

FRANK CIRILLO

**DALLAS REGIONAL HEARING
TRANSCRIPT**

April 19

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THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

**DALLAS, TEXAS REGIONAL HEARING
DALLAS CONVENTION CENTER
April 19, 1995**

COMMISSIONERS:

- RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET), CHAIRMAN**
- AL CORNELLA**
- REBECCA COX**
- GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)**
- MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)**
- WENDI LOUISE STEELE**

1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Good morning, ladies and
2 gentlemen. My name is Benjamin Montoya, and I'm a member of the
3 base closure commission charged with the task of evaluating the
4 recommendation of the Secretary of Defense regarding the closure
5 and realignment of military installations in the United States.
6 Also with me today are my colleagues and fellow commissioners Al
7 Cornella to my far right, Ms. Rebecca Cox, General James Davis,
8 General Joe Robles, Ms. Wendi Steele. Good morning.

9 First I want to thank everyone, military and civilian
10 alike, who have assisted us so capably during our visits to the
11 many bases that are represented today for these hearings. We
12 have spent many days looking at the installations that are on
13 the Secretary's list and asking questions that will help us make
14 our decisions, and the cooperation we have received has been
15 just outstanding and we all want to thank you very much.

16 The main purpose of our visits is to also see the
17 installation firsthand and to address with military personnel in
18 the community the all important question of the military value
19 of each of the bases.

20 In addition to the base visits, the commission is
21 conducting a total of 11 regional hearings, one of which is --
22 today is the sixth. The main purpose of the regional hearings
23 is to give members of the communities affected by these closure
24 recommendations a chance to express their views. We consider
25 this interaction of the community to be one of the most

1 important and valuable parts of our review of the Secretary of
2 Defense's recommendations.

3 Let me assure you that all of our commissioners and
4 our staff who are sitting seated behind us are well aware of the
5 huge implication the base closure has on local communities. We
6 are committed to openness in this process and we are committed
7 to fairness. All the material we gather, all the information we
8 get from the Department of Defense and all of our correspondence
9 is open to the public.

10 We are faced with a very difficult and unpleasant
11 task which we intend to carry out as sensitively as we can.
12 Again, the kind of assistance we receive here is greatly
13 appreciated.

14 Now let me go over some of the details of how we'll
15 proceed today as we have at all our regional hearings. The
16 commission has assigned a block of time to each state affected
17 by the base closure list. The overall amount of time was
18 determined by the number of installations on the list and the
19 amount of job loss. The limits will be enforced strictly. And
20 we have timers on my desk and timers at the podium that we will
21 ask you to observe, and then we have other ways to remind you as
22 your time is running out so that we can give everyone a fair
23 chance at their say.

24 We notified the appropriate elected officials of this
25 procedure, and we left it to them working with local communities

1 to determine how to fill your particular block of time.

2 This morning it is our intention to listen to
3 testimony from the State of Texas for a total of 150 minutes.
4 At the end of the morning presentation we set aside a period of
5 30 minutes for public comment during which members of the public
6 may speak. We have provided a sign-up sheet for this portion of
7 the hearing and hope that anyone who wishes to speak has already
8 signed up. We would ask those of you who are speaking at that
9 time to limit yourself to two minutes.

10 After the lunch break and beginning at about 1:30
11 this afternoon, we will hear 70 more minutes from the State of
12 Texas and then 50 minutes of testimony from the states of
13 Oklahoma and Arkansas. After those presentations we will again
14 have a 30-minute period for public comment from Texas, Arkansas
15 and Oklahoma.

16 Let me also state that the base closure law has been
17 amended since 1993 to require that anyone giving testimony
18 before the commission do so under oath. And so I will be
19 swearing in witnesses, and that will include individuals that
20 will speak in the public comment portion of the hearing.

21 With that, I believe we're ready to begin.

22 And I wish to welcome two people that we're delighted
23 to have with us, the governor of Texas, Governor George Bush --
24 happy to have you with us this morning, Governor -- and Senator
25 Hutchison, also from Texas. It's good to have you with us. So

1 if you'll both please rise, I will swear you in for an upbeat
2 time in your life probably.

3 (Governor Bush and Senator Hutchison sworn).

4 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you. As you know, we have
5 ten minutes to use as you see fit. So Governor?

6 GOVERNOR BUSH: Chairman Montoya, thank you very
7 much. Members, welcome to Texas.

8 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you.

9 GOVERNOR BUSH: I thank you for the opportunity to
10 share my thoughts.

11 First, I appreciate the difficult decisions that you
12 have to make in the coming weeks. As you accurately stated,
13 many careers, families, and ultimately our Texas economy will be
14 affected by what course of action you take. Texans recognize
15 that for the good of the country these tough decisions must be
16 made. We understand that the Cold War is over and that threats
17 to our national security have changed. We also understand our
18 military forces must be restructured, and we're willing to do
19 our fair share.

20 My message is simple. I believe that Texas is the
21 best place in the country for the military to live and train,
22 and that this round of base closures unfairly impacts our
23 state.

24 With nearly 7,000 direct jobs and countless other
25 indirect jobs on the line, Texas stands to lose more than any

1 other state in the United States. The federal government gets a
2 great buy for their defense dollars spent in Texas. We have a
3 low cost of living; we have outstanding weather conditions for
4 military operations; we have an abundance of available air space
5 to train pilots; but, most importantly, we have communities
6 which respect and support the military.

7 Let me start with Brooks Air Force Base. Brooks is
8 the brain trust or part of the Air Force brain trust, and it's a
9 vital part of one of the greatest military communities in the
10 country, San Antonio, Texas. Today hundreds of Brooks Air Force
11 Base workers got up at 2:00 in the morning and boarded buses to
12 come and express their support for this vital part of the Air
13 Force. The City of San Antonio has come up with an incredibly
14 common sense proposal that you'll hear about today. It saves
15 the Air Force money and preserves the brain trust that Brooks
16 Air Force Base has developed, not only for the good of San
17 Antonio and Texas, but for the good of Air Force and the good of
18 the country. This plan must be enacted if the Air Force is to
19 commit and keep its commitment to being on the leading edge of
20 vital research.

21 The Red River Army Depot in Texarkana, the depot is
22 strategically located to handle maintenance on a majority of the
23 armed forces track vehicles, and this base has proved its
24 ability to ship supplies and technical support anywhere in the
25 world during the deployment to Kuwait, Somalia, and Rwanda. It

1 is a leader in maintenance operations.

2 The federal government's recommendation to shut down
3 the Red River Army Depot defies common sense. After all,
4 Vice-President Al Gore recently hailed this base as an example
5 of government efficiency. Base closure decisions must be based
6 on merit. And we must reward excellence in the public sector as
7 we do in the private sector, and the Red River arsenal deserves
8 that kind of treatment.

9 The 924th reserve fighter wing at Austin was spared
10 in '91 and '93 by the commission on the condition that Bergstrom
11 Air Force Base be converted into a functional airport in 1996.
12 The City of Austin overwhelmingly approved a \$400 million bond
13 sale to make that airport a reality and keep its commitment, and
14 the federal government ought to keep its end of the bargain as
15 well.

16 Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock has been an innovator
17 in the Air Force's pilot training program. It was the first
18 base in the country to integrate training between the Navy and
19 the Air Force and the first to train student pilots on the Air
20 Force's new T-1 aircraft. Lubbock offered military defense
21 access to a major university and numerous employment
22 opportunities. The City of Lubbock has developed innovative
23 ways to reduce the Air Force's operating costs. For example,
24 Lubbock developed a medical partnership program with Reese's
25 medical officers to help lower the Air Force's health cost

1 expenditure. The Pentagon should support bases like Reese. If
2 you're interested and truly interested in saving taxpayer's
3 money.

4 Finally, I'd like to discuss the pilot training in
5 South Texas. In 1993 the BRAC commission added a pilot training
6 mission at Corpus Christi Naval Air to its closure list. The
7 commission later changed its mind for several reasons. First,
8 Corpus shared the operating cost with the Coast Guard, the Army,
9 and the U. S. custom Service. Secondly, Corpus Christi has
10 unlimited air space, a must for pilot training which could
11 support additional student pilot classes in the event of a
12 national emergency. The commission should once again vote to
13 maintain pilot training in Corpus.

14 I'd like to thank the communities that are here and
15 the communities that welcomed you to Texas when you came. I
16 know you saw thousands of yellow ribbons, and you saw the eyes
17 of those who really worried about their future. And they're
18 here today and they represent the best of Texas, community
19 leaders who take time out of their private lives to make their
20 case, to do innovative things, to understand the changing
21 realities. We've got good people in Texas, and you're about to
22 hear from them today.

23 I also want to thank our congressional delegation
24 ably led by some new leaders in the U.S. House and of course by
25 Senator Hutchison and Senator Gramm. They work closely with my

1 office and with others around the state to make sure that we all
2 get a fair hearing and that Texas is not discriminated against
3 relative to other states.

4 And, finally, I would like to leave you with one last
5 thought. That is, the Texas government has made helping our
6 military a priority. My staff and I stand ready to assist you
7 in resolving any lingering concerns you might have about
8 permitting or infrastructure problems. We've worked hand in
9 hand with the military in the past, and you have my word that we
10 will do so in the future. Thank you very much.

11 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you, Governor.

12 SENATOR HUTCHISON: Thank you very much for coming to
13 Texas. We are so pleased to have you here, and we want you to
14 know how much Texas associates itself with our military. And we
15 applaud your efforts, and we know how difficult your decisions
16 are.

17 I have worked with our senior Senator Gramm and
18 Governor Bush, and I wanted you to know that this is a labor of
19 love for all of us. This is a state that has a military
20 tradition.

21 During the community presentations today you will be
22 provided with information that indicates in some cases that the
23 services overlook important data in some cases and deviated from
24 the closure criteria. We feel our cases are strong and
25 compelling. Just to mention a few, as Governor Bush did, it

1 does seem odd that the Air Force would establish joint Air Force
2 and take naval pilot training at Reese Air Force Base and
3 designate Reese as the first base to receive the T-1 trainer if
4 it was the lowest ranked undergraduate pilot training base.

5 In the case of Brooks Air Force Base, the Air Force
6 did not look at the added savings that could be achieved by
7 reducing the size of the cantonment area and maintaining most of
8 the existing functions at Brooks. I think the community has
9 come up with a very innovative way to show you that in fact we
10 can save more money by keeping Brooks in a cantonment area.

11 Closure of the Red River Army Depot and transfer of
12 the depot maintenance functions to Anniston will load the depot
13 at Anniston to nearly 100 percent of capacity. This eliminates
14 surge capacity and will severely constrain the Army's capacity
15 to meet wartime maintenance needs.

16 When Bergstrom Air Force Base was slated for closure,
17 the commission said that the Austin community would undertake
18 the necessary action to turn the air force base into an airport,
19 that the Air Force Reserve Commission would remain at
20 Bergstrom. Then the Air Force Reserve was put on the 1993 round
21 of base closures, and this commission did not approve that
22 recommendation. We feel that a deal is a deal. The Austin
23 community has upheld its part of the bargain, and we expect the
24 Department of Defense to keep its part of the deal as well.

25 The movement of naval pilot training out of Corpus

1 Christi is a blow to South Texas, but the assignment of
2 helicopter and super squadrons to Corpus Christi will offset
3 most of that economic impact. We are, though, concerned that if
4 we have the JPAS as the new joint service primary trainer that
5 there is going to be a need for longer runways, which are not
6 available at some of the bases that will remain open but are
7 available at Corpus Christi.

8 But most of all I want to focus today on something
9 that is a key area of concern to me. It impacts not only Texas
10 but the nation as a whole. Unfortunately, what causes me the
11 most concern is part of the very underpinning of the base
12 closure process, and that is the size of our force structure
13 that is now projected. Shortly after my swearing in in 1993 I
14 sought, fought for, and received a seat on the Armed Services
15 Committee. During my tenure there I became convinced that the
16 force structure now proposed cannot meet our national security
17 requirements. It is imperative that we maintain a military
18 force structure capable of fighting two major regional conflicts
19 and prevailing. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, the conflict in the
20 Balkans are just a few examples of the areas of regional tension
21 that could erupt into a flash point in which we may have to take
22 military action.

23 During the cold war, we had a constant threat that
24 overrode all other considerations. We knew our military was
25 sized to deal with potential Soviet threat, and it was adequate

1 for that purpose. But now look at the things that are happening
2 around the world. Saddam Hussein pursued his quest to obtain
3 nuclear weapons while North Korea, Iran, Libya, and others were
4 seeking to join the nuclear club. What was once thought of as
5 unthinkable became a living nightmare recently in the subway
6 system of Japan when we saw a religious sect unleash the nerve
7 agent, sarin, during rush hour. As you know, this morning there
8 has been another scare in Japan.

9 So we are concerned that our United States Army is
10 only the eighth largest Army in the world, and several of our
11 likely adversaries have armies as large and larger. Asking our
12 military to defeat two adversaries at the same time is no easy,
13 easy task. A number of fine colleagues in the Senate and I
14 firmly believe that we should restore the cuts contained in the
15 current five-year defense plan which brings us to the dilemma
16 you face.

17 I would ask you to consider that in the future we may
18 decide to restore some of the cuts in our structure. Therefore,
19 I would respectfully suggest that you consider having your staff
20 conduct a parallel analysis of infrastructure requirements that
21 would be consistent with an active-duty military force structure
22 sized at the levels proposed by former Secretary of Defense Dick
23 Cheney and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell
24 during their planning for readiness in the cold war period. A
25 force structure at those levels is more in keeping with our

1 national security needs and assures us the capability to prevail
2 in two major regional conflicts with lower casualty rates, and
3 that is very important.

4 I would ask that you condition some of the proposed
5 closures on your potential list to future action that could
6 alter the size of our force structure. I hope you will factor
7 into your deliberations the necessity to ramp up in case of
8 conflict and having the base capacity to serve these needs.
9 Should Congress decide not to change the current force structure
10 plan, then additional closures could proceed. I urge you to
11 consider this very important readiness issue as you are
12 deliberating.

13 Thank you very much. Thank you for being here.

14 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you, Senator Hutchison.

15 (Applause).

16 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Our first panelist this
17 morning will be representing Reese Air Force Base, and we will
18 start your clock after we swear you in and after the drop of the
19 first word of the first speaker we will start it running. And I
20 have listed Congressman Larry Combest -- Congressman -- Mayor
21 David Langston who is seated in there, and Brigadier General
22 J. O. McFalls.

23 And so, again, will you and anyone else that you plan
24 to have supporting you all stand, and I'll swear you in.

25 (Four witnesses sworn).

1 COMMISSIONER MONTTOYA: Very well. Congressman, I
2 believe you're first.

3 CONGRESSMAN COMBEST: Chairman, thank you very much.
4 Let me say first of all to all of the commissioners, welcome to
5 Texas. I will never swear in a witness before a committee again
6 under quite the same attitude that I've had in the past.

7 It was very appropriate that you chose Reese Air
8 Force Base as the first base for discussion today. Reese has a
9 long tradition of being first. Among UPT bases Reese was first
10 in the joint training of the Navy, it was first to receive the
11 T-1 trainer, first scheduled for the new JPAS joint trainer,
12 first in preference of students and instructor pilots, and it's
13 first in the lowest cost of flying hour.

14 In every major training upgrade or policy improvement
15 Reese Air Force Base has led the way. The Air Force would not
16 put its cutting edge program at its worst base. Air Force
17 officers who were present for their education and training
18 command confirm base Reese to showcase new programs as the
19 premier base for Reese's credibility in pilot training. And
20 that's why it's slated for closure. Luckily the Air Force and
21 the defense department have relied on that doubt as a faulty
22 model. The result has been the wrong base has been selected for
23 closing.

24 When General J. O. McFalls -- while general J. O.
25 McFalls will elaborate further on some of the data, please allow

1 me to mention a few of the more disturbing mistakes. Shoring
2 Reese's air space 10,000 cubic nautical miles, leaving out 55
3 percent of the military training areas and shoring Reese's
4 airfield pavement by 10 percent.

5 Friends, these mistakes are only what the Air Force
6 has admitted were wrong. I would not be here today if I thought
7 Reese was the ugly duckling that the Air Force claims. Like
8 many of the Air Force personnel who contacted me who were all
9 simply astounded at the Air Force low ranking of Reese. This is
10 completely counter to the 1991 ranking from the BRAC for reason
11 of rank near the top. It also contradicted what the Air Force
12 had been telling me for over a year. They repeatedly stated
13 that the UPT category was the closest and the hardest decision
14 they had to make.

15 Secretary Wendahl's testimony before BRAC stated --
16 and I quote -- "I must say what we needed to do at this time
17 around was to identify to, I guess I'd say make a spread to
18 amplify, magnify the differences between facilities so we could
19 come out with a recommendation." End quote. Commissioners,
20 Secretary Wendahl is at the heart of what went wrong at Reese.
21 A computer model sought to turn slight shades of differences
22 into stark black and white contrast. That approach gave the Air
23 Force an out. It was an easy answer, but it was the wrong
24 answer.

25 It has been very frustrating to get the Air Force to

1 take another look at the UPT category. Each time I bring
2 information to their attention, they either minimize it, dismiss
3 it, or ignore it. Just two days ago the General Accounting
4 Office told you of their doubts about this method and
5 highlighted Reese as a base that BRAC should carefully
6 re-examine. At the same time the Air Force testified that they
7 score no value to Reese having already implemented the T-1
8 program. Think about that carefully. Reese gets no credit for
9 having the lowest cost per flying hour of any base in UPT. Only
10 the federal government would operate in its own world where
11 experience and cost make no difference.

12 As the congressman representing Reese in Lubbock I
13 have always told my constituents that national security must be
14 the determining factor for base closure. The defense department
15 is not the jobs program. That remains true today, but I must
16 tell you that I am not willing to watch Reese Air Force Base be
17 closed on a flimsy case that the Air Force has forwarded. You
18 must not allow that to happen. I have continually questioned;
19 the GAO has questioned it. Commissioners, your findings in the
20 UPT category, specifically your decision on Reese, has critical
21 impact on military readiness for our country in the next
22 century.

23 At this time I would like to turn the presentation
24 over to the mayor of Lubbock, Mayor David Langston.

25 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you. Mayor?

1 MAYOR DAVID LANGSTON: Mr. Chairman and members of
2 the base realignment and closure commission, it is my pleasure
3 to appear before you this morning as the mayor of the City of
4 Lubbock and present a small part of a case in behalf of Reese
5 Air Force Base and its host city, Lubbock.

6 For more than 50 years now the citizens of Lubbock
7 and Reese Air Force Base have worked together in a partnership
8 designed to train the most highly skilled pilots in the world.
9 I think you will agree that this partnership has been a
10 successful one as Reese Air Force Base has helped our nation
11 achieve its objectives of peace and security at home and
12 abroad.

13 Actually, the history of Lubbock, Texas and Reese Air
14 Force Base can be traced directly back to May 22nd, 1950 when on
15 Armed Forces Day then Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley and
16 Congressman George Mahon announced that Reese Air Force Base
17 would be designated as the third permanent military installation
18 in the nation. And of course as the chairman of the Defense
19 Subcommittee on Appropriations, Mr. Mahon made sure that the
20 base was kept in good shape during his term of 44 years.

21 As you can see by this photograph here that's been
22 blown up, the deal that was struck was that Lubbock would give
23 complete and irrevocable title to the defense department in
24 exchange for designation as a permanent military installation;
25 and in true West Texas fashion, a handshake sealed the deal.

1 It's interesting that today we are in a similar type
2 situation. Then we were, as a nation, in a period of transition
3 between World War II and the Cold War. Now, once again, our
4 nation is in a period of rapid change. The Cold War is over,
5 and we are listening to changes as we draw down our defense
6 capability. Competition and efficiency are watch words of the
7 day as our military adjusts to different threats and attempts to
8 achieve global reach and global power. Your job as BRAC
9 commissioners is to ensure that we don't repeat the mistakes of
10 the past when our military drawdown occurred much too rapidly
11 creating such things as a hollow force and other such problems.

12 Certainly it is important to the four ways to cut
13 cost and create efficiency, but the reductions in closings must
14 be investigated in light of real world situations. The
15 reconfiguration of our military capability over which you
16 preside should be analyzed in accordance with the circumstances
17 which exist today and which will exist in the next century.

18 Unfortunately, the decision of the Air Force to
19 recommend Reese Air Force Base as one of the pilot training
20 facilities to be closed does not appear to have been subjected
21 to such analysis. It seems that the process that was used and
22 the criteria employed to come to a decision about closing pilot
23 training bases took place in a vacuum. The Navy used its
24 criteria, the Air Force used a different process, and the
25 defense department as a whole did not take into account all

1 public and private assets which bear upon the ability of a base
2 to train the pilots of the future. Let me explain.

3 Since military value is the most important factor in
4 base closure deliberations, I will focus only on those areas
5 where our community's assets enhance the military value of Reese
6 Air Force Base.

7 First, the Department of Defense and the secretaries
8 of each of the military services have been giving great emphasis
9 to quality of life issues which they assert are important
10 factors in maintaining military readiness by assisting in the
11 retention of highly skilled personnel. In Lubbock, Texas we
12 have the quality of life features that are attractive to the
13 military personnel of the '90's and their families. Lubbock is
14 a modern city of 200,000 people. We are centrally located with
15 three major hospitals, three universities, a medical school, a
16 law school, an international airport with six airlines, and much
17 more. We have a sophisticated economy which can and does
18 provide sophisticated jobs for spouses and family members of
19 service personnel. Reese Air Force Base, in fact, has been the
20 number one choice of Air Force personnel in base assignment
21 preference surveys, and the reason is the overall quality of
22 life at Reese. The DOD gives substantial lip service to quality
23 of life to military personnel. Yet quality of life issues plays
24 little to no role in the process used to determine which pilot
25 training bases to close.

1 A second important fact which enhances the military
2 value, the military capability of Reese Air Force Base is the
3 existence of Lubbock International Airport. This airfield is
4 used heavily by the Air Force. It is in fact a de facto exalted
5 and exhilarated field for Reese, and it costs the Air Force
6 nothing.

7 During 1994 military operations accounted for 43
8 percent of all operations in Lubbock International Airport. And
9 I might add, the federal government has spent more than 10
10 million over the last five years in capital improvements to
11 enhance the capability of the airport. The FAA controllers,
12 which are paid for by the Federal Aviation Administration, cost
13 the defense department and the Air Force nothing.

14 However, despite this significant asset, despite the
15 significant federal investment, despite the military
16 contribution it makes to training military pilots, the Air Force
17 does not even give credit for its existence in its base closure
18 analysis. It's as if they closed their eyes and said Lubbock
19 International Airport does not exist, it's not an asset that we
20 can use; although they've been using it for 50 years.

21 Next, a third factor which contributes to the
22 military value of Reese is the medical facilities available in
23 Lubbock. Because of the number and sophistication of civilian
24 medical facilities and civilian medical personnel in Lubbock the
25 Air Force has recently established a military-civilian

1 partnership where a substantial portion for medical support for
2 Reese now comes from the civilian medical community in Lubbock.
3 This partnership saves the Air Force millions of dollars in
4 medical costs. Yet, once again, at a time when we are all
5 encouraging these types of public/private partnerships, the Air
6 Force gives no credit to this arrangement in its analysis of
7 assets available to enhance undergraduate training at reduced
8 costs.

9 Finally, the City of Lubbock contributes to the
10 military value of Reese Air Force Base due to its surplus of
11 affordable, quality off-base housing. The housing costs in
12 Lubbock are well below the national average, and affordable
13 housing close to the base is readily available.

14 Someone once said that common sense is the least
15 common of the senses. We all know that when industries are
16 looking to relocate now they consider the quality of life of the
17 community they are exploring; they consider the existence of
18 public facilities like an international airport; they look for
19 public/private partnerships that can reduce their health care
20 costs. The process of the Department of Defense should be no
21 different. A common sense approach that gives credit for the
22 existence of other private assets which avoid unnecessary costs
23 and duplication of facilities should be used.

24 Members of the commission, I urge you to review very
25 carefully the Air Force recommendation to close Reese Air Force

1 Base. Our investigation has revealed, and the Air Force has
2 admitted, that their announcement contains numerous errors
3 concerning other graduate pilot training bases. Earlier this
4 week the GAO report verified that substantial errors were made
5 in the compilation of the data. I hope I have demonstrated to
6 you the important aspects of military value, such things as the
7 quality of life of Air Force personnel, which is so important in
8 efforts to attract and keep skilled recruits; an auxiliary field
9 like Lubbock International Airport, used 43 percent of the time
10 by military operations; a public/private partnership with the
11 health care industry. All assets that have substantial value in
12 creating the Air Force of the 21st century, all of these factors
13 were not given consideration. I believe a great mistake will be
14 made if you do not revisit the issue of undergraduate pilot
15 training bases. I am confident that if you do, Reese Air Force
16 Base will not remain on the final closure list.

17 Competition, free enterprise concepts, right sizing,
18 reinventing government, getting a handle on unreasonable
19 government regulations and trying to make government operate in
20 the real world are all things that we've been talking about in
21 this nation over recent months. Last week I had the opportunity
22 to tour Eglin Air Force Base and probe their field and see
23 special operations of the Air Force and all of the electronic
24 wizardry and Buck Rogers type technology that exists. And I
25 must tell you that I was impressed. Their capabilities are

1 truly awesome and they are on the cutting edge. But the most
2 impressive thing that I saw was the personnel, the young men and
3 women who were enthusiastic about their jobs, who went about
4 their jobs in an innovative manner, in the most efficient way
5 possible. These are the type of recruits that we must have in
6 the 21st century.

7 All of us know that after you've won the national
8 championship it's not the time to stop recruiting or suddenly
9 changing the strategy and tactics of the game. Now is the time
10 that we must push forward and use free enterprise concepts, real
11 world type situations in analyzing how we reduce our defense
12 capability to make it more efficient, more powerful so we can
13 achieve global power and global reach. This has not been done
14 as we look at the issue of training pilots into the next
15 century.

16 I encourage you to revisit this issue, I encourage
17 you to retain Reese Air Force Base as one of our country's
18 national assets. And I thank you for your service to this
19 country and the grueling task that you are undertaking. Thank
20 you very much.

21 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you, Mayor.

22 (Applause).

23 CONGRESSMAN COMBEST: Commissioner, if I might
24 introduce our next individual who is going to be a little more
25 specific in some of the areas of concern, I'll introduce to you

1 General J. O. McFalls, III, whom many of you may know because of
2 his 28 years of distinguished service in the Air Force.

3 General McFalls' final assignment was at Randolph Air
4 Force Base where he was director -- where he was deputy
5 commander for the air training command, and it gives him a very
6 unique perspective on the problems we're confronted with today.
7 And I'd like to mention before General McFalls begins that
8 General McFalls is a volunteer. He came to us because he was
9 shocked, as many of us were, that Reese Air Force Base was on
10 the list. And he is here to share his opinions with you about
11 his concern about undergraduate pilot training of the Air
12 Force. And I will call on General McFalls at this time.

13 BRIGADIER GENERAL J. O. McFALLS: Thank you, Mr.
14 Combust.

15 Janice, if you'll turn on the slides, please.

16 You know, sometimes in life you've got to just stop
17 and ask yourself the question: What are you doing? In fact, my
18 wife, as she dropped me off at the airport at Dulles yesterday
19 said, "What in the world are you doing?" And I've asked myself
20 this more than one time, and I guess it all came to home last
21 night when General Davis looked at me and said, "What in the
22 world are you here for?" Well, the easiest way for me to answer
23 that I think is to tell you why I am not here.

24 As the Congressman said, I am not being paid to do
25 this; I am a volunteer. I am not lukewarm on this issue. I

1 feel very strongly that the recommendation and a judgment or
2 decision that Reese Air Force Base should close is counter to my
3 over 32 years of Air Force experience. And the other thing I'm
4 not here today is to cast any aspersions upon my service, the
5 United States Air Force, upon my former boss and for that matter
6 my mentor, General Bliss Afilio, and certainly not to my
7 successor's area of education and training command, Major
8 General Glenn Proffitt who, as many of you know, gave the
9 ultimate sacrifice two nights ago while serving his country.
10 And finally I'm not here to compare Reese against any other
11 base. This is not a base-by-base comparison. But that's enough
12 disclaimers. What about me?

13 The congressman pointed some of the things out here
14 and that is that I was born in Texas, so welcome to my home
15 state. I was a graduate of pilot training at Reese Air Force
16 Base in the mid-'60's, and I got my planes that my dad tended to
17 loan me, he being a retired colonel in the Air Force. I was an
18 instructor pilot in the T-38, so I know this business well. And
19 I've had a lot of great times with my best and most liked one
20 which was to be the wing commander of the first F-15B strike
21 eagle unit, at the at four-tack heart wing at Seymour Johnson
22 Air Force Base in North Carolina.

23 Following that I made general. I met General Joe
24 Robles at charm school, which is an oxymoron I know for the two
25 of us. We were there. They worked us over, and I went for my

1 second tour as Air Force liaison, and that's what we do with the
2 United States Congress. That's when I met the congressman this
3 time, Larry Combest.

4 Following that assignment the congressman said I was
5 assigned as the director of operations for air training command,
6 where I was responsible for all flying training, the pilot
7 training, the navigator training, the weapons system officer
8 training and, for that matter, the space officer training.

9 So for the next few minutes, until that green light
10 goes off, I'd like to spend a little time to give you a
11 different approach on this subject, something that you haven't
12 heard. Now you have in front of you over 40-plus briefings
13 that's very well done and very fancy. You can probably read it
14 on the airplane if you're not up to here with that as you leave
15 here today. But what I'd like to do now is summarize some of
16 the things. Of course you've seen the points, the
17 counterpoints, the discrepancies, the errors and things that
18 have already been mentioned, some of the agreements to
19 disagree. But I want to spend a short few minutes with my
20 experience on what makes this problem so difficult. And I think
21 I can do that using maybe seven or eight of the slides in front
22 of you.

23 So first let's look at slide 3. I'll just put the
24 map up here to who you that while at air training command I was
25 challenged and selected for the chairmanship of what was called

1 the joint flag officers experience for flying training. The
2 task was to get some money savings and get some common sense
3 into flying training by doing it with our sister services. Very
4 heated and lively discussions ensued. In fact, for a while
5 there I thought I could probably qualify to be a backup host for
6 the Phil Donahue show. It got really heated when we found out
7 that it was immediately obvious to everybody that the three
8 services had different purposes in life. They had different
9 missions and different requirements for their pilots. And if
10 you take the Army helicopter buys out and gals, you've got the
11 Air Force and Navy on two separate planets. And the goal was to
12 put those together. But this was for a good reason. The Navy
13 lands on ships; they don't worry about crosswinds. The Air
14 Force lands on land; we have to accept whatever crosswind comes
15 with that.

16 I see this as a problem. The Air Force is all jet
17 operation. Those old airplanes were built with jet engines that
18 cannot take ice down the front of them. And so where we're
19 worried about the ice on the wings, we're also very worried
20 about foreign object handling. So we'll shut down the whole
21 operation for icing. By the way, it was not considered in the
22 analysis.

23 The other completely different philosophy is that the
24 Navy trains their people base by base and you start out in one
25 base and you finish that training, and then the man or woman and

1 their spouse and children, if they have them, they move to
2 another base and do the rest there and then move to a third base
3 and try and finish their year-long training.

4 The Air Force, the philosophy is quite different.
5 All four bases are quadruplets, they're all identical; they have
6 the same runways; we very simply can relate because they have
7 the same simulators, the same academics, squadron building, et
8 cetera, et cetera.

9 And so the challenge is for us in the joint flying
10 training group was to meld these two planets together somehow,
11 but first and foremost it became obvious we had no way to
12 compare the capacity of flying training bases, we had no way to
13 judge how many sorties or how many good pilots you can produce
14 at a flying training base. And, lucky me, because I've got the
15 time and my staff and I'm research analyst as the director of
16 training. Colonel -- now retired colonel -- Air Force Colonel
17 John Feld is sitting over here and is sworn in with us in case
18 there's any questions. Because he and his band of analysts
19 formed the first capacity model and have expanded on that
20 since. And that's now used by this joint service group as well
21 as everybody else in the Pentagon when it comes to pilot
22 training. In the past you counted up how much encroachment
23 there was of the civilians, how big the ramps were, and how
24 great the community felt about you; and that seemed to be the
25 judgment call from the earlier BRAC decisions.

1 So if you're the chairman of this year's joint cross
2 service group, what do you do? Well, that gentleman and the
3 people that worked on it for him had to choose factors and
4 parameters that were across the board at all of the bases. And
5 so what's one of those? Oh, here's one, crosswinds. It's
6 crosswinds that we all measured, so we could put that down. And
7 these were all separately negotiated amongst themselves, and
8 each service said that's real important to me so I want that
9 made higher, and that's not so important so we'll give on that
10 and we'll add to this. Crosswinds carried a greater weight in
11 the analysis than did overall attrition of the sorties, meaning
12 that crosswinds contributed to sorties not taking off and
13 landing. But then you've got a lot of other type factors like
14 icing, like thunderstorms which was not considered. Like other
15 things, maintenance which was considered. When you have a
16 maintenance in the airplane that's broke, or let's say the
17 student throws up in the cockpit and you don't take off, makes
18 that official sortie. There are those types of things were
19 actually countered, but the crosswinds had a bigger factor and
20 weight factor than that. Probably because the Navy wanted it
21 that way.

22 And for some inexplicable reason, as this shows on
23 this slide, the analysis methodology -- and that's in your
24 little briefing there -- is slide 18. That summarizes some of
25 the things that you've been briefed on before and you've seen in

1 the points and counterpoints. But I'd like to go through the
2 next four slides because when you do pull this out later I want
3 you to make sure that you understand what these four slides say
4 because I think Don Feld has put it very well in the
5 perspective.

6 Sorry, audience, you're not going to see the fine
7 print and we didn't have enough copies for everybody, so you'll
8 have to bear with me a bit.

9 What you see here is those are the eight categories
10 for base closures to be considered. The most important of
11 course is the left, commission flying requirements. And then
12 I'm not a scientist and I'm not an analyst as it were, but it
13 seems inexplicable to me that what we did is we took all of the
14 bases under consideration, Navy and Air Force, all of them, and
15 gave them some sort of ranking as to how well they could do a
16 particular flying training function. Not just flying pilots,
17 but flying navigators, flying weapons system officers, flying
18 weapons system strike officers, flying flight screening, and
19 then averaging all those up to give an overall score.

20 Now the bad news is that this only has the Air Force
21 bases. If you take the Navy and everybody else, and there is
22 missing blocks all over this, that some of the data wasn't
23 considered for some reason. But we still averaged them all up
24 and took them in rank order. And this is what has been ranked
25 out with average score and then given what we in the Air Force

1 and some of the military call a stock blank chart, where you
2 red, yellow, and green. Obviously red is bad. The only red on
3 the whole chart fell out of this chart in the mission flying
4 area where Reese Air Force Base is listed.

5 Now, this is the data that was used, and quickly I'll
6 go through the next three slides so when you pull this out again
7 the Air Force has admitted they did make some oversight and some
8 mistakes; and so when you recalculate and correct those errors,
9 this is the way it falls out. That's just the error correction
10 data recalculation. It obviously makes them a lot closer.

11 Now then, if you take just what Air Force bases do,
12 that is Air Force bases trained in these areas down here for
13 pilots and you take those and isolate those particular
14 categories, you see that it does change the rankings. That's
15 just Air Force missions and not navigator and some of those
16 other things. So this is what Air Force bases do if you rank
17 them again.

18 And, finally, if you then do what the Navy did, as
19 Mr. Dukakis testified in front of you or at least told us when
20 we asked him, the Navy group then took the Navy bases and did
21 their own analysis and decided that, well, crosswinds are real
22 important to us and so we'll do that. But you can see what you
23 can do, you can take and switch icing, for example, and put it
24 in here rather than crosswinds and the whole thing racks and
25 stacks differently. And this is the model that was used.

1 Now, I just said the buzz word in my mind which I
2 think is a terrific oversight. And that is that the Navy then
3 took their five bases, knowing they had to close one, and rack
4 and stack, using Navy factors. Unfortunately, we in the Air
5 Force didn't do that. We took the data from that chart four
6 slides ago and took our four bases out, and then put them in
7 order and gave a stock blank chart to the 13 members of the main
8 closure executive group, and it's easy to vote then if you've
9 got one red stoplight on the whole chart all across the board.
10 I guess I know how I'd vote too. But they didn't do any other
11 reanalysis of it to put it in Air Force terms.

12 But now back to my joint flying training experience
13 here. I'd like to refer you now to slide 13. This one is -- I
14 don't mean to be contentious on this because I was serving in
15 legislative liaison for the Congress when this base closure
16 series went through. And these are the '91 ratings. Now, we
17 all know that these were done by a staffer -- like what's
18 sitting behind the commissioners now -- in 1991, and they put
19 those numbers down. My point is, is that while they used the
20 encroachment as one of the major factors here -- and that's why
21 Williams Air Force Base in Phoenix, Arizona -- Chandler, Arizona
22 actually was dropped way down. That was a heavily weighted
23 factor. But look how close the other ones are. Reese, by the
24 way, was number two here.

25 We've been told that we never did an official ranking

1 and stacking. In fact, that's right; that's what we were told
2 to tell the Congress, so we did. And when Mr. Combest or
3 someone would ask me, when I was serving in this duty, that we
4 did not rack and stack them. However, this is how they came
5 out. They're very, very close. So now I'll go back to my joint
6 flying training challenge. Pick a base. Where do you want to
7 put joint flying training? It was easy to me to choose a base.
8 And I talked to my boss, John Basillio, and we decided, let's
9 put it at Reese Air Force Base because we want to put our best
10 foot forward. Let's show our sister service, the Navy, how good
11 it can be. And so why not choose the best one; let's go to
12 Reese. And it's near a central hub, so we can get people out of
13 there too. And so that's why we chose Reese, just like my
14 predecessors chose it to put the T-1's for the first training.
15 And just like we decided in a joint group with the Pentagon that
16 the first replacement T-37 aircraft, the JPAS, would also go to
17 Reese Air Force Base. Never did it ever occur to me that Reese
18 would ever appear on a closure list. It was never, ever said in
19 my over a year and a half in that job.

20 So now that we've separated the Navy -- the apples
21 over here, the Navy, and the Air Force here, the oranges, the
22 Air Force all looked the same; all those oranges are the same.
23 And that's by design. Because I as a commander at Seymour
24 Johnson Air Force Base don't want to worry about the gang coming
25 from Laughlin Air Force Base, oh, here they come again; oh, no,

1 they all better be to a very high minimum standard so that each
2 man and woman that graduates with wings on their chest in the
3 United States Air Force can meet that standard and I can rest
4 assured I don't have to reinvent pilot training at this combat
5 base.

6 So I think that as the mayor said, we should use some
7 new buzz words, the things that are very close to our hearts at
8 the Pentagon now that Secretary Perry has started with a very
9 well-received and greatly appreciated program called his
10 military quality of life. And he's got another task force, as
11 you know, that's out there looking at all of that now. And I
12 can tell you about base popularity because another one of my
13 tasks while I was here at air training command was to go to
14 every operational base in the continental United States by order
15 of the commander of the air combat command, General Mike Lowe,
16 and talk to the pilots to encourage them, to cajole them, to
17 recruit them to become instructor pilots in our training
18 command. Constantly, never a problem to fill Reese Air Force
19 Base. We had waiting lists for Reese. The other bases, some of
20 the other bases we never filled 100 percent with instructor
21 pilots.

22 So what's wrong with this picture? As Mayor Langston
23 said, this really doesn't pass the common sense test. And
24 there's your summary slide there on slide 21. It shows some of
25 the things we've talked about here before. It doesn't pass the

1 common sense test, and as Chris Layman said to me the other
2 night, the figures are like out of Alice and Wonderland.

3 So I highly recommend that if we have the manpower
4 and the efforts to do it, that we look and take a very close
5 look at the model that was used here with an eye towards not
6 only making it more accurate and more pertinent, but -- and
7 here's a big foot-stomping "but" -- with an eye towards a more
8 accurate assessment of capacity of these flying training bases
9 because they know that this model did not include another
10 mission we do. We haven't even seen in any of these charts
11 introduction to fighter fundamentals; that's another part of
12 flying training that we do at our bases. That hasn't been
13 considered.

14 So if that's the case and in fact if it's true, as
15 Senator Hutchison said, we need to have -- be ready for these
16 contingencies and we see that they're forecasted to go two and a
17 half times as many pilot training production as we are today,
18 two and a half times, what does that mean to the person that
19 fills Glenn Proffitt's shoes, that goes into that seat? That
20 means he's going to be flying Saturdays and Sundays, he's going
21 to fly weekends and, oh, by the way, that hasn't been considered
22 because we're talking civilian contract maintenance, and that's
23 time and a half overtime. And so those costs are expensive to
24 fly on weekends, let alone burning out instructor pilots.

25 The other thing you can do is reduce the requirement,

1 so we can cut out all those international students that we send
2 through that their governments pay to go through our training,
3 at no cost to our government but we gain with the interface with
4 that particular individual as they go back to their countries
5 and spread goodwill and good training that they get in the
6 United States Air Force. If that doesn't work, you can cut the
7 Guard and Reserve and take them out and not train them, but it
8 turns out they're going to need a whole bunch more because they
9 have a big bathtub requirement for Guard and Reserve that
10 they're going to need to be training more of their own.

11 So basically I'd like to close by saying that I'm
12 convinced that our nation needs this highest quality pilot
13 training program, the best in the world. And I'm very convinced
14 that our nation needs Reese Air Force Base. Thank you very
15 much. Congressman.

16 CONGRESSMAN COMBEST: Chairman, members of the
17 commission, we by my calculation have about nine minutes left.
18 We would be happy to entertain questions. I would like to end
19 with one final closing statement. In our close review for now
20 well over a year of coming up to this date, making preparations
21 for this day, I think in the final analysis -- and we have
22 looked at this -- that we believe very strongly in the service
23 group and that the Air Force conducted an inadequate review of
24 pilot training. We've seen the results of that today. I don't
25 believe in any shape, form, or fashion that this was

1 intentional. I know how difficult and how complex that it is to
2 come up with these decisions. But I believe very strongly if
3 you do not reconsider the flaw of decision that has been made,
4 that there will be a premier pilot training base that will be
5 lost. The GAO related earlier this week the need for BRAC to
6 re-evaluate Reese. I would at this time make a formal
7 recommendation or request that the base realignment and closure
8 commission re-evaluate this entire category with regard to the
9 present pilot training, including all of the other bases for
10 review that have not been accomplished.

11 I thank you very much for your time.

12 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you very much, to you,
13 Mayor, and General. Let me ask my colleagues if they have any
14 questions of the panelists.

15 Hearing no questions, I want to thank all three of
16 you for your presentation and the data you provided us and,
17 again, the fine hospitality we received in our visit to Lubbock,
18 Texas. Thank you very much.

19 (Applause).

20 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: For planning purposes, what
21 we'll do is we'll set up for the next -- I think we have a
22 panelist representing Corpus Christi, Texas. And then we will
23 take a 15-minute break before we take the Brooks Air Force Base
24 panel.

25 (Pause).

1 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Mr. Neil, would you go down
2 your list of names for me?

3 MR. LLOYD NEIL: Yes, sir. I think we furnished
4 those in your book, but let me quickly do that. Admiral Weston
5 McDonald, Vice-Admiral Steven Laughlin, Brigadier General Ed
6 Shirley, Captain Mike Alt, Captain Frank Reynolds, Mr. Carl
7 Smith, Gary Steele. I think that's it. I'm sorry. Captain
8 Jerry Burnham.

9 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: All raise your right hand.

10 (Nine witnesses sworn).

11 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Very well. And good morning,
12 Mr. Neil. And the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi delegation
13 has 20 minutes beginning with right now.

14 MR. LLOYD NEIL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 They have rigged me up with sound here, and I'm not
16 sure it's going to work so I may have to unrig myself.

17 Mr. Chairman, my name is Lloyd Neil, and I'm the
18 volunteer chairman of the South Texas Military Facilities Task
19 Force. Ours is an organization that represents a four-county
20 area in South Texas.

21 This morning we would like to discuss with you the
22 six recommendations that the Navy has made concerning the
23 facilities at NAS Corpus Christi and NAS Kingsville complex. As
24 you look at these six recommendations I would like to ask you to
25 ask yourself five questions. Should this be done? Can this be

1 done? Does it make sense to do this? Is it in the best
2 long-term interest of the Navy to do this? And is it in the
3 best long-term interest of the taxpayers to do this? As we look
4 at each one of these recommendations we will try to answer these
5 questions with you and for you.

6 First, let's take a quick trip to South Texas. Most
7 of you have not had the pleasure of visiting South Texas,
8 although Commissioner Cox has and I know, Admiral Montoya, you
9 have been there when Ingleside was first started. We are
10 looking at an area in the upper middle coast of the Texas Gulf
11 coast. Let's take a quick look at our military complex as we
12 know it to exist. The hub of this complex is the Corpus Christi
13 NAS complex, a federal complex, nine air miles to the north of
14 Naval Station Ingleside, the home of the circuit fleet, flying
15 on direct command. Approximately 30 miles, air miles to the
16 Southwest is NAS Kingsville complex.

17 One of the important parts of this slide is something
18 I'll be coming back to when we talk about air space. You'll
19 notice that Kingsville is surrounded by the world famous King
20 Ranch. It's approximately 1 million acres of land. It offers
21 no problem as far as air space and any other problems associated
22 with training aviators.

23 This is the T-45 trainer. The first recommendation
24 that the Navy has made, that we wholeheartedly support, is the
25 single-siting of the T-45 trainer in South Texas in the

1 Kingsville -- NAS Corpus Christi/Kingsville complex. When you
2 look at training aviators, Naval aviators or Air Force aviators,
3 or any aviators, you look at three basic requirements, air
4 space, weather, and concrete. We hope to show, and you agree
5 with the recommendation of the Navy, that we have ample air
6 space, excellent weather, and certainly available concrete.

7 Very quickly, last year we commissioned as a task
8 force Brigadier General Shirley and Captain Alt, to make an
9 in-depth analysis of the 11 training bases used for the Air
10 Force and the Navy for pilot training, both east and west --
11 both east and west of the Mississippi. Very quickly, when you
12 overlay on top of that commercial airline routes, you see that
13 the most available air space in the United States for training
14 aviators is in South Texas. There will be those who will say we
15 don't train naval pilots at that elevation. We know that.
16 However, you do have general aviation pilots who fly at much
17 lower elevations who follow the interstates, and unfortunately
18 some of your general aviation pilots think that a military MOA
19 is something you do when you mow the grass at a naval base.

20 Do we have the weather in South Texas to train
21 military aviators? We think so. This chart very quickly, based
22 on official pilot data, shows the green being Texas, the yellow
23 being Mississippi and Florida in some cases. Going from green
24 to yellow to red, as the military is accustomed to do, green
25 being the most favorable, red being the least favorable.

1 The Meridian team in their Birmingham presentation
2 raised again -- the question arose of single siting the T-45
3 aircraft. A 100-year study done by official -- the global
4 tropical cyclone climatic, shows that approximately twice as
5 many hurricanes have entered the Gulf and moved north into the
6 far panhandle Mississippi area as have come west in the Gulf of
7 Mexico.

8 Now let's talk about concrete. The NAS Kingsville
9 complex and the NAS Corpus Christi complex is blessed with ample
10 runways. This shows an aerial view of the Kingsville complex,
11 two parallel 8,000-foot runways going both ways, for a total of
12 four 8,000-foot runways, ample concrete at NAS Kingsville.

13 An up-close look at the ramp, if you can see down in
14 the lower left-hand corner of the ramp, that's the siting place
15 for the T-45 trainer as we now know it to exist. The upper
16 right-hand corner of this slide is where the T-2 was formerly
17 located when it was located at NAS Kingsville. There's ample
18 space there of concrete to take the entire T-45 to fly should be
19 without question. Again asking yourself, can it be done? We
20 think it certainly can be done at the NAS Kingsville complex as
21 far as concrete is concerned.

22 This is the state of the art corrosion control hangar
23 at NAS Kingsville, large enough to accommodate the entire plant
24 of T-45. We think this is another example of existing
25 facilities that already exist at NAS Kingsville and the NAS

1 Kingsville complex.

2 One of the things that you have to look at is the
3 availability of outlying fields. The importance of this
4 slide -- and the two colors denote different things, but the
5 importance of this slide is to demonstrate to you on a
6 geographic basis the location of the various outlying fields to
7 both NAS Kingsville and NAS Corpus Christi. The orange color
8 denotes 8,000-foot runways, all T-45 capable. The yellow color
9 denotes 5,000-foot runways as the minimum, all T-44 capable,
10 which I'll be talking about in just a moment.

11 When you take the existing -- back up just a minute
12 and show you. When you take the location, the geographic
13 location of the outlying fields and overlay on top of that the
14 military operating areas, the military warning areas, you see
15 that the outlying fields are located right in the center of the
16 existing MOAs, on land -- the purple being on the land, the
17 yellow being over water. When you look at that on a large map,
18 you see that almost the entire area of South Texas is a
19 dedicated military flying area.

20 We have an additional outlying field in Orange Grove,
21 already a part of the Kingsville complex, two 8,000-foot
22 runways. A potential at Goliad. The Navy still owns Goliad,
23 and I'll come back to that in just a few minutes. Two
24 8,000-foot runways. A potential at Beeville. As you know, this
25 was former Chase Field. There are three 8,000-foot runways

1 there. Two of those certainly would be available for the Navy
2 without question.

3 I think, Mr. Chairman, the important part of this
4 is: If we needed this for surge capability, it's available to
5 the taxpayers of this country for one dollar per year. We made
6 that arrangement, and that is a formal contract that can be
7 initiated.

8 Very quickly, the five questions. Should we
9 single-site the T-45 aircraft in the NAS Kingsville/NAS Corpus
10 Christi complex? Can we single-site the T-45 aircraft in the
11 NAS Kingsville/NAS Corpus Christi complex, and can we allow for
12 training and surge? I'd invite your attention to the graph that
13 has 385 at the top. The existing complex at NAS Kingsville will
14 allow you to train 155 PTR's, another 100 at Orange Grove. When
15 the recommendations of the base closure commission -- or the
16 recommendations of the Navy are completed, with the extension of
17 the runways at NAS Corpus Christi, that allows you to have the
18 total PTR capability at the two bases of 385. The current Navy
19 data requires 336. But adding 19 E-2/C-2 pilots, it's 355. The
20 question then, can we do this in South Texas? Can we
21 single-site the T-45 at the NAS Kingsville/NAS Corpus Christi
22 complex, and I think you'll see the answer is yes.

23 If you'll go to the last bar graph. Do we have ample
24 capability and capacity to surge? Using Kingsville, Orange
25 Grove, Corpus Christi, and the taking advantage of what's been

1 labeled to the Navy and to the taxpayers, Goliad and Beeville,
2 again for the cost of one dollar per year, we think we have the
3 ability to surge at 559 PTR's, well above what the -- the amount
4 needed presently by the United States Navy.

5 So in summary, on single-siting of the T-45, should
6 we do it? I think we should. Can you do it? We think you
7 can. It certainly makes sense. It's in the long-term best
8 interest of the Navy, and it's certainly in the long-term best
9 interest of the taxpayers.

10 I want you to pay just a little bit of attention to
11 this slide of Corpus Christi. This is NAS Corpus Christi, a
12 federal complex. Three sides on the water's edge. This is the
13 approach coming in from the north to the two parallel runways we
14 now have at NAS Corpus Christi, again a federal complex.

15 The second recommendation of the Navy is to
16 single-site the MH-53 helicopters from the East Coast to the
17 West Coast of NAS Corpus Christi. This will be the air arm of a
18 mine warfare excellence. This is a picture of the MH-53. Can
19 we do this? Yes, we can.

20 The third recommendation of the Navy is to
21 single-site the T-34 primary trainer from Corpus Christi NAS to
22 NAS flight simulators in Pensacola. In doing that, and that's a
23 recommendation that we agree with, although we hate to see the
24 T-34 primary pilots leave Corpus Christi, we agree that it's in
25 the best long-term interest of the Navy and the taxpayers to

1 single-site that primary aircraft. You free up the two hangars
2 there with the HM-14 and HM-15 designations. Those are
3 currently on the flight line of NAS Corpus Christi, they're
4 currently occupied by the T-34 trainer, and they would become
5 available for the MH-53 helicopters.

6 Very quickly, Admiral Montoya, since 1988 Naval
7 Station Ingleside has changed a little bit. The Admiral was
8 there when we dug the first shovel of sand I believe. This is a
9 quick -- an aerial view of Naval Station Ingleside. Again,
10 where the surface assets of a mine warfare command are located.
11 Here, a quick picture of some of those naval ships located now
12 of the mine warfare command post league at Naval Station
13 Ingleside. Again, only nine air miles across the bay from the
14 center of our complex.

15 Very quickly, I've already spoken briefly about
16 single-siting the T-34, which is the bottom aircraft,
17 single-engine aircraft. That would be according to the Navy
18 recommendation of single-siting it. The top aircraft is a T-44,
19 multiengine trainer, advanced training platform.

20 The fourth recommendation that the Navy has made is
21 to relocate the T-44 trainer out of the Corpus Christi area into
22 the Pensacola area.

23 This is the recommendation that we do not agree
24 with. I will try to explain that. This shot -- this slide will
25 show you the current location of the T-44 hangars. The T-44 is

1 currently located at the end of the flight line. I'll show you
2 this again very quickly. The last hangar on the end there.
3 This is the flight ops management area at the far right-hand end
4 down there. We can relocate two MH-53 squadrons in the middle
5 and leave the T-44 there at the end where it has easy access to
6 the runways. Again, asking ourselves the five questions.
7 Should it be done? We don't think so. Can it be done?
8 Certainly. The Navy could relocate the T-44's anyplace they
9 would like to. Is it in the long-term best interest of the
10 Navy? We don't think so. Why? Because the infrastructure is
11 there, the aircraft is there, the concrete is there, the weather
12 is there. The T-44 is in the last one-third of its life as an
13 aircraft used for training by the Navy. It really doesn't make
14 a lot of sense to us to relocate an aircraft that sometime in
15 the relatively near future it will be relocated again or taken
16 out of the defense core structure. Since we have the air space,
17 concrete, and weather, and it's all in place, we can find no
18 real cost savings for the Navy to relocate the T-44.

19 Very quickly, this is another view of NAS Corpus
20 Christi, the federal complex, noting three sides on water. What
21 we want to show you here is proposed extension of the runways
22 that the Navy has recommended in association with and in
23 conjunction with single-siting the T-45 aircraft. When you
24 extend the lower runway, lower parallel runway, to allow the
25 T-45 aircraft to land and take off and go into the left-hand

1 pattern, all over the water or all over the Naval Air Station,
2 you also allow for the use of the longer runway, the Cox runway,
3 to continue to be used by the T-44 aircraft and other tenant
4 aircraft NAS Corpus Christi. Why is this important? The T-45
5 can train to the left, the T-44 and other aircraft can take off
6 to the right. The outlying fields for the T-44 are located to
7 the right off of this photograph.

8 Cabaniss Field is currently the outlying field for
9 the T-44. It's already owned by the Navy and used by the Navy
10 for training T-44 pilots. It has one 5,000-foot runway and one
11 4500-foot runway. Does it make sense to relocate the T-44 when
12 you have this concrete available? We don't think so.

13 Outlying field Aransas County. You may not remember
14 on the map, but it's slightly to the north and east of NAS
15 Corpus Christi. It's used currently by the T-34 for the T-34
16 training. Can this be used for the T-44? Yes, it can. What is
17 the cost to the Navy to use Aransas County? About \$27,000 a
18 year. One of the better bargains. Not quite as good as a
19 dollar a year for Beeville but certainly a bargain to the
20 taxpayers and to the Navy. Another outlying field to NAS Corpus
21 Christi complex is Waldron Field. This field we propose would
22 be used as an additional training site and the single-siting of
23 the MH-53 helicopters.

24 Again, very quickly, should we leave the T-44 trainer
25 in Corpus Christi? Is it compatible? Can it be done? Does it

1 make sense? Is it in the long-term best interest of the Navy
2 and the taxpayers? We think you can. Currently the capacity of
3 NAS Corpus Christi, using tenant aircraft at the bottom -- and
4 that's not a very clear slide -- the T-34 flight ops, the T-44
5 flight ops. Go all the way over to the right-hand side. This
6 last graph shows, still utilizing the current tenant aircraft,
7 adding the MH-53 squadrons, HM-14 and HM-15, your MH-53
8 squadrons, adding the T-45 that's proposed by the Navy, you
9 still have ample capacity to leave the T-44 training at Corpus
10 Christi and outlying fields, at the same time load that capacity
11 to accommodate U.S. Air Force C-130 pilots, that you're now
12 training at Corpus Christi and getting their wings there.

13 Again, another recommendation that the Navy has made
14 is to redesignate the NAS Corpus Christi from a Naval Air
15 Station to a Naval Air Facility. We don't agree with this. We
16 don't agree with it because we don't, quite frankly, think it
17 makes a lot of sense, we don't think it's cost effective, but we
18 think it's more than a naval air station; it's a naval complex.
19 This federal complex is the home of the world's largest
20 helicopter air facility, the Army depot. It's home of the chief
21 naval air training. By the way, one of the recommendations is
22 to relocate the chief naval air training out of Corpus Christi.
23 We do not oppose this. We don't want to lose Sinatra, but we do
24 not oppose this because this is truly internal Navy matter. We
25 will not oppose that. But it's also home of numerous other

1 tenants.

2 The Army depot does a lot more in preparing
3 helicopters than just Army helicopters. Here's a Marine
4 helicopter and a medic helicopter. This is the makeup of the
5 work force. There's 7,000 employees at NAS Corpus Christi, the
6 federal complex.

7 It has been said we cannot land jets at NAS Corpus
8 Christi. The last time I looked, that C-5A was no longer
9 there. So it got there some way and got off some way.

10 Coast Guard, Customs, hospital, the Federal Reserve
11 Center, Navy, the Army. It's a federal complex. Does it make
12 sense? We don't think so. Is it in the best and long-term
13 interest of the taxpayers? We don't think so.

14 Should we be an NAF like Mayport or should we be an
15 NAS like Jacksonville? I think it's very clear to most people
16 that we most closely resemble NAS Jacksonville with all their
17 tenants than we do NAF Mayport.

18 Let me summarize very quickly. Down the left-hand
19 side of the chart are the eight criteria for selection. Across
20 the top are the six recommendations. Very quickly, we do not
21 oppose Sinatra moving. We support the single-siting of the
22 T-34. We support the single-siting of the MH-53 squadron. We
23 certainly support the single-siting of the T-45 in the South
24 Texas complex. And we oppose the T-44 moving for the reasons
25 that I have given you. And we oppose the redesignation of NAS

1 Corpus Christi to an NAF.

2 Do you have any questions?

3 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Any of my colleagues have
4 questions?

5 Mr. Neil, thank you very much and all who came with
6 you. I hope to say hello to a couple of them when we break here
7 in a minute. But this hearing is now adjourned, and we'll
8 reconvene at 10:40.

9 (Recess).

10 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: This hearing is now back in
11 session. But before we start, I think those of you in the
12 audience heard this morning and General McFalls alluded to the
13 loss of an airplane a couple of days ago carrying eight members,
14 civilian and military, of the armed services. Some of those
15 members are friends of some people in the audience including
16 some of our commissioners and staff who knew them. And I think
17 it would be appropriate in their memory for us to observe a
18 moment of silence. We'll do that right now.

19 (Moment of silence).

20 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you very much. God
21 bless them.

22 Our next panel is headed by the mayor of San Antonio,
23 Mayor Nelson Wolff. You have quite a contingent here. You can
24 introduce those who are going to support you and then I'll swear
25 you in there, you and them in, Mayor.

1 MAYOR NELSON WOLFF: Thank you very much. We are
2 very pleased today that coming from San Antonio, getting up at 2
3 o'clock in the morning, boarding buses to be here to show you
4 our concern, the commission, to Brooks Air Force Base. With
5 your permission, may I allow the citizens from San Antonio to
6 stand?

7 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: You may.

8 (Applause).

9 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Would you introduce your
10 members?

11 MAYOR NELSON WOLFF: Presenting today, the ones that
12 will be testifying today will be Judge Krier, Jose Villarreal,
13 and Tullos Wells will be testifying today. The four of us will
14 be testifying.

15 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Very well.

16 (Seven witnesses sworn).

17 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Very well. Proceed, Mayor.

18 MAYOR NELSON WOLFF: Good morning. I am Nelson
19 Wolff, mayor of the city of San Antonio. And we thank you very,
20 very much for giving us the opportunity to share with you our
21 vision of the future of Brooks Air Force Base.

22 Let me first say that we are also very thankful for
23 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison who has been an inspiration to us
24 and who has helped us in many, many different ways to articulate
25 the arguments that we will present to you today. Let me also

1 say that Congressman Frank Tejada has worked with us every day
2 in terms of helping us organize the community, in terms of
3 bringing together our arguments that we're presenting to you
4 today; and we are very, very grateful for these two outstanding
5 public servants to stand here with us today as we present our
6 arguments to you.

7 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Congressman, I failed to
8 acknowledge you, but we also welcome you and it's good to meet
9 you.

10 MAYOR NELSON WOLFF: More than a year ago I appointed
11 a special task force to concentrate on Brooks Air Force Base, to
12 study and to understand the importance of its missions to the
13 Air Force, to catalog the research and contribution of the
14 scientists, to recognize the direct role played by Brooks in the
15 Desert War, and to come up with a plan to save the Air Force
16 money. This task force, with representatives from all parts of
17 San Antonio, spent thousands of hours preparing for today.
18 Missions were reviewed, concepts were considered, Air Force
19 leaders were interviewed, and numbers were scrubbed. It was a
20 very thorough process. That process convinced us that Brooks'
21 missions and scientists are critically important to the Air
22 Force, that the Air Force will be conducting human systems
23 research somewhere, and that the right place and the most cost
24 effective place for it to be is in San Antonio.

25 Two weeks ago I spent the morning with Admiral

1 Montoya, General Robles, Mrs. Cox, and Mrs. Steele. Together we
2 toured Brooks Air Force Base and saw firsthand the importance of
3 this research. We talked with scientists and learned about the
4 contributions that have been made at Brooks in the human systems
5 work that made the early space missions possible, the heads-up
6 display and night vision devices that made such a difference in
7 the Desert War. Brooks has made a difference in war fighters.
8 General Robles and Admiral Montoya and General Davis has seen
9 that difference in action.

10 During that tour, we also interacted with the
11 scientists and heard firsthand that many of them have no
12 intention of leaving San Antonio, that they have options to
13 remain in San Antonio with their bioscience and bioengineering
14 communities, and many will not move. That will mean a
15 significant interruption in the science and, the opinion of
16 many, the loss of as much of a decade of research. We also
17 heard about the very specialized and sophisticated equipment at
18 Brooks and the fact that it's going to be more expensive to move
19 than the current estimates would indicate.

20 We understand that your mission is to save the
21 taxpayers money by reducing the military's infrastructure, and
22 each of us as taxpayers generally appreciate your efforts and we
23 want to help you. We have a proposal that will close Brooks Air
24 Force Base, save the taxpayers twice as much as the DOD
25 proposal, and avoid the risk to human systems research of trying

1 to move 3,000 professionals and their work and perhaps losing 50
2 to 75 percent of them. Frankly, I think you will find it a far
3 better proposal, one that will close Brooks Air Force Base, keep
4 the scientists in San Antonio, and save the taxpayers twice as
5 much as the DOD proposal. During your time as BRAC
6 commissioners, you're going to listen to hundreds of briefings
7 and review thousands of pages of data. I know you will have to
8 look for the few hard facts which truly make a difference in
9 your decisions. If you do not remember anything else from
10 today, please remember two facts: Our proposal will double the
11 savings and avoid the risk to Brooks' vital missions.

12 In the next few minutes County Executive Cyndi Krier
13 will review the missions of Brooks Air Force Base. The missions
14 at Brooks are not being performed anywhere else. As a result, I
15 believe we need to give you an overview, which stresses the
16 importance of these missions to DOD and our national security.
17 And then Jose Villarreal, Co-Chair of the BRAC '95 Task Force
18 will discuss the DOD proposal to close Brooks and move the
19 missions and more than 3,000 people to Ohio and Florida. Then
20 he will describe an alternative proposal that will provide
21 vastly smaller closure costs, twice as much savings as the DOD
22 proposal, and eliminate the turbulence and disruption of trying
23 to move 3,000 scientists and professionals, and many of whom
24 won't move. And, finally, Tullos Wells, Chairman of The Greater
25 San Antonio Chamber of Commerce will summarize our presentation

1 and answer your questions.

2 I would like now to present County Executive Cyndi
3 Krier to give you an overview of Brooks' missions. Judge Krier?

4 JUDGE CYNDI KRIER: Thank you, Mayor. Good morning.

5 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Judge.

6 JUDGE CYNDI KRIER: I would like to spend a few
7 minutes with you this morning talking about the science and
8 research missions of Brooks Air Force Base, the scientists and
9 researchers who do them, and about their importance to the
10 defense capability of the United States of America. At the
11 heart of every aerospace system is a human being. The pilot,
12 the navigator, the weapons system operator, the load master, the
13 crew chief, the weapons director, and all those who support
14 them. In reality, there are no unmanned weapon systems. The
15 combat capability of the United States Air Force depends upon
16 human beings, and the performance of human beings depends on the
17 scientists and professionals at Brooks. Brooks Air Force Base,
18 its missions and its scientists are the Air Force Human Systems
19 Center.

20 Brooks Air Force Base is home to a unique collection
21 of scientists, researchers, medical doctors, and technicians who
22 conduct the human systems research, engineering, and medical
23 education programs required to give our war fighters the
24 advantage they need to survive and to succeed. The Human
25 Systems Center develops human systems and technologies and

1 serves as the advocate for the human war fighter. The Armstrong
2 Laboratory develops the advanced operational technologies
3 required to enhance the readiness and protection of human war
4 fighters. The School of Aerospace Medicine is the major
5 provider of aviation, space, and environmental medical education
6 programs for DOD. The Human Systems Program Office manages the
7 development and production of human systems and equipment. And
8 the Center for Environmental Excellence manages environmental
9 cleanup, compliance planning, and pollution prevention for the
10 Air Force.

11 Brooks is a research mecca, a knowledge base. It
12 employs more than 3,000 professionals, including nearly 1,000
13 scientists and engineers. Most have college degrees and nearly
14 half have advanced degrees. 400 are specially trained
15 acquisition professionals; and 128 are medical, educational, and
16 training instructors.

17 The point is: Moving scientists is not like moving a
18 tank battalion. You can't cut orders and just expect them to
19 go. Many won't go. Our information indicates more than 50
20 percent won't relocate. And the risk to our war fighting
21 capability of losing more than half of these scientists is
22 enormous. These scientists, researchers, medical doctors, and
23 technical staff provide the human systems advantage that enables
24 the war fighter to safely and capably employ advanced combat
25 systems at the leading edge of technology. And it provides the

1 warrior's competitive edge that our Air Force has repeatedly
2 demonstrated in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Granada, Panama,
3 and the Desert War.

4 The scientists at Brooks focus on the five areas on
5 the slide. Let me briefly discuss them with you. Brooks
6 scientists design, develop, and support the combat crew systems
7 required to optimize human combat performance and survivability
8 and to ensure weapon systems are compatible with their human
9 operators. These efforts include developing the equipment and
10 training necessary to withstand chemical and biological
11 attacks. Air crew laser protection systems, advanced
12 antigravity suits, and equipment for high altitude flight,
13 infrared voice communications, heads-up displays, and night
14 vision systems.

15 In the human resources area Brooks scientists
16 developed unique personnel and training technologies including
17 human systems integration, pilot situational awareness training,
18 and air crew multitask training. Particularly important is the
19 growing use of artificial intelligence and tutoring systems
20 which provides big savings for taxpayers.

21 In the aerospace medicine area Brooks scientists
22 provide research and operational medical support in fields like
23 aeromedical epidemiology and hyperbaric medicine, and they
24 develop new aeromedical systems and equipment. In addition,
25 they train more than 5,000 medical students each year in fields

1 such as aerospace medicine, aerospace nursing, aerospace
2 physiology, public health, and bioenvironmental engineering.
3 This is, without question, the premier aerospace medical
4 training program in the world.

5 The occupational and environmental health program
6 works to eliminate risks from hazardous material, noise,
7 electromagnetic radiation, and occupational stress from Air
8 Force operations worldwide, including implementing EPA's Safe
9 Drinking Water Act and reducing the effects of
10 bioelectromagnetics on computer users.

11 The final critical area is environics, the
12 development and implementation for new techniques for cleaning
13 up environmental waste science and implementing the technologies
14 required to ensure environmental compliance by critical Air
15 Force missions in both peace and war. Brooks research has
16 included projects such as the use of microorganisms to enhance
17 waste cleanup.

18 Now while the projects may sound complicated, the
19 role of Brooks scientists and technicians is very easy to
20 understand. They conduct the research and design the equipment
21 required to give our war fighters the winning advantage. And
22 they serve as the advocate for the men and women of both today's
23 and tomorrow's Air Force in the design, development, and
24 operation of the most capable aerospace systems in the world.

25 That completes the description of Brooks' missions

1 and its worker's. However, one more point must be made. Brooks
2 is an integrated research center. There are important
3 interrelationships among these missions, and relocating them
4 presents great risks of losing the critical synergies among them
5 and degrading the performance of each of the missions.

6 In addition, the Air Force will lose a large number
7 of critical scientists and technicians if the DOD proposal
8 becomes reality. Many will choose to stay in San Antonio with
9 our research and development community. Our evaluation suggests
10 that more than 50 percent won't move. It would take years to
11 rebuild these research and scientific teams, if that could be
12 done at all.

13 As a result, the nation's military capability would
14 suffer, and of course it's its war fighters who ultimately would
15 be placed in harm's way. That means the Brooks human systems
16 missions and scientists are an essential part of the Air Force's
17 combat capability. It is important to remember that the Air
18 Force has already determined that these missions and scientists
19 must be retained. None are recommended for elimination. They
20 will be somewhere, and we will show you that keeping Brooks
21 working, keeping the scientists in San Antonio avoids the risk
22 of losing them and is much more cost effective.

23 As you can see from this slide, San Antonio provides
24 a one-of-a-kind military human systems environment, an
25 environment that provides human systems synergies that are

1 absolutely unmatched anywhere in the military. San Antonio also
2 has a civilian community filled with biomedical research and
3 teaching activities that do not exist at the proposed relocation
4 sites, and that research community also provides synergy with
5 the missions at Brooks. In San Antonio there are many
6 opportunities for interaction and joint ventures among the
7 scientists and researchers at Brooks and at these facilities
8 that can't be found in Dayton, Ohio or Panama City. These
9 organizations have conducted hundreds of joint projects with
10 Brooks, studies like the bio effects of microwave radiation and
11 the development of techniques to overcome adverse effects of
12 G forces on fighter pilots. There is a big benefit to the Air
13 Force and to taxpayers because the Brooks missions and
14 scientists are in San Antonio, where the public and private
15 sectors can cooperate. They can, they have, and they will; and
16 that can be maximized.

17 Now, I'd like to introduce Mr. Jose Villarreal, who
18 will discuss the DOD proposal to close Brooks and an alternative
19 that will close Brooks but will save the taxpayers at least
20 twice as much as the DOD proposal while avoiding the risk of
21 trying to move 3,000 scientists, engineers, doctors,
22 technicians, and their research, and having to replace what is
23 projected to be more than 50 percent of them that indicate they
24 won't move. Jose?

25 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you, Judge Krier.

1 MR. JOSE VILLARREAL: Thank you, Judge Krier.

2 Good morning. You've already heard about the two
3 proposals. The Department of Defense proposal that would close
4 Brooks Air Force Base and move the missions to Dayton, Ohio and
5 Panama City, Florida and the alternative which would close
6 Brooks but keep the missions in San Antonio at a small
7 cantonment area.

8 Let's look at the two proposals side by side. As you
9 can see, both close Brooks Air Force Base and both eliminate a
10 391 manpower space. We actually believe we can save 423 spaces,
11 but we use the smaller Department of Defense number to ensure an
12 apples-to-apples comparison. Even so, the cantonment
13 alternative avoids moving nearly 3,000 people, saves
14 \$174 million in one-time closure costs, and saves twice as much
15 taxpayers money over 20 years. Let me show you why this is
16 true. We call this alternative the cantonment strategy. Under
17 this proposal Brooks Air Force Base would close its plant.
18 However, the major research and education missions would remain
19 at Brooks in a small cantonment area, and all base operating and
20 real property maintenance support would be provided by Kelly or
21 Lackland. In other words, Brooks' research and education
22 mission would be supported by an adjacent host space at a huge
23 savings.

24 This map shows how the cantonment area might look.
25 The light blue area is the cantonment. That's about 15 percent

1 of the present base. The remainder of Brooks would be closed
2 and made available for reuse. There are a couple small
3 activities that are currently located outside of the proposed
4 cantonment area. These could remain as stand-alone buildings in
5 the reuse area or be moved into the cantonment area. I want to
6 emphasize at this point that this map is only a draft to
7 demonstrate feasibility. The Air Force would obviously
8 determine the actual boundaries. I would also like to point out
9 that the factor that makes the cantonment strategy workable and
10 very cost effective is that Kelly and Lackland are a very short
11 14 miles away in distance.

12 Using the Department of Defense COBRA model and the
13 Air Force planning factors, we calculated the cost in savings of
14 this proposal. Brooks Air Force Base still closes, at least 391
15 positions are still eliminated, and 518 people will still
16 relocate to Lackland and Kelly. However, the one-time closure
17 costs are only \$11 million instead of \$185 million because the
18 huge military construction and movement costs are avoided. In
19 addition, the net present value of the 20-year savings is
20 \$301 million. That's twice the savings of the Department of
21 Defense proposal. And the savings begin in the first year
22 instead of the seventh.

23 Now, let's look at the two proposals side by side
24 again. Both close Brooks Air Force Base and both eliminate 391
25 manpower spaces. However, the cantonment avoids moving 3,000

1 people, saves \$174 million of taxpayers' money in upfront costs
2 and saves overall \$301 million, twice as much as the Department
3 of Defense proposal. In addition, the risks of losing the brain
4 trust is avoided, and the synergies with the San Antonio
5 military and civilian human systems and bioscience communities
6 are maintained.

7 Frankly, the cantonment is a far better alternative.
8 It closes Brooks Air Force Base, it saves the taxpayers twice as
9 much money, and it continues to save more than the Department of
10 Defense proposal forever. Well, for at least the 700 years we
11 ran on the COBRA model. Now I would like to present to you Mr.
12 Tullos Wells who is going to summarize for us and answer your
13 questions. Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you.

15 MR. TULLOS WELLS: Good morning, ladies and
16 gentlemen. Chairman Montoya and Commissioners, allow me the
17 courtesy of summarizing briefly and pointing out some particular
18 issues to which we would direct your attention as you make your
19 deliberations.

20 We have endeavored today to talk about the people at
21 Brooks and the work they do, the cost comparison that my
22 colleague, Mr. Villarreal, just pointed out between the DOD
23 proposal and the San Antonio cantonment plan, and particular
24 risk to the commission if the Department of Defense should
25 endeavor to move them. Now, as Mayor Wolff requested, when you

1 leave today and make your deliberations, we request that there
2 are at least two things you particularly remember about our
3 proposal.

4 First, as Mr. Villarreal said, the San Antonio
5 cantonment plan doubles the savings, two times the Department of
6 Defense proposed savings to over \$300 million to the bottom line
7 while still closing the air force base. And remember, all of
8 these numbers, all of these numbers are based on DOD numbers so
9 we can give you an apples-to-apples comparison.

10 And, second, it prevents the serious risk to the
11 missions from the proposed move of trying to move missions that
12 are not replicated anywhere else in DOD being performed by
13 people, ladies and gentlemen, who are not easily
14 interchangeable. As Judge Krier said, this is not like moving a
15 tank battalion or an air force wing. If the people do not go --
16 and I assure you many of them will not -- then the Air Force
17 loses, and the nation loses its investment in hundreds of
18 millions of dollars in research and technological progress. I
19 think it's important to consider that many of these scientists,
20 engineers, and doctors already have second jobs in the San
21 Antonio area or certainly have job opportunities in the greater
22 San Antonio/Austin area which require that they do not need to
23 move. And to explain this a little further, for those of you
24 who have never been on a San Antonio barge ride on a cool spring
25 evening, we have a saying in Texas that says "I may not have

1 been born in San Antonio, but I got here as quick as I could."
2 Thus as shown in the next slide, there are really only two
3 options for your consideration.

4 Ladies and gentlemen, you have everything to gain,
5 the nation has everything to gain and nothing to lose by
6 accepting the San Antonio cantonment plan. We have demonstrated
7 to your satisfaction I hope the cantonment plan avoids the great
8 risk of interrupting the great work that's being performed there
9 because the missions at Brooks are the people, they are the
10 engineers and scientists and furthermore the Air Force has
11 determined must in fact be preserved. But our plan provides it
12 at a cost of over \$180 million less than the cost to move all
13 these folks to Dayton or Panama City. These missions are
14 critical. They are not slated for elimination, and they will be
15 performed somewhere. Under our plan, the San Antonio cantonment
16 plan, you can provide over \$170 million dollars in savings to
17 the Department of Defense as opposed to the Department of
18 Defense proposal. And these savings begin immediately. There
19 is an immediate return to the taxpayers rather than waiting
20 seven years. And, as Mr. Villarreal said, we know at least for
21 the next 700 years the savings continue.

22 Now, ladies and gentlemen, we keenly understand that
23 agreeing to serve on this commission you've taken on an
24 incredibly important task. We know you need to save dollars for
25 the American taxpayer, and we believe we've shown you how to

1 save more than twice what the Department of Defense proposed.
2 We know that you need to reduce Department of Defense
3 infrastructure, and we showed you how to make this twice the DOD
4 proposal savings while still closing the air force base. But
5 ladies and gentlemen, most importantly, we know that your
6 mission is to assure that our military is second to none in the
7 world, and we have shown you how you can do that without taking
8 the risk of losing the incredibly important people who perform
9 the missions at Brooks.

10 Ladies and gentlemen, we believe that this proposal
11 provides not only a substantial but in fact a compelling reason
12 to deviate from the Department of Defense recommendation on
13 closing Brooks. It works to your duty to the taxpayers, it
14 works to the betterment of the Department of Defense, less money
15 spent, mission saved, and it works for the betterment of San
16 Antonio, far better than closing the base and trying to move all
17 those people.

18 Ladies and gentlemen, as I hope we have demonstrated
19 to you this morning and you undertake your deliberations you
20 will determine that in fact this proposal works for all of us.
21 We appreciate your courtesy, and we would be placed to answer
22 any questions that you might have of us before Mayor Wolff
23 returns to the podium.

24 CHAIRMAN MONTROYA: Thank you very much to all of you
25 and the Mayor. And we do have a couple questions. And I'm

1 going to ask Commissioner Robles. He's got one at least.

2 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Yes, please. And this question
3 really I think may be for you and Mr. Villarreal or Mr. Wells,
4 whichever one wants to field it. And I don't want to get into
5 the details, and I don't want to sound like a beehive which I
6 was accused of when I was a budget director but I want to sound
7 as an installation command which was my last job. And so I'm
8 acutely aware of base operations, real property maintenance, and
9 a commander's desire to get as much of its fixed costs spread
10 over a larger base. And that's the crux of your proposal as I
11 understand it. The proposed Air Force move would have you, as
12 you save in the 391 spaces or thereabout, basically support
13 spaces I understand --

14 MR. TULLOS WELLS: That is correct.

15 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: -- that go with the base
16 operations, the real property maintenance functions. And when
17 you move to a place like Wright Patterson or one of the other
18 proposed sites. Since they already have fixed costs, what
19 you're actually doing is you become -- they only have -- your
20 cost, that cost to the Air Force is a variable cost component,
21 not a fixed cost.

22 So I guess my question to you is twofold. First of
23 all, if you move, as you propose, to Kelly or Lackland to do
24 those two base operations functions, you are then in essence
25 saving the Air Force a fixed cost again because they already

1 have fixed costs in both those bases and are really into the
2 variable costs. And the question is: Does Kelly or does
3 Lackland or either/or have the ability to absorb the additional
4 workload to make this happen? That is, do they have capacity
5 right now to provide the base operations support and real
6 property maintenance support?

7 MR. TULLOS WELLS: In fact, we are confident that
8 they do. As you well know and I believe you had mentioned
9 previously, in fact it's a benefit to them because they spread
10 their costs over some additional workload and it really provides
11 no additional problem for either Kelly or Lackland. At the same
12 time it allows them to perform those functions without any
13 additional cost to the Air Force.

14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: So I guess what you're
15 testifying is that Kelly or Lackland does not hiccup if asked to
16 take the additional mission on of providing the base operations
17 support and real property maintenance support.

18 MR. TULLOS WELLS: That is correct. That's our
19 understanding.

20 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And that's notwithstanding the
21 fact what Kelly and Lackland's variable costs are as opposed to
22 a Wright Patterson or somewhere else? We didn't get into that
23 level of detail, not getting their results. Did you all look at
24 that analysis to see what the different variable cost components
25 are and are you, quote, "getting a deal" by getting the base ops

1 support from a Kelly as opposed to a Wright Patterson for
2 example.

3 MR. TULLOS WELLS: Commissioner, we did look at that
4 specifically when we prepared the numbers to present to you, and
5 we're confident that the savings that we proposed to you in fact
6 will be there. Mr. Roberson, who has worked with us on this,
7 can provide further information if you'd like.

8 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Was Mr. Roberson sworn? If he
9 speaks, I don't think he was sworn in.

10 MR. ROBERSON: Yes, sir, I was.

11 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: You were? Would you stand up?

12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: A shake of the head would
13 probably give me all the body language I need.

14 MR. TULLOS WELLS: The information -- the question
15 you have asked, Commissioner, we have responded to in our
16 proposal. It does save the money that we propose it to save.
17 We have looked at variable costs associated with moving those
18 support missions to either Lackland or Kelly.

19 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: The other question is, just to
20 make sure we're balanced on both sides of the equation here,
21 is: I assume that Kelly and/or Lackland added back in the
22 additional personnel required to a base ops staff to do this
23 additional work?

24 MR. TULLOS WELLS: That's correct. We looked at and
25 added into our cost proposals the incremental cost that would be

1 associated with performing those things at Kelly and Lackland;
2 that's correct.

3 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And the numbers still come out
4 the way you propose?

5 MR. TULLOS WELLS: And the numbers come out the way
6 we have provided it to you; that's correct.

7 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you very much.

8 MR. TULLOS WELLS: Commissioner, we have scrubbed
9 these numbers in every possible way to make sure that the
10 presentation we make to you is absolutely supported.

11 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Wells.

12 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: General Davis?

13 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I have no questions.

14 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I don't have any questions. I
15 just wanted to comment to the group -- and many of you have
16 heard me say it before, but I want to thank you both for your
17 hospitality when we visited your city and for putting together
18 this proposal because it really helps us scrub the numbers when
19 you've done so much work initially. So we look forward to
20 looking at this further. We asked the Air Force yesterday how
21 far along they've come in analyzing your proposal. They didn't
22 have an answer for us yet on that, but we look forward to
23 working with you on this potential proposal.

24 MR. TULLOS WELLS: Commissioner, thank you very
25 much. We were pleased to have you in San Antonio, and we look

1 forward to having you back in San Antonio as a tourist as
2 opposed to in an official capacity.

3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I notice you've changed that
4 since how you worded it earlier.

5 MR. TULLOS WELLS: Let me at this time ask Mayor
6 Wolff to return to the podium for a few moments. Thank you very
7 much.

8 MAYOR NELSON WOLFF: I would like at this time to
9 recognize Councilpersons Burke, Yama, and Larson who made the
10 trip up with us today, and Commissioner Tejeda, Robert Tejeda,
11 Commissioner Novac; and we appreciate very much that they came
12 along. Part of this integration in the community that we spoke
13 of, a major part of that is the University of Texas Health
14 Science Center and Dr. John Howe, president of the health
15 science center is with us today; and many, many research
16 projects go along with his institution.

17 Again, let me say we thank you very, very much for
18 allowing us to present this case to you. We thank you very much
19 for your service to the nation, and we hope that you will
20 favorably look on our proposal. Thank you.

21 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much, Mayor.

22 SENATOR HUTCHISON: Is there still time left because
23 I'd like to comment?

24 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Yes, there is, Senator.

25 Assistant Goode, please time.

1 SENATOR HUTCHISON: I just wanted to make one
2 statement, a point of emphasis. I think that the community made
3 a terrific statement on the bottom line cost savings, and that
4 is of course I think your major concern. But I want to
5 emphasize a quality issue.

6 Dr. John Howe is the head of the University of Texas
7 Health Science Center. The cooperation between the medical
8 community in San Antonio and what they are able to give in extra
9 quality adds to the accreditation possibilities for Brooks and
10 also the added learning that can come from their cooperation.
11 And I think that research component is the icing on the cake.

12 The bottom line is the savings, and I applaud the
13 originality of the City of San Antonio and its leaders. But
14 when you take that as the basic and then you add the extra
15 quality that cannot be matched anywhere else from the University
16 of Texas Health Science Center and the commitment the State of
17 Texas has to that quality medical institution, I just wanted to
18 emphasize that point because I think it is so very important.

19 Thank you very much.

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much, Senator.

21 Congressman, I'll swear you in if you'd like to have
22 some words to say.

23 CONGRESSMAN TEJEDA: I'd just like to once again
24 thank the commissioners for their service and certainly your
25 attention to our proposal, but also drawing your attention once

1 again --

2 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: May I swear you in, Congressman?
3 I have to do this.

4 (Congressman Tejeda sworn).

5 CONGRESSMAN TEJEDA: I would like just to once again
6 draw the attention of the commissioners to the tremendous
7 support of those individuals from San Antonio who came up, at
8 great personal sacrifice I might add. Many of them had children
9 that they had to make other arrangements to get them clothed and
10 breakfast and get them to school. Many took days off from work
11 to be here. So there's tremendous community support, and I
12 think that that is seen and I want to thank them personally for
13 their sacrifice and for your being here. So again, thank you
14 very much again.

15 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: You're welcome. Thank you for
16 coming up and being with us again.

17 (Applause).

18 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Before we get started, I'd like to
19 make an announcement. There is a slight change in our
20 schedule. We will start -- we will convene on time with
21 Bergstrom Air Force -- Air Reserve Base in Austin, and then we
22 follow that with five minutes from the Air Force Electronic
23 Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity. And then because of
24 apparently some rather -- a sad event that has occurred in
25 Oklahoma City this morning, we're going to proceed with the

1 Oklahoma delegation so that they can get on back to Oklahoma
2 City before we open the floor for public comment. Apparently
3 there has been what is reported to be a bomb in the federal
4 building that has cost life, and apparently -- I'm hearing
5 behind me -- that there's even been some indication they have
6 found a second one. So there has been a very, very sad state of
7 affairs in Oklahoma, and we want to accommodate them.

8 So with that, we have a quorum of commissioners
9 present and so -- Mayor Todd, good to see you again. Would you
10 introduce your team and I'll swear them in?

11 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: Thank you very much. We're
12 pleased to have the opportunity to be back in front of you to
13 discuss the issue of Bergstrom. I would like to start by
14 introduction of the team who will be responding to questions.
15 And they are -- and I will just read these in order. Rick
16 Wheeler, John Merritt, Chad Huston, Lance Hill, Bill Welch, and
17 Chuck Gabus on slides.

18 You know, I think as -- you heard a mayor already
19 today, and mayors take great pride in their cities, but they
20 particularly take pride when there is so much support in terms
21 of the citizens giving of their time and effort as did so many
22 people from San Antonio in the previous presentation. And I
23 want to say thanks to them and all the people who helped work on
24 this presentation.

25 CHAIRMAN MONTROYA: Very good. We'll have them all

1 rise, and they can participate.

2 (Seven witnesses sworn).

3 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Very well. And welcome.

4 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: Thank you again. We have before
5 you today of course the slide presentation, one tape that some
6 of you have seen. But I want to start with what we believe is a
7 very important statement and will be the hallmark of our
8 presentation, and that's a quote made by Sherry Goodman in June
9 1994 that said "Bergstrom is the perfect example of base reuse
10 this administration is looking for." We believe that we have
11 demonstrated that through the efforts that we have made in the
12 past few years and believe as we go through our analysis today
13 that will be abundantly clear.

14 We believe that Bergstrom has a joint
15 civilian/military operation that is not only productive and
16 efficient, but it is the kind of reuse that is appropriate as we
17 move into the next decade, the next century, as we engage
18 ourselves in military preparedness and making sure that we take
19 advantage of all the things in front of us.

20 We will be focusing today of course on the federal
21 promise that was referred to by the Senator and by the Governor
22 in their opening comments earlier today. We'll be talking about
23 what's happening at Bergstrom in this year, 1995. We'll be
24 talking about the evaluation criteria both in terms of the
25 mission requirements as well as the cost requirements. We'll be

1 talking about a proposal that we want to put in front of you,
2 but they're your need specifics. We'll also be concluding with
3 comments that will be appropriate to the presentation.

4 I do want to move first, though, to a promise. I
5 want to read these for emphasis. The comment made by the 1991
6 base closure and realignment commission, "The Air Force Reserve
7 units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted
8 to a civilian airport." Reading now from the 1993 base closure
9 and realignment commission, "Bergstrom's cantonment area will
10 remain open and the 407th fighter squadron with the F-16
11 aircraft and the 924th fighter group support units will remain
12 at the Bergstrom cantonment area at least until the year 1996."
13 We realize this is 1995, and 1996 is ahead of us; but we believe
14 that those words constituted a promise and reliance upon the
15 Austin community to move forward on this effort.

16 It should be noted that Bergstrom was not to be
17 converted to an airport. I note -- excuse me -- Austin had
18 looked at Bergstrom for almost two decades and requesting joint
19 use, but that not having been granted, they made a decision --
20 after a great deal of community struggle -- to put an airport
21 northeast of our community. We had spent nearly \$10 million and
22 were literally a week away from making a purchase of land when
23 that announcement was made in 1991, two weeks after I took
24 office. We understood the relevance and the importance of the
25 joint use proposals that were being made and the thrust of that

1 airport and proceeded immediately to abandon those
2 voter-approved plans. And mayors don't abandon voter-approved
3 plans once they are made without a great deal of concern, a
4 great deal of interest, and a great deal of thought about what
5 is to come.

6 We believe the reliance upon the joint use that was
7 being proposed was an appropriate one. You abandoned those
8 plans and immediately started working toward a vital election
9 which was held in 1993, which passed by 63 percent, a much
10 higher margin than I ever received personally, but a 63 percent
11 margin to reuse Bergstrom as a civilian airport and started in
12 the planning efforts.

13 Now, moving on to that promise. I would like to play
14 a tape that some of you have seen earlier, if I may. We have a
15 slide. This tape, by the way, was edited. We have the full
16 version to play.

17 SPEAKER ON VIDEOTAPE: "The law and the Base Closure
18 Act requires the Air Force to leave the reserve unit here
19 at Bergstrom, but it also requires the community to
20 decide by June of 1993 as to whether or not they're going
21 to have an airport there, because obviously we have to
22 have an airport operator there in order to support that
23 reserve. If there is -- by June of 1993, if there is not
24 a decision by the community to establish an airport, then
25 we're compelled by law to take action to move that unit

1 to another location. Let me state here that it is not
2 our purpose to try to influence the city at all in how
3 you decide to use Bergstrom Air Force Base. Certainly we
4 would like to see an airport there because then we could
5 leave the unit right where it is. But that's your
6 decision, that's the community's decision; and however
7 you decide, we will make it work for the Department and
8 the Air Force."

9 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you. That's very helpful.

10 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: We believe that that statement,
11 along with others I previously read, constitute a promise. I
12 made a promise to the Austin public in seeking approval for that
13 bond election, and that is that we would move swiftly and with
14 all deliberate cost containment issue to produce the most cost
15 effective airport that could be a joint airport used by both the
16 military as well as civilian use.

17 Not mentioned in the slides though was the regional
18 control facilities we have located on that base which is part of
19 the reserve that's staying there, and that is a state of the art
20 facility which saves the Air Force between 1.5 to \$2 million a
21 year as opposed to other uses. We have before us, as you can
22 tell from the slide, a master plan that we are proceeding with
23 that allows for a cantonment area for the reservists, in the
24 yellow picture, to be used for their exclusive use. It should
25 be noted, and something I failed to point out the other day,

1 that the entirety of the Bergstrom land was not bought by the
2 military. It was bought by Austin taxpayers in 1941 as part of
3 the military effort. So this free land will be kept by the
4 military if this decision, this recommendation we heard is to be
5 used as a cantonment area.

6 It should be pointed out that in our plans, in our
7 reliance on the promise we have made sure that our planning and
8 our engineering will satisfy cantonment reservists. We have
9 moved the -- we have located the terminal site appropriately to
10 not the cheapest location but to accommodate the military. We
11 have proposed an access road, we have proposed a northern
12 alignment of the airport, not the cheapest but the one that
13 accommodated the military. We have proposed a second runway,
14 not at the 7,000 feet the airlines are requested, but at 9,000
15 feet to make sure that the military needs were met in their
16 entirety. We awarded a contract just a month ago for a fire
17 station, a basic necessity of an airport, be it civilian or
18 military. This will be a joint use facility between the two
19 communities to be used for the future. We have spent over
20 \$540,000 just relocating utilities to accommodate the cantonment
21 area.

22 As you can see from that slide, there's not just
23 words that's being floated around; these are actual work -- this
24 is actual work that's going on today as we are sitting here
25 and -- at the Bergstrom site preparing the site for the use.

1 Now as I had mentioned earlier, I have been here
2 before. Certainly I was here in spirit in 1991 for the hearing
3 then, when it was in Birmingham in 1993 for the hearing, and now
4 I'm glad you're in Texas. Although I'd rather not be here, I'm
5 glad you're here for the hearing in 1995. We believe that the
6 promise has been made, and the plans that we are underway with
7 show that, as was said in the previous -- as made in the
8 previous comments, is the appropriate way to go.

9 Now, looking at 1995, we acknowledge that the reason
10 for a change -- that there's a higher criteria for putting on a
11 unit where a previous decision has been made. That criteria had
12 to do with providing such changes that are necessitated by
13 additions to -- structure force additions or organization for
14 significant revisions of cost effectiveness. We believe both in
15 terms of the mission of Bergstrom reservists as well as the
16 cost, that the information contained in the recommendation is in
17 error. I would like to review that for just a moment.

18 In looking at the operational side of the uses, we
19 believe that -- if you flip the slide -- we believe that no
20 consideration was given to the joint Army -- to the Army/joint
21 operations as contained there. We believe that only three of
22 the six fighter unit locations were compared. We believe that
23 no comparison was made of Austin-Bergstrom for alternative
24 mission and requested the evaluation of a, quote, "objective
25 criteria".

1 Moving forward on -- you need to understand that one
2 of the primary uses of Bergstrom is to provide support
3 facilities. And indeed the primary facility is -- that we have
4 to support, that we all support, is that of Fort Hood, the
5 largest military and largest Army base in the free world. And
6 we do provide support for that facility.

7 Moving on to some of the actual analysis, and I'm
8 just going to hit on some high points to these and leave the
9 rest for Q and A. But when we looked at -- if we go back to the
10 first slide previous to that, when we look at some of the
11 analysis of the objective criteria, we believe it's simply
12 incorrect. In fighter mission, we agreed with the DOD analysis,
13 but in the other areas where we were classified as red by DOD,
14 we believe that area ought to be green and overall ought to be
15 green. I'd like to look at the next slide, at the bomber and
16 tanker issue. Let it be understood that Bergstrom was built as
17 a longer base. The minimum criteria for green is 150 feet wide
18 and 1,000 feet long. We are at 300 feet wide and 12,000 feet
19 long. The taxiways, 75 feet wide; we're at 150 feet wide.
20 Apron, 283,000 square feet; we're at almost 800,000 square
21 feet. We believe the analysis shows are wrong. I remember the
22 day watching a 747 with the space shuttle on top land on that
23 airport. I believe it's adequate for the purpose stated and
24 certainly should be green, a far better color than red.

25 Looking on to the evaluations concerning a number of

1 other areas. One I'd like to focus on is one that's third from
2 the bottom which is the weapons drop areas. Noting again that
3 in many of the DOD analyses we're listed as red. According to
4 our information we should be marked as green. Looking at the
5 next slide, the full range mission drop, the full scale mission
6 drop ranges for green criteria, less than 200 nautical miles; we
7 are less than 60 nautical miles from Fort Hood, the base that I
8 mentioned earlier. We believe certainly that points to a
9 different grading criteria.

10 In looking to the next slide, in summary I want to
11 say that we simply believe that the analysis that was prepared
12 was incorrect and in looking at the information provided on the
13 back of it, you will see that our analysis is correct and that
14 that decision -- that recommendation needs to be revisited.

15 Now, on to the dollars briefly. We believe that only
16 the Air Force Reserve dollars were considered. We believe the
17 construction costs at alternative locations were not
18 considered. We question why only three reserve locations were
19 considered. And we believe that the overhead costs primarily,
20 which is much of this discussion in the cost area, were
21 considered in 1994 terms, not in 1996 when full joint use will
22 occur.

23 Moving to the next slide, I'd like to point out that
24 in our analysis Austin is right in the middle in terms of net
25 present value of savings in closure. Below that, Homestead,

1 below that Fort Worth, and certainly comparable to the other
2 cities that should have been looked at as part of the analysis.

3 When you move on to the discussion of what the
4 relevant costs are, we believe that they're simply much lower in
5 terms of costs for the military than compared to DOD analysis.
6 And I believe that that estimate is well supported by the backup
7 that you have in hand.

8 We understand that DOD analysis in 1994 is far
9 different than what's going to be occurring in 1996 when we have
10 true joint operations. In 1995, just next year, we're going to
11 have air cargo opening and handling some of those joint costs.
12 In 1996 the Air National Guard is scheduled to move its military
13 aviation operations to Bergstrom, thus absorbing some of those
14 costs. And of course in 1998 we will have full commercial use
15 of that airport thereby reducing the cost to the military in a
16 more significant way.

17 We have also taken a look, at your request, at
18 possible other operations. I'm not here as mayor of the City of
19 Austin to tell you or the military what the best plans would be
20 to address what we think are inadequately laid out in the
21 analysis. But we do want to suggest to you. One that we would
22 suggest was that we ought to look at Carswell in terms of
23 combining the reservists not at Carswell but at Bergstrom. We
24 believe that's an efficient kind of operation, has much more
25 room available to do so, and provide cost savings as well as

1 operational efficiency. I would note that when the decision was
2 made about Carswell two years hence, a few years previous, there
3 were only 4,000 people on duty at the shutdown. They're
4 proposing there would be 11,500 under the plans that are
5 presently presented to you. There were only 30 aircraft
6 stationed there; 140. And if you'll move to the next slide, you
7 will see that compared to Austin, that will be -- if you move
8 those 140 aircraft, they will be flying in one of the most
9 congested areas in the entire country.

10 We also took a look at -- so moving on to the next
11 slide, if you just analyze the numbers, we believe that there's
12 great justification for a proposed move that we presented in
13 your information of Carswell reservists to Austin. We also took
14 a look at Homestead, and certainly the tragedy at Homestead of
15 the natural phenomenon that occurred there must have affected
16 their score because we believe that there is significant reason
17 to question that move, as you must have seen in some of your
18 presentations. In effect, due to decisions made in bullet point
19 one and two, you'll have a single squadron at Homestead with
20 about an \$88-million-dollar cost in new construction alone, 15
21 million of which has been already been spent.

22 Move on to the next slide then. I think that just
23 shows some of the analysis.

24 We believe that a move from Carswell -- next slide
25 please -- a move from Carswell, a close of Homestead all provide

1 great opportunities for this commission to look at and for DOD
2 to look at in terms of their presentation. Next slide please.

3 I'd like to close by saying that there is something
4 that we believe strongly, whether it's among people or among
5 governments, and that is the ability to rely on promises that
6 are made. I have led my community through a great deal of
7 ordeal and a great deal of soul-searching and a financial
8 commitment of over \$400 million in bond monies to be able to
9 accomplish and fulfill the promise of the commission that we
10 believe we agreed to in 1991 and reaffirmed through this
11 commission's support in 1993. We believe that the cost
12 justification for allocation of costs which were anticipated
13 have not been properly accounted for, and we believe that will
14 be apparent through the review. We believe in joint operations,
15 and we believe that those joint operations with the U. S. Army
16 certainly can make a great deal of sense.

17 Austin is not a community that will be as highly
18 affected as some others you will look at, and we understand
19 that. We also believe, for that very fact, with the high
20 education level of Austin, the fact it is a high technology work
21 force, that we have great opportunities for recruitment in years
22 to come as far as what we have offered to DOD as part of the
23 analysis. We are one of the very few metropolitan areas in
24 Texas that is below the environmental attainment standards that
25 are set forth by EPA. We believe that provides a great deal of

1 opportunity in terms of direct operations. Also, our weather is
2 one that permits full-time use on a year-round basis, a way to
3 more further the analysis.

4 As was said in the previous presentation, your job is
5 one of the most difficult that could be possibly undertaken.
6 You have difficult decisions to make. We understand that and
7 appreciate the commitment of time and energy you put to your
8 task. We believe that we have fulfilled our end of the
9 promise. We feel also that we have an excellent cost analysis
10 to present to you, your backup; it was outlined here briefly
11 today. We think by looking to the future that was laid out by
12 Congress and by this Commission in 1991, it has been lived up to
13 by Austin every day since, that we have a great opportunity as
14 y'all go about reviewing this hopefully in the Bergstrom
15 decision.

16 Thank you very much.

17 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you, Mayor.

18 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: I'll be glad to answer any
19 questions you may have.

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you. Any questions?

21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I don't have a question, and I
22 was getting an answer from my partner here. I just wanted you
23 to know that we have bounced off all the corrected statistics
24 that you've provided to us, and if indeed they are corrected,
25 they're at the Air Force and the trusty answer is we're supposed

1 to get an answer back by the 27th of April on if the -- there
2 can be adjustments to the measurements of runways, taxiways, et
3 cetera. So I just wanted you to know that was in the works.

4 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: That's very helpful. We do
5 appreciate that very much.

6 Anything else we can help you with?

7 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Well, I think you made your case
8 very clear. And I didn't swear the fellow on that TV set.

9 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: We will leave the swearing to
10 later. We simply look forward to a favorable recommendation by
11 this Commission.

12 Gentlemen, we thank you all for being here.

13 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: And we thank you all. And
14 particularly our visit was very worthwhile. The tour -- we had
15 to leave that day, but the tour was really good, especially
16 seeing that Nick Rose has grown Southern. That is an
17 engineering piece of work.

18 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: We believe that is a wonderful
19 operation. It would be a tragedy to throw that away. It and
20 serves the needs of the military, both Army, Navy, and Air
21 Force, for quite some time here.

22 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: There's no question they feel
23 very, very comfortable where they are. No question that they
24 enjoy their relationship with you.

25 MAYOR BRUCE TODD: Part of that is they just don't

1 want to leave Austin. The other part of it is they do fine work
2 here and very proud of the product they produce.

3 Well, again, I want to thank y'all -- thank the troop
4 from Austin that came up for their time and effort; thank y'all
5 for yours. We certainly will be glad to respond at any later
6 time to any questions you may have.

7 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much.

8 (Applause).

9 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Is the -- I guess they are
10 prepared, the delegation from the Air Force Electronic Warfare
11 Evaluation Simulator Facility.

12 Are y'all ready to go?

13 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Yes, sir.

14 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Let me -- let me comment, our
15 friends from Oklahoma are going to be prepared, but because of
16 Brooks we had five people signed up from San Antonio, five who
17 signed up and their buses are waiting. We are going to hear
18 their public comment, and then we'll take the Oklahoma
19 delegation.

20 So, Mr. Anderson, are you the lead for this group?

21 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Yes, sir, I am.

22 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: And are they -- are you going to
23 be the sole testifier, or do you want me to swear them all in?
24 You only have five minutes.

25 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Swear them all in.

1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: All right, let's do that.

2 (Five witnesses sworn).

3 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Very well. Mr. Anderson, please
4 proceed.

5 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Thank you, Admiral Montoya.
6 My name is Charlie Anderson. I'm the Vice-President of Special
7 Programs at Lockheed, Fort Worth Company. Let me begin by
8 thanking you -- is this microphone on?

9 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: It doesn't sound like it.

10 (Pause).

11 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Again, my name is Charlie
12 Anderson. I'm the Vice-President of Special Programs at
13 Lockheed, Fort Worth Company. Let me begin by thanking you for
14 the opportunity to present our case for the AFEWES laboratory
15 remaining in Fort Worth. I'm sure that most of you, until you
16 saw the name in the commission, didn't realize what an AFEWES
17 was, and I'm not sure all of you do still. By limiting us to
18 five minutes, you've done two things. You've allowed me to sit
19 down, and you can say to yourself a new guy is pressing us. So
20 I appreciate that too.

21 Our case for keeping the AFEWES is very simple. One,
22 the AFEWES is a significant cross-service in international
23 military value which would be degraded if the laboratory was to
24 be relocated; and, two, an AFEWES move makes very little
25 financial sense. And, three, unnecessary and unstated community

1 impact would be avoided if we did not move it.

2 First, you need to know that the AFEWES is a
3 laboratory that occupies about 39,000 square feet of space
4 within the Air Force plant floor which Lockheed operates for the
5 Air Force. It exists to test the ability of the electronic
6 warfare and infrared electronic warfare countermeasure systems
7 to protect the airplanes against SAM threats. This is done
8 under actual battle conditions. During Desert Storm the
9 countermeasures were put on board every U.S. airplane; every
10 coalition airplane had been tested in the AFEWES. AFEWES is
11 needed because it can test EW equipment at every single stage of
12 the development from concept through the final product. If you
13 wait until equipment is flyable, you generally get in the same
14 kind of situation we got in with the B-1 where the equipment
15 didn't work. We need not to say that this equipment will keep
16 you from having to go over the flight test, because we do need
17 flight tests; but AFEWES is a critical piece in the electronic
18 process testing.

19 AFEWES is needed because it is far less expensive
20 than the flight test. I will present you a paper in the book I
21 will give you presented by the 513 test squadron from Moffet to
22 an infrared testing symposium earlier this month that says
23 AFEWES testing did things impossible to do in flight test.
24 While doing that it saved \$5 million in flight tests and
25 increased the odds that the B-1 can perform its mission

1 successfully and come home bringing the crew home safely. At
2 the same symposium the Air Force manager, Eglin Air Force Base,
3 remarked that the cost of AFEWES testing was less than three
4 percent of the cost of flight testing. As I said before, AFEWES
5 testing does not eliminate the need for flight testing, but it
6 can minimize the amount of expense that flight testing
7 requires.

8 Now let us review the information in the DOD base
9 closure and realignment report. It says that AFEWES projected
10 workload is only 28 percent. This is not true. In fact,
11 utilization has been around 90 percent for the last few years,
12 and based on available data we expect it to be that way. I
13 believe probably the 28 percent number came from the fact that
14 we have 39 simulators, and we do not use all the simulators at
15 once.

16 We expect the workload to continue through the
17 foreseeable future. This year we have already conducted a C-17
18 test, an Air Force sponsored test that verified linking AFEWES
19 to other test facilities in ranges is feasible. And that
20 option, I might add, is far less costly by combining and hooking
21 the ranges together than relocating the laboratory.

22 Additional tests are planned this year for the B-2,
23 the Priority 1-1 Special Access Required program and numerous
24 OSD-sponsored infrared countermeasures tests, a test of the
25 Army's system which is a countermeasure system, and tests for

1 Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For '96 and beyond we
2 have to date been contacted about testing the B-1, B-2, the
3 F-22, and the F-15, as well as the major chest of the U.S. Army,
4 U.S. Navy, Japan, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and the United
5 Kingdom. Other tests will materialize as those years approach.

6 AFEWES' usage is healthy and supported by military
7 need. The DOD report states that our capability is duplicated
8 elsewhere is untrue. AFEWES is a very unique facility with 39
9 high-fidelity simulations that is not matched anywhere else.
10 That is why the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and foreign
11 governments test their equipment here regularly. The DOD
12 reports state that only nine jobs are affected. But that number
13 reflects only the Air Force jobs that oversees AFEWES. In fact,
14 there are about 100 contractor people that their jobs are
15 affected.

16 Call for -- excuse me -- the Air Force recommended
17 action calls for two things; one is to move the people; and
18 two -- to manage the AFEWES and, two, to move the laboratory.
19 The small savings presented in the report are entirely due to
20 moving the people. The Air Force management from Fort Worth to
21 Eglin and the Eglin management to Edwards, we do not oppose this
22 move because we ran for many years without Air Force oversight.
23 In fact, the Air Force can achieve the savings without moving
24 the laboratory. There are no savings associated with moving the
25 laboratory. In fact, this will be very costly to move the

1 laboratory.

2 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Mr. Anderson, your time is up.
3 Let me ask you, can you -- do you have any -- I've got three
4 points I've written down, or four. Do you have any one or more
5 points you can quickly give, and we then can terminate this?

6 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Yes, sir. It's going to cost
7 about 50 or \$60 million to move the lead. That's a fact. It's
8 been documented, and the Air Force can tell you it's
9 documented.

10 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Okay.

11 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: It's also a fact that they
12 will have to build facilities at Edwards to take this particular
13 facility.

14 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Okay. What else?

15 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: So if you move all of it or
16 even part of it, there's going to be a large cost due to
17 laboratory. The only savings is moving the people.

18 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: And we'll have your testimony, and
19 we can then follow up and check on those numbers.

20 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Yes, sir.

21 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I know we give you a tough task in
22 five minutes, but you've adequately raised some flags for us and
23 I want to thank you all for coming to participate.

24 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Thank you. Do you have any
25 questions?

1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: No, we don't. You're right; I
2 know more about an AFEWES now than I did before I sat down.
3 Thank you.

4 MR. CHARLES ANDERSON: Thank you

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1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I have four names of people we
2 believe who might still be here who signed to take part in the
3 public session. And if so, if you would stand -- come forward,
4 just stand along the front here so I can swear you in. And the
5 names I have are Linda Billaburke. Good to see you,
6 Councilwoman. Adeno Rogales, Roger Callenberg. Is Mr.
7 Callenberg here? And the last one is Mr. Terry Shippey. So
8 it's three of you.

9 (Three witnesses sworn).

10 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you. Well, in the order
11 that I read to you, you may each have two minutes.

12 LINDA BILLABURKE: Thank you, Commissioner. I just
13 came to deliver some letters from one of my grade schools in San
14 Antonio, which has 75 Brooks students, and another from a
15 Catholic school. And I think you ought to appreciate this; you
16 have grandchildren. And all I want to say is that I want to
17 talk about the big picture, and it goes beyond what Brooks is
18 and saving Brooks but talking about nurturing and building a
19 brain trust. My biggest hope is that the United States has the
20 biggest and best scientists and technicians that can move our
21 country forward in technology and that we preserve that.

22 San Antonio has been extremely lucky to have Brooks;
23 they've been a partnership with the community and have one of
24 the largest tutoring systems in all of the air forces. So it
25 benefits the community, and it benefits the Air Force. You can

1 only have a strong military if you have a very strong community
2 support. I'm very proud to say that San Antonio stuck by the
3 military when times have been bad and will continue to stick by
4 the military.

5 But I think that you will enjoy these letters, and
6 they're going to be a real tug on your heart when you read them
7 because they're from first-graders all the way up to
8 fifth-graders. And there's not anybody more honest than a
9 child. So you're going to get purely honest letters that some
10 will make you laugh, most of them will make you cry; and you'll
11 understand that it's great to be a child and why can't we always
12 think as a child does. So I'll give these to you.

13 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much. And I
14 appreciate you coming. Mr. Rogales?

15 MR. ROGALES: Adeno Rogales. I'm the President of
16 the Local 1757, American Federation of Government Employees.
17 I've been privileged to have worked on the BRAC Task Force for
18 San Antonio since its inception, and I affirm to you that we
19 have worked diligently to understand all the proposals that the
20 task force has given towards y'all. We are willing to work with
21 the agency in the negotiation of the COBRA plan. We have
22 established a partnership on the base. I think we are one of
23 the unique organizations that have worked towards the
24 partnership. And you have full support of the union, and we
25 will work with the agency in this noble mission. Thank you.

1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much. Mr. Shippey?

2 MR. SHIPPEY: I'm Terry Shippey. I represent the
3 IAFF, the fire fighters at Brooks Air Force Base. I've worked
4 at Brooks Air Force Base for the past 21 years. This gives me a
5 unique look at base operations and the workplace family. The
6 facilities at Brooks were built around the people and their
7 needs. The plan to retain the mission and abandon the
8 facilities is not logical and should be rethought. The balance
9 of workers and the atmosphere and the technical support of the
10 community should not be disturbed. I'd like to thank y'all for
11 you all's cooperation and I hope you read the comments that I
12 put in the letters.

13 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I read your letter.

14 MR. SHIPPEY: Thank you.

15 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you for coming up and
16 representing your community.

17 Again, thank you all for the long trip that you made
18 to represent San Antonio and Brooks.

19 Now, hopefully we are prepared to take the Oklahoma
20 delegation out of order so that we can proceed with our day. Is
21 the Governor here?

22 LT. GEN. RICHARD BURPEE: We have a point man.

23 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Yes, sir.

24 (Pause).

25 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Senator, you may not be aware that

1 we are required to swear in all witnesses for BRAC hearings, so
2 we can do that.

3 SENATOR DON NICKLES: Oh. Why don't you swear in our
4 whole delegation.

5 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I will. I'll do them all at once.
6 If y'all will rise.

7 (Witnesses sworn).

8 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Senator, welcome, and we're ready
9 to proceed.

10 SENATOR DON NICKLES: Commissioners, thank you very
11 much for coordinating with us and allowing us to go forward a
12 little earlier than planned and thanks also to the other
13 witnesses. We appreciate your accommodation too because we know
14 a lot of schedules have been bumped around a little bit to
15 accommodate us, but we do have a natural -- not a natural
16 death -- a real tragedy that's caused by terrorism this morning
17 in Oklahoma City, and many of us want to return and to be
18 helpful if we can in any way possible.

19 I also wish to compliment the Commission for the
20 outstanding job that you've have done and the very difficult
21 task that you have. I remember testifying two years ago before
22 the regional hearing in Texas on base closures; in fact a lot of
23 the same bases that are here today. But this is probably more
24 difficult because certainly in the previous rounds I think BRAC
25 had closed most of the easy bases. Now you're really getting

1 into tough, tough decisions. And I appreciate your willingness
2 and cooperation in coming to visit Tinker Air Force Base and
3 many of the other air bases around the country. You have a very
4 difficult task, and I compliment you for your courage in taking
5 it on. Certainly when you get into the air logistic centers
6 this is not an easy quest. A couple years ago the Air Force was
7 recommending closing of one. There's no question we have excess
8 capacity. Whether one should be closed or two should be closed,
9 a lot of that decision now rests before the Commission. I wish
10 you well.

11 I did wish to open up in presenting the case for
12 Tinker Air Force Base. There's five air logistic centers. We
13 happen to think Tinker is the best. It's a big base. Several
14 of you have visited our base. It's one that we're very proud
15 of. We have a history going back 55 years. The commitment
16 between Tinker Air Force Base and the Air Force and our national
17 defense is long and solid and secure, and it's an excellent
18 relationship. Our community, our state has done a lot to make
19 that happen. They've donated land. They've built fabulous
20 facilities. When the Air Force indicated maybe they'd like to
21 have some additional space around the base, they donated that
22 land as well. Actually, we had a referendum on that land that
23 passed over eight to one to buy the land surrounding the airport
24 to give it additional space.

25 We have one of the largest hangars in the country.

1 It truly is a national asset. We have dual runways capable of
2 servicing large airplanes. We really have experienced
3 cross-servicing because we actually service not only Air Force
4 planes but Navy planes; and that saves the Department of Defense
5 and our taxpayers a lot of money.

6 We're centrally located. We think we have the best
7 facility anywhere in the country. And we also believe,
8 Commissioners, we have the best work force anywhere in the
9 country. We're very proud of Tinker Air Force Base and its
10 contribution. We think it is a national asset, and we're
11 confident after you review it that you will agree with us as
12 well.

13 I'm happy to introduce my friend and colleague, newly
14 elected Congressman from this district, Congressman J. C.
15 Watts.

16 CONGRESSMAN WATTS: Thank you, Senator, and Mr.
17 Chairman and other Commissioners. I will be brief, and I thank
18 you for the opportunity to share my thoughts on Tinker Air Force
19 Base and also the opportunity to acknowledge my continued
20 support and confidence in the employees and leadership of Tinker
21 Air Force Base and their contribution to the military readiness
22 of our great nation.

23 Let me characterize my support in two words. Tinker
24 delivers. Whether it's the fabrication of parts to keep our
25 most sophisticated aircraft like the B-2 bomber in a

1 mission-ready state or the management of missiles such as the
2 air-launched cruise missile, the short-range attack missile, the
3 Navy's harpoon, and advanced cruise missiles, Tinker delivers.
4 Tinker delivers.

5 As the Commission considers the BRAC options, I
6 encourage you to closely consider the quantitative data
7 associated and prepared and maintenance of the equipment and the
8 systems under Tinker's watchful eye. Commissioners will
9 discover, as you continue to take a close look at Tinker Air
10 Force Base, the efficiency and the effectiveness of the Tinker
11 community. For example, working with the current industrial
12 fund budget of almost \$1 billion, depot maintenance, personnel
13 seek out and achieve excellence in every endeavor. Examples of
14 Tinker's achievements include responsibility for managing more
15 than 17,000 jet engines. Department of Defense's own depot
16 maintenance operations indicates and states that during the
17 period ended in the second quarter of the fiscal year 1994,
18 Tinker's average engine processing was greater than one-third
19 better than the competition. Tinker's schedule indicator index
20 for the period between April of '93 and February of '94 was the
21 second best for the Air Force materiel command.

22 Tinker is leading the fleet in the area of technology
23 innovation in the Department. Tinker's formed a number of
24 technology advancement coalitions to address a wide spectrum of
25 environmental issues. One such thing is going on in the

1 Department of Defense installations in Oklahoma that's a
2 coalition to cost the information on compliance actions and
3 improve the partnership between EPA and other federal agencies.

4 Also, Tinker blazed a trail in cost savings of fuel
5 use by adapting some 551 vehicles to run on propane and
6 electricity. Nearly 300 fleet vehicles have been converted to
7 dual-fuel and natural gas, giving Tinker the distinction of
8 having one of the largest dual-fuel mottoes in the nation. The
9 bottom line and important defense issue is how this installation
10 contributes to the nation's war fighting capability and military
11 readiness. And I, serving on the National Security Committee in
12 the House of Representatives, have gotten a firsthand look at
13 how important fighting capability and military readiness is. Of
14 course we believe strongly that Tinker plays a critical role in
15 that proposal.

16 Tinker delivers and does it extremely, extremely
17 well. As a matter of fact, we think they do it the best. The
18 men and women of this great facility are committed to delivering
19 the products, services, and support that has made this base and
20 its people an integral part of our national security strategy.

21 Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to
22 present my thoughts on tinker Air Force Base. As you will find
23 in the next few speakers, we are awfully proud of Tinker Air
24 Force Base, its employees, and the leadership that we have
25 there.

1 At this time, Mr. Chairman, let me take this
2 opportunity to introduce to you and let him address the
3 Commission, a former commander of Tinker Air Force Base and the
4 gentleman that has led the efforts of the Tinker Task Force in
5 Oklahoma, my friend, General Dick Burpee.

6 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you, Congressman.

7 LT. GEN. RICHARD BURPEE: This is not very high tech,
8 but I do welcome the opportunity to use this kind of a format to
9 brief you on Tinker. I have just a few charts. I'd like to go
10 through them kind of quickly here if I can.

11 The first chart, we think that Tinker is truly a
12 national military asset. It's been bought and paid for, it's
13 been invested by the American people, and it just truly is a
14 national military asset.

15 Here's how it all started. We have base support
16 around the country for all of our military installations, and
17 I've been in a number of them and I know you people who served
18 in the military have been in communities where the support was
19 just superb. In Tinker it's a little bit different because it
20 all started by the community giving -- buying the land and
21 giving it to the war department, 960 acres, back in 1941. And
22 in years later, as the mission expanded, the base housing area
23 and the hospital and cantonment area and that sort of thing,
24 that land was purchased by the community and given to Tinker as
25 well as the other shaded areas that you see. Now, this was at

1 no cost to the government, which is considerably different than
2 what we experienced when we were -- I know when I was at SAC a
3 community used to buy a -- build a swimming pool for the Air
4 Force where they'd have a barbecue grill or this sort of thing.
5 But very seldom did you ever see where they actually purchased
6 land and gave it to the military and said it's yours. And
7 that's what happened.

8 If we turn now and look at military value, the
9 Senator talked about that a few minutes ago. Tinker is located
10 right in the center of the United States. You can see the
11 radius here. The thing that makes that so important is that
12 when the founders of the community wanted to give the land to
13 the war department, they wanted it to be a distribution center.
14 And they thought because of its location that it would make the
15 most sense to make it a distribution center so it could service
16 all parts of the country. The thing that makes us also
17 important in the Air Force is two-level maintenance. And, as
18 you know, the log air system has gone away and the
19 transportation things that we use now is done by truck mostly
20 except for a few critical parts. But you're within -- you're
21 within 12 hours usually of some place that you can get parts to
22 Tinker, quicker turnaround, less inventories, et cetera, et
23 cetera. And Tinker is involved in that two-level maintenance.

24 Also, I want to talk about military value, and I
25 could list -- Tinker has 570 industrial buildings. And I'm not

1 going to talk about all those, but I would like to point out a
2 couple here that do stand out. We have an aerial port which is
3 available. It was the largest signaling aerial port during the
4 Desert Storm. It's sitting there vacant right now not being
5 used. Building 3001, I'm going to address that separately.

6 But the are blade repair facility, I want to take
7 just a second on that. That facility was built just a few years
8 ago. It cost -- the building itself was about \$11 million, and
9 then the equipment inside of course is much higher than that.
10 But I remember when I was a commander we had a private
11 contractor who is doing what they call plastic spray on engine
12 blades. It was the only -- the only contractor that could do
13 that; they had the patent for that. And it was big business.
14 Well, they defrauded the government by \$12 million. We sued
15 them. We didn't have this blade facility at that time. The Air
16 Force sued them for their money back; we recovered 4 million.
17 And then I was directed by the legal counsel of the Air Force to
18 bar this company from doing business with us. But they had the
19 patent; they were the only ones who could do it. So we were
20 hostage to the company. And so at that time this building, the
21 blade repair facility, was in the works and that sort of turned
22 it over, and now we do all that blade repair right there at
23 Tinker. It has the capacity of 5 million blades per year.
24 We're currently doing just less than a million. And there's
25 only one other facility like that in the country, at least in

1 the government, and that's at Cherry Point, the Navy -- the
2 Marines.

3 B-2 facilities, we just invested \$27 million in three
4 brand new B-2 facilities that are waiting for the B-2 operation
5 to come in. We're the only depot that has dual runways.
6 Composite repair, all of them have that, but we have that ready
7 for the B-2.

8 The fuel control facility was just -- the ground was
9 just broken on that -- or not the ground, I mean, the ribbon was
10 just cut on the 6th of April. Brand new \$14.5 million facility,
11 just really first class. We have two large engine test cells,
12 on that will take engines up to 50,000 pounds of thrust and then
13 four units -- four test cells that will take engines up to
14 100,000 pounds of thrust. I think that's the only one in the
15 government that can do that.

16 I point out the large aircraft hangars. We have a
17 number of them. We can handle B-2's, B-51's -- I mean B-1's and
18 B-52's and that sort of thing. But the point I want to make
19 here is that if you can handle large airplanes, you certainly
20 can handle small ones.

21 I said I wanted to talk about Building 3001. It's
22 truly a unique building all in itself. And I just use this as a
23 representative display of the flexibility that you can do with
24 this building. Now some of the Commissioners were there the
25 other day and rode around in a cart and saw that. But you can

1 put bombers in there, you can put tankers in there, fighters.
2 When I was the commander, we had 20 A-7's going on at the same
3 time. They had a bunch of KC-135's. Engine lines, commodities,
4 our spare parts. And the other part about it is that the
5 manager of the weapons, the engineers and the administrators and
6 that sort of thing are in the same building. So if you run into
7 any kind of a problem out there doing some depot repair, you get
8 the engineer and he comes down and takes a look at it and solves
9 the problem, gets on with it.

10 It's interesting, this building is almost a mile
11 long. When it was being built they were producing Douglas
12 DC-3's during the war. At the same time they were still
13 continuing to build the building. But it's a unique asset to
14 the Air Force. We had a fire in 1984 from about this point on,
15 and when it was rebuilt they rebuilt it to the most modern
16 machine repair center or facility probably in the world. It has
17 all the latest stuff in there to overall engines and so on.

18 Continuing with more military value, the
19 cross-service, the shaded area reflects the synergism that you
20 get by being co-located with the AWACS -- or the AWACS, the Navy
21 wing being co-located at this depot. This eliminates a number
22 of people. You don't have to have a tire shop in both the AWACS
23 and the Navy. You don't have to have a fuel cell. You don't
24 have to have an engine shop. And a whole bunch of things are
25 missing. The Navy initially thought they were going to have to

1 have 1600 people to run this wing. They do it today with
2 1111 -- 1115. And then AWACS, they -- normally the AWACS size
3 would be -- if they weren't at Tinker it would probably be
4 something like 6500 people, and they do it with 3500 now. So
5 you get a great synergism by being co-located and letting the
6 depot do the work for those two units.

7 We have a kind of unique -- I don't really like that
8 term, but it is different than any other base. We call -- the
9 Navy wing we call the Tinker Naval Air Station, but it is the
10 fleet or fleet depot for the E-6, and it really is great. In
11 addition to base support, when you come through the gate you may
12 have a Navy -- a sailor on or an airman or whatever. But they
13 share the alert facility that was already built for the AWACS.
14 Simulators, they train in the same simulators, the AWACS crews,
15 the Navy crews. Aircraft trainers, there are three trainers
16 that they do transition with and air refueling and that sort of
17 thing. That's all done both by AWACS and Navy crews.
18 Intermediate maintenance done by Tinker and of course the depot
19 repair.

20 The Navy came in and had a little different concept
21 of depot repair. They wanted to replace -- or fix the airplanes
22 in depot as it went through the phase, a phase type thing. And
23 by doing that, they saved some 60 days. They were looking at --
24 the Air Force was looking at doing that with the AWACS. What's
25 important about that is two things. One is the cost, and the

1 other is it keeps the airplane in the air 60 days more than what
2 you would if you had to put it in the depot. The Navy says this
3 operation saves them a quarter of a million dollars -- a quarter
4 of a billion dollars each year.

5 Tinker has also been doing a lot of cross-service
6 work. 15 percent of their engine workload is done on Navy -- on
7 the F-14 engines right now. And they're very proud of the fact
8 they've met every engine on time and below cost, and this is the
9 Navy figure here. And it goes -- they said by doing this here
10 they've saved \$6 million a year.

11 I just want to show here -- I want to show where the
12 community has protected that base over the year. Senator
13 Nickles mentioned a little while ago -- this is the base
14 proper. Some 14,500 acres have been preserved for Tinker
15 expansion if they need it. This is owned by the city. It's a
16 wetlands area, and it's -- General Davis pickled a couple of tip
17 tanks off in Stanley Gregor Lake once and didn't think it was
18 there. It didn't hurt anybody. The community voted a
19 \$10 million bond issue and removed a whole section up here of --
20 a housing section including a school when it looked like it was
21 going to shut down the main long runway, and that is now leased
22 back to the Air Force for a dollar for every 10 units -- 15
23 units. So the encroachment -- there is no encroachment problem
24 in the community. The state, the city, and county have all
25 protected that very, very carefully.

1 We agree with the Air Force on how they evaluated the
2 depots and when they put them in the tiers, and you're well
3 familiar with these tiers. We just happen to think that it is
4 the best, as Congressman Watts mentioned.

5 Here's the way the BRAC recommendations -- and this
6 was the third iteration I think. The original one came out and
7 showed us losing -- showed Tinker losing 1180 people. And the
8 one that was just reprocessed revised and showed us losing 398.
9 And then we're gaining back some people from Rome -- the Rome
10 laboratory, 476. So we have a net gain now out of this system
11 of 78.

12 If we go back in the reductions, and there's some
13 concerns about readiness. If you go back in 1990, Oklahoma
14 City, just civilians alone, there were 16,500 people there
15 working. From '90 to '93 you can see the cuts. I learned the
16 other day that there's a Dorn memo that directed the Air Force
17 to lose 30,000 people by the year 2001, and Tinker's share of
18 that is 4,115. If you put that together with the BRAC, that
19 shows us by the year 2001 we're going to take this kind of a hit
20 for a 56 percent cut in civilian -- this is civilian-only
21 personnel. That translates into this kind of an annual impact
22 in terms of dollars to the community.

23 The impact on readiness that we just mentioned is a
24 concern to me as a former blue-suiter in that we may be placing
25 ourselves out of business if we continue the down-size process.

1 Tinker has the capacity to work \$12.9 million direct labor
2 hours. They're presently operating at 7.3. If they were at
3 12.9, the cost per hour is \$50 an hour. Today their cost is \$60
4 an hour. And as we continue to draw down these numbers of
5 people, of course the costs continue to go up.

6 If we took that \$10 an hour, for example, and just
7 applied it toward this 7.3, it's \$70 million a year. If you put
8 it towards the total Air Force direct labor hours requirement,
9 that's \$300 million that is a potential savings, if you filled
10 up the depot.

11 I showed this next chart to some of your
12 commissioners the other day, and this just emphasizes that these
13 unit costs go up, you know, the Air Force has a cash flow
14 problem. You aren't going to buy C-17's or F-22's or anything
15 else because you're absorbing that. The other thing that can
16 happen to you is that you price yourself out of business, you go
17 contractor, you become a hostage to the private industry or
18 whatever. It's just not a healthy position for the government
19 to be in.

20 So I see your challenge as, one, to pick the right
21 size in looking at all depots in the Department of Defense and
22 measuring and balancing the war fighting capability and getting
23 in the right balance so that we can meet our military
24 commitments around the world.

25 Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

1 SENATOR NICKLES: I'd like Congressman Moongoose to
2 conclude. Senator Inhoff we were hoping would be here and maybe
3 coming in momentarily, but Congressman Moongoose has had several
4 thousand citizens who work at Tinker as well.

5 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Congressman?

6 CONGRESSMAN MOONGOOSE: I'd like to thank the
7 Commission for the opportunity to briefly address you. I think
8 I simply want to stress one point in this matter -- having
9 observed the General's demonstration and all the information
10 that you've gone through, I know it's mounted in recent days and
11 weeks -- but nonetheless that's the work ethic of the Tinker
12 work force in Oklahoma. 54 years of a proven track record,
13 being efficient and being productive. And that's demonstrated
14 in all the information you've seen. That all boils back down to
15 the people who make the things happen in that facility, a
16 clearly proven dedicated work force, the kind of folks that
17 would provide the type of efficiency and productivity that we're
18 going to have to have in the days ahead of us if we down-size.
19 That's really the mission that I bring to you, is that when you
20 consider all these myriad of details, all these myriad of facts
21 that come before you, take that into account, the people who do
22 the work to accomplish the goals that have to be accomplished.
23 Thank you.

24 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much.

25 SENATOR NICKLES: As I mentioned, Admiral, I wasn't

1 sure whether or not Senator Inhoff would be here since he's
2 flying his own aircraft. He may be here momentarily, but we'll
3 be happy to answer any questions you might have, and we
4 appreciate your accommodating him if he should come in later.

5 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Yes, sir, we certainly will; we'll
6 find room for him sometime today if he chooses to -- if he gets
7 here and chooses to speak, we certainly will. Any questions?

8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I only have one. I'm sort of
9 the source talk I guess of the group. Your capacity number,
10 General, is based on when?

11 LT. GEN. RICHARD BURPEE: That was the highest
12 capacity Tinker reached. It was in 1989.

13 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Have they removed work stations
14 to degrade the ability to hit that limited number?

15 LT. GEN. RICHARD BURPEE: Some of the work stations
16 have been removed, but certainly the potential capacity is
17 there.

18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I don't have any other
19 questions.

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Any questions, Mr. Cornella?

21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: General, on the figure you
22 used of 335 million impact, was that direct or with
23 multipliers?

24 LT. GEN. RICHARD BURPEE: Those are -- those are
25 direct dollars. Those are '95 dollars. We used constant 1995

1 dollars and then projecting it up. Just kept constant FY '95.

2 That's direct annual payroll by the way, just payroll.

3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you very much.

4 SENATOR NICKLES: Admiral, I might just mention one
5 thing that General Burpee mentioned. We've had a reduction in
6 the work force in the last few years of over 4,000 people. I
7 think that's important to note. So there has been down-sizing,
8 significant down-sizing, and as a result of that the cost per
9 hour has had some increase. I think that then was by the
10 chart. Also, I wanted to apologize, I stepped out because the
11 President was calling me expressing his condolences but also his
12 assistance on the disaster we have in Oklahoma City and will be
13 returning there, I think all of us, trying to assist in any way
14 we can. We appreciate very much your willingness to accommodate
15 our schedules; and also to the other participants because we
16 know we moved them back a little bit, and we appreciate your
17 flexibility as well.

18 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Senator, our best wishes to all of
19 you in the delegation and a safe trip back. And thank you for
20 joining us today.

21 SENATOR NICKLES: Thank you very much.

22 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you all very much.

23 (Applause).

24 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: This hearing is now adjourned, and
25 we will reconvene promptly at 1:30, or 13:30 for the Army.

(Lunch recess).

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1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: The afternoon session is now in
2 session. Good afternoon to all of you.

3 (Audience responds).

4 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Welcome to our afternoon session,
5 and I'm Benjamin Montoya and with me are my fellow commissioners
6 Al Cornella, Rebecca Cox, J. B. Davis, Josue Robles and Wendi
7 Steele.

8 (Applause).

9 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: This afternoon we will hear the
10 continued presentation from the State of Texas which will last
11 70 minutes. Then presentations from Arkansas -- a presentation
12 from Arkansas which will be 25 minutes. As is the case with all
13 our regional hearings, the Commission has given a block of time
14 to each state based on the number of installations on the list
15 and the job loss. We have left it to the elected officials and
16 leaders of those communities to decide how to fill their block
17 of time, so you will have all 70 minutes to use as you see fit.

18 We're ready to begin. So Mr. DuVall, if you will
19 introduce to us those whom you expect to be part of your
20 presentation, I'll swear them in.

21 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: All right, sir. First I have
22 Brigadier General Donovan; Mr. "Swede" Lee -- Robert E. "Swede"
23 Lee; myself, Phillip DuVall; Congressman Chapman; and Senator
24 Kay Bailey Hutchison. And we have staff members, Mr. Dwight
25 Byrd; Dennis Lewis; Ms. Donna Dastillon.

1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Very good. If y'all will raise
2 your right hand.

3 (Six witnesses sworn).

4 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you. Please proceed.
5 Welcome, Congressman Chapman.

6 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: Sir, first I would like to take
7 time to introduce the Red River family. I would like for the
8 Red River family to stand up, please.

9 (Applause).

10 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: Commissioners, we're happy to be
11 here. We want to thank you for the opportunity to present the
12 defense on Red River. You have a tough job, and we just want to
13 present you with the facts that we consider pertinent to the
14 case. First, we're going to have a brief video, about a five to
15 six-minute video that gives you an overview of the installation,
16 to show the size, and then we'll follow in this order of
17 presenters. I will lead the first one.

18 (Video presentation).

19 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: I'd like to take just a few
20 additional minutes to expand on some pertinent facts related to
21 our complex that are critical to the community's case that will
22 be presented by Congressman Chapman.

23 First, we're a maintenance defense complex unlike any
24 other installation in the world. You see before you the key
25 components of our installation, our DLA distribution center, the

1 Red River Army Depot, the Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, eight
2 tenants who not only support the complex but also support
3 customers beyond, way beyond the boundaries of the
4 installation. The size of the complex is 35,000 acres, it's
5 massive place, most of you have been there; and it's located 20
6 miles west of Texarkana. The primary businesses of our complex
7 are outlined here. The distribution depot serves not only the
8 maintenance portion of the depot but many external customers as
9 I'll show you later. The Red River Army Depot proper includes
10 both a maintenance and ammunition operations mission. The Lone
11 Star plant is adjacent to Red River. It's a contractor-operated
12 plant that manufactures ammunition.

13 Now, each of these missions is a vital part of the
14 total complex. As you are aware, DOD's plan is to realign the
15 distribution mission, close the maintenance mission, except for
16 the rubber products, and enclave the ammunition and rubber
17 operations to Lone Star. I'd like to point out, though, these
18 missions do not operate as self-contained entities. Each is
19 dependent upon the other as reflected by this chart. This
20 creates synergy which reduces the cost of operations because of
21 the shared base operations cost and other resources. For
22 example, maintenance is both a customer and a supplier of DLA
23 and vice versa. Vehicles are received by the DLA's distribution
24 depot; issued to maintenance for repair and return to DLA for
25 storage or distribution as required.

1 Removal of any of these missions will result in
2 increased support costs for the remaining mission because some
3 support like the boiler plant, the water plant, the industrial
4 wastewater treatment plant must be maintained for the remaining
5 mission.

6 This map clearly illustrates our location in relation
7 to our major customers. We're in the center of the United
8 States, and over 50 percent of all stateside military posts,
9 camps, and stations are located in the Central United States.
10 We can provide cost efficient one-day service to most of our
11 customers.

12 In looking at our top ten distribution locations as
13 shown on this chart, the importance of our central location is
14 further amplified. Fort Hood, our number one customer, accounts
15 for 17.6 percent of our total workload. The Army maintenance
16 mission at Red River is not in the top ten customers, yet DLA
17 has stated that the maintenance depot is by far their biggest
18 customer and the primary reason for their presence there. While
19 that's the case for most other depots, you can see that's not
20 the case for Red River.

21 This chart reflects a little bit of that. It shows
22 the actual profile of the materiel in storage in the DLA's
23 warehouses at Red River. The materiel is valued at over 6.4
24 billion dollars. You'll note that the actual percentage of
25 materiel in storage to support the maintenance operations is

1 only 13 percent. Another approximately five percent is for
2 other local customers. The bulk of the materiel, 82 percent, is
3 in support of customers external to the complex. This, again,
4 contradicts DLA's contention that the maintenance activity is a
5 distribution depot, the primary mission.

6 Now included in that materiel, besides what's in
7 general warehouses, are over 8,000 vehicles as shown on this
8 chart. Another 6,000 are presently in route or will be in route
9 transferred from Drew Elliott as a result of BRAC '93. Now, if
10 we were to vacate all these vehicles and the materiels shown on
11 the previous chart, it would require approximately 19,000
12 18-wheelers to haul the stuff off. Now I computed that up, and
13 I estimated the mileage. The convoy that would haul that stuff
14 off would stretch from here to California. Wouldn't you imagine
15 that? The cost of the movement of this stock was not included
16 in the Army analysis.

17 Now let's look at our maintenance operations. DOD's
18 core weapons systems presently assigned to Red River the depot
19 maintenance as shown on this chart. The core systems are the
20 systems that are required to support the Army's war fighting
21 capability. I would like to point out that Letterkenny is
22 responsible for one track of the DOD core system, the
23 self-propelled Howitzer and that Anniston has only one, the M-1
24 tank.

25 Speaking of numbers, while you're looking at the Army

1 mechanized division, over three-fourths of the track vehicles
2 for the Army are presently maintained at Red River. The other
3 23 percent is split between Letterkenny and Anniston. No
4 analysis was conducted by the Army to consider moving the
5 remaining 23 percent to Red River, even though we have past
6 experience in overhauling tanks and Howitzers that we can still
7 do that work.

8 This chart is a summary of the Army's total fleet of
9 vehicles that will be maintained at Red River under the new
10 force structure. There is no plan to buy new vehicles, as
11 you're aware. We must -- simply must maintain what we have;
12 there won't be any more. At the current production rate of
13 1,000 per year, it will take 24 years to cycle this fleet
14 through our depot for overall. If this work were moved to
15 Anniston, they would be overloaded and the cycle time definitely
16 will increase. And I ask you: Can the Army's readiness afford
17 that? Would you drive your car over 24 years and get it
18 overhauled?

19 With our personnel and their unique knowledge -- and
20 we've built it up over a 20-year period in these vehicles -- we
21 have the capability and the capacity to support an emergency
22 wartime requirement. What these figures show you is that with
23 the vehicles we now have on hand we can equip an entire division
24 within six months. That's not the full overhaul; that's just
25 getting the vehicles ready to fire. Under the Army's proposal

1 to eliminate infrastructure, it's doubtful that this could be
2 accomplished with only one depot. Because we have the unique
3 knowledge base, we can respond instantly. If that knowledge
4 base is lost, which will occur under the present plan, our
5 soldiers will be in trouble if there is an emergency.

6 Let me give you some examples of how we use our
7 unique knowledge to support the soldiers. We routinely send
8 teams from both the maintenance and the distribution operations
9 throughout the world to support the troops. They can repair and
10 modify the vehicle, provide supply support, train our soldiers
11 and also support our foreign allies. During Desert Storm we
12 provided on-site support to deploying units throughout the
13 United States. Even more important, we provided support for our
14 soldiers there in the desert. A classic example was a
15 modification of our rocket system, the multiple-launch rocket
16 system, to allow it to fire long range.

17 Some of you may recall seeing the rocket attack on
18 CNN, some referred to as the night of steel rain. Our
19 technician support made this possible and directly contributed
20 to the allied victory. After the war, as a part of the force
21 reconstitution effort, many of your vehicles were cycled through
22 the depot prior to return to the using units here in the United
23 States.

24 The next chart, you don't follow in your book; you'll
25 find it over in tab H. One of our presenters didn't show, so

1 I'm doing that part of the briefing. Time and again we have
2 been formally recognized as the leader in quality, not only in
3 the Department of Defense, but in the total federal sector.
4 Some of the other awards that we've received are listed, but the
5 main one I'd like to bring to your attention is the first one on
6 the bullet, the Federal Quality Improvement Prototype Award we
7 just won this year. That is synonymous with the Malcolm
8 Baldrige Award in private industry. I think it's very special
9 that we won this award.

10 (Applause).

11 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: Now, the result of this quality
12 effort is reflected in productivity gains and the high level of
13 quality in our products. We're concerned that this record is
14 not considered in the process. There is no question that it
15 should be. This chart summarizes my briefing.

16 Congressman Chapman will now discuss the community
17 plan to show why it makes absolutely no sense for the soldiers
18 or for the taxpayers to close what the commanding general has
19 called the "flagship enterprise of the depot system". Why in
20 the world would the Department of Defense close its leader in
21 efficiency and quality? Congressman Chapman.

22 (Applause).

23 CONGRESSMAN CHAPMAN: Good afternoon. I am Jim
24 Chapman, the United States Representative for the 1st District
25 of Texas, and it's a pleasure to have you here in our state.

1 And I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today.

2 You've seen the short video, you've heard Dr.
3 DuVall's presentation, which clearly shows the importance of Red
4 River to the defense of our nation, and the closure of the
5 installation is not in DOD's best interest. Red River Army
6 Depot just won the government equivalent of the Malcolm
7 Baldrige Award. It is an intense competition. It has been
8 recognized as one of the five -- five finest federal facilities
9 in the country and the only one in the Department of Defense.
10 It is the best --

11 (Applause).

12 CONGRESSMAN CHAPMAN: The briefing you have just
13 heard by Dr. DuVall, while presented on behalf of the community,
14 is precisely the same briefing that the depot commander gave to
15 the commissioners that attended on April the 6th -- Mr. Cornella
16 was there -- precisely the same briefing. No slant, no
17 difference, just facts. Colonel Hall would have liked to have
18 been here today, and he requested that he be allowed to be here
19 today in civilian clothes on annual leave, and that permission
20 was denied. He, along with the chief civilian employee, the
21 number one civilian employee at DLA who was dispatched to
22 Washington today after he also requested permission to take
23 annual leave and appear with us in support of this effort.
24 Neither of those gentlemen are here, but the briefing you have
25 just heard is the same briefing they gave on April the 6th.

1 We've obtained the Army and the DLA data that are the
2 baseline for the decision to recommend closure of the Red River
3 Army Depot and the disestablishment of DDRT. Our review of this
4 data has led us to conclude that the DOD overall analysis is
5 flawed, fundamentally flawed.

6 I led a delegation to the Pentagon on January the 5th
7 of this year. We briefed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
8 Robert Bader, and Undersecretary of the Army, Joe Reeder, on Red
9 River's military value; and we specifically requested they
10 evaluate Red River as a single defense complex. It is not just
11 a maintenance depot; it is not just a supply mission. There are
12 eight other tenants. It is a military complex that has a
13 synergy that Dr. DuVall has briefed you on. That analysis did
14 not occur.

15 The Army and the DLA analysis of military value and
16 cost were reviewed separately and independently. I will tell
17 you that is just like going and evaluating a fighter wing and
18 evaluating a big boat with flat top and neglecting to point out
19 that it's an aircraft carrier with a fighting force on board.
20 It is precisely the same kind of flaw that the Army conducted in
21 the analysis of this facility.

22 Red River is the only Army depot with a large
23 co-location of a DLA distribution mission. DLA is located at
24 other depots to service those maintenance depots. DLA is
25 located at Red River not only to service the maintenance shop at

1 Red River but as a large distribution center that services over
2 50 percent of the troops in the continental United States. And
3 it was not analyzed on that basis. Because of this, the true
4 military value of the total cost closure were not considered.
5 We have discovered other flaws in the Army's methodology and
6 specifically the COBRA analysis, and that's what I want to talk
7 about.

8 First of all -- and please hear this if you hear
9 nothing else -- the Army savings that are claimed as BRAC
10 savings include -- the savings include reductions in personnel
11 strength that are a result of force structure reductions, not
12 BRAC. Force structure reductions. And they have nothing to do
13 with BRAC. This was verified by the April 17th, 1995 GAO report
14 just released, on page 32, which pointed that out, as part of
15 what the Army did. We estimate, using DOD's numbers, that the
16 savings may be overstated by as much as \$116 million due to the
17 workload reductions and other base operations costs. When you
18 look at Red River and Anniston workload reductions, workload
19 reductions already programmed to occur between now and 1999, 72
20 percent of the workload reduction is going to happen at
21 Anniston. 28 percent will happen at Red River. Yet, the Army
22 claims all of the personnel that will go away as BRAC savings
23 from the closure of Red River, that is wrong, it is flawed, it
24 is a mistake, and it ought not to be accepted. In fact, it
25 would suggest --

1 (Applause).

2 CONGRESSMAN CHAPMAN: It would suggest we're closing
3 the wrong depot. The cost closure --

4 (Applause).

5 CONGRESSMAN CHAPMAN: There are other costs of
6 closures that have not been included in the Army's analysis.
7 DLA's decision to close defense distribution depot Red River was
8 based solely, solely on the Army's decision to close the
9 maintenance shop. And General Ferrell so testified before you
10 all in Washington under oath five times. It is their policy to
11 close the DLA mission where it is co-located with a maintenance
12 shop if that maintenance shop goes away, but it ignores the fact
13 that this supply mission, only 12 or 13 percent of its business
14 is at Red River. Over 80 percent of its business is in other
15 places around the country, and in fact around the world. We
16 estimate that the DLA relocation cost will not be as they
17 suggest, but \$319 million. You've got to move those vehicles,
18 you've got to move that stock.

19 Just as a little example -- in fact, if I might
20 digress, they presume for a moment that they can trip the
21 inventory in the supply warehouses, and they assume a six-year
22 closure process. Yet, when we come around and want to make it
23 convenient to minimize the cost, we say we want to close it in
24 two years. Well, of course it minimizes the cost if on the one
25 hand you're going to give six years to reduce the inventory in

1 the warehouse, and it minimizes the cost again if you say but
2 we're really going to do it in two years when we get down to
3 it. That is the kind of, if you will, dishonesty that appear in
4 these numbers.

5 We estimate the cost of construction, build time,
6 that will be required at Anniston to accept the maintenance and
7 distribution mission, it was not even included -- it was not
8 even in COBRA. A conservative estimate of 34 million is based
9 upon DLA's own estimate of a \$19 million hardstand that would be
10 required and \$15 million for relocation of the combat vehicle
11 workloaded to Anniston. We believe there will be additional
12 construction required since Anniston is shown -- is shown by the
13 Army as having zero supply capacity and ranks dead last in all
14 depots in future requirements; that is, its expansion
15 capability.

16 Other requirements were not included in the cost of
17 closure analysis. Supply preservation packaging the rubber,
18 storage, and manufacturing process. The cost of supporting that
19 in the enclave were not considered. Also, the fact that some
20 support such as medical services, property disposal, the
21 calibration mission are still required in support of the
22 remaining rubber ammunition missions, and there is no cost
23 assigned to maintain those missions.

24 The Defense Finance Accounting Service has not
25 appropriated funds. The accounting office, DFAS, and the Army

1 missile recertification offices were not even considered.
2 Almost 300 warm souls who work today at Red River Army Depot in
3 the BRAC analysis are wandering somewhere in the way to twilight
4 zone. They were not even considered as part of the cost
5 analysis.

6 We found several flaws in DLA's methodology in
7 addition to the Army's flaws. First, the DLA's military value
8 ranking criteria placed Red River 5 of 17. Now remember,
9 General Ferrell testified he's closing DLA because the Army's
10 closing the depot. He's closing a DLA facility that they rank
11 on military value 5 out of 17. So it is certainly not being
12 closed because it doesn't meet the military value test. That
13 ranking was based on Red River support of the co-located
14 maintenance operation and Red River would have scored even
15 higher in military value except the DLA's model penalized Red
16 River for having the largest distribution mission. The DLA's
17 military value assessment was not the basis for the
18 recommendation. As I said, DLA made this decision solely
19 because of the Army's decision.

20 The most serious flaw is that DLA's decision was
21 driven in that way. The DLA justification -- this is DLA's
22 justification for closing their supply mission. And I quote,
23 "The primary reason for their existence is to provide rapid
24 response in support of a maintenance operation." Quote closed.
25 While this is true -- while this is true at other installations,

1 it is not true at Red River. Red River's maintenance shop is
2 only 12 percent of DLA's work load. In fact, Fort Hood, just
3 down the road from here -- from us today, Fort Hood is a much
4 larger customer, it is the largest military base in the world,
5 it is the home of two Army divisions, it is the biggest customer
6 Red River has. And where under this recommendation are we going
7 to supply Fort Hood from? California of course. That makes a
8 lot of sense.

9 And finally -- and finally the decision --

10 (Applause).

11 CONGRESSMAN CHAPMAN: Finally, the decision was not
12 based on cost savings. As a result of the flaws that I have
13 just addressed, I take serious issue with the Army's
14 calculations and the return on investment. The Army says they
15 will receive an immediate -- they will receive an immediate
16 return on investment. This is just simply not the case. Using
17 DOD data, not the community's spin on DOD data, using the
18 Department of Defense numbers we estimate the return on
19 investment at 57 years, four years longer than the installation
20 has even been in existence. It just doesn't make sense.

21 Let me give you some detail on that. I don't want
22 you to accept it just because the hometown congressman is up
23 here saying it to you. When you take the savings claimed by the
24 Army that are the actual result of force structure reductions
25 and not BRAC, the only real savings that accrue are from the

1 reduction in base operations. This is 337 people; and, yes,
2 that's a savings, \$13.1 million a year. The Army falsely
3 assumes -- and this is fascinating. The Army assumes that the
4 direct labor man-hours performing the mission could be
5 eliminated, but the man-hours will be needed by Anniston. An
6 analysis of the recommendation says the job being done by almost
7 1900 folks at Red River somehow moved 1200 miles to Alabama can
8 now be done by 375 people. Now you understand, you understand
9 this is a job being done by the folks that have just won the
10 award for being the highest quality and most efficient DOD
11 facility in the country. And somehow they're going to do that
12 same work with a fifth of the work force 1200 miles away? I
13 don't think so.

14 The community used the Army's estimate for recurring
15 costs, which includes base operations personnel required to
16 support the remaining operations. The annual net savings is 7.3
17 million. We believe one-time costs, as I said before, in DLA is
18 319 million -- they say a little over 50 million -- for
19 relocation of DLA stock. The Army -- the Army didn't even count
20 the cost of moving the core work load, the tanks, the
21 Bradleys -- I mean the Bradleys and the 113's, the current core
22 work load from Red River to Anniston just to move the operation
23 down there, did not even count the cost anywhere of moving the
24 stocks in the core work load. When the one-time cost is divided
25 by the annual net savings, the result, as I said, is a 57-year

1 return on investment.

2 If you look at the column up here on the right, we've
3 also computed return on investment. That assumes the DLA
4 mission stays but the maintenance shop closes. Recurring
5 savings is based on the estimated reduction in base ops of 237
6 people, and again the direct labor man-hours performing the
7 mission will be needed also at Anniston. The Army assumes they
8 would not be needed. Again, as I say, they claim it as BRAC
9 savings, and under even that analysis the payback is 43 years.

10 Next chart, please. The man the Army hired to run
11 the operation is Major General Dennis Benchhoff. He is the
12 commander of the installation operations command. He was at one
13 time a commander of Red River Army Depot. He is the fellow that
14 they put in charge of running this part of our armed services.
15 And he said that he considered the planned annual net operating
16 result as the primary depot performance measure; therefore we
17 should reward positive variances from the planned NOR. Now, if
18 that's what the man says that we hired to run this part of our
19 military, let's see how Red River has stacked up by that
20 measure. Next chart.

21 Here's the result. You see how we won the
22 Presidential Quality Award when you look at the last five years'
23 performance as measured by the general who used the yardstick
24 and said this is the way we ought to measure depot performance,
25 and Red River measures tops in the entire depot system in

1 profitability.

2 So here's where we are. Next chart. The Army has
3 three vehicle maintenance depots, Red River, Anniston, and
4 Letterkenny; we know that. The recommendation is to close Red
5 River, realign Letterkenny, and retain Anniston as the Army's
6 only vehicle maintenance depot. The FY '99 work load
7 projections supports the need for 1.75 depots, not one. Now,
8 that's not Jim Chapman saying we need 1.75 depots; that's the
9 Army. Until we got to BRAC '95. I personally believe the work
10 load may be understated, and here's why even the need for 1.75
11 depots may be too low. During the '80's and the '90's the Army
12 bought thousands of new weapons system vehicles. Now very few
13 vehicles are being procured, as we all know. As the vehicles
14 continue to get older, the maintenance requirements go up.
15 Since the Army's estimates of maintenance work load is based on
16 past experience, it could be significantly understated. In
17 addition, distribution depots are required to maintain
18 readiness. Approximately 50 percent of the troops in the
19 continental United States are stationed in the Central United
20 States, and 80 percent of Red River's distribution mission is in
21 support of those external customers.

22 So what do we need to do? First, we should follow
23 the concepts recommended by the Defense Science Board in April
24 of 1994, not the concepts of the Chamber of Commerce in
25 Texarkana but the concepts of the folks who say what we ought to

1 do. The board, made up of senior defense military and
2 industrial leaders, identified excess depot maintenance
3 capacity, the need to down-size poor work load, and the need to
4 preserve both the organic and the industrial base. We believe
5 that we have a plan that will achieve precisely those results.
6 We believe the Army should retain its two most efficient vehicle
7 depots, Red River and Anniston, down-size the poor work load.
8 That would maintain the knowledge base that is unique in
9 existence at Red River and that will be lost if this transfer
10 occurs. The Army should realign Letterkenny's track and
11 miscellaneous work load to Red River and Anniston. Both Red
12 River and Anniston have existing missile facilities, and in fact
13 Red River's missile facility is also unique. And that way we
14 could accommodate the missile work load.

15 Then we partner with industry; something I think we
16 all think we all to look at. The Defense Science Board
17 recommended that maintenance and overhaul of poor systems be
18 retained in depots and modification and upgrades be reserved for
19 industry. The most efficient approach is to perform any
20 modifications and upgrade at the time of overhaul. By teaming
21 with industry and providing excess depot facilities for industry
22 use, the Army can help preserve both the organic and the
23 industrial skill base.

24 Red River/United Defense. United Defense as being
25 mainly the FMC who built the Bradleys new and the 113's, the

1 producers of the Bradleys and the 113's. We have already
2 explored some possible teaming arrangements, and in your
3 briefing book is a letter from the president of United Defense
4 outlining those negotiations. In fact, it is believed we were
5 only a few weeks away from reaching a public/private agreement
6 to do the very things we suggest when the BRAC list was
7 announced. Both parties believe the concept is a good one. The
8 agreement where Red River will serve as a subcontractor to
9 United Defense on the 113, the A-2, the A-3, have been completed
10 and work began at Red River this week. That's where a private
11 contractor already won a contract and through the private sector
12 has subcontracted back to Red River. The team effort is already
13 in place in some contracts; there's no reason it won't work in
14 the future.

15 And, finally, we must maintain the distribution
16 mission at Red River. And best of all, everybody wins, the
17 Army, private industry, and perhaps most importantly the
18 taxpayer. This approach provides the core readiness base
19 required at the absolute lowest possible cost. I believe that's
20 the answer that we all should seek.

21 Ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to
22 make this presentation, and now I want to quickly introduce to
23 you Retired Brigadier General Donovan. He's the man who knows
24 firsthand the vital role that Red River plays in the Army's
25 readiness factor. General Donovan is a former commander at Red

1 River Army Depot, but more importantly he was the program
2 manager on the Army's combat vehicle systems, the Bradley and
3 the M-113. He was also the project manager for the M-60 tank
4 that's maintained at Anniston. And General Donovan is here
5 today at his own expense, on his own nickel, on his own time
6 because he is keenly concerned that the Army is making a
7 mistake, and he cares a lot about the national security of the
8 country we all love.

9 This was my moment to make my case. And I appreciate
10 so much you having given me the opportunity to do so. I thank
11 you.

12 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much.

13 (Applause).

14 BRIGADIER GENERAL DONOVAN: Thank you, Congressman
15 Chapman. As Congressman Chapman said in his introduction, I'm
16 here as a private citizen who happens to have seen firsthand
17 from a number of viewpoints the importance of the depot system,
18 both supply and maintenance depots and their very favorable and
19 cost effective impact on supply and readiness. As a logistician
20 and a program manager, as well as an operations analyst and an
21 engineer, I was both a slave to and a proponent of numbers.
22 Therefore I know, as I suspect all of you know, analysis is
23 invariably driven by assumptions and criterion which may miss
24 the heart and soul of the issue. Although I have not followed
25 the details of the issues raised by Congressman Chapman and the

1 Red River defense committee, I have studied them in enough depth
2 to believe in the validity of their statement that the analysis
3 was flawed.

4 But putting that aside, I would like to address the
5 broader question of whether the decision to close Red River Army
6 Depot and the Defense Logistics Agency's supply function there
7 is in the national interest. You members of the Commission come
8 from many diverse backgrounds. Some of you are business people,
9 some come from government, both the legislative and executive
10 sides, but I dare say you pride yourself in being able to look
11 at issues from a business standpoint. Depot maintenance is
12 smart business. It returns to units and the supply system in an
13 almost new condition, at less than 30 percent of the acquisition
14 cost, these combat vehicles. Now, that's relevant if the items
15 were in production. If no new items are being produced, depot
16 maintenance is the only way of overcoming the effects of
17 operational wear and tear in a way that provides troops with
18 equipment, with the reliability and durability approaching that
19 of new equipment.

20 What separates depot maintenance from that
21 accomplished in field units is the size, cost, mobility, and
22 complexity of the equipment needed to accomplish the maintenance
23 as well as the special skills and knowledge needed of the
24 mechanics and the tolerances to which they work.

25 With combat vehicles it is almost never good business

1 for private industry to facilitate for this kind of maintenance
2 unless a continuing work load is highly probable. That is why I
3 think the idea of a partnership between government and industry
4 to share the work load of Red River Army Depot at Red River Army
5 Depot makes good sense.

6 I would like to now walk you through a series of
7 slides that in my opinion shows why the recommendations that you
8 have been asked to agree to present an unacceptable risk to
9 national security.

10 Slide one. The point that I want to bring out in
11 this excerpt from the United States Code is that our logistic
12 capability is to be sized according to requirements.

13 Next slide. The report from which this was taken was
14 approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in April
15 1994. You will note that this is in full compliance with United
16 States Code. It bases the existence of organic depots upon core
17 requirements.

18 Next slide please. Now, what this slide shows are
19 requirements compared with the projected funded work load for
20 the three combat vehicle depots in the Army for the year 1999.
21 The requirements, computed in accordance with policy shown on
22 the previous two slides, is 9 million direct labor man-hours.
23 The projection for funding for depot maintenance that year is
24 about 42 percent of the requirements. Now, what is the
25 difference between the requirement and the funded work load?

1 The difference is deferred maintenance.

2 We have been fortunate, as has been said previously,
3 in the last several years in being able to defer our maintenance
4 on core systems without serious degradation of readiness for two
5 reasons. One, is that the equipment was new; and that the other
6 is that the draw-down in units let us redistribute the best
7 equipment for deactivated units and transfer equipment that were
8 in need of depot repair into a waiting depot maintenance
9 category. Those of you who have or will visit Red River Army
10 Depot have some feel for the number of items in this category at
11 Red River Army Depot alone. And this increase in depot
12 maintenance backlog can seriously degrade our readiness.

13 Now, this is not just my opinion. In testimony
14 between the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
15 Committee a year ago last week, Dr. Leon Solomon made the
16 following statement, and I quote, "Several of you individually
17 have asked me to tell you what effect the growing backlog of
18 unaccomplished maintenance is doing to the readiness of our
19 fighting forces. The unfunded portion of our depot maintenance
20 requirements has been growing over the last few years." And he
21 goes on to say, "Reliability is lower, and the depot work is not
22 performed. For example, tanks which do not go through the depot
23 have almost 25 percent more mission failures. Simply put", he
24 says, "Readiness of the future could suffer if the backlog
25 continues to grow." For those of you who do not know, General

1 Solomon is a four-star general who is commanding the Army's
2 materiel command, and as such is the most senior logistician in
3 the Army.

4 But if that chart is not alarming enough, let's look
5 at the next slide. Now what you see here is that if you don't
6 use the requirements, as the law and policy demand, but instead
7 use the projected funded work load, the projected funded work
8 load of 5.2 million direct labor man-hours would utilize the
9 three combat vehicle depots at 58 percent of their capacity that
10 capacity index shown on the slide is simply the number of
11 man-hours a facility can accomplish in a single shift
12 five-day-per-week schedule for a year.

13 If Letterkenny Army Depot were to be closed, as is
14 also currently being considered, the remaining two depots would
15 be utilized to 81 percent capacity. If they were to be
16 workloaded at a rate that would not contribute to a growing
17 backlog of deferred maintenance, they would both be operating at
18 over 100 percent capacity. And if Red River Army Depot and
19 Letterkenny Army Depot were both to be closed, Anniston Army
20 Depot would have to work a two-shift operation, have no surge
21 capability, and be unable to reduce the backlog in effect at
22 that time. Remember, this is a projected workloading of 54 --
23 or excuse me -- 45 percent of the core requirement. Now, why
24 would we want to do that? How would we ever restore readiness
25 in any reasonable time with a combat vehicle depot maintenance

1 capacity reduced to only 63 percent of our current program's
2 overall projections and 36 percent of the required maintenance
3 capacity projected?

4 As a taxpayer, as well as a former soldier, I'm very
5 sensitive to geographic realities of what is being considered.
6 My understanding is that the proposal is to relocate 90 percent
7 of the DLA stock to California and the rest to Alabama. One
8 need only look at where the DLA major customers are to see that
9 we would be incurring a significant longer distance to transport
10 supplies and repair parts to combat vehicles if we were to
11 relocate these stocks.

12 In today's political environment our military units
13 may be and often are called upon to move very rapidly to points
14 around the world. These units must be quickly fleshed out with
15 serviceable equipment and supplies prior to deployment. The
16 depot system can react astonishingly well to these demands.
17 Their reaction time, as well as the cost, is driven in no small
18 way by their proximity and the availability of transportation.

19 Red River Army Depot, the DLA installation there are
20 much more centrally located with respect to many of these
21 deploying units than the sites selected to relocate its
22 missions.

23 An alternative to closing Red River Army Depot
24 briefed by Congressman Chapman were developed by the Red River
25 Defense Committee and are in line by they remarks that General

1 Solomon at the same appearance before the Congress that I quoted
2 earlier. They appear to be reasonable, prudent, and
3 affordable. The staff at Red River Army Depot is far more able
4 than I am to provide the details which would point to these
5 conclusions. From a purely pragmatic standpoint those of you in
6 industry or government must seek considerations of readiness,
7 cost, driven by capacity, capability, location, productivity,
8 and unique skills would suggest that the study which concludes
9 that Red River Army Depot is expendable is flawed to the point
10 of providing a reckless recommendation which can severely damage
11 the readiness of our military forces and the security of our
12 nation.

13 Whether you accept these alternatives or not, I
14 believe that those of you who were able to tour the facility or
15 will in the near future will agree with Vice-President Gore's
16 statement shown on this screen. Should Red River Army Depot be
17 closed? Some answers are self-evident.

18 I'll be happy to take any questions. Thank you very
19 much.

20 (Applause).

21 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I've got 19 minutes yet, plus of
22 your time. We'll hold questions to the very end.

23 MR. ROBERT E. "SWEDE" LEE: My name is Robert E. Lee.
24 I'm the President of the Texarkana Chamber of Commerce, and I'm
25 serving currently also as the Chairman of the Red River Defense

1 Committee.

2 I am, again, pleased that you're here. I have four
3 minutes to talk about the subject that's probably most important
4 to all these people. That's the economic impact that closure,
5 as proposed by the Department and the DLA, would have on the
6 Texarkana area. Obviously, a lot of people sitting here in
7 these yellow shirts would recognize the impact directly. How
8 bad would it be? Well, in one word it will be severe. It's
9 ironic that the Texarkana metro area, 122,000 total population,
10 will suffer under this plan, the largest loss of jobs of any
11 area in the nation. In fact, there are only two states outside
12 of Texas that would suffer job losses in the civilian sector
13 greater than Red River Army Depot in the Texarkana area,
14 Missouri with 4100 job loss, California with 3988 job loss
15 programmed, and us with 3901 programmed civilian job losses.
16 When you add to that the indirect losses that will occur as a
17 result of this action, the total numbers swell to over 7500
18 people in the Texarkana area that will be out of work.

19 I think it significant that Red River Army Depot
20 under this plan is called on to absorb over ten percent of the
21 total job losses for the whole BRAC '95 process nationwide.
22 That will test even our patience, and we are truly patient. I
23 would like to add too -- also that these programmed job losses
24 in BRAC '95 are coming right on top of over 2500 direct job
25 losses we've absorbed at Red River and Lone Star Army Ammunition

1 Plant combined since 1990. The truth is the direct and indirect
2 job losses at Red River and Lone Star combined between '90 and
3 '95 leave us today with 1200 fewer people working in the
4 Texarkana area than were employed there in 1990.

5 So if this proposed action is allowed to take place,
6 what we're looking toward is not getting back to our 1990 level
7 of employment in the Texarkana area before the year 2007, not a
8 very heart-warming prospect. Our unemployment today is 8.1
9 percent. If this action proceeds, in less than two years we'll
10 be over 21 percent and will linger in that category for a long
11 time.

12 The major impact on our community is social. The
13 folks at the Red River Army Depot -- our motto, "Our best,
14 nothing less", and they carry that with them away from that
15 depot to the places where they live. Everything within 30 miles
16 of Red River Army Depot is impacted by these employees as
17 citizens. They include members of city council, school board,
18 church leaders, civic club leaders, girl scout, boy scout
19 leaders, and the list goes on. They're cornerstones of every
20 community in that area, and you can't put the weight on that.

21 The economic impact and the social impact combined
22 would be devastating to our community. The community will
23 survive if the worst happened, but we don't believe the
24 decision's driving forces are valid as you've already heard.

25 I want to personally thank each member of this

1 Commission. And I think I speak for all these people here and
2 probably a lot of people everywhere. I'm amazed that any of you
3 would accept such a job because it is honestly -- it has to be a
4 terrible job to make a decision you have to make. You are
5 indeed the judge and the jury of this whole process. I am
6 impressed by the way you're going about your work. I am truly
7 impressed that you're taking the time and making the schedule,
8 holding regional hearings like this and indeed have at least one
9 or more of your members visit every base on the closure list.

10 If high-ranking officials in the military were as
11 diligent, we wouldn't be here talking to you today, I don't
12 believe. It's almost impossible to believe that the two highest
13 ranking officers who are responsible for filing the audit to
14 determine which Army installation goes on the list have never
15 set foot inside the fence at Red River Army Depot. I've never
16 heard of any case where an executive would make a decision to
17 close the finest complex in this country without having ever
18 seen it. I say God bless this Commission. Whatever you end up
19 with, we'll know it's fair. Thank you.

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you.

21 (Applause).

22 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Senator, you opened up well; you
23 have a light step there.

24 SENATOR HUTCHISON: I guess nobody would know, but I
25 am very, very pleased to be up representing this wonderful

1 community. I know that you have listened carefully because I've
2 been watching you, and I want you to know this is a gut
3 decision. I want to reiterate a few points and to summarize the
4 presentation that's been made here today. I believe that
5 closing Red River will adversely impact our military readiness.
6 Secondly, the Department of Defense, the Army, and the Defense
7 Logistics Agency analysis were flawed. And, third, the return
8 on investment is not as estimated. I stated to you earlier this
9 morning that I believe the world remains a volatile place and
10 hostile to our national security interests. The number of
11 hostile nations --

12 (Applause).

13 SENATOR HUTCHISON: -- seeking to acquire weapons of
14 mass destruction is clearly on the rise. At the same time we
15 are pursuing a flawed policy of reducing our active military
16 forces and capabilities to levels we have not seen since just
17 prior to the Korean war. We are increasing the requirements on
18 our armed forces while we are shrinking them. In essence, we
19 are asking the men and women of our armed forces to do more with
20 less. The margin for error is razor thin. The readiness of our
21 armed forces, therefore, is paramount. We must have force
22 structure. I believe we have reduced the size of our armed
23 forces to a level that is inadequate to meet our needs. I
24 believe that you must consider that in your decisions to close
25 the bases. We must have ramp-up capabilities.

1 Secondly, modernization takes into account the
2 technical sophistication of weapons systems and equipment. I
3 ask each of you to look at the 1996 DOD budgeted request. We
4 are authorizing no fighter aircraft for the United States Air
5 Force for the second consecutive year. This has not happened
6 since there was an Air Force. The Army is authorizing no new
7 tanks, armored fighting vehicles, or attack helicopters.
8 Unfortunately, the list goes on for the other services. So how
9 will our forces and their equipment do the job we're asking them
10 to do? Readiness will depend on how we maintain and repair our
11 equipment. That is the bottom line.

12 Clearly, we are not replacing our equipment. Look at
13 the 1996 budget. So the importance of depot level maintenance
14 capabilities is vital. And yet you are considering closing the
15 Army depot that maintains 75 percent of the track vehicles in a
16 mechanized division and consolidating that workload into one
17 other depot. That doesn't even take into account the missile
18 work and the other activities at Red River Army Depot. Why is
19 moving the other 25 percent to Red River not being considered
20 and not a better solution?

21 (Applause).

22 SENATOR HUTCHISON: If anyone suggested to this
23 Commission that 75 percent of the aircraft depot maintenance
24 should be added to the workload of one air logistics center, I
25 feel confident you would dismiss that as a silly suggestion. I

1 think it is similarly unwise to make such a consolidation within
2 the Army's depot maintenance infrastructure. I visited, three
3 weeks ago, Fort Hood, our largest Army base in the world. It's
4 right there in Killeen, Texas. I talked to the people there
5 about Red River. I said, "Where do you get your supplies?"
6 Well, you know the answer, of course. "Red River." So when you
7 move this distribution and repair facility away from its largest
8 customer, where are the costs? You saw the map. Red River is
9 clearly the central location. Is Fort Hood going to wait longer
10 for its supplies? Probably not. You know what they will do.
11 They will start stocking up more supplies. What is the cost of
12 that? Has that been considered here? I really don't think so.
13 Are they going to wait for their vehicles to be maintained? Are
14 they going to wait a longer time? You know the answer. They're
15 going to start getting more maintenance facilities at Fort
16 Hood.

17 I don't think we have factored the cost of closing
18 this depot when you look at what Fort Hood and all of those
19 major Army bases surrounding the central location of Red River
20 and the added costs of increasing their capability for supplies
21 and increasing their own maintenance capabilities.

22 You have seen a great community briefing today, and I
23 appreciate the fact that more of you are going to visit Red
24 River than probably any other base. That tells me how seriously
25 you are considering this very important decision. What you have

1 seen today is that the cost estimates made by the Army were
2 flawed. The savings, if any, will not materialize for more than
3 half a century, and yet the negative impact on our military
4 readiness will be felt for the next 50 years.

5 I want to summarize the points that have been made
6 here today. The devastating economic impact is an issue here.
7 You may hear this at every base closing hearing; it really
8 matters here. You are talking about a city that is 60,000
9 people, a metropolitan area in two states that is 120,000; and
10 you're talking about ten percent of the entire BRAC economic
11 impact. And this is not an area that is next to a metropolitan
12 area. These people do not have other job capabilities. So
13 while economic impact may not be your first criterion, in this
14 case it is a very important point that you must consider.

15 Second, central location. How can we be talking
16 about closing the most centrally located depot facility that has
17 77 percent of the capacity? How can we even be being
18 considering it?

19 Cost of closing, I do think when you look at the
20 numbers, which is what you must do, that you are going to see
21 that the cost of closing has not been presented to you. You
22 cannot factor in what all of those other bases are going to have
23 to do for their supply lines and for their maintenance. It is
24 not in the numbers.

25 And last, but not least, you're closing the best

1 facility.

2 (Applause).

3 SENATOR HUTCHISON: I have been saying for the last
4 two years during my service in the United States Senate, we must
5 put common sense into our government once again. My friends on
6 this Commission, closing Red River Army Depot does not meet the
7 common sense test. Thank you very much.

8 (Applause).

9 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you, Senator.

10 Yes, I think some of my colleagues have some
11 questions. Ms. Steele?

12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I just have a couple of quick
13 questions, and I'll save the rest for the 15th when Commissioner
14 Robles and I will be visiting your fine facility. So we look
15 forward to seeing y'all then.

16 (Applause).

17 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I can't believe I just
18 said "y'all". You can tell I did move to Texas last year.

19 Just another comment just to let you know that the
20 Commission also found it peculiar that the Army at least didn't
21 run a COBRA on moving functions into Red River. So about a week
22 after we got the report we've asked them to do that. We don't
23 have the answer back yet, but that's going through the
24 pipeline. I just wanted you to be aware of that.

25 (Applause).

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And my two quick questions --
2 which won't be nearly as exciting as that last comment -- your
3 figure of \$116 million of nonBRAC-related savings because of
4 personnel reductions, I'm just wondering where does that
5 number -- where did you pull that from? Is that out of the net
6 savings during implementation number in the report or where?

7 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: We looked at the Department of
8 Defense projection that studied and showed the projected funded
9 workload out to '99. We compared the funded workload in '99
10 versus the current authorizations. There was a difference of
11 over 1,000 direct labor positions in that. Only 375 positions
12 are being realigned from Red River to Anniston. The numbers
13 just don't add up. You can't accomplish the work you were doing
14 with 1800 people with 375 people. So that led us to the
15 conclusion that that reduction was there. The work must be
16 done; you can't just improve that much.

17 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay, thanks. Lastly, with the
18 defense distribution, Dr. DuVall, what percentage of their
19 distribution if materiel ends up going to Korea and Europe? Do
20 you know by chance?

21 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: Yes, just a second. I have to
22 put my glasses on.

23 COMMISSIONER STEELE: That's okay; I can't take mine
24 off.

25 DR. PHILLIP DUVALL: Europe six percent, Korea six

1 percent.

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Thank you very much.
3 That's all.

4 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Senator, if you would convey this
5 to the Governor and all you folks here and the rest of the
6 delegations from Texas, we appreciate your appreciating our
7 job. I think it's fair to say that all eight commissioners also
8 feel a very strong affinity for the defense posture of our
9 country or we wouldn't be serving on this commission because we
10 do think it's probably one of the most important things if not
11 the most important things that we'll do in our lives. Certainly
12 one of the most difficult things obviously in my life.

13 Your position on defense is certainly clear, Senator,
14 and I for one appreciate it and we all appreciate the support
15 that you've shown your state today and we appreciate the
16 hospitality we've received before, received today, and I'm sure
17 that we we'll receive in the future. Thank you very much.

18 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: For the Red River folks, we are --
19 because we're a little bit ahead and Oklahoma went this morning,
20 we're going to take a few minutes and hear the public comment
21 portion from the Red River folks who signed up to speak. So
22 we'll do that right now. If you'll be so kind as to return, and
23 we'll do that.

24 We have 11 -- 11 citizens. You've got two minutes
25 each. That will get us back on schedule a bit for Arkansas, but

1 we have 11 folks. I'd like to have them come up and stand in
2 front so we can swear them in. Let me read the names. They are
3 Jim Taylor, Joe Jones, David Wood, Pat Pierce, Horace G. Pierce,
4 E. J. Chiartano, Steven Arnold, Molly Beth Malcolm, Randy Pipes,
5 Michael Fields, and Mayor John Jarvis of Texarkana. If they'll
6 all come forward.

7 If you'd all kindly raise your right hand.

8 (11 witnesses sworn).

9 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: We'll start first with Mr. Jim
10 Taylor.

11 MR. JIM TAYLOR: Good afternoon. I certainly
12 appreciate the opportunity to get to speak to you. I'd like to
13 speak about two things.

14 First, is the most valuable asset we have at Red
15 River Army Depot which is our members. At Red River you pick up
16 the phone and -- want to talk about military value -- overnight
17 we will provide you 2 to 300 members willing to go anywhere in
18 the world to do anything they can to support the military. At
19 the same time, the members that are left at Red River Army Depot
20 will be glad to work overtime so our production does not slip.
21 We've proved this during Desert Storm.

22 At Red River there's no challenge that's too big. We
23 would be foolish to tell you that our sister depots cannot do
24 the work that we do because they can. But the difference is our
25 members, the quality work you get, the timeliness of the work.

1 At Red River our saying is "Our best and nothing less." I
2 believe we have shown this time and time again through the ACOE
3 awards, through the Hammer Award presented by Vice-President
4 Gore. We're recognized throughout the United States as the
5 leader in reinvention of government. I feel that all of these
6 do have to be taken into consideration. I thank you very much.

7 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you. Mr. Joe Jones.

8 MR. JOE JONES: Thank you. I'm up here to talk about
9 military value because I think that's what the Army is trying to
10 consider when they decide who they're going to close. And I
11 think some things show up in military value, and they're easy to
12 measure. But I think some things don't show up in the numbers,
13 and they can't be measured worth anything. I think one of those
14 things is the patriotism of the work force. I'm probably just
15 following on his heels, but a number that's real easy to check
16 on is the savings bond participation rate at any installations.
17 At Red River we've flown the Minuteman flag that shows how much
18 we participate in the savings bond program for 39 consecutive
19 years.

20 Probably numbers that are harder to find, but much
21 more important are numbers that indicate how willing that work
22 force is to go in when times are tough. Red River work force
23 has found themselves in the position, for instance, in -- when
24 Saudi was called, of having to support the weapon systems from
25 other depots where those workers didn't want to go into those

1 places where it was uncomfortable to work. But the work force
2 at Red River has always shown that patriotism. When the call
3 comes in, Red River answers that call.

4 And the other thing I want to talk about is the
5 manpower and the cost implications, that phase of the military
6 value. This was -- this is probably the easiest point for Red
7 River. We live in a low-cost area, and our labor rates are
8 among the lowest of any of the depot systems. The local high
9 schools graduate large numbers, high-quality graduates that make
10 good workers out there at Red River. They said NOR was going to
11 be the guide for who showed up on this list, and that isn't what
12 they did. Apparently, we broke the rules because we make money
13 on NOR. Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much. Mr. David
15 Wood.

16 MR. DAVID WOOD: Good afternoon, ladies and
17 gentlemen. I would like to apologize for one thing; I'm not a
18 public speaker. Excuse me. I'm a direct laborer. As far as
19 building vehicles, there's no more direct labor than me. I'm on
20 the very bottom. You've heard from people at the top, and
21 they've told you figures and things that I don't even
22 understand; I don't have a clue. All I know is I've got a
23 transmission that's on my stand that Monday morning was a piece
24 of junk, it was worthless, it was scrap. Tomorrow afternoon it
25 will be a code A asset worth \$89,000 to the taxpayer.

1 (Applause).

2 MR. DAVID WOOD: I would like to say another thing.
3 I heard a man say that our rebuilt products were approaching the
4 quality of a brand new product. I'd like to say that that
5 transmission will be better than a new one, and I will tell you
6 why. Our dynamometer test facility has specifications and tests
7 that are not even required by the manufacturer of the
8 transmission that I build. When it passes my -- when it passes
9 that dynamometer test, it will have passed tests that are not
10 even required by the manufacturer.

11 I would like to say another thing. I was on the
12 first team from Red River to go to Desert Shield. I was
13 called -- we work a four-day work week. Thursday is our Friday.
14 I was called while I was watching the 6 o'clock news on Thursday
15 that they needed help to go to Desert Shield. I left Monday
16 morning at 8 o'clock. I spent six months in Saudi Arabia. I
17 worked on other depots' equipment as well as our own. I can say
18 that we went as civilians; we were uniformed. To my knowledge,
19 I don't know if the Army ever uniformed you and put civilians
20 into conflict areas. I have pride and patriotism. I felt like
21 I did my part. I never was in the service, but I felt like I
22 contributed what little I could.

23 I'd like to say that I appreciate my job. I've tried
24 to make and do the best I can for the country and for the
25 taxpayer, and that's all I've got to say. Thank you.

1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much.

2 (Applause).

3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Are you sure you don't teach
4 public speaking somewhere?

5 MR. DAVID WOOD: Ma'am, I'm shaking I'm so scared.

6 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: And this is Ms. Pat Pierce?

7 MS. PAT PIERCE: Yes. You've heard today how in fact
8 Red River Army Depot is a military/civilian platform. You've
9 also heard about our quality award that is -- in fact the
10 federal award is synonymous with that of private industry, the
11 Malcolm Baldrige. I think something that you probably would
12 like to know is that, yes, there were five of those awards given
13 in the federal government. There could have been eight. It's
14 not something that they just hand out because they could hand
15 that many out. Another thing is in '94 we were a finalist for
16 that award, and we didn't hire somebody to come in and put that
17 package together. It was done in 21 days, and it was just a
18 matter of putting down on paper what the good people at Red
19 River Army Depot do. And then in 1995 we in fact were a winner,
20 the only blue collar winner in the federal government. There
21 were three other Army depots that did apply for that award.
22 None of them passed the screening of Army level.

23 What I want you to do today is put down on your note,
24 "quality" with a big question mark, and when you think of Red
25 River think of quality, and then think why is it not part of the

1 criteria for the base closures? And then the next thing I want
2 you to think, when you think "quality" and "Red River" is to
3 think people because that's what quality is, is the people.

4 Also, we have -- we don't just do quality at Red
5 River. We are in fact the leader in all the federal
6 government. We have shared our strategies with approximately
7 6,000 other government members. In fact, yesterday I got a call
8 from the nominee for the top presidential award and they want to
9 come visit Red River, and they are on May the 31st, to find out
10 how we do it.

11 On August the 2nd, 1995 Red River Army Depot will be
12 presented the Quality Award by the President or the
13 Vice-President.

14 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: One more phrase?

15 MS. PAT PIERCE: Okay. I just want you to ask
16 yourselves the question: How can we not consider quality as a
17 value to our military?

18 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you.

19 (Applause).

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Horace G. Pierce?

21 MR. HORACE SHIELDS: Horace G. Shields. That's Pat
22 Pierce right there.

23 My name is Horace G. Shields, and I'm a member of Red
24 River Army Depot. And on behalf of the Red River members and
25 our community members I would like to make four points that I

1 would like for you to consider between now and the 1st of July.

2 Point number one is this. The United States of
3 America is the only superpower left in the world. We did not
4 get to be the only superpower nor will we remain the only
5 superpower with a weak defense. Consider keeping our national
6 defenses at an acceptable level.

7 Point number two is this. We feel that we should not
8 put all of our tracked and wheeled vehicle maintenance eggs in
9 one depot basket. This is not a good idea, whether that one
10 basket be Red River or Anniston or Letterkenny; it's not a good
11 idea.

12 Point number three. We feel that the military value
13 of Red River Army Depot and the DLA supply activity is
14 unsurpassed by any other military activity in the world.

15 And then point number four is this. Don't close the
16 best of the best. Get Red River and DLA off the closure list on
17 the 1st day of July. Thank you.

18 (Applause).

19 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Mr. E. J. Chiartano?

20 MR. E. J. CHIARTANO: I'd like to thank the
21 Commission for allowing me to speak. I know you have a
22 difficult job, and I'd like to think that I represent some of
23 the members and families of members that are here today. We're
24 here on our own time. We drove over three hours, some in buses
25 and private cars, at our own expense because we have faith in

1 Red River Army Depot as a complex.

2 We'd like to say we've grown old; we've grown
3 smarter. You've seen a lot of facts and figures. We know what
4 we're capable of. I am an Army veteran. I served as an officer
5 in the regular Army, and I'm a reservist now.

6 One of the things that's not been mentioned besides
7 our active duty requirements is we train over 5,000 reserve
8 soldiers a year. I myself am an instructor for the United
9 States Army Reserve. I travel throughout the state of Texas and
10 northeastern area to train Army troops. That type of expertise
11 will also be lost. There are many reservists to be served at
12 Red River Army Depot as a part of the Army civilians.

13 If Red River stands on anything that you've heard
14 today, we stand proudly in the record that you've seen both
15 visually and presented by the members that are here today. I
16 realize you have a tough decision, but you obviously were
17 selected for your intelligence in the area of military
18 responsibility, costs, administrative data. We ask that you
19 consider us based solely upon our record, which we are extremely
20 proud of.

21 (Applause).

22 CHAIRMAN MONTROYA: Thank you. Mr. Steven Arnold?

23 MR. STEVEN ARNOLD: Good afternoon. Ladies and
24 gentlemen of the Commission, I would like to talk to you again
25 about military value, about Red River Army Depot. As a missile

1 worker in the Missile Maintenance Division, I would like to
2 mention that I have had an opportunity and privilege to serve on
3 a self-made, self-empowered work team. This team applied the
4 force concept: Honesty, ethics, accountability, respect, trust,
5 and support. A conception of this team is historic. We went
6 from three missiles a day and built that up to a productivity
7 rate of 24 missiles. And what I would like to say is: This is
8 indicative of what the Red River employees are all capable of
9 and can do. Not just that one team. Missile people, I can
10 confidently say, have the expertise to accept any and all
11 missile work directed their way.

12 What does the force concept mean to a soldier in the
13 field? It lets them know that they're getting the best quality
14 product, that it's been the most cost efficient. On October the
15 14th of 1994 Joe Reeder, Undersecretary of the Army, and Joseph
16 Gotlowe, Economics Secretary, came to Red River and presented
17 Vice-President Al Gore's Hammer Award. This was a very big
18 honor in my opinion to Red River Army Depot and its people. It
19 showed that they can apply all the concepts. We are cost
20 efficient, innovative, creative; we cut red tape. It's been
21 proven, and it's on paper.

22 And I'd just like to end it with this saying. That
23 Red River people will do their best and nothing else. Thank
24 you.

25 (Applause).

1 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Ms. Molly Beth Malcolm?

2 MS. MOLLY BETH MALCOLM: Good afternoon. I am not an
3 employee of Red River Army Depot, nor do I have any family
4 members employed there. I'm not a military expert, but I do
5 know the USA must close some of our excess military bases.
6 We're no longer in a cold war and that y'all have a hard job
7 before you.

8 What I am is a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and
9 interested in the national defense of our country. And while
10 base closures must be done they must be done the right way, and
11 Red River Army Depot is the best of the best. It is efficient,
12 it is vital to our national security, and it's tops in
13 profitability. They can do it better, cheaper, and quicker.

14 Red River Army Depot has evolved over the years into
15 a laboratory of innovation in the defense of our nation. How
16 can what Red River does be done better, cheaper, and quicker?
17 And the answer is: It can't be done better, cheaper, and
18 quicker.

19 The whole of what Red River Army Depot does is not
20 only better, but it is also cheaper and it's quicker. And we
21 don't need to fix -- as East Texans say, "We don't need to fix
22 what ain't broke."

23 (Applause).

24 MS. MOLLY BETH MALCOLM: An example of this that I
25 remember very vividly is when thousands and thousands of

1 vehicles rolled through Texarkana at the Red River Army Depot
2 during the Gulf War. Why did they have to come there? They
3 were drab Army green, and they needed to be painted camouflage
4 colors for the desert. Why were they sent to Red River? They
5 could have been painted in other places. The reason they were
6 sent to Red River was because the Army knew they could be done
7 better, cheaper, and quicker at Red River Army Depot.

8 (Applause).

9 MS. MOLLY BETH MALCOLM: This is only one incident of
10 decades of strong, proud support of our national defense
11 effort. There's a long-standing tradition at Red River Army
12 Depot for high-quality folks; they're dedicated to the national
13 defense of our country to spend their lives at Red River
14 responding with long hours, hard work, and dedication to protect
15 the U. S. -- United States.

16 And some things cannot be measured in balance sheets,
17 income statements, and COBRA; and the innovative can-do and
18 economically soundness of Red River is one of those things.
19 It's not in our country's best interest to close Red River
20 because they can do it, better, cheaper, and quicker.

21 (Applause).

22 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Mr. Randy Pipes?

23 MR. RANDY PIPES: Thank you. I've worked for Red
24 River Army Depot for 15 years up until this past year when I was
25 detailed to go to Headquarters for the Industrial Operations

1 Command at Rock Island. The sole purpose of this was to try to
2 transition strategy that this work force, Red River Army Depot,
3 has accomplished in organizational development. You've already
4 heard the accomplishments and the results of that, the awards
5 they've received and what revenue that they've accomplished.

6 It's contradictory to us to even consider closing the
7 installation that we constantly point to, to other places, and
8 say "This is what we want you to be like." When you ask the
9 question: What is the Red River Army Depot? It's these people
10 in the yellow shirts. They're what make it. Thank you.

11 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you.

12 (Applause). Looks like -- are you the Mayor?
13 We have -- it's Michael Fields I guess.

14 MR. MICHAEL FIELDS: Yes, sir, I'm Michael Fields.
15 I'd like to thank the Commission this morning for letting me --
16 or this afternoon speak to y'all.

17 You'll notice I'm wearing my chocolate chips. All
18 right? Well, I've been working at Red River almost 20 years
19 now, and I've got nine years experience in National Guard
20 deployment and also Army Reserve. At the present time I'm
21 working on becoming a drill sergeant. This BRAC commission --
22 or this BRAC has hit me double -- well, two times. First Red
23 River, now my Army Reserve unit also. I take this kind of
24 personal, you know. It's kind of hard not to take it that way.

25 What I'd like to do is bring your attention back to

1 history though. All right? The Kaiser lost the first world
2 war; you had chaos. You had one man who came in and took over a
3 country, becomes a super world power, almost took over the
4 world. This man was Hitler. All right, now in this present day
5 we have the Iron Curtain which is supposedly down. Those
6 countries under the Warsaw pact are more of a threat now than
7 what they were when they were under the Soviet Union.

8 Also, we forget; we have China, North Korea, and
9 other countries around the globe that are totally against
10 democracy and the American way. Also, I bring your attention
11 back to history on Pearl Harbor. The Navy, the Pacific fleet
12 placed all their assets -- almost all their assets within Pearl
13 Harbor. The Japanese came in and and took it all out. Now you
14 want to take and put all your major defense maintenance
15 operation in one area. It doesn't have to take a terrorist act
16 to set the production back. All it has to be is a natural
17 disaster. Keep Red River open and keep Anniston open. That way
18 if something does happen, a tornado or some kind of natural
19 disaster comes up, you still can get some type of support to
20 your troops.

21 I served in Desert Storm; I was in Saudi Arabia for
22 ten months. I'd like to also point out that several other
23 members here at Red River, they were there. Please stand up.
24 Those that were in Saudi Arabia please stand up.

25 (Individuals stand).

1 MR. MICHAEL FIELDS: I know there's more than that.
2 I do know there's other people that supported Desert Storm and
3 Desert Shield. Would you please stand up. Every one that was
4 involved in that.

5 (Audience stands; applause).

6 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much. Now I think
7 we're at the last speaker, the Mayor. Mayor John Jarvis.

8 MAYOR JOHN JARVIS: Thank you, Commissioners. I
9 appreciate your intelligence, open-mindedness, and hopefully
10 ultimately your ability to make good business decisions. I want
11 to talk to you about disasters, such as tornadoes, floods, and
12 fires in our area. Over the past they have caused a great
13 community effort to clean up and rebuild and heal. The Red
14 River flood a few years ago caused a great number of people to
15 run to the rescue of people who were victimized, a totally
16 unselfish and caring effort.

17 My point is that we can crunch numbers, take
18 percentages, create theories, and guess what the effect that the
19 closing of Red River would have on the four-states area, but
20 luckily all we have to do is look at what has been happening
21 with community efforts, business involvement, cities and
22 counties, their involvement's been incredible. The group you
23 see in the audience today, a group -- a much, much greater group
24 that you can't see right now, but believe me they're with us in
25 spirit and thought. There has never been a greater effort --

1 there has never been a greater effort to come to the rescue of
2 our families in the four-states area. And I want to thank all
3 of them for their passion and caring. We're not like Tooele
4 in '93; we don't have a Salt Lake City 25 miles away. We're
5 talking about a lot of families that would have to move, and
6 it's devastating to think what would happen and could. It's
7 very scary. Again, I appreciate your intelligence,
8 open-mindedness and hopefully and ultimately to make good, sound
9 business decisions. God bless you, and thank you.

10 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much.

11 (Applause).

12 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I want to thank you all very
13 much. And I think you've done -- you've done so well today that
14 I want to ask the soldier among us to close this part of the
15 session for us. General Robles.

16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I -- this is a little bit
17 unorthodox, but let me put this in perspective. Of course I was
18 always unorthodox when I was on active duty; I might as well
19 continue to be unorthodox.

20 This has nothing to do with the presentation you
21 gave. We'll analyze that and take a look at it and try to sort
22 all this out. But I will tell you that in August of 1990 I was
23 assigned to Fort Hood, Texas as Assistant Division Commander of
24 the 1st Cavalry Division. My job was to be the chief
25 logistician for the 1st Cav. and get them ready for Desert --

1 Shield then, and Desert Storm. My job was the tank division,
2 upload them down at Beaumont and Houston, get all the equipment
3 on board and move out, never expecting to come back or knowing
4 if we were going to come back to Fort Hood or even to the United
5 States.

6 So what we did is we packed up everything we needed
7 to go to war, and I directed that everything else was left. We
8 started out with lots and lots of repair parts and equipment
9 that was left behind that we couldn't take to war. And I
10 remember as clearly as yesterday a dedicated team of civilians
11 from Red River Army Depot came down there and started to sort
12 through that that we left them. And I've have to tell you it
13 wasn't very pretty. As you can imagine, a division, an armored
14 division when it leaves its trail as you get ready to go off to
15 war. I thought you would be working at it for the rest of the
16 war and on into the next couple of years. And so I was amazed
17 by November, when I got called back, and said it's all done,
18 it's all cleaned up, the Red River folks came and packed it up,
19 cleaned it up, sorted it, classified it, and have redistributed
20 it throughout the Army at a great savings.

21 The next time I ran into Red River folks was when I
22 was in the desert. And we did need to get our MR missile
23 launchers up, refurbished and modified. We did need to get our
24 tanks, to have special work done on our tanks and a lot of other
25 modifications. They were in the dirt, in the heat, in the dust,

1 very austere conditions, no lifts, all done by sweat, labor, and
2 lots and lots and lots of dedicated patriotic Americans, of
3 which you were a great part of that.

4 So I want to thank you, as a soldier who spent his
5 whole adult life in the dirt in far away places, for being what
6 you were then, the greatest virtue, the best America has to
7 offer; and certainly you were a great civilian unit. And we
8 came back and we probably never told you this, so now I'm
9 telling you: Thank you, from the soldier's perspective, for all
10 you do for America and certainly all you did for us then.

11 (Appause; standing ovation).

12 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: We will start the Arkansas hearing
13 at 20 after, in ten minutes.

14 (Recess).

15 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: The hearing is back in session.
16 General, who is your leader?

17 MAJ. GENERAL THRASH: Judge Harper.

18 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Judge Harper?

19 MAJ. GENERAL THRASH: Yes, Admiral.

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Very well. Judge, if you would
21 introduce your contingent, I will swear you in and we'll get
22 started with our last session of the day.

23 JUDGE HARPER: Members of the base realignment
24 commission, ladies and gentlemen, I'm Bud Harper. I'm Sebastian
25 County Judge from Sebastian County, Arkansas. I'm Co-Chair of

1 the Committee for the Continued Use of Fort Chaffee for Military
2 Purposes.

3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Excuse me. I'm sorry. I'm
4 having a little trouble hearing you.

5 JUDGE HARPER: Is this not on?

6 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I'm afraid you're not on.

7 COMMISSIONER STEELE: It might just need to be turned
8 closer.

9 (Pause).

10 JUDGE HARPER: Members of the Base Realignment and
11 Closure Commission, ladies and gentlemen, I'm Bud Harper,
12 Sebastian County Judge and Co-Chair of the Committee for the
13 Continued Use Fort Chaffee for Military Purposes, along with
14 Congressman Tim Hutchinson. Congressman Hutchinson at this time
15 is flying someplace around above Dallas and Fort Worth, and I
16 understand now that he's in route back to Washington, so he's a
17 little frustrated I'm sure. So this gives me a couple
18 additional minutes to introduce some of the folks we have on our
19 committee.

20 Our committee is composed of a group of citizens who
21 live and surround Fort Chaffee, Arkansas who are interested in
22 the most practical use of Fort Chaffee by the military to
23 provide necessary training for the armed forces with the
24 ultimate objective being a strong national defense. We realize
25 that the best involvement is by utilization of existing military

1 installations with necessary reductions to be made by the
2 Department of Defense. While we realize each community
3 represented here --

4 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Sir, may I interrupt you for just
5 a minute? Are you going to read a statement first before you
6 introduce your members? Because I need to swear all of you in
7 before you get into your presentation.

8 JUDGE HARPER: All right.

9 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: And I thought you were going to do
10 that for me. Introduce your members to our team, and then we'll
11 swear you in.

12 JUDGE HARPER: All right. The members that we have
13 that are going to speak today are Colonel Bob Boyer who is Army
14 retired; Major General Thrash who is the Adjutant General of the
15 Arkansas National Guard, and myself.

16 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Please stand up. This is being
17 required by the minutes of the BRAC statute to swear you if in
18 if you're going to testify. If you'd raise your right hand.

19 (Three witnesses sworn).

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Very well. Sorry for the
21 interruption. Proceed.

22 JUDGE HARPER: Fine. Thank you, sir.

23 We realize that each of the communities represented
24 here today is placing its best foot forward in a convincing
25 matter. We who represent the two-state area around Fort

1 Chaffee, Arkansas firmly believe you will give serious
2 consideration to the realignment of Fort Chaffee, Arkansas,
3 utilize major portions of the acreage that it encompasses for
4 all those purposes. Fort Smith, the surrounding area and the
5 military, have enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship for
6 our national defense. Fort Smith has continually been a good
7 Army town for the military and their families since the fort was
8 built in 1940, '41, and this has been a mutual partnership
9 between the military and the fort itself.

10 Fort Chaffee occupies 25 percent of our county,
11 Sebastian County, Arkansas. This is a vital concern to us in
12 our region, and we agree that it's best suited for the most part
13 for our continued military training. In our company today we
14 have Mr. Steve Riddell representing Senator David Pryor's staff;
15 Mr. Brian Moran from Senator Dale Humphrey's staff; Mr. Ed
16 Warmax, civilian aide for the Secretary of the Army for the
17 State of Arkansas; Senator Billy Dooley, President of the Fort
18 Smith Chamber of Commerce; and Mr. Jack Plight, the Chairman of
19 the Fort Smith Chamber of Commerce. The Fort Smith Chamber is
20 unsurpassed by any chamber anywhere in its promotion and support
21 of the fort and its continued use.

22 We'll have presentations today by Major General
23 Thrash, Adjutant General of the Army National Guard, and Colonel
24 Bob Boyer, U. S. Army retired, who will bring live many of the
25 strategic and tactical and monetary reasons for the continuation

1 of use of the major -- of the majority of Fort Chaffee and its
2 acreage for military training and national defense.

3 If realignment of Fort Chaffee should be your choice,
4 as we believe it will, areas to the west of Fort Chaffee would
5 be ideal for bringing the interstate highway networks together
6 by using land already owned by the federal government but
7 outside the training areas necessary and requested by the
8 National Guard and Reserve components.

9 Our presentation time is extremely short. I
10 reiterate the support of the citizens of the region in urging
11 you to consider realignment of Fort Chaffee.

12 It's my pleasure to introduce Major General Thrash,
13 Adjutant General of the Arkansas National Guard, who will be
14 followed by Colonel Robert Boyer, to present some of the
15 remarkable features of Fort Chaffee for the continuation of
16 training use and national defense by the Army Reserve, the
17 National Guard, and other military branches through base
18 realignment.

19 Thank you for your consideration to this important
20 issue.

21 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you, Judge.

22 MAJOR GENERAL MEL THRASH: Distinguished members of
23 the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, it's certainly my
24 pleasure today to be here to present the facts concerning Fort
25 Chaffee.

1 Governor Tucker sends his regrets. He could not be
2 present. He had some duties that he could not change and had to
3 remain in the state of Arkansas today.

4 You have before you a packet of information which I
5 will speak from that. The rest of it I know you will take home
6 and study at a later date.

7 My responsibility and charge is to be sure that the
8 men and women of the Army and International Guard of Arkansas
9 are well trained, men and women who are prepared to go and win
10 the next battle and, most importantly, return home safe. To do
11 this 63,000 acres of Fort Chaffee is extremely important as
12 maneuver space for our men and women. We find there a tempered
13 climate, and there are no environmental distracters for training
14 at Fort Chaffee. This is really important. For as you know, in
15 many bases today there are environmental problems that prohibit
16 training.

17 There are several hundred reserve tenant units out at
18 Fort Chaffee. You see them listed on the screen, including the
19 NCO Academy, RTS-Med school at that location. The Army tenant
20 unit, 142nd field artillery brigade, in Northwest Arkansas
21 attended the Persian Gulf War and served with suspension at that
22 time. The 1st and 233rd air defense artillery also sent a unit
23 from Fort Chaffee, along with the 188th tactical fighting
24 group. Other tenants you will find, a regional training
25 brigade, which is a brigade that is designated to conduct lanes

1 training which is required by Title XI congressional mandates.
2 There are other tenants we hope will remain at Fort Chaffee if
3 we continue to use it for training of our troops.

4 Fort Chaffee is centrally located. And within a
5 200-mile radius you will see the 45th infantry brigade and the
6 39th infantry brigade, both separate, enhanced brigades doing
7 the same thing, designated as such; and the 142nd field
8 artillery brigade. They're within a 200-mile radius and trained
9 at Fort Chaffee. You will notice not only is this in a
10 centralized location within the United States, you have a nearby
11 civilian airport at Fort Smith that's capable of handling the
12 C-5A aircraft. Also, you have easy access to the interstate
13 highway system. You have an inland waterway system in the
14 Arkansas River. It has been used to transport equipment down to
15 the Mississippi River and to further points for demarcation.
16 Also, we have two C-130 capable dirt-landing strips in a
17 tactical area on Fort Chaffee. Also, you have a training area
18 on both sides of the Arkansas River where we can conduct
19 training operations for river crossing, the only post I know of
20 where a river crosses an active-duty post where those operations
21 can be conducted.

22 The reserve components are a hometown organization
23 and, as such, major training areas might be regionally located
24 within commuting distance if we are to do the training necessary
25 to be prepared for our next conflict. Not only for our annual

1 training but also for inactive-duty training and weekend
2 training. We feel that -- our National Guard bureau did not
3 agree to the Army basing study criteria for evaluation of value
4 on the maneuver training area. It failed to recognize the IDT
5 or weekend drill and the schoolhouse usage for reserve
6 components. It also failed to consider the congressionally
7 mandated Title XI training requirements of GFRE personnel to
8 train priority RC units and conduct of lanes training by the
9 active component of the regional training brigade, USAR training
10 division exercise. It also failed to consider the relocation
11 costs of the USAR units and the Army and air units which total
12 approximately \$40 million in relocation costs.

13 We have some requirements if we are to conduct the
14 type of reserve component training that is necessary for our
15 units to be ready. You must have a maneuver and lanes training
16 area for a light brigade. A brigade must train as organized if
17 it is to mobilize and deploy within the 90 days that they are
18 asked to do today. You cannot break down and train a battalion
19 in that zone. You must have an area for artillery maneuver, for
20 the Howitzer. You must have an engineering coalition and
21 complex. You must have land for the USAR schools, the NCO
22 Academy, and the RTS-Med facilities. This all would take
23 approximately 68,700 acres if you are to conduct these types of
24 training required by Title XI.

25 Also, Title XI requires a regional training brigade

1 to provide maneuver/lanes training areas for establishment of
2 infantry, mec, aviation, field artillery, combat engineer
3 lanes. These can all be overlaid in areas at Fort Chaffee. The
4 USAR division exercise requires maneuver/lanes training areas
5 for establishment of combat service, combat services for
6 compliance.

7 I realize I'm going through these quite fast, but to
8 hit the major bullets I must do that in the time allotted.
9 Those are the units that train at Fort Chaffee. Arkansas,
10 Oklahoma, and Missouri run our National Guard and the
11 International Guard. They do include the two enhanced brigades,
12 the 45th and 39th and also the artillery brigade from Arkansas
13 and one auxiliary 155 battalion in Oklahoma.

14 Here's the current list of schedules to conduct
15 training at Fort Chaffee from the USAR, the ones you see there
16 are a total of 1710 people. That does not include the soldiers
17 that are trained in the RTS-Med. We have a razorback range
18 located at Fort Chaffee, which is the 188th tactical fighter
19 squadron unit from the Arkansas National Guard. It is also used
20 by the Oklahoma and Texas International Guard, Louisiana and
21 Texas Air Force Reserve, U. S. Army -- U. S. Air Force in New
22 Mexico, the Navy and Marines from Texas and South Carolina.
23 Last year there were over 7,000 sorties flown training in
24 bombing deployment at this location at a cost of \$185 per
25 sortie. That makes the area extremely important if you go up to

1 30,000 feet above Fort Chaffee. Other bombing training ranges
2 are not -- do not provide that altitude for them to train in.

3 The next slide shows the area required for use of the
4 razorback range. You can see the two circles. We're in the
5 maneuver area there, but they must have restricted area which to
6 enter before they can arm their weapons. They cannot arm over
7 federal land.

8 Fort Chaffee usage increases from year to year. In
9 FY '94 right after the RTC left Fort Chaffee to go to Fort
10 Polk. At that time any uses had been suspended; they were
11 training at another post. Then in '95 land became available,
12 training time became available, and once again they started
13 using Chaffee. The '96 figures do not include the 39th infantry
14 brigade. They will be going to Fort Polk, Louisiana for their
15 RTC training in FY '96.

16 The Department of Army or BRAC alternative training
17 locations that were given to me were Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort
18 Sill, Oklahoma; and Fort Polk, Louisiana.

19 This chart shows the distances that troops have to
20 travel at those training locations. Fort Sill can support AT
21 and IDT. However, it cannot support an entire infantry brigade
22 in the nuclear area. There are also some restricted
23 environmental policies at Fort Sill.

24 Fort Polk cannot take either AT or IDT. They just do
25 not have time or space. The second ACR from Fort Polk trains at

1 Fort Chaffee now because they cannot find training time at Fort
2 Polk. They trained last year, they're training this year, and
3 they're on schedule for '96.

4 Fort Riley, Kansas can take the AT and IDT training.
5 However, the distance requires ten hours of travel time so we
6 can only do AT training at Fort Riley. Additional cost factor
7 for training of these out-of-state locations, AT and IDT
8 training at Fort Sill will take, we figure, approximately
9 \$7.4 million in additional cost. At Fort Riley we can only do
10 annual training. Because of distance it. Would take
11 \$3.5 million.

12 And Fort Polk, as I indicated, cannot help us at
13 all. It does not have the training, time, or facilities.

14 Now the impact of closure of Fort Chaffee would mean
15 lost training time, which would decrease readiness because we
16 have to spend so much of our time in travel. If we went
17 commuter five or six, this requires conflict with employees and
18 also increased time away from families and would result in
19 potential issues for our union. Also, an increased safety
20 hazard because we would have tired men and women going to and
21 from the training areas. Also, an immediate multimillion-dollar
22 environmental restoration or remediation action would be
23 required if Fort Chaffee was closed.

24 In summary then, what we would recommend this
25 Commission is that the post be realigned with the funding and

1 resources to operate primarily as a dedicated reserve component
2 and training installation. Our desire would be for it to be
3 located under force com. If that's not possible, then latch
4 them to the reserve component -- or reserve component training.
5 I think we owe it to our young men and women who give of their
6 time and being away from their families and vacations,
7 birthdays, and little league ball games to train to serve their
8 country, that we provide them with a place where they can truly
9 be trained and be prepared to fight and win the next war. Fort
10 Chaffee is absolutely an outstanding infantry training
11 facility.

12 Thank you very much.

13 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: You're welcome.

14 (Applause).

15 COLONEL BOB BOYER: Honorable Commission members,
16 I'm Bob Boyer and I appreciate the opportunity to say a few
17 words to you this afternoon. It's obviously going to be a very
18 few words because of our allotted time, but I do have a letter
19 that I would like to leave with you in which I go into some
20 detail concerning the points I'd like to try to make in my time
21 today and point out why you should retain Fort Chaffee as a
22 major training area.

23 I was going to talk a little about community support,
24 but I think it's obvious from General Robles' visit to Chaffee
25 that the community support is there. So I won't take up any

1 more time on that subject.

2 None of us on the Chaffee committee are paid for our
3 services on the committee. We're all volunteers because we feel
4 it's the right thing to do, and it's right not only for our
5 community but more importantly for our nation.

6 In regard to military value of Fort Chaffee as a
7 major training area, you've heard from General Thrash, and he
8 has spoken as to how critical Chaffee is to the Arkansas
9 National Guard and also the Oklahoma National Guard which trains
10 at Chaffee. He's told you that he needs, for training of his
11 enhanced brigades, some 63,000 acres. And when you combine the
12 U. S. Army Reserve's requirements at Chaffee, it totals 68,000
13 acres. General Thrash has also pointed if the Reserve's
14 building is there, he needs 5,000 buildings for his soldiers.

15 The charts have shown that it's really cost
16 prohibitive to go to alternate sites for this essential
17 training; and even if the money were available, the traveling
18 time would cut too severely into that essential and limited
19 training time. General Hardy of the U. S. Army Reserve also
20 briefed General Robles much to the same effect as did Colonel
21 Schron, Commander of the Army's regional training brigade at
22 Fort Chaffee.

23 Fort Chaffee is also used by the -- some units of the
24 Louisiana National Guard, the active Air Force, the Air Force
25 Reserve, the Navy Seals and Seabees, the Marine Corps Reserve

1 and the active Army's Joint Readiness Training Center, the JRTC,
2 in connection with the training of the 82nd Airborne Division,
3 the 101st Airborne Division, the 18th Airborne Corps, the 2nd
4 Armed Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk, and Special Forces Unit of
5 the Southern Command, as well as the civilian United States
6 Department of Energy.

7 I did want to add one thing that General Thrash, when
8 he commented on that river crossing training site at Fort
9 Chaffee, the river runs right through Chaffee. And I understand
10 it's the only Army installation in the country where the Army
11 owns land on both sides of the river for crossing training. It
12 also has the unique additional feature in that locking dam 13
13 run by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers is right down the
14 river, and they can control the flow of the river current to
15 enhance the river crossing training. The engineering units that
16 use that river crossing training site say it's undoubtedly the
17 best in the country.

18 All these units that I've mentioned use Fort Chaffee
19 because it's the most outstanding major training area that they
20 have access to. And that's why it was selected in 1986 as the
21 initial home of the JRTC, the Army's premier trainer of our
22 light forces. And that's why even after the JRTC was
23 transferred to Fort Polk in 1992 to replace the unit departing
24 Fort Polk, the JRTC still uses Fort Chaffee for its more
25 important training missions.

1 It's interesting, when you go back and look at that
2 1986 report -- and I'll give you a copy of it -- where the Army
3 chose Chaffee as the initial home of the JRTC, they compared
4 Chaffee with nine other installations as the possible home.
5 They immediately rejected six as not being suitable for that
6 type of training, and the competition boiled down to Chaffee;
7 Camp Shelby, Mississippi; and Fort H. P. Hill, one of Chaffee's
8 present competitors. They found that H. P. Hill had 11 serious
9 disadvantages; one being a major highway going between its
10 maneuver area and its impact area. Chaffee easily won that
11 head-to-head competition with H. P. Hill. And Fort Chaffee's
12 gotten even better since those days. In 1991 it was selected as
13 the most improved small facility of the year, and it won
14 additional honors in 1992 through 1994.

15 In the BRAC 1993 review Chaffee was rated higher than
16 five of the other installations that it's competing with today.
17 So the question arises: Well, how -- if that was true one year
18 ago, how in less than a year did Chaffee move from being rated
19 higher than five of those installations down below those
20 installations today? Well, the obvious answer is that the
21 factors that were fed into the computer were changed. And I'd
22 like to mention some of those factors just briefly.

23 Gosh, I was counting on this time remaining -- okay,
24 I see how it's working now. I thought I had four and a half
25 hours, but I only have four and a half minutes. So I have to

1 find this rather quickly, but I did comment to General Robles on
2 the things where we find errors and items in the report to
3 BRAC. We feel they're wrong as far as Chaffee's concerned, and
4 that's just concerning the maneuver acres involved, some folks
5 undoubtedly counted their national forest acreage; Fort Chaffee
6 did not. Apparently, the installations were not using the same
7 criteria in reporting their figures. If Fort Chaffee added its
8 forest acreage, we could add 1 million acres to Chaffee. Under
9 the category of employment, Chaffee wasn't given credit for the
10 interim waterway system while apparently Fort McCoy and Fort
11 Indiantown Gap were given credit for their access to the distant
12 Great Lakes system. Under the category of maneuver -- under the
13 category of reserve training, Chaffee was underreported, and
14 I've supplied the correct figures in my letter.

15 One of the more important factors considered in the
16 report to you -- and this is at page 48 of your report -- in
17 evaluating the competing installation states, "The single-most
18 important attribute for support of land forces is land. The
19 value of land is measured by mechanized maneuver acres."
20 Chaffee ranks third in that category, and really it ranks second
21 if you exclude Fort Polk's national forest acreage.

22 Under the Army guidance it takes 61,000 acres
23 approximately to conduct battalion-level mechanized unit
24 training. Only Chaffee and three other installations meet the
25 guidance for conducting that battalion-level training on

1 mechanized units. I don't understand how you can be effective
2 as a major training area if you cannot conduct the kind and size
3 of mechanized maneuvers.

4 The major reason why Chaffee rated low in the present
5 competition is due to the age of the buildings at Chaffee.
6 They're some 51 years old now, and what the computer doesn't
7 consider is that in those years the Army was pumping millions of
8 dollars into Fort Chaffee while the JRTC was there. Many of
9 those barracks and other buildings were refurbished. General
10 Robles I understand has seen those buildings, and I'm hopeful
11 that he'll report to you that they're a plus now and not a
12 minus. It's also pertinent to I think to note that the type of
13 training done at Chaffee doesn't require lavish buildings. The
14 troops are there only a short time for that type of training,
15 and they spend much of that time in the field and very few days
16 in the buildings. But these are the type of factors that I'm
17 afraid the computer printout doesn't consider in coming up with
18 its rankings.

19 I also wanted to point out to you that the savings
20 reported for closing Chaffee are just not there when you analyze
21 the data that General Thrash has given you. He's pointed out
22 that when you close Chaffee and his units had to travel, let's
23 say to the closest installation to Fort Sill, because they can
24 get the training time there, which is doubtful, but just for the
25 weekend drill and annual training for the Arkansas Guard and a

1 few other guard units and the U. S. Army Reserve units, it would
2 cost \$7.4 million a year. Right now they're running Chaffee on
3 an operating budget that ranges between 8 and \$10 million a
4 year, very little more than it would cost to cover those
5 additional travel costs. General Thrash has pointed out that
6 there's another cost of \$40 million that wasn't considered in
7 moving the reserve units and the other units that are now on
8 Chaffee to other locations. And he's referred to the
9 environmental costs, which would be extensive.

10 I won't have time to talk about the economic effects
11 to our area, but they are covered in our letter. I just want to
12 join in General Thrash's recommendation to you that you consider
13 Chaffee for realignment and not closure. The active Army
14 intends to leave, if it can, the regional training brigade at
15 Chaffee; and Chaffee's a perfect fit for it because of its
16 central location and its training of guards and reserve troops.
17 We feel that Chaffee is an important and essential major
18 training area to cover that region of the country, and we
19 believe it's in the nation's best interest to retain it as a
20 major training. Thank you very much.

21 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank you very much, Colonel.

22 (Applause).

23 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: I have one question for
24 clarification. You're through with your presentations I
25 understand?

1 JUDGE HARPER: Yes.

2 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: On one of your charts you made the
3 comment -- you had it up there and you mentioned I believe that
4 if Chaffee were closed that you would have to have immediate
5 multimillion-dollar environmental restoration or remediation
6 action would be required. Why isn't that going on now or
7 required anyway regardless of whether you close it or not? I
8 didn't understand that phrase.

9 MAJOR GENERAL MEL THRASH: What I'm referring to, as
10 I understand it, when military bases are closed and are turned
11 over for civilian use, must be environmentally cleaned up.
12 Those impact areas and all of the fort cannot be cleaned up.

13 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Because of the past ordinances and
14 so forth?

15 MAJOR GENERAL MEL THRASH: 619 and 41, yes, sir.

16 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: So it's that kind of land which
17 you're talking about, ranges.

18 MAJOR GENERAL MEL THRASH: Yes, sir.

19 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Okay.

20 MAJOR GENERAL MEL THRASH: And some of the old
21 buildings, if they're disturbed. If they're not disturbed, it's
22 not a problem.

23 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: That clears it up for me what you
24 were speaking to. I have no further questions. Any questions
25 from my colleagues on this side? This side?

1 Well, thank y'all very much for your presentation and
2 your interest in coming to Dallas and joining us, and I thank
3 you for the data you've given us. General Robles will represent
4 you well, I can assure you, with what he's wearing.

5 COLONEL BOB BOYER: Thank you.

6 MAJOR GENERAL MEL THRASH: Thank you.

7 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Thank y'all very much. And do we
8 have -- just one final call for anyone from the State of
9 Arkansas? Oh, you're back.

10 MR. MICHAEL FIELDS: I'm back, sir.

11 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Very well. In your reserve
12 uniform?

13 MR. MICHAEL FIELDS: No, sir. I'm still in civilian
14 clothes.

15 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: All right.

16 MR. MICHAEL FIELDS: I'm Michael Fields. I'm a
17 resident of the state of Arkansas, former member of the Arkansas
18 National Guard. Major General Thrash at one time was my
19 confidant when I did attend OCS in Little Rock, Arkansas. What
20 I'd like to stress is Fort Chaffee, I lived there back in 1963
21 when my father was in the Army. He was a chief warrant officer
22 in charge when they shut down the installation from being the
23 regular Army. At the present time I'm in the U. S. Army Reserve
24 with the 95th training division and I'm in Bossier City, with my
25 headquarters in Oklahoma.

1 I do know from experience with the Arkansas National
2 Guard that Fort Chaffee is an excellent training facility. I'm
3 trained in infantry tactics. I'm a Red Bravo; that's Charlie
4 qualified and MOS qualified. The tactics I went through at Fort
5 Chaffee proved to be an excellent facility to where you can gain
6 proper training in infantry tactics. I've had experience at
7 Chaffee with mechanized infantry; I was also was on the air
8 mobile and a straight leg infantry. It's an excellent training
9 facility, as I've said before, and I'd hate to see Fort Chaffee
10 close, most especially with its past history in service to the
11 military. I believe it still would be a great asset even though
12 JRTC has moved to Fort Polk, where I've also lived in the past.
13 I do know both installations real well as well as Fort Sill.

14 The military would gain -- well, they would keep --
15 now I'm trying to think of the proper words here. It would be
16 of great benefit if they did keep Chaffee because of the
17 artillery area, it was excellent for artillery, and you also had
18 the straight runs for aircraft, and just any number of things
19 that could be utilized in that facility.

20 CHAIRMAN MONTOYA: Okay. Thank you very much.

21 Any further comment? Being I can see or hear none,
22 the regional hearing in Dallas, Texas is hereby concluded.

23

24

25

1 STATE OF TEXAS)

2 COUNTY OF DALLAS)

3 I, DONNA L. COLLINS, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and
 4 for the State of Texas, do hereby certify that there came before
 5 me on the 19th day of April, 1995, at Dallas, Texas, the
 6 witnesses hereinbefore named, who were duly cautioned and sworn
 7 to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth
 8 of their knowledge in this matter before The Defense Base
 9 Closure and Realignment Commission and that their testimony was
 10 reported stenographically by me and then reduced to writing;
 11 that the transcript is a true record of the testimony given by
 12 the witnesses.

13 GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE on this the
 14 23rd day of April, 1995.

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Donna L. Collins

 DONNA L. COLLINS, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND
 REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF
 TEXAS, NO. 1086, EXPIRATION: 12/31/96

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