DON 839

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

14 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1660

Mr. Matthew P. Behrmann
Executive Director
Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

DISC

Y DAVE
SHOW to Counsel

Dear Mr. Behrmann

The Air Force has been performing site surveys and cost validation of our recommendations. Our analysis will result in COBRA cost updates that are near budget quality. These updates will be provided to the Commission as soon as they are available.

During our process one item has come to our attention that we would like you to consider. The current DoD recommendation concerning Bergstrom Air Force Base reads in part, "The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom will be closed by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority elects to assume responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date". After further analysis, we determined that modification of this statement is needed to clarify the DoD's position for the dispensation of the Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF). A more appropriate recommendation would read, "The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom will be closed or relocated by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority elects to assume responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date."

A statement similar to this would allow us the flexibility to close, relocate, or partially relocate the facility if the local civilian airport authority does not step up to its operation.

I would appreciate your consideration of this minor adjustment.

I feel no need [illegible] Rou show in the [illegible]

"Finding But course need to [illegible]

Sincerely,

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Document Separator

BRAC 93 COST COMPARISON

COBRA VS SITE SURVEY DATA

14 JUN 93

Backup provided
To Commission on
2150AP

NEWARK AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	0.0	0.0	0.0
OTHER	31.3	34.8	3.5
TOTAL	31.3	34.8	3.5

OTHER COSTS	
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)	22.6
PROGRAM MGT (AFBDA)	5.2
CONVERSION O & M	6.6
MIL PCS	0.4

GRIFFISS AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON*	46.0	40.7	-5.3
OTHER	74.8	108.3	33.5
TOTAL	120.8	149.0	28.2
OTHER COSTS			
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)		47.5	
TRANSPORTATION		5.9	
TDY TRAVEL		0.7	
PROGRAM MGT (AFBDA)		16.4	
COMM INFRASTRUCTURE		4.4	
MIL PCS		8.2	
TRAINING & RECRUITING (AFRES)		2.0	
MINOR CONSTRUCTION/PICKLING		3.5	
MISC O & M PROJECTS		3.5	
HAP		16.1	

* NOTE: INCLUDES 485 EIG AT HILL AT $13.5M.
ALTERNATE BEDDOWN AT $6.0M REDUCES COST $7.5M

GRIFFISS AFB MILCON

MINOT AFB	(ACC COSTS)	$.M
FROM GRIFFISS		
FY 94		
UPGRADE B-52 APRON/TAXIWAY		5.700
CONV MUNITIONS STORAGE AREA		2.350
AGE CORROSION CNTL FACILITY		1.200
B-52 PHASE DOCK W/AMU		5.500
PYLON/LAUNCH MAINT FACILITY		1.050
PLANNING & DESIGN		1.422
TOTAL		17.222

GRAND FORKS AFB	(AMC COSTS)	$.M
FROM GRIFFISS AND MINOT		
FY 94		
ADAL BLDG 621 (SQUADRON OPS)		.350
ADAL BLDG 622 (FABRICATION SHOP)		.500
ADAL BLDG 605 (CORROSION CONTROL)		1.500
PLANNING & DESIGN		.212
TOTAL		2.562

WESTOVER ARB	(AFRES COSTS)	$.M
FROM GRIFFISS		
FY 95		
ADAL AFRES OPS		.750
ALTER AFRES OPS & TNG		.480
PLANNING & DESIGN		.140
TOTAL		1.341

HILL AFB	(AFMC COSTS)	$.M
FROM GRIFFISS		
FY 94		
ALTER GRP HQ FAC + 5 OTHERS		12.400
PLANNING & DESIGN		1.116
TOTAL		13.516

GRIFFISS AFB	(AFMC COSTS)	$.M
AT GRIFFISS (ROME LAB)		
FY 94		
UTILITY METERS/FENCING - ROME LAB		.720
ALTER COMBINED SUPPORT BLDGS		3.800
ALTER BLDGS 106,119, 120, 302		.504
PLANNING & DESIGN		.452
TOTAL		5.476

MCCONNELL AFB	(AMC COSTS)	$.M
FROM ELLSWORTH AFB		
FY 94		
SIM FACILITY		.700
MISC INTERIM FACILITIES		.500
PLANNING AND DESIGN		.108
TOTAL		1.308

K.I SAWYER AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	106.5	79.7	-26.8
OTHER	37.1	76.1	39.0
TOTAL	143.6	155.8	12.2
OTHER COSTS			
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)		18.0	
TRANSPORTATION		10.5	
TDY TRAVEL		1.3	
PROGRAM MGT (AFBDA)		19.4	
COMM INFRASTRUCTURE		1.0	
MIL PCS		7.9	
TRAINING & RECRUITING (AFRES)		8.2	
MISC O & M		3.9	
HAP		5.9	

BARKSDALE AFB (ACC COSTS) $.M

FROM K.I.SAWYER INC GRIFFISS B-52s

FY 94	
INERT/SUPPORT EQUIP STORAGE	2.500
ABOVE GROUND STORAGE	1.400
BOMB ASSY FACILITY	.470
CMU OPERATIONS FACILITY	1.600
2 BAY B-52 DOCK	9.200
ALTER SUPPLY WAREHOUSES	.780
ADAL A/C SHOPS	.330
PLANNING & DESIGN	1.465
TOTAL	17.745

K.I. SAWYER AFB MILCON

FAIRCHILD AFB (ACC COSTS) $.M

FROM KI SAWYER

FY 94	
INERT EQUIPMENT STORAGE FACILITY	1.050
PLANNING AND DESIGN	.095
TOTAL	1.145

K.I. SAWYER AFB MILCON

PLATTSBURGH AFB (AMC/AFRES COSTS) $.M

FROM BARKSDALE

FY 94	
ADAL GRP HQ	1.640
FAMILY SUPPORT CENTER	.790
FUEL SYSTEMS MAINT DOCK	*9.500*
CORROSION CONTROL FACILITY	*8.800*
ALTER FLT SIM BLDG	3.600
ALTER COMP MEDICAL/DENTAL	4.400
KC-10 COMBS FACILITY	5.100
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR	*8.900*
ALTER KC-10 SQD OPS/AMU	*6.100*
SQ OPS FAC	4.290
PLANNING & DESIGN	4.781
TOTAL	57.901
MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING	2.688
PLANNING & DESIGN	0.242
TOTAL	2.930
TOTAL	61.498

HOMESTEAD AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	52.1	55.4	3.3
OTHER	23.0	44.0	21.0
TOTAL	75.1	99.4	24.3
OTHER COSTS			
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)		18.1	
TRANSPORTATION		1.6	
TDY TRAVEL		3.0	
PROGRAM MGT (AFBDA)		10.1	
COMMUNICATIONS		0.9	
TRAINING & RECRUITING (AFRES)		5.1	
MISC O & M		5.2	

HOMESTEAD AFB MILCON

SHAW AFB (ACC COSTS)	$.M
FROM HOMESTEAD	
FY 94	
CONST OPS/MANT FAC - 726 ACS	8.500
PLANNING & DESIGN	.765
TOTAL	9.265

LACKLAND AFB (ATC COST)	$.M
FROM HOMESTEAD	
FY 96	
IAAFA TECH TNG CLASSROOM	3.750
IAAFA DORMITORY	7.200
IAAFA VOQ	4.250
PLANNING & DESIGN	1.368
TOTAL	16.568

KELLY AFB (ATC COSTS)	$.M
FROM HOMESTEAD	
FY 95	
IAAFA INSTRUCTOR FAC	1.300
IAAFA SMALL ACFT HANGAR	1.600
ALTER IAAFA NOSE DOCKS	.840
IAAFA ARMORY/STORAGE FAC*	.400
**CAMP BULLIS*	
PLANNING & DESIGN	.373
TOTAL	4.513

PENSACOLA NAS (ATC COSTS)	$.M
FROM HOMESTEAD VIA TYNDALL	
FY 96	
NAVY/AF WATER SURVIVAL SCH	1.400
PLANNING & DESIGN	.126
TOTAL	1.526

MACDILL AFB (AFRES COSTS)	$.M
FROM HOMESTEAD (AFRES)	
FY 94	
ALTER VARIOUS FACILITIES	1.400
FUEL SYSTEMS MAINT DOCK	3.500
WING HQ & MED ADMIN FACILITY	3.100
PLANNING & DESIGN	.720
TOTAL	8.720

PATRICK AFB (AFRES COSTS)	$.M
FROM HOMESTEAD (AFRES)	
FY 95	
O&T/SQ OPS FACILITY	1.750
PARARESCUE TNG FACILITY	1.000
C-130 SCHEDULED MAINT HANGAR	4.778
CORROSION CONT/FUEL CELL FACILITY	2.500
SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT SHOP	.450
AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIP FACILITY	.600
GENERAL PURPOSE AVIONICS	2.500
PLANNING & DESIGN	1.222
TOTAL	*14.800*

MCGUIRE AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	156.6	119.0	-37.6
OTHER	33.1	76.1	42.9
TOTAL	189.7	195.1	5.4
OTHER COSTS			
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)		16.5	
TRANSPORTATION		8.0	
TDY TRAVEL		2.8	
MAINTENANCE STANDS		3.3	
COMMUNICATIONS SWITCH		3.4	
PROGRAM MGT (AFBDA)		10.3	
COMM INFRASTRUCTURE		10.0	
MIL PCS		9.4	
HAP		8.5	
MISC O & M PROJECTS		3.8	

McGUIRE AFB MILCON
AT PLATTSBURGH AFB

PROJECT DESCRIPTION	COBRA	REQUEST TOTAL	DELTA
ADAL Renovate B-100 21 AF HQ		2.050	(2.050)
Construct C-141 Sq Ops/AMU	*5.700*	*5.700*	*
Construct C-141 Sq Ops/AMU	*5.700*	*5.700*	**
Construct Aerial Trans Supt Fac	4.500	7.000	(2.500)
ADAL Flight Simulator B-2640 (7.2)	2.100	3.600	(1.500)
Renovate B-108 Support Gp Admin		0.890	(0.890)
ADAL RAPCON		0.580	(0.580)
ADAL B-2622 Base Supply		2.750	(2.750)
Relocate Cryogenic Storage		0.850	(0.850)
Demo Alert Shelter/fence		0.440	(0.44)
ADAL Mobility Ctr to Aiftl Spt Faci AMOS, CCE, TALCS, MPC		4.000	(4.000)
ADAL B-2785 Dock 4	6.150	6.400	(0.250)
ADAL B-2785 Dock 3	6.150	6.400	(0.250)
ADAL FTD B-2012		0.330	(0.330)
Vehical Refuel Shop		2.150	(2.150)
Construct POL Storage	2.000	0.000	2.000
Upgrade 3 Dorms (Pickled)	6.300	7.700	(1.400)
ADAL B-2622 SP Facility		3.600	(3.600)
Extend New York Road		0.360	(0.360)
ADAL Hospital / Dental (13.8)	8.800	9.200	(0.400)
Hospital WRM		3.100	(3.100)
Upgrade HTHW System	8.500	2.850	5.650
Comm Ducts		1.400	(1.400)
Corrosions Hangar	6.800		
BOS Tail	16.000		
Fleet Service	0.700		
PLANNING & DESIGN	7.200	6.935	
TOTAL	87.300	83.985	(3.316)

NOTES: * TOTAL COST = 7.500 (5.700 + 1.800 Conjunctively Funded)
** TOTAL COST = 7.800 (5.700 + 2.100 Conjunctively Funded)

PROJECT DESCRIPTION	COBRA	REQ TOTAL	DELTA
Construct MFH (120 units)	67.400	16.512	-50.888
PLANNING & DESIGN	6.000	1.486	-4.514
MFH TOTAL	73.400	17.998	-58.039

NOTE: * TOTAL REQUIREMENT = 19.2
(17.998 From McGuire + 2.93 From Barksdale)
(120 Units from McGuire + 20 Units from Barksdale = 140 Units Total)

McGUIRE AFB MILCON CANTONMENT AREA

PROJECT DESCRIPTION	COBRA	REQ TOTAL	DELTA
Isolate/Upgrade Utility System		3.350	
Alter Billiting/MWR Facilities		3.000	
Alter Base Support Facilities		1.700	
AFRES Consolidated Club		1.500	
Alter Facilities for Conversion		0.600	
ADAL Reserve Ops & Tng		5.500	
Cantonment Area	25.460		
BOS Tail	5.150		
Planning & Design	2.080	1.409	
TOTAL	32.690	17.059	15.632
MILCON TOTAL	156.6	119.0	-37.6

MARCH AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	116.4	144.4	28.0
OTHER	18.4	44.0	25.6
TOTAL	134.8	188.4	53.6
OTHER COSTS			
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)		8.3	
TRANSPORTATION		6.3	
TDY TRAVEL		2.2	
PROGRAM MGT (AFBDA)		10.2	
COMM INFRASTRUCTURE		4.3	
MIL PCS		7.6	
TRAINING & RECRUITING (AFRES)		1.3	
MISC O & M PROJECTS		3.0	

MARCH AFB MILCON CANTONMENT AREA

PROJECT DESCRIPTION	COBRA	REQ TOTAL	DELTA
Alter BOS Facilities		3.150	
Alter BCE/Vehicle Ops/Maint		1.000	
Alter Gate, Security Fence, Iso Utilities		3.000	
Alter Medical Training Facility		0.860	
Cantonment Area	5.000		
BOS Tail	0.800		
Planning & Design	0.500	0.721	
TOTAL	6.300	8.731	2.431

MARCH AFB MILCON

AT TRAVIS

PROJECT	COBRA	TOTAL REQ	DELTA
Const KC-10 Hgr & MX Complex		14.200	(14.200)
Const KC-10 Sq Ops/AMU	6.800	9.500	(2.700)
Const KC-10 Sq Ops/AMU		*9.500*	*(9.500)*
Const AFRES Sq Ops		4.600	(4.600)
Const KC-10 Simulator 6.600	5.200	1.400	
Demolish Lrg ACFT MX Docks		2.150	(2.150)
Const Ramp Lighting		1.250	(1.250)
Const Hydrant Fueling Sys (19 hydrant)	24.400	19.000	5.400
ADAL Bldg P3 COMBS	4.100	2.000	2.100
Construct Dormitory, 128 Person	*6.900*	*5.500*	*1.400*
Construct Child Development Center		2.550	(2.550)
Hospital WRM Storage		2.400	(2.400)
ADAL Vehicle Maintenance Facility		1.550	(1.550)
ADAL Electrical Dist System	5.000	5.000	0.000
Telephone Duct Facility		1.300	(1.300)
Vehicle Refuel Shop	0.800	0.000	0.800
Jet Fuel Storage	0.500	0.000	0.500
PLANNING & DESIGN	5.000	7.749	2.749
BOS Tail	8.300		
TOTAL	68.400	93.849	25.449)

ConstruMilitFam Housing (260 Units)	*26.000*	*37.700*	*(11.700*
Land Purchase (58 acres)		0.700	(0.700)
PLANNING & DESIGN	3.000	3.393	0.393
TOTAL	29.000	41.793	12.793
GRAND TOTAL	*116.4*	*144.4*	*28.0*

WILLOW GROVE

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	7.8	1.7	-6.1
OTHER	0.0*	8.7	8.7
TOTAL	7.8	10.4	2.6
OTHER COSTS			
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)		5.5	
TRANSPORTATION		0.3	
COMMUNICATIONS		0.8	
TRAINING & RECRUITING (AFRES)		1.4	
MISC O & M		0.7	

NOTE: * COBRA ASSUMED NO MOVE/PCS COSTS BECAUSE DISTANCE TO MCGUIRE < 50 MILES

WILLOW GROVE MILCON

MCGUIRE AFB (AFRES COSTS)	$.M
FROM WILLOW GROVE	
ALTER C-130 GP/SQD OPS	1.00
ALTTER MAINT/AVIONICS SHOPS	0.60
PLAN & DESIGN	0.15
TOTAL	1.75

REDIRECTS

BERGSTROM

- 924 FG/704 FS MOVES
- BERGSTROM TO CARSWELL

MATHER

- 940 ARG MOVES
- MCCLELLAN TO BEALE

RICKENBACKER

- 121 ARW REMAINS AT RICKENBACKER
- CANTONMENT AREA

CASTLE

- B-52 CCTS TO BARKSDALE VICE FAIRCHILD
- KC-135 CCTS TO ALTUS VICE FAIRCHILD

BERGSTROM AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	5.8	5.9	0.1
OTHER	13.3	13.3	0.0
TOTAL	19.1	19.2	0.1
OTHER COSTS			
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)		11.0	
TRANSPORTATION		.3	
COMMUNCATIONS		.6	
TRAINING & RECRUITING (AFRES)		1.4	

BERGSTROM AFB MILCON

CARSWELL AFB (AFRES COSTS) *FROM BERGSTROM AFB*	$.M
FY 94	
ALT 10 AF HQ	0.50
SQD OPS/AMU	2.60
FUEL SYSTEMS MX DOCK	2.30
PLANNING & DESIGN	0.48
TOTAL	5.88

MATHER AFB

940 ARG - MCCLELLAN TO BEALE

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	12.5	4.1	-8.4
OTHER	0.0*	6.4	6.4
TOTAL	12.5	10.5	-2.0

OTHER COSTS	
CIV (PCS, RIF, ETC)	3.9
TRAVEL &TRANSPORTATION	0.2
COMMUNICATIONS	0.5
TRAINING & RECRUITING (AFRES)	1.5
MISC O & M PROJECTS	0.3

* NOTE: ASSUMED NO MOVING/PERSONNEL COSTS BECAUSE DISTANCE FROM MCCLELLAN TO BEALE < 50 MILES

MCCLELLAN AFB MILCON

BEALE AFB ((AFRES COSTS)	$.M
REDIRECT FROM MATHER	
FY 95	
ADAL OPS/TNG FAC	3.80
ALT GP HQ	2.90
ADD RES MED TNG FAC	.40
ADD FOR RES SEC POL	.50
PLANNING & DESIGN	.34
TOTAL	4.14

RICKENBACKER AGB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	15.6	13.6	-2.0
OTHER	0.0	0.2	0.2
TOTAL	15.6	13.8	-1.8
OTHER COSTS			
MISC O & M		0.2	

RICKENBACKER AGB

RICKENBACKER AGB ((AFRES COSTS) $.M
REDIRECT FROM BRAC 91

FY 94	
JET FUEL STORAGE COMPLEX	9.00
ALT COMM FACILITY	.42
ALT COMP SUPT/ORG MX	1.05
ALT SHOPS	.43
SITE PREP	.31
ALT SQ OPS FAC	.42
FUEL CELL MX DOCK	.88
PLANNING & DESIGN	1.13
TOTAL	13.63

CASTLE AFB

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
MILCON	78.7*	73.6	-5.1
OTHER	0.0**	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	78.7	73.6	-5.1

NOTES: * PROGRAMMED IN BRAC 91.
** OTHER COSTS PROGRAMMED IN BRAC 91 AND ASSUMED TO BE SIMILAR FOR EITHER BEDDOWN.

CASTLE AFB MILCON

BARKSDALE AFB (ACC COSTS)	$.M
REDIRECT FROM FAIRCHILD	
FY 94	
ADAL FLT TNG FAC	1.850
ADAL ACADEMICS FAC	1.750
ALT B-52 SIM BLDG	.580
B-52 FLT SIM FAC	6.500
ADAL TARGET INTEL VAULT	.650
STUDENT OFFICER QUARTERS	2.950
PLANNING & DESIGN	1.285
TOTAL	15.565

ALTUS AFB (ATC COSTS)	$.M
REDIRECT FROM FAIRCHILD	
FY 95	
BUILD SIM ACADEMIC FAC	10.800
BUILD FLY TNG ACADEMIC FAC	1.700
RECONFIG APRON & HYDRANT FAC	7.900
BUILD TRANSIENT OFFICERS DORM	9.500
PLANNING & DESIGN	2.691
TOTAL	32.591
CONSTR MIL FAM HOUSING (233UNITS)	23.300
LAND ACQUISITION (50 ACRES)	.145
PLANNING & DESIGN	2.097
TOTAL	25.397
TOTAL	73.553

MISC REDIRECT COSTS

HILL AFB (ACC COSTS)	$.M
FROM CARSWELL AFB	
436 TS FACILITIES AT HILL	.300

PROGRAM SUMMARY

ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY	DELTA
TOTAL MILCON	491.2	446.8	-44.4
TOTAL OTHER	231.0	332.6	101.6
TOTAL w/o AFBDA	722.2	779.4	57.2
% change from COBRA			7.92%
TOTAL OTHER w/ AFBDA		405.2	
TOTAL w/AFBDA	722.2*	852.0	129.8
% change from COBRA			17.98%

* AFBDA NOT INCLUDED IN COBRA

Document Separator

(1)

Need Cost Breakdown for Carswell Redirect Iteration of leaving 924th at Bergstrom & moving Navy units from NAS Dallas, Memphis, Cecil Field & NAF Detroit To Carswell Cantonment Area

(2) Same as 1 above but include Berg units moving To Carswell & Bergstrom Cantonment area Closing.

ACC might want to keep items in Building Bergstrom / cost effective

Bergstrom Proposal SPLINTER the unit

Jim { Fax GAO AW

Jim ?? 150 W 4535th 3400 E 4500 TC Marine to March

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 6/11/93

TO: THE HONORABLE JAMES BOATRIGHT

FAX #: 3-7568

FROM: Toby G. Messitt
– Director of the Executive Secretariat

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 5

CONTENTS: URGENT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
RE: REDIRECT BREAKDOWN INVOLVING
BERGSTROM AFB, CARSWELL AFB

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CONTACT
FRANK CIRILLO, AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER AT
703/696-0504.

→ HARD COPY TO FOLLOW.

IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE RECEIVING THIS FAX PLEASE CALL 703-696-0504.

Site Survey Response

Our original correspondence requested specific Site Survey reports.

The, "Other Costs," need further definition/explanation of what they are since the amount is significant in the final/total estimates.

How is the, "Program Management cost" derived?

It would have been beneficial to have a breakdown of MILCON costs by project.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

14 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20330-1660

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington Virginia 22209

Dear Mr Chairman,

The refined cost estimates developed from the Major Command (MAJCOM) site surveys are forwarded for your information as requested in your May 10, 1993 letter. These estimates are not budget quality and will continue to be refined.

The costs you requested in your letter of May 7, 1993, for the redirects from Mather, MacDill, and Bergstrom, Carswell AFBs and Rickenbacker AGB have been forwarded separately.

A separate category of costs, program management, has been added to reflect the costs associated with the management of the base and its cleanup and disposal after the closure date. These costs are primarily associated with our Air Force Base Disposal Agency (AFBDA) and cover items like environmental impact studies, environmental compliance, personnel costs, and caretaker expenses including utilities and security after the active forces depart. Including these costs represents a change from past BRAC rounds which did not incorporate any estimate for program managment until implementing budgets were developed. Adding these expenses reflects a more complete picture of the total one-time costs of closures and realignments. It is important to note that these costs are a necessary part of every closure and have the same relative impact on any closure action and, therefore, do not change the basis for any DoD recommendation.

In accordance with OSD policy, no environmental restoration costs are included in our estimates. Environmental restoration expenses are an obligation outside the base closure and realignment process. However, environmental restoration costs will be incorporated later in budget documents in accordance with the assumption that the Congress will continue to require these expenses be paid from the base closure accounts.

The "Other" category reflects a higher figure than COBRA-derived numbers. COBRA is a comparative model rather than an estimating model. The higher costs in this category are attributable to more accurate estimates of operations and maintenance costs, including actual packing and transportation, communications and personnel costs, than can be forecast by COBRA in advance of site surveys and definition of actual unit and base requirements.

Finally, while these refined estimates indicate a higher cost than derived from COBRA, the Air Force's original recommendations remain sound, valid and cost effective, with the exception of the Springfield, Ohio unit relocation which we have addressed with you previously. We hope this information will be useful.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Atch
BRAC 93 COBRA and Site Survey Data

BRAC 93 COBRA and SITE SURVEY DATA

BASE	ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY
NEWARK		($M)	($M)
	MILCON	0.0	0.0
	OTHER	31.3	29.6
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	5.2
	TOTAL	31.3	34.8
MARCH			
	MILCON	116.4	144.4
	OTHER	18.4	32.6
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	11.4
	TOTAL	134.8	188.4
MCGUIRE*			
	MILCON	156.6	119.0
	OTHER	33.1	65.8
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	10.2
	TOTAL	189.7	195.1

* NOTE: COBRA Numbers Exclude Willow Grove

GRIFFISS			
	MILCON	46.0	40.7 *
	OTHER	74.8	91.9
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	16.4
	TOTAL	120.8	149.0

* NOTE: Alternate Beddown of 485 EIG at Tinker vice Hill would reduce MILCON by approximately $7.5M

K.I.SAWYER		($M)	($M)
	MILCON	106.5	79.7
	OTHER	37.1	56.7
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	19.4
	TOTAL	143.6	155.8
HOMESTEAD			
	MILCON	52.1	55.4
	OTHER	23.0	33.9
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	10.1
	TOTAL	75.1	99.4
BERGSTROM			
	MILCON	5.8	5.9
	OTHER	13.3	13.3
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	0.0
	TOTAL	19.1	19.2
WILLOW GROVE *			
	MILCON	7.8	1.7
	OTHER	0.0	8.7
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	0.0
	TOTAL	7.8	10.4

* NOTE: COBRA Amount Subtracted From McGuire COBRA

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

14 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20330-1660

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington Virginia 22209

Dear Mr Chairman,

The refined cost estimates developed from the Major Command (MAJCOM) site surveys are forwarded for your information as requested in your May 10, 1993 letter. These estimates are not budget quality and will continue to be refined.

The costs you requested in your letter of May 7, 1993, for the redirects from Mather, MacDill, and Bergstrom, Carswell AFBs and Rickenbacker AGB have been forwarded separately.

A separate category of costs, program management, has been added to reflect the costs associated with the management of the base and its cleanup and disposal after the closure date. These costs are primarily associated with our Air Force Base Disposal Agency (AFBDA) and cover items like environmental impact studies, environmental compliance, personnel costs, and caretaker expenses including utilities and security after the active forces depart. Including these costs represents a change from past BRAC rounds which did not incorporate any estimate for program managment until implementing budgets were developed. Adding these expenses reflects a more complete picture of the total one-time costs of closures and realignments. It is important to note that these costs are a necessary part of every closure and have the same relative impact on any closure action and, therefore, do not change the basis for any DoD recommendation.

In accordance with OSD policy, no environmental restoration costs are included in our estimates. Environmental restoration expenses are an obligation outside the base closure and realignment process. However, environmental restoration costs will be incorporated later in budget documents in accordance with the assumption that the Congress will continue to require these expenses be paid from the base closure accounts.

The "Other" category reflects a higher figure than COBRA-derived numbers. COBRA is a comparative model rather than an estimating model. The higher costs in this category are attributable to more accurate estimates of operations and maintenance costs, including actual packing and transportation, communications and personnel costs, than can be forecast by COBRA in advance of site surveys and definition of actual unit and base requirements.

Finally, while these refined estimates indicate a higher cost than derived from COBRA, the Air Force's original recommendations remain sound, valid and cost effective, with the exception of the Springfield, Ohio unit relocation which we have addressed with you previously. We hope this information will be useful.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Atch
BRAC 93 COBRA and Site Survey Data

BRAC 93 COBRA and SITE SURVEY DATA

BASE	ITEM	COBRA	SITE SURVEY
NEWARK		($M)	($M)
	MILCON	0.0	0.0
	OTHER	31.3	29.6
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	5.2
	TOTAL	**31.3**	**34.8**
MARCH			
	MILCON	116.4	144.4
	OTHER	18.4	32.6
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	11.4
	TOTAL	**134.8**	**188.4**
MCGUIRE*			
	MILCON	156.6	119.0
	OTHER	33.1	65.8
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	10.2
	TOTAL	**189.7**	**195.1**

cost at McG & PCYS

* NOTE: COBRA Numbers Exclude Willow Grove

GRIFFISS			
	MILCON	46.0	40.7 *
	OTHER	74.8	91.9
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	16.4
	TOTAL	**120.8**	**149.0**

* NOTE: Alternate Beddown of 485 EIG at Tinker vice Hill would reduce MILCON by approximately $7.5M

K.I.SAWYER		($M)	($M)
	MILCON	106.5	79.7
	OTHER	37.1	56.7
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	19.4
	TOTAL	**143.6**	**155.8**

cost for Barksdale PCYS?

HOMESTEAD			
	MILCON	52.1	55.4
	OTHER	23.0	33.9
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	10.1
	TOTAL	**75.1**	**99.4**
BERGSTROM			
	MILCON	5.8	5.9
	OTHER	13.3	13.3
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	0.0
	TOTAL	**19.1**	**19.2**
WILLOW GROVE *			
	MILCON	7.8	1.7
	OTHER	0.0	8.7
	PROGRAM MGT	0.0	0.0
	TOTAL	**7.8**	**10.4**

* NOTE: COBRA Amount Subtracted From McGuire COBRA

Jan Log
Rick Tran

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

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HARRY C. McPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

May 10, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)
Department of the Air Force (SAF/MII)
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1660

Please refer to this number when responding 930510-33

Dear Mr. Boatright:

We fully understand the position expressed in your letter of May 3, 1993, regarding our request for site survey results and any resulting cost differentials. However, I would appreciate your providing any early results that indicate initial estimates were substantially under or overstated due to facts that could only be uncovered during a site visit. This information, if available, would be extremely beneficial to the Commissioners when they decide on May 21, which bases should be formally added for further consideration.

Any assistance or consideration you can give in this manner will benefit our charge to reduce unnecessary DoD installations. Thank you again for your cooperation in this regard.

Sincerely,

Jim Courter

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo
ES# 930416-11; 930504-25

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MAY 3 1993

Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Installations)
Room 4C940, Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

Please refer to this number when responding: 930504-25

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter:

This letter is in response to your April 16, 1993 letter requesting results of site surveys for our 1993 BRAC recommendations. I totally agree with your assessment of the importance of site surveys to validate our COBRA cost model estimates. However, the actual site surveys are only a part of our process in validating these estimates. We go through an extensive review process to ensure the most efficient use of available resources in all relocations. Survey data is collected, compiled, and reviewed by the respective major command(s). Results are, then, presented to senior Air Force leadership via the Base Closure Executive Group. All of these actions must be completed before we can update cost estimates. We have established a very compressed schedule in order to meet the June 1, 1993 goal, established during Secretary Donley's March 15, 1993, testimony, for providing updates to your Commission.

Currently, we are performing site surveys for Air Force relocations recommended by SECDEF. We have scheduled major command briefings to the Base Closure Executive Group for May 10 - 26. After these briefings, we will compile the Air Force estimates and forward them as soon as possible, but no later than June 1, 1993.

It is unfortunate that our compressed schedule will not allow providing the information on the date requested. However, we will provide the information incrementally as soon as it is available.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
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JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

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HARRY C. McPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

April 16, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of The Air Force
(Installations)
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301

930416-11

Dear Mr Boatright:

I understand the Air Force is conducting facility site surveys at bases proposed to receive force structure as a result of the 1993 BRAC recommendations. Further, the surveys are apparently being done to validate MILCON estimates used in the BRAC recommendations. The Commission believes the results of your surveys would be beneficial to its deliberations on the DoD recommended closures and realignments. Therefore, I am requesting that you provide the Commission with copies of the survey reports or, at minimum, a list of the MILCON requirements and cost estimates associated with each of the receiving bases.

Your response to the Commission by May 15, 1993 is necessary for our deliberations on the options list which is scheduled to be completed on May 22, 1993.

Thank you for your continued cooperation and assistance in this very difficult endeavor.

Sincerely,

Jim Courter

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:dicamillo

Document Separator

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
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Jen
Log/Track
copy to
Exec DEF
member

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

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HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 4, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Installations
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

Please refer to this number
when responding 930604-24

Dear Mr. Boatright:

Staff members from the Base Closure Working Group met with Commission staff to discuss the COBRA requests noted in my June 1, 1993 letter. As a result of the superb input and advice garnered from that meeting, we request that the following COBRA products be provided, in lieu of those requested in the letter. Please provide the following runs to the Commission no later than 12:00 noon on June 14, 1993:

LARGE AIRCRAFT BASES

BASE	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3	OPTION 4
FAIRCHILD	*	*		*
GRAND FORKS	*	*	*	
GRIFFISS	*			*
KI SAWYER	*	*	*	
MARCH	choose 1 to close	choose 1 to close	choose 2 to close	*
MCGUIRE				choose 1 to close
PLATTSBURGH				

* = close

COBRA

DEPOTS

Update level runs for Robins, Tinker and Kelly. Also include a "level run" on Robins, Tinker and Kelly depot only closing. The following matrix of options will allow the staff to present other options to include closing or retaining McClellan AFB.

BASE	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3	OPTION 4	OPTION 5	OPTION 6
MCCLELLAN	*	*	*	*	*	*
ROBINS	*					
ROBINS (DEPOT ONLY)		*				
TINKER			*			
TINKER (DEPOT ONLY)				*		
KELLY					*	
KELLY (DEPOT ONLY)						*

* = close

OTHER

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 1): Keep Bergstrom AFB cantonment area open. Move the 301st Fighter Wing from Carswell AFB to the Bergstrom AFB cantonment area.

Please express our thanks to the staff at the Base Closure Working Group for meeting with us and assisting us in clarifying our request.

Sincerely,

Jim Courter

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo

WE ARE BEING VISITED BY XOOR AT 9AM TO DISCUSS OUR NO S T COBRA REQUIREMENTS. WRITE THEM DOWN/ REVIEW OUR LETTER AT ATCH #6 AND BE READY TO DEFEND AND DISCUSS YOUR NEEDS. SEE THE SUGGESTED LIST BELOW AS A STARTING POINT. COBRAS MIGHT NOT BE REQUIRED FRO EACH.

FOR DOD RECOMMENDATIONS- WE PROBABLY HAVE ALL OF THESE OR HAVE REQUESTED THEM.

- HOMESTEAD COMPLETELY CLOSED AS RECOMMENDED/ HOMESTEAD REALIGNED WITH 482D STAYING AT HOMESTEAD
- BERGSTROM AS RECOMMENDED/BERGSTROM KEEPING EXISTING "91" UNITS (IE REDIRECT DISAPPROVED)/BERGSTROM KEEPING EXISTING "91" UNITS PLUS RECEIVING CARSWELL AFRES UNIT
- RICKENBACKER REDIRECT AS RECOMMENDED/RICKENBACKER REDIRECT WITHOUT THE SPRINGFIELD MOVE
- NEWARK AS RECOMMENDED(PRIVATIZE IN PLACE)/NEWARK WITH TRANSITION ONSITE-OFFSITE CONTRACT
- MACDILL REDIRECT AS RECOMMENDED/MACDILL REDIRECT DISAPPROVED WITH NOAA OPERATING AIRFIELD AND JCSE STAYING PLUS VARIOUS HOMESTEAD OPTIONS
- O'HARE AS RECOMMENDED/O'HARE DISAPPROVED/O'HARE WITH RECEIVER SITE COST SHARING COST OF RELOCATION WITH CHICAGO
- K I SAWYER, MCGUIRE, MARCH, GRIFFISS AS RECOMMENDED OR AS DISAPPROVED
- OTHER REDIRCT COSTS?

FOR DBCRC ADDS- HOPEFULLY WE HAVE REQUESTED ALL

- MCCLELLAN COMPLETELY CLOSED
- OTHER THREE ALCs COMPLETELY CLOSED/OTHER THREE ALCs WITHDEOT ONLY PORTION CLOSED
- ALL POSSIBLE E C M BASE SCENARIOS
- FAIRCHILD & PLATTSBURGH COMPLETELY CLOSED
- GRAND FORKS COMPLETELY CLOSED/GRAND FORKS KEEPING MISSILE FIELD AND FLIGHTLINE-MISSILE MNTCE OPS OPEN/G F COMPLETELY CLOSED WITH BOS CONTRACT FOR ABM SITE

REVIEW THE COBRA LTR (ATCH 6 TO MY REPORT MEMO) FIRST.

LETS ALL MEET AT 8:30 TO SEE IF WE ARE READY FOR XOOR

FRANK

Meeting
4 Mar
w/ XOOR

PLTS
FAIR
KIS

GF
Mc
Mar
Griffiss

June 1, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Installations
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Mr. Boatright:

To assist the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with its independent analysis of DoD recommended actions and bases added for consideration by the Commission on May 21, we request the following COBRA runs to be available no later than 12:00 noon on June 14, 1993:

Plattsburgh: Close Plattsburgh, establish McGuire as air mobility wing. Transfer 28 KC-135s from Plattsburgh to McGuire. Transfer 19 KC-10s from Barksdale to McGuire. Retain AFRES C-130s (12) at Willow Grove NAS, PA.

OK

Fairchild (Option 1): Close Fairchild, March stays open. Realign 14 KC-135s from Fairchild to March. Realign ANG KC-135s to Spokane IAP. Realign B-52s to Barksdale/Minot. Survival school move to AF Academy.

OK

Fairchild (Option 2): Same as option 1 except ANG KC-135s remain at Fairchild in cantonment area.

OK

All Depots: Calculations for the closure of the Air Logistics Center, Defense Distribution Depot, DISA, and any other activities specifically located at these bases only because the Air Logistics Center is an active unit: Robins AFB, Tinker AFB, Kelly AFB, and McClellan AFB.

Tinker (Option 1): Close Tinker AFB, OK. Move B-1 workload to Kelly. Move B-52 workload to Kelly. Move E-3 workload to contractor. Move engine workload to Kelly. Move hydraulics/pneudraulics workload to McClellan. Move oxygen/gas generating equipment workload to Hill. Move 552 ACW E-3s to Offut. Move USN Strat Wing One E-6's to Robins. Leave ANG F-16s in cantonment.

McClellan and Tinker (Option 1): Close McClellan and Tinker AFBs. Move Hill C-130/Robins C-130 workload to Kelly. Move McClellan F-15 workload to Robins. Move McClellan A-10/F-111 workloads to Hill. Contract McClellan C-135s. Move Tinker B-52s to Kelly. Contract Tinker E-3s. Contract Tinker B-1s. Contract Kelly C-5's. Contract McClellan ground/comm-elect. Move McClellan instruments to Kelly. Move Tinker engines to Kelly. Move Tinker hydraulics to Kelly. Move Tinker oxygen/gas generating to Hill. Move McClellan AFR KC-135s to Beale. Move 552 ACW E-3s to Offut. Move McClellan 1849 EIS to Hill. Move McClellan HQ ARS to Langley. Move McClellan AFTAC Spec Ops Div to Offutt, NE. ✓ or as called

Grand Forks (Option 1): Grand Forks close, March stay open. Realign KC-135s to March AFB including Griffiss tankers (31 KC-135s total). Griffiss B-52s realign to Minot/Barksdale. ✓ ??

Grand Forks (Option 2): Close entire base and move the 10 B-1s and the 7 KC-135Rs to Ellsworth AFB. Move the Minuteman III ICBMs to Malmstrom AFB as a replacement for the Minuteman IIs. Move the 4 HH-1Hs to Grand Forks International Airport to be used for missile field destruction contractor support. ✓

Grand Forks (Option 3): Close missile field but leave the bomber and refueling missions intact. Move the Minuteman III ICBMs to Malmstrom AFB as a replacement for the Minuteman IIs. Move the 4 HH-1Hs to Grand Forks International Airport to be used for missile field destruction contractor support. ??

Grand Forks (Option 4): Close flying mission portion of the base but retain the missile field. Move the 10 B-1s and the 7 KC-135s to Ellsworth AFB. ✓

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 1): Close Bergstrom AFB cantonment area. Move the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft, the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units, and the 10th Air Force (AFRES) Headquarters, to the expanded cantonment area at Carswell AFB. 93'

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 2): Keep Bergstrom AFB cantonment area open. Move the 301st Fighter Wing from Carswell AFB to the Bergstrom AFB cantonment area. New

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 3): Same as Bergstrom/Carswell #2, but leave 301st as is. 91'

MacDill (Option 1): Return JCSE to MacDill (BRAC 91 moved) without identifying airfield operator.

MacDill (Option 2): Return JCSE with Department of Commerce (NOAA) as airfield operator.

MacDill (Option 3): Move JCSE to Charleston as passed by the 1991 Commission.

Bottom Line is $$

Warner Robins (Option 1): Close. Move the F-15, avionics, electrical, instruments and part of the software development Depot functions to McClellan; move the C-130, C141 and associated software updates to Kelly; move all helicopter support to Tinker. Move the U.S. AFRES HQ to Dobbins. Close the 9th Missile Warning Squadron. Move the 19th Air Refueling Wing to any base in the Southeast that can absorb the wing. Relocate JSTARS to Tinker. Terminate proposed spending of JSTAR MILCON dollars.

Warner Robins (Option 2): Close and relocate the Depot Functions and HQ AF Reserves and retain the 9th Squadron and the Airlift Wing. Retain 9th Squadron until closure in 1999. Retain 19th Air Refueling Wing at Robins.

Rickenbacker: Move Rickenbacker ANG to Wright Patterson AFB as directed by BRAC 91. Leave Springfield unit at Springfield.

For your information, the following is a list of COBRA runs that have previously been requested by the Commission. The date of request is annotated in parenthesis. Those we have received from the Air Force to date are marked with an asterisk. Again, all will be needed no later than 12:00 noon on June 14, 1993.

A) Griffiss AFB remains open as a bomber base; close Fairchild AFB; move KC-135s to Altus AFB (calculate as if the KC-135 CCTS move from Castle AFB to Altus AFB is approved); move KC-135s (ANG) to Spokane International Airport; move B-52s to Minot AFB and Barksdale AFB (calculate as if the B-52 CCTS move to Barksdale from Castle AFB is approved); move Survival School to the Air Force Academy (May 6 ltr).

B) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Fairchild AFB; move KC-135s to Altus AFB (calculate as if the KC-135 CCTS move from Castle AFB to Altus AFB is approved); move KC-135s (ANG) to Spokane International Airport; move B-52s to K.I. Sawyer AFB (calculate as if the B-52 CCTS move to Barksdale from Castle AFB is approved); move Survival School to the Air Force Academy (May 6 ltr).

C) COBRA cost estimates for the closure of Gentile AFS (April 28 ltr).

* D) Griffiss AFB remains open to host the Northeast Air Mobility Wing; B-52s move to Minot and Barksdale AFBs; realign McGuire AFB; move active C-141s to Griffiss AFB instead of Plattsburgh as recommended by DoD report; close Plattsburgh; move KC-135s to Griffiss AFB; move KC-10s from Barksdale AFB to Griffiss AFB (April 26 ltr).

E) McGuire AFB remains open to host the Northeast Air Mobility Wing; Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended in the DoD report; close Plattsburgh AFB; move KC-135s to McGuire AFB; move KC-10s from Barksdale AFB to McGuire (April 26 ltr). Please note that the initial request, which was later corrected via phone conversation, had the KC-10s moving from Barksdale to Plattsburgh.

F) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Minot AFB; move the B-52s and KC-135s to K.I. Sawyer; move the MM IIIs to Malmstrom AFB (April 26 ltr).

G) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Grand Forks AFB; move B-1s to Ellsworth AFB; move KC-135s to K.I. Sawyer AFB; move MM IIIs to Malmstrom AFB (April 26 ltr).

H) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Cannon AFB; move the F-111s to K.I. Sawyer AFB (April 26 ltr).

I) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Seymour-Johnson; move F-15Es and KC-10s to K.I.Sawyer AFB (April 26 ltr).

J) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Cannon AFB and Seymour-Johnson AFBs; move F-111s, F-15Es, and KC-10s to K.I. Sawyer AFB (April 26 ltr).

K) The Air National Guard alert detachment returns to Homestead AFB (April 12 ltr).

L) The alert detachment and the 482 Fighter Wing returns to Homestead AFB (April 12 ltr).

M) In addition to the above, the 301 Rescue Squadron returns to Homestead AFB (April 12 ltr).

N) The 482 Fighter Wing returns to Homestead AFB and assumes the alert commitment instead of the Air National Guard Detachment (April 12 ltr).

O) The 482 Wing returns to Homestead AFB operating the KC-135 (April 12 ltr).

P) Develop Griffiss AFB as the east coast mobility base (April 7 ltr).

Q) Retain Rome Lab at Griffiss and operate the airfield in a standby status (April 7 ltr).

R) Compare costs to establish/operate Plattsburgh AFB plus Griffiss AFB in standby status and Rome Lab with the cost of closing Plattsburgh and establishing/operating Griffiss AFB as the east coast mobility base (April 7 ltr).

Sincerely,

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo

Option IV -- Fairchild

- If only moving 4 B-52s to Minot, why include costs for moving 16 KC-135s to Grand Forks in Fairchild closing costs

- ROBINS: why is J-STARS Relocation cost included?
  - what is MILCON costs assoc'd with ROBINS
  - ALC ONLY: WHAT is MILCON FOR

- TINKER
  - BACKING OUT 427M FOR McCLELLAN, TINKER'S ADJUSTED COST STILL over $2 B; (ORIGINAL Level RUN WAS $1.2 BILLION) (why INCREASE?)

- Kelly:
  - SAME AS FOR TINKER: BACKING OUT the $427M to close McCLELLAN, the new cost to close Kelly is $1.7B, Almost $400M more than ORIGINAL Level RUN for Kelly: why?

Document Separator

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

18 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1660

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter

The attached COBRA estimates were accomplished as requested in your June 4, 1993 letter. The time to do this is compressed, compared to that of the original analyses, but costing of the additional options has been accomplished to the best of our ability. Where force structure realignments were involved, the beddown followed the same guidelines the Air Force applied in the COBRA models on which the Air Force recommendations were based. Site surveys and additional analysis would be required to validate these estimates. These estimates are more comparable to our level playing field process than to the expanded analysis underlying our recommendations.

The Air Force strongly disagrees with the identification of Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB as alternatives or additional candidates for closure or realignments. Fairchild AFB has significantly greater military value than the bases recommended for closure. Fairchild AFB as a Northwest tanker base is essential for our warfighting posture in the Pacific. I will support major Pacific contingency response, such as defense of Korea. Its Northwest location is ideally suited to support major deployment refueling routes in the Pacific. The closure of Grand Forks AFB and the associated missile field would be premature. The OSD bottom-up review on the ICBM force mix is not final. We therefore recommend keeping four missile fields for flexibility due to START uncertainties. The closure of Grand Forks could open ABM Treaty issues since it is the only location in the United States where the treaty permits deployment of an ABM system. The Air Force will readdress missile bases in BRAC 95.

The Air Force strongly disagrees with using the 1987 baseline to compute excess depot capacity. That baseline has major flaws. In particular, it does not account for personnel and facility reductions between 1987 and 1991. Our analysis concluded that all depot's except

McClellan were cost-prohibitive to close. These COBRA estimates reinforce that analysis. Also, our analysis accurately portrays the military value of Air Force depot bases relative to each other. McClellan was the lowest. I urge the Commission to wait before cutting too deep in Air Force depots. Let DoD finish its "bottom-up review", then evaluate all DoD depots against better defined requirements.

Sincerely

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Atch
DBCRC Requested COBRAs

OPTION I

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



* POTENTIAL RECEIVER SITES WOULD HAVE TO BE SURVEYED BEFORE SITE SELECTION, HOWEVER, GENERIC COSTING IS AVAILABLE.

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF FAIRCHILD

FAIRCHILD HAS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER MILITARY VALUE THAN THE BASES RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE

LARGE N.W. TANKER BASE ESSENTIAL FOR WARFIGHTING POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC --SUPPORTS MAJOR PACIFIC CONTINGENCY RESPONSE (ex: OPLAN 5027--DEFENSE OF KOREA)

FAIRCHILD IS THE BEST NORTHWEST BASE (GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, CAPACITY, INFRASTRUCTURE) TO SATISFY REGIONAL TANKER REQUIREMENTS

IDEALLY LOCATED CLOSE TO MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REFUELING ROUTES

BASE INFRASTRUCTURE (RAMP, HYDRANTS, FACILITIES, LARGE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS STORAGE) IDEAL FOR LARGE TANKER/BOMBER BEDDOWN

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	409.4		
OTHER	45.9		
TOTAL	455.3	-37.6	20 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: KC-135 AND B-52 CCTS REDIRECT IS APPROVED. DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE MODE (ALREADY FENCED).

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION I

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS

CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS AND ASSOCIATED MISSILE FIELD PREMATURE:

-- OSD BOTTOM UP REVIEW NOT FINAL ON ICBM FORCE MIX, CURRENTLY RECOMMENDS KEEPING FOUR MISSILE FIELDS FOR FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES

CLOSURE COULD OPEN ISSUES WITH RUSSIANS (IF U.S. ELECTED TO MOVE ABM SYSTEM WHICH IS TIED BY TREATY TO GRAND FORKS MISSILE FIELD)

MUST MAINTAIN FOUR MISSILE FIELDS TO RETAIN DESIRED FLEXIBILITY; AIR FORCE WILL READDRESS IN BRAC 95

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	50.8		
OTHER	39.7		
TOTAL	90.5	-65.9	IMMEDIATE

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION I



BEDDOWN LOCATIONS ARE DRIVEN BY ADDITIONAL BASE CLOSINGS BEING REVIEWED BY THE DBCRC AND DO NOT REPRESENT OPTIMUM CHOICES.

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF GRIFFISS

AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

GRIFFISS RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS--BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

RATED LOWER THAN PLATTSBURGH AND MCGUIRE IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

USAF WILL MAINTAIN ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE 10TH INFANTRY (LIGHT) DIVISION -- AIRFIELD REMAINS IN STANDBY STATUS

THE NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND ROME LAB REMAIN

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	134.0		
OTHER	55.1		
TOTAL	189.1	-39.4	5 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NEADS REMAINS. ROME LAB REMAINS. 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION I

KI SAWYER —14 B-52→ BARKSDALE —17 KC-10→ PLATTSBURGH

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE CLOSURE OF KI SAWYER

AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN ICBM BASING FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES--FOUR MISSILE FIELDS REQUIRED

MORE ECONOMICAL TO OPERATE A BOMBER/MISSILE BASE THAN A BOMBER ONLY-BASE

KI SAWYER RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	106.5		
OTHER	37.1		
TOTAL	143.6	-46.0	3 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION I



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MCGUIRE AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MCGUIRE RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MCGUIRE EVALUATED AGAINST PLATTSBURGH IN HEAD-TO-HEAD ANALYSIS AS THE SITE FOR EAST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING

PLATTSBURGH BEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

FAA LONG -STANDING REQUEST FOR CIVIL USE OF MCGUIRE TO EASE REGIONAL CONGESTION (NEW YORK/PHILADELPHIA)

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION II

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



* POTENTIAL RECEIVER SITES WOULD HAVE TO BE SURVEYED BEFORE SITE SELECTION, HOWEVER, GENERIC COSTING IS AVAILABLE.

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF FAIRCHILD

FAIRCHILD HAS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER MILITARY VALUE THAN THE BASES RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE

LARGE N.W. TANKER BASE ESSENTIAL FOR WARFIGHTING POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC --SUPPORTS MAJOR PACIFIC CONTINGENCY RESPONSE (ex: OPLAN 5027--DEFENSE OF KOREA)

FAIRCHILD IS THE BEST NORTHWEST BASE (GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, CAPACITY, INFRASTRUCTURE) TO SATISFY REGIONAL TANKER REQUIREMENTS

- IDEALLY LOCATED CLOSE TO MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REFUELING ROUTES
- BASE INFRASTRUCTURE (RAMP, HYDRANTS, FACILITIES, LARGE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS STORAGE) IDEAL FOR LARGE TANKER/BOMBER BEDDOWN

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	419.2		
OTHER	45.3		
TOTAL	464.5	-39.3	20 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: KC-135 AND B-52 CCTS REDIRECT IS APPROVED. DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE MODE (ALREADY FENCED). 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION II

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS

CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS AND ASSOCIATED MISSILE FIELD PREMATURE:

-- OSD BOTTOM UP REVIEW NOT FINAL ON ICBM FORCE MIX, CURRENTLY RECOMMENDS KEEPING FOUR MISSILE FIELDS FOR FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES

CLOSURE COULD OPEN ISSUES WITH RUSSIANS (IF U.S. ELECTED TO MOVE ABM SYSTEM WHICH IS TIED BY TREATY TO GRAND FORKS MISSILE FIELD)

MUST MAINTAIN FOUR MISSILE FIELDS TO RETAIN DESIRED FLEXIBILITY; AIR FORCE WILL READDRESS IN BRAC 95

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	38.7		
OTHER	40.6		
TOTAL	79.3	-65.8	IMMEDIATE

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: 940th REDIRECT TO BEALE APPROVED.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION II

KI SAWYER —14 B-52→ BARKSDALE —17 KC-10→ PLATTSBURGH

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE CLOSURE OF KI SAWYER

AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN ICBM BASING FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES--FOUR MISSILE FIELDS REQUIRED

MORE ECONOMICAL TO OPERATE A BOMBER/MISSILE BASE THAN A BOMBER ONLY-BASE

KI SAWYER RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	106.5		
OTHER	37.1		
TOTAL	143.6	-46.0	3 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION II



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MCGUIRE AFB

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PLATTSBURGH BEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

FAA LONG -STANDING REQUEST FOR CIVIL USE OF MCGUIRE TO EASE REGIONAL CONGESTION (NEW YORK/PHILADELPHIA)

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION III

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



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CLOSURE COULD OPEN ISSUES WITH RUSSIANS (IF U.S. ELECTED TO MOVE ABM SYSTEM WHICH IS TIED BY TREATY TO GRAND FORKS MISSILE FIELD)

MUST MAINTAIN FOUR MISSILE FIELDS TO RETAIN DESIRED FLEXIBILITY; AIR FORCE WILL READDRESS IN BRAC 95

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	50.8		
OTHER	39.7		
TOTAL	90.5	-65.9	IMMEDIATE

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION III



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	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION III



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MARCH AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MARCH RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MARCH ANALYZED WITH TRAVIS, BEALE, FAIRCHILD, MCCHORD AND MALMSTROM AS SITE FOR WEST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING

TRAVIS RANKS HIGHEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	116.4		
OTHER	18.4		
TOTAL	134.8	-46.9	2 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION IV

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



* POTENTIAL RECEIVER SITES WOULD HAVE TO BE SURVEYED BEFORE SITE SELECTION, HOWEVER, GENERIC COSTING IS AVAILABLE.

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF FAIRCHILD

FAIRCHILD HAS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER MILITARY VALUE THAN THE BASES RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE

LARGE N.W. TANKER BASE ESSENTIAL FOR WARFIGHTING POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC --SUPPORTS MAJOR PACIFIC CONTINGENCY RESPONSE (ex: OPLAN 5u27--DEFENSE OF KOREA)

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- BASE INFRASTRUCTURE (RAMP, HYDRANTS, FACILITIES, LARGE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS STORAGE) IDEAL FOR LARGE TANKER/BOMBER BEDDOWN

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	363.8		
OTHER	45.3		
TOTAL	409.1	-33.6	20 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: KC-135 AND B-52 CCTS REDIRECT IS APPROVED. DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE MODE (ALREADY FENCED). 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION IV



BEDDOWN LOCATIONS ARE DRIVEN BY ADDITIONAL BASE CLOSINGS DICTATED BY THE DBCRC AND DO NOT REPRESENT OPTIMUM CHOICES.

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF GRIFFISS

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RATED LOWER THAN PLATTSBURGH AND MCGUIRE IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

USAF WILL MAINTAIN ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE 10TH INFANTRY (LIGHT) DIVISION -- AIRFIELD REMAINS IN STANDBY STATUS

THE NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND ROME LAB REMAIN

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	55.9		
OTHER	57.1		
TOTAL	114.3	-38.9	2 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NEADS REMAINS. ROME LAB REMAINS.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION IV



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	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION IV

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MARCH AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MARCH RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MARCH ANALYZED WITH TRAVIS, BEALE, FAIRCHILD, MCCHORD AND MALMSTROM AS SITE FOR WEST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING

TRAVIS RANKS HIGHEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	116.4		
OTHER	18.4		
TOTAL	134.8	-46.9	2 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

DEPOTS

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF ROBINS AFB .

ROBINS RANKED HIGHER THAN MCCLELLAN AGAINST THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA.

ROBINS SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

EXACERBATES TANKER SHORTFALL IN THE SOUTHEAST U.S.

COST OF CLOSURE OF ROBINS AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO MCCLELLAN MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH ROBINS AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	799.7		
OTHER	1,172.8		
TOTAL	1,972.5	-146.6	40 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: 9 SPACE WARNING SQUADRON (PAVE PAWS) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE FACILITIES.
NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

ROBINS (ALC ONLY)

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF WR-ALC.

WR-ALC SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF WR-ALC AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO SM-ALC MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS AND REDUCES SAVINGS FROM WORKFORCE CONSOLIDATION EFFICIENCIES.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH ROBINS AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	558.2		
OTHER	1,126.0		
TOTAL	1,684.2	-124.6	73 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF TINKER AFB .

TINKER RANKED HIGHER THAN MCCLELLAN AGAINST THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA.

TINKER SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF TINKER, REALIGNMENT OF WORKLOAD, AND MOVEMENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE (ESPECIALLY AWACS AND TACAMO) IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO MCCLELLAN MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH TINKER AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	1,185.5		
OTHER	1,247.5		
TOTAL	2,433.0	-158.3	100+ YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.
NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

TINKER (ALC ONLY)

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF OC-ALC.

OC-ALC SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF OC-ALC AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO SM-ALC MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS AND REDUCES SAVINGS FROM WORKFORCE CONSOLIDATION EFFICIENCIES.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH OC-ALC AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS USAF EXCESS CAPACITY.

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	549.5		
OTHER	1,175.3		
TOTAL	1,724.8	-135.6	33 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL

KELLY

- DEPOT WORKLOAD → OTHER DEPOTS
- ARC C-5, ARC F-16 → CANTONMENT
- IAAFA → CANTONMENT

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF KELLY AFB .

KELLY RANKED HIGHER THAN MCCLELLAN AGAINST THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA.

KELLY SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF KELLY AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO MCCLELLAN MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH KELLY AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	910.4		
OTHER	1,261.4		
TOTAL	2,171.8	-178.3	23 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: AFIC HQ AND UNITS REMAIN. ARC F-16 REMAIN IN CANTONMENT. AFRES C-5s REMAIN IN CANTONMENT. KELLY PORTIONS OF IAAFA REMAIN IN CANTONMENT.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

KELLY (ALC ONLY)

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF SA-ALC.

SA-ALC RANKED HIGHER THAN SM-ALC.

SA-ALC SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF SA-ALC AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO SM-ALC MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS AND REDUCES SAVINGS FROM WORKFORCE CONSOLIDATION EFFICIENCIES.
THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH KELLY AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	1-TIME COSTS	NET RECURRING	ROI
MILCON	707.4		
OTHER	1,363.1		
TOTAL	2,070.5	-136.7	100+ YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

Document Separator

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FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

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Mary
This is a heads up FAX on a letter we should answer. I will start a draft input L/F

HQ USAF/XOOR
1480 AIR FORCE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1480
DSN 225-6766/67 or Commercial (703) 695-6766/67
Fax# DSN 223-9707 or Commercial (703) 693-9707

DATE: 8 Feb 94

FROM: HQ USAF/XOOR

TO: BCC

ATTN: Frank Cirillo

Fax #: 696-0550

NO. OF PAGES: 4 + 1 Cover Sheet

REMARKS: This is a heads up Congressional from Plattsburgh

MAUF

Plattsburgh, New York 12901
September 15, 1993

1098835

President William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear President Clinton,

Thank you for your recent answer to my letter dated July 10, 1993 regarding the BRACC decision to close Plattsburgh Air Force Base in upper New York State. While I recognize the need for your staff to categorize and respond to thousands of writers with generic letters and auto pen regarding such controversial decisions as closing air bases, I must admit I was disappointed no one took the time to read and respond to the specific arguments I presented in my letter. Why? Simply because Plattsburgh was not on the original closure list; in fact, it was slated by the Air Force to be enhanced in order to accept the East Coast Air Mobility Mission. Not only did the Air Force recommend Plattsburgh as Number #1 for this mission, but the BRACC research analysts also recommended the same decision!

With regard to your statement that the decision to close bases was made only after exhaustive research, I beg to differ. After all, Plattsburgh was only added to the list on June 26th after Griffiss Air Force Base in Rome, New York set up a cry on protest. Shortly after, you approved the BRACC recommendations early in July. Exhaustive research?

Now we learn that McGuire AFB in New Jersey (because of deficiencies) may not be able to accept the air mobility wing (which H.T. Johnson insisted would be better off located at McGuire because of "closeness to customers.") Air Force transition representatives at PAFB have remarked that it doesn't matter that McGuire may not be able to accept the new mission. The Air Force will figure out a way to disperse it; but, no matter that PAFB was once determined to be the best location, it will still close! I'm sorry to say this whole bizarre scenario from start to finish looks as if no one knows what they are doing or why they are doing it. Embarrassing for the Department of Defense, Air Force, BRACC Commission, and your approval of the closure decision, to say the least. It was especially interesting to note the temporary transfer of F15 jets from Langley Air Force Base to PAFB for safe harbor during Hurricane Emily. Why weren't they sent to ("close to the customer") McGuire or Griffis? Because we were the most logical base with adequate space, up-to-date ramps, and technical support. IN FACT, WE'RE NO. 1!

I'm enclosing another copy of my July letter. Hopefully, someone out there is reading and listening. As stated previously, I was not a big fan of the excessive military-industrial complex build-up in the 80's, however, I strongly believe such cutbacks should be done honestly and equitably.

As someone who voted for you and for the first time donated to the Democratic Election Committe, I expected the higher standards touted for change in our society would be carried forward. The question that remains in my mind, "Is there really hope for change without the power of expensive lobbying affecting important decisions in our government." So far, based on the decisions regarding the fate of PAFB, I think not. Whatever the outcome, it should make an interesting lesson for the high school students I teach.

Respectfully,

Anne Marie Morgan

Anne Marie Morgan
Business High School Teacher

cc: Les Aspin, M. Cuomo, Daniel P. Moynihan, Alfonse D'Amato, J. McHugh

130 Prospect Avenue
Plattsburgh, New York 12901
July 10, 1993

President William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton,

Recently I wrote to you expressing my shock, disappointment, and strong disagreement with the decision made by the BRACC Commission to close Plattsburgh Air Force Base in upstate New York and expand McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey for the military's proposed East Coast air mobility hub. Today I am writing to you to respond to your hasty approval of the BRACC closure list.

When you approved this list without what appeared to be so much as a second glance, the impression left with Plattsburgh residents was that you were quickly 'clearing your desk' before your departure to the Far East and attempting to prove to your detractors how decisive you could be in substantive matters. Regarding the BRACC closure list recommendations, I feel you chose the wrong issue to be decisive about without further questioning and reflecting on the justification behind closing Plattsburgh Air Force Base.

While I have never been a big fan of the military industrial complex and the excessive buildup in the 80's, I did expect that closure of bases would be performed in an equitable fashion, especially under your administration. President Clinton, you ran on an agenda of hope and change. Putting aside the media rhetoric about hope and its connection to the man from Hope, Arkansas, you truly did give hope to millions of Americans thirsting for change in our country. I was one of them; I donated to your campaign and voted for you. However, your expeditious approval of BRACC's recommendations tells me that business in Washington is being conducted in "politics as usual" fashion. Needless to say, I have less hope than when this process began.

I will refer to some of the evidence given for leaving PAFB open - and, in fact, expand it to become the Northeast Air Mobility Wing hub:

- Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the Department of the Air Force chose Plattsburgh as the center for the air mobility wing over all other bases after intense, detailed and sophisticated study. Even the Base Realignment and Closure Commission researchers rated Plattsburgh as the No. 1 base for the mission. Griffis Air Force Base was rated second, with McGuire a distant third. ?

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force James Boatright wrote the BRACC Chairman James Courter, "The Air Force remains firmly convinced Plattsburgh AFB is the best base for the East Coast Air Mobility Wing....Most important, from an operational standpoint, it is an ideal staging facility for the large European/SWA airbridge and has ample airspace for present and future training with minimum encroachment."

- The Research and Analysis staff of the BRACC commission itself found Plattsburgh superior in the critical categories of airlift, mobility and tanker capability.

- Boatright was quoted in Air Force Times as saying, "Plattsburgh is far better suited for that particular mission than McGuire is...We do not believe that the airspace at McGuire is suitable for this. We believe it's going to constrain our operations."

- There are at least 62 airports of varying size within 50 miles of McGuire. The Federal Aviation Administration says McGuire activity "often requires airborne holding/delays of Philadelphia traffic."

However, after all these supporting facts and statements, the final logic posed by Commissioner/Ret. General Hansford Johnson, "McGuire is closest to its customers," swayed five other members of BRACC to close PAFB and award the East Coast Air Mobility Wing to McGuire. In my opinion, this is an example of "horse and buggy mentality" in our modern age of technology and illogical thinking. In fact, I would think that the Commissioners would be embarrassed to admit that was the winning argument for McGuire. I am not impressed by BRACC's behavior and certainly not convinced they have shown substantial deviation to justify McGuire instead of the Air Force's original recommendation to enlarge PAFB's mission.

President Clinton, in your July 4th address entitled "What America Means To Me" in Parade magazine, you spoke of how Americans must "reaffirm the bedrock American values of opportunity, community and responsbility." For over 200 years, the community of Plattsburgh has fulfilled those values in its service to our country by its support of a variety of military missions at the Plattsburgh Air Force Base. We were poised to do so into the 21st century with a facility that is ready to accept the proposed exapanded mission. Instead our government will spend over $1 billion dollars to upgrade McGuire!

In closing, I wish that you had followed the model of the President you were named for, Thomas Jefferson, whom you spoke of in your address, ..."the great mind never rested....it was always examining the world around it." President Clinton, I am sorry to say, with due respect for your office, you failed to do the same in approving the BRACC list. But I still have enough 'hope' left to believe that you will take the necessary steps to rectify this injustice and prove that your administration is not "politics as usual."

Respectfully,

Anne Marie Morgan

Anne Marie Morgan

CC: Governor Mario Cuomo
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan
Senator Alfonse D'Amato
Rep. John McHugh
Mayor Clyde Rabideau

< CONFIRMATION REPORT >

02-08-1994(TUE) 16:07

[RECEIVE]

NO.	DATE	TIME	DESTINATION	PG.	DURATION	MODE	RESULT
7994	2-08	16:05		4	0°02'24"	NORM.E	OK
				4	0°02'24"		

Document Separator

** TX CONFIRMATION REPORT ** AS OF FEB 8 '94 16:29 PAGE.01

BASE CLOSURE COMM

	DATE	TIME	TO/FROM	MODE	MIN/SEC	PGS	STATUS
01	2/ 8	16:26	89707	EC--S	02"27	06	OK

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: Feb 8, 1993

TO: Col Wayne Mayfield

FAX #: 39707

FROM: Frank Cirillo

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 6

COMMENTS: Mafe

I could not find any record of communication with Ms Morgan but the attached should be a similar case and our response. We would send something akin to this but as I said we cannot go through DoD.

FAC

IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE RECEIVING THIS FAX PLEASE CALL 703-696-0504.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. McPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

October 15, 1993

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Kilkeary
12 Graves Lane
Plattsburgh, New York 12901

Please refer to this number
when responding 931012-2R1

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Kilkeary:

Thank you for contacting the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission regarding the selection of McGuire Air Force Base over Plattsburgh Air Force Base for the East Coast Mobility Wing.

After extensive review-and-analysis and deliberative processes, a majority of Commissioners voted to keep McGuire open based on the Department of Defense 1994 force-structure plan and on selection criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress.

Military Value criteria comprise the first four of eight selection criteria, as required by law, in determining and developing recommendations for closure and/or realignment. The four remaining criteria include: return on investment, the economic impact on the community, the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel and the environmental impact.

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4. Among other things, Plattsburgh AFB is located some distance from normal airlift customers and onload points, increasing the cost of annual operations. McGuire AFB is closer to airlift customers and onload locations for peacetime/contingency operations.

Because of its strategic location, McGuire AFB can support current classified missions' response time requirements with aircraft on home station alert rather than deploying to onload locations. Additionally, data reflected a greater savings accrued by the Department of Defense through the complete closure of Plattsburgh AFB versus the realignment of McGuire AFB.

I understand and appreciate your concerns and assure you that the decision to close Plattsburgh was made after fair and accurate assessment of all available data. Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure process.

Sincerely,

Jim Courter

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:tgm
ECTS# 931012-2

October 6, 1993

Please refer to this number when responding 931012-2

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Sir/Madam:

Enclosed is a copy of my August 16, 1993 letter to The Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the Plattsburgh Air Force Base closure. Please note the underlined question. Although I have written a number of letters asking the same question as a concerned taxpayer (also why we are rebuilding Homestead instead of moving the wing to already stable updated PAFB), no one has even come close to giving me a semblance of an answer.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their response to my letter recommended that I write to you for the requested information. I certainly would appreciate some sensible response to my questions instead of another referral or form letter. As a taxpayer of the United States, I certainly believe I am entitled to an answer.

Very truly yours,

Shirley Kilkeary

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Kilkeary
12 Graves Lane
Plattsburgh, NY 12901

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 931012-2

FROM: M/M JOSEPH KILKEARY	TO:
TITLE:	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: PRIVATE CITIZENS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: PLATTSBURGH AFB, NY / MCGUIRE AFB,	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT
CHAIRMAN COURTER				COMMISSIONER BOWMAN			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER BYRON			
SPECIAL ASSISTANT				COMMISSIONER COX			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER JOHNSON			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER LEVITT			
				COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STUART			
PRESS SECRETARY				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A			
DIR./EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		✓	FYI	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF R & A			
				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓*		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				ISSUES TEAM LEADER			
SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR				COBRA MODEL ANALYST			
DIR./INFO SERVICES DIVISION				DATABASE ANALYST (GIS)			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓*	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
	Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks: QUESTION THE RECOMMENDED CLOSURE OF PLATTSBURGH AFB

– REQUEST CLARIFICATION FOR AIR MOBILITY WING SELECTION TO MCGUIRE AFB.

* WORK WITH AIR FORCE LEADER

Due Date: 10/26/93	Routing Date: 10/12/93	Date Received: 10/12/93	Mail Date:

August 16, 1993

Col. T. R. Patrick
Secretary, Joint Staff
Office of the Chairman
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20318-9999

Dear Col. Patrick:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter to my husband and myself dated August 10, 1993 relative to the closing of Plattsburgh Air Force Base. I realize the Cold War threat has lessened and our military forces should be reduced, but I have raised one question that has never been answer by anyone in all the letters I have written, in fact, has been completely ignored.

I do not claim to be a financial genius but maybe you can explain to me the following question as not only a resident of the Plattsburgh Air Force Base area, but as a concerned taxpayer. How are we saving money by closing Plattsburgh Air Force Base, the most modern, updated (still being remodeled) military installation that was recommended as the air mobility wing by the United States Military and placing the wing at McGuire (decided by politicians) which will cost millions to merely bring it up the standard that Plattsburgh Air Force Base already has? I would feel better as a taxpayer if I could receive some type of explanation from someone instead of being ignored as I have been so far. Maybe it is time for another Boston Tea Party in the United States.

Very truly yours,

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Kilkeary
6 Graves Lane
Plattsburgh, NY 12901

Document Separator

MEMORANDUM

TO: FORMER COMMISSIONERS

FROM: MARY ANN HOOK, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL

RE: PLATTSBURGH LAW SUIT

DATE: DECEMBER 8, 1993

The State of New York and numerous members of congress, local community elected officials and others have filed a suit challenging the legality of the closure recommendation of Plattsburgh AFB. Defendants include the Base Closure 1993 Commissioners, its members, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force.

We have not officially received service of the complaint. I expect it in the next few days. Each of you are listed as defendants in your official capacity as former commissioners. As commissioners acting in your official capacity you are not held personally liable for your actions, thus, there is no need to obtain your own counsel.

As with all agency legal actions, the Commission will work with the Department of Justice in responding to the complaint.

I will forward the complaint to each of you upon its arrival in our office. If you would like more information prior to that mailing, or would like a copy of my unofficial copy, please feel free to call me or Toby Messitt at 703 696-0504.

I have attached a copy of the NYT article of Dec. 7, 1993 regarding the case.

Tom Houston will handle the press calls for the Commission. You may refer calls to him or take your own as you wish.

Any questions, please don't hesitate to call.

Document Separator

416 CIVIL ENGINEERING SQUADRON

GRIFFISS AFB, NEW YORK 13441-5000

FAX NUMBER: (315) 330-3534 or AVN 587-3534

DATE:

TO:

Name: Mr Frank Cirillo

Office Symbol/Phone No: Chief, Air Force Team, BRACC, DSN 226-0504

Fax Number: 1-703-696-0550

FROM:

Name: Major J.D. Wilson

Office Symbol/Phone No: 416 CES/CEE-SPO / DSN 587-2438

SUBJECT: Clarification to previously submitted information concerning population density in APZ I & APZ II

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGE(S)

22 JUN 93

TO: MR FRANK CIRILLO
CHIEF, AIR FORCE TEAM
BRACC

1. REFERENCE OUR PHONE CONVERSATION 22 JUN 93 @ ~ 13:00. CONCERNING POPULATION DENSITY FIGURES FOR APZ, I & APZ, II.

2. THE INFORMATION FAX'D TO YOU WAS AN UNOFFICIAL, DRAFT COPY OF INFORATION BEING PROVIDED TO HQ ACC/XP. IT HAS NOT BEEN REVIEWED OR APPROVED BY ANYONE @ 416 BW, HQ ACC, HQ USAF, OR SAF/MI.

3. I WAS TOLD BY MAJOR AUTEN @ SAF/MI THAT HE WAS EXPECTING INPUTS ON YOUR QUESTION FROM HQ ACC AND HQ AMC THIS AFTERNOON AND PLANNED ON FORWARDING AN ANSWER TO THE BRACC STAFF LATE TODAY.

MAJOR WILSON

< CONFIRMATION REPORT >

06-22-1993(TUE) 13:40

[RECEIVE]

NO.	DATE	TIME	DESTINATION	PG.	DURATION	MODE	RESULT
5527	6-22	13:39		2	0°01'28"	NORMAL	OK
				2	0°01'28"		

Document Separator

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

TO: DBCRC (Frank Cirillo) June 22, 1993

SUBJECT: Accident Potential Zones

The staff has put this information together for your use. I hope you find it helpful.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

TO COMMISSIONERS

AN AF PROVIDED

AICUZ TUTORIAL

FRANK

ISSUE PAPER

ON

ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES

ISSUE: Accident potential zones are off-installation areas off the ends of runways which the Air Force recommends not be developed for intensive human occupancy. Accident potential zones are important for safety reasons as these areas are impacted by aircraft accident potential to a higher degree than other off base areas. Attachment 1 describes how accident potential zones were developed.

BACKGROUND: Accident potential zones were developed as part of the Air Force's Air Installation Compatible Use Zone program, which was initiated in 1973 in response to growing incompatible development around air installations.

The purpose of accident potential zones is the safety of off-installation individuals. Through its AICUZ program, the Air Force recommends local jurisdictions employ land use controls to discourage people-intensive development from locating in accident potential zones. The emphasis is on discouraging land uses which involve concentrations of people over long periods of time, such as most residential uses, and crowded manufacturing and retail uses among others (see Attachment 2 for Air Force compatibility guidelines for accident potential zones). Land uses which do not involve concentrations of people, are not discouraged in accident potential zones. It should be noted that adoption of AICUZ recommendations is the prerogative of local governments.

Accident potential is based on the historical occurrence of accidents within 10 nautical miles of the air installation. Of the total analyzed accidents occurring between 1968 and 1985, 55.9 percent occurred on Air Force property (runway and clear zone areas), 7.8 percent occurred in Accident Potential Zone I, 5.0 percent occurred in Accident Potential Zone II, and 31.3 percent were scattered throughout the remaining ten nautical mile region around the air installation.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only.

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES

Attachment 1 contains the history and description of the accident potential zones used in the Air Force's AICUZ program.

Attachment 2, an excerpt from AFR 86-14, provides the land use compatibility guidelines for clear zones and accident potential zones which are used in the AICUZ program. The guidelines for APZ I are based on the concept of avoiding any land uses which cause concentrations of people. The Guidelines for APZ II are less stringent due to the reduced risk of accidents. The 1-2 dwelling units per acre and 20 percent lot coverage guidelines are borrowed from urban planning convention, to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable land uses in APZ 2.

ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES

1 Guidelines For Accident Potential

Urban areas around airports are exposed to the possibility of aircraft accidents even with well-maintained aircraft and highly trained aircraft crews. Despite stringent maintenance requirements and countless hours of training, past history makes it clear that accidents are going to occur.

When the AICUZ program began there were no current comprehensive studies on accident potential. In support of the program, the Air Force completed a study of Air Force accidents that occurred between 1968 and 1972 within 10 nautical miles of airfields. The study of 369 accidents revealed that 75 percent of aircraft accidents occurred on or adjacent to the runway (1,000 feet to each side of the runway centerline) and in a corridor 3,000 feet (1,500 feet either side of the runway centerline) wide, extending from the runway threshold along the extended runway centerline for a distance of 15,000 feet.

Three zones were established based on crash patterns: The clear zone, accident potential zone (APZ) I, and accident potential zone (APZ) II. The clear zone starts at the end of the runway and extends outward 3,000 feet. It has the highest accident potential of the three zones. The Air Force has adopted a policy of acquiring property rights to areas designated as clear zones because of the high accident potential. APZ I extends from the clear zone an additional 5,000 feet. It includes an area of reduced accident potential. APZ II extends from APZ I an additional 7,000 feet in an area of further reduced accident potential.

The Air Force research work in accident potential was the first significant effort in this subject area since 1952 when the President's Airport Commission published "The Airport and Its Neighbors," better known as the "Doolittle Report." The recommendations of this earlier report were influential in the formulation of the accident potential zone concept.

The risk to people on the ground of being killed or injured by aircraft accidents is small. However, an aircraft accident is a high consequence event and when a crash does occur, the result is often catastrophic. Because of this, the Air Force does not attempt to base its safety standards on accident probabilities. Instead the Air Force approaches this safety issue from a land use planning perspective.

2 Accident Potential Analysis

Military aircraft accidents differ from commercial air carrier and general aviation accidents because of the variety of aircraft used, the type of missions, and the number of training flights. In 1973, the

U.S. Air Force (USAF) performed a service-wide aircraft accident hazard study in order to identify land near airfields with significant accident potential. Accidents studied occurred within ten nautical miles of airfields and were related airfield-associated in-flight mishaps.

The study reviewed 369 major USAF accidents during 1968-1972, and found that 61 percent of the accidents were related to landing operations and 39 percent were takeoff related. It also found that 70 percent occurred in daylight, and that fighter and training aircraft accounted for 80 percent of the accidents.

Because the purpose of the study was to identify accident hazards, the study plotted each of the 369 accidents in relation to the airfield. This plotting found that the accidents clustered along the runway and its extended centerline. To further refine this clustering, a tabulation was prepared which described the cumulative frequency of accidents as a function of distance from the runway centerline along the extended centerline. This analysis was done for widths of 2,000, 3,000, and 4,000 total feet. The location analysis found the following:

Table 1 **LOCATION ANALYSIS**

	Width of Runway Extension (Feet)		
Length From both Ends of Runway (feet)	2,000	3,000	4,000
Percent of Accidents			
On or adjacent to runway (1,000 feet to each side of runway centerline)	23	23	23
0 to 3,000	35	39	39
3,000 to 8,000	8	8	8
8,000 to 15,000	5	5	7
Cumulative percent of accidents			
On or adjacent to runway (1,000 feet to each side of runway centerline)	23	23	23
0 to 3,000	58	62	62
3,000 to 8,000	66	70	70
8,000 to 15,000	71	75	77

Figure 1 indicates that the cumulative number of accidents rises rapidly from the end of the runway to 3,000 feet, rises more gradually to 8,000 feet, then continues at about the same rate of increase to 15,000 feet, where it levels off rapidly. The location analysis also indicates that the optimum width of the runway extension, which would include the maximum percentage of accidents in the smallest area, is 3,000 feet.

Figure 1

DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS



Using the optimum runway extension width, 3,000 feet (1,500 feet either side of the runway centerline), and the cumulative distribution of accidents from the end of the runway, zones were established which minimized the land area included and maximized the percentage of accidents included. The zone dimensions and accident statistics for the 1968-1972 study are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA

(369 Accidents - 1968-1972)



Other Accidents Within 10 Nautical Miles
94 Accidents
25.4%

The original study was updated to include accidents through 1985. The updated study now includes 728 accidents during the 1968-1985 period. Using the optimum runway extension width of 3,000 feet, the accident statistics of the updated study are shown below.

Figure 3

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA

(728 Accidents - 1968-1985)



Other Accidents Within 10 Nautical Miles
228 Accidents
31.3%

Additional accident data for 1986 through July 1990 has been analyzed. Specific locational data for some of the 1986-1990 accidents was not available, and these were not included in the analysis. The following is a comparison of data through 1985 and data through July, 1990:

Table 3 **ADDITIONAL ACCIDENT DATA**

ZONE	1968-1985	1968-1990
On-Runway	197-27.1 %	199-24.7 %
Clear Zone	210-28.8 %	226-28.1 %
APZ I	57- 7.8 %	84-10.4 %
APZ II	36- 5.0 %	45- 5.6 %
Other (Within ten NM)	228-31.3 %	251-31.2 %

Analysis has shown that the cumulative changes evident in accident location through July, 1990, reconfirm the dimensions of the clear zones and accident potential zones.

DEPARTMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE
THE ARMY, AND THE NAVY
Washington DC 20330-5000

CHANGE 1
AFR 86-14
TM 5-803-7
NAVFAC P-971
14 April 1989

Civil Engineering-Programming

AIRFIELD AND HELIPORT PLANNING CRITERIA

AFR 86-14/TM 5-803-7/NAVFAC P-971, 12 May 1981, is changed as follows:

Page-Insert Changes. New or revised material is indicated by a ★.

Remove	Date	Insert
1-1	12 May 81	1-1
2-1, 2-2	"	2-1 thru 2-2.1
2-5, 2-6	"	2-5 thru 2-6.1
3-1, 3-2	"	3-1, 3-2
3-7	"	3-7
4-3 thru 4-8	"	4-3 thru 4-8.1

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AIRFIELD AND HELIPORT PLANNING CRITERIA

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DEPARTMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE,
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Washington DC 20330

AFR 86-14
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12 May 198

Civil Engineering Programming

AIRFIELD AND HELIPORT PLANNING CRITERIA

This publication provides standardized criteria for all Department of Defense (DOD) Service components for planning and developing the layout of runways, taxiways, aprons, and related facilities for airfields and heliports. It provides criteria for establishing planes and surfaces of navigational airspace surrounding these airfields and heliports. For purposes of these standards, an airfield refers to fixed-wing aircraft facilities, and a heliport refers to rotary-wing aircraft facilities. Criteria in this publication apply to installations in the United States, its territories, trusts, and possessions and unless otherwise noted, to installations overseas on which the United States has vested base rights.

Part One contains general information, policies, and responsibilities.

Part Two covers airfield layout and airspace criteria for fixed-wing aircraft facilities.

Part Three provides heliport layout and airspace criteria for rotary-wing aircraft facilities.

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Supersedes chapters 1, 2, 3, and 6 of AFM 86-8, 10 November 1964, and augments TM 5-803-4, 19 October 1973. (See signature page for summary of changes.)
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Approved by: Major General William D. Gilbert
Writer-Editor: M. M. Green
Distribution: (See page 5-5)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LAND USE COMPATIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR CLEAR ZONE AND ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES

Land Use Category	Compatibility [1]		
	Clear Zone	APZ I	APZ II
Residential			
Single family	NO	NO	YES [2]
2-4 family	NO	NO	NO
Multifamily dwellings	NO	NO	NO
Group quarters	NO	NO	NO
Residential hotels	NO	NO	NO
Mobile home parks or courts	NO	NO	NO
Other residential	NO	NO	NO
Industrial and Manufacturing [3]			
Food and kindred products	NO	NO	YES
Textile mill products	NO	NO	YES
Apparel	NO	NO	NO
Lumber and wood products	NO	YES	YES
Furniture and fixtures	NO	YES	YES
Paper and allied products	NO	YES	YES
Printing, publishing	NO	YES	YES
Chemicals and allied products	NO	NO	NO
Petroleum refining and related industries	NO	NO	NO
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic goods	NO	NO	NO
Stone, clay, and glass products	NO	YES	YES
Primary metal industries	NO	YES	YES
Fabricated metal products	NO	YES	YES
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments	NO	NO	NO
Miscellaneous manufacturing	NO	YES	YES
Transportation, Communications and Utilities [4]			
Railroad, rapid rail transit (on-grade)	NO	YES [4]	YES
Highway and street rights-of-way	YES [5]	YES	YES
Auto parking	NO	YES	YES
Communication	YES [5]	YES	YES
Utilities	YES [5]	YES [4]	YES
Other transportation, communications and utilities	YES [5]	YES	YES
Commercial and Retail Trade			
Wholesale trade	NO	YES	YES
Building materials (retail)	NO	YES	YES
General merchandise (retail)	NO	NO	YES
Food—retail	NO	NO	YES
Automotive, marine, aviation (retail)	NO	YES	YES
Apparel and accessories (retail)	NO	NO	YES
Furniture, homefurnishing (retail)	NO	NO	YES
Eating and drinking places	NO	NO	NO
Other retail trade	NO	NO	YES
Personal and Business Services [6]			
Finance, insurance and real estate	NO	NO	YES
Personal services	NO	NO	YES
Business services	NO	NO	YES
Repair services	NO	YES	YES
Professional services	NO	NO	YES
Contract construction services	NO	YES	YES
Indoor recreation services	NO	NO	YES
Other services	NO	NO	YES
Public and Quasi-Public Services			
Government services	NO	NO	YES [6]
Educational services	NO	NO	NO

Land Use Category	Compatibility [1]		
	Clear Zone	APZ I	APZ II
Cultural activities	NO	NO	NO
Medical and other health services	NO	NO	NO
Cemeteries	NO	YES [7]	YES [7]
Non-profit organizations including churches	NO	NO	NO
Other public and quasi-public services	NO	NO	YES
Outdoor Recreation			
Playground's neighboring parks	NO	NO	YES
Community and regional parks	NO	YES [8]	YES [8]
Nature exhibits	NO	YES	YES
Spectator sports including arenas	NO	NO	NO
Golf course [9], riding stables [10]	NO	YES	YES
Water based recreational areas	NO	YES	YES
Resort and group camps	NO	NO	NO
Entertainment assembly	NO	NO	NO
Other outdoor recreation	NO	YES [8]	YES
Resource Production & Extraction and Open Land			
Agriculture [11]	YES	YES	YES
Livestock farming, animal breeding [12]	NO	YES	YES
Forestry activities	NO	YES	YES
Fishing activities and related services [13]	NO [14]	YES [13]	YES
Mining activities	NO	YES	YES
Permanent open space	YES	YES	YES
Water areas [13]	YES	YES	YES

Footnotes

1. A "Yes" or "No" designation for compatible land use is to be used only for gross comparison. Within each, uses exist where further definition may be needed as to whether it is clear or usually acceptable/unacceptable owing to variations in densities of people and structures.
2. Suggested maximum density 1-2 dwelling units per acre, possibly increased under a Planned Unit Development where maximum lot covered less than 20 percent.
3. Factors to be considered: Labor intensity, structural coverage, explosive characteristics, air pollution.
4. No passenger terminals and no major above ground transmission lines in APZ I.
5. Not permitted in graded area, except as noted in table 2-7.
6. Low intensity office uses only. Meeting places, auditoriums, etc., not recommended.
7. Excludes chapels.
8. Facilities must be low intensity.
9. Clubhouse not recommended.
10. Concentrated rings with large classes not recommended.
11. Includes livestock grazing but excludes feedlots and intensive animal husbandry.
12. Includes feedlots and intensive animal husbandry.
13. Includes hunting and fishing.
14. Controlled hunting and fishing may be permitted for the purpose of wildlife control.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

TO: DBCRC (Frank Cirillo) June 22, 1993

SUBJECT: Population Density Figures

I have attached information you requested from McGuire, Plattsburgh, and Griffiss about population density but you need to understand I am very uncomfortable with them. You know they were prepared in a very short time and represent rough estimates at best. In addition, population density by itself is not a criterion for compatiblity in the APZ's. If you choose to use this information, I hope you can convey to the Commission the limits of its validity.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

INSTALLATION WORKSHEET
MCGUIRE AFB, NJ

PURPOSE: To document answer to the question: "What is the population density in Accident Potential Areas 1 and 2?" posed by Mr Frank Cerillo at the BRAC.

SOURCE: Mr Scott Wilson and Mr Rick Dean, 438AW/CECC, Mr Marty Eisenhart, former CE Chief of Planning, Vicinity Noise Map dated 1 Jan 77, aerial photos taken during the airspace survey 12 Oct 92, and Mr Ronald Mayhue, Ft Dix Directorate of Engineering and Housing.

METHOD: The only population which ~~exists in APZs~~ 29 houses is in APZ 2 for runway 24. Maps were used to determine 20 houses existed here. Assuming 5 persons per house = 100 persons. APZ 2 = 3000'x 7000' = 21,000,000 sq ft. Divide by 42,560 sq ft/acre = 482 acres. 100 persons/482 acres = .207 persons per acre for APZ 2 runway 24.

5 people - 3.5 people/house

CONCLUSION: Population density is as follows:

RUNWAY/APZ		POPULATION
06	APZ 1	0
	APZ 2	0
24	APZ 1	0
	APZ 2	0.207 persons/acre

Personally, alone

I certify that the above information is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Preparer: Richard N. Belanger
Richard N. Belanger, LTC, USAF
438AW/XP, DSN 440-4686

Date: 21 Jun 93

MAJCOM REVIEWER:_____ DATE:_____

Commissioner Johnson how many people are at risk

ESTIMATE OF POPULATION DENSITY

IN

APZ I AND APZ II

AT

GRIFFISS AIR FORCE BASE, NY

I. Runway 15 (North End)

A. APZ I

33 single family dwellings X 2.55* = 84

*Average occupied unit from 1990 Census for City of Rome (Source: Mr. Steve Olney at Oneida Count Census Office. Mr. Tom Larrabe at the City of Rome Planning Office).

Fish Hatchery Maintenance Area	4
Tavern (Snubbing Post)	15
Small Engine Repair Shop	2
	105 people

Land Area = $\frac{3000 \times 5000}{5280 \times 5280}$ = 0.538051 square miles

Population Density = $\frac{105}{0.538051}$ = 195.2 persons/square mile

B. APZ II

64 single family dwellings X 2.55 = 163

Landscaping Business	5
Realty Office	2
Recreation Center (Privately owned)	
Baseball batting cage	2
Miniature Golf	3
Golf Driving Range	5
Custard Stand	4
Ski Shop	5
Edge of nine hole golf course	3
	192 people

Land Area = $\frac{3000 \times 7000}{5280 \times 5280}$ = 0.753271 square miles

Population Density = $\frac{192}{0.763271}$ = 254.9 persons/square mile

II. Runway 33 (South End)

A. APZ I

47 single family dwellings X 2.55 = 120

GAFB B/764	6
Precast concrete plant	7
Auto Repair Shop	4
Modular Home Demo Unit	2
	139

Population Density = $\frac{139}{0.538051}$ = 258.3 persons/square mile

B. APZ II

44 single family dwellings X 2.55 =	112
Auto Body Shop	2
Auto Maintenance Shop	2
	116

Population Density = $\frac{116}{0.763271}$ = 154.0 persons/square mile

NOTES:

1. Numbers of farm buildings are not included. Farms appear to be single family farms.

2. Numbers of people at business locations are estimates by Major Wilson. Businesses (with the exception of the small engine repair shop) were not asked for any occupancy data (not enough time to do so).

3. There is one occupied building wholely in the clear zone of the south end of the runway: Bldg 793. This building is currently being used as administrative area by the 668th Bomb Squadron. Estimated occupancy is 30. A second building, a nose dock, is 25% within the clear zone.

PLATTSBURGH

NORTH APZ I	3 PEOPLE (.009/ACRE)
NORTH APZ II	2,788 PEOPLE (5.78/ACRE)
SOUTH APZ I	62 PEOPLE (.18/ACRE)
SOUTH APZ II	191 PEOPLE (.39/ACRE)

ALL CENSUS INFORMATION. MALL INFORMATION FROM BUSINESS OWNERS. AVERAGE # OF CARS IN PARKING LOT BETWEEN 9 AM - 9 PM X AVG OCCUPANCY FOR EACH CAR

THIS INFORMATION IS DRAFT

NOTE: FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION WILL BE AVAILABLE 23 JUN 93.



RW 06/24 (.87)

GIS II = 100

AF ~~RW 06/24~~ RW

APZ I = 0

APZ II = 100

ASSUMES 5/House


Plattsburgh AFB
runway configuration
Census Bureau "blocks" that
are partially within APZ-2
279
3
62
191
GIS APZ II 276
AF APZ I = 65
APZ II = 279
SHOPPING
MALL
190
191
192

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
Griffis AFB runway configuration
Census Bureau "blocks" that are partially within APZ-2
(163 (69) SHOPS + 192
84 Residents (33) + 105 SHOPS including TAVERN
355
189
GIS II = (478)
AF
APZ TOTAL
I = 448
II = (471)
ASSUMES 2.85/HOUSE
259
120 Res (47) + 139
112 Res (44) + 4 SHOPS
116
33
APZ I
Res 120 + 84 = 204
SHOPS 105 + 139 = 244
448
I (479)
Res APZ II = 112 + 163 = 275
SHOPS = 4 + 192 = 196
471

SUGGESTED COMMENTS
ON
McGUIRE AFB, NJ VS PLATTSBURGH AFB, NY
AS EAST COAST MOBILITY BASE

- McGuire has a long distinguished history in mobility operations

  - Its capability was recently proven again during deployments and logistical support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

- Strategic location

  - McGuire is located near the northeast surface transportation infrastructure - highways, rail, and seaports

  - The base is closer to airlift customers and onload locations for peacetime/contingency operations

  - It can support current classified missions' response time requirements with aircraft on home station alert rather than deploying to onload locations

  - Like Plattsburgh, McGuire is close to airlift and tanker overseas deployment routes, closer in some cases

  - The high population density in the New York, Newark, and Philadelphia area provides the Air Force Reserve excellent recruiting capability for manning the additional tankers (KC-10s and KC-135s) to be based at McGuire

- The base has large passenger terminal and aerial port facilities with the capability to process large numbers of troops and cargo

- There are greater savings accrued by the Department of Defense through the complete closure of Plattsburgh AFB versus the realignment of McGuire AFB

  - Annual fuel resupply costs would be lower at McGuire by approximately $10M

  - Greater annual savings (approximately $9M-$10M) are accrued by closing Plattsburgh

  - Lower cost to establish the Air Mobility Wing at McGuire

- Keeping McGuire open as the East Coast Mobility Base will maintain the synergism gained by collocation of Active/Reserve airlift and tanker training and operational missions

- Although located in a highly congested air traffic area, FAA maintains they have the capability to manage the increased aircraft operations expected at McGuire as demonstrated by the large number of operations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Rick DiCamillo/AF Team/July 26, 1993

Chronology of DBCRC Meetings
with
Plattsburgh AFB Congressional/Community Representatives

Feb 17, 1993 - Commission staff briefed on the closure process and 1993 schedule

May 11, 1993 - Commission staff (Rick DiCamillo) base visit to Plattsburgh AFB

Jun 12, 1993 - Commissioners Byron and Bowman base visit to Plattsburgh AFB. Boston Regional Hearing.

Jun ??, 1993 - Congressional/Community meeting with Chairman Courter. Community briefed Commission on the attributes/capability/history of Plattsburgh AFB. Community denounced the Griffiss AFB community information and efforts discrediting/maligning Plattsburgh AFB. Plattsburgh community corrected misinformation publicly distributed by the Griffiss AFB community.

Jun ??, 1993 - Congressional/Community meeting with Commissioners Cox and Stuart. Briefed Commissioners on the attributes/capabilities/history of Plattsburgh AFB.

June 1993 - Several meetings between Rick DiCamillo and David Martin to receive information and answer requests from Congressman McHugh.

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

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ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. McPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

August 24, 1993

Dr. Donald Davison, DDS
45 Broad Street
Plattsburgh, NY 12901-3314

Dear Dr. Davison:

Thank you for contacting the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission regarding Plattsburgh AFB.

After extensive review-and-analysis and deliberative processes, a majority of Commissioners voted to keep McGuire open based on the Department of Defense 1994 force-structure plan and on selection criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress.

As you know, military value criteria comprise the first four of eight selection criteria, as required by law, in determining and developing recommendations for closure and/or realignment. The four remaining criteria include: return on investment, the economic impact on the community, the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel and the environmental impact.

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4. Among other things, Plattsburgh AFB is located some distance from normal airlift customers and onload points, increasing the cost of annual operations. McGuire AFB is closer to airlift customers and onload locations for peacetime/contingency operations.

Because of its strategic location, McGuire AFB can support current classified missions' response time requirements with aircraft on home station alert rather than deploying to onload locations. Additionally, data reflected a greater savings accrued by the Department of Defense through the complete closure of Plattsburgh AFB versus the realignment of McGuire AFB.

I understand and appreciate your concerns and assure you that the decision to close Plattsburgh was made after fair and accurate assessment of all available data.

Sincerely,

JIM COURTER
Chairman

ECTS# 930727-4

Document Separator

October 6, 1993

Please refer to this number when responding 931012-2

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Sir/Madam:

Enclosed is a copy of my August 16, 1993 letter to The Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the Plattsburgh Air Force Base closure. Please note the underlined question. Although I have written a number of letters asking the same question as a concerned taxpayer (also why we are rebuilding Homestead instead of moving the wing to already stable updated PAFB), no one has even come close to giving me a semblance of an answer.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their response to my letter recommended that I write to you for the requested information. I certainly would appreciate some sensible response to my questions instead of another referral or form letter. As a taxpayer of the United States, I certainly believe I am entitled to an answer.

Very truly yours,

Shirley Kilkeary

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Kilkeary
12 Graves Lane
Plattsburgh, NY 12901

August 16, 1993

Col. T. R. Patrick
Secretary, Joint Staff
Office of the Chairman
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20318-9999

Dear Col. Patrick:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter to my husband and myself dated August 10, 1993 relative to the closing of Plattsburgh Air Force Base. I realize the Cold War threat has lessened and our military forces should be reduced, but I have raised one question that has never been answer by anyone in all the letters I have written, in fact, has been completely ignored.

I do not claim to be a financial genius but maybe you can explain to me the following question as not only a resident of the Plattsburgh Air Force Base area, but as a concerned taxpayer. How are we saving money by closing Plattsburgh Air Force Base, the most modern, updated (still being remodeled) military installation that was recommended as the air mobility wing by the United States Military and placing the wing at McGuire (decided by politicians) which will cost millions to merely bring it up the standard that Plattsburgh Air Force Base already has? I would feel better as a taxpayer if I could receive some type of explanation from someone instead of being ignored as I have been so far. Maybe it is time for another Boston Tea Party in the United States.

Very truly yours,

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Kilkeary
6 Graves Lane
Plattsburgh, NY 12901

Document Separator

DONALD W. DAVISON, DDS, FAGD
GENERAL DENTISTRY
45 BROAD STREET
PLATTSBURGH, NEW YORK 12901
TELEPHONE (518) 561-6123

Please refer to this number when responding 931012-1

September 29, 1993

Mr. Frank Cirilo
Base Re-Alignement and Closure Commission
Rosslyn Metro Center Bldg.
1700 North Moore St.
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Cirilo,

I am writing to you as one of the very powerful staff members of the BRACC.

It sure seems as though the commission had already made up its mind and made a mockery of the thorough fact finding done by the Air Force and then you and your staff. Chairman Courter had obvious political reasons to give the mission to McGuire over Plattsburgh, and Gen. Johnson had his own axe to grind.

It also seemed that some of the commissioners were rude and impatient with you and your staff when confronted with your factual explanations.

I sure wish one of you had explained to them that location alone was not a good reason for their decision, and in fact McGuire has the poorer location for this mission.

Mr. Cirilo, I am asking for your help to correct the wrong decision made by the Base Re-alignment and Closure Committee. You know what the right decision was, and only the commissioners know why they voted the way they did. There was NO significant deviation from the criteria to justify their decision. It is wrong to let a base of Plattsburgh's quality be closed.

As you know, the Air Force will be stuck with a second rate base, in air space getting ever more crowded, and no future option of using Plattsburgh AFB's huge ramp, good air space and weather, and just a plain great place to be stationed! I could go on but you know better than I the implications of losing Plattsburgh AFB for the future Air Force.

In future BRACC's, please take a stand for the truth and what is right. PLEASE HELP DO WHAT IS RIGHT! Present the facts as you know them to Congress, the President, Les Aspin, the lawyers working for Plattsburgh.

thanks!
Don Davison

a memo from
FRANK CIRILLO

Mary Ann (so did RICK & FXC)

I Just got the "Final"
of a letter we saw in July.
I plan on logging it in
And either (1) do nothing
or (2) send CI guys: personally?
the standard - "decision has
been made" ltr. I vote
FOR (1) - Your thoughts?

d Closure Commission
ldg.

Document Separator

a memo from
FRANK CIRILLO

Sheila or } guys thoughts
MaryAnn

Rich: I read one letter as could be called for response (Bev. that does) suggest if we do it mild.

2 Nov

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
DEFENSE JOURNALISM

DEFENSE MEDIA REVIEW

A SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY PRESS WITH ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

Volume VII, Number 2 June 1993 – *Monthly*

Taking Issue

A Closer Look At Defense Reporting

H Joachim Maitre

Your Tax Dollars At Work

First the good news for all taxpayers down under: The Royal Australian Air Force will buy 15 F-111G combat aircraft from the US Air Force for $52 million (*Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 5 July). But here comes the bad news for the American taxpayer: At less than $3.5 million per aircraft, this is a lot less than the cost of the avionics upgrade program per copy completed in 1991. The Australians would not be able to buy a new F-111 for $100 million, even if they wanted to. We don't make them any more. General Dynamics closed the production line in 1974.

The F-111G is, of course, the now-defunct Strategic Air Command's FB-111A medium-range supersonic, all-weather, day-and-night penetrator. It was once deployed at Pease, New Hampshire and Plattsburgh, New York air force bases, both also history, it seems. Pease was shut down in 1991, and Plattsburgh was chosen for elimination in a surprise vote taken by the "congressional" Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRACC). That closure alone will result in annual savings of $56.6 million to the taxpayer, if you are naive enough to believe the "independent" commissioners.

Plattsburgh, arguably one of the finest installations in the country, is about to fall victim to a classic power-play of pork barrel politicos operating under the screen of non-partisan detachment. Forget about savings. The taxpayer is in for a solid soaking. But the Department of Defense and the Air Force still don't know what hit them. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the Department of the Air Force had selected Plattsburgh as the center for the Northeast Air Mobility Wing over all other candidates after detailed and in-depth studies. Even BRACC researchers had rated Plattsburgh first. On June 11, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Mr James Boatright, had informed BRACC chairman James Courter that "the Air Force remains firmly convinced [that] Plattsburgh AFB, from an operational standpoint, is an ideal staging facility for the large European and South West Asian airbridge and has ample airspace for present and future training with minimum encroachment". There was no dispute among the professionals. Plattsburgh had excelled during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Yet the BRACC civilian's nod went to McGuire Air Force base in southern New Jersey's Burlington County, located beneath one of the nation's most congested air spaces serving Philadelphia's and New York City's major airports. Within 60 miles of McGuire, the population exceeds 10 million; around Plattsburgh live less than half a million. But the case against McGuire extends beyond poor air space and quality of life in general: The Air Force's operational requirements disqualify McGuire and hugely favor Plattsburgh, the base that has everything besides the distinction of being America's oldest military installation. Plattsburgh has the runway and ramp for 156 aircraft. McGuire can park 88 – but has no adequate runway. KC-10 tanker aircraft and C-141 airlifters cannot take off from McGuire with a full load; housing, maintenance and loading facilities are all sub-standard there. All this can be changed and improved, refueling spigots can be added, and old ones can be made leakproof. New building construction will alleviate present shortcomings. Nothing that $500 million could not fix. Or a solid billion.

Pork, in other words. BRACC chairman Courter will reject any such thought with righteous indignation, so we won't even hint that he hails from the Garden State and soon might present himself as the fine candidate for governor that he should be. In any case, by voting to shut down Plattsburgh and downsize Griffiss Air Force Base near Syracuse, Mr Courter and his BRACC have scored heavily against New York and Governor Mario Cuomo as well as Mr Daniel Patrick Moynihan, its senior senator. "We have the votes!", Mr Frank R Lautenberg had crowed a few hours prior to the decisive moment, "we" being New Jersey and Senator Lautenberg, who represents that state in Washington, DC. All politics is still local . . .

Here comes the hitch: McGuire's required expansion and major upgrading will go nowhere without massive financial infusion from Congress. Wait for the pleas for hundreds of millions of dollars to arrive on the desk of the Senate's finance committee chairman, Mr Moynihan, Democrat from New York. He may be disinclined mightily to allow Plattsburgh's splendid facilities to go to waste. Maybe there is life after death in New York's North Country. BRACC's next round will resume in 1995. ■

SUGGESTED COMMENTS
ON
McGUIRE AFB, NJ VS PLATTSBURGH AFB, NY
AS EAST COAST MOBILITY BASE

- McGuire has a long distinguished history in mobility operations

  - •• Its capability was recently proven again during deployments and logistical support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

- Strategic location

  - •• McGuire is located near the northeast surface transportation infrastructure - highways, rail, and seaports

  - •• The base is closer to airlift customers and onload locations for peacetime/contingency operations

  - •• It can support current classified missions' response time requirements with aircraft on home station alert rather than deploying to onload locations

  - •• Like Plattsburgh, McGuire is close to airlift and tanker overseas deployment routes, closer in some cases

  - •• The high population density in the New York, Newark, and Philadelphia area provides the Air Force Reserve excellent recruiting capability for manning the additional tankers (KC-10s and KC-135s) to be based at McGuire

- The base has large passenger terminal and aerial port facilities with the capability to process large numbers of troops and cargo

- There are greater savings accrued by the Department of Defense through the complete closure of Plattsburgh AFB versus the realignment of McGuire AFB

  - •• Annual fuel resupply costs would be lower at McGuire by approximately $10M

  - •• Greater annual savings (approximately $9M-$10M) are accrued by closing Plattsburgh

  - •• Lower cost to establish the Air Mobility Wing at McGuire

- Keeping McGuire open as the East Coast Mobility Base will maintain the synergism gained by collocation of Active/Reserve airlift and tanker training and operational missions

- Although located in a highly congested air traffic area, FAA maintains they have the capability to manage the increased aircraft operations expected at McGuire as demonstrated by the large number of operations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Rick DiCamillo/AF Team/July 26, 1993

Document Separator

AF TEAM

This is an extract of the final briefings to the Commissioners ~~that will have to be~~ in 1991 DBCRC. We will probably use the same format so you can start thinking about the data to analyze and include. Also the FACTOR/ISSUE slides will be used. The shell is in Jennifer's files.

Rick

HAS 91

LORINS / PLISBY Slides

FLYING--STRATEGIC BASES

- REQUIREMENT (ACTIVE PAA)

	1990	1995
STRAT BOMBERS	268	181
STRAT TANKERS	503	350
TOTAL	771	531

- BASES IN CATEGORY

BARKSDALE	FAIRCHILD	MARCH
BEALE	GND FORKS	McCONNELL
CARSWELL	GRIFFISS	MINOT
CASTLE	GRISSOM	OFFUTT
DYESS	K.I. SAWYER	PLATTSBURGH
EAKER	LORING	WHITEMAN
ELLSWORTH	MALMSTROM	WURTSMITH

LORING AIR FORCE BASE

- o DOD RECOMMENDATION: CLOSURE
  - oo INACTIVATE 42 BOMBARDMENT WING
  - oo MOVE CONVENTIONAL B-52S TO K.I. SAWYER AFB
  - oo KC-135S REALIGN TO RESERVE UNITS

<u>BASE STATS</u>

LAND: 9,443 ACRES

BLDGS: 6.9 M SF

FAM HOU: 1,177

<u>RESULTS OF CLOSURE</u>

SAVING:

92-97: $182 M

ANNUAL: $61.8 M

COSTS: $46.6 M

PAYBACK: 1 YR

LORING AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
OVERALL ASSESSMENT	ONE OF THE LOWEST RATED BASES IN THE STRATEGIC CATEGORY	NOT ADDRESSED	ONE CRITERIA RATING CHANGED IN LORING'S FAVOR. PLATTSBURGH REMAINS HIGHER OVERALL RATING
FORCE STRUCTURE	B-52 STRUCTURE IS BEING REDUCED	IDEAL LOCATION FOR STRATEGIC FORCES	STRATEGIC FORCE. STRUCTURE BEING REDUCED BY 240 AIRCRAFT
STRATEGIC LOCATION	ONE OF THREE BASES WITH STRONG STRATEGIC POSITIONING	CLOSEST BASE TO POTENTIAL CONFLICT AREAS EAST OF U.S. & STRATEGIC TARGETS WEST OF THE URALS	BASE GIVEN HIGHEST POSSIBLE RATING FOR STRATEGIC LOCATION
RAMP SPACE	331,477 SQUARE YARDS	1,185,966 SQUARE YARDS BASED ON SAC REAL PROPERTY RECORDS	RAMP AREAS CAN PROVIDE PARKING FOR 82 LARGE AIRCRAFT. APRON SYSTEM COULD VARY BETWEEN 331,477 & 600,00 SQ YARDS. REAL PROPERTY RECORDS IN ERROR

LORING AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
NUMBER OF RUNWAYS	ONE FULLY OPERATIONAL RUNWAY AND ONE PLS RUNWAY	TWO FULLY OPERATIONAL RUNWAYS	ONE FULLY OPERATIONAL RUNWAY AND ONE PLS RUNWAY
BASE FACILITIES	CAPACITY HIGH. CONDITION BELOW AVERAGE. COST TO IMPROVE HIGH	NOT ENOUGH CREDIT FOR IMPROVEMENTS. POOR FACILITIES INCORRECTLY INCLUDED. COST LOW	ADJUSTMENTS MADE. LORING'S BASE FACILITIES RATING LOWERED FOR COST
LIMITED PEACETIME TANKER UTILITY	LOCATED FAR FROM AIRCRAFT USED FOR PEACETIME RECEIVER TRAINING	FAILED TO CONSIDER DEPLOYMENT TRAINING	LOCATION PUTS THE BASE AT A DISADVANTAGE FOR TANKER TRAINING
POOR ACCESS TO BOMBING RANGES	FURTHEST SAC BASE FROM BOMBING RANGES	NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR BECAUSE IT IS ONLY DONE TWICE A YEAR	DISTANCE IS A DISADVANTAGE FOR PRACTICING BOMBING & EW TRAINING

NEW 64

LORING AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ECONOMIC IMPACT	CONSIDERED ONE OF THREE WORST AFFECTED BASES ECONOMICALLY	AIR FORCE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CALCULATE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT	ECONOMIC IMPACT WILL BE SEVERE. LITTLE CHANCE OF RECOVERY
KEEP BOTH BASES OPEN (PLATTSBURGH & LORING)	ONLY 2 OF 3 NORTHEAST BASES NEEDED. EXTRA COST WOULD BE $62M PER YEAR TO KEEP ALL 3 (INCLUDES GRIFFISS)	KEEP ALL THREE BASES OPEN TO GIVE SAC MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY	FORCE STRUCTURE DICTATES THAT ONE OF THREE BE CLOSED
WEATHER CONDITION	ONE OF THE THREE BASES WITH THE WORST WEATHER RATING	NOT ADDRESSED	ADVERSE WEATHER EFFECTS MAY BE UNDER STATED
AIRSPACE	NO RESTRICTION ON AIRSPACE	NOT ENOUGH EMPHASIS GIVEN	HIGHEST RATING POSSIBLE. COMPETING BASES RATED LOWER

OPTIONS

FOR FLYING STRATEGIC BASES

- o CLOSE LORING AIR FORCE BASE (DOD RECOMMENDATION)
  - oo TRANSFER B-52S TO K.I. SAWYER AIR FORCE BASE
  - oo REALIGN KC-135 TO RESERVE UNITS

- o LEAVE LORING AIR FORCE BASE OPEN

NOT A SLIDE

STAFF COMMENTS

- **CLOSE LORING AIR FORCE BASE (DOD RECOMMENDATION)**

  RATED LOWER IN MILITARY VALUE DUE TO PEACETIME TANKER UTILITY

  ACCESS TO BOMBING RANGES LIMITS TRAINING

  CONDITION OF BASE FACILITIES IS WELL BELOW SAC AVERAGE

  REDUCES EXCESS STRATEGIC CAPACITY

  DOES NOT ALLOW FOR CLOSURE OF PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

  R&A STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DATA SUPPORTS CLOSURE

- **LEAVE LORING AIR FORCE BASE OPEN**

  STRATEGIC LOCATION WAS NOT GIVEN PROPER WEIGHING

  IMPACT ON COMMUNITY WILL BE DEVASTATING

  LORING IS 300 MILES CLOSER TO TARGETS (3-10% OF TOTAL MISSION TIME)

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NOT A SLIDE -- BACKGROUND INFORMATION

LORING AIR FORCE BASE MOTIONS

CLOSE LORING AIR FORCE BASE FROM DOD LIST

Mr. Chairman, I move that we recommend to the President the closure of Loring Air Force Base. The assigned B-52 aircraft should be transferred to K.I. Sawyer and the KC-135 aircraft should be dispersed to active and Air Reserve Component units.

LEAVE LORING AIR FORCE BASE OPEN FROM DOD LIST

Mr. Chairman, I move that Loring Air Force Base remain open. We find that the Secretary deviated substantially from Criteria I and VI because he did not place enough weight on Loring's strategic location or adequately consider the extreme economic impact on the community.

LORING AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
LOCATION ADVANTAGE FOR MISSIONS	BASE GIVEN HIGHEST RATING POSSIBLE	DID NOT GIVE ENOUGH WEIGHT FOR LOCATION BENEFITS ON STRATEGIC CONVENTIONAL NORAD STAGING TANKER SEA CONTROL	WORST CASE MISSION EFFECTS ADVANTAGE STRATEGIC-36 MINUTES 3-5% OF MISSION CONVENTIONAL-36 MINUTES - 3-5% OF MISSION NORAD-WORST CASE SCENARIO, NO WARNING, THERE IS A 0-10% DEGRADATION OF MISSION FROM BANGOR TANKER-NO ADVANTAGE SEA CONTROL-0 TO 10% LONGER DURATION

69 blu

LORING AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
PARKING OF AIRCRAFT	SAME NUMBER OF AIRPLANES CAN BE PARKED AT BOTH BASES	CONTENDS THAT BECAUSE THEY HAVE MORE SPACE THEN CAN DO BETTER THAN PLATTSBURGH	BOTH CAN PARK A LARGE NUMBER OF PLANES. PLATTSBURGH'S LARGER CONTIGUOUS RAMP ENABLES IT TO HANDLE AND SERVICE AIRPLANES EASIER AND PROVIDES MORE FLEXIBILITY FOR FUTURE MISSIONS
CAPACITY OF BASE FACILITIES	THE AMOUNT OF EACH TYPE OF SPACE IS CONSIDERED AMONG THE HIGHEST IN SAC	AMOUNT OF SPACE IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST IN SAC	FACILITY CAPACITY AMONG HIGHEST IN SAC. EXTENSIVE ASSETS RANKS HIGH
CONDITION OF BASE FACILITIES	CONDITION OF BASE FACILITIES IS WELL BELOW THE AVERAGE FOR SAC	FACILITY CONDITION UNDERRATED-NOT ENOUGH CREDIT FOR IMPROVEMENTS AND SOME LOW RATED FACILITIES SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED	SOME POOR CONDITION BUILDINGS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INCLUDED. MOST FACILITIES NEED WORK TO BE BROUGHT UP TO CONDITION CODE 1

R 11

LORING AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
COST TO IMPROVE FACILITIES	SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF THE FACILITIES NEED IMPROVEMENT. COST WILL BE HIGH	AIR FORCE FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE WEIGHT TO MILCON PROJECTS RECENTLY COMPLETED. DISAGREED WITH NEED TO BRING ALL FACILITIES UP TO CONDITION CODE 1	COST TO UPGRADE FACILITIES WILL BE HIGH. ALL BASES' FACILITIES WERE BROUGHT UP TO CONDITION CODE 1 SO THAT THERE WOULD BE A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES ONLY
TOTAL FEDERAL COSTS	ALL BASES WILL IMPACT TOTAL FEDERAL COSTS	NO CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO OTHER FEDERAL COSTS	COSTS SIGNIFICANT, BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE AT THE OTHER BASES
MOBILIZATION FACILITY	NOT ADDRESSED	HANGER DESIGNATED. FUNDS SPENT FOR NEEDED CAPABILITIES	MOBILIZATION FACILITY EXISTS

BU

PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

o DOD RECOMMENDATION: LEAVE BASE OPEN

BASE STATS

LAND: 3,430 ACRES

BLDGS: 3.0 M SF

FAM HOU: 1,627

RESULTS OF CLOSURE

SAVINGS:

92-97: $262 M

ANNUAL: $57.8 M

COSTS: $27.0 M

PAYBACK: LESS THAN 1 YR

PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
OVERALL ASSESSMENT	ONE OF THE LOWER RATED BASES IN THE STRATEGIC CATEGORY	STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IS VERY HIGH	ALTHOUGH CRITERIA II RATING WAS LOWERED, PLATTSBURGH REMAINS HIGHER RATED THAN LORING
FORCE STRUCTURE	TANKER OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE. FB-111S ARE TO BE PHASED OUT	TANKERS ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS. ROOM FOR OTHER MISSIONS	FOR TANKER MISSION BASE IS IDEALLY CONFIGURED. HAS CAPABILITY FOR ANOTHER MISSION
STRATEGIC LOCATION	ONE OF THREE NORTHEAST BASES IN A STRATEGIC LOCATION	LOCATION IS RATED HIGH. EXTRA DISTANCE IS MINOR IN RELATION TO LORING	BASE RECEIVED HIGH RATING FOR STRATEGIC LOCATION
AIRSPACE	MISSION & TRAINING NOT AFFECTED BY AIRSPACE ENCROACHMENT. ACCESS TO CLOSE BY TRAINING RANGES IS SOMEWHAT LIMITED	COMMUNITY HAS ADOPTED ZONING LAWS IN LINE WITH AICUZ REQUIREMENTS	AIRSPACE MARGINALLY RESTRICTED FOR TRAINING RANGES BUT DOES NOT AFFECT MISSION AND TOTAL TRAINING

PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
RAMP SPACE	FOURTH LARGEST RAMP SPACE IN SAC 1,015,230 SQ YDS	LARGE RAMP SPACE MAKES IT EASIER TO SERVICE AND MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT	RAMP SPACE CAN SUPPORT 82 TANKER AIRCRAFT
NUMBER OF RUNWAYS	ONE FULLY OPERATIONAL RUNWAY AND ONE PLS RUNWAY	ONE FULLY OPERATIONAL RUNWAY AND ONE PLS RUNWAY	ONE FULLY OPERATIONAL RUNWAY AND ONE PLS RUNWAY
WEATHER CONDITIONS	WEATHER EFFECTS ON MISSION ARE LOW	WEATHER IS FINEST IN NORTHEAST UNITED STATES FOR SAC BASES	WEATHER IMPACT ON MISSION IS LOW
ENCROACHMENT	VOLUNTARY QUIET HOURS FOR ENGINE TESTING	ZONING LAWS IN EFFECT TO ADHERE TO AICUZ REQUIREMENTS	QUIET HOURS ARE OBSERVED, BUT ENGINE TESTING IS DONE IF NEEDED, TAKE OFFS AND LANDING UNAFFECTED

PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
BASE FACILITIES	CAPACITY AVERAGE CONDITION AVERAGE COST TO IMPROVE IS LOW	FACILITIES ARE RELATIVELY NEW OR RECENTLY UPGRADED	CAPACITY AVERAGE. CONDITION AT HIGH AVERAGE. COST TO IMPROVE LOW
KEEP BOTH BASES OPEN	ONLY 2 OF 3 SAC BASES IN NORTHEAST NEEDED	DID NOT ADDRESS	FORCE STRUCTURE DICTATES ONE BASE BE CLOSED. NOT COST EFFECTIVE TO SPREAD AIRCRAFT OVER EXTRA BASES
LIMITED PEACETIME TANKER UTILITY	LOCATED FAR FROM AIRCRAFT USED FOR PEACETIME RECEIVER TRAINING	NOT ADDRESSED	LOW RATING JUSTIFIED, BUT CLOSEST TO DEPLOYMENT TRACKS
ACCESS TO BOMBING RANGES	DISTANCE TO BOMBING RANGES IS A PROBLEM	DISTANCE DOES HAVE AN EFFECT	DISTANCE AFFECTS BOMBER TRAINING

OPTIONS

FOR FLYING STRATEGIC BASES

- LEAVE PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE OPEN (DOD RECOMMENDATION)

- CLOSE PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

NOT A SLIDE

STAFF COMMENTS

- LEAVE PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE OPEN (DOD RECOMMENDATION)

  SLIGHTLY CLOSER TO BOMBING RANGES THAN OTHER SAC NORTHEAST BASES

  BASE FACILITIES RATED SLIGHTLY ABOVE SAC AVERAGE

  MILITARY VALUE FOR PEACETIME TANKER UTILITY HIGHER

  R&A STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DATA SUPPORTS LEAVING PLATTSBURGH OPEN

- CLOSE PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

  ARGUMENT CAN BE OFFERED THAT DISTANCE TO BOMBING RANGES IS NOT A PROBLEM

  ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE THAT PLATTSBURGH BEING 300 MILES FURTHER FROM TARGETS HAS A 3-10% AFFECT ON TOTAL MISSION TIME

  PLATTSBURGH COMMUNITY COULD RECOVER EASIER FROM ECONOMIC IMPACT

  DOES NOT ALLOW FOR CLOSURE OF LORING AIR FORCE BASE

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NOT A SLIDE -- BACKGROUND INFORMATION

PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE MOTION

OMIT PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE FROM COMMISSION STUDY LIST

Mr. Chairman, I move that we remove Plattsburgh Air Force Base from consideration for closure or realignment by this Commission.

CLOSE PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE FROM COMMISSION STUDY LIST

Mr. Chairman, I move that we recommend to the President the closure of Plattsburgh Air Force Base and the dispersal of the KC-135 aircraft to active and Air Reserve Component bases. We find that the Secretary deviated substantially from Criteria I - III by over rating Plattsburgh Air Force Base's military value. The Secretary placed too much value on Plattsburgh's strategic location and favorable weather conditions.

PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
LOCATION IS A MISSION ADVANTAGE	LOCATION IS IDEAL FOR TANKER OPERATION RATED HIGH	STRESSED THAT THE LOCATION FULLY SUPPORTS MISSION	IT IS FURTHER FROM SOME CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC TARGETS. DIFFERENCES ARE RELATIVELY MINOR
AIRCRAFT PARKING	SAME NUMBER OF LARGE AIRCRAFT CAN BE PARKED AT BOTH (LORING)	RAMP SPACE IS LARGER AND CAN HANDLE ANY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	PLANES CAN BE PARKED WHERE ACCESS FOR MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONAL EFFORT IS EASIER
CAPACITY OF BASE FACILITIES	CAPACITY RATES AT ABOUT AVERAGE FOR SAC BASES	NOT ADDRESSED	ONCE THE FB-111S LEAVE, CAPACITY RATING WILL IMPROVE, BUT REMAIN IN THE SAC AVERAGE RANGE
CONDITION OF BASE FACILITIES	CONDITION WAS ABOUT AVERAGE FOR SAC BASES	MOST OF FACILITIES RELATIVELY NEW OR RECENTLY REHABILITATED	FACILITIES ARE AT THE HIGH END OF SAC AVERAGE FOR BASES

FLYING--TACTICAL BASES

	1990	1995
o REQUIREMENT		
TFWE*	37.9	26.5
(AC/RC)	(24.5/13.4)	(15.25/11.25)

o BASES IN CATEGORY

- oo BERGSTROM
- oo CANNON
- oo DAVIS-MONTHAN
- oo EIELSON
- oo ENGLAND
- oo HOLLOMAN
- oo HOMESTEAD
- oo LANGLEY
- oo LUKE
- oo MacDILL
- oo MOODY
- oo MOUNTAIN HOME
- oo MYRTLE BEACH
- oo SEYMOUR JOHNSON
- oo SHAW
- oo TYNDALL

2

* INCLUDES TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

BERGSTROM AFB

- DOD RECOMMENDATION: CLOSURE, HQ 12AF TO D-M, AFR STAYS IF CIVIL FIELD

- MISSION: TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

BASE STATS	RESULTS OF CLOSURE
LAND: 4,058 ACRES	SAVINGS:
BLDGS: 2.7 M SF	92-97: $121 M
FAM H: 719	ANNUAL: $36.3 M
	COSTS: $39.3 M
	PAYBACK: 2 YR

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BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
OVERALL RANKING	RANKED LOW IN FLYING-TACTICAL CATEGORY	AIR FORCE SYSTEM FAILED TO EMPHASIZE MILITARY VALUE	RANKING VALIDATED BY GAO AND STAFF, MILITARY VALUE EMPHASIZED
FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN	PLAN CUTS 9 TACTICAL FIGHTER WING EQUIVALENTS (TFWE)	ESTABLISH NEW MISSION AT BASE	FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPACITY ANALYSIS CONFIRMS FIVE BASE EXCESS (OTHERS CUT FROM OVERSEAS)
TRAINING RANGES/AIRSPACE	ONLY 2 AIR-TO-GROUND, AND NO ELECTRONIC COMBAT (EC) RANGES NEARBY	BRADY & TEXON MOAs USEABLE	CONFIRMED LIMITED AIR-TO-GROUND BOMBING & LACK OF EC RANGES CONFIRMED
POTENTIAL FOR AIRSPACE/TRAINING AREA GROWTH	REDUCTION POSSIBLE	AIRSPACE ADEQUATE	BRADY & TEXON MOAs ENCROACHED, MAY BE REDUCED

BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
EXISTING LOCAL AIRSPACE ENCROACHMENT	HIGH ENCROACHMENT, REQUIRES OPERATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS	MUNICIPAL AIRPORT TRAFFIC DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH BASE	ENCROACHMENT CONFIRMED -- MUELLER AIRPORT (6 Mi N) AND EXEC AIRPORT (11 Mi NE). COMM'L AND RESIDENTIAL IN 65-80 Ldn CONTOURS
FUTURE LOCAL & REGIONAL AIRSPACE ENCROACHMENT	PROJECTED AVIATION GROWTH WILL REQUIRE OPS ADJUSTMENTS	AIRSPACE ADEQUATE -- NO INTERFERENCE FROM CITY AIRPORT	FAA CONFIRMED REGIONAL GROWTH -- OVERLAPPING TRAFFIC PATTERNS
SUPPORT TO ARMY (FORT HOOD)	SUPPORT FROM F-16s AT CARSWELL & BERGSTROM, PLUS A-10s AT KELLY & BARKSDALE	"NO TACTICAL AIR FORCES WITHIN 300 MILES"	FOUR TACTICAL UNITS WITHIN 250 MILES WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT
CLOSURE COSTS	$39M COST TO CLOSE, 2 YEAR PAYBACK, $36M SAVINGS/YR	SAVINGS OVERSTATED AND COSTS UNDERSTATED	CLOSURE COSTS & SAVINGS METHODOLOGY VALIDATED BY GAO (COBRA MODEL) AND STAFF ECONOMIST

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BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE

FACTOR/ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ECONOMIC IMPACT	IMPACT LESS THAN HISTORIC HIGHS	LOSE 13,719 JOBS	GAO AND STAFF ECONOMIST VALIDATED DoD'S IMPACT ANALYSIS AS ACCURATE

14

OPTIONS

FOR FLYING TACTICAL BASES

- CLOSE BERGSTROM AFB; RF-4 AIRCRAFT RETIRE, AIR FORCE RESERVE UNIT TO REMAIN IN CANTONMENT AREA IF BASE IS CONVERTED TO CIVIL AIRPORT BY JUNE 1993, MAINTAIN CORROSION CONTROL FACILITY IF ECONOMICAL TO OPERATE (DoD RECOMMENDATION)

- LEAVE BERGSTROM AFB OPEN

NOT A SLIDE

STAFF COMMENTS

- CLOSE BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE (DoD RECOMMENDATION)

  LIMITED PROXIMITY TO AIR-TO-GROUND AND ELECTRONIC RANGES

  REGIONAL ENCROACHMENT LIMITS GROWTH POTENTIAL FOR NEW MISSION

  LOCAL ENCROACHMENT FROM TWO CIVIL AIRFIELDS REQUIRES OPS ADJUSTMENTS

  STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE AND INDEPENDENT DATA SUPPORTS CLOSURE

- LEAVE BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE OPEN

  SUPPORT NEARBY FORT HOOD WITH CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TRAINING

NOT A SLIDE -- BACKGROUND INFORMATION

BERGSTROM AFB MOTIONS

CLOSE BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE FROM DoD LIST

Mr. Chairman, I move that we recommend to the President the closure of Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, and that the assigned RF-4 aircraft retire. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing will inactivate. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for the Air Force to operate it there. The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civil airport. If no decision on a civil airport is reached by June, 1993, the reserve units will be redistributed. If the reserve units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be redistributed. The 12th Air Force Headquarters; 12th TAC Intelligence Squadron; and the 602nd Tactical Air Control Center Squadron will relocate to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. The 712th Air Support Operations Center Squadron will relocate to Fort Hood, Texas. The 41st Electronic Combat Squadron will remain in place at Davis-Monthan AFB.

LEAVE BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE OPEN FROM DoD LIST

Mr. Chairman, I move that Bergstrom Air Force Base remain open. We find that the Secretary deviated substantially from Criteria I and II by not basing close air support units close enough to Fort Hood and by over-emphasizing the effect of ground and airspace encroachment.

Air Force Program Trends



Air Force Depot Proposal

Cost Implications
($ Millions)

Consolidate at All Depots	One-Time Costs	FY96-01 Net Costs (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings*
BRAC ACTIONS	183	(139)	89	991
NON-BRAC ACTIONS	35	(488)	146	1,875
ALL ACTIONS	218	(627)	235	2,866
Alternative - Close 2 Depots (+$600 Million Env)	1,107	(363)	161	699

* Savings in 20 year net present value

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

TIERING OF BASES

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

TIER I
Columbus AFB
Laughlin AFB
Randolph AFB
Vance AFB
TIER III
Reese AFB

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - PRODUCT CENTERS and LABORATORIES Subcategory

TIERING OF BASES

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit.

TIER I
Hanscom AFB
Rome Lab
Wright-Patterson AFB
TIER II
Kirtland AFB
Los Angeles AFB
TIER III
Brooks AFB

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - DEPOT Subcategory

TIERING OF BASES

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

TIER I
Hill AFB
Tinker AFB
TIER II
Robins AFB
TIER III
Kelly AFB
McClellan AFB

Document Separator

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. On Meet the Press you indicated that cumulative economic impact was the driving impetus which caused the removal of McClellan AFB from the list of Air Force recommendations. I would like to know exactly what Measure of Merit was used for your action. Let me be more exact in my question -- When all Service recommendations were combined and examined, what was the specific economic threshold which was exceeded in the Sacramneto area and, therefore, resulted in McClellan AFB's removal.

2. Did you use the same Measure of Merit that was used to effect McClellan AFB's removal from the list on other areas of the country. If you did, would you provide that analysis to the Commission? If DOD did not provide the same treatment to all sections of the country, do you intend to rectify the oversight? When you do, we would appreciate your providing the analysis to the Commission.

HT
Cohen Aspin was not compelled

3. Secretary Aspin, you opted to remove the Defense Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) consolidation from the BRAC process. You took this action even though the 1991 Commission Report indicated that the DFAS consolidation should be part of the 1993 process. The 1993 DOD list of closures/realignments which was forwarded to the Commission stated that "The Secretary of Defense decided to reject the Opportunity for Economic Growth (OEG) process because he was not convinced that OEG is sound public policy". OEG is the process where communities, in effect, bid for DFAS sites. Many communities spent significant time and money developing DFAS proposals and are now in limbo awaiting the DOD decision.

Cover

-- Why do you believe that OEG in not sound public policy?

-- What is the timetable you envision for completion of the DFAS consolidation?

-- If OEG is not an acceptable process, how do you intend to effect the consolidation?

-- Will the consolidation be presented to the BRAC?

March 15

A.M. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Purpose: To present publicly the recommended Department of Defense base closures and realignments.

Expectation: Macro view of how the closure & realignment recommendations mesh with the Force Structure, the threat, and declining DoD budget resources.

Witness:

- The Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

Force Structure

1. During the development of this round of base closures, the Services were given the Base Force Structure as a basis for developing their recommendations, i.e., 12 Army Divisions, 450 ships, and 26 Air Force Wings. It appears that your new budget will not support these Force Structure levels. Do your current base closure recommendations anticipate a Force Structure lower than the Base Force, or will a new Force Structure and additional closures and realignments be addressed in the 1995 round?

2. In your speech before the American Defense Preparedness Association on February 11, you said that a long-term strategic review of defense spending will begin in late March to assess threats, reconcile conflicting budget projections, and guide defense spending from 1995 through the end of the century. Based on this pending review, have you minimized the number of closures and realignments? Please elaborate.

3. Considering the lack of significant changes in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Feb '93), do you envision asking the Chairman to take a deeper look at areas of potential cost savings and base closures and realignments?

4. Is the future Force Structure Plan being developed based on projected world situations and threats, or is it being driven strictly by future budget numbers?

5. What future changes are expected in the Force Structure Plan, and what effect are these changes expected to have on the 1995 base-closure round?

A.M. **BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS** (continued)

Witness:

- **The Honorable Les Aspin**, Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310

Base Infrastructure - Capacity Analysis (continued)

13. In most of the depot areas, there already exists a capability to do similar and in many cases the same work in the private sector. Are there any ongoing policy changes envisioned that would change this public/private mix, and just what mix do you envision?

14. By law, at least 60% of all depot-level work must remain in publicly-owned facilities. What methods did you use to measure the private industry capability, and what oversight methods are used to insure this capability will be available in future years? Have excess infrastructure and skilled labor pools been retained to insure depot repair capabilities should private industry fail or move their base of operation to foreign countries?

15. In the past, you have had some disagreement with DoD using a top-down approach rather than a bottom-up approach in identifying requirements. Is this base-closure-and-realignment list based on a top-down or a bottom-up approach to identifying base-infrastructure needs?

16. There are numerous defense agencies as well as DoD and Service activities located in leased space in the National Capital Region and throughout the United States. It appears that the Navy was very diligent in this area. Was this studied by all of the Services, and is there a plan to move these activities onto vacated bases, onto partially used bases, or onto bases where land exists for construction?

17. If your recommended bases are in fact closed and realigned in addition to those already approved in 1988 and 1991, can we still perform the type of operation that we performed in Desert Shield and Desert Storm with the remaining number of bases?

18. As the military has evolved over the past hundreds of years, many large complexes have developed at strategic locations. Some would be impossible to duplicate in the future and are considered national assets or "crown jewels" of our nation's military base infrastructure. Is there any effort to look at keeping the "crown jewels" and consolidating smaller, more administrative bases on these larger bases and port facilities?

A.M. **BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS** (continued)

Witness:

- **The Honorable Les Aspin**, Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310

Foreign Basing

19. There is some criticism that not enough attention has been given to foreign bases while so many bases are being closed domestically. Proposed Senate bill S.319, introduced on February 4, 1993, requires SECDEF and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to make recommendations in 1993 and 1995 for the termination and reduction of U.S. military operations at military installations outside the U.S. What are your views on this legislation?

Process

20. During your limited tenure, what instruction did you give to the Military Departments for developing their recommendations?

21. What instructions were the Military Departments given for investigating Services' joint use of installations, and who insured that guidance was being followed throughout the process?

22. Did the OSD review result in any changes from the Services' proposals? If so, please elaborate on the changes.

23. Considering DoD guidance on maintenance depots--specifically directions to reduce excess capacity, economize management, and increase competition and privatization--why did the Air Force select the relatively small Newark, OH, Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center as the only AF Depot to close?

24. In your letter to this Commission, you state, "with respect to maintenance depots, there was not sufficient time for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review all potential interservicing possibilities." Yet General Went, whose commission was charged solely with doing just that, felt that the eight weeks they had was "hardly enough time to thoroughly examine an enterprise that would rank in the top 30 companies of the Fortune 500..." This Commission has about fifteen weeks to analyze 165 bases recommended by you for realignment or closure; do you feel we can rely on the JCS Consolidation Study?

A.M. **BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS** (continued)

Witness:

- **The Honorable Les Aspin**, Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310

Selection Criteria

25. Included in the law establishing the Base Closure Commission is the requirement for OSD to establish selection criteria to be used along with the Force Structure as a baseline for determining the defense infrastructure size. The eight criteria established for the 1991 round were again approved by OSD for the 1993 round prior to your confirmation. Are you satisfied with these eight criteria? Would you recommend any changes?

26. Of the eight criteria, the first four, which address military value, must be given primary consideration. The fifth addresses return on investment, and the remaining criteria deal with environment, economic impact, and community infrastructure. What changes did you make to the recommendations made by the Service Secretaries, and why? Did you specifically not recommend any bases for reasons other than military value?

Economic Impact

27. During your confirmation, you said that economic impact was broad enough to address the cumulative effects of defense drawdowns and prior closures. How did you insure that your interpretation was followed? What instructions did you give, and how did you insure that they were followed?

28. Was there any consideration given to not closing bases in certain states or regions because they were impacted by the 1988 and 1991 rounds?

29. When considering regional impacts, how did you define a region?

30. Should more weight be given to economic impact, or do you agree that military value should be the determining criterion when selecting bases for closures and realignments?

31. How does the economic impact on Sacramento compare with other closure locations such as K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, and the naval activities in Charleston, SC?

A.M. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)

Witness:

- The Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310

Economic Impact

32. The media have reported that McClellan AFB, California, was deleted by OSD from the Air Force list of recommended closures because of the economic impacts to the Sacramento area. Would you please comment on this issue?Was the importance of the economic impact placed above military value in the decision to delete McClellan AFB from the closure recommendations?

Environmental

33. One of the eight criteria is environmental impact. Do you know of any bases that were not recommended for closure or realignment because the cost or the time required to clean up were too great?

34. Many environmental protection statutes, regulations, and associated permit requirements impact the Services' capability to conduct military training, particularly at range complexes. Commanders are faced with maintaining and enhancing war-fighting capabilities within environmental guidelines enacted by Congress, the states, and local authorities. How did you balance the Services' operational training needs against these environmental requirements, and did environmental restrictions influence the selection of a particular base for closure?

Political Involvement

35. During the Commissioners' confirmation hearings, some Members of Congress asked about the role of politics in this process. I just want to put a question to you for the record on this subject. Can you assure the Commission that political factors were not a part of this process during the development of this analysis?

A.M. **BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS** (continued)

Witness:

- **The Honorable Les Aspin**, Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310

Retired Military Concerns

36. During the 1991 closure round, retired military personnel and communities were concerned about the loss of benefits such as military hospitals, commissaries, and exchanges when a base closed. Many military personnel retire in areas where these facilities are available. A recent article in the Army Times stated that California's Council of Chapters for the Retired Officers Association has concluded that a retiree's cost of living increases 20 to 40 percent when they lose access to these benefits. Were these concerns considered, and do you envision any policy changes that will address these issues?

Corps of Engineers

37. Congress enacted legislation in 1991 to exclude the realignment of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from the base-closure process. In November 1992, the Corps announced reorganization outside the base-closure process. You have been quoted as questioning the latest realignment because it appears politically motivated. When do you foresee that you will approve a realignment of the Corps to realize the significant savings that have been identified?

Levitt to Aspin

Defense Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS)

38. The 1991 Report to the President on closures and realignments recommended the closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison, including Building #1, which currently houses the Army Accounting and Finance activities. The report also recommended that DoD report back to the 1993 Commission with plans for the reorganization of DFAS. You have not included DFAS with your submission. How do you intend to comply with the 1991 report?

Document Separator

A.M. **FORCE STRUCTURE & OPERATIONAL ISSUES**

Purpose: To discuss the closures and realignments relative to the Force Structure Plan and to the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Expectation: Operational view of how the closure and realignment recommendations with affect national security. The Chairman is the voice of the CINCs and will provide an operational strategy perspective.

Witness:

- **Gen. Colin Powell**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 20310

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

Force Structure

1. You appeared before this Commission in 1991. Having just returned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm, you felt confident that the projected Base Force and the remaining base infrastructure after the 1988 and 1991 closures and realignments would be adequate to meet evolving world situations and national interests. With the OSD '93 round of closures and realignments, do you feel that the remaining infrastructure will provide the capability to accomplish that which we accomplished in Desert Shield and Desert Storm still exists?

2. Secretary Aspin has stated that a long-term strategic review of defense spending will begin in late March to assess threats, reconcile conflicting budget projections, and guide defense spending from 1995 through the end of the century. Do you think this review of threats will result in additional Force-Structure reductions below those used as a basis for the 1993 OSD recommendations?

3. The Report on Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Feb 1993) recommended transferring the continental air defense role from 12 National Guard interceptor squadrons to the active forces. If this is approved, does the Air National Guard plan to close these installations or hold them in reserve in case they are needed at some future date for continental air defense?

4. What instructions did you give regarding inter-Service use of facilities, and did the Services adequately address potential inter-Service facility use? Please give some examples. Will any Service completely take over another Service's base, or will any base staying open change hands because of host-tenant imbalance?

A.M. **FORCE STRUCTURE & OPERATIONAL ISSUES** (continued)
Witness:

- **Gen. Colin Powell**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 20310

Force Structure (continued)

5. Alternative scenarios have been developed regarding the desired mix of land-based and sea-based strategic missiles under START II. There is an argument that land-based ICBMs are less costly, more reliable, provide more retargeting flexibility, enhance strategic stability, and are more environmentally suitable than sea-launched ballistic missiles. How has this argument influenced the review of strategic-bomber and missile bases?

6. In your Roles and Missions report, a number of issues were addressed that could result in closures and realignments. The issue with the greatest potential impact is Depot Maintenance. The group you chartered recommended the establishment of a Joint Depot Maintenance Command and the closure of seven or eight of the military depots. With this still under review, explain why the Services were directed to recommend depot closures and consolidations for this round. Would it be better to wait until some uncertainty over Force Structure and recommended consolidations is decided?

7. The JCS Maintenance Consolidation Study concludes that "most likely true capacity exceeds workload requirements by 25% to 50%." It recommends that "a coordinated effort that truly integrates requirements and accurately reflects unneeded facilities is essential to solving the problems of excess depot capacity." Except for the Navy the list apparently does not implement this recommendation. Are you comfortable with the thrust of the current depot drawdown? What would you suggest as a vehicle for future depot drawdowns? Why weren't interservicing possibilities explored?

8. Is the future Force Structure Plan being developed based on projected world situations and threats, or is it being driven strictly by future budget numbers?

9. What role did you and your CINCs play in developing the recommendations? Did the increased time from one week in 1991 to three weeks in 1993 to review the Services' recommendations help your review?

10. Please explain the role of your JCS Depot Maintenance Panel headed by retired General Went. Are its recommendations consistent with the closures and realignments recommended by the SECDEF?

Document Separator

ADDITIONAL QUESTION FOR MR. BERTEAU

1. Commissioners and staff have been asked many time to discuss overseas base closures. Could you provide, for the record, a list of all overseas base closures that have been directed since the start of the 1988 Defense Closure Commission?

March 16

A.M. **SPECIFIC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY ISSUES**

Purpose: To receive OSD(P&L) testimony on specific policies and methodologies used in development of the installations reflected on the DOD list.

Expectation: The witness should provide an overall general policy perspective on exactly how the DOD developed the list of installations to be closed/realigned. Service and Defense Agency issues will be addressed. Follow-on witnesses/panels will detail the specifics of the methodology.

Witness:

- **David J. Berteau**, Acting Asst Secy Def (Production and Logistics), OSD, Room 3E808, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310, (703) 695-7178.

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

1. During the '91 OSD review, OSD had about one week in which to review, analyze, and change the Services' recommendations. This year, it is my understanding that OSD allowed three weeks for review. Please elaborate on the OSD analysis and review process after receipt of the Services' recommendations.

2. Please provide for the record a copy of the force table in the Force Structure plan promulgated by SECDEF in March 1993.

3. Please provide for the record a copy of all policy letters by, or in the name of, the SECDEF.

4. The DoD report for the 1991 round of base closures contained copies of four policy memos that directed the Services' efforts. For the 1993 round, there was only one memo dated May 5, 1992. In your estimation, did this memo provide adequate direction to the Services?

5. Are you satisfied with the process used by each of the Services to prepare its recommendations? Have you identified any lessons learned that will be considered for use in the 1995 round?

6. How were joint-use opportunities considered in the base-closure process? For example, did any of the Services examine the use of facilities considered excess by another Service?

A.M. **SPECIFIC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY ISSUES** (cont'd)

Witness:

- **David J. Berteau**, Acting Asst Secy Def (Production and Logistics), OSD, Room 3E808, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310, (703) 695-7178.

7. In 1991, the Services used different definitions of the eight selection criteria. Did the Services use the criteria differently this time? Are you satisfied that the Services adequately explained their implementation of the criteria to minimize confusion about process implementation?

8. Do you believe it is important for each Service to evaluate similar facilities in a consistent manner? If so, do you believe that the Services accomplished this? If they didn't, does OSD have a plan to work with the Services to effect a comprehensive, cohesive effort in the future?

9. Do you agree with the justification provided by the Services for excluding bases from closure consideration when an excess capacity exists?

10. How did OSD monitor the adherence of the Services to your guidance during the recommendation-development process? Did you use any independent organization to evaluate the work of the Services?

11. Was the consolidation of administrative organizations onto operating facilities a goal of your 1993 base-closure process?

12. Did any Service other than the Navy use the study concerning relocating National Capitol Region missions to other locations in their analysis?

13. What policy was followed concerning sending below-threshold closures or realignments, such as reserve centers, to the Commission?

14. Was guidance provided to the Services to ensure the "regional fairness" expressed by Secretary Aspin or was this a function of the final OSD review?

15. What process was used to review the Services' recommendations after they were presented to you on February 22?

16. Did OSD provide any policy guidance or direction on inter-Service coordination to be used during this round of base closures?

A.M. **SPECIFIC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY ISSUES** (cont'd)

Witness:

- **David J. Berteau**, Acting Asst Secy Def (Production and Logistics), OSD, Room 3E808, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310, (703) 695-7178.

17. Is detailed information available concerning impacts on and/or realignments of tenant organizations on recommended closure bases?

18. What was your role in the decision process, beyond setting the standards and guidelines? Did you conduct your own independent analysis or did you basically set the standards and then deliver the results to Secretary Aspin?

19. Was the cost of environmental cleanup determined to any degree of specificity, or was it just noted? How was the issue of environmental degradation and the responsibility of cleanup addressed with respect to the ultimate recommendations?

20. Are you confident that your team had enough time to look at the recommendations and that GAO is getting the information they need to prepare their report?

21. Mr. Berteau, you are aware that medical care is always a major issue when closing a military installation. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 92-93, Congress directs the Department of Defense to develop plans for each base closure location that address. (1) consideration of joint-use or preferred-care-provider Services use of the existing facilities and (2) comparison of costs to the government and to beneficiaries for CHAMPUS versus alternative health care. Could you please comment on the outcome of this study?

22. As a result of this study, were any hospitals recommended to remain open at installations that are recommended for closing?

A.M. **SPECIFIC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY ISSUES** (cont'd)

Purpose: To discuss depots and Defense Agencies.

Expectation: More specific Defense Agency discussions should take place within this panel. The witnesses should also explore differing views relating to optimizing the Defense depot structure. JCS has indicated a desire for depot consolidation across functional lines (Army - Ground; Navy - Sea; Air Force - Aircraft). The Services have somewhat different views, basically preferring to maintain streamlined depots within the Services. The panel discussion would illustrate the difficulty in implementing depot consolidation.

Witnesses:

- **The Honorable David J. Berteau,** Acting Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics), Pentagon, Washington DC.

- **General Joseph J. Went, USMC Ret,** Director, Executive Working Group, Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR BERTEAU

1. On December 8, 1992, Deputy Secretary Atwood issued a memo directing the Services to develop recommendations for consolidation of maintenance functions. In Secretary Aspin's forwarding letter which accompanied the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignments Report, he stated that "with respect to Maintenance Depots, there was not sufficient time for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review all potential interservicing possibilities". Allowing that you did not review all of the possibilities, which possibilities did you review? What process did you use, and how did you account for the basic differences in Service accounting, budgeting, and record keeping?

2. The JCS Chairman's report on Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces states that a study group chartered by him has recommended closure of seven or eight of the maintenance depots in order to reduce capacity and save $400-$600 million per year. Do you believe the numbers accurately reflect the DOD position and to what extent does the current list reflect a reduction in the capacity?

A.M. **SPECIFIC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY ISSUES** (Continued)

Witnesses:

- **The Honorable David J. Berteau,** Acting Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics), Pentagon, Washington DC.

- **General Joseph J. Went, USMC Ret,** Director, Executive Working Group, Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR BERTEAU

3. In most of the depot areas, there already exists a capability to do similar and, in many cases, the same work in the private sector. Are there any ongoing policy changes envisioned that would address this public/private mix, and just what mix do you envision?

4. The '88 and '91 closures and realignments primarily resulted from reduced Force Structure and some reorganizations, but large support functions such as depots and supply distribution centers remained intact. In December, 1992, Deputy Secretary Atwood directed the Secretaries of the military departments to investigate efficiencies and to streamline defense depot maintenance activities. At the same time, a similar effort was underway under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Please relate how these activities impacted depot-related recommendations to the Commission. effort?

5. The JCS depot consolidation study does not appear to consider private-sector capacity, while the Defense Conversion Commission report strongly states that the private-sector must be considered when reviewing the public sector maintenance infrastructure. Please comment.

6. When examining depots, how were the capabilities and capacity of the private sector considered in developing the closure recommendations?

7. The JCS depot-consolidation study and the JCS Roles and Missions report both recommend closing 7 or 8 of the 30 public depots. Did this recommendation have an effect on the closure recommendations?

8. What instructions were the Military Departments given for investigating joint use of depot installations, and who insured that guidance was being followed throughout the process?

A.M. **SPECIFIC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY ISSUES** (Cont'd)

Witnesses:

- **The Honorable David J. Berteau,** Acting Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics), Pentagon, Washington DC.

- **General Joseph J. Went, USMC Ret,** Director, Executive Working Group, Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR BERTEAU

9. What instructions were given regarding inter-Service use of facilities, and did the Services adequately address potential inter-Service facility use? Please give some examples.

10. Have the surge capacity requirements, based upon the current threat scenarios, been calculated for depot categories?

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR GEN. WENT

1. The JCS depot consolidation study identifies numbers of excess depots by category. The work confronting the Base Closure Commission is to try and ensure that the depots that remain open provide the greatest value to the Services. Do you have any guidance to assist in our comparison of depots? Is comparing the relative efficiencies of depots a useful factor to consider and, if so, what is the best way to compare efficiencies?

2. You had a number of viable options detailed in the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study. The option recommended was "the establishment of a unified command for depot maintenance with full authority to organize current Service depots as determined by the new command and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff". What are the pros and cons of your recommendation? In your opinion, what will Service reservations, if any, be?

3. Please explain the role of the JCS Depot Maintenance Panel. Are their recommendations consistent with the closures and realignments recommended by the SECDEF?

4. Given Service reservations which you have just articulated, how would you suggest addressing those reservations?

5. Do you see the elimination or significant downsizing of the extremely large Service logistics organizations we currently have if DOD implements your option?

A.M. **SPECIFIC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY ISSUES** (Cont'd)

Witnesses:

- **The Honorable David J. Berteau,** Acting Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics), Pentagon, Washington DC.

- **General Joseph J. Went, USMC Ret,** Director, Executive Working Group, Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR GEN. WENT

6. If some form of depot consolidation is effected, do you see JCS or DOD having the oversight responsibility for the effort?

7. In your letter to General Powell, which precedes the Consolidation Study, you state: "We do not believe this report should be used to make detailed organizational decisions or resource allocations." The letter goes on to suggest that further research is required. The Secretary of Defense, however, has suggested that this Commission "review all potential interservicing possibilities." If we do not use the study you prepared, what do you suggest we use?

8. During the course of analyzing DoD depot maintenance, your team must have analyzed various scenarios to determine optimum consolidation possibilities under each option. If so, have you or your staff shared any of this information with the Services? Please make this information available to the DBCRC.

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

1. Secretary Aspin stated on Meet the Press yesterday that he removed McClellan AFB from the list because of cumulative economic impact in the northern California area. Have you assessed the domino effect of that action and does this mean that other depots will be reduced an incremental amount. Please elaborate on the impacts of this removal.

P.M. **AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

Witness:

- **The Honorable Michael B. Donley**, Acting Secretary of the Air Force

PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

Force Structure

1. For the record, what Force Structure baseline did the Air Force use in its analysis for the 1993 round of base closures? Is this the same force structure used in the 1991 process? If the force structure is the same, then why is the Air Force closing more bases?

2. What impacts have the Force Structure reductions had on the Reserve Components and have these impacts resulted in any base realignments or closures during this round?

3. In the CJCS report on Roles, Missions, and Functions, General Powell stated that the mission of continental air defense could be sharply reduced or eliminated and produce significant savings. Has this mission change been considered in the Air Force's deliberations on base closures?

4. Since the Air National Guard currently performs this mission for NORAD, would it be logical to assume that the ANG installations responsible would be closed?

5. OSD directed the Air Force to cut its FY 94 budget by $2.8 billion. What impact has this had on the Air Force's Force Structure? On its basing infrastructure?

Base Infrastructure - Capacity Analysis

6. In the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment recommendations the Air Force indicated a continuing evaluation of "... the possible relocation of one or more product divisions ... to enhance the relationship between product divisions and laboratory activities." Has this evaluation resulted in any realignments and base closures during this round of recommendations?

Process

7. Under the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Grand Forks, ND, "ICBM-silo-launcher deployment area" was designated as the site for deployment of an ABM system. To what extent has this influenced the review process for Grand Forks AFB as a potential closure candidate, and is this specifically why Grand Forks did not make the list?

P.M. **AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS** (continued)

Witness:

- **The Honorable Michael B. Donley**, Acting Secretary of the Air Force

Process (continued)

8. Are you confident that the Air Force made sufficient cuts in its base structure?

9. What plan did the Air Force use in choosing bases to close?

10. Were any bases specifically excluded from consideration for being closed?

11. In considering bases for closing, what factors were considered? Were any factors weighted heavier than others? If so, which factors, and how were they weighted differently?

12. Did the Secretary of Defense make any changes to the recommendations submitted to him on February 22? If so, what explanation was given for the changes? What is the impact of these changes on the Air Force?

13. The Major Commands (MAJCOMs) do not budget for the excess cost of environmental cleanup associated with range closure. In the 1993 BRAC deliberations, did the Air Force consider training ranges for closure and inclusion in the BRAC process?

Environmental

14. Many environmental-protection statutes, regulations, and associated permit requirements impact the Services' capability to conduct military training, particularly at range complexes. Commanders are faced with maintaining and enhancing war-fighting capabilities within environmental guidelines enacted by Congress, the states, and local authorities. How did you balance the Services' operational training needs against these environmental requirements, and did environmental restrictions affecting ranges influence the selection of a particular base for closure?

15. Do any of the bases on the 1993 base-closure-and-realignment list have burial sites, critical habitats, national historical sites, or endangered species on their real property? If so, what considerations have been made to protect these resources during and after closure?

P.M. **AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS** (continued)

Witness:

- **The Honorable Michael B. Donley**, Acting Secretary of the Air Force

Environmental (continued)

16. Recognizing that the "Environmental Impact" is of secondary importance to military value, please give any instances where this criteria resulted in direct impact on the military value of an installation. For instance, one example might have been where an installation was in an Air Quality Non-Attainment Area which could impede its future growth or even its actual Military Value for the existing mission.

17. Were any bases rated as more supportable for closure because those bases had worked very closely with regulators and the communities to clean up environmental dumpsites?

18. Conversely, were any bases kept open because they were too dirty or too costly to clean up?

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QUESTIONS FOR DOD JOINT GROUP BRIEFINGS - MAY 18,19

GENERAL

- Please provide copies of existing and future policy letters?
- Please provide a list of facilities/bases/activities being considered by your committees?
- Are systems in place to collect data requirements?
    - • Who will evaluate data - Services or OSD?
- Are you looking at requirements beyond the FYDP to determine infrastructure capabilities?
- What force structure are you using as the basis for your requirements calculations?
    - • Do you have quotas or will you do a true bottom up look and determine requirements and assess them against assets?
- Will your teams make site visits?
- What measures of merit have been established to assess military value?
- Who will respond to DBCRC questions - services or OSD?
    - • Who will staff questions within OSD - who is our POC?
    - • Will the turn around time be adequate or will layers slow it down?
    - • Will answers be service or OSD positions, or both?
- How does DOD plan to insure execution of the Commission recommendations?
- What electronic format does DOD plan to use in analysis and transmittal of data?

QUESTIONS FOR DOD DEPOT GROUP BRIEFING - MAY 18

- How are you defining capacity and how will you determine existing capacity?
    - How do you define "proficiency" and how do you measure it?
- Please discuss how the joint group will interface with the policy side of the depot issue.
    - Will the Group recommend, set or use a DoD policy regarding one service "maintaining" an end item of another Service?
    - How do you account for service philosophical differences,
        - Air Force two level maintenance vs Navy three level
        - Navy's assets are very exhausted when they reach the depot and some scheduled maintenance is slipped whereas Air Force depot is very programmed
    - How do you anticipate "Core" being assigned?
- In many of the group areas services differ as to the relationship of that function to a particular installation - for example, a Depot is not just a Depot in USAF (Fighter wing, AWACS, etc.). How will the groups work their area recommendations with the operational functions sharing the affected installations?
- We understand that Group questions have been sent out through Service driven data calls. Do you envision the analysis on the inputs to be performed first by the services or the groups?
    - How do you plan to deal with the differences in service interpretation of questions and responses?
- As we understand it, the USAF and USA Plant Value calculations differ numerically and philosophically with the USN. Do you envision directing or developing a joint definition?
- DoD has directed USAF and USN to develop a coordinated plan involving aviation maintenance which could drive the depot policy regarding closures and excess capacity. Please discuss your expectations and goals in this area.
- A recent Defense Daily article mentions James Klugh's philosophies regarding "Partnering" and the impact of the DoD submitted 60/40 legislation continuation. If the reflection in the article is correct there is a distinct implication that excess capacity goes away. Please discuss.
- How does the "new measuring technique" in which industry may be getting up to 80% of depot dollars enter the groups analysis?

QUESTIONS FOR DOD LABORATORY/T&E GROUP BRIEFING - MAY 18

- Expect to be primarily in the receive mode
- Do you envision DOD Labs/T&E management structure or maintaining a service organization?
- What are the measures of merit you will use.
    - • Will cost be the primary driver?
    - • How do you determine the requirement and measure capacity the Lab/T&E world?
    - • How will you account for unique T&E facilities (AAMRAM)?

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Industry, Schools May Gain in Lab Restructuring

By ROBERT HOLZER
And STEPHEN C. LeSUEUR
Defense News Staff Writers

WASHINGTON — Pentagon officials are preparing a new strategy for reducing the Defense Department's massive system of laboratories and shifting large portions of lab activities to universities and industry.

Although most of the actual reductions will not take place until the 1995 round of base closings, Pentagon and industry study teams are trying to identify areas of research and development now performed in-house at the 80-plus defense laboratories that can be farmed out to scientists and engineers in the private sector.

"The labs need more competition from universities and industry," Donald Hicks, former undersecretary of defense for research and engineering for former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, said July 26.

Hicks is a member of a Defense Science Board task force advising Pentagon officials on laboratory management. The task force's initial report, completed in April but still unreleased, declared the Pentagon's laboratory system to be an obsolescent artifact of the Cold War.

Anita Jones, the Pentagon's director of defense research and engineering who oversees the service laboratories, has endorsed the task force's recommendations and is using them to guide her efforts to modernize the laboratories, eliminate redundant research and shift more work outside the labs, Pentagon and industry officials said.

Consequently, the list of facilities recommended for closing or reductions by the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission is expected to include many defense labs.

"In the technical community we frankly didn't do a very good job" in previous base closing rounds, Charles Nemfakos, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for force basing and infrastructure requirements analysis, said in remarks July 19 to the Surface Navy Association in Arlington, Va. "Labs have not been looked at and adjusted since 1991. That is going to lead to some pretty significant adjustment" in 1995.

The military services operate more than 80 laboratories and facilities that perform basic science and technology research, developmental engineering and technological support of fielded weapon systems.

Laboratory activities include not only the research laboratories, such as the Air Force's Armstrong Labs and the Army Research Labs, but also testing centers, service depots and other facilities that use in-house scientists and engineers.

The annual spending for the defense labs and their activities is estimated at $8 billion, according to analysts.

The labs have served two essential missions, defense

See LABS, Page 29

JPATS Hits

1,000 export orders.

The seven competitors and marked funding for JPATS to meet the Air Force's schedule.

costs range from necessary refurbishment of the tanks to the purchase of fuel trucks, ammunition

McHale argues that if the tank transfer is approved in confer- with objectivity, and casts great doubt on their credibility."

DoD Lab System May Be Focus of Base Closure Effort in '95

LABS, From Page 4

and industry officials said. First, they develop and preserve technologies that are critical to national security, in many instances where industry does not have the resources or interest.

In addition, the labs help maintain a technological expertise that make Pentagon officials smart buyers of defense weapons and equipment.

These missions have not changed, but many Pentagon and industry officials say the labs must be reduced and restructured to reflect the Pentagon's post-Cold War needs.

The report from the Defense Science Board, for example, recommended that the Pentagon double its planned cuts of lab personnel from 4 percent to 8 percent annually.

The personnel cuts would allow the labs to shift spending to industry, and would have the added benefit of helping maintain the defense technology base within the private sector.

One of the chief problems facing the labs is that the Defense Department no longer is the driving force behind all militarily critical technologies. In areas such as microelectronics, for example, the commercial sector has far outpaced the defense labs and will continue to do so.

As a result of the Defense Science Board report, Jones has Pentagon-industry teams assessing the capabilities of the defense labs to determine how much work could be shifted to industry, academia or other government labs.

Industry officials also said Pentagon officials like Jones should oversee this process to coordinate the reductions among the individual service labs and ensure that critical elements of defense research are not eliminated.

"I would not be happy if [lab cuts] were done on a service-by-service basis," Phil Selwyn, former head of the Office of Naval Technology and now vice president of Arete Associates, Arlington, Va., said July 27. "I think it is absolutely necessary that DoD manage this process. There is too much overlap in missions that it can only be dealt with in a cohesive manner."

The Pentagon's plan to shift work outside the labs could be disrupted by cuts to university funding in the 1995 defense appropriations bill. House lawmakers in June cut in half the Pentagon's request for $1.8 billion for university research.

However, Congress is expected to restore this funding in the final Senate and House conference bill.

The Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va., a government-funded research institution, is coordinating the Pentagon's study and will deliver its report to Jones in August.

This report, in turn, will form the basis of the Pentagon's recommendations to President Bill Clinton's review of all Defense Department, Energy Department and NASA laboratories.

The effort, which is being directed by the White House National Science and Technology Council, is re-examining the post-Cold War functions of these labs. The annual budgets of these three lab systems is estimated at $18 billion.

The National Science and Technology Council is slated to deliver its report to Clinton April 15.

Pentagon closing plan to target research labs

By David Eisenstadt
HEARST NEWSPAPERS

The Clinton administration is weighing a plan to shut about half of the military's 76 research laboratories, a move that could cost the jobs of thousands of scientists and engineers, according to Pentagon and congressional officials.

These labs, distinct from the national weapons complexes run by the Energy Department, are expected to be among the targets recommended to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission for the next round of military base closings in 1995.

"If we're going to keep cutting the military structure, the labs have to go just like everything else," said Donald Hicks, a former assistant defense secretary and a member of the Pentagon panel that drew up the proposal.

Under the plan, a "streamlined" system of major and minor defense laboratories, "about half the size" of the present system, would emerge, Mr. Hicks said in an interview.

The labs were built to meet the military-science needs of World War II and were enlarged throughout the Cold War. Mr. Hicks said several major labs would share research among the services while smaller facilities would cater to individual services.

A House Armed Services Committee aide familiar with the plan said, "A 50 percent reduction is a very high probability at this point."

Michael Davey, a Congressional Research Service specialist who is also familiar with the plan, added: "There's no question that 1995 will be the year of the lab closure."

The labs — 38 run by the Army, 24 by the Navy and 14 by the Air Force — spent about $12 billion last year and had about 83,000 employees.

The facilities are vulnerable in the 1995 base-closing round, Pentagon officials said, because duplication abounds and, with few weapons systems on military drawing boards, some labs have little to do.

One official, who asked not to be named, cited the Army Tank and Automotive Research Center in Warren, Mich., as lacking steady work. But Eric Emerton, a Research Center spokesman, said, "We are gainfully employed right now." However, Mr. Emerton conceded, "We could be on some list" of closure targets. He added that rumors about an impending shutdown have circulated for years.

Officials also cited the military's 20 medical laboratories as sometimes doing overlapping research. In 1991 the Congressional Research Service noted that many labs were producing vaccines to thwart the effects of chemical weapons.

Besides the tank and automotive lab in Michigan, the Pentagon panel's target list includes at least three labs in California and one each in New York, Massachusetts, Ohio and Maryland, officials said. Among those mentioned:

- The Harry Armstrong Astronautics Laboratory at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.
- The Naval Air Warfare Center at China Lake, Calif.
- The Clothing and Textile Research Facility, Natick, Mass.
- The David Taylor Research Center, Carderock, Md.
- The Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome, N.Y.

The lab plan is bound to be controversial because of the resultant layoffs and because of the federal dollars that the facilities inject into local economies.

Although the plan is subject to revision, military sources said the Navy expects initial cuts of 4,500 to 6,000 lab positions and that the Army estimates it might lose 4,000 to 6,000 jobs. A source said the Air Force could have "thousands of layoffs."

Work could be shifted to industry and university labs, a source said.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC
SECURITY

29 DEC 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Three

Background

This memorandum is the third in a series of additional policy guidance implementing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Deputy Secretary's 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) guidance of January 7, 1994.

Final Selection Criteria

The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC 95) Selection Criteria at attachment one, required by Section 2903(b) of Public Law 101-510, form the basis, along with the force structure plan, of the base closure and realignment process. These criteria were provided by the Deputy Secretary's November 2, 1994, memorandum. DoD components shall use these criteria in the base structure analysis to nominate BRAC 95 closure or realignment candidates. The criteria will also be used by the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in their review of the Department of Defense final recommendations.

Activities in Leased Space

This expands on the policy guidance contained in the DepSecDef January 7, 1994, BRAC 95 memorandum.

DoD Component organizations located in leased space are subject to Public Law 101-510. Civilian personnel authorizations of organizations in leased space, which are part of an organization located on a nearby military installation or one within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA), shall be considered part of the civilian personnel authorization of that

installation. Certain military activities performed in leased facilities constitute an installation because of common mission, permanently authorized personnel, and separate support structure. Each DoD component should aggregate the remaining civilian personnel authorizations of their organizations in leased space within a MSA and consider the aggregate to be a single installation for applying the numerical thresholds of Public Law 101-510. In aggregating leased space activities in the National Capital Region (NCR), the NCR, as defined by the National Capital Planning Act (40 USC 71), will be used as the MSA.

Return on Investment (ROI)

This expands on the policy guidance contained in the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) memorandum of May 31, 1994 (Policy Memorandum One).

- Medicare Costs Medicare Costs will not be included in DOD Component cost analyses. The Medicare program consists of part A (hospital and related costs) and Part B (supplemental costs). Part A is financed by Medicare payroll taxes. The only appropriated funds used to support Medicare are those portions of the Part B costs that exceed the monthly premiums paid by the members/beneficiaries. Therefore, total Medicare appropriations will not significantly change return on investment calculations.

- Unemployment Costs The Military Departments and Defense Agencies annually budget unemployment contributions to the Federal Employees Compensation Account for DoD military and civilian employees. DoD Components should include the contributions to this account attributable to closures and realignments in their cost calculations. However, state unemployment costs will not be included in DoD component cost analyses since such costs result only indirectly from BRAC actions and would not be borne by DoD.

- Costs to other Federal Agencies and State and Local Governments In general, DoD components need not consider costs or savings to other federal agencies and state and local governments in their calculations of BRAC 95 costs and savings.

There are, however, a limited number of circumstances when DoD components should include the costs of BRAC 95 actions to other Federal Agencies in their cost calculations. Costs to other Federal Agencies should be included only when they are measurable, identifiable costs that DoD would incur as a **direct** result of BRAC-related actions. The key distinguishing features of costs to other federal agencies that should be included is (1) DoD is unambiguously responsible for paying such costs and (2) such costs would be incurred as a direct, rather than indirect, result of BRAC actions.

For example, if a BRAC-related action would result in early termination of a lease agreement with the General Services Administration, and the lease agreement contains a provision that requires DoD to pay a penalty for breaking the lease, then the amount of the penalty should be included in cost calculations. Similarly, DoD components should include unemployment insurance costs for which they are liable. Both of these are costs **to DoD** that result **directly** from BRAC actions. In contrast, DoD components need not consider cost impacts that BRAC actions could have on Federal programs such as Medicare because (1) such costs would not be borne by DoD and (2) they result only indirectly from BRAC actions, or (3) result from base reuse activities, which cannot be known during BRAC decision-making processes.

COBRA Analyses of Cross-Service/Agency Scenarios

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies will use the following procedure for developing COBRA runs for closure and realignment scenarios involving more than one Military Department or Defense Agency:

- Military Departments or Defense Agencies having cognizance over a losing base in a cross-service scenario will identify the Departments or Agencies which have cognizance for the gaining bases in the scenario. The losing base Military Department will then task these Military Departments and Agencies to collect the necessary gaining base COBRA data.

- Each losing base Department or Agency will then prepare a COBRA analysis. Savings associated with eliminated billets/positions, overhead and mission costs should be identified under the Losing Base in the scenario. In scenarios where more than one Department or Agency has a losing base, these separate COBRA runs can then be combined by using a new summarization function of the COBRA model, the Adder.

Interaction among the Departments and Agencies will be necessary to coordinate scenario-specific data elements such as equipment transfers, MILCON requirements, consolidation savings, etc.

DoD-wide Standard Factors for COBRA Analyses

As noted in Policy Memorandum One, some standard factors used in the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) are sufficiently different to warrant DoD Component-specific cost factors. However, most of the standard factors used in COBRA algorithms reflect standard rates which should be applied consistently in all DoD closure/realignment scenarios. Attachment two contains the DoD-wide COBRA standard factors which should be used in all COBRA analyses.

Environmental Restoration Costs

Environmental Restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations. DoD has a legal obligation for environmental restoration regardless of whether a base is closed or realigned. Where closing or realigning installations have known, unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration, these will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse of the installation.

Environmental Compliance Costs

Environmental compliance costs can be a factor in a base closure or realignment decision. Costs associated with bringing existing practices into compliance with environmental rules and regulations can potentially be avoided when the base closes. Environmental compliance costs may be incurred at receiving locations also, and therefore will be estimated.

Environmental Impacts

For environmental impact considerations, there is no need to undertake new environmental studies. DoD Components may use all available environmental information regardless of when, how or for what purpose it was collected. If a DoD Component should choose to undertake a new environmental study, the study must collect the same information from all bases in the DoD Component's base structure, unless the study is designed to fill gaps in information so that all bases can be treated equally. Attachment three provides a sample of the reporting format used to summarize the environmental consequences of closure or realignment of an installation.

Economic Impact Calculations

DoD Components shall measure the economic impact on communities of BRAC 95 alternatives and recommendations using (1) the total potential job change in the economic area and (2) the total potential job change as a percent of economic area employment. These measures highlight the potential impact on economic area and also take into account the size of the economic area. In accomplishing this task, Components will follow the detailed guidance at attachment four.

Base Realignment and Closure Definitions

In order to ensure consistent terminology, DoD Components will use the definitions at attachment five to describe their recommendations.

Reporting Formats

Attachments six and seven describe general reporting formats for: (1) the anticipated DoD report to the 1995 Commission, and (2) Military Department and Defense Agency justification for their March 1, 1995, closure and realignment recommendations.

for

Joshua Gotbaum

Attachments

Department of Defense

Final Selection Criteria

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

COBRA Standard Cost Factor Table

The attached table is a listing of standard cost factors for use in COBRA analyses. These factors, defined below, are categorized as Joint Factors, Joint Methods and Unique Factors, further identified as applicable to gaining or losing bases. Those factors not identified as a gaining or losing factor should be applied consistently in all closure and realignment scenarios.

Joint Factors: Joint Factors are a reflection of standard DoD-wide rates which should be applied consistently in all DoD closure and realignment scenarios. The value for each joint factor is provided in the table.

Joint Methods: These are cost factors that are arrived at in a similar manner by all DoD Components, but the actual value may differ by Component.

Unique Factors: Unique Factors are the result of differing policies and methodologies between the Components.

Gaining: Factors applicable to a gaining (receiving) base in a closure or realignment scenario.

Losing: Factors applicable to a losing base in a closure or realignment scenario.

	STANDARD FACTOR	TYPE FACTOR	VALUE	LOSING/ GAINING BASE
1	Officers Married	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
2	Enlisted Married	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
3	Enlisted Housing Milcon	JOINT METHOD		GAINING
4	Officer Salary	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
5	Officer BAQ w/Dependents	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
6	Enlisted Salary	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
7	Enlisted BAQ w/Dependents	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
8	Average Unemployment Costs	JOINT FACTOR	$174	
9	Unemployment Eligible	JOINT FACTOR	18	
10	Civilian Salary	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
11	Civilian Turnover	JOINT FACTOR	15%	
12	Civilian Early Retirement	JOINT FACTOR	10%	
13	Civilians Reg Retirement	JOINT FACTOR	5%	
14	Civilian RIF Pay Factor	JOINT FACTOR	39%	
15	Civilian Retirement Pay Factor	JOINT FACTOR	9%	
16	Priority Placement	JOINT FACTOR	60%	
17	PPS Involving PCS	JOINT FACTOR	50%	
18	Civilian PCS Cost	JOINT FACTOR	$28,800	
19	New Hire Cost	UNIQUE		GAINING
20	National Median Home Price	JOINT FACTOR	$114.6k	
21	Home Sale Reimburse Rate	JOINT FACTOR	10%	
22	Max Home Sale Reimbursement	JOINT FACTOR	$22,385	
23	Home Purchase Reimburse Rate	JOINT FACTOR	5%	
24	Max Home Purc Reimburse Rate	JOINT FACTOR	11,191	
25	Civilian Homeowning Rate	JOINT FACTOR	64%	
26	HAP Home Value Rate	JOINT FACTOR	22.9%	
27	HAP Homeowner Rec Rate	JOINT FACTOR	5%	
28	RSE Home Value Reimbures	UNIQUE		LOSING
29	RSE Homeowner Rec Rate	UNIQUE		LOSING
30	RPMA Buildings Index	JOINT FACTOR	.93	
31	BOS Index (Population)	JOINT FACTOR	.54	
32	Program Management	JOINT FACTOR	10%	
33	Caretaker Admin Space	JOINT FACTOR	162SF	
34	Mothball Cost	JOINT FACTOR	$1.25/SF	
35	Avg Bach Qtrs Size	UNIQUE		GAINING

	STANDARD FACTOR	TYPE FACTOR	VALUE	LOSING/ GAINING BASE
36	Avg Fam Qtrs Size	UNIQUE		GAINING
37	REHAB vs NEW	UNIQUE		GAINING
38	Info Management Account	UNIQUE		GAINING
39	Design Percent	UNIQUE		GAINING
40	SIOH	UNIQUE		GAINING
41	Cntingency	UNIQUE		GAINING
42	Site Prep	UNIQUE		GAINING
43	Discount Rate	JOINT FACTOR	2.75%	
44	Inflation Rate	JOINT FACTOR	0%	
45	APPDET Report Rates	JOINT FACOTRS	2.9,3.0	
46	Material Per Assigned Person	JOINT FACTOR	710LBS	
47	Officer HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	14,500	
48	Enlisted HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	9,000	
49	Military HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	6,400	
50	Civilian HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	18,000	
51	HHG Packing Cost	JOINT FACTOR	35$/CWT	
52	Equipment Packing and Crating	JOINT FACTOR	284$/TON	
53	Military Lt Vehicle Cost	UNIQUE		LOSING
54	Heavy/Special Vehicle Cost	UNIQUE		LOSING
55	POV Reimbursement Cost	JOINT FACTOR	.18$/MILE	
56	Air Transport Cost	JOINT FACTOR	.20$/MILE	
57	Miscellaneous Expenses	JOINT FACTOR	$700	
58	Average Military Tour Length	UNIQUE		LOSING
59	Routine PCS Costs	UNIQUE		LOSING
60	One-time PCS Costs- Off	UNIQUE		LOSING
61	One-time PCS Costs- Enl	UNIQUE		LOSING
	CONSTRUCTION FACTORS:	UNIQUE		GAINING

	STATIC FACTOR	TYPE FACTOR	VALUE	
1	Civilians Not Willing to Move	JOINT FACTOR	6%	
2	Frieght Cost Per Ton-Mile	JOINT FACTOR	$.07	

Environmental Impact Considerations

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

RESULTING FROM CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

_____	_____
Installation Name	**Location**

(Provide a summary statement and status for the following environmental attributes at each installation affected by the closure/realignment action, including receiving installations. These key environmental attributes are not meant to be all inclusive. Others may be added as appropriate.)

- Threatened/Endangered Species
- Sensitive Habitats and Wetlands
- Cultural/Historic Resources
- Land and Air Space Use
- Pollution Control (Air Emissions, Compliance Issues)
- Hazardous Materials/Waste (Clean-up Implications/Asbestos, LBPs, PCBs, USTs, Radon)
- Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances

GUIDANCE FOR APPLYING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT CRITERION IN THE 1995 BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC 95) PROCESS

PURPOSE

The purpose of this attachment is to provide guidance for applying the economic impact criterion in decision making processes for the Department of Defense's 1995 recommendations to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The goal of this guidance is to apply the economic impact criterion in a reasonable, fair, consistent, and auditable manner that complies with statutory and regulatory requirements. This guidance supersedes the guidance issued on April 4, 1994, by the Chairman of the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact.

BACKGROUND

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act (PL 101-510, as amended) states that the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment of installations must be based on a force-structure plan and final selection criteria. "The economic impact on communities" is the sixth final selection criterion.

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact, which was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (January 7, 1994, memorandum on 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)), was tasked to provide guidance to DoD Components on how to calculate economic impact. The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact:

> "to establish the guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact; to analyze DoD Component recommendations under those guidelines; and to develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary."

APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT CRITERION

In developing recommendations for BRAC 95 closures and realignments, DoD Components shall consider the economic impact, to include the cumulative economic impact, on communities. The final selection criteria, however, state that priority consideration will be given to military value--the first four final selection criteria.

MEASURES OF BRAC 95 ECONOMIC IMPACT

DoD Components shall measure the economic impact on communities of BRAC 95 alternatives and recommendations using (1) the total potential job change in the economic area and (2) total potential job change as a percent of total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area. These measures highlight the potential economic impact on economic areas and also take into account the size of each economic area.

Definition of Economic Area

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall review and approve DoD Component assignments of each military installation to a particular economic area. For installations located in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), as defined by the Office of Management and Budget, the economic area is generally the MSA. For installations located in nonmetropolitan areas, the economic area is generally the county in which the installation is located. In some cases, the economic area is defined as a multi-county, non-MSA area. The criteria listed at Annex A to this attachment shall be used to guide the assignment of installations to economic areas. These definitions of economic area take into account the area where most of the installation's employees live and most of the labor-market impacts and economic adjustment will occur. (This guidance uses the term "economic area." In earlier BRAC rounds, this concept was also referred to as "region of influence.")

DoD Components will have the opportunity to identify, based on certified data, changes in the assignment of installations to economic areas. Such changes will be reviewed and approved by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact.

Calculation

For each economic area where a BRAC 95 closure or realignment is considered, DoD Components shall identify the total potential job change in the economic area and calculate the total potential job change percentage by dividing total potential job changes by total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area.

Total potential job change shall be defined as the sum of direct and indirect potential job changes for each BRAC 95 closure or realignment alternative or recommendation.

Direct job changes shall be defined as the sum of the net addition or loss of jobs for each of the following categories of personnel:

- Military Personnel. Permanent authorizations for officer and enlisted personnel. Trainees shall be included on an annual average basis. For example, members of the Guard and Reserve who serve full time (i.e., AGRs, TARs, etc.) should be included. Members of the Guard and Reserve who serve part time (during weekends, during two-weeks a year for active duty training, etc.) should not be included.

- DoD civilian employees. Permanent authorizations for appropriated fund DoD civilian employees are to be included as direct jobs. Direct jobs do not include non-appropriated fund activities, which are treated under indirect jobs.

- On-Base Contractors. Contractors that work on the installation in direct support of the installation's key military missions. These estimates should reflect an annual estimate on a full-time equivalency basis.

As described in the section entitled "Responsibilities" below, the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies will be responsible for providing direct job changes. Only job changes directly associated with base closures and realignments are to be included as direct job changes. Direct job changes shall not reflect job changes that result from planned force structure changes.

Indirect job changes shall be defined as the net addition or loss of jobs in each affected economic area that could potentially occur as a result of direct job changes. As described in the section entitled "Responsibilities" below, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations shall provide factors (multipliers) that, when multiplied by the direct job changes, will provide potential indirect job changes.

Authoritative sources shall be used to determine total--military and civilian--jobs in economic areas.

MEASURES OF CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT

During BRAC 95, DoD components shall consider the cumulative economic impact on communities for recommended installation closures and realignments as part of the economic impact on communities criterion. Cumulative economic impact shall be considered only as part of the economic impact criterion, which is one of the eight selection criteria.

Cumulative economic impact on a community shall be defined in two different ways:

- First, the cumulative economic impact on an economic area of a DoD Component's BRAC 95 recommendations, plus the future economic impacts (i.e., economic impacts that have not yet been realized) of decisions of all DoD Components from DoD-wide BRAC 88, BRAC 91, and BRAC 93 rounds (hereafter "prior BRAC rounds"); and

- Second, the cumulative economic impact on economic areas when more than one DoD component recommends a BRAC 95 closure or realignment in that economic area, plus the future economic impacts of decisions from prior BRAC rounds.

These calculations will account for circumstances in which basing decisions in one BRAC round have been changed in a subsequent BRAC round.

The cumulative economic impact of actions that have already taken place as a result of prior BRAC rounds (i.e., have already affected economic area employment) will be considered under "Historic Economic Data" discussed below.

Cumulative Economic Impact: Prior BRAC Rounds

DoD Components shall include in their consideration of recommendations the cumulative future economic impact of prior BRAC rounds.

When BRAC 95 alternatives occur in the same economic areas that have BRAC-related actions from the prior BRAC rounds, DoD Components shall review their recommendations by taking into account the cumulative future economic impact of prior BRAC rounds. The cumulative economic impact of actions that have already occurred from prior BRAC rounds (i.e., have already affected economic area employment) will be considered in the "Historic Economic Data" section below.

DoD Components shall consider the cumulative economic impacts of prior BRAC rounds that have not yet taken place by ensuring that the measures for economic impact (total potential job change in the economic area and total potential job change as a percent of total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area) include total potential job changes that have not yet taken place from prior BRAC rounds DoD-wide.

Cumulative economic impact will be considered within the overall context of the approved selection criteria. Such a review shall be conducted so that the cumulative economic impact of prior BRAC rounds will be considered only as part of the economic impact criterion, which shall in turn be considered as part of the eight selection criteria.

The fact that prior BRAC rounds affect an economic area shall not, by itself, cause a recommendation to be changed.

Cumulative Economic Impact: Multiple BRAC 95 Recommendations

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact will review the BRAC 95 recommendations submitted by the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies to the Secretary of Defense. During this review, the Joint Cross-Service Group shall identify economic areas with multiple proposed BRAC 95 actions.

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall direct the appropriate DoD Components to review their recommendations submitted to the Secretary of Defense when there are multiple BRAC 95 recommendations in the same economic area that were not considered in the development of their recommendations.

DoD Components will then reassess their BRAC 95 recommendations by taking into account the cumulative economic impact of these multiple BRAC 95 recommendations and by ensuring that the measures for economic impact for the economic area (the total potential job change in the economic area and the total potential job change as a percent of total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area) include the cumulative economic impact of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations, as well as the cumulative future economic impact of prior BRAC rounds.

Such a review shall be conducted so that the cumulative economic impact of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations will be considered as part of the economic impact criterion, which shall in turn be considered as part of the eight selection criteria. DoD Components will complete such reviews expeditiously in order to facilitate compliance with statutory deadlines for BRAC actions.

DoD Components may consider alternative closures and realignments, or mitigating actions, during this review. After the review is complete, DoD Components will report back to the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact, with a recommendation as to whether or not to change their initial recommendations.

The existence of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations in an economic area shall not, by itself, cause a recommendation to be changed.

HISTORIC ECONOMIC DATA

DoD Components shall consider the measures described above, viewed in the context of historic economic data, in applying the economic impact criterion. Historic data will, among other things, allow for consideration of the cumulative economic impacts that have already occurred (i.e., have already affected economic area employment) as a result of prior BRAC actions. Because communities' economies are so complex, it is difficult to separate the effects of prior BRAC actions from the effects of other economic factors. To address this analytical difficulty, DoD Components shall use historic data to consider the general conditions of communities' economies. Considering the general conditions of communities' economies will take into account the cumulative economic impacts that have already occurred due to prior BRAC actions, as well as the economic impact of other factors unrelated to BRAC actions.

Historic economic data shall be defined to include the following:

- Economic area civilian employment (1984 to 1993)
- Annualized change in economic area civilian employment, absolute and percent (1984 to 1993),
- Economic area per capita personal income (1984 to 1992)
- Annualized change in economic area per capita personal income, absolute and percent (1984 to 1992), and
- Economic area unemployment rates (1984 to 1993).

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations will provide historic data, from authoritative sources, to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies.

USING MEASURES AND HISTORIC ECONOMIC DATA

This guidance does not establish threshold values for measures and historic economic data. Rather, DoD components will use the measures and historic economic data for relative comparisons of the economic impacts and cumulative economic impacts of recommendations.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall analyze DoD Component recommendations and preliminary candidates to ensure that they are developed in accordance with this guidance, and shall monitor implementation of this and any additional guidance on economic impact that may be issued. The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall also carry out other analyses requested by the BRAC 95 Review Group or Steering Group.

The Joint Cross-Service Group will work closely with DoD Components to resolve issues. Issues that the Joint Cross-Service Group and DoD components cannot resolve will be referred to the BRAC 95 Steering Group.

Office of the DASD (Installations)

The office of the DASD (Installations) shall provide to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies a BRAC 95 Economic Impact Database tool that will contain the following:

- A listing of DoD installations
- The economic area to which each installation has been assigned
- Factors (multipliers) to estimate potential indirect job changes
- Historic economic data to include:
  - Economic area civilian employment (1984 to 1993)
  - Annualized change in economic area civilian employment, absolute and percent (1984 to 1993)
  - Economic area per capita personal income (1984 to 1992)
  - Annualized change in economic area per capita personal income, absolute and percent (1984 to 1992), and
  - Economic area unemployment rates (1984 to 1993)

- The capability to calculate the measures for economic impact and cumulative economic impact described in this guidance based on the information provided by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies

Military Departments and the Defense Agencies

The Military Departments and the Defense Agencies shall provide and enter into the DoD BRAC 95 Economic Impact Database:

- Current Base Personnel: As discussed above on page 3, this data will reflect projected billets and positions as of the start of FY 1996 for Officers, Enlisted, Military Students, Civilians, and Contractors, net of planned force structure changes.

- Job Changes (Out): the number of authorizations for DoD civilian, military (in training status), military (not in training status), and on-base contractor jobs to be relocated and/or disestablished under each alternative and recommendation, by installation, as a result of BRAC actions, both for DoD Component proposed BRAC 95 actions and for actions yet to be realized (i.e., future) from prior BRAC rounds, by fiscal year, from 1994 through 2001;

- Job Changes (In): the number of authorizations for civilian, military (in training status), military (not in training status) and on-base contractor jobs being gained under each alternative and recommendation, by installation, as a result of BRAC actions, both for all proposed BRAC 95 actions and for actions yet to be realized (i.e., future) from prior BRAC rounds, by fiscal year, from 1994 through 2001.

Because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate estimates, contractor job outs and ins may be aggregated into a single year.

DoD Components will provide the projected job changes from prior BRAC rounds and current personnel data to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations. In identifying projected job changes associated with prior BRAC actions, the DoD Components shall use plans that are consistent with the President's Fiscal Year 1995 Budget.

The Military Departments and the Defense Agencies shall collect information as necessary for the computer-based tool. Such data shall be collected and handled in accordance with the Internal Control Plan of the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact and the respective Internal Control Plans of each Military Department and the Defense Agencies.

Shortly after submitting recommendations and preliminary candidates to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies shall provide to the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact computer files from the Economic Impact Database for their BRAC 95 recommendations and preliminary candidates.

DETERMINATION OF ECONOMIC AREAS

In response to changes by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in metropolitan area definitions related to the 1990 Census, and a review of earlier BRAC economic area definitions, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact has established the following rules to guide the assignment of installations to economic areas for BRAC 95:

1. The economic area should include residences of the majority of the military and civilian employees at the activity.

2. An economic area is generally defined as a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or a non-MSA county(s) unless there is evidence to support some other definition.

3. In those cases where OMB's 1993 redefinition of an MSA added counties which increased the MSA population by 10 percent or more, then continue to use the old MSA definition unless certified residency data shows that the new MSA definition is more appropriate.

4. An economic area should only be expanded to include an additional county if the resulting percentage increase in the number of employee residences included in the expanded economic area is greater than the resulting percentage increase in the total employment of the expanded economic area.

5. Installations in the same county should be in the same economic area.

6. If the economic area was previously defined (in prior BRAC rounds) as a non-MSA county(s), it should continue to be that county, even if that county has now been incorporated into an MSA.

Base Realignment and Closure Definitions

Close

All missions of the base will cease or be relocated. All personnel (military, civilian and contractor) will either be eliminated or relocated. The entire base will be excessed and the property disposed. Note: A caretaker workforce is possible to bridge between closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal which are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

Close, Except

The vast majority of the missions will cease or be relocated. Over 95 percent of the military, civilian and contractor personnel will either be eliminated or relocated. All but a small portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained will often be facilities in an enclave for use by the reserve component. Generally, active component management of the base will cease. Outlying, unmanned ranges or training areas retained for reserve component use do not count against the "small portion retained". Again, closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

Realign

Some missions of the base will cease or be relocated, but others will remain. The active component will still be host of the remaining portion of the base. Only a portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed, with realignment (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal being separate actions under Public Law 101-510. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is being realigned if it will experience a net reduction of DoD civilian personnel. In such situations, it is possible that no property will be excessed.

Relocate

The term used to describe the movement of missions, units or activities from a closing or realigning base to another base. Units do not realign from a closing or a realigning base to another base, they relocate.

Receiving Base

A base which receives missions, units or activities relocating from a closing or realigning base. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is a receiving base if it will experience a net increase of DoD civilian personnel.

Mothball, Layaway

Terms used when retention of facilities and real estate at a closing or realigning base are necessary to meet the mobilization or contingency needs of Defense. Bases or portions of bases "mothballed" will not be excessed and disposed. It is possible they could be leased for interim economic uses.

Inactivate, Disestablish

Terms used to describe planned actions which directly affect missions, units or activities. Fighter wings are inactivated, bases are closed.

Department of Defense (DoD)
Base Closure and Realignment
Report to the Commission

DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report (DoD Vol. I)	OASD(ES)
Table of Contents	
Executive Summary	OASD(ES)
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Chapter 2. Force Structure Plan - Unclassified	Joint Staff
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Chapter 4. DoD Base Closure and Realignment Selection Process	OASD(ES)&JCSGs
Chapter 5. Recommendations	OASD(ES)
Chapter 6. Implementation	OASD(ES)
Appendices	OASD(ES)
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DoD Force Structure Plan (Classified) (DoD Vol. II)	Joint Staff
Department of the Army Analyses and Recommendations (DoD Vol. III)	Army
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Appendices (Unclassified or Classified, as required)	

NAME OF RECOMMENDATION
(e.g., Name of Activity/Facility/Installation, [State])

Recommendation: Describe what is to be closed and/or realigned; functions, activities, units, or organizations that will be eliminated or relocated; identify the receiving installations, if applicable; and describe functions, activities, units, or organizations that will remain on the installation, if applicable.

Justification: Explain the reasons for the recommendation: i.e., force structure reductions; mission transfer, consolidation, collocation, or elimination; excess capacity; cross-servicing; etc., as applicable.

Return on Investment: Include the total estimated one-time costs of implementing the recommendation, expected total one-time savings during the implementation period, expected annual recurring savings after implementation with return on investment years, and the net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period. Express costs and savings in FY 1996 constant dollars.

Impact: Describe the impact the recommendation could have on the local community's economy in terms of total potential job change (direct and indirect) in absolute terms and as a percentage of employment in the economic area. Describe the impact the recommendation could have on the environment.

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Fax Transmission

To:	Frank Cirillo	**From:**	Lt Col Bryan Echols
Company:	DBCRC	**Date:**	October 5, 1994
Fax #:	60550		

You should receive 4 page(s) including this one.
If you do not receive all pages, please call (703) 697-6560

Message:

Frank

Brig Gen McCarthy, the new AF/XOO, will be appointed to the alternate UPT JCSG principal, vice Maj Gen Tenoso, as soon as the SECAF signs the letter. Otherwise this should be a good list. Let me know if you have any questions.

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

JUL 1 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC SECURITY)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)
DIRECTOR, TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC REINVESTMENT & BRAC)

SUBJECT: New Air Force Representatives for 1995 BRAC Process

By memorandum dated January 7, 1994, I appointed Air Force representatives to the Review Group, Steering Group, and Six Joint Cross-Service Groups. This letter provides notification of new representatives to several of those groups.

The Air Force representative to the Steering Group is Mr. Rodney A. Coleman, SAF/MI, DSN 227-6300. Mr. James Boatright, the current appointee, will serve as alternate.

Maj Gen Everett H. Pratt, Jr., is appointed to serve as principal to the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group in the temporary absence of Maj Gen Profitt, the current appointee. Maj Gen Profitt is on extended duty that will require his absence for several months. General Pratt is the Commander, Nineteenth Air Force, at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, and can be reached at DSN 487-1919. General Profitt will return to the principal position on his return. Maj Gen Tenoso, AF/XOO, remains the alternate during this period.

Mr. Parker Horner, AF/TER, is appointed as the alternate representative to the T&E Joint Cross-Service Group, vice Mr. Carroll Jones. His phone number is DSN 227-1165.

Mr. Lee Schoenecker, AF/CEVP, is appointed as the alternate representative to the Economic Impact Joint Cross-Service Group, vice Mr. Dave Van Gasbeck. His phone number is DSN 225-8942.

Sheila E. Widnall

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC SECURITY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(LOGISTICS)
DIRECTOR, TEST & EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(HEALTH AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC REINVESTMENT & BRAC)

SUBJECT: Air Force Appointees for BRAC 95: Review Group; Steering Group; and Six Joint Cross-Service Groups - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Your January 4, 1994, memorandum requested the names of military department appointees to serve on eight different OSD BRAC 95 Joint Groups. The attached list of principals and alternates is provided to meet your request.

I might add that the Air Force totally supports this joint initiative and stands ready to ensure the BRAC 95 process is productive. We endorse reductions in DoD support infrastructure using a level-playing field approach, that will pass the scrutiny of the Commission, Congress and the affected communities. With this in mind, we totally support the goal of cross-service analyses of selected support infrastructure performed by the military departments with oversight by subject groups. If you need additional Air Force expertise, don't hesitate to ask.

Sheila E. Widnall

Sheila E. Widnall

Attachment:
Air Force appointees

AIR FORCE OSD/JOINT GROUP APPOINTEES to SUPPORT BRAC 95 PROCESS

Review Group
Principal: Dr Sheila Widnall (SecAF) * DSN 227-7376
Alternate: Gen Mike Carns (AF/CV) DSN 225-7911

* Until an Under Secretary is appointed/confirmed

Steering Group
Principal: Mr Jim Boatright, SES (SAF/MII) DSN 225-3592
Alternate: BG Charles R. Heflebower (AF/PE)

Joint Groups

Depot Maint
Principal: Mr Ronald L. Orr, SES (AF/LGM) DSN 227-2932
Alternate: Mr J.E. Delvecchio, SES (AF/LGX) DSN 227-8198

Laboratories
Principal: Mr Jim Mattice, SES (SAF/AQ) DSN 614-5301
Alternate: Mr Don Campbell, SES (SAF/AQT) DSN 225-9826

T&E
Principal: LTG (ret) Howard Leaf (AF/T&E) DSN 227-4774
Alternate: Mr Carroll Jones, SES (AF/T&E) DSN 225-5619

Hospitals
Principal: MG Robert A. Buethe, Jr (AF/SGH) DSN 297-4343
Alternate: BG Peter F. Hoffman (AFMOA/CC) DSN 297-1849

UPT
Principal: MG Glenn A. Profitt (AETC/XO) DSN 487-4527
Alternate: MG Ed Tenoso (AF/XOO) DSN 225-9067

Economic Impact
Principal: Mr Ken Reinertson (AF/CEV) DSN 225-8942
Alternate: Mr Dave Van Gasbeck (AF/CEV) DSN 227-3322

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

October 24, 1994

Honorable Tillie K. Fowler
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congresswoman Fowler:

Thank you for your letter of September 13, 1994, to President Clinton concerning potential closures and realignments resulting from the Department's 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC 95) process. Your letter expressed specific concerns regarding a news article's assertion that California installations are "off limits" in BRAC 95.

The Department of Defense is committed to a fair, open and impartial process that must, as required by law, consider all bases within like categories equally for closure. The Department will base its closure and realignment recommendations on analyses of the base structure using objective measures for the approved selection criteria, wherever possible. This framework also allows for the exercise of military judgment and for the consideration of economic impact. Therefore, military installations in California are not off limits in BRAC 95 and will be considered equally along with all other installations.

I hope you find this information useful and responsive to your concerns. I have provided a similar response to all cosigners of your letter.

Sincerely,

Joshua Gotbaum

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THE VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318

CM-264-94
16 May 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures Policy Memorandum One

1. As requested, I have reviewed the 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) Policy Memorandum One and concur subject to inclusion of three essential issues. The first would clearly designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as responsible for preserving the Nation's joint warfighting capability during the BRAC 95 process. The second would establish DoDef-led reviews to investigate additional cross-Service consolidation opportunities, external to the five existing functionally oriented joint cross-Service groups. The third would require the Services to implement the recommendations of the joint cross-Service groups.

2. Suggested language addressing the first two issues in Policy Memorandum One are:

a. Preserving Joint Warfare Capability

(1) An essential goal of the BRAC process is to improve readiness by eliminating unnecessary infrastructure. There are many aspects to readiness. One of the most critical aspects is the ability to generate and employ joint warfighting capability. This element is central to US National Military Strategy and operational planning. The Force Structure Plan by itself does not address the many aspects of military capability. Service force capabilities, geographic position, mobility, training, and command and control are only some of the essential elements integrated by senior military judgment to formulate readiness and joint warfighting capability.

(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his representatives will ensure that joint warfighting capability is sustained during BRAC 95. The Chairman

may require periodic review of Service proposals by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and is encouraged to provide input or endorse the operational need for a warfighting capability based on military judgment at any time during the BRAC 95 process. This will be especially true in the final review phase, when the CJCS endorsement should specifically address the impact of BRAC 95 on our ability to conduct joint warfare operations.

b. Secretary of Defense Cross-Service Functional Reviews. The Department of Defense needs to aggressively seek cross-Service opportunities to share assets and look for opportunities to rely on a single Military Department for support. Functions will normally be external to the joint cross-Service group review. As a minimum, the following capabilities and/or capacities will be investigated: training, intelligence, facility management, supply depots and centers, Reserve centers, chaplains, and legal support. The Secretary of Defense will conduct these functional reviews and provide consolidation and base closure or realignment recommendations at the same time Service nominations are due to the Secretary of Defense, 1 January 1995.

3. I strongly support the joint-cross Service group process. Therefore, I recommend the Services be required to incorporate the joint-cross Service groups' proposals into their final closure and realignment nominations.

Very respectfully

W. A. OWENS
Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:
* OASD(ES)BCU Coordination Record, 18 March 1994, "1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum One"

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

9 NOV 1994

Mr. David S. Lyles
Staff Director, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Lyles:

I have enclosed for the Commission's use copies of the Department's correspondence which forwarded the final selection criteria to be used in BRAC 95 to the Armed Services and Appropriations committees. The criteria remain unchanged from those used in 1991 and 1993.

The enclosed correspondence also contains papers on improvements instituted for the BRAC 95 process as well as papers on economic impact and non-DoD costs. I hope you find these useful.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 NOV 1994

Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I want to take this opportunity to describe the steps we are taking to improve the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) analytical process and to officially respond to Congressional reporting requirements regarding that process.

We have made significant improvements to the analytical process used during past BRAC rounds, which are described in the enclosure. As BRAC 95 is the last round authorized under law, it represents the Department's last chance to balance its force and base structures. We want to get it right.

We are placing a strong emphasis on cross-service use of common support assets and have established five joint cross-service analytical groups in areas with significant interservice potential. We have increased oversight of the analytical process in a number of ways and are sharing responsibility with the Military Departments and Defense Agencies more than in past rounds. We have also taken a new look at how best to factor economic impact considerations into the selection process, including cumulative economic impact considerations. A more detailed description of how the Department will consider economic impact is attached to the enclosure.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 directed DoD to consider whether the costs of base realignment and closure actions to other Federal departments and agencies (non-DoD costs) should be included in the final selection criteria for the 1995 BRAC process. After conducting a thorough review of the issue, which is detailed in another attachment to the enclosure, the Department does not propose such a criteria change.

First, it would be impossible to obtain accurate estimates for non-DoD costs within the framework of the BRAC process. Second, the Department has no basis for forecasting non-DoD costs associated with base reuse activities, because reuse decisions are generally made after the BRAC process is completed. Finally, even where BRAC actions could result in cost increases to other Federal departments and agencies, DoD found that these costs would amount to a small fraction of BRAC savings -- less than 2 percent -- even under worst-case assumptions, and therefore would not be likely to alter BRAC decisions.

In view of the above, the Department will again use, unchanged, the base closure selection criteria originally accepted by the Congress in 1991, and used by the Department in both the 1991 and 1993 rounds. These criteria, which are attached to the enclosure, provide a solid foundation for base closure and realignment decision making and will allow consistency with past rounds.

BRAC 95 will undoubtedly be difficult and I look forward to your continued support for our efforts to reduce the DoD infrastructure and free-up resources for critical readiness and modernization requirements.

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

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Strom Thurmond
Ranking Republican

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 NOV 1994

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Floyd Spence
Ranking Republican

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 NOV 1994

Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

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

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
Ranking Republican

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 NOV 1994

Honorable David R. Obey
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Joseph M. McDade
Ranking Republican

Department of Defense

Improvements

to the

1995

Base Realignment and Closure Analytical Process

(BRAC 95)

The DoD faces significant challenges in closing and realigning installations to reduce its base infrastructure to projected needs, and to capture the associated savings for other defense priorities. In the previous BRAC rounds, the vast majority of DoD's recommendations were accepted by the Base Closure Commission and approved by the President and the Congress. Because of the unique problems still facing the Department in rationalizing its base structure, it has instituted significant improvements to the process for selecting bases for closure or realignment under the Base Closure Act, P.L. 101-510. As the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is the last one authorized by the Base Closure Act, this is the Department's last chance to balance its force and base structures.

On January 7, 1994, then Deputy Secretary Perry formally began the Department's BRAC 95 process by issuing significant new policy and procedural guidance. These improvements provide for:

- **Strong emphasis on cross-service utilization of common support assets.** BRAC 95 will be seen as an unprecedented effort to eliminate duplication and reduce overall support costs through Service interdependence. To facilitate cross-servicing, the Deputy Secretary established Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) in five functional areas with significant cross-service potential. These areas are Depot Maintenance, Test and Evaluation, Laboratories, Medical Treatment Facilities and Undergraduate Pilot Training. These JCSGs will address the base structure drawdown from an overall DoD workload perspective.

  Past BRAC actions have been almost exclusively Military Department initiatives, with little cross-service analysis. Base closure and realignment recommendations were focused primarily on bases directly impacted by force structure changes, with very little analysis on the support structure which supports these forces.

Enclosure

Over time, many duplicative support capabilities have been developed among the Services. These support capabilities provide the Department with capacity that is no longer justified by the workload. In BRAC 95, DoD will address these support areas of the base structure, consolidating where possible and contracting where practical. In that regard, we hope to incorporate emerging industrial base considerations into the BRAC deliberations.

- **Shared responsibility among the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.** Interdependence and multi-service use will also be examined for operational bases, mirroring the increased emphasis on joint operations. While the DoD Components will conduct their BRAC 95 analysis based on an approved force structure plan, the final selection criteria and certified data, as required by law, sharing responsibility for the analysis among the Services and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will help identify cross-servicing opportunities. Within this overall framework, each Military Department is allowed some freedom to formulate a process that allows it to exercise its military judgement and reflect its inherent mission diversity. At the same time the Services will look for cross-service or intra-service opportunities to share assets and they will look for opportunities to rely on a single Military Department for support.

- **Increased oversight of the entire process.** In past BRAC rounds, involvement of OSD was generally limited to a final review of Service recommendations just prior to submission of the Defense Secretary's recommendations. For BRAC 95 the Deputy Secretary of Defense established two oversight groups having significant management responsibilities. The BRAC 95 Review Group, which has been chaired by the Deputy Secretary, will review BRAC policies and procedures, excess capacity analyses, and can propose closure or realignment alternatives and establish excess capacity reduction targets for consideration by the DoD Components. Also, this group will review BRAC 95 work products of the DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups, and may make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, including cross-service tradeoff recommendations. The BRAC 95 Steering Group assists the BRAC 95 Review Group in exercising its authorities and reviews DoD Component supplementary BRAC 95 guidance. The Steering Group is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security.

Inspector General (DoDIG) involvement has also been enhanced. The DoDIG is assisting the DoD Components in developing, implementing and evaluating internal control plans. Additionally, the DoDIG has provided staff resources to assist the five joint cross-service groups primarily with documentation of their work for audit purposes. The audit functions of the Military Departments, the DoD Inspector General, and the Defense Agencies will coordinate their efforts in a way to avoid audit duplication of effort.

The Department is also supporting the General Accounting Office's (GAO) early, substantial, and on-going work of independent review and analysis of DoD's base closure selection process. As a result, the GAO continues to be provided with as much information as possible without compromising DoD's internal deliberative process.

- **New look at economic impact.** In BRAC 93, for the first time, the cumulative economic impact of closure recommendations was a consideration. In order to formalize and improve the economic analysis process, an additional joint cross-service group has been established in this area, since economic impact is one of the final selection criteria and is, after military value, an important consideration. The Economic Impact Joint Cross-Service Group will establish guidelines for the DoD Components to measure the economic impact of base closure and realignment alternatives, including cumulative economic impact from past BRAC actions on the relevant regions of influence. The group will also analyze DoD Component recommendations under these guidelines and develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary. Attachment (1) describes in more detail how the Department will analyze economic impact during BRAC 95.

- **Hard look at potential criteria on "non-DoD costs".** After conducting a thorough review, the Department does not propose a criterion regarding the costs of base closures and realignments to other Federal agencies and departments. The attached report (attachment (2)) describes three key reasons why DoD does not propose such a criterion. First, it would be impossible to obtain accurate estimates for non-DoD costs within the framework of the BRAC process. Second, the Department has no basis for forecasting non-DoD costs associated with base reuse activities because reuse decisions are generally made after the BRAC process is completed. Third, even where BRAC actions could result in cost increases to other Federal departments and agencies, DoD found that these costs would amount to a small fraction of BRAC savings--less than 2 percent--even under worst-case assumptions, and therefore would not be likely to affect BRAC decisions.

- **Use of consistent base closure selection criteria.** The selection criteria used previously in BRAC 91 and BRAC 93 have served us well. They've established a demonstrated track record of success for developing consistent, fair, and reasonable closure and realignment recommendations. In addition, our hard looks at how to incorporate economic impact into BRAC 95 analyses and whether to consider costs outside of DoD have led the Department to conclude that no changes to the existing criteria are needed. Hence, the Department will use these criteria again, unchanged, for BRAC 95. As they provide the foundation for our BRAC recommendations, using the same selection criteria for BRAC 95 as have been used previously provides consistency with previous rounds and maintains both the practice and perception of fairness for impacted communities. The BRAC 95 selection criteria are at attachment (3).

- **Additional time built into DoD's internal BRAC 95 process.** DoD began the BRAC 95 analytical process sooner than past rounds and, therefore, has more time for the special attention needed to make complex decisions based on sound analysis. Also, the 1995 Base Closure Commission will have an additional month to complete their work.

Understandably, the base closure and realignment process is complex and requires tough decisions. The improvements outlined above will significantly enhance an already sound process and address the unique base reduction challenges facing the Department in 1995.

Attachments:

(1) Economic Impact Analysis for BRAC 95
(2) The Relationship Between Base Closures/Realignments and Non-DoD Federal Costs
(3) BRAC 95 Final Selection Criteria

Economic Impact Analysis for BRAC 95

This brief paper provides an overview of how the Department of Defense (DoD) will analyze economic impact, including cumulative economic impact, for the 1995 round of base realignments and closures (BRAC 95).

ECONOMIC IMPACT AND OTHER SELECTION CRITERIA

DoD is now developing recommendations for BRAC 95. The BRAC 95 process is being carried out in accordance with Public Law 101-510, as amended by Public Laws 102-190 and 103-160. The BRAC 95 process applies only to military bases in the United States; U.S. bases located overseas are being closed outside of the BRAC process. BRAC 95 follows BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, and 1993. No further BRAC rounds are authorized under current legislation.

Under the law, the Department must develop its recommendations based on consistent application of final selection criteria and a force structure plan, which projects the size of the military in the coming years. DoD will use eight final selection criteria to identify bases for closure and realignment. The first four criteria pertain to military value and are accorded priority consideration. "The economic impact on communities" is the sixth criterion.

Cumulative economic impact will be considered as part of the economic impact criterion, which in turn will be considered together with the other seven criteria. In response to concerns raised by the Defense Base Closure Commission and the General Accounting Office during BRAC 93, DoD will consider economic impact and cumulative economic impact as relative measures when comparing alternatives. No threshold values will be established above which, for example, bases in a particular economic area would have to be removed from consideration.

ECONOMIC IMPACT AND CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT

To apply the economic impact criterion, DoD seeks to answer the following three key questions:

- What is the economic impact of the recommendation?
- What is the economic impact of the recommendation in light of previous BRAC actions in the same economic area?
- What is the economic impact of the recommendation in light of other BRAC 95 recommendations in the same economic area?

In the terminology of the BRAC process, the first question is aimed at assessing "economic impact." The last two questions refer to "cumulative economic impact." Economic impact, cumulative economic impact, and the identification of "economic areas" are discussed below.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

DoD will measure the economic impact by analyzing (1) the total potential job change in the economic area and (2) total potential job change as a percent of total employment in the economic area. These measures highlight the potential impact on economic areas and also take into account the size of each economic area. Total potential job change means the sum of direct and indirect job changes estimated to result from each BRAC 95 action.

Direct job changes are the sum of the estimated net addition or loss of jobs for military personnel, DoD civilian employees, and on-base contractors that work in support of the installation's military missions. Only job changes directly associated with base closures and realignments will be included as direct job changes. Indirect job changes are the estimated net addition or loss of jobs in each affected economic area that could potentially occur as a result of the estimated direct job changes.

Indirect job changes reflect the impact that a BRAC action could have on the surrounding community. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Reinvestment and Base Realignment and Closure will provide factors (multipliers) that, when multiplied by the direct job changes, will provide estimates for indirect job changes. Multipliers will vary by the principal activity performed at each installation and the size of its economic area. Because the goal of estimating indirect job changes is to examine a "worst-case" potential outcome, multiplier values will be selected to represent the high end of a reasonable range of potential indirect impacts.

DoD will rely on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor to estimate employment in economic areas.

CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies will take into account the cumulative economic impact of prior BRAC rounds as they develop recommendations for BRAC 95. They will do so through analyzing two different timeframes: (1) 1994 through 2001 and (2) from before the BRAC process began through 1993.

With respect to impacts from 1994 through 2001, DoD Components will sum the total potential job change arising from BRAC 95 actions and the job changes from prior BRAC rounds that are estimated to occur in the same economic area from 1994 to 2001. Together, job changes from all rounds will be considered in absolute terms and as a percent of employment in the affected economic area.

With respect to impacts through 1993, DoD Components will examine historic economic information (1984 through 1993) for economic areas. This information will include the level and rate of growth of employment, the level and rate of growth of personal income per capita, and unemployment rates. This information will put the impacts from 1994 through 2001 in context, describe recent economic conditions in each economic area, and capture the economic effects, through 1993, of prior-round BRAC actions and other factors that have affected those economies.

CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM MULTIPLE BRAC 95 ACTIONS

After the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies submit their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in January 1995, DoD will identify economic areas with multiple proposed BRAC 95 recommendations. The Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact will reassess these recommendations by taking into account the cumulative economic impact of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations. DoD will ensure that the measures for economic impact (the total potential job change in the economic area, absolute and as a percent of total economic area employment) include the cumulative economic impact of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations, as well as the cumulative economic impact of prior BRAC rounds.

ECONOMIC AREAS

As in prior BRAC rounds, installations will be assigned to economic areas based on estimated expenditure patterns and labor markets. The goal is to have the economic areas reflect the locations where those affected by BRAC actions live and work. Installations located in non-metropolitan areas will be placed in a single county economic area based on the location of the headquarters of the base. Installations located in metropolitan areas will be placed in the economic area of the metropolitan area. Installations will be assigned to multi-county economic areas where that is more appropriate based on estimates of labor market areas or expenditure patterns. By defining economic areas in relatively small geographic units, this approach tends to overstate, rather than understate, the economic impact on communities.

INDEPENDENT REVIEW

At the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an independent review of the Department's plans for BRAC 95 economic analysis was conducted in May 1994. Six experts from government, academia, and the private sector participated in the review. The reviewers agreed that the proposed measures of economic impact (total potential job change in absolute terms and as a percent of economic area employment) are reasonable. They also supported DoD's approach to defining economic areas (based on estimates of local labor markets and expenditure patterns). In addition, reviewers stated that DoD's estimates of economic impact were "worst case," and that the Department should stress this in its presentations to the Congress, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and the public.

CONCLUSION

The Department of Defense seeks to ensure that analyses of economic impact during BRAC 95 will be conducted in a reasonable, fair, and consistent manner that complies with statutory and regulatory requirements. DoD believes that the process described in this paper will meet this challenge and contribute to a successful and effective BRAC 95 process.

Department of Defense

Final Selection Criteria

1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

Attachment 3

Document Separator

The Relationship Between Base Closures/Realignments and Non-DoD Federal Costs

September 1994

Executive Summary

This summary and the attached report respond to Congressional direction that the Department of Defense (DoD) consider whether the costs of base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions to other Federal departments and agencies should be included in the final selection criteria for the 1995 BRAC process.

Section 2925 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 states that:

- It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense consider, in developing in accordance with section 2903(b)(2)(B) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) amended criteria, whether such criteria should include the direct costs of such closures and realignments to other Federal departments and agencies.

- The Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on any amended criteria developed by the Secretary under Section 2903(b)(2)(B) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such a report shall include a discussion of the amended criteria and include a justification for any decision not to propose a criterion regarding the direct costs of base closures and realignments to other Federal agencies and departments.

- The Secretary shall submit the report upon publication of the amended criteria in accordance with section 2903(b)(2)(B) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

In response to Section 2925 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the DoD conducted a thorough review of its policies regarding the treatment of the costs of BRAC actions to other agencies. The review was conducted by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact (Joint Group, hereafter), which was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense as part of the BRAC process for 1995. The Joint Group, which is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Reinvestment and Base Realignment and Closure, includes representatives from the Military Departments and several organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Group conducted its review of non-DoD BRAC costs from the ground up.

Based on the Joint Group's review, the Department's position on the treatment of the costs of BRAC actions to other Federal department and agencies is as follows:

- The Department does not propose a criterion regarding the direct costs of base closures and realignments to other Federal agencies and departments.

- When calculating the costs and savings of BRAC recommendations, however, DoD will include costs to other Federal agencies when they are measurable, identifiable costs that DoD would incur as a direct result of BRAC-related actions

- When calculating the costs and savings of BRAC recommendations, DoD will not consider the costs of BRAC actions on other Federal departments and agencies when such costs (1) would not be borne by DoD, (2) would result only indirectly from BRAC actions, or (3) result from base reuse activities, which cannot be known during BRAC decision-making processes.

There are three key reasons why DoD does not propose a new criterion and will not consider some types of non-DoD costs:

- First, the Joint Group found that it would be impossible to obtain accurate estimates for costs to other Federal programs within the framework of the BRAC process. In general, reasonably accurate estimates can be obtained only at prohibitive cost and within a time frame that is far too long for the time-sensitive process of developing base closure and realignment recommendations. Less reliable estimates could be obtained more quickly and at lower cost, but typically would apply national averages or "best-guess" assumptions to local conditions. The key problem with such estimates is that their margin of error is so large that they probably would be misleading indicators of local economic conditions, and therefore would be inappropriate as a basis for BRAC-95 decision-making.

- Second, the Department has no basis for forecasting other Federal costs associated with base reuse activities. When the Department is developing BRAC recommendations, DoD cannot know how bases might ultimately be reused. Base reuse decisions generally are made long after the BRAC process is completed.

- Third, the Joint Group found that even where BRAC actions could result in cost increases to other Federal departments and agencies, these costs would amount to a small fraction of BRAC savings (less than 2 percent), even under worst-case assumptions. The increased costs to other departments and agencies would not be large enough to influence individual base closure decisions or to significantly change calculations of BRAC costs and savings.

The remainder of this summary elaborates on these three points. The attached report provides the analytical foundation for the Department's position.

Forecasting Costs to Other Agencies

The Joint Group considered how the Department might forecast the cost of BRAC actions to other Federal agencies, on a recommendation-by-recommendation basis, during the BRAC-95 process. The Joint Group found that relying on such forecasts would be ill-advised.

The Joint Group found that a trade-off exists between estimating costs to other Federal departments and agencies accurately and the cost and time of obtaining the estimates. In general, reasonable estimates can be obtained only at high cost, such as through surveys of DoD personnel and highly-detailed, sophisticated forecasts of local economic conditions, and even then would be subject to a large degree of uncertainty. Because the BRAC process must treat each installation equally, it would be unfair to rely on such estimates for some base closure recommendations, but not for others. Estimates would therefore have to be obtained for each economic area that contains one of the 400-plus installations in the United States. This would be a daunting, prohibitively expensive, and time consuming undertaking.

Less reliable estimates could be obtained at lower cost. However, such estimates typically would apply national averages or "best-guess" assumptions to local conditions. The key problem with these estimates is that while they can be produced at lower cost, their margin of error is so large that they probably would be misleading indicators of local conditions, and therefore inappropriate as a basis for BRAC decision-making.

Pages A-2 through A-5 and Annex 1 to Appendix A of the attached report provide a thorough discussion of these issues.

Potential Job Change as a Percent of Employment is an Acceptable Proxy

Although costs to other Federal departments and agencies can be difficult if not impossible to estimate directly, the Joint Group found that the economic impact measures used in the BRAC process can serve as a generally reliable indicator of such costs. (See "Cost of Federal Programs and the Base Realignment and Closure Review Process" on page 11 of the accompanying report.)

Specifically, the Joint Group found that potential job change as a percent of employment in the surrounding economic area, which has been a primary measure of economic impact used in the BRAC decision-making process, is an acceptable indicator of changes in costs to other Federal departments and agencies. The Joint Group determined that relative differences in the potential job change as a percent of economic area employment should, in general, reflect relative differences in the probable costs to other Federal departments and agencies. That is, a recommended base closure where the total potential job change as a percent of economic area employment is higher is likely to have a larger effect on the costs to other Federal departments and agencies than a closure alternative where this percentage is lower. When considering the economic impact on communities, therefore, the Department implicitly considers some costs, albeit unquantified, to other Federal, state and local government agencies.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that regardless of whether costs to other Federal departments and agencies are relatively high or low, it is

impractical to analyze the absolute size of these costs. Further, as discussed below, these costs would constitute a small fraction of BRAC savings, even under worst case assumptions, and therefore would have little influence on the ultimate closure recommendations.

DoD is Unable to Consider Other Agency Costs Associated with Base Reuse

Other Federal departments and agencies are provided the opportunity to receive real and personal property at closing military bases as a routine part of the property disposal process. When they do request a former base property, other Federal departments and agencies would be expected to incur costs for operating, maintaining, or modifying the property. In addition, some base reuse activities could require new efforts by other Federal departments and agencies. For example, a new regional airport opened at a closed Air Force base could increase the workload of the Federal Aviation Administration. On the other hand, surplus military property is often transferred at little or no cost to other Federal agencies, thus providing a capital subsidy that could offset higher operating costs.

DoD is unable to consider these types of costs or savings in its calculations of BRAC costs and savings because it cannot know how bases might ultimately be reused when it is developing BRAC recommendations. The process for determining how base property is to be reused takes place long after the BRAC decision-making process has been completed. When the Department is developing BRAC recommendations, it does not have any way of knowing or forecasting how bases would be reused if they were to be closed. Therefore, the Department is not able to predict whether particular agencies might eventually take over particular installations, and, if they do, what the associated costs would be. Similarly, the Department cannot predict the new costs that reuse activities might impose on other Federal agencies. In any case, if other governmental activities choose to reuse surplus military installations to modernize or expand their programs, these costs do not appear to be relevant to DoD closure or realignment deliberations.

Costs to Other Federal Departments and Agencies are Small Compared to BRAC Savings

Despite the barriers to estimating costs to other Federal agencies on a recommendation-by-recommendation basis, the Joint Group nevertheless analyzed how large these costs are likely to be. The Joint Group found that the costs of BRAC actions to other Federal Departments and agencies are small compared with BRAC savings.

This finding is based on a statistical analysis of six counties that had bases closed prior to December 1993 as a result of BRAC-88 and BRAC-91. The six counties were selected from a larger set of all BRAC-88 and BRAC-91 closures on the basis of their geographic diversity, labor force size, metropolitan or non-metropolitan character, and the magnitude of DoD employment reductions relative to the size of the total civilian employment base. A description of the selection process and the counties can be found on pages 3 through 6 of the attached report.

The statistical analysis focused on how changes in employment and unemployment in counties with base closures affect Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). These three programs were selected because they account for more than one-half of all outlays for cash and non-cash benefits to low-income individuals, and they are the most expensive non-DoD programs that could be influenced by BRAC actions.

The statistical analysis is described on pages 7 and 8 and in Appendix B of the report. A key conclusion of the analysis is that, on average, each time the level of county civilian employment is reduced by 1,000, the number of Food Stamp and AFDC cases increases by 46.

Three key points help put this finding into context:

- First, as explained on pages 8 through 11, "job losses" associated with base closures do not necessarily mean reductions in the level of county civilian employment. Indeed, civilian employment actually increased in five of the six counties, despite local base closures.

- Second, the results of the statistical analysis demonstrate that other economic factors, particularly in larger communities and at the state level, are more important than employment changes in explaining rising need-based Federal program costs. (See page 11 and Appendix B.)

- Third, the employment-linked incremental cost of need-based programs is small compared with savings associated with base closures. The statistical analysis suggests that under worst-case assumptions – i.e., that all BRAC-93 job losses would result in civilian employee reductions on a one-for-one basis (an assumption that clearly runs counter to the finding that civilian employment actually increased in five of the six counties studied) – the increased annual cost of these expensive programs would represent less than 2 percent of recurring BRAC-93 annual savings. (See page 12)

General Accounting Office Position

To facilitate its review, the Joint Group requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) clarify its position on the inclusion of government-wide costs

in BRAC analysis. A letter from GAO clarifying their position follows the attached report as Appendix C.

CONCLUSION

The Department takes seriously Congressional concern about the costs that the base closure process could impose on other Federal departments and agencies. The approach that we will take in BRAC-95 will consider many BRAC-related costs to other Federal agencies. There are, however, costs that could, in theory, arise from BRAC actions that the Department cannot estimate with an acceptable level of accuracy. Fortunately, we are confident that the costs we cannot estimate directly are only a small percentage of BRAC savings and that most of these are considered implicitly in BRAC measures of the economic impact on communities.

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Military Base Closures and Their Relationships to Non-DoD Federal Program Costs

Overview

The objectives of this analysis are (1) to examine the relationship(s) between base closure and realignment actions and any potential cost impacts on non-DoD Federal programs, and (2) to determine the feasibility of estimating the impacts if such relationships do exist. To fulfill these objectives we

- identified selected Federal government "need-based" benefits programs potentially affected by base closures,
- identified explanatory factors that could relate changes associated with base closures with potential cost impacts on other Federal programs,
- compared the reliability and cost of alternative methodologies for estimating those cost impacts, and
- demonstrated the statistical relationship between an explanatory factor and the cost of selected Federal programs at the national level and in communities experiencing recent base closures.

Identification of Non-DoD Federal Benefits Programs that Could be Impacted by Base Closures

Fifty-one Federal organizations administer 1,308 assistance programs. Of particular interest in this analysis are programs that account for the majority of Federal payments in the form of cash and noncash benefits to persons with limited income.[1]

One anticipated effect of base closures is the reduction, at least in the short run, of the earnings of some former base employees. Those individuals could become recipients of one or more need-based government assistance programs if their incomes decline to a level where they become eligible for assistance.

[1] For a discussion of certain Federal programs potentially impacted by base closure, see Appendix A. Appendix A also describes various approaches for estimating the relationship between Federal program costs and base closure – and the costs of using each approach.

At the national level, statistics regarding Federal fund outlays for need-based assistance programs (other than social security and other pension payments) are aggregated by the Bureau of the Census at the county level.[2] Three programs account for more than one-half of all outlays for cash and noncash benefits to low-income individuals: Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Changes in the demand for these three programs at the county level form the basis for our case study analysis of impacted communities.

Identification of an Explanatory Factor Accounting for Increased Federal Benefits Program Costs

A relationship can be hypothesized from an inspection of the budgets of need-based programs and employment conditions. In periods of employment growth, outlays for those programs stabilize. When unemployment is rising, the cost of need-based programs climbs rapidly. This relationship is expected, because low income is a primary criterion for need-based program eligibility. A substantial number of all persons receiving transfer payments (and all receiving unemployment compensation) are unemployed. As these people find jobs, expenditures for programs such as Food Stamps can be expected to decrease.

Based on these preliminary observations, employment and unemployment status can be expected to be a statistically measurable factor in explaining changes in the demand for need-based programs. Because monthly labor force data at the county level are maintained across the Nation, employment data are available in all communities with military facilities.

Alternative Approaches for Validating the Relationship Between Employment and the Demand for Federal Benefits Programs

Three quantitative approaches were considered to test the relationship between employment levels and the costs of selected need-based Federal programs at the national and local levels. The first possibility would involve population surveys in communities experiencing base closures to estimate the share of program recipients that became eligible as a result of base closures. The second approach would involve data about the number of recipients of need-based programs from counties across the Nation and examine how the number of recipients varied with changes in the national economy. The third would focus on a small number of counties experiencing recent base closures.

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[2] *Consolidated Federal Funds Report*, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Taking into account the availability of data and cost factors, we selected a combination of national-level analysis (i.e., the second approach) and analysis in communities experiencing recent base closures (i.e., the third approach) as the most reliable, cost-effective, and timely methodology for assessing the relationship between employment levels and the costs of selected need-based Federal programs. (A more detailed discussion of the alternative approaches reviewed can be found in Appendix A.)

Statistical Results of National Demand Analysis

A statistical analysis of Federal government payments to individuals (other than retirement and disability payments) for the 1988 to 1992 period (for all counties in the United States) shows a very strong, statistically significant relationship between outlays for Federal need-based benefits programs and changes in employment. (See Appendix B for a technical description of the methodology, approach, and results of the analysis.) As one would expect, when employment is reduced Federal outlays for transfer payments rise.

Employment variation alone, however, does not explain all the variance in outlays for Federal assistance programs. This is true because numerous programs to assist individuals are not directly linked to changes in employment. These include programs for housing assistance, student loans and grants, school lunch programs, and Medicaid funds. Many of these programs require recipients to be at the poverty level, and a change in employment status, which for most workers will be temporary, does not imply that all impacted individuals will fall to the poverty level.

Result of Case Studies of Base Closure Communities

Communities Selected for Review

The national demand analysis, which included all counties, shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between a decline in employment and higher outlays for Federal payments to individuals. The objective of the case studies is to determine if this relationship, or a stronger one, can be found in counties experiencing recent base closures.

A group of six counties in five states experiencing base closures mandated by base realignment and closure (BRAC) decisions in 1988 and 1991 and completed by December 1993 were selected from a larger set of all BRAC-88 and BRAC-91 closures on the basis of their geographic diversity, labor force size, metropolitan or nonmetropolitan status, and the magnitude of DoD employment reductions relative to the size of the total civilian employment base. Characteristics of the selected county sites are shown in Tables 1A and 1B. The

analysis excludes BRAC-93 closures because no BRAC-93 installations were completely closed at the time this report was prepared.

Table 1A.
Characteristics of Selected Base Closure Communities

Installation	County	State	Year of BRAC[a] announcement	County civilian DoD employment (October 1988)
Fort Ord/Presidio	Monterey	CA	1991	154,000
Sacramento Army Depot	Sacramento	CA	1991	475,600
Chanute AFB	Champaign	IL	1988	88,429
Wurtsmith AFB	Iosco	MI	1991	10,300
Pease AFB	Rockingham	NH	1988	122,800
Ira Eaker AFB	Mississippi	AR	1991	19,375

[a]BRAC = Base Realignment and Closure.

Table 1B.
Characteristics of Selected Base Closure Communities

Installation	Military personnel change (1989 – 1993)	Civilian DoD-personnel change (1989 – 1993)	DoD personnel changes as a percentage of county civilian employment (1988)	Percentage change in county civilian employment (1988 – 1993)[a]
Fort Ord/Presidio	(12,965)	(991)	(9.1)%	0.8%
Sacramento Army Depot	(232)	(2,188)	(0.5)	11.1
Chanute AFB	(4,304)	(897)	(5.9)	3.9
Wurtsmith AFB	(3,207)	(451)	(36.2)	(11.2)
Pease AFB	(3,400)	(177)	(2.9)	5.4
Ira Eaker AFB	(2,965)	(330)	(17)	20.4
Average			(9.4)%	5.1%
Total	(27,073)	(5,034)		

[a]The change in civilian employment from 1988 to November 1993 in all U.S. counties was 4.9 percent.

Quarterly or monthly data in the selected communities were collected for three major need-based programs — Medicaid, Food Stamps, and AFDC. Data about employment and unemployment for corresponding time periods were also collected. Consistent program and labor force data were tabulated for the time period of October 1988 to December 1993.

Employment Changes in Selected Communities

As shown in Table 1A, BRAC-91 affected four of the six countries. In the other two counties, facilities were closed in response to BRAC-88. Civilian employment levels prior to base closure in the selected counties ranged from 10,300 (Iosco County, Mich.) to 475,000 (Sacramento County, Calif.). DoD civilian and military personnel reductions as a percentage of county civilian employment varied from 0.5 percent in Sacramento County, to 36.2 percent in Iosco County.

Direct DoD job loses in the six counties totaled more than 30,000. Between 1988 and 1993, five of the six impacted counties gained civilian jobs despite the closure action. The exception to this pattern was Iosco County, which showed a decline in civilian jobs. This finding suggests that economic factors other than the base closure action had a more dominant influence on the economy of the region in which the installation was located.

Changes in Demand for Selected Benefit Programs at the Local and State Levels

Changes in the number of Medicaid, Food Stamps, and AFDC cases (i.e., recipients or beneficiaries) between October 1988 and December 1993 in the six communities are shown in Table 2A. In each of the six areas, changes in local cases were compared to the state average as a means for taking into account some of the variation in demand for these programs attributable to regional economic conditions. As shown in Table 2A, the rate of increase in the number of AFDC cases during the 1988 to 1993 period was *greater* at the state level than in counties experiencing base closures. The only exception to this pattern was Champaign County. The rise in demand for food stamps at the state level also exceeded the rise in the base closure-impacted counties in three of the five counties where comparable data were examined, indicating that other economic factors had a larger negative impact on the state as a whole than the closure of the base had on the county in which it is located.

Table 2A.
Percentage Change in the Number of AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid Cases (1988 - 1993)

County/State	AFDC (percentage)	Food Stamps (percentage)	Medicaid (percentage)
Iosco County	2.8	20.8	NA
Michigan	7.6[a]	16.5	NA
Missisippi County	(4.7)	NA	20.4
Arkansas	10.7[a]	NA	47.7[a]
Monterey County	51.1	43.1	NA
California	51.2[a]	100.4[a]	NA
Sacramento County	43.1	81.5	NA
California	51.2[a]	100.4[a]	NA
Champaign County	23.1	31.6	54.6
Illinois	7.3	13.6	30.4
Rockingham	218.7	133.9	NA
New Hampshire	266.6[a]	156.9[a]	NA

Notes: At the county level, data was tabulated by local personnel. State data was obtained from various state documents. NA = not applicable

[a] Change at the state level exceeds county rate of change.

As noted earlier, between 1988 and 1993, civilian employment increased in five of the six counties impacted by base closures. In three of those five counties that indicate a *rise* in civilian jobs, the growth rates *exceed* the state averages.

From 1988 to 1993, local unemployment rates increased at a pace that exceeded state-level increases in only three of the six counties. (See Table 2B.) In two counties, state-level increases in unemployment exceeded those for base closure counties. In Arkansas, unemployment rates fell in the county and state.

The five-year trend data suggest no definitive relationship between base closures and changes in the number of transfer program cases (i.e., Federal benefits program beneficiaries). To statistically examine whether a relationship exists in the selected counties experiencing recent base closures, we must apply statistical techniques that examine employment and assistance changes on a monthly or quarterly basis. We discuss the results of that analysis in the next section.

Table 2B.
Percentage Change in Unemployment Rates
(1988 - 1993)

County/State	Unemployment rate (percent)		Percentage change 1988 – 1993
	1988[b]	1993[b]	
Iosco County	8.4	11.1	32.1
Michigan	7.6	8.8	15.8
Mississippi County	13.4	11	(17.9)
Arkansas	7.7	6.2	(19.5)
Monterey County	8.4	12.3	46.2[a]
California	5.3	9.2	73.6
Sacramento County	5.4	8.3	53.7[a]
California	5.3	9.2	73.6
Champaign County	4.2	5.4	28.6
Illinois	6.8	7.4	8.8
Rockingham	2.7	6.4	137
New Hampshire	2.4	5.3	120.8
United States	5.5	6.8	23.6

[a] Change at the state level exceeds county rate of change.
[b] Average annual rate.

Results of the Statistical Analysis of the Monthly/Quarterly Data Exploring the Relationship Between Employment Changes and the Demand for Selected Federal Programs

Statistical analyses of five counties experiencing base closures shows that each time civilian employment levels in a county are reduced by 1,000, the number of food stamp and AFDC cases increases by 46 (i.e., 4.6 percent). (A detailed statistical analysis of this result is shown in Appendix B.) This relationship is an average, and considers observations for the combined cases in five counties (Mississippi County was excluded because of incomplete data.). The addition of the Medicaid program has little impact on the number of total cases because factors not related to employment are the dominant cause for rising Medicaid demand.

As one would expect, changes in unemployment have the opposite effect. Reducing unemployment by 1,000 leads to a decrease of 53 AFDC and food stamp program cases, a somewhat higher number than the reduction in employment.[3]

[3] Appendix B shows the derivation of this relationship.

Employment changes, however, explain only part of the change in demand for the Federal program funds. Between 1988 and 1993, one observes an underlying rise in demand for those funds that is independent of employment changes. This is particularly evident in the Medicaid program. That is, even in the absence of changes in employment (or unemployment), the number of cases seeking Federal assistance rises.

In small, relatively isolated, semi-rural areas such as Iosco County, changes in demand for Federal need-based programs appear to be linked primarily to changes in employment. However, in larger urban areas, and particularly at the state level, factors independent of employment are the dominant cause of changes in demand for those Federal programs. At this level, the role of employment cannot be isolated from other causes.

These results imply that in small communities with limited employment opportunities and low job mobility, employment reductions attributable to base closure or other causes can lead to measurable, but numerically small, increases in participation in the Medicaid, Food Stamps, and AFDC programs. In larger more populated communities, however, the impact of changes in employment are less important than other regional economic factors.

Base Closures and Employment Changes

Although there is a strong relationship between changes in employment and the demand for need-based Federal programs, base closures should not be expected to result in reductions in the level of civilian employment equal to the loss of all jobs at the installation. Detailed employment data from the six case study sites demonstrate that the impact in those counties has been less severe than base job loss estimates would indicate.

As noted previously, in five of the six case-study counties, civilian employment actually *rose* between 1988 and 1993, and in several areas, more rapidly than at the state level. Although the number of DoD personnel declined in each of the five counties as a result of base closures, in most instances other job growth more than offset these base-related losses.

The impact of DoD base closures on employment and unemployment can be expected to differ by the size of the community and the share of total county employment attributable to former base employment. However, even in areas where DoD civilian employees comprised a substantial percentage of all local employees prior to base closure, the results differ by location. For example, the closure of Ira Eaker AFB in Mississippi County, Ark., resulted in a loss of 3,265 military and civilian DoD jobs between 1988 and 1993. However, during the same time period, the number of civilian jobs expanded by 3,650, or by nearly 20 percent. Iosco County, Mich., the site of Wurtsmith AFB, lost 3,658 military and civilian DoD jobs. This county had a reduction of 1,150 civilian employees during this same time period, a considerably lower number than the loss of DoD jobs.

Several factors discussed in subsequent sections of this report explain why reductions in local employment levels are typically *less severe* than the job losses directly associated with base closures.

MILITARY DOD PERSONNEL PROFILE

Base closure causes many military personnel and their dependents to relocate to other military installations, usually in new counties (different from the base closure sites). This relocation has two immediate effects on the local labor force. First, both the labor force and employment levels decline by the same number as the reduction in military personnel at the site.[4] Second, most spouses of military personnel employed in the local economy leave, causing a further decline in the labor force.

The potential for higher civilian unemployment attributable to the loss of military personnel in a local economy is offset, to a large extent, by a parallel reduction in the size of the local labor force. Typically, about 60 percent of all military personnel are married and 60 percent of spouses hold full-time or part-time jobs, mostly in the services and retail trades.[5] Thus, for every military person leaving a community, 0.36 other people can be expected also to leave the local labor force. Studies have shown that spent earnings of military employee generates about 0.35 jobs in the civilian economy.[6] Thus, civilian job losses attributable to the loss of military personnel and the associated economic impact may be offset, to a large extent, by fewer workers in the local labor force.

Assuming that military spouses in the civilian labor force have the same unemployment rates as other civilians, the departure of military personnel has little impact on the *rate* of civilian employment and unemployment. In the short run, both local employment levels and the local labor force are reduced and the local economy shrinks, but employment *rates* are essentially unaffected.

In theory, one would expect to observe a reduction in civilian employment following base closure as a result of reduced purchases in the local economy by former base employees and by the base itself. This would happen if the local economy was totally dependent on the military installation. In reality, even in communities with a large DoD presence, some segments of the local economy are only marginally affected by base closures. For example, many communities with military installations have a substantial number of retired military households as area residents. Pension payments to those households continue regardless of base closure. Similarly, manufacturing industries are usually not dependent on local base purchases. As non-DoD economic activity expands, initial reductions

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[4] The decline is the same for the labor force and employment levels because none of the military personnel are unemployed. The labor force is defined as the number of persons employed and unemployed.

[5] Spouse employment levels in rural areas are usually below 60 percent due to limited job opportunities.

[6] The job multiplier varies by the size of the local economy. In rural areas, the multiplier may be lower, and in large metropolitan areas higher, than 0.35.

in base-related civilian employment are offset by gains in other sectors. However, retail and personal service businesses near the closed installation may be adversely affected by the loss of military personnel.

Civilian DoD Personnel Profile

Unlike military personnel, many DoD civilians losing on-base jobs tend to remain in the community, at least in the short run. Nonetheless, one should not expect a one-to-one decrease in civilian employment levels, an increase in unemployment rates, or increases in the demand for need-based Federal programs as a result of DoD civilian job losses for several reasons:

- *Early retirement.* Some percentage of civilian DoD personnel may have the opportunity to opt for early retirement. As such, their incomes can be expected to remain above the poverty rate, even in the absence of other earnings. For example, 348 civilians at Fort Ord opted for early retirement between 1990 and 1993, representing about one-third of civilian jobs lost at the base due to its closure.[7]

- *Other income.* About one-half or more of all married personnel will have spouses employed in the community. In most cases, this employment may not be directly affected by base closures. Others may have additional sources of income, including savings, that would preclude their eligibility for transfer payments.

- *Relocation.* Some DoD employees can be expected to leave their localities because their function has been reassigned to another installation. These employees may be given the option to be assigned to the new location. Other DoD employees may relocate because they found Federal civil service positions elsewhere in the Nation. Finally, DoD employees could move to accept positions in the private sector in another location. Relocation is most likely for more senior, higher-grade persons with extensive skills or specialized experience in occupations for which there is a high demand. Another former DoD-employed group likely to relocate are young persons without children in local public schools or other deep ties to the community.

- *Other employment opportunities within the impacted community.* Depending upon local economic conditions, the size of the local economy, and the success of base reuse programs, former base workers are often likely to find new jobs in the community.

Net Employment Impact of Base Closures

The net employment and unemployment resulting from base closures cannot be predicted with any precision for individual sites. The range of impact, as the case studies illustrate, can vary from negligible to moderate depending on

[7] Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

numerous other economic factors outside DoD's control. However, even in the worst case scenario, the added demand for need-based programs can be expected to be modest on the basis of experience in the six communities studied.

The statistical analysis described in Appendix B shows that the percentage change in the number of Federal program recipients in a community is less than the percentage change in the level of civilian employment. For example, if civilian employment is reduced by 5 percent in a community, the maximum potential impact on the cost of the three Federal programs examined for that community would be expected to be less than 5 percent. Other supporting data, such as the historical rate of growth of employment and income in a community can provide additional information on the extent to which employment effects associated with base closure will differ among communities.

Cost of Federal Programs and the Base Realignment and Closure Review Process

An economic impact measure used by DoD in prior BRAC rounds is employment change resulting from closure as a percentage of total community employment. Applying this measure, holding other economic factors constant, communities where BRAC closure would affect a large percentage of total area employment are considered to be more impacted than communities where BRAC changes would account for only a small percentage of area jobs. That is, BRAC closures where the potential job change as a percent of economic area employment is high are likely to have a larger effect on local civilian employment levels than where the potential job percentage change is low.

Differences in the potential job change as a percent of economic area employment should, in general, reflect differences in probable costs of need-based Federal programs. The statistical analyses in Appendix B suggest that these changes in civilian employment levels are correlated with changes in costs to need-based programs. Therefore, when considering the economic impact on communities, DoD implicitly considers some costs, albeit unquantified, to other Federal programs.

CONCLUSIONS

Our statistical analyses indicate that changes in employment *partially* explain changes in the costs of certain Federal programs. This relationship was established at both the national and county levels. However, the results of statistical analyses also demonstrate that other economic factors, particularly in larger communities and at the state level, are more important than employment changes in explaining rising need-based Federal program costs. For example, fund outlays for Medicaid, by far the costliest Federal need-based program, have been rising across the Nation as a result of accelerating per capita costs of medical care.

Our analyses, as evidenced in Appendix B, show that if local employment levels declines by 1,000, the number of AFDC and food stamp program cases rise by 46. The annual cost of these two programs per household is estimated at about $7,200. This means that the added cost of these programs for each person no longer employed at a base would be about $331, or less than 2 percent of earnings for the typical civilian base employee. When a county gains employment as an increase of a BRAC action, a rise of 1,000 jobs would reduce the demand for AFDC and food stamps by 46 households.

A worst-case estimate of the magnitude of the increased costs for Food Stamps, AFDC, and Medicaid, three programs that account for the majority of all need-based Federal outlays, is provided at Figure 1. The results in Figure 1 are "worst case" because they assume that each direct DoD civilian and military job

Figure 1.
Estimated "Worst Case" Cost of Other Federal Programs Compared to BRAC Savings

Estimated cost of major need-based programs per household	*$12,000*
No. of job losses for each need-based program addition (1,000 ÷ 46)	*21.7*
Program cost associated with each job loss (12,000 ÷ 21.7)	*$ 553*
Number of direct military and civilian jobs lost as a result of BRAC-93	*66,427*
"Worst Case" cost of BRAC-93 – related job losses (66,427 X $553)	*$36.7M*
Total BRAC-93 annual savings (after implementation)	*$2,144M*
"Worst Case" cost as a percentage of annual savings ($36.7M/$2,144M)	*1.71%*

***Notes**: Programs include AFDC, Food Assistance (including Food Stamps) and Medicaid. The Federal share of the three programs in FY 93 is estimated at $125 billion. It is assumed that a household is eligible for all three programs. The number of households receiving assistance is estimated from agency data.*

lost resulted in a decline in employment levels on a one-for-one basis. The analysis of the six counties examined in this study suggest, however, that this assumption greatly overestimates decline in local civilian employment levels. The analysis indicated that civilian employment levels actually rose in five of the six counties examined, despite the base closure. Even under the worst-case assumption that job losses due to base closures reduce county employment levels on a one-for-one basis, however, the costs to other Federal agencies for these programs would total less than 2 percent of base closure-related savings.

APPENDIX A

Impact of Base Closures and Realignments on Costs to Non-DoD Federal Agencies

OVERVIEW

This Appendix discusses the limitations of three alternative quantitative approaches we considered to examine the impact of base closures and realignments on non-DoD government benefits programs. The methodologies are compared for selected major benefits programs on the basis of accuracy and implementation cost in Annex 1 of this Appendix.

Alone, none of the approaches considered could be expected to provide reliable, cost-effective estimates of the linkage between base closure and the cost of need-based programs. Thus, the results support the decision to apply statistical techniques described in Appendix B to estimate the likely relationship among base closures, changes in employment, and the demand for need-based Federal programs.

BACKGROUND AND APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT LEVELS AND FEDERAL PROGRAM COSTS

Base realignments and closures may reduce economic activity in some communities and increase such activity in others. Base closures will, at least temporarily, cause a dislocation of some DoD civilian personnel previously employed at installations. Other off-base civilians and on-base contractors may lose their jobs. In general, military personnel will be reassigned to facilities at other locations.

The first part of this Appendix discusses general program evaluation issues. It also contains a rationale for the methodology that is applied for assessing the relationship between employment levels and the costs of selected need-based Federal programs. The second part, Annex A, focuses on BRAC-related changes in demand for specific government programs, data requirements to estimate impacts, and methodologies that could be used to project the effects of BRAC actions on specific programs. The Annex should be viewed as supporting material for conclusions drawn in the initial sections of this Appendix.

Approaches and Data Requirements for Estimating the Base Realignment and Closure Impact on Non-DoD Government Benefits Programs

In theory, three approaches could be used for estimating the impact of BRAC actions on non-DoD government benefits program costs. The three methodologies rely on historical data to relate changes in the well-being of households with changes in the use of government services. The sections below specify the general data required to estimate impacts and they describe the three methodologies.

General Data Required to Estimate the Impact of Base Closures on Non-DoD Government Activities

The data needed to develop estimates of potential base closure impacts summarize the personnel and economic factors that describe military bases. Some of these data are readily available while others are much more difficult to determine. The data required is

- the number of military personnel expected to remain in an area following base closure (such as early retirees),
- the number of civilian DoD workers likely to transfer from impacted areas to take other Federal jobs or otherwise leave the area,
- the number of civilian DoD workers remaining in an area who are likely to find employment without substantially diminished earnings,
- the number of civilian DoD workers likely to elect early retirement, and
- military and DoD civilian earnings prior to base closure.

Using Population Surveys

Using a survey technique would require that we interview people directly affected by base closures. The individuals, selected using statistical sampling procedures, would be asked a series of questions regarding their participation in specified government programs. The impact of base closures on their household earnings, new jobs (if any), and related data would be among the items included in the survey. This information would be tabulated and be the basis for determining factors that would be applied to communities potentially experiencing base closures. For example, if surveys found that in nonmetropolitan counties, "A" percent of all civilians found employment within one year following closure

with earnings that are "B" percent below their base earnings and "C" percent at earnings similar to their base earnings, that "D" percent were unemployed, and that the balance moved from the area – those factors would be applied to civilians in nonmetropolitan communities being considered for closing. This approach can provide information on the reliability of the data within specified confidence limits.

Using National Data

Studies have shown that a substantial percentage of the unemployed population are recipients from programs such as Food Stamps and Medicaid.[1] This relationship exists because unemployed individuals typically have low incomes, qualifying these persons and their households for "transfer payments." Here, the approach is to examine data collected by Federal agencies about outlays from transfer programs and to relate these changes to changes in employment levels. A cross-sectional, time-series analysis of such data at the local or state level provides information on this relationship for the Nation as a whole. These relationships could then be applied to potentially affected populations to estimate expected impacts.

Examining Changes in Communities with earlier (BRAC-88 or BRAC-91) Base Closures

The third methodology also examines the relationship between changes in population characteristics and changes in the utilization rates for government programs. However, rather than depending on national studies, these relationships and factors are established on the basis of data collected from areas with completed BRAC-88 and BRAC-91 base closures. These relationships are likely to be more representative of communities with potential base closures than those developed from national data. Given sufficient data, statistical tests could be applied to determine the relationship between, for example, the rate of job creation and the rate of change in the number of individuals or households receiving assistance from specific programs, such as Food Stamps.

LIMITATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Survey Techniques

Among the limitations of the survey approach is the high cost of surveys, particularly if such surveys involve personal interviews. Hundreds of such interviews would have to be completed to obtain a sufficient sample that would provide reliability at the 95 percent confidence level. The second limitation is the uncertainty associated with locating households in areas experiencing BRAC

[1] See for example, "Unemployment Among Welfare Recipients," U.S. Department of Labor, *Monthly Labor Review*, March, 1979.

actions one or more years after a base is closed. On the basis of DoD's experience with identifying the location of military households for the purposes of analyzing housing requirements, it would be extremely difficult to determine where military personnel or Federal civilians live.

The survey approach is also limited because only a small number of previous BRAC closures have been completed. Therefore, survey results would be limited to a few areas that may not be representative of all areas with base closures.

Application of National Data Base Service Demand Studies

We have no assurance that studies based on national or regional data will be applicable to BRAC-related communities. Although a relationship between transfer payments and employment levels exists, our analysis shows that there is a wide variance between locations due to the divergence in economies and other characteristics among jurisdictions. Therefore, quantitative, nationally developed measures of change may not necessarily be representative of communities with military installations that could be closed, and therefore could produce misleading results. For this reason, this approach by itself would not be useful.

Examining Changes in Communities with earlier (BRAC-88 or BRAC-91) Base Closures

This approach would examine changes in employment, unemployment, and the number of need-based program recipients prior to and following base closure. Assuming that data could be collected, the approach would provide valuable historical data. One concern is that the time required to collect and analyze the data would be considerable. An additional constraint, as in the survey approach, is that the sample number of bases fully closed is very small. Finally, given differences among BRAC communities, it would be difficult to project changes in service demand in particular communities with reasonable reliability. Nonetheless, this is the most promising approach because communities experiencing BRAC would form the basis for the relationship between employment reductions and the rise in the demand for need-based programs.

BRAC-Related Changes in the Demand for Benefits Programs and the Relationship to Uncertainty in the Community Adjustment Process

Collectively, there is little doubt that BRAC actions will increase the demand for some government programs since declines in the economy, in part, drive this

demand. However, from a decision standpoint, the issue remains: to what extent is the impact on these programs affected by a decision to close base "A" as opposed to closing base "B"? To tabulate the difference, one would have to project the economic impact and subsequent recovery of a similar action, involving roughly similar numbers of military or civilian personnel, on specific programs, and then identify the difference in the demand for program funds.

A cursory examination of BRAC-88 and BRAC-91 closures completed by December 1993 suggests that no distinct patterns in recovery periods exist. In the majority of cases, communities (at the county level) adjusted quickly, with losses in DoD employment offset by gains elsewhere in the local economy. In other areas, DoD losses have not been offset. Given these differences, one would have to systematically identify key factors that lead to differences in the rate of economic recovery. Unfortunately, these factors include not only quantifiable variables such as measures of the regional economy, but also such factors as community leadership and the ability to attract new activities. An equally important concern is that factors relevant to BRAC-88 and BRAC-91 may not necessarily be good predictors of economic and social conditions in the late 1990s, when BRAC-95 actions will actually be implemented. Economic recovery rates in specific communities during the 1990s would, at best, be extremely difficult to predict.

Proposed Methodology

As shown in Annex 1 to this Appendix, examining non-DoD costs on a base closure-by-base closure basis is impractical because the quality of the data would be inadequate and the cost would be excessive. All the methodologies described have limitations. The most promising and cost-effective methodology is to examine, applying statistical techniques, changes in employment and in the demand for selected Federal programs at the national level and in communities with recent base closures. Although this proposed approach would not provide direct information about the use of Federal programs by former base employees in communities where those workers formed a substantial percentage of total employment, a relationship is implicit.

The proposed methodology has the advantage of making use of DoD's existing methodology and system for estimating employment impacts. Although it does not overcome the problem of a small sample size or of projecting a possible impact several years into the future, it can provide a reasonable scale of the maximum potential effects associated with base closures.

ANNEX 1 TO APPENDIX A

Specific Government Programs

This Annex briefly describes categories of government programs; highlights general issues concerning the precision, accuracy, and cost of different approaches to estimate the effects of BRAC actions on non-DoD benefits programs; and illustrates how these general issues are relevant for estimating the costs of a few specific programs. The purpose of this Annex is to provide detailed examples that will highlight issues raised in the discussion of the proposed methodology described in Appendix A.

Categories of Government Benefits Programs

Entitlement benefits programs commit the Federal (and where applicable state) government to funding specified services for all persons meeting the eligibility criteria. This means, for example, that if the Federal government agrees to pay for certain medical services under the Medicaid program, an increase in total demand due to base closures would result in a higher aggregate cost for the program. Therefore, at least in theory, specific base closures could result in higher or lower entitlement program costs.

Spending for discretionary programs such as the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA), is usually set at a specific funding level. Although BRAC-related decisions could affect the distribution of discretionary program funds, it is very unlikely that BRAC actions would have an impact on total spending. In theory, Congress could, in response to a sharp rise or fall in demand, change funding levels. In reality, this is improbable given that alternative BRAC actions would be expected to have only a marginal impact on total demand for most discretionary programs. Therefore, only entitlement programs could reasonably be expected to have a measurable effect on total outlays, subject to the limitations discussed later in this report.

Several Federal programs, particularly entitlement programs, are joint Federal-state activities, including Medicaid and unemployment compensation. Therefore, a change in demand for such programs has an impact on both Federal and state funding.

Although they are not addressed directly in this Annex, state and local government finances can be affected by BRAC-related actions. School districts can also be directly affected by base closures because "school impact" assistance would eventually be withdrawn when DoD-dependent students leave the school system. Local and state governments also face reduced revenue from most tax sources if earnings of residents are reduced. To the extent that households leave

an area following base closure, the demand and outlays for some services also declines.

Precision, Accuracy, and Cost of Approaches that Could be used to Estimate the Impact on Non-DoD Benefits Programs

As noted earlier in this Appendix, the reliability of cost estimates using various methodologies can vary. For the purposes of this Annex, each methodology will be assigned one of the following three scaled confidence levels for each identified program:

- *High confidence* means that program costs can be estimated with accuracy.
- *Medium confidence* means that program costs can be estimated with some uncertainty.
- *Low confidence* means that program costs can only be estimated with substantial uncertainty.

Frequently, in order to obtain increased confidence in cost estimates, more expense is required. The cost of estimating program impacts will also be given one of the following three cost measures for each identified program:

- *Low cost* means that the cost of analysis is within reasonable limits of the current BRAC process.
- *Medium cost* means that the cost of analysis exceeds that expected for the current BRAC process.
- *High cost* means that the cost of analysis is well outside that expected for the current BRAC process.

Selected Benefits Programs

This section briefly describes selected major Federal programs that might be affected by base closures.

In some instances, two potential base closures could have a different impact on the use of certain government programs. For example, a base closure in an area with few private sector employment opportunities would be more likely to reduce the income of some households to below the poverty level, and therefore make them eligible for Federal benefits programs, compared to an area where the economy is expanding.

MEDICAID

Program Description

Medicaid is a medical assistance program jointly funded by states and the Federal government. Medicaid covers health care expenses for all recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). At the option of the state, other low income individuals also qualify. The cost of Medicaid in FY92 was $59.9 billion.[1]

Likely Impact of Base Closure

Under certain conditions, the demand for Medicaid could rise from claims made by two groups:

- former DoD civilian workers who remain in the state following base closure and who cannot find work for an extended time period (if their household income falls below a threshold level, they could be eligible for Medicaid); and

- non-DoD worker households that have sharply reduced earnings (these households include workers who lost higher paying jobs as an indirect result of base closure).

Unit of Measure and Approach

The appropriate unit of measure is a household.[2]

The approach would be to first determine the number of households that are expected to be *potentially* eligible. The second step would be to determine, on the basis of such factors as the local unemployment rate, the likelihood that the workers could not find another job paying above the minimum wage. The third step would be to estimate the number of workers who lost their jobs and would leave the area. These estimates, in turn, would be the basis for a crude projection of the level of added demand for Medicaid.

Demand can be expressed as

(number of households with members who lost jobs) x (percent of households expected to have income fall to the program eligibility level) x (percent eligible who will use the program) x (cost per household to the Federal government)

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[1] Because Medicaid is a joint Federal-state program, higher demand for Medicaid results in increased state expenditures.

[2] A household consists of a single individual or a family.

Potential Methodologies that can be used to Derive Estimates

- surveys of recipients in areas with closed DoD installations (methodology 1);
- change in demand for Medicaid following base closures, holding other factors (such as local economy) constant based on review of relevant data from communities with base closures completed (methodology 2); and
- national or regional data showing the relationship between the change in earnings or unemployment and the change in the number of Medicaid applicants (methodology 3).

Necessary Assumptions to Make

Assumptions involve

- the percentage of households expected to have income fall below the eligibility level, and
- the percentage of eligibles who will use the program.

Accuracy of Results

Depending on the methodology selected, the anticipated accuracy varies from low to medium:

- using methodology 1 – medium confidence,
- using methodology 2 – medium confidence, and
- using methodology 3 – low confidence.

Cost of Analysis

The cost of implementing the analysis ranges from low to high:

- using methodology 1 – high cost,
- using methodology 2 – medium cost, and
- using methodology 3 – low cost.

Food Stamps and Other Food and Nutrition Assistance

Program Description

The Food Stamp program, run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, provides food coupons through state and local welfare agencies. The aim of this and related programs is to increase the purchasing power of needy persons. The Federal government considers food stamps to be an unemployment-sensitive program. That is, one can predict the demand for food stamps by projecting unemployment rates. The food and nutrition programs received $27.1 billion in Federal funds in FY92.

Unit of Measure and Approach

Because need-based benefits programs are typically based on household income, the best unit of measure is the number of households.

Projecting the added cost to this program caused by base closure would require estimating the change in unemployment resulting from base closure. This, in turn, would be dependent on the condition of the local economy and its ability to absorb workers who lost their jobs as a result of base closure. The increased cost of the program would depend on factors such as household size.

Demand can be expressed as

(number of households with members who lost jobs) x (percent of household expected to have income fall to the food stamp eligibility level) x (percentage of eligible households that will use the program) x (cost per household to the Federal government)

Potential Methodologies to Derive Estimates

- surveys of food stamp recipients in areas with closed installations (methodology 1);
- change in demand for food stamps in communities following base closures, holding other factors (such as local economy) constant (methodology 2); and
- national or regional data showing the relationships between the change in earnings (or unemployment) and the change in food stamp program application; this assumes that the relationship between unemployment and food stamp demand at the national level holds at the local level (methodology 3).

Accuracy of Results

The expected accuracy of the results ranges from low to medium:

- using methodology 1 – medium confidence,
- using methodology 2 – medium confidence, and
- using methodology 3 – low confidence.

Cost of Analysis

Depending on the methodology selected, the anticipated implementation cost can be low, moderate, or high:

- using methodology 1 – high cost,
- using methodology 2 – medium cost, and
- using methodology 3 – low cost.

OTHER NEED-BASED PROGRAMS

In addition to Medicaid and Food Assistance programs (including Food Stamps), there are two other large Federal need-based programs: AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and SSI (Supplemental Security Income). The demand for AFDC is related to both economic and behavioral variables. One cannot fully explain the growth of the AFDC program simply by analyzing economic conditions. Although it would be extremely difficult to link the demand for AFDC to base closures, this program has been included (with Medicaid and Food Stamps) as one that could be linked to employment (see Appendix B). The SSI program, however, was excluded from this group because virtually all persons qualifying for this program are either blind, disabled, or elderly. Therefore, no association could be established between employment levels and the SSI program.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicare, SSI, and Food Stamps account for the majority of all Federal outlays for cash and non-cash benefits aimed at persons with limited income. Other categories of assistance include medical aid for needy veterans, housing programs, education aid (such as the Head Start program and college loans) and job training for disadvantaged persons. None of these programs can be linked directly (or, in most instances, indirectly) to BRAC actions.

Participation rates in many need-based programs vary because of differences in state standards, regulations, enforcement, and other factors. Unless a base closure results in a permanent change in the characteristics of the non-DoD

population either as a result of migration or permanent income losses, a direct linkage to changes in demand for these programs would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.

These comments are not intended to suggest that base closures, particularly in areas where a military installation comprises a significant share of the local economy, will not have long-term effects. In some communities, there may be social and economic repercussions that could affect numerous Federal (and state) programs. But to quantify those effects and to quantify the *net* impact of those effects on Federal outlays would be a monumental task that would yield highly uncertain estimates.

SUMMARY

The preceding pages considered the precision, accuracy, and cost of the BRAC-related actions for a few specific Federal programs. These specific programs were included in this Annex because they form the basis of the statistical analyses presented in this report. Although the results are not reported in detail here, we considered other Federal, state, and local programs under a similar framework. We found that, in general, estimating the costs for those programs entails the same trade-offs among precision, accuracy, and cost of estimation as those demonstrated in the specific Federal programs analyzed above.

APPENDIX B

Demand for Federal Transfer Payments — an Econometric Analysis

INTRODUCTION

This Appendix presents the econometric underpinnings to quantitatively explain changes in Federal non-pension transfer payments at the county level. Of particular interest is the effect of employment changes on transfer payments, although other variables are introduced as necessary to ensure sound model specifications. These econometric analyses produced statistically significant transfer payment-employment (or transfer payment-unemployment) relationships using the econometric technique of pooled cross-section, time-series analysis. This Appendix addresses the main transfer payment-employment results.

Two different data bases were used for establishing these transfer payment-employment relationships. The first data base was Federal annual (1988 through 1992) transfer payment data for Food Stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), other programs, and Medicaid (but excluding pensions) for 3,000 counties from the *Consolidated Federal Funds Report*, Bureau of the Census. The Census transfer payment data are expressed in current dollars, which were adjusted for inflation to derive real transfer payments. The second data base was unpublished monthly (or quarterly) data, from the 1988 through 1993 period, from five counties — Champaign, Ill.; Iosco, Mich.; Monterey, Calif.; Sacramento, Calif.; and Rockingham, N.H. These unpublished transfer payment data reflect Food Stamp and AFDC payments, and they are expressed in terms of the number of "cases" (i.e., recipient beneficiaries). This second set of data excluded Mississippi County, Ark. because of incomplete data.

Two major statistical conditions need to be satisfied for obtaining sound statistical results. First, problems of positive autocorrelation in the time series residuals of regression equations can lead to underestimation of equation errors and overestimation of the significance of model parameters, unless corrected. Positive autocorrelation means that the residuals of the equation are positively related to one another over time, instead of being uncorrelated with one another — an assumption that ordinary least squares requires for obtaining sound results. According to the test statistic for uncovering positive autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson statistic, there was very high positive autocorrelation in the regression residuals. This problem was corrected by expressing the transfer payment data and its explanatory factors in difference form, which is the appropriate correction procedure in this case. Second, heteroscedasticity in the cross-section variances can lead to biased model coefficients. Heteroscedasticity refers to the variances varying from one cross-section unit to another, instead of being

relatively constant – another assumption that ordinary least squares requires for obtaining sound results. No evidence of heteroscedasticity was found in the cross-section variances of the regression equations.

CENSUS DATA RESULTS

Equation B-1 demonstrates that changes in county-level transfer payments, [(Δtran(i)], are affected by changes in county employment, [(Δemp(i)] across more than 3000 counties (i=counties). Differences in county size, as measured by base year labor force levels, [(lbf(t-1)], are also important. Neither state dummy variables nor metropolitan/nonmetropolitan county dummy variables controlled for differences in county size were as significant as the lagged labor force variable; interaction effects between the location dummy variables and the employment/ labor force variables were not found.

$$\Delta tran(i) = -1{,}086{,}270 - 11{,}615 * \Delta emp(i) + 2{,}026 * lbf(t-1) \qquad \text{[Eq. B-1]}$$
$$\qquad (-5.1) \qquad (-18.6) \qquad (+130)$$

Number of observations = 12,528

R^2 (adjusted for degrees of freedom) = 0.58

Equation B-1 indicates that all nonpension transfer payments collectively tend to increase by about $2,000 for each employee in the labor force but decrease by more than $11,000 for each individual added to the employment rolls (holding labor force constant). Thus, the net effect of the labor force and employment change variables on transfer payments is ($9,000). According to Equation B-1, a particular county's total transfer payments would change in relation to its total labor force level and total change in employment.

Both the labor force and employment variables are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level of the t-distribution. Moreover, there is little intercorrelation between the labor force and employment variables (R^2 is less than 0.01), which adds to the precision in Equation B-1 coefficients. As indicated in the introduction, positive autocorrelation is present and corrected for by expressing county transfer payments in difference form; no evidence of heteroscedasticity in cross-section variances is found. The R^2 of 0.58 is considered good for a data base with more than 12,000 cross-section and time-series observations.

UNPUBLISHED COUNTY RESULTS

Equation B-2 also demonstrates that there are statistically significant employment-change effects on changes in the number of AFDC and Food Stamp cases in five selected counties. County dummy variables were also significant and control for nonemployment influences on transfer payments. Interaction

effects between state dummy variables and the employment variable were tested for and not found. The variables are defined in the same way as they were for Equation B-1.

$$\Delta tran(i) = 196.66*Champaign + 3.15*Iosco + 688.14*Monterey \quad \text{[Eq. B-2]}$$

$$+39.93*Rockingham + 1678.53*Sacramento - \underset{(-10.99)}{0.046}\, dEMP(i)$$

Number of observations=197

R^2=0.79

F statistic for county = dummy effect is significant at the 1 percent point of the F-distribution

Equation B-2 indicates that Food Stamp and AFDC program cases in these counties decrease by 4.6 cases for every 100 individuals added to the employment rolls, holding labor force constant. However, the county dummy variables indicate that other factors are present. For example, Sacramento tends to have an increase of 1,678 cases beyond the effects of employment changes, while Iosco — a much smaller county — has very little nonemployment influences on its transfer payments. More generally, these results show that transfer payment-employment effects are stronger for smaller counties than for larger counties, perhaps because cyclical and other employment changes tend to have greater relative effects on smaller counties than on larger counties.

Both the employment and county dummy variables are highly statistically significant. The employment variable is significant at the 99 percent confidence level of the t-distribution, while the county effect is significant at the 1 percent point of the F-distribution. Again, positive autocorrelation was corrected for by expressing county transfer payment cases in difference form, and no heteroscedasticity in cross-section variances was found. The R^2 of 0.79 is considered very good for a data base with 197 cross-section and time-series observations.

The way in which Food Stamp and AFDC program cases are affected by unemployment has also been addressed. Equation B-3 indicates that these transfer programs increase by 5.3 cases for every 100 individuals who become unemployed, holding the size of the labor force constant. However, as in the case of the employment effect, Sacramento tends to have a relatively large increase of cases (1,498) beyond the effects of unemployment changes. The other counties have considerably smaller extra-unemployment effects. Finally, the statistical properties of the transfer-unemployment formulation also are quite good: R^2 is 0.70; the unemployment variable is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence limit of the t-distribution; and the county effect is significant at the 1 percent distribution of the F-distribution.

The transfer-unemployment formulation is as follows:

$$\Delta trans(i) = 1498*Sacramento+3.23*Iosco+617*Monterey+38..32*Rockingham$$
$$+0.053*\Delta unemp \qquad \text{[Eq. B-3]}$$
$$(4.92)$$

Number of observations = 191

$R^2 = 0.70$

F statistic for county = dummy effect is significant at the 1 percent point of the F-distribution

CONCLUSIONS

These econometric results indicate that changes in nonpension transfer payments are related to changes in employment (and unemployment). Employment decreases tend to raise transfer payments, while employment increases tend to lower transfer payments. However, these results also show that changes in transfer payments are relatively more important for smaller counties than they are for larger counties.

This econometric evidence is strong for the following reasons: First, the employment-transfer payment result is the same regardless of how broad or narrow is the definition of nonpension transfer payments used. Second, the evidence is the same regardless of whether the transfer payment variable is expressed in dollar or in case number terms. Third, the result is the same regardless of the number of counties included in the analysis.

GAO

United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and
International Affairs Division

The Honorable Robert E. Bayer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Economic Reinvestment and BRAC

Dear Mr. Bayer:

In discussions with your staff we were asked for clarification of our position on inclusion of government-wide costs in DOD's Base Closure Analysis.

The decision to close and realign military bases is based on many factors, including the costs and savings associated with different options. Identifying the relevant costs and savings has been a challenge to DOD and the Base Closure Commission, and the estimating process has been improved with successive rounds of the base closure process.

Given that the closing and realigning military bases can involve costs to the government (and possibly savings) that do not accrue directly to DOD, there is an issue of how those costs or savings should be factored into DOD's recommendations regarding which bases to close, and the final decisions made. For example, when a military hospital is closed, DOD can realize savings, but those may be offset government-wide as military retirees from the affected region enroll in Medicare. Similarly, if the National Park Service acquires a closed base, it will incur costs to operate it as a public facility. Moreover, there could be costs to the federal government if usage of federal entitlement or welfare programs increases in communities negatively impacted by the loss of a base, or conversley, there could be savings for communities whose bases are expanded. Quantification of many of these costs is difficult if not impossible, and is speculative. Other costs are quantifiable and are subject to reasonable estimation.

As we have recommended in the past, we believe substantial and quantifiable government-wide cost and savings should be included in the COBRA cost analysis. In areas where DOD savings could result in significant and quantifiable costs to other agencies, such as in the case of Champus costs transferring to Medicare, or continuing GSA lease costs, DOD should indicate that fact to the Commission and

those costs to other Federal agencies. In possible cases of substantial shifting of costs from one Federal agency to another, being unaware of such shifts hinders the Base Closure Commissions overall evaluation of the DOD process and related recommendations.

If you have any questions, please call Bob Meyer, (202) 512-8431, or myself, (202) 512-8412.

Sincerely yours,



Donna M. Heivilin, Director
Defense Management and NASA Issues

Document Separator

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 JAN 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)

Reducing the Department's unneeded infrastructure through base closures and realignments is a top Defense priority. We have made good progress so far, but there are more reductions we can and must accomplish. The 1995 round of base realignments and closures (BRAC 95) is the last round of closures authorized under Public Law 101-510. Hence, our efforts to balance the DoD base and force structures, and preserve readiness through the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure, are critical. Consequently, we must begin the BRAC 95 process now.

I look to you, individually and collectively, to recommend further infrastructure reductions consistent with the Defense Guidance and DoD's planned force reductions. The Defense Guidance BRAC 95 goal of an overall 15% reduction in plant replacement value should be considered a minimum DoD-wide goal.

Significant reductions in infrastructure and overhead costs can only be achieved after careful studies address not only structural changes to the base structure, but also operational and organizational changes, with a strong emphasis on cross-service utilization of common support assets.

The attached guidance establishes policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure under Public Law 101-510, as amended by Public Law 102-190 and Public Law 103-160. This guidance supersedes Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda of May 5, 1992, and all other Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance issued regarding making recommendations for the 1993 round of base realignments and closures.

William J. Perry

Attachment

1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)
Policy, Procedures, Authorities and Responsibilities

Purpose

Part A, Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, as amended by Public Law 102-190 and Public Law 103-160, establishes the exclusive procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may pursue realignment or closure of military installations inside the United States, with certain exceptions. The law established independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions to review the Secretary of Defense's recommendations in calendar years 1991, 1993 and 1995.

The guidance herein establishes the policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure for submission to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the 1995 Commission).

This guidance supersedes Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda of May 5, 1992, and all other Office of the Secretary of Defense Guidance for the 1993 round of closures.

Goals

DoD Components must reduce their base structure capacity commensurate with approved roles and missions, planned force drawdowns and programmed workload reductions over the FYDP. For BRAC 95, the goal is to further reduce the overall DoD domestic base structure by a minimum of 15 percent of DoD-wide plant replacement value. Preserving readiness through the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure is critical to our national security.

It is DoD policy to make maximum use of common support assets. DoD Components should, throughout the BRAC 95 analysis process, look for cross-service or intra-service opportunities to share assets and look for opportunities to rely on a single Military Department for support.

Applicability

This guidance applies to those base realignment and closure recommendations which must, by law, be submitted to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the 1995 Commission) for review. This guidance also applies to recommendations which are forwarded to the 1995 Commission for review, though not required to be forwarded under the law.

This guidance does not apply to implementing approved closures and realignments resulting from the recommendations of the 1991 and 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions.

Public Law 101-510, Numerical Thresholds

Public Law 101-510 stipulates that no action be taken to close or realign an installation that exceeds the civilian personnel numerical thresholds set forth in the law, until those actions have obtained final approval pursuant to the law. The numerical thresholds established in the law require its application for the closure of installations with at least 300 authorized civilian personnel. For realignments, the law applies to actions at installations with at least 300 authorized civilian personnel which reduce and relocate 1000 civilians or 50% or more of the civilians authorized.

DoD Components must use a common date to determine whether Public Law 101-510 numerical thresholds will be met. For BRAC 95, the common date will be September 30, 1994. Nonappropriated fund employees are not direct hire, permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense, as defined by Public Law 101-510, and therefore should not be considered in determining whether the numerical thresholds of the law will be met.

Exceptions

Public Law 101-510, as amended, does not apply to actions which:

o Implement realignments or closures under Public Law 100-526, relating to the recommendations of the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (the 1988 Commission);

o Study or implement realignments or closures to which Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, is not applicable;

o Reduce force structure. Reductions in force structure may be made under this exception even if the units involved were designated to relocate to a receiving base by the 1988, 1991, or 1993 Commission; or

o Impact any facilities used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbor projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

Activities in Leased Space

DoD Component activities located in leased space are subject to Public Law 101-510, as amended. Additional guidance on how to apply this requirement will be issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

Policy Guidance

Basis for Recommendations

Base realignment, closure or consolidation studies that could result in a recommendation to the 1995 Commission of a base closure or realignment must meet the following requirements:

o The studies must have as their basis the Force Structure Plan required by Section 2903 of Public Law 101-510;

o The studies must be based on the final criteria for selecting bases for closure and realignment required by Section 2903; and

o The studies must be based on analyses of the base structure by like categories of bases using: objective measures for the selection criteria, where possible; the force structure plan; programmed workload over the FYDP; and military judgement in selecting bases for closure and realignment.

o The studies must consider all military installations inside the United States (as defined in the law) on an equal footing, including bases recommended for partial closure, realignment, or designated to receive units or functions by the 1988, 1991 or 1993 Commissions.

Cross-Service Opportunities

DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups should, where operationally and cost effective, strive to: retain in only one Service militarily unique capabilities used by two or more Services; consolidate workload across the Services to reduce capacity; and assign operational units from more than one Service to a single base.

Changes to Previous Recommendations

DoD components may propose changes to previously approved designated receiving base recommendations of the 1988, 1991 and 1993 Commissions provided such changes are necessitated by revisions to force structure, mission or organization, or significant revisions to cost effectiveness that have occurred

since the relevant commission recommendation was made. Documentation for such changes must involve clear military value or significant savings, and be based on the final criteria, the force structure plan and the policy guidance for the BRAC 95 process.

Authorities

The BRAC 95 process must enhance opportunities for consideration of cross-service tradeoffs and multi-service use of the remaining infrastructure. Since BRAC 95 is the last round of closures authorized under Public Law 101-510, these efforts are critical to balancing the DoD base and force structures and to preserving readiness through the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure. Sharing authority among the Military Departments, Defense Agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense is essential to sound decision making and taking advantage of available cross-service asset sharing opportunities. The authorities of the DoD Components and the joint groups established by this policy guidance follow and are depicted in Appendix A.

BRAC 95 Review Group

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) will chair a senior level BRAC 95 Review Group to oversee the entire BRAC 95 process. The members of the BRAC 95 Review Group will be: a senior level representative from each Military Department; the chairperson of the BRAC 95 Steering Group; the chairperson(s) of each BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group; senior representatives from the Joint Staff, DoD Comptroller (COMP), Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), Reserve Affairs (RA), General Counsel (GC), Environmental Security and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); and such other members as the USD(A&T) considers appropriate. The BRAC 95 Review Group authorities include, but are not limited to: reviewing BRAC 95 analysis policies and procedures; reviewing excess capacity analyses; establishing closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration by the DoD Components; reviewing BRAC 95 work products of the DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups; and making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, including cross-service tradeoff recommendations and recommendations on submission of below-threshold actions to the 1995 Commission.

BRAC 95 Steering Group

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security (ASD(ES)) will chair a BRAC 95 Steering Group of study team leaders from: the Military Departments; DLA; each Joint Cross-Service Group; representatives from the Joint Staff, COMP, PA&E, RA, GC and Environmental Security; and such other members as the ASD(ES) considers appropriate. The purpose of the BRAC 95 Steering Group is to assist the BRAC 95 Review Group in exercising its authorities and to review DoD Component supplementary BRAC 95 guidance.

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups are hereby established in six areas with significant potential for cross-service impacts in BRAC 95.

The purpose of the five functional area joint cross-service groups is: to determine the common support functions and bases to be addressed by each cross-service group; to establish the guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements and milestone schedules for DoD Component conduct of cross-service analyses of common support functions; to oversee DoD Component cross-service analyses of these common support functions; to identify necessary outsourcing policies and make recommendations regarding those policies; to review excess capacity analyses; to develop closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration in such analyses; and to analyze cross-service tradeoffs.

The purpose of the economic impact joint cross-service group is: to establish the guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact; to analyze DoD Component recommendations under those guidelines; and to develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary.

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups shall complete the analytical design tasks above and issue guidance to the DoD Components, after review by the BRAC 95 Review Group, no later than March 31, 1994. The six BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups are:

o Depot Maintenance: The group will be chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary Defense for Logistics (DUSD(L)) with members from each Military Department, the Joint Staff and DLA, and other offices as considered appropriate by the DUSD(L). The DASD(ER&BRAC) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production Resources will also serve as members.

o Test and Evaluation: The group will be jointly chaired by the Director, Test and Evaluation (D,T&E) and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (D,OT&E) with members from each Military Department, Defense Research and Engineering (DR&E), and other offices as considered appropriate by the chairpersons. The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Laboratories: The group will be chaired by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (D,DR&E) with members from each Military Department, T&E, OT&E and other offices as considered appropriate by the D,DR&E. The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Military Treatment Facilities including Graduate Medical Education: The group will be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) with members from each Military Department and other offices as considered appropriate by ASD(HA). The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Undergraduate Pilot Training: The group will be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (ASD(P&R)) with members from each Military Department and others as considered appropriate by the ASD(P&R). The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Economic Impact: The group will be chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Reinvestment and BRAC (DASD(ER&BRAC)) with members from each Military Department, the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) and other offices as considered appropriate by the DASD(ER&BRAC).

DoD Components

The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Directors of the Defense Agencies, and the Heads of other DoD Components shall (without delegation) submit their recommendations for base realignments or closures under Public Law 101-510, as amended, to the Secretary of Defense. Recommendations and supporting documentation shall be delivered to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security for appropriate processing and forwarding to the Secretary of Defense.

Heads of DoD Components will designate the individuals to serve on the joint groups as described above.

Coordination

The joint groups and DoD Components, in pursuing their BRAC 95 work, should coordinate with each other and should take into account other analyses or studies external to the BRAC process which may impact their deliberations. For example, the Test and Evaluation joint group should consider input from the Test and Evaluation Executive Agent Board of Directors.

USD(A&T) -- Additional Guidance

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) may issue such instructions as may be necessary: to implement these policies, procedures, authorities and responsibilities; to ensure timely submission of work products to the BRAC 95 Review Group and Joint Cross-Service Groups, the Secretary of Defense and the 1995 Commission; and, to ensure consistency in application of selection criteria, methodology and reports to the Secretary of Defense, the 1995 Commission and the Congress. The authority and duty of the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations under Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, as amended, is hereby delegated to the USD(A&T). The USD(A&T) should exercise this authority in coordination with other DoD officials as appropriate.

Responsibilities

Selection Criteria

The BRAC 95 Review Group, chaired by the USD(A&T), will make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on whether an amendment to the selection criteria is appropriate no later than January 31, 1994. If the recommendation is to amend the criteria, the recommendation will include the proposed amendment.

If the Secretary of Defense approves amending the criteria, USD(A&T) will publish the proposed amendment in the Federal Register by February 15, 1994, for a 30 day public comment period. The BRAC 95 Review Group will review the public comments received, incorporate appropriate comments and make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on the final criteria no later than March 31, 1994.

Force Structure Plan

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, General Counsel, DoD Comptroller, Director Program

Analysis and Evaluation, and such other officials as may be appropriate, shall develop the force structure plan in accordance with Public Law 101-510, as amended, and submit it to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Pending issuance of the final force structure plan by the Secretary of Defense, DoD Components shall use an interim force structure plan to be developed and issued in accordance with the above coordination procedures by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The interim force structure guidance shall be issued no later than January 31, 1994. Additional force structure guidance shall be issued as soon as practicable after the FY96-FY01 Program Review is completed in the Summer of 1994. The final force structure plan shall be issued as soon as possible after final force decisions are made during the preparation of the FY96 budget, but no later than December 15, 1994. The interim and final force structure plans must include guidance on overseas deployed forces.

Nominations

Public Law 101-510, as amended, requires that commissioners be nominated by the President no later than January 3, 1995, or the 1995 base closure process will be terminated. The Counselor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense will coordinate all matters relating to the Secretary's recommendations to the President for appointments to the 1995 Commission. All inquires from individuals interested in serving on the Commission should be referred to the Counselor.

Commission Support

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)), assisted by the Director of Administration and Management (D,A&M), will provide the Department's support to the 1995 Commission.

Primary Point of Contact

The USD(A&T) shall be the primary point of contact for the Department of Defense with the 1995 Commission and the General Accounting Office (GAO). Each DoD component shall designate to USD(A&T) one or more points of contact with the 1995 Commission and the GAO. The USD(A&T) shall establish procedures for interaction with the 1995 Commission and the GAO.

Internal Controls

The DoD Inspector General shall be available to assist the DoD Components in developing, implementing and evaluating internal control plans.

Depot Maintenance Outsourcing and Industrial Base Considerations

USD(A&T) is currently analyzing depot maintenance outsourcing considerations and is assessing public and private industrial base capabilities. Key policy decisions resulting from this review should be promulgated, if practicable, by March 1, 1994, in order to maximize possible efficiencies in maintenance depot infrastructure.

Procedures

Record Keeping

DoD Components and joint groups empowered by this memorandum to participate in the BRAC 95 analysis process shall, from the date of receipt of this memorandum, develop and keep:

o Descriptions of how base realignment and closure policies, analyses and recommendations were made, including minutes of all deliberative meetings;

o All policy, data, information and analyses considered in making base realignment and closure recommendations;

o Descriptions of how DoD Component recommendations met the final selection criteria and were based on the final force structure plan; and

o Documentation for each recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to realign or close a military installation under the law.

Internal Controls

DoD Components and joint groups empowered by this memorandum to participate in the BRAC 95 analysis process must develop and implement an internal control plan for base realignment, closure or consolidation studies to ensure the accuracy of data collection and analyses.

At a minimum, these internal control plans should include:

o Uniform guidance defining data requirements and sources;

o Systems for verifying the accuracy of data at all levels of command;

o Documentation justifying changes made to data received from subordinate commands;

o Procedures to check the accuracy of the analyses made from the data; and

o An assessment by auditors of the adequacy of each internal control plan.

Data Certification

Public Law 101-510, as amended, requires specified DoD personnel to certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that information provided to the Secretary of Defense or the 1995 Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation is accurate and complete.

DoD components shall establish procedures and designate appropriate personnel to certify that data and information collected for use in BRAC 95 analyses are accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief. DoD Components' certification procedures should be incorporated with the required internal control plan. Both are subject to audit by the General Accounting Office.

Finally, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies, and heads of other DoD Components must certify to the Secretary of Defense that data and information used in making BRAC 95 recommendations to the Secretary are accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief.

Criteria Measures/Factors

DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups must develop one or more measures/factors for applying each of the final criteria to base structure analyses. While objective measures/factors are desirable, they will not always be possible to develop. Measures/factors may also vary for different categories of bases. DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service groups must document the measures/factors used for each of the final criteria.

Categories of Bases

One of the first steps in evaluating the base structure for potential closures or realignments must involve grouping installations with like missions, capabilities, or attributes into categories, and when appropriate, subcategories. Categorizing bases is the necessary link between the forces described in the Force Structure Plan, programmed workload, and the base structure. Determining categories of bases is a DoD

Component and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group responsibility. DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups should avoid over-categorization in order to maximize opportunities for cross-service or intra-service tradeoffs.

Reserve Component Impacts

Considerable overall DoD savings can be realized through maximizing the use of Reserve component enclaves and through joint use of facilities by the Reserve components. However, these overall DoD savings may not be identified during the BRAC 95 process. Consequently, DoD Components should look for opportunities to consolidate or relocate Reserve components onto active bases to be retained in the base structure and onto closing or realigning bases.

DoD Components must complete Reserve component recruiting demographic studies required by DoD Directive 1225.7 to ensure that the impact on the Reserve components of specific closures and realignments are considered.

Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Cost Model

DoD Components must use the COBRA cost model to calculate the costs, savings and return on investment of proposed closures and realignments. The Army is executive agent for COBRA and model improvements are underway.

Community Preference

DoD Components must document the receipt of valid requests received from communities expressing a preference for the closure of a military installation under Section 2924 of Public Law 101-510. DoD components will also document the steps taken to give these requests special consideration. Such documentation is subject to review by the General Accounting Office, the Commission and the Congress.

Release of Information

Data and analyses used by the DoD Components to evaluate military installations for closure and realignment will not be released until the Secretary's recommendations have been forwarded to the 1995 Commission on March 1, 1995, unless specifically required by law. The 1995 Commission is required to hold public hearings on the recommendations.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, has a special role in assisting the Commission in its review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and must also prepare a report detailing the Department of Defense's selection process. As

such, the GAO will be provided, upon request, with as much information as possible without compromising the deliberative process. The DoD Components must keep records of all data provided to the GAO.

Dissemination of Guidance

DoD Components shall disseminate this guidance and subsequent policy memoranda as widely as possible throughout their organizations. The BRAC 95 Steering Group will review DoD Component supplementary guidance.

Timelines

The timelines described in this memorandum are depicted at Appendix B.

BRAC 95 Organization for Analysis



BRAC 95 Timeline



* Work products reviewed by BRAC 95 Review Group

Document Separator

BRAC 95 POLICY, PROCEDURES, AUTHORITIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Goal	Further reduce overall DoD domestic base structure by a minimum of 15 percent of DoD-wide plant replacement value Look for cross-service or intra-service opportunities to share assets and look for opportunities to rely on a single Military Department for support
Numerical Thresholds	Common date will be 30 Sep 94 for applicability of Public Law 101-510 NAF employees should not be considered in determining thresholds
Activities in Leased Space	Activities in leased space are subject to Public Law 101-510 USD (Acquisition and Technology) will issue guidance on applying this requirement (no suspense date)
Cross-Service Opportunities	Where operationally and cost effective, DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups should strive to: • retain in only one Service militarily unique capabilities used by two or more Services • consolidate workload across the Services to reduce capacity • assign operational units from more than one Service to a single base
Changes to Previous Recommendations	DoD components may propose changes provided such changes are necessitated by revisions to force structure, mission or organization, or by significant revisions to cost effectiveness Documentation must involve clear military value or significant savings and be based on the final criteria, the force structure plan, and the policy guidance for the BRAC 95 process
BRAC 95 Review Group	Oversee the entire BRAC 95 process Chaired by USD(A&T). Members include a representative from each Military Department, the chairperson of the BRAC 95 Steering Group, the chairpersons of each BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group, senior representatives from the Joint Staff, DoD Comptroller, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Reserve Affairs, General Counsel, Environmental Security, and DLA, and other members the chair considers appropriate

BRAC 95 POLICY, PROCEDURES, AUTHORITIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

BRAC 95 Review Group (Continued)	Authorities include, but are not limited to: • reviewing BRAC 95 analysis policies and procedures • reviewing excess capacity analyses • establishing closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets • reviewing BRAC 95 work products of DoD components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups • making recommendations to SECDEF including cross-service tradeoff recommendations and recommendations on submission of below-threshold actions
BRAC 95 Steering Group	Assist BRAC 95 Review Group in exercising authorities and review DoD Component supplementary guidance Chaired by ASD (Economic Security). Members include the study team leaders from the Military Departments, DLA, and each Joint Cross-Service Group, representatives from the Joint Staff, Comptroller, PA&E, RA, GC, Environmental Security, and other members the chair considers appropriate
BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups	Established in five functional areas-- • depot maintenance • test and evaluation • laboratories • medical treatment facilities • undergraduate pilot training and economic impact Five functional area groups will: • determine the common support functions and bases to be addressed by each group • establish guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements, and milestone schedules for DoD component conduct of analyses • oversee DoD Component cross-service analyses • identify necessary outsourcing policies and make recommendations regarding these policies • review excess capacity analyses • develop closure and realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration in such analyses • analyze cross-service tradeoffs

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups (Continued)

Economic impact group will:

- establish guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact
- analyze DoD Component recommendations under those guidelines
- develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary

Complete analytical design tasks and issue guidance to DoD Components, after review by BRAC 95 Review Group, no later than 31 Mar 94

Depot Maintenance:

- chaired by DUSD (Logistics)
- members include DASD (Economic Reinvestment and BRAC), DASD (Production Resources), representatives from each Military Department, the Joint Staff, and DLA, and other members the chair considers appropriate

Test and Evaluation:

- jointly chaired by Director, Test and Evaluation and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
- members include DASD (ER&BRAC), representatives from each Military Department and Defense Research and Engineering, and other members the chair considers appropriate

Laboratories:

- chaired by Director, Defense Research and Engineering
- members include DASD (ER&BRAC), representatives from each Military Department, T&E, and OT&E, and other members the chair considers appropriate

Military Treatment Facilities:

- chaired by the ASD (Health Affairs)
- members include DASD (ER&BRAC), representatives from each Military Department, and other members the chair considers appropriate

Undergraduate Pilot Training:

- chaired by ASD (Personnel and Readiness)
- members include DASD (ER&BRAC), representatives from each Military Department, and other members the chair considers appropriate

BRAC 95 POLICY, PROCEDURES, AUTHORITIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups (Continued)	Economic Impact: • chaired by DASD (ER&BRAC) • members include representatives from each Military Department and the Office of Economic Adjustment and other members the chair considers appropriate
Coordination	Joint Groups and DoD Components should coordinate with each other and should take into account other analyses or studies external to the BRAC process which may impact their deliberations
Selection Criteria	BRAC 95 Review Group will recommend to the SECDEF whether an amendment to the selection criteria is appropriate no later than 31 Jan 94 If SECDEF approves amending the criteria, USD (Acquisition and Technology) will publish the proposed amendment in the Federal Register by 15 Feb 94 for a 30-day public comment period BRAC 95 Review Group will review public comments received, incorporate appropriate comments, and recommend the final criteria to the SECDEF no later than 31 Mar 94
Force Structure Plan	The final force structure plan shall be issued as soon as possible after final force decisions are made during the preparation of the FY 96 budget, but no later than 15 Dec 94 Pending issuance of the final force structure plan, DoD Components shall use an interim plan to be issued by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff no later than 31 Jan 94
Depot Maintenance Outsourcing and Industrial Base Considerations	USD (Acquisition and Technology) is currently analyzing depot maintenance outsourcing considerations and is assessing public and private industrial base capabilities Key policy decisions resulting from this review should be promulgated, if practicable, by 1 Mar 94 in order to maximize possible efficiencies in depot maintenance infrastructure
Criteria Measures/ Factors	DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups must develop and document one or more measures/factors for applying each of the final criteria to base structure analyses

BRAC 95 POLICY, PROCEDURES, AUTHORITIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Categories of Bases	DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups are responsible for determining categories of bases but should avoid over-categorization in order to maximize opportunities for cross-service or intra-service tradeoffs
Reserve Component Impacts	DoD Components should look for opportunities to consolidate or relocate RC activities onto active bases to be retained and onto closing or realigning bases
COBRA Cost Model	DoD Components must use the COBRA cost model to calculate the costs, savings, and return on investment of proposed closures and realignments
Community Preference	DoD Components must document the receipt of valid requests received from communities expressing a preference for the closure of a military installation and the steps taken to give these requests special consideration
Release of Information	Data and analyses used by DoD Components to evaluate military installations for closure and realignment will <u>not</u> be released until the Secretary's recommendations have been forwarded to the 1995 Commission on 1 Mar 95

Document Separator

Borden

- Can we get policy guidance letters.
- List of facilities/bases/activities being considered by your committee
- Will your group consider below threshold activities
- Are systems in place to collect data.
- How will data be validated - Major Command - Service or by joint group.
- Are you looking at requirements beyond the FYDP to determine infrastructure capability.
- How are you defining capacity and how will you determine existing capacity.
- What force structure are you using as the basis for your requirements calculations
- Do you have quotas or will you do a true bottom up look and determine requirements and assess against assets.
- Will your team make on site visits
- Have you established measures to assess military value

How staffed
support
Tails for later

CIRILLO DRAFT QUESTIONS FOR DoD JOINT GROUP PITCH / MAY 18,19

• Please discuss how these joint groups will interface with the policy side of their respective areas. For example:

> • • In the UPT area - what is the governing policy regarding different Service philosophies in UPT approaches?
> • • In the Depot area - will the Group recommend, set or use a DoD policy regarding one service "maintaining" an end item of another Service?
> • • In the Economic area - will the Group recommend or set a DoD policy regarding CEI?

• Will the Groups recommend specific installations for closure or Service quotas within respective areas, and will those recommendations go first to the Service Secretaries?

• In many of the Group areas Services differ as to the relationship of that function to a particular installation - for example, a Depot is not just a Depot in USAF (Fighter wing, AWACS, etc.). How will the Groups work their area recommendations with the operational functions sharing the effected installations?

• We understand that Group questions have been sent out through Service driven data calls. Do you envision the analysis on the inputs to be performed first by the Services or the Groups?

• As we understand it, the USAF and USA Plant Value calculations differ numerically and philosophically with the USN. Do you envision directing or developing a joint definition?

• DoD has directed USAF and USN to develop a coordinated plan involving aviation maintenance which could drive the depot policy regarding closures and excess capacity. Please discuss your expectations and goals in this area.

• A recent Defense Daily article mentions James Klugh's philosophies regarding "Partnering" and the impact of the DoD submitted 60/40 legislation continuation. If the reflection in the article is correct there is a distinct implication that excess capacity goes away. Please discuss.

• Please explain the UPT Group's efforts as regards to JPAT and the selection of the correct installations to support JPAT.

Document Separator

Joint Cross Service Group Depot Maintenance an Overview

Ben Klugh

05/17/1994

Purpose of JCSG-DM

- Determine the common support functions to be addressed by the JCSG-DM
- Establish the guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements, and milestone schedules for the DoD Components necessary to conduct cross-service analysis of the depot maintenance function.
- Oversee DoD Component cross-service analysis of depot maintenance functions
- Identify necessary policy issues and make recommendations regarding those policies
- Review excess capacity analysis
- Develop closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets
- Analyze cross-service tradeoffs

Membership

Joint Cross Service Group

- ~~Depot Steering Group~~
  - Army - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Army for Logistics
    - » Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics)
  - Navy - Assistant Secretary of Navy (RD&A)
    - » Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)
  - Air Force - Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
  - Marines - Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics
  - Director, Defense Logistics Agency
  - Joint Staff, Director for Logistics

+ Tech support

Depot Locations/Categories

orig 35 / 11 scheduled for closure

- still have 8 depot equiv too much
- also partering with industry eg Lorkny

- Initial focus on 24 remaining depot maintenance facilities.
- Analysis will be performed on a commodity basis. Each activity that is identified by the Services as performing depot maintenance will be subject to analysis.

Depot is a political sensitivity

Guidelines
Baselines for Analysis

- Core capacity based on FYDP.
- Capacity/utilization - based on current year funded and outyear FYDP programmed workload
- Depots will be analyzed by commodity groups and sub-components

Guidelines
Definitions

- Standard definitions have been prepared.
- Definitions are included as part of the standard data call.

Standards

← November

capability (skills & facilities) to do mntce. on "things" essential to two MRCs as determined by the mil depts – DoD must have an ability to do the core – Not necessarily must DoD do the core

- Size to Core
- Capacity/Utilization - In accordance with the principles established in the DDMC study on capacity measurement
- Maximum potential capacity - Current workload mix, no hiring constraints, optimum work station usage, no MILCON
- Maximum potential capacity minus core equals excess capacity
- All measures based on a one shift, 40 hour workweek

Services say 60% = core

Assumptions

- There will be sufficient trained personnel to accomplish realigned workloads

Data Elements

- Data expressed in direct labor hours
  - Capacity
  - Utilization
  - Core capability
  - Core workload
  - Programmed workload
  - Service controlled core capacity (Title 10 requirements)
  - Available capacity to absorb workload
- Commodities
- Plant Replacement Value

Services must utilize, but are not limited to these data elements

Measures of Merit

- **Stage 1 - Development of Alternatives**

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

- **Stage 2 - Service Analysis of Alternatives**
  - All eight BRAC criteria applicable

BRAC '93 Analysis Frameworks Highlights of Common Data Elements (Military Value Criteria)

Measure of Merit	Army	Navy/USMC	Air Force	Commission	JCSG-DM
Capacity	o	o	o	o	o
Location	o	o	o		o
Construction Investment	o			o	o
Equipment Investment		o		o	o
Encroachment	o	o	o	o	o
Buildable Acres		o	o		o
Unused Maintenance Capacity	o	o	o	o	o
Unused Building Admin Space	o	o			o
Work Force Available	o	o		o	x
Labor Rates	o	o	o	o	o
Overhead Rates				o	
Environmental Compliance	o	o	o		o
Programmed MILCON & Repair	o	o	o		o
Total Depot Maint Oper Costs					o
Actual Costs per DLH					o

Variations from BRAC 93 Analysis

- Work force availability
  - Working assumption: There will be sufficient trained personnel to accomplish the realigned workloads.
- Overhead rates
  - Accumulation methodology not consistent between the Military Components
    - » Cost pools contain different elements
    - » Direct funding inconsistently applied
  - Meaningful direct comparisons not possible with existing accounting systems
- In lieu of overhead rates
  - Total depot maintenance operating costs (excluding materials)
  - Actual costs per direct labor hour

Commodities

AIRCRAFT AIRFRAMES

- ROTARY
- VSTOL
- FIXED WING
  - TRANSPORT, TANKERS, BOMBERS & CMD & CNTL
  - FIGHTER/ATTACK
  - ADMIN/TRAINING
  - OTHER

AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS

- DYNAMIC COMPONENTS (Rotary Wing)
- AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES
- HYDRAULICS/PNEUMATICS
- INSTRUMENTS
- LANDING GEAR
- AVIATION ORDNANCE
- AVIONICS/ELECTRONICS
- OTHER

ENGINES (GAS TURBINE)

- AIRCRAFT
- SHIPS
- TANKS

Commodities continued

MISSILES & COMPONENTS

- STRATEGIC
- TACTICAL/MLRS

AMPHIBIANS

- VEHICLES
- COMPONENTS

COMBAT VEHICLES

- SELF PROPELLED
- TANKS
- TOWED
- COMPONENTS

GROUND & SHIPBOARD COMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

AUTOMOTIVE/ CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT

TACTICAL VEHICLES

GROUND GENERAL PURPOSE ITEMS

- GSE (excludes aircraft)
- SMALL ARMS/PERSONAL WEAPONS
- MUNITIONS/ORDNANCE
- OTHER

Commodities continued

SEA SYSTEMS

- SHIPS
- OTHER

SOFTWARE

- TACTICAL
- SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS

- BLADES/VANES (Type 2)
- BEARINGS REFURBISHMENT
- APU's & GROUND GENERATORS
- CALIBRATION (TYPE 1)
- TMDE

OTHER

Document Separator

Joint Laboratory Cross-Service Group Process Brief

M Goldstein

Outline

- "Laboratory"
  - Definition
  - List of "Activities"/Locations
  - Common Support Functions
- Data Call - 30 Mar 94
- Macro Process
- Summary

"Lab" Definition

- "Lab" is defined as including activities primarily performing science and technology, engineering development, and/or in-service engineering.
  - Services are organized differently Apples, Oranges, Bricks

Acquisition

7 & 4 labs

AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES & INSTALLATIONS AFFECTED

23

- ARMSTRONG LAB, BROOKS AFB
- ARMSTRONG LAB, TYNDALL AFB
- ARMSTRONG LAB, WPAFB
- ARMSTRONG LAB, WILLIAMS AFB
- HUMAN SYSTEM CENTER, BROOKS AFB
- WRIGHT LAB, WPAFB
- WRIGHT LAB, EGLIN AFB
- ASC, WPAFB
- ASC, EGLIN AFB
- OC-ALC, TINKER AFB (in-service engineering)
- OO-ALC, HILL AFB (in-service engineering)
- SA-ALC, KELLY AFB (in-service engineering)

AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES & INSTALLATIONS AFFECTED

- SM-ALC, MCCLELLAN AFB (in-service engineering)
- WR-ALC, ROBINS AFB (in-service engineering)
- PHILLIPS LAB, KIRTLAND AFB
- PHILLIPS LAB, HANSCOM AFB
- PHILLIPS LAB, EDWARDS AFB
- SMC, LAAFB
- SMC, NORTON AFB
- SM-ALC, PETERSON AFB 4 ?
- ROME LAB, GRIFFISS AFB
- ROME LAB, HANSCOM AFB
- ESC, HANSCOM AFB

23 ACTIVITIES

ARMY ACTIVITIES & INSTALLATIONS AFFECTED

28

- ARMY RESEARCH LAB (ARL), ADELPHI, MD
- ARL, ABERDEEN PROVING GRND (APG), MD
- ARL, WHITE SANDS MSLE RANGE, NM
- ARL, NASA LANGLEY, VA
- ARL, NASA LEWIS, OH
- NATICK RDEC, NATICK, MA
- AVIATION RDEC, ST LOUIS, MO
- AVIATION TROOP CMD, AEROFLIGHT DYNAMICS DIR, MOFFETT FIELD, CA
- AVIATION TROOP CMD, AVIATION APPLD TECH DIR, FORT EUSTIS, VA
- CHEM BIO DEF CMD RDEC, ABERDEEN PROVING GRND, MD
- COMM ELECTRONIC CMD RDEC, FT MONMOUTH, NJ
- COMM ELECTRONIC CMD RDEC-NIGHT VISION EO DIR, FT BELVOIR, VA
- MISSILE RDEC, REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL
- ARMAMENTS RDEC, PICATINNY ARSENAL, NJ
- ARMAMENTS RDEC, BENET LABS, WATERVLIET ARSENAL, NY

ARMY ACTIVITIES & INSTALLATIONS AFFECTED

- TANK-AUTOMOTIVE CMD RDEC, WARREN, MI
- USA RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES FT DETRICK, MD
- WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH (WRAIR), WASHINGTON, D.C.
- USA INSTITUTE OF SURGICAL RESEARCH, FT SAM HOUSTON, TX
- USA AEROMEDICAL RESEARCH LAB, FT RUCKER, AL
- MEDICAL RESEARCH INST OF CHEMICAL DEFENSE APG, MD
- USA RESEARCH INST OF ENVIORNMENTAL MEDICINE, NATICK, MA
- CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING RESEARCH LABORATORY, CHAMPAIGN, IL
- COLD REGIONS RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING LABS, HANOVER, NH
- TOPOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING CENTER, ALEXANDRIA, VA
- WATERWAYS EXPERIMENT STATION, VICKSBURG, MS
- US ARMY RESEARCH INST FOR BEHAV & SOC SCIENCES, ALEXANDRIA, VA
- SIMULATION, TRAINING & INSTRUMENTATION COMMAND, ORLANDO, FL

28 ACTIVITIES

NAVY ACTIVITIES & INSTALLATIONS AFFECTED

- NAWC, WEAPONS DIV, CHINA LAKE
- NAWC, WEAPONS DIV, POINT MUGU
- NAWC, AIRCRAFT DIV, PATUXENT RIVER
- NAWC, AIRCRAFT DIV, INDIANAPOLIS
- NAWC, AIRCRAFT DIV, LAKEHURST
- NRL, WASHINGTON D.C.
- NSWC, CARDEROCK DIV, BETHESDA
- NSWC, CARDEROCK DET, ANNAPOLIS
- NSWC, CRANE DIV
- NSWC, CRANE DET, LOUISVILLE
- NSWC, DAHLGREN DIV
- NSWC, DAHLGREN DET, PANAMA CITY
- NSWC, INDIAN HEAD DIV
- NSWC, PORT HUENEME DIV
- NCCOSC, RDT&E DIV, SAN DIEGO

KEY

NAWC=NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER
NSWC=NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER
NRL=NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
NCCOSC=NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL, AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE CENTER
NUWC=NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER

NAVY ACTIVITIES & INSTALLATIONS AFFECTED

- NCCOSC, IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING (ISE), WEST COAST DIV, SAN DIEGO
- NCCOSC, ISE EAST COAST DIV, CHARLESTON
- NAMRL, PENSACOLA
- NAVAL BIODYNAMICS LAB, NEW ORLEANS
- NAVAL DENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GREAT LAKES
- NAVAL HEALTH RESEARCH CENTER, SAN DIEGO
- NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, BETHESDA
- NUWC, KEYPORT DET, WA
- NSWC, CARDEROCK, PHILADELPHIA DET
- NUWC, NEWPORT
- NUWC (NEWPORT), NEW LONDON
- NAVAL PERSONNEL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, SAN DIEGO

27 ACTIVITIES

DOD ACTIVITIES & INSTALLATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED

- ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (AFRRI), BETHESDA, MD

Common Support Functions

- Product Functions
  - Air Vehicles
  - Weapons
  - Space Systems
  - C4I Systems
- Pervasive Functions
  - Electronic Devices
  - Environmental Sciences
  - Infectious Diseases
  - Human Systems
  - Manpower and Personnel
  - Training Systems
  - Environmental Quality
  - Advanced Materials

Data Call

- Section I defines the guidelines, standards, assumptions, Measures of Merit, and identifies the activities and Common Support Functions

- Sections II & III collect <u>common</u> data on the capacity of the DoD components and capability of "Lab" activities to perform Common Support Functions as characterized by the location, personnel, workload, facilities and equipment, and the potential for expansion

How many are still there

Will get common data

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP PROCESS



Summary

- Process is sound
  - Identifies Common Support Functions as the basis for developing cross-service alternatives
  - Defines "activities" which should be considered as "labs" despite differences in the way the military departments are organized to perform science & technology/engineering development/in-service engineering
  - Depicts the capability and quality of "labs" to conduct in-house work and manage contracted development and engineering
- Schedule is success oriented but achievable
- Cross-service potential is not the only factor that the military departments will consider in making their BRAC recommendations

Document Separator

BRAC 95 T&E JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

BRIEFING FOR BRAC COMMISSION

JOHN V. BOLINO
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
TEST FACILITIES AND RESOURCES

OVERVIEW
T&E JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

- T&E MISSION
- BACKGROUND
- PROCESS/APPROACH
- PRODUCT (GUIDANCE TO SERVICES)

T&E MISSION

TEST

A PROGRAM, PROCEDURE, OR PROCESS TO OBTAIN, VERIFY, OR PROVIDE DATA FOR DETERMINING THE DEGREE TO WHICH A SYSTEM MEETS, EXCEEDS, OR FAILS TO MEET ITS STATED OBJECTIVES.

EVALUATION

THE REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND ASSESSMENT OF DATA OBTAINED FROM TESTING OR OTHER SOURCES.

BACKGROUND

DoD T&E INFRASTRUCTURE

DoD DIR-3211

- 21 major T&E activities constitute the Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB)
  - A broad base of T&E activities managed and operated under uniform guidelines
  - Sized, operated and maintained to support all DoD users
  - Available to other users with testing requirements

Points: other functions there.
. Non-CONUS
. Pax, Eglin, Ch Lake heavy into other stuff

- Testing capabilities also exist at other bases
  - For example: laboratories, depots

MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY BASE



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T&E INFRASTRUCTURE

CHARACTERISTIC	EXAMPLE
Large in Land, Sea, and Air Space	7 million land acres (over 50 percent of total DoD land area)
Costly to Replace	Replacement cost of $ 25 Billion
Active	Sites for several thousand test projects each year
Activity not driven by force structure	T&E Infrastructure budget declined during period of increased DoD budgets

DoD TRENDS IN T&E AND RDT&E BUDGETS



1995 COST OF T&E INFRASTRUCTURE

Annual cost

- T&E Infrastructure costs $ 1.7 billion
  - About 15 percent of Acquisition Infrastructure

- Acquisition Infrastructure costs $ 12.2 billion
  - About 10.8 % of DoD Infrastructure cost

T&E Infrastructure cost is 1.5 % of DoD Infrastructure cost

PROCESS/APPROACH

MISSION
T&E JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO MILITARY SERVICES AND DoD AGENCIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF BRAC 95 T&E CROSS-SERVICE ANALYSIS

MEMBERSHIP

- INCLUDED ALL ORGANIZATIONS WITH POTENTIAL FOR THE CROSS-SERVICE SAVINGS:
  - CO-CHAIRMEN: DOT&E
    DT&E, OUSD/A
  - TEAM LEADERS: DOT&E
    DT&E, OUSD/A
  - MEMBERS: ARMY
    NAVY
    AIR FORCE
    DNA
    BMDO
    DISA
    PA&E, OSD
    OSD BRAC
  - OBSERVERS: DoD COMPTROLLER
    DoD IG
    LAB JOINT C-S GROUP

PROCESS/APPROACH
T&E JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

- ESTABLISHED TRI-SERVICE WORKING GROUP
- DEVELOPED CRITICAL MILESTONES, ASSIGNED TASKERS
- ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES/SCOPE OF EFFORT
- RECEIVED WEEKLY PROGRESS REPORTS FROM WORKING GROUP
- SOUGHT CONSENSUS

PRODUCT
(GUIDANCE TO SERVICES)

GUIDANCE, STANDARDS, AND ASSUMPTIONS

- INCLUDE ALL FACILITIES PERFORMING OR WHO HAVE PERFORMED T&E
- FACILITIES FROM ALL FUNDING SOURCES
- T&E WORKLOAD IS NOT A DIRECT FUNCTION OF FORCE STRUCTURE
- THE FYDP IS CONSIDERED CERTIFIED DATA
- INFORMATION FROM NON-DoD ACTIVITIES CANNOT BE CERTIFIED AND WILL NOT BE USED AS A BASIS FOR ANALYSES

GUIDANCE, STANDARDS, AND ASSUMPTIONS (continued)

- AT LEAST ONE TEST FACILITY/CAPABILITY WILL BE REQUIRED TO ADDRESS ANY TECHNOLOGY IN USE OR NEARING MATURATION
- POTENTIAL FOR INTERNETTING FACILITIES/CAPABILITIES CAN BE CONSIDERED IF INVESTMENTS ARE PROGRAMMED
- WORK CURRENTLY PERFORMED IN-HOUSE WILL REMAIN IN-HOUSE; WORK OUTSOURCED WILL REMAIN OUTSOURCED
- FMS WORKLOAD WILL CONTINUE AT FY93 LEVELS INTO THE FUTURE (STRAIGHT-LINED)

CAPABILITY

FUNCTIONAL AREAS	FACILITY TYPES
AIR VEHICLES	MODEL/SIMULATION
ELECTRONIC COMBAT	MEASUREMENT FACILITIES
ARMAMENTS/WEAPONS	INTEGRATION LABS
	HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP
	INSTALLED SYSTEMS
	OPEN AIR RANGES

MEASURES OF MERITS FOR EACH FUNCTIONAL AREA

- OVERARCHING MEASURES:

INTERCONNECTIVITY	FACILITY CONDITION
ENVIRONMENTAL	ENCROACHMENT
SPECIALIZED SUPPORT FACILITIES/TARGETS	AVAILABLE AIR, LAND AND SEA SPACE
UNIQUENESS	EXPANDABILITY
GEOGRAPHY/CLIMATE	

- PARTICULAR MEASURES FOR EACH FUNCTIONAL AREA

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JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP FOR MTFs AND GME

- Group Organization
- Process Development
- Current Issues

Dr Martin
Col PANNTOSKI

Organization

Organization of MTF and GME Joint Cross Service Group



Process Development

Major Analysis Assumptions

- MTF will close if base closes unless a sufficient active duty population remains
- Joint Group efforts will focus primarily on peacetime requirements
- Analysis will include facilities with < 300 civilian personnel

Roles of Joint Group and Military Departments

- **Joint Group develops**
  - Analysis assumptions
  - General analytical approach and methodology
  - Categories for study and their definitions
  - Data definitions and measures of merit
  - Relative weights for measures of merit

- **Services**
  - Collect and analyze data
  - Present findings to Joint Cross Service Group
  - Evaluate alternative options recommended by Joint Cross-Services Group

GENERAL ANALYTICAL APPROACH



Categories for Study

- Stand Alone Health Clinics
- Community Hospitals
- Medical Centers

Key Characteristics of Study Design

- Bases capacity on full DoD requirements
- New Costing Methodology for inpatient care
- Considers only Active Duty and Active Duty family members for population measure
- Focuses on downsizing/rightsizing facilities

Other Rightsizing Opportunities

- Consolidation of Services'
  - Biostatistical Activities
  - Interservice Military Training Programs
  - Medical Labs and Research
  - Graduate Medical Education

Current Issues

Pending Policy Issues Related to BRAC 95 Efforts

- Final results of DoD 733 Study
- Legislative Issues relating to Health Care Reform
  - Medicare Subvention
  - Closed Enrollment
  - Third Party Reimbursement

Document Separator

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (UPT) JOINT/CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

Mike Pinsmanteer
Dan Gardner

STATUS

- Category Scope Rationale
  - Pers
  - ARC
  - Pipeline
  - A-Res - Both
- Installations in Category
- Data Call 1 April out
  - Capacity
  - Military Value
- External Policy Issues
  - type of screening
  - type of TRAINER
  - Beddown configuration
  - service methodology

Category Scope Rationale

Installations in the UPT category include all DoD flight programs which support and facilitate selection and training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators to the point of awarding "Wings"

UPT Joint/Cross-Service Group

Installations in Category

• Columbus	AFB	MS
• Corpus Christi	NAS	TX
• Fort Rucker	AATC	AL
• Kingsville	NAS	TX
• Laughlin	AFB	TX
• Meridian	NAS	MS
• Pensacola	NAS	FL
• Randolph*	AFB	TX
• Reese	AFB	TX
• Sheppard	AFB	TX
• Vance	AFB	OK
• Whiting Field	NAS	FL

Euro Navto Joint Jet Trng

* Includes Enhanced Flight Screening sites at Hondo, TX and the Air Force Academy

Document Separator

BRAC 95
Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact

Michael Berger
Study Team Leader

May 19, 1994

Mike Berger

Organizations Represented

ODASD (Economic Reinvestment and BRAC)

Military Departments

OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation

OSD Comptroller

DoD Inspector General

DoD Office of Economic Adjustment

Organization of Joint Cross-Service Group

Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact

Sub-Group on Economic Methodologies
- Subordinate to Full Group
- Concentrates on Technical Issues
- Makes Recommendations, but Decision Making Authority Rests in Full Group

Tasks from DepSecDef January 7, 1994 Memo

Establish guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact

Analyze DoD Component recommendations under guidelines

Develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary

Approach

Review Possible Measures for Economic Impact and Cumulative Economic Impact from the Ground Up

Select Appropriate Measure(s)

Develop Tool for Use by Military Departments and Defense Agencies

Develop Processes and Common Approaches

Issues

Appropriate Measures
- Economic Impact
- Cumulative Economic Impact

Cumulative Economic Impact
- Address Commission and GAO Comments from BRAC 93

Non-DoD Costs

Multipliers
- If Jobs is a Measure

Document Separator

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (UPT) JOINT/CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

STATUS

- Category Scope Rationale
- Installations in Category
- Data Call
  - Capacity
  - Military Value
- External Policy Issues

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