

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE  
AND  
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**



**CONGRESSIONAL HEARING  
WASHINGTON, DC  
TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1995**

**ROOM 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING**

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**CONGRESSIONAL HEARING  
ROOM 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
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**Tuesday, June 13, 1995**

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# Document Separator

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY  
JUNE 13, 1995  
216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING**

8:30-8:35 Opening remarks

**MISSISSIPPI**

8:35-8:40 Sen. Thad Cochran

8:40-8:45 Sen. Trent Lott

8:45-8:50 Rep. Sonny Montgomery

**MISSOURI**

8:53-8:58 Sen. Kit Bond

8:58-9:03 Sen. John Ashcroft

9:03-9:08 Rep. Dick Gephardt

9:08-9:13 Rep. William Clay

9:13-9:18 Rep. James Talent

9:18-9:23 Rep. Ike Skelton

**MONTANA**

9:26-9:31 Sen. Max Baucus

9:31-9:36 Sen. Conrad Burns

9:36-9:41 Rep. Pat Williams

**NEW JERSEY**

9:44-9:49 Sen. Bill Bradley

9:49-9:54 Sen. Frank Lautenberg

9:54-9:59 Rep. Jim Saxton

9:59-10:04 Rep. Chris Smith

10:04-10:09 Rep. Frank Pallone

10:09-10:14 Rep. Robert Menendez

Rep. Dick Zimmer

**NEW YORK**

10:17-10:22 Sen. Pat Moynihan

10:22-10:27 Sen. Al D'Amato

10:27-10:32 Rep. Gary Ackerman

10:32-10:37 Rep. Susan Molinari

10:37-10:42 Rep. Sherwood Boehlert

10:42-10:47 Rep. Jack Quinn

10:47-10:52 Rep. John LaFalce

**NORTH CAROLINA**

10:55-11:00 Rep. David Bonior (D-MI)

11:00-11:05 Rep. Walter Jones

**NORTH DAKOTA**

11:08-11:13 Sen. Kent Conrad  
11:13-11:18 Sen. Byron Dorgan  
11:18-11:23 Rep. Earl Pomeroy

**OHIO**

11:26-11:31 Sen. John Glenn  
11:31-11:36 Sen. Mike Dewine  
11:36-11:41 Rep. Tony Hall  
11:41-11:46 Rep. David Hobson  
11:46-11:51 Rep. Jim Traficant  
11:51-11:56 Rep. Rob Portman  
11:56-12:01 Rep. John Kasich

**OKLAHOMA**

12:04-12:09 Sen. Don Nickles  
12:09-12:14 Sen. Jim Inhofe  
12:14-12:19 Rep. Bill Brewster  
12:19-12:24 Rep. J.C. Watts  
12:24-12:29 Rep. Ernest Istook  
12:29-12:34 Rep. Frank Lucas

**PENNSYLVANIA**

12:37-12:42 Sen. Arlen Specter  
12:42-12:47 Sen. Rick Santorum  
12:47-12:52 Rep. Tom Foglietta  
12:52-12:57 Rep. Robert Borski  
12:57-1:02 Rep. Jon Fox  
1:02-1:07 Rep. Tim Holden  
1:07-1:12 Rep. Curt Weldon  
1:12-1:17 Rep. James Greenwood  
1:17-1:22 Rep. Bud Shuster  
1:22-1:27 Rep. Ron Klink  
1:27-1:32 Rep. William Coyne  
1:32-1:37 Rep. Mike Doyle  
1:37-1:42 Rep. Frank Mascara  
1:42-1:47 Rep. Phil English  
Rep. George Gekas  
Rep. Paul Kanjorski  
Rep. Joe McDade

**PUERTO RICO**

1:50-1:55 Rep. Carlos Romero-Barcelo

**RHODE ISLAND**

1:58-2:03 Sen. Claiborne Pell  
2:03-2:08 Sen. John Chafee  
2:08-2:13 Rep. Jack Reed  
Rep. Patrick Kennedy

**TENNESSEE**

2:16-2:21 Sen. Bill Frist  
2:21-2:26 Sen. Fred Thompson  
2:26-2:31 Rep. Bart Gordon

2:31-2:36 Rep. Harold Ford  
2:36-2:41 Rep. Ed Bryant

#### TEXAS

2:44-2:49 Sen. Phil Gramm  
2:49-2:54 Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison  
2:54-2:59 Rep. Jim Chapman  
2:59-3:04 Rep. Joe Barton  
3:04-3:09 Rep. Lloyd Doggett  
3:09-3:14 Rep. Pete Geren  
3:14-3:19 Rep. Charles Stenholm  
3:19-3:24 Rep. Larry Combest  
3:24-3:29 Rep. Henry Gonzalez  
3:29-3:34 Rep. Lamar Smith  
3:34-3:39 Rep. Henry Bonilla  
3:39-3:44 Rep. Martin Frost  
3:44-3:49 Rep. Frank Tejeda  
3:49-3:54 Rep. Greg Laughlin  
Rep. Kika de la Garza

#### UTAH

3:57-4:02 Sen. Orrin Hatch  
4:02-4:07 Sen. Bob Bennett  
4:07-4:12 Rep. Jim Hansen  
4:12-4:17 Rep. Enid Waldholtz

#### VIRGINIA

4:20-4:25 Sen. John Warner  
4:25-4:30 Sen. Chuck Robb  
4:30-4:35 Rep. Owen Pickett  
4:35-4:40 Rep. Bobby Scott  
4:40-4:45 Rep. Norm Sisisky  
4:45-4:50 Rep. Jim Moran  
4:50-4:55 Rep. Tom Davis

#### WISCONSIN

4:58-5:03 Sen. Herb Kohl  
5:03-5:08 Sen. Russ Feingold  
5:08-5:13 Rep. Thomas Barrett

5:16-5:21 Sen. Richard Shelby  
5:21-5:26 Rep. Bud Cramer  
5:26-5:31 Rep. Tom Lantos  
5:31-5:36 Rep. Maxine Waters  
5:36-5:41 Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard  
5:41-5:46  
5:46-5:51 Rep. Sam Gejdenson  
5:51-5:56 Rep. Rosa DeLauro  
5:56-6:01 Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen  
6:01-6:06 Rep. Charles Canady  
6:06-6:11 Rep. Andy Jacobs  
6:11-6:16 Rep. L.F. Payne  
6:16-6:21 Rep. Tim Hutchinson

6:21-6:26 Rep. Chris Shays  
6:26-6:31 Sen. Ted Stevens  
6:31-6:36 Rep. Dick Durbin  
6:36-6:41 Rep. Anna Eshoo  
6:41-6:46 Rep. Bill Orton  
6:46-6:51 Sen. Spencer Abraham  
6:51-6:56 Rep. Steve Horn  
6:56-7:01 Rep. Dan Burton  
7:01-7:06 Rep. Solomon Ortiz  
7:06-7:11 Rep. Sam Gibbons  
7:11-7:16

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**MISSISSIPPI**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**NAVY:**

NAS Meridian	Close
NTTC Meridian	Close


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

**AIR FORCE:**

Columbus Air Force Base	Close
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# MAP NO. 25

## MISSISSIPPI



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

**NOTES**

**Remarks Given by  
SENATOR THAD COCHRAN**

**Before the  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for giving me and my colleagues the opportunity to share our thoughts with you on Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian Naval Air Station, the two installations in Mississippi that will be voted on by the Commission within the next few weeks. We appreciate the visits made by many of the commissioners to each of these bases, and hope you find the information gathered useful in your deliberations. We know that each round of base closure has been more difficult than the last, and in this fourth round there are very few clear-cut votes for you to make. We believe, however, that military requirements support keeping both of our bases open.

Columbus Air Force Base is an undergraduate pilot training base. This base, which was not recommended for closure by the Department of Defense, was added for consideration by the Commission. Four commissioners visited the base last week, and many of you heard testimony on the base at the regional hearing in Atlanta last Friday. The Air Force continues to support keeping the base open, a point clearly and strongly made last week by General Boles, the incoming commander of that service's Air Education and Training Command. It would be a nightmare, in large part due to the process for obtaining environmental permits, to try to recreate elsewhere the bombing range that is in use at Columbus Air

Force Base, and this base also has a surge capacity unmatched within the Air Force Air Education and Training Command. The base has excellent airspace and weather, magnificent runways, no encroachment problems, and has the enthusiastic support of the state and local community. I'm sure those of you who were able to go to Columbus last week felt both the pride of the community in the base and the special bond between the base and the community. The Air Force and the Secretary of Defense made the right decision when they chose not to select Columbus Air Force Base for closure. Your examination of the facts can only lead you to conclude that Columbus is not the Air Force undergraduate pilot training base to close.

Mississippi is also home to Meridian Naval Air Station where, unfortunately, the wrong recommendation was made by a Service, in this case the Navy, and the Defense Department. This base has now been scrutinized by three successive Base Closure Commissions. In 1991, Meridian was added by that Commission for consideration and in 1993 it was recommended for closure by the Department of Defense, as it was this year. Talking to base closure commissions every two years about Meridian is a habit that the local community, the State, and Mississippi's congressional delegation would be happy to break. You will find few bases, if any, that have been as thoroughly and repeatedly scrutinized as NAS Meridian. As the facts supported keeping Meridian open in 1991 and 1993, they do so again in 1995.

You should know that I do not lightly criticize a recommendation by the Department of the Navy. Mississippi is, in many ways, a Navy state, and I consider myself fortunate to have served my time on active duty in

the Navy. Mississippians are proud of Naval Station Pascagoula, a base that was reviewed for closure by the Commission in 1993 but was kept open. We are also proud of our SeaBee base in Gulfport. Ingalls Shipbuilding, in Pascagoula, builds destroyers and amphibious assault ships for the Navy and is our State's largest single employer. Other shipbuilders, like Trinity Halter Marine, build oceanographic research vessels for the Navy and special operations craft for our special operations forces. Mississippi's ties to the Navy are strong, and I find myself in the unnatural position of disagreeing with the Navy's analysis and recommendation on NAS Meridian.

As in 1993, the analysis done by the Navy in 1995 to support its recommendation to close NAS Meridian was poorly done. The Navy's recommendation is based upon its conclusion that it can single-site all undergraduate pilot training at one base. The facts do not support this recommendation. Instead, the facts present the "substantial deviation" necessary for the Commission to overturn a recommendation by the Defense Department.

The primary mission of NAS Meridian is to conduct undergraduate pilot training. In performing its analysis the Navy projected that it would need to train 336 pilots per year, otherwise known as the Navy's "pilot training rate" (PTR). Based upon its analysis the Navy concluded that it could close NAS Meridian and conduct all of its UPT training at NAS Kingsville, provided that NAS Corpus Christi is used as an outlying airfield. The Navy concluded that Kingsville and Corpus Christi have sufficient capacity to satisfy the projected PTR. These are fine bases, and

my disagreement with the Navy's recommendation should not be viewed as criticism of either of them. My disagreement with the Navy's recommendation is made solely on the basis of the fact that only so much training can be done at any one facility, no matter how good the facility is.

The PTR provided by the Navy to the Commission is wrong, by the Navy's own admission. If asked when he testifies tomorrow, Admiral Boorda will confirm what I just said. Only last week there was an article in *Defense News*, which I'd like to submit for the record, where senior Navy officials say that the Navy will have to keep six additional squadrons in its force structure that it had planned to decommission by 1997. I'd also like to enter into the record a recent memorandum from Admiral Boorda, dated 10 May 1995, which directs his staff to increase the PTR from 336 -- the number supplied to the Commission by the Navy -- to 360, the result of keeping six additional squadrons in the force structure. As the Navy's numbers are changing, I don't know how anyone can determine if 360 is any more valid as the PTR than 336, or if 360 is only an intermediate stop enroute to a higher number. Indeed, because E-2/C-2 training is built into the strike training PTR, the PTR has actually gone up to 382, as acknowledged in a letter from Admiral Boorda to my esteemed colleague, Sonny Montgomery, on May 25.

In 1993 the Navy published both its strike PTR requirement and the PTR capacity at each of its strike UPT bases. In 1995 the Navy published its PTR requirement but didn't establish the PTR capacity of its strike UPT bases, instead publishing the "operations per hour" each base could perform. You have to wonder why the Navy was willing to compare

apples to apples in 1993, but wants you to compare apples to oranges in 1995. I don't understand why the Navy doesn't want you to have the facts you need.

Analysis conducted by the Meridian Team that has been shared with the Base Closure Commission staff clearly demonstrates that one base cannot conduct all of the strike undergraduate pilot training. Admiral Hayden, the Chief of Naval Air Training, has gone so far as to acknowledge that at a PTR of 360 there is no surge capability. And when the E-2/C-2 training rate is included, as it must be, the PTR comes out to be 382. If you are willing to believe the Navy's numbers, at best there is no surge capability if you single-site strike undergraduate pilot training. Should any of us be willing to accept a situation where the Navy cannot surge its training infrastructure to meet its needs in a crisis?

Furthermore, if you believe the Navy's numbers are correct then you must also accept the idea that effective training can be conducted without any margin for error; that is, without any maintenance problems, weather problems, or personnel problems, day in and day out, every week of the year. Common sense dictates that it is not possible to run any organization at 100% efficiency for sustained periods of time before serious problems occur. Do we want to train our young pilots under these circumstances?


Your charter is to save the Defense Department money by closing or realigning unnecessary infrastructure while at the same time maintaining enough infrastructure for the military to be able to carry out its many

missions. It will not be possible to wring every last bit of excess capacity from the Defense Department's infrastructure, nor should that be the goal unless we think it inconceivable that our military will ever have to be larger than it is today or have to surge its training capacity. Ask the CNO tomorrow if he believes the Navy can meet its mission requirements without NAS Meridian. Ask him if he is comfortable with the idea of depending upon one base for strike undergraduate pilot training, if he thinks that one base is even adequate to fulfill the Navy's mission needs in the coming years.

Back in December, in a speech given before the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Chairman Dixon said, "Base closing...should not be simply a budget-cutting tactic. It should be undertaken to reduce our defense infrastructure in a deliberate way that will improve our long-term military readiness and insure that we are spending taxpayer dollars in the most efficient way possible. We should not make hasty decisions that will eliminate important military assets based on our near-term budget imperatives." The boundaries for the Commission could not have been more clearly stated.

There is a saying in the Army, "The more you train in peace, the less you bleed in war." We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that the training conducted at both Columbus Air Force Base and NAS Meridian is among the most demanding training given to our young men and women in the military. There is no margin for error. As Chairman Dixon said in December, we should conduct our training "...in the most efficient way possible." Efficiency is exactly the right goal; to do less than that would

be to send our forces into combat unprepared, as has happened to our military too many times in this century. While we strive for efficiency in training, we can't ever be sure of exactly what perfect efficiency looks like, and I am worried that some would have you go so close to the edge that we end up passing through "efficiency" and into "inadequacy" in our training. You have the facts to demonstrate that military requirements necessitate keeping both Columbus AFB and NAS Meridian open. I urge you to do so. Thank you.



DEFENSE NEWS FILE PHOTO

The U.S. Navy will replace two squadrons of A-6s (above) with F/A-18s starting

in 1997. The move is part of an effort to meet the service's stated need for 50 strike fighters per aircraft carrier.

## Navy Plans F-18 Expansion To Counter Strike Shortfall

By ROBERT HOLZER  
Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Six squadrons of U.S. Navy A-6 and F-14 aircraft will be replaced with F/A-18 fighters over the next five years under a \$1 billion plan to address a looming shortfall in tactical aircraft.

"This is a plan in development," Rear Adm. Brent Bennett, director of naval aviation, said in a May 24 interview. "We know we have the requirement to fill our carrier decks in 1998 and beyond, and it needs to be addressed. How we actually address it still involves the balance between the Marine Corps and Navy requirements and resources."

Under the Navy's preferred plan, two A-6

squadrons would begin the transition to F/A-18s in 1997, and up to four F-14 squadrons could also be converted to fly F/A-18s during the same period, Navy officials said. It takes on average about two years to fully shift a squadron from one type of aircraft, like the A-6, to fly and maintain a completely new aircraft, Navy officials said.

Since those aircraft, pilots and maintenance personnel already were scheduled to be decommissioned by 1997, it is imperative that the Navy continue to fund those squadrons as they shift to the F/A-18 aircraft to avoid near-term shortfalls and the greater expense of re-forming those needed squadrons from scratch, Bennett said.

See **SHORTFALL**, Page 37

May 29-June 4, 1995 **DEFENSE NEWS 37**

# U.S. Navy Plans To Re-Equip Six Squadrons With F/A-18

**SHORTFALL**, From Page 4

If the squadrons are disbanded, it will be more costly to re-equip that capability at a later date.

The cost could range anywhere from \$500 million to more than \$1 billion, depending on the needs of the overseas commanders, Navy aviation officials said. The ultimate number of squadrons to be converted also could

Corps F/A-18 squadrons are integrated into Navy carrier airwing operations.

In reducing its force structure over the last four years, the Navy cut too deeply into its carrier airwing force and now faces a near-term shortfall of about six F/A-18 squadrons. Not rectifying the shortfall would leave the Navy without enough attack aircraft to meet its stated requirement of maintaining 50 strike-

That mix will be composed of 36 F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and 14 F-14 Tomcats.

To meet that strike-fighter requirement the Navy will need 30 F/A-18 squadrons, Bennett said, adding that the Marine inventory of 22 F/A-18 squadrons also has proved to be too limited to meet the Corps' needs as well as the Navy's shortfall.

"We overshot in terms of what

yond for a number of reasons," Bennett said, "not the least of which is that the requirement has not decreased at all. We still have tremendous demands on our carriers and the Marine Corps has tremendous demands on their F/A-18 squadrons."

Under a 1993 agreement between the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Marines agreed to integrate up to three F/A-18 squadrons for use aboard Navy carriers

also has witnessed no decrease in operational requirements, Corps officials said.

At the end of the Cold War, "There was the perception that requirements would logically go down. Now that has proven to not be the case," Bert Cooper, an aircraft analyst with the Congressional Research Service, said May 26. "You can make an argument that Third World threats are difficult to predict and are nebulous,



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20360-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1542  
Ser N889J6/5U665128  
10 May 95

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER AVIATION TRAINING  
REQUIREMENTS, JOINT USN/USAF TRAINING RATES

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889JG/4U661666 of 20 Jul 1994

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 95-00  
(2) NFO Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 95-00

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect training requirements to support fleet, Joint USN/USAF, USCG, FMS, and NOAA requirements.

2. USN PTR beginning in FY-98 and NFOTR beginning in FY-97 reflect a phased increase in production to address the outfitting of four (4) EA-6B squadrons to take over the USAF EF-111 mission and the transition of six (6) TACAIR squadrons to F/A-18 squadrons across the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). F/A-18E/F fleet introduction team (FIT) and fleet replacement squadron (FRS) requirements are also included.

3. PTR in FY-96/97 and NFOTR in FY-96 could not be increased over levels published in ref (a) to match an ideal production schedule to meet para. 2 force changes. Compounding this situation, PTR/NFOTR from FY 92-94 was artificially reduced below "fleet requirements" in order to shrink student pools. PTR/NFOTR listed in enclosures (1) and (2) is designed to reestablish production rates to meet and sustain fleet requirements by FY-98 and out.

4. This letter also represents the first publication of joint USAF requirement numbers that will be produced by CNATRA.

5. OPNAV point on contact is CDR Tom Donovan, N889J6, A/V 224-6013, commercial (703) 614-6013 Fax (703) 693-9795.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. T. RITTENOUR".

H. T. RITTENOUR  
By direction

Distribution:

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COMDT COGARD (G-PO-2/23, TO-7/7)  
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CNATRA (OO, N019, N-1, N-2, N-3, N-32, N-34, N-7)  
COMNAVAIRESFOR (CODE 51)  
COMNAVCRUITCOM (CODE 311)  
NAVDEPNOAA  
NETSAFA  
NAVMAC (CODE 3)

## PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

	STRIKE	MARITIME	E-6A TAC	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
<b>FY-95</b>						
USN	163	118	22	36	184	523
USMC	110	31		0	181	322
CG	0	10		0	45	55
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	22		0	0	22
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>303</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>1064</b>
<b>FY-96</b>						
USN	183	118	22	36	184	543
USMC	106	29		0	181	316
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	35		0	0	35
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>319</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>1086</b>
<b>FY-97</b>						
USN	203	124	22	36	184	569
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	113		0	0	113
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>1181</b>
<b>FY-98</b>						
USN	227	128	22	36	220	633
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>511</b>	<b>1279</b>
<b>FY-99</b>						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>1291</b>
<b>FY-00</b>						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>1291</b>

## NFO TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

FY-95	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	75	0	0	35	122	271
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
IMT	0	0	10	10	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>346</b>
FY-96	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	95	0	0	35	128	297
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	29	38	21	0	88
IMT	25	0	40	11	0	15	91
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>507</b>
FY-97	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	139	0	0	40	128	355
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>838</b>
FY-98	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	118	0	0	35	128	329
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>812</b>
FY-99	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>805</b>
FY-00	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>805</b>

REMARKS OF HON. G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY  
BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING  
JUNE 13, 1995

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS. I HAVE MOVED FROM THE FRONT ROW TO THE PULPIT TODAY. TOMORROW I WILL BE BACK ON THE FRONT ROW.

I AM HERE TODAY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF TWO BASES-- MERIDIAN NAVAL AIR STATION AND COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE.

THREE OF YOU HAVE BEEN TO MERIDIAN NAVAL AIR STATION AND GEN. J. B. DAVIS HAS AGREED TO GO THERE ON FRIDAY.

COMMISSIONERS CORNELLA AND STEELE VISITED MERIDIAN ON JUNE 8, BUT THE 90 DEGREE HEAT DIDN'T PREVENT AN ESTIMATED 20,000 PEOPLE FROM COMING OUT IN SUPPORT. WHEN GEN. ROBLES VISITED, WE HAD 12,000 PEOPLE AND ONLY 70 DEGREE WEATHER.

THE NAVY MERIDIAN TEAM MAKES A STRONG CASE THAT THE NAVY WAS ON SHAKY GROUND IN SAYING IT COULD MEET FUTURE PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AT JUST ONE BASE.

SINCE MERIDIAN WAS PUT ON THE CLOSURE LIST, THINGS HAVE CHANGED. THE NAVY SAYS IT NEEDS MORE AIR SQUADRONS AND HAS REVISED THE PILOT TRAINING RATE (PTR) FROM 336 TO 382. AND NOW THE NAVY SAYS IF MERIDIAN IS CLOSED, IT NEEDS TO BE KEPT OPEN FOR TWO MORE YEARS, FROM 1999 TO 2001.

YOU HAVE SEEN THE LETTER TO ME FROM ADMIRAL MIKE BOORDA, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, WHERE HE SAYS THAT OPERATING AT MAXIMUM CAPACITY AT ONE BASE TO MEET THE PROJECTED PTR WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND UNCOMFORTABLE.

THE ADMIRAL ALSO SAYS IT WOULD BE UNSATISFACTORY IF THE NAVY HAD TO INCREASE PTR FOR A SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL SURGE REQUIREMENT.

TO REACH THE REQUIRED PTR AT ONLY ONE BASE, NAS KINGSVILLE WOULD HAVE TO OPERATE AT NEAR CAPACITY, INCLUDING INCREASED WORK DAYS. OPERATING AT THAT LEVEL SIMPLY DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A SURGE IN PTR.

ALSO, WITH ONLY ONE STRIKE BASE, A TORNADO OR HURRICANE HITTING KINGSVILLE PUTS THE NAVY OUT OF BUSINESS IN TRAINING CARRIER PILOTS.

IN VOTING TO KEEP MERIDIAN OPEN, THE 1993 BRAC COMMISSION FOUND THAT TWO FULL STRIKE TRAINING BASES WERE NEEDED WHEN PTR WAS 384. THE PROJECTED PTR IS NOW UP TO 382.

NAS MERIDIAN HAS DIFFERENT MISSIONS. FIRST, THE TRAINING OF AVIATORS TO LAND AND FLY OFF CARRIERS; SECOND, THE NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER, WHICH TRAINS 5,000 SAILORS AND MARINES EACH YEAR; THIRD, THE ANTI-DRUG SCHOOL THAT WAS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE; FOURTH, THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL RESERVE, HAS SAID IF MERIDIAN IS NOT CLOSED, HE WILL MOVE A 200 PERSON RESERVE UNIT FROM JACKSON TO MERIDIAN.

THE CRITERIA GUIDING THIS COMMISSION GIVES PRIORITY TO MILITARY VALUE. THE FACTS ARE CLEAR THAT FOR OPERATIONAL READINESS, THE NAVY NEEDS TWO STRIKE TRAINING BASES.

(PAUSE)

I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT FOUR COMMISSIONERS VISITED COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE JUNE 7 AND 8.

THE KEY WORD WITH COLUMBUS IS FLEXIBILITY. IT CAN SUPPORT ANY OF THE FIVE AIR FORCE FLYING MISSIONS. HAVING ONCE BEEN A STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND BASE, IT HAS THE LONGEST RUNWAY IN THE SOUTHEAST AT 12,000 FEET. IT CAN ACCOMMODATE ANY AIRCRAFT IN THE INVENTORY.

IN ADDITION, COLUMBUS IS THE ONLY UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING BASE WITH THE USE OF A GUNNERY RANGE. THAT IS A BIG PLUS. IT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY TO BUILD ANOTHER RANGE SOMEWHERE ELSE IN THE COUNTRY.

IT HAS AN ABUNDANCE OF AIR SPACE AND NO ENCROACHMENT PROBLEMS OF ANY KIND.

STRONG COMMUNITY SUPPORT BROUGHT THIS BASE TO COLUMBUS IN 1941 AND THAT RELATIONSHIP IS JUST AS STRONG TODAY.

THE AIR FORCE AND THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE STUDY GROUP BOTH RANKED COLUMBUS AS THE NUMBER ONE UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING BASE.

THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO BASES WITH THE ABILITY TO ADAPT TO NEW MISSIONS. COLUMBUS IS IN THAT

CATEGORY.

THAT CAPABILITY, ALONG WITH ITS UPDATED FACILITIES, AIR SPACE AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE TO KEEP COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE OPEN.

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY.

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**MISSOURI**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**ARMY:**

Aviation-Troop Command

Disestablish


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 26

## MISSOURI



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

Statement in Support of the  
Army Aviation and Troop Command  
Before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Rep. Jim Talent (2nd - MO)

June 13, 1995

Before I start I'd like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Commissioners and their staff who are working so diligently to assess the merits of each recommendation and argument put before them.

Having said that, I'd like to discuss Army readiness this morning as it relates to the proposed disestablishment of the Army Aviation and Troop Command from St. Louis and its relocation to Natick, Massachusetts; Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Detroit; and also to Huntsville, Alabama.

While the actual cost in terms of new buildings, real estate, leased facilities, infrastructure, and additional overhead can be measured with considerable accuracy and confidence, the issue of readiness as it relates to ATCOM has yet to be fully addressed.

I'd like to focus attention this morning squarely on Army aviation readiness, especially as it relates to the proposed closing of the ATCOM installation in St. Louis, and whether or not the Army will retain the skilled personnel who represent an enormous asset to our services.

By my estimates, we will probably lose between 50 and 80 percent of the roughly 400 engineers and 400 logisticians who presently work at ATCOM. These people represent a collective body of knowledge that the Army will simply lose -- and then have to completely recreate at another installation. Without wanting to exaggerate the point, this relearning process will probably take from between three and five years. In the mean time, this crawl-walk-run scenario will, at the user level, manifest itself in terms of shortcomings in acquisitions, logistics, and in engineering.

For instance, because so many of the more experienced ATCOM employees will remain in the St. Louis area, we can realistically expect greater delays in parts requisitions, which will reflect in greater maintenance backlogs, because parts will be slower in working their way through the "pipeline." This, in turn, means that any given aviation battalion's operational readiness rate will drop considerably. The average Army aviation unit's fully mission capable "O-R" rating today is around 70 to 75 percent; however, if this proposed relocation takes place, we can expect that rating to drop, possibly to as low as 50 percent, and remain below average for as long as it takes to reestablish the Command's expertise.

In addition, we can also expect that response time to Safety of Flight (SOF) decisions will be delayed due to the loss of

experienced engineering personnel. To convey the importance of this matter, when a given fleet of, for instance, CH-47s, is grounded for some reason, ATCOM engineers must issue a Safety of Flight authorization before those helicopters can once again fly. Until then, the fleet is grounded. Over the past year, ATCOM has issued 16 such Safety of Flight authorizations.

Finally, I'd like to illustrate the importance of ATCOM's day-to-day operations. We all recall the tragedy of Desert One. At that time, we put a total of, I believe, 6 SH-53s into the air in support of that rescue mission. And I recall that a day or two later, former President Nixon remarked that we should have had a great many more helicopters involved. But the unfortunate truth was that maintenance problems, amongst other concerns, doomed the mission from the start. The support system that ATCOM maintains today wasn't there when we needed it during the days of the "Hollow Force." Next, contrast that tragedy with the success of last week's rescue mission. Everything worked as it had to work. ATCOM's business, in part, is to keep these birds in the air.

One other consideration warrants discussion. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, led by Mr. John White, has recommended that DOD collocate "all Army, Navy, and Air Force program management offices responsible for development, production, and support of military aircraft and related equipment."

As Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. White will have primary responsibility for implementing this recommendation. Will it actually take place? That remains to be seen. And since implementation of this recommendation will cause ATCOM's aviation functions to be collocated with similar functions at a yet to be determined site, the transfer of ATCOM's aviation functions to Huntsville would be an expense of over \$100 million in moving and construction costs that we can ill afford, and this says nothing of the turmoil, degradation in readiness and operational effectiveness that this move plus any follow-on move would have on the Aviation Command's ability to accomplish its missions.

Our long-term objective must be the same as the Army's Stationing Strategy: to "optimize the operational efficiency of the Army's Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation, and material/maintenance management functions." Based on this reasoning, we should set aside this proposal, and instead seek to integrate this Command's responsibilities within a reorganization concept that is more strategic in scope.

In closing, I'd like to repeat a very keen and simple observation that General Shalikashvili made in testimony before the House National Security Committee earlier this spring: That our personnel, especially those with years of leadership experience and specialized knowledge - and I dare say wisdom in a good many instances - are the Army's greatest asset. While it

may take ten years to design and produce a given weapons systems, it usually takes about 18 years to prepare an officer for battalion command, and well over 20 years for division command. The critical investment that we've made in each of these individuals is, in many respects, immeasurable. Much the same can be said of our more experienced ATCOM personnel. They are part of a proven team that will simply go away if this relocation takes place.

**BRAC hearing statement. June 13 1995**

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners... First, I want to thank you for affording all of us , the Senators and Congressmen of Missouri, an opportunity to address you on this issue of not only local but national import; the streamlining of our national defense infrastructure.

There are three specific issues I wish to address, the Army Publications Center in St. Louis, Fort Leonard Wood, and ATCOM.

**The St. Louis Army Publications Office.**

I fully support the Army's plan to consolidate the Army Publications Center's operations in St. Louis. I understand that construction of an additional loading bay, scheduled to begin this year has been approved by the Secretary of the Army and the funds have been released to accomplish this. So, M.

Chairman we are on our way to insuring that this move occur

with minimal if any impact on operations.

**Fort Leonard Wood.**

Mr.Chairman, I know that the move of the Army's Chemical Warfare Training School and Military Police School to new facilities on Fort Leonard Wood has been a contentious issue, though it shouldn't be.

Mr. Chairman, I know that the Commission is well aware of the commitment and support the people of Missouri have for this move.

We have had to face the well financed onslaught of the "friends of Fort McClellan"....and I do believe that we have successfully defended the Army's plan and exposed the subterfuge of those opposed to the move to the light of day. Even TIME magazine in its May 22 issue characterizes these opponents as conducting "guerrilla warfare to sabotage the move... and blackmail." The desperate methods employed by these people have created

much havoc during this process, extending even to the floors of Congress where they have attempted to slip into unrelated legislation during the dark of night, draconian regulatory restrictions upon future Army facilities while exempting the Alabama site from even a modicum of regulation.

We are aware that there is a classified meeting to be held shortly that was requested by the "friends of Fort McClellan" which will address the impact of the move of the Chemical Warfare facility on the United States' ability to fulfill its commitment to the Chemical Warfare Convention. We have spoken with the Department of Defense and have been assured that there is no threat to our National security, nor to our ability to meet our commitments due to the move and that the DoD has fully considered this issue and are anxious to put it to rest, as well.

I would also like to submit to the Commission, here, a summary of a survey conducted by people from Missouri, not some group in the employ of Missouri's opposition, and request

that I be allowed to submit the survey in its entirety for the record.

Commissioners, M. Chairman, I know you are aware of extensive regulatory oversight and permitting requirements this move has required of the Army and the state of Missouri. M. Chairman I am proud to let you know at this time, that Gov. Carnahan has signed the final permit and I have a copy of it here for the Commission. M. Chairman, this oversight and regulation process though to some seems tedious, has been necessary to insure the safety of the personnel at the facilities, the local resident population, the environment and national security overall. These will be the finest, state of the art facilities designed to keep our soldiers superbly trained and ready.

### **ATCOM**

On the other hand, M. Chairman the proposal to disperse the Army's Aviation and Troop Command will be found to be unwise

and dated as it does not reflect proposals of the DoD's Roles and Missions Commission.

The Army's Management Control Plan clearly shows that leased facilities were excluded from a military value assessment, a critical factor for all other base closure determinations. The GAO has found no documentation even "supporting an analysis of, or addressing the military value" of leased facilities.

The Army has based its decision to close ATCOM primarily on personnel savings. The 786 positions they anticipate to eliminate does not reflect the 533 positions that must be retained if ATCOM is closed. As a result of this overestimation, the Army's return on investment takes ten times as long and annual savings are cut by over two-thirds.

The Army has also created a new command infrastructure to include a General Officer and staff at the soldier system command at Natick. To the best of our knowledge, the Army has  
(Nay-dick)

not calculated this in its personnel savings assumptions. In our opinion, this expands rather than consolidates the Army's infrastructure, in direct opposition to the BRAC mandate.

Additionally, leaving behind the hundreds of highly trained workers and reestablishing their positions and training their replacements, essentially rebuilding the program from scratch will affect readiness.

We believe that the combined effect of downsizing ATCOM in place and moving the Space and Strategic Defense Command to Redstone will result in an immediate return on investment and save \$150 million in military construction costs.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, chaired by Mr. John White, has recommended that DoD collocate "all Army, Navy, and Air Force program management offices responsible for development, production, and support of military aircraft and related equipment." As Deputy Secy of Defense, Mr. White will be responsible for implementing this recommendation. Why then, would we want to spend millions of

dollars to disperse ATCOM to the four corners of the United States only to have it re-consolidated and relocated to a DoD-wide site in a few short years. This, especially when the return on investment for the current proposal won't occur until well after our children will have children, so in all likelihood the savings will never be achieved.

Commissioners, the Army's numbers continue to change and the Army has yet to provide documentation to support their current guess. The delegation's numbers reflect current Army reports. We believe that an objective case has been made that moving ATCOM will increase annual overhead and infrastructure costs, has high one-time costs, and does not achieve any savings that would not occur from downsizing ATCOM in place. In addition with the new revelation from the Roles and Missions Commission, the move would reflect poor headwork when service wide collocation occurs in the next few years. For all these reasons and because better alternatives exist, we believe the Army's recommendation to close ATCOM is ill

advised.

Thank you M. Chairman and Commissioners.

**FORT LEONARD WOOD  
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY  
MAY 18-20, 1995**

This 456 person telephone survey was conducted May 18 through May 20, 1995. Survey participants were randomly selected from voter registration polls in the counties of Pulaski, Laclede and Phelps, Missouri. The purpose of this survey was to elicit current public opinion regarding the proposed relocation of the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri from Fort McClellan in Alabama. This proposed relocation has become the focus of recent media attention due to a public relations campaign sponsored by civic groups in the Fort McClellan area attempting to prevent the closure of this Army installation in Alabama and its relocation to Missouri. This survey sought to test the current sentiment of persons in the Fort Leonard Wood region regarding the desirability and perceived safety of the relocation of Chemical and Military Police Training Schools to this area.

Its still the economy! Almost 28% of the survey participants, responding to an open-ended question, stated that the need for economic growth in the local community and jobs/unemployment were the primary issues facing the Fort Leonard Wood region. Crime and the growth of street gangs were cited as the next most important problem in the area at 15.86% (Table 1. Survey Results). Thus, it is understandable that of the 85.24% stating that they believed that Fort Leonard Wood has a positive effect on the area (Table 3. Survey Results), 98.48% said that the employment and local economic impact the military base provides are the primary reasons the base presence is positive. Indeed, only 12.86% (58 people) felt that the base has any negative impact on the region (Table 5. Survey Results). Those reporting a negative impact cited military personal or a personal dislike for the military as their reasons for believing Fort Leonard Wood is negative (Table 6. Survey Results.) A total of 89.14% of those interviewed stated that they believed Fort Leonard Wood was "vital" to the local economy (Table 2. Survey Results.)

lengths to keep the military schools if they were a public health hazard (Table 15. Survey Results.) Further, 87.91% stated that they believed that the main reason for the campaign financed by Alabama groups to keep the Chemical and Military Police Schools at Fort McClellan was to save the loss of some 10,600 direct and indirect jobs in Alabama (Table 16. Survey Results.)

67.11% of the survey participants said they favored the relocation of the Chemical and Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood and only 6.40% oppose the relocation. The remaining 26.49% of those surveyed had no opinion or were undecided regarding the proposed move. This is a nonpartisan issue, with Democrats, Republicans and Independents supporting the relocation of the Chemical and Military Police Schools in similar numbers. Those in Pulaski County favor the move most strongly as do those in the higher income categories and those above the age of 34 (Table 18. Survey Results.) Again, its the economy. In response to an open-ended query, the proposed base relocation was supported because it was seen to: provide jobs (37.36%), help the area generally (35.47%), and aid the economy (26.42%) (Table 19. Survey Results). Of the 29 persons providing a reason for not wanting the base relocation, 51.72% said they were concerned about the possible risk from chemicals and 37.93% said they simply felt "it was not necessary" (Table 20. Survey Results.)

STATE OF MISSOURI  
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

MISSOURI AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION



## PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT

Under the authority of RSMo 643 and the Federal Clean Air Act the applicant is authorized to construct the facility described below, in accordance with the laws, rules, and conditions as set forth herein.

Permit Number: 0695-010 Facility I.D. Number: 3860-0004-015  
Owner: U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood  
Owner's Address: Department of Defense  
Facility Name: U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood  
Facility Address: ATTN: ATZT-DPW-EE; Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473  
Legal Description: Pulaski County, All or parts of T33, 34, 35N,  
R10, 11, 12W

Application for Authority to Construct was made for:

\*\*\*\* Permission to construct a static and mobile fog oil smoke training facility. This review was conducted in accordance with Section (8), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Construction Permits Required." \*\*\*\*

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- Special Conditions are not applicable to this permit.  
 Special Conditions do apply to this permit and are listed as attachments starting on page 2.

June 7 1995

John A. Young

Overall, those surveyed had a high degree of awareness (73.63%) of the Fort McClellan base closing and relocation issue (Table 9. Survey Results.) 46.44% of the survey participants had read, seen, or heard that the Fort McClellan base closing and relocation to Fort Leonard Wood was positive since it would further improve the local economy and 36.33% were "aware" that it would provide new jobs in Missouri (Table 10. Survey Results.) Regarding negative opinions seen, read, or heard about the proposed relocation (Table 11. Survey Results); 43.51% had not been exposed to any negative information, 37.79% had heard that the relocation would bring in potentially harmful chemicals, and 12.98% were aware of opinions that the relocation would harm the environment. The most interesting fact is that, despite the exposure to these negative opinions, 83.41% of these persons (217 of 261) continue to favor the relocation of the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood.

The majority of survey respondents, 66.23%, believed that the Chemical and Military Schools will not pose a threat to public health in and around Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. However, 22.30% remain undecided about this issue (Table 12. Survey Results.)

Unsolicited comments during the telephone interviews suggested that the Fort Leonard Wood residents empathized with the Fort McClellan community and felt they could understand the need for those residents to attempt to retain the base in Alabama. This reaction was supported in that less than 17% of the respondents stated that they would be extremely or very angry and upset if they learned that civic groups near Fort McClellan, Alabama are paying for a campaign to convince people in the Fort Leonard Wood area to oppose the transfer of the training schools so that they may remain in Alabama. 18.72% said they would be "somewhat" angry and upset and 38.77% responded they would not be angry or upset "at all" (Table 14. Survey Results.)

However, the residents of Fort Leonard Wood are not easily persuaded; 70.11% stated that they did not believe that those near Fort McClellan would go to such

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HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADER RICHARD A. GEPHARDT  
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT  
COMMISSION ON THE ARMY'S AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND  
TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1995

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Senator Dixon and members of the Commission:

For weeks now, you've heard testimony against various base closings, often arguing that the armed services' numbers simply don't add up. While that sort of argument may seem compelling, that's not the argument I intend to make. In the case of the Army's Aviation and Troop Command -- ATCOM -- the numbers do add up. The problem is that they're the wrong numbers. Let me explain.

The Army claims that while the closure of ATCOM will cost 152 million dollars, it will also result in the elimination of 786 jobs -- saving 56 million dollars each year, and yielding a return on the investment in just three years.

Despite requests from your staff, the Army hasn't provided any analysis to support these reductions. At the same time, your staff has received Army data which shows that only 48 civilian positions could be eliminated through the closure of ATCOM. I'd like to summarize this data for you:

-- The Army has included savings from 205 positions that will be eliminated at ATCOM regardless of any base closure. The Army's own base closure plan agrees that these positions should not be counted as savings.

-- The Army claimed savings from 56 positions that must remain in St. Louis to fulfill contractual obligations to other federal agencies, such as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, FEMA, and the Department of Agriculture.

-- The Army claimed savings from 90 positions that must be maintained and transferred to receiving bases to perform base operations functions.

-- The Army claimed savings from 387 positions that must be maintained and transferred to receiving bases, in order to keep performing ATCOM's functions at these other sites.

The bottom line is that if you subtract these positions from the Army's claim of 786 personnel cuts, then only a measly 48 positions can be eliminated by closing ATCOM. Translating this into costs and savings, ATCOM's closure will still cost 152 million dollars, but will achieve no annual savings and no return on investment -- ever.

And you don't have to take from me. Take it from the Army's own officers -- the people

who will have to put this proposal into practice.

-- First, ATCOM's Deputy Commander has confirmed that these personnel must be kept regardless of their location for the Army to continue performing its aviation support functions.

-- Second, the Tank Command in Detroit and the Communications Command in New Jersey have confirmed that additional personnel will have to be transferred from ATCOM to ensure that the Army's operations in these areas continue.

-- Finally, for Redstone Arsenal, the Army Materiel Command has determined that any shortfall in the number of personnel transferred from ATCOM will be filled by excess personnel presently at Redstone.

When I learned this last piece of information, I asked "how many excess personnel does Redstone Arsenal have?" According to the Army's own Stationing and Installation Plan, Redstone Arsenal currently has 900 more personnel than it needs to perform its missions.

This is astounding to me. By the Army's own admission, it is planning to use the closure of ATCOM to solve an overstaffing problem at Redstone Arsenal. As far as I'm concerned, if the Army has too many people at Redstone, it should downsize there. It shouldn't waste over 150 million dollars to move ATCOM functions and kick over 700 people out the door in St. Louis -- people who have dedicated their careers to our nation's defense -- in order to avoid hard choices at Redstone. ATCOM has made these kinds of tough decisions over the past several years, reducing over 3,000 personnel since 1989. Now it's Redstone's turn.

You all know that the BRAC process was not intended to allow DOD to arbitrarily pick winners and losers among its civilian personnel. It was intended to reduce the cost of government to the taxpayer. Closing ATCOM simply wouldn't achieve this goal.

Furthermore, the strength of our Defense Department comes from its people. They are some of the most highly skilled, trained, and dedicated people in our entire nation. This is true for each unit of each branch in the military, and I know that it's particularly true of the individuals that make up ATCOM.

When considering the closure of ATCOM, we have to consider the fate of its employees, because the Army's case for closing the facility rests on the assumption that hundreds can be laid off if ATCOM's functions are transferred somewhere else. As you know, reducing personnel is often a good place to look for savings, but it also can incur even higher costs and disrupt the lives of those who are dedicated to our nation's defense. That's why we must be very careful when deciding to close any facility based on expected personnel cuts.

The Army has presented a straightforward case in which its personnel cuts appear to add up -- provided you consider them in a vacuum and don't ask for any data to back them up.

Therefore, I ask that you not simply accept the Army's claim that ATCOM's closure will

save money. Instead, look at the true number of personnel that can realistically be eliminated by closing ATCOM. Don't let the Army solve a personnel problem at one base by causing pain and hardship in another community hundreds of miles away. This is the very least the employees of ATCOM can ask.

I thank you for this opportunity to discuss ATCOM -- and I hope my testimony is helpful as you make this very difficult decision.

# # #

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congressman

ike skelton



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**NEWS RELEASE**

2227 Rayburn Building • Washington, D.C.  
(202) 225-2876 • FAX (202) 225-2695

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
Tuesday, June 13, 1995

Contact: Amy Blankenship  
(202) 225-2876

**TESTIMONY OF U.S. REP. IKE SKELTON (D-MO)  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, DC  
JUNE 13, 1995**

"Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I support the Department of Defense and Army recommendation to move the Army Chemical and Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood.

"Because of the ending of the Cold War, our country has downsized its military considerably, and continues to do so. The Army, just prior to the Gulf War in 1990, had 764,000 active duty soldiers. Today, there are 532,000 soldiers. Pentagon plans call for an Army of 475,000, which I don't like, but that's what the Pentagon wants.

"Thus, it is necessary for the Army to close bases. If the Army is forced to keep unneeded infrastructure, we will be forced to have a hollow

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**SKELTON TESTIMONY**  
**Tuesday, June 13, 1995**  
**Page 2 of 2**

river-crossing training, counter-drug operations, operations in rear areas and protection of supply routes training.

"Second, Fort Leonard Wood is a logical location for all these schools. It has 63,000 acres, 17,000 more than Fort McClellan. Fort Leonard Wood has 26 percent more work space, 66 percent more family housing, and 32 percent more barracks. Fort Leonard Wood facilities can easily accommodate contingencies as it is near transportation outlets. Consolidation allows better use of Army manpower, integrating all three branches in one place.

"Concerning return on investment, the Army computes that there will be a return on investment in six years by moving the schools to Fort Leonard Wood. There will be a \$45 million per year savings.

"The last Base Closure Commission stated: "That if the Secretary of Defense wants to move the Chemical Defense School and Chemical Decontamination Training Facility in the future, the Army should pursue all of the required permits and certification for the new site prior to the 1995 base closure process."

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~~"The permits have been applied for by the~~

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**MONTANA**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**ARMY:**

Ft. Missoula

Close

**AIR FORCE:**

Malmstrom AFB

Realign


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 27

## MONTANA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

STATEMENT BY  
SENATOR CONRAD BURNS (R—MT)

JUNE 13, 1995

BEFORE THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman and other Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. I appreciate your taking the time to hear my comments and those of my colleagues from the Montana Congressional Delegation.

I commend you all for the effort you have made in this process, and I look forward to executing your recommendations as the Military Construction Appropriations Chairman.

This morning I am would like to address the costs and savings logic of the various options open to the Commission.

I strongly believe realigning Malmstrom's 12 KC-135's is foolish because:

- \* it generates a 'suspect' half million dollars in annual savings;
- \* it generates a 20 year net present value cost of \$8.3 million;
- \* it ignores and would 'mothball' over \$100 million in state-of-the-art tanker support facilities.

The cost-savings analysis of the realign Malmstrom scenario is based on:

\* the error in Air Force data which counts as a savings in the costs to run McDill Air Force Base's runway (over \$4 million);

\* the reopening of McDill's runway is a separate recommendation and the costs associated with that independent action (which the Air Force says must occur regardless of Commission recommendations on tankers to McDill) is inappropriate to count in the Malmstrom recommendation;

\* the corrected projected savings of less than half a million dollars annually does not take into account the costs to continue missiles operations. These costs include:

1. new commercial airport hot-pad
2. critical parts support
3. medical evacuation flights

4. commercial mobilization support
5. helicopter air traffic control and weather support

\* after these changes are in place and paid for, annual net costs will accrue from the realign Malmstrom recommendation.

Closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base makes sense because;

- \* it maximizes savings with a total closure:  
it's a clean kill;
- \* the action pays back in one (1) year;
- \* it produces recurring annual savings of over \$87 million;

\* it produces a 20 year net present value of over \$1.088 billion (not million, billion);

\* it eliminates (and allows DoD to excess) capacity of one large aircraft base.

Mr. Chairman and other Commissioners, Malmstrom is a prime location to keep tankers. And if you look at the facts surrounding costs, you'll see it makes sense financially.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning.

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**NEW JERSEY**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**ARMY:**

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal	Close
Camp Kilmer	Close
Camp Pedricktown	Close
Caven Point Army Reserve Center	Close
Ft. Dix	Realign

**NAVY:**


NAWC Lakehurst	Close
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**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

# MAP NO. 31

## NEW JERSEY



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

# NOTES

# CONSOLIDATION AND COLLOCATION OF ROME LAB MISSIONS TO FT. MONMOUTH

THE HONORABLE DICK ZIMMER  
JUNE 13, 1995

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the transformation of modern warfare. It showed that a fully integrated battlefield is increasingly important to our country's military success.

Because of the importance of interoperability of information systems in battle space, U.S. technology supervision must be maximized to fully integrate all elements of the sea-land-air battlefield. This can be done through cross-servicing.

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs agreed with this assessment, recommending

Fort Monmouth as the site for C4I collocation, one of the few interservicing steps taken by the Department of Defense in BRAC 95 and right in line with BRAC 93 guidance for more cross-servicing.

Collocation of the leading Air Force and Army C4I centers will ensure that a coordinated C4I development, procurement, test and implementation plan is pursued. It will promote joint interoperability and create a World Class C4I Center, a National Center of Information Warfare. I believe Fort Monmouth has the expert, experienced staff to lead the DoD effort in C4I. Fort Monmouth is the leader in four mission areas chosen for consolidation at Fort Monmouth: photonics, electromagnetics, radio communication and communications networks.

The Fort has 68 Research and Development Agreements with leading edge academic institutions, including nearby Princeton, Rutgers, New Jersey Institute of Technology and Stevens Institute. It has public/private partnerships with New Jersey leaders in C4I technology, such as AT&T/Bell Labs and ITT and is located in the state that enjoys the highest concentration of scientists and engineers in the nation per capita.

In terms of physical space, Fort Monmouth possesses extensive, low cost expansion capacity. The fort includes more than a thousand acres on the main post and Charles Wood area and has available more than 500 thousand square feet of fully modernized, professional work space.

The fort has state of the art facilities to support the C4I mission, including a variety of unique high technology facilities such as the Digital Integrated Lab. The Myer Center, in particular, includes world class laboratory space and state of the art infrastructure to house the thousands of engineers and scientists who work there today on the cutting edge of information technology.

BRAC and non-BRAC related movements from the post have created significant expansion potential for cross-servicing. This potential is complemented by available housing for military families and the full range of medical, dental, shopping and recreational activities on post to support them.

Fort Monmouth has the ideal integrated commodity command structure, already

predominates the C4I joint arena, and has the physical space and technological and academic environment to make cross-servicing of C4I activities there a success. I strongly support the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations. Thank you.

###

Testimony of Senator Lautenberg  
before the BRAC Commission  
Washington, DC, June 13, 1995

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, it's a pleasure to come before you again today.

I know how much work you and your staff have done these past few months. On behalf of New Jersey and the nation, thank you.

America's current military strategy depends on forward deployment, power projection, and rapid reinforcement. Each of the New Jersey bases on the Pentagon's list -- Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station, Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne, and Fort Dix -- plays an essential role in making our strategy a success.

Lakehurst

As America's permanent military presence overseas is reduced, our forward deployment depends increasingly on the Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups. And make no mistake about it, Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station is the key to America's carrier operations.

Lakehurst is an award-winning pioneer in concurrent engineering. In developing, testing, and -- in the case of some critical components -- manufacturing catapult and arresting gear, Lakehurst brings the entire research-development-testing-engineering cycle under one roof.

The result has been an astounding, near-perfect degree of reliability and safety in American carrier operations, with over 2 million successful launches and retrievals in the past 5 years alone. Even reducing the reliability of Lakehurst's mission by 1/2% means that 6 aircraft and their crews would be lost each day of carrier operations. At that rate, America's strategic choices would be grim: either shut down carrier operations, or suffer losses that in less than a year would exceed our entire inventory of carrier-based aircraft.

Yet, the Pentagon's plans are to dismantle Lakehurst and to scatter its mission to the winds. Doing so would not save as much money as the Pentagon would have us believe. For example, in its report on the BRAC, the GAO noted that the Pentagon's recommendation to close Lakehurst is based on "substantial changes to original estimates" by the Navy's BRAC team. These changes artificially reduced the cost-of-closing comparisons for Lakehurst from almost \$220 million to just under \$97 million.

Commissioners, I am absolutely convinced that the Pentagon's plans to close Lakehurst are short-sighted and unsound. They

spell disaster for American carrier operations and for our strategy of forward deployment.

### Bayonne

Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne is the backbone of America's efforts to project military power from the continental United States overseas in time of crisis. No other port on the East and Gulf coasts -- commercial or military -- can duplicate Bayonne's unique combination of capabilities.

Unlike many commercial ports, moving cargo to Bayonne is fast, economical and unimpeded as Bayonne straddles the huge, highly-developed multimodal transportation network of the American Northeastern corridor. Unlike most commercial ports, once cargo arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast covered and uncovered staging areas. Unlike any commercial ports, these staging areas at Bayonne are fully secure; any military cargo can be accommodated there. Unlike any commercial port, all types of cargo -- from heavy, outsized, non-containerized weapons like the M1A2 Abrams tank, to munitions to provisions -- can be loaded by Bayonne's specially-trained labor force using state-of-the-art, dedicated rail lines. And, Bayonne has the best steaming time to Europe -- a full day's advantage, potentially the difference between life and death in combat -- of any US port, bar none.

Beyond all of these advantages, however, one thing about Bayonne stands out above all else. As our recent operations in the Gulf, Somalia and Haiti have proven beyond doubt, Bayonne's heavy sealift capabilities are always available to us. Unlike commercial ports, which can be commandeered only in times of a declared national emergency, Bayonne has no for-profit impediments, no contracts that need to be broken, no commercial cargo to displace.

Commissioners, you must consider that the Pentagon has recommended closing Bayonne in favor of using commercial ports without first examining whether these ports are both available and able to handle Bayonne's mission. In New York, you heard Lillian Liburdie, Director of the Port of New York and an acknowledged expert in military cargo handling, testify that no commercial port on the East and Gulf coasts could substitute for Bayonne. And we now know that the Pentagon has contracted with the Maritime Administration and Louisiana State University to study this very issue, literally months after recommending that Bayonne be closed.

I am convinced that closing Bayonne would cripple our heavy-lift capabilities and our ability to project American military power from the continental United States overseas.

Dix

Finally, a brief word about Fort Dix, where I and many of my generation trained for the battles of World War II. I support the Pentagon's plan to transfer Dix to the Army's Reserve Command. Especially as we come more and more to rely on citizen-soldiers to augment those on active duty for rapid reinforcement in a crisis, it makes sense to turn Dix into the East coast's premiere Guard and Reserve training facility, handling roughly 1/3 of all mobilization units in the United States. I am concerned, however, that the Pentagon may have inadvertently underestimated the need for support and other staff at Dix, and ask that the Commission consider recommending a closer look at these requirements.

Again, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, let me thank you and your staff for all of your hard work. I continue to hope that you will agree with me and my colleagues that our national security is well-served by New Jersey's bases.

The MOTBY closure recommendation is based on the unstudied and untested assumption, that dedicated military port facilities can be eliminated and that commercial capacity will be available to handle all current and future mission requirements. This is a very tenuous assumption because in closing MOTBY you are not reducing excess capacity. You are losing an essential military capability which cannot be re-established.

We believe the Army proposal to close MOTBY substantially deviates from the first four selection criteria. Criteria 1. The impact on the operational readiness of the DoD's total force.

1: There exists no study or test which examines, evaluates or supports the assumption that sufficient commercial port facilities on the East & Gulf Coasts are

available to support power projection requirements with a minimum loss to operational capacity.

2: On April 14, 1995, MTMC formulated a working group to begin to look at the problem "caused by unforeseen military cargo being sent through a port."

3: On April 19, 1995, MTMC estimated it will take between 2 - 4 years to transition MOTBY's mission to commercial ports because of "several contractual restrictions, which will affect any transfer."

Criteria 2. The availability of facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

Existence of commercial port capacity is not the same as availability. Lillian Liburdi, who is one of the nation's leading experts on both port matters and military traffic concerns, has testified on this matter.

Criteria 3. The ability to accommodate contingency

mobilization and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations.

The operational impacts and risks to rapid mobilization and future force projection needs are incalculable now that both MOTBY and MOTBA could be closed.

#### Criteria 4 Cost and Manpower implications.

1: There are no cost studies related to the mission - the movement of cargo.

2: Without cost studies, we may never know or be able to control costs for the movement of cargo.

3: The Army TABS study has even been forced to change its COBRA cost and savings estimates. While they are termed refinements, I would consider the initial figures to be drastically wrong.

4: By their own admission, the MOTBY estimates were off:

20% for return on investment;

75% on changes to costs and savings over the implementation period and

77% net present value change

5: The Army has acknowledged gross error in the assembly of its COBRA model. The latest figures from our financial analysts, Coopers & Lybrand, indicate that it will take over 30 years for the Army to recoup the costs necessary to close MOTBY and create a stand-alone enclave for selected tenants. These errors seriously call into question all the assumptions on which this closure recommendation is based.

Finally, the most serious, overarching cost problem is totally unstudied. It is the cost to the military for the mission of moving military cargo and the disruption of commercial

ports.

Military port usage is already the most commercialized activity in the entire DoD and in cooperation with the Maritime Administration has the longest experience with commercial activity. MARAD was never consulted about the proposed closure. Defense Agencies must pay for services on the basis of commercial tariffs and are responsible for all costs arising from the loss of business. Moreover, no labor costs were included in the estimates of the cost of purchasing commercial port services.

There is no legal authority to disrupt commercial port operation in the absence in a declared emergency. By that time, it may be long after the need to mobilize and use the ports. The Kuwaiti invasion was in August, 1990. Congress

authorized the use of force 5 months later.

Even Army documents points out resistance by commercial ports to 48 hour port response time and the request to shift to 7 days. Without MOTBY, there is no guarantee of an immediate logistics response, a 48 hour response or even a 7 day response. We are not reducing capacity, we are eliminating capability and changing operational requirements.

Without MOTBY, there is no absolute legal assurance on timely access to ports for fast power projection. MTMC claims that MOTBY will result in the loss of few capabilities, which we reject. These capabilities are critical and time sensitive. I have talked a lot about cost but this is not about balance sheets. Military value is about things we can't buy.

We cannot buy back time when there is delay in the arrival of equipment. We cannot buy back an American soldier's life when reinforcements come too late. The selection criteria make sense. The MOTBY closure proposal does not. Thank you. (I will be submitting supplemental materials to the Commission which addresses some areas that Commissioners have raised.)

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# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-3004

Testimony of Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ)  
Base Realignment and Closure Commission Hearing

Washington D.C.

June 13, 1995

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

4TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEES:

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAIRMAN—INTERNATIONAL

OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

VETERANS' AFFAIRS

VICE CHAIRMAN

HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

CHAIRMAN

The Pentagon's recommendation to radically realign the missions of Lakehurst Naval Air Warfare Center puts carrier aviation at risk, especially in the short term, and may cost two to three times more than the Pentagon suggests.

Navy Lakehurst is a unique, one-of-a-kind, world-class facility whose primary function is to ensure that aircraft safely launch and recover from the deck of a carrier or other platform and that support equipment assist in the service of planes, parts and ordnance at sea.

Navy Lakehurst has a long and distinguished record in technology development, engineering, developmental evaluation and verification, systems integration, prototype manufacturing of Air Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) and Support Equipment (SE).

There is no doubt that the Navy benefits from the synergy of collocating the means of development, manufacturing and testing of aircraft carrier catapult and arresting gear and support equipment.

The burden it seems to me is on the Navy to clearly demonstrate how carrier aviation is improved or at least remains the same by proceeding with realignment. Its a burden they cannot meet.

Research conducted over these past several months by our Save Lakehurst Committee raised serious questions that flight ops may suffer and the fleet may become unnecessarily vulnerable if the Lakehurst mission is torn apart. It is impossible for the Navy to replicate its current 99.999998% success rate of carrier take offs and landings without first experiencing a costly and potentially dangerous period of interruption. Why put the lynchpin of Naval aviation at risk?

Interestingly, our concerns are echoed, to some extent, by BSEC itself. In a May 15, 1995 letter to the Commission, Mr. Charles Nemfakos, Vice Chairman of BSEC stated:

*Some industrial economic and performance advantages may be lost by separating ALRE manufacturing and prototyping and...support equipment from ALRE testing fleet support functions.*

One has to ask. If performance advantages may be lost, why break it up?

In almost every instance at sea, our planes now launch as advertised. Our aircraft are recovered without incident. If a glitch is found in design of a flight critical item, they call Lakehurst. There, at Lakehurst, the requisite problem solvers are immediately available in close proximity to one another to design it, manufacture it, to fix it without delay.

The DOD scenario says relocate the prototype manufacturing of ALRE to the Navy Depot in Jacksonville, Florida, and the SE to Patuxent River, Maryland. Artificially separating the testing and evaluation capabilities from the prototype manufacturing function defies logic. Our research shows that in a crisis situation, this could mean delays -- costly delays -- that put a mission in jeopardy.

And here again, Mr. Nemfakos agrees. In his letter Mr. Nemfakos explains that the distance put between functions remaining at Lakehurst and those moved to Jacksonville, Florida will delay the Navy's operational schedule. Industrial parts will have to be shipped by truck back and forth from Florida to New Jersey to test them and ensure that they are ready for deployment. Mr. Nemfakos says it will take:

*"two additional days to transport between a shop in Jacksonville to a Lakehurst test site vice between a shop in Lakehurst."*

Delays, whether measured in hours or days, during a crisis, could quickly put the lives of our pilots, crews and sailors at risk. Any delays are likely to mean a degradation of mission competence and safety. And I defy anyone to make the case that flight readiness and safety are improved or even remain the same when design and manufacture of flight critical prototyped items are separated from the test and evaluation function.

It should be noted, too, that when a catapult or arresting gear malfunctions on any one of our aircraft carriers, all twelve of our aircraft carriers must shut down until the part is reworked, tested and the problem is fully resolved.

The Nemfakos two day delay and the several month transition period to dismantle and reestablish part of the Lakehurst mission in Florida will leave our Naval carrier operations unsupported, potentially unsafe and vulnerable.

The question we ask the Commission to considers is this: "Should the Navy or our nation be forced to endure these "windows of vulnerability?"

Why should the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, now in the Adriatic, or the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in the Gulf of Oman, or the U.S.S. Independence at Yak., Japan, or any of the other U.S. aircraft carriers shut down and loose capability, power projection and response readiness for extended periods of time because a truck is transporting equipment to or from Florida to complete the rework and testing of flight critical components?

Can tearing apart a textbook case of concurrent engineering which has proven itself, over and over, be justified to save some money?

I think not.

But, incredibly, the DOD scenario doesn't save money, it will actually cost taxpayers more for many decades.

The actual cost of realignment is likely to be between two to three times higher than what the DOD said it would be. That's not a minor miscalculation but a gross error.

Thankfully, the GAO has misgivings about the numbers and specifically asked the Commission to "more thoroughly examine the basis for the cost exclusions" associated with Lakehurst. I feel confident that by now some of you, and some of your staff have looked at the numbers and have misgivings too.

Simply put, the DOD recommendation estimates the one time cost of realignment at just under \$97 million. The certified data from Admiral William Bowes, Commander of Naval Air Systems Command, put the cost at \$162 million. The SAVE Lakehurst Committee data calculates the cost at \$218 million. And, a fourth set of figures calculated by those who will actually implement the scenario puts the price tag closer to \$260 million.

If anything is clear, it's that there is a substantial deviation in the savings envisioned by the Navy and the gigantic costs that everyone else agrees truly exist. Thus, the return on investment isn't three years as DOD says but more like a quarter of a century and possibly longer.

What the Pentagon did to arrive at its erroneous \$97 million figure was to disallow huge documented costs, drop out entire missions, or as in the case of the SE functions lost on their way to Pax River, say they will contract out the work. But you cannot contract out those who are supposed to be watching, guiding and monitoring the contractors. Unfortunately, through the Navy's process there is a constant pattern of miscalculation, value depreciation and bureaucratic double talk that insults any interested party.

The record shows that as late as February of this year the Navy BSEC and BSAT -- after attempting to close Lakehurst -- came to the undeniable conclusion that catapult and arresting gear engineering and testing could not be performed properly anywhere other than Lakehurst. The subsequent decision to "fence" this critical operation, yet strip and move its inherently interdependent manufacturing and prototype components is a cop-out and crazy. On the one hand the "fencing scenario" underscores the importance of this world class, unique operation at Lakehurst. Yet on the other hand, the "fencing scenario" destroys the synergy, collocation and concurrent engineering which has made the Lakehurst mission indispensable. If its indispensable, as the Navy itself has determined, don't break it apart.

The Commission is in a pivotal position to endorse the Navy's reliance on the catapult and arresting gear functions at Lakehurst but go one critical step further. The success of this mission and the safety of the fleet can be assured by keeping the mission whole, in tact, in one location -- at Navy Lakehurst.

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# Document Separator

# DRAFT

## NEW YORK

### I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

#### ARMY:

Bellmore Logistics Activity	Close
Fort Hamilton	Realign
Fort Totten	Close
Seneca Army Depot	Close

#### NAVY:

NRC Staten Island	Close
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#### AIR FORCE:

Griffiss AFB (485th EIG)	Redirect
Griffiss AFB (Airfield Support )	Redirect
REDCAP Activity, Buffalo	Disestablish
Rome Laboratories	Close
Roslyn AGS	Close

### II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:


#### AIR FORCE:

Niagara Falls IAP Air Reserve Station	Close
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DRAFT

# MAP NO. 33

## NEW YORK



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

STATEMENT OF  
U.S. SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO  
BEFORE THE BRAC COMMISSION  
JUNE 12, 1995

Good morning Chairman Dixon and Commissioners. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak on behalf of the New York bases which are being considered for closure or realignment.

Mr. Chairman, every elected official comes before this Commission and defends the bases in their state as the best the country has to offer. But Mr. Chairman, I am fortunate in that my state truly falls into that category.

One of the best examples is Rome Lab. Rome Lab is truly a model of excellence and should be the standard by which all Department of Defense labs are judged. Rome Lab received the highest ranking by the Air Force in its 1995 BRAC review -- It is a "Tier One" lab. The Air Force has recognized Rome's importance to the national defense mission

of this country. Rome Lab is the country's preeminent Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence facility.

The decision to close Rome Lab is simply not cost effective. When Congress wrote the legislation to establish the BRAC Commission and begin the difficult process of dismantling our nation's military installations, we were concerned that our decisions would be not only fair, but cost effective and would actually save our country money without sacrificing any military capabilities which would in any way harm our ability to maintain the most powerful and well respected military in the world.

However, the Air Force decision to place Rome Lab on the closure list is simply counterproductive to these goals. The numbers just do not add up. The return on investment by the Air Force would be in excess of 100 years. The one-time costs to the Air Force would be in excess of \$100million. And worst of all, Mr. Chairman, the savings that the Air Force would receive under this proposal are less than \$1.2 million. That means that no matter what the costs

are, if the savings are that small, the Air Force, and the American taxpayers, will never recoup the costs of closing this one-of-a-kind laboratory.

Mr. Chairman, quite simply, the numbers are so concocted that it is clear that someone made the decision to move the lab, and then the numbers were crafted to justify that decision.

The greatest tragedy of tearing down Rome Lab is the loss of not only some of the best and the brightest that the Department of Defense has to offer, but the fact that the Air Force will lose the extensive technology center that Rome Lab provides not only to the military, but to the State and the entire region. This relationship is integral to an effective research facility and takes years to develop. You can not easily replicate this incredible technology hub without losing some of the military value Rome Lab provides the Air Force.

The Joint Cross-Service Report issued by a special Department of Defense BRAC task force is supposedly one of the reasons to move Rome Lab. Yet, Mr. Chairman, when the proposed move is

completed, there will be no cross-servicing because there is no navy at Hanscom, there is no army at Hanscom. And there is none at Monmouth either. In fact, the Army's Electronic Technology Device Lab, currently at Fort Monmouth, is moving to Maryland as part of a BRAC 1991 decision.

I ask you Mr. Chairman, how can this important lab remain on the BRAC list? It is the right thing to do to remove this lab, and I am confident that this Commission will realize that and remove Rome Lab from the BRAC 95 list.

Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station has been, I believe also placed on the closure list in error. Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station and the 914th Airlift Wing are one of the Air Force Reserve's premier bases. The personnel, training, combat experience and location are ideal to carry out the Air Force mission. Out of all the bases on the current BRAC "Add-list" Niagara Falls is the only base that was activated during the Gulf War.

U.S. Active Duty and Reserve components of

today's military are and will continue to be closely linked well into the future. The current budget environment forces Congress to make tough choices when it comes to our military spending. The evolving nature of America's military doctrine also requires a flexible response and a strong mix of both Reserve and Active Duty soldiers, sailors and airmen. The 914th has operated both independently, and in conjunction with Active Forces in a series of contingency and humanitarian operations.

Any action to close Niagara will sacrifice the cohesion of a unit that has been battle tested, recognized for its performance by the Department of Defense, and terminate the 43 year relationship between the State of New York and the Air Reserve. Niagara and the 914th have drawn the finest Air Reservists from the entire state of New York, and Mr. Chairman, that is quite an accomplishment.

Niagara Falls is the last Air Reserve facility in the State of New York. The economic impact on the state of closing this essential facility will be devastating. Over 40 military facilities in New York

were closed between 1969 and 1993, with a direct loss of over 68,000 jobs. New York State has suffered greatly at the hand of previous BRAC closures, and can not afford another military installation slaughter -- as we were forced to deal with in the last BRAC round.

Next, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to REDCAP. And as you yourself wondered during the May 5th Hearing in New York, Why is REDCAP on the Pentagon closure list?

The Real-time Electromagnetic Digitally Controlled Analyzer & Processor (REDCAP) facility in Buffalo New York also merits a close, second look. REDCAP is contractor owned and operated. Calspan Corporation developed the original REDCAP simulation using independent research and development dollars. Since then, under contract with the Air Force, Calspan has been responsible for the operation and modernization of REDCAP. The F-22 is the most sophisticated, modern and technologically advanced aircraft in our nation's history. To deny the objective testing capability that

REDCAP provides to the Air Force would be an enormous mistake.

Congress and the Department of Defense need REDCAP to remain in place. The objective, thorough testing capability that this facility provides is essential and must be retained.

Additionally, the Army has said that Seneca Army Depot is the smallest and least economical depot to operate. However, all analyses provided by the Army fail to mention that Seneca is the only Army depot east of California with its own airfield, capable of handling C-5 transport planes that fly directly to Europe and Asia.

Further, I understand that the Army has proposed eliminating all the military housing at Fort Hamilton. I join Representative Molinari and the Brooklyn Community in questioning the overall savings of such a move. I also wonder how the United States Army expects its enlisted men and women, as well as officers, to find quality family housing in New York on such a limited military

housing allowance.

Mr. Chairman, I am confident that after close examination of the facts surrounding these important military installations, as well as the skewed numbers that have, in the case of Rome Lab, been presented by the Air Force, this Commission will act fairly and justly. New York must not be allowed to be the victim of those in the Air Force who have concocted numbers and arguments unfairly and without merit. I thank the Chairman and I thank the Commission. I look forward to your decision.

**Statement by Senator Daniel Moynihan**

**Before the 1995 Base Closure Commission**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the bases in New York you are considering for closure. There are flaws in the Pentagon recommendations that you should be aware of, flaws that would affect our nation's defense capability.

I also want you to be aware that only South Carolina lost a greater percentage of its defense employment than New York in the 1993 base closure round. We have only one significant base left, that being Fort Drum. Further closures would mean further economic hardship in areas of a state that has done its share, areas that are particularly unprepared to cope with them.

Rome Laboratory is absolutely vital to the future of the Air Force. We cannot afford to build aircraft after aircraft anymore, so the ones we have must do more and survive longer. The research at Rome Laboratory makes this possible. Rome benefits other services as well. In fact, 29 percent of its budget comes from agencies other than the Air Force. Electronic battlefield maps with up-to-the-second information will allow better coordination and deployment of forces in the future, making the best use of the forces on hand. Intelligence gathering, information processing, communications, photonics, and other fields are being advanced at Rome to the benefit of all three services.

Rome Laboratory is leading the Defense Department into the future, yet today we are considering scattering its functions

into three locations. There is nothing to be gained by this and no private sector CEO would even consider it. The Army's research laboratory is leaving Fort Monmouth. There will be no synergistic blending of minds or resources there. The idea that we will reap the benefits of cross-servicing is a sham. Neither will moving a portion of Rome Laboratory to Hanscom AFB accomplish anything. Hanscom is a products center with nothing to offer to basic research efforts. Neither location has the proper facilities for a world class research lab. This is not, after all, like moving the base laundry.

There is everything to be gained by leaving Rome Laboratory in place. It is an award winning, Tier One laboratory. It has strong ties throughout central New York. That is where you will find synergy. Cornell, RPI, Syracuse, RIT, the University of Rochester, Columbia, Kodak, NYNEX and many others contribute to the laboratory's success. What guarantee is there that this can be replicated, and how long might that take? Experience shows that a majority of the scientists would not make the move to Boston or Fort Monmouth. The disruption in such vital research would be detrimental, far-reaching, perpetual, and totally unnecessary.

The Defense Department has overestimated the savings from relocating the laboratory and underestimated the up-front costs. I hope you will examine these numbers carefully. Even in the latest Air Force estimate there are mistakes and omissions. Operating costs at Rome are overstated. The availability of space at Hanscom and Fort Monmouth is overstated. Personnel

costs are understated because staff reductions are too great. The higher payroll cost due to locality pay has not been included. A true cost analysis shows that the actual return on investment would not begin for over one hundred years. When you see how small the real financial benefit is, this proposal becomes even less supportable.

Finally, I hope you will consider the consequences of relocating the laboratory for Rome, New York. The community is reeling from the loss of Griffiss Air Force Base, for which the only consolation was that it would have the laboratory to build around. The Air Force put that in writing. The community planned accordingly. We owe it to Rome and every other community losing a base to tell them what to expect and then to abide by it. They have too much at stake, too much to overcome, to do otherwise.

I also believe the 914th Airlift Wing should stay right where it is, in Niagara Falls. Niagara is the easternmost base of the six under consideration, and is 200 miles closer to Europe than the next closest. It has on-base assault training, two drop zones, and an aeromedical unit. Niagara's fuel storage capacity is greater than the other five and it has significantly more housing capacity than all the others.

Not only are the existing facilities superior, but the base has the capacity for a great deal of expansion. It could handle up to 57 aircraft. And sharing the base with an Air Guard unit provides numerous opportunities for cost sharing and joint training operations. The 914th is well situated for joint

training around New York, too. In fiscal year 1995 alone it conducted 124 training missions with Fort Drum, and almost as many with units in Schenectady, Buffalo, and at Stewart Airport. This is not a location we should be giving up.

Niagara Falls has the second largest payroll in Niagara County, which has been experiencing hard times for years now. Closing it would eliminate 1.1 percent of the jobs in the area and take \$65 million out of the economy. These are factors that you must consider. In addition, the base has extremely close ties to the community. The list of local activities on the base is too long to list here.

Having said all that, military value is the primary criterion, and here is the best argument for keeping Niagara Falls. The 914th is an award winning, combat tested unit that the Reserves needs on hand. In Desert Storm the 914th had 2,900 sorties, 4,800 hours and one hundred percent mission effectiveness. In all it has 32 years of experience and 110,000 hours of accident-free flying. We rely more and more on the Reserves now. In doing so we rely on units such as the 914th. It would not be as good as it is without an outstanding base from which to train.

I hope you will agree that the military value of the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Base is superior, and that you will carefully examine the costs of closing it. You will find that there is next to nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, if you close Niagara.

The other bases on the closure list deserve careful scrutiny

as well, for each plays a role in the Department of Defense and each is important in its local economy. Fort Hamilton has defended New York Harbor since 1826 and trained many thousand troops for the Army. Its family housing would become surplus. Fort Totten has guarded the East River since 1862. It now provides administrative and logistical support for Army Reserve units in New York City. Like Fort Hamilton it would lose its family housing, making the search for affordable housing in New York City even more difficult for service families.

The REDCAP facility in Buffalo provides valuable and cost effective simulation of electronics before we go to the expense of miniaturizing them. Moving REDCAP to Edwards Air Force Base would be a mistake, for Edwards does not now have the capacity to absorb this mission. It is working just fine where it is.

New York has a proud history in the nation's defense dating back to the Revolution. Today it still can and does contribute greatly. You will determine much about the course of that contribution in the future. I appreciate your taking the time to listen and I urge you to examine these arguments diligently in the final days of deliberation.

*Molinar*

**Talking Points for BRAC Hearing**

**Tuesday, June 13, 1995**

- ▶ The Army's first set of data provided to the Commission identified \$7.2 million in annual savings. Since then the COBRA model has been revised to indicate the number to be a little over \$3 million.
- ▶ DOD's position that elimination of Ft. Hamilton's family housing would save money fails to explain why DOD does not dispose of family housing units in bases across the United States for the same purpose. Why is Ft. Hamilton singled out?
- ▶ The Pentagon and each of the Base Closure and Realignment Commissions of 1991, 1993 and 1995 have reviewed Fort Hamilton and found that the base provides a vital military function by overseeing the day-to-day duties related to the manning, equipping, recruiting, training, and sustaining of the Army in the New York City region.
- ▶ Given the overall military value of Fort Hamilton, it is extremely important that the men and women service members assigned there have adequate and affordable housing. If service members are forced to obtain housing on the local economy, the result will be financial and moral problems among service members to the detriment of the military mission.
- ▶ It is also clear that the Department of Defense must begin to improve the quality of its military housing. Secretary Perry recently proposed the Military Family Housing Revitalization Act of 1995, which proposes to solve the military's chronic housing problems through the use of public-private partnerships. Congress is currently conducting hearings and fully reviewing this proposal.
- ▶ Contrary to this strategy, the Army has recommended to the 1995 BRAC Commission to divest itself of 442 family housing units at Fort Hamilton and exacerbate the military housing shortage that already exists in the New York City area. This action is even more questionable since the DOD can dispose of this housing at any time without BRAC concurrence.
- ▶ Moreover, it is important that the DOD recommendation on Fort Hamilton be considered in the context of other recent reductions of military housing in the New York City area. In front of you is a chart showing that the 442 units at Fort Hamilton are part of a much larger reduction that would eliminate approximately 3,500 military family housing units in the New York area. The net effect of this is make it increasingly difficult and expensive for our military members to find suitable family housing.

▶ **Two options for the 1995 BRAC Commission:**

1. **Accept the realignment recommendation to close the housing and force 400 military families onto the street.**
  - If this option is approved, the Fort Hamilton housing units will no longer be available to military families at anywhere near a cost they can afford. For example, the Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) rates plus basic pay for an E-3 with dependents is \$588.00, an E-7 is \$813.00 and an O-2 is \$905.00. Yet typical housing rent in the New York City area for 3 and 4 bedrooms are significantly higher.
  - Legislation to implement Secretary Perry's recommendation will not yet be in effect and the Army will lose the leverage to provide a public/private solution.
  - Military personnel will likely refuse assignment to Fort Hamilton or will be forced to live in substandard commercial housing. Morale and the military mission will suffer.
  
2. **Reject the realignment recommendation and allow the community the opportunity to work with the Army to "privitize the housing," consistent with Secretary Perry's new pilot housing proposal.**
  - Our community has already assembled a team of experienced private developers who have proposed an initiative for Fort Hamilton to improve the physical quality and affordability of military housing at no cost to the Defense Department.
  - Allow military families stationed in New York to continue to live in the units during an orderly transition to private sector involvement.

▶ **Conclusion:**

The DOD recommendation on family housing at Fort Hamilton deviated from the base closure criteria by failing to account for the fact that such housing is critical for the military value of the mission performed at the base. The Commission should reject the DOD recommendation and keep the housing under the Army's control. This would give the Army much more leverage and flexibility in working with the private sector to improve the quality of the housing while lowering the Army's costs substantially. This would also be in keeping with the recent housing initiatives proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

**CHARTS SUBMITTED**

**BY**

**CONGRESSWOMAN SUSAN MOLINARI**

**REGARDING THE**

**PROPOSED REALIGNMENT OF FORT HAMILTON**

"The readiness of our forces depends on retaining the high quality, experienced personnel we now have in the military. One of the most important factors in retention of senior personnel is our ability to provide decent and affordable housing for their families to live in."

-- Secretary of Defense William J. Perry  
May 8, 1995

**DOD Military Housing Reductions**

Fort Hamilton	442
Fort Totten	198
Naval Station, NY	1,444
	_____
SUBTOTAL	2,084
Coast Guard	1,390
Governor's Island	
	_____
TOTAL	3,474

Chart # 3

# Military Housing Allowances for New York City

Pay Grade      Basic w/Dep.      +      VHA w/Dep.      =      TOTAL

E-3	\$345	\$243	\$588
E-7	\$513	\$300	\$813
O-2	\$499	\$406	\$905

**1 bedroom studios**

**The high cost of living in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn**

**2-3 bedroom apartments**

JANILE ...  
 B Ridge - Small Studio ...  
 hse. Colonial Rd \$600 G/F  
 Incl. Col. 7-8 pm:  
 (718) 434-7001  
 Dyker Hts - 2 lg rms. new  
 t/b, \$1-5 G/F

shop- new k/b (718) 266-7204  
 B Ridge 90 St/Battersea Ave.  
 No fee. 1 Bdrm, 3 1/2 X-16  
 rms, 2nd flr, front & rear  
 balcony in new 12 foot long  
 No pets. No brokers \$830  
 + heat 718-235-5456  
 BENSONHURST - 6 mod rms  
 on Ave U nr

...ve, 3 Bdrms.  
 totally renov. Must-see-6005  
 5 1/2 - 95 St off 3rd Ave, pvt  
 house, 2 Bdrms w/garage \$875  
 5 1/4 - 89 St on Col. Rd, 2 Bdrms  
 fin bsmt, 2 bths, gar \$1,300  
 6 - 96 St off Marine Av, 3 Bdrms  
 mod k/b, Must See \$1,100  
 Garage - 94th St off 3rd Ave  
 for mid-sized car ... \$150  
 JACOBSEN'S  
**EXECUTIVE**

**7 1/2 ROOMS**  
 Bay Ridge 3 1/2 Ave. Duplex  
 Apt w/ lots of yard & fin bsmt  
 & 1 car gar. \$1,195  
 Like other units in building  
 Rent \$1,195  
 833-8330  
 BROKER

Bay Ridge 2 Bdrms, w/ mod  
 washer \$1,200 + Heat  
 CANTALUPPO R.E. 236-7300  
 Bay Ridge - 2 Bedroom Co-op  
 For Rent. Board approval  
 mod (718) 48-4801 \$875

... 836-9157  
 A 1/2 rms - 2 Bdrms, new kit  
 & bath, ultra-mod floors  
 JAMES R.E. 850-HH  
 748-6600  
 4 1/2 rms + Fin Bsmt, 2  
 Bdrms, 2 bths, board park-  
 ing avail \$1,400 + Heat  
 JAMES R. 748-6600  
 7 rms, 1st flr, 3 Bdrms, park  
 'ain & shops

...er Heights/80's - 6 rms,  
 2 baths, Terrace, all mod  
 washer \$1,200 + Heat  
 CANTALUPPO R.E. 236-7300  
 Bay Ridge - 2 Bedroom Co-op  
 For Rent. Board approval  
 mod (718) 48-4801 \$875  
 SUNSET PK - Lovely 4 mod rm  
 drive driveway  
 Dyker

Testimony Before the Defense Base Realignment Commission

The Honorable Jack Quinn (R-NY)

June 13, 1995

Thank you Chairman Dixon and Good Morning.

As you may know, this is my second appearance before the Commission. Since I first testified before you at the New York regional hearings on May 5th, the Niagara Falls Air Force Reserve Base has been added to the list.

Therefore, I will testify in support of both the Niagara Falls Base and the Real-time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processing Facility, or REDCAP, operated by the Calspan Corporation in Buffalo.

Although I do not envy the task that you and your fellow Commissioners share, as a proponent of both reducing wasteful government spending and a strong national defense, I commend all of you for your efforts.

I am here today as a representative of my constituents who work on the Niagara Falls Base but reside in my Congressional district. I have heard from, and met with, several Western New Yorkers who fall into that category.

I would like to take just a moment to thank General Davis for taking the time to visit the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station last month. The entire community remains grateful for his visit.

It is my understanding that the Base has the support of the Defense Department, the Air Force, and the entire Congressional delegation of New York. General McIntosh, the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, has indicated the Air Force's strong support for the retention of the Base.

The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station and the 914th Airlift Wing are valuable, combat proven assets to the Air Force. The 914th Airlift Wing has operated both independently, and in conjunction with Active Forces in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti.

Any action to close the Station will sacrifice the cohesion of a unit that has been battle tested and recognized for their performance by the Department of Defense. It was the only C-130 unit activated for Operation Desert Storm. No other Air Force Reserve C-130 Unit has received a higher ranking during the last 9 years.

In addition, the closure of the Base will not achieve any significant savings over any of the other C-130 reserve bases under study.

Most of all, I want you to know the entire community, not only in Niagara Falls, but throughout Western New York embraces this mission and its people. As the second largest employer in Niagara County, the Base has a bigger impact on the lives and economy of the local community than any of the other C-130 bases under consideration.

I will now turn to my defense of REDCAP.

It is apparent that it is in the best interests of the country to keep REDCAP in Buffalo, NY.

The facility currently is being fully utilized. Any move simply would change the location of the work, without providing for any consolidation or savings. In fact, costs would increase.

The Calspan Corporation is a private company that has enhanced and operated REDCAP for 30 years. Calspan has built up a unique body of knowledge that enables the facility to provide high value to their test customers at a very low cost. The value added by this unique staff will not be retained in a move. Moving the facility, therefore, will destroy a valuable asset that the taxpayers of this county have built.

In addition, moving the facility represents taking jobs out of the private sector and moving them into the government sector.

As far as the economics of a move, the facility costs the government less than \$1 million per year to operate. The government does not pay rent for the space occupied by the facility, security, nor utilities to the Calspan Corporation.

REDCAP does not meet the necessary criteria for consideration under the BRACC process. The facility has far less than the required 300 employees and is not even a base. REDCAP is a set of government owned equipment in a contractor's facility. It is providing a significant service as evidenced by its high utilization. If it ceases to provide the service, utilization will fall off dramatically.

Finally, REDCAP is performing its mission efficiently in its present location. Moving the facility to a location that has no capability to support it just doesn't make sense. I believe this country can be best served by keeping REDCAP at its present location.

The facts show that New York has been hit hard by base closures in recent years. Since 1969, New York has lost 40 military facilities and 70,000 jobs. In the 1993 round of closures, we lost a greater percentage of our military and civilian personnel than any other state except South Carolina.

**CONGRESSMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT (R-NY)**  
**STATEMENT FOR BRACC WASHINGTON HEARING**

**June 13, 1995**

**Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission:**

**Thank you for this opportunity to testify again on behalf of Rome Laboratory.**

**Today I want to focus on just two issues that have arisen since your New York City hearing last month -- the revised Air Force cost estimates, and state funding of the reuse plan for Griffiss Air Force Base.**

**I'm afraid my discussion of the latest Air Force figures will sound painfully familiar. That's because the Air Force continues to overestimate the annual savings from relocating Rome Lab, while underestimating the costs. Indeed, the Air Force has done exactly what we predicted in our New York testimony: come back with slightly more realistic cost estimates, while further distorting the savings estimates. The May estimate is just a new ruse to obscure one central fact: relocating Rome Lab will cost money -- lots of it -- not save any.**

As you well know, the Air Force has costed out the relocation of Rome Laboratory on several occasions with wildly differing results. In the latest figures, as in February, the projected annual saving is the fatal flaw. The Air Force now maintains it would save almost \$13 million a year by moving Rome Lab. The actual figure is closer to a mere \$1 million a year -- resulting in an impossibly long payback period. Remember, these are not net savings, but rather savings that must be used to offset the costs of moving -- costs in excess of \$100 million.

How could such a discrepancy occur? First, the Air Force chose to grossly overestimate the costs of real property maintenance at Rome. For the Air Force's figures to be accurate, Rome would have to be paying \$45 per square foot for maintenance, when comparable Air Force facilities pay only 60 cents per square foot.

Here's another problem. Even though the test sites at Rome must remain in operation, the Air Force assumes that every last square foot of space at Rome will be shut down and mothballed. And the Air Force estimate of total square footage at Rome is off by almost an order of magnitude. The Air Force counted 177,000 square feet at a facility that site surveys show has over 1.3 million square feet of space. These kind of glaring, obvious, demonstrable errors hardly build confidence in the Air Force's calculations.

And these are not minor mistakes. If we correct just these errors in maintenance costs and square footage -- and accept absolutely every other Air Force assumption -- the payback period for shutting down Rome jumps to 16 years. That's right -- 16 years.

Let me remind you that the Air Force itself has said that base closures are not economical if the payback period goes into double digits. Indeed, Mr. Boatright and General Blume reiterated that point in a meeting with representatives of the Rome community on June 1. And no BRAC commission has closed an Air Force facility with a payback of more than eight years.

Of course, maintenance costs and square footage are not the only problems with the Air Force's latest estimates. The Air Force now says Rome's support manpower levels will be cut by 93 positions -- almost double the figure in the February estimate. What has happened since February to justify this conclusion? The Air Force has provided no credible answer to that question.

 I would like to submit for the record our enumeration of the other faulty assumptions in the Air Force's latest COBRA estimates. When all of them are taken into account, it turns out that the payback period for closing Rome Laboratory is in excess of 100 years -- just as the Air Force itself had concluded in October of last year.

The Air Force's proposal to dismember Rome Laboratory contrasts starkly with the community's effort to strengthen it. So let me turn now to the Griffiss reuse plan in which this Commission has shown so much interest.

Commissioners have repeatedly asked us for evidence that the commitment to the reuse plan is real.

 New York State recently concluded its budget process, and the new budget continues to make good on New York State's commitment of \$12 million to the New York State Technology Enterprise Corporation (NYSTEC).

In short, the decision to take Rome Lab off the closure list should be an easy one. In New York we demonstrated that the relocation of Rome meets none of the BRAC criteria. The events of the past six weeks have done nothing but strengthen our case.

Closing Rome Lab will cost money and damage a vital military asset. I urge you to remove Rome Lab from the list.



AIR

FORCE

COBRAS

FACTS

	October 94	February 95	May 95
One-Time Cost	\$133.6 M	\$52.8 M	\$79.5 M
Annual Savings	\$1.5 M	\$11.5 M	\$12.9 M
Manpower Cuts	5	50	93
Square Footage (SF)	615,000 SF	224,000 SF	365,000 SF
Return On Investment (ROI)	100+ years	4 years	6 years

May 95	\$103 M	\$1.2 M	22	380,000 SF	100+ years
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# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**NORTH CAROLINA**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**ARMY**

Recreation Center #2 Fayetteville

Close


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 34

## NORTH CAROLINA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

NOTES

CHARLIE ROSE  
7TH DISTRICT, NORTH CAROLINA

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
SUBCOMMITTEES:  
RISK MANAGEMENT AND SPECIALTY CROPS  
RANKING MEMBER  
FARM COMMODITIES

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3507

PLEASE RESPOND TO:

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
242 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3307  
PHONE: AREA CODE (202) 225-2731  
FAX: AREA CODE (202) 225-0345

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
218 FEDERAL BUILDING  
FAYETTEVILLE, NC 28301-5088  
PHONE: AREA CODE (910) 323-0260  
FAX: AREA CODE (910) 323-0069

208 POST OFFICE BUILDING  
WILMINGTON, NC 28401-3957  
PHONE: AREA CODE (910) 343-4959  
FAX: AREA CODE (910) 763-7790

June 13, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman, The Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am enclosing testimony that I would like to have included in the transcript from Monday's hearings on the Department of Defense's base closure recommendations.

Thank you for your assistance with this matter and please feel free to contact me if you have any questions regarding my statement.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

  
charlie Rose

CR:wm

**Statement of Congressman Charlie Rose  
before the Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission**

I thank the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) for giving me this opportunity to speak on a matter of critical importance to the people of Southeastern North Carolina.

As you are all aware, in 1993 the Department of Defense (DoD) recommended that the Navy transfer 12 aircraft operational F/A-18 squadrons and one 48 aircraft training squadron from the Naval Air Station Cecil Field in Florida to the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point. Before arriving at this decision, the DoD also considered transferring the aircraft to the Naval Air Station in Oceana Virginia. After a careful review of the merits of redirecting the aircraft to each base, DoD determined that the aircraft should be transferred to MCAS Cherry Point.

In initially recommending the transfer to MCAS Cherry Point, DoD determined that this was consistent with the objective of facilitating Joint Use Training between the Navy and Marine Corps. To quote the recommendation, "movement of NAS Cecil Field F/A-18 aircraft and personnel to NAS Oceana defeats the increase in military value achieved by the integration of Navy carrier-based aviation with the Marine Corps carrier aviation at MCAS's Cherry Point and Beaufort." Additionally, DoD found that the transfer to Cherry Point, "alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems." Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, the DoD analysis found that the cost of transferring the Air Wing to MCAS Cherry Point would be considerably cheaper than transfer to NAS Oceana. This analysis was thorough and the reasoning for relocating the aircraft to MCAS Cherry Point was compelling.

However, in 1995 BRAC reversed itself and recommended that eight 10 Aircraft Squadrons and one 48 Aircraft FRS be redirected to NAS Oceana. In doing so, the BRAC manipulated the criteria for redirection by stipulating that, "The introduction of aircraft types not currently aboard a station is not allowed." NAS Oceana prevailed under this new standard by virtue of the fact that a single Reserve squadron of F/A 18s are stationed at the base. This change is in direct contradiction to the 1993, "determination for joint military operations of Navy and Marine aircraft."

The second major motivation for the reversal was the, "application of cost avoidance...through cancellation of budgeted military construction and fuller utilization of existing capacity at other receiving sites." However, this finding is not supported by the facts. The 1995 cost figures for Cherry Point were inflated by \$43 million dollars for unneeded family housing. In fact, MCAS Cherry Point has more than 1600 family housing units than does NAS Oceana, and ample off-base private housing.

In addition, Cherry Point has benefited from a \$400 million Military Construction budget over the last decade. This budget has created 16 new BEQ's with additional capacity, a new full service Naval Hospital, a new water treatment facility with additional capacity and new sewage treatment facility with additional capacity.

There are several other reasons why MCAS Cherry Point is the preferred sight for redirection. For instance, NAS Oceana has had a long history of water supply problems that could affect operational readiness. As you are well aware, NAS Oceana is dependent on Virginia Beach for its water needs. During the drought of 1980 NAS Oceana was forced to build emergency wells to meet operational needs. In the December 1980 Navy Oceana Environmental Assessment, officials stated, "efforts to curtail consumption were successful, but these measures were at the expense of operational readiness." In 1991, Virginia Beach imposed mandatory, long-term water use restrictions and placed a moratorium on all new water system connections. These restrictions remain in place today. In 1994, the Corps of Engineers concluded that the area is vulnerable to drought and without additional water supply, faces water problems of extreme proportions. What more, The Lake Gaston Pipeline project, which may take up to 95 million gallons of water a day from the Roanoke River Basin, will not solve the long term water shortages in the Virginia Beach area. Recently, Virginia Beach Officials stated, "The Lake Gaston Project will not eliminate the need for Virginia Beach or Chesapeake to restrict water use."


Additionally, the NAS Oceana area is out of compliance for ozone pollution and EPA officials recently informed the State of Virginia that ozone pollution problems in that area may be getting worse. Under federal law, any new sources of air pollution, including F/A-18s, require a detailed conformity analysis to show that air quality will not be further degraded.

The decision to ignore the 1993 recommendations to redirect the aircraft to MCAS Cherry Point threatens the integrity of the BRAC process. I am convinced that an objective review of the facts surrounding this matter leads one to the overwhelming conclusion that the 1993 recommendations were proper and sound. I strongly urge the commission to reject the 1995 recommendations and implement the recommendations made in 1993 to transfer the aircraft to MCAS Cherry Point.


Once again, thank you for your time and consideration of these remarks.

*North Carolina  
Senate and Congressional  
Speaking Points*


**Merits of Marine Corps Air  
Station Cherry Point, NC vs.  
Naval Air Station Oceana, Va**



# Aerial View of Cherry Point



# Aerial View of Oceana



...

# Aerial View of Oceana



Extremely  
Dense  
Commercial

Residential  
Neighborhoods

Residential  
Neighborhoods

One of largest  
malls in Va.

Residential  
Neighborhoods



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WICHITA FALLS, Texas (AP) -- An Air Force training jet that smashed into an apartment complex and killed two people developed mechanical problems minutes after takeoff, the military said.

About 20 others were hurt Wednesday in the crash, which engulfed a building and several cars in flames and shook schools and homes. Investigators were searching Thursday through chunks of green metal that littered the complex parking lot to try to determine the cause.

Two or three minutes after the T-38 took off from Sheppard Air Force Base, the plane was trailing smoke and dropping off pieces, witnesses said. The two pilots ejected and parachuted onto a softball field just before the plane went down. They suffered minor scrapes.

"The pilots are extremely distressed about what happened," said Air Force Col. Bill Orcutt, the crash investigation commander. "But from what we know, it was a mechanical problem. There was nothing they could do."

The pilots names were not released. They were assigned to the 80th Flying Training Wing at Sheppard, which is about four miles from the complex.

The pilots were part of Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot training program. One, an instructor, was from the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The other, a student, was American, a base spokesman said. No further information was provided.

The plane just missed two schools that were out for the summer and a day-care center before smashing into the 120-unit Amber Falls Crossing apartment complex. One of the 11 buildings in the complex was hit; four apartments in that building were destroyed.

"It looked like a bomb dropped," said tenant Linda Thornton. "There was so much smoke you couldn't see the building."

The dead were identified as Joseph Robert Wolfe, 77, and his wife, Edelmira Corbett Wolfe, 83. They were outside the apartment complex, knocking on doors for a local Jehovah's Witness church.

Wolfe died on the sidewalk when three cars in front of him exploded. His wife burned to death near the couple's car, police said.

Most of the injured suffered smoke inhalation and bruises.

Debris was scattered over about two blocks, and a large hunk of fuselage rested among the hulls of several burned-out vehicles. The charred, splintered apartment building stood directly in front of a grassy playground.

Barbara Harrell said the fire burned everything in her mother's apartment. Her mother wasn't home at the time.

"She would've been in bed or up drinking coffee," Ms. Harrell said. "It makes you feel relief."

---

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**NORTH DAKOTA**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**AIR FORCE:**

Grand Forks AFB

Realign

**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

**AIR FORCE:**

Grand Forks AFB


Close

Minot AFB

Realign

# MAP NO. 35

## NORTH DAKOTA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

TESTIMONY OF

U.S. SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN

before the

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

June 13, 1995

Washington, D.C.

Similarly, Admiral Henry Chiles, Jr., Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, stated in a letter to you that **"the core refueling wing at Grand Forks AFB provides critical support to strategic and contingency operations"**.

General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief of U.S. Transportation Command, also made clear to you that:

**The wisdom of establishing a refueling wing at Grand Forks was validated during the recent high priority operations including VIGILANT WARRIOR in Iraq and SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda.**

Vigilant Warrior provides one of the most dramatic examples of the use of Grand Forks' tankers. In response to provocative troop movements by Saddam Hussein in 1994, the President dispatched U.S. fighters to warn Iraq that it was playing with fire. Grand Forks took the lead in supplying (23) KC-135 tankers to prevent the outbreak of new hostilities.

Let me also mention the Persian Gulf War to illustrate how KC-135s serve as gas stations in the sky -- the very lifeline of military operations. During this conflict KC-135s and other tankers completed 85,000 aerial refuelings and pumped 190 million gallons of fuel.

parking space, a new state-of-the-art Type III hydrant refueling system, extensive hangars, and unimpeded air space.

As Gen. Fogleman told you, "**... Grand Forks has some of the best infrastructure in AMC, with both the ramp and hydrant system required to support a large tanker fleet**".

Admiral Chiles also pointed out the unique value of Grand Forks' infrastructure as its "**ability to sustain a large tanker fleet and provide important operational flexibility to our strategic air refueling assets in support of global missions**".

In conclusion, I hope that you will agree with General Fogleman's assessment of the military value of Grand Forks:

**I cannot overstate my support for retention of a core refueling wing at Grand Forks Air Force Base. I believe it is essential to our nation's ability to respond in a timely manner to challenges across the entire spectrum of conflict.**

Thank you for your thoughtful consideration.

# Document Separator



# MAP NO. 36

## OHIO



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

NOTES

DAVID L. HOBSON  
7TH DISTRICT, OHIO



APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  
NATIONAL SECURITY  
VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES  
BUDGET COMMITTEE  
SPEAKER'S DESIGNEE  
STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT  
REPUBLICAN WHIP ORGANIZATION

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
1514 Longworth HOB  
Washington, D.C. 20515

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 13, 1995

Testimony of Representative David L. Hobson  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Close Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 178th Fighter Group (ANG), the 251st Combat Communications Group (ANG), and the 269th Combat Communications Squadron (ANG) to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

- Mr. Chairman. Members of the Commission. I have five minutes to convince you not to waste \$30 plus million dollars.

- My arguments are based solely on the numbers. Although the community will survive, the numbers are flawed and this is not fair. This decision results from a desire on the part of the Air Force to fill a hole at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base with pointed nosed airplanes. The numbers were backed into in an attempt to prove this is a cost effective move.

- Just as in 1993, the numbers are flawed. They are based on improper assumptions. Had the right assumptions been used in the COBRA model, the base would not be on the list in the first place. Even using the current flawed COBRA run--which just arrived Friday afternoon, June 9, 1995--there is an 11 year ROI, \$24.6 million one-time costs, and \$2.8 million annual savings, the base should not be on the list. As you see from the chart in your packet and on display.

- Let me show you a few problems about the numbers and why this should be investigated further.

1. A major dispute is manpower savings. AFMC and the Guard say 31 people are needed and authorized at Wright-Patterson to accommodate a move. Air Force headquarters says only 13 will be allowed because they assume that a current regulation may be changed some time in the future. Although no one knows when. Annual recurring savings at Wright-Patterson are reduced by \$1 million. This blows the Air Force's whole position on the move.

In 1993 this was not an issue. However, in order to make the numbers look bad for Springfield, the Air Force makes this assumption and in my opinion cooks the books.

PHILADELPHIA OFFICE  
Room 220 Post Office  
150 N. Limestone St.  
Springfield, OH 45501-1121

LANCASTER OFFICE  
212 S. Broad St.  
Room 55  
Lancaster, OH 43130-4389

2. There are asbestos and lead paint in the buildings to be provided at Wright-Patterson. No contractor is going to go in and renovate around asbestos; the liability is too great. Yet, AF assumes this will happen. This is a substantial increase, estimated to increase military construction costs by \$5 million.

3. The telephone bill is \$13,000 at Springfield but is assumed to be \$82,020 at Wright-Patterson. This is ridiculously stupid and part of why I question the numbers!

4. AF refuses to admit that an expanded Dining Hall is needed. Just wait, a military construction request for more capacity will come down the pike a year or two after a move. This is another \$1 million in milcon costs.

5. In questioning these and other open or disputed areas, AF says "Don't worry. We'll take care of it after the move." If you want to see how these things are taken care of, go back and look at the General Accounting Office study and, specifically, the move of the 445th Air Force Reserve unit. Compare the lower assumed costs vs. the higher actual ones.

- Springfield has always received more than a fair hearing from the BRAC staff. I believe your analysts understand the problem and how the numbers are being cooked to put pointed nose airplanes at Wright-Patterson.

- Why waste \$30 plus million and take--even by AF flawed assumptions and we think it will be much higher--11 years to get to where we are already in Springfield. We should not fill a hole at Wright-Patt in this costly matter and waste tax dollars just because they are available through the BRAC process.

- The Air Force should bring back on Wright-Patt, the tenants for whom they are leasing space off base, and use this space for that purpose.

- Springfield should not be abandoned. It is a well functioning facility which needs nothing and has a new engine shop for F-16s already completed. Springfield should be allowed to continue to do the cost effective job it has been doing.

- Do this by the numbers and I am confident, just as in 1993, it will be reversed.

- I implore you to look at the numbers. It is irresponsible to put a base on the list with false numbers and continue to use false assumptions.

- Think about the taxpayer and what is cost effective. Not what some General would like to see on the flight line.

- I have been requested to submit testimony on certain other moves to W-P and it is attached.

# Springfield Air Guard Base COBRA Adjustment Summary

	Decision COBRA	COBRA 8 May 95	COBRA 11 May 95	COBRA Adjusted * 9 June 95
ROI Years	6	7	8	11
NPV in 2015 (\$K)	-35,122	-29,703	-25,747	- 14,000
One Time Cost (\$K)	23,378	25,494	24,814	- 24,600
Annual Recurring Savings (\$K)	-4,208	-3,959	-3,626	- 2,800

\* This is still flawed.

**Springfield Air Guard Base  
ANG BRAC 95  
Springfield Recurring Costs**

	Springfield	WPAFB	Delta
Utilities	459,246	570,844	111,598
Phones	13,347	82,080	68,733
<b>Recurring Cost Difference</b>			<hr/> 180,331

Springfield numbers are FY94 actuals.  
WPAFB numbers based on formula provided by 88ABW/XPP.

BOS	ANG	AFMC	AIRSTAFF
Initial	-35	+39**	+13*
Current	-22	+13	

\*7 BOS positions, plus 6 Security Police positions.

\*\*39 personnel required by AFI 38-204 & AFI 65-503.

**Springfield Air Guard Base  
Community Partnership Savings Estimates  
15 May 95**

<b>Recurring Cost Item</b>	<b>Community Approach</b>	<b>Estimated Savings</b>	<b>COBRA References</b>
1. Crash, Fire & Rescue (CFR) Operations	Cover non-flying hours with mutual aid agreements with communities.	\$400K/Yr.	CFR Total: \$1,281,834
2. Air Traffic Control (ATC)	Include in joint use agreement with state & local operation.	\$370K/Yr.	ATC: \$480K

# Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport/Airpark Springfield, Ohio

## Shared Investment Summary (1982-1994)

Year	Project	Local	State	Federal	Military	Total
1982*	Installation of Arresting Gear (Barriers)	-	-	-	535,140	535,140
1982	Installation of Instrument Landing System for Runway 24 (Navigational Aid)	-	-	-	350,000	350,000
1983*	Construct TACAN Electric Service	-	-	-	59,250	59,250
1983	Runway 6/24 Crack Filling Project	9,000	-	-	-	9,000
1984	Rehabilitate Taxiway "A"	-	-	-	840,680	840,680
1985	Sealcoat Terminal Building Apron	11,000	-	-	-	11,000
1985	Reconstruct Approx. 1,000' of each end of Runway 6/24 with concrete; re-replace drainage	-	-	-	1,484,500	1,484,500
1986	Taxiways & T-Hangar Resurfacing Project; Land Reimbursement	31,260	-	281,337	-	312,597
1986	Runway 15/33 Slurry Seal Project	18,656	74,624	-	-	93,280
1986	Construct Runway 24 Approach Lighting System	-	-	-	846,400	846,400
1987	Construct Water/Sewer Facilities	740,562	1,650,000	-	1,191,888	3,582,450
1989	Utility Installation to AirparkOhio	748,000	-	-	-	748,000
1990*	Construct TACAN Building	-	-	-	58,520	58,520
1992	Rehabilitate Runway 6/24; Install Guidance Signs; Upgrade Lighting Control Building	32,950	32,950	592,500	1,141,600	1,800,000
1992	Terminal Building Apron Expansion	10,500	10,500	192,000	-	213,000
1990**	Airport Master Plan Update	10,000	-	90,000	-	100,000
1993	Secondary Runway	7,421	7,421	133,587	-	148,429
1993	Main Runway Rehab	11,535	1,391	221,337	-	234,263
1993	Apron Expansion	1,905	1,905	34,295	-	38,105
1994	Noise Study	9,064	-	81,579	-	90,643
1994	AirparkOhio Entrance	-	111,254	-	-	111,254
1994	AirparkOhio Roadways	-	733,353	-	-	733,353
<b>GRAND TOTAL:</b>		<b>\$1,641,853</b>	<b>\$2,623,398</b>	<b>\$1,626,635</b>	<b>\$6,507,978</b>	<b>\$12,399,864</b>

**Springfield Air Guard Base  
Springfield, Ohio**

**Major Military Construction (since 1980)**

<b>Year Completed</b>	<b>Project Descriptions</b>	<b>Cost</b>
1981	Fuel Systems Maintenance Dock	\$1,014,000
1982	Aircraft Arresting System	565,000
1982	Munitions Maintenance	640,000
1982	Civil Engineering	585,000
1984	Taxiway "A" Overlay	901,000
1985	Add/Alter Vehicle Maintenance	1,069,000
1985	Add/Alter Comm. Electronics	958,000
1985	Petroleum Operations	229,000
1985	Water and Sewer Lines	1,192,000
1985	Construct Concrete Runway Ends	1,486,000
1986	Instrument Landing System	856,000
1987	Construct Hush House Pad	493,000
1991	Runway Repair	1,000,000
1994	ECM Pods	553,000
1995	Engine Shop	1,118,000

(note: Natural Gas Service was recently extended to the base at an approximate cost of \$486,000.)

**Springfield Air Guard Base  
Realignment Cost Comparisons  
1993 vs. 1995**

	<b>Initial Estimate 12 May 93</b>	<b>Site Survey 10 April 93</b>	<b>BRAC Report June 93</b>	<b>Decision COBRA 1995</b>
<b>One Time Cost (\$K)</b>	3.0	45.1	35M	23.3
<b>Annual Recurring Savings (\$K)</b>	-1.1	-1.1	-1.1	-4.2

POINT PAPER ON SAVINGS OFFERED BY SPRINGFIELD

Two Key Features of Operating the ANG at Springfield ANG Base, Ohio are  
Fire Crash Rescue Services and the Control Tower

- Fire Crash Rescue - currently 24 state employees
  - 100% federally paid
  - City would cover all non-flying hours by Mutual Aid Agreement
  - Would eliminate 10 full time state employee positions
  - Cost savings annually: \$480,000 actual
  - Agreement being proposed through Adjutant General's Office from City of Springfield to NGB
  - Start FY 97 to allow transition for employees - cost savings - \$480,000 annually
  
- Control Tower operated by ANG with Title 5 employees
  - Currently two weather observes assigned
  - Controllers are already certified observers
  - Obstruction charts were developed for Springfield
  - Two positions can be eliminated
  - Savings: \$65,730.86 annually
  - Start FY 97 to allow transition for employees

TOTAL PROPOSED ANNUAL SAVINGS: \$545,730.00

Testimony for Congressman David Hobson Before BRAC In Support  
of Consolidation of Certain Brooks Air Force Base Function at  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

An issue that is of serious concern to my district is the recommendation before the Commission made by the Air Force to close Brooks Air Force Base and move certain of those functions to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The Air Force recommendation would result in the consolidation of the ARMSTRONG LABORATORY, HUMAN SYSTEMS CENTER, THE SCHOOL OF AEROSPACE MEDICINE, and the SYSTEMS ACQUISITION SCHOOL with Wright-Patterson's premier research and development activities.

The BRAC process was established by Congress to enable the reduction of infrastructure in an organized responsible manner. The BRAC criteria are clearly met with this recommended consolidation:

- Moving these functions to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base would maximize military value by providing the enhanced man-machine integration required for new and evolving weapon systems.
- The economic pay back would make the best business sense in terms of annualized and long term savings.
- Excess capacity would be reduced in that it offers the only option under consideration that reduces excess Air Force

Laboratory capacity at the same time providing the best long term value for DoD.

It has also come to my attention that there may be some concern about moving the medical capabilities from Brooks Air Force Base. I want to bring to the Commission's attention that the Dayton region is a biomedical center of excellence. Wright State University is the only civilian school of aerospace medicine. Ohio State University and the University of Cincinnati have very strong medical programs. The Dayton Area of Graduate Studies Institute (DAGSI) has recently been established and will enable graduate studies in among other things biomedical technology.

The private sector also provides capabilities in the biomedical area. The Kettering Heart Institute, Hipple Cancer Institute, and numerous commercial laboratories specializing in R&D medical and environmental testing and biomedical research are also located in the Dayton region.

There are some federal government capabilities that are located in the Dayton area. The Triservice Regional Medical Center covers ten surrounding states. The Wright Technology Network, Fitts Human Engineering Division at Armstrong Laboratories, and the Regional Veterans Administration Medical Center are located in the Dayton region.

I have been assured in conversations with well respected experts in the biomedical field that certainly the Dayton area will enable those functions which took place at Brooks to continue to be performed in the superior matter thus meeting the Air Force needs.

In conclusion, it is imperative for all of us to look to the future. This consolidation would enable the combination of two inextricably linked facets of military capability - - the weapons and the humans which fly them. The future of human flight and high performance aircraft will require a shortened acquisition process, an increased need for cross servicing capability, and a total innovative focus on the human and machine interface. The Air Force position which is being considered by you will lead to meeting these future needs. The Air Force is right and should be supported by the commission.

**Why Armstrong Laboratory, Human Systems Center, School of Aerospace  
Medicine, and the Systems Acquisition School  
Should be Consolidated  
at Wright-Patterson AFB**

**INTRODUCTION**

The future of human flight in high performance aircraft will require a shortened acquisition process, an increased need for cross servicing capability and a total integrated focus on the human and machine interface.

Consolidating the Armstrong Laboratory, Human Systems Center, the School of Aerospace Medicine, and the Systems Acquisition School with Wright-Patterson's premier research and development activities makes good economic sense. This BRAC action will also maximize military value and reduce excess laboratory capacity within the Department of Defense.

- **Military Value** - Provides the enhanced man-machine integration required for new and evolving weapon systems.
- **Economics** - Makes the best business case in terms of annualized savings and long term payback.
- **Reduces Excess Capacity** - It offers the only option under consideration that reduces excess AF laboratory capacity while providing the best long term value for the DoD.

**MILITARY VALUE**

Realignment and consolidation at WPAFB maximizes military value by enhancing man-machine integration.

The Human Systems Center currently at Brooks AFB is composed of three key elements:

- **Human Systems Program Office (HSPO)** - an acquisition management and sustainment organization with projects centered on the health, safety and efficiency of the human weapon system operator.
- **Armstrong Laboratory (AL)** - a research and development laboratory focused on the basic and applied core technologies associated with human aspects of weapon system performance.
- **Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (AFSAM)** - a medical education institution providing a flight surgeon residency program and training programs for medical technicians.

Consolidation of these elements at Wright-Patterson AFB would provide military benefit through the synergy resulting from having both the basic research and the development/acquisition of human centered technologies/equipment and the aeronautical weapon systems at one location.

- Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson has the mission of acquiring all aeronautical weapon systems (i.e., F-16, F-15, F-22, B-2, C-17, F-117, etc.) and associated training and support equipment. Human centered considerations are inextricable from the design and development of such systems. Additionally, man-machine interface issues are more efficiently resolved during the early stages (i.e. research, development, acquisition) of weapon systems management life cycle. Until 1989, the HSPO was located at Wright-Patterson with the weapon system program offices it served.
- Wright Laboratory (WL), the Air Forces largest 'super lab', is located at WPAFB. Its core technologies are flight dynamics, avionics, propulsion, and materials which are the leading edge technologies upon which advanced weapon systems are based. WL works closely with the AL divisions currently located at WPAFB in the joint cockpit office. It would forge stronger bonds with the remaining AL divisions, once collocated. There is a 50 year tradition of physiological research at WPAFB which started with the Aeromedical Research Lab which is the genesis of the current AL and the roots of the divisions of AL currently at WPAFB.
- The AFSAM would be sustained and enhanced within the WPAFB community. The local universities provide a wealth of education in the field of medicine. The region has a total of over 1600 full-time faculty, 1100 part-time faculty and 1800 full-time medical students. Wright State University School of Medicine, which is contiguous to WPAFB, has the only civilian school of aerospace medicine in the United States. Additionally, the AF's second largest medical center is located at WPAFB and currently services tri-service medical needs across a 10 state region. It provides direct access to clinical resources to complement the AFSAM curriculum. Moreover, there is a full complement of private medical facilities and biomedical research institutions in proximity of WPAFB.
- Brooks AFB has no ability to "accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements." However, WPAFB continues to be a principal part of these AF activities with considerable demonstrated potential to expand (i.e. every major class of AF aircraft has been operated from WPAFB at some time in the last 20 years-fighters, bombers, transports, tankers).

The military value of locating the HSC elements currently at Brooks AFB at WPAFB are derived from the synergistic benefit of co-locating the basic and applied research, as well as the development and acquisition, of both the weapon systems and the human centered technologies, upon which they rely. The AF can no longer afford the inefficiencies of maintaining separate infrastructures for these two inextricable facets of military capability -- the weapon systems and the humans which fly them.

## **ECONOMICS**

**Cost of relocation of Brooks AFB activities would save money with payback in six years.**

- This is driven by the lower cost of operations at Wright-Patterson AFB. All COBRA analysis studies run by the Air Force and the San Antonio community agree that more efficient operations of facilities would be at Wright-Patterson AFB.
- The one time cost of closure of Brooks AFB is \$211.5M vs \$42.4M for cantonment. However, the cantonment should not be viewed as a true closure since most missions and facilities will remain. The one time costs of closure is offset by the higher annual savings of \$32.3M vs \$10.5M for cantonment. The site survey process has now refined the Air Force estimate for return on investment to 6 years (very desirable in BRAC terms). Note: It will take at least two years for the cantonment (with its lower military value) to "pay back" vs the immediate payback asserted in the San Antonio proposal.
- Consolation at WPAFB will save significant dollars by reducing base support management, oversight and Headquarters support functions now duplicated between Brooks and Wright-Patterson Air Force Bases.

**The cantonment alternative proposed by the San Antonio community understates the true cost of that option.**

- The proposed cost of other cantonment operations across DoD have been historically understated (Kirkland AFB and Rome AFB are examples).
- The Brooks cantonment plan closes no facilities or infrastructure as represented by that option (it sells land, but does not close physical plant).
- The city of San Antonio has provided estimated "cost and manpower implications" for the cantonment. This data as well as the data for the proposed closure has been updated. This data shows that closure eliminates almost twice as many people -- 506 vs 266 and moves four times as many, 2876 vs 689. From a cost standpoint, it is the elimination of positions which produce significant savings which more than offset one time moving costs.
- The updated Air Force COBRA analysis of the Brooks closure delineates "the extent and timing of potential costs and savings." Closure has a 43% greater net present value (\$172.1M vs \$119.7M) than cantonment. Thus, cantonment would cost the Air Force at least \$52M more than closure in constant dollars.
- The cantonment option does not result in like consolidations of laboratory functions. The cantonment option also fails to reduce DoD infrastructure which is a primary consideration of the BRAC process.

## **SOLIDATION**

**Realignment of Brooks AFB activities to Wright-Patterson AFB significantly contributes to accomplishment of DoD/Air Force goals for *laboratory consolidation*.**

- Wright-Patterson has the highest concentration and diversity of research and development activities and is ranked as a Category one (1) Air Force Product Center (Best) by the DoD Joint Cross Service Group and the Air Force.
- Brooks AFB ranked lowest of nine (9) Air Force Product Centers/Laboratories by the DoD Joint Cross Service Group and has no excess capacity to accomplish additional future taskings.

**Consolidation also supports joint facility use, reduces infrastructure and overhead.**

- There are highly effective and efficient support activities at Wright-Patterson AFB, i.e. a regional military housing and other necessary base operating support infrastructure.
- Collocation reduces infrastructure for base and headquarters support with 506 positions eliminated.
- Availability, affordability and quality of housing and educational opportunities, both on an off base are available at Wright-Patterson AFB and Dayton, Ohio.
- Movement of Brooks AFB activities to Wright-Patterson AFB provides synergistic effects with the collocation of similar and mutually dependent activities.
- WPAFB has available laboratory and office space capacity to support a critical mass of the transferring activities' needs.
- Complements research, development, education, and acquisition skill base readily available at Wright-Patterson AFB.
- A significant skill base for aerospace medicine and human factors engineering is also resident at Wright-Patterson AFB and the surrounding area.

MARY

Cantonment

Consolidation of Laboratories  
to WPAFB

Military Value



Savings in Annual  
Operations Costs




Initial Investment Cost

Long Term Savings



Consolidation/Reduction  
of Excess Laboratory Capacity



Consolidation of Brooks activities to Wright-Patterson is the right answer. It meets all relevant BRAC criteria.

Relocation to Wright-Patterson is the right answer when viewed from three perspectives:

- Military Value - Provides total man-machine integration for all USAF weapon system management.
- Economics - Provides for best business case. The up front cost pays back in only six years.
- Reduction of Excess Capacity - Provides for reduction of excess capacities and promotes cross-servicing in weapon system man-machine endeavors.

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN  
BEFORE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE  
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
JUNE 13, 1995**

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.

While I have only five minutes to cover four different proposed base closure actions, I would like to highlight for you some of the key issues associated with these proposed closure actions.

The first issue relates to a 1993 recommendation I have always questioned -- the recommendation to privatize the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark Air

Force Base in Heath, Ohio.

The Commission approved the recommendation to close Newark in 1993. But, as privatization has proceeded, cost data has become available which indicates that closing and privatizing Newark may actually cost the taxpayer money, perhaps as much as \$456 million over the next five years.

Moreover, the potential cost increase and difficulties associated with privatizing Newark led GAO to recommend that the closure of Newark be reconsidered. This is the only time that GAO has recommended that a previous decision be re-examined.

As it currently stands, the Air Force will receive privatization proposals on June 17 and the Air Force has alerted the Commission that it may need to reevaluate what happens to Newark.

I urge the Commission to consider revisiting the 1993 closure decision, particularly if the proposals the Air Force receives on June 17 demonstrate that privatization will cost more than current operations.

A second closure issue is the proposed closure of Brooks Air Force Base and the realignment of its Armstrong Laboratory, Human Systems Center, School of Aerospace Medicine and the Systems Acquisition School to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. As I understand it, the Commission is considering an alternative proposal under which these activities would be cantoned at Brooks.

In terms of military value, consolidation of these activities at Wright-Patt takes advantage of the outstanding aerospace research and

development work already located there, while reducing overall Air Force infrastructure.

Furthermore, the Air Force provided the Commission with its cost analysis on the cantonment proposal and found that while the up-front cost of base closure could be avoided through cantonment, movement of these activities to Wright-Patterson is more cost effective than cantonment because after a 6 year pay back period it produces annual recurring savings in excess of \$20 million. Disapproving a recommendation merely to avoid the up-front costs of base closure seems at odds with the entire base closure process.

A third issue involves the proposed closure of the Springfield Air National Guard Base and the realignment of the 178th Fighter Group, as well as the 251st and 269th Combat

Communications units. Let me first say that a similar recommendation was made in 1993, but the Air Force reversed its position before the Commission when the costs of the move were questioned.

The costs and savings again have been questioned by the local community. According to the local community's cost data, it would take 23 years before the Air Force would obtain a return on its \$30 million investment. Mr. Chairman, that would be a \$30 million investment essentially to walk away from the fully modern taxpayer-purchased facilities at Springfield.

Given the past record on Springfield and the issues that have been raised this year by the local community, I urge the Commission to carefully examine the Air Force's

recommendation.

Finally, I urge the Commission to reconsider its actions with respect to the Youngstown Air Reserve Station. The Commission added this facility to the closure list along with several other C-130 reserve bases. Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of the Air Force recommended closing Youngstown.

Rather, the Air Force recognizes Youngstown's military value and plans to expand the number of C-130 aircraft at Youngstown, making the 910th Airlift Wing the largest C-130 wing in the Air Force Reserve. The 910th also performs the aerial spray mission, the only unit in our military that performs that technically demanding mission and for which unique maintenance facilities

have been constructed.

Youngstown is an extremely modern facility with 86% of its buildings having been constructed or upgraded in the last ten years.

I'll conclude my remarks by noting that the costs associated with closure argue against it. Youngstown has the lowest operating costs of the bases under consideration, but would have among the highest closure costs because more aircraft would have to be relocated and the facilities and training associated with the aerial spray mission would have to be reproduced elsewhere.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Commission and thank you for taking on the difficult task of base closure.

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN ROB PORTMAN  
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 13, 1995

First, I would like to thank the Commission for giving me the opportunity to testify here today with regard to the proposed consolidation of certain activities at Brooks Air Force Base (AFB) in San Antonio and Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio.

Having served in the White House when the first Base Closure and Realignment activities were initiated, I understand how important it is to have a non-political entity like the Commission involved in the closure process. As you all know, the 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act provided for an independent commission to review the closure recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense. I fully support this approach and applaud the Commission for its role in performing the difficult task of downsizing the armed services to meet budgetary requirements while maintaining the readiness and modernization capabilities that make our military force the best in the world. I am here today not to advocate a parochial view, but to urge you to act based on the merits. That, as I see it, is what this Commission is all about. The more your recommendations reflect good decisions on the merits alone, the better the results for our country.

In accordance with BRAC, the Air Force has determined that

it is necessary to reduce its laboratory research facilities in order to carry out its mission in the most thorough and cost-effective manner. To do this, the Secretary of Defense has recommended consolidating the Brooks Air Force Base (AFB) in Texas with the Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio. This decision appears to be consistent with both the long-term force structure plan as well as the selection criteria under the Base Closure and Realignment Act. Indeed, the Air Force has rated Wright-Patterson as a Tier I base, while Brooks was rated as a Tier III base.

Furthermore, the Air Force has indicated that Wright-Patterson and the surrounding area have a sufficient level of qualified personnel, support, and technical facilities to incorporate the activities from Brooks at Wright-Patterson efficiently and effectively. The one-time cost of closure and consolidation should be more than offset by the long-term savings associated with reducing personnel and infrastructure. The Air Force has determined that consolidation will eliminate almost twice as many positions as the cantonment policy suggested by supporters of Brooks. This fact, in addition to the reduction in overhead and other costs, is expected to result in an annual savings of about \$32 million, compared to only \$10.5 million in annual savings associated with cantonment. All of these are Air Force data -- not mine.

The services -- including the Air Force -- have correctly

been given the discretion to determine how to best restructure forces into a more efficient organization while preserving the ability to protect the nation. In this case, they have decided that consolidation will result in the "best" military value for the Air Force. I urge you to consider the merits of the cost-effectiveness of this measure as you review the Air Force recommendation in accordance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act. Sound decisions based on sound policies -- divorced from politics -- will help make your recommendations and the work of this Commission credible and persuasive.

Thank you for letting me say a few words today.

JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.  
17TH DISTRICT, OHIO

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**TESTIMONY OF THE  
HONORABLE JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.  
BEFORE THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION'S  
CONGRESSIONAL HEARING IN WASHINGTON, D.C.  
JUNE 13, 1995**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I want to thank you again for the opportunity you have given me to testify before you on behalf of the Air Force Reserve's 910th Airlift Wing at the Youngstown, Ohio, Municipal Airport. It is my hope that after having heard my testimony and the testimony of others on behalf of the 910th that your panel will find the 910th to be one of the most efficient, cost-effective, and vital Air Force Reserve facilities in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I believe is the intention of the BRAC Commission to close or realign those bases that are deemed to have diminishing military value, low return on investment, and negligible community impact. If that is truly the mission of this panel, then the 910th should be lauded for its success and should not be considered a candidate for closure or realignment. The 910th Airlift Wing has grown and expanded into one of the premier Air Force Reserve units in the United States. In fact, its recent growth and mission has put it on the level of many of the finest active-duty bases in the country.

I have worked diligently during my tenure in Congress to ensure that the 910th continues to grow to meet the requirements that the Department of Defense has

Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.

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asked of it. As a matter of fact, last November I was honored to be present at a commanders call to announce to approximately 500 Reservists in attendance that the 910th had the distinction of being designated a full wing. With the delivery of its sixteenth C-130H aircraft later this year, the 910th will meet that designation.

The 910th also enjoys the continued strong support of the White House and the Air Force because of the vital missions the 910th performs and the Wing's cost-effectiveness. To demonstrate this point, the fiscal year 1996 budget submitted to Congress by the President includes almost \$8 million for additional improvements to be made at the Youngstown Municipal Airport for the 910th. Last May, former Under Secretary of Defense John Deutch even reiterated the Air Force's strong commitment to making the 910th a regional C-130 maintenance facility. Clearly, these improvements are needed to continue the on-going build-up of the mission and infrastructure of the 910th Air Wing.

The mission of the 910th is two-fold: in wartime, it deploys the C-130H in the combat operations of tactical airlift. These operations include low-level infiltration into combat environments, where the aircraft can deliver personnel and materials by airdrop and air-land techniques. In peacetime, the Wing's mission is to direct the organizing, equipping and training of Air Force Reserve aircrews in tactical airlift tactics and techniques. And, as required, the unit will also be available to provide non-military humanitarian assistance. In this capacity, since February of 1993, the 910th Air Wing has provided airlift and personnel for humanitarian flights to war-torn Bosnia.

Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.

Page 3

In January of 1992, the 910th also assumed the responsibility of Aerial Spray Mission for the Department of Defense. This is the Department of Defense's only dedicated aerial spray facility. The mission of the spray facility is to maintain the ability to aerially dispense liquid pesticides. In this capacity, the 910th has carried out its mission to control insects at military bases around the country and also, at the request of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, conducted spray operations around South Florida in September of 1992 to control mosquitos following Hurricane Andrew.

Since coming to Congress in 1985, I have worked closely with appropriate House committees to ensure that the 910th's needs for fulfilling its missions have been met.

I think that by assisting the 910th at the legislative level, the Wing can concentrate on carrying out its mission instead of worrying about whether it has the tools and infrastructure to carry that mission out. In 1991, the 910th received eight new C-130H aircraft to replace aging C-130B aircraft. In that same year, I secured \$1.45 million for a much-needed avionics shop for the 910th. In fiscal years 1992 and 1993, I was able to secure \$240 million for the additional eight aircraft that brought the 910th to full wing status. Also, five new construction and expansion projects were included in the fiscal year 1994 House authorization bill for the Department of Defense.

Most importantly, the 910th has an impressive record of efficiency and fiscal responsibility. The 910 Airlift Group, dollar for dollar, is the best value that the Department of Defense can find. The 910th has always proven itself to be one

Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.

page 4

of the most cost efficient units in the country, and continues to be. However, the 910th's cost efficiency has recently been brought into question for the wrong reasons. To compare an Air Force Reserve unit that has eight planes with one that will have 16 planes and a unique mission is unacceptable. The costs associated with the closing and reassignment of any other C-130 unit in the country is minimal compared to what it would be if the 910th were to be closed. No other unit has an aerial spray unit or short field runway that can be easily shut down and relocated. Simply put, the taxpayers are getting maximum bang for their buck with the 910th.

I again want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before you and the members of the Commission. The Department of Defense and the White House have stated their unequivocal support for the 910th. For this and the reasons I've stated above, I truly believe that it is in the best interests of this nation to keep the 910th Air Wing fully operational.

I will be more than happy to respond to any questions you might have.

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**OKLAHOMA**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**AIR FORCE:**

Oklahoma City ALC (Tinker AFB)                      Realign

**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

**AIR FORCE:**


Vance AFB                                                              Close  
Tinker AFB                                                              Close

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:**

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City                      Close

# MAP NO. 37

## OKLAHOMA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

# NOTES

BILL K. BREWSTER  
3D DISTRICT  
OKLAHOMA

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AND INFRASTRUCTURE

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STATEMENT OF  
THE HONORABLE BILL K. BREWSTER  
BEFORE THE  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 13, 1995

---

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I appreciate the time and effort each of you have spent to bring this round of the BRAC process to a close. I certainly do not envy your task.

I am here with my Oklahoma colleagues to testify in support of the role Tinker Air Force Base plays in the defense of our country, as well as the important role Tinker plays in the economy of Oklahoma.

Tinker's past record speaks for itself. Tinker has consistently been ranked as one of the Air Force's superior depots. This record has been achieved while working on some of the Air Force's most complex planes, such as the B-52, B-1 and the KC-135. Furthermore, maintenance of the B-2 bomber will soon be under way at Tinker. We in Oklahoma do not understand why a base like Tinker, with its excellent record of performance, could be a target for downsizing. In fact, every entity which has reviewed the situation, except the Pentagon, has recommended the closure of one or more bases less efficient than Tinker. Moreover, I am confident Tinker's capabilities will keep it off any list the commission may propose.

We have now reached a point where the optimal operating levels may be sacrificed if we continue personnel reductions. However, increased savings could be achieved by efficiently utilizing the facility, thereby reducing the overhead expenses per person. By downsizing personnel levels below efficient levels, more overhead costs are born by the remaining workforce. Currently, it costs \$60 per man-hour to operate Tinker. However, if the base were operating at capacity, the cost would be reduced to \$50 per man-hour. The increased operating capacity could be achieved by reassigning work currently being done at other facilities.

Tinker has the excess capacity available to absorb a significant increase in duties. Its potential for sizable growth will allow Tinker to absorb new missions with minimal construction. For example, Tinker once maintained approximately 350 B-52 bombers. The number has now dropped to around 100. As a result of the lower number of B-52s, Tinker has sufficient excess ramp space to absorb up to 5 million man-hours of additional duties without additional construction. The C-5 mission is representative of a mission which Tinker could absorb with minimal additional construction.

The support for Tinker does not end at the base gates. Oklahoma community leaders have long made it a point to work closely with military installation commanders. Likewise, our bases are quick to respond when appropriate. Countless examples may be drawn from situations arising from the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

With exception to the state government, Tinker Air Force Base is the single largest employer in the State of Oklahoma. Employees live in 37 of our state's 77 counties. The positive economic impact on the State of Oklahoma by the base is tremendous. Likewise, the loss of this employment source would be devastating. Tinker's positive impact is not restricted to the Oklahoma City metro area or the state of Oklahoma, but to the Nation as a whole.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

# Document Separator

# DRAFT

## PENNSYLVANIA

### I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

#### ARMY:

Fort Indiantown Gap	Close
Kelly Support Center	Realign
Letterkenny Army Depot	Realign

#### NAVY:

NAESU Philadelphia	Close
NATSF Philadelphia	Close
NAWC-AD Open Water Test Facility Oreland	Close
NAWC-AD Warminster	Close
NCCOSC R&D Det Warminster	Close
NSY Philadelphia-Norfolk Det	Redirect

#### AIR FORCE:

Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS	Close
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#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny	Disestablish
Defense Industrial Supply Center	Disestablish

### II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

#### ARMY:

Tobyhanna Army Depot	Close
Letterkenny Army Depot	Close


#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:

Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna	Close
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DRAFT

# MAP NO. 39

## PENNSYLVANIA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

NOTES

Testimony by  
the Honorable Phil English  
before  
the Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
for June 13, 1995

I want to thank the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) for allowing me the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Youngstown/Warren Air Reserve Station that serves the Pennsylvania- Ohio Shenango Valley. I believe that this facility is a significant resource for our national defense.

I cannot claim to be an expert on all aspects of military preparedness, but what I can do is relay to the commission the significance of the air reserve base to the Mercer County community. Over 400 reservists as well as nearly 150 civilian employees from Pennsylvania, work at or otherwise utilize the 910th. The Youngstown Air Reserve Station has become one of the area's largest single employers, and its loss would have serious consequences upon the local community and the regional economy. I believe that one can compare the beneficial impacts of such a base on a local economy to that of a major industry. Individuals' livelihoods are tied to the base's operation and its closure would be a blow to a region that has suffered much recent economic hardship.

But I do not want to speak only on the extent of such a loss. I also want to emphasize the support and initiative of the 910th personnel given to their Air

Reserve Station -- an exceptional operational record recognized regularly by the Department of Defense. I firmly believe that after reviewing the Youngstown Air Reserve Station's military value, its capabilities, and its strong community support, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission will see the merits of its continued service.

Presently, the 910th Airlift Wing consists of two tactical unit's, the 757th Airlift Squadron, the 773rd Airlift Squadron, as well as the Aerial Spray Branch and its supporting units covering all facets of Air Force requirements. It is under the command of the 10th Air Force at the Bergstrom Air Force Base in Texas and the Air Force Reserve Headquarters at the Robins Air Force Base in GA. To briefly describe its size, the Youngstown Air Reserve Station employs nearly 500 people, is utilized by 1100 reservists, sits on 230 acres on the north side of Youngstown- Warren Regional Airport while using a total of 1,303 acres when counting all the facilities used.

The mission of the 910th is two-fold: in wartime, it deploys the C-130H in the combat operations of tactical airlift. These operations include low-level infiltration into combat environments, where the aircraft can deliver personnel and materials by airdrop and air-land techniques. In peacetime, the Wing's mission is to direct the organizing, equipping, and training of Air Force Reserve aircrews in

actical airlift tactics and techniques. And, as required, the unit will also be available to provide non-military humanitarian assistance. In this capacity, since February of 1993, the 910th Air Wing has provided airlift and personnel for humanitarian flights to wartorn Bosnia.

In January of 1992, the 910th also assumed the responsibility of Aerial Spray Mission for the Department of Defense. This is the Department of Defense's only dedicated aerial spray facility. The mission of the spray facility is to maintain the ability to aerially dispense liquid pesticides. In this capacity, the 910th has carried out its mission to control insects at military bases around the country and also, at the request of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, conducted spray operations around South Florida in September of 1992 to control mosquitos following Hurricane Andrew.

I want to note that as a measure of the base's ambition in fulfilling its mission, just eight months ago, the 910th received the authorization for enough C-130 aircraft to earn it "wing" status. Its complement of C-130 cargo planes was raised to 16, making the 910th the largest C-130 base in the nation. The delivery of the 16th C-130H aircraft later this year will complete its designation as a "wing" and will signify yet another important step forward in the expansion of the 910th.

But this depiction of the military preparedness is only part of the 910th's portrait. The 910th Air Reserve Base is a pillar of support in the Shenango valley. In a region that regularly experiences unemployment rates well above the national average (Mercer county began the year with a 6.2% unemployment figure while the nation averaged 5.7%), the operation of the 910th substantially effects the region's economy. The 910th is the county's largest employer and its operation has a local financial impact of \$30.1 million. When viewed in relation to the recent loss of many large employers and facilities, the placement of the 910th on the BRAC list has brought much distress to the Mercer community. Its closure would be another burden in a region fighting to revive its economy.

Besides the air base's economic strength, the Mercer community has also come to depend heavily on several key capabilities of the Reserve Station. The station provides full time fire/crash rescue capabilities for the Regional Airport and has numerous mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities. Over the past several years, the station has responded with assistance during tornado damage, recovery fuel fires, and numerous automobile accidents. The station also successfully responded to local aircraft crashes in 1981 and more recently in 1995.

I want to finish with what I believe are the 910th Air Wing greatest asset -- the individuals who make the base function so successfully. Besides the

ication needed to achieve high air force reviews, base personnel actively promote volunteerism and public service. Yearly, the base is open to a 1000 visitors as well as hosts charity events. This demonstration of generosity also extends to such recent humanitarian projects as assisting Mother Teresa and her cause while en-route to Thailand to participate in an exercise. This is but one small facet of an organization depicting the spirit of the men and women who comprise the 910th Ohio-Pennsylvania military community.

Again, I want to thank the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission for the opportunity to testify. The Department of Defense, the White House, Congressional Members from both parties have all come forth to demonstrate their support for the 910th. For this and the reasons I have already stated, I want to urge the commission to reconsider the base's placement on the closure list and to allow the 910th to continue its fine work. I believe that it is in the best interests of this nation to keep the 910th Air Wing fully operational.

**Statement of Congressman George W. Gekas (PA-17)**  
**to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**  
**Tuesday, June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

Thank you for the opportunity to present final arguments on behalf of Fort Indiantown Gap. I want to urge each of you to seriously reconsider inclusion of the Gap on the Department of Defense base closure list.

It is not my intention to bore you with the technical specifics and crunched numbers that represent the foundation of my support for Fort Indiantown Gap. These figures are already familiar to you and your staff. Instead, I am including a detailed fact sheet along with my testimony for your review in a more suitable moment.

The argument of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation is a simple one: The Army's analysis of Fort Indiantown Gap is flawed and a corrected analysis requires the Gap be removed from the closure list. The Army has already admitted that their own financial analysis of the dollar savings by closing Fort Indiantown Gap was very flawed and based on very incorrect data. Their latest analysis has required a 75% correction in their figures. I repeat, a 75% correction. And there are still more data errors that they must address. For example, the additional transportation costs for moving training to other posts has not been considered. For the Pennsylvania National Guard alone, it is estimated at \$1.6 million per year. This additional funding will have to come from operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts which will undermine readiness and training.

Another example is the projected \$8 million cost of moving the Army Reserve Equipment Concentration Site to Fort Dix. Also not included is the cost to move the Pennsylvania Guard's equipment site, currently located at Fort Pickett, VA--which is also on the closure list--to another site. This cost will be in excess of \$8 million.

Based solely on the newly configured financial data presented by the Army, it is NOT cost-effective to close the Gap. The Cost Savings argument falls strongly on the side of keeping Fort Indiantown Gap open.

In addition, I want to address the other component in determining Fort Indiantown Gap's status, its military value. I submit to you that the Department of Defense and the Army have failed to consider the following key military aspects of the Gap:

- An air-to-ground bombing and strafing range which is part of a system of low-level flight routes and sits in a large Military Operations Area (MOA), airspace dedicated to military aircraft training and used by all services, Active, Guard and Reserve from thirteen states;

- A 710 square mile maneuver rights area used for Army Aviation Training. The land used for this training was not considered in the analysis of military value since ground maneuver is restricted within most of this area. Unfortunately, this ignores the importance of Army aviation as a component of the modern Army. To not recognize the

(MORE)

Congressman George W. Gekas/BRAC Statement

J 13, 1995

P Two

value of this aviation maneuver area flies in the face of current Army maneuver doctrine. When this maneuver area is considered, the military ranking of the Gap in the Major Training Area category increases from ninth out of ten to third out of ten, a huge increase in military value;

- The local needs of reserve component troops;
- The tank crew qualification ranges, unique and non-replicated at any other location; and other aspects of military value detailed in my attachment.

In addition, to further support the case of Fort Indiantown Gap, I present this proven formula of military value and success:

ARMY GUARD/RESERVES + FORT INDIANTOWN GAP + PERSIAN GULF WAR = SUCCESS. I repeat: ARMY GUARD/RESERVES + FORT INDIANTOWN GAP + PERSIAN GULF WAR = SUCCESS. To this proven formula, I offer the Gekas Corollary: MILITARY SUCCESS = MILITARY VALUE. I repeat: MILITARY SUCCESS = MILITARY VALUE.

Fort Indiantown Gap has consistently proven its military value, most notably in one of the larger troop activities of this century, the Persian Gulf War. In this short but intense conflict, Fort Indiantown Gap displayed the high level of military value needed to make Desert Storm a success.

Prior to, and in preparation for the Persian Gulf War, over 2,700 troops were trained at Fort Indiantown Gap. And when those troops got to the field of Desert Storm they "played a key role in our success." My quote? No. Those are the words of General Gus Pagonis, the Chief Logistician during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, who has told me that, "During the Persian Gulf War, 75% of my 22nd Support Command units came from the Guard and Reserve. Fort Indiantown Gap and other mobilization sites were critical to our ability to effectuate their transition from peace to war."

May I also remind the Commission that Fort Indiantown Gap was put on the Base Closure List during the 1991 BRAC round and was taken off that list at the request of DOD! What has changed since then? A huge infusion of money and resources into the Gap has made it a better, more cost efficient and more militarily valuable training facility.

There is no logic, no consistency, no accuracy to the conclusion to close Fort Indiantown Gap. Readiness will not be enhanced and costs savings will never materialize. Keep the Gap open and keep our military in a better, not worse, state of readiness.

(END)

Remove Fort Indiantown Gap from the base closure list!

## BRAC 95

# Fort Indiantown Gap

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP HAS HIGH VALUE TO ALL OF DOD

## DoD Under Estimates The Gap's Value

The data used in the Army's military value analysis does not include some significant training facilities such as tank crew qualification ranges, automated air-to-ground bombing and strafing ranges, and the use of low-level flight routes which lead into a Military Operations Area (MOA) - airspace which is dedicated to military aircraft operations. These facilities all exist at the Gap and significantly contribute to its military value to the DOD, not just the Army.

The Army clearly did not fully understand the complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to the Air Force, Navy, and Marines Corps. In addition, the Army's analysis of military value did not include training conducted by the other services. In fact, the other services were not queried as to their training requirements at the Gap. The Marine Corps Reserves, the Air Force (both active and reserve), the Navy (both active and reserve) all train at the installation and on the bombing and strafing range.

The bombing range is part of an integrated series of ranges in the eastern U.S. The loss of any of them would overload the other ranges and severely degrade the training of the aviation units in the other services, all of which use these ranges.

In addition, international students are trained at the flight simulator complex as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program.

The Army did not consider the Northern Training Area at Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square miles used for Army Aviation training. The Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS), located at the Gap, is the second largest Army aviation training facility in the country. It is a critical part of the Army's overall aviation training program. The land used for this training



THE GAP - AN IMPORTANT DOD POWER PROJECTION PLATFORM

was not considered in the analysis of military value since ground maneuver is restricted within most of this area.

Army aviation is a key component of the three-dimensional maneuver of the modern Army. To not recognize the value of this aviation maneuver area flies in the face of current Army maneuver doctrine. When this maneuver area is considered, the military ranking of the Gap in the Major Training Area category increases from ninth out of ten to third out of ten in the DOD Major Training Area category.

FLAWED AND MISSING DATA MEAN FAULTY CONCLUSIONS

## Important Military Data Was Missed

The Army's military value analysis was based on data elements which were specified by the Army and received from all installations. However, the data does include several primary factors relevant to reserve component units: the accessibility to a given training site, the suitability of proposed alternate training sites for specific units and training, and the affordability (additional transportation costs) of moving training to more distant locations.

The Army used an analytical model called TRAINLOAD to determine to which installations reserve component annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in that its results are based on a 12 month availability of reserve component units for annual training. In reality, these units are limited to the May to September time frame due to the 15-20 percent of their soldiers who are in school during the September - May time period. When the annual training period is thus compressed, the proposed alternate training sites (Fort Drum, Fort Dix, and Fort AP Hill) are not able to take the additional training load.

## Summary

- 1 Gap's Military Value Under Estimated
- 2 DoD Missed Important Military Data
- 3 Governor To Train Federal Troops?
- 4 Army Overstated Savings and Understated Costs

*William J. Coyne*

**THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. COYNE  
TESTIMONY FOR THE  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
JUNE 13, 1995**

Chairman Dixon, Members of the Commission, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify in support of ensuring that the 911th Airlift Wing is retained as an integral part of our Nation's defense structure. / I am pleased to join with my colleagues from Pennsylvania in setting forth our views on the real and significant benefits the 911th brings to the U.S. Air Force and overall U.S. defense capabilities. /

Today we have sought to provide compelling evidence on the merits of the 911th and have also attempted to provide convincing information on why the original recommendation to close the 911th was unwarranted and ill-considered. / Quite simply, we believe that the original Cost Of Base Realignment

Actions (COBRA) report prepared by the U.S. Air Force was flawed in several key aspects.

As someone who has been deeply involved with regional efforts to create and retain jobs in the Greater Pittsburgh area, I want to provide in particular some detailed information regarding some of the regional economic issues which were not correctly reflected in the original COBRA report. I also want to request permission to submit along with my written testimony an economic impact statement prepared by Carnegie Mellon University.

I believe strongly that the Air Force's COBRA report fails to adequately reflect the conditions of the Pittsburgh economy and thus, the cumulative impact of the closing. Based upon the

economic changes of the last two decades, the Greater Pittsburgh economy is far less capable of absorbing the loss of the 911th Airlift Wing than any other major economic region. This is particularly true in light of the nature of the 701 jobs put at risk by the proposed closure of the 911th. Losing these quality jobs and the \$20,370,255 that the 911th's operations contribute to our economy would bring about a significant economic loss that must be put in context.

The 911th Airlift Wing has played a critical role in stabilizing the Pittsburgh economy in the wake of ongoing economic restructuring. The closure of the base would contribute significantly to the cumulative impact of the continued decline of manufacturing and emerging job losses in the health care industry. Moreover, closure of the base would

weaken business vitality and development in the area surrounding Greater Pittsburgh International Airport. /

The 911th Airlift Wing is an economic asset for the entire Pittsburgh metropolitan statistical area (MSA) The 911th employers workers and procures products in each of the six counties which constitute the Pittsburgh MSA (Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Washington, and Westmoreland). / The COBRA report on employment and income in four of the six counties in the MSA suggested that the Pittsburgh economy has performed better on average than the other base economies. / However a deeper assessment of the performance of the Pittsburgh MSA reveals the importance of the 911th to the region's economic future. /

Between 1970 and 1990, the Pittsburgh region experienced the steepest decline in jobs and population of the top 25 metropolitan regions. The region also experienced a decline in average wages in the same period. The decline of area steel mills was a central factor in both general job loss and the decline of wages as an international restructuring of the steel industry deprived the Pittsburgh region of many above-average wage jobs.

These conditions have only moderately stabilized in the 1990's. For example, in 1993, the region's unemployment rate was .9 percent higher than the average U.S. metropolitan region. This means that the Pittsburgh region had on average 10,000 more unemployed workers than other metropolitan areas.

A critical challenge for the Pittsburgh regional economy is to maintain and expand the number of jobs paying above-average wages -- jobs with salaries above \$27,000 per year. Retaining a strong wage base is essential to the overall health of the region's economy and the maintenance of region's quality of life.

In the 1990's, only one industry with above average wages, the health care industry, has added jobs. The health care industry now faces many of the same pressures for restructuring which the region's manufacturing base faced in earlier decades. Within the last month, one of the region's largest health care employers, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, announced the elimination of 800 jobs.

It is in this context that the 911th is so important. Between 1990 and 1993, the Pittsburgh region had a net job loss of 1,416 jobs with above average wages. The average salary of employees of the 911th is \$34,000. Thus, closing the 911th represents a 16 percent increase in the net above average wage jobs lost in the region in the 1990's. This increased pressure on the region's above average wage job base cannot fail to have a significant impact on general level of economic activity in the Pittsburgh area.

The loss of the 911th would also hinder efforts to establish the area around the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport as one of the region's job growth centers. The 911th represents an important anchor for the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport. Currently, the pace of commercial development

urrounding the airport has not proceeded quickly enough to ensure the economic reuse of the old airport terminal. / Given these development trends, it is highly unlikely that commercial reuse of the 911th base site would occur in the short term. /

Moreover, indirect job loss could be greater than estimated considering the fact that employees at the 911th provide an important market for the cluster of restaurant and entertainment enterprises located in the airport area. /

In summary, the closure of the 911th Airlift Wing will add significantly to the cumulative impact of job and population loss in the Greater Pittsburgh region. / The closure will particularly exacerbate the loss of above average jobs in the Greater Pittsburgh region. / Closure would also deprive the Air Force

Reserve and the Department of Defense a recruiting pool that is without question among the very best in the Nation.

I join with my colleagues from the Pennsylvania Congressional Delegation in requesting the Commission to consider these facts which we believe demonstrate why the 911th should retain its position as one of our Nation's essential military facilities. Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify.

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CONGRESSMAN CURT WELDON  
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, I COME BEFORE YOU TO OFFER TWO PROPOSALS WHICH SUPPORT CONSOLIDATION OF OUR DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SAVE DEFENSE DOLLARS.

FIRST, I URGE YOUR SUPPORT FOR THE RECOMMENDATION PUT FORWARD BY THE NAVY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO REALIGN THE NAVY'S MACHINERY SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FROM ITS CURRENT LOCATION IN ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND TO THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER IN PHILADELPHIA. THE COMMISSION SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT A PROPOSAL TO FURTHER INCREASE SAVINGS BY CONSOLIDATING THE NAVSEA HEADQUARTERS ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE (NAVSEA 03) NOW LOCATED IN CRYSTAL CITY INTO THE THE SURFACE WARFARE CENTER IN PHILADELPHIA.

AS THE NAVY HAS DEMONSTRATED, THE PROPOSAL TO REALIGN NSWC-ANNAPOLIS WITH NSWC-PHILADELPHIA WILL SAVE \$14.5 MILLION PER YEAR AND PRODUCE TWENTY-YEAR SAVINGS OF \$175 MILLION WHILE PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE STRUCTURE TO MEET THE MACHINERY SYSTEMS DEMANDS OF THE FLEET. AS CHAIRMAN OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE, I KNOW THAT THE NAVY NOW DEVOTES 20 PERCENT OF ITS ANNUAL BUDGET TO T & E AND IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING, AND THAT THOSE NEEDS WILL CONTINUE TO GROW IN THE FACE OF A REDUCED FORCE STRUCTURE.

THE SURFACE WARFARE CENTER AT PHILADELPHIA IS THE NAVY'S ONLY SOURCE FOR TEST AND EVALUATION AND IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING OF SHIP MACHINERY SYSTEMS. THE FACILITY HAS BEEN UPGRADED AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE AND EXPANDED OVER THE YEARS, ALONG WITH THE WORK ASSIGNED THERE. IT HAS GROWN INTO A STATE-OF-THE-ART INSTALLATION AND A VITAL NAVY ASSET.

APPROVAL OF THE DOD PROPOSAL TO REALIGN NSWC-ANNAPOLIS TO PHILADELPHIA WOULD ENABLE THE NAVY THE PROVIDE FULL LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT FOR MACHINERY SYSTEMS AT ONE LOCATION, AND SUPPORT IMPROVED EFFICIENCIES WHICH COULD NOT OTHERWISE BE OBTAINED, INCLUDING:

\* THE STREAMLINING OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION CYCLE FOR MACHINERY SYSTEMS WILL ENABLE THE NAVY TO PURCHASE SYSTEMS AT LOWER COST.

\* INCREASED NAVY ABILITY TO RESPOND RAPIDLY TO SOLVE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS RELATED TO MACHINERY SYSTEMS, THEREBY IMPROVING OPERATIONAL READINESS.

\* I THINK IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT THAT THIS PROPOSAL MOVES IN THE EXACT DIRECTION CONGRESS IS HEADING. WE ARE DEMANDING THAT THE SERVICES CONSOLIDATE OPERATIONS AND REDUCE THE COSTS AND NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACQUISITION PROCESS.

THE OPPOSITION TO THE ANNAPOLIS/PHILADELPHIA CONSOLIDATION RESTS ON TWO KEY ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE NAVY'S NON-CFC WORK AND THE NAVY'S REQUIREMENTS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AT ANNAPOLIS.

NAVSEA, THE NAVY SPONSOR OF THE NON-CFC PROGRAM, CONCURS THAT THE REALIGNMENT WILL CAUSE NO DELAY IN THE PROGRAM. NSWC-PHILADELPHIA IS INVOLVED IN THE SAME PROGRAM AND CAN QUICKLY INTEGRATE THE ANNAPOLIS NON-CFC FACILITIES WITH ITS OWN WHILE REDUCING PROGRAM COSTS.

WITH RESPECT TO INFRASTRUCTURE, THE NAVY NO LONGER NEEDS THE DEEP OCEAN SIMULATION FACILITY AND THE SUBMARINE FLUID DYNAMICS FACILITY TO MEET REQUIREMENTS. THE NAVY HAS NOT TESTED A MANNED VEHICLE IN THE DEEP OCEAN FACILITY IN OVER TWENTY TWO YEARS AND NO FUTURE MANNED VEHICLE TESTS ARE PLANNED FOR THE SITE. THE CAPABILITY PROVIDED BY THE SUBMARINE FACILITY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED AT NSWC AND OTHER DOD TEST SITES.

NSWC-PHILADELPHIA'S 1600 EMPLOYEES HAVE COMPLETE OR PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TEN OF THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER'S "CORE CAPABILITIES" AND OVER \$750 MILLION IN FACILITIES INFRASTRUCTURE, WHILE ANNAPOLIS' 400 EMPLOYEES HAVE \$100 MILLION IN FACILITIES AND PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 3 NSWC "CORE CAPABILITIES." THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDED REALIGNMENT CAN BE QUICKLY AND EASILY ACCOMMODATED WITHIN THE COST-TO-MOVE PROJECTED BY THE NAVY AND IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY CURRENTLY RESIDENT IN ANNAPOLIS.

THERE IS MORE WE CAN DO TO FURTHER INCREASE EFFICIENCIES IN THE NAVY BY CONSOLIDATING ADDITIONAL WORK INTO NSWC-PHILADELPHIA -- AND IT MEETS EACH OF THE BRAC CRITERIA RELATED TO MILITARY VALUE AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT.

BY CONSOLIDATING NAVSEA'S ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE FOR MACHINERY SYSTEMS (03) INTO PHILADELPHIA, WE WOULD ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION. 03'S PRIMARY DUTIES ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO OR DUPLICATE ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY PERFORMED AT NSWC-PHILADELPHIA. CLOSE TO A FORTY PERCENT CONSOLIDATION BENEFIT CAN BE OBTAINED. PREVIOUS MIGRATIONS OF NAVSEA 03 RESPONSIBILITIES TO PHILADELPHIA SHOW THAT THIS CAN BE DONE WITH NO DISRUPTION AND NO DIMINUTION OF SERVICES.

BY FULLY INTEGRATING SHIP SYSTEMS LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT AND IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING INTO A COHESIVE ORGANIZATION, THE COST OF DESIGNING AND INTRODUCING NEW SYSTEMS INTO THE FLEET WILL BE REDUCED. SYSTEMS WILL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE FLEET MORE QUICKLY WITH CRADLE-TO-GRAVE SUPPORT PROVIDED IN ONE LOCATION. THERE IS CLEARLY MILITARY VALUE TO THIS PROPOSAL.

THIS PROPOSAL HAS EVEN GREATER COST-SAVING POTENTIAL. IT WILL PRODUCE \$165 MILLION IN SAVINGS OVER TWENTY YEARS COMPARED TO ONLY \$10 MILLION IN SAVINGS WHICH WOULD BE RECOGNIZED IF THE 03 DIRECTORATE IS MOVED TO THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD AS PROPOSED BY DOD. HERE AGAIN, THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY PHILADELPHIA

HEADS IN THE SAME DIRECTION CONGRESS IS GOING. IT REQUIRES THE MOVEMENT OF WORK OUT OF THE HIGH-COST WASHINGTON AREA AND INTO OTHER REGIONS WHICH ALREADY SUPPORT RELATED SERVICE FUNCTIONS.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAVSEA 03 WITH NSWC-PHILADELPHIA IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE FLEET AND THE U.S. TAXPAYER. IT IS SUPPORTED NOT ONLY BY OUR DELEGATION, BUT BY MANY FORMER AND CURRENT NAVY OFFICIALS -- INCLUDING FORMER SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY JOHN LEHMAN AND SEAN O'KEEFE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE SUPPORTED BY THIS COMMISSION.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THESE PROPOSALS HAVE AN ADDED BENEFIT: EACH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SURFACE WARFARE CENTER IN PHILADELPHIA AND ENHANCE ONGOING CONVERSION EFFORTS AT THE NAVAL SHIPYARD. NSWC-PHILADELPHIA HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITS POTENTIAL TO ATTRACT NEW BUSINESS TO THE YARD. THE WESTINGHOUSE CORPORATION, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS COMMITTED TO ESTABLISHING A MANUFACTURING OPERATION AT THE YARD IN ORDER TO BE CO-LOCATED WITH THE WARFARE CENTER. WE HAVE TWO SHIPBUILDERS WHICH SEE THE FACILITY AS A MAJOR DRAW AS WELL.

THIS COMMISSION HAS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO APPROVE TWO PROPOSALS WHICH WILL ACHIEVE THE ULTIMATE GOALS OF THE BASE CLOSURE PROCESS. I URGE THE COMMISSION TO SUPPORT BOTH.

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN MIKE DOYLE  
BEFORE THE BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE COMMISSION

JUNE 13, 1995

I want to begin by thanking the Commissioners for holding this hearing, and for offering to myself and others the opportunity to testify before you today. I want to use this opportunity to speak about the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and why it should not be selected for closure and, in fact, should never have been considered for closure.

The Western Pennsylvania Coalition, after identifying multiple errors throughout the data supplied by the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve, determined that a closer look at the grading of the criteria was necessary.

After analyzing these individual errors, it became clear that final rankings of the C-130 bases were affected by these mistakes.

The Coalition then proceeded to evaluate the standings through the Grading and Weighting process used by the Air Force.

Criteria 4 and 5 were evaluated through use of the COBRA program and the results of that analysis will be described in detail by Congressman Mascara in a few minutes.

**I am going to focus on Criteria 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8, which were evaluated using raw Air Force scores from their Analysis and Recommendations, Volume 5. The results of our study differed significantly from the Air Force's findings.**

**Many of the identified errors negatively affected these raw scores. We have focused on three of these errors within this study, which I would like to submit for the record at this time.**

**First, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station received a low rating for the condition of its airfield pavement. This rating was based upon data that is fourteen years old. A 1994 study, however, rates the pavement's ability as being capable of handling any aircraft in the Air Force inventory.**

**The second error addressed was the Future Growth ability and the Attainment Status of our air quality. Our installation was graded "Red" for its future growth ability and "Yellow" for attainment status.**

**The EPA has reviewed Allegheny County's air quality and reached the conclusion contained in the following quote, "... the area attained the ozone standard at this time." Thus, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station has no restrictions on its air quality.**

**The third error I wish to highlight pertains to the Environmental Impact of this facility. Despite the 911th Airlift Wing's answer to the BRAC questionnaire, it was graded "Red" for wetlands. A 1994 study by GEONEX reports, "...there are no wetlands apparent at your installation."**

**Underscoring the credibility of our points is the fact that each of these studies was either in progress or were under contract prior to the Air Force BRAC questionnaire process which occurred during the spring of 1994. Supporting data can be found in the appendices of the study that I have submitted for the record.**

**By eliminating these errors and using the same analysis, Pittsburgh qualifies for the top ranking for Criteria 1, 2, and 8. As you can see, the net effect of these clarifications is quite substantial.**

Furthermore, the Coalition recognizes the importance of correct data and accurate assessment of that data for your deliberations. Thus, we also have taken the Air Force's grading system one step further in order to evaluate the criterion's rankings fairly and objectively.

Although there are many ways to accomplish this task, we chose a method that weights each criteria equally and produces a numeric value based upon each of the rankings within each criteria. We believe that this weighted method would yield better results in general, and, using the corrected data, bodes well for Pittsburgh because of its consistent high rankings across the full range of the criteria used by the BRAC.

**Commissioners, as you already know, and as this study and the corrected COBRA data clearly show, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should not have been on the Department of Defense's closure list, and certainly should not be selected for closure. I want to conclude my testimony by reiterating my thanks for the opportunity to testify before you today, and by respectfully requesting that you closely examine the empirical data we have supplied. Finally, I want to introduce my friend and colleague, Frank Mascara, who will detail the corrected COBRA data and its positive impact on the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station.**

**Testimony to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission**  
by U.S. Rep. James C. Greenwood (R-Pa.)  
June 13, 1995

I would like to preface my remarks today by voicing my support for the challenging mission of the BRAC. In this post-Cold War era, the United States must react to a changing world order that demands a new global strategy, while incorporating major technological advances necessary to strengthen our national defense. To this end, we must restructure our fighting force, and thus close, consolidate and realign a major portion of our state-side military installations. Among the many solutions, placing a greater emphasis on the reserve components of each branch of the armed services and encouraging their readiness and effectiveness allow us to scale back on large active duty bases. I agree that the Department of Defense, like the rest of our government, must continue the process of rightsizing.

From my own experiences at Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC)-Warminster, I understand the cost of closing a military installation from the point of view of both the military and, equally important, the impacted communities. At Warminster, these up-front expenses are running well over the original 1991 estimates from the Navy and virtually eliminate the intended savings to the American taxpayer. Furthermore, I have witnessed firsthand the difficulties of enlisting the Department of Defense as a cooperative partner in the realignment and conversion process, especially as it relates to environmental clean-up and general reuse issues. The absence of any specific and clear direction in the BRAC undertaking on the obligation of the federal government to rapidly clean-up serious environmental hazards and to aggressively promote and support new uses for former bases are criticisms of the on-going base closing process. These are areas where the BRAC must look for solutions. Moreover, I see and understand the uncertainty and frustration of the Navy's civilian employees and the concerns of the local business community -- from the small contractor to the restaurant owner to the retailer. Each base is confronted with these problems as the military eliminates its presence, but they are greatly magnified in the five county area, in and around Philadelphia, where facility after facility prepares for closure or realignment.

I urge you to consider the impact of your actions on Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia region. **The facts are clear: (1) The Philadelphia-area is the only region in the country to have installations closed in all three previous BRAC rounds; (2) Philadelphia closures account for more than 75-percent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's total job losses from the BRAC process; (3) Pennsylvania has suffered the highest percentage of DoD job losses in the nation as a result of the BRAC process; and (4) Pennsylvania has already lost more than 15,000 jobs to previous BRACs and faces the loss of more than 4,000 in 1995.**

Given this background, as the BRAC 95 process unfolds, I am increasingly concerned with its impact on my district in particular and on the Philadelphia region in general. I believe we can rightsize DoD without further weakening the regional economy or leaving large numbers of civilian employees without alternative employment opportunities. However, recent actions from the Defense Department have begun to erode my confidence that we can accomplish both goals simultaneously. The Department of the Army has recommended closing the 79th Army Reserve Headquarters in my district and, through the Off-Site Agreement, has disestablished a Reserve brigade headquartered there. Earlier rounds of the BRAC commission have closed the Naval Air Warfare Center in Warminster and the Naval Base and Shipyard in Philadelphia for a large total job loss.

Now the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) wants to remove another 1,200 jobs from the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) facility in northeast Philadelphia. From a regional economic standpoint this would exacerbate the process of economic dislocation -- which has seen the elimination of 40,000 direct and indirect local jobs due to the BRAC

process -- occurring over the past few years. And from a military value perspective, the plan appears to lack merit.

I know that you have heard testimony to that effect from Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell, retired officers from the Philadelphia region and other concerned citizens and business leaders. Among the testimony you heard in Baltimore last month, David Thornburgh, the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Economy League, testified to the military importance of keeping DISC in Philadelphia. Besides the synergy already established with the Navy's Aviation Supply Office, Mr. Thornburgh testified to the inaccuracies contained in the DLA's cost-benefit analysis. He pointed out that the one-time costs would add at least \$118 million to the proposed move; and that the planned reduction in manpower would not necessarily be a substantial cost savings when management changes and disruptions are taken into account.

A number of my colleagues and I traveled to Russia last year in an effort to secure a proposal that would allow warships of the former Soviet Union to be dismantled in Philadelphia. Currently, negotiations are proceeding with a commercial German ship-builder to use the superb facilities at the Shipyard located along the Delaware River. The community and its elected officials are continuing to work hard to find solutions for the men and women who will lose their jobs because of prior BRAC decisions.

Our efforts will be aided by the realignment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Annapolis with the detachment in Philadelphia. This would create a significant return on investment and make good military sense. By consolidating the operation in Philadelphia, the Navy would be establishing in one location the engineering lifecycle, from Research and Development to immediate feedback from fleet operations, which will lower acquisition and development costs and increase operational readiness. This action would mean the immediate return of jobs to the Philadelphia community. Also, NSWC-Philadelphia will prove valuable in attracting new technology-oriented businesses to the Naval Shipyard area. By supporting such a measure, you will be helping the Philadelphia region in beginning to recover from the Navy's withdrawal from the other facilities in the area.

Furthermore, I would urge you to review the proposals affecting Philadelphia contained in BRAC '93. The movement of the DPSC facility to the Northeast and the strong working relationship between the Navy's ASO and DLA's DISC remain strong arguments for maintaining the military relationships stressed in the previous BRAC round.

I maintain that Pennsylvania -- and especially the Philadelphia community -- has already done its part to ensure the Department of Defense is not operating at excess capacity. I urge you to reward the dedicated service of the DISC employees by adding to, not taking away, from their mission. And remember that Philadelphia, the home of the Navy and Marine Corps, remains a strong and vital region, willing and able to contribute to the defense of our nation.

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN JON FOX

BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As a new Member of Congress, I certainly appreciate the importance of your mission of cost-cutting and consolidation. I was proud to support and vote for a balanced budget, and I salute you for your efforts to preserve our national defense by streamlining and reducing inefficiencies.

While I do believe that we all must share in the burden of reducing the size and cost of federal government, I must emphasize the tremendous impact of base closures and realignments on the Philadelphia region and on Pennsylvania as a whole. Pennsylvania had 45,435 total defense personnel as of September 30, 1994. As a result of action by the 1988, 1991, and 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions, Pennsylvania lost 13,305 of those jobs. Including the 1995 Department of Defense recommendations, Pennsylvania will have lost a total of 16,635 jobs. This is a 36.6% cut in defense personnel, **higher than any other state in the nation**. Moreover, Philadelphia closures account for more than 75% of Pennsylvania job losses. Mr. Chairman, Pennsylvania has given its share towards accomplishing our goal.

I would like to take this opportunity to share my thoughts with you concerning four specific issues before the Commission - the Navy facilities in Warminster, Pennsylvania; the Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, PA; realignment and consolidation affecting Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. These issues are of great importance to me and the citizens of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, whom I am privileged to represent.

First, I would like to urge the Commission to closely examine the options for the Naval Air Warfare Center, Warminster, PA. I believe that we must do everything possible to ensure the success of reuse efforts and to protect the regional economy. Moreover, I would like to bring to your attention the value of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania.

As you know, the Navy has proposed that the functions of this detachment be relocated to the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, San Diego, California, and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.

The Philadelphia Detachment is of great military value to both Navy and joint forces programs. The proposed transfer would have an extremely negative effect on the Detachment's core capability to continue to support these programs. Moreover, the costs assumptions for the move do not include personnel and equipment transfer costs, and do not consider the Detachment's locally employed out-sourced technical support. I am concerned that the Department did not investigate the possibility of relocating this

Detachment to an alternate, local site.

Second, as I emphasized in my letter to you of April 14, 1995, I strongly support the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) in Philadelphia, PA.

As you know, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has recommended that the DISC be "disestablished." Although DLA claims that this action will eliminate 385 direct jobs, I understand that the jobs of all of the more than 1800 employees at DISC would be at risk because the current employees would have no right of placement or transfer of function entitlement in any job within the DLA's Inventory Control Point (ICP).

In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned the Department of Defense's recommendation to close DISC. This facility is still crucial to military readiness, and I urge you to uphold the decision of the 1993 Commission.

The workforce at DISC has been recognized as a model of efficiency. DISC has the highest proportion of military requisitions and still maintains the highest level of support of all hardware centers. In addition, DISC has the lowest number of below goal systems and consistently provides better availability to weapons systems items than the other ICP's. Because DISC is housed along with a Navy weapons management ICP and a weapons engineering facility, a talented pool of experienced logistics personnel has developed. As a result, DISC and the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) have developed a strong working relationship that promotes cooperation and productivity.

There is no rationale for choosing to eliminate DISC among the

four Defense Logistics Agency ICP's. Of all four ICP's, DISC manages 34.5 percent of all weapons systems hardware and processes 40 percent of all military customer requisitions.

Despite these facts, DLA recommended moving DISC's weapons-coded workload to the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), which currently manages the least amount of weapons-coded workload of the ICP's.

It is essential that we preserve DISC in order to maintain our defense logistics at the highest level of readiness, promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and save the jobs of dedicated DISC employees. Therefore, I would respectfully request your consideration of an alternative which preserves DISC.

Third, I would like to speak in support of the DOD recommendation to realign Naval Surface Warfare Center-Annapolis with Naval Surface Warfare Center-Philadelphia as well as the City of Philadelphia's recommendation to consolidate NAVSEA 03 with the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Philadelphia.

As former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman noted, realigning NSWC-Annapolis with the NSWC-Philadelphia "center of excellence" is of critical importance to the Navy. Consolidation of the machinery engineering lifecycle will improve the operational readiness of the fleet and save \$14.5 million a year for a total 20-year savings of \$175.1 million.

I would also like to strongly urge the Commission to approve the City of Philadelphia's proposal to consolidate NAVSEA 03's 650 employees with NSWC-Philadelphia's 1600 employees and tremendous facility infrastructure. This consolidation will eliminate

unnecessary duplication, saving \$165.88 million over 20 years. In contrast, moving NAVSEA 03 to the Washington Navy Yard saves only \$10 million over 20 years. Moreover, this proposal will improve the operational readiness of the fleet.

Finally, I am pleased to offer my support for Fort Indiantown Gap. I am concerned about the harm that a closure of this Fort would cause to our national security and to our local economy.

I believe that Fort Indiantown Gap is essential for military readiness. In addition, as I stated in my letter to the Commission of May 12, 1995, Fort Indiantown Gap is the only convenient training site for reserve and National Guard units in our area.

Elimination of Fort Indiantown Gap would be a grave error and I urge you to examine this proposal very carefully.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, thank you for your consideration of my thoughts. With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

JUNE 13, 1995

TESTIMONY BY

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT A. BORSKI

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, FOR GIVING ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY TODAY. TWO YEARS AGO, I CAME BEFORE YOU TO ARGUE AGAINST THE PENTAGON'S PROPOSAL TO CLOSE AND RELOCATE NEARLY EVERY DEFENSE FACILITY IN PHILADELPHIA. RECOGNIZING THAT THE TRUE MILITARY VALUE OF THESE FACILITIES IS ITS SKILLED WORKFORCES, THE COMMISSION WISELY REJECTED THE PENTAGON'S PROPOSAL AND INSTEAD APPROVED A MORE COST-EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE THAT CONSOLIDATED THESE FACILITIES AT THE AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE (ASO) COMPOUND IN PHILADELPHIA.

REGRETTABLY, IN BRAC 95, THE PENTAGON HAS CHOSEN TO IGNORE THE WISDOM OF YOUR DECISION. THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA) HAS PROPOSED TO "DISESTABLISH" THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER (DISC) ON THE ASO COMPOUND. THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT CLOSE BASE -- 80 PERCENT OF ITS CLAIMED SAVINGS COME FROM ELIMINATING PERSONNEL POSITIONS. I WILL NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE FLAWS BEHIND DLA'S STATED SAVINGS -- THE EMPLOYEES AT DISC HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED YOU WITH DETAILED INFORMATION. INSTEAD, AS YOU EXAMINE WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL WILL SAVE ANY MONEY, I ASK THAT YOU KEEP IN MIND THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL'S IMPACT ON MILITARY READINESS:

- \* DLA IS DISESTABLISHING DISC, WHICH BY EVERY MEASURE IS DLA'S MOST EFFICIENT WEAPONS SUPPLY CENTER. DISC MANAGES THE MOST WEAPONS SYSTEMS ITEMS AND HAS THE HIGHEST CUSTOMER SUPPORT RATE, YET HAS THE LOWEST RATE OF ERROR.
  
- \* BECAUSE DISC IS DLA'S BEST SUPPLY CENTER, IT HAS SERVED AS A PROTOTYPE FOR DLA'S FUTURE MISSION REQUIREMENTS. THE EMPLOYEES AT DISC HAVE BEEN REINVENTING GOVERNMENT LONG BEFORE VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S INITIATIVES.
  
- \* DISESTABLISHING DISC WILL ALSO RESULT IN THE PERMANENT LOSS OF A UNIQUE JOINT-SERVICE SYNERGY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN DISC AND ASO. IN BRAC 93, THE COMMISSION POINTED TO THIS SYNERGY AS A REASON FOR KEEPING BOTH ON THE SAME COMPOUND.
  
- \* DLA'S PROPOSAL WILL THROW THE ITEMS IT MANAGES INTO A WHIRLWIND BEYOND ITS CONTROL. IF THIS PROPOSAL IS APPROVED, MORE THAN 66 PERCENT OF DLA'S WORKLOAD WILL MOVE FROM ONE FACILITY TO ANOTHER IN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS. NO ITEM TRANSFER OF THIS MAGNITUDE HAS EVER BEEN ACCOMPLISHED!
  
- \* DISESTABLISHING DISC WILL NOT CLOSE ANY BASES. IT WILL ONLY RESHUFFLE WORKLOAD. DLA IS ESSENTIALLY ASKING A COMMISSION ESTABLISHED TO CLOSE BASES TO ENDORSE ITS AGENCY REORGANIZATION PLAN.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS, EACH OF THESE POINTS BEGS A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION: "IS THIS REALLY WORTH THE RISK?" DISC'S MISSION IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO THE RELIABILITY OF OUR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN MILITARY MISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

FOR EXAMPLE, DISC MANAGES 41 PERCENT OF THE CONSUMABLE ITEMS ON THE CH-53 SUPER STALLION HELICOPTERS THAT RESCUED CAPTAIN SCOTT O'GRADY IN BOSNIA. WE OFTEN TAKE FOR GRANTED THE ROLE THAT SUPPLY PLAYS IN THESE MISSIONS. IF THESE HELICOPTERS ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH THE PROPER PARTS, THEY RISK MALFUNCTION, OR WORSE. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TRAGIC IF THIS MISSION HAD NOT SUCCEEDED BECAUSE OF A MALFUNCTION CAUSED BY INEXPERIENCED SUPPLY MANAGEMENT.

AS YOU EXAMINE DLA'S PROPOSAL AND LOOK AT THE DISRUPTION IT WILL CAUSE, ASK YOURSELVES WHETHER ITS WORTH THE RISK OF JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF MISSIONS SUCH AS THIS -- ALL FOR SAVINGS WHICH ARE QUESTIONABLE AT BEST, AND DO NOT EVEN INVOLVE A BASE CLOSURE?

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS, I SUPPORT THE GOALS OF DLA'S REORGANIZATION, WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY CONSOLIDATE DLA'S WEAPONS WORKLOAD INTO TWO SUPPLY CENTERS. BUT, CLEARLY, DISC DESERVES TO BE ONE OF THESE WEAPONS CENTERS.

THE COMMISSION SHOULD REJECT THIS MISGUIDED PROPOSAL SO THAT DLA CAN REORGANIZE IN A MORE SENSIBLE MANNER AND TIMEFRAME -- OUTSIDE OF THE BRAC PROCESS. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD PLACE AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE READINESS OF OUR ARMED SERVICES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO BRIEFLY DISCUSS THE NAVY'S PROPOSED RELOCATIONS OF THE NAVAL AIR TECHNICAL SERVICES FACILITY (NATSF) AND THE NAVAL AVIATION ENGINEERING SERVICE UNIT (NAESU) TO CALIFORNIA. LIKE THE DISC PROPOSAL, THE NAVY PROPOSALS DO NOT LOSE BASES: THEY MERELY MOVE THESE FACILITIES FROM PHILADELPHIA TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COUNTRY. SUCH A MOVE WOULD COMPLETELY DISMANTLE TWO SKILLED WORKFORCES THAT ARE STILL ESSENTIAL TO THE READINESS OF OUR ARMED SERVICES.

IN RESPONSE TO THE NAVY'S PROPOSALS, THE EMPLOYEES OF NATSF AND NAESU HAVE DEVELOPED COUNTER-PROPOSALS THAT PRESERVE THEIR WORKFORCES AND ACHIEVE EVEN BETTER SAVINGS BY CONSOLIDATING THEIR FUNCTIONS WITH ASO. THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE THE COMMISSION WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSOLIDATE WITHOUT SACRIFICING MILITARY VALUE.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR DOD'S PROPOSED REALIGNMENT OF NSWC-ANNAPOLIS TO NSWC-PHILADELPHIA, AND THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA'S PROPOSAL TO CONSOLIDATE THE NAVSEA HEADQUARTERS ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE WITH NSWC-PHILADELPHIA. THESE PROPOSALS WILL RESULT IN A COMBINED SAVINGS OF NEARLY \$340 MILLION OVER SEVEN YEARS, AND ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY FORMER NAVY SECRETARY JOHN LEHMAN.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, THE EMPLOYEES OF PHILADELPHIA'S DEFENSE FACILITIES ARE THE TRUE MILITARY VALUE OF THESE FACILITIES. SINCE BRAC 93, THEY HAVE RISEN TO THE CHALLENGE OF "DOING MORE AND BETTER WITH LESS." I HOPE THE COMMISSION RECOGNIZES THIS VALUABLE ASSET TO OUR COUNTRY AND BUILDS ON THE CORRECT RULING IT MADE IN 1993.

**TESTIMONY OF  
CONGRESSMAN FRANK MASCARA  
PENNSYLVANIA 20TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT**

**CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE  
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
JUNE 13, 1995**

**ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN**

**COMMISSIONERS:**

**AL CORNELLA**

**REBECCA COX**

**GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)**

**S. LEE KLING**

**RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)**

**MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)**

**WENDL LOUISE STEELE**

**MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS:**

**I AM HERE TO ADDRESS THE COMMISSION  
ON TWO ISSUES.**

**FIRST IS REGARDING THE KELLY SUPPORT  
FACILITY IN OAKDALE, PENNSYLVANIA,  
AND SECOND THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING.**

**REGARDING THE KELLY FACILITY, THE  
ARMY AND THE DOD WERE  
RECOMMENDING A SIGNIFICANT  
REALIGNMENT. IT IS MY  
UNDERSTANDING THAT BECAUSE OF  
QUESTIONS FROM THE LOCAL**

COMMUNITY AND FROM THIS COMMISSION, THE ARMY HAS REVIEWED ITS POSITION AND IS SEEKING TO MODIFY ITS ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION.

NOW, THE ARMY IS RECOMMENDING A FAR LESS DRASTIC REALIGNMENT AND IS NOT RECOMMENDING THE CLOSURE OF THE EXCHANGE OR THE COMMISSARY.

IF THE ARMY AND THE DOD HAVE MODIFIED THEIR RECOMMENDATION IN THIS FASHION, THEN I WOULD URGE THE COMMISSION TO APPROVE IT. I BELIEVE THE ARMY REVIEW HAS PROVEN THE WORTH OF THE KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY. IT'S A GREAT FACILITY WITH

GREAT PEOPLE. IT DOES THE ESSENTIAL  
WORK OF LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE  
AND IT GETS THE JOB DONE.

NOW, THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING.

THE COBRA COST DATA USED TO ARRIVE  
AT THE DECISION TO CLOSE THE  
PITTSBURGH AIR RESERVE STATION WAS,  
QUITE SIMPLY, INCORRECT.

SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATIONS EXISTED ON  
THREE COUNTS--INCORRECT COST DATA,  
PARTIAL-YEAR COST DATA, AND TOTALLY  
MISSING COST DATA. SUBSEQUENT  
CORRECTED COBRA RUNS BY THE AIR

**FORCE AND YOUR OWN BRAC ANALYSTS  
HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED  
THAT PITTSBURGH IS THE MOST COST  
EFFECTIVE BASE AMONG C-130  
INSTALLATIONS ON CIVILIAN AIRFIELDS.**

**THE ORIGINAL COBRA ANALYSES ALSO  
FAILED TO CONSIDER SAVINGS BENEFITS  
FROM MILCON COST AVOIDANCE. OF THE  
6 INSTALLATIONS AT CIVILIAN AIRFIELDS,  
PITTSBURGH HAS THE LOWEST  
PROJECTED MILCON OVER THE COBRA  
ANALYSIS PERIOD. BY CONTRAST,  
ANOTHER CONSIDERED BASE HAS  
PROJECTED MILCON 775% GREATER THAN**

**PITTSBURGH--MONEY THAT WOULD  
LARGELY BE SPENT TO NEEDLESSLY  
DUPLICATE CAPABILITIES ALREADY**

**2 AVAILABLE AT PITTSBURGH. WE BELIEVE  
THAT AIR FORCE-GENERATED COBRA  
DATA CONTINUES TO SERIOUSLY  
UNDERSTATE MILCON COST AVOIDANCE  
AT SOME BASES. I AM PRESENTING  
CORRECTED WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA  
COALITION COBRA SCENARIOS RESULTS  
WHICH MOST ACCURATELY REFLECT THE  
TIME COMPARISON FIGURES (DATA  
WHICH BY THE WAY IS AGREED WITH BY  
YOUR OWN BRAC STAFF.)**

AS YOU HEARD CONGRESSMAN KLINK SO  
CORRECTLY EXPLAIN, THE AIR FORCE  
RESERVE PRESENTLY ENJOYS MILITARY  
BENEFITS AND SPECIAL FACILITIES AT  
THE PITTSBURGH AIR RESERVE STATION  
THAT DO NOT NOW EXIST AND CANNOT  
BE DUPLICATED ELSEWHERE WITHOUT  
ENORMOUS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION  
COST. PITTSBURGH ALREADY HAS THE  
ASSETS NEEDED TO EXPAND ITS MISSION  
AT NO COST TO THE UNITED STATES.

THESE EXPANSION CAPABILITIES INCLUDE  
ADDITIONAL EXISTING CONCRETE RAMP  
SPACE AND ACREAGE ON THE  
INSTALLATION, HIGH CAPACITY TARMAC

<sup>2</sup> AT THE ADJACENT AND ABANDONED PASSENGER TERMINAL. IN ALL, AIR FORCE ASSESSMENTS OF MILITARY VALUE, PITTSBURGH RATES AT OR NEAR THE TOP.

IN SUMMARY, COMMISSIONERS, WHEN CORRECTED COBRA RESULTS, MILITARY VALUE, EXPANSION CAPABILITY, RECRUITING, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT ARE CONSIDERED, PITTSBURGH IS, WITHOUT QUESTION, THE LEAST FAVORABLE CLOSURE CANDIDATE AMONG C-130 BASES. THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE

COMMISSION'S HYPOTHESIS AT THE ADD  
ON HEARINGS--FURTHER DISCOVERY,  
INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS SINCE  
THEN HAS CONVINCINGLY VALIDATED  
THIS CONCLUSION. MOST RECENTLY, THE  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, SHEILA  
WIDNALL, ANNOUNCED IN A LETTER TO  
CHAIRMAN DIXON THAT "INACTIVATION  
OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE C-130 UNIT  
AT O'HARE INSTEAD OF THE C-130 UNIT  
AT PITTSBURGH IS A REASONALBE  
ALTERNATIVE." CONSIDERING THE FACTS  
IN PITTSBURGH'S FAVOR AND THE  
CHANGE IN THE AIR FORCE'S POSITION  
REGARDING THE CLOSURE OF THE 911TH,

**THE PITTSBURGH AIR RESERVE STATION  
SHOULD REMAIN OPEN!**

## ACRONYMS

**COBRA-Cost of Base Realignment Action**

**BOS-Base Operating Support**

**COMM-Communications**

**RPMA-Real Property Maintenance Account**

**DBRAC-Defense Base Realignment and Closure**

**HQ USAF/RT-Headquarters United States Air Force**

**NPV-Net Present Value**

**ROI-Return On Investment**

**MILCON-Military Construction Budget**

**AIR FORCE COBRAS WITH FY91-94 AVERAGE NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD COSTS  
ERRONEOUSLY OMITTED FY91-94 RPMA FROM PEC 55394**

<b>AIR FORCE COBRA SCENARIOS</b>			
	[XXX14301.CBR]		
<b>Averaging FY91-94 Non-Payroll Overhead Costs (BOS, COMM, RPMA)</b>			
<b>per DBRAC Request 950517-2 and HQ USAF/RT Response dated 25 May 1995</b>			
<b>BASE</b>	<b>NPV thru 2015 (\$K)</b>	<b>ROI Years</b>	<b>Steady-State (\$K)</b>
MINI-ST. PAUL	(180,049)	1999	(14,477)
NIAGARA	(196,419)	1998	(15,157)
PITTSBURGH	(196,889)	1998	(14,871)
O'HARE	(204,271)	1999	(16,273)
YOUNGSTOWN	(211,301)	1998	(15,791)
MILWAUKEE	(223,379)	1998	(16,831)

<b>W. PA COALITION COBRA SCENARIOS</b>			
	[XXX-RPMA.CBR]		
<b>CORRECTED to Include FY 91 &amp; 92 Non-Payroll RPMA costs from PEC 55394:</b>			
<b>[Erroneously omitted from Air Force RPMA Averages]</b>			
<b>BASE</b>	<b>NPV thru 2015 (\$K)</b>	<b>ROI Years</b>	<b>Steady-State (\$K)</b>
MINI-ST. PAUL	(183,684) Rank: 1	1999	(14,666) Rank: 1
PITTSBURGH	(198,673) Rank: 2	1998	(14,998) Rank: 2
O'HARE	(215,217) Rank: 3	1998	(17,058) Rank: 5
NIAGARA	(216,974) Rank: 4	1998	(16,631) Rank: 4
YOUNGSTOWN	(219,012) Rank: 5	1998	(16,344) Rank: 3
MILWAUKEE	(238,769) Rank: 6	1998	(17,935) Rank: 6
fix91-94.xls			
	6/5/95		

**FY91-94 NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD COSTS**

<b>PEC Codes</b>	<b>PITT</b>	<b>O'HARE</b>	<b>MILW</b>	<b>MINI-ST.P</b>	<b>NIAG</b>	<b>Y-TOWN</b>
<b>FY 1991:</b>						
RPMA PEC 55394	2,607.0	3,388.9	4,028.6	2,281.0	4,510.8	3,114.9
Minor Const PEC 55376	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
RPM&R PEC 55378	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>RPMA Subtotal</b>	<b>2,607.0</b>	<b>3,388.9</b>	<b>4,028.6</b>	<b>2,281.0</b>	<b>4,510.8</b>	<b>3,114.9</b>
Comm 55395	1,048.3	139.0	2,292.5	810.9	390.6	252.4
BOS 55396	979.6	1,122.9	2,886.6	786.9	2,625.0	886.4
<b>FY 1991 Total</b>	<b>4,634.9</b>	<b>4,650.8</b>	<b>9,207.7</b>	<b>3,878.8</b>	<b>7,526.4</b>	<b>4,253.7</b>
<b>FY 1992:</b>						
RPMA PEC 55394	2,582.8	3,143.0	2,493.4	3,396.4	4,920.6	2,968.6
Minor Const PEC 55376	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
RPM&R PEC 55378	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>RPMA Subtotal</b>	<b>2,582.8</b>	<b>3,143.0</b>	<b>2,493.4</b>	<b>3,396.4</b>	<b>4,920.6</b>	<b>2,968.6</b>
Comm 55395	299.2	502.9	296.0	1,337.4	346.6	257.4
BOS 55396	768.5	693.8	822.6	711.1	1,993.3	644.6
<b>FY 1992 Total</b>	<b>3,650.5</b>	<b>4,339.7</b>	<b>3,612.0</b>	<b>5,444.9</b>	<b>7,260.5</b>	<b>3,870.6</b>
<b>FY 1993:</b>						
RPMA PEC 55394	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Minor Const PEC 55376	596.7	0.0	338.7	479.3	376.1	758.2
RPM&R PEC 55378	1,733.5	1,259.6	556.7	2,590.7	1,244.4	1,405.7
<b>RPMA Subtotal</b>	<b>2,330.2</b>	<b>1,259.6</b>	<b>895.4</b>	<b>3,070.0</b>	<b>1,620.5</b>	<b>2,164.0</b>
Comm 55395	385.7	407.5	2,013.0	1,337.6	567.0	221.4
BOS 55396	1,817.3	4,279.0	2,022.1	1,624.5	5,486.7	1,974.0
<b>FY 1993 Total</b>	<b>4,533.2</b>	<b>5,946.1</b>	<b>4,930.5</b>	<b>6,032.1</b>	<b>7,674.2</b>	<b>4,359.4</b>
<b>FY 1994:</b>						
RPMA PEC 55394	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Minor Const PEC 55376	1,319.3	461.0	647.6	744.8	258.8	780.4
RPM&R PEC 55378	1,024.9	1,672.3	563.9	1,103.1	1,653.7	926.1
<b>RPMA Subtotal</b>	<b>2,344.2</b>	<b>2,133.3</b>	<b>1,211.5</b>	<b>1,847.9</b>	<b>1,912.5</b>	<b>1,706.5</b>
Comm 55395	478.8	303.7	1,415.9	1,467.6	765.1	193.9
BOS 55396	1,803.7	3,184.9	2,008.9	2,050.1	5,773.4	1,637.2
<b>FY 1994 Total</b>	<b>4,626.7</b>	<b>5,621.9</b>	<b>4,636.3</b>	<b>5,365.6</b>	<b>8,451.0</b>	<b>3,537.6</b>
<b>4-Year Avg:</b>						
RPMA PEC 55394	1,297.5	1,633.0	1,630.5	1,419.4	2,357.9	1,520.9
Minor Const PEC 55376	479.0	115.3	246.6	306.0	158.7	384.7
RPM&R PEC 55378	689.6	733.0	280.2	923.5	724.5	583.0
<b>RPMA Subtotal</b>	<b>2,466.1</b>	<b>2,481.2</b>	<b>2,157.2</b>	<b>2,648.8</b>	<b>3,241.1</b>	<b>2,488.5</b>
<b>RPMA 4-Year Average</b>	<b>2,466.1</b>	<b>2,481.2</b>	<b>2,157.2</b>	<b>2,648.8</b>	<b>3,241.1</b>	<b>2,488.5</b>
<b>Comm 4-Year Avg 55395</b>	<b>553.0</b>	<b>338.3</b>	<b>1,504.4</b>	<b>1,238.4</b>	<b>517.3</b>	<b>231.3</b>
<b>BOS 4-Year Avg 55396</b>	<b>1,342.3</b>	<b>2,320.2</b>	<b>1,935.1</b>	<b>1,293.2</b>	<b>3,969.6</b>	<b>1,285.6</b>
<b>4-Yr Avg Total</b>	<b>4,361.3</b>	<b>5,139.6</b>	<b>5,596.6</b>	<b>5,180.4</b>	<b>7,728.0</b>	<b>4,005.3</b>
<b>PECs 76 + 76 Only</b>	<b>2,337.2</b>	<b>1,696.5</b>	<b>1,053.5</b>	<b>2,459.0</b>	<b>1,766.5</b>	<b>1,935.2</b>
<b>Air Force COBRA Inputs:</b>						
<b>RPMA Subtotal</b>	<b>2,337.0</b>	<b>1,696.0</b>	<b>1,053.0</b>	<b>2,459.0</b>	<b>1,767.0</b>	<b>1,935.0</b>
Comm 55395	553.0	338.0	1,604.0	1,238.0	517.0	231.0
BCS 55396	1342	2320	1935	1293	3970	1286
<b>COBRA Total</b>	<b>4,232.0</b>	<b>4,354.0</b>	<b>4,592.0</b>	<b>4,990.0</b>	<b>6,254.0</b>	<b>3,452.0</b>
<b>Actual/COBRA RPMA (%)</b>	<b>105.5%</b>	<b>146.3%</b>	<b>204.9%</b>	<b>107.7%</b>	<b>183.4%</b>	<b>128.6%</b>

[1] All figures are from Air Force-generated spreadsheet and COBRA Runs transmitted via HQ USAF/RT letter dated 25 May 1995 in response to DBRAC (Cirillo) letter dated May 16, 1995 (#950517-2).

[2] Comm and BOS COBRA Figures Agree with 4-Year Average; however RPMA Figures do not agree.

[3] A PEC Code changed from 55394 for FY91 and FY92 to 55376/55378 for FY93 and FY94.

[4] Air Force Failed to include FY91 and 92 RPMA (PEC 55394) in their 4-year Average RPMA calculations.

**Senator Abraham's Testimony before the  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
12 June 1995**

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,

Thank you for the opportunity to once again discuss the impact of the Base Realignment and Closure process on the State of Michigan. In my testimony before this Commission in Chicago, I raised serious concerns over the methodology and data used by the Department of the Army in proposing to close the Selfridge Army Garrison and the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant. Since that time, the Army has done little to alleviate those concerns. I still believe the Army's proposals are poorly developed and unwarranted. Therefore, I strongly recommend you reject the Army's proposals to close the Selfridge Army Garrison and the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant.

On 21 May, the Army attempted to respond to our original concerns by completing a second run of its closure cost computer model. As a result, they claimed the Department of Defense would still save almost \$7.3 million per year, and that there would be an immediate return on the investment. I believe both assumptions are wrong.

First, I believe the Department of Defense will not save any money by closing the Selfridge Army Garrison. The Army claims the recurring Base Operations Support and miscellaneous costs will be only \$3.2 million per year. However, non-housing base operations expenses for the Garrison were over \$10.1 million in fiscal year 1994, a difference of \$6.9 million. The only way the Army could realize such significant reductions is by a wholesale elimination of the support it provided. This, however, will not happen.

The Army cannot assume that the need for such support services will miraculously disappear. The military personnel at the Garrison make up less than 1/10th of 1% of the total Selfridge base military population, but provide almost all of the base operation, housing and morale support services. If the Garrison closes, the other units at the base will have to pick up the tab for the support the Garrison previously provided.

A 16 May Base Realignment and Closure Cost Estimate Validation Study, conducted by the Michigan Air National Guard's 127th Fighter Wing, and validated by every Commander at Selfridge save the Garrison, concluded that the other units will still have to fund over \$10.8 million in operation and maintenance costs after the Garrison leaves.

Now do not think that the remaining units at Selfridge can move elsewhere. Nowhere has the Department of Defense proposed moving or eliminating any units at Selfridge besides the Garrison. In fact, it proposed adding additional units to the base, namely the Marine Wing Support Group 47. Your Commission is charged with ensuring the current military base structure supports the total military force structure. I believe it is clear the planned military force structure is based upon the continued existence of Selfridge Air National Guard Base and all its tenant units. The current force level requirements assume the continuation of all Selfridge activities at Selfridge. These forces will require the infrastructure services provided by the Army Garrison.

The Army's most recent analysis is also lacking in its consideration of off-base housing costs. Although the Army now recognizes that the closing of the Selfridge housing will evict the current tenants, they continue to grossly underestimate off-base housing costs at \$1.286 million per year. 692 families currently reside in the Selfridge housing. Given these current Department of Defense residents and the amount they would be provided in Basic Allowance for Quarters and Variable Housing Allowance, the total annual costs would be almost \$4.8 million, a difference of just under \$3.5 million per year.

Last, the Army's calculations for salary savings are not correct. The Army has not changed its data since I pointed out in Chicago that the more than \$3.5 million in annual civilian and military salary savings are based on average salaries that are 50-100% above the actual averages. The fact remains that the Army is claiming \$2.3 million more in salary savings than would otherwise be indicated.

The bottom line is that the Army continues to consistently overstate the prospective savings, consistently understate the prospective costs, and grossly overlook vital economic impact data. The Army expects to realize a net annual savings of \$7.291 million by 1998. However, with the information I have presented here, the Army has underestimated continuing annual base operation and support expenses by \$7.2 million, underestimated housing costs by \$3.5 million per year, and overestimated salary savings by \$2.3 million per year. Given these costs, I estimate the Department of Defense will actually spend \$5.7 million a year more with the Garrison closed than if it were to continue to rely on the Garrison to provide these vital services, and never realize a return on its investment.

Because much of this information has not changed since my testimony in Chicago, I have enclosed an annotated copy of that statement with my remarks today. Furthermore, I commend to you the study by the 127th Fighter Wing on this proposal, and recommend you study it closely. I understand Commissioner Cox and your staff have already been provided copies of this cogent study.

I would like to close today by commenting on the Army's other proposal to close the Detroit Army Tank Plant. Not much has changed since the Chicago hearings, but I think it is important to reemphasize two salient points. First, the Army claims no jobs will be lost by this proposal. However, the Tank-Automotive Command wrote to me on 27 March, "If the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant closed, 149 General Dynamics Land Systems employees will be laid off." Furthermore, the Tank-Automotive Command staff informed me that 41 Defense Logistic Agency personnel support the production at the Plant, and their positions would likewise be eliminated.

Second, there appears to be a wide disparity between the analysis and the actual impact of such a move. Given that the cost of moving the Tank Plant's equipment in the BRAC 91 process was around \$135-\$150 million, I do not believe the full cost of this proposal has been considered.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I believe the analysis used to justify these proposals is still insufficient. I repeat my belief that the savings expected have been consistently overstated, the costs incurred consistently understated, and vital economic impact data grossly overlooked. I do not believe these proposals have been fully developed, and are not in the best interests of the US Army or the Department of Defense. I therefore make my strongest petition that you not accept these proposals by the Department of Defense.

Thank you.

Statement of Senator Spencer Abraham  
to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission  
Regional Hearings, Chicago, Illinois

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,

I thank you for this opportunity to discuss the impact of the Base Realignment and Closure process on the State of Michigan. I have serious concerns about the process by which these proposals were developed, and I do not believe the interests of the taxpayer, the Department of Defense, nor the State of Michigan are served by their execution. I recommend you not adopt these recommendations and preserve these installations for the militarily necessary purpose they serve.

Let me first address the proposal to close the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Support Activity (TACOMSA) at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. In my view, Selfridge is unique to the US military as a facility that supports all five uniformed services in addition to the National Guard. Although I could expound on the military utility of Selfridge, the base as a whole is not slated for closure, only TACOMSA. To that end, I wish to focus attention on the issues I believe have not been fully addressed by this proposal.

First, the Army suggests the closure is justified because TACOMSA "exists primarily to provide housing activities (predominately Detroit Arsenal) located in the immediate area although such support can be provided through a less costly alternative." Specifically, "commercial housing . . . on the local economy for military personnel using Variable Housing Allowance/Basic Allowance for Quarters" and that "closure avoids the cost of continued operation and maintenance of unnecessary support facilities."<sup>1</sup> Mr. Chairman, I disagree with both of those findings.

The proposal notes that TACOMSA housing is only 35% occupied<sup>2</sup>, and that moving the service families into the local economy will save over \$4.8 million per year.<sup>3</sup> However, I believe absent is an accounting for the other service families living in TACOMSA housing. It is true Army personnel only occupy 35% of the total housing available. But due to Selfridge's joint nature, Navy, Marine Corps, Air

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. III, Department of the Army, Analyses and Recommendations (March 1995), p. 153.

<sup>2</sup> Calculation derived from 965 housing units (Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. I, Department of the Army, Installation Narrative (March 1995), p. 153), and 357 Army families and unaccompanied (from Colonel King, Civil Engineer, 127th Fighter Wing, Memo of 14 March, p. 1), for a 36.99% occupancy rate. Also, The US Army Tank-Automotive Command Support Activity (TACOMSA): Fact Sheets and Items of Interest, p. 2, states Army occupancy is 35%.

<sup>3</sup> Calculation from COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 112. Calculation was line item "RECURRING NET--FAM HOUSE OPS" of -\$6.063 million, minus "RECURRING NET--MIL PERSONNEL--House Allow" of \$1.282 million, plus "RECURRING NET--OTHER--Misc Recur" of \$.056 million for a total of \$4.837 million.

Force and National Guard service families bring the total occupancy above 95%.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, because of the housing appropriation process, the Army is not reimbursed by the other military services for their personnel occupying Army housing. So although such a move may reduce Army expenditures, total Department of Defense expenditures will not be considerably less. Let me focus attention on these specific numbers.

The suggested savings to the Army is over \$6.063 million per year in family housing operations costs.<sup>5</sup> However, TACOMSA Army Family Housing costs as provided by the TACOMSA staff, are \$5.4557 million per year.<sup>6</sup> 692 families currently occupy TACOMSA housing units. With the elimination of the two TACOMSA military billets, moving the 690 military families into the local economy will cost \$5.575 million per year, an increase of almost \$120,000 per year.<sup>7</sup> What is less consistent in these calculations is that the annual operating costs have apparently been overstated by over a half a million dollars<sup>8</sup>, while the annual costs of housing the service families on the economy were understated by \$4.293 million.<sup>9</sup> In short, I believe the Federal Government may spend more money by moving the service families at Selfridge onto the economy.

TACOMSA provides much more, however, than just on-base housing. Because the National Guard does not usually provide morale, welfare, and recreation or family support services unless specifically authorized by Congress, TACOMSA, as the tenant regular military command, has provided these functions at Selfridge. TACOMSA is singularly responsible for the operation and administration of all morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities and facilities, while it also provides the maintenance and base support for all non-operational facilities on base. To my knowledge, 60-65% of all TACOMSA work is to support

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<sup>4</sup> Calculation derived from 720 habitable housing units (Commanding Officer, TACOMSA, conversation with Richard Fieldhouse, Legislative Assistant to Senator Carl Levin, 6 April 1995) and 692 total housing military sponsors (Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.). Actual rate is 95.83%.

<sup>5</sup> COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 112. Actual figure is line item "RECURRING NET-FAM HOUSE OPS" on page 3 of 3 of the Total Appropriations Detail Report.

<sup>6</sup> FY 94 Army Family Housing (AFH) obligations provided by Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.

<sup>7</sup> Based upon a monthly BAQ/VHA expenditure of \$464,603 given current occupants, this equates to an annual BAQ/VHA expenditure of \$5,575,236. Data provided by Mr. Jerry Porpour, Housing Manager, TACOMSA.

<sup>8</sup> Calculation derived from COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, page 2 of 3, line item "RECURRINGSAVES--FAM HOUSE OPS" of \$6.063 million minus the TACOMSA FY 94 obligations of \$5.4557 million (Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994), equals \$.6073 million.

<sup>9</sup> Total DoD and Coast Guard BAQ/VHA payments for evicted service families of \$5.575 million (footnote 7) minus the COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, page 2 of 3, line item "RECURRINGCOSTS--MIL PERSONNEL--House Allow" of \$1.282 million, equals \$4.293 million.

these non-housing facilities such as the Exchange, the Commissary, and the clubs.<sup>10</sup>

But the closing of TACOMSA would not necessarily mean the closing of these facilities. Although the military families would move off-base, they would still be assigned in and around Selfridge. Correspondingly, the need for the support services TACOMSA has supported and maintained may still be needed. It does not matter if TACOMSA provides that support, the fact of the matter is, some Department, Agency or organization will be needed to provide that support. Therefore, the proposed savings of almost \$1.4 million dollars annually in operations and maintenance and \$2.806 million annually in civilian salaries, would evaporate. Such functions as the woodcraft shop or the Boy Scouts may cease, but the need for maintenance on the exchange and commissary, or the administration of such core MWR functions as the fitness center and the clubs will continue.

This highlights the inconsistency of the COBRA cost model data with the savings claims. The proposal narrative states 57 military<sup>11</sup> and 555<sup>12</sup> civilian/contractor positions will be eliminated. The COBRA Realignment Summary, however, states 19 military and 61 civilian positions will be eliminated, while 268 military and 81 civilian positions are realigned.<sup>13</sup> From these reductions, over \$2.8 million in civilian salaries will be saved annually, while \$735,000 will be saved annually in military salaries.<sup>14</sup> This equates to an average civilian salary of \$46,000<sup>15</sup>, and an average enlisted military salary of \$31,000<sup>16</sup>, both 50-100% above

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<sup>10</sup> CO, TACOMSA conversation with Richard Fieldhouse, 6 April 1994.

<sup>11</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense News Release No. 095-95, 28 February, 1995, cites losing 54 military personnel, while subsequent conversation between LCOL Dave Reed of US Army Legislative Liaison and Robert Carey of the Office of Senator Abraham cited 57 military personnel. Furthermore, The Army Basing Study, BRAC 95 Alternative Documentation Set (Alternative No. CA15-10): Section II. Personnel Organization and Data, Active Army Base Military Grade Distribution, US Army Garrison, Selfridge, SAMAS data as of 16 May 1994, printed 15 August 1994, states TACOMSA has 58 officers as FY 94, and will have 60 as of FY 2000.

<sup>12</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense News Release No. 095-95, 28 February, 1995.

<sup>13</sup> COBRA Realignment Summary, p. 1 of 2, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 109. Actual figure from line items "POSITIONS ELIMINATED--Off" [4 personnel], and "POSITIONS ELIMINATED--Enl" [15 personnel].

<sup>14</sup> COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, p. 2 of 3, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 111. Line items are "RECURRINGSAVES--MIL PERSONNEL--Off Salary" [\$272 thousand] and "...--Enl Salary" [\$463 thousand]. Also, "RECURRINGSAVES--O&M--Civ Salary" [\$2.806 million].

<sup>15</sup> \$2.806 million divided by 61 personnel.

<sup>16</sup> \$463 thousand divided by 15 enlisted is \$30.87 thousand annual salary.

the average.<sup>17</sup> This also overlooks the fact that TACOMSA only has 20 military personnel assigned.<sup>18</sup>

The aforementioned illustrates how the TACOMSA proposal appears incomplete. In my investigations, I have not found any indication that the other services were advised of this proposal, nor was their opinion considered. Furthermore, the claims in the proposal narrative do not follow through in the COBRA cost accounting, while the COBRA cost assumptions do not match the actual costs experienced at Selfridge. By my estimation, the Federal Government would not save any money in housing costs<sup>19</sup>, but would continue to spend upwards of \$7 million per year for base operations and maintenance and \$2.5 million per year for MWR activities.<sup>20</sup> I further believe that the Federal Government would only save these expenditures by the elimination of Selfridge, a proposal that has not been put forth by the National Guard.

I understand these figures I've presented today, calculated from actual TACOMSA data, do not correspond to the COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report by either line item or amount. My staff, in close coordination with the staffs of my Michigan delegation colleagues, have found these inconsistencies throughout the proposal's analysis. I therefore request that your staff fully analyze the source for the proposal's data, the process by which it was calculated, and the conclusions to which it came. I believe that you will find TACOMSA to be cost-effective and militarily justified.

I also wish to discuss the Army's proposal to close the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant. The proposal narrative asserts there would be no impact as no military or civilian personnel currently work at the facility. However, the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, the Tank Plant's parent command, states 41 Defense Logistic Agency personnel, two Army military, and 149 General Dynamics Land System contractor personnel work in the facility producing gun mounts and related

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<sup>17</sup> Given the enlisted breakdown provided by The Army Basing Study, BRAC 95 Alternative Documentation Set (Alternative No. CA15-10): Section II, Personnel Organization and Data, Active Army Base Military Grade Distribution, US Army Garrison, Selfridge, SAMAS data as of 16 May 1994, printed 15 August 1994, 2% E-9 (assumed averaging over 20 years of service), 9% E-8 (over 18), 14.3% E-7 (over 12), 21% E-6 (over 8), 24% E-5 (over 6), 21% E-4 (over 4), and 7% E-3 (over 2), an average enlisted salary was calculated to be \$21,528 vice the \$31,000 used in the COBRA model.

The average civilian salary at TACOMSA, as provided by Mark Opatik of the Resource Management Division of TACOMSA is \$33,000 for 69 civilian positions. The average non-appropriated fund activity personnel salary at TACOMSA, as provided by Al Bird, Director of Community and Family Activities at TACOMSA, is \$10,790 for approximately 140 positions. From over \$3.81 million in total civilian expenditures for 209 personnel, this averages to about \$18,200 per year, vice the \$46,000 used in the COBRA model.

<sup>18</sup> Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.

<sup>19</sup> Footnote 7.

<sup>20</sup> Total TACOMSA operating costs (as provided by Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.) of \$16.015 million, minus \$5.4557 million in Army Family Housing, \$1.2216 million from the Operations Maintenance Army (OMA) spent on Army Family Housing (35%), and \$1.6808 million in SERV AIR labor cost reductions (again, assuming 40% on housing), for a net operating cost of \$7.6569. Additionally, FY 94 Appropriated MWR Facility costs are \$2.4769 million per year.

parts for the M1 tank<sup>21</sup>. Furthermore, the Tank-Automotive Command declared to me on 27 March, "If the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant (DATP) closes, 100% of the gun mounts would be produced by Rock Island Arsenal (RIA). It would not be cost effective to move the equipment when the capability to produce the required 10 per month (or less) currently exists at RIA. If DATP closed, 149 General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) employees will be laid off."<sup>22</sup>

There appears to be a wide disparity between the analysis and the actual impact of such a move. Given that the cost of moving the Tank Plant's equipment in the BRAC 91 process was around \$135-\$150 million<sup>23</sup>, I do not believe the efficacy or the full cost of this proposal has been fully considered. What is also of concern is the apparent resignation to accept Rock Island Arsenal as the sole source supplier of these tank parts, when Department of Defense policy is clearly to encourage private sector production over public agency production<sup>24</sup>.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I believe the analysis used to justify these proposals is insufficient. I believe the savings expected have been consistently overstated, the costs incurred consistently understated, and vital economic impact data grossly overlooked. I do not believe these proposals have been fully developed, and are not in the best interests of the US Army or the Department of Defense. I therefore make my strongest petition that you not accept these proposals by the Department of Defense.

Thank you.

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<sup>21</sup> Bob Kaspari, Comptroller, Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 1995, Brief to Robert Carey of the Office of Senator Abraham (10 March 1995), p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> D. R. Newbury, Acting Deputy to the Commander, Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, letter to Robert H. Carey, Jr., Office of Senator Abraham (27 March 1995).

<sup>23</sup> Defense Week, 30 May 1989, p. 9; Chad Selweski, The Macomb Daily, 12 August 1989; and Bill King, The Source Newspaper, 22 January 1990, pp. C-1, C-8.

<sup>24</sup> OMB Circular A-76 (Revised).

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM HOLDEN  
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION  
JUNE 13, 1995

GOOD AFTERNOON, COMMISSIONER'S. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU ON MATTERS RELATING TO FORT INDIANTOWN GAP AND TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT. FIRST, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, THE ARMY'S FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SAVINGS WAS BASED ON BAD DATA AND FLAWED ANALYSIS RESULTING IN A SERIOUS OVER-ESTIMATION OF THE PROJECTED SAVINGS. THE ARMY, USING MORE ACCURATE DATA FROM THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION, REVISED ITS ANNUAL PROJECTED SAVINGS DOWN FROM \$23 MILLION TO \$6.7 MILLION- ADMITTEDLY A 75% ERROR AND CORRECTION. USING ACTUAL EXPENDITURE FIGURES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ON-HAND CIVILIANS, AS PROPOSED TO THOSE AUTHORIZED BUT NOT FUNDED, AND ACTUAL REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE DATA, THE ANNUAL COST SAVINGS IS ONLY \$2.3 MILLION.

THE ARMY'S FINAL \$6.7 MILLION ANNUAL SAVINGS IS FURTHER UNDERMINED IN THAT THEY DID NOT INCLUDE ALL THE COSTS IN THEIR ANALYSIS AND ONLY THE COSTS OF MOVING ACTIVE COMPONENTS UNITS AND FUNCTIONS WERE CONSIDERED. THEIR IGNORING THE COST OF MOVING THE US ARMY RESERVE EQUIPMENT CONCENTRATION SITE TO FT DIX AND THE COST TO MOVE THE PENNSYLVANIA GUARD'S EQUIPMENT SITE CURRENTLY LOCATED AT FT PICKETT, VIRGINIA TO ANOTHER SITE IS A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

SIGNIFICANTLY, THE ARMY HAS SERIOUSLY UNDER-ESTIMATED THE GAP'S MILITARY VALUE IN A NUMBER OF OTHER WAYS.

THE ARMY CLEARLY DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITY AND VALUE OF THE AVIATION ASPECTS OF THE GAP TO THE AIR FORCE, NAVY AND MARINES CORPS. IN FACT, THE OTHER SERVICES WERE NOT EVEN QUESTIONED AS TO THEIR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AT THE GAP. THE MARINE CORPS RESERVES, THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY ALL TRAIN AT THE INSTALLATION AND ON THE BOMBING AND STRAFING RANGE, A NATIONAL ASSET WHICH IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO REPLACE.

NOT INCLUDED WAS THE NORTHERN TRAINING AREA AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, A MANEUVER RIGHTS AREA OF 710 SQUARE MILES USED FOR ARMY AVIATION TRAINING.

TANK QUALIFICATION RANGES (TANK TABLE VIII) WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN THE ARMY'S ANALYSIS OF MILITARY VALUE. THE ARMY WANTS TO SHIFT TRAINING TO FORT DIX AND AP HILL, NEITHER OF WHICH CAN SUPPORT TANK QUALIFICATION GUNNERY.

THE ARMY DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF RESERVE COMPONENT SCHOOLS, THE RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS, AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE ASSIGNED TO THE GAP. NONE OF THE SEVEN SCHOOLS, THE ASSIGNED RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS, AND THE AVIATION AND GROUND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ARE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THE GAP UPON CLOSURE. THE ACTIVE ARMY IS ATTEMPTING TO PASS THE COSTS OF RUNNING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE POST TO THE STATE. THEREBY, THE STATE WOULD BE IN THE BUSINESS OF SUBSIDIZING THE TRAINING OF FEDERAL TROOPS, A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH CLEARLY SHOULD REMAIN WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

THE ARMY ANALYSIS DETERMINED RESERVE COMPONENT ANNUAL TRAINING COULD BE MOVED. THIS ANALYSIS IS FLAWED IN THAT ITS RESULTS ARE BASED ON A 12 MONTH AVAILABILITY OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS AND THAT THE PROPOSED ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES ARE NOT ABLE TO ACCOMODATE THE ADDITIONAL TRAINING LOAD.

THIS IMPACT OF AN INCREASED TRAINING LOAD ON THE ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES WAS NOT PART OF THE ARMY'S ANALYSIS. THE AFFECTED INSTALLATIONS WERE NOT CONSULTED. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FORT DRUM HAVE TOLD THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION: (1) THEY ARE ALREADY SATURATED FOR ANNUAL TRAINING, AND (2) THE INCREASED TRAINING LOAD WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT RANGE AND TRAINING FACILITY MAINTENANCE AND INCREASE EXISTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN TRAINING AREAS.

TWO OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES ARE UNSUITABLE FOR THE REQUIRED KIND OF TRAINING. THE ARMY ERRED IN THAT THE PROPOSED SITES CANNOT MEET ALL EXISTING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITS WHICH CURRENTLY TRAIN AT THE GAP.

GIVEN THE TOTALITY OF THESE ERRORS AND OMISSIONS IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARMY SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM THE DOD SELECTION CRITERIA AND AS A RESULT OF ITS HIGHER THAN ESTIMATED MILITARY VALUE TO ALL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE CLOSURE LIST.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly turn your attention to the Tobyhanna Army Depot.

I urge you and the Commission members to accept the recommendation of the

Secretary of Defense and keep Tobyhanna open because it is an outstanding facility.

Tobyhanna offers the highest military value and is very cost effective.

Tobyhanna is a truly valuable military asset to the Department of Defense which should be retained.

Tobyhanna is a great bargain for the taxpayers and its modern facilities provide great potential for interservicing agreements. The state-of-the art facilities and highly skilled workforce at Tobyhanna provide an outstanding opportunity for the communications and electronics work from the other services to be consolidated as part of interservicing agreements. In today's modern digitized battlefield, the high-tech facilities at Tobyhanna are critical to our national security.

Pennsylvanians have always answered the call to duty, but the proposed cuts in BRAC '95 would have an unfair and drastic effect on the Commonwealth.

I deeply appreciate your consideration in this matter and ask that you remove Fort Indiantown Gap and Tobyhanna from the BRAC list. Thank you very much.

**Statement by Senator Arlen Specter  
Before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Congressional Hearing  
Washington, D.C.  
June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, I welcome this opportunity to testify before you today regarding the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment process and its importance to the state of Pennsylvania. The needs of our nation's military, as well as those of communities and citizens throughout Pennsylvania, are very much at stake in these proceedings.

This is the third time in recent weeks that I have appeared before this Commission. During that time and throughout the months leading up to these hearings, I have had numerous opportunities to visit military installations in Pennsylvania that have been included on this year's closure and realignment list. These visits have given me a keener sense of the important work that is being carried out at these facilities, of the commitment and expertise with which the men and women of Pennsylvania are fulfilling their responsibilities, and of the enormous economic importance of these installations to their local communities. In short, I have seen that these bases are important to Pennsylvania and important to our national defense.

Pennsylvania has already suffered inequitably in the base closure rounds of 1988, 1991 and 1993, taking on nearly 11 percent of nationwide Defense personnel reductions (military and civilian) in those three base closure rounds in spite of possessing only 2.6 percent of that same category in 1988. Now, in 1995, this Commission must decide if that inequitable trend is to continue -- which will surely be the case if these proposals are followed -- or if it is finally to be reversed and Pennsylvania's facilities finally recognized for their longstanding military and

economic importance.

The criteria by which you are to make that decision have been plainly set forth. They include, most importantly, the military value of the facilities under review, their economic importance to their local economies, and the cost savings associated with their potential closure or realignment. A brief survey Pennsylvania's military bases according to these criteria makes it clear that they ought not to be closed or realigned.

### **The 911th Airlift Wing**

The 911th Airlift Wing, located at the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), is a shining example of a Pennsylvania unit that has made invaluable contributions to our nation's defense. The 911th, made up of nearly 1,300 area Reservists, 350 civilian employees, and eight C-130 cargo aircraft, has played a critical role in the area of airlift support during numerous military and humanitarian operations. Its operations tempo has increased significantly in recent years as it has served with distinction in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, in humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia and Somalia, in domestic relief operations in the wake of Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, and in recent non-combat operations in Turkey and Haiti. The 911th has played an important role in the local Pittsburgh area as well, serving as an arrival point for the President and other senior government officials, and lending critical assistance last summer in the wake of the crash of USAir Flight 427. It has also played an important part in the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a cooperative public-private initiative designed to care for large numbers of casualties in overseas conflicts and domestic disasters. Its outstanding performance in these many capacities has been widely recognized, earning the 911th two Outstanding Unit Awards and numerous other Air Force awards for the

quality of its service and personnel.

Its outstanding performance in recent operations and its service to the community are only two of many reasons that the 911th ought to remain operational. An offer by the County of Allegheny to add an additional 77 acres to the unit's existing lease -- at no additional federal taxpayer cost -- would significantly expand its current capacity. These 77 acres are not undeveloped land requiring an investment of time and money for clearing and construction, but consist of concrete aircraft parking ramps and taxiways adjacent to the current 911th ramp which are ready to use. No new military construction costs would be necessary for the 911th to take advantage of this expanded capability. On its current 115 acres, the 911th has room for 13 C-130s (five more than it already has); with an additional 77 acres, its C-130 capacity would be enormous -- and all of this at no additional cost.

The 911th's \$15.1 million communications center is yet another reason for the unit's retention. Its communications facility is, in fact, one of the most advanced in the country and the only operational fiber optic network in the Air Force Reserve; it has contributed greatly to the 911th's overall efficiency and readiness. In the event that the 911th is closed, this facility will be lost and its \$15.1 million dollar investment essentially wasted. The Air National Guard and other federal agencies that currently make use of its services will be forced to replace it with their own costly systems.

It is particularly troubling, in view of all these considerations, that the Defense Department has recommended the closure of the 911th and has done so on the basis of incorrect information. The Department claims that the 911th's annual Base Operating Support (BOS) costs are \$22.2 million for 243 BOS positions; the actual figures are \$10.1 million in BOS costs

for 121 positions. The Department claims that the closure of the 911th would save over \$33.5 million in planned military construction costs through the year 2000; the actual number is \$4.4 million. It is of paramount importance that this Commission rely on accurate information, and the facts in this case are squarely on the side of the 911th: the 911th is a critical airlift unit to our nation's military, and its closure simply does not make sense.

### **Charles E. Kelly Support Facility**

The case of the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility in Oakdale, Pennsylvania is another unfortunate example of how the Defense Department has unfairly treated Pennsylvania military installations. The Kelly Support Facility provides logistical and engineering support to its various tenant activities and to Army Reserve Units throughout western Pennsylvania. The Army originally recommended to this Commission the substantial realignment of the Kelly Facility, including the elimination of 83 of its 113 positions and the use of resulting cost savings to finance the construction of a new headquarters building for the 99th Army Reserve Command at the base. In the executive summary of its more detailed implementation plan, however, the Army claimed that as many as 79 of Kelly's positions would eventually be retained -- suggesting that the Army had merely shuffled its job loss figures in an effort to produce the necessary cost savings on paper to finance its construction initiative. I am concerned by the Army's conduct in this matter, and I am appreciative that the efforts of this Commission to clarify these discrepancies have led to the reversal of the original recommendation. I am advised that in its most recent submission to this Commission the Army has now proposed a much smaller realignment of the Kelly facility consisting of the elimination of two parcels of land and 13 positions -- only five of which are currently filled and which the facility will be able to handle

through attrition. It is just this sort of diligence in evaluating the Defense Department's numbers that this Commission must apply to each and every one of these facilities.

### The Letterkenny Army Depot

The Letterkenny Army Depot, located in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, is also doing outstanding work for our nation's armed forces. This Depot's 3,550 employees have made the installation a model of efficiency and excellence. Two particular areas should be recognized. First, Letterkenny and its personnel have distinguished themselves in the maintenance and repair of a dozen different types of tracked vehicles -- and in so doing have earned the Department of the Army's designation as a Center of Technical Excellence with respect to self-propelled tracked artillery.

In a proactive effort to take advantage to the greatest extent possible of the capabilities of the private sector, Letterkenny has formed a partnership with a Pennsylvania contractor, United Defense. This innovative public-private partnership -- the first ever initiated by a Defense depot -- has produced the Paladin self-propelled howitzer at great savings to the taxpayer; the system's program manager has returned \$64 million to the Department of the Army. As the Army's top acquisition official, Assistant Secretary Gilbert F. Decker, said about the partnership last year, it is "a hallmark of something we should try to replicate . . . [I] take my hat off to this." Indeed, such innovation can help strengthen the entire defense industrial base and serve as a model for partnerships to acquire other military systems.

Letterkenny also has an outstanding record of achievement in the area of tactical missiles. In 1993, this Commission charged Letterkenny to become the Defense Department's sole center for the repair and maintenance of these weapons. Since that time, the Depot's highly skilled

electronic repair technicians have been certified by the Army Navy, Air Force and Marines to perform missile work on 14 systems, including the Patriot, Sidewinder and Hawk. Such achievements suggest that Letterkenny has clearly lived up to the expectations generated by the 1993 Commission's decision to consolidate missile work at the Depot. Realigning this crucial installation would reduce significantly the efficiencies generated by Letterkenny's position as the Pentagon-wide tactical missile repair facility. Consequently, the readiness of our armed forces may well suffer.

The Defense Department has relied on faulty data and outdated assumptions to arrive at the conclusion that Letterkenny should be substantially realigned. This was demonstrated in Letterkenny's May 9, 1994 response to the Army's data request for its Military Worth Analysis. In that response, Colonel Joseph W. Arbuckle pointed out that several of Letterkenny's capacities would not be accurately reflected in the data submission because the Army had defined its data categories in such a way as to skew the final outcome. I ask that a copy of this letter also be entered into the record of these proceedings. Unfortunately, this is not the first time that questionable methodology has been used against a Pennsylvania facility. In 1991, the Navy's fraudulent concealment of key information helped place the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard on the base closure list.

As you will recall, the Defense Department recommended Letterkenny's realignment in 1993, and the 1993 Commission found that that recommendation "deviated substantially" from the Commission's final selection criteria, which criteria are identical to that of this Commission. I believe that Letterkenny remains the important and efficient operation that our military needs -- and that this Commission is well-advised to retain.

It must also be noted that the economic impact of the proposed Letterkenny realignment would be devastating to its local economy. The Depot is the largest employer in Franklin County, employing 3,550. The original Defense Department realignment proposal would eliminate nearly 2,500 of these jobs; the May 10 BRAC realignment proposal is worse, eliminating over 3,000. Nearly 10 percent of the economy in the area surrounding Letterkenny is directly dependent on the installation. The average annual earnings of a Letterkenny employee is \$32,000, and Letterkenny employees pay approximately \$4.1 million annually in state and local taxes. If Letterkenny were to undergo realignment, the Chambersburg area would suffer a crippling \$300 million annual economic loss, and unemployment, currently at 5 percent, could nearly double.

### **Fort Indiantown Gap**

Fort Indiantown Gap is yet another Pennsylvania facility that contributes greatly to the readiness of our nation's armed forces. The Fort has served as one of our military's most important training and mobilization sites since World War II. Over 177,000 soldiers took advantage last year of its unique modernized training facilities, including a vast array of artillery ranges, flight training airfields, and planning and briefing facilities. Other important assets at the Fort include its ammunition storage facility, its state-of-the-art flight simulators, and its two equipment concentration/training sites. In short, Fort Indiantown Gap is exceptionally equipped for the various training needs of our nation's soldiers. Its proximity to Interstates 78, 81 and 76 (the Pennsylvania Turnpike) and the Harrisburg International Airport enhances its value as a training and mobilization site. It is no surprise that Fort Indiantown Gap has been used for the mobilization of U. S. troops in every armed conflict in which the United States has been involved

since World War II. Nor is it surprising that the Fort has hosted the training of National Guard and Reserve units from Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, Washington, D.C., Delaware, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and North Carolina -- in fiscal year 1994 alone.

Recent testimony before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, of which I am a member, has underscored the fact that the recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap would hamper the ability of our military to train its soldiers. As stated in a May 19 letter to this Commission from myself and several other Senators, the Director of the Army National Guard testified before our Subcommittee that the "enclaves" the Army plans to leave behind at five major maneuver areas recommended for closure or realignment, including Fort Indiantown Gap, would be inadequate to meet the Guard's minimum training needs. Also, the Directors of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard testified that the savings that would result from the closure or realignment of these facilities would be offset by the increased costs the National Guard will have to pay to send units longer distances for fewer days of annual training.

It is also of concern to me, as I outlined in my May 25 letter to this Commission, that the Army's original recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap appears to have been based upon faulty data. As I stated in that letter, I am advised that the Army Basing Study has now conceded that the annual cost savings that would result from the closure of Fort Indiantown Gap are not \$23 million, as originally claimed, but rather \$6.7 million -- a difference of almost 75 percent. Community officials involved in this issue have gone on to cite other errors in the Army's original cost savings estimates which suggest that annual savings might amount only to \$2.1 million. It is all the more difficult to believe, in view of these revised numbers, that the

closure of Fort Indiantown Gap would actually be of any benefit for our nation's armed forces.

The economic hardship that would result from the closure of the Fort is yet another argument in favor of its retention. This move would result in the loss of nearly 800 of the Fort's 2280 jobs, the remaining jobs associated with the continued operation of the Headquarters of the Pennsylvania National Guard. The loss of these 800 jobs translates into the loss of \$20.6 million in annual payroll, combined with the loss of \$20.1 million in fiscal year 1994 Operations and Maintenance funds and \$6 million in fiscal year 1994 Military Construction funds.

#### **Tobyhanna Army Depot**

The Tobyhanna Army Depot in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is also serving the U.S. Army with excellence, specifically in the area of communications and electronics maintenance. As the Director of the Army Basing Study, Colonel Michael G. Jones, said in a May 8, 1995 letter to this Commission, Tobyhanna "has a high military value" and the relocation of its workload "does not make sense." I ask that a copy of this letter be entered into the record of these proceedings.

Tobyhanna's importance to the U.S. military is based upon a number of factors. First, it has been the subject of an ongoing modernization effort begun in 1975 -- including the investment of over \$110 million since 1990 -- that has made it into one of the most up-to-date operations in the whole of the Department of Defense today. Today, 53 percent of its facilities are less than 5 years old, and 86 percent are less than 15 years old. Second, Tobyhanna's facilities have been specially designed and consolidated to maximize the efficiency of their electronics workload, with a 15 percent increase in their production efficiency resulting from recent industrial engineering initiatives. Third, Tobyhanna possesses one of the Defense

Department's most highly-trained and well-educated workforces, with the largest concentration of electronic mechanics and professional electronic support staff in the Department.

All of these factors have led to Tobyhanna's well-established reputation for efficiency and excellence. Studies by numerous organizations within the Defense Department over the last several years, as well as a recent study by the Coopers and Lybrand accounting firm, have recognized Tobyhanna as an outstanding installation. This is the second consecutive base closure round in which Tobyhanna has received the Army's highest military value rating, and it has been rewarded for its excellence in each of the three prior base closure rounds with the transfer of additional workloads. Tobyhanna is clearly a model installation within the Defense Department; it deserves to be commended -- not closed.

The recommendation to close Tobyhanna is all the more inexplicable in light of its economic importance to Northeastern Pennsylvania. With an employment of almost 3,600 area residents who earn an average of \$31,000 annually, Tobyhanna is the largest employer in the region. It contributes \$644 million annually to the local economy according to the Economic Development Council of Northeast Pennsylvania, and Tobyhanna personnel pay \$4.3 million annually in state and local taxes. An additional 9,500 jobs throughout the surrounding region depend indirectly upon the Depot's presence, totalling \$289 million in additional wages and salaries. The closure of Tobyhanna would be devastating to an economy whose unemployment rate of over 6 percent already exceeds the state and national averages and which has seen extensive job loss already throughout the last several years -- including at Tobyhanna itself.

#### **Defense Industrial Supply Center**

Finally, several military facilities in the city of Philadelphia stand to be affected by this

year's base closure round. The Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) is currently one of five Inventory Control Points (ICPs) in the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) system. DISC, with 1800 employees, is one of three ICPs that specialize in critical weapons systems, including hardware for aircraft and tanks. In fact, DISC handles more weapons items than any other ICP in the Department of Defense. DISC has a well-established a record of excellence: it has achieved the lowest proportion of "wrong parts issued" in the DLA system and the highest DLA weapons support rate of over 89 percent, meaning that 9 out of 10 of its customer requirements are filled immediately.

The Defense Department has recommended the disestablishment of the DISC and the transfer of most of its positions to the Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC), also in Philadelphia. This recommendation is troubling for many reasons. First, the Department of Defense did not include in its calculations the additional costs to operate the DPSC at its current location for two more years, as required under the Department's proposal (costs that would approach \$52 million for those two years), nor did the Department fully gauge the costs associated with the requisite transfer of items within the DLA system (a figure that DISC has estimated to be \$66 million higher than the Department's estimate.) Second, in its recommendation to disestablish DISC, the Department of Defense has estimated that only 385 jobs would be lost since the majority of the DISC's 1800 positions would be transferred to the DPSC in Philadelphia. By the use of the designation "disestablishment," however, all 1800 jobs currently at the DISC would be lost and the DISC employees given no guarantees of being rehired at the DPSC site. This recommendation, finally, is contrary to the 1993 Commission's recommendation to consolidate DISC, DPSC and the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) all at one

site. The 1993 recommendation, in fact, is a preferable move that would result in the savings of \$116 million in 20 years by consolidating DISC and DPSC under one command and maximizing DISC/ASO synergy.

**Naval Air Technical Services Facility  
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit**

In its March 1 list of recommendations to this Commission, the Defense Department has also proposed the closure of the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) and Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit (NAESU) and their relocation from Philadelphia to North Island in San Diego. The closure of the NATSF, responsible for the management of technical manuals for the Defense Department, is expected to result in the loss of 227 jobs; the closure of NAESU, responsible for a variety of engineering and technical services including training and maintenance to fleet activities, is expected to result in the loss of 90 jobs.

The recommendation to relocate these facilities to San Diego is troublesome in several respects. First of all, it disrupts the relationship between NATSF and its parent command, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) located in Arlington, Virginia. The close working relationship of these two organizations required over 600 trips by NATSF personnel to NAVAIRSYSCOM in Arlington in fiscal year 1994 alone; the relocation of NATSF to San Diego would greatly complicate their coordinated efforts. Second, the Department's relocation scenario does not reflect any costs associated with the cross-country communications links that would have to be established between NATSF and the ASO -- now only minutes away in Philadelphia. Third, it would disrupt the longstanding management and staff relationship that has emerged between NAESU and the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Philadelphia, NAESU's contract partner for over 27 years. City officials and NATSF and NAESU

representatives have estimated, in fact, that improved coordination and cost efficiency would result from the combination of these two facilities at the current ASO site in Philadelphia and not from their relocation to San Diego. The consolidation of all of these facilities at the same site would result in greater cost efficiency and would provide that face-to-face coordination that is so crucial to their related engineering and technical responsibilities.

### **Naval Surface Warfare Center**

It is important to consider these closure and disestablishment recommendations in light of the City of Philadelphia's history in past base closure rounds, which, unfortunately, serves as an example of the disproportionate burden that the entire state of Pennsylvania has had to bear. As outlined in an April 5 letter to this Commission from several members of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation, the Philadelphia region is the only region in the country to have military installations closed in all three of the previous base closure rounds. The impact of these closures is enormous: the loss of 40,000 jobs (direct and indirect) in the Philadelphia region and the loss of \$50 million in tax revenue for the city. The 10,000 direct civilian jobs lost in the 1991 base closure round, including the recommendation to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, accounted for more than one third of the national total for this round.

In light of this grim history, the Defense Department's recommendation to realign functions of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division to the Philadelphia site is a particularly welcome proposal. As stated in the aforementioned April 5 letter, the NSWC/CD-Philadelphia site is the Defense Department's only source for in-service engineering and for the testing and evaluation (T&E) of ship machinery systems. The Navy devotes 20 percent of its annual budget to the lifecycle costs associated with its 10,000 machinery systems and 200,000

component models in its ships and submarines; the 1600 employees of the NS'VC/CD-Philadelphia have played a significant role in that crucial process of upkeep, evaluation and repair. As the Navy has argued, there are significant "synergistic efficiencies" to be enjoyed as a result of the consolidation of NSWC/CD activities in Philadelphia, providing increased cost efficiency in acquisition and development, decreased overhead costs, and an increased capacity to respond rapidly to immediate problems. These efficiencies, combined with the resulting cost savings (\$175.1 million over 20 years) and the already devastating impact that Philadelphia has borne in past base closure rounds, make this proposal a reasonable one that this Commission would be wise to approve.

In an effort to further capitalize on just these sorts of "synergistic efficiencies," Philadelphia has offered this Commission a complementary proposal involving the NSWC/CD-Philadelphia. Under this additional proposal, the NSWC/CD-Philadelphia would also receive the Engineering Directorate of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), currently located in Crystal City, Virginia, a move of 600 jobs to the Philadelphia site. City officials estimate that this proposal, like the Defense Department proposal discussed above, would result in significant cost savings for the Department -- as much as \$187 million over 20 years -- as well as increased efficiency in the process of ship repair and development. NAVSEA itself, along with a wide range of Defense Department and private sector experts, has stressed the importance of achieving a smaller command structure in Washington, D.C. by moving its engineering activities into the field

### Conclusion

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, this brief survey of military facilities in

Pennsylvania demonstrates their proven importance to our nation's defense and to the communities in which they reside -- as well as the fact that, in many cases, misguided figures and assumptions have led to the recommendation that they be closed or realigned. I have represented the state of Pennsylvania for over fourteen years; having witnessed the tremendous burden that Pennsylvania has borne in the base closure rounds of 1988, 1991 and 1993, having visited Pennsylvania's military facilities personally on many occasions in recent months and having reviewed their military and economic importance, and having served as a member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I am convinced that the interests of our national defense and of the people of Pennsylvania will be harmed by the additional closure or realignment of military bases in our state. In the end, it is your responsibility to submit to the Administration a final list of base closure and realignment recommendations. I urge you to ensure that this final list does justice to the tremendous importance of Pennsylvania's military installations to the defense of our country and to the communities that are their homes.

Thank you.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT  
CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17201 - 4150

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

9 May 1994

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, U.S. Army Depot System Command,  
ATTN: COL Joseph A. Fields, AMSDS-MN,  
Chambersburg, PA 17201-4170

FOR Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical  
Command, ATTN: AMSMC-ST, Rock Island, IL 61299-6000

SUBJECT: BRAC 95 Installation Assessment (IA) Data Call

1. Enclosed is the Letterkenny Army Depot submission to subject data call. As a result of updated guidance via E-mail and numerous telephonic discussions with identified points of contact, we have included the diskette requested and narrative clarification as appropriate.

2. For ease of reference, we display a copy of the diskette screen data and/or the attribute definition followed by elaborated information, clarification, or source references. Where this is the case, we have not, in many cases, made an entry to the data field on the diskette. If data is subsequently inserted, please inform us so that we can adjust our auditable files accordingly.

3. Finally, because Letterkenny has considerable ammunition maintenance and storage capabilities, we have included information for your use in completing segments of the "Ammunition Storage Installation" matrix as well.

4. With the foregoing identified, the information contained in this report is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. My point of contact in this regard is Ms. Hallie Bunk, DSN 570-9585.

5. I have serious concerns with this model as expressed in the point paper enclosure 3.

32 Encls  
as

*Joe Arbuckle*  
JOSEPH W. ARBUCKLE  
Colonel, OD  
Commanding

9 May 94

## POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Military Worth Analysis for BRAC 95

1. PURPOSE. To provide the Department of Army (DA) Total Army Basing Study (TABS) Office with concerns relative to the Military Worth Analysis for Maintenance Facilities in support of BRAC 95.

## 2. FACTS.

a. Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) has recently completed the first Military Worth analysis data call in support of BRAC 95. The process involved a review of the data definitions, the collection of the information as prescribed by various data source documents, and finally the computation of data elements when required.

b. A thorough review of the proposed data submission revealed that in some cases where attributes had to be computed the definition of the primary attribute had direct influence over the outcome of the computed attribute. Of major concern is the maintenance capacity data element.

c. The data call requested capacity be reported in direct labor hours in accordance with DOD 4151.15H, "Depot Maintenance Capacity/Utilization Index Measurement Handbook" dated Nov 90. This DOD-mandated capacity reporting requirement does not include an assessment of the available industrial square footage of an installation. LEAD, because of its workload mix, reports the lowest direct labor manhours of available capacity for the remaining Army depots. However, LEAD is the second largest Army depot in actual available industrial square footage. The maintenance capacity attribute on its own is worth 150 of the total 1000 points associated with the military worth analysis.

d. The maintenance capacity attribute directly influences two other important attributes in the data call. The IBOE rate and the Mission Overhead rate worth 100 and 50 points respectively. The data call computation directs the division of the total maintenance base operations costs by 85 percent of the direct labor hours of capacity for the IBOE rate, and the same computation for the mission overhead rate. It is intuitively obvious that the higher the capacity data, the lower both the IBOE and mission overhead rates become. Based on this approach, LEAD will again be shown negatively as having the highest costs per hour.

SDSLE-I

SUBJECT: Military Worth Analysis for BRAC 95

e. The maintenance capacity computation in the military worth analysis therefore influences 300 of the total 1000 points or 30% of the outcome. As currently defined, it does not measure what is intended.

f. Another concern discovered during the analysis of the data submission is maintenance excess capacity. The data call required the installation report excess maintenance capacity in square footage. The attribute has a value of 40 points. The concern is two fold; first, there appears to be an inconsistency when available capacity is reported in manhours and excess capacity in square feet and secondly, the data call states that the more excess available the better.

g. LEAD is in the process of consolidating 23 DOD Tactical Missile systems into the depot, as directed by BRAC 93. Rather than new construction, LEAD is renovating existing space, or previously excess square footage to accommodate the consolidation. This was done to keep BRAC 93 costs down. Therefore, again because of the execution of the BRAC 93 recommendation, LEAD will be reported as the lowest on comparison with the other Army Depots for this attribute.

### 3. CONCLUSION.

a. It is very clear by analyzing this data call that LEAD will be viewed as the least valuable of all the Army depots in this military worth assessment. The reason is that the model simply rewards and reinforces what is already being done at a location defined by past workloading decisions. Those past decisions are not based on military worth. In fact, the effects of politics weigh heavily in this, though Congressionally-mandated workload actions.

b. A better assessment of military worth would be to evaluate the actual maintenance missions currently performed, and those slated to be performed, at each of the installations, and their overall value to DOD. This would include interservicing worth.

Hallie Bunk/DSN 570-9585

PAUL WOLF  
Sergeant H&S



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

May 8 1995

Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
ATTN: Mr Brown  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Brown,

As requested in 26 April 1995 letter, attached are the COBRA analyses associated with the following depot scenarios:

- 1) Realignment of Anniston Army Depot
- 2) Closure of Tobyhanna Army Depot
- 3) Realignment of Letterkenny Army Depot with tactical missile to Hill AFB
- 4) Closure of Letterkenny Army Depot with tactical missiles to Hill AFB

These options are neither supportable nor preferable to the current DoD recommendations, as indicated in the attached briefing presented to the Commission staff on 9 May 1995. All of the COBRA analyses presented in this package are quick turn around efforts and may cost more than is indicated. If any of these commission alternatives are added to the BRAC 95 list on 10 May 1995, we will study them further.

**Depots- General:** A review of our depot requirements into the 21st Century (Army Stationing Strategy) supports a reduction from five Army depots to three commodity oriented depots. An independent analysis by DoD through the Joint Cross-Service Group- Depot Maintenance fully supported the Army's recommendation to consolidate all ground combat workload at a single depot - Anniston Army Depot. All analysis clearly confirms that the best alternative, from both an operational and financial aspect, is to realign Letterkenny to a storage activity under Tobyhanna Depot and close Red River Army Depot.

**Anniston:** Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair and is the only depot capable of performing maintenance on the M1 series main battle tank. Because it was ranked high on the Installation Assessment and Military Value Assessments, Anniston was not considered for closure. The realignment of Anniston and relocation of heavy combat workload to Red River would cost \$128 M and have a return on investment in 4 years. A complicating factor with the realignment of Anniston is the chemical storage and chemical demilitarization mission. This mission would preclude any significant reduction base support at Anniston; furthermore,

technology maintenance skills required to work on tanks is more complicated than tactical vehicles at Red River. Consequently, a substantial portion of the installation would remain open and a large number of personnel would have to transfer to Red River.

**Tobyhanna:** Tobyhanna is our newest depot and is the repair site for ground communications and electronic systems. It has the highest Installation Value among all the depots and has a high Military Value. Moving this high tech workload with its requirement for clean rooms to a low tech ground depot does not make sense. Closing of Tobyhanna is over twice as costly and saves half as much in annual savings. This is due to the high renovation and personnel relocation costs.

**Letterkenny BRAC 93 Re-Direct:** These scenarios are variations of the same concept. Neither is cost effective for two principle reasons - ammunition storage construction and personnel relocations. Hill AFB only has approximately 100,000 SQFT of ammunition storage available at both Hill AFB and Oasis ( 20 air miles away). DoD has a requirement for 1 Million SQFT for missile storage. The personnel issue is based on the Air Force BRAC 95 recommendation and their current and projected workload. These workload figures require 922 personnel to transfer to Hill AFB to meet the requirements. These two factors drive the one time cost to \$220 for the realignment scenario and \$471 M for the closure scenario. In addition, closure requires the total redesign of the DoD ammunition tiering concept and forces reconsideration of three to five Army BRAC 95 recommendations. The net present value of both hill AFB scenarios do not meet our expectations. Neither are better options than the current DoD recommendation.

The bottom line is all of these alternatives are neither supportable nor preferable to current DoD recommendations.

Enclosure

  
Michael G. Jones  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, The Army Basing Study



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT  
CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17201 - 4150

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

9 May 1994

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, U.S. Army Depot System Command,  
ATTN: COL Joseph A. Fields, AMSDS-MN,  
Chambersburg, PA 17201-4170

FOR Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical  
Command, ATTN: AMSMC-ST, Rock Island, IL 61299-6000

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3-2 Encls  
as

*Joe Arbuckle*  
JOSEPH W. ARBUCKLE  
Colonel, OD  
Commanding

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SDSLE-I

SUBJECT: Military Worth Analysis for BRAC 95

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Hallie Bunk/DSN 570-9585

STATEMENT TO  
THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
OF THE HONORABLE FRANK PALLONE, JR.  
JUNE 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I appreciate having the opportunity to testify before you today.

The Base Realignment and Closure Commission has an historic opportunity to begin the process of consolidation and collocation of C4I capabilities, especially when the individual military services have traditionally been parochial in nature. The opportunity for cross-servicing, a goal so often sought and so consistently eluded, will not soon arise again.

The concept of cross-servicing is not new. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's 1993 Report to the President noted that "The Department of Defense has been attempting for approximately 20 years without significant success to interservice...." As a result, the 1993 Commission recommended exhaustive review on the issue of cross-servicing for the BRAC 1995 deliberations. During the 1995 process, the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group (LJCSG) recommended Fort Monmouth as the site for C4I collocation. Unfortunately, as the U.S. General Accounting Office noted, "... agreements for consolidating similar work done by two or more of the services were limited, and opportunities to achieve additional reductions in excess capacity and infrastructure were missed. In particular, this was the case at...laboratory facilities." It is evident that the only forum to achieve the desired end of cross-servicing lies within your final recommendations to the President.

Supporters of Rome have argued that it is too expensive to close the Rome Labs and cite various Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses in support. After closer examination, it is apparent that dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom does produce annual savings and a return on investment within four to six years. The first COBRA, dated October 13, 1994, indicated an estimated one-time cost of \$133.8 million and estimated that it would take more than 100 years to recoup costs. This COBRA analysis was completed before the Joint Cross-Servicing Group on Labs suggested the relocation of Rome Labs to Fort Monmouth and Hanscom. Once this alternative was calculated, the February 23, 1995, COBRA illustrated the one-time cost

at \$52.8 million with a four year return on investment. Another COBRA was conducted on May 23, 1995. Although the one-time cost increased to \$79.2 million, the return on investment would be in only six years. In addition the latest COBRA analysis found the most cost-savings -- \$13 million per year. Over a twenty year period an excess of \$180 million will be saved by this closure.

Fort Monmouth provides an excellent environment for the collocation of C4I capabilities for various reasons, including: an ideal integrated command structure, an already predominant C4I joint arena, the physical space to accommodate the Rome Labs, and the technological/academic base to make cross-servicing of C4I activities a success.

Fort Monmouth has been the center of gravity for C4I innovation for many years, and is postured to achieve the cross-servicing vision of the 1993 Commission and the 1995 LJCSG. The 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission can make this goal a reality with C4I consolidation at Fort Monmouth.

#### ATCOM REALIGNMENT

This realignment to Fort Monmouth is a logical out-growth of BRAC 93, which realigned the research and development portion of the life cycle of six ATCOM business areas to CECOM, Fort Monmouth. By realigning the rest of the life cycle to CECOM, BRAC 95 eliminates duplication of effort and achieves the efficiencies and mission enhancement of one command managing the entire life cycle.

#### MTMC RELOCATION

Another BRAC 95 recommendation closes the Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal and relocates the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Eastern Area Command Headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 1301st Major Port Command to Fort Monmouth. The fort has ample, quality facilities to house MTMC and the 1301st together. In addition, the proximity of Fort Monmouth to Bayonne facilitates coordination with the ports of NY and NJ, and lessens the personal impact of this BRAC recommendation on the MTMC/1301st employees.

Rep. Thomas M. Faglie (PA-01)  
341 cthB

**I WOULD LIKE TO THANK CHAIRMAN DIXON AND THE MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION FOR CONVENING TODAY'S HEARING.**

**MY APPEARANCE TODAY IS MUCH DIFFERENT THAN THE LAST TIME I SPOKE BEFORE THE COMMISSION IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY. IN 1991, THE COMMISSION WAS REVIEWING THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE THE PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD. THIS SEPTEMBER WHEN THE OVERHAUL IS COMPLETE ON THE USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, ON TIME AND ON BUDGET, SHE WILL STEAM OUT THE NAVY YARD AND THE YARD WILL CLOSE.**

**BASED ON THAT DECISION AND OTHERS, PHILADELPHIA HAS THE UNFORTUNATE DISTINCTION OF BEING THE ONLY CITY TO BE IMPACTED IN EVERY BASE CLOSURE ROUND. ALL TOTAL THE PHILADELPHIA REGION WILL LOSE 38,000 JOBS AS A RESULT OF THESE THREE BRAC ROUNDS.**

**I AM HERE TODAY TO URGE YOUR SUPPORT OF THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION TO CONSOLIDATE NAVY ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS AT THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, CARDEROCK DIVISION, PHILADELPHIA. ADDITIONALLY, I STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION BY THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. IT BUILDS ON THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION BY FURTHER CONSOLIDATING NAVY ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS BY REALIGNING THE ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE AT NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS IN PHILADELPHIA.**

**THE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL PROMOTE THE READINESS OF OUR ARMED FORCES, LOWER NAVY MACHINERY LIFE-CYCLE COSTS AND IMPROVE EFFICIENCY WHILE ASSISTING IN THE CONVERSION OF THE PHILADELPHIA NAVY YARD.**

**I ALSO STRONGLY URGE THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION TO MAINTAIN THE 1993 COMMISSION'S DECISION TO MOVE THE DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER FROM ITS PRESENT LOCATION TO THE SITE OF THE NAVY AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE COMPOUND IN NORTHEAST PHILADELPHIA. DPSC PERFORMS THE CRITICAL TASK OF BUYING AND MOVING FOOD, CLOTHING, MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND OTHER SUPPORT PRODUCTS FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES. IN THIS CAPACITY, DPSC HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN RESTORING CREDIBILITY TO MILITARY PROCUREMENT, PUTTING TO REST THE IMAGES OF GOLD PLATED TOILET SEATS, HAMMERS AND ASH TRAYS. FURTHERMORE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE COMMISSION GIVE CERTAINTY TO PAST COMMISSION ORDERS, RATHER THAN EXPOSING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TO A REVOLVING DOOR OF INCONSISTENT DECISIONS.**

**THE COMMISSION CAN BUILD ON THE SUCCESS OF DPSC'S IMPOSING TRACK RECORD BY MERGING IT WITH THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER IN PHILADELPHIA. THESE IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES COULD BE CONSOLIDATED UNDER ONE BASE OPERATING SUPPORT STRUCTURE. THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD ENHANCE MILITARY READINESS, BETTER UTILIZE A VALUED WORKFORCE, AND ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT COST SAVINGS.**

**THE NSWC, PHILADELPHIA IS THE NAVY'S ONLY SOURCE FOR IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING AND FOR TESTING AND EVALUATING SHIP MACHINERY SYSTEMS. A FULL TWENTY PERCENT OF THE NAVY'S ANNUAL BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO LIFE-CYCLE COSTS FOR THESE VITAL SYSTEMS.**

**BY CONTINUING THE CONSOLIDATION OF ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS IN PHILADELPHIA--A PROCESS WHICH BEGAN AS A RESULT OF A 1991 BRAC DECISION--THE NAVY ESTIMATES THAT THEY WILL SAVE \$175.1 MILLION OVER TWENTY YEARS. FURTHERMORE, THIS REALIGNMENT CAN BE COMPLETED IN A COST EFFECTIVE MANNER. THE NAVY CALCULATES THAT THE REALIGNMENT WILL COST \$25 MILLION.**

**THIS RECOMMENDATION WILL ALSO GREATLY IMPROVE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND MILITARY READINESS BY CONSOLIDATING LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT FOR MACHINERY SYSTEMS IN ONE CENTRAL LOCATION. THIS WOULD STREAMLINE THE NAVY'S ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND ENABLE THE PURCHASE OF MORE CAPABLE SYSTEMS AT LOWER COSTS.**

**THE SECOND PROPOSAL WHICH I MENTIONED EARLIER WOULD BUILD ON THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION BY MOVING NAVSEA'S ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE TO PHILADELPHIA.**

**THIS CONSOLIDATION WOULD PROVIDE A MAJOR RETURN ON INVESTMENT BY REDUCING DUPLICATION OF ACTIVITIES BETWEEN THE 650 EMPLOYEES AT NAVSEA AND THE 1600 WORKERS AT NSWC, PHILADELPHIA. THE NAVY'S OWN INTERNAL STUDIES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS DUPLICATION AND THAT NAVSEA'S ENGINEERS SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM HEADQUARTERS AND MOVED TO THE FIELD. FURTHERMORE, IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD SAVE THE NAVY \$13.4 MILLION PER YEAR AND A TOTAL SAVINGS OVER TWENTY YEARS OF \$165.88 MILLION.**

**AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, PHILADELPHIA HAS BEEN BATTERED BY THE BASE CLOSURE PROCESS.**

**HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO CONVERT THE PHILADELPHIA NAVY YARD AND DEVELOP COMMERCIAL SHIPBUILDING IN PLACE OF NAVY WORK ARE SUCCEEDING.**

**EVEN BEFORE THE KENNEDY LEAVES, WE HAVE TWO ESTABLISHED COMMERCIAL MARITIME OPERATIONS WHICH ARE INTERESTED IN BUILDING SHIPS AT THE YARD. THIS COULD MEAN 3,800 JOBS FOR NAVY YARD WORKERS. ADDITIONALLY, THE WESTINGHOUSE CORPORATION AND GARVEY PRECISION MACHINE HAVE COMMITTED TO MOVING TO THE YARD AND CREATING OVER 150 JOBS. ALL OF THESE BUSINESSES HAVE CITED NSWC'S LOCATION AT THE NAVY YARD AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THEIR DECISION TO COME TO PHILADELPHIA.**

**THESE ARE EXCELLENT RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL BOOST MILITARY READINESS, SAVE MONEY, AND GREATLY ASSIST OUR WORK TO REVITALIZE THE COMMERCIAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AT THE NAVY YARD. THE EXPERTS AGREE. FORMER NAVY SECRETARIES JOHN LEHMAN AND SEAN O'KEEFE HAVE STRONGLY ENDORSED THESE PROPOSALS.**

**IN FACT, SECRETARY LEHMAN TESTIFIED BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT THE REGIONAL HEARING IN BALTIMORE IN SUPPORT OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.**

**WITH THESE OUTSTANDING BENEFITS IN MIND--SAVING MONEY, ENHANCING READINESS AND BOOSTING DEFENSE CONVERSION IN PHILADELPHIA--I URGE THE COMMISSION TO ADOPT THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.**

**THANK YOU.**

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**PUERTO RICO**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**ARMY:**

Fort Buchanan

Realign


**II. COMMISSION ADD-ON FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 53

## PUERTO RICO



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

Hon. Carlos Romero-Barceló  
Written Testimony  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Hearings  
Tuesday, June 13, 1995

First of all, I wish to extend my appreciation to the Commission for allowing me the opportunity to express in person my deep concern over the proposed closure of Fort Buchanan, the only Active Army installation in the whole Caribbean region. And I say closure in a deliberate way as the term realignment is a misnomer under the circumstances facing the Fort.

Although the former Camp Buchanan was originally established as a training site for the 65th United States Infantry Regiment in 1923, its role has changed dramatically over the years. The main mission of Fort Buchanan at present is to prepare and assume responsibility for the mobilization of reserve component forces in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Further, the Fort provides administrative and logistical support to active and reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces in Puerto Rico and the U.S.

Virgin Islands, including Puerto Rico's Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). This includes recruiting services for the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as providing mobilization support for all reserve components in case of war. In addition, Fort Buchanan plans, coordinates and executes all Army-related counter-terrorism actions on the Island.

In recent military operations such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Uphold Democracy where Reserve Forces and National Guard units have been mobilized, Fort Buchanan, as a lead mobilization station, has played a key role serving as a support hub to bring together all elements of support assuring the quick validation and deployment of the mobilized units. Also proven during these operations was the fact that the "Total Army" concept really works, thereby firmly establishing the trend that Reserve Component Units will continue to be mobilized along with the Active Component. If Fort Buchanan is closed, who will

support future mobilizations in Puerto Rico?

Fort Buchanan is a mobilization station while its parent installation, Fort McPherson in Georgia, is solely an administrative support headquarters which has remained untouched by BRAC. To close the Fort Buchanan garrison while maintaining Fort MacPherson does not meet the test to consolidate and economize on military spending.

Although the Department of Defense Proposal asks for a "realignment" of Fort Buchanan, this move would constitute, for all practical purposes, a closure. In effect, the Fort will cease operations as an active army enclave. All active Army personnel (military and civilian) will leave; all active Army functions will cease; all family housing must be abandoned and all morale support activities stopped.

If this "realignment" were to take place, it would result in a potential reduction of at least 500 jobs. The Commission is definitely being misled by the figures presented in the Department of Defense's Base Closure and Realignment Report stating that only 128 jobs would be lost.

At this time, Fort Buchanan services 2,486 Active Duty and civilian personnel. It also serves five other sizeable groups comprising some 73,170 persons who would also be negatively impacted. These five groups include 175 Active Guard/Reserve personnel and their families; 15,410 Reserve Component soldiers; 19,835 family members of Reserve Component soldiers; 13,260 retirees; and 34,890 family members of retirees.

Fort Buchanan is a symbol of the Army's interest in the Caribbean Basin and its presence brings stability to the region. To

"realign" or close this installation will not only negatively impact on the critical support to the Active and Reserve Component Forces, but will also add to the unemployment problem on the Island.

But perhaps the strongest argument in favor of keeping Fort Buchanan on the active list is that the supposed monetary savings to be achieved by closing the Post are highly questionable. The efficiency and combat readiness of Reserve Component organizations will certainly suffer and mobilization of these organizations will eventually take place at a much higher cost to taxpayers than if Fort Buchanan were to be maintained on the active list. Is it worth risking part of our national security to allegedly save a few dollars here and there? Will the Army be able to rapidly and efficiently mobilize our Reserve Component units for a future conflict without Fort Buchanan?

I believe it is in our best national security interests that the Active Army facilities at Fort Buchanan remain open, particularly

now with the upcoming termination of the U.S. military presence in Panamá under the terms of the Panamá Canal Treaty of 1977.

Puerto Rico has a proud and long tradition of supporting national defense. This has been shown time and time again as hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans, in spite of their obvious second-class citizenship, have consistently and promptly answered the Nation's call to arms without hesitation. From the vital defenses of Panama during the First World War and practically every theater of operations during the Second World War, to the frozen plains of Korea, the hardships of Vietnam, the interventions in Grenada and Panama and the sands of the Middle East... Puerto Ricans have been there and have shed their blood. Throughout all of these operations, Fort Buchanan has always stood ready to support us.

Today, more than ever, we in Puerto Rico stand ready to assume an even greater role in the Army of the 21st century. Closing Fort Buchanan, the only Active Army installation in Puerto Rico and the

whole Caribbean region, is certain to lead us in the wrong direction.

I strongly urge you to remove Fort Buchanan from any proposed base closure list.

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**RHODE ISLAND**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

None


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 40

## RHODE ISLAND



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of defense base closures. I will summarize my full statement, which I would like to place in the record.

My testimony will be somewhat different from what you usually hear. I support each of the three Department of Defense recommendations affecting the Navy's presence in Newport, Rhode Island.

First is the proposed consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's New London, Connecticut detachment into the Center's Newport, headquarters. I am convinced that the Newport laboratories constitute an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art facility. Its upgrading in 1991 to a "superlab" enhanced the reputation it had already earned as a center of excellence in submarine research and development.

The Center is well-prepared to increase its contribution to

our national security. In fact, a \$12 million laboratory was just opened in January, and two more costing \$11.2 million and \$21.7 million apiece are under construction and scheduled to open in 1996. These last two facilities are being built specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and BRAC '95 influx of personnel and their activities from New London, CT.

Consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Newport will save DoD scarce resources by eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies. The 1991 action already appears well on its way to reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will result in further savings of \$91.2 million over 20 years. These savings will ultimately allow the Navy to invest more resources into our irreplaceable undersea technical base, rather than squander them on needless overhead and excess capacity.

For all of the reasons cited above, I urge you to approve the Navy's proposal to consolidate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's New London detachment into its Newport headquarters.

Second, the Navy has recommended the relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL to Newport. This proposal will achieve savings of \$30.1 million over 20 years, and will further strengthen the Navy's undersea research and development effort. I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal, and urge the Commission to do so as well.

Third and last, I would like to address the Navy's recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi to Athens, Georgia and Newport's Naval Education and Training Center. In advancing this proposal, the Navy seeks to streamline its operations and achieve savings by moving several Administrative Schools from Meridian to Newport.

The Naval Education and Training Center at Newport has long maintained a sterling reputation as a superior learning center. It consists of institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface Warfare Officers School, and many others which

have provided the fleet with the best-educated, highest quality personnel. The learning environment of the Naval Education and Training Center is ideal for incorporation of the Administrative schools at Meridian. Its classroom facilities are modern, housing is plentiful, and the surrounding community is prepared to welcome the influx of students with open arms. Simply put, Newport's quality of life is difficult to match within the Navy. And as we all know, it is quality of life that is such an important factor in recruiting and retaining our military's most important resource, its people.

The move of the Naval Technical Training Center to Newport will also achieve needed cost savings. Annual recurring savings after implementation of the Naval Air Station/Meridian closure is \$26.9 million, with net savings over 20 years of \$345.6 million. For all of these reasons, I urge the Commission to approve the Navy's proposed transfer of the Naval Technical Training Center in Meridian to Athens and Newport.

Again, I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to appear today to present my testimony.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN H. CHAFEE  
TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
JUNE 13, 1995

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of defense base closures. I recognize the extremely difficult job the Commission faces in deciding on how best to accomplish the continued painful down-sizing of our defense infrastructure, and I commend the efforts of the Commissioners in meeting this challenge.

I would like to address three Department of Defense (DoD) recommendations affecting the Navy's presence in Newport, Rhode Island: the proposed consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's (NUWC) New London, CT detachment into NUWC's Newport, Rhode Island headquarters; the proposed transfer of the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), Meridian, MS into Newport's Naval Education and Training Center (NETC); and the proposed relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL UWSRD), Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. I believe the Navy has done well in proposing three recommendations which will streamline its operations, thereby saving resources and enhancing national security. I am further convinced that these three proposals will survive careful scrutiny and fully meet the exacting criteria established by the base closure law.

In 1991, the Navy, through the BRAC process, consolidated all of its research and development (R&D) laboratories into four "superlabs," one each for air, surface, subsurface and C<sup>3</sup>I activities. The undersea component created by this consolidation is the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, headquartered in Newport, Rhode Island with several outlying detachments. During my three and one-half years of working with officials of NUWC/Newport, and having visited the lab on many occasions, I can surely attest that NUWC is an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art facility. NUWC's superlab designation enhanced the reputation it had already earned as a center of excellence for submarine research and development. The work of NUWC's dedicated, hard-working employees has allowed the U.S. Navy to maintain its technological superiority in all aspects of undersea warfare, a priority that has become increasingly urgent with the global proliferation of modern submarines.

But NUWC's position within the Navy force structure is not static. The Center is well-prepared with a most willing workforce and a growing infrastructure to increase its contribution to our national security. In fact, a \$12 million building was just opened in January, and two more worth \$11.2 million and \$21.7 million are under construction and scheduled to open in January and June of 1996 respectively. These last two facilities are being built specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and BRAC '95 influx of personnel and their activities from New London, CT.

Further consolidation of NUWC at Newport will save DoD scarce resources by eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies. The 1991 action appears well on its way to reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will result in further savings of \$91.2 million over 20 years. These savings will ultimately allow the Navy to invest more resources into our irreplaceable submarine technical base, rather than needlessly squander them on overhead and excess capacity.

Those seeking to thwart the Navy's plans for NUWC have argued to the Commission that the transfer to Newport will result in adverse impact on personnel retention and geographic technical synergies. This contention is seriously flawed, as any such negative impact is offset by at least two factors. First, the close geographic proximity of New London personnel to the Newport site will encourage commuting and continued employment at NUWC. Second, a large percentage of NUWC/New London technical work is performed by private contractors. If these employees choose not to move to Newport, either of two remedies are available: the contractor could utilize employees of its Newport office, or the Navy could easily hire another contractor.

Opponents of the NUWC plan also wrongly argue that the cost of transferring the 700+ NUWC/New London personnel to NUWC/Newport under BRAC '91 has more than doubled from the Navy's original estimates. Proponents of this point of view argue that transferring the remaining 417 NUWC/New London employees to

Newport under BRAC '95 would lead to further cost discrepancies. However, a more responsible analysis of these costs shows quite a different story. Earlier this year I shared with the Commission the Navy's yearly documentation of the cost of the 1991 realignment of NUWC. I was pleased to note that the Navy's original cost estimate of the transfer has actually decreased by \$7.9 million. As I understand it, proponents of retaining NUWC's New London detachment used different economic models which produced a higher current cost, thus making an unfavorable comparison to the Navy's original estimate.

For all of the reasons cited above, I urge this Commission to approve the Navy's proposal to consolidate NUWC's New London detachment into its Newport headquarters. There is clearly no logical alternative for location of the Navy's principal undersea research and development laboratory.

The Navy has also recommended the relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. This proposal will achieve savings of \$30.1 million over 20 years, and will complement the New London transfer, further bolstering our nation's undersea R&D effort. I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal, and urge the Commission to do so as well.

Finally, I would like to address the Navy's recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS to

Athens, GA and NETC/Newport. This proposal seeks to co-locate NTTC's enlisted schools at bases that largely consist of officer schools. Specifically, the Navy seeks to streamline its operations and achieve savings by transferring several Administrative Schools from NTTC/Meridian to Newport.

NETC/Newport has long maintained a sterling reputation as a superior learning center. Institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface Warfare Officers School, the Officer Indoctrination School, and many others have provided the fleet with the best-educated, highest quality personnel. I have long argued that in these times of continued shrinking of our force structure, we must ensure that our men and women in uniform continue to be educated and trained at the highest standards. An increasingly complex and unpredictable world requires military personnel who are well-prepared to meet a number of new challenges.

The learning environment of NETC is ideal for incorporation of the Administrative schools of NTTC/Meridian. Its classroom facilities are modern, housing is plentiful, and the surrounding community is prepared to welcome the influx of students with open arms. Simply put, Newport's quality of life is difficult to match within the Navy. And it is quality of life that remains such an important factor in recruiting and retaining our military's most important resource, its people.

I have previously shared with this Commission information on a recent effort conducted by NETC that merits reiteration. NETC's livability is illustrated by its successful implementation of the Navy's Family Housing Neighborhoods of Excellence (NOE) program, begun in 1992 by then-Commander of the Naval Facilities and Engineering Command, Admiral Jack Buffington. This innovative, wide-ranging program involves modernization and beautification of Navy housing, in addition to improved housing maintenance services. It is fair to say that NETC has performed as well as any other Navy base in the nation in implementing the NOE program.

Finally, the move of NTTC to Newport will achieve needed cost savings during these times of a shrinking military. The Navy's responsible research has concluded that annual recurring savings after implementation of the NAS/Meridian closure is \$26.9 million, with net savings over 20 years of \$345.6 million. These figures have yet to be adequately disproved with respect to NTTC. For all of these reasons, I urge the Commission to approve the Navy's proposed transfer of NTTC/Meridian to Athens and Newport.

Again, I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to appear today to present my testimony.

Statement of the Honorable Jack Reed  
before the  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Washington, D.C.  
June 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I am pleased to join my colleagues in support of the further realignment of Navy underwater research, development, testing, and evaluation functions to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, Rhode Island.

While this consolidation proposal would generate over 1,000 new jobs in my state, it is more important to note that this consolidation builds upon past BRAC recommendations approved by this Commission's predecessors. Failure to endorse further rationalization of the Navy's undersea R,D,T, and E capabilities would upset the sensible path recommended by the Defense Department and conceivably jeopardize future submarine research.

I am pleased that the Defense Department has once again identified Newport as the most logical and cost effective location for the consolidation of Navy submarine warfare related research.

The proposed realignment in Newport will also capitalize on and expand the existing synergy between NUWC and the multitude of private submarine oriented engineering and software firms located on Acquidneck Island. Many companies that have done business with NUWC New London are establishing Newport offices in the wake of the Defense Department's recommendation.

As you know, the Defense Department developed this proposal after intense scrutiny and in-depth data analysis. Indeed, the cost estimates for this proposal were developed jointly by personnel from both the Newport and New London NUWC facilities and comply with standard methodologies used in past BRAC's.

While some may argue that the Navy's proposal to consolidate undersea research, development, test, and evaluation in Newport will inconvenience the family life of some NUWC New London personnel, it is my understanding that many New London employees have expressed to the Navy an interest in employment at the Newport facility. Unlike many proposed realignments, the close proximity of these facilities will ease family adjustments.

The Commission should also uphold the DoD's recommendation on realigning submarine R,D,T, and E functions at NUWC Newport because it requires no new military construction or lease space and can accommodate new missions within the DoD's cost estimates.

I would also urge the Commission to carefully review and support the recommended relocation of certain Navy Air training activities to the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) in Newport. This is a straight forward proposal that would yield an estimated net savings of \$158.8 million during implementation and approximately \$471 million in savings over 20 years.

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I urge you to endorse the Defense Department's recommendation to continue the consolidation of Navy undersea research and development at NUWC Newport and to move certain training functions to NETC Newport.

Thank you.

*John Chafee*

Statement Of Senator John H. Chafee -- June 13, 1995  
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of defense base closures. I recognize the extremely difficult job the Commission faces in deciding on how best to accomplish the continued painful down-sizing of our defense infrastructure, and I commend the efforts of the Commissioners in meeting this challenge.

I would like to address three Department of Defense (DoD) recommendations affecting the Navy's presence in Newport, Rhode Island: the proposed consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's (NUWC) New London, CT detachment into NUWC's Newport, Rhode Island headquarters; the proposed transfer of the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), Meridian, MS into Newport's Naval Education and Training Center (NETC); and the proposed relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL UWSRD), Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. I believe the Navy has done well in proposing three recommendations which will streamline its operations, thereby saving resources and enhancing national security. I am further convinced that these three proposals will survive careful scrutiny and fully meet the exacting criteria established by the base closure law.

In 1991, the Navy, through the BRAC process, consolidated all of its research and development (R&D) laboratories into four "superlabs," one each for air, surface, subsurface and C<sup>3</sup>I activities. The undersea component created by this consolidation is the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, headquartered in Newport, Rhode Island with several outlying detachments. During my three and one-half years of working with officials of NUWC/Newport, and having visited the lab on many occasions, I can surely attest that NUWC is an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art facility. NUWC's superlab designation enhanced the reputation it had already earned as a center of excellence for submarine research and development. The work of NUWC's dedicated, hard-working employees has allowed the U.S. Navy to maintain its technological superiority in all aspects of undersea warfare, a priority that has become increasingly urgent with the global proliferation of modern submarines.

But NUWC's position within the Navy force structure is not static. The Center is well-prepared with a most willing workforce and a growing infrastructure to increase its contribution to our national security. In fact, a \$12 million building was just opened in January, and two more worth \$11.2 million and \$21.7 million are under construction and scheduled to open in January and June of 1996 respectively. These last two facilities are being built specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and BRAC '95 influx of personnel and their activities from New London, CT.

Further consolidation of NUWC at Newport will save DoD scarce resources by eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies. The 1991 action appears well on its way to reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will result in further savings of \$91.2 million over 20 years. These savings will ultimately allow the Navy to invest more resources into our irreplaceable submarine technical base, rather than needlessly squander them on overhead and excess capacity.

Those seeking to thwart the Navy's plans for NUWC have argued to the Commission that the transfer to Newport will result in adverse impact on personnel retention and geographic technical synergies. This contention is seriously flawed, as any such negative impact is offset by at least two factors. First, the close geographic proximity of New London personnel to the Newport site will encourage commuting and continued employment at NUWC. Second, a large percentage of NUWC/New London technical work is performed by private contractors. If these employees choose not to move to Newport, either of two remedies are available: the contractor could utilize employees of its Newport office, or the Navy could easily hire another contractor.

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For all of the reasons cited above, I urge this Commission to approve the Navy's proposal to consolidate NUWC's New London detachment into its Newport headquarters. There is clearly no logical alternative for location of the Navy's principal undersea research and development laboratory.

The Navy has also recommended the relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. This proposal will achieve savings of \$30.1 million over 20 years, and will complement the New London transfer, further bolstering our nation's undersea R&D effort. I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal, and urge the Commission to do so as well.

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The learning environment of NETC is ideal for incorporation of the Administrative schools of NTTTC/Meridian. Its classroom facilities are modern, housing is plentiful, and the surrounding community is prepared to welcome the influx of students with open arms. Simply put, Newport's quality of life is difficult to match within the Navy. And it is quality of life that remains such an important factor in recruiting and retaining our military's most important resource, its people.

I have previously shared with this Commission information on a recent effort conducted by NETC that merits reiteration. NETC's livability is illustrated by its successful implementation of the Navy's Family Housing Neighborhoods of Excellence (NOE) program, begun in 1992 by then-Commander of the Naval Facilities and Engineering Command, Admiral Jack Buffington. This innovative, wide-ranging program involves modernization and beautification of Navy housing, in addition to improved housing maintenance services. It is fair to say that NETC has performed as well as any other Navy base in the nation in implementing the NOE program.

Finally, the move of NTTTC to Newport will achieve needed cost savings during these times of a shrinking military. The Navy's responsible research has concluded that annual recurring savings after implementation of the NAS/Meridian closure is \$26.9 million, with net savings over 20 years of \$345.6 million. These figures have yet to be adequately disproved with respect to NTTTC. For all of these reasons, I urge the Commission to approve the Navy's proposed transfer of NTTTC/Meridian to Athens and Newport.

Again, I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to appear today to present my testimony.

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# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**TENNESSEE**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:**

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis

Close


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 43

## TENNESSEE



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Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

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**Testimony of the Honorable Harold Ford  
before the  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Defense Distribution Depot Memphis**

**Tuesday - June 13, 1995**

**Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to make the case for the Defense Distribution Depot Memphis. I want to express my appreciation to the Commissioners and staff who have been professional, courteous and accommodating throughout this process. I particularly would like to thank Commissioner Kling who visited the depot, Chairman Dixon and Commissioners Cox, Cornella and Steele who have given generously of their time.**

**Our two Senators make compelling arguments about the Depot's strategic geographic location, unmatched transportation infrastructure and the importance of maintaining the Depot to fill an anticipated shortfall in**

**storage capacity in the DOD distribution system. Senator Thompson and Senator Frist have explained in the clearest terms the potential negative impact closure of the Depot will have on the Department of Defense distribution system. I would like to cover another important area: that is rationale behind the DLA's closure recommendation.**

**Before I do that, let me say that as the Congressman who represents the Depot and the majority of its employees, I extremely concerned about the economic impact on the community. I urge the Commission to be sensitive to the adverse impact of the closure on the work force.**

**The primary issue I would like to address today is the rationale behind the closure recommendation. The Defense Logistics Agency has taken great pains to point out that its**

**decision to close DDMT was the result of an evaluation of a combination of factors called BRAC evaluation tools. I believe a fresh look at DLA's own BRAC evaluation tools will reveal that Defense Depot should remain open. These tools include: Military Value, DOD Force Structure Plan, Concept of Operations, Joint/Service Decisions, Excess Capacity, and "~~showstoppers~~."**

**The first factor is military value. By DLA's own analysis, Memphis was ranked third in military value among stand-alone depots. However, DLA chose to disregard DDMT's high military value ranking in favor of an installation analysis which is of questionable merit.**

**The DOD Logistics Strategic Plan states that transportation, not storage is the critical military value factor. As you have heard, DDMT is located in the industry**

**accepted transportation capital of the U.S. Why, therefore, was the DLA military analysis structured to ensure that DDMT received only 20 out of 2000 possible points for transportation resources?**

**The DLA's Concept of Operations requires that it be able to support two Major Regional Conflicts by using both coasts. Prior to BRAC 95, Defense Depot Memphis was the primary warfighting depot during the only major regional conflict since Vietnam - Operation Desert Storm. To date, DLA has not included a mobilization plan to determine how it would provide support without the capabilities provided by Defense Depot Memphis.**

**With respect to Joint-Service decisions and Excess Capacity, even though the DLA negotiated with the Air Force and Navy for extra storage space, the DLA has**

**admitted there will be a shortfall as the result of the closure of a maintenance depot. I believe this shortfall requires requires DLA to reassess its future capacity requirements and whether or not it can afford the closure of a stand-alone depot like Memphis.**

**In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I ask you to go beyond mere cost considerations in your decisions on our defense distribution system. I ask that you consider the human and economic consequences of displacing a community with disproportionately high unemployment rates. As important, I ask the Commission to fully consider the unmatched military value of DDMT. Thank you.**

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES SENATOR FRED THOMPSON  
TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
JUNE 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission:

First, let me say that I applaud the efforts of the Department of Defense and the Base Closure and Realignment Commission to streamline our nation's defense system.

However, the closure of Defense Distribution Depot Memphis -- DDMT -- would hurt, not help our country's defense structure.

As my colleagues will tell you, Memphis and DDMT have the things that are needed when it comes to serving our troops and emergency operations in the field and at home.

From World War II to Desert Storm, the Memphis Depot has a proven record of service and continues to provide top support to our men and women in uniform. It has accomplished this through DDMT's highly automated and functional facility. The goods are delivered efficiently because, as many national and international companies know, Memphis' excellent transportation system and central location have helped make it America's distribution center.

At a time when the private sector finds Memphis such an appealing place to set up business, why is the Defense Department recommending that one of its prime logistics centers be closed in the very same city?

Part of DOD's recommendations entail lessening the amount of capacity in its storage system. As its current closure list stands, there would be a 22 million cubic foot shortfall in storage requirements. The Defense Logistics Agency has stated that the Air Force logistic centers -- ALCs -- coupled with direct vendor deliver, would make up that shortfall.

As you know, the Air Force never addressed the need to close any of its maintenance depots, or ALCs and the commission is presently examining their role in future military operations. This calls into question DLA's reliance on this space, especially if any of the air logistic centers are closed.

We, the members of the Tennessee delegation, are convinced that if any of the ALCs are closed that DLA will need more storage capacity. The closure of even the smallest ALC will result in a 17.8 million cubic foot shortfall in the Defense Department's storage and material handling capacity.

Only a depot like DDMT can fulfill the requirement for storage space and material handling facilities DOD will need. The Memphis depot's transportation assets and central location are exceptional in comparison to any other DLA facility.

Even though DLA claims that its movement towards a direct vendor delivery system will help facilitate many of its future capacity needs, this system has never been proven in war time.

In fact, most vendors are small to medium sized businesses which do not have a wide range of transportation capabilities. Most vendors also do not have the warehousing abilities that the depot system provides.

Distribution Depot Memphis is a vital link between contractor and soldier for those vendors who cannot ship directly to the troops. While direct vendor delivery is an option for distributing goods to our military men and women, the customers -- our American troops -- could be placed in jeopardy if a direct vendor system were fully in place. DLA has observed that this could be a problem and that an intermediary depot would be required to meet military needs.

In summary, I ask the commission to reconsider fully the Air Force and DLA's base closing procedures. There appear to be many shortcomings and the timely delivery of military supplies could be threatened.

It must be made clear that the Memphis depot is the only DLA depot that has the combination of a central location, automated facility, and exceptional transportation assets to meet the needs of our military and other emergency operations.


It was Defense Depot Memphis and its 1,300 employees that helped ship supplies to relief workers in Oklahoma City the day of federal building bombing disaster. During Operation Desert Storm, it was DDMT that was the number one shipper of supplies to our troops in the Persian Gulf.

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee must be retained. It has a proven record of service to our men and women in the military and to the people of this country. Closing the Memphis Depot will mean the loss of a valuable resource to our nation's military.

Thank you for this opportunity to present our case, and I ask that you please consider these points in the weeks ahead as the Commission formulates its final list for the President.

# Bill Frist

UNITED STATES SENATOR • TENNESSEE



**TESTIMONY OF U.S. SENATOR BILL FRIST  
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING  
June 13, 1995**

MR. CHAIRMAN, Commissioners, thank you for this opportunity to testify in support of the Defense Depot in Memphis, Tennessee.

Mr. Chairman, as I hope the testimony given today by myself and my colleagues will demonstrate, the Memphis Depot is critical to the efficient and effective distribution of matériel to our Nation's Armed Forces. So critical, in fact, that I believe the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will not be able to meet its distribution requirements in times of war or contingency operations if the current plan to disestablish the Memphis Depot is upheld.

Mr. Chairman, under the current plan, the DLA will distribute and store military supplies through two primary distribution sites on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. However, such a plan leaves a vast and disturbing gap in coverage and service for the central United States.

Moreover, as was dramatically demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War, coastal PDS sites cannot support CONUS (continental U.S.) facilities as efficiently as can a centrally located distribution site.

During both Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, goods shipped from the coasts were backed up almost to the point of "gridlock" -- to use Admiral Straw's word -- while DDMT experienced no difficulty at all in getting its goods shipped to military users.

In fact, not only was the Memphis Depot ranked number one in matériel support for our Nation's fighting forces in the Gulf, but it has subsequently participated in every major military and humanitarian mission undertaken by the Department of Defense.

DDMT is the closest depot to the largest concentration of our military forces, and ten of the top fifteen U.S. water ports are located on the Gulf of Mexico, in close proximity to DDMT.

Not only does it have the ability to support the Southern Hemisphere and the rest of the Western World, but is a primary distribution site and third partner to the coastal DLA depots which service the European and Pacific Rim outport requirements.

-more-

Mr. Chairman, by both quantitative and qualitative measures, DDMT is superior to other depots.

- Thanks to its centralized location and Depot capabilities, DDMT provides truck services to 115 U.S. installations of 100 persons or more.

It has the ability to outreach and service by truck 66 percent of active duty CONUS military personnel within 48 hours. And 700,000 troops, or 42 percent of all CONUS-based military personnel can be supported within a 24-hour period.

In terms of transportation infrastructure, the Memphis Depot is also unparalleled, as demonstrated by the fact that many major national and international corporations have moved their distribution centers to Memphis in recent years.

- Not only is it located on both East-West and North-South interstates, it is home to 200 trucking companies;
- It sits at the crossroads of six Class 1 railroads with 96 freight trains arriving and departing daily, and has unrivaled intermodal capability;
- It boasts the world's second largest cargo airport with nine airlines, 44 carriers and, unlike other facilities which often close due to inclement weather, -- it has minimal constraints imposed by weather conditions.

It also has two military air terminals.

- As America's second largest inland port, with three harbors that handle 11 million tons of cargo annually, Memphis is home to six commercial barge lines and can accommodate ocean-going ships ten months out of every year.

Mr. Chairman, the Defense Logistics Agency's "Coastal PDS Strategy" has the advantage of simplicity. This approach might even be adequate were the DLA a commercial entity that only has to meet the usual demands and deadlines of commercial traffic.

However, the DLA is not a commercial entity but rather the one agency responsible for supplying America's fighting forces in times of peace as well as war. At such times the movement of matériel -- both within the U.S. and across the globe -- is critical, and missteps or miscalculations can and do mean lives.

We must be absolutely certain that the Depot that is chosen can support our military forces, and Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, that is why I ask you to reconsider the decision to disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot in Memphis, Tennessee.


Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time, and yield to Senator Thompson.

# Document Separator



# MAP NO. 44

## TEXAS



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Directorate for Information  
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# NOTES

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# Document Separator

STATEMENT BEFORE THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Senator Russell D. Feingold

June 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon, Commissioners, thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to you today about the 440th Air Reserve Unit at Mitchell Airport.

I have always been a strong supporter of the base closure process. Since 1993 I have worked to close Wisconsin's only Naval installation in the state, Project ELF, the Extremely Low Frequency communications system. I have introduced legislation, and I wrote to you, advocating that it be placed on the list for consideration for closure. In my view, ELF exemplifies an installation whose mission is of little -- if any -- military strategic value, and therefore should be closed.

The 440th Airlift wing, on the other hand, has time and time again demonstrated its strategic value as a part of our nation's overall defense forces. Be it during the Persian Gulf War, Haiti, Somalia, or recent and future missions in Bosnia, the men and women of the 440th have consistently served our nation with honor, distinction, and excellence.

You have heard from Senator Kohl about the unprecedented number of military honors the 440th has received in recognition of its training levels and preparedness. I believe that a primary reason the 440th has met with such incredible success is the

quality of the reservists who serve there.

I want to review for the Commission some of the notable achievements of the 440th's recruiting operation.

First, the 440th is a recognized leader for excellence in Air Force Reserve recruiting. As you all know, it is important that reserve units be staffed at over 100 percent to ensure that they can be relied upon to do their job, which is to back up the active duty in any case. Few bases can do that consistently. But the staffing levels of the 440th have been over 100 percent 9 of the last 10 years. For the reserves, this is not excess staffing: it is assurance that the 440th has the personnel strength to activate for any mission, anywhere at anytime.

Second, as Wisconsin's federal Air Force installation, the 440th draws reservists from every one of the nine congressional districts in the state, ensuring full support for its mission.

Third, with the regional hubs of both the United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express located at Mitchell Field, the 440th has a large pool of trained pilots, loadmasters and mechanics from which they successfully recruit.

Recruiting is a critical element to the readiness of any reserve

unit. The 440th has demonstrated that their recruiting efforts far outdistance those of any other C-130 reserve unit. I know some of you heard this fact repeatedly during the site visit to the 440th and at the regional hearing last week in Chicago.

The 440th airlift wing also provides essential support for other federal agencies in the Midwest. As you consider its future, I want to point out the concurrent negative impact closing the 440th would have on other government agencies.

First, the 440th is the headquarters of the regional personnel office that currently services a seven state region -- including Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Colorado, and Oregon. If the 440th closed, this function, and the related personnel, would have to be duplicated at another site, so there would not be a net savings to closure.

Second, the 440th is a regional Federal Communications Center, and is the only authorized provider of satellite and classified messages to other military and law enforcement agencies including DOD, FBI, DOT, DOE, Secret Service, and FEMA. It would be problematic for those agencies were the 440th's communications center to be terminated.

Third, the 440th is a Regional National Disaster Medical System site, tasked with providing emergency airlift services,

casualty triage processing, and as a medical disaster communications hub in times of national crisis.

It is clear that our nation cannot afford to lose the many functions that the 440th now provides for our national security. There can be no doubt this unit plays a serious strategic role in our nation's defense. The Air Force has time and time again recognized the military value of the 440th.

For these reasons, the Air Force has indicated that it does not want to close the 440th. Further, as you all know, the Department of Defense did not even recommend this unit for consideration for closure.

The State of Wisconsin is proud of the accomplishments of the members of the 440th Airlift wing and remains wholly committed to keeping this unit in Milwaukee. It has demonstrated quality, superiority, and strategic value that should not be lost. I hope the Commission will concur.

# Document Separator

CONGRESSMAN COMBEST TESTIMONY  
FOR  
BRAC CONGRESSIONAL HEARING  
(3:19-3:24 p.m., 13 June 1995)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, I know how seriously you take your role on this Commission. That is why I know that you appreciate the serious impact of closing any Undergraduate Pilot Training base because pilot training is at the very core of our military readiness. Closing Reese Air Force Base would be a serious, costly mistake.

You are being asked to make a close call here.

Your inclination might well be to follow the Air Force recommendations. However, as your own BRACC staff have confirmed, the Air Force data was flawed and the wrong recommendation was made: Reese does NOT belong at the bottom of the list. Had the Air Force data been correct, then another base would be on the bottom and your decision might be made amid less murky circumstances.

I recall very clearly that Commissioner Davis expressed a concern at the May 10th hearing that the Commission not cut back too far in

the area of pilot training.

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is going to need all its pilot training capacity to fulfill the Pilot Training Requirements of the Air Force into the 21st Century. If in the future the Air Force needs to re-open a base you recommend for closure, re-opening it will cost 8 times more than the estimated savings of closing.

The initial perception was that the Air Force had excess capacity in Pilot Training

Requirements and one Undergraduate Pilot

Training base could be closed. However,

both the Navy and the Air Force have begun to revise their future training projections --- their pilot training requirements are going up.

One reason is the forecast demand for 51,000 pilots in civilian aviation in just 9 years as massive numbers of pilots begin to retire.

Also, retention rates in all the services are going down. With a big hiring binge by the airlines, the Air Force and the Navy will lose pilots by the hundreds. Additionally, the needs of the Air National Guard will increase demand on Air Force training.

There is no margin for error if Reese AFB is closed.

If Pilot Training Requirements turn out to be higher than were projected a year or more ago, then the Air Force will be in the very dilemma that General Davis described.

I urge the Commission to press the Air Force on this question and projected requirements.

It is my understanding that there may be a much larger requirement for pilots than originally projected.

There are five clear reasons you should reject

the recommendation to close Reese AFB:

\* **FIRST:** Reese has a higher Military value than other UPT bases which will be retained.

Your own staff revealed this fact in their analysis that ranked Reese ahead of two other

UPT bases (Vance and Randolph). Their analysis proved that there were substantial errors in the Air Force/DoD analysis.

\* **SECOND:** Quality of Life is the key to retaining quality professional military

personnel, and retention is one of the keys to

readiness.

- Any successful business that prides itself on attracting and retaining quality people looks for a location that provides a quality lifestyle: plentiful housing, excellent medical facilities, jobs for spouses, easy access with an international airport, and outstanding educational opportunities.

Reese Air Force Base had the highest rating of any base in the Air Force in regards to quality of life.

- \* THIRD: DoD tells Congress that Housing

is one of the most important elements of

☛ Quality of Life. Their military doctrine is that

"We enlist soldiers, but we RE-enlist

families." Retention is 15% higher at bases

with good housing. Reese has spent millions

of dollars to ensure they have the finest

housing of any UPT base. This is an asset

☛ that cannot be ignored and cannot be matched

without considerable cost.

\* FOURTH: It is a sad but indisputable fact,

proven again just recently at Sheppard AFB,

that flying/training is a dangerous business,

☛ but it need not be a hazard for innocent

civilians if we pay special attention to

encroachment. Both of the bases with less military value than Reese, have encroachment problems that place homes, businesses, and public places in the direct path of daily training operations. By contrast, Reese does not have an encroachment problem.

FIFTH and LAST ((I promise)): Reese is the Air Force's premier Undergraduate Pilot Training Base:

- First to receive the T-1 trainer
- first and only with joint Navy training
- first to receive the new JPATS aircraft.

Reese is also the number one base of

☹ preference of Student and Instructor Pilots in the Air Education and Training Command.

Our young men and women in the Air Force vote to keep Reese every day by choosing to serve at Reese.

☹ Ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, as I said this is a close call.

Reese should not be closed:

The data is flawed and the planning assumption is clearly wrong.

☹ Thank you for your time and attention.

# KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON

UNITED STATES SENATOR • TEXAS



For immediate release

June 13, 1995

Contact: Missi Tessier 202 224-9782

## **SENATOR HUTCHISON MAKES CASE FOR TEXAS BASES**

Saying that "Texans support the military because we believe a strong national defense will preserve our freedom," U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison today led the Texas congressional delegation in making the case for keeping its military installations open to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC).

Citing recent analyses of U.S. readiness by top military officials, Senator Hutchison urged the Commission to review its initial recommendations to close Brooks AFB, Kelly AFB, Reese AFB and Laughlin AFB and the Red River Army Depot.

Senator Hutchison argued that in its haste to eliminate "excess capacity" at the Air Force installations, the Commission may harm the readiness of U.S. forces.

"If we err, our national security demands that we err on the side of excess capacity, for it is excess capacity that provides the margin of error to prevail and with fewer casualties," the Senator said. "To err on the side of cutting it too close will prove costly both in terms of lives and dollars because we cannot prevail in combat with few casualties if the force is too small. And we will hardly be able to afford to re-open infrastructure once it is closed."

The Senator cited specific key characteristics of the Texas bases to urge their retention, including:

- Laughlin AFB is "the Air Force's premier undergraduate pilot training base";

- Brooks AFB's new cantonment proposal is "the most innovative proposal on the table before the Commission and should be rewarded for innovation, excellence and efficiency";

- Reese AFB is "the clear first choice of pilots and instructors and its quality of life is superior to any";

###MORE###

- Kelly AFB's role as a depot cannot be replaced without prohibitive cost. Moving C-5 maintenance and replicating C-5 hangars would cost an additional \$275 million; and

- Red River Army Depot must be looked at in terms of capacity and readiness. If Red River is closed, "there will be no surge capacity in the event of an emergency."

"We come to you to say that our bases in Texas are the best," the Senator concluded. "Our communities adopt and support them to keep them the best. And our Members of Congress support the funding to make them what they are."

####

GREG LAUGHLIN  
TESTIMONY BEFORE BRAC  
JUNE 13, 1995

The 1986 Goldwater/Nichols Act mandates combined commands and joint operations between the various branches of the armed forces.

These joint operations are not only required during times of war but also for joint training exercises in times of peace.

This training can best be accomplished at either joint use bases or at bases which are located in close proximity to one another.

If we continue to close Air Force Bases which are close to Army Posts, we decrease the training time and joint opportunities and increase the cost of joint exercises.

This can cost us dramatically more in the long run by an ill-prepared military, than any short term cost savings we might achieve by ill-conceived base closings.

With Ft. Hood, the army's largest installation, only 50 miles away, Bergstrom Air Reserve Station is ideally suited for joint operations.

The Air Force Reserve's 924th Fighter Wing currently flies in a quarter of all joint training exercises at Ft. Hood each year.

In addition, these two organizations have twice deployed together to the National Training Center for "Air Warrior" exercises.

These Close Air Support (CAS) and Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) operations provide both services with the live training necessary for top combat preparedness.

Without Bergstrom Air Reserve Station, Ft. Hood's actual training time will be greatly curtailed and the Army's training costs will be greatly increased.

In addition to these joint training opportunities, the 924th trains in numerous Military Operating Areas, air refueling tracks, Military Training Routes and bombing ranges in the area.

These provide the 924th with invaluable training in aerial refueling, surface attack tactics, Low Altitude Awareness Training and aerial combat.

Few organizations in the Air Force have access to such an array of excellent training areas as does the 924th.

The unit thus is able to plan and execute missions encompassing the elements and skills required in realistic combat scenarios.

The excellent training opportunities in central Texas are only surpassed by the facilities and opportunities found on Bergstrom Air Reserve Station itself.

The 302 acre cantonment area has an existing wet ramp and hangers originally built for KC-135 aircraft.

Nowadays, these facilities are used to accommodate several squadrons of fighter, tanker, or transport aircraft.

Existing buildings can accommodate the support personnel and equipment of additional units.

In addition, there is adequate open space for growth of support facilities or ramp space.

Currently, there are only two Air Force Reserve facilities located in air quality attainment areas.

Bergstrom Air Reserve Station is one of those.

Flight and training operations and unit growth, long taken for granted at Bergstrom, can be hampered or even curtailed at other facilities which are located in non-attainment areas.

Austin is proud of its environmental quality and works hard to maintain it.

For the past three years, the 924th consistently has led other Air Force Reserve units in recruiting.

The latest data available showed nearly 100% manning for two years in a row.

Central Texas is an ideal location for recruiting with a highly educated population, over 200,000 students, numerous AFROTC and AFJROTC units, many high tech and defense manufacturers, and thousands of military retirees, families and support organizations.

At a time when we face base closures such as this, we must question the larger issue of priorities.

It is ironic that at the same time we discuss closing vital bases such as Bergstrom ARS, the American taxpayer pays billions of dollars to subsidize our allies' defense by keeping overseas bases open.

Instead of closing Bergstrom ARS, we should close bases overseas which originally were built, and are still being kept, to counter a Soviet threat which no longer exists.

Finally, it seems incredible that so many Air Force Reserve bases and units have been added to the closure consideration list while not a single Air National Guard unit was also added.

Is this oddity the result of sober deliberation, or is it rather the product of naked political maneuvering?

This appears to run directly counter to the very reason the BRAC procedure was developed in the first place.

The citizens of the 14th Congressional District join those of the 10th District in urging the Commission to keep the 924th Fighter Wing, 10th Air Force headquarters and other ancillary units operating at Bergstrom Air Reserve Station.

*Green*

TUESDAY, JUNE 13

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK BEFORE YOU TODAY REGARDING THE 301ST FW AT JRB FORT WORTH. I ALSO A COMPREHENSIVE REBUTTAL OF AUSTIN'S ATTACKS ON JRB FORT WORTH I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT FOR THE RECORD TODAY.

BUT FIRST, REGARDING THE AFEWES FACILITY IN FORT WORTH TEXAS RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT TO EDWARDS AFB. I HAVE SOME QUESTIONS AND ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT REGARDING SOME OF THE DATA USED. ANY DECISION WE MAKE REGARDING AFEWES, THAT DEVELOPS AND TESTS ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY -- A NEED DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE SHOOTING DOWN OF OUR F-16 PILOT OVER BOSNIA -- IS VERY IMPORTANT AND I URGE THE COMMISSION TO REVIEW THIS CAREFULLY.

REGARDING JRB FORT WORTH'S MILITARY VALUE, NO LESS OF AN AUTHORITY THAN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GEN. SHALI HAS INTERCEDED ON OUR BEHALF, STATING IN PART THAT "THE JRB...AT FORT WORTH...OFFERS A PRIME OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THE VIABILITY OF JOINT BASING...[AND]...HOLDS GREAT PROMISE FOR STREAMLINING OUR INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENHANCING JOINT OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS." REGARDING BERGRSTROM, GEN. SHALI ALSO WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE "CINCS, CHIEFS OF THE SERVICES AND I REVIEWED THE AF PROPOSAL TO CLOSE..[BERGSTROM].. AND DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD NOT IMPAIR OUR ABILITY TO EXECUTE THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEBBIE LEE ALSO SENT YOU A LETTER STATING IN PART THAT IT WAS "IMPERATIVE" THAT THE 301ST REMAIN A PART OF JRB FTW.

I WOULD LIKE TO DIGRESS BECAUSE CONCERN HAS BEEN RAISED THAT THERE WAS SOME KIND OF A "COMMITMENT" OR "PROMISE" MADE TO AUSTIN THAT GOES BEYOND THAT STIPULATED IN THE 93 BRAC REPORT.

ALTHOUGH COMMISSIONER COX SAID DURING HER RECENT SITE VISIT THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER AN ISSUE, I WANTED TO ADDRESS IT BECAUSE SOME MISPERCEPTIONS STILL MAY EXIST.

WE HAVE PROVIDED ALL OF THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL TO THOSE STAFF AND COMMISSIONERS PRESENT IN FORT WORTH LAST SATURDAY. BUT, I WOULD LIKE TO REFERENCE A FEW KEY POINTS:

FIRST, AUSTIN'S PLAN TO MOVE OUT OF ITS CENTER CITY CONGESTED AIRPORT DID NOT COMMENCE WITH BRAC AND NOR WAS IT BASED ON BRAC 91 OR 93. THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO MOVE THEIR AIRPORT FOR 20 YEARS:

SECOND, BACK TO THE "ALLEGED COMMITMENT." IN SPITE OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF BRAC 93, THERE IS CONCERN THAT SOME IN AUSTIN UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AIR FORCE PLANNED TO REMAIN AT BERGSTROM BEYOND 1996 AND HAD RELIED TO THEIR DETRIMENT ON THIS UNDERSTANDING. WHO MIGHT THAT BE?

IN FEBRUARY 1995, BRUCE TODD, MAYOR OF AUSTIN SENT A LETTER TO THE DOD COMPLAINING ABOUT THE IMPENDING CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION. YET, IN THAT VERY LETTER HE ALSO STATES:

"THE CITY HAS BEEN ABIDING BY THE DECISION OF BRAC II AND II WHICH COMMITTED THE 924TH TO AUSTIN AT THE SITE OF OUR NEW AIRPORT AT LEAST UNTIL SEPTEMBER 30, 1996."

SO, IF SOME IN AUSTIN SO MISUNDERSTOOD, AT LEAST IT WASN'T MAYOR TODD. OUR FORMER COLLEAGUE CONGRESSMAN JAKE PICKLE, WHO LED THE SUCCESSFUL AUSTIN EFFORT IN BRAC 93 ALSO UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE THE CASE, SAYING IN THE APRIL 29TH 1994 AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN:

"THE PENTAGON IS COMMITTED TO KEEPING THE UNIT HERE AT LEAST THROUGH 1996."

SO NOW WE KNOW THAT NEITHER THE MAYOR NOR THE CONGRESSMAN MISUNDERSTOOD. WHAT ABOUT THE CITY COUNCIL?

THE CITY COUNCIL PASSED A RESOLUTION ON AUGUST 1ST 1991 THAT SETS OUT THE COUNCIL'S CONDITIONS FOR THE MOVE AND THEY ARE VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD, WHICH I PARAPHRASE:

- 1: THE TRANSFER OF LAND & FACILITIES FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO AUSTIN;
- 2: APPROVAL OF A MASTERPLAN BY THE FAA AND;
- 3: THAT THE PROJECT BE AFFORDABLE, SUITABLE, ETC.

THREE THINGS HAPPEN AND AUSTIN GOES TO BERGSTROM. PERIOD.  
THAT'S IT. NO MENTION OF THE RESERVES. ALSO, THE OMISSION OF  
THE RESERVES WASN'T AN OVERSIGHT BECAUSE ON THE VERY SAME DAY,  
THE COUNCIL PASSED ANOTHER RESOLUTION, URGING THE RESERVES TO  
STAY. THEIR CONDITIONS FOR THE MOVE WERE IN THE FIRST  
RESOLUTION, THEIR HOPES WERE IN THE SECOND.

THE PUBLIC RECORD IS CLEAR THAT NEITHER THE MAYOR NOR THE COUNCIL  
RELIED ON THE RESERVES WHEN IT MADE THE DECISION TO MOVE. SO  
THEY'RE OK. ANY OTHERS?

THE CITY OF AUSTIN COMMISSIONED A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR MASTER  
PLAN BY THE CONSULTING FIRM OF PEAT MARWICK TO STUDY THE  
BERGSTROM MOVE.

THE PLAN WAS COMPLETED IN MAY 1993, AND, IN DESCRIBING THE ROLE  
THAT THE RESERVES PLAYED, THE PROJECT DIRECTOR TOLD THE AUSTIN  
AMERICAN STATESMAN ON MARCH 12TH 1993 -- DIRECTLY CONTRADICTING  
MAYOR TODD'S OWN SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON APRIL  
19 OF THIS YEAR -- THE FOLLOWING:

"HAVING THE RESERVES DID NOT INFLUENCE ANY MAJOR DECISIONS  
DURING THE MASTER PLAN PROCESS...THE RESERVES SHOULDN'T BE  
THE GOVERNING FACTOR...[AND THAT] ANY EFFECT ON WORK ALREADY  
DONE ON THE PROPOSED NEW AIRPORT WOULD BE MINOR"

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, THE MAY 1993 STUDY ALSO SHOWS THAT AUSTIN  
PLANS TO EXPAND A NEW PASSENGER TERMINAL RIGHT INTO THE HEART OF

THE PROPOSED RESERVES CANTONMENT THEY CLAIM TO BE PLANNING THEIR ENTIRE AIRPORT AROUND.

ANOTHER POINT: SOME HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT AUSTIN HAS SOLD \$400 MILLION IN BONDS IN RELIANCE ON AN ALLEGED "PROMISE" AND DESPITE WHAT THE MAYOR, THE CONGRESSMAN, THE COUNCIL AND THE MILLION DOLLAR CONSULTANT KNEW OTHERWISE, A REFERENDUM WENT FORWARD. WELL, REGARDING THOSE BONDS, ACCORDING TO THE TEXAS STATE COMPTROLLER, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED.

NOT ONE PENNY!

NOW ON TO THE FAMOUS BOATRIGHT "PROMISE."

THE CITY OF AUSTIN HAS ASSERTED REPEATEDLY THAT ON FEBRUARY 21 1992 BEFORE THE AUSTIN CITY COUNCIL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES BOATRIGHT MADE A PROMISE TO LEAVE THE RESERVES AT BERGSTROM AND THAT AS A RESULT, A \$400 MILLION REFERENDUM WAS AUTHORIZED.

AUSTIN'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE "PROMISE" WEIGHED HEAVILY IN THE FINAL DELIBERATIONS FOR BRAC 93. IN FACT, THIS BOATRIGHT "PROMISE" IS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE AUSTIN ARGUMENT, REPEATED OVER AND OVER IN BRAC 93 AND AGAIN ON APRIL 19TH AND MAY 10TH 1995 WHEN THEY QUOTE THIS BOATRIGHT "STATEMENT" AS EVIDENCE OF THIS PROMISE.

BUT MR. BOATRIGHT DID NOT STOP THERE -- AS SOME MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED BY THE WAY IT WAS PRESENTED BY AUSTIN. BUT WE CAN TAKE COMFORT IN KNOWING THAT THE MAYOR, THE COUNCIL, AND THEIR MILLION

DOLLAR CONSULTANT WERE AT THAT COUNCIL MEETING AND DID HEAR THE REST OF THE STORY. AND WHAT IS THE REST OF THE STORY? HE WAS VERY CAREFUL TO QUALIFY THE DISCUSSION SAYING:

"I NEED TO ADD ADDITIONAL COMMENT....WE CANNOT MAKE A LONG TERM COMMITMENT ON THAT RESERVE UNIT. I CAN EVER SIT HERE AND TELL YOU THAT THAT RESERVE UNIT WILL STAY HERE FOREVER."

HE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE CLEAR.  
THERE WAS NO "PROMISE."

NOW, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, AS I NOTED AT THE BEGINNING, AUSTIN HAS BEEN TRYING TO MOVE ITS AIRPORT OUT OF ITS CONGESTED CENTRAL CITY LOCATION FOR 20 YEARS. THE FIRST STUDY WE FOUND WAS DATED 1975. IN 1987, AUSTIN VOTERS APPROVED A MOVE TO NEARBY MANOR, TEXAS AND IN 1989 AUSTIN APPROVED A \$30 MILLION BOND SALE FOR THIS PURPOSE. BUT, THE MOVE TO BERGSTROM HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE RESERVES.

WHEN SECRETARY CHENEY PUT BERGSTROM ON THE ABORTIVE 1990 CLOSURE LIST, IT WAS MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE THE BRAC 91 DECISION AND SOME 21 MONTHS BEFORE THE FAMOUS BOATRIGHT "PROMISE." THE CITY HALTED WORK ON THE MANOR SITE IN APRIL 1990 AND SHIFTED TOWARD BERGSTROM. WHY? SIMPLE. IT SAVED \$108 MILLION. THE DECISION WAS BASED ON A GOOD OLD FASHIONED PRINCIPLE: IT WAS CHEAPER.

IN SUMMARY, WAS A "PROMISE" MADE THAT REQUIRES SPECIAL  
CONSIDERATION OF BERGSTROM AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE NORMAL BRAC  
PROCESS? NO! AND, THE MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL KNOW OTHERWISE.

THE PUBLIC RECORD IS CLEAR.

THERE WAS NO "PROMISE," OR A "COMMITMENT" BEYOND 1996.

AND THERE WAS NO RELIANCE.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION: BRAC 93 CREATED JOINT RESERVE BASE  
FORT WORTH AND GAVE US, AS TAXPAYERS, AND THE MILITARY A GOLDEN  
OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP THE FIRST TRULY JOINT RESERVE BASE AND  
SAVE MONEY AT THE SAME TIME. IT IS THE MODEL FOR THE FUTURE. I  
URGE YOU TO CONTINUE WHAT BRAC 93 STARTED AND RETAIN THE 301ST  
FIGHTER WING HERE AT NAS FORT WORTH JRB. LET THIS SUCCESS, A  
BRAC SUCCESS, CONTINUE.

**TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN JOE BARTON**  
**BEFORE THE**  
**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
**June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and Commission members, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding the recommendations of the 1995 Base Closure Commission. I would like to address the proposed deactivation of the 301st Air Force Reserve unit at NAS Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base (NAS FW JRB).

The problem with the idea of the Base Closure Commission moving the 301st is that it will not close a base it actually keeps one open. It won't save money, it will cost 16 and a half million dollars more. Deactivating the 301st would result in NO base closure, NO base closure savings and would cost the American Taxpayer millions each and every year for as far as the eye can see.

Base operations and overhead at the NAS FW JRB must continue with or without the 301st. In fact, other units at the JRB must pick up support contributions that are now the responsibility of the 301st. For example, over \$1.2 million has been identified as potential costs that the Navy must pick up. Deactivating the 301st is a force structure issue. DOD analysis correctly shows that such an action would **never** result in a pay back.

On the contrary, closing Bergstrom and moving the 10th Air Force Headquarters to the NAS FW JRB results in **complete closure of a DOD installation**. The action would have an immediate, or one year pay back. Annual recurring savings would continue in the amount of approximately \$4.5 million. This \$4.5 million is understated due to substantial annual savings associated with joint training and operations at the Joint Reserve Base.

At the request of the BRAC, COBRA models were run on May 5, 1995 and May 10, 1995, that compared 1) deactivating the 301st at NAS FW JRB, and 2) closing Bergstrom and moving the 10th Air Force Headquarters to NAS FW JRB. This focus is based on comparison with Bergstrom, since Bergstrom is the DOD recommendation for closure. The DOD analysis shows closing Bergstrom to clearly be the most cost-effective. The COBRA models confirm that closing a base saves more money than not closing a base. It's not even a close call.

The first item the COBRA models looked at was the net one time cost. The net total one time cost to deactivate the 301st at NAS FW JRB would be \$20,946,000. The total one time cost to close Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force Headquarters to NAS FW JRB would be \$4,362,000. Therefore, the net total savings to close Bergstrom versus deactivating the 301st would be \$16,584,000. This is a substantial savings, especially in light of the current restraints on the federal budget.

The second big area the COBRA models evaluated was the annual recurring steady state savings. The steady state savings to close Bergstrom and move the 10th AF would be \$17,666,000. The steady state savings to deactivate the 301st at NAS FW JRB would be \$13,195,000. Therefore, the annual recurring savings to close Bergstrom is the net difference of the two steady state savings or \$4,471,000. In addition, there will be substantial savings due to joint training and operations that are not reflected in the \$4,471,000 figure. Areas where additional savings could occur include deployment savings, billeting savings and on-going fine tuning of cost sharing.

Deactivating the 301st at NAS Fort Worth JRB results in NO base closure, NO base closure savings and NEVER pays back. Instead there will be recurring costs to DOD in that the remaining NAS FW JRB units will pick up the fixed overhead costs and there will be redundant overhead at another stand alone base. This action will jeopardize the model Joint Reserve Base established by BRAC 93.

Another issue I would like to address concerns the supposed "promise" to Austin and reliance on that promise. Austin Mayor Todd and the Austin delegation represented that somehow the Air Force made a promise about locating the Air Force Reserve unit at the Bergstrom site. Congressman Geren and others have clearly shown that there was no promise or commitment

beyond 1996. Additionally, during her site visit to NAS FW JRB, Commissioner Cox assured me that the "promise" was no longer an issue for BRAC 95.

Another claim of the Austin group is that there was reliance on the promise. They would have you believe that Austin adjusted the planning of their airport around the presence of the Air Force Reserves. The fact is that Austin designed the optimum airport and then fit the reserves within that optimum airport.

Austin wants only one thing, the economic advantages of a Bergstrom location for a civilian airport, which they have wanted since at least 1975. I commend Austin for making good business decisions and putting their airport at the best and least costly location. However, I am concerned that Austin may have misrepresented how much of a factor the Air Force Reserves were in making that decision.

Some of you may know I am an engineer by training, so I am somewhat familiar with airport layouts and planning. There are about three or four major elements that go into configuring an airport: 1) runway location and spacings, 2) passenger terminal locations, 3) air cargo and freight operations, and 4) general aviation and FBO operations.

In reviewing the Austin Airport layout plan, it is clear that the Airport planners selected the best locations for all of the above elements and then the other Airport elements, including the Reserve component, were located to fit within the resulting framework. In fact, on March 12, 1993, the City's consultant stated that, "The City's instructions to us were to plan the best airport we could and that the reserves shouldn't be the governing factor."

Austin would have you believe that the runway spacing was affected by the Reserves. According to the Final Master Plan Report for the Austin Airport at Bergstrom, the runways are spaced 6,700 feet apart to 1) allow for dual instrument operations in poor weather conditions which gives the best overall operational flexibility, and 2) allow the "greatest flexibility for development of the central terminal facility." The location of the Reserves was made to fit within the Airport layout dictated by the above mentioned functions.

Additionally, the report clearly states that the north alternative was selected because it is less expensive, has much more convenient access to the traveling public, and can take advantage of existing aircraft parking areas, not because it would best suit the Reserves. In fact, the Reserves are not even mentioned in the location analysis.

In conclusion, Austin had no promise and there is no reliance on an

alleged promise. Austin elected to pursue Bergstrom as a civilian airport not because of any promise made by the Air Force, but because it saves them \$108 million to do so. Based on this same reasoning, NAS FW JRB is the best and least costly location for the Air Force Reserves.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to address this Commission today.

**STATEMENT OF  
Charles W. Stenholm  
BEFORE THE  
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. I want to express my strong support for the excellent military facilities that we have in Texas. Also, I want to make you aware of the primary Defense Department facility in my district, Dyess Air Force Base and the options it makes available to you as you go through the BRAC decision process.

First, I want to express my strong support for Goodfellow Air Force Base located in San Angelo which I represent together with Lamar Smith. Although Goodfellow is in Lamar's district, it is literally across the street from my district line. Therefore, I do represent many of the men and women who work and serve at Goodfellow so I feel it is part of my district.

To call Goodfellow an Air Force Base is a little misleading because it has a proven track record as a joint service training facility. At times, in fact, there may be more Army personnel at Goodfellow than Air Force. I bring this to your attention because of my concerns and efforts to find cost savings in the Federal Budget and my belief that joint missions whenever possible could be helpful

**in finding cost savings in the Defense Budget.**

**In that regard, I would like to see more training missions go to Goodfellow. The City of San Angelo is a good partner to the military and I know they would welcome growth at the base and would actively help accomodate any new needs caused by new missions at the base.**

**As a whole, the people of Texas have proven themselves to be very supportive of our bases and the men and women who serve there. While I am supportive of all Texas facilities, there are two, Reese Air Force Base and Naval Air Station, Joint Reserve Base Ft. Worth (formerly Carswell) currently being considered for closure which I would like to speak to you about. Although these bases are not in my district, I know that they are exceptional bases and encourage the commission to reconsider the decision to close them.**

**Secretary Widnall has stressed the importance of Air Force training and quality of life issues. The decision to close Reese which was ranked the number one base by the Air Force for quality life and which has an excellent training record contradicts previously stated Air Force goals. If Reese does close, I believe the Air Force will regret the decision because it could result in a lack of well trained pilots in the future. Moreover, it is my understanding that mistakes were made in the Air Force/Department of Defense analysis of Reese**

and I believe that it deserves another look and should remain open.

J.R.B. Ft. Worth is another facility that does not warrant closure. The 301st Fighter Wing is not a base closure issue and it will not result in long term cost savings. J.R.B. Ft. Worth is supported by senior Pentagon officials and should be taken off the closure list.

Turning to Dyess Air Force Base, it is the training base for the B-1 bomber and is also the home for two squadrons of C-130s. Until last year, Dyess also handled KC-135 tankers. The Air Force has consistently rated Dyess in Tier 1, one of its best bases. It has excellent infrastructure, almost all of which is in virtually new condition. Dyess has extra capacity available to handle additional aircraft; it has near-perfect flying conditions; and its airfield has no encroachment problems. The base presently has a Primary Aircraft inventory of 60 and could handle about 40 more. I would also like to mention that Dyess is in an attainment area under the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, additional aircraft could be relocated there without raising any air pollution concerns.

I understand that the Commission is considering several scenarios which would relocate KC-135 tankers or C-130s. Dyess could handle either plane with little or no MILCON cost and would be an excellent location for both assets.

I am aware that the proposal to move tankers to Dyess may not

be consistent with the Air Force's stated "one base, one boss" policy. In fact, the Air Force moved 17 tankers out of Dyess in 1994 solely because of this policy, even though the base has and is capable of handling KC-135 tankers. The combination of B-1s, C-130s and KC-135 tankers at Dyess worked very well there for over 10 years.

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, the need to save money due to budgetary constraints require much greater flexibility in locating different types of aircraft, such as bombers and tankers, at the same base. This "one base, one boss" policy should not be the driving factor in matters involving sound fiscal decisions and operational logic.

In closing ladies and gentlemen, take a good hard look at the Texas installations such as Dyess and Goodfellow Air Force Bases and others. The one common thread is that the people of my State are staunch supporters of defense and have prepared their installations to perform the mission of defense in the United States for the next century. Texas has always trained our troops for conflicts such as World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam and that was a conscientious decision made by our government due to its citizens and location. Thank you.

CONGRESSMAN DICK ARMEY  
26TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEES:  
EDUCATION AND LABOR  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE  
REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE  
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**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-4326**  
June 10, 1995

Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission,

I appreciate the time and effort you will take today in hearing from the various communities regarding the next round of base closure and realignment now being considered.

As you go through this process and give deliberation to this important decision, I wanted to take this opportunity for reviewing the intent of the legislation that created the process. It is critical that we provide a system of national defense that maximizes the use of our scarce resources dedicated to this task.

If an opportunity exists to realign a unit to another facility and this allows for more efficient use of the facility, then we should seize the opportunity. On the other hand, realigning a unit to an area that would otherwise be closed should be a secondary option to leaving that unit in its existing location if the current facility will continue to exist after the Commission completes all other actions.

All of these decisions are to be made irrespective of any considerations other than the efficient, effective deployment capability of our national defense. This is the charge that has been extended to every Commission that has sat where you sit today, and is still the charge before you.

Again, I appreciate the time and effort you have put into this effort and encourage you to continue the tradition set before you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Dick Arme".

DICK ARMEY  
Member of Congress

DA/jlc

Copy

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**Statement of**

**Congressman Jim Chapman (D-TX)**

**Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

**Congressional Hearing**

**June 13, 1995**

Chairman Dixon and BRAC Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of Red River Army Depot and the Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas in my Congressional District. The Red River Defense Complex is a unique installation combining the missions of tracked vehicle maintenance, supply distribution, depot-level maintenance and storage of ammunition and ammo production at the co-located Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant.

By the end of this week, all eight Commissioners will have traveled to Northeast Texas to witness this world-class installation in action. On behalf of the people of the Four States Region -- Arkansans, Oklahomans, Louisianans, and Texans - - I want to thank you for taking the time to see for yourselves the best of the best. The Commission's April 19th regional hearing in Dallas demonstrated conclusively the strong community support the Red River family enjoys. In a few days, you will decide the fate of the people you met in my district. I trust you will keep them -- and their tireless commitment to quality service to the American taxpayer -- very much in mind as you consider alternatives to the Defense Department's recommendations.

CAPACITY. The central issue of Army depots is the issue of excess capacity. Our nation's military force structure has been reduced substantially from its Cold War levels, and appropriate cuts in infrastructure must be made to ensure that defense spending is distributed so that our readiness is not jeopardized by misplaced priorities.

But the flip side to this rule is that we must make sure we retain sufficient military infrastructure to meet our warfighting needs. To paraphrase one of my constituent's statement's from the Dallas hearing: Do we really want to put all our vehicle maintenance "eggs" in one depot "basket"? I think the answer to that question is a resounding NO!

The Army has proposed closing Red River Army Depot, significantly realigning Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania and consolidating all ground vehicle maintenance work at Anniston Army Depot in Alabama. I have contended from the beginning of this process that this plan would overload Anniston and severely impede the ability of the depot system to surge to meet a wartime mobilization. New figures submitted by the Army confirms that assessment.

The Army's TABS Office recently submitted to the Commission its estimated peacetime and wartime vehicle maintenance workload requirements. The Fiscal Year 1999 peacetime workload of 3.2 million manhours exceeds Anniston's capacity of 2.8 million manhours. Also, the wartime workload of 12.9 million manhours

greatly exceeds Anniston's maximum capacity of 4 million manhours. These numbers, which come directly from the Army, strongly support my contention that we must retain two maintenance depots.

RRAD vs. LEAD. I wish no ill will toward the supporters of Letterkenny Army Depot. I know first-hand the terrible burden of trying to prevent a proposed base closure action. But the Commission must make these tough calls. I strongly believe the right call is to retain Red River and realign Letterkenny to Red River and Anniston.

My position is based on two simple factors: military value and cost. Red River's score in the Army's military value assessment is more than double that of Letterkenny. Military value comprises half of the base closure selection criteria, and any closure action must have this factor as its basis.

The other factor is cost. On May 26, the Army submitted to the BRAC revised COBRA numbers that show it would save more money (\$1.262 billion) to realign Letterkenny than it would to close Red River.

You have heard over and over that the Army's numbers are wrong. You've heard from me. In this case, the Army's right: the Army's evaluation that Red River's military value is more than twice that of Letterkenny, and the Army would realize a greater cost savings to close Letterkenny is correct. The Commission should opt to keep Red River open and move Letterkenny's work to Red River and Anniston.

Win-Win. The Red River community has devised a plan to deal with the problem of excess capacity without jeopardizing the knowledge base and expertise that are required to meet wartime needs. This Win-Win proposal follows the concepts recommended by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance Management in April, 1994. We should retain the Army's two most efficient depots (Red River and Anniston), realign Letterkenny's vehicle and missile workload to Red River and Anniston, downsize workload to core warfighting systems while teaming with industry for non-core work and maintaining the distribution mission at Red River. This arrangement will reduce excess capacity while ensuring our ability to meet readiness requirements and preserve the industrial base. Everybody wins with this plan: the Army, private industry and the American taxpayer.

I call on the Commission to focus for a moment on the impact of the Pentagon's recommendation on our local economy. The projected local unemployment of 21.7% that would result from Red River's closure would be a brutal blow from which we may never recover. This is an award-winning installation, the nation's recognized quality leader. The people of Red River, with their

demonstrated commitment to quality and efficiency, have earned the chance to continue to play a vital role in defense of America's national security. I strongly urge you to reject the Army's mistaken recommendation, and take Red River Army Depot and the Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas, off the closure list before you send that list to the President on July 1.


Thank you for your time, and I wish you best regards as you complete the difficult task before you.

# Document Separator



# MAP NO. 45

## UTAH



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

NEWS RELEASE



June 13, 1995

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# ORRIN HATCH

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*United States Senator for Utah*

*Contact: Paul Smith (202)224-9854*

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR ORRIN HATCH  
OF THE  
BASE REALIGNMENT AND  
CLOSURE COMMISSION**

Mr. Chairman, other BRAC Commissioners, let me try to be brief: Hill Air Force Base is simply the best of the best.

\* It is the best operational base, and it is the best depot. Two rating groups came to this conclusion. Their findings have been twice verified by Air Force Under Secretary Rudy DeLeon.

- First, in evaluating the five Air Logistics Centers, for both operational and depot excellence, the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group found that only Hill was rated as "Tier I" in both the operations and depot categories. Hill received 33 out of a maximum of 39 points. Tinker Air Force Base was second with 29 points.

- Second, the Joint Cross Service Group, in evaluating military value, gave Hill

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SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT  
BRAC HEARINGS - JUNE 12, 1995

IF I COULD GIVE SOME ADVICE: **LOOK AT THE NUMBERS.**

I. [ **IT MAKES GOOD BUSINESS SENSE TO KEEP HILL.** ]

WHAT DO THE NUMBERS SAY?

I BELIEVE THE NUMBERS OVERWHELMINGLY SAY THAT HILL SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN. YOU HAVE SOPHISTICATED ANALYSIS, AND YOUR STAFF HAS BEEN SWIMMING IN NUMBERS, BUT I DO WANT TO MENTION A FEW:

- THE AIR FORCE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP RANKED HILL THE HIGHEST OF THE FIVE IN MILITARY VALUE.
- THE RETURN ON INVESTMENT IF HILL WERE CLOSED IS 29 YEARS.
- IN THE AIR FORCE'S ORIGINAL SUBMISSION, THE ONE TIME COST OF CLOSING HILL IS THE HIGHEST AMONG ALC'S AT \$1.418 BILLION.

KEEPING HILL OPEN MAKES GOOD BUSINESS SENSE. THE NUMBERS BACK UP THAT CONTENTION.

**II. [IT NOT ONLY MAKES SENSE TO KEEP HILL OPEN, IT MAKES GOOD BUSINESS SENSE TO CONSOLIDATE TACTICAL MISSILE WORKLOAD TO HILL. ]**

- HILL IS MORE THAN A DEPOT
  - OPERATIONAL WINGS
  - UTAH TEST AND TRAINING RANGE
  - TEST AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
  - MAJOR CORE WORK INCLUDES:
    - ICBM'S & TAC MISSILES AND MUNITIONS  
( HILL HAS 35 YEARS IN MISSILE WORK)
    - LANDING GEAR
    - FIGHTER AND TAC AIR LIFT AIRCRAFT
    - ELECTRONICS AND SIMULATORS
- WORKBASE IS 5.2 MILLION HOURS. THIS GIVES A BROAD BASE TO SPREAD OVERHEAD. MOVING THE MISSILES THERE PROVIDES SAVINGS REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT OF WORK
- COST TO DO WORK IS LESS AT HILL

THERE A MANY WAYS TO ACCOUNT FOR COST. IN TWO DIFFERENT COMPARISONS, DEPOT HOURLY RATES AT HILL ARE CHEAPER IN COMPARISON TO OTHER DEPOTS.

- IN THE DEPOT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS INDICATOR REPORT, HILL IS \$69 COMPARED TO \$101 AT LETTER-KENNEY.
- BASED ON THE COST COMPARABILITY HANDBOOKS AND THE ARMY REPORTED DEPOT HOURLY RATES, HILL WAS \$49, COMPARED TO \$65 AT LETTERKENNY.
- BASED ON THE LATTER FIGURES, THERE WILL BE A MINIMUM COST SAVINGS OF \$15 MILLION PER YEAR

■ COST TO MOVE:

MOVING CURRENT WORK LOAD FROM HILL WILL COST \$12-15 MILLION. **THERE ARE NO REAL SAVINGS** SINCE FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE REMAIN AT HILL WITH OTHER WORK BEING DONE.

■ FACILITIES:

- HILL SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IS IN PLACE;
- HILL STORAGE REQUIRES NO MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.
- STORAGE, TEST, ANALYSIS, REPAIR, AND DISPOSAL OF MISSILES CAN BE DONE IN ONE PLACE.

NOT MAXIMIZING THE MOST CAPABLE FACILITIES WILL DRIVE UP END ITEM SALES PRICE.

III. [DDOU: ASK BRAC TO LOOK AT DLA'S ANALYSIS VERY CAREFULLY.]

THERE IS STILL DOUBT THAT DLA HAS AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM TO DETERMINE WHAT DEPOTS SHOULD BE CLOSED.

- DLA HAS STATED THAT DEPOT EFFICIENCIES CANNOT BE COMPARED, EFFICIENCY IS DETERMINED ENTIRELY BY WORKLOAD, AND SHOULD NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATION.

I QUESTION THAT ASSERTION.

FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995, DDOU HAS TURNED BACK OVER \$7 MILLION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED A PROFIT. DOES THIS OCCUR AT OTHER DEPOTS?

- **IN ADDITION, I UNDERSTAND DLA FAILED TO INCLUDE THE DEPMEDS IN THEIR COBRA ANALYSIS. OMITTING THE LARGEST COST OF CLOSURE HAS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE NUMBERS.**

**IN THE LATEST COBRA RUN, COST TO CLOSE DDOU WENT FROM \$101.8 M TO \$409.6 MILLION IF DEPMEDS WERE INCLUDED.**

**THIS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION FROM THE BRAC SELECTION CRITERION.**

- **HAVING SAID THAT, I BELIEVE WE CAN AND MUST CONTINUE TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH DLA, AND SEEK ANSWERS, SO THAT SOLUTIONS ARE FOUND THAT WILL BENEFIT BOTH THE COMMUNITY AND THE DLA.**

IV. [CONCLUDE]

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# Document Separator

# DRAFT

## VIRGINIA

### I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

#### ARMY:

Fort Lee (Kenner Hospital)	Realign
Fort Pickett	Close
Information Systems Software Command	Close

#### NAVY:


Information Systems Mgmt Center Arlington	Relocate
Naval Mgmt Systems Support Office Chesapeake	Disestablish
NAVSEA Crystal City	Redirect
NISE Det Norfolk	Close
Office of Naval Research Arlington	Redirect
SPAWAR Arlington	Redirect

### II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

# MAP NO. 47

## VIRGINIA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

# NOTES

PROPOSED COMMENTS FOR

SENATOR JOHN WARNER

AT BRAC CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

JUNE 13, 1995

Appropriate greeting to Chairman

Dixon and Commissioners

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to briefly summarize some key points I believe the Commission should consider, with regard to Virginia military installations, before you vote next week on the final BRAC list.

We all agree that the most important of the BRAC criteria is military value, or how a particular base contributes to the continued readiness of our Armed Forces. It is from the perspective of readiness that I applaud the Navy's recommendation to redirect 8 F/A-18 squadrons from Cecil Field, Florida to Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia. Placement of those squadrons at Oceana will allow them to maximize the synergistic effect of being part of the Nation's largest military complex, the Hampton Roads Megabase. Morale, training

and logistical sustainment, hence readiness, will all be enhanced. The move will also be more cost effective for the Navy than other options previously considered. I urge you to uphold this recommendation.

I also support the Navy's recommendation to redirect its Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to the Washington Navy Yard. Although for the past 2 years I have joined Senator Robb and Congressman Moran in arguing for NAVSEA to remain in its current location

in Arlington's Crystal City, I believe that the proposed move to government-owned space at the Navy Yard is sound, both in terms of efficiency and quality of life for the people who work for NAVSEA.

The Navy's 1995 recommendation would keep NAVSEA close to the Navy's decision-makers in the Pentagon, thereby enhancing efficiency, and would be much more cost-effective than the previous recommendation to move it to White Oak, Maryland since it would consume

considerably less military construction monies. Additionally, the Navy Yard is much closer than White Oak to where most of NAVSEA's employees live, thereby making their daily commutes that much easier. Finally, by upholding the Navy's recommendation to quarter NAVSEA at the Navy Yard, the Commission will be contributing to the revitalization of the Navy Yard and Southeast Washington and thereby improving the economic health of the District of Columbia.

While I agree with the Navy regarding Naval Air Station, Oceana and NAVSEA, I cannot see how their recommendation to move the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) from Arlington to San Diego, California, would enhance readiness in any way. In fact, a move to San Diego would adversely affect how SPAWAR accomplishes its mission. As is the case with NAVSEA, most of SPAWAR's business is conducted with other government and civilian agencies in and around Washington. Putting the efficient accomplishment of SPAWAR's mission, hence

readiness, in jeopardy just so SPAWAR can be housed in government-owned space on the other side of the country, seems to me to be short-sighted. I believe this recommendation should be overturned.

Now I turn to Army installations.

The Army's recommendation to realign Fort Lee's Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic would degrade readiness at a key power projection and personnel training site.

Among other things, Fort Lee is an important training installation that supports, on the average, nearly 4,000 military students each day. For purposes of efficiency and morale, sick and injured trainees who require in-patient care should be hospitalized in a facility which is as close as possible to their units. Perhaps the Army's medical infrastructure needs to be reduced; but those reductions should not be made at facilities with a high density of military students who often engage in risky training. I urge you to maintain

Kenner Army Community Hospital as a full service facility.

Finally, I want to address the Army's proposed closure of Fort Pickett, one of the most cost-effective bases in America. On May 4th, some of you heard me express my strong belief that the true facts about Fort Pickett seriously deviate from what the Army has reported to you. You also heard former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, testify to the significant military value of Fort Pickett. Additionally, this Friday

Commissioner Cornella will have the opportunity to view, first hand, Fort Pickett's many attributes and receive a briefing on, among other things, the importance of the fort to Army and Marine Corps tank gunnery on the East Coast.

I want to emphasize to you again today that the Army's plan is not to close Fort Pickett, but rather to keep its ranges and maneuver areas open, while drastically cutting jobs, through the use of an "enclave". In addition to being a detriment to readiness, which I will

explain in a moment, this "enclave" concept would negate community reuse of Fort Pickett and make it nearly impossible to create jobs to offset those eliminated by the closure. That fact alone makes it an unfair recommendation.

The Army says that the "enclave" will save the Government money. But careful analysis shows that the savings they have announced are greatly exaggerated. By all indications, the Army plan is to keep Fort Pickett running by "licensing necessary ranges and maneuver areas to

the National Guard." In their COBRA runs, however, the Army has not factored in the resultant costs to the Federal Government caused by the licensing. According to National Guard Bureau estimates, those costs would be over \$7.5 million dollars a year, an amount that is nearly half of the present annual operating budget of Fort Pickett. Therefore, the Army's actual steady state savings from closing Fort Pickett would be significantly less than what they have projected.

Most significantly, in addition to being unfair and uneconomical, the "enclave" concept represents a half-hearted and potentially dangerous approach to readiness. The "enclave" and the "licensing action" combined would still leave Fort Pickett seriously undermanned. As a result, there would be poorly planned, poorly supported and unsafe training. Readiness would ultimately suffer.

Fort Pickett is crucial to the continued readiness of our Armed Forces.

The Army agrees that it should remain open. But their proposed means to do so--the "enclave"--is flawed from both the readiness and the fiscal standpoints. I strongly urge the Commission to overturn the recommendation to close Fort Pickett.

In closing, I thank you all for your attention this afternoon and for your service to the Nation in this critical yet thankless task.

####



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

RANKING MEMBER:  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY READINESS

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

OWEN PICKETT  
2ND DISTRICT  
VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
2430 RAYBURN BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
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May 31, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

At the regional hearing in Baltimore conducted by the Commission, the Virginia Congressional Delegation expressed its general agreement with the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. We applaud the efforts of you, your fellow commissioners, and your dedicated staff in sorting out the many issues being thrust upon you.

Unfortunately, some inaccurate data was presented to the Commission by representatives of North Carolina at this hearing that needs to be corrected. For this purpose there is attached a point-by-point analysis of the major items presented by North Carolina in opposition to the BRAC-95 recommendation by the Secretary of Defense to move the F/A-18's from Cecil Field, Florida to NAS Oceana, Virginia.

It must be remembered that when BRAC-93 recommendations and decisions were made, the A-6 aircraft program was scheduled to remain in the US Navy's active aircraft inventory until early in the 21st century. With the projected force structure of F-14's, A-6's and other aircraft scheduled at NAS Oceana when the BRAC-93 decisions were made, there was not adequate capacity to re-direct the F/A-18's from Cecil Field to Oceana.

Since BRAC-93, however, the A-6 aircraft program has been zeroed out. Of the nine A-6 squadrons formerly based at NAS Oceana, all but two have been disestablished. The remaining two A-6 squadrons will either transition to F/A-18's or be disestablished in the next two years. With this dramatic change in Navy aircraft force structure, NAS Oceana will have more than ample room to handle the single-siting of the Navy's entire F-14 aircraft inventory and the Navy's east coast F/A-18 aircraft inventory, including the F/A-18 "E/F" versions to be purchased in the future.

The BRAC-95 decision to move the F/A-18's from Cecil Field, Florida to NAS Oceana, VA can be accommodated with a relatively small expenditure of scarce MILCON dollars compared with the extensive cost of other options. Having these F/A-18's at NAS Oceana is a "Win-Win-Win Situation" for operational readiness, for "quality of life" for military families, and for savings of taxpayer dollars.

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2710 VIRGINIA BEACH BOULEVARD  
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA 23452  
(804) 486-3710

NORFOLK OFFICE:  
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112 EAST LITTLE CREEK ROAD  
NORFOLK, VA 23505  
(804) 583-5892


The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
May 31, 1995  
Page 2

We hope the above information and the enclosed materials will be helpful to you and your staff in your decision making process. If we can be of further help, please let us know.

Respectfully,



Owen B. Pickett




John W. Warner



Robert C. Scott



Charles S. Robb



Norman Sisisky



Herbert H. Bateman

TESTIMONY BY  
HON. OWEN PICKETT

---

BEFORE THE  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1995

THANK YOU CHAIRMAN DIXON AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION. I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH AND ITS SISTER COMMUNITIES IN GREATER HAMPTON ROADS. WE SPEAK AS ONE IN OUR ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT OF THE RECOMMENDATION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO REALIGN ALL NAVY F-14 "TOMCAT" SQUADRONS, AND TO REDIRECT THE BULK OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET FA-18 "HORNET" AIR ASSETS TO NAVAL AIR STATION OCEANA.

AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, BRAC '93 RECOMMENDED CHERRY POINT AS THE PRIMARY RECEIVING SITE FOR CECIL FIELD FA-18'S. MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES IN NORTH CAROLINA QUESTION THE SEC/DEF'S 1995 DIRECTIVE AND ASK "WHAT HAS CHANGED?" TO JUSTIFY MODIFICATION OF

THE BRAC '93 DECISION. THE OBVIOUS ANSWER IS FORCE STRUCTURE. BRAC '93 DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE IMMEDIATE RETIREMENT OF THE ENTIRE A-6 COMMUNITY NOR DID IT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF F-14 SQUADRONS THAT HAS OCCURRED. THIS WILL LEAVE AMPLE CAPACITY AT OCEANA TO ACCOMMODATE BOTH THE SINGLE-SITING OF ALL F-14'S AND THE CECIL FIELD FA-18 SQUADRONS. THE NAVY AND DOD WISELY CHOSE TO CAPITALIZE ON OCEANA'S AVAILABLE CAPACITY AND AVOID THE HIGH COST OF CONSTRUCTING ENTIRELY NEW FACILITIES AT CHERRY POINT. THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION MONEY SAVED BY THIS DECISION IS EQUAL TO THE COST OF CONSTRUCTING AN ENTIRELY NEW AIR STATION. WHILE THERE MAY NOT BE AGREEMENT ON EXACT DOLLAR VALUES, IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS TO ANYONE THAT IT IS CHEAPER TO BED DOWN THESE SQUADRONS AT A HALF EMPTY MASTER JET BASE THAN AT AN AIR STATION ALREADY LOADED AND OPERATING AT OR NEAR ITS MAXIMUM CAPACITY.

THE COST ISSUE AND OTHER MATTERS RAISED BY NORTH CAROLINA AT THE BALTIMORE PUBLIC HEARING ARE DEALT WITH MORE FULLY IN THIS WRITTEN REBUTTAL PREPARED BY OUR OCEANA COMMUNITY SUPPORT GROUP. WITH YOUR KIND PERMISSION, I SUBMIT THIS DOCUMENT FOR THE RECORD AND WILL RESTRICT MY REMAINING COMMENTS TO A FEW KEY POINTS.

THE SEC/DEF's 1995 RECOMMENDATIONS CLEARLY PROVIDE THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE BASING PLAN FOR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT BUT THEY ALSO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES. TOMCAT AND HORNET SQUADRONS FLY INTO COMBAT TOGETHER FROM NAVY CARRIER DECKS -- NOW THEY WILL TRAIN TOGETHER FROM A COMMON BASE LOCATED ONLY A FEW MILES FROM THEIR AIRCRAFT CARRIER HOME PORT, A MAJOR CONCENTRATION OF NAVY SCHOOLS AND TRAINING FACILITIES, AND THE PRIMARY NAVY AND JOINT HEADQUARTERS FOR THE ATLANTIC THEATER.

IT IS LITTLE WONDER OCEANA RANKS FIRST IN MILITARY

VALUE AMONG THE 20 NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OPERATIONAL AIR STATIONS. OCEANA HAS A LONG AND PROUD HISTORY AS A MASTER JET BASE FOR CARRIER-BASED "FIGHTER" AND "ATTACK" AIRCRAFT. THIS EXCELLENT BASE OFFERS A WELL DESIGNED AIRFIELD CAPABLE OF HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS, DIRECT NAVY-CONTROLLED ACCESS TO EXTENSIVE OFFSHORE TRAINING AREAS, COMPREHENSIVE SUPPORT FACILITIES, A MODERN INFRASTRUCTURE, AND ALL NECESSARY AMENITIES TO ENHANCE THE "QUALITY OF LIFE" OF OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILIES.

LAND ENCROACHMENT AT OCEANA IMPOSES NO SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS ON AIRCRAFT LANDING, APPROACHES OR DEPARTURES. UNLIKE CHERRY POINT, THE STANDARD LEFT-HAND PATTERN REQUIRED BY CARRIER PILOTS IS AVAILABLE ON ALL RUNWAYS. TO PROTECT OCEANA'S FUTURE, THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH HAS ENACTED A NEW, COMPREHENSIVE AIRPORT ZONING ORDINANCE AND RECENTLY ACQUIRED THE LAND AND BUDGETED \$25 MILLION DOLLARS TO RELOCATE TWO 40-

YEAR OLD ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS THAT NOW marginally infringe a runway approach. Oceana's unencroached outlying field at Fentress provides intensive day and night carrier landing practice on a full length, 8000 foot runway fully equipped to handle emergency landings.

Water-supply and water quality at NAS Oceana is an absolute non-issue. Along with all other Navy bases in South Hampton Roads, NAS Oceana gets its water supply directly from the City of Norfolk under a blanket contract dating back to 1947. Norfolk and the Navy enjoy a long-standing partnership in responsible water supply management, including a 1981 joint venture for deep wells at Driver, Virginia to guarantee the Navy's water supply in an emergency.

In response to the Air Quality Conformity Statement requirement noted in DOD's recommendation for Oceana, the appropriate

VIRGINIA AUTHORITIES HAVE COMPLETED THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED BASE LOADING AND ISSUED DOCUMENTATION ATTESTING TO "NO IMPACT ON CONFORMITY DETERMINATIONS" FOR THE HAMPTON ROADS AREA.

LET ME CLEARLY AND FORCEFULLY STRESS THE FACT THAT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEC/DEF'S BRAC '95 RECOMMENDATIONS, OCEANA WILL STILL HAVE FEWER AIRCRAFT AND FEWER MILITARY PERSONNEL THAN IT SUCCESSFULLY HOSTED AND SUPPORTED DURING THE LATE 1980'S. BY CONTRAST, FA-18 BASING AT CHERRY POINT WOULD REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT NEW GROWTH FOR AN AIR STATION AND SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES THAT ARE ALREADY PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THEIR SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS.

FINALLY, LET ME EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THE SEC/DEF'S BRAC '95 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OCEANA ARE STRONGLY AND WIDELY SUPPORTED BY OUR ELECTED OFFICIALS, BY OUR CIVIC GROUPS, AND BY THE COMMUNITY

AT LARGE. AS MAYOR OBERNDORF TOLD YOU IN  
BALTIMORE, THE CITIZENS OF VIRGINIA BEACH ARE EAGER  
TO ROLL OUT THE RED CARPET AND WELCOME THE NAVY'S  
BEST AND BRIGHTEST TO NAS OCEANA, THE NAVY'S  
"FIGHTER TOWN EAST."

# **Testimony before the BRAC Commission**

**Senator Charles S. Robb**

**June 13, 1995**

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Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to present the legislative perspective on this last round of base closings. Yours is not an easy task and we appreciate the fair and open manner in which the BRAC proceedings have been conducted. Our differences with the DoD's recommendations are few, but significant.

Let me begin by joining Virginia's senior senator in strongly urging you to reverse the DoD recommendation to withdraw any support for Fort Pickett. Clearly, the Army did not take into account the utilization of this key facility by the other services and the impact upon East Coast armor training readiness if this facility is closed. Transferring control of Fort Pickett to the National Guard under a so-called "enclave" may decrease the Army's budget very slightly, but the cost to the taxpayer will remain unchanged. The need for this strategically located training facility has not been challenged. We believe the Army should share the costs of operating it with the other services who are presently using the ranges.

Secondly, and critically important, Mr. Chairman, the Navy's planning process surrounding the proposal to move SPAWAR to San Diego was seriously flawed and the decision ought to be reversed. In 1993 the BRAC directed that SPAWAR relocate in government owned space within the National Capitol Region. Under Secretary Danzig reinforced this policy by issuing a policy imperative in April 94 that quote, "The Department of the Navy must collocate the acquisition work force with the Service Acquisition Executive -- the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RD&A -- to ensure efficiency, timeliness and effectiveness of the acquisition work force." End quote. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Service Acquisition Executive is located in the Pentagon, not in San Diego.

SPAWAR is the major acquisition command for hardware and software for electronic systems in the world. In this capacity it works with commands and activities in the National Capital Region and on the East Coast. Over the years

they have been extraordinarily successful in carrying out this role. As the nation watched the events unfold in Bosnia last week, it struck me that the electronics aboard the ships which guided the successful mission to rescue Captain O'Grady, was due, in large part, to SPAWAR's ability to work closely with both the contractors and their ultimate fleet customers. It makes no sense at all to move this critical command with its unique work force over 3000 miles away from the Assistant Secretary and their primary customers.

In doing the BRAC analysis for the move to San Diego, the Navy conducted COBRA models for a move to Ft. Monmouth and Hanscom AFB. But despite the obvious practical reasons to stay within the NCR, inexplicably, the Navy did not even conduct COBRA runs on alternatives within the National Capital Region. In addition, the Navy did not calculate in its analysis for the San Diego move any construction costs associated with a transcontinental move, despite the fact that four years ago it spent over \$10 million to relocate just two blocks to its present location.

An independent analysis which did conduct COBRA runs for alternatives in the NCR show savings values in the NCR to be three to four times greater than the amount of projected savings from a move to San Diego. This data has been made available to your staff for their review.

It has also come to our attention recently, Mr. Chairman, that the Navy is now preparing plans to consolidate the systems commands. The object is to merge redundant staffs and restructure the planning, budgeting and acquisition roles of the systems commands. We applaud this move which has been recommended by cross service groups for years - most recently by the White Commission on Roles and Missions in the armed forces. But we would argue, Mr. Chairman, that it simply does not make sense to be scattering key elements of these commands all across the country even while we work to rationally and efficiently consolidate our efforts.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Nearly 40 percent of the personnel in SPAWAR are in support or overhead positions -- not the line positions performing the critical functions of this command. Elimination of this overhead and combining redundant functions with the other systems commands could achieve the hoped for savings without a major move and will enable this command to continue its service to its primary customers which are co-located with them in this part of the

country.

To quickly summarize my points, Mr. Chairman, I believe the DoD recommendation to move SPAWAR to San Diego should be overturned for the following reasons:

(1) The COBRA analysis and cost estimates were seriously flawed in that they understate realistic construction costs and fail to consider more practical and efficient alternative sites in the NCR.

(2) Moving this command, at this time, complicates efforts to consolidate the Navy's systems commands. The force structure of SPAWAR suggests that the planned savings can be achieved by staying in their present location and reducing unnecessary and redundant functions. And

(3) Keeping SPAWAR in the NCR keeps them collocated with their customers and with the ASN (RD&A) as required by Navy policy imperatives.

Mr. Chairman, the Navy's own data call specified that -- and I quote -- "If SPAWAR were relocated outside the NCR, the mission would be performed slower, with greater technical risk, and at greater expense ..." Close quote.

Decreasing the efficiency of our critical commands and increasing their costs Mr. Chairman, was not the intent of the BRAC process. Our mission is to increase our efficiency and reduce our costs. For SPAWAR, this can really only be done by keeping it in the National Capitol Region.

Mr. Chairman, Thank you.

# Document Separator

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P R E S S   R E L E A S E

JOHN WARNER

UNITED STATES SENATOR • VIRGINIA

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United States Senate • Washington, D.C. 20510-4601 • (202) 224-2023 FAX (202) 224-6295

June 13, 1995

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

WARNER TESTIFIES ON BEHALF OF VIRGINIA BASES

Senator John Warner testified today before the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission on behalf of Virginia military installations affected by 1995 Department of Defense (DoD) BRAC recommendations. Warner previously testified at the May 4, 1995 BRAC Regional Hearing in Baltimore.

"The most important of the BRAC criteria is military value, or how a particular base contributes to the continued readiness of the Armed Forces," said Warner. In his five minute presentation, Warner outlined how military readiness would be affected if the Commission were to uphold DoD recommendations regarding four Virginia bases.

Warner applauded the Navy's recommendation to redirect 8 F/A-18 squadrons from Cecil Field, Florida to Naval Air Station, Oceana, near Virginia Beach, and urged the commission to uphold it. "Placement of those squadrons at Oceana will allow them to maximize the synergistic effect of being part of the Nation's largest military complex, the Hampton Roads Megabase," he said. "Morale, training and logistical sustainment, hence readiness, will all be enhanced."

Warner expressed doubt that the Navy's recommendation to move its Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) from Arlington to San Diego, California would enhance readiness. "In fact," he said, "a move to San Diego would adversely affect how

- more -

SPAWAR accomplishes its mission, because most of SPAWAR's business is conducted with other government and civilian agencies in and around Washington, D.C." In urging the Commission to overturn the recommendation, Warner concluded, "Moving SPAWAR across the country, just so it can be quartered in government-owned buildings, is short-sighted."

Warner also expressed strong opposition to two Department of Defense recommendations regarding Army facilities in Southern Virginia.

He said that the Army's recommendation to realign Fort Lee's Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic, "would degrade readiness at a key power projection and personnel training site." Warner stressed that Fort Lee's nearly 4000 military students have unique needs as a result of their time-constrained and often risky curriculum. "Sick and injured trainees requiring in-patient care should be hospitalized in a facility which is as close as possible to their units," he said. "Perhaps the Army's medical infrastructure needs to be reduced; but those reductions should not be made at facilities with a high density of trainees who often engage in risky training."

With regard to Fort Pickett, near Blackstone, Virginia, Warner underscored the points he had made in his May 4th testimony in Baltimore. "The true facts about Fort Pickett seriously deviate from what the Army has reported to you," he said.

Warner took particular exception to the Army's closure language: "I want to emphasize to you again today that the Army's plan is not to close Fort Pickett, but rather to keep its ranges and maneuver areas open, while drastically cutting jobs, through the use of an 'enclave'". Warner called the concept unfair pointing out that, "in addition to being a detriment to readiness, the 'enclave' would negate community reuse of Fort Pickett and make it nearly impossible to create jobs to offset those eliminated by the closure."

Warner also claimed that the Army's projected cost savings from "closing" Fort Pickett are greatly exaggerated. "By all indications, the Army plan is to keep Fort Pickett running by 'licensing necessary ranges and maneuver areas to the National Guard,'" he said. "In their COBRA runs, however, the Army has not factored in the resultant costs to the Federal Government caused by the licensing." Warner pointed out that, according to National Guard Bureau estimates, those costs would be over \$7.5 million a year, an amount that is nearly half of the present annual operating budget of Fort Pickett. "Therefore, the Army's

Senator Warner, Page 3

actual steady state savings from closing Fort Pickett would be significantly less than what they have projected," he said.

"In addition to being unfair and uneconomical," Warner continued, "the enclave concept represents a half-hearted and potentially dangerous approach to readiness. The 'enclave' and the 'licensing action' combined would still leave Fort Pickett seriously undermanned. As a result, there would be poorly planned, poorly supported and unsafe training."

In strongly urging the BRAC Commission to overturn the recommendation to close Fort Pickett, Warner noted that the post "is crucial to the continued readiness of our Armed Forces," and concluded that the Army's "enclave" plan for the post "is flawed from both the readiness and fiscal standpoints".

The BRAC Commission is scheduled to vote on the Department of Defense's closure and realignment recommendations between June 22nd and June 26th. The site for those meetings, which are open to the public, is expected to be announced later this week.

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# Document Separator

Statement of Congressman Tom Davis  
before the  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Hearing  
June 13, 1995

Chairman and commissioners. The Army has proposed moving the Information Systems Software Development Center (ISSC) from leased space in Fairfax County to government space at Fort Meade, Maryland. This move from leased space to government-owned space looks good -- it should save the government money, none of the 400 military and civilian personnel will be laid off, and the move is from Virginia to just across town in Maryland. But, this is a bad decision for the Army and the Government, and I urge you to have the Army reconsider this move.

The Army ISSC has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. When the Army looked to move ISSC from outdated facilities in Fairfax, Virginia, the Army asked the General

Services Administration (GSA) to find space for ISSC in Northern Virginia. They even specified the boundaries. The Army sought a location close to its Fort Belvoir and Pentagon customers and close to where most of its employees had settled during the past 20 years. This was the Crown Ridge building located at the junction of I-66 and Route 50.

GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease with Crown Ridge Associates for 6 years, at a cost of \$3 million a year. That lease started a little over a year ago and runs through **May 28, 2000**. A total of \$7.2 million was spent by Crown Ridge, GSA, and the Army to upgrade the building to meet the unique requirements of Army ISSC. Crown Ridge spent \$1.3 million, GSA \$2.9 million, and DoD spent \$3.0 million to get this building ready. And in fact, they are still in the process of upgrading and moving into the space. The agreement with GSA allows the Army to move out of the current space without penalty if appropriate notice is given.

Now, after spending all this money the Army is proposing

moving the ISSC to Fort Meade, Maryland. The Army believes that it will save \$8 million over 20 years.

Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer, GSA is still obligated for the six-year term of the lease. If the Army moves out, GSA is stuck with an empty building. This will not be easy space to fill considering it was built to suit ISSC and is not in reasonable proximity to mass transit. **To quote GSA regarding the Army's plans to move out of this building, "... the building was leased specifically for the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the location, and the building might be difficult to market."**

In addition, the Army is going to have to convert or build facilities at Fort Meade. The Cobra model figures used by the Army indicate that it will have to spend roughly \$5 million to renovate space at Fort Meade and move ISSC. So, at a minimum, the government spends \$11 million in renovation and moving costs and ISSC has to go through two moves in

three years. But, the government also will be stuck with a \$3 million per year lease for a building which may sit empty for three years -- another \$9 million.

**This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process to work -- the objective is to reduce costs for the government, not just the military services. All this move would accomplish is a cost-shift from the Army to GSA -- a tactic Congress has discouraged BRAC from endorsing.**

But more importantly, while this is listed as an in-area move, one only has to try the Washington rush hour commute from western Fairfax County to Ft. Meade, Maryland to know that it will require people to move or spend hours commuting. ISSC civilian personnel, roughly 2/3rds of the command's personnel, have built their lives in Fairfax County over the past 20 years. With the signing of a new six-year lease, personnel felt comfortable making plans to stay in this area. Now the command will be moved again -- and, literally to the other side of the Washington Metropolitan area.

Those working at ISSC are software experts with very specialized and valuable skills. Certainly, some will move to Maryland and some will commute from Northern Virginia, but it is likely that significant numbers will choose to find other jobs. The Army will lose talented people, and there will be a real and operational impact on ISSC.

I think if you look at the big picture, this decision never made sense for the government. It may save the Army some money, if you do not count the disruption to operations caused by another move and the potential loss of skilled people. Ultimately, however this move will cost the government millions in renovation and moving costs and leave the GSA with a \$3 million annual lease obligation on a building without tenants.

In closing, I repeat. With this move, we are shifting the cost of this operation from the Army to GSA. We are not saving any money. This is not what Congress intended when the Base Closure process was set up.

June 13, 1995

Base Closure and Realignment  
Commission Congressional Hearing

the proposed transfer of the

U.S. Army Information Systems  
Software Development Center -

Washington

to Fort Meade, Maryland

## BRAC Congressional Hearing 95 - ISSC

- The Army was very specific in its request to GSA - the new ISSC building would be located in Northern Virginia within a specifically designated "area of consideration."
- The Army agreement with GSA allows it to move out of the space without penalty if appropriate notice is given.
- GSA is still obligated for the six-year term of the lease. GSA has stated that this building may be hard to fill because it is not close to the subway or mass transit.

## BRAC 95 Congressional Hearing - ISSC

- A total of \$7.2 million was spent by Crown Ridge, GSA, and the Army to upgrade the current building to meet the unique requirements of Army ISSC. This breaks down as follows:
  - Crown spent \$1.3 million,
  - GSA \$2.9 million, and
  - DoD spent \$3.0 million.
- ISSC is still in the process of upgrading and moving into the Crown Ridge building.

## BRAC Congressional Hearing 95 - ISSC

- If the Army moves out in 1997, GSA is still obligated for the remainder of the six-year term of the lease - \$9 million.
- This building does not meet the usual GSA criteria for federal buildings in the Washington area, it has no easy access to the subway or mass transit.
- When asked about the Army's plan to move out, GSA stated, " ... *the building was leased specifically for the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the location, and the building might be difficult to market.*

## BRAC Congressional Hearing 95 - ISSC

- There is a human and operational impact here. ISSC's move to Fort Meade will be the second move in three years and the cause of substantial work disruption.
- But more importantly, while this is listed as an in-area move, one only has to try the Washington rush hour commute from western Fairfax County to Laurel, Maryland to know that it will require people to move or spend hours commuting by car -- roughly a 1 1/2 to 2 hour commute, one way.
- These are software experts with highly valuable skills. Certainly, some will move to Maryland and some will commute, but significant numbers of ISSC personnel will choose to find other jobs. The Army will lose talented people, and there will be a real operational impact on ISSC.

## CONCLUSION

- This is a building that the Army specifically asked for.
- It has been modified at a government cost of \$5.9 million to meet Army requirements; renovating space at Fort Meade will cost an additional \$5 million.
- If the Army vacates the building, at whatever cost savings, GSA still has to honor the \$3 million per year lease that runs through the year 2000.
- There are hidden costs in loss of qualified people and in the disruption caused by two moves in three years.

# Document Separator

**DRAFT**

**WISCONSIN**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**NAVY:**

NRC Sheboygan

Close

**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

**AIR FORCE:**


General Mitchell Air Reserve Station

Close

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 50

## WISCONSIN



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

news from

# HERB KOHL

*United States Senator  
Democrat of Wisconsin*

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Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI)  
Testimony to Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
on the  
440th Airlift Wing at General Mitchell Air Reserve Station  
Milwaukee, WI  
June 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, it is my pleasure to testify before you today on behalf of the 440th Airlift Wing, an Air Reserve unit based at General Mitchell International Airport Air Reserve Station in Milwaukee.

When you close an Air Reserve station you are not just closing an installation, you are making the decision to dismantle a unit. In the case of the 440th Airlift Wing, the Air Force would be losing some of the best highly trained C-130 pilots and maintenance crews.

From D-Day to the Cuban Missile Crisis, from Desert Shield/Desert Storm to Haiti, the 440th has demonstrated its importance to our Nation. Even now, as we consider the future of this historic unit, the 440th is ready as the lead wing in the event of an evacuation of United Nations forces from Bosnia.

In 1993, the 440th accomplished what no other C-130 airlift wing has ever accomplished -- and that includes active duty, Air National Guard and reserve units -- an unprecedented performance in the Air Mobility Command's Rodeo, known as the "Olympics of Airlifters." The 440th won the competition for:

- The best C-130 airdrop crew
- The best C-130 crew
- The best C-130 airdrop wing
- The best C-130 wing, and
- The best U.S. Air Force Mobility Wing


- more -

**Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI)**  
**Testimony to Base Closure and Realignment Commission**  
**on the**  
**440th Airlift Wing at General Mitchell Air Reserve Station**  
**Milwaukee, WI**  
**June 13, 1995**

**Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, it is my pleasure to testify before you today on behalf of the 440th Airlift Wing, an Air Reserve unit based at General Mitchell International Airport Air Reserve Station in Milwaukee.**

**I have a statement from Congressman Kleczka I would like to insert for the record.**

**When you close an Air Reserve station you are not just closing an installation, you are making the decision to dismantle a unit. In the case of the 440th Airlift Wing, the Air Force would be losing some of the best highly trained C-130 pilots and maintenance crews.**



News From: \_\_\_\_\_

# U.S. Senator Russ Feingold

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For Immediate Release:  
June 13, 1995

## **FEINGOLD URGES BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION TO SPARE 440TH AIR RESERVE UNIT FROM CUTS**

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- U.S. Senator Russ Feingold urged members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission today to consider keeping the 440th Air Reserve Unit open and closing the Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications system instead.

"In my view, ELF exemplifies an installation whose mission is of little, if any, military strategic value, and therefore should be closed. In contrast, the 440th Airlift wing has time and time again demonstrated its strategic value as part of our nation's overall defense forces," Feingold said.

Feingold praised members of the 440th for their "honor, distinction, and excellence" in serving this country in the Persian Gulf War, Haiti, Somalia, and most recently in Bosnia.

Feingold offered several notable achievements of the 440th's recruiting operation.

-- Staffing levels of the 440th have been over 100 percent in 9 of the last 10 years, thereby ensuring personnel are ready immediately for active duty.

-- The 440th draws reservists from every one of the nine congressional districts in the state, ensuring full support for its mission.

-- With the regional hubs of both the United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express located at Mitchell Field, the 440th has a large pool of trained pilots, loadmasters and mechanics from which they can successfully recruit.

-- more --

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# Document Separator

*The Unique Military Value  
of Military Ocean Terminals:*

A Consolidated Summary of  
Expert Witness Testimony  
Before the Commissioners

Submitted by: Senator Bill Bradley,  
Senator Frank Lautenberg, &  
Congressman Robert Menendez  
June 13, 1995

# Introduction

*"This is a different category of BRAC. We are not just relocating, we are not just realigning, but in fact we are eliminating a capability . . . ."<sup>1/</sup>*

The BRAC Commissioners receive thousands of pages of testimony from hundreds of witnesses in numerous settings making countless valuable points. To aid the Commissioners, this paper briefly presents in a thematic manner the points made on the military value of military ocean terminals by the three expert witnesses who have appeared before the Commission:

- (1) **General Dick Larson**, former MTMC Commander [hereafter, General Larson];
- (2) **Lillian Liburdi**, Executive Director, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey [hereafter, Director Liburdi]; and,
- (3) **Captain Ensminger**, Deputy Commander, Western Area Command, MTMC [hereafter, Captain Ensminger].

Although these expert witnesses gave independent testimony before the Commission on two different dates in two different cities in support of two different bases, the points they make and the conclusions they reach are remarkably similar. In essence, their testimony points out several significant differences between military ocean terminals and commercial ports, points that are described within. Ultimately, these expert witnesses conclude that **the capabilities of military ocean terminals have unique military value that cannot be duplicated by commercial ports.** This testimony is not mere conjecture (like the unproven assumption that commercial ports can meet all the nation's national security needs); their testimony is rooted in real world experience. The points raised in their expert testimony demand that the Commission retain **both** the Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne, New Jersey (hereafter, "MOTBY") and the Military Ocean Terminal at Oakland, California (hereafter, "MOTOA").

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<sup>1/</sup> General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 238.

# **Differences in Capabilities Between Commercial Ports and Military Ocean Terminals**

Military Ocean Terminals were designed to support our national security. Serving our military is their sole purpose, and every aspect of their operation is planned with that unique function in mind. Commercial ports are different in design and operation in manners that make it impossible for them to compete with the military value provided by MOTBY and MOTOA. This paper briefly summarizes some of the critical differences between the two types of ports.

## **1. Guaranteed Port Availability**

### **A. MOTs Guarantee Instant Access in a Contingency Situation.**

It is a fact of military history that contingencies arise which demand instant action on short notice.<sup>2/</sup> Military officials understand the nature of contingency operations and plan for the day when our nation's military forces must be deployed for immediate action. Military preparedness guides the planning and operations of military ocean terminals.<sup>3/</sup> As a result, MOTs constantly focus on how to expedite military vehicles and cargo in a crisis, how their physical facilities can be arranged to facilitate responding to such a scenario, and how their personnel should be prepared to handle the potential tumult of a national security emergency.

---

<sup>2/</sup> *"Characteristics of contingencies are short notice, quick movement response, secure requirements."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 141-42.

<sup>3/</sup> *"When I was Commander of MTMC I was preoccupied with the ability of our ports to handle on a short term, 24 hours or less, to garner the availability of the port facilities, be that diverse staging areas, marshalling areas, and many of the attributes that I think are absolutely necessary for the defense of this country and . . . to deploy forces anywhere in the world from the United States in the force projection scenario today."*

General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 239-240.

**B. Commercial Ports Do Not and Will Not Guarantee Port Availability Necessary for Effective Military Operations.**

Our nation's commercial ports are congested with commercial shipments that delay prompt action.<sup>4/</sup> These commercial ports do not allocate money to maintain extra capacity that is needed only in times of a surge in military need.<sup>5/</sup> Further, the availability of commercial ports for military shipping is worsening rather than improving.<sup>6/</sup>

In addition, General Larson recounted real-life situations where a commercial port did not guarantee access to military shipping during ongoing military operations.<sup>7/</sup> The Commission cannot depend upon the wishful thinking of some analysts that, in time of military action, the normal commercial port congestion created by limited facilities will melt away. All three experts agreed: commercial ports are unwilling to guarantee access in the required time frame to assure readiness.

---

4/ *"Commercial ports, like the commercial port of Oakland, are busy. That means limited availability, congestion in their ports, and very little access capacity."*  
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 139.

5/ *"Commercial ports are profit-making organizations, and there aren't too many profit-making organizations that can afford to maintain excess capacity. That limits their availability, especially when we need them on short notice."*  
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 139-140.

6/ *"[C]ommercial ports are becoming increasingly unable to deal with disruption resulting from military activity. Without a declaration of a nation's emergency, many ports are requiring lead time well beyond those that are currently assumed in joint planning orders."*  
Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 229.

*"Traffic at all major ports, with the exception of Baltimore, has increased significantly each year."*  
Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 227.

7/ *See generally* General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 236-237 (one commercial port did not provide the military with the staging areas and berths to accommodate full deployment of a Gulf War force, and another commercial port refused to guarantee the availability of continued berthing for a military ship during a military action in Somalia).

## 2. Secure Port Operations

### A. MOTs Guarantee Secure Operating Environments That Are Necessary for Military Operations.

It is critical that all movements of essential war-fighting support equipment have the best security we can provide. Terrorists and the governments that support them will do their utmost to disrupt the transportation of military hardware. In addition, certain domestic forces would like to acquire weapons of destruction for their own dark purposes. In short, military equipment and operations must have a high level of security.<sup>8/</sup> Both MOTs have security unrivaled by any commercial ports.<sup>9/</sup>

### B. Commercial Ports Simply Do Not Have Equivalent Security.

Commercial ports cannot afford to duplicate and are not equipped to manage security operations on a par with either MOT.<sup>10/</sup> The commercial port security is not designed to safeguard classified military goods, to protect lethal military weapons, and to prevent terrorist actions that could choke a military deployment in a time of national emergency.

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<sup>8/</sup> *"The military security aspect . . . was of utmost importance. It is not that only certain aspects on an M-1 tank are classified and have to be secured, it is also because the military equipment by nature has to be secure. They are lethal weapons, they are cannons and tanks and artillery and aircraft that have to be secured and have to be protected."*

General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 240.

<sup>9/</sup> For example,  
*"MOTBY is located on a peninsula and has a perimeter security line and another, more fortified security arrangement around the cargo handling facility. This level of security, which includes CCTV surveillance around the compound, is essential to a military deployment."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 232.

<sup>10/</sup> *"[O]ur cargoes are secured to prevent theft . . . but not to the degree of sophistication and control that MOTBY provides.*

*. . . .  
Neither the Port of New York and New Jersey nor alternate ports which may be considered -- Norfolk, Baltimore, Savannah, Charleston or Wilmington -- have a similar [security] capability."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, pp. 233-234.

### 3. Ability to Handle Specialized Military Cargo

#### A. MOTs Are Designed to Handle Large, Non-Containerized Pieces of Military Cargo.

Military cargo has unique characteristics. One of the most important of those characteristics is the fact that most military cargo is not containerized,<sup>11/</sup> unlike most commercial cargo. Further, it is often better to ship even that portion of military cargo that could be containerized (and made easier for commercial port shipping here) in a non-containerized manner because many ports cannot receive such heavy containers.<sup>12/</sup>

#### B. Commercial Ports Have a Limited Ability to Provide Adequate Staging and Operating Areas Needed for Large Deployments.

Commercial ports were not designed to handle military cargo.<sup>13/</sup> Most commercial ports are designed to handle containerized cargo, not large uncontainerized military equipment.<sup>14/</sup>

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<sup>11/</sup> "[D]uring contingencies and unit moves, most military equipment is not containerizable. Well, one reason it's not containerizable is size. Picture the M-1 tank. that should make that obvious. You can't fit an M-1 tank into an eight foot wide opening of a container."

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 138.

<sup>12/</sup> "Another reason not so obvious is the inability to off-load and move containers in underdeveloped ports or countries. Mogadishu and Somalia and Haiti is an example of that lesson relearned. Because military cargo is heavy and overweight, it often requires special heavy lift cranes, a unique problem for most ports."

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 138-139.

<sup>13/</sup> "Commercial ports have not been designed to accommodate the special requirements of military cargo. Non-containerized military equipment armaments combat vehicles and sustaining cargoes require specialized staging, restaging, security, intermodal access and a trained labor force dedicated solely to this activity if we are going to assure safety and timeliness."

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 230.

<sup>14/</sup> "[M]ost commercial ports are optimized to handle commercial cargo in containers. Large amounts of military cargo can't be containerized . . . .

.....

(continued...)

## 4. Adequate Staging and Operating Areas

### A. MOTs Guarantee Secure Operating Environments That Are Necessary for Military Operations.

The size and nature of military cargo require larger staging areas than those found in commercial ports.<sup>15/</sup> The need to marshall mixed cargo loads that might have arrived separately into a comprehensive shipment needed to support a fighting force also necessitates large and convenient staging areas.<sup>16/</sup> These staging areas must be designed for military cargo.<sup>17/</sup> Further, the difficulties involved in moving military goods make it essential that such staging areas are convenient to transportation and loading facilities.<sup>18/</sup>

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<sup>14/</sup>(...continued)

*"Commercial ports are optimized for containerized cargo, which makes it a limited capability for non-containerized cargo."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 139, 140.

<sup>15/</sup>

*"The size and nature of military vehicles means you can't stack them one on top of another like you can containers. That means military cargo typically requires large amounts of staging area, more so than typical commercial cargo. Military cargo also frequently has security requirements, has hazardous waste consideration."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 139.

<sup>16/</sup>

*"The staging area that is provided at MOTBY . . . not only provide[s] the ability to bring in a great deal of equipment and provide[s] a number of ships to be loaded concurrently, but it also ensures the ability to manifest and marshall the equipment in the priority order that is wanted overseas."*

General Dick Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 240-241.

<sup>17/</sup>

*"For military purposes the staging area must be designed to accommodate irregular shapes, sizes and other requirements of specialized military cargo. The weight and overall dimensions of this military cargo also dictate that the staging area be designed to support the loads placed by M-1 tanks and Bradleys."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 231.

<sup>18/</sup>

*"[MOTBY] has a concrete staging area along its operational berths which allows unique staging configurations. This staging area is integrated with on-dock rail leading directly to the berths, thereby allowing for immediate transfer to shipside -- features that no commercial port can match today."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 231.

Both MOTBY<sup>19/</sup> and MOTOA have outstanding staging areas. Their abundant, contiguous, and open staging to the shipping berths ensure that military cargo will be handled in both orderly and rapid fashion.

**B. Commercial ports have a limited ability to provide adequate staging and operating areas needed for large deployments.**

In contrast, commercial ports have a concern for maximizing the value of their real estate. They have not reserved large amounts of space for open staging areas that are needed only for military shipping needs. Their staging areas are not as convenient to points of transportation and loading.<sup>20/</sup> As a result, commercial ports do not have the capability to replace MOTs due to the lack of sufficient staging areas.<sup>21/</sup>

That last point needs to be reiterated. Commercial ports do support certain military operations and are capable of shipping some military cargo. What commercial ports cannot do, however, is take over entirely **all** of the military sea lift shipping mission.<sup>22/</sup> No detailed study has yet analyzed the capability of commercial ports to completely usurp the role of our nation's two Military Ocean Terminals, and no objective study could reach such a conclusion.

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<sup>19/</sup> "MOTBY has almost a million and a half square feet of storage under cover and several million square feet that are available in the open."  
General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 240.

See also footnote 18, *supra*, regarding the convenience of MOTBY's staging areas.

<sup>20/</sup> "[W]e have Gantry cranes and stacked boxes which preclude helicopter landings at berthside."  
Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 232.

<sup>21/</sup> "[Commercial ports] are limited in suitability because of inadequate staging . . . ."  
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 140.

<sup>22/</sup> "That doesn't mean we don't need the commercial ports. On the contrary. In both peacetime and during contingencies, there still is a lot of militarized cargo moving in containers. The commercial ports **complement** the military ports. We need them **both**."  
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 140-141 (emphasis added).

## 5. Trained Port Personnel

### A. MOTs Have the Specially Trained Port Personnel Needed for Moving Military Vehicles and Cargo.

Both MOTs have the dedicated and experienced stevedores that are necessary to deal with whatever diverse cargo arrives at the port. MOT professional longshoremen are trained to stage, marshal and move **all** types of military cargo, and are licensed to operate and load the over sixty DoD oversized vehicles port personnel must handle every day.<sup>23/</sup> This cadre of highly trained professionals is integral to a successful mobilization.

### B. No Other Workforce Should Handle Military Mobilization.

Workers at commercial ports simply do not have the training and expertise to handle the full range of military vehicles and cargo, and certainly not as efficiently as the MOT longshoremen.<sup>24/</sup> Commercial port workers cannot take over the task of moving military vehicles and cargo, nor should we use scarce military manpower in that mission.<sup>25/</sup>

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<sup>23/</sup> *"Given that military cargo is different from the type of vehicles and equipment normally handled at a commercial port, a trained labor force to move these pieces in an efficient manner is essential. International Longshoreman Association drivers at MOTBY have military drivers licenses, permitting them to operate all military equipment, including M-1 tanks."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 234.

<sup>24/</sup> *"[M]y experience was, in dealing with the commercial ports, they have a wonderful force for loading containers and cars and fastening them down, but when it comes to dragging heavy chain to tie down M-1 tanks and outsized heavy equipment, most commercial ports do not have that experience and training which exists today and every day at MOTBY."*

General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 242.

<sup>25/</sup> *"It is not possible during times of military mobilization to first train workers at commercial ports to do the specialized tasks associate with military cargoes. In past mobilization efforts, troops were required to be at commercial ports to move these vehicles, shrink-wrap helicopters prior to loading, and so on. In some case staging had to take place at the home base. This deprived MTMC of its flexibility in its use of ships. In cases where alternate ships were used, restaging was required. Restaging, of course, costs time, money, and coordination effort."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 235.

## 6. Special Transportation Advantages

### A. Both MOTs Are Located Near Major Transportation Modes.

The military value of the two Military Ocean Terminals cannot be appreciated without considering our nation's geography.<sup>26/</sup> If the military were to choose anew the location for one East Coast MOT and one West Coast MOT, it could not choose better locations than Bayonne and Oakland. MOTBY has access to two of the nation's major interstate routes.<sup>27/</sup> In addition, MOTBY is near major ports, railroads, and airports.<sup>28/</sup> Similarly, MOTOA is situated near major transportation systems.<sup>29/</sup>

The strategic locations of our nation's two Military Ocean Terminals near the premier ports of New York and San Francisco equips them for power projection into all parts of the world. Their indispensable military is augmented by complete access to the best intermodal transportation networks in our country.

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<sup>26/</sup> *"The model [for military value], as good as it was, was deficient. It was deficient because it was missing a crucial attribute. What the missing attribute is, in a word, was geography. . . . Military value must consider the strategic importance of Oakland's geographic location . . . ."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 135.

<sup>27/</sup> *"MOTBY enjoys unparalleled highway access, being located adjacent to the major north-south motor carrier roadway in the United States -- I-95 -- and near the nation's major east-west roadway -- I-80. This is important because a significant percentage of military cargo is delivered over the road."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 234.

<sup>28/</sup> *"The transportation center that we have in the Port of New York and New Jersey is one of the best in the country. You not only use the rails to bring in the equipment, but you have a wonderful road system. Also, Newark Airport and the other airports are within close proximity to MOTBY."*

General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 241.

<sup>29/</sup> *"Part of the reason for Oakland being the CONUS focus for west deployment is the excellent highways and railroads. . . . Oakland also has excellent railroad infrastructure. . . . Oakland is serviced by three full service railroads, the Santa Fe, Union Pacific, and Southern Pacific. By the way, rail is the preferred mode of transportation for moving containerized military cargo."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 137-138.

**B. Both MOTs Have Special Facilities and Capabilities  
That Aid in the Expedited Transport of Military Cargo.**

Military Ocean Terminals were designed with one key concept foremost in the minds of planners--namely, that in a mobilization situation, large amounts of military vehicles and cargo must be moved in an expedited manner.<sup>30/</sup> In many ways, large and small, the need for speed is built into their mission. First, just by being immediately available (unlike commercial ports), MOTs can respond quickly.<sup>31/</sup> That availability comes at a price, but its is a small price for the military capability our nation needs.

Second, the MOTs' physical plant is designed for even quicker transportation of cargo than commercial ports (given the difficult nature of the military cargo handled). In addition to the staging areas discussed earlier, another example of superior physical facilities designed for speedy transport is MOTBY's rail system. The MOTBY rail system is designed to allow mostly direct shipments and easy access for large military cargo shipments.<sup>32/</sup> No other East Coast Port has a similar facility, and use of other ports would result in critical delays.<sup>33/</sup>

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<sup>30/</sup> *"What distinguishes military port capacity from commercial port capacity? The unique characteristics of military cargo. For example, crises occur with little or no notice, and that means huge amounts of military cargo must move quickly."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 138.

<sup>31/</sup> *"[MOTOA] is designed for rapid movement of military cargo in a crisis. Its facilities are immediately available and suitable for handling non-containerized cargo. . . ."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 137.

<sup>32/</sup> *"The rail installation at MOTBY is first rate, having been totally rehabilitated as a result of the lessons learned during the Gulf War. This \$15 million upgrade, designed by the [DOT], produced facilities which provide an efficient time saving transportation link to berthing facilities. Most of the rail shipments received at MOTBY are direct runs, eliminating time-consuming rail interchanges which could add days when taken to ports elsewhere, Norfolk and others."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 233.

<sup>33/</sup> *"In contrast to [MOTBY's] capability, rail access to the Port of New York and New Jersey's commercial facilities was not designed with the specific needs of the military in mind. The same is true in Baltimore and Norfolk and Charleston and Savannah."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, pp. 233-234.

## Conclusion

*"I believe that I cannot at my port provide the space, security, access, and trained labor in the efficient, timely manner needed to support the MTMC mission, to service troops to the support scenario areas. I also sincerely doubt whether my colleagues at other ports could do so. On the other hand, MOTBY stands ready to performs these services with a proven, and unparalleled, record."<sup>34/</sup>*

Even the Executive Director of one of the nation's largest general cargo port on the East and Gulf coasts agrees that commercial ports cannot replace our Military Ocean Terminals at Bayonne and Oakland. All of the expert testimony consistently agrees that MOTs are uniquely capable of handling military missions on short notice in a secure and efficient manner.<sup>35/</sup> MOTs have singular capabilities that render them invaluable, even aside from questions of port capacity generally. In short, **Military Ocean Terminals cannot be replicated by commercial ports.**<sup>36/</sup>

The Military Ocean Terminals at Bayonne and Oakland are designed solely for rapid movement of military cargo in a crisis. Because of their unique military value, the Commission **must** retain these capabilities in order to preserve our nation's security.

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<sup>34/</sup> Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 237.

<sup>35/</sup> *"Knowing the unique characteristics of military cargo, and knowing that military ports like Oakland Army Base are designed and built for military cargo, it is not surprising that military cargo works best in military ports."*  
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 139.

<sup>36/</sup> *"It simply cannot be replicated, the capabilities, the accessibility, of MOTBY, any place in the United States other than Oakland Army Base on the West Coast. And the studies that were done for Oakland show that in fact the other commercial ports on the West Coast cannot take the full capabilities and necessities of the military equipment through that far in the world."*  
General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 242-243.