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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

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COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Senator Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Mr. Alton W. Cornella
Ms. Rebecca G. Cox
General J.B. Davis, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. S. Lee Kling
Major General Josue Robles, USA (Ret.)
Mrs. Wendi Louise Steele

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, ladies and
3 gentlemen, and welcome to today's hearing of the Defense Base
4 Closure and Realignment Commission. My name is Alan Dixon.
5 I'm Chairman of the Commission. With us today are my
6 colleagues, Commissioners Al Cornella, Rebecca Cox, S. Lee
7 Kling, Joe Robles, and Wendi Steele. Other commissioners
8 will be arriving through the morning.
9 As most of you know, this Commission is heading
10 into the final three weeks of its difficult and unpleasant
11 task of recommending to the President of the United States
12 which domestic military bases should be closed or realigned.
13 Since we received the closure list from Secretary Perry 15
14 weeks ago, the commissioners have held ten hearings here in
15 Washington, D.C., 16 regional hearings around the country,
16 and made 200 visits to 75 military bases.
17 Yesterday, we heard testimony from 82 Members of
18 the Congress whose states or districts are affected by the
19 base closure list, and today, believe it or not, we will hear
20 from 121 more. This is an important part of the process.
21 For the past three-and-a-half months, commissioners
22 and staff have been in regular contact with elected officials

1 and community members, but our hearings yesterday and today
2 will give us one more chance to hear sharply focused
3 arguments regarding bases on the list.
4 Let me assure Members of the Congress and everyone
5 else, this Commission has made no decisions yet regarding
6 which bases will close and which ones will not. Information
7 regarding many installations is still coming in and is still
8 being evaluated by the Commission and the Commission staff.
9 That process will continue right up until the 22nd day of
10 June of this month when the Commission begins its final
11 deliberations. That is why we regard these two days of
12 testimony as extremely valuable to us.
13 As was the case yesterday, we will today hear
14 testimony state-by-state, and each member will be limited to
15 five minutes. We will be required to enforce that limit
16 strictly, because 121 Members of the House and Senate will
17 testify today. Anyone who has longer remarks, or who wishes
18 to submit additional testimony for the record, is welcome to
19 do so.
20 Let me also say that the Base Closure Act requires
21 that all testimony given before the Commission be made under
22 oath. Our staff counsel will swear in Members before they

1 testify so that we can keep things moving, and we usually do
2 it before they come in the door.
3 With that, I believe we're ready to begin. We
4 begin today with the great State of Mississippi, and we have
5 here the distinguished Senior Senator from the State of
6 Mississippi, my old friend, Senator Thad Cochran; and we're
7 delighted to have him. Senator Cochran, pleased to have you
8 here, sir.
9 SENATOR COCHRAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
10 Chairman, we appreciate very much the opportunity to talk
11 with you this morning about Columbus Air Force Base and
12 Meridian Naval Air Station, both of which are located in the
13 State of Mississippi.
14 I think it's clear from the facts that military
15 requirements support keeping both bases open. The Department
16 of Defense has not recommended closing Columbus Air Force
17 Base. The Air Force continues to support keeping that base
18 open, and it was clearly stated by General Boles, who was in
19 Columbus just last week. He's the incoming commander of the
20 service's Air Education and Training Command, and I was
21 pleased to be able to attend that site visit.Air Force
22 The base is up to date, it's modern in every way,

1 it's efficient. It has excellent air space and weather, a
2 bombing range that would be very difficult to recreate
3 anywhere else, excellent or magnificent runways, as one
4 person has described them, no encroachment problems, and it
5 has the enthusiastic support of the state and local
6 community.
7 Meridian Naval Air Station has been scrutinized by
8 three successive Base Closure Commissions. The question
9 before the Commission is whether the Navy can single-site all
10 undergraduate pilot training at one base. The primary
11 mission of Naval Air Station Meridian is to conduct
12 undergraduate pilot training.
13 The pilot training rate provided by the Navy to the
14 Commission is wrong, by the Navy's own admission. Only last
15 week there was an article in Defense News, which I'd like to
16 submit to the Commission for inclusion in the record, where
17 senior Navy officials say that the Navy will have to keep six
18 additional squadrons in its force structure, six more than it
19 had planned to decommission by 1997.
20 I would also like to submit, Mr. Chairman, for the
21 record, a recent memorandum from Admiral Boorda, the Chief of
22 Naval Operations, dated May 10, 1995, which directs his staff

1 to increase the pilot training rate from 336, the number
2 supplied to the Commission by the Navy, to 360, the result of
3 keeping six additional squadrons in the force structure.
4 The facts clearly show that one base cannot conduct
5 all of the required strike undergraduate pilot training.
6 Admiral Hayden, the Chief of Naval Air Training, has
7 acknowledged that, at a PTR -- pilot training rate -- out of
8 360, there is no surge capability and, when the E2C2 training
9 rate is included in this, as it must be, the pilot training
10 rate comes out to be 382.
11 Your charter, as you well know and have eloquently
12 stated, is to save the Department of Defense money by closing
13 or realigning unnecessary infrastructure while, at the same
14 time, maintaining infrastructure for the military to be able
15 to carry out its missions. I hope you will ask the Chief of
16 Naval Operations tomorrow if he believes the Navy can meet
17 its mission requirements with Naval Air Station Meridian.
18 Back in December, Mr. Chairman, when you were
19 talking to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, you said, very
20 correctly:
21 "Base closing should not be simply a budget-cutting
22 tactic. It should be undertaken to reduce our defense

1 infrastructure in a deliberate way that will improve our
2 long-term military readiness and ensure that we are spending
3 taxpayer dollars in the most efficient way possible. We
4 should not make hasty decisions that will eliminate important
5 military assets based on our near-term budget imperatives."
6 Mr. Chairman, you will have the facts to
7 demonstrate that military requirements necessitate keeping
8 both Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian Naval Air Station.
9 Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my old friend, the
11 distinguished Senior Senator from the great State of
12 Mississippi.
13 We're delighted to have here with him his
14 colleague, my old friend, the Majority Whip, the fine Senator
15 from the State of Mississippi. I served with him as chairman
16 of the Readiness Subcommittee. He was my ally and friend,
17 the Ranking Member, and nobody ever had a better-mannered
18 friend to work with in the United States Senate -- Senator
19 Trent Lott of Mississippi.
20 SENATOR LOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we
21 did some good work together.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Amen, brother.

1 SENATOR LOTT: It's a pleasure to appear before you
2 today and, of course, I remember those experiences as we sat
3 beside each other in committee hearings. Members of the
4 Commission, thank you very much for giving us the opportunity
5 to testify to you regarding the two Mississippi bases that
6 are under consideration by you today.
7 As my distinguished colleague has just said, of
8 course, there has been a recommendation to close Meridian
9 Naval Air Station. That was on the list that came from the
10 Pentagon. But you added Columbus Air Force Base in order to
11 fully evaluate the Department's decision to recommend closure
12 of Reese Air Force Base.
13 I'd like to start with Columbus Air Force Base.
14 Columbus was not recommended for closure by the Secretary for
15 three very sound reasons.
16 First, it is a top-ranked pilot training base in
17 the Air Force today. Columbus has great weather, great
18 facilities, and an outstanding record of training pilots for
19 the Air Force.
20 Second, Columbus has the best facilities of all Air
21 Force pilot training bases. As an old SAC base, its 12,000-
22 foot runway and top-of-the-line support facilities provides

1 Columbus with the flexibility needed by the Air Force as it
2 continues to train our undergraduate pilots for the future,
3 even with fewer bases.
4 Third, the cost of training pilots at Columbus is
5 the second lowest in the entire Air Force. Based on the
6 future defense budget, of course, it's essential that we
7 retain one of our most cost-effective bases.
8 For these reasons, I believe the Department was
9 correct when it identified the military value of Columbus Air
10 Force Base and recommended retention of that base, and I
11 encourage you to follow the Secretary's recommendations and
12 keep Columbus, simply because the Department did not deviate
13 from closure criteria.
14 Regarding Meridian Naval Air Station, you are
15 largely being asked to review the work of the two previous
16 Commissions. It has been quite an experience. What was it?
17 I think that we had a great Prime Minister of England one
18 time who said, "There's nothing more exhilarating than being
19 shot at and missed." We've been shot at twice and missed,
20 and we'd like to do that one more time.
21 We think that the Commissions made the right
22 decisions in the past. They rejected the Department's

1 recommendations, and I think that you should do the same.
2 I can tell you that the previous Commissions
3 carefully reviewed the closure recommendations in the past
4 and determined that the Navy could not meet their pilot
5 training rate requirements if Meridian was closed. That is a
6 critical part of that decision, and I think that was the
7 point that the Commission made the decision on two years ago.
8 This year, you're in the same situation faced by
9 these previous Commissions. If Meridian Naval Air Station is
10 closed, the Navy will not be able to meet their strike pilot
11 requirement. As my colleague just pointed out, there would
12 be a tremendous responsibility on the one remaining base.
13 In order to meet their strike training requirement,
14 that one base at Kingsville, they would have to operate that
15 base 16 hours a day, five days a week, all year long. Under
16 this scenario, we can provide the only surge capacity
17 available, and this surge capability will cost you time-and-
18 a-half on Saturdays and double time on Sundays.
19 This op. tempo would equate to 26 aircraft taking
20 off every hour, one every 2.3 minutes and, during that hour,
21 an average of six jets are in the landing pattern at the home
22 field, six at Corpus Christi, and four jets in the pattern at

1 Alice Orange Grove, all day, five days a week, all year long.
2 It's just not practical, not safe, and probably not even
3 possible.
4 After the Meridian community presented this
5 information to you in Birmingham, the Navy re-evaluated their
6 pilot training rate calculations and made several changes.
7 First -- and this is important -- they delayed the
8 closure date of Meridian from 1999 to 2001. This was done
9 primarily to delay the impact of increasing the extremely
10 high op. tempo required at Kingsville. In effect, the Navy
11 has agreed that the op. tempo at Kingsville, due to the
12 Secretary's recommendation, is difficult and stressful, so
13 much so that they want to delay its impact as long as
14 possible.
15 Secondly, the Navy increased their strike PTR
16 requirement from 336 to 360 and expedited the shift of the
17 E2C2 training mission to a strike base. This increase in PTR
18 exemplifies the difficulty of predicting the Navy's pilot
19 requirements in the future. It could go up again and, if it
20 does, the Navy has an even bigger problem in the future.
21 The cumulative impact of these changes validates
22 the essential need to maintain two strike training bases for

1 the Navy. Without two bases, they have no flexibility, very
2 limited surge capability, and face an undue and unacceptable
3 risk.
4 You essentially face four questions regarding the
5 proposed Meridian closure:
6 Can the Navy meet their strike PTR requirements
7 with only one base? The answer is no.
8 Does one strike base provide the Navy sufficient
9 surge capability in the event of war or other PTR increases
10 in the future? The answer is clearly no.
11 Is it reasonable to safely expect student pilots to
12 learn to fly jets at one base, particularly when that one
13 base forces you to operate with very small margins for error,
14 delay, or precision? And I think the answer is no.
15 Is Meridian, Lauderdale County, and the State of
16 Mississippi receiving equitable treatment compared to the
17 exemptions granted to California bases due to impact
18 economic? According to the GAO, the answer is no.
19 In closing, I want to repeat the statement made by
20 the Meridian community every year that the Commission has
21 reviewed their fate: if a fair review of the numbers showed
22 that Meridian should not be closed and that there was a

1 substantial deviation existing, then shouldn't the base be
2 kept open?
3 I urge you to accept the recommendation to retain
4 Columbus Air Force Base and reject the idea that the United
5 States Navy can meet their strike pilot requirements at only
6 one base. If you support these two positions, the Air Force
7 and Navy will be better off and the country will benefit from
8 your wisdom. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
9 of the Commission.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much, Senator
11 Lott, and the Commission is indebted to both you and your
12 colleague, Senator Cochran, for your great work on behalf of
13 your state and your fine testimony.
14 We simply want to say that I know you're now going
15 to introduce your congressional friend from the House side --
16 SENATOR LOTT: I just want to say, Mr. Chairman,
17 besides that, both of these bases are in Sonny's district.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, let me tell you, I just want
19 to say this about Representative Sonny Montgomery. We've had
20 ten hearings in Washington, D.C. and Congressman Montgomery
21 has been at all ten, and that's more than I can say for my
22 commissioners.

1 So Sonny, you're not a strange looking fellow.
2 We've seen you here before. So I guess you might as well
3 drop your whole load now. Representative Sonny Montgomery
4 from the great State of Mississippi.
5 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: I don't know whether I
6 really need to say anything or not, Mr. Chairman.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You've been doing pretty good just
8 staring at us, Sonny.
9 (Laughter.)
10 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: He thinks that I'm
11 tired of looking at him every day.
12 (Laughter.)
13 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: Mr. Chairman and
14 Commissioners, I moved from the front row to the pulpit this
15 morning. Now, tomorrow, I'll be back on the front row.
16 As has been said, I speak on behalf of the two
17 bases, Meridian Naval Air Station and Columbus Air Force
18 Base. Three of you have been to the Meridian Naval Air
19 Station, and General J.B. Davis has agreed to go there on
20 Friday, to the Meridian Naval Air Station.
21 Commissioners Cornella and Steele visited Meridian
22 on June the 8th. It was 90- degree weather, but over 20,00

1 people turned out in support of the base. When General
2 Robles was in Meridian, we had 12,000 people and 70 degrees.
3 The Navy Meridian team makes a strong case that the
4 Navy was on shaky ground in saying it could meet future pilot
5 training requirements at just one base. Since Meridian was
6 put on the closure list, things have changed, as has been
7 pointed out by my colleagues this morning.
8 The Navy says it needs more air squadrons and has
9 revised the pilot training rate, and we have charts there
10 that will follow my remarks. The training rate was at 336
11 and now it has been moved up by the Navy to 382, to train
12 pilots. Now the Navy says if Meridian is closed, it needs to
13 be kept open for two more years, from 1999 to the year 2001.
14 You've seen the letter to me from Admiral Mike
15 Boorda, where he says that, operating at maximum capacity --
16 these are his words -- that one base, to meet the projected
17 PTR, the pilot training, would be difficult and
18 uncomfortable. The admiral also says it would be
19 unsatisfactory if the Navy had to increase pilot training for
20 a significant surge requirement.
21 To reach the required pilot training, or PTRs, on
22 only one base, NAS Kingsville would have to operate at near

1 capacity, including increased work days. Operating at that
2 level simply does not allow for a surge in pilot training.
3 Also, with one strike base, a tornado or hurricane hitting
4 Kingsville puts the Navy out of business in training carrier
5 pilots.
6 In voting to keep Meridian open in 1993, BRAC
7 commissioners found that two full strike training bases were
8 needed when the PTR, pilot training, was 384. The projected
9 PTR is now up to 382.
10 NAS Meridian has different missions. We are fully
11 utilizing that base.
12 First, it's the training of aviators to land in fly
13 off of carriers.
14 Second, the base has a Naval Technical Training
15 Center which trains 5,000 sailors and Marines.
16 Third, the anti-drug school, that was not
17 recommended for closure. Some of you have seen that school.
18 Fourth, the Chief of the Naval Reserve has said if
19 Meridian is not closed, he will move a 200-person Reserve
20 unit from Jackson, Mississippi to Meridian.
21 The criteria guiding this Commission gives priority
22 to military value. The facts are clear that, for operational

1 readiness, the Navy needs two strike training bases.

2 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that your

3 commissioners visited Columbus Air Force Base on June the 7th

4 and June the 8th, and four commissioners did come. The key

5 word with Columbus is flexibility. It can support any of the

6 five Air Force flying missions.

7 Having once been a Strategic Air Command base, it

8 has, as has been mentioned, the longest runway in the South,

9 at 12,000 feet. It can accommodate any aircraft that's in

10 the Air Force inventory, large or small.

11 In addition, Columbus is the only undergraduate

12 pilot training base with the use of a gun range. That is a

13 big plus. It has an abundance of air space and no

14 encroachment problems of any kind.

15 Strong community support brought the base to

16 Columbus in 1941 and that relationship is just as strong

17 today. The Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Study Group

18 both rank Columbus as the number one undergraduate pilot

19 training base.

20 The highest priority ought to be given to bases

21 with the ability to adapt to new missions. Columbus is in

22 that category. Columbus has updated facilities, air space,

1 and community support, which makes a compelling case to keep
2 Columbus Air Force Base open.
3 Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I'll
4 be back tomorrow.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, it's great to finally hear
6 from you, Sonny.
7 We're indebted to the great State of Mississippi,
8 its fine Senators and its fine Congressman for a first-class
9 presentation. Thank you very much.
10 We'll now hear from the great State of Missouri and
11 Senator Kit Bond, its distinguished Senior Senator. My old
12 friend, Senator Kit Bond. I'm telling all these stories
13 about being ranking. I was chairman of a Subcommittee on
14 Banking. My old friend, Senator Bond, was ranking on that,
15 and we had a fine, warm relationship, and I'm delighted to
16 see an old friend and neighbor, the distinguished senior
17 Senator from the great State of Missouri, Senator Kit Bond.
18 SENATOR BOND: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
19 Those are the good old days when the Cardinals weren't 12
20 games out, as well.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're not going to make it this
22 year, Kit.

1 SENATOR BOND: Well, practice, I guess, makes
2 perfect.
3 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I thank you for
4 affording all of us, the Senators and the Congressmen from
5 Missouri, an opportunity to address you on this issue of
6 great national importance, the streamlining of our national
7 defense system.
8 There are three specific issues we need to address:
9 the Army Publications Center in St. Louis, Fort Leonard Wood,
10 and ATCOM.
11 First, we fully support the Army's plan to
12 consolidate the Army Publications Center in St. Louis. The
13 construction of an additional loading bay, scheduled to begin
14 this year, has been approved by the Secretary of the Army,
15 and the funds have been released to accomplish this. We are
16 well on our way to ensuring the move will occur with minimal,
17 if any, impact on operations.
18 Now, with respect to the more of the Army's
19 Chemical Warfare Training School and Military Police School
20 to new facilities at Fort Leonard Wood, this has been a
21 contentious issue, though I don't think it should be. I know
22 the Commission is well aware of the commitment and support of

1 the people of Missouri for this move. I've seen it firsthand
2 and I can explain it at great length to anybody who has any
3 questions about it.
4 We've had to face what's been a well-financed and
5 clever onslaught by the friends of Fort McClellan. I do
6 believe we have successfully defended the Army's plan and
7 exposed some of the subterfuges used by those opposed to the
8 move.
9 Time Magazine, you may have seen, in its May 22
10 issue, characterized the opposition as conducting guerilla
11 warfare to sabotage the move and blackmail -- harsh words,
12 not mine, they're Time Magazine's. But I have seen some of
13 the desperate methods employed by these people.
14 They've created havoc during the process, extending
15 even to attempts on the floor of the Congress to slip, into
16 unrelated legislation during the dark of night, draconian
17 regulatory restrictions on future Army facilities while
18 exempting the Alabama site from even a modicum of regulation.
19 Fortunately, we were able to undo that effort.
20 We're aware that there is a classified meeting to
21 be held shortly that was requested by the friends of Fort
22 McClellan. We have spoken with the Department of Defense and

1 have been assured that there is no threat to our national
2 security or our ability to meet our commitments due to the
3 move, and that this has been fully considered and examined by
4 the DOD. The commissioners will learn of that firsthand.
5 I also submit to the Commission a survey conducted
6 by the people of Missouri of the people of Missouri, not some
7 group employed by Missouri's opposition, showing that this is
8 well supported. And I would ask that the Commission make
9 that a part of the record.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be a part of the record,
11 Senator.
12 SENATOR BOND: I also know you're aware of
13 extensive regulatory oversight and permitting requirements
14 this move has required of the Army and the State of Missouri.
15 I'm proud to let you know that Governor Carnahan has signed
16 the final permit. I have a copy of that here. Again, I ask
17 that that be accepted as part of the record.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be put in the record,
19 Senator.
20 SENATOR BOND: This oversight and regulation
21 process on the chemical warfare facilities may seem tedious
22 to some, but I really think it's necessary to ensure the

1 safety of the personnel at the facilities, the local resident
2 population, the environment, and national security overall.
3 These tests have been met. This will be the finest
4 state-of-the-art facilities, designed to keep our soldiers
5 superbly trained and ready. I think that's extremely
6 important.
7 Mr. Chairman, on the other hand, the proposal to
8 disperse the Army's Aviation and Troop Command from St.
9 Louis, I believe will be found to be unwise and outdated, as
10 it does not reflect proposal of the DOD's Roles and Missions
11 Commission. The Army Management Control Plan clearly shows
12 that leased facilities were excluded from a military value
13 assessment, a critical factor for all other base closure
14 determinations, but GAO found no documentation that they'd
15 done so.
16 The Army based its decision to close ATCOM
17 primarily on personnel savings, but the 780 positions they
18 anticipate to eliminate did not include the 533 positions
19 that must be retained if ATCOM is closed.
20 The Army also has created a new command
21 infrastructure to include a general officer and staff at the
22 Soldier System Command at Natick. To the best of our

1 knowledge, the Army has not calculated this in its personnel
2 savings assumption.
3 In our opinion, this expands, rather than
4 consolidates, the Army's infrastructure, in direct opposition
5 to the BRAC mandate. Additionally, leaving behind hundreds
6 of highly trained workers, re-establishing their positions,
7 training their replacements, essentially rebuilding the
8 program from scratch, will affect readiness.
9 The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
10 Forces, chaired by Mr. John White, has recommended that DOD
11 co-locate all Army, Navy, and Air Force program management
12 officers responsible for development, production, and support
13 of military aircraft and related equipment.
14 As the deputy secretary, Mr. White will be
15 responsible for that, and we should not want to spend
16 millions of dollars to disperse ATCOM to the four corners of
17 the United States only to have it reconsolidated and
18 relocated to a DOD-wide site in a few years. That means the
19 return on our investment won't occur until well after our
20 children have children so, in all likelihood, the savings
21 will never be achieved.
22 Mr. Chairman, I ask your consent that a copy of my

1 full statement be included in the record.

2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your entire statement, Senator,

3 will be included in the record and we're indebted to you for

4 those fine remarks.

5 SENATOR BOND: I thank the Chair and the

6 Commission. Thank you very much.

7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished senior

8 senator from the great State of Missouri.

9 Now, if his colleague would want to catch his

10 breath for a moment, we can take another member of the

11 delegation. Or is the Senator ready? We're delighted to se

12 the distinguished Senator from the great State of Missouri,

13 Senator John Ashcroft.

14 SENATOR ASHCROFT: Good morning, and thank you Mr.

15 Chairman and members of the Commission.

16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, Senator.

17 SENATOR ASHCROFT: I want to thank the Commission

18 for this opportunity to testify before you.

19 Every community affected by the base closure

20 process asks, at a minimum, that it be given a fair

21 evaluation, an honest review, and even-handed deliberations,

22 and I thank you for your participation in the development of

1 this process.

2 Unfortunately, in the case of the Army's decision

3 concerning ATCOM and St. Louis, the Army has not followed

4 these basic requirements of fairness. It's true that, in

5 1993, the BRAC instructed the armed services to include a

6 separate category for leased facilities in the 1995 process.

7 While that instruction somewhat altered the

8 evaluation process, the Army, unlike the Navy and the Air

9 Force, evidently used the instruction as a basis for

10 excluding leased facilities from any evaluation based on the

11 military value criteria established by the Department of

12 Defense. As a result, the Army has targeted leased

13 facilities for closure, while failing to comply with the

14 law's requirement that leased facilities be evaluated in the

15 same manner as other military installations, based on

16 "military value."

17 Let me repeat this for emphasis: of the eight

18 specific criteria identified by the Department of Defense for

19 closing facilities, the Army failed to evaluate ATCOM based

20 on the first four criteria related to military value, despite

21 the Department of Defense's instruction that these four

22 military value criteria be given priority in all evaluations.

1 Let me just briefly review a few facts concerning
2 ATCOM, the failure of ATCOM to receive the military value
3 assessment.
4 First, the Army Management Control Plan. The
5 framework used by the Army in its closure and realignment
6 review process shows that ATCOM and other leased facilities
7 were not included in the installation assessment phase of the
8 process until after the Army had evaluated all other
9 facilities and assigned them military values.
10 Second, military value assessment summaries for
11 leased facilities should have been presented to the Secretary
12 of the Army before his decisions were made, but the record
13 shows that such a value assessment was simply not there for
14 ATCOM at that stage of the decision-making process.
15 The Army's response to this glaring omission was
16 the blanket and clearly erroneous statement that, "Leased
17 facilities in general, not necessarily the operations they
18 house, have low military value." This sweeping conclusion
19 obviously has no military value assessment to back it up,
20 which is why Missouri's entire Congressional delegation is
21 concerned about this issue and is making the kind of appeal
22 to you that it is today.

1 The last, and perhaps most incriminating evidence
2 of the Army's failure to evaluate ATCOM's military value as
3 required by law, is the fact that, in the Army's own report
4 to the Commission, military value assessment summaries are
5 included for all facilities' categories except one -- leased
6 facilities.
7 As the Chairman of the Commission will recall,
8 Brigadier General Shane, in his April 14 letter to the
9 Chairman, stated categorically that the Army's evaluation
10 process for leased facilities, "might be said to have
11 differed slightly from its process for other types of
12 installations." Well, the General Accounting Office said the
13 same thing more forcefully when it found that the Army, "did
14 not formally adhere to its regular process for installations
15 in assessing military value when recommending minor and
16 leased facilities for closure."
17 GAO also found no documentation "supporting an
18 analysis of or addressing the military value of leases" and
19 the GAO recommended that the Commission, and I quote, "make a
20 determination, under its legislative authority, whether these
21 variances represent substantial deviation from the selection
22 criteria."

1 Again, as I stated earlier, the Army was the only
2 -- the only -- service that did not evaluate its leased
3 facilities for their military value. Both the Navy and the
4 Air Force performed military value analysis of their leased
5 facilities. The bottom line is that the Army's own documents
6 show that its decision to close ATCOM in St. Louis was based
7 solely on a flawed cost-savings analysis and not on all eight
8 criteria of the evaluation, as required by the law.
9 The second issue I'd like to address is the
10 Pentagon's recommendation to transfer the Army's Chemical and
11 Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan in Alabama to
12 Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri.
13 As the Commission is aware, the state-of-the-art
14 Military Engineer Center at Fort Leonard Wood now conducts
15 training for officers, non-commissioned officers, and
16 enlisted personnel for the Army and other personnel from the
17 Department of Defense. The addition of the Chemical and
18 Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan would allow for
19 the joint development of doctrine, and expand opportunities
20 for training in all three of the schools.
21 Thus, combining al three schools at Fort Leonard
22 Wood would create a synergy that will do more than just save

1 money. It will improve the Army's ability to meet its
2 mission.
3 I want to remind the Commission that Missouri state
4 officials worked tirelessly to ensure that a series of
5 necessary environmental and construction permits and one
6 variance were secured in accordance with a 1993 BRAC
7 directive. The final permit, issued just last week by the
8 Missouri Department of Natural Resources, will allow for the
9 construction of a smoke training facility at Fort Leonard
10 Wood to teach soldiers how to perform in smokescreen type
11 conditions.
12 While we're on the subject of smokescreens, I want
13 to briefly call attention to several concerns that have been
14 raised about this measure by environmental groups and their
15 concerns about the use of real chemical agents at the site.
16 Exhaustive research by the Missouri Department of Natural
17 Resources, and others, makes it clear that the chemicals will
18 pose no danger, because there is never more than milliliter
19 -- a fraction of an ounce -- of agent mixed at any one time.
20 Fort Leonard Wood has already coordinated its
21 proposed new training with both the Missouri Department of
22 Natural Resources and the Army's Training and Doctrine

1 Command, to ensure that the required training standards will
2 be met and that the environment is protected.
3 Another smokescreen that's been raised would have
4 us believe that the U.S. national security interests would be
5 adversely affected by moving the Army's Military Police and
6 Chemical Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood.
7 Given the fact that the move will be a phased operation, not
8 a wholesale move at once, there will be no lag time as the
9 transition occurs.
10 Simply stated, as the individual facilities are
11 completed in Missouri, the corresponding facilities in
12 Alabama will close. Let me add, in closing, that Fort
13 Leonard Wood is enthusiastically supported by the surrounding
14 community. The Army could not find a better home for the
15 Army's Military Police and Chemical Schools.
16 I want to thank you again for the care and concern
17 with which this Commission has addressed these issues and for
18 the fact that, on numerous occasions, you've allowed us to
19 participate in your discussions, including your visit to St.
20 Louis at ATCOM, and it's my pleasure to be with you and to be
21 with you today.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Senator.

1 We're delighted to welcome to the rostrum the
2 distinguished Democratic leader of the United States House of
3 Representatives, Representative Dick Gephardt. Congressman
4 Gephardt, thank you for coming.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GEPHARDT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
6 very much. I'm very appreciative of the opportunity to be
7 here and make this testimony to this distinguished
8 Commission. I know how hard you're all working to do your
9 responsibilities and to do the right thing for our country.
10 For weeks now, you've heard testimony against
11 various base closings, often arguing that the armed services'
12 numbers simply don't add up. While that sort of argument may
13 seem compelling, that's not the argument that I intend to
14 make. In the case of the Army's Aviation and Troop Command,
15 the numbers do add up. The problem, in my view, is that
16 they're the wrong numbers. Let me explain.
17 The Army claims that, while the closure of ATCOM
18 will cost $152 million, it will also result in the
19 elimination of 786 jobs, saving $56 million each year and
20 yielding a return on the investment in just three years.
21 Despite requests from your staff, the Army has not
22 provided any analysis to support these reductions. At the

1 same time, your staff has received Army data which shows that
2 only 48 positions could be eliminated through the closure of
3 ATCOM. I'd like to summarize the data briefly for you.
4 The Army has included savings from 205 positions
5 that will be eliminated at ATCOM regardless of any base
6 closure. The Army's own base closure plan agrees that these
7 positions should not be counted as savings.
8 The Army claims savings from 56 positions that must
9 remain in St. Louis to fulfill contractual obligations to
10 other agencies, such as Defense Finance Accounting Service,
11 FEMA, and the Department of Agriculture.
12 The Army claims savings from 90 positions that must
13 be maintained and transferred to receiving bases to perform
14 base operations functions.
15 The Army claims savings from 387 positions that
16 must be maintained and transferred to receiving bases in
17 order to keep performing ATCOM's functions at these other
18 sites.
19 The bottom line is that, if you subtract these
20 positions from the Army's claims of 786 personnel cuts, then
21 only 48 positions can be eliminated by closing ATCOM.
22 Translating this into costs and savings, ATCOM's closure will

1 still cost $152 million but will achieve no annual savings
2 and no return on investment, ever.
3 You don't have to take it from me. Take it from
4 the Army's own officers, the people who have to put this into
5 practice.
6 First, Army's deputy commander has confirmed that
7 these personnel must be kept, regardless of their location,
8 for the Army to continue to perform its support functions.
9 Second, the Tank Command in Detroit and the
10 Communications Command in New Jersey have confirmed that
11 additional personnel will have to be transferred from ATCOM
12 to ensure the Army's operations in these areas continue.
13 Finally, for Red Stone Arsenal, the Army Materiel
14 Command has determined that any shortfall in the number of
15 personnel transferred from ATCOM will be filled by excess
16 personnel presently at Red Stone.
17 When I learned this last piece of information, I
18 asked how many excess personnel does Red Stone Arsenal have?
19 According to the Army's own stationing and installation plan,
20 Red Stone Arsenal currently has 900 more personnel than it
21 needs to perform its mission. This is astounding to me. By
22 the Army's own admission, it's planning to use the closure of

1 ATCOM to solve an overstaffing problem at Red Stone Arsenal.
2 As far as I'm concerned, if the Army has too many
3 people at Red Stone, it should downsize there. It shouldn't
4 waste over $150 million to move ATCOM functions and kick 700
5 people out the door in St. Louis -- people who, as you know,
6 have dedicated their lives to the nation's defense -- in
7 order to avoid hard choices at Red Stone.
8 ATCOM has made these tough decisions over the past
9 several years, reducing over 3,000 personnel since 1989. I
10 think now it may be Red Stone's turn.
11 You all know that the BRAC process was not intended
12 to allow DOD to arbitrarily pick winners and loses among
13 civilian personnel. It was intended to reduce the cost of
14 government to the taxpayer and to make the Department of
15 Defense more efficient. Closing ATCOM, in my view, will
16 simply not achieve this goal.
17 Finally, the strength of our Defense Department
18 comes from its people. These are some of the most highly
19 skilled, trained, dedicated people in our entire nation.
20 This is true for each unit of the military, and I know it's
21 particularly true of the individuals that make up ATCOM.
22 I know this Commission is seriously looking at all

1 of these issues. I tremendously admire the dedication and
2 work that you're all doing to make the right decisions. I
3 urge you to look at these facts on ATCOM. They are, I think,
4 compelling facts, and I believe that, if you look at them
5 closely, you may come to the conclusion I have. And that is
6 that closing ATCOM in St. Louis will not increase the
7 efficiency, will not increase the savings to the United
8 States Government.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished
10 Democratic leader of the House for his fine remarks, and we
11 are pleased to welcome his distinguished colleague from the
12 Missouri delegation, Representative William Clay.
13 REPRESENTATIVE GEPHARDT: Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman.
15 Congressman Bill Clay. We're delighted to have
16 you, sir.
17 REPRESENTATIVE CLAY: Mr. Chairman and members of
18 the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear this
19 morning.
20 The Army Aviation and Troop Command should be
21 retained in St. Louis, which is the world center for the
22 military and civilian aviation industry. In addition to the

1 highly skilled personnel at ATCOM, which have just been
2 described by my colleague, Mr. Gephardt, numerous businesses
3 located in St. Louis support the Army with the most efficient
4 and cost-effective methods of conducting product development
5 and procurement.
6 Uniquely skilled personnel associated with ATCOM's
7 aviation operations, local contractors, and academic
8 institutions combine to provide the Army with an ideal pool
9 of aviation expertise. Moving ATCOM's aviation support
10 functions to Red Stone Arsenal would be counterproductive and
11 definitely cannot achieve the projected cost savings.
12 It seems that the Army has over-estimated cost
13 savings by failing to account for the downsizing already
14 underway at ATCOM and the Army has also failed to adequately
15 access the viable alternatives that would generate genuine
16 cost savings. Fair consideration to alternatives to ATCOM's
17 closure were not given.
18 ATCOM's efforts to reduce personnel and increase
19 efficiency were not thoroughly examined. Plans to reduce
20 personnel by over 200 positions in the next five years will
21 result in savings of almost $10 million annually with an
22 immediate return on investment.

1 Moreover, this staff reduction will increase
2 efficiency, reduce overhead, permit a reduction in the amount
3 of space leased from the General Services Administration, and
4 streamline activities, thus accomplishing all of the goals of
5 the Army's stationing strategy.
6 The Army did give some attention to the possibility
7 of relocating the Space and Strategic Defense Command -- SSDC
8 -- from a leased facility in Huntsville, Alabama to Red Stone
9 Arsenal, but this suggestion should have been thoroughly
10 addressed. Apparently, the SSDC proposal was dismissed on
11 the mistaken notion that it would be more costly than closing
12 ATCOM and would not achieve the same efficiencies, synergies,
13 or cost reductions.
14 However, there is no basis for this contention and,
15 in fact, the Army's own data supports the notion that
16 disestablishing SSDC and downsizing ATCOM is a superior
17 choice. Documentation presented by the Army to the
18 Commission indicates that the relocation of SSDC to Red Stone
19 Arsenal would cost much less than the closure at ATCOM -- $21
20 million versus $150 million in one-time costs and $2 million
21 versus $12 million in recurring cost.
22 There's reason to believe the one-time costs may be

1 even less than the $21 million claimed by the Army, since the
2 Army assumed that a new facility would have to be constructed
3 at Red Stone to accommodate SSD personnel when, in fact, both
4 the Army Materiel Command and the Office of the Assistant
5 Chief of Staff for Installation Management have stated that
6 Red Stone Arsenal currently possesses sufficient space to
7 accommodate approximately 1,500 personnel.
8 The BRAC staff has also confirmed this fact and
9 determined that minimal renovation would be required for Red
10 Stone to accommodate SSD's 950 employees. Based on the BRAC
11 Commission staff's renovation estimates, it may be calculated
12 that the actual one-time costs required to relocate SSDC to
13 Red Stone Arsenal is approximately $1 million, not $21
14 million as claimed by the Army.
15 Using this data, the relocation of SSDC would
16 generate an immediate return on investment, annual savings of
17 at least $1.3 million, and a 20-year net present value of as
18 much as $23 million. This is a much more cost-effective
19 prospect than the closure at ATCOM.
20 Further, the relocation of SSDC to Red Stone
21 Arsenal is entirely consistent with the Army's stationing
22 strategy. The Army's COBRA report for SSDC demonstrates that

1 it's relocation would increase efficiency and reduce overhead
2 by eliminating $3.8 million in lease costs and generating
3 only $2.5 million in additional overhead costs at Red Stone
4 Arsenal, for a net savings of $1.3 million annually.
5 Documentation presented by the Army Basing Study
6 Office to the under secretary of the Army stated that the
7 relocation of SSDC would achieve synergy with major program
8 managers and Missile Command and Red Stone. The Army's own
9 data and assertions to its leadership demonstrate that the
10 relocation of SSDC would fulfill the goals of a stationing
11 strategy to reduce overhead and lease space, eliminate excess
12 capacity, and co-locate activities.
13 Finally, if the Department of Defense is to achieve
14 maximum cost savings and the most efficient realignment of
15 its facilities' infrastructure, ATCOM should not be
16 disestablished before SSDC. This action would be wholly
17 contrary to the Army's own findings of just two years ago.
18 When referring to ATCOM, the Army stated that, and
19 I quote: "The high relocation costs make realignment or
20 closure impractical and prohibitively expensive."
21 Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission, I
22 thank you for this opportunity and hope that you give it the

1 kind of weight that I think it should be given. Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

3 Clay.

4 We're delighted to welcome your colleague, the

5 distinguished Congressman from Missouri, Representative James

6 Talent.

7 REPRESENTATIVE TALENT: I thank the Chairman. And,

8 before I start, I'd like to, as the other Members have,

9 extend my appreciation to the commissioners and your staff.

10 You're working diligently to assess the merits of each

11 recommendation and argument put before you, and I really

12 congratulate you on your tenacity and patience in listening

13 to all this testimony.

14 Having said that, I want to discuss Army readiness

15 this morning as it relates to the proposed disestablishment

16 of the Aviation and Troop Command in St. Louis. Much of the

17 discussion so far has concerned the actual cost, in terms of

18 new buildings, real estate, leased facilities,

19 infrastructure, and additional overhead of moving the ATCOM

20 functions.

21 I concur in the comments that have been made by my

22 colleagues here this morning, but I want to focus attention

1 this morning squarely on the issue of Army aviation
2 readiness, rather than solely on cost issues, especially as
3 it relates to the proposed closing of the ATCOM installation
4 in St. Louis and specifically on whether or not the Army will
5 retain the skilled personnel who represent an enormous asset
6 to our services and to this particular function.
7 By my estimates, we will probably lose between 50
8 and 80 percent of the roughly 400 engineers and 400 logistics
9 personnel who presently work at the ATCOM, if we go ahead
10 with this move. These people represent a collective body of
11 knowledge that the Army will simply lose, and then have to c
12 completely recreate at another installation.
13 Without wanting to exaggerate the point, this
14 relearning process will take many years. It could take as
15 many as three to five years. In the meantime, this crawl,
16 walk, run scenario will, at the user level in the Army,
17 manifest itself in terms of shortcomings in acquisitions,
18 logistics, and engineering.
19 For example, because so many of the more
20 experienced ATCOM employees will remain in the St. Louis area
21 and will not make the move, we can realistically expect
22 greater delays in parts requisitions for helicopters, which

1 will be reflected in greater maintenance backlogs, because
2 parts will be slower in working their way through the
3 pipeline.
4 This, in turn, means that any given aviation
5 battalion's operational readiness rate will drop
6 considerably. The average Army aviation unit's fully
7 mission-capable OR -- its operational readiness rating --
8 today is about 70 to 75 percent. If the proposed relocation
9 takes place, we can expect that rating to drop, possibly to
10 as low as 50 percent, at least in the short term, and remain
11 below average for as long as it takes to reconstitute the
12 command's expertise.
13 In addition, we can also expect that response time
14 to safety of flight decisions will be delayed, due to the
15 loss of experienced engineering personnel. Let me convey the
16 importance of this matter. When a given fleet of, for
17 example, CH-47s is grounded for some reason, ATCOM engineers
18 are the ones who must issue a safety of flight authorization
19 before those helicopters can once again fly. Until then, the
20 whole fleet is grounded. Over the pat year, ATCOM has issued
21 16 such safety of flight authorizations.
22 Finally, I'd like to use an example which

1 illustrates the importance of ATCOM's day-to-day operations.
2 It's very timely, given what's happened in the last couple
3 weeks.
4 We all recall the tragedy of Desert One, which was
5 the rescue mission for the hostages in Iran in the late
6 1970s. At that time, we put a total of, I think, about six
7 SH-53s into the air in support of that rescue mission. It
8 would have been ideal, at the time, to have had a great many
9 more helicopters involved, but the unfortunate truth was that
10 maintenance problems, among other concerns, made that mission
11 much less likely to succeed, from the start. The support
12 system that ATCOM maintains today was not there when it was
13 needed, in the late 1970s.
14 Contrast that tragedy with the success of last
15 week's rescue mission. Everything worked as it had to work.
16 It's ATCOM's business, in part, to keep those helicopters in
17 the air.
18 I want to mention one other consideration. The
19 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, led by
20 Mr. John White, has recommended that the Department of
21 Defense co-locate or consolidate all Army, Navy, and Air
22 Force program management offices responsible for development,

1 production, and support of military aircraft and related
2 equipment. In other words, the services are seeking to
3 consolidate to have joint, inter-service management of these
4 programs.
5 As the deputy secretary of defense, Mr. White will
6 have primary responsibility for implementing this
7 recommendation. Since implementation of the recommendation
8 will cause ATCOM's aviation functions to be consolidated with
9 similar functions from the other services at a yet-to-be-
10 determined site, the transfer of ATCOM's aviation functions
11 now to Huntsville would, if that co-location or consolidation
12 subsequently occurs, be an expense of over $100 million in
13 moving and construction costs that are just going to have to
14 be duplicated down the road when we do the consolidation
15 within the services.
16 Our long-term strategy has to be the same as the
17 Army's stationing strategy to optimize the operational
18 efficiency of the Army's research, development, testing, and
19 evaluation and material maintenance management functions.
20 Based on this reasoning, even apart from the other
21 cost considerations which we've discussed today, we ought to
22 set aside the proposal and, instead, seek to integrate the

1 command's responsibility within a reorganization concept that
2 is more strategic in scope, and which the services are
3 considering even as we speak.
4 In closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to repeat a very
5 keen and simple observation that General Shalikashvili made
6 in testimony before the House National Security Committee
7 earlier this spring, that our personnel, especially those
8 with years of leadership experience and specialized
9 knowledge, are the Army's greatest asset.
10 While it may take ten years to design and produce a
11 given weapons system, it usually takes about 18 years to
12 prepare an officer for command and well over 20 years for
13 division command. The critical investment that we've made in
14 each of these individuals is, in many respects, immeasurable.
15 Much the same can be made of our more experienced
16 ATCOM personnel. They are part of a proven team that, I
17 submit, will simply go away if this relocation takes place.
18 Again, I want to thank the Commission.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Talent.
20 We're delighted to welcome your colleague, the
21 distinguished Congressman from the State of Missouri,
22 Representative Ike Skelton.

1 REPRESENTATIVE SKELTON: Mr. Chairman and members
2 of the Commission, thank you for this opportunity to testify
3 before you.
4 I support the Department of Defense and the Army's
5 recommendation to move the Army Chemical and Military Police
6 Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood. Because of
7 the ending of the Cold War, our country has downsized its
8 military considerably and it continues to do so.
9 The Army, just prior to the Gulf War in 1990, Mr.
10 Chairman, had 764,000 active duty soldiers. Today, there are
11 532,000 active duty soldiers. Pentagon plans call for an
12 Army of 475,000, which I don't like, but that's what the
13 Pentagon wants.
14 Thus, it's necessary for the Army to close bases.
15 If the Army is forced to keep unneeded infrastructure, we
16 will be forced to have a hollow Army in the future. The Army
17 must maintain its effectiveness and become more efficient.
18 America does not need a financially strapped or bankrupt
19 Army.
20 A recent TRADOC memorandum states: "The relocation
21 of the Chemical and Military Police Schools is the first
22 piece in the TRADOC commanding general's strategic vision for

1 the future structure of the command." General Norman
2 Schwarzkopf, back in 1973, was involved in an attempt to
3 close Army bases, including Fort McClellan. General
4 Schwarzkopf has written that the Fort McClellan base was the
5 least efficient in the entire U.S. Army.
6 Today, it makes sense not only to reduce the Army
7 infrastructure, but to co-locate various branches and
8 schools. There are two major standards or criteria this
9 Commission should consider: military value and return on
10 investment.
11 Concerning the first, military value, a transfer to
12 Fort Leonard Wood would increase readiness by co-locating the
13 Chemical, Military Police, and Engineering Schools,
14 especially in river crossing training, counter-drug
15 operations, operations in rear areas, and protection of
16 supply routes training.
17 Second, Fort Leonard Wood is a logical location for
18 all these schools. It has 63,000 acres -- 17,000 more than
19 Fort McClellan. Fort Leonard Wood has 26 percent more work
20 space, 66 percent more family housing, and 32 percent more
21 barracks. Fort Leonard Wood facilities can easily
22 accommodate contingencies, as it is near transportation

1 outlets. Consolidation allows better use of Army manpower,
2 integrating all three branches in one place.
3 Concerning return on investment, the Army computes
4 that there will be a return on investment in six years by
5 moving the schools to Fort Leonard Wood. There will be a 45
6 million dollar per year savings.
7 The last Base Closure Commission stated the Army
8 should pursue all the required permits and certification for
9 the new site. The permits have been applied for by the Army
10 and they have been granted.
11 The Army recently sent this Commission a letter,
12 concluding six points. We have the environmental permits.
13 The smoke training has no impact on unit readiness.
14 Relocating the Military Police and Chemical Schools is an
15 integral component of the Army's strategic vision. The
16 relocation will cause minimal disruption, if any, to
17 training. No linkage exists between Fort McClellan and
18 international treaties, such as the still unratified Chemical
19 Weapons Convention. And care should be taken not to confuse
20 the installation of Fort McClellan with the institution
21 Chemical School.
22 There's been a major public relations effort, Mr.

1 Chairman, to collaterally attack the Army and the Department
2 of Defense's recommendation. The necessary permits have been
3 issued. They've been issued by the State of Missouri.
4 Taxpayer dollars will be saved, and the Army will be made all
5 the more ready to perform its mission with its new, smaller
6 size.
7 I urge this Commission to approve the
8 recommendations of the Department of Defense and of the
9 United States Army to move the Chemical School and the
10 Military Police School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
11 REPRESENTATIVE SKELTON: Thank you very much,
12 Congressman Skelton. We're indebted to you, sir. And thank
13 you, from the Commission, for the fine presentation by the
14 State of Missouri.
15 We are delighted to see the distinguished Senator
16 from the great State of Montana, Senator Conrad Burns, here.
17 Pleased to have you, Senator Burns.
18 SENATOR BURNS: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
19 thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to testify
20 before you this morning, taking time to take my comments, and
21 I commend you on the effort that you're making with regard to
22 your duties, and I look forward, as chairman of the Military

1 Construction and Appropriations Subcommittee, to help you
2 execute whatever your decision may be.
3 This morning, I'd like to address my cost and
4 savings logic to various options with regard to Malmstrom Air
5 Force Base in Montana. I strongly believe realigning
6 Malmstrom's 12 KC-135s is a foolish idea, and I give these
7 reasons:
8 It generates a suspect, at best, half million
9 dollars in annual savings; it generates a 20-year net present
10 value cost of around $8.3 million; and it ignores and would
11 mothball, over $100 million of state-of-the-art tanker
12 support facilities. The cost savings analysis of a realigned
13 Malmstrom scenario is based on what I think is an error in
14 the Air Force data which count as savings in the cost to run
15 MacDill Air Force Base's runway, which is over $4 million.
16 The reopening of MacDill's runway is a separate
17 recommendation, and the costs associated with that
18 independent action, which the Air Force says must occur
19 regardless of Commission recommendations on tankers to
20 MacDill, is inappropriate to count in the Malmstrom
21 recommendation.
22 The corrected projected savings of less than a half

1 a million dollars annually does not take into account the
2 cost to continue the missiles operation at Malmstrom, and
3 these costs include new commercial airport hot pad, critical
4 parts support, medical evacuation flights, commercial
5 mobilization support, helicopter traffic control, and, of
6 course, weather support. After these changes are in place
7 and paid for, annual net costs will accrue from the realigned
8 Malmstrom recommendation.
9 Now, to me, what makes sense is the complete
10 closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota; and I
11 say this because it maximizes savings with a total closure.
12 In other words, it is clean. The action pays back in only
13 one year. It produces reoccurring annual savings of over $87
14 million and it produces a 20-year net present value of over
15 $1.88 billion -- not million, billion.
16 Also Mr. Chairman and other Commissioners,
17 Malmstrom Air Force Base is a prime location to keep the
18 tankers. If you look at the facts surrounding the cost,
19 you'll see that it also makes sense financially.
20 Thank you very much for letting me present these
21 figures to you, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Burns, we're indebted to

1 you for that outstanding presentation. Now, let me mention
2 to you that the time frame for the great State of Montana is
3 9:26 through 9:41. I understand that your colleagues have,
4 in the one case, some traffic difficulty and, in the other
5 case, another problem.
6 But I hope you'll understand, with 121 members
7 testifying today, the Chair is obligated to be very, very
8 strict about time so that, if your delegation doesn't get
9 here on time, I will have to go to the State of New Jersey at
10 9:44.
11 SENATOR BURNS: I understand that, and I would ask
12 the Chairman, if they do not make it, can their testimony be
13 made part of the record?
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It can be made part of the record
15 and, unless we get into too late an hour, they could come in
16 at the end of the day, although the Chair admonishes my good
17 friend that we are working through the 7 O'clock hour
18 already, and so the hour may get somewhat late.
19 SENATOR BURNS: I was here early, because I know
20 how tight your schedule is, and I know mine is just as tight
21 as yours, so I'm going to --
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'd like to accommodate, but you

1 can see that we have 120 Members.

2 SENATOR BURNS: I understand. I understand. And

3 the Chairman, when I served with him in the United States

4 Senate, was always known to be a fair Senator, and I would

5 imagine he's the same kind of a Chairman. Thank you very

6 much.

7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much for those

8 kind remarks and I thank you for your contribution, Senator.

9 Ladies and gentlemen, Senator Burns's colleague is

10 stuck in traffic. That's happened to this former Member a

11 lot of times. The State of New Jersey has been called, and

12 we will be in temporary recess for about six or seven

13 minutes.

14 (A brief recess was taken.)

15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair takes note of the fact

16 that the distinguished senior Senator from the great State of

17 New Jersey is here. As usual, he is early, which is to his

18 credit, and we are pleased to welcome before the Commission

19 the distinguished senior Senator from the great State of New

20 Jersey, Senator Bill Bradley.

21 SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman

22 and Commissioner Kling, Commissioner Cox for giving me the

1 opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of two very
2 important military assets.
3 I've already had the opportunity to appear before
4 some of you at the Commission's regional hearing in New York
5 to demonstrate why closing the Military Ocean Terminal at
6 Bayonne and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Lakehurst would
7 undermine the goals of this Commission.
8 Shutting down these installations would not reduce
9 unnecessary infrastructure and would not save taxpayer money.
10 What it would do is cause a dangerous reduction in the level
11 of military readiness that is critical to maintaining our
12 strong national defense.
13 I testified then and I maintain today that
14 decisions to close these installations were based upon
15 incorrect premises, incomplete analysis, and insufficient
16 understanding of their unique attributes. As you well know,
17 I'm certainly not alone in the assessment on these two bases.
18 The director of the largest general cargo port on
19 the East and Gulf Coasts successfully challenged the premise
20 for closing Bayonne. Lillian Liburdie conveyed to you on May
21 5th that commercial ports are increasingly unable to deal
22 with the disruptions that result from military activity.

1 They have, in fact, turned away military shipments, due to
2 the pressures of commercial business.
3 And yet, the Army wants to close the Bayonne
4 terminal, because it believes, "Bayonne provides the Army
5 with few military capabilities that cannot be accomplished at
6 commercial ports."
7 I must ask, where is the study and the accompanying
8 analysis to back up this assertion? What evidence does the
9 Army use as a basis for eliminating -- not moving, not
10 downsizing, but eliminating -- the capability that Bayonne
11 provides.
12 Mr. Chairman, there is no study, and there is no
13 evidence, and the conclusion is simply indefensible. It
14 would be a grave mistake to force shipments of munitions and
15 equipment for our troops to wait in line behind commercial
16 cargo. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the
17 delays this move may cause to deploying troops and equipment
18 cannot be quantified.
19 To sacrifice Bayonne would be to sacrifice a
20 military asset that has proven its value to this nation again
21 and again. This move would come to haunt our military in the
22 event of another sudden deployment, such as Desert Storm or

1 Operation Restore Hope.

2 Mr. Chairman, those of you who were present at the
3 hearing on May 5th will no doubt remember the powerful
4 testimony of another expert, Commander Michael Hagy of the
5 Save Lakehurst Committee. I'm sure you remember. It was a
6 very dramatic moment, one of the more dramatic moments that
7 I've participated in in these base closure hearings.

8 He demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the
9 recommendation to tear apart Lakehurst is not just unfounded
10 and misguided, it is downright senseless. Lakehurst designs
11 and tests aircraft catapult and arresting gear. This is the
12 gear that ensures that our pilots can safely take off from
13 and land on aircraft carriers.

14 Our pilots put their lives in the hands of the
15 people at Lakehurst and the Lakehurst team's virtually
16 perfect safety record has demonstrated that those lives are
17 in good hands. Yet, the recommendation demands that the Navy
18 rip apart this model of excellence and scatter it up and down
19 the East Coast of the United States.

20 The Navy recommends that we tear machines and
21 equipment out of the ground in New Jersey and then rebuild
22 those same machines in Florida. How is this going to save

1 taxpayers any money? How does this scenario relieve the
2 military of unnecessary infrastructure? And, most
3 importantly, how does this continue to ensure that our pilots
4 are in capable and experienced hands?
5 The answer to all these questions is the same. It
6 does not. This move would put hundreds of miles between
7 people who engineer catapult and arresting gear and the
8 experts that test them to ensure that it is safe for our
9 pilots to rely on them.
10 Today, if a piece of equipment for an aircraft
11 carrier needs to be reworked or fine tuned, it is shipped
12 across the grounds at Lakehurst to the machine shop. In this
13 new scenario, it will have to be shipped from Florida all the
14 way back up to Lakehurst and then back to Florida again --
15 Mr. Chairman, a senseless plan.
16 This Commission has a number of difficult decisions
17 to make during this process. It must scrutinize an extensive
18 list of recommended closures and realignments and make sure
19 that these recommendations were based upon a fair and
20 rational assessment of the value of those bases.
21 Mr. Chairman, I hope we in New Jersey have helped
22 to demonstrate to you that fair and rational are not words

1 that can be used to describe the recommendations to close
2 Bayonne and to realign Lakehurst. I hope the facts will lead
3 you to reject those recommendations. Thank you very much.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank the distinguished senior
5 Senator from the great State of New Jersey, Senator Bill
6 Bradley.
7 We are going to revert to Montana very briefly, to
8 hear from the distinguished senior Senator from Montana,
9 Senator Max Baucus.
10 SENATOR BAUCUS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
11 Before I begin, I just want to thank all of you, all the
12 commissioners, for performing a great public service in
13 taking the time, frankly, to go to all the communities
14 affected around our country, ask a lot of questions, dig deep
15 into what's going on here.
16 I must say that's one way to help restore some of
17 the lost confidence the American people have in the federal
18 government -- that is, your extra effort in going to listen
19 to people and talk to people; and I just want to commend you
20 all for it.
21 Mr. Chairman, thank you again for calling this
22 hearing and giving me an opportunity to testify. This

1 process, as you know better than I, was created to keep
2 politics out of base closing. You will decide to keep a base
3 and its missions going if they are cost effective parts of a
4 national security strategy.
5 I believe the air refueling mission at Malmstrom
6 Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana is just that. As home
7 of the 341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom is our country's premier
8 Minuteman-III missile base, undisputed and, as the base of
9 the 43rd Air Refueling Group, it supports virtually every
10 major contingency operation, including refueling flights to
11 Europe, Asia, Middle East, and Central America.
12 In March, the Department of Defense reviewed these
13 missions and it concluded that the missile mission ranked as
14 one of the nation's best, and should remain in place, but it
15 also said the flying mission had limited utility at should
16 move to Florida.
17 The main reason for this latter recommendation
18 seems to be the general conclusion that the Southeast needs
19 more tankers, and they have to come from somewhere. Maybe,
20 Commissioners, the Southeast does need some more tankers but,
21 before reviewing the data in detail, I must say that they
22 should not come from the Northwest.

1 Malmstrom is ideal for peacetime training and
2 wartime operations. We have more air space, fewer big
3 cities, and a drier climate than almost any part of the
4 country. As several of you commissioners saw when you
5 visited Malmstrom, encroachment, noise abatement, and
6 restricted flight paths are not a problem. They don't call
7 us the Big Sky State for nothing. We've got a lot of wide
8 open space.
9 In conflicts, tankers from the Northwest and
10 Malmstrom, in particular, can reach their destinations faster
11 than tankers from the Southeast, by flying over the North
12 Pole to Asia or Russia. These are the places where politics
13 are unstable, armies are large, and potential threats are
14 high.
15 Now, let's look at the numbers. Here, Malmstrom's
16 flying mission comes up just as well as the common sense look
17 at the big picture would suggest, and much better than the
18 principal competitor in Grand Forks.
19 The Air Force itself, in its February 1995 report
20 to BRAC, rates Malmstrom's flying mission -- underline the
21 word "flying" -- very high. On a scale of green, down
22 through yellow to red -- green being the best, red the worst

1 -- Malmstrom's flying mission was rated a green-minus.

2 Malmstrom has an excellent alternative air field

3 with extra runway capacity at Great Falls International

4 Airport. The dry air prevents rust and corrosion, meaning

5 that aircraft based at Malmstrom have low maintenance and

6 operating costs, and the Air Force rated all these factors,

7 along with the basic weather and other flying conditions, a

8 green.

9 When it comes to condition and support, Malmstrom

10 again fares well. Its infrastructure and buildings are in

11 excellent condition. Its utilities have great excess

12 capacity. The lack of nearby urban development means

13 Malmstrom can expand significantly if necessary during a war.

14 The Defense Department has invested millions of

15 dollars to give Malmstrom state-of-the-art support equipment,

16 such as a new fuel dispensing center and a three-bay hangar,

17 so Malmstrom's facilities are more than adequate for its

18 flying mission and, at relatively minor expense, it could

19 handle a larger mission than it has today.

20 To give both sides, the major complaint in the Air

21 Force report was that Malmstrom has relatively small runway

22 and parking capabilities. Yet the Air Force also rated the

1 air field capabilities, the runways, the taxis, and the
2 aprons, a perfect green for the tanker mission and even for
3 wide-bodied aircraft.
4 In comparison, Grand Forks Air Force Base received
5 an overall flying mission rating of yellow-plus. Its
6 infrastructure got a yellow-plus, while the building
7 condition ranked yellow. So the choice boils down to a
8 choice between a student earning As and Bs -- Malmstrom --
9 and another student earnings Cs and Ds. The choice should
10 not be difficult.
11 If Grand Forks were completely closed, as now being
12 considered by BRAC, a squadron or more of its four tanker
13 squadrons could move to the Southeast and a squadron to
14 Malmstrom. This would satisfy the Air Force's need for more
15 tankers in the Southeast and, as the Air Force also requires,
16 it would still keep a solid presence in the North.
17 Finally, a word on behalf of our service personnel.
18 They work very hard, take big risks for their country. They
19 do not make much money for it. To them, Great Falls offers a
20 high quality of life at a low cost. There is plenty of on-
21 base and off-base housing, transportation is convenient,
22 school system excellent; and all of it is cheap, especially

1 compared to a place like Tampa Bay, where they're supposed to
2 move.
3 In closing, whether you're looking at national
4 security, the budget, or the morale of our servicemen and
5 women, Malmstrom makes sense. It's a good deal, and I
6 believe the flying mission should stay there. Again, thank
7 you once again. I very much appreciate the job you're doing.
8 You're not being praised very much for all that you're doing
9 but it's a job that has to be done, and I thank you very much
10 for your service.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished senior
12 Senator from the great State of Montana.
13 We're delighted to have the distinguished Senator
14 from the great State of New Jersey, Senator Frank Lautenberg.
15 SENATOR LAUTENBERG: Good morning. Chairman Dixon,
16 welcome to Washington, sir.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you.
18 SENATOR LAUTENBERG: It's nice to see all of you
19 again and to thank you for the work that you and your staffs
20 have done these past months and, on behalf of New Jersey and
21 the country, I want to thank you. It is not a task for which
22 you're often complimented, but the fact is that you've been

1 assigned this duty and you're doing it, in my view, fully
2 comprehensively and without question.
3 America's current military strategy depends so much
4 on forward deployment, power projection, and rapid
5 reinforcement. Each of New Jersey's bases on the Pentagon's
6 list -- Lakehurst Naval Engineering Station, Military Ocean
7 Terminal Bayonne, and Fort Dix -- plays an essential role in
8 making our strategy a success.
9 As America's permanent military presence overseas
10 is reduced, our forward deployment depends more and more on
11 the Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups. And, with that,
12 it's critical to note that the Lakehurst Naval Air
13 Engineering Station is the key to our carrier operations.
14 Lakehurst is an acknowledged pioneer in something
15 called concurrent engineering. By developing, testing and,
16 in the case of some critical components, manufacturing
17 catapult and arresting gear, Lakehurst brings the entire
18 research, development, testing, engineering cycle under one
19 roof.
20 The result has been an astounding, near perfect
21 degree of reliability and safety in American carrier
22 operations, with over 2 million -- 2 million -- successful

1 launches and retrievals in just the past five years. Even
2 reducing the reliability of the Lakehurst mission by one-half
3 percent could mean that six aircraft and their crews would be
4 lost each day of carrier operations.
5 At that rate, America's strategic choices would be
6 grim -- either shut down carrier operations or suffer losses
7 that, in a year, would exceed our entire inventory of
8 carrier-based aircraft. And yet, the Pentagon's plans are to
9 dismantle this unique facility and scatter it to the winds,
10 hoping that Lakehurst skills can be duplicated elsewhere.
11 Doing so would not save as much money as the
12 Pentagon would have us believe. We've seen those questions
13 raised.
14 For example, in its report on the BRAC, the GAO
15 noted the Pentagon's recommendation to close Lakehurst is
16 based on substantial changes to original estimates by the
17 Navy's BRAC team. These changes artificially reduce the cost
18 of closing comparisons for Lakehurst from almost $220 million
19 to just under $97 million.
20 Commissioners, the Pentagon's plans to close
21 Lakehurst are shortsighted and unsound. They spell a high-
22 risk gamble for American carrier operations and for our

1 strategy of forward deployment.

2 Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne is a perfect
3 complement with Lakehurst, with America's efforts to project
4 military power from the Continental United States to overseas
5 in time of crisis. No other port on the East or the Gulf
6 Coast, commercial or military, can duplicate Bayonne's unique
7 combination of capabilities.

8 Unlike commercial ports, moving mixed cargo to
9 Bayonne is fast, economical, and unimpeded. Bayonne
10 straddles the huge, highly developed multi-modal
11 transportation network of the American Northeast Corridor.

12 Now, unlike most commercial ports, once cargo
13 arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast
14 covered and uncovered staging areas in a secure mode and,
15 unlike any commercial ports, these staging areas are fully
16 protected and any military cargo can be accommodated there.

17 Unlike any commercial port, all types of cargo --
18 from heavy, outsized, non-containerized weapons, like the M-
19 182 Abrams tanks to munitions to provisions -- can be loaded
20 by Bayonne's very, very unique, well-trained labor force,
21 using state-of-the-art dedicated rail lines.

22 Bayonne has the best steaming time to Europe -- a

1 full day's advantage, potentially the difference between life
2 and death in combat -- of any U.S. port, bar none.
3 Beyond all of these advantages, however, one thing
4 about Bayonne stands out above all else, as our recent
5 operations in the Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti have proven beyond
6 doubt. Bayonne's heavy sealift capabilities are always
7 available to us.
8 Unlike commercial ports, which can be commandeered
9 only in times of a declared national emergency, Bayonne has
10 no for-profit impediments. No contracts need to be broken,
11 no commercial cargo to displace.
12 So, Commissioners, I would ask that you please
13 consider that the Pentagon has recommended closing Bayonne in
14 favor of using commercial ports without first examining
15 whether these ports are both available and able to handle
16 Bayonne's mission.
17 I thank you once again for hearing us, for the
18 visits that many of you have made to these installations in
19 New Jersey. I'm sure that, having done that, those who have
20 had a chance to see it recognize the unique excellence of all
21 of these facilities; and I thank you for your time and your
22 efforts.

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much, Senator
2 Lautenberg.
3 And, from your House delegation, we're delighted to
4 welcome Representative Jim Saxton. Representative Saxton,
5 from the great State of New Jersey.
6 REPRESENTATIVE SAXTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you
7 very much, and Commissioners. It's -- gee, I'm so used to
8 starting speeches by saying "It's a pleasure to be here," but
9 it doesn't seem quite appropriate. But it is, really.
10 (Laughter.)
11 REPRESENTATIVE SAXTON: I'd just like to do two
12 things.
13 First, I'd like to thank you very much for your
14 cooperation with regard to fine-tuning that was necessary on
15 the recommendation for Fort Dix. The Chief of Staff of the
16 Army, General Reimer, the Commander of the Reserve force, the
17 U.S. Army Reserve, General Barritz and their staffs and your
18 staff, have been wonderful partners in making sure that we
19 end up with a recommendation with regard to the new mission
20 at Fort Dix that is workable and staffed correctly; and we
21 thank you very much for that.
22 Let me secondly talk about some success stories

1 which will lead up to, I think, the crux of the issue with
2 regard to Lakehurst Naval War Center, success stories that
3 we're able to experience through BRAC and through our
4 military services, otherwise. I think there are three very
5 good examples that I'm very, very close to.
6 First of all, Commissioner Cox was here two years
7 ago when a decision was made with regard to McGuire Air Force
8 Base and the power projection facility that was made possible
9 because of a decision that was made here. That facility, in
10 conjunction with Fort Dix, is now the power projection
11 platform for the northeastern part of the country through
12 which people and material fly off to far parts of the world
13 on a daily basis.
14 It is, in fact, a success story that was brought
15 about because of a consolidation -- a very key word, I
16 believe -- a consolidation of activities that took place,
17 that now take place on a very efficient basis.
18 Secondly, I'm intimately familiar with one of the
19 Navy's weapon systems that is a tremendous success story and
20 advances each year into new and better facilities. That, of
21 course, is known as the AEGIS System, which is a weapon
22 system that is, for all practical purposes, the backbone of

1 our Naval tactical defense system, in that it protects our
2 fleets when they're out to sea
3 The facilities are consolidated at the now
4 Lockheed-Martin facility in Morristown, New Jersey where the
5 components are brought together and engineered and put
6 together in a way that makes the AEGIS system a very, very
7 good system and, as a matter of fact, I would say, without
8 question, second to none of anyplace in the world.
9 The third success story currently takes place at
10 Lakehurst where the facilities that are necessary to carry
11 out our Naval air carrier activities are engineered and
12 designed in one compact, efficient operation which is
13 currently in place at Lakehurst. I don't think anybody
14 questions how important it is to have a facility coordinated,
15 an activity carried out, where engineer and design and
16 testing and production all take place simultaneously in one
17 location.
18 The recommendation of the Navy, to my way of
19 thinking at least, destroys that third success story, because
20 it separates the engineering and design, testing and
21 production, and sends part of it to Florida, sends part of it
22 to Virginia, and keeps part of it in New Jersey.

1 It has been successful, and the third success story
2 that I speak of, because of the mere fact that we've been
3 able to carry out -- in a successful way, in a productive
4 way, in an efficient way, in a cost-effective way -- the
5 activities that have gone on at Lakehurst and to destroy
6 that, to separate it, and to diminish it, as Senator
7 Lautenberg says, by as little as one-half of one percent
8 costs lives, costs efficiency, costs dollars.
9 We appeal to you today -- and I know that
10 Commissioner Cox will be -- hopefully, I'll be able to
11 accompany her on Friday, if my schedule allows, to take a
12 second look at Lakehurst and, of course, Commissioner
13 Cornella was already there, to experience that success story
14 that I speak of.
15 So we thank you very much for giving us the
16 opportunity to make these points this morning and we look
17 forward to keeping that success story alive. Thank you very
18 much.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Saxton, we thank you
20 for your important contribution.
21 We're delighted to have your colleague,
22 Representative Chris Smith.

1 REPRESENTATIVE SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
2 members of the Commission.
3 Mr. Chairman, the Pentagon's recommendation to
4 radically realign the missions of Lakehurst Naval Air Warfare
5 Center puts carrier aviation at risk, especially in the short
6 term, and may cost two or three times more than the Pentagon
7 suggests. Navy Lakehurst is a unique, one of a kind, world
8 class facility whose primary function is to ensure that
9 aircraft safely launch and recover from the deck of a carrier
10 or other platform, and that support equipment assists in the
11 service of planes, parts, and ordnance at sea.
12 Navy Lakehurst has long been distinguished, and had
13 a long and distinguished record in technological development,
14 engineering, developmental evaluation and verification,
15 systems integration, prototype manufacturing of air launch
16 and recovery equipment, known by the acronym ARA, and support
17 equipment.
18 There is no doubt that the Navy benefits from the
19 synergy of co-locating the means of development,
20 manufacturing and testing of aircraft carrier, catapult and
21 arresting gear, and support equipment. The burden, it seems
22 to me, Mr. Chairman, is on the Navy to clearly demonstrate

1 how carrier aviation is improved or at least remains the
2 same, by proceeding with realignment. It is a burden they
3 cannot meet.
4 Research conducted over the past several months by
5 our Save Lakehurst Committee has raised serious questions
6 that flight ops may suffer and the fleet may become
7 unnecessarily vulnerable if the Lakehurst mission is torn
8 apart. It is impossible for the Navy to replicate its almost
9 perfect success rate of carrier takeoffs and landings without
10 first experiencing a costly and potentially dangerous period
11 of interruption. Why, Mr. Chairman, should we put the
12 linchpin of Navy aviation at risk?
13 Interestingly, our concerns are echoed, to some
14 extent, by BCEG itself. In a May letter to the Commission by
15 Charlie Nemfakos, the vice chairman of BCEG, he pointed out,
16 and I quote: "Some industrial, economic, performance
17 advantages may be lost by separating ARA, manufacturing, and
18 prototyping and support equipment from ARA testing.
19 One has to ask, Mr. Chairman, if performance
20 advantages may be lost, wy break it up? In almost every
21 instance at sea, our planes now launch as advertised. Our
22 aircraft are recovered without incident. If a glitch is

1 found in design of a flight-critical item, they call
2 Lakehurst.
3 There at Lakehurst, the requisite problem solvers
4 are immediately available, in close proximity to one another,
5 to design it, to manufacture it, and to fix it without delay.
6 The DOD scenario says, relocate the prototype
7 manufacturing of ARA to the Navy depot in Jacksonville, and
8 the support equipment to Pax River. Artificially separating
9 the evaluation and testing capabilities from the prototype
10 manufacturing function defies logic. Our research shows
11 that, in a crisis situation, this could mean delays, costly
12 delays, that put a mission in jeopardy.
13 Here again, Mr. Nemfakos agrees. In his letter he
14 explains that the distance between the functions that
15 remained at Lakehurst and those that were moved to
16 Jacksonville will mean -- and I quote -- "two additional days
17 to transport between a shop in Jacksonville to a Lakehurst
18 test site."
19 You know, it reminds me of the song by Willie
20 Nelson, On The Road Again. We will have flight critical
21 items going back and forth, back and forth, being retested
22 over and over again. Where it could have just gone two

1 miles, they now will be going hundreds of miles.

2 Delays, whether measured in hours or days, during a
3 crisis could quickly put the lives of our pilots, our crews,
4 and our sailors at risk. Any delays are likely to mean a
5 degradation of mission competence and safety, and I defy
6 anyone to make the case that flight readiness and safety are
7 improved or even remain the same when design and manufacture
8 of flight-critical prototype items are separated from the
9 test and evaluation function.

10 Mr. Chairman, the question has to be raised, can
11 tearing apart a textbook case of concurrent engineering which
12 has proven itself over and over again be justified to save
13 money? I think not. But, incredibly, the DOD scenario
14 doesn't even save money. It actually costs taxpayers more
15 money than keeping the current system in place.

16 The actual cost of realignment is likely to be
17 between two and three times higher than what DOD said it
18 would be. That is not a minor miscalculation. That's a
19 gross error. The DOD recommendation estimates a one-time
20 cost of realignment at just $97 million. The certified data
21 from Admiral Bowes put it at 162, the Save Lakehurst
22 Committee at 218, and a more recent figure puts it at $260

1 million.

2 We're seeing a doubling, perhaps as much as a

3 tripling of the cost and again, it puts our mission

4 competence at grave risk.

5 I know that Commissioner Cox will be making a trip

6 to Lakehurst on Friday. Commissioner Cornella has been kind

7 enough to come and take a good, hard look. I strongly invite

8 other Commissioners to come. Seeing is believing, and I

9 think when you see what goes on there and the importance of

10 concurrent engineering, you, too, will be convinced we should

11 not break up Lakehurst. It works. It works well. It would

12 be a gross error to break it up.

13 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

15 Smith.

16 (Applause.)

17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We are delighted to have

18 Congressman Frank Pallone here.

19 REPRESENTATIVE PALLONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman

20 and Commissioners. I do appreciate the opportunity to be

21 able to testify before you today.

22 I'm going to talk about primarily Fort Monmouth, as

1 a facility for C4I capabilities. As I think you know, your
2 Commission essentially has an opportunity today to begin the
3 process of consolidation and co-location of C4I capability --
4 which is command, control, communication, computers, and
5 intelligence -- and the opportunity for cross-servicing these
6 functions. A goal which so often has been sought and so
7 consistently eluded, I think, by the Pentagon will not arise
8 again soon.
9 My real statement to you today is to say please,
10 take this opportunity, which is unique with the BRAC, to go
11 ahead with the cross-servicing notion, with regard to Fort
12 Monmouth.
13 I think you know that the concept of cross-
14 servicing is not new. The '93 BRAC report to the President
15 noted that the Department of Defense has been attempting, for
16 about 20 years, without significant success, to inter-service
17 and, as a result, the '93 Commission recommended exhaustive
18 review of the issue of cross-servicing for this BRAC '95
19 deliberations.
20 During the '95 process, the Laboratory Joint Cross-
21 Service Group recommended Fort Monmouth as the site for C4I
22 relocation. Unfortunately, the only co-location that was

1 recommended as part of the Pentagon's recommendation to you
2 was with regard to the Air Force and the Rome Labs.
3 There were other opportunities there, but they were
4 missed, and the Accounting Office, the General Accounting
5 Office actually noted that it would have been a good idea if
6 there were more opportunities, but this is the only one,
7 essentially, that you have before you today.
8 You've heard from the Rome Labs supporters, who I'm
9 sure are going to be also talking again today, and they've
10 argued that it's too expensive to close the Rome Labs but,
11 after close examination, I believe it is apparent that
12 dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom Air
13 Force Base does produce annual savings and a return on
14 investment within four to six years, and significant return
15 on investment.
16 The first COBRA, which some of the Rome people have
17 cited, dated October 13th of '94, indicated an estimated one-
18 time cost of $133 million and estimated it would take more
19 than 100 years to recoup the costs, but that was before the
20 Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs suggested relocation and,
21 in a sense, dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and
22 Hanscom.

1 Once that alternative was calculated and the COBRA
2 was done again, in February 23rd of this year, it illustrated
3 the one-time cost at $52.8 million with a four-year return on
4 investment and, as you know, another COBRA was conducted just
5 a few weeks ago on May 23rd. And, although the one-time cost
6 under that COBRA increased to $79.2 million, the return on
7 investment would still be only six years, which is a short
8 time.
9 In addition, the latest COBRA analysis found the
10 most cost savings, $13 million per year. Over a 20-year
11 period, in excess of $180 million would be saved by this
12 closure.
13 I know that you've looked at this and you're going
14 to look at it again over the next few weeks or so, but there
15 are significant savings resulting from Rome being split
16 essentially between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom, and I think
17 that the Air Force has shown that.
18 Fort Monmouth, I think as you know -- Commissioner
19 Cornella has been there and Commissioner Cox was there a
20 couple of years ago -- provides an excellent environment for
21 the co-location of C4I capabilities for a number of reasons.
22 We have an ideal integrated command structure. We

1 already have existing C4I joint activities in many areas. We
2 have the physical space to accommodate the Rome Labs, and we
3 have the technological academic base to make cross-servicing
4 of C4I activities a success.
5 We've been the center of gravity for C4I activities
6 and innovations for many years, and I think that we're
7 uniquely postured to achieve the vision, if you will, of
8 cross-servicing that has been talked about by the previous
9 BRAC, as well as by the Joint Cross Service Working Group on
10 Labs.
11 I wanted to also mention two other suggestions for
12 additional functions to come to Fort Monmouth.
13 One is with regard to the Aviation Troop Command at
14 St. Louis. There, we are asking basically or the Pentagon
15 has asked that the realigning research and development
16 portion of the life cycle of six ATCOM business areas be
17 relocated to Fort Monmouth.
18 By realigning the rest of the life cycle to CECOM,
19 BRAC '95 would eliminate duplication of efforts and achieves
20 the efficiencies and mission enhancement of one command
21 managing the entire life cycle. We already have a number of
22 these functions at Fort Monmouth, pursuant to the previous

1 BRAC, and it only makes sense for this one from ATCOM to come
2 here.
3 Lastly, I wanted to talk about Bayonne. I wanted
4 to add to the others from the New Jersey delegation who do
5 not support the closure of Bayonne. I don't think it should
6 close. I think that would be a mistake.
7 But, as you may know, and I'm sure you've looked at
8 it, the Pentagon recommendation says that if Bayonne does
9 close, then significant functions are suggested to come to
10 Fort Monmouth, and I would suggest that, if you do mistakenly
11 close Bayonne, that it would certainly make sense for those
12 functions to come to Fort Monmouth, because of our proximity
13 to the port facilities and the fact that it would lessen the
14 personal impact of this BRAC recommendation if those
15 employees, who are primarily in New Jersey, were allowed to
16 come to Fort Monmouth.
17 I appreciate your involvement in this, and thank
18 you very much.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Pallone.
21 We're delighted to see your distinguished
22 colleague, Representative Robert Menendez here.

1 REPRESENTATIVE MENENDEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
2 members of the Commission. I want to thank all the
3 commissioners for continuing to be engaged, Commissioners
4 Kling and Cornella for their visit to the site, Commissioner
5 Cox, who had an opportunity to speak, and others. We
6 appreciate your continuing involvement. I hope you will not
7 disappoint Congressman Pallone and make sure that he doesn't
8 have to get all that excess out of Bayonne to his site.
9 The MOPF closure recommendation is still, still
10 based on the unstudied and untested assumption that dedicated
11 military port facilities can be eliminated and that
12 commercial capacity will be available to handle all current
13 and future mission requirements, and it's a very tenuous
14 assumption, because in closing MOPF, you're not reducing
15 excess capacity, you are losing an essential military
16 capability which cannot be reestablished.
17 We believe the Army proposal to close MOPF
18 substantially deviates from the four selection criteria,
19 starting with number one, the impact on the operational
20 readiness of the DOD's total force.
21 There still is no study or test which examines,
22 evaluates, or supports the assumption that sufficient

1 commercial port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts are
2 available to support power projection requirements with a
3 minimum loss to operational capacity. MTMC first started
4 looking at this in April of this year, after the decisions
5 were made.
6 Availability of facilities at both the existing and
7 potential receiving locations is the second criteria.
8 Existence of commercial port capacity is not the same as
9 availability. Lillian Liburdie, one of the nation's leading
10 experts on the New York-New Jersey Port Authority testified
11 to this before the full Commission, in essence stating that
12 exactly that is the case.
13 The third criteria is the ability to accommodate
14 contingency mobilization and future total force requirements
15 at both existing and potential receiving locations. The
16 operational impacts and risks to rapid mobilization and
17 future force projection needs, I think, are incalculable now
18 that both MOPF and MOFFA could be closed.
19 Criterion four is cost and manpower implications.
20 As I said, there are no costs related to the mission, the
21 cost studies, the movement of cargo and, without the cost
22 studies, we may never be able to control costs for the

1 movement of cargo.

2 The Army tab study has been forced to change, as we
3 suggested to you at the hearing that it would have to change
4 its COBRA costs and savings estimates and, while they're
5 termed "refinements," I would consider the initial figures to
6 be drastically wrong.

7 As I suggested in our full presentation, and now by
8 their own admission, the MOPF estimates were off -- 20
9 percent off for return on investment, 75 percent off on
10 changes to costs and savings over the implementation period,
11 and 77 percent off net present value change; and those are
12 only the figures for the Army.

13 You've heard, at the presentations and the site
14 visits, that the enclave supposedly left behind, they
15 basically take the position that they cannot do it on their
16 own; there will be significant cost to them if they become
17 the landlords at the base. That has not been calculated
18 here. So the percentages that are off are just dealing what
19 Army costs.

20 They've acknowledge the gross error in the assembly
21 of its COBRA model. Our figures from our financial analysts,
22 Coopers and Lybrand, indicate that it will take over 30 years

1 for the Army to recoup the costs necessary to close MOPF and
2 create a stand-along enclave for selective tenants, and these
3 areas seriously call into question the assumptions on which
4 this closure recommendation is based.
5 Finally, the most overarching cost problem is
6 totally unstudied. It is the cost to the military for the
7 mission of moving military cargo and the disruption of
8 commercial ports. Military port usage is already among the
9 most commercialized activities in the entire DOD.
10 Defense agencies must pay for services on the basis
11 of commercial tariffs and are responsible for all costs
12 arising from the loss of business, and no labor costs were
13 included in the estimates of the cost of purchasing
14 commercial port services.
15 There's no legal authority to disrupt commercial
16 port operation in the absence of a declared emergency. By
17 that time, it would be long after the need to mobilize and
18 use the ports. The Kuwait invasion, as an example, was in
19 August of 1990. Congress authorized the use of force five
20 months later. That's not going to be able to work at
21 commercial port activities.
22 Now, there's no absolute assurance and timely

1 access to ports for fast power projection without MOPF. MTMC
2 claims that MOPF will result in the loss of few capabilities.
3 We reject that. These capabilities are critical, time-
4 sensitive. I've talked a lot about costs, but that's not
5 only the decisions you have to make.
6 Military value is about things we can't buy. We
7 can't buy back time when there is delay in the arrival of
8 equipment. We cannot buy back an American soldier's life
9 when reinforcements come too late. The selection criteria
10 are right. The MOPF decision to close is wrong. And I'll be
11 submitting additional information to the Commissioners for
12 their consideration. Thank you so much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And your additional information
14 will be reproduced in the record. Thank you, Congressman
15 Menendez.
16 We're delighted to have your distinguished
17 colleague, Representative Dick Zimmer.
18 REPRESENTATIVE ZIMMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
19 members of the Commission. I would like to address the issue
20 that my colleague, Frank Pallone, discussed, which is the
21 consolidation and co-location of functions from the Rome Lab
22 to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

1 Operation Desert Storm demonstrated dramatically
2 the transformation of modern warfare. It showed that a fully
3 integrated battlefield is increasingly important to our
4 country's military success. Because of the importance of
5 interoperability of information systems in battle space,
6 United States technology supervision must be maximized to
7 fully integrate all elements of the sea, land, air
8 battlefield. This can best be done through cross-servicing.
9 The Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs agreed with
10 this assessment, recommending Fort Monmouth as the site for
11 C4I co-location, one of few inter-servicing steps taken by
12 the Department of Defense in BRAC '95, and right in line with
13 BRAC '93 guidance for more cross-servicing.
14 Co-location of the leading Air Force and Army C4I
15 centers will ensure that a coordinated C4I development
16 procurement test and implementation plan is pursued. It will
17 promote joint interoperability and create a world class C4I
18 center, a national center of information warfare.
19 I believe Fort Monmouth has the expert, experienced
20 staff to lead the DOD effort in C4I. Fort Monmouth is the
21 leader in four mission areas chosen for consolidation at Fort
22 Monmouth -- photonics, electromagnetics, radio communication,

1 and communications networks.

2 The fort has 68 research and development agreements
3 with leading edge academic institutions, including nearby
4 Princeton, Rutgers, New Jersey Institute of Technology, and
5 Stevens Institute. It has public-private partnerships with
6 New Jersey leaders in C4I technology, such as AT&T, Bell
7 Labs, and IT&T, and is located in the state that enjoys the
8 highest concentration of scientists and engineers in the
9 nation per capita.

10 In terms of physical space, Fort Monmouth possesses
11 extensive, low-cost expansion capacity. The fort includes
12 more than 1,000 acres on the main post and Charles Wood area,
13 and, because of previous BRAC decisions, has available more
14 than 500,000 square feet of fully modernized, professional
15 work space.

16 The fort has state-of-the-art facilities to support
17 C4I mission, including a variety of unique high-technology
18 facilities, such as the digital integrated lab, the Myers
19 Center and, in particular, includes world-class laboratory
20 space and state-of-the-art infrastructure to house the
21 thousands of engineers and scientists who work there today,
22 on the cutting edge of information technology.

1 BRAC and non-BRAC-related movements from the post
2 have created significant expansion potential for cross-
3 servicing. This potential is complemented by available
4 housing for military families and the full range of medical,
5 dental, shopping, and recreational activities on post to
6 support them.
7 Fort Monmouth has the ideal integrated commodity
8 command structure, already predominates the C4I joint arena,
9 and has the physical space and technological and academic
10 environment to make cross-servicing of C4I activities there a
11 success.
12 I strongly support the Joint Cross-Service Group
13 recommendations. Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
15 Representative Zimmer. We thank the distinguished New Jersey
16 delegation for their very fine presentation and we ask our
17 friends from Lakehurst to file out silently, and we thank
18 them for being here.
19 We will go next to the New York delegation. Let
20 the Chair first make this announcement, please, as the folks
21 from New Jersey are leaving the room. Yesterday, we had 81
22 Members of the House and Senate and, from 8:30 until 6:10

1 p.m., in direct compliance with the schedule, we heard 81
2 Members of the House and Senate.
3 There's something in the water today, and the Chair
4 is obligated to say that he and the Commission are obligated
5 to hear today 121 Members of the House and Senate. Of the
6 first 18 this morning, only three of the 18 testified within
7 the five-minute framework.
8 I am obligated to say to my friends in the Congress
9 -- and I guess only a Member can say this -- five minutes is
10 five minutes and, whenever you talk longer, we go later; and
11 we are going to do the very best we can to slog through 121
12 Members. But I would hope, in all fairness to everybody
13 involved, everyone would try to honor the five-minute sign.
14 There is the green light, the red light, and the
15 yellow light. The colors are red, yellow, green. There's a
16 green light, a yellow light, and a red light. No one
17 realizes more than a man who spent 42 years in elected public
18 service how wonderful it is to hear one's own voice.
19 (Laughter.)
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Spare us. Spare us.
21 (Laughter.)
22 COMMISSIONER COX: We are delighted -- and I say

1 this on the verge of hearing two of the most eloquent men in
2 the United States Senate, so this is probably a terrible time
3 to make this speech, because I am so pleased to see the great
4 senior Senator from the great State of New York, my friend,
5 Senator Pat Moynihan.
6 SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Mr. Chairman, members of this
7 honorable Commission, I will speak as the voice of
8 disinterested science, principally on behalf of the Rome
9 Laboratories, and to say to you, in great seriousness, that I
10 am formerly a member of the President's Science Advisory
11 Committee, which President Eisenhower established to provide
12 an independent source of advice on weapons development.
13 I'm formerly vice chairman and member of the board
14 of directors of the American Association for the Advance of
15 Science and I am now chairman of the Commission on the
16 Protection and Reduction of Government Secrecy, which was
17 established by statute in the last Congress.
18 I'll say two things. The work at Rome Labs,
19 primarily in photonics, is now in its third generation. It
20 is science at its most fundamental. It concerns photonics,
21 which I think can fairly be judged, at this point, as much as
22 you would know. What electronics has been to the 20th

1 century, photonics will be to the next century.

2 On Sunday, I gave the commencement address at Union
3 College in Schenectady, its 200th anniversary. One of the
4 honorees, who got a medal, was the inventor, Class of '41, of
5 laser -- LASER, light amplification by stimulated emission of
6 radiation.

7 This work has been going along from roughly
8 Schenectady, across the Mohawk Valley, to Rochester, the
9 Kodak Labs, down to Cornell, and back by way of Corning and
10 Alfred and Syracuse. It is not a warehouse. This is not an
11 Air Force Base. This is an intellectual activity in its
12 third generation and its moment of peak productivity.

13 To rip it out by the roots would be a form of
14 vandalism, and the Air Force apparently is prepared to do
15 that. I don't know what's happened to their sense of
16 science.

17 One of the problems is that what's going on there
18 is classified, and it ought not be. In 1971, the Pentagon
19 set up a Commission under Frederick Sites, who was then
20 chairman of the Rockefeller University, and Jack Rouena from
21 MIT, Edward from California were on it. They recommended
22 that all weapons development secrecy would be stopped at the

1 science level, just stop it. It gets in your way, it slows
2 you down. At best, no more than five years.
3 So the people at Rome have been pathetic with
4 respect to telling people what they do. They don't dare even
5 hint, for fear of some awful transgression of rules which
6 ought not to be there in the first place, but that is the
7 case.
8 The state of photonics is evidence of the work
9 done. I tell you, it would be seriously, grievously set back
10 if it's not continued in the research mode that has been
11 established. Thirty years ago, you began to hear about light
12 in those circles, and now you begin to see the consequences.
13 My distinguished colleague, Senator D'Amato, will
14 continue in this matter. I have friends on the other body
15 who will speak about specific places.
16 I would add a special word, though, for the Niagara
17 base. It is the only Air Force Reserve unit in the State of
18 New York. You ripped out two great Air Force bases -- not
19 you, but the last time around -- including the oldest
20 military base in the United States, built to fight off the
21 British on the shores of Lake Champlain, and a stone barracks
22 in 1818, standing there abandoned and forlorn. I'm hoping,

1 in some measure of equity, you might at least save Niagara
2 and Rome. Thank you very much.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my erudite friend, the
4 distinguished senior Senator from the great State of New York
5 for continuing to educate me and others, and we appreciate
6 his contribution.
7 We're delighted to see his distinguished friend and
8 colleague, the great Senator from the State of New York, the
9 chairman of the Banking Committee, my old friend, Senator Al
10 D'Amato.
11 SENATOR D'AMATO: Mr. Chairman, it's good to be
12 here. Let me first thank you and the Commission and really
13 thank the Commission for the work that you do. I mean,
14 having 80-plus and then 100-plus Members come in is more
15 than, I think, anyone could possibly be asked to endure. It
16 goes beyond public service. You could call it something
17 else.
18 (Laughter.)
19 SENATOR D'AMATO: So I'm going to attempt to do
20 something that most people would say is impossible, and that
21 is to keep within the time constraints. I'm going to ask
22 that my full statement be entered into the record as if read

1 in its entirety, and I am sure that you will read every
2 single word of the statement, even though it is 92 pages.
3 (Laughter.)
4 SENATOR D'AMATO: Let me say that, number one, I
5 honestly believe that, Mr. Chairman, that what was done, for
6 whatever reason, was that a decision was first made and
7 formulated to close the Rome Lab, not on economics, not in
8 terms of what work they were doing or weren't and that, once
9 that decision was made, we had to find numbers to justify it.
10 I don't think there's any other case where the
11 books were cooked more than in this particular case --
12 cooked. The numbers don't add up.
13 I'm simply saying to this Commission, let's do the
14 right thing. What is the right thing to do? You're going to
15 lose, as Senator Moynihan has testified to, a great team.
16 Then we hear about now, we have this new thing that we're
17 going to get into this joint cross-service business, and it
18 just doesn't apply here.
19 Let me say the Joint Cross-Service Report issued by
20 the Special Department of Defense BRAC Task Force is
21 supposedly of one the reasons for this move -- just cooked it
22 up. Let's look at the record. There will be no cross-

1 servicing because there is no Navy at Hanscom, there's no
2 Army at Hanscom, there's none at Monmouth, either. In fact,
3 the Army's Electronic Technological Device Lab, currently at
4 Fort Monmouth, is being moved to Maryland.
5 This is a fiasco. It's a farce. And let me not
6 say here for the Commission's benefit what I believe has
7 empowered it, because I think the Commission and its members
8 have their own expertise and understands the body politic.
9 There's a time for politics and there's a time for
10 doing what's right. We were promised -- we being the people
11 at Rome, the State of New York -- that this lab would be kept
12 open and, based upon that, we made very specific commitments.
13 Millions of dollars, both by the state and the
14 private sector, have been poured in as it relates to a re-use
15 program; and I daresay there are very few others throughout
16 this country that can demonstrate that. We took up Mr.
17 Boatright on his promise. We pointed that out to the
18 Commission in the past.
19 I just ask this Commission to do the right thing,
20 because it's the right thing to do. No savings here. Pure
21 politics. It's wrong. You don't spend the time that you do
22 here because of political concerns but, rather, you do it

1 because you're trying to make a difference for this country
2 and you have touch decisions to make.
3 I feel confident, if you take a look at all the
4 facts and really look at this carefully, based upon what the
5 state has committed, what we have done, and what the facts
6 are, this lab will be preserved. I thank the Commission.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank our friend, the
8 distinguished Senator from New York State and his
9 distinguished colleague.
10 We're pleased to have your Member from the House of
11 Representatives, Gary Ackerman. Congressman Ackerman.
12 REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN: Thank you very much, Mr.
13 Chairman, members of the Commission. I'm testifying on
14 behalf of Fort Totten, which is in Queens County on the North
15 Shore.
16 As I noted in my testimony last month, the current
17 proposal regarding Fort Totten is to close the fort, except
18 for an enclave reserved for the headquarters of the 77th Army
19 Reserve Command. That command will actually increase at the
20 end of this fiscal year by 2,000 Reservists.
21 The increase will also bring additional full-time
22 military personnel, which leaves us with the question or

1 where to house service members and their families. The
2 Army's answer foolishly continues to be that Fort Totten be
3 closed and the Army pay $3.1 million to the Navy to house
4 service members and their families at Mitchell Field.
5 Despite the fact that the Army will pay the Navy
6 $3.1 million to upgrade their housing, the Army is guaranteed
7 as much as one cot for housing, as the Navy will continue to
8 give the right of first refusal to Navy and Marine personnel.
9 This may force Army personnel to look for housing
10 on the open market, in arguably one of the most, if not the
11 most, expensive markets in the country. I believe the
12 proposal is both unfair and unwise.
13 The proposal is unfair to service members, who
14 would prefer to live in Bayside, where easy access to major
15 transportation arteries places the entire tri-state area and
16 its military facilities well within reach of the base.
17 Closing Fort Totten would also deprive service members of the
18 ability to enroll their children in two of New York's top-
19 rated school districts, Numbers 25 and 26. It's also unfair
20 to force service members and their families to search for
21 housing in such an expensive market.
22 Army personnel in New York will receive a 6 percent

1 COLA for a maximum additional payment of $270 a month. Even
2 with this additional $270 in their pocket, that payment is
3 unlikely to provide them the ability to find adequate housing
4 at all and certainly not near the high-quality schools and
5 shopping and easy transportation that Fort Totten provides.
6 It is unwise for the Army to pay the Navy to
7 upgrade Navy housing when the Army could spend that $3
8 million to upgrade housing at Fort Totten and permit the
9 continuation of residences which are close to the expanding
10 Reserve facility in a superior location.
11 Closing Fort Totten would be also unwise from the
12 standpoint of morale. Secretary Perry and the President have
13 both committed to upholding the morale and the welfare of
14 service members and their families. The combination of
15 amenities and superior quality of life in the Bayside market
16 make Fort Totten an attractive housing option for service
17 members and their families. In fact, the Citizens Committee
18 of New York rated the Bayside area one of the top communities
19 in which to raise a child within the City of New York.
20 The Fort Totten community, in the Bay Terrace
21 section of Bayside, is right on the Long Island Sound. It's
22 on the water's edge. It's a little peninsula jutting out.

1 It overlooks the Long Island Sound. It overlooks New York
2 Harbor. It looks straight through the Whitestone and four
3 different bridges. It is one of the most prime pieces of
4 real estate in the entire northeast region, and it would be
5 foolhardy for the Army to give this up.
6 In short, Fort Totten should remain open because of
7 the continuing military housing needs in New York, the high
8 cost of housing in the New York area, and because it will
9 improve the morale and welfare of service members and their
10 families, and I urge the Commission to remove Fort Totten
11 from the list of facilities to be closed. The savings, if
12 any, certainly are not worth it.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank Congressman Gary Ackerman
14 for those very enlightening and fine remarks.
15 We're delighted to see his distinguished colleague,
16 Representative Susan Molinari.
17 REPRESENTATIVE MOLINARI: Thank you and good
18 morning.
19 Let me just follow up on the comments that have
20 been prepared by my colleague, Congressman Ackerman, and talk
21 briefly about Fort Hamilton, which is basically going through
22 the same growing pains.

1 Before I get into the meat and potatoes of my
2 presentation, I'd like to just ask you to please, in your
3 deliberations, note that there have been revised figures
4 since last we met. The Army's original projections for
5 savings were approximately $7.2 in annual savings and they
6 have since concluded that they made a mistake and it's a
7 little over $3 million.
8 That being said, we don't disagree with the
9 fundamental concept that the Department of Defense is trying
10 to put forth, particularly in light of the fact that, coming
11 from New York city, we have developers that we've talked to
12 who have indicated that they would be interested and willing
13 to work with the community to come into Brooklyn, revitalize
14 the housing, and lease it out back to the military.
15 However, there is going to be a gap if this
16 Commission accepts the Army's recommendations between when
17 that is legitimately possible and the military families can,
18 in fact, move into suitable housing.
19 The Army, as you know, has recommended to divest
20 itself of 442 units at Fort Hamilton. At the same time, the
21 Army has concluded that those military missions at Fort
22 Hamilton are necessary and, gratefully, this committee

1 concluded the same thing, and did not put to close Fort
2 Hamilton's mission on the final list.
3 So now you have 442 families who are going to look
4 for a place to live. Remember one thing. The Department of
5 the Army is counting on legislation passing in order to do
6 what needs to be done. That legislation is moving through
7 the House this week. It has yet to see the Senate. Will it
8 be attached to a piece of legislation signed into law by the
9 President? None of us know.
10 So now we are going to create a gap where 442
11 members of our armed services are going to be put out on the
12 Brooklyn economy, getting a variable housing allowance plus
13 basic pay for an E-3, which is approximately what is the
14 predominant makeup of Fort Hamilton, which is about $600.
15 I'm sending you attachments that you should have
16 before you show you that the average advertisement for
17 housing in and around the base is about $1,500. Where are
18 these military personnel going to go on a housing allowance
19 of $600?
20 You have stated that their mission is valuable and,
21 therefore, the fort must remain open. You have stated, the
22 Department of Defense has stated that they want private

1 developers to come over and they want you to make that
2 decision now, not knowing when legislatively that is going to
3 be capable. So we're going to create a gap for a member of
4 our armed services to try and live on $600 in an economy that
5 demands $1,500 for affordable housing, and that's not luxury
6 housing.
7 Let me suggest to you, Chairman -- and I will
8 conclude with this -- and members of the Commission, 442
9 housing units does not need Base Closure Commission
10 recommendations.
11 You can recommend that these housing units stay in
12 the Department of the Army and, at any point in time that is
13 below the threshold the Department of the Army can negotiate
14 with developers in the New York City area when the
15 legislation is passed, when it's signed into law, and when
16 there can be an orderly transition for our members of the
17 armed services to proceed out and back in.
18 We can do that. We cannot do that in the amount of
19 time that will be allowed if you vote to close us down on 442
20 housing units that legislation allows to be rented back out
21 to developers.
22 We are going to supply you, as I said, with the

1 names of the building construction industry we've been
2 working with in New York to show you, in good faith, we're
3 willing to proceed on this. In fact, the community thinks it
4 would benefit by having private developers take over the
5 housing, revamp it, and lease it back to the Army.
6 But what we are creating is a disaster in the
7 making for our military families if the Base Closure
8 Commission votes to do it before we are ready to proceed on
9 that course, from both a legislative standpoint where we're
10 allowed to do it and negotiations with the developers.
11 Last line, I'll say it again: this does not need
12 base closure action. It's below the threshold. So nothing
13 stands to be gained except for another line under the
14 Department of the Army to say "closure" and, in the best
15 interests of our military families, we can accomplish the
16 same purpose with an orderly transition if you vote to remove
17 Fort Hamilton from the realignment list.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
19 Representative Molinari.
20 REPRESENTATIVE MOLINARI: Thank you, Chairman
21 Dixon.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're indebted to you for that

1 fine contribution. May I observe, I hope that you and my
2 friend, Senator D'Amato, and others that are referencing
3 printed material and other information, be sure to give it to
4 our staff. Thank you very much.
5 We're delighted to have your colleague and friend,
6 Representative Sherwood Boehlert here. Congressman Boehlert.
7 REPRESENTATIVE BOEHLERT: Mr. Chairman and members
8 of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify
9 once again on behalf of Rome Laboratory.
10 Today, I want to focus on just two issues that have
11 arisen since your New York City hearing last month -- the
12 revised Air Force cost estimates and state funding of the re-
13 use plan for Griffiss Air Force Base.
14 I'm afraid my discussion of the latest Air Force
15 figures will sound painfully familiar. That's because the
16 Air Force continues to overestimate the annual savings from
17 relocating Rome Lab while underestimating the cost. Indeed,
18 the Air Force has done exactly what we predicted in our New
19 York testimony -- come back with slightly more realistic cost
20 estimates while further distorting the savings estimates.
21 The May estimate is just a new ruse to obscure one
22 central fact: relocating Rome Lab will cost money, lots of

1 it, not save any. As you well know, the Army has costed out
2 the relocation of Rome Laboratory on several occasions, with
3 wildly different results. In the latest figures, as in
4 February, the projected annual saving is the fatal flaw.
5 The Air Force now maintains it would save almost
6 $13 million a year by moving Rome Lab. The actual figure is
7 closer to $1 million a year, resulting in an impossibly long
8 payback period. Remember, these are not net savings but,
9 rather, savings that must be used to offset the cost of
10 moving, costs in excess of $100 million. Spending $100
11 million up front, to save an estimate $1 million per year --
12 not a very prudent or wise business decision.
13 How could this discrepancy occur? First, the Air
14 Force chose to grossly overestimate the cost of real property
15 maintenance at Rome. For the Air Force's figures to be
16 accurate, Rome would have to be paying $45 per square foot
17 for maintenance while comparable Air Force facilities pay
18 only 60 cents per square foot.
19 Here's another problem. Even though the test sites
20 at Rome must remain in operation, the Air Force assumes that
21 every last square foot of space at Rome will be shut down and
22 mothballed. That's not going to happen. And the Air Force

1 estimate of total square footage at Rome is off by almost an
2 order of magnitude. The Air Force 177,000 square feet at a
3 facility that site surveys has over 1.3 million square feet
4 of space.
5 These kinds of glaring, obvious, demonstrable
6 errors hardly build confidence in the Air Force's
7 calculation, and these are not minor mistakes. If we correct
8 just these errors in maintenance costs and square footage,
9 and accept absolutely every other Air Force assumption, the
10 payback period for shutting down Rome Lab jumps to 16 years.
11 That's right -- 16 years.
12 Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
13 that the Air Force itself has said that base closures are not
14 economical if the payback period goes into double digits.
15 Indeed, Mr. Boatright and General Blume reiterated that point
16 in a meeting with representatives of the Rome community on
17 June 1st, and no BRAC Commission has closed an Air Force
18 facility with a payback of more than eight years.
19 Of course, maintenance costs and square footage are
20 not the only problems with the Air Force's latest estimates.
21 The Air Force now says Rome's support manpower levels will be
22 cut by 93 positions, almost double the figure in the February

1 estimate. What has happened since February to justify this
2 conclusion? The Air Force has provided no credible answer to
3 that question.
4 I will submit, for the record, our enumeration of
5 that other faulty assumptions in the Air Force's latest COBRA
6 estimates, and it's voluminous. When all of them are taken
7 into account, it turns out that the payback period for
8 closing Rome Laboratory is in excess of 100 years, just as
9 the Air Force itself had concluded in October of last year.
10 The Air Force's proposal to dismember Rome
11 Laboratory contrasts starkly with the community's effort to
12 strengthen it, so let me now turn to the Griffiss reuse plan
13 in which the Commission has shown so much interest.
14 Commissioners have repeatedly asked us for evidence
15 that the commitment for the reuse plan is real. New York
16 State just concluded its budget process and the new budget
17 continues to make good New York State's commitment of $12
18 million to the New York State Technology Enterprise
19 Corporation.
20 In short, the decision to take Rome Lab off the
21 closure list should be an easy one. In New York, we've
22 demonstrated that the relocation of Rome meets none of the

1 BRAC criteria. The events of the past six weeks have done
2 nothing but strengthen our case. Closing Rome Lab will cost
3 money and damage a vital military asset. It will be
4 excessively costly and totally disruptive of critically
5 important research and development. I urge you to remove
6 Rome Lab from the list; and I think you for your courtesy.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Boehlert.
8 We're delighted to see your friend, the
9 distinguished member of the New York House delegation,
10 Representative Jack Quinn, here.
11 REPRESENTATIVE QUINN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
12 good morning, Commissioners.
13 As you may know, this is my second appearance
14 before the Commission, as well, as I join other colleagues
15 here and, since we last testified in New York City, for the
16 U.S.S. Intrepid, new news has surface that the Niagara Falls
17 Air Force Base has been added to the list so, this morning, I
18 would briefly like to talk to the Commission about the
19 Niagara Falls Air Force Base, as well as REDCAP in the
20 Calspan Corporation in Buffalo.
21 For the record, just once, REDCAP, as you know, we
22 all do, is the Realtime Digitally Controlled Analyzer

1 Processing Facility. Thank goodness for abbreviations like
2 REDCAP.
3 Although I do not envy the task that you have here
4 today, listening to all of these Members, plus all the
5 testimony that you've already heard over these past months
6 and will hear in these next few weeks, I have to tell you
7 that, as a proponent of both deficit and wasteful government
8 spending reduction as well as a strong national defense, I
9 commend all of you for your efforts.
10 I'd also like to take a minute just to thank
11 General Davis for his visit to Western New York some weeks
12 ago at the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station last month. The
13 entire community remains grateful for your visit to see,
14 firsthand, the activities there.
15 I'm here also as a representative, of course, of
16 constituents in my district, the 30th District of New York,
17 Buffalo and Western New York. Even though the Niagara Falls
18 Air Force Base isn't located in my district, I think we all
19 understand and we're aware that congressional boundaries
20 isn't where these kinds of things begin and end.
21 Indeed, I've talked with several representatives,
22 also constituents in Buffalo and Western New York, about the

1 importance of this, and I also want to take a minute right
2 now, if I can, to congratulate my colleague, John LaFalce, a
3 member of the other party. I think we're pointing up now,
4 we're different parties, but this issue is one that's
5 bipartisan in nature and importance. I congratulate John for
6 the great effort he's put together on behalf of the Niagara
7 Falls Air Force Base.
8 It's also my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the
9 base has the support of the Defense Department, the Air
10 Force, of course the entire congressional delegation from New
11 York. General MacIntosh, the Chief of the Air Force Reserve,
12 in fact, has indicated the Air Force's strong support, also,
13 for the retention of the base.
14 The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station and the 914th
15 Air Lift Wing are valuable, combat-proven assets to the Air
16 Force. The 914th Air Lift Wing has operated both
17 independently and in conjunction with active forces in
18 Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Any action to close this station
19 will sacrifice the cohesion of a unit that has been battle-
20 tested and recognized for the performance by the Department
21 of Defense.
22 We also know, as Mr. LaFalce will point out, it's

1 the only C-130 unit activated for Operation Desert Storm. No
2 other Air Force Reserve C-130 unit has received a higher
3 ranking during the last nine years.
4 In addition, closure of the base will not achieve
5 any significant savings over any other C-130 Reserve base
6 currently under study.
7 Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn my comments
8 toward the REDCAP facility. It's apparent that I believe,
9 and others, that it's in the best interest of the country to
10 keep the REDCAP in Buffalo. I think, when we last discussed
11 this issue in New York, many of us agreed that we weren't
12 even certain how and why REDCAP got on the list in the first
13 place.
14 This facility is being currently being fully
15 utilized. Any move simply would change the location of the
16 work, without providing any consolidation or savings. In
17 fact, costs would probably increase.
18 The Calspan Corporation, which has operated the
19 REDCAP facility, is a private company that has operated it
20 for over 30 years. It's built up a unique body of knowledge
21 that enables the facility to provide high value to their test
22 customers at a very, very low cost. Moving the facility,

1 therefore, would destroy a valuable asset that the taxpayers
2 of this country have built over many years.
3 In addition, something that we're talking about in
4 the Congress now, and we have for some time, as many of you
5 are aware, this move at this facility for REDCAP would simply
6 take jobs that are out of the private sector and move them
7 into the government sector. At this time, with shrinking
8 budgets, I think most of us are trying to do the opposite.
9 Finally, we believe, as I said, in New York, and
10 others have agreed, that REDCAP simply doesn't meet the
11 criteria for consideration under the BRAC process. It has
12 far less than the required 300 employees and it's not even a
13 base, in the first place. It's providing a significant
14 service, as is evidenced by its high utilization. The facts
15 show that New York has been hit hard. We know that from the
16 other testimony.
17 I appreciate your time this morning and the time in
18 the past, and wish you all well in your deliberations.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Quinn. We appreciate those very helpful remarks.
21 We're delighted to have a distinguished Member of
22 your House delegation, my old friend, Representative John

1 LaFalce, here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE LaFALCE: Chairman Dixon and members
3 of the Commission, it's a pleasure to appear before you
4 again. This is my third appearance before either General
5 Davis or the Commission.

6 I appear before you today with respect to both the
7 Niagara Falls Air Force Base and REDCAP, joining forces with
8 Congressman Jack Quinn, in whose district REDCAP resides. A
9 brief word about that, first.

10 REDCAP has been operated by either Calspan or its
11 predecessor, Cornell Aeronautical Labs, for over 30 years. I
12 know a bit about this because, in my prior incarnation as an
13 attorney, my law firm represented the employees at Calspan.
14 They're some of the most brilliant Ph.D.'s in the world. I
15 don't think you'll find a finer group.

16 It's inconceivable to me that this recommendation
17 would be before this Commission. This is not a base
18 realignment or closing. This is not a government employee
19 group. These are some of the best civilian Ph.D.s in the
20 world, doing work under private contract with the United
21 States Government that cannot be done by any other group.

22 It shouldn't be before you. You shouldn't be

1 considering that. If the Air Force wants to do this, the Air
2 Force can do it on their own, although they would get
3 considerable objection. They couldn't perform the type of
4 in-flight testing that it would be necessary to accomplish
5 for a fraction of the cost that these simulated tests can do.
6 Take this off the possible closing list. It
7 doesn't belong there.
8 Now, with respect to Niagara Falls, Chairman Dixon
9 and each and every Commissioner, when you think of Niagara
10 Falls, don't even think of the Air Reserve Station. Just
11 think of the honeymoon capital of the world and where you
12 should go for your second honeymoon.
13 (Laughter.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Don't let my wife hear that, John.
15 REPRESENTATIVE LaFALCE: Because, when you go on a
16 honeymoon in Niagara Falls, you have a virtual perfect
17 marriage, the type of perfect marriage that has existed
18 between the Air Force and the Niagara Falls community since
19 the Niagara Falls community has been host to the 914th Air
20 Lift Wing. Don't mess around with this perfect marriage.
21 Now, why is it such a perfect marriage? Because
22 you have this union of Air Force wants and desires and needs,

1 and community wants, desires, and needs.

2 Let me talk about the Air Force desires and needs.

3 What does the Air Force desire? They desire to have the very

4 best C-130 outfit in the world continue. And you know what?

5 According to last year's ORI -- overall readiness inspection

6 -- we received an excellent rating, and there is no unit in

7 the United States that's received a higher rating in the past

8 nine years.

9 For the past five years, we've done it. We've done

10 it with outstanding excellence. We did it in Operation

11 Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We did it in Bosnia. We did

12 it in Somalia. We did it in Turkey and Iraq, et cetera. We

13 want to continue doing it.

14 Now, the Air Force also needs us. I don't just

15 assert that. I can cite data which prove it, letters that

16 prove it.

17 First of all, when they made a recommendation

18 earlier this year, they recommended that Pittsburgh be

19 closed, and they did this on the assumption that Chicago

20 O'Hare was going to be closed -- not closed, but relocated,

21 not closed, because the '93 BRAC commission said, "Well,

22 Chicago O'Hare should be relocated to Rockport at the City of

1 Chicago's expense. But the City of Chicago couldn't afford
2 that.
3 When they recommended Pittsburgh, they said
4 "because Pittsburgh is so close to Youngstown that we won't
5 lost the Reservists." Now, on Friday, they sent the
6 Commission a new letter saying:
7 "It's imperative that we only close one C-130. We
8 cannot close two and, if it's going to be one, we now want to
9 revise our opinion and recommend Chicago O'Hare, because the
10 City of Chicago, as testified in the Chicago hearing, doesn't
11 want it there. They need that space for commercial
12 expansion. And so we now recommend that BRAC close it at
13 BRAC expense for the Air Reserve and let the City of Chicago
14 handle the expense of relocating the Air National Guard,
15 which they can afford."
16 But, underlying either their Pittsburgh or their
17 O'Hare recommendation is that, if they closed either of
18 those, they would not be losing the most important ingredient
19 that any military has -- its people, its personnel -- because
20 the Reservists at Pittsburgh could go to Youngstown, or vice
21 versa, and the Reservists at O'Hare could go to Milwaukee or
22 vice versa, because each is within approximately a one-hour

1 drive of the other whereas, at Niagara Falls, if you were to
2 close the 914th, you'd lost the Reservists, because it's at
3 least a four-to-five-hour drive to the next closest base.
4 That's why the Air Force wants and needs our 914th
5 so much, and we want and need it, I think more than any other
6 unit. Now, how do you know that? How do you quantify
7 community support?
8 Well, you can quantify community need by looking at
9 the data, and the revised data show that our job loss would
10 be 1.1 percent, Youngstown's .5 percent, three of the others
11 .1 percent, and Chicago O'Hare is .0 percent.
12 Now, what does that mean? That means that our need
13 and, therefore, our community support, is more than twice as
14 great as Youngstown, 11 times greater than Pittsburgh or
15 Minneapolis or Milwaukee and, Chairman Dixon, infinitely
16 greater than Chicago's, which has a .0 job loss.
17 Again, when you have such a union, a marriage,
18 between Air Force wants and needs and community wants and
19 needs, you do not put that marriage asunder. Again, come to
20 Niagara Falls for your second honeymoon. Thank you very
21 much.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

1 LaFalce. We thank the great New York State delegation. The
2 Chair observes that, out of seven there, five were able to do
3 it in five minutes. The quality of presentations is
4 substantially improving in length and the Chair urges other
5 delegations to emulate the great State of New York. Let the
6 word go forth to the Congress and the world that five of
7 their seven did it in the five minutes.
8 There is out there some delegation desperately
9 wanting to please the Chair by having 100 percent of their
10 delegation make their presentation within the magic time of
11 five minutes.
12 The State of New York is concluded.
13 COMMISSIONER COX (presiding): We are now most
14 pleased and honored to have with us the distinguished
15 Minority Whip, on behalf of the State of Michigan.
16 REPRESENTATIVE BONIOR: Thank you, Madam Chairman
17 and Commissioners. I want to thank you for the opportunity
18 to speak with you this morning about the Army garrison at
19 Selfridge Air National Guard Base, and for your hard work and
20 your patience during this process.
21 In particular, I want to think Commissioner Steele
22 for taking the time last April to come to Selfridge and hear

1 our concerns firsthand, as well as the Chairman for all the
2 courtesies that he has extended me.
3 I want to echo, this morning, some of the comments
4 made last night by my distinguished colleagues, Senators
5 Levin and Abraham. We in Michigan, as you know, are very,
6 very proud of our Selfridge Air National Guard base and proud
7 of the role it continues to play in the defense of our
8 country.
9 As much as we all recognize the need to downsize
10 the military, we believe that closing the Army garrison at
11 Selfridge is a bad idea, for two reasons: first, because it
12 would seriously undermine the morale and quality of life of
13 the military families who serve at Selfridge and, second,
14 that it would do so needlessly, because closing the Army
15 garrison wouldn't save the taxpayers or the DOD a dime.
16 Now, to understand why, you have to understand one
17 thing. Selfridge is the premier joint military base in the
18 country and a perfect model of the kind of base this
19 Commission is working so hard to promote. At Selfridge, we
20 have the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines, the
21 Coast Guard, the National Guard, both active duty and
22 Reserve, and they're all working together as a team.

1 The reason they work so well together is because
2 they've made a special effort at Selfridge to make military
3 life compatible with family life. We do so because, as
4 Secretary of Defense Perry pointed out in a statement on the
5 8th of May, we recognize that the key to maintaining
6 readiness and the key to retaining good quality soldiers is
7 to provide good quality housing, because we recognize that
8 most soldiers today have families and they have to come to
9 expect more than just a bunk. They have to expect a home.
10 694 military families, 78 unaccompanied service
11 members who call Selfridge home share family housing,
12 education, counseling services, and recreational facilities.
13 By closing the Army garrison we will, in effect, be evicting
14 nearly all of those families and dismantling the very
15 structure that promotes the quality of life that Secretary
16 Perry said was so important.
17 Here is the worst part: closing this facility
18 won't save the taxpayers a dime, because we believe the Army
19 based its COBRA model, on erroneous calculations and
20 incorrect information. When the Army prepared its COBRA
21 model, it only took into account the cost of providing the
22 substitute housing for Army personnel.

1 The problem is, less than half of the families and
2 military personnel at Selfridge are Army personnel. In other
3 words, as Commissioner Cornella pointed out at a hearing
4 seven weeks ago, it appears as though the Army's projected
5 savings at Selfridge come only as a result of making housing
6 somebody else's problem, and that's just plain wrong.
7 The Army has an agreement with other branches at
8 Selfridge. They can't just up and leave. Yet, none of the
9 other branches were even consulted about this move.
10 What's more, the Army also assumed that families at
11 Selfridge could find affordable housing elsewhere but this,
12 too, isn't supported by the facts. Nearly 85 percent of the
13 families affected by this closure are enlisted personnel --
14 and listen to this -- with a monthly housing allowance
15 ranging from $427 a month to $740 a month.
16 A recent study in the area around the base showed
17 an insufficient number of houses available for rent, at an
18 average cost of $736 a month. Not only is there not enough
19 housing available, there's no way these families could afford
20 to pay even if they could find housing. Unless you want the
21 men and women who defend our country being forced to live in
22 seedy motels, the other branches are going to have to come up

1 with the additional housing money, and that will all but wipe
2 out the cost savings projected by the Army.
3 Keep in mind, this isn't a run-down facility that
4 we're talking about. If we close the Army garrison at
5 Selfridge, we will be shutting down a state-of-the-art
6 facility. Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, and members of the
7 board, I know you have a difficult decision to make, and it
8 seems to me that if we truly want to improve the quality of
9 life for military families, as Secretary Perry has said time
10 and time again, we should be providing more of what is
11 offered at Selfridge, not less.
12 I would urge that, before you make a decision that
13 will significantly affect the lives of over 1,800 men, women,
14 and children at Selfridge, you reconsider the Army's
15 recommendations because, if you do, I am convinced that you
16 will reach the same conclusions we have -- that the Army
17 garrison at Selfridge should be removed from the base closure
18 list.
19 I thank you for your time and your courtesies this
20 morning.
21 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much for that
22 fine and concise explanation.

1 Now, we'll move on to the great State of North
2 Carolina, and we're pleased to see Congressman Walter Jones.
3 REPRESENTATIVE JONES: Thank you, Madam Chairman,
4 Commissioners. I am Walter Jones, Jr., Congressman from the
5 Third District of Eastern North Carolina, home for Camp
6 LeJeune, Cherry Point Marine Air Station, and the 2nd Marine
7 Air Wing. Thank you for taking time to hear my testimony.
8 At issue is the final disposition of the 10
9 squadrons F-18 Hornets from Cecil Field, Florida which were
10 directed by the '93 BRAC Commission to Cherry Point Marine
11 Air Station. I am here to express three simple ideas:
12 First, I will ask you to consider, in the context
13 of the integrity of the BRAC process, why the '93 BRAC
14 Commission's recommendation to use Cherry Point was reversed
15 by the Department of Defense.
16 Secondly, I would like to talk about the simple
17 matter of fairness. Many or all of the airplanes in
18 question, if stationed at Oceana, will operate in the air
19 above Eastern North Carolina, which means we would receive
20 the air and noise pollution without receiving the benefit
21 connected with the presence of those planes on the ground.
22 Finally, I would ask you to take a second look at

1 the long-term costs associated with maintaining and operating
2 these squadrons at Oceana. The case for Oceana may not be as
3 clear cut as once believed.
4 First, the integrity of the BRAC process. Madam
5 Chairman, less than 18 months after the '93 BRAC Commission
6 rendered its decision to designate Cherry Point as the prime
7 operating base for the Hornets, DOD had developed a plan to
8 change the decision to Oceana. However, Cherry Point made so
9 much sense that millions of dollars were spent in
10 preparation.
11 At the recommendation by Secretary Perry that the
12 F-18s be sent to Oceana, I immediately questioned the
13 reversal, since the previous BRAC panel had conducted
14 extensive studies on both bases in the areas of military
15 value, cost savings, and environment impact.
16 In addition to the basic criteria, Cherry Point was
17 also cited, by the '93 BRAC, as an excellent location to
18 conduct joint use training. It should be especially noted
19 that joint use training is not possible at Oceana. Our staff
20 has briefed your staff on the detailed background on the
21 departure from the '93 recommendation.
22 Now, the issue of fairness. Eastern North Carolina

1 and the Cherry Point area are well-known for their flight
2 training and ground target areas. The Marine Corps, the U.S.
3 Air Force, and Navy planes regularly make use of these areas
4 which also means that we receive the noise and pollution
5 associated with these planes. The noise and pollution will
6 only increase if the planes in question operate from Oceana.
7 Our citizens are well aware of both the pros and
8 cons connected with the arrival of jet squadrons, but the
9 environmental cost of these planes in the air, without the
10 economic benefit of having them stationed on the ground,
11 would become a burden our citizens will not want to bear, nor
12 should our citizens bear such a burden, without the benefits.
13 Finally, some comments on costs. I was very
14 pleased that your staff recently visited Cherry Point Air
15 Station. The main point I would like to make is that a
16 second look at the whole picture at Oceana will raise serious
17 questions regarding the wisdom of the move.
18 Aerial photos of both Oceana and Cherry Point
19 clearly show the tremendous difference in the safety factor
20 due to crowding around Oceana. The presentation we made to
21 you at the public hearing in Baltimore on May 4th cited a
22 difference between the 1993 and 1995 cost estimates of $385

1 million. I have yet to hear a satisfactory answer for why
2 there is this nearly half-a-billion dollar discrepancy. The
3 bottom line is that there is more to the costs at Oceana than
4 meets the eye.
5 Madam Chairman, in conclusion, I think we all know
6 that any issue can be seen in different ways by different
7 people, but I believe that whatever time you spend on this
8 issue will bring to you and to our country a more secure
9 position for all.
10 The civilians and military personnel who represent
11 Cherry Point are ready and able to take on the future,
12 whatever it may bring. We just want to be treated fairly,
13 based upon the facts which have been made available to us.
14 Please do not forget us in the shuffle and please do not
15 forget the integrity of the BRAC process itself.
16 Thank you for hearing me today.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman,
18 for those excellent remarks.
19 We're now pleased to move on to the great State of
20 North Dakota, and hope to have Senator Kent Conrad start.
21 Thank you, sir.
22 SENATOR CONRAD: Thank you very much. I especially

1 want to thank the commissioners who came to North Dakota,
2 Commissioner Cox, Commissioner Kling, Commissioner Steele.
3 We deeply appreciate that you would take the time to come and
4 see, firsthand, the base that we are defending here today.
5 Here is what our top military leaders have told us.
6 The Secretary of Defense, Josh Gotbaum, who is Assistant
7 Secretary who is in charge of the base closure process, he
8 said, and I quote, "Although complete closure may appear
9 attractive from a cost savings perspective, it does not take
10 account of the preeminent military factors considered by the
11 department in its realignment considerations."
12 Air Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman, said,
13 "I can not overstate my support for retention of a core
14 refueling wing at Grand Forks." Admiral Hank Chiles, head of
15 the Strategic Command, said, and I quote, "U.S. Strategic
16 Command views retention of a core tanker wing at Grand Forks
17 as an important element in support of our nation's strategic
18 deterrent capability."
19 And most recently, General Rutherford, head of the
20 Transportation Command, has said, and I quote, "Grand Forks
21 Air Force Base with its strategic central location and
22 extensive infrastructure is ideally suited to support the

1 single integrated operational plan force deployments to
2 Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific area."
3 You know, in real estate -- Commissioner Kling, you
4 know this well -- they always say location, location,
5 location. That is Grand Forks. We have got the location.
6 No other base has got it. That is why you ought to keep
7 Grand Forks.
8 First and foremost, Grand Forks supports our
9 nuclear deterrent as a part of the single integrated
10 operational plan. Tankers at Grand Forks have quick response
11 time, maximum range -- maximum range -- and a secure position
12 from which to operate. Other bases being considered simply
13 don't meet those tests.
14 Grand Forks is also perfectly suited to support a
15 variety of conventional contingencies. Tankers from Grand
16 Forks can reach Europe or Asia faster than tankers from any
17 other base. That is why General Rutherford said in a letter
18 to you, "Keep Grand Forks." Location, location, location.
19 Strategic location is one of the reasons Grand Forks was the
20 busiest tanker base in the Air Mobility Command last year.
21 General Tonoso in Chicago, you may recall, said to
22 you, "Importance of Grand Forks as a war fighting base is

1 key." He stressed that we select our combat bases to prepare
2 for war. To prepare for war. That is why Grand Forks became
3 a core tanker base and that is why it ought to be retained.
4 One final note on location, if you will permit me.
5 Grand Forks, under the ABM treaty, is our chosen site for a
6 ballistic missile defense system. Congress is taking steps
7 to speed up possible deployment of such a system. One option
8 would use Minuteman boosters from Grand Forks to launch
9 missile interceptors. Missile defense options reinforce the
10 importance of keeping Grand Forks.
11 If you close Grand Forks, you lose all of those
12 advantages. Closing Grand Forks will damage our ability to
13 effectively respond to crises and conflicts, to carry out
14 national policy, and to fight and to win a war.
15 For those reasons, we urge you to retain Grand
16 Forks. Thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, Senator,
18 and we are pleased to move to the distinguished Congressman
19 from North Dakota, Congressman Pomeroy.
20 REPRESENTATIVE POMEROY: Thank you very much,
21 Commissioner Cox. I want to echo my appreciation for each of
22 you who took the time to visit the outstanding bases in North

1 Dakota. I have enjoyed becoming personally acquainted with
2 you in the course of your visits and believe that you are
3 bringing terrific talent and dedication to the difficult
4 judgments before you.
5 I used to practice law in a small town, and as I
6 would approach a case would try and figure out what are the
7 key issues relevant to the determination before you. Here
8 the key issue is whether or not the Grand Forks tanker
9 mission ought to be added to the base closure list.
10 The key burden of proof attaching to that
11 determination is whether or not the Department of Defense
12 substantially deviated from the base closure criteria in not
13 having it on their recommended closure list. The criteria
14 are eightfold. The first four involve military value. Just
15 to briefly summarize: impact on operational readiness;
16 availability of land facilities and air space; availability
17 to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future force
18 requirements; and, finally, cost and manpower implications.
19 Now, the record before you shows that these
20 considerations were very much at the heart of the decision to
21 establish core tankers bases and place one in Grand Forks.
22 The move is a natural response to the closure of twelve bases

1 formerly housing tankers. It established operational
2 efficiencies and long-term stability for tankers charged with
3 maintaining global reach, a worldwide presence based
4 increasingly on domestic military basing considerations.
5 Grand Forks was chosen because of infrastructure, location,
6 and capacity. There is not another base that offers those
7 three considerations as an alternative.
8 Your decision to add the Grand Forks flying mission
9 to the base closure list for review has given our commanders
10 an opportunity to show you exactly why they made the
11 decisions that they did, and they have been rather emphatic
12 in their demonstration to you.
13 Chief of Staff Fogleman spoke to both the readiness
14 and the facilities issue when he, in his correspondence to
15 you, noted why they established a core mission at Grand
16 Forks. He cited national military strategy, including the
17 two major regional conflict issue, strategic nuclear
18 deterrence, as well as peacetime operations. He noted the
19 base's capacity, its infrastructure, and the importance in
20 terms of readiness for the military personnel which have been
21 relocated and shuffled about throughout this closure period.
22 Admiral Chiles, taking a slightly different

1 perspective, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stressing
2 the importance of Grand Forks in terms of supporting the
3 SIOP. He called it "an important element in support of our
4 nation's strategic deterrent capability due to its strategic
5 location to support the bomber leg of the triad."
6 Yet another perspective on the importance of the
7 Grand Forks Air Force Base, General Rutherford, commander of
8 TRANSCOM, responsible for delivering our military forces to
9 any theater in the globe, because Grand Forks is now
10 structured as a cohesive, integrated core tanker base capable
11 of supporting operations in both Asian and European theaters,
12 General Rutherford has stated in correspondence to you that
13 the closure of Grand Forks would "impair our ability to
14 effectively execute national military missions."
15 Viewed in this framework, the Department of Defense
16 concurred with the Air Force determination that there ought
17 to be a core tanker base and it ought to be based in Grand
18 Forks. Assistant Secretary Gotbaum in correspondence to you
19 said that, "The Pentagon's analysis supported this
20 determination as militarily and fiscally sound."
21 Again, the issue before you is whether the DOD and
22 the Air Force have substantially deviated from base closure

1 criteria by including the flying mission at Grand Forks Air
2 Force Base in their future operational and strategic
3 planning. The information has been emphatic. Fogleman,
4 Chiles, Rutherford and Gotbaum all have made it very clear
5 there was no substantial deviation from the criteria and, in
6 fact, those criteria of military value were at the heart of
7 why they established core bases and placed one in Grand
8 Forks.
9 I am confident that after you evaluate carefully
10 all of these considerations you will find no substantial
11 deviation and, in fact, that the Air Force have done just
12 what we wanted them to: build a defense strategy for the
13 21st Century by creating efficient core tanker bases and
14 utilizing the outstanding facilities and location of Grand
15 Forks for this mission.
16 North Dakota is proud to be a host for the Grand
17 Forks Air Force Base and hopes to continue this role for a
18 long time to come. Thank you.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, and now we
20 are pleased to have the Senator from North Dakota, Senator
21 Byron Dorgan.
22 SENATOR DORGAN: Madame Chairman, thank you very

1 much. Mercifully, I suppose, for the commission that you are
2 nearing the end of a packed agenda yesterday and today and
3 you are no doubt on the edge of your chairs on every word
4 with respect to every base, because all of us who come here
5 believe that our military installation is the most important
6 installation for this country. We understand that and we
7 make the best cases we can.
8 But we in North Dakota are not here to make the
9 case on our behalf. We are here to make the case that has
10 been made to the commission by General Fogleman, by Admiral
11 Chiles, by Assistant Secretary Gotbaum and others, who say
12 that they made the determination that Grand Forks should be
13 one of three supertanker bases, and they believe in the
14 interests of this country, both strategically and for
15 military value purposes, that that flying mission of the
16 Grand Forks Air Force Base should remain.
17 All of these issues are put in the context of the
18 larger case. Let me give you a quote from Staff Sergeant
19 Merrifield, who is at Grand Forks. He is with the tanker
20 mission. He spent 300 days TDY last year from Grand Forks in
21 almost every theater -- SOUTHCOM and South America, Saudi
22 Arabia, England, Turkey. He says, "I am very proud to serve

1 my country in all hotbed theaters where the action is. I am
2 proud to see the Grand Forks tail flash on airplanes all
3 around the world."
4 His point is that he is part of a unit, a core
5 tanker unit, one of three supertanker bases at the Grand
6 Forks Air Force Base, and they have moved all across the
7 world at the request of the Pentagon to do this country's
8 military business. Fortunately, we have never had to have a
9 live test of our nuclear war fighting capability, but General
10 Fogleman's recent white paper makes it crystal clear, I
11 think, to you and to us that Grand Forks would be a premiere
12 refueler for SIOP contingencies because he said, "It can ease
13 command and control issues and minimize turmoil when tanker
14 assets are transferred to the United States Strategic
15 Command."
16 Admiral Chiles, Commander in Chief of the U.S.
17 STRATCOM, stated in a letter to you that, "The core refueling
18 wing at the Grand Forks Air Force Base provides critical
19 support to strategic and contingency operations."
20 And General Rutherford, Commander in Chief of U.S.
21 TRANSCOM, made the same thing clear to you. "The wisdom of
22 establishing a refueling wing at Grand Forks was validated

1 during the recent high priority operations, including Vigil
2 Warrior in Iraq and Support Hope in Rwanda."
3 We are very proud of this space, proud of its
4 mission, and proud of its contribution to this country. But
5 we don't, again, come to you as a Congressional delegation or
6 as a community or a state to say save this base because it's
7 in our state. We come to you and say that the Chief of Staff
8 of the Air Force, that the Defense Department itself, says
9 this base is strategically critical for this country's
10 military mission.
11 And that is why we believe that this commission
12 should make a decision to keep the flying wing at the Grand
13 Forks Air Force Base up, open, and operating and helping be
14 part of the defense of this country for the long-term future.
15 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I was
16 offering an amendment on the floor of the Senate a few
17 moments ago and then rushed as quickly as I could to the
18 Cannon Caucus Room to be there at 11:08. And when I
19 discovered you were not at the Cannon Caucus Room, which was
20 my error, I have set a new record in running from the Cannon
21 Building to the Hart Building only so that I would not be
22 late to present this vital testimony.

1 And I hope that even as I perspire about the run I
2 have just made and perspire also about the decision you are
3 going to make in the coming days, that you will be guided in
4 that decision by the wisdom of the Chief of Staff of the Air
5 Force and so many others who viewed this mission at the Grand
6 Forks Air Force Base as critically important to the military
7 mission of our country.
8 Thank you very much.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, Senator,
10 and we are indeed pleased that you were able to make it and
11 present those fine remarks. And I might also say on behalf
12 of the chairman that we are also pleased that the North
13 Dakota delegation and the North Carolina delegation have both
14 100 percent made their five-minute limit. We are deeply
15 appreciative of that, and I know that the chairman, when he
16 returns, will be very happy to hear it.
17 We are also happy now to move on to the great State
18 of Ohio and recognize Senator John Glenn.
19 SENATOR GLENN: Thank you, Madame Chairman. Thank
20 you very much. And I just came down from upstairs so I
21 didn't have any problem getting here this morning. But I
22 don't envy you your task. You do have a tough task and

1 everybody wants to defend what is in their state, of course.
2 The first issue I wanted to bring up this morning
3 relates to a 1993 recommendation by the commission which I
4 have questioned. It is a recommendation to privatize the
5 Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at NORC Air Force
6 Base in Heath, Ohio. The commission approved the
7 recommendation to close NORC in '93, but as that continued
8 the cost data became available and I asked GAO to take a look
9 at this whole thing. And it looks as though it may actually
10 cost the government taxpayer money, perhaps as much as $456
11 million over the next five years, instead of saving money.
12 Now, I think the GAO -- this is the only time that
13 GAO has done a study and recommended that a former decision
14 be reconsidered. And I would recommend that to you because
15 everything we have seen so far at least looks like it is
16 going to cost more than it will save if NORC is closed.
17 As it currently stands, the Air Force will receive
18 privatization proposals on June 17th. That is the deadline,
19 so right up on that. And the Air Force has already alerted
20 the commission that it may need to reevaluate what happens at
21 NORC, and all of our indications are that that should be
22 done. So I urge the commission to consider revisiting that

1 '93 closure decision, particularly if those proposals
2 demonstrate that privatization will actually cost more than
3 current operations.
4 A second closure issue is the proposed closure of
5 Brooks Air Force Base and the realignment of its Armstrong
6 Laboratory Human Systems Center School of Aerospace Medicine
7 and Systems Acquisition School to Wright-Patt in Dayton. As
8 I understand it, the commission is considering an alternative
9 proposal under which these activities would be cantoned at
10 Brooks. In terms of military value, consolidation of these
11 activities at Wright-Patt takes advantage of the outstanding
12 aerospace research and development work already located there
13 while reducing overall Air Force infrastructure.
14 Further, the Air Force provided the commission with
15 its cost analysis on the cantonment proposal and found that
16 while the up-front costs, the up-front cost of base closure,
17 could be avoided through cantonment, movement of these
18 activities to Wright-Patt is more cost-effective than
19 cantonment because after a six-year payback period then there
20 are annual recurring savings in excess of $20 million per
21 year on into the future. So it appeared to me that that was
22 certainly the best way to go. These are Air Force figures,

1 also, so they have made a good estimate of this.
2 Disapproving a recommendation merely to avoid up-front costs
3 of base closure seems to me to be at odds with the whole base
4 closure process and the purpose of it.
5 A third issue involves the proposed closure of the
6 Springfield Air National Guard Base and the groups, the
7 units, based there. Let me say first that a similar
8 recommendation was made in '93 but the Air Force reversed its
9 position before the commission when the costs of the move
10 were questioned. They have questioned those costs again this
11 year, questioned by the local community.
12 And according to the local community's cost data,
13 it would take 23 years before the Air Force would obtain a
14 return on its $30 million investment. That would be a $30
15 million investment essentially to walk away from the fully
16 modern taxpayer-purchased facilities at Springfield. Given
17 the past record on Springfield and the issues that have been
18 raised this year by the local community, I urge you to look
19 very carefully at the Air Force's figures on this.
20 Congressman Hobson, who is with us here this morning, will be
21 giving more detail on that.
22 And, finally, I urge the commission to reconsider

1 its actions with respect to the Youngstown Air Reserve
2 Station. The commission added this facility to the closure
3 list along with several other C-130 reserve bases. Neither
4 the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of the Air Force
5 recommended closing Youngstown; rather, the Air Force
6 recognizes Youngstown's military value and plans to expand
7 the number of C-130 aircraft at Youngstown, making the 910th
8 Airlift Wing the largest C-130 wing in the Air Force Reserve.
9 The 910th also performs the aerial spray mission.
10 They are the only unit in the Air Force that has that as an
11 assigned mission, either Reserve or regular, the only unit
12 that performs a technically demanding mission and for which
13 unique maintenance facilities have been constructed and are
14 there at Youngstown now. It is an extremely modern facility.
15 Eighty-six percent of its buildings have been constructed or
16 upgraded in the last ten years.
17 So I would conclude my remarks by noting that the
18 costs associated with the closure argue against closure, I
19 believe. Youngstown has the lowest operating cost of the
20 bases under construction, would have among the highest
21 closure costs because more aircraft would have to be
22 relocated and the facilities and training associated with the

1 aerial spray mission would have to be reduced elsewhere.

2 So thank you for your opportunity to appear before

3 the commission. I know I am running through these rapidly.

4 I am glad to see our chairman, my friend, Alan

5 Dixon, back in the chair there again this morning. I am

6 sorry you missed my brilliant expose, Alan, this morning

7 here, but we do -- I don't envy any of you your jobs on this

8 commission. I know it is a tough job. We hope you can

9 reconsider these here as I present them this morning. I had

10 a handout down here earlier to be given to each one of the

11 commissioners, if you wanted to review that.

12 Thank you very much.

13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my good friend, the

14 distinguished senior senator from the great State of Ohio,

15 Senator Glenn, for his good remarks this morning and his

16 great service to his state and nation. We are delighted to

17 have Senator Mike Dewine here as well. Thank you for coming

18 this morning, Senator Dewine.

19 SENATOR DEWINE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank

20 you very much. I am very grateful for the opportunity to be

21 here today to discuss four specific issues facing the

22 commission.

1 First is NORC. It has been recommended that the
2 NORC Air Force Base be privatized in place. It is our
3 understanding based on GAO report that this proposed
4 privatization would really not be cost-effective. The GAO
5 says privatizing NORC in place would actually cost more than
6 closing the base outright.
7 On June 17th, the Air Force expects to receive bids
8 on that privatization project and if indeed, as we are led to
9 believe, this project will be too expensive, I certainly
10 recommend that status quo be maintained. The only conclusion
11 we can draw from the analysis that has been made and what the
12 facts are is that NORC should, in fact, be kept open.
13 Let me turn second to Youngstown. A proposal has
14 been made to close the Youngstown Air Reserve Station. Our
15 summary of this would indicate that, really, it's a one-of-a-
16 kind project. It has a runway that has been paid for, a
17 bigger facility than its counterparts, and to shut down this
18 base would really incur costs that could not -- that would
19 not be incurred by closing any of the other five bases. The
20 additional costs of closing the Youngstown station will
21 really be in the millions of dollars. BRAC, we believe,
22 should reconsider this decision to shut down the Youngstown

1 station.

2 Third, let me turn to Springfield. The proposal
3 has been made to relocate the 178th Air National Guard
4 Fighter Group from the Springfield Air National Guard Base in
5 Springfield to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Mr.
6 Chairman, the total cost of moving the 178th and closing the
7 Springfield base is 29.8 million. That is nearly $30
8 million. It will take the taxpayers at least 13 years, and
9 perhaps as long as 23 years, to recoup that investment. We
10 believe that the 30 million could certainly be spent more
11 wisely. Congressman Hobson, as Senator Glenn, has indicated,
12 will give you more details and statistics that we believe
13 demonstrate that even that, even that $30 million figure, is
14 flawed and that it will cost even more than that.

15 Fourth, let me turn to Wright-Patterson. The Air
16 Force has proposed moving most of the functions of the Brooks
17 Air Force Base in Texas to Wright-Patterson. The case for
18 keeping Brooks open is based on a plan that would divide up
19 the base so that parts of it can be kept running. It is
20 argued that this would avoid the cost of closing Brooks by
21 keeping part of the base open.

22 I don't think, though, that we should make any

1 mistake. This option represents savings only over the
2 extremely short term. The cost of operations at Wright-
3 Patterson is so much lower than at Brooks that the relocating
4 would pay for itself within just six years. And the Air
5 Force's own estimate named Wright-Patterson as the highest
6 rated research and development center and Brooks as the
7 lowest R & D center. If we can consolidate the functions of
8 the lowest rated facility into the highest rated facility and
9 make back the investment on that consolidation in just six
10 years, I believe that that is a pretty good outcome. That,
11 in fact, is the kind of outcome that certainly BRAC was
12 established to achieve.
13 I appreciate the opportunity to address members of
14 the commission. I don't envy your very, very tough task.
15 Following me, of course, will be some members of the Ohio
16 delegation from the House. Thank you very much, Mr.
17 Chairman.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Dewine, we thank you and
19 your distinguished colleague for a fine presentation on
20 behalf of the State of Ohio. We are delighted to have one of
21 your distinguished members from the House, Representative
22 Tony Hall, here.

1 REPRESENTATIVE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
2 members of the commission. I want to thank you very much for
3 the opportunity to speak to you today. I am here to testify
4 in support of the Defense Department's recommendation to
5 close Brooks Air Force Base and move some of the functions to
6 Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, which is partially in my
7 district.
8 I want to leave you with three points: One, my
9 community of Dayton, Ohio, was hit very hard by the Base
10 Closure Commission in 1991 and '93; two, locating all the Air
11 Force human systems functions at Wright-Patterson will
12 benefit the Defense Department and will produce the greatest
13 military value; and, three, if the goal of this process is to
14 reduce excess capacity and consolidate activities, then
15 Brooks should be closed.
16 My first point is that my community has already
17 lost a large number of defense jobs. In the last four years
18 we lost about 10,000 government defense related jobs with the
19 closure of Gentille Air Force Station, the closure of The
20 Mound Defense Nuclear Production Facility, the loss of the
21 4950 Test Wing, and downsizing in the Air Force Materiel
22 Command. The number of jobs from Brooks is a fraction of the

1 very deep losses my community has already suffered from
2 defense downsizing.
3 My second point is that combining the functions at
4 Brooks with Wright-Patterson is a move that offers the
5 greatest military value. By co-locating the human systems
6 activity now at Brooks with the aeronautical activities at
7 Wright-Patterson, we will create a complete system for the
8 research, development, and acquisition of manned air
9 vehicles. This approach offers enormous advantages for the
10 Defense Department. It is the most effective way of
11 integrating pilot and aircraft to create a total weapons
12 system.
13 I want to stress that Wright-Patterson and the
14 Dayton area are already home to a great deal of medical
15 research and teaching. It was, in fact, at Wright-Patterson
16 where Captain Harry G. Armstrong founded the first aerospace
17 medicine research unit, and since that time Wright-Patterson
18 continuously has been a major center of aerospace medical
19 research and conducts joint efforts with the Army, Navy,
20 NASA, and other federal agencies. Some of the human systems
21 activities now at Brooks were originally transferred from
22 Wright-Patterson in a time of expanding military, and now in

1 a time of shrinking military those activities can be
2 transferred back to Wright-Patterson with little disruption
3 in mission.
4 There is also the potential for a powerful working
5 relationship between Wright-Patterson and Wright State
6 Medical School, which is immediately adjacent to the base.
7 Wright State is the nation's only civilian degree-granting
8 university for aerospace medicine. The Air Force continues
9 to emphasize the importance of the military value of this
10 move. As recently as last week, the Air Force provided the
11 commission a detailed point paper again underscoring the
12 military value, which is this point right here. That was
13 issued last week. And I would urge the members of the
14 commission to study this paper before making a decision.
15 My third point is that the purpose of this
16 commission is to reduce excess capacity, consolidate
17 functions, and eliminate overhead costs. Let us not confuse
18 the military value of Brooks with the military value of its
19 mission. The human systems activities that take place at
20 Brooks are very important, but they can be done at Wright-
21 Patterson. The military value of the physical facilities at
22 Brooks does not justify maintaining this expensive plant in

1 the long term.

2 The Defense Department financial calculations

3 demonstrate conclusively that there are long-term cost

4 savings with closing Brooks. The Defense Department

5 recommendation satisfies all the criteria for this

6 commission: It will have a long-term increase in the

7 military value for the Department of Defense; it will produce

8 the greatest return on investment; and it satisfies the

9 impact criteria. In sum, this is a move that works for the

10 Defense Department and our nation's taxpayers and I would

11 urge you to accept the Defense Department's recommendation.

12 Thank you for the chance to be here, Mr. Chairman

13 and members. I appreciate it.

14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

15 Hall, for that excellent presentation that is most helpful to

16 us. We are delighted to have you, and we welcome

17 Representative David Hobson.

18 REPRESENTATIVE HOBSON: Mr. Chairman, members of

19 the commission, I would like to say I am delighted to be here

20 today but, as Commissioner Cox will recall, this is a little

21 deja vu for me and I am sorry that I have to come back.

22 But I have five minutes to convince you not to

1 waste $30 million. My arguments are based solely on the
2 numbers. Although the community will survive, the numbers
3 are flawed and, frankly, this just isn't fair.
4 This decision results from a desire on the part of
5 the Air Force to fill a hole at Wright-Patterson Air Force
6 Base with pointed-nose airplanes. The numbers were backed
7 into in an attempt to prove this as a cost-effective move.
8 Just as in 1993, the numbers are flawed. They are based on
9 improper assumptions. Had the right assumptions been used in
10 the COBRA model, the base wouldn't even be on the list in the
11 first place. Even using the current flawed COBRA run, which
12 you see in red there which just arrived Friday afternoon,
13 June 9th, 1995, there is an 11-year return on investment,
14 24.6 million one-time cost, a 2.8 million annual savings.
15 The base shouldn't even be on the list.
16 Let me show you a few problems from the numbers and
17 why this should be investigated further. One, a major
18 dispute is manpower saving. AFMC and the Guard say 31 people
19 are needed and authorized at Wright-Patterson to accommodate
20 the move. Air Force headquarters says only 13 will be
21 allowed because they assume that the current regulation may
22 be changed sometime in the future, although no one knows

1 when. Annual recurrent savings at Wright-Patterson are
2 reduced by $1 million if you take the assumption that was
3 there in 1993. This blows the Air Force's whole position on
4 the move. In '93 this wasn't an issue; however, in order to
5 make the numbers look bad for Springfield, the Air Force
6 makes this assumption -- in my opinion, cooks the books.
7 Number two, there are asbestos and lead paint in
8 the buildings to be provided at Wright-Patterson. No
9 contractor is going to go in and renovate around asbestos.
10 The liability is just too great. But that is the position
11 taken by Wright-Patterson. We believe that there is going to
12 be an estimated increase in military construction costs by $5
13 million due to the asbestos.
14 And let me give you really one that blows my mind.
15 The telephone bill currently at Springfield is $13,000, but
16 it is assumed to be, and this is the number that the Air
17 Force gave us, $82,020 at Wright-Patterson. This is
18 ridiculously stupid and part of why I question the numbers.
19 Number four, the Air Force refuses to admit that an
20 expanded dining hall is needed. Just wait. A military
21 construction request for more capacity will come down the
22 pike in a year or two after the move. This is just another

1 one million in mil con costs.

2 Number five, in questioning these and other open or
3 disputed areas, the Air Force says don't worry, we'll take
4 care of it after the move. If you want to see how these
5 things are taken care of, go back and look at the General
6 Accounting Office study and, specifically, the move of the
7 445th Air Force Reserve Unit. Compare the lower assumed
8 costs versus the higher actual costs to the result from these
9 moves.

10 Springfield has always received more than a fair
11 hearing from the BRAC staff. I believe your analysts
12 understand the problem and how the numbers are being cooked
13 to put pointed-nose airplanes at
14 Wright-Patterson. Why waste $30 million plus and take, even
15 by Air Force flawed assumptions -- and we think it would be
16 much higher than 11 years, more as to what Senator Glenn and
17 Senator Dewine have testified to -- to change what is already
18 at Springfield?

19 We should not build a hole at Wright-Patterson in
20 this costly manner and waste taxpayers' dollars just because
21 they are available through the BRAC process. The Air Force
22 should bring back on Wright-Pat the tenants for whom their

1 leasing space are based and use this space for that purpose.
2 Springfield should not be abandoned. It is a well-
3 functioning facility and needs nothing and has already a new
4 engine shop completed. Springfield should be allowed to
5 continue to do the cost-effective job it has been doing. Do
6 this by the numbers and I am confident, just as in '93, it
7 will be reversed.
8 I implore you to look at the numbers. It is
9 irresponsible to put a base on the list with false numbers
10 and continue to use false assumptions. Think about the
11 taxpayer and what is cost-effective, not what some general
12 would like to see on the flight line.
13 I am also submitting some material in support of
14 the material which has been testified to on the move from
15 other places into Wright-Patterson, but we have had great
16 difficulty getting the right numbers because people want to
17 see pointed-nose airplanes. And I don't blame them, but it
18 is just not cost-effective to do at Wright-Patterson in
19 comparison to the way they are operating in Springfield.
20 I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
22 Congressman Hobson, for your valuable contribution on behalf

1 of the State of Ohio, and we are pleased to see your clean-up
2 man is here, Representative Jim Traficant from the great
3 State of Ohio.
4 REPRESENTATIVE TRAFICANT: Thank you, Chairman,
5 General Davis, members of the commission. I am glad to be
6 here with you again. I believe that you have heard the
7 salient points of my testimony. I would ask that my official
8 document here submitted be incorporated into the record.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And it will be in the record,
10 Congressman.
11 REPRESENTATIVE TRAFICANT: Fine. Thank you. And I
12 would just like to say several things. I know you have this
13 little library somewhere and there is some rumors that have
14 been persisting about our base. The airport used to be under
15 the control of the City of Youngstown. They have fallen on
16 hard times economically and there are those that say that the
17 City of Youngstown can't afford to keep that airport open and
18 the Air Force would have to pick up a big, huge cost in
19 maintaining that great infrastructure.
20 That is the furthest from the truth. We are able
21 to politically bring together all the components of those two
22 county areas and create a regional port authority. That port

1 authority is now on solid ground. That airport in itself is
2 growing. The State of Ohio, through workings with myself and
3 others, have designated that airport as a future air cargo
4 international jet port. That is a tremendous facility.
5 There is no financial problems that bear on that airport
6 whatsoever as far as the Air Force is concerned. In fact,
7 for very small fees they have an unlimited use of one of the
8 finest infrastructures in the entire country, I am sure, as
9 General Davis can attest to.
10 Let me also say this: Because of the near
11 proximity of Cleveland and Pittsburgh, all those big planes
12 are landing in Cleveland and Pittsburgh taking away the
13 passenger service from our airport, which means that we have
14 an under-utilized commercial airport that is extremely open
15 and available for the complete unlimited use of the Air
16 Force.
17 With nearby Ravenna Arsenal and Lake Erie and with
18 the joint cooperation now of the Air Force Reserve and the
19 Coast Guard, there is oil spill abatement programs underway
20 and we are actively involved in that. So I would like to
21 state here that the financial aspects of that airport have
22 been completely mitigated and removed and there are no

1 overlying factors there.

2 Let me say one other thing: You could take the
3 troops and you can move them; you can take the planes and you
4 can move them, but we have the aerial spray mission, the only
5 one of its kind for the entire Pentagon. We not only go
6 around the country and spray military bases, but FEMA in some
7 of their hurricane activities have called upon our unit, the
8 910th Aerial Spray Mission, to, in fact, go around the nation
9 for specific mitigation of some of these pesticide problems
10 and that comes from us.

11 And let me say this: The only building of its kind
12 in the world, state-of-the-art, is located at that base. The
13 only short filled runway in the Air Force Reserve located at
14 that base. There is not a wetland problem on that base and
15 there is not one environmental problem that down the road can
16 cause financial factor process engagement for the Pentagon.
17 Now, there are people in our community who are saying, look,
18 when the bombs were flying we made those bombs, we built the
19 helmets, we built the guns and the steel mills. The steel
20 industry is now gone. We have fallen on hard times. The
21 only double digit unemployment in the entire state.

22 But that isn't a reason to keep our base open. The

1 reason to keep our base open, quite frankly, is the value
2 that exists there for the Pentagon. So I would just like to
3 say to you that hopefully when this process is all over you
4 all will come out there and pay us a visit.
5 But I would like the BRAC Commission to endorse the
6 expansion that is planned there by the Pentagon -- the
7 building and development of a regional air service facility
8 to service planes from around the nation -- because of that
9 good availability without traffic congestion that exists
10 there.
11 So there has been some talk about Congressional
12 add-ons. I don't apologize for them. I don't apologize for
13 any member that takes care of the Pentagon, first of all,
14 and, second of all, for taking a look at the issues that the
15 Pentagon experiences in their own district. I am proud of
16 that record. I will continue to support that record and
17 fight hard to make sure the procurement by the Pentagon, in
18 fact, does most of its activity in the states here.
19 So that is where I am. I would like my record
20 incorporated into the minutes. I want, when it is all over,
21 your endorsement of our expansion. That is unusual
22 testimony, I am sure, that you have had, but I know you have

1 an important mission. I don't want to slight that mission.
2 I wish you the very best in doing what you can to keep our
3 military forces at a level that can protect our great nation
4 and, in fact, do it in a way that is cost-effective for our
5 taxpayers for that mutual marriage that is so necessary to
6 keep America free.
7 So we are very proud to have General Davis there.
8 I want to say that. And people are very impressed with the
9 fact of his knowledge of his mission and what we do there.
10 So I am very proud to have had the opportunity to
11 testify again before you and all those people who come down
12 here and want to punch everybody in the nose, I think, if you
13 would talk about closing it. That is how important that base
14 is, the fourth largest employer in our community but, in
15 fact, a very effective training facility, one of the best --
16 in fact, the model of its kind in all of America.
17 So, with that, I appreciate your goodwill in
18 accepting my testimony.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Traficant, and we thank the great State of Ohio and its
21 distinguished delegation for an outstanding contribution.
22 Now, ladies and gentlemen, the chair labored

1 mightily earlier this morning and fell behind and fell
2 behind. And as we always see, we gave the job to a woman and
3 she did an outstanding job and Commissioner Rebecca Cox
4 straightened everybody out and now we have caught up.
5 And because of the good work of the women, we are
6 presently in a position where the next delegation testifies
7 at 12:04, the Oklahoma delegation. Now, we have called them
8 and told them if they can get here early we would like to
9 hear them. But in fairness to that delegation, Commissioner
10 Rebecca Cox and her excellent service have served to bring us
11 up to date and we are going to have a recess for a few
12 minutes till someone from Oklahoma arrives.
13 (A brief recess was taken.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chair will declare the
15 commission back in session. We are pleased to see our
16 friends from the Oklahoma delegation here. We have been with
17 them in the last several days at a visitation in their great
18 state, and we are honored and delighted to have the
19 distinguished senior senator from the great State of
20 Oklahoma, my old friend, Senator Don Nickles, here to lead
21 off for the Oklahoma delegation.
22 SENATOR NICKLES: Chairman Dixon, thank you very

1 much. And to Commissioner Cornella and Commissioner Steele,
2 we appreciate your patience and endurance. We were delighted
3 to have all of you in Oklahoma last Wednesday. I had the
4 pleasure of speaking to you also in Fort Worth, as well as my
5 colleague, Senator Inhofe, and several of the Oklahoma
6 delegation. So we know that you have been more than
7 attentive. We know that this has been a 100 percent job for
8 you for the last several months and we compliment you for the
9 work that you have done and the work of your staff.
10 This may be repetitive for a couple of us because
11 we have talked to you now for, let's see, this will be the
12 third time within a week, but it nevertheless shows the
13 importance of the issue because you have a very, very
14 difficult job and I think you are on the right path.
15 I don't envy you for your task but I compliment you
16 for your diligence and I know that you look forward to the
17 conclusion of it. But I look forward to you doing a good job
18 and having the results of your work be something that will be
19 successful, both with the administration and with Congress,
20 and so I compliment you.
21 You have a difficult job in concerning the Oklahoma
22 bases because you are dealing with both the air logistics

1 centers and the undergraduate pilot training bases. On the
2 ALCs, Air Force has made it very clear we have got excess
3 capacity, and you have a couple of options. You can downsize
4 all five or you can close one or two.
5 A couple years ago the Air Force said we ought to
6 close at least one. When I found out the capacity rates were
7 only working on an average about 50 percent capacity of all
8 five, that tells you we have a lot of excess capacity. My
9 background is in the business field, and in the business
10 field that would say that's really not the way to do it and
11 the real solution isn't just to downsize all of them. That's
12 not a very effective management.
13 And so my guess is that, ultimately, one or two are
14 going to have to be closed. Air Force recommended closing
15 one a couple of years ago. The Joint Cross Service Group for
16 depot maintenance recommended closing one or two. That was
17 this year. And the Air Force Base Closure Group Executive
18 Group recommended closing one or two. I think they are
19 probably right.
20 I feel somewhat comfortable in Tinker Air Force
21 Base because I think if you look and compare the five, we
22 come out on top in almost any scenario. We have the

1 location, we have the two large runways, we have the large
2 maintenance facility, we do joint work with the Navy. And it
3 has worked very well.
4 We do work on time. I asked my staff to do an on-
5 time delivery comparison of Tinker versus Kelly on aircraft
6 and we were 91 percent on time. Kelly was only 10 percent.
7 There is a big difference there. And also on parts, the
8 parts were pretty close. We were 97 percent on time and
9 Kelly was 96 percent on time. On engines we were 99 percent
10 on time and Kelly was 93 percent on time. And also the
11 comparisons on aircraft where we were 91 percent and McLellan
12 was 80 percent.
13 So I submit those. Those, I think, have already
14 been given to you. But we do work on time. We do quality
15 work and Air Force people -- I know General Davis will tell
16 you -- want to have their work done at Tinker because they do
17 such quality work.
18 At Vance Air Force Base, likewise, I know that you
19 are going to have to close one pilot training base. Vance
20 should not be that one base. It is the least costly of any
21 of the bases. It saves money, and one of the purposes of
22 this commission is to try to save money.

1 We have more airspace than any other pilot training
2 bases, and that airspace is closer to Vance. It is closer to
3 the air base. They don't have to fly. We don't have an
4 encroachment problem. We don't have a big city. We don't
5 have a city surrounding the base. We have the economy, we
6 have the community support.
7 If you close Vance, the economic impact would be
8 devastating. Enid, which some of you had the opportunity to
9 visit, is population of 45,000. Compare that to Lubbock.
10 It's a population of almost 200,000. There is a lot of
11 difference, so the economic impact would be much, much
12 greater in Enid than it would be in Vance.
13 We have the community support. We have a
14 scholarship program at Vance. And this didn't just start as
15 an effort to show our love and support of Vance Air Force
16 Base, but we pay -- the government pays 75 percent of the
17 cost of a pilot's extra education or tuition. We pay the
18 other 25 percent and we pay 50 percent for a spouse if they
19 wish to have continued education and 50 percent for their
20 dependents. That is already done so the community support is
21 very strong for both bases and I think it is certainly in the
22 best interest of Oklahoma, but also in the best interest of

1 our country to keep both Vance and Tinker Air Force Base.

2 And I compliment the commission for doing an

3 outstanding job. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank the distinguished

5 senior senator from the great State of Oklahoma for doing a

6 good job and we are pleased to see his colleague and friend,

7 Senator Jim Inhofe here. Senator Inhofe, we are delighted to

8 have you, sir.

9 SENATOR INHOFE: Thank you very much. I suspect

10 you folks are just about as happy that this is coming to a

11 close as we are. I think we have all heard so many

12 presentations, seen so many charts, and it has to be

13 confusing. But I have to tell you and compliment all of you.

14 You have been out hands-on to the site and have been willing

15 to really take it seriously enough that you get beyond the

16 rhetoric and into the actual details of what we have, what

17 resources are out there.

18 And I think you have done a wonderful job but it's

19 coming very rapidly to a close. And you know a lot of this

20 would be redundant from some of our previous presentations,

21 but I can remember during the confirmation hearings that took

22 place right in this room -- it seems like several months ago,

1 it was a few months ago -- and we talked about the criteria
2 that was going to be used by the commission. And I think we
3 came to the conclusion that the military recommendation
4 probably should be the first criteria that should be
5 considered. And so I think that is what I hope that we can
6 leave you with is to look and see how the military is -- what
7 they are recommending.
8 As far as Tinker is concerned, you know, I think
9 Senator Nickles stated it very well. Tinker stands alone in
10 two respects, anyway. One is in its facilities and the other
11 is in readiness, because we approach the readiness from two
12 fronts. We have the Air Force with its AWACS and the Navy
13 with the TACAMO. And I commented, I guess somewhat jokingly,
14 down in Fort Worth that our Navy and Air Force actually talk
15 to each other and like each other. And I don't think anyone
16 will question that we have been the model for inter-servicing
17 throughout the nation.
18 So I hope when you look at Tinker that you will
19 agree that the three areas where we are number one would be
20 in the facilities and the quality of the facilities, the
21 inter-servicing and then, of course, the greatest
22 contribution to readiness.

1 Now, at Vance you have heard from Senator Nickles
2 and others the impact on the community, and certainly no one
3 could question that it has such tremendous impact on the
4 community, being in Oklahoma a relatively small community.
5 But also the contribution of the community too to Vance in
6 terms of land. You have seen the charts and the maps and all
7 of the contributions that have been made -- the educational
8 contributions. Down in Fort Worth I saw a banner of St.
9 Mary's Hospital. They were holding it up. Well, St. Mary's
10 Hospital has directly saved the Department of Defense $58,000
11 in the first six months of this year.
12 Don mentioned the airspace. I am a pilot. That is
13 what I was professionally. And I look down every time I go
14 across there and I see we have closer airspace, 24 low-level
15 routes that are much closer, within 50 nautical miles of
16 Vance. You can't say that about Columbus, you can't say that
17 about Reese, you can't say that about Laughland.
18 And so I think that we -- the conclusion is that we
19 can train cheaper and better, and that is what we are
20 supposed to be doing. But I would like to ask you to take it
21 out of the sense that you are listening today to -- I don't
22 know how many members of the House and of the Senate -- who

1 are all prejudiced. You know, we all want to protect our own
2 bases.
3 So I would ask you to look at the professional
4 people who really don't have a horse in the race and the ones
5 that are looking at this through the objective criteria that
6 they are using to make analyses. One was the Air Force
7 analysis. The Air Force analysis came out with the
8 conclusion that in the case of Vance we can train better and
9 cheaper than the rest of them can.
10 In the case of the Joint Cross Services Group, they
11 came to the same conclusion: Vance trains better and trains
12 cheaper. The Air Education Training Command, the AETC, that
13 is General Facilio. I mean, you stop and realize he doesn't
14 do anything else for a living. His job is to make a
15 determination as to how we can train better and cheaper, and
16 he came to this conclusion.
17 So, lastly, I would suggest to you that I got on
18 the House Armed Services Committee and the House of
19 Representatives when I represented only Tulsa County. There
20 weren't any facilities there. Then I came over to the Senate
21 Armed Services Committee. I didn't have any axe to grind. I
22 was concerned about one thing, and that is what is happening

1 to our military today. We are operating on a budget that
2 deeply concerns me and it is that much more important that we
3 get the very most out of the resources we have today.
4 So I would like to suggest to you that when you
5 look at Vance and you look at Tinker, that you can only come
6 to the conclusion as you listen not to the politicians but to
7 the experts who are trained in making these decisions, that
8 both Vance and Tinker should be not only saved but should be
9 expanded in the best national security interests of our
10 nation.
11 Thanks so much for all of your hard work.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much, Senator
13 Inhofe. We are indebted to you and your distinguished
14 colleague, Senator Nickles, for a fine presentation on behalf
15 of the folks in Oklahoma. And we are delighted to see
16 distinguished members of your House delegation here, and the
17 chair recognizes Representative Bill Brewster.
18 REPRESENTATIVE BREWSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
19 commissioners. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
20 before you today. I appreciate the time and effort each of
21 you has spent to bring this round of the BRAC process to a
22 close. I certainly do not envy your task.

1 I am here with the Oklahoma colleagues to testify
2 in support of Tinker Air Force Base in the defense of our
3 country, as well as the important role Tinker plays in the
4 economy of Oklahoma. Tinker's past record speaks for itself.
5 Tinker has consistently been ranked as one of the Air Force
6 superior depots. This record has been achieved while working
7 on some of the Air Force's most complex planes, such as the
8 B-52, B-1, KC-135, and the maintenance of the B-2 bomber will
9 soon be underway at Tinker.
10 We in Oklahoma do not understand why a base like
11 Tinker, with its excellent record of performance, could even
12 be considered a target for downsizing. In fact, every entity
13 which has reviewed the situation except the Pentagon has
14 recommended the closure of one or more bases less efficient
15 than Tinker. Moreover, I am confident Tinker's capabilities
16 will keep it off any list the commission may propose.
17 We have now reached a point where the optimal
18 operating levels may be sacrificed if we continue personnel
19 reductions; however, increased savings could be achieved by
20 efficiently utilizing the facility, thereby reducing the
21 overhead expenses per person. By downsizing personnel levels
22 below efficient levels, more overhead costs are borne by the

1 remaining work force.

2 Currently, it costs $60 per man/hour to operate
3 Tinker; however, if the base were operating at capacity the
4 cost would be reduced to $50 per man/hour. The increased
5 operating capacity could be achieved by reassigning work
6 currently being done at other facilities. Tinker has excess
7 capacity available to absorb a significant increase in
8 duties. Its potential for sizable growth will allow Tinker
9 to absorb new missions with minimal construction.

10 For example, Tinker once maintained approximately
11 350 B-52 bombers. The number has now dropped to around 100.
12 As a result of the lower number of B-52s, Tinker has
13 sufficient excess ramp space to absorb up to five million
14 man-hours of additional duties without additional
15 construction. The C-5 mission is representative of a mission
16 which Tinker could absorb with minimal additional
17 construction.

18 With the exception of the state government, Tinker
19 Air Force Base is the single largest employer in the State of
20 Oklahoma. Employees live in 37 of our state's 77 counties.
21 The positive economic impact on the State of Oklahoma by the
22 base is tremendous. Likewise, the loss of this employment

1 source would be devastating. Tinker's positive impact is not
2 restricted to the Oklahoma City metro area or the State of
3 Oklahoma, but to the nation as a whole. Thank you, Mr.
4 Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
6 Congressman Brewster. We are delighted to have that fine
7 testimony. We recognize your colleague, Representative Frank
8 Lucas.
9 REPRESENTATIVE LUCAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
10 commissioners, for granting me the opportunity to visit with
11 you again on behalf of Vance Air Force in Enid, Oklahoma.
12 And thank you for your patience as you listen to testimony
13 you have heard again and again over the past weeks.
14 Vance is a necessary and integral part of the Air
15 Force's readiness efforts. It is a superior training
16 facility with a successful history and a bright future.
17 Community support for Vance is very strong, as some of you
18 witnessed at the base visit last Wednesday. An estimated
19 12,000 people attended the rally to welcome the commissioners
20 and cheer for Vance. In a town with a population of
21 approximately 40,000, that is a pretty impressive feat, I
22 think.

1 Further evidence was the huge crowd of over 1,000
2 at the regional hearing in Fort Worth just this past
3 Saturday. Enid is at least a five-hour drive from Fort
4 Worth, longer, I am sure, for the 17 bus loads of folks who
5 came down for the hearing.
6 Vance is clearly the pride of Enid and the pride of
7 America. If you were to drive around Enid you would see huge
8 billboard signs on the way into town and at the entrances of
9 the base that sum up the Vance/Enid relationship as such.
10 The pride of Enid, the pride of America. And also you would
11 see signs in every retail store, on many vehicles, on many,
12 many tee shirts throughout the town that state Vance and
13 Enid, partners in the sky.
14 We in northwest Oklahoma obviously realize how
15 important the base is to our survival. Vance has been a
16 stable pillar of the community, especially during some of the
17 area's darkest days, such as the oil bust, farm crisis, and
18 the resulting loss of many small businesses in the area.
19 Enid works to make the Air Force feel welcome and
20 it is evident that they succeed. Many former pilots who
21 trained at Vance retire to the Enid area and make it their
22 permanent home. The morale of the student pilots at Vance is

1 high. While touring the base last Wednesday, the
2 commissioners got an opportunity to talk to some of those
3 students and many told that Vance was their first choice.
4 They chose Vance because their buddies who had
5 trained there told them it was the best. They commented on
6 the education program available to them and their spouses by
7 the community of Enid. Most of the pilots we met that day
8 were furthering their education because of this program.
9 They were also pleased with the accessibility of housing in
10 Enid and believed it to be a great place to raise their
11 families. And, finally, even a couple stated that the bigger
12 cities might perhaps offer too many distractions. On paper,
13 Vance is equally impressive. If the reason for the base
14 closure process is to save money, then clearly Vance should
15 remain open. Being a contractor-operated base, it makes for
16 the most cost-effective UPT base, saving over $81,000 per
17 graduate over the command average. That totals more than $10
18 million this year alone.
19 The base has one of the best, if not the best,
20 training environments in the country. As a result, Vance has
21 trained some of the finest pilots in the Air Force. No one
22 in the Air Force trains as well, primarily because of the

1 close and unencumbered Oklahoma airspace, which is the
2 largest of all the UPT bases, at 8,400 square miles. As a
3 result, Vance students get up to 15 percent more training
4 time than any other UPT base.
5 Perhaps most importantly, the hardworking people at
6 Vance make it stand out above the crowd. Throughout this
7 past year, my first year to represent this area, I have had
8 the privilege, I should say, of visiting Vance often and have
9 been impressed with every visit. The people take their jobs
10 seriously and they serve their country with dignity. You
11 will not find a stronger work ethic anywhere else in the
12 nation. Oklahomans today are direct descendants of the
13 pioneers who settled this vast, rough region of the heartland
14 only 100 years ago.
15 After visiting the base and after all of your
16 deliberations and analysis, I hope you will come to the same
17 conclusion I have: The Air Force made the right decision in
18 leaving Vance open. No substantial deviation from the Air
19 Force recommendation has been found. I thank the
20 commissioners again for your dedicated efforts.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I want to thank you,
22 Congressman Lucas, for that fine presentation. We appreciate

1 your contribution on behalf of the great State of Oklahoma.
2 We are delighted to see Representative J.C. Watts here.
3 Congressman Watts.
4 REPRESENTATIVE WATTS: Good morning, and thank you,
5 Mr. Chairman and distinguished commissioners. Let me again,
6 by stating my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to
7 tell the Tinker story, as we have done several times in the
8 last couple months.
9 The Oklahoma Air Logistics Center will be the
10 centerpiece of my comments today, obviously, and in the past
11 two days lawmakers have come before you to state their case.
12 You have heard these messages before during on-site visits
13 and regional hearings. You have listened to success stories
14 and had a chance to witness firsthand the excellence that is
15 at work at these depots, bases, posts, and ports across this
16 great country.
17 We talk and you listen, and now the process is
18 concluding. It is the time for summary and a final
19 opportunity to recommend a course of action. You have heard
20 the men and women of the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center tell
21 their story. It is a story of pride, commitment to customer
22 satisfaction, and a willingness to cooperate with the

1 changing profile of the American military industrial complex.

2 We have demonstrated an unmatched work ethic that

3 serves as the linchpin for Tinker's day-to-day activities,

4 which are integral to the military readiness of this great

5 country. Those contributions include fabricating parts to

6 keep our most sophisticated aircraft, like the B-2 bomber in

7 the mission ready status.

8 We have shown how the men and women of Tinker

9 perform a unique maintenance task on missiles such as the air

10 launch cruise missile, the short-range attack missile, the

11 Navy's Harpoon, or advanced cruise missile. Tinker has shown

12 their capable stewardship in managing a current year-end

13 industrial fund budget of almost $1 billion and supervising

14 the maintenance of more than 17,000 jet engines.

15 In this regard, the Department of Defense's own

16 depot maintenance operations indicators reports states that

17 during the period ending in the second quarter of fiscal year

18 1994, Tinker's average engine process days were greater than

19 one-third better than the competition. In addition, Tinker's

20 schedule indicator index for the period between April '93 and

21 February '94 was second best in Air Force Material Command.

22 We have shown that Tinker led the fleet in the area

1 of technology innovation and partnering. Tinker's technology
2 advancement coalitions address a wide spectrum of
3 environmental issues. One such venture joins all Department
4 of Defense installations in Oklahoma as a coalition to cross-
5 feed information on compliance actions and improve the
6 partnership between the Environmental Protection Agency and
7 other federal agencies.
8 Further, Tinker blazes a trail in alternative fuel
9 use by adapting some 551 vehicles to run on propane,
10 compressed natural gas, and electric battery power. Nearly
11 300 fleet vehicles have been converted to dual fuel clean
12 natural gas, giving Tinker the distinction of having one of
13 the largest dual fuel armada in the nation.
14 In summary, you saw pride, commitment to customer
15 satisfaction, and a willingness to cooperate with the
16 changing profile of the American military industrial complex.
17 That being the case, let me close with the recommended course
18 of action.
19 I have confidence in the commission's objectivity.
20 I know you will be making some of the most difficult
21 decisions since the BRAC process began. While those
22 decisions will not be easy, they must be made. I know that

1 you will honor the data that is put before you and not allow
2 politics to play an overwhelming role.
3 The American military industrial complex is
4 changing. This change is forcing people to disrupt their
5 professional lives, the lives of the families, and the lives
6 of the communities in which they live. The duty owed to the
7 citizens of this country is to make that change as rational a
8 decision as possible and avoid political correctness.
9 The people have told their story. The politicians
10 have told their story. Now let demonstrated performance and
11 proven statistics tell their story. I am confident the data
12 representing Tinker Air Force Base and, more specifically,
13 the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center, tell the story of a work
14 force committed to pride, customer satisfaction, and a
15 willingness to pursue excellence at every turn.
16 Mr. Chairman and honorable commissioners, I thank
17 you for your listening ear.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Congressman Watts, we
19 certainly thank you and we thank the entire Oklahoma
20 delegation, which gets the accolades of the commission for
21 giving their presentations in every individual case within
22 the five minutes allotted to their eternal credit. We are

1 grateful. Ever since Commissioner Rebecca Cox took over,
2 things have immeasurably improved and we are indebted to her.
3 We thank the great State of Oklahoma.
4 The only thing I could object to is Commissioner
5 Cox has done such a fine job that the chairman is obligated
6 to declare another recess until we can find some more people
7 to come over here. We are running now a little ahead of
8 schedule, briefly. May I say to my friends in the Congress
9 in both houses, please do not interpret this to mean we
10 encourage you to exceed your five minutes. We thank the
11 Oklahoma delegation once again for their 100 percent
12 performance.
13 (A brief recess was taken.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chair is delighted to see
15 Congressman Ernest Istook here and we are pleased to have him
16 be the clean-up man for the Oklahoma delegation, which has
17 done extremely well and will now do even better.
18 Congressman Istook.
19 REPRESENTATIVE ISTOOK: Thank you, Chairman Dixon.
20 I appreciate the opportunity. I didn't realize with the time
21 change that I might be clean-up, but I will accept whatever
22 position in the batting order is available.

1 As the commission well knows, I am here to testify
2 on behalf of Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. Tinker
3 is one of five air logistics centers. From my perspective,
4 not only as a person who has been very, or tried to be very
5 tight-fisted with the taxpayers' dollar, but also as a member
6 of the Appropriations Committee and a member of the Military
7 Construction Subcommittee, I am very sensitive to the
8 interest in changing the current structure of the air
9 logistics centers. And I realize that this commission seeks
10 to honor its oath and its obligations to take an objective
11 look at what is the right size, what is the proper size, to
12 be able to fulfill the military mission to meet the needs of
13 our national security, and yet have the most economical
14 circumstances for the taxpayer.
15 Now, there is only two viable ways to squeeze the
16 most bang for the buck out of our shrinking defense budget to
17 make the most of what you've got and look for the synergy
18 that you can through things such as inter-servicing. If you
19 maximize the use of existing military facilities, and I know
20 you have heard testimony regarding what are the needs when it
21 comes to the logistics centers of the Air Force, the needs
22 are to find if you can locate things in a smaller number of

1 locations and not only have overall savings but put them into
2 facilities that are most cost-effective, I believe that
3 Tinker Air Force Base satisfies those objectives.
4 It certainly has the flexibility. I think you have
5 received prior testimony that Tinker, for example, could
6 maintain all of the engines in the Air Force, that only what
7 are comparatively minor modifications are necessary to be
8 able to house all of the aircrafts for servicing purposes,
9 such as the C-5, I believe, was mentioned in particular. The
10 main servicing building at Tinker, which is Building 3001, is
11 flexible in the types of configurations in which it can be
12 utilized.
13 I think you have probably seen this chart
14 previously, which shows the ability to simultaneously be
15 doing air frame work on larger aircraft and smaller aircraft
16 and it is capable of being reconfigured in many different
17 ways. With depots, these are very expensive facilities.
18 Just in the last couple of years, the military construction
19 budget in FY '94 for air logistics centers was $120 million
20 when spread over five facilities; for FY '95, $70 million
21 when spread over five facilities. FY '96, of course, is
22 still unknown.

1 But if you have the opportunity to minimize the
2 cost of military construction as well as the cost of military
3 maintenance and performing the mission, I believe that Tinker
4 offers the cost advantages. It was pointed out in the
5 hearing Saturday that one of the comparative figures from one
6 of the other ALCs evidently misstated the cost advantage that
7 actually exists per hour for Tinker personnel being able to
8 perform the services for $11 per man/hour less than the
9 comparable ALC in that.
10 I agree wholeheartedly with the former chairman of
11 this commission, Jim Courter, where he said that if we
12 maintain excess capacity it only takes resources away from
13 the ability to modernize, to train, to procure, and to take
14 care of the quality of life for our current servicemen.
15 That is why I take seriously the interest that this
16 commission has in decreasing the number of ALCs and believe
17 that Tinker Air Force Base not only has proven by its
18 performance, by its on-time delivery of engines of avionics
19 and of air frames; has proven that it operates more
20 efficiently and effectively and more flexibly than other ALCs
21 and has the existing facilities that can absorb additional
22 work; that can absorb transfers of missions, which is one of

1 your criteria in considering realignment, a very important
2 one.
3 If Tinker can do more for less than is being done
4 at the other ALCs, I believe it should be considered as a
5 candidate not for closing but for receiving missions that may
6 come from ALCs that are closed because they are not as
7 efficient, they are not as effective, they do not deliver on
8 time, they do not have the history of inter-servicing such as
9 Tinker has established with Navy aircraft, air frames, and
10 engines.
11 I thank you for your time and I appreciate it.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Congressman
13 Istook, for your fine contribution. Let me say that I see
14 several members of the Pennsylvania delegation, in their
15 usual interest to serve their constituency, arriving a little
16 early. We are grateful.
17 As soon as a couple more come so that the chair
18 sees some continuity, in the next couple of minutes, we will
19 start on the Pennsylvania delegation. You are slated to
20 begin at 12:37. You are here early. I see several more
21 coming. I appreciate it. In about a minute or two we will
22 take up Pennsylvania. We will be right with you and I thank

1 you very much.

2 (A brief recess was taken.)

3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, ladies and gentlemen, we're

4 indebted to the distinguished members of the Pennsylvania

5 delegation for coming here early. I've noted the order of

6 their arrival. There are four of them here. We appreciate

7 the fact that Congressman Holden, Congressman Gekas,

8 Congressman McDade, and Congressman Fox would all be here.

9 We're going to start a little early, because

10 they're on the ball, and they got here early. And my

11 understanding is that in the Senate right now, there's an

12 amendment about to be pending in which a member of your

13 delegation will be required to be working the well, which I

14 understand as a member of the Senate for a few years.

15 And so we're going to, if it's all right with your

16 delegation, start with your House members and let the

17 Senators come in as they're able to come in. And we'll

18 recognize the four of you in the order in which you arrived.

19 And the Commission is indebted to you for accommodating us

20 and the country by being so prompt.

21 And we're going to hear first from Representative

22 Tim Holden. And Congressman Holden, we thank you for being

1 here, sir.

2 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 And good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and commissioner. I would

4 like to thank you for this opportunity to testify before you

5 on matters relating to Fort Indiantown Gap and to Tobyhanna

6 Army Depot.

7 I would first like to discuss Fort Indiantown Gap.

8 As you are probably aware, the Army's financial analysis of

9 the savings was based on bad data and flawed analysis,

10 resulting in a serious overestimation of the projected

11 savings. The Army, using more accurate data from the Fort

12 Indiantown Gap Coalition, revised its annual projected

13 savings down from 23 million to $6.7 million, admittedly a 75

14 percent error and correction.

15 Using actual expenditure figures for the

16 elimination of on-hand civilians as opposed to those

17 authorized but not funded, the actual repair and maintenance

18 data, the annual cost savings is only $2.3 million. The

19 Army's final $6.7 million annual savings is further

20 undermined in that they did not include all the costs in

21 their analysis, and only the cost of moving active component

22 units and functions were considered.

1 Their ignoring the cost of moving the U.S. Army
2 Reserve equipment concentration site to Fort Dix and the cost
3 to move the Pennsylvania Guard's equipment site currently
4 located at Fort Pickett, Virginia, to another site is a
5 serious mistake.
6 Significantly, the Army has seriously
7 underestimated the Gap in military value in a number of other
8 ways. The Army clearly did not fully understand the
9 complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to
10 the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In fact, the other
11 services were not even questioned as to their training
12 requirements at Fort Indiantown Gap.
13 The Marine Corps Reserves, the Air Force, and the
14 Navy all train at the installation and on the bombing and
15 staffing range, a national asset which is nearly impossible
16 to replace. Not included was the Northern training area at
17 Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square
18 miles used for Army aviation training.
19 Tank qualification ranges, Tank Table 8, were not
20 considered in the Army's analysis of the military value. The
21 Army wants to shift training to Fort Dix and AP Hill, neither
22 of which can support tank qualification gunnery. The Army

1 did not recognize the number and types of Reserve component
2 schools, the Reserve component units, and maintenance
3 activities which are assigned to the Gap.
4 None of the seven schools, design Reserve component
5 units, and the aviation and ground maintenance activities are
6 scheduled to leave the Gap upon closure. The active Army is
7 attempting to pass the cost of running the infrastructure of
8 the post to the state. Thereby, the state would be in the
9 business of subsidizing the training of federal troops, a
10 responsibility which clearly should remain with the federal
11 government.
12 The Army's analysis determined Reserve component
13 annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in
14 that its results are based on a 12-month availability of
15 Reserve component units and that the proposed alternative
16 training sites are not able to accommodate the additional
17 training load.
18 This impact of an increased training load on the
19 alternative training sites was not part of the Army's
20 analysis. The affected installations were not consulted.
21 Representatives from Fort Drumm have told Fort Indiantown Gap
22 before the Fort Indiantown Gap Coalition, number one, that

1 they were already saturated for annual training, and number
2 two, the increased training load will adversely affect range
3 and training facility maintenance and increase existing
4 environmental problems in the training areas.
5 Two of the proposed alternative training sites are
6 unsuitable for the required kind of training. The Army
7 erred, in that proposed sites cannot meet all existing
8 training requirements of the units which currently train at
9 the Gap.
10 Given the totality of these errors and omissions,
11 it is clear that the Army substantially deviated from the DOD
12 selection criteria, and as a result of its higher than
13 estimated military value to all the Department of Defense,
14 Fort Indiantown Gap should be removed from the closure list.
15 Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly turn your
16 attention to the Tobyhanna Army Depot. I urge you and the
17 Commission members to accept the recommendation of the
18 Secretary of Defense and keep Tobyhanna open, because it is
19 an outstanding facility. Tobyhanna offers the highest
20 military value and is very cost-effective. Tobyhanna is a
21 truly valuable military asset to the Department of Defense
22 which should be retained.

1 Tobyhanna is a great bargain for the taxpayers, and
2 its modern facilities provide great potential for
3 interservicing agreements. The state-of-the-art facilities
4 and highly skilled workforce at Tobyhanna provide an
5 outstanding opportunity for the communications and
6 electronics work for other services to be consolidated as
7 part of interservicing agreements.
8 In today's modern, digitized battlefield, the high
9 tech facilities at Tobyhanna are critical to our national
10 security. Pennsylvanians have always answered the call to
11 duty, but the proposed cuts in BRAC 1995 would have an unfair
12 and drastic effect on the Commonwealth.
13 I deeply appreciate your consideration in this
14 matter and ask that you remove Fort Indiantown Gap and
15 Tobyhanna from the BRAC list. Thank you very much,
16 commissioners.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
18 Holden.
19 And we will now call upon your distinguished
20 colleague, Representative George Gekas.
21 REPRESENTATIVE GEKAS: I thank you. To the
22 chairman and to the members of the Commission, we bring you

1 greetings from Lebanon Valley, Pennsylvania, the heart of
2 Central Pennsylvania. And Indiantown Gap is the heart of the
3 heart of Central Pennsylvania.
4 The written statement that I wish to submit to the
5 Commission, with your consent, contains the fact sheet that
6 replicates what Representative Holden was able to convey to
7 you. And the numbers are adequately presented in the record
8 already in the previous functions that brought forth the
9 story of Indiantown Gap.
10 What I would like to concentrate on with the
11 Commission, if it please the Commission, is as follows: When
12 last the BRAC considered Indiantown Gap, it was the Pentagon
13 which urged the Commission, along with the advocates of
14 maintaining Indiantown Gap, the Pentagon itself who pressed
15 for retention of the Indiantown Gap facility; that is, your
16 predecessor in the Commission was listing it as a possible
17 closure or realignment.
18 But the Pentagon felt that the military value and
19 the investment that they had thus far up to that juncture
20 made justified its being removed from the BRAC consideration.
21 Now, we have a reversal of form, as it were. And I need to
22 focus the attention of the Commission on the rationale for

1 that change, that 360 turnaround in the Pentagon and in the
2 BRAC considerations.
3 If, indeed, the Pentagon and BRAC, your
4 predecessors, already had found that Indiantown Gap should
5 remain open, then they found that the economic impact of
6 closure would be adverse to the community, which we all would
7 know. That's a matter of fact. And secondly, more
8 importantly, the military value required that it remain in
9 its present state.
10 Now, what has happened since then? Not only did
11 the Pentagon endorse its remaining in place, that Indiantown
12 Gap remain in place with its function, but also poured
13 additional dollars into it to modernize certain facilities
14 and to make the training that Indiantown Gap has historically
15 been performing even more feasible and more valuable, more
16 worthwhile, to the Pentagon itself.
17 And so we have now the anomaly of a Pentagon
18 endorsement in the last BRAC round, a Pentagon increased and
19 a Congressionally increased investment in Indiantown Gap, an
20 upgrading of its functions, its training capacities. And
21 then, we have Desert Storm data to show that immediate
22 mobilization was a factor that was commented on by every

1 person of military strength in the whole nation as being a
2 remarkable feat for Indiantown Gap or any mobilization point.
3 And now, we have the BRAC Commission considering
4 closing the new investment made in Indiantown Gap. That has
5 to be taken into consideration by the Commission. It would
6 be like throwing bad dollars after good dollars. We have
7 heard that trite expression thousands of times, but it
8 pertains here.
9 Why increase the tank artillery range capacity of
10 Indiantown Gap and then close it down? Why invest more money
11 and then determine, "Well, we'll realign it or close it down
12 altogether"? These are the kinds of considerations that go
13 beyond just the fact sheets which we present to you but go
14 onto questions of common sense, application of the value in
15 Indiantown Gap.
16 I want to close with two anecdotes. A high Cabinet
17 official in a previous Administration, a resident of Virginia
18 who himself served in the Reserves of that state, commented
19 to me after he heard about it. He said, "How are they going
20 to close Indiantown Gap?"
21 This was a member of a previous Cabinet in a
22 previous Administration. "That's where I trained," he told

1 me, as a Reserve, "and there was no other place for us in
2 Virginia," he felt, or perhaps some regions of Virginia, "to
3 go for this type of training except Indiantown Gap. Anything
4 else would be cost-defective," if that's a phrase. I'll
5 incorporate it into my testimony, coin a new phrase, "cost-
6 defective."
7 And so I was pleased to hear that, because that's
8 our contention. And this was from an out-of-state, other
9 state resident who served in the Reserves and who trained in
10 Indiantown Gap.
11 Second anecdote. Right after Desert Storm had been
12 completed successfully, on a chance stop at the Chalet
13 Restaurant in Dillsburg, also in Central Pennsylvania, I
14 happened to see sitting in a booth a familiar face. And I
15 went down to join him for a cup of coffee. It was General
16 Gus Pagonas, who was the officer in charge of all the
17 logistics required in Desert Storm.
18 And I sat down with him and asked him just on a
19 casual basis how would he evaluate the role of New Cumberland
20 Army Depot, which is in Central Pennsylvania, and Indiantown
21 Gap and Mechanicsburg Naval Depot in what happened so
22 successfully in Desert Storm. He was quick to tell me that

1 the mobilization that took place in Indiantown Gap and the
2 logistics capacity of New Cumberland were key measures in the
3 successful exercise of Desert Storm.
4 That was very important to me, because then what he
5 had told me justified the additional funding that the
6 Pentagon and the Congress poured into Indiantown Gap
7 following Desert Storm for an update and modernization and
8 fulfillment of the capacity of Indiantown Gap. That was very
9 important to me.
10 I speak for, of course, on a parochial, selfish,
11 political basis, many would ascribe my testimony as being.
12 And I accept that, because I want Indiantown Gap to be saved.
13 But what I've tried to outline here is objective data, the
14 Pentagon's opinion in the last BRAC, the BRAC's last BRAC
15 opinion, the gentleman from Virginia who served in a Cabinet
16 of a previous Administration, and the general that was in
17 charge of all the Indiantown Gap and other facilities in the
18 country were able to do during Desert Storm.
19 This is the gist of my testimony to you, and I
20 would urge you to review the record of your predecessor BRAC
21 as to the value of Indiantown Gap.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Gekas.

1 We're delighted to have you here, and we're pleased to have
2 my old friend, Congressman Joe McDade.
3 Representative McDade.
4 REPRESENTATIVE McDADE: Mr. Chairman, members of
5 the Commission, thank you once again for the privilege of
6 having the opportunity to speak to you again on behalf of
7 what I consider to be the best depot in the entire DOD
8 system, Tobyhanna Army Depot.
9 Let me say that I know that you've had thousands of
10 miles and thousands of hours of information presented to you,
11 and I'm going to try to be brief and certainly not present to
12 you any more slides today or charts. I know you've probably
13 seen the ultimate in every slide possible.
14 Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I did bring a
15 piece of hardware. It's a little, tiny radio. It weighs
16 about two pounds. It's designed to operate for about 15
17 hours on a single battery. It is called a PRC-111 in the
18 jargon of the military, and it is maintained, enhanced, and
19 repaired at the Tobyhanna Army Depot.
20 There's something else about it I want you to know,
21 too. This is the kind of survival radio that was used by
22 Scott O'Grady to be recovered in conjunction with all the

1 rest of our forces in Bosnia.

2 Tobyhanna does this for everybody in the military,
3 and it indicates the unique nature of their interservicing
4 capabilities and, in my opinion, as well, the requirement
5 that we have absolutely well-maintained equipment if our
6 youngsters are to survive. That's the kind of radio that we
7 see maintained at Tobyhanna, enhanced at Tobyhanna, kept
8 ready there so that it can help our youngsters to get on
9 back.

10 I want to say that I know that you've had enormous
11 data presented to you and mountains of briefing papers and
12 point papers. I only want you to keep in mind, if I might
13 ask you to, as you come to your conclusion just a couple of
14 points about the Tobyhanna Army Depot that I think really cut
15 to the core, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, and
16 something that we all have to do as we try to make decisions
17 in a committee environment, where we get an awful lot of
18 material presented to us.

19 What are those salient points? First, we need to
20 realize that Tobyhanna Army Depot is the single largest
21 communications electronics depot in the entire Department of
22 Defense. It is a single commodity, dedicated facility used

1 by the Department with the largest single concentration in
2 that one depot on this one single commodity.
3 It is also, Mr. Chairman and members of the
4 Commission, the lowest cost, most productive by DOD standards
5 GCE facility in the entire system. Now, we can do a lot and
6 you've heard a lot about rates here and there, but I want to
7 give you two rates, both of which are published DOD rates.
8 One is the Air Force commodity rate for electronics at
9 Sacramento ALC. And the rate per hour in that particular
10 depot is $88.35.
11 For the same work at Tobyhanna Army Depot, the rate
12 published by the Army Depot Systems is $55.95, a savings of
13 $30 an hour for work performed on similar work, identical
14 work at Tobyhanna.
15 And all of you are faced with this enormous problem
16 of figuring out how to deal with the shortages that confront
17 not just our military; but everybody in the country has to
18 look at that, because any dollar you spend that has that kind
19 of a wage rate differential at Tobyhanna indicates that you
20 can get the job done much less costly and, indeed, enhance
21 readiness by making these scarce dollars available at other
22 places.

1 I want to indicate, too, that in the Commission's
2 decision last time to eliminate the Sacramento Army Depot,
3 Tobyhanna was permitted to compete against McClellan Air
4 Force Base on five occasions. Head to head, as you mandated
5 in competition, four out of five of those competitions were
6 won on bid rate packages by Tobyhanna. They were lower, they
7 were of equal quality, they did the work better. They
8 deserve to be rewarded for that, Mr. Chairman.
9 So I submit to you that the only logical place that
10 we can look at is Tobyhanna because of that wage rate,
11 because of its efficiency, and because it has the capacity.
12 If we were to say today, "What is the depot in the United
13 States of America that can expand in ground control
14 communications electronics and make these type survival
15 radios with efficiency and cost efficiency and material
16 efficiency?" the resounding answer is, "Tobyhanna Army
17 Depot."
18 It is the only depot that could accept additional
19 work without one cent of military construction dollars
20 required. There would be, of course, some minor facilitation
21 dollars, but that's it. I submit to the Commission -- and
22 you've heard it many times, and I know you know it's

1 accurate -- Tobyhanna is the best GCE depot in the system.
2 We need to keep the best for our country and for
3 the Scott O'Gradys who might have to use its resources later
4 on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission.
5 Thank you very much.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you for an excellent
7 presentation. We appreciate it very much. Representative
8 Joe McDade.
9 Our next presentation will be by Congressman Jon
10 Fox of the Pennsylvania delegation. Representative Fox,
11 we're delighted to have you. My wife's maiden name was Fox,
12 so you have a gentle audience.
13 REPRESENTATIVE FOX: I hope you'll be thinking of
14 your wife as you decide for Pennsylvania affirmatively on all
15 of our requests. From one Fox to another, I thank you very
16 much for her help. I hope she'll talk to you after hours
17 like I'm talking to you during hours.
18 Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, thank
19 you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I also
20 join the expressions of Colonel Burton, who led the rescue
21 mission for Scott O'Grady. He's from my district, and he
22 joins me in the spirit of these remarks.

1 As a new member of Congress, I certainly appreciate
2 the importance of your mission of cost-cutting and
3 consolidation, and I salute you for your efforts to preserve
4 our national defense by streamlining and reducing
5 inefficiencies.
6 And while I do believe that we all must share in
7 the burden of reducing the size and cost of the federal
8 government, I must emphasize the tremendous impact of base
9 closures and realignments on Philadelphia and on Pennsylvania
10 as a whole. Pennsylvania had 45,435 total defense personnel
11 as of September 30, 1994; as a result of action by the '88,
12 '91, and '93 Defense Base Closure and Realignment
13 Commissions, Pennsylvania lost 13,305 of those positions.
14 Including the 1995 Department of Defense
15 recommendations, Pennsylvania will have lost 16,600 jobs.
16 This is a 36.6 percent cut in defense personnel, higher than
17 any other state in the Union. Moreover, Philadelphia
18 closures account for more than 75 percent of Pennsylvania job
19 losses.
20 Mr. Chairman and fellow commissioners, Pennsylvania
21 has given its fair share towards accomplishing our goal. I
22 would like to take this opportunity to share my thoughts with

1 you concerning four specific issues before the Commission,
2 the Navy facilities in Warminster, Pennsylvania; the defense
3 industrial supply center in Philadelphia; realignment and
4 consolidation affecting Naval Surface Warfare Center in
5 Philadelphia; and the Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.
6 These issues are of great importance to me and our
7 colleagues here in Pennsylvania and the citizens of
8 Montgomery County who I'm privileged to represent.
9 First, I would like to urge the Commission to
10 closely examine the options for the naval air warfare center
11 in Warminster, Pennsylvania. I believe that we must do
12 everything possible to ensure the success of reuse efforts
13 and to protect the regional economy.
14 Moreover, I would like to bring to your attention
15 the value of the Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance
16 Center, the RDT&E divisions detachment in Warminster. As you
17 know, the Navy has erroneously proposed that the functions of
18 this detachment be relocated to the Naval command in San
19 Diego and the Naval Oceanographic Office in St. Louis.
20 It should be noted that the Philadelphia detachment
21 is of great military value to both the Navy and joint forces
22 programs. The proposed transfer would have an extremely

1 negative effect on the detachment's core capability to
2 continue to support these programs.
3 Moreover, the cost assumptions for the move do not
4 include personnel and equipment transfer costs and do not
5 consider the detachment's locally employed outsourced
6 technical support. We are concerned that the Department did
7 not investigate the possibility of relocating locally.
8 Secondly, as I emphasized in my letter to you of
9 April 14th, I strongly support the defense industrial supply
10 center in Philadelphia. As you know, the Defense Logistics
11 Agency has recommended that DISC be disestablished. Although
12 the DLA claimed that this action will eliminate 385 direct
13 jobs, I understand that the jobs of more than 1,800 other
14 employees at DISC would be at risk because the current
15 employees would have no right of placement or transfer
16 function entitlement at any job within the DLA's inventory
17 control point.
18 In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overruled the
19 Department of Defense's recommendation to close DISC. This
20 facility is still crucial to military readiness, and I urge
21 you to uphold the decision of the '93 Commission.
22 The workforce at DISC has been recognized as a

1 model of efficiency. DISC has the highest proportion of
2 military requisitions and still maintains the highest level
3 of support of all hardware centers. In addition, DISC has
4 the lowest number of below goal systems and consistently
5 provides better availability to weapons systems items than
6 any other ICPs.
7 Because DISC is housed along with a Navy weapons
8 management ICP and a weapons engineering facility, a talented
9 pool of experienced logistics personnel has developed. As a
10 result, DISC and the Aviation Supply Office have developed a
11 strong working relationship that promotes cooperation and
12 productivity. There is no rationale for choosing to
13 eliminate DISC among the four Defense Logistics Agencies.
14 Of all four ICPs, DISC manages 35 percent of all
15 weapons systems hardware and processes 40 percent of all
16 military customer requisitions. In spite of these facts,
17 Defense Logistics Agency recommended moving DISC's weapons
18 coded workload to the general supply center, which currently
19 manages the least amount of weapons coded workload of the
20 ICPs.
21 It is essential that we preserve DISC in order to
22 maintain our defense logistics at the highest level of

1 readiness, promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness and save
2 the jobs, of course, of dedicated DISC employees.
3 Third, I would like to speak in support of the DOD
4 recommendations to realign Naval Surface Warfare Center
5 Annapolis with Naval Service Warfare Center Philadelphia, as
6 well as the City of Philadelphia's recommendation to
7 consolidate NAVSEA 03 with the Naval Surface Warfare Center
8 in Philadelphia.
9 As the former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman,
10 is quoted as saying, "Realigning NSWC Annapolis with the NSWC
11 Philadelphia center of excellence is of critical importance
12 to the Navy." Consolidation of the machinery engineering
13 life cycle will improve the operational readiness of the
14 fleet and save 14.5 million a year, for a total 20-year
15 savings of 175.1 million.
16 I would also like to finally strongly urge the
17 Commission to approve the City of Philadelphia's proposal to
18 consolidate NAVSEA 03650 employees with the Naval Surface
19 Warfare Center Philadelphia, 1,600 employees and tremendous
20 facility infrastructure. The consolidation will eliminate
21 unnecessary duplication, save about $166 million over 20
22 years.

1 Finally, I'm pleased to offer my support for Fort
2 Indiantown Gap. I'm concerned about the harm that a closure
3 of this fort would cause to our national security and our
4 local security. I believe that the fort is essential for
5 military readiness.
6 In addition, as I stated in my letter to the
7 Commission of May 12th, Fort Indiantown Gap is the only
8 convenient training site for Reserve and National Guard units
9 in our area. Elimination of Fort Indiantown Gap would be a
10 grave error, and I urge the Commission to reexamine this
11 proposal.
12 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you
13 for consideration of my thoughts. With your permission, I
14 would like to have my remarks submitted for the record.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your remarks will be reproduced in
16 the record in full, Congressman Fox. We're indebted to you.
17 May I ask my friend, the distinguished Senator from
18 Pennsylvania, whether he has voted? You have voted. Then,
19 if you don't object, Senator, I'm going to go by the numbers
20 here as the folks have arrived.
21 And we now recognize Congressman Paul McHale.
22 CONGRESSMAN McHALE: Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 Commission, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before
2 you today. My colleagues in the Pennsylvania delegation who
3 preceded me to the microphone have eloquently defended the
4 capabilities available at Fort Indiantown Gap.
5 Although I'm a member of Congress and a member of
6 the National Security Committee and previously a member of
7 the Armed Services Committee, I bring a slightly different
8 perspective to the comments that I make regarding Fort
9 Indiantown Gap. I'm a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps
10 Reserve, and I often have said and think of myself as a
11 Marine rifleman on temporary duty with the United States
12 Congress.
13 From 1984 to 1987, I served as a Marine infantry
14 officer with the Reserve unit located in Harrisburg,
15 Pennsylvania. That's Echo Company 225. For a year, I was a
16 rifle platoon commander with that unit. For the last two
17 years, 1985 to '87, I was the commanding officer of that
18 unit. That unit is located 20 miles from Fort Indiantown Gap
19 and on many, many, many occasions, I trained at the Gap.
20 Following the Gulf War in which I had the
21 opportunity to serve, I was the operations officer of the 2nd
22 Battalion 25th Marines. That battalion frequently trained,

1 in whole or in part, at Fort Indiantown Gap. I know every
2 range at the Gap. I have fired virtually every infantry
3 weapon that is available to the American Armed Services at
4 the Gap, and I've scheduled training and supervised training
5 at the Gap.
6 I'm a grunt. I clean rifles. And I am familiar
7 with the training that takes place at the Gap. Let me assure
8 you as sincerely and as forcefully as I can, the live fire
9 training opportunities now available at Fort Indiantown Gap
10 are among the finest in the nation. I've been training as a
11 Marine for over 20 years. I have never had better live fire
12 training opportunities on the East Coast of the United States
13 than I have experienced at Fort Indiantown Gap.
14 I've said that modern warfare is not brain surgery;
15 it is more complicated than that. When we move combined
16 armed forces forward on the battlefield, particularly if we
17 are to retain the protection of our air power, it is
18 absolutely essential that we have synchronized utilization of
19 the various weapons systems available to us.
20 At Fort Indiantown Gap as nowhere else that I have
21 ever experienced it on the East Coast of the United States --
22 and I'm including places that are much better known, such as

1 Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; Quantico, Virginia -- nowhere
2 else have I and the Marines that I served with had an
3 opportunity such as that available at Fort Indiantown Gap to
4 combine and synchronize tank, artillery, mortar, machine gun,
5 and close air support.
6 If you close the Gap for our active duty and
7 particularly for our Reserve forces, there will be no
8 substitute for the training opportunities, particularly the
9 live fire training opportunities now routinely available and
10 readily accessible at Fort Indiantown Gap. You can spend a
11 lot of time in uniform without having the opportunity to
12 exercise live fire the way it is available during the week
13 and on every weekend at Fort Indiantown Gap.
14 Let me close with this, if I may. We make a
15 serious mistake of judgement, a mistake of judgement that
16 will cost lives, if in the interest of economy, we foreclose
17 training opportunities that very nearly replicate what real
18 combat is about.
19 I am a firm believer in training during peacetime
20 in a manner that as nearly as possible duplicates that which
21 we expect of our soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen in
22 time of war. And I'm telling you, what is available at Fort

1 Indiantown Gap is unique.

2 If you close those live fire ranges, there will be
3 nowhere else on the East Coast within a reasonable distance
4 of the units to be trained where that kind of live fire
5 training, exactly the kind of utilization of live fire that
6 won the Gulf War, will be available to such units.

7 I have no parochial interest in Fort Indiantown
8 Gap. My district is two hours away. There are no jobs
9 affected, to the best of my knowledge, in any significant
10 number within my district by your decision one way or the
11 other.

12 But please, I urge you, before you close the Gap,
13 before you make what I believe to be a serious misjudgment,
14 look at the live fire training opportunities available at
15 Fort Indiantown Gap, realize as I have that those training
16 opportunities are not available elsewhere, and reconsider any
17 decisions that you might have otherwise made to close those
18 training ranges.

19 Nowhere else on the East Coast will our Reserve
20 units in particular have the chance to go out and coordinate
21 mortars, artillery, tanks, and air power as they will be
22 expected to do so in the next conflict. Please reconsider

1 your decision and think about the training of those young men
2 who are dependent upon your judgement. I thank you very
3 much.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman McHale. We
5 appreciate it very much. The Chair would remind everybody
6 again, as a former member of the Congress speaking to the
7 Congress, this is green, this is yellow, this is red. I know
8 it's difficult.
9 The Chair is delighted to recognize a distinguished
10 member of the House from the great Pennsylvania delegation,
11 Congressman Bud Shuster.
12 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: Thank you very much for the
13 opportunity to appear here today to highlight the reasons why
14 we believe this Commission should reaffirm the BRAC '93
15 unanimous decision to consolidate missiles at Letterkenny and
16 continue the teaming of track vehicles.
17 Just as DOD did in 1993 and as the 1993 BRAC
18 Commission concluded at that time, the Department has again
19 substantially deviated from criteria 1 and criteria 4. The
20 methodology they use to compute capacity drives both of these
21 criteria and is not based on true military worth. The
22 capacity computation ignores the value of the actual

1 maintenance mission performed, and it rewards installations
2 who work on small items.
3 How can Letterkenny have more land, more
4 facilities, more square feet, and be ranked last in capacity?
5 A better assessment of military worth would be to look at the
6 requirements of the future and consider the successes in
7 interservicing and in teaming and the overall value to DOD.
8 In this case, Letterkenny would rank at the top of all the
9 depots.
10 Additionally, we have recently become aware of an
11 important new development that supports the BRAC 1993
12 decision. We have seen an internal Army document dated 31
13 May to the Undersecretary of the Army which states -- and I
14 quote -- "The Army's recommendation to realign Letterkenny's
15 tactical missile workload was footed in a faulty stationing
16 strategy. Due to an oversight in the document's preparation,
17 provision of a tactical missile capability was neglected,
18 even though this commodity is key to DOD's war fighting
19 capability."
20 As the Commission knows, Letterkenny is not a
21 single depot like most in the inventory. We perform several
22 missions, including ammunition storage, joint service missile

1 maintenance, and combat vehicle maintenance. We're the only
2 depot with these capabilities. To realign Letterkenny simply
3 does not make sound business sense.
4 The way to save money is to have a clean kill. It
5 is to totally close an installation. We all know that
6 Letterkenny will not be totally closed because of the
7 strategic need to maintain the ammo storage mission. It's
8 true that base operation costs will go down, but the cost to
9 maintain 19,000 acres and a staff of 672 for the continued
10 support and several million square feet of building space
11 will remain.
12 So to realign the joint tactical missiles will cost
13 MILCON, training, transportation of equipment, and personnel
14 costs. The best estimate is that the cost to realign the
15 depot is definitely not only the $53 million that is the TABS
16 estimate, because that TABS estimate does not include DLA,
17 SYMAC, and the logistics support activity.
18 More probably, the best evidence indicates it will
19 cost in excess of $230 million to realign, along with the
20 recurring annual costs to operate the remaining functions at
21 Letterkenny.
22 The point that seems to often be missed is that

1 there are zero added costs to retain Letterkenny, not to
2 realign Letterkenny. After four years of tactical missile
3 studies and several DODIG investigations, it has been
4 conclusively concluded that Letterkenny is the best of the 19
5 depots studied to perform the joint services tactical missile
6 maintenance program.
7 As a result of this decision, Letterkenny already
8 has completed the transition of 13 of the 21 missile systems,
9 shipped and installed over $100 million in specialized
10 equipment, and hired and trained an additional 262 technical
11 missile experts. What businessman would recommend changing
12 course this far into a business decision without overwhelming
13 justification?
14 No other depot in the United States can perform
15 joint missile integration. None have adequate storage
16 capability. None have adequate maintenance space. And none
17 have the capacity for missile ground support equipment. To
18 claim otherwise without significant construction and other
19 major associated costs is simply false.
20 As the DODIG concluded last month, this program,
21 the BRAC '93 program of consolidation of missiles, is within
22 budget and on schedule. We're also aware of the Army Chief

1 of Staff's letter of just 8 June which reinforces the closure
2 of Red River and states that the justification is
3 "compelling."
4 Well, with the closure of Red River, keeping
5 Letterkenny open is even more important. Because Letterkenny
6 is the only other depot which can provide surge capacity to
7 Anniston in time of war.
8 Currently, Letterkenny is performing vehicle
9 maintenance on Palladin, as well as others. We have entered
10 into a partnership agreement with United Defense on the
11 program and in two short years have saved over $60 million.
12 This model procurement program has already eliminated
13 substantial bureaucracy.
14 In summary, Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen,
15 the Department has again substantially deviated from criteria
16 1 and 4. The 1993 BRAC decision was a sound decision. And
17 we urge this Commission to reaffirm that BRAC 1993 decision
18 to consolidate missiles and to continue the public-private
19 teaming of track vehicles at Letterkenny. Thank you very
20 much.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
22 Bud Shuster.

1 And on behalf of the Pennsylvania delegation,
2 Representative Robert Borski.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BORSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
4 members of the Commission, for giving me the opportunity to
5 testify today. Two years ago, I came before you to argue
6 against the Pentagon's proposal to close and relocate nearly
7 every defense facility in the City of Philadelphia.
8 Recognizing that the true military value of these
9 facilities is its skilled workforces, the Commission wisely
10 rejected the Pentagon's proposal and instead approved a more
11 cost-effective alternative that consolidated these facilities
12 at the ASO compound in Philadelphia.
13 Regrettably, in BRAC '95, the Pentagon has chosen
14 to ignore the wisdom of your decision. DLA has proposed to
15 disestablish DISC on the ASO combat. This proposal does not
16 close a base. Eighty percent of its claimed savings come
17 from eliminating personnel positions.
18 I will not go into the details of the flaws behind
19 DLA's stated savings. The employees at DISC have already
20 provided you with detailed information. Instead, as you
21 examine whether this proposal will save any money, I ask that
22 you keep in mind the following points about this proposal's

1 impact on military readiness.

2 DLA is disestablishing DISC, which by every measure
3 is DLA's most efficient weapons supply center. DISC manages
4 the most weapons system items and has the highest customer
5 support rate, yet has the lowest rate of error. Because DISC
6 is DLA's best supply center, it has served as a prototype for
7 DLA's future missions requirement.
8 The employees at DISC have been reinventing government long
9 before Vice President Gore's initiatives.

10 Disestablishing DISC will also result in the
11 permanent loss of a unique joint service synergy that exists
12 between DISC and ASO. In BRAC '93, the Commission pointed to
13 this synergy as a reason for keeping both on the same
14 compound.

15 DLA's proposal will throw the items it manages into
16 a whirlwind beyond its control. If this proposal is
17 approved, more than 66 percent of DLA's workload will move
18 from one facility to another in the next four years. No item
19 transfer of this magnitude has ever been accomplished.

20 Disestablishing DISC will not close any bases. It
21 will only reshuffle workload. DLA is essentially asking the
22 Commission established to close bases to endorse its agency

1 reorganization plan.

2 Mr. Chairman and commissioners, each of these
3 points begs a fundamental question: Is this really worth the
4 risk? This mission is still essential to the reliability of
5 our high technology weapons systems and military missions
6 around the world.

7 For example, DISC manages 41 percent of the
8 consumable items on the CH-53 Superstallion helicopters that
9 rescued Captain Scott O'Grady in Bosnia. We often take for
10 granted the role that supplies play in these missions. If
11 these helicopters are not equipped with the proper parts,
12 they risk malfunction or worse. It would have been tragic if
13 this mission had not succeeded because of a malfunction
14 caused by inexperienced supply management.

15 As you examine DLA's proposal and look at the
16 disruption it will cause, ask yourself whether it's worth the
17 risk of jeopardizing the future success of missions such as
18 this, all for savings which are questionable at best and do
19 not even involve a base closure.

20 Mr. Chairman, I support the goals of DLA's
21 reorganization, which would ultimately consolidate DLA's
22 weapons workload into two supply centers. But clearly, DISC

1 deserves to be one of these weapons centers. The Commission
2 should reject this misguided proposal, so the DLA can
3 reorganize in a more sensible manner and time frame outside
4 of the BRAC process. To do otherwise would place an
5 unacceptable risk to the reediness of our armed services.
6 I would also like, Mr. Chairman, to briefly discuss
7 the Navy's proposed relocations of the Naval air technical
8 services facility and the Naval engineering service unit to
9 California. Like the DISC proposal, the Navy proposals do
10 not close bases. They merely move these facilities from
11 Philadelphia to the other side of the country.
12 Such a move would completely dismantle two skilled
13 workforces that are still essential to the readiness of our
14 armed services. In response to the Navy's proposal, the
15 employees of NAVSAV and NAVSU have developed counterproposals
16 that preserve their workforces and achieve even better
17 savings by consolidating their functions with ASO. These
18 proposals provide the Commission with an opportunity to
19 consolidate without sacrificing military value.
20 Finally, I would like to express support for DOD's
21 proposed realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center from
22 Annapolis to Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia's

1 proposal to consolidate the NAVSEA headquarters engineering
2 directorate with Philadelphia. These proposals will result
3 in a combined savings of nearly 340 million over seven years
4 and are strongly supported by former Secretary of the Navy
5 John Lehman.
6 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the
7 employees of Philadelphia's defense facilities are the true
8 military value of these facilities. Since BRAC '93, they
9 have risen to the challenge of doing more and better with
10 less. I hope the Commission recognizes this valuable asset
11 to our country and builds on the correct ruling it made in
12 1993. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Borski.
14 And we're delighted to have the distinguished
15 Senator from the State of Pennsylvania, Senator Rick
16 Santorum, here. Senator Santorum.
17 SENATOR SANTORUM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
18 appreciate the opportunity to come now for the third time and
19 speak before the Commission. I appreciate your indulgence in
20 having me do so. And I want to thank you for the fine work
21 and continued participation that we have had. And I
22 appreciate that, also, very much.

1 As we all know, the BRAC process is a necessary
2 process for all services. And I want to emphasize again that
3 all services should share in this process. And that's why I
4 have testified that I am troubled to see that with respect to
5 depots, not all services are participating. It frankly sort
6 of angers me to see what the Air Force is doing relative to
7 what the Army is doing.
8 In the past BRACs, the Army has closed three major
9 depots -- Lexington in '88; Sacramento in '91; and Tooele in
10 1993. The Air Force has only closed one very small base in
11 1993, the Aerospace Guidance and Meteorology Center in
12 Newark, Ohio.
13 In this round, the Air Force comes to the table
14 with no depot closings, zero. They basically shuffle the
15 deck tiers in the Titanic but keep in place all of their
16 ALCs.
17 In addition, they go through a six-year realignment
18 instead of the two- to four-year period that the other
19 departments are proposing and what was recommended by the
20 BRAC. And they don't eliminate positions until the sixth
21 year. This is punting. This was not what this Commission is
22 all about. This is not what the Congress wanted to see from

1 the United States Air Force.

2 Mr. Chairman, what I am proposing and what's being
3 proposed, as you heard in testimony from Congressman Shuster
4 and Congressman McDade, is to have a little shared sacrifice
5 between the services, between the Air Force and the Army.
6 And Pennsylvania is a place where you can see some of that
7 shared sacrifice be brought to bear.

8 In the case of ground communications, you heard
9 Congressman McDade talk about the excess capacity at
10 Tobyhanna and the ability for them to consolidate ground
11 communications from Sacramento to Tobyhanna. The same thing
12 is in the case with Letterkenny with respect to the missile
13 consolidation which was proposed in the BRAC round of 1993
14 and should be sustained in this BRAC round. We should share.

15 I know that there is concerns with at least members
16 of the Armed Services Committee about the Army eating its
17 seed core with reducing to the depot level that they have
18 suggested. I would hope that this Commission would look very
19 carefully at sharing the sacrifice across the bases.

20 With respect to the Pittsburgh Air Force Reserve
21 Station, as you all know, the numbers that were thrown in the
22 COBRA models initially were wrong. The Air Force has

1 admitted they're wrong.

2 The numbers as they have been recranked out again

3 have Pittsburgh in much better shape and, in fact, provide

4 not only good numbers and good cost and military value

5 numbers, but also the fact that there's 77 acres of ready

6 ramp space sitting there from the former Pittsburgh Airport

7 terminal sitting there ready to deal with surge operation or

8 any other contingency that may come along makes this a very

9 valuable piece of property because of the fact that it's at a

10 major airport with lots of runway space, et cetera.

11 In addition, as you know, the Secretary of the Air

12 Force sent a letter dated June 9 to the chairman -- and I

13 quote -- "In view of these circumstances" -- the

14 "circumstances" are referring to the problems of relocating

15 Chicago O'Hare -- "it would appear that the inactivation of

16 the Air Force Reserve C-130 unit at O'Hare IAP, instead of

17 the C-130 unit at Pittsburgh IAP is a reasonable

18 alternative."

19 So now, you have the Secretary of the Air Force

20 suggesting that O'Hare because of the problems with the City

21 of Chicago and being able to finance it really is the better

22 place to close, as opposed to the Pittsburgh base. I would

1 agree with Congressmen McHale and Gekas who testified on Fort
2 Indiantown Gap.
3 I speak for Governor Ridge. I know there was some
4 question about the governor's position on this. He is
5 strongly behind Indiantown Gap and it remaining open. And
6 the fact of the matter is, this is not going to save money.
7 This is a basis -- Congressman McHale testified, a
8 vibrant and active base is going to stay active with its
9 Guard and Reserve and all the other training components that
10 it has. And we're going to have to come back for
11 supplemental appropriations to fund the Reserve operations
12 there if we don't do it through an active unit. So if you're
13 looking to save money, the Gap is not the place to do it.
14 I would also support one DOD recommendation with
15 the consolidation of Annapolis and NSWC at the Philadelphia
16 NSWC. We have the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, which was hit
17 worse, biggest closure in the entire BRAC process. We need
18 at least some sort of economic development draw. And having
19 NSWC there and the work that they're doing consolidated -- in
20 addition, the City of Philadelphia has suggested NAVSEA
21 from -- the NAVSEA center here in Crystal City to move up to
22 Philadelphia to consolidate into a more manageable plan.

1 It would be another, I think, big thing for the
2 City of Philadelphia. I'm gong to submit the rest of my
3 testimony for the record, as my light came on, and try to
4 keep with the chairman's recommendation. Thank you.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Senator Rick
6 Santorum. We appreciate it.
7 Now, the Chair is advised that a vote is going on
8 in the House and that it would accommodate the Pennsylvania
9 delegation for me to tell you the order in which the Chair
10 shows you arriving. Senator Santorum was the eighth person
11 to testify for Pennsylvania.
12 The next that we have noted in attendance -- I hope
13 you'll not blame the Chair if we didn't note him correctly --
14 is Representative Paul Kanjorski, number nine. We show
15 Representative Tom Foglietta as number 10. Representative
16 James Greenwood is number 11. The distinguished senior
17 Senator, Senator Arlin Spectre, number 12, was in the room
18 and I presume is at hand. Representative Kurt Weldon, number
19 13, and Representative Ron Klink, number 14.
20 Now, there may be others here that the Chair has
21 not been told about, but this is the order. I'm hopeful to
22 accommodate the Pennsylvania delegation in any manner that I

1 can. I'm going to call Representative Paul Kanjorski.
2 Please note that we have staff here that will work with you.
3 We're trying to solve your problem. I want you to know, it's
4 difficult, with the kind of day we have, with 121 witnesses.
5 We're delighted to recognize Representative Paul
6 Kanjorski.
7 REPRESENTATIVE KANJORSKI: Thank you very much, Mr.
8 Chairman. And I'm going to ask unanimous consent that my
9 formal testimony be admitted into the record.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That will be done.
11 REPRESENTATIVE KANJORSKI: Mr. Chairman, I thought
12 that the proposition before the Commission is very important,
13 because you're going to have a very tough decision. And
14 those of us that have been in the Congress for the last
15 several years probably -- I've been there 10 years -- have
16 discovered the Commission form of answering very serious
17 political and other national questions has been reliable.
18 Certainly, the BRAC Commission has proved that over the
19 years.
20 But probably the decisions made by this BRAC
21 Commission will bring into question the decisions that are
22 not based on fact, on recommendations, and efficiency and

1 effectiveness of our military alignment.

2 When I argue for the Tobyhanna depot, I make a very

3 simple argument. We have the facts, we have the

4 recommendations, and we have the community support. Before

5 the Commission, I know some of the commissioners had the

6 opportunity to come up and see Tobyhanna. You know what that

7 community is like.

8 Before you are over 15,000 personal letters and

9 more than 100,000 signatures on petitions. This has been a

10 very traumatic experience for Northeastern Pennsylvania

11 because up to four weeks ago, we didn't think we had a

12 problem. Now, we do have a problem.

13 Those of us that represent Pennsylvania and

14 Northeastern Pennsylvania were rather shocked with this

15 opening up and putting Tobyhanna on the list. I hope it

16 never happens again. It is a very traumatic experience for

17 communities.

18 I cannot see the justification or the reason why

19 Tobyhanna would be closed. I can understand some alignment.

20 I can understand some additions. All I would urge you is,

21 the facts are very simple. The Defense Department has said

22 it's the most effective and efficient depot system in the

1 United States Army. The recommendation from the United
2 States Army and the Defense Department is that it is number
3 one in depots and should be kept open.
4 Finally, for the community, I don't think you'll
5 have experienced a stronger support system from a community
6 behind the depot and in support of it the activities they
7 have taken.
8 As a member of Congress representing half of the
9 depot area with Joe McDade, I just think that anything less
10 than retaining Tobyhanna would send probably the most
11 negative message to Congress to ever exercise the Commission
12 form of activity again to solve serious national problems
13 where the legislature of this country cannot face the
14 political problem that needs to be solved.
15 So I urge this Commission to use your charge and
16 your conscience to resolve the question for Tobyhanna. And
17 if you do, I'm sure you'll keep the best. Thank you.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
19 Kanjorski. That was a very moving presentation on behalf of
20 your Congressional district. The Chair knows a little about
21 politics and recognizes there's a little division in the
22 Pennsylvania delegation. So I'm going to have to request

1 that you take the boxes out of the front of the room so that
2 others who represent another district will not be embarrassed
3 by having the wrong sign in the television picture.
4 Can the folks do that as quickly as they can? I'm
5 going to go on with the work, but I would appreciate it.
6 Congressman Tom Foglietta, we're delighted to see
7 you here, Congressman. Thank you for coming.
8 REPRESENTATIVE FOGLIETTA: First of all, I would
9 like to thank you, Chairman Dixon and other members of the
10 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, for
11 convening today's hearing. My appearance today is much
12 different than the last time I spoke before the Commission in
13 Newark, New Jersey.
14 In 1991, the Commission was reviewing the Navy's
15 recommendation to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
16 This September, when the overhaul is complete on the USS John
17 F. Kennedy on time and on budget, she will steam out of the
18 Navy yard, and the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard will close.
19 Based on that decision and others, Philadelphia has
20 the unfortunate distinction of being the only city to be
21 impacted on every base closure around. All totalled, the
22 Philadelphia region will lose 38,000 jobs as a result of

1 these three BRAC rounds.

2 I'm here today to urge your support of the Navy's
3 recommendation to consolidate Navy engineering functions at
4 the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Philadelphia.
5 Additionally, I strongly support the proposal submitted to
6 the Commission by the City of Philadelphia to build on the
7 Navy's recommendation by further consolidating Navy
8 engineering functions by realigning the engineering
9 directorate at Naval Sea Systems Command headquarters in
10 Philadelphia.

11 The recommendations will promote the readiness of
12 our armed forces, lower our Navy machinery life cycle costs,
13 and improve efficiency while assisting the conversion of the
14 Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.

15 I also strongly urge the members of the Commission
16 to maintain the 1993 Commission's decision to move the
17 Defense Personnel Support Center from its present location to
18 the site of the Navy Aviation Supply Office in Northeast
19 Philadelphia. The DPSC performs the critical task of buying
20 and moving clothing, medical supplies, and other support
21 products for the military services.

22 In this capacity, DPSC played an important role in

1 restoring credibility to military procurement, putting to
2 rest the images of gold-plated toilet seats, hammers, and
3 ashtrays.
4 Furthermore, it is important that the Commission
5 give certainty to past Commission orders rather than exposing
6 the Defense Department to a revolving door of inconsistent
7 decisions. The Commission can build on the success of DPSC's
8 imposing track record by merging it with the Defense
9 Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia.
10 These important activities could be consolidated
11 under one base operating support structure. This alternative
12 would enhance military readiness, better utilize a valued
13 workforce, and achieve significant cost savings. The NSWC
14 Philadelphia is the Navy's only source for in-service
15 engineering and for testing and evaluating ship machinery
16 systems.
17 A full 20 percent of the Navy's annual budget is
18 devoted to life cycle costs for these vital systems. By
19 continuing the consolidation of Philadelphia engineering
20 functions in Philadelphia, a process which began as a result
21 of the 1991 BRAC decision, the Navy estimates that they can
22 save $175 million over the next 20 years.

1 Furthermore, this realignment can be completed in a
2 cost-effective manner. The Navy calculates that the
3 realignment will cost $25 million. This recommendation will
4 also greatly improve operational efficiency and military
5 readiness by consolidating life cycle support for machinery
6 systems in one central location. This would streamline the
7 Navy's acquisition and development process and enable the
8 purchases of more capable systems at lower costs.
9 The second proposal which I mentioned earlier would
10 build on the Navy's recommendation by moving NAVSEA's
11 engineering directorate to Philadelphia. This consolidation
12 would provide a major return on investment by reducing
13 duplication of activities between the 650 employees at NAVSEA
14 and the 1,600 workers at NSWC in Philadelphia.
15 The Navy's own internal studies have confirmed that
16 there is duplication and that NAVSEA's engineers should be
17 separated from headquarters and moved to the field.
18 Furthermore, it has been estimated that this proposal would
19 save the Navy $13.4 million per year and a total savings over
20 20 years of $165 million.
21 As I mentioned earlier, Philadelphia has been
22 battered by the base closure process. However, efforts to

1 convert the Philadelphia Naval Yard and develop commercial
2 ship-building in place of the Navy work are succeeding. Even
3 before the Kennedy leaves, we have two established commercial
4 maritime operations which are interested in building ships at
5 the yard -- building ships, reviving the ship-building
6 industry in this country. This would mean 3,800 new jobs for
7 Navy yard workers.
8 Additionally, the Westinghouse Corporation and the
9 Garvey Precision Machine Company have committed to moving to
10 the yard and creating 150 jobs. All of these businesses have
11 cited NSWC's location at the Navy yard as a major factor in
12 their decision to come to Philadelphia. These are excellent
13 recommendations which will boost military readiness, save
14 money, and greatly assist our work to revitalize the
15 commercial ship-building industry at the Philadelphia Naval
16 Shipyard.
17 The experts agree. Former Navy Secretaries John
18 Lehman and Shaun O'Keefe have strongly endorsed these
19 proposals. In fact, Secretary Lehman testified before the
20 Commission at the regional hearings in Baltimore in support
21 of these recommendations.
22 With these outstanding benefits in mind, saving

1 money, enhancing readiness, and boosting defense conversion
2 in Philadelphia, I sincerely and strongly urge the Commission
3 to adopt these recommendations. And I thank you.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And I thank you very much,
5 Congressman Foglietta, for that fine contribution on behalf
6 of the State of Pennsylvania.
7 Now, let me say, the situation is this -- there's a
8 vote in the House. Members of the delegation have left us,
9 as is their responsibility to their constituency, to vote.
10 Thank you. You are excused, Congressman Foglietta. Thank
11 you so much.
12 Senator Spectre was in the room. He had on a prior
13 occasion when it was his time to testify been obligated to
14 work the floor in connection with an amendment. I see him
15 walking in at this very moment. He left his lunch, let the
16 people of Pennsylvania know. We see this poor, starving man
17 walking into the room.
18 Senator, let me say before you begin, I'm not quite
19 sure what we'll do about the balance of your delegation. We
20 have heard from 10 of your Congresspeople or 11, as the case
21 may be, counting Senator Santorum. There's a vote in the
22 House. Many have gone back to discharge their obligations to

1 their constituency in that connection.

2 I can't find places to work them in in the next few

3 minutes or so if they don't get in here by 1:50. But I say

4 that so far as this Commission is concerned, if the Chair's

5 the only one here, we'll hear them this evening at the end if

6 they want to, but it's going to be in the seven-ish to eight-

7 ish hour, I'm afraid. I'm sorry about that, Senator.

8 I hope you understand, there's 121 members of the

9 Congress wanting to be heard, and the schedule is just a

10 couple of pages. But anyway, we'll try to work with you,

11 sir, as the senior Senator from the great State of

12 Pennsylvania, and we're honored to have the distinguished

13 senior Senator, Senator Arlin Spectre.

14 SENATOR SPECTRE: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for

15 your comments and for your diligent work. And I thank the

16 Commission for undertaking this arduous task. And I

17 understand with the lengthy list of those who are to appear

18 before you that it is an Herculean job on scheduling.

19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: If I may interrupt once more,

20 Senator, that would be six members of the House who were

21 listed to testify and had to leave. And we can supply your

22 office with the names of those members. Senator Spectre.

1 SENATOR SPECTRE: All right. I shall transmit that
2 to those who could not be here, and they can then come back.
3 I know how arduous the job is for this Commission.
4 And in a sense, it is a very difficult matter to sit here
5 listening to witness after witness making the argument,
6 almost cruel and unusual punishment for the commissioners and
7 really hard to ingest and digest it all.
8 This is the third time that I have appeared before
9 this distinguished Commission in Baltimore and Boston and now
10 here in Washington. There have been very strenuous arguments
11 made on behalf of the many installations in Pennsylvania.
12 And without going through the details on the substantive
13 arguments, they're all set forth in my brief, and they're all
14 set forth by others who have argued.
15 In alphabetical order, I would submit that the
16 Kelly Support facility and the Defense Industrial Supply
17 Center and the Fort Indiantown Gap and Letterkenny and the
18 Naval Air Technical Service and Naval Surface Warfare 9th Air
19 Lift Unit in Pittsburgh and Tobyhanna all have very, very
20 substantial national defense purposes.
21 And I say that to you based on my experience on the
22 Defense Appropriation Subcommittee. And I know the

1 distinguished chairman has had extensive experience on the
2 Armed Services Committee.
3 What I would submit to you is a little different
4 kind of an argument, after having considered the military
5 capabilities of all of these units, and with special emphasis
6 on Letterkenny and Tobyhanna. That poses an unusual problem
7 for those of us who are statewide officeholders, as I
8 analogize it to a dispute between my two sons. In trying to
9 be as fair and as evenhanded as possible, I submit that both
10 have a very, very high military purpose.
11 And in alphabetical order, Letterkenny did not get
12 a fair shake on some of the military evaluations which were
13 done early in the process. And I know this distinguished
14 Commission has all those facts before it.
15 Tobyhanna has been given extraordinarily high
16 ratings for all who have taken a look at it. And while the
17 closure of any of the facilities would be very problemsome,
18 not only for the individuals involved, but also for the
19 communities, the closure of either of these installations
20 would be absolutely devastating, Letterkenny in South Central
21 Pennsylvania and Tobyhanna in the Northeastern part of the
22 state with a very large number of individuals employed at

1 each of these installations.

2 But let me give you a broader picture, if I may,
3 which I know you will impart to your fellow commissioners.
4 And that is an overall assessment as to what has happened to
5 Pennsylvania in all of the base closures, going back to 1991.
6 We have had only 2.6 percent of the national military
7 installations but have suffered approximately 11 percent of
8 the job loss. And that is a valid consideration by this
9 Commission.

10 And in making those representations to you under
11 oath, that's to the best of my knowledge, information, and
12 belief as supplied to me. When the Philadelphia Navy Yard
13 was closed, Pennsylvania took a very hard hit. And it was
14 broader than just the City of Philadelphia and the Delaware
15 Valley Region. It was statewide. It rippled throughout the
16 state.

17 And I ask the Commission to consider that
18 especially, because it was the expectation of the Commission
19 at that time and it was the expectation of the Congress at
20 that time that there would be judicial review on the
21 contention which I made that material evidence was withheld
22 because we were not advised that two Navy admirals had said

1 the base should be kept open but downsized.

2 And I know you, Chairman Dixon, will recall in your
3 capacity as Senator, when you provided on the subcommittee
4 reviewing the work when we took the matter to the Congress
5 after the Commission had ruled and the President had signed
6 off, as you said and the record will show -- and I know you
7 recall from your nods now -- that there would be judicial
8 review.

9 You said, "Senator, take it to the court," which we
10 did, with the full expectation that there would be judicial
11 review. And in a very complex case, the Court of Appeals for
12 the Third Circuit said we were entitled to judicial review.
13 And then, on a very complex argument in the Supreme Court on
14 separation of power and delegation of authority, the Supreme
15 Court disagreed. So we never had that judicial review.

16 And I think that that has impacted really unfairly
17 on Pennsylvania without an opportunity to have had what was
18 the expectation of the Commission and the Congress at that
19 time. So I would ask this Commission to weigh that factor in
20 addition to the other factors before the Commission. And I
21 think as a matter of fairness, Pennsylvania really ought to
22 be spared these closures.

1 And I would ask it as the Senator from Pennsylvania
2 on behalf of all of the ones which I have enumerated, where
3 those communities have been very hard hit. And the people
4 who were displaced as the ripple effect went up across
5 Pennsylvania have taken other jobs that if any of these
6 facilities were to be closed, it would limit the employment
7 opportunities of those who would be put out of work on any of
8 these facilities.
9 We are unique in that respect. That is the only
10 case which went to the Supreme Court of the United States
11 where there had been the expectation of judicial review and
12 that did not occur. So I ask for that special consideration
13 for the Commission on Pennsylvania's military installations.
14 In conclusion, I thank you, commissioners, Mr.
15 Chairman, for your diligent service. I know what it's like.
16 I have been in that chair as chairman of the Intelligence
17 Committee or the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism or the
18 various other committees. You have an arduous task, and you
19 have our thanks. And we do ask you for your special
20 consideration for the working men and women of Pennsylvania.
21 Thank you.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, Senator Spectre, for

1 your fine presentation, the distinguished senior Senator from
2 the State of Pennsylvania.
3 The Chair is advised that Representative Mike Doyle
4 has arrived. We're delighted to have you, Representative
5 Doyle.
6 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: Mr. Chairman, my speech was
7 to be in conjunction with the Western Pennsylvania
8 delegation, Congressmen Klink, Coyne, myself, and Mr.
9 Mascara. And we just got called for a vote. And I've
10 already voted. And I think they're on their way. And the
11 way our presentation is intended is to go in a certain order.
12 So I would ask to defer from speaking until the rest of my
13 delegation is able to do so.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I'm greatly distressed that I
15 cannot honor your request, Representative Doyle. Let me tell
16 you the problem. I recognize the obligation to vote. It is
17 a duty to your constituency that the Chair is very sensitive
18 to, having served 12 years in this place. But I have an
19 obligation to the entire Congress to hear everybody in order.
20 At 1:50, we go to Puerto Rico. So I'm going to
21 have to hear whoever comes here and put the rest of you at
22 the end of the evening. Now, I hate to do that, but the

1 Chair will penalize himself by staying. I'm distressed I
2 have to do that.
3 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: I understand, Mr. Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I hope you're sensitive to the
5 problem of the Chair.
6 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: And I see members of our
7 delegation coming in, so perhaps I'll begin, then.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Fine. Representative Mike Doyle.
9 Thank you, sir.
10 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
11 want to begin by thanking the commissioners for holding this
12 hearing and for offering to myself and others the opportunity
13 to testify before you today.
14 I want to use this opportunity to speak about the
15 Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and why it should not be
16 selected for closure and, in fact, should never have been
17 considered for closure.
18 The Western Pennsylvania Coalition, after
19 identifying multiple errors throughout the data supplied by
20 the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve, determined that a
21 closer look at the grading of the criteria was necessary.
22 After analyzing these individual errors, it became clear that

1 the final rankings of the C-130 bases were affected by these
2 mistakes.
3 The coalition then proceeded to evaluate the
4 standings through the grading and weighing process as used by
5 the Air Force. Criteria 4 and 5 were evaluated through use
6 of the COBRA program, and the results of that analysis will
7 be described in detail by my distinguished colleague,
8 Congressman Mascara, in a few minutes.
9 I'm going to focus on criteria 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8,
10 which were evaluated using raw Air Force scores from their
11 analysis and recommendations Volume 5. The results of our
12 study differed significantly from the Air Force's findings.
13 Many of the identified errors negatively affected these raw
14 scores. We have focused on three of these errors within this
15 study, which I would like to submit for the record at this
16 time.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Those will be admitted in the
18 record. Thank you, sir. Will someone from staff get those,
19 please?
20 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: First, the Pittsburgh Air
21 Reserve Station received a low rating for the condition of
22 its airfield pavement. This rating was based upon data that

1 is 14 years old. A 1994 study, however, conducted by the Air
2 Force Civil Engineer Support Agency rates the pavement's
3 ability as being capable of handling any aircraft and Air
4 Force inventory.
5 The second error addressed was the future growth
6 ability and the attainment status of our air quality. Our
7 installation was graded red for its future growth ability and
8 yellow for attainment status. The EPA has reviewed Allegheny
9 County's air quality and reached the conclusion contained in
10 the following quote: "The area attained the ozone standard
11 at this time. Thus, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station has
12 no restrictions on its air quality."
13 The third error I wish to highlight pertains to the
14 environmental impact of this facility. Despite the 911th Air
15 Wing's answer to the BRAC questionnaire, it was graded red
16 for wetlands. A 1994 study by GEONEX reports there are no
17 wetlands apparent at your installation.
18 Underscoring the credibility of our points is the
19 fact that each of these studies was either in progress or
20 were under contract prior to the Air Force BRAC questionnaire
21 process which occurred during the spring of '94. Supporting
22 data can be found in the appendices of the study that I have

1 submitted for the record.

2 By eliminating these errors and using the same

3 analysis, Pittsburgh qualifies for the top ranking for

4 criteria 1, 2, and 8. As you can see, the net effect of

5 these clarifications is quite substantial.

6 Furthermore, the coalition recognizes the

7 importance of correct data and accurate assessment of that

8 data for your deliberations. Thus, we have also taken the

9 Air Force's grading system one step further in order to

10 evaluate the criteria's rankings fairly and objectively.

11 Although there are many ways to accomplish this

12 task, we chose the method that weighs each criteria equally

13 and produces a numeric value based upon each of the rankings

14 within each criteria. We believed that this weighted method

15 would yield better results in general, and using the

16 corrected data bodes well for Pittsburgh because of its

17 consistent high rankings across the full range of criteria

18 used by the BRAC.

19 Commissioners, as you already know and as this

20 study and the corrected COBRA data clearly show, the

21 Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should not have been on the

22 Department of Defense Closure list and certainly should not

1 be selected for closure.

2 I want to conclude my testimony by reiterating my

3 thanks for the opportunity to testify before you today and by

4 respectfully requesting that you closely examine the

5 empirical data we have supplied.

6 Finally, I want to introduce my friend and

7 colleague, Frank Mascara, who will detail the corrected COBRA

8 data and its positive impact on the Pittsburgh Air Reserve

9 Station. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Doyle.

11 And we're delighted to have Representative Frank

12 Mascara. Congressman Mascara.

13 REPRESENTATIVE MASCARA: Thank you. Thank you very

14 much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the Commission who has

15 presented me with an opportunity to address the Commission

16 relative to two issues.

17 First is regarding the Kelly support facility in

18 Oakdale, Pennsylvania; and second, the 911th Airlift Wing.

19 Regarding the Kelly facility, the Army and the DOD were

20 recommending a significant realignment. It is my

21 understanding that because of the questions from the local

22 community and from the Commission, the Army has reviewed its

1 position and is seeking to modify its original
2 recommendation.
3 Now, the Army is recommending a far less drastic
4 realignment and is not recommending the closure of the
5 exchange and the commissary. If the Army and the DOD have
6 modified their recommendation in that fashion, then I would
7 urge the Commission to approve it. I believe the Army review
8 has proven the worth of the Kelly support facility. It is a
9 great facility with great people. It does the essential work
10 of logistics and maintenance, and it gets the job done.
11 Now, the 911th Airlift Wing. The COBRA cost data
12 used to arrive at the decision to close the Pittsburgh Air
13 Reserve Station was, quite simply, incorrect. Substantial
14 deviations existed on three counts -- incorrect cost data,
15 partial year cost data, and totally missing cost data.
16 Subsequent corrected COBRA runs by the Air Force and your own
17 BRAC analysts have consistently demonstrated that Pittsburgh
18 is the most cost-effective base among C-130 installations on
19 civilian airfields.
20 The original COBRA analysis also failed to consider
21 savings benefits from MILCON cost avoidance. Of the six
22 installations at civilian airfields, Pittsburgh has the

1 lowest projected MILCON over the COBRA analysis period. By
2 contrast, another considered base has projected MILCON 775
3 percent greater than Pittsburgh, money that would largely be
4 spent to needlessly duplicate capabilities already available
5 at Pittsburgh.
6 We believe that Air Force generated COBRA data
7 continues to seriously understate MILCON cost avoidance at
8 some bases. I am presenting corrected Western Pennsylvania
9 Coalition COBRA scenarios results which most accurately
10 reflect time comparison figures, data which, by the way, is
11 agreed with by the BRAC staff.
12 As you heard Congressman Klink -- if he has not
13 testified, you will hear so -- he has correctly explained
14 that the Air Force Reserve presently enjoys military benefits
15 and special facilities at the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station
16 that do not now exist and cannot be duplicated elsewhere
17 without enormous military construction costs.
18 Pittsburgh already has the assets needed to expand
19 its mission at no cost to the United States. These expansion
20 capabilities include additional existing concrete ramp space,
21 an acreage on installation, high capacity tarmac at the
22 adjacent, and a band-in passenger terminal. In all Air Force

1 assessments of military value, Pittsburgh rates at or near
2 the top.
3 In summary, commissioners, when corrected COBRA
4 results, military value expansion, capability, recruiting,
5 environmental impact, and community support are considered,
6 Pittsburgh is, without question, the least favorable closure
7 candidate among C-130 bases. This was undoubtedly the
8 Commission's hypothesis at the add-on hearings.
9 Further discovery, investigation, and analysis
10 since then has convincingly validated that conclusion. Most
11 recently, the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall,
12 announced in a letter to Chairman Dixon that inactivation of
13 the Air Force Reserve 130 unit at O'Hare instead of the C-130
14 unit at Pittsburgh is a reasonable alternative.
15 Considering the facts in Pittsburgh's favor and the
16 change in the Air Force position regarding the closure of the
17 911th, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should remain open.
18 And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much for
20 that very fine contribution, Representative Frank Mascara.
21 And I understand that members of your delegation are arriving
22 even as I speak.

1 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to leave the
2 State of Pennsylvania momentarily and accommodate the
3 distinguished delegate from Puerto Rico. And then we're just
4 going to go on Murphy's rules for a little while around here
5 because of the vote in the House.
6 And the Chair is pleased to recognize the
7 distinguished delegate from Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero-
8 Barcello.
9 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we're delighted to have you,
11 Delegate Romero-Barcello.
12 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you very much.
13 It's a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
14 the opportunity.
15 First of all, I would like to extend my
16 appreciation to the Commission for allowing me the
17 opportunity to express in person my serious concerns over the
18 proposed closure of Fort Buchanan, the only active Army
19 installation in the whole Caribbean region. And I say
20 "closure" in a deliberate way, because the term "realignment"
21 is a misnomer under the circumstances facing the fort.
22 Although the former Camp Buchanan was originally

1 established as a training site for the 65th United States
2 Infantry Regiment in 1923, its role has changed dramatically
3 over the years. The main mission of Fort Buchanan at present
4 is to prepare and assume responsibility for the mobilization
5 of Reserve component forces in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
6 Virgin Islands.
7 The fort also provides administrative and
8 logistical support to active Reserve components of the U.S.
9 Armed Forces in Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, including
10 Puerto Rico Reserve Officers Training Corps, the ROTC. And
11 this includes recruiting services for the Army, the Navy, and
12 the Air Force, as well as providing mobilization support for
13 all Reserve components in case of war.
14 Fort Buchanan also provides support for the
15 planning, the coordination, and the execution of all Army-
16 related counter-terrorism actions on the island.
17 In recent military operations, such as the
18 Operation Desert Shield/Storm, an operation to uphold
19 democracy where Reserve forces and National Guard units have
20 been mobilized, Fort Buchanan as a lead mobilization station
21 has played a key role serving as a support hub to bring
22 together all elements of support, assuring the quick

1 validation and the deployment of the mobilized units.

2 Also proven during these operations was the fact

3 that the total Army concept really works, thereby firmly

4 establishing the trend that Reserve component units will

5 continue to be mobilized along with the active component.

6 If Fort Buchanan is closed, where will the support

7 for future mobilizations in Puerto Rico come from? Fort

8 Buchanan is a mobilization station. While its parent

9 installation, Fort MacPherson in Georgia, is solely an

10 administrative support headquarters which has remained in

11 touch by BRAC, to close the Fort Buchanan garrison while

12 maintaining Fort MacPherson does not meet the test to

13 consolidate and economize on military spending.

14 Although the Department of Defense proposal asked

15 for a realignment of Fort Buchanan, this would constitute,

16 for all practical purposes, a closure. In effect, the fort

17 will cease operations as an active Army enclave. All active

18 Army personnel, military and civilian, will leave. All

19 active army functions will cease. All family housing must be

20 abandoned and all morale support activity stopped.

21 If this realignment were to take place, it would

22 result in a potential reduction of at least 500 jobs. The

1 Commission is definitely being misled by the figures
2 presented in the Department of Defense Base Closure and
3 Realignment report stating that only 128 jobs would be lost.
4 At this time, Fort Buchanan services 2,486 active
5 duty and civilian personnel. It also serves five sizeable
6 groups, comprising some 73,170 persons who would also be
7 negatively impacted. These five groups include 175 active
8 Guard Reserve personnel and their families, 15,410 Reserve
9 component soldiers, 19,835 family members of Reserve
10 component soldiers, and 13,260 retirees and 34,890 family
11 members of retirees.
12 Fort Buchanan is a symbol of the Department of
13 Defense and the Army's interests in the Caribbean Basin, and
14 its presence brings stability to the region. To realign or
15 close this installation will not only negatively impact on
16 the critical support to the active and Reserve component
17 forces but would also added to the unemployment problem of
18 the island.
19 But perhaps the strongest argument in favor of
20 keeping Fort Buchanan on the active list is that the supposed
21 monetary savings to be achieved by closing the post are
22 highly questionable. The efficiency and combat readiness of

1 Reserve component organizations will certainly suffer. A
2 mobilization of these organizations will eventually take
3 place at a much higher cost to taxpayers than if Fort
4 Buchanan were to be maintained on the active list.
5 Is it worth risking part of our national security
6 to allegedly save a few dollars here and there? Will the
7 Army be able to rapidly and efficiently mobilize our Reserve
8 component units for a future conflict without Fort Buchanan?
9 In Puerto Rico, we have the Reserve units and the National
10 Guard, which are bilingual and very necessary and very
11 important in the use of any conflict or any military action
12 in the Caribbean or Central America or even South America.
13 I believe it is in our best national security
14 interest that the active Army facilities at Fort Buchanan
15 remain open, particularly now with the upcoming termination
16 of the U.S. military presence in Panama under the terms of
17 the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.
18 Puerto Rico has a proud and long tradition of
19 supporting national defense. This has been shown time and
20 time again as hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans, in
21 spite of their obvious second-class citizenship, have
22 consistently and promptly answered the nation's call to arms

1 without hesitation.

2 From the vital defenses of Panama during the First
3 World War and practically every theater of operations during
4 the Second World War to the frozen planes of Korea, the
5 hardships of Vietnam, the interventions in Grenada and Panama
6 and the sands of the Middle East, Puerto Ricans have been
7 there and have shed their blood.

8 Throughout all these operations, Fort Buchanan has
9 always stood ready to support us and has been a principal
10 place for mobilization and coordination, particularly for the
11 Grenada efforts, for the people who were going to the
12 Operation Desert Shield in the Gulf Coast, for the trainees
13 that were organized in Puerto Rico. Today more than ever, we
14 in Puerto Rico stand ready to assume an even greater role in
15 the Army of the 21st century.

16 Closing Fort Buchanan, the only active Army
17 installation in Puerto Rico and the whole Caribbean region,
18 is certain to lead us in the wrong direction. I strongly
19 urge you to remove Fort Buchanan from any proposed base
20 closure list.

21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Delegate
22 Romero-Barcello. We appreciate it. Thank you.

1 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Chaffee, I hate to have to
3 tell you, we're on Murphy's rules. A House vote interrupted
4 the Pennsylvania delegation. There are two members who have
5 returned, and I want to accommodate them, if you will give me
6 that courtesy. And I appreciate that usual courtesy from my
7 friend from the great State of Rhode Island.

8 And we're delighted to honor and recognize
9 Represent Ron Klink.

10 REPRESENTATIVE KLINK: I thank the members of the
11 Commission. I thank Senator Chaffee for also stepping aside
12 for a few moments. I know that you've heard from some of my
13 fellow Congressmen. I just wanted to come before you and
14 again ask for unanimous consent that my entire statement be
15 permitted into the record.

16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And it will be reproduced in the
17 record in full, Congressman.

18 REPRESENTATIVE KLINK: Thank you very much. Again,
19 I want to talk on behalf of the 911th Airlift Wing, like the
20 other members of the Pennsylvania delegation. The 911th, as
21 you're probably aware by now, operates very economically on
22 about 115 acres of land. It's a tremendous facility that

1 comprises the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport.

2 This is the largest land mass airport in the Mid-

3 Atlantic and Northeastern part of the United States. And it

4 is the fourth largest in the entire country. The airport

5 contains more than 12,000 acres of land, and much of it is

6 still available for airport-related development.

7 The Pittsburgh Airport is USAIR's largest hub. It

8 will handle over 20 million passengers and 450,000 airlift

9 operations this year alone. Pittsburgh International

10 Airport, for example, has resources that are not available at

11 many smaller airfields across this country, three of the most

12 important services I think the Commission should be available

13 of because they're provided to the 911th direct benefits that

14 are offered at practically no cost -- runway construction and

15 maintenance, aircraft rescue, as well as firefighting.

16 In the case of field and runway maintenance,

17 Allegheny County each year allocates $6.5 million for runway

18 building and upkeep, which includes about 120 personnel on

19 approximately 30 pieces of snow clearance and removal

20 equipment valued at about $15 million. When the snow flies,

21 the operation goes on.

22 And, in fact, we will tell you that over the past

1 12 years, not one minute has been lost in takeoffs and
2 landings at Greater Pittsburgh International Airport because
3 of snow and ice. The airport's all-weather capability, in my
4 view, is a very strong selling point, and these runways are
5 available to the 911th Airlift Wing.
6 This is something that is greatly in their favor.
7 Currently, the airlift wing operates on four runways at
8 Greater Pittsburgh. And this runway length runs from 8,100
9 feet to 11,500 feet. And even more significant is the fact
10 that the airport has the ability to build two additional
11 runways, a northern parallel one and a southern parallel one,
12 without the need to purchase a single additional acre of
13 land.
14 Currently, the ability exists to handle
15 simultaneous arrivals and departures on runways 28R and 28L
16 when the southern parallel is built. It is next slated
17 runway construction with environmental review underway with
18 proposed construction in 1998.
19 The airport will have the capability for
20 simultaneous triple arrivals and departures. Only
21 Dallas/Fort Worth and the new Denver International Airports
22 can perform this type of sequence. Such rapid deployment is

1 not possible on a runway operation. If you blow a tire on
2 one runway airport, you're out of business. You shut down.
3 At Pittsburgh, if this happens, you move to runway 2. You
4 move then to runway 3 or 4 or the fifth runway.
5 The cost of constructing new runway space can be
6 15,000 to $20,000 per running foot of 24-inch thick concrete
7 or anywhere from 150 million to 250 million for an 8,500 foot
8 runway. This is a cost that neither the 911th nor the
9 federal government has to bear. It is being absorbed by the
10 locality.
11 All of the land and expansion capabilities that
12 have been mentioned are currently being leased from Allegheny
13 County for $1 per year. The 911th Air Wing has a compact and
14 efficient infrastructure. All the facilities and buildings
15 are well maintained. In February of 1994, the 911th Air Wing
16 signed a memorandum of agreement with Allegheny County to
17 utilize 21.7 acres of land.
18 Additionally, the county has offered 30 acres of
19 prime ready ramp space to the Air Force in 1994. And
20 recently, Allegheny County offered an additional 47 acres of
21 concrete ramp space adjacent to the existing ramp at no cost
22 to the Air Force. The Air Force is not required to possess

1 nor maintain this valuable acreage. It will be held in
2 escrow for future Air Force utilization. And again, it will
3 be held at no cost.
4 This is a unique arrangement. It should not be
5 overlooked by the Commission when they're considering what to
6 do. This offer is the outcome of a $500,000 study that was
7 begun back in 1983 and in 1988 at the 911th Air Lift Wing
8 Base at their comprehensive plan. The exceptional capacity
9 and capability of the 911th to accommodate contingency
10 mobilization and future total requirements are demonstrated
11 in the comprehensive summary that was submitted to the
12 Commission.
13 I will try to wrap up by just saying that I would
14 like you to also if you haven't done so thus far to also
15 submit to the record the letter that was written by the
16 Secretary of the Air Force Widnall, that states unequivocally
17 that the deactivation of the C-130 Reserve unit at Chicago's
18 O'Hare Airport, rather than the 911th in Pittsburgh, is more
19 cost-effective. And I would ask that that be submitted for
20 the record. And I thank you.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
22 Congressman Klink.

1 And we now call upon your distinguished colleague,
2 Representative Kurt Weldon.
3 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
4 also ask unanimous consent to insert my system in the record.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And may I say to you, Congressman,
6 Weldon, that request is granted. Now, we do recognize that
7 two members of your delegation have been prevented from
8 speaking because of the roll call. They are welcome to come
9 tonight. I regret to say it will be after 7 o'clock,
10 Congressman.
11 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: I'll pass the word to them.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're very kind. I hope you
13 understand the problem with the Chair.
14 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: I do. Mr. Chairman, we
15 thank you for your leadership and the leadership of the
16 members of the Commission. I come today as a five-term
17 member of the National Security Committee, as an original
18 supporter of the BRAC process, and as chairman of the
19 Research and Development Subcommittee on the National
20 Security Committee in this Congress.
21 But I also come as a former teacher to give you a
22 report card, Mr. Chairman, in three areas. The three areas

1 of interest that I have, I would give you an A, an
2 incomplete, and an F. The A, Mr. Chairman, is for the
3 recommendation of DOD and the Commission's acceptance of a
4 recommendation to consolidate machinery operations from
5 Annapolis to Philadelphia.
6 The former NAVSES operation, now Naval Surface
7 Warfare Center operation in Philadelphia, has become a crown
8 jewel of Navy surface ship engineering work. It makes sense,
9 it's logical, and it will save us a significant amount of
10 money.
11 For that, I give DOD and the Commission an A for
12 its foresight and would hope that you would follow through on
13 that recommendation. It's the direction that Congress is
14 going in in terms of consolidation. And as chairman of the
15 Research and Development Committee, I think it makes sense.
16 The second proposal I would like to talk about, I
17 give you an incomplete because you have not yet taken action,
18 even though it has been brought up by several of my
19 colleagues. And that is to continue Naval consolidation into
20 the NSWC at Philadelphia as it relates to machinery
21 operations. And this would consolidate NAVSEA's engineering
22 directorate for machinery systems, the 03 operation into

1 Philadelphia, eliminating unnecessary duplication.

2 By fully integrating ship systems, life cycle

3 management, and in-service engineering into a cohesive

4 organization, the cost of designing and introducing new

5 systems into the fleet will be greatly reduced.

6 This proposal, Mr. Chairman, which has the support

7 of former Navy Secretaries John Lehman, as well as Shaun

8 O'Keefe, would save $165 million over 20 years, compared to

9 only $10 million in savings which would be realized if you

10 locate the 03 directorate at the Washington Navy Yard, as now

11 proposed. The Crystal City operation, in my opinion, should

12 be moved to Philadelphia. It will be logical, it will save

13 the Navy money, and I think would be more consistent in terms

14 of our future direction in regards to consolidations.

15 Let me give you my third area, Mr. Chairman. And

16 for that, I have to give you an F. Not you personally, but

17 the Commission. Because for the nine years that I've been in

18 Congress, I've been the only member coming before you trying

19 to close the facility. And each year, you've rejected me.

20 As a matter of fact, this year, the Commission did

21 not even consider my request, despite the support of the city

22 where the facility is housed, the county government that has

1 gone on record, and all of the people in the area, we still
2 have an Army operation operating Naval tugs, Naval seagoing
3 tugs. To me, that's outrageous.
4 As a strong supporter of the military and a strong
5 supporter of defense, as a nine-year member of the committee
6 and as chairman of the R&D Committee, I think this Commission
7 is doing this country a disservice by not closing a facility
8 that's in my old hometown where I happen to be the mayor. We
9 have requested it. This year, you didn't look at it.
10 So while I give you an A for the one proposal, an
11 incomplete for the second, you fail in the third. That's a
12 shame, because your failure is a failure to the taxpayers.
13 It is unnecessary, it is an operation where the Reserve
14 officers there are protecting their own little operation and
15 little place along the Delaware River which is not necessary.
16 And I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, in your deliberations to
17 go back and look at this again.
18 Because I commit to you as a member of the National
19 Security Committee, I'm going to continue to pursue why the
20 Army has to have ocean-going tugs, when we have a fully
21 equipped Navy, which I'm a big supporter of, when we have the
22 necessary potential to meet any need that we have on the

1 seas, and why we still have to have the Army operating ocean-
2 going tugs is beside me.
3 But the two consolidations at Philadelphia do make
4 sense. They are not in my Congressional district. They make
5 sense because they are right for the Navy.
6 As someone who voted for BRAC, in spite of knowing
7 that the Philadelphia Navy Yard was a possible candidate for
8 closure, these two consolidations make sense for the
9 taxpayers. They make sense for the Navy. They make sense
10 for the people of the region. They are right, they are
11 logical, and they will allow us to better utilize the
12 shrinking defense dollars that we're fighting on the floor to
13 keep in place at this very time working on the House National
14 Security legislation.
15 I thank you for your time. I thank you for your
16 indulgence in allowing me to come back. And I would hope
17 that when I come back the next time, that report card can be
18 switched to all As, and I can announce as a former teacher
19 that you've passed with flying colors. Thank you, Mr.
20 Chairman.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you, Congressman
22 Weldon. And I am properly chastised as Chair. But I'm going

1 to give you an A anyway, because you did your job within five
2 minutes, and only three in your delegation did. You get an
3 A, Congressman Weldon, a solid A.
4 Now, ladies and gentlemen, this isn't very funny
5 work, I know, but maybe I've been sitting here too long. I'm
6 going to turn the Chair over to my distinguished colleague,
7 Commissioner Al Cornella, for the Rhode Island and Tennessee
8 delegations.
9 And I've been asked to announce that my old friend,
10 the distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island, Senator
11 Pell, as Senator Chaffee knows, is attending a funeral for
12 his friend and my own friend, former Secretary of Defense and
13 our former colleague, Les Aspin, a memorial service for him,
14 I should say. And we understand that, and we're going to
15 hear Senator Clayburn Pell later in the day.
16 And it's my delight to recognize an old friend,
17 Senator John Chaffee. I hope he'll understand that I have to
18 excuse myself for a few minutes.
19 SENATOR CHAFFEE: Thank you very much, Senator
20 Dixon and members of the Commission. First of all, I want to
21 thank you for the service to our nation that you're giving in
22 this very, very difficult task.

1 I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
2 Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of
3 Defense Base Closures. I'll summarize my full statement and
4 would like to have it placed in the record.
5 My testimony will be somewhat different from what
6 you usually hear, because I give you good news. I support
7 all the recommendations that affect us in Rhode Island, three
8 in all, dealing with the Navy's presence in Newport. These
9 recommendations, of course, came from the Defense Department.
10 And as I mentioned, I supported each one of them.
11 First is the proposed consolidation of the Naval
12 Undersea Warfare Centers that are currently one in Newport,
13 one in New London. The proposal is they be consolidated in
14 Newport. I'm for that. I'm convinced the Newport
15 laboratories constitute an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art
16 facility.
17 Its upgrading in 1991 -- this is the facility in
18 Newport -- to a super lab status enhanced its reputation
19 which it had already earned as a center of excellence in
20 submarine research and development. The center is well-
21 prepared to increase its contribution to national security.
22 In fact, a $12 million laboratory was just opened in January,

1 and two more major labs, one costing 11.2 million, the other
2 costing 21.7 million, are under construction and scheduled to
3 open in 1996.
4 These last two facilities are being built
5 specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and the BRAC '95
6 influx of personnel and their activities from New London over
7 to Newport. Consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare
8 Center at Newport will save DOD scarce resources by
9 eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies.
10 The 1991 action already appears well on its way to
11 reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will
12 result in further savings of $91.2 million over 20 years.
13 For the reasons cited above, I urge you to approve
14 the Navy's proposal to consolidate the Naval Underwater
15 Warfare Center's New London detachment into the Newport
16 headquarters.
17 Second, the Navy has recommended the relocation of
18 the Naval Research Laboratory Underwater Sound Reference
19 Detachment currently in Orlando, Florida, moving to Newport.
20 This proposal will achieve savings of 30.1 million over 20
21 years and will further strengthen the Navy's undersea
22 research and development effort. I heartily endorse that.

1 Third, I would like to address the Navy's
2 recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training
3 Center in Meridian, Mississippi, some to Athens, Georgia, and
4 some to Newport's Naval Education Training Center. In
5 advancing this proposal, the Navy seeks to streamline its
6 operations and achieve savings by moving several
7 administrative schools from Meridian to Newport.
8 The Naval Education and Training Center at Newport
9 has long maintained a sterling reputation. It consists of
10 institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface
11 Warfare Officers' School, and many others which have provided
12 the fleet with the best educated, highest quality personnel.
13 The learning environment of the Naval Education and Training
14 Center in Newport is ideal for incorporation of the
15 administrative schools at Meridian.
16 Its classrooms in Newport are modern, housing is
17 plentiful, and the community will welcome students with open
18 arms. The move of this center to Newport will achieve needed
19 cost savings. Annual reoccurring savings after
20 implementation of the Naval air station Meridian, a closing
21 of the total facility at Meridian, is $26.9 million, with net
22 savings over 20 years of 344 million. That isn't all the

1 part that's going to Newport. That's the complete closure of
2 the facility at Meridian.
3 For all these reasons, I urge the Commission to
4 approve the Navy's proposed transfer of the Naval Technical
5 Training Center in Meridian to Athens and to Newport. Again,
6 I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to
7 appear today to give this testimony. Thank you very much,
8 Mr. Commissioner.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA [Presiding]: Thank you, sir.
10 We thank the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Senator
11 John Chaffee.
12 SENATOR CHAFFEE: Thank you. And I came in under
13 time.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: And we appreciate that.
15 We'll move now to Representative Jack Reed.
16 REPRESENTATIVE REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
17 this opportunity to address the Commission and for your work
18 on behalf of the country and our defense.
19 I have a prepared statement which I would like to
20 submit and summarize that statement for the benefit of the
21 commissioners.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We would be glad to enter

1 that into the record.

2 REPRESENTATIVE REED: Thank you very much, Mr.

3 Chairman. I rise in support along with my colleagues of the

4 proposals the Department of the Defense and Department of the

5 Navy to consolidate facilities in Newport, Rhode Island.

6 This is a continuation of policies that have been in effect

7 for several years.

8 It makes sense in terms of cost-effectiveness, it

9 makes sense in terms of the availability of the intellectual

10 capital we have built up in terms of scientists and

11 researchers and technicians in Newport. It also makes sense

12 in terms of the physical facilities at Newport, which will

13 readily accommodate all of these proposed transfers.

14 This is the type of, I think, sensible program and

15 programmatic changes that will strengthen our defense and

16 also save the taxpayers valuable dollars. Newport has long

17 been a center of research and Naval education. This proposal

18 will enhance that center and that ability to educate our Navy

19 and to provide the research we need as we face a

20 technological revolution in warfare over the next several

21 decades.

22 One other point I would like to add is that in

1 terms of the human factors involved in some of these
2 consolidations, it's always very difficult because people
3 have attachments to localities, it's disruptive of the lives
4 of people to move. But particularly with respect to New
5 London and to Newport, my district sits squarely between the
6 two communities.
7 I have many people who live in my district and work
8 in New London or work in Newport and vice versa. And I think
9 this proposal not only will be sensible in terms of the
10 bottom line to the Navy and the mission of the Navy, but it
11 will be something that will accommodate in the easiest way
12 the lives and the futures of all the personnel that are
13 proposed to move.
14 So I would urge the Commission to support these
15 proposals, continue the consolidation of Naval underwater
16 research and testing and evaluation at Newport. It will be
17 in the best interest of the nation, and it will be in the
18 best interest of our taxpayers. And I thank the
19 commissioners for their efforts.
20 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Representative
21 Reed.
22 Representative Patrick Kennedy.

1 REPRESENTATIVE KENNEDY: Mr. Chairman, members of
2 the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to testify along
3 with my colleagues from the Rhode Island delegation in
4 support of the Department of Defense Base Closure and
5 Realignment recommendations for the Naval Undersea Warfare
6 Center and the Naval Education Training Center, both located
7 in Newport, Rhode Island.
8 I realize that yesterday, the Commission heard a
9 day of testimony and today will continue to hear testimony
10 well into this evening, so I'll make my remarks brief. The
11 U.S. Navy has a long and rich history in Newport, Rhode
12 Island. Throughout that history, from the Revolutionary War
13 onward to this present day, the local community has actively
14 and vigorously supported a strong Naval presence in Rhode
15 Island.
16 Currently, the Navy is the largest single employer
17 in Newport County. And I am proud to say that the Navy
18 personnel, both military and civilian, play an integral role
19 in the community. It is in that vein and in that view that I
20 am pleased to represent the spirit of the Newport County
21 community and voice my support for the recommendations in the
22 BRAC '95.

1 As you are well aware, DOD BRAC '95 recommendations
2 for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center built upon the previous
3 BRAC decisions. If the BRAC '95 recommendations are
4 implemented, they will complete the realignment of the Naval
5 underwater research and development and test and evaluation
6 functions in Newport.
7 The recommendations to consolidate undersea warfare
8 functions at Newport are consistent with the Navy's goals of
9 geographically consolidating compatible RDTE facilities,
10 interacting technical capabilities and resources, and
11 decreasing infrastructure and operating costs while at the
12 same time increasing the military value of those activities
13 not selected for closure.
14 Finally, I respectfully request that the Commission
15 support the incorporation of various Naval air training
16 activities at the Naval Education Training Center in Newport,
17 the Navy's premiere training site for officers, officer
18 candidates, senior enlisted personnel, and prospective
19 midshipmen. Such a realignment would result in a significant
20 return on investment in both the relatively short term, as
21 well as the long-term basis.
22 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I believe

1 the DOD recommendations represent a win-win situation, as has
2 been said by my colleagues. They're cost-effective measures
3 and in the best interests of both the taxpayers, as well as
4 our military.
5 Having visited these facilities every weekend since
6 I've first been elected, I can tell you that the proximity of
7 the Naval Education Training Center with the Naval Undersea
8 Warfare Center next to the Naval War College is tremendous
9 and will only be enhanced by these BRAC recommendations.
10 There is compatibility and synergy because of their
11 collocation.
12 And, as I said before, Newport's proud of its
13 tradition of supporting the Navy. The whole community is
14 very actively anxious to facilitate in this process, and they
15 have the expertise to do so. I might add, the Chamber of
16 Commerce in Newport, as well as other retired military
17 personnel, are all active in preparing any of the movement
18 that needs to take place as a result of these
19 recommendations, so it's easy to make.
20 We have even got the superintendents of local
21 schools participating on this to show their interest in
22 making sure that the families have a quality of life that

1 will be fitting for them in Newport. And, as you know,
2 quality of life is the number one issue, as recommended by
3 Defense Secretary Perry. And I think that in that spirit,
4 these recommendations should be implemented and would ask for
5 that consideration. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Kennedy.
8 And we thank the delegation from Rhode Island for
9 their testimony and also staying within the time limits. As
10 long as we're giving out grades here today, we'll give you an
11 A plus for that.
12 We'll now move on to the great State of Tennessee.
13 First to testify, the distinguished Senator, Bill Frist.
14 SENATOR FRIST: Mr. Chairman, commissioners, thank
15 you for this opportunity to testify in support of the defense
16 depot in Memphis, Tennessee.
17 Mr. Chairman, as I hope the testimony given today
18 by myself and my colleagues will demonstrate, the Memphis
19 depot is critical to the efficient and effective distribution
20 of material to our nation's armed forces, so critical, in
21 fact, that I believe the Defense Logistics Agency will not be
22 able to meet its distribution requirements in times of war or

1 contingency operations if the current plan to disestablish
2 the Memphis depot is upheld.
3 Mr. Chairman, under the current plan, the DLA will
4 distribute and store military supplies through two primary
5 distribution sites, one on the Atlantic Coast and one on the
6 Pacific Coast. However, such a plan leaves a vast and
7 disturbing gap in coverage and in service for the Central
8 United States.
9 Moreover, as was dramatically demonstrated during
10 the Persian Gulf War, coastal PDS sites cannot support CONUS
11 facilities as efficiently as can a centrally located
12 distribution site. During both Operation Desert Shield and
13 Operation Desert Storm, goods shipped from the coast are
14 backed up almost to the point of gridlock, to use Admiral
15 Straw's word, while DDMT experienced no difficulty at all in
16 getting its goods shipped to military users.
17 In fact, not only was the Memphis depot ranked
18 number one in materiel support for our nation's fighting
19 forces in the Gulf, but it has subsequently participated in
20 every major military and humanitarian mission undertaken by
21 the Department of Defense. DDMT is the closest depot to the
22 largest concentration of our military forces, and 10 of the

1 top 15 water ports in the United States are located on the
2 Gulf of Mexico in close proximity to DDMT.
3 Not only does it have the ability to support the
4 Southern hemisphere and the rest of the Western world, which
5 is more prone to multiple insurgencies, but it is a primary
6 distribution site and third partner to the coastal DLA depots
7 which service the European and Pacific Rim outport
8 requirements.
9 Mr. Chairman, by both quantitative and qualitative
10 measures, DDMT is superior and is more accessible than the
11 other depots. Thanks to its centralized location and depot
12 capabilities, DDMT provides truck services to 115 U.S.
13 installations of 100 persons or more. It has the ability to
14 outreach and service by truck 66 percent of active duty CONUS
15 military personnel within 48 hours. And 700,000 troops, or
16 42 percent of all CONUS based military personnel, can be
17 supported within a 24-hour period.
18 In terms of transportation infrastructure, the
19 Memphis depot is also unparalleled. This is demonstrated by
20 the fact that many major national and international
21 corporations have moved their distribution centers to Memphis
22 in recent years. Not only located on both East-West, as well

1 as North-South interstates, it is home to over 200 trucking
2 companies.
3 It sits at the crossroads of 6 class 1 railroads --
4 6 railroads -- with 96 freight trains arriving and departing
5 daily. And it has unrivaled intermodal capability. It
6 boasts the world's second largest cargo airport, the second
7 largest in the world, with 9 airlines, 44 carriers. And
8 unlike Susquehanna, which was closed for 22 days last year
9 because of inclement weather, it has minimal constraints
10 imposed by weather conditions.
11 It also has two military air terminals. As
12 America's second largest inland port, with three harbors that
13 handle 11 million tons of cargo annually, Memphis is home to
14 six commercial barge lines and can accommodate ocean-going
15 ships 10 months of every year.
16 Mr. Chairman, the Defense Logistics Agency's
17 coastal PDS strategy has the advantage of simplicity. This
18 approach might even be adequate, were the DLA a commercial
19 entity that only has to meet the usual demands and deadlines
20 of commercial traffic. However, the DLA is not a commercial
21 entity, but rather the one agency responsible for supplying
22 America's fighting forces in times of peace, as well as times

1 of war.

2 At such times, the movement of materiel both within

3 the U.S. and across the globe is critical. We must be

4 absolutely certain that the depot that is chosen can support

5 our military forces, and that is why I ask you to reconsider

6 the decision to disestablish the defense distribution depot

7 in Memphis, Tennessee.

8 Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and yield

9 to my colleague, Senator Thompson.

10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Senator, thank you for your

11 testimony.

12 We now call Senator Thompson.

13 SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, members of the

14 Commission, obviously, we're dealing here with a subject much

15 more important than even impact to the community or to the

16 jobs that are involved. We're dealing with a matter of

17 national defense and national security. And that's why I

18 applaud the efforts of the Department of Defense and the Base

19 Closure and Realignment Commission to streamline our nation's

20 defense system.

21 I must point out that the closure of the defense

22 distribution depot in Memphis would hurt, not help, our

1 country's defense structure. As my colleagues will tell you,
2 Memphis and DDMT have the things that are needed when it
3 comes to serving our troops in emergency operations in the
4 field and at home.
5 From World War II to Desert Storm, the Memphis
6 depot has a proven record of service and continues to provide
7 top support to our men and women in uniform. It has
8 accomplished this through DDMT's modern, highly automated and
9 integrated facility. Goods are delivered efficiently
10 because, as many national and international companies know,
11 Memphis's excellent transportation system and central
12 location have helped make it America's distribution center.
13 At a time when the private sector finds Memphis
14 such an appealing place to set its business, why is the
15 Defense Department recommending that one of its prime
16 logistics centers be closed in a city with such assets? Part
17 of DOD's recommendations entail lessening the amount of
18 capacity in its storage system. As its closure list stands,
19 there would be a 22 million cubit foot shortfall in storage
20 requirements.
21 The Defense Logistics Agency has stated that the
22 Air Force Logistics Centers, the ALCs, coupled with direct

1 vendor delivery, would make up that shortfall. As you know,
2 the Air Force never addressed the need to close any of its
3 maintenance depots or ALCs, and the Commission is presently
4 examining their role in future military operations.
5 This calls into question DLA's reliance on this
6 space, especially if any of the air logistics centers are
7 closed. If any of the centers are closed, then DLA will need
8 more storage capacity. The closure of even the smallest ALC
9 will result in a 17.8 million cubit foot shortfall in the
10 Defense Department storage of the materiel handling capacity.
11 Only a depot like DDMT can fulfill the requirement
12 for storage space and materiel handling facilities that DOD
13 will need. The Memphis depot's transportation assets and
14 central location are exceptional in comparison with any other
15 DLA facility. Even though DLA claims that its movements
16 toward a direct vendor delivery system will help facilitate
17 many of its future capacity needs, this system has never been
18 proven in wartime.
19 In fact, most vendors are small- to medium-sized
20 businesses which do not have a wide range of transportation
21 capabilities. Most vendors also do not have the warehousing
22 abilities that the depot system provides. Distribution depot

1 Memphis is a vital link between contractors and soldiers for
2 the vendors who cannot ship directly to the troops.
3 While direct vendor delivery is an option for
4 distributing goods to our military men and women, the
5 customers -- that is, our American troops -- could be placed
6 in jeopardy if a direct vendor system were fully in place.
7 DLA has observed that this could be a problem and that an
8 intermediary depot would be required to meet our military
9 needs.
10 In summary, I ask the Commission to reconsider
11 fully Air Force and DLA's base closure procedures. There
12 appear to be many shortcomings, and the timely delivery of
13 military supplies could be threatened. It must be made clear
14 that the Memphis depot is the only DLA depot that has a
15 wealth of modern automated facilities, central location, and
16 exceptional transportation assets to meet the needs of our
17 military and other emergency operations.
18 And I believe that points out the uniqueness of
19 this situation. We're very well aware of the appeals that
20 are made before this Commission and the exceptions that are
21 pointed out. But here, we do have a unique situation. We
22 ask that this not be lost in the shuffle. Whether you're

1 looking at matters of transportation or location or
2 automation, this facility is a unique facility.
3 It was the Memphis depot and its 1,300 employees,
4 many of whom or some of whom are here today, that would be,
5 frankly, disproportionately affected as minority employees if
6 this closure goes through. These employees have helped ship
7 supplies to relieve workers in Oklahoma City the day of the
8 federal building bombing disaster.
9 During Operation Desert Storm, it was DDMT that was
10 the number one shipper of supplies to our troops in the
11 Persian Gulf. DDMT must be retained, because during war and
12 peace, it has a proven record of serving men and women in the
13 military and the people of this country, and closing it will
14 mean the loss of a valuable resource for this nation.
15 I thank you for the opportunity that we have to
16 present this case and ask you to consider these points ahead,
17 as I know you will, as the Commission formulates its final
18 list for the President. Thank you very much.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Senator Thompson, we thank
20 you for your excellent testimony.
21 And we now welcome Representative Harold Ford.
22 REPRESENTATIVE FORD: Thank you very much, Mr.

1 Chairman and the members of the BRAC Commission. I
2 appreciate the opportunity to join with my colleagues from
3 Tennessee to make this case of the defense distribution depot
4 in Memphis.
5 I want to express my appreciation to the
6 commissioners and the staff. Everybody has been courteous
7 and certainly have been accommodating throughout this whole
8 process.
9 I particularly would like to thank Commissioner
10 Kling, who visited the site in Memphis, and would also like
11 to take the opportunity to thank Chairman Dixon and to
12 Commissioner Steele, Commissioner Cornella, along with
13 Commissioner Cox for taking time to meet with us and talk
14 about some of the problems that we see and the things that we
15 wanted to highlight in Memphis.
16 Our two Senators making compelling arguments who
17 have already testified before your Commission today about the
18 depot's strategic geographic location, unmatched
19 transportation infrastructure, and the importance of
20 maintaining the depot to fill the anticipated shortfalls in
21 storage capacity in the DOD distribution system, it is a
22 pleasure for us to testify, but it is very critical for us in

1 the Tennessee area and those of us who live in the mid-South
2 area of Memphis.
3 Senators Thompson and Frist have explained in the
4 clearest terms the potential negative impact that closure of
5 the depot will have on the Department of Defense and its
6 distribution system.
7 I would like to cover another important area. That
8 is, the rationale behind the DLA's closure recommendation.
9 Before I do that, let me say that I am the Congressman from
10 the area that this defense base is located, and I am
11 extremely concerned about the economic impact that this
12 closure would have on the Memphis community. And I would
13 urge the Commission members to be sensitive to the adverse
14 impact of the closure in the workforce that we have in the
15 Memphis area.
16 The primary issue that I would like to address
17 today is the rationale behind the closure recommendation.
18 The Defense Logistics Agency has taken great pains to point
19 out that its decision to close DDMT was the result of an
20 evaluation of a continuation of factors called "BRAC
21 evaluation tools." And I believe a fresh look at DLA's own
22 BRAC evaluation tools will reveal that defense depot should

1 remain open in Memphis, Tennessee.

2 These tools include military value, DOD force

3 structure plan, concept operations, joint service decisions,

4 and excess capacity. The first factor is military value. By

5 DLA's own analysis, Memphis was ranked third in military

6 value among stand-alone depots. However, DLA chose to

7 disregard DDMT's high military value ranking in favor of an

8 installation analysis which is of questionable merit.

9 DOD logistics strategic plan states that

10 transportation, not storage capacity, is critical military

11 value factor. And, as you have heard, DDMT is located in the

12 industry accepted transportation capital of the U.S. and

13 basically the world. Why, therefore, was DLA military

14 analysis structured to ensure that DDMT receive only 20 out

15 of 2,000 possible points for transportation resources?

16 The DLA's concept of operation requires that it

17 will be able to support two major regional conflicts by using

18 both coasts. Prior to BRAC '95, defense depot Memphis was

19 the primary war-fighting depot during the only major conflict

20 in Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm. Today, DLA has not

21 included a mobilization plan to determine how it would

22 provide without the capabilities provided by the DDMT in

1 Memphis.

2 With respect to joint service decisions and excess
3 capacity, even though the DLA negotiated with the Air Force
4 and Navy for extra storage space, DLA has admitted there will
5 be a shortfall as a result of the closure of a maintenance
6 depot. And I believe that the shortfall requires DLA to
7 reassess its future capacity requirements in whether or not
8 it can afford the closure of a stand-alone depot like
9 Memphis, Tennessee.

10 In conclusion, members of the Commission, Mr.
11 Chairman, I ask that you and the Commission members go beyond
12 the mere cost considerations in your decisions on our defense
13 distribution system.

14 I ask that you consider the human and economic
15 consequences of displacing a community with
16 disproportionately high unemployment rates as important as
17 the Commission will make these decisions to make sure that
18 during wartime and peacetime, that the Department of Defense
19 and the Pentagon will have those logistics centers that can
20 meet the need and the building that will require the military
21 defense. Thank you.

22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman

1 Ford.

2 And we welcome Representative Ed Bryant.

3 REPRESENTATIVE BRYANT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

4 and other members of the Commission. I appreciate very much

5 the opportunity along with the rest of the Tennessee

6 delegation to speak to this Commission.

7 My district does not include the Memphis depot.

8 However, as a former Army veteran and as a representative of

9 the area next to the depot, I am very much of one community

10 with Congressman Ford in urging this committee to relook at

11 their decision in closing the Memphis depot.

12 Memphis, in our opinion, is the most cost-effective

13 stand-alone depot in the nation and the Defense Department.

14 I am resolute in my belief that the important fact cannot and

15 must not be ignored by anyone through the remainder of the

16 process in the weeks ahead. Mr. Chairman, I believe our

17 performance in Memphis in carrying out our intricate mission

18 for our military is indicative of its importance for the

19 Defense Department and the security needs of America.

20 I think it would be accurate to say that Memphis

21 has strengthened our military effectiveness and readiness. I

22 would like to just pick up, if I could, and skip over a

1 couple of comments. I know I've got a little bit shorter
2 time. But I wanted to follow up on Senator Thompson's
3 comments about the idea of the concept of direct vendor
4 system.
5 Mr. Chairman, I would question the efficiency and
6 the effectiveness of such a system envisioned to supposedly
7 supplant the already proven distribution process in Memphis.
8 In essence, the direct vendor system could very well be a
9 scatter shot approach for an operation which requires
10 organization, timeliness, and efficiency. And I have grave
11 concerns about this concept.
12 I also don't believe our military effectiveness
13 should be gambled -- our readiness should be gambled and our
14 security of our country in an effort to save money through
15 this type of concept. I would also like to point out the
16 fact that Memphis -- and follow up to what the Congressman
17 has said -- has gained an outstanding reputation as a
18 nationwide distribution center.
19 And I know this Commission has heard this before,
20 but I'll put aside my notes and just talk to you briefly
21 about this. Last week, I had the privilege of attending
22 another national corporation's grand opening in Memphis in

1 Shelby County of a distribution center. And Memphis has
2 proven itself over the years through its railway system, its
3 highway system, its waterway system.
4 And now, with the addition of Federal Express, we
5 have that unique ability to place orders and get supplies out
6 by midnight the night before and delivered the next day,
7 which I don't think any other depot in this country has. And
8 because of our central location to either coast, we're able
9 to meet the needs of any contingent in any war anyplace in
10 this world, I think, better than any other department and
11 depot in this nation.
12 And it begs the question, I think -- it's something
13 of concern I've always had, when I sit back as a Congressman
14 from this district and see America's best industries,
15 America's best companies coming to Memphis and recognizing it
16 as a distribution center and yet I see my very own government
17 moving away from Memphis. And I think that's an important
18 issue. I think that would be a good example for us to look
19 at as we make this decision.
20 I would urge this Commission, in summary, to look
21 at these issues of location, proven effectiveness, the
22 caliber of work that we have already done for this country,

1 and I ask you to seriously reconsider your decision to close
2 the Memphis depot. And I would again thank you on behalf of
3 our delegation. Thank you.
4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you very much.
5 As long as we have most of the people here from
6 Texas, I would like to open with a comment that we will try
7 to hold all testimony to five minutes. We have over 200
8 members of Congress testifying before us.
9 And with that, I will begin with the senior Senator
10 from Texas, Senator Phil Gramm.
11 SENATOR GRAMM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
12 Chairman, let me repeat to you what I said in Fort Worth this
13 weekend. And that is, your work is critically important. I
14 congratulate each of you for your willingness to serve. And
15 I'm confident that you're going to do your best to try to
16 make a determination as to what is in the country's interest
17 and that you're going to be fair in each and every case that
18 you deal with.
19 I've got a short time. I want to touch on just a
20 few key points. First of all, in terms of Red River Army
21 Depot, I believe that credible evidence has been presented to
22 question whether or not one heavy depot can do all the

1 peacetime work in the Army. I think there is a very serious
2 question as to whether one heavy depot can meet a wartime
3 surge and, as a result of that question, and even if you were
4 looking at only it alone, I think the Red River Army Depot
5 should not be closed.
6 I could outline the fact that it won the
7 President's Quality Award this year. The economic impact at
8 Red River Army Depot would be larger than any other proposed
9 closing on your list. I'm confident when you look at all
10 those things, it's going to stay open.
11 I support the single siding of the T-45 in Corpus
12 Christi. I support unifying the mine warfare helicopters.
13 And I also agree with those who say that there is room to
14 continue the T-44 training at Corpus Christi.
15 In terms of Reese Air Force Base, I think if you
16 look at the factors that are critical to pilot training in
17 the Air Force, that Reese stacks up well. Secondly, I want
18 to urge you to look not just at air space today, but the
19 relevant question is, what is air space going to look like 20
20 years from now. When you look at that, the argument for
21 Reese skyrockets.
22 Finally, Reese has a major university, a major

1 city. The quality of life there, the access to education and
2 jobs for spouses is, I think, very strong.
3 In terms of Kelly Air Force Base, Kelly is the
4 lowest labor cost, the highest labor productivity, and in
5 terms of the quality of workmanship, the number one logistics
6 center in the Air Force. I mentioned in Fort Worth this
7 weekend that the commodity-based comparison makes absolutely
8 no sense economically, and I want to urge you to challenge it
9 and reject it. I am confident if you do, that you're going
10 to keep Kelly open.
11 Finally, the biggest surprise on the base closing
12 list to me was Brooks Air Force Base. Long ago, we should
13 have turned this into a scientific center. It has facilities
14 that are very specialized. It does all the drug testing for
15 the military. It is basically a science and research center.
16 It has brand-new facilities.
17 It seems to me that operating in Military City, USA
18 under a contonement plan where it is basically run out of
19 Kelly, that we can save tens of millions of dollars by
20 keeping this facility open, limiting its function to
21 research, having it supervised out of Kelly.
22 And I want to remind you that you're dealing with

1 Ph.D.s, with scientists, who are not simply going to get up
2 and leave the research center in San Antonio. Many of them
3 are going to refuse to move. And I think if you look at this
4 decision on Kelly, you're going to conclude that it was the
5 poorest decision that was made in the whole base closing
6 recommendation.
7 A final point. Our love affair in Texas with our
8 military bases didn't happen the day that they went on the
9 Base Closing Commission list. Texans have always believed in
10 a strong defense. We have always been supportive of defense.
11 We want to continue to play a leadership role. We ask you to
12 look at the arguments that we have made to make a judgement
13 on the merits.
14 And we're confident that when that judgement is
15 made, that Kelly is going to be kept open, that Brooks is
16 going to be kept open, that Red River Army Depot is going to
17 be kept open.
18 And we believe that if you will look 20 years into
19 the future at air space, if you will look at quality of life,
20 which is not a major factor, but it's a significant factor,
21 and if you will compare Reese on those factors that are
22 important to the function Reese performs, pilot training in

1 the Air Force, that Reese will also stay open.

2 I want to thank the committee for their

3 consideration and thank you for the good work you're doing.

4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Senator Gramm.

5 And now, we call Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson.

6 SENATOR HUTCHINSON: I certainly appreciate the

7 opportunity to be here with you again. Since I only saw you

8 three days ago, I'm tempted to say, we have got to stop

9 meeting like this. Since I'm your 167th witness in two days,

10 I know you would agree.

11 I want to talk briefly about our Texas bases. The

12 capacity and quality of Laughlin Air Force Base makes it the

13 Air Force's premiere undergraduate pilot training base. And

14 its location will make it remain forever so in the entire

15 United States.

16 Bergstrom Air Force Reserve Base has been a great

17 one and would continue to be. Carswell has the unique

18 mission of joint training that is a model for future

19 interservice cooperation in efficiencies, and it has been a

20 perfect model. The San Antonio community presented an

21 innovative plan to keep the function of Brooks Air Force Base

22 in San Antonio at reduced cost to the taxpayers and also

1 providing the savings above the original Air Force proposal.

2 Brooks is not an Air Force base. It's a research

3 center. Its excellence would be compromised if the technical

4 staff didn't move, and the statistics show that they probably

5 won't. The Brooks contonement is the most innovative

6 proposal of the entire BRAC this time. I think it meets your

7 standard of substantial deviation, and I hope you will reward

8 innovation, excellence, and efficiency.

9 We in Texas support the consolidation of Navy

10 strike pilot training at Kingsville NAS. Also, Corpus

11 Christi NAS in South Texas provides the best air space and

12 training conditions for Navy pilot training. We are not

13 contesting the Navy's proposal, but T-44 training should stay

14 at Corpus.

15 Your Commission staff not only ranks Reese higher

16 in military value than its nearest competitor, but it also is

17 the clear choice of pilots and instructors. The Commission

18 heard sworn testimony from Brigadier General McFalls that he

19 chose Reese as the first Navy Air Force joint training base

20 because it was clearly the Air Force's best place to do it.

21 When you're looking at roughly equal facilities,

22 quality of life should be the tie breaker. Reese has job

1 opportunities for spouses and a great university for
2 continued education of our military personnel and spouses.
3 Now, I want to talk about the two depots that are
4 on the list from Texas, and I want to talk about readiness.
5 We have a goal of winning two major regional conflicts that
6 are near simultaneous. We don't know what "near
7 simultaneous" means. We know that other potential aggressors
8 will have learned Saddam Hussein's lesson that you can't let
9 America have time to gear up, or you will pay a price.
10 Anyone who talks about readiness, anyone who talks
11 about the ability of our smaller armed services to meet the
12 test of two MRCs is talking first about lift capacity. As a
13 member of the Armed Services Committee, every service Chief
14 and every Secretary has come to us and said, "We must have
15 adequate air lift." Adequate air lift includes a dependence
16 to a great extent on the C-5.
17 There is only one hangar in America that can take a
18 C-5, and that is at Kelly. The competitors said last
19 Saturday that they could build a hangar to take Kelly for
20 about $52 million. Those numbers are not correct. It will
21 take $275 million to replicate the hangar at Kelly that can
22 take a C-5.

1 We cannot afford to take this chance on readiness
2 by moving the expertise and moving away from the one hangar
3 that is there that can provide the C-5, which is going to be
4 a major part of our air lift capacity for the years to come.
5 Another major issue for readiness is maintenance of
6 equipment not being replaced. Red River Army Depot maintains
7 Bradleys, multiple launch rocket systems, and M-113 families
8 of vehicles. Not one of those is going to come online to be
9 bought new in the next year, probably not in the next two or
10 three years, which makes maintenance and the expertise even
11 more important.
12 The Army is suggesting that we put all of our
13 capabilities into one place, Anniston. Anniston's terrific.
14 Red River is terrific. Red River has proven in every
15 competition that it is the best. Red River maintains these
16 vehicles. We cannot afford by military strategy to put all
17 our eggs in one basket, and most certainly if we have a surge
18 need, we're not going to be able to fill it if we're at 100
19 percent capacity at Anniston.
20 Most certainly, if we had something terrible like a
21 natural disaster, having all our eggs in one basket does not
22 make sense. So I am just going to say that we have the case

1 to be made on the merits for these very important readiness
2 issues for Texas. And I want to end by saying that our Texas
3 delegation comes to you, Republicans and Democrats. We
4 support the military. We have done it on the merits for
5 years and years and years.
6 We are not a delegation that comes to you voting
7 against the defense budgets, against the defense increases,
8 and then asks you to spend more by saving our bases. We are
9 supporting our military. We support it because it's right
10 for our national defense. And we thank you for all the
11 efforts you're putting forward. Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Senator
13 Hutchinson.
14 Again, I will reiterate that we want to try to stay
15 within our five-minute time limit if we could, please, as
16 each speaker comes to the podium.
17 It was appropriate, I guess, to finish with Red
18 River. So we'll continue on with that. Representative Jim
19 Chapman.
20 REPRESENTATIVE CHAPMAN: Commissioners, thank you
21 very much. I see that I stand before a group all but one of
22 whom have been to Red River Army Depot. And we will cure

1 that situation on Thursday. Commissioner Davis, we are
2 pleased and excited that you are coming along with
3 Commissioner Cox and look very much forward to your visit.
4 I want to echo what Senator Hutchinson has said.
5 First, I want to thank all of you. Knowing the terrific and
6 burdensome job that you have, I want to thank you for having
7 taken the time to come to Bowie County.
8 I want to remind you, though, at the same time
9 within the allotted time that I have that Red River Army
10 Depot is unique. It is the only depot in the Army that is a
11 combination of maintenance, supply, ammunition storage,
12 collocated with a large ammo plant, Lone Stone Army
13 Ammunition Plant.
14 It is the largest depot in the system. It is by
15 age of facilities the newest. Senator Hutchinson has already
16 said, we believe it is the best, not from the subjective
17 opinion of the hometown Congressmen, but from the objective
18 analysis and awards that have been won by this facility. It
19 was named as the President's quality leader award as one of
20 the finest facilities not in DOD but in the entire federal
21 government, one of four winners this year and the only winner
22 in the Department of Defense.

1 The capacity is the issue in the depots. We know
2 that. Capacity, we believe, if you try to put all of the
3 work that could result from the work that would be necessary
4 in the two theater scenario that Senator Hutchinson
5 mentioned. To pour all of that or attempt to pour all of
6 that into a single ground maintenance facility, we believe,
7 is a terrible mistake.
8 We believe that Anniston is a good facility. We
9 believe Red River is even better. And we believe it is a
10 mistake to put all of your eggs in one depot basket. Red
11 River Army Depot is unique. It is the only facility in the
12 world that maintains over 75 percent of the ground vehicles
13 that you find in an Army mechanized division. Nowhere else
14 in the world is that work done today.
15 The Army's workload numbers support the contention
16 that if we consolidate all of this into one facility,
17 Anniston will not have surge capacity, we will not be able to
18 respond, and we think it would be a mistake.
19 You all know -- and, Commissioner Davis, you'll
20 hear me later this week take issue -- substantial issue, in
21 many cases, with some of the Army's numbers. We have tried
22 to make a case individually and collectively that we believe

1 the costs of closure are grossly understated when it comes to
2 Red River Army Depot and that the savings are overstated.
3 Last week or a few days ago, the Army redid its
4 COBRA numbers. And, while we still believe the case to be
5 that costs of closure are understated and savings overstated,
6 at least we now find that if it comes to the situation of
7 comparing Red River to its depot competition, its military
8 value is double that of Letterkenny, and the savings are
9 greater by realigning Letterkenny than closing Red River.
10 We believe the win-win scenario -- and that's what
11 we have called it -- is to keep your two best depots,
12 Anniston and Red River. We believe you should downsize to
13 core. And we believe that by doing so and that partnering
14 with private industry, everybody wins, the taxpayers, the
15 Army, the military, national security, private industry. We
16 all win. We believe that is what we ought to do.
17 And finally, let me just say, as you all know too
18 well, of the BRAC recommendations this year, the economic
19 impact is most severe at Red River Army Depot. In fact, of
20 all of the recommended closures and realignments, of all of
21 the negative impact of this BRAC, 10 percent of the total
22 impact falls from the closure of Red River Army Depot.

1 It is, according to the Army's numbers, going to
2 drive our unemployment rate to almost 22 percent. And those
3 of you who have been there and seen the statistics know, it
4 will likely stay there for many, many years.
5 I know the negative impact is going to be great in
6 every community that is adversely impacted by your decisions.
7 But I suggest to you that closing the best installation,
8 loading all of your eggs in one basket, and by doing so,
9 devastating and driving the unemployment rate in this
10 community this high for many, many years is the wrong thing
11 to do.
12 We trust your judgement. We hope that you will
13 view all of the facts and in your final analysis vote to
14 remove Red River from the list. And Commissioner Davis, we
15 look forward to seeing you on Thursday. Mr. Chairman, I
16 thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
18 Chapman.
19 Representative Joe Barton.
20 REPRESENTATIVE BARTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
21 I'm here to make a plea for the 301st Air Force Reserve Unit
22 at Naval Air Station Fort Worth which this Commission has

1 asked to be looked at for deactivation or relocation.

2 The problem with the idea of moving the 301st is

3 that it will not close a base and actually might keep one

4 open. It won't save money. In fact, it will cost $16 and-a-

5 half million more. Deactivating the 301st would result in no

6 base closure, no base closure savings, and would cost the

7 American taxpayer millions of dollars each and every year as

8 far as the eye can see.

9 The fact is that base operations and overhead at

10 Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base must continue with or without

11 the 301st. In fact, other units at the Joint Reserve Base

12 must pick up support contributions that are now presently

13 borne by the 301st Air Force Reserve unit. Over $1.2 million

14 has been identified as a potential cost that the Navy must

15 pick up.

16 Deactivating the 301st is a force structure issue.

17 DOD analysis correctly shows that such an action would never

18 result in a payback.

19 On the contrary, closing Bergstrom Air Force Base

20 and moving the 10th Air Force headquarters to the Naval air

21 station joint Reserve base in Fort Worth results in complete

22 closure of a DOD installation. This action would have an

1 immediate or one-year payback. Annual recurring savings
2 would continue in the amount of about $4 and-a-half million
3 annually. This 4.5 million is understated due to substantial
4 annual savings associated with joint training operations at
5 the joint Reserve base.
6 At the request of the BRAC, COBRA models were run
7 on May 5, 1995, and May 10, 1995, that compared deactivating
8 the 301st in Fort Worth and closing Bergstrom and moving the
9 10th Air Force headquarters to Fort Worth. This focus is
10 based on a comparison with Bergstrom, since Bergstrom is the
11 DOD recommendation for closure that has been presented to the
12 Commission.
13 This analysis shows closing Bergstrom to be clearly
14 the most cost-effective. The COBRA models confirm that
15 closing a base saves more money than not closing a base.
16 It's not even a close call.
17 The first item the COBRA model looked at was the
18 net one-time cost to deactivate the 301st in Fort Worth which
19 would be $2,946,000. The total one-time cost to close
20 Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force headquarters to Fort
21 Worth would be $4,362,000. So the net savings to close
22 Bergstrom versus deactivating the 301st would be that

1 difference, or $16,584,000.

2 The second big area the COBRA models evaluated was

3 the annual recurring savings. The steady state savings to

4 close Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force would be

5 $17,666,000. The steady state savings to deactivate the

6 301st at Naval Air Station at Fort Worth would be

7 $13,195,000. So the annual recurring savings to close

8 Bergstrom as a net difference of the two are $4,471,000.

9 Again, deactivating the 301st Naval Air Station

10 Fort Worth Joint Reserve unit results in no base closure, no

11 base closure savings, and never pays back. Instead, there

12 would be recurring costs to other DOD units at that remaining

13 base.

14 Another issue that I would like to address very

15 quickly concerns a supposed promise to Austin and reliance on

16 that promise. Austin Mayor Todd in the Austin delegation had

17 represented that somehow, the Air Force made a promise about

18 locating the Air Force Reserve unit at the Bergstrom site.

19 Congressman Geren and others have clearly shown that there

20 was no promise or commitment made, even given the benefit of

21 the doubt, beyond 1996.

22 During her site visit to Fort Worth last week,

1 Commissioner Cox assured me that the promise was no longer an
2 issue for BRAC '95. Austin wants only one thing, the
3 economic advantages of the Bergstrom location for a civilian
4 airport. And they're to be commended for that.
5 I would like to submit for the record a news
6 article of June the 5th in the Austin American Statesman that
7 shows right now, there is a big controversy between the
8 airlines that want to use the new airport and the airport
9 authority about whether to build a second runway. They're
10 going to issue bonds in Austin this fall for about $600
11 million to build the second runway. And the airlines do not
12 want the second runway built.
13 If the second runway is not built, you can't have
14 the Air Force unit there, because it would only be one
15 runway. I don't have that article with me, but I will submit
16 it for the record.
17 In short, it doesn't make sense to deactivate the
18 301st. It doesn't make sense to move the 301st. It's a part
19 of a joint concept that's working very well with the Navy,
20 the Army, the Texas Air National Guard, the Marine Air Corps,
21 and the Air Force Reserve. Thank you very much.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman.

1 Congressman Lloyd Doggett.

2 REPRESENTATIVE DOGGETT: Thank you very much. And
3 I thank all of you members of the Commission. There is
4 clearly no way that we're going to achieve both economic
5 security with a balanced budget and military security unless
6 we achieve savings through base closure.

7 And I'm going to take a little different position
8 than perhaps some of your other Congressional witnesses,
9 because I want to emphasize that if the Air Force unit in the
10 10th Congressional district that I represent cannot pass
11 muster under your applicable criteria, I think you ought to
12 close it.

13 The taxpayers of America and the taxpayers of
14 Travis County are not going to benefit if we keep a unit that
15 is not efficient and is not economical. But I would say to
16 you, if the taxpayers in Travis County and throughout this
17 country are receiving a benefit as compared with other bases
18 and if you evaluate that benefit on a level playing field and
19 you compare it to the alternatives, then you have a
20 responsibility under the same standards to maximize the use
21 of that facility.

22 All that we are asking in the City of Austin is

1 that you evaluate our base relative to others on a level
2 playing field. Let me just summarize a very few of the
3 special things about Bergstrom Air Force Base. During the
4 1991 BRAC process, as you know, Bergstrom was recommended for
5 closure.
6 After that, the citizens of Austin approved by a
7 vote the conversion of that base into a civilian airport.
8 And it's moving faster than luggage through the Denver
9 airport, I can assure you. The cargo operations are now
10 scheduled to begin in 1996. And there's no reason, newspaper
11 clipping aside, to assume they won't. And passenger
12 operations will begin in 1988.
13 The relative cost of keeping the 924th as a tenant
14 in the Austin Airport have to be evaluated not just on 1994
15 and 1995 before the new airport is ever opened, when costs
16 are at their peak. But I think you have to consider the fact
17 that the cost will drop when cargo gets there. And then,
18 they're going to drop dramatically when we have passenger
19 operations underway in 1998, which I have no reason to assume
20 will not occur.
21 Now, there is some disagreement. I think it's
22 sparked by an unfortunate disagreement not of my making and

1 not of the making of any of my colleagues, but which you've
2 seen, I'm sure in other parts of the country between some
3 people in Austin and some people in the Fort Worth area over
4 the two relative bases.
5 I don't plan to participate in that disagreement,
6 except to this extent. As far as what Austin was promised by
7 the BRAC in the past or what it has not been promised, our
8 position has never been that the 1991 BRAC could or did say
9 that we would have a unit there for the rest of civilization.
10 Rather, it was our understanding that if we
11 proceeded as we have done with the conversion, with the
12 investment of local funds in a conversion to a domestic or
13 civilian airport, that the unit wouldn't be moved
14 immediately. And now, we're to a point where we're
15 fulfilling our obligations and feel that the Air Force in
16 proposing to move the unit is not fulfilling its.
17 Our frustration is, we met the 1996 deadline.
18 We're doing that. And we believe that the unit should not be
19 taken away on that basis. But I think the focus has got to
20 be not just on the promise but on the cost, because that's
21 what we're concerned about. And when you look at the
22 facility that will be there in terms of its size, in terms of

1 its runways, in terms of its training areas, it has ample
2 capacity for inclusion of additional units with varied
3 missions.
4 It's uniquely located, the closest unit to Fort
5 Hood, which will soon hold 40 percent of the United States
6 Army's combat power. Bergstrom is the only Air Force Reserve
7 facility located in such close proximity to that
8 installation.
9 In addition to its logistical superiority, the
10 924th has itself proven in its winning members in the long
11 shot '95 competition at Nellis Air Force Base with the
12 missions that flew just in March over at Bosnia what a
13 winning unit it is, without a single sortie canceled due to
14 mechanical or equipment failure.
15 Finally, we have the support there in Austin with a
16 high tech economy, the most highly educated populace of any
17 county in the country, with a city of over 250,000, 65
18 percent of our manufacturing workforce in the technology
19 area. It's the kind of city that is compatible with having
20 the kind of Air Force Reserves that we need. And we're
21 backed up and are immensely proud of the veterans
22 organizations and the many veteran retirees that we have

1 there in the Austin area.

2 In summary, we believe we're going to have a first-

3 class airport that works and that we can provide the Air

4 Force a first-class, well-placed, well-trained Reserve unit.

5 Thank you.

6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman

7 Doggett, for your testimony.

8 And we now recognize Representative Pete Geren.

9 REPRESENTATIVE GEREN: Thank you, members of the

10 Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before

11 you today. And for those of you who were fortunate enough to

12 make the trip to Fort Worth last Saturday, I hope that you

13 enjoyed our hospitality. And we appreciated very much your

14 taking the day and spending it there.

15 I'm going to touch on a couple of points today. In

16 addition to the 301st in Fort Worth, I would also like to

17 note the AFUS facility in Fort Worth, as well. I'm going to

18 go back over some of the points I made on Saturday. For

19 those of you who were there, I apologize for that. But I

20 think the issue that I want to emphasize is so important in

21 the consideration of this, I wanted to go over it with you.

22 But first, regarding the AFUS facility in Fort

1 Worth. It's recommended for closure and realignment to
2 Edwards Air Force Base. I have some questions and additional
3 testimony I would like to submit regarding some of the data
4 used. In any decision we make regarding AFUS that develops
5 and tests electronic warfare capability, it's a need
6 dramatically demonstrated by the shooting down of our F-16
7 pilot over Bosnia.
8 It's very important, and we believe that the
9 decision to move it out of Fort Worth is not cost-effective.
10 And we would like to provide additional information for the
11 record.
12 Regarding the JRB Fort Worth's military value, at
13 the hearing on Saturday, a couple of very important points
14 were emphasized. No less of an authority than the Chairman
15 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, sent a
16 letter that was introduced into the record on Saturday.
17 And let me quote from that record: "JRB Fort
18 Worth, which includes the 301st, it offers a prime
19 opportunity to demonstrate the viability of joint basing and
20 holds great promise for streamlining our infrastructure and
21 enhancing joint operational effectiveness."
22 Regarding Bergstrom, which unfortunately has become

1 our competition in this initiative, General Shali also went
2 on to say that "The CINCs, chiefs of the services and I have
3 reviewed the proposal to close Bergstrom and determined that
4 it would not impair our ability to execute the national
5 military strategy."
6 Assistant Secretary of Defense Debbie Lee also sent
7 you a letter stating in part that it was imperative that the
8 301st remain part of JRB Fort Worth. The military value of a
9 joint operations base, particularly as we ask the Reserves to
10 do more with less, is we not only shrink our military but ask
11 it to get better at the same time. It's critical that we
12 heed the recommendations of these military experts in this
13 regard.
14 It is a success. In fact, it's a BRAC success. We
15 all started JRB Fort Worth in 1993. The outstanding men and
16 women out there are making it a success, and we urge that
17 BRAC let the success go forward.
18 The commitment whether or not the BRAC '93 or BRAC
19 '91 made a commitment to Austin somehow supersedes all of
20 your other considerations has worked its way as a primary
21 concern of the Commission. And you have to be fair. Our
22 government has to be fair. We understand that. I think it's

1 important, though, to look at some of the words of the people
2 in Austin that have supposedly relied on this commitment to
3 see what their understanding of it was.
4 The mayor of Austin sent a letter to the DOD in
5 which he said, and I quote from it -- and a copy of it's in
6 the packet -- he understood that the 924th would remain there
7 until at least September 30, '96. Congressman Pickle said in
8 a public statement, "The Pentagon is committed to keeping the
9 unit there until 1996." So they all understand that your
10 commitment, if there is one, extended no further than that.
11 The city council actually passed a resolution
12 authorizing the move to Bergstrom. August 1, 1991, they laid
13 out the conditions for the move. They did not mention
14 anything about the Reserves. They said, "If we get the land
15 from the government, if we get the FAA to approve the master
16 plan, and if it's affordable, we'll move." The very same
17 day, they had another resolution that says, "Please leave the
18 924th there." It wasn't a condition.
19 They emphasize a statement by -- I say "they" --
20 Austin emphasizes a statement by Secretary Boatwright in
21 which he talked about leaving the Reserves at Austin. He did
22 say, if you took one sentence out of context, that it was

1 their plan to leave those Reserves at Austin. But he went on
2 to say -- and he made it very clear -- and we showed a tape
3 of the hearing to the Commission on Saturday -- he said, "But
4 I can't make any long-standing commitment."
5 Secretary Boatwright is a professional. He does
6 not get out on a limb and promise something he can't deliver.
7 He didn't have the authority to bind the BRAC. But even if
8 he had, he made sure that he didn't do that. He said, "I
9 cannot make a long-standing commitment." And you have a copy
10 of the transcript of Mr. Boatwright's so-called "promise" in
11 your text.
12 And in closing, let me just mention a couple of
13 things. There's the understanding, I think, by some that
14 this move out of inner city Austin to this new site was
15 something that came about as a part of BRAC. Austin has been
16 trying to move its airport for 20 years. They decided about
17 10 years ago to move to Maynard, a little town outside of
18 Boston, and build the Green Field Airport.
19 When they got put on the BRAC list in 1990 by
20 Secretary Cheney, Secretary Cheney's whole list was rejected.
21 But when they got put on the BRAC list, then, they decided to
22 move from Maynard to Bergstrom, because it saved them $108

1 million. It had nothing to do with the commitments you made.
2 My time is out. I see the gavel going up. I
3 appreciate very much the opportunity to meet with you, and
4 again, I appreciate your making the time to come to Fort
5 Worth last Saturday. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Geren.
8 Representative Larry Combest.
9 REPRESENTATIVE COMBEST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I know how
11 seriously you take your role in this Commission. That's why
12 I know that you appreciate the serious impact of closing any
13 undergraduate pilot training base, because pilot training is
14 the very core of our military readiness.
15 Here, you're being asked to make a very close call.
16 Your inclination might be to follow the Air Force
17 recommendations. However, as your own BRAC staff have
18 confirmed, the Air Force data was flawed, the wrong
19 recommendation was made. Reese does not belong at the bottom
20 of the list.
21 Had the Air Force data been correct, then another
22 base would be on the bottom, and your decision might be made

1 amid less murky circumstances. I recall very clearly that
2 Commissioner Davis expressed a concern at the May 10th
3 hearing that the Commission not cut back too far in the area
4 of pilot training.
5 Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is going to need all of
6 its pilot training capability and capacity to fulfill the
7 pilot training requirements of the Air Force into the 21st
8 century. If in the future, the Air Force needs to reopen a
9 base that you recommend for closure, reopening will cost
10 eight times more than the estimated savings that would be
11 presented.
12 The initial perception was that the Air Force had
13 excess capacity in pilot training, and one undergraduate
14 pilot training base could be closed. However, both the Navy
15 and the Air Force have begun to revise their future training
16 projections. Their pilot training requirements are going up.
17 One reason is the forecast demand for 51,000 pilots in
18 civilian aviation in just nine years, as massive numbers of
19 pilots begin to retire.
20 Also, retention rates in all the services are going
21 down. With a big hiring binge by the airlines, the Air Force
22 and the Navy will lose pilots by the hundreds. Additionally,

1 the needs of the Air National Guard will increase demand on
2 Air Force training. There is no margin for error if Reese
3 Air Force Base is closed.
4 If pilot training requirements turn out to be
5 higher than were projected a year or more ago, then the Air
6 Force will be in the very dilemma that General Davis
7 described. I urge the Commission to press the Air Force on
8 this question and projected requirements. It is my
9 understanding that there may be much larger requirements for
10 pilots than originally projected.
11 There are five clear reasons that you should reject
12 the recommendation to close Reese. First, Reese has a higher
13 military value than any other UPT base which would be
14 retained or than other UPT bases which would be retained.
15 Your own staff revealed this fact in their analysis that
16 ranked Reese ahead of two other UPT bases. Their analysis
17 proved that there were substantial errors in the Air Force
18 DOD analysis.
19 Second, quality of life is the key to retaining
20 quality professional military personnel, and retention is one
21 of the keys to readiness.
22 Any successful business that prides itself on

1 attracting and retaining quality people looks for a location
2 that provides a quality lifestyle, plentiful housing,
3 excellent medical facilities, jobs for spouses, easy access
4 with an international airport, and outstanding educational
5 opportunities. Reese Air Force Base had the highest rating
6 of any base in the Air Force in regards to quality of life.
7 Third, DOD tells Congress that housing is one of
8 the most important elements of quality of life. Their
9 military doctrine is, we enlist soldiers, but we reenlist
10 families. Retention is 15 percent higher at bases with good
11 housing. Reese has spent millions of dollars to ensure that
12 they have the finest housing of any UPT base. This is an
13 asset that cannot be ignored and cannot be matched without
14 considerable cost.
15 Fourth, it is a sad but indisputable fact proven
16 again just recently at Shepherd Air Force Base that flying in
17 training is a dangerous business. But it need not be a
18 hazard for innocent civilians if we pay special attention to
19 encroachment.
20 Both of the bases with less military value than
21 Reese have encroachment problems that place homes,
22 businesses, and public places in the direct path of daily

1 training operations. By contrast, Reese does not have an
2 encroachment problem.
3 Fifth, Reese is the Air Force premiere
4 undergraduate pilot training base. It's the first to receive
5 the T-1 trainer, the first and only with joint Navy training,
6 the first to receive the new JPATS aircraft, and Reese is
7 also the number one base of preference of student and
8 instructor pilots in the air education and training command.
9 Our young men and women in the Air Force vote to
10 keep Reese every day by choosing to serve at Reese. Ladies
11 and gentlemen of the Commission, as I said, this is a close
12 call. Reese should not be closed. The data is flawed. The
13 planning assumption is clearly wrong, and I thank you very
14 much for your time.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
16 Combest.
17 Many members -- in fact, all members of Congress
18 have worked real hard in this process, but I would have to
19 say that we have probably seen more of Mr. Combest than
20 anyone. He has certainly represented his constituents well.
21 We're going to have a little change in our
22 schedule, and we're going to move up. Representative Martin

1 Frost.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 I'm here on the same subject as the three witnesses you heard

4 right before Mr. Combest, and that's why I had asked to be

5 heard at this point. And I appreciate the opportunity to be

6 here today to express my opposition to the proposal to remove

7 the 301st Fighter Wing from the joint Reserve base in Fort

8 Worth.

9 And I will focus my remarks strictly on the issue

10 of jointness. I recognize that you have many difficult

11 decisions to make as part of the 1995 Base Closure and

12 Realignment process. However, this is not one of them.

13 Keeping the 301st Fighter Wing in Fort Worth is an easy

14 decision, a decision that is strongly and enthusiastically

15 supported by the North Texas Congressional Delegation, Fort

16 Worth city officials, and the community at large and by the

17 military.

18 You have already received detailed information

19 concerning the role and mission of JRB Fort Worth, so I won't

20 try to go over the same ground. However, I do believe it's

21 worthwhile to reemphasize a couple of points. It's critical

22 that we better utilize the defense assets we have as defense

1 spending declines. In other words, to promote cost savings
2 and efficiencies, it would be necessary for the services to
3 eliminate duplicate efforts and find ways to work and train
4 together.
5 Admittedly, there are questions about whether such
6 joint ventures can be successful, yet you have in Fort Worth
7 proof that collaborative efforts are possible. Already, the
8 301st Fighter Wing and the Naval Reserve have developed an
9 operations plan which clearly reduces costs and promotes
10 efficiency through mutual support. No other base in the
11 United States offers this opportunity in the way it is
12 occurring at JRB Fort Worth.
13 Further proof that it is working can be seen in
14 support expressed for what's happening in Forth Worth by the
15 Department of Defense. As Congressman Geren just mentioned,
16 in a letter to this Commission, Assistant Secretary of
17 Defense Deborah Lee referred to JRB Fort Worth as "one of the
18 most successful products of BRAC '91 and BRAC '93."
19 In a memorandum provided to this Commission, Navy
20 Rear Admiral T.F. Hall stated that JRB Fort Worth "is on
21 track to be our nation's first master Guard Reserve base. As
22 such, it serves as a model for future consolidations."

1 Admiral Hall concluded by saying that "Reversing the BRAC '93
2 decision establishing JRB Fort Worth would be a mistake and
3 that we should continue to pursue our present course of
4 action, which makes this joint Reserve base a model for the
5 future."
6 Let me note that some of the Reserve and Guard
7 units being reassigned to Fort Worth are coming from NAS
8 Dallas, which is in the area I represent and which was closed
9 as a part of BRAC '93 process. I was initially concerned
10 about the closure of NAS Dallas, but it's clear that
11 consolidation of these units with other Reserve and Guard
12 units at JRB Fort Worth makes sense.
13 So this experiment in joint service operations is
14 working. It is an experiment that we should not disturb by
15 removing a major part of the team. If we are to validate the
16 concept of joint preparation, training, and operations at one
17 facility by the services, it's essential that the 301st
18 Fighter Wing remain in place as originally planned. To do
19 otherwise would be disruptive and deny the services the
20 opportunity to demonstrate the efficiencies gained from joint
21 operations.
22 I urge the Commission to let this experiment

1 continue, let the military have a chance to show how a joint
2 venture between the services will not only be cost-effective
3 but will ultimately best serve the needs of our national
4 security by improving defense preparedness.
5 Again, I appreciate having this opportunity to be
6 here today. I believe that the right decision is to permit
7 the 301st Fighter Wing to remain a part of this joint Reserve
8 base in Fort Worth. Thank you.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Frost, thank you for
10 your testimony.
11 Congressman Charles Stenholm.
12 REPRESENTATIVE STENHOLM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
13 commissioners. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
14 today. I want to express my strong support for all of the
15 excellent military facilities that we have in Texas. Also, I
16 want to make you aware of the primary defense department
17 facility in my own district, Dais Air Force Base, and the
18 options it makes available to you as you go through the BRAC
19 decision process.
20 But first, I want to also express my strong support
21 for Goodfellow Air Force Base located in St. Angelo, which I
22 represent together with Lamar Smith. Although Goodfellow is

1 in Lamar's district, it is literally across the street from
2 my district line. Therefore, I do represent many of the men
3 and women who work and serve at Goodfellow, so I feel it is
4 part of my district.
5 To call Goodfellow an "Air Force base" is a little
6 misleading, because it has a proven track record as a joint
7 service training facility. In fact, the latest in new state-
8 of-the-art firefighting school facility is tops in the world.
9 At times, in fact, there may be more Army personnel at
10 Goodfellow than Air Force.
11 I bring this to your attention because of my
12 concerns and efforts to find cost savings in the federal
13 budget and my belief that joint missions whenever possible
14 could be helpful in finding cost savings in the defense
15 budget. In that regard, I would like to see more training
16 missions go to Goodfellow. The City of St. Angelo is a good
17 partner to the military, and I know they would welcome the
18 growth at the base and would actively help accommodate any
19 new needs caused by new missions at the base.
20 As a whole, the people of Texas have proven
21 themselves to be very supportive of our bases and the men and
22 women who serve there. While I am supportive of all the

1 Texas facilities, there are two -- Reese Air Force Base, as
2 you've just heard from Mr. Combest, and Naval Air Station;
3 Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, formerly Carswell, currently
4 being considered for closure, which I would like to speak to
5 you about.
6 Although these bases are not in my district, again,
7 I know that they are exceptional bases and encourage the
8 Commission to reconsider the decision to close them.
9 Secretary Widnall has stressed the importance to the Air
10 Force of Air Force training and quality of life issues. The
11 decision to close Reese, which was ranked the number one base
12 by the Air Force for quality of life and which has an
13 excellent training record, contradicts previously stated Air
14 Force goals.
15 If Reese does close, I believe the Air Force will
16 regret the decision, because it could result in a lack of
17 well-trained pilots in the future. Moreover, it is my
18 understanding that mistakes were made in the Air Force
19 Department of Defense analysis of Reese, and I believe that
20 it deserves another look and should remain open.
21 JRB Fort Worth is another facility that does not
22 warrant closure. The 301st Fighter Wing is not a base

1 closure issue, and it will not result in long-term cost
2 savings. JRB Fort Worth is supported by the Pentagon and
3 should be taken off the closure list.
4 Turning to Dais Air Force Base, it is the training
5 base for the B-1 bomber, and it is also the home of two
6 squadrons of C-130s. Until last year, Dais also handled KC-
7 135 tankers. The Air Force has consistently rated Dais in
8 tier 1, one of the best bases. It has excellent
9 infrastructure, almost all of which is in virtually new
10 condition.
11 Dais has extra capacity available to handle
12 additional aircraft. It has near perfect flying conditions,
13 and its airfield has no encroachment problems. The base
14 presently has a primary aircraft inventory of 60 and could
15 handle another 40. I would also like to mention that Dais is
16 an attainment area under the Clean Air Act. Accordingly,
17 additional aircraft could be relocated there without raising
18 any air pollution concerns whatsoever.
19 I understand that the Commission is considering
20 several scenarios which would relocate KC-135 tankers or C-
21 130s. Dais could handle either plane with little or no
22 MILCON cost and would be an excellent location for both

1 assets. I am aware that the proposal to move tankers to Dais
2 may not be consistent with they Air Force's stated one base,
3 one boss policy.
4 In fact, the Air Force moved 17 tankers out of Dais
5 in 1994 solely because of this policy, even though the base
6 has and is capable of handling KC-135 tankers. The
7 combination of B-1, C-130s, and KC-135s at Dais worked very
8 well there for over 10 years.
9 Mr. Chairman, commissioners, the need to save money
10 due to budgetary restraints requires much greater flexibility
11 in locating different types of aircraft such as bombers and
12 tankers at the same base. This one base, one boss policy
13 should not be the driving factor in matters resolving sound
14 fiscal decisions and operational logic.
15 In closing, ladies and gentlemen, take a hard look
16 at the Texas installations such as Dais and Goodfellow and
17 others. The one common thread is that the people of my state
18 are staunch supporters of defense and have prepared their
19 installations to perform the mission of defense in the United
20 States for the next century.
21 Texas has always trained our troops for conflict
22 such as World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. That

1 was a conscientious decision made by our government due to
2 its citizens and location. We thank you very much.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
4 Stenholm.
5 The Chair now recognizes Representative Henry
6 Gonzalez.
7 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: Thank you very much. I
8 sympathize very much. The Commission is confronted with a
9 task of staggering complexity and of monumental importance to
10 the safety and the well-being of our country. What you
11 decide will have a profound impact on the ability of our
12 country to protect itself and its interests around the world
13 and to do so with shrinking budgets.
14 The case for Kelly Air Force Base is this. First,
15 it's the most efficient, most effective of all of the air
16 logistic centers. Second, it has capabilities that are
17 unique, cannot be easily replaced, and cannot, economically,
18 be moved. If you were to take Kelly and its current workload
19 and try to do it at any other logistics center, it would cost
20 anywhere from $30 million to $60 million more per year, based
21 on today's labor and overhead costs.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Gonzalez, could you

1 just pull the microphone down a bit, please.

2 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: Sure.

3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir, sorry to

4 interrupt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: No, sir. And that

6 assumes that you could move the workload at no cost. There

7 are thousands of skilled, experienced workers at Kelly, and

8 they are efficient -- 99 percent of their work is defect-

9 free. And Kelly stands behind it. Kelly produced the first

10 organic product warranty in the Department of Defense. You

11 can't find a better workforce anywhere. Kelly has unique

12 capabilities.

13 Every outsized cargo carrier in the Air Force --

14 engines and airplanes alike -- is maintained there. It would

15 be impossible to move this operation without a severe adverse

16 effect on the airlift capability. And as you all well know,

17 the ability to move vast cargos over great distances in a

18 very short time is absolutely essential to our ability to

19 respond to the many different kinds of threats that exist

20 throughout the world today.

21 Kelly repairs and manages 60 percent of the engines

22 of our front line fighter aircraft, and 100 percent of the

1 secondary power systems of this aircraft. Moving this
2 workload would disrupt fighter operations for a significant
3 period, and cost more than $1 billion, according to the Air
4 Force studies. While some may argue that all primary engine
5 work could be done in a single location, I would urge caution
6 on this.
7 Only a few years ago, the entire engine repair
8 facility at Tinker Air Force Base was shut down for many
9 months by a disastrous fire. Thus, we have practical, recent
10 experience that should caution everyone not to place all of
11 an essential workload at one place where an accident, hostile
12 action, or some other mishap could wreck readiness capability
13 overnight.
14 Anyone who has been to Kelly knows that this
15 installation is at the heart and soul of the Air Force
16 logistics. It has the best engine facility in the Department
17 of Defense. Its paint shops can handle any airplane. Its
18 hangers can house any airplane. It is a leader in cross
19 servicing. Its airlift capability is second to none. There
20 is no workforce anywhere that can match Kelly in skill, in
21 craftsmanship, pride, or cost. And there's no way that the
22 taxpayer will be well served by relocating its functions.

1 Kelly has proved its worth to the nation time after
2 time. Kelly has earned its place, and keeping Kelly is the
3 only course of action that makes sense. Finally, I want to
4 urge the commission to consider carefully San Antonio's well
5 thought out, thoroughly cost effective plan to reconfigure
6 Brooks Air Force Base. This plan saves twice as much as the
7 proposed transfer of Brooks missions to other facilities
8 without disrupting ongoing operations or compromising
9 capability.
10 And I want to thank you, and express my gratitude
11 for this opportunity to appear before you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir, for your
13 excellent testimony. Representative Lamar Smith.
14 REPRESENTATIVE SMITH: Chairman, commissioners,
15 thank you for this opportunity to discuss the importance of
16 Brooks and Kelly Air Force Bases. These bases are not just
17 important to our hometown of San Antonio, they're also
18 important to the American taxpayer and to our nation's
19 defense. Everyone in this room is familiar with the
20 important contributions that the people of San Antonio have
21 made to our nation's defense.
22 The families of Military City have sent their sons

1 and daughters into harm's way for their country in record
2 numbers. This record has fostered a patriotism and
3 commitment to the military that makes San Antonio truly
4 unique. It was apparent when most of you saw more than
5 35,000 San Antonians lining the entrance to Kelly Air Force
6 Base, displaying Kelly Proud; and on April 6th, when you saw
7 several thousand people displaying Brooks Proud, during your
8 visit to that base.
9 Those are not slogans invented for your visit.
10 They are a way of life, a way of working, that resonate
11 throughout the Department of Defense, and translate into top
12 quality, top efficiency, and top productivity. This
13 commitment to the military makes Kelly and Brooks as
14 important to the American taxpayer as they are to San
15 Antonio. San Antonio provides a one of a kind military
16 community that nourishes the critically important research
17 and aerospace medical training at Brooks.
18 In addition to the human system center, the
19 Armstrong Laboratory, the School of Aerospace Medicine, the
20 Center for Environmental Excellence, and the human systems
21 program office are all at Brooks. The Air Force personnel
22 center, the repository for all Air Force personnel data, and

1 the Lackland military training center, the home of the Air
2 Force basic training, also are in San Antonio.
3 San Antonio's outstanding and absolutely unique
4 biomedical community is the other part of this productive
5 partnership that exists in our hometown, and that cannot be
6 duplicated anywhere else. The University of Texas Health
7 Science Center, the University of Texas at San Antonio, the
8 Texas Research and Technology Foundation, Southwest Research
9 Institute, the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research,
10 Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center, and Brooks Army
11 Medical Center all contribute to the research synergies from
12 which the work at Brooks and the taxpayers who provide it and
13 the military missions that need it benefit.
14 When you combine these synergies with the very
15 small up front cost to the San Antonio cantonment proposal
16 that is before you, and with the long term savings from such
17 cantonment, that are twice as large as the DOD's proposals to
18 uproot the missions, then keeping the research work in San
19 Antonio makes sense and saves dollars.
20 Keeping the logistics depot at Kelly is an even
21 easier decision. That's because Kelly is the most cost
22 effective location in the Department of Defense to conduct

1 aircraft depot maintenance. Kelly's labor costs are lower;
2 the quality of work higher; and the productivity greater than
3 at any other depot.
4 Your task is not easy, but it is clear that moving
5 the cost effective missions at Kelly or Brooks elsewhere
6 would not provide the taxpayers the value for their dollar
7 they are receiving now, nor would it assure continued top
8 quality support for our military personnel in missions around
9 the world. We live in a world where danger still lurks. It
10 lurks in the dreams of tyrants, like Saddam Hussein; in the
11 access of terrorist organizations to weapons of mass
12 destruction; and in instability and uncertainty on all
13 continents.
14 Danger of another kind lurks right here at home, in
15 out of control budget deficits that threaten the futures of
16 all of our children. This commission was charged with
17 combatting both dangers. And today I'm here to say that by
18 continuing the good work at Kelly and Brooks, driven by the
19 people of San Antonio in Military City, we can protect
20 against both such dangers.
21 Mr. Chairman, thank you and thank you
22 commissioners, as well.

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Smith. We
2 recognize Representative Henry Bonilla.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BONILLA: Thank you, Chairman, very
4 much; it's nice to see you again.
5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
6 REPRESENTATIVE BONILLA: You can walk into almost
7 any room, after walking down any hallway in the city, on any
8 given day of the week in this city, the most powerful city on
9 Earth, and find a hearing going on. But this hearing that's
10 being conducted here today, there is none more important,
11 none more significant to the people of South Texas as the
12 decisions are being formulated the next several weeks, based
13 on the information that you're hearing today and that you've
14 gathered while out visiting the bases.
15 The last seven days have been profound for me, and
16 they have been a time that I'll remember for the rest of my
17 life -- watching 35,000 people line the streets of San
18 Antonio during your visit; then watching close to 20,000 in
19 Del Rio coming out to save Laughlin Air Force Base. And
20 frankly, I was delighted to see the looks on some of the
21 faces of the commissioners that visited that day -- looking
22 at the signs, reading what people had come out to tell you

1 after their businesses had closed to allow them to come out
2 and show their support.
3 And hopefully, what has happened in the last seven
4 days has touched your life as well, and will be taken into
5 consideration as you make some very tough choices. Let me
6 take this opportunity to share with you my perspective, as a
7 member of the National Security Subcommittee of the House
8 Appropriations Committee. As a member of that committee, I'm
9 constantly reminded of the very real constraints that we are
10 experiencing in the defense budget.
11 We're having increasingly difficult times ensuring
12 that our military is provided with an adequate quality of
13 life and the tools and training to remain number one in terms
14 of our fighting force in this world. I personally welcome
15 your assistance in this effort to cut costs and make our
16 military more economically efficient. Laughlin and Kelly Air
17 Force Bases are the low cost providers for the United States
18 Air Force.
19 Closing either one of these bases will not be cost
20 effective, and will not serve the taxpayers' best interest.
21 We should not close facilities unless it saves money. A few
22 short days ago, a few of you were with us, as I mentioned in

1 my opening remarks, and you visited Del Rio. You saw with
2 your own eyes the strong case for Laughlin. No other
3 undergraduate pilot training facility matches Laughlin. Its
4 weather and air space remain unsurpassed by any other
5 facility. And what this means is, dollars saved -- dollars
6 saved by fewer canceled missions; dollars saved by less time
7 traveling to useable air space; dollars saved by a low cost
8 and efficient workforce.
9 Laughlin trains the best pilots in the United
10 States Air Force. That is Laughlin's first contribution to
11 our national defense. Laughlin's cost effectiveness is its
12 second contribution to our national defense. These savings
13 free up additional dollars to be spent on quality of life, on
14 procurement, and training. These savings are vital for our
15 national defense. Without Laughlin, America would simply be
16 weaker.
17 I am proud to be Laughlin's representative, and the
18 people of Del Rio are very proud to be the home of the best
19 little base in the Air Force. And now for Kelly. I grew up
20 in the shadows of Kelly Air Force Base. My father worked at
21 Kelly for roughly 30 years. I probably would not be here
22 today were it not for what Kelly Air Force Base provided for

1 my family, and the opportunities it provided for many other
2 San Antonians as well.
3 Kelly is the lowest cost depot. Kelly has the
4 lowest labor cost, the highest quality, and this is nothing
5 that you've heard for the first time. This has been Kelly's
6 story for decades. As a member of the Appropriations
7 Committee, it would trouble me if we did not make cost
8 effective choices. I'm working hard to stretch federal
9 dollars. Assets like Kelly help me make my job much easier.
10 Our government must learn to deliver service as
11 well as for a lower cost. The BRAC can make that task easier
12 for all of us. I urge you to make cost efficiency a goal in
13 your decision-making process. We gain little and, in fact,
14 hurt ourselves, if closures cost money. Our goal must always
15 be saving money, not just closing bases. In simple terms, we
16 are closing bases to save money.
17 If it costs us money to close them, then we are
18 defeating the purpose of the base closure process. Kelly is
19 a tool we need in the battle to control government spending.
20 We should be looking at transferring workload to Kelly to
21 control costs. Low costs benefit the taxpayers, and make
22 dollars available for other vital Department of Defense

1 missions. In fact, the issue of excess capacity is only
2 relevant in terms of its cost impact.
3 Now, to Brooks. San Antonio's cantonment proposal
4 maximizes the returns for taxpayers from closing Brooks Air
5 Force Base. This proposal results in considerable savings
6 with few closure costs. In addition, it keeps in tact the
7 workforce which has made Brooks a world-class facility. I
8 know you will give this proposal the serious consideration it
9 deserves. I don't have to tell you how strongly the people
10 of Del Rio and San Antonio support their military bases --
11 many of you have seen that firsthand.
12 You have personally witnessed this, and I sincerely
13 doubt that there are any communities in this great nation
14 with such strong and long standing support for our military.
15 That's why we are proudly known, in San Antonio, as Military
16 City, USA. Thank you for giving me a chance to testify
17 before your committee today. I appreciate your help with the
18 effort to save taxpayer dollars. Your jobs are very tough,
19 and I know you have some very difficult decisions ahead. And
20 we appreciate your commitment to this country.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. We
22 recognize Representative Frank Tejeda.

1 REPRESENTATIVE TEJEDA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
2 members of the commission. We are both here for the same
3 purpose, and that's to save taxpayers' dollars. As a
4 representative of the 28th congressional district, I have
5 been sent to Washington to be an effective steward of the
6 taxpayers' dollars. As created by Congress, the Defense Base
7 Closure and Realignment Commission is charged with making
8 decisions which must maximize military value and cost
9 savings.
10 The decisions this commission will make aren't
11 necessarily more difficult than the previous commissions.
12 I'm here to discuss two San Antonio bases, each of which have
13 served this nation for more than 75 years, First, Kelly Air
14 Force Base. Kelly is the most cost effective and productive
15 depot in the Defense Department today. Part of Kelly's
16 success is its low cost of labor, measured by the actual
17 overall labor and overhead rate.
18 According to figures published in DOD manuals, San
19 Antonio has maintained the lowest rates of all Air Force and
20 Navy depots from 1987 through 1993. Although its rates went
21 up in 1994, according to monthly DOD reports, San Antonio is
22 once again the lowest in 1995. In fact, San Antonio was the

1 only ALC whose rates went down instead of up from 1994 to
2 1995. Closing Kelly would be an unacceptable financial
3 investment.
4 For example, the cost of military construction for
5 another ALC to absorb the C-5 workload would exceed $80
6 million. The 1994 headquarters Air Force material command's
7 AFMC-21 study estimated the MILCON costs at $52 million for
8 program maintenance of 13 aircraft. For the current
9 projected annual workload for 21 C-5s, that figure increases
10 to $82 million. However, this estimate does not include
11 transfer of equipment and personnel, training costs, or added
12 production costs, which would add another $147 million.
13 The resulting cost would provide only the minimal
14 maintenance facilities to do the job. The gaining depot
15 still would not have the same superb wide body aircraft
16 capability that Kelly already possesses. A complete
17 replication of these one of a kind facilities would raise the
18 costs to an astronomical level. On the other hand, San
19 Antonio can absorb a small aircraft workload in addition to
20 the C-5 workload, without building any new facilities.
21 That is military value, and that is cost
22 effectiveness. Two thoughts on Brooks Air Force Base.

1 First, the enormous up front cost to move its missions
2 elsewhere is unacceptable, given the small return on such an
3 investment. In fact, such costs may rise above the original
4 estimate. In fact, attempting to relocate these missions
5 elsewhere, without most of the personnel, will seriously
6 disrupt the valuable work being performed.
7 Moving the work away from San Antonio will result
8 in the loss of many, if not most, of the scientists who would
9 not relocate. The missions at Brooks will not disappear.
10 Brooks is home to the only integrated human systems research
11 effort in the Defense Department. The Armstrong Lab is a
12 world leader in its mission area, with such unique facilities
13 as hyperbaric chambers, altitude chambers, one of three
14 spatial disorientation demonstrators in the world, directed
15 energy chambers, and a centrifuge.
16 The Armstrong Lab provides 30 percent of the
17 faculty of the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine. This
18 is the nation's leading aerospace medical training program.
19 In addition, the one of a kind configuration of biomedical
20 research and teaching activities in San Antonio provides an
21 invaluable resource for the Defense Department. Also at
22 Brooks, the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence is

1 essential to long term Air Force environmental programs in
2 the areas of compliance, hazardous waste clean up, and
3 environmental planning.
4 The permanent facility is currently under
5 construction, and will be completed in the very near future.
6 The San Antonio community has worked hard in support of an
7 alternative to the Air Force's recommendation. The
8 community's plan is innovative, and merits very serious
9 consideration. The pay off will avoid the high and somewhat
10 uncertain up front costs, save more than $100 million over 20
11 years, and avoid disruption to vital research and
12 environmental programs, without the loss of many scientists.
13 Mr. Chairman, that is military value, and that is
14 cost effectiveness. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman.
16 The Chair recognizes Representative Greg Laughlin.
17 REPRESENTATIVE LAUGHLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
18 and distinguished commissioners. I'm here today to speak on
19 behalf of the men and women of the 14th district who proudly
20 serve in the 924th Air Force Reserve unit. But before doing
21 so, I certainly would echo the words of my colleagues, Frank
22 Tejeda and Henry Bonilla, for I'm familiar with their bases,

1 also having constituents that work and serve there.

2 Today I come before you to speak in behalf of a

3 commitment made by Secretary Boatright when, on behalf of the

4 BRAC, he told the citizens of Austin that if they were to

5 pass a bond election and the airport operational by 1996,

6 then they would be able to keep their reserve unit. No one

7 in his or her right mind would think that this commitment was

8 made for eternity. But certainly, as we talk about saving

9 dollars, the commitment of the federal government ought to be

10 worth a few dollars and cents.

11 And certainly the commitment ought to be honored

12 past the opening date of that facility. The 1986 Goldwater-

13 Nichols Act mandates combined commands and joint operations

14 between the various services of the government, military

15 services. With Fort Hood, our nation's largest military

16 facility, 50 nautical miles from Bergstrom, and with the

17 924th operating in approximately 25 percent of all joint

18 training exercises at Fort Hood, military preparedness and

19 military defense of our nation mandates that the 924th at

20 Bergstrom remain there.

21 That training can take place with minimal cost to

22 the taxpayer. Currently, only two Air Force reserve

1 facilities are located in air quality attainment areas.
2 Bergstrom Air Force Base is one of those areas. And isn't it
3 ironic that at a time we talk about closing vital bases such
4 as Bergstrom, the American taxpayer is paying billions of
5 dollars to subsidize our allies' defense by keeping overseas
6 bases open.
7 Instead of closing Bergstrom, we should close bases
8 overseas, which were originally constructed and are still
9 kept open to counter a Soviet threat which no longer exists.
10 And finally, it seems to me incredible that so many Air Force
11 reserve bases and units have been added to the closure
12 consideration list, while not a single Air National Guard
13 unit has been mentioned.
14 I raise this question as an oddity of sober
15 deliberation, or is it rather the product of naked political
16 maneuvering? The question remains, as was asked by one of my
17 Republican colleagues on the National Security Committee last
18 month, why we have a separate Air National Guard from an Air
19 Force Reserve unit. And he asked the question because, as I
20 recall, he was from the state of Indiana, did the witness
21 have any information that the state of Illinois or Ohio have
22 a plan of attack or aggression.

1 And so I ask you to simply consider, why is it that
2 no Air National Guards are on this list? And if it's a
3 matter of state pride for our governors, then we as a
4 responsible committee should ask them to pick up the
5 financial tab. Because as you well know, the federal
6 government pays in excess of 95 percent of the Guard's
7 expense and operation.
8 So I submit to you today that there is no reason to
9 close the 924th, when just a few weeks ago, men and women of
10 that unit were flying combat missions under the direction of
11 our Commander-in-Chief. So it's a question today of our
12 government keeping a commitment to a few American citizens.
13 I thank you very much.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
15 Laughlin. Now a gentleman who's been waiting so patiently.
16 I believe he was the first member of the delegation to
17 arrive, Representative Kika de la Garza.
18 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Thank you very much,
19 Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, and I don't mind
20 waiting. My district has been spared. I'm here to speak in
21 behalf of all of my colleagues, and the people of the state
22 of Texas. It's good to have this opportunity to appear

1 before you today. And as is evident from the Texas presence
2 here this afternoon, we are very concerned about some of the
3 recommendations for the closure and realignment in our state.
4 In fact, I think that all of my Texas colleagues
5 will attest to the fact that some of the targets of the BRAC
6 95 unfairly impact us. Each member here has presented strong
7 and compelling details, and specific about their bases. Mr.
8 Chairman, I'll be very brief. There is no one that could
9 challenge the Texas strong and solid military tradition. My
10 family came in 1605, the original ones, as members of the
11 armed forces of the Kingdom of Spain. And we've been there
12 since.
13 And every generation has served, including myself
14 and the generation after me. I would like to make one
15 specific note, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, and ask
16 that the commission reconsider the Navy's recommendation to
17 realign T-44 training to NAS Pensacola. Quite simply, with
18 the new pilot training rate requirements, there is not
19 sufficient capacity at NAS Pensacola to train multi-engine
20 pilots.
21 In addition, what would seem to me to be a very
22 practical consideration is the fact that South Texas has

1 vast, unencumbered air space and good weather unmatched by
2 any area in this nation. The decisions that you will make in
3 the final weeks will, I know, be based on the information
4 presented here today. And I know that you will consider it
5 carefully and thoughtfully and with the seriousness that it
6 matters.
7 And I join all of my Texas colleagues in asking you
8 that your decisions be made on the facts presented here
9 today; and for that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. Before you
11 leave, I'd like you to introduce the young gentleman you have
12 with you. I notice he's been waiting just as patiently.
13 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Well, he's been asking
14 how many more to go. This is grandson, Phil Ferias, from
15 Austin, Texas, that's helping me out for this week.
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Welcome.
17 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Thank you, Mr.
18 Chairman.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: He must be your advisor,
20 right, sir? Before we move into Utah, I will relinquish the
21 chair. I'd like to thank the great and diverse state of
22 Texas for keeping us on time, and for the excellent

1 presentations they've given us. With that, I'd like to turn
2 it over to my distinguished colleague, Commissioner Wendi
3 Steele.
4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: [Presiding.] Good afternoon.
5 I'd like to recognize Senator Orrin Hatch, please.
6 SENATOR HATCH: Madame Chairman, and distinguished
7 BRAC commissioners, let me try to be brief. Hill Air Force
8 Base is simply the best of the best. And I'm not saying that
9 just to be saying it. It is the best operational base, and
10 it is the best depot. Two rating groups have come to this
11 conclusion. Their findings have been twice verified by Air
12 Force Under Secretary Rudy de Leon.
13 First, in evaluating the five air logistics centers
14 for both operational and depot excellence, the Air Force Base
15 Closure Executive Group found that only Hill was rated as
16 tier one in both the operations and depot categories. Hill
17 received 33 out of a maximum 39 points. Tinker Air Force
18 Base was second, with 29 points. Second, the joint cross
19 service group, in evaluating military value, gave Hill and
20 Warner Robins the highest rating.
21 Now, what makes Hill the best of the best? It is
22 the pervasive winner mentality of its workforce. Let me give

1 you just five examples, and I could give you many more.
2 First, Hill's two F-16 wings have won two of the last four
3 Gunsmoke competitions. Base wings are co-located on the Air
4 Force's best depot and on the Utah test and training range --
5 the best exercise facility in the world.
6 This combination has produced winners where it has
7 counted most of all, and that's in battle. Secondly, Hill is
8 the only maintenance site for the nation's ICBM fleet, with a
9 workforce cited by Vice President Al Gore as the heroes of
10 reinvention. And Hill is the single most important
11 inspection site of the START I treaty. Third, the commanders
12 of the units that fly into danger have cited Hill as the
13 leader in two level maintenance support.
14 Its successful programs for critical F-16 avionics
15 and radar equipment led to substantial savings for our Air
16 Force. And its avionics, such as the radar systems that
17 detect missiles targeted on our aircraft, of course, have
18 saved lives. Fourth, Hill won the cross service competition
19 to provide maintenance to the Navy's FA-18 tactical fighter.
20 The GAO recently confirmed that Hill's performance was
21 $11,000 per aircraft cheaper or less than the best competing
22 naval depot.

1 And fifth, in the past two years, Hill has won five
2 environmental awards, culminating with its win of the
3 Secretary of Defense's environmental quality award as the
4 "best" in the DOD. Hill spills over with excellence, and its
5 vast capacity offers savings and successes with each
6 potential expansion of its base mission. Let me give you
7 just four reasons why our future air power will depend on
8 Hill.
9 First, Hill is now the logistics manager and depot
10 for the world's largest aircraft fleet, the F-16, used by 21
11 nations which share our regional and global security
12 objectives. Secondly, the cross service competition has
13 proven that Hill Air Force Base, perhaps more than any other
14 DOD installation, will become the Defense Department's most
15 cost efficient tactical fighter depot. Third, it is already
16 the world's largest overhaul facility for landing gear,
17 struts, wheels and brakes, accommodating 70 percent of DOD's
18 work; and with the capacity to do it all and to do it very
19 well.
20 And fourth, Madame Chairman and members of the
21 commission, Hill is clearly the logical source to consolidate
22 tactical missile work. It already does 92 percent of the Air

1 Force mission, and 48 percent of DOD's, and can manage an
2 expanded mission with ease, efficiency, and economy. In
3 summary, Madame Chairman, Hill should be workloaded to its
4 fullest capacity.
5 We all know what the results are certain to be.
6 When everything is said and done, the one lingering
7 obligation that morally hangs over all of our heads is to
8 insist on a standard of excellence, even if that means the
9 loss of some of our installations. I thank the commission
10 for its consideration of my remarks, and for its visits to
11 Utah defense installations, including the defense depot
12 Ogden, which, in my opinion, is still the best in the DLA.
13 And I hope you'll consider that, as well. I
14 believe the commission will act in the best interest of our
15 national defense. I believe you're committed to do that, and
16 I urge you to do that. But we all need to remember this --
17 it is the young people in our military services, like my
18 brother who was killed in the Second World War, like CPT
19 Scott O'Grady, who risk their lives for our nation, and who
20 ought to expect the very best equipment and maintenance of
21 that equipment that our nation can provide.
22 And Hill Air Force Base is doing just exactly that.

1 Let me just say that I believe in you, and I believe you'll
2 do what is best for our country, and I urge you to do so, and
3 not let any politics enter into it at all. Do what's right.
4 And in the end, I think most people will accept that. Thanks
5 so much.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator Hatch.
7 And now, your colleague, Senator Bennett.
8 SENATOR BENNETT: Thank you very much, Madame
9 Chairman. I'm here as a senator, but I can't shake my past,
10 which is primarily in the business world. I have sympathy
11 for what you're doing, because I've had to do it myself --
12 downsize a corporation. It's always painful; it means people
13 get laid off; it means people get exciting plans postponed,
14 if not killed; and it's never fun.
15 However, there are some particular guiding
16 principles that apply, I think, in business or government.
17 And if I may be so presumptuous, I will try to suggest some
18 of them to you. One, of course, is that after you've visited
19 the facility and you've gotten the feel of things and you've
20 got a sense of smell about it, you go back and look at the
21 numbers. And if the numbers are properly compiled, they
22 don't lie to you, and they usually confirm the sense of smell

1 that you have.

2 The numbers on Hill, Senator Hatch has given you

3 some. I won't belabor them. It is rated number one in

4 military value, the top rated base. But look at the

5 financial numbers. The return on your investment if you

6 close Hill is 29 years. And anybody who's tried to make a

7 return on investment calculation knows that 29 years is long

8 enough that it's going to slip.

9 In other words, there is a very good possibility,

10 from the numbers that you're being given, that in fact,

11 you'll get no return, ever, on your investment on closing

12 Hill, if it's that far out in the future. Of the ALCs you're

13 looking at, the one time cost of closing Hill is the highest.

14 If you decide we have to close one ALC, the most expensive

15 one you can close is Hill, at $1.418 billion.

16 Those are what the numbers say. I could give you a

17 great deal more. You've heard it all; you've examined it

18 all. I highlight those, and assume that since I'm so

19 brilliant and have convinced you that Hill must stay open, I

20 want to take the advantage of asking you to give Hill more

21 work, rather than less. And in your procedures, it's good

22 business sense to consolidate tactical missile workload to

1 Hill.

2 Once again, let's look at the numbers. The depot
3 maintenance operation indicator report, the cost at Hill is
4 $69, compared to $101 at Letterkenny. Based on the cost
5 comparability handbooks the Army report, depot hourly rates
6 Hill at $49, compared to $65 at Letterkenny. There will be a
7 $15 million per year cost of savings if you bring that work
8 to Hill.

9 So convinced you in the first instance to keep
10 Hill, and now as a salesman still wearing my business suit,
11 tell you, send Hill more work. One other comment. Reference
12 has been made to DDOU. And several of you were at DDOU and
13 saw that. I understand, looking at the numbers, DDOU didn't
14 come out so well. So am I going to change my tune now and
15 say, no, don't look at the numbers this time; look at
16 something else?

17 No, I say look at the numbers because we understand
18 that the calculation made on the cost to close DDOU was made
19 on the assumption that DEPMEDS -- and those of you that were
20 there remember those as the medical things that go in boxes
21 and all the rest of this -- were included. In fact, through
22 some kind of error, DEPMEDS was left out of the statistical

1 analysis, which means that the numbers you have, without
2 keeping the DEPMEDS program going, are wrong.
3 And I ask you to go back to DLA and recalculate the
4 DDOU circumstance, saying, oops, we left DEPMEDS out of the
5 calculation before; we need to put it in. And having said
6 that, I think then I can go back to my original pitch and say
7 you can trust the numbers. So I conclude by giving you my
8 best wishes for the challenge that you have; my conviction
9 that you will do it right and intelligently; and my certainty
10 that if you do, Hill will stay open, Hill will receive more
11 work, and DDOU will get a second look. Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Senator, thank you for your
13 testimony, and for your kind note that you sent the other
14 day, as well. And now, Congressman Hansen, who so faithfully
15 traveled about the state with us, as we looked at your
16 installations.
17 REPRESENTATIVE HANSEN: Well, thank you. It's good
18 to see you again. I appreciate the work you folks do. I
19 can't think of a harder job than the one you folks have. And
20 thank you for all you've done, in coming to Utah as many
21 times as you do. Let me take a moment and address a few of
22 the specific issues facing us in Utah. First is the Army's

1 recommendation to significantly realign Dougway Proving
2 Grounds by closing the English Village housing area and
3 realigning over 250 vital support positions, including fire
4 fighters and medical personnel.
5 The current proposal also reallocates between six
6 and eight vital command and control positions. To this date,
7 I cannot find anyone -- except for General Shane of the BRAC
8 office -- that supports this recommendation. Even prior to
9 the release of the original BRAC list, the Pentagon chief
10 scientists, Mr. Philip Coyle and Mr. John Burke, called this
11 decision a major show-stopper, and actually recommended the
12 Department of Defense develop recommendations to relocate and
13 consolidate all chemi-bio testing and research activities to
14 Dougway.
15 Let me remind everybody what we're talking about.
16 Dougway Proving Ground is the size of Rhode Island. It is
17 the only place in the country where we can do the critical
18 chemical and biological test missions currently done at
19 Dougway. I do not have to tell you how important the work
20 is, protecting our military forces and civilian population in
21 an increasing dangerous world.
22 Commissioner Kling and Steele can tell you, have

1 both been there. Dougway is very isolated. If the dedicated
2 professionals at Dougway Proving Ground are to be doing this
3 important and dangerous work safely and with the decent
4 quality of life, they must live at Dougway. There is simply
5 no housing outside the gate. In fact, there is no housing
6 for over 60 miles, over a high mountain pass which is covered
7 with snow as late as last week.
8 I feel so strongly about this issue that I've told
9 the Army if they cannot see the tremendous military value of
10 keeping English Village open to provide the necessary support
11 for Dougway Proving Grounds, then I'll just as soon fight to
12 close the whole thing. I'll do like I did once before, and
13 put in a bill to close that base. I really can see no reason
14 to do it any other way.
15 You simply cannot have Dougway Proving Ground
16 without the support of English Village. I hope you will move
17 to resolve this issue with the Army at tomorrow's hearing.
18 On another subject, I must repeat my disappointment with the
19 decision not to add any Defense Logistic Agency distribution
20 depots for further analysis. Studying these facilities
21 arbitrarily left out the original DLA analysis is the only
22 way to guarantee a full and fair hearing based on real

1 numbers for the Defense Depot at Ogden, Utah.

2 The one thing the Peat Marwick study does tell us

3 is that DLA has no idea who is their most cost efficient and

4 productive depot. I would continue to argue that the depot

5 that continually returns money to the department, the one

6 that makes a profit is the most efficient, and ought to be

7 kept. I strongly believe that DLA is closing their best

8 depot and the best deal for the American taxpayer.

9 I ask you to reconsider the DLA recommendation to

10 close DDOU. I believe a re-look at this decision is

11 particularly imperative, as you consider closing even more

12 DLA warehouse facilities associated with the closure of any

13 more air logistics centers. I also want to point out that if

14 DDOU is recommended for closure, there are a number of

15 important and independent missions performed at the depot,

16 including the DEPMEDS, the computer design center and the

17 Defense Reutilization and Marketing, that would be

18 dramatically affected by relocation, with no military

19 economic benefit.

20 I would also note here that I find it interesting

21 that the cost to move the DEPMEDS mission was not included in

22 the DLA's COBRA analysis of the cost to close DDOU. And I

1 think that's an important point. They would have represented
2 one of the single largest costs. The fact is that all these
3 important missions should be left at Ogden. The Ogden
4 community is more than willing to come up with a creative
5 solution that meets everyone's needs.
6 I believe the lease back arrangement your staff has
7 been briefed on presents a win-win possibility. I hope you
8 have a chance to discuss these issues with DLA tomorrow in
9 their hearing. Lastly, I would be remiss not to repeat what
10 my other colleagues have already said, as has the senior
11 leadership of the Air Force, regarding Hill Air Force Base
12 and Ogden Air Logistics Center.
13 Hill is simply the best depot and the best
14 operational base from among the other depots. To my mind, it
15 makes both military and economic sense to fully workload your
16 best facility and reduce your excess capacity by closing one
17 or two depots. I believe, and I think the Air Force will
18 testify tomorrow, if questioned, that Hill Air Force Base is
19 the future for fighter aircraft maintenance and testing.
20 Hill's combination of maintenance facilities,
21 operational wings and the Utah Test and Training Range is
22 just simply unmatched. But you don't have to take my word

1 for it. I know you have all seen the letter from the
2 assistant secretary, Rudy de Leon, which placed Hill Air
3 Force Base in the top tier. Now let me tell you some things
4 you probably don't know.
5 This week I will be attending an Air Force ceremony
6 at the Pentagon, honoring Hill Air Force Base and the 388th
7 fighter wing for maintenance excellence. I've also just
8 received a draft report in which GAO confirms, which we have
9 always known, that the Ogden Air Logistics was a less
10 expensive option for the maintenance of the Navy's FA-18s.
11 At the risk of sounding like a broken record, Ogden is the
12 best, and should be fully workloaded to give the American
13 people and the American soldiers their best value.
14 I also believe that Hill should be the Air Force's
15 center of excellence for airborne tactical and missile
16 maintenance, and should also be considered for single site
17 consolidation, if the decision reached in BRAC 93 is to be
18 reversed. Again, I thank you for your hard work, and the
19 honest deliberations you've given us, and for coming out to
20 Utah. It's been great to be with you, and I thank you so
21 very much for what you're doing. I hope you take these
22 things into consideration.

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congressman, and
2 thank you for your testimony. Now, Congresswoman Enid
3 Waldholz.
4 REPRESENTATIVE WALDHOLZ: Thank you, Madame
5 Chairman, commissioners. I want to thank you for the
6 opportunity to speak on behalf of the people of Utah,
7 particularly the second district, which I represent, in
8 detailing for you just a few of the reasons why Hill Air
9 Force Base, together with the Ogden Air Logistics Center is
10 so vital not only to our state and its citizens, but to the
11 overall military capability of the United States.
12 Hill Air Force Base, together with the towns and
13 cities that surround it, make up a thriving American
14 community, anchored by the jobs of more than 21,000 men and
15 women who work round the clock to do their part to keep
16 America and its allies free. Utahans have long been
17 emotionally attached to Hill Air Force Base. They've shed
18 tears at the passing of its pilots and crews. They've shared
19 great pride at the news of successful missions of Hill's
20 fighter wings in conflicts around the world.
21 And they've shared the success of Utah's team when
22 Hill's active and reserve fighter wings have taken top prize

1 at the Air Force Gunsmoke competitions. And from a purely
2 economic point of view, Utahans, particularly those that live
3 along the Wasatch Front, have benefitted both directly and
4 indirectly from the powerful economic presence of Hill Air
5 Force Base.
6 If Hill were to close, the negative economic impact
7 would be nearly double that of any other state with an air
8 logistics center. Current Department of Defense
9 recommendations are going to reduce jobs in Utah by 20
10 percent, and that's in addition to the 53 percent overall
11 defense cuts Utah has already taken in the last seven years.
12 If Hill were to close, that figure will rise up to an
13 incredible 90 percent cut of defense spending in Utah in the
14 last nine years.
15 Utahans have always answered the call of their
16 country to aid in its defense, and they fully expect to
17 continue to do their part as the nation starts to tighten its
18 belt. But it's clear from these figures that Utah has
19 already taken more than its share of cuts. Whether you look
20 at the state by state figures or the overall national
21 figures, you can clearly see that Utah has been the recipient
22 of very severe cuts over the past several years.

1 Looking at the economics from a different angle, I
2 hope you'll consider that, as a percentage of personal
3 income, Utah is fourth in civilian defense salary, behind
4 only Washington, D.C.; Virginia; and Hawaii, with a total
5 annual impact in excess of $2 billion. With the military
6 history that's been fully representative of our nation's
7 fighting forces spanning many, many decades, and fully
8 utilizing Utah's unique landscape and geographical assets,
9 Utah has become economically dependent on the defense
10 establishment for the simple reason that the defense
11 establishment has been equally dependent on Utah.
12 While every state that comes before you can and
13 will talk about its economic ties to the military, not every
14 state has been subjected to fallout from nuclear tests or
15 stores volatile chemical weapons for the nation's arsenal.
16 But Hill Air Force Base doesn't just deserve to stay open for
17 the sake of the Utah economy or for other reasons of
18 fairness.
19 Let me remind you briefly what America is getting
20 for the dollars it is spending in Utah. Utah has long been
21 known in all business and manufacturing circles as having one
22 of the highest skilled, best trained, and most highly

1 motivated workforces in the nation. Hill Air Force Base is
2 home to more than 21,000 of these industrious, hardworking
3 and dedicated individuals. And our country's military is the
4 beneficiary.
5 Accordingly, it can't be said enough, Hill Air
6 Force Base is the highest rated ALC for military value in the
7 Air Force. There simply is no other way to state Hill's
8 importance to our country's military fighting forces. And
9 there is no other factor that should be more significant in
10 determining which ALCs should remain in service. Our
11 military is built on a bedrock of fairness, honor and
12 excellence. And simply put, on objective criteria, Hill is
13 the best.
14 For our nation's sake, it should remain open. In
15 closing, let me express my gratitude to the commissioners for
16 their careful and their dedicated consideration of Hill Air
17 Force Base. You've taken the time to visit Hill, to listen
18 to those of us who advocate its value to America as well as
19 to the people of Utah. Please support the continued
20 effectiveness and excellence of one of the brightest stars in
21 America's defense team, and vote to keep Hill Air Force Base
22 and the Ogden ALC open.

1 Thank you again for your time and consideration.

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congresswoman, and

3 you made it under your five minutes, so you get a bonus or

4 something here. In closing out the Utah delegation, we have

5 Representative Bill Orton.

6 REPRESENTATIVE ORTON: Thank you, commissioners.

7 And if we would get a bonus sufficient to keep the bases

8 open, I would yield back the balance of my time.

9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Actually, one of your

10 colleagues used extra time, so it's probably a wash, if you

11 must know.

12 REPRESENTATIVE ORTON: Okay. Well, it is a

13 pleasure for me to come and join with you to express my

14 support and views on the status of Hill Air Force Base, DDO

15 Utah, as well as Dougway Proving Ground. As the only

16 Democrat in the Utah delegation, I can tell you this is not a

17 partisan or a political issue. We are a united delegation

18 who have worked together tirelessly.

19 And I would like to commend the other members of

20 the delegation for their work and their testimony here today.

21 As a member of Congress and a member of the Budget Committee,

22 I come to you as one, who, from the very beginning of time,

1 when I was elected, have supported downsizing of military
2 bases; have supported consolidation; have supported the very
3 reductions which are what you're striving to accomplish.
4 I understand your difficult job, and support what
5 you're doing in it. Even though I do not represent the
6 district in which these bases are located, I grew up there.
7 I know the workforce. I know that, in fact, the people
8 employed at these bases are the best workforce anywhere in
9 the country. In fact, I began my career as a civilian
10 employee at Defense Depot Ogden.
11 My father retired after 30 years of service as a
12 civilian employee at the fire department at Hill Air Force
13 Base. My brother-in-law and uncle currently work there.
14 It's no accident that people are wanting to move to Utah and
15 Ogden in order to live and raise their family. We have a
16 tremendous work ethic in Utah. The quality of our workforce
17 is outstanding -- well-educated, loyal, and growing.
18 The availability there of a growing, or of a well-
19 educated workforce is a tremendous asset to the federal
20 government. Now, for the most part, you're not going to be
21 hearing any new information here. But let me just refer the
22 commission to a study which did occur recently, which you

1 have just received information on -- a COBRA study that has
2 been mentioned by a couple of other members of our
3 delegation.
4 The DLA, in analyzing the cost to close Defense
5 Depot Ogden did not include the cost of moving the DEPMEDS.
6 These DEPMEDS -- deployable medical centers -- the only place
7 in the country they are deployed from is Defense Depot Ogden.
8 The COBRA study will indicate to you that it will cost
9 upwards of $380 million to move that segment of what occurs
10 at DDO. So you thought it was $110 million, add $380
11 million, you're up almost to $500 million to close that
12 facility and move it. So it does deserve a second look.
13 I believe -- and in fact, what I want you to do is
14 what is best for the Defense Department. You're going to
15 hear from everybody here today, all the members, saying don't
16 close the base in my backyard. I'm asking the commission to
17 do the best thing for the Department of Defense, the best
18 thing for the people of this nation; and that is, look at the
19 facts, look at the resources, look at the cost efficiencies,
20 analyze the human resource asset, analyze the unique missions
21 and the irreplaceable missions, analyze the efficiency on
22 these bases.

1 I'm confident if you do that, you will reach the
2 same conclusion that I and the other members of our
3 delegation have reached. So in closing, I would ask you to
4 keep in mind the following points. Defense Depot Ogden, in
5 direct comparison with other depots, ranks at or near the top
6 in overall efficiency of operations. The '94 study done by
7 Peat Marwick found Defense Depot Ogden the most cost
8 efficient of the five depots studied.
9 Hill Air Force Base, in any comparison with other
10 bases or air logistic centers, emerges as a superb facility,
11 if not number one, with critical missions and significant
12 capacity for expansion. The support that this gives the Utah
13 Test and Training Range is a great variety of unique
14 capabilities which cannot be replaced. In order for the
15 Department of Defense to continue to operate in the most cost
16 effective manner, while maintaining operational capabilities
17 which include surge ability and adequate infrastructure to
18 meet worldwide commitments, it must retain its best
19 facilities.
20 Defense Depot Ogden, Hill Air Force Base, and
21 Dougway are top notch facilities which qualify among the very
22 best, and need to be retained. So in closing, I am mindful

1 of the very tough choices you're facing. I recognize
2 everyone coming here is going to be asking you not to close
3 their bases. And all I ask is that you consider the
4 facilities in Ogden from a fair and objective analysis.
5 I'm confident, in doing so, that you will come to
6 the same conclusion, that these bases cannot be spared. So
7 thank you very much for your consideration.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congressman, and
9 thank you for the testimony on behalf of your whole
10 delegation. We appreciate it. Now we're moving along to the
11 state of Virginia. And I notice, in spite of back to back
12 votes, Senator Robb has shown up. Would you like to lead
13 off?
14 SENATOR ROBB: Madame Chair, thank you, and I do
15 appreciate it. We do have two back to back votes on, and I'm
16 sneaking over between the votes, if I may. I thank you again
17 for the opportunity to present the legislative perspective on
18 this last round of base closings. Yours is certainly not an
19 easy task, and we appreciate the fair and open manner in
20 which the BRAC hearings have proceeded. And I would say
21 simply that our differences with the DOD recommendations are
22 few, but they are important.

1 Let me begin by joining Virginia's senior senator
2 who, if he has not already testified, will testify; and I
3 join in his testimony in strongly urging you to reverse the
4 DOD recommendation to withdraw support for Fort Pickett.
5 Clearly, the Army did not take into account the utilization
6 of this key facility by other services, or the impact on East
7 Coast armor training readiness if this facility is closed.
8 Transferring control of Fort Pickett to the
9 National Guard under a so-called enclave may decrease the
10 Army's budget very slightly, but the cost to the taxpayer
11 will remain unchanged. The need for this strategically
12 located training facility has not been challenged. We
13 believe the Army should share the cost of operating it with
14 the other services who are presently using those ranges.
15 Secondly, and critically important, Madame
16 Chairman, the Navy's planning process surrounding the
17 proposal to move SPAWAR to San Diego was seriously flawed,
18 and the decision ought to be reversed. In 1993, the BRAC
19 directed that SPAWAR relocate in government owned space
20 "within the national capital region."
21 Undersecretary Danzig reinforced this policy by
22 issuing a policy imperative in April 1994 that "The

1 Department of the Navy must co-locate the acquisition
2 workforce with the service acquisition executive, the
3 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RD&A, to ensure
4 efficiency, timeliness, and effectiveness of the acquisition
5 workforce."
6 As you know, Madame Chairman, the service
7 acquisition executive is located in the Pentagon, not in San
8 Diego. SPAWAR is the major acquisition command for hardware
9 and software for electronic systems in the world. In this
10 capacity, it works with commands and activities of the
11 national capital region and on the East Coast. Over the
12 years, they have been extraordinarily successful in carrying
13 out this role.
14 As the nation watched events unfold in Bosnia last
15 week, it struck me that the electronics aboard the ships
16 which guided the successful mission to rescue CPT O'Grady was
17 due, in large part, to SPAWAR's ability to work closely with
18 both the contractors and their ultimate fleet customers. It
19 makes no sense at all to move this critical command, with its
20 unique workforce, over 3,000 miles away from the assistant
21 secretary and their primary customers.
22 In doing the BRAC analysis for the move to San

1 Diego, the Navy conducted COBRA models for a move to Fort
2 Monmouth and Hanscom Air Force Base. But despite the obvious
3 practical reasons to stay within the NCR, inexplicably, the
4 Navy did not even conduct COBRA runs on alternatives within
5 the national capital region.
6 In addition, the Navy did not calculate, in its
7 analysis for the San Diego move, any construction costs
8 associated with the transcontinental move, despite the fact
9 that four years ago, it spent over $10 million to relocate
10 just two blocks to its present location. And independent
11 analysis, which did conduct COBRA runs for alternatives in
12 the NCR, shows savings values in the NCR to be three to four
13 times greater than the amount projected for savings from a
14 move to San Diego.
15 This data has been made available to the staff for
16 their review. It has also come to our attention recently,
17 Madame Chairman, that the Navy is now preparing plans to
18 consolidate the systems commands. The object is to merge
19 redundant staffs and restructure the planning, budgeting and
20 acquisition roles of the system commands. We applaud this
21 move, which has been recommended by cross service groups for
22 years; most recently by the White House Commission on Roles

1 and Missions in the Armed Forces.

2 But we would argue, Madame Chairman, that it simply
3 does not make sense to be scattering key elements of these
4 commands all across the country, even while we work to
5 rationally and efficiently consolidate our efforts. Finally,
6 Madame Chairman, nearly 40 percent of the personnel in SPAWAR
7 are in support or overhead positions, not in the line
8 positions, performing the critical functions of this command.

9 Elimination of this overhead, and combining
10 redundant functions with the other systems commands could
11 achieve the hoped for savings, without a major move, and
12 would enable this command to continue its service to its
13 primary customers, which are co-located with them in this
14 part of the country.

15 To quickly summarize my point, Madame Chairman, I
16 believe the DOD recommendation to move SPAWAR to San Diego
17 should be overturned for the following reasons. One, the
18 COBRA analysis and cost estimates were seriously flawed in
19 that they understate realistic construction costs and fail to
20 consider the more practical and efficient alternative sites
21 in NCR. Two, moving this command at this time complicates
22 efforts to consolidate the Navy systems commands.

1 The force structure of SPAWAR suggests that the
2 planned savings can be associated by staying in their present
3 location and reducing unnecessary and redundant functions.
4 And three, keeping SPAWAR in the NCR keeps them co-located
5 with their customers and with the ASN RD&A, as required by
6 Navy policy imperatives. Madame Chairman, the Navy's own
7 data calls specified that, and I quote, "if SPAWAR were
8 relocated outside the NCR, the mission would be performed
9 slower with greater technical risk and greater expense."
10 Decreasing the efficiency of our critical commands
11 and increasing their costs, Madame Chairman, was not the
12 intent of the BRAC process. Our mission is to increase our
13 efficiency and reduce our costs. For SPAWAR, this can only
14 be done by keeping it in the national capital region. With
15 that, Madame Chairman, I thank you. I went a couple seconds
16 over. I appreciate your allowing me to not only testify
17 quickly, but to leave very briefly, because another vote is
18 in progress.
19 And Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to see you as well
20 as other members of the commission, and I thank you.
21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator. I think
22 you win for the speaking speed award. And you may take off

1 for your vote. Thank you, sir. I believe Senator Warner is
2 voting, if I'm not mistaken, so the delegation has asked that
3 Congressman Pickett testify next.
4 REPRESENTATIVE PICKETT: Thank you, Madame Chairman
5 and members of the commission. I welcome this opportunity to
6 speak on behalf of the city of Virginia Beach and its sister
7 communities in greater Hampton Roads. We speak as one, in
8 support of the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to
9 realign all Navy F-14 squadrons and to redirect the bulk of
10 the Atlantic fleet FA-18 Hornet assets to Naval Station
11 Oceana.
12 As you're well aware, BRAC 93 recommended Cherry
13 Point as a primary receiving site for Cecil Field F-18s. My
14 distinguished colleagues in North Carolina questioned the 95
15 directive, and asked, what has changed to justify this
16 modification? The obvious answer is force structure. BRAC
17 93 did not anticipate the immediate retirement of the entire
18 A-6 community, nor did it take into account the 50 percent
19 reduction in the number of F-14 squadrons that has occurred.
20 This leaves ample capacity at Oceana to accommodate
21 both the single-siting of all F-14s and the Cecil Field FA-18
22 squadrons. The Navy and DOD wisely chose to capitalize on

1 Oceana's available capacity, and avoid the high cost of
2 constructing entirely new facilities at Cherry Point. The
3 military construction money saved by this decision is equal
4 to the cost of constructing an entirely new air station.
5 While there may not be agreement on exact dollar
6 values, it should be obvious to anyone that it is cheaper to
7 bear down these squadrons that are half-empty master jet
8 base, than at an air station already loaded and operating at
9 or near its maximum capacity. The cost issue and other
10 matters raised by North Carolina at the Baltimore public
11 hearing are dealt with more fully in this written rebuttal,
12 prepared by our Oceana community support group.
13 With your kind permission, I submit this document
14 for the record, and will restrict my remaining comments to a
15 few key points.
16 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We'd be delighted to insert
17 that in the record.
18 REPRESENTATIVE PICKETT: Thank you. The 1995
19 recommendations clearly provide the most cost effective
20 basing plan for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. But they
21 also provide significant operational advantages. Tomcat and
22 Hornet squadrons fly into combat together from Navy carrier

1 decks. Now they will train together from a common base
2 located only a few miles from their aircraft carrier home
3 port, within a major concentration of Navy schools and
4 training facilities, and the primary Navy and joint
5 headquarters for the Atlantic theater.
6 It is little wonder Oceana ranks first in military
7 value among the 20 Navy and Marine Corps operational air
8 stations. Oceana has a long and proud history as a master
9 jet base for carrier-based fighter and attack aircraft. This
10 excellent base offers a well-deigned airfield, capable of
11 high intensity operations; direct Navy controlled access to
12 extensive off shore training areas; comprehensive support
13 facilities; a modern infrastructure; and all necessary
14 amenities to enhance the quality of life of our military
15 personnel and their families.
16 Land encroachment at Oceana imposes no significant
17 operational limitations on aircraft landing, approaches, or
18 departures. Unlike Cherry Point, the standard left-hand
19 pattern, required by carrier pilots, is available on all
20 runways. To protect Oceana's future, the city of Virginia
21 Beach has enacted a new comprehensive airport zoning
22 ordinance, and recently required the land and budgeted $25

1 million to relocate two 40-year-old elementary schools that
2 now marginally infringe a runway approach.
3 Oceana's unencroached outlying field at Fentriss
4 provides intensive day and night carrier landing practice on
5 a full length 8,000-foot runway, fully equipped to handle
6 emergency landings. Water supply and water quality at Oceana
7 is an absolute non-issue. Along with all other Navy bases in
8 South Hampton Roads, NAS Oceana gets its water supply
9 directly from the city of Norfolk, under a blanket contract,
10 dating back to 1947.
11 Norfolk and the Navy enjoy a longstanding
12 partnership and responsible water supply management,
13 including a 1981 joint venture for deep wells at Driver,
14 Virginia, to guarantee the Navy's water supply in an
15 emergency. In response to the air quality conformity
16 statement requirement noted in DOD's recommendation for
17 Oceana, the appropriate Virginia authorities have already
18 completed their analysis of the proposed base loading, and
19 issued documentation attesting to no impact on conformity
20 determinations for the Hampton Roads area.
21 Let me clearly and forcefully stress the fact that
22 after implementation of the 95 recommendations, Oceana will

1 still have fewer aircraft and fewer military personnel than
2 its successfully hosted and supported during the late 1980s.
3 As mayor Obendorf of Virginia Beach told you in Baltimore,
4 the citizens of Virginia Beach are ready to roll out the red
5 carpet and welcome the Navy's best and brightest to NAS
6 Oceana, the Navy's Fightertown East.
7 Thank you very much.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much. And I
9 notice Senator Warner has arrived, and we'd be delighted to
10 hear your testimony at this time.
11 SENATOR WARNER: Thank you, Madame Chairman, and I
12 shall not take all my time. As the commission knows, we're
13 engaged in votes at this present time. Seeing my former
14 colleague and good friend, the senator from Illinois, Mr.
15 Dixon, I have to share with you an experience several of us
16 had not more than an hour ago at a beautiful service, a
17 memorium for Congressman Les Aspin.
18 And during the course of remarks from several
19 persons, including Congressman Spratt, Spratt noted the
20 following about the history of the BRAC process, and at one
21 time, Secretary Cheney took it upon himself -- and you
22 remember that, Senator, because you and I were tasked, in the

1 Armed Services Committee, to draw up the legislation.
2 Secretary Cheney decided it wasn't needed, a BRAC commission.
3 And this is what Spratt recounted in a hearing
4 public for the Armed Services Committee, whereupon Chairman
5 Aspin leaned down and said to Secretary Cheney, you remind me
6 of Claude Raines' immortal line in Casablanca, when he said,
7 I am shocked that politics would ever enter this issue; i.e.,
8 base closing. That's a direct quote.
9 Madame Chairman, and other members of the
10 commission, forgive me, I thought maybe a little moment of
11 levity --
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: It was greatly appreciated,
13 actually.
14 SENATOR WARNER: Particularly as it related to one
15 who was so knowledgeable and so influential, and provided
16 such warm friendship to those of us who are now before you
17 today. We miss him very much, and we did work with him on
18 this process. My colleagues have covered a number of items
19 here, and of course we are very appreciative of the various
20 decisions relating to Oceana, the Washington Navy Yard.
21 And on that, I would have to say that we fought the
22 battle to retain it in Virginia. I still think that's the

1 best option. But if it's to go to the Navy Yard, that will
2 enable much of the industrial base and, indeed, many of the
3 employees to retain their offices in their homes, minimizing
4 a lot of serious dislocation; and preserving, in Crystal
5 City, a part of the economic base associated with the
6 facilities that are to be moved to the Yard.
7 It's a sound decision in terms of efficiency, and
8 therefore, we support that. I'm going to ask that my
9 statement be included, because we have another vote here
10 momentarily.
11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We will include it in its
12 entirety.
13 SENATOR WARNER: Thank you. While I agree with the
14 Navy regarding Naval Air Station Oceana and the NAVSEA, I
15 cannot see how their recommendation to move the Space and
16 Naval Warfare Systems Command from Arlington to San Diego,
17 California, would enhance readiness in any way. In fact, the
18 move to San Diego would adversely affect how that entity
19 accomplishes its mission.
20 Most of the business is conducted with other
21 government and civilian agencies in and around Washington,
22 putting the efficient accomplishment of this entity in

1 considerable doubt. Now I turn to the Army installations.
2 The Army's recommendations to realign Fort Lee's Kenner Army
3 Community Hospital to a clinic would indeed degrade readiness
4 at a key power projection and personnel training site.
5 And I'm sure my colleagues are going to very
6 carefully cover that, because they have been far more
7 intimately connected with that decision than others. Among
8 other things Fort Lee is an important training installation
9 that supports, on the average, nearly 4,000 military students
10 each day. For purposes of efficiency and morale, sick and
11 injured trainees who require in-patient care should be
12 hospitalized in a facility which is as close as possible to
13 their unit.
14 Perhaps the Army's medical infrastructure needs to
15 be reduced, but those reductions should not be made at
16 facilities with a high density of military students who often
17 engage in the risky training. If you could underline the
18 risky training, I think that's the key part of that decision.
19 And therefore, I join with my colleagues in urging you to
20 maintain the Army community hospital there as a full-service
21 facility.
22 Finally, I want to address the Army's proposed

1 closure at Fort Pickett, one of the most cost effective bases
2 in America. And I had the opportunity, once again in the
3 past few days, to, on a one on one basis, discuss that issue
4 with the Army chief of staff, General Sullivan, who will soon
5 be concluding his most distinguished career. And I judged
6 from our exchange that he agrees with me on that. On May
7 4th, this commission heard me express my strong belief that
8 the true facts about Fort Pickett seriously deviate from what
9 the Army has reported to you.
10 You also heard former commandant of the Marine
11 Corps, General Al Gray testify to the significant military
12 value of Fort Pickett. Additionally, this Friday,
13 Commissioner Cornella will have the opportunity to view
14 firsthand Fort Pickett's many attributes, and receive a
15 briefing on and among other things, the importance of the
16 Fort to the Army and Marine Corps tank gunnery on the East
17 Coast.
18 Therefore, I want to emphasize to you again today
19 that the Army's plan is not to close Fort Pickett, but rather
20 to keep its ranges and maneuver areas open, while drastically
21 cutting jobs through the use of an enclave concept. In
22 addition to being a detriment to readiness, which I will

1 explain momentarily, this enclave concept would negate
2 community reuse of Fort Pickett, and make it nearly
3 impossible to create jobs to offset those eliminated by the
4 closure.
5 That fact alone makes it an unfair, and I underline
6 unfair, recommendation. In other words, everybody loses;
7 everybody loses with this type of decision. And therefore,
8 we encourage you to consider leaving the fort as it is, and
9 continuing to serve both the Army and the Marine Corps and,
10 indeed, other services. The Army says the enclave will save
11 the government the money. But careful analysis shows that
12 the savings they have announced are greatly exaggerated.
13 By all indication, the Army's plan to keep Fort
14 Pickett running by licensing necessary ranges and maneuver
15 areas to the National Guard. It's interesting, in another
16 hearing before the Armed Services Committee this morning, we
17 had the nominee, Mr. White, up, who was to be the number two
18 man in the Department of Defense. And the Base Closure
19 Commission addressed perhaps the changing of a lot of the
20 National Guard units.
21 And therefore, that seems to me to be in conflict
22 with any decision on this area. In their COBRA runs,

1 however, the Army has not factored in the resulting cost to
2 the federal government caused by the licensing. According to
3 National Guard bureau estimates, these costs would be over
4 $7.5 million a year -- an amount that is nearly half of the
5 present annual operating budget of Fort Pickett.
6 Therefore, the Army's actual study states savings
7 from closing Fort Pickett would be significantly less than
8 what they have projected. Most significantly, in addition to
9 being unfair and uneconomical, the enclave concept represents
10 a half-hearted and potentially dangerous approach to
11 readiness. The enclave and licensing action combined would
12 still leave Fort Pickett seriously undermanned.
13 As a result, there would be poorly planned, poorly
14 supported and unsafe training. Readiness would ultimately
15 suffer. Fort Pickett is crucial to the continued readiness
16 of our armed forces. The Army agrees that it should remain
17 open, and that's essentially what General Sullivan told me.
18 But their proposed means to do so -- the enclave -- is flawed
19 from both the readiness and fiscal standpoints.
20 I strongly urge the commission to overturn the
21 recommendation to close Fort Pickett. In closing, I thank
22 all of you for your attention this afternoon, and for your

1 service to the nation in this critical work that you're
2 doing. And I thank you for your patience while I was able to
3 deliver this statement.
4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator, very
5 much, for your testimony. And now, Congressman Sisisky,
6 who's been waiting very patiently in the wings.
7 REPRESENTATIVE SISISKY: Thank you very much,
8 members of the commission; and I thank you, Madame Chairman,
9 for not using that gavel on my very senior senator.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I took the time off yours.
11 REPRESENTATIVE SISISKY: -- who happens to be three
12 months older than I am, so I can call him my senior senator.
13 My colleagues here will go into depth on Fort Pickett and
14 Kenner Army Hospital -- both of them are in my district. And
15 although the staff will probably tell you the Kenner decision
16 does not involve substantial deviation from the criteria,
17 that doesn't mean that it's very smart.
18 Fort Lee needs the ability to provide in-patient
19 services and isolate soldiers from the barracks. Of course,
20 there's sufficient private capacity to do that; but at what
21 cost? Past BRAC decisions increased Fort Lee's training
22 load, and Kenner serves 30,000 beneficiaries that are not

1 reflected in the data because they're outside any catchment
2 areas.
3 Since these people weren't counted, the cost of the
4 decisions are likely to escalate beyond anyone's rejections.
5 That's why Tri-Care has questions about whether it was the
6 right decision. Yet the Army and joint group never consulted
7 Tri-Care. And as of last week, neither had your staff. The
8 easy way, obviously, out is to simply wash your hands of the
9 whole thing, and accept the recommendation. But I ask you
10 sincerely to apply your good sense.
11 Please do not do anything to degrade the quality of
12 life for our young warriors -- men and women who train at
13 this post. Now, the recommendation to close Fort Pickett
14 involves substantial deviation from all four military value
15 criteria. Criteria one evaluates current and future mission
16 requirements, and the impact on DOD's total force. Army
17 reserve data calls contain major areas -- not just little
18 areas, but major areas -- that they confess to, such as rail
19 that they said was not available, and C-141 capable airport.
20 And the Army issued no data calls to anyone,
21 anyone, regarding other uses of Fort Pickett. Air Force,
22 Navy, Marine and Special Ops use of Fort Pickett were

1 completely ignored. Criteria two is the availability of land
2 facilities and air space at both existing and receiving
3 locations. The Army said annual training conducted at
4 Pickett could easily be conducted at Fort Bragg, AP Hill, and
5 Camp Dawson.
6 Yet on March 17th, the Army testified that Fort
7 Bragg needs $15 million to buy 15,000 acres to make up a
8 100,000 acre shortfall in training land. What's laughable is
9 that they want to buy outpost woodpecker habitat to credit
10 against the onpost woodpecker habitat that led to current
11 training restrictions. They spend $1 million a year to
12 protect woodpeckers, and now they want to go out and buy
13 more.
14 But let me tell you a little secret. We already
15 own 47,000 acres -- woodpecker-free acres at Fort Pickett.
16 With the exception of the national combat training centers at
17 Fort Irwin and Polk, Pickett's air space exceeds that
18 available anywhere else in the United States. And how can
19 Camp Dawson, which is in West Virginia, absorb some of the
20 training load? Camp Dawson is smaller than Rock Creek Park,
21 believe it or not. We've measured the acreage there.
22 Criteria three is the ability to accommodate total

1 force requirements at existing and receiving locations. This
2 criteria was also ignored by the Army. For example, they
3 recommended moving Pickett's petroleum training facility to
4 Fort Dix. Yet on April 21st, representatives of Fort Dix
5 told your staff that the Army plan did not assign sufficient
6 personnel to Fort Dix to support these requirements.
7 This is the problem discussed in the memo, where
8 the new Army chief of staff asks, "think we need to rework
9 the figures." Now, criteria four involves cost and manpower
10 implications. If the Army had really wanted to save money at
11 Pickett, they should have done a manpower survey and
12 developed a more efficient staffing pattern. Instead, they
13 propose to enclave 93 percent of the post and transfer it to
14 the Guard.
15 But an enclave can't be operated by 16 people
16 identified by the COBRA model. DOD's recommendation, I
17 think, is a shell game designed to let the Army have their
18 cake and eat it, too. They get to keep using Fort Pickett
19 while someone else pays the bill. If I could leave you with
20 one thought now, and I know my time is fleeting, it is to
21 remember what General Al Gray said up in Baltimore.
22 The former commandant of the Marine Corps, General

1 Gray came to you on his own time, on his own time, because he
2 loves his country. He believes that the decision to close
3 Fort Pickett is a terrible, horrible mistake. After he
4 finished his presentation, and I think you were there, people
5 said it was almost like having a religious experience.
6 General Gray said that after the 2nd Marines smashed into
7 Kuwait City, they said it was easy; it was just like at Fort
8 Pickett.
9 Fort Pickett is too valuable a resource, and I beg
10 you not to give it up. Let me, at this time, thank you very
11 much, and I sincerely mean it, for your service. I know how
12 difficult it can be. I've already talked to Chairman Dixon
13 on that. And I think the whole country appreciates whatever
14 you do. Thank you so much.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Well, thank you, sir, very
16 much, for your testimony. And now, Congressman Payne.
17 REPRESENTATIVE PAYNE: Madame Commissioner and
18 members of the commission, thank you for giving me this
19 opportunity to testify. I want to follow up on some of the
20 comments that have just been made about Fort Pickett.
21 Congressman Sisisky has outlined how the recommendation
22 involves substantial deviation from the military value

1 criteria.

2 And I want to first call your attention to criteria
3 six, which is the economic impact on communities. I believe
4 the Army understated the adverse impact, by using Dinwiddie
5 County as a basis for their calculations, although much of
6 the post lies in Dinwiddie County, very few Fort Pickett
7 employees actually reside there. Most come from Nottoway
8 County and Lunenberry County, which is in my district, which
9 have unemployment rates of 6.3 percent and 10.4 percent,
10 respectively.

11 The total impact of this recommendation would
12 amount to nearly 7.5 percent of the current workforce in
13 those counties. This would be one of the most serious
14 impacts on a locality anywhere in the nation. Having served
15 in the Army both on active duty and in the Reserves, I also
16 want to comment on two of the military issues. Out of
17 loyalty to my service, I must confess that I wish the Army
18 had done a better job on this one.

19 The colonel who directs the Army basing study has
20 written, and I quote, "We believe the Marine Corps schedules
21 training at Fort Pickett as an alternative training area for
22 Camp LeJeune, on occasions where ranges and training areas

1 are not available on Camp LeJeune." As most of you are
2 aware, nothing could be farther from the truth.
3 The Marines do not train at Fort Pickett simply
4 because of scheduling problems at Camp LeJeune. They train
5 at Fort Pickett because it offers a unique training
6 environment that is not duplicated at LeJeune or anywhere
7 else. They can put young Marines in an unfamiliar
8 environment, and teach them how to work together. The best
9 description of this is in a letter the commission has already
10 received from General O.K. Steele, former commander of the
11 2nd Marine Division.
12 I'm told he'll be in the commission offices on this
13 coming Thursday, and would be most happy to visit with any of
14 you who want to take advantage of this opportunity to speak
15 with him about Fort Pickett. General Steele said, and I
16 quote, "The training value and improvements in operational
17 readiness a unit commander can accrue at Fort Pickett, and
18 have always exceeded the relative low cost of the
19 investment."
20 One of the specific issues that the use of tank
21 ranges at Camp LeJeune is restricted only to stationary
22 firing. And even that can only happen during the suspension

1 of boat traffic on the Intercoastal Waterway. Pickett, on
2 the other hand, offers tank training for both the Army and
3 Marines. In the Eastern United States, only Fort Knox,
4 Benning, Drum, and Camp LeJeune, with its restrictions, have
5 more ranges than Fort Pickett, capable of firing tank tables
6 I-VIII.
7 During the winter at Fort Drum, you learn more
8 about how to operate your tank heaters than you do about how
9 to fire tank tables. And that's why the 10th Mountain
10 Division, headquartered in Fort Drum, trains at Fort Pickett
11 during the winter. Those of you who attended the Baltimore
12 hearing remember that former Marine commandant Al Gray had a
13 number of things to say about Fort Pickett.
14 General Gray said Fort Pickett is the only place
15 east of the Mississippi where you can conduct the kind of
16 combined arms warfare that teaches the thought process that
17 goes beyond the art of war. He said, "If you didn't have a
18 Fort Pickett, you'd have to invent one." General Gray also
19 explained why Pickett's training figures over the last two
20 years do not accurately reflect their mission.
21 It's because people who normally train there were
22 around the world in places like Somalia, Haiti, and off the

1 coast of Bosnia. Just last week, they were in position to
2 rescue Air Force pilot Scott O'Grady. General Gray
3 concluded, and again I quote, "In my military judgment, based
4 on 41 years of being a Marine and four years as a joint
5 chief, closing Pickett is ludicrous; it's absolutely
6 ridiculous."
7 And I hope that the commission will come to the
8 same conclusion, and turn this decision around. Thank you
9 very much, and thank you for the good service that you are
10 providing this nation.
11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much,
12 Congressman. Representative Scott will be next.
13 REPRESENTATIVE SCOTT: Thank you, Madame Chairman,
14 Mr. Chairman, and other commissioners. Thank you for the
15 opportunity to be with you today. I'm here to oppose the
16 recommendation to realign Kenner Memorial Hospital at Fort
17 Lee in Virginia. Currently, Kenner provides a full range of
18 in-patient and out-patient services to beneficiaries in its
19 catchment area.
20 Its catchment area is large because the nearest
21 military facility is over an hour and 20 minutes away. We
22 must remember that in any case, whatever we do in this

1 recommendation, the same number of people will be sick or
2 injured and need the same medical service. So the question
3 is how we can best provide those services. The options
4 before you are to reject the recommendation and maintain
5 Kenner as it is now; or realign Kenner and depend on the
6 private in-patient and out-patient services totally; or
7 establish medical services on base, ranging from simple out-
8 patient services or an infirmary or a super clinic, providing
9 99 percent of the services now provided at Kenner.
10 The proposed recommendation before you is just to
11 realign Kenner. But that's as specific as the proposal gets.
12 How to provide for the services that will be needed and the
13 cost and the convenience of those services is still under
14 review by the joint medical working group. There are several
15 critical problems with the proposal to realign Kenner.
16 First, it's not clear that there is sufficient medical
17 services on a private basis to meet the needs of Kenner
18 beneficiaries.
19 And in any case, those who use those services will
20 have significant travel requirements, which means that the
21 active duty personnel will have to spend more time getting
22 there. And others will have the inconvenience and additional

1 expense of co-pays, deductibles, and exclusions associated
2 with Champus and Medicare. Second, there will not be an
3 emergency room on the base, because if you don't have an in-
4 patient facility, you can't have an emergency room.
5 Third, according to evidence I've seen, an
6 uncontradicted analysis, that there will be an increase -- as
7 much as $20 million -- to provide the same services that
8 people will need and are getting at Kenner, as they get now.
9 And the point of BRAC is to reduce expenses for the federal
10 government. I would hope we would not shift $20 million to
11 another budget, just to save the Defense Department a little
12 money.
13 Because we cannot make an intelligent decision
14 without the necessary information, I'm asking the commission
15 not to make a decision about Kenner Army Hospital until the
16 joint medical working group has finished its work and fully
17 understands the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense.
18 Time is not important at this point. When the joint medical
19 working group completes its work, the Secretary of Defense
20 and, by extension, the government will still have an
21 opportunity to make informed decisions and right-size the
22 defense medical establishment.

1 It is not necessary to make a decision about Kenner
2 during the BRAC process because the size of the number of
3 employees involved is under the BRAC threshold of 200. Let
4 me conclude by reiterating what's at issue and what's at
5 stake with the options before you. First of all, the same
6 number of people will be sick or injured and need the same
7 level of services. And the issue is how we can best provide
8 those needs.
9 Further, there will be additional expense and
10 inconvenience to the beneficiaries, if they have to go
11 elsewhere. There are problems of what to do about
12 emergencies, infectious diseases such as chicken pox, because
13 they cannot be admitted an in-patient in private hospitals.
14 They have to be put somewhere. And furthermore, by
15 realigning Kenner, there's a potential $20 million additional
16 expense to the federal government.
17 Until these matters are fully evaluated, we cannot
18 make an intelligent decision. There's no necessity to make
19 the decision now. And for those reasons, I urge you to
20 reject the recommendation to realign Kenner at this time, to
21 allow us to make an informed decision based on the
22 appropriate information. Otherwise, we run the risk of

1 putting form before substance and ending up with greater
2 costs and inconvenience to all concerned.
3 Madame Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be
4 with you and Mr. Chairman and other members of the
5 commissions. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much for your
7 testimony, Congressman. Representative Jim Moran.
8 REPRESENTATIVE MORAN: Good afternoon, Mrs. Steele
9 and Chairman Dixon, Mr. Clinger.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome.
11 REPRESENTATIVE MORAN: I'm going to talk to you
12 about SPAWARS. It's a technical command; it's what they call
13 a C4I command, primarily intelligence gathering. It's
14 currently located in Crystal City. There's four reasons why
15 we don't think that it should be moved. The first is stated
16 by the Navy in the BRAC data call 31. They say if SPAWARS
17 were relocated outside the Washington area, their mission
18 would be performed slower, with greater technical risk and
19 greater expense, due to a different, less experienced work
20 force.
21 That's the best argument -- the one that the Navy
22 used in the data call -- for not moving SPAWARS. The second

1 is that SPAWARS provides a great deal of support for our
2 international allies. There's a current memorandum of
3 understanding that we have to comply with that requires
4 coordination and development of all the C4I projects, to take
5 place within the Washington metropolitan area.
6 SPAWARS works with our allies that need the ready
7 and secure access to their embassies in order to facilitate
8 information exchanges. And as I say, the C4I
9 interoperability -- you move them to the West Coast, and they
10 clearly couldn't perform that function, which is necessitated
11 by the current memorandum of understanding. The third point
12 is the contractors that work primarily with SPAWARS.
13 They also work with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, the Defense
14 Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, OPA, the
15 National Science Foundation. They work for virtually all of
16 these various naval systems commands. There's about 4,000
17 experts that SPAWARS needs. They're going to find it very
18 difficult to move out to San Diego. It will break up that
19 network of expertise, and as a result, SPAWARS needs will not
20 be as well met.
21 The last reason is that the personnel savings were
22 overstated and the construction costs were understated. The

1 personnel savings, we feel, could well be achieved simply by
2 consolidation. Some of the management reforms that have been
3 discussed for a long time -- you could consolidate the common
4 support functions across the technical commands. There's
5 been several suggestions for consolidating some of the
6 commands themselves. That's up to the Navy.
7 But the reality is that the personnel savings that
8 are supposed to be achieved by moving SPAWARS could even more
9 readily achieved by leaving it where it is. Because where it
10 is gives you the opportunity to consolidate functions,
11 particularly the overhead support functions that they share
12 with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and all of the other commands. They're
13 all co-located here.
14 That makes a lot of sense. It gives us an
15 opportunity to achieve personnel savings, many of which have
16 been recommended for a long time. You move it out to San
17 Diego, and you're going to have to create new overhead costs,
18 and those additional people are going to cost more money than
19 if you were to share many of the functions. Construction
20 costs -- they are not addressed in this recommendation. It's
21 hard to assume that if you move 11,060 personnel and all the
22 associated equipment, that it's not going to require a build-

1 out of the work spaces, the installation of computer
2 equipment.
3 You're going to have to pay for improvements to the
4 secure compartmented information facility, SCIF is the
5 acronym. Three years ago, SPAWARS moved just a short
6 distance within Crystal City; and it cost $10 million to
7 build a new SCIF, the secure compartmented information
8 facility. They had to install a new local area network and
9 construct a new communications lab. Well, you're going to
10 have to at least do that if you move out to San Diego.
11 And construction costs were not figured into this
12 analysis. So we urge the commission to reconsider the
13 SPAWARS move; to look at the loss of the corporate memory
14 that you have and the contractors that serve all the
15 commands; to weigh the impact that this is going to have on
16 current memoranda of understanding that we have to comply
17 with, and we couldn't if we moved to San Diego; and to review
18 the unstated personnel and construction costs that are not
19 included in this cost analysis.
20 We think those are compelling arguments for leaving
21 SPAWARS where it is. And finally, let me just say, I heard
22 something that is hard to believe, but that is that NAVSEA

1 could still move to White Oak, which I would hope would not
2 be considered, for all the reasons that were given to the
3 previous base closure commission. It was not intended for an
4 office building.
5 It doesn't have the capacity for office building,
6 unless you're willing to spend more than it would cost to
7 build a new office building. They can't even accommodate the
8 commercial offices that would be needed for the contractors.
9 And they don't have the public transportation which is
10 required in the national capital region.
11 They would be in violation of the agreements that
12 the federal government has made with national capital
13 planning commission; that you have every facility beyond a
14 public transit have public transit access, which White Oak
15 doesn't.
16 So with that, I'm sure my time is expired. I
17 appreciate your indulgence, by not gavelling me to order.
18 And thanks for all the work you're putting into this. Thank
19 you.
20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much,
21 Congressman, for your testimony. And lastly, but not least,
22 from the Virginia delegation, is Congressman Tom Davis.

1 REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
2 commissioners. The Army has proposed moving the Information
3 Systems Software Development Center, ISSC, from leased space
4 in Fairfax County to government space at Fort Meade,
5 Maryland. Now, this move from leased space to government
6 owned space may look good, and it could save the government
7 money, but none of the 400 military and civilian personnel
8 would be laid off, and the move is from Virginia to just
9 across town in Maryland.
10 But I think it's a bad decision for the Army and
11 the government, and I want to urge yo to have the Army
12 reconsider this move, and let me tell you why. The Army ISSC
13 has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. A couple of
14 years ago, when the Army looked to move the facility from
15 outdated facilities in Fairfax, Virginia, the Army asked the
16 GSA to find space for ISSC in Northern Virginia. They even
17 specified the boundaries.
18 The Army sought a location close to Fort Belvoir
19 and the Pentagon customers, and close to where most of its
20 employees had settled during the past 20 years. This was the
21 Crown Ridge building located at the junction of I-66 and
22 Route 50. GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease

1 with Crown Ridge Associates for six years, at a cost of $3
2 million a year. That lease started a little over a year ago,
3 and it runs through May 28, 2000; and that's important.
4 Also, a total of $7.2 million was spent by Crown
5 Ridge, GSA, and the Army, to upgrade the buildings to meet
6 the unique requirements of the Army ISSC. The agreement with
7 GSA allows the Army to move out of the current space without
8 penalty, if appropriate notice is given. But the GSA is
9 still stuck with the lease until May 28, 2000. Now, after
10 spending all this money, the Army is proposing moving the
11 ISSC to Fort Meade, Maryland.
12 The Army claims that it will save $8 million over
13 20 years. Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer,
14 GSA is still obligated for the six-year term of the lease.
15 If the Army moves out, GSA is stuck with an empty building.
16 This will not be easy space to fill, considering it was built
17 to suit ISSC and is not in reasonable proximity to mass
18 transit.
19 To quote GSA, regarding the Army's plan to move out
20 of this building, "The building was leased specifically for
21 the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs.
22 Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the

1 location, and the building might be difficult to market."
2 Now, the office vacancy rate out in this area is about 12
3 percent today, and I think they will have a hard time
4 marketing it or subletting the facility, given the
5 particularities of particularly building needs used today.
6 In addition, the Army is going to have to convert
7 or build facilities at Fort Meade. The COBRA model figures
8 used by the Army indicate that it will have to spend roughly
9 $5 million to renovate space at Fort Meade and move ISSC. So
10 at a minimum, the government spends $11 million in renovation
11 and moving costs, and ISSC has to go through two moves in
12 three years. But the government will also be stuck with the
13 $3 million per year lease for a building which may sit empty
14 for three years -- another $9 million.
15 This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process
16 to work. The objective is to reduce costs for the
17 government, not just the military services. All this move
18 would accomplish is a cost shift from the Army to GSA -- a
19 tactic Congress has discouraged BRAC from endorsing. But
20 more importantly, while this is listed as an in-area move,
21 one only has to look at Washington rush hour commute from
22 Western Fairfax to Fort Meade, Maryland, to know that it will

1 require people to move or spend hours commuting.

2 ISSC civilian personnel, roughly two-thirds of the

3 command's personnel, have built their lives in Fairfax County

4 over the past 20 years. With the signing of a new six-year

5 lease last year, personnel felt comfortable making plans to

6 stay in this area. Now the command will be moved again, and

7 literally to the other side of the Washington metropolitan

8 area.

9 Those working at ISSC are software experts with

10 very specialized and valuable skills. Certainly some will

11 move to Maryland and some will take the long commute from

12 Northern Virginia. But it's also likely that a significant

13 number will choose to find other jobs. The Army will lose

14 talented people, and there will be a real operational impact

15 on ISSC.

16 I think that if you look at the big picture, this

17 decision has never made sense for the government. It may

18 save the Army some money, if you don't count the disruption

19 and operations caused by another move and the potential loss

20 of skilled people. But ultimately, however, this move will

21 cost the government millions in moving and renovation costs,

22 and leave the GSA with a $3 million annual lease obligation

1 on a building without tenants.

2 If you want to move it, wait until the end of the

3 lease, in the year 2000. Then, I think the savings could be

4 there. In closing, I repeat, with this move, we are shifting

5 the cost of the operation from the Army to GSA, we're not

6 saving any money. This is not what Congress intended when

7 the base closure process was set up. Thank you very much.

8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank

9 Congressman Davis for finishing within the time limit. And

10 as you assume the chair, Mr. Chairman, may I make this

11 observation one more time. The great state of Virginia, with

12 eight people making a presentation, succeeded in having half

13 honor the request that their remarks be made within the five

14 minute period.

15 I congratulate Congressman Davis. I would have

16 been reluctant to make these remarks had he not finished

17 within the period. I would say again, it's five minutes.

18 There are 25 witnesses still to go today. Green is talk;

19 yellow is slow down; red is stop. Red is not talk another

20 minute; red is not talk another two minutes; red is not now

21 I'm all set to conclude, no, no, no, no. Red is stop. We

22 thank you very much, Congressman.

1 REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Thank you, Senator.

2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you.

3 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Dixon.

4 And our final clean-up scheduled state delegation is the

5 great state of Wisconsin, and leading off will be Senator

6 Kohl.

7 SENATOR KOHL: Mr. Chairman and members of the

8 Commission, it is an opportunity that I appreciate very much

9 to testify before you today on behalf of the 440th Airlift

10 Wing, an Air Reserve unit based at General Mitchell

11 International Air Reserve Station Milwaukee.

12 I have a statement with me from Congressman Kleczka

13 which I would like to insert for the record.

14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be admitted.

15 SENATOR KOHL: When you close an Air Reserve

16 station, you are not just closing an installation, you are

17 making a decision to dismantle a unit, and in the case of the

18 440th Airlift Wing, the Air Force would be losing some of the

19 best highly trained C-130 pilots and maintenance crews.

20 From D-Day to the Cuban Missile Crisis, from Desert

21 Shield and Desert Storm to Haiti the 440th has demonstrated

22 its importance to our nation. Even now, as we consider the

1 future of this historic unit, the 440th is ready as the lead
2 wing in the event of an evacuation of United Nations Forces
3 from Bosnia.
4 In 1993, the 440th accomplished what no other C-130
5 airlift wing has ever accomplished, and that includes active
6 duty Air National Guard and Reserve units.
7 An unprecedented performance in the Air Mobility
8 Command's Rodeo known as the olympics of airlifters, the
9 440th won the competition for the best C-130 air drop crew,
10 the best C-130 air drop wing, the best C-130 wing and the
11 best U.S. Air Force Mobility Wing.
12 As General Fogleman so aptly stated about the
13 440th, and I quote, "They are the best of the best." The
14 excellence of this unit is a reflection of the high quality
15 of the training provided at General Mitchell Air Reserve
16 Station and at other training venues in Wisconsin.
17 There are no traffic delays in Milwaukee. While
18 other airports experience significant air traffic delays
19 keeping Air Reserve pilots on the ground waiting to take off,
20 Milwaukee's pilots have minimum waiting time and maximum time
21 in the air flying.
22 Wisconsin Fort McCoy, an Army Reserve base, and

1 Bulk Field, an Air National Guard installation offer unique
2 opportunities for joint training and provide local facilities
3 for flying air drops and training on dirt runways, which are
4 essential for combat training.
5 More important, the flying time from General
6 Mitchell to Fort McCoy or Bulk Field is 40 minutes. The C-
7 130 training mission requires that pilots fly for at least 30
8 minutes at low levels before they perform air drops, which
9 makes the location of the 440th in relation to Fort McCoy
10 ideal for efficient training.
11 Mr. Chairman, during Commissioner Steele's site
12 visit and again at the regional hearing in Chicago, pilots
13 from the 440th who fly commercially out of airports around
14 the country testified about how they like to fly out of
15 Milwaukee because of the unrestricted and unencroached
16 airspace and the lack of air track control delays.
17 The fact that Mitchell International Airport is not
18 a hub for a major international airline means that pilots do
19 not have to plan their flying time around jumbo jets. Again,
20 all of these conditions translate into for flying time for
21 pilots.
22 In addition to the obvious military value, the

1 440th provides there are some unique and innovative cost
2 savings that make the installation extremely cost-effective.
3 The 440th owns its own facilities, and thus it has
4 no lease costs. The 440th has reduced landing fees at the
5 airport in exchange for providing crucial fire support.
6 And the training efficiencies in using of drop
7 zones at Fort McCoy and other training facilities around
8 Wisconsin translate into real savings for the Air Force.
9 So Mr. Chairman, I'm committed to finding ways for
10 the federal government to reduce the deficit, and I am
11 supportive of the base closing process. We should make the
12 hard decisions to eliminate bases we no longer need.
13 In the case of General Mitchell Air Reserve
14 Station, however, it would be contrary to the goals of
15 deficit construction. The 440th represents value for the
16 taxpayer dollar. It has the unique combination of
17 characteristics that has produced a top C-130 unit in an
18 extremely cost-effective manner.
19 America and Wisconsin cannot afford to lose this
20 unit which truly is the best of the best. I thank you for
21 your attention.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Kohl.

1 Senator Feingold.

2 SENATOR FEINGOLD: Chairman Dixon and

3 Commissioners, thank you for giving me also this opportunity

4 to speak to you today about the 440th Air Reserve Unit at

5 Mitchell Airport.

6 I've always been a strong supporter of the base

7 closure process. Since 1993, I've actually worked to close

8 Wisconsin only naval installation in the state, Project Ill

9 Health, the extremely low frequency communications system,

10 and I've introduced legislation and wrote to you advocating

11 that it be placed on the list for consideration for closure.

12 In my view, it exemplifies an installation whose

13 mission is of little, if any, military strategic value, and

14 it therefore should be closed.

15 The 440th Airlift Wing, on the other hand, has time

16 and time again demonstrated its strategic value as a part of

17 our nation's overall defense forces. During the Persian Gulf

18 War, Haiti, Somalia or recent and future missions in Bosnia,

19 the men and women of the 440th have consistently served our

20 nation with honor, distinction and excellence.

21 You've already heard from Senator Kohl about the

22 unprecedented number of military honors the 440th has

1 received in recognition of its training levels and
2 preparedness.
3 I believe that a primary reason has met with such
4 incredible success is the quality of the reservists who serve
5 there. I want to review very briefly for the Commission some
6 of the notable achievements of the 440th recruiting
7 operation.
8 First, the 440th is the recognized leader for
9 excellence in Air Force Reserve recruiting. As you all know,
10 it is important that reserve units be staffed at over 100
11 percent to ensure that they can be relied upon to do their
12 job, which is to back up the active duty in any case.
13 Few bases have been able to do that consistently,
14 but the staffing levels of the 440th have been over 100
15 percent nine out of the last ten years. For the Reserves,
16 this is not excess staffing. It is assurance that the 440th
17 has the personnel strength to activate for any mission
18 anywhere at any time.
19 Second, as Wisconsin's federal Air Force
20 installation, the 440th draws reservists from every one of
21 the nine congressional districts in the state, ensuring full
22 support of its mission.

1 Third, with the regional hubs of both of the United
2 Parcel Service and Federal Express located at Mitchell Field,
3 the 440th has a large pool of trained pilots, loadmasters and
4 mechanics from which they can successfully recruit.
5 Recruiting is a critical element to the readiness
6 of any reserve unit. The 440th has demonstrated that their
7 recruit efforts far outdistance those of any other C-130
8 reserve unit.
9 I know some of you have heard this fact repeatedly
10 during the state visit to the 440th and at the regional
11 hearing that was recently held in Chicago. The 440th Airlift
12 Wing also provides the essential support for other federal
13 agencies in the Midwest.
14 As you consider its future, I'd like to point out
15 the concurrent negative impact that closing the 440th would
16 have on other government agencies.
17 First, the 440th is the headquarters of the
18 regional personnel office that currently services a seven-
19 state region, including Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana,
20 Minnesota, Ohio, Colorado and Oregon.
21 If the 440th closed, this function and the related
22 personnel would have to be duplicated at another site so that

1 there would not be a net savings coming from the closure.
2 Second, the 440th is a regional federal
3 communications center and is the only authorized provider of
4 satellite and classified messages to other military and law
5 enforcement agencies, including DOD, FBI, DOT, DOE, Secret
6 Service and FEMA. It would be problematic for those agencies
7 were the 440th's communication center to be terminated.
8 Third, the 440th is a regional national disaster medical
9 system's site tasked with providing emergency airlift
10 services, casualty triage processing and as a medical
11 disaster communications hub in times of national crisis.
12 It is clear that our nation cannot afford to lose
13 the many functions that the 440th now provides for our
14 national security. There could be no doubt that this unit
15 plays a serious, strategic role in our nation's defense.
16 The Air Force has time and time again recognized
17 the military value of the 440th. For these reasons, the Air
18 Force has indicated that it does not want to close the 440th.
19 Further, as you all know, the Department of Defense
20 did not even recommend this unit for consideration for
21 closure. The State of Wisconsin is proud of the
22 accomplishment of the members of the 440th Airlift Wing and

1 remains wholly committed to keeping this unit in Milwaukee.

2 It has demonstrated quality, superiority and

3 strategic value that should not be lost. I hope the

4 Commission will concur, and I thank you for your time.

5 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Feingold.

6 Representative Barrett.

7 REPRESENTATIVE BARRETT: Thank you. I'd like to

8 thank Chairman Dixon and the members of the Commission for

9 giving us the opportunity to speak on behalf of the 440th

10 Airlift Wing in Milwaukee.

11 And I'd also like to thank Commissioner Steele

12 again for her visit to Milwaukee. We appreciated the

13 opportunity to show off the best of the best. I'm also

14 pleased to be the last speaker from the last state, and I'm

15 sure that you are, too, at least prior to the filler-ins that

16 come after me.

17 I join Congressman Kleczka, Senator Kohl and

18 Senator Feingold in my strong support for the 440th, and I

19 would like to conclude our testimony by highlighting some of

20 the arguments against closing the base.

21 In the most recent COBRA provided for the

22 Commission, the Air Force overstated by $1.85 million the

1 potential savings to be achieved by closing the 440th. Also,
2 the costs associated with closing the base were understated
3 by $9.4 million in one-time costs and $2.6 million in
4 recurring costs.
5 These inaccuracies can be traced to several
6 factors. The regional civilian personnel office at the 440th
7 serves seven states and will have to be relocated if the Air
8 Force moves out of Wisconsin. The salaries of the 41 people
9 assigned to the 440th CPO therefore cannot be counted as
10 savings.
11 The Air Force Reserve has invested $7.7 million in
12 the 440th digital fiber optic communication system, the only
13 working system as required by the PY 2001 POM decision.
14 Although all bases will eventually receive such a
15 system, the Air Force Reserve will need to assemble a new
16 system at another base immediately if the 440th is closed,
17 substantially increasing the cost to close the 440th.
18 Another factor contributing to the increased cost
19 of closing the 440th is the need to maintain the support
20 functions such as drop zone operations at nearby Fort McCoy
21 that must continue even if the 440th closes.
22 The locate of the 440th at Mitchell International

1 Airport provides unrestricted unencroached airspace and
2 minimal ground traffic delays for more efficient flight
3 operations than any other C-130 base.
4 The airport can annual any aircraft in the Defense
5 Department inventory in all weather and has been designated a
6 weather testing site for the C-17. In addition, enough space
7 exists to accommodate four additional C-130 aircraft
8 immediately.
9 Lastly, I would like the emphasize the strong and
10 constructive relationship that exists between the 440th and
11 the community. When members of the 440th flew to Bosnia,
12 Panama and Haiti, the community stepped in to help the
13 families they left behind.
14 When future emergencies call the reservists of the
15 440th to duty, the people of Wisconsin will be there again.
16 I hope you will all agree that the 440th makes an important
17 contribution to the Milwaukee area and to the State of
18 Wisconsin as a whole.
19 If the 440th is closed, the Air Force will no
20 longer have any presence in the State of Wisconsin. Our
21 national defense and our local community will surely suffer.
22 Thank you, and I would also, in closing, like to

1 point out Chairman Dixon complimented Virginia. All our
2 speakers finished in time, and we did so to show the
3 efficiency that we work with the 440th. Thank you very much.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
5 Barrett. In fact, all three of you came under the time, and
6 I commend you for your performance.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman, I was just in the
8 back room making some certificates, some gold certificates
9 for the three of you from Wisconsin, which I'm going to
10 present personally.
11 CONGRESSMAN BARRETT: And it's just an example of
12 how well the 440th works. We couldn't have done it without
13 the 440th. Thank you very much.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We will now hear from a
15 number of members of Congress who, for scheduling reasons,
16 were not able to appear with their delegations. We'll start
17 with Senator Shelby from Alabama.
18 SENATOR SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, members of the
19 Commission, I regret that I was not able to be with you
20 yesterday. I would first ask that my full written statement
21 be made part of the record, and we have some exhibits that
22 Chairman Dixon taught me years ago could be made part of it,

1 too.

2 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Without objection, your full

3 statement and the exhibits will be entered.

4 SENATOR SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you

5 and other members of the Commission for giving me here today

6 the opportunity to speak before you briefly, and I'll try to

7 be brief.

8 The major focus of my comments this afternoon is

9 the ill-advised Army proposal to close Fort McClellan and

10 move the chemical and military police schools to Fort Leonard

11 Wood.

12 In addition, I will also highlight in my remarks

13 the proposed relocation of the aviation mission of the

14 Aviation Troop Command to Red Stone Arsenal and the movement

15 of the Army depot maintenance and defense distribution

16 functions from Red River and Letterkenny Army Depots to

17 Anniston Army Depot.

18 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I believe

19 that the rush to grab Fort McClellan's training missions has

20 resulted in a shoddy, very shoddy permitting process that has

21 completely disregarded our nation's military readiness for

22 the sake of short-term gains in jobs, yes, and prestige.

1 Let me be clear that this is the final round for
2 the foreseeable future for BRAC. You know it and I know it.
3 The decisions you make in the coming days are irrevocable.
4 If you choose to the Army chemical training
5 functions to Fort Leonard Wood, this nation I believe will be
6 taking an enormous risk. The current permits, as
7 corroborated by expert commentary, are completely inadequate
8 for duplicating our current chemical training activities at
9 Fort McClellan.
10 This morning, this very day you heard from the
11 distinguished representative from the congressional district
12 in which Fort Leonard Wood is located. He made two
13 statements to you which require correction.
14 First, he told you that there would be an increase
15 in readiness because rear area protection in river crossings
16 would have the chemical school and MP school together with
17 the engineering school.
18 Second, he told you here that the Army sent a
19 letter stating that it can properly perform its mission under
20 the existing environmental permits.
21 As far as the first statement, I ask that you
22 consider whether at this point in history we should place a

1 higher priority on river crossings than on the emergent
2 reaction to the use of chemical and biological agents,
3 particularly in urban areas, which provides lucrative targets
4 for weapons of mass destruction.
5 Secondly, I too have a letter dated yesterday from
6 the Chief of Staff of the Army Training and Doctoring Command
7 which states unequivocally that the smoke training permit
8 does not allow the chemical school to train as it currently
9 does at Fort McClellan. It also has other things in it, and
10 I'm sure you have that.
11 The letter then indicates that the Army will have
12 to modify its operations if the relocation is executed.
13 Because of the shortcutting of the permit process, the
14 lengthy litigation has already begun and I predict will
15 continue in Missouri.
16 As a result, any decision, yes, any decision to
17 move chemical training to Fort Leonard Wood bears substantial
18 risk to our nation's military readiness.
19 In contrast, Fort McClellan is a functional
20 facility with the proper permitting, the facilities and
21 experience for chemical warfare training. You know that.
22 In regard to the smoke permit, it's my

1 understanding that a Memorandum for the Record was prepared
2 dated June 9, 1995, by Colonel Koflin, Director of Training
3 at the Army Chemical School.
4 This memorandum was approved by Colonel Mashburn,
5 Assistant Commandant of the Chemical School, also approved by
6 General Wooten, Commandant at the Army Chemical School and
7 transmitted to the assistant to the Chief of Staff for
8 Operations at TRADOP.
9 I respectfully this afternoon request that the
10 Commission obtain the Koflin memorandum to obtain a true
11 picture of the smoke permit. The Alabama delegation has
12 requested the document but have been refused by TRADOP. I do
13 not believe they will refuse you, Mr. Chairman.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We will do that, Mr. Senator.
15 SENATOR SHELBY: I will now turn to the movement of
16 the aviation component at ATCOM to Red Stone Arsenal forming
17 the Aviation and Missile Command, which is proposed.
18 The Army will achieve significant savings through
19 this realignment with little economic impact to the effected
20 community from which it's moved. This movement will allow
21 the Army aviation function to be located at a major Army
22 installation that has, yes, has an existing research

1 development and engineering center.

2 This is an excellent fit because MICOM, the missile

3 command, and ATCOM have closely related commodity missions

4 and expertise, a synergism that is not found between the Army

5 chemical, military police and engineering schools, leading to

6 a very much more efficient AMC organization.

7 Why is this move cost-effective, we might ask?

8 It's cost-effective, Mr. Chairman, because the return on the

9 investment is only 2.3 years. I believe that answers itself.

10 In regard to the Anniston Army Depot, the depot maintenance

11 and defense supply movements will improve, yes, improve

12 readiness by consolidating all track vehicle maintenance in

13 one depot and will result in the need for only one depot to

14 support on-site operations such as Operation Desert Storm, as

15 opposed to the current situation where three depots are

16 necessary.

17 I know that the Commission has taken a close look

18 at the issue of capacity, and you should, questioning the

19 ability of Anniston Army Depot to perform the maintenance and

20 supply functions that would be transferred from Red River and

21 Letterkenny Army Depots.

22 The Army and Anniston Army Depot have analyzed the

1 out-year workload levels and have concluded, Mr. Chairman,
2 that Anniston can perform all the maintenance and supply
3 functions with one eight-hour shift during a five-day
4 workload.
5 They also analyzed workload levels under other
6 conditions such as wartime conditions and have concluded that
7 all functions can be performed with just one extra shift, not
8 three.
9 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I ask you
10 that you validate the decisions of your predecessors in this
11 Commission and keep the current chemical training programs at
12 Fort McClellan and move the aviation function of ATCOM to Red
13 Stone Arsenal and move Army depot maintenance and supply
14 functions to Anniston Army Depot. I appreciate your
15 consideration this afternoon.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator. Next
17 will be representative Bud Cramer also from Alabama.
18 REPRESENTATIVE CRAMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
19 and members of the Commission. I thought perhaps I might be
20 the very last of just a few members of Congress that would
21 testify before you for these two days, but it looks like my
22 colleague from California will, in fact, follow me over a

1 different issue.

2 I'm sure you've heard a lot of different arguments

3 from a lot of different members of Congress. This is my

4 third time to testify before this Commission. So I want to

5 thank you again for your attention.

6 What I'm going to attempt to do is summarize some

7 of the past points that I and other representatives of my

8 community have I think effectively made in the Birmingham

9 regional hearing and the Atlanta hearing this past Friday as

10 well.

11 I follow Senator Shelby. I come from north

12 Alabama, the Fifth Congressional District, so our Alabama

13 concern there really runs along a parallel of issues over Red

14 Stone Arsenal, one of the Army's finest military bases, one

15 of the most recognized and honored military bases in this

16 country.

17 We are speaking on behalf of the Army's

18 recommendation, the Army's recommendation to close the

19 Aviation and Troop Command in St. Louis and create, as

20 Senator Shelby said, the Army Aviation and Missile Command at

21 Red Stone Arsenal.

22 Now again, in Atlanta, we gave you examples of

1 during the Gulf War how those two commands had to communicate
2 with one another from the separate sites there, and that was
3 done effectively but how much more effectively that could be
4 done if this move or recommendation is in fact followed.
5 We want to stress what we think, obviously, you
6 know the BRAC process is all about, and that is that if we're
7 to maintain military readiness and modernize our forces, then
8 what the BRAC process was intended to do was that of saving
9 money and that of forcing us to face tough decisions and
10 forcing us to close facilities that are recommended to be
11 closed.
12 We do that, again, to save money, but we want to do
13 it fairly. The Army and other services went through a
14 detailed and involved process to determine the installations
15 that they will need to carry out their current missions.
16 The Army then applied the selection criteria
17 established by law and made its base closure recommendations,
18 and the Army recommends that the Aviation and Troop Command
19 in St. Louis be closed. They would be consolidated there at
20 Red Stone Arsenal.
21 Now, the savings to be realized are enormous, and
22 they're quickly realized. There will be $46 million in

1 savings every year with a 20-year savings total of $453
2 million.
3 The one-time cost of this consolidation will be
4 returned in less than three years, in fact in 2.3 years. The
5 Army obviously saves money and achieves what Chairman Dixon
6 has referred to in the past as the purposes of the BRAC
7 process in fact transferring ATCOM there to Red Stone.
8 The ATCOM closure is the largest Army commodity
9 command restructuring in the history of the base closing
10 process. The savings from this one closure represents 3
11 percent of the total DOD base closure savings this year.
12 The recommendation, if followed, will reduce the
13 Army commodity commands by more than 15 percent, and again
14 this meets the DOD recommendation.
15 Now, we've had a confusing issue, in my opinion,
16 that has been added over ATCOM. It has been suggested that
17 as an alternative to ATCOM moving to Red Stone that the Army
18 move the Space and Strategic Defense Command, which is in
19 Huntsville, in Research Park in rented facilities, that it
20 move that command to Red Stone Arsenal instead of closing
21 ATCOM.
22 Now, let me again point out that SSDC and ATCOM are

1 totally separate commands, but I think the suggestion is a
2 smoke screen, and the suggestion seems to give the impression
3 that if SSDC is moved to Red Stone, then we wouldn't have
4 room for ATCOM there; we wouldn't need ATCOM to be there.
5 That is not true. There are no savings, none
6 whatsoever that would result from the move of SSDC to Red
7 Stone, and I think analysis is being run and has been run
8 that would show that.
9 So the return on the investment of the
10 recommendation of SSDC to Red Stone is never in fact
11 achieved. So I hope that issue doesn't confuse the members
12 of this Commission.
13 And let me, in conclusion, point out that again the
14 BRAC process was established to reduce our military
15 infrastructure by closing bases and consolidating activities.
16 This, of course, saves money.
17 The savings achieved with these closures are
18 crucial, again, to maintain military readiness and continuing
19 military modernization. Right now on the floor of the House
20 we're debating the House Armed Services Authorization Bill.
21 This is a tough atmosphere here, and we're debating the very
22 issues of military readiness in the field.

1 So I think again, in today's atmosphere, we've got
2 to face these tough decisions. So we ask you to move ATCOM
3 to Red Stone Arsenal, and don't be fooled by the smoke screen
4 over SSDC.
5 If you in fact choose to close SSDC and move it
6 onto Red Stone Arsenal, we can, in fact, accommodate both of
7 those commands. So I want to offer that as a final
8 alternative as well.
9 Again, I want to thank the Commission, I want to
10 congratulate the Commission for its patience, for this
11 practically thankless job and for hearing me now three times.
12 Thank you.
13 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you very much,
14 Representative Cramer. Next we'll hear from Maxine Waters
15 from the state of California.
16 REPRESENTATIVE WATERS: Thank you very much,
17 Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission. I've very
18 appreciative for the opportunity to testify today. As you
19 may have guessed, I will focus my remarks on your report's
20 proposed closing of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
21 I am well acquainted with the military value and
22 the enormous economic impact the shipyard has not just in

1 Long Beach but throughout Southern California. The rationale
2 for closing Long Beach is based on the assumption that the
3 private San Diego port facility currently in operation can be
4 upgraded to meet the needs now served by Long Beach.
5 For several reasons, I would urge the Commission to
6 carefully reconsider this finding. First, there are
7 significant questions about the cost estimates made by the
8 Commission associated with transforming the San Diego
9 facility.
10 Many familiar with the operations of both Long
11 Beach and San Diego's capabilities believe the overhaul
12 required by San Diego could cost up to five times the Navy's
13 original estimate.
14 At the same time, government savings from closure
15 of Long Beach would be far less than the 2 billion over 20
16 years the Navy has projected. There have also been serious
17 environmental issues raised which might render the
18 restructuring of San Diego's port unsafe.
19 These concerns about closing Long Beach are not
20 just my own. I site an enclosure to this Commission's report
21 of two years ago. With a majority of the Pacific Fleet home
22 ported in San Diego, there are distinct advantages to be

1 gained by continuing to use Long Beach Naval Shipyard in the
2 Navy's ship repair program.
3 At the time that statement was written, 1993, 30
4 percent of the Pacific Fleet home ported in San Diego. That
5 percentage has increased to 70 percent today.
6 If anything, the value of the Long Beach Shipyard
7 and its ability to service the Pacific Fleet is greater today
8 than it was in 1993.
9 Second, in addition to the cost question, I believe
10 there is a real chance that San Diego's port cannot
11 reasonably be altered to absorb the capacity of the Long
12 Beach Shipyard. Again, quoting from a letter by the last
13 Commission's Base Structure Evaluation Committee Chair, "The
14 commitment of the private sector to maintain the skills and
15 facilities necessary to accomplish complex Navy workloads
16 without the ensured profit of a continuous construction and
17 maintenance workload is unknown.
18 Principal dependency on the private sector to
19 accomplish this workload and to respond to unplanned emergent
20 and urgent repair puts fleet readiness at risk and outside
21 Navy control.
22 Finally, I'd like to comment on one of the

1 Commission's professed goals; that is, the maintenance of a
2 balanced work force racially, ethnically and in terms of
3 gender.
4 The Long Beach Naval Shipyard is the most diverse
5 military base in the country. I've tried to put together
6 some figures that will be in my written testimony about the
7 makeup of that work force.
8 And while its ethnic diversity is not in and of
9 itself a reason to keep it open, I believe this factor helps
10 us meet the Navy's expressed goal of diversity.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. I'm sorry. We've
12 got people coming in and out of here. We're trying to keep
13 track of the inventory who is in here, who is not in here.
14 REPRESENTATIVE WATERS: I know. This factor along
15 with the other reasons cited earlier in my testimony makes a
16 strong case for maintaining the Long Beach facility.
17 In conclusion, Long Beach has twice been judged
18 essential by the Department of Defense and the Department of
19 the Navy. That conclusion was affirmed by an independent
20 assessment done by the General Accounting Office.
21 For these reasons, I implore you to rethink your
22 preliminary decision to close Long Beach for the good of its

1 employees, for the good of the entire Southern California
2 region, for the economy of the state of California and most
3 importantly for the good of our military I'd like to please
4 ask you to keep the Long Beach Shipyard operational. And I
5 thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
7 Waters. Next we'll hear from Senator Pell from the State of
8 Rhode Island.
9 SENATOR PELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
10 opportunity and I admire your patience and strength. You
11 must be pretty enured to what we say, so I'll be extra brief
12 and within the limit.
13 This marks the third time I've testified before
14 this mandated Commission. My testimony today represents a
15 continuation of what I've previously stated and also more
16 importantly reflects the continuity of the consecutive
17 actions which were taken by your predecessor commissions.
18 Two years ago, the Commission determined to
19 relocate surface ships from Newport and other coastal states.
20 The move represented the departure of naval vessels that have
21 graced Narragansett Bay for more than two centuries.
22 At the same time, however, they continued the

1 consolidation of functions at both -- in Newark and at NETC,
2 thus solidifying Newport's unique role as the Navy's
3 preeminent center for indoctrination, classroom instruction,
4 laboratory research.
5 At that time I concluded that with the Commission's
6 decision Newport has trained sailors and traded sailors for
7 science. Quite frankly, I believe that the previous actions
8 by the predecessor commissions worked out well for the Navy,
9 for Rhode Island and more important for the taxpayer.
10 Given my brief time, I'd like to leave you with
11 just two thoughts. I would ask that a copy of the full text
12 of these remarks be made a part of the Commission's record.
13 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: They will be made a part of
14 the record.
15 SENATOR PELL: I thank you. First, I strongly
16 support DOD's recommendation to relocate Newark headquarters
17 in Newport, the central functions from both Naval Undersea
18 Warfare Center Detachment to New London and the Naval
19 Research Underwater Lab in Fort Orlando, Florida.
20 The BRAC recommendations are consistent with the
21 Navy's stated desire to geographically consolidate full
22 spectrum laboratories and training facilities in a manner

1 that simultaneously increases military value, decreases the
2 infrastructure and reduces the operating cost.
3 Based on information gathered from top Navy staff
4 when I last visited Newport less than two weeks ago, I'm
5 convinced of the accuracy of the official data provided by
6 the Navy and the analysis who ranked the Newport site in
7 Newark third out of 64 of all the Navy technical centers in
8 terms of military value. Without any hesitation, I would
9 urge you to sustain the recommendation.
10 Secondly, I strongly support the recommendation to
11 relocate training functions from the Naval Training Center in
12 Meridian, Mississippi, to Naval Education and Training Center
13 in Newport.
14 As you know, NATC Newport is recognized as the
15 crown jewel of excellence in naval education, training and
16 indoctrination. After the removal of the North Atlantic
17 Fleet from Newport in the 1970s, NATC was formed as a large
18 campus noted for its excellent schools.
19 The various commands currently at Newport include
20 the Naval War College, which dates back to 1884 and is the
21 oldest of its kind in America. I thank you for your
22 consideration and, as I say, admire your ability to hear so

1 many. Thank you.

2 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Pell.

3 Next we'll hear from Representative Sam Gejdenson from

4 Connecticut.

5 REPRESENTATIVE GEJDENSON: Thank you very much.

6 I'll be very brief. I'm impressed by your sitting ability

7 and by your kidneys to hang out as long as you have.

8 I just want to say a couple of quick things. We're

9 all coming in here arguing for our districts. Go back, look

10 at the numbers. I think that the BRAC decisions, and I have

11 great admiration for Senator Pell, frankly from the first day

12 were based on faulty numbers.

13 When you look at where we are today, we see there

14 are two new buildings that the Navy is talking about adding

15 to the Newport facility at a time when we have all these

16 empty buildings in New London.

17 About a decade ago a friend of mine, Charlie Rose,

18 a gentleman I met in New York who is a builder said this to

19 me. He says, "I used to build buildings in New York City,

20 and those buildings would have every fifth floor for

21 computers.

22 And we had all our secretarial staff, and we had

1 everybody in New York City, the most expensive real estate in
2 the world." He says, "Today there are no more floors for
3 computers. The management's in New York City, but the staff
4 is in Nebraska because it's cheaper to have it out there than
5 in New York City."
6 The logic in an era of computers and
7 telecommunications to take an isolated function that exists
8 today in New London and move it 45 minutes to an hour and a
9 half up to Rhode Island makes no sense when you look at the
10 cost of the program, to build new buildings when there are
11 perfectly good buildings providing these functions in New
12 London.
13 In an area where it is the individuals who make up
14 the expertise, to uproot those people or lose them will be
15 far more damaging to the government and costly. So I will
16 ask you to think of what the private sector does.
17 The private sector does not move all of its people
18 into one facility, building new buildings and cramming them
19 in together just so they can say they're on one physical
20 site. With computers, telecommunications and modern means of
21 communication, you can have the staff in Nebraska, and you
22 can have the bosses in Rhode Island.

1 You can certainly have the management in Rhode
2 Island and this function that exists in New London kept in
3 New London. I will ask you to look at that photo that we are
4 bringing up to you now.
5 In New London, we build the submarines. We have
6 the submarine base with all of the submarine schools destined
7 to be there, and if this Commission agrees with last year's
8 Commission, including the Nuclear Power School, and we have
9 Newark.
10 Now, what sense it makes to take that function and
11 expend maybe 20- maybe $40 million more to put in Rhode
12 Island, with all deference to Senator Pell doesn't make sense
13 to me.
14 It doesn't make sense for the people who work there
15 to either make them travel further or sell their homes, up
16 root their families. There is no benefit to the government.
17 If anything, it's clear to me there is a cost to the
18 government.
19 And it seems clear that this Commission wants to do
20 the right thing for the government, as I think all of them
21 have wanted to do. If you look at the facts, make a decision
22 that makes sense, not just one that, you know, follows the

1 flow. It will help government, and you'll help the people of
2 the country.
3 Let me now go to the debate about the Nuclear Power
4 School. I understand that others have come here and argued
5 about that photograph. I think your staff has been down
6 there.
7 There is nothing in Charleston except for trees,
8 what appears to be a dirt road, and the only debate exists as
9 to whether there is real swamp in the background. Now, there
10 is no infrastructure. There is no sewers. There's no
11 telephone lines. There are no buildings.
12 This is the building in Connecticut, less than nine
13 years old. It is perfectly suited for the Nuclear Power
14 School, and think of flying people back up to Connecticut to
15 do part of their work, down to Charleston to do some of their
16 work.
17 You can put virtually all the training in
18 Connecticut where the previous BRAC said it made sense to do
19 it. We have the space. We have physical assets in place,
20 and we have spent $11 million of the taxpayer monies to
21 redesign these buildings to the standard that the Navy
22 wanted.

1 To now midstream turn around and go into that --
2 you know, it's not as pretty as Connecticut countryside, but
3 it's fairly decent for the scrub they have down there, and
4 flatten it, hope you get through the environmental problems
5 and then proceed to put in all the infrastructure you need,
6 buildings, doesn't make sense.
7 I ask you to look at the facts. I know you've got
8 a lot before you. Each of us comes and says save our people.
9 I'm saying only do it if it makes sense for the country. I
10 think we've made that case, and I thank you gentlemen for
11 your time.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. Thank you
13 Representative Gejdenson. Next we'll hear from
14 Representative Ros-Lehtinen from Florida.
15 REPRESENTATIVE ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much,
16 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. As you know, in
17 1993, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission decided
18 that a portion of Homestead Air Force Base would to function
19 as the Homestead Air Reserve Base and would be the home of
20 two mutually supportive reserve units, the 482nd Fighter Wing
21 and the 301st Air Rescue Squadron.
22 Working closing with the BRAC and other federal

1 agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Dade County
2 worked out a dual use plan for the base based on the military
3 and civilian use of that facility.
4 The cornerstone of that redevelopment plan was the
5 presence of both the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st Air
6 Rescue Squadron. Secretary Perry described this existing
7 plan as an exemplary model of military-civilian partnership
8 for future base closures and realignments.
9 Undoing this careful plan not only undermines the
10 viability of this project in our home base of Dade County but
11 will also serve to undermine other procedures to mitigate the
12 impact of the BRAC's decisions on affected communities by
13 undercutting the reliability of your decisions.
14 It is therefore unconscionable that even the
15 presence of the 482nd Fighter Wing has been called into
16 question through the actions of a community whose joint use
17 airport operation lacks efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
18 Allow me to briefly review the compelling reasons
19 that led to the current plan and how these reasons retaken
20 their force today.
21 As in real estate, the value of a base lies in its
22 location, and Homestead's location allows it to support a

1 number of crucial missions. South Florida rests at the
2 crossroads of South America and the Caribbean.
3 Neither the location nor the importance of these
4 areas has changed since the original BRAC plan. This fact
5 was demonstrated during the Haitian operation when Homestead
6 was used in the movement of troops and supplies.
7 Thus, Homestead remains a critical forward base for
8 these important areas. The geo political importance of South
9 Florida has been collaborated by the Defense Department's
10 decision to locate the United States Southern Command here.
11 When the announcement was made, DOD officials
12 stressed that this area was simply the only logical choice.
13 The arrival of SOUTHCOM also reenforces the utility of this
14 base as a possibility support facility.
15 The mission of the 301st Air Rescue Squadron is to
16 locate and recover Air Force personnel and other defense
17 personnel involved with the U.S. defense activities as well
18 as provide rescue and recovery support for man flight
19 operations.
20 Thus, the decision to relocate the rescue squadron
21 to Homestead, home of the 482nd Fighter Wing fulfills a
22 compelling operational and maintenance justification as the

1 squadron would be in a position to support a combat-ready war
2 fighting unit.
3 Moreover, the 301st has traditionally provided air
4 rescue around the tip of Florida, thus its location at
5 Homestead will allow it to respond quickly and effectively.
6 Reality dictates that the decision of BRAC should be
7 affirmed.
8 This Commission heard the arguments to relocate the
9 squadron to Homestead and after careful deliberation reached
10 the correct decision. Failure for this Commission to stick
11 to its decision would invite endless attempts to undo the
12 Commission's work and would threaten the entire mechanism for
13 rationale reallocation of resources.
14 To move the 301st Air Rescue Squadron should not be
15 reconsidered, and beyond the obvious issues of military
16 efficiency, the reversal of the BRAC decision would put in
17 serious peril the future of South Dade and the reconstruction
18 efforts of this community.
19 The South Dade community has worked tirelessly to
20 rebuild our community after Hurricane Andrew, and the center
21 of these efforts lie in the base. Stopping the move of the
22 301st to Homestead would severely put into question the

1 future viability of this plan.

2 Moreover, the rebuilding plans which count on the

3 move of the 301st would be dealt a serious setback and could

4 have great negative implications for the economic future of

5 our community.

6 In 1993, the Commission recognized the importance

7 of our base to this nation's defense. That reality has been

8 reaffirmed by subsequent events, and this base remains an

9 essential part of U.S. military readiness.

10 In conclusion, I strongly urge you and the other

11 Commissioners to keep Homestead Air Reserve Base open by

12 retaining the 482nd Fighter Wing at Homestead and reaffirming

13 the decision to return the 301st to Homestead in 1995-'96.

14 These are the right decisions for the military, for

15 our community and indeed for our nation. I thank you very

16 much for your patience.

17 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative

18 Ros-Lehtinen. Next we'll hear from Representative Kasich

19 from Ohio.

20 REPRESENTATIVE KASICH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I

21 come before the Commission sometimes to recommend closing

22 things, sometimes to dispute facts. I'm not here to keep

1 something open. It just depends what the facts are.

2 I'm here today to talk to you about the Newark Air

3 Force Base for one reason. The Government Accounting Office

4 and come out with, I'm told, the only report that has

5 criticized the BRAC findings since this situation started.

6 And it says that contrary to the fact that we would

7 save $3.8 million a year after the first eight years, they

8 say in the report that it might take somewhere between 17 and

9 100 years to get any savings.

10 I don't know if they're right. I think we need to

11 look at it. I don't want you to do the wrong thing. I'm not

12 asking you to do the wrong thing. I'm asking you to take a

13 look at whether these numbers are right.

14 The GAO, as Chairman Dixon will tell you, sometimes

15 they do great work. Sometimes their work is less than great.

16 Sometimes their work is flat out wrong. I don't know what it

17 is in this case, although the people at the base obviously

18 have done a lot of work themselves.

19 When Newark was first recommended for closing, I

20 didn't do anything other than to argue we've got to make sure

21 that the numbers are right. This GAO report calls to mind

22 the fact that we've just got to take a look at it.

1 If in fact the Base Closing Commission, which I
2 strongly support -- I wrote part of the bill that created
3 it -- if they determine that the savings will be there and it
4 needs to be done, I will support you.
5 But if you find out that the numbers aren't right,
6 then I think you got to come back and take a look at it.
7 I've been before the Commission two other times. One was to
8 argue the closing of BCSC in the last year where our numbers
9 proved to be correct when we did receive some consolidation.
10 The first round of base closing was to close the
11 base in Columbus, Ohio, and I came before the Commission and
12 said I was prepared to support that.
13 So I'm here today not as an advocate other than an
14 advocate of anything other than the process. I just think
15 that when a report comes out that shows these kind of
16 distinctions -- and it's my understanding the Commission is
17 already aware of this.
18 So take a look at it. If it turns out to be smart
19 to keep the operation open, then I'd urge you to do that, if
20 it's going to save the taxpayers money.
21 If, in your judgment, the GAO is wrong, then you
22 got to close it, going to privatize it there, and that's what

1 we're going to have to live with, but I felt an obligation to
2 come here and say that with this kind of a report raising
3 these kind of questions it's necessary to bring it to your
4 attention, and I think many people would like to have the
5 questions answered. So Commissioner, thank you.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you very much,
7 Representative Kasich. I'll guarantee you have looked at it,
8 and we'll continue to take a good, hard look at that
9 particular report you cited and the whole issue of Newark.
10 Thank you. Next we'll hear from Representative DeLauro from
11 Connecticut.
12 REPRESENTATIVE DeLAURO: Mr. Chairman and
13 distinguished members of the Commission, I appreciate the
14 opportunity to testify today about the proposed closure of
15 the Stratford Army Engine Plant.
16 Between the visits to Stratford by Commissioners
17 Cornella and Kling and our presentation at the New York
18 regional hearing, I know that the Commission is familiar by
19 now with the issues surrounding the Stratford plant.
20 Rather than repeat all of the details, I want to
21 highlight several key points that I urge you to keep in mind
22 during your final deliberations.

1 Our argument for keeping the Stratford plant open
2 is a simple one. We believe the Army has substantially
3 understated the military value of the Stratford plant, and it
4 has substantially unit estimated the cost of closing the
5 facility and reconstituting its capabilities elsewhere.
6 Let me first address the military value question.
7 As you know from previous testimony, the AGD 1500 engine will
8 be in use in the Abrams tank for the next 30 years, and the
9 Army has no other tank engine in development, no other tank
10 engine in development.
11 Historically, the Army procured two spare engines
12 for every tank produced. With the Abrams, the Army procured
13 only one spare engine per three tanks. So not only must
14 tanks equipped with the AGD 1500 last for 30 more years, they
15 must also make due with fewer spares.
16 The Stratford Army Engine Plant is the only place
17 in the country where we build the AGD 1500 and critical spare
18 parts such as the recuperator. In my view, it is a
19 tremendous risk to national security to close this plant and
20 to lose its unique capabilities given the continuing
21 dependency of our tank fleet on the AGD 1500.
22 We need the Stratford plant to extend the life of

1 the engines that are now in use, to build critical spares, to
2 provide field expertise to resolve the unique problems of the
3 battlefield and to quickly build new engines should that be
4 required by a military emergency.
5 The second point I want to leave you with is that
6 reconstituting the capabilities of the Stratford plant
7 elsewhere simply is not feasible. Stratford is not just an
8 Army engine plant. It is a dual use military and civilian
9 facility that manufactures a wide range of products.
10 These range from the exclusively military AGD 1500
11 tank engine to the exclusively commercial jet engine. In
12 between there is a continuum of helicopter and hover craft
13 engines with both military and commercial applications.
14 The Army has proposed moving the helicopter work to
15 Corpus Christi and the tank work to Anniston. This is much
16 simpler said than done. The same equipment and the same work
17 force teams at the plant produce military and commercial
18 products for both aviation and for ground use.
19 All but two of 11 manufacturing cells are dual use,
20 as is the vast majority of the machinery. As those who work
21 at the plant like to say, splitting this capability is like a
22 very bad divorce in which one spouse takes the dining room

1 table and the other gets the chairs. It will be very
2 expensive to get a complete set again.
3 The third point that I would like to leave you with
4 is that the Army has substantially underestimated the cost of
5 closing the plant. The greatest cost is for environmental
6 cleanup. The Army's calculations did not include any
7 environmental costs, but a November 1994 study conducted by
8 the Army Corps of Engineers estimated a minimum cost of $17.5
9 million just for environmental stabilization of the plant.
10 The study estimated that cleanup sufficient for
11 plant reuse could cost as much as $422 million. This is but
12 one of several costs that were understated by the Army. The
13 plant's operating contractor, Allied Signal Aerospace,
14 believes the Army also has understated closing costs,
15 recurring costs to secure the facility, relocation costs and
16 personnel costs as well.
17 Altogether, the contractor estimates that closing
18 the plant the cost $100 million over the next 20 years rather
19 than save $80 million as the Army has concluded. The much
20 better option for the Stratford Army Engine Plant is to
21 continue the work underway to downsize the facility, complete
22 its conversion into a dual use manufacturing plant.

1 The Army is committed to investing $47.5 million in
2 this program. The employees of the plant, the union members
3 and the management have joined together to make the plan
4 work. They are cutting costs, improving productivity and
5 diversifying the product line into the commercial
6 marketplace.
7 This dual use approach maintains the vital military
8 value of the Stratford Army Engine Plant while reducing costs
9 to the Army by expanding commercial use of the plant.
10 This is the best option for national security and
11 the best option for the taxpayers. That is our case, Mr.
12 Chairman. We hope that the Commission will support us, and
13 we thank you and sincerely thank you for all of the time and
14 consideration that you have given to us. Thank you very,
15 very much for letting me come by today.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
17 DeLauro. Next we'll hear --
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Chairman, I understand that a
19 member of the conference has a conference with you, and I'd
20 be glad to take the next two witnesses while you undertake
21 your obligation.
22 We're delighted to have Representative Charles

1 Canady of Florida. Congressman Canady, we're pleased you
2 could come.
3 REPRESENTATIVE CANADY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I want to begin
5 by thanking for the opportunity to testify today.
6 My purpose in offering a statement today is to urge
7 your support for the redirect of MacDill Air Force Base in
8 Tampa, Florida, as recommended by the Department of Defense.
9 The continued health and well-being of MacDill is
10 very important to my many constituents who are employed at
11 the base. Throughout its long and distinguished history,
12 MacDill has contributed much to our national security. The
13 facilities there have accommodated many diverse missions over
14 the years, from a home base for a fighter wing to massive
15 airlifts of personnel and equipment during Operations Desert
16 Shield and Desert Storm.
17 It boasts easy access to a first-class training
18 facility and bombing range at Avon Park in Central Florida.
19 Generations of fighter pilots have honed their skills there
20 and in other training areas over the Gulf of Mexico.
21 In my view, the decision by DOD to redirect the
22 1993 Base Closure Commission's recommendation with regard to

1 MacDill make strategic and operational sense. Recent massive
2 airlift operations such as last year's deployment of
3 personnel and equipment to the Persian Gulf have demonstrated
4 the clear need for a fully operational military run runway at
5 MacDill.
6 MacDill is a unique asset among military
7 facilities. It is the only installation which is home to two
8 joint unified commands from which national command authority
9 missions are directed. U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special
10 Operations Command are both headquartered at the base.
11 The contributions of these commands to our
12 country's security in recent years is well known. An
13 integral part of their success has been the first-class
14 facilities at MacDill.
15 Earlier in this process, you heard testimony from
16 General Wayne Downing of Special Operations Command and
17 Lieutenant General Butch Neal of U.S. Central Command. Both
18 have indicated that airfield support at MacDill is critical
19 to their missions.
20 The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
21 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have both validated the command's
22 requirements. The Air Force, for its part, has performed

1 internal studies which have determined that the best facility
2 to support these requirement is the MacDill airfield.
3 I am confident you will reach the same conclusion
4 and support the Department of Defense's recommendation that
5 you will return the MacDill Airfield to MacDill Air Force
6 Base.
7 Another action you have before you is the 43rd Air
8 Refueling Group's transferring to MacDill. As you know, the
9 force structure review found a shortage of air refueling
10 units in the Southeastern United States.
11 27 percent of the demand for tankers is found in
12 this area, and only 9 percent of the supply is located there.
13 These figures, along with the Secretary of Defense's
14 recommendations to support the unified command's needs at
15 MacDill created the opportunity to relocate a tanker unit
16 from the asset-rich northern area to the south.
17 The location, the infrastructure and the physical
18 plant at MacDill make it ideal for the relocation of tanker
19 aircraft. Having met with the principals and toured the
20 base, I am confident MacDill can accommodate the 43rd Air
21 Refueling Group and other aircraft units in need of
22 relocation.

1 I want to close, Mr. Chairman, by stressing the
2 commitment of the Tampa Bay area community to our Air Force
3 base. The citizens and leaders in our part of Florida know
4 that a fully operational MacDill Air Force Base will make an
5 important contribution to our success as a community.
6 We appreciate the affirmative steps taken by the
7 military to maximize the use of its assets at MacDill. We
8 urge you to support the recommendations of the Department of
9 Defense with regard to the MacDill redirect. Thank you, Mr.
10 Chairman.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Canady, and
12 we are always indebted to a distinguished member of the
13 Congress who does it inside five minutes. We appreciate it.
14 CONGRESSMAN CANADY: Thank you very much.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Andy Jacobs of
16 Indiana. We're delighted to have your here, Representative
17 Jacobs. Thank you for coming.
18 REPRESENTATIVE JACOBS: Thank you, Senator. I note
19 in the paper that the Hello Dolly is joining a renaissance,
20 and so I would like to say to you it's not to see you back
21 where you belong.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you.

1 REPRESENTATIVE JACOBS: I incorporate my reference,
2 which you already know, about Mayor Goldsmith's proposal not
3 to obstruct or object to the closing of the Naval Warfare
4 Center in Indianapolis but to close it in a way that is best
5 for the Navy, best for the country and indeed best for the
6 community.
7 As I understand it, an issue here is whether the
8 Commission has the authority to use this innovative proposal,
9 rather like the traditional question of whether you can get
10 there from here.
11 I have written to each of you, but just to mention
12 again the former Base Closure Commission came to Indianapolis
13 with a recommendation that Fort Benjamin Harrison be closed
14 and no recommendation that the Army Finance Center located at
15 Building One, the second largest building in the United
16 States Government's inventory anywhere be torn down or be
17 discontinued.
18 One of the Commissioners took a tour of that
19 building, came back to the Commission meeting and insisted
20 that the Commission recommend that that enormous building be
21 razed, and that was not recommended by the Army.
22 As a matter of fact, the Army had asked for an

1 appropriation to refurbish it. If that isn't precedent
2 enough, I really don't know what would be.
3 I'll just add this simple thing, two simple things
4 about whether it's practical, whether you can do what is
5 best, whether you can accomplish a sensible goal.
6 Bill Malden, in one of his World War II cartoons,
7 shows four GIs on a jeep in a clearing, And Germany small
8 arms rounds are coming in puffing up all around, and the
9 driver, obviously, is refusing to move the jeep into the
10 woods.
11 And the caption is, "I hate like hell to run on a
12 flat." And I might add, too, that a few years ago they
13 finished the downtown inner loop in Indianapolis, and they
14 had what they called Dead Man's Curb, because it went under
15 several bridges, overpasses, and it just kept turning and
16 kept turning, and truck drivers were being killed, about one
17 every 30 days on that turn.
18 I wrote to Governor Bowen, then Governor Bowen of
19 Indiana, and suggested that they use the ramp chevrons which
20 indicate to you that you keep turning and don't speed up
21 where you logically would think you might.
22 He turned it over to his highway department, and

1 after 50 days of due consideration he wrote back and told me
2 they reported that those -- according to regulation could
3 only be used on ramps to highways.
4 That very day I received that letter one more man
5 was killed on that curve, and I picked up the phone and
6 called the Governor and said, "Are you ready to employ a
7 little common sense?" He said, "Quite."
8 And they put the chevrons up. There has not been
9 an accident, let alone a fatality since, and that's several
10 years ago.
11 So I implore the Commission do the practical thing
12 here. Help the Navy. Help the country, which includes
13 Indianapolis. Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you. Thank you very
15 much, Congressman. We appreciate Representative Jacobs'
16 contribution. We're delighted to have Representative Tim
17 Hutchinson of the great state of Arkansas.
18 REPRESENTATIVE HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr.
19 Chairman. Let me first of all thank you, as chairman, for
20 your leadership on this important issue and the job that
21 you're doing.
22 During the few minutes that I have, I would like to

1 point out the adverse economic impact that the closure of
2 Fort Chaffee Arkansas would have not on the local communities
3 but rather on the training of our armed forces.
4 As you all know, as enunciated in the policy
5 guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense for the 1995 BRAC
6 round, it was directed that when reviewing the potential
7 action to be taken at a certain installation priority
8 consideration be given to the fundamental military criteria,
9 which includes the current and current mission requirements
10 and impact on operational readiness of the Department of
11 Defense total force, the availability and condition of land,
12 facilities and associated airspace at the potential receiving
13 locations and the cost and manpower applications.
14 There could be no doubt that if the annual training
15 which is currently conducted at Fort Chaffee is forced to be
16 relocated to another major training area that there will be
17 extensive additional costs involved.
18 In addition to the monetary increase, our reserve
19 component units would be faced with a loss of training time
20 due to additional travel coupled with the limited
21 availability of maneuver training areas at alternate sites.
22 It is also my understanding that these moves will

1 violate the travel requirements in United States Army Forces
2 Command National Guard Regulation 351.
3 It has been estimated that traveling to alternate
4 annual training sites will involve a minimum of two
5 additional training days per soldier per year. Obviously,
6 additional funds would be required to pay for these added
7 days.
8 And let us also not forget since these troops are
9 Reserve or National Guard units they're still held
10 accountable for the extra training days by their full-time
11 private sector employers.
12 Currently, the National Guard can operate Fort
13 Chaffee at a cost of $6.9 million a year. This includes real
14 property and operations maintenance costs for 1 million
15 square feet, an environmental and training area management of
16 62,000 acres.
17 If the National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve units
18 are forced to relocate to Fort Sill, the total funding
19 increase for annual individual training will be between $6.75
20 million and $11 million.
21 Relocation to Fort Riley, a distance which would,
22 in fact, preclude inactive duty training, annual costs could

1 exceed an additional expenditure by the Army of $3.5 million
2 per year.
3 A third option that has been mentioned is Fort
4 Polk, and it does not even have the facilities to train any
5 additional units from Fort Chaffee until the year 2001.
6 I'll tell you that these figures which I have used
7 were obtained from Army officials. Obviously, training and
8 readiness will be greatly degraded for those units that
9 normally drill at Fort Chaffee.
10 Also, the 188th Tactical Fighter Group, which is
11 based at the Fort Smith Airport, would have to have their
12 training areas reassigned with projected cost increases of
13 over $900,000 annually to utilize the nearest alternate
14 aerial bombing or strafing site.
15 This figure does not reflect additional cost of
16 other aerial component units training at alternate sites.
17 The need for sufficient training areas for the reserve
18 components was recognized by the Director of the U.S. Army
19 National Guard, Major General John Derouge, and the Director
20 of Management for the Office of the Army Chief of Staff,
21 Brigadier General James Shane during a meeting on June 8th
22 with staff members of your Commission.

1 At that meeting Major General Derouge contended
2 that he, "Needs ranges, maneuver training areas and impact
3 areas for individual and unit training on weekends." These
4 Army officials stated that in fact their recommendation to
5 the Department of Defense did not include the words "training
6 areas" as part of the enclave because they were inadvertently
7 edited out.
8 In addition, the Army representative stated that
9 the Department has identified $20 million to pay for enclave
10 expenses at several major training areas to include Fort
11 Chaffee. Brigadier General Shane stated at the completion of
12 the meeting that, "The Army as an obligation to ensure that
13 the National Guard and the Reserve can train." I strongly
14 concur with General Shane's observation.
15 In conclusion, let me say that clearly the
16 statements by these officials demonstrate that Fort Chaffee
17 can continue to provide the necessary facilities to allow for
18 the proper training of our armed forces.
19 Being that the Army has already determined how to
20 allocate the funding for keeping this post operating, our
21 nation will be the loser of our armed services are denied the
22 opportunity to use the unique training areas provided by the

1 post.

2 I believe that a rigorous cost benefit analysis

3 will reveal that the long-term cost of a shutdown of Fort

4 Chaffee will far exceed any apparent short-term savings.

5 Therefore, Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I

6 strongly urge you to keep this valuable training installation

7 available to our citizen soldiers, and I thank you.

8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Hutchinson, we're

9 indebted to you for that very fine contribution on behalf of

10 the great state of Arkansas. And we're pleased to have with

11 us the Distinguished Congressman from the great state of

12 California, Congressman Steve Horn.

13 REPRESENTATIVE HORN: Nice to see you again, Mr.

14 Chairman, and Commissioners and all visitors to Long Beach.

15 We're going to get the Chairman there yet.

16 I represent the 38th Congressional District of

17 California that includes the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, which

18 is the closest public shipyard to the largest fleet

19 concentration in the world with over 70 percent of the

20 Pacific Fleet home ported just 81 nautical miles away.

21 I'm concerned that the Navy and the Department of

22 Defense substantively deviated from the future force

1 structure plan and the preestablished final selection
2 criteria when they made the recommendation to close Long
3 Beach.
4 First, the Navy uses a new force structure plan as
5 the justification for no longer needing Dry Dock No. 1. In
6 1991 and 1993, the Navy stated that Dry Dock No. 1 was
7 essential as the primary West Coast aircraft carrier emergent
8 dry dock and that the Navy could not fulfill its Pacific
9 Fleet mission requirement without Dry Dock No. 1.
10 What has changed? Frankly, nothing. There are
11 still six carriers in the Pacific Fleet. The percentage of
12 large deck ships in the new force structure is increasing.
13 Dry Dock No. 1 is one of only two dry docks on the entire
14 West Coast capable of docking every ship in the Navy.
15 Without Long Beach a carrier would have to travel
16 1,100 nautical miles to Puget Sound from San Diego or 2,600
17 nautical miles to Pearl Harbor for repair, and they can't
18 handle the work they already have on time.
19 It is essential that the Long Beach Shipyard Dry
20 Dock No. 1 be kept open. History shows that mothballing or a
21 government-owned, contractor-operated approach for preserving
22 dry docks simply doesn't work.

1 Economic vitalization is denied a community which
2 has already lost thousands of jobs with the closure of the
3 naval station, the naval hospital and the economy generally,
4 and the Navy is unable to maintain the dry dock in a way that
5 would be of any value in a time of need. Once this asset is
6 lost, it's lost forever.
7 Second, the Navy justifies its recommendation to
8 close Long Beach and not Portsmouth Naval Shipyard by stating
9 that the future uncertainties of the force structure prevent
10 the closure of Portsmouth.
11 I'm not here to denigrate Portsmouth, but Public
12 Law 101.510, which is your charter, clearly states that the
13 force structure plan for Fiscal Years 1995 through 2001 are
14 not some mythical formulation, but that period is what counts
15 in the decision-making, and that's to be the basis for making
16 recommendations.
17 Third, the base structure analysis team developed
18 data call scenarios, military value criteria and then
19 evaluation criteria in a manner that was prejudicial and
20 caused Long Beach's initial value scores to be lower by over
21 10 points in 1995.
22 The Department of Defense did not establish new

1 selection criteria between 1993 and 1995, yet only Long
2 Beach's military value scores substantially changed from its
3 consistent position as a strong third in military value
4 behind only Puget Sound and Norfolk. What has changed?
5 Nothing.
6 Fourth, the Navy badly underestimated the cost of
7 closure at only $74.5 million with an immediate break-even
8 point and a 20-year return on investment of at least $1.9
9 billion. Internal Navy documents reveal something else, a
10 budget request of 433 million or six times the amount now
11 claimed by the Navy to this Commission.
12 Neither the Navy's fictional figure given to you
13 and the rest of us nor its partially realistic internal
14 figure includes over 500 million of additional workers's
15 compensation. Neither their fictional one or the real one in
16 their files from the shipyard doesn't say a thing about the
17 half billion dollars in worker's comp costs over 20 years.
18 Ask Charleston, ask Mare Island what those figures
19 meant and what they are now when they were closed. Using the
20 realistic cost of closure numbers, a break-even point is
21 about 40 years out rather than the Navy's claim of an
22 immediate return on investment.

1 Finally, the Navy recommended the closure of Long
2 Beach and not Portsmouth despite the fact that the Navy
3 consistently in 1991, 1993, now 1995 ranked Long Beach higher
4 in military value than Portsmouth.
5 The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria are weighted
6 heavily toward military value, as they should be. The Navy
7 contends that nuclear issues significantly outweigh the
8 established selection criteria. Therefore, Portsmouth should
9 not be closed.
10 Since this is a substantial deviation from the
11 established selection criteria, if Portsmouth remains open,
12 then Long Beach should also remain open. Is the Commission
13 ready to close the one public shipyard that complied with the
14 Department of Defense guidance to install more efficient
15 management and reduce overhead, the only public shipyard to
16 return money to the taxpayers six years in a row?
17 Long Beach is the only public shipyard operating in
18 the black. If closed, what kind of a message does that send
19 to the taxpayers of the United States and those in charge of
20 other federal facilities that are attempting to become more
21 efficient?
22 And it's the only yard within 1,100 miles of the

1 largest ship concentration in the Pacific that can dry dock
2 the carriers and amphibious ships that are the heart of our
3 force projection capability in the Pacific.
4 On the merits, based on the military criteria, Long
5 Beach deserves to stay open. It's an irreplaceable asset
6 that we cannot afford to lose, and I thank you very much for
7 the opportunity.
8 Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a letter to the
9 Commissioners for the record with a few attachments,
10 including the law that guides the Commission with which I'm
11 sure you're familiar, but I think you will find the
12 attachments that spell out the substantial deviation most
13 helpful, and I believe staff has it here.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have the letter. Thank you,
15 Representative Horn.
16 REPRESENTATIVE HORN: You have it. Very good. I
17 thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know and I'm confident
18 in this group you're going to do the right thing. Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Horn. And
20 we're delighted to have the Distinguished Congressman from
21 the great state of Connecticut, Representative Chris Shays.
22 REPRESENTATIVE SHAYS: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman

1 and members of the Committee. I appreciate you for all your
2 hard work and the tough decisions you'll be making. And let
3 me say to you that whatever your decision on the issue that
4 I'm most concerned with, and that's Allied Signal, I intend
5 to support the process and know that we've all been given a
6 fair hearing and hope you agree with my conclusions. But
7 whatever they are, I intend to support the Base Closing Bill.
8 Chairman Dixon and members of the Commission, I
9 appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today
10 regarding the recommendation to close the Stratford Army
11 Engine Plant. This is an extremely important issue not only
12 to the state of Connecticut but to our country, and that's
13 the reason for which I'm here.
14 As I'm sure you are aware, Connecticut as a
15 distinguished history of contributing to our national
16 defense. From aircraft to tanks and submarines, Connecticut
17 plays an integral role in maintaining our national security.
18 At a time of scarce resources and absolute
19 necessity for the implementation of a plan to balance the
20 budget, we must explore every option to help in achieving
21 this goal. Your efforts and suggestions will play,
22 obviously, a major role in this effort.

1 I've repeatedly opposed increases in national
2 defense spending and feel Congress has an historic
3 opportunity to make meaningful reductions in the amount of
4 money we spend on defense, hence my support for the concept
5 and your efforts.
6 And there is little doubt military spending will
7 decrease in real terms over the coming years, I think also in
8 absolute terms, obviously.
9 Make no mistake, I support a strong national
10 defense and believe our forces should be prepared to deal
11 with whatever threats they may face, but the Cold War is over
12 and America has won.
13 The fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the
14 Warsaw Pact, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the spread
15 of democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics are
16 harbingers of a new era.
17 Now we can and should reduce defense spending and
18 determine the best way in which we can save money. However,
19 it must be done in a fashion which preserves our national
20 security interests and realigns military objectives to meet
21 the threats of the post Cold War era.
22 The Stratford Army Engine Plant is a perfect

1 example of how we can achieve both. As you are aware from
2 the May 5th presentation in New York Stratford is just more
3 than just a tank engine plant.
4 Not only are products manufactured exclusively for
5 the military, such as the AGT 1500 engine used in the Abrams
6 Tank M-1 produced at the plant, engines like the LF-507 Turbo
7 Fan which powers the Averroe regional jet aircraft are also
8 built at this site.
9 Through a dual use program, Allied Signal, which
10 conducts operations in the facility, has the ability to
11 produce engines for both the military and commercial sector,
12 and by next year they expect to have a production rate of at
13 least 70 percent commercial and 30 percent military. We
14 think it may actually go up to 80 percent commercial.
15 As you also know from the New York presentation,
16 Stratford has taken steps to downsize while maintaining its
17 ability to produce these necessary products. This plan will
18 reduce military production capacity from 200 to 10 engines
19 per month, cut the occupied area from 1.8 million to 1
20 million square feet and decrease the number of machines owned
21 by both Allied Signal and the Army by nearly 50 percent.
22 As a result, the costs are expected to be cut in

1 half. Aside from making an effort to diversify Stratford,
2 it's extremely important that we remember -- and this is the
3 key point, I think -- the value this plant has to the
4 military.
5 It is the only plant that produces vital parts such
6 as the recuperative plates for the AGT 1500 and is the source
7 of repair parts for the engine, which is expected to be in
8 service for at least 30 more years.
9 While the Army may suggest it has the capability to
10 repair engines elsewhere, I believe this point proves that
11 theory incorrect. While I was not at the hearing in New York
12 last month, I'm aware of Commissioner Cornella's questions
13 regarding the amount of time an overhauled engine can last.
14 I believe the response of between 1,200 and 1,300
15 hours if done in Stratford compared to 400 hours in completed
16 at the Alabama depot again illustrates the value of this
17 facility.
18 As you may know, many of the machines needed to
19 produce the engines, such as the AGT 1500 and aviation
20 products, are owned by Allied Signal and that most are used
21 for the production of both. They use the machine to produce
22 both. Therefore, the Army would be unable to separate this

1 manufacturing capability and, obviously, the cost savings as
2 well.
3 With all the concerns associated with closing the
4 plant, including its military value and the cost of closing
5 it -- excuse me. With all the concerns associated with
6 closing the plant, including its military value and the cost
7 of closing it and reconstituting its capabilities to other
8 areas, I don't believe it would be in our best interests, our
9 country's best interests.
10 I don't see the logic behind the Army's suggestion
11 that they close the plant. Simply stated, I believe the Army
12 has miscalculated the true costs and benefits of closing this
13 facility and request that you reject its proposal to do so,
14 and I thank you both, all three.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
16 Congressman Shays, for that important contribution on behalf
17 of the great state of Connecticut. And we're now delighted
18 to hear from the Distinguished Senior Senator from the state
19 of Alaska.
20 And as he moves towards the podium, I want to say I
21 thank him for the book on the 1,000 Mile War. That war began
22 53 years and 10 days ago on June 3, 1942, when the Japanese

1 bombed Alaska and killed 25 Americans in a barracks, and also
2 the second largest number of people on both sides in the
3 Pacific Theater next to Iwo Jima was lost in the great state
4 of Alaska. I read the book from cover to cover. Excellent
5 book. I thank my friend from Alaska.
6 SENATOR MURKOWSKI: It was a good book. That
7 gentleman went on to be a good novelist. Thank you very
8 much.
9 Let me commend you and your staff for the fine work
10 you've done to try and make this a fair process. Since the
11 regional hearing in San Francisco, I've worked with the Delta
12 Junction Community members on serious concerns over the
13 realignment of Fort Greely.
14 Congressman Don Young testified before you
15 yesterday. I'll try not to duplicate his comments. My point
16 is this is not just a realignment. It really is the closing
17 of a small community in a remote part of the United States
18 that is economically dependent upon the Department of
19 Defense.
20 Fort Greely provides the Army with a training and
21 testing base that is roughly half the size of the state of
22 New Jersey, a post in which varied terrain and arctic

1 conditions provide a real ability to train our troops for
2 winter warfare.
3 It permits rigorous testing of advanced weapons and
4 supports systems in an arctic weather environment which
5 cannot be replicated in a test chamber. The proposal before
6 you has been called a safari concept. It attempts to operate
7 the missions currently performed at Fort Greely, particularly
8 training and testing, from Fort Wainwright.
9 Common sense dictates that this is an inefficient
10 system and destroys the training proficiency of the
11 operation. There is also one overriding significant obstacle
12 to the Fort Greely scenario, because the bulk of the safari
13 concept will take place during our long, dark Alaska winter.
14 It is night all along, all night up there. It's dark all
15 night up there during the period of this time.
16 Transiting 120 miles to and from the Greely
17 training area in subzero temperatures in nighttime
18 conditions, coping with ice, fog and snowy conditions is like
19 traveling the distance between the snowy shores of Lake
20 Michigan in Chicago and the place I was born in Indianapolis.
21 You now how far away that is.
22 Now, they would do that on a steady basis. More

1 importantly, from a human perspective, the safari concept
2 adds further risk to our men and women who are required to
3 shift their operations back and forth between these two
4 bases.
5 You've also heard about the devastating impact of
6 this proposed realignment on the community from Don Young, as
7 I said, the significant loss of jobs and economic viability,
8 but the overall economic impact on this community is a
9 staggering 70 percent.
10 I don't think there is any other base realignment
11 or closure concept before the Commission that hits that
12 level. 70 percent of the economy of this area will be
13 eliminated. As you know, that is a real difficult
14 proposition.
15 If it were a true realignment, the community would
16 not face extinction. I ask you to examine, really, this
17 catastrophic impact on this community and see if something
18 can't be done.
19 I think there are alternatives to realignment,
20 retaining portions of the mission at Fort Greely. I think it
21 could be largely a governmental-civilian operation retaining
22 the core functions currently performed at Fort Greely and

1 keep them there without the costs that have been indicated be
2 necessary at Fort Wainwright.
3 We became aware recently of significant military
4 construction requirements that the Army in Alaska say are
5 necessary if this realignment takes place. That raise
6 serious concerns over the true cost of the program.
7 I've asked that that memo be made available to you
8 and your staff, and I've asked the General Accounting Office
9 to review the discrepancy in the information that has been
10 provided to us from the various portions of the Army. But
11 the specific details of the Army's plan need, I think, review
12 by the Commission, and I would urge you to do so.
13 In closing, if you find it absolutely essential to
14 realign this community, at a minimum, I implore you to look
15 at the realignment time line as proposed by the Army.
16 The Army now plans to abandon the facilities at
17 Fort Greely during the next Alaskan winter. Hundreds of
18 millions of dollars in investments made over the years in
19 this base infrastructure will be destroyed in a matter of
20 months.
21 This effectively eliminates any real chance for the
22 community of Delta Junction to develop a reuse plan for those

1 facilities. To abandon them in the middle of an Arctic
2 winter is just wrong. I think that you could adopt some fair
3 form of the Army's realignment but direct that it take place
4 solely so that the place can be kept in good operating
5 condition and the plans can be made in the following summer.
6 Again, I appreciate your courtesy in allowing me to
7 be here. It's a tough job that you have, and I commend you
8 for doing it. Thank you very much.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank my friend, the
10 Distinguished Senior Center from the great state of Alaska
11 for his great presentation today, for the book and for his
12 friendship. Thank you very much, Senator.
13 We're delighted to have -- I'm going to ask that my
14 colleagues indulge me. Congressman Solomon Ortiz has been
15 waiting here a while. We're going to call him. Congressman
16 Solomon Ortiz. I want to give my colleague from Illinois a
17 moment to catch his breath. Congressman Ortiz.
18 REPRESENTATIVE ORTIZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
19 Commissioners. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
20 you this afternoon. I will focus on those facilities that
21 have been impacted by the Department of Navy's base closure
22 recommendations, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi and Naval

1 Air Station Kingsville.

2 Naval Air Station Kingsville with its outlying
3 field and its neighbor, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, can
4 meet the single-sited T-45 strike training needs of the Navy,
5 offers best weather, uncongested airspace, plenty of runways,
6 good outlying fields, protected from infringement, access to
7 over-water training areas, strong community support and its
8 highest naval air training rating make this statement
9 possible, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.

10 I am aware that criticism for the Navy plan has
11 surfaced regarding the ability of the South Texas complex to
12 meet this single-sited T-45 strike requirement. Using the
13 most conservative capacity estimate of the most expensive
14 training requirements with generous surge included, South
15 Texas remains the most cost-effective alternative for advance
16 strike training for the Navy.

17 Careful analysis the demonstrate that Naval Air
18 Station Kingsville and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi have
19 sufficient capacity to meet the strike training needs of the
20 Navy. Should the Commission have concern about this ability,
21 I would suggest that the OLF, a current Navy asset could be
22 used for surge capability.

1 Naval Air Station Kingsville is the Navy's finest
2 pilot training facility with tremendous capacity and growth
3 potential. NAS Corpus Christi has consistently demonstrated
4 superior military value and versatile utility for our
5 nation's military.
6 It is home to the three aviator training
7 essentials, uncongested airspace, good weather and plenty of
8 concrete for runways and outlying fields. It is a federal
9 complex housing 47 tenant commands, including Customs, the
10 Coast Guard, a major joint DOD research center and the Corpus
11 Christi Army Depot, the world's largest helicopter repair
12 facility.
13 In addition to its current mission as an
14 Undergraduate Pilot Training base for Navy, Marine and Air
15 Force pilots, NAS Corpus Christi serves as the home to the
16 Navy Mine Warfare Command. It is a key component in the
17 ongoing Navy plan to establish a center of excellence for
18 mine warfare in South Texas that combines all elements of
19 mine warfare training and operations in a central location.
20 The Navy has recommended the transfer of its West
21 Coast mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi in
22 support of the mine warfare center of excellence. I strongly

1 endorse this proposal which serves to advance the Navy's plan
2 to co-locate its mine warfare assets to secure maximized
3 training opportunities and operational advantages.
4 This is a small redirect action that is
5 noncontroversial and reaps enormous economic benefits for the
6 taxpayer.
7 I strongly support the retention of the T-44, move
8 the engine training at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi.
9 Joint multi-engine maritime training with the Air Force has
10 already begun at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi.
11 In those studies of maritime training conducted by
12 the Department of Defense, NAS Corpus Christi has the highest
13 military value. The T-44 used for multi-engine training is
14 already single-sited at NAS Corpus Christi in compliance with
15 the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Navy policies
16 that functional pilot training be consolidated.
17 Transfer of this undergraduate training function
18 could only result in disruption to pilot training pipelines,
19 duplication of facilities and expenses and the unnecessary
20 incurring of a significant military construction cost.
21 The increased NFO PTR requirements and ongoing
22 activities at NAS Pensacola make the transfer of the T-44

1 mission to Pensacola quite complex, most unsafe and
2 impossible from a capacity standpoint.
3 The Navy's substantially deviates from the base
4 closure criteria in recommending the transfer of the T-44,
5 and I urge you to reject this portion of the Navy's proposal.
6 The South Texas community has reluctantly decided not to
7 oppose the transfer of primary pilot training from NAS Corpus
8 Christi to NAS Whiting Field in order to accommodate the
9 single-siting of primary air training.
10 I support the analysis that asserts that both
11 strike training and primary training may be consolidated
12 based on the 1994 PTR rates with a reasonable surge.
13 However, it must be noted that the single-siting of primary
14 air training results in a much tighter management of aviation
15 assets that the single-siting of advanced strike training
16 since a much greater access capacity currently exists in the
17 training facility.
18 I want to briefly discuss, and I'll finish in a few
19 seconds, the Navy recommendation to realign NAS Corpus
20 Christi to a naval air facility in support of NAS Kingsville.
21 This seems like an internal Navy decision on the operational
22 status of this facility.

1 However, let me suggest that this may, in fact,
2 hinder the future operation of the base and the well-being of
3 numerous tenants. The recommendation to realign Naval Air
4 Station Corpus Christi to a naval air facility is based on
5 its proposed status as an outlying field.
6 However, I do not believe that this proposal takes
7 into full consideration the complexity of the base as a
8 federal facility. I appreciate the Commission listening to
9 me today, Mr. Senator, Mr. Commissioner.
10 Good to see some of my friends on the Commission,
11 and I know and I have all the faith that you will do what is
12 best or our country, and I just wanted to relay some of our
13 concerns of my constituents back in South Texas.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
15 Ortiz. We're delighted to have you. We're pleased to
16 welcome the Distinguished Congressman from the great state of
17 Illinois, Congressman Dick Durbin.
18 REPRESENTATIVE DURBIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 Let me at the outset thank both you, Mr. Kling, whom I know,
20 and the other members of the Commission for your service to
21 your country in this regard. It is a momentous task, and we
22 are most appreciative of the public service which you are

1 rendering.

2 I might say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, this last
3 Sunday in a paper you're familiar with, the St. Louis Post
4 Dispatch, there was an excellent article printed about the
5 two facilities that I'm discussing by Mr. Harry Levins,
6 including a very nice picture of the Chairman, and I would
7 recommend it to you, and I'll leave it if you would like to
8 look at it informally or as part of the record, because I
9 think it sets out in detail the importance of the two
10 facilities I'll discuss today.

11 These facilities are the Aviation Troop Command,
12 better known as ATCOM, in St. Louis, and the Charles Melvin
13 Price Support Center in Granite City. I am from the Illinois
14 side of the river, but we have a regional approach to these
15 issues as we did with Metrolink and many others, and we are
16 hoping that your Commission will view this as a regional
17 asset in both instances.

18 The Army's recommendation to close ATCOM and
19 realign the Price Center does not fairly and accurately
20 represent the military value of these facilities and
21 exaggerates the resulting return on investment.

22 To follow an admonition I have given so many

1 witnesses, I will, in fact, condense my remarks which are
2 made part of this record and just say to you that I believe
3 that at the outset the Army's recommendation to close ATCOM
4 exaggerates the savings in annual overhead cost.
5 The original estimate of 17.6 million has now been
6 re-estimated to 3.5 million. In addition, the close of ATCOM
7 is premature and would cost more than $100 million in moving
8 and relocation costs, and it would place the Army's aviation
9 mission in turmoil at this moment when, in fact, this
10 decision should be deferred until after the Department of
11 Defense has decided on a site for department-wide aviation
12 acquisition organization.
13 On the Price Support Center named after a mutual
14 friend of ours who gave a life of public service in support
15 of the armed services, I would say that I hope you'll
16 consider that the estimated cost of realigning the Price
17 Center would result in savings of 8.6 million a year, and, in
18 fact, the Army has over estimated these savings by about 6
19 million.
20 First, the Army estimated savings of 1.8 million
21 for closing the military family housing. Local data has
22 assigned the figure of 1 million instead of 1.8.

1 Second, the Army failed to take into account the
2 cost of relocating the Price Support Center families which
3 would be about $1.45 million.
4 Third, the Army did not include the reimbursable
5 amount they now receive from tenants, which is almost $1
6 million a year. In fact, the Army has admitted to the
7 Commission is miscalculated the savings of realigning the
8 Price Center over the implementation period by $10 million
9 from an original estimate of 35 million to a revised estimate
10 of 25 million.
11 In sum, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,
12 the best alternative for the Army is not to close ATCOM or
13 the Price Support Center. The best alternative is to
14 establish an aviation command in St. Louis and retain the
15 Price Support Center.
16 I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you. I
17 urge the Commission to reject the Army's recommendations, and
18 I ask that my written remarks be entered in the record of
19 this hearing.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you so much, Congressman
21 Dick Durbin, the Congressman from the great state of
22 Illinois, and his remarks will be reproduced in the record in

1 full. Will staff please obtain the remarks from the
2 Distinguished Congressman. Thank you very much, Congressman
3 Durbin.
4 And we're delighted to have Congressman Norm Mineta
5 from the great state of California.
6 REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: Mr. Chairman, if I might
7 approach the desk to give you a report, sir?
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Norm.
9 REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: Mr. Chairman and members of
10 the Commission, it really does give me an honor and a
11 privilege to have this opportunity to appear before you
12 today.
13 Mr. Chairman, I am here this evening to bring to
14 your attention information which seriously calls to question
15 the credibility of the Air Force and unless acted upon would
16 challenge the credibility of the BRAC process.
17 The Department of Defense's recommendation that the
18 750th Space Group "realigned" to Falcon Air Station should be
19 described as what it is, a base closure. There are three
20 principal occupants at Onizuka Air Force Base, and the DOD
21 recommendation calls for two to move and one to eventually
22 disappear.

1 Specifically, under the DOD recommendation, the
2 750th is being realigned to Falcon. The research group or
3 Detachment 2, will move to another facility in a "non-BRAC
4 action." And the remaining top secret tenants will remain at
5 Onizuka until no longer needed and then just go away.
6 Under any definition that I can imagine, the
7 absence of all units from a facility is a closure, and that
8 is exactly what is going on here.
9 Mr. Chairman, let me explain why the Air Force has
10 gone to such lengths to define its request as a realignment
11 and not as a closure. Just last year the Air Force studied
12 the cost of closing Onizuka. It studied five options for
13 relocating the three units at that facility.
14 This very Air Force study, which I have before me
15 right now and have now handed to the Chair of the Commission,
16 shows that the one-time costs of closing Onizuka is $699
17 million.
18 Mr. Chairman, the reason the DOD recommendation
19 with regard to Onizuka Air Station is being called a
20 realignment is the Air Force knows how much it would cost to
21 close the base and to deal with each of its occupants, and it
22 is doing everything it can do define away those costs from

1 the start.

2 It is the responsibility of this Commission to

3 honestly consider the impact of a DOD recommendation on the

4 taxpayers both financially and from a national security

5 perspective.

6 The study I have before me shows that the Air Force

7 knows exactly how much its request would cost and is

8 attempting to redefine the effort in such a way to hide its

9 worst problems.

10 The numbers in this study must be seriously

11 examined, and we must recognize that what is being requested

12 is really a stealth closure and not a realignment. Mr.

13 Chairman, in my chairman, if it looks like a duck, quacks

14 like a duck and walks like a duck it is probably a closure.

15 We strongly urge the Commission to consider how the

16 DOD recommendation actually differs from a base closure and

17 to then use the Air Force's own numbers to examine what the

18 true costs of a closure really are.

19 Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity

20 to appear before this very distinguished Commission to

21 testify this evening, and I really want to thank all of the

22 members of the Commission for the very, very hard work and

1 the time and the effort that you have put the last several
2 months in the issues that are facing this Commission and wish
3 to thank all of you for your very fine and hard work, and
4 thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much,
6 Congressman Norm Mineta, a Distinguished Member of the House
7 from the great state of California, and we welcome his
8 colleague and friend Representative Anna Eshoo from the great
9 state of California as well. We've heard her before. We
10 look forward to hearing her again.
11 REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
12 that warm welcome and to the members of the Commission. It's
13 wonderful to hear about the great states that we come from
14 and the great members of Congress that you think we are.
15 Let's hope that you find our testimony to be great and
16 important.
17 It's a privilege to appear before you once again,
18 and I'd like to follow-up on some of the points my colleague,
19 Congressman Mineta, did make. I want to express to you how
20 troubled I am by the actions of the Defense Department,
21 specifically the Air Force, with respect to Onizuka Air Force
22 Base and the implications it has for our nation's

1 intelligence gathering capabilities.

2 I think that we had a very fine discussion on this

3 very issue when you were in California, and I think very

4 important groundwork was laid on this very point.

5 Throughout this process, the Air Force has provided

6 us with a set of costs that show the saves our government

7 could make by closing Onizuka. In March, my staff directly

8 asked the Air Force for any other studies that were done by

9 them, and we told there were none.

10 Again in April, Senator Fienstein's staff asked the

11 Air Force in writing whether there were any studies done on

12 the costs of closing Onizuka. Both times the Air Force said

13 there were none, yet last week Mr. Mineta and I received an

14 Air Force report -- and not from the Air Force, obviously --

15 which demonstrates that just last year the Air Force did a

16 study on closing Onizuka, and the costs were astronomically

17 higher than the figures we had been given.

18 Not only does it show there are no savings in

19 closing or even realigning Onizuka, it shows that unless

20 there is some magic bullet developed our intelligence

21 gathering capabilities would be more costly and less

22 efficient.

1 Essentially, the Air Force says not to worry, and
2 although we didn't tell you about this report, which
3 contradicts our own numbers, it doesn't matter because we
4 will have a classified capability that makes the report you
5 found out about insignificant.
6 I ask can the Air Force guarantee this capability
7 by the time the President must decide to proceed with an
8 Onizuka mothballing? Evidently, the answer is no.
9 Mr. Chairman and Commission members, as recently as
10 two months ago the GAO criticized the Air Force for its
11 credibility regarding figures it has provided in the BRAC
12 process. Now again there is another case of the Air Force
13 essentially boiling the books.
14 In the process, a United States Senator and at
15 least a few members of Congress were misled, and upon further
16 inquiry regarding the conflicting cost figures that the Air
17 Force has given us they are relying on unfounded assumptions
18 that it will be capable of providing an architecture that
19 would reduce costs, an architecture which intelligence
20 sources raise serious questions as to estimates of
21 operational capability with respect to the so-called savings
22 that would be realized under the Onizuka closure.

1 Mr. Chairman, I know that the Commission works
2 under a strong mandate to reduce defense costs while ensuring
3 a strong national defense. I support your mission, and my
4 support must include the Commission closing redundant and
5 unnecessary facilities throughout this country, including my
6 district.
7 But in fact the operations at Onizuka Air Force
8 Base are very different, but in the name of savings for its
9 own line item, the Air Force has provided an incomplete
10 picture and faulty numbers to Congress and to the Commission
11 itself.
12 Its answer to substantive questions about real
13 costs is to assert it will have an R&D answer by the time we
14 need it. I urge the Commission to reject this approach and
15 require the DOD to provide a more convincing fiscal case
16 before indeed our intelligence gathering capabilities are
17 reduced.
18 The Air Force has made its choice how it wants to
19 proceed in this manner. I believe that BRAC must insist on
20 more. Thank you once again for the opportunity to provide
21 testimony to you and for the work that you are engaged in. I
22 know that it is difficult, but I trust that your judgment

1 will be a sound one. Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we appreciate very much your

3 valuable contribution, Representative Eshoo and you and your

4 colleagues who have so ably contributed to our efforts on

5 behalf of the great state of California. Thank you very

6 much.

7 REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO: Thank you.

8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Dan Burton of the

9 great state of Indiana.

10 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Great state of Indiana,

11 Senator.

12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good to see you, Dan.

13 Representative Burton.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Thank you, Senator. I want

15 to thank you and the committee for permitting me to testify

16 before you this evening. I appreciate the opportunity to

17 support a very innovative and unique privatization proposal

18 for the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis.

19 This proposal was developed by an Indianapolis task

20 force which included Mayor Goldsmith and has received

21 positive reaction from the highest levels of the Pentagon and

22 I believe from BRAC Commissioner Lee Kling, who I see here

1 today and had an opportunity to meet with when he was out in
2 Indianapolis.
3 In fact, I have in front of me a letter from
4 Richard Dansig, the Undersecretary of the Navy, that he has
5 forwarded to you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Dixon, which
6 expresses the Navy's interest in working with the City of
7 Indianapolis on this plan.
8 As some of you may know, I have been a fiscally
9 conservative member of Congress, and I consistently look for
10 ways to eliminate the wasteful use of taxpayers' dollars.
11 The partnership plan for the Naval Air Warfare Center I
12 believe does exactly that.
13 It actually saves more money, it saves more money
14 than the DOD's recommendation to completely close the
15 facility. The actual cost for closing the Naval Air Warfare
16 Center in Indianapolis is $226 million or almost three times
17 what the DOD estimate in its most costly COBRA analysis.
18 We are not talking about small change here. We're
19 talking about an unnecessary, and I want to emphasize
20 unnecessary, expenditure of 184 million taxpayers' dollars if
21 the DOD plan is used.
22 On the other hand, by complementing the partnership

1 plan, the costs of closure are reduced by that $184 million.
2 Under the partnership plan, the implementation time is also
3 much shorter. It is hard to understand implementing a plan
4 which will cost taxpayers an unnecessary $150 million when
5 there is an alternative plan which will save $184 million.
6 I have two requests for you, the members of the
7 BRAC Commission, today. First, I request that the Commission
8 alter the present DOD recommendation by inserting the
9 partnership plan in its place. At the very least, the
10 Commission must make it clear that the partnership proposal
11 is the preferred closure option.
12 The Commission has nothing to lose by doing this.
13 The plan saves taxpayers' dollars. Technically, a closure
14 has been achieved, and the plan will protect and preserve a
15 very vital part of our national security and, I might add,
16 the jobs of nearly 2,500 of my constituents.
17 And second, I request the Commission establish a
18 time frame in which the negotiations between the city and the
19 Navy must occur, perhaps maybe a year. This would set a time
20 period within which the Navy and the city would be required
21 to structure the agreement upon which the partnership must be
22 based.

1 These are two significant requests but are both
2 within the scope and jurisdiction of your Commission. I hope
3 you agree this alternative makes good sense and that you will
4 look with favor on this proposal. And with that,
5 Mr. Chairman, I'll be happy to try to answer any questions
6 you might have.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have no questions,
8 Representative Burton. We are very much aware of the plan,
9 and we appreciate your valuable contribution. It's under
10 serious consideration.
11 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Thank you very much.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very kindly. We're
13 delighted to have my old friend the great Congressman from
14 the great state of Florida, Representative Sam Gibbons. Good
15 to see you, Sam.
16 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Mr. Chairman and
17 Commissioner Kling, I first of all want to thank you for the
18 job you're doing for our country. It's very important, and
19 we know you'll do a good job. Secondly -- I've found
20 somebody's glasses here. I don't know whose they are.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: As the sign of an honest
22 politician, he found some glasses, and he's going to return

1 them to the proper source. This will be in your credit, Sam.

2 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: All right. Thank you. I

3 represent MacDill Air Force Base. I am from Tampa, Florida,

4 and obviously I am here to talk about MacDill. And all I ask

5 you to do about MacDill is to follow the request of the

6 Defense Department and of the Air Force.

7 The Air Force wants to keep MacDill open to provide

8 the services that they must provide for the two joint

9 commands that are headquartered at MacDill, Special

10 Operations Command and Central Command.

11 We're honored to have those two very important

12 installations there. They need an airport to accomplish

13 their mission. The cheapest and best way is to allow the Air

14 Force to continue, as has been recommended to you, to operate

15 that airfield and of course to allow the Commerce Department

16 to have their NOAA operations there, their air wing there.

17 There is plenty of room at MacDill. I helped build

18 it in 1939, opened it way back then. As a college student, I

19 laid concrete for those runways. I'm very familiar with it.

20 I became a second lieutenant on active duty there in 1941,

21 and I have had it as my charge ever since.

22 Plenty of room. If you want to put some more

1 tanker wings down there, we can take care of all of them that
2 you got, and as you know, the United States is short of
3 tanker wings in the southern part of the country, and the
4 northern part of the country is over tanker-winged according
5 to the DOD estimates.
6 So put as many tankers there as you want. We'll be
7 glad to take them all or anybody else that you got that you
8 need a home for and just do what the Department of Defense
9 has asked you to do as far as keeping MacDill open and
10 operated so Central Command and Special Operations Command
11 can both carry out their missions. Thank you very much. Any
12 questions, I'll be glad to answer them. It's nice to see you
13 back.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have no questions. We've been
15 down to your fine base and had a look at it. We thank you,
16 Representative Sam Gibbons, for your great contribution on
17 behalf --
18 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: And I assume that my
19 formal statement will be a part of the record.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your formal statement will be
21 reproduced in the record in full. Do we have it?
22 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Yes. If you don't, I will

1 hand you one right now.

2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, you're going to give it to

3 the director right there. You're giving it to the top dog.

4 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: All right. Good. Thank

5 you very much and have a nice day.

6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you. Good to see you,

7 Sam. Representative Gibbons?

8 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Yes, sir.

9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I just wanted to ask do you still

10 get any of that Schlitz around?

11 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: I've got cases of Schlitz

12 now, you know that?

13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I read that article. It's getting

14 kind of hard to get Schlitz. I was just wondering.

15 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Well, you know, I didn't

16 know they made Schlitz any more, Mr. Chairman. I was down at

17 the White House before the 50th anniversary of D-day. We

18 were supposedly briefing the President on what it was like,

19 and after the dinner the waiter came in with a silver tray,

20 and on the tray were two cans of Schlitz beer.

21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I love it.

22 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: So I took them back to

1 Normandy and drank them with my family at the same spot on
2 the road to where I had consumed the first ones 50 years ago.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: My god, you done the right thing,
4 Sam.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: This time I didn't leave
6 the empties, though.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Bless your bones.
8 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Good to see you.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Thank you, Sam. We're
10 delighted to have the Distinguished Congressman from the
11 great state of California, Congressman Rob Portman, here, and
12 we're pleased to hear from him.
13 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: Thank you, Senator. I'd
14 like to claim California as my own, but I'm actually from
15 Ohio.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, let the record show that
17 that's the first mistake the Chairman has made in about 46
18 years, and I want the record to be eminently clear now that I
19 charge my Commission to understand that this Distinguished
20 Congressman, Rob Portman, is from the great state of Ohio.
21 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: There you go. There you
22 go.

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: My apology to you, Congressman.

2 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: Not at all, Senator. I'm

3 just from the great Midwest like you, and I'm proud of it.

4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I can tell by the cut of

5 your jib.

6 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: There you go. I'm very

7 pleased to be here. Thank you for having me. I'm here to

8 talk about Brooks Air Force Base at San Antonio and Wright-

9 Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.

10 I don't represent Dayton Ohio. I do represent

11 Southwestern Ohio and have some interests in being sure that

12 Wright-Patterson continues to be a viable Air Force base and

13 continues to be given the responsibilities I think that it

14 deserves based on its rating.

15 And you've got a lot of tough decisions to be made

16 here. I served in the White House back in the Bush

17 Administration when the Base Closure Commission was first

18 getting going, and I understand I think as well as anybody

19 the need to keep it bipartisan, nonpartisan and apolitical,

20 and I think you should make the decisions on the merits and,

21 you know, there is a good reason to appoint an independent

22 commission, and I support entirely.

1 I applaud the Commission, in fact, for its role. I
2 think you've been a very constructive force, and you've made
3 a lot of difficult decisions in terms of downsizing while
4 maintaining our readiness and modernization.
5 So I'm here today not to support a parochial view,
6 although I tend to think consolidation works better than
7 another but instead simply to urge you to act on the merits
8 in this situation, and that's what the Commission is all
9 about as I see it, and that's what you've done so well.
10 In accordance with BRAC, the Air Force has
11 determined that it's necessary to reduce its laboratory
12 research facilities around the country to carry out its
13 mission in the most thorough and cost-effective way, and I'm
14 sure you're very aware of that.
15 And to do this the Secretary of Defense has
16 recommended consolidating Brooks Air Force Base in San
17 Antonio with Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, in
18 Dayton, Ohio.
19 This decision I think is consistent with both the
20 long-term force structure plan as well as the selection
21 criteria under the Base Closure and Realignment Act. Indeed,
22 the Air Force has rated Wright-Pat as a Tier 1 base, and

1 Brooks was rated as a Tier 3 base.

2 Furthermore, the Air Force has indicated that
3 Wright-Patterson and the surrounding area have sufficient
4 level of qualified personnel, expertise, support, technical
5 facilities to incorporate the activities from Brooks at
6 Wright-Pat efficiently and effectively.

7 The one-time costs of closure and consolidation
8 should be more than offset by the long-term savings that the
9 study indicates that would be associated with reducing
10 personnel and reducing infrastructure.

11 The Air Force has also determined that
12 consolidation will eliminate almost twice as many positions
13 as the cantonment policy suggested by supporters of Brooks,
14 almost twice as many positions.

15 This fact in addition to the reduction in overhead
16 and other costs, is expected to result in an annual savings
17 of about $32 million compared with only $10.5 million in
18 annual savings associated with the other approach.

19 All of these are Air Force data, mind you, and they
20 aren't fine. It comes straight from DOD. The services,
21 including the Air Force, I think you've correctly been given
22 the discretion to determine how best to restructure forces in

1 a more efficient organization while preserving the ability to
2 protect our great nation, and in this case they've decided
3 that consolidation will result in the best military value for
4 the Air Force.
5 So I urge you to consider the merits of the cost-
6 effectiveness of the measure as you review the Air Force
7 recommendation in accordance with the Defense Base Closure
8 and Realignment Act.
9 Sound decisions are based on sound policy -- I
10 don't have to tell you all that -- divorced from politics,
11 and I know that you will carry out your responsibilities, but
12 I hope that in this case those sound decisions will help make
13 your recommendations and the work of this Commission all the
14 more credible and all the more persuasive to the American
15 people as we're going through this tough downsizing.
16 I thank you very much for allowing me to say a few
17 words here today, Senator.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Congressman Portman, thank
19 you very much. I'm sorry that I hadn't had the pleasure to
20 meet you during my service here, sir. You've made a very
21 fine presentation on your behalf and the State of Ohio. I'm
22 pleased to advise you you are the 200th member of the

1 Congress to come before this panel in a little over 20 hours
2 so far, and you've discharged your obligation very well, and
3 we thank you for it.
4 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: I think you are very
5 patient with us, and I appreciate you're getting the input.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
7 Portman. Ladies and gentlemen who have had the stamina to
8 stay -- I hope you guys are getting overtime over there at
9 that table. God bless you.
10 Now, we have two more coming, one member of the
11 House and one in the Senate, and they're on their way. And
12 should they show up in apt time, which I'm sure they will,
13 we're going to accommodate them.
14 Now, earlier in the day the great state of
15 Pennsylvania encountered difficulties because a substantial
16 number of members from the House were here and had to return
17 for a vote, and one of them demonstrating his devotion to his
18 district and his state, having sped back to the House, having
19 cast his vote, having served his constituency all day coming
20 back here tonight, and we're delighted to see Congressman
21 Phil English from the great state of Pennsylvania.
22 REPRESENTATIVE ENGLISH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 I'm grateful for the opportunity to testify, and I appreciate
2 the fact that the Base Closure and Realignment Commission has
3 to make some decisions that would challenge the wisdom of
4 Solomon. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf
5 of the Youngstown-Warren Air Reserve Station that currently
6 serves the Pennsylvania Chenango Valley.
7 I believe that this facility is a significant
8 resource for our national defense, and I believe my
9 colleague, Mr. Traficant, is going to be offering or has
10 offered testimony to the Commission to that effect.
11 What I wanted to do in support his comments, since
12 I cannot claim to be an expert on all aspects of military
13 preparedness, is to relay to the Commission the significance
14 of the Air Reserve base to the Mercer County Pennsylvania
15 community.
16 Over 400 reservists as well as nearly 150 civilian
17 employees from Pennsylvania work at or otherwise utilize the
18 910th. The Youngstown Air Reserve Station has become one of
19 the area's largest single employers, and its loss would have
20 serious consequences upon the local community and on the
21 regional economy.
22 I believe that one could compare the beneficial

1 effects of such a base on the local economy to that of a
2 significant company. This is particularly significant in
3 view of the fact that this region of Pennsylvania has
4 experienced a very substantial downturn in recent years and
5 hasn't fully recovered from the recession of the early 1980s.
6 I am here to emphasize the support and initiative
7 of the 910 personnel that they have given to their Air
8 Reserve station. They have an exceptional operational record
9 recognized regularly by the Department of Defense.
10 My view is that after reviewing the Youngstown Air
11 Reserve Station's military value, its capabilities and its
12 strong community support this Commission will see the merits
13 of its continued service.
14 Currently, the 910th Airlift Wing consists of two
15 tactical units, the 757th Airlift Squadron, the 773rd Airlift
16 Squadron as well as the Aerial Spray Branch and its
17 supporting units covering all facets of Air Force
18 requirements.
19 It is under the command of the 10th Air Force at
20 the Bergstrom Air Force Base in Texas and the Air Force
21 Reserve Headquarters at the Robins Air Force Base in Georgia.
22 To briefly give you a sense of its size, the

1 Youngstown Air Reserve Station employs nearly 500 people, is
2 utilized by 1,100 reservists, sits on 230 acres on the north
3 side of the Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport while using a
4 total of 1,300 acres when counting all of the facilities
5 used.
6 The mission of the 910 is two-fold. In wartime, it
7 deploys the C-130H in the combat operations of tactical
8 airlift. These operations include low-level infiltration
9 into combat environments where the aircraft can deliver
10 personnel and materials by airdrop and air-land techniques.
11 In peacetime, the Wing's mission is to direct the
12 organizing, equipping and training of Air Force Reserve air
13 crews in the tactical airlift tactics and techniques, and as
14 required, the unit will also be available to provide
15 nonmilitary humanitarian assistance.
16 In this capacity, since February of 1993, the 910
17 Air Wing has provided airlift and personnel for humanitarian
18 flights to Bosnia. Having offered this general testimony,
19 and I welcome you to review the balance of it in a
20 submission, I would love to field any questions you might
21 have and appreciate the opportunity to participate.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,

1 Congressman English, for your fine contribution. We thank
2 you for the statement you're placing in the record, and we
3 appreciate your efforts on behalf of your district and your
4 state. Thank you very much.
5 REPRESENTATIVE ENGLISH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
6 and again I appreciate all of the efforts of this Commission
7 and wish you well.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman. Now, let
9 me say that the man who will be last is a man from a family
10 that has always been first. What a great way to end two days
11 of hearings by having an old friend who is always first come
12 in here as our 202nd witness.
13 He is last but not least the great Senior Senator
14 from the great state of Massachusetts, Ted Kennedy.
15 SENATOR KENNEDY: What an introduction. We missed
16 you out in your home state yesterday, Mr. Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That's in your credit, Mr.
18 Senator, in your credit.
19 SENATOR KENNEDY: That's indiscreet for me to
20 mention that at this time I know I'm the last thing between
21 you and a wonderful dinner somewhere.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're quite right, Senator, and a

1 cold drink. Let your conscious be your guide.

2 SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, with that I will sit down,

3 I think. I'll just really take just a moment or two. First

4 of all, to thank all of you for the wonderful attention that

5 you've given in performing an extraordinarily national

6 service.

7 I think, Senator Dixon, and Lee Kling and General

8 Robles and General Davis have all had distinguished and

9 wonderful careers, and the fact that you've been willing to

10 run through this whole process and procedure you deserve the

11 highest commendations and the medals of our country for

12 service to our nation, and I say it very sincerely.

13 I thank you, and I want to thank Mr. Kling and

14 Generally Robles for coming up through Massachusetts, General

15 Davis as well. Every one in those communities are enormously

16 grateful, and they feel that you've given attention. You've

17 listened to their case.

18 I am a great believer in the case that has been

19 made and a great believer in the credibility of the case that

20 has been made, but I want to tell you that part of this whole

21 process was getting out and listening and asking people

22 questions and asking their participation. This really has

1 served the process well.

2 To you, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for presiding

3 over this. From the decks of the Intrepid to the halls here

4 in Congress, your service has been exemplary as always.

5 Let me just finally mention this. There was a

6 procedure that was established by the Defense Department that

7 believed it was in the best interest of the security of this

8 nation and that is that they were going to treat the reserve

9 bases and the active duty bases as two different kind of

10 entities, and they did so with the exception of the South

11 Weymouth.

12 As you well know and as the record as we've gone

13 over reflects, the Brunswick Station was to be closed, South

14 Weymouth to remain open, and then, on the basis of

15 interventions and, quite frankly, the CINCLAN Fleet's

16 opinions ought to be listened to.

17 But at other times when his advice was sought, it

18 had reached a different conclusion, and all we're saying is

19 that the record has been made or not made with regards to

20 that intervention we do not believe that this Commission

21 giving the consideration of all these other factors should

22 deviate from what has been a tested, tried, evaluated process

1 which says consider the active duty operation bases and
2 consider the reserve bases in a different scale.
3 Now, I'm not here to review where South Weymouth
4 comes out in the reserve bases other than to say it is a
5 superb base, and with regards to the manning issue, though
6 are men and women who are ready to serve the reserve
7 function.
8 There is no real competition between what is
9 available at South Weymouth and at other reserve bases. I
10 respect the demographic issue as it relates to other bases,
11 but with regards to the different criteria which were used in
12 terms of the reserve, that South Weymouth makes that and
13 makes it in a strong way.
14 What we are saying is that -- and I think General
15 Robles, Mr. Kling, General Davis when they were out there and
16 listened to the details and went through the various
17 presentations that were made to them in terms of the assets
18 of that base, and not to denigrate others, but the fact of
19 the matter is when you look at all the other reserve bases we
20 ought to be one that is maintained.
21 That was the initial recommendation. That is the
22 one that ought to be followed. If at some other time there

1 is going to be a different criteria in terms of bringing the
2 reserve in operation and bringing a different kind of
3 criteria, then so be it.
4 But to single this out as the only situation in the
5 whole BRAC procedure that deviates from the clear, specific
6 requirements which were established, and when the clear,
7 specific requirements were established they reached a certain
8 result, and when they circumvented those procedures, they
9 reached a certain result in the termination or the closing
10 will south Weymouth.
11 And we believe that we have a base with men and
12 women that will perform that function, the reserves, with
13 great distinction. I thank you very much. We have responded
14 to all of the various sort of questions. I thank the members
15 of the community, Representative Haley, the others that are
16 here.
17 I think Generally Robles, Mr. Kling, General Davis
18 would feel that in that time of that presentation really
19 important information and analysis was made available by
20 these really outstanding citizens.
21 As you know, Representative Haley flies planes as a
22 part of the military service, takes great pride, as all our

1 reservists do, but is someone who probably has assets in
2 terms of understanding these relationships with an insight
3 which is really very special and very unique.
4 And I want to thank him and to thank our whole
5 group very much for being here and yield whatever time
6 remains back to our Chair. I thank you very much. You're
7 wonderful to permit to me and the other members of the
8 Committee to testify, and we know whatever the results we've
9 been treated fairly and with respect, and we're very, very
10 grateful to you.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Senator, you continue to
12 give your complete devotion to your state. It honors us all
13 that you do that, and we thank you for coming here with your
14 friends on behalf of your great state of Massachusetts.
15 The great Senior Senator from Massachusetts,
16 Senator Ted Kennedy, leads me to say that this meeting is
17 adjourned.
18 (Whereupon, at 7:30 p.m., the meeting of the Base
19 Closure and Realignment Committee was adjourned.)
20 * * * * *