

FINAL

DEPOT MAINTENANCE
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS

GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. Mr. Klugh, please explain, in general terms, the Joint Cross Service Group study of depot maintenance.

We understand capacity was one of the most significant features of your study. Please describe current excess capacity in DoD facilities in percentage terms.

What is the excess capacity by Service and by depot?

What is the impact of DoD's BRAC recommendations on this excess capacity?

What would have been the impact on excess capacity if the Joint Cross Service alternatives had been accepted?

The Air Force's elimination of excess capacity requires reengineering of the core workload. What would the Air Force's excess capacity be if the reengineering can not be accomplished?

2. Mr. Klugh, please describe the concept of "maximum potential capacity".

Does maximum potential capacity require a second shift or military construction expenditures?

3. Mr. Klugh, describe how your Joint Cross Service Group assigned functional values to each of the depots and shipyards?

When assigning workload, how did the functional value scores impact the positioning of workload?

Please describe the "centers of excellence concept".

4. Mr. Klugh, what does the DoD BRAC recommendation do to your ability to inter-service depot maintenance work in the future?

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**CHART 1
EXPLANATION OF 8 JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP PROPOSALS**

**1995 DEPOT/SHIPYARD CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES**

Category	DoD	Cross-Service 1 Min Sites/Max Mil Value	Cross-Service 2 Min Excess Capacity
Army Depots	(C) Red River (R) Letterkenny	(C) Red River (C) Letterkenny	(C) Red River (C) Letterkenny
Navy Shipyards	(C) Long Beach	(C) Portsmouth (C) Pearl Harbor	*(C) Long Beach *(C) Portsmouth *(C) Pearl Harbor
Navy Aviation Depots		(C) Jacksonville	(C) Jacksonville
Navy Weapon Center	(C) Crane-Louisville (R) Keyport	(C) Crane-Louisville (C) Keyport	** (C) Crane- Louisville ** (C) Keyport
Air Force Aviation	(D) San Antonio (D) Sacramento (D) Ogden (D) Warner Robins (D) Ok City	(C) San Antonio	(C) San Antonio (C) Sacramento

C = CLOSURE R = REALIGN D = DOWNSIZE * = CLOSE any 2 of 3 ** = CLOSE any 1 of 2

1. Mr. Klugh, based on extensive study, the Joint Cross Service Group indicated that up to 8 maintenance depots could be closed. This table lists the depot alternatives for closure. Please explain the basis for these alternatives.

What was the basis for the alternatives to close depots at San Antonio and Sacramento and Jacksonville, in the fixed wing aircraft area?

Did any of your analysis point to the need to close the Naval Aviation Depots at Cherry Point or North Island or the Hill, Tinker, or Warner Robins Air Logistics Centers?

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CHART 2
CONSIDERATION OF AIR DEPOT CLOSURES

Air Force Depot Proposal

Cost Implications (\$ Millions)				
FY96-01 Net				
<u>Consolidate at All Depots</u>	<u>One-Time Costs</u>	<u>Costs (Savings)</u>	<u>Annual Savings</u>	<u>Total Savings*</u>
BRAC Actions	183	(139)	89	991
NON-BRAC ACTIONS	35	(488)	146	1,875
ALL ACTIONS	218	(627)	235	2,866
Alternate — Close 2 Depots (+\$600 Million Env)	1,107	(363)	161	699

*Savings in 20 year net present value

1. General Blume, when the Secretary of Defense testified before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, he showed a chart which compared the cost of downsizing Air Force depots to the cost of closing two depots.

Which two depots were represented on that chart?

2. General Blume, the Secretary of the Air Force testified to the fact that Air Force depot capacity levels indicate that the need to close 1 1/2 to 2 depots. As we know, the Air Force has determined that it is more cost effective to eliminate two "depot equivalents" through downsizing rather than two bases.

If the Air Force were to close one or two depots, which would they be and why?

3. General Blume, two years ago, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for installations testified to the Commission that "...if the Commission chooses to recommend a closure of a major Air Force depot this year, it should be McClellan. Not only can closure be accommodated within the DoD cost and pay-back guidelines, but it was also the lowest ranked of the five major depot bases."

If McClellan's cost to close was not prohibitive in 1993, why is it prohibitive in 1995 when cost to close is calculated to be lower than it was in 1993?

RECENT CHANGES TO AIR FORCE BRAC RECOMMENDATION

1. General Blume, the Commission staff was recently briefed on a revision to the 1 March DoD recommendation from the Air Force.

Please outline for the Commission the revision to the recommendation.

Would you please explain why the Air Force found it necessary to revise its BRAC recommendation 7 weeks into the process?

CHART 3 DOWN SIZE VS CLOSE

BRAC Depot/Shipyard History
1988 — 1995 (Recom)

Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines
■ Anniston	✘ Alameda	■ Oklahoma City	■ Albany
■ Corpus Christi	■ Cherry Point	■ Ogden	■ Barstow
✘ Lexington Bluegrass	■ Jacksonville	■ San Antonio	
✘ Letterkenny	✘ Norfolk (NAD)	■ Sacramento	
✘ Pueblo	■ North Island	■ Warner Robins	
✘ Red River	✘ Pensacola		
✘ Sacramento	■ Crane		
■ Tobyhanna	✘ Louisville		
✘ Tooele	✘ Keyport		
	■ Portsmouth		
	✘ Philadelphia		
	■ Norfolk (NSY)		
	✘ Charleston		
	■ Puget Sound		
	✘ Mare Island		
	✘ Long Beach		
	■ Pearl Harbor		
	✘ Guam		

1. Mr. Klugh, this chart depicts the BRAC history since 1988 on depots/shipyards. Prior actions have been closures, and, as this chart shows, the Air Force has elected to downsize all Air Logistics Centers (ALCs) in lieu of closure of one or two depots as recommended by the Joint Cross Service Group. Please explain to us why your group recommended closure vs. downsizing.

2. Mr. Klugh, if you were responsible for submitting a recommendation to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for removal of Navy and Air Force fixed wing aircraft maintenance depot infrastructure, would your recommendation be to close or downsize?

3. General Blume, never in the history of BRAC has the DoD recommended downsizing in place of closing a depot. Why was it not recommended to earlier Commissions by the Air Force?

4. General Blume, have you determined that the law allows BRAC funds to be expended to mothball and demolish depot space?

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CHART 4
COST TO CLOSE

B/W

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT — DEPOT Subcategory

IV/V Cost and Manpower Implications/Return on Investment

	One Time Costs (Closing)	20 Year Net Present Value	Steady State Savings	Manpower Savings	Return on Investment
Base Name	IV.1	IV.2			V
Hill AFB	1409	514	70	1450	30
Kelly AFB	653	-180	70	1492	10
McClellan AFB	514	-607	96	1756	5
Robins AFB	1011	133	75	1744	18
Tinker AFB	1312	633	56	1393	42

1. General Blume, the Air Force's 1995 Base Closure documentation included estimates of the cost to close each of the five depot installations. We note that the costs to close Kelly and McClellan were significantly less than the closure costs for the three other installations. Were the costs-to-close a significant basis for studying Kelly and McClellan as closure candidates for 11 months?

Why were the costs to close these two so much lower than the other three?
Do the costs to close include any environmental clean-up costs?

B/W

CHART 5

Comparison of Closure COBRA data from each Military Department (costs in \$M)				
	Air Force Kelly AFB	Navy Long Beach	Army Red River	Army Letterkenny
ROI year	9	0	0	0
NPV	283	1,949	1,497	952
costs and savings:				
one time costs	582	75	60	50
one time savings	7	0	0	0
Steady state savings	76	131	123	78
positions:				
population	19,104	3,891	2,971	3,017
eliminated	1,245	1,697	1,861	1,287
realigned	16,415	472	1,040	803
% eliminated	7%	44%	63%	43%
% realigned	86%	12%	35%	27%

2. General Klugh, There are significant differences between the Services' COBRA estimates to close depots. For example, there are substantial differences in the percentages of people which would be moved

What is your estimate of the percentage of personnel that would move upon the closure of a depot?

Is there a difference in the number of people that would move upon a downsizing versus closure?

3. General Blume, Secretary Widnall testified that a depot closure is prohibitively expensive. We are interested in understanding the relatively high cost that you estimated for the closure of an Air Force depot.

This chart (chart 5) shows that the Air Force calculates the steady state savings from closing Kelly Air Force Base with a base population of 19,104 to be just over half of the cost of the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard with a base population of 3,891.

The reason for this is that the Navy estimates that closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard will result in the elimination of 44% of the jobs at the shipyard, while the Air Force estimates that the closure of Kelly Air Force base will result in the elimination of only 7% of the jobs at the depot and the base -- and that 16,415 of the jobs at Kelly Air Force base will be realigned to other bases, resulting in moving costs alone of \$160 million.

Why does the closure of an Air Force depot result in the elimination of such a low percentage of the jobs at the depot, particularly compared to the closure of industrial facilities in the other services?

4. General Blume, assumptions drive closing costs and savings calculations.

I understand that almost all of the savings in your depot downsizing option come from a 15 percent "reengineering factor" which assumes personnel savings of approximately 15 percent based on increased efficiency in certain depot operations as a result of the downsizing plan. Is this accurate?

5. General Blume, let's focus on three key assumptions that the Air Force made in determining the cost to close one of your depots:

-First, that only 7% of the personnel positions would be eliminated;

-Second, that the closure would take 6 years, and third, that no personnel savings would be achieved until year 6.

Changing these assumptions can have a dramatic effect on the projected savings. This chart (Chart 6) uses the Air Force COBRA and changes a few of these assumptions:

CHART 6

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Closure Sensitivity Analysis (\$M) of Personnel Savings and Phasing

	One-Time Cost	Steady State Savings	Net Present Value
AF Baseline 7% personnel savings; close in year 6	582	76	283
15% personnel savings; close in year 6	572	154	1,102
15% personnel savings; close phased over 4 yrs	571	154	1,523
25% personnel savings; close phased over 4 years	561	244	2,764

6. General Blume, if you assumed the same increased efficiency from a depot closure and calculated a 15% instead of a 7% personnel savings, the one-time closure cost would be \$572 instead of \$582 million, and the annual steady state savings would be \$154 million instead of \$76 million.

Change the personnel savings to 25% -- significantly less than what the Navy calculates from Long Beach Naval Shipyard and less than half of what the Army calculates from the closure of its Red River depot -- and phase the closure over 4 years, the annual savings from closing the depot rise to \$ 244 million and the net present value rises to more than \$2.7 billion.

General Blume, what is your reaction to this analysis?

7. General Klugh, did your Joint Cross Service Group do any kind of independent analysis of the Air Force's calculation on the cost to close one of its depots? If so, did you conclude that their assumptions about positions eliminated and the time to carry out the closure were appropriate, even though they differed significantly from the estimates of the other services?

8. General Shane, please explain the Army's assumptions which drive the numbers of positions which will be moved versus realigned.

9. Mr. Nemfakos, in 1993 the Navy recommended closure of three of the six Naval Aviation Depots. When do you expect to have each of the three facilities closed?

Do you expect to attain the annual recurring savings of over \$230 million you projected in 1993 from the closure of the three Naval Aviation Depots?

10. Mr. Nemfakos, The Joint Cross Service Group offered an alternative to close the Jacksonville Aviation Depot.

Did the Navy assess this alternative?

What was the result of the assessment?

Would the Navy be able to get their engine work done if Jacksonville were to close?

Where would that work be done?

CHART 7
AIR FORCE IMPACT OF MILITARY VALUE

Air Force Tiering System Describing Military Value		
	<u>Depot tier</u>	<u>Base tier</u>
Hill	I	I
Tinker	II	I
Robins	I	II
Kelly	III	III
McClellan	II	III

1. General Blume, military value is the most important criterion to be considered when sizing the DoD infrastructure through the base closure process. The Air Force has used a tiering system in place of assigning military values. This chart shows the tiering of depot installations and depots. Please explain how these tiers were derived.

What was the basis for assigning Kelly and McClellan Air Forces Bases to "tier" 3?

What was the basis for assigning the depot at Kelly to "tier" 3?


2. General Blume, the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group minutes indicate that the Air Force was studying the closure of Kelly and McClellan for 11 months. Were military value "tiers" a significant basis for studying Kelly and McClellan as closure candidates?

How did the low military values of Kelly Air Force base and McClellan Air Force base impact the Air Force's final base closure recommendations?

3. General Blume, the Air Force's depot downsizing recommendation would result in a "tier" 3 base (lowest ranking) receiving workload from "tier" 1 bases (highest ranking). What is the reason for this?

CHART 8

Air Force Certified Maximum Potential Capacity (Single Shift)
Reported to Joint Cross Service Group (Million Hrs)



4. General Blume, this chart (chart 8) shows a stacked bar which reflects each of the Air Force depots' maximum potential capacity. The bases are stacked according to base "tier" which is the proxy for military value. The chart demonstrates that all of the Air Force's depot maintenance workload could be performed by tier 1 and 2 installations.

This suggests that the Air Force's workload could be performed by three depots. Do you concur with this capacity analysis?

REENGINEERING

1. General Blume, all of the savings from the Air Force's BRAC recommendation to downsize all Air Force depots in place is the result of a 15 % reengineering factor.

Have the reengineering studies been performed yet?

What is the basis of the 15 % factor?

Was this based on certified data from the performing organizations?

Do your site surveys confirm this 15% productivity savings is achievable?

(If the answer is yes then Commissioner Steele or Davis could ask:)

2. General Blume, why was I told by Tinker and Robins that the 15% productivity improvement is not achievable?

MOTHBALLING AND DEMOLITION

1. General Blume, the Air Force's BRAC submission will eliminate 8.9 million of the 13.2 million hours of excess capacity, but will not eliminate or consolidate overhead structures and therefore overhead costs of the depot workload which results in higher hourly rates.

The BRAC submission equates to knocking down bedrooms and locking others when the kids go off to college, rather than moving into a smaller house.

What are the costs of demolishing 2.8 million square feet of depot space?

What are the savings?

How do savings accrue from mothballing depot space?

2. General Shane, did the Army consider downsizing depots? If not, why not?

In your view, is downsizing in place a cost effective method for sizing the depot infrastructure to meet force structure and program requirements?

3. Mr. Nemfakos, did the Navy consider downsizing maintenance facilities rather than closures? If not why not?

In your view, is downsizing in place a cost effective method for sizing the depot infrastructure to meet force structure and program requirements?

WHY THE AIR FORCE USED THE BRAC PROCESS


1. General Blume, the downsizing of ALCs would not breach the BRAC thresholds if actions were to be evenly phased over the next several years. Furthermore, if the personnel eliminations due to reengineering were subtracted from the BRAC recommendation, only one installation would have a workload adjustment which breaches the BRAC threshold.

Why did the Air Force choose to use the BRAC process if it could independently accomplish the same result?

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CHART 9
REDUCTION IN DEPOT OVERHEAD COSTS

**Effect of Workload Volume
on Depot Maintenance Hourly Rate at Tinker AFB**



1. General Blume, the Air Force BRAC recommendation will not cut overhead of depots proportionately with reductions in capability. The increasing proportional size of overhead will result in increased depot labor hour costs. For example, the labor hour rate will increase \$6 per hour at the Tinker depot under your depot downsizing proposal. (chart 9)

In addition to the BRAC proposals to downsizing in place, mothballing and demolition of depot space, will the Air Force take any steps to reduce depot overhead to make the depot system more efficient?

Shouldn't the Department eliminate at least proportional overhead and administrative costs when eliminating industrial capability? In other words, cutting the fat and muscle proportionately?

2. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy has had considerable experience closing aviation depots.

How have the closures of Naval Aviation depots impacted the proportion of overhead vs. operating costs?

SHIPYARD ISSUES

1. Mr. Klugh, part of Navy's rationale for retaining Portsmouth NSY is its East Coast location. In moving shipyard work, did the Joint Cross Service Group account for the benefit of East Coast/ West Coast capabilities?

Did the JCSG take dry-dock capabilities and capacity into account?

2. Mr. Klugh, Cross Service Alternative Two (chart 1) proposes the closure of Long Beach and either Pearl Harbor or Portsmouth. Did the Joint Cross Service Group view Pearl Harbor and Portsmouth as equivalent in terms of capability as well as capacity?

3. Mr. Klugh, the COBRA for the shipyard scenario in Cross Service Alternative One indicates that virtually all of Portsmouth's workload can be moved to Norfolk for a total cost of \$100 million. Since the COBRA predicts annual recurring savings from closing Portsmouth of \$150 million, does this suggest that current and predicted shipyard workload does not justify keeping Portsmouth open?

4. Mr. Nemfakos considering this assessment about Portsmouth's workload and the projected annual recurring savings of \$150 million, why didn't the Navy propose closing Portsmouth?

5. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy says that "continuing decreases in force structure eliminates the need to retain the capacity to dry-dock large naval vessels for emergent requirements." How many large-decked ships (CV, CVN, LHA & LHD) are in the Pacific Fleet now? How many less are expected to be in the Pacific Fleet in 2001?

6. Mr. Nemfakos, currently, the Navy is creating the capability for refueling 688-class submarines at Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, and Puget Sound Naval Shipyards. How many 688's are slated to be refueled, and at which yards? When will these three shipyards have the capability to refuel 686-class submarines? How much is it costing to facilitate Pearl Harbor to perform these refueling, including training and military construction?

7. Mr. Nemfakos, in determining nuclear capacity, did the Navy consider the maintenance capacity at Newport News Shipbuilding and Electric Boat?

Considering that the Navy is performing carrier refueling in the private sector, what is the potential for private nuclear shipyards to perform submarine refueling?

8. Mr. Klugh, in both alternatives one and two, (chart 1) specific workload transfers are identified for each commodity group except for sea systems. In that case, the alternative states, "Consolidate as possible within the Department of the Navy." Why was the sea systems commodity area proposal not specific concerning workload distribution?

ARMY DEPOTS

1. General Shane, the Army studied two ground vehicle depots for possible closure, Red River and Letterkenney depots. Tobyhanna Army Depot was not studied for closure because it was considered a unique, one of a kind, depot for the repair of electronics components.

In terms of buildings and acres, Letterkenny is a considerably larger depot. Did the Army look at possibly closing Tobyhanna Army Depot and transferring the electronics workload to Letterkenny, a facility that is partly focused on electronics and partly focused on ground vehicle maintenance?

2. General Shane, your recommendation to transfer missile work to Tobyhanna require added costs to transport guidance and control sections between Letterkenny and Tobyhanna. Were these costs included in the Army's COBRA analysis?

3. General Shane, in determining military value, why did the Army place heavy emphasis on capacity, which is based on the number of work stations to produce a particular workload, and relatively less emphasis on building square footage and expandable acreage?

Were other options considered as an alternative to the Letterkenny / Tobyhanna scenario recommended by DoD? For example, did the Army look at sending all of the tactical missile storage and maintenance workload to Hill Air Force Base and sending the residual conventional ammunition storage mission to other DoD storage locations? This would result in a total base closure, rather than a partial realignment.

4. General Shane, the Army plans to transfer ground vehicle workload from Letterkenny to Anniston, but none of the personnel authorizations would be realigned. How can this work be accomplished at Anniston with no additional people?

5. Mr. Klugh, why did the Cross Service initially recommend the decentralization of tactical missile maintenance and then later "approve" the Army plan to consolidate at Tobyhanna?

Did the JCSG consider the centralization of tactical missile maintenance at Hill Air Force Base? If so, what were the findings?

Was Anniston Army depot considered for missile maintenance consolidation?

6. Mr. Klugh, we understand the Joint Cross Service Group for Depot Maintenance looked at alternatives for accommodating tactical missile maintenance at three sites -- Barstow, Hill, and Anniston-- if Letterkenny were approved for closure.

In your view what are the advantages and disadvantage of consolidating like workloads at one single location versus the three locations suggested by your joint group?

Do you believe the Army's proposal to transfer guidance and control work to Tobyhanna, and leaving the ammunition and missile storage mission at Letterkenny is the best alternative?

7. General Shane, did the Army look at moving the Tobyhanna Depot to Letterkenny? If so, what were the results? Do you believe this would be a good idea?

5. Mr. Nemfakos, also during the Commission's visit to Louisville Naval Warfare Center, we were given documents that claim the Navy's recommendation does not include many costs to implement this recommendation. These excluded costs total \$240.4 million, and are listed on chart #10. Could you please comment on these costs?

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CHART 10

Data Call Area	Items Excluded	Costs Excluded
One Time Unique	CIWS Overhaul at crane	\$48,600,000
Net Mission Costs	Depot Transitional costs to sustain fleet/workforce readiness	\$45,370,000
Mission Costs	Increase costs due to stabilized rate at Norfolk Naval Shipyard	\$29,120,000

6. Mr. Nemfakos, regarding the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, could you explain why the Navy gave this installation a 0 in the Military Value category for integrated capabilities?

7. Mr. Nemfakos, during the Commission's recent visit to the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, we were shown the systems design facility for the EP-3 and ES-3 aircraft. We were told by the Naval Air Warfare Center that the cost to relocate those facilities to China Lake would be \$30 million. Could you please explain why the Navy only provided \$1.17 million for Military Construction at China Lake to accommodate these facilities?

NAVAL AVIATION DEPOTS

1. Mr. Klugh, your Cross Service team recommended the closure of Jacksonville Navy Aviation Depot. Where was their engine work to be done under your proposal?

Do you still support this proposed alternative?

2. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy's configuration analysis did not result in a scenario that closed a complete Naval Aviation Depot. Did the Navy investigate any realignment scenarios that, through interservicing, would have reduced the substantial overcapacity for component and engine workload?

LABORATORY AND TEST AND EVALUATION
JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUPS

I. LABORATORY QUESTIONS

1. Dr. Dorman, in summarizing the results of the Services' laboratory cross servicing, the Chair of the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group wrote, and I quote: "The final results are disappointing and unbalanced. Cross-servicing is minor at best."

What is the impact of DoD's 1995 BRAC recommendations on excess laboratory capacity?

2. Dr. Dorman, what would have been the impact on excess laboratory capacity if the Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's four priority alternatives had been accepted by the Services and DoD?

SEE CHART #1

3. General Shane, why didn't the Army accept the applicable Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's priority alternatives?

4. Mr. Nemfakos, why didn't the Navy accept the applicable Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's priority alternatives?

5. General Blume, why didn't the Air Force accept the applicable Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's priority alternatives?

6. Dr. Dorman, in your view, what were the deficiencies in the process that allowed the Services to disregard the Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's proposed priority alternatives?

7. Dr. Dorman, in sum, the Chair of the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group wrote, and I quote: "If we are to achieve desired results it appears that we have a system in which only a heavier handed instrument will suffice." Can you explain this comment.

DOD LABORATORY JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP

PRIORITY ALTERNATIVES FOR SERVICE CONSIDERATION

- **Consolidate most command, control, communications, computers, & intelligence (C4I) acquisition, research & development at Fort Monmouth, NJ.**
- **Consolidate air launched weapons' research, development, test & evaluation at Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA.**
- **Consolidate explosives at Armament Research Development Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, and at Naval Air Weapons Center, China Lake.**
- **Consolidate propellants at Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake.**

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8. Dr. Dorman, in response to a Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group data call, the Navy provided information that clearly outlined significant cross-service and federal agency use of two unique facilities at White Oak, Maryland: the Nuclear Weapons Effect facility and the Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel.

The Navy recommended, and the DoD endorsed, abandonment of these one-of-a-kind facilities.

Was the need for the continued operation of these facilities under a joint or consolidated arrangement addressed by the Test & Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Working Group? If not, why not?

CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF ROME LABORATORY

1. Dr. Dorman, it is our understanding that DoD's only recommended laboratory closure and/or realignment involving cross-servicing is closing Rome Laboratory and realigning its functions at Fort Monmouth, New York, and Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

SEE CHART # 2

2. Dr. Dorman, please explain the context in which your group proposed the closing of Rome Lab and the alternative for cross service collocation of common Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) activities at Fort Monmouth.

3. Dr. Dorman, what organizations and how many personnel would have been located at Fort Monmouth under this alternative?

4. Mr. Nemfakos, why didn't the Navy realign the C4I functions of its Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command and its approximately 910 personnel positions at Fort Monmouth as suggested by the Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group?

5. General Blume, why did the Air Force decide to move most of Rome Laboratory to Hanscom Air Force Base, rather than moving the lab to Fort Monmouth, as suggested by the Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group?

6. Dr. Dorman, as you know, Rome was designated as one of the Air Force's four Tier I laboratories. As Director of Defense Research and Engineering, are you concerned that closing the lab and moving some of its C4I functions to Fort Monmouth and the others to Hanscom Air Force Base will have a major impact on the DoD's and the Services' ability to conduct current and further C4I research and development?

7. Dr. Dorman, in your view does it make sense to split Rome Lab's C3I functions between two military installations?

Rome Laboratory

The Proposed Relocation


Current Directorates

Intelligence & Reconnaissance
Command, Control, & Communications
Electromagnetics & Reliability
Surveillance & Photonics



Proposed Thrust

Electromagnetics
Intelligence
Surveillance
Software Technology
Command and Control
Space Communications
Total of 595 Positions



Proposed Thrust

Electromagnetics & Reliability
Total of 77 Positions

Proposed Thrust

EM/Reliability
Photonics
Computer Systems
Comm Networks
Radio Comm
Total of 283 Positions



Tyrone's Office

8. Dr. Dorman, the Army was planning to locate the functions and personnel positions from Rome Laboratory into facilities at Fort Monmouth's Myer Center, which is currently occupied by the Army's Electronic Technology Device Laboratory. This lab is to move to the Army Research Laboratory at Adelphi, Maryland, as the result of a 1991 BRAC decision to consolidate Army laboratories.

Does it make sense from a joint cross servicing perspective to move the Army's lab, which performs C4I functions, including DoD's flat screen display research and development, from Fort Monmouth while moving Rome laboratory's related C4I functions to Fort Monmouth?

9. General Blume, how did the Air Force determine the cost and savings of the Rome Laboratory recommendation? Did anyone from the Air Force involved in the decision to close the lab and realign its functions visit the lab before the recommendation was made to: (1) discuss these actions with the lab's managers, (2) evaluate the impact of these actions on the lab's current and future C4I work, (3) determine the Lab's requirements at the receiving locations, and (4) determine what had to be moved to the new location and at what cost?

10. General Blume, it has been suggested the Air Force's costs associated with closing and realigning Rome Laboratory are understated and the Lab's moving costs, requirements for space, communications equipment and networks have not been determined, as of April 7, 1995. For example:

--The Air Force's total one-time moving cost is \$6.8 million but it is for moving only four major pieces of equipment. There is only \$152,000 for freight for moving every thing else.

--Rome Laboratory has an Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Research Center containing equipment, including a large anechoic chamber, with an estimated current replacement value of \$17.4 million. Replacement costs were not included in the Air Force's Cost of the Base Realignment Actions (COBRA).

General Blume, is the Air Force planning to take another look at the costs of this proposed move? When will a revised COBRA be made available to the Commission?

BROOKS/ARMSTRONG LABORATORY

1. Major General Blume, in all of DoD capacity, approximately 35-40% of human systems research and technology development is conducted at Brooks AFB. 15-20% is conducted at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, and the remaining 40-50% is conducted by the Army and the Navy at 15-17 separate sites.

The Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the consolidation of Army and Navy human systems lab functions at Brooks and Wright-Patterson. It also found that Brooks has more capacity and a higher functional value than Wright-Patterson.

Given all of this, why did the Air Force recommend the closure of Brooks?

Major General Shane and Mr. Nemfakos, were you considering moving these functions to Brooks prior to finding out that Brooks was closing?

In addition, since the current DoD recommendation is to close Brooks completely and move most of the personnel and functions elsewhere, how can there be a great deal of cost savings? How could an accurate estimate be generated without a transition plan?

2. Major General Blume, one of the main reasons Brooks Air Force Base scored low in military value is that it does not have an active runway. However, there are several active military runways in San Antonio, and the primary functions at Brooks are laboratory and research-related, and therefore do not require an active runway.

Did DoD consider a runway foremost in its assessment of the military value of Brooks? If so, why?

3. Major General Blume, during the Commission's visit of Brooks, the San Antonio community presented a plan to establish a cantonment area, close Brooks, and preserve the functions of the Human Systems Center, that is, Armstrong Laboratory, the School of Aerospace Medicine, and the Human Systems research.

Had the Air Force considered this option previously?

Will you be sure the COBRA results already requested by the Commission on this matter be submitted to us prior to 1 May 95?

OTHER LABORATORY ISSUES

1. Major General Blume and Dr. Dorman, the current DoD recommendations dictate that the Aircrew Training Research Division of Armstrong Laboratory remain as a stand-alone facility at the closed Williams Air Force Base.

Nearby Luke Air Force Base already conducts the majority of the fighter weapons training for the Air Force, and has a long history of cooperation with Williams.

How strongly did the Air Force consider moving this unique and necessary function from Williams Air Force Base to Luke Air Force Base? Have any COBRA runs performed?

2. In 1990, the Secretary of Defense announced his intention to close the Los Angeles Air Force Base, including the laboratory function, and move it to Kirtland Air Force Base.

What has happened in the years since that time to change the earlier Secretary of Defense announcement?

II. TEST AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. Mr. Burt, the core alternatives from the Joint Cross-Service Group are displayed before you.

SEE CHART # 3

Do you still support these as the ways to reduce excess capacity in the Test and Evaluation area?

Mr. Burt, what percent of the excess Test and Evaluation capacity would be eliminated if your alternatives were adopted?

2. Mr. Burt and Mr. Coyle, no significant reductions in Test and Evaluation capacity resulted from the Services' recommendations.

Why was the Joint Cross Service Group so unsuccessful in convincing the individual Services to consolidate activities?

3. Major General Blume, why did the Air Force not implement any of the core alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

4. Mr. Nemfakos, why did the Navy not implement any of the core alternatives presented by the Joint Cross Service Group?

5. Major General Blume, the Joint Cross Service Group stated "electronic combat Test and Evaluation capability at Eglin and China Lake have approximately 85% overlap." One alternative suggested was to move China Lake test assets to Eglin.

Why is the Air Force, in light of this alternative, proposing to move Electronic Combat Testing from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base?

What will be the cost for this move of Electronics Combat Testing to Nellis Air Force Base?

Will there be a scheduled delay and a negative impact on programs from this proposed move of Electronic Combat Testing to Nellis Air Force Base?

Mr. Nemfakos, did the Navy consider the alternative to move China Lake T&E missions primarily to Eglin?

6. Mr. Nemfakos, did the Navy consider moving the test activities from Pt. Mugu to Eglin Air Force Base to eliminate excess test infrastructure?

Would this be the prudent course to follow considering the excess capacity identified by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

7. General Blume, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended that the relocation of the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity (AFEWES) at Fort Worth, Texas, and the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New York (simulation systems) be moved to Patuxent River or to Edwards Air Force Base.

The Air Force recommended to move these activities to Edwards Air Force Base. Why?

8. Mr. Coyle, the Joint Cross Service Group on Test and Evaluation put forth the alternative to consolidate Armament/Weapons testing at Eglin Air Force Base eliminating these missions at China Lake and Point Mugu.

Do you still support this alternative?

9. Mr. Coyle, since you suggested an alternative to consolidate testing at the Eglin Air Force Base Test Range, does the proposed movement by the Air Force of the Electromagnetic Test Environment effort to Nellis Air Force Base eliminate the opportunity to consolidate DoD electronic testing?

JCSG PROPOSAL — CORE REDUCTIONS ALTERNATIVES

(AIR VEHICLES)

- PAX River T&E missions primarily to Edwards OR
- Edwards T&E missions primarily to PAX River
- If either is enacted, consolidate Army air vehicle T&E to the receiving site

(ELECTRONIC COMBAT)

- Eglin T&E missions primarily to China Lake OR
- China Lake T&E missions primarily to Eglin

(ARMAMENT/WEAPONS)

- Pt. Mugu T&E missions primarily to China Lake OR to Eglin

H. / varallo / doc / 17 Apr / Tesy. doc

Document Separator

**MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
SUMMARY OF COMMISSION STAFF COST DELTAS**
(IN \$)

DESCRIPTION	SQUARE FEET	COST DELTA
HANSCOM AEB		
REPLACED RENOVATED COMMISSARY BUILDING WITH NEW MILCON FACILITY	70,000	\$8,200,000
FORT MONMOUTH		
ADDED MODELING/ FABRICATION FACILITY		
NEWPORT.NY TEST SITE	15,000	
ADDED MODELING/ FABRICATION FACILITY		2,400,000
TOTAL	50,000	2,500,000
	135,000	\$20,100,000

ROME LABORATORY (GRIFFISS AFB), NY

ISSUE: ROME LAB'S MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

- **SPLITS ROME LAB'S ACTIVITIES AMONG FOUR LOCATIONS:**
 - **GRIFFISS AFB, FORT MONMOUTH, HANSCOM AFB, AND 5 TEST SITES**
- **RELOCATES 100% OF LAB'S ACTIVITIES:**
 - **ELIMINATES 154 PERSONNEL AND RETAINS 65 AT GRIFFISS AFB**
 - **RELOCATES 77% (736 OF 955) PERSONNEL POSITIONS**
 - **MOVES 65% (478) OF THE PERSONNEL FOR POSITIONS RELOCATED**
 - **HIRES PERSONNEL FOR THE REMAINING 35% (258) OF RELOCATED POSITIONS**
 - **MOST NEW PERSONNEL REQUIRE SECURITY CLEARANCES (TOP SECRET, SPECIAL ACCESS, AND IN SOME CASES COMPARTMENTED) TO WORK**
 - **SERIOUSLY DEGRADES LAB'S ABILITY TO MEET WORK'S COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY FOR CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS**

BASE ANALYSIS ROME LABORATORY (GRIFFISS AFB), NY

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Close Rome Laboratory, NY and Relocate Its Activities to Fort Monmouth, NJ and Hanscom AFB, MA.

CRITERIA	DOD ORIGINAL	DOD REVISED	COMMUNITY	R&A STAFF ANALYSIS
AIR FORCE TIERING	I	I	N/A	N/A
FORCE STRUCTURE	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	52.8	79.2	103.4	103.8
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	11.5	13	1.2	5.9
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	2003 (4YEARS)	2004 (6 YEARS)	100+ YEARS	2025 (25 YEARS)
NET PRESENT VALUE (COST) (\$ M)	98.4	102.5	(86.4)	(29.7)
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	12	12	9.8	9.8
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL/CIV)	0/50	0/93	0/22	0/18
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL/CIV)	10/873	10/726	10/797	10/901
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95/CUM)	-1.52/-6.60	-1.40/-6.60	N/A	N/A
ENVIRONMENTAL	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT

ROME LABORATORY (GRIFFISS AFB), NY

SUMMARY OF ONE-TIME COSTS

(\$ IN THOUSANDS)

<u>COST CATEGORY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE REVISED COST</u>	<u>COMMUNITY</u>		<u>R&A STAFF</u>	
		<u>COST</u>	<u>DIFFERENCE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>DIFFERENCE</u>
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION	\$32.919	\$46.151	\$13.232	\$53.048	\$20.129
PERSONNEL	2.417	2.537	0.120	2.644	0.227
OVERHEAD	0.998	3.155	2.157	3.565	2.567
MOVING	18.615	19.356	0.741	20.182	1.567
OTHER	24.295	32.248	7.953	24.327	0.032
TOTAL	\$79.244	\$103.447	24.203	\$103.766	\$24.522

BASE ANALYSIS ROME LABORATORY (GRIFFISS AFB), NY

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Close Rome Laboratory, NY and Relocate Its Activities to Fort Monmouth, NJ and Hanscom AFB, MA..

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION	R&A STAFF ANALYSIS	
AIR FORCE TIERING	I	N/A	
FORCE STRUCTURE	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT	
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	79.2	103.8	83.7
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	13	5.9	
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	2004 (6 YEARS)	2025 (25 YEARS)	2019 (19 YEARS)
NET PRESENT VALUE (COST) (\$ M)	102.5	(29.7)	(10.8)
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	12	9.8	
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL/CIV)	0/93	0/18	
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL/CIV)	10/726	10/901	
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95/CUM)	-1.50/-6.20	N/A	
ENVIRONMENTAL	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT	



DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY
HEADQUARTERS
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 22001-6300

Mr. Dick Helmer
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 142J
Arlington, VA 22209

June 9, 1995

Dear Mr. Helmer:

This letter is in response to your telephonic conversation with Mr. Sclater of our Liaison Office, concerning DeCA's plans for the Hanscom Air Force Base Commissary. With the Department's plans to establish an Exchange Mart (combined commissary and exchange operation) at Fort Devens, DeCA is not considering new store construction at Hanscom. The migration of customers from the Fort Devens area with this shopping alternative will be less than originally projected and thus a new facility will not be required. Current plans are to remain in the existing facility with a modification project to upgrade the shopping and working environment to DeCA standards.

I trust that this information responds to your concerns.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ronald P. McCoy", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Ronald P. McCoy
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

1XBU-6



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY
HEADQUARTERS
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801-6300

CC

June 20, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL JAY D. BLUME, JR., SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF, FOR BASE REALIGNMENT
AND TRANSITION, HQ USAF, 1670 AIR FORCE PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Commissary Construction at Hanscom AFB, MA

This memorandum is a followup to a DeCA Chief of Staff letter of June 9, 1995 to the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission regarding plans for a new commissary at Hanscom
AFB, MA.

DeCA received Congressional approval in June 1994 to build a new 70,000 sf
commissary store at Hanscom AFB. Our planning focused on correcting current facility
deficiencies through the replacement of the current outmoded store. A new store would
incorporate more efficient equipment and environmental systems and provide better customer
service.

While it is DeCA's preference today to build a new commissary at Hanscom, there are still
differences within the Department of Defense on the approach we should follow. As you may
know, the DODIG raised concerns in their audit of the Hanscom construction project regarding
the economics of building a new store versus renovating the existing structure. Additionally, they
questioned the sizing model used to determine the population base in which the store would serve,
highlighting the issue of patron migration from Fort Devens. Consequently, we have withheld
further action pending resolution of these issues.

I have discussed various options with the commander of the Army and Air Force
Exchange Service and the commander of Hanscom AFB on how best we can serve the Hanscom
military community. We are in agreement that building a new commissary store remains the best
option for all concerned.

I hope this information clarifies our position.

Richard E. Beale, Jr.
RICHARD E. BEALE, JR.
Major General, U.S. Army
Director

1 XBU-7

ISSUES

Kirtland Air Force Base

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Costs	<u>Revised Costs</u> One Time Costs: \$538.1M Annual Savings: \$32.9M	<u>Total costs to USG:</u> One Time Costs: \$602M Annual Savings: -\$25.2M	<u>DoD Costs</u> One Time Costs: \$538.1M Annual Savings: \$32.9M <u>National Defense Costs</u> (DOD & DOE) One Time Costs: \$602.1M Annual Savings: \$2.9M
Number of Military Personnel remaining at Kirtland AFB	519 (381 officers and 138 enlisted)	None	519 (381 officers and 138 enlisted)
Security		Decreased security for remaining activities	Potential for a decrease in security for remaining activities
58th Special Operations Wing	USCINCSOC: Significant negative impact on training if moved to Holloman AFB	Training degraded and disrupted	Relocation expensive and training disrupted

ISSUES
Kirtland Air Force Base
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
DOE Comments	SECDEF memo concurs with DOE's concerns	Agrees with DOE's concerns	Concurs with DOE's concerns of increased costs and loss of synergy with DNA
DNA Comments		Agrees with DNA's position	Concurs with DNA's desire to remain at Kirtland due to loss of synergy with DOE
Air Quality	Potentially limits incoming units	Does not limit	Room for growth
Reuse	Not an issue	Virtually nonexistent	Very limited. Approximately 95% cantoned, leaving 5% for reuse

BROOKS COST BREAKDOWN COMPARISONS

CRITERIA (<i>\$ millions</i>)	DoD/ AIR FORCE POSITION	CANTONMENT ALTERNATIVE COMMUNITY COBRA	CANTONMENT ALTERNATIVE AIR FORCE CERTIFIED COBRA (BOS LACKLAND)
ONE-TIME COST	211.6 PERSONNEL 5.3 OVERHEAD 5.2 MOVING 43.7 OTHER 41.2	10.9 PERSONNEL 2.0 OVERHEAD 1.2 MOVING 1.5 OTHER 0.2	21.8 PERSONNEL 1.3 OVERHEAD 1.9 MOVING 3.7 OTHER 7.7
MILCON	111.3 W-P 95.9 TYNDALL 11.1 KELLY 1.5 LACKLAND 7.3	6.0 BROOKS 4.8 LACKLAND 1.0	8.0 BROOKS 6.7 LACKLAND 1.3
ANNUAL SAVINGS	30.8 PERSON. 22.2 BOS/RPMA 8.5	17.7 PERSON. 19.1 BOS/RPMA 1.4	10.3 PERSONNEL 12.0 BOS/RPMA 1.1
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	2008 (7 years)	IMMEDIATE 1996	2000 (2 years)
NET PRESENT VALUE	158.1	247.8	115.2
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED	499	423	250
PERSONNEL REALIGNED	2883 W-P 2089 TYNDALL 362 KELLY 93 LACKLAND 339	375 LACKLAND	507 339 LACKLAND (168 BASE X)

**ISSUES REVIEWED
BROOKS AIR FORCE
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS**

<p>COST</p> <p>MISSION EFFECTIVENESS & MILITARY VALUE</p> <p>EXCESS CAPACITY/CONDITION OF FACILITIES</p>	<p>LOSS OF SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL PERSONNEL</p> <p>PROJECT DELAYS & LOSS OF ACCREDITATION</p>
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ISSUES
BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE,
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
LOSS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimate 12-20% of Brooks lab personnel will not relocate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major disruption to Human Systems research mission by losses of enormous number of essential scientists who will not leave 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concur with Brooks command estimates that 50-75% of professional personnel would not move
PROJECT DELAYS & LOSS OF ACCREDITATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not addressed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research programs would be interrupted and significant delays of 3-5 years would occur 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delays and interruptions to research would unquestionably occur

SCENARIO SUMMARY (continued)
BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

ALTERNATIVE STATUS QUO RETAIN BROOKS AS IS	
Retain Brooks Air Force Base including all activities and facilities.	
One Time Costs (\$M): 0 Annual Savings (\$M): 0 Return on Investment: Immediate Net Present Value (\$M): 0	
PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Least disruptive to research and productivity • Saves over \$200M in one-time costs • AF supports if Commission changes DoD recommendation on Brooks (rather than cantonment) • Preserves a unique, "world-class" facility with an essential defense mission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does not reduce laboratory infrastructure

Flying Operations (Non-ALC Functions)

Issue	Hill AFB	Kelly AFB	McClellan AFB	Robins AFB	Tinker AFB
FY 97/4 Force Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 54 F-16 • 15 F-16 (AFR) • 16 Test Aircraft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 C-5 (AFR) • 12 F-16 (ANG) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 HC-130*(ANG) • 5 HH-60*(ANG) • 4 HC-130 (CG) (* If Moffett move is approved.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 E-8 (JSTARS) • 4 B-1 (ANG) • 12 KC-135 • 1 EC-135 • 1 EC-137 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 30 E-3 (AWACS) • 8 KC-135 (AFR) • 1 EC-135 • 16 E-6 (TACAMO)
USAF Ops Eval Overall Flying	Green	Green-	Green-	Green-	Green-
USAF Operational Concerns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • F-16 LANTIRN training • Relocation of AFR F-16s • UTTR-CM test • UTTR-SS range • Missile Mx • Weapon storage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relocation of AFR C-5s and ANG F-16s • Wilford Hall uses runway 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevents ANG rescue unit move from Moffett 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALC for JSTARS • Delays JSTARS IOC • Relocation of ANG B-1s 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relocation of AWACS, TACAMO, and AFR KC-135s • ALC for AWACS and TACAMO
Unique Facilities (non-ALC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UTTR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air Intelligence Agency • AF News Agency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AF Technology Application Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JSTARS • HQ AFRES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AWACS • TACAMO
Pros	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Excellent Flying Range 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large Ramp 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large Ramp
Cons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor Winter Wx 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited Force Structure 		
R&A Staff Eval	202/311	189/311	147/311	205/311	237/311

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Flying Operations

(Non-ALC Functions)

Hill AFB	Kelly AFB	McClellan AFB	Robins AFB	Tinker AFB
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Pros</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force Structure • Range to MOA • Range to ACMI • MTR • Range to DZ 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Pros</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range to LZ • Hydrants • Ramp Space 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Pros</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range to MOA 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Pros</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force Structure • Jet Fuel Storage • Comp Gnd Enc • Comp N Enc 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Pros</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force Structure • Hydrants • Ramp Space
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Cons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range to LZ • Freezing Precip • Ramp Space • Non-Comp Gnd Enc • Non-Comp N Enc • # Noise Complaints • Air Quality Constr 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Cons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force Structure • Range to MOA • Range to Drop • MTR • Non-Comp Gnd Enc • Non-Comp N Enc 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Cons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force Structure • # IR w/i 100 NM • Range to DZ • Hydrants • Ramp Space • Non-Comp Gnd Enc • Non-Comp N Enc • # Noise Complaints • Air Quality Constr 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Cons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range to MOA • MTR • Range to DZ • Housing 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Cons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range to MOA • Freezing Precip • Non-Comp Gnd Enc • Non-Comp N Enc

Air Logistic Center Major Tenants

Hill Air Force Base

- F-16 Wing and associated units (MILCON to relocate -- 69M)

Kelly Air Force Base

- Air Intelligence Agency (Assign to Lackland)
- C-5 Air Force Reserve Wing (Assign to Lackland)
- F-16 Air National Guard Group (Assign to Lackland)

McClellan Air Force Base

- Coast Guard Unit (MILCON to relocate -- \$22M)
- Engineering Installation Squadron (MILCON to relocate -- \$25M)
- Total MILCON to relocate major tenants -- \$47M

Robins Air Force Base

- JSTARS (MILCON to relocate -- \$113M)
- 5th Combat Comm Group (MILCON to relocate -- \$28M)
- KC-135 Air Refueling Wing (MILCON to relocate -- \$33M)
- Total MILCON to relocate major tenants -- \$174M

Tinker Air Force Base

- AWACS (MILCON to relocate -- \$401)
- TACAMO (MILCON to relocate -- \$176M)
- 3rd Combat Comm Group (MILCON to relocate -- \$22M)
- 38th Engineering Installation Wing (MILCON to relocate -- \$55M)
- Total MILCON to relocate major tenants -- \$654M

**Air Force Logistic Center Tenants
McClellan Air Force Base**

Organization	Function	# of Personnel	Potential Relocation Site
US Coast Guard	4 HC-130 Search and Rescue	190	Moffett Federal Airfield or Beale AFB
Technical Operations	Classified Mission	356	Offutt AFB
1849th Engineering Installation Squadron	Installation of computers and communications	283	Travis AFB
Defense Logistics Agency- Distribution	Storage	565	As Required
Defense Commissary Agency	Commissary	101	N/A
Defense Finance Accounting Service	Finance	127	San Bernardino
Defense Information Systems Agency	Information Processing	138	N/A

Air Force Logistic Center Tenants Kelly Air Force Base

Organization	Function	# of Personnel	Potential Relocation Site
Air Intelligence Agency	Intelligence Production	3824*	Lackland AFB
433rd Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve Wing	14 C-5 Strategic Airlift	673	Lackland AFB
149th Fighter Group Air National Guard	12 F-16 Tactical Fighters	202	Lackland AFB
838th Engineering Installation Squadron	Installation of computers and communications	247	Lackland AFB
Air Force News Agency	Provides Worldwide News Information	149	Lackland AFB
Defense Logistics Agency- Distribution	Storage	955	As Required
Defense Commissary Agency-Mid West Region HQ	Headquarters Functions	108	Lackland AFB
Defense Commissary Agency	Commissary	303	N/A
Defense Finance and Accounting Service	Finance	162	Lackland AFB
Defense Information Systems Agency	Information Processing	210	N/A

* Includes Cryptologic Support Directorate

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**Air Force Logistic Center Tenants
Hill Air Force Base**

Organization	Function	# of Personnel	Potential Relocation Site
388th Fighter Wing	54 F-16 Tactical Fighter	1861	Cannon and Shaw AFBs
419th Fighter Wing Air Force Reserve	15 F-16 Tactical Fighter	264	Canton in Range
729th Air Control Squadron	Tactical Command and Control	243	Cannon AFB
485th Engineering Installation Group	Installation of computers and communications	577	Tinker AFB
Defense Logistics Agency- Distribution	Storage	558	As Required
Defense Finance and Accounting Service	Finance	162	San Bernardino
Defense Information Systems Agency	Information Processing	210	N/A

Air Force Logistic Center Tenants Robins Air Force Base

Organization	Function	# of Personnel	Potential Relocation Site
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System JSTARS	6 E-8 Surveillance, Command, and Control	996	Beale AFB
116 Bomb Wing Air National Guard	4 B-1 Tactical Bomber	617	Conversion from F-15 to B-1 would not take place
19th Air Refueling Wing	12 KC-135 Air Refueling	898	Charleston AFB
Headquarters Air Force Reserve	Headquarters Functions	937	Dobbins AFB
5th Combat Communications	Tactical Communications	741	Shaw AFB
Defense Logistics Agency- Distribution	Storage	821	As Required
Defense Finance and Accounting Service	Finance	130	San Bernardino
Defense Information Systems Agency	Information Processing	198	N/A

Air Force Logistic Center Tenants Tinker Air Force Base

Organization	Function	# of Personnel	Potential Relocation Site
552 Air Control Wing AWACS	30 E-3 Surveillance and Control	3630	Beale AFB
Navy TACAMO	16 E-6 Strategic Command and Control	1186	IAW Navy Operational Requirements
507 Air Refueling Wing Air Force Reserves	8 KC-135 Air Refueling	225	March AFB
3rd Combat Communications Group	Combat Communications	1031	Davis-Monthan AFB
38th Engineering Installation Wing	HQ - Installation of computers and communications	1279	Peterson AFB
Defense Logistics Agency- Distribution	Storage	949	As Required
Defense Commissary Agency	Commissary	125	N/A
Defense Finance and Accounting Service	Finance	147	Local
Defense Information Systems Agency	Information Processing	235	N/A

Kelly Air Force Base Personnel

Realign to Lackland Air Force Base	5,445
Realign to Other Installations	8,934
Eliminated	<u>3,275</u>
Total	17,654

Major Air Force Closures/Realignments Previous Rounds

1988

Chanute AFB
Mather AFB
Pease AFB
George AFB
Norton AFB

1991

Eaker AFB
England AFB
Grissom AFB
Loring AFB
Lowry AFB
Myrtle Beach AFB
Richards-Gebaur ARS
Rickenbacker AGB
Williams AFB
Wurtsmith AFB
Bergstrom AFB
Castle AFB

1993

Griffiss AFB
K.I. Sawyer AFB
Newark AFB
March AFB
Plattsburgh AFB
O'Hare IAP ARS
Homestead AFB

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

McClellan Air Force Base

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Extent of environmental contamination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Priorities List site • Ongoing soil and groundwater cleanup • Estimated cleanup year 2034 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McClellan is most contaminated Air Force site 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All ALCs have similar types of industrial contamination • McClellan has extensive contamination
Cost to clean up	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD guidance states that environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental cleanup costs are high -- \$705 million to \$925 million to clean up base by 2034 under current plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental restoration costs at closing bases were not considered in cost of closure
Effect of closure on cleanup costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental cleanup can be accelerated in fast-track program at closing bases • Acceleration does not necessarily increase costs • DoD guidance does not require cleanup of a closing base by a specified time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cleanup must be accelerated under closure scenario • Cost to clean by 2018: estimate is \$1.2 to \$1.8 billion • Cost to clean in 5 years: estimate is \$3 to \$10 billion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs may rise to some extent; projected cost differences cannot be verified • Cleanup costs were not considered in costs of closure • DoD guidance does not require cleanup of a closing base by a specified time
Cleanup funds available in future	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cleanup of closing bases funded by BRAC account • Cleanup of open bases funded by DERA account 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Future cleanup funds will not be sufficient to clean up McClellan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of cleanup funds is a concern to all bases, open and closed

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Kelly Air Force Base

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Water supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Water supply and asbestos resulted in a low environmental rating by Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• U.S. District Court has issued statement that no water use restrictions will apply to Kelly AFB• Water supply issues no longer apply	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Adequate water supply assured
Extent of environmental contamination	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ongoing soil and groundwater cleanup• Estimated cleanup year 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Only ALC not on National Priorities List• Recognized for environmental excellence by DoD, State of Texas	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• All ALCs have similar types of industrial contamination• Several cleanup actions are in progress• Groundwater contamination only affects shallow alluvial aquifer, so groundwater cleanup is comparatively feasible

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION SUMMARY - ALCs

Environmental Conditions	McClellan	Kelly	Tinker	Hill	Robins
Acres Total	2,950	3,996.5	5,001	6,666	8,855
Acres of Known Contamination On Base	664 acres (soil + groundwater) Offbase contamination	46 soil, 1319 groundwater acres; some overlap. Offbase contamination	120 soil, 400 groundwater acres; some overlap. Offbase contamination	370 acres (soil + groundwater) Offbase contamination	1900 acres (soil + groundwater) No offbase contamination
Investigation of Additional Sites Ongoing	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes, but additional sites unlikely
Contamination Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 large pits where solvents dumped/burned - Contaminated groundwater affects former drinking wells - Radiation issues - Leaking industrial waste lines - Soil vapor gas - Contamination under structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 pit where solvents dumped - Leaking industrial waste lines - Leaking jet fuel hydrant - Leaking underground petroleum tanks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 pits where solvents dumped - Radioactive paints in landfills - Leaking industrial waste lines/system - 6 landfills, some with hazardous waste - Groundwater plumes only partially identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 pit where solvents dumped (100,000 gal.) - Leaking industrial waste lines - 3 hazardous waste landfills - Former plating shop - Contamination under structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 lagoon (open pit) where solvents dumped - Haz waste landfill (1.5 acres) - Radioactive waste burial site - Pesticides - Groundwater contamination from past industrial practices
Depth of Groundwater Contamination	To -400 ft; deep aquifer	To -25 ft (stops at clay layer)	To -200 ft; aquifer layers	To -80 ft; perched aquifer	2 aquifers, -50ft and -190 ft

Air Force Determination of Depot Workload Movement with Installation Closure

INSTALLATION CLOSURE	Hill	Kelly	McClellan	Tinker	Robins
Hill		10%	39%	37%	14%
Kelly	10%		0%	89%	1%
McClellan	70%	0%		25%	5%
Tinker	1%	72%	13%		14%
Robins	12%	30%	58%	0%	

**Joint Cross Service Distribution of Kelly and McClellan
workload**

<u>relocation of work</u>	<u>thousands of direct labor hours</u>
Tinker	4,828
Robins	613
Hill	1,674
Tobyhanna	1,081
North Island	205
Cherry Point	102
Annisition	2
Barstow	62

JOINT CROSS SERVICE DISTRIBUTION OF KELLY WORKLOAD

<u>to Tinker:</u>	<u>Thousands of direct labor hours</u>
air frames	821
hydraulics	3
instruments	5
aircraft (other components)	93
engines	2,626
tactical software	14
equip software	155
associated manufacturing	120
subtotal	3,837
<u>to Robins:</u>	
aircraft structures	19
avionics	31
subtotal	50
<u>to Hill:</u>	
aircraft structures	10
landing gear	4
missiles	57
subtotal	71
<u>to Tobyhanna:</u>	
TMDE	205
subtotal	205
<u>to North Island:</u>	
TMDE	205
subtotal	205
<u>to Cherry Point:</u>	
APU	102
subtotal	102
<u>to Anniston:</u>	
ordinance	2
subtotal	2

JOINT CROSS SERVICE DISTRIBUTION OF McCELLAN WORKLOAD

<u>to Tinker:</u>	Thousands of direct labor hours
air frames	441
hydraulics	357
instruments	193
subtotal	991
<u>to Robins:</u>	
airframes	150
aircraft structures	25
avionics	334
manufacturing	54
subtotal	563
<u>to Hill:</u>	
lt combat airframes	757
aircraft structures	151
software tactical systems	211
software equipment	184
manufacturing	300
subtotal	1,602
<u>to Tobyhanna:</u>	
ground radar	430
radio communication	177
wire communication	118
navigation aides	118
electical optics	32
subtotal	876
<u>to Barstow:</u>	
ground generators	62
subtotal	62
<u>to Crane:</u>	
electical optics	109
subtotal	109

XBU-32

33-109X

subtotal	310
manufacturing	150
munitions	5
missiles	21
AFU	105
landing gear	4
instruments	2
aircraft structures	10
work from Kelly to Hill:	

subtotal	000
software	100
avionics	31
airframes	400
work from Kelly to Robin:	

subtotal	3,223
LMDE	410
engines	5,050
other components	03
hydraulics	3
air frames	451
work from Kelly to Tinker:	

subtotal	001
11 combat airframes	001
from McClellan to Hill:	

subtotal	1,801
manufacturing	584
electrical optics	100
satellite	35
navigation aids	102
wire communication	118
radio communication	111
ground radar	430
avionics	334
aircraft structures	121
work from McClellan to Robin:	

subtotal	1,211
manufacturing	10
tactical system and equip software	302
ground generators	05
instruments	103
hydraulics	321
air frames (tanker \ bomber)	441
work from McClellan to Tinker:	

Thousands of direct labor hours

DISTRIBUTION OF WORK WITHIN AIR FORCE DEBOTS (TWO CATEGORIES)

COMPARISON OF DEPOT BASE CLOSURE COBRAs

	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Army</u>
Time to Close	2-3 years	6 years	3-4 years
Positions eliminated before workload move	average 20-30% gainer requirement	none	average 50% gainer requirement
Timing of position elimination	phased	all in last year	phased
Base Conversion Agency Costs	COBRA calculation	COBRA calculation plus \$30 M	COBRA calculation

Comparison of Closure COBRA data from each Military Department (costs in \$M)

	Air Force Kelly AFB	Navy Long Beach	Army Red River	Army Letterkenny
ROI year	9	0	0	0
NPV	-283	-1,949	-1,497	-952
costs and savings:				
one time costs	582	75	60	50
one time savings	7	0	0	0
Steady state savings	-76	-131	-123	-78
population	19,104	3,891	2,971	3,017
eliminated	1,245	1,697	1,861	1,287
realigned	16,415	472	1,040	803
force structure	1,444	185	0	436
contoned	0	0	70	491
privatized	0	1,537	0	0
% eliminated	7%	44%	63%	43%
% realigned	86%	12%	35%	27%
% force structure	7%	5%	0%	14%
%contoned	0%	0%	2%	16%
%privatized	0%	39%	0%	0%

XBU-35

SCENARIO SUMMARY

Kelly Air Force Base

COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
<p>Close Kelly AFB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assign ALC and DLA workload IAW DoD requirements • Assign Cryptological Support Directorate to Lackland AFB • Attach airfield to Lackland AFB • Assign Air Intelligence Agency to Lackland AFB • Assign AFR C-5 unit to Lackland AFB • Assign ANG F-16 unit to Lackland AFB • Assign Air Force News Agency to Lackland AFB 	
<p>One Time Costs (\$M): 412.8 Annual Savings (\$M): 178.5 Return on Investment: 2001 (1 Year) Net Present Value (\$M): 1,848.0</p>	
PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces excess ALC capacity • Tier III installation • Tier III depot • Tenant units can be easily attached to Lackland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relocation of C-5 workload

XBU-36

SCENARIO SUMMARY

McClellan Air Force Base

COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
<p>Close McClellan AFB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALC and DLA workload transfers IAW DoD requirements • Cost Guard unit relocates IAW DOT requirements • Canton the Nuclear Radiation Center Reactor and make available for dual use or research 	
<p>One Time Costs (\$M): 409.8 Annual Savings (\$M): 159.7 Return on Investment: 1 year (2001) Net Present Value (\$M): 1,606.7</p>	
PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces excess ALC capacity • Tier III installation • Most economical ALC to close 	

XBU-37

BASE ANALYSIS

Hill Air Force Base

DOD RECOMMENDATION: downsize the depot located at Hill Air Force Base, Salt Lake City -Ogden, Utah

COMMISSION ADD FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Hill Air Force Base **FOR CLOSURE**

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION	Air Force Closure	R&A Closure
MILITARY VALUE	tier I	tier I	tier I
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	41.9	1,293.1	1,105.5
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	.4	71.0	152.6
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	never	27 years	7 years
NET PRESENT VALUE	46.7	-441.5	874.7
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	0/0	543/ 651	1,044/2,008
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	0/0	4,302/ 8,293	2,952/ 6,763
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	-0.1 %/ -0.3%	-4.7%/ -4.9%	-4.4%/ -4.6%

- NOTE: The DOD Recommendation to downsize cannot occur independently, it must be executed in conjunction with downsizing at all the Air Force ALCs.

(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

(*) = Commission add for further consideration

XBU-38

BASE ANALYSIS

Kelly Air Force Base

DOD RECOMMENDATION: downsize the depot located at Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio

COMMISSION ADD FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Kelly Air Force Base **FOR CLOSURE**

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION	Air Force Closure	R&A Closure
MILITARY VALUE	tier III	tier III	tier III
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	29.7	582.1	412.8
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	22.3	76.41	178.5
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1 year	9 years	1 year
NET PRESENT VALUE	265.2	282.6	1848.0
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL/ CIV)	10/458	237/ 1,008	640/ 2634
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	0/0	4,491/ 11,924	3,353/11,026
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	0.0 / -0.9%	-5.7%/-6.6%	-4.3%/-5.1%

- NOTE: The DOD Recommendation to downsize cannot occur independently, it must be executed in conjunction with downsizing at all the Air Force ALCs.

(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

(*) = Commission add for further consideration

BASE ANALYSIS

Tinker Air Force Base

DOD RECOMMENDATION: downsize the depot located at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma City

COMMISSION ADD FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Tinker Air Force Base **FOR CLOSURE**

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION	Air Force Closure	R&A Closure
MILITARY VALUE	tier I	tier I	tier I
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	39.7	1,332.2	1,141.4
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	46.7	73.1	163.8
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1 year	28 years	6 years
NET PRESENT VALUE	567.6	-471.8	980.5
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	19/980	480/ 804	626/ 2,540
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	0/133	7,906/ 11,584	7,023/ 8,906
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	-0.3 %/ -0.3%	-7.7%/ -7.7%	-7.1%/ -7.1%

- NOTE: The DOD Recommendation to downsize cannot occur independently, it must be executed in conjunction with downsizing at all the Air Force ALCs.

(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

(*) = Commission add for further consideration

XBU-410

BASE ANALYSIS

Robins Air Force Base

DOD RECOMMENDATION: downsize the depot located at Robins Air Force Base, Macon GA

COMMISSION ADD FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Robins Air Force Base **FOR CLOSURE**

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION	Air Force Closure	R&A Closure
MILITARY VALUE	tier II	tier II	tier II
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	29.4	925.4	762.1
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	17.3	61.9	162.2
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1 year	22 years	4 years
NET PRESENT VALUE	205.9	-249.3	1,307.5
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	8/ 368	413/ 776	785/ 2,604
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	0/118	4,314/ 10,222	3,723/ 8,984
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	-0.7 %/ -0.7%	-19.4%/ -19.4%	-19.9%/ -19.9%

- NOTE: The DOD Recommendation to downsize cannot occur independently, it must be executed in conjunction with downsizing at all the Air Force ALCs.

(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

(*) = Commission add for further consideration

XBU-41

BASE ANALYSIS

McClellan Air Force Base

DOD RECOMMENDATION: downsize the depot located at McClellan Air Force Base, Sacramento, CA

COMMISSION ADD FOR CONSIDERATION: Study McClellan Air Force Base **FOR CLOSURE**

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION	Air Force Closure	R&A Closure
MILITARY VALUE	tier III	tier III	tier III
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	41.7	574.5	409.8
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	.3	86.9	159.7
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	never	7 years	1 year
NET PRESENT VALUE	44.3	574.5	1,606.7
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	0/0	562/876	1,014/ 2,027
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	0/0	2,193/ 7,372	1,743/ 6,801
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	-0.1 %/- 0.1%	-3.4%/-3.7%	-3.7%/-3.9%

- NOTE: The DOD Recommendation to downsize cannot occur independently, it must be executed in conjunction with downsizing at all the Air Force ALCs.


(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

(*) = Commission add for further consideration

XBU-42

Cross Service Distribution of Air Force workload FY 1999, single shift



XBU-43

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - DEPOT Subcategory**TIERING OF BASES**

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

TIER I

Hill AFB

Tinker AFB

TIER II

Robins AFB

TIER III

Kelly AFB

McClellan AFB

6 Feb 95

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - DEPOT Subcategory

ANALYSIS RESULTS at TIERING (13 Sep)

The following grades and data reflect the information on which the BCEG members based their tiering determination. Information in this chart was updated as the result of a number of factors between initial tiering and final recommendations.

Base Name	I.3	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
III AFB	Green -	Yellow +	Green -	1,409/ 514	30	38,748 (6.8%)	Green -	Yellow +
Kelly AFB	Yellow	Green -	Yellow +	653/-179	10	41,125 (6.4%)	Green -	Red +
McClellan AFB	Yellow +	Yellow +	Yellow +	514/-607	5	32,438 (5.2%)*	Yellow	Yellow +
Robins AFB	Green -	Green -	Green	1,011/ 133	18	32,004 (24.3%)	Green -	Yellow +
Tinker AFB	Yellow +	Green -	Green	1,312/ 633	42	47,590 (10.1%)	Green -	Yellow +

21 Feb 95

UNCLASSIFIED

XBU-415

SCENARIO SUMMARY

Hill Air Force Base

COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
<p>Close Hill AFB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALC and DLA workload transfers IAW DoD requirements • Relocate F-16 Wing to Cannon and Shaw AFBs 	
<p>One Time Costs (\$M): 1,105.9 Annual Savings (\$M): 152.6 Return on Investment: 7 years (2007) Net Present Value (\$M): 874.7</p>	
PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces excess ALC capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tier I installation • Tier I depot • Weapon storage facility, landing gear maintenance, and ICBM maintenance expensive to relocate • UTTR used for cruise missile testing and as supersonic range

SCENARIO SUMMARY

Robins Air Force Base

COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
<p>Close Robins AFB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALC and DLA workload transfers IAW DoD requirements • Relocate JSTARS to Beale • Relocate KC-135 Air Refueling Wing to Charleston AFB • HQ AFRES to Dobbins AFB 	
<p>One Time Costs (\$M): 762.1 Annual Savings (\$M): 162.2 Return on Investment: 4 years (2004) Net Present Value (\$M): 1,307.5</p>	
PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces excess ALC capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tier I depot • Delays JSTARS Initial Operational Capability • Difficult to relocate ANG B-1 unit

SCENARIO SUMMARY

Tinker Air Force Base

COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
<p>Close Tinker AFB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALC and DLA workload transfers IAW DoD requirements • Relocate AWACS to Beale AFBs • Relocate TACAMO IAW Navy requirements • Relocate 38th Electronic Installation Wing to Peterson AFB • Relocate 3rd Combat Comm Group to Davis-Monthan AFB 	
<p>One Time Costs (\$M): 1,141.4 Annual Savings (\$M): 163.8 Return on Investment: 6 years (2006) Net Present Value (\$M): 980.5</p>	
PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces excess ALC capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tier 1 installation • AWACS and TACAMO expensive to relocate • Dissolves AWACS, TACAMO, and ALC synergism • Increase operating costs for AWACS and TACAMO

	Thousands of hours	Percentage
Total Kelly worklog	4,403	
Subtotal	3,710	83
Other engines	1,358	30
C-2 engines	1,508	50
C-2 Airframe	1,083	54




(FY 1999)

Composition of Kelly Debot Worklog




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Comparison of Cost Estimates to Transfer C-5 Workload
(\$'s in millions)

	Kelly	Air Force	Commission
	community		Staff
Military construction	82	78	78
transfer equipment	102	11	11
training and production	45	57	32
transition			
move C-5 personnel		44	38
TOTAL	229	190	159



PROPOSED C-5 COMPLEX



DEPOT MAINTENANCE FLOW

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. ARRIVAL/INVENTORY/DRAIN LAVATORY | 5. PDM DOCKS | 9. BORESITZ AVIONICS CHECK |
| 2. DEFUEL/PURGE/INCOMING LEAK CHECKS | 6. PAINT | 10. FLIGHT PREP/PCP |
| 3. REMOVE FLIGHT CONTROLS/ENGINES | 7. INITIAL FUEL/LEAK CHECKS | 11. DEPARTURE |
| 4. LARPS STRIP/FUEL DOCK | 8. ENGINE RUN/LOAD BACK | |

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
C-5 GALAXY

WING SPAN - - 222' 8.5'
 LENGTH - - 217' 10.0'
 HEIGHT - - 65' 1.5'
 TOP OF FUSELAGE - - 32' (EST.)

BLDG 240
 SIDE VIEW
 C-5 DOCK

DECK DIMENSIONS

WIDTH - - 250' 0'
 LENGTH - - 200' 0'
 HEIGHT - - 47' 0'



1. FORM 1128' NOV 88'

34	EXPERIMENTAL WORK OTHER VENDORIFICATIONS					
35	TOTAL BONDING BOND					
36	TOTAL BONDING (30 + 31)					
37	STION (2'0X)					
38	TOTAL CONTRACT COST (38 + 39)					
39	CONTRACTING (2'0X)					
40	ESTIMATE + SUBTOTAL SUBTOTAL (30 + 31)					
41	SUBTOTALING ESTIMATE SUBTOTAL					

UTILITIES CONNECTIONS	1'08	12			
VEH HOLDING BOND	1'08	12			
STREET DESTRUCTION	1'08	12			
VEHICLE PARKING	1'08	12			
ELECTRICITY SUBSTATION	1'08	2X	13'000		00.43
STREET CONSTRUCTION BOND	1'08	12			
INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREAT	1'08	12			
WATER/SEWER SYSTEM EXCHANGE	1'08	12			
MUNICIPAL AMPLIFICATION	1'08	12			
CONCRETE PAVING 18"	1'08	2X	13'000		00.44

42	SUBTOTALING ESTIMATES	55'000	12		1201	
43	ESTIMATE SUBTOTAL	55'000	12	25000	52'000	5

CONCRETE CONCRETE ESTIMATE	511-120	'83	1'08	2E	20'000	150'00
DEBT MAINTENANCE FUNDING	511-110	'83	1'08	2E	300'000	88'00

44	ESTIMATE SUBTOTAL	CODE	13'000	12'000	12'000	12'000	12'000
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1' CONGR BOND	8' W/HS OF CONGR	2' LG DATE	10' CURRENCY BY	11' EXCHANGE
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4' W/SON	2' B/SE/STATE/INSTR CODE	1' VCE
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7' BDC NUMBER	W/MS ST' CP O/SON W/BS V	3' B/OTECI LIFE
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BY 1988 PROJECT COST ESTIMATE SUMMARY (Computer-3000)

OC-ALC PROPOSAL FOR
C-5 GALAXY MAINTENANCE

- Under AFMC 21 option IVG, OC-ALC prepared a comprehensive plan to relocate C-5 maintenance/modification workloads at a cost of \$52.0M. This price tag includes both new construction and modifications to existing structures
- Cost for new construction is \$7.2M
 - 60K square feet (SF) corrosion control facility
- Cost for modifying existing structures is \$23.4M
 - Enlarge Building 240 dock for tail enclosure
 - Ceiling modification to raise nose radome
- Cost for supporting facilities is \$16.2M
 - Supplement concrete paving
 - Expand fuel/defuel system
 - Attach industrial waste line
 - Upgrade steam generation plant/utility connections
 - Purchase blast deflectors
- The remaining \$5.2M consists of a 5 percent contingency and 6 percent for support/inspection/overhead (Corps of Engineers) cost

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AFMC 21

CERTIFICATION WORKSHEET
 PHASE _____ OPTION 4

INSTALLATION: Tinker Air Base Oklahoma

V
 PURPOSE: To provide a comprehensive plan to acquire C-5 workload from SA-ALC IAW Option IV of the AFMC 21 Plan. Real Estate and Milcon's for facilities required to accomplish and identify workload.

SOURCE: Richard Wright, 72 CEG/CECX, 884-3201 and Jerald Terrell, OC-ALC LAFEE, 336-7757.

METHOD: Knowledge of program provided by SA-ALC was used. Unit costs were based on category codes of the facility requirements provided. Civil Engineering standards were used to develop the costs.

Per discussion with Col Pitcher, HQ AFMC/LGP, 2 Dec 94 AF Form 1178 was revised to breakout depot maintenance support shops, C-5 hangar tail enclosure and the hangar radome area. Unit costs for these facilities were adjusted to the current Air Force pricing guide data. A line item was added for the overhead bridge crane systems. The total MILCON request is a rounded number and remains \$52.0M. Initial outfitting equipment and shop rearrangement costs are shown at the bottom of the AF Form 1178.

CONCLUSION: The C-5 Aircraft workload can be relocated to OC-ALC with a MILCON cost of \$52.0M.

I certify that the above information is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Green Base Level Preparer(s): Richard D. Wright Date 2 2
 Richard Wright, 72 CEG/CECX
 DSN 884-3201

Green Base Level Reviewer(s): Edna E. McDaniel Date 2 2
 Edna E. McDaniel
 OC-ALC/RMP
 DSN 339-3426

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
Sensitivity Analysis of Timing & Phasing of McClellan AFB & Kelly AFB Full Closure

Alternative 1:	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01
Mission Realigned & Eliminated	0%	10%	25%	35%	30%	0%
BOS Realigned & Eliminated	0%	0%	15%	15%	35%	35%

Alternative 2:	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01
Mission Realigned & Eliminated	0%	10%	20%	35%	35%	0%
BOS Realigned & Eliminated	0%	0%	15%	15%	35%	35%

	1-Time Cost <u>(\$M)</u>	Annual Savings <u>(\$M)</u>	20-Yr Savings <u>NPV (\$M)</u>	Break Even <u>Year (ROI)</u>
McClellan	410	160	1,607	2001
Alternative 1	410	160	1,568	2001
Alternative 2	410	160	1,561	2001
Kelly	413	179	1,848	2001
Alternative 1	413	179	1,803	2001
Alternative 2	413	179	1,793	2001

KELLY AFB OVERVIEW



WALKER HALL
MEDICAL CENTER

KELLY AIR FORCE BASE HIGHLIGHTED ORGANIZATIONS

█ Dept	█ 6000	█ 6000	█ 6000
█ AA	█ 6000	█ 6000	█ 6000
█ DLA	█ 6000	█ 6000	█ 6000
█ 6000	█ 6000	█ 6000	█ 6000
█ 6000	█ 6000	█ 6000	█ 6000

LEGEND:
 - - - SAFETY EXCLUSION ZONE
 - - - BASE BOUNDARY

ISSUES
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT, TEXAS

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MISSILE RECERTIFICATION OFFICE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INITIAL ARMY POSITION WAS THAT OFFICE SHOULD GO TO LETTERKENNY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OFFICE SHOULD STAY AT STORAGE ACTIVITY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY AND COMMUNITY AGREE THAT MISSILE RECERTIFICATION OFFICE SHOULD STAY AT RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT AWARDS AND RECOGNITION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY MUST CLOSE SOME EXCELLENT FACILITIES • EVEN EXCESS FACILITIES ARE QUALITY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WINNER OF SEVERAL AWARDS AND RECOGNIZED FOR QUALITY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AWARDS TESTIFY TO DEPOT'S QUALITY • ARMY HAS REDUCED TO 5 QUALITY DEPOTS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT AND DEFENSE DEPOT, RED RIVER, ARE SEPARATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GUIDANCE WAS TO DEVELOP SEPARATE SCENARIO FOR DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS ONE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONSISTENT WITH OSD GUIDANCE
FUTURE TEAMING WITH INDUSTRY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RECOMMENDATION DIVESTS ARMY OF EXCESS FACILITIES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNITED DEFENSE WAS LOOKING AT TEAMING WITH ARMY RED RIVER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TO BE EFFECTIVE, TEAMING REQUIRES A TENANT
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NO CONSTRUCTION AT ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT IN COBRA • ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT ESTIMATES \$531,000 (ALL BELOW MILCON THRESHOLD) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMMUNITY STATES REQUIREMENTS FOR \$15 MILLION IN CONSTRUCTION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INCLUDED IN COMMISSION COBRA

ISSUES
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT, TEXAS

(Continued)

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
BASE SUPPORT FOR ENCLAVED AT LONE STAR AMMUNITION PLANT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY SCENARIO LEAVES 100 BASOPS PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT ENCLAVED ACTIVITIES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOME REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT CONSIDERED • ESTIMATES NEED FOR ADDITIONAL 70 PERSONNEL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY WILL TRANSFER 510 PERSONNEL TO LONE STAR OF 1040 REALIGNED • 100 OF THE 510 ARE BASOPS PERSONNEL
UNEMPLOYMENT IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY COMPUTED UNEMPLOYMENT IMPACT USING DOD STANDARD FACTORS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMMUNITY STATES THAT ARMY UNDERESTIMATED UNEMPLOYMENT IMPACT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • STANDARD FACTORS MAKE COMPARISON EQUITABLE
ARMY SAVINGS BASED ON NON-BRAC PERSONNEL SAVINGS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY COUNTS PERSONNEL SAVINGS AS RESULT OF BRAC ACTION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMMUNITY STATES THAT THEY ARE FROM PROGRAM WORKLOAD REDUCTION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PERSONNEL IMPACTS ARE CONSISTENTLY APPLIED TO ALL RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNISTON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS

PROJECT	COST (\$ 000'S)	REQUIREMENT
TRITIUM STORAGE FACILITY	25	RENOVATE WAREHOUSE TO SUPPORT LEAD ARTILLERY WORKLOAD (LEAD)
RECOIL ROOM EXPANSION	294	EXPAND EXISTING RECOIL ROOM FOR ARTILLERY WORKLOAD (LEAD)
FIRING RANGE UPGRADE	249	UPGRADE EXISTING RANGE TO SUPPORT ARTILLERY WORKLOAD (LEAD)
RECOIL HONING FACILITY	185	RENOVATE EXISTING FACILITIES TO SUPPORT ARTILLERY WORKLOAD (LEAD)
MACHINING FACILITY	290	CONSTRUCT MACHINE SHOP TO SUPPORT ARTILLERY AND LIGHT/MEDIUM COMBAT VEHICLE WORKLOAD (RRAD)
TRANSMISSION DYNAMOMETER FACILITY	241	CONSTRUCT NEW FACILITY TO SUPPORT LIGHT/MEDIUM COMBAT VEHICLE WORKLOAD (RRAD)
TOTAL \$1,284		

CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED TO SUPPORT MOVE FROM LETTERKENNY: \$753,000

CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED TO SUPPORT MOVE FROM RED RIVER: \$531,000

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD AND CAPACITY
(DLH/Ks)

WORKLOAD


DEPOT	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	WARTIME
ANNISTON	2,179	1,538	1,443	
LETTERKENNY	1243	650	458	
RED RIVER	2,037	1,399	1,282	
TOTAL	5,421	3,552	3,183	8,400

MAXIMUM POTENTIAL CAPACITY

SCHEDULE	ANNISTON	LETTERKENNY	RED RIVER	TOTAL
1-8-5	4,042	1,605	3,630	9,277
2-8-5	7,846			
2-8-7	11,054			

XBJ-51

Ground Combat Vehicle Core



180-524

ISSUES: TACTICAL MISSILES

DOD Recommendation: realign Letterkenny; missiles to Tobyhanna; vehicles to Anniston

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Tactical Missile Workload Forecast (FY 99 Programmed vs Core) (DLH in thousands)	programmed = 1,502 core = 523	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community believes all missile work should be core • Community concerned that non-core not considered in DOD's closure scenario 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-core tactical missile work could be assigned to the private sector <p>DOD considered all programmed work. some non core work will remain at Letterkenny pending privatization.</p>
Space Available for Missile Maintenance	Tobyhanna has space available to accept tactical missile maintenance	Tobyhanna plans to use half the space that Letterkenny plans to use	Waiting for copy of preliminary implementation plan
One Stop Shop	No Position Stated	Community advocates collocation of consolidated depot maintenance along with expanded storage, disassembly, assembly, upruding and demilitarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Storage and disassembly are supply missions • All potential workload shifts are below BRAC threshold

ISSUES: TACTICAL MISSILES

DOD Recommendation: realign Letterkenny; missiles to Tobyhanna; vehicles to Anniston

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY CONCERNS	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Tactical Missile Storage Requirements (FY 99)	1,239,000 square feet	Future storage requirement for tactical missile storage and uprounding could be slightly higher	No reason to question Army's certified numbers
Benefits of Public / Private Teaming	Paladin will end in October 1998, leaving considerable excess capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential for future teaming projects could extend to 2001 Public /Private Teaming has saved millions	Reuse plan could include use depot facilities as a COCO operation
Potential for Privatization	Chairman, Joint Cross Service Group believes major portion of tactical missile workload could be privatized	Not Stated	Agree with DOD
Tenant Moves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DOD COBRA estimate to realign Letterkenny supports movement of all tenant organizations. • Separate closure estimate for DLA Distribution Depot 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBRA does not support Public Works, DISA,DFAS, LOGSA,SIMA,TMDE • DLA and DOD costs should be combined 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOGSA & SIMA covered by BRAC 91 • Separate estimate for DLA totals \$44.9 million • COBRA estimate moves 392 personnel from other tenant organizations

XBU-54

ISSUES: TACTICAL MISSILES

COMMISSION Alternative: realign Letterkenny; missiles to Hill Air Force Base; vehicles to Anniston

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Military Value	Hill is a tier I installation and also a tier I depot	Community agrees	No reason to question DOD
Capacity utilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air Force acknowledges excess capacity and plans to eliminate it through demolishing and / or mothballing of buildings • Air Force does not endorse transfer of new missile work into Hill 	Community believes the Hill depot has the capacity and capability to accept entire DOD depot level tactical missile maintenance workload	Transfer of tactical missile maintenance workload to Hill would increase depot utilization rate from 54% to 71 %
Military Construction Costs	\$124 million	\$2.0 million (assumes no new missile storage facilities)	\$2.0 million (assumes no new missile storage facilities)
Personnel Training Costs	\$19.6 million	\$17.5 million	agree with DOD
Total One Time Costs	\$219.7 million	\$89 million	\$89 million

ISSUES: TACTICAL MISSILES

**COMMISSION Alternative: realign Letterkenny; missiles to Hill Air Force Base;
vehicles to Anniston**

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Tactical Missile Workload Forecast (FY 99 Programmed vs Core)	programmed = 1,502 core = 523	none stated	Non core tactical missile work could be assigned to the private sector
Space Available for Missile Maintenance	No DOD position. Air Force has not supported this option	264,000 square feet	Hill Air Force Base has about 1.5 million square feet of excess infrastructure -- more space could likely be made available
One Stop Shop	No DOD Position	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No synergism gained from collocation of storage, uprounding and depot level maintenance • Only store items awaiting maintenance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Storage and uprounding are supply function • All potential shifts to accommodate one stop shop are below threshold
Tactical Missile Storage Requirements (FY99)	1,239,000 square feet	187,000 square feet	No reason to question Army's certified numbers

ISSUES: TACTICAL MISSILES


**COMMISSION Alternative: realign Letterkenny; missiles to Hill Air Force Base;
vehicles to Anniston**

ISSUE	DoD	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Benefits of Public / Private Teaming	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Potential for Privatization	Chairman, Joint Cross Service Group believes major portion of tactical missile workload could be privatized	Not Stated	Agree with DOD
Tenant Moves	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable


ISSUES: TACTICAL MISSILES
COMMISSION Alternative: close Tobyhanna; electronics to Letterkenny

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Tactical Missile Workload Forecast (FY 99 Programmed vs Core)	programmed = 1,502 core = 523	none stated	Non core tactical missile work could be transferred to the private sector
Space Available for Missile Maintenance	222,000 square feet	222,000 square feet	Awaiting draft implementation plan. Specific shop layouts have not yet been determined.
One Stop Shop	No DOD Position	None stated	Storage and uprounding are a supply function Personnel shifts are below threshold
Tactical Missile Storage Requirements	Tobhanna has no storage capability	None stated	Not applicable
Benefits of Public / Private Teaming	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Potential for Privatization	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Tenant Moves	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable


**Consolidation of DOD Tactical Missile and
Army Light Combat Vehicle Maintenance Workloads at Letterkenny
FY99 Programmed and Core Workload (Single Shift)**




Continue DOD Tactical Missile Consolidation and Combat Vehicle Workload at Letterkenny



**Consolidation of DOD Ground Communications and
Tactical Missile Workloads at Tobyhanna
FY 99 Programmed Workload (Single Shift)**





**Consolidation of DOD Tactical Missile and Army Ground Communications
Electronics Maintenance Workloads at Letterkenny
FY99 Programmed & Core Workload (Single Shift)**



PHASED ARRAY TRACKING RADAR TO INTERCEPT OF TARGET (PATRIOT)




LAUNCHER / MISSILE CANISTER




ELECTRICAL POWER PLANT



ENGAGEMENT CONTROL
STATION



RADAR SET



MISSILE



- * RADAR
- * COMMAND AND CONTROL
- * TEST SETS \ SYSTEMS
- * LAUNCHERS
- SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
- MISSILE GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SECTIONS
- MISSILE MAINTENANCE CONSOLIDATION

RETURN TO DEPT
ONLY COMPONENTS

IS ELECTRONIC
WORKLOAD



ROCKET MOTOR



WARHEAD



SECTIONS

CONTROL/GUIDANCE

CONSOLIDATION "COMPOSITION" TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&V STAFF FINDINGS
<p>One-Time Unidine Costs</p> <p>and Norfolk Wage Rates Between Tomsville</p>	<p>DOD policy not to allow these included in the COBRA, or it is. These costs were either already</p> <p>secretly result in a net savings between these two activities was data, the wage rate differential According to NAVSEA certified moving period.</p> <p>during the estimated 15 months necessary build spread costs before moving, will eliminate A compressed production cycle</p>	<p>and/or the R&V improbably by higher echelons, \$121.6 M was excluded</p> <p>two unlike facilities work is being transferred from the Government regardless if the \$250 M is going to be incurred by</p> <p>requirements maintain fleet CIWS systems \$48.6 M should be included to</p>	<p>Concern with the DOD position.</p> <p>Concern with the DOD position.</p> <p>Concern with the DOD position.</p>

(continued)

TONISVILLE, KENTUCKY
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER'S CRANE DIVISION DETACHMENT
ISSUES

ISSUES
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, AIRCRAFT DIVISION
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
Military Value for Integrated Capabilities	No work years under the category of research.	This value was improperly evaluated.	Community is right, but overall rating is satisfactory.
MILCON Cost avoidance	\$11.18 M included in the COBRA model for project 028, Chemical Production Facility.	NAWC Indianapolis has no programmed MILCON	Concur with DOD position.
Miscellaneous Recurring Costs	\$4.7 M	\$6.7 M	Concur with DOD position
One-Time Unique Costs	\$1.6 M	\$41.5 M	Concur with DOD position.
Average Salary Projection	\$46,786 average per employee	\$54,694 average per employee	Concur with DOD position.
Renovations at: NAWC Patuxent River, MD NAWC China Lake, CA	Final certified data included a rehabilitation cost estimate of 40% of the existing infrastructure at China Lake and Patuxent River.	75% is the maximum allowable rate at which rehabilitation is done in lieu of new MILCON as calculated by the COBRA, and MILCON costs for renovation should be calculated at 75% .	Concur with DOD position
Recurring Costs / Savings of Workload Transferred to the Private Sector	779 workyears	601 workyears	Concur with DOD position

XBU-64

**LAKEHURST, NEW JERSEY
NAVAL AIR WAREHOUSE CENTER, AIRCRAFT DIVISION
ISSUES**

(Continued)

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&V STATE FINDINGS
<p>ALIRE) RDT&E Aircraft Launch and Recovery</p>	<p>It will be cautioned at Lakehurst. Too costly to relocate. Naval and must be maintained. This mission is critical to the</p>	<p>ALIRE test. dismanagement of the Naval product-cycle delays in the production loss and inherent costs each year for travel, would incur significant recruiting of this capability, and the Naval exceptional strategic importance The proposal recognizes the</p>	<p>relocated functions. L remains inter-dependent on the Lakehurst. testing facilities cautioned at Increased costs of utilizing the</p>
<p>Contracted Workload</p>	<p>333 personnel are eliminated with no salary savings. 100 and about eliminated technical personnel are workyears will be contracted out recruiting cost. by the receiving sites as an annual</p>	<p>The personnel are essential to the transferring workload, and must be transferred to the receiving sites.</p>	<p>position. Concur with the community</p>
<p>Personnel MILCON at NADEP</p>	<p>21.24 M is needed for machine foundations and electrical service. There is sufficient excess capacity</p>	<p>transferring machines. MILCON to accommodate the An additional 29.46 M for</p>	<p>Concur with the DOD position.</p>

<p>Concur with community position.</p>	<p>Retain the current operations at Lakehurst. The cost to move to Ft Dix would be M 1.12</p>	<p>Construction costs, cost of moving other base equipment, miscellaneous costs since base is not being used for training.</p>	<p>Base Mobile Construction (MBCB)</p>
<p>AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution. Howver, AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution.</p>	<p>D. 2. U. The cost to relocate M 2. 1. 12 to AGC will be M 1.12</p>	<p>AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution. Howver, AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution.</p>	<p>AGC</p>
<p>AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution. Howver, AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution.</p>	<p>The cost to relocate M 2. 1. 12 to AGC will be M 1.12</p>	<p>AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution. Howver, AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution.</p>	<p>AGC</p>
<p>AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution. Howver, AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution.</p>	<p>The cost to relocate M 2. 1. 12 to AGC will be M 1.12</p>	<p>AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution. Howver, AGC will be able to provide a more efficient and cost-effective solution.</p>	<p>AGC</p>

NAWC LAKEHURST

CURRENT FLEET EMERGENCY RESPONSE SCHEDULE

CARRIER PROBLEM---Notifies TYCOM---Lakehurst initiates investigation---CAFSU Team travels to ship---Analysis begins---Corrective action developed---Prototypes made, tested, modified, retested,--- prototypes approved---Initial lot manufactured---Delivery and installation on ship.

61 DAYS


LAKEHURST CANTONMENT & NADEP JACKSONVILLE

IMPACT OF DOD RECOMMENDATION ON FLEET EMERGENCY RESPONSE SCHEDULE


CARRIER PROBLEM--- Notifies TYCOM---Lakehurst initiates investigation---CAFSU Team travels to ship---Analysis begins at both Lakehurst and Jacksonville---Engineers travel to one site---Corrective action developed---Prototypes made at Jacksonville---Prototypes tested at Lakehurst---Prototypes returned to Jacksonville for rework---Prototypes tested at Lakehurst---Prototypes returned to Jacksonville for modification--
-Prototypes tested for approval at Lakehurst---Initial lot manufactured at Jacksonville---Delivery and Installation on ship.

115 DAYS

**Commission Analysis of DOD Recommendation
NAWC Lakehurst (2048 total)**



DOD Recommended Personnel Actions NAWC Lakehurst (2048 Total)



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMPARISON OF FUNCTIONAL VALUES ELECTRONIC COMBAT

SITE	ORIG FV SCORE	INTERIM SCORE	RM* FV SCORE
AFDTC-EGLIN	65	63	62
NAWCWPNS-PT MUGU	58	59	57
NAWCAD-PATUXENT	53	54	50
AFTC-EDWARDS AFB	52	50	49
NAWC-CHINA LAKE & WSM	47	50	49
USA EPG	47	47	48
HOLLOMAN AFB	29	30	30
AFEWES-EGLIN AFB	17	17	17
NSWCCD-CRANE	17	17	17
RDCAP-EGLIN	15	15	15

* "Reasonable-man"

CHANGES:

- AFTC AND CHINA LAKE NOW TIED
- NARROWED SPREAD AMONG TOP SIX
- DID NOT OTHERWISE CHANGE POSITIONS
 - Largest Change, original to final "RM": -6% (Pax)
 - Largest Change, Interim to final "RM": -8% (Pax)

XBU-70

UNCLASSIFIED

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - TEST FACILITY Subcategory

TIERING OF BASES

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

TIER I

Eglin AFB

UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix 10 63

XBU-71

ISSUES REVIEWED
REAL-TIME DIGITALLY CONTROLLED ANALYZER PROCESSOR
(REDCAP)

<p>Cost to Close</p> <p>Projected Estimation of Workload</p> <p>Legality of Disestablishment Action</p>	<p>Ability to Electronically Link REDCAP with Other Facilities</p> <p>Environmental Impact of Disestablishment Action</p>
--	---

ISSUES
REAL-TIME DIGITALLY CONTROLLED ANALYZER PROCESSOR
(REDCAP)

(Continued)

ISSUES	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ABILITY TO ELECTRONICALLY LINK REDCAP WITH OTHER FACILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feasible, but results in data transfer delays on some tests • Data transfer delays on integrated tests (ex. F-22) can degrade effectiveness of test results • Electronic linking would require 'avionics suite' for every new aircraft program to be built at REDCAP, because integrated tests have to be tested as a whole 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost effective • Feasible • Data transfer delays can be overcome or tolerated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concur in community's decision Electronic linking is feasible and more cost effective than collocation • Collocation of <u>entire</u> REDCAP mission at Edwards AFB: \$18M-\$30M v. electronic linking: \$3M • Every new aircraft program currently has an avionic suite built at contractor and AF facility • Results of linking: No cost to move, retain full capability, no disruption in operations
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF DISESTABLISHMENT ACTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal environmental impact 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 747,000kwh of generated electricity for cooling equipment. Proposed receiving site is located on a 100 year floodplain area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No significant environmental impact

XBU-73

POINT MUGU REALIGNMENT TO CHINA LAKE

PROs

**COLLOCATE ALL R & D AND IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING AT ONE
LOCATION**

INCREASED SYNERGY

**HIGH MILITARY VALUE OF SEA RANGE INSTRUMENTATION WILL
BE RETAINED**

BASE SUPPORT WILL BE REDUCED

OPPORTUNITY FOR RE-USE OF FACILITY

**EXPANDED USE OF RUNWAY AT SAN NICOLAS ISLAND WILL
ENSURE CLOSE PROXIMITY WITH SEA RANGE**

XBU-74

CONS

INITIAL HIGH COST (MILCON)

FURTHER REALIGNMENT OF MUGU WOULD DISRUPT OR
ELIMINATE THE EXISTING SYNERGISM WITHIN NAWC WEAPONS
DIV.

NO REDUCTION OF OPEN AIR TEST RANGE EXCESS CAPACITY

ADVERSE IMPACT ON MOBILIZATION MISSION AND TRAINING OF
SEABEES

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD WOULD BE FORCED TO RELOCATE
AWAY FROM LA AREA

NAVAL AIR RESERVE WILL HAVE TO AIRLIFT RESERVISTS TO A
NEW SITE

**NAWC WEAPONS DIVISION
PERSONNEL HISTORY
(MUGU & CHINA LAKE COMBINED)**

FY 89	11,483
FY 90	11,499
FY 91	11,323
FY 92	11,064
FY 93	10,273
FY 94	9,531
FY 95	9,238

REALIGNMENT FROM POINT MUGU TO CHINA LAKE

SQUARE FOOTAGE SHUTDOWN AT POINT MUGU (Sq.Ft.)

Laboratory Space	697,233
Administrative Space	213,441
Support Space	1,394,926
Total	2,305,600

PORT HUENEME AND CHINA LAKE REQUIREMENTS (Sq.Ft.)

	New Construction	Rehabilitated Space	Total
Port Hueneme	37,500		43,500
China Lake	1,327,040	6,000	1,718,489
Total	1,364,540	397,449	1,761,989

NAWC-POINT MUGU MILCON CONSIDERATIONS

DOD-IG

Built some new buildings but added-on to existing buildings also (\$259M)

COMMUNITY

Moved large equipment (e.g. F-14 and EA-6B WSSA's) rather than reconstitute at China Lake (\$287M)

NAVY

Provided for full replacement at China Lake (only Sea Range retained at Point Mugu)-Based on scenario provided by Commission (\$497M)


COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE (REVISED SCENARIO)

Retained at Point Mugu activities with :

- Large moving costs
- Support systems with limited life
- Subject to obsolescence caused by advancing technology / threats

Results in June 1995 showed MILCON of \$537 million.

XBU-78



Point Mugu
Sea Test Range
Warning Area
36,000 Sq. Mi.

Vandenberg AFB

Point Mugu

Edwards AFB

China Lake

Fort Irwin

MC Twentynine Palms

Los Angeles

San Diego

Nellis AFB

Las Vegas

- Distance from Point Mugu to:
- China Lake - 162 miles
 - Edwards AFB - 90 miles
 - Fort Irwin - 166 miles
 - Nellis AFB - 280 miles
 - Twentynine Palms - 172 miles
 - Vandenberg AFB - 92 miles

**DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL'S JUNE 1994 REPORT
ON TEST FACILITY REALIGNMENT**

ILLUSTRATIONS OF MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS

DOD/IG POSITION

REALIGNMENT OF TEST FACILITIES WOULD SAVE \$1.7 BILLION OVER 20 YEARS.

SAVINGS BASED ON 50% DECREASE IN WORKLOAD.

AERIAL TARGETS CAN BE SITED AT CHINA LAKE, LAUNCHED FROM AIR-CRAFT BASED THERE AND DO NOT NEED TO BE BASED AT SEA RANGE.

NAVY POSITION

REPORT CONTAINS TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS INACCURACIES. NAVY DID NOT CONCUR WITH 19 OF 22 REPORT FINDINGS AND 5 OF 6 CONCLUSIONS.

WORKLOAD SHOWS SIGNIFICANT INCREASES.

FUEL CONSIDERATIONS PREVENT AERIAL TARGETS FROM BEING BASED AT CHINA LAKE AND USED FOR OPERATIONS ON THE SEA RANGE.

**DBCRC STAFF VIEW ON CONSOLIDATION POTENTIAL FOR
POINT MUGU**

**--MAJOR PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS SINCE DOD-IG
COMPLETED ITS WORK**

**--HIGH COST TO MOVE BASED ON NAVY CERTIFIED DATA
ELIMINATES SAVINGS OPPORTUNITIES**

**--NAVY CERTIFIED TO HIGH COSTS TO MOVE UNDER TWO
DBCRC SCENARIOS**

**--UNLESS WORKLOAD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES IN THE
NEAR FUTURE, NEAR TERM CONSOLIDATION POTENTIAL
IS LIMITED**

STAFF COMMENTS..CONT

--DBCRC STAFF BELIEVES THAT CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED SINCE THE DOD-IG REPORT AND SAVINGS OF THE MAGNITUDE REPORTED BY THAT ORGANIZATION ARE NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. IT IS CLEAR THAT NAVY IS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO KEEPING POINT MUGU OPEN.

KELLY DEPOT OPTION

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Kelly ALC	1,024	10,001	11,025
Kelly DLA	5	1,071	1,076
Kelly Tennants	<u>2,962</u>	<u>2,969</u>	<u>5,931</u>
Total FY 97	3,991	14,041	18,032
Remain After Closure	2,620	2,385	5,005

Note: BOS numbers included.

XBU-79

**AIR FORCE DEPOT CLOSURE
IMPACT ON AIR FORCE BUDGET
COST/(SAVINGS) \$MIL**

McClellan

Kelly

	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Savings</u>	<u>Net</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Savings</u>	<u>Net</u>	<u>Total Net</u>
<u>96</u>	7.2	0	7.2	1.6	0	1.6	8.8
<u>97</u>	103.2	19.5	83.6	104.2	21.0	83.2	166.8
<u>98</u>	130.4	63.8	66.6	122.1	75.6	46.6	113.2
<u>99</u>	94.9	105.1	(10.3)	122.6	126.3	(4.7)	(15.0)
<u>00</u>	115.6	148.2	(32.6)	122.6	174.9	(52.2)	(84.8)
<u>01</u>	15.5	175.2	(159.7)	21.6	202.2	(180.6)	(340.3)
<u>Total</u>	466.8	511.8	(45.0)	493.79	600.0	(106.2)	(151.3)
<i>Annual Savings:</i>			(159.7)			(178.5)	(338.2)


XBU-80

SAN ANTONIO AREA INSTALLATIONS

	Military	Civilian	Total
Brooks AFB	1,639	1,766	3,405
Kelly AFB	3,991	14,041	18,032
Lackland AFB	11,649	2,728	14,377
Fort Sam Houston	9,568	4,817	14,385
Randolph AFB	4,323	3,137	7,460
Total	31,170	26,489	57,659



XBU - 81

San Antonio, Texas Area



XBU-82

DOD Depot Maintenance Facilities Considered by the DoD Joint Cross Service Group



**1995 DEPOT/SHIPYARD CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES**

Category	DoD	Cross-Service 1 Min Sites/Max Mil Value	Cross-Service 2 Min Excess Capacity
Army Depots	(C) Red River (R) Letterkenny	(C) Red River (C) Letterkenny	(C) Red River (C) Letterkenny
Navy Shipyards	(C) Long Beach	(C) Portsmouth (C) Pearl Harbor	*(C) Long Beach *(C) Portsmouth *(C) Pearl Harbor
Navy Aviation Depots		(C) Jacksonville	(C) Jacksonville
Navy Weapon Center	(C) Crane-Louisville (R) Keyport	(C) Crane-Louisville (C) Keyport	** (C) Crane- Louisville ** (C) Keyport
Air Force Aviation	(D) San Antonio (D) Sacramento (D) Ogden (D) Warner Robins (D) Ok City	(C) San Antonio	(C) San Antonio (C) Sacramento

C = CLOSURE

R = REALIGN

D = DOWNSIZE

* = CLOSE any 2 of 3

** = CLOSE any 1 of 2

3

DEPOT CAPACITY UTILIZATION - SINGLE SHIFT

Remaining Depots
% Capacity Utilization

Without BRAC 1995

48

DOD BRAC recommendation

52

Joint Cross Service Group option - 1

69

Joint Cross Service Group option - 2

73

AIR FORCE DEPOTS

<i>TIER</i>	<i>INSTALLATION</i>	
<i>I</i>	<i>Hill AFB / Ogden ALC</i>	<i>(D) (*)</i>
<i>I</i>	<i>Tinker AFB / Oklahoma City ALC</i>	<i>(D) (*)</i>
<i>II</i>	<i>Robins AFB / Warner Robins ALC</i>	<i>(D) (*)</i>
<i>III</i>	<i>Kelly AFB / San Antonio ALC</i>	<i>(X) (D) (*)</i>
<i>III</i>	<i>McClellan AFB / Sacramento ALC</i>	<i>(X) (D) (*)</i>

(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing air logistics centers (ALCs)

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure (AFBs)

(*) = Candidate for further consideration (AFBs)

AIR FORCE BRAC RECOMMENDATION DOWNSIZE-IN-PLACE ALL FIVE DEPOTS

DOWNSIZING CONSISTS OF :

- 1) MOTHBALL 2 MILLION SQUARE FEET OF DEPOT SPACE**
 - REDUCE AMOUNT OF DEPOT CAPACITY**
- 2) REDUCE 1,905 PERSONNEL**
 - EQUAL TO 2.5% REDUCTION IN INSTALLATION POPULATION OR 7.2 % IN DEPOT POPULATION**
 - REDUCTION TO BE ACHIEVED BY REENGINEERING DEPOT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE A 15% SAVINGS**

DOWNSIZING HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN PURSUED THROUGH BRAC

- OVERHEAD COSTS TO RUN DEPOT STRUCTURE WILL BE VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED**
- MAINTENANCE COST PER HOUR INCREASES**

DOWNSIZING PLAN IS STILL BEING REVISED BY AIR FORCE

- TWO REVISIONS SINCE 1 MARCH**

RECURING SAVINGS - \$89 M, NET PRESENT VALUE - \$991 M, ONE TIME COST - \$183 M

7

(D) = DoD recommendation for downgrading (*) = Candidate for further consideration (X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

Air Force score on EVALUATION	yellow + Priority List on Initial	red + Priority List Not on Initial	yellow + Priority List on Initial			
ЕВАЛУАЦИОННАТА	20% \ 2.4%	21% \ 2.4%	20% \ 2.4%	20% \ 2.4%	21% \ 2.4%	20% \ 2.4%
ЕСОЮНИС ИМПАСТ (ВРАС 22/СУМ)	100,11 \ 88,7	100,11 \ 88,7	100,11 \ 88,7	100,11 \ 88,7	100,11 \ 88,7	100,11 \ 88,7
ПЕРСОННЕЛ БЕАТИФИЕД (МИ/СИ/А)	708 \ 808	708 \ 808	708 \ 808	708 \ 808	708 \ 808	708 \ 808
BASE OPERATING COSTS (\$ M)	130	130	130	130	130	130
BASE OPERATING COSTS (\$ M)	34	34	34	34	34	34
БЕЛТЪИ ОИ ИНВЕСТИМЕНТ	50 years	50 years				
АНИУЛА ГАУНДС (\$ M)	57	57	57	57	57	57
ОИЕ-ТИМЕ СОСТ (\$ M)	1,418	1,351	1,351	1,351	1,351	1,351
МИЛТАРЪ УАЛУЕ	tier I	tier I	tier I	tier I	tier III	tier III
ВСЕС vote maximum score 30	33	30	30	30	21	11
КРИТЕРИА	(D) (*)	(D) (*)	(D) (*)	(D) (*)	(D) (*) (X)	(D) (*) (X)
	Нил	Тинкер	Роринг	Келъ	МакКелан	

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study all Air Force Bases with maintenance debts FOR CLOSURE.

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Downsize all Air Force debts

**Category: Maintenance Debt Installations
Base Analysis**

AIR FORCE DEPOT COBRA CLOSURE ASSUMPTIONS

AIR FORCE ASSUMPTIONS RESULT IN HIGHER COSTS, SMALLER SAVINGS THAN OTHER SERVICES.

HIGH CLOSURE COSTS RESULT FROM:

- **ALL EQUIPMENT IS MOVED OR REPURCHASED**
- **NO RECOGNITION OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COST AVOIDANCE**
- **BASE CONVERSION AGENCY COST \$30 M MORE THAN STANDARD**

COBRA FACTOR

SMALL SAVINGS RESULT FROM:

- **6 YEAR IMPLEMENTATION**
- **ALL POSITIONS TO BE ELIMINATIONS OCCUR IN LAST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION**
- **VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL POSITIONS ELIMINATED COMPARED WITH OTHER SERVICES**

**Sensitivity Analysis on the
Personnel Elimination and Phasing of the
LSAF Baseline for Depot Closure
(\$ in millions)**

Personnel Eliminated	Closure Phasing	One-Time Cost	Steady State Savings	Net Present Value
7%	6 yrs	582	76	283
15%	6 yrs	572	154	1,102
15%	4 yrs	571	154	1,523
25%	4 yrs	561	244	2,764

ARMY DEPOTS

<i>Military value</i>	<i>INSTALLATION</i>
<i>1 of 4</i>	<i>Tobyhanna Army Depot (*)</i>
<i>2 of 4</i>	<i>Anniston Army Depot</i>
<i>3 of 4</i>	<i>Red River Army Depot (X) (C)</i>
<i>4 of 4</i>	<i>Letterkenny Army Depot (X) (R) (*)</i>
	<i>Corpus Christi Army Depot</i>

(C) = DoD recommendation for closure

(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

(*) = Candidate for further consideration


ARMY DEPOT BASING STRATEGY

- MAINTAIN THREE DEPOTS:
 - COMBAT VEHICLES (**Anniston**)
 - ELECTRONICS (**Tobyhanna**)
 - AVIATION (**Corpus Christi**)

- ARMY RECOMMENDED TWO COMBAT VEHICLES DEPOTS FOR REALIGNMENT / CLOSURE:
 - RED RIVER
 - VEHICLES TO ANNISTON

 - LETTERKENNY
 - VEHICLES TO ANNISTON
 - MISSILE ELECTRONICS TO TOBYHANNA

BRAC '93 Commission Recommended A Single DoD Tactical Missile Facility



20 tactical systems to be consolidated
Elimination of duplication at 11 sites
(6 DoD, 5 Contractor)

SUMMARY TACTICAL MISSILE DEPOTS


1993 COMMISSION

- **CONSOLIDATE DOD TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE AT LETTERKENNY**
- **RETAIN ARTILLERY WORKLOAD AT LETTERKENNY**

1995 DOD RECOMMENDATION

- **CHANGE 1993 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION BY TRANSFERRING MISSILE GUIDANCE SYSTEM WORKLOAD TO TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT.**
- **TRANSFER COMBAT VEHICLE WORKLOAD TO ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT.**
- **RETAIN ENCLAVE FOR CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION AND TACTICAL MISSILE DISASSEMBLY AND STORAGE AT LETTERKENNY.**

BRAC '95 DoD Recommended Tactical Missile Work Sites



20 tactical systems to be consolidated
Elimination of duplication at 11 sites
(6 DoD, 5 Contractor)

BASE ANALYSIS
CATEGORY: TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE DEPOTS

DOD Recommendation: Realign Letterkenny, move guidance system maintenance workload to Tobyhanna and vehicle / support equipment maintenance workload to Anniston.

For consideration: Study Letterkenny and Tobyhanna for further realignment or closure.

CRITERIA	Letterkenny Army Depot (X)(R) (Disassemble/Storage remains at Letterkenny) (Electronics to Tobyhanna) (Mobile Vehicles to Anniston)	Letterkenny Army Depot (*) (Retain Conventional Ammo. Storage Only) (Missile Work to Hill AFB)	Tobyhanna Army Depot (*) (Closure) (Electronics to Letterkenny) (All current work at Letterkenny remains)
MILITARY VALUE	4 out of 4	4 out of 4	1 out of 4
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	50	220	154
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	78	65	33
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	Immediate	2 years	4 years
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	56	56	33
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL/CIV)	20 / 1,267	13 / 1,018	34 / 535
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL/CIV)	15 / 788	20 / 1,433	249 / 2691
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC95/CUM)	7.8% / 9.0%	9.2% / 10.4%	2.6% / 2.6%
ENVIRONMENTAL	On National Priority List	On National Priority List	On National Priority List

- (C) = DoD recommendation for closure
- (R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
- (X) = Joint Cross Service Group Alternative for closure
- (*) = Candidate for further consideration

TECHNICAL CENTERS

Naval Air Warfare Centers

MILITARY VALUE	INSTALLATION
59.61	NAWC China Lake, CA
54.62	NAWC Point Mugu, CA (X) (*)
51.17	NAWC Patuxent River, MD
36.66	NAWC Lakehurst, NJ (C)
34.95	NAWC Indianapolis, IN (C)
19.97	NAWC Warminster, PA (C)
9.73	NAWC HQ Washington, DC
7.54	NAWC Oreland, PA (C)

- (C) = DoD Recommendation for Closure
(R) = DoD Recommendation for Realignment
(X) = Joint Cross Service Group Alternative for Realignment
(*) = Candidate for further consideration

**CHINA LAKE / POINT MUGU
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER WEAPONS DIVISION**

- POINT MUGU IS AN OPERATING CENTER UNDER THE COMMAND OF CHINA LAKE
- CHINA LAKE DOES AIR/LAND TESTING AND TRAINING
POINT MUGU DOES AIR/SEA TESTING AND TRAINING
- BOTH SITES PERFORM RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST AND EVALUATION, AND IN-SERVICE
ENGINEERING.
- POINT MUGU IS 162 MILES FROM CHINA LAKE.

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER POINT MUGU, CALIFORNIA


- **JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP IDENTIFIED 48% EXCESS CAPACITY IN TEST AND EVALUATION OPEN AIR RANGES.**
- **AFTER A ONE YEAR STUDY, THE TEST AND EVALUATION JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP PROPOSED A REALIGNMENT OF NAWC POINT MUGU'S TEST AND EVALUATION MISSIONS TO NAWC CHINA LAKE, CA, TO REDUCE EXCESS CAPACITY/INFRASTRUCTURE.**
- **IN JUNE 1994, DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTED NAVY COULD SAVE \$1.7 BILLION OVER 20 YEARS BY CONSOLIDATING FUNCTIONS FROM NAWC POINT MUGU, CA. TO NAWC CHINA LAKE, CA.**

**MAJOR POINTS OF THE
JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ALTERNATIVE FOR
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER POINT MUGU, CA.**

- **RETAIN SEA TEST RANGE**
- **RETAIN AIRSPACE AND ISLAND INSTRUMENTATION**
- **RELOCATE GROUND TEST FACILITIES**
- **CLOSE OR MOTHBALL REMAINING FACILITIES, RUNWAYS AND HANGARS.**
- **MANAGE ALL ACTIVITIES AT CHINA LAKE**
- **PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR REMAINING POINT MUGU ACTIVITIES FROM PORT HUENEME CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTER.**

Document Separator

DoD Depot Maintenance Facilities Considered by the DoD Joint Cross Service Group



FY 1999 DEPOT CAPACITY UTILIZATION - SINGLE SHIFT

Based on DOD Certified Data

<i>INSTALLATION:</i>	<i>Maximum potential capacity (000 hours)</i>	<i>Core (000 hours)</i>	<i>% capacity utilization</i>
<i>Ogden ALC</i>	9,005	4,895	54
<i>Oklahoma City ALC</i>	12,863	6,658	52
<i>Warner Robins ALC</i>	9,913	6,763	68
<i>San Antonio ALC</i>	15,220	4,463	29
<i>Sacramento ALC</i>	10,291	4,231	41
<i>Tobyhanna Army Depot</i>	7,606	2,304	30
<i>Red River Army Depot</i>	4,684	1,323	28
<i>Anniston Army Depot</i>	4,512	1,497	33
<i>Letterkenny Army Depot</i>	3,707	981	26
<i>Corpus Christi Army Depot</i>	4,714	3,182	68
<i>Cherry Point NADEP</i>	5,735	2,211	39
<i>Jacksonville NADEP</i>	7,158	3,093	43
<i>North Island NADEP</i>	7,772	3,333	43
<i>Norfolk NSY</i>	15,851	9,016	57
<i>Pearl Harbor NSY</i>	8,032	3,212	40
<i>Portsmouth NSY</i>	7,996	3,196	40
<i>Puget Sound NSY</i>	14,919	10,699	72
<i>Long Beach NSY</i>	5,401	3,217	60
<i>Crane NSWC</i>	2,451	675	28
<i>Louisville NSWC</i>	2,480	1,228	50
<i>Keyport NUWC</i>	1,141	734	64
<i>Albany Marine Corps Depot</i>	1,883	1,061	56
<i>Barstow Marine Corps Depot</i>	1,563	836	53
<i>Total DoD</i>	164,897	78,808	48

**1995 DEPOT/SHIPYARD CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES**

Category	DoD	Cross-Service 1 Min Sites/Max Mil Value	Cross-Service 2 Min Excess Capacity
Army Depots	(C) Red River (R) Letterkenny	(C) Red River (C) Letterkenny	(C) Red River (C) Letterkenny
Navy Shipyards	(C) Long Beach	(C) Portsmouth (C) Pearl Harbor	*(C) Long Beach *(C) Portsmouth *(C) Pearl Harbor
Navy Aviation Depots		(C) Jacksonville	(C) Jacksonville
Navy Weapon Center	(C) Crane-Louisville (R) Keyport	(C) Crane-Louisville (C) Keyport	** (C) Crane- Louisville ** (C) Keyport
Air Force Aviation	(D) San Antonio (D) Sacramento (D) Ogden (D) Warner Robins (D) Ok City	(C) San Antonio	(C) San Antonio (C) Sacramento

C = CLOSURE R = REALIGN D = DOWNSIZE * = CLOSE any 2 of 3 ** = CLOSE any 1 of 2

DEPOT CAPACITY UTILIZATION - SINGLE SHIFT

Remaining Depots
% Capacity Utilization

Without BRAC 1995

48

DoD BRAC recommendation

52

Joint Cross Service Group option - 1

69

Joint Cross Service Group option - 2

73

4

AIR FORCE DEPOTS

<i>TIER</i>	<i>INSTALLATION</i>	
<i>I</i>	<i>Hill AFB / Ogden ALC</i>	<i>(D) (*)</i>
<i>I</i>	<i>Tinker AFB / Oklahoma City ALC</i>	<i>(D) (*)</i>
<i>II</i>	<i>Robins AFB / Warner Robins ALC</i>	<i>(D) (*)</i>
<i>III</i>	<i>Kelly AFB / San Antonio ALC</i>	<i>(X) (D) (*)</i>
<i>III</i>	<i>McClellan AFB / Sacramento ALC</i>	<i>(X) (D) (*)</i>

(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing air logistics centers (ALCs)

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure (AFBs)

(*) = Candidate for further consideration (AFBs)

AIR FORCE BRAC RECOMMENDATION DOWNSIZE-IN-PLACE ALL FIVE DEPOTS

DOWNSIZING CONSISTS OF :

- 1) MOTHBALL 2 MILLION SQUARE FEET OF DEPOT SPACE**
 - REDUCE AMOUNT OF DEPOT CAPACITY**
- 2) REDUCE 1,905 PERSONNEL**
 - EQUAL TO 2.5% REDUCTION IN INSTALLATION POPULATION OR 7.2 % IN DEPOT POPULATION**
 - REDUCTION TO BE ACHIEVED BY REENGINEERING DEPOT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE A 15% SAVINGS**

DOWNSIZING HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN PURSUED THROUGH BRAC

- OVERHEAD COSTS TO RUN DEPOT STRUCTURE WILL BE VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED**
- MAINTENANCE COST PER HOUR INCREASES**

DOWNSIZING PLAN IS STILL BEING REVISED BY AIR FORCE

- TWO REVISIONS SINCE 1 MARCH**

RECURING SAVINGS - \$89 M, NET PRESENT VALUE - \$991 M, ONE TIME COST - \$183 M

Base Analysis

Category: Maintenance Depot Installations

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Downsize all Air Force depots

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study all Air Force Bases with maintenance depots **FOR CLOSURE**.

MAJOR ISSUES	Hill (D) (*)	Tinker (D) (*)	Robins (D) (*)	Kelly (D) (*) (X)	McClellan (D) (*) (X)
BCEG vote maximum score 39	33	29	26	15	11
MILITARY VALUE	tier I	tier I	tier II	tier III	tier III
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	1,418	1,324	1,021	660	524
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	72	69	76	74	95
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	29 years	28 years	17 years	10 years	5 years
BASE OPERATING COBRA (\$ M)	34	39	37	38	36
BASE OPERATING COSTS (\$ M)	130	130	138	142	117
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL/CIV)	643 / 807	512 / 881	501 / 1,243	346 / 1,146	649 / 1,107
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL/CIV)	3,976 / 7,622	7,689 / 11,001	3,229 / 9,297	1,353 / 10,797	1,947 / 7,840
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95/CUM)	5.0% / 5.4%	7.3% / 7.3%	17.9% / 17.9%	5.1% / 8.3%	3.8% / 3.8%
ENVIRONMENTAL	on National Priority List	on National Priority List	on National Priority List	Not on National Priority List	on National Priority List
Air Force score on ENVIRONMENTAL	yellow +	yellow +	yellow +	red +	yellow +

(D) = DoD recommendation for downsizing

(*) = Candidate for further consideration

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

AIR FORCE DEPOT COBRA CLOSURE ASSUMPTIONS

AIR FORCE ASSUMPTIONS RESULT IN HIGHER COSTS, SMALLER SAVINGS THAN OTHER SERVICES.

HIGH CLOSURE COSTS RESULT FROM:

- **ALL EQUIPMENT IS MOVED OR REPURCHASED**
- **NO RECOGNITION OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COST AVOIDANCE**
- **BASE CONVERSION AGENCY COST \$30 M MORE THAN STANDARD COBRA FACTOR**

SMALL SAVINGS RESULT FROM:

- **6 YEAR IMPLEMENTATION**
- **ALL POSITIONS TO BE ELIMINATIONS OCCUR IN LAST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION**
- **VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL POSITIONS ELIMINATED COMPARED WITH OTHER SERVICES**

**Sensitivity Analysis on the
Personnel Elimination and Phasing of the
USAF Baseline for Depot Closure
(\$ in millions)**

Personnel Eliminated	Closure Phasing	One-Time Cost	Steady State Savings	Net Present Value
7%	6 yrs	582	76	283
15%	6 yrs	572	154	1,102
15%	4 yrs	571	154	1,523
25%	4 yrs	561	244	2,764

ARMY DEPOTS

<i>Military value</i>	<i>INSTALLATION</i>
<i>1 of 4</i>	<i>Tobyhanna Army Depot (*)</i>
<i>2 of 4</i>	<i>Anniston Army Depot</i>
<i>3 of 4</i>	<i>Red River Army Depot (X) (C)</i>
<i>4 of 4</i>	<i>Letterkenny Army Depot (X) (R) (*)</i>
<i>Corpus Christi Army Depot</i>	

- (C) = DoD recommendation for closure
- (R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
- (X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure
- (*) = Candidate for further consideration

ARMY DEPOT BASING STRATEGY

- MAINTAIN THREE DEPOTS:
 - COMBAT VEHICLES (Anniston)
 - ELECTRONICS (Tobyhanna)
 - AVIATION (Corpus Christi)

- ARMY RECOMMENDED TWO COMBAT VEHICLES DEPOTS FOR REALIGNMENT / CLOSURE:
 - RED RIVER
 - VEHICLES TO ANNISTON

 - LETTERKENNY
 - VEHICLES TO ANNISTON
 - MISSILE ELECTRONICS TO TOBYHANNA

SUMMARY

TACTICAL MISSILE DEPOTS


1993 COMMISSION

- CONSOLIDATE DOD TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE AT LETTERKENNY
- RETAIN ARTILLERY WORKLOAD AT LETTERKENNY

1995 DOD RECOMMENDATION

- CHANGE 1993 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION BY TRANSFERRING MISSILE GUIDANCE SYSTEM WORKLOAD TO TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT.
- TRANSFER COMBAT VEHICLE WORKLOAD TO ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT.
- RETAIN ENCLAVE FOR CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION AND TACTICAL MISSILE DISASSEMBLY AND STORAGE AT LETTERKENNY.


BRAC '93 Commission Recommended A Single DoD Tactical Missile Facility



20 tactical systems to be consolidated
Elimination of duplication at 11 sites
(6 DoD, 5 Contractor)

Transfer Complete

BRAC '95 DoD Recommended Tactical Missile Work Sites



20 tactical systems to be consolidated
 Elimination of duplication at 11 sites
 (6 DoD, 5 Contractor)
Transfer Complete

BASE ANALYSIS
CATEGORY: TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE DEPOTS

DOD Recommendation: Realign Letterkenny, move guidance system maintenance workload to Tobyhanna and vehicle / support equipment maintenance workload to Anniston.

For consideration: Study Letterkenny and Tobyhanna for further realignment or closure.

CRITERIA	Letterkenny Army Depot (X)(R) (Disassemble/Storage remains at Letterkenny) (Electronics to Tobyhanna) (Mobile Vehicles to Anniston)	Letterkenny Army Depot (*) (Retain Conventional Ammo. Storage Only) (Missile Work to Hill AFB)	Tobyhanna Army Depot (*) (Closure) (Electronics to Letterkenny) (All current work at Letterkenny remains)
MILITARY VALUE	4 out of 4	4 out of 4	1 out of 4
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	50	220	154
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	78	65	33
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	Immediate	2 years	4 years
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	56	56	33
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL/CIV)	20 / 1,267	13 / 1,018	34 / 535
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL/CIV)	15 / 788	20 / 1,433	249 / 2691
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC95/CUM)	7.8% / 9.0%	9.2% / 10.4%	2.6% / 2.6%
ENVIRONMENTAL	On National Priority List	On National Priority List	On National Priority List

- (C) = DoD recommendation for closure
- (R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
- (X) = Joint Cross Service Group Alternative for closure
- (*) = Candidate for further consideration

TECHNICAL CENTERS

Naval Air Warfare Centers

MILITARY VALUE	INSTALLATION
59.61	NAWC China Lake, CA
54.62	NAWC Point Mugu, CA (X) (*)
51.17	NAWC Patuxent River, MD
36.66	NAWC Lakehurst, NJ (C)
34.95	NAWC Indianapolis, IN (C)
19.97	NAWC Warminster, PA (C)
9.73	NAWC HQ Washington, DC
7.54	NAWC Oreland, PA (C)

- (C) = DoD Recommendation for Closure
- (R) = DoD Recommendation for Realignment
- (X) = Joint Cross Service Group Alternative for Realignment
- (*) = Candidate for further consideration

**CHINA LAKE / POINT MUGU
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER WEAPONS DIVISION**

- POINT MUGU IS AN OPERATING CENTER UNDER THE COMMAND OF CHINA LAKE
- CHINA LAKE DOES AIR/LAND TESTING AND TRAINING
POINT MUGU DOES AIR/SEA TESTING AND TRAINING
- BOTH SITES PERFORM RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AND IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING.
- POINT MUGU IS 162 MILES FROM CHINA LAKE.

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER POINT MUGU, CALIFORNIA

- JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP IDENTIFIED 48% EXCESS CAPACITY IN TEST AND EVALUATION OPEN AIR RANGES.
- AFTER A ONE YEAR STUDY, THE TEST AND EVALUATION JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP PROPOSED A REALIGNMENT OF NAWC POINT MUGU'S TEST AND EVALUATION MISSIONS TO NAWC CHINA LAKE, CA, TO REDUCE EXCESS CAPACITY/INFRASTRUCTURE.
- IN JUNE 1994, DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTED NAVY COULD SAVE \$1.7 BILLION OVER 20 YEARS BY CONSOLIDATING FUNCTIONS FROM NAWC POINT MUGU, CA. TO NAWC CHINA LAKE, CA.

**MAJOR POINTS OF THE
JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ALTERNATIVE FOR
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER POINT MUGU, CA.**

- **RETAIN SEA TEST RANGE**
- **RETAIN AIRSPACE AND ISLAND INSTRUMENTATION**
- **RELOCATE GROUND TEST FACILITIES**
- **CLOSE OR MOTHBALL REMAINING FACILITIES, RUNWAYS AND HANGARS.**
- **MANAGE ALL ACTIVITIES AT CHINA LAKE**
- **PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR REMAINING POINT MUGU ACTIVITIES FROM PORT HUENEME CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTER.**

Document Separator

I HAVE ANN REESE AND GLENN KNOEPFLE OF MY STAFF, WITH ME.

THE FIRST CROSS SERVICE CATEGORY THAT I WILL REVIEW IS THE DEPOT CATEGORY.

THIS SLIDE DEPICTS THE ENTIRE UNIVERSE OF DEPOTS WITHIN THE DOD AND I AM DISPLAYING IT SO THAT YOU CAN HAVE A VISUAL IMAGE OF THE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF THE DOD'S DEPOTS.

CHART #1

MY SECOND CHART DISPLAYS, FOR EVERY DEPOT, MAXIMUM POTENTIAL CAPACITY AND CORE HOURS THAT WERE REPORTED TO THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP BY THE SERVICES.

MAXIMUM POTENTIAL CAPACITY IS DEFINED AS THE OPTIMUM DEPOT CONFIGURATION AND EMPLOYMENT LEVELS WITH NO SIGNIFICANT CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND NO MILITARY CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES. ITS ALSO IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT THIS IS BASED ON ONE 40-HOUR SHIFT PER WEEK.

CORE IS DEFINED AS THAT WORKLOAD THAT THE SERVICES HAVE DETERMINED MUST STAY IN-HOUSE TO ENSURE THE ABILITY TO MOBILIZE.

A GUIDING DOD POLICY THROUGH THE 1995 BRAC PROCESS WAS THAT THE DOD DEPOT STRUCTURE MUST BE SIZED TO CORE. THE DEPOT INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD BE SIZED APPROPRIATELY TO BE ABLE TO DO THE CORE WORK IN-HOUSE, OTHER WORK CAN BE PERFORMED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

ALL THE CAPACITY AND CORE NUMBERS ON THIS CHART WERE PROVIDED BY THE SERVICES TO THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP. WE ARE ALSO DISPLAYING A CALCULATION OF THE CAPACITY UTILIZATION, AND WE SEE THAT, BASED ON THIS CORE CALCULATION, THERE IS A LOW CAPACITY UTILIZATION ALL DOD DEPOTS.
IN TOTAL, THERE IS CAPACITY UTILIZATION OF 48 %.

CHART #2

ON MY NEXT CHART I HAVE DISPLAYED THREE THINGS:

- THE DOD BRAC RECOMMENDATION IN THE DEPOT AREA,
- AND TWO SETS OF OPTIONS PREPARED BY THE DOD DEPOT JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP.

THE SECOND COLUMN DISPLAYS THE DOD RECOMMENDATION IS TO CLOSE THREE, REALIGN TWO AND DOWNSIZE-IN-PLACE FIVE DEPOTS.

BOTH OF THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE OPTIONS EXAMINED, ON A COMMODITY BY COMMODITY BASIS, HOW WORKLOAD COULD BE SHIFTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE DEPOTS.

OPTION-1 (DISPLAYED IN COLUMN 3) SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF DEPOT SITES WHILE MAXIMIZING MILITARY VALUE.

OPTION-2 (DISPLAYED IN THE FAR RIGHT COLUMN) SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF EXCESS CAPACITY RETAINED IN THE DOD DEPOT SYSTEM.

BOTH OF THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE OPTIONS WOULD BE TO CLOSE 8 DEPOTS.

CHART #3

MY NEXT CHART IS INTENDED TO GIVE YOU A FEEL FOR THE IMPACT ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION WITH THE DOD BASE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION AND THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE OPTIONS.

AS YOU REMEMBER ON AN EARLIER CHART, TOTAL CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN DOD IS 48%.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD 1995 BASE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION WILL RESULT IN SOMEWHAT OF AN IMPROVEMENT OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION; UTILIZATION WOULD INCREASE TO 52%.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE OPTION-1 WOULD MORE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE THE UTILIZATION RATE TO 69 %.

THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE OPTION-2 WOULD HAVE THE MOST DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN CAPACITY UTILIZATION TO 73%. YOU'LL REMEMBER, THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT THAT OPTION SOUGHT TO DO, MINIMIZE EXCESS CAPACITY.

THIS PORTION OF THE PRESENTATION IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE TOTAL DEPOT FUNCTION. I WILL NOW MOVE TO SERVICE SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS.

CHART #4

THIS SLIDE IS THE FIRST OF MANY WHICH YOU WILL SEE TODAY. IT LISTS THE INSTALLATIONS IN A GIVEN CATEGORY. THE VALUES IN THE LEFT COLUMN DENOTE MILITARY VALUE, EITHER IN TIERS OR NUMERICAL VALUES. THE AIR FORCE USED A TIERING SYSTEM, THOSE BASES IN TIER I ARE CONSIDERED THE BASES MOST NECESSARY TO RETAIN AND THOSE IN TIER THREE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE AIR FORCE AS THE LEAST NECESSARY TO RETAIN,

THE INSTALLATIONS ARE ANNOTATED WITH AN "X" FOR THOSE BASES WHICH ARE ALTERNATIVES RECOMMENDED BY THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP.

AS YOU CAN SEE, THE AIR FORCE ELECTED TO DOWNSIZE AS THEIR PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE AND THE BASES ARE DENOTED WITH A "D" FOR THAT OPTION. FINALLY, I'LL BE DISCUSSING THOSE BASES INDICATED WITH AN ASTERISK AND SHADED.

THE NEXT CHART DESCRIBES THE DOD BRAC RECOMMENDATION TO DOWNSIZE AIR FORCE DEPOTS.

CHART #5

THE AIR FORCE DETERMINED THAT EXCESS CAPACITY REQUIRED THE CLOSURE OF 1 TO 2 DEPOTS. HOWEVER, THE AIR FORCE ELECTED TO DOWNSIZE RATHER THAN CLOSE DEPOTS BECAUSE LARGE UPFRONT COSTS, AND A SMALL RETURN ON INVESTMENT.

THE DOD BRAC RECOMMENDATION TO DOWNSIZE ALL AIR FORCE DEPOTS HAS TWO COMPONENTS:

1) 2 MILLION SQUARE FEET OF DEPOT SPACE WILL BE MOTHBALLED
-- THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE AMOUNT OF SQUARE FOOTAGE
USED BY THE DEPOT BUT IT WILL NOT ELIMINATE DEPOT
INFRASTRUCTURE

2) SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 2,000 PERSONNEL POSITIONS WOULD BE
ELIMINATED

-- THE PERSONNEL NUMBER IS BASED ON AN ASSUMPTION THAT
REENGINEERING OF THE DEPOT PROCESSES WILL RESULT IN A
PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT 15 %

-- THE 15 % FACTOR HAS NOT YET BEEN VALIDATED BY
REENGINEERING STUDIES AND IS NOT BASED ON HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME DOWNSIZING HAS EVER BEEN PURSED THROUGH THE BRAC PROCESS
DOWNSIZING WILL NOT REDUCE OVERHEAD COSTS; AS A RESULT, COSTS PER HOUR INCREASES

I'D LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THE AIR FORCE IS STILL IMPROVING UPON THE PLAN. SINCE THE
BRAC RECOMMENDATION WAS SUBMITTED, THE AIR FORCE HAS MADE TWO REVISIONS BASED
ON THE SITE SURVEYS THAT HAVE OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO THE SUBMISSION.

THE DOWNSIZE RECOMMENDATION REQUIRE \$183 MILLION IN ONE-TIME COSTS AND WILL
RESULT IN STEADY STATE ANNUAL SAVINGS OF \$89 MILLION AND NET PRESENT VALUE
SAVINGS OF \$991 MILLION.

CHART #6

THIS CHART IS BUSY BUT CONTAINS SOME VERY IMPORTANT INFORMATION. THIS IS THE FIRST OF MANY SUCH SLIDES YOU WILL SEE TODAY. THE SLIDES ARE GENERALLY ARRANGED SO THAT THE INSTALLATIONS ARE LISTED ACROSS THE TOP, REFLECTING THE VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS AS DESCRIBED AT THE TOP OF THE CHART. WE HAVE LISTED SPECIFIC CRITERIA AREAS ALONG THE LEFT SIDE ARRANGED IN GENERAL ORDER OF THE EIGHT SELECTION CRITERIA, STARTING WITH THOSE ELEMENTS REFLECTING MILITARY VALUE.

WHEN FORMULATING THE DOD BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS, THE AIR FORCE RAN WHAT IS KNOWN AS "LEVEL PLAYING FIELD" COBRAS, IN PART TO GAUGE THE DIFFERENCE OF COST AND SAVINGS TO CLOSE DEPOT INSTALLATIONS. THIS CHART DISPLAYS THE RESULTS OF THESE COBRAS ALONG WITH SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

YOU'LL NOTE THAT I ORDERED THE COLUMNS BY TIER WHICH IS DETERMINED BY SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICIALS AND SERVES AS A PROXY FOR MILITARY VALUE.

AN IMPORTANT FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN FORMULATING BASE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS IS THE COST TO CLOSE. YOU CAN SEE IN ROW 4 THE COST TO CLOSE AIR FORCE DEPOT INSTALLATIONS -- RANGING FROM A HIGH OF \$1.4 BILLION AT HILL, TO A LOW OF A HALF A BILLION DOLLARS AT MCCLELLAN. ALL FIVE OF THE ONE-TIME COSTS MAY BE OVERSTATED, AND I EXPLAIN THAT ON THE NEXT CHART.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IS THE ANNUAL RECURRING SAVINGS AFTER REACHING A STEADY STATE. THE ANNUAL SAVINGS RANGE FROM A LOW OF \$68 MILLION PER YEAR AT TINKER TO A HIGH OF \$95 MILLION PER YEAR AT MCCLELLAN. SIMILARLY, I BELIEVE THAT THE SAVINGS MAY BE UNDERSTATED.

CHART #7

AS I INDICATED ON THE PREVIOUS CHART, AIR FORCE CALCULATIONS MERIT FURTHER STUDY. THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE INDICATED IN HER TESTIMONY TO THE COMMISSION THAT THE DECISION TO DOWNSIZE WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT CLOSURE WAS DEEMED UNAFFORDABLE.

WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY NOTED AIR FORCE'S RELATIVELY HIGH COST TO CLOSE AND LOW SAVINGS COMPARED TO THE OTHER SERVICES. WE HAVE DONE A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND NOTE THE DIFFERENCES ARE DRIVEN BY DIFFERENCES IN ASSUMPTIONS THAT GO INTO THE COBRA CALCULATION.

I HAVE LISTED A FEW OF THE ASSUMPTIONS ON THIS CHART. CLOSURE COSTS ARE IMPACTED BY THE AIR FORCE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL DEPOT EQUIPMENT IS EITHER MOVED OR REPURCHASED; UNLIKE THE OTHER SERVICES WHICH PERMIT THE RECEIVER TO INDICATE THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED SO THAT EQUIPMENT IS NOT DUPLICATED. FURTHER, THE OTHER SERVICES RECOGNIZE A COST AVOIDANCE OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTED AT A CLOSING BASE AND THEY RELY ON A COBRA STANDARD FACTOR TO CALCULATE THE COST OF BASE CONVERSION AGENCY COSTS. THE AIR FORCE USES THE AGENCY STANDARD FACTOR PLUS \$30 MILLION PER BASE.

SIMILARLY, COBRA DERIVED SAVINGS ARE RELATIVELY LESS IN THE AIR FORCE THAN IN OTHER SERVICES. AIR FORCE ASSUMES A 6 YEAR IMPLEMENTATION; WHILE THE OTHER SERVICES ASSUME A 2-4 YEAR IMPLEMENTATION. THE AIR FORCE ASSUMES THAT ALL OF THE POSITIONS ELIMINATED OCCUR IN THE LAST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION. THE OTHER SERVICES PHASE THE POSITION ELIMINATION OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD. THE LAST DIFFERENCE I'LL MENTION IS THAT THE AIR FORCE ASSUMES VERY FEW POSITIONS ARE ELIMINATED. THE AIR FORCE ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT ONLY 7% OF THE POSITIONS ARE ELIMINATED. THE AIR REALIGNED. THE RESULTS OF ARMY CLOSURE COBRAS IS THE ELIMINATION OF 43-63% OF THE POSITIONS AND THE NAVY ELIMINATES 44% OF THE POSITIONS.

CHART #8

COST TO CLOSE AND ANNUAL SAVINGS ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO ASSUMPTIONS. THIS CHART IS A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS TO DEMONSTRATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COBRA ASSUMPTIONS.

THE TOP ROW OF THE CHART DISPLAYS THE RESULTS OF A COBRA RUN BY THE AIR FORCE FOR THE CLOSURE OF A DEPOT INSTALLATION. 7% OF THE POSITIONS ARE ELIMINATED IN THE LAST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION, YEAR SIX. THIS COBRA MODEL INDICATES ONE TIME COSTS OF \$582 MILLION, RECURRING ANNUAL SAVINGS AFTER REACHING STEADY STATE OF \$ 76 MILLION AND A TOTAL NET PRESENT VALUE OF \$283 MILLION

THE NEXT ROW ASSUMES A LARGER POSITION ELIMINATION. A 15% PERSONNEL PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT WAS ASSUMED BY THE AIR FORCE IN THE DOD DOWNSIZE-IN-PLACE BRAC RECOMMENDATION. WE HAVE APPLIED 15 % PERSONNEL SAVINGS HERE AND SEE THAT ONE-TIME COSTS ARE NOT GREATLY IMPACTED, BUT RECURRING SAVINGS RISE TO \$154 MILLION AND NET PRESENT VALUE INCREASES TO \$1.1 BILLION.

IF THESE POSITION ELIMINATION ARE EVENLY PHASED, NET PRESENT VALUE RISES TO \$1.5 BILLION.

IF THE POSITION ELIMINATION ASSUMPTION IS MADE MORE SIMILAR TO THE RESULTS OF THE OTHER SERVICE DEPOT COBRAS, AND THE ELIMINATION IS PHASED, THE RECURRING SAVINGS RISE TO \$244 MILLION AND THE NET PRESENT VALUE OF THIS ONE CLOSURE ALONE IS NEARLY \$2.8 BILLION.

THESE CHANGES IN ASSUMPTIONS ARE NOT UNREASONABLE; THEY ARE IN LINE WITH OTHER SERVICE ASSUMPTIONS AND ACTUAL EXPERIENCES. THEY HAVE ONLY BEEN RUN AS A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS BUT, INDICATE THAT FURTHER ANALYSIS IS APPROPRIATE. ***THAT CONCLUDES MY PRESENTATION OF THE AIR FORCE PORTION OF THE DEPOT MAINTENANCE AREA. ARE THERE QUESTIONS?

CHART #9

ARMY DEPOTS

THE ARMY CURRENTLY OPERATES FIVE DEPOTS:

- TOBYHANNA AN ELECTRONICS ORIENTED DEPOT
- ANNISTON RED RIVER AND LETTERKENNY ARE COMBAT VEHICLE DEPOTS. ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT LETTERKENNY ALSO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPAIR OF DOD'S TACTICAL MISSILE INVENTORIES.
- CORPUS CHRISTI DEPOT SERVES AS THE ARMY'S ONLY AVIATION DEPOT, HAVING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REPAIR AND OVERHAUL OF ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT.

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP IDENTIFIED RED RIVER AND LETTERKENNY AS CLOSURE CANDIDATES TO ELIMINATE EXCESS CAPACITY.

Chart #10

ARMY BASING STRATEGY

THE ARMY BASING STRATEGY WAS DESIGNED TO RETAIN THREE DEPOTS. THE ARMY WANTED TO KEEP AN ELECTRONICS DEPOT, A COMBAT VEHICLE DEPOT AND AN AVIATION DEPOT.

THE ARMY RANKED TOBYHANNA , ANNISTON, RED RIVER AND LETTERKENNY. ULTIMATELY THE ARMY DECIDED THAT IT WOULD ONLY NEED TO RETAIN ONE OF THE THREE COMBAT VEHICLE DEPOTS. DUE TO ITS HIGHER MILITARY RANKING AND CAPABILITY TO HANDLE ALL ITEMS WITHIN THE COMBAT VEHICLE FLEET, ANNISTON WAS RETAINED AND RED RIVER AND LETTERKENNY DEPOTS HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT.

THE LETTERKENNY RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE OR REALIGN RESULTS IN THE TRANSFER OF TACTICAL MISSILE ELECTRONICS REPAIR WORK TO TOBYHANNA.

CHART #11

SUMMARY TACTICAL MISSILE RECOMMENDATIONS

THE 1993 COMMISSION REVERSED DOD'S RECOMMENDED REALIGNMENT AND INSTEAD ESTABLISHED A CONSOLIDATED DOD DEPOT ACTIVITY FOR REPAIR OF MOST DOD TACTICAL MISSILE ITEMS.

THE 1995 DOD RECOMMENDATION PRESERVES INTERSERVICING, BUT INSTEAD SENDS THE GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SECTIONS TO TOBYHANNA. UNDER DOD'S 1995 PROPOSAL, TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEMS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE STORED AT LETTERKENNY. TOBYHANNA IS A DEPOT THAT HAS TRADITIONALLY REPAIRED AND OVERHAULED ELECTRONICS TYPE ITEMS.

ALSO UNDER DOD'S 1995 RECOMMENDATION, ALL REMAINING COMBAT VEHICLE WORK WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE ANNISTON DEPOT.

CHAM # 12~

BRAC 93 MISSILE CONSOLIDATION MAP

THIS CHART SHOWS THE TRANSITION OF TACTICAL MISSILE WORK FROM 11 SITES INTO ONE CENTRAL LOCATION AS MANDATED BY THE 1993 COMMISSION. THE SHADED SYSTEMS INDICATE THE WORKLOAD HAS ALREADY TRANSITIONED INTO LETTERKENNY. SO FAR LETTERKENNY HAS SPENT ABOUT \$26 MILLION OF THE \$42 MILLION CONSOLIDATION BUDGET. IN TERMS OF WORKLOAD TRANSFERS, ABOUT HALF OF THE WORK PACKAGES HAVE ALREADY TRANSFERRED.

MY NEXT CHART WILL ADDRESS DOD'S 1995 RECOMMENDATION.

CHART #13

BRAC 95 MISSILE CONSOLIDATION

THIS CHART SHOWS THAT PER THE 1995 DOD RECOMMENDATION, THE INTERSERVICED REPAIR OF TACTICAL MISSILE GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SECTIONS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AT TOBYHANNA DEPOT, LOCATED ABOUT 170 MILES FROM THE LETTERKENNY STORAGE AND DISASSEMBLY SITE AND THAT LETTERKENNY'S COMBAT VEHICLE WORK WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO ANNISTON.

DISASSEMBLY AND STORAGE WILL REMAIN AT LETTERKENNY.

MY NEXT CHART WILL BE THE STANDARD BASE ANALYSIS.

CHART #14

BASE ANALYSIS - TACTICAL MISSILE ALTERNATIVES

THIS CHART PROVIDES SOME PRELIMINARY COMPARATIVE COST AND SAVINGS DATA FOR THREE ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING DOD'S RECOMMENDATION.

THE DOD RECOMMENDATION IS SUMMARIZED IN COLUMN 1. YOU WILL NOTE THE \$50 MILLION ONE-TIME COST FOR REALIGNMENT OF LETTERKENNY. ANNUAL STEADY STATE SAVINGS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE \$78 MILLION, WHICH PROVIDES AN IMMEDIATE RETURN ON INVESTMENT. PLEASE NOTE THAT DOD'S RECOMMENDATION SENDS GUIDANCE AND CONTROL WORK TO TOBYHANNA AND COMBAT VEHICLE WORK TO ANNISTON. TACTICAL MISSILE AND CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION STORAGE ARE ENCLAVED AT LETTERKENNY. THE ENCLAVED AREA OF LETTERKENNY WOULD STORE AND PERIODICALLY TEST THE FULL UP ROUNDS FOR SERVICEABILITY. THIS OPTION WAS REVIEWED BY THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP AND FOUND TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF PRESERVING INTERSERVICING, AND AT THE SAME TIME ELIMINATES EXCESS DEPOT CAPACITY.

CHART #15

COLUMN TWO PROVIDES PRELIMINARY COST DATA FOR AN OPTION SUGGESTED BY THE COMMUNITY REPRESENTING HILL AIR FORCE BASE. AT THE REQUEST OF COMMISSION STAFF, THE ARMY DEVELOPED A COBRA SCENARIO WHICH WOULD CONSOLIDATE TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE AND TACTICAL MISSILE STORAGE, SURVEILLANCE AND DISASSEMBLY AT HILL. THAT LEAVES LETTERKENNY OPEN AS A STORAGE SITE FOR CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE ONETIME COSTS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE \$220 MILLION. ANNUALIZED STEADY STATE SAVINGS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE \$65 MILLION PER YEAR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO VERIFY AND ANALYZE THESE NUMBERS, THE HIGH ONE TIME COST MAY BE DRIVEN BY THE FACT THAT HILL MAY NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO ASSUME LETTERKENNY'S CURRENT MISSILE STORAGE AND DISASSEMBLY MISSION.

DUE TO THE UNCERTAINTY OF MISSILE STORAGE CAPACITY AND RELATED COST IMPLICATIONS FURTHER ANALYSIS WILL BE REQUIRED.

COLUMN THREE PROVIDES PRELIMINARY COST AND SAVINGS ESTIMATES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE THAT WOULD LEAVE ALL CURRENT MISSILE WORK AT LETTERKENNY AND TRANSFER ELECTRONICS WORK FROM TOBYHANNA TO LETTERKENNY. AT FIRST GLANCE THE ONE-TIME CLOSING COST AND STEADY SAVINGS MIGHT NOT APPEAR AS ATTRACTIVE AS DOD'S RECOMMENDATION, HOWEVER STAFF HAS NOT HAD TIME TO ANALYZE AND VERIFY THE VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA SUPPORTING THE TOBYHANNA CLOSURE ESTIMATE.

AT THIS TIME I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE ON ANY OF THE ARMY DEPOTS.

CHAR #15

TECHNICAL CENTERS

THE FINAL CATEGORY I WILL BE DISCUSSING IS THAT OF THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTERS (NAWCS).

DOD HAS RECOMMENDED THE CLOSURE OF FOUR CENTERS LOCATED IN LAKEHURST, NEW JERSEY, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, WARMINSTER, PENNSYLVANIA, AND ORELAND, PENNSYLVANIA.

THE MILITARY VALUES SHOWN IN COLUMN ONE WERE ESTABLISHED BY THE NAVY, WITH THE HIGHEST SCORE BEING THE BEST.

THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE WORKING GROUP OFFERED AS AN ALTERNATIVE THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER AT POINT MUGU, CALIFORNIA. ITS ALTERNATIVE CENTERED AROUND TESTING AND EVALUATION DONE ON OPEN AIR RANGES. THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED 4 CENTERS RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE BY DOD DO NOT DO THIS KIND OF TESTING. AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT REDUCE CAPACITY IN THE OPEN AIR TEST RANGES.

CHART #16

CHINA LAKE /POINT MUGU

THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER WEAPONS DIVISION IS HEADQUARTERED AT CHINA LAKE, CALIFORNIA. POINT MUGU, NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER IS A SUBORDINATE COMMAND OF THE DIVISION.

BOTH INSTALLATIONS DO SIMILAR WEAPONS ARMAMENT TESTING AND EVALUATION ACTIVITIES WITH CHINA LAKE PRIMARILY INVOLVED WITH AIR/LAND TESTING, AND POINT MUGU WITH AIR/SEA TESTING.

THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING THE OPEN AIR TESTING ARE SIMILAR IN NATURE.

OUR NEXT CHART WILL CONCENTRATE ON POINT MUGU.

CHART #17

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER
POINT MUGU, CALIFORNIA

THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE WORKING GROUP IDENTIFIED EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE USE OF TEST AND EVALUATION OPEN AIR RANGES.

AFTER A ONE YEAR STUDY, AN ALTERNATIVE OFFERED WAS THE REALIGNMENT OF POINT MUGU TO THEIR DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AT CHINA LAKE.

IN JUNE OF 1994, THE DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL COMPLETED A REPORT THAT INDICATED LARGE POTENTIAL SAVINGS IF POINT MUGU WAS CONSOLIDATED WITH FUNCTIONS AT CHINA LAKE.

THE NAVY HAS TAKEN EXCEPTION TO MOST OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT.

CHART #18

MAJOR POINTS OF THE JCSG ALTERNATIVE FOR NAWC POINT MUGU

THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE WORKING GROUP'S ALTERNATIVE TO REALIGN POINT MUGU TO CHINA, AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, RETAINS THE ESSENTIAL SEA AND AIR RANGE INCLUDING INSTRUMENTATION

SUPPORT FOR THE REMAINING ACTIVITIES WOULD BE PROVIDED BY NEARBY PORT HUENEME CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTER.

THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL WOULD REMAIN UNDER THE DIVISION OUT OF CHINA LAKE.

THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE ALTERNATIVE TO REALIGN THE POINT MUGU ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN ASSESSED BY THE DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL TO HAVE POTENTIALLY LARGE SAVINGS. WE DO NOT YET HAVE A COBRA FROM THE NAVY, BUT WE WOULD ANTICIPATE SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS.

THIS OUR FINAL CHART ON THIS AREA, AND FOR OUR PRESENTATION. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS.

THANK YOU COMMISSIONERS.

CHART #19 -

Document Separator

**JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP - DEPOT
FUNCTIONAL VALUE SCORING**

**24 DOD DEPOTS REPORTED CORE WORKLOAD & CAPACITY FOR 60 COMMODITY
GROUPINGS**

**JCSG ASSIGNED FUNCTIONAL SCORES BY COMMODITY GROUP BASED ON
CURRENT DEPOT EXPERIENCE:**

- **30 POINT MAXIMUM SCORE BASED ON PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CORE
WORKLOAD ASSIGNED TO THE DEPOT**
- **15 POINT MAXIMUM SCORE BASED ON RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF
UNIQUE CORE WORK**
- **15 POINT MAXIMUM SCORE BASED ON RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF
UNIQUE TEST FACILITIES**
- **30 POINT MAXIMUM SCORE BASED RELATIVE IMPORTANCE ON NON-
CORE WORK**
- **10 POINT MAXIMUM BASED ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS WHICH
MIGHT LIMIT EXPANDED WORK**

**JCSG ASSIGNED COMMODITY WORK FROM CLOSING BASES TO DEPOT WITH
HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL VALUE SCORES SUBJECT TO AVAILABLE CAPACITY.**

Document Separator

Capacity

The ALC installations visited by the Commission to date have reported the available capacity to include a second shift.

For example, Warner Robins reports that by going to a second shift, capacity can be increased 89% in the commodities directorate which includes: sheetmetal repair, machining manufacturing, F-15 wings, propeller overhaul, sheetmetal manufacturing, tube manufacturing and composites.

Maximum Potential Capacity

The Joint Cross Service Group defined maximum potential capacity

as

**“optimal depot configurations and force/employment levels, but
no significant unprogrammed capital improvements and no
unprogrammed MILCON.”¹**

¹ 4 April 1994 BRAC Policy memo signed by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics


AIR FORCE DEPOTS

1995 DoD RECOMMENDATION AND SUBSEQUENT PERSONNEL CHANGES

	HILL	KELLY	McCLELLAN	ROBINS	TINKER
DoD REC. (28 FEB)	+237	-433	+14	-466	-1058
USAF PROPOSAL (6 MAR)	-65	-435	-118	-320	-775
USAF PROPOSAL (11 APR)	-395	-412	-521	-106	-398


X4

Consolidation of core workload within 3 Air Force depots



XS

Air Force Certified Maximum Potential SINGLE SHIFT Capacity In Millions of Hours Compared To FY 1999 Projected Workload



X6

Air Force Tiering of DEPOT Installations

criterion 1 - depot value **70%**

a. commodity analysis **80 %**

1) capacity

2) core workload

3) unique workloads

4) unique test facilities

5) other workloads

b. cost analysis **20%**

criterion 2 - operational capabilities analysis **30%**

a. operations **70%**

b. airspace **20%**

c. airfield **10%**

Remaining criteria determined in manner consistent with other categories of bases

All criteria were reviewed prior to tiering by the BCEG using secret ballots


X7

MAJOR COBRA ASSUMPTIONS FOR DEPOT CLOSURES

<i>Assumption</i>	NAVY	ARMY	AIR FORCE
TIME TO CLOSE	2-3 YEARS	3-4 YEARS	6 YEARS
POSITIONS ELIMINATED BEFORE MOVE	20-30%	43-63%	7%
COST TO HIRE AT RECEIVING BASE	NONE RECOGNIZED AS BRAC COST	\$1,109/NEW EMPLOYEE	\$4,000 /NEW EMPLOYEE
EQUIPMENT TO BE MOVED	ESTABLISHED BY RECEIVER	ESTABLISHED BY RECEIVER	ALL MOVED OR RE-PURCHASED
BASE CONVERSION AGENCY COSTS	COBRA CALCULATION	COBRA CALCULATION	COBRA CALCULATION + \$30 million PER BASE
OTHER TENANTS	SCENARIO SPECIFIC	SCENARIO SPECIFIC	MOVE ALL

X8

TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE



X9

Issues

Category: Tactical Missile Maintenance Depots

ISSUES	Letterkenny Army Depot (R)(X)(*)	Tobyhanna Army Depot (*)	Hill Air Force Base (*)
Principal Depot Specialties	Combat vehicle and, tactical missile repair; explosive storage	ground communications & electronics systems repair	C-130 and F-16 aircraft, landing gear, tactical strategic missile, turbines & instruments repair, explosive storage
Total Building Square Footage	8,400,359	4,311,812	6,298,386
Acres	19,243	1293	31,150
Maximum Potential Capacity (DLH)	3,707,000	7,606,000	9,005,000
Core Workload	981,000	2,304,000	4,895,412
Percent Capacity Utilized (FY 1999)	26	30	54
Building Square Footage to be Used for Depot Tactical Missile Repair	502,000	264,000	220,000
Potential Missile Surveillance Testing & Storage Space			
• square feet	2.1 million	none	355,000 (+ Army Depot Tooele)
• structures	902 igloos/ 11 test	none	259 (+ Army Depot Tooele)

(C) = DoD recommendation for closure

(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group Option for Closure

(*) = Candidate for further consideration

X 10

Base Analysis

Category: Tactical Missile Maintenance Depots

DOD Recommendation: Realign Letterkenny, move guidance system maintenance workload to Tobyhanna and vehicle / support equipment maintenance workload to Anniston.

For consideration: Study Letterkenny for closure.

<i>CRITERION</i>	<i>Letterkenny Army Depot (*) (Closure)</i>
MILITARY VALUE	4 out of 4
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	470.8
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	94.2
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	4 years
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	55.9
PERSONNEL SAVINGS (MIL/CIV)	24 / 1281
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL/CIV)	19 / 1684
ECONOMIC IMPACT (Base/cumulative)	10.9%/11.1%
ENVIRONMENTAL	no significant limitations

(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group Option for Closure

(*) = Candidate for further consideration

BASE ANALYSIS
CATEGORY: TACTICAL MISSILE DEPOTS

BASE	MISSILE SYSTEMS STORED AND CERTIFIED	DIRECT LABOR STAFF YEARS	PERCENT OF DOD MISSILE STORAGE PERSONNEL
Army Depot Letterkenny (R)(X)(*)	ATACMS,Sidewinder,Sparrow, HARM,AVENGER,Phoenix, AMMRAAM	77	24
Army Depot Red River (C)(X)(*)	Avenger,Stinger,Patriot, HAWK,Maverick	131	40
Army Depot Anniston (*)	Hellfire, TOW,	16	5
Navy Yorktown (*)	Sparrow, Phoenix,Sidewinder,HARM, AMRAAM	55	17
Navy Fallbrook (*)	Sparrow,Phoenix,Sidewinder, Standard,HARM,AMRAAM	23	7
Navy Seal Beach (*)	Standard	7	2
Navy Crane (*)	HARM	1	—
Navy Indianhead (*)	HARM	1	—
Navy Charleston (*)	Sparrow, Phoenix, AMRAAM	1	—
Air Force Ogden (*)	Maverick	16	5


(C) = DoD recommendation for closure

(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment


(*) = Commissioner candidate for further consideration

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group for Closure

DOD PERCENT ORGANIC DEPOT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM



	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99
Air Force	69	75	77	78	80	80
Navy	80	72	68	62	62	62
Army	67	71	71	70	69	70



**UTILIZATION OF DOD
TEST AND EVALUATION OPEN AIR RANGES
(TEST HOURS)**

TEST AREA	WORKLOAD	CAPACITY	PERCENT UTILIZATION
AIR VEHICLES	27,578	53,761	51
ELECTRONIC COMBAT	2,771	5,860	47
ARMAMENT / WEAPONS	31,742	68,857	46
TOTAL	62,091	128,478	48

DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL'S JUNE 1994 REPORT
ON TEST FACILITY REALIGNMENT
ILLUSTRATIONS OF MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS

DOD/IG POSITION

REALIGNMENT OF TEST FACILITIES WOULD SAVE \$1.7 BILLION OVER 20 YEARS.

SAVINGS BASED ON 50% DECREASE IN WORKLOAD.

AERIAL TARGETS CAN BE SITED AT CHINA LAKE, LAUNCHED FROM AIRCRAFT BASED THERE AND DO NOT NEED TO BE BASED AT SEA RANGE.

DBCRC IS IN THE PROCESS OF FULLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND NAVY RESPONSE.

NAVY POSITION

REPORT CONTAINS TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS INACCURACIES. NAVY DID NOT CONCUR WITH 19 OF 22 REPORT FINDINGS AND 5 OF 6 CONCLUSIONS.

WORKLOAD SHOWS SIGNIFICANT INCREASES.

FUEL CONSIDERATIONS PREVENT AERIAL TARGETS FROM BEING BASED AT CHINA LAKE AND USED FOR OPERATIONS ON THE SEA RANGE.

NAWC POINT MUGU
COMPUTATIONAL FACILITIES

POINT MUGU

CENTER-WIDE LOCAL AREA NETWORK
SECURE VIDEO TELECONFERENCING CENTERS
RANGE COMPUTER SYSTEMS
CYBER COMPUTERS
RANGE INSTRUMENTATION INTERFACE
TELEMETRY PROCESSING SYSTEM
SENSOR POSITIONING AND READBACK SYSTEM
EXTENDED AREA TRACKING SYSTEM
INTEGRATED TARGET CONTROL SYSTEM
DISPLAY SYSTEMS
NAVAL TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM
REAL TIME INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION ENVIRONMENT

LABORATORIES

CRUISE MISSILE SIMULATION LAB
SPECIAL PRODUCTS ANALYSIS CENTER
COMMAND AND CONTROL SIMULATION LAB
SEEKER IN THE LOOP LAB
ALL SUPPORTED BY SEVERAL VAX COMPUTERS

CHINA LAKE

THREE FIBER-OPTIC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

FIBER OPTIC TRUNK SYSTEM

OPTICAL RANGE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

FIBER OPTIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

MICROWAVE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

16,400 COMPUTER SYSTEMS WITH AN ACQUISITION COST OF \$145 MILLION

VIDEO TELECONFERENCING SYSTEM

SIMULATION FACILITIES INTERNETTING

ELECTRONICS COMBAT RANGE

RANGE CONTROL CENTER

WEAPONS SYSTEM SUPPORT FACILITIES

WEAPONS AND TACTICS CENTER

MISSILE SIMULATION LABORATORY

SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING FACILITY

COMPUTATIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS GROUP

TACTICAL AIR RANGES INTEGRATION FACILITY

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS BRANCH COMPUTING FACILITY

COMPUTER AIDED ENGINEERING/DESIGN

AIRCRAFT DEPARTMENT COMPUTING FACILITY

COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION AND SCIENCES BRANCH

SURVIVABILITY AND LETHALITY DIV. COMPUTING CAPABILITIES

EW SIMULATIONS LAB

CONCURRENT ENGINEERING LAB

STRIKE TECHNOLOGY LAB

CHINA LAKE HAS SUPER COMPUTING, PARALLEL COMPUTING, DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING AND NETWORKING CAPABILITIES. CAPABILITIES ALSO INCLUDE HIGH SPEED DATA TRANSFER, FIBER-OPTIC LINKS, NETWORK INTERCONNECTIVITY AND VIDEO TELECONFERENCING CAPABILITIES.

SOURCE: BRAC DATA CALL # 5.

X 19

NAVY AVIATION DEPOTS

<i>Military value</i>	<i>INSTALLATION</i>
<i>1 of 3</i>	<i>Cherry Point Naval Aviation Depot</i>
<i>2 of 3</i>	<i>Jacksonville Naval Aviation Depot</i> (X) (*)
<i>3 of 3</i>	<i>North Island Naval Aviation Depot</i>

(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure

(*) = Candidate for further consideration

ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS CENTER HANSCOM AIR FORCE BASE
FY 1993 GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT WORKYEARS

CATEGORY	GOVERNMENT	MITRE CORP.	SETA	TOTAL
ENGINEERING	336	1,467	654	2,457
LOGISTICS	150	0	88	238
CONTRACTING	269	0	0	269
FINANCIAL	264	0	134	398
LEGAL	36	0	0	36
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT	434	0	0	434
ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER	505	0	124	629
TOTALS	1994	1,467	1,000	4,461

X 25

HANSCOM AIR FORCE BASE FORCE STRUCTURE

FOR ALL GOVERNMENT, NON-APPROPRIATED FUND, AND NON-AIR FORCE EMPLOYEES

(FY 1993/94 PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS)

CATEGORY	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES	852	872	2,354	4,078
MINOR ACTIVITIES & TENANTS (39)	22	69	759	850
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS AND MAJOR CONTRACTORS:				
LINCOLN LABORATORY	0	0	2,872	2,872
MITRE CORPORATION	0	0	2,889	2,889
OTHER-TECHNICAL SUPPORT	0	0	1,100	1,100
TOTALS	874	941	9,974	11,789

X-24

Base Analysis
Category: United States Air Force Product Centers and Laboratories

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Hanscom Air Force Base **FOR CLOSURE**

MAJOR ISSUES	ROME LABORATORY DOD RECOMMENDED (C) (X)	HANSCOM AFB ALTERNATIVE (*)(X)
AIR FORCE TIERING	TIER I	TIER I
FORCE STRUCTURE	NO IMPACT	NO IMPACT
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	53	441
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	12	48
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	4 years	11 years
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	12	37
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL/CIV)	0/50	466/272
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL/CIV)	10/873	1210/1733
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC95/CUM)	1.5% / 6.2%	0.8% / 0.8%
ENVIRONMENTAL	NO IMPACT	NATIONAL PRIORITY LIST

- (C)= DoD Recommendation for Closure
- (R)= DoD Recommendation for Realignment
- (X)= Joint Cross Service Group Alternative for Closure
- (*)= Candidate for further consideration

x23

**ASSUMPTIONS MADE BY THE
JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ON
C4I ALTERNATIVE**

- **MINIMAL MILCON EXPENDITURES FOR LABORATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACILITIES.**
- **ROME LABORATORY CAN BE LEFT IN PLACE OR MOVED TO FORT MONMOUTH , NEW JERSEY.**
- **NO MOVEMENT OF FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES AT HANSCOM TO FORT MONMOUTH.**

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS AND INTELLIGENCE - C4I

- **DOD LABORATORY JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP PROPOSED AN ALTERNATIVE THAT WOULD CENTER C4I ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY ACQUISITION, AT FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY.**
- **THE ACTIVITIES THE LABORATORY JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP CONSIDERED ARE:**

SPACE & NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND (SPAWARSCOM)

USAF ROME LABORATORY

USAF HANSCOM ELECTRONICS SYSTEM CENTER

- **THE ARMY'S C4I ACTIVITIES ARE CURRENTLY LOCATED AT FORT MONMOUTH.**

x21

AIR FORCE PRODUCT CENTERS AND LABORATORIES

TIER	INSTALLATION	
I	HANSCOM AFB	(X) (*)
I	ROME LABORATORY	(C)
I	WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	
II	KIRTLAND AFB	(R)
II	LOS ANGELES AFB	
III	BROOKS AFB	(C)

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- (*)= Candidate for further consideration

ROME LABORATORY (GRIFFISS AFB), NY

CUSTOMER COMMENTS ON DOD RECOMMENDATION

TO CLOSE THE LAB AND RELOCATE ITS ACTIVITIES ELSEWHERE

**“CAUSES SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT ONGOING WORK AND PLANNING FOR FUTURE WORK”
(NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER, JUNE 1995).**

**“COMES AS A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT TO THOSE OF US WHO HAVE WORKED CLOSELY
WITH THEM OVER THE YEARS. I FEAR THAT THIS TOTAL QUALITY AND THIS EXCELLENT
LABORATORY WILL BE TOTALLY DESTROYED BY THE FRAGMENTING AND MOVE OF ITS
PARTS” (ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, MARCH 1995).**

**“THE SERVICES AND EXPERTISE PROVIDED BY ROME LAB’S IRA DIVISION HAVE PROVEN
CRITICAL TO THE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY OF THE US MILITARY. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT
THE SUCCESSES OF IRA HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF TEAM EFFORT BUILDING ON
SYNERGISTIC TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS. THE TEAM APPROACH HAS NOT ONLY
PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS, BUT HAS ALSO MINIMIZED DUPLICATION OF EFFORT. IT
MAY TAKE BUT A FEW YEARS TO DETERMINE THAT BREAKING UP SUCH A TEAM WAS A
BAD IDEA, HOWEVER, IT WOULD CERTAINLY TAKE MANY YEARS TO REBUILD ONE”
(HEADQUARTERS, AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, MAY 1995).**

XBU-2

CHINA LAKE

THREE FIBER-OPTIC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

FIBER OPTIC TRUNK SYSTEM

OPTICAL RANGE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

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SOURCE: BRAC DATA CALL # 5.

X19

