DCN 1029

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS

MARCH 1ST, 1995

ROOM 106
DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader
Review and Analysis

INFORMATION PACK

INVESTIGATIONAL HEARINGS

Investigational Hearings

Fact Sheet

Assignment Sheet for Staff

Airport Arrivals/Departures

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Put in March 1 Hearing Book

INVESTIGATIONAL HEARINGS
WASHINGTON, DC
MARCH 1, 1995

COMMISSIONERS ATTENDING:

Chairman Alan Dixon
Commissioner Alton Cornella
Commissioner Rebecca Cox
Commissioner James Davis
Commissioner Lee Kling
Commissioner Benjamin Montoya
Commissioner Joe Robles
Commissioner Wendi Steele

HEARING LOCATION :

Room 106
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
(202) 224-2739

CONTACT:

Senate Appropriations Committee
Mazie Mattson
(202) 224-2739

FACT SHEET
INVESTIGATIONAL HEARINGS
WASHINGTON, DC
MARCH 1, 1995

LOCATION:

Dirksen Senate Office Building
Room 106
Washington, DC 20510

DIRECTIONS:

Enter Dirksen Senate Office Building
From First & Constitution. Past the elevators
on the right.

CAPACITY:

200 People

LUNCH ROOM:

Dirksen Senate Office Building
Room 124
The American Cafe (Carry Out)

CONTACTS:

Senate Appropriations Committee
Mazie Mattson/Kim Range
(202) 224-2739

Capitol Hill Police
Paula Harington
(202) 224 4841

Office of the Superintendent
Special Functions
Tim Maxey
(202) 224-3146

PARKING:

None

STENOGRAPHER:

Diversified
Ellen Alcott
(202) 296-2929

STAFF ASSIGNMENT SHEET
INVESTIGATIONAL HEARINGS
WASHINGTON, DC

Signage.....Ziba
- reserved seating (vip, witness, press)
- staff only

Commissioner and staff dais seating.....Ziba

Advance on site check.....Ziba
- lights
- microphones
- stenographer
- water
- coffee.....Wayne

Lunch arrangements/logistics.....Ziba

Designated on-site supervisor during lunch.....Ziba

Testimony Collection.....Ziba

TimeKeeper.....Paul

VIP Greeter.....CeCe

Final site sweep.....Ziba

General Runner..... Kent & Melissa

Transported (nameplates/gavel).....Ziba

Computer Equipment.....Jim

AIRPORT ARRIVALS/DEPARTURES
INVESTIGATIONAL HEARINGS
WASHINGTON, DC

ALAN DIXON

Arrival:	Tuesday, Feb. 28	8:00 pm
Departure:	Wednesday, Mar. 1	6:16 pm

AL CORNELLA

Arrival:	Monday, Feb. 27	2:50 pm
Departure:	Friday, Mar.17	9:00 am

REBECCA COX

In town

J.B. DAVIS

Arrival:	Monday, Feb. 27	4:00 pm
Departure:	Wednesday, Mar. 1	7:05 pm

LEE KLING

Arrival:	Tuesday, Feb. 28	1:20 pm
Departure:	Wednesday, Mar. 1	after hearing

BEN MONTOYA

Arrival:	Tuesday, Feb. 28	1.10 pm
Departure:	Wednesday, Mar. 1	5:00 pm

JOE ROBLES

Arrival:	Tuesday, Feb. 28	1:00 am
Departure:	Wednesday, Mar. 1	5:45 pm

WENDI STEELE

Arrival:	Tuesday, Feb. 28	11:46 am
Departure:	Thursday, Mar. 2	3:40 pm

DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
First Floor
SD•101 - SD•197



Constitution Avenue

Document Separator

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2. LIST OF 1995 DOD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT.

3. OPENING STATEMENT - CHAIRMAN DIXON.

4. OPENING STATEMENTS - THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

5. COMMISSIONER QUESTIONS.

AFTERNOON SESSION:

6. OPENING STATEMENT - CHAIRMAN DIXON.

7. OPENING STATEMENT - THE HONORABLE JOSHUA GOTBAUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ECONOMIC POLICY); ROBERT E. BAYER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INSTALLATIONS.

8. COMMISSIONER QUESTIONS.

9. LETTERS OF INVITATION.

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10. COMMISSION CHARTER.

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12. COMMISSION STAFFING CHART.

13. SUPER 25 LIST.

14. SCHEDULE OF COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES.

HEARING AGENDA
MARCH 1, 1995
SD-106 DIRKSEN BUILDING

9:00AM - 11:30AM MORNING SESSION:

Witnesses:	The Honorable William J. Perry Secretary of Defense
	General John M. Shalikashvili, USA Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
	The Honorable John M. Deutch Deputy Secretary of Defense
11:30AM	Press Availability
12:00PM - 1:30PM	Lunch: SD-124

1:30PM - 4:00PM AFTERNOON SESSION:

Witness:	The Honorable Joshua Gotbaum Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)
4:00PM	Commission Business Meeting
4:30PM	Press Availability

NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. · 20301
PLEASE NOTE DATE

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE February 28, 1995

SECRETARY PERRY RECOMMENDS CLOSING, REALIGNING 146 BASES

Secretary of Defense William Perry today announced the Department's recommendations to close or realign 146 military installations in the United States. The recommendations are being forwarded to the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

"These recommendations, though painful, are necessary to achieve the levels of readiness and modernization we need within the budget we have," said Secretary Perry. "Our armed forces and our budget have been cut by one-third or more, but our infrastructure only about half that. Today's recommendations will save the taxpayers and the Department some $18 billion over the next two decades."

The Secretary's recommendations were developed by each of the military services in accordance with the strict procedures laid down by the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Each base was evaluated using a set of published criteria, giving priority first to the military-value of the facility, and then to the savings and the economic and other effects that the closure would have. The evaluation data is certified for accuracy by each Service, and then reviewed by both the Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the General Accounting Office.

During a press conference at the Pentagon, Perry said that both he and General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had approved the recommendations made by the military departments without exception. "These actions are necessary so that we can carefully shape our armed forces to support the National Military Strategy and the Bottom Up Review," the Secretary explained.

The BRAC 95 recommendations will cost less than the BRAC 95 round ($3.8 billion vs. $6.9 billion) and will generate savings more quickly. Over the six-year implementation period prescribed by law, the closures and realignments are expected to generate net savings of approximately $4 billion. Recurring savings thereafter are expected to reach $1.8 billion per year. Total savings over 20 years, discounted to present value, are estimated to be $18 billion.

-MORE-

INTERNET AVAILABILITY: This document is available on DefenseLINK, a World Wide Web Server on the Internet, at: http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/

Perry also announced that he will recommend that the current BRAC authority be extended to permit another base closure round in three or four years. "We need time to absorb the closure of over a hundred major bases," the Secretary said, "but we are continuing to refine our force structure and our mission. Each service has told me that, ultimately, they can do more."

While some of these actions will have significant economic impact upon local communities, Perry said that he did not remove any Service recommendations for this reason. However, he pledged to continue and expand the Department's efforts to encourage recovery and reuse. Department of Defense assistance programs include personnel transition and job training assistance, local reuse planning grants, on-site transition coordinators, accelerated property disposal, and faster environmental cleanup that supports reuse needs.

"These installations offer an opportunity for communities to diversify and reshape their economic futures. We have already seen impressive redevelopment successes in such diverse communities as Sacramento, Calif.; Alexandria, La.; and Rantoul, Ill. They prove that new jobs can be created to replace those that are lost. There is no doubt that it takes strong local leadership and a lot of hard work., but the President has committed us to help, and we will," Secretary Perry said.

Attached are summaries of the impacts of each BRAC action, listed by state.

-END-

1995 List of Military Installations Inside the United States for Closure or Realignment

Part I: Major Base Closures

Army

Fort McClellan, Alabama
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado
Price Support Center, Illinois
Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois
Fort Ritchie, Maryland
Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey
Seneca Army Depot, New York
Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
Red River Army Depot, Texas
Fort Pickett, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California
Ship Repair Facility, Guam
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland
Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts
Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Air Force

North Highlands Air Guard Station, California
Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, California
Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York
Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York
Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, Ohio
Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
Reese Air Force Base, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah

Part II: Major Base Realignments

Army

Fort Greely, Alaska
Fort Hunter Liggett, California
Sierra Army Depot, California
Fort Meade, Maryland
Detroit Arsenal, Michigan
Fort Dix, New Jersey
Fort Hamilton, New York
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
Fort Lee, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
Naval Activities, Guam
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington

Air Force

McClellan Air Force Base, California
Onizuka Air Station, California
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico
Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota
Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
Hill Air Force Base, Utah

Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignments, Disestablishments or Relocations

Army

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, California
East Fort Baker, California
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California
Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut
Big Coppett Key, Florida
Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland
Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts
Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts
Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), Missouri
Fort Missoula, Montana
Camp Kilmer, New Jersey
Caven Point Reserve Center, New Jersey
Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey
Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York
Fort Totten, New York
Recreation Center #2, Fayettville, North Carolina
Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginia
Camp Bonneville, Washington
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), West Virginia

Navy

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast Division, San Diego, California
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California
Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California
Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut
Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam
Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana
Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia

Navy/Marine Reserve Activities

Naval Reserve Centers at:

Huntsville, Alabama
Stockton, California
Santa Ana, Irvine, California
Pomona, California
Cadillac, Michigan
Staten Island, New York
Laredo, Texas
Sheboygan, Wisconsin

Naval Air Reserve Center at:

Olathe, Kansas

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:

New Orleans, Louisiana (Region 10)
Charleston, South Carolina (Region 7)

Air Force

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, California
Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta, Georgia
Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas

Defense Investigative Service

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird, Maryland

Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC Recommendations

Army

Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland

Navy

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California
Naval Air Station Alameda, California
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California
Naval Training Center, San Diego, California
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida
Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida
Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida
Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.
Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C.

Air Force

Williams AFB, Arizona
Lowry AFB, Colorado
Homestead AFB, Florida (301st Rescue Squadron)
Homestead AFB, Florida (726th Air Control Squadron)
MacDill AFB, Florida
Griffiss AFB, New York (Airfield Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division)
Griffiss AFB, New York (485th Engineering Installation Group)

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, California

Selected Recommended Changes to Prior Round BRAC Decisions

(Personnel that have not yet relocated.)

A Prior BRAC Decision Requires Personnel To Relocate:		A BRAC 95 Recommendation Would Change the Destination To:		
			Personnel In	
From	To	New Location	Military	Civilian
NAS Alameda, CA	NAS North Island, CA	NAS Corpus Christi, TX	423	0
NAS Cecil Field, FL	MCAS Cherry Point, NC	NAS Oceana, VA	3,288	111
		MCAS Beaufort, SC	640	5
	MCAS Beaufort, SC	NAS Atlanta, GA	319	7
	NAS Oceana, VA	NAS Jacksonville, FL	1,889	22
NAF Detroit, MI	Marine Corps Res. Ctr., Twin Cities, MN	Selfridge AGB, MI	84	0
MCAS El Toro and MCAS Tustin, CA	NAS Lemoore, CA	NAS Oceana, VA	1,897	34
		NAS North Island, CA	1,271	84
		NAS Jacksonville, FL	12	5
MCAS El Toro and MCAS Tustin, CA	NAS Miramar, CA	MCAS New River, NC	703	0
		MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI	128	0
Naval Nuclear Training, Orlando, FL	SUBASE New London, CT	Weapons Station Charleston, SC	2,790	0
NTC Orlando & NTC San Diego, CA	NAS Pensacola, FL	Lackland AFB, TX	193	0
	NTC Great Lakes, MI	NUWC Keyport, WA	82	0
		FTC San Diego, CA	127	0
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC	NTC Great Lakes, MI	Bureau of Personnel, Memphis, TN	216	135
Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, MD	Fort Meade, MD	Naval Research Laboratory, MD	32	0
Williams Air Force Base, AZ	Orlando, FL	Williams Air Force Base, AZ	0	36
Griffiss AFB, NY 485th Engineering Installation Group	Hill AFB, UT	Unit Inactivates		

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Net Gain/(Loss) Mil	Civ
ALABAMA			
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	RECEIVE	28	473
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT ANNISTON	RECEIVE	0	839
FORT MCCLELLAN	CLOSE	(6,085)	(2,441)
NRC HUNTSVILLE	CLOSE	(11)	(8)
REDSTONE ARSENAL	RECEIVE	201	2,368
	Total	(5,877)	931
ALASKA			
FORT GREELY	REALIGN	(438)	(286)
FORT WAINWRIGHT	RECEIVE	205	86
NAF ADAK	CLOSE	(540)	(136)
	Total	(773)	(336)
ARIZONA			
FORT HUACHUCA	RECEIVE	108	166
YUMA PROVING GROUND	RECEIVE	39	18
	Total	147	184
ARKANSAS			
FORT CHAFFEE	CLOSE	(40)	(207)
	Total	(40)	(207)
CALIFORNIA			
CBC PORT HUENEME	RECEIVE	0	2
DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT DISTRICT WEST	RECEIVE	2	20
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT SAN JOAQUIN	RECEIVE	0	213
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION WEST	REDIRECT	2	289
EAST FT BAKER	CLOSE	(47)	(50)
EDWARDS AFB	RECEIVE	3	0
FISC SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	0	18
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	REALIGN	(303)	(85)
MCCLELLAN AFB	RECEIVE	134	245
MOFFETT FEDERAL AIRPORT AGS	CLOSE	(86)	(230)
NADEP NORTH ISLAND	RECEIVE	6	213
NAS NORTH ISLAND	RECEIVE	1,329	54
NAVAL HEALTH RESEARCH CENTER, SAN DIEGO	CLOSE	(17)	(137)
NAVAL PERSONNEL R&D CENTER, SAN DIEGO	DISESTABLISH	(17)	(203)
NAVAL STATION SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	176	22
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	RECEIVE	61	126
NAVMEDCEN SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	102	36
NAWC CHINA LAKE	RECEIVE	16	284
NCCOSC RDT&E SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	154	696
NISE WEST SAN DIEGO	DISESTABLISH	0	(56)
NORTH HIGHLANDS AIR GUARD STATION	CLOSE	0	0
NRC POMONA	CLOSE	(7)	(3)
NRC SANTA ANA (IRVINE)	CLOSE	(12)	(2)
NRC STOCKTON	CLOSE	(7)	0
NSWC PORT HUENEME	RECEIVE	0	107
NSY LONG BEACH	CLOSE	(283)	(3,796)
ONIZUKA AS	REALIGN	(673)	(1,202)
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	REALIGN	(53)	(536)
SUPSHIP LONG BEACH	DISESTABLISH	(11)	(8)
TRAVIS AFB	RECEIVE	14	1
	Total	802	(3,986)

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load, civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Net Gain/(Loss) Mil	Civ
COLORADO		0	0
FALCON AFB	RECEIVE	287	234
FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL CENTER	CLOSE	(1,291)	(1,812)
FORT CARSON	RECEIVE	291	0
LOWRY AFB	REDIRECT	(78)	(11)
PETERSON AFB	RECEIVE	10	69
	Total	(541)	(1,320)
CONNECTICUT			
NUWC DET NEW LONDON	DISESTABLISH	(5)	(622)
STRATFORD ARMY ENGINE PLANT	CLOSE	(2)	0
SUBASE NEW LONDON	RECEIVE	20	13
	Total	13	(609)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA			
NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY	RECEIVE	32	0
WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER	RECEIVE	193	0
	Total	225	0
FLORIDA			
EGLIN AFB	RECEIVE	420	299
HOMESTEAD AFB	REDIRECT	(61)	(153)
MACDILL AFB	RECEIVE	887	57
NADEP JACKSONVILLE	RECEIVE	0	40
NAS JACKSONVILLE	RECEIVE	1,901	27
NAS KEY WEST	REALIGN	(19)	(1)
NAS PENSACOLA	RECEIVE	399	94
NAS WHITING FIELD	RECEIVE	327	5
NAWC TRNG SYS DIV ORLANDO	RECEIVE	5	48
NRL UNDERWATER SOUND DET ORLANDO	DISESTABLISH	0	(109)
NSWC PANAMA CITY	RECEIVE	42	28
TYNDALL AFB	RECEIVE	83	344
	Total	3,764	879
GEORGIA			
DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT DISTRICT SOUTH	DISESTABLISH	(5)	(184)
DOBBINS ARB	RECEIVE	0	68
FORT GORDON	RECEIVE	94	0
NAS ATLANTA	RECEIVE	319	7
NAVSCSCOL ATHENS	RECEIVE	391	12
WARNER-ROBINS ALC (ROBINS AFB)	REALIGN	(8)	(826)
	Total	791	(913)
GUAM			
FISC GUAM	DISESTABLISH	(73)	(340)
NAS AGANA	REDIRECT	(1,272)	0
NAVAL ACTIVITIES GUAM	REALIGN	(737)	(1,684)
SRF GUAM	CLOSE	(22)	(841)
	Total	(2,104)	(2,865)
HAWAII			
FORT SHAFTER	RECEIVE	102	0
MCB KANEOHE BAY	RECEIVE	545	0
NAVMAG LUALUALEI	RECEIVE	80	246
NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR	RECEIVE	267	527
	Total	995	773

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Net Gain/(Loss) Mil	Civ
IDAHO			
MOUNTAIN HOME AFB	RECEIVE	123	3
	Total	123	3
ILLINOIS			
NTC GREAT LAKES	RECEIVE	10	5
PRICE SUPPORT CENTER, IL	CLOSE	(25)	(200)
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY	CLOSE	(57)	(393)
	Total	(72)	(588)
INDIANA			
NAWC-AD INDIANAPOLIS	CLOSE	(36)	(2,805)
NSWC CRANE	RECEIVE	13	1,778
	Total	(23)	(1,027)
KANSAS			
NARC OLATHE	CLOSE	(10)	(4)
	Total	(10)	(4)
KENTUCKY			
FORT KNOX	RECEIVE	1,416	54
NSWC LOUISVILLE	CLOSE	(15)	(1,449)
	Total	1,401	(1,395)
LOUISIANNA			
NAS NEW ORLEANS	RECEIVE	0	2
NAVAL BIO DYNAMICS LAB NEW ORLEANS	CLOSE	(15)	(39)
NR READINESS CMD 10 NEW ORLEANS	CLOSE	(24)	(23)
	Total	(39)	(60)
MAINE			
NAS BRUNSWICK	RECEIVE	215	5
	Total	215	5
MARYLAND			
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND	RECEIVE	11	108
ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTER	RELOCATE	(2)	(129)
FORT DETRICK	RECEIVE	802	325
FORT MEADE (KIMBROUGH HOSPITAL)	REALIGN	(86)	(74)
FORT RITCHIE	CLOSE	(1,011)	(1,333)
NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INST, BETHESDA	CLOSE	(91)	(35)
NAWC-AD PATUXENT RIVER	RECEIVE	67	649
NSWC CARDEROCK	RECEIVE	1	19
NSWC DET ANNAPOLIS	CLOSE	(2)	(520)
NSWC DET WHITE OAK	CLOSE	(1)	(201)
	Total	(481)	(1,211)
MASSACHUSSETTS			
DEFENSE CONTRACT MGT. DISTRICT NORTHEAST	RECEIVE	1	20
HANSCOM AFB	RECEIVE	8	885
NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH	CLOSE	(837)	(399)
NATICK RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CENTER	RECEIVE	2	160
SUDBURY TRAINING ANNEX	CLOSE	0	(13)
	Total	(826)	453
MICHIGAN			
DEFENSE REUTILIZATION AND MARKETING SERVICE (HQ)	RECEIVE	0	97
DETROIT ARSENAL	RECEIVE	6	178

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Net Gain/(Loss) Mil	Civ
DETROIT ARSENAL TANK PLANT	CLOSE	0	0
NRC CADILLAC	CLOSE	(6)	0
SELFRIDGE AGB	RECEIVE	54	0
SELFRIDGE ARMY GARRISON	CLOSE	(54)	(555)
	Total	0	(280)
MISSISSIPPI			
COLUMBUS AFB	RECEIVE	115	201
NAS MERIDIAN	CLOSE	(1,634)	(947)
NAVOCEANO	RECEIVE	0	36
	Total	(1,519)	(710)
MISSOURI			
AVIATION-TROOP COMMAND	DISESTABLISH	(247)	(4,484)
FORT LEONARD WOOD	RECEIVE	1,409	342
ST LOUIS PUBS	RECEIVE	2	40
	Total	1,164	(4,102)
MONTANA			
MALMSTROM AFB	REALIGN	(719)	(80)
	Total	(719)	(80)
NEVADA			
NELLIS AFB	RECEIVE	87	85
	Total	87	85
NEW JERSEY			
BAYONE MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL	CLOSE	(100)	(1,267)
CAVEN POINT RESERVE CENTER	CLOSE	(3)	0
FORT DIX	REALIGN	(310)	(429)
FORT MONMOUTH	RECEIVE	35	1,188
NAVY WPNSTA EARLE	RECEIVE	0	25
NAWC LAKEHURST	CLOSE	(380)	(1,383)
	Total	(758)	(1,866)
NEW MEXICO			
HOLLOMAN AFB	RECEIVE	1,368	344
KIRTLAND AFB	REALIGN	(4,556)	(2,294)
	Total	(3,188)	(1,950)
NEW YORK			
FORT DRUM	RECEIVE	0	180
FORT HAMILTON RESERVE CENTER	REALIGN	3	(82)
FORT TOTTEN	CLOSE	(11)	(32)
GRIFFISS AIR GUARD	REDIRECT	0	(150)
NRC STATEN ISLAND	CLOSE	(12)	(2)
REDCAP ACTIVITY, BUFFALO	DISESTABLISH	(2)	(1)
ROME LABORATORIES	CLOSE	(10)	(1,057)
ROSLYN AGS	CLOSE	(6)	(36)
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	CLOSE	(9)	(315)
STEWART IAP AGS	RECEIVE	8	36
WATERVLIET ARSENAL	RECEIVE	0	15
	Total	(41)	(1,415)
NORTH CAROLINA			
MCAS NEW RIVER	RECEIVE	703	0
	Total	703	0

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Net Gain/(Loss) Mil	Civ
NORTH DAKOTA			
GRAND FORKS AFB	REALIGN	(1,506)	(118)
	Total	(1,506)	(118)
OHIO			
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT COLUMBUS	REALIGN	(2)	(721)
SPRINGFIELD BECKLEY MAP ACS	CLOSE	0	0
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	RECEIVE	1,315	1,233
	Total	1,313	512
OKLAHOMA			
FORT SILL	RECEIVE	1,575	32
MCALESTER ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	RECEIVE	83	219
TINKER AFB (INCL. OKLAHOMA CITY ALC)	REALIGN	127	(631)
VANCE AFB	RECEIVE	115	201
	Total	1,870	(379)
PENNSYLVANIA			
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT LETTERKENNY	DISESTABLISH	(4)	(374)
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT SUSQUEHANNA	RECEIVE	0	297
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION EAST	RECEIVE	0	89
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER	REALIGN	(16)	(369)
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	CLOSE	(136)	(385)
GREATER PITTSBURGH IAP ARS	CLOSE	0	(367)
KELLY SUPPORT CENTER	REALIGN	0	(121)
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	REALIGN	(35)	(2,055)
NAESU PHILADELPHIA	CLOSE	(10)	(80)
NATBF PHILADELPHIA	CLOSE	(4)	(223)
NAWC-AD & NCCOSC DET WARMINSTER WARMINSTER	CLOSE	(16)	(332)
NAWC-AD OPEN WATER TEST FACILITY ORELAND	CLOSE	0	0
NSWC PHILADELPHIA	RECEIVE	0	281
NSY PHILADELPHIA-NORFOLK DET	REDIRECT	0	0
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	RECEIVE	0	300
	Total	(221)	(3,378)
PUERTO RICO			
FORT BUCHANAN	REALIGN	(69)	(123)
	Total	(69)	(123)
RHODE ISLAND			
NETC NEWPORT	RECEIVE	522	10
NUWC NEWPORT	RECEIVE	0	562
	Total	522	572
SOUTH CAROLINA			
FISC CHARLESTON	CLOSE	(2)	(6)
FORT JACKSON	RECEIVE	1,404	51
MCAS BEAUFORT	RECEIVE	840	5
NAVAL READINESS CMD 7 CHARLESTON	CLOSE	(30)	(16)
NAVY WPNSTA CHARLESTON	RECEIVE	2,780	0
SHAW AFB (726 ACS, HOMESTEAD AFB)	REDIRECT	(123)	(3)
	Total	4,869	31
TENNESSEE			
BUREAU OF PERSONNEL (IN)	RECEIVE	233	283
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT MEMPHIS	DISESTABLISH	(11)	(1,289)
	Total	222	(996)

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Net Gain/(Loss) Mil	Civ
TEXAS			
AF ELEC. WARFARE SIMULATOR ACT., FT. WORTH	DISESTABLISH	(4)	(1)
BERGSTROM AIR RESERVE BASE	CLOSE	0	(585)
BROOKS AFB	CLOSE	(1,820)	(1,939)
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT RED RIVER	DISESTABLISH	(1)	(820)
FORT BLISS	RECEIVE	470	62
FORT SAM HOUSTON	RECEIVE	414	27
JRB FT WORTH	RECEIVE	2	5
KELLY AFB (INCL. SAN ANTONIO ALC)	REALIGN	364	(143)
LACKLAND AFB	RECEIVE	240	26
LAUGHLIN AFB	RECEIVE	129	523
LONE STAR ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	RECEIVE	0	510
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	REALIGN	252	(384)
NAS KINGSVILLE	RECEIVE	418	50
NRF LAREDO	CLOSE	(6)	0
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	CLOSE	(14)	(2,857)
REESE AFB	CLOSE	(900)	(1,183)
SHEPPARD AFB	RECEIVE	81	143
	Total	(375)	(6,606)
UTAH			
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT OGDEN	DISESTABLISH	(8)	(1,105)
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND	REALIGN	(165)	(831)
HILL AFB (INCL. UTAH TEST AND TRNG RANGE)	RECEIVE	0	147
	Total	(173)	(1,789)
VIRGINIA			
CG MCCDC QUANTICO	RECEIVE	12	0
DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COMMAND	RECEIVE	11	41
DEFENSE GENERAL SUPPLY CENTER	RECEIVE	12	347
FORT LEE (KENNER HOSPITAL)	REALIGN	(99)	(108)
FORT PICKETT	CLOSE	(9)	(245)
NAS NORFOLK	REALIGN	(551)	0
NAS OCEANA	RECEIVE	5,185	145
NAVAL MGT SYSTEMS SPT OFFICE CHESAPEAKE	DISESTABLISH	(9)	(15)
NSWC DAHLGREN	RECEIVE	0	34
NSY NORFOLK	RECEIVE	0	230
SPAWAR ARLINGTON	REDIRECT	(201)	(832)
	Total	4,364	(511)
WASHINGTON			
FORT LEWIS	RECEIVE	137	0
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND	RECEIVE	610	0
NSY PUGET SOUND	RECEIVE	41	28
NUWC KEYPORT	RECEIVE	92	(28)
	Total	780	0
WEST VIRGINIA			
VALLEY GROVE AREA MAINT SUP ACT (AMSA)	CLOSE	0	(7)
	Total	0	(7)
WISCONSIN			
NRC SHEBOYGAN	CLOSE	(9)	0
	Total	(9)	0

NOTE: This table excludes relocations "out" for BRAC 95 recommendations to change prior BRAC decisions that have not yet been implemented.

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 $millions)

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Civ
Alabama								
Army								
Ft McClellan		Close	269	122	46	316	(4,095)	(2,441)
Navy								
NRC Huntsville		Close	0	(3)	1	7	(11)	(8)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							229	3,380
Total Alabama Personnel Impact							(3,877)	931
Alaska								
Army								
Ft Greely		Realign	23	(43)	19	225	(438)	(284)
Navy								
NAF Adak		Close	9	(108)	26	355	(840)	(138)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							205	66
Total Alaska Personnel Impact							(773)	(356)
Arizona								
Air Force								
Williams AFB		Redirect	0	(16)	0	21	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							147	184
Total Arizona Personnel Impact							147	184
Arkansas								
Army								
Ft Chaffee		Close	10	(39)	13	167	(40)	(207)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total Arkansas Personnel Impact							(40)	(207)
California								
Army								
Branch US Disciplinary Barracks		Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sost Ft Baker		Close	8	1	2	16	(47)	(80)
Ft Hunter-Liggett		Realign	4	(120)	6	64	(393)	(86)
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center		Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0
Sierra Army Depot		Realign	14	(86)	29	333	(83)	(839)
Navy								
MCAS El Toro/Tustin		Redirect	90	(293)	3	347	0	0
NAS Alameda		Redirect	Costs/Savings Included in NAS Meridian closure				0	0
Naval Health Research Ctr San Diego		Disestablish	6	2	1	11	(17)	(137)
NAVFER R&D Ctr San Diego		Disestablish	8	4	2	16	(17)	(202)
NSE West San Diego		Disestablish	2	(19)	4	40	0	(86)
NRC Pomona		Close	0	(2)	0	6	(7)	(3)
NRC Santa Anna (Irvine)		Close	0	(3)	1	8	(12)	(2)
NRC Stockton		Close	0	(2)	0	5	(7)	0
NSY Long Beach		Close	76	(726)	131	1,949	(263)	(3,746)
Recruiting District San Diego		Redirect	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPSHIP Long Beach		Disestablish	0	(1)	0	3	(11)	(8)
Air Force								
Moffett Federal Airport AGS		Close	15	(4)	5	60	(86)	(230)
North Highlands Air Guard Station		Close	1	1	0	2	0	0
Onizuka AS		Realign	134	136	30	182	(673)	(1,202)
Ontario IAP AGS		Close	1	0	0	1	0	0

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 $Millions)

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Civ
Sacramento ALC (McClellan AFB)		Realign	Costs/Savings included in All ALC Realignments (See San Antonio ALC)				0	0
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Contract Management District West		Redirect	10	(11)	4	51	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							2,190	2,294
Total California Personnel Impact							602	(3,968)
Colorado								
Army								
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center		Close	142	39	34	299	(1,291)	(1,412)
Air Force								
Lowry AFB		Redirect	2	(11)	3	39	(78)	(11)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							528	303
Total Colorado Personnel Impact							(841)	(1,320)
Connecticut								
Army								
Stratford Army Engine Plant		Close	2	(24)	6	80	(20)	0
Navy								
NUWC Det New London		Disestablish	23	(14)	8	91	(5)	(622)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							20	13
Total Connecticut Personnel Impact							13	(609)
District of Columbia								
Navy								
Recruiting Command Wash. D.C		Redirect	7	(1)	0	1	0	0
Security Group Det Potomac		Redirect	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							226	0
Total District of Columbia Personnel Impact							226	0
Florida								
Army								
Big Coppitt Key		Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
Navy								
NADEP Pensacola		Redirect	2	(2)	0	4	0	0
NAS Cecil Field		Redirect	67	(335)	12	436	0	0
NAS Key West		Realign	0	(8)	2	26	(19)	(1)
NRL Underwater Sound Det Orlando		Disestablish	8	(4)	3	30	0	(109)
NTC Orlando/San Diego		Redirect	6	(26)	0	26	0	0
Nuclear Power Propulsion Trng Ctr, Orlando		Redirect	148	(30)	6	71	0	0
Air Force								
Eglin AFB		Realign	2	(6)	3	31	420	299
Homestead AFB (301 ARS)		Redirect	6	(2)	2	16	(61)	(163)
Homestead AFB (726 ACS)		Redirect	7	(2)	0	6	0	0
MacDill AFB		Redirect	Costs/Savings included in Malmstrom AFB action				0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							3,414	643
Total Florida Personnel Impact							3,754	679
Georgia								
Air Force								
Warner-Robins ALC (Robins AFB)		Realign	Costs/Savings included in All ALC Realignments (See San Antonio ALC)				(9)	(526)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 $Millions)

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Civ
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Contract Management District South		Disestablish	4	(18)	4	76	(5)	(164)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							804	77
Total Georgia Personnel Impact							791	(613)
Guam								
Navy								
FISC Guam		Disestablish	18	(143)	31	437	(73)	(340)
NAS Agana		Realign	44	(214)	22	418	(1,272)	0
Naval Activities Guam		Realign	93	(44)	43	474	(737)	(1,684)
SRF Guam		Close	8	(172)	38	629	(22)	(641)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total Guam Personnel Impact							(2,104)	(2,665)
Hawaii								
Navy								
NAS Barbers Point		Realign	0	(18)	0	18	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							996	773
Total Hawaii Personnel Impact							996	773
Idaho								
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							123	3
Total Idaho Personnel Impact							123	3
Illinois								
Army								
Price Support Center, IL		Close	4	(35)	9	116	(25)	(200)
Savanna Army Depot Activity		Close	28	12	13	112	(87)	(393)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							10	5
Total Illinois Personnel Impact							(72)	(588)
Indiana								
Navy								
NAWC-AD Indianapolis		Close	180	27	68	640	(34)	(2,805)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							13	1,778
Total Indiana Personnel Impact							(23)	(1,027)
Kansas								
Navy								
NARC Olathe		Close	0	(0)	1	11	(10)	(4)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total Kansas Personnel Impact							(10)	(4)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.78%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 Millions)

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Civ
Kentucky								
Navy								
NSWC Louisville		Close	Costs/Savings included in NAWC Indianapolis action				(15)	(1,449)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,416	54
Total Kentucky Personnel Impact							1,401	(1,395)
Louisiana								
Navy								
Naval Biodynamics Lab New Orleans		Close	1	(14)	3	42	(15)	(39)
Naval Reserve Cmd 10 New Orleans		Close	1	(6)	2	24	(34)	(23)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	2
Total Louisiana Personnel Impact							(49)	(60)
Maine								
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							215	5
Total Maine Personnel Impact							215	5
Maryland								
Army								
Army Biomedical Research Lab, Ft Detrick		Redirect	0	(4)	0	4	0	0
Army Publications Distribution Center		Relocate	4	(3)	3	36	(2)	(129)
Concepts Analysis Agency		Relocate	4	0	1	7	0	0
Ft Meade (Kimbrough Hospital)		Realign	2	(14)	4	50	(56)	(74)
Ft Ritchie		Close	93	(83)	46	712	(1,011)	(1,333)
Navy								
Naval Medical Research Inst Bethesda		Close	3	(19)	10	111	(91)	(55)
NSWC Det Annapolis		Close	26	(37)	16	176	(2)	(520)
NSWC Det White Oak		Close	3	(29)	4	86	(1)	(201)
Defense Investigative Service								
ICSAD, Ft. Holabird		Relocate	11	1	0	4	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							461	1,101
Total Maryland Personnel Impact							(661)	(1,211)
Massachusetts								
Navy								
NAS South Weymouth		Close	17	(51)	27	316	(537)	(299)
Army								
Hingham Cohasset		Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0
Sudbury Training Annex		Close	1	0	0	1	0	(13)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							9	746
Total Massachusetts Personnel Impact							(528)	453
Michigan								
Army								
Detroit Arsenal		Realign	1	(8)	3	28	0	0
Selfridge Army Garrison		Close	6	(47)	10	140	(54)	(556)
Navy								
NAF Detroit		Redirect	0	(9)	0	9	0	0
NRC Cadillac		Close	0	(2)	0	5	(8)	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							62	276
Total Michigan Personnel Impact							0	(280)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.70%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

($Y 96 (Millions))

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Civ
Mississippi								
Navy								
NAS Meridian		Close	83	(169)	33	471	(1,443)	(947)
NTTC Meridian		Close	Costs/Savings included in NAS Meridian action					
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							116	237
Total Mississippi Personnel Impact							(1,519)	(710)
Missouri								
Army								
Aviation-Troop Command		Disestablish	146	(9)	44	453	(247)	(4,484)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,411	362
Total Missouri Personnel Impact							1,164	(4,122)
Montana								
Army								
Ft Missoula		Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0
Air Force								
Malmstrom AFB		Realign	17	(6)	5	64	(719)	(60)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total Montana Personnel							(719)	(60)
Nevada								
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							87	86
Total Nevada Personnel Impact							87	86
New Jersey								
Army								
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal		Close	44	8	10	90	(100)	(1,247)
Camp Kilmer		Close	0	(1)	0	3	0	0
Camp Pedricktown		Close	0	(2)	0	6	0	0
Coven Point Army Reserve Center		Close	Cost/Savings included in Ft Hamilton action				(3)	0
Ft Dix		Realign	19	(112)	36	478	(310)	(429)
Navy								
NAWC Lakehurst		Close	97	6	37	359	(380)	(1,383)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							26	1,213
Total New Jersey Personnel Impact							(764)	(1,844)
New Mexico								
Air Force								
Kirtland AFB		Realign	376	199	42	466	(4,564)	(2,394)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,368	344
Total New Mexico Personnel Impact							(3,196)	(1,960)
New York								
Army								
Belmore Logistics Activity		Close	0	(2)	0	5	0	0
Ft Hamilton		Realign	2	(3)	7	74	3	(82)
Ft Totten		Close	4	0	2	17	(11)	(22)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.785%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 $Millions)

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Civ
Seneca Army Depot		Close	15	(34)	21	242	(9)	(316)
Navy								
NRC Staten Island		Close	0	(4)	1	10	(12)	(2)
Air Force								
Griffiss AFB (485th EIG)		Redirect	1	(27)	3	64	0	0
Griffiss AFB (Airfield Support)		Redirect	61	13	12	111	0	(180)
REDCAP Activity, Buffalo		Disestablish	2	(2)	1	11	(2)	(1)
Rome Laboratories		Close	53	16	12	98	(10)	(1,067)
Roslyn AGS		Close	2	(1)	1	8	(8)	(36)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							8	231
Total New York Personnel Impact							(41)	(1,415)
North Carolina								
Army								
Recreation Center # 2 Fayetteville		Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							703	0
Total North Carolina Personnel Impact							703	0
North Dakota								
Air Force								
Grand Forks AFB		Realign	12	(112)	36	447	(1,506)	(119)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total North Dakota Personnel Impact							(1,506)	(119)
Ohio								
Air Force								
Springfield-Beckley MAP AGS		Close	23	6	4	36	0	0
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Contract Mgmt Command International		Realign	3	(9)	3	39	0	0
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus		Realign	8	(51)	12	161	(2)	(721)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,316	1,233
Total Ohio Personnel Impact							1,313	512
Oklahoma								
Air Force								
Oklahoma City ALC (Tinker AFB)		Realign	Costs/Savings included in AF ALC Realignments (See San Antonio ALC)				127	(831)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,743	452
Total Oklahoma Personnel Impact							1,870	(379)
Pennsylvania								
Army								
Ft Indiantown Gap		Close	13	(67)	23	286	(136)	(368)
Rally Support Center, PA		Realign	36	22	5	35	0	(121)
Letterkenny Army Depot		Realign	80	(307)	78	962	(36)	(2,068)
Navy								
NAESU Philadelphia		Close	3	(6)	3	30	(10)	(80)
NATSF Philadelphia		Close	4	(1)	2	23	(4)	(223)
NAWC-AD Open Water Test Facility Oreland		Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAWC-AD Warminster		Close	8	(33)	8	106	(14)	(332)
NCCOSC R&D Det Warminster		Close	Costs/Savings included in NAWC-AD Warminster action				0	0

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 Millions)

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Civ
NSY Philadelphia-Norfolk Det		Redirect	0	(52)	9	134	0	0
Air Force								
Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS		Close	22	(34)	13	141	0	(367)
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny		Disestablish	46	21	12	102	(4)	(374)
Defense Industrial Supply Center, PA		Disestablish	17	(99)	18	337	(16)	(349)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	947
Total Pennsylvania Personnel Impact							(221)	(3,379)
Puerto Rico								
Army								
Ft Buchanan		Realign	74	60	10	46	(99)	(123)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total Puerto Rico Personnel Impact							(99)	(123)
Rhode Island								
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							822	572
Total Rhode Island Personnel Impact							822	572
South Carolina								
Navy								
FSC Charleston		Close	2	(2)	1	11	(2)	(6)
NR Readiness Cmd 7 Charleston		Close	1	(14)	3	40	(30)	(16)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							4,601	53
Total South Carolina Personnel Impact							4,569	31
Tennessee								
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Distribution Depot Memphis		Close	66	(15)	24	344	(11)	(1,289)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							233	293
Total Tennessee Personnel Impact							222	(996)
Texas								
Army								
Red River Army Depot		Close	40	(313)	123	1,497	(14)	(2,887)
Navy								
NAS Corpus Christi		Realign	Costs/Savings included in NAS Meridian closure				282	(994)
NRF Laredo		Close	0	(1)	0	4	(4)	0
Air Force								
AF Electronic Warfare Simulator Activity, Ft. Worth		Disestablish	6	3	1	4	(4)	(1)
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base		Close	13	(93)	21	291	0	(585)
Brooks AFB		Close	164	139	37	142	(1,820)	(1,939)
Reese AFB		Close	37	(82)	22	357	(900)	(1,183)
San Antonio ALC (Kelly AFB)		Realign	183	(139)	89	991	364	(143)
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Distribution Depot Red River		Disestablish	89	1	19	186	(1)	(830)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,764	1,346
Total Texas Personnel Impact							(378)	(6,606)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

Service/Agency Installation	State	Act	Cost	Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses) Mil	Civ
Utah								
Army								
Dugway Proving Ground	Realign	25	(61)	36	357	(145)	(921)
Air Force								
Ogden ALC (Hill AFB)	Realign	Cost/Savings included in ALC Realignments (see San Antonio ALC)				0	0
Hill AFB (Including Utah Test and Training Range)	Realign	3	(62)	12	180	0	147
Defense Logistics Agency							
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden	Close	111	28	21	181	(8)	(1,105)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases						0	0
Total Utah Personnel Impact						(173)	(1,889)
Virginia								
Army								
Ft Lee (Kenner Hospital)	Realign	2	(16)	4	61	(99)	(106)
Ft Pickett	Close	26	(41)	21	241	(9)	(245)
Information Systems Software Command	Relocate	6	2	1	8	0	0
Navy							
Info Systems Mgt Ctr Arlington	Relocate	0	0	0	2	0	0
Naval Mgt Systems Spt Office Chesapeake	Disestablish	2	(9)	3	36	(6)	(16)
NAVSEA Crystal City	Redirect	140	(48)	9	144	0	0
NISE Det Norfolk	Close	5	0	2	20	0	0
Office of Naval Research Arlington	Redirect	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPAWAR Arlington	Redirect	24	(120)	25	360	(201)	(932)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases						4,669	787
Total Virginia Personnel Impact						4,364	(511)
Washington							
Army							
Camp Bonneville	Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0
Navy							
NUWC Keyport	Realign	2	(10)	2	30	0	(28)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases						780	28
Total Washington Personnel Impact						780	0
West Virginia							
Army							
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Spt Activity, WV	Close	Cost/Savings included in Kelly Support Center action				0	(7)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases						0	0
Total West Virginia Personnel Impact						0	(7)
Wisconsin							
Navy							
NRC Sheboygan	Close	0	(1)	0	4	(6)	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases						0	0
Total Wisconsin Personnel Impact						(6)	0

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.79%

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

OPENING STATEMENT

THE HONORABLE ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Hearing on 1995 Base Closure Recommendations of Department of Defense

March 1, 1995

Washington, DC

GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO THE FIRST HEARING OF THE 1995 ROUND OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION.

TODAY WE EMBARK ON A DIFFICULT AND, FOR MANY COMMUNITIES, INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES, A PAINFUL JOURNEY THAT WILL END ON JULY FIRST, WHEN THE COMMISSION PRESENTS ITS FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS TO THE PRESIDENT.

BEFORE WE HEAR FROM SECRETARY PERRY, GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI AND DEPUTY SECRETARY DEUTSCH ABOUT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS, I WANT TO DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE RECENT HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE, AND I WANT TO TELL YOU ABOUT HOW THIS COMMISSION WILL OPERATE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

I CANNOT EMPHASIZE STRONGLY ENOUGH THAT BOTH THE LAW UNDER WHICH OPERATE AND THE PERSONAL FEELINGS OF EVERY PERSON ASSOCIATED WITH THIS COMMISSION COMMIT US TO PROVIDE A FAIR , OPEN AND INDEPENDENT PROCESS THAT WILL RESULT IN THE TIMELY CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

IN 1988, THEN-SECRETARY CARLUCCI UNDERTOOK, WITH THE APPROVAL OF CONGRESS, THE FIRST ROUND OF DOMESTIC BASE CLOSURES IN MORE THAN A DECADE. THAT ROUND RESULTED IN THE CLOSING OF 86 BASES AND REALIGNMENT OF THIRTEEN OTHERS. TWO OF THE CLOSURES WERE IN THE MY OWN HOME STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND SO I KNOW THE PAIN OF BEING ON THE RECEIVING END OF ONE OF THESE DECISIONS.

IT WAS A FRUSTRATING TIME FOR ME AND FOR MANY OTHER ELECTED OFFICIALS. SECRETARY CARLUCCI OPERATED WELL WITHIN THE GUIDELINES GIVEN HIM BY CONGRESS. NONETHELESS, THE 1988 PROCESS WAS, TO BE CANDID, A VERY CLOSED ONE.

WHEN IT WAS OVER, SENATOR NUNN AND SENATOR WARNER AND I , AND OTHERS, SET ABOUT DEVISING A WAY TO CLOSE BASES THAT WOULD BE DONE FAIRLY AND OPENLY. AS A RESULT, IN 1990 CONGRESS PASSED THE "DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT," UNDER WHICH WE OPERATE.

I BELIEVE THE LAW WE PASSED HAS IMPROVED SUBSTANTIALLY ON HOW BASES WERE CLOSED IN THE PAST. THE HALLMARK OF THE PROCESS IS OPENNESS.

I WANT TO ASSURE EVERYONE HERE TODAY, AND EVERY CITIZEN OF EVERY COMMUNITY THAT'S ON THE LIST, THAT EVERYTHING THIS COMMISSION DOES BETWEEN NOW AND JULY FIRST WILL BE DONE IN THE OPEN.

ALL THE MATERIAL THAT PERTAINS TO THIS JOB AT HAND WILL BE IN OUR LIBRARY AND AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS. OUR MANY HEARINGS IN WASHINGTON, AND ALL AROUND THE COUNTRY ARE, OF COURSE OPEN TO ALL. THE NOTES WE TAKE ON BASE VISITS WILL BE IN THE LIBRARY. SO WILL EVERY DOCUMENT ANY COMMUNITY GIVES US IN SUPPORT OF THEIR BASE.

THERE ARE NO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUESTS NECESSARY. IF WE HAVE IT, YOU CAN HAVE IT. IN THIS PROCESS, THERE WILL BE A SEAT AT THE TABLE FOR ANYONE WHO WANTS ONE.

WE ALL KNOW THAT PASSIONS WILL RUN HIGH AS THIS PROCESS UNFOLDS. BELIEVE ME, WE APPRECIATE WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR THE COMMUNITIES ON THE LIST, AND I GIVE YOU MY WORD -- WHICH IS ALL THAT YOU HAVE IN THIS BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT -- THAT WE WILL GO ABOUT OUR DIFFICULT BUSINESS SENSITIVELY, AS WELL AS FAIRLY.

AS YOU ALL KNOW, THIS IS THE FINAL ROUND OF BASE CLOSINGS UNDER THE CURRENT LEGISLATION. OUR COMMISSION GOES OUT OF BUSINESS ON DECEMBER 31ST OF THIS YEAR.

THE FIRST THREE ROUNDS OF BASE CLOSINGS HAVE REDUCED DOMESTIC BASE STRUCTURE BY ABOUT 15 PER CENT. OVERALL, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS NOW CLOSING 70 MAJOR BASES AND REALIGNING 38 OTHERS, AND IMPLEMENTING MORE THAN 200 OTHER SMALLER CLOSURES.

BUT AS YOU ALSO KNOW, WHAT YOU MIGHT CALL THE "EASY" DECISIONS -- AND NONE OF THEM WERE -- HAVE ALL BEEN MADE. WE ARE DOWN TO, FOR THE MOST PART, EXCELLENT BASES, MANY WITH A LONG AND DISTINGUISHED HISTORY OF SUPPORT FOR OUR ARMED FORCES. OUR DECISIONS THIS YEAR WILL BE ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THAT REASON.

I BELIEVE THAT BASE CLOSING MUST NOT BE LOOKED AT AS SIMPLY A BUDGET-CUTTING TACTIC. IT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO REDUCE OUR DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE IN A DELIBERATE WAY THAT WILL IMPROVE LONG-TERM MILITARY READINESS AND INSURE WE ARE SPENDING TAXPAYER DOLLARS IN THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY POSSIBLE.

WE SHOULD NOT MAKE DECISIONS THAT WILL ELIMINATE IMPORTANT MILITARY ASSETS BASED ON OUR NEAR-TERM BUDGET IMPERATIVES. THIS COMMISSION'S CHALLENGE IS TO DEVELOP A CLOSURE LIST THAT ALLOWS US TO MAINTAIN READINESS, MODERNIZE OUR MILITARY, AND PRESERVE THE FORCE LEVELS WE NEED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY.

AND THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT THIS THIRD ROUND PROCEED AS SCHEDULED -- BOTH OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND OUR LONG-TERM BUDGET GOALS DEMAND IT. BRIEFLY, WE WILL GO ABOUT OUT WORK IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

* HEARINGS TODAY AND ON MARCH 6 AND 7 IN WASHINGTON AT WHICH DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WILL EXPLAIN THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS.

* A HEARING MARCH 16 IN WASHINGTON ON THE BASE RE-USE ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

* AS MANY REGIONAL HEARINGS AS WE NEED AROUND THE COUNTRY TO ALLOW INTERESTED PARTIES TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES FULLY.

* BASE VISITS BY COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF.

* HEARINGS IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE AT WHICH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CAN ADDRESS THE COMMISSION.

* PUBLIC SESSIONS BEGINNING IN LATE JUNE AT WHICH THE COMMISSIONERS WILL CAST THEIR VOTES ON WHICH BASES TO CLOSE OR REALIGN.

WE WILL MAKE OUR JUDGMENTS BASED ON EIGHT CLEARLY-STATED CRITERIA, DEVELOPED BY THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT UNDER AUTHORITY GIVEN THEM BY CONGRESS, INVOLVING MILITARY VALUE, RETURN ON INVESTMENT AND IMPACTS ON THE COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS ON THE FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS OF THE MILITARY BRANCHES.

IN ADDITION TO OUR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT LIST, OUR FINAL REPORT WILL ALSO INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS REGARDING HOW TO CARRY OUT BASE CLOSURES IN THE FUTURE, AND IT WILL INCLUDE AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO COMMUNITIES IN REPLACING THESE BASES IN THE LOCAL ECONOMY.

IT IS A LARGE, WRENCHING AND NECESSARY UNDERTAKING. YOUR ASSISTANCE WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

I BELIEVE THIS PROCESS HAS WORKED JUST ABOUT AS WELL AS WE COULD HAVE HOPED FOR WHEN WE THOUGHT IT UP. IF THE NUMBER OF CALLS FOR "BASE CLOSURE TYPE COMMISSIONS" TO BE CREATED TO DEAL WITH OTHER VEXING PUBLIC POLICY QUESTIONS IS ANY INDICATION, IT HAS SURELY BEEN A SUCCESS.

IN THE PAST TWO ROUNDS, THIS COMMISSION, WORKING UNDER GREAT TIME CONSTRAINTS AND POLITICAL PRESSURE, HAS PRODUCED A FAIR AND PRUDENT REDUCTION OF OUR DOMESTIC MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE.

TODAY, WE BEGIN THE JOB OF COMPLETING THAT TASK. I WANT TO WELCOME ALL THREE OF OUR DISTINGUISHED WITNESSES TO THE COMMISSION THIS MORNING. I UNDERSTAND THE THREE OF YOU HAVE OPENING REMARKS. DR. PERRY, WE WILL BEGIN WITH YOU.

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

MARCH 1, 1995

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission. I appear before you today to present the Department of Defense's 1995 base realignment and closure, or BRAC, recommendations. As you know, this is the last list authorized under the current, streamlined base closure authority.

Our recommendations were not easily arrived at. We were forced to consider and choose among many excellent facilities. But there is no alternative. The BRAC process is a critical part of our efforts to bring the Department into the post-Cold War era. The dramatic changes in the global security environment have allowed us to carry out responsible reductions in our country's investment in defense. Since the 1980s, the defense budget has declined by roughly 40 percent. Our force structure has declined as well, shrinking by about 33 percent. Reductions in our base structure, however, have not kept pace. Even after the previous three BRAC rounds are implemented fully, we will have reduced our domestic infrastructure by only 15 percent. It is clear that we still have more bases than we need.

What may not be as clear are the increased risks that our nation's defense will face if we do not address the imbalance between our force structure and our base structure. Closing excess bases produces important savings over the long term, savings that we have already earmarked for maintaining readiness and modernizing our forces. Put simply, we will not have adequate funding for our highest priorities -- readiness and

modernization -- if we do not continue to close bases that we no longer need.

Our BRAC 95 recommendations are the result of a process that began well over a year ago. The Congress designed the base closure process to be objective, open, and fair. Each potential recommendation is measured by published criteria. The data we used have been certified; our procedures have been overseen by our Inspector General and the General Accounting Office. Both, of course, will be reviewed in detail by the public and this Commission. The process has worked well, so far, and we have followed it to the letter.

Our process was based a force structure plan and eight selection criteria. This was the first BRAC round based on the force structure called for in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which details our plans for the future size of the military. For BRAC 95, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies assessed their basing needs from the bottom-up to bring them into line with the BUR. The eight selection criteria give priority consideration to military value, and also address costs and savings as well as economic and environmental impacts.

We created new organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to improve the process. Deputy Secretary Deutch chaired the BRAC 95 Review Group, which provided high-level oversight. The Review Group included senior representatives from

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies. The BRAC 95 Steering Group, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security, assisted the Review Group.

We also placed a strong emphasis on common support functions in BRAC 95. Joint cross-service groups in five functional areas with significant potential for cross-servicing worked for over a year to develop cross-cutting alternatives. Joint groups addressed depot maintenance, test and evaluation activities, laboratories, medical treatment facilities, and undergraduate pilot training. The groups developed measures both of the functional value and the capacity of these facilities. They compared this to projected needs and suggested to the Services both reduction goals and possible alternatives in their own review process. In some cases, the Services adopted these suggestions as recommended or in modified form; in other cases they declined to do so because of the bases' underlying military value or for other reasons. Overall, the joint cross-service effort did assist in reducing excess capacity and determining where joint or collocated functions made functional and economic sense. Further, their DoD-wide review of support functions provides a road map for further cross-servicing in the future. The Department also established a cross-service group on economic impact to develop common methods and measures.

Within the Department, recommendations were made first by each Military Department and Defense Agency. Each made its best judgment about the facilities it has and the capacities it needs, applying the force structure and selection criteria as required by law.

At the beginning of February, the Services made their recommendations to me. Since that time, my staff and the Joint Staff have reviewed the recommendations and underlying analyses to ensure that the law and DoD policies were followed. We were particularly looking for concerns or effects that the Military Departments might not have fully taken into account, such as the war fighting requirements of the Unified and Specified Commanders, treaty obligations of the United States, or economic impacts from other Services' recommendations. In exercising military judgment, the Services have retained domestic capacity to accommodate their forward deployed forces if need be. I am confident, therefore, that the remaining base structure can accommodate any foreseeable force resizing -- even a significant degree of reconstitution.

As General Shalikashvili will tell you shortly, he concurs in this view and supports our recommendations fully.

The Department recommends 146 actions in BRAC 95. Our recommendations include a number of smaller closures and realignments.

As I stated a few moments ago, the BRAC process is essential because it saves money. Some have questioned whether BRAC savings are real, or whether they are as significant as we claim. Let me state clearly and unambiguously that the savings from the BRAC process are real. They are substantial by any measure.

Like many efficiencies, however, closing bases requires us to invest some money up front. Implementing our BRAC 95 recommendations will result in one-time costs of about $3.8 billion -- excluding certain environmental costs. These funds cover the costs of closing and realigning bases, such as costs for relocating personnel and equipment and preparing facilities for transfer to the public. However, even within the six year period for which we budget, this BRAC round will save enough to cover all these costs and still provide about $4 billion in net savings.

Over the long run, the up-front costs will pay for themselves several times over. If implemented, our recommendations will create annual recurring savings of $1.8 billion. When measured by their net present value -- a commonly used approach to capture a stream of costs and savings in a single number -- our BRAC 95 recommendations would save over $18 billion in the long run.

With the recommendations I am making this morning, the four BRAC rounds combined will have effected 548 BRAC actions. Annual savings for all four rounds would rise to $6.0 billion, and the net present value of all BRAC savings would climb to about $57 billion. We will have reduced our domestic base structure by about 21 percent -- measured in plant replacement value.

As you know, BRAC 95 is the last round authorized under our current legal authority for streamlined closings and realignments. If circumstances do not change, however, there is no doubt in my mind that the Department will need future base closure rounds.

It is fair to ask why, after four BRAC rounds, we need to continue the closure and realignment process. The answer is straightforward. First, we will continue to carry excess infrastructure, even after BRAC 95 has been implemented. So we will need to continue the process of balancing our bases and our forces. Second, we need time to absorb current closures. If we close too much too soon, we will jeopardize readiness in the near turn. Third, we need to continue to assess future threats and to examine our future force structure needs.

I look forward to working with you and the Congress to lay the foundation for future rounds, which I believe will be needed about three or four years from now.

As we implement these closures, we recognize a special obligation to those men and women -- military and civilian -- who won the Cold War. We will meet that obligation.

In addition to a variety of personnel transition programs, the Department is determined to implement President Clinton's promise to help base closure communities reshape their economic future. This assistance comes in many forms: technical assistance and planning grants, on-site base transition coordinators to provide a focal point for Federal assistance; accelerated property disposal to make surplus property available for civilian reuse; and fast-track environmental clean-up in coordination with Federal and state regulators and community reuse authorities.

In some cases, reused bases are now home to more civilian jobs than there were before closure. Many communities have found that base property can be the bedrock for a healthier and more diverse economy. What it requires is strong local leadership and a lot of hard work. We at the Department stand ready to help.

Let me conclude by noting the critical role that your Commission plays. Your review is an essential confirmation of the integrity of our procedures and the soundness of our judgments. We know your review of our recommendations will be as searching, thorough, and careful as the process by which we made them. We stand ready to provide any information you require and

to discuss any judgment we have made. In the end, we hope you endorse our recommendations for this process is so essential to our Nation's security.

Thank you. With your approval, I would now like to allow General Shalikashvili to say a few words.

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Until Released by the
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission

OPENING STATEMENT

BY

GENERAL JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BEFORE THE
1995 DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1 March 1995

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. Thank you for the opportunity to share my views on how the Department's proposed base closures and realignments support our Armed Forces and our national military strategy.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The past few years have seen one of those great geopolitical upheavals that come only once every few generations. This has required us to respond with the most dramatic restructuring of our Armed Forces since the end of the Vietnam War.

We have a new military strategy that will carry us into the next century. Since 1990, we have completed four exhaustive force reviews. The most recent were the Bottom Up Review, that recommended the shape of our future conventional forces, and the Nuclear Posture Review, that determined our future strategic and nonstrategic nuclear requirements. As a result of these reviews and subsequent analysis, the CINCs and I are confident that the future force we are building is about right. It will meet our requirements at the turn of the century and into the foreseeable future.

As well, we are 70% to 80% toward meeting our reduction goals and repositioning our force to execute our new strategy. Part of that shift entails reorienting

our force from a global strategy against a global threat toward a global strategy against regional threats. We have returned large numbers of forces from their overseas Cold War bases to the continental United States where they are better situated to perform the power projection role required by our new strategy.

As a result of the work and analysis of the past few years we now have a reliable blueprint for how many forces we need for the future, where those forces are going to be stationed, and how we will deploy those forces to crises or conflicts.

As we have moved along this glidepath, there have been three rounds of base closures attempting to keep pace with the still evolving force. This upcoming fourth round is needed to respond to the further changes mandated by the Bottom Up Review. The force reduction objective of the previous Base Force was to downsize our force by one quarter from our 1988 levels. But the Bottom Up Review, after recommending selected force enhancements, increased our reductions to nearly a third of our 1988 force strengths.

The numbers tell the story. By the end of the century our force will be around 34% smaller. Our budget will be about 40% smaller. But after three rounds of base closures and realignments our infrastructure is only projected to be 15% smaller.

The problem this presents is how to maintain balance among all those elements of our force that are critical to our overall posture -- the costs of retaining quality

people; the costs of maintaining our near-term readiness; and the costs of ensuring our longer-term readiness through modernization and a sustained industrial base. These competing costs argue against maintaining excessive inventories in any area, just as they also put pressure on our Armed Forces to find new and innovative ways to train, to maintain, to sustain, and to care for our forces.

The Base Realignment and Closure process provides us the tool to close unneeded bases, reduce base operating costs, and reengineer our infrastructure to support our evolving military strategy. Our challenge is to use this tool wisely. While striving to balance force and base structure in ways that will foster operational flexibility and enhance joint warfighting capability, we must also balance the high upfront cost of base closures with the cost of operations today and modernization for the future. I am confident that our goal to maintain this balance is the right way to proceed.

BRAC 95

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my role in the base closure process is to review and certify to the Secretary of Defense and the President that the proposed closures and realignments will not impair our operational warfighting capability. To carry out this review and ensure that all joint operational requirements were considered, I asked each of the combatant commanders and combat support agencies to participate along with the Services and the Joint Staff. Once they were prepared, we studied the Services' closure recommendations, looking for potential warfighting

impacts. Our analysis encompassed not just the current proposals, but also the cumulative impact of the three previous BRAC rounds and the significant reductions that have occurred in our overseas base structure.

Functional experts from every military specialty reviewed the lists. The top priority was to ensure that we could execute our war plans without the bases marked for closure. We asked if we could still get Army equipment loaded on ships to meet deployment schedules if we closed Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal. Could the Air Force support rapid deployment of the 10th Mountain Division without the contingency airfield at Griffiss Air Force Base? We had to consider the impact of closing the Fleet Industrial Supply Center and Ship Repair Facility on Guam; could USCINCPAC still support the Seventh Fleet without these important logistics capabilities? We determined that the answer to all these questions was "yes".

We had to make sure that none of the installations being closed housed vital links in our worldwide network of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. Had the Services proposed closure of any of the irreplaceable instrumented training ranges that have enabled our forces to develop and maintain their warfighting skills? While downsizing the large infrastructure devoted to military research and development, were we retaining those critical facilities that provide US forces their decisive technological edge? We had to reduce the number of Reserve Component bases, but could the remaining installations adequately support the training and mobilization of our Citizen Soldiers? And of utmost importance, would the smaller

basing structure still provide an acceptable quality of life for our dedicated men and women in uniform? Again, the answer was "yes".

On the basis of this review, I determined that the recommended closures and realignments that have been submitted to your commission will not impair the ability of our Armed Forces to carry out the national military strategy. I thus endorse these recommendations.

But, while these closures and realignments will not degrade operational readiness, neither will they achieve a full balance between our force and base structure. Excess capacity will remain. As Secretary Perry has explained, even though base closures eventually yield billions of dollars in savings, the high up-front investment costs associated with BRAC actions limit the number of closures that can be programmed in any one year. Trying to close too many bases at once would divert funding from other accounts, jeopardizing readiness today and modernization for tomorrow. Given current resource constraints, the uncertainty of world events, and the ongoing debate over defense spending, I believe the scope of these BRAC recommendations to be fiscally and operationally prudent.

However, it is vitally important that we complete divestiture of unaffordable excess infrastructure. To do so, I believe we will need future base closure authority. In addition, while we made some progress in this round with regard to cross-servicing, opportunities remain, particularly in the area of joint-use bases and training facilities.

The Commission on Roles and Missions is expected to recommend such measures to enhance efficiency and interoperability. Implementing these recommendations could require a process similar to the one we are engaged in now.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the Base Realignment and Closure process has been very successful. It has enabled us to close excess bases and to begin reengineering the defense infrastructure to more efficiently support our forces and our national strategy. The Department's BRAC 95 recommendations represent another major step in this process. The task before you and your fellow commissioners is terribly difficult, but absolutely essential to the national security of the United States. Thank you.

BRIEFING SLIDES TO ACCOMPANY THE TESTIMONY OF THE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE

1995 DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

March 1, 1995

BRAC 95 Highlights

- Lower Costs than BRAC 93
- Faster Pay Back
- Consistent with Downsizing Imperatives
- Cumulative Economic Impact Considered
- First Time for Cross-Service Assessment

Process Mandated in Law



Total Impact

BRAC 95	FY 96 $ Billions* Closure Costs	Annual Savings	Total Savings**	Net Direct Civilian Job Loss (000s)
Army	$1.1	$0.7	$6.8	14.5
Navy	1.2	0.6	7.4	10.7
Air Force	1.1	0.4	3.1	6.1
Agencies	0.4	0.1	1.1	2.9
Total	3.8	1.8	18.4	34.2
BRAC 93	6.9	1.9	15.7	42.3
BRAC 91	4.0	1.6	15.8	27.9
BRAC 88	2.2	0.7	6.8	11.9

* Excluding environmental costs and land sale revenues

** Net savings over 20 years, discounted to present value at 4.2%

Major Decisions

Army

Fort McClellan, AL
Fitzsimons AMC, CO
Aviation Troop Command, MO
Letterkenny AD, PA
Red River AD, TX

Navy

NSY Long Beach, CA
NAS Meridian, MS
NAWC Indianapolis, IN
NSWC Louisville, KY
Guam Activities

Air Force

Grand Forks AFB, ND
Kirtland AFB, NM
Rome Lab, NY
Reese AFB, TX
Brooks AFB, TX

DLA

Def Depot Memphis, TN
Def Dep Red River, TX
Def Depot Ogden, UT

Significant Army Actions



Significant Navy Actions



Significant DLA Actions



Significant Air Force Actions



Air Force Depot Proposal

Cost Implications
($ Millions)

Consolidate at All Depots	One-Time Costs	FY96-01 Net Costs (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings*
BRAC ACTIONS	183	(139)	89	991
NON-BRAC ACTIONS	35	(488)	146	1,875
ALL ACTIONS	218	(627)	235	2,866
Alternative - Close 2 Depots (+$600 Million Env)	1,107	(363)	161	699

* Savings in 20 year net present value

Outstanding Issues

- Future BRAC?
- Grand Forks AFB -- ABM Treaty
- Environmental Clean-Up Cost?

Comparison of Net Direct Civilian Losses
Previous BRAC's vs BRAC 95



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In December, you stated in an interview concerning the 1995 closure round that: "We don't have goals as to what the size should be. ...But I think it's reasonable to expect that the 1995 round is going to be approximately comparable in size to the last one."

In January, you noted in a speech to the US Conference of Mayors that the 1995 round of base closings "will not be as large as the last one, not because we don't need to close more bases from the point of view of saving infrastructure, but simply because in the previous three closure rounds we have closed all of the bases that were relatively easy to close."

Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what caused you to alter your original guidance to the Services regarding the closure of 15% of the plant replacement value and how you determined the size of the base closure list you are presenting to the Commission this morning?

original hope to balance out infrastruc/pers — problem
Has been a manageable problem — 3 parallel downsizing — pushing as hard as we could

2. General Shalikashvili, in your view when the 1995 base closure and realignment proposal is combined with the closures and realignments of previous rounds, is there an appropriate balance between the general drawdown of forces and base infrastructure?

as big a lump as we could swallow

3. Secretary Perry, you were quoted in the press last month as saying that even after this year's closure process is finished, the nation will have more bases than it needs to support the scaled-down military of tomorrow.

If the Commission, the President, and the Congress endorsed the list of closures and realignments that you are presenting today, would there still be excess capacity in the Defense Department's basing structure? yes

In what general areas is there still excess capacity?

Desirable Excess is Redundancy to Rev overseas Basing,

Would the Services still have more bases than needed in the future to support the force levels in your force structure plan?

4. Secretary Perry, to your knowledge, were any of the closure or realignment recommendations submitted to you by the Services changed by your office?

If so, which ones and for what reasons?

5. Secretary Perry, did your office instruct the Services to exclude certain installations as they developed their recommendations?

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Reword ALL SVCS

6. Secretary Perry, did the Services provide your staff with their approaches for determining excess capacity, and if so, were these approaches adequately documented and reasonable in your opinion?

7. Secretary Perry, the Fiscal Year 96 Defense budget proposal includes civilian personnel reductions totaling 38,300 in 1996 and 137,500 through 2001 in accordance with your expressed desire to expand the civilian drawdown to match the percentage of active duty reductions.

Mr. Secretary, how have these proposed civilian personnel reductions affected the number and specific type of installations on the closure and realignment list?

8. Secretary Perry, some communities have expressed concern that not all communities are receiving the same level of assistance from local base officials as they prepare their rebuttals to closure or realignment. One community says that their base officials have received orders to provide no assistance.

ALL services

Is there a DoD policy that restricts base officials from providing assistance to communities as they prepare positions or materials to present to the Commission? All should be equal spcv Dnto

9. Secretary Perry, since this the last round of closures and your list is somewhat smaller than originally planned, how much excess infrastructure will continue to exist?

ALL SVCS

10. Secretary Perry, how do you answer critics who say that by leaving excess infrastructure in place you have joepardized the future ability of the Services to train and to modernize their forces--particularly since there is not another round of base closings authorized under the current law?

Short term cost limit current Readiness
Long term savings gap

FORCE STRUCTURE

1. General Shalikashvili, would you review for this Commission *the national military strategy and* the force structure that *were* used in developing this year's base closure and realignment recommendations?

world has changed, Forward deployed which are n / 2 nearly simultaneous Regional Conflicts

2. General Shalikashvili, recognizing that our national military strategy remains in a state of transition, are you satisfied that sufficient capacity has been retained to support the potential need for a more robust force structure in the future?

Robust enough to support any contingency we forsee

3. Secretary Perry, was any consideration given to consolidating and realigning smaller bases or functions to those larger bases which were essentially exempt from closing because of their strategic location? ANS yes done by the services

AF

4. General Shalikashvili, are there any functional areas with excess capacity that you recommended not be considered by your staff or the Services because changes in the basing structure might preclude future force structure or roles and missions changes?

ALL SVCS

5. General Shalikashvili, are you and the Joint Warfighting Commanders-in-Chief satisfied that the basing infrastructure that remains provides sufficient mobilization and deployment capacity to support a two Major Regional Conflict scenario?

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7. General Shalikashvili, has a region by region force projection analysis, such as an analysis of our ability to respond to contingencies in the Caribbean, revealed

any significant loss of responsiveness as a result of the proposals you are presenting today?

8. General Shalikashvili, *according to the 1995 DoD base closure report, you have validated the airfield requirements for the two Unified Commands at MacDill AFB and have determined that the Air Force should take responsibility for supporting those requirements. During the 1991 and 1993 rounds, the Joint Staff was unable to validate those requirements.* DID NOT address this

Can you explain what has changed to permit validation now?

It is valid -

Are you completely satisfied with the recommendation for the Air Force to operate the airfield at MacDill?

9. *Secretary Perry, you have proposed inactivating the 321st Missile Group (150 Minuteman III missiles) at Grand Forks AFB, unless you determine prior to December 1996 that " the need to retain Ballistic Missile Defense options effectively precludes this action."* AF

What has prevented an earlier decision on the need to retain these options that would have enabled the Commission to act on a definitive recommendation? we didn't think about — weak intergovt

we will

If the Commission eliminates the 91st Missile Group (150 Minuteman III missiles) at Minot AFB from consideration for inactivation, and simply directs inactivation of the 321st Missile Group at Grand Forks AFB, how will Ballistic Missile Defense options be affected? NOT

10. Secretary Perry, did the Air Force or your staff exclude FE Warren AFB from consideration because of Peacekeeper missile basing? AF

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE ISSUES

ALL SVCS

1. Secretary Perry, what impact did the work of the Joint Cross-Service Groups that you set up last year have on the final recommendations that you are presenting here this morning?

Its a start not far enough — Successes — Rome Lab & Ft Monm Brooks — Navy in Mass (Hans?) medical DLA — use logistics facilities

2. Secretary Perry, in May 1994 the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens, recommended to the Deputy Secretary of Defense that the Services be required to incorporate the recommendations of the Joint Cross-Service Groups into their base closure recommendations. The Deputy Secretary elected not to require this of the Services.

Mr. Secretary, why wasn't the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation accepted? Joint Depot could not happen, Adm Owens issue manage by managing not by edict

3. General Shalikashvili, did the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Warfighting Commanders-in-Chief and the Joint Staff have any role in developing or critiquing the work of the Joint Cross-Service Groups?

Are you satisfied that the Services have consolidated some of their common functions as much as they need to or as much as they can?

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4. Secretary Perry, in June of 1993 the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Commission not to address fixed wing aviation depots separately from other interservicing issues. They asked instead for the opportunity to come forward with comprehensive interservicing recommendations in 1995.

Are you satisfied, Mr. Secretary, that your recommendations in the area of fixed wing aviation depots represent a comprehensive approach to the problems of interservicing and excess capacity in this area?

P Have made progress - Have a way to go

D tried to look at all options - AF has a "better idea"

5. Secretary Perry, the Air Force has had five major air logistics centers since the Vietnam Era. In the 1993 round, the Air Force recommended the closure of one of these five depots, but that depot was removed from the list by the Secretary of Defense. This year with the same selection criteria and a smaller force structure plan there is once again no Air Force depot on the list.

AP

On what basis did you determine that the Air Force continues to need five air logistics centers?

Powerfull AF Argument

6. Secretary Perry, in 1993 both the General Accounting Office and the Commission were critical of DoD for not making more progress in consolidating common functions across the Services. Your January 1994 guidance to the Services stated: "It is the DoD policy to make maximum use of common support assets. DoD components should, throughout the 1995 base closure analysis process, look for cross-service or intra-service opportunities to share assets and look for opportunities to rely on a single Military Department for support."

Mr. Secretary, in your view, do the recommendations you are presenting today represent a significant step forward in terms of consolidating common functions--such as depot maintenance, research labs, and test and evaluation facilities--across the Services?

ALL SVCS

7. Secretary Perry, are you satisfied that your interservicing recommendations to the Commission remove most or all of the excess capacity in each of the five Cross-Service study areas?

that can be done now

If there are areas where this is not the case, please explain why not?

NO Could have made an edict

COST TO CLOSE

1. Secretary Perry, *given that the list is smaller than initially planned, how much will DoD have to plus up the budget to accommodate reduced savings in the late 1990s.*

Not really smaller

2. Secretary Perry, the Future Years Defense Program proposed by the Administration last month relies on savings from this round of closures to round out the defense budget beginning in the late 1990s. *What changes will you make to reduce costs if these savings are not realized?*

3. 1. Secretary Perry, the proposed Fiscal Year 1996 budget you presented to Congress last month represents a reduction of almost $6 billion, or 5.3 percent in real terms, from the Fiscal Year 1995 level, and it includes $785 million to begin implementing the 1995 closures in Fiscal Year 1996.

Was the size of the 1995 closure and realignment list that you are presenting today limited by your ability to budget adequate up-front closing costs to carry out these closures beginning in Fiscal Year 1996?

NO (generally)

4. Secretary Perry, there are reports that the cost to close bases and the time required to recover those costs from previous rounds are significantly greater than anticipated.

Is this accurate, and what steps have you directed to ensure that cost and savings estimates are realistic for the 1995 round?

- No incentive to Services to make estimate correct
- Not in a position to Judge past BRACS

5. Secretary Perry, your report to us uses the results of Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses to project the anticipated costs and savings that would result from implementing your recommendations.

ALL SVCS

Recognizing that the figures used in the COBRA analyses are not budget quality, how accurate do you believe the projections are?

How closely have the figures in the COBRA analyses prepared in 1991 and 1993 compared to the actual costs for closures?

ECONOMIC ISSUES

Not state But SMSA

1. Secretary Perry, for the 1993 closure round your staff established cumulative economic impact thresholds that resulted in the removal of at least one installation from the Service recommendations by your staff. Were any similar cumulative economic thresholds set for the 1995 round?

Method of Analysis Conference

2. Secretary Perry, you have been quoted as saying that you would "try to avoid having any one state suffer inordinately as a result of the closure process." Was any installation removed from or added to a Service list primarily because of economic impact, including cumulative economic impact, within a state or a community?

NO Used Navy eg on "Calif/Guam"

3. Secretary Perry, in calculating cumulative economic impact, how did DoD differentiate between economic impacts caused by previously announced force structure changes and those that were due to closure or realignment decisions?

Goldfarb ??

No

4. Secretary Perry, was DoD reluctant to close major industrial, laboratory, or test & evaluation installations because of economic impact?

NO

Was any decision taken to downsize, rather than close an installation, as a result of economic impact considerations?

Strategic closure made by the Air Force

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT/RESTORATION ISSUES

1. Secretary Perry, according to your policy guidance, "environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations." Your policy further states that "unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse."

   Were any installations not recommended for closure or realignment due to unique contamination problems? If so, please elaborate.

   Not at the Secretarial Level

2. Secretary Perry, were any installations eliminated from closure consideration because of the high cost of environmental cleanup?

   NO

3. Secretary Perry, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

   How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?

   Record

4. Secretary Perry, did the overall cost of environmental restoration at closure bases, which is a budget factor in closing bases even though it is not a decision factor, limit the size of the list presented to the Commission?

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RECORD

6. Secretary Perry, could you describe any efforts by DoD or the Environmental Protection Agency to establish variable levels of environmental cleanup, tied to specific plans for reuse?

RECORD

7. Secretary Perry, in making closure decisions what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

ALL SVCS

For example, did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis?

Were Bases in Clean Air Act non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

MEDICAL ISSUES

We Need TO KNOW WHICH TO ASK for Read

AF

1. General Shalikashvili, *given that wartime medical requirements far exceed those of peacetime, is there enough medical infrastructure remaining to support our two Major Regional Conflict strategy?*

Yes

2. Secretary Perry, military medical facilities play an important role in terms of both readiness for war and in supporting the force during peacetime. For families of military members, retirees and their families, and survivors, the local military hospital is often of particular importance. Military medical assets are also important from a Department budget point of view, in their ability to reduce Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services costs. However, the fate of military hospitals is often tied to larger closure and realignment decisions about the installations on which they are located.

Mr. Secretary, what guidance did the Department provide to the Services and to the Joint Cross-Service Groups to ensure that decisions that impact military hospitals and military beneficiaries are made in consideration of those impacts?

QoL active/Retired very important — A Rule not an exception
Med JCSG was the engine

3. Secretary Perry, in 1993 the Commission made specific recommendations to the Department regarding improvements in health care operations and increased cost effectiveness.

Mr. Secretary, did you direct your Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs to examine the consolidation of resources across military departments?

What was the outcome of that examination?

How is that examination reflected in the Departments new list of recommended closures and realignments?

4. Secretary Perry, in developing the current list, did you direct the Services to consider closing military hospitals that are not cost effective, given their patient load and the cost and availability of medical care in their communities?

5. Secretary Perry, did you direct the Services to move medical assets, including moving them across Service lines, in order to increase the capability and usage of military medical facilities?

6. Secretary Perry, during the development of the current list, did you direct the Services to review their policy of closing military hospitals when bases served by those hospitals are closed?

What was the result of that review?

Have you ensured that the most cost effective means of delivering care to all beneficiaries are maintained, irrespective of other base closure actions?

??

Record

BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

1. Secretary Perry, in October 1994 Business Executives for National Security (BENS) issued a report ,"Uncovering the Shell Game," which criticized the Department's record in actually closing military facilities. "60 Minutes" featured the report later in the year. The essence of the report and the "60 Minutes" characterization was that "of the 67 bases the President, Congress and the Pentagon have agreed to shut down thus far, over one-third never closed or have quietly reopened under a new name or function." As you know, Mr. Secretary, we plan on offering recommendations to the President concerning reuse and future closure actions. Reports such as the BENS report detract from general support for the closure process.

Mr. Secretary, please give us your comments on the BENS report.

prompt reuse of facilities very important and "FAST OF the MARK" — they have DOD

2. Secretary Perry, The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is currently slated to consolidate its 300+ offices at the 5 centers it currently operates (Denver, Columbus, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Cleveland). It also has plans to add 21 new sites, many of which will be on installations slated to close as a result of previous base closure rounds. Our staff's analysis of the Business Executives for National Security report indicates that of the 26 bases noted in the report as being "reopened," 14 were operating reasonably close to the recommendations of the Commission, and the other 12 were recipients of DFAS centers.

Please explain why DoD plans to place 12 of the 21 new DFAS offices on bases which are slated to close rather than on bases remaining open which have existing excess capacity.

Smile

"Criteria" includes MAKE USE OF existing ???
Federal Facilities OF Closed Base" — . . .
Mentioned LORING — "If there was
A weight putting one at A Closed Sib

3. Secretary Perry, about one-third of the 21 new Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sites have yet to open. There is a Military Construction requirement for nearly $200 million to make improvements to many of these sites.

In light of the ongoing consolidation efforts taking part in other parts of DoD, would it be worthwhile to consider further reductions in the number of Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sites?

NO

we are undergoing from several Hundred to 2 DOZEN

FUTURE BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

1. Secretary Perry, as you know this is the final round of expedited base closures and realignments authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

Once this round is completed, the Defense Department will go back to operating under the section of Title 10, United States Code, that required DoD to conduct extensive budgetary, strategic, economic, and environmental studies of a potential closure affecting more than 300 civilians, or a realignment affecting more than 50 percent of an installation's civilian workforce, before proposing such a closure or realignment.

I think we can all agree that it is almost impossible to close or realign a military base under this authority.

This Commission plans to make recommendations on a process for closing or realigning military bases in the future, after this 1995 round is completed.

Mr. Secretary, do you have any suggestions in this area for us to consider?

Document Separator

GENERAL BACKGROUND

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MEDICAL ISSUES

1. General Shalikashvili, given that wartime medical requirements far exceed those of peacetime, is there enough medical infrastructure remaining to support our two Major Regional Conflict strategy?

2. Secretary Perry, military medical facilities play an important role in terms of both readiness for war and in supporting the force during peacetime. For families of military members, retirees and their families, and survivors, the local military hospital is often of particular importance. Military medical assets are also important from a Department budget point of view, in their ability to reduce Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services costs. However, the fate of military hospitals is often tied to larger closure and realignment decisions about the installations on which they are located.

Mr. Secretary, what guidance did the Department provide to the Services and to the Joint Cross-Service Groups to ensure that decisions that impact military hospitals and military beneficiaries are made in consideration of those impacts?

3. Secretary Perry, in 1993 the Commission made specific recommendations to the Department regarding improvements in health care operations and increased cost effectiveness.

Mr. Secretary, did you direct your Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs to examine the consolidation of resources across military departments?

What was the outcome of that examination?

How is that examination reflected in the Departments new list of recommended closures and realignments?

4. Secretary Perry, in developing the current list, did you direct the Services to consider closing military hospitals that are not cost effective, given their patient load and the cost and availability of medical care in their communities?

5. Secretary Perry, did you direct the Services to move medical assets, including moving them across Service lines, in order to increase the capability and usage of military medical facilities?

6. Secretary Perry, during the development of the current list, did you direct the Services to review their policy of closing military hospitals when bases served by those hospitals are closed?

What was the result of that review?

Have you ensured that the most cost effective means of delivering care to all beneficiaries are maintained, irrespective of other base closure actions?

BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

1. Secretary Perry, in October 1994 Business Executives for National Security (BENS) issued a report ,"Uncovering the Shell Game," which criticized the Department's record in actually closing military facilities. "60 Minutes" featured the report later in the year. The essence of the report and the "60 Minutes" characterization was that "of the 67 bases the President, Congress and the Pentagon have agreed to shut down thus far, over one-third never closed or have quietly reopened under a new name or function." As you know, Mr. Secretary, we plan on offering recommendations to the President concerning reuse and future closure actions. Reports such as the BENS report detract from general support for the closure process.

Mr. Secretary, please give us your comments on the BENS report.

2. Secretary Perry, The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is currently slated to consolidate its 300+ offices at the 5 centers it currently operates (Denver, Columbus, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Cleveland). It also has plans to add 21 new sites, many of which will be on installations slated to close as a result of previous base closure rounds. Our staff's analysis of the Business Executives for National Security report indicates that of the 26 bases noted in the report as being "reopened," 14 were operating reasonably close to the recommendations of the Commission, and the other 12 were recipients of DFAS centers.

Please explain why DoD plans to place 12 of the 21 new DFAS offices on bases which are slated to close rather than on bases remaining open which have existing excess capacity.

3. Secretary Perry, about one-third of the 21 new Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sites have yet to open. There is a Military Construction requirement for nearly $200 million to make improvements to many of these sites.

In light of the ongoing consolidation efforts taking part in other parts of DoD, would it be worthwhile to consider further reductions in the number of Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sites?

FUTURE BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

1. Secretary Perry, as you know this is the final round of expedited base closures and realignments authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

Once this round is completed, the Defense Department will go back to operating under the section of Title 10, United States Code, that required DoD to conduct extensive budgetary, strategic, economic, and environmental studies of a potential closure affecting more than 300 civilians, or a realignment affecting more than 50 percent of an installation's civilian workforce, before proposing such a closure or realignment.

I think we can all agree that it is almost impossible to close or realign a military base under this authority.

This Commission plans to make recommendations on a process for closing or realigning military bases in the future, after this 1995 round is completed.

Mr. Secretary, do you have any suggestions in this area for us to consider?

Document Separator

QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

ALL
RECORD

David Pryor

QUESTIONS FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR DAVID PRYOR
ON THE BEHALF OF THE RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT COMMUNITY

The Department of the Army was requested to consider the cost of moving the DLA activity at the Red River Army Depot in its analysis of total closure costs. The community has estimated the cost to be in excess of $300 million for such a move. Is this estimate consistent with the costs calculated by the Department of Defense?

DLA
DRmy

It is my understanding that the Red River Army Depot was recently awarded the 1995 President's Prototype Award in support of the Administration's National Performance Review initiatives. Were such awards for quality and efficiency considered by the Department of Defense in this base closure process?

There are excellent But

Could you detail the reasoning behind the Department of the Army's recommendation to completely close one of its primary depots and realign another when the other military services appear to have chosen realignment initiatives through "downsizing in place" at their maintenance facilities?

Strategy issue depends on cost issue

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Secretary Perry, your report to us uses the results of Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses to project the anticipated costs and savings that would result from implementing your recommendations.

Recognizing that the figures used in the COBRA analyses are not budget quality, how accurate do you believe the projections are?

How closely have the figures in the COBRA analyses prepared in 1991 and 1993 compared to the actual costs for closures?

2. Secretary Perry, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?

3. Secretary Perry, in the 1993 round, one community pointed out that the cost of cleaning up an installation directed to close could be three to ten times as great as the cost of cleaning up an active installation. This difference is due to expected technological advances in environmental restoration.

Mr. Secretary, do you believe the difference between routine and closure related cleanup costs, if factual, should be considered in cost of closure calculations?

4. Secretary Perry, could you describe any efforts by DoD or the Environmental Protection Agency to establish variable levels of environmental cleanup, tied to specific plans for reuse?

5. Secretary Perry, in making closure decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

For example, a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions. Did this issue play a major role in the analysis?

Were bases in Clean Air Act non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

6. Secretary Perry, in 1993 the Commission made specific recommendations to the Department regarding improvements in health care operations and increased cost effectiveness.

Mr. Secretary, did you direct your Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs to examine the consolidation of resources across military departments?

What was the outcome of that examination?

How is that examination reflected in the Department's new list of recommended closures and realignments?

7. Secretary Perry, in developing the current list, did you direct the Services to consider closing military hospitals that are not cost effective, given their patient load and the cost and availability of medical care in their communities?

8. Secretary Perry, did you direct the Services to move medical assets, including moving them across Service lines, in order to increase the capability and usage of military medical facilities?

9. Secretary Perry, during the development of the current list, did you direct the Services to review their policy of closing military hospitals when bases served by those hospitals are closed?

What was the result of that review?

Have you ensured that the most cost effective means of delivering care to all beneficiaries are maintained, irrespective of other base closure actions?

10. Secretary Perry, in October 1994 Business Executives for National Security (BENS) issued a report ,"Uncovering the Shell Game," which criticized the Department's record in actually closing military facilities. "60 Minutes" featured the report later in the year. The essence of the report and the "60 Minutes" characterization was that "of the 67 bases the President, Congress and the Pentagon have agreed to shut down thus far, over one-third never closed or have quietly reopened under a new name or function." As you know, Mr. Secretary, we plan on offering recommendations to the President concerning reuse and future closure actions. Reports such as the BENS report detract from general support for the closure process.

Mr. Secretary, please give us your comments on the BENS report.

(Note: During the March 1, 1995 hearing, Secretary Deutch agreed to provide a copy of DoD's written response to BENS.)

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From the New Mexico delegation:

1. Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

2. Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment will have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

3. Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

1. Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

From Senator Pryor (Arkansas):

1. Secretary Perry, the Army was asked to consider the cost of moving the Defense Logistics Agency activity at the Red River Army Depot in its analysis of the total closure costs. The community has estimated the cost for such a move to be in excess of $300 million. Is this estimate consistent with the cost calculated by DoD?

2. Secretary Perry, it is my understanding that the Red River Army Depot was recently awarded the President's Prototype Award in support of the Administration's National Performance Review initiatives. Were such awards for quality and efficiency considered by DoD in its base closure process?

3. Secretary Perry, could you detail the reasoning behind the Army's recommendation to completely close out one of its primary depots and realign another when the other Services appear to have chosen realignment initiatives through "downsizing in place" at their maintenance facilities?

From Senator Shelby and Representative Browder (Alabama):

1. Secretary Perry, the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission removed Fort McClellan from the list proposed by the Department of Defense and directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue all the required permits and certification for the construction of facilities at a new location prior to the 1995 base closure round if DoD wanted to put the installation on the list again. It appears that DoD did not follow this direction.

Have all the necessary permits been obtained by the Army at Fort Leonard Wood, the receiving installation?

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

17 APR 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to the above
when replying. No. 950307-20 R1

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciated the opportunity to testify before you on March 1, 1995. We are committed to providing the Commission with all the assistance and support we can. Enclosed are the Department's responses to the questions you requested I answer for the record, as well as the Department's answers to the additional questions you forwarded from Members of Congress.

I trust this information will be helpful to you; please let me know if there is anything else I can provide.

Sincerely,

William J. Perry

Enclosures

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1: Secretary Perry, your report to us uses the results of Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses to project the anticipated costs and savings that would result from implementing your recommendations.

Recognizing that the figures used in the COBRA analyses are not budget quality, how accurate do you believe the projections are?

How closely have the figures in the COBRA analyses prepared in 1991 and 1993 compared to the actual costs for closures?

Answer: The cost and savings estimates for the 1988, 1991 and 1993 closure and realignment recommendations were initially based on service estimates provided by the COBRA model. While not budget quality, COBRA produces estimates that are useful for analyzing the relative merits of each closure or realignment scenario.

Once the recommendations are approved a more aggressive site survey and budget "scrub" is conducted to fine-tune the data. As the recommendations are implemented, costs and savings can be expected to rise in some cases and fall in others. The overall cost of military construction projects for the BRAC 88 round, for example, has decreased because of subsequent BRAC recommendations. Environmental costs, on the other hand, have tended to rise as site inspections progress. Overall, our experience is that costs are lower than expected and our savings have been greater than expected. Our costs to implement BRAC 88, 91, and 93 have decreased from $14.7 billion to $13.1 billion, and our annual savings have increased from $3.9 billion to $4.2 billion.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 2: Secretary Perry, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?

Answer: Out of all sites recommended for closure or realignment, only two sites have substantial portions of land that may have to be placed in caretaker status. The two sites are Jefferson Proving Ground (BRAC 88) and Fort Ord (BRAC 91). In both cases, the areas that we expect to put into caretaker status have significant unexploded ordnance that is prohibitively expensive to remove using current technology.

We are working on alternative solutions at these two sites. Under current law, caretaker costs will be accounted for under the BRAC account until FY 2001.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 3: Secretary Perry, in the 1993 round, one community pointed out that the cost of cleaning up an installation directed to close could be three to ten times as great as the cost of cleaning up an active installation. This difference is due to expected technological advances in environmental restoration.

Mr. Secretary, do you believe the difference between routine and closure related cleanup costs, if factual, should be considered in cost-of- closure calculations?

Answer: The Department is committed to cleaning up all of our installations, whether they are closing or remaining open. The costs associated with this cleanup have not been part of the decision-making process in the past and should not be considered for this base closure round.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 4: Secretary Perry, could you describe any efforts by DoD or the Environmental Protection Agency to establish variable levels of environmental cleanup, tied to specific plans for reuse?

Answer: The Department continues to work with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to incorporate future land use into the remedy selection process. The current Superfund law (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended) requires the selection of remedies that are permanent and treat the contamination. This may not always be compatible with reuse. For example, if the remedy requires the excavation and incineration of soils underneath an Air Force Base runway that is going to be reused as an airport, the destruction of the runway may be necessary. Last year, the Administration proposed and both Houses of Congress included language in the proposed Superfund Requthorization Bill that would consider future land use in the remedy selection process: however neither proposal was enacted.

To a limited extent, future land use is factored into the existing Superfund cleanup process during the risk assessment. For example, exposure pathways are evaluated including how human health is affected by a specific use of the site.

The Department established Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs) at nearly all major bases. The RABs are a focal point for information exchange between regulators, DoD, and the community. Membership consists of representatives from the community, DoD, and the regulators. The creation of these partnerships fosters a process that will permit cleanups to proceed smoothly and results in the availability of parcels for reuse as soon as possible.

The Department also has a Future Land Use Working Group created under the Congressionally established Defense Environmental Response Task Force. This working group considers ways to incorporate future land use into the remedy selection process. This ongoing effort has been instrumental in bringing together representatives from DoD, EPA, GSA, the National Association of Attorneys General, the National Association of Installation Developers, California EPA, and the International City/County Management Association.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 5: Secretary Perry, in making closure decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

For example, a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions. Did this issue play a major role in the analysis?

Were bases in Clean Air Act non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

Answer: The December 29, 1994, policy guidance issued to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies acknowledged that environmental compliance (not restoration) costs could be a factor in a base closure or realignment decision. Costs associated with keeping a base in compliance with environmental rules and regulations can, potentially, be avoided when the base closes. Environmental compliance costs could be incurred at receiving locations also, and were therefore included in the BRAC 95 cost analysis.

The fact that a facility was located in a non-attainment area was a consideration in the BRAC 95 analysis, particularly in the military value analysis.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 6: Secretary Perry, in 1993 the Commission made specific recommendations to the Department regarding improvements in health care operations and increased cost effectiveness.

Mr. Secretary, did you direct your Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs to examine the consolidation of resources across military departments?

What was the outcome of that examination?

How is that examination reflected in the Department's new list of recommended closures and realignments?

Answer: The guidance provided in the January 7, 1994, memorandum directed the chairpersons of the Joint Cross-Service Groups, which included the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), to look at potential infrastructure reductions and operational and organizational changes, with a strong emphasis on cross-service utilization of common support assets.

The Medical Treatment Facilities JCSG identified 16 hospitals and medical centers for the Military Departments to consider in their BRAC processes. Fifteen sites were to downsize from hospitals to clinics: one was to close a medical center.

The Medical Treatment Facilities Joint Cross-Service Group established and generally achieved its overall cross-service and excess capacity reduction goals. This was possible in large measure due to the cross-servicing policies already in affect. Since the location of military medical facilities is largely dependent on the major military installations that provide their patient load, they generally followed the realignment and closure actions of the Military Departments. As with several of the other groups, the medical JCSG is planning future actions for consolidation and downsizing of medical facilities through programmatic actions independent of the BRAC process. Additionally, BRAC 95 provided an opportunity to close one major teaching hospital, while rationalizing other graduate medical training. It also provided an avenue to down-size many large, full service hospitals to smaller hospitals or clinics.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 7: Secretary Perry, in developing the current list, did you direct the Services to consider closing military hospitals that are not cost effective, given their patient load and the cost availability of medical care in their communities?

Answer: No, I directed the Joint Cross Service Groups and the Services to develop measures of merit and analytical processes that were consistent with Department policy and the BRAC final selection criteria. As you know, one of the criteria under Military Value concerns manpower and cost considerations. The Medical Joint Cross Service Group developed a cost measure that compared the average relative weighted inpatient Medical Treatment Facility cost with the CHAMPUS inpatient standardized cost for each catchment area. This measure was scored and weighted along with other measures of merit.

Whether a specific recommendation increases the overall health care costs to the beneficiary population of the affected area is a function of the source of alternative care ultimately selected by the individual.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 8: Secretary Perry, did you direct the Services to move medical assets, including moving them across Service lines, in order to increase the capability and usage of military medical facilities?

Answer: No; the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group was, however, tasked to provide a DoD-wide evaluation of the Medical Health Services System.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 9: Secretary Perry, during the development of the current list, did you direct the Services to review their policy of closing military hospitals when bases served by those hospitals are closed?

What was the result of that review?

Have you ensured that the most cost effective means of delivering care to all beneficiaries are maintained, irrespective of other base closure actions?

Answer: The Department's policy is ordinarily to close every installation recommended for closure completely. Absent specific justification to keep open a medical or other facility on a closing base, the Department's goal is to close the entire base.

During the Office of the Secretary of Defense review of the Military Department's recommendations, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) reviewed the recommendations to ensure adequate health care services remained in every area.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 10: Secretary Perry, in October 1994 Business Executives for National Security (BENS) issued a report, "Uncovering the Shell Game," which criticized the Department's record in actually closing military facilities, "60 Minutes" featured the report later in the year. The essence of the report and the "60 Minutes" characterization was that "of the 67 bases the President, Congress and the Pentagon have agreed to shut down thus far, over one-third never closed or have quietly reopened under a new or function." As you know, Mr. Secretary, we plan on offering recommendations to the President concerning reuse and future closure actions. Reports such as the BENS report detract from general support for the closure process.

Mr. Secretary, please give us your comments on the BENS report.

(Note: During the March 1, 1995 hearing, Secretary Deutch agreed to provide a copy of DoD's written response to BENS.)

Answer: As the Deputy Secretary pointed out in his testimony before you, prompt reuse of facilities is a very important priority of this Administration. I agree with Mr. Deutch's and Mr. Gotbaum's assessment that, in this instance, BENS drew faulty conclusions. I have included the Department's response to the BENS board of directors regarding its report.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

December 2, 1994

Mr. Stanley A. Weiss
Chairman
Business Executives for National Security Inc.
1615 L Street N.W., Suite 330
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Weiss:

In October, your organization released a report on the base closing process that made a number of charges: that the Department was "quietly reopen[ing]" closed bases, that the taxpayers would bear an extra burden that "could exceed $15 billion in the next five years", and that "the Pentagon is often to blame".

These are, of course, serious charges about a program that is one of the Department's top priorities. As your report notes, base closure and realignment is critical. Only by doing so can we save funds that are necessary to maintain the training and equipment of our armed forces. Coming from BENS, an organization that has supported defense efforts in the past, these charges are especially damaging.

They are also, I hasten to add, profoundly misleading and wrong.

- The cost analysis, to be frank, is unlike any real estate siting analysis I have ever seen. Coming from an organization that is supported by business, this is especially disconcerting. I know of no business in the world that would make real estate decisions using such methods.

- The charges of secrecy on the Department's part are as false as they are irresponsible. The BRAC process is one of the most public processes ever undertaken by government. The actions described in your report in almost every case received intense public scrutiny and review, both in process and in result.

- Perhaps most damaging and misleading is the claim that the Department's actions are costing rather than saving resources. The first round of base closure decisions is already saving the Department and the taxpayers some $750 million annually. When the closures already agreed to have been implemented the savings should grow to over $4 billion annually.

There are also numerous errors of fact and of interpretation.

I believe your report does a grave disservice to the Department's base closing effort and to all who have been involved in it. The fact is that the Department of Defense *is* closing bases -- hundreds of them -- and restructuring its operations. That restructuring is neither easy, quick nor smooth, but it is happening. Furthermore, it will continue. The Department is already working on the next round of closure and realignment recommendations, to be proposed -- publicly, of course -- in 1995.

We at DoD would have been happy to discuss your analysis when it was in process. Unfortunately, BENS chose not to do so and to publish and disseminate it without even contacting the responsible officials in the Department. This, too, marks a departure from BENS' previous practice.

Because your charges were made in so damaging a manner and are so misleading, it is incumbent upon the Department to respond. I am sending a copy of the enclosed to each member of your board of directors and to other interested parties.

Sincerely,

Joshua Gotbaum

Enclosure

cc: BENS Board of Directors

ANALYSIS & RESPONSE TO A REPORT ON BASE CLOSURE BY THE BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (BENS)

In October 1994 the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) released a report, "Uncovering the Shell Game: Why Closed Military Facilities Don't Stay Closed". The report criticized implementation of the base closure process by the Department of Defense. The Department officials involved in the base closure process consider the report both inaccurate and misleading.

Base closure and realignment are critical to our nation's security. Only by doing so can we save funds that are necessary to maintain the training and equipment of our armed forces. Because the report maligns this effort, the Department feels obligated to respond.

I. DoD base closure processes *are* public -- exceptionally so.

BENS reports that "over one third of the bases [slated to be closed] were...*quietly reopened*". This claim is profoundly false, for the base closure process is one of the most carefully analyzed and public processes ever undertaken by government. *Every* action recommended is based upon an analysis of the costs and each analysis is provided to the independent base closing commission, to the General Accounting Office and to the public. Even the process for selecting single commercial offices for the Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) was conducted using sites and procedures that were announced in advance -- contrary to the BENS claim.

From the moment the Department of Defense issues BRAC recommendations, the entire process is *intensely* public. The Base Closure Commission conducts all of its hearings, its deliberations and its votes in public. Congress may also conduct public hearings to review the Commission's report. Throughout the review and analysis process the Commission maintains an active and ongoing dialogue with local communities through regional hearings and visits to closing and realigning candidates.

Under the Base Closure Act, the Department provides all data and information used to the Congress, the Commission and the Comptroller General. The GAO evaluates the Department's selection process, verifies data, visits candidate bases and participates in public hearings before the Commission. The GAO reports directly to the Commission and Congress. Its report is public.

BENS in its report claimed that the Department, after the fact, chose to ignore or circumvent the decisions of the BRAC commission by locating reserves on closing bases. This, too, is nonsense. In those few cases where the Department of Defense suggested a change to a previous Commission recommendation, the changes were reviewed and approved by the BRAC Commission using the same public process. (It is also worth noting that a number of the decisions criticized by BENS were made by the BRAC Commission itself on its own motion, not the Department of Defense. These, too, were made entirely in the public eye.)

BENS also claimed that the restructuring and placement of satellite offices of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) was done without public scrutiny. This, too, reflects a complete disregard of the facts: On June 7, 1993, 11 months before the decision was made, the Secretary of Defense personally described the process that DoD would follow. The criteria *and* the sites under consideration were also announced well in advance.

In short, the BENS claim that DoD acts in a "shell game", without public process is profoundly untrue and a disservice to a public agency doing its job in an open fashion.

By comparison, *the BENS report was made without any public process at all* or any consultation with the responsible DoD officials. As a result, it is replete with mistakes, misinformation, and biased analyses. Some of these are summarized below.

II. DoD is making infrastructure decisions on a businesslike basis.

A. Retaining part of a facility can make sense.

BENS in its report seemed unaware that it might make business sense to *keep* certain operations and real estate while disposing of others. In some ten[1] instances, the Department concluded that restructuring of its facilities would be more effective or less expensive if portions of bases were retained.

BENS claimed that such actions weren't "real closures". This misses the point, which is to *restructure* the Department and save money. It was for this reason that Congress included *realignments* as well as closures in the enabling legislation. (In fact, the formal name of the process is Base *Realignment* & Closure).

In each instance, these realignment alternatives were analyzed on the basis of estimated operating and relocation costs, both real estate and other costs. And, in each instance, the BRAC commission undertook its own review and agreed on the merits. For example:

- DoD recommended Lowry AFB be closed and all technical training be redistributed to the remaining technical training centers. However, the base was the site of an already-operating regional DFAS center, the 1001st Space Systems Squadron and a reserve personnel center. These were recommended for retention. A complete closure would have involved moving over 3,000 people whose work for DoD was continuing, as well as their equipment. DoD thought such a relocation made no sense as a business matter, and the BRAC Commission agreed.

- Pensacola NADEP, located on Naval Air Station Pensacola, was recommended by the DoD for closure. Its buildings were retained by the Navy to support the planned expansion of NAS Pensacola's training mission. This expansion in turn made

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[1] *Lowry AFB, NADEP Pensacola, NADEP Norfolk, NS Long Beach, Rickenbacker AGB, Grissom AFB, Carswell AFB, NAS Moffett Field, Homestead AFB and Bergstrom AFB.*

possible the relocation of the Naval Air Technical Training Center from NAS Memphis and the relocation of parts of the Service School Command from Naval Training Center San Diego. This closure and realignment will save the taxpayers some $50 million annually. Again, the Commission agreed with DoD's proposal.

- Norfolk NADEP, which is located on Naval Air Station Norfolk and employs over 4,000 people, was recommended by the DoD for closure. In this case, too, its property was retained by the Navy since it sits in the middle of an ongoing Naval Air Station. The Commission also agreed with this initiative. The closure will save the Department and the taxpayers an estimated $108 annually.

B. Keeping & using reserves on some closed bases is necessary.

BENS questioned the decision to use the reserves on some bases that the active military have left. This reflects a misunderstanding of the operation of reserve units and of how these valuable organizations are manned and sited.

The role of the reserve forces has changed as the number of active military is drawn down. Tasks that were formerly undertaken by active soldiers, sailors and airmen are increasingly handled by reservists. For example, the Naval Reserve has been given new capabilities and responsibilities through the assignment of five new classes of ships and aircraft.

However, we must develop our reserve capabilities *where the reserves are*. Unlike the active duty force, the Reserves rely on local men and women to fill their ranks. You can't expect a reservist who trains one weekend per month to drive hundreds of miles to do so. Relocating a reserve unit could mean losing many, if not all, of its members. The loss of critical skills can take years to recruit and retrain.

BENS argued that reserve needs could be met entirely on those bases that remain active. Many of these, however, are not well-located for reserve activity.

Where reserve units are located on former active duty bases, they generally occupy only a small "cantonment" area, not the entire base. By retaining only small complexes, the cost of operation is significantly reduced and DoD is able to retain reserve training capabilities which are responsive to geographic reserve requirements.

BENS cites, critically, the placing of reserve forces on the former Carswell Air Force Base in Fort Worth, Texas. In fact, Carswell is a good example of how realignment can *save* money for the Department and the taxpayers, while improving readiness. Consolidation at Carswell permitted the closure of Naval Air Station Dallas and three other NAS sites. The creation of the single reserve site for the Dallas/Fort Worth area both reduces support costs for the reserves *and* helps to alleviate air traffic congestion in the area. The $1.2 million increase in operating costs of NAS Fort Worth over NAS Dallas is more than offset by the annual savings of $36 million from the closures/realignments of NAS Memphis, NAF Detroit, NAS Dallas and NAS Glenview.

C. *Placement of DFAS accounting offices*

BENS also criticized the retention or placement on some otherwise closed bases of facilities for the Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS). As the report notes, DFAS is itself being restructured and consolidated, from 46,000 employees on 300 sites to 23,000 employees on 25. This restructuring, once completed, should save the taxpayers some $1 billion annually.

The previous Administration had recognized the need to restructure DFAS and proposed a system of five "regional centers" employing a total of approximately 21,000. However, their method for determining where these centers would be located was, in effect, to auction them off to whichever states would offer the highest combination of real estate and training subsidies. The Clinton Administration took the view that such a process was, in effect, a tax upon the states and localities and developed an alternative procedure.

The five existing major DFAS centers were kept (whether they were on a closed base or not), because the cost of relocating them would have been substantial. The remaining DFAS personnel were then consolidated into a series of 20 satellite offices. The siting criteria included: cost to the government; maintenance of customer support; use of (no-cost) defense assets made redundant by the end of the Cold War; and adequate skilled labor supply. On May 3,1994, the Deputy Secretary announced the selection of 25 DFAS sites. Five of the 25 sites are existing sites; two of which are on installations recommended for closure by previous BRAC Commissions, and 10 of the new sites are to be located on installations identified for closure resulting from previous BRAC rounds.

Table 1 compares the number and square feet of *existing* buildings at each of 10 closing bases with what is retained for DFAS use. To claim, as BENS does, that the result is an open base is to ignore how small a portion of each base the retained facilities represent.

COMPARISON OF BUILDINGS AND SQUARE FOOTAGE
FOR DFAS PROPERTY RETAINED
ON "CLOSING" BASES

	Total Number of Buildings	Total Square Footage (in millions)	Number of Buildings Retained for DFAS	Square Footage Retained for DFAS (in millions)	Percent of Buildings Retained for DFAS	Percent of Square Footage Retained for DFAS
Charleston NSY	208	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	0.48%	[illegible]
Loring AFB	855	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	0.12%	[illegible]
Newark AFB	43	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	2.33%	[illegible]
Orlando NTC	759	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	0.13%	[illegible]

Griffiss AFB	338	5.0	1	0.20	0.30%	4%
Chanute AFB	752	26.4	1	0.40	0.13%	6%
Norton AFB	535	8.2	3	0.91	0.56%	3%
Ft Ord	4,268	18.0	1	0.36	0.02%	2%
Gentile AFS	51	1.9	1	0.14	1.96%	7%
Bluegrass AD	112	2.1	1	0.14	0.89%	6%
TOTAL	7,921	54.1	12	2.08	0.15%	4%

Table 1

Chart 1 shows the percentage of base building square footage retained after closure and Chart 2 shows the percentage of total buildings on closed bases being retained for DFAS use.



Chart 1

Both the criteria and the sites under consideration were announced personally by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in a press conference on June 7, 1993. Nonetheless, BENS claims that "no specific information on the site selection process was provided to the public".

There are of course those who can and will argue that DoD should have followed a different process. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Department acted using a public process based primarily upon real estate costs and other business-related criteria.



Chart 2

D. *Other actions*

Of the 26 claims by BENS of improper, "reopening" of closed bases, there are only two that weren't made by a public process involving analysis of real estate and other costs. Both of these were entirely proper uses of Federal resources. These included:

- Richards-Gebaur ARS, in Kansas City, was recommended for closure in 1991. The Marine Corps Reserve, who operate locally in 3 separate leased sites, proposed to save funds by relocating to a few of the buildings made vacant by this closure. The proposal was approved after completion of a real estate siting analysis that projected net cost savings on the order of $1 million annually. The vast majority of this air base will be made available for private development.

- Orlando Naval Hospital (VA Hospital). The Veterans Administration has taken over this facility using its own funds to meet its requirements for medical care in the area. The availability of the Orlando hospital allowed the VA to scale back its facility needs in the Florida area. Operation of the hospital had previously cost DoD approximately $52 million per year ($25 million O&M and $27 million in personnel costs). (It should also be noted that Federal law requires DoD and all Federal agencies to give priority to transfers of surplus property to other Federal agencies.)

III. Base closure is already saving the taxpayers billion$.

The Department is already saving an estimated $760 million annually from implementing the first round of closures and realignments. This savings will grow to over $4 billion per year

after implementation of the 1991 and 1993 round of closures are complete. While closing bases does involve upfront costs, overall DoD estimates a net $5.3 billion *savings* over the period from FY90 through FY99.

IV. Errors in Fact and Method

A. How real estate siting analysis is usually done:

Ironically, much of the BENS analysis is done in a distinctly *un*businesslike manner. Real estate siting analysis ordinarily involves a comparison of the *real estate costs* of two alternatives, but the BENS study made no such distinction:

- *In no instance did it compare costs between two different siting choices.*
- *As a result, it could not take into account the costs that were saved or avoided.*
- In its rush to buttress a misguided and weak claim, BENS threw in all costs at the site by any government agency of any kind:
  - Including costs, such as salaries, that would be borne no matter where the activity occurred.
  - Even including costs of other government agencies -- that have never been and never will be borne by Defense. For example, BENS includes the five-year $3.2 billion operating cost of NASA's Ames Space Research Center as "lost savings" because NASA will continue to operate the former NAS Moffett airfield. How DoD failed to "save" money it never spent is hard to fathom.

As a result of these errors, BENS portrayed moves that will save billions of dollars as if they would *cost* money. We are not aware of any business in the world that would use the BENS methodology in making real estate siting decisions.

Let us again consider, as an example, the consolidation of reserve functions onto the former Carswell AFB in Fort Worth. BENS "analysis" claimed that the move would cost the taxpayers an estimated $1.2 billion over the next five years. The real result is a *savings* of $59 million annually. Even after substantial realignment costs, the proposal should save the Department approximately $12.5[2] million *in present value.*

B. Other Errors

There are many other points in the report that are misleading or simply incorrect. For example:

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[2] *Derived from FY 96 Navy and Air Force Budget Estimate Submissions*

- The report claims St. Inigoes NESEC was not closed, but instead its name was changed to NAS Patuxent River. In fact, they are two separate installations.

- The report claims reserves will be remaining at NAS Glenview. They will not.

- The main body of the report claims the Federal government will spend $1.4 billion by not fully closing the Presidio in San Franciso. Only in an appendix does BENS mention that a longstanding Federal law *required* DoD to turn the property over to the Department of the Interior.

The report claims that Long Beach Naval Station, instead of closing, was being retained as Long Beach Shipyard. They are two separate installations. The DoD recommended closure of the Naval Station, but not the shipyard. The 93 BRAC Commission agreed.

C. DoD BRAC officials were never consulted by BENS

DoD would have been happy to discuss and correct the BENS analysis before it was published, but BENS chose never to discuss the report with the responsible DoD officials. In order to ensure publicity, BENS limited distribution of the report prior to publication to *60 Minutes* and *The New York Times.*

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From the New Mexico delegation:

Question: Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

Answer: There were facilities under consideration that involved the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. Military Departments also conducted an analysis on the impact proposed base closures or realignments would have on this capability. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review of the recommendations and identified no impacts to the Nation's nuclear deterrent capability. The Department of Energy was consulted.

Question: Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment would have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

Answer: We believe the principal goal of the BRAC process is to reduce unnecessary infrastructure. Tenants were fully considered in the installation data calls sent out by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Tenant needs were an important part of the Military Department analysis. Specific data call responses regarding tenants have been provided to the Commission in the Military Department's detailed back-up data.

However, the sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. With regards to the Department of Energy (DoE) and other non-DoD tenants at Kirtland Air Force Base, the Air Force did consult informally with DoE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information it possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations the Air Force sent teams to meet with DoE, the Sandia National Laboratory, and other agency representatives at Kirtland Air Force Base to assess needs and impact. The Air Force is in the process of conducting site surveys and will continue in this

cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

Question: Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

Answer: Every military installation has a relationship with other government agencies, most notably the local community. Wecan not as a practical matter notify and solicit all the the local community governments for information regarding potential closure or realignment recommendations; the data would not be consistent or certifiable and the effect on community moreale could be severe. However, we did conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the economic impacts of every recommendation on the local economy. This information has been provided to the Commission and to the reading rooms set up in the House and the Senate.

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

Question: Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

Answer: The Department of Defense has recommended realigning (not closing) Kirtland AFB. The Phillips Laboratory activity, that scored high in both the Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Group for Laboratories analysis is retained at Kirtland along with other activities. The placement of Kirtland AFB and Los Angeles AFB in the middle tier of bases indicates that the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group viewed them as roughly comparable, based on all eight criteria. From this starting point, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the examination of a number of scenarios for the closure or realignment of these and other installations in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory. The details of that analysis are described in the minutes of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. The decision by the Secretary of the Air Force not to recommend the closure of Los Angeles AFB indicates that no scenario for the closure of Los Angeles AFB was viewed by her as cost-effective or consistent with mission needs. The recommendation regarding Kirtland retains laboratory, weapon storage, and DNA activities that can operate with minimal military support, while reducing the overall support infrastructure associated with flying units and other DoD activities producing significant savings.

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Pryor (Arkansas):

Question: Secretary Perry, the Army was asked to consider the cost of moving the Defense Logistics Agency activity at the Red River Army Depot in its analysis of the total closure costs. The community has estimated the cost for such a move to be in excess of $300 million. Is this estimate consistent with the cost calculated by DoD?

Answer: The Defense Logistics Agency recommendation to disestablish the distribution depot at Red River Army Depot and relocate the remaining material to Defense Depot Anniston, Alabama, is estimated to cost $58.9 million over the implementation period. Annual recurring savings after implementation are estimated to be $18.9 million and a 20 year net present value (savings) of $186.1 million.

Question: Secretary Perry, it is my understanding that the Red River Army Depot was recently awarded the President's Prototype Award in support of the Administration's National Performance Review initiatives. Were such awards for quality and efficiency considered by DoD in its base closure process?

Answer: In his testimony before you, Secretary Deutch indicated that many of the installations slated for closure or realignment are made up of high-performing individuals and very supportive communities in relationships that span decades. DoD did not direct the Military Departments to specifically consider awards.

Question: Secretary Perry, could you detail the reasoning behind the Army's recommendation to completely close out one of its primary depots and realign another when the other Services appear to have chosen realignment initiatives through "downsizing in place" at their maintenance facilities?

Answer: Each of the Military Departments conducted an independent analysis of various alternatives based upon the eight approved criteria and the force structure plan. Different results were obtained based upon the maintenance philosophies of each of the Military Departments. The Air Force determined that, in light of the large Air Logistics Center installations on which depot activities are located and the significant costs associated with closure, downsizing of all depot activities was more cost-effective than the closure of a single depot installation. Conversely, the Army determined that the closure of a relatively small Army depot would be a better alternative for producing savings than downsizing.

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Shelby and Representative Browder (Alabama):

Question: Secretary Perry, the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission removed Fort McClellan from the list proposed by the Department of Defense and directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue all the required permits and certification for the construction of facilities at a new location prior to the 1995 base closure round if DoD wanted to put the installation on the list again. It appears that DoD did not follow this direction.

Have all the necessary permits been obtained by Army at Fort Leonard Wood, the receiving installation?

Answer: No. As Secretary Deutch pointed out in his testimony, he instructed the Secretary of the Army, Togo West, not to pursue the requisite permits until the DoD recommendations were publicly announced. The Army has assured me that the permits will be in place prior to your decision making.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF SENATOR DIXON

AFTERNOON HEARING

MARCH 1, 1995

WASHINGTON DC

GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN AND WELCOME.

AT THIS AFTERNOON'S HEARING, WE ARE PLEASED TO HAVE WITH US THE HONORABLE JOSHUA GOTBAUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY. MR. GOTBAUM SERVES AS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S "BRAC 95" STEERING GROUP AND IN THAT CAPACITY HAS HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR REVIEWING THE DEPARTMENT'S BASE CLOSURE PROCESS.

HE IS ACCOMPANIED BY MR. ROBERT E. BAYER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INSTALLATIONS.

THEY WILL EXPLAIN FOR US THE METHODOLOGY THE DEPARTMENT USED IN DEVELOPING ITS CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS, AND I HOPE THEY WILL ALSO ADDRESS TWO IMPORTANT AREAS THAT WERE UNDER MR. GOTBAUM'S PURVIEW -- NAMELY, ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES TO MEASURE BOTH THE ECONOMIC IMPACT AND THE CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BASE CLOSURES ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES; AND THE WORK OF THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUPS THAT WERE ESTABLISHED IN THE PENTAGON FOR THE 1995 BRAC ROUND TO EXAMINE AREAS WITH SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-SERVICE COOPERATION.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT PROCESS

STATEMENT OF

JOSHUA GOTBAUM

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC SECURITY)

BEFORE THE

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

MARCH 1, 1995

Good afternoon. I am Joshua Gotbaum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security. With me is Robert Bayer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations.

You have asked that we review for you the process and procedures that the Department followed in developing the recommendations. We welcome the opportunity to do so, because they are, necessarily, very complicated. Nonetheless, we believe that they are sound, that they are fair, and that they meet both the spirit and the letter of the law.

I will cover our procedures in general and our joint cross-service work, then ask Bob to describe how we considered economic impact.

Before I turn to the details, there are four points about our process that I would like to emphasize.

First, that it is fair. Congress, when it recognized that the existing procedures for base closing did not work and proposed BRAC as a substitute, recognized that it must, unquestionably, be fair. We go to extraordinary efforts to make sure that it is. As the law directs, we consider all installations equally. We direct the use of a common public force structure and public selection criteria. The services develop their tests and measures for applying those criteria, where possible, in advance of seeing any data for particular installations. All the data used is certified by its providers to be, to the best of their knowledge, complete and accurate. We performed more analysis in BRAC 95 than we did in any of the prior rounds. All of it is done under the watchful eyes of auditors from the DoD Inspector General, auditors within each Military Department, and the General Accounting Office.

These requirements form an extraordinary discipline. Only then do we make these critical, difficult judgments. And then those judgments are reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, by the General Accounting Office, by the public, and -- most importantly -- by this Commission.

Second, that it is undeniably painful. As the Secretary has already noted, we did not arrive at our recommendations easily. We were forced to choose among many excellent facilities. The facilities are on this list, not because they aren't excellent, but because they are more than we need or can afford. And in every case, this is a facility with a Commander who is justifiably proud of his or her operation. And in every case, there is a community that has supported our Nation's defense, sometimes for hundreds of years.

Third, that it is extraordinarily complicated. In the base closure process, we must make judgments about many different kinds of facilities in a way that is at the same time effective, accurate, consistent, public and fair. To do so we have developed many methods of analysis and many methods for implementation of the selection criteria. Because these are so complicated, in some cases where the results are relatively close people will argue that the Department's recommendation is arbitrary. Once you understand the extraordinary level of analysis that we have undertaken, it should be clear that there is nothing in this process that is arbitrary. Others will argue that some additional factor ought to be taken into account that would help their base

survive. You will, of course, make your own judgments on these arguments, but we hope you recognize that every ad hoc addition for a specific site makes the result less consistent, less fair, and even more complicated.

My last point before turning to the process is that, as we discuss the details of this or that procedure and this or that base, we must not lose sight of the reasons why we must close bases in the first place. And that, quite simply, is because we need those funds. Even after the three previous BRAC rounds, we still have too many bases. Reductions in our forces and our budget have far outpaced reductions in our basing structure. We estimate that the BRAC process will produce total savings of some $50 billion dollars -- savings that are critical to maintain readiness and modernize the armed forces in the decades to come.

A Bottom Up Process Under Secretarial Guidance

Most of the analysis and review that is carried out in the base closure process is performed by the Military Departments and Defense agencies under the policy guidance and review of the Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense established the policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment and closure. Over a year ago, in January 1994, he set out by memorandum the basic policies under which all service and the Defense agencies must operate. This guidance required them to:

- develop recommendations based exclusively upon the force structure plan and eight selection criteria;
- consider all military installations inside the United States equally;
- analyze their base structure using like categories of bases;
- use objective measures for the selection criteria wherever possible; and
- allow for the exercise of military judgment in selecting bases for closure and realignment.

The Deputy Secretary also established the BRAC 95 Review Group and the BRAC 95 Steering group to oversee the entire BRAC process. The Review Group was composed of senior level representatives from each of the Military Departments, Chairpersons of the Steering Group and each Joint Cross-Service Group, and other senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Defense Logistics Agency. It provided oversight and policy for the entire BRAC process.

The BRAC Steering Group was established to handle day-to-day issues and assist the Review Group in exercising its authorities. Upon confirmation, I chaired that group. I was given the responsibility to oversee the process on a day-to-day basis, and was delegated authority to issue additional instructions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issued force structure plans in February 1994. The force structure plan was updated in January and again this month to reflect budget decisions, and we have already provided the plan to the Commission. As the Secretary noted, this was the first round of base closures based upon the Bottom Up Review.

The selection criteria, which the Deputy Secretary issued in November, remained unchanged from BRAC 93. They give priority consideration to military value, and also consider costs and savings and environmental and economic impacts. (Those criteria are attached to this testimony.)

These criteria have not been changed. However, we have made some improvements in the way we implement them. For example, the Army never analyzed air space in analyzing its training schools; it now does so. They now also give extra credit for ranges that are computerized. In 1991, the Air Force took 80 different attributes of each base into account; this year they use 250.

The Service Recommendation Process

Each Service begins by categorizing its bases. For example, the Air Force divides its activities into large aircraft and missile bases, small aircraft bases, air reserve/guard components, industrial/depot, and so forth.

Then they must define -- in advance -- those factors that should be taken into account to apply the criteria for each type. Obviously, different factors are important for different types of installations. They defined data -- again, in advance -- that would measure those factors. The Services were directed and sought to develop measures that were, as much as possible, objective and quantifiable.

Furthermore, they assigned a weighting in advance to each criterion. The weighting reflected their best military judgment as to the likely importance of each factor to the particular criterion and to the Department as a whole.

There are two key points here:

- One, that BRAC 95 was a process conducted from the bottom-up, based on the judgments of the military services about the relative value of their installations.

- Second, that before any data was collected, before any alternatives were considered, before any decisions were made, the Services defined what was important, what measures they would use in ranking facilities, and how they would evaluate those measures.

Once the Services had completed these tasks, they sent to their installations requests for data, to collect the information on which to base their decisions. Personnel at bases around the country collected the data, certified that it was accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief, and sent it back to headquarters where it could be analyzed.

The Services next developed rankings of their installations by type, using the approved selection criteria, the common force structure plan, and the measures that they had previously defined. In many cases, they considered alternatives developed by the Joint Cross-Service Groups, and/or modifications of those alternatives.

The process of assessing alternatives is itself a difficult undertaking. The Services had to balance numerous considerations. For example, they examined how much capacity they have now, and how much they need to keep. They had to evaluate the military value of numerous alternatives, and examine these in light of differing costs and savings, economic impacts, and environmental concerns. Also, as Secretary Perry stated this morning, closing bases costs money up front. So each Service had to determine how much of a near-term investment they could afford to make in order to realize long-term savings.

At the end of this rigorous, labor-intensive, analytical process, the Services decided on their recommendations, and presented them to the Secretary of Defense.

Within each military department, these decisions are of course the responsibility of the service secretary. But in every case, they were discussed, reviewed, analyzed and debated -- sometimes for days -- by a group composed very senior, experienced military and civilian officials. The chiefs of service were completely involved in the process. The resulting recommendations reflect the best judgment of both the civilian and military leadership. And they are never made lightly.

Cross-Service Alternatives

The 1993 Commission recommended that the Department develop procedures for considering joint or common activities among the Military Departments. For BRAC 95, the Deputy Secretary directed the creation of Joint Cross-Service Groups to consider these issues in conjunction with the Military Departments. Each such group included membership from the Office of the Secreatry of Defense and each of the Military Departments.

We established a process, involving the Joint Groups and the Military Departments, through which we developed alternatives in five areas: depot maintenance, medical treatment facilities, test and evaluation, undergraduate pilot training, and laboratories.

Each of the Joint Groups developed excess capacity reduction goals, established data collection procedures and milestone schedules, presented alternatives to the Military Departments for their consideration in developing recommendations. The Joint Groups issued their alternatives to the Military Departments in November 1994, and they considered them as part of their ongoing BRAC analyses. In some instances, the Departments adopted the alternatives and recommended them, as made or modified, to the Secretary of Defense. In other instances, the Services declined to endorse them, because the particular alternative was not considered to be cost effective, the base too valuable militarily, or for other reasons. Our report to you -- in Chapter 4 -- summarizes the Joint Groups' efforts. Further, we have already provided you with detailed documentation of each Joint Group's activities, methods, and analyses.

We also established a Joint Group to address economic impact. Bob will discuss their efforts in a few minutes.

Review & Decision by the Secretary of Defense

Once the services reported their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, these were in turn reviewed by the Office of the Secretary and of the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff reviewed the recommendations from a warfighting perspective, to ensure they would not impair the military readiness of the armed services and the particular war fighting requirements of the Unified and Specified Commanders. After that review, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed all of the recommendations without exception.

Within the Office of the Secretary, the recommendations were review by many different offices. For example, the Undersecretary for Policy, the General Counsel, and the Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy reviewed recommendations that might affect compliance with various treaties. We considered whether recommendations made by a particular service might have failed to consider sufficiently the interests of other parts of the Department or other Federal agencies with national security concerns. Furthermore, the staff assistants to the secretary who had been responsible for particular cross-service analyses were asked to review the responses of the Services to their recommendations. Finally, my office reviewed the recommendations, to ensure that they conformed to the Secretary's guidance, and to consider possible economic impacts from independent actions of several Services on a particular locale. After considering the results of our review, Secretary Perry endorsed all of the recommendations of the Service Secretaries and Defense Agency Directors.

HOLD UNTIL RELEASED
BY COMMISSION

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT PROCESS

STATEMENT OF

ROBERT E. BAYER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INSTALLATIONS

BEFORE THE
DEFENSE COMMISSION ON BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

MARCH 1, 1995

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Commission. I am Robert Bayer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Installations. I serve as one of Assistant Secretary Gotbaum's Deputies and the BRAC 95 process is one of my principal responsibilities. I served as the Chairman of the BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact. I also served as Chairman of the BRAC Steering Group during the early months of the process, until Mr. Gotbaum was confirmed in his current position. I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you how the Defense Department conducted its BRAC 95 process and in particular, how the Department applied the economic impact criterion in our BRAC 95 process.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Before I turn to the specifics of economic impact, I would like to make three general observations.

First, the Department fully recognizes that communities face economic challenges when military installations are realigned or closed. Economic impact is not something that we try to sweep under the rug. On the contrary, our approach has been to recognize that closures and realignments do have economic impacts. As a matter of past and current BRAC policy, we assess these impacts on a "worst case" basis.

Second, I want to highlight the improvements we made in analyzing economic impacts for BRAC 95. Over a year ago, we established the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact. This Group which included Service representatives, reviewed our methods from the ground up; established common measures and approaches; and developed a greatly enhanced computer-based system for analyzing economic impact and cumulative economic impact. While our policy direction did not change from previous BRAC efforts, it is no exaggeration to say that we reinvented the way economic impact was considered in our BRAC processes.

Finally, our focus on economic impact was local...MSA or county. We did not analyze economic impacts on either a state or regional basis, believing that we should measure impacts where they occur.

Now let me turn to the specifics. First, I will discuss in some detail the method that we used to analyze economic impact. Then, I will discuss the economic implications of our recommendations.

ECONOMIC IMPACT IN THE BRAC PROCESS

Under the law, the Department developed BRAC recommendations based on consistent application of the eight selection criteria and the force structure plan. The first four selection criteria pertain to military value and are accorded priority consideration. "The economic impact on communities" is the sixth criterion.

The Department considered cumulative economic impact as part of the economic impact criterion. In response to concerns raised by the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission and the General Accounting Office, DoD analyzed economic impact and cumulative economic impact as relative measures for comparing alternatives. DoD did not establish threshold values above which, for example, it would remove bases from consideration.

ECONOMIC IMPACT MEASURES

DoD measured economic impact by analyzing:

Mil + Civilian (RAW #)

(1) the potential job change in the economic area and

(%)

(2) that change expressed as a percentage of total, that is, military and civilian, employment in the economic area in which the installation is located.

There are some limits to the scope of our analysis. Our estimates of job changes include "direct job losses," that is military, DoD civilian, and on-base contractor jobs. We did not account for off base contractor personnel as direct impacts, even if their sole purpose was to support a base's missions. Our job change figures include only jobs directly associated with base closures and realignments.

Our analysis also included indirect job losses that are calculated by applying multipliers to the direct personnel reduction. The multipliers, which we developed working with data from the Department of Commerce, vary by the type of personnel, the principal activity performed at each installation, and the size of its economic area. Because the our goal for estimating indirect job changes was to examine the "worst-case" potential outcome, we selected multiplier values that represent the high end of a reasonable range of potential indirect impacts. These multipliers ranged from 0.13 for some military trainees to 2.42 for some civilians. We also used data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to estimate employment in levels economic areas.

ECONOMIC IMPACT AREAS

We assigned installations to economic areas based on our estimates of where people who would be affected by BRAC actions live and work. We defined and consistently applied a set of rules for assigning installations to economic areas. These rules are included at the end of my written statement.

Our approach focused on the local level. We have already provided the Commission with a listing of the economic areas for each military installation. In short, we generally used metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as the economic area for installations located within an MSA. The Office of Management and Budget defines MSA boundaries, and they are the standard Federal unit for economic analyses of metropolitan areas.

Under some circumstances, we felt that using current MSA definitions would unnecessarily dilute one of our measures of economic impact--the percentage of area jobs affected. We made changes on a case-by-case-basis when recent changes to MSA boundaries or other factors suggested that the standard MSA definitions would not be an appropriatedepiction of where local economic activity occurred. For these exceptions, which our rules define, we

Changed 1 Bad 20% (made them smaller)

assigned installations to smaller economic areas. This has the effect of increasing those particular measures of economic impact. Out of 351 areas, approximately 66 (or 19 percent) were altered to better reflect economic impact.

The Department placed installations located in non-metropolitan areas in a single county economic area, or in a multi-county area when that was more appropriate based on estimated labor and expenditure patterns.

For BRAC 95 purposes, we determined that there is no economic impact associated with relocating personnel from one installation to another within the same economic area.

CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS

Improving our consideration of cumulative economic impact in BRAC 95 was a high priority for the Department. We developed a much more sophisticated approach to measure and consider cumulative economic impact. Here is an overview.

Cumulative economic impact can arise for two reasons, so it was measured in two dimensions: retrospectively and prospectively. First, cumulative impact can occur if we recommend a BRAC 95 action in an area that has had BRAC actions in the prior rounds. Second, cumulative impact can occur if more than one BRAC 95 action is recommended in the same location.

We used our same two measures to estimate cumulative impact -- the maximum potential job loss, expressed in absolute numbers and as a percent of area employment -- but we adjusted them to include prior-round BRAC actions.

To place these estimates of past and future impacts in a broader context, we considered historic economic information, covering the period 1984 through 1993. This information included local information on the level and rate of growth of employment, the level and rate of growth of personal income per capita, and unemployment rates. This information describes recent economic conditions in each economic area, and, more importantly, it captures the economic effects, through 1993, of prior-round BRAC actions and other factors that have affected local economies. Although some areas around our bases have been affected by the drawdown in defense industry, we could not capture these discrete impacts. However, by assessing overall economic activity in an area, we captured these industrial reductions, along with other economic impacts on the economy.

CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM MULTIPLE BRAC 95 ACTIONS

After the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies submitted recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, we identified economic areas with multiple proposed BRAC 95 recommendations. These numbered about 46. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies reassessed their recommendations considering the cumulative economic impact, along with the other seven selection criteria. Fortunately, most of these

eg SVC + DCA

multiple actions involved small numbers of personnel. In no case did a Military Department or Defense Agency change its recommendation as a result of this review.

PROCESS VALIDATION

From the start, we wanted to make sure that our approach to analyzing economic impact was sound and consistent among all Services and Defense Agencies. In the past the Services used different approaches which while valid, were inconsistent. Since we anticipated consideration of cross service closure alternatives, we were determined to develop and use a uniform approach in this area. We felt that the best way to ensure that we were on the right track was to have independent reviewers from outside the Defense Department evaluate our plans for analyzing economic impact. To accomplish this, we sponsored an independent review in May 1994. Six experts from government, academia, and the private sector participated in the review.

The reviewers agreed that our proposed measures of economic impact were reasonable. They also supported our approach to defining economic areas--that is, based on estimates of local labor and expenditure patterns. The reviewers suggested several improvements, many of which we incorporated into our final methods. In addition, they emphasized a point that I have already stressed -- namely, that our estimates are "worst case," and often overstate economic impact. The reviewers stressed the need for the Department to make this point in our presentations to this Commission, the Congress, and the public.

In addition to the independent review, we asked the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce to review our methodology for deriving indirect job multipliers. Their written response, a copy of which we will provide to you, pronounced the methodology to be of "good, sound quality, consistent with good regional economic impact estimation practices."

PROCESS LIMITATIONS

Model is A User Item Not A User Interface

That being said, I feel that it is important for you to understand the limits of methodology. Like the data used to apply the other seven criteria, we wanted it to be as accurate as possible. However, its primary purpose is to help make valid comparisons, not to provide "budget quality projections". The entire BRAC analysis is a balance between accuracy and timeliness to achieve the functional goal of even handed comparisons. Our measures of economic impact helped us compare alternative closures and realignments. We have used them to judge the relative differences, under worst-case scenarios, of the potential economic impacts of various BRAC alternatives. We believe that our measures are very well suited for that limited purpose.

Let me stress, however, that these measures are not detailed forecasts of how economies will ultimately adjust to BRAC actions. Forecasting how any particular local economy will adjust over a period of many years is a highly uncertain undertaking, and one that we stayed away from. In essence, our process compares the magnitude of the economic challenges presented by alternative closures and realignments. It does not predict how well communities will meet these challenges.

DATA IS WORST CASE

Finally, let me touch briefly on the point stressed by our independent reviewers. The method we use to derive the our key measures overstates economic impact for numerous reasons. For example, the measures do not take into account the creation of new jobs in base closure communities. Experience strongly suggests that the creation of new jobs can, over time, offset job losses from base closures. Also, the job losses associated with base closures will occur over a period of several years, rather than all at once as the measures imply. Further, there are many programs administered by DoD and other federal and state agencies to ease the transition for base personnel and for the surrounding communities. For these and other reasons, the measures should be considered a "worst-case" potential outcome, rather than a likely prediction of future economic impact.

We intentionally chose to use this "worst-case" methodology. We sought to create a reasonable, fair, and consistent tool to compare the potential economic impacts of alternative BRAC recommendations. We believe that the BRAC decision making process was enhanced through consistent comparisons of these worst-case potential economic impacts.

DATABASE TOOL

We developed the BRAC 95 Economic Impact Database to facilitate our analysis of the measures of economic impact, cumulative economic impact, and historic economic information. The Database allows users to measure the economic impact and cumulative economic impact of BRAC actions. We have already made the Database available to the Commission staff. The public may obtain a copy of the Database by downloading it from the Internet, beginning at the end of this week. The Internet address is (HTTP://GLOBE.LMI.ORG/BRAC.HTM).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe that the Department conducted a fair, consistent, and auditable assessment of the economic impacts of proposed BRAC actions. While the tools we developed did not address every conceivable economic impact, we believe that it captured a sufficiently broad and timely set of economic data so that BRAC decision makers - the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of Defense Agencies, and ultimately the Secretary of Defense, could appropriately weigh economic impact in making difficult base realignment and closure actions.

I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

DETERMINATION OF ECONOMIC AREAS

In response to changes by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in metropolitan area definitions related to the 1990 Census, and a review of earlier BRAC economic area definitions, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact has established the following rules to guide the assignment of installations to economic areas for BRAC 95:

1. The economic area should include residences of the majority of the military and civilian employees at the activity.

2. An economic area is generally defined as a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or a non-MSA county(s) unless there is evidence to support some other definition.

3. In those cases where OMB's 1993 redefinition of an MSA added counties which increased the MSA population by 10 percent or more, then continue to use the old MSA definition unless certified residency data shows that the new MSA definition is more appropriate.

4. An economic area should only be expanded to include an additional county if the resulting percentage increase in the number of employee residences included in the expanded economic area is greater than the resulting percentage increase in the total employment of the expanded economic area.

5. Installations in the same county should be in the same economic area.

6. If the economic area was previously defined (in prior BRAC rounds) as a non-MSA county(s), it should continue to be that county, even if that county has now been incorporated into an MSA.

Military Service Process (Illustrative)

DoD Criteria

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving location.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.
5. The extent and timing of potential cost savings.....
6. Economic impacts ....
7.....communities infrastructure.....
8. The environmental impacts.

Military Value Criteria

Installation Assessment

Ranking by Category

Military Value Assessment Band (by category)



Force Structure Plan
Field Inputs
RC Requirements
National Strategy

Stationing Strategy

Installation Category Requirements

Army eg

	WEIGHT	
CAPACITY-MAINTENANCE	150	
CAPACITY-SUPPLY	150	
RESERVE TRAINING	30	
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	50	
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE	30	
MAINTENANCE FLEX	40	
MISSION REQUIREMENTS	---	450
AGE OF FACILITIES	75	
INFRASTRUCTURE	50	
% PERMANENT FACILITY	75	
ENVIRONMENTAL CAP	25	
LAND AND FACILITIES	---	225
EXCESS CAP-MAINT	40	
EXCESS CAP-SUPPLY	40	
BUILDABLE ACRES	20	
ENCROACHMENT	15	
IMA	10	
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	---	125
IBOE	100	
MCA Cost Factor	50	
MISSION OVERHEAD	50	
COST AND MANPOWER	---	200

SCORE		1000
RANK		

Table 60. Depots Decision Pad Model (Table 1 of 2)

	WEIGHT		ANNISTON DEPOT	LETTERKENNY DEPOT	RED RIVER DEPOT
CAPACITY-MAINTENANCE	150		3,200,446	1,995,000--	3,350,808
CAPACITY-SUPPLY	150		1,962,600++	1,195,000--	1,707,000+
RESERVE TRAINING	30		0.30+	2.20	5.10
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	50		6.1	6.2	6.1
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE	30		48,264	59,407+	52,006
MAINTENANCE FLEX	40		13	13	12-
MISSION REQUIREMENTS	---	450	7.2	2.8	5.1
AGE OF FACILITIES	75		44.00-	43.00	44.00-
INFRASTRUCTURE	50		7.6+	0.0-	6.8+
% PERMANENT FACILITY	75		99%+	83%-	91%
ENVIRONMENTAL CAP	25		7.9	5.3	9.2
LAND AND FACILITIES	---	225	6.5	1.0	4.8
EXCESS CAP-MAINT	40		164,600	56,421,000+	149,770
EXCESS CAP-SUPPLY	40		0	19,000	10,000
BUILDABLE ACRES	20		1,468	3,202	2,139
ENCROACHMENT	15		190.9	161.1	80.7
IMA	10		1195.0	1220.0	1275.0
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	---	125	1.2	6.0	2.5
IBOE	100		$11.38+	$19.28--	$13.40
MCA Cost Factor	50		0.77	1.02	0.94
MISSION OVERHEAD	50		$15.32	$22.37-	$8.32+
COST AND MANPOWER	---	200	6.5	0.4	6.3
		===			
SCORE		1000	6.1	2.3	5.0
RANK			2	4	3

Table 60. Depots Decision Pad Model (Table 1 of 2)

Joint Cross-Service Analysis Process

- JCSG identifies FYDP core workload requirements with *interservicing* potential



- JCSG develops alternatives for interservicing for DoD Component analysis



- Services and JSCG consider alternatives



- Service Recommendations

GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. Mr. Gotbaum, did DoD achieve their objectives in the cross-service areas?

2. Mr. Gotbaum, we understand that the five joint cross-service functional groups reported to you and were established to develop closure and realignment alternatives with a "strong emphasis on cross-service utilization of common support assets."

   Please outline for the Commission the interservicing and consolidation proposals emerging from your cross-service groups and list those that were included in the DoD's recommended list of closures and realignments.

   Did the Office of the Secretary of Defense conduct an independent analysis of cross-service opportunities?

3. Mr. Gotbaum, to your knowledge were any installations removed from the recommendations of the military departments by your office?

   If so, which ones, and for what reasons?

4. Mr. Gotbaum, why were the joint cross-service groups' alternatives given to the Services for their consideration rather than included as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's base closure deliberation process?

5. Mr. Gotbaum, once the 1995 Base Closure recommendations are implemented, where will excess capacity remain? Please identify for the Commssion where excess capacity will exist by Service, by category of base or functional area.

6. Mr. Gotbaum, if implemented, will the Department's recommendations to the Commission reduce a major portion of the excess capacity in any or all of the five cross-service functional areas? Please discuss those areas in which this was not the case and explain.

7. Mr. Gotbaum, the joint cross-service groups calculated functional value. How does functional value relate to military value?

8. Mr. Gotbaum, what was the role of the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Steering Group, which you chair, compared with that of the Review Group chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology?

9. Mr. Gotbaum, what was your role in the cross-service decision process, beyond that of setting standards and guidelines?

10. Mr. Gotbaum, will the Commission receive *all* of the data and study options produced by the joint cross-service groups? When will we receive it?

COSTS/SAVINGS

1. Mr. Gotbaum, the Administration's Fiscal Year 1996 budget reflects net savings of $6.6 billion over 5 years for the first three rounds of base closures. This budget also includes requests for $785 million and $824 million Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997, respectively, to cover costs for the 1995 Commission closures.

How do actual costs and savings compare with what had been anticipated in previous budgets? Differences go both ways

What are the annual costs and savings expected from your recommendations on the 1995 round of closures?

FY96 $ $3.8B Closure

How does the Department keep track of savings and costs from the base closure process?

COMPARE FOR THE RECORD

At what point is it more cost effective to keep excess infrastructure rather than pay the up-front closure costs?
Is there a formula?
Have thresholds been established?
Or, is this just a financial judgement decision?

CRIT IV V

2. Mr. Gotbaum, what is the annual cost of the excess infrastucture remaining after the 1995 round?
Do not know - SVC issue

what is it RECORD

Will this excess infrastructure cost cause a drain on Modernization, Operations and Maintenance funds?

yes

3. Mr. Gotbaum, in the past, despite specific DoD guidance, the Services have used different baselines. For example, the Navy and Air Force used different base years for computing manpower numbers and job losses.

Have these inconsistencies been corrected for your 1995 analysis?

What have you done to ensure a common baseline for analysis among services?

Are there any significant differences among services?

4. Mr. Gotbaum, how did you apply cost of base realignment action (COBRA) analysis to cross-service groups given the different way of computing costs among services? What were the major cost problems and how did you overcome them?

5. Mr. Gotbaum, did DoD factor any external costs, such as leases, into the analysis? If so, what were they and will all such data be provided to the Commission?

FORCE STRUCTURE/CAPACITY

1. Mr. Gotbaum, since the end of the Cold War, the DoD has reduced the Armed Forces by approximately 30 percent. The prior rounds of the base closure process have reduced the size of the DoD infrastructure by approximately 15 percent. The current Defense Planning Guidance and the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) policy guidance set a goal of reducing the infrastructure by another 15 percent.

Does the 1995 list of recommended closures achieve the goal of a 15 percent reduction in infrastructure?

In your view, did DoD need to achieve an additional 15% reduction in infrastructure to bring it in line with the force levels?

What measures of infrastructural capacity did you and the Department use to measure reductions:

1) the number of bases?
2) plant replacement value?
3) building square footage?

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

1. Mr. Gotbaum, several years ago, the Went study of DoD maintenance depots done for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs concluded that there was 25 to 50 percent excess capacity in the depots. The General Accounting Office reviewed the study and concurred that there was significant excess capacity. An April 1994 study by the Defense Science Board concluded that 24 depots remaining after the BRAC 93 closures round will have 20 to 30 percent excess capacity. One of the goals of the Joint Cross-Service Depot Maintenance Group was to eliminate unnecessary duplication and excess capacity.

Do the closure recommendations that you have submitted result in significant elimination of excess depot maintennace capacity?

G yes Klugh 4 to 6-8 excess
Rcmdt 5½-6 Depots

2. Mr. Gotbaum, the staff understands that the joint-cross service Maintenance depot group recommended that eight depots should be closed but DoD's list includes fewer.

What were the eight maintenance depots?

Why wasn't the joint cross-service group's recommendation accepted?

How much excess capacity would be eliminated if the Secretary's recommendations are accepted?

How much additional excess capacity would be eliminated if all eight maintenance depots closed?

3. Mr. Gotbaum, as you know, excess capacity is one of the primary factors considered by this Commission in deciding whether or not a particular base or activity should be closed or realigned. An April 1994 Defense Science Board study indicates Air Force aviation depots expect to reduce their capacity by more than 4.9 million direct labor hours between fiscal years 1994 and 1997.

Please explain how the Air Force will reduce the total depot capacity for its aviation depot facilities by 4.9 million direct labor hours.

Will the Air Force eliminate workstations through permanent divestiture of plant equipment and facilities or will the maintenance capability simply be placed on layaway?

4. Mr. Gotbaum, in May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that "Core is the capability maintained within organic Defense depots to meet readiness and sustainability requirements...Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the ***minimum facilities, equipment and skill personnel necessary*** to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence. " (emphasis added)

After the implementation of the proposed closure recommendations, will any of the Services retain capacity above their core level? If so, what are the reasons for retaining this capacity?

Will the DoD's base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability? If not, what means other than the base closure process will the Department use to implement the Deputy Secretary's direction to achieve the minimum number of depot maintenance facilities?

Did you seek to minimize the number of facilities through use of a two-shift per day operation similar to that used by the private sector? If not, did you study the impact that use of the private sector standard would have on achieving the Deputy Secretary's May 1994 guidance.

Please explain how Air Force plans to accomplish this reduction.

Will this reduction result in the closing of one or more of the five Air Force Depots? If not, won't retaining the remaining infrastructure be exceptionally expensive?

5. Mr. Gotbaum, you indicated in testimony last week that the Joint Cross Service Group Depot Team calculated capacity of depots based on a 40-hour work week, or just one shift per activity.

Of course, this is a very conservative eay of measuring capacity since people work more than one shift in times of crisis.

Even with this conservative one-shift calculation, how much excess capacity did the Joint Cross Service Group Depot Team find in the five Air Force depots?

6. Mr. Gotbaum, in May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that private and public competition for maintenance depot workload would be halted due to DoD's ability to determine actual costs. He also stated that efficiencies in the maintenance function will be achieved through interservicing.

What maintenance depot workloads will be done on an interservice basis if the Secretary's recommendations are accepted?

How did interservicing impact the Department's recommendation for maintenance depot closures?

How will interservicing decisions be made if not through competition or the base closure processes?

7. Mr. Gotbaum, in May 1994 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed all system upgrades and modifications will be performed by the private sector. Furthermore, he directed that new weapon systems will no longer transition to organic DoD maintenance facilities, but instead be supported by the private sector.

What is the impact of these policy changes on workload projections in the future?

Do the Department's base closure recommendations reflect the impact of the workload changes which will result from these policy changes?

8. Mr. Gotbaum, the 1993 Commission report stated that the Commission "...strongly supports a joint organization responsible for assigning workloads to DoD's maintenance depots. Joint oversight could mandate cost effective interservicing actions circumventing Services parochial interests...the Commission recommends the Secretary of Defense consider during his bottom up review of the Department, a single defense depot system with a joint responsibility..."

Did the joint cross-service depot maintenance group consider this option as part of their analysis? If so, what was the result of the analysis?

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES

1. Mr. Gotbaum, an April, 1994 Defense Science Board (DSB) report states the Defense Laboratory System is an obsolescent artifact of the Cold War which has not kept pace with the shrinking military force structure and changing patterns of technology advancement generation.

The DSB recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995 through 1999. According to a senior DoD official, these cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction in these personnel by the turn of the century.

How much of a reduction in DoD laboratory infrastucture is contained in your recommendations?

How and when is DoD going to eliminate the excess infrastructure?

TEST AND EVALUATION

Mr. Gotbaum, as you know, test and evaluation was one of the joint cross service areas selected for special emphasis during the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure process (BRAC 95). Several studies and key officials have pointed out that the greatest opportunities for reduction in test and evaluation infrastructure exist in testing of high performance aircraft, electronic warfare systems, weapons and munitions testing, test support aircraft, and selected test and training functions.

Why did DoD's BRAC 95 not recommend significant consolidations in the above areas? Some shrinking w/ service - each svcs considered its T&E facility to be core thus not to be given up

How does the Department plan to reduce its test and evaluation infrastructure?

2. Mr. Gotbaum, please state for the record the specific consolidation and realignment alternatives proposed by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross Service Group at DoD.

3. Mr. Gotbaum, how was capacity measured for laboratories and test and evaluation facilities? Was the basic 8-hour workday used to measure capacity or were additional measures used, such as a two-shift operation? If a two-shift operation was not used, why not?

Medical

Closure and Realignment Decisions

1. Mr. Gotbaum, in 1993 the Commission made specific recommendations to the Department regarding improvements in health care operations and increased cost effectiveness. Most of these recommendations relate directly to cross-service issues.

Did your joint cross-service medical group examine the consolidation of resources across military departments?

If so, what was the outcome of that examination?

How are the results of that examination reflected in the Department's new list of recommended realignments and closures?

2. Mr. Gotbaum, did you direct the joint cross-service medical group to review the costs and benefits of closing military hospitals when bases served by those hospitals are closed? What was the result of that review? Does the Department's list reflect an attempt to ensure that the most cost effective means of delivering care to all beneficiaries are maintained, irrespective of other base closure actions?

3. Mr. Gotbaum, in developing the joint cross-service medical group alternatives, did the group recommend closing military hospitals that are not cost effective, given their patient load and the cost of medical care in their communities? Did the group explore the potential for consolidation, including consolidation across Service lines, in order to increase efficiency?

Medical

Impacts on Beneficiaries

4. Mr. Gotbaum, with only Medicare to fall back on, many retirees, their family members, and survivors over age 65 view their local military hospital as an important source of health care services. Many retirees viewed access to those hospitals for themselves and their spouses as an important inducement to make a career of military service. However, these beneficiaries have always had the lowest priority for receiving most direct care services. Furthermore, it appears that the TRICARE goal of maximizing use of military hospitals for enrolled beneficiaries will further erode their chances of accessing the military health services system because only under 65, civilian health and medical program of the uniformed services (CHAMPUS) eligible beneficiaries are eligible for TRICARE.

Mr. Secretary, is the Department taking steps to ensure that these beneficiaries are not doubly penalized by the closure of military hospitals and their exclusion from the TRICARE program?

5. Mr. Gotbaum, given that wartime medical requirements far exceed those of peacetime, is there enough medical infrastucture remaining to support our two Major Regional Conflict strategy?

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

1. Mr. Gotbaum, in your view, what are the pros and cons of DoD integrating fully Air Force and Navy Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) programs?

2. Mr. Gotbaum, did the Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) Joint Cross Service Group recommend that any Air Force or Navy UPT bases be closed? yes

4. Mr. Gotbaum, does DoD have a policy regarding the cross-servicing of UPT? If so, please discuss. WP HM

5. Mr. Gotbaum, did DoD or the Services consider integrating operations at the same base, using the same training aircraft, in a way that still permits Service-specific training programs?

ECONOMIC IMPACT

1. Mr. Gotbaum, would you define for the record cumulative economic impact? How are losses from previous closure rounds captured? Can impacts from previous closures be differentiated from other negative impacts on the economic area, such as civilian downsizing, or is everything lumped together?

2. Mr. Gotbaum, for the 1993 closure round your staff established cumulative economic impact thresholds that resulted in the removal of at least one installation from the Service recommendations by your staff. Were any similar cumulative economic thresholds set for the 1995 round?

3. Mr. Gotbaum, in calculating cumulative economic impact, how did DoD differentiate between economic impacts caused by previously announced force structure changes and those that were due to closure or realignment decisions?

4. Mr. Gotbaum, was DoD reluctant to close major industrial, laboratory, or test & evaluation installations because of economic impact?

   Was any decision taken to downsize, rather than close an installation, as a result of economic impact considerations?

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT/RESTORATION

1. Mr. Gotbaum, according to the Departments policy guidance, "environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations." But your policy further implies that "unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse."

   Were any installations not recommended for closure or realignment to the Commission due to unique contamination problems? If so, please elaborate.

2. Mr. Gotbaum, did the overall cost of environmental restoration at closure bases limit the size of the list presented to the Commission?

3. Mr. Gotbaum, were any installations eliminated from closure consideration because of the high cost of environmental cleanup?

DEFENSE AGENCIES

1. Mr. Gotbaum, in 1993, the Defense Base Closure Commission realigned a part of the Defense Information Services Agency (DISA) into 16 information processing megacenters. At that time, all officials concluded there would be excess capacity even within these megacenters. Some have suggested that DISA actually requires only 5 megacenters. To realign, DISA would have to come to the Commission to change the 1993 recommendation.

> Given that there is excess capacity within DISA, why are there not recommendations for further consolidation?

2. Mr. Gotbaum, the Defense Finance and Accouonting System (DFAS) is currently slated to consolidate its 300+ offices at the 5 centers it currently operates (Denver, Columbus, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Cleveland). Further, it will add 21 new offices, many of which will be placed on installations slated to close as a result of previous Base Realignment and Closure rounds.

> Why did DoD place most of the 21 new DFAS offices on bases which are to close rather than on bases remaining open which have existing excess capacity?

3. Mr. Gotbaum, about one-third of the 21 new DFAS sites have yet to open. There is a Military Construction (MILCON) requirement for nearly $200 million to make improvements to many the sites, particularly among those not yet open.

> In light of the ongoing consolidation efforts taking part in other parts of DoD, would it be worthwhile to consider further reductions in the number of DFAS sites?

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

February 6, 1995

Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Perry:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will begin its hearings on the Defense Department's recommendations to close or realign military installations in the United States on March 1, 1995. I would like to invite you and General Shalikashvili to testify at the Commission's opening hearing and to present the Department's 1995 closure and realignment recommendations to the Commission.

The Commission would like you to discuss how the Department's selection criteria and force structure plan have shaped your closure and realignment recommendations. We will be very interested in hearing how your recommendations will affect the ability of the military services to carry out their full range of assigned missions in the future, as well as the costs and expected savings of your recommendations. Given the interest of past Commissions in the issue of consolidating common functions across the military services, I hope your testimony will also highlight any recommendations in this area.

As you know, the 1995 round of base closings is the final round authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. In light of this fact, I intend for this Commission to recommend to the Defense Department and the Congress a process for the closure and realignment of military bases in the future. I hope you will give the Commission your views on this important question.

The hearing will be held in room SD-106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building beginning at 9:30 am. Please provide 100 copies of your opening statement to the Commission staff prior to the hearing. If your staff has any questions before the hearing, they should contact Mr. Frank Cirillo of the Commission staff.

I look forward to your testimony.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

February 6, 1995

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon, Room 2E872
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear General Shalikashvili:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will begin its hearings on the Defense Department's recommendations to close or realign military installations in the United States on March 1, 1995. I would like to invite you to testify with Secretary Perry at the Commission's opening hearing and to present the Department's 1995 closure and realignment recommendations to the Commission.

The Commission would like you to discuss the role that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified Commanders in Chief played in the development of the Department's closure and realignment recommendations. In addition, the Commission is particularly interested in your views on how the Department's recommendations will affect the ability of the military services to carry out the full range of their assigned missions in the future, including the effect of these recommendations on readiness, joint operations and training. Given the interest of past Commissions in the issue of consolidating common functions across the military services, I hope your testimony will include your views on any recommendations in this area.

The hearing will be held in Room SD-106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building at 9:30 am. Please provide 100 copies of your opening statement to the Commission staff prior to the hearing. If your staff has any questions before the hearing, they should contact Mr. Frank Cirillo of the Commission staff.

I look forward to your testimony.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

February 6, 1995

Honorable Joshua Gotbaum
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)
The Pentagon, Room 3E808
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Gotbaum:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will begin its hearings on the Defense Department's recommendations to close or realign military installations in the United States on March 1, 1995. I would like to invite you to testify before the Commission on the afternoon of March 1 at 1:30 p.m. in room SD-106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

The Commission would like your testimony to address the process and methodology used by the Department of Defense in putting together its closure and realignment recommendations for 1995. This should include a discussion of the role that each of the Joint Cross Service Groups played in the development of the Department's recommendations, and the extent to which the alternatives examined by these Groups are reflected in your recommendations. We would also like your testimony to summarize the implementation of prior closure rounds, and the projected schedule, costs and savings from the 1995 round.

As in past years, the Commission will be particularly interested in the economic impact of the Department's closure and realignment recommendations. Your testimony should address in detail the economic impact and cumulative economic impact the closure and realignment recommendations have on the affected communities, as well as the methodology used to measure these impacts.

Finally, as you know, the 1995 round of base closings is the final round authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. In light of this fact, I intend for this Commission to recommend to the Defense Department and the Congress a process for the closure and realignment of military bases in the future. I hope you will give the Commission your views on this important question.

Please provide 100 copies of your opening statement to the Commission staff prior to the hearing. If your staff has any questions before the hearing, they should contact Mr. Jim Owsley of the Commission staff.

I look forward to your testimony.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

CHARTER

A. Official Designation: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

B. Objective and Scope of Activity: In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, there is hereby established a Presidential advisory committee entitled the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which shall review the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense regarding base closures and realignments for the time periods and by the dates set down in the Authorization Act. The Commission shall transmit a report of its findings and conclusions to the President, based upon a review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations in the United States.

C. Period of Time Required: This Commission shall continue to function until December 31, 1995, as specified in the Act.

D. Official or Sponsoring Proponent to Whom the Commission Reports: The Commission shall report directly to the President, and provide copies of its reports to the congressional defense committees.

E. Support Agency: The Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, shall provide administrative and related support for the Commission.

F. Duties and Responsibilities: The Commission will be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress, the President shall designate one such individual to serve as Chairman of the Commission. The functions of the Commission are outlined in B. above and amplified in the Act.

G. Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Manyears: It is estimated that the annual operating costs for the Commission for the calendar years 1991 through 1995 will average $2.65 million. Funding for the operation of the Commission will be appropriated and obtained from the DoD Base Closure Account 1990, as specified in the Act.

H. Number of Meetings: The Commission will meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995. During each of those years it will meet as needed, upon the call of the Chairman, to meet the functions and the responsibilities outlined in B. above and amplified in the Act. Ad hoc panels and staff working groups will perform research and analysis functions, as necessary, to carry out the responsibilities of the Commission.

I. Termination Date: The Commission will terminate on December 31, 1995. This charter will be renewed every two years from the date of its establishment, consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

J. Date Charter is Filed: _____

PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Rule1 The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission ("Commission") was established in Title XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510 as amended. The Commission's operations shall comply with the Act and with these Procedural Rules.

Rule 2 The Commission's meetings, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public. In other respects, the Commission shall comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. app2.

Rule 3 The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

Rule 4 The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman or at the request of a majority of members of the Commission serving at that time.

Rule 5 When the Commission meets to consider (a) the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense ("Secretary") submitted under section 2903(c) of Pub. L. No. 101-510, as amended, (b) the Commission's report to the President under section 2903(d) including the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations, or (c) a revised list of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations under section 2903(e), a quorum shall consist of a majority of the Commission members serving at that time. When the Commission conducts public hearings on the Secretary's recommendations under section 2903(d) (1), a quorum shall consist of one or more members designated by the Chairman.

Rule 6 When the Commission meets to consider (a) the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense ("Secretary") submitted under section 2903(c) of Public Law No. 101-510, as amended, (b) the Commission's report to the President under section 2903(d), or (c) a revised list of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations under section 2903(e) and a QUORUM has been established, a vote shall be required of the Commission to dispense with any of the above responsibilities or to ratify any actions of the Commission. The adoption of any action taken by the Commission with regard to responsibilities (a), (b), or (c) stated above will be by a majority vote of Commission members serving at that time. Commissioners may vote in person or by proxy in accordance with Rule 9. The resolution of all other issues arising in the normal course of the Commission meetings or hearings, etc. will be by a simple majority of the Commissioners present.

Rule 7 The Chairman shall preside at meetings and public hearings of the Commission when he or she is present. In the Chairman's absence, he or she shall designate another member of the Commission to preside.

Rule 8 The Chairman (or another member of the Commission presiding in the Chairman's absence) shall have the authority to ensure the orderly conduct of the Commission's business. This power includes, without limitation, recognizing members of the Commission and members of the public to speak, imposing reasonable limitations on the length of time a speaker may hold the floor, determining the order in which members of the Commission may question witnesses, conducting votes of members of the Commission, and designating Commission members for the conduct of public hearings under section 2903(d)(1).

Rule 9 A member of the Commission may designate another member to vote and otherwise act for the first member when he or she will be absent. The first member shall issue a written proxy stating the specific or limited purpose for which the proxy can be exercised.

Rule 10 These rules other than those required by statute may be amended by the majority vote of the members of the Commission serving at that time.

Rule 11 Public and all interested parties may submit written testimony for the record.

Oath to be administered to all witnesses testifying before the Commission:

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1995 ORGANIZATION CHART

COMMISSIONERS

Staff Director	David Lyles
Executive Director	Charles Smith
Military Assistant	Col. Wayne Purser, USAF
Sr. Exec. Asst to the Chairman	Britta Brackney
General Counsel	Madelyn Creedon
Special Assistant	Christy Still
Counsel	Ralph Kaiser
Counsel	Elizabeth King

ADMINISTRATION

Chris Goode

Budget /Personnel
Paul Stilp
Executive Secretariat
Jeffrey Campbell
ExecSec Assistants
Bond Almand
Antonia Forkin
Walton Smith
Travel/Hearings Coordinator
Shelley Kestner
Travel Assistants
Ziba Ayeen
Melissa Chalfant
Kent Eckles
Paul Hegarty
Raymond Geller
Bob Gibson
Clark Gyure
Staff Assistants
Amy Smith
Altnett Turner

REVIEW & ANALYSIS

Ben Borden

Army Team Leader
Ed Brown

Navy Team Leader
Alex Yellin

Air Force Team Leader
Frank Cirillo

Interagency Team Leader
Bob Cook

Cross Service Team Leader
Jim Owsley

(Individual team members listed separately)

COMMUNICATIONS

Wade Nelson

Deputy Communications Director
Chuck Pizer

Assistant Communications Director
John Earnhardt

LIAISON

Cece Carman

House Liaison
Jim Schufreider

State & Local Liaison
Chip Walgren

Reuse Issues Liaison
Sylvia Davis Thompson

Congressional Assistant
Cristin Ciccone

INFORMATION SERVICES

James K. Phillips

Systems Analyst
David Fuchs

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
OFFICE OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
1995 ORGANIZATION CHART

DIRECTOR
Ben Borden — **Rob Kress**

ARMY TEAM	NAVY TEAM	AIR FORCE TEAM	INTERAGENCY TEAM	CROSS SERVICE TEAM
Team Leader Ed Brown	Team Leader Alex Yellin	Team Leader Frank Cirillo	Team Leader Bob Cook	Team Leader Jim Owsley
Rick Brown	Larry Jackson	Frank Cantwell	Bob Bivins (2)	Ann Reese (2)
J.J. Gertler	Jeff Mulliner	Dave Olson	Dave Henry (5)	Glenn Knoepfle (1)
Steve Bailey (2)	Doyle Reedy (1)	Rick DiCamillo (2)	Deirdre Nurre (4)	Les Farrington (1)
Bob Miller (2)	Eric Lindenbaum (2)	Merrill Beyer (2)	EdFlippen (3)	Dick Helmer (1)
David Lewis (1)	Jim Brubaker (2)	Craig Hall (1)	Marilyn Wasleski (1)	Brian Kerns
Mike Kennedy (1)	David Epstein (1)	Mark Pross (1)	Tyrone Ligon	Joe Varallo
Cliff Wooten	James Landrith	Steve Ackerman	Ty Trippet	

1 Detailee from General Accounting Office
2 Deatilee from Department of Defense
3 Detailee from Federal Aviation Administration
4 Detailee from Environmental Protection Agency
5 Detailee from Department of Commerce

SUPER 25 LIST

SENATE

Senator Bob Dole
Majority Leader
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Washington, DC 20510

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(202) 228-4569 (fax)

Staff Contact: Dan Stanley

Senator Tom Daschle
Minority Leader
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(202) 224-2047 (fax)

Staff Contact: Brad Van Dam

Senator Strom Thurmond
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
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Washington, DC 20510

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(202) 228-3781 (fax)

Staff Contact: George Lauffer

Senator Sam Nunn
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
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Staff Contact: Arnold Punaro

Senator John McCain
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Staff Contact: Ann Sauer

Senator John Glenn
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Armed Services Committee
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(202) 224-7983 (fax)

Staff Contact: Suzanne McKenna

Senator Mark O. Hatfield
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
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Senator Robert C. Byrd
Ranking Member
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Washington, DC 20510

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Staff Contact: Dick D'Amato

Senator Ted Stevens
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
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Staff Contact: Steve Cortese

Senator Daniel Inouye
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
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(202) 224-3001 (fax)

Staff Contact: Charlie Houy

Senator Conrad Burns
Chairman
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Committee on Appropriations
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Staff Contact: Jim Morhard

Senator Harry Reid
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction
Committee on Appropriations
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(202) 224-3001 (fax)

Staff Contact: Dick D'Amato

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Majority Leader
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Staff Contact: Valerie Shank

Rep. Dick Gephardt
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(202) 226-0938 (fax)

Staff Contact: Brett O'Brien

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(202) 225-0789 (fax)

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Larry Shockley

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Larry Shockley

Rep. Joel Hefley
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National Sercurity Committee
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Larry Shockley

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Rep. John Murtha
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Staff Contact: Carmen Scalabba
Greg Dahlberg

Rep. Barbara Vucanovich
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(202) 225-2319 (fax)

Staff Contact: Dennis Parobek

Rep. Bill Hefner
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction
Committee on Appropriations
B-300 RHOB
Washington, DC 20515

(202) 225-3715
(202) 225-4036 (fax)

Staff Contact: Irene Schecter

March 1995

EVENT CALENDAR (as of 2/22/95)

February

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28				

April

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9	10	11	12	13	14	15
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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
			1 **9:00 AM HRG.(Sec. Perry), SD-106** **1:30 PM HRG. (Gotbaum), SD-106**	2	3	4
5	6 **9:00 AM HRG.(Navy), Cannon 345** **1:30 PM HRG.(Air Force), Cannon 345**	7 **9:00 AM HRG.(Army), SD-106** **1:30 PM HRG.(Defense Agencies), SD-106**	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16 **9:00 AM HRG.(Re-use), SH-216** **1:30 PM HRG.(Re-use), SH-216**	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

April 1995

EVENT CALENDAR (as of 2/22/95)

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20 **9:30 AM HRG.(GAO)** **1:30 PM HRG.(Re-use)**	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

March

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May

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7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

May 1995

EVENT CALENDAR (as of 2/22/95)

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9 **DELIBERATIONS (ADDS)**	10 **DELIBERATIONS (ADDS)**	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

April

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
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June

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4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
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25	26	27	28	29	30	

June 1995

EVENT CALENDAR (as of 2/22/95)

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
May S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31		July S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31		1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12 **HEARINGS (Cong.)**	13 **HEARINGS (Cong.)**	14 **HEARINGS (Cong.)**	15 **HEARINGS**	16	17
18	19	20	21 **DELIBERATIONS**	22 **DELIBERATIONS**	23 **DELIBERATIONS**	24 **DELIBERATIONS**
25	26 **DELIBERATIONS**	27 **COMMISSIONER REVIEW**	28	29	30	