

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**



INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS

MARCH 6TH, 1995

**ROOM 345
CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING**

WASHINGTON, D.C.



**Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader**

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**HEARING AGENDA
MARCH 6, 1995
RM 345, CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING**

9:00AM - 11:30AM MORNING SESSION:

Witness: The Honorable John H. Dalton
 Secretary of the Navy

 Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda
 Chief of Naval Operations

 General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.
 Commandant of the Marine Corps

 The Honorable Robert B. Pirie, Jr.
 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment

11:30AM Press Availability

12:00PM - 1:30PM Lunch: Cannon Rm 311.

1:30PM - 4:00PM AFTERNOON SESSION:

Witness: The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall
 Secretary of the Air Force

 General Ronald R. Fogleman
 Chief of Staff of the Air Force

 General Thomas S. Moorman
 Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

 Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr.
 Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Base Realignment
 and Transition

4:00PM Commission Business Meeting

4:30PM Press Availability





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF SENATOR DIXON

MORNING HEARING

MARCH 6, 1995

WASHINGTON, DC

GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN AND WELCOME.

AND LET ME ALSO WELCOME -- MOST GRATEFULLY, I MIGHT ADD -- MY FELLOW
BASE CLOSURE COMMISSIONERS. WHO WERE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE LAST
THURSDAY. THEY ARE, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER, AL CORNELLA, REBECCA COX,
J.B. DAVIS, S. LEE KLING, BENJAMIN MONTOYA, JOE ROBLES AND WENDI STEELE.

THESE DEDICATED PEOPLE HAVE SPENT MUCH TIME IN THE PAST WEEKS
PREPARING THEMSELVES TO SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. AND THEY ARE
PREPARED -- UP TO SPEED ON THE ISSUES AND READY TO PROCEED WITH THE
DIFFICULT TASK AHEAD.

THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS THIS MORNING IS TO FORMALLY INSTALL THESE
SEVEN MEN AND WOMEN AS MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION. I WOULD ASK EACH OF THE COMMISSIONERS TO
RISE. RAISE YOUR RIGHT HANDS, AND REPEAT AFTER ME THE OATH OF OFFICE:

I, (AND STATE YOUR NAME), DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR THAT I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL ENEMIES, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC; THAT I WILL BEAR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE TO THE SAME; THAT I TAKE THIS OBLIGATION FREELY, WITHOUT ANY MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION; AND THAT I WILL WELL AND FAITHFULLY DISCHARGE THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF WHICH I AM ABOUT TO ENTER. SO HELP ME GOD.

CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU ALL.

THIS MORNING WE BEGIN THE FIRST OF FOUR HEARINGS THE COMMISSION WILL HOLD TODAY AND TOMORROW HERE IN WASHINGTON. AT THE FIRST THREE HEARINGS, WE WILL HEAR FROM AND QUESTION THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND THEIR CHIEFS OF STAFF ABOUT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO CLOSE OR REALIGN BASES IN THEIR BRANCH OF THE SERVICE. AT THE FOURTH HEARING -- TOMORROW AFTERNOON -- WE WILL HEAR FROM HEADS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES AFFECTED BY CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS.

THIS MORNING, WE ARE PLEASED TO HAVE WITH US THE HONORABLE JOHN H. DALTON, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY; ADMIRAL JEREMY M. BOORDA, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; GENERAL CARL E. MUNDY, JR., THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS; AND THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR., THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT.

BEFORE WE SWEAR IN THE WITNESSES AND BEGIN WITH SECRETARY DALTON'S OPENING STATEMENT, THOUGH, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT REGARDING AN ISSUE I HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT SINCE LAST TUESDAY, WHEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RELEASED HIS LIST OF PROPOSED CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS.

THAT LIST INCLUDED THREE FACILITIES THAT ARE LOCATED IN THE AREA WHERE I HAVE SPENT MY ENTIRE LIFE AND WHICH I SERVED AS AN ELECTED OFFICIAL IN ONE CAPACITY OR ANOTHER FOR 42 YEARS. THOSE FACILITIES ARE THE MELVIN PRICE SUPPORT CENTER IN GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS, THE SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT IN SAVANNA, ILLINOIS AND THE ARMY'S AVIATION TROOP COMMAND IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, THE CITY WHERE I, AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER ILLINOISANS, WORK.

FOR 22 YEARS I SERVED AS A STATEWIDE ELECTED OFFICIAL IN ILLINOIS -- THE LAST 12 OF WHICH WERE HERE IN WASHINGTON AS A UNITED STATES SENATOR. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP I SHARE WITH THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS HAS LED ME TO DECIDE THAT I WILL VOLUNTARILY RECUSE MYSELF FROM THE COMMISSION'S CONSIDERATION OF THE INSTALLATIONS I HAVE NAMED.

I MAKE THIS DECISION BECAUSE OF MY FEELINGS FOR THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS AND BECAUSE I DO NOT WANT THOSE FEELINGS EVER TO BE CONSTRUED IN A WAY THAT CALLS INTO QUESTION THE VERY IMPORTANT WORK OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION.

THIS DECISION WAS NOT MADE AS A RESULT OF ANY LEGAL REQUIREMENT OR FINANCIAL CONFLICT. THIS DECISION IS MY PERSONAL AND WHOLLY VOLUNTARY DECISION, MADE BECAUSE OF MY UNIQUE AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS AND AS A RESULT OF MY SERVICE TO THEM AS A STATEWIDE ELECTED OFFICIAL.

NOW, LET ME SAY THAT IN 1993, AS PART OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994, THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT WAS AMENDED TO REQUIRE THAT ALL TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT A PUBLIC HEARING BE PRESENTED UNDER OATH. AS A RESULT, ALL OF THE WITNESSES WHO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMISSION THIS YEAR MUST BE SWORN IN BEFORE TESTIFYING.

SECRETARY DALTON, ADMIRAL BOORDA, GENERAL MUNDY AND MR. PIRIE, WOULD YOU PLEASE RISE AND RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND.

DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION SHALL BEE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?
THANK YOU. MR. SECRETARY. YOU MAY BEGIN.



Remarks as delivered by
The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
6 March 1995

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, it is an honor for me to appear before you today to provide an overview of the recommendations for closure and realignment of Navy and Marine Corps bases and installations.

These recommendations have been generated through a process that builds upon the successful BRAC-93 procedures. That process was validated in the last round by both the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BCRC) after a very thorough and extensive review.

Mr. Chairman, our primary goal for BRAC-95 was, of course, to reduce Department of the Navy infrastructure to the minimum shore facilities required to sustain the Navy and Marine Corps forces through 2001. But, more than that, we are seeking to design a more streamlined, efficiently located, and responsive baseline of support, capable of meeting the needs of a forward deployed, expeditionary force. This is an absolutely critical requirement. Our visibility throughout the world must be reflective of a potent force that is able to demonstrate our resolve wherever it is deployed.

With our transition in operational focus to a "...From the Sea" fighting force, we must also undertake "rightsizing" of our infrastructure support. Such "rightsized" infrastructure must be able to sustain naval forces in the broad spectrum of responses which I'm sure, Mr. Chairman, you fully appreciate, based on your many years of experience in defense matters as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. We have been careful to ensure that the remaining Navy and Marine Corps base structure is correctly configured to maintain a broad range of demanding operational requirements well into the foreseeable future. While we recognize that the resources freed up by this process are vital to future readiness, we are mindful of our obligation to preserve readiness today as well. With it comes a responsibility that has caused us to scrutinize each detail of each decision in each recommendation to be sure that we do not, through lack of foresight, leave our nation vulnerable in any way. We embrace the base closure process as a unique opportunity to properly tailor our shore support organization and have sought to take full advantage of that opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, in your invitation, you highlighted the fact that this is the last round of base closure authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. You also indicated you are interested in a process for future base closure. There is no question that your previous experience, combined with your current position, places you in a unique position to influence the direction of this process today and well into the future.

With this in mind there are two questions that need to be asked. First, "how soon should we begin this process again?" This, I believe, is dependent on the availability of adequate funding necessary to carry out the base closures already approved by previous BRAC decisions. If we are forced to retain installations because of a shortfall in funding two negative situations will result. First, the Department of the Navy will not be able to achieve all the benefits we are counting on with our "rightsizing" effort. And, secondly, communities will not be able to convert these installations for economic redevelopment. This would be the worst of all possible worlds. Couple this with the expected further downsizing of our force structure, and I believe we may once again need the streamlined, open process allowed by this Base Closure Act to reorient our infrastructure as required by then-current conditions. Without that process, we have a very limited ability to affect such changes on our own.

The second question I believe is this, "is there a better way to do this work in the future?" From the Department of the Navy's perspective, the Base Closure Act has worked well. I think, Mr. Chairman, you and your former colleagues on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees accomplished a remarkable achievement with this legislation. If it is possible to duplicate it for future rounds of base closure, it has our endorsement.

On the other hand, because this is the last scheduled round of closures, we have proceeded as if this were our final chance to bring the size of our infrastructure into balance with the declining size of operating forces.

We have faced a very different challenge from the first rounds of base closure. As we performed detailed studies of our remaining support infrastructure, it was evident that the margin separating activities to keep, and those to give up, was slight. Nevertheless, we have arrived at a coherent set of recommendations which, when taken together with the decisions made in all previous rounds, result in a Navy and Marine Corps infrastructure able to support the kind of fast-paced, flexible, world-wide operations that our men and women will be conducting well into the next century.

Four principal themes are evident in our process and recommendations. First, we must retain the ability to pursue or sustain essential technological effort. Next, we must provide appropriate maintenance support to fleet assets. Third, our operational homeports must be structured to provide the necessary degree of flexible responsiveness. Finally, we will position forces, training and support functions in a manner supporting the Total Force concept. With BRAC-95 we have eliminated unnecessary duplication in the Navy and Marine Corps without adversely impacting the quality of life achievements recently attained. The savings we generate from this process are absolutely critical to recapitalization -- the linchpin of our future readiness.

After all BRAC decisions are implemented, the bases and installations that remain will support the critical warfighting effectiveness of our Sailors and Marines. We have

maintained the infrastructure necessary for them to train, to perform needed maintenance to ships, aircraft and other weapons systems, and to provide other support to operating forces. These also are the places where our men and women live. Therefore, it is important that these bases and stations contribute to overall morale, and thus operational readiness, by providing acceptable housing, and sufficient social, recreational, religious, and other support for Sailors, Marines and their families.

With these objectives in mind, I charged the Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Richard Danzig, to assemble a Base Structure Evaluation Committee for the evaluation and deliberations required to satisfy the mandates of the Act. This Committee was chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment, Mr. Robert B. Pirie. The Vice Chair is Mr. Charles P. Nemfakos, a senior career civil servant. The other members of the Committee are four Flag and General officers and two additional Senior Executive Service career civilians.

We employed a methodology characterized by the highest standards of analytical rigor. The Committee was supported by the Base Structure Analysis Team, whose responsibility was to collect data and perform analysis as directed by the Evaluation Committee. The Analysis Team was composed of about 50 senior military and civilian analysts. They represent a broad spectrum of operational and technical expertise.

The Naval Audit Service worked in conjunction with the Analysis Team to ensure that the standards of integrity which the public has every right to expect were strictly followed. These auditors reviewed and validated the data gathering process from top to bottom, employing over 250 auditors from coast-to-coast and in Washington.

To ensure that the process was responsive to Navy and Marine Corps leadership, the Evaluation Committee held a number of deliberative sessions with the Fleet Commanders in Chief and other major commanders to apprise them of the progress of the process and to discuss potential impacts on Fleet operations, support, and readiness. Prior to making my final decision, I met with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps several times to seek their advice as well.

When considered in conjunction with the previous rounds of base closures, BRAC-95 represents the continuation of a significant initiative to correctly align infrastructure with the operational forces it must support. Clearly, excess capacity remains. But where it remains, it has been identified as peculiar to a particular type of installation, or it is being retained to protect future flexibility.

The efforts of the Department of Defense Joint Cross-Service Groups complemented our process. The task of these multi-service analytical groups was to identify possible asset sharing opportunities in five functional areas and the crucial area of economic impact. Members of our Analysis Team were assigned to each of the Cross-Service Groups, to ensure that both technical and base closure knowledge and experience were applied to

the functional analyses conducted by the groups. Many alternatives forwarded by the Joint Groups were anticipated by Department of the Navy scenarios already under study. We formally considered all of the Joint Cross-Service alternatives, and many of our recommendations include Joint Group suggestions. The joint cross-service process not only gave us a broader sense of what was possible, it also confirmed the validity of our evaluation process.

I'm confident that the Commission recognizes the enormity of the task involved in reviewing over 800 activities in five categories fully considering all mechanisms to reduce excess capacity. The consistent theme in looking at that large universe of activities was to ensure that we could satisfy our goal of having a shore infrastructure that had the full range of capability to support our Navy and Marine Corps Team.

And now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss each of our five major groupings and to portray how our evaluation of each is consistent with what we believe our naval forces need to satisfy our future requirements.

It was clear, Mr. Chairman, from the beginning of this round, that we must proceed very carefully in our search for excess capacity. We could not afford to give up what we might need in this uncertain world to retain the flexibility that our Operational Commanders require. The approach taken in this final round was profoundly affected by the 1993 base closure round. As you recall, in 1993, my Department completely closed two major ship homeports and both a Navy and a Marine Corps major aviation center. Our decisions this time were carefully constructed to ensure that our forces had sufficient capacity remaining at operational bases to ensure the flexible response to changing operational requirements that has become so vital to the Naval forces' ability to go in harm's way, as well as to perform emerging new peacetime missions.

Much of the remaining ship home porting capacity is located in our fleet concentrations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. While our aggressive operating tempo would allow some additional closures, I did not think it prudent to further reduce our stateside infrastructure beyond the actions from the BRAC-93 round.

The changing shape of our Pacific fleet, and the changing nature of Pacific deployment patterns, allowed us to reduce our Western Pacific presence in Guam, while retaining the necessary wharves, infrastructure, and equipment to allow continued access. The realignment of the Naval Activities on Guam eliminates the day-to-day presence of the Fleet Combat Support Ships, supply stores, and ashore maintenance organization, while retaining the necessary infrastructure from these activities to allow reconstitution if the need arises. The Naval Magazine, Hospital, Communications Station and on station afloat emergent repair capability remain on the island, providing a robust Navy presence.

In a related realignment, the Naval Aviation assets presently on Guam, and scheduled

for relocating from the Naval Air Station closed in the BRAC-93 round to Andersen Air Force Base, are recommended to be relocated with the Supply Ships they support or collocated with similar aviation assets at existing bases elsewhere.

The remaining Naval Stations are sized and located to allow the Operational Commanders the flexibility they need to conduct the day-to-day training, maintenance and logistics support to guarantee the force readiness required to meet the Department's global commitments.

For Naval Aviation, previous round closures were cost effective but had significant start-up costs at existing bases for the transfer of assets from closing bases. Naval Aviation assets have continued to be significantly reduced in the force structure plan. Our analysis this time considered realignment of prior BRAC movements in order to minimize future expenditure of scarce resources by better using existing facilities through collocation of like airframes and grouping of common missions at existing bases.

Reassigning carrier based anti-submarine warfare assets to Naval Air Station Jacksonville builds a synergy of anti-submarine warfare platforms and allows single siting of all Navy F-14 and Navy Atlantic Fleet strike-fighter tactical aviation in existing capacity at Naval Air Station Oceana. Pacific Fleet carrier support aviation is redirected to North Island. The combination of these redirections saves military construction at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point and Naval Air Station Lemoore equivalent to an entire naval air station, and avoids the building of new capacity for Naval Aviation.

The shift in location and reduction in maritime patrol operations allows the closure of Naval Air Station Adak. The vital asset at Naval Air Station Key West is its irreplaceable training airspace, so I have recommended realigning it to a Naval Air Facility to release unneeded excess infrastructure not associated with the operational training mission.

When considering Reserve aviation infrastructure, we focused on the fleet commander's desire to have the best possible aviation capability in the Northeast region. The best way to meet fleet operational needs, support Total Force requirements and reduce excess capacity was to close Naval Air Station South Weymouth and move Reserve assets to Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine. This supports integration of regular and Reserve forces, preserves demographics and gives us the most capable base north of Norfolk to support fleet operations.

Depot maintenance is a cornerstone of fleet readiness and of forward presence and power projection sustainment. Our ability to provide the required depot support for our operational forces is critical to ensuring the nation's ability to continue meeting the high operational tempo associated with contingency operations. Our BRAC-95 analysis

focused on eliminating excess capacity while ensuring that the right combination of capability and capacity remained to meet fleet operational requirements. The Navy Department's depot capabilities are the most diverse in Department of Defense and span aviation, surface ships, submarines, and ground combat weapon systems. While excess capacity was fragmented across a large number of diverse categories, significant reductions overall will be achieved through our BRAC-95 recommendations.

The smaller force structure with little relief from operational requirements dictates a highly responsive, robust industrial maintenance capability at major fleet concentrations. The Department must safeguard a level of nuclear ship repair capability and the ability to meet both scheduled and emergent depot maintenance requirements to support fleet assets forward deployed around the world. Our BRAC-95 depot maintenance recommendations are a continuation of the efforts that began in 1991 and include the closure the Ship Repair Facility at Guam and our last remaining non-nuclear shipyard at Long Beach. The decreased ship depot maintenance requirements associated with a smaller force and changing deployment patterns enable the closure of these activities, while meeting fleet requirements to support Unified Commanders' taskings.

Additional excess capacity was eliminated through consolidations, divestiture of facilities, and the incorporation of technical center industrial workload into remaining depot activities. These actions, along with previous closures equate to a reduction of 50% of our aviation depots, 64% of our shipyards and ship repair facilities, and 64% of the depot maintenance functions that were previously located at our technical center activities. The magnitude of these reductions clearly demonstrates the Department's firm commitment to "rightsizing" to levels commensurate with future requirements.

We applied a great deal of emphasis and energy to the review of our array of Technical Centers. Our efforts were focused on "rightsizing" to the appropriate minimum set of sites that would give significant overhead cost reductions, while, at the same time, ensuring that we could pursue essential technologies and develop warfighting systems capability well into the twenty-first century. We tried to match our infrastructure reductions with the changes in numbers and use of our operational forces. Our emphasis was to minimize the amount of topline money going into the cost of operating and maintaining a large infrastructure and to focus our limited resources on the development, acquisition, and operation of warfighting systems.

We developed a mosaic map of the workload and capabilities of all Navy technical activities. We then attempted to reduce excess capacity through consolidation of similar work into the larger sites with full spectrum, total life cycle and total systems responsibilities. We continued our historical thrust of the collocation of our laboratory and development responsibilities with sites where major ranges exist. Throughout our deliberations, we were ever mindful of the need to provide immediate technical support and maintenance to the major fleet concentrations.

I am pleased to report that we have developed a list of recommendations that we feel will significantly improve technical support to the fleet while reducing overhead costs and duplication. We shed depot and industrial functions from the Technical Centers and returned these efforts to the Navy Industrial activities or made the decision to depend on the private sector.

An example of this industrial consolidation is our recommended closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky. This action consolidates ships' weapons systems--primarily guns and associated equipment-- with the general industrial workload at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, which already has many of the required facilities. This functional workload distribution also offers an opportunity for cross-servicing large gun barrel plating functions to the Army Watervliet (Water-vay) Arsenal in New York. Some engineering will relocate with other engineering workload at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Port Hueneme, California. The Close-in-Weapons Systems depot maintenance functions collocated with similar functions at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane Indiana.

Likewise, the closure of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana collocates similar efforts into Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana, but also consolidates weapons workload into the extensive laboratories and ranges at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California, and moves aircraft related efforts into the significant consolidations that form the Aircraft Center of Excellence at Patuxent River, Maryland. By these consolidations we also realize both a reduction in excess capacity and major reductions in cost.

Obviously, Mr. Chairman, the closures were difficult decisions. But the reduction of excess capacity, the relocation of functional workload to activities performing similar work, and the economies that will be gained in the management of these similar functions demanded our consideration and resulting recommendations. Our recommendations both reduce our technical infrastructure and result in significant savings to the taxpayer and the Department of Defense, without impeding our ability to provide the forward presence, power projection and warfighting responsibilities for which we are responsible.

Operational education flexibility was the key to the Department's examination of the existing capacity within the training establishment. To support the smaller force levels dictated by the Force Structure for 2001, it might appear that we could dramatically shrink our capacity. However, we were concerned that our training activities be able to support fleet operational requirements to allow Sailors and Marines to be trained in their homeports, and that we continue to offer graduate level education and the opportunity to participate in the type of policy decision-making exercises the Naval War College offers in the joint service world. Accordingly, we eliminated excess aviation training capacity by closing and realigning two training air stations to take advantage of the full airspace and ground support synergies at the West Florida and South Texas

complexes. We also realigned "schoolhouse" training activities to be more responsive either to the fleet or to follow-on training opportunities. The result of these actions are centralized, economically-based training center complexes which serve fleet sailors and marines. Our recommendations result in educational institutions, fleet training centers, and training air stations which provide personnel-oriented, family-supportive training complexes that meet requirements for today and the future. These recommendations build on and support initiatives endorsed by previous BRAC decisions.

In the Personnel Support/Other category the Department evaluated the changes that were necessary to reflect force downsizing and closures. The focus in Reserve centers was to retain an infrastructure that supports a Reserve force that is robust, demographically sound and supports fleet readiness. For administrative activities, we pursued further streamlining to eliminate excess and support the President's National Performance Review. Reduction of management layers continues and further refines the process begun by the Department in BRAC 93.

Our recommendations resize the Reserve infrastructure by closing eleven Reserve Centers. These closures, in conjunction with BRAC 93 recommendations, maintain a presence in each state, maintain a demographically sound Reserve establishment, and are supportive of the fleet, Reserve recruiting, and readiness.

Six actions for closure and realignment are recommended for administrative activities. All of these actions reflect a concerted effort to balance the need to reduce infrastructure against that of supporting force readiness. The redirect of Space and Naval Warfare Command Headquarters to San Diego is an example of the effort to create a synergy between the Navy's headquarters commands and the fleet. This redirect consolidates a command activity with its technical activity in an area of fleet concentration. It collocates those providing the requirement with those having the requirement, and eliminates one entire management layer. This action will allow translation of fleet requirements into a product that functions in the operational environment with minimal delays.

With these recommendations I am happy to report that our BRAC-95 goals have been achieved. They reflect the closure or realignment of 62 Department of the Navy activities. Annual savings will exceed \$600 million per year, with a net present value of savings of \$8.5 billion over 20 years. These actions should be viewed in conjunction with the significant actions undertaken by the Department during BRAC-93, where our actions resulted in annual savings of \$1.4 billion and a net present value of savings of \$9.7 billion over 20 years.

For example, if implemented, the elimination of the excess capacity represented in our current recommendations could translate, in the first year alone, to the capability to accomplish nearly \$1-billion in research and development work, plus the overhaul of 12 major combatants, the training of 800 naval aviators, and the basing of approximately

two carrier air wings.

While this round of base closure evaluation was underway, the Department of the Navy continued the process of implementing the prior three rounds of BRAC decisions. For Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997 we have requested over \$3 billion to execute our base closure program. Ninety-eight Navy and Marine Corps bases were identified for closure in the previous three rounds. Thirty-eight other bases were selected for realignment. Of the original 98 bases, 49 have been closed and 11 others have been realigned. We would like to be further along on implementing these decisions, but we have been hampered by less than adequate funding. These resource limitations have restricted our ability to close facilities in a timely manner and have delayed our expected savings. These delays not only jeopardize force modernization, they also delay return of these facilities to productive civilian use.

With our BRAC-95 recommendations, Mr. Chairman, the Department of the Navy also anticipates considerable savings once the actions are realized. Obviously, if the implementation process is delayed or full funding is not received, the savings we have projected will not be realized. We already expect, and we are basing our Department budget projections on the realization of \$1.9 billion per year in savings from earlier BRAC rounds. It is, therefore, absolutely vital that we stay the course; we must make these suggested cuts in excess infrastructure. Our future readiness depends on it.

The base realignment and closure process, as you and your colleagues had the foresight to envision when you gave us these tools, has come a long way from those early days of 1988, which I know you remember well, Mr. Chairman. I can fully assure you that our process of selection has been as accurate, fair, responsible, and responsive as we could possibly make it.

As in the previous rounds, Mr. Chairman, this is a very painful process. We are saying goodbye to trusted friends and dedicated communities. They have nurtured and adopted our bases. They have fed and housed our troops. They have entertained and counseled our families during those long absences for which our maritime forces are well known. They were always there to welcome us home and to honor those who gave all they had to give. Because of this long-standing relationship, I believe the efforts of your committee are critical in ensuring the citizens of these communities that the correct decisions have been made.

Throughout the Nation we are seeing the successful reutilization of our Navy and Marine Corps installations. Local leaders are implementing plans to diversify the use of land and facilities closed and realigned under previous BRAC actions. We are confident that with the President's "Five Part Community Reinvestment Program" we can work together with communities to create new jobs. You can be confident we will do every thing we can to revitalize our communities.

And now I would like to introduce Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, General Carl E. Mundy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Pirie, Chairman of our Base Structure Evaluation Committee, and Mr. Charles P. Nemfakos, Executive Director of our Base Structure Analysis Team.

**Remarks as delivered by
The Honorable Robert B. Pirie, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment)
to the 1995
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
6 March 1995**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, it is an honor for me to appear with Secretary Dalton, Admiral Boorda and General Mundy today. I will try not to repeat nor dwell on points they have previously made, but to take you through the Department of the Navy's process for the 95 BRAC round. I will illustrate the process in detail by showing how the Department of the Navy addressed one specific area, the ship depot maintenance infrastructure requirement to support and maintain the 2001 force structure.

The Department focused on a qualitative target, rather than quantitative goals, to measure our efforts in this round of base closure. Admiral Boorda described these goals and their support of the Department's posture for the twenty-first century. This final round of base closure mandated by the Base Closure Act is a continuation of the prior strong commitment to the process begun in the 1988, 1991 and 1993 base closure rounds.

The list of major closures highlights the strong focus on the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation activities this round, as well as the continuing rationalization of our Operational Bases, Industrial Facilities, and Training establishment.

Clearly, the process is driven by a hard budget reality. Each successive round of base closures has acted to close a widening gap between the Department's bottom line and our infrastructure overhead. The close alignment of personnel and installation numbers after this final round of base closure is an indication of our success in this effort.

I will now lead you through the Department of the Navy process used to carry out the Act and the DoD guidance on base closure for 1995. The Department's organization to implement the law was formally established by the Secretary on December 8, 1993. Building on the lessons learned from the 1993 round, a two tiered organization was constituted to collect, analyze and evaluate the Department's infrastructure and requirements. Again, the Office of General Counsel and the Naval Audit Service were called upon to provide senior level support on staff, throughout the process.

The Base Structure Evaluation Committee, or BSEC, is the team of Navy Flag Officers, Marine Corps General Officers, and SES civilian leaders who were tasked to evaluate the certified data received and make the required recommendations on closures and realignments to Secretary Dalton. In addition to myself, the BSEC members include Mr. Charles P. Nemfakos, the Executive Director of the BSAT, our supporting staff, and the DASN (FBIRA); Vice Admiral Richard C. Allen, COMNAVAIRLANT; Vice Admiral William A. Earner, the DCNO

for Logistics; Lieutenant General Harry W. Blot, DC/S Aviation; Lieutenant General J. A. Brabham, DC/S, I & L; Mrs. Genie McBurnett, the Deputy at SPAWAR; and Ms. Elsie Munsell, the DASN (E&S). This group provided the broad spectrum of experience and mature perspective required to make the difficult decisions required by the Act.

The Base Structure Analysis Team, or BSAT, working under Mr. Nempfakos, provided staff support to the BSEC and is filled with some of the top military and civilian talent available in the Department of the Navy today. The breadth and depth of their experience provided a sound footing for the BRAC-95 analytical process undertaken. Examples of members include the former Director of Navy Labs, and former Commanding Officers from an Aircraft Carrier, a Naval Air Station, and the NADEP community. Day to day representation from the Naval Audit Service and the Office of General Counsel ensured that the process was fair, accurate and in accordance with the law and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary.

The DON process ran for more than a year. Improving on lessons learned from previous BRAC rounds, the major owners and operators of our forces and stateside infrastructure, together with the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, participated in all aspects of the process, and the judgment of these senior leaders helped shape the final outcome. The process was designed to satisfy the analysis required by the eight DOD selection criteria.

Beginning in January 1994, the Department polled the 16 major owners and operators of the Navy and Marine Corps installations to identify the issues that they felt were imperative in accomplishing the DON mission. The themes of their imperatives dovetailed with the DON target described earlier, and reinforced the sense of direction the process should take in this round.

The universe of over 800 DON activities was divided into five categories and 27 sub-categories. These groupings allowed similar activities to be compared, and allowed the flexibility of process required to ensure a common sense answer resulted.

The process for the Department began with the development of data calls to gather the certified information necessary to measure the capacity and military value of all the installations in the DON universe. Every data call question was approved by the BSEC, and again improving upon previous rounds, those data calls were provided to the activity commanders for comment and to ensure maximum understanding, before final issue of the data call for response. Data calls were structured so that all responses would be generated at the individual activity level, and the activity commander would certify that the data was complete and correct. As the data was forwarded and reviewed by the chain of command for use by the BSEC in deliberative session, each intervening commander also certified the data's correctness. The certified responses received to these calls provide the backbone for the subsequent analysis.

Capacity analysis was conducted on each of the 27 sub-categories. Quantitative measures of capacity, to assess the "throughput", were developed for each sub-category, and related to the established force structure for Fiscal Year 2001. The capacity for each individual

activity was determined and they were summed across all activities in a sub-category to determine what was in excess of the total DON requirements to support the 2001 force.

The gross excess capacity calculation that resulted would allow a significantly larger force to be supported, therefore subsequent military value analysis was required in 19 of the original 27 sub-categories. It is important to understand that the Department's capacity in many areas is not evenly distributed, not exactly sized for typical units of the force composition, and therefore that some interstitial capacity would remain even if all removable excess were eliminated.

To illustrate the analysis process, I have chosen the Naval Shipyard / Ship Repair Facility sub-category. The gauge chosen to measure capacity and requirement for 2001 was "Direct Labor Man Years". The capacity and requirement were determined in detail, and accumulated into two basic types, nuclear work and non-nuclear work. Overall excess capacity in ship depot repair was calculated to be 7,500 Direct Labor Man Years or 29.4%. Of this, 6,000 DLMYs of the excess was in nuclear capable capacity, and 1,500 DLMYs was in non-nuclear capacity.

A military value analysis was conducted on each of the 19 sub-categories that demonstrated excess capacity. We used a method that was as objective as possible to evaluate activities within a sub-category across the complete spectrum of areas that constitute military value. Each sub-category had a tailored set of "yes/no" questions that covered an aspect of overall military value. Individual questions were associated with the four DoD criteria to which they applied and were weighted based on their importance. It is important to remember that the output score is only a relative measure, and only valid between activities within the same sub-category. Some of the specific questions were "cascaded", so in most military value matrices, the highest possible score was not 100.

The military value analysis was conducted in sequence to ensure the legitimacy of the process. I will again use the Shipyard / Ship Repair Facility sub-category to illustrate the process. The question bank was proposed by the BSAT with questions grouped into subject areas, and each question was approved by the BSEC after deliberation. For Shipyards, there were 149 questions grouped into nine subject areas: Drydocks; Production Workload; Cost and Manpower Factors; Environment and Encroachment; Strategic Factors; Operating Factors; Contingency Factors; Crews of Customer Ships; and Quality of Life. The questions were initially assigned into one of three bands of importance. The BSEC next assigned the DoD criteria to each question, and assigned a weight to each of the four DoD criteria: Readiness, Facilities, Mobilization, and Cost and Manpower, and a score from one to ten to each of the questions. The BSAT then calculated the weight of each of the questions, based on the algorithm the BSEC had previously approved for use, utilizing the weights, bands and scores approved in deliberative session. The weights for individual questions and the subject areas were reviewed in deliberative session for consistency. Only then were individual activity answers to the questions entered into the matrix and activity military value scores computed. The review of the activity military value scores ensured the result was in harmony with the perspectives developed during deliberative session while assigning individual question values.

As you can see, the five Naval Shipyards scored in a range between 38.0 and 57.6 out of 79.1 possible points. The Ship Repair Facility on Guam scored significantly lower. The first column in the chart shows the weight of each of the nine subject areas considered in the military value of shipyards. Drydock capability and Production Workload each account for about thirty percent of the score. Cost and Manpower factors account for another fifteen percent. The Quality of Life score has relatively low weight in this category, because of the small size of the active duty component present in the shipyard work force.

The configuration analysis used a Linear Programming Model to combine the results of the capacity and military value analyses and assist the BSEC in developing a starting point for deliberation. The model was designed to minimize excess capacity and to maintain the initial average military value in the sub-category. The model was constructed to allow a sensitivity analysis for changing force structure or workload. I want to stress that the model results were used only to focus the preliminary BSEC discussions of possible alternatives.

The military perspective of the BSEC members was key to the generation of potential scenarios from the initial model results. The generation of scenarios and measurement of return on investment was an iterative process, with additional scenarios issued after deliberation on the results of the initial scenario results. While the model highlighted possible solutions, it was not the driving factor in the generation of possible scenarios.

Configuration analyses resulted in scenario generation in 18 of the 19 remaining sub-categories. The Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity sub-category was considered to be a follower group of activities and no scenario data calls were issued. The scenario data calls addressed the myriad details required to weigh the costs and benefits from the proposed closure or realignment. The data calls gathered the detailed financial information necessary for the return on investment analysis, as well as information necessary to measure the impact on the communities designated as receiving sites. Owners and operators were permitted to propose alternate receiving sites for the functions at the closing activities. In total, the BSEC reviewed 174 responses involving 119 activities.

The DoD COBRA algorithms were used as the tool to conduct the return on investment analysis. These algorithms provide a consistent method of evaluating the cost-effectiveness of proposed realignment or closure scenarios, but are not intended to develop budget quality data. The BSEC aggressively challenged cost estimates provided from the field to ensure that cost estimates were reasonable and consistent. COBRA was used as a method of ensuring that DON recommendations were cost effective, rather than to identify the "lowest cost" alternative.

The shipyard model used the common rules on capacity and military value, and included the additional rule that nuclear workload could only be accomplished at a nuclear capable yard, while non-nuclear workload could be accomplished by either nuclear or non-nuclear ones. The initial model results proposed the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the Ship Repair Facility on Guam. Secondary and tertiary solutions were also developed by requiring the model to specify the "next best" solutions. Only Long Beach Naval

Shipyard was contained in all three solutions.

After deliberation, and a review of the sensitivity analysis conducted by assuming workload increased by ten percent and decreased by ten or twenty percent, the BSEC directed that scenario data calls be generated for all three activities proposed in the initial solution. These data calls requested the certified information required for the COBRA algorithm, as well as information on where the Fleet Commanders and Systems Command leadership would send the unique facilities and workload to on the closure of the indicated activity.

The Joint Cross Service Group for Depot Maintenance also completed an analysis and forwarded alternatives to the BSEC for consideration and incorporation in the DON process. Many of these alternatives dealt with the interservicing of workload from shipyards to other service depot activities as well as other shipyards. The depot group did recommend the closure of Long Beach and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards. Because of the requirement for a strong presence in the Central Pacific, the Pearl Harbor closure scenario was not considered in a return on investment analysis. The Long Beach joint scenario was considered, but the return on investment was higher in the original DON scenario.

The closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard showed immediate and strong positive return on investment. After deliberation, the BSEC decided not to recommend the closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The closure of all three activities listed in the "optimum" solution reduced excess capacity to essentially zero. Nuclear shipyards, considered impossible to regenerate, had already been extensively reduced in the 1993 BRAC round. The workload flexibility associated with a submarine center of excellence, both in refueling and defueling for decommissioning, warranted retention of the nuclear capable asset at Portsmouth.

To further reduce the excess capacity in ship depot repair capability, over one million hours of depot work on ships systems were transferred from Technical Centers to the remaining shipyards. The NUWC Keyport realignment indicated on this chart, as well as the closures of NSWC Louisville and NAWC Indianapolis are the primary sources of this adjusted workload.

The Ship Repair Facility on Guam is closed, with the floating drydock, crane, and waterfront retained in the custody of the Naval Activities to ensure emergency access in the Western Pacific, even though the robust repair capability on Guam is no longer required. The release of the surge docking assets at Philadelphia retained in a previous BRAC round completes the picture of the scenario and return on investment deliberations in this complex area.

Economic impact analysis was conducted on each candidate for closure or realignment. This employment based analysis, calculating both the direct and indirect jobs lost due to the proposed action determined both the absolute change, the number of jobs lost, and the percentage change in unemployment for the affected labor market area. This impact was weighed against the historical trend in that area, based on available Department of Labor statistics. This analysis is conservative because any potential recovery or reuse of the candidate facilities is not considered. Across all the candidate closures and realignments, the total direct

and indirect jobs lost is estimated to be less than 33,000 over the six year implementation period of the actions. The national job growth rate is about 300,000 jobs per month, so on a national scale, the proposed closures do not have significant impact.

The information on the Los Angeles - Long Beach area illustrates the data reviewed in deliberative session. The Long Beach area mirrors the country as a whole: no extraordinary impact is seen. While the economic impact is 13,000 jobs, that number is only 0.3% of the total employment in the metropolitan area. The scenario proposed shifts 1500 workyears of effort from the shipyard to the private sector in the area, further mitigating the loss.

The final two areas that required review in compliance with the DoD selection criteria were the impact on the local community receiving the assets from closing and realigning bases, and the environmental impact of the proposed action. Both areas were reviewed for each candidate action, and no significant community infrastructure or environmental impacts were identified for any candidate scenario. Community impact looked at the total number of personnel the community gained and the current DON population in the community. Required MILCON was reviewed and any community impact MILCON was highlighted.


Some of the Long Beach Shipyard personnel transferred to the Supply Center in San Diego. The San Diego summary used by the BSEC to weigh the community impact on San Diego is illustrated. Although the total MILCON required to effect all moves into the San Diego area totals \$80 million, none was required for community impact. The number of personnel gained is not significant, compared to the already large DON presence in the area.

Environmental assessment was accomplished by studying the impact of installation restoration (IR), air quality, natural & cultural resources, and unrestricted property available at the gaining base. The assessment compared the amount of DON management effort necessary at both gaining and losing bases to comply with statutes in the environmental arena. No activity required removal from the list of potential gaining sites due to environmental issues.

The proposed closures and realignments remove significant excess infrastructure from the Department's account. There is little overhead left in the Department's infrastructure. What we are proposing for closure in this, the final round, cuts deep into capable productive infrastructure. Unfortunately, it is infrastructure that we can not afford and can not fully utilize with the significantly smaller force anticipated in 2001.

The specific wording of each recommendation has been carefully crafted, for this is the last chance. There may never be further rounds to correct oversights in the recommendation wording, so each was carefully crafted to ensure the widest possible set of options for community reuse is permitted. Additionally, the language allows the military commanders the flexibility to position their forces in response to operational requirements. This is done recognizing that flexibility of decision in implementation inevitably invites external pressure for solutions that the Department may not believe to be in the best public interest. The proposals forwarded by the Department of the Navy for this, the final round under the current Act,

complete the actions started in the three previous BRAC rounds to rationalize our infrastructure for the force of the twenty first century.



GENERAL

1. Secretary Dalton, did the Office of the Secretary of Defense remove or add any installation closures or realignments from your recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics?

2. Secretary Dalton, did anyone in the administration instruct you not to place any specific installations on your list to the Secretary of recommended closures and realignments?

If so, which ones and for what reasons?

3. Secretary Dalton, did the Office of the Secretary of Defense instruct your Service to place or not to place any specific installations for closure or realignment on your listed recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics?

4. Secretary Dalton, will your service have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this commission? Please elaborate.

5. Secretary Dalton, did you or the Office of the Secretary of Defense remove any installations from the recommendations solely for reasons of environmental or economic impact? Please elaborate.

6. Secretary Dalton, given the limitations on the base closure process by current Title 10 restrictions and the fact that excess capacity will more than likely remain after this last and final round under the current Base Closure Law, what method would you recommend for consideration in future base closure efforts?

Dixon
Have a few years
- some 3-4 yrs

7. Secretary Dalton, have you provided to the commission all of the information that you used in your decision-making process?

If not, would you please provide it within the next five days?

8. Secretary Dalton, some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to the DoD proposals.

What guidance did the Navy give its base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

Cox
is the cost Budget

KLING
Record list of
excess capacity
Several Medical? 5

Kling will the navy
copy the recession -
yes news - not a comm we could
spend first

FORCE STRUCTURE/READINESS

1. Secretary Dalton, the Navy's report indicates that even if all recommendations to this Commission regarding the Navy are approved, excess capacity will exist in a number of mission areas.

Additionally, the report indicates that the Navy's goal is to reduce its infrastructure to the minimum required to support its forces in the year 2001.

Would you outline the categories where this excess capacity will remain, along with the reasons for retaining the excess? For example, 344 battle force ships are currently projected in the 1999 force level, a drop from the 425 ships projected two years ago. In view of this reduction, why were no naval bases recommended for closure, even though excess capacity remained at the previously projected force level?

PROCESS

1. Secretary Dalton, we heard testimony last week from Secretary Perry, that the size of the list of recommendations to this commission was limited by the Department of Defense's management ability to implement BRAC actions when they are added to those of previous rounds. In view of the size of the 1993 list, how--if at all--did these concerns affect the Navy's 1995 recommendations?

revised? — we are doing what we need to

ASPW
Robbs
Cornell
Rebut?

2. Secretary Dalton, when a base has multiple functions and, as such, could fall under more than one installation category, it is our understanding that the base was ranked by each of its functions. In these cases, how did the Navy evaluate its military value?

Cornell

3. Secretary Dalton, in the analysis of bases affected by several recommendations, COBRAs examine the effects in the aggregate. In such cases, is there a way to determine the impact of each individual recommendation?

Cornell

4. Secretary Dalton, last week Secretary Gotbaum described the method used by the Services to create a military value ranking for each base in a category which was used to determine closure or realignment choices. Are there any circumstances where the Navy closed or realigned bases which ranked higher than bases not included on the Navy list? If so, please explain the reason for not following the military value rankings.

Cornell

eg
Showa
Long Beach
Dixon

Record

5. Secretary Dalton, the Navy recommendations include a long list of redirects. What is the value of the military construction costs eliminated by the redirects? Are these costs based on the 1993 COBRA analyses or on the more detailed assessments performed during implementation planning?

Robbs
Cornell

Changes in Marine #, Mil con Spans

Full Funding Anticipation
Approval costs — were you
Construction

Robb
NO

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Dixon
Steele

1. Secretary Dalton, your report states that "because of the large number of job losses occurring in California and Guam, the DON decided against recommending several closures that could otherwise have been made."

How did you decide on the economic threshold that eliminated California and Guam from further closures? Did you establish this economic threshold on your own, or was it directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense?
NO
CEC

Which closures were not recommended and were bases in other locations substituted for them?
NO

How many jobs would have been lost if they had been closed and what savings did the Navy sacrifice to keep them open?
4 new 107 mil cost 27720 Dir Jon 47 mil SAON

Did this decision consider job losses from only this round or did it take into account job losses resulting from previous rounds of closures?

51

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE

1. Secretary Dalton, Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary Deutch recently testified before this Commission that in the cross-service area significant excess capacity will exist after BRAC-95 and will provide future opportunity for reduction. The message that "more needs to be done" in joint cross-servicing came through loud and clear.

Connelly

In light of these statements, along with the rather small success that the cross-service groups had in getting the services to adopt their alternatives, do you think interservicing can ever be a successful means to eliminate excess capacity? *incorp 20 "suggestions"*

*Perry - we adopted 11
FMR # - went forward*

2. Secretary Dalton, it is our understanding that the Joint Cross-Service Groups provided the Services with various alternatives to increase cross-service usage of common resources in a number of areas. The Navy's report indicates that twenty such alternatives were "subsumed" by the Navy's recommendations.

Would you explain the procedures the Navy used in considering these alternatives, and can you point to a few examples where these alternatives resulted in specific recommendations to this Commission regarding a Navy installation? Which alternatives were not included in Navy's recommendations?

Steele ? on which AF

~~*Steele - under*~~

Trustme → *Any consideration to interservice Medical*

COX = *Frustration - very little done*

BRAC makes it harder not easier

inx Svcs @g Merit Colony if they had more time - will there be

Signif. X Serv. w/o BRAC

eg Tinker / Corpus

Robb's Q ON Rotaries
we are different

TRAINING AIR

1. Secretary Dalton, have the Navy and the Air Force agreed to a fully integrated Undergraduate Pilot Training program? How did this affect the Navy's recommendations to close or realign pilot training bases?

2. Secretary Dalton, it was the Commission's finding in 1993 that the Navy would require two strike training bases to accommodate the current and future pilot training rate. The Commission further found military construction for the T-45, the Navy's new intermediate and advanced strike training aircraft, which is completed at Naval Air Station Kingsville and has begun at Naval Air Station Meridian, is required at two sites to support future pilot training. Therefore, the 1993 Commission recommended that Naval Air Station Meridian remain open.

COX

What has changed since 1993 that allows the Navy to now recommend the closure of Naval Air Station Meridian?

Is the Navy planning to conduct strike training at any other location than Naval Air Station Kingsville?

NO/Comps n need for a 2nd strike Trng
Small # of AC / One less air wg / 346 ship / 11 carrier

3. Secretary Dalton, it is our understanding that the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended that Naval Air Station Whiting Field, Florida be closed and that all rotary wing training be collocated at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Will you please comment as to why the 1995 DoD recommendations did not address this option?

Was it considered as an alternative?

DAVIS 1st of Pilot + reorg / Meridian / Columbus Region
considerations - did look at it

DAVIS do you have a surge ~~X~~

OPERATIONAL AIR

1. Secretary Dalton, the Navy has requested significant changes in the plan for basing aircraft that resulted from the 1993 decision to close Marine Corps Air Station El Toro in California and Naval Air Station Cecil Field in Florida. Please explain what has changed since 1993 that caused the Navy to require such a dramatic change?

DAVIS

2. Secretary Dalton, when considering the redirect involving Marine Corps Air Stations Tustin and El Toro, did the Navy consider redirecting any aviation assets to March AFB, California?

If so, why wasn't the option to use excess capacity at March acceptable to the Navy?

Steel Underwood?

SHIPYARDS/DEPOTS

1. Secretary Dalton, minutes from the Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee deliberations during the 1993 round state that the Committee was "concerned that there was insufficient capacity on the West Coast for dry-docking carriers and other large ships." Therefore, they agreed not to consider Long Beach Naval Shipyard for closure."

Mr. Secretary, what has changed since 1993 that allows you to recommend that shipyard for closure?

2. Secretary Dalton, it appears that the Navy ran a consolidated Cost of Base Realignment Action, or COBRA, on Naval Air Warfare Center Indianapolis and Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville.

COX

Were closure decisions based on the combined COBRA and not on individual assessments?

yes

What are the specific costs to close and the twenty year Net Present Value for the separate recommendations affecting Indianapolis and Louisville?

3. Secretary Dalton, when assessing the closures of Naval Air Warfare Center Indianapolis and Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville, did the Navy consider the option of privatization in place or joint public-private operation of either facility?

4. Secretary Dalton, the Navy has closed 3 of its 6 aviation depot activities in previous rounds. The Air Force has made a determination that downsizing their aviation depots rather than closing them creates greater savings.

Has the Navy evaluated the downsizing option?

If so, why was it rejected over the closure option?

Is there excess capacity remaining in the Navy's aviation depots?

If so, did the Navy consider closing additional aviation depots?

Robles

IF it is so good

- closed 50% in 93
- no sense to close more
- seems better to close

Steel
Parting

5. Secretary Dalton, what is the Navy's current level of interservicing aviation depot workload?

Considering the Navy's recent decision to move the F/A -18 workload which had been interserviced with the Air Force back to the Navy what are your plans for interservicing?

Davis

Why was the F/A-18 workload moved back to Navy facilities?
2.6% of N work done by other SVCS - purely an economic decision ← cheaper Quaker

Did the Air Force's plan to downsize their depots have any effect on the Navy's recommendations for closure or realignment of their aviation depots?

Askel

6. Secretary Dalton, did the 60%-40% depot workload split between public and private facilities required under current law have any effect on the Navy's recommendations?

At the present time what are the Navy's public-private depot workload percentages?

7. Secretary Dalton, is it the Navy's policy to perform carrier refueling overhauls at Newport News rather than at a public shipyard?

Steb

If so, did this policy have any effect on the Navy's shipyard recommendations?

NO

8. Secretary Dalton, several Navy recommendations move industrial and technical missions at smaller facilities to shipyards and aviation depots. Were any similar missions considered for relocation to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, such as missions currently being performed at Marine Corps Logistic Base Barstow?

Steb

NO

9. Secretary Dalton, based on our staff's preliminary review of your information, it appears that nuclear shipyard capacity is approximately 40% in excess of needs, yet you are only closing the only shipyard with no nuclear capacity. How do you explain carrying the excess capacity?

Steb

RECORD (prev) we feel good about what we do

10. Secretary Dalton, the Navy's detailed analysis states that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was removed from consideration due to the possibility that the Navy might need to refuel more 688-class submarines while awaiting delivery of a replacement class of submarine.

Steele

Does this mean that the Navy is contemplating the extension of the lives of some Los Angeles-class attack submarines?

could well happen - looking at capabilities of others

Does this mean that sufficient capacity does not exist in other naval shipyards to meet the potential submarine workload?

According to the Navy's COBRA analysis the closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard results in an immediate return on investment and a 20 year Net Present Value of more than \$2 billion and ongoing savings of \$150 million per year. Was this level of savings compared to the projected costs of improving the 688-class submarine work capabilities at other shipyards?

What is the capability of the private sector submarine builders to do non-refueling submarine overhaul work? Did you consider the use of this capacity in your analysis?

11. Secretary Dalton, in 1993, Long Beach Naval Shipyard had a military value significantly higher than both Pearl Harbor and Portsmouth shipyards. In 1995, the Navy has ranked Long Beach just slightly above Portsmouth, and well below Pearl Harbor. What changed your analysis?

col

- Smaller/tighter mil value approx
- Resinements
- Wgting as QoL & Force Structure

TECHNICAL CENTERS

1. Secretary Dalton, the Navy has recommended the complete closure of Naval Surface Warfare Center, White Oak, in Maryland.

Does this mean that the Navy no longer needs the test facilities located there, including the wind tunnel. *Navy does NOT need*

Does the Navy anticipate any other DoD or federal agency taking over the facilities in-place? *Are Budget #'s different -*

COX
Red Pro
Disp Ad

2. Secretary Dalton, there exists a great opportunity for reduction in test and evaluation infrastructure in the testing of high performance aircraft and electronic warfare systems.

Why didn't the Navy move high performance aircraft testing to Edwards Air Force Base, as suggested by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group?

What is your view on the Air Force's decision to move some of Eglin Air Force Base's electronic warfare missions to Nellis Air Force Base rather than to Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, as suggested by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group?

3. Secretary Dalton, did the Navy consider the alternative of moving Naval Air Warfare Center Point Mugu test and evaluation missions to Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake or Eglin Air Force Base as suggested by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group?

More is going on ~~that~~
LOSS OF AIRSPACE IS AN ISSUE

DAVIS

4. Secretary Dalton, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in a 13 February 1995 memo, stated, "The laboratories retain significant duplication and excess capacity..." To reduce this excess, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the consolidation of C-41 acquisition and R&D to Fort Monmouth and explosives to Picatinny Arsenal and the Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake. The Navy did not accept these alternatives and decided to move C-41 to San Diego and to maintain explosives at Indian Head.

Why did the Navy not adopt the alternatives recommended by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

RESERVE CENTERS

1. Secretary Dalton, did the Navy consider possibilities for consolidating reserve facilities with those of other services that are located in the same area?

Navy Recruiting / NAVAL RESERVES PRIMARY PRIORITYS - DEMOGRAPHICS

KLING

2. Secretary Dalton, did the Army's interest in some of the facilities at the Naval Air Reserve Center Olathe, Kansas have any effect on the Navy's decision to close that facility?

3. Secretary Dalton, the Navy ranked six Reserve Air Stations, and of the six, Naval Air Station Atlanta was ranked lowest. Naval Air Station Atlanta was not, however, recommended for closure, because it is located in an area that is "demographically rich" for reserve recruitment. As a result, Naval Air Station Weymouth, Massachusetts, despite receiving a higher ranking than the Atlanta air station, was recommended for closure,.

Cornells

Would you explain the method used by the Navy to determine the relative value of a reserve installation's geographic location with respect to reserve recruiting?

Always look at Atlanta then did not

Also, please explain why recruiting potential was given a higher weight than military values.

KLING

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Secretary Dalton, did the Navy review any of the lease and sale offers made by building owners in Crystal City? If reviews were made of these offers, why were they not accepted by the Navy?
2. Secretary Dalton, the Navy has requested a redirect to move the Naval Sea Systems Command to the Washington Navy Yard instead of to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, White Oak, Maryland.

Would you please characterize the general category of the facilities at both sites in their current configuration? For example would they be categorized primarily as administrative space or industrial/warehousing space?

Is the cost of renovating the Navy Yard facilities for Naval Sea System Command's use less than the cost to renovate the existing facilities at White Oak?

Are present estimates for the renovations at White Oak higher than those presented to the 1993 Commission when it originally considered the relocation of Naval Sea Systems Command? If so, how did you change your estimation procedures for this round to minimize inaccuracies?

SUPPLY

1. Secretary Dalton, regarding your decision not to close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, the Navy's report states: "the gap between attributed costs and savings was most likely to narrow under the realities of implementation, resulting in an even narrower benefit between costs and savings." This implies an inaccuracy in the data. Please explain this comment?
2. Secretary Dalton, the Defense Logistics Agency plans to move some of the Defense Industrial Supply Center's mission out of Philadelphia. Did the Navy's analysis relative to the two inventory control points in Philadelphia and Mechanicsburg consider the DLA recommendation and the excess office space that it will make available in Philadelphia?
3. Secretary Dalton, the analysis for supply centers indicated that the center in Oakland was not closed because of "concern over eliminating additional civilian jobs". Why wasn't a similar consideration given to the supply center in Charleston, considering the large civilian job loss in that area?

Essenello

MISC. OPERATIONAL

1. Secretary Dalton, with regard to closing the facilities on Guam, would you explain how operational commanders in the Pacific provided input and participated in the decision?
2. Secretary Dalton, the Navy's Detailed Analysis states that the Navy intends to retain the waterfront assets on Guam for contingencies and to support the afloat tender. If the Navy were guaranteed access to necessary facilities in the event of hostilities, would you consider allowing the Government of Guam access to the waterfront?
3. Secretary Dalton, the Navy's justification for recommending the closure of the Naval Air Facility, Adak in Alaska is that the Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires the facility to base or support its aircraft. According to documents submitted to the Commission, the air facility at Adak has already been undergoing a drawdown to meet Congressionally-mandated budget reductions and the Navy's overall downsizing initiatives.

Does this mean that there has been a decrease in the threat since 1993, or has the mission of anti-submarine warfare that was carried out at Adak been transferred elsewhere?

Montoya

ENVIRONMENTAL

1. Secretary Dalton, DoD policy states that “unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse.” Were any installations eliminated from closure consideration due to unique contamination problems? If so, please elaborate.
2. Secretary Dalton, DoD began its “Fast Track Cleanup” program eighteen months ago to speed cleanup on closing bases.

Does “Fast Track Cleanup” cause the Navy to clean up a closing base sooner than if the base were to remain open? good thing - does well

Montoya

Do costs of cleanup increase because the cleanup is on the fast track? If so, should the increased cost of cleanup be considered in cost of closure calculations?

3. Secretary Dalton, as the Navy made its closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in its analysis? For example, did the fact that a base’s expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis?

Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

4. Secretary Dalton, were any of the Navy’s redirects to this Commission caused by environmental restrictions on previously-planned receiving sites, such as naval air stations in California?
5. Secretary Dalton, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

6. Secretary Dalton, several of the Navy recommendations state that conformity determinations will be required before certain actions are implemented. What will the Navy do if these air quality determinations are unfavorable? For example, it is our understanding that a personnel and aircraft loading at Naval Air Station, Oceana in 2001 that is lower than the loading in Fiscal Year 1990 may not guarantee a favorable determination of conformity under the Clean Air Act.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

*Underwood
(Steele)*

Senator Wendell Ford (Kentucky)

1. In regard to Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, Kentucky would you comment on the data used by the Base Structure Executive Committee to make the decision to place that facility on the list? I have heard the data call information forwarded to the Department of the Navy, by Crane Division and NAVSEA, indicated the cost of moving the Phalanx work, currently being done at Louisville, to Crane, Indiana would be less than officials originally determined. I also understand the discrepancies in those figures were brought to the attention of the Inspector General who conducted an audit and verified that indeed the figures submitted were not correct, and the cost of moving the work to Crane, Indiana would be higher than the figures given to the Navy's Base Structure Executive Committee. Please comment on this information request that a copy of the Inspector General's audit be provided to this commission.

Dixon

2. Also in the case of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, how do you evaluate and justify splintering the current work being done by the Louisville workforce of engineers and machinists - those places being Norfolk, Virginia, Port Hueneme, California, and Crane, Indiana? Was not it the determination of an early BRAC Commission to not close the Louisville facility in order to keep the Navy's 5-inch gun work, and now Phalanx work, consolidated and centrally located to ship ports on both coasts of the United States?

Dixon

Senator Rick Santorum (Pennsylvania)

1. Machinery systems engineering has been migrating to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Philadelphia for several decades. The BRAC 95 proposal to continue this migration by moving all machinery Research and Development to NSWC-Philadelphia consolidates a majority of machinery systems responsibility in Philadelphia (approx. 2000 people and \$800 M worth of machinery facilities) and is a logical progression in reducing infrastructure and improving overall machinery development and performance. In order to provide further reduction in infrastructure, have you considered consolidating the entire function of machinery systems in NSWC-Phila, some of which is still being performed in NAVSEA headquarters?

2. BRAC 93 decisions included moving the Naval Sea Systems Command from Crystal City to White Oak. The BRAC 95 proposes closing White Oak and moving NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard. Was there any consideration given to relocating NAVSEA to the Philadelphia Naval Base?

Representative Robert A. Borski (Pennsylvania)

1. In your proposal to close and relocate the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) to North Island, CA, you appear to achieve most of your savings by eliminating 52 positions.

How is this more cost effective than keeping NATSF in Philadelphia and eliminating those same positions?

2. In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned your recommendation to close and relocate NATSF. In its report, the Commission “found compelling the potential cost savings and reduction in workload” of establishing a central DoD technical publications organization under the auspices of NATSF.

To what extent did the Navy work with other services to explore this possibility.

Why did the Navy choose not to recommend this idea in its 1995 BRAC recommendations?

Questions submitted for the record by Senators Sarbanes and Mikulski and Representatives Hoyer, Wynn, Morella and Gilchrest.

NSWC-WHITE OAK:

Q. DoD's justification for redirecting NAVSEA from White Oak to "...the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. or other government-owned property in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area" cites reductions of personnel in administrative activities as the rationale for no longer needing the capability at the White Oak facility. Yet that same report indicates no reductions in civilian or military personnel from redirecting NAVSEA from White Oak to the Washington area sites. How do you explain this discrepancy?

Q. What specifically is the "other government-owned property in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area?" Why weren't the Navy Yard and/or these other sites considered as a potential location for the NAVSEA move during the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment process? How many NAVSEA employees would be relocated to the Navy Yard and how many would be relocated to this unspecified other government-owned property?

Q. Will the recommended redirection of NAVSEA from White Oak to the Navy Yard or other government-owned sites require NAVSEA to remain in leased space in Crystal City longer than planned for the White Oak move?

Q. Please provide the estimated costs of moving NAVSEA to White Oak vs. moving to the Navy Yard and/or any other facilities under consideration including:

- 1) Costs of new construction or renovation
- 2) Renovation "swing space" requirements
- 3) Costs of any associated utility or water and sewer upgrades
- 5) Costs of any associated transportation infrastructure improvement
- 6) Sunk costs previously spent to move NAVSEA to White Oak
- 5) Costs of security and parking

Q. Have you value engineered the plans for the NAVSEA headquarters facility at White Oak to determine whether NAVSEA could be accommodated more efficiently or in a less costly manner?

Q. What is the cost of reconstructing the hyper-velocity windtunnel, the hydroballistics tank, the magnetic silencing facility or nuclear weapons effects facility located at White Oak? Were the costs of these facilities considered and assessed in the Department's decision to redirect NAVSEA from White Oak to the Navy Yard and other Washington area-government owned property?

Questions for Secretary of the Navy John Dalton submitted by Senators Sarbanes and Mikulski and Representatives Hoyer, Wynn, Morella and Gilchrest. Hearing before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, March 6, 1995.

Q.1. Part 1. NSWC-White Oak. In testimony before the BRAC Commission on March 1, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, raised concerns about the proposed closure of the Naval Surface Weapons Center at White Oak, Maryland and specifically stated that "...the loss of the hyper-velocity wind tunnel at that facility could eliminate a unique national capability, a capability that serves military research and development needs and that is used, as well, by other agencies, such as NASA." Since it is clear that the need to preserve this unique military capability was overlooked by DoD in recommending the closure of White Oak, isn't it possible that you might have also overlooked or failed to adequately assess the military value and costs associated with the other vital military capabilities at White Oak such as the the Reentry Systems capability, the nuclear weapons radiation effects simulator, the hydroballistics tank or the magnetic silencing facility?

Q.1. Part 2. The Base Closings and Realignment Commission of 1993, like General Shalikashvili and other senior military officials, recognized the value of these unique facilities. To ensure that these unique capabilities are maintained, the BRAC made a second decision -- to move NAVSEA from leased space in Crystal City, Virginia to underutilized government-owned facilities at White Oak. Since the military needs to maintain these unique capabilities, why would the Navy now recommend overturning the second part of the 1993 BRAC decision?

Q. 2. In 1993, the BRAC Commission unanimously reversed the Department of Defense's recommendation to disestablish NSWC-Annapolis based on the DOD's "overstated potential cost savings" and "a substantial deviation from criteria 4 and 5."

What has changed in the two years since to invoke the DOD to recommend a full closure of NSWC-Annapolis?

Questions submitted for the record by Senators Sarbanes and Mikulski and Representatives Hoyer, Wynn, Morella and Gilchrest.

NSWC-ANNAPOLIS

- Which specific staff and facilities are proposed for relocation under the \$25 million one-time move cost estimate?
- Which specific staff and facilities would be moved to Carderock? Which would be moved to Philadelphia, the Naval Research Lab or other locations??
- What is the specific breakdown of the \$25 million one time cost for relocation?
- Which of the Annapolis Detachment's capabilities and facilities would be eliminated entirely?
- What is the Annapolis Detachment's specific excess capacity?
- What is the specific breakdown of the Department of Defense's \$36.7 million savings estimate and \$14.5 million annual recurring savings estimate for closing NSWC - Annapolis?

Questions Received from Representative Stephen Horn (California, 38th District):

Proposed Questions for BRAC hearing 3/6, 345 Cannon: Navy witness

(1) The purpose of the base closure process is to reduce as much excess capacity as possible and to save the greatest amount of money. However, the recommended closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard closes the least amount of excess capacity, and does nothing to reduce capacity in the nuclear category, where the excess is greatest. Moreover, according to the COBRA data, closure of Long Beach would save less money over the next 20 years than, for example, Portsmouth. Why has the Navy targeted the one shipyard for closure whose closure would do the least in meeting the goals of the BRAC process?

(2) In 1991 and 1993, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard was the third highest ranked naval shipyard, behind only Puget Sound and Norfolk. Curiously, the Navy's new military value matrix now ranks Long Beach as below Pearl Harbor in military value and only slightly above the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Why has this ranking changed from the two previous base closure rounds?

(3) From an examination of the Navy's base closure deliberations minutes, it seems as if the Navy only really considered closing two shipyards -- Portsmouth or Long Beach -- and decided to not recommend Portsmouth for closure because of a desire to retain nuclear repair capability. Were other scenarios actively considered? For instance, was a closure option for Norfolk Naval Shipyard considered, and scenarios run? If not, why not? Was Pearl Harbor considered for closure, or considered for realignment along with Long Beach?



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0650-F13
BSAT/CD
24 March 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number
when responding 950327-5

Dear Chairman Dixon:

In response to your letter of March 10, 1995, I am forwarding the responses to the questions for the record contained therein. The remainder of the response to the Commission question number 10 and responses to questions 1 through 4 with respect to NUWC New London from Senator Christopher Dodd will be answered in separate correspondence. In accordance with Section 2903(c)(5) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, I certify the information provided to you in this transmittal is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I have provided two identical copies of this information to the United States Congress and these can be found in the Reading Rooms established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Room B15 in the Russell Senate Office Building and Room G2L2 in the Rayburn House Office Building, respectively.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Nemfakos
Vice Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee/
Executive Director
Base Structure Analysis Team

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950327-5

FROM: NEMFAKOS, CHARLES	TO: DIXON
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: BASE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR. COMMUNICATIONS	✓			REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:
 ANSWERS TO "QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD"
 FROM THE MARCH 6 HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950327	Date Originated: 950324	Mail Date:
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NAVY QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD RESULTING FROM THE 06 MARCH NAVY HEARINGS

1. Question: Has the Navy provided to the Commission all of the information used in its decision-making process? If not, please provide it within the next five days.

Answer: Yes. The Base Structure Data Base, which contains the certified data used for analysis, and the minutes and deliberative reports, which contain the decision-making record, were transmitted to the Commission on March 1, 1995. Copies of the analytical tool outputs for each subcategory (including capacity analysis summaries, military value matrices, and configuration analysis summaries) were transmitted on March 9, 1995. Revisions to the certified data, which were received by the Navy after transmittal of the Base Structure Data Base, were forwarded on March 14, 1995. Final certified data for several COBRA scenarios was transmitted on March 20, 1995.

2. Question: Secretary Gotbaum described the method used by the Services to create a military value ranking for each base in a category which was used to determine closure or realignment choices. Are there any circumstances where the Navy closed or realigned bases which ranked higher than bases not included on the Navy list? If so, please explain the reason for not following the military value rankings.

Answer: There are a number of instances where the Department of the Navy's recommendations close or realign bases with higher relative military value scores than bases which were not affected by recommendations. The reason for these results is inherent in the process followed by the DON, which was identical to that used and validated by the Commission in BRAC-93.

As described in our report on pages 21 to 25, military value analysis was conducted of each subcategory of activities to arrive at a relative score which represented how each activity in a subcategory related to a series of questions which portrayed the characteristics of the subcategory. The results of the military value analysis and the capacity analysis for each subcategory were then used as inputs to the linear programming model used for configuration analysis. For the Department of the Navy, configuration analysis sought to identify that set of installations for each subcategory that both would satisfy the future force structure requirements and would allow the retention of installations whose overall military value average was at least equal to the average of the current set of existing installations. This methodology was developed because of the nature of naval installations, which tend to be multi-functional activities (as opposed to one unit/mission = one base) with locational limitations (e.g., support to the fleet in the Atlantic and Pacific). The restriction on average military value derives from the philosophy that the Department, after base closure, should be in at least as "good" a position as it is now vis-a-vis the installations it retains. The operational flexibility that is central to naval forces depends on operational and forward deployment requirements. As these requirements change, the nature of and requirements for our bases change. As a result, although we use individual activities to arrive at a perspective on the military value of a particular subcategory, the overall value to the Department is

oriented on the aggregate. Configuration analysis allowed us to seek the best installations which would satisfy our future requirements in an operationally feasible manner.

The use of this methodology and the resultant closure scenarios developed do lead to results where installations are recommended for closure as a function of satisfaction of force structure requirements rather than absolute military value. An example of this result, as noted during our testimony before the Commission on March 6, 1995, is Long Beach Naval Shipyard. While Long Beach's military value is about .02 points higher than the military value of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Long Beach was selected for closure to eliminate excess shipyard capacity. Portsmouth was considered for closure but not recommended because of concerns over future nuclear force requirements. Another example may be found in training air stations, where NAS Meridian was recommended for closure and NAS Corpus Christi was recommended for realignment. Both have higher military value scores than NAS Whiting Field, which is to be retained. The two recommendations are the result of the various installations' ability to satisfy pilot training requirements, rather than an arbitrary military value cut-off. Given the diverse nature of the activities in the Technical Center subcategory, the Administrative Activities subcategory, and the Reserve Activities subcategory, while military value was helpful in arraying the capabilities of these activities, satisfaction of future capacity requirements was key to the scenarios which were considered and which resulted in the Department's final base closure recommendations.

In summary, the nature of naval bases is such that they do not have equal capacity to support the force structure. In determining which bases to close, we need to be able to retain bases with the best collection of military value that also satisfy capacity requirements. If this analytical approach was not followed, we would either have to keep more excess capacity than we need or to close more base structure than we can operationally afford, resulting in a requirement to build additional capacity at the remaining bases.

3. Question: Some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to the DoD proposals. What guidance did the Navy give its base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

Answer: The primary guidance to commanders regarding conduct of the BRAC process was contained in public affairs messages issued on April 15, 1994; January 18, 1995; February 3, 1995; February 15, 1995; February 23, 1995; and February 24, 1995. Key points relating to dealings with local communities are as follows:

- The importance of maintaining open lines of communication between base commanders and local communities cannot be overemphasized. Uninterrupted base participation in face-to-face meetings with community leaders/neighbors is important to reinforce longstanding community partnerships, to address possible rumors and misinformation, and to make sure all our neighbors are getting the big picture. All commands can and should continue to pursue all current and planned community

relations and partnership/outreach activities, but should remain mindful of longstanding Navy policy to remain impartial.

- Prior to the Secretary of Defense's forwarding of the BRAC-95 recommendations to the Commission, no public release of the Navy recommendations, or data or analysis compiled in support of those recommendations, was authorized. However, commands were authorized to respond to inquiries using normally releasable, unclassified information, such as number of employees, military population, payroll, command and tenants' missions, current base contracts, etc.
- Following submission of the DoD recommendations, inquiries received by local commands relating to factual information upon which naval installations were recommended for closure or realignment can be answered to the extent that factual and accurate information is on hand, properly coordinated, and cleared for release by the local command's chain-of-command. Details concerning an installation's mission, size, number of personnel, payroll, and other local information normally releasable may continue to be released. However, commanders were advised to avoid speculation about whether the Commission will approve or disapprove the list of recommendations, what impact closure of a specific installation would have upon local areas or military capabilities, and what savings may be gained.
- There are no restrictions on hosting informational briefings or tours of base facilities for community group representatives. The decisions to accept such visit requests may be made at the command level. With regard to Congressional visits, commanders were advised that members of Congress should be given access to installations for the purpose of learning about base operations and missions and about community relations-related topics, such as the impact of the base on the local community. Further, base commanders should be prepared to provide this type of information to anyone seeking it. The only limitation is that commanders must avoid speculation on whether their installation should or should not be approved for closure or realignment.
- In their official capacities, naval personnel must remain neutral and should avoid the appearance of taking sides relating to a decision to close or realign a certain base. Command officials must exercise discretion in hosting on-base activities, accepting invitations to speak, or attending public functions in their official capacity which could be considered inconsistent with DoD standards of conduct policy or misconstrued as support for any particular cause vis-a-vis BRAC. In their capacities as private citizens, however, DON personnel are permitted to attend hearings, while not in uniform and during off-duty hours.

4. Question: Will the Navy have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.

Answer: Some excess capacity will remain in virtually every subcategory of activity evaluated by the Department. The nature and extent of the excess varies from subcategory to subcategory. In some cases, elimination of this excess was infeasible due to the configurations of particular types of installations or to the nature of the excess capacity. For instance, in the Training and Education subcategory, significant excess capacity will remain in fleet training activities. While various closure scenarios were considered by the Department for eliminating this excess, given a requirement for fleet training to be located proximate to the fleet and given that most of this excess capacity represents individual classrooms, no obvious, cost-effective solutions could be developed which would eliminate this excess. Likewise, analysis of the Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair demonstrated that, while there is excess capacity, execution of the workload of these activities is strictly tied to the locations of the private sector contractors to whom ship work has been awarded. Closure of any of these activities with more than nominal future workload requires considerable travel and remote support and offers no appreciable savings.

In other cases, the Department determined that retention of the excess capacity was prudent to protect future flexibility. For instance, in naval stations, the Department determined that it was unwilling to recommend closure of homeporting operations at several installations because of future uncertainty in operational tempo and the size of the active force. While closure of additional naval stations was possible, it is critical to understand that the excess capacity that was calculated based on requirements to have significant portions of the fleet forward deployed at all times. In fact, the capacity that will remain in naval stations and air stations, if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this Commission, will be insufficient to house all of the ships and aircraft that are in the FY 2001 force structure than would be the case if the naval forces were to be viewed as static and in a garrison status. Similarly, in the case of Ordnance Activities, we calculated significant excess capacity. However, no recommendations were issued due to concern over long-term storage requirements (based on the uncertainty of overseas rollbacks, removal of fleet assets, and the ability to demilitarize our existing inventories) and the deficiency identified in outload capacity to transfer ordnance during wartime contingencies.

5. Question: The Navy recommendations include a long list of redirects. What is the value of the military construction costs eliminated by the redirects? Are these costs based on the 1993 COBRA analyses or on the more detailed assessments performed during implementation planning?

Answer: Department of the Navy BRAC-95 redirects would result in construction cost avoidances of \$1,305 million. Construction cost avoidance estimates included in our return on investment analyses are a reflection of our most recent assessment of actual implementation requirements.

6. Question: Have the Navy and the Air Force agreed to a fully integrated Undergraduate Pilot Training program? How did this affect the Navy's recommendations to close or realign pilot training bases?

Answer: No. The Deputy Secretary of Defense in an October 24, 1994 memorandum, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy, approved Air Force and Navy plans to implement joint fixed-wing flight training programs and additional joint training initiatives. Today, these consist of a consolidated initial fixed-wing aircraft training program and three joint NFO programs (advanced navigator, electronic warfare officer, and weapons system officer training). Navy helicopter and carrier aviation training (strike and advanced E2/C2) will not be integrated.

In developing its recommendations, during configuration analysis, the Navy accounted for Air Force training that is projected, under current agreements, to be conducted at naval air stations. Likewise, the Navy adjusted its PTR to reflect training that is scheduled to go to Air Force facilities.

7. Question: The Navy has requested significant changes in the plan for basing aircraft that resulted from the 1993 decision to close Marine Corps Air Station El Toro in California and Naval Air Station Cecil Field in Florida. Please explain what has changed since 1993 that caused the Navy to require such a dramatic change?

Answer: Since BRAC-93 there have been significant reductions in Naval Aviation Forces. For instance, we have retired the A-6 attack aircraft series, reduced the maritime patrol aircraft inventory by about one-third, and eliminated approximately fifty percent of the Navy's F-14 inventory with further reductions forthcoming. After reviewing several options for reducing this excess, we concluded that utilizing existing excess air station capacity and avoiding unnecessary new construction were both more cost-effective and operationally responsive. In the process we were able to avoid incurring about three-quarters of a billion dollars in new construction costs, a clear savings to the taxpayer.

8. Question: When considering the redirect involving Marine Corps Air Stations Tustin and El Toro, did the Navy consider redirecting any aviation assets to March AFB, California? If so, why wasn't the option to use excess capacity at March acceptable to the DON?

Answer: Yes, we did discuss the possible use of March AFB during deliberations. However, since March AFB was previously closed as an operational base, this alternative would have involved the reopening of a previously closed base, which is not consistent with the Department's policy. Additionally, because the Air Force is eliminating the hospital, commissary, exchange and all other quality of life support infrastructure, as part of reopening this facility, we would have been faced with the task of recreating and replicating facilities that already exist at the base to which the Marine Corps aircraft units are currently scheduled to relocate.

9. Question: It appears that the Navy ran a consolidated Cost of Base Realignment Actions, or COBRA, on Naval Air Warfare Center Indianapolis and Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville. Were closure decisions based on the combined COBRA and not on individual assessments? What are the specific costs to close and the twenty year Net Present

Value for the separate recommendations affecting Indianapolis and Louisville? Please provide separated COBRA information for any other consolidated COBRA analyses.

Answer: Our assessment of the potential closure/realignment of technical centers began with individual activity assessments. During our analysis, we looked at a series of closure alternatives involving Indianapolis, Louisville and NSWC Crane, activities with some similar functions and facilities. Our final decision was to close Indianapolis and Louisville, and as a result, transfer some functions from both activities to a common receiving site, NSWC Crane. Combining these two actions into a single COBRA analysis allowed us to most accurately portray changes in costs associated with this consolidation at NSWC Crane.

The costs and savings associated with the separate Indianapolis and Louisville recommendations are as follows: NAWC Indianapolis: One-Time Costs - \$77.6 M, 20 Year NPV (Savings) - \$392.1 M; NSWC Louisville: One-Time Costs - \$103.9 M, 20 Year NPV (Savings) - \$243.7 M.

In two cases, our analysis resulted in a single COBRA run for physically separated installations. In both cases, the analysis was consolidated to more accurately and completely portray an interrelated set of closure/realignment actions, as follows:

a. Indianapolis/Louisville. As noted above, in our final deliberations on technical centers, the closures of NAWC Indianapolis and NSWC Louisville were combined into a single COBRA analysis to most accurately portray changes in costs associated with consolidation at NSWC Crane. As requested, we have broken this analysis into two separate COBRA runs, one for Indianapolis (see Tab 1) and one for Louisville (see Tab 2). The "stand-alone" Indianapolis scenario also includes a revision to the construction cost avoidances shown at Indianapolis (to reflect final certified data). The "stand-alone" Louisville scenario also includes minor revisions to both one-time moving costs and the identification of workload transferred to Watervliet (to reflect final certified data). A revised version of the consolidated Indianapolis/Louisville run, incorporating these revisions, is also provided (see Tab 3).

b. Undergraduate Pilot Training. In the area of Undergraduate Pilot Training, we conducted a single COBRA analysis that comprised two separate installations: (1) closure of Meridian and (2) closure of the training air station at Corpus Christi and subsequent establishment of Naval Air Facility Corpus Christi (to include the redirect of mine warfare helicopters to Corpus Christi). These actions were interrelated, and consequently, more accurate and complete cost and savings estimates were obtained by considering these actions in a single COBRA analysis. For example, the closure of Meridian results in the need to use Corpus Christi for primary flight operations necessary for advanced strike training. Similarly, the consolidation of mine warfare assets is facilitated by the realignment of the training air station mission at Corpus Christi. As requested, we have broken this COBRA analysis into two COBRA runs, one for each of the two separate installations involved in the scenario (Meridian (see Tab 4)

and Corpus Christi (see Tab 5)). The "stand-alone" Corpus Christi scenario also includes a refinement to our estimation of changes in base operating support associated with consolidation of mine warfare assets at NAF Corpus Christi. A revised version of the consolidated Corpus/Meridian COBRA run, incorporating this revision, is also provided (see Tab 6).

In two cases (NAS Cecil Field redirect and MCASs El Toro/Tustin redirect), a single DON recommendation incorporated more than one COBRA run. Based on discussions with your staff, to assist in your evaluation of these recommendations, we have also provided a consolidated COBRA run for each of these two recommendations (see Tab 7 for the East Coast redirect and Tab 8 for the West Coast redirect).

10. Question: Did the 60%-40% depot workload split between public and private facilities required under current law have any effect on the Navy's recommendations? At the present time what are the Navy's public-private depot workload percentages?

Answer: No, the 60/40 requirement did not impact our recommendations. The cumulative effect of all of our recommendations, if approved, will not inhibit our ability to comply with the law. We do not have certified data on the current public-private depot workload percentages, but will obtain such data. The response to this part of the question will be forwarded separately.

11. Question: Minutes from the Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee deliberations during the 1993 round state that the Committee was "concerned that there was insufficient capacity on the West Coast for dry-docking carriers and other large ships." Therefore, they agreed not to consider Long Beach Naval Shipyard for closure. What has changed since 1993 that allows you to recommend the shipyard for closure?

Answer: The force structure that drives requirements declined by almost 20% overall since the 1993 BRAC analysis. These reductions are reflected in the 1995 BRAC capacity analysis, which supports the closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

12. Question: According to the Navy's COBRA analysis, the closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard results in an immediate return on investment and a 20 year Net Present Value of more than \$2 billion and ongoing savings of \$150 million per year. Was this level of savings compared to the projected costs of improving the 688-class submarine work capabilities at other shipyards? What is the capability of the private sector submarine builders to do non-refueling submarine overhaul work? Did you consider the use of this capacity in your analysis?

Answer: Our BRAC-95 analysis was based on programmed workload scheduled to be performed in organic naval shipyards. Private sector capability was not considered, and, as specified in the BRAC law, only certified data was utilized. Our analysis identified different combinations of potential naval shipyard closures, some of which included moving

Portsmouth's workload to other naval shipyards. At the conclusion of the analysis process, it was the BSEC's military judgment to remove Portsmouth from further consideration for closure. Future decisions to refuel, defuel and inactivate SSN Class 688 submarines make the precise determination of nuclear requirements difficult, and Portsmouth has a unique role as the center of excellence for the 688 submarine.

13. Question: Based on our staff's preliminary review of the Navy's information, it appears that nuclear shipyard capacity is approximately 40% in excess of needs, yet the Navy is only closing the only shipyard with no nuclear capacity. Please explain why this excess capacity is being carried?

Answer: In analyzing Naval Shipyards, the relevant measure to determine excess capacity was the aggregate capacity of all of the shipyards. Nuclear and non-nuclear capacity were calculated only to see if there were individual capacity limitations. Force structure downsizing has reduced the overall numbers of nuclear ships/submarines, which could support the closure of an additional shipyard. However, in the Department's military judgment with respect to the uncertainty of future nuclear workload (refueling versus inactivation), it was prudent to maintain sufficient organic capability to meet unanticipated nuclear work requirements.

14. Question: Did the Navy consider the alternative of moving Naval Air Warfare Center Point Mugu test and evaluation missions to Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake or Eglin Air Force Base as suggested by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group?

Answer: The DON did not examine the Point Mugu-China Lake alternative, since Pt. Mugu is already part of China Lake. While physically separate, the missions of these activities are interdependent, and both the sea range at Point Mugu and the land ranges at China Lake are required by the Department.

The DON did request a gaining service COBRA response from the Air Force for movement of Point Mugu T&E missions to Eglin AFB. Data was not received, so no further analysis could be performed.

15. Question: The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in a 13 February 1995 memo, stated, "The laboratories retain significant duplication and excess capacity..." To reduce this excess, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the consolidation of C-4I acquisition and R&D at Fort Monmouth and explosives to Picatinny Arsenal and the Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake. The Navy did not accept these alternatives and decided to move C-4I to San Diego and to maintain explosives at Indian Head. Why did the Navy not adopt the alternatives recommended by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

Answer: The alternatives of moving C⁴I to either Fort Monmouth or Hanscom AFB were considered, as was a DON alternative of combining Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command with its subordinate element, Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance

Center (NCCOSC), at San Diego. The consolidation at San Diego produced five times as great an annual savings and a 20 year net present value of over \$300 M more than either of the two cross-service alternatives.

Regarding movement of explosives to Picatinny and China Lake, COBRA analysis was performed on completely closing Indian Head and moving all functions to China Lake. Our analysis showed that up front costs were very large, both in absolute terms and in relation to potential savings. This fact, coupled with the lengthy payback period, made this alternative unacceptable. The DON requirement for Insensitive Munitions aboard ships is unique within DoD for both explosives and propellants. The replication costs for duplicate Energetics-Explosive facilities at Picatinny, while retaining the facilities at Indian Head required for Propellant efforts, were not cost-effective.

16. Question: Regarding the Navy's decision not to close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, the Navy report states: "the gap between attributed costs and savings was most likely to narrow under the realities of implementation, resulting in an even narrower benefit between costs and savings." This implies an inaccuracy in the data. Please explain this comment.

Answer: The return on investment for the COBRA scenario which closed ASO and consolidated functions at SPCC was viewed as marginal because of limited savings. In the context of the COBRA analysis, the BSEC recognized that savings were slight because ongoing consolidation efforts between ASO and SPCC are leading to a more efficient organization by reducing the overall cost of operations and that COBRA costs and savings were being measured at a point in time before those consolidation efforts were complete. Once all planned "in-place" management initiatives have been completed, it was likely that fewer savings would accrue than as calculated by the COBRA algorithms for the relocation to SPCC. Additionally, the BSEC felt that the costs and potential inefficiencies of disrupting these consolidation efforts could outweigh the relatively small benefits of the COBRA savings estimates.

17. Question: The Defense Logistics Agency plans to move some of the Defense Industrial Supply Center's mission out of Philadelphia. Did the Navy's analysis relative to the two inventory control points in Philadelphia and Mechanicsburg consider the DLA recommendation and excess office space that it will make available in Philadelphia?

Answer: No. The Navy's analysis focussed on the capacities at the two inventory control points. We were unaware of the DLA recommendation relating to the Defense Industrial Supply Center until after SECNAV's recommendations were forwarded to SECDEF.

18. Question: With regard to closing the facilities on Guam, please explain how operational commanders in the Pacific provided input and participated in the decision?

Answer: As directed by the Secretary of the Navy, the BSEC actively interacted with the major owners/operators of Navy and Marine Corps installations on matters concerning fleet operations, support and readiness. Accordingly, there were a series of BSEC deliberative sessions with the Fleet CINCs, Fleet Marine Force Commanders, Systems Commanders, the Navy and Marine Corps personnel chiefs, and the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Force Commanders. During these meetings, the BSEC provided information on all aspects of the DON BRAC-95 process including data collection, analytical approaches, capacity and military value analyses, and the development of alternative closure and/or realignment scenarios. These meeting provided CINCPACFLT a direct forum to address the potential operational impacts of BSEC recommendations. Additionally, the CINCs and other major claimants provided the direct responses to COBRA scenario data calls including such information as functions which could be eliminated and/or transferred and the identification of potential receiver sites. The deliberative session discussions and the COBRA scenario responses provided the basis for a clearer understanding of the need to only maintain access to Guam rather than continued presence.

19. Question: The Navy's Detailed Analysis states that the Navy intends to retain the waterfront assets on Guam for contingencies and to support the afloat tender. If the Navy were guaranteed access to necessary facilities in the event of hostilities, would it consider allowing the Government of Guam access to the waterfront? What Navy property on Guam will be disposed of after implementation of the recommendations?

Answer: Decisions regarding the retention of specific waterfront and other property at Naval Activities Guam will not be finalized until the BRAC recommendations are approved. The Navy is, however, committed to closing bases right. Our goal is to empower local communities to play a principal role in determining what happens to a base when it closes. In the case of the facilities in Guam, since our recommendation is clear that we need to maintain access to this strategic location, a careful balance will be struck between community reuse and the retention of the necessary facilities for potential operational contingencies.

20. Question: The Navy's justification for recommending the closure of the Naval Air Facility, Adak in Alaska is that the Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires the facility to base or support its aircraft. According to documents submitted to the Commission, the air facility at Adak has already been drawn down to meet Congressionally-mandated budget reductions and the Navy's overall downsizing initiatives. Does this mean that there has been a decrease in the threat since 1993, or has the mission of anti-submarine warfare that was carried out at Adak been transferred elsewhere?

Answer: The decision on the mission of NAF Adak had already been appropriately made by CINCPACFLT. In fact, certified data relating to capacity and military value indicated that continuous maritime patrol aircraft deployments to NAF Adak were discontinued in FY 1994. The base closure process is not the process by which the DON makes operational decisions. Our decision on Adak was, in part, predicated on the fact that there was no operational need for Adak.

21. Question: As the Navy made its closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in its analysis? For example, did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis? Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

Answer: The Navy issued a comprehensive environmental data call that captured the full range of environmental issues on each base. The presence of environmental management issues, their impact on operations, and any limitations they presented were characterized for each environmental area including endangered/threatened species, cultural/historic resources, wetlands, environmental facilities, air quality, pollution control, hazardous materials, installation restoration sites, Air Installation Compatible Use Zones, and land use. The current and past impact of these environmental issues on base operations and development was included, as appropriate, in the military value analysis. Once closure/realignment alternatives were identified, an environmental summary for each scenario was prepared which noted the anticipated air quality impacts and other anticipated environmental impacts resulting from the action for both closing and receiving bases. In no case did the environmental condition of a base, or the anticipated impact and/or the expansion potential of a receiving base, necessarily preclude a recommendation. Many of the recommendations resulted in a positive environmental impact.

Bases in non-attainment areas were not viewed differently from those in attainment areas. While the air quality status of the area in which a base was located was reviewed as part of the environmental analysis, in no case did air quality impact the process of selection or determination of closure or realignment sites.

22. Question: How many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

Answer: For the installations identified for closure under BRAC-95, no contamination sites have been identified for which recognized/accepted remediation processes are unavailable. Installation restoration site characterization and clean up will continue after operational closure, if not yet completed.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Christopher J. Dodd (Connecticut)

With respect to the Navy recommendation to relocate the Nuclear Training Commands (NTC) from Orlando to Charleston:

1. Question: How will BRACC Appropriations already committed and spent for planned relocation of NTC at New London, be recouped in this redirection action?

Answer: The 1993 Commission recommended, and Congress and the President concurred in, the closure of Naval Training Center (NTC) Orlando. This recommendation directed the move of a tenant of NTC Orlando, Naval Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center (NNPPTC), to Submarine Base New London. The Department of the Navy, in accordance with the base closure law, has begun the planning and budgeting process to move this school. The DON will not know what appropriations are able to be recouped until the BRAC-95 recommendations are finalized.

2. Question: How have savings promised in 1993 been recouped in the 1995 recommendations to redirect the NTCs? Are these savings lost permanently?

Answer: The savings calculated in BRAC-93 result from the closure of NTC Orlando, which will still occur. The recommended redirect for NNPPTC does not affect those savings.

3. Question: If the proposed savings and return on investment (ROI) from the redirect of the NTCs are so substantial as to require the 1995 BRACC to overturn the 1993 BRACC decision, why were the savings not recognized in 1993? Was Charleston considered for relocation in 1993?

Answer: The 1993 Commission overturned the DON's recommendation relating to closure of the piers at Submarine Base, New London, making the move of NNPPTC unacceptable because classroom and berthing facilities at New London anticipated to be used for this relocation were no longer available.

Charleston was not considered as a receiving site in 1993. In selecting a receiving site in BRAC-93 for this tenant of NTC Orlando, it was determined that the movement of NNPPTC to Submarine Base New London would create a training center of excellence by locating the NNPPTC with the Submarine School, taking advantage of the infrastructure vacated by the relocation of fleet operational units. In the absence of these facilities, a similar center of excellence will be created by locating the NNPPTC with the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Training Unit and the follow-on training with the moored training ships at Charleston.

4. Question: What methodology was applied to identify Charleston as the new location of the NTCs? What other sites were examined? What were the associated military values and cost?

Answer: During BRAC-95 deliberations, the BSEC recognized that the 1993 Commission's decision to retain the piers at New London had significantly increased military construction (MILCON) costs for relocating NNPPTC to New London, making this receiving site much less attractive. Accordingly, Weapons Station Charleston was introduced as an alternative which will achieve similar expected training synergies and greater savings from reduced MILCON and PCS costs. No other sites were examined. The one-time cost associated with the redirect to Charleston is \$147.9 million; the one-time savings is \$162.5 million; and the annual recurring savings is \$5.3 million.

5. Question: What are the specific flaws in the 1993 BRACC decision that require the proposed redirection at this time?

Answer: The 1993 Commission did not accept the Department of the Navy's recommendation to close the piers at New London, resulting in unavailability of facilities for the NNPPTC move upon the closure of NTC Orlando.

With respect to the Navy decision to close the Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) in New London, Connecticut:

1. Question: Total estimated costs for BRACC implementation: a detailed (by line item) of cost expenditures to date comparing costs spent or obligated to date vs. costs to complete the redirection as proposed.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

2. Question: A complete accounting of billets and actual personnel transferred from Norfolk, VA to Newport, RI as of this date.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

3. Question: A complete accounting of billets and actual personnel transferred from New London, CT to Newport, RI as of this date.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

4. Question: Savings in personnel and operating costs achieved per year to date at New London.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

5. Question: What would be the impact upon laboratory military value and cost analysis to co-locate all Navy acoustic research and development and system engineering at New London, Connecticut?

Answer: The BSEC did not evaluate such a scenario. The BRAC-95 recommendations relating to acoustic R&D and system engineering complete the steps taken in earlier rounds of base closure to concentrate these functions at NUWC Newport, NUWC Keyport, and NSWC Crane. Appropriate functions from four technical centers (NRL Det Orlando, NAWC Oreland, NAWC Det Warminster, and NUWC New London) will be relocated to NUWC Newport.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Wendell Ford (Kentucky)

1. Question: In regard to Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, Kentucky would you comment on the data used by the Base Structure Executive Committee to make the decision to place that facility on the list? I have heard the data call information forwarded to the Department of the Navy, by Crane Division and NAVSEA, indicated the cost of moving the Phalanx work, currently being done at Louisville, to Crane, Indiana would be less than official originally determined. I also understand the discrepancies in those figures were brought to the attention of the Inspector General who conducted an audit and verified that indeed the figures submitted were not correct, and the cost of moving the work to Crane, Indiana would be higher than the figures given to the Navy's Base Structure Executive Committee. Please comment on this information. I request that a copy of the Inspector General's audit be provided to this commission.

Answer: The data used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) is contained in the Base Structure Data Base. The BSEC did not use any data other than that provided through the DON certification process to make a decision. Costs which are provided by the major claimants to the BSEC as part of scenario development data calls were subject to review by the BSEC, which applied military judgment to the inclusion of costs in the COBRA analysis.

With regard to the audit being conducted on the data supplied for the Louisville scenario, although the investigation is not yet complete, it is our understanding that the focus of the audit is primarily on process (data flow up and down the chain of command).

2. Question: Also in the case of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, how do you evaluate and justify splintering the current work being done by the Louisville workforce of engineers and machinists - those places being Norfolk, Virginia, Port Hueneme, California, and Crane, Indiana? Was not it the determination of an early BRAC Commission to not close the Louisville facility in order to keep the Navy's 5-inch gun work, and now Phalanx work, consolidated and centrally located to ship ports on both coasts of the United States?

Answer: The workload being performed at Louisville is an amalgam of work similar to that being accomplished at a number of other Navy depot and technical activities. Our recommendation consolidates the Louisville workload with other similar depot and engineering efforts at other sites and achieves savings by closing an entire installation.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Rick Santorum (Pennsylvania)

1. Question: Machinery systems engineering has been migrating to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Philadelphia for several decades. The BRAC 95 proposal to continue this migration by moving all machinery Research and Development to NSWC-Philadelphia consolidates a majority of machinery systems responsibility in Philadelphia (approx. 2000 people and \$800 M worth of machinery facilities) and is a logical progression in reducing infrastructure and improving overall machinery development and performance. In order to provide further reduction in infrastructure, have you considered consolidating the entire function of machinery systems in NSWC-Philadelphia, some of which is still being performed in NAVSEA headquarters?

Answer: No. The BRAC effort is concerned with closing and realigning bases. Workload allocation is a management prerogative that can be accomplished at any time.

2. Question: BRAC 93 decisions included moving the Naval Sea Systems Command from Crystal City to White Oak. The BRAC 95 proposes closing White Oak and moving NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard. Was there any consideration given to relocating NAVSEA to the Philadelphia Naval Base?

Answer: No. Given the requirement of Naval Reactors (NAVSEA-08) to be located in the Washington, D.C. area to satisfy responsibilities to the Department of Energy, and the Navy's desire not to fragment NAVSEA Headquarters, relocation options were restricted to the Washington metropolitan area in both the 1993 and 1995 round of base closures.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Robert A. Borksi (Pennsylvania)

1. Question: In your proposal to close and relocate the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) to North Island, CA, you appear to achieve most of your savings by eliminating 52 positions. How is this more cost effective than keeping NATSF in Philadelphia and eliminating those same positions?

Answer: The savings are attendant to the command elimination, the subsuming of regional offices and detachments, and the integration into another NAVAIR organization. This cannot be accomplished in place.

2. Question: In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned your recommendation to close and relocate NATSF. In its report, the Commission "found compelling the potential cost savings and reduction in workload" of establishing a central DoD technical publications organization under the auspices of NATSF. To what extent did the Navy work with other services to explore this possibility? Why did the Navy choose not to recommend this idea in its 1995 BRAC recommendations?

Answer: None of the Joint Cross-Service Groups suggested this as an alternative to consider. The Navy felt its decision to send the function to NADEP North Island was sound, fostered proper internal synergies, helped to reduce capacity at the critical NADEP site, and demonstrated good cost savings.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Stephen Horn (California)

1. Question: The purpose of the base closure process is to reduce as much excess capacity as possible and to save the greatest amount of money. However, the recommended closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard closes the least amount of excess capacity, and does nothing to reduce capacity in the nuclear category, where the excess is greatest. Moreover, according to the COBRA data, closure of Long Beach would save less money over the next 20 years than, for example, Portsmouth. Why has the Navy targeted the one shipyard for closure whose closure would do the least in meeting the goals of the BRAC process?

Answer: The Department's process analyzed excess capacity for the entire NSYD/SRF community and then sought solutions to eliminate that excess. Non-nuclear workload can be accomplished in a nuclear shipyard, but nuclear workload cannot be accomplished in a non-nuclear shipyard. While our analysis considered Portsmouth for closure, it was removed from consideration for closure based on the BSEC's military judgment. Future decisions to refuel, defuel and inactivate SSN Class 688 submarines make the precise determination of nuclear requirements difficult, and Portsmouth has a unique role as the center of excellence for the 688 submarine. The Navy is satisfied that its recommendations to close Long Beach Naval Shipyard and SRF Guam result in a significant overall reduction of excess shipyard capacity, with a collective annual savings of \$168.4M and a 20 year net present value savings of \$2477.6M.

2. Question: In 1991 and 1993, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard was the third highest ranked naval shipyard, behind only Puget Sound and Norfolk. Curiously, the Navy's new military value matrix now ranks Long Beach as below Pearl Harbor in military value and only slightly above the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Why has this ranking changed from the two previous base closure rounds?

Answer: In response to constructive criticism by, among others, the Commission and Members of Congress, for BRAC-95, the DON shipyard military value matrix was adjusted where appropriate to be more reflective of the nature and scope of work being conducted at these activities. While this causes the absolute scores for the activities to change, the results are consistent with those of previous rounds. Consistent with the relationships demonstrated in BRAC-93, these industrial activities fall into three distinct groups. As in BRAC-93, Long Beach Naval Shipyard is in the middle group whose military value scores are tightly grouped and which falls below the two large shipyards at Puget Sound and Norfolk. Because the scores are so close, the relative placement of the shipyards in this middle group is affected by changes that were made not only to respond to criticism but also to portray as accurately as possible the characteristics of these activities.

3. Question: From an examination of the Navy's base closure deliberations minutes, it seems as if the Navy only really considered closing two shipyards--Portsmouth or Long Beach--and decided to not recommend Portsmouth for closure because of a desire to retain nuclear repair capability. Were other scenarios actively considered? For instance, was a closure option for Norfolk Naval Shipyard considered, and scenarios run? If not, why not? Was Pearl Harbor considered for closure, or considered for realignment along with Long Beach?

Answer: Every activity within the shipyard subcategory was equally considered. Capacity and military value analyses was conducted on all activities. Using the results of these analyses, possible closure candidates were identified during configuration analysis. In various combinations, the potential candidates were Long Beach, Portsmouth, Pearl Harbor, and SRF Guam. The configuration analysis demonstrated that the Puget Sound and Norfolk shipyards had to be retained to satisfy capacity and military value requirements. The BSEC eliminated Pearl Harbor from further consideration due to its unique strategic location and full service capability. Closure scenario data calls were sent to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Ship Repair Facility Guam, Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Surge Dry Docks at Philadelphia, and several technical centers that perform depot level work.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (Mississippi)

1. Question: I am concerned about how the Navy determines such factors as the pilot training rate (PTR). The certified data which the commission will receive appears to be, quite frankly, a compilation of conclusions rather than a trail of hard facts leading to a conclusion. Is the Navy going to give the Commissioners and the communities access to the critical data used to determine such conclusions as the daytime operations necessary to generate one new pilot? Moreover, will commissioners and communities have access to base operational data? I hope you will provide any requested data directly to Commissioners and affected communities.

Answer: The Navy has provided the Commission and Congress with all the data used in its analysis. If there is any additional information that may be required after a review of the basic data, it will be provided upon request by the appropriate level within the DON. As we have already related in a separate response to a question for the record from the Commission, the Secretary of the Navy has issued specific public affairs guidance to all activities of the Department that provides for their release of unclassified base information.

Specific information on the number of daylight flight operations required per student (for each type and level of undergraduate pilot training) can be found in the Data Call Two (Capacity for Training Air Stations) responses from each training air station under Section: Mission Requirements, Subsection: b. Flight Training, questions 3 and 4. These questions instructed the fleet to base requirements on historic flight operations. The certified responses to these questions were the input for the calculations used in the Navy analysis.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Robert Underwood (Guam)

Naval Base Guam, Fleet Ind. Supply Center and Ship Repair Facility

1. Question: Mr. Secretary, in your recommendations for BRAC 95, you recommend closing the Ship Repair Facility and disestablishing the Fleet Industrial Supply Center and you recommend reducing and the "mothballing" the waterfront activities of the Naval Base. This eliminates a large source of income for the citizens of Guam, but it does not allow these valuable industrial and port facilities to be used as economic recovery tools for Guam to help replace their lost revenues. Isn't it true that these facilities could be turned over to the Government of Guam for economic development with the proviso that they could be used for military contingency operations at the request of the Federal Government?

Answer: We are committed to working with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in the development of a reuse plan to focus the community's intentions and ideas concerning how it desires excess property/facilities to be utilized. In the case of the facilities in Guam, since our recommendation is clear that we need to maintain access to this strategic location, a careful balance will be struck between community reuse and the retention of the necessary facilities for potential operational contingencies. Decisions regarding the retention of specific property on Guam will not be finalized until the BRAC recommendations are approved.

NAS Agana

2. Question: Mr. Secretary, last year this Commission recommended that the Navy consolidate the air operations at NAS Agana with the Air Force operations 10 miles away at Anderson AFB. During the last two years, however, you have disestablished one of the three fixed wing squadrons on Guam and moved the other two to bases on the West Coast. In spite of the Navy's rhetoric two years ago, you have also agreed to return all of the enlisted administrative buildings and the officer housing on a piece of land that is essential for the development of an expanded international aviation complex on Guam. You are also in the process of building 300 brand new family housing units. Isn't it true that with all of these reductions this year you should have quite a bit of excess Navy housing? Isn't it also true that the retention of this one isolated section of family housing has more to do with the view than the need for military housing island-wide?

Answer: The final determination of what facilities will be deemed in excess will not be made until after the BRAC-95 recommendations are approved. As you are aware, even if all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. We are committed to maintaining the highest quality of life possible for those personnel. Retention of necessary

critical married family housing units will be one of our principal objectives. Where excesses may exist, however, you can be assured that we will work with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to develop a sound community reuse plan.

Fena Reservoir

3. Question: Mr. Secretary, in your report, you did not mention the large watershed and reservoir at Fena that currently sits outside the Naval Magazine on Guam. It is no longer needed as a "buffer" for Naval Magazine, Guam, and the magazine no longer contains special weapons. In view of the economic hardships these closures will impose of the citizens of Guam, why couldn't this watershed be returned to the Government of Guam for use in its water system and as a "low environmental impact" recreation area?

Answer: Our recommendations did not affect the Naval Magazine on Guam. This facility will continue to execute its full function and mission. Accordingly, all of the current infrastructure and supporting buffers, including the reservoir at Fena, must be maintained.

Navy Water System on Guam

4. Question: Mr. Secretary, I am amazed to hear that the Navy maintains an island-wide water distribution system on Guam that duplicates one maintained by GovGuam. With the disestablishment of most of the Navy activities on Guam, it seems inefficient and expensive for the Navy to maintain a separate system. Are there any other locations in the United States or its Territories where the Navy does not procure water from the local government and maintains its own water system? In light of the huge reductions in the Navy presence and the dichotomy this issue seems to raise, doesn't it make more sense for the Navy to turn its water system over to the Public Utility Agency on Guam, assist Guam financially in consolidating the two systems, and then satisfy its water needs from the Public Utility Agency, as it does in most other locations?

Answer: There are a number of naval installations which operate water treatment and distribution systems, such as China Lake, Roosevelt Roads, and others. With respect to the system in Guam, the continued operation of that system will be evaluated, if necessary, after a final determination is made regarding the retention of naval facilities on the island.

Island-wide Navy Housing on Guam

5. Question: Mr. Secretary, as can be seen from the above points, most of the current Navy activities on Guam that remain from previous closures or reductions are recommended for closure, disestablishment or realignment. No mention is made, however, of the disposal of the large amounts of housing that served those units. Guam has always had a deficit of housing for its civilian population and this housing could be used to provide housing for the citizens of Guam, provide an income stream for GovGuam through lease payments, and provide the Navy with a source of properly maintained military housing in the event of a

Western Pacific military contingency. Wouldn't it seem reasonable to seek the transfer to GovGuam of all Navy housing that does not serve the needs of the few remaining Navy activities? Doesn't it also make economic sense to then combine the remaining Navy housing and the existing Air Force housing under one Federal/DoD housing authority and maintain the transferred Navy housing under rules that permit it to be leased back to the Navy during extended military contingencies?

Answer: The final determination of what facilities will be deemed in excess will not be made until after the BRAC-95 recommendations are approved. As you are aware, even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. We are committed to maintaining the highest quality of life possible for those personnel. Retention of necessary critical married family housing units will be one of our principal objectives. Where excesses may exist, however, you can be assured that we will work with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to develop a sound community reuse plan.

Navy Command Structure

6. Question: Mr. Secretary, with the disappearance of most Navy facilities on Guam, there does not seem to be a great need for a Navy Admiral command on Guam. Could you not move the remaining overall island-wide Navy Commander and his staff to joint spaces at Anderson AFB on the northern end of Guam and then transfer all the remaining command assets, including the housing area on Nimitz Hill to GovGuam for their economic development?

Answer: Our recommendations do not address the location of the headquarters for the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas, nor does the DON use the BRAC process to address flag officer billet requirements. Even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. It should be noted that the issue of the amount of presence left on Guam does not detract from the importance that the Department places on access to Guam for purposes of support to operations in that part of the Pacific.

Long-term Economic Impact (Section 30 of the Guam Organic Act)


7. Question: Mr. Secretary, Guam receives quite a bit of funding under section 30 of the Guam Organic Act. Have you included those revenues in your economic impact studies?

Answer: The Office of the Secretary of Defense required that all DoD Components analyze the economic impact on communities through the use of the DoD Economic Impact Data Base (see OSD Policy Memorandum Three). This data base is used to calculate the total potential direct and indirect job change (both as a total number of jobs and as a percentage of economic area employment) which will result from a closure or realignment action. Review of the economic impact methodology by the Joint Cross-Service Group on

Economic Impact confirmed that changes in employment, as calculated by the data base, provided a reasonable proxy for levels of impact associated with other aspects of the economy. These other impacts could include, for example, changes in expenditures, population, number of school age children, local government revenues and expenses, and, in this specific case, revenues to Guam resulting from the provisions of the Guam Organic Act.

8. Question: Mr. Secretary, in light of the closings, realignments and reductions on Guam that you are recommending, there seem to be services that could be provided more efficiently to the remaining Navy personnel and the Air Force through more consolidated activities, now that both are essentially in a caretaker status. Could you not provide some of these services more efficiently by combining such activities as Recreation, Public Works, Housing Management, Medical and Dental?

Answer: Following approval of the BRAC-95 recommendations, we will carefully determine what specific facilities need to be retained at Naval Activities and FISC Guam. We will then revise our infrastructure support requirements, as appropriate, taking into account operational requirements, quality of life, and potential community reuse/dual use. Our goal is the retention of those facilities that are both cost-effective and operationally responsive, which could encompass consolidation with the Air Force support infrastructure.





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF SENATOR DIXON

AFTERNOON HEARING

MARCH 6, 1995

WASHINGTON, DC

GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN AND WELCOME.

THIS IS THE SECOND OF FOUR HEARINGS TODAY AND TOMORROW AT WHICH THE COMMISSION IS HEARING FROM AND QUESTIONING THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, THEIR CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES REGARDING PROPOSED BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS THAT AFFECT THEIR SERVICE OR AGENCY.

WE ARE PLEASED TO HAVE WITH US THE HONORABLE SHEILA E. WIDNALL, THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE; GENERAL RONALD R. FOGLEMAN, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE; GENERAL THOMAS MOORMAN, THE VICE-CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE; AND MAJOR GENERAL JAY D. BLUME, JR., THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF FOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND TRANSITION.


BEFORE WE BEGIN WITH SECRETARY WIDNALL'S OPENING STATEMENT, LET ME SAY THAT IN 1993, AS PART OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994, THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT WAS AMENDED TO REQUIRE THAT ALL TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT A PUBLIC HEARING BE PRESENTED UNDER OATH. AS A RESULT, ALL OF THE WITNESSES WHO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMISSION THIS YEAR MUST BE SWORN IN BEFORE TESTIFYING.

SECRETARY WIDNALL, ARE THERE OTHER PERSONS HERE WITH YOU IN ADDITION TO THOSE AT THE TABLE WHOM YOU BELIEVE MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO GIVE ANSWERS TO THE COMMISSION THIS AFTERNOON? IF SO, COULD EVERYONE WHO MIGHT TESTIFY TODAY PLEASE RISE AND RAISE YOUR RIGHT HANDS?

DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION SHALL BEE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?

THANK YOU.

SECRETARY WIDNALL, YOU MAY BEGIN.



OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA E. WIDNALL
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
MARCH 6, 1995

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission today to discuss the Air Force base closure and realignment recommendations. General Fogleman and I look forward to working with the Commission as it considers these recommendations over the next few months.

The Air Force recommendations include 12 base or activity closures, seven realignments and seven actions requesting redirects of prior Commission recommendations. The Air Force recommendations are the fourth installment of a plan to restructure our bases to support United States national security interests into the next century. Taken with the prior three rounds of BRAC, the withdrawal from overseas bases and other Air Force downsizing activities, these 1995 recommendations will result in a total reduction of our physical plant infrastructure by approximately 25%. This is close to our personnel and equipment reductions of approximately 30% each. To date, our total investment in base closure as a result of the four rounds is over \$5 billion.

As I noted, this is the fourth round of base closures and realignments. In the first three rounds -- in 1988, 1991 and 1993 -- the Air Force focused primarily on closing operational bases. In the first three rounds we closed or realigned 18 active duty large and small aircraft bases. This enabled us to achieve the early cost savings associated with such closures. In the first three rounds the Air Force closed or realigned only one industrial/technical support base. These support bases -- falling in the categories of labs,

product centers and logistic centers -- were necessarily the focus of a great deal of our efforts in this 1995 round.

Overarching Themes

Before I discuss the specific 1995 recommendations, and the process by which we arrived at them, I want to talk briefly about some general principles we applied, and some broad goals we attempted to achieve, as we worked through the very difficult task of downsizing our infrastructure.

First, and most obviously, as we approached this round, it was imperative that we reduce excess capacity in our physical plant infrastructure. This is never easy -- all Air Force bases are outstanding installations that stand as a credit to our Nation and the communities that surround them. However, we had to reduce unneeded capacity to save taxpayer dollars and to preserve our limited budget for such vital purposes as readiness and modernization.

In selecting bases for closure or realignment we sought to achieve a basing structure that would satisfy current and anticipated future operational requirements. These recommendations accomplish that vital goal. They also permit the Air Force to retain the important capabilities to surge in time of national crisis and to absorb units returning from closed or downsized overseas bases. These recommendations are consistent with the bottom up review conducted by both Secretary Aspin and Secretary Perry. The Air Force will not be left with inadequate infrastructure to meet our worldwide commitments.

The Air Force mission is defined not through an introspective vision but rather with a view of the Air Force as an integral part of a joint structure, making unique

contributions that assist all the military departments within the Department of Defense. Our recommendations were made with these supporting and complimentary roles in mind. The ability to supply rapid global mobility with airlift and tankers, for example, is critical to all operations within the Department of Defense. The Air Force recommendations had to create a basing structure that would fully support these missions requiring the Air Force to deploy substantial forces and sustain those forces in parts of the world where adequate infrastructure may not be available.

The Air Force has placed critical emphasis on airspace needed to train and maintain combat readiness. Airspace, military training routes and military operating areas must be used or lost. The Air Force cannot and will not sacrifice a resource that is the cornerstone of creating a realistic training environment. Realistic training saves lives in combat and provides the winning margin. Our recommendations reflect this absolute requirement and the need to beddown force structure in a manner that permits an operations tempo sufficient to achieve training and mission objectives.

Last, but certainly not least, it was imperative that we approach the task of downsizing our infrastructure in a financially responsible manner. We had to design recommendations that we can in fact afford to implement within our budget, that will achieve real cost savings, and that will provide solid returns on our investment. These recommendations are fiscally responsible and thereby further protect the Air Force of the future.

Selection Process and Recommendations

Let me now turn to the process by which the Air Force arrived at its recommendations. This selection process was similar to the one used in each of the 1991 and 1993 BRAC rounds. Consistent with base closure law, bases were selected through

this process for closure or realignment based on the 1995 DOD Force Structure Plan and the eight selection criteria.

In January 1994, I appointed a Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) of general officer and civilian equivalents to review all installations in the United States that met or exceeded the legal requirements for consideration as closure or realignment candidates. Data was collected from the installations and commands, and validated by the major commands and the Air Staff. The AF Audit Agency continually reviewed the process to insure accuracy.

The BCEG placed all bases in categories based on primary mission. Capacity was analyzed by category, based on current base capacity and the Force Structure Plan. Categories having insufficient excess capacity were excluded from further study. Bases deemed militarily or geographically unique or mission essential were also excluded from further consideration. All non-excluded active component bases in the remaining categories were individually examined on the basis of the eight selection criteria. The Air Force Reserve Component was examined for cost effective relocations. These bases have special recruiting needs and relationships to their respective states that do not allow them to compete directly against each other in the same manner as the active force bases.

The BCEG presented to me and the Air Force Chief of Staff, the base groupings, excess capacity data, detailed base evaluations, and options resulting from the BCEG and JCSG analyses. We met on at least 20 occasions. Based on the information presented, the Force Structure Plan and the eight selection criteria, with consideration given to excess capacity, efficiencies in base utilization, and necessary concepts of force structure organization and basing, and in consultation with the Chief of Staff, I selected the Air Force bases to be recommended to the Secretary of Defense for closure and realignment.

Throughout this process, the Air Force worked extensively with the Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG). The Air Force collected data as requested by the JCSGs. The Air Force analyzed and considered alternatives developed by the JCSGs. The Air Force responded with comments and cost analyses, and engaged in a dialogue with the JCSGs. The Laboratory JCSG recommended the Air Force consider the closure of Rome Laboratory. The Air Force adopted this proposal and recommended the activities at Rome Laboratory be relocated to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. The movement to Fort Monmouth will increase inter-service cooperation and common C³ research. Fort Monmouth's location near unique civilian research facilities also offers potential for shared private sector research activities.

The Air Force recommendation regarding the Industrial/Technical Support Depot Category is worthy of special comment.

A capacity analysis of this category revealed excess capacity across the five Air Force depots. Detailed analysis, however, revealed that the cost to close one or two depots would be effectively prohibitive. Including environmental costs, which as you know must become part of our budget planning, we estimate it would cost in the range of \$800 million each to close the depots. Put another way, the full cost to close a single depot would consume most of the total amount budgeted for the next six years for all Air Force 1995 closures and realignments.

We also learned that even if sufficient funds could be made available for a full depot closure, the return in future Air Force Total Obligation Authority (TOA) savings would be much smaller than what we could achieve in other types of base closure. As I suggested earlier, an essential goal in the Air Force base closure analysis was to ensure

that each base we proposed for closure would make clear, economic sense, and that future budget savings would exceed budget costs. Undertaking large, unbudgeted efforts, would clearly jeopardize future recapitalization and modernization of Air Force programs. We simply had to find a better way to get this job done and we did.

The recommendation before you reflects an alternative to full closure -- an alternative that will decrease excess capacity in a way that makes operational sense and that will achieve savings at a realistic cost. The recommendation to realign the Air Logistics Centers and consolidate workload at receiver locations will transfer approximately 3.5 million direct labor hours and eliminate 37 product lines across the five depots. The total one time cost to implement is \$183 million. With annual savings of \$89 million, the return on investment is expected to be achieved within two years. This recommendation is fiscally sensible and does not place at risk Air Force dollars needed for readiness, modernization and quality of life for Air Force personnel.

While the Air Force BRAC depot recommendations are significant standing alone, they are also part of a broader Air Force effort to downsize and achieve real cost savings in a financially sound manner within the depot structure. Programmed work reductions, downsizing through contracting or transfer to other Service depots, and the recommended BRAC consolidations will achieve a total real property infrastructure reduction equal to 1.5 depots. This overall effort will also achieve a manpower capacity reduction equivalent to nearly two depots. The BRAC recommendations must be recognized as only a portion of this overall strategy.

Finally, the Air Force BRAC depot recommendations have inter-departmental components. The recommendations provide for the Air Force to make available to the Defense Logistics Agency over 25 million cubic feet of space for storage and other

purposes, thereby allowing another Department to achieve substantial consolidations and savings. The Air Force will also make depot space available for a portion of the Defense Nuclear Agency mission, as well as realigned non-depot Air Force missions. The sum total of this strategy creates cost savings not only to the Air Force, but to other organizations with the Department of Defense. Again, it does so in a manner that optimizes Air Force dollars invested in the BRAC process.

Anticipated Costs and Savings and Implementation Schedule

You have asked that I comment briefly on anticipated costs and savings associated with our 1995 recommendations and our tentative implementation schedule. Obviously these numbers and dates reflect our best estimates at this time. We will continue to refine this data in cooperation with the major commands and then look forward to sharing the results with the Commission.

The 1995 recommendations will result in great savings for the Air Force. Considering only traditional BRAC related numbers, we estimate a total net savings of approximately \$113 million during the implementation years, and savings of \$363 million in each year thereafter. When we also consider savings associated with our related actions not traditionally included in BRAC calculations, the numbers are even greater. The closure of a missile group, program actions, and the efficiencies and downsizing at our Air Logistic Centers bring our projected savings over twenty years to over six billion dollars, expressed as a present value.

The Air Force achieved this stream of savings by paying attention not only to the savings from potential actions, but the costs as well. For example, the high costs of total base closures were avoided not only with the innovative approach to depot downsizing, but also by maximizing realignment opportunities, such as at Kirtland Air Force Base,

New Mexico. That action preserves important mission elements but avoids costly support activities associated with a military population. The smaller actions on our list also add up to larger savings. These include test functions, as well as our Air Reserve Component actions. Finally, we faced up to some costly actions that resulted from previous rounds, and found smarter ways to achieve the same mission support, such as with our recommended redirect associated with the Fort Drum airfield support arrangement.

The Air Force has begun to develop an implementation schedule for these 1995 recommendations. We will work closely with the major commands and the Air Reserve Component further to develop and refine this schedule.

In prior rounds, the Air Force established an excellent record of closing bases as quickly as possible. This aggressive approach provides the quickest savings to the Air Force and assists the local communities in their efforts to develop the closure and implementation plan necessary to begin economic revitalization.

The presence of a number of support installations in this year's recommendations may increase to some degree the time needed to implement closure and realignment actions. Research projects and unique test or research facilities may require longer lead times to relocate without mission impact. The Air Force will insure that all efforts are undertaken to maximize savings at these installations and to work closely with the local communities to facilitate a prompt transition and the best reuse opportunities.

* * * *

We have brought to you the base structure that is needed to support the Air Force mission; we have looked to the future for that mission and to the future for our infrastructure requirements. This is the final of four closure rounds that restructures the Air Force of the future; an Air Force that is and will be capable of responding to any challenge, in any theatre, at anytime.



BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE GENERAL RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

DATE: 6 Mar 95, 1330

LOCATION: Cannon Building, Capitol Hill

AUDIENCE: Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission -- it's an honor to represent our Air Force this afternoon. I look forward to working with this Commission as you consider the recommendations forwarded to you from the Secretary of Defense.

I will tell you up-front that recommending the closures and realignments was not an easy decision.

- **These bases are outstanding installations.**
- **Having been a commander at virtually every organizational level within the DOD, I appreciate the close relations that have been formed over the years in these communities.**
- **So, I realize that these actions will affect good people who have done so much for Air Force men and women in the past.**

But, this being the case, I will also tell you that we must take these actions. By reducing our infrastructure, we are better positioning the Air Force to meet the nation's needs in the long run.

And, these recommendations do not harm the Air Force's readiness -- today or tomorrow.

- We will have sufficient airspace, training routes, and ranges to train and to maintain critical combat skills.**
- The remaining bases and infrastructure allow us to support the current security strategy, as outlined by Secretary Perry and Chairman Shalikashvili last week.**
- And, the remaining CONUS infrastructure permits a hedge against future requirements, if we should need to return overseas facilities to host nations and bring additional forces home.**

So, these proposals will position us well for the future. And, as we look ahead to the 21st Century, let me share with you my thoughts about how we might approach the possibility of future closure and realignment actions.

• First, we may need a “sunset clause” on current force structure actions directed by this and previous BRACs.

•• So, if future force structure reductions occur, we may need to re-examine our basing.

• Second, the services should be allowed future realignments as required for operational requirements. As a service chief, I value the freedom to make prudent moves after proper consultation with Congress.

• Third, having said this, I will also tell you that in my view, we need to put a hold on any new BRAC actions for the next 5 to 7 years. This will provide some much needed stability for our people and the communities supporting our installations.

• If future force structure reductions occur, we may need to re-examine our basing. If that happens, I think that any future BRAC actions should be initiated by the SECDEF.

• We are prepared to discuss these in detail or provide you inputs at an appropriate point during your deliberations.

With this as an overview, I am prepared to answer any questions you may have. I think it is important that you know that based on a ruling by the General Counsel, I recused myself from considering small aircraft bases and laboratories.



GENERAL

1. Secretary Widnall, did the Office of Secretary of Defense remove or add any installation closures or realignments from your recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics.

2. Secretary Widnall, did the Office of Secretary of Defense instruct your Service to place or not to place any specific installations for closure or realignment on your listed recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, would you please elaborate on the specifics?

3. Secretary Widnall, did anyone in the administration instruct you not to place any specific installations for closure or realignment on your listed recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics?

4. Secretary Widnall, will the Air Force have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.

5. Secretary Widnall, did you or the Office of Secretary of Defense remove any installations from the recommendations solely for reasons of economic or environmental impact? Please elaborate.

6. Secretary Widnall, given the limitations on the base closure process by current Title 10 restrictions and the fact that excess capacity will more than likely remain after this last and final round under the current Base Closure Law, what method would you recommend for consideration in future base closure efforts?

7. Secretary Widnall, have you provided to the commission all of the information that you used your decision-making process? If not, would you please provide it within the next five days?

8. Secretary Widnall, some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from local base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to DoD proposals.

What guidance did the Air Force give base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

9. Secretary Widnall, which of your recommendations are a direct result of the alternatives presented by the joint cross-service groups?

Please explain the use of information by joint cross-service groups?

How were joint cross-services issues addressed differently this round by the Air Force as compared to the 1993 round? Please elaborate.

10. Secretary Widnall, in earlier testimony Dr. Perry, General Shalikashvili and Secretary Deutch expressed the desirability of cross servicing in depots, laboratories, and test and evaluation facilities to reduce infrastructure .

Do you believe that cross servicing is in the best interests of the Air Force?

Why has the Air Force done so little in cross servicing?

Are any of your recommendations a result of interservicing? Please elaborate.

DEPOTS

1. Secretary Widnall, Deputy Secretary Deutch presented an Air Force Depot Proposal chart at his February 28th press conference which suggests ,at least in the case of the Air Force, it is more cost effective to consolidate or downsize depots than it is to close them. According to that chart, consolidation as opposed to two depot closure, will reduce one-time costs by \$924 million, while increasing the net present value by another \$292 million.

Please explain how the consolidation option, which retains 18 million more square feet and 763 more people than the closure option, can produce these savings?

2. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has had five major Air Logistics Centers since the Vietnam Era. In the 1993 round, the Air Force recommended the closure of one of these five depots, but that depot was removed from the list by the Secretary of Defense. This year with the same selection criteria and a smaller force structure plan there is once again no Air Force depot on the list. The **CHART** titled "Air Force Program Trends" reflects reductions in fighter wing equivalents, assigned aircraft, major bases and personnel end-strengths over the last ten years.


On what basis did you determine that the Air Force continues to need five Air Logistics Centers?

On what basis did you determine that realigning the workload at the five depots was preferable to closing one or more of these depots?

Did anyone outside the Air Force ask, suggest, or direct the Air Force to avoid closing any particular air logistics center?

3. Secretary Widnall, during the DoD hearing last week, Secretary Perry presented this **CHART** which compared the costs and savings of down-sizing and retaining all five Air Logistics Centers to the costs and savings of closing two of

Air Force Program Trends



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Air Force Depbt Proposal



Cost Implications (\$ Millions)

Consolidate at All Depots	FY96-01 Net		Total Savings*
	One-Time Costs	Costs (Savings)	
BRAC ACTIONS	183	(139)	991
NON-BRAC ACTIONS	35	(488)	1,875
ALL ACTIONS	218	(627)	2,866
Alternative - Close 2 Depots (+\$600 Million Env)	1,107	(363)	699

* Savings in 20 year net present value

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these centers. Nearly two-thirds of the savings under the “downsizing” alternative came from “non-BRAC actions.”

What are these “non-BRAC actions” and why are they included in this analysis?

Would these “non-BRAC” actions be realized even if one or two Air Logistics Centers were closed?

What are the total savings that these “non BRAC actions” would provide if the Air Force closes one or two Air Logistics Centers?

How would the alternatives compare if you remove the “non-BRAC actions” from the downsizing alternative and then compare that alternative to closing only the one air logistics center that provides the greatest savings?

4. Secretary Widnall, this **CHART** also shows that the one time cost to close Air Logistics Centers at San Antonio and Sacramento, are approximately \$1.1 billion. Cost of Base Realignment Actions analysis in support of these recommendations reflect that the estimate includes about \$249 million in construction costs, \$330 million in personnel moving costs, and approximately \$257 million in “unique” one time costs.

Please explain in as much detail as possible why the Air Force would need to spend \$249 million for construction, when excess capacity already exists at all Air Logistics Centers.

The \$330 million cost estimate to accommodate personnel movements would apparently move almost 19,000 civilian and 6600 military personnel.

Considering that the five Air Logistics Centers will employ only 27,000 civilians, is it really necessary to relocate 19,000 (67%) civilians to accommodate two aviation logistics center closures?

Why is the cost of moving 6600 military personnel included as a cost to close the Air Logistics Centers when nearly all depot personnel are civilian employees?

Air Force Depot Proposal



Cost Implications (\$ Millions)

Consolidate at All Depots	FY96-01 Net		Total Savings*
	One-Time Costs	Costs (Savings)	
BRAC ACTIONS	183	(139)	991
NON-BRAC ACTIONS	35	(488)	1,875
ALL ACTIONS	218	(627)	2,866
Alternative - Close 2 Depots (+\$600 Million Env)	1,107	(363)	699

* Savings in 20 year net present value

Please explain in as much detail as possible, what is meant by "one time unique closing costs?"

5. Secretary Widnall, in your opening statement you indicated the cost to close a depot is \$800 million including costs for environmental restoration.

Were these restoration costs a factor in the Air Force's decision not to close depots? If so, could you explain why?

6. Secretary Widnall, your alternative to downsizing was the closure of two depots. Did you examine the alternative to close one depot?

7. Secretary Widnall, in testimony last week, Mr. Gotbaum indicated that the Depot Joint Cross-Service Group calculated capacity of depots based on a 40-hour work week, or just one shift per activity. This is a very conservative way of measuring capacity since people work more than one shift in times of crisis. Using only one shift, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?

If you use one-and-one-half or two shifts, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?

8. Secretary Widnall, in 1993, the Air Force recommended closing McClellan Air Force Base. This base is not recommended in 1995. In fact, McClellan Air Force Base gains additional personnel in the Air Force's proposal of closures and realignments.

Would you explain why?

9. Secretary Widnall, according to Defense Logistics Agency approximately 28,000 civilian employees are presently employed at the Air Force's five Air Logistics Centers -- this is an average of 5,600 civilians per center. The Air Force proposes to retain all five of its Air Logistics Centers, but says it will achieve savings that "are comparable to closing two Air Logistics Centers" by

consolidating functions and downsizing in place. But the Air Force's plan achieves a net reduction of only 1850 civilian personnel at all five centers, compared to a reduction of approximately 11,000 civilian personnel that would result from closing two depots.

How can the Air Force claim that its downsizing plan is "comparable to closing two Air Logistics Centers" when closing two centers would have eliminated six times as many civilian personnel positions?

10. Secretary Widnall, part of the rationale provided by the Air Force for downsizing rather than closing one or more Air Logistics Centers is that 25 million cubic feet of storage space can be "made available" to Defense Logistics Agency under the Air Force plan. In a February 14, 1995 letter to Major General Klugh, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics, Admiral Straw indicated that since Defense Logistics Agency is also in the process of downsizing,, "offers of space to Defense Logistics Agency should carry no weight in the determination of whether a depot/base remains open."

What agreement does the Air Force have with Defense Logistics Agency regarding the use of the 25 million cubic feet of unused space that would be available if all five Air Logistics Centers are retained?

11. Secretary Widnall, in June of 1993 the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Commission not to address fixed wing aviation depots separately from other interservicing issues. They asked instead for the opportunity to come forward with comprehensive interservicing recommendations in 1995.

12. Secretary Widnall, the Joint Cross-Service Review Team at DoD for Depot Maintenance analyzed and evaluated four sets of capacity figures. First, they looked at current available capacity and found that the five Air Logistic Centers could produce almost 38 million direct labor hours using a split-shift, 8 hour-per-day schedule. Yet, if all unoccupied and currently unused infrastructure were considered, the five Air Logistics Centers could produce almost 58 million direct labor hours under a single shift 8 hour-per-day schedule.

In your view, are the maximum available capacity numbers valid, and could they be used to assign additional workload?

13. Secretary Widnall, in May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated, “. . . depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the *minimum facilities, equipment and skill personnel necessary* to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence.” (emphasis added)

Will the Air Force base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?

14. Secretary Widnall, at one time, Hill Air Logistics Center performed maintenance support for the Navy’s F-18.

In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of this interservicing effort?

Why did the Navy discontinue Air Force support of the F-18?

Are you satisfied, that your recommendations in the area of fixed wing aviation depots represent a comprehensive approach to the problems of interservicing and excess capacity in this area?

PRODUCT CENTERS AND LABORATORIES

1. Secretary Widnall, a February 13, 1995 memo to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security on behalf of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering states, "The laboratories retain significant duplication and excess capacity. . . ." To offset capacity and duplication, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the consolidation of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence research and development at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; consolidation of explosives at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey; and consolidation of research and development of propellants at China Lake, California.

Why did the Air Force reject all of these alternatives?

This memo also stated, ". . . the Military Departments, by and large, have been unwilling to collocate, let alone rely on each other. They continue to defend fiercely their independent pursuit of similar product lines." The memo concludes that "only a heavier handed instrument" will result in meaningful interservicing actions.

Do you agree with this assessment?

2. Secretary Widnall, an April 1994 Defense Science Board (DSB) report states that the Defense Laboratory System is an "obsolescent artifact of the Cold War that has not kept pace with the shrinking military force structure and changing patterns of technology advancement generation."

The DSB recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995-99. These cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction by the end of the century.

Have you recommended base closures or realignments as a result of these personnel reductions?

3. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has recommended that the Rome Laboratory close even though it is categorized in Tier I, the highest grouping, as indicated by this **CHART**.

Why was Rome Laboratory recommended for closure when it is in Tier I?

What consideration was given to absorbing workload and eliminating excess capacity at Army and Navy laboratories as an alternative to closing Brooks?

What alternatives other than relocation to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base were considered?

4. Secretary Widnall, in 1993, the Commission requested that the Air Force comment on the community concern that in realigning Griffiss Air Force Base at that time, the Air Force appeared to be positioning itself to close Rome Laboratory in the near future. The Air Force responded by saying: "The Air Force has no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory within the next five years." Since then the Rome, New York community has made plans to reuse Griffiss Air Force Base centered on the fact that Rome Laboratory was to stay in place. The Air Force now recommends to close the Rome Laboratory.

Could you please comment on the why the Air Force has changed its mind on the status of Rome Laboratory in less than two years?

5. Secretary Widnall, in accordance with the Air Force analysis, one of the important attributes for the evaluation of depots is "access to technically oriented labor pool." Likewise, one of the attributes for Product Centers and Laboratories is "population of highly skilled personnel." Could you please elaborate how the Air Force compared the different installations in regard to these attributes?

6. Secretary Widnall, the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona, be relocated to Orlando, Florida. In the current round of base closures and realignments, you

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - PRODUCT CENTERS and LABORATORIES Subcategory

TIERING OF BASES

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

TIER I

Hanscom AFB

Rome Lab

Wright-Patterson AFB

TIER II

Kirtland AFB

Los Angeles AFB

TIER III

Brooks AFB

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recommended that the Laboratory remain at its present location in Mesa, Arizona, as a stand-alone activity. The Air Force's justification states, in part, that "the activities are consistent with the community's plans for redevelopment of the Williams Air Force Base property, including a university and research park."

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 states that "In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary may not take into account for any purpose any advance conversion planning undertaken by an affected community with respect to the anticipated closure or realignment of an installation" (Title XXIX, Part A, Sec. 2903, paragraph (c)(3)(B)).

Why was facility reuse planning used as a consideration factor for this recommendation?

7. Secretary Widnall, in recommending closure of Brooks Air Force Base, the Human Systems Center, including the School of Aerospace Medicine and Armstrong Laboratory, is recommended to relocate to Wright-Paterson Air Force Base. Part of the justification for your recommendation is that the Air Force has more laboratory capacity than necessary to support current and future Air Force requirements.

What consideration was given to absorbing workload and eliminating excess capacity at Army and Navy laboratories as an alternative to closing Brooks?

What alternatives other than relocation to Wright-Paterson Air Force Base were considered?

8. Secretary Widnall, your recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base, Texas involved closing all activities and facilities, including family housing. We understand that there is a large waiting list for family housing at nearby Lackland Air Force Base.

Why did your recommendation not include the retention of family housing at Brooks to help satisfy Air Force family housing requirements in the San Antonio metropolitan area?

9. Secretary Widnall, we recently received a copy of a memorandum dated February 15, 1995, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing) to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) expressing interest in the U.S. Army Reserve Command acquiring approximately 57 acres and 13 permanent buildings at Brooks AFB--should it become available from the Air Force. Transfer of this Air Force property would allow the Army Reserve to (1) eliminate a costly lease, (2) reduce the need for newly programmed military construction, and (3) provide facilities necessary to enhance unit readiness at a significant savings to the Department of Defense. According to Army officials, the Army Reserve would be able to cancel a lease with an annual cost saving of \$218,655 and a fiscal year 1999 military construction project with an estimated cost saving of \$11.4 million.

Was this request discussed and resolved during deliberations by either the BRAC 95 Steering Group or BRAC 95 Review Group, which were established to consider such inter-service needs? If not, why not?

10. Secretary Widnall, an alternative was received by the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group for to consolidate the lab at Brooks Air Force Base to a Naval installation in Orlando, Florida. Instead, the Air Force chose to relocate the lab to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

What was the Air Force's rationale for this action?

Why did the Air Force reject the alternative submitted by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

KIRTLAND

1. Secretary Widnall, regarding the realignment recommendation for Kirtland Air Force Base, were all of the base tenants contacted in a timely manner and asked to provide information about how the realignment and subsequent economic impact would affect them?

2. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has recommended realignments to Kirtland Air Force Base. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has testified that the Air Force coordinate this action with the Department of Energy. What concerns does the Department of Energy have with realignment of Kirtland? How does the Air Force respond to DOE's concerns?

3. General Fogleman, the Air Force has recommended realigning Kirtland Air Force Base. As part of this recommendation, the 58th Special Operations Wing (SOW) will relocate to Holloman Air Force Base.

How was this move coordinated with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?

How does this move effect the operational requirements of 58th SOW?

What guidance or direction from outside the Department of the Air Force, if any, was received to move this unit to Holloman Air Force Base?

What consideration, if any, was given to move this unit to the West Coast?

4. Secretary Widnall, in recommending Kirtland Air Force Base for realignment, the Air Force is proposing to move some of the Defense Nuclear Agency activities to Kelly Air Force Base and Nellis Air Force Base.

How was this action coordinated with Defense Nuclear Agency? Please elaborate?

TEST AND EVALUATION

1. General Fogleman, several studies have pointed out that great opportunities for reduction in the test and evaluation infrastructure exist in testing of high performance aircraft, test support aircraft and electronic warfare testing. Do you believe the Air Force and Navy should combine activities such as Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center with China Lake Naval Weapons Center and Edwards Air Force Base?

2. Secretary Widnall, regarding the test and evaluation realignment recommendation that would relocate electronic warfare capability from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base, why didn't the Air Force accept an alternate proposal by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross Service Group that would have transferred certain Eglin missions to China Lake Naval Weapons Center?

3. Secretary Widnall, regarding the realignment recommendation that would relocate electronic warfare capability from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base, did the Air Force consider an alternate proposal by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross Service Group that would have transferred certain Eglin missions to China Lake Naval Weapons Center?

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

1. Secretary Widnall, DoD and the Services have been diligently pursuing the consolidation of Undergraduate Flying Training for the last two years. The consolidation of Navigator Training appears to be quite a success story between the Air Force and the Navy. In regards to the training of Pilots, in your view, what are the advantages and limitations of a fully consolidated Air Force and Navy Undergraduate Pilot Training program?

What was the effect, if any, of DoD or Joint Staff policy regarding cross-servicing of the Air Force's pilot training with the Navy on training requirements and on basing decisions?

What alternatives did the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group provide to the Air Force regarding the closure or realignment of its pilot training bases?

How did the Air Force respond to these alternatives?

2. General Fogleman, what elements of the Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training program require Air Force-specific training that is unique as compared to the Navy program?

Did DoD or the Services consider integrating Pilot Training operations at the same base and using the same training aircraft in a way that permits Air Force-specific training?

3. General Fogleman, how would the subsequent reduction of excess capacity due to the consolidation of Air Force and Navy Pilot Training programs restrict the Air Force's ability to ramp-up future pilot—and international pilot—production requirements?

4. General Fogleman, what was the impact, if any, of basing considerations for the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System on your BRAC 95 basing decisions?

Will final selection of a jet or prop Joint Primary Aircraft Training System aircraft affect your basing decisions?

What Joint Primary Aircraft Training System selection criteria, such as range, airspace, and cross-wind limitations, were or were not considered as factors in your basing decision and why? This criteria is relevant, since Reese Air Force Base, Texas was downgraded in these areas.

Absent a decision on which Joint Primary Aircraft Training System aircraft candidate will be selected until this summer, and recognizing that the planned introduction of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System into the Service's Pilot Training programs will not occur until 2001 and stretch over a decade, how much weight did Joint Primary Aircraft Training System considerations carry in your decision-making during this round?

5. General Fogleman, the Air Force selected Reese Air Force Base, Texas as its first Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training site, introduced the T-1 training aircraft there, and initiated the consolidation of Undergraduate Pilot Training with the Navy in a joint program there as well. Based on these decisions, many are of the impression that the Air Force places a high value on Reese Air Force Base.

Why has the Air Force now rated Reese so low in comparison to the other Undergraduate Pilot Training category bases?

Please explain the Air Force rationale for recommending the closing of Reese and transferring all its aircraft, in particular the newly introduced T-1 aircraft, along with the joint training program, to Vance, Laughlin and Craig, when these bases have yet to transition to these programs, as opposed to leaving these assets in-place at Reese, and simply closing one of these other bases, and avoiding the need for these transfers altogether.

6. Secretary Widnall, the Navy has requested significant changes in the plan for basing aircraft resulting from the 1993 decision to close Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California and Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida. Can you comment on what has changed since 1993 that caused the Navy to require such a dramatic change?

FORCE STRUCTURE

1. Secretary Widnall, how do planned reductions in the bomber force in the Future Years Defense Plan, and in your Force Structure Plan, affect the base structure needed to support this force?

There is a statutory prohibition against retiring B-52H, B-1B or F-111 aircraft contained in the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. To accommodate this prohibition while drawing down the active bomber inventory, the Air Force created a "reconstitution reserve."

How has the "reconstitution reserve" affected the required basing structure?

What is the Air Force operational concept for maintaining these aircraft "on the ramp," the process for returning them to combat ready status in the event of a mobilization, and the sourcing of combat ready crews to fly these aircraft?

2. General Fogleman, considering that approximately 5.5 fighter wing equivalents remain based overseas, how much capacity should be retained in Continental United States in terms of land, usable facilities, and training facilities and ranges for basing those units if they are to return? Please elaborate.

3. General Fogleman, the Air Force has recently instituted a two-level maintenance structure instead of a three-level maintenance program. We understand that this has resulted in a \$259 million saving through civilian/military manpower reductions. Will this move to two-level maintenance create excess capacity at certain bases and should it lead to any infrastructure reductions? If so, please elaborate.

How has the Air Force's move to two-level maintenance affected your closure or realignment recommendations?

LARGE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE BASES

1. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force recommended inactivation of the missile group at Grand Forks, "unless the need to retain Ballistic Missile Defense options effectively precludes this action." Should that be the case, you then recommended that the missile group at Minot should be inactivated. If you had recommended inactivating the missile wing at Malmstrom, instead of the group at Grand Forks or Minot, you could have avoided the uncertainty now facing the communities at Grand Forks and Minot as well as the cost of completing the Minuteman III conversion program at Malmstrom, and you could have closed an entire base.

Did the Air Force consider deactivating the missile wing at Malmstrom and closing an entire base, instead of deactivating the missile group at either Grand Forks or Minot? If so, why was it rejected?

2. Secretary Widnall, since the Air Force has identified Minot Air Force Base as an alternative to Grand Forks Air Force Base, do you consider Minot a Secretary of Defense recommendation for realignment?

3. Secretary Widnall, the future force structure decisions that led to the inactivation of one Minuteman missile group or wing were made several months ago. Why weren't the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment implications of inactivating the missile group at Grand Forks reviewed at that time, so that the Air Force could make a more definitive recommendation now regarding inactivation of a missile group or wing?

4. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has indicated that it could be as late as December 1996 before questions regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment implications related to closing the missile field at Grand Forks are resolved. These questions were also raised during the 1993 round when the missile field at Grand Forks was first considered for inactivation. In March of 1993, the Commission asked General Horner, the Commander-in-Chief of US Space

Command, to help resolve these questions, and in an April 1993 reply to the Commission, General Horner stated: "My staff has provided a copy of your letter to the Joint Staff and the Air Staff. I have asked them to assist in getting a definitive reading.

The Commission understands that a coordinated US Government position, requiring input from both DoD and the State Department, is needed regarding this issue. But it also appears that the Air Staff was asked to begin coordinating this position nearly two years ago, and as of now has been unable to get an answer.

During the DoD hearing last week, Secretary Deutch indicated that it should not take more than a few weeks to get a coordinated US Government position. What steps is the Air Force now taking to provide a prompt answer to the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment issue so that the Commission can decide whether to focus on Grand Forks or another missile unit.

5. Secretary Widnall, between 1993 and 1995, the cost to close Malmstrom Air Force Base dropped from \$543 million to \$39 million, the cost to close Minot Air Force Base dropped from \$195 million to \$59 million, and the cost to close Grand Forks Air Force Base increased from \$118 million to \$129 million. What accounts for the sharp drop in the cost close Malmstrom or Minot versus the slight increase in the cost to close Grand Forks?

6. General Fogleman, we have heard numerous statements regarding the 1993 Commission recommendation to establish the East Coast Mobility Wing at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey as instead of Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York as recommended by the Air Force.

Has the Air Force been satisfied with this decision?

Has the establishment of the East Coast Mobility Wing progressed to your satisfaction?

Will the wing be able to accomplish its mission?

7. General Fogleman, with the transfer of tanker aircraft from Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, is the Air Force reopening a closed base and adding infrastructure to the inventory?

Savings estimates from the previous BRAC recommendations will not be realized as a result of the new recommendation. Has this been taken into account in estimating the current savings?

How will additional cost savings be achieved by this action, as the current recommendation indicates?

Why is the base being opened as an active component installation rather than a Reserve installation as recommended in 1993?

SMALL AIRCRAFT BASES

1. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has reduced its fighter aircraft force from 36 fighter wings at the end of the Cold War to the 20 wings now projected in your current Force Structure Plan. Simultaneously, it has reconfigured the size of the typical fighter wing from 72 to 54 aircraft, and the typical squadron from 24 to 18 aircraft. Similarly, the size of reserve units has also decreased.

What was the Air Force's rationale for these smaller units?

In light of excess capacity at fighter bases that results from smaller wings, would it be feasible to increase the number of squadrons assigned to a fighter wing, or the number of fighter wings assigned to a base?

Is it reasonable to assume if the fighter wing structure is realigned to 72 aircraft that more bases could be closed?

Was wing size taken into consideration during the Air Force analysis of closure and recommendations?

2. General Fogleman, the current Force Structure Plan reduces the fighter aircraft inventory by six Fighter Wing Equivalents from 26 to 20 wings. During this drawdown, the Air Force has recommended closure of one small aircraft base, Homestead Air Force Base, in 1993.

Can you explain why the Air Force has been unable to identify any additional small aircraft bases for closure despite this significant reduction in fighter aircraft?

3. General Fogleman, an article in the March 1995 issue of the Air Force Magazine stated the Air Force is retiring the F-111 aircraft and that all would be out of the inventory by 1999.

Is this an accurate statement?

In light of the fact that all F-111s in the continental US are based at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, and considering the retirement of all F-111's, what are your plans for Cannon Air Force Base ?

Please comment on why the retirement of the F-111 aircraft alone would not result in excess capacity in terms of small aircraft bases?

HOSPITAL ISSUES

1. Secretary Widnall, based on DoD data, the Air Force is currently operating more than two times the capacity it needs to meet wartime requirements. According to this information, if expanded bed capability is considered, capacity is more than six times the requirement.

Do you agree with this data?

Given this excess capacity, why isn't the Air Force recommending any hospital closures or realignments?

2. Secretary Widnall, the Medical Joint Cross Service Group recommended realigning eight Air Force hospitals to outpatient clinics -- USAF Medical Centers Wilford Hall, Scott Air Force Base, and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and the Air Force hospitals located at Shaw, Reese, Sheppard, and Langley Air Force Bases and the Air Force Academy. The DoD list includes none of these actions.

Why did the Air Force reject all of the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives?

3. Secretary Widnall, do the hospital closures that follow the Air Force's list of recommended base closures and realignments represent consideration of the Air Force's planned draw-down in medical staff and infrastructure, or will further actions be required?

4. Secretary Widnall, how did the Air Force consider the medical needs of the active duty personnel and their family members remaining in the area of hospitals to be closed?

How were the medical needs of retirees, survivors, and their family members taken into consideration?

ECONOMIC IMPACT ISSUES

1. Secretary Widnall, to what extent were your recommendations influenced by economic impact considerations?

How were the cumulative economic impact of closings on a region considered? Please elaborate.

Was any decision taken to down-size, rather than close an installation, as a result of economic impact considerations?

2. Secretary Widnall, the Navy, in their report, stated "Because of the large number of job losses occurring in California and Guam, the DON (Navy) decided against recommending several closures that could otherwise have been made Other than the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, no other closure is recommended that would result in a negative direct civilian job loss impact in any economic area in California".

Did the Air Force establish similar economic thresholds for any state or region?

3. Secretary Widnall, how did you assess the impact of your closure and realignment recommendations on existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure? Please elaborate.

What factors were considered?

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ISSUES

1. Secretary Widnall, according to DoD guidance, "environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations."

Were any bases not recommended for closure or realignment due to unique contamination problems? Please elaborate.

2. Secretary Widnall, did the overall cost of environmental restoration at all bases affect the size of the list presented to the Commission?

3. Secretary Widnall, DoD policy also states that "unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse." Were any installations eliminated from closure consideration due to unique contamination problems? If so, please elaborate.

4. Secretary Widnall, DoD began its "Fast Track Cleanup" program eighteen months ago to speed cleanup on closing bases.

Does "Fast Track Cleanup" cause the Air Force to clean up a closing base sooner than if the base were to remain open?

Do costs of cleanup increase because the cleanup is on the fast track? If so, should cost of cleanup be considered in cost of closure calculations?

5. Secretary Widnall, in making closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

Did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis?

Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

6. Secretary Widnall, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?

7. Secretary Widnall, in the 1993 round, one community pointed out that the cost of cleaning up an installation directed to close could be three to ten times as great as the cost of cleaning up an active installation. This difference is due to expected technological advances in environmental restoration.

Do you believe the difference between routine and closure related cleanup costs, if factual, should be considered in cost of closure calculations?

CHANGES TO PREVIOUS ROUNDS

1. Secretary Widnall, the 1991 BRAC Commission agreed with the Air Force recommendation to close Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas and to retain the Reserve units in a cantonment area “. . . if the base is converted to a civilian airport.” This recommendation was contingent on a community commitment by June 93, which was met, to operate Bergstrom as a civilian airport.

In 1993 the Air Force recommended the Reserve units be relocated to Carswell Air Force Base. The 93 BRAC Commission found substantial deviation with this recommendation because the Air Force had failed to recognize the communities commitment to establish a civilian airport, and did not consider the demographics problem associated with the large multi-service reserve component population planned for Carswell (i.e., numerous Navy Reserve units and an Air National Guard unit).

Would you please explain what conditions have changed to cause the Air Force to recommend deactivation of the unit?

Could you explain how the aircraft are proposed to be redistributed?

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND BASES

1. General Fogleman, the Secretary of Defense recommended realignment of the Onizuka Air Station, California, including the inactivation of the 750th Space Group and moving its functions to Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado, and relocation of Detachment 2, Space and Missile Systems Center to Falcon Air Force Base.

What are the projected future Air Force satellite control requirements and how do they differ from current requirements?

In the Space-Satellite Control Subcategory, what percent of excess capacity currently exists at Onizuka Air Station?

Based on projected future Air Force satellite control requirements, what percent of excess capacity is expected to be found at Onizuka Air Station?

Does realignment of Onizuka Air Station leave sufficient capacity to adequately support projected future requirements?

If the Air Force has one more satellite control installation than is needed to support projected future requirements, then why did the Air Force not recommend closing Onizuka Air Station?

What other tenants would be affected by a decision to close the facility?

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT ISSUES

1. Secretary Widnall, during the 1993 base closing process, the Air Force identified the basing of Air Reserve Component units as an issue that would be addressed during this round. Further, the size of Air Reserve Component units has recently been reduced.

How have you addressed the Air Reserve Component during this round of base closure?

Do this years recommendations eliminate all excess capacity in the Air Reserve Component?

How have opportunities to consolidate reserve squadrons been affected by reductions in the size of Air Reserve Component units?

2. General Fogleman, the Air Force is recommending the transfer of a few Air National Guard units to larger active and reserve bases, such as McClellan and March Air Force Bases in California.

Also, the Air Force has recommended the closure of the Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station and the realignment of its eight C-130 aircraft to two other Reserve units. The justification for this action states, "The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 aircraft operating locations than necessary to effectively support the Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan."

However, there are many Air Reserve Component units that were not recommended for consolidation. For example, no major Air National Guard unit (as identified in Appendix VI of the Air Force's Analyses and Recommendations) was identified for closure or realignment?

Since there appears to be considerable savings to be gained by this type of consolidation of resources, what opportunities exist for further consolidations throughout the Air Reserve Component, especially in the fighter force structure where there have been reductions in the size of the units?

What distinguished the Air Reserve Component units the Air Force recommended for relocation to other bases as candidates for this action?

Why was the Air National Guard unit at Pittsburgh International Airport not identified for relocation in light of the fact the Air Force Reserve unit at the same location was recommended for relocation?

Since the Air National Guard unit will remain at Pittsburgh International Airport, how will this affect the closure of the Air Force Reserve station at the airport?

3. Secretary Widnall, Representative Calvert and the Riverside, California community have been actively involved in a proposal to the Navy to relocate Rotary Wing assets from Marine Corps Air Station Tustin to March Air Force Base. Considering that March Air Force Base was realigned as a Reserve Base as a result of the 1993 Closure Round, has the Air Force been a part of those discussions and do you consider the initiative as acceptable to the Air Force?

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - DEPOT Subcategory**TIERING OF BASES**

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

TIER I

Hill AFB
Tinker AFB

TIER II

Robins AFB

TIER III

Kelly AFB
McClellan AFB

6 Feb 95

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QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

NEW MEXICO CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

Sen. Pete Domenici
Sen. Jeff Bingaman
Rep. Joe Skeen
Rep. Bill Richardson
Rep. Steve Schiff

1. Nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?
2. One of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment will have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?
3. Which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

REP. SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, NY

In last weeks testimony before this commission, Defense Secretary Perry described Lowery Air Force Base's reuse plan as a successful consequence of the BRAC process.

1. In the BRAC 95 process, did you consider the communities' reuse plans as a result of previous BRAC closure or realignment decisions?

Should already completed, well developed reuse planning efforts be a part of subsequent BRAC decisions?

2. At Rome, New York for instance, as a result of the realignment of Griffiss Air Force Base, a reuse plan was completed with the assistance of the Office of Economic Adjustment and the Air Force.

Was the impact to the community's reuse plan taken into consideration in the decision to close Rome lab?

CONGRESSMAN LARRY COMBEST, TX

Secretary Widnall:

We have had only had a few days to review the data which was used to make decisions on Undergraduate Pilot Training, but some things stand out. Let me give you some examples of what I would consider real animosities:

RANKING OF BASES

1. The Air Force rated Reese Air Force Base number two among five Undergraduate Pilot Training Bases in 1991. What has changed at Reese or at other bases that would make the Air Force rank Reese Air Force Base last, well below its other Undergraduate Pilot Training bases in the 1995 analysis?

QUALITY OF LIFE

1. Reese Air Force Base is the number one choice of student and instructor pilots in Air Education and Training Command for base of assignment. Obviously, they think that the Quality of Life at Reese is better than that at other Undergraduate Pilot Training bases. Why would the Air Force ignore this very clear Quality of Life indicator and recommend Reese Air Force Base for closure?

2. With respect to educational opportunities, Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock, Texas is rated below Vance Air Force Base in Enid, Oklahoma. Are you aware that Enid, Oklahoma has one private university with a permanent enrollment of over 700 students? Lubbock, Texas has two private universities, a private college, and Texas Technical University with a permanent enrollment of over 17,000 students, nine undergraduate schools, two graduate schools, and a 1.1 million volume library. Knowing that one of the important features of an assignment for our highly skilled officer pilots and their talented spouses is the availability of graduate education programs. How is it that the Air Force rated Vance AFB higher than Reese AFB in educational opportunities?

OPERATIONS

1. Reese Air Force Base was the choice of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Department of Defense for implementation of Joint Undergraduate Primary Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training of the Air Force. How is it that the Air Force, now in 1995, rates its capability in all of these areas as less than that of Columbus, Randolph, and Vance Air Force Base's?
2. Reese and Laughlin Air Force Base's have fully implemented T - 1 training and have completed all the facility construction necessary to support that training. Did the Air Force consider the fact that Vance AFB has not implemented T - 1 training and has not yet built the necessary T - 1 facilities?
3. Did you consider the savings that would accrue from stopping construction and implementation of the T - 1 program at Vance?
4. In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?
5. Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?
6. Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighing total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

ANALYSIS ERRORS

The following are examples of errors in the published results of the Air Force's analysis that we have noticed at first glance:

PREVIOUS RANKINGS

1. In the 1991 Base Closure round, Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) bases were reviewed and Reese Air Force Base was rated very highly - number two out of five Air Force bases. What accounts for this disparity?
2. The Air Force itself and the Department of Defense have placed great confidence in Reese AFB by choosing it as: the first base to implement Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first base to receive the new T - 1 airlift/tanker training aircraft; the first and only base to implement the Air Force's portion of Joint Primary Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first and only base to do Joint Maritime Training for the Navy in the T - 1; and Reese is the Air Force's choice as the first base to receive the new JPATS aircraft. Why would the Air Force want to close its premier UPT base?
3. The Air Force analysis rates Reese below three UPT bases (Columbus, Randolph, and Vance) in its ability to perform Primary, Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training. If this is the case, why did the Air Force choose Reese as the first base to perform joint training with the Navy in all three of these categories?

QUALITY OF LIFE

1. Reese AFB is the number one choice of preference for base assignment of Student and Instructor Pilots in the Air Force's Air Education and Training Command (confirmed in a statement to the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, February 2, 1995). This kind of choice is made on the basis of Quality of Life. Why would the Department of Defense, newly committed to stressing "people over programs" (John Deutch, 09/94), want to close the base that its personnel rate as the best for Quality of Life?

Vance AFB is rated in this year's analysis as co-equal with Reese in transportation. Reese and Randolph Air Force Bases are the only bases near large metropolitan areas with international airports. Reese was specifically chosen as the Joint Navy training base because it was the most accessible UPT base.

Reese is rated as RED by the Air Force in "Geographic Location," yet it was their choice as a joint training base because it is the most accessible of all Air Force UPT bases.

Vance is rated higher in education with only one small 700 student private university. Reese has three universities including Texas Tech and its associated medical school and one private college available in nearby Lubbock, Texas.

OPERATIONS

Airspace is one area that was weighted very heavily during this round's analysis. We are firmly convinced that Reese AFB has access to adequate airspace to do its mission and it is unthreatened by encroachment. We are concerned that sheer volume of airspace owned and controlled by each base was emphasized, and that usability was not adequately considered. Some bases may own/control more airspace than Reese in terms of sheer volume, however, much of their airspace is unusable for basic Undergraduate Pilot Training.

Reese has readily available visual routes and alternate training fields.

SAVINGS

The objective of any BRAC process is to save our tax dollars. Reese's T - 1 program is fully implemented with all facilities in place. Vance Air Force Base is still constructing their T - 1 hangar. Stopping construction would save MILCON dollars.

SENATOR RICK SANTORUM, PA

1. Secretary Widnall, the DoD justification for closure of the Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station was that, "although Greater Pittsburgh ARS is effective in supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields."

Can you tell me what exactly are the components of "operating costs?"

Are the costs associated with successfully manning at 110% considered relative to other bases which are below 100% total manning?

Are the costs incurred in maintaining a higher state of readiness (exercise, contingency, and humanitarian deployments, etc.) held against the unit in computing "operating costs?"

CONGRESSMAN JAMES V. HANSEN, UT

1. Secretary Widnall, Did you, or anyone on your staff, receive any communication or guidance from the White House, or anyone associated with the White House, directing you to remove McClellan AFB in California from consideration for closure or recommending that you devise a plan for Air Logistics Centers that would keep McClellan open?

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

March 3, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We would like to thank you for presenting the questions, we, the New Mexico delegation, submitted for the Secretary of Defense during the first hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. We are looking forward to a response from the Defense Department.

In the meantime the process continues and we again respectfully submit the following attached questions for consideration by the BRAC Commissioners for the March 6, 1995 hearing to submit to the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall. Should you have any questions regarding this issue please feel free to call Troy Benavidez, Legislative Director for Steve Schiff at (202) 225-6316.

We appreciate your consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,



Pete Domenici



Joe Skeen



Jeff Bingaman



Bill Richardson



Steve Schiff

1. How much money was appropriated for military construction at Kirtland AFB for fiscal years 1994 and 1995? How does this compare with other Air Force bases and facilities, scheduled for closure or realignment in the 1995 BRAC.
2. According to the Air Force's proposal for the 1995 BRAC, Kirtland AFB has tenants, both Air Force and non-Air Force, which will require continued support. Would there exist recurring costs if the Air Force had transferred the Space and Missile Systems Center and Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB and closed Los Angeles Air Force Base?
3. Is there any plan in existence determining which facilities at Kirtland AFB, to be abandoned as a result of realignment, will be turned over to other government agencies or private enterprise? Will the existing fence perimeter be altered?
4. By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense, had the Air force consulted with the Department of Energy as to the effect of realignment on the Department's nuclear deterrence mission and/or the fiscal impact of the realignment of the DOE with respect to nuclear deterrence programs? Did the Air Force receive any response from the DOE? Was the response in writing?
5. By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense, had the Air Force consulted with the Department of Energy or Sandia National Laboratories as to the effect of the realignment on Sandia National Laboratories? Did the Air Force receive any response from the DOE or Sandia? Was the response in writing?
6. By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense, did the Air Force consult with all of Kirtland's scheduled remaining tenants, both Air Force and non-Air Force, about the effect of the realignment of their respective missions and the fiscal costs to them of the realignment. Did the Air Force receive any responses? Were they in writing?
7. By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense, did the Air Force consult with the Department of Veterans Affairs about the effect of no longer supporting the joint Air Force-Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Albuquerque? Did the Air Force receive any response? Was it in writing?

8. By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense, did the Air Force consult with the city of Albuquerque on the effect of the withdrawal of the Air Force crash-fire support to the Albuquerque International Airport? Did the Air Force receive any response? Was it in writing?
9. By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense did the Air Force consult with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy about the effect of removing the Field Command of the Defense Nuclear Agency from Kirtland? Did the Air Force receive any response from the Assistant to the Secretary? Did he address the adverse impact on DNA's mission of separating the Field Command from DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office and Sandia and Los Alamos Laboratories?
10. Was it appropriate to categorize Kirtland AFB as a Laboratory and Product Center when the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory represents only a small fraction of the installation work force?
11. Wouldn't it have been more appropriate to look at Kirtland AFB as a federal installation with significant Department of Defense and Department of Energy activities, rather than as an Air Force Laboratory and Product Center?
12. An Air Force justification indicates that the Sandia and Phillips Laboratories can be cantoned. Does the cantonment plan envision cantoning the 60 square miles of specialized testing and storage areas and facilities used by both laboratories? Was the cost of such an extensive cantonment properly assessed?
13. With respect to the move of the 58th Special Operations Wing, what are the total costs for relocating this wing? How much of these costs are associated with moving the flight simulators?
14. Does your estimate of the cost savings of realigning Kirtland include the new security cost for the 898th Munitions Support Squadron, whose mission is control and security of nuclear weapons? Are these security forces costed as high-quality police with special training equipment and procedures or as the standard security forces associated with a normal Air Force Base?

GENERAL

CIRP

1. Secretary Widnall, did the Office of Secretary of Defense remove or add any installation closures or realignments from your recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics.

DIXON

2. Secretary Widnall, did the Office of Secretary of Defense instruct your Service to place or not to place any specific installations for closure or realignment on your listed recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, would you please elaborate on the specifics?

DIXON

3. Secretary Widnall, did anyone in the administration instruct you not to place any specific installations for closure or realignment on your listed recommendations to the Secretary?

If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics?

DIXON

4. Secretary Widnall, will the Air Force have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.

5. Secretary Widnall, did you or the Office of Secretary of Defense remove any installations from the recommendations solely for reasons of economic or environmental impact? Please elaborate.

6. Secretary Widnall, given the limitations on the base closure process by current Title 10 restrictions and the fact that excess capacity will more than likely remain after this last and final round under the current Base Closure Law, what method would you recommend for consideration in future base closure efforts?

7. Secretary Widnall, have you provided to the commission all of the information that you used your decision-making process? If not, would you please provide it within the next five days?

8. Secretary Widnall, some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from local base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to DoD proposals.

What guidance did the Air Force give base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

9. Secretary Widnall, which of your recommendations are a direct result of the alternatives presented by the joint cross-service groups?

Please explain the use of information by joint cross-service groups?

How were joint cross-services issues addressed differently this round by the Air Force as compared to the 1993 round? Please elaborate.

Record

10. Secretary Widnall, in earlier testimony Dr. Perry, General Shalikashvili and Secretary Deutch expressed the desirability of cross servicing in depots, laboratories, and test and evaluation facilities to reduce infrastructure .

Do you believe that cross servicing is in the best interests of the Air Force?

Why has the Air Force done so little in cross servicing?

Are any of your recommendations a result of interservicing? Please elaborate.

DAVIS - Do you have Adobant \$ in Budget

DEPOTS

*were alternatives
costs*

1. Secretary Widnall, Deputy Secretary Deutch presented an Air Force Depot Proposal chart at his February 28th press conference which suggests, at least in the case of the Air Force, it is more cost effective to consolidate or downsize depots than it is to close them. According to that chart, consolidation as opposed to two depot closure, will reduce one-time costs by \$924 million, while increasing the net present value by another \$292 million.

Please explain how the consolidation option, which retains 18 million more square feet and 763 more people than the closure option, can produce these savings?

2. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has had five major Air Logistics Centers since the Vietnam Era. In the 1993 round, the Air Force recommended the closure of one of these five depots, but that depot was removed from the list by the Secretary of Defense. This year with the same selection criteria and a smaller force structure plan there is once again no Air Force depot on the list. The **CHART** titled "Air Force Program Trends" reflects reductions in fighter wing equivalents, assigned aircraft, major bases and personnel end-strengths over the last ten years.


On what basis did you determine that the Air Force continues to need five Air Logistics Centers?

On what basis did you determine that realigning the workload at the five depots was preferable to closing one or more of these depots?

Did anyone outside the Air Force ask, suggest, or direct the Air Force to avoid closing any particular air logistics center?

3. Secretary Widnall, during the DoD hearing last week, Secretary Perry presented this **CHART** which compared the costs and savings of down-sizing and retaining all five Air Logistics Centers to the costs and savings of closing two of

Air Force Program Trends



3A Q#2 DBCRC

3/3/95

Air Force Depot Proposal



Cost Implications (\$ Millions)

FY96-01 Net

Consolidate at All Depots	One-Time Costs	Costs (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings*
BRAC ACTIONS	183	(139)	89	991
NON-BRAC ACTIONS	35	(488)	146	1,875
ALL ACTIONS	218	(627)	235	2,866
Alternative - Close 2 Depots (+\$600 Million Env)	1,107	(363)	161	699

* Savings in 20 year net present value

these centers. Nearly two-thirds of the savings under the "downsizing" alternative came from "non-BRAC actions."

What are these "non-BRAC actions" and why are they included in this analysis?

Part is force &

Would these "non-BRAC" actions be realized even if one or two Air Logistics Centers were closed?

What are the total savings that these "non BRAC actions" would provide if the Air Force closes one or two Air Logistics Centers?

How would the alternatives compare if you remove the "non-BRAC actions" from the downsizing alternative and then compare that alternative to closing only the one air logistics center that provides the greatest savings?

??
Record

4. Secretary Widnall, this **CHART** also shows that the one time cost to close Air Logistics Centers at San Antonio and Sacramento, are approximately \$1.1 billion. Cost of Base Realignment Actions analysis in support of these recommendations reflect that the estimate includes about \$249 million in ~~construction costs, \$330 million in personnel moving costs, and approximately \$257 million in "unique" one time costs.~~

Record

Please explain in as much detail as possible why the Air Force would need to spend \$249 million for construction, when excess capacity already exists at all Air Logistics Centers.

Robles

The \$330 million cost estimate to accommodate personnel movements would apparently move almost 19,000 civilian and 6600 military personnel.

Considering that the five Air Logistics Centers will employ only 27,000 civilians, is it really necessary to relocate 19,000 (67%) civilians to accommodate two aviation logistics center closures?

Recy

Why is the cost of moving 6600 military personnel included as a cost to close the Air Logistics Centers when nearly all depot personnel are civilian employees?

Air Force Depot Proposal



Cost Implications (\$ Millions)

FY96-01 Net

<u>Consolidate at All Depots</u>	<u>One-Time Costs</u>	<u>Costs (Savings)</u>	<u>Annual Savings</u>	<u>Total Savings*</u>
BRAC ACTIONS	183	(139)	89	991
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ALL ACTIONS	218	(627)	235	2,866
Alternative - Close 2 Depots (+\$600 Million Env)	1,107	(363)	161	699

* Savings in 20 year net present value

Please explain in as much detail as possible, what is meant by "one time unique closing costs?"

5. Secretary Widnall, in your opening statement you indicated the cost to close a depot is \$800 million including costs for environmental restoration.

Were these restoration costs a factor in the Air Force's decision not to close depots? If so, could you explain why?

6. Secretary Widnall, your alternative to downsizing was the closure of two depots. Did you examine the alternative to close one depot?

7. Secretary Widnall, in testimony last week, Mr. Gotbaum indicated that the Depot Joint Cross-Service Group calculated capacity of depots based on a 40-hour work week, or just one shift per activity. This is a very conservative way of measuring capacity since people work more than one shift in times of crisis. Using only one shift, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?

If you use one-and-one-half or two shifts, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?

8. Secretary Widnall, in 1993, the Air Force recommended closing McClellan Air Force Base. This base is not recommended in 1995. In fact, McClellan Air Force Base gains additional personnel in the Air Force's proposal of closures and realignments.

Would you explain why?

9. Secretary Widnall, according to Defense Logistics Agency approximately 28,000 civilian employees are presently employed at the Air Force's five Air Logistics Centers -- this is an average of 5,600 civilians per center. The Air Force proposes to retain all five of its Air Logistics Centers, but says it will achieve savings that "are comparable to closing two Air Logistics Centers" by

Kling
Z

consolidating functions and downsizing in place. But the Air Force's plan achieves a net reduction of only 1850 civilian personnel at all five centers, compared to a reduction of approximately 11,000 civilian personnel that would result from closing two depots.

Uling
Answers would not

How can the Air Force claim that its downsizing plan is "comparable to closing two Air Logistics Centers" when closing two centers would have eliminated six times as many civilian personnel positions?

10. Secretary Widnall, part of the rationale provided by the Air Force for downsizing rather than closing one or more Air Logistics Centers is that 25 million cubic feet of storage space can be "made available" to Defense Logistics Agency under the Air Force plan. In a February 14, 1995 letter to Major General Klugh, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics, Admiral Straw indicated that since Defense Logistics Agency is also in the process of downsizing,, "offers of space to Defense Logistics Agency should carry no weight in the determination of whether a depot/base remains open."

Robbs

What agreement does the Air Force have with Defense Logistics Agency regarding the use of the 25 million cubic feet of unused space that would be available if all five Air Logistics Centers are retained?

Ans DLA Needs

11. BLANK

12. Secretary Widnall, the Joint Cross-Service Review Team at DoD for Depot Maintenance analyzed and evaluated four sets of capacity figures. First, they looked at current available capacity and found that the five Air Logistic Centers could produce almost 38 million direct labor hours using a split-shift, 8 hour-per-day schedule. Yet, if all unoccupied and currently unused infrastructure were considered, the five Air Logistics Centers could produce almost 58 million direct labor hours under a single shift 8 hour-per-day schedule.

In your view, are the maximum available capacity numbers valid, and could they be used to assign additional workload?

13. Secretary Widnall, in May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated, "... depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the *minimum facilities, equipment and skill personnel necessary* to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence." (emphasis added)

Will the Air Force base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?

14. Secretary Widnall, at one time, Hill Air Logistics Center performed maintenance support for the Navy's F-18.

In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of this interservicing effort?

Why did the Navy discontinue Air Force support of the F-18?

Are you satisfied, that your recommendations in the area of fixed wing aviation depots represent a comprehensive approach to the problems of interservicing and excess capacity in this area?

Steep

PRODUCT CENTERS AND LABORATORIES

1. Secretary Widnall, a February 13, 1995 memo to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security on behalf of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering states, "The laboratories retain significant duplication and excess capacity. . . ." To offset capacity and duplication, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the consolidation of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence research and development at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; consolidation of explosives at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey; and consolidation of research and development of propellants at China Lake, California.

Why did the Air Force reject all of these alternatives?

This memo also stated, ". . . the Military Departments, by and large, have been unwilling to collocate, let alone rely on each other. They continue to defend fiercely their independent pursuit of similar product lines." The memo concludes that "only a heavier handed instrument" will result in meaningful interservicing actions.

Do you agree with this assessment?

2. Secretary Widnall, an April 1994 Defense Science Board (DSB) report states that the Defense Laboratory System is an "obsolescent artifact of the Cold War that has not kept pace with the shrinking military force structure and changing patterns of technology advancement generation."

The DSB recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995-99. These cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction by the end of the century.

Have you recommended base closures or realignments as a result of these personnel reductions?

3. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has recommended that the Rome Laboratory close even though it is categorized in Tier I, the highest grouping, as indicated by this **CHART**.

Wendy

Why was Rome Laboratory recommended for closure when it is in Tier I?

What consideration was given to absorbing workload and eliminating excess capacity at Army and Navy laboratories as an alternative to closing Brooks?

What alternatives other than relocation to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base were considered?

4. Secretary Widnall, in 1993, the Commission requested that the Air Force comment on the community concern that in realigning Griffiss Air Force Base at that time, the Air Force appeared to be positioning itself to close Rome Laboratory in the near future. The Air Force responded by saying: "The Air Force has no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory within the next five years." Since then the Rome, New York community has made plans to reuse Griffiss Air Force Base centered on the fact that Rome Laboratory was to stay in place. The Air Force now recommends to close the Rome Laboratory.

Wendy
93'

Could you please comment on the why the Air Force has changed its mind on the status of Rome Laboratory in less than two years?

Must consider all bases - opportunity now - JCSG OPR (93 Ave The MRB)

5. Secretary Widnall, in accordance with the Air Force analysis, one of the important attributes for the evaluation of depots is "access to technically oriented labor pool." Likewise, one of the attributes for Product Centers and Laboratories is "population of highly skilled personnel." Could you please elaborate how the Air Force compared the different installations in regard to these attributes?

6. Secretary Widnall, the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona, be relocated to Orlando, Florida. In the current round of base closures and realignments, you

INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - PRODUCT CENTERS and LABORATORIES Subcategory

TIERING OF BASES

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

TIER I

Hanscom AFB

Rome Lab

Wright-Patterson AFB

TIER II

Kirtland AFB

Los Angeles AFB

TIER III

Brooks AFB

recommended that the Laboratory remain at its present location in Mesa, Arizona, as a stand-alone activity. The Air Force's justification states, in part, that "the activities are consistent with the community's plans for redevelopment of the Williams Air Force Base property, including a university and research park."

Widnall

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 states that "In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary may not take into account for any purpose any advance conversion planning undertaken by an affected community with respect to the anticipated closure or realignment of an installation" (Title XXIX, Part A, Sec. 2903, paragraph (c)(3)(B)).

*Not mentioned
to group
But was nice to
have as a result*

Why was facility reuse planning used as a consideration factor for this recommendation?

7. Secretary Widnall, in recommending closure of Brooks Air Force Base, the Human Systems Center, including the School of Aerospace Medicine and Armstrong Laboratory, is recommended to relocate to Wright-Paterson Air Force Base. Part of the justification for your recommendation is that the Air Force has more laboratory capacity than necessary to support current and future Air Force requirements.

✓

What consideration was given to absorbing workload and eliminating excess capacity at Army and Navy laboratories as an alternative to closing Brooks?

What alternatives other than relocation to Wright-Paterson Air Force Base were considered?

8. Secretary Widnall, your recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base, Texas involved closing all activities and facilities, including family housing. We understand that there is a large waiting list for family housing at nearby Lackland Air Force Base.

Why did your recommendation not include the retention of family housing at Brooks to help satisfy Air Force family housing requirements in the San Antonio metropolitan area?

9. Secretary Widnall, we recently received a copy of a memorandum dated February 15, 1995, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing) to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) expressing interest in the U.S. Army Reserve Command acquiring approximately 57 acres and 13 permanent buildings at Brooks AFB--should it become available from the Air Force. Transfer of this Air Force property would allow the Army Reserve to (1) eliminate a costly lease, (2) reduce the need for newly programmed military construction, and (3) provide facilities necessary to enhance unit readiness at a significant savings to the Department of Defense. According to Army officials, the Army Reserve would be able to cancel a lease with an annual cost saving of \$218,655 and a fiscal year 1999 military construction project with an estimated cost saving of \$11.4 million.

Was this request discussed and resolved during deliberations by either the BRAC 95 Steering Group or BRAC 95 Review Group, which were established to consider such inter-service needs? If not, why not?

10. Secretary Widnall, an alternative was received by the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group for to consolidate the lab at Brooks Air Force Base to a Naval installation in Orlando, Florida. Instead, the Air Force chose to relocate the lab to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

What was the Air Force's rationale for this action?

Why did the Air Force reject the alternative submitted by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

Suppose
that
Recall
~~~~~

**KIRTLAND**

1. Secretary Widnall, regarding the realignment recommendation for Kirtland Air Force Base, were all of the base tenants contacted in a timely manner and asked to provide information about how the realignment and subsequent economic impact would affect them?

*Cornell*

2. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has recommended realignments to Kirtland Air Force Base. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has testified that the Air Force coordinate this action with the Department of Energy. What concerns does the Department of Energy have with realignment of Kirtland? How does the Air Force respond to DOE's concerns?

*Cornell*

3. General Fogleman, the Air Force has recommended realigning Kirtland Air Force Base. As part of this recommendation, the 58th Special Operations Wing (SOW) will relocate to Holloman Air Force Base.

How was this move coordinated with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?

*Very Desirable*

How does this move effect the operational requirements of 58th SOW?

What guidance or direction from outside the Department of the Air Force, if any, was received to move this unit to Holloman Air Force Base?

What consideration, if any, was given to move this unit to the West Coast?

*if*

4. Secretary Widnall, in recommending Kirtland Air Force Base for realignment, the Air Force is proposing to move some of the Defense Nuclear Agency activities to Kelly Air Force Base and Nellis Air Force Base.

How was this action coordinated with Defense Nuclear Agency? Please elaborate?

*Talked with Before  
- FA vorunby*

*3*

## TEST AND EVALUATION

1. General Fogleman, several studies have pointed out that great opportunities for reduction in the test and evaluation infrastructure exist in testing of high performance aircraft, test support aircraft and electronic warfare testing. Do you believe the Air Force and Navy should combine activities such as Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center with China Lake Naval Weapons Center and Edwards Air Force Base?
  
2. Secretary Widnall, regarding the test and evaluation realignment recommendation that would relocate electronic warfare capability from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base, why didn't the Air Force accept an alternate proposal by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross Service Group that would have transferred certain Eglin missions to China Lake Naval Weapons Center?
  
3. Secretary Widnall, regarding the realignment recommendation that would relocate electronic warfare capability from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base, did the Air Force consider an alternate proposal by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross Service Group that would have transferred certain Eglin missions to China Lake Naval Weapons Center?

## UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

1. Secretary Widnall, DoD and the Services have been diligently pursuing the consolidation of Undergraduate Flying Training for the last two years. The consolidation of Navigator Training appears to be quite a success story between the Air Force and the Navy. In regards to the training of Pilots, in your view, what are the advantages and limitations of a fully consolidated Air Force and Navy Undergraduate Pilot Training program?

What was the effect, if any, of DoD or Joint Staff policy regarding cross-servicing of the Air Force's pilot training with the Navy on training requirements and on basing decisions? ✓

What alternatives did the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group provide to the Air Force regarding the closure or realignment of its pilot training bases?

How did the Air Force respond to these alternatives?

2. General Fogleman, what elements of the Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training program require Air Force-specific training that is unique as compared to the Navy program? ✓

Did DoD or the Services consider integrating Pilot Training operations at the same base and using the same training aircraft in a way that permits Air Force-specific training? ✓

3. General Fogleman, how would the subsequent reduction of excess capacity due to the consolidation of Air Force and Navy Pilot Training programs restrict the Air Force's ability to ramp-up future pilot—and international pilot—production requirements? ✓

4. General Fogleman, what was the impact, if any, of basing considerations for the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System on your BRAC 95 basing decisions?

Will final selection of a jet or prop Joint Primary Aircraft Training System aircraft affect your basing decisions?

What Joint Primary Aircraft Training System selection criteria, such as range, airspace, and cross-wind limitations, were or were not considered as factors in your basing decision and why? This criteria is relevant, since Reese Air Force Base, Texas was downgraded in these areas.

Absent a decision on which Joint Primary Aircraft Training System aircraft candidate will be selected until this summer, and recognizing that the planned introduction of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System into the Service's Pilot Training programs will not occur until 2001 and stretch over a decade, how much weight did Joint Primary Aircraft Training System considerations carry in your decision-making during this round?

5. General Fogleman, the Air Force selected Reese Air Force Base, Texas as its first Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training site, introduced the T-1 training aircraft there, and initiated the consolidation of Undergraduate Pilot Training with the Navy in a joint program there as well. Based on these decisions, many are of the impression that the Air Force places a high value on Reese Air Force Base.

DAVIS  
✓

Why has the Air Force now rated Reese so low in comparison to the other Undergraduate Pilot Training category bases? (CHART has Reese the only Tier 3.)

Please explain the Air Force rationale for recommending the closing of Reese and transferring all its aircraft, in particular the newly introduced T-1 aircraft, along with the joint training program, to Vance, Laughlin and Columbus, when these bases have yet to transition to these programs, as opposed to leaving these assets in-place at Reese, and simply closing one of these other bases, and avoiding the need for these transfers altogether.

6. Secretary Widnall, the Navy has requested significant changes in the plan for basing aircraft resulting from the 1993 decision to close Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California and Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida. Can you comment on what has changed since 1993 that caused the Navy to require such a dramatic change?

## UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

### TIERING OF BASES

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

#### TIER I

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Columbus AFB

Laughlin AFB

Randolph AFB

Vance AFB

#### TIER III

---

Reese AFB

Q#5  
P15A

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

1. Secretary Widnall, how do planned reductions in the bomber force in the Future Years Defense Plan, and in your Force Structure Plan, affect the base structure needed to support this force?

There is a statutory prohibition against retiring B-52H, B-1B or F-111 aircraft contained in the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. To accommodate this prohibition while drawing down the active bomber inventory, the Air Force created a "reconstitution reserve."

How has the "reconstitution reserve" affected the required basing structure?

What is the Air Force operational concept for maintaining these aircraft "on the ramp," the process for returning them to combat ready status in the event of a mobilization, and the sourcing of combat ready crews to fly these aircraft?

Robles

Flying Reserve Status

1999-2000  
Come Back  
up on Line

Slack

AM

2. General Fogleman, considering that approximately 5.5 fighter wing equivalents remain based overseas, how much capacity should be retained in Continental United States in terms of land, usable facilities, and training facilities and ranges for basing those units if they are to return? Please elaborate.

3. General Fogleman, the Air Force has recently instituted a two-level maintenance structure instead of a three-level maintenance program. We understand that this has resulted in a \$259 million saving through civilian/military manpower reductions. Will this move to two-level maintenance create excess capacity at certain bases and should it lead to any infrastructure reductions? If so, please elaborate.

How has the Air Force's move to two-level maintenance affected your closure or realignment recommendations?

**LARGE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE BASES**

1. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force recommended inactivation of the missile group at Grand Forks, "unless the need to retain Ballistic Missile Defense options effectively precludes this action." Should that be the case, you then recommended that the missile group at Minot should be inactivated. If you had recommended inactivating the missile wing at Malmstrom, instead of the group at Grand Forks or Minot, you could have avoided the uncertainty now facing the communities at Grand Forks and Minot as well as the cost of completing the Minuteman III conversion program at Malmstrom, and you could have closed an entire base.

COX

*Alternative  
For Rec  
Geology  
Geography  
dis. Persement*

Did the Air Force consider deactivating the missile wing at Malmstrom and closing an entire base, instead of deactivating the missile group at either Grand Forks or Minot? If so, why was it rejected?

*substantive difference in quality of missile field  
Malmstrom in Finley Beller 1st GF, 2d Minot*

Secretary Widnall, since the Air Force has identified Minot Air Force Base as an alternative to Grand Forks Air Force Base, do you consider Minot a Secretary of Defense recommendation for realignment?

COX

3. Secretary Widnall, the future force structure decisions that led to the inactivation of one Minuteman missile group or wing were made several months ago. Why weren't the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment implications of inactivating the missile group at Grand Forks reviewed at that time, so that the Air Force could make a more definitive recommendation now regarding inactivation of a missile group or wing?

4. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has indicated that it could be as late as December 1996 before questions regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment implications related to closing the missile field at Grand Forks are resolved. These questions were also raised during the 1993 round when the missile field at Grand Forks was first considered for inactivation. In March of 1993, the Commission asked General Horner, the Commander-in-Chief of US Space

Command, to help resolve these questions, and in an April 1993 reply to the Commission, General Horner stated: "My staff has provided a copy of your letter to the Joint Staff and the Air Staff. I have asked them to assist in getting a definitive reading.

The Commission understands that a coordinated US Government position, requiring input from both DoD and the State Department, is needed regarding this issue. But it also appears that the Air Staff was asked to begin coordinating this position nearly two years ago, and as of now has been unable to get an answer.

During the DoD hearing last week, Secretary Deutch indicated that it should not take more than a few weeks to get a coordinated US Government position. What steps is the Air Force now taking to provide a prompt answer to the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment issue so that the Commission can decide whether to focus on Grand Forks or another missile unit?

5. Secretary Widnall, between 1993 and 1995, the cost to close Malmstrom Air Force Base dropped from \$543 million to \$39 million, the cost to close Minot Air Force Base dropped from \$195 million to \$59 million, and the cost to close Grand Forks Air Force Base increased from \$118 million to \$129 million. What accounts for the sharp drop in the cost close Malmstrom or Minot versus the slight increase in the cost to close Grand Forks? (Note: Closure costs are as shown in AF Volume 5 for "Level playing field")

*COX*  
*included establish a 50 missile field*

6. General Fogleman, we have heard numerous statements regarding the 1993 Commission recommendation to establish the East Coast Mobility Wing at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey as instead of Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York as recommended by the Air Force.

*Robles*

Has the Air Force been satisfied with this decision?

*yes*

*Fogleman not what we want*

Has the establishment of the East Coast Mobility Wing progressed to your satisfaction?

Will the wing be able to accomplish its mission?

*Functioning well*

7. General Fogleman, with the transfer of tanker aircraft from Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, is the Air Force reopening a closed base and adding infrastructure to the inventory?

Savings estimates from the previous BRAC recommendations will not be realized as a result of the new recommendation. Has this been taken into account in estimating the current savings? *COF*

How will additional cost savings be achieved by this action, as the current recommendation indicates?

Why is the base being opened as an active component installation rather than a Reserve installation as recommended in 1993?

*good answer  
Record on Audit  
Trail*

### SMALL AIRCRAFT BASES

1. Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has reduced its fighter aircraft force from 36 fighter wings at the end of the Cold War to the 20 wings now projected in your current Force Structure Plan. Simultaneously, it has reconfigured the size of the typical fighter wing from 72 to 54 aircraft, and the typical squadron from 24 to 18 aircraft. Similarly, the size of reserve units has also decreased.

What was the Air Force's rationale for these smaller units?

In light of excess capacity at fighter bases that results from smaller wings, would it be feasible to increase the number of squadrons assigned to a fighter wing, or the number of fighter wings assigned to a base?

Is it reasonable to assume if the fighter wing structure is realigned to 72 aircraft that more bases could be closed?

Was wing size taken into consideration during the Air Force analysis of closure and recommendations?

2. General Fogleman, the current Force Structure Plan reduces the fighter aircraft inventory by six Fighter Wing Equivalents from 26 to 20 wings. During this drawdown, the Air Force has recommended closure of one small aircraft base, Homestead Air Force Base, in 1993.

Can you explain why the Air Force has been unable to identify any additional small aircraft bases for closure despite this significant reduction in fighter aircraft?

3. General Fogleman, an article in the March 1995 issue of the Air Force Magazine stated the Air Force is retiring the F-111 aircraft and that all would be out of the inventory by 1999.

Is this an accurate statement?

In light of the fact that all F-111s in the continental US are based at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, and considering the retirement of all F-111's, what are your plans for Cannon Air Force Base ?

Please comment on why the retirement of the F-111 aircraft alone would not result in excess capacity in terms of small aircraft bases?

**HOSPITAL ISSUES**

1. Secretary Widnall, based on DoD data, the Air Force is currently operating more than two times the capacity it needs to meet wartime requirements. According to this information, if expanded bed capability is considered, capacity is more than six times the requirement.

Do you agree with this data?

*AF does not agree with the data*

*K Ling*

Given this excess capacity, why isn't the Air Force recommending any hospital closures or realignments?

2. Secretary Widnall, the Medical Joint Cross Service Group provided the Air Force with alternatives for realigning eight Air Force hospitals to outpatient clinics -- USAF Medical Centers Wilford Hall, Scott Air Force Base, and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and the Air Force hospitals located at Shaw, Reese, Sheppard, and Langley Air Force Bases and the Air Force Academy. These alternatives would reduce operating beds by over 1,000 and expanded beds by over 2,500, significantly narrowing the gap between requirements and capacity. The DoD list includes none of these actions.

*ANS ON THIS  
Recomm  
Premative*

Why did the Air Force reject all of the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives?

*will address in time*

3. Secretary Widnall, do the hospital closures that follow the Air Force's list of recommended base closures and realignments represent consideration of the Air Force's planned draw-down in medical staff and infrastructure, or will further actions be required?

4. Secretary Widnall, how did the Air Force consider the medical needs of the active duty personnel, retirees, and their family members remaining in the area of hospitals to be closed?

**ECONOMIC IMPACT ISSUES**

1. Secretary Widnall, to what extent were your recommendations influenced by economic impact considerations?

*one of 48 carbon*

How were the cumulative economic impact of closings on a region considered? Please elaborate.

Was any decision taken to down-size, rather than close an installation, as a result of economic impact considerations?

2. Secretary Widnall, the Navy, in their report, stated "Because of the large number of job losses occurring in California and Guam, the DON (Navy) decided against recommending several closures that could otherwise have been made Other than the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, no other closure is recommended that would result in a negative direct civilian job loss impact in any economic area in California".

Did the Air Force establish similar economic thresholds for any state or region?

*NO thresholds or Recession*

3. Secretary Widnall, how did you assess the impact of your closure and realignment recommendations on existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure? Please elaborate.

What factors were considered?

## ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ISSUES

1. Secretary Widnall, according to DoD guidance, "environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations."

Were any bases not recommended for closure or realignment due to unique contamination problems? Please elaborate.

2. Secretary Widnall, did the overall cost of environmental restoration at all bases affect the size of the list presented to the Commission?

3. Secretary Widnall, DoD policy also states that "unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse." Were any installations eliminated from closure consideration due to unique contamination problems? If so, please elaborate.

4. Secretary Widnall, DoD began its "Fast Track Cleanup" program eighteen months ago to speed cleanup on closing bases.

Does "Fast Track Cleanup" cause the Air Force to clean up a closing base sooner than if the base were to remain open?

Do costs of cleanup increase because the cleanup is on the fast track? If so, should cost of cleanup be considered in cost of closure calculations?

5. Secretary Widnall, in making closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

Did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis?

Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

6. Secretary Widnall, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?

7. Secretary Widnall, in the 1993 round, one community pointed out that the cost of cleaning up an installation directed to close could be three to ten times as great as the cost of cleaning up an active installation. This difference is due to expected technological advances in environmental restoration.

Do you believe the difference between routine and closure related cleanup costs, if factual, should be considered in cost of closure calculations?

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At what point would  
Make a decision at  
Face Struktur  
Close US down size

**CHANGES TO PREVIOUS ROUNDS**

1. Secretary Widnall, the 1991 BRAC Commission agreed with the Air Force recommendation to close Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas and to retain the Reserve units in a cantonment area “. . . if the base is converted to a civilian airport.” This recommendation was contingent on a community commitment by June 93, which was met, to operate Bergstrom as a civilian airport.

In 1993 the Air Force recommended the Reserve units be relocated to Carswell Air Force Base. The 93 BRAC Commission found substantial deviation with this recommendation because the Air Force had failed to recognize the communities commitment to establish a civilian airport, and did not consider the demographics problem associated with the large multi-service reserve component population planned for Carswell (i.e., numerous Navy Reserve units and an Air National Guard unit).

Would you please explain what conditions have changed to cause the Air Force to recommend deactivation of the unit?

Could you explain how the aircraft are proposed to be redistributed?

## AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND BASES

1. General Fogleman, the Secretary of Defense recommended realignment of the Onizuka Air Station, California, including the inactivation of the 750th Space Group and moving its functions to Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado, and relocation of Detachment 2, Space and Missile Systems Center to Falcon Air Force Base.

What are the projected future Air Force satellite control requirements and how do they differ from current requirements?

In the Space-Satellite Control Subcategory, what percent of excess capacity currently exists at Onizuka Air Station?

Based on projected future Air Force satellite control requirements, what percent of excess capacity is expected to be found at Onizuka Air Station?

Does realignment of Onizuka Air Station leave sufficient capacity to adequately support projected future requirements?

If the Air Force has one more satellite control installation than is needed to support projected future requirements, then why did the Air Force not recommend closing Onizuka Air Station?

What other tenants would be affected by a decision to close the facility?

## AIR RESERVE COMPONENT ISSUES

1. Secretary Widnall, during the 1993 base closing process, the Air Force identified the basing of Air Reserve Component units as an issue that would be addressed during this round. Further, the size of Air Reserve Component units has recently been reduced.

How have you addressed the Air Reserve Component during this round of base closure?

Do this years recommendations eliminate all excess capacity in the Air Reserve Component?

How have opportunities to consolidate reserve squadrons been affected by reductions in the size of Air Reserve Component units?

2. General Fogleman, the Air Force is recommending the transfer of a few Air National Guard units to larger active and reserve bases, such as McClellan and March Air Force Bases in California.

Also, the Air Force has recommended the closure of the Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station and the realignment of its eight C-130 aircraft to two other Reserve units. The justification for this action states, "The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 aircraft operating locations than necessary to effectively support the Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan."

However, there are many Air Reserve Component units that were not recommended for consolidation. For example, no major Air National Guard unit (as identified in Appendix VI of the Air Force's Analyses and Recommendations) was identified for closure or realignment?

Since there appears to be considerable savings to be gained by this type of consolidation of resources, what opportunities exist for further consolidations throughout the Air Reserve Component, especially in the fighter force structure where there have been reductions in the size of the units?

What distinguished the Air Reserve Component units the Air Force recommended for relocation to other bases as candidates for this action?

Why was the Air National Guard unit at Pittsburgh International Airport not identified for relocation in light of the fact the Air Force Reserve unit at the same location was recommended for relocation?

Since the Air National Guard unit will remain at Pittsburgh International Airport, how will this affect the closure of the Air Force Reserve station at the airport?

3. Secretary Widnall, Representative Calvert and the Riverside, California community have been actively involved in a proposal to the Navy to relocate Rotary Wing assets from Marine Corps Air Station Tustin to March Air Force Base. Considering that March Air Force Base was realigned as a Reserve Base as a result of the 1993 Closure Round, has the Air Force been a part of those discussions and do you consider the initiative as acceptable to the Air Force?



**INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT - DEPOT Subcategory****TIERING OF BASES**

As an intermediate step in the Air Force Process, the BCEG members established the following tiering of bases based on the relative merit of bases within the subcategory as measured using the eight selection criteria. Tier I represents the highest relative merit,

**TIER I**

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Hill AFB  
Tinker AFB

**TIER II**

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Robins AFB

**TIER III**

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Kelly AFB  
McClellan AFB

6 Feb 95

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Appendix 8 75

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**QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS**

## NEW MEXICO CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

Sen. Pete Domenici  
Sen. Jeff Bingaman  
Rep. Joe Skeen  
Rep. Bill Richardson  
Rep. Steve Schiff

1. Nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?
2. One of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment will have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?
3. Which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

**REP. SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, NY**

In last weeks testimony before this commission, Defense Secretary Perry described Lowery Air Force Base's reuse plan as a successful consequence of the BRAC process.

1. In the BRAC 95 process, did you consider the communities' reuse plans as a result of previous BRAC closure or realignment decisions?

Should already completed, well developed reuse planning efforts be a part of subsequent BRAC decisions?

2. At Rome, New York for instance, as a result of the realignment of Griffiss Air Force Base, a reuse plan was completed with the assistance of the Office of Economic Adjustment and the Air Force.

Was the impact to the community's reuse plan taken into consideration in the decision to close Rome lab?

## CONGRESSMAN LARRY COMBEST, TX

Secretary Widnall:

We have had only had a few days to review the data which was used to make decisions on Undergraduate Pilot Training, but some things stand out. Let me give you some examples of what I would consider real animosities:

### RANKING OF BASES

1. The Air Force rated Reese Air Force Base number two among five Undergraduate Pilot Training Bases in 1991. What has changed at Reese or at other bases that would make the Air Force rank Reese Air Force Base last, well below its other Undergraduate Pilot Training bases in the 1995 analysis?

### QUALITY OF LIFE

1. Reese Air Force Base is the number one choice of student and instructor pilots in Air Education and Training Command for base of assignment. Obviously, they think that the Quality of Life at Reese is better than that at other Undergraduate Pilot Training bases. Why would the Air Force ignore this very clear Quality of Life indicator and recommend Reese Air Force Base for closure?

2. With respect to educational opportunities, Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock, Texas is rated below Vance Air Force Base in Enid, Oklahoma. Are you aware that Enid, Oklahoma has one private university with a permanent enrollment of over 700 students? Lubbock, Texas has two private universities, a private college, and Texas Technical University with a permanent enrollment of over 17,000 students, nine undergraduate schools, two graduate schools, and a 1.1 million volume library. Knowing that one of the important features of an assignment for our highly skilled officer pilots and their talented spouses is the availability of graduate education programs. How is it that the Air Force rated Vance AFB higher than Reese AFB in educational opportunities?

## OPERATIONS

1. Reese Air Force Base was the choice of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Department of Defense for implementation of Joint Undergraduate Primary Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training of the Air Force. How is it that the Air Force, now in 1995, rates its capability in all of these areas as less than that of Columbus, Randolph, and Vance Air Force Base's?
2. Reese and Laughlin Air Force Base's have fully implemented T - 1 training and have completed all the facility construction necessary to support that training. Did the Air Force consider the fact that Vance AFB has not implemented T - 1 training and has not yet built the necessary T - 1 facilities?
3. Did you consider the savings that would accrue from stopping construction and implementation of the T - 1 program at Vance?
4. In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?
5. Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?
6. Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighing total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

## ANALYSIS ERRORS

The following are examples of errors in the published results of the Air Force's analysis that we have noticed at first glance:

## PREVIOUS RANKINGS

1. In the 1991 Base Closure round, Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) bases were reviewed and Reese Air Force Base was rated very highly - number two out of five Air Force bases. What accounts for this disparity?
2. The Air Force itself and the Department of Defense have placed great confidence in Reese AFB by choosing it as: the first base to implement Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first base to receive the new T - 1 airlift/tanker training aircraft; the first and only base to implement the Air Force's portion of Joint Primary Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first and only base to do Joint Maritime Training for the Navy in the T - 1; and Reese is the Air Force's choice as the first base to receive the new JPATS aircraft. Why would the Air Force want to close its premier UPT base?
3. The Air Force analysis rates Reese below three UPT bases (Columbus, Randolph, and Vance) in its ability to perform Primary, Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training. If this is the case, why did the Air Force choose Reese as the first base to perform joint training with the Navy in all three of these categories?

## QUALITY OF LIFE

1. Reese AFB is the number one choice of preference for base assignment of Student and Instructor Pilots in the Air Force's Air Education and Training Command (confirmed in a statement to the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, February 2, 1995). This kind of choice is made on the basis of Quality of Life. Why would the Department of Defense, newly committed to stressing "people over programs" (John Deutch, 09/94), want to close the base that its personnel rate as the best for Quality of Life?

Vance AFB is rated in this year's analysis as co-equal with Reese in transportation. Reese and Randolph Air Force Bases are the only bases near large metropolitan areas with international airports. Reese was specifically chosen as the Joint Navy training base because it was the most accessible UPT base.

Reese is rated as RED by the Air Force in "Geographic Location," yet it was their choice as a joint training base because it is the most accessible of all Air Force UPT bases.

Vance is rated higher in education with only one small 700 student private university. Reese has three universities including Texas Tech and its associated medical school and one private college available in nearby Lubbock, Texas.

## **OPERATIONS**

Airspace is one area that was weighted very heavily during this round's analysis. We are firmly convinced that Reese AFB has access to adequate airspace to do its mission and it is unthreatened by encroachment. We are concerned that sheer volume of airspace owned and controlled by each base was emphasized, and that usability was not adequately considered. Some bases may own/control more airspace than Reese in terms of sheer volume, however, much of their airspace is unusable for basic Undergraduate Pilot Training.

Reese has readily available visual routes and alternate training fields.

## **SAVINGS**

The objective of any BRAC process is to save our tax dollars. Reese's T - 1 program is fully implemented with all facilities in place. Vance Air Force Base is still constructing their T - 1 hangar. Stopping construction would save MILCON dollars.

## SENATOR RICK SANTORUM, PA

1. Secretary Widnall, the DoD justification for closure of the Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station was that, "although Greater Pittsburgh ARS is effective in supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields."

Can you tell me what exactly are the components of "operating costs?"

Are the costs associated with successfully manning at 110% considered relative to other bases which are below 100% total manning?

Are the costs incurred in maintaining a higher state of readiness (exercise, contingency, and humanitarian deployments, etc.) held against the unit in computing "operating costs?"

**CONGRESSMAN JAMES V. HANSEN, UT**

1. Secretary Widnall, Did you, or anyone on your staff, receive any communication or guidance from the White House, or anyone associated with the White House, directing you to remove McClellan AFB in California from consideration for closure or recommending that you devise a plan for Air Logistics Centers that would keep McClellan open?



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

28 MAR 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950324-4

Dear Chairman Dixon:

It was my pleasure to provide testimony concerning the Air Force portion of the Secretary of Defense's 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations to the Commission. By letter dated March 9, 1995, you provided a number of additional questions to be answered for the record. The responses to those questions are attached.

You will note in some cases that I have referred questions to the Department of Defense for response. I did so only where I believed that the answer required their perspective, or called for an explanation of a Joint Cross-Service Group decision. I trust this will not excessively inconvenience your staff.

We remain prepared to support any further requests you may have.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Stuart Wilson", is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

Attachment

GENERAL  
FXC

General

Page 1, Question 1: Secretary Widnall, will the Air Force have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.

Answer: In our operations categories, we have intentionally retained some reserve capacity to accommodate future contingencies, including the potential return of forces currently based overseas. If one were to examine only aircraft parking capability, one could conclude there is excess infrastructure. However, my examination of a number of base closure and realignment scenarios in the operations categories raised significant operational or logistical support concerns and convinced me that no recommendations beyond those I have made would be operationally sound. In the depot category, the BRAC actions recommended, coupled with the efforts to downsize, reduce to core, and contract out, will bring our installations down to the size necessary to support our needs. Additionally, our support structure recommendations were accomplished in a manner that was fiscally prudent and represents a sound investment strategy in the BRAC process.

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General  
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**Page 1, Question 2:** Secretary Widnall, have you provided to the commission all of the information that you used during your decision-making process? If not, would you please provided it within the next five days?.

**Answer:** Yes, all information used in the Air Force decision-making process has been provided.

General

Page 1, Question 3: Secretary Widnall, some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from local base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to DoD proposals.

What guidance did the Air Force give base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

Answer: Air Force Public Affairs sent a message to all commanders and public affairs officers on base realignment and closure issues. That message is attached.

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UNCLAS ALMAJCOM-FOA 0170/94 SECTION 01 OF 03  
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS ON BASE  
REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC) ISSUES

1. THE PUBLIC IS INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN THE BRAC PROCESS AND HOW IT WILL AFFECT THEIR LOCAL AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS. THIS MESSAGE GIVES GUIDANCE TO COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS ON RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES FROM BOTH THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PUBLICS.

2. THIS MESSAGE IS IN FOUR PARTS: I. COMMUNITY "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS; II. PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGIES; III. 1995 BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRES; AND IV. MEDIA INTEREST AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

PART I: COMMUNITY "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS

3. MANY COMMUNITIES WHO ARE ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN THE WELFARE OF THEIR LOCAL AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS HAVE FORMED GROUPS IN ANTICIPATION OF POTENTIAL BRAC ACTIONS IN THE UPCOMING ROUND (BRAC 95). THE OBJECTIVES OF THESE "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS (OFTEN SUB COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE) USUALLY INCLUDE:

A. LOBBYING LOCAL, STATE, FEDERAL, AND AIR FORCE OFFICIALS TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THEIR BASE'S CURRENT STATUS OR OBTAIN "NEW" MISSIONS.

B. UPGRADING COMMUNITY RESOURCES THEY BELIEVE COULD AFFECT BASE CLOSURE ANALYSIS.

C. KEEPING THEIR COMMUNITIES INFORMED OF THEIR EFFORTS THROUGH THE LOCAL MEDIA, THEREBY MAINTAINING PUBLIC ATTENTION ON BRAC ISSUES.

D. FUND-RAISING.

E. SEEKING ACCESS TO BASE DATA AND DOCUMENTS (SEE PARTS III AND IV).

4. DO NOT BECOME ADVOCATES FOR KEEPING YOUR BASE OPEN, PROMOTING CLOSURE, OR OFFERING ALTERNATIVE USE OPTIONS; AVOID ANY ACTIONS WHICH GIVE THE PERCEPTION OF SUCH ROLES. BRAC PUBLIC LAW STIPULATES THAT SECDEF MAKES CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AT A PRESCRIBED TIME TO THE BRAC COMMISSION (BRACC).

5. DOD REGULATIONS AND BRAC PUBLIC LAW GOVERN THE EXTENT TO WHICH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES CAN PARTICIPATE IN "SAVE THE BASE" GROUP ACTIVITIES AND HOW DOD FACILITIES AND RESOURCES MAY BE USED. SEE DOD STANDARDS OF CONDUCT REGULATIONS (DOD 5500.7-R) AND YOUR LOCAL STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IS APPLICABLE:

A. COMMANDERS MUST NOT HOST OR ORGANIZE MEETINGS, SEND INVITATIONS, OR ASSIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AS GROUP MEMBERS. HOWEVER, COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVES MAY OBSERVE GROUP MEETINGS AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT HOLD OFFICIAL MEMBERSHIP OR ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE GROUP. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES MAY PARTICIPATE IN GROUP ACTIVITIES IF THEIR PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY AND IS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS OR LEAVE TIME.

B. COMMANDERS SHOULD NOT AUTHORIZE FUND-RAISING EVENTS ON BASE (EXAMPLE: "SAVE THE BASE" CAMPAIGN DINNERS). AFR 11-32, CHAPTER 4, PROVIDES THAT OFF-THE-JOB FUND-RAISING SOLICITATIONS ARE AT THE COMMANDER'S DISCRETION. COMMANDERS MUST REFRAIN FROM ANY OFFICIAL SUPPORT OF SUCH ACTIVITIES AND SHOULD DENY ANY DISCRETIONARY USE OF

\*\*\* AF SECTION MESSAGE \*\*\*

WHEN RECEIVING A SARAH-LITE PACKAGE FROM THE PTC, YOU MUST EXCHANGE A 3.5" OR 5.25" HIGH DENSITY FLOPPY DISK. IF YOUR SYSTEM USES DOUBLE DENSITY DISK THEN ONLY THE 3.5" DOUBLE DENSITY DISK WILL BE ACCEPTED.

\*\* LOCAL DISTRO

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PA(1) AFMA(1) AFPEO(2) AFRBA(1) AFCAA(1)

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THE BASE FOR SUCH PURPOSES.

C. GENERALLY, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MAY PARTICIPATE IN PRIVATE FUND-RAISING IF THEY ARE VOLUNTEERS, OFF DUTY, NOT IN UNIFORM, AND ARE NOT ACTING IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY.

6. COOPERATE WITH "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS IN PROVIDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE BRAC PROCESS. IF ASKED, FEEL FREE TO PROVIDE MISSION BRIEFINGS AND BASE TOURS AT YOUR BASE TO ENHANCE THE INFORMATION FLOW. HOWEVER, DO NOT TAKE LOCAL GROUPS TO OTHER BASES FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPILING BRAC-RELATED DATA. (NOTE: SAF/PAM WILL PROVIDE A BRAC PROCESS INFORMATION GUIDE FOR YOUR USE. LOCAL BRIEFINGS ON THE BRAC PROCESS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THAT GUIDE; DEVIATIONS MUST BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY SAF/PAM.)

7. IN SUM: COOPERATE WITH "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS BY PROVIDING PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION BUT DO NOT TAKE A LEADERSHIP ROLE OR ACTIVELY SUPPORT THEIR OBJECTIVES. 11

PART II: PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGIES

8. KEY MESSAGES:

A. CUTS IN DEFENSE SPENDING AND DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAVE NECESSITATED FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS THAT DICTATE CLOSING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

B. AIR FORCE LEADERS VALUE AND APPRECIATE THE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OUR BASES OVER THE YEARS AND REGRET ANY NEGATIVE IMPACT RESULTING FROM CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT ACTIONS.

C. ALL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS MEETING THE CRITERIA DEFINED IN BRAC LAW ARE CONSIDERED FOR CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT.

D. THE AIR FORCE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS IS ACCOMPLISHED IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH AN INTERNAL CONTROL PLAN DEVELOPED TO COMPLY WITH ALL OF THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW.

E. THE AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY ASSISTS IN VALIDATING THE PROCESS AND THE DATA BASE USED IN THE ANALYSIS. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AUDITS THE PROCESS AND REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS AND THE BRACC. THE RESULTS OF THE AIR FORCE ANALYSIS ARE SUBMITTED TO SECDEF. SECDEF USES SERVICE INPUTS TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BRACC.

9. TARGET AUDIENCES:

A. THE ENTIRE AIR FORCE COMMUNITY (ACTIVE DUTY, GUARD, AND RESERVE) INCLUDING FAMILIES, CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, AND CONTRACTORS.

B. NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL MEDIA (PARTICULARLY IN AREAS NEAR AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS).

C. LEADERS AND CITIZENS IN COMMUNITIES NEAR AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS.

D. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

10. TACTICS FOR INTERNAL PUBLIC:

A. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH BRAC PROCEDURES AND THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OF THE PROCESS. USE THE PROCESS INFORMATION GUIDE DEVELOPED BY SAF/PAM TO PROMOTE A STANDARDIZED RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS.

B. SINCE INTERNAL INTEREST IN BRAC ISSUES IS PRESUMED TO BE HIGH, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS NEED TO RESPOND TO A DEMAND FOR INFORMATION THROUGH PUBLISHING DOD NEWS SERVICE AND AFNEWS ARTICLES IN BASE NEWSPAPERS.

C. CAUTION BASE PERSONNEL THEY MUST NOT SPECULATE ON THE OUTCOME OF BRAC 95.

D. SAF/PAM WILL SEND ELECTRONIC MESSAGES TO COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM OATSD/PA.

11. TACTICS FOR EXTERNAL PUBLIC:

A. BE CAUTIOUS IN YOUR STATEMENTS TO NEWS MEDIA AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. YOU WILL LIKELY BE PRESSED FOR COMMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF YOUR BASE, BUT SUCH COMMENTS WOULD BE SPECULATIVE AND INAPPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, YOU MAY DISCUSS THE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA USED BY THE AIR FORCE, DOD, AND THE BRACC IN MAKING THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS (SEE THE PROCESS GUIDE). BE CAREFUL NOT TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF ANY OF ANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES.

B. AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS, REFER QUERIES ON BRAC 95 TO OATSD/PA (THRU MAJCOM/PA AND SAF/PA).

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C. AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, LIMIT RESPONSES TO MEDIA QUERIES TO THE KEY  
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UNCLAS ALMAJCOM-FOA 0170/94 SECTION 02 OF 03  
MESSAGES ABOVE. DO NOT COMMENT ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF ANY  
INSTALLATION BEFORE THE RECOMMENDATIONS BECOME FINAL.

PART III: 1995 BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRES

12. THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRE (WHETHER BLANK OR  
COMPLETED), ALL QUESTIONNAIRE DATA AND ANSWERS, AND ANY OTHER  
INFORMATION REQUESTED BY AND PROVIDED TO THE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE  
GROUP (BCEG) TO DETERMINE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT  
RECOMMENDATIONS BECOME BCEG RECORDS AND MUST BE MARKED "FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY." IAW DOD POLICY, THIS INFORMATION IS NOT RELEASABLE UNDER  
THE FOIA OR OTHERWISE TO THE PUBLIC WHEN THE DELIBERATIVE, PRE-  
DECISIONAL PROCESS IS UNDERWAY. ONCE DOD RECOMMENDATIONS ARE  
PROVIDED TO THE BRACC (NLT 1 MAR 95), ALL NON-CLASSIFIED DATA USED IN  
THE PROCESS MAY BE RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

13. THIS RESTRICTION ON RELEASING BASE CLOSURE INFORMATION DOES NOT  
PROHIBIT INSTALLATIONS FROM OBTAINING DATA FROM THE LOCAL COMMUNITY  
WHEN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY IS THE ONLY SOURCE OF INFORMATION (EXAMPLES:  
PUPIL-TO-TEACHER RATIO, CRIME STATISTICS, ETC.).  
IT DOES, HOWEVER, PROHIBIT INSTALLATIONS FROM GIVING THE  
QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. ONLY DESIGNATED DOD PERSONNEL  
MAY ANSWER THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

14. HANDLE REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLOSURE  
PROCESS IAW THE FOIA AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. HOWEVER,  
COORDINATE THESE REQUESTS THROUGH BOTH PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE BASE  
CLOSURE POC TO ENSURE THAT THE REQUESTED INFORMATION IS NOT  
SIMILAR TO OR THE SAME AS INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE BRAC 95  
QUESTIONNAIRE. IF THE REQUESTED INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE AND TRACKS  
WITH THE BRAC 95 QUESTIONNAIRE, MAKE SURE THE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO  
THE PUBLIC IS SUBSTANTIVELY THE SAME AS THAT PROVIDED ON THE BRAC 95  
QUESTIONNAIRE. INCLUDE THE BASE FOIA OFFICE IF A RECORDS REQUEST IS  
INVOLVED.

PART IV: MEDIA INTEREST AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

15. AS COMMUNITY LEADERS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN THE  
BRAC PROCESS, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN QUERIES REGARDING THE  
PROCESS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR LOCAL IMPACT FROM MEDIA  
REPRESENTATIVES.

A. THE PERCEPTION EXISTS THAT BRAC 95 WILL BE THE MOST DRAMATIC  
ROUND YET, AND REPORTERS ARE PROCEEDING ACCORDINGLY. THE FACT THAT  
SOME COMMUNITY LEADERS ARE VISITING SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIALS AND  
OTHER COMMUNITIES, AND ARE OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY INVESTMENTS  
FOR LOCAL BASES, HAS FURTHER PIQUED MEDIA INTEREST. THE MEDIA ARE  
VERY INTERESTED IN GETTING AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES TO SPECULATE ON  
THE POSSIBILITY OF LOCAL BASE CLOSINGS.

B. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES SPECULATE  
OR RANK THEIR BASES AGAINST OTHER INSTALLATIONS. BASE CLOSING IS A  
VERY EMOTIONAL ISSUE FOR COMMUNITIES TO DEAL WITH, AND REGARDLESS OF  
THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BASES DEVELOP WITH THEIR LOCAL COMMUNITIES,  
THE MILITARY MUST REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THIS ENTIRE PROCESS.

16. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN PROVIDING FACTUAL,  
ACCURATE, AND NON-SPECULATIVE INFORMATION TO ENSURE THE BASE CLOSURE  
AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS WILL PROCEED ACCORDING TO STATED LAWS. THE  
FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ARE DESIGNED TO HELP YOU ANSWER  
QUERIES AND REMAIN NEUTRAL IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH THE MEDIA AND  
COMMUNITY LEADERS.

17. Q: HOW MANY AIR FORCE BASES WILL BE CLOSED IN BRAC 95?

A: THERE IS NO TARGET NUMBER OR QUOTA OF BASES TO BE CLOSED.  
HOWEVER, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ESTABLISHED A GOAL OF A 15%  
REDUCTION OF THE DOD-WIDE PHYSICAL PLANT FOR BRAC 95. THIS GOAL DOES  
NOT TRANSLATE INTO A NUMBER OR QUOTA OF BASES TO BE CLOSED. SECDEF'S  
CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE BASED ON THE FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN AND  
THE CLOSURE CRITERIA. UNDER THE LAW, EVERY BASE MEETING THE CRITERIA  
IN THE LAW MUST BE CONSIDERED FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT.

18. Q: HOW WILL THE CURRENT COURT CASES CHALLENGING THE PROCESS

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AFFECT BRAC 95?

A: WE CANNOT COMMENT ON CASES UNTIL THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (INCLUDING ANY APPEALS) IS COMPLETE.

19. Q: IF THE MILITARY SAYS THERE ARE NO LONGER ANY "BAD BASES," THEN WHY ARE WE STILL CLOSING INSTALLATIONS?

A: THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN PLACE WAS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT A MUCH LARGER MILITARY FORCE. WITH THE DRAWDOWN, WE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE OUR FORCES AND OPERATE MORE EFFICIENTLY. BASE CLOSINGS AND REALIGNMENTS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE OUR FORCES ARE LOCATED WHERE WE NEED THEM AND IN FACILITIES THAT WILL SUPPORT THEM.

20. Q: WHEN WILL WE KNOW WHICH BASES WILL BE CLOSED?

A: THE DOD RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE BRACC NLT 1 MAR 95. THE COMMISSION IS SCHEDULED TO START ITS REVIEW IN MARCH 1995.

21. Q: WHO WILL SIT ON THE BRAC COMMISSION THIS YEAR?

A: COMMISSIONERS WILL BE NOMINATED BY THE PRESIDENT NLT 3 JAN 95.

22. Q: HOW ARE BRAC COMMISSIONERS SELECTED?

A: THEY ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, AND IN CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.

23. Q: IF A BASE SCORED POORLY IN SEVERAL AREAS IN THE LAST ROUND, HOW WILL THAT AFFECT ITS CHANCES FOR CLOSURE IN THE 1995 ROUND?

A: EVERY BASE BEGINS THE PROCESS WITH A CLEAN SLATE. THE DATA USED FOR EVALUATION IN THE 1995 ROUND IS CURRENTLY BEING COLLECTED. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS CHANGES IN FORCE STRUCTURE, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND PERSONNEL SINCE THE PREVIOUS ROUND, SO USING DATA FROM THE 1993 OR 1991 ROUND WOULD NOT PROVIDE A FACTUAL PICTURE FOR BRAC 95.

24. Q: WHICH BASES WILL BE EVALUATED DURING BRAC 95?

A: ALL BASES WITH AT LEAST 300 DIRECT-HIRE CIVILIAN AUTHORIZATIONS MUST BE EVALUATED AND HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SUBMIT REPLIES TO A STANDARDIZED QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH FORMS THE MASTER DATA BASE. (BASES WITH LESS THAN 300 DIRECT-HIRE CIVILIAN AUTHORIZATIONS MAY ALSO BE INCLUDED.)

25. Q: HOW IS THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED?

A: THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE GOES THROUGH THE MAJCOM TO THE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP (BCEG). THE BCEG USES THE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS TO EVALUATE EACH BASE IN LIGHT OF THE SELECTION CRITERIA AND FORWARDS ITS ANALYSIS TO SECAF, WHO THEN DEVELOPS THE AIR FORCE'S RECOMMENDATION FOR SUBMISSION TO DOD. THE BRACC USES ALL THIS INFORMATION TO HELP IN MAKING ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.

26. Q: WHO IS ON THE BCEG?

A: THE BCEG IS MADE UP OF APPROXIMATELY 12 AIR FORCE GENERAL OFFICERS AND SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE CIVILIANS FROM A VARIETY OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS. SECAF SELECTS THE BCEG MEMBERS.

27. Q: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF QUESTIONS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE?

A: THE BASIC QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO COLLECT DATA TO SUPPORT EVALUATION OF EACH OF THE DOD CRITERIA. AS A RESULT, QUESTIONNAIRE TOPICS RANGE FROM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS TO BASE CAPACITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE. THE COMMUNITY'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING SERVICES AS WELL AS ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE ALSO TOPIC AREAS.

28. Q: HOW LONG DO BASES HAVE TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE?

A: INPUTS ARE DUE TO HQ USAF FROM THE BASES VIA THE MAJCOMS IN EARLY BT

UNCLAS ALMAJCOM-FOA 0170/94 FINAL SECTION OF 03  
MAY 1994. HOWEVER, SUPPLEMENTAL DATA MAY BE GATHERED THROUGH THE SUMMER AND FALL.

29. Q: HOW IS THE INFORMATION DETERMINED TO BE CORRECT?

A: THE AIR FORCE INTERNAL CONTROL PLAN PROVIDES A SERIES OF STEPS FOR ENSURING ACCURATE DATA IS PROVIDED. THE DATA IS REVIEWED AT BASE, MAJCOM, AND AIR STAFF LEVELS. AT EACH STEP, OFFICIALS ARE REQUIRED TO CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION IS ACCURATE AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE. THE PROCESS IS DESIGNED TO BE DELIBERATE, AUDITABLE, AND ACCOUNTABLE.

30. Q: WHY IS THE QUESTIONNAIRE NOT RELEASABLE?

A: OSD HAS DIRECTED THAT THE DATA AND ANALYSES USED TO EVALUATE

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MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL AFTER DOD HAS FORWARDED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BRACC (REFERENCE SOURCE DOCUMENT). WE DO NOT RELEASE THE QUESTIONS OR ANSWERS BECAUSE THEY ARE PART OF AN INTERNAL DELIBERATIVE PROCESS AND DISCLOSURE COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THAT PROCESS.

31. Q: CAN THE QUESTIONNAIRE BE REQUESTED THROUGH FOIA?  
A: YES. THE QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE FULLY RELEASABLE AFTER DOD HAS FORWARDED RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BRACC. SEND ALL QUESTIONNAIRE FOIA REQUESTS TO SAF/AAIS.

32. Q: WHY CAN'T THE LOCAL COMMUNITY GIVE INPUTS?  
A: THE COMMUNITY CAN GIVE INPUTS, BUT NOT THROUGH THE OFFICIAL AIR FORCE QUESTIONNAIRE. THE OFFICIAL QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE USED BY THE AIR FORCE IN ITS DELIBERATION; THEREFORE, ONLY DESIGNATED DOD PERSONNEL CAN PROVIDE INPUTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

33. Q: WHAT IS THE PROCESS FOR THE LOCAL COMMUNITY TO GIVE INPUT?  
A: LOCAL COMMUNITIES CAN BE HEARD THROUGH LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND BEFORE THE BRACC. AFTER THE DOD PHASE OF THE BASE CLOSURE PROCESS IS COMPLETE, THE BRACC MEETS WITH COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES, HOLDS REGIONAL HEARINGS, VISITS MILITARY FACILITIES, AND HEARS FROM EXPERT WITNESSES, INCLUDING CONGRESS. HEARINGS, DELIBERATIONS, AND RECORDS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. THE BRACC ALSO RECEIVES LETTERS FROM CONCERNED CITIZENS.

34. Q: DOES IT BENEFIT THE LOCAL COMMUNITY TO SEND A DELEGATION TO MEET WITH SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICIALS LIKE SECAF OR CSAF?

A: SUCH VISITS ARE OF LIMITED VALUE SINCE THE SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS TO SECDEF ARE BASED ON THE OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF MISSION NEEDS AND THE SELECTION CRITERIA. HOWEVER, THE AIR FORCE DOES ENDORSE COMMUNITY UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESS. IN THAT REGARD, THE AIR FORCE WILL ADDRESS COMMUNITY BRAC PROCESS INQUIRIES.

35. Q: DOES IT BENEFIT THE LOCAL COMMUNITY TO "PUT THEIR MONEY WHERE THEIR BASE IS;" THAT IS, OFFERING TO INVEST LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY TO BUILD NEW RUNWAYS, MOVE HOUSING AREAS, BUY LAND, ETC.?

A: COMMUNITY OFFERS THAT MUST BE APPROVED/ENDORSED BY THE AIR FORCE WILL BE DENIED. HOWEVER, LOCAL COMMUNITIES ARE FREE TO PURSUE ACTIONS NOT REQUIRING AIR FORCE APPROVAL AT THEIR DISCRETION. (EXAMPLE: THE CONDEMNATION OF HOUSING IN THE VICINITY OF A MILITARY INSTALLATION IN ORDER TO REDUCE ENCROACHMENT.)

36. Q: WHAT IS THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS SURVEY?

A: THIS IS A SURVEY OF ALL AIR FORCE BASES TO DETERMINE WHAT LEVEL OF CAPACITY IS AVAILABLE AND WHAT IS CURRENTLY BEING USED. THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS INVOLVES LOOKING AT TWO MAJOR AREAS: OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND FACILITIES. THE INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED IN VALIDATING AIR FORCE EXCESS CAPACITY AND IN DETERMINING BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS.

37. Q: DOES THE EXISTENCE OF EXCESS CAPACITY AT A BASE MEAN IT WILL CLOSE?

A: NO, ALL OF OUR BASES HAVE EXCESS CAPACITY TO A DEGREE; HOWEVER, WE DO NOT PLAN TO OPERATE OUR INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES AT 100%. IF WE DID, WE WOULD NOT HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT MINOR MOVEMENTS OF DOD FORCE STRUCTURE, MISSION, AND/OR PERSONNEL. THEREFORE, EXCESS CAPACITY ALONE WILL NOT DRIVE A CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION. HOWEVER, EXCESS CAPACITY CAN RESULT IN REALIGNMENTS TO REDUCE THE EXCESS OR NO ACTION.

38. Q: WHEN IS THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS SURVEY TO BE COMPLETED?

A: THE BASES HAVE MADE THEIR INPUTS AND IT IS BEING PROCESSED BY MAJCOMS AT THIS TIME. RESULTS WERE DUE TO HQ USAF BY 15 APR 94.

39. Q: WILL THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS SURVEY BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC?

A: IT WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN THE DOD RECOMMENDATIONS ARE FORWARDED TO THE BRACC, NLT 1 MAR 95. (NOTE: THIS SURVEY IS ALWAYS CONSIDERED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.")

40. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH SAF/MI, SAF/GC, AF/JA, AND AF/XO. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POC FOR BASE CLOSURE ISSUES IS MAJOR MARY FELTAULT, SAF/PAM, DSN 225-0640. POC FOR THE BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRE IS LT COL JOHN PLUMMER, AF/XOOF, DSN 225-6766. POC FOR FOIA QUESTIONS IS MS. ANNE TURNER, SAF/AAIQ, DSN 227-3491.

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OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

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General  
X TEAM  
DAVE  
MARK  
Merrill

**Page 1, Question 4: Secretary Widnall, which of your recommendations are a direct result of alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Groups? Please explain the use of information by Joint Cross-Service Groups. Please furnish Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) analyses for the cross-service groups scenario alternatives in accordance with the 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC) Policy Memorandum Three dated December 29, 1994.**

**Answer:** The recommendation to close Rome Lab, and some of the distribution of activities to Hanscom AFB and Fort Monmouth, resulted from a Laboratory Joint Group alternative. The retention of the Phillips Lab portion of Kirtland AFB is consistent with the Laboratory Joint Group. The REDCAP and AFEWES actions are the result of alternatives developed by the T&E Joint Group. The recommended closure of Reese AFB is consistent with the UPT Joint Group's evaluation and alternatives.

The Air Force fully integrated the Joint Group process into its 1995 BRAC analysis. For the Laboratory, Test and Evaluation, and Depot subcategories, the Air Force used Joint Group data, the same methodology and, with few exceptions, the same measures of merit to produce the functional portion of the Criterion I grade for those installations. For the Undergraduate Flying Training category, the Air Force used the Joint Group functional values as the basis for its Criterion I grade. These steps ensured that the Air Force analysis was consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the Joint Group direction on analysis of these functions.

The Air Force also analyzed Joint Group alternatives, examined the capacity and capability appropriateness of alternatives, and participated in COBRA analysis where an Air Force installation was either the losing or gaining installation in the alternative. The Air Force provided its analysis to the Joint Groups as appropriate, with a clear communication of the prospects for implementation of the alternatives.

COBRA information is in a notebook titled "Department of the Air Force Joint Cross-Service Groups COBRA Run Summaries" which has already been provided.

What about Hospital  
JCSG afts?  
No COBRA info  
provided.

*[Handwritten signature]*


**Depots**

**Page 2, Question 1: Secretary Widnall, Deputy Secretary Deutch presented an Air Force Depot Proposal Chart at his February 28th press conference which suggested, at least in the case of the Air Force, that it is more cost effective to consolidate or downsize depots than it is to close them. According to that chart, consolidation as opposed to a two depot closure, would reduce one-time costs by \$924 million, while increasing the net present value by another \$292 million.**

**Please explain how the consolidation option, which retains 18 million more square feet and 763 more people than the closure option, can produce these savings?**

**Answer:** Significant costs can be avoided by consolidating rather than closing depots. Large cost avoidances include personnel and equipment transfers, MILCON requirements, and other one-time unique costs associated with a closure. A dual closure option closed the entire installation and all depot maintenance and non-depot maintenance personnel authorizations at Kelly and McClellan AFBs were transferred to new installations, cantoned, or eliminated. Although we examined a dual closure option, we identified excess capacity in our depots of only 1.5 depot equivalents. It is important to note the number of non-depot maintenance personnel authorizations at each site is significant and would have a dramatic impact on cost to close. The following chart identifies the number of depot maintenance and non-depot maintenance authorizations at Kelly and McClellan AFBs.

## Comparison of Depot Maintenance vs. Non-Depot Maintenance Authorizations at Kelly and McClellan AFBs



The consolidation option assumed the installation remains open and impacted primarily the depot maintenance activities and associated personnel. Since the Air Force selected for consolidation the commodities/processes which produced the most benefits, costs were low and savings were high. As a result, large MILCON requirements for the tenant population, military family housing, and renovation/new administrative space were avoided.

The savings noted in this question refer to the net present value of each option in the year 2015. The consolidation option has one-time costs of \$183M and produces annual savings of approximately \$89M. The dual closure option has one-time costs of \$1200M and annual savings of approximately \$163M. Although the annual savings of the consolidation option is approximately one-half that of the closure option, it produces a higher net present value during this period because the one-time costs to implement this option are significantly less than the one-time cost to implement the dual closure scenario.

Bob Bw

**Page 2, Question 2: Secretary Widnall, the Air Force option would consolidate similar workloads to the least number of sites as does the cross service alternative of closing two Air Logistics Centers. Both options would require some personnel to transfer from one location to another.**

**Why does the Air Force downsize option involve realignment of 251 civilian personnel, compared to almost 19,000 personnel who would be realigned if two Air Logistics Centers were closed?**

**Answer:** The dual closure option closed both Kelly AFB and McClellan AFBs in their entirety. This approach required the transfer, cantonment, or elimination of all personnel authorizations at these installations and resulted in the transfer of nearly 19,000 personnel authorizations. The Kelly/Lackland cantonment accounts for approximately 5300 transfers. It should be noted that there are no costs associated with these transfers since the COBRA model considers all moves under 50 miles to be "no cost" transfers.

The downsizing option assumed that the installation remained open and involved only depot maintenance personnel and their associated BOS tail. Since the installation remained open, there was no requirement to move the people. Furthermore, it was assumed the personnel could be retrained rather than transferred to a new location if a workload was realigned. Personnel authorizations were transferred only when a location was a net workload gainer. For example, a depot may lose 100 authorizations as a result of workloads realigned to new sites and gain 110 authorizations as a result of workload realigned in. This scenario would result in a net gain of 10 authorizations and would require the transfer of 10 authorizations.

Page 2, Question 3: Secretary Widnall, during the DOD hearing last week, Secretary Perry presented a chart which compared the costs and savings of downsizing and retaining all five Air Logistics Centers to the costs of closing two of these centers. Nearly two-thirds of the savings under the “downsizing” alternative came from “non-BRAC actions.”

What are these “non-BRAC actions” and why are they included in this analysis?


**Answer:** The “non-BRAC actions” reflect the impact of force structure reductions, downsizing to core, contracting out, and other non-BRAC initiatives. The chart portrayed the real effort, both BRAC and non-BRAC, that the Air Force brought to bear on the issue of reducing depot infrastructure.

Page 2, Question 3b: Would these “non-BRAC actions” be realized even if one or two Air Logistics Centers were closed?

Answer: No. The movement of workload into remaining Air Logistics Centers would preclude many of these actions.

**Page 2, Question 3c: What are the total savings that these “non BRAC actions” would provide if the Air Force closes one or two Air Logistics Centers?**

**Answer:** Some savings would be achieved, but these savings would be substantially reduced because the infrastructure eliminated by these actions may either be eliminated by the closure, or may be required for receiving work from closed Air Logistics Center bases. These savings have not been calculated. The savings should not be added directly to a depot closure calculation.



**Page 3, Question 3d:** How would the alternatives compare if you remove the “non-BRAC actions” from the downsizing alternative and then compare that alternative to closing only the one air logistics center that provides the greatest savings?

**Answer:** The financial aspects of the recommended downsizing option, with no consideration of non-BRAC actions, are as follows:

| <u>One-time costs</u> | <u>Annual savings</u> | <u>20 Yr NPV</u> | <u>ROI</u> | <u>Personnel</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|
| \$183 M               | \$89 M                | (\$991.2 M)      | 2          | 1905             |

The financial aspects of the options for closure of either Kelly or McClellan alone are as follows:

|               | <u>One-time costs</u> | <u>Annual savings</u> | <u>20 Yr NPV</u> | <u>ROI</u> | <u>Personnel</u> |
|---------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|
| Kelly AFB     | \$545 M               | \$74 M                | (\$341 M)        | 7          | 1201             |
| McClellan AFB | \$559 M               | \$89 M                | (\$487 M)        | 6          | 1500             |

Robb  
AIR

Page 3. Question 4: Secretary Widnall, the chart also shows that the one time cost to close Air Logistics Centers at San Antonio and Sacramento are approximately \$1.1 billion. Cost of Base Realignment Actions analysis in support of these recommendations reflect that the estimate includes about \$249 million in construction costs, \$330 million in personnel moving costs, and approximately \$257 million in "unique" one time costs.

Please explain in as much detail as possible why the Air Force would need to spend \$249 million for construction, when excess capacity already exists at all Air Logistics Centers. (It was indicated during the hearing that an insert for the record detailing the construction requirements would be provided).

Answer: A large percentage of the total MILCON costs are associated with tenant requirements, renovation/new administrative space, and military family housing. Refer to the following tables for specific projects and costs.

## MILCON Requirements for Kelly Closure

| Losing Base | Gaining Base | Organization             | Description                | Cost (\$M)   |
|-------------|--------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| Kelly       | Lackland     | Multiple<br>(cantonment) | Utilities                  | 1.5          |
| Kelly       | Lackland     | Multiple<br>(cantonment) | Fences, Security, Roads    | 0.3          |
| Kelly       | Hill         | Air Logistics Center     | Cold Storage Facility      | 0.5          |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center     | Bldg 214 GTE Test Facility | 0.7          |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center     | Fuel/Air Facility          | 1.1          |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center     | Bldg 3902 Fuel Test        | 1.7          |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center     | Bldg 3703 Fuel Test        | 5.0          |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center     | C-5 Repair Facilities      | 52.1         |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center     | Renovate Engine Test Cells | 8.7          |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Multiple                 | New/Renovate Admin Space   | 19.9         |
| Kelly       | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center     | 93 new MFH Units           | 12.1         |
|             |              |                          | <b>Kelly Total</b>         | <b>104.6</b> |

Continued Next Page

## MILCON Requirements for McClellan Closure

| Losng Base | Gaining Base | Organization         | Description                | Cost (\$M)  |
|------------|--------------|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| McClellan  | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center | New A/C Maintenance Dock   | 0.3         |
| McClellan  | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center | Hydraulics Reconfiguration | 1.0         |
| McClellan  | Tinker       | Special Mission      | SCIF and Secure Storage    | 15.4        |
| McClellan  | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center | Instruments                | 0.5         |
| McClellan  | Tinker       | Air Logistics Center | New/Renovate Admin Space   | 3.3         |
| McClellan  | Offutt       | AFTAC                | Renovate Facilities        | 4.4         |
| McClellan  | Offutt       | AFTAC                | Airman Dormitory           | 1.7         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | 3&6 Story Tower            | 1.5         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | 40,000 sf High Bay         | 8.2         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | Renovate Bldg 100C         | 0.1         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | Renovate Bldg 5N           | 1.5         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | Construct Test Platform    | 0.4         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | Tower Supports             | 0.2         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | Renovate Bldg 265          | 1.3         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | Construct Test Cells       | 0.3         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | Renovate Bldg 11           | 1.0         |
| McClellan  | Hill         | Air Logistics Center | New/Renovate Admin Space   | 9.5         |
| McClellan  | Moffett      | US Coast Guard       | Beddown 4 C-130 Aircraft   | 22.1        |
| McClellan  | Travis       | Multiple             | Dormitory                  | 1.3         |
| McClellan  | Travis       | Det 42               | Secure Facilities          | 23.5        |
|            |              |                      | <b>McClellan Total</b>     | <b>97.5</b> |

why total \$97.5

**MILCON Requirements for Dual Closure**  
**(Close Kelly and McClellan AFBs Simultaneously)**

| <b>Losing Base</b> | <b>Gaining Base</b> | <b>Organization</b>     | <b>Description</b>              | <b>Cost \$(M)</b> |
|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Dual Closure       | Tinker              | Air Logistics<br>Center | TTB Hangar                      | 12.6              |
| Dual Closure       | Tinker              | Air Logistics<br>Center | Add'l Admin MILCON              | 8.8               |
| Dual Closure       | Tinker              | Air Logistics<br>Center | Add'l 90 MFH Units              | 11.7              |
| Dual Closure       | Hill                | Air Logistics<br>Center | Add'l Admin MILCON              | 10.7              |
|                    |                     |                         | MILCON For Kelly Closure        | 104.6             |
|                    |                     |                         | MILCON for McClellan<br>Closure | 97.5              |
|                    |                     |                         | <b>Dual Closure Total</b>       | <b>245.9</b>      |

Page 3, Question 4a: The \$330 million cost estimate to accommodate personnel movements would apparently move almost 19,000 civilian and 6,600 military personnel. Considering that the five Air Logistics Centers will employ only 27,000 civilians, is it really necessary to relocate 19,000 (67%) civilians to accommodate two aviation logistics center closures. (Mr. Beach indicated he also questioned this percentage and would provide an insert for the record on this point.)

Answer: When the closure of the Air Logistics Center bases are considered, a total base closure is the scenario. There are more than 79,000 civilian and military positions in five Air Logistic Centers. The two depot closure option involved 28,664 military and civilian position. (17,660 at Kelly, and 11,004 at McClellan) From that number, 2,683 positions were eliminated as a result of base operating support and consolidation efficiencies. The remaining positions were moved. Approximately 5,300 positions moved to Lackland, at no cost because of the 50 mile limit on costed moves. The remainder were moved to other Air Force installations, the majority of which were Air Logistic Centers, and were transferred with the relocated workload.

Bar B  
Date  
April

Some  
very  
low

**Page 3, Question 4b: Why is the cost of moving 6600 military personnel included as a cost to close the Air Logistics Centers when nearly all depot personnel are civilian employees. Please provide details used in calculating costs.**

**Answer:** Although most depot personnel are civilians, there are other AF or DOD tenants on the installation that must be transferred if the entire installation is closed. The Kelly/Lackland cantonment accounts for approximately 3300 military personnel transfers. There are no costs associated with these transfers since the COBRA model considers all moves under 50 miles to be “no cost” transfers. The remainder move to other military installations, at a cost in the scenario of approximately \$15 Million.

**Page 3, Question 4c:** Please explain in as much detail as possible what is meant by “one-time unique closing costs?” Please itemize the one time unique costs.

**Answer:** The COBRA model is well suited to estimate the cost of operational units but does not capture all costs associated with closing a depot. As a result, a number of “one-time unique costs” are computed off-line and entered into COBRA. These costs generally include production transition costs, environmental studies, line rearrangement costs, and Base Conversion Agency overhead. Production transition costs reflect the cost of overtime, contractor support, and temporary hires necessary to support depot requirements during the transition period. Environmental studies reflect those studies needed to determine disposal/reuse potential for closure and realignment actions. Line rearrangement costs result when a product line must be changed either to accommodate more workload or moved to a new building/installation. If an installation is closed, the Base Conversion Agency (BCA) establishes an office during the closure period. This cost represents the estimated cost for the BCA. Refer to the following table for one-time unique costs used in the COBRA model for each option.

### One-Time Unique Costs for Dual Closure Option

| Category                              | Cost (\$M)   |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| Production Transition Costs           | 112.7        |
| Environmental Studies                 | 6.9          |
| Civilian Terminal Leave               | 15.1         |
| Rearrangement Costs                   | 41.0         |
| Base Conversion Agency                | 60.0         |
| Shutdown Neutron Radiography Facility | 20.0         |
| <b>Total</b>                          | <b>255.7</b> |

### One-Time Unique Costs for Consolidation Option

| Category                  | Cost (\$M)   |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| Retraining Costs          | 9.0          |
| Productivity Losses       | 14.9         |
| Facility Demolition Costs | 25.9         |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>49.8*</b> |

\* Varies slightly from COBRA report due to inputs associated with facility demolition costs.

The consolidation option also includes \$44.1 million for rearrangement costs. Unlike the closure option, these costs are reflected in the MILCON category.

**Page 3, Question 5: Secretary Widnall, your alternative to downsizing was the closure of two depots. Did you examine the alternative to close one depot?**

**Answer:** Each Air Logistics Center installation was examined for the same eight criteria by which all Air Force installations were examined. This analysis led to each installation being placed in one of three tiers. Based upon the tiering of all five installations, we examined three closure options: Kelly only, McClellan only, and both installations together. We identified, however, an excess capacity of only 1.5 depot equivalents in our process.

**Page 4, Question 6: Secretary Widnall, in testimony last week, Mr. Gotbaum indicated that the Depot Joint Cross-Service Group calculated capacity of depots based on a 40-hour work week, or just one shift per activity. This is a very conservative way of measuring capacity since people work more than one shift in times of crisis. Using only one shift, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?**

**Answer:** The Air Force calculated an excess capacity of approximately one-and-one-half depots of excess capacity. The Air Force peacetime CORE requirement is calculated based upon a 40 hour, single shift workweek. This CORE peacetime requirement is necessary to ensure sufficient personnel, facilities, and resources, are available to support JCS wartime scenarios as required by Title 10. The wartime requirement will be greater than that experienced in peacetime. This will be met by surging our peacetime capability (through increased shift operations). The CORE determination is an approved DOD methodology used by all services.

**Page 4, Question 6a:** If you used one and one half or two shifts, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?

**Answer:** For given workloads, the number of shifts required is a function of the amount of work, facilities, and personnel available. The Air Force currently utilizes multi-shift operations at its depots for given workloads.

It is important to understand that excess capacity is not solely based upon single/multi-shift utilization. The Air Force must be able to support its wartime requirements and other statutory requirements. The Air Force must maintain sufficient capacity in peacetime to surge to meet our wartime requirement. Excess capacity can be determined after meeting our peacetime, wartime, and statutory capacity requirements. The Air Force must also comply with the law which requires that no more than 40 percent of our appropriated funds be obligated for the performance of depot level maintenance by non-Government employees.

Page 4, Question 7: Secretary Widnall, in May 1994 the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated "...depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the *minimum facilities, equipment, and skill personnel necessary to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence.*

**Will the Air Force base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?**

**Answer:** The Air Force proposal (BRAC and non-BRAC) reduces excess depot capacity across all depots. The recommended realignments will consolidate production lines and move workloads to a minimum number of locations, allowing the reduction of personnel, infrastructure, and other costs. The net effect of the realignments along with other downsizing actions reduce Air Force capacity from 39.5 million hours to 30.7 million hours. These actions will reduce excess capacity and enhance efficiencies. As a result of all Air Force actions, depot maintenance capabilities will comprise the minimum necessary resources to accomplish the workload.

## Product Centers and Laboratories

**Page 4, Question 1:** **Secretary Widnall,** an April 1994 Defense Science Board (DSB) report states that the Defense Laboratory System is an “obsolescent artifact of the Cold War that has not kept pace with the shrinking military force structure and changing patterns of technology advancement generation.” The DSB recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories’ Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995-99. These cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction by the end of the century. Have you recommended base closures or realignments as a result of these personnel reductions?

**Answer:** The recommended closure of Brooks AFB and relocation of the Human Systems Center and the closure of Rome Lab will bring total personnel down to the level the Air Force will need to effectively operate in this area. The closures and realignments were recommended as a result of an analysis of force structure and the eight selection criteria.

**Page 5, Question 2: Secretary Widnall, your recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, involved closing all activities and facilities, including family housing. We understand that there is a large waiting list for family housing at nearby Lackland Air Force Base.**

**Why did your recommendation not include the retention of family housing at Brooks to help satisfy Air Force family housing requirements in the San Antonio metropolitan area? (Major General Blume agreed to revisit this issue and to provide an insert for the record.)**

**Answer:** Brooks AFB Family Housing was not recommended for retention so that Brooks AFB could be recommended for total closure. The Air Force receives most benefit from the total closure of an installation and the elimination of its entire base operating support. However, in response to the question from the Commission, AETC and AFMC are evaluating the possibility of transferring the responsibility for Brooks base housing to Kelly AFB or Lackland AFB. The Air Force will provide a position on this issue in the near future.

**Page 5, Question 3: Secretary Widnall**, we recently received a copy of a memorandum dated February 15, 1995, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing) to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) expressing interest in the U.S. Army Reserve Command acquiring approximately 57 acres and 13 permanent buildings at Brooks AFB--should it become available from the Air Force (see attachment). Transfer of this Air Force property would allow the Army Reserve to (1) eliminate a costly lease, (2) reduce the need for newly programmed military construction, and (3) provides facilities necessary to enhance unit readiness at a significant savings to the Department of Defense. According to Army officials, the Army Reserve would be able to cancel a lease with an annual cost saving of \$218,655 and a fiscal year 1999 military construction project with an estimated cost saving of \$11.4 million.

Was this request discussed and resolved during deliberations by either the BRAC 95 Steering Group or BRAC 95 Review Group, which were established to consider such inter-service needs? If not, why not? (During the hearing, testimony indicated a record reply was in order.)

Answer: This question was not discussed during any deliberation of the Review or Steering Group. Moreover, this request was not discussed by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group nor presented to the Secretary of the Air Force for consideration. This type of request seems most appropriate for consideration during the screening period associated with base closures after those closures are approved. During the screening period, conducted immediately following closure approval, DoD organizations have priority to request real property.

**Page 5, Question 4: Secretary Widnall, an alternative was received by the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group to consolidate the lab at Brooks Air Force Base to a Naval Installation in Orlando, Florida. Instead, the Air Force chose to relocate the lab to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.**

**What was the Air Force's rationale for this action?**

**Answer:** The rationale for the Air Force decision regarding the Brooks AFB receiver was (1) cost, (2) use of available capacity, and (3) consolidation of related activities. Specifically, because the LJCSG proposed relocation of part of Brooks AFB activities was to leased space, the LJCSG alternative would not use available DoD capacity and would be more costly than using existing Air Force capacity at Wright-Patterson AFB. Additionally, since the primary customer for the products and services of the Human Systems Center and Armstrong Lab are the activities at Wright-Patterson AFB (e.g., ASC and WL), the collocation made sense from a synergistic perspective.

**Page 5 Question 4a: Why did the Air Force reject the alternative submitted by the Joint Cross-Service Group?**

**Answer:** The Air Force did not reject the alternative submitted by the Lab Joint Group. Instead, the alternative was considered as one option, along with options involving Air Force sites as the consolidation receivers. For reasons of costs and compatibility, the Air Force option was selected. The Air Force's analysis of this alternative was consistent with the principle that Joint Group alternatives are provided for Service consideration, in parallel with broader Service considerations.

## Test and Evaluation

**Page 6, Question 1: General Fogleman, several studies have pointed out that great opportunities for reduction in the test and evaluation infrastructure exist in testing of high performance aircraft, test support aircraft, and electronic warfare testing. Do you believe the Air Force and Navy should combine activities such as Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center with China Lake Naval Weapons Center and Edwards Air Force Base?**

**Answer:** No. Analysis of certified data indicates that both Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB and Naval Air Weapons Center, Patuxent River, are needed to support Air Vehicle Fixed-Wing T&E. We recognize the unique capabilities of many of the Test and Evaluation ranges, particularly relating to geographic or topographical characteristics. There are testing advantages to keeping a diversity of environments, e.g., water, beach, desert, and forest areas; low temperature, high temperature; and humid and arid areas. The Air Force has, over a long period of time, consolidated its Electronic Combat, Air Vehicle, and Armament/Weapons test activities into only a few locations. The resulting locations, such as Eglin AFB and Edwards AFB, represent full-service capabilities over the full life-cycle of components.

**Page 6, Question 2: Secretary Widnall, regarding the realignment recommendation that would relocate electronic warfare capability from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base, did the Air Force consider an alternate proposal by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross Service Group that would have transferred certain Eglin missions to China Lake Naval Weapons Center?**

**Answer:** No. The Test & Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG-TE) chose to exclude “core” activities from its analysis for closure and realignment, limiting these activities to receiver status only. As a result, there was no JCSG-TE alternative to transfer any Eglin missions to China Lake. Some additional “core” activity options were presented by the JCSG-TE co-chairs. The Air Force did not analyze these options as no supporting analysis was provided. Our Air Force internal analysis, using Joint Group data and the Joint Group analysis plan on core activities, demonstrated that relocation of Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC) to NAWC (China Lake) from Eglin was not viable in terms of cost or capability. Further, relocation of only one portion of the Eglin AFB capabilities presented no benefits, and disrupted a consolidated, full-service test center.

## Undergraduate Pilot Training

**Page 6, Question 1: General Fogleman, what was the impact, if any, of basing considerations of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System on your BRAC 95 basing decisions? Will the final selection of a jet or prop Joint Primary Aircraft Training System aircraft affect your basing decisions? What Joint Primary Aircraft Training System selection criteria, such as range, airspace, and cross-wind limitations, were or were not considered as factors in your basing decision and why? This criteria is relevant, since Reese AFB, Texas was downgraded in these areas. Absent a decision on which JPAT aircraft candidate will be selected until this summer, and recognizing that the planned introduction of the JPAT into the Service's Pilot Training programs will not occur until 2001 and stretch over a decade, how much weight did JPAT considerations carry in your decision-making during this round?**

**Answer:** The specific evaluation of the training capabilities of the pilot training installations was conducted by the Joint Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training. I have referred your questions to that Group. The Air Force accepted the functional values provided by the Joint Group and used an average of the Joint Group functional values for each installation as the basis for its Criterion 1 grading. In the evaluation of the other criteria, JPATS-related issues were not a factor.

**Page 7, Question 2: General Fogleman, the Air Force selected Reese AFB, Texas as its first Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training site, introduced the T-1 training aircraft there, and initiated the consolidation of Undergraduate Pilot Training with the Navy in a joint program there as well. Based on these decisions, many are of the impression that the Air Force places a high value on Reese AFB. Why has the Air Force now rated Reese so low in comparison to the other Undergraduate Pilot Training category bases?**

**Answer:** The 1995 BRAC process included a Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training (JCSG-UPT) to evaluate the functional effectiveness of each UPT base to perform pilot training. The Air Force accepted the functional values derived by the JCSG-UPT as the basis for its Criterion I grading. All eight criteria were then examined to produce the tiering of Undergraduate Flying Training bases.

Reese AFB is a highly valuable pilot training base, as are all the Air Force pilot training bases. The selection for closure of any Air Force flying training will involve closure of an excellent installation. Nonetheless, using the evaluations of the Joint Group and the Air Force analysis provides a reliable means of retaining the most capable installations.

**Page 7, Question 2b:** Please explain the Air Force rationale for recommending the closing of Reese and transferring all of its aircraft, in particular, the newly introduced T-1 aircraft, along with the Joint Training Program, to Vance, Laughlin, and Columbus, when these bases have yet to transition to these programs, as opposed to leaving these assets in-place at Reese, and simply closing one of these other bases, and avoiding the need for these transfers altogether.

**Answer:** The costs of relocating all missions, aircraft, and personnel were included in the final COBRA analyses of Air Force recommendations. Those costs were not sufficient to warrant the selection for closure of a base other than Reese AFB. It should be noted that T-1 training is currently being performed at Randolph, Reese, and Laughlin AFBs. It will also be performed at Vance AFB this fall, and Columbus AFB in the spring of 1996. Each of these bases is fully capable and will to a great extent participate in the Joint Training Program.

## Large Aircraft And Missile Systems

**Page 8, Question 1a: General Fogleman, with the transfer of aircraft from Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, is the Air Force reopening a closed base and adding infrastructure to the inventory?**

**Answer:** The Air Force is not recommending that a closed base be reopened. MacDill AFB was not recommended for closure, but was realigned and provides the entire support for the two Unified Commands located there. The Air Force did recommend retention of the airfield as an active duty Air Force airfield, rather than transferring control to the Department of Commerce or other non-DoD agency.

The requirement for the Air Force to provide support for recently-validated Unified Command requirements substantially increases Air Force costs of airfield operations. There is no benefit to transferring the airfield if the Air Force must contribute approximately 95 percent of the airfield's operating costs. The proposed retention provides an opportunity to receive limited, compatible force structure. Closing the airfield at Malmstrom AFB removes infrastructure, and personnel overhead, roughly equal to that gained by the MacDill airfield action. In addition, placing tanker assets on MacDill airfield reduces a tanker shortage in the Southeastern United States. Both actions taken together provide a cost-effective means of providing necessary support to the Unified Commands and solving an operational issue, without increasing Air Force infrastructure. Each of these actions is exclusive and may be accomplished independently.

**Page 8, Question 1b:** Savings estimates from the previous BRAC recommendations will not be realized as a result of the new recommendation. Has this been taken into account in estimating the current savings?

**Answer:** Yes, the manpower authorizations associated with the closure of the airfield at Malmstrom AFB will be used to establish Air Force operations on the airfield at MacDill AFB. If those manpower authorizations were not used, there would be a cost for the Air Force to run the airfield. Those costs, however, would be substantially the same as the Air Force costs that will be incurred to support the airfield if transferred to the Department of Commerce.

Page 8. Question 1c: How will additional cost savings be achieved by this action, as the current recommendation indicates?

Answer: The primary savings come from the fact that the Air Force will be paying for the operation of one airfield, MacDill (which it must now continue to operate to satisfy the recently validated Unified Command requirements), versus the current situation of operating two airfields, MacDill and Malmstrom.

**Page 8 Question 1d: Why is the base being opened as an active component installation rather than a Reserve installation as recommended in 1993?**

**Answer:** The 1993 recommendation was to temporarily operate the airfield until conversion to a civil airport. The AFRES unit which was to have operated the airfield was directed by the 1993 Commission to remain in a cantonment at Homestead AFB.

The 1995 recommendation reflects current force structure, operational considerations, and the 1993 Commission direction regarding the AFRES unit at Homestead ARB. . A scenario was considered which involved movement of an AFRES unit to the airfield, but the movement of the Malmstrom unit was considered more cost-effective, given the recommendation to close the Malmstrom airfield. Materials that document this decision were supplied to the Commission as part of the initial Air Force data submission.

## Small Aircraft Bases

**Page 8, Question 1a: Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has reduced its fighter aircraft force from 36 fighter wings at the end of the Cold War to the 20 wings now projected in your current Force Structure Plan. Simultaneously, it has reconfigured the size of the typical fighter wing from 72 to 54 aircraft, and the typical squadron from 24 to 18 aircraft. Similarly, the size of reserve units has also decreased. What was the Air Force's rationale for these smaller units?**

**Answer:** In the past five years, the Air Force has structurally reorganized to achieve the deployment and employment flexibility and global forward presence necessary to deter or respond to aggression by any emerging threats in the Post Cold War era. As outlined in the Bottom Up Review, increases in reliability and maintainability of newer weapons systems, coupled with improved accuracy and lethality of precision weapons, allow us to field combat firepower of yesterday with fewer combat aircraft per wing. The higher number of smaller squadrons provides a 33 percent greater deployment and employment flexibility. Additionally, decreasing the squadron size helped mitigate the increased span of command and control for the squadron commander associated with integrating the flight line maintenance functions organically within the fighter squadrons. The additional manpower associated with more smaller squadrons was more than offset by the savings associated with restructuring maintenance within the flying squadrons and reorganizing our logistics from a three- to a two-level maintenance structure.

**Page 8. Question 1b:** In light of the excess capacity at fighter bases that results from smaller wings, would it be feasible to increase the number of squadrons assigned to a fighter wing, or the number of fighter wings assigned to a base?

**Answer:** When discussing excess capacity at fighter bases several factors beyond base facilities infrastructure must be considered. As we have modernized our forces, our peacetime as well as our wartime operations tempo (sorties per training day) have increased noticeably. This has increased the number of aircraft movements (takeoffs, landings, and practice approaches) per aircraft as well as the demand on our special use training airspace and ranges. These, as opposed to base facility infrastructure, are the factors that generally tend to limit the amount of aircraft that can be assigned to a particular base. Additionally, as we have downsized our force structure, we have also fielded weapons systems and munitions with increased target acquisition and delivery ranges which require larger volumes of airspace to meet effective training. Many of our fighter bases are currently operating at, or above, historical high water marks for PAA aircraft. Other fighter bases now support Composite Wing bases operating significant numbers of other types of aircraft. The imperative to maintain engine and avionics compatibility at the wing and base level to the maximum extent possible constrains force structure realignment opportunities. Finally, some reserve capacity in the small aircraft base category is desirable to provide the flexibility to return forces from overseas should future national policy so dictate. In short, the Air Force looked at the capacity of our small aircraft bases and concluded that, considering all the above factors, there was no operationally sound opportunity to achieve a base closure recommendation.

**Page 8, Question 1c: Is it reasonable to assume if the fighter wing structure is realigned to 72 aircraft that more bases could be closed?**

**Answer:** There are many factors that mitigate realigning our fighter wings to 72 aircraft. The Air Force organizes its forces to efficiently meet National Security imperatives, provide overseas forward presence, and preserve readiness of the force. Our overseas forward presence is dictated by and tailored to meet multiple bi- and multi-lateral international security arrangements. Additionally, the Air Force has tailored three CONUS Composite Wings to meet specific missionized rapid reaction response requirements. The wings, designed to meet specific requirements, are critical elements of our Post-Cold War era Air Force. Several of our small aircraft bases are operating at or above their historical high water mark for operations tempo. Four of our small aircraft bases are operating at approximately 75 percent of their operations tempo high water mark. Of these, two are F-15 bases and two are F-16 bases. The Air Force reviewed realignment options which would allow the recommendation for a base closure. All these options provided either mixed aircraft beddowns with logistical concerns or beddowns which significantly exceeded operations tempo capacity at one or more receiving bases.

**Page 9, Question 1d: Was the wing size taken into consideration during the Air Force analysis of closure and recommendations?**

**Answer:** The wing size was taken into consideration during the Air Force base closure deliberative process. Many of our wings have aircraft PAA in addition to that which is accounted for in the FWE force but that nonetheless contribute to the operations tempo at the base. For example, Seymour-Johnson AFB has 36 PAA TF-coded F-15Es and Shaw AFB and Davis-Monthan AFB have OA-10 aircraft embedded in A/OA-10 squadrons. The total flying force structure assigned to a base must be used in determining excess capacity available. After complete analysis, the Air Force stands by its recommendation to retain all its small aircraft bases.

**Page 9, Question 2: General Fogleman, the current Force Structure Plan reduces the fighter aircraft inventory by six Fighter Wing Equivalents from 26 to 20 wings. During this drawdown, the Air Force has recommended closure of one small aircraft base, Homestead Air Force Base, in 1993. Can you explain why the Air Force has been unable to identify any additional small aircraft bases for closure despite this significant reduction in fighter aircraft? (This was discussed but a record response would amplify this issue.)**

**Answer:** This answer was not provided by General Fogleman, due to his disqualification from participation in Air Force considerations of the Small Aircraft subcategory. The reduction from the Base Force of 26.5 Fighter Wing Equivalents to the Bottom Up Review Force of 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWEs) was accomplished by reducing the Active Component from 15.25 FWEs to 13 FWEs and the Reserve Component from 13.25 to 7 FWEs. In the Active Component reduction of 2.25 FWEs from the Base Force to the BUR Force, 1.0 FWE was reduced in Europe and 0.17 FWEs were reduced in the Pacific. The resulting CONUS Active Component reduction from the Base Force was slightly more than 1 FWE. In 1993, the Air Force recommended Homestead AFB, Florida for closure. The 1993 Commission included Homestead AFB in their closure recommendation to the President and it was subsequently approved for closure. Additionally, the Air Force has, subsequent to the Base Force, formed three missionized Composite Wings and collocated some TF-coded fighters and A/OA-10s not counted in the FWE force structure on fighter bases. This has resulted in near high water mark operations tempo at many of our small aircraft bases. As stressed previously, the Air Force analyzed closure scenarios for each small aircraft base in the bottom and middle tiers. No operationally sound or cost-effective option was revealed. The record of this analysis is contained in the minutes of the Base Closure Executive Group.

## Hospital Issues

**Page 10, Question 1:** Secretary Widnall, during Mr. Boatright's testimony, he indicated that the Air Force does not agree with the hospital bed requirement figure used by the Hospital Joint Cross Service Group.

**What is the correct figure for the Air Force's requirement for hospital beds in the United States?**

**Answer:** The Air Force's operating bed requirement for peacetime support in the United States is 2255. This figure is based on workload demand and reflects a percentage of the average daily patient load at our medical facilities.

**Page 10, Question 1a: Does this requirement figure take into consideration the capacities of the Army and Navy, as well as the contingency beds provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).**

**Answer:** No. Wartime, contingency operations and disaster casualty requirements include but exceed this baseline number. Expansion bed missions are in addition to this number. The number, therefore, is limited to Air Force, peacetime inpatient workload only and does not account for Army, Navy, Department of Veteran's Affairs or NDMS beds availability.

**Page 10, Question 2:** Secretary Widnall, Mr Boatright also stated that the Air Force believes that hospital closure and realignment decisions are premature at this point and that they should follow this round of base closures and realignments.

**Why didn't the Air Force develop a list of hospital closures and realignments that is predicated on the acceptance of the rest of the Air Force BRAC list?**

**Answer:** Recommendation on the closure of medical treatment facilities are integral to the Air Force recommendations. However, not only Air Force but all DoD closures and realignments must be considered in order to develop a list such as that proposed by the Medical Joint Group. Mission transfers, with the associated personnel moves, will impact the health care delivery systems in all regions where a realignment or mission change associated with BRAC occurs. The Air Force has aggressively been sizing the Medical Service separate from the BRAC actions. During the period FY 94-96, the following actions have been or are planned to occur: Three hospitals have been downsized to clinics, 4 more are being evaluated, and 18 emergency rooms are being modified. Three obstetrics services have been closed, 1 is awaiting approval to close and 8 are being evaluated for closure. Strategic Resourcing has reduced manpower requirements by 10 percent and 1,350 operating beds have been reduced. Joint staffing has been initiated at 4 MTFs and is being considered at 2 more. AFMS Medical Force Review has been initiated to identify the baseline medical readiness needs with an estimated completion date of May 95. Finally, the Strategic Resourcing process, initiated for the first time in Dec 94, is designed to size our medical facilities based on the most economical source of care for our total beneficiary population. This process will continue to drive proper sizing of the AFMS into the next century. The vast majority of proposed actions can be accomplished without resort to BRAC.

**Page 10, Question 3: Secretary Widnall, Mr. Boatright testified that hospitals can be closed and realigned outside of the BRAC process.**

**While this is likely to be true for small and medium hospitals, is it true for large hospitals?**

**Answer: Closing or realigning even large hospitals would likely not break the BRAC thresholds. In addition, since only portions of those hospitals would be relocated, there is even less likelihood that a BRAC threshold would be broken.**

**Page 10, Question 3a:** Does the Air Force intend to address the potential cost effectiveness of realigning large hospitals, such as the three medical centers identified by the joint cross service group?

**Answer:** Yes, but not through the BRAC process. Strategic Resourcing is being developed to address present and future resource requirements of the total AFMS. This process considers the total MILPERS and Direct Care dollars (O&M, CHAMPUS) required to operate a medical facility in each catchment area. The decision process will include a cost comparison of the sources of care, quality considerations, and access impacts. The goal of the entire process is to ensure that the most cost effective source of high quality, appropriate access to care is provided to our beneficiary population. Since medical facilities are being closed at bases being closed or realigned under BRAC, the Air Force is realizing a substantial reduction in medical facilities. Through Strategic Resourcing the remaining medical facilities will be rightsized based on cost effectiveness.

**Page 10, Question 4: Secretary Widnall, how did the Air Force consider the medical needs of the active duty personnel, retirees, and their family members remaining in the area of hospitals to be closed?**

**Answer:** Statutory requirements dictate that a joint services working group shall solicit the views of persons adversely affected by installation closures and realignments on the issue of suitable substitutes for furnishing health care. In most cases, no hospital or clinic will remain after the closure or major realignment of an installation.

## Economic Impact

**Page 11, Question 1: Secretary Widnall, how did you assess the impact of your closure and realignment recommendations on existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure? Please elaborate. What factors were considered?**

**Answer:** As a general rule, AF active installations are located adjacent to communities that provide outstanding support. In rating community support, we were faced with the difficult task of distinguishing the best of the best. Nevertheless, we approached the evaluation of community support in a very systematic fashion. We adopted essentially the same process and factors for BRAC-95 as used for BRAC-93 to evaluate the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, mission and people. In evaluating Criterion VII, the AF Base Closure Executive Group(BCEG) assessed a number of factors. Nine factors--referred to as subelements--were evaluated: Availability of Housing, Transportation, Shopping, and Recreation; Quality of Education and Medical Services; Proximity to Metro Area; Likelihood of Obtaining Employment and Local Crime Rate. Questions and corresponding grading elements (or goalposts) were developed by the BCEG to assess a community's capability to meet AF needs relative to the nine subelements. The BCEG used an objective, color coded rating scale in order to quantify specific data points relative to the established criterion; "green" represented the highest capability, yellow less so, and red the lowest. Weights were assigned and an overall score was mathematically derived for each installation. Of the 43 active bases evaluated, 18 received ratings of G-; 16-Y+; and 9-Y. The overall Criterion VII grades were considered by the BCEG in the tiering process, and were reviewed by the Secretary of the Air Force.

## Environmental Impact

**Page 11, Question 1: Secretary Widnall, according to DoD Guidance, “environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations.”**

**Were any bases not recommended for closure or realignment due to unique contamination problems? Please elaborate.**

**Answer:** Environmental restoration costs at Air Force bases were not considered in closure cost calculations. There were no unique contamination problems which caused any base to be excluded from closure or realignment consideration or recommendation.

**Page 11, Question 2: Secretary Widnall, did the overall cost of environmental restoration at all bases affect the size of the list presented to the Commission?**

**Answer:** The Air Force has a legal obligation for environmental restoration regardless of whether a base is closed, realigned or remains open. The overall cost of environment and restoration did not affect the decision to recommend a base for closure or realignment. In the case of depot installations, although the recommendation to consider a downsizing option was based only on COBRA-related expenses, a further analysis of the impact of environmental restoration expenses at depot installations further supported the wisdom of the downsizing approach.

**Page 11, Question 3: Secretary Widnall, DoD policy also states that “unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse.” Were any installations eliminated from closure consideration due to unique contamination problems? If so please elaborate.**

**Answer: No.**

**Page 11, Question 4a: Secretary Widnall, in making closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?**

**Answer:** Environmental compliance was considered in the overall analysis.

Compliance costs were factored into the COBRA model. Compliance costs in COBRA may be savings associated with a closure, or may be costs incurred at a receiving location.

To the extent that air quality concerns are viewed as environmental compliance issues, there was considerable attention given. Air Quality was a Criterion II subelement, and included analysis of attainment status, current restrictions, and restrictions on future growth.

Air Quality issues were also considered when selecting potential receiver bases in closure scenarios. Receivers that held the prospect of difficulty in achieving a positive conformity determination were generally not used in the scenarios.

**Page 12, Question 4b: Did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis?**

**Answer:** Expansion potential (capacity) was looked at to determine if any environmental issue (e.g., threatened or endangered species, unique habitat, etc.) could constrain the existing or future mission. Although there are identified constraints on some Air Force installations, in no instance did these constraints impact on a decision to close or realign and installation. Constraints were considered in the evaluation of Criteria VIII grading, as well as the Air Quality portion of Criterion II.

**Page 12, Question 4c: Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?**

**Answer:** The attainment status of the area in which an installation is located formed a portion of the Criterion II grade for that installation. In addition, air quality issues were considered in selecting receivers when developing potential closure scenarios for analysis.

Bases in nonattainment areas received further analysis to determine the affect on capacity. The Clean Air Act Amendments mandate that when the Federal government proposes any action in an area designated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as nonattainment, with reference to National Ambient Air Quality Standards, it must document that the impact of those actions conform to the purpose of the applicable State or Federal implementation plan. Force structure moves are considered Federal actions, whether resulting from a base closure or realignment.

The conformity analysis examines the impacts of foreseeable direct and indirect emissions created only from the proposed action. It must also demonstrate, by EPA standards, that the Federal action will not cause or contribute to new violations of any national air quality standard in the nonattainment area, nor increase the frequency or severity of an existing violation. The impact of the action is determined with respect to the nonattainment status of the entire air quality district, not just its immediate vicinity.

The necessity of a conformity analysis alone does not bar a Federal action. Conformity may be shown after analysis, or the emissions associated with the action may be viewed as de minimis. Even where the action by itself might violate conformity, mitigation measures may be implemented which, when coupled with the action, will achieve positive conformity.

When considering receivers for closure scenarios, the BCEG reviewed conformity issues. If a base appeared to be unable to accept a mission due to conformity issues, other receivers were selected for the closure scenarios.

**Page 12, Question 5a: Secretary Widnall, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?**

**Answer:** At the twenty-seven Air Force bases closed under the 1988 and 1990 BRAC Realignment and Closure Laws, we have 80,409 acres available for reuse. While cleanup activities are required on 36,703 of these acres, there are no "unique" contamination problems preventing us from transferring these acres when remedial actions are in-place. Right now, most of these remedies will be in-place by end of FY 97 for BRAC '88 bases, by end of FY 99 for BRAC '91 bases, and by end of FY 2001 for BRAC 93 bases. This will "free up" most of the property on the 27 installations for transfer by deed.

**Page 12, Question 5b: How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?**

**Answer:** Caretaker requirements are currently programmed through FY 2001 as we expect to have to maintain facilities until cleanup remedies are in place and longer if reuse of some parcels occurs beyond FY 2001.

**Page 12, Question 6: Secretary Widnall, in the 1993 round, one community pointed out that the cost of cleaning up an installation directed to close could be three to ten times as great as the cost of cleaning up an active installation. This difference is due to expected technological advances in environmental restoration. Do you believe the difference between routine and closure related cleanup costs, if factual, should be considered in cost of closure calculations?**

**Answer:** We do not believe there are necessarily substantial differences between the cleanup costs at a closing base as compared to an active base. Our experience shows that the costs to complete cleanups are much better defined at closure bases because more dollars have been invested in completing investigations, hence the real cost of cleanup is more clearly understood. In some cases, costs are not increased, but are expended more rapidly. This acceleration of expenses has budgetary impact. We do not believe the environmental costs should be considered in the cost to close an installation because these are dollars we have to expend regardless of whether the base closes or remains open.

## Air Force Space Command Bases

**Page 12, Question 1a: General Fogleman, The Secretary of Defense recommended realignment of the Onizuka Air Force Station, including the inactivation of the 750th Space Group and moving its functions to Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado, and relocation of Detachment 2, Space and Missile Systems Center to Falcon Air Force Base. What are the projected future Air Force satellite control requirements and how do they differ from current requirements?**

**Answer:** In the past, dual satellite control nodes were deemed essential. The current Air Force policy concerning the degree of duplication required to protect satellite operations has changed. In the past, an entire alternate satellite control node was required. Presently, requirements only call for duplicate communication infrastructure at a geographically separated site. We plan to meet this requirement by adding communication capabilities to the existing infrastructure.

**Page 13, Question 1b:** In the Space-Satellite Subcategory, what percent of excess capacity currently exists at Onizuka Air Station?

**Answer:** Currently, there is no excess capacity at Onizuka Air Station. Existing facility shortfalls are met by leasing facility space off station. However, there is excess capacity in the category. It was this excess capacity that had to be addressed and which resulted in the recommendation related to Onizuka AFB.

**Page 13, Question 1b.1: Based on projected future Air Force satellite control requirements, what percent of excess capacity is expected to be found at Onizuka Air Station**

**Answer: Although an excess of one satellite control node was identified in the Air Force process, this excess was not associated with a particular base. Either Onizuka AS or Falcon AFB could support Air Force control node requirements.**

**Page 13, Question 1b.2: Does realignment of Onizuka Air Station leave sufficient capacity to adequately support projected future requirements?**

**Answer: Yes.**

**Page 13, Question 1c:** If the Air Force has one more Satellite control installation than is needed to support projected future requirements, then why did the Air Force not recommend closing Onizuka Air Station?

**Answer:** Onizuka AFS is required to support tenant missions beyond the year 2001 that are not cost effective to relocate to another location. The Air Force's vision is to downsize Onizuka AFS by reliance on contract or civilian operations. It is anticipated that Onizuka AFB will eventually close as tenant missions phase out.

**Page 13. Question 1c.1:** What other tenants would be affected by a decision to close the facility?

**Answer:** Discussion of this subject requires an appropriate security classification.

## Air Reserve Components

**Page 13, Question 1: Secretary Widnall, during the 1993 base closing process, the Air Force identified the basing of Air Reserve Component units as an issue that would be addressed during this round. Further, the size of Air Reserve Component units has recently been reduced. How have you addressed the Air Reserve Component during this round of base closure?**

**Answer:** The base closure and realignment process evaluates Air Force installations, both active and reserve, against the eight selection criteria and the force structure requirements. The Air Force subdivided the Air Force Reserve mission into four weapon system groups: Fighter, Strategic Airlift, Aerial Refueling (Tankers), and Tactical Airlift. Each group was analyzed using the eight criteria, and cost effective closures and realignments identified and analyzed. Two Reserve bases were recommended for closure (Bergstrom ARB, TX and Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS, PA). Additionally, four other Reserve units will be impacted by the current Air Force recommendations.

The Air National Guard (ANG) operates on a cost effective basis on a large number of civilian airfields. We examined ANG bases for cost effective opportunities that made sense for relocation to active Air Force bases as recommended by the Secretary of Defense's kick-off memorandum. Generally, it is impractical for ANG units to cross state lines. The new location's capacity analysis and recruiting factors were also taken into consideration. The Air Force recommended a number of closures of Air Guard Stations, including several that were stand alone installations (North Highland, CA; Ontario AGS, CA), and others that were in leased space at other airfields (Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA; Greater Pittsburgh AGS, PA; Roslyn AGS, NY).

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THIS AGS IS NOT  
CLOSING

**Page 13, Question 1b: How have opportunities to consolidate reserve squadrons been affected by reductions in the size of Air Reserve component units?**

**Answer:** The Air Force Reserve looked for opportunities to consolidate force structure and reduce overall operating costs. The reductions in the size of units reduced the costs of consolidating aircraft such as C-130s from closed units to bases where we previously had a like number of aircraft (Peterson AFB, CO) and at a base where the capacity analysis showed that no military construction (MILCON) would be required (Dobbins ARB, GA). This resulted in an opportunity for the Air Force Reserve to achieve savings.

The Air National Guard (ANG) is a community-based defense force. Therefore, it is imperative the ANG maintain a presence in the communities throughout the nation. Further consolidations of ANG units will erode the importance and magnitude needed to maintain that community based support. Also, with the present force structure, it is still economically viable to retain existing ANG units rather than to combine ANG fighter units. Several units would be at or beyond their maximum capacity if required to absorb additional force structure from overseas or from the active Air Force inventory; therefore, further opportunities to consolidate were not presented.

**Page 14, Question 2: General Fogleman, the Air Force is recommending the transfer of a few Air National Guard units to larger active and reserve bases, such as McClellan and March Air Force Bases in California. Also, the Air Force has recommended the closure of the Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station and the realignment of its eight C-130 aircraft to two other Reserve units. The justification for this action states, "The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 aircraft operating locations than necessary to effectively support the Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan." However, there are many Air Reserve Component units that were not recommended for consolidation. For example, no major Air National Guard unit (as identified in Appendix VI of the Air Force's Analyses and Recommendations) was identified for closure or realignment? Since there appears to be considerable savings to be gained by this type of consolidation of resources, what opportunities exist for further consolidations throughout the Air Reserve Component, especially in the fighter force structure where there have been reductions in the size of the units?**

**Answer:** As the Air Force analysis demonstrates, the Air Force considered a number of closure scenarios involving Reserve or Guard installations. The record also supports the decision involving each potential closure scenario. All reasonably cost-effective and operationally sound closure opportunities were recommended for implementation. Many of the fighter units were located at airports or other locations in very cost-effective situations, such that closures or movements would have been very costly or would have produced lengthy payback periods.

**Page 14, Question 2b: What distinguished the Air Reserve Component units from the Air Force recommended for relocation to other bases as candidates for this action?**

**Answer:** After consideration of the eight selection criteria, the final determination of actions related to ARC bases typically rested on cost-effectiveness, recruiting and retention considerations, and opportunities to consolidate at other locations.

**Page 14, Question 2c: Why was the Air National Guard unit at Pittsburgh International Airport not identified for relocation in light of the fact the Air Force Reserve unit at the same location was recommended for relocation.**

**Answer:** The Air National Guard unit at Pittsburgh International Airport is not collocated with the Air Reserve unit. It is located across the runway from the Air Reserve unit. The ANG unit operates cost effectively and independently of the Air Force Reserve unit. There are no other locations within the State of Pennsylvania to which this unit could be economically relocated.

**Page 14, Question 2d: Since the Air National Guard unit will remain at Pittsburgh International Airport, how will this affect the closure of the Air Force Reserve station at the airport?**

**Answer:** The closure of the C-130 unit at Pittsburgh IAP will have little, if any, effect on the Air National Guard KC-135 unit also located at the airport. Likewise, the continued operations of the Air National Guard unit will have little, if any, effect on the closure of the Air Force Reserve Station.

## Congressional Questions for the Record

Rep Boehlert (NY)

**Page 15, Question 1:** In last weeks testimony before this commission, Defense Secretary Perry described Lowry Air Force Base's reuse plan as a successful consequence of the BRAC process. In the BRAC 95 process, did you consider the communities' reuse plans as a result of previous BRAC closure or realignment decisions? Should already completed , well developed reuse planning efforts be a part of subsequent BRAC decisions?

**Answer:** There is no formal consideration of a reuse plan in the Air Force process. However, past BRAC actions are reflected in the economic impact criterion and its supporting data. Additionally, we are well aware of the past actions at all our installations, and are sensitive to both the reality and perception in the community when multiple actions are taken. On the other hand, the law makes no provision for exempting locations that have been impacted in previous BRAC rounds and in fact requires them to be considered if the remaining activities meet the BRAC threshold.

**Page 15, Question 2: As you know, Griffiss Air Force Base was realigned as part of BRAC 1993. During that process the Air Force stated in a letter to the commission that “the Air Force has no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory within the next five years.” Since then the community has united behind a reuse plan with the lab as its linchpin. Was the impact to the community’s reuse plan taken into consideration in the decision to close Rome Lab?**

**Answer:** There is no formal consideration of a reuse plan in the Air Force process. However, past BRAC actions are reflected in the economic impact criterion and its supporting data. Additionally, we are well aware of the past actions at all our installations, and are sensitive to both the reality and perception in the community when multiple actions are taken. On the other hand, the law makes no provision for exempting locations that have been impacted in previous BRAC rounds and in fact requires them to be considered if the remaining activities meet the BRAC threshold.

At the time of the referenced letter, the Air Force had no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory. The recommendation to close Rome Laboratory is a direct result of the 1995 BRAC analysis.

**Page 15, Question 3: How does the Air Force define interservicing? How was interservicing applied to Air Force labs in total? How did the Air Force apply interservicing to C3I labs?**

**Answer:** Interservicing can take a variety of forms - from collocation of activities to assignment of individuals to joint activities to transfer of responsibility for the function to a single service. The Air Force agreed with the LJCSG and recommended C3I interservicing in the laboratory category consisting of the relocation of a portion of Rome Laboratory to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, for eventual integration with the Army Laboratory. During the BRAC 95 analysis process, other Air Force laboratory activities were offered for interservicing but were not accepted.

**Page 15, Question 4: What criteria did the LJCSG use to determine if excess capacity existed in its labs? In the Air Force, where and to what extent does excess capacity in labs exist?**

**Answer:** Without addressing the method used by the LJCSG, the capacity review was based on man-years, based on demonstrated available capacity versus future requirements. The briefing on lab capacity was provided in the BCEG minutes for the November 9, 1994, meeting. Those minutes note the difficulty of attempting to define a capacity reduction targets because of the diversity in size and variety of missions among the lab facilities. A total of 2,806 man-years of excess lab capacity were identified.

**Page 15, Question 5: Having received the highest ranking of its labs, why did the Air Force decide that Rome Lab was one to be slated for closure?**

**Answer:** Rome Lab did not receive the highest ranking of Air Force Labs. Rather, it was placed in the top tier based on preliminary analysis. Subsequently, the Lab Joint Cross-Service Group requested the Air Force to analyze Rome Lab for closure. We found significant costs that could be avoided by an innovative sharing of the Rome Lab activities between Hanscom AFB and Fort Monmouth. An additional advantage is increased inter-service cooperation. In contrast to the level-playing field analysis in which the tiering was based, we found cost-effective options for a Rome Lab closure after reviewing in depth the Lab Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation.

## Representative Combust (Tx)

### Ranking of Bases

**Page 16, Question 1: The Air Force rated Reese Air Force Base number two among five UPT bases in 1991. What has changed at Reese or at other bases that would make the Air Force rank Reese AFB last, well below its other UPT bases in the 1995 analysis?**

**Answer:** In 1991, the Air Force closed Williams AFB because it was clearly ranked below the retained UPT bases. The information regarding Reese AFB's ranking as #2 cannot be substantiated and did not come from Air Force analysis. There was no tiering done by the Air Force in 1991 to indicate any such ranking. The Pilot Training Subcategory, of which Reese AFB was a member, was excluded from consideration in 1993 based upon capacity analysis. Tiering in 1995 placed bases in one of three tiers to show relative value of the bases to the Air Force. There was no ranking within the tiers.

During the 1995 process the SECDEF created several Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to examine and recommend to the services basing alternatives that could reduce excess capacity. The JCSG for Undergraduate Pilot Training used quantitative analyses to determine the functional value of each pilot training base to perform the mission of producing rated aviators. The JCSG-UPT evaluated each UPT base for several pilot training functions (e.g., primary, airlift/tanker, bomber/fighter, etc) against measures of merit that encompassed the requirements for undergraduate flying training.

In many cases, changes in force structure, facilities, measures of merit, and the cross-service evaluation of categories resulted in different outcomes from previous rounds.

## Quality of Life

**Page 16, Question 1: Reese AFB is the number one choice of student and instructor pilots in AETC for base of assignment. Obviously, they think that the Quality of Life at Reese is better than that at other UPT bases. Why would the Air Force ignore this very clear Quality of Life indicator and recommend Reese AFB for closure?**

**Answer:** Aspects of community support important to military members and their families are measured in the Criterion VII evaluation through a series of objective subelements. There are a number of reasons why people request assignments; it is not a useful measure.

**Page 16, Question 2:** With respect to educational opportunities, Reese AFB in Lubbock Texas is rated below Vance AFB in Enid, Oklahoma. Are you aware that Enid, Oklahoma has one private university with a permanent enrollment of over 700 students? Lubbock, Texas has two private universities, a private college, and Texas Technical University with a permanent enrollment of over 17,000 students, nine undergraduate schools, two graduate schools, and a 1 million volume library. Knowing that one of the important features of an assignment for our highly skilled officer pilots and their talented spouses is the availability of graduate education programs, how is it that the Air Force rated Vance AFB higher than Reese AFB in educational opportunities?

**Answer:** The Education subelement under Criterion VII consists of measuring and grading Pupil Teacher Ratio, Four Year Programs, Honors Programs, College Attendance, and Off-base Education. Reese AFB scored a Red for Pupil Teacher Ratio (Greater than 30 to 1 Pupil to Teacher Ratio in Grades K-12). Reese received Green grades for the remaining elements within the Education subelement, for an overall grade of Green Minus. Vance AFB received all Greens with the exception of a Yellow grade for College Attendance. Vance received an overall Green grade in Education, while Reese's overall grade was Green Minus. The details of the Criteria VII analysis, including data, subelements, and weighted grades are provided in the base questionnaire and the Air Force Report, Volume V of the DoD Report.

## Operations

**Page 16, Question 1: Reese AFB was the choice of the Air Force, the Navy, and the DoD for implementation of Joint Undergraduate Primary Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training of the Air Force. How is it that the Air Force, now in 1995, rates its capability in all of these areas as less than that of Columbus, Randolph, and Vance AFB's?**

**Answer:** All UPT bases underwent a qualitative analysis in regard to Airlift/Tanker and Maritime functional aspects of pilot training. In fact, each base was examined for many functional areas. Measures of merit were derived to judge the effectiveness of each base in each functional area, with the measures weighted slightly differently for the different functions. When the analysis was complete, Reese AFB ranked last by the JCSG-UPT in the Primary and Airlift/Tanker functional areas, and ahead of only Laughlin AFB in the Maritime training function. These analyses were based on data requested by the JCSG-UPT and certified at the base, Major Command and Air Staff levels in accordance with the Air Force Internal Control Plan.

**Page 17, Question 2: Reese and Laughlin AFB's have fully implemented T-1 training and have completed all the facility construction necessary to support that training. Did the Air Force consider the fact that Vance AFB has not implemented T-1 training and has not yet built the necessary T-1 facilities?**

**Answer: Military construction is currently ongoing at Vance AFB to prepare for the arrival of the T-1 aircraft. COBRA cost analysis considered projects as savings if they were programmed in 1996 or beyond.**

**Page 17, Question 3: Did you consider the savings that would accrue from stopping construction and implementation of the T-1 program at Vance?**

**Answer:** No. COBRA cost analysis considered projects as a savings if there were programmed funds in 1996 or beyond. A review of the COBRA data for the level-playing field analysis reveals no MILCON cost avoidance.

**Page 17, Question 4: In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?**

**Answer:** The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

**Page 17, Question 5: Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?**

**Answer:** The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

**Page 17, Question 6: Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighing total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?**

**Answer:** Since this question addresses the internal deliberations of the UPT Joint Group, it will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

## Previous Rankings

**Page 17, Question 1: In the 1991 Base Closure round, Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training bases were reviewed and Reese AFB was rated very highly - number two out of five Air Force bases. What accounts for this disparity?**

**Answer:** The Air Force did not rank the UPT bases in 1991 and cannot substantiate the claimed ranking. However, each round of base closures is independent of other rounds. Different methods of analysis, refined data, changes at the installation level, and force structure changes contribute to a variance in grading from one round to the next.

**Page 17, Question 2: The Air Force itself and the DoD have placed great confidence in Reese AFB by choosing it as: the first base to implement Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first base to receive the new T-1 airlift/tanker training aircraft; the first and only base to implement the Air Force's portion of Joint Primary Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first and only base to do Joint Maritime Training for the Navy in the T-1; and Reese is the Air Force's choice as the first base to receive the new JPATS aircraft. Why would the Air Force want to close its premier UPT base?**

**Answer:** During the 1995 process the SECDEF created several Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to examine and recommend to the services basing alternatives that could reduce excess capacity. A JCSG for Undergraduate Pilot Training was chartered to consider cross-service evaluations of UPT bases. The JCSG used quantitative analyses to determine the functional value of each pilot training base to perform the mission of producing rated aviators. The JCSG-UPT evaluated each UPT base against a number of pilot training functions (e.g., primary, airlift/tanker, bomber/fighter, etc) using measures of merit that encompassed the requirements for pilot training. The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group accepted the JCSG functional value analysis as the basis for the Air Force's Criterion I score. However, the subsequent tiering accomplished by the BCEG was based on an evaluation of all eight DoD criteria. This tiering was provided to the SECAF, who also reviewed the eight criteria grades and data. In addition to the Air Force analysis, the SECAF reviewed the JCSG-UPT alternatives that included the closure of the UPT function at Reese AFB in each alternative.

**Page 18, Question 3: The Air Force analysis rates Reese below three UPT bases (Columbus, Randolph, and Vance) in its ability to perform Primary, Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training. If this is the case, why did the Air Force choose Reese as the first base to perform joint training with the Navy in all three of these categories?**

**Answer:** The analysis referred to was accomplished by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT. The initiation of joint UPT activities significantly preceded BRAC '95 and was the beginning of a joint initiative to consolidate all primary pilot training activities. Reese AFB was just the first of all UPT bases that will participate in such joint activity.

## Quality of Life

**Page 18, Question 1: Reese AFB is the number one choice of preference for base assignment of Student and Instructor Pilots in the Air Force's AETC (confirmed in a statement to the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, February 2, 1995). This kind of choice is made on the basis of Quality of Life. Why would the Department of Defense, newly committed to stressing "people over programs" (John Deutch, 09/94), want to close the base that its personnel rate as the best for Quality of Life?**

**Answer:** Aspects of community support that are important to military members and their families are measured in Criterion VII evaluation through a series of objective subelements. There are a number of reasons why people request assignments; it is not a useful measure.

Page 18, Response to Commentary: Reese and Vance received overall Green Minus grades for the Transportation subelement under Criterion VII. Within the subelement of Transportation, Reese AFB received a Red grade for Public Transportation, and Green grades for the other subelements. The Red grade resulted from the lack of regularly-scheduled public transportation to the base. Vance AFB was graded Green for all of the Transportation subelement, with the exception of a Red for Municipal Airport Carriers. The overall grade reflected a "roll-up" of these grades. Since both bases had three Greens and one Red, and the weighting of these two subelements was equal, both bases received the same overall grade for Transportation.

## Operations - Airspace

**Page 18, Question not numbered: Airspace is one area that was weighted very heavily during this round's analysis. We are firmly convinced that Reese AFB has access to adequate airspace to do its mission and it is unthreatened by encroachment. We are concerned that sheer volume of airspace owned and controlled by each base was emphasized and that usability was not adequately considered. Some bases may own/control more airspace than Reese in terms of sheer volume, however, much of their airspace is unusable for basic Undergraduate Pilot Training. Reese has readily available visual routes and alternate training fields.**

**Answer: The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT. The Air Force process did analyze airspace encroachment under Criterion II. All Air Force UPT bases received a Green score under Encroachment except Randolph AFB, which received a Green Minus.**

## Savings

**Page 19, Question not numbered: The objective of any BRAC process is to save our tax dollars. Reese's T-1 program is fully implemented with all facilities in place. Vance AFB is still constructing their T-1 hangar. Stopping construction would save MILCON dollars.**

**Answer: COBRA cost analysis would consider any halt to MILCON projects as a savings, if the costs were programmed in 1996 or later. Review of COBRA data for the level-playing field analysis at Vance shows no MILCON savings.**

Sen Santorum (PA)

**Page 19, Question 1: The DoD justification for closure of the Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station was that, "although Greater Pittsburgh ARS is effective in supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields." Can you tell me what exactly are the components of "operating costs?"**

**Answer: The following are components of Base Operating Support: Public Affairs; Ground Safety; Administration; Contracting; Comptroller/Budget; CBPO; Civilian Personnel; Supply/Fuels; Transportation; Security/Law Enforcement; Civil Engineering; Fire Protection; MWR; Services/Billeting; Base Operations; Aircrew Life Support; Disaster Preparedness.**

**Page 19, Question 2: Are the costs associated with successfully manning at 110% considered relative to other bases which are below 100% total manning?**

**Answer:** The costs were compiled for requirements, not assigned personnel. This ensures that all organizations are equally evaluated using the same criteria.

**Page 19, Question 3: Are the costs incurred in maintaining a higher state of readiness (exercise, contingency, and humanitarian deployments, etc.) held against the unit in computing “operating costs?”**

**Answer:** No. The operating costs that are considered are fixed irrespective of operations of the unit. The costs are related to the unit’s facilities and operating location arrangements.

Rep Hansen (UT)

**Page 19, Question 1: Did you, or anyone on your staff, receive any communication or guidance from the White House, or anyone associated with the White House, directing you to remove McClellan AFB in California from consideration, foreclosure, or recommending that you devise a plan for Air Logistics Centers that would keep McClellan open?**

**Answer: No.**

Rep Tejeda (TX)

**Page 19, Question 1:** In 1993, the Air Force excluded three bases in the Industrial/Technical Support Category-Product Center and Laboratory Subcategory from further consideration for closure/realignment. Those bases were Brooks AFB, Hanscom AFB, and Los Angeles AFB. The Air Force stated that, "...there is not sufficient excess capacity to close any of these bases without replicating a significant portion of these facilities.. at another location. The cost to do this is prohibitive." What has changed in the past two years that the Air Force now recommends closing Brooks AFB and moving Armstrong Lab and the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine to Wright-Patterson AFB?

**Answer:** Since BRAC 93, the Air Force has been required to absorb major personnel reductions in its acquisition and sustainment workforce. In addition, the work of the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group provided a much more refined analysis for evaluating the excess capacity of DoD laboratory facilities. Finally, excess capacity at Wright-Patterson AFB provides a cost-effective beddown of the activities from Brooks AFB.

Rep Scarborough (FL)

**Page 20, Question 1:** The 1995 Defense Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a Master Plan for the final disposition of all Electronic Combat (EC) facilities before relocating any EC equipment or making any EC realignments. How does the Department of Defense BRAC recommendations to move eight EC threat simulators and two EC pod systems from Eglin Air Force Base, as well as the movement of REDCAP and AFEWES equipment to Edwards Air Force Base, comply with this Congressional directive?

**Answer:** This question will be referred to OSD for response, since it concerns the OSD recommendation and consideration of Authorization Bill provisions.

# Document Separator



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300



20 APR 1995

Mr. Ben Borden  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Borden:

Enclosed is a response to a question for the record submitted to the Air Force by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. We are responding to the question due to its policy perspective.

I trust this information will be useful.

Sincerely,

R.L. Meyer  
Director  
Base Closure

Enclosure

cc: USAF/RT (Col Mayfield)

*P 20, Ques 1  
(Rep. Scarborough response)*



**Question:** The 1995 Defense Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a Master Plan for the final disposition of all Electronic Combat (EC) facilities before relocating any EC equipment or making any EC realignments. How does the Department of Defense BRAC recommendations to move eight EC threat simulators and two EC pod systems from Eglin Air Force Base, as well as the movement of REDCAP and AFEWES equipment to Edwards Air Force Base, comply with this Congressional directive?

**Answer:** The BRAC 95 recommendations to consolidate certain Electronic Combat test and evaluation activities, including a realignment at Eglin AFB, were made pursuant to the requirements of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Section 2903. These recommendations, and the consequent elimination of underutilized infrastructure, are expected to generate a relatively high return on the front-end investment needed to implement the recommendations. The Department believes that making these cost-effective recommendations is not inconsistent with the FY 1995 Appropriations Committee Report language requesting the Department to justify any Electronic Combat test facility consolidations on economic grounds.

# Document Separator

## Representative Montgomery (MS)

**Page 20, Question 1: The Navy testified on March 6, 1995 that there was excess capacity at Air Training Stations. If the pilot training rate is the same for both services in the year 2001 and the Air Force is transferring substantial numbers of Air Force flight officers to the Navy, and the Navy is going from five Air Training Bases to three, how is it that the Air Force can now have after BRAC 95, seven Air Training Bases that include the two additional Air Force Bases conducting flight screening?**

**Answer:** The Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) recommendations for undergraduate flying training reflect sizing by several independent methods. The UPT JCSG determined the infrastructure needed to support total DoD requirements. The Air Force and the Navy completed independent analyses which confirmed they each retained the appropriate level of resources. The Department of the Navy specifically stated it did not need additional training capability. Several facts bear explanation.

There is no single number which represents a "pilot training rate". For example, the JCSG estimated rotary-wing aircraft use less than 20% of the infrastructure of light fixed-wing aircraft per flying operation. In 2001, the rotary-wing track represents about 44% of the Navy-generated advanced track requirements, and less than 4% of Air Force-generated requirements. Primary training (which includes the Navy's T-34 primary and intermediate tracks) is the most directly comparable. The Air Force and Navy are moving toward consolidation in primary training and are exchanging students on a one-to-one basis. Their rotary-wing students as well as fixed-wing students complete primary training. In primary, the Air Force "pilot training rate" is about 30% higher than the Navy rate. Additionally, about a third of the Navy's students only complete 66 hours of primary flight training rather than the 92 hours their counterparts fly. All Air Force students complete the entire track.

Counting "bases" also requires some caveats. The flight screening locations are unsuitable for undergraduate pilot training. Their prospective closure offers limited savings or payback

potential. For example, the Air Force contract flight screening operation at Hondo, Texas, uses the airfield under a no-fee lease. The JCSG considered flight screening sites as outlying fields, not as "bases". This brings a more accurate post BRAC count to five Air Force bases and three Navy bases. Shepherd AFB represents a unique training activity that provides training to a number of foreign aviation students and a limited number of USAF students. Randolph AFB provides no undergraduate pilot training, but instead provides navigation and pilot instructor training. Air Force primary pilot training is accomplished at only four bases, and the 1995 recommendation would decrease this by 25 percent. Also of note, while the Navy realigned the NAS Corpus Christi UPT mission, they retained the runway and airspace capacity. In fact, they propose to extend one NAS Corpus Christi runway to further increase capacity to service NAS Kingsville UPT requirements.

In summary, the BRAC recommendations reflect a confluence of joint and Service analyses. The Air Force and the Navy have retained the infrastructure they require to accomplish their respective missions.

## New Mexico Delegation

**Page 21, Question 1: How much money was appropriated for military construction at Kirtland AFB for fiscal years 1994 and 1995? How does this compare with other Air Force bases and facilities, scheduled for closure or realignment in the 1995 BRAC?**

**Answer:** In FY94 Air Force military construction appropriated for Kirtland AFB was \$35.1M. For FY95 the amount was \$10.5M, for a total for the two years of \$45.6M. Military construction at all other Air Force bases recommended for closure or realignment in this Commission for both FY94 and FY95 is \$164.4M. I must emphasize that in the vast majority of these cases this military construction funding remains necessary and a high priority because it is taking place at realigned bases.

**Page 21, Question 2: According to the Air Force's proposal for the 1995 BRAC, Kirtland AFB has tenants, both Air Force and non-Air Force, which will require continued support. Would there exist recurring costs if the Air Force had transferred the Space and Missile Systems Center and Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB and closed Los Angeles Air Force Base.**

**Answer:** The Air Force examined a closure of Los Angeles AFB, but determined that this was not a viable option due to a loss of its interconnectivity with the aerospace community and excessive costs for the savings. Since no focused analysis was accomplished on the closure of Los Angeles AFB with a move to Kirtland AFB, that information is unavailable.

**Page 21, Question 3: Is there any plan in existence determining which facilities at Kirtland AFB, to be abandoned as a result of realignment, will be turned over to other government agencies or private enterprise? Will the existing fence perimeter be altered?**

**Answer:** The details of property disposal, transfer, and reuse will be worked out in a cooperative process among the Air Force, the community, and the remaining activities at Kirtland AFB. The goal of that process will be to effectively and efficiently accommodate the needs of all affected parties. The issue of the fence perimeter will be addressed in that process.

**Page 21, Question 4: By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, had the Air Force consulted with DOE as to the effect of realignment on the Department's nuclear deterrence mission and/or the fiscal impact of the realignment of the DOE with respect to nuclear deterrence programs? Did the Air Force receive any response from the DOE? Was the response in writing?**

**Answer:** The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult with DOE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Under the DoD COBRA guidance, costs of actions to other agencies are not normally included in the calculations. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Page 22, Question 5: By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, had the Air Force consulted with DOE or Sandia National Laboratories as to the effect of realignment on Sandia National Laboratories? Did the Air Force receive any response from the DOE or Sandia? Was the response in writing?**

**Answer:** The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult informally with DOE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Page 22, Question 6: By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, did the Air Force consult with all of Kirtland's scheduled remaining tenants, both Air Force and non-Air Force, about the effect of the realignment on their respective missions and the fiscal cost to them of the realignment? Did the Air Force receive any responses? Were they in writing?**

**Answer:** The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult with some agencies, both Air Force and non-Air Force, during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on those agencies. Under the DoD COBRA guidance, costs of actions to other agencies are not normally included in the calculations. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Page 22, Question 7: By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, did the Air Force consult with the Department of Veteran's Affairs about the effect of no longer supporting the joint Air Force-Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Albuquerque? Did the Air Force receive any response? Was it in writing?**

**Answer:** The Air Force did not consult with the Department of Veteran's Affairs prior to submitting its recommendations to the Department of Defense. The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult with some agencies, both Air Force and non-Air Force, during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on those agencies. Under the DoD COBRA guidance, costs of actions to other agencies are not normally included in the calculations. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Page 22, Question 8: By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, did the Air Force consult with the City of Albuquerque on the effect of the withdrawal of the Air Force crash-fire support to the Albuquerque International Airport? Did the Air Force receive any response? Was it in writing?**

**Answer:** The Air Force did not consult with the City of Albuquerque prior to making its recommendations to the Department of Defense. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with those affected by the Kirtland recommendation to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Page 22, Question 9: By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense, did the Air Force consult with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy about the effect of removing the Field Command of the Defense Nuclear Agency from Kirtland? Did the Air Force receive any response from the Assistant to the Secretary? Did he address the adverse impact on DNA's mission of separating the Field Command from DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office and Sandia and Los Alamos Laboratories?**

**Answer:** The Air Force did not consult with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy concerning its recommendations at Kirtland. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

The Air Force Special Assistant for Base Closure and Transition contacted senior leadership in DNA relative to the proposed Air Force action at Kirtland AFB. Air Force was advised by DNA that relocation was not as preferred as remaining at Kirtland but could be accomplished in a workable manner with a small contingent remaining as liaison with DOE. Impacts on DNA's mission were discussed and weighed.

**Page 23, Question 10: Was it appropriate to categorize Kirtland AFB as a Laboratory and Product Center when the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory represents only a small fraction of the installation work force?**

**Answer:** Installations were categorized according to their predominant Air Force mission. The Phillips Laboratory operation is the primary mission of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB. No other category more accurately characterizes the operations of the base.

**Page 23, Question 11: Wouldn't it have been more appropriate to look at Kirtland AFB as a federal installation with significant Department of Defense and Department of Energy activities, rather than as an Air Force Laboratory and Product Center.**

**Answer:** The BRAC law requires that all military installations with 300 or more DoD civilian authorizations be reviewed for closure or realignment. Characterization of this installation as a non-Air Force facility would have been inconsistent with the law. All installations were categorized according to their predominant Air Force mission. The Phillips Laboratory operation is the primary mission of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB. No other category more accurately characterizes the operations of the base. The value of the other DoD and federal activities was duly recognized, and was in fact the basis for retaining those activities in their present facilities.

**Page 23, Question 12: An Air Force justification indicates that the Sandia and Phillips Laboratories can be cantoned. Does the cantonment plan envision cantoning the 60 square miles of specialized testing and storage areas and facilities used by both laboratories? Was the cost of such an extensive cantonment properly assessed?**

**Answer:** The implementation plan for the realignment has not been finalized. On-site surveys will further refine the projected costs of the proposal in the BRAC analysis process. We believe that the cantonment requirements can be met with reasonable costs as projected in our analysis. If the recommendation regarding Kirtland becomes law, the Air Force will work cooperatively with the community, the other agencies at Kirtland AFB, and other interested activities to ensure that the ultimate plan accommodates the reasonable needs of those parties.

**Page 23, Question 13: With respect to the move of the 58th Special Operations Wing, what are the total costs for relocating this wing? How much of these costs are associated with moving the flight simulators?**

**Answer:** The Air Force estimated a cost of approximately \$109 M in military construction, including housing, for the move to Holloman. Of that expense, \$5.95M was for construction of simulator facilities. The \$109M figure does not include \$9.6M in projects currently funded for Kirtland for simulator facilities. These projects will be transferred to Holloman under the Air Force recommendation. An additional expense of \$3M will be incurred for shipment of the simulators from Kirtland to Holloman.

**Page 23, Question 14: Does your estimate of the cost savings of realigning Kirtland include the new security cost for the 898th Munitions Support Squadron, whose mission is control and security of nuclear weapons? Are these security forces costed as high-quality police with special training equipment and procedures or as the standard security forces associated with a normal Air Force Base?**

**Answer:** There is no new security requirement. Instead, the military personnel of the security police will be converted to the appropriate level of civilian personnel, with necessary training and equipment. Since we have security personnel at many of our installations with special weapon responsibility or other sensitive concerns, we are confident the quality and training of these personnel will be sufficient.



ECONOMIC SECURITY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301 3300



APR 1995

Mr. Frank Cirillo  
Air Force Team Leader  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Cirillo:

Attached are responses from the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training regarding questions for the record which were submitted to the Air Force by the Commission.

I trust this information is useful.

Sincerely,

R. L. Meyer  
Director  
Base Closure

Attachment





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



March 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, BASE CLOSURE AND UTILIZATION

SUBJECT: Commission Questions for the Record

The response to your request for answers to the BRAC Commission questions for the record regarding the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional analyses is provided as Attachment One.



Louis C. Finch  
Chairman

Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachment:  
1. Qs & As







**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

February 6, 1995

Honorable John H. Dalton  
Secretary of the Navy  
The Pentagon, Room 4E686  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Next month the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will begin a series of hearings on the Defense Department's recommendations to close or realign military installations in the United States. I would like to invite you, Admiral Boorda, General Mundy, and other appropriate members of your staff to present the Department of the Navy's 1995 closure and realignment recommendations to the Commission on Monday, March 6, 1995.

Your testimony should summarize the process used by the Navy to develop its closure and realignment recommendations; the implementation schedule, the costs and the expected savings from your recommendations; and the relationship between your recommendations and the Navy's current and projected force structure and training requirements. Your testimony should also address the role that the Joint Cross Service Groups played in the development of the Navy's recommendations to consolidate common functions across the military services and highlight any specific proposals in this area.

This hearing will be the first opportunity for the Commission and members of the public to hear the details of the Navy's 1995 closure and realignment recommendations. You should anticipate specific questions from the Commission about each of the closure and realignment recommendations which you are proposing.

As you know, the 1995 round of base closings is the final round authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. In light of this fact, I intend for this Commission to recommend to the Defense Department and the Congress a process for the closure and realignment of military bases in the future. I hope you, Admiral Boorda, and General Mundy will give the Commission your views on this important question.

The hearing will be held in Room 345 of the Cannon House Office Building at 9:00 a.m. Please provide 100 copies of your opening statement to the Commission staff at least two working days prior to the hearing. If your staff has any questions, they should contact Mr. Alex Yellin of the Commission staff.

I look forward to your testimony.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alan J. Dixon". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Alan" and last name "Dixon" clearly distinguishable.

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman



**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

February 6, 1995

Honorable Sheila E. Widnall  
Secretary of the Air Force  
The Pentagon, Room 4E871  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Madam Secretary:

Next month the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will begin a series of hearings on the Defense Department's recommendations to close or realign military installations in the United States. I would like to invite you, General Fogleman, and other appropriate members of your staff to present the Department of the Air Force's 1995 closure and realignment recommendations to the Commission on Monday, March 6, 1995.

Your testimony should summarize the process used by the Air Force to develop its closure and realignment recommendations; the implementation schedule, the costs and the expected savings from your recommendations; and the relationship between your recommendations and the Air Force's current and projected force structure and training requirements. Your testimony should also address the role that the Joint Cross Service Groups played in the development of the Air Force's recommendations to consolidate common functions across the military services and highlight any specific proposals in this area.

This hearing will be the first opportunity for the Commission and members of the public to hear the details of the Air Force's 1995 closure and realignment recommendations. You should anticipate specific questions from the Commission about each of the closure and realignment recommendations which you are proposing.

As you know, the 1995 round of base closings is the final round authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. In light of this fact, I intend for this Commission to recommend to the Defense Department and the Congress a process for the closure and realignment of military bases in the future. I hope you and General Fogleman will give the Commission your views on this important question.


The hearing will be held in Room 345 of the Cannon House Office Building at 1:30 p.m. Please provide 100 copies of your opening statement to the Commission staff at least two working days prior to the hearing. If your staff has any questions, they should contact Mr. Frank Cirillo of the Commission staff.

I look forward to your testimony.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alan J. Dixon". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Alan" written in a large, looping script.

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman



Department of Defense  
1995 List of Military Installations  
Inside the United States for Closure or Realignment

**Part I: Major Base Closures**

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**Army**

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Fort McClellan, Alabama  
Fort Chafee, Arkansas  
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado  
Price Support Center, Illinois  
Fort Ritchie, Maryland  
Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan  
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey  
Seneca Army Depot, New York  
Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania  
Red River Army Depot, Texas  
Fort Pickett, Virginia

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**Navy**

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Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska  
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California  
Ship Repair Facility, Guam  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland  
Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania

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**Air Force**

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North Highlands Air Guard Station, California  
Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, California  
Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York  
Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York  
Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, Ohio

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania  
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas  
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas  
Reese Air Force Base, Texas

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**Defense Logistics Agency**

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Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee  
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah

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**Part II: Major Base Realignments**

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**Army**

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Fort Greely, Alaska  
Fort Hunter Liggett, California  
Sierra Army Depot, California  
Fort Army Depot, California  
Fort Meade, Maryland  
Detroit Arsenal, Michigan  
Fort Dix, New Jersey  
Fort Hamilton, New York  
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania  
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania  
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico  
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah  
Fort Lee, Virginia

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**Navy**

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Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida  
Naval Activities, Guam  
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington

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**Air Force**

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McClellan Air Force Base, California  
Onizuka Air Station, California  
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida  
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia  
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana  
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico  
Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota  
Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma  
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas  
Hill Air Force Base, Utah

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**Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignment,  
Disestablishments or Relocations**

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**Army**

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Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, California  
East Fort Baker, California  
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California  
Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut  
Big Coppert Key, Florida  
Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland  
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland  
Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts  
Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts  
Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), Missouri  
Fort Missoula, Montana  
Camp Kilmer, New Jersey  
Caven Point Reserve Center, New Jersey  
Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey  
Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York  
Fort Totten, New York  
Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, North Carolina  
Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginia  
Camp Bonneville, Washington  
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), West Virginia

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Navy

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Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast  
Division, San Diego, California  
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California  
Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California  
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California  
Naval Underwater Warfare Center-Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London,  
Connecticut  
Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam  
Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana  
Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland  
Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi  
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment,  
Warminster, Pennsylvania  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast  
Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia  
Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, Virginia  
Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia

Navy Marine Reserve Activities

Naval Reserve Centers at:

Huntsville, Alabama  
Stockton, California  
Santa Ana, Irvine, California  
Pomona, California  
Cadillac, Michigan  
Staten Island, New York  
Laredo, Texas  
Sheboygan, Wisconsin

Naval Air Reserve Center at:

Olathe, Kansas

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:

New Orleans, Louisiana (Region 10)  
Charleston, South Carolina (Region 7)

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**Air Force**

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Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, California  
Real-Time Digitally controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York  
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

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**Defense Logistics Agency**

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Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta, Georgia  
Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton, Ohio  
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio  
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania  
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas

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**Defense Investigative Service**

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Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird, Maryland

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**Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC Recommendations**

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**Army**

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Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland

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Navy

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Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California  
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California  
Naval Air Station Alameda, California  
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California  
Naval Training Station, San Diego, California  
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida  
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida  
Naval Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida  
Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida  
Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam  
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii  
Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan  
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia  
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia  
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.  
Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C.

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Air Force

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Williams AFB, Arizona 91 *stam*  
Lowry AFB, Colorado 91 90  
Homestead AFB, Florida (301st Rescue Squadron) 93 *switch 90*  
Homestead AFB, Florida (726th Air Control Squadron) 93 *storm switch*  
MacDill AFB, Florida 91 *add*  
Griffiss AFB, New York (Airfield Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division) 93 90  
Griffiss AFB, New York (485th Engineering Installation Group) 93 *switch*

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
Defense Logistics Agency

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Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, California

# 1995 DoD Recommendations Major Base Closures

● NAS, Adak




# 1995 DoD Recommendations Major Base Realignment

■ Fort Greely




## Legend

- Army (12)
- ★ Air Force (10)
- Navy (4)



## CHARTER

- A. Official Designation: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
- B. Objective and Scope of Activity: In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, there is hereby established a Presidential advisory committee entitled the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which shall review the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense regarding base closures and realignments for the time periods and by the dates set down in the Authorization Act. The Commission shall transmit a report of its findings and conclusions to the President, based upon a review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations in the United States.
- C. Period of Time Required: This Commission shall continue to function until December 31, 1995, as specified in the Act.
- D. Official or Sponsoring Proponent to Whom the Commission Reports: The Commission shall report directly to the President, and provide copies of its reports to the congressional defense committees.
- E. Support Agency: The Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, shall provide administrative and related support for the Commission.
- F. Duties and Responsibilities: The Commission will be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress, the President shall designate one such individual to serve as Chairman of the Commission. The functions of the Commission are outlined in B. above and amplified in the Act.
- G. Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Manyears: It is estimated that the annual operating costs for the Commission for the calendar years 1991 through 1995 will average \$2.65 million. Funding for the operation of the Commission will be appropriated and obtained from the DoD Base Closure Account 1990, as specified in the Act.
- H. Number of Meetings: The Commission will meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995. During each of those years it will meet as needed, upon the call of the Chairman, to meet the functions and the responsibilities outlined in B. above and amplified in the Act. Ad hoc panels and staff working groups will perform research and analysis functions, as necessary, to carry out the responsibilities of the Commission.
- I. Termination Date: The Commission will terminate on December 31, 1995. This charter will be renewed every two years from the date of its establishment, consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
- J. Date Charter is Filed: \_\_\_\_\_



**PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE  
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

- Rule 1      The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission ("Commission") was established in Title XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510 as amended. The Commission's operations shall comply with the Act and with these Procedural Rules.
- Rule 2      The Commission's meetings, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public. In other respects, the Commission shall comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. app2.
- Rule 3      The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.
- Rule 4      The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman or at the request of a majority of members of the Commission serving at that time.
- Rule 5      When the Commission meets to consider (a) the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense ("Secretary") submitted under section 2903(c) of Pub. L. No. 101-510, as amended, (b) the Commission's report to the President under section 2903(d) including the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations, or (c) a revised list of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations under section 2903(e), a quorum shall consist of a majority of the Commission members serving at that time. When the Commission conducts public hearings on the Secretary's recommendations under section 2903(d) (1), a quorum shall consist of one or more members designated by the Chairman.
- Rule 6      When the Commission meets to consider (a) the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense ("Secretary") submitted under section 2903(c) of Public Law No. 101-510, as amended, (b) the Commission's report to the President under section 2903(d), or (c) a revised list of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations under section 2903(e) and a QUORUM has been established, a vote shall be required of the Commission to dispense with any of the above responsibilities or to ratify any actions of the Commission. The adoption of any action taken by the Commission with regard to responsibilities (a), (b), or (c) stated above will be by a majority vote of Commission members serving at that time. Commissioners may vote in person or by proxy in accordance with Rule 9. The resolution of all other issues arising in the normal course of the Commission meetings or hearings, etc. will be by a simple majority of the Commissioners present.

Rule 7 The Chairman shall preside at meetings and public hearings of the Commission when he or she is present. In the Chairman's absence, he or she shall designate another member of the Commission to preside.

Rule 8 The Chairman (or another member of the Commission presiding in the Chairman's absence) shall have the authority to ensure the orderly conduct of the Commission's business. This power includes, without limitation, recognizing members of the Commission and members of the public to speak, imposing reasonable limitations on the length of time a speaker may hold the floor, determining the order in which members of the Commission may question witnesses, conducting votes of members of the Commission, and designating Commission members for the conduct of public hearings under section 2903(d)(1).

Rule 9 A member of the Commission may designate another member to vote and otherwise act for the first member when he or she will be absent. The first member shall issue a written proxy stating the specific or limited purpose for which the proxy can be exercised.

Rule 10 These rules other than those required by statute may be amended by the majority vote of the members of the Commission serving at that time.

Rule 11 Public and all interested parties may submit written testimony for the record.

**Oath to be administered to all witnesses testifying before the  
Commission:**

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?




**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1995 ORGANIZATION CHART**

**COMMISSIONERS**


|                                       |                         |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Staff Director</b>                 | David Lyles             |
| <b>Executive Director</b>             | Charles Smith           |
| <b>Military Assistant</b>             | Col. Wayne Purser, USAF |
| <b>Sr. Exec. Asst to the Chairman</b> | Britta Brackney         |

|                          |                 |
|--------------------------|-----------------|
| <b>General Counsel</b>   | Madelyn Creedon |
| <b>Special Assistant</b> | Christy Still   |
| <b>Counsel</b>           | Ralph Kaiser    |
| <b>Counsel</b>           | Elizabeth King  |



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS  
1995 ORGANIZATION CHART**

**DIRECTOR**  
Ben Borden ——— Rob Kress



1 Detailee from General Accounting Office  
 2 Detailee from Department of Defense  
 3 Detailee from Federal Aviation Administration  
 4 Detailee from Environmental Protection Agency  
 5 Detailee from Department of Commerce



## SUPER 25 LIST

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Greg Dahlberg

**Rep. Barbara Vucanovich**

Chairman

Subcommittee on Military Construction

Committee on Appropriations

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Staff Contact: Irene Schecter



# March 01 - 31, 1995

## EVENT CALENDAR (as of 3/2)

| Sunday                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Monday                                                                            | Tuesday                                                                          | Wednesday | Thursday                                                                  | Friday    | Saturday  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
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| <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="7">February</th> </tr> <tr> <th>S</th> <th>M</th> <th>T</th> <th>W</th> <th>T</th> <th>F</th> <th>S</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>4</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>6</td> <td>7</td> <td>8</td> <td>9</td> <td>10</td> <td>11</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>13</td> <td>14</td> <td>15</td> <td>16</td> <td>17</td> <td>18</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19</td> <td>20</td> <td>21</td> <td>22</td> <td>23</td> <td>24</td> <td>25</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> <td>27</td> <td>28</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="7">April</th> </tr> <tr> <th>S</th> <th>M</th> <th>T</th> <th>W</th> <th>T</th> <th>F</th> <th>S</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>4</td> <td>5</td> <td>6</td> <td>7</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> <td>10</td> <td>11</td> <td>12</td> <td>13</td> <td>14</td> <td>15</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16</td> <td>17</td> <td>18</td> <td>19</td> <td>20</td> <td>21</td> <td>22</td> </tr> <tr> <td>23</td> <td>24</td> <td>25</td> <td>26</td> <td>27</td> <td>28</td> <td>29</td> </tr> <tr> <td>30</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> |                                                                                   |                                                                                  | February  |                                                                           |           |           |  |  |  | S | M | T | W | T | F | S |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |  | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |  |  |  |  | April |  |  |  |  |  |  | S | M | T | W | T | F | S |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 |  |  |  |  |  |  | <b>1</b><br>9:00 AM HRG.(Sec. Perry), SD-106<br>1:30 PM HRG. (Gotbaum), SD-106 | <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>4</b> |
| February                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                                                   |                                                                                  |           |                                                                           |           |           |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| S                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | M                                                                                 | T                                                                                | W         | T                                                                         | F         | S         |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                   | 1                                                                                | 2         | 3                                                                         | 4         |           |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 6                                                                                 | 7                                                                                | 8         | 9                                                                         | 10        | 11        |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 12                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 13                                                                                | 14                                                                               | 15        | 16                                                                        | 17        | 18        |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 19                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 20                                                                                | 21                                                                               | 22        | 23                                                                        | 24        | 25        |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 26                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 27                                                                                | 28                                                                               |           |                                                                           |           |           |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| April                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                   |                                                                                  |           |                                                                           |           |           |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| S                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | M                                                                                 | T                                                                                | W         | T                                                                         | F         | S         |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                   |                                                                                  |           |                                                                           |           | 1         |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 3                                                                                 | 4                                                                                | 5         | 6                                                                         | 7         | 8         |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 9                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 10                                                                                | 11                                                                               | 12        | 13                                                                        | 14        | 15        |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 16                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 17                                                                                | 18                                                                               | 19        | 20                                                                        | 21        | 22        |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 23                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 24                                                                                | 25                                                                               | 26        | 27                                                                        | 28        | 29        |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| 30                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                   |                                                                                  |           |                                                                           |           |           |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| <b>5</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <b>6</b><br>9:00 AM HRG.(Navy), Cannon 345<br>1:30 PM HRG.(Air Force), Cannon 345 | <b>7</b><br>9:00 AM HRG.(Army), SD-106<br>1:30 PM HRG.(Defense Agencies), SD-106 | <b>8</b>  | <b>9</b>                                                                  | <b>10</b> | <b>11</b> |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| <b>12</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <b>13</b>                                                                         | <b>14</b>                                                                        | <b>15</b> | <b>16</b><br>9:00 AM HRG.(Re-use), SH-216<br>1:30 PM HRG.(Re-use), SH-216 | <b>17</b> | <b>18</b> |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| <b>19</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <b>20</b>                                                                         | <b>21</b>                                                                        | <b>22</b> | <b>23</b>                                                                 | <b>24</b> | <b>25</b> |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |
| <b>26</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <b>27</b>                                                                         | <b>28</b>                                                                        | <b>29</b> | <b>30</b>                                                                 | <b>31</b> |           |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |       |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                |          |          |          |

# April 01 - 30, 1995

## EVENT CALENDAR (as of 3/2)

| Sunday | Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday                                        | Friday | Saturday |
|--------|--------|---------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|----------|
|        |        |         |           |                                                 |        | 1        |
| 2      | 3      | 4       | 5         | 6                                               | 7      | 8        |
| 9      | 10     | 11      | 12        | 13                                              | 14     | 15       |
| 16     | 17     | 18      | 19        | 20<br>9:30 AM HRG.(GAO)<br>1:30 PM HRG.(Re-use) | 21     | 22       |
| 23     | 24     | 25      | 26        | 27                                              | 28     | 29       |
| 30     |        |         |           |                                                 |        |          |

March

| S  | M  | T  | W  | T  | F  | S  |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    |    | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  |    |
| 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 |
| 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 |
| 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |    |

May

| S  | M  | T  | W  | T  | F  | S  |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    |    | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  |
| 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 |
| 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 |
| 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |    |    |

# May 01 - 31, 1995

## EVENT CALENDAR (as of 3/2)

| Sunday | Monday | Tuesday                      | Wednesday                     | Thursday | Friday | Saturday |
|--------|--------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|--------|----------|
|        | 1      | 2                            | 3                             | 4        | 5      | 6        |
| 7      | 8      | 9<br>DELIBERATIONS<br>(ADDS) | 10<br>DELIBERATIONS<br>(ADDS) | 11       | 12     | 13       |
| 14     | 15     | 16                           | 17                            | 18       | 19     | 20       |
| 21     | 22     | 23                           | 24                            | 25       | 26     | 27       |
| 28     | 29     | 30                           | 31                            |          |        |          |

April

| S  | M  | T  | W  | T  | F  | S  |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  |
| 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 |
| 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |
| 29 | 30 |    |    |    |    |    |

June

| S  | M  | T  | W  | T  | F  | S  |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  |
| 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 |

# June 01 - 30, 1995

## EVENT CALENDAR (as of 3/2)

| Sunday | Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday           | Thursday            | Friday           | Saturday         |
|--------|--------|---------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|
|        |        |         | 1                   | 2                   | 3                |                  |
|        |        |         | 7                   | 8                   | 9                | 10               |
|        |        |         | 14                  | 15                  | 16               | 17               |
|        |        |         | HEARINGS (Cong.)    | HEARINGS            | DELIBERATIONS    | DELIBERATIONS    |
|        |        |         | 21                  | 22                  | 23               | 24               |
|        |        |         | DELIBERATIONS       | DELIBERATIONS       | DELIBERATIONS    | DELIBERATIONS    |
|        |        |         | 28                  | 29                  | 30               |                  |
|        |        |         | COMMISSIONER REVIEW |                     |                  |                  |
|        |        |         | 27                  | 28                  | 29               | 30               |
|        |        |         | DELIBERATIONS       |                     |                  |                  |
|        |        |         | 26                  | 27                  | 28               | 29               |
|        |        |         | DELIBERATIONS       | COMMISSIONER REVIEW |                  |                  |
|        |        |         | 25                  | 26                  | 27               | 28               |
|        |        |         | 18                  | 19                  | 20               | 21               |
|        |        |         | 11                  | 12                  | 13               | 14               |
|        |        |         | HEARINGS (Cong.)    | HEARINGS (Cong.)    | HEARINGS (Cong.) | HEARINGS (Cong.) |
|        |        |         | 4                   | 5                   | 6                | 7                |

May

| S  | M  | T  | W  | T  | F  | S  |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  |
| 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
| 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 |
| 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |    |    |    |

July

| S  | M  | T  | W  | T  | F  | S  |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    |    |    |    |    |    | 1  |
| 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  |
| 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 |
| 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 |
| 30 | 31 |    |    |    |    |    |