UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE RECORD

1. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Robles that you would provide a list of those criteria used by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group to constrain the linear programming model from presenting nonsensical results. Please provide these criteria.

2. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Cornella that Flight Screening was "basically" included as a matter of completeness. For the record, please respond to the following question:

Why did you include Flight Screening, a function not now nor envisioned to be done at UPT bases, but did not include Introduction to Fighter Fundamental (IFF) training, a function that is done at UPT bases, in the scope of your analysis?

3. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Davis asked how much surge capacity exists in each service. Please respond to this question in terms of capacity to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather, and also in terms of capacity to accommodate an increase in the Pilot Training Rate in the event of a long-term increase in pilot requirements.

4. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Robles requested that each Service provide data summarizing the costs to train pilots. Please include in this information the fixed costs for Base Operating Support (BOS), Real Property Management Account (RPMA), Overhead and Personnel at each UPT base, and the variable costs which vary by the number of students and flight hours/sorties flown. These costs should reflect only the portion attributable to UPT for the installations that also host other tenant units.

5. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated that in order to achieve uniformity when making comparisons between the services, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group drafted rules used by the FAA to measure airfield operations capacity at each UPT base. Please provide the formula that the FAA uses and how these rules were applied by your group.

6. General Blume, during your testimony, you stated you would provide answers to several questions relating to weather. Please respond to the following questions:

Why was the percent of time at which the ceiling and visibility are better than 1000 feet and 3 miles given any weight in the analysis when it is 1500 feet and 3 miles that represents a key weather decision factor in conducting Air Force flight training operations?

In tracking weather attrition, factors such as actual attrition experience, cancellations due to forecast icing conditions, and the occurrence of crosswinds out of limits can be used. Why was so much weight placed on crosswinds rather than some of these other factors in the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group functional value analysis?

The T-38 attrition rate planning factor at Reese is 28 percent compared to 17 percent for the T-1. Since the T-1 factor is currently in use at Reese, why did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group use the T-38 instead of the T-1 planning factor in its functional value analysis?

7. Mr. Nemfakos, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Davis that you would provide for the record your analysis on Strike Pilot Training Rates. Please provide that general data along with your response to the following specific questions:

Are the flight operations per strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) at NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville used in your capacity analysis the same? Please explain any differences.

What is the current operations per strike Pilot Training Rate at NAS Kingsville? How does this compare with the figure used to determine strike Pilot Training Rate capacity at NAS Kingsville?

To what extent was the Navy's determination that a single intermediate/advanced strike UPT base containing sufficient capacity to conduct training to support the strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) in the future and under surge operations based upon the availability of NAS Corpus Christi as an outlying field?

What is the maximum strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) that NAS Kingsville could support with Orange Grove and NAS Corpus Christi available as outlying fields?

To what extent would the strike training capacity of NAS Kingsville be impacted if NAS Corpus Christi was not available?

8. Mr. Finch, your optimization analysis apparently placed primary emphasis on the installation military value data provided to you by the services, and less emphasis on the functional values developed by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group.

Please explain the reasoning for this approach?

9. Mr. Finch, your Joint Cross-Service Group minutes of March 24, 1994, state that the UPT category is largely installation oriented. If the value of a UPT base is best reflected in its functional rather than military value, why didn't you base your alternatives on model output which maximized functional value unconstrained by installation military value?

Since there is a direct correlation between the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional value rating and the Air Force's determination of military value, didn't the use of both functional and military value in the model simply increase the impact of functional value in the result?

10. General Blume, since the Air Force relied so heavily on the results of the Joint Cross-Service Group's computer model, did you analyze the model for calculation errors?

11. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos, your Service recommendations used your own BRAC process as well as non-BRAC policy decisions to chose which UPT bases to close or realign. Why didn't your recommendations necessarily reflect the high functional value scores from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group?

12. Gen Blume, the average functional value for each Air Force UPT base is shown (the Reese score is adjusted based on your recent memo to us).

Columbus AFB	6.74
Vance AFB	6.67
Randolph AFB	6.53
Laughlin AFB	6.50
Reese AFB	6.22

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) apparently used the functional values from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group. These averages were used to find military value by performing a standard deviation analysis to assign a color "Stop Light" code to Criteria I, "Flying Mission Evaluation." All eight criteria were then considered to derive an overall Air Force ranking: the result was Tier I for Columbus, Laughlin, Randolph, and Vance, and Tier III for Reese.

Why didn't the Air Force simply use the functional value for the training that is actually accomplished at each specific UPT base to determine its score? Would the result have been different?

13. Mr. Finch, did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group run any excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model, such as the ones shown on below:

a. Examining only Air Force Bases
b. Examining only Naval Air Stations
c. Excluding flight screening
d. Excluding Navy-unique functional areas
e. Excluding Air Force-unique functional areas
f. Changing the weights on various factors, such as airspace

What would the results be if these excursions were run?

14. Mr. Finch, what were the options you considered for measuring capacity, and why did you choose the methods you did?

15. Mr. Finch, a separate functional value for the Air Force's post-UPT Introduction to Fighter Fundaments (IFF) training was not included among the 10 functional areas selected for assessing the overall functional value of each UPT-category base.

Even though it is conducted after "Wings" are awarded, IFF is conducted at a UPT base, consumes capacity, and is similar in content to training events contained within the latter stages of the Navy's Strike Training syllabus.

Why didn't the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group include IFF as an additional functional area?

16. General Blume, did the Air Force consider transferring the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals training from Columbus AFB to another location such as Luke AFB in order to increase the capacity to do other training at Columbus?

17. Mr. Finch, in the consideration of training airspace for both capacity analysis and functional value, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group methodology permitted a base to claim credit for large sectors of airspace so long as any portion of it was within 100 nautical miles of the base. For bases near the Gulf of Mexico, this meant credit for huge over-water sectors.

Both Air Force and Navy UPT programs train predominantly over land. This is to permit such over-land flight training events as ground reference maneuvers and low level navigation. Over-water training is performed close to shore. Since actual UPT practice precludes the use of large blocks of over-water airspace, doesn't giving credit for such over-water airspace unfairly skew the results in favor of coastal bases?

18. Mr. Finch, did either the Services or the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider the impact of contracting some UPT functional training areas to outside sources?

19. General Blume, does closing Reese AFB leave sufficient capacity in the UPT area to provide for surge capability in pilot training?

20. Mr. Finch, all of your alternatives move the Navy's helicopter training to Fort Rucker. There are several different ways to implement this alternative. For example, the Navy could retain their current helicopter training process and be collocated at Fort Rucker as an Army tenant; or the Navy's pilots could be integrated into the Army training through a consolidation. Did the Joint Cross Service Group consider the issue of consolidation vs. collocation when developing its alternatives?

21. Mr. Finch, the Navy responded to your alternatives to close Whiting Field with COBRA analyses that showed a high cost of implementing the move of primary training to Naval Air Station Pensacola and helicopter training to Fort Rucker.

Did the UPT-Joint Cross Service Group look at variations to this scenario, such as the relocation of helicopter training to Fort Rucker with primary training remaining at Whiting Field?

22. Mr. Nemfakos, would moving helicopter training out of Whiting Field help the Navy meet its requirement for outlying fields for primary training?

Does your answer change when considering the transition to any of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft?

23. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) record states that the reason for rejecting the movement of helicopter training to Fort Rucker is the high one-time cost and long return on investment.

Did operational concerns also enter into this decision or was it strictly an economic decision?

24. General Blume, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) choose Reese AFB to close?

25. Mr. Nemfakos, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) choose NAS Meridian to close?

26. Mr. Finch, please discuss the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

What alternatives or "strawmen" did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider?

What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

What cost advantages were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

27. Mr. Nemfakos, if the redirect of mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi is not approved, what impact would that have on the operations per day available for pilot training at Corpus Christi?

How much do other flight operations at Corpus Christi reduce daily operations available for pilot training?

28. Mr. Finch, will Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) increase or decrease the number of bases required for UPT training?

29. Mr. Finch, what was the impact of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)-related issues on the group's assessment of functional value?

What specific facility and airspace requirements were used to determine Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) functional values?

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

Questions submitted by Congressman Smith:

1. Since the Navy has recommended relocating the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC) from Lakehurst, NJ, to Pensacola, do you envision recreating the Carrier Aircraft Launch and Recovery System (COLASSES) at Pensacola or do you expect to disassemble, package, ship and reinstall those devices that are critical to training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers?

2. At what cost do you envision recreating the unique aircraft flight training facility in Pensacola?

3. Do facilities exist at Pensacola for the housing of the Lakehurst NATTC students?

4. What type of delay or disruptions are anticipated or planned for in the training of these aircraft carrier student pilots while the training facility is disassembled, moved and recreated in Pensacola?

Questions submitted by Senators Shelby and Heflin and Congressman Everett:

1. In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in there entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed wing training at Whiting NAS.

a. Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Rucker was not adopted?

b. Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft. Rucker?

c. From an efficiency, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary wing training deducted at one location?

2. On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing the, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama." He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Fort Rucker is less than $18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker would save at least $79 million dollars over 5 years.

a. Is this savings estimate still valid today?

3. In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary wind aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

a. From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

4. During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

a. Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

5. In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was asked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed wing and rotary wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

a. Each of these points has been satisfied, yet DoD only adopted the fixed wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary wing training ignored?

6. Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

A number of Army missions in support of Naval operations:

1983: Operation Urgent Fury
*Shipboard operations involving the Army's 18th Airborne Corps: UH-60's. OH-58A/C's, AH-1's

1987: Operation Prime Chance
*Shipboard and overwater operations involving the Army's 4/17th CAV (now 4/2) with OH-58D's
*valid CONOPS mission today

1994: Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti
*10th Mountain Division operated from the USS Eisenhower
*OH-58D's had extensive missions prior to invasion
*UH-60's, CH-47's, OH-58A/C's and AH-I's transported troops and equipment to the AO for several days, followed by command & control missions

Each Army Aviation unit has a task for shipboard operations incorporated in their mission essential list of tasks. The Army trains for shipboard operations and performs shipboard operations.

7. In 1992, MGen. Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a "cutting" tool for students.

a. Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra "cutting" tool?

b. Could the Navy use the Army's training syllabus that places student pilots directly into the rotary wing pipeline?

8. According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Fort Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting Field NAS."

a. Is there a problem with congestion at Whiting Field, both in the air and on the ground? If so, would relocation of the Navy's Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program free up space at Whiting Field?

b. How does Fort Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?

c. Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Fort Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

Document Separator

M E M O R A N D U M

DATE: April 8, 1995

TO: Attendees at 8 April UPT Discussion

FROM: Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader

RE: UPT Discussion Questions

We have attached a list of questions which should be considered as a point of departure for today's discussion. The main thrust of the discussion, I would imagine, is to go over the Air Force input into the UPT JCSG and to cover the functional analysis factors/ weighting and use - not only by the JCSG but by the BCEG - and in particular if the method is sound from an Air Force perspective.

The attached questions will more than likely be modified and used during the 17 April Hearing. Additionally the DBCRC intends to do some independent analysis excursions and today's discussions should facilitate that effort.

fc

AIR FORCE UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING QUESTIONS

1. Please discuss the 10 Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) functional areas (flight screening, primary pilot, airlift/tanker, advanced bomber/fighter, strike/advanced E-2/C-2, advanced maritime/intermediate E-2/C-2, helicopter, primary and intermediate Naval Flight Officer (NFO), advanced NFO strike, and advanced NFO panel). How were they determined? How were they weighted?

2. Did you agree fully with the Joint Cross-Service Group's (JCSG) selection of functional areas? If not, why not?

3. How did the JCSG build and use these factors?

4. How did the JCSG use the Linear Programming Optimization Model as a tool to limit the number of feasible base closure alternatives?

5. In the JCSG/UPT Student Resource Calculation, the average functional value for the Air Force UPT bases resulted in the following tiering:

Columbus AFB	6.65
Vance AFB	6.50
Randolph AFB	6.46
Laughlin AFB	6.36
Reese AFB	6.08

   The Air Force color coded Criteria I in its evaluation based on a standard deviation analysis of those averages. The Department of the Air Force's Analyses and Recommendations, Vol. V, on the other hand, ranks Columbus AFB, Laughlin AFB, Randolph AFB, and Vance AFB in Tier I. Do the functional scores represent your perception of the mission capability of the UPT bases?

6. The functional average of the highest Air Force UPT base was equivalent to the lowest ranking Navy UPT base. What are the implications?

7. What did the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training (JCSG/UPT) do right? In your view, what, if anything, should the JCSG/UPT have done differently?

8. What is your view of how the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) used the JCSG alternatives to develop its closure recommendations?

9. To your knowledge, what did the Base Support Analysis Team (BSAT) do differently in its analysis compared with the Air Force's analysis?

10. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission staff plans to conduct some excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model. Do you have any

suggestions regarding what the Commission staff should examine? What are your views on the following options:

- examining only Air Force bases;
- excluding flight screening;
- separating "flying training" factors from other factors, such as a 300 foot-wide runway; and
- excluding Navy-unique functional areas?

11. In our excursions, do you recommend that we consider any other factors or change the relative weights in a way that more accurately reflects Air Force requirements?

12. In your view, how far should the Commission go in defining base closure and realignment options in terms of selecting bases for closure and realignment of base functions?

13. The Lubbock, Texas, community offered to purchase and then lease back to the Air Force Reese AFB family housing as well as a 40,000 square foot hangar at Lubbock International Airport. What is the status of these offers? [NOTE: The BCEG representative might want to discuss this issue.]

14. The JCSG/UPT described UPT capacity in a certain way. Please compare the relative merits of various ways to describe the capacity of UPT bases, such as:

    - operations per hour;
    - the high-water peak pilot training rate (PTR);
    - FAA-normalized operations (an FAA formula or procedure that measures airport capacity, taking into account such factors as weather conditions, runway configuration, traffic mix (takeoffs/landings versus touch/go), and runway availability (i.e., night/day runways); and
    - differences in Navy versus Air Force operations.

15. How can capacity analysis best account for factors that influence capacity historical data, but are not readily apparent, such as shortages in the following areas:

    - aircraft maintenance;
    - instructor pilots;
    - primary student graduates feeding into the next level; and
    - weather?

    How do you account for the operational savvy of one base's operations group commander versus another base's commander?

16. Joint primary training is just a beginning in the process of "jointness." How far can the Air Force and the other Services go in the following areas:

- consolidating similar functions on one base or base complex, such as conducting strike and bomber/fighter training at Columbus AFB or a NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex;
- operating a Navy TA-4 squadron on an Air Force base;
- consolidating all joint primary training in such western bases as NAS Kingsville, Laughlin AFB, Reese AFB, and Vance AFB to exploit favorable weather and airspace; and
- consolidating all joint primary training in such eastern bases as at NAS Meridian, NAS Pensacola, NAS Whiting, and Columbus AFB to permit all helicopter training to be consolidated at Ft. Rucker, thus freeing up NAS Whiting to receive fixed-wing aircraft to exploit available auxiliary fields and airspace?

17. It appears the actual UPT bases selected for realignment or closure were service-specific selections not related to joint training or syllabus. Please discuss this selection process.

18. In your view, what is the best way to judge the quality of a base's airspace, for example:

    - by functional area (primary versus strike and bomber/fighter);
    - by use versus control; or
    - by potential versus actual use?

19. Other UPT bases own or control more airspace than Reese AFB, but much of this airspace is unusable for UPT activities. Is Reese AFB down-graded because it lacks actual ownership and control of required airspace--even though access to the airspace it uses for UPT training activities is unimpeded and despite of the lack of an encroachment problem?

20. If we find, after correcting for factual errors, that Reese AFB scores improve placing it into the yellow/green areas, then how would you recommend the Commission proceed in selecting a UPT base for closure?

21. Is the Air Force ignoring a key quality of life indicator that (1) Reese AFB is the number one choice of assignment by student and instructor pilots in AETC, (2) Reese AFB's accessibility is enhanced by its proximity to a large international airport, and (3) Reese AFB offers clearly superior higher education opportunities?

22. Please discuss, in detail, the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

    - What alternatives or "strawmen" did the JCSG/UPT consider?
    - What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS/Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

- What cost advantages, if any, were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

23. Should the Air Force transfer Columbus AFB to the Navy and move the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training to Luke AFB?

24. Did the JCSG/UPT consider NAS Meridian a potential transfer to the Air Force, which would allow the Air Force to close another UPT base?

25. If Reese AFB is closed, then where is the Air Force planning to transfer joint Air Force and Navy primary training?

26. A lot has been learned about conducting joint primary training at Reese AFB. How was this experience factored, weighted, or considered in the analysis to close a UPT base?

27. What was the impact, if any, on Criterion I grading of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)-related issues?

Merrill Beyer and Mark Pross/Air Force Team and Jim Brubaker/Navy Team/April 7, 1995

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

8 APR 1995

Mr. Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Cirillo:

Attached are responses from the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training regarding questions for the record which were submitted to the Air Force by the Commission.

I trust this information is useful.

Sincerely,

R. L. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

Attachment

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

March 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, BASE CLOSURE AND UTILIZATION

SUBJECT: Commission Questions for the Record

The response to your request for answers to the BRAC Commission questions for the record regarding the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional analyses is provided as Attachment One.

Louis C. Finch
Chairman
Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachment:
1. Qs & As

1. QUESTION: In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?

ANSWER: The analysis did not restrict airspace credit to the volume a base owned or controlled.

2. QUESTION: Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?

ANSWER: Usable or useful airspace is a key ingredient to the training mission. The existence of other special use airspace can add flexibility or the ability to accommodate expansion and/or mission changes.

3. QUESTION: Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighting total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

ANSWER: Assigning weights in the model was one of the Groups biggest challenges. All members agreed that airspace should be heavily weighted, so the discussion centered on what types of airspace to credit. In the end, the Group reached and implemented a consensus.

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Attachment

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A follow-up

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR AIR FORCE REGARDING REESE AFB

- GENERAL:

  - Why did the Air Force use portions of the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis results for its Flying Training Missions evaluation and the Navy did its own separate analysis to determine military value and which Navy base to close?

BCEG

  - Has the Air Force scrubbed the Joint Cross Service Groups D-PAD model for calculation errors? The BRAC Commissioners and staff have been advised that there are instances of incorrect formulas and incorrect results being used in the ranking of bases.

- MANAGED TRAINING AREAS:

  - Why did Reese AFB get a "No" answer on the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis when asked if they had "Alert Airspace controlled/owned by the installation that supports training?" This response cost them points in the evaluation of several functional areas. Reese AFB does own and control Alert Airspace which is used for training.

- WEATHER:

  - Why was percent of time ceiling and visibility better than 1,000 ft. and ceiling of 3 miles given weight in addition to 1,500 ft. and 3 miles; isn't 1,500/3 the key weather factor for Air Force operations? Isn't the important factor for Air Force operations the measurement of ceilings and visibility greater than 1,500/3 which is the key decision point in Air Force training operations?

  - Why was so much weight placed on crosswinds in the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis? Is it the largest cause of weather cancellation/rescheduling? Aren't significant numbers of sorties lost due to forecast icing vs. actual crosswinds?

  - Why was so little weight put on actual attrition experience in the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis and very heavy weight put on a single weather measurement (crosswinds) and on planning factors which contain other non-weather related loss factors such as maintenance and operations losses? Isn't attrition experienced an overall measure of a base's performance?

- Why was the T-38 planning factor used in lieu of the T-1 planning factor currently being used by Reese AFB in the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis? Didn't this unduly penalize Reese AFB considering that their T-38 planning factor is 28% versus a current planning factor for the T-1 of approximately 17%?

- AIRSPACE AND FLIGHT TRAINING AREAS:

  - The BRAC Commissioners and staff were advised during the Site Visit that the Air Force found discrepancies in the airspace data for Reese AFB and Vance AFB. Since discrepancies were found in airspace available for training for these2two bases, did the Air Force review the other Air Force UPT bases? If they did, what were the results?

  - The BRAC Commissioners and staff were also informed during the Site Visit that the Air Force found a discrepancy with the count of Military Training Routes (MTRs) for Reese AFB versus the count used in the functional analysis (14 in latest review versus 9 reported in the analysis). Has the Air Force reviewed the counts for the other bases? If so, what were the results?

  - CAPACITY Why did the Air Force measure the distance to airspace available for training to the leading edge of the airspace instead of the geographic center to better reflect the actual flying distance required to reach working blocks of airspace?

  - Why did the Air Force place so much weight on the total number of MTRs? Wouldn't it cause problems for scheduling time on these training routes if there were lots of MTRs in the local area used by other bases (i.e., makes it more difficult to deconflict traffic)?

  - Why if Vance AFB had 32 MTRs within 100 nm of its base did it find it necessary to create 4 new routes to accommodate the T-1?

- AIRFIELDS:

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LARRY COMBEST
19TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

CHAIRMAN
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

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LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

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SUITE 205
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AMARILLO, TX 79110-3626
(806) 352-3946

April 7, 1995

Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Beyer III
Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Colonel Beyer:

I would like to forward the enclosed questions for your consideration regarding the Joint Cross Service Working Group's Functional Analysis and its effect on Reese Air Force Base.

I certainly appreciate your willingness and dedication to fully analyze this very difficult set of issues. Please call on me or my staff if we can be of any further assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Larry

Larry Combest

LC/rdl
Enclosure

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950410-17

FROM: COMBEST, LARRY	TO: BEYER, MERRILL
TITLE: REP. (TX)	TITLE: AF DOD ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: REESE AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR. COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER		X	
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

[redacted] QUESTIONS REGARDING THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE WORKING GROUP'S FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS.

Due Date: 950412	Routing Date: 950410	Date Originated: 950407	Mail Date:

LARRY COMBEST
19TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

CHAIRMAN
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

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Larry

Larry Combest

LC/rdl
Enclosure

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR AIR FORCE REGARDING REESE AFB

- GENERAL:
  - Why did the Air Force use portions of the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis results for its Flying Training Missions evaluation and the Navy did its own separate analysis to determine military value and which Navy base to close?
  - Has the Air Force scrubbed the Joint Cross Service Groups D-PAD model for calculation errors? The BRAC Commissioners and staff have been advised that there are instances of incorrect formulas and incorrect results being used in the ranking of bases.
- MANAGED TRAINING AREAS:
  - Why did Reese AFB get a "No" answer on the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis when asked if they had "Alert Airspace controlled/owned by the installation that supports training?" This response cost them points in the evaluation of several functional areas. Reese AFB does own and control Alert Airspace which is used for training.
- WEATHER:
  - Why was percent of time ceiling and visibility better than 1,000 ft. and ceiling of 3 miles given weight in addition to 1,500 ft. and 3 miles; isn't 1,500/3 the key weather factor for Air Force operations? Isn't the important factor for Air Force operations the measurement of ceilings and visibility greater than 1,500/3 which is the key decision point in Air Force training operations?
  - Why was so much weight placed on crosswinds in the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis? Is it the largest cause of weather cancellation/rescheduling? Aren't significant numbers of sorties lost due to <u>forecast</u> icing vs. actual crosswinds?
  - Why was so little weight put on actual attrition experience in the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis and very heavy weight put on a single weather measurement (crosswinds) and on planning factors which contain other non-weather related loss factors such as maintenance and operations losses? Isn't attrition experienced an overall measure of a base's performance?

- Why was the T-38 planning factor used in lieu of the T-1 planning factor currently being used by Reese AFB in the Joint Cross Service Group Functional Analysis? Didn't this unduly penalize Reese AFB considering that their T-38 planning factor is 28% versus a current planning factor for the T-1 of approximately 17%?

- AIRSPACE AND FLIGHT TRAINING AREAS:

  - The BRAC Commissioners and staff were advised during the Site Visit that the Air Force found discrepancies in the airspace data for Reese AFB and Vance AFB. Since discrepancies were found in airspace available for training for these2two bases, did the Air Force review the other Air Force UPT bases? If they did, what were the results?

  - The BRAC Commissioners and staff were also informed during the Site Visit that the Air Force found a discrepancy with the count of Military Training Routes (MTRs) for Reese AFB versus the count used in the functional analysis (14 in latest review versus 9 reported in the analysis). Has the Air Force reviewed the counts for the other bases? If so, what were the results?

  - Why did the Air Force measure the distance to airspace available for training to the leading edge of the airspace instead of the geographic center to better reflect the actual flying distance required to reach working blocks of airspace?

  - Why did the Air Force place so much weight on the total number of MTRs? Wouldn't it cause problems for scheduling time on these training routes if there were lots of MTRs in the local area used by other bases (i.e., makes it more difficult to deconflict traffic)?

  - Why if Vance AFB had 32 MTRs within 100 nm of its base did it find it necessary to create 4 new routes to accommodate the T-1?

- AIRFIELDS:

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Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950412-17

FROM: EVERETT, TERRY	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (AL)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION(s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
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MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
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DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER		X	
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES				MERRILL BEYER	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SUBMITTING QUESTION FOR APRIL 17 JOINT CROSS-SERVICE WORKING GROUP HEARING CONCERNING CONSOLIDATING PRIMARY HELICOPTER TRAINING BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY.

Due Date: 950414	Routing Date: 950412	Date Originated: 950412	Mail Date:

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 12, 1995

Please refer to this number when recording 95042-17

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you prepare for your April 17th hearing on the Joint Cross-Service Working Groups' involvement in the Pentagon's base closure and realignment recommendations, we would be most appreciative if you would raise a number of issues with regard to the consolidation of undergraduate pilot training. Enclosed are a number of questions that you and the commissioners may want to put before the witnesses.

We applaud the addition of the joint cross-service working groups into the base closure process. They provided a new and important analysis that considered jointness and the consolidation of roles and missions. Unfortunately, in the case of undergraduate pilot training, the Pentagon acted on only half of the mission. While they agreed that introductory fixed wing training operations could be consolidated between the Air Force and the Navy, the Pentagon chose not to act on the recommendation to consolidate primary helicopter training between the Navy and the Army. We believe that this is a grave mistake, and a missed opportunity to provide the American taxpayer with significant cost savings.

Mr. Chairman, we can no longer afford unnecessary duplications in the military when more efficient and equally effective training arrangements are available. The consolidation of primary helicopter training is long overdue, and we hope that you and the other commissioners will consider this opportunity during your deliberations of the 1995 base closure process.

With best regards, we are

Sincerely yours,

Terry Everett
TERRY EVERETT, MC

Richard Shelby
RICHARD SHELBY, USS

Howell Heflin
HOWELL HEFLIN, USS

Proposed Questions

BRAC 95 HEARING ON JOINT CROSS-SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

17 APRIL 1995

In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. **Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.**

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in there entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed wing training at Whiting NAS.

- Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Rucker was not adopted?
- Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft. Rucker?
- From an efficiency, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary wing training deducted at one location?

On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama". He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Fort Rucker is less than $18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker would save at least $79 million dollars over 5 years.

- Is this savings estimate still valid today?

In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

- From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

- Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was tasked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed wing and rotary wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

- Each of these points has been satisfied, yet DoD only adopted the fixed wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary wing training ignored?

Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

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* How does Fort Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?

* Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Fort Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

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House Committees:
Agriculture
National Security
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Congressional Peanut Caucus

Congressman Terry Everett
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(202) 225-2901

Alabama Offices:
Montgomery (334) 277-9113
Dothan (334) 794-9680
Opp (334) 493-9253

U.S. House of Representatives

Congressman Terry Everett

Second Congressional District of Alabama

FAX MESSAGE

DATE: 4/12

TO: Ed Brown

FROM: Wade Heck

PAGE 1 of: 4

If you have any problem with this transmission, please contact sender at (202) 225-2901.

NOTES: As per your conversation with Vicki Siegel.
Thanks for your help.

NOTICE: This fax is intended only for the exclusive use of the recipient. If unable to deliver this fax to the recipient listed above, please notify the sender of this fax at (202) 225-2901, Office of Congressman Terry Everett.

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 12, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

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17 APRIL 1995

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THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
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S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

The Honorable William "Mac" Thornberry
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number
950327-11 R1

Dear Representative Thornberry:

Thank you for your letter urging the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to examine the model the Air Force used in making its recommendation for closure of Reese Air Force Base. I appreciate your strong interest in the Commission and its process.

You may be certain that the Commission staff is actively reviewing the Secretary of Defense's recommendation for Reese as well as its analysis of Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) bases. The Commission intends to hold a hearing on April 17, 1995, in Room 216 of the Hart Senate Office Building which will examine the Joint Cross Service Group's analysis of UPT bases. The UPT portion of the hearing will begin at 1 P.M.

You can be assured that the information you have shared with the Commission will be utilized during the review and analysis process.

Again, thank you for your letter. Please do not hesitate to contact the Commission whenever you believe we can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:js
ECTS#: 950327-11

Document Separator


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NORMAN
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R-246
R-248
REESE 1
REESE 2
REESE 3
REESE 4
REESE 5
LUBBOCK
PORTALES
LITTLEFIELD
CROSBYTON
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
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CME
Artesia
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Carlsbad FSS
Carlsbad
Cavern City Air Terminal
CNM
Lea Co-Zip Franklin Mem
Industrial Airpark
Lea Co/ Hobbs
HOB
Lea Co IJAL
JNK
Winkler Co
Hereford Muni
Dimmitt Muni
Tulia
Hale Co
PVW
Littlefield Muni
Abernathy Muni
Floydada Muni
Lubbock Regional
LBB
Reese AFB
Levelland Muni
Terry Co AF Aux
Slaton Muni
Post-Garza Co Muni
Terry Co
T-Bar
Lamesa Muni
Andrews Co
BGS
Big Spring
Winston Field
Colorado City AF AUX
Sweetwater Muni
Midland Airpark
MAF
Ector Co
Midland Regional
Amarillo Air Terminal
AMA
Tradewind
Perry Le Fors Field
Shamrock Muni
McLean-Gray County
Clarendon Muni
Hollis Muni
Childress Muni
CDS
Altus Muni
Altus AFB
Olustee Muni
Tipton Muni
Sayre Muni
Clinton-Sherman
SYO
Mignon
Laird Muni
Elk City Muni
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Cordel Muni
Hobart Muni
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VR-1107

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THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950419-21

FROM: SCARBOROUGH, JOE	TO: DIXON
TITLE: U.S. REP. (FL)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER		X	
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING APRIL 17TH HEARING CONCERNING JCSG-UPT.

Due Date: 950422	Routing Date: 950419	Date Originated: 950417	Mail Date:

JOE SCARBOROUGH
1ST DISTRICT, FLORIDA

NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515–0901

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April 17, 1995

950419-21

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

The attached information is in response to the questions you asked Department of Defense officials at the April 17, 1995 Joint Cross-Service Group hearing on Undergraduate Pilot Training. This information should be submitted for the official record. I hope this sheds some additional light on the issue of consolidation of helicopter training.

Sincerely,

Joe Scarborough
Member of Congress

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

THE CASE FOR USING FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT IN ROTARY-WING PILOT TRACK SELECTION AND TRAINING

CORM issues related to aviation infrastructure require another review of the issues surrounding helicopter pilot training and the Navy practice of using initial fixed-wing training to select and train all student naval aviators, including those that eventually select for rotary-wing pipelines. Although a number of attempts have been made, by both services, to consolidate helicopter training, a recent joint Navy/Army study determined that the current *"proven format meets Department of the Navy service requirement and is presently the least costly approach to producing Navy helicopter pilots."*

In determining training requirements, the Navy first determines what the mission requirements are for a graduate. Ultimately a graduate must be ready for a mission, or the next phase of training, the first time he/she sets foot in the aircraft. The Navy/Marine Corps undergraduate helicopter pilot training (UHPT) program is based on the requirements for a fleet naval aviator.

The Department of the Navy has long believed that providing common primary fixed-wing flight training to all Navy and Marine Corps pilots provides a benefit that significantly exceeds the cost. This belief was validated by a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study published in January, 1994. The CNA study concluded that *"If pipeline assignments are made without using primary flight scores, then quality distributions in the fixed- and rotary-wing pipelines will shift"* and *"Splitting the current Navy primary into two separate tracks, rotary primary and fixed-wing primary, could increase attrition if current standards are maintained. Attrition would be higher in each track than in the present-unified primary and thus would be higher overall."* This increased attrition must be accounted for in the Navy training flight hour budget. Increasing attrition will increase the cost of training and require increased accessions. In addition, the study forwards the following training considerations:

"The motor skills and learned responses needed to fly helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes in forward flight are almost exactly the same...These skills are transferable."

"Flying helicopters in hover mode is different from flying them in forward flight mode. From a training standpoint, it is sensible to first teach rotary-wing pilots forward flight in a fixed-wing trainer. Student pilots can then move to helicopters where they acquire specialized flight skills."

"Some flight training, particularly navigation and instrument flying, involves skills that are not specific to a particular type of aircraft."

The Air Force also supports the concept of undergraduate, primary fixed-wing training for its helicopter pilots. In December 1992 the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force stated, *"...fixed-wing training before rotary-wing training produces a better trained helicopter pilot for less money."* Though the Air Force previously has not afforded early-on fixed-wing training to their helicopter pilots, leaving that option to provide Air Force helicopter pilots that training later at its fixed-wing transition school at Vance AFB, Oklahoma, the Air Force has now decided to provide the training up front with the implementation of Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) program. SUPT also provides the Air Force a tool for track classification in a system identical to the Navy's current practice.

Looking to the future, the lines between fixed and rotary-wing aircraft begin to blur. The DoN plans to replace much of its Marine Corps CH-46 fleet with the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. This vehicle is unique in that it combines flight characteristics of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. A Marine Corps study has shown that the most effective means of training V-22 pilots is through a hybrid of fixed and rotary-wing training.

In addition, combat helicopter design is now incorporating performance qualities essential for modern warfare heretofore only witnessed in fighter or attack aircraft. As these designs become more advanced, and helicopters are employed in missions such as air-to-air combat, the proper three-dimensional situational awareness training, currently provided only by fixed-wing trainer aircraft, must be afforded these crewmembers. Given present trainer aircraft limitations, and the path by which known trainer aircraft procurements are proceeding, only fully aerobatic trainers such as the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) or the T-34C will be capable of integrating these skills. Neither the Navy TH-57 nor the Army TH-67 is able to accomplish this degree of maneuvering. Pushing this training to a later point in the training pipeline, using advanced helicopters, would increase the cost to train since operating costs for more advanced helicopters are 3 to 4 times more than the T-34C or JPATS. Additionally, the attrition rate normally experienced during the aerobatic phase of training would now be experienced after a greater amount of time and money has been invested in the student.

Cost of training is always an issue to be weighed against requirements. The Navy T-34C is the least costly flight trainer in DoD and its use results in the Navy having a lower curriculum flight training cost than other services. The impact of operating costs for JPATS remains to be determined following source selection and testing.

SUMMARY

Fixed-wing primary training remains a valuable commodity in undergraduate naval aviation training, and in many cases is critically necessary. This practice for Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard primary training was endorsed by CJCS in the February, 1993 "Report on Roles and Missions." Currently, the T-34C is the least costly trainer, including helicopters, to operate. However, once a JPATS candidate has been selected and system testing refines current preliminary JPATS operating cost estimates, the issue will need to be revisited to determine what amount of fixed-wing instruction should continue within the Navy's rotary-wing training pipeline. The issue has numerous options including retaining T-34C assets for a portion of Navy primary flight training.

1. *The Marine Corps strongly supports preserving Naval Aviation Helicopter Training at NAS Whiting.*

The Army will not be able to train Naval Service Rotary Wing pilots to the standards that the Naval Services have come to expect. **The bottom line on this plan is, if the Naval Services lose cognizance over their undergraduate helicopter pilot training philosophy and unique infrastructure at NAS Whiting, it would have to reconstruct them in their Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) at much higher costs to train .** The Army plan does not address quality of training and is simply asserting that, because the Army owns the majority of the Nation's helicopter assets, it should control them all.

2. *The Marine Corps does not support moving any Naval Service Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training to Fort Rucker, AL.*

To understand what this proposal would do for the Naval Service Rotary Wing training, one must look at the Army's training philosophy. Army training is designed to produce a large number of pilots in the shortest possible time. The Warrant Officer Training Course lasts about nine weeks, consisting of basic aviation ground school and basic military skills. Leadership training is not emphasized. Army warrant officer pilots are skilled technicians, not commissioned officer leaders. **The Army produces what the Naval Services would consider conditionally qualified pilots with minimum flight time and very basic skills.** Newly designated pilots are expected to perform only as copilots under the supervision of a senior warrant officer for the next few years. This training philosophy may work well for the Army, but is contrary to Naval Service requirements that have junior officers operating with rapidly increasing levels of responsibility as part of small detachments at sea.

a. Other areas of concern with Army training:

- Army instrument flight training is directed to the FAA minimum of 50 hours and Army pilots are not normally expected to intentionally fly IFR. Student Naval Aviators fly over 140 hours of IFR in both the aircraft and simulator (80 hr simulator/60 hr in A/C). **To transfer training from flight school to the FRS would increase cost by about 400% per hour.**

- Other costs shift to the FRS to compensate for reduced flight training. Army pilots get wings with about 150 flt hrs and 30 simulator hours vice Naval Aviators 208 flight hours and 80 simulator hours. This training delta would have to be compensated somewhere in Naval Service training.

- Aviators graduating from Army flight training would have to receive significant training in the FRS (more cost shifting to FRS) on the "service unique missions" that the Army would not teach at Fort Rucker.

- Facilities at Fort Rucker are not the quality of NAS Whiting. Contrary to the Army statements, significant MILCON will be needed to consolidate the training (eg., movement of

simulators and helicopters). Also, the quality and capacity of Rucker family housing is of concern.

3. *The Army plan omits the revolutionary emergence of the V-22 and tiltrotor technology.*

As stated before, the Army has no interest in tiltrotor aviation, the future of Marine medium lift aviation and the Corps' largest vertical lift requirement. The Army sees aviation future in helicopters only. The lead on all aspects of tiltrotor maintenance, training, and doctrine lies with the Marine Corps.

a. Aspects of the Tiltrotor Technological Revolution

- MV-22 training/conversion. The Army institutional focus is helicopter only. From the Army's point of view, only helicopters can serve the Army's requirements. The Marine Corps anticipates no assistance/proponency from the Army to assist in MV-22 requirements.

- Tiltrotor technology itself will force helicopter users (DoD and civil) to reevaluate the way helicopters are used and which aircraft suit the vertical assault mission. The tiltrotor is in a position to replace all helicopter functions in all but the "heavy lift" (HMH) mission.

- The size of the initial buy, including the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, forces the DoD to reevaluate flight training for this A/C (who, how, where, and why). Again, the Marine Corps has the lead.

- Tiltrotor is able to take on the light attack helicopter and aerial observation mission with a single airframe. Tiltrotor could eventually fill all Marine Corps helicopter missions, except HMH. This could make moot the Army's flight training, vis-a-vis the Naval Services.

4. *The Marine Corps feels that service requirements should drive this discussion, rather than prospective economic savings.*

The Marine Corps is unequivocal in its position on this topic. Consolidation may benefit the Army, but it would greatly reduce the quality of training for the Naval Services, effecting both operational readiness and safety.

Train Like You Fight!

The United States military must concentrate on how to train the best capable pilot predicated on mission requirements and economics, but never solely on economics.

The United States Army and Navy each conduct their own respective helicopter flight training programs for a very good reason...the ultimate combat environment that each services operates in is inherently different, demanding an emphasis on different aviation skills appropriately learned in their respective aviation programs. "Train Like You Fight", is a reality based on 85 years of flight training experience. What differentiates Army and Navy Helicopter Flight Training is not the quality of the student, instructors or aircraft but the ultimate combat environment that each service operates in and the respective missions that its aviators are expected to accomplish.

The Army Helicopter pilot is trained to support the Army mission on land, i.e. "in the field". Consequently, their training programs logically emphasize the day/night contact (with visual reference to the horizon) flying under VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) rules, ground contact environment in which they operate. Their training necessarily emphasizes low-level tactical flying/navigation, slope and confined area landings/takeoffs, tactical formation flying and night vision goggle training. Their instrument flying qualification is consequently designed to meet only minimum FAA requirements. Upon graduation, the Army helicopter pilot has accumulated 157 hours of actual flight time plus an additional 30 hours in flight simulators.

The Navy Helicopter Flight Training Program is conducted first in a fixed-wing T-34C then in the TH-57 helicopter. Both syllabuses are instrument intensive, emphasizing day/night Instrument Meteorological Condition (IMC rules), reflecting the capricious all weather environment in which Navy ships with their assigned aircraft operate. The Primary fixed-wing phase enables the Navy to accelerate the student pilots adaptation to an instrument environment by teaching unusual attitudes, out-of-control flight and acrobatic flight thus facilitating consequent three-dimensional situation awareness that can only be achieved by training in a fully acrobatic fixed-wing aircraft. Also compelling is the fact that future military aircraft combine the flight characteristics of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft as in the V-22 Osprey and the AV8B Harrier.

Obviously, Navy pilots fly at sea. In order to assure the ultimate accomplishment of their helicopter missions and because they often operate in areas of the world that do not have navigation aides, Navy ships create and maintain their own Instrument Air Traffic Control System comprised of shipborne TACANS, RADAR and Aircraft Controllers aboard every ship in the fleet at sea. Ships in Navy Battle Groups are tactically widely dispersed at sea often experiencing diverse weather phenomena at the same time. Consequently, Navy Helos frequently fly IFR while conducting their daily routine missions whatever the tactical environment.

Upon graduation, the Navy Helicopter Pilot will have accumulated a total of 208.4 hours of actual flight time plus an additional 80.1 hours in flight simulators. Of the total 208.4 actual flight hours, 87.5 actual flight hours (42%) are instrument flight hours. Additionally 50% of the academic syllabus (191 hours) is devoted to instrument training.

Thus the Navy truly fulfills the ideal...TRAIN LIKE YOU FIGHT!...thereby producing a superbly trained helicopter pilot able to accomplish the mission.

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
AVIATION MANPOWER AND TRAINING BRANCH
CNO-N889

FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

DATE: 27 APR 95

FROM: LCDR JEFF HESTERMAN, N889F3
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TO: NAME: LCOL BRUBAKER
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FAX: 696-0550

REMARKS:
Sir,
This is a draft of the paper that we are giving to Mr. Nemfakos. I don't anticipate too many (if any) changes.

V/R,

Jeff

TOTAL PAGES: 6 (PLUS COVER)

DRAFT

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED QUESTIONS FOR
BRAC 95 HEARING ON JOINT CROSS-SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS
UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

Comment: In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training (UHPT) at Ft Rucker.

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in their entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Ft Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed-wing training at Whiting NAS.

Response: The recommendation from the Joint Cross Service Group was to <u>co-locate</u> training, not consolidate. Co-location was chosen due to significant differences between services in training requirements.

Question: Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Rucker was not adopted?

Response: The recommendation was to co-locate training at Ft Rucker. A move to co-locate results in re-creating NAS Whiting Field at Ft Rucker. The large cost to move to Ft Rucker, with little savings, is not fiscally prudent.

Question: Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed-wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft Rucker.

Response: While it is true that space is "freed-up" any time something is moved from a location, one must look further to determine if there is any gain from this "freed" space. In the case of NAS Whiting, the current mix of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft optimize space utilization since they have requirements that cause them to operate in different areas on the ground as well as in the air. Consequently, the "freed up" space would not be usable for the fixed-wing aircraft operating from NAS Whiting and therefore there is no gain. In contrast, co-locating similar helicopters at Ft Rucker would add to congestion at that field and in the training areas. This position was acknowledged in the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) comments on a DoD IG audit dated March 27, 1992.

Question: From an efficiency, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary-wing training conducted at one location?

DRAFT

Response: Two separate sets of validated requirements drive the two training programs, the location for this training, and efficiencies derived. The Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard training requirements include fixed-wing training for all students, emphasis on basic and radio instrument training, situational awareness/unusual attitude/aerobatic training and shipboard landing training. At this time, it is most cost effective for the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard to continue with their consolidated training at NAS Whiting. Army requirements are different and training is oriented towards the day/night VMC, ground contact environment that supports the Army mission in the field. Different requirements produce efficiencies unique to the specific training program at each base.

Comment: On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Ft Rucker, Alabama." He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Ft Rucker is less than $18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Ft Rucker would save at least $79 million dollars over 5 years.

Response: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Navy nonconcurred with this portion of the DoD IG audit report. The Assistant Secretary believed that the audit analysis attempted to compare dissimilar programs and also questioned the estimated monetary benefits from relocation.

Question: Is this savings estimate still valid today?

Response: No. A joint Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force and Coast Guard working group recommended, in a 1993 study, ***"retaining existing Navy helicopter training at Whiting Field and continuing use of the T-34C ... This proven training format meets Department of the Navy service requirement and is presently the least costly approach to producing Navy helicopter pilots."*** This comment was supported by an analysis of 5 options which each included alternative siting at NAS Whiting and Ft Rucker. In each case, the cost to consolidate at Ft Rucker was more expensive than remaining at NAS Whiting. Cost increases ranged from $65.8M to $131M over 20 years. These costs included $19.3M in up front costs for MILCON and moving of training facilities.

In a letter dated November 6, 1993, General Peay, U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, stated that ***"the Army supports the analysis and recommendations included in the UHPT study."***

Comment: In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary-wing training, integration and standardization among the services

would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary-wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

Response: The proposal delivered to the Roles & Missions Commission contained no analyses to support its conclusions and attempted to shift more advanced training later into the training track. While it may be true that consolidated training would help enhance jointness, it is unknown to what degree the enhancement would take place.

The position that no expansion or new construction is required contrasts with the joint UHPT study conclusion that $16.5M in MILCON was required in order to absorb the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.

Question: From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

Response: No. Each service is already conducting training in the most efficient and effective manner. Co-locating at Ft Rucker, or NAS Whiting, only adds cost without increasing training efficiency or effectiveness.

It is uncertain how interoperability would be affected by UHPT co-location. In fact, co-location may cause confusion concerning service regulations. For example, a Navy student is trained in the Naval Aviation Training & Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) program throughout his flight training. This program is the foundation for all of Naval Aviation while the Army trains and operates under different regulations and procedures.

The value of increasing interoperability through co-located primary training is questionable since the student aviator's attention is focused on developing the physical and cognitive skills necessary to safely, and effectively, operate his type aircraft in his service's normal operating environment.

Comment: During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots and that this arrangement worked very well.

Response: In the late 1960s the Marine Corps experienced a severe shortage of pilots and helicopter pilots in particular. Following the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Marine Corps accepted helicopter pilots who had been trained by the Army. Although their training was complete by Army requirements, evaluation of these pilots indicated that additional 70 to 75 hours of flight training was required to meet Marine Corps requirements. This additional training was provided in Marine Corps helicopter training groups.

Question: Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

Response: The Navy and Marine Corps are opposed to co-location of training at Ft Rucker for a number of reasons. First, Navy/Marine Corps requirements are different from Army requirements. This situation was proven by the need to provide additional training to Marine Corps pilots who had received training from the Army. Second, there is no savings from proposed co-location. Third, grade inversion between students and instructors under Army training is an area of potential problems.

Comment: In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was tasked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed-wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

Response: Although there are valid points raised in the previous comment, it is important that we clear the record concerning what truly was in the report. This report, signed by General Colin Powell in February 1993, did not recommend consolidation of primary helicopter training. Instead, it stated ***"If it is cost effective, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard helicopter training will be moved from Pensacola to Ft Rucker."*** A joint working group, led by the Navy with assistance from the Army, recommended ***"retaining existing Navy helicopter training at Whiting Field and continuing use of the T-34C for primary training and track selection at least through JPATS introduction. This proven training format is presently the least costly approach to producing Navy helicopter pilots that meet service requirements."*** The study further recommended that ***"All services reevaluate each of the options presented in this study shortly after the following events occur: JPATS source selection is complete and acquisition/operating costs are identified. Final force levels are established and thus flight training requirements determined. Army receives TH-67 deliveries and actual inventory and operating costs are identified."*** The study was forwarded with concurrence from the Army.

Question: Each of these points has been satisfied yet DoD only adopted the fixed-wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary-wing training ignored?

Response: Rotary-wing training was not ignored. At this time, co-location is not prudent. The present decision should be reevaluated, as recommended by the joint UHPT study, when JPATS source selection is complete and acquisition/operating costs are identified, final force levels are established, and the Army

receives TH-67 deliveries and its actual operating, training, and inventory costs are verified.

Comment: Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue and that Navy pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions? .

Response: The Army does operate helicopters from Navy ships on certain occasions and under favorable weather conditions as directed by senior Defense Department officials. Army pilots are not trained for, and do not operate during, degraded weather conditions over the water. In the cases mentioned, Army helicopters were required due to unique mission circumstances.

Comment: In 1992, MGen Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a 'cutting' tool for students.

Question: Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra cutting tool?

Response: The Navy practice of using fixed-wing aircraft in rotary-wing pilot track selection and training was validated by a 1994 Center for Naval Analyses study which concluded that ***"Splitting the current Navy primary into two separate tracks, rotary primary and fixed-wing primary, could increase attrition if current standards are maintained. Attrition would be higher in each track than in the present unified primary and thus would be higher overall."*** Increasing attrition will increase the cost of training and require increased accessions. In addition, the study forwards the following training considerations:

"The motor skills and learned responses needed to fly helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes in forward flight are almost exactly the same... These skills are transferrable."

"Flying helicopters in hover mode is different from flying them in forward flight mode. From a training standpoint, it is sensible to first teach rotary-wing pilots forward flight in a fixed-wing trainer. Student pilots can then move to helicopters where they acquire specialized flight skills."

"Some flight training, particularly navigation and instrument flying, involves skills that are not specific to a particular type of aircraft."

The Air Force also supports the concept of undergraduate, primary fixed-wing training for its helicopter pilots. In December 1992 the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force stated

"...fixed-wing training before rotary-wing training produces a better trained helicopter pilot for less money."
In light of the proven benefits of using fixed-wing aircraft in rotary-wing pilot training, the Navy will continue to use this training path for all of its pilots.

Question: Could the Navy use the Army's training syllabus that places student pilots directly into the rotary-wing pipeline?

Response: No. Based on the benefits of fixed-wing primary training, using the Army's curriculum would not meet Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard requirements.

Comment: According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Ft Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting NAS."

Response: Fixed- and rotary-wing training aircraft use different airspace. Consequently there is little congestion at Whiting Field involving helicopters. In contrast, increased congestion at Ft Rucker with a potential reduction in flight safety could result from consolidating training there.

Question: Is there a problem with congestion at Whiting Field, both in the air and on the ground? If so, would relocation of the Navy's Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program free up space at Whiting Field?

Response: Airspace congestion would not be relieved by moving the UHPT program out of Whiting Field. Some ground space aboard Whiting would be made available by such a move. This however would not result in greater safety.

Question: How does Ft Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?

Response: Ft Rucker is larger than Whiting Field however this is of no significance since Whiting Field and the surrounding area provide sufficient space to conduct training and meet all requirements. In addition Ft Rucker's available space would still require MILCON to support consolidated training.

Question: Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Ft Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

Response: Although there may be sufficient space available at Ft Rucker, there are insufficient facilities available to support all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without the infusion of significant MILCON funds.

Document Separator

AF/XOOT

PFT Guidance Letter

LT COL BEYER

Pilot Training

30 Mar 95

Course #	Title	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	Remarks	RAW	ATTR	SUPTEq
S-V8A-E	Flt Screening Pgm T-41 / T-3	958	1157	1329	1793	1825	1827	1893				
	Active/ROTC	253	240	452	575	660	761	775	Entries			
	Active/Other	114	126	176	371	344	245	297	Entries			
	ANG	108	108	108	113	112	112	112	Entries			
	AFRES	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	Entries			
	USAFA Cadets	424	624	534	675	650	650	650	Entries			
S-V8A-D	Flt Screening Pgm T-41 / T-3, SATP	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	Entries			
UPT/SUPT: (T-37 / T-34 Primary >> T-38 / T-1 / T-44 / UH-1)												
P-V4A-A	Bomber / Fighter (T-38)	145	248	335	372	372	382	387				
	Active	61	163	248	282	282	292	297	Grads +20 =	317	1.00	317
	ANG	26	27	29	32	32	32	32	Entries 0 =	32	.85	27
	AFRES	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	Entries =	8	.85	7
	SATP	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	Entries =	50	.85	43
												394
P-V4A-G	Airlift / Tanker (T-1)	379	315	325	479	498	556	576				
	Active	269	194	205	357	377	435	455	Grads +30 =	485	1.00	485
	ANG	54	54	53	55	54	54	54	Entries	54	.85	46
	AFRES	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	Entries	42	.85	36
	Navy	14	25	25	25	25	25	25	Grads	25	1.00	25
	SATP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries	0	—	0
												592
P-V4P-C	Airlift (Turboprop) (T-44)	22	26	99	138	143	150	150				
	Active	22	26	99	138	143	150	150	Grads (max 150)			
	ANG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
	AFRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
	SATP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
P-V4C-C	SUPT / Helicopter (UH-1)	54	59	56	56	56	56	56				
	Active	50	52	50	50	50	50	50	Grads			
	ANG	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	Entries			
	AFRES	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	Entries			
P-V4A-N	Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Tng	204	213	250	250	250	250	250				
	Active	98	90	98	98	98	98	98	Grads			
	ANG	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	Entries			
	AFRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
	NATO	94	111	140	140	140	140	140	Entries			
	Total active (UPT, SUPT-BF/AT/H, ENJJPT)	500	525	700	925	950	1025	1050	>>1100			
F-V5A-J	Banked Pilot Requal / T-38	62	55	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
F-V5A-Z	Banked Pilot Requal / T-1	318	145	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
F-V5A-Q	Fixed-Wing Qual Tng	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		4	1.00	4
	Active	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Entries			
	ANG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
	AFRES	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	Entries			
F-V5B-B	Rotary Wing Qual Crs	16	17	10	10	10	10	10	FY Entry dates			
	Active	10	12	0	0	0	0	0	Entries			
	ANG	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	Entries			
	AFRES	3	2	7	7	7	7	7	Entries			
P-V4A-E	Aviation Ldrship Pgm T-37, SATP	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	Entries			
P-V4A-P	UPT T-38 Adv Tng Pgm, SATP	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	Entries	33	.94	31

Total US entries: 115 in FY94/95, 125 in FY96-01

Attachment 1

AF/XOOT

PFT Guidance Letter

Pilot Training

8 Aug 94

Course #	Title	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	Remarks
S-V8A-E	Flt Screening Pgm T-41 / T-3	1016	958	1144	1242	1462	1923	2023	2073	
	Active/ROTC	159	253	400	400	400	533	583	608	Entries
	Active/Other	0	114	114	206	427	697	747	772	Entries
	ANG	201	108	121	127	126	184	184	184	Entries
	AFRES	56	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	Entries
	USAFA Cadets	600	424	450	450	450	450	450	450	Entries
S-V8A-D	Flt Screening Pgm T-41 / T-3, SATP	100	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	Entries
P-V4A-A	UPT/SUPT:	683	532	566	684	814	938	1038	1088	
	T-37 > T-38 Bomber / Fighter	161	140	217	256	299	319	336	336	
	Active	56	56	132	169	209	229	246	246	
	ANG	32	26	27	29	32	32	32	32	Entries
	AFRES	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	Entries
	SATP	65	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	Entries
	T-37 > T-1 Airlift / Tanker	522	392	349	428	515	619	702	752	
	Active	363	296	253	333	418	523	606	656	
	ANG	102	54	54	53	55	54	54	54	Entries
	AFRES	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	Entries
	SATP	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries
	Total active (UPT, SUPT-BF7A7A/H, ENJUPT)	*500*	*500*	*525*	*650*	*775*	*900*	*1000*	*1050*	*>>1100*
P-V4C-C	SUPT Helicopter: T-37 > Helo	0	56	57	56	56	56	56	56	
	Active	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	
	ANG	0	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	Entries
	AFRES	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	Entries
P-V4A-N	Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Tng	189	204	220	250	250	250	250	250	
	Active	81	98	90	98	98	98	98	98	
	ANG	2	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	Entries
	AFRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries
	NATO	106	94	118	140	140	140	140	140	Entries
F-V5A-J	Banked Pilot Requal / T-38	219	62	55	0	0	0	0	0	Entries
F-V5A-Z	Banked Pilot Requal / T-1	126	318	145	0	0	0	0	0	Entries
F-V5A-Q	Fixed-Wing Qual Tng	8	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
	Active	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Entries
	ANG	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries
	AFRES	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	Entries
F-V5B-B	Rotary Wing Qual Crs	78	23	10	10	10	10	10	10	FY Entry dates
	Active	64	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	Entries
	ANG	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	Entries
	AFRES	11	10	7	7	7	7	7	7	Entries
P-V4A-E	Aviation Ldrship Pgm T-37, SATP	20	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	Entries
P-V4A-P	UPT T-38 Adv Tng Pgm, SATP	60	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	Entries
F-V5A-K	Intro to Flt Fundamentals AT-38	268	322	351	363	366	366	383	383	
	Active	203	250	275	263	263	263	280	280	
	ANG	48	44	25	39	42	42	42	42	Entries
	AFRES	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	Entries
	NATO	11	15	30	40	40	40	40	40	Entries
	SATP	0	5	13	13	13	13	13	13	Entries

50 FY95 active entries to Ft Rucker – 24 FY95 grads

Total US entries: 115 in FY94/95; 125 in FY96-01

Attachment 1

Staff Analysis IV

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85	91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
%TIME WTHER > 300/1	45	98.40%	99.00%+	98.90%	97.90%	97.90%	95-100%,100% HI
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10	93.20%-	99.20%	99.30%	98.40%	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	15	1.40%-	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85	19.8%	22.9%--	18.0%+	15.0%++	23.3%--	10-25%, 10% HI
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	60	27.0%-	26.0%-	19.0%+	19.0%+	22.3%	15-30%, 15% HI
WEATHER ---	300	4.6	4.7	6.9	5.7	4.7	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100	19191	23531+	21522	9685-	24108+	0-60K, 60K HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	34.6-	21.5	18.5+	43.8--	6.9++	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	14	11	10	18	32+	0-20, 20 HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20	N-	Y+	N-	Y+	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	12	2	4	3	20-	0-30, 0 HI
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	200	3.4	5.6	4.5	3.6	5.3	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25	17	43-	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-10K RW,10K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50	C	C	C	B-	F+	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25	85.00%	100.00%	85.00%	66.00%-	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20	32.00%-	100.00%+	42.00%	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10	92.00%	100.00%	59.00%	51.00%	97.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10	87.00%	76.00%	60.00%	40.00%	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRFIELDS ---	150	8.2	8.9	7.7	6.0	9.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14	59469	84459	68320	135526	26652-	0-100K, 100K HI
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14	60863.0	63354.0	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0	0-MAX, MAX HI

Staff Analysis IV

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8	51572.0	17029.0	19365.0	36060.0	68639.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	4	99.00%	36.00%	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	50	7.9	7.4	7.3	8.6	7.8	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	60	D+	D+	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	12	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	100	7.4	7.4	6.4	7.4	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90	Y++	Y++	Y++	N--	Y++	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	50	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	40	4.00%+	0.00%++	0.00%++	18.00%--	18.00%--	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	200	8.6	8.9	10.0	0.0	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0	152.0	264.0	222.0	558.0	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0	462.0	690.0	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0	93.00%	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0	400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0	230.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	216.0	14.0	150.0	186.0	30.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
SERVICES ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
	===						

Staff Analysis IV

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
SCORE	1000	6.1	6.7	7.1	4.5	6.3	
RANK		4	2	1	5	3	

Staff Analysis III

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85	91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
%TIME WTHER > 300/1	45	98.40%	99.00%+	98.90%	97.90%	97.90%	95-100%,100% HI
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10	93.20%-	99.20%	99.30%	98.40%	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	15	1.40%-	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
FRZNG PRECP DAYS	15	10	8	1	1	14-	0-20, 0 HI
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	15	30	37	26	24	37	0-100, 0 HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85	19.8%	22.9%--	18.0%+	15.0%++	23.3%--	10-25%, 10% HI
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30	27.0%-	26.0%-	19.0%+	19.0%+	22.3%	15-30%, 15% HI
WEATHER ---	300	5.0	5.0	7.0	5.8	4.7	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100	19191	23531+	21522	9685-	24108+	0-60K, 60K HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	34.6-	21.5	18.5+	43.8--	6.9++	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	14	11	10	18	32+	0-20, 20 HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20	N-	Y+	N-	Y+	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	12	2	4	3	20-	0-30, 0 HI
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	200	3.4	5.6	4.5	3.6	5.3	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25	17	43-	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-10K RW,10K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50	C	C	C	B-	F+	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25	85.00%	100.00%	85.00%	66.00%-	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20	32.00%-	100.00%+	42.00%	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10	92.00%	100.00%	59.00%	51.00%	97.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10	87.00%	76.00%	60.00%	40.00%	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRFIELDS ---	150	8.2	8.9	7.7	6.0	9.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14	59469	84459	68320	135526	26652-	0-100K, 100K HI

Staff Analysis III

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14	60863.0	63354.0	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8	51572.0	17029.0	19365.0	36060.0	68639.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	4	99.00%	36.00%	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	50	7.9	7.4	7.3	8.6	7.8	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	60	D+	D+	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	12	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	100	7.4	7.4	6.4	7.4	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90	Y++	Y++	Y++	N--	Y++	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	50	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	40	4.00%+	0.00%++	0.00%++	18.00%--	18.00%--	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	200	8.6	8.9	10.0	0.0	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0	152.0	264.0	222.0	558.0	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0	462.0	690.0	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0	93.00%	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0	400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0	230.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	216.0	14.0	150.0	186.0	30.0	0-MAX, MIN HI

Staff Analysis III

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
SERVICES ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
	===						
SCORE	1000	6.2	6.9	7.2	4.5	6.3	
RANK		4	2	1	5	3	

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT		REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS		0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC		0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE		0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE		0	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85		91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
%TIME WTHER > 300/1	45		98.40%	99.00%	98.90%	97.90%	97.90%	95-100%,100% HI
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10		93.20%-	99.20%	99.30%	98.40%	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	15		1.40%-	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
FRZNG PRECP DAYS	15		17-	7	2+	2+	19-	0-20, 0 HI
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	15		50	144-	15+	15+	80	0-100, 0 HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85		19.8%	22.9%--	18.0%+	15.0%++	23.3%--	10-25%, 10% HI
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30		27.0%-	26.0%-	19.0%+	19.0%+	22.3%	15-30%, 15% HI
WEATHER ---		300	4.7	4.7	7.0	5.8	4.3	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100		27214	20545-	40435++	9685--	27945	0-60K, 60K HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40		32.6-	33.2-	16.8+	43.8--	12.3++	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		14	11	10	18	32+	0-20, 20 HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20		N-	Y+	N-	Y+	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN		0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI		0	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		12	2	4	3	20-	0-30, 0 HI
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		200	4.3	4.9	6.5	3.6	5.7	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS		0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP		0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?		0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25		17	43	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?		0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-10K RW,10K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50		C	C	C	B-	F+	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25		85.00%	100.00%	85.00%	66.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20		32.00%	100.00%+	42.00%	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		92.00%	100.00%	59.00%	51.00%	97.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		87.00%	76.00%	60.00%	40.00%	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRFIELDS ---		150	8.2	8.9	7.7	6.0	9.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14		59469	84459	68320	135526	26652-	0-100K, 100K HI

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14	60863.0	63354.0	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8	51572.0	17029.0	19365.0	36060.0	68639.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	4	99.00%	36.00%	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	50	7.9	7.4	7.3	8.6	7.8	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	60	D+	D+	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	12	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	100	7.4	7.4	6.4	7.4	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90	Y++	Y++	Y++	N--	Y++	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	50	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	40	4.00%+	0.00%++	0.00%++	18.00%--	18.00%--	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	200	8.6	8.9	10.0	0.0	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0	152.0	264.0	222.0	558.0	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0	462.0	690.0	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0	93.00%	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0	400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0	230.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	216.0	14.0	150.0	186.0	30.0	0-MAX, MIN HI

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
SERVICES ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
	===						
SCORE	1000	6.3	6.6	7.6	4.5	6.2	
RANK		3	2	1	5	4	

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85	91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
%TIME WTHER > 300/1	45	98.40%	99.00%	98.90%	97.90%	97.90%	95-100%,100% HI
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10	93.20%-	99.20%	99.30%	98.40%	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	15	1.40%-	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
FRZNG PRECP DAYS	15	~~17~~ 10	~~7~~ 8	~~2~~ 1	~~2~~ 1	~~18~~ 14	0-20, 0 HI
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	15	~~50~~ 30	~~144~~ 37	~~154~~ 26	~~154~~ 24	~~80~~ 37	0-100, 0 HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85	19.8%	22.9%--	18.0%+	15.0%++	23.3%--	10-25%, 10% HI
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30	27.0%-	26.0%-	19.0%+	19.0%+	22.3%	15-30%, 15% HI
WEATHER ---	300	4.7	4.7	7.0	5.8	4.3	GROUP SUBTOTAL
		Columbus Data:	23,531 ✓	21,522		24,108	
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100	19,191 ~~27214~~ ✓	~~20545~~-	~~40435~~++ ✓	9685--	~~27945~~ ✓	0-60K, 60K HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	34.6 ~~32.8~~- ✓	~~33.2~~ 21.5 ✓	~~16.8~~+ 18.5 ✓	43.8--	6.9 ~~12.37~~+ ✓	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	14	11	10	18	32+	0-20, 20 HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20	N-	Y+	N-	Y+	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	12	2	4	3	20-	0-30, 0 HI
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	200	4.3	4.9	6.5	3.6	5.7	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25	17	43	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-10K RW,10K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50	C	C	C	B-	F+	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25	85.00%	100.00%	85.00%	66.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20	32.00%	100.00%+	42.00%	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10	92.00%	100.00%	59.00%	51.00%	97.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10	87.00%	76.00%	60.00%	40.00%	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRFIELDS ---	150	8.2	8.9	7.7	6.0	9.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14	59469	84459	68320	135526	26652-	0-100K, 100K HI

Dixon _____

Cornella _____

Cox _____

Davis _____

Kling _____

Montoya _____

Robles _____

Steele _____

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14	60863.0	63354.0	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8	51572.0	17029.0	19365.0	36060.0	68639.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	4	99.00%	36.00%	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	50	7.9	7.4	7.3	8.6	7.8	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	60	D	D	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	12	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	100	7.0	7.1	6.4	7.4	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90	Y++	Y++	Y++	N--	Y++	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	50	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	40	4.00%+	0.00%++	0.00%++	18.00%--	18.00%--	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	200	8.6	8.9	10.0	0.0	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0	152.0	264.0	222.0	558.0	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0	462.0	690.0	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0	93.00%	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0	400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0	230.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	216.0	14.0	150.0	186.0	30.0	0-MAX, MIN HI

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
SERVICES ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
	===						
SCORE	1000	6.3	6.6	7.6	4.5	6.2	
RANK		3	2	1	5	4	

Document Separator

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

182
950614-21

15 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Response to 14 Jun 95 Questions for the Record

Attached is the Air Force response to your 14 Jun 95 Questions for the Record request. We have provided answers to all the questions, with the exception of those relating to Brooks AFB, which we intend to forward to you Friday, 16 Jun. I trust you will find this information useful.

Jay D. Blume

JAY D. BLUME JR, Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

Attachment:
Questions/Responses

1. The FAA has projections of future trends in airline hiring. What airline hiring figures did the Air Force use in computing its future pilot training requirements?

ANSWER: The Air Force uses a variety of sources to estimate the impact of airline hiring on future pilot retention. Projected retention estimates are then used to determine necessary pilot training production for force sustainment. Air Force airline hiring projections primarily rely on estimates generated by the Federal Aviation Administration. In particular, current estimates are based in part on the forecasts produced in the FAA's August 1993 Blue Ribbon Panel report, *Pilots and Aviation Maintenance Technicians for the Twenty-First Century: An Assessment of Availability and Quality* and the March 1995 *FAA Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal Years 1995-2006*. The Air Force estimates primarily focus on projections for the major air carriers, as they constitute the primary draw on military pilots. The Air Force also uses commercially-generated estimates to help validate Air Force forecasts.

1a. What are your projections of Air Force pilot training requirements beyond the FYDP, and what is your uncertainty level with these projections?

ANSWER: See attached 13 Jun 95 AF/RT Letter (Atch 1)

2. In the event a jet instead of a turbo-prop aircraft is chosen for the JPATS, the Navy is likely to lose primary capacity at Whiting Field. If the Air Force intends to use its joint training program with the Navy as a relief valve for future increases in its pilot training requirements, how will this loss of training capacity at Whiting affect the Navy's ability to absorb Air Force requirements (assuming one Air Force UPT base is closed)?

ANSWER: Even with one base closed, the Air Force has retained sufficient infrastructure to accomplish its proportional share of currently forecast primary pilot training. The Air Force is not relying on Navy capacity to complete its requirements.

2a. If future increases in the Navy's Pilot Training Requirements force them to rely on Air Force training capacity, how will the closure of one Air Force UPT base affect your ability to absorb Navy requirements.?

ANSWER: If one Air Force UPT base is closed, the Air Force will be operating at close to full capacity. We would have very little ability to absorb additional requirements, whether from the Navy or any other source.

2b. Would the Air Force benefit from the retention of Meridian whether or not one Air Force UPT base is closed?

ANSWER: The Air Force has limited confidence in the ability to expand the training mission at Meridian. Air Force UPT bases have three parallel runways and are optimized for volume training with multiple aircraft types. Meridian's dual offset runway configuration may affect its capability to accommodate more than one aircraft type for intensive training. Meridian also has lower total capacity than Air Force UPT bases.

3. As the Commission prepares for its final deliberations, it would be helpful if we could have your views on Homestead Air Reserve Base's military value. Please comment on its value as a staging/divert base for Caribbean operations and as a peacetime training location as well as any other activities you believe to be militarily significant.

If the Commission were to close Homestead, would the Air Force lose its access to supersonic airspace presently used for training Homestead?

ANSWER: Homestead's geographic location makes it a militarily strategic asset even while its facilities and infrastructure are still being restored for the Air Reserve Component missions there. This reconstruction and base operation system is designed to support training for our Air Force Reserve units and provides support for the Air National Guard air defense alert. In addition to on-base billeting and messing capacity, the base has access to off base contract services. Bivouac areas are also available within the cantonment. An example of this potential: in preparation for the possible Haiti invasion, the base hosted 11 Air Force KC-135s with crews and maintenance personnel, an Army aviation support group, and a helicopter assault group.

In regards to your airspace question. There is limited special use airspace and any loss can not readily be recovered due to airspace crowding and environmental concerns. Closure of Homestead does not preclude the use of this airspace; however, the distance the fighters would have to travel to get to supersonic airspace would make usage of this airspace less than optimal.

4. If Brooks AFB closes, a large number of highly-skilled laboratory personnel may not relocate to Wright-Patterson AFB. Is the Air Force concerned about loss of laboratory personnel if Brooks AFB closes?

ANSWER: **Will be forwarded to Commission NLT 1000, 16 Jun**

4a. Setting aside COBRA standard factors, what is the Air Force's Brooks AFB specific estimate of the percentage of laboratory personnel which would relocate to Wright-Patterson AFB, if Brooks closes?

ANSWER: Will be forwarded to Commission NLT 1000, 16 Jun

5: In 1994, the Air Force Space Command, Air Force Material Command, and classified tenants at Onizuka Air Station conducted a study entitled "Single Node Operations Study" to assess the impact of closing the facility. The RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet shows an estimated cost of about $788 million between fiscal years 1994 and 2001 for development of new satellite control network capabilities. Please describe this RDT&E effort and how it pertains to Onizuka AS.
ANSWERS: *Note: The Single Node study performed by units at Onizuka AS* ***is not connected*** *to the RDT&E effort to upgrade the Air Force Satellite Control Network(AFSCN).* The RDT&E effort (atch 2) of the AFSCN funds the development, acquisition and engineering needed to continue the evolution of this highly reliable national satellite tracking, telemetry, commanding and data relay capability to meet the requirements of the operational and developmental DoD, National, Civil, and Allied satellite systems. The AFSCN is a global network of control centers, remote tracking stations and communications links which provide the earth-to-space connection required for operation of military satellite. Onizuka AS is part of the AFSCN infrastructure. Funds in this RTD&E package will be used at Onizuka AS for engineering to insure maintainability and operational support based on user needs.
5a. What is the status of the RDT&E budget effort?

ANSWER: The status of this RDT&E budget effort (0305110F) is fully funded. The current program cost are identified at Atch 2. These are the most current numbers. The upgrade of the AFSCN was not derived as a result of the proposed realignment of Onizuka AS. The upgrade of the AFSCN is required with or without the realignment of Onizuka AS to reduce the cost of satellite operations. The cost of the upgrade includes Onizuka AS as an integral part of the global network. The proposed realignment of Onizuka AS does not increase the cost of this RTD&E effort to upgrade the AFSCN.

5b. What is the current cost estimate for developing and implementing this capability?

ANSWER: The current program costs are identified at attachment one. These are the most current numbers.

5c. Relate this expense to the Air Force recommendation for Onizuka AFB?

ANSWER: The upgrade of the AFSCN is required with or without the Onizuka realignment. The cost of the upgrade includes Onizuka AS as an integral part of the global network. The proposed realignment of Onizuka AS **does not** increase the cost of this RTD&E effort.

5d. Is it the Air Force's position that two fully functional satellite control nodes (that is, at Onizuka AS and Falcon AFB) are no longer required ?

ANSWER: Yes

5e. Can that capability be provided by other means? If so, how?

ANSWER: Redundancy will be provided through a distributed architecture that in an integral part of the AFSCN upgrade.

5f. When will the Air Force have a satellite control network communication architecture in place to provide redundancy ?

ANSWER: 2001

5g. Will the proposed BRAC 95 action to realign Onizuka Air Station in any way increase the risk associated with satellite control or reduce redundancy ?

ANSWER: No increased risk is expected with the realignment of Onizuka. The present "node" as it exists today will remain in place until the programmed upgrade to the AFSCN is complete.

6. As you know, the Hill community has suggested the tactical missile workload could be transferred from Letterkenny Army Depot to Hill AFB. Community officials have indicated shortage facilities, repair facilities, personnel and equipment are available to accommodate this workload at little or no cost. They believe this is a more attractive option than DoD's proposal, which move the workload from Letterkenny to Tobyhanna Army Depot. Does the Air Force endorse transfer of this workload to Hill AFB?

ANSWER: The Air Force is not seeking any tactical missile workload from Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) and supports the Department of Defense BRAC submission related to tactical missile consolidation

6a. Do the missile storage facilities need to be located adjacent to the depot?

ANSWER: There is adequate tactical missile storage at Hill AFB to meet the maintenance and repair workload requirements. The Air Force does not

understand or support the requirement to collocate all the DoD tactical missile storage with the depot maintenance and repair function. Collocation of tactical missile storage with the maintenance and repair function is not consistent with present DoD storage requirements and procedures. The storage requirements and number of locations is a function of vulnerability assessments and operational requirements; each tactical missile program manger in conjunction with the Services owning the storage facilities determines the storage requirements and locations.

6b. Can all or some portion of the missiles be absorbed by Hill AFB? At what cost?

ANSWER: It is our understanding that the Hill community has two proposals to consolidate the tactical missile work at Hill AFB. One proposal consolidates all the tactical missile work at Hill AFB and the other proposal consolidates only the Air Force and Navy Maverick and Sidewinder guidance and control section workloads.

The Air Force BRAC office has not conducted any COBRA analysis on the consolidation of DoD tactical missile workload at Hill AFB; therefore, we can only comment in general terms. At the direction of the Commission Staff, the Army was tasked on April 26, 1995, to examine a BRAC 93 re-direct proposal to realign the tactical missile workload (including missile disassembly, storage, and maintenance of guidance and control systems) from Letterkenny Army Depot to Hill AFB. Representatives from the Army and Air Force conducted a quick study in the first week of May 1995, to comply with the Commission's tasking. Based on that study, it was determined that Hill AFB has the facilities to support the DoD tactical missile workload with some additional MILCON ($0.7M-Air Force estimate to $5.2M-Army estimate for the Patriot and ATACMS). In support of the Commission tasking, Hill AFB estimated the total cost to consolidate the tactical missile work at Hill AFB would be $27.7M. This cost estimate pertains to the gaining site only; losing site costs were not included but should be similar in nature. The Hill cost estimate for the gaining site includes the costs for MILCON, equipment transfer, inventory transfer, first article test, training, facility modifications, equipment purchase, and interim contractor support. The Army BRAC office reviewed the Hill AFB cost estimate and increased Hill's proposal by $13.7M.

In our response, dated 20 Jan 1995, to a tasking from the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance our preliminary analysis indicated that Hill AFB has both the facilities required and the workforce capability to accept the entire workload within their current infrastructure. At that time, we stated that approximately $8-10 million of Letterkenny cost avoidance could be achieved by adopting Hill AFB as the single DoD consolidation site for this workload.

We have not seen the cost analysis provided by the Hill community that consolidates only the Air Force and Navy Maverick and Sidewinder guidance and control section workloads, therefore, we can not comment. The Navy and Air Force Maverick and Sidewinder guidance and control work is currently being supported at Hill AFB. If this work were to remain at Hill AFB, there would be no costs associated with facilities or transferring equipment.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

'13 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Response To Request for Analysis of Air Force UPT Requirements For The Long-Term

Per your 2 June, 1995 request, AF/XO and AF/DP analyzed Air Force UPT requirements for the long-term. This analysis was conducted for the years beyond the BRAC "time-line" capacity analysis of FY01. This long-term AF/XO and DP analysis supports the original analysis that the Air Force has enough excess capacity to close a single UPT base.

The problem with conducting a capacity analysis for the long-term is that it is impossible to quantify the requirements for pilot production that many years in the future. The Air Force is aware of several potential increases in requirements. The Air Reserve Component (ARC) hiring pool may shrink beginning in FY02 as small UPT year groups produced during the active duty drawdown reach the end of their Active Duty Service Commitment. The conversion to the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System will reduce capacity during the transition from the T-37, currently projected to begin in FY02. In addition, downturns in retention and force structure adjustments could also require changes in production rates. However, the Air Force can respond to these possible out-year capacity problems with programs to increase capacity, production, and retention. None of these measures are considered extreme, as the Air Force has historically and successfully responded to fluctuations in pilot requirements since its conception.

The Air Force stands by its analysis that if it must close a UPT base, Reese AFB is the right choice. Closing one base would leave a reasonable margin for uncertainty in out-year requirements, including surges. The XO and DP analysis determined that closing two bases, however, would clearly leave a gap in production capacity even before acknowledging the possibility of increased requirements. I hope this information proves helpful.

Jay D. Blume Jr.

JAY D. BLUME JR, Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET (R-2 Exhibit)

DATE: February, 1995

BUDGET ACTIVITY: 7 - Operational System Development

PE NUMBER AND TITLE: 0305110F Satellite Control Network

PROJECT: 3276

COST (In Thousands)	FY 1994 Actual	FY 1995 Estimate	FY 1996 Estimate	FY 1997 Estimate	FY 1998 Estimate	FY 1999 Estimate	FY 2000 Estimate	FY 2001 Estimate	Cost to Complete	Total Cost
3276 Satellite Control Network (SCN)	78,884	79,232	89,717	95,435	98,855	112,705	115,532	119,878	Continuing	Continuing

(U) A. Mission Description and Budget Item Justification

(U) The AF Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) is a global network of control centers, remote tracking stations, and communications links which provide the earth-to-space connection required for operation of military satellites. The AFSCN provides satellite and payload command and control, and mission data relay using Mission Control Centers in California and Colorado and nine global Remote Tracking Stations (RTS). Because the AFSCN operations are continuous, system improvements must occur in parallel with operations of the growing inventory of national security space vehicles. This AFSCN project funds the development, acquisitions, and engineering needed to continue the evolution of this highly reliable national satellite tracking, telemetry, commanding, and data relay capability to meet the requirements of the operational and developmental DoD, National, Civil, and Allied satellite systems. Since this effort supports a fielded system, it is in the budget activity/research category Operational Systems Development.

(U) Satellite systems must have contact with ground based command & control systems to operate. The AFSCN is the DoD common user satellite control network. The AFSCN is maintained, operated and improved using funding provided in three PE's. The AFSCN provides satellite state-of-health for the following operational satellite systems: DMSP, GPS, DSCS, DSP, FLTSAT, Milstar, GEOSAT, Skynet, NATO III/IV, and Classified Programs. It controls on orbit spares and orbit changes of satellite programs with dedicated mission networks. It also supports these and other systems with mission data relay.

(U) The SCN has an aggressive Improvement & Modernization (I&M) program to reduce the cost of satellite operations in the future and to operate effectively with fewer, lower skilled personnel. The primary focus of the I&M program is upgrades to the Command and Control Segment and the Communications Segment. Both are planned to be accomplished on a time phased approach exploiting commercial developments, using an evolutionary acquisition strategy.

(U) The Command and Control Upgrades, an evolutionary upgrade, will move satellite command and control from a mainframe-based, centralized computer architecture to a workstation-based, open architecture using advanced high speed data links. When developed and fielded, this will facilitate a 30% reduction in O&M for the command and control segment. In addition, the SCN will have greater capability and capacity with increased standardization and interoperability.

(U) The Communications Upgrades eliminate the current, costly point-to-point AFSCN communications network and replaces it with a communications grid system that integrates government and commercial networks. This new architecture will eliminate costly infrastructure, enable surge capability, and provide a minimum 25% savings in O&M costs over the current systems. This will greatly improve capacity, reliability, data quality, and user access to the network.

(U) Research category is Operational Systems Development. Development of new satellite control capabilities is essential to the operational capability of current and new satellite systems. The project number for the entire Program Element is 3276.

RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET (R-2 Exhibit)		DATE February, 1995
BUDGET ACTIVITY 7 - Operational System Development	PE NUMBER AND TITLE 0305110F Satellite Control Network	PROJECT 3276

(U) FY 1994

- (U) Command and Control Segment (CCS):
  - (U) Continued CCS upgrades by beginning distributed architecture workstation-based control prototyping. Continued developing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)-based open and distributed system architecture for Falcon AFB Satellite Operations Centers (SOC). Scheduled completion FY 03 ($5,200)
  - (U) Continued developing user-requested modifications to command and control segment ($21,700)
- (U) Communications Segment:
  - (U) Begin design specification for the communication segment upgrades and provide beginning of open architecture to the AFSCN control nodes. Complete definition of new archiving equipment specifications for upgrade of both control nodes. Comm Upgrade scheduled program completion FY 01 ($8,800)
  - (U) Continued developing user-requested modifications to command and control segment ($10,900)
- (U) Range Segment:
  - (U) Continued developing user-requested modifications to the range segment ($3,900)
- (U) Systems Engineering and Integration:
  - (U) Continue system engineering, development and integration of network hardware/software to meet evolving satellite program requirements at Onizuka AFB, Falcon AFB, and the Remote Tracking Stations (RTS) ($28,100)

(U) FY 1995

- (U) Command and Control Segment:
  - (U) C^2 Upgrades: Develop system architecture, documentation, and lab demonstration equipment necessary to support development contract for workstation based, Simplified Satellite Operations System for satellite command and control mission. Objectives: open architecture "plug-and-use," increased efficiency, reduced hardware/software maintenance costs, and reduced manpower to operate. Complete development of functional requirements document and employment concept, identify system implementation alternatives for further technical evaluations. Begin assessments of those satellite control products in the Demonstration Lab. Pursue a system development approach in cooperation with other government efforts. Scheduled program completion FY 01 ($18,300)
  - (U) Continue developing user-requested, priority work group required modifications ($8,600)
- (U) Communications Segment ($25,800):
  - (U) Continue Communications upgrades by completing engineering and integration of standardized telemetry recorders to mission control centers and tracking sites. Initiate development of hardware (H/W) and software (S/W) for Wide Area Interface Unit (WIU) for installation at the control nodes and remote tracking stations. Initiate the development of the Centralized Control and Monitoring (CCM) of network communications at the control nodes and remote tracking stations. Comm Upgrade completion FY01 ($18,900)
- (U) Range Segment: Continue developing user-requested modifications to range segment ($2,000)
- (U) Systems Engineering and Integration: Continue system engineering and development of network hardware/software to meet evolving satellite program requirements at Onizuka AFB, Falcon AFB, and the RTS's ($24,532)

RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET (R-2 Exhibit)		DATE February, 1995
BUDGET ACTIVITY 7 - Operational System Development	PE NUMBER AND TITLE 0305110F Satellite Control Network	PROJECT 3276

(U) FY 1996
- (U) Command & Control Segment:
  - (U) Complete prototype of workstation-based control environment and perform functional assessments in the Demonstration Lab. Complete development of specification, contract actions, and initiate acquisition of selected distributed architecture Command & Control System Upgrade. These upgrades are consistent with the US Space Command developed "Plug-and-Use" architecture. The four Satellite Operations Centers (SOC) to be modernized are: SOC 31A (GPS), SOC 31B (DSP & DMSP), SOC 33 (Comm Sats), and SOC 34 (Milstar). Work will begin on one in FY 96. CCS Upgrade scheduled completion FY 01 ($27,000)
  - (U) Continue developing priority user-requested modifications to command and control ($3,800)
- (U) Communications Segment:
  - (U) Continue Communications upgrades by completing engineering and integration of standardized telemetry recorders to mission control centers and tracking sites. Initiate development of hardware (H/W) and software (S/W) for Wide Area Network Interface Unit (WANIU) for installation at the control nodes and remote tracking stations. Initiate the development of the Centralized Control and Monitoring (CCM) of network communications at the control nodes and remote tracking stations. Begin voice upgrades and solid state switch replacement. Comm Upgrade scheduled completion FY 01 ($33,900)
  - (U) Continue developing priority user-requested modifications to the communications segment ($1,100)
- (U) Range Segment: Continue developing priority user-requested modifications to range segment ($2,000)
- (U) Systems Engineering and Integration: Continue system engineering and development of network hardware/software to meet evolving satellite program requirements at Onizuka AFB, Falcon AFB, and the RTS's ($21,900)

(U) FY 1997
- (U) Command & Control Segment:
  - (U) Continue acquisition, installation, and test of upgrades to C^2 system for first of four Falcon AFB Satellite Operations Centers (SOC), and begin upgrades on the second SOC. CCS Upgrade scheduled program completion FY 01 ($26,000)
  - (U) Continue developing priority user-requested modifications to command and control segment ($9,800)
- (U) Communications Segment:
  - (U) Complete development of WANIU and CCM H/W and S/W and begin development of voice circuit improvements. Comm Upgrade scheduled completion FY01 ($32,100)
  - (U) Continue developing user-requested modifications to the communications segment ($3,400)
- (U) Range Segment: Continue developing user-requested modifications to range segment ($3,000)
- (U) Systems Engineering and Integration: Continue system engineering and development of network hardware/software to meet evolving satellite program requirements at Onizuka AFB, Falcon AFB, and the RTS's ($21,100)

RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET (R-2 Exhibit)

DATE February, 1995

BUDGET ACTIVITY: 7 - Operational System Development

PE NUMBER AND TITLE: 0305110F Satellite Control Network

PROJECT: 3276

(U) B. Program Change Summary ($ in Thousands)

	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997	Total Cost
(U) Previous President's Budget	96,095	101,146	96,482	100,957	Continuing
(U) Appropriated Value	100,000	83,000			
(U) Adjustments to Appropriated Value					
a. Cong Gen Reductions	-3,905	-2,213			
b. SBIR	-1,499	-1,534			
c. Omnibus and Other Above Theshold Reprogram	-12,000				
d. Below Threshold Reprogramming	-3,712	-21			
(U) Adjustments to Budget Years since FY 95 PB			-6,765	-5,522	
(U) Current Budget Submit/President's Budget	78,884	79,232	89,717	95,435	Continuing

(U) Change Summary Explanation:

Funding: Reductions due to Omnibus reprogramming action and undistributed Congressional reductions.

Schedule: No changes.

Technical: Not Applicable.

(U) C. Other Program Funding Summary ($ in Thousands)

	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	To Compl	Total Cost
(U) Other Procurement, Budget Activity: 83, Program Title: AFSCN, BPAC 83440	30,005	25,629	25,495	28,052	32,551	37,629	39,487	40,380	Continue	Continue

Related RDT&E:

(U) Not Applicable.

RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET (R-2 Exhibit)	DATE February, 1995
BUDGET ACTIVITY 7 - Operational System Development	PE NUMBER AND TITLE 0305110F Satellite Control Network — PROJECT 3276

(U) D. Schedule Profile

	FY 1994				FY 1995				FY 1996				FY 1997			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
(U) Complete spec for archival equip				X												
(U) Relocate Network Status and Scheduling workstations				X												
(U) Provide prototype common workstations/local area network (C2)				X					X							
(U) Prototype SSOP						X										
(U) Initiate development of WIU & CCM						X										
(U) Initiate procurement of communications data archiving equipment for installation at Falcon & Onizuka						X										
(U) Deliver standardized recorders								X								
(U) Complete CCS Cartridge Tape Upgrade							X									
(U) Complete prototype of distributed workstation control architecture										X						
(U) Complete specification development for distributed workstation architecture							X									
(U) RFECP for WIU development										X						
(U) Complete development of Wide Area Network Interface Units (WIU) and initiate procurement														X		
(U) Install WIU at Colorado Tkg Station																X
(U) Complete Archival equipment installations - FY98																
(U) Install WIU at three remote tracking stations - FY98																

RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET (R-2 Exhibit)	DATE February, 1995
BUDGET ACTIVITY 7 - Operational System Development	PE NUMBER AND TITLE 0305110F Satellite Control Network PROJECT 3276

	FY 1994				FY 1995				FY 1996				FY 1997			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
(U) Complete Centralize Control and Monitor development - FY99																
(U) Design spec for Planning and Evaluation side replacement - FY99																

Page 6 of 7 Pages

Exhibit R-2

RDT&E PROGRAM ELEMENT/PROJECT COST BREAKDOWN (R-3)

DATE February, 1995

BUDGET ACTIVITY: 7 - Operational System Development

PE NUMBER AND TITLE: 0305110F Satellite Control Network

PROJECT: 3276

(U) A. Project Cost Breakdown ($ in Thousands)

	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997
(U) Command and Control Segment	26,967	26,900	30,800	35,800
(U) Communications Segment	19,769	25,800	35,000	35,500
(U) Range Segment	4,011	2,000	2,000	3,000
(U) Systems Engineering and Integration	28,137	24,532	21,917	21,135
(U) Total	78,884	79,232	89,717	95,435

(U) B. Budget Acquisition History and Planning Information ($ in Thousands)

(U) Not Applicable.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

June 2, 1995

Major General Jay Blume (ATTN: Lt Col Tripp)
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Base Realignment and Transition
Headquarters USAF
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

Dear General Blume:

Congressman Larry Combest is concerned that the Air Force will not retain sufficient UPT capacity for the long-term if a UPT base is closed in this round.

Our own review of your requirements indicates that if 1,078 SUPT equivalents remains the Air Force steady state requirement, a comfortable excess of UPT capacity will remain. However, if future requirements increase, all Air Force UPT bases will need to function at a high operations tempo to provide full capacity.

Please provide the Commission with an analysis by AF/XO and AF/DP of Air Force UPT requirements for the long-term. It would be helpful if they would address the factors and assumptions that drive the requirements, e.g., pilot retention rates, Reserve Component and International requirements, force structure changes, etc., and the affect of changes to these assumptions on the result. To be useful prior to the final deliberations of the Commission, request your analysis by June 14, 1995.

If your staff has any questions about this request, they should contact Lt Col Merrill Beyer (USAF) of the Commission staff.

Sincerely,

Francis A. Cirillo Jr., PE
Air Force Team Leader

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

13 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Response To Request for Analysis of Air Force UPT Requirements For The Long-Term

Per your 2 June, 1995 request, AF/XO and AF/DP analyzed Air Force UPT requirements for the long-term. This analysis was conducted for the years beyond the BRAC "time-line" capacity analysis of FY01. This long-term AF/XO and DP analysis supports the original analysis that the Air Force has enough excess capacity to close a single UPT base.

The problem with conducting a capacity analysis for the long-term is that it is impossible to quantify the requirements for pilot production that many years in the future. The Air Force is aware of several potential increases in requirements. The Air Reserve Component (ARC) hiring pool may shrink beginning in FY02 as small UPT year groups produced during the active duty drawdown reach the end of their Active Duty Service Commitment. The conversion to the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System will reduce capacity during the transition from the T-37, currently projected to begin in FY02. In addition, downturns in retention and force structure adjustments could also require changes in production rates. However, the Air Force can respond to these possible out-year capacity problems with programs to increase capacity, production, and retention. None of these measures are considered extreme, as the Air Force has historically and successfully responded to fluctuations in pilot requirements since its conception.

The Air Force stands by its analysis that if it must close a UPT base, Reese AFB is the right choice. Closing one base would leave a reasonable margin for uncertainty in out-year requirements, including surges. The XO and DP analysis determined that closing two bases, however, would clearly leave a gap in production capacity even before acknowledging the possibility of increased requirements. I hope this information proves helpful.

Jay D. Blume Jr

JAY D. BLUME JR, Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

Document Separator

FAX COVER SHEET

HQ USAF/RTR
HQ USAF/RTT
1670 AIR FORCE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1670
DSN 225-6766 or (Comm) 703/695-6766
FAX DSN 223-9707 or (Comm) 703/693-9707

DATE: 1 Jun 95

FROM: AF/RT

TO: Frank Cirillo

ATTN:

FAX #: 696 0550

NO. OF PAGES 2 + 1 COVER SHEET

REMARKS: We will deliver paper copy in the morning

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

01 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Response to Inquiry on the Impact of Icing on UFT Operations

Attached is the Air Force response to a Commission request for the impact of icing on UFT operations.

The attached information is certified true and correct to the best of our ability. If you have any questions concerning this issue our POC is Maj Malcomb, est 695-4667.

JAY D. BLUME JR, Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

Attachment:
Worksheet on Icing Impacts on UFT

WORKSHEET
HQ USAF/RTR

PURPOSE: To answer a question posed by the BRAC Commission staff member, Lt Col Beyer.

QUESTION: Calculate the number of training days per year when icing impacts operations at each UFT base.

SOURCE: USAFETAC/DS-86/001, Climatic Atlas of Icing Potential Over North America, January 1986, on file at USAF Environmental Technical Application Center (ETAC). The study was based on data from 1977 to 1980.

METHOD: Extracted from graphs the percentage of time when meteorological conditions required for trace to light icing were present. Multiply these monthly percentages by the number of training days for each month. Add the monthly totals to calculate the number of days per year when these conditions existed.

CONCLUSION There is no direct data base which depicts the frequency of atmospheric icing. The source document provides a graphic presentation of icing potential, based on the frequency of occurrence of the meteorological conditions required for icing to be present. Therefore, this data provides a picture of the maximum number of days (worst case) a weather flight could forecast trace or light icing for each base. The data is for three altitude blocks: surface to 5,000 feet, 5,000 to 10,000 feet and 10,000 to 15,000 feet. The data for each level applies only to that level. Data can not be added or averaged between levels. Although the data below is for the entire year, the primary threat of icing at UFT bases occurs from October to March. Although the data was gathered between 1977 and 1980, it provides a representative picture because of the large number of observations in the data base.

ANNUAL TRAINING DAYS WITH POTENTIAL FOR TRACE OR LIGHT ICING

Level	Columbus	Laughlin	Randolph	Reese	Vance
Surface to 5,000'	8.1	1.4	1.4	10.0	14.0
5,000' to 10,000'	32.0	25.0	19.1	31.0	35.3
10,000' to 15,000'	42.3	27.1	29.0	29.7	39.2

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

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RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

June 1, 1995

Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr. (Lt. Col. Mary Tripp)
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Base Realignment and Transition
Headquarters USAF
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

171
Please refer to this number
when responding 950601-1

Dear General Blume:

We request you conduct updates to the Level Playing Field COBRAs for Columbus AFB, Laughlin AFB, and Vance AFB. These focused COBRAs should be done with the same assumptions and updated personnel numbers as was done for the recently completed Reese AFB site survey COBRA.

These updated COBRA runs are needed to provide an apples-to-apples comparison between Reese AFB and the three bases added from the UPT category at the 10 May Adds Hearing. If these runs are not received we will be forced to use the Level Playing Field COBRA runs for all four UPT bases at the Final Deliberations Hearing. We would much prefer to use focused COBRA runs since these would more accurately reflect the Return on Investment to the Air Force for closing a UPT base.

In order to assist the Commission in its work, we request this information to be provided no later than June 12, 1995. My point of contact for this request is Lt Col Beyer. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr., PE
Air Force Team Leader

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

12 JUN 1995

HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Cirillo

This is in response to your letter of June 1, 1995, (Commission number: 950601-1) requesting focused COBRA runs for Columbus AFB, Laughlin AFB, and Vance AFB.

The [redacted] COBRA runs were accomplished using the same assumptions as the recently completed [redacted] COBRA run for Reese AFB. However, these COBRA runs are based on table top estimates and do not reflect the fidelity available after a site survey is conducted.

We trust this information is useful for your analysis.

Sincerely

JAY D. BLUME, Jr.
Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Base Realignment and Transition

Attachment:
UPT COBRA's

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

25 MAY 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your April 27, 1995, letter requesting that the Department of Defense provide responses to questions for the record resulting from the April 17, 1995 hearing. On May 9, 1995, we forwarded an interim response to these questions. Enclosed is the final set of answers.

I trust this information will be helpful, please let me know if there is anything else we can provide.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

Enclosure

cc: Senate and House Reading Rooms

Q's From the 17th
* David/FXC See Depots (separate)
* Mark/Merrill See UPT (separate)
* CRAIG See Medical (separate)
* Steve, CRAIG, MARK See T&E/LAB

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE RECORD

1. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Robles that you would provide a list of those criteria used by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group to constrain the linear programming model from presenting nonsensical results. Please provide these criteria.

ANSWER: In addition to the "Site/Function Constraint Matrix" which limited potential site/functions combinations from the outset of the modeling process, constraints were imposed as the JCSG proceeded with its Optimization Model process. These constraints which were applied in an additive manner are as follows:

1. Flight screening would not be performed/collocated with any other function - based on JCSG military judgment.
2. Primary and advanced NAV/NFO, advanced NFO Strike, and advanced NFO Panel functions would be joint and single-sited - based on DEPSECDEF memo of October 24, 1994.
3. No function would be "spread" or fractionalized smaller than a "notionalized" or smallest squadron (approximately 100 annual production) - JCSG military judgment.
4. Flight screening function limited to the Air Force Academy and Hondo, TX sites - JCSG military judgment.
5. Primary function limited to four sites - JCSG military judgment. (This constraint was later dropped.)
6. Three site closure results (MIN PRIME model run) used as baseline for follow-on Optimization Model runs.
7. Air space and outlying airfield operations capacity from sites closed in MIN PRIME model run were transferred to remaining sites in close proximity for all additional modeling efforts.

2. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Cornella that Flight Screening was "basically" included as a matter of completeness. For the record, please respond to the following question:

Why did you include Flight Screening, a function not now nor envisioned to be done at UPT bases, but did not include Introduction to Fighter Fundamental (IFF) training, a function that is done at UPT bases, in the scope of your analysis?

ANSWER: The JCSG defined its category scope to include: DoD flight programs which support and facilitate selection and training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators to the point of awarding "Wings." Post-"Wings" flying missions such a IFF, the Blue Angels, and a large number of graduate rotary-wing courses were excluded from direct analysis. Non-flying missions at the bases (such as technical training at Sheppard AFB and NAS Meridian) were also excluded. When forwarding alternatives for consideration, the JCSG asked the military departments to quantify any such missions that impacted their capacity.

3. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Davis asked how much surge capacity exists in each service. Please respond to this question in terms of capacity to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather, and also in terms of capacity to accommodate an increase in the Pilot Training Rate in the event of a long-term increase in pilot requirements.

ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume. If Reese AFB closes as recommended by DoD, the Air Force will retain approximately 12 percent surge capacity to recover from temporary situations at the Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training bases. In addition, bases will have the capability to respond to temporary requirements by lengthening the duty day, increasing sortie density, flying on the weekend, etc. Increases such as these are not sustainable over a sufficient period of time to generate net increases in production. For extended operations such as an increase in the pilot training rate, the Air Force will retain between 7 and 12 percent surge capacity.

Mr. Nemfakos. To ensure the DON has capacity to support future unforeseen increases in pilot/NFO training rates, as part of its configuration analysis the BSEC looked at scenarios where all the FY 2001 pilot and NFO training rates were increased by 10 and 20 percent. (This includes increases in the Air Force training scheduled for Naval air stations.) The results showed that even with the its closure recommendations, the DON could support a 20 percent increase in PTR requirements and still have some excess capacity.

In addition, the capacity analysis was based on a 237-day work year and accounted for down time due to bad weather. If need be, training capacity could be increased at each air station by increasing the operating schedule (e.g., pilots could train on weekends to make up for lost flying time during the week days).

Brig Gen Shane. The ability to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather is excellent. Because our flight training facilities are underutilized, our capability to surge is only constrained on the availability of instructor pilots, aircraft, and OMA funding. USAAVNC has the capability to support long term training increases. According to the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group certified data, the Pilot Training Rate could be increased to 2,056 annually with no additional MILCON.

4. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Robles requested that each Service provide data summarizing the costs to train pilots. Please include in this information the fixed costs for Base Operating Support (BOS), Real Property Management Account (RPMA), Overhead and Personnel at each UPT base, and the variable costs which vary by the number of students and flight hours/sorties flown. These costs should reflect only the portion attributable to UPT for the installations that also host other tenant units.

ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume.

COST ESTIMATE BASED ON FY94 DATA

	Mission Fixed Costs (in $M)	RPM Fixed Costs (in $M)	BOS Fixed Costs (in $M)	Medical* Fixed Costs (in $M)	Total Fixed Costs (in $M)	SUPT Variable Cost Per Graduate
Columbus	$33.5	$4.9	$27.9	$8.5	$74.8	$237,507
Laughlin	$35.3	$5.7	$32.2	$11.0	$84.2	$245,039
Reese	$32.1	$5.5	$31.0	$9.9	$78.5	$244,619
Vance	$33.8	$5.7	$25.4	$4.9	$69.8	$232,394

* Although not specifically asked for, medical fixed costs are also provided. These costs are not included in any other of the fixed costs provided.

Definitions:

Mission Fixed Costs: Open-the-door costs to enter one student. Includes Instructors, school overhead, and maintenance.

RPM Fixed Costs: The upkeep on the facilities that is required whether or not you have students in training (e.g., utilities).

BOS Fixed Costs: Base operating support costs that are required to support the fixed personnel (e.g., transportation, supply, grounds maintenance, chaplains, comptroller).

Medical Fixed Costs: Open-the-door costs to enter one student (e.g., supplies, and equipment to support fixed population).

Variable Cost Per Graduate: The cost of sending one additional student through SUPT. It does not include any fixed costs.

Mr. Nemfakos. The Navy has issued a data call to collect these data. We will forward a response as soon as possible.

Brig Gen Shane.

Estimated costs for Undergraduate Pilot Training
Undergraduate Pilot Training fixed-cost: $45,611,784
Undergraduate Pilot Training variable-cost: $30,599 per student
Undergraduate Pilot Training flying hour variable-cost: $322 per flying hour
Undergraduate Pilot Training actual total cost: $114,745,433 (FY 94)
Undergraduate Pilot Training actual civilian salary proportion: $9,150,860 (8.0%)

Estimated costs for Undergraduate Pilot Training Share of Base Operations
Base Operations fixed cost for Undergraduate Pilot Training: $2,926,,412
Base Operations fixed variable for Undergraduate Pilot Training: $1,009 per student
Base Operations total cost for Undergraduate Pilot Training: $4,985,370
[Base Operations civilian salary proportion: $3,300,315 (66.2%)]
Note: RPMA, overhead and personnel are included in above calculations.

5. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated that in order to achieve uniformity when making comparisons between the services, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group drafted rules used by the FAA to measure airfield operations capacity at each UPT base. Please provide the formula that the FAA uses and how these rules were applied by your group.

ANSWER: In collecting runway capacity data, the JCSG data call asked for the sustainable capacity of the air station's main field and each outlying field in terms of the number of flight operations per hour each runway complex can support. To ensure consistency in the responses, the question instructed the air stations to base their capacity calculations on the methodology in the FAA Advisory Circular 150/5060-5 entitled "Airport Capacity and Delay." This methodology accounts for the type and mix of aircraft, the runway and taxiway configurations, and reductions in operations due to weather and times the airfield is closed to flying operations for other reasons. The attached pages at **TAB 5** excerpted from the Circular describe the procedure for determining the weighted hourly capacity for each runway.

6. General Blume, during your testimony, you stated you would provide answers to several questions relating to weather. Please respond to the following questions:

ANSWER: These questions pertain to Joint Cross-Service Group analysis and data and should therefore be directed to the Joint Cross-Service Group.

Why was the percent of time at which the ceiling and visibility are better than 1000 feet and 3 miles given any weight in the analysis when it is 1500 feet and 3 miles that represents a key weather decision factor in conducting Air Force flight training operations?

Mr. Finch: The measures and criterion reflected the JCSG developed consensus decision. The 1000/3 ceiling visibility cutoff represents a key Navy decision factor. Missions were analyzed based on the users. For example, both Military Departments will conduct primary training, so both 1000/3 and 1500/3 were used. In Air Force unique bomber-fighter training, on the other hand, 1500/3 was used while 1000/3 was not.

In tracking weather attrition, factors such as actual attrition experience, cancellations due to forecast icing conditions, and the occurrence of crosswinds out of limits can be used. Why was so much weight placed on crosswinds rather than some of these other factors in the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group functional value analysis?

Mr. Finch: All weather factors (icing, crosswinds, etc.) were captured by weather attrition inputs. The extra weight given to crosswinds represents a measurement of the frequency of crosswinds, not a measure of "lost sorties." While some crosswind exposure is useful, frequent crosswinds complicate the learning process and can cause last-minute scheduling changes.

The T-38 attrition rate planning factor at Reese is 28 percent compared to 17 percent for the T-1. Since the T-1 factor is currently in use at Reese, why did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group use the T-38 instead of the T-1 planning factor in its functional value analysis?

Mr. Finch: In computing the T-1 attrition planning factors, the JCSG used the reported value for Reese AFB and a surrogate, based on existing aircraft, for the other sites. In the final analysis, no Air Force site received points for the T-1 planning factor in the JCSG model. Based on T-37/T-38 attrition planning factor comparisons across sites, there is no reason to believe that Reese AFB would gain an advantage from a T-1 planning factor comparison.

7. Mr. Nemfakos, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Davis that you would provide for the record your analysis on Strike Pilot Training Rates. Please provide that general data along with your response to the following specific questions:

Are the flight operations per strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) at NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville used in your capacity analysis the same? Please explain any differences.

ANSWER: Yes, the analysis used 1511 daylight flight operations per Strike PTR

What is the current operations per strike Pilot Training Rate at NAS Kingsville? How does this compare with the figure used to determine strike Pilot Training Rate capacity at NAS Kingsville?

ANSWER: NAS Kingsville's data call reported a daylight flight operations requirement for an all T-45 syllabus of 1393 ops. The 1511 ops used in the analysis was derived as follows. Because in FY 2001 not all strike training will be done in T-45 aircraft, we assumed 50 percent of the Strike pilots would go through an all T-45 syllabus and 50 percent would go through a split syllabus consisting of an Intermediate phase in the T-2 aircraft and an Advanced phase in the T-45 aircraft. Based on certified data, the flight ops requirement for this split syllabus was calculated as follows:

Intermediate Phase in T-2 -- 741 (from NAS Meridian' data call)
Advanced Phase in T-45 -- 888 (from NAS Kingsville's data call)
Total: 1,629

Taking a weighted average, this gives

(1393 x .5) + (1629 x .5) = 1511 daylight flight ops per Strike PTR

To what extent was the Navy's determination that a single intermediate/advanced strike UPT base containing sufficient capacity to conduct training to support the strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) in the future and under surge operations based upon the availability of NAS Corpus Christi as an outlying field?

ANSWER: Under the recommended scenario, the main airfield at NAS Corpus Christi is needed to support the single-siting of Strike training at NAS Kingsville.

What is the maximum strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) that NAS Kingsville could support with Orange Grove and NAS Corpus Christi available as outlying fields?

ANSWER: Because daylight runway operations is the capacity limiter at training air station, we will show the capacity of this complex to support Strike training in these terms. As explained in response question 6b, the certified data showed that the daylight runway operations per pilot training rate (PTR) for Strike training is 1511 operations. The capacity at NAS Kingsville, OLF Orange Grove, and NAS Corpus Christi (after the proposed runway extensions) is as follows:

NAS Kingsville ------- 237 days x 12.1 hrs/day x 80 ops/hr = 229,416 annual flight ops
OLF Orange Grove -- 237 days x 11.6 hrs/day x 54 ops/hr =148,457 annual flight ops
NAS Corpus Christi -- 237 days x 11.6 hrs/day x 80 ops/hr = 219,936 annual flight ops
Total: 597,806 annual flight ops

Dividing the total annual flight ops by the flight ops required per PTR gives a strike PTR capacity of

597,806/1511 = 396 PTR

The FY 2001 pilot training rate for Strike is 336 pilots. Thus, the recommended scenario provides an excess capacity of

396 - 336 = 60 PTR

which equates to about an 18% surge capability under planned and budgeted operations. Note that the Strike training capacity at this complex will increase as the Navy completes its transition to an all T-45 training syllabus. Once this transition is completed, the capacity at this complex will be

597,806/1393 = 427 PTR

which increases the surge capability to about 28%

To what extent would the strike training capacity of NAS Kingsville be impacted if NAS Corpus Christi was not available?

ANSWER: Without the use of NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Kingsville would need another outlying field to support all Strike training.

8. Mr. Finch, your optimization analysis apparently placed primary emphasis on the installation military value data provided to you by the services, and less emphasis on the functional values developed by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group.

Please explain the reasoning for this approach?

ANSWER: Sites have value both with respect to their ability to accommodate activities involving specific functions (e.g., those associated with flight training) and the more general military missions of the Military Departments. For the former, the initial means of representing value for flight training functions was to consider the capacity of sites collectively to carry out all the functions associated with flight training. This was done by introducing a set of constraints that ensured that there was sufficient capacity in the collection of sites that remained open to handle all flight training functions.

Beyond ensuring there was sufficient capacity to perform flight training functions, the Group's methods next considered military value, maximizing the inherent military value of all sites that remained open to carry out general military missions of the Military Departments.

Finally, the Group's method considered the value of sites that remained open to perform flight training functions. Since functional value was already considered implicitly by setting constraints that guaranteed sufficient capacity to carry out all functions, this additional consideration of functional value was given lower priority.

To allow functional value to drive the model is relevant only if we assume functions can be easily moved and are completely interoperable. In practice, this led to nonsensical results during the early, "unconstrained" model runs. For example, Navy Strike training with its attendant costly T-45 infrastructure was spread to four sites. Other functions were swapped between Air Force and Navy sites. Site functional value was also a more narrow look at installation value, as it did not consider collateral missions such as technical training. The Military Departments' inputs encompassed all functions and potential alternative uses of the installation.

9. Mr. Finch, your Joint Cross-Service Group minutes of March 24, 1994, state that the UPT category is largely installation oriented. If the value of a UPT base is best reflected in its functional rather than military value, why didn't you base your alternatives on model output which maximized functional value unconstrained by installation military value?

Since there is a direct correlation between the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional value rating and the Air Force's determination of military value, didn't the use of both functional and military value in the model simply increase the impact of functional value in the result?

ANSWER: Functional and military values are not independent. SECDEF guidelines define the first four BRAC criteria as military value. Criterion one is "mission requirements." This indicates functional value is a significant element of military value. There is also no single

functional value for each base. The JCSG generally analyzed each site for all UPT missions, regardless of whether the site currently supported those missions. The JCSG did not analyze non-UPT missions. Functional value is only a subset of military value.

10. General Blume, since the Air Force relied so heavily on the results of the Joint Cross-Service Group's computer model, did you analyze the model for calculation errors?

ANSWER: The Air Force had representatives on the Joint Cross-Service Group and its Study Team to continuously monitor the process and its output. The Base Closure Executive Group also did an independent capacity analysis to confirm the required infrastructure level.

11. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos, your Service recommendations used your own BRAC process as well as non-BRAC policy decisions to choose which UPT bases to close or realign. Why didn't your recommendations necessarily reflect the high functional value scores from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group?

ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume. The Air Force recommendations do reflect the high functional value scores. The recommendation to close Reese AFB is consistent with the fact Reese had the lowest average functional value.

Mr. Nemfakos: The DON's process did not consider functional value. It used its own documented method for evaluating the military value of its installations.

12. Gen Blume, the average functional value for each Air Force UPT base is shown (the Reese score is adjusted based on your recent memo to us).

Columbus AFB	6.74
Vance AFB	6.67
Randolph AFB	6.53
Laughlin AFB	6.50
Reese AFB	6.22

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) apparently used the functional values from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group. These averages were used to find military value by performing a standard deviation analysis to assign a color "Stop Light" code to Criteria I, "Flying Mission Evaluation." All eight criteria were then considered to derive an overall Air Force ranking: the result was Tier I for Columbus, Laughlin, Randolph, and Vance, and Tier III for Reese.

Why didn't the Air Force simply use the functional value for the training that is actually accomplished at each specific UPT base to determine its score? Would the result have been different?

ANSWER: Functional value is an important part of military value, but is not necessarily the only indicator. For example, Randolph AFB houses a Major Command Headquarters, a Numbered Air Force Headquarters, and the Air Force Military Personnel Center besides having a

flying mission. In the case of UPT bases, average functional value scores, the BCEG "Stop Light" analysis, and professional judgment all indicated Reese AFB is the correct base to close. The Air Force does not believe the results would have been different if functional value were used as an exclusive measure. However, using only functional value would be a narrow analysis and would not comply with Secretary of Defense guidelines. In addition, the Air Force made a conscious effort to fully integrate, where possible, the Joint Group process into its entire 1995 BRAC analysis. For the Laboratory, Test and Evaluation, and Depot subcategories, the Air Force used Joint Group data, the same methodology and, with few exceptions, the same measures of merit to produce the functional portion of the Criterion I grade for those installations. For the Undergraduate Flying Training category, the Air Force used the Joint Group functional values as the basis for its Criterion I grade. These steps ensured that the Air Force analysis was consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the Joint Group direction on analysis of these functions.

It should be noted that the average functional values were not used to find "military value," but were instead used to determine the Criterion I grade. Military value, under the criteria, consists of the first four criteria.

Finally, the BCEG examined the functional values derived by JCSG-UPT. After discussion, the BCEG agreed to include all activities pertaining to Air Force operations as the basis for the average functional value. Including all potential flying training activities rather than the training actually accomplished provides a better analysis of both current and potential training value.

13. Mr. Finch, did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group run any excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model, such as the ones shown on below:

a. Examining only Air Force Bases
b. Examining only Naval Air Stations
c. Excluding flight screening
d. Excluding Navy-unique functional areas
e. Excluding Air Force-unique functional areas
f. Changing the weights on various factors, such as airspace.

ANSWER: The Group was sensitive to the potential issue of adjusting the model after the data had been collected. Excursions to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to movement of new functions to new sites given differing minimum site levels was performed. Service specific excursions were not performed, given the joint perspective of the Group's efforts.

What would the results be if these excursions were run?

ANSWER: It would be inappropriate to speculate as to potential results without running the model.

14. Mr. Finch, what were the options you considered for measuring capacity, and why did you choose the methods you did?

ANSWER: Factors of capacity and the methods to measure them were developed over time by the JCSG. The process started with development of the Data Call followed by construction of the Capacity Analysis Matrix and the questions utilized in point distribution for the Measures of Merit. As the process evolved, the JCSG refined its methods of measurement in the framework of sound operational experience and military judgment.

15. Mr. Finch, a separate functional value for the Air Force's post-UPT Introduction to Fighter Fundaments (IFF) training was not included among the 10 functional areas selected for assessing the overall functional value of each UPT-category base.

Even though it is conducted after "Wings" are awarded, IFF is conducted at a UPT base, consumes capacity, and is similar in content to training events contained within the latter stages of the Navy's Strike Training syllabus.

Why didn't the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group include IFF as an additional functional area?

ANSWER: Post-"Wing" flying missions such as IFF, the Blue Angels, and a large number of graduate rotary-wing courses were excluded from direct JCSG analysis. Non-flying missions collocated at the UPT sites (such a technical training a Sheppard AFB and NAS Meridian) were also excluded. When forwarding alternatives for consideration, the JCSG asked the military departments to quantify any such missions that impacted their capacity.

16. General Blume, did the Air Force consider transferring the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals training from Columbus AFB to another location such as Luke AFB in order to increase the capacity to do other training at Columbus?

ANSWER: No. The Air Force collocated Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training on the UPT bases in 1993 when it stood up Air Education and Training Command during a major reorganization. This allowed a more seamless training continuum for fighter-bound students, particularly as the Air Force converted from generalized UPT to specialized UPT. Luke AFB also does not have the capacity to absorb this training. Even if Luke could absorb IFF, this would require an additional move for many fighter-bound students whose final formal training units were located elsewhere. To return to a different basing structure would be expensive and counterproductive.

17. Mr. Finch, in the consideration of training airspace for both capacity analysis and functional value, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group methodology permitted a base to claim credit for large sectors of airspace so long as any portion of it was within 100 nautical miles of the base. For bases near the Gulf of Mexico, this meant credit for huge over-water sectors.

Both Air Force and Navy UPT programs train predominantly over land. This is to permit such over-land flight training events as ground reference maneuvers and low-level navigation. Over-water training is performed close to shore. Since actual UPT practice precludes the use of large blocks of over-water airspace, doesn't giving credit for such over-water airspace unfairly skew the results in favor of coastal bases?

ANSWER: Over-water airspace has intrinsic value to the Navy and the consensus of the JCSG was to consider it equally with over-land airspace.

18. Mr. Finch, did either the Services or the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider the impact of contracting some UPT functional training areas to outside sources?

ANSWER: No. The JCSG charter was to help size infrastructure, not to make policy decisions.

19. General Blume, does closing Reese AFB leave sufficient capacity in the UPT area to provide for surge capability in pilot training?

ANSWER: Yes. The closure of one Air Force UPT base leaves sufficient capacity to provide for surge capability. However, there is not enough excess capacity to close more than one Air Force UPT base.

20. Mr. Finch, all of your alternatives move the Navy's helicopter training to Fort Rucker. There are several different ways to implement this alternative. For example, the Navy could retain their current helicopter training process and be collocated at Fort Rucker as an Army tenant; or the Navy's pilots could be integrated into the Army training through a consolidation. Did the Joint Cross Service Group consider the issue of consolidation vs. collocation when developing its alternatives?

ANSWER: No. The JCSG was not established to consider policy issues related to undergraduate pilot training. Therefore, its approach was to use existing policies that were applicable to the various functions considered by the Group. In the case of helicopter training, existing policy was, and is, not to consolidate such training for the Army and Navy. Therefore, only alternatives that involved collocating or not collocating this function were considered.

21. Mr. Finch, the Navy responded to your alternatives to close Whiting Field with COBRA analyses that showed a high cost of implementing the move of primary training to Naval Air Station Pensacola and helicopter training to Fort Rucker.

Did the UPT-Joint Cross Service Group look at variations to this scenario, such as the relocation of helicopter training to Fort Rucker with primary training remaining at Whiting Field?

ANSWER: Given the resource requirements, site capacities and functional values, and site military values, the Optimization Model consistently moved the helicopter function to Fort Rucker and closed NAS Whiting Field. The Group did not look at additional variations.

22. Mr. Nemfakos, would moving helicopter training out of Whiting Field help the Navy meet its requirement for outlying fields for primary training?

Does your answer change when considering the transition to any of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft?

ANSWER: No, the OLFs used for helicopter training are not configured to support fixed-wing training. JPATS does not change this situation.

23. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) record states that the reason for rejecting the movement of helicopter training to Fort Rucker is the high one-time cost and long return on investment.

Did operational concerns also enter into this decision or was it strictly an economic decision?

ANSWER: The decision not to co-locate helicopter training at Fort Rucker was strictly an economic decision -- high one-time costs and a poor return on investment. Operational considerations, however, lead the DON to evaluate a co-location scenario as opposed to a consolidation scenario.

24. General Blume, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) choose Reese AFB to close?

ANSWER: When all eight criteria were applied to the bases in the UFT category, Reese AFB ranked lowest relative to the other bases in the Undergraduate Flying Training category. In addition, Reese AFB was recommended for closure in each alternative recommended by the DoD Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT.

25. Mr. Nemfakos, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) chose NAS Meridian to close?

ANSWER: First, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR (particularly in the decline from 11 to 10 carrier air wings) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, the consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated. The training conducted at NAS Meridian is similar to that conducted at NAS Kingsville, which has a higher military value, presently houses T-45 assets (the Department of the Navy's new primary strike training aircraft) and its supporting infrastructure, and has ready access to larger amounts of air space, including over-water air space if such is required. Lastly, the net of all costs and savings associated with this recommendation is a savings of $158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected.

26. Mr. Finch, please discuss the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

What alternatives or "strawmen" did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider?

ANSWER: The Group evaluated three alternatives for the NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex: 1) A JPATS Primary "Master" site, 2) a Strike/Bomber-Fighter complex with Strike at NAS Meridian and Bomber-Fighter at Columbus AFB, and 3) moving Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV to NAS Meridian to allow creation of a JPATS Primary "Master" site at NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field. The first alternative's up-front costs - building five outlying fields and relocating Columbus AFB's Bomber Fighter function to Laughlin AFB were considered excessive. The second alternative was dropped because it did not result in the net increase of a "base complex," would waste significant investment in the T-45 training system at NAS Kingsville, and it would also require high, up-front cost at NAS Meridian. The third alternative, while not as costly to implement as alternative one, was discounted as the Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV functions could be readily accommodated by those flight training bases not recommended for closure. (JCSG Meeting Minutes of February 23, 1995).

What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

ANSWER: None.

What cost advantages were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

ANSWER: The JCSG considered potential savings in shared or combined facilities from a JPATS site consolidation or formation of a JPATS base complex, but found they could not readily be identified. The Group also agreed that savings, if any, would be well in the future. In reviewing the base complex issue, the Group found no clear or compelling rationale to change the Military Departments' recommendations.

27. Mr. Nemfakos, if the redirect of mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi is not approved, what impact would that have on the operations per day available for pilot training at Corpus Christi?

How much do other flight operations at Corpus Christi reduce daily operations available for pilot training?

ANSWER: Operating mine warfare helicopters out of NAS Corpus Christi would have a negligible effect on the runway operations available for pilot training. All other flight operations at NAS Corpus Christi, to include the proposed mine warfare helicopter operations, require less than 5 percent of NAS Corpus Christi's pilot training capacity.

28. Mr. Finch, will Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) increase or decrease the number of bases required for UPT training?

ANSWER: The answer will depend on the aircraft selected and the evolution of the JPATS training syllabus. For example, some contenders may require longer runways than others. On the other hand, these same aircraft may be able to absorb some flying time from the more costly and more infrastructure-intensive advanced training tracks (i.e., T-45 Strike training).

29. Mr. Finch, what was the impact of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)-related issues on the group's assessment of functional value?

What specific facility and airspace requirements were used to determine Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) functional values?

ANSWER: For purposes of the analyses, the Measures of Merit utilized the maximum requirements identified in the source selection process for JPATS (i.e., 5,000 ft runway).

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

Questions submitted by Congressman Smith:

1. Since the Navy has recommended relocating the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC) from Lakehurst, NJ, to Pensacola, do you envision recreating the Carrier Aircraft Launch and Recovery System (COLASSES) at Pensacola or do you expect to disassemble, package, ship and reinstall those devices that are critical to training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers?

ANSWER: The mission of NATTC Lakehurst Detachment does not include training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers. The NATTC Lakehurst Detachment personnel and equipment support training requirements specific to operations and maintenance of aircraft carrier catapult, launch, and recovery equipment systems. The personnel and equipment necessary to continue supporting this training will be relocated to NAS Pensacola.

2. At what cost do you envision recreating the unique aircraft flight training facility in Pensacola?

ANSWER: NATTC Lakehurst Detachment is not a unique aircraft flight training facility and therefore will not be recreated as such. However, all appropriate costs to relocate NATTC Lakehurst Detachment necessary personnel and equipment that support training requirements specific to operations and maintenance of aircraft carrier catapult, launch, and recovery equipment systems were included in the COBRA analysis for Lakehurst. These costs are calculated automatically by COBRA algorithms from various input data and appear as part of the

aggregate one-time costs for NAWC AC Lakehurst, NJ plus the one-time costs for NAS Pensacola, FL. The exact cost will be determined as part of the implementation planning and budgeting process; however, it would be expected that the final cost would be of a similar magnitude.

3. Do facilities exist at Pensacola for the housing of the Lakehurst NATTC students?

ANSWER: Yes. BRAC 93 moved average onboard of 5004 students to NAS Pensacola. BRAC 95 adds the relocation of aviation students from both NTTC Meridian and Lakehurst, a total of 162 additional students. Barracks space was sized under BRAC 93 to accommodate the planned force structure through the end of the century. The FY 2001 average onboard for aviation students, including Meridian and Lakehurst, is 4226. The Navy is under contract to build BEQ space for 4924 beds. This number includes planned onboard, transient students and a surge capability. In view of this, the BSEC made a determination that no additional BEQ construction was required.

4. What type of delay or disruptions are anticipated or planned for in the training of these aircraft carrier student pilots while the training facility is disassembled, moved and recreated in Pensacola?

ANSWER: NATTC Lakehurst Detachment does not train aircraft carrier student pilots.

Questions submitted by Senators Shelby and Heflin and Congressman Everett:

1. In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in there entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed-wing training at Whiting NAS.

a. Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Ft. Rucker was not adopted?

ANSWER: **Mr. Nemfakos.** While the recommendations forwarded by the UPT Joint Cross-Service Group called for moving the DON's Advanced Helicopter training to Fort Rucker, they said nothing about consolidating UHPT. Because of operational differences in training Navy and Army helicopter pilots, in evaluating these proposals, the DON only considered the co-location of UHPT.

b. Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed-wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft. Rucker?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. Moving the DON's Advanced Helicopter training to Fort Rucker would free-up space at NAS Whiting Field for fixed-wing training. However, because there is no issue of limited space at NAS Whiting Field for fixed-wing training, this additional space would be of little value.

c. From an efficiency standpoint, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary-wing training dedicated at one location?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. It would make sense to have all initial rotary wing training at one location if both the Navy and Army had the same training syllabi, same trainers, and identical aircraft. They do not. The DON has unique training requirements which are driven by its operational missions (i.e., a sea-based environment). Because of this, a consolidation of UHPT training would still require separate training tracks for Navy and Army pilots, and therefore, only create costs.

2. On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama." He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Fort Rucker is less than $18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker would save at least $79 million dollars over 5 years.

a. Is this savings estimate still valid today?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. It should be noted that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Department of the Navy nonconcurred with the portion of the 1992 DoD IG audit report in which were presented the savings estimate cited above, believing that the audit analysis attempted to compare dissimilar programs and also questioning the estimated monetary benefits from relocation.

In considering the UPT JCSG alternatives during the 1995 base realignment and closure process, the BSEC used only data, certified to be accurate and complete, contained in our 1995 Base Structure Data Base, and information provided and verified by the other Military Departments. Based on our analysis of this certified data, the total estimated one-time cost to implement the "non-JPATS' alternative is $155.7 million with an annual recurring savings after implementation of $13 million and a return on investment expected in 14 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years for this scenario is a savings of $9 million. The total estimated one-time cost to implement the "JPATS' alternative is $159 million with an annual recurring savings after implementation of $13 million and a return on investment expected in 15

years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years for this scenario is a savings of $7 million.

3. In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary-wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary-wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

a. From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. There is a fundamental difference in how the Army and the naval services desire to train their pilots from an operational perspective; each has its own set of validated requirements that drive its training program, the location for the training, and efficiencies derived. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard training requirements include fixed-wing training for all students, emphasis on basic and radio instrument training, situational awareness/unusual attitude/aerobatic training and shipboard landing training. We use aircraft systems as well as simulators and ground support systems that are different from those used by the Army in support of this specialized training. Then too, we believe that the operational environment in which our helicopter pilots will eventually be required to fly validates and mandates our current approach to UHPT. For example, the absolute necessity for aviator competence in over water flight, where aircraft performance and navigational techniques employed differ significantly from those over land, carries unique training demands. And, especially for Marine helicopter pilots, replacement of the aging CH-46 fleet with V-22 aircraft that feature in-flight transitions between rotary and fixed-wing modes will spawn a completely different dynamic for which they must be trained. In contrast, Army requirements and training are oriented toward the day/night VMC, ground contact environment that supports the Army mission in the field.

What makes the most sense for all the Services is to adhere to training programs that best prepare pilots to function in the respective operational environments in which they will be employed. Different requirements produce efficiencies unique to the specific training program at each base (NAS Whiting Field and Fort Rucker). It should be noted that intent of the Secretary of Defense in establishing a JCSG for UPT was not for it to examine the UPT programs of the Services with an eye toward consolidation, but to assist the Military Departments in identifying asset sharing opportunities. To what extent "jointness" is served by consolidation of UHPT, whether it should be, and which Service ought to conduct consolidated UHPT for all are issues more appropriately addressed outside the base realignment and closure process.

4. During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

a. Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. The Department of the Navy does not endorse Army UHPT for Marine pilots, because it does not meet the training requirements for service with the Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces. During the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps experienced a severe shortage of pilots, and following the direction of the Secretary of Defense, accepted helicopter pilots who had been trained by the Army. To meet Marine Corps requirements those Army-trained pilots, whose training was complete by Army requirements, required an additional 70 to 75 hours of flight training that was provided in Marine Corps helicopter training groups. General Mundy's comment during the Commission's hearing on March 6, 1995, did not indicate his willingness to change the training syllabus for Marine Corps helicopter pilots, but was offered in rebuttal to suggestions that our current resistance to UHPT consolidation is fueled in whole or in part by interservice rivalry.

5. In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was tasked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed wing and rotary wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

a. Each of these points has been satisfied, yet DoD only adopted the fixed-wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary-wing training ignored?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. The 1992 JCS Report on Roles & Missions, signed by General Colin Powell in February 1993, did not recommend consolidation of primary helicopter training. Instead, it stated *"If it is cost effective, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard helicopter training will be moved from Pensacola to Ft Rucker."* A joint working group, led by the Navy with assistance from the Army, recommended *"retaining existing Navy helicopter training at Whiting Field and continuing use of the T-34C for primary training and track selection at least through JPATS introduction. This proven training format is presently the least costly approach to producing Navy helicopter pilots that meet service requirements."* The study further recommended that *"All services reevaluate each of the options presented in this study shortly after the following events occur: JPATS source selection is complete and acquisition/operating costs are identified. Final force levels are established and this flight training requirements determined. Army receives TH-67 deliveries and actual inventory and operating costs are identified."* The study was forwarded with concurrence from the Army.

Rotary-wing training was considered on an equal basis with all other types of UPT in both the Department of the Navy's analysis and that conducted by the UPT JCSG. The rationale for the Department of the Navy's rejection of the UPT JCSG alternative to close NAS Whiting Field is explained in response to question 1.

6. Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

A number of Army missions in support of Naval operations:

1983: Operation Urgent Fury
*Shipboard operations involving the Army's 18th Airborne Corps: UH-60's, OH-58A/C's, AH-1's

1987: Operation Prime Chance
*Shipboard and overwater operations involving the Army's 4/17th CAV (now 4/2) with OH-58D's
*valid CONOPS mission today

1994: Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti
*10th Mountain Division operated from the USS Eisenhower
*OH-58D's had extensive missions prior to invasion
*UH-60's, CH-47's, OH-58A/C's and AH-I's transported troops and equipment to the AO for several days, followed by command & control missions

Each Army Aviation unit has a task for shipboard operations incorporated in their mission essential list of tasks. The Army trains for shipboard operations and performs shipboard operations.

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. As mentioned in response to question 1, training for Army helicopter pilots and naval aviators is designed to prepare them for two significantly different operational environments. The record of employment of Army helicopters shows that the Army does operate from Navy ships on certain occasions and under visual meteorological (VMC) weather conditions. However, Army helicopter pilots are not trained for, and do not operate during, degraded weather conditions. In contrast, every Navy pilot is trained to operate from large and small deck ships under all weather conditions. In each of the cases cited above, Army helicopters were required due to unique mission circumstances and operated under favorable weather conditions as directed by senior Defense Department officials.

7. In 1992, MGen. Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a "cutting" tool for students.

a. Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra "cutting" tool?

b. Could the Navy use the Army's training syllabus that places student pilots directly into the rotary wing pipeline?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. The Navy practice of using fixed-wing aircraft in rotary-wing pilot track selection and training was validated by a 1994 Center for Naval Analysis study which concluded that *"Splitting the current Navy primary into two separate tracks, rotary primary and fixed-wing primary, could increase attrition if current standards are maintained. Attrition would be higher in each track than in the present unified primary and thus would be higher overall."* Increasing attrition will increase the cost of training and require increased accessions. In addition, the study forwards the following training considerations:

"The motor skills and learned responses needed to fly helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes in forward flight are almost exactly the same... These skills are transferable."

"Flying helicopters in hover mode is different from flying them in forward flight mode. From a training standpoint, it is sensible to first teach rotary-wing pilots forward flight in a fixed-wing trainer. Student pilots can then move to helicopters where they acquire specialized flight skills."

"Some flight training, particularly navigation and instrument flying, involves skills that are not specific to a particular type of aircraft."

The Air Force also supports the concept of undergraduate, primary fixed-wing training for its helicopter pilots. In December 1992 the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force stated *"...fixed-wing training before rotary-wing training produces a better trained helicopter pilot for less money."*

Based on the benefits of fixed-wing primary training, using the Army's curriculum would not meet Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard requirements.

8. According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Fort Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting Field NAS."

a. Is there a problem with congestion at Whiting Field, both in the air and on the ground? If so, would relocation of the Navy's Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program free-up space at Whiting Field?

b. How does Fort Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?

c. Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Fort Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. There is no ground or air congestion at NAS Whiting Field. As previously stated, fixed wing (T-34C) aircraft normally conduct training operations at altitudes above 1500 feet and rotary wing (TH-57B/C) training aircraft operate in the airspace structure

below 1500 feet. Commercial airliners overfly training airspace at altitudes above 24,000 feet. Navy fixed-wing aircraft conduct landing operations at exclusive fixed-wing airfields, which are specifically designed to train naval aviators to land day or night, in fair or foul weather, and aboard the confined landing areas of our ships at sea. These airfields are located within ten miles of home field, enhancing training efficiency and lowering cost per completed student sortie. NAS Whiting, in effect, is two airfields for the price of one. There are no course rule conflicts between fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft operating at these two fields. Operations in joint-use areas are normally conducted using air traffic control procedures and/or radar monitoring. Additionally, helicopters, by design, can operate at very slow airspeeds. As a result, near mid-air collisions involving Navy helicopters are virtually non-existent. In contrast, increased congestion at Fort Rucker would result from consolidating training there.

Fort Rucker is larger than NAS Whiting Field. However, NAS Whiting Field meets all present and future Navy requirements for primary and helicopter training and includes sufficient maritime operating areas for the Helicopter Landing Trainer ship. Additionally, the area around Fort Rucker has a much greater concentration of noise sensitive areas than does NAS Whiting Field.

Fort Rucker requires significant facilities MILCON, extensive rehabilitation and upgrade of existing structures and, equally important, extensive quality of life improvements to support consolidated training. Facilities meeting the Navy's requirements for both mission and quality of life are currently available and in use at NAS Whiting Field.

Brig Gen Shane. Yes. According to Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross- Service Group certified data, the total DoD throughput in the near future is 1,481. This training rate would only engage 72% of Fort Rucker's present capacity for undergraduate helicopter pilot training.

Document Separator

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE RECORD

1. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Robles that you would provide a list of those criteria used by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group to constrain the linear programming model from presenting nonsensical results. Please provide these criteria.

ANSWER: In addition to the "Site/Function Constraint Matrix" which limited potential site/functions combinations from the outset of the modeling process, constraints were imposed as the JCSG proceeded with its Optimization Model process. These constraints which were applied in an additive manner are as follows:

1. Flight screening would not be performed/collocated with any other function - based on JCSG military judgment.
2. Primary and advanced NAV/NFO, advanced NFO Strike, and advanced NFO Panel functions would be joint and single-sited - based on DEPSECDEF memo of October 24, 1994.
3. No function would be "spread" or fractionalized smaller than a "notionalized" or smallest squadron (approximately 100 annual production) - JCSG military judgment.
4. Flight screening function limited to the Air Force Academy and Hondo, TX sites - JCSG military judgment.
5. Primary function limited to four sites - JCSG military judgment. (This constraint was later dropped.)
6. Three site closure results (MIN PRIME model run) used as baseline for follow-on Optimization Model runs.
7. Air space and outlying airfield operations capacity from sites closed in MIN PRIME model run were transferred to remaining sites in close proximity for all additional modeling efforts.

2. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Cornella that Flight Screening was "basically" included as a matter of completeness. For the record, please respond to the following question:

Why did you include Flight Screening, a function not now nor envisioned to be done at UPT bases, but did not include Introduction to Fighter Fundamental (IFF) training, a function that is done at UPT bases, in the scope of your analysis?

ANSWER: The JCSG defined its category scope to include: DoD flight programs which support and facilitate selection and training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators to the point of awarding "Wings." Post-"Wings" flying missions such a IFF, the Blue Angels, and a large number of graduate rotary-wing courses were excluded from direct analysis. Non-flying missions at the bases (such as technical training at Sheppard AFB and NAS Meridian) were also excluded. When forwarding alternatives for consideration, the JCSG asked the military departments to quantify any such missions that impacted their capacity.

ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume.

COST ESTIMATE BASED ON FY94 DATA

	Mission Fixed Costs (in $M)	RPM Fixed Costs (in $M)	BOS Fixed Costs (in $M)	Medical* Fixed Costs (in $M)	Total Fixed Costs (in $M)	SUPT Variable Cost Per Graduate
Columbus	$33.5	$4.9	$27.9	$8.5	$74.8	$237,507
Laughlin	$35.3	$5.7	$32.2	$11.0	$84.2	$245,039
Reese	$32.1	$5.5	$31.0	$9.9	$78.5	$244,619
Vance	$33.8	$5.7	$25.4	$4.9	$69.8	$232,394

* Although not specifically asked for, medical fixed costs are also provided. These costs are not included in any other of the fixed costs provided.

Definitions:

Mission Fixed Costs: Open-the-door costs to enter one student. Includes Instructors, school overhead, and maintenance.

RPM Fixed Costs: The upkeep on the facilities that is required whether or not you have students in training (e.g., utilities).

BOS Fixed Costs: Base operating support costs that are required to support the fixed personnel (e.g., transportation, supply, grounds maintenance, chaplains, comptroller).

Medical Fixed Costs: Open-the-door costs to enter one student (e.g., supplies, and equipment to support fixed population).

Variable Cost Per Graduate: The cost of sending one additional student through SUPT. It does not include any fixed costs.

Mr. Nemfakos. The Navy has issued a data call to collect these data. We will forward a response as soon as possible.

Brig Gen Shane.

Estimated costs for Undergraduate Pilot Training
Undergraduate Pilot Training fixed-cost: $45,611,784
Undergraduate Pilot Training variable-cost: $30,599 per student
Undergraduate Pilot Training flying hour variable-cost: $322 per flying hour
Undergraduate Pilot Training actual total cost: $114,745,433 (FY 94)
Undergraduate Pilot Training actual civilian salary proportion: $9,150,860 (8.0%)

Mr. Finch: All weather factors (icing, crosswinds, etc.) were captured by weather attrition inputs. The extra weight given to crosswinds represents a measurement of the frequency of crosswinds, not a measure of "lost sorties." While some crosswind exposure is useful, frequent crosswinds complicate the learning process and can cause last-minute scheduling changes.

The T-38 attrition rate planning factor at Reese is 28 percent compared to 17 percent for the T-1. Since the T-1 factor is currently in use at Reese, why did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group use the T-38 instead of the T-1 planning factor in its functional value analysis?

Mr. Finch: In computing the T-1 attrition planning factors, the JCSG used the reported value for Reese AFB and a surrogate, based on existing aircraft, for the other sites. In the final analysis, no Air Force site received points for the T-1 planning factor in the JCSG model. Based on T-37/T-38 attrition planning factor comparisons across sites, there is no reason to believe that Reese AFB would gain an advantage from a T-1 planning factor comparison.

7. Mr. Nemfakos, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Davis that you would provide for the record your analysis on Strike Pilot Training Rates. Please provide that general data along with your response to the following specific questions:

Are the flight operations per strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) at NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville used in your capacity analysis the same? Please explain any differences.

ANSWER: Yes, the analysis used 1511 daylight flight operations per Strike PTR

What is the current operations per strike Pilot Training Rate at NAS Kingsville? How does this compare with the figure used to determine strike Pilot Training Rate capacity at NAS Kingsville?

ANSWER: NAS Kingsville's data call reported a daylight flight operations requirement for an all T-45 syllabus of 1393 ops. The 1511 ops used in the analysis was derived as follows. Because in FY 2001 not all strike training will be done in T-45 aircraft, we assumed 50 percent of the Strike pilots would go through an all T-45 syllabus and 50 percent would go through a split syllabus consisting of an Intermediate phase in the T-2 aircraft and an Advanced phase in the T-45 aircraft. Based on certified data, the flight ops requirement for this split syllabus was calculated as follows:

Intermediate Phase in T-2 -- 741 (from NAS Meridian' data call)
Advanced Phase in T-45 -- 888 (from NAS Kingsville's data call)
Total: 1,629

Taking a weighted average, this gives

(1393 x .5) + (1629 x .5) = 1511 daylight flight ops per Strike PTR

8. Mr. Finch, your optimization analysis apparently placed primary emphasis on the installation military value data provided to you by the services, and less emphasis on the functional values developed by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group.

Please explain the reasoning for this approach?

ANSWER: Sites have value both with respect to their ability to accommodate activities involving specific functions (e.g., those associated with flight training) and the more general military missions of the Military Departments. For the former, the initial means of representing value for flight training functions was to consider the capacity of sites collectively to carry out all the functions associated with flight training. This was done by introducing a set of constraints that ensured that there was sufficient capacity in the collection of sites that remained open to handle all flight training functions.

Beyond ensuring there was sufficient capacity to perform flight training functions, the Group's methods next considered military value, maximizing the inherent military value of all sites that remained open to carry out general military missions of the Military Departments.

Finally, the Group's method considered the value of sites that remained open to perform flight training functions. Since functional value was already considered implicitly by setting constraints that guaranteed sufficient capacity to carry out all functions, this additional consideration of functional value was given lower priority.

To allow functional value to drive the model is relevant only if we assume functions can be easily moved and are completely interoperable. In practice, this led to nonsensical results during the early, "unconstrained" model runs. For example, Navy Strike training with its attendant costly T-45 infrastructure was spread to four sites. Other functions were swapped between Air Force and Navy sites. Site functional value was also a more narrow look at installation value, as it did not consider collateral missions such as technical training. The Military Departments' inputs encompassed all functions and potential alternative uses of the installation.

9. Mr. Finch, your Joint Cross-Service Group minutes of March 24, 1994, state that the UPT category is largely installation oriented. If the value of a UPT base is best reflected in its functional rather than military value, why didn't you base your alternatives on model output which maximized functional value unconstrained by installation military value?

Since there is a direct correlation between the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional value rating and the Air Force's determination of military value, didn't the use of both functional and military value in the model simply increase the impact of functional value in the result?

ANSWER: Functional and military values are not independent. SECDEF guidelines define the first four BRAC criteria as military value. Criterion one is "mission requirements." This indicates functional value is a significant element of military value. There is also no single

flying mission. In the case of UPT bases, average functional value scores, the BCEG "Stop Light" analysis, and professional judgment all indicated Reese AFB is the correct base to close. The Air Force does not believe the results would have been different if functional value were used as an exclusive measure. However, using only functional value would be a narrow analysis and would not comply with Secretary of Defense guidelines. In addition, the Air Force made a conscious effort to fully integrate, where possible, the Joint Group process into its entire 1995 BRAC analysis. For the Laboratory, Test and Evaluation, and Depot subcategories, the Air Force used Joint Group data, the same methodology and, with few exceptions, the same measures of merit to produce the functional portion of the Criterion I grade for those installations. For the Undergraduate Flying Training category, the Air Force used the Joint Group functional values as the basis for its Criterion I grade. These steps ensured that the Air Force analysis was consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the Joint Group direction on analysis of these functions.

It should be noted that the average functional values were not used to find "military value," but were instead used to determine the Criterion I grade. Military value, under the criteria, consists of the first four criteria.

Finally, the BCEG examined the functional values derived by JCSG-UPT. After discussion, the BCEG agreed to include all activities pertaining to Air Force operations as the basis for the average functional value. Including all potential flying training activities rather than the training actually accomplished provides a better analysis of both current and potential training value.

13. Mr. Finch, did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group run any excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model, such as the ones shown on below:

a. Examining only Air Force Bases
b. Examining only Naval Air Stations
c. Excluding flight screening
d. Excluding Navy-unique functional areas
e. Excluding Air Force-unique functional areas
f. Changing the weights on various factors, such as airspace.

ANSWER: The Group was sensitive to the potential issue of adjusting the model after the data had been collected. Excursions to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to movement of new functions to new sites given differing minimum site levels was performed. Service specific excursions were not performed, given the joint perspective of the Group's efforts.

What would the results be if these excursions were run?

ANSWER: It would be inappropriate to speculate as to potential results without running the model.

Both Air Force and Navy UPT programs train predominantly over land. This is to permit such over-land flight training events as ground reference maneuvers and low-level navigation. Over-water training is performed close to shore. Since actual UPT practice precludes the use of large blocks of over-water airspace, doesn't giving credit for such over-water airspace unfairly skew the results in favor of coastal bases?

ANSWER: Over-water airspace has intrinsic value to the Navy and the consensus of the JCSG was to consider it equally with over-land airspace.

18. Mr. Finch, did either the Services or the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider the impact of contracting some UPT functional training areas to outside sources?

ANSWER: No. The JCSG charter was to help size infrastructure, not to make policy decisions.

19. General Blume, does closing Reese AFB leave sufficient capacity in the UPT area to provide for surge capability in pilot training?

ANSWER: Yes. The closure of one Air Force UPT base leaves sufficient capacity to provide for surge capability. However, there is not enough excess capacity to close more than one Air Force UPT base.

20. Mr. Finch, all of your alternatives move the Navy's helicopter training to Fort Rucker. There are several different ways to implement this alternative. For example, the Navy could retain their current helicopter training process and be collocated at Fort Rucker as an Army tenant; or the Navy's pilots could be integrated into the Army training through a consolidation. Did the Joint Cross Service Group consider the issue of consolidation vs. collocation when developing its alternatives?

ANSWER: No. The JCSG was not established to consider policy issues related to undergraduate pilot training. Therefore, its approach was to use existing policies that were applicable to the various functions considered by the Group. In the case of helicopter training, existing policy was, and is, not to consolidate such training for the Army and Navy. Therefore, only alternatives that involved collocating or not collocating this function were considered.

21. Mr. Finch, the Navy responded to your alternatives to close Whiting Field with COBRA analyses that showed a high cost of implementing the move of primary training to Naval Air Station Pensacola and helicopter training to Fort Rucker.

Did the UPT-Joint Cross Service Group look at variations to this scenario, such as the relocation of helicopter training to Fort Rucker with primary training remaining at Whiting Field?

ANSWER: Given the resource requirements, site capacities and functional values, and site military values, the Optimization Model consistently moved the helicopter function to Fort Rucker and closed NAS Whiting Field. The Group did not look at additional variations.

26. Mr. Finch, please discuss the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

What alternatives or "strawmen" did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider?

ANSWER: The Group evaluated three alternatives for the NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex: 1) A JPATS Primary "Master" site, 2) a Strike/Bomber-Fighter complex with Strike at NAS Meridian and Bomber-Fighter at Columbus AFB, and 3) moving Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV to NAS Meridian to allow creation of a JPATS Primary "Master" site at NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field. The first alternative's up-front costs - building five outlying fields and relocating Columbus AFB's Bomber Fighter function to Laughlin AFB were considered excessive. The second alternative was dropped because it did not result in the net increase of a "base complex," would waste significant investment in the T-45 training system at NAS Kingsville, and it would also require high, up-front cost at NAS Meridian. The third alternative, while not as costly to implement as alternative one, was discounted as the Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV functions could be readily accommodated by those flight training bases not recommended for closure. (JCSG Meeting Minutes of February 23, 1995).

What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

ANSWER: None.

What cost advantages were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

ANSWER: The JCSG considered potential savings in shared or combined facilities from a JPATS site consolidation or formation of a JPATS base complex, but found they could not readily be identified. The Group also agreed that savings, if any, would be well in the future. In reviewing the base complex issue, the Group found no clear or compelling rationale to change the Military Departments' recommendations.

27. Mr. Nemfakos, if the redirect of mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi is not approved, what impact would that have on the operations per day available for pilot training at Corpus Christi?

How much do other flight operations at Corpus Christi reduce daily operations available for pilot training?

ANSWER: Operating mine warfare helicopters out of NAS Corpus Christi would have a negligible effect on the runway operations available for pilot training. All other flight operations at NAS Corpus Christi, to include the proposed mine warfare helicopter operations, require less than 5 percent of NAS Corpus Christi's pilot training capacity.

aggregate one-time costs for NAWC AC Lakehurst, NJ plus the one-time costs for NAS Pensacola, FL. The exact cost will be determined as part of the implementation planning and budgeting process; however, it would be expected that the final cost would be of a similar magnitude.

3. Do facilities exist at Pensacola for the housing of the Lakehurst NATTC students?

ANSWER: Yes. BRAC 93 moved average onboard of 5004 students to NAS Pensacola. BRAC 95 adds the relocation of aviation students from both NTTC Meridian and Lakehurst, a total of 162 additional students. Barracks space was sized under BRAC 93 to accommodate the planned force structure through the end of the century. The FY 2001 average onboard for aviation students, including Meridian and Lakehurst, is 4226. The Navy is under contract to build BEQ space for 4924 beds. This number includes planned onboard, transient students and a surge capability. In view of this, the BSEC made a determination that no additional BEQ construction was required.

4. What type of delay or disruptions are anticipated or planned for in the training of these aircraft carrier student pilots while the training facility is disassembled, moved and recreated in Pensacola?

ANSWER: NATTC Lakehurst Detachment does not train aircraft carrier student pilots.

Questions submitted by Senators Shelby and Heflin and Congressman Everett:

1. In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in there entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed-wing training at Whiting NAS.

a. Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Ft. Rucker was not adopted?

ANSWER: **Mr. Nemfakos.** While the recommendations forwarded by the UPT Joint Cross-Service Group called for moving the DON's Advanced Helicopter training to Fort Rucker, they said nothing about consolidating UHPT. Because of operational differences in training Navy and Army helicopter pilots, in evaluating these proposals, the DON only considered the co-location of UHPT.

years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years for this scenario is a savings of $7 million.

3. In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary-wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary-wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

a. From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. There is a fundamental difference in how the Army and the naval services desire to train their pilots from an operational perspective; each has its own set of validated requirements that drive its training program, the location for the training, and efficiencies derived. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard training requirements include fixed-wing training for all students, emphasis on basic and radio instrument training, situational awareness/unusual attitude/aerobatic training and shipboard landing training. We use aircraft systems as well as simulators and ground support systems that are different from those used by the Army in support of this specialized training. Then too, we believe that the operational environment in which our helicopter pilots will eventually be required to fly validates and mandates our current approach to UHPT. For example, the absolute necessity for aviator competence in over water flight, where aircraft performance and navigational techniques employed differ significantly from those over land, carries unique training demands. And, especially for Marine helicopter pilots, replacement of the aging CH-46 fleet with V-22 aircraft that feature in-flight transitions between rotary and fixed-wing modes will spawn a completely different dynamic for which they must be trained. In contrast, Army requirements and training are oriented toward the day/night VMC, ground contact environment that supports the Army mission in the field.

What makes the most sense for all the Services is to adhere to training programs that best prepare pilots to function in the respective operational environments in which they will be employed. Different requirements produce efficiencies unique to the specific training program at each base (NAS Whiting Field and Fort Rucker). It should be noted that intent of the Secretary of Defense in establishing a JCSG for UPT was not for it to examine the UPT programs of the Services with an eye toward consolidation, but to assist the Military Departments in identifying asset sharing opportunities. To what extent "jointness" is served by consolidation of UHPT, whether it should be, and which Service ought to conduct consolidated UHPT for all are issues more appropriately addressed outside the base realignment and closure process.

4. During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

6. Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

A number of Army missions in support of Naval operations:

1983: Operation Urgent Fury
*Shipboard operations involving the Army's 18th Airborne Corps: UH-60's, OH-58A/C's, AH-1's

1987: Operation Prime Chance
*Shipboard and overwater operations involving the Army's 4/17th CAV (now 4/2) with OH-58D's
*valid CONOPS mission today

1994: Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti
*10th Mountain Division operated from the USS Eisenhower
*OH-58D's had extensive missions prior to invasion
*UH-60's, CH-47's, OH-58A/C's and AH-I's transported troops and equipment to the AO for several days, followed by command & control missions

Each Army Aviation unit has a task for shipboard operations incorporated in their mission essential list of tasks. The Army trains for shipboard operations and performs shipboard operations.

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. As mentioned in response to question 1, training for Army helicopter pilots and naval aviators is designed to prepare them for two significantly different operational environments. The record of employment of Army helicopters shows that the Army does operate from Navy ships on certain occasions and under visual meteorological (VMC) weather conditions. However, Army helicopter pilots are not trained for, and do not operate during, degraded weather conditions. In contrast, every Navy pilot is trained to operate from large and small deck ships under all weather conditions. In each of the cases cited above, Army helicopters were required due to unique mission circumstances and operated under favorable weather conditions as directed by senior Defense Department officials.

7. In 1992, MGen. Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a "cutting" tool for students.

a. Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra "cutting" tool?

below 1500 feet. Commercial airliners overfly training airspace at altitudes above 24,000 feet. Navy fixed-wing aircraft conduct landing operations at exclusive fixed-wing airfields, which are specifically designed to train naval aviators to land day or night, in fair or foul weather, and aboard the confined landing areas of our ships at sea. These airfields are located within ten miles of home field, enhancing training efficiency and lowering cost per completed student sortie. NAS Whiting, in effect, is two airfields for the price of one. There are no course rule conflicts between fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft operating at these two fields. Operations in joint-use areas are normally conducted using air traffic control procedures and/or radar monitoring. Additionally, helicopters, by design, can operate at very slow airspeeds. As a result, near mid-air collisions involving Navy helicopters are virtually non-existent. In contrast, increased congestion at Fort Rucker would result from consolidating training there.

Fort Rucker is larger than NAS Whiting Field. However, NAS Whiting Field meets all present and future Navy requirements for primary and helicopter training and includes sufficient maritime operating areas for the Helicopter Landing Trainer ship. Additionally, the area around Fort Rucker has a much greater concentration of noise sensitive areas than does NAS Whiting Field.

Fort Rucker requires significant facilities MILCON, extensive rehabilitation and upgrade of existing structures and, equally important, extensive quality of life improvements to support consolidated training. Facilities meeting the Navy's requirements for both mission and quality of life are currently available and in use at NAS Whiting Field.

Brig Gen Shane. Yes. According to Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross- Service Group certified data, the total DoD throughput in the near future is 1,481. This training rate would only engage 72% of Fort Rucker's present capacity for undergraduate helicopter pilot training.

Document Separator

Staff Analysis II

UPT Scores Corrected & New Weights

Base	Score	Z	Color
Reese	6.3	0.13	Green –
Columbus	6.4	0.22	Green –
Laughlin	7.4	1.14	Green
Randolph	4.4	−1.61	Red
Vance	6.3	0.13	Green –

$\bar{X} = 6.16$

$s = 1.09$

$$Z = \frac{\text{Value} - \text{Mean}}{\text{Std Dev.}}$$

COMMISSION

~~BCEG~~

Statistical Test of Revised UPT Scores

			z	Rating	COMMISSION
Scores:	Columbus	6.74	1.05	Green.	Green
	Laughlin	6.50	-0.15	Yellow+	Yellow
	Randolph	6.53	0.00	Green-	Yellow
	Reese	6.22	-1.55	Red	Red
	Vance	6.67	0.70	Green	Yellow+



$\bar{x} = 6.53$

$s = 0.2004$

$n = 5$

$t_{0.10} = 2.132$

$v = n-1 = 4$

$$\bar{x} \pm t\frac{s}{\sqrt{n}}$$

$$\bar{x} \pm \frac{2.132(0.20)}{2.236068}$$

$$\bar{x} \pm 0.19069$$

$$6.34 \leq \bar{x} \leq 6.72$$

$\therefore$ 6.22 is outside of 90% confidence interval

$$z = \frac{\text{Value} - \text{Mean}}{\text{Standard Deviation}} = \frac{x-\mu}{\sigma} = \frac{6.22-6.53}{0.2004} = -1.55$$

Area between mean & this value of $z = 0.4394$

$\therefore \mu \pm 1.55\sigma = 0.8788 \cong 88\%$

BottomLine: New data generates new color ratings for AF UPT bases.

Staff Analysis I

UPT Scores Recalculation

Base	Score	Z	Color
Reese	6.4	-0.30	Yellow +
Columbus	7.2	0.55	Green
Laughlin	7.8	1.19	Green
Randolph	5.3	-1.47	Red +
Vance	6.7	0.02	Green -

$\bar{X} = 6.68$

$s = 0.94$

$$Z = \frac{\text{Value} - \text{Mean}}{\text{Std Dev}}$$

SCENARIO X

Corrected Test of Ratio Applied Scores of PRI/ALTK/BM-FTR UPT

			Z	Rating
Scores:	Randolph	7.12	1.46	Green
	Vance	6.83	-0.12	Yellow+
	Reese	6.64	-1.15	Red+
	Laughlin	6.74	-0.61	Yellow
	Columbus	6.93	0.42	Green-

$\bar{X} = 6.852$

$s = 0.184$

$n = 5$

$t_{0.10} = 2.132$

$\nu = n-1 = 4$

$\bar{X} \pm \frac{2.132(0.184)}{2.236068}$

$\bar{X} \pm 0.175$

$6.68 \le \bar{X} \le 7.027$ ∴ Reese slightly outside 90% conf. lvl

$$Z = \frac{\text{Value} - \text{Mean}}{\text{Stand Dev}} = \frac{X - \mu}{\sigma} =$$



- Ensure cross-service analysis
- Charter in DEPSECDEF memo, Jan 7, 94
- Immediate tasks:
  - conduct non-BRAC policy review
  - * design capacity analysis
  - * { determine measures of merit / determine common data elements } support DoD Closure criteria
- * UPT Category Scope
  - Programs
  - Fixed, Rotary wing
  - Off/Enl
  - * Installations
- DoD Screening policy - why wasn't AF position accepted?
  - * Flt Screening reduces attrition rate *
  - * No functional value for IFF - why? (Navy Strike Lead-In)
- JPATS standard
- UPT - JCSG consideration of DoD criteria - appropriateness
  - * Functional area for Army fixed-wing?
- In-flight separation philosophy differences affect on capacity - std assumptions
- External Policy Decisions
  - Flt Screening
  - Acft mix
  - Fixed wing for Helo students
  - UHPT Consolidation
  - JPATS Syllabus (VFR vs IFR, Class Progression)
  - Acft Beddown
- Outsourcing UPT
- Accounting for other activities at UPT bases
- * Data call to support DoD military value closure criteria
- WX Data call
  - Icing
  - Ceiling 1000/3 vs 1500/3
  - Crosswinds >15 kts, >25 kts
- Over water requirement
  - 4 sorties/syllabus (STRIKE, MARITIME Patrol) - no training carrier (Det to Atlantic/Pacific)
- Roles & Missions Study efforts impact on JCSG analysis

UPT - JCSG

UPT - JST (Joint Study Team)

MG Profitt	AETC
RADM Hayden	CNATRA
BG Riggs	USAAVNC

Unnecessarily complicates UPT analysis
- AFA Air Field will not close
- Hondo below BRAC threshold
- FS capacity does not affect UPT capacity
- Service policy decision

How does the functional value analysis of Flt Screening help distinguish the relative merits of UPT bases when there is no intent to ever conduct Flt Screening at a UPT base?

- Extent to which Decision-PAD model (to determine functional value) and Mixed-Integer Linear Programming model aided or inhibited application of common sense and judgement. DACS-TABS: Maj Chuck Fletcher 2A684/71765/6
  * Sensitivity analysis
- Flt Trng workload (avg onboard-daily) and Historic Peak - how reliable?

Capt Clark
AETC/XOSW
DSN 487-3367

LTC McClerkan

		REESE	COL	LAU	RAN	VAN
WX ≥ 1500/3		91.5 ✓	~~88.5~~ 89.1 ✓	90.29 ✓	~~82.5~~ 83.6 ✓	89.14 ✓
WX ≥ 300/1	~~93:~~	~~98.1~~	~~98.1~~	~~98.3~~		~~97.3~~
(pg. 18)	95:	~~98.2~~ 98.4 ✓	99.0 ✓	98.89 ✓	97.89 ✓	~~98.0~~ 97.9 ✓
ICING DAYS: TERM	95:	17	7	2	2	19
AREA ?			42	<10	NA	
AMOUT OF AIRSPACE OWNED/USED		27,214	20,545	40,435	9,685	27,945
AVG DIST TO AIRSPACE		32.6	33.2	16.8	43.8	12.3
% CROSSWIND < 15 KTS		93.2 ✓	99.22 ✓	99.23 ✓	~~97.8~~ 98.4 ✓	~~93.2~~ 97.8 ✓
% CROSSWIND < 25 KTS		98.6 ✓	~~100.0~~ 99.9 ✓	~~100.0~~ 99.9 ✓	99.9 ✓	99.18 ✓
AIRFIELD CONDITION		VERIFY		100%		
RWY COND	(111)	85%	100%	21%	66%	100%
TAXIWAYS	(112)	62%	100%	83%	36%	73%
APRONS	(113)	9%	100%	1%	23%	100%

Staff Analysis I

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1500/3 > 80?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85	91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
1000/3 > 80?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	45	93.60%	92.00%	94.30%+	90.00%-	91.80%	80-95%, 80 LO
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30	93.20%--	99.20%+	99.30%+	98.40%	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25	1.40%--	0.10%+	0.10%+	0.10%+	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85	19.8%	22.9%-	18.0%+	15.0%++	23.3%--	10-25%, 10% HI
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	0	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y(10)/N(0)
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30	27.0%-	26.0%-	19.0%+	19.0%+	22.3%	15-30%, 15% HI
WEATHER ---	300	4.7	5.4	7.4	6.0	5.3	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100	31116--	45092	53868+	85447++	36084-	0-60K, 60K HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	42.6	39.5	31.5+	65.2--	36.1+	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	9	11	10	18	32+	0-20, 20 HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20	N-	Y+	N-	Y+	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	12	2	4	3	20-	0-30, 0 HI
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	200	5.0	7.8	7.9	7.8	6.1	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25	17	43	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-10K RW,10K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50	C	C	C	B-	F+	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25	85.00%	100.00%	85.00%	66.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20	32.00%	100.00%+	42.00%	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10	92.00%	100.00%	59.00%	51.00%	97.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10	87.00%	76.00%	60.00%	40.00%	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRFIELDS ---	150	8.2	8.9	7.7	6.0	9.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL

Staff Analysis I

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14	59469	84459	68320	135526	26652-	0-100K, 100K HI
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14	60863.0	63354.0	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8	51572.0	17029.0	19365.0	36060.0	68639.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	4	99.00%	36.00%	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	50	7.9	7.4	7.3	8.6	7.8	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	60	D	D	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	12	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	100	7.0	7.1	6.4	7.4	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90	Y++	Y++	Y++	N--	Y++	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	50	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	40	4.00%+	0.00%+	0.00%+	18.00%--	18.00%--	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	200	8.6	8.9	10.0	0.0	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0	152.0	264.0	222.0	558.0	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0	462.0	690.0	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0	93.00%	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0	400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0	230.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI

Staff Analysis I

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	216.0	14.0	150.0	186.0	30.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
SERVICES ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
	===						
SCORE	1000	6.4	7.4	7.9	5.4	6.6	
RANK		4	2	1	5	3	

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT		REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0		Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	0		?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85		91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
%TIME WTHER > 300/1	45		98.40%	99.00%	98.90%	97.90%	97.90%	95-100%,100% HI
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10		93.20%-	99.20%	99.30%	98.40%	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	15		1.40%-	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
FRZNG PRECP DAYS	15		17-	7	2+	2+	19-	0-20, 0 HI
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	15		50	144-	15+	15+	80	0-100, 0 HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85		19.8%	22.9%--	18.0%+	15.0%++	23.3%--	10-25%, 10% HI
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30		27.0%-	26.0%-	19.0%+	19.0%+	22.3%	15-30%, 15% HI
WEATHER ---		300	4.7	4.7	7.0	5.8	4.3	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100		27214	20545-	40435++	9685--	27945	0-60K, 60K HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40		32.6-	33.2-	16.8+	43.8--	12.3++	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		14	11	10	18	32+	0-20, 20 HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20		N-	Y+	N-	Y+	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0		NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		12	2	4	3	20+	0-30, 0 HI
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		200	4.1	4.0	5.7	2.8	6.0	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25		17	43	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-10K RW,10K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50		C	C	C	B-	F+	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25	76?	85.00%	100.00%	85.00%	66.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20	✓	32.00%	100.00%+	42.00%	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		92.00%	100.00%	59.00%	51.00%	97.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		87.00%	76.00%	60.00%	40.00%	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRFIELDS ---		150	8.2	8.9	7.7	6.0	9.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14		59469	84459	68320	135526	26652-	0-100K, 100K HI

30 Hi

REVERSED !!

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14	60863.0	63354.0	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8	51572.0	17029.0	19365.0	36060.0	68639.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	4	99.00%	36.00%	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	50	7.9	7.4	7.3	8.6	7.8	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	60	D	D	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	12	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	100	7.0	7.1	6.4	7.4	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90	Y++	Y++	Y++	N--	Y++	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	50	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	40	4.00%+	0.00%++	0.00%++	18.00%--	18.00%--	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	200	8.6	8.9	10.0	0.0	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0	152.0	264.0	222.0	558.0	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0	462.0	690.0	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0	93.00%	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0	400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0	230.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	216.0	14.0	150.0	186.0	30.0	0-MAX, MIN HI

Staff Analysis II

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
SERVICES ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
	===						
SCORE	1000	6.3	6.4	7.4	4.4	6.3	
RANK		3	2	1	5	3	

Document Separator

Lehmann/Feld 5/12 p 2/2
Reese Community

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & CALCULATIONS, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0		1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0		N	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		0.000001		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
1500/3 > 80?	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85		83.60%	2.0	89.40%	5.3	91.50%	6.5	90.90%	6.2	89.10%	5.2
1000/3 > 80?	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	45		90.00%	3.0	91.80%	3.5	93.60%	4.1	94.30%	4.3	92.00%	3.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		98.40%	2.6	97.80%	2.3	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25		0.10%	2.5	0.20%	2.1	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	2.5	0.10%	2.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85		15.00%	5.7	23.30%	1.0	19.80%	2.9	18.00%	4.0	22.90%	1.2
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	0		Y	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30		19.00%	2.2	22.30%	1.5	27.00%	0.6	19.00%	2.2	26.00%	0.8
WEATHER ---		300		6.0		5.3		4.7		7.4		5.4
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100		85447	10.0	36084	6.0	31116	5.2	53868	9.0	45092	7.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40		65.2	0.0	36.1	3.5	42.6	2.7	31.5	4.0	39.5	3.1
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		18	1.8	32	2.0	9	0.9	10	1.0	11	1.1
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	0		0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	MAX-HI	3	0.2	20	1.3	12	0.8	4	0.3	2	0.1
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		200		7.0		6.4		4.8		7.1		6.9
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0		1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25	1.7	20	2.4	26	2.2	17	2.5	22	2.3	43	1.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.7	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.8	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50	0.3	2	2.9	3.5	5.0	3	4.3	3	4.3	3	4.3
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25		66%	1.7	100%	2.5	85%	2.1	85%	2.1	100%	2.5
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20		27%	0.5	88%	1.8	32%	0.6	42%	0.8	100%	2.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		150		6.0		9.2		8.2		7.7		8.8
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14		135526	1.4	26652	0.4	59469	0.8	68320	1.0	84459	1.2
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5		83%	0.4	86%	0.4	100%	0.5	91%	0.5	100%	0.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14		66423	1.2	75207	1.4	60863	1.1	70689	1.3	63354	1.2
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8		36060	0.4	68639	0.8	51572	0.6	19365	0.2	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	4		78%	0.3	100%	0.4	99%	0.4	54%	0.2	36%	0.1
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		50		8.6		7.8		7.9		7.3		7.4
LVL MAINT OPS	60		I	4.0	I	4.0	D	4.6	I	4.0	D	4.6
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28		238496	2.8	156858	1.8	147685	1.7	151346	1.8	151102	1.8
COND OF HANGARS	12		52%	0.6	64%	0.8	54%	0.6	48%	0.6	57%	0.7
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		100		7.4		6.6		7.0		6.4		7.1
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0		N	0.0	Y	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		1E-08		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
AIR QUALITY ---		1E-14		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90		N	0.0	Y	9.0	Y	9.0	Y	9.0	Y	9.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0		0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	50		22%	0.0	1%	4.8	0%	5.0	0%	5.0	1%	4.8
%INCOMPAT APZII	40		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	3.1	0%	4.0	0%	4.0
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
ENCROACHMENT ---		200		0.0		6.9		8.6		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0		558	0.0	247	0.0	152	0.0	222	0.0	264	0.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0		100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0		521	0.0	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.0
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0		100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0		87%	0.0	70%	0.0	93%	0.0	87%	0.0	87%	0.0
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0		948	0.0	230	0.0	400	0.0	654	0.0	812	0.0
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0		27%	0.0	0%	0.0	72%	0.0	54%	0.0	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		1E-15		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
SCORE		1000		5.3		6.7		6.4		7.8		7.2
CORRECT SCORE		1000		5.4		6.6		6.5		7.9		7.4
RANK				5		3		4		1		2

Handed to F Cirillo by Lehmann/Feld 5/12 p 1/2
Reese community

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & CALCULATIONS, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
ICING DATA AND AIRSPACE OWNED AND SCHEDULED USED

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0		1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0		N	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		0.000001		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
1500/3 > 80?	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85		83.60%	2.0	89.40%	5.3	91.50%	6.5	90.90%	6.2	89.10%	5.2
1000/3 > 80?	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 300/1	45		97.90%	2.6	97.90%	2.6	98.40%	3.1	98.90%	3.5	99.00%	3.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10		98.40%	0.9	97.80%	0.8	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	1.0	99.20%	1.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	15		0.10%	1.5	0.20%	1.3	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.5	0.10%	1.5
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	15		2	1.4	19	0.1	17	0.2	2	1.4	7	1.0
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	15		15	1.3	80	0.3	50	0.8	15	1.3	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85		15.00%	5.7	23.30%	1.0	19.80%	2.9	18.00%	4.0	22.90%	1.2
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	0		Y	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30		19.00%	2.2	22.30%	1.5	27.00%	0.6	19.00%	2.2	26.00%	0.8
WEATHER —		300		5.8		4.3		4.7		7.0		4.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100		9685	1.6	27945	4.7	27214	4.5	40435	6.7	20545	3.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40		43.8	0.0	12.3	4.0	32.6	1.4	16.8	3.4	33.2	1.3
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		18	1.8	32	2.0	14	1.4	10	1.0	11	1.1
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	0		0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	MAX-HI	3	0.2	20	1.3	12	0.8	4	0.3	2	0.1
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		200		2.8		6.0		4.1		5.7		4.0
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0		1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0	1	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25	1.7	20	2.4	26	2.2	17	2.5	22	2.3	43	1.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.7	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.8	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50	0.3	2	2.9	3.5	5.0	3	4.3	3	4.3	3	4.3
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25		66%	1.7	100%	2.5	85%	2.1	85%	2.1	100%	2.5
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20		27%	0.5	88%	1.8	32%	0.6	42%	0.8	100%	2.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		150		6.0		9.2		8.2		7.7		8.8
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14		135526	1.4	26652	0.4	59469	0.8	68320	1.0	84459	1.2
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5		83%	0.4	86%	0.4	100%	0.5	91%	0.5	100%	0.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14		66423	1.2	75207	1.4	60863	1.1	70689	1.3	63354	1.2
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8		36060	0.4	68639	0.8	51572	0.6	19365	0.2	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	4		78%	0.3	100%	0.4	99%	0.4	54%	0.2	36%	0.1
GRNF TRNG FAC —		50		8.6		7.8		7.9		7.3		7.4
LVL MAINT OPS	60		I	4.0	I	4.0	D	4.6	I	4.0	D	4.6
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28		238496	2.8	156858	1.8	147685	1.7	151346	1.8	151102	1.8
COND OF HANGARS	12		52%	0.6	64%	0.8	54%	0.6	48%	0.6	57%	0.7
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		100		7.4		6.6		7.0		6.4		7.1
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0		N	0.0	Y	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		1E-08		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
AIR QUALITY —		1E-14		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90		N	0.0	Y	9.0	Y	9.0	Y	9.0	Y	9.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0		0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	50		22%	0.0	1%	4.8	0%	5.0	0%	5.0	1%	4.8
%INCOMPAT APZII	40		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	3.1	0%	4.0	0%	4.0
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	0		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.0
ENCROACHMENT —		200		0.0		6.9		8.6		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0		558	0.0	247	0.0	152	0.0	222	0.0	264	0.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0		100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0		521	0.0	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.0
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0		100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0	100%	0.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0		87%	0.0	70%	0.0	93%	0.0	87%	0.0	87%	0.0
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0		948	0.0	230	0.0	400	0.0	654	0.0	812	0.0
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0		27%	0.0	0%	0.0	72%	0.0	54%	0.0	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES —		1E-15		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
SCORE		1000		4.4		6.3		6.3		7.4		6.4
CORRECT SCORE		1000		4.5		6.2		6.3		7.5		6.6
RANK				5		3		4		1		2

Document Separator

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

20 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Additional Data on Undergraduate Pilot Training Capacity Analysis

As per Commissioner Cox's question during the recent hearings concerning Air Force UPT capacity in the out years, the attached slides are provided.

JAY D. BLUME JR, Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

Attachment:
"Pilot Production Capacity Analysis"

OT-4634

Pilot Production Capacity Analysis

AF/XOOT

AF/DPXOF

AETC/XOTI

Production Capacity Analysis

- SUPT equivalent: flying hour / workload unit
  - Accepted standard for BRAC capacity analysis
  - Excludes ENJJPT and cross-service advanced tracks
  - Includes intl / interservice / short course equivalents
- FY02: 1078 SUPT equivalent = 1100 AD, 145 ARC
  - Unprogrammed AFRES request for +30 SUPT beginning FY98
- Closing one base is workable
  - Closing two bases leaves a clear gap



Pilot Production Concerns Beyond FYDP

- Need 1100/year AD <u>average</u> to sustain 20FWE force
  - Correcting cumulative shortfall could require additional 100-150/yr, even with continued good retention
- ARC hiring pool shrinks in FY03
  - Low-production AD "bathtub" hits end of ADSC in FY03
  - Potential requirement for additional SUPT for ARC
  - RAND analysis supports concerns
- JPATS transition cuts into capacity starting FY02
  - Capacity normally used for students taken up by conversion
- Downturn in retention could require increased SUPT
  - Current retention estimates assume continued pilot bonus
  - Loss of bonus or surge in airline hiring could increase losses
- Future force structure always uncertain

ARC Hiring Pool Critical in FY03

Historically <50% of 8-15 year AD exits hired to ARC; 100% insufficient in FY03. Alternatives may require increased new pilot production.



Air Force and Navy Pilot Production

Active Duty



Document Separator

HQ AETC
Plans & Operations
1 F Street, Suite 2
Randolph AFB, TX 78150-4325

From:

Sender: LTCOL DAVID A. MCCLURKIN
Fax: (210) 652-6264
Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 1995 10:08 a.m.

To:

Company: BRAC, EXT 168 Merrill Beyer
Phone:
Fax: 882260550

Pages: 2

Please deliver to:

LT COL BEYER

---

16 May 95

MEMORANDUM FOR Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
(Attn: Lt Col Beyer)

FROM: HQ AETC/XOSW
1 F Street, Ste 02
Randolph AFB TX 78150-4325

SUBJECT: Atmospheric Icing Potential at UPT Bases

1. Reference telecon, 12 May 95, Same subject.

2. As indicated in reference telecon, there is no data base which depicts the frequency of atmospheric icing. However, the USAF Environmental Technical Application Center has published a study (USAFETAC/DS-86/001, Climatic Atlas of Icing Potential Over North America, January 1986). This study provides graphic presentation of icing potential, based on the frequency of occurrence of the meteorological conditions required for icing to be present. It lists the potential for trace to light, moderate and severe icing in three layers: Surface to 5000 feet, 5000 feet to 10,000 feet and 10,000 feet to 15,000 feet for each month of the year. The study is based on data from a four year period, 1977 to 1980. The study indicates this is sufficient to provide a representative picture, because of the large number of observations in the data base.

3. The following table is a format for presenting icing potential. We can provide separate tables for each month of the year, depicting the potential for trace to light, moderate and severe icing conditions.

LEVEL	END	REE	LAU	RND	CBM
SFC - 050	XX%	XX%	XX%	XX%	XX%
050 - 100	XX%	XX%	XX%	XX%	XX%
100 - 150	XX%	XX%	XX%	XX%	XX%

4. Please advise us if the information will meet your needs. If you have any questions, I can be reached at DSN 487-3700.

//SIGNED//
DAVID A. MCCLURKIN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Weather Support Branch

cc: HQ USAF/XOWR
HQ AETC/XOPU

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

01 APR 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Response to "Preliminary Review of Air Force and JCSG Analysis, Reese AFB"

Attached is the Air Force response to the "Preliminary Review of Air Force and Joint Cross Service Group Analysis, Reese Air Force Base" per your 22 March request.

JAY D. BLUME JR, Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

Attachment:
Air Force Point Paper

RESPONSE TO "PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF AIR FORCE AND JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ANALYSES, REESE AIR FORCE BASE" MARCH 15, 1995

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The Secretary of Defense has made recommendations to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as part of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) 95 process. Both the Commission and the affected communities are reviewing the recommendations.

This report addresses the concerns of the Lubbock Community Consultants (LCC) as expressed in their "Preliminary Review of Air Force and Joint Cross Service Group Analyses." The LCC's bottom-line contention is that the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to close Reese AFB, Texas, is based on an analysis which is flawed and inaccurate. As discussed more fully below, the Air Force does not believe there is any merit to this contention. Reese was considered in the Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT) subcategory. It was recommended for closure on the basis of certified data, analyzed accurately and fully consistent with base closure law.

Foreword

To support their contention, the LCC took several approaches. One was to scrutinize the data in the Air Force and Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG-UPT) processes. They did find some inconsistencies between the two data sets and some errors which this report will analyze. None was substantial enough to affect the outcome.

Another approach was to consider data sources outside the BRAC process. These uncertified sources were not available for every base. In some cases, data was from sources published after the appropriate BRAC time frame. Notably, some of this other data would have lowered Reese's ratings.

In many cases the LCC compared Reese's ratings to Vance's ratings. The implication was that either Reese should have been rated higher or Vance should have been rated lower. However, the bases were not rated in pairs. Instead, the bases were compared against the bases within the UFT subcategory. In several cases the LCC charged the dividing lines were arbitrary. They were not. This report will explain scoring on these items.

The LCC questioned why Reese fell from being the Air Force's "second-highest ranked UPT base" in BRAC 91 to last place in BRAC 95. This is an incorrect statement. The Air Force did not "rank" UPT bases in BRAC 91, just as they did not "rank" UPT bases in BRAC 95. The point paper the LCC used as a reference reflected an attempt by a BRAC 91 commission staffer to place numerical values against Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) color coding. The numbers reflected the staffer's judgment, and showed no great differentiation except for Williams AFB. The only UPT recommendation the Air Force or the BRAC Commission made in BRAC 91 was to close Williams AFB.

Overview

This report will first provide background on the BRAC 95 process. For the first time, BRAC included six Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSGs) that were tasked to look at specific functions across military department lines. One was for UPT.

Second, the report will analyze LCC concerns individually. The concerns are divided into four sections. Each section will cover one of the eight BRAC criteria.

Finally, the report will summarize its conclusions. After analyzing the LCC allegations, the Air Force retains a high degree of confidence in the BRAC process and the BRAC recommendations.

THE BRAC 95 PROCESS

Rules of Engagement

The Secretary of Defense established eight BRAC criteria that the Services must use when considering bases for closure. The figure below shows these criteria and the Air Force BCEG ratings (stoplight chart) for each of the UFT bases.

	MILITARY VALUE				RETURN	IMPACT		
	MISSION (FLYING) REQUIREMENTS I.	FACILITIES & INFRA-STRUCTURE II.	CONTINGENCY & MOBILITY III.	COST & MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS IV.	RETURN ON INVESTMENT (YEARS) V.	ECONOMIC IMPACT (JOBS / %) VI.	COMMUNITY SUPPORT VII.	ENVIRON-MENTAL IMPACT VIII.
COLUMBUS			Y	17 / -333	1	2661 / 5.4 %	Y+	Y
LAUGHLIN	Y+	G-	Y-	25 / -275	2	3368 / 20.9%	Y	Y+
RANDOLPH	G-	G-	Y	204 / -59	13	13863 / 1.9%	G-	Y-
REESE		G-	Y-	15 / -259	1	2702 / 2.0%	G-	Y
VANCE		G-	Y-	14 / -254	1	3028 / 9.4%	G-	Y+

AIRSPACE
WEATHER
AIRFIELD
PAVEMENTS

HOUSING
INFRASTRUCTURE

OFF-BASE HOUSING
EDUCATION
TRANSPORTATION

"QUALITY OF LIFE"

ASBESTOS

The first four criteria represent the military value of installations. These criteria have priority. Criterion V is the return on investment. Criteria VI-VIII can affect decisions based on the overall impact in each area.

The LCC particularly emphasized "quality of life." There is no BRAC criterion for quality of life, per se. For example, quality of life concerns are different for a married colonel living off-base than for a single airman living in the dormitories. While no one can score quality of life, the process captures many elements which contribute to quality of life, both on an off duty. The LCC addressed several of these which fell under Criterion VII.

The BRAC process included only certified data. This analysis will also base conclusions only on certified data that was available during the process.

The Secretary of Defense also established the JCSGs. He directed the Services to share analysis and, where possible, to consider the recommendations of the JCSGs. The JCSGs did not recommend base

closures. They offered several alternatives for military department consideration.

Two Interactive Processes

During BRAC 95, the JCSG and BCEG each analyzed UPT bases. Each group had its own focus. The JCSG considered Army, Navy, and Air Force bases, but only the UPT mission. The BCEG considered only Air Force bases, but all missions.

The JCSG and the BCEG each issued a tailored data call and maintained a separate data base. The LCC noted the JCSG data base sometimes reflected different answers to similar questions in the Air Force data. They mistakenly assert this indicates a flaw in the process. This is not the case.

Quality control was very important. Data was certified at the wing, MAJCOM, and Headquarters Air Force levels. The Air Force Audit Agency audited data collection at each level. The DoD IG provided a representative who sat on the JCSG and audited data transfer and use. Despite the oversight and assistance, the sheer volume of data did leave an opportunity for errors. This report found no basis to conclude the data bases contained errors that would or should have changed the Air Force BRAC recommendations.

The JCSG Process



The figure above illustrates the JCSG process. It consisted of three inputs:

a. CAPACITY ANALYSIS. This was a measure of how much training each base can do. In nearly every case, airfield operations became the limiter. Airfield operations is "access to the runway" for takeoffs, landings, approaches, etc. Force structure projections established how many students the services must train. Balancing capacity and requirements helped identify how many bases would be needed.

b. FUNCTIONAL VALUE. This was a measure of how well each base can perform a function, and represents the accumulated analyses of numerous factors. Functions are primary pilot training, rotary-wing pilot training, primary navigator/Naval flight officer training, etc. With some exceptions, the JCSG computed a functional value for each base for each function. Functional value is a number between zero and ten.

c. MILITARY DEPARTMENT RATING. The JCSG felt it was important to have an evaluation from each military department. This ensured a professional judgment from the services about their bases.

The depiction below shows how airspace was scored for primary UPT, using Reese's values to illustrate. It shows graphically that individual subelements did not greatly impact final results.



Amount of airspace is one of six subelements that make up the overall airspace score. Reese scored 4.8 on a scale of 10. Airspace became one of ten inputs to the overall functional value score. Reese scored 6.0 on a scale of 10. The JCSG supplied values for each function to the military departments. The JCSG did not aggregate scores.

The BCEG Process

Since the JCSG had done a focused UPT analysis, the BCEG used JCSG input to derive an average functional value for selected functions. The graph below shows the average functional values for the UPT locations.



The average functional value became the basis for BCEG grading of Criterion I, Mission Requirements, in the previously-illustrated BCEG stoplight chart. The BCEG used the stoplight chart and the eight BRAC criteria to provide the JCSG with a rating for the UPT bases.

The JCSG formulated alternatives for military department consideration. The BCEG provided these alternatives as well as its own analysis to the Secretary of the Air Force who made the Air Force recommendation.

CRITERION I: MISSION

Perspective

Reese was color-coded Red in this criterion. Laughlin was Yellow. The other bases were either Green Minus or Green. This became an important criterion since it showed the most differentiation. The LCC expressed several concerns regarding the JCSG process. Of primary importance were airspace and weather. An additional issue involved condition of airfield pavements.

Airspace

Airspace measurement was an instance where the LCC noted differences between Air Force data and JCSG data. Some airspace was measured differently between the data calls. The areas are irregular in shape and difficult to measure precisely. The data calls occurred at different times, and in some cases different people prepared the responses. The potential for different answers exists. However, the JCSG used its own data base throughout the process. The Air Force data base was never used since the BCEG determined it would use the JCSG functional value as the basis for the Criterion I grade. This was to Reese's advantage, as Reese was credited with a higher airspace volume than if the Air Force data base had been used.

Some of Reese's areas with 11,000 feet of altitude were only credited with 9,000 feet of altitude. The base's data response included the right number, but it was transcribed incorrectly during subsequent analysis. The LCC also correctly pointed out two reporting errors. The data base should have included two additional areas, and Reese should have received credit for having an alert area. The net total effect would increase Reese's average functional value under the JSCG analysis by an estimated 0.08 point. This would not change the relative standings. The correction is depicted below.



Weather

Weather included weather attrition, a weather planning factor, ceiling and visibility considerations, and crosswinds.

The JCSG elected to use two measures of weather attrition. The first was historical attrition, which is a look at attrition over a year. This was a composite number which reflected all aircraft. The other factor was a

planning factor, or expected weather attrition. It was based on ten-year historical attrition, and was aircraft-specific.

The LCC implied the JCSG did not use historical attrition and instead used the planning factor. In fact, the JCSG used both. In this respect, Reese gained an advantage because they were the only base equipped with the T-1. One factor is weather attrition or "% sorties canceled/rescheduled." The number put into the model was the monthly average of the total attrition for the aircraft stationed at each base. It was based on a one-year look-back at actual attrition data. Reese benefited from its short experience with the T-1's. The attrition numbers for the T-1 brought Reese's average down to 19.8%. This number was used in all functional models in which Reese was rated. Reese's 19.8% ranked it third among USAF UFT bases behind Randolph (15.0%) and Laughlin (18.0%).

The second data point was "sortie planning factor." During data submission, limited historical data precluded computing a meaningful, long range T-1 planning factor. The decision was to report known T-38 data (28%) so as to base comparative factors on experience over a period of ten years at each of the bases. The assumption in the absence of solid T-1 attrition data, was <u>not</u> that T-1 attrition in the future would equal T-38 attrition, but that since all bases are planned to operate T-1s, comparative weather factors based on similar experience would be of most value. The total weight for weather attrition of a single aircraft was less than three-tenths of a percent of the points available in the seven functions the BCEG averaged. Assuming we had indeed gained enough experience with the T-1 to certify that T-1 attrition varied significantly from other aircraft, that in turn would have required estimating a T-1 factor for all bases, which would have eliminated any advantage Reese might have otherwise accrued.

The LCC also noted differences in crosswind data between the Air Force and JCSG data calls for Vance AFB. They used Air Force data to conclude the JCSG model had given Vance too much credit for both the amount of time crosswinds were less than 15 knots and also for the time crosswinds exceeded 25 knots. In fact, the JCSG data base was correct. Air Force data reflected information for the alternate runway which is not used during normal training operations. JCSG data--which was correct--was used in all cases.

Airfield Pavements

The JCSG included airfield pavement data in its model. It used the percent of pavement categorized as "adequate" for two categories. One was taxiways and aprons. The other was runways. The JCSG credited Reese with

29% adequate taxiways and aprons. The LCC said the figure should have been 32%. This is correct. The 29% figure was for the main field and the auxiliary field. It should have been for the main field only. However, deleting auxiliary field data also lowers the runway condition rating, which more than offsets the effects of including the auxiliary field. The net effect would be to lower Reese's functional value slightly.

The LCC implies BRAC data is flawed since it does not match a 1993 Airfield Pavements Evaluation Report published by the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA). The LCC incorrectly implied an AFCESA rating of Good was the equivalent of a BRAC rating of Adequate. However, an AFCESA rating of Good can mean major repairs are needed. The BRAC Adequate rating can have no major repairs required. In the AFCESA report, the aprons were all rated Good and some taxiways are rated Very Poor and Fair. Since repairs totaling about $12M are planned for the aprons, the BRAC assessment was appropriate. The AFCESA report was not available for all bases and did not capture the attributes desired for this portion of the BRAC analysis.

CRITERION II: FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Perspective

The focus in Criteria II-VIII shifted to the BCEG analysis rather than the JCSG. Criterion II has 4 elements and 32 subelements. All of the Air Force's UFT bases have good facilities. This is reflected in the ratings, with no base rated lower than green minus in Criterion II. The LCC focused on base housing and infrastructure. They also identified age of facilities as a concern.

Housing Condition

BCEG criteria keyed on the number of housing units requiring "whole house" renovations. Whole house projects address repair, size, and configuration. The BCEG used data for the 5 UFT bases to determine the statistical mean of 404 houses which needed to be upgraded. Bases with whole house requirements equal to or less than the mean were rated Green. Bases up to one standard deviation above the mean were Yellow. Bases greater than one standard deviation were rated Red.

The LCC's position is that the whole house requirement at Reese is significantly less than that at Vance, so the assessments for the two bases should be different. At Reese, 289 homes have been renovated to meet the whole house standard, leaving 111 which have not been renovated. Contrary

to the LCC's perceptions, there is no program to renovate the remaining homes to the whole house standard. None of Vance's 230 homes has been renovated to whole house standards. Although the BCEG did not address costs, renovating them all would cost relatively more than renovating the remaining homes at Reese. However, both bases have excellent housing areas. When compared to all the UFT bases, both bases have a relatively small number of housing units requiring upgrade to whole house standards. This led to a Green rating for both bases. It is important to keep in mind that the comparison was made against all Air Force UFT bases, not a comparison of only the two bases selected by the LCC for comparison.

The fact that Reese has had some of its housing undergo the whole-house upgrade, while Vance has yet to do so, is not in dispute. There will be some cost involved, but when compared to other bases and considered in the scope of our Air Force-wide housing program, these differences are less significant than they seem in a side-by-side comparison of these two bases. One additional observation: the condition of Vance's housing may well have been a factor in the decision to upgrade Reese's housing to whole-house standards before Vance's. Vance housing is in excellent shape, and has received four consecutive "outstanding" ratings from our Command Inspector General.

Housing Availability

The relative ranking for housing capacity was another concern. The BCEG used data from market surveys which reflected either a surplus or deficit of housing to determine the combined availability of on- and off-base housing. Again, the BCEG used a statistical analysis to assess the data and set the rating criteria. The mean capacity of the 5 bases was a surplus of 77 homes. Bases with a larger surplus were given a Green rating. This included Vance, Columbus, and Reese. Laughlin, with a small deficit, was rated Yellow, while Randolph was Red.

The LCC made a point that Reese has a housing surplus. This was true. The LCC contends that Vance had a housing deficit. When data was collected, Vance had a current deficit, but all bases had to project their status to fourth quarter, FY95 for the BRAC analysis. Using 95/4 projections, Vance had a surplus of 113 houses and Reese had a surplus of 501 houses.. The projected number was used for all UFT bases.

Infrastructure

In the infrastructure subelement, the LCC computed that 83% of Reese's infrastructure facilities were adequate, while only 41% of Vance's facilities were adequate. These calculations added together systems which

have unlike units of measure, such as linear feet of power lines and square yards of roads.

To compare dissimilar infrastructure elements, the BCEG normalized the data. They assigned a color rating to each element based on the condition assessment. Each color was then assigned a weight. The weights were summed and averaged. While Vance's infrastructure scored slightly higher than Reese's, each base earned a Yellow rating.

Age of Buildings

The LCC expressed a concern that data on the age of buildings was not considered. Their implication--that older buildings cost more to maintain--is not necessarily true. Maintenance costs are a function of a number of factors, primarily condition. The BCEG collected but did not use building age data. The BCEG used engineering surveys to assess infrastructure condition.

The LCC correctly pointed out that only 2% of the buildings at Reese are over 50 years old. However, their assertion that 37% of Vance's buildings are over 50 years old is incorrect. At Vance, 37 buildings are over 50 years old. The number 37 was incorrectly reported as a percentage. This is actually 9% of Vance's buildings.

CRITERION VII: COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Perspective

Scoring in Criterion VII included aspects of community support important to military members and their families. Notably, no base in the entire Air Force scored higher than Reese in this criterion. Criterion VII included 9 elements and 32 subelements. The LCC raised three issues: off-base housing, education, and transportation.

Off-Base Housing Affordability

The DoD recognizes that Lubbock is justifiably proud of its cost-of-living ranking among America's cities. The suggestion, however, that we use that as a factor in, or the basis for our off-base housing evaluations is flawed in that we are not comparing off-base housing situations nationwide, but rather among five UPT bases. Our housing survey program has been in existence for some time, giving us very accurate data on cost and suitability that's used both by the Air Force for our housing programs and by DoD and Congress for variable housing allowance calculations. This data focuses

precisely on the question at hand...the availability, suitability, and cost to our uniformed personnel of the housing at a specific location. Comparing that data as it applies to the five bases in question gave us the focused insights that led to our ratings.

The LCC asserted the BCEG arbitrarily established the criteria for off-base housing Affordability. This is not correct. BCEG criteria drew from the model used to establish Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) payments. Data was from the latest DoD VHA survey. It established a median housing cost of $782. A base was rated Green if the median cost in its area was less than 80% of the median ($626). The Yellow rating ranged from 80 to 120% of the mean housing cost. Vance, Columbus, and Laughlin were Green. Reese and Randolph were Yellow. All ranks at Reese and Randolph were eligible for VHA payments. None were eligible at Vance.

The LCC also offered an American Chamber of Commerce Researcher's Association Cost-of-Living Survey as a noncertified data source. This was not used for BRAC. The VHA survey which was used, focused on Air Force people and captured data on off-base housing costs and other issues affecting them.

Off-Base Housing Suitability

Similarly, the LCC asserted the criteria for off-base housing suitability was arbitrary. The BCEG used the same VHA survey, in which members assessed their housing suitability. On the average base, about 10% of the people identified their housing as unsuitable. A five percent variable on the mean (5-15%) was used for a Yellow grade, while an unsuitable response of less than or equal to 5% received a Green. Vance and Columbus were well below the 5% cut-off and rated Green. Reese, Randolph and Laughlin were rated Yellow.

Student-Teacher Ratio

BRAC data correctly reflected Lubbock's maximum student-teacher ratio as 35:1. The LCC took exception. Quoting state law, they contended the Lubbock maximum student-teacher ratio was 22:1, while the actual ratio was 16.8:1. The state standard they quoted applied only to grades K-5. The local school district set the maximum ratio at 35:1 for grades 6-12.

Education Opportunities

The LCC asserted Reese has significantly more educational opportunities than Vance, and Vance should not be accorded the same Green rating as Reese. Lubbock does offer excellent and varied education. The rating reflected the presence of off-base vocational, technical, undergraduate, and graduate colleges within 25 miles of a base. Both communities offer very fine educational opportunities within 25 miles, and both bases earn the Green rating. Again, this is in the context of an Air Force-wide rating rather than a one-versus-one stratification. In fact, a substantial percentage of personnel at both bases take advantage of local educational opportunities.

Transportation

The LCC expressed concern that Vance rated higher than Reese in this element. That is not correct. Each earned a Green Minus rating. The LCC contended that Reese, with the nearby Lubbock International Airport, was rated inappropriately. Reese was in fact rated Green for both airport proximity and the number of air carriers. Vance was rated Red in the "number of air carriers" subelement. Reese's rating in the transportation element was brought down slightly because public transportation does not service the base.

Reese as the "Number One Choice" of Student and Instructor Pilots

To bolster its "quality of life" claim, the LCC said Reese is the number one choice of student and instructor pilots. They quoted an uncertified article in a Lubbock newspaper. This was not measured in BRAC or any other survey. It also did not fall into any BRAC category. There are a number of reasons why people request assignments; it is not a useful measure.

CRITERION VIII: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

Perspective

All the UFT bases were in the Yellow range in Criterion VIII (Reese Yellow Minus; Vance Yellow Plus). The criterion has five elements. The LCC's concern was in the asbestos element which was 5% of the criterion.

Asbestos

The LCC incorrectly stated asbestos data was not considered, and that there is no asbestos in Reese's facilities. The BCEG rated bases Red if asbestos was present in more than 25% of the buildings. At the time of the data call, an asbestos survey was not complete for Reese. The rating defaulted to Green. The subsequent survey showed asbestos to be present in 72% of Reese's facilities. Had this data been available for use in the Air Force analysis, Reese's rating would have been Red. The LCC states that Vance has an "asbestos problem" in 84% of its facilities. While 84% of Vance's facilities contain some asbestos, no health problem exists. Vance was correctly assessed as Red.

CONCLUSION

This report validated the BRAC process and its recommendations. Many of the LCC issues came from noncertified or incorrect data. Others reflected disagreements with method or an attempt to change the analysis into a one-versus-one comparison for selected elements. On the other hand, several observations had merit. The net effect of incorporating the valid points would be less than 1.5% improvement in Reese's average functional value score and no change to the grade of Criterion I. There would be no impact on BRAC recommendations. The analysis supports the Air Force BRAC recommendations.

All the Air Force UFT bases are excellent. Unfortunately, not all of them are needed to sustain today's smaller force. The Air Force appreciates the strong support the Lubbock community has provided for many years, just as it appreciates the strong support from the other UFT communities.

Staff Analysis I

	WEIGHT		REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	0		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	0		N	N	Y	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	0		?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1500/3 > 80?	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	85		91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
1000/3 > 80?	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	45		93.60%	92.00%	94.30%+	90.00%-	91.80%	80-95%, 80 LO
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		93.20%--	99.20%+	99.30%+	98.40%	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25		1.40%--	0.10%+	0.10%+	0.10%+	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	85		19.8%	22.9%-	18.0%+	15.0%++	23.3%--	10-25%, 10% HI
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	0		N	N	Y	Y	N	Y(10)/N(0)
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	30		27.0%-	26.0%-	19.0%+	19.0%+	22.3%	15-30%, 15% HI
WEATHER ---		300	4.7	5.4	7.4	6.0	5.3	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100	Changed from VFT-JCSG Primary	31116--	45092	53868+	85447++	36084-	0-60K, 60K HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40		42.6	39.5	31.5+	65.2--	36.1+	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		9	11	10	18	32+	0-20, 20 HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	20		N-	Y+	N-	Y+	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	0		NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		12	2	4	3	20+	0-30, 0 HI REVERSED?
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		200	4.8	6.9	7.1	7.0	6.4	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	0		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	25		17	43	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	0		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-10K RW,10K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	50		C	C	C	B-	F+	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	25		85.00%	100.00%	85.00%	66.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	20		32.00%	100.00%+	42.00%	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		92.00%	100.00%	59.00%	51.00%	97.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		87.00%	76.00%	60.00%	40.00%	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRFIELDS ---		150	8.2	8.9	7.7	6.0	9.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL

Staff Analysis I

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	14	59469	84459	68320	135526	26652-	0-100K, 100K HI
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	5	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	14	60863.0	63354.0	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	5	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	8	51572.0	17029.0	19365.0	36060.0	68639.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	4	99.00%	36.00%	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	50	7.9	7.4	7.3	8.6	7.8	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	60	D	D	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	28	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	12	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	100	7.0	7.1	6.4	7.4	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	0	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	90	Y++	Y++	Y++	N--	Y++	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	50	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	40	4.00%+	0.00%+	0.00%+	18.00%--	18.00%--	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	20	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	200	8.6	8.9	10.0	0.0	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	0	152.0	264.0	222.0	558.0	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	0	462.0	690.0	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	0	93.00%	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	0	400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0	230.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	0	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI

Staff Analysis I

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	216.0	14.0	150.0	186.0	30.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
SERVICES ---	0	?	?	?	?	?	GROUP SUBTOTAL
	===						
SCORE	1000	6.4	7.2	7.8	5.3	6.7	
RANK		4	2	1	5	3	

UPT-JCSG Primary

	WEIGHT		REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-6, 6 HI
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N-	N-	Y+	N-	Y+	Y(10)/N(0)
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50	4.9	4.9	5.9	4.9	5.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		91.50%+	89.10%	90.90%+	83.60%--	89.40%	80-95%, 80 LO
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		93.60%+	92.00%	94.30%+	90.00%-	91.80%	80-95%, 80 LO
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		93.20%--	99.20%++	99.30%++	98.40%+	97.80%	%MIN-M, MAX HI
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		1.40%--	0.10%+	0.10%+	0.10%+	0.20%	%MIN-M, MIN HI
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		19.80%	22.90%	18.00%	15.00%+	23.30%	5-20%, 5% HI
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N-	N-	Y++	Y++	N-	Y(10)/N(0)
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		27.00%	26.00%	19.00%	19.00%	22.30%	5-20%, 5% HI
WEATHER ---		140	4.4	6.7	8.1	6.4	6.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	100		31116.0--	45092.0--	53868.0+	85447.0++	36084.0--	0-MAX, MAX HI
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		42.6	39.5+	31.5++	65.2--	36.1+	MIN-M, MIN HI
# MTR'S AVAIL	25		9.0--	11.0-	10.0-	18.0	32.0++	0-MAX, MAX HI
NEAREST RNGE<50MI?	25		N--	Y++	N--	Y++	N--	Y(10)/N(0)
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	20		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	Y(0)/N(10)
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		12.0-	2.0++	4.0+	3.0+	20.0--	0-MAX, MIN HI
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220	4.3	6.8	6.2	8.5	5.2	GROUP SUBTOTAL
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		17	43-	22	20	26	MIN-100, MIN-Hi
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		10500	12000	8858	8353	9200	5-8K RW, 8K HI
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		C+	C+	C+	B--	F++	PRIMARY RUNWAYS
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		85.00%	100.00%+	85.00%	66.00%-	100.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		29.00%-	100.00%++	42.00%-	27.00%-	88.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		92.00%+	100.00%+	59.00%-	51.00%-	97.00%+	%0-100, 100 HI
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		87.00%+	76.00%+	60.00%	40.00%-	56.00%	%0-100, 100 HI

Changes from UPT-JCSG "PRI"

	WEIGHT	REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
AIRFIELDS ---	239	8.0	8.5	7.7	6.4	8.7	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	59469.0-	84459.0+	68320.0	135526.0++	26652.0--	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	100.00%	100.00%	91.00%	83.00%	86.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	60863.0-	63354.0-	70689.0	66423.0	75207.0+	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	51572.0+	17029.0-	19365.0-	36060.0	68639.0++	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION OTHR FAC	5	99.00%	36.00%-	54.00%	78.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100	7.4	6.9	6.9	8.7	7.5	GROUP SUBTOTAL
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D+	D+	I	I	I	LVL MAINT
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	147685.0	151102.0	151346.0	238496.0+	156858.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
COND OF HANGARS	5	54.00%	57.00%	48.00%	52.00%	64.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	50	7.0	7.1	6.4	7.5	6.6	GROUP SUBTOTAL
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5	N	N	N	N	Y+	Y(10)/N(0)
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	N	N	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	20	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	7.5	GROUP SUBTOTAL
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
AIR QUALITY ---	50	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10	Y+	Y+	Y+	N--	Y+	Y(10)/N(0)
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	0.00%+	1.00%+	0.00%+	22.00%--	1.00%+	%0-MAX, MIN HI
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	4.00%	0.00%+	0.00%+	18.00%-	18.00%-	%0-MAX, MIN HI
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	N	Y+	N	N	Y(10)/N(0)
CLR ZONE ACQ CMPLTD	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(10)/N(0)
ENCROACHMENT ---	50	8.8	8.9	10.0	4.0	7.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	152.0-	264.0	222.0-	558.0++	247.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	462.0	690.0+	400.0	521.0	442.0	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI

UPT-JCSG Primary

	WEIGHT		REESE	COL	LAU	RANDOLPH	VANCE	RATING SCALE
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		93.00%+	87.00%	87.00%	87.00%	70.00%-	%0-100, 100 HI
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		400.0	812.0	654.0	948.0+	230.0-	0-MAX, MAX HI
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.00%	100.00%	%0-100, 100 HI
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		37.0	4.0	6.0	79.0-	1.0	0-MAX, MIN HI
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		216.0-	14.0+	150.0	186.0	30.0+	0-MAX, MIN HI
SERVICES ---		80	6.4	8.2	7.1	8.3	6.9	GROUP SUBTOTAL
		===						
SCORE		999	6.4	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.1	
RANK			5	1	2	3	4	

PRIMARY

	WEIGHT	WHITING		CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1.5	0.6	3	1.3	0.5	0.2	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	50		5.3		3.5		4.4		4.8		5.8		4.8		4.8		5.8		4.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 - 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30	84.00%	0.8	84.10%	0.8	83.00%	0.6	83.40%	0.7	85.70%	1.1	83.60%	0.7	91.90%	2.4	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 - 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20	87.10%	0.9	88.00%	1.1	86.00%	0.8	86.20%	0.8	90.00%	1.3	90.00%	1.3	94.00%	1.9	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30	99.00%	2.7	94.00%	0.4	98.00%	2.3	99.60%	3.0	95.00%	0.8	98.40%	2.4	97.50%	2.0	97.80%	2.2	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.9	99.20%	2.8
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10	0.10%	0.9	1.00%	0.3	0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10	19.40%	0.0	22.20%	0.0	9.00%	0.7	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.7	15.00%	0.3	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10	22.00%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	22.80%	0.0	22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---	140		5.3		4.1		5.3		6.3		6.1		6.3		6.5		6.0		4.4		7.9		6.5
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120	28511	4.0	57169	8.0	28445	4.0	42588	6.0	62724	8.8	85447	12.0	29144	4.1	36084	5.1	31116	4.4	53868	7.6	45092	8.3
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	27.7	2.0	39.6	1.4	35.3	1.6	39	1.4	37.5	1.5	65.2	0.0	32.3	1.8	36.1	1.6	42.6	1.2	31.5	1.8	39.5	1.4
# MTR'S AVAIL	30	21	2.0	9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA --	220		5.2		6.9		5.2		5.8		7.2		8.4		4.4		5.9		4.8		6.8		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40	1.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	0.5	0.7	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0.5	1.0	1	2.0	0.5	1.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	18	0.9	8	1.0	20	0.9	19	0.9	26	0.8	20	0.9	33	0.7	26	0.8	17	0.9	22	0.8	43	0.6
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	6000	0.3	8000	1.0	8002	1.0	8000	1.0	8000	1.0	8353	1.0	13100	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	K	6	H	5.5	E	5.0	E	5.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	95%	1.4	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	88%	1.3	28%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	98%	1.7	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	93%	1.6	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---	239		7.6		8.8		6.9		7.9		8.2		5.2		7.8		7.6		6.9		6.5		7.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	34137	0.6	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	46413	1.9	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	68423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	83354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	93438	1.2	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100		6.1		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30	DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5	86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC --	50		7.2		8.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		4.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC --	20		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		5.0		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT --	50		8.7		8.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	205	0.6	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	338	0.0	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20	80%	1.6	90%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6	330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4	80%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5	25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5	145	0.2	285	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---	80		6.0		5.4		8.1		6.0		5.6		7.7		9.2		6.3		6.1		8.6		7.2
SCORE	999		6.6		6.7		6.4		6.8		7.0		6.7		6.3		6.8		6.0		7.0		6.8
RANK			8		6		9		4		1		7		10		5		11		2		3

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	28.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		4.2		4.4		8.1		6.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		26007	7.6	29016	8.5	41056	12.0	22358	6.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		22	3.0	9	1.2	10	1.4	11	1.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		6.8		6.1		9.1		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		8.7		9.3		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		999		7.2		7.3		8.2		7.5
RANK				4		3		1		2

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL		
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8	
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8	
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6	
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5	
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	50		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.1	18.00%	0.7	22.90%	0.0	
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	
WEATHER —		140		4.0		4.4		5.9		4.6	
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6	
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8	
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		22	1.0	9	0.4	10	0.5	11	0.5	
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8	
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		6.4		6.4		9.6		6.2	
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7	
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0	
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0	
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5	
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7	
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3	
AIRFIELDS —		239		8.7		9.3		7.7		8.4	
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0	
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0	
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5	
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		88639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4	
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2	
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1	
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5	
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4	
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3	
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.8		8.4		7.4		8.5	
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0	
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0	
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0	
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	
ENCROACHMENT —		50		8.0		8.8		10.0		7.0	
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	284	2.0	
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5	
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4	
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2	
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3	
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2	
SERVICES —		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		8.9	
SCORE		999		7.1		7.4		8.0		7.2	
RANK				4		2		1		3	

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	5		19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	20		80	1.0	50	1.5	15	2.0	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	50		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.1	18.00%	0.7	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		155		4.2		5.0		6.3		3.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	18.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		22	1.0	9	0.4	10	0.5	11	0.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		6.4		6.4		9.6		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		8.7		9.3		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	83354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	38%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	284	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	8	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	160	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		6.2		6.3		7.9		8.6
SCORE		1014		7.0		7.5		8.1		7.1
RANK				4		2		1		3

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA AND CALCULATIONS ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		4.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		98.40%	2.6	97.80%	2.3	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	1.0	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		15.00%	0.3	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		19.00%	0.1	22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		6.4		6.1		4.4		8.1		6.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		85447	12.0	44961	6.3	42068	5.9	53868	7.6	45092	6.3
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		18	1.7	32	3.0	14	1.3	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		8.4		6.3		5.4		6.9		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		6.4		8.7		8.9		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		6.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	890	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		87%	1.7	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	8		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.3		6.9		6.4		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.2		7.3		6.9		7.5		7.3
RANK				4		3		6		1		2

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA, CALCULATIONS & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		4.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	50		15.00%	1.7	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.1	18.00%	0.7	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		19.00%	0.0	22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		140		5.1		4.5		4.4		5.9		4.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		85447	14.0	44861	7.4	42068	6.9	53868	8.8	45092	7.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		18	0.6	32	1.0	14	0.4	10	0.3	11	0.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		6.8		5.9		5.4		7.2		6.4
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	68%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		6.4		8.7		8.9		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135528	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151348	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		6.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		87%	0.4	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.2		6.9		6.9		7.2		7.1
RANK				2		4		5		1		3

AIRSPACE AND DISTANCE DATA
AIRSPACE OWNED/SCHEDULED BY
LAUGHLIN AFB

LAUGHLIN					
NAME	AREA NM2	ALT	VOLUME NM3	DIST	CNM X DIST
A633A	708	6000	698.7	1	698.6842105
A633B	154	3000	76.0	22	1671.710526
LAU1	4500	13000	9621.7	20	192434.2105
LAU2	469	13000	1002.8	40	40111.84211
LAU3	1975	15000	4872.5	15	73087.99342
PECOS ATCAA	7980	19000	24937.5	15	374062.5

ALERT x .8:	620	ALERT:	2370	ALERT DIST:	3.06
ALERT TOT:	775	WA:	0	WA DIST:	0.00
WA TOTAL:	0	MOA:	679697	MOA DIST:	16.81
MOA TOTAL:	40435	RES:	0	RES DIST:	#DIV/0!
RES TOTAL:	0	TOTAL:	682067	ALL DIST:	16.55
TOTAL:	41209				

AL/WA/MOA	41209
AL/MOA	41209

STRIKE & B/F	WA/MOA/RES:	40435
E2/C2 & AIRLIFT & WSO	AL.8/WA/MOA:	41054
PRIMARY & NFO & SCREENING	AL.8/MOA:	41054

STRIKE & B/F DIST:	16.81
MARITIME & AIRLIFT:	16.55
PRIMARY DIST:	16.55

AIRSPACE AND DISTANCE DATA
AIRSPACE OWNED/SCHEDULED BY
COLUMBUS AFB

COLUMBUS					
NAME	AREA NM2	ALT	VOLUME NM3	DIST	CNM X DIST
A440	177	6500	189.2	1	189.2269737
CBM1	2643	15000	6520.6	1	6520.559211
CBM2	647	15000	1596.2	45	71829.76974
CBM3	2668	15000	6582.2	42	276453.9474
CBM4	1379	13000	2948.5	74	218190.4605
CALDONIA1	877	4000	577.0	12	6923.684211
CALDONIA2	804	4000	528.9	12	6347.368421
GREENWOOD	831	4000	546.7	45	24601.97368
MEMPHIS	857	4000	563.8	75	42286.18421
OXFORD	809	4000	532.2	45	23950.65789
R4404	78.5	11500	148.5	37	5493.708882

ALERT x .8:	151	ALERT:	189	ALERT DIST:	1.00
ALERT TOT:	189	WA:	0	WA DIST:	0.00
WA TOTAL:	0	MOA:	677105	MOA DIST:	33.20
MOA TOTAL:	20396	RES:	5494	RES DIST:	37.00
RES TOTAL:	148	TOTAL:	682788	ALL DIST:	32.93
TOTAL:	20734				

AL/WA/MOA	20585
AL/MOA	20585

STRIKE & B/F	WA/MOA/RES:	20545
E2/C2 & AIRLIFT & WSO	AL.8/WA/MOA:	20548
PRIMARY & NFO & SCREENING	AL.8/MOA:	20548

STRIKE & B/F DIST:	33.23
MARITIME & AIRLIFT:	32.90
PRIMARY DIST:	32.90

AIRSPACE AND DISTANCE DATA
AIRSPACE OWNED/SCHEDULED BY
REESE AFB
(USING AETC REVISED DATA)

REESE					
NAME	AREA NM2	ALT	VOLUME NM3	DIST	CNM X DIST
A637	1250	2700	555.1	1	555.098684
REESE 1	1022	6000	1008.6	31	31265.1316
ATCAA 1	1022	8000	1344.7	31	41686.8421
REESE 2	828	8000	1089.5	12	13073.6842
ATCAA 2	828	5000	680.9	12	8171.05263
REESE 3	2677	6000	2641.8	47	124163.487
ATCAA 3	2677	8000	3522.4	47	165551.316
REESE 4	894	8000	1176.3	16	18821.0526
ATCAA 4	894	5000	735.2	16	11763.1579
REESE 5	1437	6000	1418.1	46	65232.2368
ATCAA 5	1437	8000	1890.8	46	86976.3158
HIGH A	1340	11000	2424.3	15	36365.1316
HIGH B	893	11000	1615.6	49	79165.625
HIGH C	1226	11000	2218.1	49	108686.513
HIGH D	908	11000	1642.8	15	24641.4474
HIGH E	1023	11000	1850.8	15	27762.3355
TORCH	405	11000	732.7	25	18318.2566
NORMAN	464	8000	610.5	20	12210.5263
RAMSEY	464	8000	610.5	20	12210.5263

ALERT x .8:	444	ALERT:	555	ALERT DIST:	1.00
ALERT TOT:	555	WA:	0	WA DIST:	0.00
WA TOTAL:	0	MOA:	886065	MOA DIST:	32.56
MOA TOTAL:	27214	RES:	0	RES DIST:	#DIV/0!
RES TOTAL:	0	TOTAL:	886620	ALL DIST:	31.93
TOTAL:	27769				

AL/WA/MOA	27769
AL/MOA	27769

STRIKE & B/F	WA/MOA/RES:	27214
E2/C2 & AIRLIFT & WSO	AL.8/WA/MOA:	27658
PRIMARY & NFO & SCREENING	AL.8/MOA:	27658

STRIKE & B/F DIST:	32.56
MARITIME & AIRLIFT:	31.93
PRIMARY DIST:	31.93

AIRSPACE AND DISTANCE DATA
AIRSPACE OWNED/SCHEDULED BY
VANCE AFB
(USING AETC REVISED DATA)

VANCE					
NAME	AREA NM2	ALT	VOLUME NM3	DIST	CNM X DIST
A562A	209	8700	299.1	1	299.0625
A562B	140	8800	202.6	17	3444.73684
VANCE 1A	6298	8000	8286.8	1	8286.84211
ATCAA 1A	6298	6000	6215.1	1	6215.13158
VANCE 1B	2132	11000	3857.2	1	3857.23684
ATCAA 1B	2132	6000	2103.9	1	2103.94737
EAGLE 2N	998	9000	1477.3	40	59092.1053
EAGLE 2S	916	9000	1355.9	40	54236.8421
EAGLE 3N	832	9000	1231.6	66	81284.2105
EAGLE 3S	930	9000	1376.6	66	90858.5526
EAGEL 6	612	17000	1711.2	18	30801.3158
TORCH	500	4000	328.9	18	5921.05263

ALERT x .8:	401	ALERT:	3744	ALERT DIST:	7.46
ALERT TOT:	502	WA:	0	WA DIST:	0.00
WA TOTAL:	0	MOA:	342657	MOA DIST:	12.26
MOA TOTAL:	27945	RES:	0	RES DIST:	#DIV/0!
RES TOTAL:	0	TOTAL:	346401	ALL DIST:	12.18
TOTAL:	28446				

AL/WA/MOA	28446
AL/MOA	28446

STRIKE & B/F	WA/MOA/RES:	27945
E2/C2 & AIRLIFT & WSO	AL.8/WA/MOA:	28346
PRIMARY & NFO & SCREENING	AL.8/MOA:	28346

STRIKE & B/F DIST:	12.26
MARITIME & AIRLIFT:	12.18
PRIMARY DIST:	12.18

AIRSPACE AND DISTANCE DATA
AIRSPACE OWNED/SCHEDULED BY
RANDOLPH AFB

RANDOLPH					
NAME	AREA NM2	ALT	VOLUME NM3	DIST	CNM X DIST
A635	119	2500	48.9	1	48.9309211
A638	112	2500	46.1	19	875
RND1A	1407	13000	3008.4	50	150419.408
RND1B	540	15000	1332.2	30	39967.1053
RND1C	123	5000	101.2	40	4046.05263
RND2A	1462	20000	4809.2	45	216414.474
RND2B	330	8000	434.2	30	13026.3158

ALERT x .8:	76	ALERT:	924	ALERT DIST:	9.73
ALERT TOT:	95	WA:	0	WA DIST:	0.00
WA TOTAL:	0	MOA:	423873	MOA DIST:	43.77
MOA TOTAL:	9685	RES:	0	RES DIST:	#DIV/0!
RES TOTAL:	0	TOTAL:	424797	ALL DIST:	43.43
TOTAL:	9780				

AL/WA/MOA	9780
AL/MOA	9780

STRIKE & B/F	WA/MOA/RES:	9685
E2/C2 & AIRLIFT & WSO	AL.8/WA/MOA:	9761
PRIMARY & NFO & SCREENING	AL.8/MOA:	9761

STRIKE & B/F DIST:	43.77
MARITIME & AIRLIFT:	43.43
PRIMARY DIST:	43.43

AIRSPACE AND DISTANCE DATA
REVISION PROVIDED BY
AETC
CORRECTED FOR DATA ERRORS

REESE					
NAME	AREA NM2	ALT	VOLUME NM3	DIST	CNM X DIST
NORMAN	464	8000	610.5	20	12210.52632
RAMSEY	464	8000	610.5	20	12210.52632
REESE 1	1022	6000	1008.6	31	31265.13158
ATCAA 1	1022	8000	1344.7	31	41686.84211
REESE 2	828	8000	1089.5	12	13073.68421
ATCAA 2	828	5000	680.9	12	8171.052632
REESE 3	2677	6000	2641.8	47	124163.4868
ATCAA 3	2677	8000	3522.4	47	165551.3158
REESE 4	894	8000	1176.3	16	18821.05263
ATCAA 4	894	5000	735.2	16	11763.15789
REESE 5	1437	6000	1418.1	46	65232.23684
ATCAA 5	1437	8000	1890.8	46	86976.31579
ROBY	1160	6000	1144.7	72	82421.05263
ATCAA ROBY	1160	5000	953.9	72	68684.21053
WESTOVER 2	2222	8000	2923.7	75	219276.3158
ATCAA WSTO	2222	5000	1827.3	75	137047.6974
PECOS SH	1222	7000	1406.9	99	139283.8816
ATCAA PSH	1222	27000	5426.6	99	537237.8289
PECOS SL	834	5300	727.0	99	71973.65132
HIGH A	1340	11000	2424.3	15	36365.13158
HIGH B	893	11000	1615.6	49	79165.625
HIGH C	1226	11000	2218.1	49	108686.5132
HIGH D	908	11000	1642.8	15	24641.44737
HIGH E	1023	11000	1850.8	15	27762.33553
TORCH	405	11000	732.7	25	18318.25658
A637	1250	2700	555.1	1	555.0986842
R-5104A/B	204	18300	614.0	90	55261.18421
R-5105	120	5300	104.6	95	9937.5

ALERT x .8:	444	ALERT:	555	ALERT DIST:	1.00
ALERT TOT:	555	WA:	0	WA DIST:	0.00
WA TOTAL:	0	MOA:	2141989	MOA DIST:	51.46
MOA TOTAL:	41624	RES:	65199	RES DIST:	90.73
RES TOTAL:	719	TOTAL:	2207743	ALL DIST:	51.47
TOTAL:	42898				

AL/WA/MOA	42179
AL/MOA	42179

STRIKE & B/F	WA/MOA/RES:	42343
E2/C2 & AIRLIFT & WSO	AL.8/WA/MOA:	42068
PRIMARY & NFO & SCREENING	AL.8/MOA:	42068

STRIKE & B/F DIST:	52.13
MARITIME & AIRLIFT:	50.80
PRIMARY DIST:	50.80

AIRSPACE AND DISTANCE DATA
REVISION PROVIDED BY
AETC
CORRECTED FOR DATA ERRORS

VANCE					
NAME	AREA NM2	ALT	VOLUME NM3	DIST	CNM X DIST
A562A	209	8700	299.1	1	299.0625
A562B	140	8800	202.6	17	3444.73684
A683	112	3000	55.3	78	4310.52632
VANCE 1A	6298	8000	8286.8	1	8286.84211
ATCAA 1A	6298	6000	6215.1	1	6215.13158
VANCE 1B	2132	11000	3857.2	1	3857.23684
ATCAA 1B	2132	6000	2103.9	1	2103.94737
TRACY					0
WASHITA	782	7000	900.3	74	66624.3421
ATCAA WAS	782	5000	643.1	74	47588.8158
EUREKA H	1695	12000	3345.4	85	284358.553
EUREKA L	1695	3500	975.7	85	82937.9112
ATCAA EUR	1695	27000	7527.1	85	639806.743
EAGLE 2N	998	9000	1477.3	40	59092.1053
EAGLE 2S	916	9000	1355.9	40	54236.8421
EAGLE 3N	832	9000	1231.6	66	81284.2105
EAGLE 3S	930	9000	1376.6	66	90858.5526
EAGEL 6	612	17000	1711.2	18	30801.3158
TORCH	500	4000	328.9	18	5921.05263
SHEPPARD 2	1248	10000	2052.6	94	192947.368
SHEPPARD 3	1248	5000	1026.3	94	96473.6842
R-5601 A	33	38500	209.0	96	20060.5263

ALERT x .8:	446	ALERT:	8054	ALERT DIST:	14.46
ALERT TOT:	557	WA:	0	WA DIST:	0.00
WA TOTAL:	0	MOA:	1753395	MOA DIST:	39.48
MOA TOTAL:	44415	RES:	20061	RES DIST:	96.00
RES TOTAL:	209	TOTAL:	1781510	ALL DIST:	39.43
TOTAL:	45181				

AL/WA/MOA	44972
AL/MOA	44972

STRIKE & B/F	WA/MOA/RES:	44624
E2/C2 & AIRLIFT & WSO	AL.8/WA/MOA:	44861
PRIMARY & NFO & SCREENING	AL.8/MOA:	44861

STRIKE & B/F DIST:	39.74
MARITIME & AIRLIFT:	39.17
PRIMARY DIST:	39.17

FORMULAS FOR LINEAR MODEL

0 - 6, 6 HI	=IF(D=0,0,(IF(D>=U,W/10,((D/U)*(W/10)))))
Y(10)/N(0)	=(IF(EXACT(D,A),1,0))*(W/10) or =(IF(EXACT(D,A),(W/10),0)) OR =IF Y(0)/N(10) JUST CHANGE "A"
80 - 95%, 80 LO	=(D-0.8)*((W/10)/0.15) OR =IF(D<0.8,0,(D-0.8)*((W/10)/0.15))
%MIN - MAX, MAX HI	=(D-L)*((W/10)/(U-L))
%MIN - MAX, MIN HI	=IF(D<=L,(W/10),IF(D=U,0,((-((W/10)/U-L)*D)+(U*((W/10)/U-L)))))
5 - 20%, 5% HI	=IF(D<=0.05,(W/10),IF(D>0.2,0,((-((W/10)/0.15)*D)+(0.2*((W/10)/0.15)))))
0 - MAX, MAX HI	=((W/10)/U)*D
MIN - MAX, MIN HI	=IF(D=0,(W/10),(-(W/10)/(U-L))*(D)+((U)*((W/10)/(U-L))))
SHOULD BE	=IF(D=L,(W/10),(-(W/10)/(U-L))*(D)+((U)*((W/10)/(U-L))))
0 - MAX, MIN HI	=IF(D=0,(W/10),(-(W/10)/(U))*(D)+((U)*((W/10)/(U))))
MIN - 100, MIN HI	=IF(D=L,(W/10),(-(W/10)/(100-L))*(D)+((100)*((W/10)/(100-L))))
5 - 8K RW, 8K HI	=IF(D<=5000,0,(IF(D>=U,W/10,(((D-5000)/3000)*(W/10)))))
SHOULD BE	=IF(D<=L,0,(IF(D>=U,W/10,(((D-L)/(U-L))*(W/10)))))
%0 - 100, 100 HI	=(W/10)*D

LEGEND:

D = DATA
W = WEIGHT
U = UPPER BOUND
L = LOWER BOUND
A = DESIRED ANSWER

Document Separator

– Percentage of time wx 3000/3 and above? (I.2.A.1.c)

ANSWER: 82.0%

– Percentage of time wx 1500/3 and above? (I.2.A.1.d)

ANSWER: 89.6%

- Number of forecasted or actual icing days: Base? Working areas (MOAs & Ranges)? (I.2.A.2)

ANSWER: The total number of forecast icing days for Columbus AFB from 1 Jan 92 to 31 May 92 was 77 days. When the training areas are included, the total was 94 days. Only two days during the period included icing forecased to the surface. The five month period used in the study is typically when the majority of our icing days occur. Climatological estimates for the remainder of the 1992 calendar year should add another 50 days of forecasted icing or a total of 144 forecasted days.

- Wx attrition? (Use both operations and maintenance records--request five year look-back. Use MAJCOM information, if required). In answering question, please breakout rates with respect to local (read base weather problem), enroute weather, and training area weather, if required. (I.2.A.3.)

- How many sorties were lost due to wx? How many were recovered? (I.2.A.3.a)

NOTE: Weather attrition for Columbus AFB MS FY 87 thru FY 91 (maintenance data only; operations does not maintain this data). All weather losses were due to local/training area weather -- enroute weather problems are not applicable.

COMMONWEALTH CONSULT TEL:1-703-524-1005 May 05,95

2. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (L2)

A. Weather information (L2.A)

- During the best period of record (at least ten years), what was the average: (L2.A.1)

  -- Percentage of time wx at or above 300/1? (L2.A.1.a)

  ANSWER: 98.1%

  -- Percentage of time wx 3000/5 and above? (L2.A.1.b)

  ANSWER: 87.6%

  -- Percentage of time wx 3000/3 and above? (L2.A.1.c)

  ANSWER: 87.6%

  -- Percentage of time wx 1500/3 and above? (L2.A.1.d)

  ANSWER: 91.6%

- Number of forecasted or actual icing days: Base? Working areas(MOAs & Ranges)? (L2.A.2)

ANSWER: Surface: 20 days per year with forecast ice in the airport traffic area.
Working MOA: 50 days per year with forecast ice in the Reese 1-5 MOAs

- Wx attrition? (Use both operations and maintenance records--request five year look-back. Use MAJCOM information, if required). In answering question, please breakout rates with respect to local (read base weather problem), enroute

COMMONWEALTH CONSULT TEL:1-703-534-1005 May 18,2005

2. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (L2)

A. Weather (WX) information (L2.A)

- During the best period of record (at least ten years), what was the average: (L2.A.1)

  -- Percentage of time wx at or above 300/1? (L2.A.1.a)

  ANSWER: 98.3%

  -- Percentage of time wx 3000/5 and above? (L2.A.1.b)

  ANSWER: 80.7%

  -- Percentage of time wx 3000/3 and above? (L2.A.1.c)

  ANSWER: 80.7%

  -- Percentage of time wx 1500/3 and above? (L2.A.1.d)

  ANSWER: 89.6%

- Number of forecasted or actual icing days: Base? Working areas (MOAs & Ranges)? (L2.A.2)

  ANSWER: Surface: 0 Working areas: Approximately 15; NOTE: We do not track icing in the working areas per se, an estimated average from historical data indicates 15 days annually where icing in the working areas may be a factor in student training.

ANSWER: 89.3%

Number of forecasted or actual icing days: Base? Working areas (MOAs & Ranges)? (L2.A.2)

ANSWER: Surface: 15 Working Areas: 80

- Wx attrition? (Use both operations and maintenance records--request five year look-back. Use MAJCOM information, if required). In answering question, please breakout rates with respect to local (read base weather problem), enroute weather, and training area weather, if required. (L2.A.3)

  -- How many sorties were lost due to wx? How many were recovered? (L2.A.3.a)

ANSWER: FY 89 7077 of 38,425 (T-37) 8678 of 46,771 (T-38); FY 90 6549 of 37,820 (T-37) 9574 of 47,939 (T-38); FY 91 4852 of 29,496 (T-37) 8490 of 44,312 (T-38); FY 92 4328 of 24,152 (T-37) 5070 of 26,571 (T-38). Ten year loss average 1980-1989 = T-37 22.7%; T-38 22.4%. All sorties were recovered.

NOTE: No numerical data is available on loss of sorties due to local, enroute, or other training area weather.

-- How many required exercise (local or HHQ) sorties were not flown due to wx during the last year? Is this about the average number lost per year? (L2.A.3.b)

ANSWER: ATC does not perform required exercise sorties.

-- How many formal (BFT, FTU) sorties were lost due to wx? Provide yearly average. (L2.A.3.c)

ANSWER: None.

-- How many class graduations were delayed by wx? Is this about the average? (L2.A.3.d)

ANSWER: None. Yes.

COMMONWEALTH CONSULT TEL:1-703-524-1005 May 05,

Undergraduate Pilot Training Bases



NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB Air Space



NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field Air Spaces



Vance AFB Air Space



Reese AFB Air Space



Laughlin AFB and Randolph AFB Air Spaces



NAS Kingsville and NAS Corpus Christi Air Spaces



Document Separator


91318
AIRPORT DIAGRAM
AFD-91 (USAF)
COLUMBUS AFB (KCBM)
COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI
ATIS
115.2 273.5
CLNC DEL
126.25 338.6
GND CON
275.8
COLUMBUS TOWER
128.65 289.6
HAZARDOUS CARGO AREA
NOVEMBER 1991
ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE
0.1°W
33°40'N
33°39'N
33°38'N
33°37'N
88°28'W
88°27'W
88°26'W
88°25'W
MA-1A
ELEV 195
ELEV 192
ELEV 194
ELEV 207
ELEV 214
FIELD ELEV 219
6300 x 175
12,000 x 300
8000 x 150
0.3% UP
134.2°
314.2°
CONTROL TOWER
BASE OPS
TRANSIENT RAMP
399
RWY 13C-31C
S155, T230, ST175, TT436
RWY 13L-31R
S56, T98, TT233
RWY 13R-31L
S155, T230, ST175, TT436
31C
31R
COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI
COLUMBUS AFB (KCBM)
AIRPORT DIAGRAM

FIGURE 12-A


93203
AIRPORT DIAGRAM
AFD-111 (USAF)
LAUGHLIN AFB (KDLF)
DEL RIO, TEXAS
ATIS
114.4 269.9
LAUGHLIN TOWER
125.2 396.0
GND CON
275.8
CLNC DEL
335.8
JULY 1993
ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE
0.1°W
TANKS
HANGAR
FIRE STATION
BASE OPS
CONTROL TOWER ELEV 1167
HANGAR
ELEV 1075
MA-1A
FIELD ELEV 1082
ELEV 1078
ELEV 1077
ELEV 1064
8858 x 150
8310 x 150
6246 x 150
RWY 13L-31R
S60, T150, ST175, TT260, TDT800
RWY 13C-31C
S25, T65, ST96
RWY 13R-31L
S35, T90, ST114
AIRPORT DIAGRAM
DEL RIO, TEXAS
LAUGHLIN AFB (KDLF)

FIGURE 12-D


94174
AIRPORT DIAGRAM
AFD-240 (USAF)
REESE AFB (KREE)
LUBBOCK, TEXAS
ATIS ★
270.1
REESE TOWER ★
125.45 291.1
GND CON
125.45 275.8
CLNC DEL
335.8
33°37'N
102°03'W
102°02'W
1000 x 150
BAK-15
ELEV 3333
MA-1A
FIELD ELEV 3338
170.8°
JUNE 1994
ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE
0.1°W
33°36'N
10,500 x 150
ELEV 3330
CONTROL TOWER
HANGARS
3480
BASE OPS
ELEV 3325
FIRE STATION
RWY 17R-35L
S50, T100, ST127, TT215
RWY 17C-35C
S50, T100, ST127, TT215
RWY 17L-35R
S30, T45
350.8°
6500 x 150
TANKS
33°35'N
ELEV 3326
ELEV 3326
ELEV 3325
35R

FIGURE 12-H


ATIS ★
115.4 271.8
VANCE TOWER ★
124.05 348.4
GND CON
121.8 289.4
CLNC DEL
225.4
MARCH 1989
ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE
0.1°W
MA-1A
300 x 300
ELEV 1277
1000 x 150
173.1°
MA-1A
ELEV 1276
300 x 200
0.3% UP
9200 x 150
ELEV 1273
218.1°
173.1°
ELEV 1275
FIRE STATION
BASE OPS
1457
CONTROL TOWER
ELEV 1280
128.1°
5550 x 150
4A
4B
5000 x 150
5B
5A
038.1°
ELEV 1290
308.1°
353.1°
ELEV 1290
ELEV 1285
36°21'N
36°20'N
9200 x 150
7B
353.1°
300 x 200
MA-1A
ELEV 1293
1000 x 150
RWY 17L-35R, S35, T65, ST100
RWY 17C-35C, S35, T75, ST100, TT200
RWY 17R-35L, S40, T75, ST115, TT190
RWY 4-22, 13-31, S20, T45
FIELD ELEV 1307
MA-1A
HOT CARGO AREA
300 x 300
1000 x 150
97°55'W
97°54'W
AIRPORT DIAGRAM
ENID, OKLAHOMA
VANCE AFB (KEND)

FIGURE 12-J

UPT COMPARISON
(Backup data)

WEATHER LOSSES SUMMARY
BY AIRCRAFT BY BASE BY FY

	VANCE	REESE	COLUMBUS	LAUGHLIN
T-37				
FY89	21.3	23.6	23.2	15.7
FY90	21.1	22.2	22.2	19.1
FY91	20.9	26.8	22.6	14.1
FY92	21.5	25.8	19.8	19.1
FY93	22.5	23.6	21.1	9.6
FY94	15.9	21.9	20.9	9.6
FIVE YEAR AVERAGE FY90-94	20.4	24.0	21.3	14.3
T-38				
FY89	21.0	23.6	25.5	17.4
FY90	22.0	18.3	22.6	23.0
FY91	23.4	20.7	24.3	18.2
FY92	21.1	24.3	20.2	19.9
FY93	25.1	20.6	21.9	14.8
FY94	18.0	18.6	24.1	13.3
FIVE YEAR AVERAGE FY90-94	21.9	20.5	22.6	17.8
T-1				
FY93	n/a	7.8	n/a	n/a
FY94	n/a	8.1	n/a	1.2

Vance AFB

Close Area Access = Quality Training

	T-37 (closest 16) Total	T-37 (closest 16) Ave.	T-38 (closest 8) Total	T-38 (closest 8) Ave.
■ Vance	240	15	248	31
■ Reese	368	23	316(7)	45
■ Columbus	242	18	214	27
■ Laughlin	378	24	230	36

- *Vance has 7.2% more T-37 training than Laughlin*
- *Vance has 7.5% more T-38 training than Reese*
- *Closest 4 T-38/T-1 areas -- Vance is 13% better than Reese*

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Lack of Congestion

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Airports within 50NM**

	Uncontrolled	Controlled
▪ *Vance*	*14*	*2*
▪ *Reese*	*31*	*1*
▪ *Columbus*	*20*	*0*
▪ *Laughlin*	*29*	*0*

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Strange Fields

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Additional training opportunities away from home field**
- **Divert options with bad weather**

	Inside 100NM	150NM
■ *Vance*	*8*	*12*
■ *Reese*	*4*	*6*
■ *Columbus*	*7*	*11*
■ *Laughlin*	*0*	*4*

NORTHWEST AREAS

FORT WORTH CENTER
DEPARTURE/RECOVERY - 316.1 (CH 11)
AREA MONITOR - 276.0 (CH 12)



1. AREA BOUNDARIES OFF: PRIMARY LBB CH 29
BACKUP (RVO CH 25)

2. IMC NORDO PROCEDURES:

HUBBI DEPARTURE. CROSS HUBBI AT FL 260 OR ASSIGNED, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER. TURN LEFT DIRECT PEPPY. CROSS PEPPY AT 11,000. FLY THE PEPPY NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-12.)

IN AREA. DEPART FRONT OF THE AREA AT 11,000' DIRECT PEPPY. CROSS PEPPY AT 11,000. FLY THE PEPPY NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-12.)

NORTHEAST AREAS

FORT WORTH CENTER
DEPARTURE/RECOVERY - 316.1 (CH 11)
AREA MONITOR - 276.0 (CH 12)



1. AREA BOUNDARIES OFF: PRIMARY RVO CH 25
BACKUP (LBB CH 29)

2. IMC NORDO PROCEDURES:

HUBBI DEPARTURE. CROSS HUBBI AT FL 260 OR ASSIGNED, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER. TURN LEFT DIRECT PEPPY. CROSS PEPPY AT 11,000. FLY THE PEPPY NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-12.)

IN AREA. ARC TO PEPPY VIA THE RVO 22 DME ARC. MAINTAIN FL 180 UNTIL RVO 320R. CROSS PEPPY AT 11,000. FLY THE PEPPY NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-12.)

SOUTHWEST AREAS

FORT WORTH CENTER
DEPARTURE/RECOVERY - 362.3 (CH 10)
AREA MONITOR - 295.9 (CH 9)



1. AREA BOUNDARIES OFF: PRIMARY RVO CH 25
BACKUP (LBB CH 29)

2. IMC NORDO PROCEDURES:

MOORE DEPARTURE. CROSS MOORE AT FL 260 OR ASSIGNED, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER. ARC WEST ON RVO 41 DME. INTERCEPT THE RVO 250R INBOUND. MAINTAIN ALTITUDE UNTIL RVO 222R, THEN CROSS YANKE AT 16,000'. FLY THE RUBY NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-11.)

IN LAMESA OR SEMINOLE. EXIT AREA AT FL 240. FLY POKER NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-12.)

IN ALRED. EXIT THE FRONT OF THE AREA AT 16,000'. ARC WEST ON THE 50 DME TO THE RVO R-250 AND INBOUND TO YANKE. CROSS YANKE AT 16,000' AND FLY THE RUBY NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-11.)

SOUTHEAST AREAS

FORT WORTH CENTER
DEPARTURE/RECOVERY - (CH 10)
AREA MONITOR - (CH 9)



1. AREA BOUNDARIES OFF: PRIMARY RVO 25
BACKUP (LBB 29)

2. IMC NORDO PROCEDURES:

SHURE DEPARTURE. CROSS SHURE AT FL 260 OR ASSIGNED, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER. ARC SOUTH ON RVO 41 DME. INTERCEPT THE RVO 118R INBOUND. CROSS POKER AT FL 260, THEN PICK UP THE REMAINDER OF THE POKER NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-12.)

IN AREA. EXIT AREA AT FL 240. FLY POKER NORDO RECOVERY. (SEE PAGE 1-12.)

1-7 (C-1)



REESE 2 TRANSITION: FLY HEADING 245 UNTIL INTERCEPTING THE RVO R-213. CROSS RVO 213/22 AT 9000' MSL AND RVO 213/26 AT OR ABOVE 10,000'MSL THEN ARC NORTH ON THE 22 DME ARC INTO "A". ENTER OTHER AREAS VIA RVO R-213 AND/OR THE 33 DME ARC.

TURN INTO ASSIGNED AREA AFTER PASSING THE BASE ALTITUDE. EXPECT RADAR VECTORS INTO THE AREAS FROM WESTWIND.

1-8 (C-1)



REESE 4 TRANSITION: INTERCEPT THE RVO R-126 AND CROSS RVO 126/26 AT OR ABOVE 10,000' MSL. ENTER THE AREAS VIA THE RVO R-126 AND/OR 32 DME ARC. TURN INTO ASSIGNED AREA AFTER PASSING THE BASE ALTITUDE.

71ST FLYING TRAINING WING
VANCE T-38 INFLIGHT GUIDE

1 JUL 1993



MOA FREQUENCIES
AREA 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11 CH 8
AREA 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 CH 9

ALTITUDE BLOCK
10,000-FL230
(11,000 IF ALTIMETER
LESS THAN 29.92)



71ST FLYING TRAINING WING
VANCE T-37 INFLIGHT GUIDE

1 SEP 1994



ALL AREAS
HIGH 14,000' - 22,000' MSL
LOW 7,000' - 12,000' MSL



T-38

IN-FLIGHT GUIDE

14TH FLYING TRAINING WING

13 Oct 94



T-37

INFLIGHT GUIDE

LOW SECTORS 8000'-13,000' MSL
HIGH SECTORS 15,000'-22,000' MSL
USE LOCAL ALTIMETER



NOTE: V-278 NOT DEPICTED TO SCALE

14TH FLYING TRAINING WING
COLUMBUS AFB, MS. 13 OCT 1994

T-38 INFLIGHT GUIDE

RANCH AREAS



BURR AREA



47TH FLYING
TRAINING
WING

LAUGHLIN AFB, TX

CHANGE 2 JAN 1994

T-37 INFLIGHT GUIDE

FCIF/CHG	DATE	INITIALS



FEB 1994

CHANGE 3

LAUGHLIN AFB, TEXAS


COLUMBUS 4
COLUMBUS 3
COLUMBUS 1
MERIDIAN 1 EAST
MEMPHIS
MEMPHIS NAS
Chan 38
OLIVE BRANCH
CORINTH
FLORENCE
MUSCLE SHOALS
Calhoun City
TEDCK
SCOBEY
TUSKE
16
19
18
25
23
28
35
34
88
CP
CD
BD
BP
CN
CC
CM
DM
DN
DC
DD
DP
DE
DQ
CE
CQ
BN
BC
BB
BE
AP
AE


REESE 1
REESE 2
REESE 3
REESE 4
REESE 5
PORTALES
LITTLEFIELD
LUBBOCK
PLAINVIEW
CROSBYTON
LEVELLAND
BROWNFIELD
LOVINGTON
GAINES CO.
ANDREWS
BIG SPRING
NEW MEXICO
TEXAS


VANCE 1A
VANCE 1B
Great Salt Plains Rec
A-8628
HUTCHINSON Chan 115
WICHITA Chan 85
ANTHONY Chan 78
WELLINGTON
PIONEER Chan 79
PONGA
SAWCY
BUFFALO
ALVA
FOLLETT
WEST WOODWARD
GAGE Chan 103
MOORELAND
FAIRVIEW
VORTAC VANCE Chan 101
TARTY
STILLWATER
LOGAN COUNTY
KINGFISHER Chan 94
POND CREEK
MEDFORD
KANSAS
OKLAHOMA
ARKANSAS


LAUGHLIN
LAUGHLIN 3
LAUGHLIN Chan 91
VORTAC
ROCKSPRINGS Chan 49
CENTER POINT Chan 122
NDB UVALDE
NDB DIMMIT COUNTY
SONORA
Sonora
Rocksprings
Brackettville
Del Rio
Eagle Pass
PIEDRAS NEGRAS
CIUDAD ACUNA
Dryden
Sanderson
Langtry
Comstock
Uvalde
Batesville
Crystal City
Asherton
Big Wells
Valley Wells
Spofford
Allende
Nava
Morelos
Zaragoza
Santo Domingo
Jimenez
Remolino
A-633A
A-633B
ADIZ
UNITED STATES
MEXICO
RIO GRANDE
U.S.
35
30
28
29
27
70
66
13
100°
101°
102°
MJ
FA
EA
DA
LJ
KJ
LH
KH
MH
LG
KG
MG
FQ
EQ
GC
GD
GB
DQ
UTM GRID ZONE DESIGNATION 13R
UTM GRID ZONE DESIGNATION 14R

30

Enid & Vance

USAF

Partners in the Sky

Vance AFB

Other USAF UPT Competitors

- **Columbus AFB**
  - *Columbus, MS*
- **Laughlin AFB**
  - *Del Rio, TX*
- **Reese AFB**
  - *Lubbock, TX*

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Pilot Conditions

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Pilot training occurs in a very confined cockpit**
- **Training sorties are short -- 1.3 hours per student**
- **Anything that facilitates training produces a better pilot**

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Airspace

- 8400 sq. miles of unencumbered airspace



- Most accessible airspace of any UPT base
- Encroachment nonexistent

Vance AFB

Military Value



Source: USAF BRAC95 Data Sheets

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Pilot Training

- **Vance is the <u>best</u> training environment**
  - ***Greatest total accessible airspace***
  - ***Increased quality training time per limited 1.3 hour sortie -- 15% more at Vance***
  - ***<u>Best</u> access to more strange fields in every direction than any UPT base***

Vance AFB

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

Military Value -- Pilot Training

- **Access to low level routes**
  - *Less congestion = better training variety*
  - *Vance has 24 routes within 50NM*

    Columbus = 17
    Reese = 7
    Laughlin = 4

- **Access to alternate airfields**

- **Better bad weather options**

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Pilot Training

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

BCEG Functional Value Ratings

Randolph	= 39
Columbus	= 36
Vance	= 32
Laughlin	= 32
Reese	= 14

JCSG-UPT Functional Value Ratings

Columbus	= 6.74
Vance	= 6.67
Randolph	= 6.53
Laughlin	= 6.50
Reese	= 6.14

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Contracting Out

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Aircraft maintenance**
- **Base-wide services**
- **Lowest total costs of all UPT bases**
- **A success for over 30 years**

Vance AFB

Military Value



Source: AETC Information Digest, Jan 95

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Training costs

- ***Dramatically lower costs per pilot***



Source: AETC/FM Telcon, Summer 94

Vance AFB Savings = $81K per graduate

- ***Over $10M savings to USAF in FY94***

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Infrastructure

- **Ability to double present student load <u>without</u> construction**
- **Highest percentage Code 1 infrastructure**
- **Least infrastructure overhead**
  - *Buildings/runways/ramps/roads*
  - *Utilities*

Vance AFB

Infrastructure

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky



Source: AETC/CE Data, Aug 94

Vance AFB

Infrastructure

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

Runways, ramps, roads



Source: AETC/CE Data, Aug 94

Vance AFB

Infrastructure

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

Utilities

Thousands of linear feet



Source: AETC/CE Data, Aug 94

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Quality of Life

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Superior base facilities**
- **Vance Development Authority created solely to support Vance AFB**
  - *Educational scholarships for active duty and dependents provided by community*
  - *Rental housing pool*
  - *Land for Vance expansion: two parcels purchased -- 158 and 12.5 acres*

Vance AFB

Bottomline

- **Premier UPT base**
- **Highest quality pilot training**
- **Lowest cost per student**

VANCE 1A / 1B MOA



VANCE AIRSPACE

Vance special use airspace

• Alert area A-562A	surface - 10000' MSL	299 NM^3
• Alert area A-562B	surface - 10000' MSL	202 NM^3
• Vance 1A MOA	10000' - 17999 MSL	8286 NM^3
• ATCAA extention to 1A	FL180 - FL240	6215 NM^3
• Vance 1B MOA	7000' - 17999MSL	3857 NM^3
ATCAA extention to 1B	FL180 - FL240	2103 NM^3
• AR 669	FL260 B280	
• Torch routes	FL300 - FL390	328 NM^3
• Eagle 2N (ATCAA)	FL260 - FL350	1477 NM^3
• Eagle 2S (ATCAA)	FL260 - FL350	1355 NM^3
• Eagle 3N (ATCAA)	FL260 - FL350	1231 NM^3
• Eagle 3S (ATCAA)	FL260 - FL350	1376 NM^3
• Eagle 6 (ATCAA)	FL260 - FL350	1711 NM^3

IRs: 145,146,171,172, 173 175, 181,182,183,185	-avg 500' AGL (1900' to 2800' MSL) TO 4000' MSL, 3 to 5 miles either side of centerline, and 170 to 200 miles long
SRs: 235,253,241,257	-avg 500' to 1500' AGL (1300' to 3300' MSL) 3 miles either side of centerline, and 140 to 160 miles long

Operating hours and restrictions

Vance 1A MOA	-one hour before sunrise to one hour after sunset -Monday - Friday (except hollidays), other times by NOTAM -no supersonic flight
Vance 1B MOA	-operating hours and restrictions same as Vance 1A
Alert area A562A	-sunrise to three hours after sunset -Monday - Friday -altitudes - surface t 10000' MSL, excluding between 3000' - 4000'MSL within one half NM of Owen K. Garriott Road
Alert area A562B	-days -Monday - Friday -altitudes - surface to 10000' MSL
IRs 145, 146, 171, 172, 173, 175, 181, 182, 183, 185	-sunrise to sunset daily -altitudes and widths vary per route / per route leg -and are published in AP/1B, section 1, pgs 48-68

SRs 235, 253, 241, 247	-sunrise to sunset daily -500' to 1500' AGL -avoid flight within 1500' or 3 NM of airports when practical

Proximity of sua

-All special use airspace begins within 20 NM of Vance
-Vance 1A MOA - 3 min (to 10000' MSL and the front of the area)
-Vance 1B MOA - 5 min (to 8000' MSL and the front of the area)

Alternate NAVAID procedures

-T-38/T-1 alternate NAVAIDs are Kingfisher as primary and Gage as secondary
-T-37 alternate NAVAID is Woodring
-There is very little degridaton of usable MOA airspace when the Vance VORTAC is out of service

Proximity of other airfields

-Vance has a large number of airfields within 150 NM for use in emergency situations or in the event a divert base is required.

	T-37
Stereos:	Wiley Post
	Tinker AFB
Emerg/Divert:	Woodring
	Kegelman
	Will Rogers
	Tinker AFB
	Tulsa
	McMonnell AFB
	Wichita Mid-Continent
	Salina Muni
	Hutchinson Muni
	West Woodward (VFR only)
	Altus AFB

	T-38/T-1
Stereos:	Tinker AFB
	Tulsa
	McConnell (working)
Emerg/Divert:	Kegelman
	Woodring
	Tinker AFB
	Tulsa
	McConnell AFB
	Clinton-Sherman
	Altus AFB

	T-1
Long range divert:	Amarillo
	Dyess AFB
	Ft Worth NAS

Military RAPCON controll

-Vance RAPCON talks to everyone within a 44 DME radius from the surface to

FL240. Outside 44DME to 90DME they controll the airspace from 10000' MSL to FL240. The exceptions being the two class D airspaces.
-Our air traffic and landing system (ATCALS) is entered in the national airspace system (NAS) for RAPCON's service to civilian traffic going in and out of Enid Woodring.
-Strong professional relationship, respect, and interaction between the folks at RAPCON and the flyers. e.i. RAPCON always sends a rep to ct meetings to answer any questions that the pilots have and visa-versa.

Civil aviation conflicts and interaction

-Two jet routes through 1A MOA
-Five victor routes through Vance airspace (1A/B)
-RAPCON service to Woodring

Weather

-Overall attrition less than 5% due to weather
-Vance has never had a class graduate late due to wx
-Flying has never had to be scheduled on weekends
-Monthly planned attrition factors available
-Icing: surf - 5000 14
5000 - 10000 35.3
10000 - 15000 39.2
--This is the worst case number of days per year that the conditions would be right for forcast trace/light icing.

AICUZ Air installation compatable use zone

-Most recent study dated Mar '93
--validated for Vance Jan '93
--validater for Kegelman Nov '93
-Encroachment areas include the Lahoma Corridor, an ATC designated VFR flyway and a 51.7% land encroachment within the APZ II for rwy 17R/C/L. This encroachment is largely comprised of a residential area north of the base.
-No known current enviornmental isssues working
--Pattern assessment for the T-1 at 1000' AGL still in the works at HQ
-Noise complaints for '93 study, 0.56/mo ~ 7 for the year
--Current yearly count, 2.

Vance's LOA network is the most extensive of all the UPT bases
Exceptional relationship with our military rep at K.C. Center, Mr. Roger Wingert.

VANCE AFB Visit:

- CRUSHER

Montoya: Volume less critical, Efficiency measure more

- ☆ Proximity of Airspace means efficient utilization:
- Divert options more
- Weather - 10 year planning factor reflects "HIGH CAPACITY" attrition
- Encroachment - APZ II development
- ☆ Costs: Less military personnel nets $10M/yr over other (9 years lowest cost/grad)
- Use overall ATTRITION DATA, not broken-down by category

- MAYOR MIKE COOPER

- Community Support: Education (ratio 14:1)
  - TA: Active (75 + 25) } from city
  - Spouse (0 + 50) }
  - Recreation: Golf, Hunting (Quail), Parks
  - Utilities: Modern Well/Sewer attached to base, Fiber optics
  - Medical: St. Mary's

31% expansion with no MILCON best in UPT

- Economic Impact: 13.4% wages in Enid
- Rental Home program
- Quality of Life

- GOVERNOR KEATING & CONG. LUCAS / SENS INHOFE & NICHOLS

- Work ethic
- $/81K per grad less at Vance

- COL SULIGAN

- Northrop contract $42M/yr: 5 yrs - one year options
- 2 Bird strikes in one year at Ke galman
- RAPCON Blue Suit: Efficiency and Site for that AFSC in worldwide assignments
- $1.3M CHAMPUS savings/yr in "right-sizing" initiative
- Level II Trama (24 hrs Neuro-surgeon not staffed) - Level I 65 mins in OKC

Carswell (817) 782-7756 Col Ray Hurley
DSN 739 - 7033 Jane Col Soligan 71 FTW/CC
- 5646

VANCE Pre-Visit : Mon/Jun 5

- Airspace Chart audit
- FAX ATM Fee & Money Order Receipts to T&A / Correct Excess Fuel Item
- Receive OKLAHOMA Closure History FAX To: LTC MIKE OLSON DSN 732-4322 (210)298-5191
- Verify BV details
  - ~~King status~~ not Columbus
  - Charlie Smith & Liz King Travel (Jun 7 evening) (Vance) 7-7950 AF/LLP Col Stevens
  - Mike Kennedy plan [Huntsville: Linda Powell/205-955-3513/ssoc]
  - Frank Cirillo Columbus departure plan
  - Robles Columbus departure TBD
  - Montoya Columbus departure (Red River)
  - LGen Boles C-21 w/Press (L-V-C)

NW 938 OKC/0630
MEM
GPR/0945

- 3x Davis Memo's (CSAF, CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH)
- ✓ BV Reports (Minn-St Paul & Homestead) FAXed to Commissioners (Cornella & Davis)
- Office Admin
  - 3-hole punch Adds Brief, Gagliardi Presentation, Gunbest ?'s, Staff II, Icing
  - 4x copies of Gunbest ?'s
- Quantico Update x7200
- AIRSPACE : - Scoreable Ranges : Smokey Range
  Fort Sill Range
  - AR 669 built for T-1s
  - Bi-secting airways (20 vs 7 ?)

  - Recompute volume & dist
  Capt Jeni Cushing
  DSN 940-7854
  OSS/OSOP

★ • Weather : - Cat III days, Crosswinds, Icing FACTORS
- ATC Rep: KC Center / Roger Wingert

VANCE MEETING

WED/May 3, 95 - 1330

- Proximity of Airspace : ~7% more training (Laughlin-T-37/Reese-T-38)
- Is there a mistake in what appears to be already complete analysis by the AF & OSD.
- Efficiency: Contract vs Civil Service vs Military

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

MEMORANDUM

TO: Merrill Beyer
AFUPT Senior Analyst
FR: Crusher Craigie
DT: May 9, 1995

Thought you'd like some more data to keep you busy—

1. Not sure whether you've seen the latest Congressman Combest letter -- enclosed

2. Reese still claims lowest cost per flying hour -- data shows Vance lower in 94 and 5

	FY94(T-37)	OCT-MAR FY95(T-37)	FY94(T-38)	OCT-MAR FY95(T-38)
Vance	$256	259	659	479
Reese	274	258	720	548

Vance is lower in every case but T-37 this year by one dollar. This data (attached) is from financial offices at each base.

3. For graduate cost, here is only AETC data published -- based on FY93 data -- again Reese is next to last not next to first!

Vance	Reese	Columbus	Laughlin
500K	602K	592K	639K

Thumbs up,
Crusher

P.S. IF THIS FAX GETS THROUGH IT'S BECAUSE OF MAYOR COOPER - SEE LAST ARTICLES.

LARRY COMBEST
19TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

CHAIRMAN
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

ROOM 1511
LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4319
(202) 225-4005

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

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SUITE 205
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ODESSA, TX 79762-5941
(915) 550-0743

SUITE 205
5809 S. WESTERN
AMARILLO, TX 79110-3828
(806) 353-3945

VC

May 5, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950508-1

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to ask you to support the addition of one or more Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) bases during the May 10th hearing.

While I understand and even agree with a reluctance to add any base for consideration, I believe that it is a necessity with regard to UPT bases for a number of a reasons.

First, and most importantly, the Commission should decide to review Air Force UPT bases because there is documented evidence of substantial errors in the Department of Defense (DoD)/Air Force analysis. These were not minor errors in unimportant areas. They were in areas declared to be vitally important by the Air Force (i.e., airspace, training routes and other key measures of merit). The Air Force and the DoD have admitted errors in these areas. However, they have side-stepped or ignored other errors and maintain that the errors do not alter the outcome. The facts, however, indicate that correcting the errors does make a difference; it changes which base is closed.

Second, the General Accounting Office (GAO) review of DoD mentioned specifically Air Force UPT as an area worthy of further review by the Commission. If the Commission does not challenge the DoD recommendation on Air Force UPT where the errors are glaring and numerous, then the Commission will not have provided the review GAO requested or met its statutory responsibility.

A third important reason to add Air Force UPT bases is that the cost and effectiveness of the bases were never considered. While Reese Air Force Base (AFB) has the lowest cost-per-flying-hour and the second lowest cost-per-student-graduate, it appears this critical issue was never a component of the Air Force/DoD analysis.

In light of the problems described above and in view of the concerns expressed by the GAO and members of the BRAC staff, I urge you to make sure that Air Force UPT bases are added and reviewed further by the Commission.

This is a most important issue which deserves the full scrutiny of the BRAC Commission.

Sincerely,

Larry

Larry Combest

LC/lec

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OFFICES

FY 94 CUMMULATIVE
T-37 COST PER FLYING HOUR

VANCE AFB	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 55.44	$ 51.00	$ 4.44	21426.0	$ (95,131.44)
DLR COST	$ 61.70	$ 69.00	$ (7.30)	21426.0	$ 156,409.80
AV POL	$139.14	$147.00	$ (7.86)	21426.0	$ 168,408.36
TOTAL CPFH	$256.28	$267.00	$ (10.72)	21426.0	$ 229,686.72

COLUMBUS	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 61.45	$ 51.00	$ 10.45	22395.0	$ (234,027.75)
DLR COST	$ 56.11	$ 69.00	$ (12.89)	22395.0	$ 288,671.55
AV POL	$146.11	$147.00	$ (0.89)	22395.0	$ 19,931.55
TOTAL CPFH	$263.67	$267.00	$ (3.33)	22395.0	$ 74,575.35

LAUGHLIN	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 57.03	$ 51.00	$ 6.03	23363.0	$ (140,878.89)
DLR COST	$ 59.21	$ 69.00	$ (9.79)	23363.0	$ 228,723.77
AV POL	$ -	$ -	$ -	23363.0	$ -
TOTAL CPFH	$116.24	$120.00	$ (3.76)	23363.0	$ 87,844.88

LF is down 4 today.

REESE	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 76.26	$ 51.00	$ 25.26	23274.0	$ (587,901.24)
DLR COST	$ 53.81	$ 69.00	$ (15.19)	23274.0	$ 353,532.06
AV POL	$143.91	$147.00	$ (3.09)	23274.0	$ 71,916.66
TOTAL CPFH	$273.98	$267.00	$ 6.98	23274.0	$ (162,452.52)

SHEPPARD	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 56.78	$ 51.00	$ 5.78	36080.0	$ (208,542.40)
DLR COST	$ 50.53	$ 69.00	$ (18.47)	36080.0	$ 666,397.60
AV POL	$ -	$ -	$ -	36080.0	$ -
TOTAL CPFH	$107.31	$120.00	$ (12.69)	36080.0	$ 457,855.20

none ies are in use of info

FY 94 CUMMULATIVE
T-38 COST PER FLYING HOUR

VANCE AFB	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENC	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 207.97	$190.00	$ 17.97	29736.0	$ (534,355.92)
DLR COST	$ 143.76	$162.00	$ (18.24)	29736.0	$ 542,384.64
AV POL	$ 307.73	$318.00	$ (10.27)	29736.0	$ 305,388.72
TOTAL CPFH	$ 659.46	$670.00	$ (10.54)	29736.0	$ 313,417.44

COLUMBUS	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENC	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 230.45	$190.00	$ 40.45	26511.7	$ (1,072,398.27)
DLR COST	$ 130.73	$162.00	$ (31.27)	26511.7	$ 829,020.86
AV POL	$ 326.86	$318.00	$ 8.86	26511.7	$ (234,893.66)
TOTAL CPFH	$ 688.04	$670.00	$ 18.04	26511.7	$ (478,271.07)

LAUGHLIN	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENC	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 213.86	$190.00	$ 23.86	25479.0	$ (607,928.94)
DLR COST	$ 137.96	$162.00	$ (24.04)	25479.0	$ 612,515.16
AV POL	$ -	$ -	$ -	25479.0	$ -
TOTAL CPFH	$ 351.82	$352.00	$ (0.18)	25479.0	$ 4,586.22

REESE	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENC	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 285.98	$190.00	$ 95.98	15569.0	$ (1,494,312.62)
DLR COST	$ 125.37	$162.00	$ (36.63)	15569.0	$ 570,292.47
AV POL	$ 308.82	$318.00	$ (9.18)	15569.0	$ 142,923.42
TOTAL CPFH	$ 720.17	$670.00	$ 50.17	15569.0	$ (781,096.73)

SHEPPARD	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENC	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 212.93	$190.00	$ 22.93	40236.0	$ (922,611.48)
DLR COST	$ 117.72	$162.00	$ (44.28)	40236.0	$ 1,781,650.08
AV POL	$ -	$ -	$ -	40236.0	$ -
TOTAL CPFH	$ 330.65	$352.00	$ (21.35)	40236.0	$ 859,038.60

FY93 (OCT - MAR)

CUMMULATIVE
T-37 COST PER FLYING HOUR

VANCE AFB	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 94.32	$ 84.00	$ 10.32	8742.6	$ (90,223.63)
DLR COST	$ 39.02	$ 54.00	$ (14.98)	8742.6	$ 130,964.15
AV POL	$125.53	$132.00	$ (6.47)	8742.6	$ 56,564.62
TOTAL CPFH	$258.87	$270.00	$ (11.13)	8742.6	$ 97,305.14

COLUMBUS	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 73.56	$ 84.00	$ (10.44)	9281.6	$ 96,899.90
DLR COST	$ 29.06	$ 54.00	$ (24.94)	9281.6	$ 231,483.10
AV POL	$129.00	$132.00	$ (3.00)	9281.6	$ 27,844.80
TOTAL CPFH	$231.62	$270.00	$ (38.38)	9281.6	$ 356,227.81

LAUGHLIN	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 86.28	$ 84.00	$ 2.28	9395.5	$ (21,421.74)
DLR COST	$ 47.77	$ 54.00	$ (6.23)	9395.5	$ 58,533.97
AV POL	$126.79	$132.00	$ (5.21)	9395.5	$ 48,950.55
TOTAL CPFH	$260.84	$270.00	$ (9.16)	9395.5	$ 86,062.78

REESE	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$ 75.47	$ 84.00	$ (8.53)	9603.0	$ 81,913.59
DLR COST	$ 45.74	$ 54.00	$ (8.26)	9603.0	$ 79,320.78
AV POL	$136.39	$132.00	$ 4.39	9603.0	$ (42,157.17)
TOTAL CPFH	$257.60	$270.00	$ (12.40)	9603.0	$ 119,077.20

SHEPPARD	ACTUAL	FUNDED	DIFFERENCE	HOURS	TOTAL SAVINGS
CONSUMABLE	$107.05	$ 84.00	$ 23.05	15875.5	$ (365,930.28)
DLR COST	$ 37.34	$ 54.00	$ (16.66)	15875.5	$ 264,485.83
AV POL	$128.65	$132.00	$ (3.35)	15875.5	$ 53,182.92
TOTAL CPFH	$273.04	$270.00	$ 3.04	15875.5	$ (48,261.52)

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Strange Fields

- **Additional training opportunities away from home field**
- **Divert options with bad weather**

	Inside 100NM	150NM
■ *Vance*	*8*	*12*
■ *Reese*	*4*	*6*
■ *Columbus*	*7*	*11*
■ *Laughlin*	*0*	*4*

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Lack of Congestion

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Airports within 50NM**

	Uncontrolled	Controlled
■ *Vance*	*14*	*2*
■ *Reese*	*31*	*1*
■ *Columbus*	*20*	*0*
■ *Laughlin*	*29*	*0*

Vance AFB

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

Close Area Access = Quality Training

	T-37 (closest 16)		T-38 (closest 8)	
	Total	Ave.	Total	Ave.
■ Vance	240	15	248	31
■ Reese	368	23	316(7)	45
■ Columbus	242	18	214	27
■ Laughlin	378	24	230	36

- *Vance has 7.2% more T-37 training than Laughlin*
- *Vance has 7.5% more T-38 training than Reese*
- *Closest 4 T-38/T-1 areas -- Vance is 13% better than Reese*

25 MAR 95

1

Merrie —

Just wanted to pass on thanks on behalf of Vance for our session on St Patricks Day —

Know the UPT analysis will be tough because the bases are all good. Also know that Vance ranks 1 or 2 in all the capability & efficiency measures —

Our Vance Enid team stands ready to help you in any way you need it — Am sure everyone wants a fair analysis & it takes honest/consistent data to get that —

Don't hesitate to call —

719-495-8875

Thumbs up —

Crusher Craig
Team Vance Enid

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: March 17, 1995

TIME: 9:00

MEETING WITH: Community representatives of Vance Air Force Base

SUBJECT: Vance Air Force Base

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Col. Donald "Crusher" Craigie USAF (Ret.)
J.R. Rescovac; Consultant

***Commission Staff*:**

Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison
Ben Borden, Director, Review & Analysis
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
Lt. Col. Merrill Beyer, Air Force Analyst
Mark Pross, Air Force Analyst

MEETING PURPOSE: Provide community representatives an opportunity to present information supporting the continued operation of Vance AFB. They are concerned about how Vance will be evaluated, especially considering efforts by Reese and Meridian groups to offer alternatives to SECDEF recommendations. Representatives highlighted the merits of Vance AFB: Airspace, Training Efficiencies (Cost/Graduate, Training Quality, etc.) and Quality of Life.

Document Separator

Enid & Vance

USAF

Partners in the Sky

Vance AFB

Background

- **Mission**
  - *Premier USAF Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) Base*
  - *Primary -- T-37 "Tweet"*
    Advanced -- T-38 "Talon"
    -- T-1 "Jayhawk"
- **FY94**
  - *Over 40,000 accident-free sorties*
  - *153 pilot graduates proudly serving the nation*

Vance AFB

Other USAF UPT Competitors

- **Columbus AFB**
  - *Columbus, MS*
- **Laughlin AFB**
  - *Del Rio, TX*
- **Reese AFB**
  - *Lubbock, TX*



Vance AFB

Military Value -- Airspace

- *8400 sq. miles of unencumbered airspace*



- *Most accessible airspace of any UPT base*
- *Encroachment nonexistent*

Vance AFB

Military Value



Source: USAF BRAC95 Data Sheets

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Contracting Out

- **Aircraft maintenance**
- **Base-wide services**
- **Lowest total costs of all UPT bases**
- **A success for over 30 years**

Vance AFB

Military Value



Source: AETC Information Digest, Jan 95

Slide 7 -- Manpower

*AETC Information Digest, Jan 95

	VAFB	RAFB	CAFB	LAFB
Officers	303	349	350	364
Enlisted	375	606	763	714
Civilians	101	366	347	873
Total	779	1321	1460	1951

Vance AFB

Military Value

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

Cost to run the base

$M of dollars



Slide 8 -- Costs

*AETC Information Digest, Jun 94; AETC/FMA letter, Sep 94

	VAFB	RAFB	CAFB	LAFB
O&M	29	33	45	61
Contracts	47	29	27	6
Civilian Per	3	11	9	27
Military Per	37	52	50	37
Total	116	125	131	131

**$M of dollars

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Training costs

- ***Dramatically lower costs per pilot***

Cost Savings per Graduate



Source: AETC/FM Telcon, Summer 94

Vance AFB Savings = $81K per graduate

- ***Over $10M savings to USAF in FY94***

Vance AFB

Military Value



Source: AETC Digest, Jun 94; AETC/FMA letter, 7 Sep 94

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Infrastructure

- **Ability to double present student load <u>without</u> construction**
- **Highest percentage Code 1 infrastructure**
- **Least infrastructure overhead**
  - ***Buildings/runways/ramps/roads***
  - ***Utilities***



Vance AFB

Infrastructure

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

Facilities

Thousands of sq. feet



Source: AETC/CE Data, Aug 94

Slide 13 -- Facilities

*AETC/CE Summary Information, 30 Aug 94

	VAFB	RAFB	CAFB	LAFB
Total	1477	1994	2553	2206
Need Repair	370	538	1047	1566

**Thousand of sq. feet

Vance AFB

Infrastructure

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

Runways, ramps, roads

Thousands of sq. yards



Source: AETC/CE Data, Aug 94

Slide 14 -- Runways, ramps, roads

*AETC/CE Summary Inforamtion, 30 Aug 94

	VAFB	RAFB	CAFB	LAFB
Total	1762	2108	2596	2033
Need Repair	300	906	52	1565

**Thousands of sq. yards

Vance AFB

Infrastructure



Source: AETC/CE Data, Aug 94

Slide 15 -- Utilities

*AETC/CE Summary Information, 30 Aug 94

	VAFB	RAFB	CAFB	LAFB
Total	90	50	65	85
Need Repair	50	40	45	70

**Thousands of linear feet

Vance AFB

Military Value -- Quality of Life

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Superior base facilities**

- **Vance Development Authority created solely to support Vance AFB**
  - *Educational scholarships for active duty and dependents provided by community*
  - *Rental housing pool*
  - *Land for Vance expansion: two parcels purchased -- 158 and 12.5 acres*

Vance AFB

Bottomline

Enid & Vance
Partners in the Sky

- **Premier UPT base**
- **Highest quality pilot training**
- **Lowest cost per student**

DEFENSE REALIGNMENT ADVISORS
THE HOMER BUILDING
SUITE 410 SOUTH
601 THIRTEENTH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-9460

MEMORANDUM

TO: **Frank Cirillo**
FR: **JR Reskovac**
DT: **21 March 95**
RE: **Vance AFB briefing**

Enclosed please find the follow-up Vance AFB briefing as requested by you after our meeting last Friday. Additional slides have been included citing specific data used in preparation, as well as the sources of that data.

Please do not hesitate to contact Crusher Craigie, or myself, if you have any questions.

Document Separator

UPT

Audit Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP FOR UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING 1995 BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROCESS

Report No. 95-175 April 13, 1995

Department of Defense

Additional Copies

Copies of the report can be obtained from the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit, Audit Planning and Technical Support Directorate (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or FAX (703) 604-8932.

Suggestions for Future Audits

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Planning and Coordination Branch, Audit Planning and Technical Support Directorate, at (703) 604-8939 (DSN 664-8939) or FAX (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

Inspector General, Department of Defense
OAIG-AUD (ATTN: APTS Audit Suggestions)
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)
Arlington, Virginia 22202-2884

DoD Hotline

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, call the DoD Hotline at (800) 424-9098 or write to the DoD Hotline, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301-1900. We fully protect the identity of writers and callers.

Acronyms

AFB	Air Force Base
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
JCSG	Joint Cross-Service Group
NAS	Naval Air Station
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884

Report No. 95-175 April 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (READINESS)

SUBJECT: Report on the Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Process (Project No. 4CG-5016.05)

Introduction

We are providing this report for your information and use. This report is one in a series of reports that discusses the review of the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) for 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC 95) implementation of the internal control plan for managing the identification of DoD cross-Service opportunities. Six JCSGs implemented the BRAC 95 Steering Group's internal control plan to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information upon which the Secretary of Defense recommendations for realignments and closures to the 1995 Commission on Defense Base Closure and Realignment (the 1995 Commission) are based. The Inspector General, DoD, was directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to review the adequacy and implementation of the internal control plan over this process.

Audit Results

The JCSG for Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) implementation of the internal control plan was generally effective. We identified the following deficiencies to management, and management took the appropriate action to correct the deficiencies:

o computer-analysis scoring sheet errors and

o identifying and referencing source documents for scoring sheet determinations.

Audit Objectives

The overall audit objective was to assess the adequacy of the BRAC 95 Steering Group's internal control plan. The specific objective of this audit was to determine whether the JCSG-UPT adequately implemented the internal control plan. A summary report will discuss the overall audit objective.

Scope and Methodology

We reviewed the JCSG-UPT process for collecting and analyzing BRAC 95 data. We did not review the data collection process of the Military Departments.

We attended JCSG-UPT meetings and reviewed the formal minutes of the meetings.

We validated the JCSG-UPT process used to derive undergraduate pilot training site functional values and functional capacities from data the Military Departments submitted.

We verified that the JCSG-UPT applied certified data for developing alternative recommendations to the Military Departments.

Statistical Sampling Methodology. We applied statistical sampling to validate the 4,631 data call responses used for scoring functional values. The sampling plan was developed by the Quantitative Methods Division, Audit Planning and Technical Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD. The statistical sampling was used to assess the reliability of the computer processed data used in computer models for the JCSG-UPT process. The details of the statistical sampling plan and results are in Enclosure 1.

Audit Standards and Locations. This program audit was conducted from January 1994 through March 1995. The audit was conducted in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. Accordingly, we included tests of internal controls considered necessary. We conducted the audit at various DoD organizations and locations. Enclosure 3 lists the organizations we visited or contacted.

Internal Control Plan

On April 13, 1994, the Steering Group issued the BRAC 95 internal control plan for the JCSGs to use in the BRAC 95 process. The objective of the internal control plan was to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information upon which the Secretary of Defense recommendations for realignments and closures will be based.

The internal control plan established two principal mechanisms to control the review and analytical process: organization and documentation.

Implementation of Organizational Controls. Organizational controls consisted of the establishment of three organizations that were separated by distinct functional boundaries and levels of decisionmaking authorities. An Inspector General, DoD, summary report will discuss the implementation of organizational controls.

Implementation of Documentation Controls. Documentation controls were divided into the following control elements: data information and collection, certification, record keeping, oral briefings, outside studies, technical experts, and access to records. We reviewed the JCSG-UPT implementation of these controls.

The primary purpose of the internal control plan was to provide a consistent set of management controls for all JCSGs and to ensure the accuracy of the data collection and analysis process. In addition, the internal control plan incorporated the certification procedures in Public Law 101-510, "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990," November 5, 1990, as amended, and policy guidance issued in the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, "1995 Base Realignment and Closures," January 7, 1994.

Audit Background

The Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum established policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure under Public Law 101-510, as amended. To oversee the entire process and to enhance opportunities for consideration of cross-Service tradeoffs and multi-Service use of the remaining infrastructure, the memorandum established a BRAC 95 Review Group, a BRAC 95 Steering Group, and six BRAC 95 JCSGs. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Inspector General, DoD, to review the activities of the JCSGs to ensure such activities comply with the requirements of the internal control plan.

BRAC 95 Review Group Authorities. The Review Group oversees the entire BRAC 95 process. The Review Group was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and included a senior representative from each Military Department, chairperson(s) of the Steering Group, and each JCSG; and senior representatives from other DoD Components. Authorities of the Review Group included, but were not limited to:

- o reviewing BRAC 95 analysis policies and procedures,
- o reviewing BRAC 95 excess capacity analyses,
- o establishing BRAC 95 closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration by the DoD Components, and
- o making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

BRAC 95 Steering Group Authorities. The Steering Group assisted the Review Group in exercising its authorities and reviewed DoD Component supplementary BRAC 95 guidance. The Steering Group was chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security) and was composed of representatives from each Military Department, each JCSG, and other DoD Components.

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups Authorities. The JCSGs were established in six areas with significant potential for cross-Service impact in the BRAC 95 process. The six JCSGs are:

- o depot maintenance,
- o test and evaluation,
- o laboratories,
- o medical treatment facilities including graduate medical education,
- o undergraduate pilot training, and
- o economic impact.

The JCSGs are chaired by senior DoD officials, with members from each Military Department and other DoD offices, as considered appropriate by the chairperson.

Joint Cross-Service Group Responsibilities. The JCSGs (excluding the JCSG for Economic Impact) were tasked to perform the following functions.

o Establish guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements, and milestone schedules for cross-Service analysis of the common-support functions.

o Perform an excess-capacity analyses.

o Develop closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess-capacity reduction targets for Military Department consideration.

o Analyze cross-Service tradeoffs.

The JCSG for Economic Impact had the following unique responsibilities.

o Establish the guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact.

o Analyze DoD Component recommendations under those guidelines.

o Develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary.

Joint Cross-Service Group Process. To fulfill its responsibilities, each group generally performed the following tasks.

o Developed analytical framework and methodology for analyzing cross-Service opportunities.

o Developed data call requirements to use in the analysis.

o Determined capacity requirements and functional values and prepared optimization scenarios.

o Analyzed the results for operational feasibility.

o Recommended cross-Service opportunities to the Military Departments.

Discussion

Data Information and Collection. The JCSG-UPT received and reviewed certified data call information the Military Departments submitted for validity and consistency. When the JCSG-UPT determined inconsistences existed in the data or that additional data was required, supplemental data call requests were sent to the Military Departments.

The JCSG-UPT identified all UPT sites within each Military Department. The UPT sites provided programs supporting the selection and undergraduate training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators. The 14 UPT sites identified were at Naval Air Stations (NAS), Air Force Bases (AFB), and other training sites.

Undergraduate Pilot Training Sites

Military Department	Training Site	Location
Army	Fort Rucker	Alabama
Navy	Corpus Christi NAS	Texas
	Kingsville NAS	Texas
	Meridian NAS	Mississippi
	Pensacola NAS	Florida
	Whiting Field NAS	Florida
Air Force	Air Force Academy	Colorado
	Columbus AFB	Mississippi
	Hondo Field	Texas
	Laughlin AFB	Texas
	Randolph AFB	Texas
	Reese AFB	Texas
	Sheppard AFB	Texas
	Vance AFB	Oklahoma

The JCSG-UPT developed its analytical plan and data call requirements from January through March 1994. The analytical plan established measures of merit with relative weights for determining the functional capabilities and measuring excess functional capacities of the 14 UPT sites. The JCSG-UPT identified 10 common support functions associated with UPT: flight screening, primary pilot training, airlift tanker pilot training, maritime pilot training, bomber

fighter pilot training, strike advanced pilot training, helicopter pilot training, primary Naval flight officer training, weapons system officer training, and panel navigator training. All members of the JCSG-UPT approved the analytical plan. The data call requirements provided information to determine UPT functional requirements, functional value, and functional capacity.

Functional Requirements. Functional requirements define the DoD outyear military airspace and facilities needed for the 10 UPT functions. Derived from data call responses, the results were used by the JCSG-UPT to identify excess capacity.

Functional Value. The Decision-PAD computer analysis model was used to determine the functional value of UPT functions at the 14 UPT sites. The Decision-PAD model assigned functional values by combining the data derived from the UPT site data call responses with weight assignments identified in the JCSG-UPT analytical plan.

Procedurally, the JCSG-UPT analyzed data call responses and placed the appropriate scored results on master input sheets for each UPT site. The scored results from the master input sheets were combined with assigned weights for placement in the Decision-PAD model.

To conduct the data analysis process and score the master input sheets, the JCSG-UPT established a subgroup working team. This working team consisted of members from the JCSG-UPT supported by functional experts from the Military Departments. Whenever consensus could not be achieved within the working team, issues were elevated to the JCSG-UPT for discussion and resolution. The JCSG-UPT ratified all working team results.

Functional Capacity. Functional capacity defines each UPT site's present ability to perform each of the 10 UPT functions. The JCSG-UPT derived functional capacity values for each UPT site from the data call response. Functional capacity scoring was conducted in the same manner as functional value scoring.

In April 1994, the JCSG-UPT sent the data call questionnaires to the Military Departments. The Military Departments forwarded the questionnaires to the UPT sites. The UPT sites completed and certified the data call responses and forwarded them through their chains of command for further reviews and certifications. The data call responses were then passed to their respective Military Department BRAC organizations for delivery to the JCSG-UPT.

In August 1994, the JCSG-UPT working team determined that additional data were needed to facilitate the completion of the functional value scoring process. The working team outlined the additional data requirement at the August 12, 1994, JCSG-UPT meeting. The JCSG-UPT authorized the working team to request the additional data from the UPT sites. Because of time constraints, the working team initially obtained the additional information by telephone or FAX, and then later received the UPT sites' certified responses that were placed in data call folders.

Military Value. In addition to the UPT site data call requirements, the Military Departments were to make military value determinations for each of their UPT sites. The numeric values, ranging from one to three, measured the site's value to the Military Department as a UPT site. As opposed to a ranking system, the Military Departments could assign the same numeric military value to multiple UPT sites. Military values were to be used in the JCSG-UPT analytical process. During the review, we confirmed that the JCSG-UPT used the military values provided by the Military Departments.

Certifications. In compliance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act and the BRAC 95 Steering Group's internal control plan, we determined that UPT site data call responses, including additional information responses, were certified as accurate and complete. The Base Closure and Realignment Act provides that the DoD can use only certified data and information to make decisions and recommendations on prospective cross-Service basing alternatives. The BRAC 95 Steering Group's internal control plan required that the Military Departments certify all data call responses as accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief before its submission to the JCSG-UPT.

Record Keeping. The JCSG-UPT maintained adequate documentation and controls for supporting its UPT cross-Service base closure and realignment alternatives. Record keeping included the analytic plan, UPT site data call responses, functional and capacity value determinations, UPT functional requirements, UPT site military values obtained from the Military Departments, scoring values applied in the Optimization Model, alternative recommendations developed, oral briefings documentation, information from outside studies, the services of technical experts, and records access documentation.

Oral Briefings. The JCSG-UPT received oral briefings from multiple levels within the DoD. As required by the BRAC-95 Steering Group's internal control plan, the substance of the briefings with slides was recorded in the JCSG-UPT meetings minutes.

Outside Studies. The JCSG-UPT did not use outside study results or conclusions in its analyses and deliberations. All data the JCSG-UPT used were solely derived from certified UPT site data call responses and results from sanctioned models.

Technical Experts. The JCSG-UPT did not use technical experts. The JCSG-UPT and its working team relied solely on certified UPT site data call responses and the JCSG-UPT members' combined training, technical experiences, and judgment.

Access to Records. All JCSG-UPT working team data and deliberations were conducted in a secure working area at the Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, Virginia. UPT site folders maintaining data call responses and related products were stored in locked file cabinets. All data and documents were

treated as sensitive "close hold" information with access restricted to authorized personnel. When JCSG-UPT meeting and working team sessions were finished, all documents were collected and secured.

Data Reviews. The JCSG-UPT performed two reviews of the UPT site data. One review evaluated the quality of the data call responses to determine whether the responses were correctly answered and complete. Another review evaluated and scored information needed to determine functional and capacity values and functional requirements. The JCSG-UPT working team provided staff support and developed products for the JCSG-UPT's review and approval.

Audit Review of Data Review Process. Because we considered the data reduction and analysis process high risk, we made audit tests to determine whether the derived scores on the Decision-PAD model master input sheets were verifiable to the UPT site data call books. Initially we judgmentally selected 60 scored values from the most heavily weighted functional value determinations. We found an error rate of approximately 10 percent. An error was defined as a wrong score. We did not measure differences to determine beneficial or detrimental effect because the JCSG-UPT analytical plan was an incremental building process. The JCSG-UPT had to complete each incremental step in the process before moving to the next step. We also determined that data call responses used in deriving scores needed to be identified and cross-referenced to provide an audit trail.

As a result of our initial review, the JCSG-UPT working team corrected the errors, revalidated the scored values, and created audit trails to certified data call responses before they ran the Decision-PAD model. Our subsequent statistical review of scored functional values placed on master input sheets showed that the error rate had been reduced to less than 5 percent.

Optimization Model. The JCSG-UPT used the BRAC Joint Cross-Service Group Optimization Model as a tool to help develop base closure and realignment alternatives. The Optimization Model generated solution sets of functional alternatives by combining military values with results from the UPT sites functional and capacity value determinations and functional requirements. We determined that data placed in the Optimization Model was traceable to certified UPT installation source documents.

Development of Alternative Recommendations. The JCSG-UPT developed three functional base closure and realignment alternatives using the Optimization Model as a tool that would consolidate cross-Service functions at fewer UPT sites. The JCSG-UPT agreed to the most feasible alternatives and its rationale was recorded in JCSG-UPT meeting minutes. The JCSG-UPT briefed the BRAC 95 Steering Group and forwarded the recommendations to the Military Departments for consideration in their BRAC 95 process.

Conclusion. Based on our review, we concluded that the JCSG-UPT complied with the internal control plan established by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Management Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the addressee on March 15, 1995. Because we made no recommendations and did not claim monetary benefits, no official comments were required. However, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) did comment and concurred with the report. Enclosure 2 provides his comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. If you have questions on this memorandum, please contact Mr. John E. Meling, Program Director, at (703) 604-9091 (DSN 664-9091) or Mr. David M. Wyte, Project Manager, at (703) 604-9027 (DSN 664-9027). Enclosure 4 lists the distribution of this report.

David K. Steensma

David K. Steensma
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

Enclosures

Statistical Sampling Documentation

Sampling Plan

Sampling Purpose. The purpose of the statistical sampling plan was to estimate the percent of entries on UPT Functional Value master scoring sheets that contained errors.

Universe Represented. The audit universe was defined as all master scoring sheet entries for 10 functional areas and 13 sub-functional categories at 12 military organizations. This universe contained a total of 4,631 entries.

Sampling Design. A simple random sample of 228 entries was drawn from the audit universe.

Sampling Results

Confidence Interval Table. Statistical projection of the sample data are shown in the table.

Percentage of Master Scoring Sheet Entries with Errors

95-Percent Confidence Interval	Percent
Lower Bound	1.9
Point Estimate	4.8
Upper Bound	7.8

Confidence Interval Statement. We are 95-percent confident that from 1.9 percent to 7.8 percent of the 4,631 master scoring sheet entries contained errors. The unbiased point estimate, 4.8 percent, is the most likely single value for the percentage of errors in this universe.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Comments

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

06 APR 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report on Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training, 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Process (Project No. 4CG-5016.05)

I have reviewed the draft report and concur in the auditor's description of the process used by the Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) for Undergraduate Pilot Training to develop alternatives for consideration by the Military Departments during their BRAC analyses.

The Inspector General, DoD, has been a key part of the Department's BRAC process by providing advice and review of organizational and internal management controls for JCSG activities. The involvement of the Inspector General enhanced the process by helping to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information used as a basis for development of functional alternatives by the Joint Cross-Service Groups.

Robert E. Bayer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Installations

Organizations Visited or Contacted

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations)
  - Director, Base Closure and Utilization

Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)
  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations)
Director, Base Closure and Utilization
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness)

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
  Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
Director, National Security Agency
  Inspector General, National Security Agency
Inspector General, Central Imagery Office

Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office

Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees and subcommittees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Governmental Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Committee on National Security

Audit Team Members

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Teresa D. Bone

Document Separator

BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

LONG-TERM UPT REQUIREMENTS

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has requested an AF/XO and DP analysis of long-term Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) requirements, to include the assumptions used to derive requirements.

- The production capacity data previously provided to the Commission indicated a requirement for 1078 SUPT equivalents through FY02. (See atch slide #2)

  -- "SUPT equivalents" are the accepted standard for capacity analysis, normalizing different course lengths, flying hours, and workloads. This *excludes* production in the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) program at Sheppard AFB, and SUPT advanced tracks conducted by other services (T-44 turboprop airlift with the Navy, helicopter training with the Army). SUPT equivalents *include* various international and support courses such as Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF). 1078 SUPT equivalents represents the currently programmed production for FY02 (entries in FY01), of 1100 total active duty and 145 Guard and Reserve.

  -- Recent input from the Reserve asks for 30 more SUPT equivalents beginning in FY98, though this has not yet been published or funded. When incorporated into the next PFT guidance letter, this will increase the official end-of-FYDP total requirement to 1108.

- There are indicators of possible increased demand on UPT production beyond the FYDP. (See atch slide #3)

  -- For the active duty force, production of 1100 per year <u>average</u> is required to sustain the 20 FWE force even after a 20% pilot staff cut, assuming continued good retention supported by the pilot bonus program. Downturns in retention could require increased production.

  -- JPATS conversion will reduce capacity during the transition from the T-37 in primary training, beginning in FY02.

  -- The Air Reserve Component (ARC) hiring pool will shrink significantly beginning in FY03, as small UPT year groups produced during active duty drawdown reach the end of their Active Duty Service Commitment (ADSC). The Guard and Reserve have historically hired less than 50% of active duty pilots separating after the end of their ADSC but before reaching 15 years of service. In FY03, even 100% of this potential hiring pool will fall short of the ARC requirement. Though difficult to quantify now, an increase in pilot production for the Guard and Reserve in that time frame is probably unavoidable. (See atch slide #4) A recent RAND report to OSD supports this concern.

- No assumptions are made concerning the possibility of future force structure changes.

- AF/XO & DP support Air Education & Training Command's (AETC) analysis to close one UPT base, leaving a reasonable margin for uncertainty in out-year requirements. Closing two bases, however, would clearly leave a gap in production capacity even before acknowledging the possibility of increased requirements.

Pilot Production Capacity Analysis

AF/XOOT

AF/DPXOF

AETC/XOTI

Production Capacity Analysis

- SUPT equivalent: flying hour / workload unit
  - Accepted standard for BRAC capacity analysis
  - Excludes ENJJPT and cross-service advanced tracks
  - Includes intl / interservice / short course equivalents
- FY02: 1078 SUPT equivalent = 1100 AD, 145 ARC
  - Unprogrammed AFRES request for +30 SUPT beginning FY98
- Closing one base is workable
  - Closing two bases leaves a clear gap



Pilot Production Concerns Beyond FYDP

- Need 1100/year AD <u>average</u> to sustain 20FWE force
  - Correcting cumulative shortfall could require additional 100-150/yr, even with continued good retention
- ARC hiring pool shrinks in FY03
  - Low-production AD "bathtub" hits end of ADSC in FY03
  - Potential requirement for additional SUPT for ARC
  - RAND analysis supports concerns
- JPATS transition cuts into capacity starting FY02
  - Capacity normally used for students taken up by conversion
- Downturn in retention could require increased SUPT
  - Current retention estimates assume continued pilot bonus
  - Loss of bonus or surge in airline hiring could increase losses
- Future force structure always uncertain

ARC Hiring Pool Critical in FY03

Historically <50% of 8-15 year AD exits hired to ARC; 100% insufficient in FY03. Alternatives may require increased new pilot production.



Air Force and Navy Pilot Production

Active Duty



Pilot Training Production Rates

Air Force Method

- The Air Force determines required pilot production using the following formula:

  UPT Rate = Requirement/TARS

  TARS: Total Active Rated Service - Expected man years of utilization as a rated officer for the average pilot after completing initial flying training, given existing retention rates (AFMPC/DPMYAF)

  UPT Rate = 13,711 [FY01 Rqmts] / 12.5 [steady state TARS]

  1,097 pilots required annually for long-term sustainment

- Current rate below sustainment rate for two reasons
  - Insufficient absorption rate due to cockpit reductions and base/unit closures during drawdown
  - The need to drawdown "surge" populations

    (pilot bank, third pilots, FAIPs, Operation Total Force)

Pilot Training Production

Navy Method

- The Navy produces primarily to fill first-tour rqmts
  - 14 Aviation Communities determine their annual requirements based on a three year tour
- Retention of approx 45% of that group provides sufficient aviators for remaining rated requirements
  - Career Path: Ops tour (O-2) - flying
    Training tour (O-3) - flying
    Disassociated tour (O-3/O-4) - staff job
    Department Head tour (O-4) - flying
    Command or Staff (O-5)
- Little crossflow between prop/jet/helo communities or aviation/surface/sub communities

Backup Slides

Pilot Distribution Into Initial Entry Tng



Steady-State Production vs TARS

Sustainment requires 1100 active duty per year average, with optimistic TARS



Pilot Retention Trends



Pilot Retention Assumptions



Pilot Production Considerations

- Replace annual losses to sustainment (950-1400)
  - Not achievable or desirable - chases the problem
- Long-term sustainment (1100)
  - Smooths spikes but must accept shortage/overage
- 5-year average sustainment (>1200)
  - Reasonable compromise to correct, but not constrained
- Experience-constrained absorption (~1100)
  - Practical chokepoint and classic RDTM challenge
- Resource-constrained absorption
  - Identify shortfall and fix problem - not an avoidable cost
- Vacancy-constrained absorption
  - Fill vacancies as they occur -- difficult to project needs

Pilot Production Considerations



Requirement vs Inventory Projection



(End-of-FY Manpower Data)

SUPT

Including Joint & Interservice Tracks



HQ USAF/XOOT

FAX COVER SHEET

HQ USAF/RTR
HQ USAF/RTT
1670 AIR FORCE PENTAGON
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DSN 225-6766 or (Comm) 703/695-6766
FAX DSN 223-9707 or (Comm) 703/693-9707

Merrill
Please PASS to

DATE: 20 Jun 95

FROM: AF/RT

TO: DBCRC

ATTN: Mr Cirillo

FAX #: 60550

NO. OF PAGES 6 + 1 COVER SHEET

REMARKS:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

20 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Additional Data on Undergraduate Pilot Training Capacity Analysis

As per Commissioner Cox's question during the recent hearings concerning Air Force UPT capacity in the out years, the attached slides are provided.

JAY D. BLUME JR, Major General, USAF
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

Attachment:
"Pilot Production Capacity Analysis"

T# 634

Pilot Production Capacity Analysis

AF/XOOT

AF/DPXOF

AETC/XOTI

Production Capacity Analysis

- SUPT equivalent: flying hour / workload unit
  - Accepted standard for BRAC capacity analysis
  - Excludes ENJJPT and cross-service advanced tracks
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- FY02: 1078 SUPT equivalent = 1100 AD, 145 ARC
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- Closing one base is workable
  - Closing two bases leaves a clear gap



JUN-30-1995 09:14 FROM HQ USAF REALIGN AND TRANS TO 703-695-8550 P.004 005

Pilot Production Concerns Beyond FYDP

- Need 1100/year AD <u>average</u> to sustain 20FWE force
  - Correcting cumulative shortfall could require additional 100-150/yr, even with continued good retention
- ARC hiring pool shrinks in FY03
  - Low-production AD "bathtub" hits end of ADSC in FY03
  - Potential requirement for additional SUPT for ARC
  - RAND analysis supports concerns
- JPATS transition cuts into capacity starting FY02
  - Capacity normally used for students taken up by conversion
- Downturn in retention could require increased SUPT
  - Current retention estimates assume continued pilot bonus
  - Loss of bonus or surge in airline hiring could increase losses
- Future force structure always uncertain

JUN-30-1995 09:15 FROM HQ USAF PERSONNEL AND TRAINS TO 703-695550 P.005/007

ARC Hiring Pool Critical in FY03

Historically <50% of 8-15 year AD exits hired to ARC; 100% insufficient in FY03.
Alternatives may require increased new pilot production.



Air Force and Navy Pilot Production

Active Duty



JUN-30-1995 09:18 FROM HQ USAF PERSONNEL AND TRAIN TO 703-60550 P.007 007
TOTAL P.007

Document Separator

COMMERCIAL PILOT DEMAND
(ANNUAL REQUIREMENT)



SOURCE: Future Airline Pilots Association (FAPA), Atlanta, Georgia - 1995 "Forecast of True Pilot Demand." See also, Federal Aviation Administration - "Pilots and Aviation Maintenance Technicians for the Twenty-First Century."

Greg Carr, Exec. Dir. 404 997-8097, Ext.112 4/27/95 5:00 PM 1/1

Forecast of True Pilot Demand

© 1995 FAPA, Atlanta, GA.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J
Year	Jet Airlines Pilot Force	plus Commutr Pilot Force	plus Other Pilot Professnls	equals Total Pilot Force	Annual Pilot Force Growth...	...plus Annual Attrition...	= Annual TRUE PILOT DEMAND	"Over the next ___ years...	... this many new pilots will be needed."
1994	55,482	16,528	63,995	136,005					
1995	55,495	16,928	64,753	137,176	1,171	2,556	3,727	1	3,727
1996	55,885	17,216	66,056	139,157	1,981	2,685	4,666	2	8,393
1997	55,592	17,368	66,964	139,924	767	2,732	3,499	3	11,892
1998	56,233	17,560	67,917	141,710	1,786	2,955	4,741	4	16,633
1999	57,002	17,800	69,002	143,804	2,094	3,046	5,140	5	21,773
2000	57,934	18,040	69,987	145,961	2,157	3,066	5,223	6	26,996
2001	59,828	18,296	70,922	149,046	3,085	2,895	5,980	7	32,976
2002	62,150	18,584	71,971	152,705	3,659	2,909	6,568	8	39,544
2003	64,287	18,872	73,070	156,229	3,524	2,668	6,192	9	45,736
2004	66,377	19,048	73,969	159,394	3,165	2,435	5,600	10	51,336
*2005	68,813	19,219	73,455	161,487	2,093	2,503	4,596	11	55,932
*2006	70,016	19,615	73,949	163,580	2,093	2,578	4,671	12	60,603
*2007	71,221	20,012	74,440	165,673	2,093	2,863	4,956	13	65,559
*2008	72,429	20,410	74,927	167,766	2,093	2,913	5,006	14	70,565
*2009	73,640	20,809	75,410	169,859	2,093	2,953	5,046	15	75,611
*2010	74,976	21,245	76,570	172,791	2,932	2,851	5,783	16	81,394
*2011	75,901	21,629	76,928	174,458	1,667	2,659	4,326	17	85,720
*2012	76,828	22,014	77,284	176,126	1,668	2,575	4,243	18	89,963
*2013	77,756	22,401	77,639	177,796	1,670	2,518	4,188	19	94,151
*2014	78,685	22,788	77,990	179,463	1,667	2,485	4,152	20	98,303
*2015	79,695	23,200	78,792	181,687	2,224	2,417	4,641	21	102,944

Notes:

- The basic data in columns A-D are found in the FAA publication, "Pilots & Aviation Maintenance Technicians for the Twenty-First Century." FAPA has modified* FAA's numbers after 2004.
- Column F is based on FAPA estimates that use FAA and ALPA retirement projections as starting points.
- Columns G and J represent True Pilot Demand, the correct measure of expected systemwide job growth. True Pilot Demand excludes double-counting, as would occur if one counted movement WITHIN the system, such as a regional pilot being hired by a major airline.

* FAA applied different assumptions for years 2005 and later, which created (not shown) an excessively large Force Growth in 2005, followed by correspondingly depressed projections in later years. FAPA has smoothed this effect by proportionately redistributing the year-2005 excess across subsequent years.

Questions / comments to Greg Carr, FAPA, (404) 997-8097 © 1995 FAPA FAPA membership telephone (800) JET-JOBS

CAPACITY ANALYSIS
CATEGORY: UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (UPT) BASES

AIR FORCE UPT CAPACITY

- BASED CAPACITY ANALYSIS ON MEETING AIR FORCE PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS (PTR) ONLY
- ASSUMES 5-DAY WORK WEEK TO ALLOW RECOVERY CAPACITY FOR UNFORESEEN IMPACTS
- CAPACITY EXPRESSED IN "UPT GRADUATE EQUIVALENTS."

CAPACITY	
COLUMBUS	408
LAUGHLIN	424
REESE	392
VANCE	396
SUBTOTAL	1,620
CLOSE LOWEST	- 392
TOTAL	1,228

REQUIREMENT	
BOMBER/FIGHTER	394
AIRLIFT/TANKER	592
FIXED-WING UPGRADE	4
FMS	31
SUBTOTAL	1,021
INTRO, FIGHTER FUND	57
TOTAL	1,078

CAPACITY	1,228
PTR	- 1,078
	150 (12% EXCESS)

NEED FOR EXCESS

- JPATS TRANSITION 100
- INSTRUCTOR CROSSFLOW (T-37 TO T-38): 39
- OPERATIONS BEYOND 95% CAPACITY WILL BE COMPROMISED

AF-101

Rated Management:

Red: Req'ts - Rated Requirements Estimate

Blue: Inventory

Crew Ratio

Overhead (Supervision)

Training Requirement (IPs)

Advanced Students (IFF/RTU)

Staff (Wg, HHQ, other)

(20% staff cut by 99)

↓

attrition driven

Rated Mgt Decision Support System Model sorted by Wpns Sys

- Current Inventory (SSANs)
- Promotions
- Retention
- Air Line Hiring

> LOSS RATES Volatile!

MGT:

- Less req'ts
- Increase Inventory via production
- Improve retention (bonus, commitments, continuations, locked out of good-deal out pgms, recalls)

Replace losses

Total Active Rated Svc (TARS) average = 13 years

FYDP req't = 13,700 ÷ 12½ (avg TARS) = 1100 SUPT/yr

temp averages & shortages must be fixed

rate of tiring down on 5 year average approach

unconstrained by cost, capacity, and absorption ability of units (4600), force structure

4600 cockpits can absorb new guys

24% turn-over rate

Less than 24% turn-over increases next years rate.

SUPT + Bank + FAIP + KC-135 3rd pilots + C-5 overmanning

RAND: increase UPT input

ARC / reg't } extend mandatory requirement
airline pilot direct hirings

SQUARE CORNER → 20 FWEs not in force structure

ABSORPTION IS THE RATED MGT CHALLENGE

- Unit over-manning
- Feet on ramp rules

OSA is good to drop UPTs into - give experience available nowhere else.
- Increases absorption rate
- FAIPs help, too.

Merrill Beyer
Air Force Team

GENERAL PROFFITT UPT QUESTIONS

- What did the UPT-JCSG do right? ... do wrong?
  (Base Closure Exec Gp)
- Comment on how the BCEG used the JCSG alternatives.
- Comment on what the BSAT/BSET *** did differently than the Air Force.
- The Commission will do some excursions on the Linear Programming Model: What are your suggestions on what we should examine?
  - Air Force Bases only?
  - Exclude Flight Screening, RANDOLPH, SHEPPARD?
  - Separate "FLYING TRAINING" factors from others (e.g., RWY 300' wide)?
  - Exclude Navy-unique Functional Areas?
- How far should the commission go in defining closure/realignment options:
  - Base selections only
  - Unit/Function moves also
    ? MAYBE — OK
- Example commission recommendation:

  CLOSE: Vance, Corpus

  Realign: Primary - Laughlin/Kingsville/Reese

  STRIKE & BMB/FTR - Columbus/Meridian/Laughlin

  JET TRAINING (Airlift/Tnk) - Reese

  PROP TRAINING (Maritime) - Pensacola/Whiting

  IF ALL HELO - RUCKER (SEE * NEXT PAGE)

  NAV/WSO/EWO - Pensacola/Randolph
- Comment on the Lubbock community's offer regarding the purchase and lease-back of some Reese facilities.

- Discuss the various ways to describe the capacity of a UPT base:
  - Operations/hr
  - High water peak PTR
  - FAA-normalized operations
  - Navy vs AF operations differences

- How can capacity analysis best account for factors that influence capacity historical data, but are not readily apparent: SHORTAGES OF—
  - Aircraft (mx, etc)
  - IPs
  - Primary student graduates (feeding into AL/TK & BM/FT)
  - WX trends
  - Operational savvy of one base's OG/CC vs another base's

- Joint Primary training is a start in the process of going "joint" in training. Can we go further?
  - Consolidate similar functional areas on a base/base complex (STRIKE & BM/FT at Columbus or Columbus/Meridian)
  - Place a Navy TA-4 squadron on an AFB (POLICY)? NAVY PHILOSOPHY OF JOINT BASING THAS ALL. HIGH MAINTENANCE COSTS!
  - Put all Primary Training out West to exploit WX/Airspace: Laughlin, Reese, Kingsville, Vance

* — OR PUT ALL JOINT PRIMARY TRAINING EAST ie PENSACOLA/WHITING TO EXPLOIT OLF/AIRSPACE. (CAPACITY) SINGLE SITE ? NON-PRIMARY BASE

- What is the best way to judge the quality of a base's airspace:
  - by functional area (Primary vs. STRIKE & BM/FT)
  - by use vs. control
  - by potential vs. use

- Should the AF give Columbus to the Navy and put IFF at Luke?
  - Close Kingsville/Corpus

- T-44 MERIDIAN / C-130 | JOINT (PROP) MULTI-ENGINE BASE
- T-1A REESE & E-6A / KC-10/135

+

JOINT NAVIGATOR TRAINING ?

T-34/JPATS + T-43 PENSACOLA/RANDOLPH



UPT BASES : 11

AIR FORCE : 6

NAVY : 5

Maritime — Airlift/Tanker

Primary

Strike — Bomber/Fighter

Helo

SAT/Apr 8, 95

MGen Profitt Brief: "JOINT TRAINING"

AF 1150 output: $\frac{1}{3}$ FTR/BMB
$\frac{2}{3}$ ALF/TK/HELO

{ AF, NATO, INT'L } + IFF (90)

Bank empty by 96 end

NAVY 1000 output: $\frac{1}{2}$ HELO (500)
$\frac{1}{4}$ STRIKE (270)
$\frac{1}{4}$ MARITIME (230)

Need for water not valid

ALTERNATIVES: Works the opposite of the "complex" idea

- Navy Helo trng to Rucker (Close Whiting, Reese, Meridian)
- Pensacola/Columbus use Whiting Aux Flds (add Vance)
- Kingsville use Corpus Aux Flds (add Corpus)

COBRA for Whiting

NOTIONAL BASING

T-34 & TH-57
Whiting

T-38
BMB/FTR
Columbus

T-1 & NAV
Randolph

T-37
Primary
Laughlin

T-45
Strike
Kingsville

T-37 & T-1
Vance

T-37 & NATO
Sheppard

NFO/WSO & T-44
Pensacola



MERRILL -
This is the "JET" Route structure - FYI -

EL

P.S. - TOO High FOR "AIR MERRILL"!

Document Separator

Commonwealth Consulting Corporation

1925 North Lynn Street
Suite 600
Arlington, VA
22209

Telephone: (703) 524-0026
Facsimile: (703) 524-1005

UPT

TO: Merrill Beyer
FROM: Don Feld
TIME: 1650

LOCATION: (703) 696-0550
DATE: 2 Jun 95
NO. OF PAGES: 4
(excluding cover)

SUBJECT: Please See Attached

Cover Message: Merrill, here is the Navy's revised PTR. Unfortunately I don't have their original PTR, so I have no idea what the delta is.

By the way, conversations between people outside the Air Force and the SECAF indicate that she has no idea about pilot training requirements. She believes, for instance, that pilot training requirements will be going down because of UAVs.

Cheers, Don

Telecopy: 703/524-1005
Confirmation: 703/524-0026

PS: If you have the Navy's original PTR I'd like to get a look at it.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1542
Ser N889J6/5U665128
10 May 95

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER AVIATION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, JOINT USN/USAF TRAINING RATES

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889JG/4U661666 of 20 Jul 1994

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 95-00
(2) NFO Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 95-00

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect training requirements to support fleet, Joint USN/USAF, USCG, FMS, and NOAA requirements.

2. USN PTR beginning in FY-98 and NFOTR beginning in FY-97 reflect a phased increase in production to address the outfitting of four(4) EA-6B squadrons to take over the USAF EF-111 mission and the transition of six (6) TACAIR squadrons to F/A-18 squadrons across the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). F/A-18E/F fleet introduction team (FIT) and fleet replacement squadron (FRS) requirements are also included.

3. PTR in FY-96/97 and NFOTR in FY-96 could not be increased over levels published in ref (a) to match an ideal production schedule to meet para. 2 force changes. Compounding this situation, PTR/NFOTR from FY 92-94 was artificially reduced below "fleet requirements" in order to shrink student pools. PTR/NFOTR listed in enclosures (1) and (2) is designed to reestablish production rates to meet and sustain fleet requirements by FY-98 and out.

4. This letter also represents the first publication of joint USAF requirement numbers that will be produced by CNATRA.

5. OPNAV point on contact is CDR Tom Donovan, N889J6, A/V 224-6013, commercial (703) 614-6013 Fax (703) 693-9795.

H. T. RITTENOUR
By direction

COMMONWEALTH CONSULT TEL:1-703-524-1005 JUN 05'95

Distribution:
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PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

	STRIKE	MARITIME	E-6A TAC	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
FY-95						
USN	163	118	22	36	184	523
USMC	110	31		0	181	322
CG	0	10		0	45	55
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	22		0	0	22
TOTAL	303	228	22	36	475	1064
FY-96						
USN	183	118	22	36	184	543
USMC	106	29		0	181	316
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	35		0	0	35
TOTAL	319	229	22	36	480	1086
FY-97						
USN	203	124	22	36	184	569
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	113		0	0	113
TOTAL	336	312	22	36	475	1181
FY-98						
USN	227	128	22	36	220	633
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	511	1279
FY-99						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	523	1291
FY-00						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	523	1291

Enclosure (1)
PTR1.XLS

COMMONWEALTH CONSULT TEL:1-703-524-1005 Jun 05,95 5:44 No.001 P.04

NFO TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

FY-95	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	75	0	0	35	122	271
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
IMT	0	0	10	10	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	57	87	19	10	35	138	346

FY-96	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	95	0	0	35	128	297
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	29	38	21	0	88
IMT	25	0	40	11	0	15	91
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	82	107	69	49	56	144	507

FY-97	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	139	0	0	40	128	355
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	151	77	77	99	343	838

FY-98	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	118	0	0	35	128	329
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	106
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	130	77	77	94	343	812

FY-99	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	121	77	77	94	345	805

FY-00	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	121	77	77	94	345	805

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UPT Discussion
4/8/95

Name	Position	Tele
Frank Cirillo	DBCRC-AF Team Leader	703-696-0504x16
Mr Glenn Profitt	AF Rep to UPT SCSG	210 652-4527
Mr Jay Blumer Jr	AF/RT	703-693-8678
Col Chuck Fox	SAF/LL	703-697-8153
Jim Bontrigh	SAF	
Ben Barden	DBCRC - Dir R&A	703-696-0504
Mr Al Cornella	Commis - DBCRC	703-696-0504
David Lyles	DBCRC - ~~Chief S/~~ STAFF DIR	" " "
Ed Brown	DBCRC Arm T.L.	" " "
Alex Yellin	" N TL	" " "
Jim Brubaker	" N Team	" " "
Merrill Beyer	" AF Team	" " "
Charles Smith	DBCRC Exec Dir	" " "
Bob Cook	DBCRC Interagency T.L	" "
Lt Col Len Tarmin	AF-/RT	703-695-0902
Mark Pross	DBCRC/AF Team	703 696-0504
Doyle Reedy	" /Navy Team	" "
~~MERRILL BEYER~~	~~DBCRC/AF TEAM~~	" "
~~DOUG JIM BROBAKER~~	~~DBCRC/NAVY TEAM~~	
Elizabeth King	DBCRC - Legal counsel	703-696-0504
ED FLIPPEN	DBCRC - Airspace	"
Bob Bivins	DBCRC - COBRA	703 696-0504
BOB COOK	DBCRC - INTERAGENCY TEAM LEAD	" "
ALEX YELLIN	DBCRC NAVY TEAM	" " x183
JJ GERTLER	DBCRC ARMY TEAM	x174
BRYAN ECHOLS	SAF/GCN	703-697-6540
Marcia Malcomb	AF/RTR	(703) 695-4666

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

8 APR 1995

Mr. Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 14[illegible]
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Cirillo:

Attached are responses from the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training regarding questions for the record which were submitted to the Air Force by the Commission.

I trust this information is useful.

Sincerely,

R. T. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

Attachment

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

March 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, BASE CLOSURE AND UTILIZATION

SUBJECT: Commission Questions for the Record

The response to your request for answers to the BRAC Commission questions for the record regarding the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional analyses is provided as Attachment One.

Louis C. Finch
Chairman
Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachment:
1. Qs & As

1. QUESTION: In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?

ANSWER: The analysis did not restrict airspace credit to the volume a base owned or controlled.

2. QUESTION: Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?

ANSWER: Usable or useful airspace is a key ingredient to the training mission. The existence of other special use airspace can add flexibility or the ability to accommodate expansion and/or mission changes.

3. QUESTION: Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighting total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

ANSWER: Assigning weights in the model was one of the Groups biggest challenges. All members agreed that airspace should be heavily weighted, so the discussion centered on what types of airspace to credit. In the end, the Group reached and implemented a consensus.

Section I

Columbus AFB

2. Operational Effectiveness

MONROE COUNTY	Uncontrolled
OKOLONA	Uncontrolled
OKTIBBEHA	Uncontrolled
REFORM	Uncontrolled
RICHRAD ARTHUR	Uncontrolled
STINSON	Uncontrolled
TUPELO INDUSTRIAL	Uncontrolled

I.2.E.14 **Civilian/commercial operators or other airspace users do Not pose scheduling, operational, or environmental constrains or limits.**

I.2.E.15 **List of all nearby high traffic, commercial aviation facilities (hubs):**

Atlanta	201
Memphis	113
Nashville	172

Document Separator

David Silverberg

The JPATS Beat Goes On... And On...And On...

Despite Delays, Competitors Prepare For The Ground-Based Training Round

The decision to delay came from two different sources. One originated with Colleen Preston *(above)*, deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition reform, who decided the program, a pilot program for commercial acquisition reform, did not have sufficient commercial content and was not being run on a sufficiently commercial basis, and urged that it be delayed.

The 14th day of August will mark the 50th anniversary of VJ Day, Victory Over Japan. On 25 August another VJ Day is scheduled: Victory Over JPATS Day—at least that's the latest schedule. The US Air Force now says that 25 August is when they will announce their selection for the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS).

Is this finally the real date? Who knows? All the others were real, too. Meanwhile, each contractor shells out a million dollars a month to keep his competitor flying and his team together.

The latest blow to the program fell on 23 January when competitors received an Air Force modification request telling them that the program will be stretched out by eight years (taking place over 20 years rather than the originally scheduled 12) and will lose $700 million over five years. The existing trainers, the Air Force T-37 and the Navy T-34, will have to be upgraded and continue in service. By FY2001, instead of a total of 168 planes, the Air Force will have purchased only 141. The Navy will only buy its first plane in 2001, rather than the previously scheduled 1998.

Contractors felt devastated by the change—especially by its suddeness. There had been so many reassurances that the program was finally on track, that it was fully funded, that it would not be touched, and those assurances came from Defense Secretary William Perry and John Deutsch, deputy defense secretary. To add insult to injury, contractors were given only 30 days to resubmit their bids, which meant reworking their cost analyses along with their subcontractors.

According to an industry source, the decision to delay the selection date originated with Colleen Preston, deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition reform, who decided that JPATS, a pilot program for commercial acquisition reform, did not have sufficient commercial content and was not being run on a sufficiently commercial basis. (Preston was unavailable for comment.) In the modification request, the Air Force waived some requirements that the program use military specifications.

At the same time, Air Force budgeteers felt the budget simply could not sustain the up-front payments necessary to maintain the existing schedule. By stretching it out, they save money in the short run, although they will face vastly greater costs over the long haul. "If we had not done this, we would have faced an eight-year delay, not a stretch-out," a Pentagon official told *AFJI*. "The acquisition is not delayed. We still procure the planes on the scheduled date [three in FY95]. We just don't procure the same number of planes each year. If we hadn't done this to make it more affordable, we would have lost the program entirely."

THE SECOND ROUND

Instead of February marking the end of the aircraft selection process and the beginning of the search for a Ground Based Training System (GBTS), 28 February marks the deadline for contractors to respond to the modification request (it's set "firmly set in jello," as one defense official put it). After competitors have responded to the request, they will have face-to-face meetings with Air Force officials, produce a best and final offer, be briefed by source-selection authorities, and undergo a Milestone I review.

Despite a resulting delay for the second phase of the JPATS competition, the GBTS competitors are preparing their bids. The GBTS will contain the course curriculum for JPATS and a system for tracking trainers, students, and flying hours. An award for GBTS is likely about one year from the time of the final JPATS selection.

Under the Navy's acquisition strategy, once the prime contractor is selected for the aircraft, that contractor will submit an acquisition strategy to the Air Force for approval. Once approved, the prime will conduct an open competition for the GBTS subcontractor and make the award, subject to Air Force approval. The award is expected 10 to 12 months after the selection is made. The prime contractor, including all subsidiaries and parents, is prohibited from competing for GBTS.

Though GBTS is estimated to be a $300 to 400 million program—fairly modest by Pentagon standards—it will be a massive undertaking in terms of logistics and complexity, requiring extensive courseware, administrative support, and computer hardware.

As of February, competition appeared to center around five main competitors. One past competitor, British Aerospace, was linked to only one aircraft candidate, the Beechcraft Mi

RUN THE JPATS CHECKLIST

- ✓ Highest thrust-to-weight ratio
- ✓ Greatest performance growth potential
- ✓ Unsurpassed training effectiveness
- ✓ Meets all military desires
- ✓ Designed and produced in America
- ✓ Built for production prototypes in the U.S.
- ✓ Built more aircraft last year than all U.S. JPATS competitors
- ✓ Contractor Logistics Support operating at all USAF/USN training bases
- ✓ Inherently low acquisition and life cycle cost



ONLY THE BEECH MKII CAN COMPLETE THIS CHECKLIST

The Beech MkII, designed and produced in America, gives you superior performance thanks to having the highest thrust-to-weight ratio of all JPATS competitors. But that's only the beginning. The Beech MkII can grow an additional 32% in thrust with the existing engine providing enough growth potential for well into the middle of the next century. All this performance capability means greater training effectiveness, energy maneuverability and unsurpassed student safety. No other JPATS plane can match this. The MkII also offers outstanding performance on the bottom line. From fuel savings to the low maintenance manhour per flight, the Beech MkII can't be beat. Totally designed and built in the U.S., the MkII is based on a proven primary trainer. And, Beech Aerospace Services, Inc. (BASI), is the only logistics support contractor operating at all USAF/USN training bases.

Raytheon Aircraft

Beech

Manufacturer

CAE-LINK

It was Edward A. Link who created the first aircraft simulator in 1929. Since then, CAE-Link has expanded until today it is a training giant and may be acquired by Hughes by 1 March.

"Link is totally committed to the JPATS program, and we've put a great deal of work into it," Ed Field, vice president of training systems, told *AFJI*. "This GBTS requirement consists of many different parts, but we believe we must maintain a focus on the overall objective, which is to train pilots."

Jerry Stecklein, CAE-Link's JPATS program manager, told *AFJI* that Link's experience managing the largest Air Force training program, the C-130 Aircrew Training System, as well as training programs for the E-3/E-6, the KC-10, and the F-117A, are evidence of its fitness to handle JPATS.

These kinds of programs, and Link's long training experience, mean that it's also an experienced integrator, another plus for JPATS. "Total system integration is a key element in developing a fully functioning GBTS with this complexity," according to Stecklein. Every element of the system must be integrated and mutually supportive, and this is the kind of capability CAE-Link will bring to bear, as well as a next-generation capability in computer-based training and training management systems.

FLIGHT SAFETY SERVICES CORP.

This company, based in Littleton, CO, provides a wide variety of training, from classroom instruction to aircraft flight, using everything from simple procedures devices and small aircraft simulators to extremely complex trainers and wide-body commercial aircraft simulators. Flight Safety operates 39 different teaching centers, trains over 35,000 students annually, and handles instruction on 30 different types of aircraft. It also currently provides the flight simulator hardware for the C-17 and handles GBTSs for the C-5 and the KC-135. "Our capabilities and current programs are ideally suited for JPATS applications," according to Mike Sarrester, who handles strategic management for the company. "Training is the only business we are in, rather than being a sideline for a diversified company. We have the right culture. We are also totally vertically integrated—we provide everything from introduction to final certification. That is a unique position."

HUGHES TRAINING

"The biggest challenge will be the training management system," Wes Crocheron, program manager for JPATS-GBTS, told *AFJI*. "It's a much more difficult task than most people realize. Most people think that a computer can do a lot of fancy things, and that scheduling and the resource management for training are simple, but they're not. It becomes a monstrous effort to keep it current." The GBTS management system will have to track the aircraft, about 8,000 students, 35,000 training objectives, the number of sorties and flying hours, and the teachers.

But Crocheron and Ric Morrow, director of Hughes' Air Force Business Development, will be drawing on long experience, including the training program for the T-45, F-16, and the F-15 as the company prepares its GBTS bid. "We view ourselves as the premier integrator of integrated training systems, and we've exhibited them," said Crocheron.

LORAL CORP.

Loral has two major programs under way that qualify it for the GBTS competition, Joe Tedino, manager of corporate public relations, told *AFJI*. One is the Special Operations Forces Aircrew Training System, and the other is the JAS-39 Gripen Full-Mission Training System for the Swedish air force.

The Special Operations program includes full-mission flight simulators, computer-based instruction, and training that allows a crew to rehearse a complex military operation within 48 hours of getting the mission. The JAS-39 program requires Loral to build small, compact trainers that complement its simulator. In the trainers, pilots can hone skills such as cockpit procedures, takeoffs and landings, and instrument flying.

Jay Wilcox, executive vice president of Loral Defense Systems-Akron, said the Loral philosophy is "to develop and implement a comprehensive system that will ensure optimum student learning and performance at the lowest life-cycle cost."

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

Three major training systems, the T-1, the C-17, and the T-45, form the backbone of McDonnell Douglas' training experience, according to Bob Browning, director of business development for aircraft, and Ray Duquett, manager for Navy and Marine Corps programs. "We're the prime integrators for those programs," Browning told *AFJI*. "Working with both the Navy and the Air Force will position us to be readily available for GBTS."

"Simplicity will be the key to our approach," Browning continued. "Today [the Air Force and Navy] both have separate [training] systems, and we believe we have a good understanding of their requirements and how to merge them."

Should McDonnell Douglas win the contract, it will mark the first time the aerospace giant creates a training system for a non-McDonnell Douglas aircraft. Nonetheless, according to Duquett, developing the training system for the C-17 was very much like working with a different company, since Douglas Aircraft Co. is on the West Coast and the training company is in St. Louis. ■

The latest blow to the program fell on 23 January when competitors received an Air Force modification request telling them that the program will be stretched out by eight years.

CAE

FlightSafety International

HUGHES

HUGHES TRAINING, INC.

LORAL Corporation

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS





Competitors will be bringing their best technology to bear in the GBTS competition. A trainee (left) attempts to land on a simulated carrier in a McDonnell Douglas T-45 TS and student pilots work out (right) in Loral's F-15E trainer.

Tues, 28 Mar 95/1000

NAVY UPT / CDR Tom Donovan N889
/ LCDR Dave Walker 614-6013/10 4E412

VT-28 / CORPUS

VT-31 / CORPUS → PENS

VADM Wright
Ch, Naval Ed & Trng
(CNET)

RADM Hayden → CNATRA

Gen Vicellio
19 AF

AETC ← CNET

Chief Naval Air Training

T-1	Jayhawk	E-8 A/T
T-3		Screening
T-34		Prim
T-37	Tweet	
T-38	Talon	B/F
T-44		C-130 Mari
T-45	Hawk	Strike

Cultural Differences

Navy: PWR = GP

BLUE AIR STUDY

T-45 production being drawn-out from 48 down to 12/yr

- Can the Navy meet its PTR with Meridian closing without the T-45.
- Need 1½ bases to do STRIKE Trng: Kingsville w/OLFs
  PTR: 336 FMS, USMC, Navy
- Future F/A-18 E/F production, EA-6B increases, may cause future PTR increases

1300/Tue, Mar 21, 95

UPT-JCSG Meeting:

Military Value utility
- Re-run model without it
- Re-weighting
- Capacity
- Comply w/ Services' policies

Compare FV of actual functions to be performed at each base

Operating Cost/ SUPT equiv Grad

Bob Bayer
Gl Thompson
Don Gardner
Lou Eich

Impacts of Joint Training
- Different bases
- More bases

- Sensitivity analysis
  - Weighting factors
  - JCSG rankings

- Combest mtg w/ Deutch

  AF data

  Apr 17/Mon Hearing → GAO & UPT

  Look at data

  Mark → process vs data

- Get SW for LIPM

- Adds Hearing

Document Separator

~~CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

16 NOV 1994

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

FROM: SAF/MII

SUBJECT: Military Values for Air Force UPT Installations: Additional Information

In my letter of November 15, 1994, providing installation tiering for undergraduate pilot training sites, I neglected to include the flight screening programs at Falcon Field, the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, and at Hondo, Texas. I have attached an amended list which includes those operations. Hondo was included under the Randolph AFB site value, since it is attached to that installation. I have also provided a copy of the tiering to the Air Force representative to the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Working Group.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Co-Chairman, Air Force Base Closure Executive Group

Attachment
Tiering Information

~~CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

UPT Joint Cross-Service Group Air Forces Bases by Tier

Tier 1

Columbus AFB*
Laughlin AFB*
Randolph AFB (includes Hondo operation)*
Sheppard AFB
USAF Academy (includes Falcon Field)
Vance AFB*

Tier 2

None

Tier 3

Reese AFB*

* Considered in the Undergraduate Flying Training Subcategory

~~CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

15 NOV 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

FROM: SAF/MII

SUBJECT: Military Values for Air Force UPT Installations

The Air Force has been asked to provide military site values to the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG-UPT) for Air Force installations where undergraduate pilot training activities are performed. I have this day delivered results to date of the Air Force process to the Air Force representative to the JCSG-UPT Working Group, for use in your process. A copy is attached for your ready reference. Since the Air Force does not determine a "military value" in its process, I have provided the installation tiering our process has so far produced. This is, of course, only one measure of the relative merit of a base within its primary category as determined at this point in the Air Force process. It is not a closure or retention recommendation.

The Air Force categorizes its bases according to the primary mission, and some of the activities for which values were requested by your group are not in the Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT) Subcategory. I have annotated on the list those bases considered in the UFT Subcategory. For bases not in that subcategory, their tier reflects a relative merit compared to the bases of the subcategory in which they are analyzed.

The tiering (1(top), 2, or 3) of the bases results from the Air Force BRAC analysis and there is no predetermined number of bases to go into any of the three tiers. Within each tier, bases are listed alphabetically. It is important that the JCSG-UPT clearly understand the meaning of this tiering. Each of these installations is capable, efficient, and possesses excellent physical and manmade assets. The fact that a particular installation was placed in a given tier represents only its merit relative to the other installations in its category/subcategory at this preliminary stage in our process and as a result of one of various analyses. It certainly does not imply that the flying activity or the base is not providing a valuable contribution to the Air Force mission.

The Air Force supports the OSD goal of retaining those assets that represent the best combination of functional capability and cost effectiveness, based on the selection criteria and force structure. We look forward to receiving the input from your analysis for inclusion in the Air Force process.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Co-Chairman, Air Force Base Closure Executive Group

Attachment
Tiering Information

~~CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

UPT Joint Cross-Service Group Air Forces Bases by Tier

Tier 1

Columbus AFB*
Laughlin AFB*
Randolph AFB*
Sheppard AFB
Vance AFB*

Tier 2

None

Tier 3

Reese AFB*

* Considered in the Undergraduate Flying Training Subcategory

CLOSE HOLD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

15 NOV 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING
JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP

Subject: Military Value for Fort Rucker

The Army's military value assessment of Fort Rucker is a "3" on a scale of "1-3" with a "3" representing the highest possible value.

Fort Rucker has the mission of helicopter pilot training, both graduate and undergraduate. It is rich in special use airspace with over 8,000 cubic statute miles and controls 3 basefields, 16 stagefields and over 100 outlying fields. Southeast Alabama is an ideal location for helicopter training with its mild climate, low cost of living and low population density. Fort Rucker is the only installation of its type and is an irreplaceable Army asset.

If we can be of further assistance, please contact the Army Basing Study office undergraduate pilot training representative, Captain Blake Hollis, xx51375.

MICHAEL G. JONES
Colonel, U. S. Army
Director, The Army Basing Study

CLOSE HOLD

Printed on Recycled Paper

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

MM-0430-F8
BSAT/CM
4 November 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

Subj: PROVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MILITARY VALUE BANDING

In response to a tasking received during BRAC-95 Steering Group meetings, I am forwarding this list of the Department of the Navy military value banding for activities to be considered by the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group (with 3 being the highest.)

BAND 3
NAS Pensacola
NAS Kingsville
NAS Corpus Christi

BAND 2
NAS Meridian
NAS Whiting Field

BAND 1
None

This grouping will allow the joint cross-service process to continue by providing a framework against which the Joint Cross-Service Group can overlay its functional analysis to facilitate arriving at the best set of alternatives for the Military Departments to consider in their processes. For Optimization Model purposes, each activity within a band has the same military value; activities are not ordered within each band according to their internal military value score.

This grouping is based upon the military value analysis conducted by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) using data obtained by the Department of the Navy for its BRAC-95 evaluation which was certified in accordance with the Department's policy and procedures. The Department of the Navy will continue to refine and audit the data utilized to respond to the questions in the military value matrices scored by the BSEC, so the absolute scores used to group these installations may change. It is not anticipated, however, that the relative relationship of these activities to each other will change.

Subj: PROVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MILITARY VALUE BANDING

In grouping these installations, I have relied on the Steering Group's expression of the value to the Joint Cross-Service Groups of such information from the Military Departments. It is my understanding that this will facilitate identification of activities most likely - and least likely - to be candidates for closure, so as to ensure that cross-service considerations focus on viable alternatives.

CHARLES P. NEMFAKOS
Vice Chairman,
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Document Separator

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

Flaws:
- Data (A/S, WX, Facilities)
- Model (weighting, categories)

AF vs JCSG use of analysis
- did not accept alternatives
- did accept FNC UAL
- Navy did their own analysis

USAF UPT bases scattered on JCSG analysis
- should not be
- Use model, change weights

Fri, Mar 17/

Combest White Paper
- Check Capacity (Excess) Chart figures
- Handout / 3-page Briefing
- UPT-JCSG "UPT Base Ranking Chart"
- Sorties / graduate

-AETC Charts that measure UPT rates/perf

0900 Vance

1015 Combest

Vance Group
Concerned about Reese & Navy
A/S - accessable, max of all bases
Efficiencies
Quality of Life

9 x T-1s now, MILCON underway

T-37/T-34: Common Syllabus leading-in to JPATS

Future: Combine T-1 & JPATS at 2 bases
T-38 at 1 base

Northrop contract $40M+ base-wide vs. AF O&M : Normalize to compare
- TOTAL Manpower: Blue + Contractors
- Laughlin is civil service

- Cost comparisons
  - AETC chart shows savings over command avg
  - Enid chart shows cost/grad by base
  - NAVY costs?

- T-1 beddown
  Laughlin/Reese
  Vance/Columbus

- Look at JCSG capacity for analysis

- Navy does UFR ops to increase capacity

Regionals before Adds
  - another round of visits & regional hearings

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

ANALYSIS RESULTS at TIERING (18 Oct)

The following grades and data reflect the information on which the BCEG members based their tiering determination. Information in this chart was updated as the result of a number of factors between initial tiering and final recommendations.

Base Name	I.1 Mission (Flying) Requirements	II Facilities and Infrastructure	III Contingency and Mobility	IV Costs and Manpower Implications	V Return on Investment	VI Economic Impact	VII Community	VIII Environmental Impact
Columbus AFB	Green	Green	Yellow	17/-333	1	3,423 (8.4%)	Yellow +	Yellow
Laughlin AFB	Yellow +	Green -	Yellow -	25/-275	2	4,115 (27.1%)	Yellow	Yellow +
Randolph AFB	Green -	Green -	Yellow	204/-59	13	12,579 (2.0%)	Green -	Yellow -
Reese AFB	Red	Green -	Yellow -	15/-259	1	3,446 (3.1%)	Green -	Yellow
Vance AFB	Green	Green -	Yellow -	14/-254	1	3,040 (11.6%)	Green -	Yellow +

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

I.4 FLYING TRAINING MISSION

Base Name	I.4.A Primary	I.4.B Airlift Tanker	I.4.C Maritime E2/C2	I.4.D Bomber Fighter	I.4.E Primary/ Int Nav/NFO	I.4.F WSO Strike	I.4.G Panel Navigator	I.4.H Flight Screen	Average Score	I.4 Overall
Columbus AFB	6.8	6.3	6.7	6.4	6.9	6.6	7.6	6.6	6.74	Green
Laughlin AFB	7.0	5.8	6.5	5.5	7.1		6.8	6.8	6.50	Yellow +
Randolph AFB	6.7	6.5	6.4	6.8	7.1	6.1	6.9	5.7	6.53	Green -
Reese AFB	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.6	6.2		7.2	6.2	6.14	Red
Vance AFB	6.8	6.7	6.7	5.5	6.8		7.5	6.6	6.67	Green

JOINT UPT FUNCTIONAL VALUE RANKING

	Primary	Airlift Tanker	Maritime E2/C2	Strike Adv E2/C2	Bomber Fighter	Prim/Int Nav/NFO	WSO Strike	Panel Nav	Helicopter	Flight Screening	
1	KIN	PEN	KIN	*PEN*	PEN	**LAU**	PEN	**SHP**	Ft RCK	Ft RCK	**1**
2	**LAU (1)**	KIN	COR	*KIN*	KIN	**RAN (1)**	KIN	PEN	WHI	**LAU**	**2**
3	**COL**	**VAN**	PEN (2)	*MER*	MER	KIN	WHI	**COL (2)**	PEN	KIN	**3**
4	MER (3)	MER	WHI	*COR*	**RAN (3)**	**COL**	COR	**VAN**		WHI	**4**
5	**VAN (3)**	**RAN**	**VAN**	***SHP (4)***	**COL**	MER	Ft RCK	KIN		**COL (4)**	**5**
6	**RAN**	**SHP (5)**	**COL**	***RAN***	**SHP**	**VAN (5)**	**COL**	**REE (5)**		**VAN**	**6**
7	COR (6)	COR (5)	MER	***COL (6)***	**REE**	COR	MER	MER		MER	**7**
8	WHI	**COL**	**SHP**	***REE***	**LAU**	PEN	**RAN**	**RAN**		COR	**8**
9	PEN	**REE**	**LAU (8)**	***LAU***	**VAN (8)**	WHI (8)		**LAU**		**SHP**	**9**
10	**SHP**	**LAU**	**RAN**	***VAN***		**REE**		COR		**REE (9)**	**10**
11	**REE**		**REE**			**SHP (10)**				PEN	**11**
12										**RAN**	**12**
13										**HON**	**13**
14										**USAFA**	**14**
				Numbers in Parentheses Indicate a Tie Score							

NAVY UNDERGRADUATE FLIGHT TRAINING OVERVIEW

CDR TOM DONOVAN

LCDR DAVE WALKER

OPNAV N889

TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- USAF
  - ONE BASE SUPPORTS MULTIPLE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
  - BUILDING BLOCK/LOCK STEP APPROACH
  - FLIGHT SCREENING
- USN
  - PIPELINE SPECIFIC TRAINING BASES
  - FLEXIBLE PROGRESSION
  - PREFLIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE SCREENING

USN TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- AIRSPACE USE - VISUAL FLIGHT RULES (VFR) PROCEDURES
- AIRFIELD OPERATIONS:
  - VFR DEPARTURES
  - SPLIT RUNWAY OPERATIONS
  - BOX PATTERNS/CARRIER OPERATIONS
- EMPHASIS ON INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING
- NIGHT TRAINING - GEARED FOR SEA OPERATIONS

USAF TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- AIRSPACE USE - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES (IFR) PROCEDURES
- AIRFIELD OPERATIONS:
  - IFR DEPARTURES
  - STANDARD OVERHEAD PROCEDURES
- EMPHASIS ON CONTACT AND FORMATION
- EMPHASIS ON DAYTIME OPERATIONS

JOINT TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- AIRSPACE USE/AIRFIELD OPERATIONS
  - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES
- EMPHASIS ON:
  - NIGHT
  - INSTRUMENT TRAINING
- AVERAGE SORTIE DURATION: 1.38 HRS

JPATS

AIR FORCE AND NAVY JPATS LOCATIONS



STUDENT FLOW PLAN
(PER SQUADRON)



JOINT FIXED-WING TRAINING

SECDEF GUIDANCE:

- CONSOLIDATE INITIAL FIXED WING AIRCRAFT TRAINING AND TRANSITION TO A COMMON PRIMARY TRAINING AIRCRAFT

- ESTABLISH 4-TRACK FOLLOW-ON TRAINING (OPR: SECAF / OCR: SECNAV)

USN PILOT TRAINING



JOINT TRAINING PROJECTION
JPATS



JOINT NAVIGATOR TRAINING



JOINT ENTRY LEVEL EWO TRAINING



AETC CAPACITY ANALYSIS (CERTIFIED DATA)

- *Derived from HQ AETC/XOT automated model*
- *Considers Air Force requirements and Air Force sites*
- *Assumes current three aircraft per base Specialized UPT (SUPT) program*
- *Capacity is expressed in "SUPT Graduate Equivalents"*
- *Four SUPT bases only*
  - *Excludes Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) at Sheppard AFB*
  - *Excludes Pilot Instructor Training (PIT) at Randolph AFB*

AETC CAPACITY ANALYSIS
UNCONSTRAINED BY AIRCRAFT

BASE	GROSS CAPACITY	IFF/ATP	ADJUSTED CAPACITY	CROSSFLOW	NET CAPACITY
COLUMBUS	408	-90	318	-13	305
LAUGHLIN	424		424	-13	411
REESE	392		392	-13	379
VANCE	396		396	-13	383
TOTAL	1620	-90	1530	-52	1478

PROGRAM	936
EXCESS	542
TRANSITION	-100
NET EXCESS	442

- *Reduction for JPATS transition offsets interruption, inefficiencies and extra training which reduce plant capacity during transition period at each base*

AETC CAPACITY ANALYSIS

CONSTRAINED BY AIRCRAFT (T-37 IS LIMITER)

BASE	T-37 LIMIT	ALP/FWQ	ADJUSTED CAPACITY	OTHER	NET CAPACITY
COLUMBUS	309	-10	299	0	299
LAUGHLIN	338	-10	328	0	328
REESE	298	-10	288	0	288
VANCE	317	-10	307	0	307
TOTAL	1262	-40	1222	0	1222
				PROGRAM	936
				EXCESS	286

- *No reduction for JPATS transition*

AETC CAPACITY ANALYSIS: CONCLUSION

"The data provided by the model leads to the conclusion that the Air Force has excess capacity equivalent to one SUPT base.

AETC/XO response to BCEG data call

ATTEMPT TO COMPARE AETC/JOINT GROUP ANALYSES

	PRI	B-F	A-T	OPS REQ	JT GROUP	DELTA	%
COLUMBUS	408	143	265	711,287	784,371	73,084	9.3
LAUGHLIN	424	148	276	739,180	787,572	48,392	6.1
REESE	392	137	255	683,393	686,547	3,154	0.5
VANCE	396	139	257	690,367	685,390	-4,977	-0.7
TOTAL	1,620	567	1,053	2,824,227	2,943,880	119,653	4.1

CAVEATS:

- ***AETC model doesn't include PIT requirements***
- ***AETC model based on 3 aircraft per site***

SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY AETC

- *IFF: 90 SUPT equivalents annually*
  - *Approximately 157,000 airfield operations (about 3% of total DoD required capacity)*
- *Disruption during JPATS transition: 100 SUPT equivalents*
  - *Approximately 174,000 airfield operations (3.5%)*
- *Aircraft capacity limitations: 156 SUPT equivalents*
  - *Approximately 267,000 airfield ops (5.4%)*
  - *Not additive to above limitations*

EFFECT OF IFF

	DERIVED FROM JOINT ANALYSIS				ESTIMATED DELTA		
	AFLD OPS AVAILABLE	AFLD OPS REQUIRED	EXCESS AFLD OPS	% USED	IFF OPS REQ	NEW OPS REQ	% USED
ALT 1 "PURE"	5,139,750	4,920,538	219,212	95.7	157,000	5,077,538	98.8
ALT 1 SCENARIO	5,461,048	4,920,538	540,510	90.1	157,000	5,077,538	93.0
ALT 2	4,988,057	4,920,538	67,519	98.6	157,000	5,077,538	101.8
ALT 3	5,037,738	4,920,538	117,200	97.7	157,000	5,077,538	100.8

OVERVIEW

- *Tasking*
- *Review of Joint Cross-Service Group Alternatives*
- *Independent UPT Capacity Analysis*
- *Recommended Response*

Document Separator

Question: Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has reduced its fighter aircraft force from 36 fighter wings at the end of the Cold War to the 20 wings now projected in your current Force Structure Plan. Simultaneously, it has reconfigured the size of the typical fighter wing from 72 to 54 aircraft, and the typical squadron from 24 to 18 aircraft. Similarly, the size of reserve units has also decreased. What was the Air Force's rationale for these smaller units?

Answer: In the past five years, the Air Force has structurally reorganized to achieve the deployment and employment flexibility and global forward presence necessary to deter or respond to aggression by any emerging threats in the Post Cold War era. As outlined in the Bottom Up Review, increases in reliability and maintainability of newer weapons systems, coupled with improved accuracy and lethality of precision weapons, allow us to field combat firepower of yesterday with fewer combat aircraft per wing. Additionally, decreasing the squadron size helped mitigate the increased span of command and control for the squadron commander associated with integrating the flight line maintenance functions organically within the fighter squadrons. The additional manpower associated with more smaller squadrons was more than offset by the savings associated with restructuring maintenance within the flying squadrons and reorganizing our logistics from a three- to a two-level maintenance structure.

Question: In light of the excess capacity at fighter bases that results from smaller wings, would it be feasible to increase the number of squadrons assigned to a fighter wing, or the number of fighter wings assigned to a base?

Answer: When discussing excess capacity at fighter bases several factors beyond base facilities infrastructure must be considered. As we have modernized our forces, our peacetime as well as our wartime operations tempo (sorties per training day) have increased noticeably. This has increased the number of aircraft movements (takeoffs, landings, and practice approaches) per aircraft as well as the demand on our special use training airspace and ranges. These, as opposed to base facility infrastructure, are the factors that generally tend to limit the amount of aircraft that can be assigned to a particular base. Additionally, as we have downsized our force structure, we have also fielded weapons systems and munitions with increased target acquisition and delivery ranges which require larger volumes of airspace to meet effective training requirements than in the past. Many of our fighter bases are currently operating at, or above, historical high water marks for PAA aircraft. Many other fighter bases are now Composite Wing bases operating significant numbers of other types of aircraft. In short, the Air Force looked at the capacity of our small aircraft bases and concluded that, considering all the above factors, there was not sufficient excess capacity to allow the consolidation of assets necessary to result in a base closure recommendation.

Question: Is it reasonable to assume if the fighter wing structure is realigned to 72 aircraft that more bases could be closed?

Answer: There are many factors that mitigate realigning our fighter wings to 72 aircraft. The Air Force organizes its forces to efficiently meet National Security imperatives, provide overseas forward presence, and preserve readiness of the force. Our overseas forward presence is dictated by and tailored to meet multiple bi- and multi-lateral international security arrangements. The

resulting Active Component CONUS force structure is 5.67 FWEs. The Air Force has tailored three CONUS Composite Wings to meet specific missionized rapid reaction response requirements. These wings, designed to meet specific requirements, are critical elements of our Post Cold War era Air Force. The remaining Active Component CONUS force structure is 3.75 FWEs is currently based on 5 bases with an additional 75 PAA of TF-coded fighters and OA-10A aircraft. Total base loading considered, after our reorganization and restructuring of the immediate Post Cold War era, the Air Force does not see an operationally sound opportunity for large scale increases in fighter aircraft base loading that would allow a return to 72 PAA fighter wings in the CONUS.

Question: Was the wing size taken into consideration during the Air Force analysis of closure and recommendations?

Answer: The wing size was taken into consideration during the Air Force base closure deliberative process. We have, as already noted above, significant aircraft PAA and associated flying activities at fighter bases that have not and do not currently count in the FWE force but that nonetheless contribute to the operations tempo at the base. The total flying force structure assigned to a base must be used in determining excess capacity available. After complete analysis, the Air Force stands by its recommendation to retain all its small aircraft bases.

Question: General Fogleman, the current Force Structure Plan reduces the fighter aircraft inventory by six Fighter Wing Equivalents from 26 to 20 wings. During this drawdown, the Air Force has recommended closure of one small aircraft base, Homestead Air Force Base, in 1993. Can you explain why the Air Force has been unable to identify any additional small aircraft bases for closure despite this significant reduction in fighter aircraft? (This was discussed but a record response would amplify this issue.)

Answer: The reduction from the Base Force of 26.5 Fighter Wing Equivalents to the Bottom Up Review Force of 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWEs) was accomplished by reducing the Active Component from 15.25 FWEs to 13 FWEs and the Reserve Component from 13.25 to 7 FWEs. In the Active Component reduction of 2.25 FWEs from the Base Force to the BUR Force, 1.0 FWE was reduced in Europe and 0.17 FWEs were reduced in the Pacific. The resulting CONUS Active Component reduction from the Base Force was slightly more than 1 FWE. In 1993, the Air Force recommended Homestead AFB, FL for closure. The 1993 Commission included Homestead AFB in their closure recommendation to the President and it was subsequently approved for closure. Additionally, the Air Force has, subsequent to the Base Force, formed three missionized Composite Wings and collocated some TF-coded fighters and A/OA-10s not counted in the FWE force structure on fighter bases. This has resulted in near high water mark operations tempo at many of our small aircraft bases.

	FIGHTER WING EQUIVALENTS					
	ACTIVE				RESERVE	
TYPE	FWEs	PAA		TYPE	FWEs	PAA
F-15	3.5	252.0		F-15	0.6	43.2
F-15E	1.9	136.8		F-15E	0.0	0.0
F-16	6.1	439.2		F-16	5.2	374.4
F-117	0.5	36.0		F-117	0.0	0.0
A-10	1.0	72.0		A-10	1.2	86.4
TOTAL:	13.0	936.0		TOTAL:	7.0	504.0
			FWEs	PAA		
		ACTIVE	13.0	936.0		
		RESERVE	7.0	504.0		
		TOTAL:	20.0	1440.0		

AIR FORCE UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

LT COL LEN JARMAN
HQ USAF/XOOT
28 FEB 95

OVERVIEW



- ***UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE***
- ***FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT***
- ***USAF PILOT TRAINING***
- ***JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING***
- ***JOINT PRIMARY AIRCRAFT TRAINING SYSTEM (JPATS) UPDATE***

CURRENT USAF FLYING TRAINING LOCATIONS



TYPICAL USAF PILOT TRAINING BASE



FEATURES:

1. ONE RUNWAY APPROXIMATELY 5000-6500 FEET.
2. TWO RUNWAYS OVER 8000 FEET.
3. ONE OUTLYING FIELD APPROXIMATELY 5000-7000 FEET.

NOTES:

1. SOME AIRFIELDS HAVE CROSSWIND RUNWAYS.
2. RANDOLPH AFB HAS DIFFERENT CONFIGURATION.

OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- ***FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT***
- *USAF PILOT TRAINING*
- *JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
- *JPATS UPDATE*

PRIMARY TRAINER (T-37)



- *FIRST AIRCRAFT FLOWN IN UPT*
- *TWIN-ENGINE JET*
- *SIDE-BY-SIDE SEATING*
- *UNPRESSURIZED*
- *TO BE REPLACED BY JPATS*

ADVANCED TRAINERS

T-38

- ***BOMBER-FIGHTER TRAINER***
- ***TWIN-ENGINE SUPERSONIC JET***
- ***TANDEM SEATING***

T-1

- ***AIRLIFT-TANKER TRAINER***
- ***TWIN-ENGINE JET***
- ***FLIGHT DECK WITH SIDE-BY-SIDE SEATING AND JUMP SEAT***

NAVY AIRCRAFT IN WHICH USAF STUDENTS TRAIN

T-34

- ***PRIMARY TRAINER***
- ***SINGLE-ENGINE TURBOPROP***
- ***TANDEM SEATING***
- ***UNPRESSURIZED***
- ***TO BE REPLACED BY JPATS***

T-44

- ***ADVANCED MARITIME PATROL TRAINER***
- ***TWIN-ENGINE TURBOPROP***
- ***FLIGHT DECK WITH SIDE-BY-SIDE SEATING***

OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- ***USAF PILOT TRAINING***
- *JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
- *JPATS UPDATE*

GENERALIZED UPT



NOTES:

- *ALL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED AT ONE BASE*
- *BEING REPLACED BY SPECIALIZED UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (SUPT)*

EURO-NATO JOINT JET PILOT TRAINING (ENJJPT)--SHEPPARD AFB



NOTES:

- *FIGHTER-ORIENTED TRAINING (WILL NOT INCORPORATE T-1)*
- *INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM--NOT FOREIGN MILITARY SALES*
- *MEMBER COUNTRIES PAY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE*
- *MEMBER COUNTRIES OWN SOME AIRCRAFT*

SPECIALIZED UPT



OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- *USAF PILOT TRAINING*
- ***JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING***
- *JPATS UPDATE*

UFT BASES--ALL SERVICES



JOINT TRAINING: BACKGROUND

- *APR 93: SECDEF TASKED SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, ASSISTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, TO "CONSOLIDATE INITIAL FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT TRAINING FOR ALL SERVICES AND TRANSITION TO A COMMON PRIMARY TRAINING AIRCRAFT."*
  - *GENERAL OFFICER/FLAG OFFICER GROUP DEVELOPED JOINT FIXED-WING TRAINING PLAN*
  - *EXPANDED TASKING TO INCLUDE ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING AND NAVIGATOR/NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER (NFO) TRAINING*
  - *SERVICE SECRETARIES APPROVED IN JUL 93*
- *OPERATORS CONTINUED TO REFINE PLAN*
  - *MODIFIED NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
  - *SERVICE SECRETARIES APPROVED*
- *DEPUTY SECDEF APPROVED FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING PLANS IN OCT 95*

JOINT PILOT TRAINING

- *PRIMARY:*
  - *35th FTS AT REESE AFB TEXAS AND VT-3 AT NAS WHITING FIELD FL BECAME PROTOTYPE JOINT TRAINING SQUADRONS*
  - *ROTATING SQUADRON COMMAND*
  - *BY FY 98: 100 STUDENTS CROSSFLOW ANNUALLY, 24 EXCHANGE INSTRUCTORS*
  - *OTHER SQUADRONS BECOME JOINT AS THEY TRANSITION TO JPATS*
- *AIRLIFT/TANKER/MARITIME PATROL:*
  - *STUDENT/INSTRUCTOR EXCHANGE*
  - *NAVY EVENTUALLY TRAINS USAF TURBOPROP-BOUND STUDENTS (C-130)*
  - *USAF EVENTUALLY TRAINS NAVY JET-BOUND STUDENTS (E-6)*

JOINT UPT--END GAME



JOINT UPT--CURRENT STATUS



JOINT NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING--END GAME



JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER (EWO) TRAINING--END GAME



OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- *USAF PILOT TRAINING*
- *JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
- ***JPATS UPDATE***

JPATS CONTENDERS (T-37/T-34 REPLACEMENT)

	NORTHROP/ EMBRAER SUPER TUCANO BRAZIL	BEECH/ PILATUS PC-9 MK II SWITZERLAND	GRUMMAN/ AGUSTA S.211A ITALY	ROCKWELL/ MBB RANGER 2000 GERMANY	VOUGHT/ FMA PAMPA 2000 ARGENTINA	LOCKHEED/ AERMACCHI MB 339 ITALY	CESSNA CITATIONJET USA
PLANFORM							
	AIRCRAFT DRAWN TO SCALE						
TAKEOFF WEIGHT (lb)	7,040	6,789	6,393	7,900	8,168	10,420	7,400
MAXIMUM SPEED	285	278	375	380	400	475	420
ENGINE(S)	P&W TURBOPROP	P&W TURBOPROP	P&W TURBOFAN	P&W TURBOFAN	GARRETT TURBOFAN	ROLLS-ROYCE TURBOJET	2 WILLIAMS TURBOFANS
MODEL IN PRODUCTION	EMB-312A/F	PC-9	S.211A (LIMITED)	(PROTO)	PAMPA (LOW RATE)	MB 339 (LIMITED)	(PROTO)
APPROX NO. BUILT	570	160	85	2	18	182	2

POTENTIAL GBTS CONTRACTORS: BRITISH AEROSPACE, CAE-LINK, HUGHES TRAINING SYSTEMS, LORAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, McDONNELL DOUGLAS TRAINING SYSTEMS

JPATS ACQUISITION SCHEDULE



NOTES:

- *711 AIRCRAFT BUY: DOESN'T INCLUDE ALL OF ENJJPT AIRCRAFT*
- *SERIES OF FIRM FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS EXTENDING 4-5 YEARS EACH*
- *FIRST ORDER WILL BE FOR APPROXIMATELY 140 AIRCRAFT*

USAF UPT CHANGES SINCE 1973

- *CLOSED OR REALIGNED FIVE UPT BASES*
- *STOPPED TRAINING IRANIANS*
- *ENJJPT TRAINING BEGUN*
- *TWO GENERATIONS OF FLIGHT SIMULATION CHANGES*
- *IFF TRAINING ABSORBED INTO UPT BASES*
- *T-46 TO REPLACE T-37 PURCHASED/CANCELLED*
- *SUPT AND T-1 ACQUISITION*
- *JOINT TRAINING*
- *ROTARY-WING TRAINING CHANGED MULTIPLE TIMES*
- *NAV TRAINING BASE CLOSED*
  - *NAV TRAINING "REALIGNED" THREE TIMES*

JOINT UPT--INTERMEDIATE STATUS WITH JPATS



SUMMARY



- *JOINT TRAINING IS CENTERPIECE OF UFT*
- *JPATS IS KEY TO CONSOLIDATED PRIMARY PILOT TRAINING*
- *TRAINING "VISION" IS STILL GROWING AND DEVELOPING*

Document Separator

BRAC 95

Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training

GOALS

- Retain Capacity to Meet Quality Air Crew Training Requirements
- Ensure Function Compatibility at Remaining Sites
- Minimize Costs
  - Long term
  - Transitional
- Retain Sites with Inherent Military and Functional Value

METHODOLOGY - PHASE 1

DATA COLLECTION / PREPARATION

- Determine Scope and Sites in Category
- Collect Data - Standardized and Certified
- Develop Functional Values
- Compute Capacities
- Integrate Appropriate Policy
- Obtain Site Military Values

METHODOLOGY - PHASE 2

Modeling, Analyses, Alternatives, "Wrap-Up"

- Analyze Phase 1 Results using Optimization Model
- Develop and evaluate Alternatives
- Provide Alternatives to Military Departments
- Evaluate Military Department Recommendations
- Review Base "Complex" Potential

Category Scope Rationale

Installations in the UPT category include all DoD flight programs which support and facilitate selection and training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators to the point of awarding "Wings."

Installations in Category

• Columbus	AFB	MS
• Corpus Christi	NAS	TX
• Fort Rucker	AATC	AL
• Kingsville	NAS	TX
• Laughlin	AFB	TX
• Meridian	NAS	MS
• Pensacola	NAS	FL
• Randolph*	AFB	TX
• Reese	AFB	TX
• Sheppard	AFB	TX
• Vance	AFB	OK
• Whiting Field	NAS	FL

* Includes Enhanced Flight Screening sites and Hondo, TX and the Air Force Academy

TEN UPT FUNCTIONS

1. Flight Screening
2. Primary
3. Bomber/fighter
4. Strike/Advanced E-2/C-2
5. Airlift/Tanker
6. Maritime/Inter. E-2/C-2
7. Pri./Inter. NFO/NAV
8. WSO Strike
9. Panel NAV
10. Helo

CAPACITIES

- Airfield Ops
- Air Space
- Ground Training
  - Classroom
  - Simulators
- Ramps, Aprons, Taxi-ways
- Hangars
- Maintenance
- Supply/Storage
- Housing

[redacted]

SITE / FUNCTION CONSTRAINT MATRIX

FUNCTION	SERVICE	A/C	RUCKER	WHITING	CORPUS	P-COLA	MERIDIAN	KING	RAN	SHEP	VANCE	REESE	LAU	COL
FLT SCREENING	USAF	T-3												
PRIMARY PILOT	USN USAF	T-34 T-37 JPATS	X (2)											
AIRLIFT/TANKER	USAF	T-1	X (1)	X (1)										
MARITIME/ INT E-2/C-2	USN USAF	T-44	X (2)											
STRIKE/ ADV E-2/C-2	USN	T-2 TA-4 T-45	X (1)	X (1)										
BOMBER/ FIGHTER	USAF	T-38	X (1)	X (1)	X (1)									
HELO	USN USAF USA	TH-57 UH-1 TH-67 OH-58			X (2)		X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)
PRIM & INT NAV/NFO	USN USAF	T-34 T-39	X (2)											
WSO STRIKE	USN USAF	T-39 T-2								X (3)	X (3)	X (3)	X (3)	
PANEL NAV	USN USAF	T-43	X (1)	X (1)										

(1) Runway length constraints based on model design series of training aircraft (FY 2001 requirements)
(2) Lack of suitable outlying fields (one or more for indicated fixed-wing programs, two or more for helo)
(3) Too far from water (greater than 200 NM to working area)

[redacted]

TO BE VERIFIED UPON RECEIPT OF CERTIFIED DATA

[redacted]

MEASURES OF MERIT FOR:
PRIMARY

MEASURES OF MERIT	WEIGHT	RATIONALE
Managed Training Areas	5	The questions addressed in this area are focused toward ownership of special use airspace, air-to ground ranges, and outlying fields. In this analysis, *accessibility* to these facilities was considered more important than ownership.
Weather	14	This weight was used because students in primary flight training need better weather than students in the advanced tracks.
Airspace and Flight Training Areas	22	This area was weighted heavily due to the direct impact it has on primary flight training. Much of the training takes place in special use airspace; therefore, this area plays a large role in determining the training effectiveness of an installation.
Airfields	24	This area is weighted the heaviest due to the emphasis primary training places on pattern activities. This area plays a big role in evaluating the effectiveness of a training installation.
Ground Training Facilities	10	This weight is commensurate with the role classrooms, simulators, and other facilities play in flight training.
Aircraft Maintenance Facilities	5	Training aircraft are not difficult to maintain and do not require an extensive training infrastructure.
Special Military Facilities	0	N/A
Proximity to Training Areas	0	N/A
Proximity to Other Support Facilities	2	This area looks at the local area to determine what other facilities are available The overall training infrastructure is already established and in use at each base so the impact to this area should be minimal.
Unique Features	0	N/A
Air Quality	5	This has been baselined due to like aircraft.
Encroachment	5	Encroachment plays a role in determining installation compatibility with the training mission; however, training aircraft do not have a large impact on encroachment issues.
Services	8	Quality of life plays a significant role in determining installation compatibility with the training mission and this weight will be applied to the other training functions.

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Questions for Assessing the Functional Quality of *Primary* Pilot Training

Managed Training Areas (5 points)

1. The # of outlying/auxiliary fields that are controlled/owned by the installation and support primary training. (2.5 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 6 (0 pt for 0 fields, 2.5 pts for 6 fields)
   Rationale: Owning airfields and airspace have equal impact on training.
2. The number and type of special use airspace that is controlled/owned by the installation and supports primary training. (2.5 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: 1.5 pt for MOA, 0.5 pt for MTR, 0.5 for AA
   Rationale: Owning airfields and airspace have equal impact on training.

Weather (14 points)

1. Percent of time weather is better than 1500/3. (4 pt or 29%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 80% and 100% (1 pt for 80% and 4 pt for 95%)
   Rationale: USAF weather requirements to conduct training. Higher % is better.
2. Percent of time weather is better than 1000/3. (3 pt or 21%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 80% and 100% (1 pt for 80% and 3 pt for 95%)
   Rationale: USN weather requirements to conduct training. Higher % is better.
3. Percent of time crosswinds are less than 15 knots. (3 pt or 21%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between min% and max% (0 pt for min% and 3 pt for max%)
   Rationale: Max crosswinds for majority of student training. Higher % is better.
4. Percent of time crosswinds are greater than 25 knots. (1 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between min% and max% (1 pt for min% and 0 pt for max%)
   Rationale: Max aircraft crosswind limits. Lower % is better.
5. Percent of sorties canceled/rescheduled. (1 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 5% and 20% (1 pt for 5% and 0 pt for 20%)
   Rationale: This area captures weather attrition not covered by questions 1-4.
6. Official Planning factor for lost sorties due to weather. (2 pt or 14%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 5% and 20% (2 pt for 5% and 1 pt for 20%)
   Rationale: This area captures weather attrition not covered by questions 1-4.

Airspace and Flight Training Areas (22 points)

1. Amount of airspace (MOA and AA) in nm^3 (12 pt or 64%).
   Scoring: Linear scale of weighted airspace from 0 to max airspace (MOA and .8 AA) (0 pt for 0 nm^3 and 12 pt for max nm^3). Weighted airspace for each site = amount of MOA airspace + .8(amount of AA airspace)
   Rationale: More airspace is better, MOA is slightly better than AA.
2. Average distance to airspace (2 pt or 9%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max weighted average airspace size times distance (0 pt for min and 2 pt for max). Weighted average airspace size times distance for each site = Sum (airspace size in nm^3 times distance to airspace in nm) for all MOA or AA divided by the Sum of all airspace size.
   Rationale: Closer airspace is better.
3. Number of MTR's available (3 pt or 14%).
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0 pt for 0 MTR's and 3 pt for max MTR's)
   Rationale: MTRs are required for training...more is better.
4. Percent of flight ops experiencing ATC delays of 15 minutes or greater. (2 pt or 9%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and some max (2 pt for 0 % delays and 0 pts for max % delay)
   Rationale: Fewer ATC delays is better.
   nned commercial hub within 100 miles. (1 pt or 4%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for no and 0 pt for yes.
   Rationale: Commercial hub will impact training. No hub is better.
6. Number of bisecting airways. (2 pt or 9%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (2 pts for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: Bisecting airways reduce training effectiveness in areas.

Airfields (24 points)

1. The # of outlying/auxiliary fields usable for primary pilot training (4 pt or 17%) Definition of usable field will be based on runway length (preliminary cutoff -- 5000 ft)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and some max (0 pt for 0 fields, 4 pt for max # fields)
   Rationale: More outlying fields improve capacity and quality of training.
2. The # of usable outlying/auxiliary fields with IFR or night? capability. (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and some max (0 pt for 0 fields, 2 pt for max # fields)
   Rationale: This capability will help reduce congestion at the home field.
3. Median distance to outlying/auxiliary fields. (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between some min and max (2 pt for min distance, 1 pt for max)
   Rationale: Closer airfields are better.
4. Runway length of longest runway at main airfield. (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 5000 and 8000 ft (1 pt for 5000 ft runway , 2 points for 8000 ft runway)
   Rationale: Longer runway is better for safety reasons
5. Number of primary runways that can support concurrent ops and crosswind runways at main field. (7 pt or 29%)
   Scoring:
   With 0 crosswind runways: 2 pts for first runway, 4 pts for 2 parallel runways, 6 pts for 3 parallel runways without crosswind runways.
   With 1 crosswind runway: 3 pts for first primary runway, 5 pts for 2 parallel runways, 7 pts for 3 parallel runways.
   With 2 non-parallel crosswind runways: 3.5 pts for first primary runway, 5.5 pts for 2 parallel runways, 7 pts for 3 parallel runways.
   With 2 parallel crosswind runways: 4 pts for first primary runway, 6 pts for 2 parallel runways, 7 pts for 3 parallel runways.
   Rationale: More runways improve quality of training for safety reasons and flexibility
6. Condition of runways -- % of runway sq ft in adequate condition (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 2 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the runway. Higher quality is better.
7. Condition of taxiways/aprons -- % of taxiways/aprons sq ft in adequate condition (1.5 pt or 6%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1.5 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the taxiways. Higher quality is better.
8. Condition of utilities -- ave % of facilities in adequate condition (1.75 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1.75 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the utilities. Higher quality is better.
9. Condition of other facilities (e.g., term, admin) -- ave % of facilities in adeq cond (1.75 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1.75 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the facilities. Higher quality is better.

Ground Training Facilities (10 points)

1. Amount of training facilities (classrooms) rated "adequate" in sq ft. (3 pt or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 3 pt for max%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
2. Condition of training facilities (classrooms) - % of "adequate" sq ft. (1 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
3. Amount of training facilities (trainers) rated "adequate" in sq ft. (3 pt or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 3 pt for max%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
4. Condition of training facilities (trainers) - % of "adequate" sq ft. (1 pt or 10%)

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Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1 pt for 100%)
Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
nount of training facilities (other) rated "adequate" in sq ft. (1.5 pt or 15%)
Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 1.5 pt for max%)
Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.

6. Condition of training facilities (other) - % of "adequate" sq ft. (.5 pt or 5%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .5 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.

Aircraft Maintenance Facilities (5 points)

1. Level of maintenance operations at site (3 pt or 60%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for O-level, 2 pt for I-level, 2.5 pt for Depot level, 3 pt for Depot level for aircraft type (TMS)
   Rationale: Higher level of maintenance is better.
2. Amount of hangars rated "adequate" in sq ft (1.5 pt or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 1.5 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" hangar space is better.
3. Condition of hangars - % of hangars in "adequate" condition (.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .5 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This is another measure of installation quality. Higher % is better.

Proximity to Other Support Facilities (2 points)

1. Number of other airfields in the area that could support primary pilot training (1 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: .5 pt for 1 field, 1 pt for 2 or more fields)
   Rationale: More available airfields are better.
   stance to other airfields. (1 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: .5 pt for 1 field less than 30 miles, 1 pt for 2 or more fields less than 30 miles
   Rationale: Closer airfields are better.

Air Quality (5 points)

1. Is the air station in an attainment or maintenance area for CO, ozone, and PM-10? (3 pt or 60%)
   Scoring: 3 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Attainment and maintenance areas are best.
2. Is the air station in a moderate non-attainment area or better area for CO, ozone, and PM-10? (1 pt or 20%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Moderate and marginal non-attainment (as well as attainment and maintenance) are better than Serious, Severe, and Extreme non-attainment.
3. There have been no restrictions or delays due to air quality considerations (1 pt or 20%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Fewer restrictions are better..

Encroachment (5 points)

1. Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordinances? (1 pts or 20%)
   Scoring: 1 pts for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Having an existing AICUZ study in the zoning ordinance is best.
2. What is the percent incompatible land use for clear zones? (1.5 pts or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (1.5 pts for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: The lower amount of incompatible land use is better.
3. What is the percent incompatible land use for APZ I? (1 pt or 20%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (1 pt for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: The lower amount of incompatible land use is better.
   at is the percent incompatible land use for APZ II? (0.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0.5 pt for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: The lower amount of incompatible land use is better.
5. Are real estate disclosures required by local communities? (0.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: 0.5 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Real estate disclosures are best.
6. Has all clear zone acquisition been completed? (0.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: 0.5 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: It is best if all clear zones have been acquired.

Services (8 points)

1. Amount of BOQ rooms rated "adequate" (2 pt or 25%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 2 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
2. Condition of BOQ rooms - % of "adequate" (1 pt or 12%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
3. Amount of BEQ rooms rated "adequate" (.6 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, .6 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
4. Condition of BEQ rooms - % of "adequate" (.4 pt or 5%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .4 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
5. What percent of the listed MWR and support facilities/programs are available? (2 pt or 25%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to 100 (0 pt for 0 and 2 pt for 100).
   Rationale: More MWR facilities are better to enhance quality of life.
6. Amount of military housing rated "adequate" (.6 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, .6 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" housing is better.
7. Condition of military housing - % of "adequate" (.4 pt or 5%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .4 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" housing is better.
8. Number of children on the waiting list. (0.5 pt or 6%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0.5 pt for 0 and 0 pt for max).
   Rationale: Fewer children on waiting list is better.
9. Average wait for children on the waiting list. (0.5 pt or 6%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0.5 pt for 0 and 0 pt for max).
   Rationale: Less waiting time for child care is better.

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CAPACITY ANALYSIS

FACTORS	HISTORICAL	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED TRAINING (SYLLABI) (A)	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED GRADS (B)	REQUIRED CAPACITY (AxB)	MAX AVAILABLE CAPACITY (C)	EXCESS CAPACITY (C-(AxB))
TRAINING SORTIES	SORTIES/ GRAD SYLLABUS •OVERHEAD PG 8 # 6 PG 14 #2	SORTIES/ GRAD •MAJCOM PG 8 # 3	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR PG 4 #1 & 3	SORTIES/ YEAR	SORTIES/ YEAR PG 18 # 16	SORTIES/ YEAR
AIRFIELD OPS	OPS/SORTIE •TRAFFIC CNT PG 17 # 14 •TOT # SORTIES PG 14 # 2	OPS/GRAD •MAJCOM PG 8 # 2 X =	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR	OPS/YEAR	OPS/YEAR PG 17 # 8	OPS/YEAR
AIRSPACE	BLOCKS AVAILABLE IN DOCK HOURS AVAILABLE SYLLABUS •OVERHEAD •MX PG 22 # 1	AIRSPACE IN DOCK HRS GRAD •MAJCOM PG 8 # 1	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR	AIRSPACE IN DOCK HRS YEAR	# OF GRADS X AVAILABLE AIRSPACE IN DOCK HRS YEAR PG 22 # 1	AIRSPACE IN DOCK HRS YEAR
GROUND TRAINING	TOTAL FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN DUTY HOURS BY AL YEAR •SKILL + ATTRNT •CLASSROOMS •SIMULATORS •LIFE SPT TNG	FACILITY HRS GRAD •MAJCOM PG 10 # 1	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR	FACILITY HRS YEAR	FACILITY HRS YEAR PG 25 # 1 PG 27 # 8	FACILITY HRS YEAR

CAPACITY ANALYSIS (CONT)

FACILITY FACTORS	HISTORICAL	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED TRAINING (SYLLABI) (A)	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED GRADS (B)	REQUIRED CAPACITY (AxB)	MAX AVAILABLE CAPACITY (C)	EXCESS CAPACITY (C-(AxB))
RAMPS/ APRONS/ TAXIWAYS	TOT FP USED # OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORTED FP / AIRCRAFT RSO PG 28 # 1	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR) PG 28 # 1 PG 4 # 1	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR PG 4 #1 & 3	AIRCRAFT	TOT FP AVIL / FP / AIRCRAFT = AIRCRAFT PG 28 # 8	AIRCRAFT
HANGARS	HANGARS USED MX DOCKS/HANGAR AIRCRAFT/MX DOCK	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR)	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR	AIRCRAFT	AE X SLAMS X AIRCRAFT PG 29 # 8	AIRCRAFT
MAINTENANCE	FACILITIES USED # OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORTED AIRCRAFT / FACILITY RSO	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR)	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR	AIRCRAFT	AE X = AIRCRAFT PG 29 # 8	AIRCRAFT
SUPPLY/ STORAGE	TOT FP USED # OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORTED FP / AIRCRAFT RSO	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR)	GRADS/YEAR •POL •PTR	AIRCRAFT	TOT FP AVIL / FP / AIRCRAFT = AIRCRAFT PG 30 # 8	AIRCRAFT
HOUSING	CAPACITY USED STUDENTS/DAY PG 31 # 1	STUDENTS/DAY PG 4 # 1		STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY PG 32 # 8	STUDENTS/DAY
MESSING	CAPACITY USED STUDENTS/DAY PG 33 # 3	STUDENTS/DAY PG 4 # 1		STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY PG 33 # 8	STUDENTS/DAY

11/10/94
11/17/94 Update

	Columbus	Corpus Christi	Ft Rucker	Kingsville	Laughlin	Meridian	Pensacola	Randolph	Reese	Sheppard	Vance	Whiting Field	Hondo	USAFA	
Site Military Value															
Functions for UPT	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	DoD Requirements
Flight Screening	6.6	6.4	6.9	6.7	6.8	6.5	6.1	5.7	6.2	6.2	6.6	6.6	5.4	3.9	2,073
Primary Pilot	6.8	6.7	X2	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.4	6.7	6.0	6.3	6.8	6.6	0.0	0.0	2,493
Airlift/Tanker	6.3	6.5	X1	7.7	5.8	6.6	7.8	6.5	5.9	6.5	6.7	X1	0.0	0.0	752
Inter E2/C2, Adv Maritime	6.7	7.5	X2	7.6	6.5	6.6	7.5	6.4	5.9	6.5	6.8	7.4	0.0	0.0	273
Adv E2/C2, Strike	6.0	6.2	X1	7.3	5.4	6.3	7.6	6.0	5.7	6.2	5.3	X1	0.0	0.0	372
Adv Bomber/Fighter	6.4	X1	X1	7.3	5.5	6.8	7.8	6.8	5.6	6.3	5.5	X1	0.0	0.0	619
Helicopter	X2	X2	8.9	X2	X2	X2	6.5	X2	X2	X2	X2	7.2	0.0	0.0	1,481
Primary NFO, Inter NFO	6.9	6.7	X2	7.0	7.1	6.8	6.4	7.1	6.2	6.2	6.8	6.4	0.0	0.0	718
Adv NFO Strike	6.6	6.9	6.7	7.4	X3	6.5	7.6	6.1	X3	X3	X3	7.0	0.0	0.0	312
Adv NFO Panel	7.6	5.9	X1	7.2	6.8	7.0	7.6	6.9	7.2	7.7	7.5	X1	0.0	0.0	222

X1 - Runway length constraints X2 - Lack of outlying fields X3 - Too far from water

Resources	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap
Airfield Ops	784,371	752,136	7,441,016	389,136	787,572	389,136	270,072	619,768	686,547	646,988	685,390	865,392	554,664	651,630
Airspace	116,973	315,810	0	253,418	218,889	128,879	181,790	49,494	106,925	166,922	114,708	147,888	43,560	49,368
Ground Training Classroom	542,080	464,640	5,523,408	859,584	193,600	406,560	3,915,544	696,960	696,960	348,480	373,648	554,400	116,160	77,440
Ground Training Simulators	77,440	46,464	212,960	61,952	61,952	54,208	135,520	92,928	61,952	92,928	61,952	104,544	0	0
Aprons	209,840	540,367	392,726	240,614	217,378	241,166	299,395	501,946	282,496	394,125	223,645	386,667	251,200	46,122
* Normalized Airfield Ops	—	—	—	537,008	—	537,008	326,519	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Resources per student	Flight Screening	Primary Pilot	Airlift/Tanker	Inter E2/C2, Adv Maritime	Adv E2/C2, Strike	Adv Bomber/Fighter	Helicopter	Primary NFO, Inter NFO	Adv NFO Strike	Adv NFO Panel
Training Sorties	24	94	88	44	166	132	137	33	70	13
Airfield Ops	526	1,156	405	496	1,393	926	1,288	248	280	39
Airspace	6	32	61	21	97	75	N/A	37	53	0
Ground Training Classroom	14	213	186	202	196	156	955	371	144	304
Ground Training Simulators	0	27	42	30	98	29	32	44	53	80
Aprons	18.81	181.92	357.60	190.01	303.45	357.35	190.62	60.31	239.59	201.00
* Normalized Airfield Ops	—	—	—	—	1922	—	—	—	386	54

Maximum requirements where duplicate training

#Aircraft/student	0.0555	0.2274	0.2384	0.2088	0.3817	0.5105	0.2681	0.1058	0.1346	0.0402
SQ YDS/Aircraft	339	800	1,500	910	795	700	711	570	1,780	5,000
# Aircraft Required	113	567	179	57	142	316	397	76	42	9

No copies to be made without express permission of JCSG UPT Chairman

* Normalized Light/Heavy aircraft → Airfield Ops

POLICY INTEGRATION

Joint Fixed-Wing:

1. Primary (JPATS)
2. Primary/Intermediate NFO & Navigator
3. WSO Strike
4. Panel Navigator
5. Multi-Engine:
   a. Jet - Air Force
   b. Prop - Navy

2K

MILITARY DEPARTMENT MILITARY VALUES

(Scale 1 to 3 with 3 = High)

• Columbus	3
• Corpus Christi	3
• Fort Rucker	3
• Kingsville	3
• Laughlin	3
• Meridian	2
• Pensacola	3
• Randolph	3
• Reese	1
• Sheppard	3
• Vance	3
• Whiting	2

OPTIMIZATION MODEL

- MAXFV - Maximize Functional Value
- MINSITE - Minimum Site (5% FV & 3 "Rules")
  - Flt Screening Separate
  - Joint Fixed-Wing Policy
  - Notional Squadron > 100 Students
- MINNMV - Minimum Sites with Maximum Military Value - "Best" with 4th "Rule": Flt Screening at Hondo and Air Force Academy
- "MIN PRIME" - 3 Sites Closed

OPTIMIZATION MODEL (Cont.)

- "MIN PRIME 2" - 4 Sites Closed

  Added Air Space and OLF capacity from closed sites back into system.
- Analytical Excursion: Used Air Space and OLF capacity from Corpus Christi to maximize Kingsville capacity. Closed 5th Site.
- "Scenarios" developed with additional efforts to consolidate functions and minimize moves of new functions to new sites.

ALTERNATIVES

3-Site

- Close Meridian, Reese, & Whiting
- Excess Capacity Remaining - 9.9%

4-Site

- Close Meridian, Reese, Whiting, & Vance
- Excess Capacity Remaining - 1.3%

5-Site

- Close Meridian, Reese, Whiting, Vance, & Corpus Christi
- Excess Capacity Remaining - 2.3%

Military Department Recommendations

Navy - Close Meridian and Realign Corpus Christi. Whiting **not** closed based on $'s:

1). High costs to move helicopter UPT to Fort Rucker and primary UPT to Pensacola.

2). Small savings for collocating helicopter UPT.

Air Force - Close Reese. Vance **not** closed based on capacity concerns.

1). Added capacity needed for Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals course.

2). Required flexibility for new training systems.

3). Capacity "buffer" for uncertainties associated with Base Closure and fielding new aircraft.

Bottom Line: Not inconsistent with JCSG work

BASE "COMPLEXES"

- Issue Raised by SECNAV and JCSG Reviewed
- Three Base "Pairs" or Complexes in UPT Category:

  1) Corpus Christi & Kingsville - Compatible with Military Department Recommendations
  2) Pensacola & Whiting - Compatible with Military Department Recommendations
  3) Columbus & Meridian - Not Compatible with Military Department Recommendations. No Clear and Compelling Rationale to Change the Recommendations

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

1. In your view, what are the pros and cons of DOD integrating fully Air Force and Navy Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) programs?

2. Please discuss any issued DOD or JCS policy regarding cross-servicing of UPT.

3. What is the impact of the Joint Primary Aircraft Trainer (JPAT) on actual basing decisions such as those achieved as a result of the BRAC process?

4. Could final selection of a jet or prop JPAT effect basing decisions?

5. Should JPAT selection criteria, such as that related to take-off and landing and cross-wind requirements, be a factor in basing decisions and if not, why not?

6. What elements of the Air Force and Navy UPT programs require Service-specific training?

7. Did DOD or the Services consider integrating operations at the same base and using the same training aircraft in a way that still permits Service-specific training programs?

8. By consolidating Air Force and Navy UPT, how would the subsequent reduction of excess capacity restrict the Services' ability to ramp-up future pilot production should military requirements dictate?

9. How would the subsequent reduction of excess capacity due to consolidation of Air Force and Navy UPT restrict the Services' ability to ramp-up future international pilot production requirements?

NAVY UPT Discussion: CAPT Buzzell FRI, 17 FEB 95/1400

① DOD: Readiness Office - Finch
Charlie Ninfakos
Ron Nichol
Moeller

JOINT STAFF: Training -

② ARMY:

③ AIR FORCE: - Proffit AETC
Pratt
McCarthy XOO

④ NAVY: CAPT Brian Buzzell
Col Dave Stockwell

Alternatives for consideration: given to services to run COBRA

Study Team: AF - reps from Randolph went home every weekend. Functional.

Navy - Steve Belcher. No functionals (SINATRA, etc).
No influence, contamination. BSAT?

Flight Screening { USAFA, ROTC, OTS } where? → USAFA, Hondo

JPATS characteristics considered for basing
- used worst case spec (jet) → drove the analysis

2001 PTR Comparison:

Flight Screening	-25%	2000 PTR
JPATS	-25%	2000 PTR

3 minute rule? What is it and who took it off.

DOD BRAC organizations not empowered to create policy

Deutch memo (Oct 94) major player
- JPATS will be joint. IPs will be exchanged
- NAVs joint (Randolph - NAV / Pensacola - EWO)
- Helos unresolved

Visit all UPTs on the list. Navy & Air Force

Data Call based on Navy's 93 Call

DPADS Army based: determines ~~MILITARY VALUE, not~~ functional value ranking in 10 areas for each base.

Data Reduction runs done 3 times (USAF didn't like first two)

JCSG: not authorized to look at MILITARY VALUE. Services determined military value and ranked bases in "BANDS." If not in highest band (III), base was recommended for closure.

NAVY - Did not use Fuctional Value.

AF - Used it, but also applied subjective criteria for voting.

LIMITER: FLIGHT OPS at the airdrome

Overhead: Navy - 28%

USAF - 60%

Document Separator

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 OCT 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Fixed-Wing Flight Training

In April 1993 the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Air Force, assisted by the Secretary of the Navy, to:

1. Consolidate initial fixed-wing aircraft training for all Services and transition to a common primary training aircraft; and

2. Combine follow-on flight training into four common pipelines (Navy fighter attack, Air Force fighter/bomber, Navy and Air Force tanker/transport/maritime patrol, and helicopter).

In response, the Navy and the Air Force are in the process of implementing joint fixed-wing flight training initiatives that carry out the Secretary's directive. A common pipeline for helicopter training is still under review. A schematic description of their approach is in Attachment 1.

In addition, the Navy and Air Force have proposed other joint flight training initiatives for the functions of navigator, weapon system officer, and electronic warfare officer, as illustrated in Attachment 2.

I am encouraged by the cooperation and progress we have made in bringing jointness to flight training and hope that it serves as a model in other areas where the Department might benefit from increasing "jointness." This memorandum, therefore, provides my approval for Air Force/Navy plans to implement these joint fixed-wing flight training programs, as well as for their additional joint training initiatives. The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, and others that may be involved, should take actions to implement these programs as soon as possible.

John Deutch

21146

JOINT FIXED-WING TRAINING



Attachment 1

JOINT NAVIGATOR TRAINING



JOINT ENTRY LEVEL EWO TRAINING



WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES

CORRESPONDENCE & DIRECTIVES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1155
FAX # (703) 695-1219

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

FROM: **Mr. Curry**

TELEPHONE #: **697-8261**

TO: **Merrill Beyer (Air Force Team BRAC)**

TELEPHONE #: Fax **696-0550** w - 696-0504

PAGES (Including Cover Sheet): **5**

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, CONTACT SENDER *IMMEDIATELY*!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

COMMENTS

(UNCLASSIFIED OFFICIAL INFORMATION ONLY)

PENSACOLA: WED/ FEB 8, 95, 1700

Video & Brochures available, Mar

Joint training:

- benefits at lower levels
- Service unique specialization limits integration

Water survival AF utilization periods: Winter?

JPATS should have limited impact (Newbekus said "no-play")

- Aug 25 Decision
- 2016 stretch-out: 1st Acft 2002 (Navy), 1997 (AF)
- Will the AF accept a prop?
- Capacity:

AF UPT programs

- Tanker/Transport: T-37 / T-1 Jayhawk
- Recce-Trn
- Fighter/Bomber: T-37/T-38

location: Randolph, Reese, Laughlin

AF/Navy Joint Training Plan

- AETC/NATC agreement (Veccillio/Sinatra)
-

Airspace issues: Navy certifies Gulf area sufficient (latest version)

Major Issues: Airspace
Capacity
Encroachment

Enhanced Flight Screener: T-3A Firefly

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: February 8, 1995

TIME: 5:00

MEETING WITH: Pensacola Chamber of Commerce

SUBJECT: Military Installations in Pensacola

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Jimmie Taylor; VP, Military Affairs Committee
John Griffing; President, Pensacola Chamber of Commerce
Don Salter; Chrmn, Military Affairs Committee
Bart Roper; Office of Cong. Scarborough
Paul Hirsch; Consultant
Wayne Arney; Consultant

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Charles Smith, Executive Director/Special Assistant
Madelyn Creedon, General Counsel
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison
Ben Borden, Director, Review & Analysis
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader
Jim Owsley, Cross-Service Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader

MEETING PURPOSE:

Tues/April 25, 1995
1530

REESE FOLLOW-UP



- ☐ May 1 / 3:30pm Cox @ Combest
- ☐ RECOVERY CAPACITY
  - Cross-countries
  - Routine cat
  - What is true capacity
- ☐ Validate D-PAD model results with Gardner
  - Calculation errors

Priority:
RWY
ACFT
/Ps

- ☐ Weight changes
  - WX planning factor (Attrition factor)
  - Owned/Used Airspace
  - Reduced weight of MIR quantity
  - MWR/DEQ/Childcare moved to Housing sub-area

210-652-6236
HQ AETC/XOT: DSN 487-6236
Robie Robinson
Mr. Capacity

- ☐ Airspace

T-1	65	
T-38	35	35k × 80nm
T-37	400	24k × 50nm

Overlapping areas

OSD/DRAC
Col Thompson
[redacted]

- ☐ Status of Housing repair
- ☐ Cost/Flying Hr & Cost/Graduate

Integrated/Phase/Track

Develop CLOSURE Alternatives:
- Move Functions to bases with highest FV
- Eliminate excess CAPACITY
- Retain max MILITARY value

DRAFT

50 CAP
30 Cost/Sav
10 CEI
10 Cost to Close

CATEGORY: UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (UPT)

TIER	INSTALLATION
3	REESE AFB ----------(C)
1	COLUMBUS AFB ----------(*)
1	LAUGHLIN AFB ----------(*)
1	VANCE AFB----------(*)
1	RANDOLPH AFB
1	SHEPPARD AFB

(C) = DoD recommendation for closure
(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
(*) = *Commissioner candidate for further consideration*

9:48 / April 25, 1995

DRAFT

FLIGHT SCREEN
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		150		2.9		3.6		5.8		4.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90		26007	5.7	29016	6.4	41056	9.0	22358	4.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		25	7.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	12.0	31.5	4.6
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		6.5		4.1		9.9		5.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	2	3.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	22	1.9	43	1.4
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25		88%	2.2	98%	2.5	42%	1.1	100%	2.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1
AIRFIELDS —		229		8.6		8.4		7.1		9.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		247	0.9	152	0.6	222	0.8	264	1.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	9		230	0.3	400	0.4	654	0.7	812	0.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	7		100%	0.7	100%	0.7	100%	0.7	100%	0.7
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	2		1	0.2	37	0.0	6	0.2	4	0.2
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
SCORE		999		6.9		6.6		8.1		7.1
RANK				3		4		1		2

FLIGHT SCREEN
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	5		19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	20		80	1.0	50	1.5	15	2.0	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		135		3.9		5.1		5.4		1.9
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90		26007	5.7	29016	6.4	41056	9.0	22358	4.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		25	7.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	12.0	31.5	4.6
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		6.5		4.1		9.9		5.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	2	3.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	22	1.9	43	1.4
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25		88%	2.2	98%	2.5	42%	1.1	100%	2.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1
AIRFIELDS ---		229		8.6		8.4		7.1		9.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		247	0.9	152	0.6	222	0.8	264	1.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	9		230	0.3	400	0.4	654	0.7	812	0.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	7		0%	0.0	72%	0.5	54%	0.4	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	2		1	0.2	37	0.0	6	0.2	4	0.2
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		50		8.3		8.0		8.5		9.1
SCORE		984		7.0		6.7		8.0		6.8
RANK				2		4		1		3

FLIGHT SCREEN
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40		98.40%	3.4	97.80%	3.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		15.00%	0.3	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	10		19.00%	0.1	23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		150		4.2		4.9		3.6		6.1		4.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90		85447	9.0	44861	4.7	42068	4.4	53868	5.7	45092	4.7
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		65.2	0.0	39.2	9.3	50.8	5.1	31.5	12.0	39.5	9.2
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		5.4		6.7		5.3		8.6		7.3
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	2	3.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		20	1.9	26	1.8	17	2.0	22	1.9	43	1.4
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		66%	2.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25		27%	0.7	88%	2.2	32%	0.8	42%	1.1	100%	2.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		51%	1.4	97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		40%	1.1	56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1
AIRFIELDS ---		229		5.5		8.6		7.7		7.1		9.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		6.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		558	1.0	247	0.4	152	0.3	222	0.4	264	0.5
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		50		8.3		8.3		8.0		8.5		9.1
SCORE		999		6.1		7.3		6.6		7.7		7.5
RANK				5		3		4		1		2

FLIGHT SCREEN
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40		98.40%	3.4	97.80%	3.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		15.00%	0.7	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		19.00%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		150		4.1		4.9		3.6		5.8		4.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90		85447	9.0	44861	4.7	42068	4.4	53868	5.7	45092	4.7
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		65.2	0.0	39.2	9.3	50.8	5.1	31.5	12.0	39.5	9.2
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		5.4		6.7		5.3		8.6		7.3
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	2	3.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		20	1.9	26	1.8	17	2.0	22	1.9	43	1.4
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	0.0	C	0.0	C	0.0	C	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		66%	2.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25		27%	0.7	88%	2.2	32%	0.8	42%	1.1	100%	2.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		51%	1.4	97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		40%	1.1	56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1
AIRFIELDS ---		229		5.5		5.5		5.1		4.5		6.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	0	D	0	I	0	D	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		2.6		2.5		2.4		2.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		558	1.0	247	0.4	152	0.3	222	0.4	264	0.5
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	9		948	0.9	230	0.2	400	0.4	654	0.6	812	0.8
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	7		93%	0.7	100%	0.7	100%	0.7	100%	0.7	100%	0.7
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	2		79	0.0	1	0.2	37	0.1	6	0.2	4	0.2
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
SCORE		999		6.1		6.4		5.8		6.9		6.6
RANK				4		3		4		1		2

Document Separator

FLIGHT SCREEN

	WEIGHT		RUCKER		WHITING		CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL		HONDO		USAFA	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		0.0	0.0	9	1.0	3	0.5	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	0	0.0	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		8.0		10.0		9.0		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.0		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		78.80%	0.0	71.40%	0.0	74.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	72.60%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	86.10%	1.4	83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	89.50%	2.5
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		86.50%	0.9	84.00%	0.5	84.10%	0.5	83.00%	0.4	83.40%	0.5	85.70%	0.8	83.60%	0.5	91.90%	1.6	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2	87.50%	1.0	93.50%	1.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40		98.00%	3.1	94.00%	0.5	94.00%	0.5	96.00%	3.1	96.00%	1.8	95.00%	1.2	98.40%	3.4	97.50%	2.8	97.80%	3.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9	98.40%	3.4	88.00%	-3.4
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		7.25%	0.9	19.40%	0.0	22.20%	0.0	9.00%	0.7	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.7	15.00%	0.3	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0	15.00%	0.3	23.00%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	10		16.70%	0.2	22.00%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	22.80%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	28.30%	0.0
WEATHER ---		150		4.7		1.4		2.1		3.5		3.0		3.6		4.2		5.2		4.9		3.6		6.1		4.1		4.5		1.9
AMT MOA/AA ANSPCE	90		5431	0.6	28511	3.0	57169	6.0	28445	3.0	42588	4.5	62724	6.6	85447	9.0	29144	3.1	36064	3.8	31116	3.3	53868	5.7	45092	4.7	76958	8.1	3880	0.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		1.5	12.0	27.7	7.1	39.6	4.8	35.3	6.6	39	4.9	37.5	6.2	65.2	0.0	32.3	6.2	36.1	6.5	42.6	4.3	31.5	6.3	39.5	4.8	48.2	3.2	57.8	1.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB WAN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		0	2.0	20	0.5	2	1.6	0	2.0	2	1.6	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8	3	1.8	3	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		6.9		5.4		6.2		6.4		5.7		6.5		5.5		4.2		5.1		4.7		6.6		5.7		6.3		2.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		0	0.0	9	3.0	3.0	1.0	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	2	0.7	0	0.0	1	0.3
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		101.0	0.0	41	1.3	8	2.0	20	1.7	19	1.8	26	1.6	20	1.7	33	1.5	26	1.6	17	1.8	22	1.7	43	1.2	101	0.0	27	1.6
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		A	2.0	K	6	H	6.5	E	5.0	E	5.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	A	2.0	A	2.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	56%	1.7	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	66%	2.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0	72%	2.2	3.00%	0.1
%TAXIWAYRNS ADQ COND	26		100%	2.5	95%	2.4	36%	0.9	63%	1.3	100%	2.5	95%	2.4	27%	0.7	100%	2.5	88%	2.2	29%	0.7	42%	1.1	100%	2.5	67%	1.7	61%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	51%	1.4	100%	2.7	97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	76%	2.1
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		100%	2.7	98%	2.6	82%	2.2	87%	2.3	93%	2.5	74%	2.0	40%	1.1	77%	2.1	56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1	100%	2.7	74%	2.0
AIRFIELDS ---		229		5.6		8.6		7.6		7.2		7.8		7.9		4.9		8.3		8.0		7.1		6.5		7.9		4.9		4.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		323435	3.0	34137	0.3	48549	0.5	184423	1.7	20385	0.2	41826	0.4	135526	1.3	76822	0.7	26652	0.2	59469	0.6	68320	0.6	84459	0.8	9556	0.1	11452	0.1
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		100037	3.0	46413	1.4	22239	0.7	40091	1.2	60224	1.5	47000	1.4	66423	2.0	7737	0.2	75207	2.3	60863	1.8	70889	2.1	63354	1.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		238036	1.5	93438	0.6	2000	0.0	113783	0.7	28380	0.2	6162	0.0	36060	0.2	48349	0.3	58639	0.4	51572	0.3	19365	0.1	17029	0.1	0	0.0	8582	0.1
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		79%	0.4	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2	0%	0.0	100%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		9.9		4.8		3.5		6.1		4.4		4.2		5.7		3.7		5.3		5.2		5.1		5.0		1.1		1.7
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5	O	1	O	1
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		245463	0.2	194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156868	0.1	147686	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1	22494	0.0	80261	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5		100%	0.5	86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	46%	0.2	57%	0.3	100%	0.5	92%	0.5
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		5.4		7.2		8.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		4.9		5.8		4.7		5.9		3.0		3.0
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	N	0.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		4.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		9.70%	0.7	3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		0%	0.5	2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		5.3		8.7		5.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9		7.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		732	1.0	205	0.3	162	0.2	604	0.8	99	0.1	130	0.2	558	0.8	659	0.9	247	0.3	152	0.2	222	0.3	264	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		87.40%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		100%	1.0	80%	0.8	90%	0.9	100%	1.0	80%	0.8	80%	0.8	87%	0.9	80%	0.8	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9	0%	0.0	77%	0.8
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		1516	0.7	330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1267	0.5	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4	0	0.0	1229	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		98.00%	0.4	80%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	0%	0.0	100%	0.4
# CHILDCAR WAIT LIST	5		0	0.5	25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5	0	0.5	55	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		0	0.5	145	0.2	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5	0	0.5	23	0.5
SERVICES ---		50		9.7		7.8		6.9		8.3		8.5		7.6		8.1		8.9		8.3		8.0		8.5		9.1		6.0		8.9
SCORE		999		6.8		6.3		6.2		6.1		6.3		6.6		5.6		6.1		6.5		6.0		6.8		6.6		6.3		3.6
RANK				1		7		8		10		6		4		12		9		5		11		2		3		13		14

FLIGHT SCREEN
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	10		23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		150		2.9		3.6		6.1		4.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90		26007	5.7	29016	6.4	41056	9.0	22358	4.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		25	7.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	12.0	31.5	4.6
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		6.5		4.1		9.9		5.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	2	3.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	22	1.9	43	1.4
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25		88%	2.2	98%	2.5	42%	1.1	100%	2.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1
AIRFIELDS ---		229		8.6		8.4		7.1		9.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		247	0.9	152	0.6	222	0.8	264	1.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		50		8.3		8.0		8.5		9.1
SCORE		999		6.9		6.6		8.2		7.2
RANK				3		4		1		2

Document Separator

BOMBER/FIGHTER

	WEIGHT		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		6.7		6.7		6.7		5.0		3.3		3.3		5.0		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		68.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	72.60%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	85.10%	0.7	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.00%	0.2	83.40%	0.2	85.70%	0.4	83.60%	0.2	91.90%	0.8	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	25		98.00%	1.9	99.60%	2.5	95.00%	0.7	98.40%	2.0	97.50%	1.7	97.80%	1.8	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.4	99.20%	2.3
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		100		5.3		6.4		5.1		4.9		5.9		5.8		3.7		6.3		4.9
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		135531	11.9	42585	3.7	136737	12.0	82318	7.2	35191	3.1	35644	3.1	30958	2.7	53249	4.7	45089	4.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	HI=MAX	57.1	0.2	38.9	0.8	39.8	0.8	85.1	0.0	32.9	1.0	36.4	0.9	43.9	0.7	31.9	1.0	39.7	0.8
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		9	1.2	5	0.7	9	1.2	14	1.8	15	2.0	23	3.0	9	1.2	6	0.8	10	1.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		0	2.0	3	1.8	3	1.8	3	1.8	26	0.0	19	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		8.8		5.2		7.7		8.8		4.1		3.9		3.2		4.1		5.9
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	1.0	19	1.0	28	0.9	20	1.0	89	0.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8002	0.0	8000	0.0	8000	0.0	8353	0.1	13100	1.0	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		8	4.0	8	4.0	K	6	8	4.0	C	6.0	8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	66%	0.7	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		53%	0.5	100%	1.0	95%	1.0	27%	0.3	100%	1.0	98%	0.9	29%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	51%	0.5	100%	1.0	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		87%	0.9	93%	0.9	74%	0.7	40%	0.4	77%	0.8	56%	0.6	97%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
A RFIELDS —		170		7.3		7.6		8.6		5.8		8.8		5.1		6.8		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	66067	0.9	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.8		5.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		289040	1.4	218457	1.1	301674	1.5	238496	1.2	219824	1.1	156858	0.8	147685	0.7	151346	0.8	151102	0.8
COND OF HANGARS	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.9		7.2		7.9		6.9		7.2		6.2		8.0		6.0		6.1
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZ I	10		28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZ II	5		50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.1		5.6		8.8		9.1		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	8		604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	9074	0.6	442	0.0	482	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	90%	1.8	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		887	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		69	0.1	6	0.5	53	0.2	79	0.0	42	0.2	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		113	0.2	10	0.5	180	0.1	186	0.1	74	0.3	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		7.7		6.0		5.2		7.3		9.0		6.3		5.8		6.5		7.1
SCORE		1000		7.6		6.7		7.3		6.6		6.3		5.5		5.5		5.5		6.4
RANK				1		3		2		4		6		9		7		8		5

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		39.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	25		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.5	99.20%	2.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		100		3.5		3.7		6.5		5.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		26007	7.6	29016	8.5	41056	12.0	22358	6.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	0.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	1.2	31.5	0.5
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		23	3.0	9	1.2	6	0.8	10	1.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		5.3		5.0		6.9		6.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		88%	0.9	98%	1.0	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		170		5.1		7.8		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		8.7		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		9.4		7.4		9.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC ---		40		5.0		5.0		5.0	-	10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	8		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	8		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	8	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		1000		5.9		6.7		6.7		7.0
RANK				4		3		2		1

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		39.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		100		3.3		3.7		4.4		2.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	0.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	1.2	31.5	0.5
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		23	1.0	9	0.4	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		5.1		5.2		7.4		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		88%	0.9	98%	1.0	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		170		5.1		7.8		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		8.7		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		9.4		7.4		9.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC ---		40		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		1000		5.7		6.7		6.6		6.8
RANK				4		2		3		1

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	5		19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	20		80	1.0	50	1.5	15	2.0	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		115		3.6		4.5		5.1		1.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	0.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	1.2	31.5	0.5
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		23	1.0	9	0.4	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		5.1		5.2		7.4		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0	8	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		88%	0.9	98%	1.0	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		170		5.1		7.8		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		28652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		8.7		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		9.4		7.4		9.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC ---		40		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		6.2		6.3		7.9		8.6
SCORE		1015		5.6		6.7		6.6		6.5
RANK				4		1		2		3

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.0		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.60%	0.2	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	25		98.40%	2.1	97.80%	1.9	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.5	99.20%	2.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	1.0	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		15.00%	0.2	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		20.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		100		5.0		6.0		3.7		6.5		5.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		82318	12.0	44624	6.5	42343	6.2	53249	7.8	45089	6.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.1	0.0	39.7	0.8	52.1	0.4	31.9	1.0	39.7	0.8
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		14	1.8	23	3.0	14	1.8	6	0.8	10	1.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		8.3		4.9		4.5		5.2		6.8
#CTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#CUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	20	1.0	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RLNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.1	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		66%	0.7	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		27%	0.3	88%	0.9	32%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		170		3.5		2.8		5.1		2.2		3.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		7.8		8.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	I	0	DA	0	I	0	DA	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		3.5		2.6		2.5		2.4		2.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	8		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		90%	1.8	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	8		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		8.4		6.9		6.4		7.1		8.2
SCORE		1000		6.7		5.3		5.6		5.4		6.1
RANK				1		5		3		4		2

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.0		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.60%	0.2	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		15.00%	1.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		20.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		100		3.7		4.0		3.7		4.4		2.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		82318	14.0	44624	7.6	42343	7.2	53249	9.1	45089	7.7
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.1	0.0	39.7	0.8	52.1	0.4	31.9	1.0	39.7	0.8
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		14	0.6	23	1.0	14	0.6	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		8.6		4.6		4.4		5.5		6.9
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	20	1.0	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.1	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		66%	0.7	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		27%	0.3	88%	0.9	32%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		170		3.5		5.1		7.4		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		7.8		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		3.5		6.6		8.5		6.4		8.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		90%	0.5	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		1000		6.7		5.6		6.2		5.9		6.6
RANK				1		5		3		4		2

Document Separator

AIRLIFT/TANKER

	WEIGHT		CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		2.5		7.1		5.4		6.3		5.4		3.3		5.3		5.4		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		84.10%	0.5	83.00%	0.4	83.40%	0.5	85.70%	0.8	83.60%	0.5	91.90%	1.6	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		88.00%	0.5	86.00%	0.4	86.20%	0.4	90.00%	0.7	90.00%	0.7	94.00%	0.9	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20		94.00%	0.3	98.00%	1.6	96.60%	1.1	95.00%	0.6	98.40%	1.7	97.50%	1.4	97.80%	1.5	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		1.00%	0.1	0.00%	0.5	0.00%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.30%	0.4	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		9.00%	0.4	9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		9.00%	0.4	10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —		90		4.7		6.2		5.1		5.7		6.1		7.0		6.6		4.9		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		137659	13.5	137656	13.5	42588	4.2	143213	14.0	86447	8.4	29144	2.8	36084	3.5	31116	3.0	53868	5.3	45092	4.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		22.5	2.0	55	0.5	39	1.2	38.9	1.2	65.2	0.0	32.3	1.5	36.1	1.4	42.6	1.1	31.5	1.6	39.5	1.2
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB WIN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240		8.8		8.2		4.5		8.6		6.2		3.4		4.7		3.8		5.2		4.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		101	0.0	20	1.0	19.3	1.0	26	0.9	20	1.0	89	0.1	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 F??	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8000	0.5	8002	0.5	8000	0.5	8000	0.5	8353	0.6	13100	1.0	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		A	2.0	E	5.0	B	4.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	56%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ACQ COND	15		36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	88%	1.3	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		82%	1.4	97%	1.5	100%	1.7	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	50%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		219		4.6		8.4		8.4		9.0		5.9		9.4		7.1		6.9		5.0		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	0.7	136526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	56423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	54%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5		94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	54%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		9.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		5.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50		10.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		8.0		9.0		5.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
ACUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		7.4		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.1		5.6		8.8		9.1		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	6		90%	0.5	100%	0.6	80%	0.5	80%	0.5	97%	0.5	80%	0.5	70%	0.4	93%	0.6	87%	0.5	97%	0.5
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	4		439	0.1	687	0.2	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.3	1287	0.4	230	0.1	400	0.1	654	0.2	812	0.3
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	20		100%	2.0	78%	1.6	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	93%	1.9	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
# CHILDCAR WAIT LIST	6		197	0.0	69	0.4	6	0.6	53	0.4	79	0.4	42	0.5	1	0.6	37	0.5	6	0.6	4	0.6
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	4		265	0.0	113	0.2	10	0.4	180	0.1	186	0.1	74	0.3	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.4
SERVICES —		80		5.7		7.8		6.5		6.2		7.9		9.6		7.0		6.4		7.0		7.5
SCORE		999		6.5		7.8		6.6		7.7		6.5		5.5		6.7		6.0		5.8		6.3
RANK				6		1		4		2		5		7		3		9		10		8

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS ONLY

	WEIGHT	VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	60		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20	93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---	90		4.7		5.3		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140	26007	8.9	29015	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	25	1.3	40.3	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	30	22	3.0	9	1.2	10	1.4	11	1.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	240		6.7		6.2		9.2		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---	219		7.1		8.3		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	50		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---	60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	6	70%	0.4	93%	0.6	87%	0.5	87%	0.5
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	4	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	312	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	20	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	6	1	0.6	37	0.0	5	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	4	30	0.3	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.4
SERVICES ---	80		8.9		7.1		8.6		9.8
SCORE	999		7.3		7.5		7.2		7.0
RANK			2		1		3		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90		4.7		5.3		6.3		5.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150		26007	9.5	29016	10.6	41056	15.0	22358	8.2
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		22	2.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240		6.6		6.3		9.4		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219		7.1		8.3		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		999		7.1		7.5		7.1		6.9
RANK				3		1		2		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	5		19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	20		30	1.0	50	1.5	15	2.0	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90		5.6		7.0		7.7		4.9
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150		26007	9.5	29016	10.6	41056	15.0	22358	8.2
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		22	2.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240		6.6		6.3		9.4		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219		7.1		7.4		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		6.2		6.3		7.9		8.6
SCORE		999		7.1		7.4		7.2		6.7
RANK				3		1		2		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.4		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20		98.40%	1.7	97.80%	1.5	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		15.00%	0.2	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		20.00%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —		90		6.1		6.7		5.3		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		85447	14.0	44861	7.4	42068	6.9	53868	8.8	45092	7.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		18	1.7	32	3.0	14	1.3	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240		8.5		6.2		5.4		6.8		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.6	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		219		5.9		7.1		7.9		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		7.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50		9.0		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	6		87%	0.5	70%	0.4	93%	0.6	87%	0.5	87%	0.5
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	4		948	0.4	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.3
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	20		93%	1.9	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	6		79	0.0	1	0.6	37	0.3	6	0.6	4	0.6
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	4		186	0.1	30	0.3	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.4
SERVICES —		80		8.4		7.7		6.7		7.5		8.4
SCORE		999		7.3		7.2		7.0		6.4		6.9
RANK				1		2		3		5		3

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT	RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL		
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60	5.4		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5	98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20	15.00%	0.7	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	20.00%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —		90	5.3		5.4		5.3		6.3		5.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150	85447	15.0	44861	7.9	42068	7.4	53868	9.5	45092	7.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	18	1.1	32	2.0	14	0.9	10	0.6	11	0.7
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240	8.7		6.0		5.4		7.0		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	8353	0.6	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		219	4.0		5.3		6.0		3.2		4.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100	8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30	I	0	D	0	D	0	I	0	D	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5	52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50	3.5		2.6		2.5		2.4		2.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50	9.0		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50	10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60	4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5	521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5	87%	0.4	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22	948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10	93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3	79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2	186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80	9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999	6.7		6.3		6.3		5.7		6.1
RANK			1		3		2		5		4

Document Separator

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO

	WEIGHT		WHITING		CORPUS		P'COLA		MERIDIAN	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		15	0.6	3	1.3	[illegible]	0.2	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	[illegible]	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		5.3		4.5		3.4		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		34.00%	0.8	34.10%	0.8	33.00%	1.6	33.40%	0.7
1000/3 > 80?	10			1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		97.10%	0.9	98.00%	1.1	96.00%	0.8	98.20%	0.3
% TIME CROSWND < 15KT	30		99.00%	2.7	94.00%	0.4	98.00%	2.3	99.60%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND > 25KT	10		0.10%	0.9	1.00%	0.3	0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		19.40%	[illegible]	22.20%	0.0	9.00%	0.7	18.10%	0.1
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		22.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	17.80%	0.1
WEATHER —		140		5.3		4.0		5.3		6.3
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		28511	4.3	57169	8.7	28445	4.3	42588	6.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	[illegible]	[illegible]	39.6	2.4	35.3	2.2	39	2.4
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		4.3		7.3		5.2		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	0.5	0.7	1	1.3
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		17.6	1.5	8	2.0	20	1.3	19.3	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		6000	0.7	8000	2.0	8002	2.0	8000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		[illegible]	[illegible]	4	5.5	[illegible]	5.0	[illegible]	5.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		35%	1.4	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		98%	1.7	92%	1.4	37%	1.5	93%	1.6
AIRFIELDS —		239		7.5		9.6		7.1		[illegible]
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		34137	0.6	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		46413	1.9	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		93438	1.2	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5
GRND TRNG FAC —		100		6.1		4.1		8.6		5.2
CVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	[illegible]	D	2.5	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2
COND OF HANGARS	5		96%	[illegible]	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.2		8.9		5.5		5.4
1 OTHR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5		0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
1 FLD < 30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
PROX OTHR SFT FAC —		20		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		8.7		6.8		4.0		10.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		205	0.6	162	0.5	504	1.8	99	0.3
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		338	0.0	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		80%	1.6	90%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	[illegible]
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		90%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	5	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		145	0.2	285	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5
SERVICES —		80		5.0		5.4		9.1		6.0
SCORE		999		6.4		6.8		6.4		5.8
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				6.5		6.7		5.4		6.7
RANK				3		5		3		[illegible]

	KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS		0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC		1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE		1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		5.8		3.8		3.8		5.8
1500/3 > 80?	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	45.70%	1.1	33.60%	[illegible]	31.90%	2.4	39.40%	1.9
1000/3 > 80?		1.0		1.0		1.0		[illegible]
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	90.00%	1.3	90.00%	1.3	94.00%	1.9	91.80%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND < 15KT	95.00%	0.8	98.40%	2.4	97.50%	2.0	97.80%	2.2
% TIME CROSWND > 25KT	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10.00%	0.7	15.00%	[illegible]	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	11.00%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	22.80%	0.0	23.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		6.1		6.3		6.5		6.0
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	62724	9.5	85447	13.0	29144	4.4	36084	5.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	37.5	2.3	35.2	4.0	32.3	2.0	36.1	2.2
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	5	1.6	3	1.9	26	0.0	20	0.5
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		7.5		9.9		3.8		5.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	26	1.0	20	1.3	33	0.6	26	1.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	8000	2.0	8353	2.0	13100	2.0	9200	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	4.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	100%	2.0	56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	35%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	38%	[illegible]
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	100%	1.7	[illegible]	[illegible]	100%	1.7	37%	[illegible]
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0
AIRFIELDS —		[illegible]		5.8		8.1		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	26852	0.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	100%	1.0	93%	0.8	100%	1.0	96%	0.9
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	47000	1.9	68423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9
CONDITION OTHER FAC	64%	0.3	79%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5
GRND TRNG FAC —		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7
CVL MAINT OPS		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	DA	[illegible]
AMT ADQ HANGARS	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	56859	[illegible]
COND OF HANGARS	97%	0.4	52%	[illegible]	100%	0.5	64%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		5.4		4.9		5.4		5.9
1 OTHR PRI PILOT FLD		0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD		0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD < 30MILES		0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SFT FAC —		10.0		5.0		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0%	1.5	[illegible]	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	0%	0.5	19%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	209	0.0	521	0.0	3074	0.6	442	0.0
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	80%	1.6	70%	1.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	245	0.1	348	[illegible]	1287	0.6	230	0.1
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	180	[illegible]	186	[illegible]	74	0.4	30	0.4
SERVICES —		5.5		[illegible]		9.2		[illegible]
SCORE		[illegible]		[illegible]		6.2		6.9
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA		[illegible]		6.7		6.2		5.7
RANK		[illegible]		[illegible]		10		5

	REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		3.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	31.50%	2.3	30.90%	2.2	29.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?		1.0		1.0		[illegible]
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	93.60%	1.3	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	[illegible]
% TIME CROSWND < 15KT	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.9	99.20%	2.8
% TIME CROSWND > 25KT	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		4.4		7.9		6.5
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	31116	4.7	53868	8.2	45092	6.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	42.6	2.6	31.5	1.9	39.5	2.4
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		5.2		6.7		6.4
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	17	1.5	21.5	1.2	43	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10500	2.0	9858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	45%	[illegible]	35%	[illegible]	100%	[illegible]
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	92%	[illegible]	59%	[illegible]	100%	[illegible]
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	37%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	[illegible]
AIRFIELDS —		7.5		[illegible]		7.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	59489	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRND TRNG FAC —		6.6		6.4		6.3
CVL MAINT OPS	D	2.5		[illegible]	D	[illegible]
AMT ADQ HANGARS	47685	[illegible]	151346	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
COND OF HANGARS	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	[illegible]
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRI PILOT FLD	Y	0.5		0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD < 30MILES	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SFT FAC —		5.0		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	[illegible]
%INCOMPAT APZII	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		8.9		10.0		9.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	462	0.0	400	0.0	590	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	400	0.2	654	0.3	212	[illegible]
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	216	[illegible]	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		5.1		5.6		7.2
SCORE		6.2		[illegible]		[illegible]
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA		6.1		7.1		5.9
RANK		11		2		4

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATION AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		23.00%	0.0	10.86%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		4.2		4.8		8.1		6.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		26007	8.2	29016	9.2	41056	13.0	22358	7.1
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	25	2.5	40.8	4.0	16.6	1.6	31.5	3.1
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		6.2		7.7		8.7		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	21.5	1.9	43	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		9.5		9.3		8.5		9.1
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		9.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		7.5		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	590	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	312	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		999		7.4		7.8		8.3		7.8
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				7.3		7.4		8.4		7.6
RANK				4		3		1		2

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	1.0	99.20%	1.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		23.00%	0.0	10.86%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		4.2		4.8		6.8		5.3
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		26007	8.2	29016	9.2	41056	13.0	22358	7.1
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	25	2.5	40.8	4.0	16.6	1.6	31.5	3.1
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		6.2		7.7		8.7		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	21.5	1.9	43	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		9.5		9.3		8.5		9.1
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		9.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		7.5		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		999		7.3		7.8		8.1		7.6
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				7.2		7.4		8.2		7.4
RANK				4		2		1		3

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.3	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	5		19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	15		80	0.7	50	1.1	15	1.5	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		23.00%	0.0	17.00%	0.2	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		140		4.4		5.4		6.8		4.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		26007	8.2	29016	9.2	41056	13.0	22358	7.1
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	25	2.5	40.8	4.0	16.6	1.6	31.5	3.1
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		6.2		7.7		8.7		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	21.5	1.9	43	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		9.5		9.3		8.5		9.1
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		9.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		7.5		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		6.2		6.3		7.9		8.6
SCORE		999		7.3		7.8		8.1		7.4
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				7.2		7.4		8.2		7.2
RANK				4		2		1		3

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATION AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		3.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		98.40%	2.6	97.80%	2.3	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	1.0	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		15.00%	0.3	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		19.00%	0.1	23.00%	0.0	10.86%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		140		6.4		6.1		4.8		8.1		6.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		85447	13.0	44861	6.8	42068	6.4	53868	8.2	45092	6.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	65.2	4.0	39.2	2.4	50.8	3.1	31.5	1.9	39.5	2.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		9.9		5.6		6.1		6.7		6.4
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		20	1.9	26	1.8	17	2.0	21.5	1.9	43	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		8353	2.0	9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		7.2		9.5		8.9		8.5		9.1
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		8.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		5.0		7.5		7.5		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		87%	1.7	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		8.3		6.9		6.4		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.7		7.4		7.1		7.6		7.5
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				5.5		7.1		6.8		7.5		7.2
RANK				1		4		5		2		3

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		3.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10		98.40%	0.9	97.80%	0.8	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	1.0	99.20%	1.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	1.0	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		15.00%	1.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		19.00%	0.1	23.00%	0.0	10.86%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		140		5.7		5.0		4.8		6.8		5.3
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		85447	13.0	44861	6.8	42068	6.4	53868	8.2	45092	6.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	65.2	4.0	39.2	2.4	50.8	3.1	31.5	1.9	39.5	2.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		9.9		5.6		6.1		6.7		6.4
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		20	1.9	26	1.8	17	2.0	21.5	1.9	43	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		8353	2.0	9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		7.2		9.5		8.9		8.5		9.1
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		8.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y-	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		5.0		7.5		7.5		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		87%	0.4	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.7		7.2		7.1		7.4		7.4
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				5.5		6.9		6.7		7.3		7.0
RANK				1		4		5		2		3

Document Separator

PANEL NAVIGATOR

	WEIGHT	CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50	N	0.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —	50		0.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 907	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15	74.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	72.60%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	85.10%	0.5	83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	91.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25	1.00%	0.7	0.00%	2.5	0.00%	2.5	0.10%	2.3	0.10%	2.3	0.30%	2.0	0.20%	2.1	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	2.3	0.10%	2.3
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	9.00%	0.4	9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5	9.00%	0.4	10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —	70		3.5		6.0		5.2		5.6		5.0		5.7		5.8		3.1		5.9		4.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	80	9	3.1	9	3.1	5	1.7	9	3.1	14	4.9	15	5.2	23	8.0	9	3.1	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —	220		7.8		7.8		7.2		7.8		7.7		8.7		8.2		7.8		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50	8000	1.7	8200	2.0	8000	1.7	8000	1.7	8353	2.3	13100	5.0	9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	A	2	E	5	B	4	K	6	B	4	E	5	B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	66%	2.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30	36%	1.1	53%	1.6	100%	3.0	95%	2.9	27%	0.8	100%	3.0	88%	2.6	29%	0.9	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	51%	1.0	100%	2.0	97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20	82%	1.6	87%	1.7	93%	1.9	74%	1.5	40%	0.8	77%	1.5	56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —	230		5.4		7.1		7.2		7.8		5.2		8.9		7.6		7.4		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55	48549	1.4	184423	5.5	20385	0.6	41826	1.2	135526	4.0	76822	2.3	26652	0.8	59469	1.8	68320	2.0	84459	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25	92%	2.3	99%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	93%	2.1	100%	2.5	96%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55	22239	1.6	40091	2.9	50224	3.7	47000	3.4	66423	4.9	7737	0.6	75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25	20000	0.4	113783	2.5	28380	0.6	15782	0.3	36060	0.8	48349	1.1	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	16	100%	1.5	100%	1.5	100%	1.5	84%	1.3	78%	1.2	99%	1.5	100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —	200		4.9		8.7		5.7		5.6		7.7		5.2		7.0		6.9		6.6		6.5
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151016	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —	50		8.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		4.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —	50		6.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20	92%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	90%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	246	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —	80		5.5		9.1		6.0		5.6		7.7		9.2		6.3		6.1		6.6		7.2
SCORE	1000		5.9		7.6		7.0		7.2		6.9		7.7		7.5		7.2		6.8		7.6
RANK			10		2		7		6		8		1		4		5		9		3

PANEL NAVIGATOR
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50		Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15		83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25		0.90%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	2.5	0.10%	2.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5		23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		70		4.0		3.1		6.1		4.3
# MTR'S AVAIL	80		23	8.0	9	3.1	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60		0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40		N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		8.2		7.8		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50		9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30		88%	2.6	98%	2.9	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20		97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20		56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —		230		7.6		8.3		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55		26652	1.7	59469	3.9	68320	4.4	84459	5.5
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25		86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55		75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25		100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25		68639	2.5	51572	1.9	19365	0.7	17029	0.6
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15		100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —		200		7.9		8.3		8.0		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151016	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		1000		7.7		7.9		7.4		8.2
RANK				3		2		4		1

PANEL NAVIGATOR
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50		Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15		83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	25		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORT'E PLAN FCTR	5		23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		70		3.0		3.1		3.6		1.4
# MTR'S AVAIL	80		23	8.0	9	3.1	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60		0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40		N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		8.2		7.8		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50		9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30		88%	2.6	98%	2.9	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20		97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20		56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —		230		7.6		8.3		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55		26652	1.7	59469	3.9	68320	4.4	84459	5.5
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25		86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55		75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25		100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25		68639	2.5	51572	1.9	19365	0.7	17029	0.6
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15		100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —		200		7.9		8.3		8.0		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151016	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		1000		7.6		7.9		7.2		8.0
RANK				3		2		4		1

PANEL NAVIGATOR
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50		Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15		83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	5		19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	15		80	0.7	50	1.1	15	1.5	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	25		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5		23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		85		3.1		3.9		4.8		1.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	80		23	8.0	9	3.1	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60		0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40		N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		8.2		7.8		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50		9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30		88%	2.6	98%	2.9	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20		97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20		56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —		230		7.6		8.3		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55		26652	1.7	59469	3.9	68320	4.4	84459	5.5
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25		86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55		75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25		100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25		68639	2.5	51572	1.9	19365	0.7	17029	0.6
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15		100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —		200		7.9		8.3		8.0		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151016	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		6.2		6.3		7.9		8.6
SCORE		1015		7.6		8.0		7.3		7.9
RANK				3		1		4		2

PANEL NAVIGATOR
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50		Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25		0.10%	2.5	0.20%	2.1	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	2.5	0.10%	2.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		15.00%	0.2	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5		20.00%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		70		5.2		5.8		3.1		6.1		4.3
# MTR'S AVAIL	80		14	4.9	23	8.0	14	4.9	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60		0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40		N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20		N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		7.7		8.2		8.6		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50		8353	2.3	9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		66%	2.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30		27%	0.8	88%	2.6	32%	1.0	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20		51%	1.0	97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20		40%	0.8	56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —		230		5.2		7.6		7.4		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55		135526	5.5	26652	1.1	59469	2.4	68320	2.8	84459	3.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25		83%	2.1	86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55		66423	4.9	75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25		100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25		36060	1.3	68639	2.5	51572	1.9	19365	0.7	17029	0.6
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15		78%	1.2	100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —		200		8.7		7.6		7.6		7.1		7.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151016	0.9
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		6.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		87%	1.7	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		8.3		6.9		6.4		7.1		8.2
SCORE		1000		7.2		7.8		7.7		7.1		7.9
RANK				4		2		3		5		1

PANEL NAVIGATOR
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50		Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	25		15.00%	0.8	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5		20.00%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		70		3.3		3.3		3.1		3.6		1.4
# MTR'S AVAIL	80		14	4.9	23	8.0	14	4.9	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60		0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40		N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20		N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20		Y	0.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		7.7		8.2		8.6		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50		8353	2.3	9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		66%	2.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30		27%	0.8	88%	2.6	32%	1.0	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20		51%	1.0	97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20		40%	0.8	56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —		230		5.2		7.6		7.4		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55		135526	5.5	26652	1.1	59469	2.4	68320	2.8	84459	3.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25		83%	2.1	86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55		66423	4.9	75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25		100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25		36060	1.3	68639	2.5	51572	1.9	19365	0.7	17029	0.6
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15		78%	1.2	100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —		200		8.7		7.6		7.6		7.1		7.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151016	0.9
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		6.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		87%	0.4	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		1000		7.2		7.5		7.6		6.9		7.7
RANK				4		3		2		5		1

Document Separator

MARITIME E2/C2

	WEIGHT		WHITING		CORPUS		PCOLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LA[illegible]		[illegible]	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	15		15	1.9	3	0.5	5	0.6	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	[illegible]
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	[illegible]	1.5	[illegible]	1.5	[illegible]	1.5	[illegible]	1.5	Y	1.5	[illegible]	1.5	[illegible]	[illegible]
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	[illegible]	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	[illegible]
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	[illegible]	0.5	Y	0.5	[illegible]	0.5	Y	0.5	[illegible]	0.5	[illegible]	0.5	[illegible]	[illegible]
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	[illegible]	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	[illegible]
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		80		6.5		5.0		4.4		5.4		6.3		5.4		5.4		6.3		5.4		6.3		6.4
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	[illegible]	1.0	Y	1.0	[illegible]	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	[illegible]	1.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		84.00%	0.5	84.10%	0.5	83.00%	0.4	83.40%	0.5	95.70%	1.8	83.60%	0.5	91.90%	1.6	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	[illegible]
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	[illegible]	1.0	[illegible]	1.0		[illegible]	Y	1.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.0	[illegible]	1.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		97.10%	0.5	88.00%	0.5	96.00%	0.4	98.20%	0.4	90.00%	0.7	90.00%	0.7	94.00%	0.9	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	[illegible]
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20		99.00%	1.8	94.00%	0.2	98.00%	1.5	99.60%	2.0	95.00%	0.6	98.40%	1.6	97.50%	1.3	97.80%	1.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	1.9	99.20%	[illegible]
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	1.00%	0.5	0.00%	0.5	1.00%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.30%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	[illegible]
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		19.40%	0.0	9.00%	0.4	3.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.30%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.30%	[illegible]
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	[illegible]
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		22.00%	0.0	9.00%	0.4	10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	[illegible]
WEATHER —		90		5.9		4.0		6.1		6.1		5.7		6.0		[illegible]		6.6		5.5		7.6		[illegible]
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		138008	13.5	137659	13.5	137656	13.5	42588	4.2	143213	14.0	85447	8.4	29144	2.8	36084	3.5	31116	3.0	53868	5.3	45092	4.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSPCE	20		43.2	1.0	22.5	2.0	55	0.5	39	1.2	38.9	1.2	65.2	0.0	12.3	1.5	36.1	1.4	42.6	1.1	31.5	1.6	39.5	[illegible]
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		7	0.7	9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	[illegible]
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	[illegible]
COMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	[illegible]	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	[illegible]
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.9	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	[illegible]
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240		7.8		8.8		8.2		4.5		8.6		6.2		3.4		4.7		3.8		5.2		4.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		15	1.0	30	2.0	5	0.3	[illegible]	0.7	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.7	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	0.7	[illegible]	0.7	[illegible]	0.7	[illegible]	[illegible]
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		5	1.0	[illegible]	2.0	5	1.0	[illegible]	2.0	[illegible]	2.0	0	0.0	[illegible]	2.0	0	0.0	[illegible]	0.0	[illegible]	0.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		17.6	0.8	3	1.0	20	0.8	19.3	0.8	26	[illegible]	20	0.8	81	0.0	26	[illegible]	17	0.8	21.5	0.7	43	[illegible]
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	[illegible]	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	[illegible]	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	[illegible]	1.0	[illegible]	1.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		6000	0.3	8000	1.0	8002	1.0	8000	1.0	8000	[illegible]	8353	1.0	13100	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	[illegible]
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	[illegible]		4	6	4	5.5	3	5.0	3	5.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	3	4.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	6.0	[illegible]	6.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	[illegible]
%TAXI/APPRNS ADQ COND	15		95%	1.4	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	98%	1.3	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	[illegible]
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		100%	1.7	100%	[illegible]	100%	[illegible]	100%	1.7	100%	[illegible]	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.5	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	[illegible]
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	[illegible]		98%	1.7	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	93%	1.6	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	30%	1.0	76%	[illegible]
AIRFIELDS —		219		7.8		6.7		7.3		8.3		[illegible]		5.3		9.1		7.9		7.2		6.7		[illegible]
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		34137	0.6	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	[illegible]	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	28652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	34459	[illegible]
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	93%	0.8	100%	1.0	98%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	[illegible]
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		46413	1.9	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	33354	[illegible]
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	[illegible]	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	[illegible]
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		93438	1.2	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	[illegible]	38060	0.5	48349	0.6	68839	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	[illegible]
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	[illegible]	[illegible]	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	[illegible]
GRND TRNG FAC —		100		[illegible]		[illegible]		8.6		5.2		[illegible]		7.5		[illegible]		[illegible]		6.6		6.4		[illegible]
LVL MAINT OPS	30		D	2.5	DA	3		2		2		2		2		2	D	2.5	D	2.5	[illegible]	2	[illegible]	[illegible]
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	[illegible]
COND OF HANGARS	5		86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	64%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	[illegible]
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		[illegible]		9.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		5.9		5.8		4.7		[illegible]
1 OTHR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	[illegible]	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	[illegible]	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	[illegible]	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	[illegible]
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	[illegible]
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		5.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	[illegible]
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	[illegible]
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	[illegible]
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	[illegible]	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	19%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		9.0		7.4		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.0		5.6		8.8		9.1		10.0		[illegible]
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		205	0.6	162	0.5	304	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	[illegible]
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	98%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	[illegible]
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		338	0.0	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	[illegible]	209	[illegible]	521	0.0	8074	[illegible]	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	[illegible]
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	[illegible]
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		80%	1.6	90%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	[illegible]	[illegible]	97%	[illegible]	90%	1.8	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	[illegible]
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		330	0.2	439	0.2	587	0.3	520	0.2	245	[illegible]	348	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	554	0.3	812	[illegible]
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		80%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	[illegible]	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	[illegible]
# CHLD CAR WAIT LIST	5		25	0.4	197	0.0	69	[illegible]	6	[illegible]	53	[illegible]	79	0.3	42	0.4	[illegible]	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	[illegible]
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		145	0.2	265	0.0	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	180	[illegible]	196	[illegible]	74	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	216	[illegible]	150	[illegible]	12	[illegible]
SERVICES —		30		6.0		[illegible]		[illegible]		6.0		[illegible]		[illegible]		9.2		5.7		6.1		5.6		[illegible]
SCORE		999		7.4		7.5		7.4		6.6		[illegible]		6.4		6.5		6.8		6.0		6.5		[illegible]
RANK				3		2		4		[illegible]				10		[illegible]		5		11		8		[illegible]

MARITIME E2/C2
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT	VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	60		6.3		6.3		6.3		5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20	93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.90%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---	90		5.0		5.8		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140	26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	30	22	3.0	9	1.2	10	1.4	11	1.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	240		6.7		6.2		9.2		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	26	0.7	17	1.0	21.5	0.8	43	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---	219		8.5		9.2		7.4		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	50		9.0		9.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---	60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6	230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5	1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---	80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE	999		7.5		7.7		8.1		7.6
RANK			4		2		1		3

MARITIME E2/C2
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT	VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL		
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60	6.3		6.3		6.3			5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%		1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y		1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%		0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5	93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%		0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.90%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%		0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%		0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N		0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%		0.0
WEATHER ---		90	5.0		5.9		6.3			5.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150	26007	9.5	29016	10.6	41056	15.0	22358		8.2
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5		0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	22	2.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11		1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%		2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N		1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2		1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240	6.6		6.3		9.4			6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1		2.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0		0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y		1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	26	0.7	17	1.0	21.5	0.8	43		0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y		1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000		1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C		6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%		2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%		1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%		1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%		1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219	8.5		9.2		7.4			8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459		3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%		1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354		2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%		1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029		0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%		0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100	7.8		8.2		7.8			8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D		2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102		1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%		0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50	8.6		8.4		7.4			8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y		2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y		2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y		0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N		0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50	9.0		9.0		5.0			9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y		3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y		1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y		1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50	10.0		10.0		10.0			10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y		1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%		2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%		0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%		0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N		0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y		0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60	6.7		9.0		10.0			7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264		2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%		1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690		0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%		0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%		0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22	230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812		2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%		1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3	1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4		0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14		0.2
SERVICES ---		80	7.4		6.7		8.5			9.9
SCORE		999	7.4		7.7		8.0			7.5
RANK			4		2		1			3

MARITIME E2/C2
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		6.3		6.3		6.3		5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	39.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
FREEZING PRECIP DAYS	5		19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	20		80	1.0	50	1.5	15	2.0	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —		105		4.8		6.0		6.8		4.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150		26007	9.5	29016	10.6	41056	15.0	22358	8.2
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.5	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		22	2.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240		6.6		6.3		9.4		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		26	0.7	17	1.0	21.5	0.8	43	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		219		8.5		9.2		7.4		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50		9.0		9.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		6.2		6.3		7.9		8.6
SCORE		1014		7.4		7.8		8.1		7.3
RANK				3		2		1		4

MARITIME E2/C2
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANCOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		5.4		6.3		6.3		6.3		5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20		98.40%	1.7	97.80%	1.5	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.90%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		15.00%	0.2	0.20%	0.5	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		20.00%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90		6.1		7.3		5.8		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		85447	14.0	44861	7.4	42068	6.9	53868	8.8	45092	7.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39.2	1.5	50.8	0.9	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		18	1.7	32	3.0	14	1.3	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240		8.5		6.2		5.4		6.8		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	0.9	26	0.7	17	1.0	21.5	0.8	43	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219		6.0		8.5		8.8		7.4		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		7.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50		9.0		9.0		9.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		19%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		87%	1.7	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.3		6.9		6.4		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.3		7.5		7.2		7.3		7.4
RANK				3		1		5		4		2

MARITIME E2/C2
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.4		6.3		6.3		6.3		5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		15.00%	0.7	23.30%	0.0	19.30%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		20.00%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	10.36%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —		90		5.3		5.5		5.9		6.3		5.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150		85447	15.0	44861	7.9	43068	7.6	53868	9.5	45092	7.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39.2	1.5	50.8	0.9	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		18	1.1	32	2.0	14	0.9	10	0.6	11	0.7
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240		8.7		6.0		5.5		7.0		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	0.9	26	0.7	17	1.0	21.5	0.8	43	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	35%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		219		6.0		8.5		8.8		7.4		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		7.6		7.5		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50		9.0		9.0		9.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		19%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		87%	0.4	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.4		7.2		7.2		7.2		7.3
RANK				1		3		4		5		2

Document Separator

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSIONS, CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	7.3	6.9	6.1	6.78	
LAUGHLIN AFB	7.5	6.4	5.4	6.42	
RANDOLPH AFB	7.2	7.3	6.7	7.06	
REESE AFB	6.9	7.0	5.6	6.49	YELLOW-
VANCE AFB	7.3	7.2	5.3	6.61	YELLOW+

AVERAGE	6.67
STD DEV	0.229823797

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSIONS; CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED; AND WEIGHTING ADJUSTED

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	7.1	6.1	6.6	6.59	
LAUGHLIN AFB	7.2	5.7	5.9	6.25	
RANDOLPH AFB	7.2	6.7	6.7	6.86	
REESE AFB	6.9	6.3	6.2	6.46	YELLOW+
VANCE AFB	6.9	6.3	5.6	6.25	

AVERAGE	6.48
STD DEV	0.22934106

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSION; CALCULATIONS AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED; AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	6.9	5.8	6.5	6.40	YELLOW
LAUGHLIN AFB	8.0	6.3	6.5	6.93	
RANDOLPH AFB	6.5	5.7	5.8	6.00	
REESE AFB	7.3	6.7	6.6	6.86	
VANCE AFB	7.1	6.5	5.7	6.43	YELLOW+

AVERAGE	6.52
STD DEV	0.336407939

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSIONS, CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED WITH ICING INCLUDED

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	6.9	5.9	6.5	6.43	YELLOW
LAUGHLIN AFB	8.0	6.3	6.6	6.96	
RANDOLPH AFB	6.5	5.7	5.8	6.00	
REESE AFB	7.3	6.7	6.6	6.86	
VANCE AFB	7.1	6.5	5.8	6.46	YELLOW+

AVERAGE	6.54
STD DEV	0.341786923

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSION; CALCULATIONS AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED; WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED; AIRSPACE DATA ZEROED

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	6.1	5.0	6.8	5.98	
LAUGHLIN AFB	6.4	4.6	6.0	5.65	YELLOW-
RANDOLPH AFB	6.1	5.4	6.5	6.01	
REESE AFB	6.3	5.6	6.7	6.18	
VANCE AFB	5.9	5.2	5.5	5.55	

AVERAGE	5.87
STD DEV	0.233203494

PRIMARY

	WEIGHT		WHITING		CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1.5	0.6	3	1.3	0.5	0.2	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		5.3		3.5		4.4		4.8		5.8		4.8		4.8		5.8		4.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		84.00%	0.8	84.10%	0.8	83.00%	0.6	83.40%	0.7	85.70%	1.1	83.60%	0.7	91.90%	2.4	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		87.10%	0.9	88.00%	1.1	86.00%	0.8	86.20%	0.8	90.00%	1.3	90.00%	1.3	94.00%	1.9	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		99.00%	2.7	94.00%	0.4	98.00%	2.3	99.60%	3.0	95.00%	0.8	98.40%	2.4	97.50%	2.0	97.80%	2.2	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.9	99.20%	2.8
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	0.9	1.00%	0.3	0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		19.40%	0.0	22.20%	0.0	9.00%	0.7	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.7	15.00%	0.3	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		22.00%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	22.80%	0.0	22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		140		5.3		4.1		5.3		6.3		6.1		6.3		6.5		6.0		4.4		7.9		6.5
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		28511	4.0	57169	8.0	28445	4.0	42588	6.0	62724	8.8	85447	12.0	29144	4.1	36084	5.1	31116	4.4	53868	7.6	45092	6.3
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		27.7	2.0	39.6	1.4	35.3	1.6	39	1.4	37.5	1.5	65.2	0.0	32.3	1.8	36.1	1.6	42.6	1.2	31.5	1.8	39.5	1.4
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		21	2.0	9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		5.2		6.9		5.2		5.8		7.2		6.4		4.4		5.9		4.8		6.8		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	0.5	0.7	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0.5	1.0	1	2.0	0.5	1.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		18	0.9	8	1.0	20	0.9	19	0.9	26	0.8	20	0.9	33	0.7	26	0.8	17	0.9	22	0.8	43	0.6
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		6000	0.3	8000	1.0	8002	1.0	8000	1.0	8000	1.0	8353	1.0	13100	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		K	6	H	5.5	E	5.0	E	5.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		95%	1.4	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	88%	1.3	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		98%	1.7	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	93%	1.6	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		7.6		8.8		6.9		7.9		8.2		5.2		7.8		7.6		6.9		6.5		7.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		34137	0.6	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		46413	1.9	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		93438	1.2	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		6.1		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151348	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5		86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.2		8.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		4.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		5.0		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		8.7		6.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		205	0.6	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		338	0.0	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		80%	1.6	90%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		80%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	8	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		145	0.2	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	218	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		6.0		5.4		8.1		6.0		5.6		7.7		9.2		6.3		6.1		6.6		7.2
SCORE		999		6.6		6.7		6.4		6.8		7.0		6.7		6.3		6.8		6.0		7.0		6.8
RANK				8		6		9		4		1		7		10		5		11		2		3

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA AND CALCULATIONS ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		4.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		98.40%	2.6	97.80%	2.3	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	1.0	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		15.00%	0.3	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		19.00%	0.1	22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		140		6.4		6.1		4.4		8.1		6.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		85447	12.0	44861	6.3	42068	5.9	53868	7.6	45092	6.3
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		18	1.7	32	3.0	14	1.3	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		8.4		6.3		5.4		6.9		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		6.4		8.7		8.9		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.5		6.6		7.4		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		87%	1.7	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		8.3		6.9		6.4		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.2		7.3		6.9		7.5		7.3
RANK				4		3		5		1		2

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA, CALCULATIONS & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		4.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	50		15.00%	1.7	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.1	18.00%	0.7	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		19.00%	0.0	22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		5.1		4.5		4.4		5.9		4.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		85447	14.0	44861	7.4	42068	6.9	53868	8.8	45092	7.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		18	0.6	32	1.0	14	0.4	10	0.3	11	0.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		8.8		5.9		5.4		7.2		6.4
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		6.4		8.7		8.9		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		6.6		7.4		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		87%	0.4	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		7.2		6.9		6.9		7.2		7.1
RANK				2		4		5		1		3

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & CALCULATIONS, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		4.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	50		15.00%	5.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	2.1	18.00%	3.2	22.90%	0.2
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		19.00%	0.5	22.30%	0.3	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.5	26.00%	0.1
WEATHER ---		140		7.8		4.7		5.9		8.1		4.8
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		9761	3.3	28346	9.7	27658	9.4	41054	14.0	20547	7.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		43.4	0.0	12.2	2.0	31.9	0.7	16.6	1.7	32.9	0.7
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		18	0.6	32	1.0	14	0.4	10	0.3	11	0.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		3.9		7.1		6.5		9.4		5.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		6.4		8.7		8.9		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		6.6		7.4		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		999		6.5		7.1		7.3		8.0		6.9
RANK				5		3		2		1		4

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & CALCULATIONS, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
WITH ICING INCLUDED

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		4.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
FRZNG PRECIP DAYS	5		2	0.5	19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	5		15	0.5	80	0.2	50	0.4	15	0.5	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	40		15.00%	4.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	1.7	18.00%	2.6	22.90%	0.2
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		19.00%	0.5	22.30%	0.3	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.5	26.00%	0.1
WEATHER ---		140		7.8		4.9		5.9		8.3		5.0
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		9761	3.3	28346	9.7	27658	9.4	41054	14.0	20547	7.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		43.4	0.0	12.2	2.0	31.9	0.7	16.6	1.7	32.9	0.7
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		18	0.6	32	1.0	14	0.4	10	0.3	11	0.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		3.9		7.1		6.5		9.4		5.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		6.4		8.7		8.9		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		6.6		7.4		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		999		6.5		7.1		7.3		8.0		6.9
RANK				5		3		2		1		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER

	WEIGHT	CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —	60		2.5		7.1		5.4		6.3		5.4		3.3		6.3		5.4		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 90?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	84.10%	0.5	83.00%	0.4	83.40%	0.5	85.70%	0.8	83.60%	0.5	91.90%	1.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 90?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	88.00%	0.5	86.00%	0.4	86.20%	0.4	90.00%	0.7	90.00%	0.7	94.00%	0.9	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20	94.00%	0.3	98.00%	1.6	96.60%	1.1	96.00%	0.6	98.40%	1.7	97.50%	1.4	97.80%	1.5	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	1.00%	0.1	0.00%	0.5	0.00%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.30%	0.4	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	9.00%	0.4	9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=6%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=6%	5	9.00%	0.4	10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	26.50%	0.0
WEATHER —	90		4.7		6.2		5.1		5.7		6.1		7.0		6.6		4.9		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140	137659	13.5	137656	13.5	42588	4.2	143213	14.0	86447	8.4	29144	2.8	36094	3.5	31116	3.0	53868	5.3	45092	4.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	22.5	2.0	55	0.5	39	1.2	38.9	1.2	66.2	0.0	32.3	1.5	36.1	1.4	42.6	1.1	31.5	1.6	39.5	1.2
# MTR'S AVAIL	30	9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB WIN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —	240		8.8		8.2		4.5		8.6		6.2		3.4		4.7		3.8		5.2		4.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	0	0.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	101	0.0	20	1.0	19.3	1.0	26	0.9	20	1.0	89	0.1	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	8000	0.5	8002	0.5	8000	0.5	8000	0.5	8363	0.6	13100	1.0	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8968	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	A	2.0	E	5.0	B	4.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	96%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	95%	1.7	96%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	36%	0.6	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	96%	1.3	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	100%	1.7	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	67%	1.5	50%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —	219		4.6		8.4		8.4		9.0		5.9		9.4		7.1		6.9		5.0		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20365	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84469	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	96%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	26360	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	69639	0.8	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —	100		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30	DA	3	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156856	0.1	147686	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	64%	0.3	48%	0.2	67%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —	50		9.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		5.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —	50		10.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		8.0		9.0		5.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	26%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	19%	0.3	2%	0.5	19%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —	60		7.4		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.1		5.6		8.8		9.1		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	182	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	568	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	96%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	6	90%	0.5	100%	0.6	90%	0.5	80%	0.5	87%	0.5	80%	0.5	70%	0.4	93%	0.6	87%	0.5	87%	0.5
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	4	439	0.1	687	0.2	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.3	1287	0.4	230	0.1	400	0.1	654	0.2	812	0.3
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	20	100%	2.0	78%	1.6	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	93%	1.9	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	6	197	0.0	69	0.4	6	0.6	53	0.4	79	0.4	42	0.6	1	0.6	37	0.5	6	0.6	4	0.6
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	4	265	0.0	113	0.2	10	0.4	180	0.1	196	0.1	74	0.3	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.4
SERVICES —	80		6.7		7.8		6.5		6.2		7.9		9.6		7.0		6.4		7.0		7.6
SCORE	999		6.5		7.6		6.6		7.7		6.5		6.5		6.7		6.0		5.8		6.3
RANK			6		1		4		2		5		7		3		9		10		8

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & CALCULATIONS, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
AIRSPACE ZEROED OUT

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		4.8		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		83.60%	0.7	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		90.00%	1.3	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	50		15.00%	5.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	2.1	18.00%	3.2	22.90%	0.2
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		19.00%	0.5	22.30%	0.3	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.5	26.00%	0.1
WEATHER ---		140		7.8		4.7		5.9		8.1		4.8
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	0		9761	0.0	28346	0.0	27658	0.0	41054	0.0	20547	0.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	0		43.4	0.0	12.2	0.0	31.9	0.0	16.6	0.0	32.9	0.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		18	0.6	32	1.0	14	0.4	10	0.3	11	0.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		60		8.8		6.7		7.1		8.2		8.6
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		6.4		8.7		8.9		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		6.6		7.4		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		4.0		7.9		8.8		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		839		6.1		5.9		6.3		6.4		6.1
RANK				3		5		2		1		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		5.4		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20		98.40%	1.7	97.80%	1.5	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		15.00%	0.2	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		20.00%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90		6.1		6.7		5.3		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		85447	14.0	44861	7.4	42068	6.9	53868	8.8	45092	7.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		18	1.7	32	3.0	14	1.3	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240		8.5		6.2		5.4		6.8		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.6	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219		5.9		7.1		7.9		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.5		7.6		7.4		6.4		7.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50		9.0		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	6		87%	0.5	70%	0.4	93%	0.6	87%	0.5	87%	0.5
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	4		948	0.4	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.3
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	20		93%	1.9	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	6		79	0.0	1	0.6	37	0.3	6	0.6	4	0.6
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	4		186	0.1	30	0.3	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.4
SERVICES ---		80		8.4		7.7		6.7		7.5		8.4
SCORE		999		7.3		7.2		7.0		6.4		6.9
RANK				1		2		3		5		3

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.4		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		15.00%	0.7	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		20.00%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.3	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —		90		5.3		5.4		5.3		6.3		5.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150		85447	15.0	44861	7.9	42068	7.4	53868	9.5	45092	7.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.2	0.0	39	1.6	51	0.8	31.5	2.0	39.5	1.5
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		18	1.1	32	2.0	14	0.9	10	0.6	11	0.7
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240		8.7		6.0		5.4		7.0		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.6	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		219		4.0		5.3		6.0		3.2		4.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	D	0	D	0	I	0	D	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		3.5		2.6		2.4		2.4		2.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50		9.0		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		87%	0.4	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		999		6.7		6.3		6.3		5.7		6.1
RANK				1		3		2		5		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED

	WEIGHT	RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	60		5.4		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5	98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20	15.00%	2.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.8	18.00%	1.3	22.90%	0.1
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	20.00%	0.2	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.5	22.00%	0.1	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---	90		7.0		5.5		6.4		7.6		5.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150	9761	3.6	28346	10.4	27658	10.1	41056	15.0	20547	7.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	43.4	0.0	12.2	2.0	31.2	0.8	16.6	1.7	32.9	0.7
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	18	1.1	32	2.0	14	0.9	10	0.6	11	0.7
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	240		3.9		7.2		6.5		9.1		5.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	8353	0.6	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---	219		4.0		5.3		6.0		3.2		4.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30	I	0	D	0	D	0	I	0	D	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5	52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	50		3.5		2.6		2.4		2.4		2.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	50		9.0		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---	60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5	521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10	87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22	948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10	27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---	80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE	999		5.7		6.5		6.7		6.3		5.8
RANK			5		2		1		3		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
WITH ICING INCLUDED

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		5.4		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
FRZNG PRECIP DAYS	5		2	0.5	19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	5		15	0.5	80	0.2	50	0.4	15	0.5	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		15.00%	1.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.4	18.00%	0.6	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		20.00%	0.2	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.5	22.00%	0.1	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90		7.0		5.7		6.4		8.0		6.0
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150		9761	3.6	28346	10.4	27658	10.1	41056	15.0	20547	7.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		43.4	0.0	12.2	2.0	31.2	0.8	16.6	1.7	32.9	0.7
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		18	1.1	32	2.0	14	0.9	10	0.6	11	0.7
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240		3.9		7.2		6.5		9.1		5.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.6	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219		4.0		5.3		6.0		3.2		4.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	D	0	D	0	I	0	D	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238498	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		3.5		2.6		2.4		2.4		2.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50		9.0		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		999		5.7		6.5		6.7		6.3		5.9
RANK				5		2		1		3		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
AIRSPACE ZEROED OUT

	WEIGHT	RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60	5.4		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	83.60%	0.5	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	90.00%	0.7	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5	98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20	15.00%	2.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.8	18.00%	1.3	22.90%	0.1
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	20.00%	0.2	24.50%	0.0	10.86%	0.5	22.00%	0.1	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90	7.0		5.5		6.4		7.6		5.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	0	9761	0.0	28346	0.0	27658	0.0	41056	0.0	20547	0.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	0	43.4	0.0	12.2	0.0	31.2	0.0	16.6	0.0	32.9	0.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	18	1.1	32	2.0	14	0.9	10	0.6	11	0.7
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	3	1.7	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		70	8.3		7.1		6.7		7.5		7.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	20	1.0	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	8353	0.6	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	27%	0.4	88%	1.3	32%	0.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	51%	0.9	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	40%	0.7	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219	4.0		5.3		6.0		3.2		4.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100	8.7		7.4		7.4		6.9		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30	I	0	D	0	D	0	I	0	D	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5	52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50	3.5		2.6		2.4		2.4		2.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50	9.0		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50	10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60	4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5	521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10	87%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22	948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10	27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0	79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0	186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		80	8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		829	5.4		5.2		5.6		4.6		5.0
RANK			2		3		1		5		

BOMBER/FIGHTER

	WEIGHT		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		6.7		6.7		6.7		5.0		3.3		3.3		5.0		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		68.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	72.60%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	86.10%	0.7	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.00%	0.2	83.40%	0.2	86.70%	0.4	83.80%	0.2	91.90%	0.8	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	25		98.00%	1.9	99.80%	2.5	95.00%	0.7	98.40%	2.0	97.50%	1.7	97.80%	1.8	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.4	99.20%	2.3
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		100		5.3		6.4		5.1		4.9		5.9		5.8		3.7		6.3		4.9
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		135531	11.9	42585	3.7	136737	12.0	82318	7.2	35191	3.1	35644	3.1	30958	2.7	53249	4.7	45019	4.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	HI=MAX	57.1	0.2	38.9	0.8	39.6	0.8	65.1	0.0	32.9	1.0	36.4	0.9	43.9	0.7	31.9	1.0	39.7	0.8
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		9	1.2	5	0.7	9	1.2	14	1.8	15	2.0	23	3.0	9	1.2	6	0.8	10	1.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		0	2.0	3	1.8	3	1.8	3	1.8	28	0.0	19	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		8.8		5.2		7.7		6.6		4.1		3.9		3.2		4.1		5.9
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	1.0	19	1.0	26	0.9	20	1.0	89	0.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8002	0.0	8000	0.0	8000	0.0	8353	0.1	13100	1.0	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8958	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	K	6	B	4.0	C	8.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	66%	0.7	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	95%	0.9	95%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		53%	0.5	100%	1.0	95%	1.0	27%	0.3	100%	1.0	88%	0.9	29%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	51%	0.5	100%	1.0	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		97%	0.9	93%	0.9	74%	0.7	40%	0.4	77%	0.8	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		170		7.3		7.8		8.6		5.8		8.8		5.1		6.8		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		184423	3.0	20386	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	78822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84439	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	63%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63334	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	69639	0.9	51572	0.7	66067	0.9	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.8		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		289040	1.4	218457	1.1	301674	1.5	238496	1.2	219824	1.1	156958	0.8	147685	0.7	151346	0.8	151102	0.8
COND OF HANGARS	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.9		7.2		7.9		6.9		7.2		6.2		8.0		6.0		8.1
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.1		5.8		8.8		9.1		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		96%	1.0	96%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		100%	2.0	90%	1.8	90%	1.8	90%	1.8	90%	1.8	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		667	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1297	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	512	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		79%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		69	0.1	6	0.5	53	0.2	79	0.0	42	0.2	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		113	0.2	10	0.5	190	0.1	186	0.1	74	0.3	30	0.4	216	0.0	160	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		7.7		6.0		5.2		7.3		9.0		6.3		5.8		6.5		7.1
SCORE		1000		7.6		6.7		7.3		6.6		6.3		5.5		5.5		5.5		6.4
RANK				1		3		2		4		6		9		7		8		5

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS AND DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.0		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.60%	0.2	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	25		98.40%	2.1	97.80%	1.9	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.5	99.20%	2.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	1.0	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		15.00%	0.2	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		20.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		100		5.0		6.0		3.7		6.5		5.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		82318	12.0	44624	6.5	42343	6.2	53249	7.8	45089	6.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.1	0.0	39.7	0.8	52.1	0.4	31.9	1.0	39.7	0.8
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		14	1.8	23	3.0	14	1.8	6	0.8	10	1.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		8.3		4.9		4.5		5.2		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	20	1.0	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.1	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0	B	0.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		66%	0.7	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		27%	0.3	88%	0.9	32%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		170		3.5		2.8		5.1		2.2		3.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		7.8		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	I	0	DA	0	I	0	DA	0
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		3.5		2.6		2.4		2.4		2.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		521	0.5	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		90%	1.8	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		948	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.3	654	0.4	812	0.5
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		79	0.0	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		186	0.1	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		6.4		6.9		6.4		7.1		8.2
SCORE		1000		6.7		5.3		5.6		5.4		6.1
RANK				1		5		3		4		2

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.0		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.60%	0.2	89.40%	0.8	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		15.00%	1.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		20.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		100		3.7		4.0		3.7		4.4		2.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		82318	14.0	44624	7.6	42343	7.2	53249	9.1	45089	7.7
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		65.1	0.0	39.7	0.8	52.1	0.4	31.9	1.0	39.7	0.8
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		14	0.6	23	1.0	14	0.6	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		8.6		4.6		4.4		5.5		6.9
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	20	1.0	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.1	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		66%	0.7	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		27%	0.3	88%	0.9	32%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		170		3.5		5.1		7.4		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		7.8		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		3.5		6.6		8.4		6.4		8.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		90%	0.5	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		93%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		79	0.0	1	0.3	37	0.2	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		186	0.0	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		9.1		6.1		5.9		7.1		8.2
SCORE		1000		6.7		5.6		6.2		5.9		6.6
RANK				1		5		3		4		2

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		5.0		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.60%	0.2	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		15.00%	3.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	1.3	18.00%	1.9	22.90%	0.1
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		20.00%	0.5	26.00%	0.1	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.4	25.00%	0.2
WEATHER ---		100		6.2		4.1		4.9		6.3		2.9
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		9685	3.4	27945	9.7	27214	9.4	40435	14.0	20396	7.1
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		43.8	0.0	12.3	1.4	32.6	0.5	16.8	1.2	33.2	0.5
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		14	0.6	23	1.0	14	0.6	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		4.7		5.6		5.3		7.4		6.6
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	20	1.0	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.1	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		66%	0.7	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		27%	0.3	88%	0.9	32%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		170		3.5		5.1		7.4		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		7.8		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		3.5		6.6		8.4		6.4		8.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC ---		40		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		90%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		1000		5.8		5.7		6.6		6.5		6.5
RANK				4		5		1		2		3

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
WITH ICING INCLUDED

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		5.0		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.60%	0.2	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
FRZNG PRECIP DAYS	5		2	0.5	19	0.0	17	0.1	2	0.5	7	0.4
ICING IN AREAS DAYS	5		15	0.5	80	0.2	50	0.4	15	0.5	144	0.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		15.00%	2.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.8	18.00%	1.3	22.90%	0.1
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		20.00%	0.5	26.00%	0.1	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.4	25.00%	0.2
WEATHER —		100		6.2		4.4		4.9		6.6		3.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		9685	3.4	27945	9.7	27214	9.4	40435	14.0	20396	7.1
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		43.8	0.0	12.3	1.4	32.6	0.5	16.8	1.2	33.2	0.5
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		14	0.6	23	1.0	14	0.6	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		4.7		5.6		5.3		7.4		6.6
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	20	1.0	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.1	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		66%	0.7	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		27%	0.3	88%	0.9	32%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		170		3.5		5.1		7.4		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		7.8		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		3.5		6.6		8.4		6.4		8.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		7.5		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		90%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES —		80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		1000		5.8		5.8		6.6		6.6		6.5
RANK				4		5		1		2		3

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
AIRSPACE ZEROED OUT

	WEIGHT		RANDOLPH		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		5.0		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		73.40%	0.0	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.60%	0.2	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		98.40%	0.4	97.80%	0.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		15.00%	3.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	1.3	18.00%	1.9	22.90%	0.1
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		20.00%	0.5	26.00%	0.1	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.4	25.00%	0.2
WEATHER ---		100		6.2		4.1		4.9		6.3		2.9
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	0		9685	0.0	27945	0.0	27214	0.0	40435	0.0	20545	0.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	0		43.8	0.0	12.3	0.0	32.6	0.0	16.8	0.0	33.2	0.0
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		14	0.6	23	1.0	14	0.6	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		3	1.7	19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		110		8.4		3.6		4.0		4.4		9.3
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	20	1.0	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8353	0.1	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	0.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		66%	0.7	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		27%	0.3	88%	0.9	32%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		51%	0.5	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		40%	0.4	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		170		3.5		5.1		7.4		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		135526	3.0	26652	0.6	59469	1.3	68320	1.5	84459	1.9
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		83%	0.8	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		66423	2.6	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		36060	0.8	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		78%	0.4	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		8.7		7.4		7.4		7.8		6.9
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	0	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		238496	1.5	156858	1.0	147685	0.9	151346	1.0	151102	1.0
COND OF HANGARS	5		52%	0.3	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		3.5		6.6		8.4		6.4		8.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC ---		40		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		22%	0.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		4.2		8.3		9.0		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		558	2.0	247	0.9	152	0.5	222	0.8	264	0.9
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		521	0.4	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		90%	0.9	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		948	2.2	230	0.5	400	0.9	654	1.5	812	1.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		27%	0.3	0%	0.0	72%	0.7	54%	0.5	0%	0.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	0		79	0.0	1	0.0	37	0.0	6	0.0	4	0.0
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	0		186	0.0	30	0.0	216	0.0	150	0.0	14	0.0
SERVICES ---		80		8.8		4.7		5.9		6.6		6.9
SCORE		840		6.5		5.5		6.7		6.0		6.8
RANK				3		5		2		4		1

REVISED DISTRIBUTION



UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSIONS, CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED
(USING NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR SCORING)

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	7.3	6.9	6.1	6.78	YELLOW
LAUGHLIN AFB	7.5	6.4	5.4	6.42	
RANDOLPH AFB	7.2	7.3	6.7	7.06	
REESE AFB	6.9	7.0	5.6	6.49	YELLOW-
VANCE AFB	7.3	7.2	5.3	6.61	YELLOW

AVERAGE	6.67
STD DEV	0.229823797

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSIONS; CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED; AND WEIGHTING ADJUSTED (USING NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR SCORING)

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	7.1	6.1	6.6	6.59	YELLOW
LAUGHLIN AFB	7.2	5.7	5.9	6.25	
RANDOLPH AFB	7.2	6.7	6.7	6.86	
REESE AFB	6.9	6.3	6.2	6.46	YELLOW
VANCE AFB	6.9	6.3	5.6	6.25	

AVERAGE	6.48
STD DEV	0.22934106

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSION; CALCULATIONS AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED; AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED

(USING NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR SCORING)

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	6.9	5.8	6.5	6.40	YELLOW
LAUGHLIN AFB	8.0	6.3	6.5	6.93	
RANDOLPH AFB	6.5	5.7	5.8	6.00	
REESE AFB	7.3	6.7	6.6	6.86	YELLOW+
VANCE AFB	7.1	6.5	5.7	6.43	YELLOW

AVERAGE	6.52
STD DEV	0.336279356

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSIONS, CORRECTED CALCULATIONS & DATA, AND WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED
WITH ICING INCLUDED
(USING NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR SCORING)

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	6.9	5.9	6.5	6.43	YELLOW
LAUGHLIN AFB	8.0	6.3	6.6	6.96	
RANDOLPH AFB	6.5	5.7	5.8	6.00	
REESE AFB	7.3	6.7	6.6	6.86	YELLOW+
VANCE AFB	7.1	6.5	5.8	6.46	YELLOW

AVERAGE	6.54
STD DEV	0.341786923

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

AIR FORCE ONLY BASES AND MISSION; CALCULATIONS AND DATA ERRORS CORRECTED; WEIGHTING/FORMULAS ADJUSTED; AIRSPACE DATA ZEROED

(USING NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR SCORING)

	FUNCTIONS				
BASE NAME	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	6.1	5.0	6.8	5.98	
LAUGHLIN AFB	6.4	4.6	6.0	5.65	YELLOW+
RANDOLPH AFB	6.1	5.4	6.5	6.01	
REESE AFB	6.3	5.6	6.7	6.18	
VANCE AFB	5.9	5.2	5.5	5.55	YELLOW+

AVERAGE	5.87
STD DEV	0.233203494

Document Separator

CORRECTED CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

I.4 FLYING TRAINING MISSION

	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	MARITIME E2/C2	BOMBER FIGHTER	PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO	WSO STRIKE	PANEL NAVIGATOR	FLIGHT SCREEN	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
BASE NAME	I.4.A	I.4.B	I.4.C	I.4.D	I.4.E	I.4.F	I.4.G	I.4.H		I.4
COLUMBUS AFB	7.3	6.9	7.4	6.1	7.2	6.6	7.9	7.5	7.12	
LAUGHLIN AFB	7.5	6.4	7.3	5.4	7.5		7.1	7.7	6.98	
RANDOLPH AFB	7.2	7.3	7.3	6.7	5.5		7.2	6.1	6.77	
REESE AFB	6.9	7.0	7.2	5.6	6.8		7.7	6.6	6.82	YELLOW-
VANCE AFB	7.3	7.2	7.5	5.3	7.1		7.8	7.3	7.08	

AVERAGE 6.96
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.136968452

CORRECTED CALCULATION AND DATA ERRORS

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

I.4 FLYING TRAINING MISSION

	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
BASE NAME	I.4.A	I.4.B	I.4.D		I.4
COLUMBUS AFB	7.3	6.9	6.1	6.78	GREEN
LAUGHLIN AFB	7.5	6.4	5.4	6.42	
RANDOLPH AFB	7.2	7.3	6.7	7.06	GREEN
REESE AFB	6.9	7.0	5.6	6.50	YELLOW-
VANCE AFB	7.3	7.2	5.3	6.61	YELLOW+

AVERAGE	6.68
STD DEV	0.229189151

CORRECTED CALCULATIONS, DATA & WEIGHTING

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

I.4 FLYING TRAINING MISSION

	PRIMARY	AIRLIFT TANKER	BOMBER FIGHTER	AVERAGE SCORE	OVERALL
BASE NAME	I.4.A	I.4.B	I.4.D		I.4
COLUMBUS AFB	7.1	6.1	6.6	6.59	
LAUGHLIN AFB	7.2	5.7	5.9	6.25	
RANDOLPH AFB	7.2	6.7	6.7	6.86	
REESE AFB	6.9	6.3	6.2	6.47	YELLOW+
VANCE AFB	6.9	6.3	5.6	6.25	

AVERAGE	6.48
STD DEV	0.229276643

Document Separator

ORIGINAL DATA

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

I.4 FLYING TRAINING MISSION

BASE NAME	I.4.A PRIMARY	I.4.B AIRLIFT TANKER	I.4.C MARITIME E2/C2	I.4.D BOMBER FIGHTER	I.4.E PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO	I.4.F WSO STRIKE	I.4.G PANEL NAVIGATOR	I.4.H FLIGHT SCREEN	AVERAGE SCORE	I.4 OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	6.8	6.3	6.7	6.4	6.9	6.6	7.6	6.6	6.74	GREEN
LAUGHLIN AFB	7	5.8	6.5	5.5	7.1		6.8	6.8	6.50	YELLOW+
REESE AFB	6	5.9	5.9	5.6	6.2		7.2	6.2	6.14	RED
VANCE AFB	6.8	6.7	6.7	5.5	6.8		7.5	6.6	6.66	GREEN

AVERAGE	6.51
STANDARD DEVIATION	0.228199

CORRECTED DATA

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

I.4 FLYING TRAINING MISSION

BASE NAME	I.4.A PRIMARY	I.4.B AIRLIFT TANKER	I.4.C MARITIME E2/C2	I.4.D BOMBER FIGHTER	I.4.E PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO	I.4.F WSO STRIKE	I.4.G PANEL NAVIGATOR	I.4.H FLIGHT SCREEN	AVERAGE SCORE	I.4 OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	7.5	7.0	7.6	7.0	7.8	6.6	8.2	7.2	7.36	YELLOW+
LAUGHLIN AFB	8.2	7.2	8.1	6.7	8.3		7.4	8.2	7.71	GREEN
REESE AFB	7.1	7.2	7.5	6.6	7.7		7.9	6.6	7.23	YELLOW
VANCE AFB	7.2	7.3	7.5	5.9	7.4		7.7	6.9	7.14	RED+

AVERAGE	7.36
STANDARD DEVIATION	0.217988

CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

I.4 FLYING TRAINING MISSION

BASE NAME	I.4.A PRIMARY	I.4.B AIRLIFT TANKER	I.4.C MARITIME E2/C2	I.4.D BOMBER FIGHTER	I.4.E PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO	I.4.F WSO STRIKE	I.4.G PANEL NAVIGATOR	I.4.H FLIGHT SCREEN	AVERAGE SCORE	I.4 OVERALL
COLUMBUS AFB	7.2	6.9	7.5	6.8	7.6	6.6	8.0	7.2	7.23	YELLOW+
LAUGHLIN AFB	8.0	7.1	8.0	6.6	8.1		7.2	8.2	7.61	GREEN
REESE AFB	7.2	7.2	7.5	6.6	7.7		7.9	6.6	7.24	YELLOW+
VANCE AFB	7.1	7.1	7.4	5.7	7.3		7.6	6.9	7.03	RED+

AVERAGE	7.28
STANDARD DEVIATION	0.209322

PRIMARY

	WEIGHT	WHITING		CORPUS		1.3 P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1.5	0.6	3	1.3	0.5	0.2	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	50		5.3		3.5		4.4		4.8		5.8		4.8		4.8		5.8		4.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30	84.00%	0.8	84.10%	0.8	83.00%	0.6	83.40%	0.7	85.70%	1.1	83.60%	0.7	91.90%	2.4	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20	87.10%	0.9	88.00%	1.1	86.00%	0.8	86.20%	0.8	90.00%	1.3	90.00%	1.3	94.00%	1.9	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30	99.00%	2.7	94.00%	0.4	98.00%	2.3	99.60%	3.0	95.00%	0.8	98.40%	2.4	97.50%	2.0	97.80%	2.2	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.9	99.20%	2.8
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10	0.10%	0.9	1.00%	0.3	0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10	19.40%	0.0	22.20%	0.0	9.00%	0.7	16.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.7	15.00%	0.3	22.60%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10	22.00%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	22.80%	0.0	22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---	140		5.3		4.1		5.3		6.3		6.1		6.3		6.5		6.0		4.4		7.9		6.5
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120	28511	4.0	57169	8.0	28445	4.0	42588	6.0	62724	8.8	85447	12.0	29144	4.1	36084	5.1	31116	4.4	53868	7.6	45092	6.3
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	27.7	2.0	39.6	1.4	35.3	1.6	39	1.4	37.5	1.5	65.2	0.0	32.3	1.8	36.1	1.6	42.6	1.2	31.5	1.8	39.5	1.4
# MTR'S AVAIL	30	21	2.0	9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS > 15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB WIN 100M	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	220		5.2		6.9		5.2		5.8		7.2		8.4		4.4		5.9		4.6		6.8		6.[illegible]
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40	1.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	0.5	0.7	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
#OUT/AUX FLD IFP CAP	20	0.5	1.0	1	2.0	0.5	1.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	18	0.9	8	1.0	20	0.9	19	0.9	26	0.8	20	0.9	33	0.7	26	0.8	17	0.9	22	0.8	43	0.6
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	6000	0.3	8000	1.0	8002	1.0	8000	1.0	8000	1.0	8353	1.0	13100	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	K	6	H	5.5	E	5.0	E	5.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXW/APRNS ADQ COND	15	95%	1.4	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	88%	1.3	20%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	98%	1.7	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	93%	1.6	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	58%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---	239		7.6		8.8		6.9		7.9		8.2		5.2		7.8		7.6		6.9		6.5		7.3
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	34137	0.6	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	46413	1.9	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	,100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	93438	1.2	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	38%	0.[illegible]
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100		6.1		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30	DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238498	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5	86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	50		7.2		8.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		4.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRI PILOT FLD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	20		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		5.0		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---	50		8.7		6.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	205	0.6	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	859	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	338	0.0	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20	80%	1.6	90%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	8	330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4	80%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5	25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5	145	0.2	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.1
SERVICES ---	80		6.0		5.4		8.1		6.0		5.6		7.7		9.2		6.3		6.1		6.6		7.2
SCORE	999		6.6		6.7		6.4		6.8		7.0		6.7		6.3		6.8		6.0		7.0		6.8
RANK			8		6		9		4		1		7		10		5		11		2		3

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		4.2		4.4		8.1		6.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		26007	7.6	29016	8.5	41056	12.0	22358	6.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		22	3.0	9	1.2	10	1.4	11	1.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		6.8		6.1		9.1		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		8.7		8.5		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		999		7.2		7.1		8.2		7.5
RANK				3		4		1		2

PRIMARY
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		4.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	50		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.1	18.00%	0.7	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		22.30%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		4.0		4.4		5.9		4.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		22	1.0	9	0.4	10	0.5	11	0.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		6.4		6.4		9.6		6.2
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.3	26	0.9	17	1.0	22	0.9	43	0.7
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		8.7		8.5		7.7		8.4
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		999		7.1		7.2		8.0		7.2
RANK				4		3		1		2

AIRLIFT/TANKER

	WEIGHT	CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —	60		2.5		7.1		5.4		6.3		5.4		3.3		6.3		5.4		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	84.10%	0.5	83.00%	0.4	83.40%	0.5	86.70%	0.8	83.60%	0.5	91.90%	1.6	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	86.00%	0.5	86.00%	0.4	86.20%	0.4	90.00%	0.7	90.00%	0.7	94.00%	0.9	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20	94.00%	0.3	98.00%	1.6	96.60%	1.1	95.00%	0.6	98.40%	1.7	97.50%	1.4	97.80%	1.5	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	1.00%	0.1	0.00%	0.5	0.00%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.30%	0.4	0.20%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	9.00%	0.4	9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	9.00%	0.4	10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —	90		4.7		6.2		5.1		5.7		6.1		7.0		6.6		4.9		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/WA AIRSPCE	140	137659	13.5	137656	13.5	42588	4.2	143213	14.0	85447	8.4	29144	2.8	36084	3.5	31116	3.0	53868	5.3	45092	4.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	22.5	2.0	55	0.5	39	1.2	38.9	1.2	55.2	0.0	32.3	1.5	36.1	1.4	42.8	1.1	31.5	1.6	39.5	1.2
# MTR'S AVAIL	30	9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB WIN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —	240		8.8		8.2		4.5		8.6		6.2		3.4		4.7		3.8		6.2		4.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	0	0.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	101	0.0	20	1.0	19.3	1.0	26	0.9	20	1.0	89	0.1	26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	8000	0.5	8002	0.5	8000	0.5	8000	0.5	8353	0.6	13100	1.0	9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	A	2.0	E	5.0	B	4.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	86%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	88%	1.3	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	100%	1.7	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —	219		4.6		8.4		8.4		9.0		5.9		9.4		7.1		6.9		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20365	0.3	41826	0.7	135626	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	26380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —	100		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.5		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30	DA	3	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219624	0.2	156858	0.1	147686	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —	50		9.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		5.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRIPI.OT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PI.OT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —	50		10.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		8.0		9.0		5.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —	60		7.4		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.1		5.5		8.8		9.1		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	6	90%	0.5	100%	0.6	80%	0.5	80%	0.5	87%	0.5	80%	0.5	70%	0.4	93%	0.6	87%	0.5	87%	0.5
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	4	439	0.1	687	0.2	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.3	1287	0.4	230	0.1	400	0.1	654	0.2	812	0.3
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	20	100%	2.0	78%	1.6	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	93%	1.9	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	6	197	0.0	89	0.4	6	0.6	53	0.4	79	0.4	42	0.5	1	0.6	37	0.5	6	0.6	4	0.6
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	4	265	0.0	113	0.2	10	0.4	180	0.1	186	0.1	74	0.3	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.4
SERVICES —	80		5.7		7.8		6.5		6.2		7.9		9.6		7.0		6.4		7.0		7.5
SCORE	999		6.5		7.8		6.6		7.7		6.5		6.5		6.7		6.0		6.8		6.3
RANK			6		1		4		2		5		7		3		9		10		8

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		24.50%	0.0	17.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90		4.7		5.1		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		22	3.0	9	1.2	10	1.4	11	1.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240		6.7		6.2		9.2		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219		7.1		7.4		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	6		70%	0.4	93%	0.6	87%	0.5	87%	0.5
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	4		230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	20		100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	6		1	0.6	37	0.0	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	4		30	0.3	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.4
SERVICES ---		80		8.9		7.1		8.6		9.8
SCORE		999		7.3		7.2		7.2		7.0
RANK				1		2		3		4

AIRLIFT/TANKER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	1.3	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		6.3		6.3		4.2		3.3
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		24.50%	0.0	17.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---		90		4.7		5.1		6.3		5.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150		26007	9.5	29016	10.6	41056	15.0	22358	8.2
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	20		22	2.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		240		6.6		6.3		9.4		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		26	0.9	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.8	10500	1.0	8858	0.7	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		219		7.1		7.4		5.1		6.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		50		9.0		9.0		0.0		8.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		999		7.1		7.2		7.1		6.9
RANK				3		1		2		4

MARITIME E2/C2

	WEIGHT		WHITING		CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1.5	1.9	3	2.5	0.5	0.6	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		6.5		5.0		4.4		5.4		6.3		5.4		5.4		8.3		5.4		6.3		5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		84.00%	0.5	84.10%	0.5	83.00%	0.4	83.40%	0.5	85.70%	0.8	83.60%	0.5	91.90%	1.6	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10		87.10%	0.5	88.00%	0.5	86.00%	0.4	86.20%	0.4	90.00%	0.7	90.00%	0.7	94.00%	0.9	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20		99.00%	1.8	94.00%	0.2	98.00%	1.5	99.60%	2.0	95.00%	0.8	98.40%	1.6	97.50%	1.3	97.80%	1.4	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	1.9	99.20%	1.9
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.10%	0.5	1.00%	0.5	0.00%	0.5	0.00%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.30%	0.5	0.20%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		19.40%	0.0	9.00%	0.4	9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5		22.00%	0.0	9.00%	0.4	10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	24.50%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER —		90		5.9		4.0		6.1		6.1		5.7		6.0		7.1		6.6		5.5		7.6		7.1
AMT MOA/AA AIRSPCE	140		138006	13.5	137659	13.5	137656	13.5	42588	4.2	143213	14.0	85447	8.4	29144	2.8	38084	3.5	31116	3.0	53868	5.3	45092	4.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		43.2	1.0	22.5	2.0	55	0.5	38	1.2	38.9	1.2	65.2	0.0	32.3	1.5	36.1	1.4	42.6	1.1	31.5	1.6	39.5	1.2
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		7	0.7	9	0.8	9	0.8	5	0.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	19	1.8	32	3.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB WIN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.8	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		240		7.8		8.8		8.2		4.5		8.6		6.2		3.4		4.7		3.8		5.2		4.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1.5	1.0	3.0	2.0	0.5	0.3	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	2	1.3	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20		0.5	1.0	1	2.0	0.5	1.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUXOUT	10		17.6	0.8	8	1.0	20	0.8	19.3	0.8	26	0.7	20	0.8	61	0.0	26	0.7	17	0.8	21.5	0.7	43	0.3
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		6000	0.3	8000	1.0	8002	1.0	8000	1.0	8000	1.0	8353	1.0	13100	1.0	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		K	.6	H	5.5	E	5.0	E	5.0	K	.6	B	4.0	F	7.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		95%	1.4	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	88%	1.3	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		98%	1.7	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	93%	1.6	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		219		7.8		8.7		7.3		8.3		8.5		5.3		9.1		7.9		7.2		6.7		7.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		34137	0.6	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	78822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		46413	1.9	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		93438	1.2	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	38%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		6.1		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30		D	2.5	DA	3	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5		86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		6.2		9.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		5.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		9.0		9.0		9.0		5.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	19%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		9.0		7.4		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.0		5.6		8.8		9.1		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		205	0.6	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	98%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		338	0.0	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		80%	1.6	90%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		80%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		145	0.2	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		6.0		5.4		8.1		6.0		5.6		7.7		9.2		6.3		6.1		6.6		7.2
SCORE		999		7.4		7.5		7.4		6.6		7.6		6.4		6.5		6.8		6.0		6.5		6.8
RANK				3		2		4		7		1		10		9		5		11		8		6

MARITIME E2/C2
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT	VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	60		6.3		6.3		6.3		5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	20	93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.0	99.20%	2.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.90%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	24.50%	0.0	17.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---	90		5.0		5.6		7.7		7.2
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140	26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	30	22	3.0	9	1.2	10	1.4	11	1.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	240		6.7		6.2		9.2		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	26	0.7	17	1.0	21.5	0.8	43	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---	219		8.5		8.3		7.4		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	50		9.0		9.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---	60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6	230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5	1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5	30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---	80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE	999		7.5		7.5		8.1		7.6
RANK			3		4		1		2

MARITIME E2/C2
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT	VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
WA SPEC AIRSPC	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---	60		6.3		6.3		6.3		5.4
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
1000/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	10	91.80%	0.8	93.60%	0.9	94.30%	1.0	92.00%	0.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5	93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5	0.90%	0.5	1.40%	0.5	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	5	24.50%	0.0	17.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	25.50%	0.0
WEATHER ---	90		5.0		5.6		6.3		5.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	150	26007	9.5	29016	10.6	41056	15.0	22358	8.2
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20	25	1.3	40.8	0.0	16.6	2.0	31.5	0.8
# MTR'S AVAIL	20	22	2.0	9	0.8	10	0.9	11	1.0
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---	240		6.6		6.3		9.4		6.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	20	0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	26	0.7	17	1.0	21.5	0.8	43	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10	9200	1.0	10500	1.0	8858	1.0	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15	88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---	219		8.5		8.3		7.4		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---	100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D	2.5	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5	64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---	50		8.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	20	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
1 FLD <30MILES	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---	50		9.0		9.0		5.0		9.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---	60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5	442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5	70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22	230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3	1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2	30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---	80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE	999		7.4		7.5		8.0		7.5
RANK			4		2		1		3

BOMBER/FIGHTER

	WEIGHT		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WARA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		60		6.7		6.7		6.7		5.0		3.3		3.3		5.0		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		68.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	72.80%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	86.10%	0.7	83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		83.00%	0.2	83.40%	0.2	85.70%	0.4	83.60%	0.2	91.90%	0.8	89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	25		98.00%	1.9	99.60%	2.5	96.00%	0.7	98.40%	2.0	97.50%	1.7	97.80%	1.8	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.4	99.20%	2.3
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		100		5.3		6.4		5.1		4.9		5.9		5.8		3.7		6.3		4.8
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		135531	11.9	42685	3.7	136737	12.0	82318	7.2	36191	3.1	35644	3.1	30958	2.7	53249	4.7	45089	4.0
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		57.1	0.2	38.9	0.8	38.6	0.8	65.1	0.0	32.9	1.0	36.4	0.9	43.9	0.7	31.9	1.0	38.7	0.8
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		9	1.2	5	0.7	9	1.2	14	1.8	15	2.0	23	3.0	9	1.2	6	0.8	10	1.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		0	2.0	3	1.8	3	1.8	3	1.8	26	0.0	19	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		8.6		5.2		7.7		6.6		4.1		3.9		3.2		4.1		5.9
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10		20	1.0	19	1.0	26	0.9	20	1.0	89	0.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		8002	0.0	8000	0.0	8000	0.0	8353	0.1	13100	1.0	9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	K	6	B	4.0	C	6.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	66%	0.7	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		53%	0.5	100%	1.0	95%	1.0	27%	0.3	100%	1.0	99%	0.9	29%	0.3	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	51%	0.5	100%	1.0	97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		87%	0.9	93%	0.9	74%	0.7	40%	0.4	77%	0.8	56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS —		170		7.3		7.8		8.6		5.8		8.8		5.1		6.8		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		184423	3.0	20395	0.3	41826	0.7	136526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	93%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	68067	0.9	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.8		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		289040	1.4	219457	1.1	301674	1.5	238496	1.2	219824	1.1	156858	0.8	147685	0.7	151346	0.8	151102	0.8
COND OF HANGARS	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.9		7.2		7.9		6.9		7.2		6.2		8.0		6.0		8.1
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC —		40		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		5.0		7.5		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		5.0		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	19%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS'	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		60		4.2		10.0		9.2		5.1		5.8		9.8		9.1		10.0		9.1
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		96%	1.0	96%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		667	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		69	0.1	6	0.5	53	0.2	79	0.0	42	0.2	1	0.5	37	0.3	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		113	0.2	10	0.5	180	0.1	186	0.1	74	0.3	30	0.4	216	0.0	160	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		7.7		6.0		5.2		7.3		9.0		6.3		5.8		6.5		7.1
SCORE		1000		7.6		6.7		7.3		6.6		6.3		5.5		5.5		5.5		6.4
RANK				1		3		2		4		6		9		7		8		5

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	25		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.5	99.20%	2.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		100		3.5		3.7		6.5		5.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	120		28007	7.6	29016	8.5	41056	12.0	22358	6.5
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	0.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	1.2	31.5	0.5
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	30		23	3.0	9	1.2	6	0.8	10	1.3
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		5.3		5.0		6.9		6.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		88%	0.9	98%	1.0	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		170		5.1		7.2		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	66067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		8.7		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		9.4		7.4		9.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC ---		40		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		1000		5.9		6.6		6.7		7.0
RANK				4		3		2		1

BOMBER/FIGHTER
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
WA/RA SPEC AIRSPC	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		60		3.3		6.7		3.3		3.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	20		83.90%	0.5	86.70%	0.9	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	10		89.40%	0.6	91.50%	0.8	90.90%	0.7	89.10%	0.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	5		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	0.5	99.20%	0.5
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR 5-20%	5		26.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		100		3.3		3.7		4.4		2.6
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	140		26007	8.9	29016	9.9	41056	14.0	22358	7.6
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	20		25	0.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	1.2	31.5	0.5
1 AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
2+ AIR-SURF RGE 75MI	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
NEAREST RNGE <50MI?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	10		23	1.0	9	0.4	6	0.3	10	0.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		19	0.0	12	0.7	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		270		5.1		5.2		7.4		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	20		0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
#OUT/AUX FLD IFR CAP	10		0	0.0	1	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	10	1.1	101	0.0	17	1.0	101	0.0	101	0.0
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	10		9200	0.3	10500	0.6	8858	0.2	12000	1.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0	B	4.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	10		100%	1.0	85%	0.9	85%	0.9	100%	1.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	10		88%	0.9	98%	1.0	42%	0.4	100%	1.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	10		97%	1.0	92%	0.9	59%	0.6	100%	1.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	10		56%	0.6	87%	0.9	60%	0.6	76%	0.8
AIRFIELDS ---		170		5.1		7.2		4.5		5.7
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	68067	1.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	25%	0.1	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		8.7		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	DA	3	I	2	DA	3
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		7.6		9.4		7.4		9.5
MUNITIONS LDING PAD?	20		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	2.0
WEAPON STRG HND FAC?	20		Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0	Y	2.0
SPEC MIL FAC ---		40		5.0		5.0		5.0		10.0
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		5.0		7.5		0.0		5.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		60		6.7		9.0		10.0		7.5
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		1000		5.7		6.6		6.6		6.8
RANK				4		3		2		1

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO

	WEIGHT		WHITING		CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1.5	0.6	3	1.3	0.5	0.2	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	N	0.0	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		6.3		4.5		3.4		3.8		5.8		3.8		3.8		5.8		3.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		84.00%	0.8	84.10%	0.8	83.00%	0.6	83.40%	0.7	85.70%	1.1	83.60%	0.7	91.90%	2.4	89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		87.10%	0.9	88.00%	1.1	86.00%	0.8	86.20%	0.8	90.00%	1.3	90.00%	1.3	94.00%	1.9	91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		99.00%	2.7	94.00%	0.4	98.00%	2.3	99.60%	3.0	95.00%	0.8	98.40%	2.4	97.50%	2.0	97.80%	2.2	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	2.9	99.20%	2.8
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.10%	0.9	1.00%	0.3	0.00%	1.0	0.00%	1.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9	0.30%	0.8	0.20%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.9	0.10%	0.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		19.40%	0.0	22.20%	0.0	9.00%	0.7	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.7	15.00%	0.3	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		22.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	22.00%	0.0	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	22.80%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		140		5.3		4.0		5.3		6.3		6.1		6.3		6.5		6.0		4.4		7.9		6.5
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		28511	4.3	57169	8.7	28445	4.3	42588	6.5	62724	9.5	85447	13.0	29144	4.4	36084	5.5	31116	4.7	53868	8.2	45092	6.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSPCE	40	HI=MAX	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	Y	0.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		4.3		7.3		5.2		6.2		7.5		9.9		3.8		5.1		5.2		6.7		6.4
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	0.5	0.7	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		17.6	1.5	8	2.0	20	1.7	19.3	1.8	26	1.6	20	1.7	33	1.5	26	1.6	17	1.8	21.5	1.7	43	1.2
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		6000	0.7	8000	2.0	8002	2.0	8000	2.0	8000	2.0	8353	2.0	13100	2.0	9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		K	6	H	5.5	E	5.0	E	5.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		56%	1.1	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	66%	1.3	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		95%	1.4	36%	0.5	53%	0.8	100%	1.5	95%	1.4	27%	0.4	100%	1.5	88%	1.3	29%	0.4	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	100%	1.7	51%	0.9	100%	1.7	97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		98%	1.7	82%	1.4	87%	1.5	93%	1.6	74%	1.3	40%	0.7	77%	1.3	56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS —		239		7.5		8.8		7.3		7.9		8.1		6.0		8.5		8.3		7.7		7.3		8.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		34137	0.8	48549	0.8	184423	3.0	20385	0.3	41826	0.7	135526	2.2	76822	1.2	26652	0.4	59469	1.0	68320	1.1	84459	1.4
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		46413	1.9	22239	0.9	40091	1.6	50224	2.0	47000	1.9	66423	2.6	7737	0.3	75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		93438	1.2	2000	0.0	113783	1.5	28380	0.4	6162	0.1	36060	0.5	48349	0.6	68639	0.9	51572	0.7	19365	0.3	17029	0.2
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	76%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		6.1		4.1		8.6		5.2		5.0		7.5		4.7		6.7		6.6		6.4		6.3
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5		86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.2		8.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		6.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC —		20		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		5.0		5.0		7.5		5.0		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAINMAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZI	5		2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		8.7		6.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		205	0.6	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		338	0.0	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		80%	1.6	90%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		80%	0.3	100%	0.4	76%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		145	0.2	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		6.0		5.4		8.1		6.0		5.6		7.7		9.2		6.3		6.1		6.6		7.2
SCORE		999		6.4		6.8		6.5		6.8		7.1		7.2		6.3		6.8		6.3		7.1		7.0
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				6.5		6.7		6.5		6.7		7.0		6.8		6.3		6.8		6.1		7.1		6.9
RANK				9		6		8		7		3		1		10		5		11		2		4

PRIMARY/INT NAV/NFO
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	30		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	3.0	99.20%	3.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		23.00%	0.0	17.00%	0.2	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		4.2		4.5		8.1		6.7
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		26007	8.2	29016	9.2	41056	13.0	22358	7.1
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	25	2.8	40.8	4.0	15.6	1.6	31.8	3.1
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		6.2		7.7		8.7		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	21.5	1.9	43	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		9.5		9.3		8.5		9.1
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		9.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		7.5		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES ---		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		999		7.4		7.7		8.3		7.8
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				7.5		7.4		8.6		8.2
RANK				4		3		1		2

PRIMARY/INT NAV/INFO
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	25		1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.4
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	15		Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5	Y	1.5
AA SPEC AIRSPACE	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS ---		50		5.8		5.8		5.8		3.8
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	30		89.40%	1.9	91.50%	2.3	90.90%	2.2	89.10%	1.8
1000/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1000/3	20		91.80%	1.6	93.60%	1.8	94.30%	1.9	92.00%	1.6
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	10		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	1.0	99.20%	1.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	10		0.90%	0.4	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	1.0	0.10%	1.0
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	30		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.4	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR>=5%	10		23.00%	0.0	17.00%	0.2	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER ---		140		4.2		4.5		6.8		5.3
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	130		26007	8.2	29016	9.2	41056	13.0	22358	7.1
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	40	HI=MAX	25	2.5	40.5	4.0	18.5	1.8	31.5	3.1
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	10		N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0	N	1.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA ---		220		6.2		7.7		8.7		6.8
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	40		1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0	1	4.0
MEDIAN DIST <= MAX?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	21.5	1.9	43	1.4
RUNWAY 5000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	20		9200	2.0	10500	2.0	8858	2.0	12000	2.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	20		100%	2.0	85%	1.7	85%	1.7	100%	2.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	15		88%	1.3	98%	1.5	42%	0.6	100%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	17		97%	1.6	92%	1.6	59%	1.0	100%	1.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	17		56%	1.0	87%	1.5	60%	1.0	76%	1.3
AIRFIELDS ---		239		9.5		9.3		8.5		9.1
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC ---		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC ---		50		9.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
1 OTHR PRIPILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ OTR PRI PILOT FLD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5
1 FLD <30MILES	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
2+ FLDS < 30MILES	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
PROX OTHR SPT FAC ---		20		7.5		7.5		5.0		7.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY ---		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT ---		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES ---		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		999		7.3		7.7		8.1		7.6
SCORE W/CORRECT FORMULA				7.4		7.4		8.5		8.1
RANK				4		2		1		3

PANEL NAVIGATOR

	WEIGHT	CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50	N	0.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —	50		0.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15	74.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	72.60%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	85.10%	0.5	83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25	1.00%	0.7	0.00%	2.5	0.00%	2.5	0.10%	2.3	0.10%	2.3	0.30%	2.0	0.20%	2.1	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	2.3	0.10%	2.3
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5	9.00%	0.4	9.00%	0.4	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.3	15.00%	0.2	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5	9.00%	0.4	10.50%	0.3	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.3	20.00%	0.0	22.80%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —	70		3.5		6.0		5.2		5.6		5.0		5.7		5.8		3.1		5.9		4.0
# MTR'S AVAIL	60	9	3.1	9	3.1	5	1.7	9	3.1	14	4.9	15	5.2	23	8.0	9	3.1	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —	220		7.8		7.8		7.2		7.8		7.7		8.7		8.2		7.8		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50	8000	1.7	8200	2.0	8000	1.7	8000	1.7	8353	2.3	13100	5.0	9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	A	2	E	5	B	4	K	6	B	4	E	5	B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	66%	2.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30	36%	1.1	53%	1.6	100%	3.0	95%	2.9	27%	0.8	100%	3.0	88%	2.6	29%	0.9	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	100%	2.0	51%	1.0	100%	2.0	97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20	82%	1.6	87%	1.7	93%	1.9	74%	1.5	40%	0.8	77%	1.5	58%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —	230		5.4		7.1		7.2		7.8		5.2		8.9		7.6		7.4		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55	48549	1.4	184423	5.5	20385	0.6	41826	1.2	135526	4.0	76822	2.3	26652	0.8	59469	1.8	68320	2.0	84459	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25	92%	2.3	99%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	83%	2.1	100%	2.5	86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55	22239	1.6	40091	2.9	50224	3.7	47000	3.4	66423	4.9	7737	0.6	75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25	20000	0.4	113783	2.5	26380	0.6	15782	0.3	36060	0.8	48349	1.1	68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15	100%	1.5	100%	1.5	100%	1.5	84%	1.3	78%	1.2	99%	1.5	100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —	200		4.9		8.7		5.7		5.6		7.7		5.2		7.0		6.9		6.6		6.5
LVL MAINT OPS	30	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151016	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —	50		5.9		5.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		4.9		5.8		4.7		5.8
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —	50		6.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20	162	0.5	604	1.8	99	0.3	130	0.4	558	1.7	659	2.0	247	0.7	152	0.5	222	0.7	264	0.8
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6	408	0.0	604	0.0	732	0.1	209	0.0	521	0.0	8074	0.6	442	0.0	462	0.0	400	0.0	690	0.1
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	94%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20	92%	1.8	100%	2.0	80%	1.6	80%	1.6	87%	1.7	80%	1.6	70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	6	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	6	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —	80		5.5		8.1		6.0		5.6		7.7		9.2		6.3		6.1		6.6		7.2
SCORE	1000		5.9		7.6		7.0		7.2		6.9		7.7		7.5		7.2		6.8		7.6
RANK			10		2		7		6		8		1		4		5		9		3

PANEL NAVIGATOR
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50		Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15		83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	25		0.90%	0.9	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	2.5	0.10%	2.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5		23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		70		4.0		3.1		6.1		4.3
# MTR'S AVAIL	80		23	8.0	9	3.1	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60		0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40		N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		8.2		7.8		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50		9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30		88%	2.6	98%	2.9	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20		97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20		56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —		230		7.6		8.3		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55		26652	1.7	59469	3.9	68320	4.4	84459	5.5
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25		86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55		75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25		100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25		68639	2.5	51572	1.9	19365	0.7	17029	0.6
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15		100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —		200		7.9		8.3		8.0		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151016	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	6		442	0.4	462	0.4	400	0.3	690	0.6
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	20		70%	1.4	93%	1.9	87%	1.7	87%	1.7
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		80		8.2		6.9		8.3		9.6
SCORE		1000		7.7		7.9		7.4		8.2
RANK				3		2		4		1

PANEL NAVIGATOR
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT	VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL		
MTR SPEC AIRSPACE	50		Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0	Y	5.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
3000/5 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	15		83.90%	0.4	86.70%	0.7	81.80%	0.2	78.80%	0.0
% TIME CROSWND >25KT	5		0.90%	0.2	1.40%	0.0	0.10%	0.5	0.10%	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	25		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR>=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR	5		23.00%	0.0	28.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	25.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		70		3.0		3.1		3.6		1.4
# MTR'S AVAIL	80		23	8.0	9	3.1	6	2.1	10	3.5
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	60		0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0	0%	6.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	40		N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0	N	4.0
PLNED STRUC AFCT OPS	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
STRUC CHGS W/IN 50NM	20		Y	0.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		220		8.2		7.8		6.4		7.9
RUNWAY 7000 FT?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
LGEST MAIN FLD RUNWY	50		9200	3.7	10500	5.0	8858	3.1	12000	5.0
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		B	4	B	4	B	4	B	4
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	30		88%	2.6	98%	2.9	42%	1.3	100%	3.0
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	20		97%	1.9	92%	1.8	59%	1.2	100%	2.0
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	20		56%	1.1	87%	1.7	60%	1.2	76%	1.5
AIRFIELDS —		230		7.6		8.3		6.2		8.5
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	55		26652	1.7	59469	3.9	68320	4.4	84459	5.5
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	25		86%	2.2	100%	2.5	91%	2.3	100%	2.5
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	55		75207	5.5	60863	4.5	70689	5.2	63354	4.6
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	25		100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5	100%	2.5
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	25		68639	2.5	51572	1.9	19365	0.7	17029	0.6
CONDITION OTHER FAC	15		100%	1.5	99%	1.5	54%	0.8	36%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —		200		7.9		8.3		8.0		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151016	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	20		247	1.9	152	1.2	222	1.7	264	2.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT BEQ RMS ADQ	5		442	0.3	462	0.3	400	0.3	690	0.5
CONDITION BEQ % ADQ	3		100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3	100%	0.3
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	5		70%	0.4	93%	0.5	87%	0.4	87%	0.4
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	22		230	0.6	400	1.1	654	1.8	812	2.2
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	3		1	0.3	37	0.0	6	0.3	4	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		80		7.4		6.7		8.5		9.9
SCORE		1000		7.6		7.9		7.2		8.0
RANK				3		2		4		1

FLIGHT SCREEN

	WEIGHT	RUCKER		WHITING		CORPUS		P-COLA		MERIDIAN		KING		RANDOLPH		SHEPPARD		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL		HONDO		USAFA	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10	0.0	0.0	9	1.0	3	0.5	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	0	0.0	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —	50		8.0		10.0		9.0		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.0		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40	78.80%	0.0	71.40%	0.0	74.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	68.00%	0.0	72.60%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	86.10%	1.4	83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0	73.40%	0.0	89.50%	2.5
1500/3 > 80?	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20	86.50%	0.9	84.00%	0.5	84.10%	0.5	83.00%	0.4	83.40%	0.5	85.70%	0.8	83.60%	0.5	91.90%	1.6	89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2	87.50%	1.0	93.50%	1.8
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40	98.00%	3.1	94.00%	0.5	94.00%	0.5	98.00%	3.1	96.00%	1.8	95.00%	1.2	98.40%	3.4	97.50%	2.8	97.80%	3.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9	98.40%	3.4	88.00%	-3.4
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10	7.25%	0.9	19.40%	0.0	22.20%	0.0	9.00%	0.7	18.10%	0.1	10.00%	0.7	15.00%	0.3	22.80%	0.0	23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0	15.00%	0.3	23.00%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	10	16.70%	0.2	22.00%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.00%	0.0	17.80%	0.1	11.00%	0.6	19.00%	0.1	22.80%	0.0	23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	28.30%	0.0
WEATHER —	150		4.7		1.4		2.1		3.5		3.0		3.5		4.2		5.2		4.9		3.6		6.1		4.1		4.5		1.9
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90	5431	0.6	28511	3.0	57169	6.0	28445	3.0	42588	4.5	62724	6.6	85447	9.0	29144	3.1	36084	3.8	31116	3.3	53868	5.7	45092	4.7	76958	8.1	3880	0.4
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120	1.5	12.0	27.7	7.1	39.6	4.8	35.3	5.6	39	4.9	37.5	5.2	65.2	0.0	32.3	6.2	36.1	5.5	42.6	4.3	31.5	6.3	39.5	4.8	48.2	3.2	57.8	1.4
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	Y	0.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20	0	2.0	20	0.5	2	1.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	5	1.6	3	1.8	26	0.0	20	0.5	12	1.1	4	1.7	2	1.8	3	1.8	3	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —	270		6.9		5.4		6.2		5.4		5.7		6.5		5.5		4.2		5.1		4.7		6.6		5.7		6.3		2.1
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30	0	0.0	9	3.0	3.0	1.0	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	2	0.7	0	0.0	1	0.3
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20	101.0	0.0	41	1.3	8	2.0	20	1.7	19	1.8	26	1.6	20	1.7	33	1.5	26	1.6	17	1.8	22	1.7	43	1.2	101	0.0	27	1.6
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70	A	2.0	K	6	H	5.5	E	5.0	E	5.0	K	6	B	4.0	F	7.0	F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	A	2.0	A	2.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30	100%	3.0	56%	1.7	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	66%	2.0	100%	3.0	100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0	72%	2.2	3.00%	0.1
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25	100%	2.5	95%	2.4	36%	0.9	53%	1.3	100%	2.5	95%	2.4	27%	0.7	100%	2.5	88%	2.2	29%	0.7	42%	1.1	100%	2.5	67%	1.7	61%	1.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	51%	1.4	100%	2.7	97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7	100%	2.7	76%	2.1
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27	100%	2.7	98%	2.6	82%	2.2	87%	2.3	93%	2.5	74%	2.0	40%	1.1	77%	2.1	56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1	100%	2.7	74%	2.0
AIRFIELDS —	229		5.6		8.6		7.6		7.2		7.8		7.9		4.9		8.3		8.0		7.1		6.5		7.9		4.9		4.2
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30	323435	3.0	34137	0.3	48549	0.5	184423	1.7	20385	0.2	41826	0.4	135526	1.3	76822	0.7	26652	0.2	59469	0.6	68320	0.6	84459	0.8	9556	0.1	11452	0.1
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	92%	0.9	99%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	83%	0.8	100%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30	100037	3.0	46413	1.4	22239	0.7	40091	1.2	50224	1.5	47000	1.4	66423	2.0	7737	0.2	75207	2.3	60863	1.8	70689	2.1	63354	1.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15	238036	1.5	93438	0.6	2000	0.0	113783	0.7	28380	0.2	6162	0.0	36060	0.2	48349	0.3	68639	0.4	51572	0.3	19365	0.1	17029	0.1	0	0.0	8582	0.1
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5	79%	0.4	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	78%	0.4	99%	0.5	100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2	0%	0.0	100%	0.5
GRNF TRNG FAC —	100		9.9		4.8		3.5		6.1		4.4		4.2		5.7		3.7		5.3		5.2		5.1		5.0		1.1		1.7
LVL MAINT OPS	30	I	2	DA	3	D	2.5	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5	O	1	O	1
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15	245483	0.2	194391	0.2	1854292	1.5	289040	0.2	218457	0.2	301674	0.2	238496	0.2	219824	0.2	156858	0.1	147685	0.1	151346	0.1	151102	0.1	22494	0.0	80251	0.1
COND OF HANGARS	5	100%	0.5	86%	0.4	94%	0.5	100%	0.5	100%	0.5	87%	0.4	52%	0.3	100%	0.5	64%	0.3	54%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3	100%	0.5	92%	0.5
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —	50		5.4		7.2		8.9		6.5		5.4		5.4		4.9		5.4		4.9		5.8		4.7		5.8		3.0		3.0
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	N	0.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —	50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0		4.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10	9.70%	0.7	3%	0.9	25%	0.1	28%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	22%	0.2	4%	0.9	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	1.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5	0%	0.5	2%	0.5	19%	0.3	50%	0.0	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	18%	0.3	2%	0.5	18%	0.3	4%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5	N	0.0	N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —	50		5.3		8.7		6.8		4.0		10.0		9.0		5.1		5.7		8.6		8.9		10.0		8.9		7.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10	732	1.0	205	0.3	162	0.2	604	0.8	99	0.1	130	0.2	658	0.8	659	0.9	247	0.3	152	0.2	222	0.3	264	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10	87.40%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	96%	1.0	86%	0.9	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	0%	0.0	0%	0.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10	100%	1.0	80%	0.8	90%	0.9	100%	1.0	80%	0.8	80%	0.8	87%	0.9	80%	0.8	70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9	0%	0.0	77%	0.8
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6	1516	0.7	330	0.2	439	0.2	687	0.3	520	0.2	245	0.1	948	0.4	1287	0.6	230	0.1	400	0.2	654	0.3	812	0.4	0	0.0	1229	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4	98.00%	0.4	80%	0.3	100%	0.4	78%	0.3	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	93%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	0%	0.0	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5	0	0.5	25	0.4	197	0.0	69	0.3	6	0.5	53	0.4	79	0.3	42	0.4	1	0.5	37	0.4	6	0.5	4	0.5	0	0.5	65	0.3
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5	0	0.5	145	0.2	265	0.0	113	0.3	10	0.5	180	0.2	186	0.1	74	0.4	30	0.4	216	0.1	150	0.2	14	0.5	0	0.5	23	0.5
SERVICES —	50		9.7		7.8		6.9		8.3		8.5		7.6		8.1		8.9		8.3		8.0		8.5		9.1		6.0		8.9
SCORE	999		6.8		6.3		6.2		6.1		6.3		6.5		5.6		6.1		6.5		6.0		6.8		6.6		5.3		3.5
RANK			1		7		8		10		6		4		12		9		5		11		2		3		13		14

FLIGHT SCREEN
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA ONLY

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	10		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.1	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	10		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	10		23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.1	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		150		2.9		3.6		6.1		4.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90		26007	5.7	29016	6.4	41056	9.0	22358	4.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		25	7.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	12.0	31.5	4.6
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		6.5		4.1		9.9		5.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	2	3.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	22	1.9	43	1.4
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25		88%	2.2	98%	2.5	42%	1.1	100%	2.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7
%CTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1
AIRFIELDS —		229		8.6		8.4		7.1		9.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		247	0.9	152	0.6	222	0.8	264	1.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
%MWR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	6		230	0.2	400	0.3	654	0.5	812	0.6
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	4		100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4	100%	0.4
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	5		1	0.5	37	0.0	6	0.4	4	0.4
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	5		30	0.4	216	0.0	150	0.2	14	0.5
SERVICES —		50		8.3		8.0		8.5		9.1
SCORE		999		6.9		6.6		8.2		7.2
RANK				3		4		1		2

FLIGHT SCREEN
AIR FORCE ONLY ANALYSIS
CORRECTED DATA & WEIGHTING

	WEIGHT		VANCE		REESE		LAU		COL	
# OF OUTLYING FLDS	10		1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
MOA SPEC AIRSPC	40		Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0	Y	4.0
MANAGED TRNG AREAS —		50		8.3		8.3		8.3		8.3
3000/5 >=80%?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	N	0.0
%TIME WTHER > 3000/5	40		83.90%	1.0	86.70%	1.8	81.80%	0.5	78.80%	0.0
1500/3 > 80?	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%TIME WTHER > 1500/3	20		89.40%	1.3	91.50%	1.5	90.90%	1.5	89.10%	1.2
% TIME CROSWND <15KT	40		93.20%	0.0	93.20%	0.0	99.30%	4.0	99.20%	3.9
% SORTIES CXL/RESCHD	20		23.30%	0.0	19.80%	0.0	18.00%	0.3	22.90%	0.0
SRTIE PLAN FCTR<=20%	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
SORTIE PLAN FCTR<=5%	5		23.00%	0.0	27.00%	0.0	19.00%	0.0	26.00%	0.0
WEATHER —		150		2.9		3.6		5.8		4.1
AMT MOA/AA ARSPCE	90		26007	5.7	29016	6.4	41056	9.0	22358	4.9
AVG DIST TO AIRSCE	120		25	7.8	40.8	0.0	16.6	12.0	31.5	4.6
%ATC DLAYS >15 MIN	20		0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0	0%	2.0
CMERC HUB W/IN 100MI	20		N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0	N	2.0
# OF BISECT AIRWAYS	20		20	0.0	12	0.8	4	1.6	2	1.8
AIRSPC/FLT TRNG AREA —		270		6.5		4.1		9.9		5.7
#OTLYG/AUX FLDS	30		1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	2	3.0
MED DIST TO AUX/OUT	20		26	1.8	17	2.0	22	1.9	43	1.4
#PRIMARY RUNWAYS	70		F	7.0	C	6.0	C	6.0	C	6.0
CONDIT OF RUNWAYS	30		100%	3.0	85%	2.6	85%	2.6	100%	3.0
%TAXI/APRNS ADQ COND	25		88%	2.2	98%	2.5	42%	1.1	100%	2.5
CONDIT OF UTILITIES	27		97%	2.6	92%	2.5	59%	1.6	100%	2.7
%OTHR FAC ADQ COND	27		56%	1.5	87%	2.3	60%	1.6	76%	2.1
AIRFIELDS —		229		8.6		8.4		7.1		9.0
AMT ADQ TRNG FAC	30		26652	0.9	59469	2.1	68320	2.4	84459	3.0
CONDITION % ADQ CLAS	10		86%	0.9	100%	1.0	91%	0.9	100%	1.0
AMT ADQ TRAINERS	30		75207	3.0	60863	2.4	70689	2.8	63354	2.5
CONDITION % ADQ TRNR	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
AMT OTHR TRNG FAC	15		68639	1.5	51572	1.1	19365	0.4	17029	0.4
CONDITION OTHER FAC	5		100%	0.5	99%	0.5	54%	0.3	36%	0.2
GRNF TRNG FAC —		100		7.8		8.2		7.8		8.1
LVL MAINT OPS	30		I	2	D	2.5	I	2	D	2.5
AMT ADQ HANGARS	15		156858	1.5	147685	1.4	151346	1.4	151102	1.4
COND OF HANGARS	5		64%	0.3	62%	0.3	48%	0.2	57%	0.3
AIRCRFT MAINT FAC —		50		7.6		8.4		7.4		8.5
IN ATTAIN/MAINT AREA	30		Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0	Y	3.0
MOD NONATTAIN/BETTER	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
DELAYS DUE AIR QUAL	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
AIR QUALITY —		50		10.0		10.0		10.0		10.0
AICUZ CPLTD ENCODED	10		Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0	Y	1.0
%INCOMPAT CLR ZONE	15		0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5	0%	1.5
%INCOMPAT APZI	10		1%	0.0	0%	1.0	0%	1.0	1%	0.0
%INCOMPAT APZII	5		18%	0.0	4%	0.4	0%	0.5	0%	0.5
REAL ESTATE DISCLOS	5		N	0.0	N	0.0	Y	0.5	N	0.0
CLR ZONE ACQ COMPLTD	5		Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5	Y	0.5
ENCROACHMENT —		50		6.0		8.8		10.0		7.0
AMT BOQ RMS ADQ	10		247	0.9	152	0.6	222	0.8	264	1.0
CONDITION BOQ % ADQ	10		100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0	100%	1.0
%M/WR/SPT FAC AVAIL	10		70%	0.7	93%	0.9	87%	0.9	87%	0.9
AMT MIL HSE ADQ	9		230	0.3	400	0.4	654	0.7	812	0.9
CONDITION HSE % ADQ	7		100%	0.7	100%	0.7	100%	0.7	100%	0.7
# CHLDCAR WAIT LIST	2		1	0.2	37	0.0	6	0.2	4	0.2
AVG WAIT CHILDREN	2		30	0.2	216	0.0	150	0.1	14	0.2
SERVICES —		50		8.3		8.0		8.5		9.1
SCORE		999		6.9		6.6		8.2		7.2
RANK				3		4		1		2

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REVIEW AND ANALYSIS - ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: FRANK CIRILLO DATE: Apr 1/22

	FYI	COORD.	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
STAFF DIRECTOR					
DIRECTOR/REVIEW & ANALYSIS					
DEP. DIR./ REVIEW & ANALYSIS					
ARMY TEAM LEADER	copy				
NAVY TEAM LEADER	copy				
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	copy				
SPECIAL TEAM LEADER	copy				

COMMENTS: ED, BOB, ALEX
ATTACHED IS A Pitch prepared by Greg Nixon to Focus AF Team ON Specific Compliance
(1) is the Pitch outline (2) Is AF Gov comp (3) is exerpt from Review & Analysis PLAN with Checklist. FOR YOUR USE AS APPROP

AF SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE OVERVIEW

- ANALYSIS TEAMS APPLY ACCEPTED GC en compliance METHODOLOGIES
- •• APPLY TO EACH INSTALLATION WITHIN EACH CATEGORY (*)
- •• WAS METHODOLOGY OF AF APPLIED CORRECTLY AND CONSISTENTLY?
- •• USED BY COMMISSIONERS TO IDENTIFY AND ASSESS S. DEV.
- USING SPECIFIC CHECKLIST, TEAM MUST ACCOMPLISH:
- •• POSITION PAPER AND BRIEFING TO MATT - NLT 7 MAY
  - ••• FOR EACH INSTALLATION CATEGORY
  - ••• ASSUMES COMPLETED ANALYSIS
- •• POSITION PAPER TO COMMISSIONERS - NLT 14 MAY
- •• EACH TEAM WILL BRIEF THE COMMISSIONERS 21 MAY AT HEARINGS
- •• CONCERN---TEAM FOCUS IMMEDIATELY REQUIRED

(1)

(*) Actually will be for only installations being considered for CLOS/REALIGN + any potential adds

CONCERNS

- HAS THE COMMISSION ACCEPTED THE GC REVIEW?
- IS EACH INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS FOLLOWING THE CHECKLIST?
  - •• ASKS PERTINENT QUESTIONS FOR DECISIONMAKING
  - •• IS EXCELLENT LOGIC FLOW FOR CONCLUSIONS
  - •• EVEN IF NOT USED, ANALYSIS SHOULD MIRROR
- CHECKLIST WILL SERVE AS THE FORMAT FOR THE POSITION PA
- MUST BE AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE - SOUND ANALYSIS
  - •• NEED DIRECTION ON HOW TO TREAT INCOMPLETE ANAYLSIS AREAS
  - •• RECOMMEND THAT ALL PAPERS INDICATE CAVEATS
- RAPID TEAM RESPONSE REQUIRED TO AVOID LAST MINUTE REQ FROM MANAGEMENT

STRATEGY

- AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITIES SAME AS FOR GC
- TWO SERIES OF PARALLEL ACTIONS
  1) BEGIN WRITING POSITION PAPERS NOW BASED ON ANALYSIS COMPLETED TO DATE - INCLUDE ANY PERTINENT CAVEATS

  2) PREPARE LIST OF OPEN ITEMS WITH EXPECTED RESOLUTION DATES
     - -- TASK GAO FOR SOME - NEED ACTIONS NLT COB TOMMORO
     - -- CONTINUE ANALYSIS OF OTHERS
- PAPERS AND STATUS OF OPEN ACTIONS REQUESTED NLT 4 MAY
  - •• BRIEFING TO FRANK - 5 MAY
  - •• REFINE AND SUBMIT TO MATT 7 MAY

DRAFT

GENERAL COMPLIANCE

AIR FORCE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS TEAM

PURPOSE:

This position paper prepared by the Commission's Air Force Review and Analysis(R&A) Team addresses the adequacy of the methodology used by the U.S. Air Force in developing its 1993 BRAC recommendations.

AIR FORCE R&A TEAM PROCESS:

The Air Force R&A team reviewed DoD's Base Closure And Realignment Report, the Air Forces's Analyses And Recommendations (Volume V) and its supporting documentation. Hearing responses and briefings provided by Air Force officials, including its Base Closure Working Group, answered our process questions and provided additional support for exclusion categories such as undergraduate pilot training. On-going R&A team efforts include reviewing follow-on responses from hearings and collating data from Air Force supporting documentation and inputs from communities to be used during our specific compliance analysis.

FINDINGS:

The R&A team found that the Air Force's methodology for developing its base closure and realignment recommendations was generally sound. The Air Force appears to have adequately considered the force structure plan and the eight DoD selection criteria.The R&A Issues team addressed the Air Forces compliance with selection criteria V-VIII. See the R&A Issues team's general compliance summary for details.

The Air Force R&A team found,however, that the Air Force's use of color codes to group bases rather than rankings made it virtually impossible to identify a distinct break point between those bases in group three which were considered for closure and the bases in group two which were not considered. This equivocal perspective in the break point was further exacerbated by the subjectivity of the BCEG 's rulings and determinations during base facility and capability ratings.

IDENTIFYING ELIGIBLE BASES: The Air Force used multiple sources to develop a listing of Air Force owned and leased bases which met the 10 United States Code, Section 2687 threshold of 300 or more authorized civilian personnel. For active and reserve bases the Air Force tasked the Defense Manpower Data Center(DMDC) to

identify DoD installations with 300 or more authorized civilian positions. This listing prepared by DMDC was compared to the DoD Base Structure Report, USAF's Installations Report, and the Air Staff's Manpower Programming Division list of bases with 200 or more authorized civilian positions. The Department of the Army and the Air Force National Guard Bureau identified Air National Guard installations with 300 or more authorized civilian positions. Through this process the Air Force identified 75 active and 24 Air Reserve Component bases. The GAO report identified 100 bases. This one base discrepancy, which appears to be Springfield Beckley MAP AGS, will be resolved during our specific compliance analysis.

CAPACITY ANALYSIS: The Air Force based closure and realignment recommendations on the Bush Administration Force Structure Plans. The legal deadline for submission of recommendations precluded Secretary Aspin from submitting a revised Clinton Administration Force Structure Plan. Although the Air Force force structure has already changed from the Bush plan, the Air Force R&A team accepts the premise used by the Air Force's BCEG in developing its recommendations.

The Air Force performed capacity analyses for the 99 bases completing surveys and performed actual on-site surveys at 48 bases. This analyses evaluated the capabilities of these bases to accommodate additional force structure beyond what had been programmed. The Air Force R&A team generally accepts the capacity analyses performed for these 99 bases, but is having difficulty in determining how the Air Force concluded that it had an excess of four large aircraft and one small aircraft base. This issue will be resolved during specific compliance.

BASE CATEGORIES: The Air Force categorized bases to perform the actual selection analysis. Categories included flying, industrial/technical support, training and other. The flying category was divided into three subcategories - operation, pilot training, and special operations forces. The operations subcategory was further divided into missile, small aircraft and large aircraft mission areas, based on predominant use and suitability. The industrial/technical support category was divided into depots, product centers and labs, and test facilities. Other categories included major headquarters, space operations, and cantonments. Since, all bases were contained in these categories and therefore were evaluated by the BCEG, the Air Force R&A team accepts the Air Force's categorization of bases.

BASE EXCLUSIONS: The Air Force excluded 35 bases from closure and or realignment considerations. Nineteen bases were excluded because the categories/subcategories in which they are included had no excess capacity or had some excess capacity for their

specified missions. The BCEG concluded that costs to relocate or replicate these missions would be prohibitive. Undergraduate pilot training bases and technical training centers are examples of these exclusions. The Air Force also excluded 16 bases as being mission essential or geographically key. Included in this category is Hickam AFB considered to be crucial to the reinforcement of the Pacific. (see Atch A for a listing of all 37 excluded bases by category/subcategory). The Air Force R&A team generally accepts the exclusion categories used by the Air Force.

COBRA: The DoD COBRA cost model was used to compute the cost and manpower implications, and the extent and timing of potential costs and savings. The BCEG approved the COBRA products that addressed these two selection criteria. The basic scoring for each base used all eight criteria, with priority given to military value (Criteria I-IV) with emphasis on readiness, training, future, and cost. Although, errors in specific COBRA data entries have been found, the Air Force R&A team generally accepts the COBRA runs for use in comparison analysis.

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT(ARC): The Air Reserve Components (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. The DoD Force Structure Plan does not reduce the ARC force structure, so there was no apparent excess base structure. Therefore, the ARC category was not examined for closure, but the Air Force Reserves were examined for cost effective realignments to other bases. The Air Force R&A team accepts the Air Force's special considerations as falling within general compliance requirements.

REDIRECTS: Bases identified by the 1988 and 1991 Base Closure Commissions as receiving bases were reevaluated by the Air Force along with all other bases against current force structure reductions to identify opportunities to operate more efficiently and effectively. The Air Force has recommended changes to six previously approved designated receiving bases. The Air Force has justified these redirects because they either result in significant cost savings or increase military value. The Air Force R&A team is initially concerned with two aspects of this analysis: first, the DoD late change in attributes used to validate the decision to pass on the redirects to the Commission, and second, the DoD decision to consider one time savings as low as $1 million as a valid attribute for accepting these redirects. The R&A Staff will continue this examination during our specific compliance analysis.

DEPOTS: The Air Force considered all six of its depots and recommended two for closure: McClellan and Newark. The Air Force developed performance measurement standards as part of Selection

Criteria I(current and future mission requirements and the impact of operational readiness of the DoD's total force). During our specific analysis we will address whether the scope and depth of the depot performance measurement standards used by the Air Force accurately measured one depot against another. Specific areas which will be addressed include excess capacity, realignment and consolidation alternatives and cost considerations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

We believe that the Commission should accept the Air Force's methodology as meeting the general compliance requirements specified by law. We suggest that the Commission may want to require the Air Force to use specific rankings rather than color codes for the 1995 base closure process. However, if the Commission considers color codes to be adequate, the R&A team recommends that statistically supported installation rankings, as presented to the SECAF, be documented and made available for independent review.

From the 1993

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
OFFICE OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

1 March 1993

1993 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS PLAN

SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE

GENERAL

Using accurate and appropriate supporting data, the analysis teams will apply the methodologies accepted by the Commissioners from the General Compliance review to each installation within each category in order to determine whether those methodologies were applied correctly and consistently by the Services and Defense Agencies. This analysis will enable the Commissioners to identify substantial deviations and formulate options for redressing identified substantial deviations. ? see (*)

Using the outline below, the analysis teams will prepare a position paper and a briefing for each installation category. The questions below serve only as a guideline for doing the required analysis. Teams are free to delve deeper into the analysis or to investigate additional issues. Each analysis team will brief the Staff Director on its progress and preliminary observations NLT 7 May 1993. This briefing is intended to be a brainstorming session in case there are procedural or policy questions to iron out. By that time, all of the installations recommended for closure and realignment by the Department of Defense will have been analyzed. (*)

what are implications (intended)?

Based on this review, each analysis team will prepare a position paper for each installation category to be sent to the Commissioners NLT 14 May 1993. Each analysis team will brief the Commissioners on their observations during the deliberation hearings scheduled for 21-22 May 1993.

PURPOSE

State the purpose of evaluation as outlined in the 1993 Review and Analysis Plan.

PROCESS

In general terms, explain the process used by the Service or Defense Agency in developing their closure and realignment recommendations.

3

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
OFFICE OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

1 March 1993

1993 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS PLAN

SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE
(Continued)

FINDINGS

I Data Accuracy - Explain how the accuracy of the data was determined.

II Data Verification - Explain how the data were verified.

III Category Validation - Explain how the proper data elements and methodology were applied.

IV Base Validation - Explain whether the Service or Defense Agency final recommendations appear accurate based on application of the methodology and evaluation of data.

1. Were the data used in the methodology valid and accurate?

a. What proportion of the data was accepted based on Service audit agency or General Accounting Office verification?

b. What proportion of the data was verified by the team?

2. Were the categorization rules of the methodology applied consistently? Did the bases in each category belong there?

3. Were the exclusion rules of the methodology applied consistently? Did the stated reasons for each exclusion apply to each base excluded?

4. Do valid data and the application of the methodology support the numerical or color coding of each factor used?

5. Do the factors' numerical or color codings support the overall rating given to the base?

6. Is there a justifiable, non-random pattern to the closure and realignment decisions at the final step of the Service's and Defense Agency's process?

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
OFFICE OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

1 March 1993

1993 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS PLAN

SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE
(Continued)

OBSERVATIONS

1. Did corrections to the data call into question any of the Service's or Defense Agency's closure or realignment recommendations?

a. Should any bases on the closure list drop off?

b. Should any bases not on the list be considered for closure?

c. Should any realignment actions be reconsidered?

2. For those bases categorized incorrectly, did you re-categorize them into a more appropriate category? Did the new categorization indicate that any closure, non-closure, or realignment decisions should be reconsidered?

3. For those bases inappropriately excluded, did you apply the full methodology to them to see how they rate in their appropriate category? Did the change indicate that any closure, non-closure, or realignment decisions should be reconsidered?

4. For those changes in factor or overall base coding, did you re-prioritize any bases? Did the change indicate that any closure, non-closure, or realignment decisions should be reconsidered?

5. Do the installations selected for closure seem logical when compared to changes in the Force Structure Plan? (A matrix would be useful for this comparison.) Conversely, do the bases remaining support the FY 95 Force Structure Plan?

6. What did sensitivity analysis on each of the eight selection criteria show?

a. In general, how much do the data used to evaluate a criterion have to change in order to change a color or numerical coding?

b. How much does a criterion's color and numerical coding have to change in order to change a closure, non-closure, or realignment decision?

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
OFFICE OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

1 March 1993

1993 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS PLAN

SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE
(Continued)

7. Have the conclusions been discussed with Service or Defense Agency counterparts? What was the Service's response?

8. Should the Commission accept all of the Service's decisions on all of its installations? If not, what options for changes to the base closure and realignment list are there for the Commission to consider?

9. What changes should the Commission recommend for the base closure and realignment process in 1995?

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FROM: Bob

TO: Ben, Frank, Ed, Alex

SUBJECT: Specific Compliance

Attached are the specific compliance analyses for criterion 7 (Community Infrastructure) and 8 (Environmental). Criterion 8 is marked "draft" because we are awaiting (a) a response from the Army to a Commission letter and (b) more information from the Air Force.

You can use them as you see fit during your forthcoming presentations. We anticipate having criterion 6 (Economic) completed shortly and will immediately provide it to you.

For criteria 5 (ROI), Jeff is currently working various scenarios for you. The results of the continuous COBRA runs are the specific compliance for criteria 5. Therefore, there will be no formal written analysis developed until later in the process and that will be for the historical record.

Atch

DRAFT

INTERNAL WORKING DOCUMENT

AIR FORCE TEAM ACTION/GOALS FOR FIRST PHASE ANALYSIS

1. There are two areas of Analysis that are necessary to prepare ourselves for the Final Deliberations;
    - GENERAL COMPLIANCE - To be complete by GAO Hearing. This is in essence our review and check as to whether the Air Force followed the Requirements of the Law, DoD Guidance (See Book I, Tab 9, Air Force Team Read File - Steve put together and is in his Book Case), Air Force Procedures (Vol V Chaps 3 and 4) and other internal directions. In addition we must verify that the Air Force categories and exclusions appear valid considering the Force Structure and Capacity. LETS TALK ON OUR APPROACH ON THIS
    - SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE - To be complete by Adds Hearing. This is where we validate the data, capacity issues and that the bases are in the correct categories and appear to have been judged fairly throughout the BCEG process. The best tools here are the Capacity Analysis, BCEG/SECAF Minutes and Briefings, and Force Plan (Classified). It is essential that we brief our validated capacity analysis to the Commissioners as part of the Adds Hearing - i.e. The Air Force says this and we support or contradict - essential if they are to be satisfied that adds or even closures in specific areas are required.
    - Both of the above were formalized in 1993 but not in 95. See Tab A of the R&A Handbook. This is not smoke or make work but vital to the process. In sure your notes reflect these areas.

2. Be very, very familiar with the R&A Handbook. Insure you know what is ahead. Start building your ADDS and Final Delib Charts now - Think about the Report and Motions as well as reports for trips, regional hearings etc..
3. Insure you are preparing meeting memos for all community meetings where we are lead and following Tab B
4. Read the Read File Books Steve has prepared.
5. Be very familiar with ACCESS and POWER POINT. Start now.
6. Suggest the following Read Schedule:
    - Read Vol I, II & V of DoD Report - NLT 3/15
    - Read Transcripts of 1(AM/PM) and 6 March Hearing - NLT 3/18
    - Read your Category Capacity Briefs - NLT 3/31
    - Read through BCEG/SECAF Briefs - NLT 3/31
    - Read your Category's Base Data calls - NLT your base visit (or 4/15)
    - Read ECTS and Walton's letter files for your base - NLT RH (or 4/15)
    - Analyze related focused, level P F COBRAs for your Cat. - NLT 3/24
    - Update "Closure History" Data Base and "Static" Data Base - NLT RH

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Specific Compliance

of

AF Team Independent Analysis

BACKGROUND: In 1991 the AF Team analyzed the DoD recommendations using the color coded grades provided by the BCEG and assigning numerical values to the "grades" to verify numerically that the BCEG decisions made sense. The 1993 AF Team analysis is independent of both the grades and the 1991 analysis.

DISCUSSION:

• The Air Force sent questionnaires to every base. The base's responses were used by the Air Force's Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) for the base closure and realignment process and their analysis. The base's questionnaire responses were officially "certified" and provided to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC).

- •• This certified data was the basis for all analysis done by the BCEG and the ratings given to each base.
- •• More questions were asked on the questionnaire than were used to determine BCEG ratings.
- •• All bases responded to questions covering all mission areas (airlift, tanker, fighter, and bomber) regardless of whether that mission was performed at the base.

• The AF Team conducted independent analysis of the military criteria (criteria 1 through 3) for validating Air Force base operational groupings and analyzing a base's ability to support other missions that were not rated by the BCEG and began a three phase review process.

Phase I. Data Collection, Database Population and Display.

• The first phase of the specific base operational analysis focused on data collection from base questionnaires and database population within the Installation Information Data System (IIDS).

• The questionnaires were reviewed independently by AF Team members to determine which questions were relevant to operational military value within each mission area.

- •• AF Team question selections focused on a bases' ability to conduct operations from peacetime training to wartime deployment/ employment.
- •• The AF Team conservatively selected more questions for inclusion in the database than expected for use in the analysis to ensure the data would be available, because the database was to be "locked out" early in the process.

•• Questions focused on operational areas for generating training sorties (such as fuel, ramp space, and weather) as well as the training airspace and ranges to support training once airborne.

•• Noise complaints, ground encroachment compliance, and ATC delay responses were included to reflect restrictions to flight operations at a base.

• Questions that the AF Team assessed would be of value to the Commissioners were selected from the database and formatted for Commissioner's display screens.

•• The displays included explanations of questionnaire inquiries as well as a standard to measure the responses against.

•• The "standard" used for the Commissioner screens was derived from the BCEG's values for grades of "Green" or "Red". This range was not available for all questions in the AF Team database, as the BCEG graded questionnaire responses for a limited number of items.

•• Additional questionnaire responses were displayed for Commissioner use, but not defined by a range and were intended for use in comparing raw data of various bases.

• All database fields were checked for input errors, and all questionnaire extractions were checked by two persons to ensure accurate data extraction and to resolve interpretation conflicts.

Phase II. Independent Analysis of Mission Areas- Airlift, Bomber, Fighter, Mobility, and Tanker.

• The next phase was to analyze the database for future comparative analysis of bases.

• The Database from IIDS was converted to Excel for analysis and scoring of four mission areas: airlift, bomber, fighter, and tanker. Additionally, airlift and tanker mission areas were combined for comparative analysis of the mobility mission.

• The mission area specialists determined which question responses, from those in the IIDS database, best represented a bases' ability to support a mission area.

•• This mission area analysis determined the datafields that would be scored for all bases in that category.

•• Several questionnaire responses (such as encroachment compliance, noise complaints, weather, ramp space etc.) were relevant to all mission areas, although maximum points vary depending on the relative importance of the question response to the mission area.

- Next the AF Team determined maximum score values.
  - •• Ten points was determined to be the maximum score value with questions of lesser importance being assigned five points.
  - •• AF Team analysis focused on the "house" and not the "furniture in the house".
    - ••• Unique infrastructure requirements such as large hangars, hush houses, and special security must be considered under criteria four as additional costs to replicate.

- Question responses were not weighted by multiplying scores with an arbitrary factor; the AF Team scored more questionnaire responses from mission elements deemed pertinent and therefore determined relative value within a mission area. For example, rather than saying the location of ranges supporting bomber base training was worth three times the base's runway length, only ten points were given for runway length while scores were given for "Electronic Combat" ranges, bombing ranges, Radar Bombing Sites and low level training routes, totalling 30 points.

- Next, the AF Team determined the point score for each question response.
  - •• For each mission area, an approximate threshold was determined above which no points would be awarded i.e. a bombing range further than 250 miles has little value for the fighter mission and would score zero points.
  - •• If applicable, a threshold on the opposite spectrum was determined beyond which all responses would receive the maximum number of points.
  - •• Linear equations were developed to provide a score within the range, with higher scores being better.

- A sample of question responses was run through each equation to determine "reasonableness" for the range of scores and values, without associating specific bases to the scores.

- Condition and capacity of a bases' facilities and housing could not readily be captured from questionnaire data. Instead, the AF Team used the color coded ratings that the BCEG certified for these areas as the basis for the analysis.
  - •• The AF Team applied numerical scores to color codes similar to the AF Team analysis in 1991. The colors were scored as follows:
    - ••• Green = 5 points
    - ••• Yellow = 3 points
    - ••• Red = 1 point
  - •• The BCEG rated base facility capacity, building condition, and infrastructure condition. Also, the BCEG rated a bases' housing capacity and condition.
  - •• A base's facilities could receive a maximum score of 25 points.

•• The BCEG rated facilities for all those bases in mission categories containing bases recommended for closure or realignment. Additionally, supplemental data included some facility ratings for bases in excluded categories (such as Flying Training bases and Major Headquarters).
•• Some bases do not have facility scores.

• AF Team scoring and analysis of questionnaire data for operational aspects provided relative values between bases across a wide spectrum of mission aspects, rating more question responses than the BCEG. Additionally, each question response had a range of possible values from one to ten (or five) for discrimination within a category. This methodology does not, however, capture the qualitative issues for question responses that the BCEG is able to with "subjective" discussions.

Phase III. Base Comparative Analysis.

• The AF Team sought to score all bases claiming a mission capability with validated scores and maximum scores for the mission areas in question.
•• Costs for closure and realignments, and cost avoidance analysis were not included in this analysis phase and are not reflected in the staff scores.

• An initial database run produced preliminary scores for only those bases that claimed the ability to accomplish each mission area.
•• The scores were scrubbed for incorrect data.
•• This initial look was used by the AF Team for preliminary scores in the "adds brief" to the Commissioners.

• Two areas needing review in the matrix and equations surfaced from community and Air Force investigations of the AF Team's initial scoring.
•• One was an inconsistency in the bomber matrix. The bomber matrix awarded points for force structure unlike the other mission areas. The AF Team voted and the force structure scores were removed. Force structure "value" will be addressed under cost to replicate facilities for those forces under criteria four.
•• The second area concerned the Air Force's new operational concept for the mobility mission. The AF Team consulted tanker pilots and action officers from the air staff's mobility shop on mobility mission base requirements.
••• An additional data call was made from the Air Force's BCEG minutes for "KC-135 equivalent" parking spaces, "tanker saturation", and distance to the nearest high density refueling track.

••• A Mobility matrix was built incorporating the new data-call. This matrix was completed after the "adds" hearings for further analysis of the bases being considered by the Air Force as "Mobility" bases.
••• The tanker matrix was also updated with the tanker saturation and distance to the nearest high-density refueling track.
••• The airlift matrix was updated in the following areas:

1. The percent of the time weather exceeded 3,000 feet and 5 miles, for low level training-- added (10 points maximum)
2. The importance of "port" facilities and rail access were also deemed questionable. The port question was removed from the scoring matrix, and the rail score was reduced from 10 to 5 points.
3. The distance to the primary airlift customer was changed from 10 to 5 points.

• Following the "Adds" hearings, where the Commissioners accepted the Air Force's exclusions, the database for comparative analysis was restricted to only those bases the Air Force graded in each major category.

•• Of the 21 large aircraft bases rated by the Air Force, only 18 bases were capable of performing the Bomber mission and were compared in the fianl AF Team analysis.
•• The comparative analysis numerically ranked all 21 large aircraft bases for the airlift, tanker and and the mobility mission areas.

• Community inputs for Database errors are still being considered and incorporated in this comparative analysis.

• Following are the maximum point values for question areas and the specific equations used to score the bases claiming the capability to perform the airlift, bomber, fighter, and tanker missions:

Maximum Scores for Airlift Questionnaire Responses.

- Runway length (FLIP)-- 10 points
- Total usable ramp space (III.1.H.1)-- 10 points
- Does the base have a hot pad (III.1.F)-- 10 points
- C-141 maximum on ground (III.1.A)-- 10 points
- POL storage store (II.2.B.1.P)-- 10 points
- Number of fuel hydrants (III.1.C.1)-- 10 points
- Weather above 300' and 1 mile (I.2.A.1.A)-- 10 points
- Weather above 3000' and 5 miles (I.2.A.1.B)-- 10 points
- Distance to weather alternate (I.2.C.1.A)-- 10 points
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays (I.2.B)-- 10 points
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones (II.6.A)-- 5 points
- Number of noise complaints (II.3.E)-- 10 points

- Drop zone (I.2.N.1)-- 10 points
- Army base within 150 miles (III.1.G.1)-- 5 points
- Rail access within 150 miles (III.1.G.2)-- 5 points
- Distance to full-scale airdrop (I.2.N.3)-- 5 points
- Distance to ground forces (airborne) (I.2.N.2)-- 10 points
- Distance to primary airlift customer (I.2.M.4)-- 5 points
- Distance to Air Refueling Track (I.2.H.4)-- 10 points
- Number of low level routes within 200 nautical miles (I.2.D.9)-- 5 points
- Base facilities -- 15 points
- Housing facilities -- 10 points

MAXIMUM SCORE -- 195 points

Maximum Scores for Bomber Questionnaire Responses.

- Runway length -- 10 points
- Total usable ramp space -- 10 points
- Does the base have a hot pad -- 5 points
- Number of refueling hydrants -- 5 points
- C-141 maximum on ground -- 5 points
- Weather above 300 and 1 mile -- 10 points
- Distance to weather alternate -- 10 points
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays -- 10 points
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones -- 10 points
- Number of noise complaints -- 10 points
- Distance to Radar Bombing Site scoring facility (I.2.H.2)-- 10 points
- Distance to Air Refueling Track -- 10 points
- Distance to bombing range (I.2.H.1)-- 10 points
- Distance to low altitude military operating area (I.2.D.2)-- 5 points
- Distance to electronic combat range (I.2.D.4)-- 5 points
- Number of visual and instrument low level routes within 200 nautical miles -- 5 points
- Base facilities -- 15 points
- Housing facilities -- 10 points

MAXIMUM SCORE -- 155 points

Maximum Scores for Fighter Questionnaire Responses.

- Runway length -- 10 points
- Total usable ramp space -- 5 points
- Does the base have a hot pad -- 5 points
- Is there hot pit refueling for fighter training (III.1.C.2)-- 5 points
- C-141 maximum on ground -- 5 points
- Weather above 300'/1 mile for take-off-- 10 points
- Weather above 3000'/5 mile for low level training (I.2.A.1.B)-- 10 points
- Distance to weather alternate -- 10 points
- Distance to divert for emergency runway closure (I.2.C.1.B)-- 5 points
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays -- 10 points

- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones -- 10 points
- Number of noise complaints -- 10 points
- Is there a bombing range within 100 miles (I.2.D.3)-- 5 points
- Distance to bombing range -- 10 points
- Number of bombing ranges within 250 miles (I.2.D.3)-- 5 points
- Distance to electronic combat training range -- 10 points
- Distance to Army units for joint training (I.2.D.5)-- 10 points
- Distance to Air Refueling Track -- 10 points
- Distance to supersonic air-to-air training area (I.2.D.1)-- 10 points
- Distance to low altitude military operating area -- 10 points
- Number of visual and instrument low level routes within 200 nautical miles -- 10 points
- Number of night low level routes within 200 nautical miles (I.2.D.10)-- 5 points
- Base facilities -- 15 points
- Housing facilities -- 10 points

MAXIMUM SCORE -- 205 points

Maximum Scores for Mobility Questionnaire Responses.

- Runway length (FLIP)-- 10 points
- Total usable ramp space (III.1.H.1)-- 10 points
- Does the base have a hot pad (III.1.F)-- 10 points
- C-141 maximum on ground (III.1.A)-- 10 points
- POL storage store (II.2.B.1.P)-- 10 points
- Number of fuel hydrants (III.1.C.1)-- 10 points
- Weather above 300′ and 1 mile (I.2.A.1.A)-- 10 points
- Weather above 3000′ and 5 miles (I.2.A.1.B)-- 10 points
- Distance to weather alternate (I.2.C.1.A)-- 10 points
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays (I.2.B)-- 10 points
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones (II.6.A)-- 5 points
- Number of noise complaints (II.3.E)-- 10 points
- Drop zone (I.2.N.1)-- 10 points
- Distance to full-scale airdrop (I.2.N.3)-- 5 points
- Distance to ground forces (airborne) (I.2.N.2)-- 10 points
- Distance to Air Refueling Track (I.2.H.4)-- 10 points
- Number of low level routes within 200 nautical miles (I.2.D.9)-- 5 points
- Number of KC-135 equivalents that can be parked -- 10 points
- Distance to high-density air refueling track -- 10 points
- What is the tanker saturation -- 10 points
- Base facilities -- 15 points
- Housing facilities -- 10 points

MAXIMUM POSSIBLE -- 210 points

Maximum Scores for Tanker Questionnaire Responses.

- Total usable ramp space -- 10 points
- Runway length -- 10 points
- POL storage store -- 10 points
- Number of fuel hydrants -- 10 points

- Weather above 300′ and 1 mile for take-off-- 10 points
- Distance to weather alternate -- 10 points
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays -- 10 points
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones -- 5 points
- Number of noise complaints -- 10 points
- Distance to Air Refueling Track -- 10 points
- Distance to high density air refueling track -- 10 points
- Tanker saturation for base's area -- 10 points
- Base facilities -- 15 points
- Housing facilities -- 10 points

MAXIMUM SCORE -- 140 points

The equations used to determine the linear values for individual scores (up to the maximums stated above) follow:

Questionnaire Item	**R&A Score**
Ramp Space	# /100,000 = score (lrg a/c) # /200,000 = score (fighter)
Runway Length	# < 10000 = 0 (bomber/tanker/ mobility) # < 8000 = 0 (fighter) # < 7000 = 0 (airlift) # = 7k-8k = 7 (airlift) # = 10k-11k = 8 (bomber/tanker/ mobility) # = 8k-9k = 8 (fighter/airlift) # = 11k-12k = 9 (bomber/tanker/ mobility) # = 9k-10k = 9 (fighter/airlift) # > 12k = 10 (bomber/tanker/ mobility) # > 10k = 10 (fighter/airlift)
POL storage capacity	#/20000 = score (tanker/mobility) #/10000 = score (airlift/bomber)
Numbers of hydrants	# / 5 = score (bomber/airlift/ mobility) (# - 8)/4 = score (tanker)
Does base have "hotpad" for explosive cargo handling?	Yes = 10 (airlift/mobility) Yes = 5 (bomber/fighter) No = 0
C-141 Maximum on Ground	# = score (bombers and ftrs) 2 x # = score (airlift/mobility)

Questionnaire Item	R&A Score
Does the base have "hot pit" refueling for fighter refuel?	Yes = 5 (fighter) No = 0
Is the base in encroachment compliance for accident potential zones?	Yes = 10 (bomber/fighter) Yes = 5 (airlift/tanker/ mobility) No = 0
% Weather > 300′ and 1 mile	90 - # = score
% Weather > 3000′ and 5 miles	(80 - #)/2 = score (fighter/airlift/mobility)
Distance to weather alternate	(250 - #)/25 = score (lrg a/c) (210 - #)/21 = score (ftrs)
Distance to divert runway	(100 - #)/20 = score (ftrs)
Number of ATC delays	10 - # = score
Number of noise complaints per month	10 - # = score
Distance to bombing range	(600 - #)/60 = score (bomber) (250 - #)/25 = score (fighter)
Distance to Electronic Combat Training Range	(600 - #)/120 = score (bomber) (250 - #)/20 = score (fighter)
Number of Low Level training routes	# IR + VR = score (bomber) # (IR+VR)/2 = score (fighter) # IR + VR + SR = score (airlift/ mobility)
Number of Night Low Level training routes	# = score (fighter)
Distance to Supersonic military operating area	(200 - #)/15 = score (fighter)
Is there a bombing range within 100 miles?	Yes = 5 points (fighter) No = 0 points
Distance to Radar Bombing Site	(500 - #)/50 (bomber)
Number of bombing ranges within 250 miles	# = score (fighter)
Distance to Low altitude military operating area	(200 - #)/30 = score (bomber) (200 - #)/15 = score (fighter)

Questionnaire Item	R&A Score
Distance to Army unit for joint training	(200 - #)/15 = score (fighter)
Distance to Drop Zone	(250 - #)/25 = score (airlift/ mobility)
Distance to Airborne units	(250 - #)/25 = score (airlift/ mobility)
Distance to Air Refueling Routes	(400-#)/40 = score (bomber) (250-#)/25 = score (lift/tank/ mobility) (200-#)/15 = score (fighter)
Distance to Primary Airlift Customer	(250 - #)/50 = score (airlift)
Distance to Full Scale Airdrop range	(250 - #)/50 = score (airlift/ mobility)
What is tanker saturation?	Rich = 0 points (tanker/mobility) Balanced = 5 points (tanker/mobility) Poor = 10 points (tanker/mobility)
Distance to nearest high density air refueling track	(600 - #)/60 = score (tanker/mobility)
Number of KC-135 equivalents that can be parked on ramp	# / 10 = score (mobility)
Is there an Army base within 150 miles?	Yes = 5 points (airlift) No = 0 points
Is there Railroad access within 150 miles?	Yes = 5 points (airlift) No = 0 points

Attached are the actual data entry points and the scores for each mission area. Only active duty bases that were ranked by the BCEG and indicated within the questionnaire that they were capable of accommodating the particular mission area were included in the matrix.

5 Attachments
1. Airlift
2. Bomber
3. Fighter
4. Mobility
5. Tanker

INST_NAM	STATE	FORCES (FY95/4)	HOTPAD SCORE	RAMPMAX	RAMP SCORE	MOG141	MOG SCORE	WXMIN	WX MIN SCORE	WXLL	WXLL SCORE	WXALT	WXALT SCORE	ATCDLYNO	ATC DLY# SCORE	SRNO	VRNO	IRNO	ILL# SCORE	AARTRK	AAR SCORE	DZ	DZ SCORE	ARBRNE	ARBRNE SCORE	ARDRP	ARDRP SCORE	AIRLFTDIST	AIRLIFT DIST SCORE	ARMYBASE	ARMY SCORE	RAIL	RAIL SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCRCH SCORE	RWYLG	RWY SCORE	POL	POL SCORE	HYDRANTS	# HYD SCORE	TOTAL OPS SCORE	FACILITY SCORE	TOTAL SCORE
ATTSBURGH AFB	NY	KC135	10	954568	10	6	10	99.0	9	89.0	6	120	6	1	9	0	7	2	6	44	8	36	9	95	6	36	4	95	3	Y	5	Y	5	1	9	0	11760	10	100672	10	84	10	142	21	163
IFFISS AFB	NY	B52/135	10	515000	5	10	10	98.6	9	71.1	0	31	9	0	10	6	10	5	5	0	10	60	8	60	8	60	4	60	4	Y	5	Y	5	3	7	5	11820	10	73600	7	30	8	137	23	160
TTLE ROCK AFB	AR	C-130	10	680000	7	2	4	97.8	8	81.9	1	108	6	1	9	19	9	11	5	100	6	25	9	95	6	0	5	95	3	Y	5	Y	5	2	8	5	12000	10	106260	10	74	10	132	23	155
AVIS AFB	CA	C5/C141	10	1040177	10	6	10	97.0	7	91.0	6	40	8	0	10	7	13	4	5	157	4	40	8	540	0	50	4	100	3	Y	5	Y	5	2	8	5	11000	10	192744	10	64	10	138	17	155
YESS AFB	TX	B1/K135/C130	10	859796	9	2	4	98.7	9	86.7	3	115	5	0	10	11	11	13	5	190	2	6	10	135	5	1	5	999	0	Y	5	N	0	1	9	0	13500	10	119277	10	76	10	121	25	146
HITEMAN AFB	MO	B2//A10	10	720000	7	2	4	98.0	8	80.0	0	14	9	0	10	4	15	7	5	80	7	32	9	160	4	160	2	160	2	Y	5	Y	5	0	10	5	12400	10	103396	10	22	4	126	19	145
TUS AFB	OK	C17/C141/KC1	10	649050	6	2	4	98.6	9	86.9	3	110	6	1	9	1	10	4	5	65	7	22	9	210	2	22	5	52	4	Y	5	Y	5	1	9	5	13440	10	88874	9	30	6	128	17	145
ALE AFB	CA	U2/T38	10	213055	2	3	6	97.7	8	92.1	6	28	9	3	7	7	13	5	5	30	9	75	7	445	0	83	3	150	2	Y	5	Y	5	0	10	5	12000	10	129862	10	28	6	125	17	142
ARKSDALE AFB	LA	B-52/KC10/KC1	10	1042608	10	2	4	98.2	8	79.0	0	96	6	1	9	5	18	29	5	30	9	90	6	160	4	230	0	90	3	Y	5	Y	5	1	9	5	11756	10	142048	10	29	6	124	17	141
CGUIRE AFB	NJ	C-141/KC135	10	944708	9	3	6	94.1	4	73.9	0	68	7	2	8	19	12	4	5	90	6	11	10	107	6	80	3	350	0	Y	5	Y	5	2	8	0	10001	10	95240	10	29	6	118	21	139
HARLESTON AFB	SC	C141/C17	10	656667	7	5	10	97.2	7	83.6	2	70	7	0	10	2	26	10	5	150	4	70	7	70	7	70	4	135	2	Y	5	Y	5	1	9	0	9001	9	77976	8	33	7	125	13	138
CCHORD AFB	WA	C-141/A10	10	683000	7	6	10	95.0	5	73.2	0	95	6	0	10	11	4	7	5	150	4	0	10	10	10	10	5	10	5	Y	5	Y	5	14	0	0	10100	10	73604	7	23	5	119	17	136
ARCH AFB	CA	KC10/135/C14	0	1038421	10	5	10	99.0	9	86.0	3	28	9	1	9	2	21	11	5	290	0	37	9	149	4	37	4	37	4	Y	5	Y	5	30	0	0	13300	10	990048	10	40	8	114	21	135
OVER AFB	DE	C-5	10	605700	6	8	10	96.6	7	83.2	2	68	7	0	10	18	18	9	5	200	2	32	9	60	8	66	4	290	0	Y	5	Y	5	5	5	0	12902	10	97942	10	14	3	118	15	133
CCONNELL AFB	KS	B-1/K135	10	489269	5	2	4	97.8	8	82.0	1	72	7	0	10	5	19	11	5	110	6	72	7	90	6	90	3	90	3	Y	5	Y	5	12	0	0	12000	10	80986	8	22	4	107	21	128
LLSWORTH AFB	SD	B-1/KC135	10	1374582	10	2	4	97.2	7	86.9	3	265	0	1	9	3	0	17	5	110	6	200	2	320	0	200	1	400	0	Y	5	Y	5	2	8	0	13497	10	144887	10	38	8	103	25	128
ALMSTROM AFB	MT	KC-135	10	333541	3	2	4	98.8	9	87.0	4	263	0	0	10	0	0	16	5	67	7	0	10	407	0	65	4	10	5	N	0	Y	5	2	8	5	11500	10	65952	7	15	3	109	17	126
INOT AFB	ND	B-52/KC135	10	420041	4	3	6	97.9	8	82.2	1	164	3	0	10	0	0	5	5	0	10	190	2	500	0	190	1	597	0	N	0	Y	5	1	9	5	13200	10	63214	6	29	6	101	21	122
AIRCHILD AFB	WA	B52/K135	10	848960	6	2	4	94.5	5	80.6	0	205	2	0	10	0	4	6	5	50	8	160	4	210	2	150	2	210	1	N	0	Y	5	0	10	0	13901	10	77831	8	30	6	98	21	119
RAND FORKS AFB	ND	B1B/K135	10	444160	4	2	4	98.3	8	82.2	1	68	7	0	10	0	1	12	5	100	6	210	2	430	0	210	1	500	0	N	0	Y	5	2	8	5	12351	10	56666	6	26	5	97	17	114
. I. SAWYER AFB	MI	B52	10	416564	4	1	2	93.5	4	65.3	0	200	2	0	10	4	12	2	5	90	6	180	3	276	0	180	1	150	2	Y	5	N	0	0	10	5	12300	10	41715	4	42	8	91	21	112
			Y = 10 N = 0		X/100,000		X*2		90-X		(X-80)/2		(250-X)/25		10-X				SR + VR + IR = X		(250-X)/25		(250-X)/25		(250-X)/25		(250-X)/50		(250-X)/50		Y = 5		Y = 5		10-X				X/10000		X/5			
MAX SCORE AVAILABLE			10		10		10		10		10		10		10				5		10		10		10		5		5		5		5		10	5		10		10		10	170	25	195

1 1 Incorporates Griffiss Assessed Ramp Capacity-- 515,000Sq Yds

BOMBER BASE ANALYSIS

INST_NAM	FORCES (FY95/4)	HOTPAD	HOTPAD SCORE	RAMPMAX	RAMP SCORE	MOG141	141 MOG SCORE	WXMIN	%WX>300/1 SCOR	WXALT	ALT DIST SCORE	ATCDLYNO	ATC DLY SCORE	ECRNG	ECRNG SCORE	VRNO	IRNO	IR/VR SCORE	AARTRK	AAR SCORE	LOWMOA	LOW MOA SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCRCH	ENCRCH SCORE	RWYLG	RWY LG SCORE	BMBRNG	BOMB SCORE	RBS	RBS SCORE	# OF HYDRANTS	HYD# SCORE	OPS TOTAL	FACILITY SCORE	TOTAL SCORE
IFFISS AFB	B52/135	Y	5	515000	5	10	5	98.6	9	31	9	0	10	368	2	10	5	5	0	10	30	5	3	7	Y	10	11820	9	60	9	50	9	30	5	114	23	137
NOT AFB	B-52/KC1	Y	5	420041	4	3	3	97.9	8	164	3	0	10	130	4	0	5	5	0	10	40	5	1	9	Y	10	13200	10	0	10	120	8	29	5	109	21	130
AVIS AFB	C5/C141	Y	5	1040177	10	6	5	97.0	7	40	8	0	10	180	4	13	4	5	157	6	64	5	2	8	Y	10	11000	9	90	9	150	7	64	5	113	17	130
RKSDALE AFB	B52/KC10	Y	5	1042508	10	2	2	98.2	8	96	6	1	9	180	4	18	29	5	30	9	75	4	1	9	Y	10	11756	9	92	8	60	9	29	5	112	17	129
TLE ROCK AFB	C-130	Y	5	680000	7	2	2	97.8	8	108	6	1	9	490	1	9	11	5	100	8	64	5	2	8	Y	10	12000	10	95	8	59	9	74	5	106	23	129
TUS AFB	C17/C141	Y	5	649050	6	2	2	98.6	9	110	6	1	9	220	3	10	4	5	65	8	25	5	1	9	Y	10	13440	10	23	10	220	6	30	5	108	17	125
ALE AFB	U2/T38	Y	5	213055	2	3	3	97.7	8	28	9	3	7	155	4	13	5	5	30	9	50	5	0	10	Y	10	12000	10	150	8	160	7	28	5	107	17	124
HITEMAN AFB	B2/A10	Y	5	720000	7	2	2	98.0	8	14	9	0	10	555	0	15	7	5	80	8	0	5	0	10	Y	10	12400	10	215	6	390	2	22	4	101	19	120
ESS AFB	B1/KC135	Y	5	859796	9	2	2	98.7	9	115	5	0	10	225	3	11	13	5	190	5	20	5	1	9	N	0	13500	10	225	6	240	5	76	5	93	25	118
I. SAWYER AFB	B52	Y	5	416564	4	1	1	93.5	4	200	2	0	10	550	0	12	2	5	90	8	25	5	0	10	Y	10	12300	10	0	10	100	8	42	5	97	21	118
RAND FORKS AFB	B1B/K135	Y	5	444160	4	2	2	98.3	8	68	7	0	10	850	0	1	12	5	100	8	40	5	2	8	Y	10	12351	10	350	4	160	7	26	5	98	17	115
LSWORTH AFB	B1/KC135	Y	5	1374582	10	2	2	97.2	7	265	0	1	9	70	4	0	17	5	110	7	72	4	2	8	N	0	13497	10	405	3	65	9	38	5	88	25	113
IRCHILD AFB	B52/K135	Y	5	648960	6	2	2	94.5	5	205	2	0	10	100	4	4	6	5	50	9	31	5	0	10	N	0	13901	10	100	8	180	6	30	5	92	21	113
ARCH AFB	KC10/135	N	0	1038421	10	5	5	99.0	9	28	9	1	9	90	4	21	11	5	290	3	55	5	30	0	N	0	13300	10	40	9	280	4	40	5	87	21	108
ALMSTROM AFB	KC-135	Y	5	333541	3	2	2	98.8	9	263	0	0	10	330	2	0	16	5	67	8	50	5	2	8	Y	10	11500	9	250	6	243	5	15	3	90	17	107
CCONNELL AFB	B-1/K135	Y	5	489269	5	2	2	97.8	8	72	7	0	10	375	2	19	11	5	110	7	28	5	12	0	N	0	12000	10	69	9	330	3	22	4	82	21	103
OVER AFB	C-5	Y	5	605700	6	8	5	96.6	7	68	7	0	10	248	3	18	9	5	200	5	97	3	5	5	N	0	12902	10	40	9	435	1	14	3	84	15	99
					RAMP	X/100000	MOG	(X) = #<5	WXMIN	X-90	WXALT	(250-X)/25	ATC	(10-X)	EC	(600-X)/120		VRIR	(X>5=5, X<5=VA	AAR	(400-x)/40	LOW	(200-x)/30	NOISE	(10-X)			RWY>10=8 11=9	BMB	(600-X)/60	RBS	(500-X)/50		x/5	OPS TOTAL		OVERALL TOTAL
			5			10		5		10		10		10		5			5		10		5		10		10			10		10		5	130	25	155

Ver 1.3

Incorporates Griffiss Ramp change to 515,000 Sq Yds (usable)

INST_NAM	STATE	FORCES	RAMPMAX	RAMPMAX SCORE	WXMIN	WX SCORE	WXALT	ALT SCORE	ATCDLYNO	ATC DLY SCORE	AARTRK	AAR SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCRCH SCORE	RWYLG	RWY SCORE	POL	POL SCORE	HYD #	HYD SCORE	OPS SCORE TOTAL	FACILITY SCORE	TOTAL SCORE	DIST TO RCVR	RCVR SCORE	SATURATION	SATUR SCORE	TOTAL SCORE
LITTLE ROCK AFB	AR	C-130	680000	7	98.0	8	108	6	1	9	100	6	2	8	5	12000	10	106260	5	74	10	74	23	97	314	5	POOR	10	112
DYESS AFB	TX	B-1/K135	859796	9	98.7	9	115	5	0	10	190	2	1	9	0	13500	10	119277	6	76	10	70	25	95	260	6	POOR	10	111
TRAVIS AFB	CA	KC10/141	1040177	10	97.0	7	40	8	0	10	157	4	2	8	5	11000	9	192744	10	64	10	81	17	98	208	7	BALAN	5	110
WHITEMAN AFB	MO		720000	7	98.0	8	14	9	0	10	80	7	0	10	5	12400	10	103396	5	22	4	75	19	94	225	6	POOR	10	110
BARKSDALE AFB	LA	B-52	1042508	10	98.2	8	96	6	1	9	30	9	1	9	5	11756	9	142048	7	29	6	78	17	95	520	1	POOR	10	106
ALTUS AFB	OK	C-141	649050	6	99.0	9	110	6	1	9	65	7	1	9	5	13440	10	88874	4	30	6	71	17	88	260	6	POOR	10	104
BEALE AFB	CA	KC-135	213055	2	97.7	8	28	9	3	7	30	9	0	10	5	12000	10	129862	6	28	6	72	17	89	210	7	BALAN	5	101
MINOT AFB	ND	B-52	420041	4	97.9	8	164	3	0	10	0	10	1	9	5	13200	10	63214	3	29	6	68	21	89	210	7	BALAN	5	101
MARCH AFB	CA	KC10/135	1038421	10	99.0	9	28	9	1	9	290	0	30	0	0	13300	10	990048	10	40	8	65	21	86	73	9	BALAN	5	100
ELLSWORTH AFB	SD	B-1	1374582	10	97.2	7	265	0	1	9	110	6	2	8	0	13497	10	144887	7	38	8	65	25	90	340	4	BALAN	5	99
GRIFFISS AFB	NY	B52/135	515000	5	98.6	9	31	9	0	10	0	10	3	7	5	11820	9	73600	4	30	6	74	23	97	540	1	RICH	0	98
PLATTSBURGH AFB	NY	KC135	954568	10	99.0	9	120	5	1	9	44	8	1	9	0	11760	9	100672	5	84	10	74	21	95	461	2	RICH	0	97
MCCONNELL AFB	KS	B-1/K135	489269	5	97.8	8	72	7	0	10	110	6	12	0	0	12000	10	80985	4	22	4	54	21	75	115	8	POOR	10	93
GRAND FORKS AFB	ND	B1B/K135	444160	4	98.3	8	68	7	0	10	100	6	2	8	5	12351	10	56666	3	26	5	66	17	83	360	4	BALAN	5	92
K. I. SAWYER AFB	MI	B52/K135	416564	4	93.5	4	200	2	0	10	90	6	0	10	5	12300	10	41715	2	42	8	61	21	82	90	9	RICH	0	91
FAIRCHILD AFB	WA	B52/K135	648960	6	94.5	5	205	2	0	10	50	8	0	10	0	13901	10	77831	4	30	6	61	21	82	370	4	RICH	0	86
MCGUIRE AFB	NJ	C-141	944708	9	94.0	4	68	7	1	9	90	6	2	8	0	10001	8	95240	5	29	6	62	21	83	686	0	RICH	0	83
CHARLESTON AFB	SC	C141/C17	656667	7	97.0	7	70	7	0	10	150	4	1	9	0	9001	0	77976	4	33	7	55	13	68	365	4	POOR	10	82
MALMSTROM AFB	MT	KC-135	333541	3	98.8	9	263	0	0	10	67	7	2	8	5	11500	9	65952	3	15	3	57	17	74	484	2	RICH	0	76
DOVER AFB	DE	C-5	605700	6	97.0	7	68	7	0	10	200	2	5	5	0	12902	10	97942	5	14	3	55	15	70	686	0	RICH	0	70
MCCHORD AFB	WA	C-141	683000	7	95.0	5	95	6	0	10	150	4	14	0	0	10100	8	73604	4	23	5	49	17	66	425	3	RICH	0	69
				X/100000		X-90		(250-X)/25		10-X		(250-X)/25		10-X		X < 10000			X/20000		X/5								
				10		10		10		10		10		10	5		10		10		10	95	25	120		10		10	140

Incorporates Griffiss Ramp Change to 515,000 Sq Yds usable

	INST_NAM	STATE	FORCES (FY95/4)	HOTPAD SCORE	RAMPMAX	RAMP SCORE	MOG141	MOG SCORE	WXMIN	WX MIN SCORE	WXLL	WXLL SCORE	WXALT	WXALT SCORE	ATCDLYNO	ATC DLY# SCORE	SRNO	VRNO	IRNO	LL# SCORE	AARTRK	AAR SCORE	DZ	DZ SCORE	ARBRNE	ARBRNE SCORE	ARDRP	ARDRP SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCRCH SCORE	RWYLG	RWY SCORE	POL	POL SCORE	HYDRANTS	# HYD SCORE	TOTAL OPS SCORE	FACILITY SCORE	SUBTOTAL	KC135 PARK	PARK SCORE	REV TOTAL	DIST TO RCVR	RCVR SCORE	TANKER SATUR	SATURATION SCORE	OVERALL
TRAVIS AFB		CA	C5/C141	10	1040177	10	6	10	97.0	7	91.0	6	40	8	0	10	7	13	4	5	157	4	40	8	540	0	50	4	2	8	5	11000	9	192744	10	64	10	124	17	141	148	10	161	208	7	BALAN	5	163
PLATTSBURGH AFB		NY	KC135	10	954568	10	5	10	99.0	9	89.0	5	120	5	1	9	0	7	2	5	44	8	36	9	95	6	36	4	1	9	0	11780	9	100672	5	84	10	123	21	144	156	10	164	466	2	RICH	0	166
GRIFFISS AFB		NY	B52/135	10	515000	5	10	10	98.6	9	71.1	0	31	9	0	10	8	10	5	5	0	10	60	8	60	8	60	4	3	7	5	11820	9	73600	4	30	6	119	23	142	63	6	148	540	1	RICH	0	149
MARCH AFB		CA	KC10/135/	0	1038421	10	5	10	99.0	9	86.0	3	28	9	1	9	2	21	11	5	290	0	37	9	149	4	37	4	30	0	0	13300	10	990048	10	40	8	100	21	121	132	10	131	73	9	BALAN	5	146
BEALE AFB		CA	U2/T38	10	213055	2	3	6	97.7	8	92.1	6	28	9	3	7	7	13	5	5	30	9	75	7	445	0	83	3	0	10	5	12000	10	129862	6	28	6	109	17	126	59	6	132	210	7	BALAN	5	144
CHARLESTON AFB		SC	C141/C17	10	656667	7	5	10	97.2	7	83.6	2	70	7	0	10	2	26	10	5	150	4	70	7	70	7	70	4	1	9	0	9001	0	77976	4	33	7	100	13	113	61	6	119	365	4	POOR	10	133
MCGUIRE AFB		NJ	C141/KC1	10	944708	9	3	6	94.1	4	73.9	0	68	7	2	8	19	12	4	5	90	6	11	10	107	6	80	3	2	8	0	10001	8	95240	5	29	6	101	21	122	88	9	131	686	0	RICH	0	131
DOVER AFB		DE	C-5	10	605700	6	8	10	96.6	7	83.2	2	68	7	0	10	18	18	9	5	200	2	32	9	60	8	66	4	5	5	0	12902	10	97942	5	14	3	103	15	118	88	9	127	686	0	RICH	0	127
MCCHORD AFB		WA	C141/A10	10	683000	7	6	10	95.0	5	73.2	0	95	6	0	10	11	4	7	5	150	4	0	10	10	10	10	5	14	0	0	10100	8	73604	4	23	5	99	17	116	57	6	122	425	3	RICH	0	125
FAIRCHILD AFB		WA	B52/K135	10	648960	6	2	4	94.5	5	80.6	0	205	2	0	10	0	4	6	5	50	8	150	4	210	2	150	2	0	10	0	13901	10	77831	4	30	6	88	21	109	49	5	114	370	4	RICH	0	118
MALMSTROM AFB		MT	KC-135	10	333541	3	2	4	98.8	9	87.0	4	263	0	0	10	0	0	16	5	67	7	0	10	407	0	65	4	2	8	5	11500	9	65952	3	15	3	94	17	111	32	3	114	484	2	RICH	0	116
				Y = 10 N = 0		X/100,000		X*2		X-90		(X-80)/2		(250-X)/25		10-X				SR + VR + IR = X		(250-X)/25		(250-X)/25		(250-X)/25		(250-X)/50		10-X			X > 12000 = 10		X/20,000		X/6				X/10						
MAX SCORE AVAILABLE				10		10		10		10		10		10		10				5		10		10		10		5		10	5		10		10		10	155	25	180		10	190		10		10	210

MOBILIT2.XLS Incorporates Griffiss Ramp change to 515,000 Sq Yds usable

INST_NAM	STATE	FORCES (FY95/4)	HOTPAD SCORE	RAMPMAX	RAMP SCORE	MOG141	141 MOG SCORE	WXVFRLL	%WX > 3000/5 SCOR	WXMIN	%WX > 300/1 SCORE	WXALT	ALT DIST SCORE	WXDVT	DVT DIST SCORE	ATCDLYNO	ATC DLY SCORE	RNG100	CLOSE RNG SCORE	RNG240	#RNGS SCORE	ECRNG	ECRNG SCORE	ARMYRNG	ARMY_SCORE	VRNO	IRNO	IR/VR_SCORE	AARTRK	AAR_SCORE	AAMOA	SUPRSONIC SCORE	LOWMOA	LOW MOA SCORE	NITELL	NITELL SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCRCH	ENCRCH SCORE	RWYLG	RWY LG SCORE	PIT_SCORE	BMBRNG	BMBRNG SCORE	TOTAL OPS SCORE	FACILITY SCORE	TOTAL SCORE
OLLOMAN AFB	NM	F117/AT38	5	358044	2	2	2	97.9	9	99.7	10	134	4	0	5	0	10	1	5	2	2	145	5	45	10	7	20	10	20	10	35	10	35	10	16	5	2	8	Y	10	10577	10	5	20	10	157	21	178
OUNTAIN HOME AFB	ID	F15/F16/E3	5	638904	3	3	3	95.0	8	99.0	9	35	8	35	3	0	10	7	5	7	5	24	10	280	0	10	15	10	92	7	160	3	30	10	11	5	1	9	Y	10	13500	10	5	24	10	148	17	165
KE AFB	AZ	F16/F15E	5	537463	3	3	3	99.4	10	100.0	10	38	8	0	5	0	10	6	5	8	5	275	0	240	0	25	14	10	90	7	30	10	50	10	34	5	6	4	Y	10	10000	10	0	65	9	139	25	164
OODY AFB	GA	F16/A10	5	310833	2	3	3	82.0	1	96.0	6	81	6	0	5	2	8	2	5	5	5	85	8	100	7	23	15	10	0	10	110	8	10	10	43	5	4	6	Y	10	8003	8	5	2	10	141	21	162
IAW AFB	SC	F16/A10	5	317222	2	4	4	83.0	2	97.0	7	17	9	17	4	0	10	2	5	6	5	210	2	100	7	22	8	10	1	10	100	7	28	10	30	5	8	2	Y	10	10010	10	5	160	3	134	23	157
AVIS MONTHAN AFB	AZ	A10/EC130	5	877497	4	4	4	99.3	10	99.9	10	5	10	5	5	0	10	7	5	13	5	350	0	300	0	20	11	10	30	10	40	10	20	10	19	5	11	0	N	0	13645	10	5	90	7	135	19	154
NDALL AFB	FL	F-15	5	302222	2	2	2	85.0	3	97.0	7	55	7	0	5	0	10	2	5	6	5	60	10	145	4	31	17	10	192	1	9	10	25	10	40	5	7	3	Y	10	10000	10	0	70	9	133	21	154
OPE AFB	NC	C130/F16/	5	674998	3	6	5	84.0	2	98.0	8	50	8	50	3	1	9	1	5	5	5	125	6	0	10	25	15	10	50	10	120	5	77	8	45	5	4	6	N	0	7500	0	5	3	10	128	9	137
YMOUR JOHNSON	NC	F15E/KC10	5	391249	2	4	4	83.4	2	97.3	7	60	7	60	2	4	6	3	5	4	4	75	9	60	9	19	8	10	100	7	100	7	125	5	10	5	10	0	N	0	11758	10	5	75	8	119	17	136
ANNON AFB	NM	E/F111	5	235500	1	4	4	89.3	5	98.0	8	166	2	0	0	0	10	1	5	4	4	30	10	250	0	21	42	10	1	10	152	3	30	10	68	5	1	9	N	0	10000	10	0	26	10	121	15	136
OMESTEAD AFB	FL	F16/C130/	5	837291	4	3	3	95.2	8	99.7	10	89	6	89	1	0	10	1	5	2	2	440	0	395	0	12	16	10	0	10	55	10	131	5	13	5	3	7	N	0	11200	10	5	131	5	121	5	126
			Y = 5 N = 0		X/200,000		X<5		(X-80)/2		X-90		(210-X)/21		(100-X)/20		10-X		X > 1 = 5		X = #<5		(250-X)/20		(200-X)/15				(200-X)/15		(200-X)/15		(200-X)/15		X = #<5		10-X		Y = 10		X<8 = 0	Y = 5		(250-X)/25			
			5		5		5		10		10		10		5		10		5		5		10		10			10		10		10		10		5		10		10		10	5		10		25	

MACRO FIGHTER ANAL SIS - THE MOTHER OF ALL.......

INST_NAM	STATE	AF_CAT	FORCES	MOTPAD SCORE	RAMPMAX	RAMP SCORE	MOC141	141 MOC SCORE	WXVFRLL	%WX>3000/5 SCO	WXMIN	%WX>300/1 SCOR	WXALT	ALT DIST SCORE
HOLLOMAN AFB	NM	FIGHTER	F-117	5	350044	2	2	2	87.9	9	99.7	10	131	4
MOUNTAIN HOME AF	ID	FIGHTER	F-15/F16	5	838904	3	3	3	85.0	8	89.0	9	35	8
LUKE AFB	AZ	FIGHTER	F16/F15E	5	537403	3	3	3	99.4	10	100.0	10	30	8
MOODY AFB	GA	FIGHTER	F-16	5	310833	2	3	3	82.0	1	90.0	8	81	6
SHAW AFB	SC	FIGHTER	F16/A10	5	317222	2	4	4	83.0	2	87.0	7	17	9
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB	AZ	FIGHTER	A-10	5	877487	4	4	4	99.7	10	99.9	10	5	10
EDWARDS AFB	CA	EXCLUDED	VARIOUS	5	840000	3	2	2	99.1	10	99.8	10	10	9
TYNDALL AFB	FL	FIGHTER	F-15	5	302222	2	2	2	85.0	3	97.0	7	55	7
GRIFFISS AFB	NY	BOMBER	B52/135	5	711000	4	10	5	71.1	0	90.0	9	31	9
BARKSDALE AFB	LA	BOMBER	B-52	5	1042508	5	2	2	79.0	0	98.2	8	90	5
NELLIS AFB	NV	FIGHTER	F-15/F16	5	693308	3	4	4	100.0	10	100.0	10	30	8
HURLBURT FIELD	FL	SOF	AC130	5	450741	2	2	2	82.0	1	98.9	7	10	10
MARCH AFB	CA	TANKER	KC10/135	0	1038421	5	5	5	80.0	3	99.0	9	20	9
TRAVIS AFB	CA	AIRLIFT	KC10/141	5	1040177	5	8	5	91.0	6	97.0	7	40	8
EIELSON AFB	AK	EXCLUDED	F16/K135	5	510000	3	3	3	87.0	4	99.1	9	210	0
LANGLEY AFB	VA	MAJHQ	F-15C	5	477944	2	3	3	84.4	2	97.5	8	73	8
ALTUS AFB	OK	AIRLIFT	C-141	5	849050	3	2	2	88.9	3	98.8	9	110	5
BEALE AFB	CA	TANKER	KC-135	5	213055	1	3	3	92.1	0	97.7	8	28	9
PATRICK AFB	FL	EXCLUDED	SPACECO	5	181887	1	2	2	84.0	2	99.0	8	30	8
POPE AFB	NC	FIGHTER	C130/F16	5	874898	3	8	5	84.0	2	98.0	8	50	8
SEYMOUR JOHNSON	NC	FIGHTER	15E/K135	5	391249	2	4	4	83.4	2	97.3	7	80	7
CANNON AFB	NM	FIGHTER	F-111	5	235500	1	4	4	89.3	5	88.0	0	100	2
WHITEMAN AFB	MO	BOMBER		5	770000	4	2	2	80.0	0	98.0	8	14	9
CHARLESTON AFB	SC	AIRLIFT	C141/C17	5	858887	3	5	5	83.0	2	97.2	7	70	7
EGLIN AFB	FL	TEST	VARIOUS	5	547603	3	3	3	80.2	0	98.4	0	[illegible]	7
MCGUIRE AFB	NJ	AIRLIFT	C-141	5	844708	5	3	3	73.9	0	94.1	4	68	7
TINKER AFB	OK	DEPOT	E-3	5	878700	4	4	4	81.8	1	87.1	7	15	9
KELLY AFB	TX	DEPOT	F16/C-5	5	2991501	5	8	5	71.8	0	88.0	8	10	8
LITTLE ROCK AFB	AR	AIRLIFT	C-130	5	800000	3	2	2	81.9	1	87.8	8	108	5
REESE AFB	TX	FLYTRNG	T-38	5	370248	2	2	2	88.0	4	98.0	8	79	8
HILL AFB	UT	DEPOT	F-16	5	843133	4	3	3	90.0	5	97.0	7	5	10
PLATTSBURGH AFB	NY	TANKER	KC135	5	954568	5	5	5	89.0	5	99.0	9	120	4
DOVER AFB	DE	AIRLIFT	C-5	5	805700	3	8	5	83.2	2	98.8	7	80	7
COLUMBUS AFB	MS	FLYTRNG	T-37/38	5	282300	1	2	2	82.0	1	98.7	9	88	7
HOMESTEAD AFB	FL	FIGHTER	F-16C	5	837291	4	3	3	95.2	8	99.7	10	89	6
SHEPPARD AFB	TX	FLYTRNG	T37/T38	5	538000	3	2	2	84.7	2	98.0	8	50	7
MCCONNELL AFB	KS	BOMBER	B-1/K135	5	489289	2	2	2	82.0	1	97.8	8	72	7
WRIGHT PATTERSON	OH	EXCLUDED	F-16	5	582885	3	18	5	60.0	0	98.0	0	10	10
PETERSON AFB	CO	MAJHQ	C-130	5	222222	1	3	3	88.8	5			38	8
VANCE AFB	OK	FLYTRNG	T37/T38	5	279550	1	1	1	84.0	2	97.0	7	82	7
KIRTLAND AFB	NM	EXCLUDED	C130/F16	5	328181	2	1	1	96.7	8	99.4	9	134	4
LAUGHLIN AFB	TX	FLYTRNG	T37/T38	5	271723	1	1	1	80.7	0	98.3	8	143	3
MCCLELLAN AFB	CA	DEPOT	KC-135	5	708141	4	1	1	91.3	6	97.8	8	30	9
DYESS AFB	TX	BOMBER	B-1/K135	5	859790	4	2	2	80.7	3	98.7	9	115	5
MINOT AFB	ND	BOMBER	B-52	5	420041	2	3	3	82.2	1	97.9	8	104	2
KEESLER AFB	MS	TECHTRNG	W/C-130	5	201894	1	3	3	85.4	3	97.1	7	8	10
FAIRCHILD AFB	WA	BOMBERS	B52/K135	0	840900	3	2	2	80.8	0	94.5	5	205	0
MCCHORD AFB	WA	AIRLIFT	C-141	5	883000	3	8	5	73.2	0	95.0	5	85	5
K I SAWYER AFB	MI	BOMBER	B52/K135	5	410504	2	1	1	85.3	0	93.5	4	200	0
ELLSWORTH AFB	SD	BOMBER	B-1	5	1374592	5	2	2	80.9	3	97.2	7	265	0
MALMSTROM AFB	MT	TANKER	KC-135	5	333541	2	2	2	87.0	4	98.8	8	283	0
OFFUTT AFB	NE	MAJHQ	EC-135	5	359000	2	3	3	81.0	1	98.0	8	50	8
RANDOLPH AFB	TX	MAJHQ	T-38	0	395988	2	0	0	70.0	0	87.0	7	20	9
ANDREWS AFB	MD	EXCLUDED	C-137	0	997522	5	4	4	82.1	1	98.3	8	38	8
GRAND FORKS AFB	ND	BOMBER	B1B/K135	5	444100	2	2	2	82.2	1	98.3	8	88	7
ROBINS AFB	GA	DEPOT	ALC/K135	5	590001	3	4	4	79.0	0	97.0	7	85	8
MAXWELL AFB	AL	EXCLUDED	C-130	5	385020	2	2	2	81.8	1	88.8	9	5	10
SCOTT AFB	IL	MAJHQ	C-9	5	192818	1	2	2	81.0	1	88.0	8	25	9
ELMENDORF AFB	AK	EXCLUDED	F15/C130	5	915515	5	3	3	86.8	3	97.9	8	210	0

INST_NAM	WXDVT	DVT DIST SCORE	ATCDLYNO	ATC DLY SCORE	IRNG100	CLOSE RNG SCORE	RNG240	FRNGS SCORE	ECRNG	ECRNG SCORE	ARMYRNG	ARMY_SCORE	IVRNG	IRRNG	IR/VR SCORE
HOLLOMAN AFB	0	5	0	10	1	5	2	2	145	5	45	10	7	20	10
MOUNTAIN HOME AF	35	3	0	10	7	5	7	5	24	10	200	0	10	15	10
LUKE AFB	0	5	0	10	8	5	8	5	275	0	240	0	25	14	10
MOODY AFB	0	5	2	8	2	5	5	5	85	8	100	7	23	15	10
SHAW AFB	17	4	0	10	2	5	8	5	210	2	100	7	22	8	10
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB	5	5	0	10	7	5	13	5	350	0	300	0	20	11	10
EDWARDS AFB	20	4	1	9	5	5	11	5	30	10	50	10	12	2	7
TYNDALL AFB	0	5	0	10	2	5	6	5	80	10	145	4	31	17	10
GRIFFISS AFB	31	3	0	10	1	5	1	1	300	0	80	9	10	5	8
BARKSDALE AFB	80	0	1	9	2	5	4	4	100	4	80	7	18	20	10
NELLIS AFB	0	5		10	2	5	2	2	72	9	90	7	37	34	10
HURLBURT FIELD	10	5	20	0	4	5	8	5	10	10	145	4	21	12	10
MARCH AFB	20	4	7	3	4	5	8	5	80	0	80	7	21	11	10
TRAVIS AFB	0	5	0	10	0	0	3	3	100	4	350	0	13	4	9
EIELSON AFB	218	0	0	10	3	5	3	3	20	10	20	10	4	1	3
LANGLEY AFB	73	4	3	7	1	5	2	2	130	6	175	2	17	0	9
ALTUS AFB	110	0	1	8	1	5	1	1	220	2	40	10	10	4	7
BEALE AFB	50	2	3	7	0	0	4	4	155	5	325	0	13	5	8
PATRICK AFB	30	4		10	8	5	8	5	345	0	70	9	10	11	10
POPE AFB	50	3	1	9	1	5	5	5	125	8	0	10	25	15	10
SEYMOUR JOHNSON	80	2	4	6	3	5	4	4	75	9	80	9	19	8	10
CANNON AFB	0	0	0	10	1	5	4	4	30	10	250	0	21	42	10
WHITEMAN AFB	48	3	0	10	0	0	1	1	555	0	105	2	15	7	10
CHARLESTON AFB	0	5	0	10	1	5	3	3	220	2	135	4	20	10	10
EGLIN AFB	0	5	0	10	1	5	7	7	12	10	144	4	10	13	10
MCGUIRE AFB	0	5	1	8	1	5	4	4	540	0	243	0	12	4	8
TINKER AFB	15	4	0	10	2	5	6	5	320	0	80	8	15	12	10
KELLY AFB	18	4	0	10	2	5	3	3	400	0	150	3	10	12	10
LITTLE ROCK AFB	108	0	1	9	1	5	4	4	490	0	242	0	9	11	10
REESE AFB	0	5	1	9	1	5	2	2	875	0	260	0	17	13	10
HILL AFB	79	1	10	0	1	5	4	4	209	2	85	9	8	7	7
PLATTSBURGH AFB	120	0	1	9	1	5	1	1	805	0	95	7	7	2	5
DOVER AFB	0	5	0	10	3	5	7	5	248	0	290	0	18	8	10
COLUMBUS AFB	0	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	505	0	100	3	12	15	10
HOMESTEAD AFB	89	1	0	10	1	5	2	2	440	0	395	0	17	18	10
SHEPPARD AFB	0	5	1	9	0	0	0	0	835	0	175	2	23	14	10
MCCONNELL AFB	0	5		10	1	5	1	1	375	0	80	7	19	11	10
WRIGHT PATTERSON	10	5	0	10	2	5	4	4	525	0	140	4	10	8	10
PETERSON AFB	0	5		10	3	5	3	3	250	0	8	10	8	17	10
VANCE AFB	0	5	0	10	0	0	0	0	835	0	175	2	29	13	10
KIRTLAND AFB	0	0		10	2	5	4	4	130	6	510	0	8	17	10
LAUGHLIN AFB	0	5	3	7	0	0	0	0	800	0	190	1	7	5	8
MCCLELLAN AFB	30	4		10	0	0	3	3	150	5	105	2	8	3	0
DYESS AFB	200	0	0	10	0	0	1	1	275	1	125	5	11	13	10
MINOT AFB	101	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	130	8	600	0	0	5	3
KEESLER AFB	8	5	1	9	0	0	2	2	430	0	50	10	15	11	10
FAIRCHILD AFB	205	0	0	10	0	0	2	2	100	8	100	7	4	0	5
MCCHORD AFB	22	4		10	0	0	1	1	115	7	95	7	4	7	6
K I SAWYER AFB	200	0	0	10	0	0	2	2	550	0	570	0	12	2	7
ELLSWORTH AFB	265	0	1	9	0	0	0	0	70	9	300	0	0	17	0
MALMSTROM AFB	10	5	0	10	0	0	0	0	330	0	400	0	0	10	0
OFFUTT AFB	50	3	0	10	0	0	0	0	505	0	480	0	15	11	10
RANDOLPH AFB	0	5		10	0	0	0	0	895	0	100	7	10	13	10
ANDREWS AFB	0	5	10	0	3	5	8	5	250	0	241	0	14	10	10
GRAND FORKS AFB	378	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	850	0	430	0	1	12	7
ROBINS AFB	100	0	1	8	0	0	2	2	200	3	125	5	25	20	10
MAXWELL AFB	5	5		10	0	0	4	4	120	7	80	7	19	12	10
SCOTT AFB	190	0	4	0	0	0	2	2	510	0	155	3	10	7	9
ELMENDORF AFB	218	0	3	7	0	0	3	3	217	2	172	2	8	0	4

INST_NAM	AARTRK	AAR SCORE	AAMOA	SUPSONIC SCORE	LOWMOA	LOW MOA SCORE	INTELL	INTELL SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCROACH	ENCROACH SCORE	[illegible]	PWS SCORE
HOLLOMAN AFB	20	10	35	10	35	10	18	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	10
MOUNTAIN HOME AF	92	7	100	3	30	10	11	5	1	8	Y	10	[illegible]	10
LUKE AFB	80	7	30	10	50	10	34	5	0	4	Y	10	[illegible]	10
MOODY AFB	0	10	110	6	10	10	43	5	4	0	Y	10	[illegible]	8
SHAW AFB	1	10	100	7	20	10	30	5	8	2	Y	10	[illegible]	10
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB	30	10	40	10	20	10	19	5	11	0	N	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
EDWARDS AFB	55	10	100	7	5	10	11	5	3	3	Y	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
TYNDALL AFB	192	1	9	10	25	10	40	5	7	3	Y	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
GRIFFISS AFB	0	10	215	0	30	10	5	5	3	7	Y	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
BARKSDALE AFB	30	10	0	10	75	8	52	5	1	9	Y	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
NELLIS AFB	90	7	30	10	47	10	73	5	10	0	Y	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
HURLBURT FIELD	80	7	900	0	12	10	33	5	3	7	Y	10	[illegible]	9
MARCH AFB	150	1	98	7	[illegible]	10	37	5	[illegible]	0	Y	10	[illegible]	10
TRAVIS AFB	157	3	70	9	84	9	15	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	10
EIELSON AFB	52	10	35	10	35	10	8	5	1	9	Y	10	[illegible]	10
LANGLEY AFB	85	8	60	8	90	7	24	5	9	1	Y	10	[illegible]	10
ALTUS AFB	85	9	400	0	25	10	45	5	1	9	Y	10	[illegible]	10
BEALE AFB	30	10	105	8	50	10	25	5	0	10	Y	10	[illegible]	10
PATRICK AFB	150	3	12	10	70	0	0	0	9	1	N	0	[illegible]	[illegible]
POPE AFB	50	10	120	5	77	8	45	5	4	8	N	0	[illegible]	0
SEYMOUR JOHNSON	100	7	100	7	125	5	10	5	10	0	N	0	11758	10
CANNON AFB	1	10	157	3	[illegible]	10	88	5	1	9	N	0	[illegible]	10
WHITEMAN AFB	80	8	0	10	0	10	28	5	0	10	Y	10	[illegible]	10
CHARLESTON AFB	150	3	25	10	27	10	35	5	1	9	N	0	[illegible]	9
EGLIN AFB	100	7	40	10	75	8	19	5	11	0	Y	10	[illegible]	10
MCGUIRE AFB	80	7	50	10	50	10	18	5	2	8	N	0	[illegible]	9
TINKER AFB	30	10	470	0	100	7	0	0	4	6	N	0	[illegible]	10
KELLY AFB	91	7	220	0	85	9	28	5	3	7			[illegible]	10
LITTLE ROCK AFB	100	7	350	0	81	9	19	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	10
REESE AFB	120	5	93	7	93	7	17	5	0	10	N	0	[illegible]	10
HILL AFB	171	5	88	7	35	10	4	4	10	0	N	0	[illegible]	10
PLATTSBURGH AFB	44	10	200	0	81	8	2	2	1	9	N	0	11700	10
DOVER AFB	200	0	40	10	97	7	24	5	5	5	N	0	[illegible]	[illegible]
COLUMBUS AFB	95	7	105	8	83	9	10	5	1	9	Y	10	[illegible]	[illegible]
HOMESTEAD AFB	0	10	55	10	111	5	13	5	3	7	N	0	[illegible]	10
SHEPPARD AFB	30	10	39	10	105	2	4	4	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	10
MCCONNELL AFB	110	8	200	0	20	10	35	5	12	0	N	0	[illegible]	10
WRIGHT PATTERSON	60	9	230	0	40	10	10	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	10
PETERSON AFB	170	2	200	0	110	0	20	5	0	4	Y	10	11021	10
VANCE AFB	90	7	99	7	90	7	0	5	1	9	N	0	[illegible]	9
KIRTLAND AFB	50	10	95	7	[illegible]	8	25	5	4	6	N	0	[illegible]	10
LAUGHLIN AFB	50	10	83	9	130	5	8	5	0	10	Y	10	[illegible]	8
MCCLELLAN AFB	60	9	120	5	140	4	0	0	19	0	N	0	[illegible]	10
DYESS AFB	100	1	200	0	20	10	35	5	1	9	N	0	[illegible]	10
MINOT AFB	0	10	450	0	40	10	5	5	1	9	Y	10	[illegible]	10
KEESLER AFB	40	10	20	10	37	10	12	5	1	9	N	0	7612	0
FAIRCHILD AFB	50	10	290	0	31	10	10	5	0	10	N	0	[illegible]	10
MCCHORD AFB	150	3	102	7	129	5	10	5	14	0	N	0	[illegible]	10
K I SAWYER AFB	90	7	93	7	25	10	18	5	0	10	Y	10	[illegible]	10
ELLSWORTH AFB	110	8	170	2	72	9	20	5	2	8	N	0	10497	10
MALMSTROM AFB	87	9	200	0	50	10	18	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	10
OFFUTT AFB	122	5		0	120	5	29	5	1	9	Y	10	[illegible]	[illegible]
RANDOLPH AFB	110	8	77	8	88	7	9	5	1	9	N	0	[illegible]	[illegible]
ANDREWS AFB	128	5	115	6	40	10	29	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	[illegible]
GRAND FORKS AFB	100	7	370	0	40	10	12	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	[illegible]
ROBINS AFB	300	0	220	0	50	10	45	5	3	7	N	0	[illegible]	10
MAXWELL AFB	50	10	190	1	40	10	47	5	2	8	N	0	[illegible]	0
SCOTT AFB	30	10	750	0	120	5	13	5	2	8	Y	10	[illegible]	[illegible]
ELMENDORF AFB	100	3	50	10	05	8	0	5	7	3	N	0	[illegible]	10

* Fighter Missions

** No Capacity Analysis

MACRO FIGHTER ANALYSIS - THE MOTHER OF ALL.......

INST_NAM	STATE	AF_CAT	FORCES	HOTPAD SCORE	RAMPMAX	RAMP SCORE	MOG:41	141 MOG SCORE	WXVFRLL	%WX> 3000/5 SCO	WXMIN	%WX> 300/1 SCR	WXALT
HOLLOMAN AFB	NM	FIGHTER	F-117	5	350044	2	2	2	87.8	9	99.7	10	134
MOUNTAIN HOME AF	ID	FIGHTER	F-15/F16	5	838904	3	3	3	85.0	8	99.0	9	35
LUKE AFB	AZ	FIGHTER	F16/F15E	5	537403	3	3	3	99.4	10	100.0	10	38
MOODY AFB	GA	FIGHTER	F-16	5	310833	2	3	3	82.0	1	98.0	8	81
SHAW AFB	SC	FIGHTER	F16/A10	5	317222	2	4	4	83.0	2	87.0	7	17
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB	AZ	FIGHTER	A-10	5	877497	4	4	4	99.3	10	99.9	10	5
EDWARDS AFB	CA	EXCLUDED	VARIOUS	5	840000	3	2	2	99.1	10	99.8	10	10
TYNDALL AFB	FL	FIGHTER	F-15	5	307222	2	2	2	85.0	3	97.0	7	55
GRIFFISS AFB	NY	BOMBER	B52/135	5	711000	4	10	5	71.1	0	98.0	9	31
BARKSDALE AFB	LA	BOMBER	B-52	5	1042508	5	2	2	79.0	0	88.2	8	90
NELLIS AFB	NV	FIGHTER	F-15/F16	5	893308	3	4	4	100.0	10	100.0	10	38
HURLBURT FIELD	FL	SOF	AC130	5	450741	2	2	2	87.0	1	96.9	7	10
MARCH AFB	CA	TANKER	KC10/135	0	1030421	5	5	5	80.0	3	99.0	9	20
TRAVIS AFB	CA	AIRLIFT	KC10/141	5	1010177	5	8	5	91.0	6	97.0	7	40
EIELSON AFB	AK	EXCLUDED	F16/K135	6	510000	3	3	3	87.8	4	99.1	9	218
LANGLEY AFB	VA	MAJHQ	F-15C	5	477944	2	3	3	84.4	2	87.5	8	23
ALTUS AFB	OK	AIRLIFT	C-141	5	849050	3	2	2	88.9	3	98.8	9	110
BEALE AFB	CA	TANKER	KC-135	5	713055	1	2	2	92.1	0	92.7	8	28
PATRICK AFB	FL	EXCLUDED	SPACECO	6	191007	1	2	2	84.0	7	99.0	9	30
POPE AFB	NC	FIGHTER	C130/F16	5	874898	3	8	5	84.0	2	94.0	8	50
SEYMOUR JOHNSON	NC	FIGHTER	15E/K135	5	391249	2	4	4	83.4	2	97.3	7	80
CANNON AFB	NM	FIGHTER	F-111	5	235500	1	4	4	89.3	5	98.0	8	100
WHITEMAN AFB	MO	BOMBER		5	270000	4	2	2	90.0	0	88.0	8	14
CHARLESTON AFB	SC	AIRLIFT	C141/C17	5	858007	3	5	5	83.0	2	97.2	7	70
EGLIN AFB	FL	TEST	VARIOUS	5	547803	3	3	3	80.2	0	98.4	6	80
MCGUIRE AFB	NJ	AIRLIFT	C-141	5	844708	5	3	3	73.9	0	94.1	4	88
TINKER AFB	OK	DEPOT	E-3	5	870700	4	4	4	81.8	1	97.1	7	15
KELLY AFB	TX	DEPOT	118/C-5	5	[illegible]	5	8	5	71.8	0	88.0	8	10
LITTLE ROCK AFB	AR	AIRLIFT	C-130	5	800000	3	2	2	81.9	1	87.8	8	108
REESE AFB	TX	FLYING	T-38	5	370249	2	2	2	88.0	4	98.0	8	79
HILL AFB	UT	DEPOT	F-16	5	843133	4	3	3	90.0	5	97.0	7	5
PLATTSBURGH AFB	NY	TANKER	KC135	5	954568	5	5	5	89.0	5	99.0	9	120
DOVER AFB	DE	AIRLIFT	C-5	5	805700	3	8	5	83.7	2	96.8	7	80
COLUMBUS AFB	MS	FLYING	T-37/38	5	282300	1	2	2	82.0	1	98.7	9	80
HOMESTEAD AFB	FL	FIGHTER	F-16C	5	837291	4	3	3	95.7	8	99.7	10	89
SHEPPARD AFB	TX	FLYING	T37/T38	5	539000	3	2	2	84.7	2	98.0	8	50
MCCONNELL AFB	KS	BOMBER	B-1/K135	5	489209	2	2	2	87.0	1	97.8	8	72
WRIGHT PATTERSON	OH	EXCLUDED	F-16	5	582005	3	10	5	80.0	0	98.0	8	10
PETERSON AFB	CO	MAJHQ	C-130	2	222222	1	3	3	88.8	5			38
VANCE AFB	OK	FLYING	T37/T38	5	279550	1	1	1	84.0	2	97.0	7	87
KIRTLAND AFB	NM	EXCLUDED	C130/F16	5	378181	2	1	1	90.7	8	99.4	9	134
LAUGHLIN AFB	TX	FLYING	T37/T38	5	271723	1	1	1	80.7	0	98.3	8	143
MCCLELLAN AFB	CA	DEPOT	KC-135	5	708141	4	1	1	91.3	6	97.8	8	30
DYESS AFB	TX	BOMBER	B-1/K135	5	859798	4	2	2	80.7	3	98.7	9	115
MINOT AFB	ND	BOMBER	B-52	5	470041	2	3	3	82.2	1	97.9	8	104
KEESLER AFB	MS	TECHTRNG	W/C-130	5	201694	1	3	3	85.4	3	97.1	7	8
FAIRCHILD AFB	WA	BOMBERS	B52/K135	0	848900	3	2	2	80.0	0	94.5	5	205
MCCHORD AFB	WA	AIRLIFT	C-141	5	883000	3	8	5	73.2	0	95.0	5	85
K I SAWYER AFB	MI	BOMBER	B52/K135	5	410564	2	1	1	85.3	0	83.5	4	200
ELLSWORTH AFB	SD	BOMBER	B-1	5	1374582	5	2	2	88.9	3	97.2	7	205
MALMSTROM AFB	MT	TANKER	KC-135	5	333541	2	2	2	87.0	4	98.8	8	283
OFFUTT AFB	NE	MAJHQ	EC-135	5	359000	2	3	3	81.0	1	98.0	8	50
RANDOLPH AFB	TX	MAJHQ	T-38	0	395288	2	0	0	70.0	0	97.0	7	20
ANDREWS AFB	MD	EXCLUDED	C-137	0	187522	5	4	4	82.1	1	90.3	8	38
GRAND FORKS AFB	ND	BOMBER	B1B/K135	5	444180	2	2	2	82.2	1	98.3	8	88
ROBINS AFB	GA	DEPOT	ALC/K135	5	590001	3	4	4	79.0	0	97.0	7	85
MAXWELL AFB	AL	EXCLUDED	C-130	5	385828	2	2	2	81.8	1	88.8	9	5
SCOTT AFB	IL	MAJHQ	C-9	5	182818	1	2	2	81.0	1	88.0	8	25
ELMENDORF AFB	AK	EXCLUDED	F15/C130	5	905515	5	3	3	88.8	3	87.9	8	218

INST_NAM	ALT DIST SCORE	WXOVT	OVT DIST SCORE	ATC LYNO	ATC DLY SCORE	RNG100	CLOSE RNG SCORE	RNG240	RNGS SCORE	ECRNG	ECRNG SCORE	ARMYRNG	ARMY SCORE	IVRNO	IRNO	IR/VR SCORE	AARTRK	AAR SCORE	AAMOA
HOLLOMAN AFB	4	0	5	0	10	1	5	2	2	145	5	45	10	7	20	10	20	10	35
MOUNTAIN HOME AF	8	35	5	0	10	7	5	7	5	24	10	200	0	10	15	10	92	7	100
LUKE AFB	8	0	5	0	10	8	5	8	5	275	0	240	0	25	14	10	80	7	30
MOODY AFB	6	0	5	2	8	2	5	5	5	05	8	100	7	23	15	10	0	10	110
SHAW AFB	9	17	4	0	10	2	5	8	5	210	2	100	7	22	8	10	1	10	100
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB	10	5	5	0	10	7	5	13	5	350	0	300	0	20	11	10	30	10	40
EDWARDS AFB	9	20	4	1	9	5	5	11	5	30	10	50	10	17	2	7	55	10	100
TYNDALL AFB	7	0	5	0	10	2	5	8	5	00	10	145	4	31	17	10	197	1	9
GRIFFISS AFB	9	31	3	0	10	1	5	1	1	300	0	00	9	10	5	8	0	10	215
BARKSDALE AFB	5	00	0	1	9	2	5	4	4	100	4	00	7	18	29	10	30	10	0
NELLIS AFB	8	0	5		10	2	5	2	2	77	9	90	7	27	34	10	90	7	30
HURLBURT FIELD	10	10	5	20	0	4	5	8	5	10	10	145	4	21	12	10	88	7	900
MARCH AFB	9	20	4	7	3	4	5	6	5	70	0	00	7	21	11	10	190	1	98
TRAVIS AFB	8	0	5	0	10	0	0	3	3	100	4	350	0	13	4	9	157	3	70
EIELSON AFB	0	218	0	0	10	3	5	3	3	70	10	70	10	4	1	3	52	10	35
LANGLEY AFB	9	23	4	3	7	1	5	2	2	130	0	175	2	17	0	9	85	8	60
ALTUS AFB	5	110	0	1	9	1	5	1	1	220	2	40	10	10	4	7	05	9	400
BEALE AFB	9	50	2	3	7	0	0	4	4	155	5	325	0	13	5	8	30	10	105
PATRICK AFB	8	30	4		10	8	5	8	5	345	0	70	9	10	11	10	150	3	17
POPE AFB	8	50	3	1	9	1	5	5	5	175	8	0	10	25	15	10	50	10	120
SEYMOUR JOHNSON	7	80	2	4	6	3	5	4	4	75	9	80	9	19	8	10	100	7	100
CANNON AFB	2	0	0	0	10	1	5	4	4	30	10	250	0	21	47	10	1	10	157
WHITEMAN AFB	9	40	3	0	10	0	0	1	1	555	0	105	2	15	7	10	00	8	0
CHARLESTON AFB	7	0	5	0	10	1	5	3	3	270	2	135	4	20	10	10	150	3	75
EGLIN AFB	7	0	5	0	10	1	5	7	7	12	10	144	4	10	13	10	100	7	40
MCGUIRE AFB	7	0	5	1	9	1	5	4	4	540	0	243	0	12	4	8	80	7	50
TINKER AFB	8	15	4	0	10	2	5	8	5	370	0	80	8	15	17	10	30	10	470
KELLY AFB	8	10	4	0	10	2	5	3	3	400	0	150	3	18	17	10	91	7	220
LITTLE ROCK AFB	5	108	0	1	9	1	5	4	4	490	0	242	0	9	11	10	100	7	350
REESE AFB	8	0	5	1	9	1	5	2	2	875	0	260	0	17	13	10	120	5	93
HILL AFB	10	79	1	10	0	1	5	4	4	209	2	85	9	8	7	7	171	5	88
PLATTSBURGH AFB	4	120	0	1	9	1	5	1	1	805	0	85	7	7	2	5	44	10	200
DOVER AFB	7	0	5	0	10	3	5	7	5	248	0	290	0	18	8	10	200	0	40
COLUMBUS AFB	7	0	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	505	0	100	3	12	15	10	95	7	105
HOMESTEAD AFB	0	89	1	0	10	1	5	2	2	410	0	395	0	17	16	10	0	10	55
SHEPPARD AFB	7	0	5	1	9	0	0	0	0	835	0	175	2	23	14	10	30	10	39
MCCONNELL AFB	7	0	5		10	1	5	1	1	375	0	00	7	19	11	10	110	0	200
WRIGHT PATTERSON	10	10	5	0	10	2	5	4	4	525	0	140	4	10	8	10	60	9	230
PETERSON AFB	8	0	5		10	3	5	3	3	250	0	8	10	8	17	10	170	2	200
VANCE AFB	7	0	5	0	10	0	0	0	0	835	0	175	2	29	13	10	90	7	09
KIRTLAND AFB	4	0	0		10	7	5	4	4	130	0	510	0	8	17	10	50	10	95
LAUGHLIN AFB	3	0	5	3	7	0	0	0	0	800	0	190	1	7	5	8	50	10	83
MCCLELLAN AFB	9	30	4		10	0	0	3	3	150	5	105	2	8	3	0	80	9	120
DYESS AFB	5	200	0	0	10	0	0	1	1	225	1	125	5	11	13	10	100	1	200
MINOT AFB	2	101	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	130	8	600	0	0	5	3	0	10	450
KEESLER AFB	10	8	5	1	9	0	0	2	2	430	0	50	10	15	11	10	40	10	20
FAIRCHILD AFB	0	205	0	0	10	0	0	2	2	100	8	100	7	4	0	5	50	10	290
MCCHORD AFB	5	22	4		10	0	0	1	1	115	7	85	7	4	7	8	150	3	102
K I SAWYER AFB	0	200	0	0	10	0	0	2	2	550	0	570	0	13	2	7	80	7	90
ELLSWORTH AFB	0	205	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	70	8	300	0	0	17	0	110	8	170
MALMSTROM AFB	0	10	5	0	10	0	0	0	0	330	0	460	0	0	10	0	87	9	200
OFFUTT AFB	8	50	3	0	10	0	0	0	0	505	0	400	0	15	11	10	122	5	
RANDOLPH AFB	9	0	5		10	0	0	0	0	895	0	100	7	10	13	10	110	8	77
ANDREWS AFB	8	0	5	10	0	3	5	8	5	250	0	241	0	14	10	10	120	5	115
GRAND FORKS AFB	7	378	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	850	0	430	0	1	12	7	100	7	320
ROBINS AFB	8	100	0	1	9	0	0	2	2	200	3	125	5	25	20	10	300	0	220
MAXWELL AFB	10	5	5		10	0	0	4	4	170	7	80	7	19	12	10	50	10	190
SCOTT AFB	9	190	0	4	6	0	0	2	2	510	0	155	3	10	7	9	30	10	250
ELMENDORF AFB	0	218	0	3	7	0	0	3	3	217	2	172	2	0	0	4	100	3	50

INST_NAM	SUPRSONIC SCORE	LOWMOA	LOW MOA SCORE	INTELL	INTELL SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCROCH	ENCROCH SCORE	RWYLG	RWY LG SCORE	[illegible] SCORE	[illegible]MARNG	[illegible]NG SCORE	[illegible] SCORE
HOLLOMAN AFB	10	35	10	10	5	7	8	Y	10	10577	10	5	20	10	157
MOUNTAIN HOME AF	3	30	10	11	5	1	0	Y	10	13500	10	5	24	10	148
LUKE AFB	10	50	10	34	5	8	4	Y	10	10000	10	0	05	9	133
MOODY AFB	8	10	10	43	5	4	8	Y	10	[illegible]	8	5	7	10	141
SHAW AFB	7	20	10	30	5	8	2	Y	10	10010	10	5	100	3	111
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB	10	70	10	19	5	11	0	N	0	13045	10	5	50	7	115
EDWARDS AFB	7	5	10	11	5	7	3	Y	10	14995	10	0	15	10	151
TYNDALL AFB	10	25	10	40	5	7	3	Y	10	10000	10	0	70	9	133
GRIFFISS AFB	0	30	10	5	5	3	7	Y	10	11020	10	0	60	9	123
BARKSDALE AFB	10	75	0	52	5	1	9	Y	10	11158	10	0	97	7	[illegible]
NELLIS AFB	10	47	10	73	5	10	0	Y	10	10119	10	0	50	10	150
HURLBURT FIELD	0	17	10	33	5	3	7	Y	10	9000	9	0	20	10	124
MARCH AFB	7	55	10	32	5	10	0	Y	10	11300	10	0	40	10	120
TRAVIS AFB	9	04	9	15	5	7	8	Y	10	11000	10	0	[illegible]	1	120
EIELSON AFB	10	35	10	8	5	1	9	Y	10	14513	10	5	20	10	144
LANGLEY AFB	8	90	7	24	5	9	1	Y	10	10000	10	5	80	7	120
ALTUS AFB	0	25	10	45	5	1	9	Y	10	13110	10	0	73	10	124
BEALE AFB	8	50	10	25	5	0	10	Y	10	12000	10	0	150	3	123
PATRICK AFB	10	70	0	0	0	9	1	N	0	9022	9	0	70	9	117
POPE AFB	5	77	8	45	5	4	8	N	0	7500	0	5	3	10	120
SEYMOUR JOHNSON	7	125	5	10	5	10	0	N	0	11750	10	5	75	8	110
CANNON AFB	3	30	10	08	5	1	9	N	0	10000	10	0	20	10	121
WHITEMAN AFB	10	0	10	20	5	0	10	Y	10	12400	10	0	215	0	117
CHARLESTON AFB	10	27	10	35	5	1	8	N	0	9001	8	0	20	9	121
EGLIN AFB	10	75	8	19	5	11	0	Y	10	12000	10	5	10	10	105
MCGUIRE AFB	10	50	10	18	5	2	8	N	0	5000	9	0	22	10	114
TINKER AFB	0	100	7	0	0	4	6	N	0	11100	10	0	60	8	113
KELLY AFB	0	05	9	20	5	1	7			11550	10	0	150	3	108
LITTLE ROCK AFB	0	01	9	19	5	2	8	Y	10	12000	10	0	05	7	100
REESE AFB	7	93	7	17	5	0	10	N	0	10500	10	0	95	7	109
HILL AFB	7	35	10	4	4	10	0	N	0	13500	10	5	57	10	113
PLATTSBURGH AFB	0	84	8	7	2	1	9	N	0	11700	10	0	95	7	100
DOVER AFB	10	97	7	74	5	5	5	N	0	12907	10	0	40	10	111
COLUMBUS AFB	8	03	9	10	5	1	9	Y	10	12000	10	5	215	0	109
HOMESTEAD AFB	10	131	5	13	5	3	7	N	0	11200	10	5	131	5	121
SHEPPARD AFB	10	105	2	4	4	2	8	Y	10	13100	10	0	215	0	107
MCCONNELL AFB	0	70	10	35	5	12	0	N	0	12000	10	0	09	9	103
WRIGHT PATTERSON	0	40	10	10	5	2	8	Y	10	12000	10	0	575	0	121
PETERSON AFB	0	110	0	20	5	0	4	Y	10	11021	10	0	262	0	107
VANCE AFB	7	90	7	0	5	1	9	N	0	9700	9	0	140	4	98
KIRTLAND AFB	7	00	8	25	5	4	6	N	0	10000	10	0	160	7	110
LAUGHLIN AFB	9	130	5	8	5	0	10	Y	10	8058	8	0	255	0	94
MCCLELLAN AFB	5	140	4	0	0	19	0	N	0	10000	10	0	134	4	95
DYESS AFB	0	70	10	35	5	1	9	N	0	13500	10	0	225	0	90
MINOT AFB	0	40	10	5	5	1	9	Y	10	13200	10	0	450	0	91
KEESLER AFB	10	37	10	12	5	1	9	N	0	7832	0	0	115	0	115
FAIRCHILD AFB	0	31	10	10	5	0	10	N	0	13901	10	0	160	7	91
MCCHORD AFB	7	129	5	10	5	14	0	N	0	10100	10	0	50	9	97
K I SAWYER AFB	7	25	10	18	5	0	10	Y	10	12300	10	0	150	3	93
ELLSWORTH AFB	2	72	9	20	5	2	8	N	0	13497	10	0	405	0	87
MALMSTROM AFB	0	50	10	18	5	7	0	Y	10	11500	10	0	250	0	97
OFFUTT AFB	0	120	5	29	5	1	9	Y	10	11700	10	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
RANDOLPH AFB	8	00	7	9	5	1	0	N	0	8350	8	0	215	0	93
ANDREWS AFB	6	40	10	79	5	7	8	Y	10	9755	9	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	111
GRAND FORKS AFB	0	40	10	12	5	2	8	Y	10	12351	10	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	97
ROBINS AFB	0	50	10	45	5	3	7	N	0	12000	10	0	150	1	87
MAXWELL AFB	1	40	10	42	5	7	8	N	0	7800	0	0	320	0	100
SCOTT AFB	0	120	5	13	5	2	8	Y	10	7440	0	0	370	0	64
ELMENDORF AFB	10	05	8	8	5	7	3	N	0	10000	10	5	177	7	100

* Fighter Missions

** No Capacity Analysis

Document Separator

Commission Staff Fighter Military Value Analysis

Commission Staff evaluated all Air Force bases that stated that they could perform the fighter mission in their questionnaire, including those bases excluded by the Air Force

Commission Staff used the following criteria to evaluate military value

- Staff criteria correspond to DoD criteria one, two, and three

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- Runway length -- 10 points
- Total usable ramp space -- 5 points
- Does the base have a hot pad -- 5 points
- Is there hot pit refueling for fighter training -- 5 points
- C-141 maximum on ground -- 5 points
- Weather above 300' and 1 mile for take-off-- 10 points
- Weather above 3000' and 5 mile for low level training -- 10 points
- Distance to weather alternate -- 10 points
- Distance to divert for emergency runway closure-- 5 points
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays -- 10 points
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones -- 10 points
- Number of noise complaints -- 10 points
- Is there a bombing range within 100 miles-- 5 points
- Distance to bombing range -- 10 points
- Number of bombing ranges within 250 miles-- 5 points
- Distance to electronic combat training range-- 10 points
- Distance to Army units for joint training-- 10 points
- Distance to Air Refueling Track -- 10 points
- Distance to supersonic air-to-air training area-- 10 points
- Distance to low altitude military operating area -- 10 points
- Number of low level routes within 200 nautical miles -- 10 points
- Number of night low level routes within 200 nautical miles -- 5 points
- Base facilities -- 15 points
- Housing facilities -- 10 points

Commission Staff Fighter Military Value Analysis

Commission Staff evaluated all Air Force bases that stated that they could perform a fighter mission in their questionnaire

Commission Staff used the following criteria to evaluate military value

- Staff criteria correspond to DoD criteria one, two, and three

- Runway length -- 10 points
  - # < 8,000 = 0
  - 8,000 ≤ # < 9,000 = 8
  - 9,000 ≤ # < 10,000 = 9
  - # ≥ 10,000 = 10

- Total usable ramp space -- 10 points
  - # / 200,000 square yards = score
  - Maximum of 5

- Does the base have a hot pad -- 5 points
  - Yes = 5
  - No = 0

- Number of refueling hydrants -- 5 points
  - # / 5 = score
  - Maximum of 5

- C-141 maximum on ground -- 5 points
  - # = score
  - Maximum of 5

- Does the base have "hot pit" refueling capability for mission quick turns -- 5 points
  - Yes = 5
  - No = 0

Commission Staff Fighter Military Value Analysis

- Weather
  - % weather > 300 feet and one mile (minimum for take-off)
  - # - 90 = score -- 10 points
  - % weather > 3000 feet and 5 miles (minimum for flying low-level training missions)
  - (# - 80)/2 = score -- 10 points

- Distance to weather alternate -- 10 points
  - (210 - #)/21 = score

- Distance to emergency divert runway (bases with dual runways receive max) -- 5 points
  - (100 - #)/20 = score

- Number of Air Traffic Control delays per month -- 10 points
  - 10 - # = score

- Compliance with encroachment policies -- 10 points
  - Are developments within the accident potential zones in compliance with requirements?
  - Yes = 10
  - No = 0

- Number of noise complaints per month -- 10 points
  - 10 - # = score

- Distance to Air Refueling Track -- 10 points
  - (200 - #)/15 = score

- Number of bombing ranges within 150 miles -- 5 points
  - Any # = 5 points

- Number of bombing ranges within 250 miles -- 5 points
  - # = score

Commission Staff Fighter Military Value Analysis

- Distance to bombing range -- 10 points
  - (250 - #)/25 = score
- Distance to low altitude military operating area -- 10 points
  - (200 - #)/15 = score
- Distance to supersonic military operating area -- 10 points
  - (200 - #)/15 = score
- Distance to electronic combat range -- 10 points
  - (250 - #)/20 = score
- Number of low level routes within 250 nautical miles -- 5 points
  - # of IR (instrument) and VR (visual) low level routes
  - # = score
- Number of night low level routes within 250 nautical miles -- 5 points
  - # = score
- Distance to Army unit for joint training -- 10 points
  - (250 - #)/20 = score
- Base facilities -- 15 points
  - Building Condition, Capacity, Infrastructure Condition
  - Green = 5 points • Yellow = 3 points • Red = 1 point
- Housing facilities -- 10 points
  - Air Force Availability and Condition Facilities ratings/Family Housing
  - Green = 5 points • Yellow = 3 points • Red = 1 point

Total 170 points

Document Separator

Capacity Analysis

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Air Force recommendation:

- Close 4 large aircraft bases
- Close 1 small aircraft base

- Air Force performed a capacity analysis of large and small aircraft bases
  - Reviewed civil engineering records
  - Performed 48 on-site surveys

- AF calculated it had an excess of:
  - 16 large aircraft squadrons (squadron is 12 large aircraft)
  - 4 small aircraft squadrons (squadron is 24 small aircraft)

- AF did not indicate how many large or small aircraft should be assigned to a base

Commission staff calculated Air Force has an excess of:

- 16 large aircraft squadrons/192 large aircraft
- 5 small aircraft squadrons/120 small aircraft

- Using 48 large aircraft per base and 72 small aircraft per base, initial Commission staff calculations are:
  - 4 large aircraft bases
  - 1.7 small aircraft base

- Small aircraft issues
  - Robusting not considered for closure purposes
  - Luke AFB not considered because it is to become an Air and Education Training Command Base
  - Site survey not accomplished at Davis-Monthan AFB

Air Force Categories

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CATEGORY	NUMBER
Flying/Large Aircraft (missile)	21 (5)
Flying/Small Aircraft	11
Flying/Pilot Training	4
Flying/Special Operations	1
Depots	6
Production Centers	3
Test Facilities	1
Technical Training	4
Educational	2
Headquarters	6
Space Operations	3
Cantonments	2
Air National Guard	13
Air Force Reserve	11
Geographical/Mission Essential Exclusions	16

Highlighted categories have Commissioner candidates for further consideration

Air Force Large Aircraft Bases

Altus, OK	Barksdale, LA	**Beale, CA (*)**
Charleston, SC	Dover, DE	Dyess, TX
Ellsworth, SD	**Fairchild, WA (*)**	**Griffiss, NY (R)**
Grand Forks, ND (*)	**K.I. Sawyer, MI (C)**	Little Rock, AR
Malmstrom, MT (*)	**March, CA (R)**	**McChord, WA (*)**
McConnell, KS	**McGuire, NJ (R)**	**Minot, ND (*)**
Plattsburgh, NY (*)	Travis, CA	Whiteman, MO

C = DoD Recommendation for closure
R = DoD Recommendation for realignment
* = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

Flying Category - Operations Subcategory - Large Aircraft



Category: Large Aircraft

BASE	EVALUATED UNDER
Altus, OK KC-135, C-141, C-5	• Airlift
Beale, CA (*) KC-135, V-2	• Bomber • Tanker • Mobility
Dover, DE C-5	• Airlift • Mobility
Ellsworth, SD KC-135, B-1	• Bomber • Tanker • Missile Field (inactive)
Griffiss, NY (R) KC-135, B-52	• Bomber • Tanker • Mobility
KI Sawyer, MI (C) KC-135, B-52	• Bomber • Tanker
Malmstrom, MT (*) KC-135	• Bomber • Tanker • Mobility • Missile Field
McChord, WA (*) C-141, A/OA10	• Airlift • Mobility
McGuire, NJ (R) C-141, KC-135 (Res)	• Airlift • Mobility
Plattsburgh, NY (*) KC-135	• Bomber • Tanker • Mobility
Whiteman, MO MMII	• Bomber • Tanker • Missile Field (inactive)

BASE	EVALUATED UNDER
Barksdale, LA KC-135,KC-10,B-52,A-10(Res)	• Bomber • Tanker
Charleston, SC C-141, C-17	• Airlift • Mobility
Dyess, TX KC-135, C-130, B-1	• Bomber • Tanker
Fairchild, WA (*) KC-135, B-52	• Bomber • Tanker • Mobility
Grand Forks, ND (*) KC-135, B-1	• Bomber • Tanker • Missile Field
Little Rock, AR C-130	• Airlift
March, CA (R) KC-10, KC-135 (Res) C-141 (Res), C-130 (Res) RF-4 (Guard)	• Bomber • Tanker • Mobility
McConnell, KS KC-135, B-1, F-16 (Guard)	• Bomber • Tanker
Minot, ND (*) KC-135, B-52	• Bomber • Tanker • Missile Field
Travis, CA C-141, C-5	• Airlift • Mobility

C = DoD recommendation for closure R = DoD recommendation for realignment * = Commisioner candidates for further consideration

Category: Large Aircraft
East Coast Mobility Bases

Charleston, SC	Dover, DE
Griffiss, NY (R)	McGuire, NJ (R)
Plattsburgh, NY (*)	

= DoD Recommendation for closure
DoD Recommendation for realignment
mmissioner candidates for further consideration

ghlighted bases are Commissioner candidates for further consideration as East Coast Mobility Bases

Base Comparative Analysis
Category: Large Aircraft/East Coast Mobility Bases

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Plattsburgh **FOR CLOSURE** and **AS AN ALTERNATIVE** select Griffiss or McGuire as East Coast Mobility Base

MAJOR ISSUES	McGuire, NJ (R)	Griffiss, NY (R)	Plattsburgh, NY (*)
AF GROUPING (AIRLIFT) (BOMBER) (TANKER)	Airlift Base (Group 3 of 3) (Not rated) (Not rated)	Bomber Base (not rated) (Group 3 of 3) (Group 3 of 3)	Tanker Base (Not rated) (Group 3 of 3) (Group 3 of 3)
STAFF OPERATIONAL SCORE	144/190 (?)	158/190 (?)	161/190 (?)
UNIQUE MILITARY ASSETS		• Rome Lab • Ft Drum Support • NE Air Defense Sector	Large Contiguous Concrete Ramp
FUEL STORAGE (LARGE QUANTITY)	4.05M GALS	3.13M GALS	4.56M GALS
HYDRANTS (QUANTITY)	29, Poor Condition	30, High Volume Issue	84
ACFT PARKING APRON (sy) (KC-135 EQUIV) ~~(70-80)~~	944,708 (88 ACFT)	711,000 (63 ACFT) Community says 116	954,568 (156 ACFT)
GROUND ENCROACHMENT	Community comments on Plattsburgh	Community comments on Plattsburgh	APZII 8.4% not in compliance
AIR ENCROACHMENT	AF rated - R Community says - G	N/A	
FUEL RESUPPLY	Pipeline/Barge/Truck Community comments	Pipeline/Truck Community comments	Pipeline/Barge/Rail/Truck
ONE TIME COST ($M)	300.1 (197.5 cost for DoD recommendation to realign)	416.4 (120.8 cost for DoD recommendation to realign)	114.4
ANNUAL SAVINGS ($M)	79.1 (47.5 DoD recommendation savings)	64.4 (39.2 DoD recommendation savings)	56.6

R = DoD Recommendation for realignment **C** = DoD Recommendation for closure * = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

6

Category: Large Aircraft Tanker/Airlift Bases

Beale, CA (*)	**Fairchild, WA** (*)
Malmstrom, MT (*)	**March, CA** (R)
Grand Forks, ND (*)	**McChord, WA** (*)
Travis, CA	

Highlighted bases are Commissioner candidates for further consideration as Tanker/Airlift Bases

C = DoD Recommendation for closure
R = DoD Recommendation for realignment
* = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

Base Comparative Analysis
Category: Large Aircraft/Tanker/Airlift Bases

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Malmstrom, McChord, and Beale **FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO** March

MAJOR ISSUES	**March, CA (R)**	**Malmstrom, MT (*)**	**McChord, WA (*)**
AF GROUPING (AIRLIFT) (BOMBER) (TANKER)	(Not rated) (Group 3 of 3) (Group 3 of 3)	(Not rated) (Group 3 of 3) (Group 2 of 3)	(Group 3 of 3) (Not rated) (Not rated)
STAFF OPERATIONAL SCORE	ALFT 134/190 (?) TANKER 85/125 (?)	ALFT 121/190 (?) TANKER 93/125 (?)	ALFT 140/190 (?) TANKER (Not Scored)
UNIQUE MILITARY ASSETS	Southwest Air Defense Sector (SWADS)	Missile Field/START	Northwest Air Defense Sector (NWADS)
FUEL STORAGE (LARGE QUANTITY)	5.5M GALS	2.45M GALS	3.95M GALS
ACFT PARKING APRON (sy)	1,081,529	373,351	648,202
GROUND ENCROACHMENT	AF rated-R Community rates-G	AF rated-G	AF rated-R
AIR ENCROACHMENT	AF rated-Y Community rated-G	AF rated-G	AF rated-G
ONE TIME COST ($M)	256.9 (134.8 cost for DoD rec to realign)	543.4	453.4
ANNUAL SAVINGS ($M)	45.9 (46.9 DoD recommendation savings)	41.4	51.5

R = DoD Recommendation for realignment **C** = DoD Recommendation for closure * = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

Break Even Yr 2002 (Yr 6) 2028 (Yr 35) 2008 (Yr 15)

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Base Comparative Analysis
Category: Large Aircraft/Tanker/Airlift Bases

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Malmstrom, McChord, and Beale **FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO** March

MAJOR ISSUES	Beale, CA (*)	Grand Forks, ND (*)	Fairchild, WA (*)
AF GROUPING (AIRLIFT) (BOMBER) (TANKER)	(Not rated) (Group 2 of 3) (Group 2 of 3)	(Not rated) (Group 3 of 3) (Group 3 of 3)	(Not rated) (Group 3 of 3) (Group 3 of 3)
STAFF OPERATIONAL SCORE	ALFT 137/190 (?) TANKER 108/125 (?)	ALFT 108/190 (?) TANKER 91/125 (?)	ALFT 104/190 (?) TANKER 87/125 (?)
UNIQUE MILITARY ASSETS	• U-2 Base • Pave Paws • AF Combat Ammo Center	Missile Base/START	AF Survival School
FUEL STORAGE (LARGE QUANTITY)	6.08M GALS	2.41M GALS	3.3M GALS
ACFT PARKING APRON (sy)	399,525	444,160	648,960
AIR ENCROACHMENT	AF rated - G	AF rated - G	AF rated - G
ONE TIME COST ($M)	225.8	118.1	379.8
ANNUAL SAVINGS ($M)	53.8	69.8	40.2

lation for realignment C = DoD Recommendation for closure * = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

DoD Recommend

Break Even

-1/r. 2002 (Yr 7) 1996 (Yr 3) 2010 (Yr 17)

9

Category: Large Aircraft
Bases Air Force Rated as Bomber Bases

Barksdale, LA	Beale, CA (*)	Dyess, TX
Ellsworth, SD	**Fairchild, WA (*)**	**Griffiss, NY (R)**
Grand Forks, ND (*)	**KI Sawyer, MI (C)**	Malmstrom, MT (*)
March, CA (R)	McConnell, KS	**Minot, ND (*)**
Plattsburgh, NY (*)	Whiteman, MO	

Highlighted bases are Commissioner candidates for further consideration as Bomber Bases

C = DoD recommendation for closure
R = DoD recommendation for realignment
* = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

Base Comparative Analysis
Category: Large Aircraft/Bomber Bases

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Fairchild and Minot **FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT** and **AS AN ALTERNATIVE** retain Griffiss and/or K.I. Sawyer as a bomber base

MAJOR ISSUES	**Griffiss, NY (R)**	**KI Sawyer, MI (C)**	**Fairchild, WA (*)**
AF GROUPING	Group 3 of 3	Group 3 of 3	Group 2 of 3
STAFF OPERATIONAL BOMBER SCORE	146/170 (?)	123/170 (?)	113/170 (?)
UNIQUE MILITARY ASSETS	• Rome Lab • NE Air Defense • Ft Drum Support	• Advanced Cruise Missile • Classified Mission	
COBRA COSTS	All operating costs for cantonment area may not be included	Appears ACM relocation costs not included	AF closing costs included moving Combat Crew Training (currently at Castle)
ECONOMIC IMPACT	DoD • Potential employment loss (direct and indirect) 7.6%	• Proj 24% unemploy • MI #50 in DoD $ • Wurtsmith closed	Unknown
ONE TIME COST ($M)	416.4 (120.8 cost for DoD rec to realign)	154.6 (143.6 cost for DoD recommendation to close)	379.8
ANNUAL SAVINGS ($M)	64.4 (39.2 DoD recommendation savings)	47.6 (62.4 DoD recommendation savings)	40.1
Break Even Yr.	2001 (Yr. 11)	1999 (Yr. 6)	2010 (Yr. 17)

R = DoD Recommendation for realignment
C = DoD Recommendation for closure
* = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

Base Comparative Analysis
Category: Large Aircraft/Bomber Bases

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Fairchild and Minot **FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT** and **AS AN ALTERNATIVE** retain Griffiss and/or K.I. Sawyer as a bomber base

MAJOR ISSUES	**Minot, ND** (*)	**Grand Forks, ND** (*)
AF GROUPING	Group 3 of 3	Group 3 of 3
STAFF OPERATIONAL BOMBER SCORE	135/170 (?)	125/170 (?)
UNIQUE MILITARY ASSETS	Missile Base/START	Missile Base/START
COBRA COSTS	N/A	N/A
ECONOMIC IMPACT	Unknown	Unknown
ONE TIME COST ($M)	194.7	118.1
ANNUAL SAVINGS ($M)	63.2	69.8
Break Even Yr.	1998 (Yr 5)	(Yr. 3)

R = DoD Recommendation for realignment
C = DoD Recommendation for closure
* = Commissioner candidates for further consideration

Air Force Small Aircraft Bases

Cannon, NM (*)	**Davis-Monthan, AZ (*)**	**Homestead, FL (C)**	Holloman, NM
Luke, AZ	**Moody, GA (*)**	Mt. Home, ID	**Pope, NC (*)**
Seymour-Johnson, NC (*)	Shaw, SC	Tyndall, FL	

C = DoD recommendation for closure
R = DoD recommendation for realignment
* = Commissioner candidates for further study

Flying Category - Operations Subcategory - Small Aircraft



Base Comparative Analysis
Category: Small Aircraft

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Davis-Monthan, Moody, or Pope **FOR CLOSURE** as **ADDITIONS** to the Secretary's list

MAJOR ISSUES	**Homestead, FL (C)**	**Davis-Monthan (*)**	**Moody, GA (*)**	**Pope (*)**
AF GROUPING	Group 3 of 3	Group 3 of 3	Group 3 of 3	Group 3 of 3
R&A CRIT 1 AND 3 SCORE (OPERATIONAL SCORE)	140/180 (?)	159/180 (?)	166/180 (?)	141/180 (?)
R&A CRIT 2 SCORE (FACILITIES SCORE)	5/25 (?)	19/25 (?)	21/25 (?)	9/25 (?)
R&A SCORE TOTAL	145/205 (?)	178/205 (?)	187/205 (?)	150/205 (?)
ONE TIME COST ($M)	68.9 (75.1 cost for DoD recommendation to close)	138.3	223.8	194.2
ANNUAL SAVINGS ($M)	56.0 (75.4 DoD recommendation savings)	48.8	41.3	47.2

C = DoD recommendation for closure
R = DoD recommendation for realignment
* = Commissioner candidates for further study

Base Comparative Analysis
Category: Small Aircraft
K.I. Sawyer Community Scenario

FOR CONSIDERATION: Study Cannon or Seymour-Johnson **FOR CLOSURE** and **AS AN ALTERNATIVE** realign fighter force structure to K.I. Sawyer

MAJOR ISSUES	**K.I. Sawyer (C)**	**Seymour-Johnson (*)**	**Cannon (*)**
AF GROUPING (SMALL AIRCAFT)	Not ranked	Group 2 of 3	Group 2 of 3
CRITERIA 1 AND 3 SCORE (OPERATIONAL SCORE)	88/180 (?)	122/180 (?)	120/180 (?)
R&A CRIT 2 SCORE (FACILITIES SCORE)	21/25 (?)	17/25 (?)	15/25 (?)
R&A SCORE TOTAL	109 (?)	139 (?)	135 (?)
DISTANCE TO TRAINING RANGES	150 miles	75 miles	26 miles
ONE TIME CLOSE ($M)	154.6 (143.6 cost for DoD rec to close)	318.5	348.3
ANNUAL SAVINGS ($M)	47.6 (62.4 DoD rec savings)	54.2	45.3

C = DoD recommendation for closure
R = DoD recommendation for realignment
***** = Commissioner candidates for further study

Document Separator

DRAFT INTERNAL WORKING DOCUMENT (II) - April 6, 1995

AIR FORCE TEAM ACTION/GOALS FOR FIRST PHASE ANALYSIS (VERIFICATION OF EXCLUSIONS AND CATEGORIES)

- This is a continuation of our plan of attack with specific team assignments set up.

- I have attached a copy of the 1993 Round of Exclusion Review and write up. I also attach a copy of the Vol V Tab and have marked up OPRs for Msn/Geo and Cat exclusions. Steve is the Lead on putting together the Write-up but each need to feed him your input. Please work with Steve on this. It is vital that we finish this look no later than 20 April in case we need to suggest to commissioners that some of the exclusions are light and might need to be looked at. (As an example, we are already reviewing F E Warren.)

- In a related issue we should be well on our way on doing capacity analysis. Frank is the overall lead on our write-up and Merrill is the major input to him on UPT and Small Aircraft bases. Each of you should be concentrating on your respective categories where there are recommendations. If in your review of the three category exclusions (Steve, Craig and Mark), you find that the exclusions are flawed - you will need to pursue capacity analysis.

- The bottom line is that we will be expected to discuss if not brief the category assignments, exclusions and capacity analysis at the 10 May Adds hearing

Questions for discussion with the Base Closure Working Group

Meeting with DBCRC Air Force Team, March 14, 1995, 1:30 PM-4:00 PM

1. Please define "Total Aircraft Inventory".

2. Why is TAI used as a measure/factor in assessing excess capacity when funding \resources are authorized and appropriated for PAA?

3. Please explain the difference in the manpower baseline numbers chart and the personnel numbers used in the COBRA runs.

4. The Cannon AFB chart used in the AF hearing reflects F-111s moving to Nellis. Why, if the aircraft are being dropped from the inventory?

5. Was a COBRA run done on an option to close Grand Forks AFB? Malmstrom AFB? Minot AFB? If so, may we have a copy?

6. Do you have an estimate of when we may receive copies of the site survey reports/summaries?

7. Please provide a copy of Atch 1 to the 7 Jul 94 BCEG minutes. It is missing.

8. Please define and explain "level playing field."

9. The Air Force has recommended closing the minimum essential airfield at Griffiss Air Force Base, and providing the mobility/contingency/training support to the 10th Infantry Division from the Fort Drum airfield.

   a. Could you please describe the concept of operations the Air Force intends for the operations at the Fort Drum airfield?

   b. What agreement has the Air Force established with the Army to operate the airfield at Fort Drum? Would you please provide us with a copy of any of the agreements?

   c. Has the Army or the Air Force calculated the additional costs associated with operating the Fort Drum airfield as a result of this proposal?

   d. Does the Air Force expect the Army to fund all the costs associated with operating the field at Fort Drum?

   e. The information the Air Force has provided us indicates the Army desired a 200 feet wide runway. Are you aware of the Army's rational for desiring a 200 foot runway? Did the Army have other concerns? Could you please provide us with them?

   f. Could you please provide us with a copy of all the costs associated with keeping the minimum essential airfield at Griffiss AFB open?

10. If the Defense Base Closure Commission voted to close Minot AFB, where would the Air Force prefer the B-52s to go, and why?

11. In deciding to realign Grand Forks Air Force Base, did the Air Force take any actions attempting to resolve ABM Treaty implications? If so, what were they?

12. The Air Force has proposed inactivating the 485th EIG rather than transferring the unit to Hill AFB. One of the reasons is the very high costs of renovating Hill AFB. What are these costs? (The 1993 site survey data showed the cost to Hill at $13.5M)

13. Could you please provide us with information about all the USG organizations other than Air Force organizations effected by the realignment of Kirtland Air Force Base?

a. How would these organizations be effected by the realignment of Kirtland AFB? How much coordination has been performed with these organizations?

b. The Air Force has proposed leaving the 898th Munitions Squadron in-place. How does the Air Force plan to support this organization with such things as medical, base exchange, and commissary privileges?

c. In realigning Kirtland AFB, it appears the Air Force did not calculate the potential increase of CHAMPUS costs. Could you please provide us with the reason why? And could you please calculate these costs for us and provide us with the information?

14. Would like to discuss measures of effectiveness that were used to evaluate the mission effectiveness of the missile fields at Grand Forks, Minot, and Malmstrom. (2 Nov 94 BCEG Minutes from the classified annex).

15. Request you discuss the rationale for the lack of a small aircraft base on the closure list.

16. We recognize the fact that there are no bad bases in the Air Force, but would give us some detail on how closely the UPT bases compared and what was the deciding factor for naming Reese?

17. How did the UPT JCSG rank the bases (A, N, AF) functionally? Discuss.

18. Where did the suggestions to consolidate ANG units onto larger bases originate? Were they suggested by the ANG? Did the BCEG identify other ANG candidates for consolidation?

19. What distinguished the Air Reserve Component units the Air Force recommended for relocation to other bases as candidates for this action? Did the BCEG identify other ANG candidates for consolidation?

20. How did the BCEG identify and validate costs associated with recommended ANG consolidations?

21. Austin Community approved major bond issue worth $400M on May 1, 1993 to convert the base to a municipal airport. 93 Commission directed Air Force to keep Bergstrom ARB open if community acted before Jun 93. What is the Air Force position about transferring the Carswell unit to Bergstrom?

22. Although the operating cost to operate Bergstrom today are high (due in part, it seems, because the AF has had to retain much of the base because of environmental cleanup), what would be your estimate of operating only the residual cantonment area?

1 Dec BCEG minutes

23. AETC Capacity Analysis. Is there sufficient remaining capacity if one base is closed?

BASE	Projected Pilot Production (4th Qtr, FY 01)	Maximum Capability	Limiting Factor
Columbus	291	372	Runway Capacity
Laughlin	316	386	" "
Reese	291	359	" "
Vance	316	366	" "
TOTAL	1,214	1,483	

24. Why did the Air Force rate Reese so low (Tier III) compared with other bases in the Undergraduate Flying Training category, especially considering that the Air Force:

(1) selected Reese as its first Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training site;
(2) introduced the T-1 training aircraft at Reese; and
(3) initiated the consolidation of UPT with the Navy in a joint program at Reese?
(4) (We understand) ranked Reese as the number 2 UPT base in 1991.

25. What is the Air Force rationale for closing Reese and transferring all of its aircraft, particularly the newly introduced T-1 training aircraft, along with the joint training program to Vance AFB, Oklahoma; Laughlin AFB, Texas; and Columbus AFB, Mississippi, when these bases have yet to transition to these programs?

26. The 1991 DBCRC recommended that the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona, be relocated to Orlando, Florida. In the current round of base closures and realignments, the Air Force recommended that the Laboratory remain at its present location in Mesa, Arizona, as a stand-alone activity. The Air Force's justification states, in part, that the activities are consistent with the community's plans for redevelopment of the Williams Air Force Base property, including a university and research park..

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 states that "In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary may not take into account for any purpose any advance conversion planning undertaken by an affected community with respect to the anticipated closure or realignment of an installation" (Title XXIX, Part A, Sec. 2903, paragraph (c)(3)(B)).

Why was facility reuse planning used as a consideration factor for this recommendation?

Please recognize that there will be continuing questions throughout our analysis process that we will try to direct to the appropriate individuals as they arise. We will try to keep the pressure as low as possible.

Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader

QUESTIONS ON AIR FORCE ANALYSIS

1. Why did BCEG members use their judgment to evaluate the overall rating for an installation (based on the eight selection criteria) rather than the mathematical roll-up method? In other words, why did BCEG members not roll-up criterion grades into an overall color rating for an installation?

2. Color grades were assigned for some subelements (based on an installation's capability relative to other installations' capabilities) rather than by applying an objective measure. Why were color grades assigned for some subelements and not for other subelements? What are some examples of color grades assigned to subelements?

3. Why was a standard deviation (σ) method used? Please describe the standard deviation method used.

4. Wouldn't a score at the mean (μ) or above (a Green grade) or at the mean or below (a Yellow or Red grade) distort the subelement roll-up compared with those subelements in which a standard deviation was not used?

5. Why doesn't the standard deviation mean correspond to a Yellow grade?

6. Did use of the standard deviation affect substantially any outcome? If so, please elaborate.

93 DRAFT WRITE UP

GEOGRAPHICALLY KEY/MISSION ESSENTIAL EXCLUSIONS

The Secretary of the Air Force, with the advice of the Base Closure Executive Group, decided to exclude geographically key and mission essential bases. The Air Force used the rationale that these bases are strategically significant to the mission of the Air Force. We feel that the Air Force decision to exclude the following bases from consideration for closure is supported by the indicated rationale included in the DoD BRAC Report of March 1993. Additionally, GAO stated in their Report of April 1993 entitled Analysis of DoD's Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and Realignments that "there were 16 bases excluded from the process because they were considered geographically or mission essential. We found no reason to question the exclusions."

Andersen AFB, Guam, and Hickam AFB, Hawaii, are strategically located bases in the Pacific Ocean. They are critical for the defense of the Island of Guam and the Hawaiian Islands, and crucial for military operations in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.

Andrews AFB, Maryland, is essential in providing world-wide Presidential and Congressional airlift support.

Bolling AFB, D.C. is a key base for support of Air Force and joint activities in the Washington metropolitan area.

Edwards AFB, California, and Nellis AFB, Nevada, support extensive, irreplaceable testing facilities for Air Force aircrew and force structure. Edwards AFB is also the primary landing site for the space shuttle.

Falcon AFB, Colorado, supports the Consolidated Space Operations Center, and the National Test Facility for Strategic Defense Initiative.

F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, is the Air Force's Peacekeeper missile base. The Peacekeeper is the Air Force's newest intercontinental ballistic missile. The DoD Force Structure Plan reflects the Peacekeeper missiles remaining at the present level.

Patrick AFB, Florida, and Vandenberg AFB, California, support the USAF's sole equatorial and polar space launch facilities, accordingly. Patrick AFB provides crucial support for Cape Kennedy Space Center, and Vandenberg AFB is home for the Western Space and Missile Center.

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, supports numerous research and training facilities. It is also the Headquarters of Air Force Material Command.

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, supports several irreplaceable research and testing facilities essential to DoD, DoE, and other governmental agencies.

Maxwell AFB, Alabama, is a unique education complex that supports the Air University, Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, Squadron Officer School, and numerous other training and education programs.

USAF Academy, Colorado, is a one-of-a-kind facility and is the primary commissioning source for USAF officers.

Eielson AFB, and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The Air Force stated in the DoD report of March 1993 that Elmendorf and Eielson AFBs, Alaska, are crucial to the defense of Alaska and the reinforcement of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. Elmendorf AFB is a port of entry for Alaska, and Eielson provides critical access to ranges.

We felt that additional information was needed to validate the exclusions of Eielson and Elmendorf. As a result, we questioned the Air Force's reasoning in a letter of April 5. Their response was: "The Air Force needs Eielson and Elmendorf for four reasons. First, Air Force fighter-interceptors are based at Elmendorf to provide air defense and establish air sovereignty for Alaska and Canada as part of NORAD. While the Cold War threat of Soviet bomber attack has significantly reduced, the Air Force believes it is prudent to maintain an air defense capability. No one can predict the future of US-Russian relations, particularly as Russia enters an era of high volatility and uncertainty. Furthermore, these fighter-interceptors are the nation's guarantor of national sovereignty for US territory in that region. Second, the USAF element in Alaska constitutes a significant part of our forward-deployed combat forces for use in an Asian contingency. They are based in Alaska to be closure to their potential operational areas, not necessarily because the Air Force believes

CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY EXCLUSION
FLYING CATEGORY -- SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES (SOF) SUBCATEGORY

Hurlburt Field, Florida

Hurlburt AFB is the home of the Air Force Special Operations Command and supports 50 unique special operations aircraft. Hurlburt's location is ideal for special operations training. It is located adjacent to the Eglin range which is exceptional for night low altitude training. Also, because of its location on the Gulf of Mexico, it has easy access to over water training.

Hurlburt is the only base dedicated to special operations. Even though many portions of the Air Force structure is decreasing, special operations forces are increasing. The Air Force decision to exclude special operations forces from consideration for base closure is valid.

CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY EXCLUSION
TRAINING CATEGORY -- TECHNICAL TRAINING SUBCATEGORY

Four bases were considered in the Training Category--Technical Training Center Subcategory: **Goodfellow AFB, TX, Keesler AFB, MS, Lackland AFB, TX, and Sheppard AFB, TX.**

These bases were excluded from further consideration based on two factors: (1) two technical training centers recommended for closure in 1988 and 1991 will result in relocating 39% of all technical training courses to the four bases listed above; (2) an accession level of 32,000 personnel each year through 1997 will require 100 percent of these four bases' capacity. Based on capacity analysis, no excess capacity was identified in this subcategory. The Air Force's rationale for excluding these bases appears to be sound.

CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY EXCLUSION
INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT CATEGORY --
TEST FACILITIES SUBCATEGORY

One base was considered in this subcategory: **Eglin AFB, FL.**

Eglin AFB was excluded from further review because of its extensive range and testing complex, the replication of which would be cost prohibitive. Additionally, DoD's Force Structure Plan does not indicate a reduction in testing requirements. We found this exclusion supportable.

CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY EXCLUSION
INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT CATEGORY --
PRODUCT CENTER AND LABORATORY SUBCATEGORY

Three bases were considered in this subcategory: **Brooks AFB, TX, Hanscom AFB, MA, and Los Angeles AFB, CA.**

These bases conduct research, development, and acquisition functions that require expensive, specialized facilities. Two of the bases are heavily supported by resident Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC). They were excluded from further consideration because excess capacity was not sufficient to justify closure without incurring prohibitive costs. We find this exclusion to be sound.

CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY EXCLUSION
MAJOR HEADQUARTERS SUBCATEGORY

Six bases were considered in this subcategory: **MacDill AFB, FL; Offutt AFB, NE; Peterson AFB, CO; Randolph AFB, TX; Scott AFB, IL; and Langley AFB, VA.**

All bases in this subcategory have unique/specialized command and control facilities. Further, DoD's Force Structure Plan does not indicate a significant reduction in the missions that these bases support. Additionally, there is not sufficient excess capacity to permit closing one of these bases and relocating functions without significant expense. We concur with the Air Force's decision to exclude this subcategory from further consideration, but urge the Air Force to consider consolidation of these functions during BRAC 1995.

UNCLASSIFIED

95

Exclusions of
Geographically/Militarily Unique or Mission Essential Bases

Rick	Andersen AFB, Guam:	Essential staging base for Combat Forces and Military Operations in the Pacific. Its geographic location provides an irreplaceable resource for overseas contingencies
Rick	Andrews AFB, Maryland:	Necessary base for Presidential/Congressional airlift support. The presence of an installation capable of airlift operations near the nation's capital is essential to this mission
MARK	Arnold AS, Tennessee:	One-of-a-kind Joint Service Center for wind tunnel and engine testing. Possesses unique and costly equipment, servicing all of DoD
MARK	Edwards AFB, California:	Supports an irreplaceable, extensive/specialized testing center and range complex. Natural features as well as facilities to support space shuttle operations are unique resources
Morrill	Eielson AFB, Alaska:	Crucial to reinforcement of the Pacific and to the defense of Alaska; location is critical for ready access to irreplaceable specialized ranges and airspace
Morrill	Elmendorf AFB, Alaska:	Necessary Port of Entry into United States; crucial to reinforcement of Pacific; provides GSU support to 21 remote sites including 18 long range radar sites crucial to the defense of the US, ready access to specialized ranges and airspace
DAVE	FE Warren AFB, Wyoming:	Air Force's only "Peacekeeper" missile base; DoD Force Structure Plan reflects a requirement for Peacekeeper missiles through the period under which BRAC 95 actions must be taken; START treaty implications

Rick	Hickam AFB, Hawaii:	Necessary Port of Entry into the western US: crucial to reinforcement of Pacific; key to support of USCINCPAC
Craig	Maxwell AFB, Alabama:	Unique educational complex supports the Air University, Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, Squadron Officer School, Officer Training School, Senior NCO Academy and numerous other training and education programs
Rick	McChord AFB, Washington:	Located with Fort Lewis, the primary deployment base for the US I Corps that provides support for rapid deployment of troops to the Pacific theater
Morrill	Nellis AFB, Nevada:	Supports an irreplaceable, extensive/specialized range complex and the Air Force Weapons Center. Range and airspace resources are vital to Air Force operations and training
Mark	Patrick AFB, Florida:	Critical support to Cape Canaveral (the nation's sole equatorial orbit space launch facility); home of Eastern Space and Missile Center
Rick	Pope AFB, North Carolina:	Collocated with Fort Bragg, this primary deployment base for the 18th Airborne Corps provides time critical deployment and essential joint training capability for the US Army's primary contingency corps
Craig	USAF Academy, Colorado:	Unique facilities support all aspects of cadet training, including academic, athletic, summer encampment, airfield operations, and survival
Dave	Vandenberg AFB, California:	Nation's sole polar orbit space launch facility and home of Western Space and Missile Center

Category/Subcategory Exclusions

STEVE

Administrative Support: There are four installations in this category: Battle Creek Federal Center, Michigan; Bolling AFB, Washington DC; DFAS/ARPC, Colorado; and MacDill AFB, Florida. After a thorough capacity analysis of the facilities in this category, it was determined that no excess capacity exists within the category.

CRAIG

Education and Training/Technical Category: There are four bases in this subcategory: Goodfellow AFB, Texas; Keesler AFB, Mississippi; Lackland AFB, Texas; and Sheppard AFB, Texas. Two other Technical Training Center bases were selected for closure in 1988 and 1991. This resulted in 39 percent of technical training courses relocating to the remaining four bases. DoD's Force Structure Plan will require the Air Force to recruit and train approximately 100,000 personnel per year. This accession level will require approximately 80 percent of the remaining four bases' capacity with minimal peacetime surge capability. Closure of any one training center would reduce capacity to a level below that required to support programmed and contingent operations. Based on capacity analysis, there is no excess capacity in this subcategory.

Space Support: There are three bases in this subcategory: Patrick AFB, Florida; Vandenberg AFB, California; and Peterson AFB, Colorado. These installations provide logistical and administrative support for space functions in and around three locations. Patrick AFB provides critical support to both Cape Canaveral AS and Cape Kennedy Space Center (Nation's easterly space launch facility) and home of Eastern Space and Missile Center. Peterson AFB provides operating support for all space activities located in the Colorado Springs area to include support for two major headquarters involved in space operations. Vandenberg AFB is the sole polar orbit space launch facility and home of the Western Space and Missile Center. Since each base is critical to a different geographic location of space-related missions, there is no excess capacity in this subcategory.

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SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE
AIR FORCE TEAM

PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to determine whether or not the Air Force applied its methodology correctly and consistently, and to identify substantial deviations. Where substantial deviations are identified, we will recommend options for redressing those deviations.

PROCESS

The Air Force team used a structured process consisting of four distinct parts to evaluate whether the Air Force carried out its methodology correctly and treated all bases under consideration equally. The Air Force methodology is clearly outlined in both the DoD Detailed Analysis and is re-stated in the Air Force Team's General Compliance report.

Part one of the process verified the accuracy of the source data used. To do this the General Accounting Office (GAO) checked a random sample of data elements from the three base questionnaires used by the Air Force (General, Environmental, and Airspace). The GAO then visited a selected number of bases to verify these specific data elements.

Part two verified the correct use of the data from the source documents through the establishment of criteria ratings. Source documents included all base questionnaires and updated data, if necessary, as provided to the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG). The team's process consisted of randomly selecting four sets of eight or nine bases (34 bases total) to verify Criteria I through V. Three sets of bases were used for Criteria I, II and III. The fourth set of bases was used for Criteria IV and V. Each sub-element rating in Criteria I, II and III was verified by tracing the source data supporting each sub-element rating to the overall criteria rating. In carrying out this process across the different base categories, the team also checked for consistent application of criteria and sub-element content and standards. The team analyzed eight or nine bases per Criteria as this represented a reasonable sample of the bases considered by the Air Force.

The Air Force used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model to estimate and compare one-time closure costs and recurring savings for each base. This data was used for Criteria IV and V. To assess the adequacy and accuracy of the specific cost figures used in the COBRA Model, the team selected a sample of bases to accomplish a detailed verification for selected cost elements. The cost elements selected accounted for most of the one-time costs involved in a base closure or realignment. These elements were: military construction, transportation of equipment

and Permanent Change of Station of personnel, shutdown costs, civilian attrition costs, and base administration. The eight bases selected included two recommended for closure, four recommended to remain operational and two Air Reserve Component (ARC) bases. The team traced the selected cost elements from the Air Force Detailed Analysis furnished to the Commission back to the primary source documents.

Because the Air Force did not use the COBRA Model to calculate the cost and savings to be realized in closing an ARC base, the team used a different verification technique. It involved ascertaining the procedures used, how the Air Force determined which bases had potential for cost savings, and how the Air Force computed the savings.

Part three validated the methodology by base category. In this part, four bases per category were randomly selected to provide a reasonable sample. Additionally, all closure candidates not in the random sample were evaluated. The validation process consisted of reviewing all source data used to establish sub-element and criteria ratings for Criteria I, II and III. The team then traced the data from the source through the sub-element to the final criteria rating. Through this process the team searched for factual errors, consistent application of the sub-elements and the associated standards, and the ability to replicate the BCEG ratings.

Part four validated the overall base rankings and the DoD Closure recommendations. The process checked the validity of the base ranking/grouping and closure recommendations by examining the sub-element ratings, associated criteria ratings, and resulting overall standings of all bases within each base category. The Air Force assigned color ratings to each of the sub-elements for scoring and rating the bases for six of the eight criteria. The other two criteria were given numerical values. The Air Force methodology depended upon the reasoned judgement of ten senior Air Force officials. The team could not duplicate this expertise. Therefore, the team applied a three step process to highlight any inconsistencies in final rankings.

In step one, the team tabulated the red, yellow, and green rankings. Step two employed the team members' judgment to establish the criteria and overall rating. Step three was to assign a numerical value to all ratings (colors and numerical ratings). The team then summed the numerical values to establish an order of merit for each criteria. Similarly the overall base order of merit was established by again assigning numerical rankings to the criteria totals and summing the values. The team ran two analyses. For the first analysis each criteria was given equal weight. For the second analysis the first four criteria were given additional weight, in concert with DoD guidance to the services. In all cases the result was compared with the Air

Force's final base rankings to identify inconsistencies which could not be justified by military value. The assigned numerical ratings follow:

Red	1	Yellow+	5
Red+	2	Green-	6
Yellow-	3	Green	7
Yellow	4	Green+	8

The above process addresses those categories from which the Air Force attempted to find closure candidates. The Air Force Team consciously did not readdress bases or categorical exclusions because they were previously assessed under general compliance. During that process not only was the principle of exclusions considered but also the correctness of the particular bases included under an exclusion. For completeness, the detailed analysis supporting the exclusions is repeated in an attachment to this section.

FINDINGS

The detailed results of this four part process are included in the attachments. The following summarizes the results of the team's analysis.

Part One - Data Accuracy

(GAO)

Part Two - Data Verification

As mentioned in the process section, the team accomplished data verification through two distinct methods, one for Criteria I, II, and III and another for Criteria IV and V. Accordingly, the findings are addressed in two sections.

The team identified an error rate of less than one percent in the Air Force's sub-element ratings of Criteria I, II and III. The team concluded that these errors did not justify a change to the criteria rating. The team found no inconsistencies in the application of sub-elements and associated standards within and across categories. There were differences in both sub-elements and standards across base categories. However, these changes were reasonable, and were explained with adequate justification in the Detailed Analysis. When source data was applied to the sub-element definitions and standards according to the Air Force methodology, the sub-element ratings were adequately supported.

For Criteria IV, the data used to calculate the one-time costs to close a base and the procedures used were consistently applied to all bases with only a few exceptions. These exceptions did not increase or decrease the cost to close any base enough to

characterize it as a significant deviation. However, because of the high CHAMPUS costs and the costs the federal government will incur for Medicaid, the closure of the Carswell hospital has raised some concerns. The Air Force is currently taking a second look at the decision to close the hospital. For Criteria V, the payback period calculated and included in the Detailed Analysis for the bases were all correct. The team noted one typographical error for Mountain Home Air Force Base.

Part Three - Category Validation

The data and methodology used to support the ratings for Criteria I through III in each of the base categories was valid, reasonable and correctly applied. There were very few minor errors noted by the team, and none of the errors was significant enough to demand a change in the final criteria score for any base. The two largest base categories, Flying-Strategic and Flying-Tactical, had a combined data accuracy rate of better than 99 percent.

Part Four - Base Validation

The base validation process checked the validity of base ranking/grouping and subsequent closure recommendations. The Air Force process was purposefully not a purely objective or a numerical analysis of a base's military value. Therefore, the team's numerical validation of the accuracy and consistency of a base's overall rating could only identify anomalies. These anomalies were justified by military value.

The numerical validation, using both equal weighting for each criteria and increased weighting for the military value criteria, supported the recommended closures. Some bases not recommended for closure were identified numerically as having lower relative value than closure candidates. Yet for each of those bases there is adequate military reason to justify selecting the next less-valuable base for closure.

Observations

As part of the specific compliance process, the members of the Air Force Team were challenged to look for evidence of the ratings being more sensitive to one sub-element or criteria in establishing the criteria and/or overall rating. This challenge was particularly difficult when one considers the number of sub-elements in the analysis and the fact that the Air Force acknowledged that military judgment was applied in determining the criteria and overall base rankings.

By using a large number of sub-elements, the Air Force methodology inherently limits its sensitivity to any one element. This was borne out by the fact that the errors found by the team did not change a single criteria rating. Additionally the

inability to hold all other sub-element ratings constant and change one precludes making a definitive statement on the sensitivity of the analysis to any element.

CONCLUSIONS

The Air Force applied its methodology correctly and consistently to all the bases not excluded from potential closure. While the team did find limited errors, they were not statistically significant nor did they justify a change to any of the criteria ratings. There are no substantial deviations in either the data or the application of the methodology.

The GAO's data accuracy check at a sample of bases found no significant errors. This supports the team's conclusion that the source data was accurate. The results of the data verification review support the conclusion that the Air Force used the data and methodology both consistently and correctly to reach the criteria ratings for the bases. The results of the category validation review reinforced the above conclusion for each base category by using a statistically significant sample within each category. The Air Force used its methodology both correctly and consistently.

The results of the base validation review confirm the conclusion that the Service's recommendations are supported by both the facts and the methodology. In short, the Air Force recommended closing bases of the lowest military value.

Since the number of Air Force bases recommended for closure or realignment is consistent with the force structure and the DoD Criteria. The Air Force process has been validated with out substantial deviations, and there is no justification to add or delete bases from the Air Force's list.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Commission accept the Air Force closure list as meeting the requirements of specific compliance with the law and with the DoD Criteria.

2. The services be challenged to provide a clearer documentation of the military judgment element of their process to future Commissions.

Air Force Team
Specific Compliance
CATEGORY VALIDATION (FLYING TRAINING)
Criteria 1-3

Process

This process checked the validity of data for Criteria 1-3 for eight bases within the Flying Training category. The team randomly selected four bases with the category to validate. This selection process included the one closure within the category. The validation process involved an examination and review of all source data used to determine sub-element and criteria ratings. The source data included responses to base questionaires and updated information, if necessary, as provided to the Base Closure Executive Group.

Findings

The findings supported the Air Force analysis. The specific data follows:

Sample Used:

- Columbus AFB
- Reese AFB
- Vance AFB
- Williams AFB (Closure Candidate)

Criteria Checked:

- 1, 2, and 3
- All subelements

Columbus AFB:
- Findings:
  -- Subelements 2D1 and 2D2 of criteria 1 required explanation.
  -- Subelement 2A (low Level) of criteria 2 required explanation.
  -- No other element questions were found.
- Conclusions:
  -- Subelements were validated.
  -- Overall rating for criteria 1, 2, and 3 were validated.

Reese AFB
- Findings:
  -- Subelement 2D1 and 2D2 of criteria 1 required explanation.
  -- Subelement 2A and 5A of criteria 2 required explanation.
  -- No other element questions were found.
- Conclusions:

-- Subelements were validated.
-- Overall rating for criteria 1, 2, and 3 were validated.

Vance AFB

- Findings:
  -- Subelement 2D1 and 2D2 of criteria 1 required explanation.
  -- Subelement 2A of criteria 2 required explanation.
  -- Subelement 1 (Munitions Storage) of criteria 3 required clarification.
  -- No other element questions were found.
- Conclusions:
  -- Subelements were validated.
  -- Overall rating for criteria 1, 2, and 3 were validated.

Williams AFB

- Findings:
  -- Subelement 2D1 and 2D2 of criteria 1 required explanation.
  -- Subelement 2A (LL) of criteria 1 required explanation.
  -- Subelement 2B (LL) of criteria 2 required explanation.
  -- Subelement 1 (Proximity of Army) of criteria 3 was rated "red" incorrectly. It should have been "G." Error did not change overall criteria rating.
- Conclusions:
  -- subelement ratings were validated with one error corrected ~~the except noted.~~
  -- Overall rating for criteria 1, 2, and 3 were validated.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

- Flying Training category was validated for criteria 1, 2, and 3.

Air Force Team
Specific Compliance
BASE VALIDATION (FLYING TRAINING)

Process

This process checked the validity of the base ranking/grouping and closure recommendations by examining the subelement ratings, associated criteria ratings, and resulting overall standings of the all bases within the Flying Training category. The Air Force assigned color ratings to each of the sub-elements for scoring and rating the bases for six of the eight criteria. The other two criteria were given numerical values. As the Air Force methology using ten senior Air Force officials was not available a three part process was establish to attempt to highlight inconsistencies.

Part one was to tabulate the ranking. Part two was to use the team member's judgment and establish the rating. Part three was to assign a numerical value to all ratings (colors and numerical ratings). The numeric values were then summed to establish an order of merit for each criteria. Similarily the overall base order of merit was established by again assigning numerical values and summing the values. In all cases the result was compared with the Air Force decision to identify any possible inconsistencies which could not be explained by military judgment. The assigned values were as follows:

Red	1	Yellow+	5
Red+	2	Green-	6
Yellow-	3	Green	7
Yellow	4	Green+	8

Bases Examined:

- Columbus AFB
- Laughlin AFB
- Reese AFB
- Vance AFB
- Williams AFB

Analysis:

- Criteria 1

-- Columbus	6-3-1	G-	Y+	55
-- Laughlin	6-3-1	G	Y+	55
-- Reese	7-2-1	G	G-	58
-- Vance	7-2-1	G-	G-	58
-- Williams	7-1-2	G-	Y+	56

- Criteria 2

-- Columbus	14-2-3	Y+	Y+	109
-- Laughlin	16-2-1	G	G	121
-- Reese	16-2-1	G	G	121
-- Vance	12-4-3	G-	Y	103
-- Williams	10-6-3	R+	Y-	97

- Criteria 3

-- Columbus	7-1-2	G	Y+	55

--	Laughlin	4-1-5	Y	Y-	37		
--	Reese	4-0-6	Y-	R+	32		
--	Vance	4-2-4	Y	Y	40		
--	Williams	4-1-5	R+	Y-	37		

- Criteria 4 and 5 are numerical.
- Criteria 6

--	Columbus	4-1-0	G	G	32
--	Laughlin	4-0-1	G	G-	29
--	Reese	2-3-0	Y	Y	26
--	Vance	5-0-0	G	G	35
--	Williams	2-0-3	R	Y-	17

- Criteria 7

--	Columbus	6-0-2	Y	G-	44
--	Laughlin	5-3-0	Y	G-	47
--	Reese	5-0-1	G	G-	36
--	Vance	7-1-0	G	G	53
--	Williams	5-1-2	Y	Y	41

- Criteria 8

--	Columbus	4-8-0	Y	Y+	60
--	Laughlin	8-3-1	Y+	G-	69
--	Reese	8-3-1	G-	G-	69
--	Vance	4-8-0	Y	Y+	60
--	Williams	6-2-4	R	Y-	54

- Overall Rating

--	Columbus	4-1-1-2-0-0-0	47	5.9	G-
--	Laughlin	5-0-1-2-0-0-0	48	6.0	G-
--	Reese	5-1-0-1-1-0-0	48	6.0	G -
--	Vance	4-2-0-2-0-0-0	48	6.0	G-
--	Williams	2-1-0-1-1-1-2	30	4.3	Y

Finding:

- None of the ratings by team member varied by a full letter grade from the ratings of the BCEG.
- Numerical ratings were consistent with the BCEG.
- Williams is significantly lower than the other bases. Single rating error on williams would not change the resulting order.

Conclusions:

- Base ratings were validated.
- Selection of Williams for closure is validated.

	CRITERIA I-IV 80% WEIGHTED CRITERIA		CRITERIA V-VIII 20% WEIGHTED CRITERIA	
BASE	0.8	MULTIPLIER	0.2	MULTIPLIER
GOODFELL	4	3.2	9	1.8
KEESLER	16	12.8	14	2.8
LACKLAND	10	8	13	2.6
LOWRY	7	5.6	5	1
SHEPPARD	17	13.6	8	1.6

TECH TRAINING

ASCENDING RANKING

GOODFELLOW	5
LOWRY	6.6
LACKLAND	10.6
SHEPPARD	15.2
KEESLER	15.6

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ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE
CRITERION 7
COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE

DESCRIPTION: The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the Department of Defense Services' consideration of community infrastructure in their recommendations of specific installations for closing and realignment. The data on community infrastructure used by the Services in their installation-specific conclusions were evaluated. The methodologies used to consider community infrastructure were evaluated for consistency within each Service. A determination was made on whether the Services complied with Department of Defense (DOD) policy guidance issued pursuant to Public Law 101-510, as amended. Based on the analysis on how the Services considered community infrastructure, recommendations were made on whether a specific installation's status pursuant to BRAC-93 could be revised.

The Services took varied approaches to evaluating this criterion. Criterion 7 is given in DOD's May 5, 1992 policy guidance as, "The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, mission and personnel." No specific guidance was provided on how the Services should evaluate this criterion.

The specific compliance analysis is broken down by Service. The following steps were taken in this analysis:

1. Installation-specific data (compiled in base questionnaires or data calls) were reviewed and compared to the Services' conclusions on community infrastructure in the Recommendations and Analyses Reports (Volumes III-VI).

2. The methodologies used by each Service were evaluated and determinations were made on whether this criterion was applied consistently within each Service, and whether it was evaluated pursuant to DOD's direction.

3. Any discrepancies pursuant to the first two steps were considered in recommending whether a specific installation's status pursuant to BRAC-93 could change.

After evaluating each Service, recommendations for improvements to the community infrastructure evaluation process for BRAC-95 are presented.

ANALYSIS

ARMY

1. Data Evaluation

The Army's process for ranking the value of specific installations involved evaluating five "Measures of Merit." The Measures of Merit were derived from DOD's four Military Value Assessment Criteria. The Measures of Merit incorporate community infrastructure factors, specifically expandability and quality of life. These community infrastructure data are included in the Army's Installation Assessments. These assessments documented community infrastructure by providing ratings from the "Places Rated Almanac", evaluating factors such as off-base housing status, public transportation availability, and health care and education opportunities. The Army's Volume III report includes a discussion of community infrastructure in the "Recommendations and Justification" section for each recommended action. This text on community infrastructure is identical for each action. The Army's canned text mentions that community infrastructure impacts have been considered, and will be addressed. Specific information on how any impacts will be addressed has not been documented. Because this Volume III discussion is all-encompassing, it is not inconsistent with the data compiled on specific bases in the Installation Assessments.

2. Consistency/Compliance

Since the Army includes the same exact text for each recommended action in its Volume III discussion of community infrastructure, the Army is clearly internally consistent in this document. The Installation Assessments consistently address community infrastructure issues in a thorough manner, but do not consistently use the same factors to gauge community infrastructure. For example, in many cases the "Places Rated Almanac" ratings are noted, in others (e.g. Fort Belvoir, Fort Leonard Wood) they are not. Similarly public transportation availability is documented in the majority of cases, but is not universally noted (e.g. not given for Fort Huachuca).

Since the Army utilized community infrastructure factors in it installation selection process, the Army is in compliance with DOD guidance for considering this criterion.

3. Impact on Base Status

There are no recommended changes to any specific base's status due to the Army's evaluation of criterion 7.

NAVY

1. Data Evaluation

The Navy compiled community infrastructure information via data calls from specific installations eligible for closure or realignment. Community infrastructure factors surveyed include housing availability, education, public utilities, public

transportation, health care, and recreational facilities. The data calls rated impacts from hypothetical personnel increases of 20%, 50%, and 100% on these infrastructure factors. The Navy's Volume IV report noted whether community infrastructure impacts would result from specific recommended closure or realignment actions. The only two actions noted in Volume IV as having any significant community infrastructure impacts at receiving bases are the recommended closure of NAS Cecil Field, FL, with relocation of assets to MCAS Cherry Point, NC, and the recommended realignment of missions at NSB New London, CT, to NSB Kings Bay, GA.

The Volume IV Report's conclusions about community infrastructure impacts for these two recommended receiving installations accurately reflect the data call results. The Cherry Point data call notes that a 20% increase in personnel would result in impacts to local public schools, which would require investment to expand schools. In Volume IV, the Navy documented that in FY-96 and FY-97 costs for additional school classrooms in two local communities would results in costs of $36.56M. Similarly, in the case of recommended moves to Kings Bay, the data call notes that increases in personnel will require investments to expand schools and roads. In Volume IV, total costs for these community infrastructure improvements are estimated at $46M.

The Volume IV report also notes community infrastructure impacts for the recommended closure of Naval Air Station, Meridian, MS, with relocation to Naval Air Station, Kingsville, TX. These impacts are described as increased noise, requiring adoption of noise abatement procedures. These should be considered under environmental impacts, rather than community infrastructure. In fact, the Navy includes a discussion on these noise impacts under the environmental attribute of Land Use and Airspace Implications.

The specific compliance review also included selected recommended actions for which the Navy concluded that no significant community infrastructure impacts will occur. In these cases, the Navy's Volume IV accurately reflects the information compiled in specific installation data calls.

2. Consistency/Compliance

The Navy's approach for evaluating community infrastructure impacts was consistently applied across the Service. The Navy has complied with DOD's direction to consider this criterion in its process.

3. Impact on Base Status

There are no recommended changes to any specific base's status due to the Navy's evaluation of Criterion 7.

<u>AIR FORCE</u>

1. Data Evaluation

The Air Force collected specific information on the current status of community infrastructure in base questionnaires. These questionnaires collected information on a wide range of community factors such as housing, transportation, and recreational facilities. The data in the questionnaires was translated into ratings (red, yellow, green) and compiled in the Air Force's Volume V report. Questionnaires for realigning and receiving bases were reviewed, and it was found that the Volume V report accurately translated the questionnaire data.

2. Consistency/Compliance

The Air Force's approach consistently evaluated the current status of community infrastructure, both across the Service as a whole, and across their various flying and operations categories.

The Air Force's Volume V report summarizes community infrastructure ratings for all installations, which demonstrates that community infrastructure was considered in recommendations for closure and realignment. Therefore, the Air Force is in compliance with the general direction given by DOD on this criterion. However, as a result of the approach used by the Air Force, there is no documentation showing that the Air Force considered impacts from specific recommended actions on community infrastructure.

3. Impact on Base Status

There are no recommended changes to any specific base's status due to the Air Force's evaluation of criterion 7.

DEFENSE AGENCIES - Of the Defense Agencies impacted by BRAC-93, only the Defense Logistics Agency is being considered for major closures or realignments with potential community infrastructure impacts.

1. Data Evaluation

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) used an approach similar to the Army, in that they revised DOD's four Military Selection Criteria to establish four DLA Measures of Merit in order to rank their installations and determine which to recommend for closure and realignment. These four DLA Measures of Merit include consideration of quality of life, a community infrastructure factor, under Mission Suitability. DLA's use of quality of life included consideration of how the communities surrounding the installations supported DLA's mission. DLA's Detailed Analysis Report (part of Volume VI) documented that points were assigned for quality of life in the installation ranking process. Another of DLA's four Measures of Merit, Expandability, focused more on installation infrastructure (e.g., Is there space to expand?) than

on community infrastructure. Limited (relative to the other Services) information on community infrastructure was received through installation-specific questionnaires. The questionnaire data were not carried through to DLA's Detailed Analysis Report under the specific discussions of criterion 7. This report contains an impact analysis on each specific recommended action which has a section entitled "DOD Selection Criteria 6-8." However, this section does not include an analysis of Criterion 7.

2. Consistency/Compliance

DLA's consideration of community infrastructure did not appear consistent between installations, as specific installations provided different degrees of detail on community infrastructure in responses to the questionnaires.

Since DLA documented their use of community infrastructure in their Measures of Merit (especially under Mission Suitability), they have complied with DOD's direction to consider this criterion in the installation selection process.

3. Impact on Base Status

There are no recommended changes to any specific base's status due to DLA's evaluation of Criterion 7.

RECOMMENDED CHANGE FOR BRAC-95

Specific direction should be provided to the Services on what should be evaluated pursuant to this Criterion. Specific community infrastructure factors should be given, with a description of how each one should be evaluated. The direction should include a requirement for an impact analysis from each specific recommended action. Those Services that did conduct such impact analyses have much more meaningful evaluations of community infrastructure.

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ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE
CRITERION 8
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

DESCRIPTION: The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the Department of Defense Services' consideration of environmental impacts in their recommendations of specific installations for closing and realignment. The environmental data used by the Services in their installation-specific conclusions were evaluated. The methodologies used to consider environmental impacts were reviewed for consistency within each Service. A determination was made on whether the Services complied with Department of Defense (DOD) policy guidance issued pursuant to Public Law 101-510, as amended. Based on the analysis on how the Services considered environmental impacts, recommendations were made on whether a specific installation's status pursuant to BRAC-93 could be revised.

The specific compliance analysis is broken down by Service. The following steps were taken in this analysis:

1. Installation-specific data (compiled in base questionnaires or data calls) were reviewed and compared to the Services' conclusions on environmental impacts in the Recommendations and Analyses Reports (Volumes III-VI).

2. The Services' summaries of the environmental impacts at specific installations were evaluated for consistency within each Service, and for compliance with DOD's December 4, 1992 policy memorandum. In this policy memorandum, guidance is provided to the Services for considering the environmental impacts on installations affected by closure and realignment actions, including receiving installations.

3. Discrepancies pursuant to the first two steps were considered in recommending whether a specific installation's status pursuant to BRAC-93 could change.

After evaluating each Service, recommendations for improvements to the environmental impact evaluation process for BRAC-95 are presented.

ANALYSIS

ARMY

1. Data Evaluation

All Army installations impacted by major closures and realignments were reviewed to determine whether the Army's Recommendations and Analyses Report (Volume III) accurately reflected their Environmental Baseline Surveys (EBS). In several

recommended actions, the conditions documented were in agreement. In the following cases, issues were raised in the EBS's that were not carried through to Volume III.

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA is recommended to receive missions from Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. The EBS for Tobyhanna notes potential constraints related to obtaining air permits. The Volume III report does not specifically evaluate the environmental impacts at Tobyhanna.

Rock Island Arsenal, IL is recommended to receive missions from Fort Monmouth, NJ. The EBS for Rock Island notes that new operations may be constrained due to difficulties with air permits. This point is not mentioned in the environmental evaluation of Rock Island Arsenal in Volume III.

Fort Belvoir, VA is recommended for realignment. The Volume III report states that there are "no significant environmental issues involved." However, the EBS for Fort Belvoir notes several environmental issues, including the presence of wetlands, threatened or endangered species, and leaking underground storage tanks.

Fort Huachuca, AZ is recommended to receive missions from Presidio of Monterrey, CA. The EBS for Fort Huachuca notes that air permits may be a limiting factor to the receipt of additional missions. This is not noted in the Volume III report.

Fort Jackson, SC is recommended to receive missions from Fort Monmouth, NJ. The EBS for Fort Jackson notes that permits for air emissions may be a limiting factor for the receipt of new missions, and notes that the presence of threatened or endangered species, "must be considered and may impact receiving additional personnel or missions." The Army's Volume III report did not evaluate environmental impacts on Fort Jackson.

Red River Army Depot, TX is recommended to receive missions from both Letterkenny Army Depot, PA, and Tooele Army Depot, UT. The EBS for Red River notes that the receipt of new missions may lead to delays due to the need for permits for increases in solid waste disposal and air emissions. Additionally, the EBS indicates that a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulated landfill has been ordered to close and a new facility must be constructed. The Army's Volume III report did not evaluate environmental impacts from the recommended moves to Red River.

Anniston Army Depot, AL is recommended to receive missions from both Fort McClellan, AL, and Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. The EBS for Anniston notes that the receipt of new missions may lead to delays due to the need for permits for solid waste and air emissions. The environmental impacts from these recommended moves were not evaluated in the Army's Volume III report.

Fort Leonard Wood, MO is recommended to receive missions from Fort McClellan, AL. The EBS for Fort Leonard Wood notes possible constraints on expansion due to wetlands and endangered species. The Volume III report notes that there is no impact from this realignment on these resources, but does not mention how this conclusion was reached.

2. Consistency/Compliance

The Army's consideration of environmental programmed costs/cost avoidances may not have been consistent. The output from the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model was reviewed to check for how specific bases considered environmental costs. Discrepancies were found between the costs noted by the Army in the EBS and Volume III report, and the funds noted in COBRA reports. Annual environmental costs were entered into COBRA for fiscal years through 1997. These COBRA costs appear to be environmental compliance costs, and did not match the compliance costs given in the EBS's or Volume III report.

The Army's evaluation of criterion 8 at specific facilities made use of environmental restoration costs in a way that may be inconsistent with DOD's policy. DOD's "Policy Memorandum Two," December 4, 1992, states, "Environmental Restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations." The memo goes on to stipulate that these costs can be "considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse of the installation." Thus, simply by noting restoration costs, the Army is not necessarily in non-compliance, they are only in non-compliance if these restoration costs are used in the cost of closure.

In its base specific EBS's, and in its Volume III report, the Army often cites environmental restoration costs, along with the environmental compliance costs. In one specific case, Tooele Army Depot, the documentation provided is only for restoration costs in Volume III, and the EBS does not distinguish between restoration and compliance costs. This documentation for Tooele does not allow for consideration of compliance costs, pursuant to DOD's direction, in the evaluation of Programmed Costs/Cost Avoidances.

The Army's use of environmental restoration costs in decisions on Fort Monroe, VA is unclear. Documentation on briefings given by the Army's Total Army Basing Study (TABS) in late January, and early February, 1993, discuss environmental restoration impacts on the possible closing of Fort Monroe, VA. On February 3, 1993, the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff were briefed on a recommendation for deferral of closure of Fort Monroe due to "environmental and operational considerations." During the March 16, 1993 Commission Hearing, Brigadier General Ballard of TABS, stated that the "primary reason" for not closing Fort Monroe was due to environmental restoration costs. During the March 22, 1993

Commission Hearing, Mr. Newsome of the Army stated that the application of military criteria was the basis for the decision not to close Fort Monroe.

On April 26, 1993, the Commission requested information from the Army on the process used in evaluating environmental impacts at Fort Monroe, the discrepancies in cost information, and the EBS questions that were not addressed in the Volume III report. The Commission's letter requested a response by May 10, 1993.

3. Impact on Base Status

The status of Fort Monroe, VA could potentially be revised given the possible improper use of environmental restoration costs in the Army's decision-making process.

Pending the Army's response to the Commission's April 26 letter, based on the Army's evaluation of criterion 8, there are no other recommended changes to the status of specific bases.

NAVY

1. Data Evaluation

The base-specific conclusions in the Navy's Recommendations and Analyses Report (Volume IV) were checked for accuracy by reviewing a subset of the individual Navy data calls on environmental issues. Each recommended closing, realigning, and receiving Navy installation was not reviewed, due to the large number of installations involved. The specific bases were selected based on the magnitude of the closure or realignment, and the environmental significance of the action (based on the judgement of the Commission staff). The conclusions documented by the Navy's Volume IV report accurately reflected the information from the Navy's data calls.

One issue noted in the Volume IV report that is not identified in the Navy's data calls is the status of air pollutant non-attainment areas. This information was included in the Volume IV report after the installation data calls were submitted, as the Naval Facilities Engineering Command compiled and entered data on non-attainment status from the Environmental Protection Agency.

2. Consistency/Compliance

In some specific cases, cost figures in cited in the Navy's Volume III report could be reconciled with costs noted in the base-specific data calls. In other cases these costs did not exactly match. Environmental costs were entered into COBRA for the Navy's recommended actions. Based on the Navy's BRAC-93 Scenario Development documentation, these costs include additional environmental compliance costs incurred as a result of closure or

realignment actions, and cost avoidances for environmental projects which are no longer necessary as a result of closure or realignment. Specific costs in COBRA could not be exactly reconciled with other cost documentation provided by the Navy.

The Navy's installation-specific data summarizes the environmental attributes consistently with DOD's policy guidance.

3. Impact on Base Status

No recommended change in any specific base's status due to the Navy's evaluation of criterion 8.

AIR FORCE

1. Data Evaluation

All Air Force installations impacted by major closures and realignments were reviewed to determine whether the Air Force's Recommendations and Analyses Report (Volume V) accurately reflected the information compiled in base-specific questionnaires. The Air Force assigned ratings (red, yellow, green) for twelve environmental factors in their Volume V report. These ratings did not accurately reflect the base questionnaires. For example, Plattsburgh AFB, NY is rated as "Y" for air quality, which means the base is located in a non-attainment area, and pollutants are classified as moderate or marginal. However, the base questionnaire for Plattsburgh indicates that it is not in a non-attainment area. In some cases the discrepancies are widespread. For example, on K.I. Sawyer AFB, eight of the twelve ratings in Volume V do not reflect the base questionnaire. Through discussions with the Air Force's Environmental Planning Division, it was learned that, in some cases, the Air Force's Base Capacity Evaluation Team, upon reviewing the questionnaires, revised the answers to the questionnaires. Revisions were based on the Team's evaluation of the base, and their knowledge of how the base completed the questionnaire. These revisions were based on the Team's professional judgement and are not documented.

The Air Force rated twelve environmental factors, and combined these into one overall environmental rating for each base. In assigning these overall ratings, the Air Force concluded that the twelve factors are not of equal value. However, they chose not to assign numerical values to weigh these factors. Instead, a qualitative approach was used, based on the judgement of the Air Force decision-makers. This qualitative approach was not documented.

2. Consistency/Compliance

Because the Volume V recommendations did not reflect the base questionnaire results and since the methodology for determining an

overall environmental rating was not documented, the Air Force has not demonstrated that their methodology was applied consistently within each base category.

As noted in General Compliance with Criterion 8, the Air Force did not consider Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances in their environmental analyses in either the base questionnaires or the Volume V report. On April 2, 1993, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission wrote to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) requesting the Air Force's explanation for not evaluating this environmental attribute. The Air Force responded that their evaluation process did include environmental compliance, but referred to a section of the base questionnaires that does not address these costs. A follow-up letter is being drafted from the Commission to the Air Force.

Results of the Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) model were reviewed for specific bases, and it was found that environmental costs were only entered for McClellan AFB and Newark AFB. For other recommended actions, the Air Force entered environmental costs of zero into the COBRA model.

Relative to the other Services, the Air Force's approach to evaluating criterion 8 provides minimal information on the environmental impacts of specific recommended closure or realignment actions. Whereas the other Services compiled baseline data, and subsequently evaluated environmental impacts from each specific recommended action, the Air Force compiled data on the current status of environmental conditions and summarized the impact of environmental attributes on continued military mission at each installation. The Air Force's approach does not examine specific actions to determine environmental impacts from closure or realignment. Despite the absence of this discussion regarding specific recommendations, the Air Force's approach is not inconsistent with DOD's guidance on considering environmental impacts, as environmental conditions at all impacted bases were summarized.

3. Impact on Base Status

It is unlikely the discrepancies in the Air Force's use of questionnaire data in assigning ratings would dramatically change the overall environmental ratings. Again, using K.I. Sawyer AFB as an example, four of the eight discrepancies give "higher" ratings (e.g. Yellow instead of Red), while four discrepancies give "lower" ratings (e.g. Yellow instead of Green). None of the recommended bases had discrepancies in ratings that would lead to major swings in the overall environmental ratings.

Although the documentation provided by the Air Force does not demonstrate an internally accurate or consistent methodology, and apparently does not fully follow OSD's policy for evaluating

environmental impacts, because the overall environmental ratings would not significantly change, and since this criterion was not a primary factor in the Air Force's decisions, it very unlikely that the status of any base would be revised due to the Air Force's analysis of the environmental criterion.

DEFENSE AGENCIES - Of the Defense Agencies impacted by BRAC-93, only the Defense Logistics Agency is being considered for major closures or realignments with environmental impacts.

1. Data Evaluation

The Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA's) Recommendations and Analyses Report (Part of Volume VI) accurately reflects the information compiled in DLA's environmental questionnaires for the recommended installations.

2. Consistency/Compliance

COBRA environmental costs were entered for DLA's recommended action at DPSC-Philadelphia, however these costs were not entered into COBRA for DESC-Dayton. The installation questionnaire for DESC-Dayton indicates that environmental costs at this facility are relatively low.

3. Impact on Base Status

No recommended change in base status due to evaluation of criterion 8.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES FOR BRAC-95

1. Specific, detailed direction should be given to the Services on how to evaluate environmental impacts. Guidance should be given on the perspective the Services should use to address each of the environmental attributes, and how the environmental impact of the Services' recommended actions should be evaluated.

2. The consideration of environmental costs should be modified to consider incremental restoration costs associated with closure.

There are several unique factors that contribute to additional restoration costs at closing bases.

a. The Community Environmental Response, Facilitation Act (CERFA) includes requirements unique to closing bases. There must be an assessment of the property to identify clean parcels in order to attempt to facilitate reuse. The costs of these assessments are typically in the same order of magnitude as many of the compliance

costs that are currently tracked under Programmed Costs/Cost Avoidances.

b. Investigation and cleanup acceleration is necessary due to pressure to convert to civilian use. Deadlines, unique to closing bases, for the completion of the investigation phase have been established by Congress. This acceleration will often lead to additional costs due to:

1) The need to use "off-the-shelf" cleanup technology rather than seeking more cost-efficient innovative approaches, which by their nature require more testing prior to application.

2) Spending incremental funds in near-term fiscal years, that is not currently programmed

c. In some cases, cleanup standards for converting to a new, civilian use may be more stringent than standards for continuing military use. This could result in significant incremental costs at closing bases, relative to restoration costs at bases that remain open.