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AIR FORCE TEAM



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BOOK TWO

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OPEN MEETING

9:00 a.m.

Hart Senate Office Building
Room 216
Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, June 23, 1993

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Jim Courter, Chairman
CPT Peter B. Bowman, USN (Ret.)
Beverly B. Byron
Rebecca G. Cox
GEN Hansford T. Johnson, USAF (Ret.)
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.
Robert D. Stuart

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Base Closing Commission will
3 come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. After
4 three-and-a-half months of a pretty grueling schedule, the
5 members of the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment
6 Commission are ready to begin some very, very difficult
7 decisions about the domestic infrastructure of the United
8 States military.
9 It has been, obviously, not a quiet spring for
10 members of the Commission, nor has it been an early summer.
11 We have been lobbied and approached by members of Congress,
12 elected officials at every level, governors and state
13 representatives. We have been courted by consultants that
14 were hired by worried communities and now it's time for us to
15 take our own counsel.
16 Just a word, very quickly, about the members of
17 Congress and elected officials. With very few exceptions,
18 and I mean very few, as much as they feel very strongly about
19 their facilities, as much as they deeply believe that their
20 bases should remain open for legitimate national security
21 reasons, and as much as the stakes are very high and that
22 they're concerned about -- and rightly so -- the future of

1 their towns and their constituents, they have been very
2 courteous to this Commission.
3 And, they have been helpful to the process, by
4 advocating the good things that their facilities have, by
5 making sure that this Commission is totally aware of the
6 military attributes of those bases that they represent, and
7 that has added, I think, to the quality of the dialogue and
8 the accuracy of the information that we're dealing with, and
9 I want to commend the Members of Congress for showing the
10 courtesy that they have to the individual members of this
11 Commission during a very arduous and difficult process.
12 In the face of it all, the members of this
13 Commission have not wavered at all from our commitment to
14 render a fair and fiercely independent judgment with respect
15 to the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, which
16 were published by him on March 12th of this year.
17 From beginning to end, start to finish, the
18 Commissioners and I have really been privileged to
19 participate in what is a very stimulating exercise of open
20 government, I think one of the more robust examples of open
21 government in Washington, D.C. We have clearly been
blessed
22 by this challenge for no other reason than the fact that we

1 have been part of it.
2 We visited, as you know, well over 100 bases in
3 every corner of the United States. We've heard directly
4 through testimony from over 200 members of Congress here on
5 Capitol Hill and received thousands of telephone calls from
6 elected representatives.
7 The 1993 Base Closing Commission is now ready to
8 hold its final deliberations and will be starting the voting
9 process this afternoon. As we do that, we're very sensitive
10 to the fact that our decisions will have a very large

11 economic impact on communities.
12 And, as we discovered, in some parts of the
13 country, there has been three generations and four
14 generations of families working for the Navy, in some
15 instances, and the Army, in other instances, at Supply Depots
16 and shipyards and maintenance facilities.
17 Now, they are looking around and their lifestyle
18 will change, based on the final decisions on this Commission,
19 the President and the Congress. Their opportunities will
20 change, and we are well aware of the huge economic impact it
21 will have on these individuals and their families and their
22 lives, and that weighs very heavily because we're all human

1 beings. It's not good news for individual communities in the
2 short run. We firmly hope and we believe in the long run,
3 that every community will make the appropriate adjustments.
4 We have a very dynamic economy.
5 We have, obviously, an ambitious schedule this week
6 and I think members of the press have received it. On each
7 day, through Sunday, the 27th of June, the Commission will
8 carefully review all the 238 installations, large and small,
9 but all important, that are on either the Secretary's list
10 for recommended closures or our own.
11 By the time we complete our last vote some time
12 late on Sunday, obviously, everybody will know what the make
13 up is of this final list. It will be presented in written
14 form and report form to the president by July 1st.
15 When we finish Sunday with our votes late in the
16 afternoon or early in the evening, we will then have our
17 staff and members of the Commission write and finalize the
18 report that we'll be sending to the president, so the work is
19 not over on Sunday for the members of this Commission or the
20 staff.
21 Before we begin the final review and voting process
22 early this afternoon, we'll be spending this morning

1 revisiting three major categories that we failed to complete
2 last Friday and this afternoon, we'll be having some votes
3 and further discussion with regard to the Army facilities.
4 On Friday, June 25th, we'll move over to the House
5 side of the Capitol in Room 2167 of the Rayburn House Office
6 Building, which is the main hearing room of the House Public
7 Works Committee. We'll begin at 9:00 and finish
8 approximately 6:00 or 6:30 each day.
9 Saturday, June 26th, we'll return to Room 650 of
10 the Dirksen Senate Office Building, beginning, as we plan, at
11 9:00 o'clock in the morning and finishing about 6:30 in the
12 evening. We'll work through the day on Navy categories.
13 As I mentioned, if all goes well, we'll complete
14 our work with respect to votes and the public session by
15 6:30. We will have press availabilities twice a day. Our
16 custom is normally once a day but in view of the fact that
17 we're going to have votes and final deliberations and
18 hearings, we thought we would have it twice a day at around
19 12:00 or 12:30 in the morning and then at 5:00, 6:30 or 7:00
20 in the evening.
21 Because of the enormous amount of work that we have
22 to accomplish, we would respectfully ask the press that they

1 try to focus their questions on those facilities that we have
2 disposed of through votes. They may have very legitimate and
3 tough, challenging questions as to why we did that which we
4 did, although I think you'll understand why after you hear
5 the discussions among the Commissioners and between
6 Commissioners and staff.
7 We would rather not speculate on votes that have
8 not taken place, so if the press would indulge us with
9 respect to that, we would appreciate it, but on the other
10 hand, they are the press and when they ask the questions that

11 they think are important, we certainly understand that.
12 Let me just mention two things personally. First,
13 members of the press and the public have seen the
14 Commissioners faces and heard our voices, not only in
15 Washington but throughout the United States, and it's
16 obvious that we're not alone, but you haven't seen very much
17 nor have you heard very much from the extraordinarily
18 dedicated and talented members of our staff, just four of
19 which are sitting in front of me now.
20 We have an additional 65 or 70 people that have
21 worked as hard as I've ever seen public servants work in my
22 entire life, and I'm not just pandering. I've been on

1 Capitol Hill for many, many years, in this base closing
2 process, one a couple of years ago, a member of Congress fo
3 many, many years, and the folks that we managed to stitch
4 together for this work are talented and dedicated.
5 I believe, without exaggeration, they've worked
6 every weekend for the past six weeks. They were in the
7 office again last night until 12:00 or 1:00. They'll be in
8 the office tonight until that time, getting up early in the
9 morning. They did work all last weekend, Saturday and
10 Sunday, will be working this weekend, Saturday and Sunday,
11 and the nation doesn't know them but the nation really must
12 tip its hat to these dedicated people who have done such an
13 outstanding job.
14 I've heard from members of Congress the same thing,
15 that "Your staff is a talented one and a dedicated one." I
16 want to publicly express my personal appreciation and the
17 appreciation from the Commission to this dedicated staff.
18 They are an outstanding group of individuals.
19 Finally, just a quick word as to why we're here.
20 It's clear, I think, and I can tell by talking to people tha
21 I don't know, the people that I meet at bases, the people
22 that we run into in airports and on the roads and the

1 comment, as we've gone to the heartland of America and to
2 shores.
3 They recognize the requirement. They recognize
4 that which we have to do. It doesn't make it easy, but the
5 recognize, and I think America recognizes, that we are
6 blessedly capable of reducing significantly our defense
7 expenditures and spending that money on other things.
8 Cold War is over and we don't have to go into all that, but
9 necessary component of making efficiencies is doing some ve
10 painful things.
11 Home owners do it. Families do it. Private
12 enterprise does it and so must the Department of Defense, a
13 that is, to get rid of everything that's not needed, so it
14 doesn't have to be supported, so it doesn't have to be
15 guarded, so it doesn't have to be kept warm or kept cool, a
16 that means we're going to have to close a lot of bases in
17 this round, and there will be further mobility bases
18 domestically in the United States that will be closed in
19 1995, I suspect.
20 It is a classic area where the local interest
21 conflicts with the national interest. In this particular
22 situation, we have pledged -- this Commission has -- to ma

1 sure that the national interest is served. That is our
2 master. We have to do that which is necessary for the comm
3 good, even though the decision is very painful for a locati
4 or a region or a county or, in some instances, a state, bu
5 that's our job and we're not going to shrink from it.
6 Also, I might add that we're well aware, as well,
7 that this process was created because Congress and the
8 administration found it so difficult to arrive at thes
9 conclusions themselves, and that's not by way of criticis
10 those two remarkable and flexible institutions that are

1 imperfect and I suppose imperfect to the people that work
2 in them.
3 We now know why it was impossible. There is an
4 extraordinary effort by communities to put their best foot
5 forward to show the absolute essentiality of their facility
6 and you're dealing in not simple terms. That which you do
7 with respect to one base affect another, and that which you
8 do in one part of the country affects another as well.
9 So, we recognize that because of the paralysis of
10 and the inability of Congress and the administration to make
11 these decisions and carry them out, without suspicion of
12 bias, without suspicion of political expediency, a Commission

1 had to be created that was the final judge and arbiter. The
2 process can only survive and will only be accepted by
3 Congress if this Commission meets in public, aggravates in
4 public, votes in public, and visits bases in public and
5 that's what we have tried to do.
6 As you know, we have not met and discuss and voted
7 behind closed doors. This is an exercise that is being
8 conducted totally in public and, because of that, there are
9 going to be disagreements among Commissioners. There may be,
10 at times, late in the afternoon, some heated discussions
11 between staff and Commissioners but please know that that, I
12 don't think, lessens the credibility of our product.
13 I think it should enhance it, because the
14 difficulty that we may have publicly in arriving at these
15 conclusions I think confirms and ratifies and proves that our
16 decisions have been made as public as we can possibly make
17 them.
18 To this moment, although individual Commissioners
19 are arriving at conclusions in their own minds, I cannot -- I
20 could not look any individual in this room in the face and
21 say, "That base stays open. That base is closed." We have
22 purposely kept our minds open, so I have the input of the

1 other Commissioners as we arrive at our final decisions.
2 That, I guess, is a long enough opening statement.
3 I would ask whether any other Commissioners have
4 anything to say before I introduce our staff, to proceed. Is
5 there anything that any of the Commissioners would like to
6 add to this?
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, said, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll proceed and, Mr. Behrmann,
9 if you would start out, we'll complete this morning the three
10 categories that we failed to complete on Thursday.
11 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, I have no opening
12 comments. I think we could right into the NADEPs with Alex
13 Yellin and Roy Karadbil.
14 MR. YELLIN: Mr. Chairman, first, I'd like to thank
15 you for your comments. I'm sure the staff really appreciates
16 them. I'd like to now introduce Roy Karadbil who will be
17 presenting the Naval Air Depots. Please put up No. 1,
18 please.
19 MR. KARADBIL: You can also put up No. 2. Good
20 morning, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners. We'll start off here
21 with the first slides, indicating that there are six NADEPs.
22 The slide on the left shows you which ones are on the base

1 closure list. The other three were placed on the
2 consideration list in the May hearings. They are located
3 about the country on the map on the right.
4 Three and four, please. Slide 3 shows you the
5 three major issues to be discussed today about the NADEPs:
6 The capacity and how many need to be closed; the military
7 value, what it is and will it provide you a basis for
8 decision; and then the cost and savings and other non-cost
9 factors that will be used by you to make that decision.
10 Starting off in capacity, during this process, the
11 DOD determined excess capacity, and the slide on the right
12 shows you that excess capacity for each of the NADEPs. In
13 the bottom right-hand corner is the most important number.
14 It says there's 115 percent excess capacity, more than twice
15 as much as we need.
16 COMMISSIONER STUART: Is that based on eight-hour
17 operations?
18 MR. KARADBIL: This is based on a one shift, five
19 day a week operation, yes, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER STUART: One shift?
21 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: All right.

1 MR. KARADBIL: Remove three, put up five. When we
2 take those hours and we convert them into capacity
3 utilization, you now see a chart that shows all the NADEPs in
4 the BRAC process, DOD process, of capacity utilization at 4
5 percent overall.
6 The far right corner on the bottom gives you the
7 result of the Joint Chiefs, GEN Went, the Depots
8 Consolidation Study, and that came out with an estimate of
9 percent, both of these being right around 50 and indicating
10 that three NADEPs need to be closed to lose the excess
11 capacity.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Roy, your comment is that
13 both those numbers are pretty well researched and they only
14 serve to show you the order of magnitude, which is around 50.
15 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, they use slightly different
16 numbers, slightly different years, but they give you the same
17 general answer. Put up Slides 6 and 7, please.
18 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Roy, let me ask you on the
19 excess capacity, higher numbers, meaning more excess
20 capacity?
21 MR. KARADBIL: For the hours, the higher the
22 numbers, the more excess capacity.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: On four?
2 MR. KARADBIL: On the capacity utilization.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: The fact that in Norfolk, the
4 engine workload which they previously had done and now,
5 because of interservicing, which we have spent a great deal
6 of time talking about, it is now being done at Tinker, is
7 that a detriment to their numbers?
8 MR. KARADBIL: Not in these, because they are
9 counted as no hours of capacity at all, so there's no excess
10 involved at Norfolk in engines.
11 MR. BEHRMANN: Mrs. Byron, that will have an impact
12 when you get to looking at the overhead that they're carrying
13 presently, because they have not reduced some of their
14 management structure, which was there to support that
15 workload.
16 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I understand that, so that is
17 really negative on this slice?
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, ma'am, not on this particular
19 slide, but it's --
20 COMMISSIONER BYRON: In the overall?
21 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, ma'am, and we'll talk to that
22 at length when we get to that particular issue later on.

1 MR. YELLIN: Mrs. Byron, it can be a dramatic
2 effect on the cost implications of it, but this is really a
3 workload calculation, not a square footage utilization, so
4 the fact that they would have an empty building doesn't
5 impact this. It impacts the cost, obviously.
6 MR. KARADBIL: Slides 6 and 7. The next issue is
7 that of military value, where many of the groups of bases are
8 decided. On the top, DOD point awards; on the bottom are
9 adjusted totals.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Which means?

11 MR. KARADBIL: Which means that primarily --
12 MR. YELLIN: These are our adjustments.
13 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, they are our adjustments and
14 they are made to reverse some inconsistent judgments, to
15 correct some recording and mathematical errors, and to assign
16 more consistent credit for the special skills and
17 capabilities of the NADEPs.
18 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Were those adjusted totals
19 reviewed by the services, and did they concur, or were they
20 not reviewed by the services?
21 MR. KARADBIL: They were not reviewed by the
22 services.

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: These were so close
2 together when you do the adjustments, that they are within
3 what the poll takers call the margin of error, aren't they?
4 MR. KARADBIL: I agree, yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: The North Island one on the
6 first viewgraph is a little bit different. It's
7 significantly different.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I'm talking about the
9 final judgment. You're really running between almost 62 and
10 67.
11 MR. KARADBIL: Yes. I think if I had taken longer,
12 I'd probably get closer together than even this.
13 MR. YELLIN: They are all very capable facilities.
14 They all have a lot of skills in many areas, and what we
15 tried to do was to make sure that they were all fairly
16 treated in the questioning that made up the military value
17 matrix that the Navy used.
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Our initial assumptions that any
19 three could be selected and that you would have at least a
20 military value average for those three that is higher or
21 equal to the present, has been validated. That was our
22 supposition May 21st.

1 I think Roy has just, by going through and
2 scrubbing these things overall, has said military value
3 really is not a great discriminator. They are all very
4 capable. They can all basically accomplish what we need to
5 if we go to three.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: It's good for the country,
7 bad for the Commissioners. It would be great if there were
8 just three of them that just popped out as clear winners.
9 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, we're going to bank military
10 value in the NADEPs but unfortunately, it's not a
11 discriminator to make the final decision.
12 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Are any of them easier to
13 carve out from a base than another? When we look at re-use,
14 you know, several of them are right in the middle of a base
15 or as far into the base as you can get. Are any of them on
16 the fringes?
17 MR. KARADBIL: They're all tenants on the base, and
18 I don't believe it would be easy to take out the land they
19 occupy.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And with one exception, no
21 bases are scheduled to close that have NADEPs.
22 MR. KARADBIL: Correct. Only the Alameda Air

1 Station is on the list at present.
2 MR. BEHRMANN: Just one other note about military
3 value and then maybe we can move on to other things, but the
4 overall point score and the way they looked at all attributes
5 generally has them coming out about the same.
6 One of the things that I think you're going to
7 start to do is look at cost, look at, you know, their co
8 location with other assets, these sorts of things, so those
9 all do talk about military value points. I don't think you
10 can completely discount military value as an important issue
11 here, but the overall score, as done by the Navy, [illegible]
12 thing that's not going to let you discriminate.
13 We've seen this in the air mobility area. We've
14 had to go beyond that overall general score and get [illegible]
15 some very specific military attributes, and I think [illegible]
16 what this slide is designed to tell you.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Let me ask a general, sort of
18 a principle question, of how private industrial capacity
19 metered into this. You probably saw -- I think I sent to
20 you -- the article yesterday in which the Navy announced a
21 new policy for the future, in which they would attempt to
22 utilize the private sector to a greater extent in this deg

1 activity. Would you comment a little on that?
2 MR. KARADBIL: In this process, the Navy
3 recognized there was a great deal of private sector
4 capability and that it mirrored most of the NADEPs'
5 operations but it was not taken into account because they
6 didn't have a specific knowledge of exactly what it was,
7 it would affect the cost, and how they might use it, so t
8 simply left it out, as it were, during this.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: Did our staff people attempt
10 to assess that? It's a short time and you probably didn't
11 have an opportunity.
12 MR. YELLIN: One of the things the Navy did, in
13 looking at scenarios and looking at a certain NADEP, look
14 at the work at that NADEP, there were judgments made by t
15 Navy during this process, and we'll be showing you some o
16 this later in the presentation, that there were judgments
17 made by the Navy that said, "This piece of workload at th
18 NADEP, it's appropriate to have a portion of that privatiz
19 sent to the commercial sector," and that is a key part of
20 analysis.
21 Each of the scenarios reflects the Navy's judgment
22 about where workload at that NADEP should be directed.

1 to another NADEP or to an inter-serviced or to the privat
2 sector, and that does have an effect on the cost and [illegible]
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: Thanks.
4 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Along that same vein, I think
5 we have insufficient data because of differences between
6 services and because of unidentified or zero information f
7 the private sector for us to make a thoughtful, detailed
8 decision involving the private sector. That seems to me
9 be the case, anyway.
10 MR. KARADBIL: I agree completely.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'm afraid that's correct.
12 Peter.
13 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir, Commissioner Stuart. I
14 think the indications about the industrialization policy
15 Naval Air Systems has announced, I think it's still indic
16 that this is an evolving process, that they are still loo
17 more and more closely at their workload in order to furt
18 define the core capabilities that they feel obligated to
19 maintain, to maintain the Navy's -- the requirements for
20 Navy's in-house capability.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: But, in view of that, if the
22 Commission leans one way or another, with the possibilit

1 more going to the commercial sector, on a close one, one
2 might lean toward closing, other things being equal.
3 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir. The implications of a
4 NAVAIR industrialization policy is that more work will b
5 done in the private sector than has been done in the pas
6 that more work will be taken out of the government-owne
7 system to be done in the private sector; and that the
8 go back to what they feel they need, that is, specifi
9 suited for government performance rather than private
10 performance, or put out to a competitive situation, wher

lowest cost producer, but [illegible] or private, would be able to that work.

MR. BORDEN: Even though the private sector capability was not assessed, the Navy, in this area as well as other areas, currently does work in the private sector, somewhere between 30 and 40 percent, so even though the capability of the private sector wasn't assessed, it's there and is currently being used. I'm certain it would be able to be expanded.

COMMISSIONER STUART: But there seems to be a thrust now toward more of that in the private sector, as a matter of policy, anyway?

MR. BORDEN: Right, yes.

MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER STUART: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: In your analysis, did you factor in what this Commission has been beating on and that is, inter-servicing of depot work?

MR. KARADBIL: There is a great deal of inter servicing in the scenarios that we will get into from the COBRA model, and they had to take it into account because of the number of scenarios that were presented. They naturally lent themselves to the work going certain places and so, I have some slides later, showing some examples of some real proposed transfers.

MR. YELLIN: And I think you'll see that in this category already, the Navy participates in inter-servicing. At Pensacola, the NADEP at Pensacola does a lot of work for the Air Force right now, so there has been inter-servicing but you're right. This is clearly a category where more of that could be done than has been done.

MR. BORDEN: I think in this area, there's more talk than action. I think currently, there's about two percent --

COMMISSIONER BYRON: Well, there is on one hand. On the other hand, as we went through the depots, you could see where work that had previously been done in the depot is now being inter-serviced in another facility, so there has been some of that begun.

MR. BORDEN: Some.

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I agree with all the comments on inter-servicing and consideration of the private sector, so don't get my next comment misinterpreted and that is, that the Navy has forthrightly and aggressively addressed the issue of over capacity by recommending for closure half, 50 percent, of their aviation industrial depot capability. That is a bold action and we should not take that lightly. They have aggressively done it, where you might -- underlined, you might -- not come to that conclusion with some of the other services.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: You're being very diplomatic.

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I always am. I try to be.

MR. KARADBIL: Put up Slide 8, please. The COBRA model is used by the Navy.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Roy, can you just pull the mike over, so you can really get heard?

MR. KARADBIL: The COBRA model is used by the Navy in quantifying many of the things that you talk about, work transfer, what it costs to close, who goes where, how many people are eliminated and whatever, and this slide shows you some of the questions that we've asked about the results of the Navy COBRA models, what costs they're using there. How the rates or costs affect the results?

How do management decisions affect the results in terms of inter-servicing, sending to the private sector; the number of personnel eliminated and how that's factored in.

[illegible] in the [illegible] bullet, a question. Is there a need for NADEP on the west Coast? This will become apparent later, why this is part of the questioning process.

Slides 9 and 10, please. On the bottom section of these slides is an average of the Navy break-even rate that they use to determine cost relationships between the NADEPs. It's basically the NADEP saying that at this time, this is the cost structure necessary to break even on the workload that you're going to assign me.

We looked at this because this is the cost relationship in the COBRA model and if it isn't a valid representational relationship, it will skew all the results

one way or another. So, the first thing we looked at was historical, actual costs.

In doing that, along the top of both charts, what you'll see is the numbers are fairly well related, except for one NADEP, Norfolk, which, over the past five years of actual costs, has had the lowest and, in the Navy rates, is the second highest.

This led us to question how those costs were developed by the Navy, what it was and what the relationship was, and so we looked at the historical. We also looked at their operating results. In everything we looked at, Norfolk seems to be pretty squarely located in the lower cost NADEPs.

Then, looking at the Navy rate and where it came from, there are a number of problems on the validity of that rate and using that rate as the representation of the cost relationship. So, basically, what we think is that what's on top would be a better relationship and properly puts Norfolk into the lower cost trio, if you will, than what the Navy used.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Would you find out, for example, why G&A overhead went at Norfolk from $11.51 in that five-year period to $22? Why did it double?

MR. KARADBIL: Okay. What you're talking about is that in the five-year actual costs, the G&A rate for Norfolk was $11.51. The rate the Navy used, the rate that was being paid for that particular year, was $22.26, and what I'm saying is that the numbers that went into the Navy rate are subject to questions about their validity. They are directed, in many cases, by management, and they do not offer what I think is a fair cost relationship between the NADEPs.

MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. McPherson, there are two reasons that I can see on its face, after having looked at all this, that those numbers seem inconsistent when you look over a five-year period and then you look at the fifth, and that is because, as Mrs. Byron pointed out, a substantial chunk of Norfolk's workload has either been reduced or moved out, and that's one part of the factor.

The other is that Norfolk did not reduce its force at all. They didn't RIF people. They didn't take management positions out, so they are maintaining an overhead and a force structure that could do more work and had done more work and you see the rates at which they did it over a five-year period. They are artificially high, is the point, and that's --

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: My recollection, and Commissioner Byron may correct me on this, but I thought they said that they had really taken a big cut. They had really downsized very sharply in the last year or year-and-a-half.

MR. KARADBIL: Yes, they have over the last year and they are in for an additional RIF and an additional downsizing, but those numbers are what the Navy is using. The last full year of operation was 1992 that went into this and during that year, Norfolk was caught with too many people, too little workload, for a variety of reasons.

11 COMMISSIONER BYRNE: So, what you're basically
12 saying is if we looked at the number next year, their
13 numbers would be more accurate in what you projected, as
14 opposed to what the Navy projects.
15 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, and then in looking at the
16 COBRA results for the Navy, that rate for Norfolk is making a
17 big difference in what happens, and we get into that more
18 specifically a little later.
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But isn't it true, Roy,
20 within reason, you can drive that rate anywhere you want it,
21 depending upon how you choose to put the workload?
22 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir, it is.

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The Navy, obviously, has
2 chosen the workload distribution as it is, so it's important,
3 but the rate itself can be driven and the local labor rate
4 cannot, but the overhead and other things can be driven.
5 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, this is one of the primary
6 reasons I have a problem with that rate, is that management
7 decisions on the distribution of workload and additional
8 workload during the year can have a complete turn-around.
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But surely, you're going to
10 get into something meaningful here later about the quality of
11 the work and other things that drive management decisions?
12 MR. KARADBIL: We have some additional slides later
13 on if you want to look at them that speak a little to that.
14 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Let me just summarize that by
15 saying, clearly, some of the factors that go into the rate
16 structure that we see here are controlled by the NADEP
17 Commander and some are not.
18 The other thing you have to keep in mind is, as I
19 understand the Naval Air Depot work, they try to take chunks
20 of work, like F-14 engines, and put them someplace, so you
21 work in parcels or categories, and it may not be that you can
22 get them all at a certain, same level, because by

1 transferring work here and there, you're going to have some
2 that are significantly higher than others.
3 MR. KARADBIL: Right.
4 MR. YELLIN: Yes, you're absolutely right.
5 MR. KARADBIL: Put up Slides 11 and 12, please.
6 Slide No. 11 shows you what taking one of those particular
7 rates in the prior slide, the one that reflects the actual
8 cost over the last five years and the one the Navy used, and
9 what difference it would make to transfer a million hours of
10 workload from Norfolk to Jacksonville.
11 Basically, I think this slide shows you the
12 significance of the impact of those two different rates on a
13 COBRA scenario because there's three million or so hours, at
14 least, transferred from each of the closing NADEPs.
15 COMMISSIONER STUART: Roy, I think you're making a
16 point that reflects the amount of work being assigned to
17 Norfolk, but you questioned that 6876 figure which is the
18 number for '94, but that also, in turn, reflects a prior
19 decision by the Navy to take out that engine processing?
20 MR. KARADBIL: Oh, yes.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: So, that's where we are
22 today.

1 MR. KARADBIL: Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER STUART: Isn't that the number that
3 we've got to deal with, from the point of view of making a
4 decision?
5 MR. KARADBIL: From the point of view of working on
6 what you're going to bid on something next year, that's what
7 the number is used for. The COBRA process, as I see it here,
8 is to try to make a fair evaluation of the cost relationships
9 between the NADEPs and put a number on them, and into that,
10 you need a fair representation of the actual cost, what it

11 will be.
12 You have a point-of-time rate that the Navy used
13 that freezes it, and I have about another half-dozen to
14 laser problems with that rate I could get into later.
15 Simply said, I don't believe it shows you a fair cost
16 relationship between the NADEPs that should be used to
17 calculate savings and make a decision on who stays and who
18 goes.
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, what you're saying is
20 this is not a driver. We should look at other factors.
21 MR. KARADBIL: What I'm saying is that that Navy
22 rate will distort the Navy COBRAs in my opinion and,

1 therefore, we have to look at them a little differently w
2 we look at that "what's saved" line.
3 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: This is really kind of a
4 self-fulfilling prophesy, isn't it? In fact, Roy, would
5 take a minute to describe the way work goes to -- the way
6 work is assigned or is obtained by the NADEPs? Is it --
7 speak of their customers and bidding on stuff, but then
8 learn, after awhile, that particular business gets steere
9 particular NADEPs; isn't that correct?
10 MR. KARADBIL: There's a variety of ways. First of
11 all --
12 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: That very much affects all
13 this overhead and all the costs that the NADEP has?
14 MR. KARADBIL: Absolutely.
15 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Go ahead. Excuse me.
16 MR. KARADBIL: Right. There's a variety of ways.
17 First of all, most of the NADEPs are single-sided and se
18 the world for a certain air frame, a certain engine, so
19 get that work that comes in and no one else gets it, how
20 much it is.
21 Then, they will do bidding on various contracts and
22 they may or may not win. Also, roughly a quarter, as

1 understand it, is basically a management decision during
2 year, with work that comes up, where it will go, who wil
3 it, and with that kind of ability to direct work and the
4 inability of the NADEP to necessarily position itself at
5 times in a favorable way, can lead in my mind to a distr
6 relationship at any given time.
7 The COBRA proposes to make this relationship
8 permanent for all time, so to be fair, I think we have t
9 a rate that's more indicative of what it is, what it wa
10 what it will be, not what it is this very second.
11 MR. BEHRMANN: Let me try to take a crack at it a
12 little bit different way. If you look at a business an
13 looked at them in any given year and you saw that a div
14 that had always done well for you suddenly went down, y
15 start to say, "Why?"
16 If you made an overall business decision that had
17 impacted him and left him with overhead, that he couldn't
18 rid of and he sort of was struggling with that, that one
19 would be an isolated way to look at one of your better
20 performers.
21 So, what we tried to do was look at a way to give
22 you a level playing field. Look at his true performance

1 one year in isolation, one year that maybe he was -- tha
2 guy was caught in isolation with a particular problem,
3 that's why Roy went to this five-year levelling. It gi
4 you a little bit better picture, I think.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But you also have to look at
6 did the NADEP make a profit during that five years and
7 in fact, the '94 rate reflect the fact that they were
8 operating at a deficit?
9 MR. BEHRMANN: We address that later, General.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay.

MR. KARADBIL: [illegible]

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I think it would be smoother if you just go through your presentation.

MR. KARADBIL: The next slide, No. 10, shows the results of looking at the personnel or billets eliminated in all of the COBRA scenarios that we looked at to see what kind of percentage of personnel elimination is done to each of the NADEPs.

The reason it's important is that personnel eliminations are the single greatest savings center in all of the scenarios, to a very great extent, and one of the ways

you can ensure certain results would come out would be to ensure that you had more people eliminated from one place or another, generating a very large savings when they were out and not generating that savings when they were in.

The two highlighted numbers show you that in Norfolk and Cherry Point's case, they both, on the average, had a great many more people eliminated during the scenarios they were in, that caused extra savings and because of that, one of the things I tried to do was go back and level that out.

But, the reason for that is coming up in the next two slides, 13 and 14, please. These give you some scenario write-ups on where the work is going when we close the three NADEPs in each of these four cases. As you can see, there's a number going inter-service. There's a number going private sector.

The impact of that is when you send work inter service or private sector, the people don't follow. They are eliminated. If you transfer it between NADEPs, the people follow. They are not eliminated. So, that's one way to explain why Norfolk and Cherry Point have a great many more people eliminated and a lot more savings in a number of

scenarios.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: That's assuming that people will move to the other NADEP.

MR. KARADBIL: [illegible] assumption [illegible] certain percentage, almost [illegible] of the direct labor and a small amount of the indirect labor, will follow the work between NADEPs if the work is going there. If it's going to the Army or if it's going to Lockheed or wherever, those people are no longer needed and they become additional personnel eliminated and additional savings.

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: They are less likely to.

MR. KARADBIL: Yes.

MR. BORDEN: Commissioner McPherson, the positions would go. Now, whether the people would go -- what he's saying is the positions, if the work is transferred, the positions would transfer. I don't know what would happen. The people may or may not go.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: If you have a NADEP that is operating at, say, 40 percent capacity, and one of the detriments that we have in the formula is excess personnel and management, and we close another NADEP and move to that NADEP, I would not perceive that you would have an increase

in their numbers of personnel.

MR. KARADBIL: The indirect or support personnel would not increase much because you have an infrastructure there providing payroll personnel, whatever, but the direct labor would, because one person can only work one year, one year's worth of hours, and you're transferring "X" number of hours across, so that you are basically coming very close to a one-to-one on shifting direct labor.

MR. YELLIN: The excess capacity information we gave you before doesn't mean that they're currently staffed

[illegible] amount of people to be the right number. That is a [illegible] of the capability of the facility. They do have excess people because of inefficient utilization of that capability, of that facility.

MR. BEHRMANN: It doesn't necessarily translate down to the artisan level, the guy actually turning bolts.

MR. KARADBIL: The workload going down is factored into the process. It's a force structure elimination and, therefore, not counted as a savings from BRAC. There are significant numbers of people that will be excess due to force structure, so that's already taken care of before we get to this.

COMMISSIONER COX: Roy, on your tables here, the assumptions as to what would be inter-serviced or sent to the private sector, are those yours or are those the Navy's?

MR. KARADBIL: Those are the Navy's. As you see, many of them -- and they require a lot of direct knowledge exactly where things will fit, and what in the private sector is operational right now, we might move more into -- it seemed reasonable that this would reside in the Navy to make that decision.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me ask you this question, Roy. How do these charts, 13 and 14, aid us in a decision?

MR. KARADBIL: What I was showing you here is there is a great many columns here of inter-service and private sector, which will affect the number of people eliminated, which will increase the savings where that is done.

For instance, NAVAIR made a decision that the two primary programs at Norfolk, the F-14 and the A-6, would have 60 percent of their work sent out to the private sector in those scenarios where Norfolk was closed.

This generates a significant amount of people excessed more than the average, and is one way that the management decision on what to do impacts on the results of

the scenarios and who comes out with the most savings and who the best, when we add up all the differences and so on.

The work around.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Now, let's move on.

MR. KARADBIL: Speaking of COBRAs, put up Slide 15, please.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Can I ask a technical question?

MR. KARADBIL: Sure.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The Navy proposal keeps the rotary test facility at Pensacola or not?

MR. KARADBIL: Yes, it does.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: One of your scenarios implies that's not the Navy proposal, but -- okay, go ahead.

MR. KARADBIL: One of the scenarios has Pensacola part way open. That is the Navy scenario, as it stands in their decision to close down Alameda, Norfolk and a part of Pensacola, leaving a small detachment of Cherry Point at Pensacola.

MR. YELLIN: On the right-hand scenario on page 14 is the Navy proposal.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay. I assumed the left

one was the Navy one, but the right one is the correct Navy one.

MR. KARADBIL: Right. Next to it is that same thing without the detachment at Pensacola. Put up 15, please. We asked the Navy to do quite a large number of COBRA scenarios to ensure that all of the NADEPs, since they are all very close together in everything, got a lot of analysis as to whether or not they should be retained.

The left-hand column shows you the results of the Navy COBRAs except for the top. That was a guess yesterday

11 and I've since received the COBRA from the Navy. It's about
12 1.2, not 1.7, on top. On the other side are the results of a
13 number of levelling efforts that are still ongoing where I
14 have tried to implant a different rate, adjust for personnel
15 eliminated and the work transfer and a number of other
16 problems I had with the way the COBRA data was.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, you look at this chart
18 and you re-do Line No. 1, which moves it down, the Navy
19 dutifully came back and said their original number was the
20 best to close in the original proposal?
21 MR. KARADBIL: In the original proposal, no. The
22 original proposal is down at Number 4 and if you look at the

1 right-hand column and see the two stars, read across left,
2 that's the Navy proposal. So, in their own numbers, it does
3 not come out Number 1. It comes out three, and is not too
4 far separated from the fourth and the fifth one.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay.
6 MR. KARADBIL: Sixteen and 17, please.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you, for the record,
8 explain, going back to 15, where you say "total savings."
9 Those numbers are in millions of dollars?
10 MR. KARADBIL: Those are in millions of dollars,
11 1.7, 1.4 billion dollars, and they are the net 20-year
12 savings, the bottom line, as it were on the COBRA scenario.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: What is the difference between
14 the left and right, 1.75 billion?
15 MR. KARADBIL: What the right is reflects a number
16 of adjustments, including putting in the historical cost
17 rate, levelling off the excess personnel that were excessed
18 at Cherry Point and Norfolk above the norm.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Did the Navy do this analysis?
20 MR. KARADBIL: No, I did this analysis.
21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And you haven't shown it to
22 them for review and comment, have you?

1 MR. KARADBIL: No, I have not.
2 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: So, what you're saying
3 that the number on the right is your number?
4 MR. KARADBIL: It reflects an ongoing adjustment to
5 try and level the playing field as much as possible to take
6 out the impact of management decisions, which may have been
7 prejudicial to one or another NADEP, in effect, not
8 necessarily in intent.
9 MR. YELLIN: We have had ongoing discussions with
10 the Navy continually about our concerns about certain things
11 like using the current budget rate rather than an actual
12 five-year average of actual.
13 The Navy is very insistent in their comments back
14 to us that the rate that they use is the most appropriate
15 rate to make this decision, and that the adjustments that we
16 are proposing are not appropriate for this decision.
17 They said, "We used the numbers we felt were the
18 best. They reflect where we are now. They reflect decisions
19 that have already been made, and we want to move on from
20 where we are now, and these are the appropriate numbers to
21 use."
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: Isn't there a pretty good

1 case for that, because this effort is, to me, somewhat
2 theoretical, level the playing field, because the Navy
3 numbers reflect decisions that have already taken place and
4 have affected the bottom line results of each of these
5 depots, but if these decisions have been made, aren't we
6 dealing with that reality?
7 MR. YELLIN: One of the things that we have tried
8 to do here is to try to give you a picture of one NADEP in
9 relationship to another NADEP that tried to take out some of
10 those management decisions that we think, in what we've

11 presented here, distort looking at one NADEP versus anothe
12 but you're right. Those decisions have been made.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: But the difference, quite
14 apart from this argument, the difference in the numbe
15 very substantial. If the number on the left is the N
16 number and the number on the right is ours, to the taxpaye
17 we're talking about three-to-one margins here. The Navy
18 saying that something will save a billion, 700 millio
19 MR. YELLIN: I think you really should look at our
20 numbers more as a comparative number between these differe
21 scenarios rather than a predictive number, and that's rea
22 what we've tried to do, is to try to take out issues that

1 thought distorted the ability to use the COBRA as a way to
2 compare different groups of NADEPs to be closed to other
3 NADEPs to be closed, rather than strictly a predictive too
4 to look at costs as they project to be.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We've spent too much time on
6 this already but going back to Line No. 1, you said that i
7 really should be 1250?
8 MR. KARADBIL: Around 1220, I think, yes.
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And the 800 should be
10 something much lower?
11 MR. KARADBIL: I don't have that yet.
12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, you'd say line 1 goes
13 out?
14 MR. KARADBIL: Line 1 is for the Navy down.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: It goes down.
16 MR. KARADBIL: I believe it should be at that level
17 if I receive the COBRA from the Navy, done using the rate
18 I've requested them to use.
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, it should go down to the
20 1200 level?
21 MR. KARADBIL: The 1200 for the Navy total and
22 leave the 800 where it is, as an estimate of what it wo

1 under the level ing that I'm going.
2 MR. BEHRMANN: It would drop it to fifth or sixt
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, looking at this, the
4 Number 1 is -- actual ly, Number 1 becomes Number 1 from
5 Navy standpoint.
6 MR. KARADBIL: Yes.
7 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And the difference is North
8 Island versus Alameda?
9 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And that depends upon the
11 decision we make there. Your Number 1 and the next Numb
12 would be the Navy recommendation plus closing the rotary
13 facility at Pensacola?
14 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir, at this time, that's what
15 the numbers indicate.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay.
17 MR. KARADBIL: I wanted to add in, to make sure we
18 got it straight here, that for the purposes of analysis,
19 wherever Alameda NADEP has been retained, I have assumed
20 had the Navy assume that the Alameda Naval Air Station w
21 also be retained. That gives an equal playing field anal
22 and while you might have the Alameda Naval Air Station

1 retained without the NADEP, if you have the NADEP without
2 air station, it creates a very significant monetary pena
3 for having to be a stand-alone organization.
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And in all of your analysis
5 and the Navy analysis, it shows that Alameda is better
6 Alameda stays open versus North Island?
7 MR. KARADBIL: No, in the Navy analysis, it comes
8 out as their number one to date; in mine, it comes out
9 second.
10 MR. YELLIN: That comes out as the number one COBRA

11 savings number. That's not the Navy's position for other
12 reasons.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: On the West Coast only?
MR. YELLIN: On the West Coast, the Navy has said
their preference is to keep North Island, not Alameda.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Assuming Alameda stays open,
17 the Navy numbers say Alameda has a higher military value than
18 North Island?
19 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay.
21 MR. KARADBIL: And it has a higher savings
22 according to the COBRAs.

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And you agree with that, if
2 Alameda stays open?
3 MR. KARADBIL: If Alameda stays open, their COBRA
4 has it number one. I believe their COBRA rates are not
5 valid, so I don't accept that as a useful number to tell me
6 that it's number one.
7 MR. YELLIN: But our number reverses that, okay?
8 MR. KARADBIL: Our number at present has North
9 Island retention on the West Coast having more savings than
10 retaining Alameda.
11 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But the issue we haven't
12 addressed is do we need one of those.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I'm not sure that it does. Look
14 at Number 2 here. You have North Island closing.
15 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, North Island closing under the
16 levelled numbers yields 575 million.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Versus 733?
18 MR. KARADBIL: Versus 733, yes.
19 MR. YELLIN: So, our adjustment to the COBRA which
20 was to get, we felt, a more fair comparative type number,
21 indicates that independent of any decision on the air station
at Alameda, that North Island is a more favorable, from a

1 COBRA standpoint, than --
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: You have a situation where our
3 figures justify the Navy position and the Navy position
4 justifies something else, and the Navy figures justify
5 something else.
6 MR. YELLIN: And the Navy has responded to us in
7 saying that they looked at other things other than COBRA, but
8 you're absolutely right. From the COBRA standpoint, from
9 what the Navy sent us, that the COBRA gives more savings for
10 closing North Island than Alameda.
11 MR. KARADBIL: Right, for that, but -- okay, excuse
12 me.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: In Scenarios 3 and 4, you have
14 a difference of 733 to 502, and that has got to be predicated
15 on keeping Pensacola partially open.
16 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, ma'am.
17 COMMISSIONER BYRON: So, if you look at Scenarios 2
18 and 3, which is 575 and 733, which is the flip of Alameda to
19 North Island, you're not talking about a great deal of
20 difference.
21 MR. KARADBIL: No, not as much. One of the --
22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Because that scenario that

1 puts it at 733 is closing all of Pensacola.
2 MR. KARADBIL: Right. One of the points I wanted
3 to make during this is that the Navy chose to keep open a
4 partial operation at Pensacola, the rotor blade repair and
5 dynamic components. The head of NAVAIR noted that it would
cost about $25 million to move that into another organic
position such as Cherry Point.
8 Cherry Point has indicated that moving all of that
9 work, including the equipment and the necessary MILCON, would
10 come to about $21 million. The Navy COBRAs themselves show
11 you a great deal more cost than 25 million for having that
12 part open or closing it.
13 Since the issue of capability in-house is a non
14 issue, it's either leave it in place or move it, it seems
15 that that's not really a very justified decision, especial
16 economically.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Roy, you confuse me. Logic
18 says that to eliminate that facility and send it up to Cher
19 Point makes good sense. The numbers you quoted suggest th
20 that was true, also?
21 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: Okay, so basically what

1 you've seen is that taking that rotary blade facility at
2 Pensacola and moving it up to Cherry Point would be
3 worthwhile from an economic point of view?
4 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'm straight.
6 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir, to move that facility to the
7 place where the Navy is proposing to do the work on
8 helicopters that use that blade, which is Cherry Point.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: It makes sense.
10 MR. YELLIN: We think that's cost effective.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.
12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But in actual fact, Cherry
13 Point has the capability to do everything except one rotary
14 blade, which could be done in the private sector if it had t
15 be.
16 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Or in other services.
18 MR. KARADBIL: Oh, yes, sir. They already have a
19 whirl tower and they can do everything but the one largest
20 blade.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But, Peter, there's no other
22 service that has a whirl tower that can handle the 853 blade

1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I didn't know that.
2 MR. BEHRMANN: At CCAS, the turn tower and turn
3 cage down there for the blades is not large enough to hand
4 that one particular huge blade the Navy uses, so if you're
5 going to do it in-house, you've got to either do it at
6 Pensacola or replicate it somewhere else. GEN Johnson point
7 out you may be able to do it in the private sector. I don't
8 know that for sure.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: That's a good example.
10 MR. KARADBIL: There is only one more issue in
11 terms of the Commissioners deciding where things might go,
12 even at the Navy's 1.2 billion. We find that the three
13 lowest cost NADEPs are all on the East Coast and in the
14 Navy's scenarios, using the Navy's numbers for savings and
15 for military value, the three lowest cost, highest military
16 value NADEPs are all on the East Coast.
17 By constraining to one having to be on the West
18 Coast, it requires a high cost, low military value NADEP be
19 in every solution, so the question arises as to why there's a
20 need for a West Coast NADEP. We are still getting some
21 information in from the Navy on that.
22 Primarily, they feel there is a very strong need

1 for having that NADEP there provide a lot of input and a lot
2 of reaction to the air fleet and to the sea fleet, that this
3 would come especially in the area of maritime expertise in
4 the air and they'd go on the carriers, for instance, and
5 repair the gear that's there. They'd have a lot of synergy
6 developed between the operation there.
7 So, the Navy is also going to provide, I
8 understand, a little more specifics on that, but I bring it
9 up simply because if you go by what I think are the more
10 proper rates, it would undoubtedly be the highest savings

11 scenario by having three on the East Coast. So, it's a
12 decision that should be contemplated as to what's the best in
13 this situation.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And, certainly, in the Navy,
15 military judgment makes the tie-breaker.
16 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir. The Navy has indicated that
17 that is a key part of their operating philosophy for the
18 NADEPs. Unlike the Air Force, where the Air Logistics
19 Centers, as you'll see later today, they do not have
20 geographic constraints.
21 The Navy has indicated to us that a significant
22 portion, on the order of 30 percent of the work done at a

1 NADEP at a fleet location, is done in direct support of the
2 fleet assets, air and carrier fleet assets that are in that
3 area, so that they are geographically advantaged by being at
4 a location.
5 On the East Coast, they've indicated that even
6 though Norfolk is proposed for closure, Cherry Point is close
7 to a large concentration of airplanes and is not that far
8 from Norfolk to support the operations that would be done
9 related to the carriers themselves.
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Roy, I'm having trouble
11 following you on that. Show me how I should go. The
12 scenario that I see on Number 15 that closes the three West
13 Coast NADEPs is where?
14 MR. KARADBIL: The top line shows the closing of
15 the two West Coast NADEPs and Pensacola on the Gulf, with an
16 adjusted rate that is not based on the Navy.
17 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Oh, you're using
18 Pensacola.
19 MR. YELLIN: There are two NADEPs on the West Coast
20 and there are four --
21 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And Pensacola, so I mean,
22 your combination is --

1 MR. KARADBIL: Right.
2 MR. BORDEN: I think if you look at the total cost
3 per man hour, direct labor man hour, with overhead on th
4 line there, I think that will clear it up. The NADEPs
5 have the lowest direct labor costs are the ones where
6 cheapest to get work done in.
7 For instance, if you have three million man hours
8 worth of work at the NADEP or over a year's period of time
9 you save $4, that's $12 million you're going to save, and
10 think you see that, then, when you work through the scenar
11 back on page 15, that's then reflected on which ones ended
12 being the ones --

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: If you followed that logic,
2 you would move all of our military forces to the cheapest
3 places in our country.
4 MR. BORDEN: If that's the only factor, yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I don't believe that's the
6 only factor or the driving factor we ought to use.
7 MR. BORDEN: No, I don't, either. I think military
8 value should be the --
9 MR. KARADBIL: We're not suggesting that.
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: We'd have a maquilladoras
11 defense established.
12 MR. BORDEN: I just wanted to clear up the dollar
13 and the figure and the way it comes out in the COBRA.
14 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Roy, all the scenarios were
15 factored and savings factored in, closing all of Pensaco
16 except for that one on Chart 15?
17 MR. KARADBIL: The closure of Pensacola totally is
18 indicated where Pensacola is listed without any stars on
19 The one with the star represents the --
20 MR. YELLIN: There is only one scenario that keeps
21 the small piece there.
22 MR. KARADBIL: Which is the current Navy decision

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Just to recapitulate
2 something you said earlier, if the Naval Station is clo
3 Alameda, then Alameda's NADEP costs rise very substanti
4 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
5 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir. They would have to -- a
6 NADEP requires an operational airfield to operate and t
7 now, the Naval Air Station, the Carrier Port operates t
8 Naval Air Station, that airfield, so the NADEP would ha
9 then bear the cost of the operations and maintenance of
10 airfield.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: And the DOD recommendation is
12 to close that Naval Air Station.
13 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir.
14 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, it is.
15 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: One last question for me,
17 Roy. All your analysis goes on the fact that you thin
18 the Navy number for Norfolk of 68 is wrong and your num
19 49 is right?
20 MR. KARADBIL: It is closer to what a fair
21 representation would be, yes, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, if one would not accept

1 MR. KARADBIL: The number I have there is an
2 estimate. I have not received the Navy COBRA using the rates
3 that I requested. That's my estimate of where it would come
4 out relative to the others.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Oh, the 800 number is still a
6 good number, in your mind?
7 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, with rates that I feel are more
8 comparative.
9 MR. YELLIN: As a relative projection compared to
10 the others.

1 that assumption, the Navy numbers are closer than your
2 MR. KARADBIL: Absolutely.
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I don't accept that.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Why don't you proceed? Is ther
5 anything else?
6 MR. KARADBIL: The last slides in your book, whic
7 we won't put up, are a recap of the military value
8 historical cost rate, and some of the questions inve
9 at this point that pretty well does it.
10 MR. YELLIN: GEN Johnson, we do have a backup sli

11 that indicates the net operating result numbers. Would you
12 like to see that? We have that if you'd like to see it.
That's the end of our briefing.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you very much. We'll move on.
16 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Were we going to show that
17 NOR or AOR?
18 MR. YELLIN: GEN Johnson, would you like to see
19 that? We have that.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I would like to, yes.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I thought you had it back in the
22 office. Do you have it here?

1 MR. YELLIN: I have it here, oh, yes, sir.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I would very much like to see
3 that.
4 MR. KARADBIL: B7 and B8.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: On what?
6 MR. KARADBIL: These are backup slides. The one on
7 the left is the annual net operating result. If you view it
8 as "Did you make a profit or a loss on your work?", that's
9 the easiest way to do it. The one on the right is the
10 accumulated results from the time, 1977, I believe, when the
11 Navy industrial fund started this operation, this costing.
12 If you look at them, you'll see that in both of
13 these, Norfolk is a highly profitable organization,
14 indicating it must be doing something right. These are just
15 additional indicators that show it should be placed amongst
16 the efficient, low-cost NADEPs.
17 MR. YELLIN: If you look over the last several
18 years, the NADEPs that have consistently had positive net
19 operating results have been Norfolk, Cherry Point and
20 Jacksonville. Jacksonville, if you go back a few years
21 before that, did have some problems that they have made some
very dramatic improvements, but this is basically a result

1 against what they're budgeting.
2 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Last question. Is any of
3 the Navy -- any of the work currently at the West Coast
4 NADEPs do-able at McClellan?
5 MR. YELLIN: I would say that there probably are
6 significant things throughout the Navy, Naval Air Depots
7 that could be done in the ALCs.
8 MR. KARADBIL: There are a number of manufacture
9 and component items which you need machine tools to do.
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Well, I'm thinking about
11 your question about do you need a NADEP on the West Coast.
12 If you went for the three NADEPs on the East Coast, could you
13 inter-service at McClellan and handle some of the load out
14 there?
15 MR. YELLIN: What the Navy has indicated is that
16 they need a facility that is relatively close to where the
17 fleet, the air and the carrier assets are. McClellan would
18 not be a suitable substitute for that in the Navy's mind, as
19 they've described those needs.
20 They want them to be -- obviously, McClellan will
21 be closer than an East Coast location, but they've indicated
22 that a NADEP at North Island is right there where their plans

1 are to put carriers, and they have a lot of their air assets
2 right in that area, and they feel that direct interaction is
3 a very important part of the operation of the NADEP.
4 MR. BORDEN: The answer to your question is yes.
5 MR. KARADBIL: It can be done.
MR. BEHRMANN: Clearly, after having walked through
just about all the ALCs and all the NADEPs, I'm convinced,
8 except for the largest aircrafts, you could do air frame work
9 on just about anything anywhere. You know, there's some
10 facilitation to do that, but I certainly think you could do

11 any of the work at either of the two NADEPs at McClellan.
12 Size becomes an issue. McClellan is significantly larger
13 than either of the two.
14 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is some of the work done
15 at North Island, some of the maintenance work that is done
16 North Island, do-able in the private sector in Southern
17 California?
18 MR. KARADBIL: Absolutely, yes, sir, and also do
19 able by any of the other organic NADEPs.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And that's quite close by.
21 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, I noticed that

1 on Saturday, we're going to talk about rotary wing
2 maintenance as a separate inter-servicing and I assume we'
3 talk about Cherry Point, the Army Corpus Christi Depot and
4 Pensacola at that time separately. It might be more
5 appropriate to talk about it before we talk about the NADEP
6 rather than after, since that decision should drive the NADE
7 decision on Pensacola, or could drive it on Pensacola and
8 Cherry Point.
9 MR. BEHRMANN: General, if you wanted us to, we
10 could slip Bob Cook in right after lunch and have him talk
11 about that inter-servicing issue.
12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: It can wait until Saturday,
13 but I think it ought to come before this one, is my point.
14 COMMISSIONER BYRON: All you do is flip those two.
15 Flip those two on Saturday.
16 MR. BEHRMANN: We'll just move him up and put him
17 in front. Mr. Chairman, we'll move on to the Air Logistics
18 Centers. Frank Cirillo and Roger Houck are the primary
19 briefers.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Matt, to summarize that last
21 flurry of activity and questions that we addressed, it's a
22 classic case of military effectiveness versus efficiency.

1 seems to me. You maximize military effectiveness by keeping
2 the NADEP at North Island, at least using military judgment
3 keeping that open, but you incur some inefficiencies, if yo
that could be maximized with McClellan ALC or perhaps
5 the private sector.
6 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Bowman, that encapsulates it. I
7 think what we were trying to do was the costs kept showing
8 it might drive you to make another decision, and that's whe
9 we really went back to really question, "Is this true
10 military necessity that you have them on the West Coast?"
11 think you need to make that decision.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I fully understand that. I
13 was just trying to summarize the often confusing paradox tha
14 we face.
15 MR. BEHRMANN: Military value has a cost, it sure
16 does.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Military effectiveness.
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
19 MR. CIRILLO: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and
20 Commissioners.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Frank, why don't you proceed
22 with the ALCs?

1 MR. CIRILLO: Right, sir. You should have a book
2 in front of you. We'll be reaching the first tab today and
3 all the slides, including the backup slides that we think we
4 need should be in that first tab for the first portion of the
5 briefing.
6 I have with me today on my left Mr. Roger Houck,
7 who is the primary depot analyst. On his left is Mr. Greg
8 Nixon, who also works within the depot area, and also on the
9 far right, my far right of the table, your far left, is MAJ
10 Kurt Dittmer, who also works in the depot area. All of them

11 will have a part of this presentation today.
12 Looking at that first chart on your left, which is
13 Slide No. 1, that is, again, the reminder of the Air Force
14 categories that were evaluated. The first category, we
15 talked about the mobility portion of large aircraft earlier
16 in the week, and after this presentation, we'll discuss the
17 world of large aircraft, the seven aircraft that we'll be
18 considering.
19 The next category that is shown there bolded is the
20 flying small aircraft. That will be discussed tomorrow along
21 with the Air Force Reserve and the redirect categories, but
22 today, we'll be going right into the depot category and

1 that's the presentation that we'll make in front of you
2 today.
3 To do that, I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Roger
4 Houck, who will kick off the presentation on depots and,
5 again, this is an early presentation with the votes for this
6 actually scheduled for Thursday morning. Roger.
7 MR. HOUCK: Good morning, sir. Before we get
8 started, I'd like to give you a brief overview of what we'll
9 be discussing this morning. Could I have Slide 3, please?
10 We'll talk about the candidate bases. We'll introduce and
11 discuss the subject of excess capacity at Air Force depot
12 bases. We'll display for you static base information, as
13 well as base cost information, major depot issues, and we'll
14 conclude with a summary.
15 Could I have Slide 4, please?
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We could add to 4, if you wanted
17 us to, but it's pretty accurate.
18 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: We're state of the art.
19 MR. HOUCK: State of the art. Yes, sir, we could.
20 We could expand that list of things overheard at the various
21 depot bases. "We are unique. We are more than a depot." It
22 is that last --

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: "If they hadn't taken our work
2 away, we would be full," belongs on that slide, too.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: "We'd be efficient."
4 MR. HOUCK: Of course, there is good excess
5 capacity and bad excess capacity. Following the 21 May
6 hearings where we added Kelly, Tinker and Robins Air Force
7 Bases for review, certainly, the debate over the issue of
8 excess capacity intensified tremendously.
9 As we went to the bases, we discussed
10 interpretations of how excess capacity is computed, what
11 exactly it is, the iterations that go into how to compute
12 this. Upon return from the depot bases, I put to work one of
13 my colleagues, Kurt Dittmer, and asked him to take a look at
14 excess capacity to do some statistical analysis in terms of
15 capacity, using 87 baseline '91 Air Force workload, projected
16 Air Force '99 workload.
17 I'll turn it over to Kurt at this time to explain
18 the results of his analysis.
19 MAJ DITTMER: I have a hard time speaking unless
20 it's with my hands or I have a picture. Could I have Slide
21 No. 7 here on the right projector? What this is, is a
22 graphic representation. He gave me a table full of numbers

1 and I turned the numbers into something that I could
2 understand.
3 This comes from the corporate business plan, the
4 Defense Depot Maintenance Council's corporate business plan
5 for '92 to '97. What you see on the left-hand side is direct
6 labor hours in thousands, so what we'd have here is each of
7 the depots, their workload capacity -- and this is a capacity
8 index -- stacked on top of each other, to give a total of
9 53,100,000 direct labor hours for capacity.
10 Now, to define that, capacity is one eight-hour
11 shift, a 40-hour work week, and that's multiplied by --
12 that's a single shift, producing a product mix that the
13 facility was designed to produce. There's a formula for
14 It makes no difference.
15 What we have here, though, is a total of all the
16 workload capacities. Now, capacity, again, I'll have to
17 bring it up, is not something that's defined. It's someth
18 that has to be projected, and it's projected off of the
19 workload, so this is not something that's a theoretical
20 number.
21 It's not something that they can test or achieve
22 necessarily or something that they do achieve. It's

1 something that they project they could achieve. Are you
2 confused as I am?
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, on 7, that's not
4 theoretical.
5 MAJ DITTMER: It is theoretical, sir.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: In what sense?
7 MAJ DITTMER: In that the capacity is an index, so
8 it's projected off of what their workload was in '87. Th
9 is what their capacity should be able to be, okay, so it
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, it's very real world
11 stuff. If that's what they did in '87, their capacity has
12 be consistent with that which they did.
13 MAJ DITTMER: Well, the workload -- that's correct,
14 sir. The assumptions that have to be made, though, of th
15 work you're doing in '87, you are projecting a capacity f
16 the number of work stations you have and the area you hav
17 so, again, it's not something that was done, so we can't
18 there and measure it, but this is what was used in the We
19 study.
20 So, the '87 capacity -- and the reason '87 is
21 important is because that was the high year, okay? That
22 the highest production load; therefore, the highest

1 projection for the capacity.
2 Now, this slide looks complicated. I'll try to
3 walk you through it again. That same table is here on t
4 left, so that column has all of the depots added up togeth
5 That's the $53,100,000, and I ran a line across here and
6 shows the baseline, because this is what they used to
7 determine excess capacity.
8 Now, what you're showing on this slide in addition
9 is, again, from the DOD's -- the corporate business plan
10 These are the workloads projected in '91, '92, '93 and s
11 forth, and you can see that the workload is going down.
12 Now, we don't have a number for '99, because the
13 corporate business plan stops at '97, but this is what w
14 projected for excess capacity as being a 50 percent exce
15 capacity, and since it was theoretical, the Air Force sa
16 "Well, we'd rather use the '91 workload, something that
17 actually achieved."
18 So, this column that only has one color in it was
19 the column that the Air Force said was their '91 workloa
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Actual.
21 MAJ DITTMER: Actual.
22 COMMISSIONER COX: And then they're using that

1 number as capacity, the actual '91 number?
2 MAJ DITTMER: That's right, because that was the
3 capacity they had in '91. We did that work. Therefore
4 should be our projection for our capacity in '99.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: So, between '87 and '91, our
6 capacity just dropped?
7 MAJ DITTMER: Well, again, the workload in '87 wa
8 a million hours less than what you see.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Based on this chart, I mean, to
10 show you the fiction of the '91 capacity argument, it s

11 to me that in fiscal year '91, '92, '93, '94 and '95, in
12 order to have enough capacity, you have to build additional
facilities.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Or go to the private sector.
MAJ DITTMER: That's correct, and this is where we
16 have apples and oranges. The Air Force projection, their
17 workload, is different than what DOD was showing as workload,
18 which may be because of air frame or how they account for it.
19 There's differing accounting.
20 Rather than going into the semantics and saying,
21 "Well, this is Air Force '91 workload but we're going to use
22 that as a measure," it makes it very difficult. What we'd

1 like to do is use the DOD numbers because that's something
2 that we have that's from the corporate business plan rather
3 than what we got from the various bases.
4 MR. CIRILLO: But you're absolutely correct, Mr.
5 Chairman.
6 MAJ DITTMER: You are exactly right, sir.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: You have to build another depot.
8 MAJ DITTMER: But that's not true.
9 MR. CIRILLO: If you accept the '91 figures, that's
10 right.
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: They have the same
12 facilities and their same equipment when they're operating
13 the depots at 20,000 people, and they're now operating them
14 at eight, so their capacity is really the workload, the
15 number of people they chose to hire that year, and it's not
16 true capacity.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: It's the old three-bay
18 garage, two-bay garage.
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And I think that's why we're
20 having problems from a staff perspective, at least, accepting
21 that '91 workload as a capacity because it indicates right
22 there we're already into our capacity.

1 MR. CIRILLO: It's workload. It's not capacity.
2 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: That's right, but they're
3 using it as --
4 MR. CIRILLO: Correct.
5 MAJ DITTMER: They're saying that that should be
6 the measure for your capacity at a depot to project in '99,
7 and that's how they came up with their projection for excess
8 capacity. Now, we don't have a '99 workload projection from
9 DOD, so what we did is we used the Air Force '99 workload,
10 which was derived by using their '91 baseline, 32,364, and we
11 subtract from that the excess capacity that the Air Force
12 says they have, and that gave us a workload for fiscal year
13 '99.
14 The other way to come up with an idea about the '99
15 workload was to use Went's capacity. He said in '87, we had
16 53.1, and we have between 25 and 50 percent. Well, that
17 would say in '99, that the workload would even be higher than
18 what the Air Force is showing, which would stand to reason,
19 because their '91 workload was less than what the DOD numbers
20 were showing.
21 So, this workload is probably somewhere in between
22 here but, again, I don't want to do apples and oranges, so

1 what we're going to use -- I'm going to have this as a
2 comparison, the '99 workload from the Air Force, but we're
3 going to use the '97 DOD workload, which is even higher than
4 both of those, and we're going to do a scenario comparison
for you.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Kurt, are the DOD '91 and '92
7 years actual rather than projections?
8 MAJ DITTMER: I can't answer that, sir. I don't
9 know. Okay. Next slide.

10 MR. CIRILLO: Before you go to this next slide,
11 think of that slide as all those little dots. Think of it
12 one number that he'll discuss with you. I would suggest
13 rather than getting involved in all the different scenarios
14 think of the picture that he's about to show you, because
15 that helps, I think, to show you where at least the staff
16 coming from in this presentation, if you could.
17 MAJ DITTMER: Okay. This looks more complicated
18 but this is a little bit easier because we don't try to us
19 all the different scenarios or different measures. This
20 again, most aggressive. This is the '87 capacity. This
21 the highest capacity shown.
22 This is from the Went study. That same column is

1 on the left-hand side, so that's the 53.1, and then that
2 column is reduced by the depots that would be taken away s
3 therefore, on the column next to it, the "N" is Newark.
4 you took Newark's capacity away, that capacity would not b
5 available.
6 All this is now is that all the iterations
7 available up to and including three depots. Now, the
8 projections you've got to look for to determine excess
9 capacity, we have the DOD '97 workline that goes across
10 there, and the Air Force '99 workload as the other reference
11 If the columns are above the line, whichever one
12 the Commission determines is the appropriate line for your
13 projection in '99, if the columns are above the line, then
14 that's a viable scenario. You could close, for instance,
15 McClellan, Robins and Newark and you could close three depot
16 in that case and still have capacity left over, making the
17 assumption that in '87, the '87 capacity is the ability tha
18 the depots still have.
19 There have been reconfigurations at the depots and
20 that's why the Air Force went to the '91 baseline and that
21 gives us the other options. Now, you look at that and,
22 again, the three depot scenarios, the ones falling below t

1 line are scenarios that you could not try or attempt becau
2 you would not have the capacity at the depots remaining to
3 the workload.
4 I'm going to contrast that now. We'll use the Air
5 Force numbers. The next slide on 10 in your books is the
6 DOD workload. Again, I don't have Air Force workload prove
7 down, so I'm going to use DOD numbers to match with DOD
8 numbers so we don't have apples and oranges.
9 So, what you see on the left again is the '97
10 baseline that was the Went study capacity and then the next
11 column to it is the '91 workload that DOD reported on the
12 corporate business plan. Then scenarios start to the right
13 of that and continue on down with one depot, two depots,
14 three depots and so forth.
15 As you can see in this scenario, with the two
16 workload lines, one for '97 and one for '99, no options for
17 three scenario would be above the line, so --
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Now, tell us again what this
19 "least capacities" is, a definition of it?
20 MAJ DITTMER: This is using a baseline. This is
21 the lowest of the scenarios.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: This is assuming that we're

1 operating at capacity at the 8,000 people rather than 20,00
2 at the depots?
3 MAJ DITTMER: It assumes that your capacity was
4 your workload in '91.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, it's really not
6 capacity.
7 MAJ DITTMER: It's not capacity. It was your
8 workload in '91.
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, this is the '91

10 workload.
11 MAJ DITTMER: Yes, sir.
12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Right. So your slide is
13 wrong. It shouldn't say "least capacity." It's "least '91
14 workload."
15 MR. CIRILLO: The reason that we say that is
16 because the Air Force's numbers use that workload as a
17 capacity and so --
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I understand.
19 MAJ DITTMER: You're right, sir, and we can change
20 the slide and just eliminate it.
21 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I noticed at least it
22 seems that you don't show any elimination of Hill in any of

1 these?
2 MAJ DITTMER: That's because it was not on the
3 list, so it's not an option for your scenarios and that's the
4 only reason we didn't show that.
5 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Okay.
6 MAJ DITTMER: Sir, we do have some backup slides
7 with more detail on the scenarios.
8 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: So, what has been changed on
9 this one is the individual capacities of each ALC?
10 MAJ DITTMER: That's right. The capacity now is
11 the baseline that the Air Force wanted to use; however, we
12 didn't use the Air Force numbers. We used DOD numbers
13 because we have those in a document.
14 MR. HOUCK: Let's go back to Slide 11.
15 MAJ DITTMER: Okay, sir. If there are no further
16 questions, we'll go back to Roger.
17 MR. HOUCK: Slide 11, please. So, what we're
18 displaying now is static base information for the bases under
19 review. There are a number of important things about this
20 slide. First of all, you'll notice the large number of the
21 square footage at depot bases. These are large bases, a lot
22 of square footage. Also, you'll notice that the depots

1 employ a large number of civilian employees, a pretty
2 significant factor.
3 Could I have Slide 12, please? This is base cost
4 information. First of all, I'd like to explain that on the
5 annual operating cost, that does not include payroll cost.
6 We will have that information available for you on Friday.
7 Number 2, on the one-time cost to close, depot
8 bases, obviously, are very expensive bases to close for a
9 number of reasons. For example, typically, they are
10 collocated with a large amount of force structure. At depot
11 bases, you have a workload that you have to shift to other
12 bases. That is very expensive to do.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: On your McClellan cost of close
14 figure, they have a nuclear-powered X-ray machine.
15 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir, a small university-type
16 reactor with a nondestructive inspection.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do the McClellan figures show
18 the removal of that? I know it shows the cost to clean up
19 the site, but does it replace it or does it not replace it?
20 MR. HOUCK: The original Air Force estimate did not
21 include the disposal of that reactor. We have added an
22 additional $50 million for the ultimate disposal of that

1 reactor.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: How about the reconstruction of
3 the reactor someplace else? Did your numbers include that?
4 In other words, the Air Force numbers did not include the
5 disposal of the reactor.
6 MR. HOUCK: The Air Force had deactivation cost
7 included for the facility but not disposal cost for the
8 reactor.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Right, so your figures now
10 include disposal?
11 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is that the 494.5?
13 MR. HOUCK: Yes, it is.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That's your figures?
15 MR. HOUCK: That's correct.
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That's our figures?
17 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Which is?
19 MR. HOUCK: The first Air Force estimate was 427
20 million. By adding in 50 million for the reactor disposal
21 and 15 million to replicate an F-111 stress test capability
22 at another base, that has elevated you up to 494 million.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: To 494, almost 500. Now, does
2 that include the reconstruction of that reactor at some ot
3 facility so it has the same capabilities?
4 MR. HOUCK: It doesn't, no, sir.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It doesn't, so it's
6 deactivation/disposal, without reproduction?
7 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: If you put reproduction in, if
9 it was considered to be a state-of-the-art, terrific thin
10 have, how much would that go up by?
11 MR. HOUCK: That original facility cost $16 million
12 to build.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Sixteen?
14 MR. HOUCK: Sixteen.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: How long ago?
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: How long ago?
17 MR. CIRILLO: They started the construction in
18 about '84, finished -- I'm sorry, in about '86, finishe
19 about '88, so it has been there for about three to four
20 years, and if it's different than that, I'll let you kn
21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Roger, these numbers are
22 basic Air Force numbers modified by the staff?

MR. HOUCK: For the one-time cost to close?
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Yes.
MR. HOUCK: The numbers you see for Kelly, Tinker
Robins and Newark are Air Force numbers based on our la
request for two scenarios, two options. If the depot o
the entire base closes.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Do you, the staff, concur
with those numbers?
MR. HOUCK: At this point, sir, I think they are
over-exaggerated to an extent. We, the staff, are curr
seeking additional information on personnel eliminatio
Kelly, Tinker and Robins, which would be consistent wit
number of personnel eliminations that occurred at McCle
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And you could say the same
thing about the steady state savings?
MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir. Personnel savings will drive
your steady state, which will bring your break-even yea
down.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Right. Thank you.
COMMISSIONER COX: I'm sorry, Roger. I think what
you're at least implying is that at least on personnel
savings, the McClellen personnel savings are a lot high

1 than the numbers we've gotten from the Defense Departme
2 personnel savings by jobs eliminated at the other bases
3 at least are inconsistent?
4 MR. HOUCK: At McClellan, they are eliminating 696
5 positions. Thus far, based on the information we have
6 Kelly, Tinker and Robins, a fewer number of position
7 being eliminated. The Air Force claims that that's be
8 McClellan has a larger support tail, if you will.
9 At Kelly, Tinker and Robins, you have a large force

10 structure, so you have a larger number of people that you
11 would move, rather than people that you would eliminate, but
we hope to be able to sort this out by Friday for you.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Roger, this does not
14 include the dreaded environmental clean-up?
15 MR. HOUCK: No, sir, it does not. It includes
16 environmental compliance costs.
17 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: We've heard figures at
18 some of these bases -- McClellan, for example -- that are
19 anywhere from 50 million to $10 billion if it's done over a
20 period of --
21 MR. HOUCK: Guesstimates I have seen go from 1.1 to
22 10 billion dollars. The latest Air Force estimate I saw from

1 Secretary Boatright's office was 1.1 billion.
2 MR. CIRILLO: They just brought that down, I think,
3 earlier. It was 1.2 or --
4 MR. HOUCK: 1.1 or 1.2.
5 MR. CIRILLO: It went down to 1.1. As a technical
6 estimate, the numbers that we've heard were expressed both at
7 the installation and also in the regional hearing, and that
8 was if you had to accelerate the clean-up, the cost would be
9 so much. We've asked the question and the Air Force
10 doesn't -- they don't really support that much of an increase
11 so, because it's not a factor, we have not, as far as the
12 costs to be used, we haven't included it.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Roger, I was going to, if
14 I may, ask one more about economic impact. In the case of
15 McClellan, the Secretary of Defense took it off the list
16 because of the multiple hits at Sacramento Army Depot and I
17 believe the figure that was used is for the three years or
18 the three bases, direct hires and indirect, was somewhere
19 around 67,000 jobs; is that correct?
20 MR. HOUCK: 69,000, I believe, is what the
21 community claimed from those three bases if McClellan closes.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: In going back to the last

1 time you briefed us, every number has changed on the one-time
2 cost to close. Would you tell us how you got to the new
3 numbers?
4 MR. HOUCK: These numbers are -- what's the best
5 way to explain this?
6 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Community numbers?
7 MR. HOUCK: On the cumulative economic impact?
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: No, the one-time cost to
9 close?
10 MR. HOUCK: Oh, cost to close. The first set of
11 COBRA numbers we had for Kelly, Tinker and Robins was what
12 they call a level run, which is where they kind of send
13 equipment, workload to a Base "X" type scenario. The
14 McClellan COBRA estimate was a recommended run, which meant
15 they specifically identified bases to which workload and
16 force structure would be relocated.
17 These numbers are somewhere between, I think, a
18 level and a recommended run. There is more precision --
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: These are Air Force numbers?
20 MR. HOUCK: These are Air Force numbers.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And you've not changed any
22 of them?

1 MR. HOUCK: No, sir.
2 MR. CIRILLO: We've looked at them. They looked
3 reasonable. We received the COBRA costs.
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, when the Air Force saw
5 we were going to put others on, they went back and re-ran and
6 had higher prices and everything?
7 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir, they did. For example, at
8 Tinker, they identified bases to which AWACS, for example,
9 and Navy TACAMO aircraft would be relocated. We have a
10 breakdown of MILCON and the moving costs associated with each
11 one of those scenarios.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: So, Roger, just so I understand
13 it, the first number was sort of a hypothetical cost to close
14 and no definitive answer on where anything went, and this one
15 is a specific --
16 MR. HOUCK: I think a little more thought went into
17 this one.
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, the first numbers were
19 to defend the Air Force position and the second numbers were
20 to defend against all others?
21 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thanks.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Roger, let me ask one question
2 on the civilian personnel. McClellan has already downsized.
3 They are in the process currently of another RIF. Are any of
4 the other facilities downsizing?
5 MR. HOUCK: All of the depot bases have
6 implemented, over the past two or three years, RIFs, internal
7 downsizings, streamlinings, consolidations. I don't have
8 specific numbers for you regarding what each depot has done.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: And I assume that we're careful
10 that we're not counting dollars saved from downsizing again,
11 so to speak, if they are already doing that with or without
12 closing it. We're making sure that they're not taking cost
13 savings for something that was going to happen anyway.
14 MR. HOUCK: That's correct.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: We've looked at that? You all
16 have looked at that and feel comfortable that that's the
17 case?
18 MR. HOUCK: Yes. Put up Slide 13, please. These
19 are the issues we'll be discussing this morning. Slide 14,
20 please. The first thing I would like to do is give you just
21 a brief refresher, if I could, on what the Air Force depot
22 bases do.

1 They work on aircraft. They repair aircraft but
2 they also do a number of other things. Aircraft repair,
3 program depot maintenance, that occupies perhaps 40 percent
4 of what a depot does. The rest of the repair work ranges
5 from software, hydraulics, flight instruments at McClellan to
6 electronic warfare, avionics, just a whole wide range of
7 activities at the various depot bases.
8 They each are responsible for developing processes
9 technology applications, things of this sort. There's a lot
10 of flexibility in the depot system in terms of realigning
11 workloads. For example, at McClellan, it's currently doing
12 F-15 air frames and KC-135 air frames. F-15s are managed by
13 Robins. KC-135s are managed by Tinker. Kelly recently
14 completed B-52 work which is managed by Tinker.
15 Each depot manages weapons systems and commodities.
16 To maintain a command levelling effect, to maintain depots at
17 the required target of 85 percent, they realign workloads
18 among the various depots, so there's a lot of flexibility in
19 that system to move workloads around the system, if you will.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Roger, I've got two questions on
21 this chart or on depots. Number one, we heard over and over
22 again -- and I'm just asking you for your opinion publicly.

1 I have my own opinion. I think I have my own opinion on it.
2 We heard that, "Commissioner, large depots can do the work of
3 large depots and small depots, and small depots can only do
4 the work of small depots; therefore, keep large depots." Is
5 that an over simplification?
6 MR. HOUCK: I think to an extent it is. McClellan,
7 for example, does large aircraft. It does KC-135s. Robins,
8 you think of Robins typically as an F-15 repair base, but
9 Robins repairs C-141s. I look at Kelly and Tinker as

10 essentially large aircraft repair bases primarily because of
11 the two facilities those two bases have.
12 At Tinker, for example, you've got that .8-mile
13 long building out there that you can put 11 to 18 KC-135s in,
14 in a single building. At Kelly, you can put six E-5s in a
15 single hanger. Those facilities would allow those bases to
16 accommodate a mix of small and large aircraft.
17 At McClellan Air Force Base, you probably could not
18 put a large number of C-5s or B-52s or AWACS E-3s at
19 McClellan for repair. The same could be said for Robins.
20 You could not move a large number of B-52s and C-5s to Robins
21 Air Force Base for repair without major military construction
22 to build the facilities to accommodate those kinds of

1 aircraft.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Also on these Air Force depots,
3 did the Air Force give additional value to those large depots
4 that were collocated with active airfields?
5 MR. HOUCK: The Air Force evaluated force structure
6 at that base and projected force structure in FY '95. They
7 were graded accordingly green, yellow, red, based on the
8 presence of that force structure. Beyond that, I wasn't able
9 to determine whether or not the presence or absence of a
10 force structure in FY '95 had an impact on that overall
11 score.
12 I'm certain that it did because that impacts, you
13 know, the military value of that base. What kind of force
14 structure will that base have in FY '95? What kind of force
15 structure does it have now that would impact the cost to
16 close that base?
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, you can close a depot
18 without closing a base?
19 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir, you can, yes.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay.
21 MR. HOUCK: Slide 15, please. This displays the
22 attributes of the factors the Air Force evaluated the depot

1 bases on, and I'd be happy to review them with you or answer
2 any questions you have on these specific attributes.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let us just kind of scan them
4 down and if we have any questions, we'll let you know. Is
5 there anything there that you want to bring to our attention
6 that stands out?
7 MR. HOUCK: Nothing that really sticks out in my
8 mind, sir. They are all important. These are the attributes
9 the Air Force used. The Air Force approach was not, in my
10 mind, to identify the best or the worst depot. I think it
11 was more of a case of a relationship of that depot to a cost
12 to close consideration.
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: Roger, a figure that really
14 stands out under McClellan is average cost work component of
15 $100.72.
16 MR. HOUCK: That's workmen's compensation, sir.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Why is it so much higher?
18 MR. HOUCK: I don't have an explanation for you on
19 that as to why it's that much higher at McClellan. The
20 process the Air Force used was they took the total case
21 creation or workmen's compensation cost paid to the bases
22 between FY '88 and '92. They divided it by the number of

1 civilian employees at that base to come up with an average
2 cost or fee paid per employee.
3 MR. CIRILLO: They had the least number of
4 employees of any of the depots, so because they had a lower
5 number, that could affect the average. That's one
6 possibility but, indeed, they stand out as being the highest.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: Isn't that also the state law in
8 California?
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I'm sure it has to do with the
10 law and the judges that are appointed to carry out the law
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: A comment on utility rate at
12 the bottom line. McClellan is 1039, Kelly is 780
13 the utility rate so high at McClellan?
14 MR. HOUCK: Again, sir, I don't have a specific
15 explanation as to why McClellan is higher. That was simp
16 reported by the base in the base questionnaire.
17 MR. CIRILLO: Again, they receive their power from
18 Sacramento Metropolitan Utility District or SMUD. That r
19 has gone up considerably over the last several years, and
20 think it's an infrastructure problem within SMUD that has
21 caused that to happen.
22 At one time, back about 10 years ago, their rate

1 was about half that of Mather Air Force Base ten miles awa
2 Now, they've gone up considerably higher than Mather Air
3 Force Base, the SMUD rate, Sacramento Metropolitan Utilit
4 District.
5 COMMISSIONER STUART: So, McClellan does have a
6 number of higher costs than these competing systems, is
7 right?
8 MR. CIRILLO: A number of higher costs than what,
9 sir?
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: Than other alternatives, such
11 as Kelly, Tinker, Robins.
12 MR. CIRILLO: Their costs, their operating costs,
13 yes, sir, that's correct.
14 COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.
15 MR. CIRILLO: That's correct.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I guess a more interesting
17 one is why Tinker is so low. It sounds like it's TVA or
18 something.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That one looks like a typo.
20 MR. HOUCK: That's what the base used. That's what
21 the Air Force used.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: They must have had a

1 different way of measuring it, surely.
2 MR. CIRILLO: If you wish, we can check that out
3 we will check it out.
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Is utilities a high factor in
5 base operations?
6 MR. CIRILLO: Usually, an average base would cost
7 to operate, without personnel, somewhere in the 30 mil
8 year to run the base, and the fuel portion of that on t
9 utility portion of that, could range about a third if y
10 consider the fuel to operate the BOS or the base operat
11 support fuel as well as the utility districts and opera
12 the plants.
13 So, it's a good chunk on a normal base, not a
14 depot, but on a normal base. It's a good chunk of the
15 operating requirements for any one installation, yes, m
16 certainly.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But the cost per BTU is not
18 what is important. It's the number of BTUs times the c
19 the total cost?
20 MR. CIRILLO: That's correct. That's what is
21 important as far as how much it costs to operate a base
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And this is a composite rate

1 between oil, gas, fuel, electricity? Is that how I rea
2 MR. HOUCK: That's correct, sir.
3 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Okay.
4 MR. HOUCK: Slide 16, please. The next issue, sir,
5 is what I call depot operations capabilities. As you
6 the depot bases and you saw what the depots do, in
7 as I went to the bases, as I did my research on the de
8 each of them kind of has what I call a trademark uniqu
9 capability, if you will.

10 For McClellan, obviously, it's the high tech, very
11 high tech communications, electronics skill base that depot
has. Kelly and Tinker, large aircraft, engine technology
bases. Robins, avionics, electronics warfare, airborne
electronics. Newark, sole site for ICBM missile guidance
15 system repair and metrology work, test equipment calibration.
16 As I said before, all of the bases are very
17 flexible in terms of the ability to accept a mix of large and
18 small aircraft. Depots claim to have unique facilities.
19 There were two in my mind that stood out in my research,
20 Building 3001 at Tinker because of the workload configuration
21 potential it has, and the C-5 hanger at Kelly, again in terms
22 of workload reconfiguration potential.

1 Each of the depot bases have collocated forces. As
2 we looked at the bases, the things that we considered
3 significant at those bases are displayed for you there under
4 Collocated Ops. If you have any questions about that, I can
5 address those.
6 The last issue there on that chart we looked at was
7 contingency capability. I mean, given the goal to put the
8 depots closer to the front lines, if you will, in terms of
9 supporting the war fighters, the things we looked at were C
10 141 maximum underground capability and the ability of that
11 base to accept wide body operations.
12 Slide 17, please. The next issue, sir, is cost of
13 labor considerations and, again, I'll let you review this and
14 I will answer any questions you have.
15 COMMISSIONER STUART (Presiding): Mr. Chairman
16 asked me to say, "Let's proceed."
17 MR. HOUCK: Slide 18, please. At this time, I'd
18 like to turn it over to Kurt Dittmer, who will speak to you
19 about flying operations at the various bases.
20 MAJ DITTMER: On Slide 18, we have the force
structure for '95, the projection for that across the top,
and then the Air Force's military value rating. They rated

1 each of the bases for the different missions and again, the
2 BCAG used the 4 of 4 ability, yellow, green and red. They are
3 all good bases, not great bases, but good bases for the
4 missions.
5 One of the interesting ones is the next bullet, the
6 excess flying capacity. This is a survey that the teams did
7 going to each base, to see if it could accept more force
8 structure for later consolidation, if you're going to close a
9 base to put force structure, which is robusting.
10 This is the squadrons that you already own, has
11 increased the numbers of aircraft, and you can increase the
12 numbers of aircraft at all three bases except McClellan and
13 McClellan is showing an air quality constraint, so additional
14 operations in the future will be limited because of the
15 environmental impact to the air quality.
16 COMMISSIONER STUART: Kurt, talk a little bit more
17 about that. Why?
18 MAJ DITTMER: It's California laws. I don't know
19 enough about California laws to say that you have to have a
20 battery-operated airplane, but that's what they're going
21 towards in cars.
22 What you have on the base is you have "X" amount of

1 chits that you're allowed to use for your air quality, so if
2 you turn on a power unit that runs on a diesel motor, that's
3 one of your air quality chits. So, you may have to use that
4 chit for your support equipment rather than your airplanes.
If you bring more airplanes on, you have to find more chits.
Again, I don't understand it well enough to go into it, but
7 that's my understanding of it.
8 COMMISSIONER STUART: Thanks.
9 MR. HOUCK: Slide 19, please. Kurt, would you

10 speak to this, please.
11 MAJ DITTMER: The next one is noise complaints and
12 delays. All this is, is you asked us at the last hearing
13 21 June to relate noise complaints and traffic delays to
14 operations, to activity. So, sir, this is the noise
15 complaints at Kelly, McClellan, Robbins and Tinker.
16 relatively few noise complaints. McClellan has -- and thes
17 are monthly. McClellan has a high number of 19.
18 Then you look at the operations. Operations aren't
19 necessarily the number of sorties, but it's how many times
20 the sortie comes by the tower, either for a take-off, a
21 landing or a touch-and-go or an approach.
22 MR. CIRILLO: I need to point out that McClellan's

1 numbers -- they, from an installation perspective, one of th
2 things they pointed out during that installation visit was
3 that that number probably was high because they came from
4 just a few number of people, and also that they took some
5 complaints from the other surrounding airlines.
6 We haven't been able to validate that perspective
7 or any changes to that, but that was a comment that was made
8 by the community, that the numbers that were reported by the
9 installation were really higher than they should have been
10 reported. It did come across as certified data, though.
11 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Three malcontents at the
12 end of the runway. That was pretty much the impression.
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: Proceed.
14 MR. HOUCK: Slide 20, please. Again, this is a
15 review of the cost to close information. For McClellan, let
16 me explain on the full base cost to close, there is a small
17 hydraulics repair facility at McClellan. The Air Force
18 recommendation was to leave that small hydraulics repair
19 operation in place at McClellan.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Why would you want to do
21 that?
22 MR. HOUCK: Well, we came up with no good

1 explanation, sir. The staff did not. It could have been
2 cost-to-move consideration by the Air Force. We cranked in
3 some money to move that hydraulics facility from McClellan to
4 Tinker, and that elevated that cost to close at McClellan to
5 $609 million.
6 MR. CIRILLO: The Air Force recommendation did
7 include keeping it there. The "small" didn't refer to the
8 size of the building but the size of the hydraulic
9 components, I guess.
10 MR. HOUCK: It's a unique facility and it has a
11 capability of 6,000 PSI which is required for the B-1.
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: But the difference is really
13 that $15 million between the two numbers; is that right?
14 MR. HOUCK: Yes, sir.
15 COMMISSIONER BYRON: And if it were retained there,
16 you would not be required to keep the airfield open for that.
17 Everything would come in on truck or train?
18 MR. HOUCK: That's correct. The civilian workforce
19 at that facility is about 458 civilians, so we'd move the
20 facility to Tinker.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: Staff finds no justification,
22 really?

1 MR. HOUCK: Sir?
2 COMMISSIONER STUART: You don't find any real
3 justification in maintaining that since we can do what Mrs.
4 Byron has already suggested and close the whole place, if we
5 were to vote?
6 MR. HOUCK: The only justification I've been able
7 to arrive at was the cost simply to replicate that facility
8 elsewhere.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: Thanks.

10 MR. CIRILLO: Before we go on to the next series of
11 slides, what we'll be doing now is we've talked about the
12 depot issues, and we'll be going through each of the
13 installations starting with Newark, which is a specific
14 installation, in that we'll be talking about the
15 privatization aspect of that.
16 We'll be going through the scenarios as related to
17 that installation. In order, the presentations will be made
18 by Mr. -- except for the first one where Mr. Greg Nixon will
19 make the comment, Mr. Houck will start off and then the
20 people that visited the base, if they aren't Mr. Houck, will
21 be able to respond to any questions.
22 MR. HOUCK: Slide 21, please

1 MR. NIXON: Good morning. As you know, DOD made a
2 recommendation to close Newark and the fundamental gut of
3 that recommendation was to close Newark and privatize and
4 place the metrology and guidance workload, which works out to
5 be about 90 percent of that workload, and distribute among
6 the other ALCs the remaining 10 percent, which stands now as
7 flight control systems, electronic communications equipment,
8 et cetera.
9 So, as we looked at the issues surrounding Newark,
10 the fundamental one we focused on was privatization. The
11 three issues, sub-issues, we really looked at were: One, is
12 privatization achievable; two, is it cost effective; and,
13 three, are there any operational impacts involved with the
14 transition to industry.
15 So, addressing the first -- and that's not on the
16 chart, but the first issue is pretty cut and dried. Is
17 privatization achievable? Yes, it is. The workforce in the
18 civilian sector currently has the expertise to absorb that
19 workload.
20 Contractor interest was noted when the Air Force
21 submitted their RFI to industry. They had 50 responses, a
22 variety of opinions and recommendations, but 50 contractors

1 did submit interest in doing that work that Newark does.
2 It is interesting to note that of the 50 responses,
3 only one of those contractors noted that they could do the
4 entire workload, that entire metrology and guidance work that
5 Everyone else would have preferred to do a portion of it at
6 their local facility or privatize in place, or do some
7 combination of the two.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But there is capability
9 within the country to do the whole workload, and maybe not
10 all done at one place.
11 MR. NIXON: Yes, sir. We'll get into some of the
12 issues surrounding the Minuteman Guidance System which can be
13 accomplished by private industry, but there is some lead time
14 to absorb that workload.
15 So that we could do an independent analysis of
16 contractor interest, we personally met with four of the large
17 guidance contractors -- Rockwell International, Northrop,
18 Honeywell and Litton -- and they all expressed an interest in
19 privatization and absorbing that workload.
20 The primary focus, though, from those discussions
21 was that they really didn't have much interest in
22 privatization in place. They had an extreme interest in

1 absorbing the workload at their respective facilities, using
2 the equipment currently at Newark as GFE. So, to answer that
3 first question, privatization is achievable. How you do it
4 is another story, and we'll get into that in the briefing.
5 The first issue we touched on in the slide is cost
6 effectiveness. As you know, the Air Force sent an RFI out.
7 They developed a COBRA analysis based upon a $31.2 million
8 cost to close and $3.2 million in steady state savings, and
9 some of the things we focused on was the fact that the Air
10 Force never received -- they still don't have -- a propos
11 from any contractors
12 So, their assumption of cost to contract this
13 workload out is simply an assumption based upon their bes
14 guess. All they did was utilize the current personnel co
15 at Newark, which is about $68 million, and they said that
16 going to be the cost to contract this workload out.
17 The savings, that steady state savings, is simply
18 the assumption to contract out, and minus the personnel c
19 they're going to save, 68 million, minus the overhead co
20 so it works out to be about 3.2 million
21 In our assessment of the cost effectiveness, we
22 can't say, and neither can the Air Force, that closing Ne

1 and going to some privatization scheme, will save money.
2 can't assess that.
3 MR. CIRILLO: It appears to be a matter of getting
4 rid of some excess capacity at 1.7 million DPAH, and that
5 their thrust there.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER (Presiding): 1.7 what?
7 MR. CIRILLO: 1.7 million DPAH.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: What is that?
9 MR. CIRILLO: Capacity factor.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Roger, what does that stand for
11 again? I'm sorry.
12 MR. NIXON: Direct product, actual hours.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Direct product, actual hours?
14 MR. NIXON: Yes, sir.
15 MR. CIRILLO: And that's been consistently used.
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: How did they arrive at that?
17 MR. CIRILLO: You might recall from the first slide
18 the 8.798, I believe, million DPAH as the excess capaci
19 within the Air Force, and of that 1.7, that's going tho
20 that capacity figure that we talked about earlier, whi
21 the one-shift, eight hours.
22 MR. NIXON: That works out to be about 19.5 perce

1 of that total, the Newark [illegible] Forces.
2 COMMISSIONER [illegible]: [illegible] and Greg, I gather th
3 staff doesn't have much trouble with the Air Force
4 recommendation on this one.
5 MR. CIRILLO: No, we don't. The comment that was
6 made, you might recall, we'll see that in the next two
7 scenarios that will show up as the next slide by GEN Y
8 The Air Force recommendation and DOD, the Secretary of
9 Defense's recommendation, says specifically, "Privatiz
10 place." We heard some concerns, and we've given you a
11 concerns that we heard.
12 One of the scenario shows -- and GEN Yates said,
13 "We, the Air Force, would like to do it the most cost
14 effective way possible, which could be any combination
15 privatization, transferring to other depots, going con
16 or inter-servicing." Maybe I should have put inter-ser
17 first.
18 MR. NIXON: Or some combination of those.
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But they must have a plan.
20 If they made a formal proposal to close it, they must
21 had a plan that tells how they would do it, what their
22 savings would be, and what it would cost.

1 MR. NIXON: As I said, their current plan is to
2 privatize in place, and it will result in some cost s
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Do they have someone that
4 will privatize in place? You said there was no inter
5 that.
6 MR. NIXON: No, they don't. They don't have
7 anyone. They have a proposal.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Their proposal has gained

9 interest across the country?
10 MR. NIXON: No. They have interest. Based on that
RFI, they have contractors that say, "We are willing to
entertain," but --
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You said privatize in place
14 was the Air Force goal.
15 MR. NIXON: Yes, sir, and they are getting opinions
16 that contractors are interested in that workload, but the way
17 you privatize is still fluid right now.
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, their plan to privatize
19 in place has no interest?
20 MR. CIRILLO: One out of 50 responding contractors
21 implied that they would be interested in doing something like
22 that, so they're looking. That's why I think we've offered

1 at least a second scenario to give the Air Force more options
2 to get this --
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But when we finish, we have
4 to make a motion on whether we privatize, go out to private
5 industry, and what the savings are going to be, so before you
6 bring it up again, you have to know what the Air Force wants,
7 how they're going to do it, and what are the costs.
8 MR. NIXON: We do know what they want, and that was
9 expressed by GEN Yates in his testimony. What they want to
10 do now is maintain maximum flexibility and take the most cost
11 effective approach, whether that be privatize in place,
12 contract out, do some combination.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Maybe the most cost
14 effective is to keep it as it is.
15 MR. NIXON: We don't know and you're right. That
16 could be a possibility.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But that's something that
18 you have to tell us before we can make an enlightened
19 decision.
20 MR. CIRILLO: Yes, sir, we'll give you what we can.
21 MR. NIXON: The second issue, before we leave that
22 chart, is the Minuteman Guidance System. Presently, Newark

9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The Air Force has to help
10 you if we're going to make an enlightened decision.
11 MR. NIXON: Yes, sir, and they haven't gone out
12 with an RFP. They are in the process of now of writing th
13 Statement of Work and developing that RFP package.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You've all been at this for
15 90 days or so.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Are you all
17 suggesting -- I'm following GEN Johnson's line of
18 questioning. Are you suggesting that the Commission take
19 stance that this is okay to close Newark if the Air Force c
20 find somebody who will do it in place, do the work in plac
21 and do it cost effectively?
22 MR. NIXON: NO, sir.

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: You're not suggesting
2 that. Now, if we say, "Close Newark," and they can't find
3 anybody do it there or cost effectively, then are they goir
4 to come back in '95 and say, "Well, we tried but it didn't
5 work"?
6 MR. NIXON: What we're saying, sir, to try to
7 answer your question, is: If closing Newark is based upon
8 cost savings, we can't tell you that there are cost savings
9 with the Air Force approach because no one, including the A
10 Force, knows whether privatization will save money.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: I think they are saying that
12 they are confident that -- I think we just need to leave th
13 words "in place" out of there. They are confident the Air
14 Force, in their judgment, is going to find contractors, whic
15 a number have already bid on it.
16 MR. NIXON: Yes, sir.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: I was the one that -- I
18 visited there and it just makes sense that that work will b
19 very attractive. Maybe we needn't lock them into "in place
20 in our resolutions if we were to consider that.
21 MR. NIXON: That's right.
22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: If you look at the original

1 is the only facility that can do that workload
2 MR. CIRILLO: Commissioner Johnson, we won't be
3 able to give you those exact figures. We will give a
4 statement from the Air Force as to exactly what their plans
5 are. We aren't going to be able to, as we see it now, give
6 you specific costs.
7 Their contract costs, what they assumed in their
8 contract costs, if you will, to privatize in place, they used
9 the salary of 66 million a year, that was what they used as
10 the contract cost, and that's all the information that's
11 available.
12 The only way we could come up with the specific
13 figures for you, for the Commissioners, would be to go out
14 there with our own requests for proposals, but we have enough
15 information, I believe, to give you at least the
16 consideration to either yes, keep it open --
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: My problem is: I was
18 comfortable before I heard you talk. You say the one-time
19 savings are maybe. The steady state savings might be and we
20 found only one of 50 that might want to do what the Air Force
21 wants to do.
22 MR. CIRILLO: That's correct.

recommendation from DOD. "The depot will close. Some
work will move to other depot maintenance activities
including the private sector. We anticipate that most w
be privatized in place."
They anticipate. It is not that they mandate,
require, request. I don't know if we're getting down to
micromanaging in the ntr degree, and I think we've got enoug
on our plate without kind of going down to the --
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But Commissioner McPherson's
comment is very valid. If it turns out that it's best for
the nation to do it as it is, then the Air Force comes bac
two years later and says, "We made a mistake"?
MR. CIRILLO: We're comfortable -- if you would,
turn to Slide 22. We're comfortable with the fact that the
industry has the capability to do the mission. We are 100
percent comfortable with that.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Everything except Greg said
Minuteman, which is a pretty big job.
MR. CIRILLO: The guidance system, the requirements
are how many a month, Greg?
MR. NIXON: The requirements are 34 per month right
now.

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Now, we can vote very
2 clearly, "Close Newark," but if we're going to say "privatize
3 Newark" or anything else, we have to have some facts, and
4 right now, I'm not convinced that the current situation isn't
5 the best for the country. You've confused me this morning.
6 MR. NIXON: We can't assess contractor -- I guess
7 it's difficult to assess contractor interest based upon an
8 RFI.

1 MR. CIRILLO: Right now, the industry has the
2 capability to do less than that. I think it's around two a
3 month but given a transition time, which this would allow, a
4 six-year transition time, they could pick up that
5 requirement.
6 MR. NIXON: They could absorb it.
7 MR. CIRILLO: They could absorb it. They gave, at
8 least in our discussions with them, full confirmation. We're

9 very comfortable with the fact that they can absorb the
10 workload. I think somebody asked the question the other day,
11 "If a storm blew away Newark, could it happen right now
12 during the hearings," to GEN Yates. I believe he said "yes"
13 at that time.
14 In fact, that would be the case, but that
15 particular requirement, at least, we found from industry,
16 would take some transition time to build up to that.
17 Scenario 2 on page 22 gives the Air Force the flexibility to
18 do what needs to be done, and we are 100 percent confident as
19 far as the staff, to tell you that the industry has the
20 capability to assume the requirement.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But it's your opinion that
22 if we vote to close Newark, that the workload will go

1 elsewhere. It will not be privatized. Is that what you've
2 gotten from your investigation?
3 MR. NIXON: That's the indication we received from
4 the contractors we talked to.
5 MR. BEHRMANN: I think it's impossible to say with
6 certainty that it will be privatize in place, and there are
7 some doubts about that, but when you look at the alternative
8 of possibly throwing it out into the private sector, we're
9 confident that that could meet the requirement.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But you're not confident that
11 it will save money. That's the way I read it.
12 MR. NIXON: Correct.
13 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: You're confident the work can
14 be done, although not in place, if you will, but you're not
15 comfortable with answering the question, "Will it save
16 money?"
17 MR. BEHRMANN: I don't think you can project the
18 exact savings, but I think that there's got to be an
19 assumption that if you're maintaining overhead that you're
20 not fully utilizing and you throw it out into the private
21 sector, maybe your incremental cost goes up a little bit, but
22 you're no longer carrying overhead you don't need.

1 Now, what the exact [illegible] you are going to be,
2 don't know, but --
3 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Intuitively, you're telling
4 me that you would think so.
5 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
6 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But you don't have the actual
7 data to prove it?
8 MR. BEHRMANN: No, I don't. We don't have a
9 number.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That's what I had in my mind.
11 Okay.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, I understand what
13 Commissioner Bowman is saying but that's the problem you face
14 any time there's private enterprise that does part of the
15 depot maintenance work.
16 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Exactly.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I mean, the Air Force, the Army,
18 the Navy, the Department of Defense and Congress recognizes
19 that some of it should be done. It depends on who you talk
20 to as to how much should be done by private enterprise for
21 all sorts of reasons, but it would be impossible to derive
22 any sort of model to determine the exact, precise savings if

1 private enterprise does something that the public sector is
2 doing today.
3 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Unless there's some past
4 track record to demonstrate it.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Right. Why don't you proceed?
6 MR. CIRILLO: If we could, go to Slide 24. What we
7 can do, and we'll put these up, if there are any issues,
8 you'll find that most of these issues have been discussed
9 through the discussions that we have already had on the
10 depots.
11 If there are any of those that you wish us to
12 respond to, this kind of lays out the issues and the c[illegible]
13 that were made by the community as well as the staff fi[illegible]
14 in those issues. If you don't have any comments, we'll g[illegible]
15 through them as quickly as you'd wish.
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's do it this way. Give us a
17 chance and when everybody is ready, we'll move on. We're
18 24 now. We can just all read it.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Can we move off of 24 onto 25?
20 Proceed.
21 MR. BEHRMANN: I think that's just review at this
22 point, Mr. Chairman.

1 MR. CIRILLO: When you get to 26 and 27, those are
2 the scenarios for McClellan that we'll talk about.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's look at 26 and 27, the
4 scenarios.
5 MR. CIRILLO: The first scenario is the Air Force
6 recommendation. The second scenario, the difference is
7 the Air Force recommendation, with closing the depot
8 hydraulics facility, as Roger expressed earlier. Of co
9 the third scenario would be that it remains open.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: Commissioner McPherson asked
11 earlier about the possibility of moving some work from
12 Alameda to --
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: North Island.
14 COMMISSIONER COX: North Island, excuse me, to
15 McClellan, and we got an answer from the Navy team, bu
16 wanted to ask you all but, too, to ask a larger questio
17 McClellan stayed open or if we made a different decisi
18 here, have we looked at inter-servicing, so to speak,
19 these depots and how they compare, say, to the Navy dep
20 the Air Force depots? I guess what I'm saying is: A
21 hurting flexibility on inter-servicing by making a d
22 decision?

MR. BEHRMANN: I was just going to add that you've
1 got to put one note into the con column on 26 in both
3 that it does reduce flexibility for future inter-serv
4 Clearly, it does, as does taking down the three NADEP
5 pro of keeping it open is it does -- we were all out
6 we saw McClellan.
7 It's got great facilities. The folks out there,
8 both in Congress and that do the work, have supported
9 workload tremendously. It's a fine facility. We're
10 to the point where we're going to have to jettison so
11 facilities, and that's difficult to do.
12 When you look at it sometimes in larger issues, I
13 think those are the things you've got to wrestle wit
14 we looked at it, we did not have real good cost effic
15 workload capacity data, that we felt we could rely on
16 you a fair look across services at this point. I do
17 whether, you know, in your --
18 COMMISSIONER COX: Is that something that either
19 the Defense Department or the Base Closure staff tha
20 remain through '95 if there were more time, could we
21 with a good view of inter-servicing and if you were
22 inter-service, which depots, whether it's Navy or Ar

1 Force, would we keep? Is that just outside the ca
2 of the Commission staff.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me just jump in there, Ma
4 and just mention what I know that we've tried to do
5 you can backfill where I've left off.
6 You know, we started with the goal toward --
7 sincere effort toward inter-servicing, recognizing
8 never run into anybody inside the Beltway that thin

9 bad idea, nor have I run into anybody inside the Beltway that
10 can tell me how we can easily accomplish it, and that's the
11 conundrum.
12 So, what we did is look at the various commodity
13 areas, and we carved out four that we looked at with great
14 vigor and we're going to be discussing those later. In fact,
15 the inter-servicing is a distinct possibility through the
16 work of this Commission with regard to some commodity areas.
17 One of those areas -- well, we talked about rotary
18 wing. We talked about missile. We talked about wheeled
19 vehicles and the fourth one was --
20 MR. BORDEN: Ground communications.
21 MR. BEHRMANN: Oddly enough, if McClellan closes,
22 they have a substantial workload that could migrate across

1 service lines.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: What was the fourth?
3 MR. BORDEN: Ground communications.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Ground communications, right,
5 and then we looked at the possibility of this Commission
6 tackling the issue of fixed wing commodity area for cross
7 servicing and inter-servicing, and we concluded quite some
8 time ago that because of the fact that the workload was being
9 done in so many different locations by a couple of the
10 services, or really two services and a half, two services and
11 the Marines, and because there were huge disputes with
12 respect to what capacity was in certain areas, that it was
13 not something that the Commission could handle, that is,
14 inter-servicing when it came to fixed wing assets.
15 Therefore, right now, we have our contribution to
16 inter-servicing, which we all want to make a contribution,
17 will be by closing the maximum number of depots that are
18 justified by excess capacity we can, I think.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well said.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: And, number two, by in those
21 areas that we have analyzed it appropriately, making the most
22 informed judgment we can, and those four commodity areas, the

1 areas that we carved out is something that this Commission
2 could reasonably handle, given the time restraints and the
3 staff restraints.
4 MR. BEHRMANN: I would add one thing to that, Mrs.
5 Cox, and you asked a question about did I think in the off
6 year, we could do it. I don't think it's a function of we
7 couldn't, but right now, there's a great deal of concern
8 about what a Commission does in the off year.
9 Do we go out and generate a list? Are we kind of a
10 rogue body out there that --
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We don't want to go down that
12 road.
13 MR. BEHRMANN: Absolutely not.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Period.
15 MR. BEHRMANN: We've worked hard not to do that.
16 All of the data that we got our hands on in the off year, we
17 used to just set up data bases, briefing charts, to build a
18 GIS system that would help us. We did nothing to generate a
19 list.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No substance, all process to
21 smooth this thing out and that's the way it should be in '94,
22 as well, and Congress made sure of that by statutorily

1 requiring that our Commission is, in essence, gutted. I
2 mean, there's a Chairman that stays for the purposes of
3 continuity, and keeping the office lights going and all the
4 other Commissioners lose their portfolio when Congress
5 adjourns sine die this year, 1993.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Praise be.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: You'll be a free man again,
8 Commissioner McPherson. Also, you know, I remember talking

9 to very many members of Congress, and they didn't want a
10 Commission to go out on its own during the even years, and
11 agree with that. We made sure that that was the case by
12 virtue of statutorily requiring that the Commission staff
13 reduced to just a caretaker group.
14 COMMISSIONER COX: I certainly agree with that. I
15 guess my question was a little bit more towards Secretary
16 Aspin's testimony here where he said, you know, in the next
17 two years or year or so, he was going to take on the issue
18 inter-servicing and hopefully have some recommendations for
19 '95.
20 I guess I'm looking a little bit more toward should
21 we -- maybe it's not the right question, but he certainly
22 testified as to that and perhaps in '95, one would have

1 better information, more information, on which to make some
2 of these decisions.
3 MR. BEHRMANN: I don't often talk out of both sides
4 of my mouth, but we've got DLA out of a -- it grew out of
5 some of the same things, you know. The support structure was
6 out there in four different services, and we had to get our
7 hands around that, and we did that in the '70s. We forced
8 that issue.
9 This is a different environment. There's a lot of
10 pressures. In this environment, maybe we could change a
11 year history which says the Department is not, in and of
12 itself, going to address this issue. Now, it is -- I don't
13 have to say how changed it is. It's a dramatically different
14 environment, with all kinds of pressures, you know, and the
15 may yield.
16 I think Secretary Aspin and some of the folks that
17 are over there with them, Secretary Perry, are certainly
18 ready to do business differently.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think they are, too.
20 MR. BEHRMANN: I think you have to make that
21 judgment.
22 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Well let me just remind

1 you to go back a few minutes to what the Chairman said, now
2 we got to this issue. With the Navy group earlier, the Navy
3 staff, it was said to us that the three most -- I forget
4 don't want to characterize it. The best economic result
5 would be to leave the three East Coast NADEPs open and close
6 the West Coast NADEPs.
7 I asked whether if we did that, the work from North
8 Island could -- at least, part of it could be steered to
9 McClellan. This is something that McClellan has asked for,
10 an opportunity to compete for Navy business, and is very
11 confident of its ability to do a good job of acquiring it.
12 I think your answer was that indeed it was a
13 realistic possibility for a good part of North Island's work.
14 Is that right?
15 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And I hope that there will
17 be an opportunity for us, before we make the final decision
18 on this, to at least know what the realities and the number
19 would look like.
20 MR. BEHRMANN: Well, I caution you here. There's
21 so much of a reduction that has to be accomplished, that
22 competition cannot be viewed as a panacea. It is not going

1 to allow us to do it fast enough, efficiently enough. We
2 looked hard at this in '91 and we actually competed
3 McClellan's workload with the Army depot that does ground
4 communications and electronics workload for the Army,
5 Tobyhanna.
6 They broke the package into nine commodity
7 packages, workloads, and they bid on one. This was two years
8 ago. They are still trying to formulate the other seven or

9 eight and, you know, then you get legal challenges to the
10 bids and there's -- I'm not so sure that when you have to do
11 dramatic drawdowns that competition is going to really be the
12 panacea you're looking for. I mean, some tough decisions are
13 going to have to be made.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's see if we can move on.
15 We're 45 minutes behind schedule and we've got a big day
16 ahead of us.
17 MR. CIRILLO: Go to Slide 28. Again, if any
18 Commissioners have any questions -- in the next three, there
19 will be no DOD recommendations, because these -- or Air Force
20 recommendations, for that matter, with I think only one
21 exception. So, if you have any questions on those? If not,
22 we can go --

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Frank, one quick question. On
2 McClellan, that is the only incident that we have that is an
3 Air Force recommendation versus a DOD recommendation.
4 MR. CIRILLO: In the Air Force area, right. I
5 think there was one in the Army area that was in that
6 category, but that's correct.
7 Slides 29 and 30, if you would put those up, are
8 the scenarios for Kelly which, in all cases for the next
9 three, I believe, in all cases, you'll see the first scenario
10 would be to close the whole thing. The second scenario would
11 be to only close the depot portion and the third scenario
12 would be to keep everything open.
13 We can go to Slide 31, which is Robins, again those
14 issues that came up.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I appreciate how the COBRA
16 model works but surely, when you talk about one-time cost,
17 steady state savings and break even years, you don't expect
18 us to believe those are really true representations. If they
19 are, we should not close hardly any bases, and our nation
20 cannot stand that, so I appreciate the numbers but they
21 aren't very useful.
22 MR. CIRILLO: You heard GEN McPeak the other day

1 and his concerns on the costing. Of interest it when we
2 asked for a COBRA run that would keep -- in support of what
3 you just said, when we asked for a COBRA run that would keep
4 two depots closed, the individual depot's prices went up even
5 higher because of the cost to replicate that one depot would
6 be so much higher.
7 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I understand, but General
8 Motors would have all of its plants if it used your analysis.
9 It would never be cost-effective to close a plant. I don't
10 believe the methodology is my problem. I'm just lecturing.
11 Sorry.
12 MR. CIRILLO: If you want, we can go to 32 and 33,
13 which are the scenarios for Robins. If there are no
14 questions, we can go to 34. Again, this is the last of the
15 five bases that we're discussing in this category. There is
16 only one DOD position and that's the excess capacity concern
17 we received on this one and the scenarios on Slides 35 and
18 36, again.
19 If there are no other questions on the depot area,
20 we can go right to Tab 2 in your books. While my colleagues
21 are coming up and these colleagues are leaving, I can go
22 ahead and transition you right into the next portion of it.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The next portion, for those
2 people here that don't have notebooks is the large aircraft
3 bases. This is the last category that was deferred from
4 Friday for review before we break for lunch and before we
5 return this afternoon, to discuss and vote on Army
6 facilities. Frank, why don't you proceed?
7 MR. CIRILLO: Sure. If we would go ahead and put
8 Slide 100 up, or just the opening slide. Slide 100 and 1
9 on opposite sides. Again, we're in the large aircraft
10 category.
11 As a reminder, the other day, we gave you some
12 discussions on the mobility bases which are also in the
13 aircraft base category. We would envision, as we go thro
14 the discussion here, that we wouldn't specifically addres
15 the mobility issues, but would address all issues as rela
16 to the large aircraft bases.
17 The map on Slide 101 parallels the chart to give
18 you an idea of where everything is. Again, we are address
19 seven large aircraft, with the asterisk bases being those
20 added by the Commission and the four bases shown that we
21 either realigned or recommended for realignment or closur
22 If we could go ahead and put Slide 102 up, now I'm

1 going to go ahead and turn this over to Mr. Frank Cantwe
2 who is on my left and also, assisting him will be Mr. Ric
3 DiCamillo on his left and we also have at the table a
4 representative from FAA, Mary Ellen, if you have any
5 questions. Frank.
6 MR. CANTWELL: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
7 fellow Commissioners. Slide 103 on the right, please.
8 stated last Friday, Mr. Cirillo said due to the changing
9 threat, the Air Force has reorganized. One year ago, the
10 Force retired Strategic Air Command.
11 The Air Force had based bomber and tanker aircraft
12 on the same installations in order to better perform the
13 primary mission, the single integrated operations plan.
14 threat has changed and the Air Force has reorganized
15 accordingly.
16 Bomber aircraft have been assigned to the new Air
17 Combat Command and most of the tanker aircraft have bee
18 assigned to the Air Mobility Command. Also, the Air Fo
19 as discussed last Friday, has established mobility bas
20 Slide 103 on the right reflects the projected Air
21 Force reorganization. As you can also see in the lowe
22 are the DOD recommendations for closure and realignment

1 accordance with the Office of Secretary of Defense guid
2 the Air Force evaluated bases according to their curren
3 missions.
4 In order to be fair to all bases, the Commission
5 staff has evaluated all bases for all missions that the
6 was capable of performing. Last Friday, we compared
7 Griffiss, McGuire and Plattsburgh for their ability to
8 perform the mobility mission.
9 Now, we will look at all seven bases, including the
10 three candidates for the mobility bases, for consider
11 for their ability to perform the tanker and bomber miss
12 and these installations' overall military value to the
13 Department of Defense.
14 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Frank, I think looking at
15 each base in all the categories as you have done is ve
16 insightful. It's an excellent idea. When you went ba
17 the Air Force and said, "Why did you just evaluate eac
18 according to the function that it presently performed?"
19 was their answer?
20 MR. CANTWELL: The Air Force was given Office of
21 the Secretary of Defense guidance. I'm uncertain of t
22 exact page but that guidance is reflected in the yello

1 that you have a copy of. The Air Force -- when discus
2 with the Air Force, they did look at other bases.
3 discussing it with the air staff, they said that those
4 say, for instance, that a bomber base was not as go
5 the rest of the fighter bases.
6 Because it was such a difference, they did not
7 reflect that in their detailed analysis. We tried to

8 fair, especially since some of the communities brought this
9 up as an issue, to look at all the bases for all missions
10 that they could perform.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Thank you.
MR. CANTWELL: Slides 104 and 105, please. What
13 I'd like to do at this time is present some of the static
14 base information for the seven installations remaining for
15 consideration. If you don't have any questions, Slides 106
16 and 107, please.
17 The annual operating cost on the first line
18 reflects the cost to operate a base such as things as to turn
19 the lights on. Also, it is the costs for the support people
20 at that installation, military and civilian. It does not
21 include, as you would like to call it, say, the shooters, the
22 operators, the pilots, or the fuel for the aircraft, just the

1 costs, as best as we can analyze, to operate the base.
2 On the costs to close or realign, each
3 installation, the COBRA is best utilized as comparing
4 scenarios. What I have put here is the cost to realign
5 McGuire, realign Griffiss, close Plattsburgh, close
6 Fairchild, close Grand Forks, close K.I. Sawyer and realign
7 March. We will get into more detail on the costs for
8 different scenarios when we discuss the scenarios.
9 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: The one that jumps out at me
10 is the cost to close Fairchild, but if you cover it later,
11 that's fine.
12 MR. CANTWELL: We'll cover that.
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: Frank, on Slide 107, the
14 economic impact, I am surprised that the closing of Grand
15 Forks in that scenario would end up with a 25.7 as
16 distinguished from K.I. Sawyer, only 16 percent. Do you have
17 validation of those numbers?
18 MR. CIRILLO: We'll have a slide that will discuss
19 just those issues. We can show you the percentages.
MR. CANTWELL: This will be a major issue for
21 discussion, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: All right. Proceed.

1 MR. CIRILLO: Yes, we can do it better later on.
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Isn't it part of it predicated
3 on the civilian workforce in the area?
4 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, ma'am. Slide 108, please. As
5 you can see, economic impact will be one of the issues that
6 we'll discuss. These are the issues I will discuss. Slide
7 109, please.
8 For the major issues, I would first like to begin
9 with the impacts of the START and ABM Treaties. I would like
10 to first begin with the START Treaty. The Air Force has
11 stated it, and I quote, "...must maintain Minuteman III
12 basing flexibility due to the uncertainty with respect to
13 START II."
14 One of these uncertainties includes the
15 questionable relationship currently between Ukraine and
16 Russia. Closing Grand Forks may send negative signals to
17 Russia and/or the Ukraine. Also, the U.S. government has not
18 decided how it plans to downsize its nuclear forces. Because
19 of these uncertainties, the Air Force --
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What would the signal be?
21 I don't mean to interrupt you, but what would be the major
22 signal we'd be sending?

1 MR. CANTWELL: That the United States government
2 will react without any consideration to what countries like
Russia and Ukraine do. We will act independent of what's
going on in the treaties.
5 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: We'd give up a trading
6 chip?
7 MR. CANTWELL: Yes.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It's a signal of weakness rather
9 than strength.
10 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir, and as Mr. Cirillo said,
11 it gives up flexibility. So, the United States Air Force
12 decided to keep Malmstrom, F.E. Warren, Minot and Grand Fork
13 Air Force Base. The Air Force could perhaps close Grand
14 Forks and move its 150 Minuteman IIIs to Malmstrom, but this
15 also leaves the question of the silos
16 if they were to move the 150 Minuteman IIIs and
17 leave the silos open, that would count against START. Some
18 of the START is also -- it just has not been decided yet.
19 Currently, the U.S. Senate has ratified START I -- has
20 consented to ratify START I but is holding hearings for START
21 II.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: Frank, you went over that

1 quite quickly.
2 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: The possibility that some of
4 us have raised of separating the airfield, the active Air
5 Force at Grand Forks from the Minuteman capabilities the
6 missile fields, did you look at the cost?
7 MR. CANTWELL: Sir, we have three different
8 scenarios that are connected directly with Grand Forks that
9 we will discuss.
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: Good. I'm jumping the gun.
11 Sorry.
12 MR. CANTWELL: What I'd like to move on to is the
13 ABM Treaty which is different but does have some of the same
14 implications. In my estimation, the treaty does not prevent
15 the closure of Grand Forks but there are numerous treaty
16 implications if Grand Forks Air Force Base were to close.
17 First, if the U.S. government were to close Grand
18 Forks and destroy the entire missile field, it is
19 questionable whether the United States government would be
20 able to deploy an antiballistic missile system elsewhere
21 unless the U.S. government negotiates with the standing
22 consultative commission -- that's the commission, a group

1 that resolves disputes once ratified -- to make a move either
2 to Washington, D.C., or to another ICBM missile field.
3 Also, it is not clear, but it appears to me that to
4 do this, the U.S. government would have to dismantle the
5 mothballed site at Nekoma in accordance with the protocol of
6 the ABM Treaty.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: How far is the Nekoma site from
8 the missile fields?
9 MR. CANTWELL: I believe they are collocated.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think they are, too. Are the
11 missile fields north of the ABM site?
12 MR. CIRILLO: That's correct.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: North, south, east and west?
14 MR. CIRILLO: Mostly north from Grand Forks Air
15 Force Base proper, that's correct, with the ABM site in the
16 northern portion off to the east, if you will, from a
17 straight north line, northeast.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Frank, let me ask you this
19 question. Was the missile fields collocated with -- that's
20 the ABM missile field collocated with the Minuteman III
21 missile fields at Norfolk -- at Grand Forks? Was that
22 specifically mentioned, that site specifically mentioned in a

1 protocol to the ABM Treaty?
2 MR. CANTWELL: I'm not certain, sir. I would have
3 to check.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Could you check?
5 MR. CIRILLO: Yes, it was.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think it was.
7 MR. CIRILLO: It was mentioned.

8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think that's the reason
9 there's a problem.
10 MR. CIRILLO: They refer to the Grand Forks missile
11 field.
12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: There's no question it was,
13 sir.
14 MR. CIRILLO: That is correct. It is mentioned in
15 the protocol.
16 MR. CANTWELL: There are some options for
17 Department of Defense. They could close Grand Forks and move
18 the missiles to Malmstrom but keep the missile fields
19 themselves intact. This would close the base but the missile
20 silos would count against DOD limits for the numbers of
21 launchers in accordance with START.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: Now, say that again?

1 MR. CANTWELL: They could move the missiles.
2 COMMISSIONER STUART: Move the missiles?
3 MR. CANTWELL: Missiles, the actual missiles.
4 MR. CIRILLO: Just the missiles out of the silos.
5 MR. CANTWELL: Out of the silos, leave the silos
6 intact, but now the silos would count as launchers against
7 the limits on START Treaty.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: So, you don't have the
9 deterrence and they count, those treaties count holes in the
10 ground, really?
11 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, Chairman. Another option would
12 be to leave a small number of the silos at Grand Forks, say,
13 two. This could technically satisfy the ABM Treaty and
14 minimally only affect the START Treaty. This is a
15 possibility, but between the START Treaty and the ABM Treaty,
16 there are numerous implications in closing Grand Forks Air
17 Force Base.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: Frank, you still haven't
20 answered my question.
21 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: [illegible]

1 Grand Forks from the [illegible] base. [illegible]
2 a runway to bring those [illegible] but [illegible]
3 tower and runway. [illegible] be there and you require the
4 cost.
5 MR. CIRILLO: We have three scenarios we'll present
6 to you later on. One of them will be closing the entire
7 base. Actually, there are four scenarios. We can go right
8 to the chart.
9 One of the scenarios would be to close the active
10 airfield, the bomber wing that's there, and to operate the
11 missile field itself. You have to require a missile
12 maintenance, an operational BOS tail, if you will,
13 operational support tail, to maintain that.
14 What you end up doing in that scenario, and Frank
15 can look up the cost to close numbers right here from our
16 chart, is you end up having to keep a substantial amount of
17 personnel. I think you have to retain over half of the
18 people that are already on the installation because of the
19 support requirements to the installation. You do have to
20 keep an operational airfield.
21 There is another scenario that was looked at, and
22 that was closing the entire base, shutting down the door, and

1 operating out of Minot Air Force Base, which is to the east,
2 approximately 200 -- between 200 and 250 miles, depending on
3 if you're talking about the missile fields or the base itself
4 at Minot. That is a substantially high cost as well as it
5 has some implications as far as missile surety and security
6 that we'll present to you as pros and cons at that time.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Thanks.
8 MR. CANTWELL: Would you like to see those at this
9 time, Commissioner Stuart?
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: I don't want to change your
11 pattern, your flow, but go ahead. We'll do it later.
12 MR. CANTWELL: I would like to discuss a community
13 concern at this time on the previous slide, please -- go b
14 to the last slide -- raised by the K.I. Sawyer community,
15 which believes it is militarily unsound to assign a few
16 remaining bombers on installations with missiles; therefo
17 K.I. should remain open because it is a bomber-only base.
18 Stationing bombers on missiles has been
19 accomplished for many years and throughout the Cold War.
20 Currently, the Air Force has operational B-52s at Barksda
21 B-1s at Dyess and McConnell, that are based on bases with
22 missile fields. Also, this community concern does not ta

1 into consideration the possibility of dispersing bombers
2 times of increased tension.
3 110 and 111, please. These are unique missions and
4 assets that increase the overall military value at the se
5 installations. The K.I. Sawyer community has brought up
6 they are the only installation with the advanced cruise
7 missile and in discussions with the Air Force, this is
8 correct, but it can be moved to other locations.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: Doesn't, in the case of
10 Griffiss, the adjacency to Fort Drum, enhance its missio
11 MR. CANTWELL: Overall military value, yes, sir.
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes.
13 MR. CANTWELL: We do have an option where we would
14 close the airfield and the alternate will be Syracuse
15 Hancock, and we'll discuss this when that option comes u
16 Slide 112, please. I'd like to put 112 on the right, ple
17 and leave it up, and we'll go through the next set of slid
18 we should have maps of the accident potential zones. 1
19 the left, very quickly, to remind you, this was a slid
20 was shown last Friday.
21 MR. CIRILLO: We will discuss this in detail, by
22 [illegible] when we get into the mobility bases. There are

1 questions that were asked at the previous -- during the
2 mobility bases as related to those. We can ask them
3 want to go over this, the AICUZ.
4 As it is, it's a voluntary program. It gives you
5 the types of items that are allowed, if you will. This
6 suggestion to the community, the AICUZ program, that is
7 hopefully, by the community in developing their zoning.
8 It shows you the types of things that are allowed
9 in Accident Potential Zones I and II, and we have got s
10 information from the Air Force that you asked about ear
11 I think, Commissioner Johnson, that we will address wit
12 mobility bases or if you choose to, we can address them
13 at your call.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll bring it up later, I
15 guess.
16 MR. CANTWELL: Slide 114 on the left, please.
17 Fairchild Air Force Base has approximately five percent
18 encroachment in the northeast corner of the Accident
19 Potential Zone. Slide 115 on the left. Grand Forks h
20 encroachment. Slide 116 on the left, please.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: On Grand Forks, on this one
22 on 123, can you show us the site of the ABM either on

1 last one, 115 or 123?
2 MR. CANTWELL: Put 123 on the right.
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: No, no, we'll come to it
4 later.
5 MR. CANTWELL: Okay.
6 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: My question is: When you
7 get there, can you point out either better on 115 or

5 MR. CANTWELL: Sir, I cannot. I don't have that
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Does anybody know where it
is located? Why don't you send it out and get it marked on
one of those slides so we can see it at some point.
12 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir. Slide 116 on the left,
13 please. Griffiss has no ground encroachments on the Accident
14 Potential Zone. There is part of an Air Force building in
15 the clear zone. Next slide, please. K.I. Sawyer has no
16 encroachment whatsoever. Slide 118. March Air Force Base
17 has approximately two percent. Next slide, please. McGuire
18 Air Force Base has approximately five percent ground
19 encroachment.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Where is the encroachment
21 here?
22 MR. DiCAMILLO: Sir, it's in the areas outside of

1 the military reservation. The military reservation, Fort
2 Dix, and McGuire are shown in the gray colors.
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But can you show us on the
4 map there?
5 MR. DiCAMILLO: I'm sorry, sir?
6 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Can you show us on the map?
7 It doesn't indicate any.
8 MR. DiCAMILLO: Where the roads are. It would be
9 Runway 19 -- I'm sorry, off of Runway 36.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Five percent is an awful
11 lot.
12 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, sir. It's spread out.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I don't believe it's five
14 percent.
15 MR. DiCAMILLO: It's not incompatible. It's
16 compatible to developments with one house per acre.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'd believe two percent. I
18 wouldn't believe five percent.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is that an APZII or I?
MR. DiCAMILLO: APZII, sir. It's off the
21 reservation.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Where does the number of five

1 percent come from?
2 MR. DiCAMILLO: Two to five percent. Commissioner
3 Johnson is correct in suggesting two. Two to five percent
4 comes out of the Air Force certified data.
5 MR. CIRILLO: What that applies to is the acreage
6 or the footprint of those items that are noncompatible with
7 the standards, is the percentage that is used. For example,
8 if you have an APZII, you're not supposed to have an eating
9 facility. You're not supposed to have that. That is
10 incompatible. If the square footage of that is 40,000 square
11 foot, that divided by the acreage is the percentage that that
12 portion is out of compliance, if that's the only thing in
13 that zone.
14 MR. DiCAMILLO: There is also a trailer court in
15 the clear zone off of Runway 18, which is on government
16 property.
17 MR. BORDEN: I don't think they can tell which one
18 is 18.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: I'm sorry, Rick. That trailer
20 court is military, though, is it not?
21 MR. DiCAMILLO: I'm sorry?
22 COMMISSIONER COX: Those are Air Force housing?

1 MR. DiCAMILLO: The trailer park is Air Force
2 housing for enlisted personnel, yes, ma'am. The Runway 18 is
the one on your left, the red line on the opposite end.
That's off the reservation. If you go into the clear zone
5 right up next to the runway, Mark, the runway is the red
6 line. There you go, right in that area to the left, that's
7 clear zone. That's it. That's it, right there, exactly.

8 MR. CANTWELL: Slide 120 on the left, please.
9 Plattsburgh ground encroachment problems will be discussed
10 more on the East Coast Mobility Base. The red marked areas
11 as shown, are shopping malls. The Department of Defense
12 Inspector General has given us indications of approximately
13 eight percent.
14 MR. DiCAMILLO: I'll be glad to answer any other
15 questions that you might have about this particular map.
16 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, Rick, this seems to add
17 up to the fact that Plattsburgh has the highest estimated
18 encroachment; is that correct?
19 MR. DiCAMILLO: Out of the three bases in the
20 Northeast Mobility, yes, sir.
21 COMMISSIONER COX: We still don't have any answer
22 of the 8 to 15 percent?

1 MR. CIRILLO: Yes, we do, and we can discuss it
2 now. I'd be glad to.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We can go over this when we go
4 to the air mobility bases.
5 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, sir.
6 MR. CANTWELL: Slide 121 on the right, please,
7 Slide 122 on the left, please. Next, we'll be going through
8 any air encroachment problems. First, we have Fairchild Air
9 Force Base. Spokane International is approximately five
10 nautical miles from Fairchild. They have worked out
11 procedures. There are no problems.
12 Slide 123 on the left. Grand Forks has no
13 problems. Sir, this is the slide you would like to have the
14 site --
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The question has come up
16 several times. We need to have a feel for where it's at and
17 you might also, if you get it on the map, the missile fields.
18 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir. Slide 124 on the left,
19 please. Griffiss has no air encroachment problems. Slide
20 125.
21 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Frank, I'm an amateur at
22 these matters. What is air encroachment? What is the radius

[illegible] the radius from the field?
MR. CIRILLO: We'll let Mary Ellen -- would you
like to respond to that?
MS. KRAUS: Could you repeat that, sir?
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The question is how you
define air encroachment. Is it a radius, air traffic with
a radius of a field?
MS. KRAUS: We look at not only the radius of the
airport and five miles around the airport of close proximity,
10 sir. We also look in the whole surrounding area, as we did at
11 McGuire, and Plattsburgh and Griffiss. In looking at the
12 high density, you look out on the West Coast with the Los
13 Angeles Basin, you have to take into consideration the whole
14 real surrounding area.
15 What we're looking at here is any close-in
16 encroachment. When you get down to March and McGuire, I
17 believe where it says "some restrictions," basically, there
18 we're talking airport and the surrounding area.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is there a category or is
20 there a sub-category of air encroachment that has to do with
21 air traffic density on a path that would be flown, for
22 example, that is presumed to be flown under the Air Force's

1 plan? If aircraft were flying from Base A to Base B to pick
2 up personnel and equipment, if that were the design, and that
3 particular route was through densely occupied air space, is
4 that an air encroachment problem?
5 MS. KRAUS: I would say no, sir. This is where, in
6 our discussions of adjusting traffic flows to the mission
7 requirements and the scheduling on how each would be handled.

8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: So, you don't say that
9 there is an air encroachment issue if there is simply heavy
10 traffic --
11 MS. KRAUS: That is correct, sir.
12 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: -- in the presumed
13 operation?
14 MS. KRAUS: That is correct, sir. The flows are
15 adjusted to accommodate both civil and military,
16 simultaneously, using the same air space in the most
17 efficient manner for both aircraft.
18 MR. CIRILLO: Do they get assigned to the jet
19 routes if that happens to be the case?
20 MS. KRAUS: It can be both low and high altitude.
21 MR. CIRILLO: These happen to portray, in this
22 case, vector routes or low altitude. What is it, less than

1 18,000 feet, I believe?
2 MS. KRAUS: This one has both vector and high and
3 low altitude on it. It is just to give you a general idea in
4 the area. It is a low traffic density area in the upper
5 northern peninsula of Michigan.
6 MR. CANTWELL: As can be seen, there is no
7 encroachment whatsoever at K.I. Sawyer. Next slide, please.
8 MR. DiCAMILLO: This shows March Air Force Base
9 outside the Los Angeles Basin east of the Los Angeles area.
10 They have a number of small airports around March dealing
11 with parachute, jumping and light aircraft, as well as
12 soaring or gliders to the south and then to the northwest, is
13 the Ontario International Airport.
14 MR. CANTWELL: If there are no questions, next
15 slide, please. McGuire has a lot of traffic, but the
16 procedures have been worked, and this will be discussed more
17 in the East Coast Mobility Base. Next slide, please.
18 Plattsburgh has Clinton County two nautical miles away. This
19 will also be discussed tomorrow again with the East Coast
20 Mobility Base.
21 MR. DiCAMILLO: This is portrayed as a low density
22 area similar to K.I. Sawyer but the vicinity of Clinton

1 County is in question.
2 MR. CANTWELL: Next slide, please. Move on to the
3 next issue, economic impact. Slide 103.
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Back up a slide, please.
5 MR. CANTWELL: Sure.
6 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Plattsburgh is pretty well
7 hemmed in, the city, by the airfield, runway extension and
8 the lake. I've not been up in the northern part. Is that
9 true or not?
10 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, sir, that's true.
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: There's no way to grow
12 south because of the base? Okay, thanks.
13 MR. CANTWELL: Next slide, please. The State of
14 Michigan, the Upper Peninsula, I have indicated it would be
15 potentially disastrous economically to close K.I. Sawyer and
16 it would be a projected worst case, according to our issues
17 team, 24.2 percent unemployment if K.I. Sawyer were to close.
18 We must note, also, though, that Grand Forks would have a
19 tremendous impact on their community.
20 COMMISSIONER STUART: Quite obviously, Frank, what
21 surprised me was that Grand Forks' level of unemployment is
22 as high as stated, and the impact obviously is what we see

1 here, but is it currently 25.7 out there?
2 MR. CANTWELL: Sir, looking at the numbers, it
3 appears that the community in Grand Forks is only slightly
4 larger than at K.I. Sawyer but the base itself has more
5 people and provides more money to the local community, and
6 when you have more jobs associated with it, the economic
7 impact is greater. So, the base at Grand Forks, if the
8 numbers are correct, have more of an impact on that
9 community.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Slide 105 shows that military
11 personnel at Grand Forks are 4296 compared to 2354; civ
12 is 457 to 351, so you've got a heavier concentration of
13 civilian population on the base, plus a larger number of
14 military that has an impact on the economics of the local
15 community, which is that three-for-one fall-out of auxiliar
16 services.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: If we didn't do anything at
18 Grand Forks, what is the current unemployment level?
19 MR. CANTWELL: 3.9 percent.
20 COMMISSIONER STUART: What?
21 MR. CANTWELL: 3.9 percent.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: And to move it up to 25.9?

1 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
2 COMMISSIONER STUART: It seems to me that Ms. Byron
3 has explained it, in a sense, because of the large number
4 people, but those percentages seem to jump so substantiall
5 Would you take another look at those numbers?
6 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Okay.
8 MR. CANTWELL: Slide 130 on the left, please. Even
9 though the Commission's challenge is to close military
10 installations, which is reflected in the following scenar
11 slides, I'd like to pause for a few moments to look at th
12 seven installations.
13 The Department of Defense selected Plattsburgh for
14 the East Coast Mobility Base. The Department of Defense
15 selected Fairchild and Grand Forks as major tanker
16 installations. The other four installations were selecte
17 for closure or realignment, or recommended for closure o
18 realignment.
19 In a sense, if you were to select the three best
20 bases, the first being the East Coast Mobility Base, an
21 select -- mentally, if nothing else -- the two best bases
22 for major tanker installations, it may make your job easie

1 when voting to close or realign the other four installat
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We can discuss it, but when the
3 time comes to vote, I guess that's Wednesday or Thursday.
4 MR. CANTWELL: Tomorrow, sir.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Tomorrow, Thursday. I think
6 that makes a lot of sense to handle the East Coast air
7 mobility bases and dispose of those, and then go to the o
8 large aircraft bases.
9 MR. CIRILLO: All right, sir. The next series of
10 slides, starting -- and Frank will cover these. All of
11 scenarios are based upon the four bases that were projec
12 recommended for realignment or closure for the installat
13 so you might not see a title that would say Grand Forks
14 the top or Fairchild or any of the other installations,
15 Plattsburgh but you will see them within the different
16 scenarios. Frank?
17 MR. CANTWELL: Slide 131 on the left and 132,
18 please, on the right. The DOD recommendations is the
19 realignment of Griffiss. Scenario 1 is very similar ex
20 for you would close the airfield.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It keeps Rome open and closes
22 the airfield. That's the only difference?

1 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, Chairman.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, the only difference is the
3 airfield?
4 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, Chairman. The only differenc
5 is the airfield.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: And so you save about a million

...: Yes, sir, 1.1 is what the Air Force

... COURTER: I see. It's under pros. 1.1.

...WELL: Scenario 2 essentially would be if ...e to be selected as the East Coast Mobility Base.

... 3 would be a scenario where Griffiss remained open ...omber or tanker base and Fairchild Air Force Base were ...lose.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: On Scenario 2, Griffiss remains ...en as the East Coast Mobility Base, Plattsburgh closes and McGuire realigns pursuant to the recommendations of the Air Force. That one-time cost is 499.7, almost $500 million?

MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, sir, that was the latest COBRA run that the Air Force gave us and it came in with an

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1 extremely high MILCON cost.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: What were some of the things in
3 that MILCON cost?
4 MR. DiCAMILLO: Well, they had maintenance
5 facilities, some administrative facilities, and housing and
6 ramp were big cost items.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: All right. Go ahead.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Go back to Scenario 1. We
9 have found an alternative to Griffiss for Fort Drum? You
10 have found --
11 MR. DiCAMILLO: Alternative, sir. We looked at
12 Hancock Field and we've had differing pieces of information.
13 Apparently, there are two to four C-5s that support the Air
14 National Guard at that base during the year. The Hancock
15 field itself, the civil side, can handle large aircraft.
16 When the C-5s go in to support the Guard, they do park over
17 on the civilian side of the airport and not the Air National
18 Guard side, and they can handle 747s, too.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Can you take it fully loaded
20 with troops, I would presume?
21 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, sir, they can take maximum
22 loads, C-5s and 747s, yes, sir.

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1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Hancock can
2 MR. DiCAMILLO: Hancock can, yes, sir.
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, the Air Force and the
4 Army are comfortable with Hancock?
5 MR. DiCAMILLO: No, sir. What I understand is that
6 the Army has indicated they would prefer Griffiss but have
7 outloaded exercises out of Hancock Field.
8 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: There is some information
9 provided to us from some sources that dispute the fact that
10 Hancock can handle --
11 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, sir, there is in the flip, the
12 Air Force flight information publication documents that
13 indicates some problems, weight bearing, narrow taxiways.
14 That all pertains to the Air National Guard side. In the
15 civil publications, as our FAA representative pointed out to
16 me, there are no such limitations on that side of the
17 airport.
18 MS. KRAUS: Commissioner Bowman, if I can expand,
19 we checked further and earlier this morning. During Desert
20 Storm, Syracuse Hancock did handle fully loaded C-5s and 747s
21 in and out of Hancock during that time and can take the
22 weight-bearing capacity on the civil side.

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COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And fully loaded, in my definition or our definition here is with troops as opposed to tanks.
MR. DiCAMILLO: It would be troops and equipment. A C-5 can carry approximately 80 troops. It's built mostly for the cargo.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: 750,000 pounds is fully loaded.
MR. CANTWELL: If there are no questions, I'd like to move on to the scenarios involving K.I. Sawyer. Slide 13 on the left. This is the DOD recommendation. Scenario 1 would be K.I. Sawyer remains open and Fairchild Air Force Base closes. We have three more scenarios involving K.I. Sawyer.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll just glance at them.
MR. CANTWELL: Slides 134 and 135, please.
MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Stuart, these outline the scenarios that you requested. That's one of the things I just wanted to point out for you clearly which ones did exactly what you had requested of staff.
COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: In Scenario 3, where you have

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1 Grand Forks realigns, what does that mean?
2 MR. CANTWELL: It means that the Air Force would
3 remove the flying operations, the B-1s and the KC-135s would
4 transfer to other installations, and the missile wing would
5 remain at Grand Forks. The runway needs to remain open for
6 missile operations and it does not close an installation.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: So it's affordable but there's
8 operational restraints, operational problems.
9 MR. CANTWELL: It doesn't really close an
10 installation.
11 MR. BEHRMANN: It just takes out the operational
12 air wing and will maintain a reduced operations air field to
13 support --
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: And you are supporting the
15 missile fields out of Minot?
16 MR. CANTWELL: No, that's Scenario 4, the one on
17 the right, sir.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Oh, that's four.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Can I ask another
20 question? If we closed K.I. Sawyer, if we voted to do that
21 you show steady state savings of about 46 million. This is
22 or 133. I mean, this is what you're going to save? That

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what we project to save?
MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Annually?
MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: 46 million?
MR. CIRILLO: Right, after the break-even year.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: After you get to 1999, you're going to save 46 million a year. Scenario 3, the one that Frank just described, where Grand Forks missile silos stayed active, stay open, the airfield stays open but the planes are taken away, you have to wait a couple of years to get to a break-even, but you save almost as much money, don't you, as you do by closing K.I. Sawyer?
If you look at Scenario 3 and compare it to the DOD recommendation, the break-even point in the DOD recommendation is 1999 and you save $46 million thereafter. If you leave it open and realign Grand Forks, leaving the missile bases there and the runway open but taking the planes away, you break even in '97 and you get annual savings of 43 million?
MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Am I right?

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MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: So, that's pretty close, isn't it?
MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER STUART: So, the one-time cost is

6 considerably less?
7 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And the one-time cost is
9 less, so what's wrong with that?
10 MR. CANTWELL: Sir, I don't think there's anything
11 wrong with that.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And the cumulative economic
13 impact or economic impact numbers we saw before was the total
14 base closure at Grand Forks, not this scenario?
15 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir, that's true. I do not
16 have the numbers for a partial base closure at Grand Forks.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: What magnitude are we talking
18 about, a third, a half, two-thirds? You don't even have that
19 information?
20 MR. CANTWELL: A wild -- one-third support. It
21 would just be a guess, sir. We could find those numbers out,
22 but it would be a guess.

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: Frank, if we look at those
2 numbers again, Ms. Byron has reminded me you use a multiplier
3 in connection with each civilian job, as its effect on the
4 community. I think we ought to get that multiplier out in
5 front of us to be aware, because that kicks that number.
6 MR. CIRILLO: In the indirect positions?
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes.
8 MR. CIRILLO: Right. There's a different
9 multiplier depending on the --
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: I think we ought to know what
11 that is and figure out how that works.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do you have any idea what the
13 economic impact would be in Scenario 3?
14 MR. CANTWELL: No, sir.
15 MR. CIRILLO: We can get hat.
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you get that for me,
17 please?
18 MR. BEHRMANN: We'll use the ca culator and give
19 you that number.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you ca culate that? Thank
21 you.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: [illegible]

1 them to do just that.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Oh, you did? I'm sorry.
3 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Speaking as one of us at
4 here, I would like to see that elaborated a little bit more,
5 the Number 3, in the way that Commissioner Bowman just
6 described and in any other way. In other words, how much of
7 a hit is that going to be to Grand Forks? I'd just like to
8 weigh the DOD against the Number 3.
9 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: And to understand that
11 cumulative economic impact and how those numbers are
12 calculated.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Right, because it does
14 look, contrary to our usual prayer book lesson that we go by
15 which is you need to close the base instead of just
16 downsizing, this looks like one of those instances where you
17 can get about as much money back for the Treasury by doing
18 Number 3 as you do by Number 1, by the DOD recommendation.
19 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
20 MR. CIRILLO: The numbers indicate that, sir.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: We'd still be all right from
22 the point of view of the ABM Treaty and the missiles.

1 MR. CANTWELL: No treaty implications with this,
2 with Scenario 3.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Keep in mind -- and this
4 certainly deserves the very serious examination but keep in
5 mind, I remember well, Friday when I forgot which Air Force
6 General testified, saying that -- we were talking
7 additional scenarios with regard to large aircraft
8 closures and he specifically said, "If you close Gra
9 don't use it as a substitute for K.I. Sawyer. Clos
10 both."
11 MR. CIRILLO: Our calculations showed, when we went
12 through -- the staff went through the calculations, we
13 using the numbers, using the approach we did, it was a
14 four-and-a-half base excess capacity.
15 In other words, it supported the four and indeed,
16 the Air Force did state then, and have also stated in wr
17 for the record, that if we closed -- if Grand Forks was
18 closed by the Commission, exactly as you said, Mr Chairm
19 it could be and should be a fifth installation, in their
20 words, to reduce the excess capacity that they had. That
21 correct.
22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Frank, let me ask you on the

1 first four criteria which we have, which are military val
2 and the fact that we have to have a substantial deviation
3 from that, from the eight criteria, in the scenario you a
4 looking at, which I think is Scenario 3, are you comforta
5 that there is substantial deviation that would keep us wi
6 those guidelines?
7 MR. CIRILLO: In that particular scenario, it
8 doesn't close a base for one thing, so you have your exc
9 capacity. In other words, you still have the excess
10 capacity. You haven't taken that away in that scenario.
11 You've saved, in that scenario, the cumulative economic s
12 which is certainly one of the criteria, although Criteria
13 6, I believe, so the substantial deviation, I would leav
14 that up to the Commissioners.k
15 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I didn't mean to put you on
16 the spot, but I think, you know, I think we've got to kee
17 the back of our minds as we are going through scenario
18 we've got to look at the military value and the substa
19 deviations.
20 MR. CIRILLO: [illegible] right on, Commissioner.
21 MR. CANTWELL: If there are now more questions on
22 the [illegible] we'd like to move to Slides 136, plea

1 MR. DiCAMILLO: Commissioners, this is the March
2 Air Force Base scenario. The DOD recommendation is to
3 realign March Air Force Base and download the KC-135s,
4 transferring them to Travis Air Force Base, which would
5 become the west Coast Mobility Base. Scenario 1 would
6 leave March open and close Fairchild Air Force Base.
7 MR. CANTWELL: If there are no questions, Slides
8 137 and 138, please.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could we stay with March for
10 a second?
11 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: This relates to another
13 option that comes up under Naval Air. One of the sugges
14 that has been made is whether some of the aircraft that
15 be moved out of El Toro could conceivably -- this is in
16 service cooperation -- could be moved up to March. Has
17 been looked at?
18 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, sir, and I believe the Navy is
19 prepared to address it, but just to give you a little
20 background on it, I believe it was helicopters from Tu
21 moving to March.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: You're right.

1 MR. DiCAMILLO: Just off the top of my head, it wa
2 a rather high price tag to do it, because there are
3 insufficient maintenance facilities at March Air Fo
4 to accommodate all those helicopters.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But the problem, also, is

6 the law says you cannot put an active unit on a reserve base
7 and you have to make March an active base, and that was what
threw the cost up.
MR. DiCAMILLO: It would retain its active duty
status, yes, sir. The Marines would be the predominant user,
11 as well as being active duty, and would probably have
12 to -- the Air Force would transfer ownership to the Marines,
13 and the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard forces, would
14 be a tenant.
15 MR. CIRILLO: And, indeed, they suggested that in
16 response to the scenario.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Would you say the Navy is
18 going to look at that when they review these Naval Air
19 Stations?
20 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, I believe they have that on
21 their plate.
22 MR. CIRILLO: They have the cost information on

1 that and they have the responses and they're prepared for
2 that.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: Maybe the General has got the
4 practical reason.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's move right along here.
6 MR. CANTWELL: Slide 137 and 138, please. This is
7 the McGuire scenario to realign McGuire to an Air Reserve
8 installation. Scenario 1 is to close Plattsburgh instead of
9 McGuire, realigning McGuire. Scenario 2 is to retain McGuire
10 and to retain Plattsburgh, McGuire retaining its air lift
11 capability and Plattsburgh remaining as a tanker
12 installation.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We addressed these the other
14 day, right?
15 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I think we've already
addressed these, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, and then you have the
19 backup slides.
20 MR. CIRILLO: That would conclude the Air Force
21 presentation and I believe your morning schedule. We almost
22 got you back the time.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Not exactly. In five minutes,
2 we'll have a press availability, and we'll adjourn until 1:00
3 o'clock.
4 (Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., a luncheon recess was
5 taken.)

1 A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N
2 (2:26 p.m.)
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Commission will come to
4 order. This is the beginning of further discussion and
5 votes, and we're starting with the Army.
6 One thing I wanted to mention and that is, there's
7 going to be, I think, an irresistible urge by some leaders,
8 political leaders and appointed leaders, to contact the
9 Commissioners after we have voted today, saying, "I found
10 additional information. You overlooked something and
11 therefore, would you bring it up again on Thursday? We'd
12 like further discussion and a second vote." That is the
13 danger in carrying out this process over a four or five-day
14 period.
15 I simply just want to say that we will consider
16 that when the votes are taken today, that they are final
17 votes, and we'll do the very best we can to keep it at that
and that's just a statement I'd like to make for the record.
Also, for those people that are here and listening,
20 we intend to start off, for example, this afternoon and
21 everybody that follows this process will understand it will
22 fall into a pattern, but we're going to take up the Army

1 Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools. It's scheduled from
2 2:00 to 3:00 o'clock.
3 We're not going to be duty bound to follow that
4 We're starting 30 minutes late. That couldn't be avoided
5 because of the delay this morning. We intend on following,
6 as best we can, the schedule as we presented same to the
7 press and to the public earlier today, but if there is
8 obviously less discussion than would be allotted here, we'll
9 entertain a motion early. If it requires more, we'll take
10 more time.
11 We want to make sure that all the Commissioners are
12 comfortable with their votes, knowing that these votes will
13 have a great economic impact on communities and also an
14 impact on military capabilities, not only now but for many,
15 many years to come.
16 I will do the best I can in recognizing those
17 people that are proffering motions. A motion will require a
18 second for further discussion. We expect much of the
19 discussion to occur before we entertain a motion. There can
20 be a motion and I'll entertain one at any time to table the
21 vote, because sometimes, what we'll want to do is to rewrite
22 the motion.

1 Staff has anticipated various scenarios and various
2 motions. The motions may not follow specifically the
3 language that was provided to us by legal counsel and, if
4 that's the case, it's the Commission's intention to defer
5 voting until the motion can be reduced to writing and read
6 into the record, as we want no errors in this area
7 whatsoever.
8 If there is a motion and a second and a discussion
9 followed by a substitute motion, the substitute motion will
10 be recognized. It would require a second. We'll have
11 discussions on the substitute, and the voting will take
12 place. The first vote will be on the substitute and the
13 second vote will be on the original motion.
14 With respect to the votes, I will start and do the
15 best I can to make sure that not one Commissioner leads off
16 in every category. I'll spread out the opportunity to vote
17 fairly, as best and honestly as I possibly can.
18 If there is a Commissioner that, for whatever
19 reason, does not want to be the lead person that votes on a
20 particular issue, they should feel free to pass until later
21 on, and I'll go back to that individual Commissioner or
22 Commissioners that wanted to pass voting until the end.

1 That's certainly appropriate if they feel more comfortable in
2 doing that, for whatever reason.
3 Those are some of the things I wanted to mention
4 with regard to the motions. There is going to be, obviously,
5 some disagreements, perhaps, I assume, between the
6 Commissioners today, maybe tomorrow, and most certainly some
7 time and perhaps many times during this entire process.
8 There will be, in two or three instances,
9 Commissioners that want to recuse themselves from voting.
10 They have done so publicly various times before. A recusal
11 means that they will not participate in the discussion, nor
12 in the vote.
13 A recusal means that we have six Commissioners and
14 in order to change the recommendations of the Secretary of
15 Defense, it requires four votes, irrespective of a recusal,
16 because it has to be by majority. That means that even
17 though we have recusals in certain categories, it doesn't
18 change the requirement that you need four votes to change the
19 recommendations of the Secretary of Defense.
20 There is no -- and staff can correct me if I'm
21 wrong. I don't believe there is any category in which there
22 are two Commissioners that felt that he or she had to recuse

1 themselves. Is that correct?
2 MS. CHESTON: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That is correct, Counsel. I
4 appreciate it. Is there any other business or statements
5 that should be made at this time by any of the Commissioners?
6 (No response.)
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: If not, we will proceed with the
8 Army and Mr. Behrmann, if you would proceed.
9 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, could I just say one
10 thing about the motions? We have drafted just about every
11 conceivable option. There's no prejudice on our part. We've
12 tried to use it as a means of facilitation. I think that
13 there is a dearth of options for you to select from, and I
14 just wanted that to be clear for the record.
15 We'll move right to Ed Brown, who is going to start
16 the brief for us on Army bases.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, you are recognized.
18 You may proceed.
19 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I have
20 with me today the entire Army team. The analysts will be
21 talking to you in their respective areas where they have done
22 the work, starting off with me today at the table. On my

1 left is LTC Brian Duffy and to his left is Mr. John Graham.
2 If I may direct your attention to Slide 1, the top portion of
3 the chart shows the number of categories into which the Army
4 divided its installations for consideration.
5 The number on the right-hand column represents
6 those subjected to military value assessments within each
7 category. Highlighted categories, initial entry training,
8 branch schools, professional schools, command and control,
9 depots and commodity-oriented, have recommended for closure
10 or realignment by the Secretary of Defense or recommendations
11 added for further consideration by the Commission during its
12 hearings on the 29th of March and on May 21st.
13 The box at the bottom reflects the Commissioners'
14 addition of the U.S. Army Reserve Training Facility at Harrisburg,
15 Pennsylvania, for consideration. This category was not
16 considered by the Army in its military value assessments;
17 therefore, I have separated it from the others.
18 If I may now direct your attention to Tab 1, we
19 have the first category that will be discussed, Initial Entry
20 Training and Branch Schools. The map, which is Slide 2, and
21 the accompanying chart, Slide 3, show the names and locations
22 of the Army's 13 initial entry training/branch school

1 installations.
2 The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort
3 McClellan, Alabama be closed, and the Commissioners added
4 Fort Lee, Virginia, for further consideration. Before
5 discussing each installation, I would like to outline the
6 staff's evaluation of the impact of force structure
7 reductions on training loads at these installations.
8 In looking at these charts, it must be remembered
9 that both active and reserve component soldiers are trained,
10 so there cannot be a direct one-to-one correlation in force
11 structure reductions to reduction in the training load.
12 Slide 4 compares the training load at the Army's basic
13 training installations for fiscal years 1992 and 1997.
14 This chart assumes a force structure of 12 active
15 divisions. Through the period, there is a reduction of
16 almost 20 percent. That compares with a total force
17 reduction, both active and reserve, of approximately 15
18 percent.
19 Slide 5 shows the same information for the combined
20 arms installations, those that train the infantry, their
21 defense artillery, armor, aviation and artillery soldiers.
22 Through the period, there's a reduction of about six-and-a

1 half percent.
2 Slide 6 shows the same information for combat
3 support installations, Fort Leonard Wood where they tra
4 engineers; Fort Gordon trains signal soldiers; Fort
5 McClellan, both chemical and military police; Fort Huachuc
6 military intelligence; and Fort Devens, which is in the
7 process of being closed and the training load is being
8 transferred from Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca. In this
9 category, there was a reduction of about nine percent.
10 Slide 7 shows the information for combat service
11 support installations. The installations shown along the
12 bottom, I will not detail them. There is a reduction of
13 about 18 percent in training load in these installations
14 through the period.
15 At Tab 2, we have the first installation to be
16 considered, Fort McClellan, Alabama. Slide 8 pictorially
17 shows the DOD recommendation. This recommendation is to
18 close Fort McClellan, move the Chemical School, the Milit
19 Police School and the DOD, Department of Defense Polygrap
20 Institute, to Fort Leonard Wood, retain Pelham Range, and
21 establish a reserve component enclave at Fort McClellan a
22 retain the capability for live agent training, the Chemic

1 Decontamination Training Facility, at Fort McClellan.
2 Slide 9 shows the relative locations of Fort
3 McClellan and Fort Leonard Wood. LTC Brian Duffy will
4 discuss Fort McClellan.
5 LTC DUFFY: Mr. Chairman, I'm just waiting for the
6 first slide.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you move the mike closer,
8 please, so we have no problem hearing you? Thank you.
9 LTC DUFFY: I think you have a copy of this slide
10 in your packets, Slide No. 10. On this slide, you see
11 various statistics for the base.
12 I point your attention to the last row. That shows
13 that the recommendation made by the Department of Defens
14 carried with it a one-time construction cost of $110.8
15 million. It had a steady state savings of approximately
16 million and pays back in the year 2000, which would be t
17 years after the six-year BRAC period. I also point yo
18 attention to the cumulative economic impact which is 16.
19 percent cumulative economic impact.
20 Next slide, please. These are the major issues
21 that I would like to review. Those listed on the left a
22 what I would consider the driving issues for this

1 recommendation. Those are the ones I will cover. If yo
2 have any questions about the issues on the right, I will
3 glad to cover those, also.
4 Next slide, please. The first issue, military
5 value, four installations ranked lower than Fort McClell
6 Forts Lee and Eustis in Virginia, Fort Rucker in Alabama
7 also, and Fort Huachuca. Fort Lee is the Quartermaster
8 Center and School. It has been studied for consolidatio
9 along with Fort Eustis and I think that the Commission h
10 taken it under consideration and understands those
11 installations.
12 Fort Rucker is the Army's Aviation Center and
13 School. It's a unique installation that trains aviators
14 has 23 stage fields of various sizes, all adding up to a
15 couple hundred acres each. They are located on the outsk
16 of the installation that makes it rather unique and diff
17 to replicate.
18 Fort Huachuca is a gaining installation from BRAC
19 '91 and in the Army's recommendation was a gainer in
20 '93. So, for that reason, it was not considered for c
21 or realignment.
22 I think the point I would like to make is that

1 military value is merely the beginning part of the analysis.
and the service did not use military value as the sole
determinant of whether a base should be closed or realigned.
4 It did allow them to start the study
5 At this point, I'd like to talk about the
6 separation of the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense
7 Training Facility. What I thought would be more useful was
8 to show you a picture of what the Chemical Defense Training
9 Facility is for those Commissioners who did not have an
10 opportunity to view it.
11 Mark, if I may have Slide No. 6, this is what the
12 facility looks like. Those buildings with the roofs that are
13 colored in orange are the areas where the agent is actually
14 contained, either in a laboratory, in a training area, or
15 being evacuated or incinerated. The blue building is an
16 administration building and classrooms.
17 Could I have the next slide, please? This shows
18 you some of the training that is conducted inside. Liquid
19 agent is poured on military equipment and soldiers are then
20 given a chance to practice their decontamination skills with
21 a live agent. Naturally, you can imagine it's rather a
22 fearful exercise. It's been proven to build their confidence

1 and competence and it makes them better trainers. Thank you,
2 Mark.
3 The CDTF, if I may use that acronym, is a one-of-a
4 kind facility. It was built in 1987. Studies commissioned
5 by the Army have shown this training actually does produce a
6 higher level of confidence in decontamination equipment and
7 skills than training in a simulated environment.
8 Within this facility, binary components are mixed
9 to produce a live, toxic agent. After completion of the
training, contaminated products are incinerated; thus, it has
a hazardous waste incinerator contained as part of this
12 facility.
13 This facility currently operates within the State
14 of Alabama with a clean air permit and that, to date, is the
15 only permit that has been required by the State of Alabama.
16 There has never been an accident or a discharge of toxic
17 chemicals or any other matter into the environment from this
18 facility.
19 As you see on the issued slide, the DOD
20 recommendation including leaving the CDTF at Fort McClellan.
21 This was done because it was believed that movement may not
22 be possible, and the Army saw value in the consolidation of

1 the three branch schools. Although separation produces
2 difficult logistics problems, the potential savings to close
3 the remainder of Fort McClellan, as well as combine three
4 maneuver combat branch schools as more attractive.
5 This part of the DOD recommendation has produced
6 almost unanimous disagreement with the DOD position from the
7 community. Their argument is that besides the logistical
8 nightmare, the resulting effect on doctrine and equipment
9 testing would be devastating to the development community.
10 Also, the community has presented the Commission
11 with the perception that the State of Alabama may require
12 additional permits for a stand-alone facility, requiring
13 response forces and adding additional costs if it were to be
14 left in place while the school moved. Of course, no one
15 knows the answer to that question, but it is a possibility.
16 We have looked at the economics of moving the CDTF
17 with the Chemical School and results show an additional $10
18 million savings would be saved each year. This represents
savings in base operations support as well as the movement of
20 soldiers between Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan.
21 I think this naturally leads to the question of
22 whether or not the CDTF can be relocated at Fort Leonard

1 Wood, which is the next issue. The community has presented
2 the Commission with arguments that the CDTF either cannot b
3 permitted in Missouri, environmental permits, or if possible
4 it requires so much time that the movement could not be
5 completed within the six-year time frame required by law.
6 They base the argument on the time it took to construct the
7 CDTF in Alabama.
8 The permit process there was started in 1981.
9 Construction began in 1983. It was finished in 1986 and the
10 tested with the first students being trained in 1987. It
11 was, indeed, a six-year process for this first facility.
12 community at the Birmingham regional hearing suggested it
13 would be eight-and-a-half years before you could begin
14 training students in Missouri.
15 The Commission communicated with the Missouri
16 Department of Natural Resources to determine how long permit
17 would actually take and if there would be a problem. Their
18 response to the Commission suggests that the entire
19 permitting process would require from one-and-a-half to two
20 years for both part one and part two.
21 This does not include the time it takes to
22 construct, which would be an additional two years. This

1 leaves two years for problems to be resolved, that is, with
2 the information that they know today about the Chemical
3 Defense Training Facility. They have seen a copy of the
4 plans and they have also a copy of the operating SOPs.
5 In addition, we received two letters from local
6 Chambers of Commerce and a citizens group that they have not
7 found any public opposition to the relocation of the Chemica
8 School activities. Another question was posed back to the
9 Director of Missouri Natural Resources about the type of
10 opposition that could be expected from such a facility.
11 They replied that the public generally does not
12 oppose hazardous waste generators if they are actually
13 incinerating material within the state, that is produced
14 within the state. If the material comes from out of the
15 state, they have a violent public opposition. In particula
16 they mentioned the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant which
17 itself has a hazardous waste incinerator. It was permitted
18 within nine months after the application was received by th
19 State of Missouri.
20 I don't mean to suggest that the permitting is a
21 sure thing. I can only tell you what the State has said. M
22 impressions of the area down there are that public oppositio

1 would not be significant, if any at all, and that the state
2 and the post have a very cooperative relationship that will
3 allow permitting to proceed as quickly as can be expected;
4 however, I cannot find anybody that would promise that this
5 will be a sure thing.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't understand your
7 last sentence.
8 LTC DUFFY: I'm sorry, sir?
9 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't hear your last
10 sentence.
11 LTC DUFFY: What I said was that I cannot guarantee
12 100 percent and neither can the state, that this facility
13 will be built in the four-year time frame that they think it
14 can, nor that there will be no public opposition.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I can guarantee there's going to
16 be public opposition to it from my experience in the real
17 world. I know you're not quite finished your first
18 presentation.
19 But this is an issue that we've been living with
20 and I've been living with for three years, and this
21 Commission for the last three-and-a-half or four months.
22 feel very, very strongly about it, so I'm not going to bring

1 a motion myself at this particular time, but I'd like to open
2 a discussion.
3 It basically goes as follows. In 1991, the
4 Department of Defense, the Army recommendation was to close
5 the CDTF, close McClellan, keep Anniston open, and rid the
6 free world of the only live agent training capability that
7 I'm aware of or anybody is aware of. Indeed, it might be the
8 only, at the present time, functioning live agent training
9 facility in the entire world.
10 We, the Commission, rejected the proposal of the
11 Army in 1991, and the Army wasn't very pleased with that,
12 simply because they are always, as all the services,
13 correctly want to justify their actions and their proposals.
14 Then it was a surprise to me that they, in fact, backed down
15 from their 1991 position.
16 We heard the Army testify in lockstep that, indeed,
17 a CDTF facility, live agent training facility and
18 decontamination facility, is essential, and is imperative;
19 that it's more important for the instructors than anybody
20 else, because obviously, all recruits can't go through this
21 facility but it is a major component, and that they had erred
22 in making that recommendation in 1991.

1 In 1993, this year, their proposal is saying,
2 "We'll keep the CDTF open but, in essence, close down
3 everything else. Move the smoke training to Leonard Wood.
4 Separate the chemical school by moving that out, moving out
5 the DOD Polygraph Institute, and leaving just the facility,
6 the live agent training facility."
7 As far as I'm concerned, they have it half right
8 now, but they still don't have it all right, because I'm very
9 concerned about a number of things. One is the fact that I
10 don't have great confidence -- and the Army and I, as an
11 individual, agree that live agent training is important.
12 I don't have any great confidence that it can
13 possibly stay or will stay if the chemical school and the
14 CDTF training is bifurcated and one is in one location and
15 one is in another. That leads, as I said, the very competent
16 people at Fort Leonard Wood and their and the community
17 to come back and say, "No problem. We will be the permitting
18 to build one of these facilities."
19 Now, a decade ago or more, it took six to seven
20 years and today, with the increased environmental sensitivity
21 that communities have, with the great flexibility given to,
22 and properly, I suppose, latitude given to plaintiffs to sue

1 and tie up all sorts of important public works projects
2 throughout the land for decades.
3 I remember in my State of New Jersey, an interstate
4 highway wasn't completed for 25 years, and a highway is far
5 different than a CDTF, than chemical, live agent
6 capabilities, so it seems to me that if a community, not for
7 any fault of its own, not because there was official public
8 resistance to it but private individual resistance
9 manifesting itself in all sorts of litigation.
10 And, therefore, difficult funding questions, can
11 tie up a road for 20 years or 25 years, in almost any state.
12 not to mention landfills, hazardous waste facilities, burn
13 facilities, throughout this country, it could be an awfully
14 long time before a similar capability is built someplace else
15 and I'm very concerned about that.
16 And, therefore, it seems to me if you want to err,
17 you err on the side of giving our men and women the type of
18 training that everybody recognizes they need. Don't
19 bifurcate these two capabilities and make sure that they
20 exist. To me, it's not a pro Fort McClellan argument. It's
21 a pro-recruit argument and Army argument and Air Force
22 argument.

1 It's for our men and women in uniform that we want
2 this capability and I just don't want to do anything
3 conscience to degrade it. I think separating it will c
4 it and possibly lead to its demise, which the Army and ma
5 of us agree with at this particular time that it should no
6 happen.
7 Also, I'm concerned. I know there's conflicting
8 information the Commission received with regard to Fort
9 Leonard Wood and its capability with regard to smoke
10 training. Ed, I believe that -- I mean, we had testimony
11 week and then we had the harshest letter you'd ever heard,
12 you repeated to me that you'd ever seen, where the Army
13 criticized, I guess, the commanding officer.
14 MR. BROWN: It was from the Commander of Fort
15 Leonard Wood to the Commander of Fort McClellan, Mr.
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay. So, there's an internal
18 disagreement with respect to that, and I don't know who t
19 believe with regard to the smoke training at Leonard Wood
20 the present time.
21 Also, I'm concerned about the economic impact and I
22 know it's a smaller criterion and we want to make sure th

1 it's given its proper weight and it doesn't have the weig
2 of military criteria, but it seems to me that in this
3 community, what we're telling this community is that what
4 we're going to do is to close the base, in essence.
5 We're going to remove the jobs and the revenue
6 stream from the community and what we're leaving is a
7 Chemical Defense Training Facility, live agent training
8 facility, and a bunch of chemical weapons that have to be
9 milled, so it's the worst of all worlds.
10 I've said earlier in this process and I've said it
11 today and I've kept my mind open, and I will listen to
12 other Commissioners. The deliberative process requires
13 but it seems to me that it's the worst of all scenarios
14 to me to tell a community you're not only closing their
15 base, but partially you can't use it because that
16 remainder is that which is the community's America heal
17 health, and that is chemical weapons and chemical
18 decontamination training facilities.
19 [illegible] from the standpoint of the economics of that
20 don't know what all that land could be used for. On the
21 argument of military value and the degradation of the ty
22 training, I'm fearful. Based on those two arguments,

1 very strongly that the Commission would be making a mis
2 if they accepted the Army's recommendations, even though
3 came a long way from 1991. They're getting close, but
4 think these two capabilities should be co-located, and
5 guess I've said enough at the present time.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, may I add on to
7 what you have said? I think one of the things that thi
8 Commission has a responsibility, as we address the list
9 was presented to us, and the first four criteria are mil
10 value. I think you spoke very dramatically and correct
11 the military value of an existing facility, the only on
12 know of in the free world and I have to agree with you.
13 probably the only one in the world.
14 It hasn't been too long ago when this nation
15 agonized with a potential threat for a chemical enviro
16 of our troops a half a world away, and the fact that we
17 an opportunity, at least, to train and to build that t
18 force up to understand how to operate in that type of
19 environment.
20 If we loose this training facility, I think the
21 next time it is going to be needed, we will not have
22 much leeway and I think we will be in a much worse pos

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you very much. There's a couple of other things I want to mention and that is, I can see, I mean, the State of Alabama making the argument. Now, this facility is either grandfathered or permitted in Alabama, but I am quite sure since it was permitted and created and became a reality, the environmental standards of Alabama are getting more strict, just like they are anyplace else.

It wouldn't surprise me if based on the fact that there's now a substantial changed use of that facility that even Alabama, if the CDTF was left there and nothing else, that the State of Alabama would want a reconsideration of the permitting process and reconsideration as to whether this type of use is consistent with the new, now upgraded environmental standards that properly the State of Alabama now has. That is something that concerns me, as well.

Finally, I know that this decision costs money and the Commission's function, as much as anything else, is to save money. I know that, by virtue of not closing Fort McClellan, at least at the present time, and the requirement that these two capabilities, the school and the CDTF, be collocated, means $25-30 million per year. At least, those

are the numbers that were brought to my attention.

But I feel so strongly about the fact that we are duty bound to give the very best capabilities to our men and women in uniform, who are charged with the responsibility of going out in battle and the battlefield may, in the future, contain chemical agents, that it's worth the cost.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. McPherson.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I feel like the guy who said, "Outside of that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?" I mean, after these very powerful statements, what is the Army's rationale? COL Duffy, if you'd take a few minutes to make the Army's case, it ought to go [illegible] the record.

LTC DUFFY: [illegible] conversations with various people in the Army, the communication we've received from the Director of the Army Basing Study [illegible] Dallard, there seem to be two reasons. One is that initially, in 1991, the CDTF would start to be a luxury that the Army could no longer afford. It was not that it was not a requirement. It was a requirement.

Everybody recognizes the value of such a facility but when all the requirements were put together, it could not

be afforded. Many important requirements end up being unfunded.

The second thing is the reason it may have fallen below the cut line, if you will, is that the importance never really was studied. It was only after the '91 Commission that the Army asked the Health Services Command to do a study, which they did, and it was a very detailed study. It involved physiological testing in order to make assumptions about a person's competence level, et cetera, which they did, that conclusively proved that the confidence of a soldier is raised.

Again, these are the soldiers that train the trainers. These are not the soldiers that actually are out there on the front lines, but those are the ones that are training the ones going to the front lines.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Why do they want to move it to Leonard Wood? Why is the recommendation before us to move it to Leonard Wood?

LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation?

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I mean the '93 recommendation. Why is that here before us?

LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation was to

leave the Chemical Defense Training Facility mothballed at Fort McClellan in 1991. In 1993, initially, the Army studi the option of moving this to Fort Leonard Wood together wit the chemical school, realizing they should be collocated. I do not know the reason why, but at some point in the decisi process from the documents we've been provided, it was decided to leave it at Fort McClellan.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But a bigger question is: Why move it to Fort Leonard Wood? As I understand the Arm position, very legitimately wanted to take care of the synergism between chemical, military police, engineering, a all that.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: That's the reason it was given to us a few weeks ago.

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, these are the --

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Would you address that?

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. These three branches are the combat support arms that are the direct support for the fighting force, the infantry, the armor, et cetera. They ar side by side with them somewhere on the battlefield. They are also the maneuver combat support elements versus those that are fairly stationary or fixed, so they are peas in a

pod, if you will. There is a synergy to collocating them because their operations, military operations, entail a combined arms approach.

The engineer depends on the chemical branch and vice-versa. All of us depend on the military police. Ther is an opportunity here for the combat support arms to develo joint combat support doctrine, to test it at Fort Leonard Wood and by so doing, increase the readiness of the forces. That's the real value of collocating these schools.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And that is a genuine value, in your mind?

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. As an engineer, I can tell you that is a value.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: All right. So, if it were possible to have these three collocated, those three, training engineers and military police and chemical, in th same place, and to have the chemical facility with them, th would be the ideal situation?

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, it would.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The problem here is that if you leave behind the chemical weapons, the problem the Chairman has been addressing is that if you leave behind th

chemical weapons and move the chemical training, that sooner or later, the emphasis on chemical training will dissipate and if, indeed, it is ever possible to build the facility for the chemical weapons in Missouri, it's going to be some time before that can be done, quite a long time. Is that right?

LTC DUFFY: Sir, again, this is an opinion. This is an opinion based on documents we've received, a careful study by the State of Missouri, my discussions with people in the State of Missouri. I am left with the impression that the facility can be built.

Similar facilities have been built in the State of Missouri, facilities more onerous than this facility, without much public opposition. I use the example of Lake City Army Ammunition Plant because it's a military facility. Military facilities tend to gather a lot of attention just by their nature.

This facility burns explosive matter. It releases, it has the potential which will release hazardous chemicals into the atmosphere. During the permitting process for that facility, a public hearing was requested. In that public hearing, four questions were received from the public. Those questions were successfully answered.

From what I gather, the state requires technology that will produce a 99.5 percent pure product outside of the stack. I think there's a lot of confidence in the state's ability to ensure that the environment is taken care of by the public, so I personally have not yet found the reason to doubt the fact that it could be built. I can't foresee the future, but I have searched and I have just not found it yet.

Now, that is owing, of course, for the bias, naturally, of the State of Missouri for the people in that region.

COMMISSIONER STUART: Brian, your answer to Mr. McPherson really is that there are advantages of collocation and as you've shown on your chart, the collocation saves money. The Army has basically recommended that the training, except for the live agent training, be given at Fort Leonard Wood.

So, my question really is not taking a back seat to the Chairman's concern about live chemical training, because I think the poor man's nuclear bomb is probably the chemical warfare, and I think it's tremendously important that we maintain this capability, but I do sense that it would be a greater cost effectiveness and long-run, that it would be a better solution if we were to accept the Army's

recommendation to close the McClellan base, providing that we can maintain that capability for live agent training.

It seems to me that's where the point of disagreement is. I think we're all deeply concerned about the maintenance of this capability. Wouldn't it be possible to support the recommendations of DOD and, at the same time, condition it upon having secured the environmental approvals that are necessary, to make sure that we maintain the capability if, as the Chairman has brought out, it sometimes takes longer than we think?

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: As Brian mentioned earlier, sir, it will require at least two years to get that permitting and I'm prepared in a few minutes to offer a motion which would require the Army to get the permitting before they bring it back to BRAC '95. Nothing would happen before then, anyway, and then there would be no question about whether it could be moved or not.

In visiting Fort McClellan and listening to everyone and reading all the expert advice we've gotten, I'm convinced that the school and the live agent test facility must be together, if it's going to do what's needed, not only for our country but internationally.

It's an international asset to have those two together and operating, and I believe that we ought to keep it at Fort McClellan and ask the Secretary to have the Army gain the permits before they bring it up again in '95, if they desire. That will take care of all the concerns that we have.

It also will take away the what-ifs. It will take away -- maybe Missouri doesn't want it or someone else doesn't want it. I'm prepared to make a motion when you're ready, Mr. Chairman.

LTC DUFFY: Sir, if I may just mention something about the permitting process, the permitting process starts with the permission to build. That generally takes from nine to 14 months. At that point, then, you can build.

The second permit is the important one which takes place after construction and that is the operational test permit. That is where they ensure that the technology installed in the incinerator actually does clean by byproducts to the state standard. That is the difficult one, really.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think the first one is the difficult one. There's no doubt in my mind that from a

technological standpoint, given no resistance and all cooperation, the facility can be duplicated. I mean, it built once. It can be built again.

But, whether you get the permit to build, I think is the crucial one and, therefore, I agree with Commissioner Johnson.

COMMISSIONER STUART: I just would like to ask Commissioner Johnson, since our mission is to endeavor to save money, move the process along of cutting back on bases as recommended, and we've heard that collocation is the ultimate answer here, why couldn't we accept the DOD's recommendations subject to assurance that they had the environmental approval and the facilities were in place?

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The problem is, number one, you put the community of Fort McClellan in limbo for many many years, and you don't have a time table. If we go the opposite direction, it will happen just as quickly if they can gain those permits and certifications.

COMMISSIONER STUART: I would like to contend that we keep them on pins and needles, anyway, because logic the Army thinks these should be collocated and they think Leonard Wood is the place to go.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Stuart, it's my understanding that in the recommendation by DOD, it was to move the CDTF. It was to move the other facilities.

COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: My understanding in your suggestion right now is to also incorporate moving the C

COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me mention something about doing something subject to. My only concern there is found from experience that unless our motions are dra carefully, with no weasel words whatsoever, no discret totally, clearly defined, they're going to be -- the recommendations are not going to be followed or they ne to be tied up in court forever.

I found that experience with respect to Fort Ord California when the intention of the Commission was to do things, and it turned out because we weren't artful and careful in our language, something else occurred.

Also, when you say "subject to," there's going to be, I think, arguments as to how long that contingency there. There's going to be legal arguments and I think perhaps, with merit that this Commission's job was to a

or reject the recommendations of the services with rega specific closures and realignments and, if we have to, other recommendations, but not to do things subject to f actions.

I have problems with that in the sense that I'm not sure that is within the parameters of what Congress int by giving us this responsibility.

COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, Mr. Chairman, you wanted us to be fiercely independent.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, I did.

COMMISSIONER STUART: I submit that at Fort Ord, we made that decision in '91 and we got the largest part of decision made. We have objected and been concerned in discussing the Presidio, which will come up later, that kept more of that than was necessary, but basically, we that decision and it stuck.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, it's going to stick because we're going to revisit the question later on week. Words in motions -- this is my opinion and it m be others, but I want our work to be so clear, so cond because if we, in one motion, have the words "subject

22 and the next motion we're going to have the words "contingent

upon," and the next motion, it's going to be based on words such as "subsequent to," and I don't think those are the
3 types of scenarios that we should get involved with.
4 I think we have to make decisions that are clear
5 cut based on all the information we have today rather than on
6 events that may or may not take place in the future. I think
7 that's the cleanest way to do it and in the perfect world, if
8 we were both the Congress and the Executive Branch and the
9 Secretary of Defense, I wouldn't mind those words, and the
10 courts.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: The reason I'm concerned
12 about GEN Johnson's proposal is we're postponing a decision.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, we're not postponing
14 anything. My belief is that we should reject the Department
15 of Defense's recommendations. If the Department of Defense
16 feels strongly that McClellan is closed or should be closed,
17 they should get their ducks in order with regard to the
18 collocation of these facilities before they come back to
19 another Commission.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And that's what I propose in
21 my motion, sir, when you're ready.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I empathize with Commissioner

1 Stuart but I agree with the Chairman.
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, let me very
3 quickly talk about the difficulty any time you are talking
4 about moving munitions, any time you are talking about trying
5 to re-locate a chemical environment, you not only have to go
6 through the existing state, but you have to get permits from
7 each and every state that is adjacent or that you're going
8 through, and those permits are extremely difficult to get.
9 This is a very, very difficult thing.
10 This country is fortunate that we happen to have a
11 facility that is operational and was there when we needed it
12 not too long ago.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: [illegible] further discussion before I
14 entertain a motion.
15 [illegible]
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson, do you
17 have a motion? [illegible] indicated you may have a motion.
18 MOTION
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir. I move that the
20 Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated
21 substantially from the force structure plan and final
22 criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan.

1 Alabama.
2 Therefore, the Commission rejects the
3 recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to close Fort
4 McClellan, relocate U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police
5 Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to
6 Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
7 It also rejects transfer accountability of Pelham
8 Range and other required training support facilities through
9 licensing to the Army National Guard, and rejects retaining
10 an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves and retaining the
11 capability for live agent training at Fort McClellan.
12 The Commission does recommend, if the Secretary of
13 Defense wants to move the Chemical School and the Chemical
14 Defense Training Facility in the future, that the Army pursue
15 all the required permits and certifications from the new site
16 prior to the 1995 Base Closure process.
17 The Commission finds this recommendation is
consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I second.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion has been seconded by

22 Commissioner Bowman. Any discussion on the motion?

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could I --
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Absolutely.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: I have a variation, a second
4 motion, an alternative, and basically, it is what I've been
5 discussing, collocation subject to the CDTF closure being
6 accomplished with the Army getting the permits in accordance
7 with the environmental laws and regulations of Missouri. So
8 shall I read the --
9 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart, I'm having a
10 hard time hearing you. Are you making a motion now or are
11 you discussing your alternative motion? I thought I heard
12 you say that you were discussing a possible alternative, and
13 I might suggest that before you actually make a second
14 motion, that there be a vote on the first that is pending.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you, Counsel. I
16 appreciate it. That would simplify things and simplify my
17 life quite a bit, but I think what we said in the very
18 beginning, that if a Commissioner felt compelled to offer a
19 substitute motion, the substitute motion would be recognized,
20 if it has a second, seconded; there would be discussion; and
21 then the vote would be on the substitute then followed by the
22 original motion.

1 MS. CHESTON: Perhaps I'm just having a hard time
2 hearing him. I didn't hear him say that what he's doing is
3 amending the first motion.
4 COMMISSIONER STUART: No, I'm offering a substitute
5 motion.
6 MS. CHESTON: Offering a substitute motion.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart is offering
8 a substitute motion which, of course, will require a second.
9 Commissioner Stuart, do you want to read your substitute
10 motion?
11 MOTION
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: The language is lengthy, but
13 I'll read it.
14 I move the Commission find the Secretary of Defense
15 deviated substantially from Criteria 1 and 4 and, therefore,
16 the Commission adopted the following recommendation.
17 Close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and
18 other required training support facilities to be licensed
19 through the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support
20 the U.S. Army Reserves, relocate the Chemical and Military
21 Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, close the
22 Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan and

1 construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood,
2 subject to the CDTF closure being accomplished and the
3 permits secured by the Army, in accordance with environmental
4 laws and regulations, and following this, relocate the
5 Defense Polygraphic Institute to another location determined
6 by the Department of Defense.
7 The Commission finds this recommendation is
8 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion,
10 to the substitute motion?
11 (No response.)
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no second to the
13 substitute motion. The motion fails. Any further discussion
14 on the original motion, the original motion made by
15 Commissioner Johnson?
16 (No response.)
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No further discussion. We will
18 call for a vote, and we will start to my far right with
19 Commissioner Peter Bowman.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
21 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."

22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.

1 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
2 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
5 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Courter votes "aye."
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: No.
10 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "nay."
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Commissioner Byron.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
17 The motion is to reject the Secretary of Defense's
18 recommendation with respect to Fort McClellan, Alabama. The
19 vote on the motion is six in favor, one opposed. The motion
20 passes.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, why don't you
22 proceed?

1 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, at Tab
2 3, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Lee,
3 Virginia. Fort Lee was added for further consideration on
4 May 21st.
5 Slide 16 pictorially shows the option under
6 consideration, the closure of Fort Lee, the relocation of
7 Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster School and
8 Center, and the Army Logistics Management College to Fort
9 Eustis, Virginia, and the Defense Commissary Agency to
10 Quantico, Virginia.
11 Slide 17 shows the relative locations of Fort Lee,
12 Fort Eustis and Quantico. Mr. John Graham will now discuss
13 Fort Lee. It's in your book at Tab 3.
14 MR. GRAHAM: Slide No. 18 shows the static
15 information for Fort Lee. What I'd like to do is highlight
16 the bottom line. The one-time cost for this proposal would
17 be a little over $529 million, a steady state savings of 28.5
18 million and the payback would be in excess of 100 years.
19 Next slide.
20 These are the issues that staff has reviewed in
21 regards to Fort Lee. I'd like to go through each of them and
22 I'll start on the next charts. Next slide. First off is

1 military value. Fort Lee was ranked 11 of 13 within its
2 category of Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools by the
3 Army.
4 The community argued that it was a multi-purpose
5 installation, that it was both command and control,
6 professional schooling, as well as initial entry training
7 and, therefore, should be viewed from the other Initial Entry
8 Training/Branch Schools, that it was more than a training
9 center.
10 Our review showed that the primary mission of Fort
11 Lee is the training of soldiers, noncommissioned officers and
12 officers, and that the Army did treat it fairly and it was
13 consistent in its assignment of installations to this
14 category, and it was ranked fairly against the others, so the
15 11 of 13 is a valid military value assessment.
16 The second issue is that of combat service support
17 training consolidation. The Army has consolidated some of
18 its combat service support training at Fort Lee, most notably
19 in officer training. It is also finalizing plans to
20 consolidate combat developments, doctrine developments and
21 training developments and standardization at Fort Lee.

22 Lieutenant General Wakefield, the Commanding

1 General at Fort Lee, under whose command this initiat
2 ongoing, stated that this initiative would save the Ar
3 million a year.
4 Our review of what has happened at Fort Lee shows
5 that there is a consolidation ongoing of the officer course
6 and that there is in development, but not yet approved by t
7 Department of the Army or Department of Defense, a plan to
8 consolidate the training and doctrine development at Fort
9 Lee, and there will be considerable savings from this
10 consolidation.
11 The third issue is unique facilities. The Army
12 argues that there are four unique facilities, truly unique
13 facilities on Fort Lee. The first is the Petroleum Traini
14 Facility, which was opened in 1993. This is new. It's an
15 environmentally safe facility where we train -- we, the
16 nation -- train soldiers and Marines in inland distributio
17 of petroleum and bulk petroleum storage.
18 The second facility that the Army claims is unique
19 is water purification training where they train all of the
20 Army soldiers on how to purify water, which, as we found o
21 in the Gulf War, is a vital requirement.
22 The Battle Support Center is a computer-assisted

1 wargaming center, which has the capability to be uplinked
2 worldwide organizations from Korea to Germany, and it sav
3 money from bringing the soldiers to a central location to
4 this type of training. The second is as part of the Arm
5 Logistics Management Staff College, there is a satellite
6 education uplink at the center.
7 Our review shows that two of these are truly
8 unique. The POL training facility is the only one in DOD
9 that does this type of inland distribution and bulk stor
10 training and the water purification training facility
11 only one within the Army and would have to be replicat
12 The other two, the Battle Support Center and the
13 Satellite Education Center, are not as unique in that the
14 are not one of a kind, but since they are part of the
15 instructional requirements for the activities at Fort Lee
16 they would have to be replicated wherever we decided to r
17 those organizations from Fort Lee.
18 Next slide, Mark. The Army stated that the
19 Combined Arms Support Command, which is the headquarters
20 Fort Lee and is also the command and control element for
21 of the combat service support schools within the Army, t
22 Quartermaster's School, the Army Logistics Management

1 College, and associated activities, all needed to be
2 collocated at a given installation.
3 The Defense Commissary Agency and the Troop Support
4 Agency, the Troop Support Agency was the Army predecesso
5 the Defense Commissary Agency, it is slowly going out of
6 business but until it does, they need to be collocated.
7 remaining units can go anywhere that we can find room fo
8 them on an Army or other service installation.
9 Our analysis showed that the collocations stated by
10 the Army were reasonable, that you do get some synergies
11 collocating the activities stated. You reduce the overl
12 in instructional requirements. You don't have to duplic
13 any classrooms or other training facilities by collocat
14 those activities.
15 The next item is tenant synergy, which goes along
16 with the collocation. What we're really saying is that
17 exists between these units that need to be collocated.
18 mentioned, they share instructional staff. They shar
19 facilities, and that's the DOD position, and we found
20 also was reasonable.
21 However, if you move the Quartermaster School, the

22 Army Logistics Management Staff College, and the Combined

Arms Support Command to another combat service support
2 training facility, you'll gain some additional efficiencies
3 just for those same reasons. You'll be able to reduce the
4 instructional requirement for overhead and also be able to
5 share in the training facilities.
6 RC tenants. On the post, there is a United States
7 Army Reserve Center and several reserve component units do
8 train at Fort Lee. The Army's intention is not to try to
9 carve out an RC enclave at Fort Lee if Fort Lee is directed
10 to be closed. There are other posts within the Virginia
11 area, Forts Pickett, A.P. Hill, Eustis itself, where these
12 units could be relocated, both for stationing and for
13 training purposes.
14 Now, the one thing that the community did mention
15 about this is that Fort Lee was used for mobilization in
16 Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Over 6,000 people came
17 through Fort Lee en route to the Gulf but, again, we found
18 that you can mobilize individual reservists or units at any
19 of those locations that I mentioned. It does not have to be
20 at Fort Lee.
21 Slide 22. Infrastructure. The Army stated that
22 they had spent over $31 million in the last 15 years on

1 infrastructure improvements on post. This is everything from
2 installing fiber optics telephones, burying the utilities, a
3 new water system, those types of things.
4 The communities in the surrounding area stated that
5 they had invested heavily in new schools, new utilities,
6 particularly in water and sewer capacity, to meet the
7 requirements of the population at Fort Lee.
8 Our findings are if Fort Lee is closed, there will
9 be an impact on the local community. They will have schools
10 that will not be fully utilized or may have to close, and
11 they will also have excess capacity in their utilities until
12 a re-use can be found for the facilities on Fort Lee.
13 The final issue is the closure of Fort Lee would be
14 a change to the 1988 Commission. The '88 Commission
15 recommended, and the Army has implemented, the movement of
16 the Supply and Food Service Specialist training from Fort
17 Jackson and Fort Dix, respectively, to Fort Lee, and that
18 they have spent about $16 million in military construction to
19 accommodate these changes.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: John, could I interrupt
21 you? We're behind time and I was just thinking, in looking
22 at this, the break-even year on this is 2099?

1 MR. GRAHAM: Plus, over 100 years.
2 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Plus? Mr. Chairman, I
3 don't think we need to talk about this anymore.
4 MR. GRAHAM: Any time you want to stop me, feel
5 free, sir.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I appreciate that. That's the
7 Chair's sentiment and I know is Commissioner Stuart's
8 sentiment, as well. Is there anything, any questions of
9 Commissioners? We, in good faith, wanted to check this out
10 to see if there was any further opportunities for savings and
11 anticipating that which we did, of course, with respect to
12 McClellan.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman?
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The gentlelady is recognized.
15 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Do we have to do anything to
remove it from the list to be looked at and compared?
CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, there's no motion. It dies.
The Department of Defense's recommendations prevail.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I just wanted to take
20 exception with one thing you said, John. You stated that 11
21 out of 13 was the proper categorization. I happen to

22 disagree with that in the sense that a maneuver base, by

1 means of its large real estate, got many, many more points
2 than Fort Lee did and therefore, Lee went down on the list.
3 I think that the Army needs to pursue next time a better wa
4 of evaluating that or highlighting that, one or the other,
5 because --
6 MR. GRAHAM: Sir, after our trip there, I did take
7 your concerns back to the Army Basing Study to talk about
8 multi-purpose installations and I don't know how they'll wor
9 it out, but I did take those concerns back to them.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Yes, that's my only concern.
11 Otherwise, I totally agree with you, Commissioner McPherson
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you. Any further
13 discussion?
14 (No response.)
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll just move on. There's
16 lack of a motion. The recommendations of the Department of
17 Defense which was to keep Fort Lee prevail. Mr. Brown.
18 MR. BROWN: At Tab 4, Mr. Chairman, we have the
19 next category that will be discussed, Professional Schools.
20 The map, Slide 25, and the accompanying chart, Slide 26, sho
21 the names and locations of the Army's five professional
22 school installations.

1 At Tab 5, we have the next installation to be
2 discussed, the Presidio of Monterey, to include the Presidi
3 of Monterey Annex. The Army recommended the closure of the
4 Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex to
5 the Secretary of Defense but he removed the recommendation
6 from the list prior to submitting it to the Commission
7 because of the potential impact on intelligence activities.
8 The Commission added the Presidio of Monterey in
9 its March 29th hearing and clarified its motion on May 21st
10 by also adding the Presidio of Monterey Annex. Slide 27
11 pictorially shows the option under consideration; that is,
12 the relocation of the Defense Language Institute Foreign
13 Language Center from the Presidio of Monterey to Fort
14 Huachuca, where it would be contracted with a university th
15 can provide the training in that area.
16 LTC Duffy will discuss this recommendation.
17 LTC DUFFY: Next slide, please.
18 MR. BROWN: I beg your pardon. The map shows the
19 relative locations of Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of
20 Monterey Annex and Fort Huachuca.
21 LTC DUFFY: Thank you. May I have the next slide,
22 Mark? Before you are the statistics on this recommendation.

1 In the Army's analysis, the first thing I'd like to point ou
2 is that the Presidio of Monterey is 393 acres. The Presidi
3 of Monterey Annex is 1,500.
4 The one-time costs of 155 million with steady state
5 savings of 49 million, approximately, a cumulative economic
6 impact in the Monterey area of 27 percent in addition to si
7 percent from this recommendation alone. The other is from
8 the Fort Ord closure in '91.
9 Next slide, please. These are the three issues I
10 would like to highlight. Next slide, please. The first
11 issue is contracting language training. The DOD position is
12 that a contract study can be done or should be done after the
13 recommendation is voted on by the Commission.
14 The community took exception to that and believes
15 that a contract study is required by law -- not by law, but
16 by Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. The Army
17 position that a study may be required is probably the best
18 position that we have to discuss the ability to contract out
19 language training
20 Such a contract study could take quite a bit of
21 time. Such a contract study could find that DLI actually is

22 a most efficient organization and should remain. Until that

1 study is done, at least, it is the position right now from
2 our analysis that the study is required. We will go with the
3 Army's recommendation.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Brian, let me interrupt you on
5 this. I don't know where you are. Are you on a chart here?
6 You're on 31?
7 LTC DUFFY: This is the first issue.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We are so familiar with this
9 thing we want to just cut right through to --
10 LTC DUFFY: Okay, I can move to the next issue,
11 sir, the Presidio of Monterey Annex?
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: -- to the core, to the core of
13 the apple.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Why don't we just discuss it
15 here, sir?
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, why don't we discuss it?
17 We'll open ourselves up, Brian, to questions from the
18 Commission. Commissioner Johnson, did you want to start out
19 the discussion or questions?
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I, as you, visited the DLI
21 and I believe that DLI offers a unique capability to the
22 Department of Defense. I believe it was placed on the list

1 because of the high cost of operating DLI. Your Commission
2 in '91 closed Fort Ord but kept a catonement open, which grew
3 into quite a catonement and made the cost very, very
4 difficult.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Capital "C" catonement.
6 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We've looked at Fort
7 Huachuca as the alternative and certainly the University of
8 Arizona could eventually build a DLI. It would take a long
9 time. The Presidio of Monterey DLI makes sense, but I
10 believe we need to look at the support structure that
11 supports DLI.
12 I believe that the Navy postgraduate school at
13 Monterey should be tasked to provide operational support to
14 DLI, housekeeping, if you will. The City of Monterey has a
15 very -- seemingly, a very good proposal in to provide that.
16 I recommend that we direct the Navy to provide the support
17 but also direct them to look at the potential of contracting
18 out to the city or some other agency.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me just jump in here. I
20 agree with the analysis of Commissioner Johnson on this, that
21 Arizona, the University of Arizona, Fort Huachuca, could one
22 day be a preeminent Defense Language Institute. There is no

1 doubt in my mind, a great state, dedicated people, good
2 quality of life, but my sense is and my strong feeling is
3 that there's going to be a degradation in language training
4 if this is moved.
5 That reduction in capabilities and degradation and
6 disruption and dislocation will take place for many, many
7 years, and therefore we wanted to look for a cheaper way of
8 doing it where it now exists, and I concur with the fact that
9 the Presidio of Monterey is burdened with the operational
10 overhead that was forced upon it by a catonement area that
11 grew all out of proportion to what the 1991 Commission had
12 contemplated.
13 Therefore, what I like, also, is that which
14 Commissioner Johnson said, and that language with respect to
15 the consolidation of operations support with the Naval
16 postgraduate school, by inter-service agreement, and an
17 evaluation as to whether contracting out is going to be
18 helpful in the future, is, I think, language that should be
19 contained in our motion.
20 On the other hand, and I'm looking for the purpose
21 of the Commissioners Alternate Motion No. 4, and I was

22 reading that. Basically, it says retain the Presidio of

1 Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the Presidio
2 Monterey Annex except the housing, commissary and post
3 exchange, required to support the Presidio of Monterey.
4 What I'm suggesting, and I don't know now without
5 further discussion, that what I'm interested in is a hybri
6 motion between really 2 -- that language in 2 that I
7 mentioned, and Alternative 4.
8 What I don't want, frankly, is more language saying
9 that at the Annex, the DOD or Army should dispose of all
10 unneeded facilities because that's basically, it's my
11 understanding, what we did a couple of years ago, and the
12 definition of what is needed and essential is the thing t
13 got DLI in trouble in the first instance.
14 So, I think we want to be very, very specific.
15 Now, we're not going to get a meets-and-bounds description
16 what should be retained at Ord, but maybe we should have s
17 discussion as to what should be kept there. I know that
18 there is housing that is now being used, is essential for
19 Presidio, as well as for the Navy postgraduate school.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Sir, I'd recommend that we,
21 looking at your paper there at Alternative 2, where it sa
22 dispose of all facilities at the Annex except housing,

1 commissary, post exchange, required to support the Presid
2 of Monterey and Naval postgraduate school and then go on
3 the rest of 2.
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Brian, there is extensive
5 excess housing at the Annex, much more than DLI would nee
6 just an adequate amount?
7 LTC DUFFY: There is the correct amount. The Army
8 actually, when they sized it, sized it for a 3400-studer
9 load.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Then we don't need to tighten
11 housing anymore?
12 LTC DUFFY: No, ma'am. Our calculations show a
13 requirement for 1,045 housing units for the students,
14 faculty, plus the 500 that the Navy requires. I would ha
15 to add that I know you don't want to get too detailed,
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, we want to get very
18 detailed. That's fine. Go ahead.
19 LTC DUFFY: There are some facilities located on
20 that annex that are critical to the quality of life suc
21 the child care center. The capacity of the child care
22 centers on the Peninsula between the Navy and the Army

1 frankly unknown because Fort Ord still exists.
2 While it's downsizing, these facilities are being
3 right-sized. Nobody really knows exactly how much capa
4 you need. Our calculations show that the one child car
5 center on the Presidio of Monterey is not sufficient.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Brian, if I could
7 interrupt you here, I think everybody on this Commissio
8 pretty well agrees, in general terms, with what we want
9 do. We want to stay in the Presidio and we want to get
10 of this load of the Presidio's back that it's been carr
11 for some time, and that made it fiscally unattractive.
12 What I would propose, Mr. Chairman and
13 Commissioners, is that we defer voting on an alternati
14 motion until tomorrow in order to give us, our counsel
15 staff time to draft the resolution that will express w
16 think we all agree to, rather than go through a long p
17 of trying to cover each aspect of it today.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think that's a good
19 recommendation. Before we implement that recommendati
20 consider it, and I hope everybody will agree with it,
21 just wondering whether there's anything else we want t

22 squeeze out of this hearing today, so tomorrow we're just

basically -- you know, I want to have this evening the language precisely crafted so no one can misunderstand it. If a child care center has to be placed in it, we specifically mention the child care center.

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman?

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I don't mean to craft it on the spot here, but I think it can be done very simply by taking Scenario No. 2 under the first bullet to say, "Keep the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the POM Annex except those agreed to as essential by the Defense Language Institute and the Naval Postgraduate School."

CHAIRMAN COURTER: No.

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: What you will avoid is us micromanaging, which is unsatisfactory, and you allow the customers, if you will --

MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Bowman, that's exactly what happened in '91.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yeah, that's what happened, and basically, if you leave it in the hands of those people that ideally would like to have as much as possible, you know, we would defeat --

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: What they're really setting themselves up for in '95 is the same stuff. I didn't have the history behind me to --

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Oh, boy. I want to -- I would love to dispose of the thing in great clarity today, and I like what Commissioner McPherson said, that we work out the precise language so there's no further negotiations, there's no loopholes, there's no flexible language.

We know precisely, number one, DLI stays open; and number two, what it's going to be supported by and nothing else, specifically named. That's my goal.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: Brian, is there currently a clinic at the facility?

LTC DUFFY: Yes, ma'am, there's a Primus Clinic at the Presidio of Monterey, not on the Annex but on the Presidio of Monterey.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: At DLI, so that is not something we should structure in our amendment. Is there anything else in that category we should --

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, if I might suggest the staff be very, very careful on adding things. You know, you add child care and then you want to add

something else and so forth, and pretty soon you get exactly where we are.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: I know.

COMMISSIONER STUART: I think we need to have a very accurate definition. I think we're all concerned about this being expanded to a larger operation, which has been the drag and the reason the original --

COMMISSIONER BYRON: Specifically, we don't want the golf courses. We don't want the stadium, et cetera.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: And excess land should be sold.

COMMISSIONER STUART: Exactly.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: I mean, you can draw the lines. I've seen developers do it and surveyers do it to include two facilities and 80 percent of the vacant land, and we're back to the same problem we were before, and that's what I want to avoid.

And, I think it's going to take some careful drafting to make sure we end up with that which only is needed, so the '95 Commission doesn't come back with the same problem this one is faced with and that is, a good facility that is burdened with the overhead by the Annex.

22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I empathize with that. I

don't think the people that are going to use these facilities are going to make the same mistake again. I really doubt that, and I think we ought to avoid micromanaging in areas that we're not totally competent or won't be competent by the time we have to do this, but I strongly support Commissioner McPherson's proposal.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Brian, did you want to add to this?

LTC DUFFY: Sir, I understand your intent. I think that the recommendation to consolidate is good and there has been the community -- those people who live on the peninsula have all asked for that. DOD is moving towards those types of arrangements.

However, some of these revenue producers that they take away from them means that some of the quality of life facilities will not be available. I don't know how many.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: That's the trap. That's the trap that everybody falls into.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: I agree. That's the trap that everybody falls into.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: There's nothing wrong with contracting out child care.

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, there are many options. I would like to say that I agree with Commissioner Bowman that the Commander on the ground has to be -- is the person who has, I think, the best feel of that.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's continue to discuss it if we want to, but I feel strongly that Commissioner McPherson is right, and I feel absolutely strongly. I agree with Commissioner Johnson on this thing. We simply must not permit discretion because if you do, it's a trap and the same thing will occur.

And they will be burdened with the overhead. There will be another review. Their cost per student will shoot out. Every computer will spit it out all over the Pentagon and they'll be back in the same situation they are today and we don't want that.

They want to be able to leave here tomorrow or when the president signs this thing and the Congress ratifies our work, knowing that that's the end of this, and they are not burdened with nice things, terrific things, but they cannot be burdened with that which is going to make their student costs jut out and create signals and red flags in the future.

COMMISSIONER STUART: The Chairman said it well.

We just want the essential facilities and that should be defined in the resolution we can discuss tomorrow.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion before we table the votes on this matter until tomorrow?

COMMISSIONER BYRON: I don't think we need to discuss it tomorrow. We'll just vote.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: We don't have to discuss it. Well, we'll discuss the specific language after a motion is made and seconded tomorrow. Is there any further discussion on this matter? Does everybody agree -- I don't need a formal motion -- that we defer the motion on the Presidio of Monterey and the Annex until tomorrow?

COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: Yes.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Everyone agrees. We'll move on then, command and control.

MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 6, we have the next category that will be discussed, command and control. The map, Slide 39, and the accompanying chart, Slide 40, shows the names and locations of the Army's 11 command and control installations.

22 The are 12 installations on this chart, and the

1 12th one is the Presidio of San Francisco. It was not
2 evaluated by the Army since it was closed by the 1988
3 Commission; however, it is included on the chart because
4 there is a DOD recommendation to redirect an activity that is
5 currently at this installation.
6 At Tab 7, we have the next installation to be
7 discussed, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Slide 41 pictorially
8 shows the DOD recommendation; that is, to realign Fort
9 Belvoir, disestablish the Belvoir Research Development and
10 Engineering Center, in the top right-hand block, eliminate
11 six business areas that are within that organization,
12 transfer command and control of six business areas to the
13 Tank Automotive Command -- I beg your pardon, to the Night
14 Vision Engineering Organization at Fort Belvoir, and to
15 relocate five business areas to Detroit Arsenal.
16 Slide 32 shows the relative location of Fort
17 Belvoir and Detroit Arsenal. Mr. John Graham will discuss
18 this recommendation.
19 MR. GRAHAM: Next slide, Mark. This slide depicts
20 both the DOD recommendation which Ed just briefly outlined
21 and the static information about Fort Belvoir. Again, I'd
22 like to call your attention to the bottom line, the one-time

1 cost of 11.3 million, steady state savings of 13.4, and a
2 payback break-even point of 1996 for this recommendation.
3 Next slide is the major areas, issue areas, that
4 I'd like to discuss as we go through. We'll cover each of
5 them in detail but before I go on, one thing I would like to
6 point out is that in the community's argument, they did
7 not -- they supported the actual elimination of the Belvoir
8 Research Development and Engineering Center.
9 Their concerns were with the elimination of three
10 specific business areas, and the movement of the business
11 areas from Fort Belvoir to the Detroit Arsenal. Next slide.
12 The first issue, the first three issues are the elimination
13 of three business areas.
14 The first one is the elimination of the marine
15 craft business area. The DOD position is to eliminate this
16 business area. The Navy will provide the necessary
17 engineering support to the Army for marine craft under a tri
18 service reliance program.
19 This is a DOD initiative to reduce technological
20 bases within the services if there is not a service-unique
21 requirement. DOD's position is that the Navy is the
22 unquestioned lead in marine craft and therefore the marine

1 craft business area at Belvoir is not needed.
2 The community argued that this is a vital Army
3 mission, logistics over the shore, supportive, established
4 ports and coastal harbor/inland waterway support, are all
5 Army missions. They argued that the Army needed to retain
6 its expert acquisition personnel in order to stay current in
7 this. Otherwise, you lose the mission or you will impact on
8 readiness of the Army engineer forces and transportation
9 forces which use these.
10 Our findings are that inter-servicing will create
11 efficiencies. We're trying to end duplication by looking at
12 inter-servicing. This will do that in the marine craft
13 business area. The Army will maintain its acquisition
14 capability through an existing organization which is the
15 Weapons Systems Management for Marine Craft, which is located
16 in St. Louis.
17 The second business area that the community
18 recommended that we should retain and that the Army
19 recommended should be eliminated is construction equipment.
20 The DOD's position, that this is a nondevelopmental item and
21 that's the preferred procurement approach. A

22 nondevelopmental item is you buy it off the shelf,

1 essentially, with maybe some major modifications for m
2 use.
3 The Army's position is that research and
4 development for this will be done by the National Automoti
5 Research and Development Center in Warren, Michigan, and th
6 the acquisition expertise will be provided by the program
7 manager for construction equipment, an already existing
8 organization.
9 Again, the community argued that it should be
10 retained. They stated that the demise of this area will
11 result in Army forces using old and obsolete equipment
12 because there is not anybody overseeing the research,
13 development or acquisition.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Who is the community you
15 keep referring to?
16 MR. GRAHAM: It was Representative Moran and Mr.
17 Lovelace, sir.
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Lovelace is who?
19 MR. GRAHAM: He was the former director of the
20 Belvoir Research Development and Engineering Center.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, really, you're talking
22 about the development community when you say community?

1 MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: And the Congressman who
3 represents that area?
4 MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am. We found that the Army
5 plan will end duplication in this effort. They already ha
6 folks who are doing the acquisition, and that the eliminat
7 will not hurt Army readiness, because they will maintain t
8 capability.
9 Elimination of topographic business areas, again,
10 it's a nondevelopmental item. The Army buys the stuff
11 the shelf, is their argument, and that the program manage
12 for specific weapons systems, such as artillery pieces.
13 routinely include this type of equipment in their project
14 when they go out for bid and final development of the weap
15 system itself.
16 They further argue that state-of-the-art equipment
17 is available from the civilian sector, and that the commun
18 argued to retain it because, again, it would cause old an
19 obsolete equipment and would impact on the readiness of A
20 forces. We found that this would not be the case, since t
21 do now rely on civilian industry and they will retain the
22 capability to do acquisition, that the readiness of the A

1 would not be impacted. Next chart.
2 The movement of the five business areas to Detroit
3 Arsenal, the DOD position is to move them from Belvoir to
4 Detroit. Collocation will facilitate concurrent enginee
5 of land force vehicles, and their bottom line position is
6 that costs are minimal to the overall savings, because yo
7 get a synergy by collocating similar business areas with
8 those that already exist in Detroit.
9 The community argued that it needed to be retained
10 at Fort Belvoir and that the Army intent could be achieve
11 establishing a high speed data line between Detroit and
12 Belvoir, to give real world command and control, real ti
13 data transfer.
14 We think that additional efficiencies will be
15 gained by the collocation; however, if you do not move
16 business areas, there's a $9 million savings due primari
17 the transportation and construction costs that will be
18 required in Detroit.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: I'm sorry, John. If we don't
20 move these?
21 MR. GRAHAM: Yes.

22 COMMISSIONER COX: The Army has recommended that we

move them?
MR. GRAHAM: Right.
COMMISSIONER COX: If we don't move them, it saves us $9 million?
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am, for one-time costs.
COMMISSIONER COX: For one-time costs.
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER COX: And we still get the same savings --
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am, roughly the same savings.
COMMISSIONER COX: -- we would have gotten without moving, but basically the Army argument is that we really need all of these things collocated for military purposes rather than saving?
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am, because from a research development and engineering standpoint, they want to try to streamline it as much as possible. You put them all together. They can form task forces to work on, say, the next armored bridging capability. The chassis is done by an organization that is at Detroit. The actual bridge is done at Belvoir. If you have the engineers in the same location, it just goes a little smoother.

COMMISSIONER COX: Basically, we're paying $9 million to try to get all of this operation together and the synergies that might come from that?
MR. GRAHAM: To bring them together, yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: There certainly is great synergism in doing that.
COMMISSIONER COX: Right.
MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: It should have been done from the get-go.
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir, and I think the Army is trying to correct that mistake, sir. The last issue is just the cost. The community stated that the Army had under estimated the cost of 11.3, and it would probably be closer to 26.
In our review, when we looked at what the Army was doing, the Army is going to go to Detroit, renovate facilities that are up there that are existing and empty. The community estimate is built on all new military construction. That's the big difference between those two numbers.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman, I have a

motion.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson has a motion.

MOTION

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I move that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. I presume I have to read this thing.
Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: Dis-establish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; eliminate the Tunnel Detection Materials Marine Craft; Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas.
Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter-Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel Lubricant business areas to the Tank Automotive Research Development Engineering Center, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan.
Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power Remote Mine Detection Utilization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost

22 Low Observables business areas -- I wish there were an

acronym for all of this -- to the Night Vision Electro-Optic Directorate of the Communications, Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
COMMISSIONER STUART: My only question is, Mr. McPherson, are you pushing for more acronyms?
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
COMMISSIONER COX: Second.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion has been moved and seconded. Is there any discussion on the motion?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Hearing no desire for discussion on the motion, we'll start out with Commissioner Rebecca Cox.
COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes aye.
MS. CHESTON: The Chair votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart?
COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart voted "aye."

MS. CHESTON: Thank you. I didn't hear that. Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye." On the motion to accept the Secretary's recommendation on Fort Belvoir, Belvoir, Virginia, the vote is seven in favor, zero opposed. The motion passes.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Presidio of San Francisco. By way of background, let me just mention that in 1988, I believe it was 1988, there was, as we know, a Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, although I don't think it was called precisely that. That Commission was configured somewhat differently than this one.
The Commissioners were appointed by the Secretary of Defense without confirmation. They met in Washington

someplace, didn't visit any facilities and didn't hold any hearings, but certainly got their job done, and the fact that they came forward with a long list of recommended closures and realignments, and this was one of them.
They recommended closure of the Presidio of San Francisco and it's my recollection that that was supported not only by the Army but by San Francisco, as well, the City of San Francisco. I believe that was the case. In any event, the implementation of that 1988 BRAC decision was deferred as these things do take a period of time, anywhere between two and six years, to implement.
Now we're reaching the time that -- I believe it's the 7th Army?
MR. BROWN: 6th Army, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: 6th Army? Thank you. The 6th Army is about to vacate, and then the land where the Presidio is was taken over by the Department of Interior to be run by the Park Service. Then there are a number of people, including the former Secretary of Defense, Michael Stone, that testified --
MR. BROWN: Army.

22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Army, thank you. Michael Stone.

1 that testified before this Commission when we held a hearing
2 in California, saying that that's not a good idea, the
3 vacating of the 6th Army from the Presidio is not a good
4 idea, and that he thought that the 6th Army should stay. We
5 thought it was an engaging and interesting proposal.
6 His comments were, number one, the Park Service is
7 not equipped to do anything like this before. They deal with
8 parks. This isn't a park. It has hundreds and hundreds of
9 buildings and lots of people stay there. It's basically a
10 town, so they'll find it very difficult.
11 It would be good for the Army to stay because you
12 avoid the cost of moving, number one, and number two, you're
13 there in the San Francisco area in case of a natural
14 catastrophe, i.e., an earthquake, and people would want the
15 6th Army there to help in that type of a contingency.
16 That led us to wonder why, if the Secretary of the
17 Army was disposed to keep the 6th Army there, why he didn't
18 just make it happen when he was Secretary of the Army but be
19 that as it may, we checked with the new Secretary of Defense
20 as to that proposal, because it did, on its face, have some
21 logic to us.
22 It's my understanding that we did receive a

1 communique recently from whom, if the staff could --
2 MR. BROWN: We have received no communique from the
3 Department of Defense, Mr. Chairman. You have a letter today
4 from the Secretary of the Interior.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Secretary of the Interior
6 wrote a letter today seconding -- and I think this letter
7 should go in our record, and we'll make it go in the record,
8 but basically what the Secretary of the Interior indicates is
9 that he supports the retention of the 6th Army at the
10 Presidio of San Francisco; is that correct?
11 MR. BROWN: That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Now, have we received orally any
13 word from the Army? I thought we did.
14 MR. BROWN: We received indications that they would
15 accept the decision by the Commission to stay at the Presidio
16 of San Francisco rather than relocating to old Naval Air
17 Station Moffett now known as NASA/AMES if a suitable lease
18 arrangement to both the Department of the Interior and
19 Department of the Army can be negotiated.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And that letter says that
21 Interior is willing to do that, I believe.
22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, when Presidio of

1 San Francisco was closed, there was in statute of law a
2 legislative initiative by Congressman Burton that states if
3 and when the military vacated the Presidio facilities, they
4 would revert to the Department of Interior, not under the
5 usual process as is the case in many of the other
6 installations that are closed.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: We've done all the
8 commenting. Does the staff have any point of view on this?
9 MR. BROWN: I don't believe so, Commissioner
10 Stuart.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Mr. Chairman, I have a motion.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: All right.
13 MR. BROWN: I think the Commission needs to realize
14 that there is an increased steady state cost if 6th Army
15 stays at the Presidio of San Francisco. It's comparable to
16 what it would be if they relocated to NASA/AMES. The steady
17 state cost is more than it would be if they moved to Fort
18 Carson, which was the original recommendation.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: But that's been scrubbed by
20 the DOD, anyway.
21 MR. BROWN: No, it has not been scrubbed by DOD.

22 They were recommending that, of course, that be the redirect

1 however, it's always the option of the Commission to
2 disapprove that redirect.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: But the point -- I think
4 Commissioner Stuart is right, that the Army thought we shou
5 use Moffett Field.
6 MR. BROWN: That is the recommendation to the
7 Commission, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That has the same steady state
9 costs as does the Presidio?
10 MR. BROWN: Comparable, that's correct, Mr.
11 Chairman.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Comparable, and the advantage in
13 staying at the Presidio is, number one, you don't have to
14 move and, number two, it is as well as AMES at Moffett,
15 located in the San Francisco Bay area.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And, Mr. Chairman, there's
17 a third advantage and it's one that I think the Commission
18 ought to take note of. The General Accounting Office
19 certainly took note in a couple of instances when it looke
20 at these recommendations this year, that the Pentagon, the
21 services, often look at things from a single focus, with a
22 single focus that has to do with their own budget.

1 They don't look at other services and the effect of
2 what they do on other services very often, and they certai
3 don't look outside the Pentagon. Here is a case, I'm
4 persuaded, where the interests of the United States will
5 advanced if we permit the Park Service and the Army to try
6 negotiate some kind of cohabitation at the Presidio.
7 If they can't do it, if they want to load the Army
8 with too much fiscal responsibility and break the bank,
9 the Army in 1995 can very well leave, but at this poin
10 we're talking about the Park Service having responsibi
11 for finding tenants for about 6 million square feet of
12 buildings, and that is something that is going to be
13 really -- it's going to tax them. It will cost the Unite
14 States quite a lot and the area will suffer from it.
15 So, in my judgment, we should permit them an
16 opportunity to work out a lease agreement that will let
17 live together and let the Army continue to play a role a
18 Presidio.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox had a motion, I
20 believe.
21 MOTION
22 COMMISSIONER COX: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I move that

1 the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviat
2 substantially from Criteria 2 and 4 and, therefore, that
3 Commission adopt the following recommendation:
4 The 1988 Commission decision will be changed, to
5 allow only the 6th U.S. Army to remain at the Presidio o
6 Francisco, California. The Department of the Interior a
7 the Department of the Army will negotiate a lease that
8 favorable to both departments for the current facilities
9 occupied by the 6th U.S. Army and family housing at the
10 Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the
11 Headquarters members.
12 If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission
13 expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to
14 1995 Commission for the relocation of the 6th U.S. Army.
15 Commission further recommends that the Defense Commissa
16 Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System deter
17 the commissary and exchange requirements to support 6th
18 Army based on sound business decisions.
19 The Commission finds this recommendation is
20 consistent with the force structure plan and final crit
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?

22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Second.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Second.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion is made and properly seconded. Any discussion on the motion?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Hearing none, we start out with Commissioner Harry McPherson.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
MS. CHESTON: The Chair votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart?
COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson?
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye." The motion is to reject the Secretary's recommendation on the Presidio of San Francisco and, instead, to recommend that the 6th Army remains at Presidio of San Francisco. The vote on the motion is seven in favor, zero opposed. The motion passes.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: For the record, I know there are some people that are keeping this record. I understand there was a second by Commissioner Byron.
COMMISSIONER STUART: Both of them at the same time.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron and others, but Commissioner Byron was the lead person who seconded the motion.
MS. CHESTON: Thank you for clarifying that.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: We're always concerned about the record. Now, let's proceed.
MR. BROWN: At Tab 9, Mr. Chairman, we have the next installation to be discussed. While you all were discussing the Presidio of San Francisco, I was joined by two

new members of the staff. On my left is Mr. Bud Bale, whose job it was to discuss the Presidio of San Francisco. He did such a good job he didn't have to say anything to you all. On his left is MAJ Gary Evans, who is also detailed from the Department of the Army.
Fort McPherson was added for further consideration on May 21st. Slide No. 57 shows the option under consideration; that is, to close Fort McPherson.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me stop you there, Ed, if I may, and we'll recall very well the day that we added McPherson and Gillem on the list and we wanted to, obviously, consider it for an alternative possibility, but there was a great deal of discussion then, and I believe it's correct now, that we at least discuss, not vote but discuss, McPherson and Gillem together, simply because of their collocation and also because of the fact that one helps support the other.
I think what I'd like to do is after we finish McPherson, Fort McPherson, we then take up Fort Gillem and get both of them on our plate.
MR. BROWN: Both of them will be discussed by Gary,

22 Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay.
MR. BROWN: Slide 57 shows pictorially the option that we're looking at which is to close Fort McPherson, mo Forces Command Headquarters, 3rd U.S. Army Headquarters, a the U.S. Army Reserve Command to Fort Sam Houston or Fort Hood. Fort Sam Houston is more economical so we will focu on that one.
Slide 58 shows the relative location of Fort McPherson and Fort Gillem which are almost one dot on that map, as we found out there, in close proximity. This opti looks at, as I said, moving the activities of Fort McPhers to Fort Sam Houston. The option that we will look at Fort Gillem moves 2nd Army Headquarters from Fort Gillem to Fort Stewart, which is also in Georgia.
MAJ Gary Evans will discuss both of these recommendation.
MAJ EVANS: Mark, next slide, please. Sir, this is the Atlanta area and shows the close proximity of the two bases and the proximity of the international airfield there at Hartsfield. Next slide, Mark.
Sir, this is the static installation information. Again, the bottom line is the one-time cost in excess of $29

million and the steady state savings of 32.8 million and th break-even year at 21 years, the year 2014. Next slide, Mark.
These are the three primary issues we focused on. On the left are the two driving issues that we noticed, operational readiness and the cost. Next slide, please. Under operational readiness, Forces Command has got a worldwide mission going on throughout the world.
Their claim is that this mission would be disrupted if a move were put on them at this point in time. Additionally, the Department of the Army has said that Force Command is a major player in the present force structure downsizing and a turbulence would affect that and their pla in that.
As far as the community looks at the operational side, and when I speak of the community, I'm also including the Fort McPherson staff structure. They claim that the three major headquarters there, the Forces Command, 3rd Arm and U.S. Army Reserve Command should all be collocated.
There is a certain synergy involved in that, especially where it works out with force structure and USARC the U.S. Army Reserve Command, but they do a lot of planning

mobilization and contingency purposes for getting the reserves where they need to be during crisis times.
As far as our findings go, there is a case that says Forces Command and the U.S. Army Reserve Command shoul be collocated just for those mobilization purposes. There i another train of thought that 3rd Army should either be collocated with Forces Command or U.S. Central Command, whic is the wartime headquarters, that the 3rd Army would then become the Army component of CENTCOM during the wartime scenario.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And you are recommending that 3rd Army go to Fort Stewart?
MR. BROWN: That was 2nd Army, Commissioner Johnson.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: 2nd Army.
MR. BROWN: 2nd Army. It's one of the Continental United States Armies that stationed at Fort Gillem and headquartered at Fort Gillem.
MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir, that will be discussed with Gillem. Underneath the cost, like we pointed out earlier, it's got a high one-time cost, a steady state savings that

22 causes a break-even year at year 21. The driving point

1 behind the one-time cost is the replication of the new
2 FORSCOM Headquarters building.
3 As we took a tour of that, and I'm sure you caught
4 on, that's a pretty extensive creation they have there, with
5 a lot of high technology underneath. The impression that I
6 got from it is that Forces Command, with their worldwide
7 operations, they need that kind of communications link, so
8 that it's not unreasonable to think that they would want to
9 replicate that headquarters were they to move to another
10 location.
11 As far as the USARC, where we talked about the
12 collocation requirement, if you were to move the U.S. Army
13 Reserve Command along with them, there would be no
14 requirement for additional funds, since they already have a
15 project going to build their headquarters at Fort McPherson,
16 anyway. That would just be a transfer in place.
17 One additional funding requirement that was not a
18 part of the COBRA model that's come up is a need for dual
19 operations if they were to switch from Fort McPherson to Fort
20 Sam Houston. If you recall, during the course of their
21 operations, they said they couldn't move their headquarters
22 during the time of crisis.

1 As a soldier, I would tend to disagree with that,
2 since all along, we jump our headquarters, which is the term
3 we use, whether you're a battalion, a brigade or whatever.
4 What I will agree with, though, in their calculations, is it
5 does require dual equipment. You can't just all of a sudden
6 break down a headquarters, cut out all your communications
7 and move.
8 So, when they say they need a dual communications
9 to set up, they are going to need them both in operation for
10 a short time period and, unfortunately, most of that is sunk
11 cost because they've got to buy or lease the equipment for
12 the duration of the move. Being as that is a lot of
13 communication equipment, over $100 million, it may sound high
14 but for the extent of which they communicate and their
15 computer linkage, that may not be so out of sight.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Isn't it true that 3rd Army
17 has a forward headquarters capability to begin with? Forces
18 Command does not, but they have the capability to operate out
19 of two locations now.
20 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: In fact, they demonstrated
22 that during the Persian Gulf War, didn't they, so that it's

1 really not a big deal?
2 MAJ EVANS: Except that I'm not sure you'd want to
3 tie that requirement down in a CONUS move if there were the
4 possibility of a scenario going on overseas.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I understand, but it's
6 certainly not as difficult as you made it sound.
7 MAJ EVANS: I didn't say it was difficult, sir. I
8 just said it might be expensive. Next chart, please.
9 Sir, here is where we've portrayed the scenarios.
10 The scenario on the left is the status quo, keeping Fort
11 McPherson as is. The scenario on the right is closing it,
12 and moving the three headquarters to Fort Sam Houston.
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: Shall we move along and
14 accept the Chairman's suggestion to look at both of these
15 together?
16 MAJ EVANS: Go right into Gillem?
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes.
18 MAJ EVANS: Okay.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Gary, if I could just make
20 a comment and invite your comment, I don't think I've ever
21 seen a -- I've ever heard a defense of a location of an

22 installation based so much on its proximity to an

1 international airport. It seems kind of odd. Did it
2 to you?
3 MAJ EVANS: Sir, I put that under one of the
4 issues, the Atlanta location. It wasn't a driving factor.
5 That's why I didn't really brief it.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: It seemed that an awful
7 lot of the testimony we were receiving, both in Atlanta and
8 recently up here from when GEN Sullivan spoke to us,
9 immediately after Secretary Aspin and GEN Powell spoke, he
10 zeroed in on this one and spoke about the proximity to the
11 airport. Why is that such a big deal?
12 MAJ EVANS: Well, an issue can be made, sir, in
13 that with FORSCOM having such a large oversight of the
14 forces, the CONUS forces, and the requirement they have for
15 going out and visiting bases, that they have a lot of work
16 with the airlines and they gave to get to places.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: International? I'm sorry. It
18 may be just from an airline standpoint. The point is that
19 it's international or the point is that it's a hub?
20 MAJ EVANS: It's a hub is what it is. They don't
21 have to commute. Being that I was in Hampton, you'd have t
22 catch the commuter flight to D.C. in order to catch a fligh

1 anywhere else in the States.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: So, it's not Atlanta, per se.
3 It would be best if it were close to a hub, basically?
4 MAJ EVANS: right.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Dulles would work just as
6 well, right?
7 COMMISSIONER COX: Dulles or Chicago or Boston or
8 Dallas?
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Excuse me. It seems to me I
10 asked that specific question and the answer that I got,
11 I found absolutely ludicrous was that, "If we weren't in
12 Atlanta, no one would come." Now, that is not really the
13 answer.
14 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: They must be on Delta.
15 (Laughter)
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What is that old thing?
17 When you die and go to heaven, you'll change planes in
18 Atlanta.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I empathize with the
20 requirement but think that it's vastly overblown and
21 exaggerated.
22 MAJ EVANS: As far as the transportation hub, I

1 might tend to agree with you, sir. I guess I would be
2 looking at the communications side, and they look at Atlan
3 as being one of the five -- what they call a Class I
4 communication hub.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That seems to make more
6 sense.
7 MAJ EVANS: That being one of five cities, like I
8 said, there was another chart that went after that issue,
9 like I said, I didn't consider this to be one of the driv
10 factors here. The only other comment I'd make on there i
11 that of those five communication hubs, there's not anothe
12 major installation near one of those that would be readil
13 available.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Do you want us to vote on
15 McPherson or go on to Gillem, sir?
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, let's go on to Gillem and
17 at least get it on the table and then we can discuss th
18 either together or independently and obviously vote on
19 independently.
20 MAJ EVANS: Next chart, Mark. Sir, this is the
21 Scenario 2, Scenario 1 obviously being do nothing. Scena

22 2. Fort Gillem would move 2nd Army to Fort Stewart in

entirety and then the other elements on Fort Gillem would move to the unknown Base "X" at this point in time.
3 One other added note there is that those elements
4 that actually are a part of Fort McPherson residing on Fort
5 Gillem would return to Fort McPherson. Next chart, please.
6 Now, the static installation information. Again, the one
7 time cost for a move, in excess of $370 million and a steady
8 state savings of only 5.6 million. This puts the break-even
9 year at 2094 plus.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Why is the steady state savings
11 so little?
12 MAJ EVANS: In this scenario, sir, there's no
13 elimination of units. There's no elimination or savings of
14 personnel so, therefore, the personnel, in most cases, is
15 usually your driving savings factor and without that, it just
16 doesn't generate much in the way of savings.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I was at Gillem and I mean, I
18 buy totally, completely, 100 percent, the arguments of the
19 Army with respect to McPherson. I think it's a very modern
20 facility. I think there's added value in the collocation
21 argument. I think it's probably overstated that it has to be
22 near Atlanta.

1 I'm convinced that it would be quite costly to move
2 it because of its communications capabilities, and you really
3 don't want those to go down, so you'd be basically building
4 duplicate communications facilities for FORSCOM. All the
5 while, you're keeping these, and then you take them down when
6 the others are up, which doesn't make a great deal of sense,
7 but Gillem is a different story.
8 Gillem is a bunch of warehouses, basically, and
9 there is some part, some fraction of Gillem, being used for
10 the support of McPherson, and I understand that. I want to
11 get into that. It's also my understanding that I believe
12 about 40 percent of the warehouses at Gillem are being used
13 by the exchanges.
14 MAJ EVANS: That's correct, sir.
15 MR. BROWN: The Army/Air Force Exchange System and
16 the distribution system, distribution center.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Army/Air Force Exchange and
18 Distribution System. Now, what's the acronym for that?
19 MR. BROWN: AAFES.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: AAFES.
21 MAJ BROWN: They've indicated they plan to move out
22 of Gillem, anyway, sir.

1 MR. EVANS: Sir, I don't think officially they've
2 come on line and made that claim. Now, there's a lot of
3 discussion on it and --
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: They have told the U.S.
5 Army.
6 MAJ EVANS: Again, sir, when we go to them, they
7 are still looking at the situation and haven't officially
8 come out, so you may know better than I do, then.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Let's look at that scenario
10 under a different category. If AAFES moves out and if you
11 move 2nd Army to Fort Stewart, you are going to cut back
12 substantially on the personnel infrastructure that is
13 necessary because you will not have the warehousing to manage
14 for security.
15 MR. BEHRMANN: Mrs. Byron, we're trying to deal
16 with a couple of other issues. There's remaining warehouses
17 and then there's National Guard and Reserve units there
18 stationed on base.
19 Now, there is a possibility, and we're trying to
20 validate this now, that there may be some excess space at
21 Dobbins, which is sort of around the beltway on the other

22 side of Atlanta. It would probably be within the commute

1 distance for all National Guardsmen and Reservists.
2 We're trying to find out whether there's any excess
3 facilities there that we can avail ourselves of and maybe
4 drive that construction cost to duplicate facilities in
5 another location. We're not there yet. The AAFES thing just
6 kind of reared its head for us and with that 40 percent going
7 away, we're trying to find a way now to deal with the other
8 60 percent
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But we don't have to tell
10 the Army where to put every tenant that's on Gillem. We have
11 to say whether we recommend closing or keeping Gillem open,
12 and if we want to direct some, we can, but we don't have to.
13 Is that not true?
14 MAJ EVANS: Sir, that's true but I think what
15 Mr. Behrmann, the point he's trying to make is if we were
16 able to find space where there were existing facilities, we
17 would avoid the new construction costs, and right now, that's
18 what's driving the train.
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But we also take away the
20 decision making from the Army if we tell the Army to put in
21 existing facilities. We can certainly direct that.
22 MR. BEHRMANN: You are dealing with a lot less to

1 bed down now, and the 40 percent definitely makes things
2 attractive.
3 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: AAFES?
4 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Is that in concrete yet? Is
6 that formally proposed?
7 MR. BEHRMANN: My understanding is that they plan
8 in the '96 timeframe to vacate their present home.
9 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I don't doubt that, but
10 is it formally written down such that we can base a decision
11 on it? Is it concrete?
12 MAJ EVANS: Sir, all our inquiries that we've gone
13 through, the TABS, the Total Army Basing Study, and Fort
14 McPherson, to try to talk to the AAFES people, is that they
15 have not made a decision at this point.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Have you called the
17 Commander of AAFES?
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, we have, and we've gotten
19 directly from them that that's their plan. Now, there may be
20 a little bit of shenanigans going on here.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Who else is there to talk
22 to?

1 MR. BEHRMANN: Excuse me?
2 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: If you've talked to them and
3 they plan to withdraw from there, who else is there to talk
4 to?
5 MR. BEHRMANN: Well, I'm not so sure that they want
6 to put it in writing yet because --
7 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That's my point.
8 MR. BEHRMANN: -- if we mandate the closure, then
9 it's a question of who can pay for their movements.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But we can very simply
11 transfer those warehouses to GSA as long as AAFES needs them,
12 and then they've got until '96 to move out.
13 MR. BEHRMANN: I'm not positive we can legally do
14 that. I can look into that. We could call GSA and find out,
15 you know, how we would effectuate that transfer. I'm not so
16 sure whether we can do it or not, but we'll look into it.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You can transfer them to
18 AAFES, can you now?
19 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson, I think without
20 confirming who owns the property and looking into some GSA
21 regulations, I'm not sure that we can sit here today and say

22 that that transfer can be made.

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'm prepared to make a
2 recommendation, a motion to close Gillem, and if we can
3 provide some details about where it ought to go, that's fine,
4 but we don't have to. The Army can do that. They can decide
5 where to send it. We don't have to tell them to send it
6 across town or to Fort McClellan or wherever.
7 MS. CHESTON: That's right.
8 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I agree with that. I
9 just think we need to have a firm basis on which to make that
10 recommendation, which I'm sure you do.
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Are we going to have any firmer
12 handle with respect to AAFES tomorrow than we do today?
13 MR. BEHRMANN: I'm not sure whether or not the
14 passage of 24 hours, given why we're deferring, whether
15 they're going to put that onto paper, Mr. Chairman. I don't
16 know that.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: See, I'm convinced -- I just
18 have a feeling that based on what I've heard that AAFES is,
19 in fact, going to do that which they say, that if this was
20 going to be closed, they could -- the Army could dispose of
21 those facilities. GSA would take them over. There's
22 probably -- it may be difficult. There's probably something

1 that could be done to McPherson, such that it's totally
2 supported by McPherson rather than Gillem, and you can close
3 something.
4 My problem is the fact that all the written
5 information I have in front of me, and I don't -- I mean,
6 just like Fort McClellan and the permitting problem at Fort
7 Leonard Wood, I don't want to vote on things that I know
8 might be able to be achieved, but that which is achieved or
9 is in writing and in hand, and all the evidence that's in
10 writing is that it's going to cost $100 million or more, $370
11 million, and there's not going to be a pay-back for 100
12 years.
13 MAJ EVANS: If I could add one comment to that,
14 too, sir, the cost to move AAFES, were the Army to pick up
15 the bill, would be $192 million. Now, were AAFES to come on
16 line prior to your vote and say, "We're moving and here are
17 the papers" --
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: AAFES would pay for it.
19 MAJ EVANS: -- AAFES would pay that. Now, we ran a
20 COBRA model taking that 192-plus out of the one-time costs.
21 We still run into a break-even year about -- 52 years was
22 where it was.

1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That's as good as it gets,
2 right?
3 MAJ EVANS: Well, again, that's why we started
4 trying to look at the Dobbins availability, and my first
5 inquiries on Dobbins, it doesn't appear that that has
6 capacity but we're still looking into it, so even by taking
7 that AAFES cost out, that alone isn't going to be the saving
8 grace here. We've still got to find some more cost savings
9 in order to make this pay off.
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Gary, what are the MILCON
11 projects on McPherson if you close Gillem? On page 70, your
12 statement is at the bottom right, "Closing Fort Gillem would
13 cause costly MILCON projects on Fort McPherson." What are
14 those?
15 MAJ EVANS: On Fort McPherson, we've got storage
16 buildings going in, general purpose admin, child support
17 center, an additional main exchange since the main exchange
18 that services that area was on Gillem.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What's the general
20 estimate of the cost of all of this?
21 MAJ EVANS: About 16 million is all for that one.

22 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: For all of the projects on

1 McPherson?
2 MAJ EVANS: For those projects at McPherson only,
3 were Gillem to close.
4 COMMISSIONER STUART: You're talking about
5 McPherson, not Gillem?
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Yes.
7 MAJ EVANS: We're talking of closing Gillem and
8 building added military construction on McPherson.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Gary, how many operations that
10 are McPherson operations are housed at Gillem?
11 MAJ EVANS: The Director of Logistics, the Director
12 of Engineering and Housing, that is with the McPherson
13 installation is actually housed on Gillem. You also have
14 overflow from Headquarters, 3rd Army, that works out of F
15 Gillem.
16 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Because I think one of the
17 points that they were making at McPherson was that because
18 the new nature of their mission, they had to use Fort Gi
19 to house and to take care of some of their excess capaci
20 because there was no longer available space at Fort
21 McPherson.
22 MAJ EVANS: That's true. That's what they were

1 doing over there. Now --
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Is there room to bring them
3 back if it's closed?
4 MAJ EVANS: I gave Mr. Stuart a paper one day and I
5 kind of light-heartedly said, "Turning the 18-hole golf
6 course into a 9-holer," and believe it or not, that woul
7 a piece of reality if you needed to find buildable acres,
8 know, as much as I hate to say that. I like to golf mys
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I was looking at the
10 difference in acreage, too, and it's substantial.
11 MAJ EVANS: One other thing to keep in mind is tha
12 you'd also mentioned others. USARC, the U.S. Army Rese
13 Command, they are in leased space waiting for that new
14 project to go on at McPherson, so that building is going
15 be taking place.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Go back for a minute to
17 the exchange, AAFES.
18 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The decision about what to
20 do about that is likely to be made in '96. Did I hear
21 say that to someone?
22 MAJ EVANS: The decision, we were told, was

1 probably due out a month or so ago, and basically the
2 official word is that it's still under advisement. It'
3 still under --
4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And the movement is
5 supposed to be made in '96, if it were to move?
6 MAJ EVANS: That's the word we're getting, yes,
7 sir.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: So that if the Commission
9 in '95 -- by that time, I assume somebody would have ma
10 decision. It wouldn't be too far behind the curve if t
11 Commission in '95 made the decision --
12 MAJ EVANS: No.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: -- that we are being asked
14 to make now by Commissioner Johnson.
15 MAJ EVANS: The '95 Commission should easily be
16 able to have that information.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Is not the decision imminent
18 and the Army doesn't want it to be part of BRAC beca
19 it's part of BRAC, they pay for the move. If AAFES
20 not part of BRAC, they pay for it? Aren't we quibblin
21 who pays?

22 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And it's imminent as opposed to two years from now?
3 MAJ EVANS: Absolutely, sir. Were I in the Army
4 Budget Office, I wouldn't want to pay $192 million out of my
5 pocket if I could avoid it.
6 COMMISSIONER STUART: We've been worried about
7 "iffy" situations. We don't really have these facts yet, and
8 I don't think we're in a position to go ahead and say this is
9 a substantial deviation which requires us to close Gillem.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: If we don't do that, sir,
11 we'll never close a base like Gillem or any other.
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: I felt that way about Fort
13 McClellan. I'm concerned about this, that we don't have
14 enough information yet.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We never will have.
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion before we
17 entertain a motion on either Gillem or McPherson? I'll
18 entertain a motion on either facility.
19 MOTION
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'd like to make a motion on
21 Gillem. I move the Commission find the Secretary of Defense
22 deviated substantially from the force structure and final

1 criteria in not recommending the closure of Fort Gillem.
2 Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Fort
3 Gillem and the movement of the Director of Engineering and
4 Housing and all 3rd Army tenants to Fort McPherson, the 2nd
5 Army to Fort Stewart.
6 The Commission further recommends the Army directly
7 or through GSA make warehouse buildings at Fort Gillem
8 available to the Army Air Force Exchange Service for as long
9 as they need them.
10 The Commission finds the recommendation is
11 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
13 (No response.)
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
15 (No response.)
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion fails without a
17 second. Is there a motion on McPherson?
18 (No response.)
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no motion on McPherson.
20 The recommendation of the Department of Defense obviously
21 stand.
22 Fort Monroe.

1 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 11, we have the
2 next installation to be discussed, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
3 Fort Monroe was added for further consideration on May 21st.
4 Slide 21 pictorially shows the option under consideration.
5 It is the closure of Fort Monroe, the relocation of
6 Training and Doctrine Command and the Reserve Officer
7 Training Corps Cadet Command to Fort Eustis and moving the
8 Naval Surface Warfare Detachment to Base "X." Slide 72 shows
9 the relative location of Fort Monroe and Fort Eustis.
10 Mr. Bud Bale will discuss this recommendation.
11 MR. BALE: Next slide, please. This slide shows
12 the static information concerning Fort Monroe. I draw your
13 attention to the bottom line on the one-time costs. The
14 number you see to the left without the parentheses around it
15 is the original numbers provided to us.
16 The number surrounded by the parentheses is the
17 most recent data that was provided by the Department of the
18 Army. We received this Saturday and we really haven't had a
19 lot of time to do a detailed analysis of the information.
20 COMMISSIONER STUART: Which is your number, Bud?
21 MR. BALE: Sir, the first number on the left is the

22 one we've had a chance to look at. The number on the right

1 was the latest data, based on a regional hearing and new
2 information provided by the Army.
3 The basic difference from the initial evaluation of
4 this, though, is that this is due to a greater one-time cost,
5 primarily in construction and the furnishing of a new
6 facility at Fort Eustis. The original version we had called
7 for the Cadet Command moving to Fort Knox, so now they're
8 housing more people.
9 Next slide, please. There is a wide variety of
10 issues that we can discuss on here. I'm prepared to discuss
11 the ones on the left and the ones on the right, unless you
12 would like further discussion on those. I'll bypass.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Are you on Slide 74?
14 MR. BALE: Yes, sir.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Why don't you discuss those?
16 MR. BALE: All of them? Yes, sir. Okay. The next
17 slide, please, on 75, goes down into the issues in a little
18 bit more detail here. The Army points out that a move at
19 this time would cause a disruption of the Training and
20 Doctrine Command located at Fort Monroe and the valuable work
21 that they are doing as the Office of Change for the
22 Department of the Army.

1 The community strongly supports keeping the
2 Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe. When we looked
3 at the options, we found that Fort Eustis is only 20 miles
4 away. When we look at today's environment in the world,
5 vastly changing, the trend is to downsize the military.
6 The civilian leadership is going to make some
7 strong decisions on this, and we don't know when this change
8 or these decisions are going to end, so there is always going
9 to be turmoil in the foreseeable future in that. We feel
10 that a well-developed plan could mitigate any problems that
11 Training and Doctrine Command would have if the decision by
12 the Commission is to move them to Fort Eustis.
13 The economics of the move, the next issue in this,
14 is the Army feels that there will be a high cost concerned
15 with clean-up. I'm going to talk about the environmental
16 clean-up a little bit later on this and get into a little bit
17 more detail.
18 The community also reiterates that Fort Monroe is a
19 little bit unique in that it will revert back to the State of
20 Virginia when the U.S. Government no longer has need for it
21 as a defense usage, but the economics of the move, though, is
22 that Fort Monroe is kind of a single-purpose installation.

1 We would not be able to take advantage of moving it to excess
2 space at a multi-purpose installation.
3 The economic impact in the area we feel would be
4 minimal because a move 20 miles down the road, most of the
5 people are going to remain with the command, and they will be
6 in the same Tidewater area. However, the local community
7 adjacent to Fort Monroe would probably have a higher economic
8 impact than the Tidewater area itself.
9 The environmental issue is one you all are well
10 aware of from the regional hearings on that. The Army policy
11 is that, really, there is no environmental problem at Fort
12 Monroe as long as the Army stays there. They consider that
13 unexploded ordinance is not an environmental problem unless
14 there is some sort of a seepage. A recent study in 1990 by
a
15 contractor found that there is no environmental problem at
16 Fort Monroe.
17 The community stresses the point, though, that the
18 clean-up of any unexploded ordinance is an environmental
19 issue to them and they would expect it hazard-free when they
20 get it back. The environmental problems must be cleaned up,

21 no matter what the situation is. The military has to do
22 something about that.

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What are they doing now,
2 Bud?
3 MR. BALE: As far as cleaning up the unexploded
4 ordinance, sir, nothing that I've been able to find out.
5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Bud, let me touch that,
6 because you were with me when I did the base visit at Fort
7 Monroe and subsequently to some fairly stringent discussion
8 with the community and the base personnel, I have received
9 three phone calls, one from GEN Sullivan, who wanted to hear
10 my words and my concerns, and I said they were very strong.
11 I have been assured that the Army is going to put in place a
12 program to look at that facility and to begin cleaning up.
13 One of the key components that I found in the
14 ordinance, much of it is almost Civil War ordinance. There
15 is a four-foot water table and to do clean-up in that area,
16 you would have to do -- since it is on the Historic Register,
17 you would have to go down six to eight feet to find much of
18 that ordinance and you would have to do shoring to be able to
19 get into that component.
20 Now, there has been some ordinance that has been
21 found when they have been doing modifications, sewer lines,
22 housing project. I do not think, and I can't state this

1 emphatically, but I do not think it's the case where children
2 will be playing in a backyard sand pile and they will uncover
3 ordinance. I may be wrong on that, but I can assure you that
4 the Army has told me that they are going to update the study
5 that was done in -- was it 1980?
6 MR. BALE: 1990.
7 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Wasn't there a 1980 study,
8 also?
9 MR. BALE: Yes, ma'am.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: The 1980 study was much more
11 in-depth than the 1990 study, I believe.
12 MR. BALE: Yes, ma'am.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I also looked at it from the
14 military value and the fact that TRADOC, which is the main
15 component on that base has been joined by the Air Force and
16 the Navy in that same area with their TRADOC command, so
17 there is an interaction between the three training commands
18 of the three branches of service.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We have had discussion at
20 various times with regard to the costs of the environmental
21 clean-up and, I would imagine, unexploded ordinance does fall
22 into that category, and I believe it's the position of each

1 individual Commissioner -- it is my position; maybe it's not
2 everybody's -- that this, you know, attending to the
3 environmental concerns, the environmental needs of a
4 facility, is something that should be done irrespective of
5 what the decision is on whether the base stays open or
6 whether it closes.
7 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I agree with you.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Fort Monroe tries to distinguish
9 it, I think, on two grounds, number one, saying this isn't
10 the normal environmental problems. You know, this is
11 unexploded ordinance. I don't know what the
12 distinction -- that's a distinction without a difference.
13 Two, they are saying there is a distinction here
14 and a difference because there is a reverter clause in the
15 land transfer that took place many, many years ago, such that
16 when it's closed and no longer being utilized for military
17 purposes or for the Army, it reverts automatically to the
18 Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Commonwealth of Virginia is
19 not going to accept it until it's brought up to the standards
20 that they impose elsewhere.

21 I remember I was not at all impressed with the
22 testimony of the gentleman from the environmental communit

1 not environmental community, but from the State of Virg.
2 He was the Attorney General spokesperson or something.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Assistant Attorney General.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Assistant Attorney General,
5 you know, and he was trying to say that, "If we get this la
6 back, the Commonwealth has an interest in the health and
7 safety of its citizens and, therefore, we're going to dema
8 that the unexploded ordinance be cleaned up and attended t
9 before we accept it back," as if the Commonwealth of Virgi
10 does not have an interest in other citizens of the
11 Commonwealth, who are now living and working on the facili
12 that just happen to be wearing a uniform.
13 He could not assure me or this Commission that the
14 Commonwealth is not going to take the position that we wa
15 that unexploded ordinance cleaned up, even though the Arm
16 keeps it; that's my position.
17 My question to him was: How do we know the
18 Commonwealth, who has a legitimate concern about the heal
19 and safety of its citizens, is not going to come back six
20 months from now and demand that this ordinance be cleaned
21 even though the base is not closed and he couldn't. I'm
22 sure whether he understood the point I was driving at.

1 It's a single-use base. It seems to me that
2 whatever dislocation would occur, should be able to be
3 handled. It's not that it's being moved a thousand mile
4 away. Was it 25 miles to Fort Eustis?
5 MR. BROWN: Yes, sir, twenty.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It seems to me in the very
7 beginning that we were given, either informally or forma
8 some words by the Army to the effect that they wanted
9 close it but felt they couldn't because of the cost of
10 unexploded ordinance. Now, is that an informal, off
11 record statement of someone in the Army or is that the
12 position of the Army?
13 MR. BROWN: It was briefed, Mr. Chairman, during
14 the Army's deliberation process for the selection of it
15 installations. At that time, the Army leadership took
16 the list for operational considerations, turbulence and
17 expected environmental clean-up costs.
18 MR. BEHRMANN: GEN Ballard, who has been before us
19 twice, stated in his first appearance that really a dri
20 decision not to close Monroe was because of the environm
21 problem.
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: See, that, for this

1 Commissioner, is not a good enough reason. I mean, it
2 to me that the men and women that work on these facilit
3 uniform or as civilians for the Department of Defense a
4 the Army, deserve as much attention when it comes to t
5 environmental as anybody else.
6 Also, I mean, we've been dealing with the services
7 for a period of time now and all of them will say that
8 which they should do when it comes to the environment,
9 know they have an obligation to do and they're going to
10 when they get the money to do it.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could I ask a supplementary
12 question?
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER STUART: Let's look ahead five or 10
15 years. Is this single-purpose TRADOC operation going
16 continue at the present headquarters? Won't they be c
17 in the future, because as we try to get greater effi
18 long run, and Fort Eustis is right across the way,
19 couldn't that be done now?
20 MR. BROWN: There's no reason, Commissioner Stuar

21 other than what might be the potential cost, and we're not
22 sure. We have two --

COMMISSIONER STUART: But if you're looking ahead
2 10 years, do you think they probably will be -- TRADOC will
3 be --
4 MR. BROWN: TRADOC will still be in existence. I'm
5 not sure where TRADOC will be located.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: But we don't expect the function
7 to disappear.
8 MR. BROWN: I do not expect the function to
9 disappear. It is the trainer of the Army.
10 MR. BEHRMANN: I really have got to say I think it
11 would be a mistake to move it away from that region. I think
12 you're looking at something here that's kind of unique.
13 There is a synergy of having all the training commands right
14 there, collocated. I think that makes some sense. You know,
15 the Air Force is right across the water and the Navy is
16 across the water.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Historically, the Army was
18 the first to recognize the need to have a command that
19 developed doctrine and training. The Air Force used what was
20 then called the Tactical Air Command and worked out a
21 relationship, informal one, with TRADOC. They have now, as I
22 understand it, a formal group that works with them.

1 The Navy has established one in Norfolk, so you
2 have Hampton -- both of them in Hampton, Langley and Monroe,
3 and then Norfolk across. The Marines are nearby just south
4 of town in Quantico, so our own forces have brought together
5 all four services in the doctrine business.
6 Quite frankly, Monroe or TRADOC was the first and
7 it's still probably the leader in that area. I recommend we
8 leave it at Monroe as it is. In the future, I believe that
9 will be one of the last commands to be combined in the Army
10 because of their great feeling of the importance of training
11 and doctrine.
12 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What is at Eustis right
13 now?
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The training command and the
15 training school but, really, they don't have the facilities
16 to handle a command as large as TRADOC.
17 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Eustis does not today?
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: No.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is that the reason for the
20 $128 million?
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Most of it is in
22 building a new facility for the TRADOC Headquarters and the

1 Cadet Command and the other people who are part of TRADOC.
2 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is there any kind of
3 synergy between that transportation school and TRADOC?
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: None.
5 MR. BROWN: The transportation school is a
6 subordinate element of Training and Doctrine Command, two
7 echelons below the Headquarters.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And it's a school, whereas,
9 TRADOC is the element.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: A think tank.
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: A think tank, a Commissioner
12 Byron says.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: It seems to me that while
14 I can see this need or wish to get rid of the single purpose
15 installations, that you don't really get anything. You don't
16 get any synergy from the combination. You spend $130 million
17 and it takes you at least 15 years to get it back, to get
18 square, and you have an uncertain and possibly very large
19 environmental clean-up cost, so I don't think it's a great
20 idea.

21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I think that, much as I am
22 very much for consolidation and synergism in relatively smal

1 facilities and I also believe that we should clean up
2 problems if they exist, I think the counter to that is that
3 my understanding is that environmental clean-up, which woul
4 be significant here, would, in the long term, come out of
5 Army operating funds. That's my understanding.
6 And, secondly, the State of Virginia, in this case,
7 should be the adjudicating authority as to whether it needs
8 immediate remediation or could be delayed, and I understand
9 that I think it's called a Class III, that they believe tha
10 it doesn't need immediate remediation.
11 So, therefore, even though I am tempted to say,
12 "Yeah, let's consolidate and let's clean up," I don't think
13 it would be in the best interests.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a motion on --
15 MR. BORDEN: I have one more comment. I think
16 maybe the synergy question hasn't totally been answered from
17 an infrastructure standpoint because there is some synergy
18 from having duplicate support type facilities, and that's
19 what you gain by moving to Fort Eustis.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a motion on Fort
21 Monroe?
22 (No response.)

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no motion on Fort
2 Monroe. The recommendations of the Army to keep it open
3 remain. The Commission will take a 10-minute recess.
4 (A short recess was taken.)
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Commission will return to
6 order and will commence business, and we'll proceed. Mr.
7 Brown, if you would start with the Commodity-Oriented
8 Installations.
9 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 12, we have the
10 next category that will be discussed, commodity oriented,
11 with the map, Slide 79, and the accompanying chart, Slide 80
12 shows the names and locations of the Army's 12 commodity
13 oriented installations.
14 At Tab 13, we have the next installation to be
15 discussed, Vint Hill Farms, Virginia. Slide 81 pictorially
16 shows the DOD recommendation to close Vint Hill Farms,
17 relocate the maintenance and repair function of the
18 Intelligence Material Management Center to Tobyhanna Depot,
19 Pennsylvania, to transfer the remaining elements of the
20 Intelligence Material Management Center, the Program
21 Executive Officer for Intelligence and Electronics Warfare,
22 and the Electronics Warfare Directorate to Fort Monmouth.

1 The map at Chart 82, Slide 82, shows the relative
2 locations of Vint Hill Farms, Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna
3 Army Depot. Mr. John Graham will discuss this installation.
4 MR. GRAHAM: This chart shows the static data about
5 Vint Hill Farms. I'd like to draw your attention to the
6 bottom with the one-time cost of 72.4, steady state savings
7 to 19.1 and a break-even year of 2,001, eight years into the
8 process. Next chart.
9 These are the issues that we reviewed. The ones on
10 the left are the issues that I'm going to speak to during
11 this briefing. The ones on the right I am prepared to
12 discuss if you have questions.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The ones on the left or the
14 right?
15 MR. GRAHAM: The left in bold, sir. The left I
16 will talk to. The right I am prepared to talk to. Next
17 slide.
18 The first issue I'd like to talk about is unique
19 workforce. The work that is done at Vint Hill Farms for the
20 Intelligence and Electronics Warfare efforts of the Army and

21 other agencies is totally dependent upon the qualified and
22 highly skilled workforce.

1 These people are trained. The majority of them
2 have security clearances, most at the Top Secret level and a
3 lot of them, about 77 percent, have more than 10 years
4 experience working on these types of systems. The DOD
5 position is that for any of the folks who elect not to move,
6 when we do the realignment to Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna,
7 that qualified replacements are available and could be hired
8 to replace them.
9 The community's position is that up to 80 percent
10 of the workforce will not move if Vint Hill Farms closes and
11 the activities are realigned at Tobyhanna or Fort Monmouth.
12 We found that the Army estimate of somewhere in the
13 neighborhood of 25 percent was probably low, people who would
14 not be willing to move.
15 It's probably closer, based on the military's
16 experience with moving like organizations that are heavily
17 civilianized, that it will be closer to the 80 percent who
18 will not move and will have to be replaced.
19 We also looked at the fact that it's a six-year
20 process. As you begin to phase things over, it's not like
21 we're going to say, "Next month, everybody has got to move."
22 With proper phasing, for those who elect not to move, you can

1 hire replacements and train them.
2 The next two issues are very closely interrelated
3 and I'll talk in generalities as we go through them. The
4 activities at Vint Hill Farms perform a variety of classified
5 work, both for Army, Department of Defense and non-Department
6 of Defense agencies. The Department's position is that the
7 move of the activities from Vint Hill to Fort Monmouth or
8 Tobyhanna will have minimal impact on their ability to supply
9 the support to these organizations.
10 The community presented the case that there needs
11 to be the capability within close proximity to the National
12 Capital Region, which is where most of these intelligence
13 agencies are located. They interact with them on a frequent
14 basis. They do work for them and by moving them further
15 away, there is the potential for serious harm to the national
16 security just because this interaction is not there to
17 happen.
18 As far as the coordination that the Army did with
19 both Army and Department of Defense agencies, the Army did
20 coordinate internally with the Assistant Chief of Staff for
21 Intelligence and with the Intelligence and Security Command,
22 which is the Army's major command for intelligence, and "no

1 OSD comment" on my slide means that when this action was
2 coordinated through the Department of Defense, nobody raised
3 a specific objection to the realignment.
4 As far as the non-DOD agencies, the Army did not
5 coordinate with anybody; however, the Commission did send out
6 letters to all of the affected customers, and they all came
7 back and said there would be little or no impact if the
8 activities --
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Are there any issues on this
10 closure from any of the Commissioners?
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I have no particular concerns.
12 The one thing I wanted to mention, and that is, that the
13 community through their elected representatives, talked much
14 in the office about the degradation in capabilities and
15 dislocation that would occur in some special access programs
16 that are taking place at Vint Hill Farms.
17 The Commission did meet with the appropriate people
18 in the intelligence community and were briefed on a highly
19 classified level at the Pentagon. I believe a couple staff
20 were and most Commissioners, and it was my view that although
21 that was very helpful for us, it was not something that the
22 community, the intelligence community, felt that they

1 couldn't handle. That was the sum and total of it.
2 I can't go into exactly what was said, obviously,
3 but my clear and very clear recollection of that briefing -
4 and we went through four programs - that there was plenty
5 each one of them and it was the opinion of the community,
6 that is, the intelligence community, that they could handle
7 this.
8 They were -- as a matter of fact, we asked the
9 question whether they, in this particular instance and
10 generally in other instances, whether the intelligence
11 community and the special access community were brought
12 within the base closing process at some stage.
13 The answer to that question, and it was answered to
14 our satisfaction that not only in the case of Vint Hill Farms
15 but in other cases, as well, that the special access
16 intelligence communities were brought into the process at the
17 appropriate level and that their concerns were taken under
18 consideration and were included in the recommendations of the
19 Secretary of Defense.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: One thing, John, I'd like
21 to ask you to comment on. On No. 86, in the category of
22 synergy, the research and analyst staff finds that there will

1 be greater efficiencies from collocating Vint Hill Farms and
2 Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna, and then it says "may not be
3 great as stated by the Army if CECOM Headquarters moves."
4 That means moves out of Fort Monmouth and goes to Rock
5 Island.
6 So, what is being proposed here, and we'll take up
7 Fort Monmouth, I know, next, but what's being proposed is
8 move this very sophisticated entity, which is a subordinate
9 agency of the CECOM up to the CECOM and at the very same
10 time, it's being proposed to move much of the leadership of
11 CECOM out to Illinois. Is that correct?
12 MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. What that comment means is
13 that some of the efficiencies they are going to gain is
14 through -- by collocating, they'll do away with overhead
15 duplication and personnel authorizations.
16 There is the potential that the savings that the
17 Army has stated for this move, especially in the field of
18 logistics management, may not be as great as what the Army
19 anticipating if you take the logistics part of CECOM
20 Headquarters and move it away. It's a few people, but I
21 thought I had to bring it out.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: John, is there any lack of

1 synergy or the opposite of it -- I'm looking for the right
2 word there -- or disefficiencies, I guess you could say,
3 the breaking apart of the repair and maintenance functions
4 from the R&D function?
5 MR. GRAHAM: In my opinion, no, sir, because what
6 we're doing is we're sending the repair and maintenance
7 function to Tobyhanna which is the Army Center for
8 Communications Electronics Repair.
9 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Yes, but it seems to me you
10 might be separating the engineers from the repair people.
11 MR. GRAHAM: That's essentially what you're doing.
12 is the folks who are doing the research, development and
13 engineering, and some limited production, from the guys
14 are doing the repair.
15 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But you and the Army think
16 that's not significant?
17 MR. GRAHAM: No, sir.
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Bowman, I might disagree with
19 that a little bit. I think there could be a little
20 degradation there.

21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I would think there would be
22 some.

1 MR. BEHRMANN: There probably will be some. One of
2 the things about Vint Hill is it works on very low density
3 quick turn equipment. They've got to support, you know,
4 rapid deployment, rapid repair. If something goes down, if
5 there's a new problem, they've got to be able to turn that
6 equipment fairly quickly due to who they service.
7 If you throw that into a larger depot away from
8 some of the folks that sort of maybe know what state-of-the
9 art -- what you can buy out there, it may degrade it a little
10 bit but, you know, there's trade-offs in this business. I
11 just want to make sure I put it in that context for you.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Right, I appreciate that.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion among the
14 Commissioners on Vint Hill Farms?
15 (No response.)
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair will recognize a
17 Commissioner for the purposes of making a motion.
18 MOTION
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman, I move that
20 the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not
21 deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final
22 criteria; therefore, that the Commission adopt the following

1 recommendation of the Secretary of Defense:
2 Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance
3 and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management
4 Center to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania, transfer the
5 remaining elements of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
6 Directorate and the Program Executive Officer for
7 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare to Fort Monmouth, New
8 Jersey.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'll second.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Stuart seconds the motion.
11 Any discussion on the motion?
12 (No response.)
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll start by the gentleman to
14 my left, Mr. Stuart.
15 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron?
18 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
19 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson?
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
22 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson vote "aye."

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman?
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
3 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
6 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson?
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
9 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: And the Chair votes aye.
11 MS. CHESTON: And the Chair votes "aye." On the
12 motion to accept the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to
13 close Vint Hill Farms, the vote is seven in favor, zero
14 opposed. The motion passes.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's move on to Fort Monmouth.
16 MR. GRAHAM: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 14, we have the
17 next installation, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Slide 90
18 pictorially shows the DOD recommendation which is to move
19 Communications Electronics Command Headquarters from a leased
20 facility off or outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal
21 and to move the Chaplain School from Fort Monmouth to Fort
22 Jackson, South Carolina.

1 The map at Chart 91 shows the relative locations of
2 Fort Monmouth, Rock Island Arsenal and Fort Jackson. Mr. Bu
3 Bale will discuss this installation.
4 MR. BALE: The static data for Fort Monmouth is
5 shown in this chart. We have a one-time cost of $99.9
6 million for the move and will show a steady state savings o
7 21.9 million moving to the Rock Island. Next chart, please
8 The issues on the left in bold I am prepared to
9 discuss and the ones on the right at your leisure or request.
10 Next page, please. The community brought up some points
11 that were hard to discuss, in that they think that the high
12 tech skills that are associated with the Communications
13 Electronics Command will be hard to duplicate or replicate
14 out at the Rock Island Arsenal.
15 The DOD position is that there are skills found in
16 the area and institutions, the same. Our findings are that
17 we found that there are available in the Rock Island
18 community institutions that can support the training of the
19 CECOM skills that we found, the high tech skills.
20 Part of it, too, goes with if Communications
21 Electronics Command is chosen to move by the Commission, then
22 the community thinks that a large number of the people will

1 not actually go out to Rock Island, that they will choose to
2 stay in the area.
3 The COBRA model that provides this uses a six
4 percent figure of the civilian force that will not move. We
5 probably agree with the civilian community that it will
6 probably be higher than the six percent but the true nature
7 we will not know until the move actually progresses.
8 The proposal is to move into excess space found at
9 Rock Island Arsenal. The community came up with a counter
10 proposal that they move out of leased space outside of Fort
11 Monmouth and to move onto space vacated at Fort Monmouth by
12 the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain's
13 School. We found that both the proposals would meet the
14 Commission's requirements and are valid proposals.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: So, basically, the premise of
16 getting out of leased facilities, if it's meritorious, is
17 satisfied by keeping the functions at Fort Monmouth in
18 vacated DOD-owned facilities.
19 MR. BALE: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
20 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Will there be a cost involved
21 in upgrading those facilities that would be substantial?
22 MR. BALE: There will be a cost. It will not be

1 substantial. The facilities on Fort Monmouth were renovated
2 a little while back. They were a different kind of
3 headquarters so there will be some modification that has to
4 be done. It will be relatively inexpensive compared with the
5 construction that would have to go on at Rock Island.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: So, basically, the bottom line
7 is it would be more economically feasible to relocate inside
8 Fort Monmouth as opposed to moving to --
9 MR. BALE: Not exactly, Mrs. Byron. The operating
10 cost at Rock Island, Illinois, on an annual basis, it's a
11 less costly area to operate for your day-to-day operations
12 than the Fort Monmouth area.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And why is that?
14 MR. BALE: There's two things. It's just the cost
15 of living out there and then there is a factor I was going to
16 cover a little bit later that deals with personnel locality
17 pay. The people in the Fort Monmouth area --
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, with that reasoning, any
19 place that gets the higher rate because of the cost of
20 living, we should close all those bases.

21 MR. BALE: No, sir, I didn't say that.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: That's what the proposal is

1 saying.
2 MR. BALE: The proposal would say that but we
3 differ with the proposal. Our comment is that any area that
4 is covered by the locality pay, any decision to move it to
5 another base or a location that is not covered by locality
6 pay could bias it against that installation.
7 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But the majority of their
8 business is at Fort Monmouth, isn't it?
9 MR. BALE: The Communications Electronics Command's
10 business is, yes, sir. That's where their research and
11 development and their program executive officers are. One of
12 the arguments --
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: I was just going to ask you
14 what the driver was in the DOD recommendation to go to Rock
15 Island. Is it the steady state savings being greater?
16 MR. BALE: In the long run, sir, the steady state
17 savings are greater at Rock Island than they would be at the
18 Fort Monmouth area.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: In the long run, is one base
20 going to be there and another not?
21 MR. BALE: I'm not sure I understand.
22 MR. BROWN: I'm not sure that we can predict that,

1 Commissioner Stuart.
2 MR. BEHRMANN: Do you get a total closure in either
3 scenario or no?
4 MR. BALE: This is not a closure that's at issue.
5 This is a realignment.
6 COMMISSIONER STUART: My point, essentially, is:
7 Is Rock Island, in all probability, going to be around longer
8 or is Fort Monmouth going to be around longer? We're dealing
9 with the force structure as it exists today.
10 MR. BEHRMANN: I think that depends which
11 Congressman you ask and which Senator you ask. I think
12 they'll fight very hard to keep both of those alive, and I
13 think it's the Army's plans to keep both installations
14 present.
15 COMMISSIONER STUART: But the Army did recommend
16 going to Fort --
17 MR. BALE: Rock Island.
18 COMMISSIONER STUART: Rock Island.
19 MR. BALE: Yes, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But it was strictly from a
21 financial standpoint?
22 MR. BALE: It was from a financial point and from a

1 leased facility outside of Fort Monmouth at some $15 million
2 a year.
3 MR. BROWN: Mr. Stuart, if you look at the military
4 value assessment that the Army did, Rock Island Arsenal is
5 rated three of the 12. Fort Monmouth is number four, so they
6 are relatively close.
7 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Someone suggested when I
8 was up there that this had slipped between the cracks with
9 the Army, because there is all this space that has been
10 vacated by the 513th and by the Chaplain's School and it's
11 excellent space.
12 They are a mile or two away from it in this leased
13 building, whose own cost is excessive because of the payment
14 they have to make to the GSA. They are moving up the
15 facility from Vint Hill Farms and at the very moment they're
16 doing it, they want to peel off a lot of people and move them
17 out to Rock Island.
18 From an organizational point of view, it doesn't
19 seem to make any sense at all and from a cost saving point of
20 view, they've got their relief right down the road from

21 everything except the pay differential. So, I think we ough
22 to save the Army from itself and realign them in Fort

1 Monmouth. If I could, I'd like to make this motion, Mr
2 Chairman.

MOTION

3
4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I move that the Commission
5 find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially
6 from criteria in four. The Commission finds that the
7 Department misstated the cost differential between two
8 alternative choices.
9 Therefore, the Commission adopts the following
10 recommendation. Move CECOM Headquarters out of the leased
11 space and into space at Fort Monmouth vacated by the 513th
12 Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain's School or
13 other suitable space, relocate the Chaplain's School to Fo
14 Jackson, consolidate activities to maximize utilization of
15 Main Post Fort Monmouth and to dispose of excess facilitie
16 and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub-post as we
17 as main post, Fort Monmouth.
18 The Commission finds this recommendation is
19 consistent with the force structure plan and final criter
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do I hear a second to the
21 motion?
22 COMMISSIONER COX: Second.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Before I ask for any discussion,
2 I have a technical amendment to the motion, and it's as
3 follows: After, therefore, the Commission, after that wo
4 "Commission" on the third line, add "rejects the Secretar
5 recommendation on Fort Monmouth and instead" and then I
6 continue "adopts the following recommendations." Do I hea
7 second?
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I second.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There's a second. Let's dispose
10 of the technical amendment. All those in favor, say
11 (Chorus of ayes.)
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: All opposed?
13 (No response.)
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The amendment unanimously
15 passes. Counsel, do I need a roll call vote on that?
16 MS. CHESTON: No, I don't think you do.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could we discuss it? Is it
18 time for discussion or not?
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It is now time for discussion on
20 the motion.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'd just like to ask
22 Commissioner McPherson, we're doing this because of the

1 range advantages to being in Fort Monmouth, because the
2 savings indicated were greater at Rock Island.
3 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Well, Commissioner Stuart,
4 my reason for doing it is that the savings are likely to
5 very, very similar, and that the organizational efficien
6 having the entire operation together in one locale,
7 particularly when they're bringing the Vint Hill Farms
8 contingent up there, outweigh any of the small savings
9 advantage for going to Rock Island, such as it may be.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think the Army just -- if I
11 could go in here, I think the Army just, when they did
12 forgot about the fact that the relocation of some funct
13 from Fort Monmouth made available owned facilities and
14 therefore they could get out of leased space, which was
15 desire. If you can get out of leased space and not mov
16 normally, you don't want to move.
17 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I was going to say we are
18 getting out of the $15 million a year leased space,
19 a key component when the Army was structuring this move
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion?

21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I tend to agree with what
22 been stated, but I was going to ask the staff. I see some

1 heads nodding and things like that, but what evidence do you
2 find that says that the costs were misstated?
3 MR. BALE: The cost for both proposals shows a
4 savings over the present condition. When we take out the pay
5 differential and all that, it's almost an equal comparison to
6 the Rock Island, and we avoid the moving pay from some 900
7 miles from Fort Monmouth out to Rock Island, Illinois.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Plus, from a military
9 standpoint, we leave the command headquarters where the
10 majority of their work is, and that should override any cost
11 differential.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I have a feeling that there
13 are some benefits that have yet to be quantified. That's
14 what we're really saying, or that are difficult to quantify
15 and, therefore, have not yet been, and I believe that;
16 however, I have a little difficulty coming up and saying
17 exactly what they are at the moment.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion?
19 (No response.)
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll start with Commissioner
21 Beverly Byron.
22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.

1 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
4 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
6 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
10 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
12 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
15 MS. CHESTON: The chair votes "aye."
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
18 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye." The
19 motion is to reject the Secretary's recommendation on Fort
20 Monmouth and instead to recommend an alternative realignment
21 of Fort Monmouth. On that motion, the vote is seven in
22 favor, zero opposed. The motion passes.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Rock Island Arsenal.
2 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 15, we have the
3 next installation, the Rock Island Arsenal. Slide 98
4 pictorially shows the DOD recommendation, which is a redirect
5 of a 1991 Commission recommendation. It's to leave those
6 material management function of Armament, Munitions and
7 Chemical Command at Rock Island Arsenal rather than sending
8 it to Redstone Arsenal.
9 Slide 99 shows the relative location of Rock Island
10 Arsenal and Red Stone Arsenal. MAJ Gary Evans will discuss
11 the recommendation.
12 MAJ EVANS: Sir, the static installation chart,
13 once again, I direct you to the bottom line. The one-time
14 cost is zero; steady state savings one million; break-even
15 year immediate. The steady state savings, if you'd noticed
16 on the first chart, if you noticed, the redirect number was
17 different going back to Rock Island versus going to Redstone
18 Arsenal.
19 Rock Island determined that they could do the job
20 with 23 less personnel, and that's where you're generating
21 the steady state savings down there. Next chart, please.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Say that one again. That one

1 slipped right by me. The steady state savings are obtained
2 from?
3 MAJ EVANS: From the savings of 23 personnel
4 slots/positions that the Rock Island facility determined tha
5 they could do the job for less, once it's realigned under th
6 Tank Automotive Command. The driving issues are on the lef
7 side of the chart, operational issues and cost issues.
8 Personnel savings is an issue I'm prepared to talk about,
9 you so choose. Next chart.
10 You really see this redirect as an operational
11 issue. Basically, it's the Army Materiel Command is coming
12 on line and saying that they believe that the alignment of
13 the Material Management Functions of the Armament and
14 Chemical portion of the Armament, Munitions and Chemical
15 Command, are better aligned with the Tank Automotive Comman
16 than they would be aligned with the Missile Command.
17 Incidentally, were they to be aligned with the
18 Missile Command, they'd then create a new command called th
19 Missile, Ammunitions and Chemical Command, MACCOM.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do you have any speculation as
21 to what motivated this recommendation by the Army in 1991,
22 1990, 1991, because they wanted to change the commands.

1 They were going to create some movement of people, 1200 and
2 some, but they also indicated there would be substantial
3 savings to it. Now, what has changed in the meantime?
4 MAJ EVANS: Two years ago, sir, they had a piece
5 called the AMC Vision 2000 which, from what I could read and
6 determine, in talking to personnel, basically, it was going
7 to make the Redstone Arsenal somewhat of a showcase for all
8 commodity-oriented functions.
9 This was one piece of that grand movement to
10 fulfill that vision. Unfortunately, it was determined that
11 Vision 2000 was just not feasible because of the costs
12 involved. Within the last two years, for some reason that
13 really haven't got a good answer on, it was that this piece
14 of that puzzle stayed in the system and got directed down to
15 Redstone Arsenal.
16 In the last two years, obvious to everybody, all
17 the services have gone through a downsizing that I don't
18 think they really anticipated two years ago, so with those
19 things in mind, that was a real driving factor, and then the
20 change of the vision. It's pretty much predicated then that
21 it was no longer feasible to do that move.
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, it's not that it makes

1 much difference, but what is the new command going to be
2 called?
3 MAJ EVANS: Sir, were it to go to Redstone Arsenal?
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, if it stays. If it stays at
5 the Rock Island Arsenal pursuant to the recommendation of the
6 DOD?
7 MAJ EVANS: No, there is no new command, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There's not.
9 MAJ EVANS: What it does is it eliminates the
10 Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command and it takes those
11 materiel functions on the armament and chemical side and
12 realigns them with the existing Tank Automotive Command.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: So, TACOM stays?
14 MAJ EVANS: TACOM, yes, sir.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But you could go either way,
16 from what you said here. You could go with the missile
17 command and have a new MACCOM or whatever it is?
18 MAJ EVANS: In either event, you're right, sir.
19 You're going to eliminate a national inventory control point.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, before, we approved, our

21 predecessors approved this move, and the Army has not
22 completed it, and now they want to reverse it?

1 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Where is TACOM Headquarters?
3 MAJ EVANS: Warren, Michigan, sir.
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, they won't be
5 collocated?
6 MAJ EVANS: It will be a split operation.
7 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, if we accept what the
8 previous agreement was, it goes to Huntsville?
9 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: If we reverse it, then it
11 goes to Rock Island?
12 MAJ EVANS: It stays at Rock Island and realigns
13 under Tank Automotive Command.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: In all cases, it won't be
15 collocated with Tank Command?
16 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir, you're right.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Are there other parts of
18 TACOM that are not collocated with the Headquarters?
19 MAJ EVANS: Not to my knowledge, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: So, this would be the only
21 one, to your knowledge?
22 MAJ EVANS: Again, I don't have good knowledge on

1 that.
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Right, I understand.
3 MAJ EVANS: What the Army and DOD have determined,
4 though, is that the functions within this materiel management
5 function is better aligned with the Tank Automotive side than
6 it is with the missile side, and that's why I was saying it's
7 really an operational issue.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The cost of going ahead
9 with this, over the Army's objection, would be $70 million,
10 and the cost of staying put is obviously to avoid that. It
11 seems to me that we are in no position as a Commission to
12 find that the Army is wrong in doing that.
13 MOTION
14 And so I would move that the Commission find that
15 the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from
16 the force structure and plan criteria; therefore, that the
17 Commission adopt the following recommendation of the
18 Secretary of Defense.
19 Instead of sending the materiel management
20 functions of the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical
21 Command to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the
22 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions

1 under Tank Automotive Command with the functions remaining in
2 place at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'll second that.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It has been moved by
5 Commissioner McPherson, seconded by Commissioner Stuart, that
6 we accept the recommendations of the Department of Defense.
7 Is there any discussion on the motion?
8 (No response.)
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Hearing no discussion, we'll
10 start out with Commissioner Johnson.
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: No.
12 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "no."
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
14 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
15 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
18 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
21 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes aye.

1 MS. CHESTON: The Chair votes "aye."
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
4 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: A reluctant aye.
7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye." On
8 the motion to accept the Secretary's recommendation with
9 respect to Rock Island Arsenal, the vote is six in favor, o
10 opposed, the motion passes.
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, why don't you proceed
12 with Marcus Hook?
13 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, we have --
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me just ask you this
15 question. Is that the last topic for the day?
16 MR. BROWN: Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay. Just as a reminder for
18 those people that are still here, about five minutes after
19 complete business for today, there will be a press
20 availability for those Commissioners that want to stay, t
21 can. If they don't want to, that's their right. Tomorro
22 just to remind everybody, we meet at 9:00 o'clock. What

1 the location of that? Is it here, as well? It's in this
2 hearing room at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
3 Mr. Brown, why don't you proceed?
4 MR. BROWN: Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center,
5 Pennsylvania, is the next installation to be discussed.
6 Marcus Hook was added for further consideration on May 21
7 as a result of the request of Congressman Weldon.
8 Slide 105 pictorially shows the location of Marcus
9 Hook. The option under consideration would move Marcu
10 Reserve Center to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard that
11 mothballed by the 1991 Commission. Mr. Bud Bale will
12 discuss this recommendation.
13 MR. BALE: Next slide, please. The Marcus Hook
14 operation is relatively small when you look at the one-t
15 cost of the move and the steady state savings that wou
16 result from it. Next chart, please.
17 MR. BROWN: Let me emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that is
18 a steady state cost for the move over the current operat
19 costs.
20 MR. BALE: Next slide, Mark. These are the issues
21 we are going to discuss today, sir. Next chart. The Ar
22 says that the military value of the Marcus Hook facility

1 high because the reserve unit that is located there, the
2 are only three units like this in the Army inventory. Tw
3 these units have the high density of marine craft. One i
4 active duty, the reserve unit is not.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: What precisely do they do there,
6 that is so unique that there's two other in the inventor
7 MR. BALE: This is a marine water craft. They have
8 tugboats, inland waterway and seagoing tugboats and barg
9 craft. They do the training to keep those people up to
10 Department of Transportation standards, which takes a fe
11 years, six to seven years, and they do the various missi
12 when the Army needs somebody to back them up.
13 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I think a little known fact
14 is that Army owns a huge, at least, relatively speaking,
15 amount of barges, boats, don't they?
16 MR. BALE: Yes.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: This is where those people
18 the reserves get their training.
19 MR. BALE: This is one place, sir. Down at Fort
20 Eustis is the primary facility where the Army trains its

21 marine craft personnel.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Active duty?

MR. BALE: Active duty and reserve people that go
2 down there for basic training and then the advanced training
3 in that.
4 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: So, now does this differ from
5 that?
6 MR. BALE: This is a facility where people -- they
7 do some on-the-job training here to build the skills as they
8 go through, starting out as seamen and working up through the
9 warrant officers, who are the captains of the boats. They do
10 go out during their monthly drills and they actually try to
11 do the types of missions that they would do.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: So, this is maintenance of
13 proficiency for reservists?
14 MR. BALE: It's proficiency training for
15 reservists.
16 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But all those people get
17 their basic instruction, if you will, down at Eustis?
18 MR. BALE: Yes, sir.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Is this the only reserve
20 facility where that's done?
21 MR. BALE: This is the only reserve facility.
22 There is a National Guard unit, a reserve-type, that's out on

1 the West Coast. This is the only one on the East Coast.
2 MR. BROWN: This is a detachment of the 949th
3 Company that is headquartered at Curtis Bay near Baltimore,
4 Maryland.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Active duty?
6 MR. BROWN: No, reserve, also.
7 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Okay.
8 COMMISSIONER STUART: Bud, give us the pros and
9 cons of just moving it a little bit east on the river to
10 Philadelphia. Couldn't they have reserve training there?
11 You are answering a community's requests. They've been
12 making it for years to get this small installation out.
13 Wouldn't we get some advantages of consolidation and the
14 training goes on, and there are lots of reservists around
15 Philadelphia.
16 MR. BALE: Yes, sir. One of the options we looked
17 at was moving it to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard which was
18 mothballed under the '91 BRAC. There are some things wrong
19 with it, and that's the first scenario we look at. The
20 facilities at the Philadelphia Shipyard are older facilities.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: Are what?
22 MR. BALE: Older, dating back to, I think it's 18

1 something, some of them, and the facility that we did find
2 that they could occupy would take about $300,000 just to
3 repair the roof. It would also, then, have to take
4 renovation inside to make it into a facility that they could
5 do actual maintenance and do training inside.
6 The pier facility or dock facility at Philadelphia
7 Navy Shipyard would also take some upgrading in that the
8 utilities and the water supply to it, so they could handle,
9 take these boats that are there. There is a plan by the
10 Navy, too, to put some of the reserve fleet up into the Navy
11 Shipyard coming in '96, in the mothballed status.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: If you believe your cost
13 information, it doesn't make any sense to move it.
14 MR. BALE: The facility, the Marcus Hook facility,
15 is owned by the government today. It's a very low cost to
16 them to operate. They do have to do some periodic
17 maintenance but basically, their cost is utilities for the
18 year and, as you see, it's relatively low.
19 Moving to the Philadelphia yard would take a one
20 time cost just to get it prepared and then would have a
21 higher operating cost because of the size of the facility
22 itself.

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: Why is the community so
2 anxious to move it?
3 MR. BALE: The community has limited land available
4 that they can use for the community. They developed a pa
5 a river-side park, a few years back, and they would like t
6 expand this park, and the Marcus Hook facility sits right
7 the side of it, and it is the only available place that th
8 could expand it to.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: It's such a small
10 installation. On the other hand, I guess your costs are
11 higher in Philadelphia, unless it's factored to the
12 reservists?
13 MR. BALE: The recruiting for the reservists in the
14 Philadelphia, it's about 15 nautical miles or straight dow
15 the Delaware River to the yard, and the recruiting for the
16 reservists probably wouldn't be a factor in doing that, in
17 the short move like that
18 The biggest thing you'll see here is just the cost
19 of the shipyard to move the operation, to get the annual
20 recurring costs and the one-time cost of getting it up to
21 grade where they could actually use it.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I don't see where we could

1 find substantial deviation on this, or does anyone?
2 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'd be interested in whether
3 Matt or Ed had a point of view. Have you seen the facility
4 MR. BEHRMANN: I am very familiar with this from
5 the '91 round. Again, it's here in '93. My read of the
6 situation is that it's a below-threshold action, that we
7 might best address by putting some recommendation language
8 into our report that says Army, Navy and the community of
9 Marcus Hook in a downsized environment.
10 You ought to look at the best way that that little
11 community can best utilize its waterfront, and once we know
12 exactly what's going to happen with the reserves at the
13 Shipyard, it doesn't seem to be a big enough unit that it
14 would present great problems.
15 Maybe once you flush that all out, you could move
16 this in and collocate it with the Navy reserves that are
17 going to be there, but I'm not certain that it's best to do
18 that right now and I'm not certain that you can find a
19 substantial deviation.
20 I think that may be about the best way to resolve
21 this issue and to, you know, strongly encourage the Army an
22 the Navy and this community that, clearly, they want to get

1 their hands on their waterfront property and maybe put it to
2 higher use in their eyes. I see that motivation.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: You have several scenarios
4 here and under Scenario 2, close Marcus Hook and move the
5 Army Reserve Unit to locate with its parent unit at Curtis
6 Bay. How large is that parent unit and how many people are
7 we talking about at the Marcus Hook unit?
8 MR. BALE: The Marcus Hook unit right now has two
9 boats, two tugboats, and two barges. It's scheduled to get
10 two more of each and a 100-ton crane. The parent unit at
11 Curtis Bay is the company headquarters and the rest of the
12 unit, basically. It's a company and its one detachment at
13 Marcus Hook.
14 I would have to get out of my briefcase the exact
15 numbers, but they have two large tugboats. They're getting
16 five more. They've got like five medium-sized tugboats, 12
17 foot, I believe it was, at least 20 barges, a 100-ton crane
18 already there, with another crane -- excuse me.
19 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Let's not belabor the point.
20 I guess maybe what I am suggesting is we put some language in

21 our report to have them look at consolidation.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: One of the issues that I

1 think is relevant is if we cannot find substantial deviation,
2 do we have the authority to make recommendations?
3 MR. BALE: I would have to defer to counsel on
4 that, sir.
5 MS. CHESTON: You don't have the authority to
6 change the Secretary's recommendations and adopt your own in
7 lieu of the Secretary's recommendations, unless you find
8 substantial deviation.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: He recommended nothing on
10 this. I just --
11 MR. BEHRMANN: The answer is no. You'd have to
12 find the force structure violation and/or cost, manpower.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, you're saying that a lot
14 of the things that we recommended that he had not addressed,
15 we could not recommend?
16 MS. CHESTON: No. If there is substantial
17 deviation in the Secretary's recommendations, as a whole,
18 including the fact that the Secretary did not recommend
19 closure or realignment of an installation, then you can add
20 an installation but unless there is a substantial deviation
21 in the fact that Marcus Hook is not on the list, then you
22 cannot recommend action with respect to Marcus Hook.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: We cannot mention Marcus Hook
2 unless we vote to --
3 MS. CHESTON: You cannot formally recommend it. In
4 the general discussion section of the report of Issues for
5 Future Consideration, you may want to mention it, but you
6 can't formally recommend it.
7 COMMISSIONER BYRON: That's basically, I think,
8 what I just said, and I was not advocating formally
9 recommending it, because I don't think today is the time to
10 address that. What I do think, since there is some
11 controversy over it or some question over it, I frankly think
12 it should stay where it is, but if it isn't going to stay,
13 then maybe I think we should make a comment in our report
14 that the Secretary should look at that.
15 MR. BEHRMANN: That's the language that I referred
16 to, Mrs. Byron, something that would not be a formal
17 recommendation but would be, you know, a recommendation that
18 they at least look at it and discuss it and, you know, look
19 at the wishes of the community in this regard.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is a number of issues that
21 we would want to place in the report with regard to future
22 policy and future considerations and this, I think, is

1 appropriate to add to that list. I know that we're roaring
2 through this week and the staff is over-burdened, but what we
3 want to make sure is that our concerns with regard to future
4 recommendations are placed in this report.
5 And they go back to my concern and Commissioner
6 Stuart's concern and others' concern with respect to GSA and
7 the way they cost out leases, with respect to the issue of
8 there's always a bias against leases because it comes out
9 from Operations and Maintenance, and in a real world of
10 depreciation in business, that bias should be eliminated for
11 strict analysis.
12 It deals with the issue, as well, we want in the
13 report of the issue of capacity and that -- I know it's going
14 to happen and that is, that for some services, particularly
15 Air Force already has, is going to give to Secretary Aspin
16 some time in 1995, a statement saying there's no excess
17 capacity anywhere and these are our numbers.
18 We all know that's not the case, and we don't want
19 the Secretary to be hoodwinked by the services' position with
20 respect to that, particularly the Air Force. There are a
21 number of other things that I've mentioned and others
22 And, Mr. Behrmann, if you would make sure that we

1 do include them, and what we may want to do now is to h
2 whoever is drafting that section of the report, you know,
3 draft it in rough and just talk about the areas and give t
4 to the Commissioners some time Wednesday or Thursday, so t
5 we can add our own. When Sunday hits, it's going to be a
6 furious pace around here.
7 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, we've already done
8 that once, as you know, and we view that section as grow
9 day by day. I mean, there are going to be things like th
10 that we're going to address in the next week that are go
11 to rear their head, and they're going to have to be
12 addressed, so we're prepared to add to that. We'll give
13 an update of issues that we see growing and ones that may
14 appropriately addressed in that section.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you give each Commissioner
16 the latest version of that as soon this week as possible
17 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Separate and apart from all the
19 other things that would be in the report?
20 MR. BEHRMANN: I'll hand it to you each personally.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That would be terrific. Thank
22 you very much.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, I think it's
2 easier as we go along, when these issues come up, to ma
3 notation to make sure that they have been taken down.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any other --
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I was just going to say
6 that's an excellent idea. Relating back to Marcus Hook
7 would seem to me we would want to address issues such
8 Marcus Hook generally, rather than specifically, howeve
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, that's dicta and it has
10 not the force of law. Each Commissioner will have a
11 opportunity to have an input in the final language, so
12 your recommendations when you see the language. Any f
13 discussion on Marcus Hook?
14 (No response.)
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a motion? The Chair
16 will entertain a motion.
17 (No response.)
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no motion and we have,
19 therefore, completed the business for the day. We'll
20 press availability in about five minutes.
21 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I make a motion we adjourn.
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do I hear a motion for

1 adjournment?
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I make a motion we adjourn.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion is made by
4 Commissioner Byron.
5 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Second.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Seconded by McPherson. All
7 those in favor, say "aye"?
8 (Chorus of ayes.)
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Opposed?
10 (No response.)
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Passed unanimously.
12 (Whereupon, at 6:09 p.m., the hearing was
13 adjourned.)
14 * * * * *

Hamre's Briefing

ALL MATERIALS AND COMMENTS WILL BE EMBARGOED UNTIL MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6 AT 8 A.M.EST.

Ann — John Hamre used these charts at Press Conference

FY 1996 DoD Budget Briefing
Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller

February 6, 1995

BRIEFING AGENDA

- FY 1995 contingencies and supplemental funding request
- FY 1996 budget
  - Builddown is largely behind us
  - Readiness
  - Quality of life
  - Recapitalization
- Non defense spending in DoD

FY 1995 UNFUNDED CONTINGENCY COSTS

	$ millions
Somalia	$17.3
Rwanda	17.2
Bosnia	311.9
Southwest Asia	1,040.5
Korea	59.0
Haiti	594.6
Cuba	367.1
Unit Inventory Replenishment	89.0
Section 506/552 Recovery	59.1
Total	2,556.7

Training Dollars Become Source of Short-Term Loans to Cover Cash Flow Shortages

Contingency Operations of $2.6B are:

1 % of the total DoD Budget



3 % of DoD O&M



10 % of Flexible O&M





40 % of 4th Quarter Flexible O&M

Services Borrow from 4th Quarter O&M Funds to Finance Contingency Operations until Supplemental Reimbursements are Received.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND IMPACT ON READINESS

To Avoid Readiness Problems:

- Full and Prompt Funding of Supplemental
- New Fiscal Authorities

FY 1996 Budget Highlights

- Funds Bottom-up Review - Strategy and Force Structure
- Builddown is Largely Behind Us
- Protecting Readiness
- Quality of Life Initiative
- Recapitalization

Budget Sustains Bottom-Up Review

- Sustains force structure to support two nearly-simultaneous major regional contingencies
- Maintains overseas presence
- Provides capability to mount contingency operations
- Ensures continuing readiness of forces
- Continues initiatives to reduce threats
  - Military cooperation programs
  - Cooperative Threat Reduction
  - Counterproliferation
- Preserves key elements of modernization & industrial base
- Broadens defense foundations
  - Defense reinvestment
  - Dual use programs

NATIONAL DEFENSE TOPLINE
(Current $ Billions)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
BUDGET AUTHORITY							
DoD military - 051	252.6	246.0	242.8	249.7	256.3	266.2	276.6
DoE & other	10.9	11.8	10.6	9.9	9.9	9.9	9.9
Total national defense	263.5	257.8	253.4	259.6	266.3	276.0	286.5
% Real change	**-1.9**	**-5.3**	**-4.1**	**-0.1**	**-0.2**	**+ 1.1**	**+ 1.2**
OUTLAYS							
DoD military - 051	260.2	250.0	246.1	244.2	249.6	257.9	261.6
DoE & other	11.4	11.4	10.9	10.3	10.0	9.9	9.9
Total national defense	271.6	261.4	257.0	254.5	259.7	267.8	271.5
% Real change	**-5.4**	**-6.6**	**-4.4**	**-3.6**	**-0.6**	**+ 0.6**	**-1.2**

DoD BUDGET AUTHORITY by TITLE
(Dollars in Billions)

	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01
Military Personnel	68.7	67.5	68.2	69.6	70.9	72.3
Operation & Maintenance	91.9	90.6	89.9	92.7	94.8	98.1
Procurement	39.4	43.5	51.4	54.2	62.3	67.3
RDT&E	34.3	32.7	31.7	30.9	30.2	30.6
Military Construction	6.6	4.5	4.6	4.4	3.7	3.9
Family Housing	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.4	4.5	4.6
Other	0.9	- 0.2	- 0.2	0.1	- 0.2	- 0.1
TOTAL	**246.0**	**242.8**	**249.7**	**256.3**	**266.2**	**276.6**

DoD Military Personnel Drawdown

Active Duty End Strength in Millions



Total DoD Personnel Reductions
(in Thousands)





Bottom-up Review Force Structure

	Cold War Base 1990	Base Force	1996	Projected Goal
Land Forces				
Army active divisions	18	12	10	10
Reserve Component Brigades	57	34	47 *	42 *
Marine Corps (3 Active /1Reserve)	4	4	4	4
Navy				
Battle force ships	546	430	365	346
Aircraft carriers				
Active	15	13	11	11
Reserve	1	-	1	1
Navy carrier wings				
Active	13	11	10	10
Reserve	2	2	1	1
Air Force				
Active fighter wings	24	15.3	13	13
Reserve fighter wings	12	11.3	7	7

* Includes 15 enhanced readiness brigades (equivalent to 5 + divisions)

DoD APPROACH TO READINESS

- Readiness is President's first priority for $25 billion increase
- Senior Readiness Oversight Council monitors readiness monthly and takes appropriate action
- Emergency supplemental funds required for unplanned contingencies
- Prompt action required on $2.6 billion FY 95 emergency supplemental
- New "Readiness Preservation Authority" to prevent future readiness shortfalls

PROTECTING READINESS IN FY 96 BUDGET

- Highest priority in Defense Guidance
- OPTEMPO fully funded
- Depot maintenance for 2 MRCs fully funded

Readiness Trends

US Army



US Air Force



US Navy



USMC



OPTEMPO Training Rates

Compared to 1990 Rates



Operational Training Rates

1990-1994 = Actual
1995-2001 = Planned







Operational Training Rates

Flying Hours/Crew/Month

1990-1994 = Actual
1995-2001 = Planned









Depot Maintenance

(Dollars in Billions)









Real Property Maintenance

(Dollars in Billions)







QUALITY OF LIFE PROGRAMS

COMPENSATION

- Fully funds legal pay raise
- Close BAQ gap to within 15% of average housing costs
- Restores equity in cost of living adjustments for military retirees
- New HMO benefits reduce out-of-pocket expenses
- Adds $1.1 billion in FY 96 for personnel transition assistance

COMMUNITY AND FAMILY SUPPORT

- FY 95 and FY 96 Budget includes:
  - $56 million for 20 new child care/day care centers
  - $108 million for 18 recreation/fitness centers and chapels

LIVING ACCOMMODATIONS

- Over next 5 years, $6 billion programmed for:
  - improvement to 9% of family housing
  - 39,500 new bachelor quarters and 9,800 renovations
  - 13% increase in the amount spent on housing per active duty member in FY 1996 over FY 1994 levels

Quality of Life

(Dollars in Billions)









DEFENSE RECAPITALIZATION

- Procurement declines 71% from FY 1985 to FY 1996
- Procurement increases 47% from FY 1996 to FY 2001
- Larger increases needed in the future

Defense Procurement Recapitalization

(FY 96 Dollars in Billions)



MAJOR RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAMS
Procurement Funding in Billions

SYSTEM	Cumulative FY 1996-FY 2001
C-17 aircraft /NDAA	20.6
DDG-51 destroyer	17.1
F/A-18 E/F aircraft	16.9
F-22 aircraft	7.5
New attack submarine	7.4
V-22 tiltrotor aircraft	4.2
M1A2 tank upgrade	3.4

PEOPLE, OUR MOST IMPORTANT ASSET



Overall Budget Assessment

This budget preserves our national security

- DoD funded readiness as its highest priority;
  - People come first
- The force structure is about right
- DoD plans outyear recapitalization

Non-Defense Spending in DoD Budget

- Claims for major non-defense spending
  - CRS study
  - McCain/Warner letter
- Frequently-cited examples
  - Nunn-Lugar
  - Environmental
  - Dual use R&D
- No common framework for evaluation
- Key questions
  - Does DoD budget for non-defense items?
  - How much?

DEFENSE BUDGET CATEGORIES

- Core military activities
- Inherent/prescribed management responsibilities
- Dual use investment
- Broader citizenship responsibilities

- Other

Core Military Activities

- Military operations/contingency operations
- Intelligence
- Developing and buying new weapon systems
- Traditional military liaison activities/joint maneuvers (Marshall Center, Partnership-for-Peace, etc)
- Cooperative Threat Reduction

INHERENT/PRESCRIBED MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Category

- Force management/leadership development
- Acquisition management
- Operations of industrial facilities
- Test and evaluation
- Pollution prevention
- Environmental reclamation (prescribed by law, mandated by courts)
- Medical care for military retirees

Example

- Kaho'olawe Island restoration
- Temporary early retirement
- Separation pay/civilian health benefits
- Guard/reserve transition assistance
- Transition /relocation assistance

DUAL USE INVESTMENT

Category

- National Guard domestic mission
- Airport operations (Joint Air Force/civilian airports)
- Air traffic control
- Commercial use of government space launch facilities
- Corps of Engineers

Example

- Technology Reinvestment Program
- National Airspace System Plan
- High performance computing modernization
- Global Positioning System

BROADER CITIZENSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES

Category

- Disaster assistance
- Humanitarian assistance
- Community assistance for base closings
- Drug interdiction

Example

- Olympics
- Humanitarian mine-clearing training

Defense Categories



Core Military Activities
Programs that contribute to the warfighting capabilities of the DoD or reduce the threat to national security.
Examples: Weapons Procurement, Nunn/Lugar

Inherent/Prescribed Management Responsibilities
Programs that support acquisition and industrial management, current and former personnel, or are legal mandates.
Examples: Environmental Reclamation, Personnel Transition Assistance

Dual Use
Programs that have both a military and commercial application.
Examples: Technology Reinvestment, High Performance Computing

Broader Citizenship Responsibilities
Governmental programs for which DoD has substantial expertise.
Examples: Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance, Drug Interdiction

Other
Programs that have merit but represent responsibilities of Domestic Agencies.
Example: Medical Research

BACKUP CHARTS

FOR

FY 1996 BUDGET BRIEFING

PERSONNEL/FORCE STRUCTURE/MISCELLANEOUS

Ann,
These are backup charts
- 1st 4 deal with BRAC.
- The 5th one is Environmental
- Others are "odds & ends"

BRAC FUNDING IN FY 1996 BUDGET

(Dollars in Millions)

		FY 1995	FY 1996
BRAC I	88	88	-
BRAC II	91	607	1,044
BRAC III	93	2,114	2,149
BRAC IV	95	-	784
TOTAL		**2,809**	**3,977**

MAJOR BASE CLOSURES

- Major bases to be closed in BRAC I through BRAC III

	Approved	Closed to Date
BRAC I	16	13
BRAC II	26	17
BRAC III	28	3
TOTAL	70	33

- Net savings:
  - $6.6 billion during 6-year implementation periods (FY 1990-99)
  - $4.5 billion annually after implementation

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURES (BRAC)

- FY 96 budget includes $3.9 billion for BRAC
  - BRAC IV budget is $784 million
- BRAC IV recommendations due to Commission in March 1995
- 70 major domestic bases closed in BRAC I thru III with net savings of:
  - $6.6 billion during the 6-Year implementation periods (FY 1990-99)
  - $4.5 billion annually after implementation


Environmental Funding
(FY 96 Dollars in Billions)
2.5
2
1.5
1
.5
0
Actual
FY 1995 Plan
FY 1996 Plan
FY 87
FY 89
FY 91
FY 93
FY 95
FY 97
FY 99
FY 01

BACKUP CHARTS

FOR

FY 1996 BUDGET BRIEFING

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

"...SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS REMAINS UNCERTAIN AND UNTIMELY. THE UNCERTAINTY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION OFTEN LEADS TO CANCELED TRAINING OR SCALED DOWN EXECUTION AS THE SERVICES HUSBAND SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO GET THROUGH THE FISCAL YEAR. WHEN SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING DOES ARRIVE, IT IS OFTEN TOO LATE TO RECAPTURE LOST TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES."

CJCS FORCE READINESS ASSESSMENT

FY 1995 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS

FY 1994 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTALS

- The Department received two emergency supplemental appropriations in FY 1994:

  - $1.2 billion in February 1994, primarily for operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Southwest Asia. (Only $347 million in new BA)

  - $299 million on September 30, 1994 for humanitarian efforts in Rwanda and processing refugees from Cuba.

FY 1995 CONTINGENCY COSTS

(Initially a "SMALL PROBLEM")



FY 1995 DoD BUDGET = $253 B

FISCAL LAW CREATES A BIGGER PROBLEM

- Fiscal Year Integrity
- Restriction in Transfer Authority
- "Bona Fide" Need
- Anti-Deficiency

BOTTOM LINE: Unfunded Contingencies Can **ONLY** be Paid from Current Year O&M

FY 1995 O&M BUDGET $92 BILLION



Flexibility = $ 27 B

OPTEMPO	10 B
Depot Maintenance	5 B
Force Opns Support/Transportation	12 B

No Flexibility = $ 45 B

Civilian Pay & Benefits	23 B
Health Program	10 B
Environmental	4 B
Utilities/Rents	3 B
Mobilization/Other	5 B

Limited Flexibility = $ 20 B

Guard/Reserves	6 B
Contract Services/Other	5 B
Drug Interdiction	1 B
Recruiting/Training	3 B
Support Activities	5 B

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND IMPACT ON READINESS

TO AVOID READINESS PROBLEMS:

- Full and Prompt Funding of Supplemental
- New Fiscal Authorities

BACKUP CHARTS

FOR

FY 1996 BUDGET BRIEFING

BUDGET SHORTFALL

PREPARATION FOR FY 1996 BUDGET

- DoD Acknowledged $49 billion shortfall (1996-2001)
- President Clinton's Response
- Famous "Deutch" Memo
- Economic Assumptions

SOLVING THE FY 1996 - FY 2001 PROBLEM



PRESIDENTIAL DEFENSE FUNDING INITIATIVE

($ Billions)

	1996	1996-01
Improve Quality of Life	0.5	3.0
Full Military Pay Raise Thru FY 99	0.7	7.8
Readiness Increases	1.1	6.1
Outyear Modernization	--	8.1
Total	2.3	25.0

DOD DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY
($ Billions)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Cum
FY 95 Budget	244.2	241.0	247.5	253.8	(260.9)	(268.4)	1,515.8
RRF Transfer	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 1.0
President's Add	+ 2.3	+ 2.3	+ 2.8	+ 3.1	+ 5.8	+ 8.7	+ 25.0
FY 96 Budget	246.7	243.5	250.5	257.1	266.9	277.3	1,542.0

OTHER PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS
($ Billions)

"DEUTCH MEMO"	Savings FY 96-01
Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS)--No Change	---
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)--No Change	---
Cancel the Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile (TSSAM)	2.1
Restructure Comanche Helicopter (Prototype Program Only)	2.1
Reduce Procurement of DDG-51 from 18 to 16 (FY 1996-01)	1.5
Deferred 1 New Attack Submarine (from 2001 to 2002)	1.5
Commit Production of V-22 Osprey for Marine Corps & SOF	0.1
Delay Development of Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)	0.2
Reduce FY 1996 R&D Funding for F-22	0.2
Sub Total	7.7
Other Program Budget Decisions	4.3
Total Program/Budget Cuts	12.0

SAVINGS FROM MORE FAVORABLE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

($ Billions)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Cum
Lower Inflation							
Purchases (GDP)	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-4.2
Fuel	--	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.6	-0.7	-2.2
Lower ECI Rates							
Military	-0.4	-0.5	-0.5	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7	-3.3
Civilians	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.5	-0.7	-2.5
Total Inflation and Pay	**-1.5**	**-1.7**	**-1.9**	**-2.1**	**-2.4**	**-2.7**	**-12.2**

GAO/CBO FY 95-FY 99 Shortfall Estimates

(Dollars in Billions)

Categories	CBO	GAO	DoD Action
Immediate Costs:			
Inflation	20	22	Wedge Eliminated
Pay Increases	23	26	Full Military Pay Raise Funded
Quality of Life	21	-	Fully Funded
BRAC	7	13	Improved BRAC methodology
Contingency Costs:			
On-going Operations	6	6	Supplementals
Potential Future Costs:			
Weapons cost growth	8-32	58	Expected program cost funded
Environmental cleanup	0-20	20	FY 94-FY 95 broke pattern of budget increases
DMRD Savings	-	27	Odeen panel budget increase
TOTAL	65-110	172	

DoD PERSONNEL
(End Strength In Thousands)

	FY 1995	Change	FY 1996	Change	FY 1997
ACTIVE MILITARY					
Army	510	-15	495	-	495
Navy	439	-11	428	-19	409
Marine Corps	174	-	174	-	174
Air Force	400	-12	388	-3	385
Total Active	**1,523**	**-38**	**1,485**	**-21**	**1,464**
Selected Reserves	**965**	**-38**	**927**	**-26**	**901**
Civilians	**867**	**-38**	**829**	**-30**	**799**

Personnel Levels--Builddown is Behind Us
(End Strength in Thousands)

	Cold War Base 1990	1995	1996	1997	Projected Goal
Active Military					
Army	751	510	495	495	495
Navy	583	439	428	409	394
Marine Corps	197	174	174	174	174
Air Force	539	400	388	385	382
Total	2,070	1,523	1,485	1,464	1,445
Selected Reserves					
Army	729	629	603	582	575
Navy/Marine Corps	197	142	141	138	138
Air Force	202	194	183	180	180
Total	1,128	965	927	900	893
Civilians					
Army	380	270	257	249	232
Navy/Marine Corps	341	254	241	231	209
Air Force	249	190	184	179	161
Defense Agencies	103	153	147	141	126
Total	1,073	867	829	799	728

OPERATIONAL TRAINING RATES

	FY 1985	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997
Army				
Annual Tank Miles	850	800	800	800
Flying Hours per Crew per Month	13.1	14.5	14.5	14.5
Navy				
Flying Hours per Crew per Month	25	24	24	24
Ship Steaming Days Per Quarter				
• Deployed Fleet	53.6	50.5	50.5	50.5
• Nondeployed Fleet	27.4	29	29	29
Air Force				
Flying Hours per Crew per Month				
• Fighter/Attack Aircraft	19.1	19.7	19.7	19.7
JCS Exercises				
C-141 Equivalent Flying Hours	75.6	59.6	60.0	60.0

User's Manual

COBRA

Cost Of Base Realignment Actions

V5.01

October 1994

Prepared for the COBRA Joint Process Action Team by:

RICHARDSON and KIRMSE, Inc.
ENGINEERING • PLANNING • SYSTEMS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE MANUAL

The modifications and enhancements that have been incorporated into this version of COBRA make its operations and capabilities different from previous versions. In addition, COBRA now comes with a new module called ADDER. This manual should therefore be read completely, even if the user is familiar with COBRA. The manual is written so that after its initial reading, users need generally refer only to the section(s) where he or she has a question.

Throughout the manual, when a single key-press is described, the notation < > is used (for example <ENTER> means to press the ENTER key). Similarly, when two keys are to be pressed at the same time, they are both shown within the < > (for example <ALT-S> means to press the ALT and the S keys, simultaneously). When a string of characters are to be pressed they will be shown within quotation marks (for example "B:" means to press the B and the : keys, sequentially).

1.2 BACKGROUND

The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model was originally developed in early 1988 by the United States Air Force Cost Center, in conjunction with the Logistics Management Institute, to evaluate the cost of Air Force stationing actions. This Lotus Spreadsheet based model was adopted by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission to evaluate and compare the relative costs of stationing alternatives. Throughout 1988 the Commission reviewed and revised the model so it could be used by all Military Departments. As a result it was used to produce all cost estimates used by the 1988 Closure Commission.

At the conclusion of the Commission, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the COBRA model and provided the Commission with a list of minor model modifications, and stated in their final report "...that the Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model used by the Commission and the Military Departments is a conceptionally sound tool for evaluating costs, savings, and payback periods." Consequently, the model was revised once more to satisfy those GAO concerns that could be accommodated. Ultimately, this model was released in May 1989 and was selected as the starting point to evaluate the 1991 Commission stationing actions. It soon became apparent that the revised Lotus based COBRA would have difficulty satisfying the long term Department of Defense (DOD) requirements.

The Department of the Army then took over the continued development and modification of the COBRA model. Richardson and Kirmse Engineering, Incorporated was tasked to make a detailed examination of the model and to provide recommendations as to how it could be improved. The Lotus 1-2-3 COBRA was found to be a valuable analytical tool, but with several limitations. R&K Engineering subsequently converted COBRA to a true computer model using

the Pascal programming language. Several versions of this new COBRA program were developed and used for the 1991 Commission. The latest version in general use was V1.42.

In early 1992, R&K was tasked to make a series of enhancements to COBRA in preparation for the 1993 Commission. The result was a varitey of improvement changes in the COBRA model. The Version 4.00 series of COBRA enabled the model closure/realignment scenarios to involve up to 15 separate bases, each of which could be a Losing Base, a Gaining Base, or both a Losing and a Gaining Base. It incorporated numerous improvements to accommodate unique costs and savings, which allowed industrial activities to be modeled without disconnecting the model's standard algorithms. In those cases where the unique attributes of an activity could not be accommodated by the standard algorithms, a "Unique Activities" data entry screen was used. The 4.00 series revised calculations to better account for Construction Costs, Transfer of Military Students, Costs of Local Moves, CHAMPUS Costs, Homeowners Assistance Costs, and several other cost/savings factors. This series also made input of data more easy and logical, with information on a single base input on a small number of base-specific screens rather than being spread over many general input screens.

In 1994, R&K Engineering was again tasked to make a series of enhancements to COBRA in preparation for the 1995 Commission. The result is as described in this manual.

1.3 CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONS

The COBRA model is designed to estimate the costs and savings associated with a proposed base closure or realignment action, using data that is readily available to the Military Department staffs without extensive field studies. In addition, the model can be used to compare the relative cost differences between various stationing alternatives. It is not designed to produce budget estimates, but to provide a consistent method of evaluating closure and realignment options. Although COBRA produces data formatted similarly to Military Department budget data, an exact match between the two should not be expected.

COBRA calculates the costs and savings of base closure/realignment scenarios over a period of 20 years, or longer if necessary. It models all activities (moves, construction, procurements, sales, closures) as taking place during the first 6 years, and thereafter all costs and savings are treated as steady-state. The key output value produced is the Return on Investment Year. This is the point in time where savings generated equal (and then exceed) costs incurred. In other words, this is the point when the realignment/closure has paid for itself and net savings start to accrue.

COBRA allows closure/realignment scenarios to be compared in terms of when Return on Investment is achieved. Should Return on Investment not be achieved for a specific scenario, that action will result in a net cost rather than savings. Similarly, if a scenario has a long Payback Period (late Return on Investment) it will not start to generate net savings until well after the action would have been completed. Such an action would generally be less beneficial

than one with an earlier Return on Investment.

Net Present Value costs and savings figures generated are reported as Present Value dollars. In simple terms, this is the amount of dollars that would have to be invested during the Base Year at the assumed discount (interest) rate to cover the costs or match the savings at a specific point in the future. This is important because it eliminates artificial distinctions between scenarios based on inflation, while highlighting the affects of timing on model results.

This version of COBRA also includes a companion program called ADDER. ADDER loads the output data from one or more COBRA scenarios and adds all costs and savings into one set of reports for the total group of scenarios.

CHAPTER 2

INSTALLATION of COBRA V5.01

CHAPTER 2 - INSTALLATION of COBRA V5.01

2.1 HARDWARE REQUIRED

COBRA will run on any IBM 286-compatible computer with MS-DOS 3.00 or higher, 640K of RAM, and at least one megabyte of hard drive space to hold the program, input data, and reports. The minimum RECOMMENDED configuration is a 25 MHz 386 computer with at least one megabyte of RAM, MS-DOS 5.0 running in high memory, and a hard disk with an access time of 30 ms or less with ten megabytes free before installing COBRA. COBRA will run on monochrome systems; but color is highly recommended, since color is used to emphasize different fields on the menus and input screens.

2.2 INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS

COBRA is supplied on a floppy diskette as a file named COBIN501.EXE, a self-extracting archive containing the program, overlay, and assorted data files. The diskette also contains INSTALL.EXE, a program for safely creating directories and installing COBRA, and a text file named READ.ME containing installation instructions.

Insert the COBRA distribution diskette into one of your floppy disk drives. (For the purpose of illustration, we will assume you use the "A:" drive; if not, then use "B:" wherever the instructions say "A:".)

Type the command "A:INSTALL", then press <ENTER>. This will execute the program INSTALL.EXE supplied on the floppy disk that you inserted in the "A:" drive and start the installation process. If you have Microsoft Windows, do not install COBRA while Windows is running.

The COBRA installation program will then display the current disk and directory in use by MS-DOS, the amount of free space left on that disk, and a menu of options for the user (see Figure 1). COBRA will not be installed on any disk with less than one megabyte (a little over one million bytes) of available space.

```
COBRA
v5.01 Install Program

The current directory is: C:\DOS\
The current directory has 19,709,952 bytes free.

Press <1> to put COBRA files in current directory
Press <2> to put COBRA files in C:\COBRA
Press <3> to change to a different directory
Press <ESC> to cancel COBRA installation
```

FIGURE 1 - Installation Screen

Pressing <1> will cause COBRA and ADDER to be installed in the current directory if there is sufficient free space on the disk. If there is not, the program will issue a warning and return to the Installation Screen. If an old version of COBRA is already in the directory, those program and system files will be overwritten.

Pressing <2> will install COBRA and ADDER in a directory named "C:\COBRA". If there is no "C:\COBRA" directory, the installation program will create it. As with option <1>, it will check for available disk space and will overwrite any old COBRA system and program files. If you install COBRA in C:\COBRA and have Microsoft Windows in C:\WINDOWS, the installation program will give you the option of adding COBRA and ADDER icons to your Windows desktop.

Pressing <3> will allow the user to change the current drive and directory. The user will be asked to enter the new drive and directory (such as "D:\COB"). If the directory does not exist, the installation program will create it. If for some reason the directory cannot be created (such as a write-protected or non-existent disk), the program will issue a warning and return to the Installation Screen. The user should now press <1> to complete the installation in the new drive and directory.

Pressing <ESC> will cancel the COBRA installation and return the user to DOS. When COBRA has been successfully installed using options <1> or <2>, the user will be returned to the DOS prompt, in the directory to which COBRA has been installed. Enter "COBRA" then if you want to run COBRA, or "ADDER" to run ADDER.

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CHAPTER 3

OPERATING COBRA

CHAPTER 3 - OPERATING COBRA

It is assumed that users of COBRA will be generally familiar with the operation of the computer. No general keyboard instructions are therefore provided in this manual; rather only COBRA specific information will be included. Should users require generalized computer operation information they should consult their computer manual(s). The most efficient operation of COBRA is achieved by using a mouse wherever possible. Therefore, instructions in this manual will key on "mouse commands" to the system. However, in all cases "keyboard commands" will also be described so that the COBRA user can individually determine how he or she is most comfortable "navigating" through COBRA.

3.1 INITIATING COBRA

To open the COBRA program, access the disk/directory where COBRA has been installed (see Chapter 2), type "COBRA" and press <ENTER>. The "About COBRA" window will then appear (see Figure 2).

This welcome screen identifies the COBRA model and its version number; the telephone number of R&K Engineering, the COBRA developer, is also provided. The lower-right corner of the window contains the amount of free memory available, in K (kilobytes). This window can be accessed later on (see Section 3.3) to check the current free memory.

To close the "About COBRA" window and access the Main Menu, click on the "OK" at the bottom-center of the window. Other methods of closing the window are: clicking on the Close Window Square [■] at the upper-left of the window border; clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border; pressing <ENTER>; or pressing <ESC>.

3.2 THE MAIN MENU

The Main Menu is the starting point for using the COBRA program. Upon closing the initial display of the "About COBRA" window, the screen will display the Main Menu (see Figure 3). Along the top of this screen are displayed the "Help", "File", "DataBase", "Input Data", "Reports", "Windows", and "Quit" menu selections. During the use of COBRA additional menu windows, reports, and other data are displayed on the screen, however the Main Menu selections will always remain displayed behind any other active displays. Each of the Main Menu selections is summarized below.



FIGURE 2 - "About COBRA" Window



FIGURE 3 - Main Menu

3.3 HELP

From the Main Menu the Help selection is made by either clicking on the word "Help" along the top of the Main Menu screen, or by pressing <ALT-H>. The Help menu will appear (see Figure 4). By clicking on the words "About COBRA" or by pressing <A>, the "About COBRA" window will again be displayed (see Section 3.1, above). The Help menu may be closed by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, by clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.3.1 Viewing Help

Users of COBRA may want to access the on-screen COBRA Help Text while they are working. This can be done by selecting a Help file to view or by invoking the Context-Sensitive Help. Help files can be selected only from the Help menu. By clicking on the words "View Help" or by pressing <V>, the "View Help" window is displayed (see Figure 5). This window may also be opened from the Main Menu, by pressing <ALT-F1>. The user can view the Help text by double clicking on the Help file which is desired. The Help files may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the Help files list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired Help file. The highlighted Help file can then be viewed by clicking on the word "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. The user may move up or down through the Help text using the mouse or the <↑> <↓> and <Page Up> <Page Down> keys. This window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.3.2 Printing Help

The user may want to print one of the Help files. This is done by clicking on the words "Print Help" on the Help menu or by pressing <P>. This will display the "Print Help" window, from which a Help file may be selected for printing exactly as it would be selected for viewing (see Section 3.3.1 above).

3.3.3 Context-Sensitive Help

The COBRA user may want to access information which is specific to the place in COBRA where he or she is at the time. This is most easily done through the use of Context-Sensitive Help. This feature is invoked by pressing <F1>, or clicking on "F1-Help", which will display on-screen text intended to provide information specific to that place in COBRA where the user is at the time. The user may move up or down through the Help text using the mouse or the <↑> <↓> and <Page Up> <Page Down> keys.



FIGURE 4 - Help Menu



FIGURE 5 - "View Help" Window

A number of highlighted cross-reference words in the Context-Sensitive Help text are provided so the user can skip to other Help texts which cover related subjects. The user can change the designated keyword in the text by clicking on it, or by pressing <TAB> one or more times. Then press <ENTER> to shift to the cross-referenced Help text.

3.3.4 Files in Use

The user should always be aware of which Data and Standard Factors files are in use. By clicking on the words "Files Used" on the Help menu or by pressing <F>, the "Files in Use" window is displayed (see Figure 6). If Data and Standard Factors files are in Program memory at the time this window is opened, they will be indicated here. The Data file in use is also displayed along the bottom border of the Main Menu and will remain there until replaced in, or cleared from Program memory. The window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the "OK", or by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing either <ENTER> or <ESC>.

3.3.5 On-Screen Calculator

By clicking on the word "Calculator" or by pressing <C> from the Help menu, a simple four-function calculator will be displayed (see Figure 7). This can also be done from the Main Menu by pressing <ALT-C>. To operate the calculator you can either click on the buttons with the mouse, or use the keyboard. The calculator has four arithmatic function keys, ten number keys, and "C" to clear the calculator, "←" to erase the last character entered, and "±" to change the sign of the number in the display. The keyboard keys <Backspace> and <_> also erase the last character and change sign, respectively. The calculator may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.3.6 On-Screen Calendar

By clicking on the word "CalenDar" or by pressing <D> on the Help menu, a calendar of the current month can be displayed (see Figure 7). The current date is also highlighted. Past and future months can be displayed by clicking on the triangles (▼ and ▲) or by pressing the <+> and <-> keys. The calendar may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 6 - "Files in Use" Window



FIGURE 7 - Calculator and Calendar

3.3.7 Changing COBRA Set-Up

COBRA has several options for generating and printing its reports that can be changed by using the "COBRA Setup" Window (see Figure 8). By clicking on the words "COBRA Setup" or by pressing <S> from the Help Menu, the "COBRA Setup" window is displayed. To cancel any change(s), close the window and return to the Main Menu click on the word "Cancel", or click on the Close Window Square, or press <ESC>. Click on "OK" to save changes.

COBRA will format its output for most dot matrix (those that are EPSON/IBM compatible) and laser (those that are are HP LaserJet compatible) printers, or print them unformatted (requiring a wide-carriage printer for most reports). The user can select which type of printer is to be used, along with a printer device name for that printer. If printing with COBRA does not work, it may be necessary to change the Printer Set-Up inside of COBRA. By clicking on the words "Printer Setup" on the Help menu or by pressing <P>, the "Printer Setup" window is displayed (see Figure 36). The default device name is "PRN" which will work with most system configurations. Should a system not be able to print with this setting (a LAN for example), or should the system have multiple printers (a LaserJet on LPT1: and a dot matrix on LPT2:, for example) the correct device name can be entered in the appropriate "Device Name" field.

If the user wants to change the directory to be used to store Reports, the new entry can be typed into the "Report Directory" field. This may be useful if the user wants to run a new scenario or set of Reports, while continuing to save the current Reports in memory. Unless the directory is changed, any new Reports will automatically overwrite the old ones.

The user can limit the scope of Input Data reports generated by selecting which Input screens (see Chapter 4) are included in the report. Click on the desired screen names, or press <ALT> and the highlighted letter, to turn that screen on or off (those screens with an "X" next to them will be included in future Input Data reports.

Other options available are whether or not the inflation values on Standard Factors Screen Two will be applied to the Appropriation Detail report, whether or not some reports will have pages for each individual base, and whether or not to include a second page with the COBRA Summary report listing total Costs and Savings. Click on the desired options, or press <ALT> and the highlighted letter, to turn that option on or off (those options with an "X" next to them will be used in future reports.

3.4 FILE

The File selection is made by either clicking on the word "File" along the top of the Main Menu screen, or by pressing <ALT-F>. The File menu will appear (see Figure 9). The File menu may be closed by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, by clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 8 - "COBRA Setup" Window



FIGURE 9 - File Menu

3.4.1 Loading Saved Data

COBRA users may want to run a saved scenario, or retrieve a saved scenario in order to confirm entries and/or make changes. By clicking on the words "Load Data File" on the File menu or by pressing <L>, the "Load Data File" window is displayed (see Figure 10). This window may also be opened from the Main Menu, by pressing <ALT-L>. Retrieval of a saved data set (in the form "*.CBR") is done by double clicking on the file name desired. The Files list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the Data files list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired Data file. The highlighted Data file can be retrieved by clicking on the word "Open" or by pressing <ENTER>. **Any Data set which was in COBRA Program memory will be removed and replaced when the new Data set is loaded.** Once loaded, the file name of the Data set will be displayed at the bottom border as described in Section 3.3.4 above. This window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>. Note that scenario files created with COBRA versions 4.00 through 4.04 can be loaded into COBRA version 5.01.

3.4.2 Saving Current Data

New or revised scenarios should be saved for future retrieval and use. By clicking on the words "Save Data File" on the File menu or by pressing <S>, the "Save Data File" window is displayed (see Figure 11). This window may also be opened from the Main Menu, by pressing <ALT-S>. The saving of the currently used data set is done by typing the Data file name desired or leaving the previously saved file name, and then clicking on the word "Save". The file may also be saved by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the save canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>. The user should save the scenario before executing; particularly if the scenario is a new one, so that the filename will appear on all of the reports generated.

3.4.3 File Directory

The user may want to review the list of COBRA files in a directory. This is done by clicking on the words "File Directory" on the File menu or by pressing <F>. This can also be done from the Main Menu by pressing <F2>. This creates and displays a Report named "COBFILES.RPT" which lists all Data files and Standard Factors files in the current directory. These files are displayed with the English text name on the left (this is the user created common name/description), and the complete path name on the right (includes the user defined file name). The mouse or <↑> <↓> keys can be used to scroll through the files list. This window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 10 - "Load Data File" Window



FIGURE 11 - "Save Data File" Window

3.4.4 Clearing the Data Set

To create a COBRA scenario from scratch, the Program memory should be cleared of any other Data set that may have been in use. By clicking on the words "Clear Data Set" on the File menu or by pressing <C>, the currently used Data Set is removed from the COBRA Program memory (If previously saved, it remains saved). A new Data Set can then be created using the "Input Data" menu. This window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.4.5 Deleting Saved Data

The user may want to permanently remove a scenario Data set from disk when it is outdated and no longer under consideration. By clicking on the words "Delete Data File" on the File menu or by pressing <D>, the "Delete Data File" window is displayed (see Figure 10). The deletion of a saved Data file is done by double clicking on the file to be deleted. The Data files list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired Data file. The highlighted Data file can then be deleted and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the delete function canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.4.6 Loading Standard Factors

If the scenario Data set does not have a specific Standard Factors file associated with it, or if the user wants to change the Standard Factors file to be used, the new Standard Factors file must be loaded into Program memory. By clicking on the words "LOad Standard Factors" on the File menu or by pressing <O>, the "Load Standard Factors" window is displayed (see Figure 11). The retrieval of a saved Standard Factors file (in the form "*.SFF") is done by double clicking on the file name desired. The Files list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the Standard Factors files list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired file. The highlighted Standard Factors file can be retrieved by clicking on the word "Open" or by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 12 - "Delete Data File" Window



FIGURE 13 - "Load Standard Factors" Window

3.4.7 Saving Standard Factors

New or modified Standard Factors files should be saved for future retrieval and use. By clicking on the words "SaVe Standard Factors" on the File menu or by pressing <V>, the "Save Standard Factors" window is displayed. Saving the currently used Standard Factors file is done by typing the Standard Factors file name desired or leaving the previously saved file name, and then clicking on the word "Save". The file may also be saved by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the save canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.4.8 DOS Shell/Change Directory

By clicking on the words "DOS SHell" or by pressing <H> on the File menu, a DOS Shell may be accessed. The user may return to COBRA by typing "EXIT" at the DOS prompt. Similarly, by clicking on the words "ChanGe Dir" or by pressing <G> the "Change Directory" menu is displayed (see Figure 14). The current directory will be displayed on this window, both in directory name and directory tree format. The directory may be changed using this function, with all file loads and saves, from that point on, going to or coming from the new directory. The user may type in the new drive and directory into the "Directory name" field, or may designate the new directory on the "directory tree". The user can click on "Chdir", or press <C> to change the directory but return to this window. By clicking on "OK", or by pressing <ENTER> the directory will be changed, and the user returned to the Main Menu. By clicking on "Revert", or pressing <R> the directory will revert to the initial setting (when the window was first opened) and the user returned to this window. Lastly, by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC> the change directory actions are stopped, and the user returned to the Main Menu.

3.4.9 Exiting COBRA

When the user has finished using COBRA, he or she should always use the Exit command to terminate the program. This is required to prevent inadvertent loss of data by improper termination (such as switching the computer off). By clicking on the Words "EXit COBRA" on the File menu or by pressing <X> the user may exit COBRA and return to the DOS prompt. This command may also be selected by pressing <ALT-X> from the Main Menu. These and Quitting (see section 3.9) are the only proper methods of exiting the COBRA program.



FIGURE 14 - "Change Directory" Window



FIGURE 15 - Database Menu

3.5 DATABASE

COBRA has two types of databases which can assist the user in entering scenario data (see Section 3.6 and Chapter 4). The Database selection is made by either clicking on the word "DataBase" on the Main Menu, or by pressing <ALT-D>. The Database menu will then appear (see Figure 15). The use of these databases will allow the user to save and retrieve both base-specific data (see Section 4.4) and distances between bases (see Section 4.2). The storage and retrieval of this information will make initial scenario data entry easier and will promote consistency between scenarios which involve the same base(s). The Database menu may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.5.1 Loading Base(s)

The Load Base(s) function is used to load information from the Base Information database to Program memory. This database contains information on specific bases which is required to complete Data Entry Screen 4 (see Section 4.4). By clicking on the words "Load Base(s)" on the Database menu or by pressing <L>, the "Load Base(s)" window is displayed (see Figure 16). The selection of the database file to be loaded from is made by clicking on the file name desired. The Files list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the database files list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired database file. The highlighted file can be accessed by clicking on "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the load canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

When a database file has been selected, the "Load Base(s) From DataBase" window is displayed (see Figure 17). This window consists of one or more pages listing all bases which have data stored in the database file. The user may now select up to 15 bases to be loaded from the database into Program memory. The base is selected by clicking on the space in front of the base name, or by typing the highlighted number/letter for the base, or by scrolling to the base name and pressing <SPACE BAR> to select it. A selected base will appear with [X] in front of it on the list. The selected base(s) are loaded into Program memory by clicking on the word "Open", by pressing <O>, or by pressing <ENTER>. To see other pages of this window, click on "Next" or "Previous", or press <N> or <P>. The "Next" and "Previous" selections load the bases selected on the current page, and then move to the new page. To do a quick search for a base, type the base name in the "Search for:" field and click on "Open" or press <O>. Search can also be invoked by pressing <ENTER> once to complete the base name entry, and again pressing <ENTER> to start the search. COBRA will load any bases selected on the current page, and then move to the page containing the name of the base searched for. All bases loaded from the database will automatically be entered into the COBRA scenario, and the stored information for each base entered into Data Entry Screen 4. This window may be closed with no further loading, and the user returned to the Main Menu, by clicking on the word "Cancel", by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 16 - "Load Bases" Window



FIGURE 17 - "Load Base(s) From DataBase" Window

3.5.2 Saving Base(s)

When the user wants to save information from Program memory to the Base Information database, the Save Base(s) function is used. This will save information on selected bases from the current scenario to a Base Information database. By clicking on the words "Save Base(s)" on the Database menu or by pressing <S>, the "Save Base(s)" window is displayed (see Figure 18). The selection of the Base Information database file, to be saved to, is made by clicking on the file name desired. The Files list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the database files list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired database file. The highlighted database file can be accepted by clicking on "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. A new Base Information database file can be created by entering a new file name and clicking on "OK" or pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the save canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

When a Base Information database file has been selected the "Save to DataBase" window is displayed (see Figure 19). This window consists of one page, listing all bases which are used in the current scenario. The user may now select those bases to be saved to the database from Program memory. The base is selected by clicking on the space in front of the base name, or by typing the highlighted number/letter for the base, or by scrolling to the base name and pressing <SPACE BAR> to select it. A selected base will appear with [X] in front of it on the list. The selected base(s) are saved into the database by clicking on "OK", or by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the save canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu, by clicking on the word "Cancel", by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 18 - "Save Base(s)" Window



FIGURE 19 - "Save to DataBase" Window

3.5.3 Loading/Saving Distances

The second COBRA database is the Distances database, which contains the distances between pairs of bases. These can be used to enter distance information required on Data Entry Screen 2 (see Section 4.2). When the user wants to load distances from, or save distances to the Distances database, the Distances function is used. By clicking on the word "Distances" on the Database menu or by pressing <D>, the "Distances" window is displayed (see Figure 20). The selection of the Distances database file to be loaded from/saved to is made by clicking on the file name desired. The Files list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the database files list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired database file. The highlighted database file can be accepted by clicking on "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. A new Distances database file can be created by entering a new file name and clicking on "OK" or pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the save canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

When a Distances database file has been selected the "Distances DataBase" window is displayed (see Figure 21). This window consists of one page, listing all bases which are used in the current scenario. The user may now select a pair of bases to check for distance data. The pair of bases is designated by picking one from the right column and a second from the left column. Bases are designated be clicking on the space in front of the base name or on the name itself, or by typing the highlighted number/letter for the base, or by scrolling to the base and pressing the <SPACE BAR>. Designated bases will have (•) in front of their names.



FIGURE 20 - "Distances" Window



FIGURE 21 - "Distance DataBase" Window

When the user clicks on "OK", or presses <ENTER> a "DB/Memory Transfers" window is displayed (see Figure 22). The "DB/Memory Transfers" window displays the names of the two bases, and the distance currently in Program memory as well as that in the database. If these distances are not the same, the user can transfer the correct value from one data location to the other. This is done by clicking on one or the memory transfer choices (Memory to DataBase or DataBase to Memory) and either clicking on "OK" or pressing <ENTER>. Should no transfer be wanted, the user can click on "Cancel" or press <ESC> to return to the "Distances DataBase" window, and another pair of bases may be selected.

The "Distances DataBase" window also has two shortcut transfer options. By clicking on "All>Mem" or pressing <M>, all distances in the database between pairs of bases in the scenario can be transferred to Program memory. Similarly, by clicking on "All>DB" or by pressing <D>, all distances in Program memory can be transferred to the database. When either of these options is selected COBRA will inform the user as to how many distances were found. **Care must be taken when loading distances to Program memory since COBRA expects only to have distances entered when people/equipment moves are planned between those bases (see Section 4.2).** The "Distance DataBase" window can by closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on "Cancel", by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.6 INPUT DATA

To create a scenario from scratch or to change an already loaded Data set the Input Data selection is used. The Input Data selection is made by either clicking on the words "Input Data" along the top of the Main Menu screen, or by pressing <ALT-I>. The Input Data menu will then appear (see Figure 23). The Data Entry and Standard Factors screens are entered by clicking on the desired screen name. A screen may also be entered by typing the highlighted number/letter (shown in a different color) or by cursoring to the desired screen name and pressing <ENTER>. Data entry is covered in detail in the Chapter 4. The Input Data menu may be closed by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, by clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 22 - "DB/Memory Transfers" Window



FIGURE 23 - Input Data Menu

3.6.1 Deleting a Base

The user may wish to change an existing scenario by simply removing one of the bases involved. The deletion of a base removes the specific base and all activities involving that base from the scenario. By clicking on the words "Delete Bases" on the Input Data menu or by pressing <D>, the "Delete Bases" window is displayed (see Figure 24). The deletion of a base(s) from the scenario is done by designating the base(s) listed on the window by clicking in the space in front of the base name, and then clicking on the word "Delete" or pressing <ENTER>. A base may also be selected by moving the cursor to the base (using the <↑> <↓> keys) and then pressing the Space Bar. Another way to designate the base to be deleted is to type the highlighted number/letter in front of that base name. To cancel the delete function, close the window and return to the Main Menu click on the word "Cancel", or click on the Close Window Square, or press <ESC>.

3.7 REPORTS

COBRA output Reports are created, viewed on the screen, and printed using the Reports selection on the Main Menu. The Reports selection is made by either clicking on the word "Reports" along the top of the Main Menu screen, or by pressing <ALT-R>. The Reports menu will then appear (see Figure 25). The Reports menu may be closed by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, by clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.7.1 Generating Reports (Running COBRA)

The user must generate COBRA Reports using the current Data set and Standard Factors before these Reports can be viewed or printed. By clicking on the word "Execute" on the Reports menu or by pressing <E>, the COBRA program will generate all Reports. **This must be done before Reports can be viewed in the screen or printed.** Reports can also be executed from the Main Menu by pressing <ALT-E>. Output Reports are covered in detail in the Chapter 5. This option also creates an output data file (with the same filename as the COBRA scenario, but with an ".OUT" extension) for use with the ADDER program (see Chapter 6).

If while it is executing, COBRA detects inconsistencies in the scenario data a Scenario Error Report will be generated (see Section 5.13). **This Report should be reviewed, and potential errors resolved before the other COBRA Reports are used for analysis purposes.**



FIGURE 24 - "Delete Bases" Window



FIGURE 25 - Reports Menu

3.7.2 Viewing a Report

Analysis of COBRA outputs can be done by viewing Reports on the computer screen or by studying printed Reports. By clicking on the words "View Report" on the Reports menu or by pressing <V>, the "View Reports" window is displayed (see Figure 26). This can also be done from the Main Menu by pressing <ALT-V>. The selection of a Report for viewing on the screen is done by double clicking on the name of the desired Report. The Report file list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the Reports file list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired Report. The highlighted Report can then be viewed by clicking on the word "Open" or by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.7.3 Printing a Report

Although COBRA output Reports can be viewed on the computer screen, eventually paper copies of at least some Reports will be needed. By clicking on the words "Print Report" on the Reports menu or by pressing <P>, a "Print Reports" window, similar to the "View Reports" window, is displayed. This can also be done from the Main Menu by pressing <ALT-P>. The Report is selected by double clicking on the name of the desired Report. The Reports file list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the Reports file list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired Report. The highlighted Report can then be selected by clicking on the "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. Once a Report is selected it is immediately printed and the user is automatically returned to the Main Menu. To cancel the Report selection before printing, close the window, and return to the Main Menu, click on the word "Cancel", or click on the Close Window Square, or press <ESC>.

3.7.4 Deleting a Report

Standard COBRA Reports (Report formats) should generally not need to be deleted, as new COBRA runs overwrite previous reports. However, by clicking on the words "Delete Report" on the Reports menu or by pressing <R>, the "Delete Report" window will be displayed (see Figure 27). To delete a Report double click on the name of the Report. The Report file list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the list , with the <↑> <↓> keys being used to highlight the desired Report. The highlighted Report can then be deleted by clicking on the "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. To cancel the delete function, close the window and return to the Main Menu click on the word "Cancel", or click on the Close Window Square, or press <ESC>.



FIGURE 26 - "View Reports" Window



FIGURE 27 - "Delete Reports" Window

3.7.5 Viewing or Printing a Group of Reports

Many COBRA users will want to view or print two or more different Reports from an individual scenario. By clicking on the words "Report Groups" or by pressing <G> on the Reports menu, the "Report Groups" window is displayed (see Figure 28). There are several preset Report Groups already programmed, which may be viewed, modified, or added to as described below.

The Report Group is selected by double clicking on the name of desired group on the "Report Groups" window. The Report Group file list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the list, with the <↑> <↓> keys being used to highlight the desired group. The highlighted Report Group can then be selected by clicking on the "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. When a Report Group is selected the "Reports in Group" window is displayed (see Figure 29) showing the Reports that are currently included in that group ([X] indicates that the Report is included). When the word "Clear" is clicked or the <C> is pressed on the "Report Groups" window a blank "Reports in Group" window is displayed. When the word "Cancel" is clicked, or the Close Window Square clicked, or <ESC> pressed the "Report Groups" window is closed and the user returned to the Main Menu.

To add a Report to or delete a Report from the group on the "Reports in Group" window click on the Report name. Reports may also be added/deleted by typing the highlighted letter in front of the Report name, or by highlighting the desired Report (<TAB> to move from right to left column, and <↑> <↓> keys to move cursor to desired Report) and pressing the <Space Bar>. To view the group shown on the "Reports in Group" window click on the word "View" or press <V>. To print the group shown on the "Reports in Group" window click on the word "Print" or press <P>. To save the Report Group shown click on the word "Save" or press <S>. Any view, print, or save actions selected will be executed and the user returned to the "Reports in Group" window. See section 3.8 for a discussion of windows manipulations. To close the window and return to the Main Menu click on the word "Cancel", or click on the Close Window Square, or press <ESC>.



FIGURE 28 - "Report Groups" Menu



FIGURE 29 - "Reports in Group" Window

3.7.6 Saving a Group of Reports

The user will generally want to save a new or modified Report Group for future retrieval and use. By clicking on the word "Save" or pressing <S> on the "Reports in Group" window, the "Save Report Group List" window is displayed (see Figure 30). If the user has changed an existing Report Group, the old name will be displayed, otherwise that field will be blank. The modified group list can be saved under the old name by clicking on the word "Save" or by pressing <ENTER> twice. The modified group or a newly created group list can be saved in the same way, after the new name has been typed in the space indicated. The save function can be canceled and the user returned to the "Reports in Group" window by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

3.7.7 Deleting a Group of Reports

The user may at some point want to delete a Report Group from COBRA. This process will only delete the grouping of the Reports; no Report that was in the group will be deleted from COBRA when the group of Reports is deleted. By clicking on the words "Delete Group" on the Reports menu or by pressing <D>, the "Delete Report Group" window will be displayed (see Figure 31). To delete a Report Group double click on the name of the group. The Report Group file list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the list , with the <↑> <↓> keys being used to highlight the desired group. The highlighted group can then be deleted by clicking on the "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. To cancel the delete function, close the window and return to the Main Menu click on the word "Cancel", or click on the Close Window Square, or press <ESC>.



FIGURE 30 - "Save Report Group List" Window



FIGURE 31 - "Delete Report Group" Window

3.8 WINDOWS

Many of the functions of COBRA, as well as inputs of data and outputs of Reports are accomplished through the use of windows displayed on the computer screen. The easiest way to operate COBRA in this windows environment is by using a mouse, however keyboard operations are also possible. The Windows menu selection is made by either clicking on the word "Windows" along the top of the Main Menu, or by pressing <ALT-W> (see Figure 32). The following discussion will describe general windows operations using mouse, keyboard, and the Windows menu. The sample COBRA window (see Figure 33) is notional; all windows features are described for it, however no actual COBRA window has all of these features active.

(1) Close Window Square. Clicking on this part of a window will close it, just as if <ESC> had been pressed. The Close Window Square is only present if the window is active.

(2) Window Title. By placing the mouse cursor on the title and pressing the mouse button, the window can be moved (dragged) to another location on the computer screen. This can also be done by pressing <CTRL-F5>, or selecting "Size/Move" on the Windows menu; the window can then be moved using the arrow keys, and placed by pressing <ENTER>.

(3) Window Number. A number is only presented when more than one window can be displayed (such as when viewing Reports). Clicking anywhere on an inactive window will make that window active (only one window can be active at a time). Pressing <ALT> and the Window number will also make the window active. Pressing <F6> or selecting "Next" on the Windows menu will shift the active window to the next window; <SHIFT-F6> will shift to the previous window.

(4) Zoom Icon. Clicking on this icon (↑) will expand the window to its full size, and place the unZoom icon in its place. Clicking on the unZoom icon (↓) will shrink the window back to its previous size. Pressing <F5> or selecting "Zoom" on the Windows menu will also toggle the active window between Zoomed and unZoomed conditions.

(5) Vertical Scroll Bar. Clicking on the triangles above or below the bar will scroll the text in the window up or down, while dragging the square will move the text proportionally. The text can also be moved using the <↑> <↓> and <PageUp> or <PageDown> keys.

(6) Horizontal Scroll Bar. Clicking on the triangles left or right of the bar will scroll the text in the window left or right, while dragging the square will move the text proportionally. The text can also be moved using the <←> <→> keys.



FIGURE 32 - Windows Menu



FIGURE 33 - Sample COBRA Window



FIGURE 34 - Tiled/Cascaded Windows

(7) Grow Corner. Clicking here and dragging will allow window to be resized. This can also be done by pressing <CTRL-F5> or selecting "Size/Move" on the Windows menu; the window can then be sized using <SHIFT> and the arrow keys, and placed by pressing <ENTER>.

(8) Input Field. This is where input is entered to COBRA. All Data and Standard Factors screens contain this type of field. Other examples are windows where file names are entered. To use an input field, move the cursor to the field using the mouse or the keyboard, then type in the applicable entry and press <ENTER>.

(9) Button. Examples are "Cancel", "Next", "Save", and "OK" buttons. Clicking on a button with the mouse causes COBRA to react as though an actual button with the same function had been pressed with a finger. Buttons can also be activated by typing the highlighted character, or by pressing <ENTER> to activate the highlighted button.

(10) Checkboxes. These allow the selection of one or more items from a list (such as Reports or Bases). The item(s) are selected by clicking on it/them with the mouse, by typing the highlighted character, or by moving the cursor onto the item and pressing the <SPACE BAR>.

(11) Radio Buttons. These function just like checkboxes, except that only one item may be selected from each list (such as for Printer Setup or the Distance Database). Selecting a second item will cancel the previous selection (just like the buttons on your car radio).

When the user wants to display more than one window on the screen (several Reports for example) they may be sized and moved using the features described above, or they may be automatically displayed as either tiled or cascaded windows (see Figure 34). These automatic windows displays are invoked from the "View Reports" mode by pressing <CTRL-F7> or <F7> respectively. These can also be selected from the Windows menu by selecting "Tile" or "Cascade" or pressing <T> or <C>.

3.9 QUIT

Clicking on the Word "Quit" or pressing <ALT-Q> from the Main Menu is the same as exiting COBRA from the File Menu (see Section 3.4.9).





FIGURE 35 - Confirmation Boxes

3.10 WARNING/CONFIRMATION BOXES

There are several safety features built into COBRA, designed to prevent inadvertent termination of the program, deletion of files, or other possible user errors. These are presented as "Warning" or "Confirm" boxes (see Figure 35) alerting the user to the situation, and requiring the user to indicate if he or she wants to continue with the operation. The choice is made by clicking on the option desired, or by typing the highlighted letter, or by pressing <ENTER> to chose the preferred (highlighted) option.

3.11 ADVANCED OPERATIONS (Using Command-Line Parameters)

To allow for more efficient use of COBRA, or to automate some tasks, the user may issue some COBRA commands **directly** from the DOS command line by use of Command-Line Parameters. These advanced features are completely optional. The user may choose never to use them.

Entering "COBRA" is sufficient to initiate COBRA and provide access to the Main Menu. The user can then load a Data file to work with, through the COBRA menus. If the user wished to have COBRA automatically load a certain Data file when COBRA was initiated, he or she would enter "COBRA /L=filename" at the command prompt. COBRA will be then loaded, and the Data file named "filename" will be in memory when the user is given access to the Main Menu.

To initiate COBRA, load a Data file, and execute it to create Reports, the user would enter "COBRA /E=filename". COBRA will then be initiated, and the user will be given access to the Main Menu after the Data file named "filename" has been loaded and the Reports executed.

If the user wishes to create Reports from a Data file without modifying data before (or after); entering "COBRA /X=filename" will cause COBRA to load the scenario and execute the Reports, after which COBRA will return the computer to the MS-DOS command line. This option is most useful for automating COBRA Report generation through MS-DOS batch files.

Additionally, another parameter can be used to change the directory into which the Reports will be created. By using "/D=directory" after "COBRA" (and another parameter, if specified), the default Reports directory specified in the Set-Up file (see Section 3.8.2) will be overridden by the directory specified in this parameter.

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CHAPTER 4

COBRA DATA INPUT

CHAPTER 4 - COBRA DATA INPUT

The COBRA model requires the input of specific data before it can execute its Reports. This is done through the Data Entry screens and the Standard Factors tables which were briefly described in Section 3.6. Whether data is being input for the first time, or it is being modified from a saved data file, it is important to understand all of the inputs that are components of the COBRA model and therefore impact the reported results. Data Entry screens are constructed so that the user need only select one screen for the initial input/update of data, thereafter moving between screens/pages by clicking on the words "Next" and "Previous"; respective keyboard commands are <ALT-N> and <ALT-P>. This saves the data on a screen/page to Program memory. The screen/page can also be saved and the user return to the Main Menu by clicking on "Done" or pressing <ALT-D>. To close the Data Entry screens without saving and return to the Main Menu click on the Close Window Square or press <ESC>. **Be sure to save new data to Program memory before closing a screen/page, or it will be lost.** The cursor is moved from place to place on a screen by using the mouse or by repeated pressing of the <ENTER>, <TAB>, <Shift-TAB>, or the < ↑ > < ↓ > keys. The four Standard Factors tables are similarly completed. Detailed screen inputs are described below. See Section 3.4.2 for saving current scenario data to disk.

4.1 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 1 - GENERAL SCENARIO

This is the first Data Entry screen, where the general information is entered which defines the scenario being analyzed. Screen 1 (see Figure 36) is contained on one page.



FIGURE 36 - Screen One - General Scenario

Option Package Name

This is a free text name for the realignment/closure option. This appears on most output Reports and on the File Directory (see Section 3.4.3) (Allowed entries up to 20 characters)

Department

The department running the scenario (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or other agency). This entry is only for information, all calculations are identical for the various Military Departments, except that the Army uses vehicle tons rather than numbers of vehicles moved, and ships all vehicles (see Section 4.3). (Allowed entries up to 20 characters; default algorithms are non-Army)

Standard Factor File

The Standard Factor file that is to be used with this scenario. When a Data set has been loaded the previously used Standard Factors file will be displayed here. When the user enters a different name, that new Standard Factors file replaces the old one and becomes the one to be used. When entering a new (never saved) name, users need not enter the path and extension; these will be automatically added. (Allowed entries up to 79 characters)

Year One is Fiscal Year

The first fiscal year of modeled scenario. COBRA will automatically show the correct years on other screens and Reports based on this year. (Allowed entries four digits, 1990 to 2100; the default is 1996)

Auto Time-Phase?

The default ([X], or on) will cause the model to automatically schedule construction and shut downs based on the movement of personnel. Disabling this field (a value of [ ], or off) by clicking on the field allows user entered scheduling (on Screen 5) to be applied to construction and shut downs. (Allowed entries [X] or [ ], default is [X])

Base Name

The name of each base involved in the scenario (up to 15 individual bases per scenario). The names entered will automatically be entered where appropriate in the remainder of the Data Entry screens. See Section 3.5.1 for a discussion of loading bases from the database. (Allowed entries up to 20 characters)

State

The two letter abbreviation of the state where the base is located. (Allowed entries 2 characters)

Close Year (or Deactivate Year)

If the base is to be closed or deactivated, the year that the action will be accomplished. This is used in calculating Return On Investment years (see Section 5.1). (Allowed entries 0 to 6) Entry of the default (0) means that the activity at the base is realignment only. Cost/savings algorithms are different for closing, deactivating, and realigning bases.

Base Deactivated

If the base is to be deactivated rather than closed, enter "Y" for yes. Cost/savings algorithms are different if the base is deactivating rather than closing. (Allowed entries Y or N; Default value is 'N')

Summary/Description

This is an eight-line, free text field for the user to enter a summary description of the scenario being modeled. This is for information only, but if entered, it will be printed on the Realignment Summary Report (see Section 5.1) and will appear in the File Directory (see Section 3.4.3). (Allowed entries up to 78 characters per line)

Time/Date of Data

The time/date of the data used in the scenario; this will be printed on each COBRA output Report. If a saved data file is used the time/date of that file will automatically be displayed here. The user can type in a new time/date in any desired format, or use the Set entry to enter the actual time/date. (Allowed entries up to 20 characters)

Set

This allows the user to enter the actual time/date in the Time/Date of Data field. Entering [X] in the Set space will enter the current time/date in the format HH:MM MM/DD/YYYY. (Allowed entries [X] or [ ])

4.2 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 2 - DISTANCE TABLE

Screen 2 (see Figure 37) will be displayed on one or more pages, depending on the number of bases entered on Screen 1.

```
[■]──────────────── Screen Two - Distance Table ────────────────
                    Distance between Bases (in Miles)

From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  GW III, RI
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Camp Frozen, NY
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Camp Rocky, OH
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Camp Swampy, LA
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Fort Beach, CA
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Fort Buffalo, KS
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Fort Deluxe, CA
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Fort Demo, AR
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Fort Distant, AK
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Lab Complex II, MD
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Lab Compex V, MA
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Machine AAP, MN
From:  Camp Diagon, VA          To:  Base X
From:  GW III, RI               To:  Camp Frozen, NY
From:  GW III, RI               To:  Camp Rocky, OH
From:  GW III, RI               To:  Camp Swampy, LA

                                Next      Previous      Done
```

FIGURE 37 - Screen Two - Distance Table

Distance Between Bases

The distance in miles between bases involved in movements of personnel or equipment. All combinations of bases which were entered on Screen 1 will be presented with a place to enter the distance between them. The user will enter only the distances between bases which, in the scenario, will have movements take place (eg. If the scenario shows movements from Base A to Base B, and from Base B to Base C, the user will enter distances between A and B, and between B and C, but not enter the distance between A and C.). The combinations of bases shown to have moves planned (distances between them entered) will be automatically entered where appropriate on the remainder of the Data Entry screens. See Section 3.5.3 for a discussion of loading distances from the database. (Allowed entries 0 to 15,000 miles)

[illegible] good source for distances between bases [illegible] they determine travel time & distance for travel reimbursements on POS moves.

4.3 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 3 - MOVEMENT TABLE

For each pair of bases with movements planned (as defined by Screen 2 entries), the user will enter the personnel, equipment, and vehicles moving in each of the scenario years. The model will use these figures to calculate personnel and transportation costs and to automatically schedule construction and shutdown at each base. The pairs of bases will be entered automatically; the user need only enter the data below for the appropriate pair of bases. A separate page will be presented for each pair of bases (see Figure 38).



FIGURE 38 - Screen Three - Movement Table

Officer Positions

The total number of officer and warrant officer positions moving from one base of a pair to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 30.000 officers)

Enlisted Positions

The total number of enlisted personnel positions moving from one base of a pair to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 30,000 enlisted personnel)

Civilian Positions

The total number of civilian government employee positions (not contractors) moving from one base of a pair to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 30,000 civilians)

Student Positions

The total number of military student slots (PCS and TDY) moving from one base of a pair to the other in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 30,000 students)

Mission Equipment

The total tons (2000 pounds/ton) of mission equipment moving from one base of a pair to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999 tons)

Support Equipment

The total tons (2000 pounds/ton) of support equipment moving from one base of a pair to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999 tons)

Military Light Vehicles

The total number of vehicles which will be driven from one base of a pair to the other base in each year of the scenario. The Army enters tons rather than number of vehicles. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999 vehicles, or tons for Army)

Heavy/Special Vehicles

The total number of large/special vehicles which will be transported (not driven) from one base of a pair to the other base in each year of the scenario. The Army enters tons rather than number of vehicles. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999 vehicles, or tons for Army)

4.4 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 4 - BASE INFORMATION (STATIC)

For each base identified in the scenario (listed on Screen 1) the user will enter the specific information below. This data defines the starting point at each base as well as lists values which are expected to remain relatively constant at the base over the period of analysis. It will not change over the scenario years, and will change very little, if at all, from one scenario to another. A separate page will be presented for each base (see Figure 39). The user should save this data for each base so that time can be saved when the same base is part of another scenario. See Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.4 for discussions of loading this data from/to the database.

```
[■]──────────── Screen Four - Base Information (Static) ────────────
Base:  Fort Deluxe, CA
    Total Officers (1993):                RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Yr):
    Total Enlisted (1993):            Communication Costs ($K/Yr):
    Total Students (1993):                BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Yr):
   Total Civilians (1993):                    BOS Payroll ($K/Yr):
                                         Fam Housing Costs ($K/Yr):
   % Mil Families On Base:        %
  % Civs Not Will to Move:        %                Area Cost Factor:

 Off Housing Units Vacant:              CHAMPUS In-Patient($/Vis):
 Enl Housing Units Vacant:             CHAMPUS Out-Patient($/Vis):
   Total Facilities (KSF):              CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:        %

    Officer VHA ($/Month):                       Activity Code:
   Enlisted VHA ($/Month):
                                        [ ] Homeowner Assistance Program
    Per Diem Rate ($/Day):              [ ] Unique Activity Information
  Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mi):

                                 Next        Previous        Done
```

FIGURE 39 - Screen Four - Base Information (Static)

Total Officers (Year 0)

The total number of officers assigned to the base at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 50,000 officers)

Total Enlisted Personnel (Year 0)

The total number of enlisted personnel assigned to the base at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 50,000 enlisted personnel)

Total Military Students (Year 0)

The total number of military students assigned to the base at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 50,000 students)

Total Civilian Employees Year (0)

The total number of civilian government employees (not contractors) assigned to the base at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 50,000 civilians)

Percent of Military Families Living On Base

The percent of assigned military families which live on the base at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

Percent Civilians Not Willing to Move

The percent of assigned civilian employees who if their positions were moved to a new base would not be willing to relocate to the new base. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

Officer Housing Units Vacant

The total number of officer family housing units (sets of quarters) which are vacant at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,000 units; usually 0)

Enlisted Housing Units Vacant

The total number of enlisted family housing units (sets of quarters) which are vacant at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,000 units; usually 0)

Total Facilities

The total thousands of square feet of facilities, **except for Family Housing**, existing on the base at the beginning of the scenario. Family housing units and costs are treated separately from the rest of the base facilities. (Allowed entries 0 to 20,000,000 thousand square feet)

Officer VHA

The average monthly Variable Housing Allowance for officers who live off-base. (Allowed entries 0 to 20,000 $/month)

Enlisted VHA

The average monthly Variable Housing Allowance for enlisted personnel who live off-base. (Allowed entries 0 to 20,000 $/month)

Per Diem Rate

The per diem rate at the base. (Allowed entries 0 to 400 $/day).

Freight Cost

The average cost of freight movement expected at the base. (Allowed entries 0.00 to $100.00 $/ton/mile)

RPMA Non-Payroll

The Real Property Maintenance Activities budget for the base at the beginning of the scenario which does not include either payroll or family housing costs (which are accounted for separately). (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $K/Yr)

Communications Costs

The base communications budget at the beginning of the scenario. If not separated from other Base Operations Costs they may be entered as part of the Base Operations Non-Payroll Costs, and no communications costs entered here. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $K/Yr)

Base Operations Non-Payroll

The base operations budget for the base at the beginning of the scenario which does not include military or government civilian payroll costs (which are accounted for separately). Department contracts, which do include contractor payroll costs, should be included in this figure. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $K/Yr)

Base Operations Payroll

The base operations payroll budget at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $K/Yr)

Family Housing Costs

The total family housing budget for the base at the beginning of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $K/Yr)

Area Cost Factor

The published Area Cost Factor for construction costs at the base. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 5.00; Default value is 1.00)

CHAMPUS In-Patient

The average cost paid by CHAMPUS for each in-patient visit of retirees and their dependents to civilian (off-base) hospitals/treatment facilities. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $/visit)

CHAMPUS Out-Patient

The average cost paid by CHAMPUS for each out-patient visit of retirees and their dependents to civilian (off-base) hospitals/treatment facilities. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $/visit)

CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare

The percent of retirees and dependents who are eligible for Medicare rather than CHAMPUS. This is used to adjust CHAMPUS costs for those entitled to Medicare coverage. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent; Default value is 20.9%)

Activity Code

A unique code for each installation, so that ADDER can identify installations in multiple scenarios for the Economic Impact Database (see Chapter 6). (Allowed entries up to six alphanumeric characters; installations with no activity code will be ignored by ADDER when making an Economic Impact Database file.

Homeowner Assistance Program

Designated [X] if the base will have Homeowner Assistance Program costs incurred. When HAP is not applied at a base Relocation Services Entitlement (RSE) costs may be incurred for civilian employees. (Allowed entries On [X] or Off [ ])

Unique Activity Information

Designated [X] if the activity being modeled can not be modeled using standard calculations. Marking this field with an "X" will disconnect several of the model's algorithms and make Screen 8 - "Unique Activities" available for data entry (see Section 4.8). (Allowed entries On [X] or Off [ ])

4.5 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 5 - BASE INFORMATION (DYNAMIC)

For each base identified in the scenario (listed on Screen 1) the user will enter the specific information below. A separate page will be presented for each base (see Figure 40). This data does change over the scenario years, and will be greatly different from one scenario to another.

```
[■]──────────── Screen Five - Base Information (Dynamic) ────────────
 Base:  Camp Rocky, OH      1994      1995      1996      1997      1998      1999
 1-Time Unique Cost($K):
 1-Time Unique Save($K):
 1-Time Moving Cost($K):
 1-Time Moving Save($K):
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):
 Actv Mission Cost*($K):
 Actv Mission Save*($K):
   Misc Recur Cost*($K):
   Misc Recur Save*($K):
  Land +Purch/-Sale($K):
  Construction Schedule:      %         %         %         %         %         %
      Shutdown Schedule:      %         %         %         %         %         %
   Construct Avoid ($K):
 Fam Hous Con Avoid($K):
 Procurement Avoid*($K):
 CHAMPUS InPat*(Vis/Yr):
CHAMPUS OutPat*(Vis/Yr):
 Facility ShutDown(KSF):     (CHAMPUS values are +Increases / -Decreases)
   Fam Housing ShutDown:     %      Next        Previous        Done
 *1999 value used in Beyond years
```

FIGURE 40 - Screen Five - Base Information (Dynamic)

One-Time Unique Costs

The unique non-recurring expenditures during each year which can not be portrayed properly elsewhere. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

One-Time Unique Savings

The unique non-recurring savings during each year which can not be portrayed properly elsewhere. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

One-Time Moving Costs

The unique costs of moving during each year. Examples are special equipment or munitions transportation or calibration of laboratory equipment after it is moved. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

One-Time Moving Savings

The unique savings of moving during each year. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

Environmental Non-Construction Required

The costs (negative if savings) in each scenario year of environmental mitigation, which are not construction. An example would be the purchase of additional sewage treatment, or solid waste disposal from off base. (Allowed entries -99,999 to 999,999 $K)

Activity Mission Costs

The change in mission costs each year realized by the activity(ies) which are involved in the closure/realignment. These are costs incurred by the activity; not part of the normal operations of the base. Examples of activity mission costs are fuel to travel to training areas, supplies, contracts, etc. not part of normal base overhead costs. These costs should be entered for the base the activity is located at. The figure entered in the last year will be assumed to continue throughout the remainder of the modeled years. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

Activity Mission Savings

The change in mission savings each year realized by the activity(ies) which are involved in the closure/realignment. These are savings incurred by the activity; not part of the normal operations of the base. These savings should be entered for the base the activity is located at. The figure entered in the last year will be assumed to continue throughout the remainder of the modeled years. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

Miscellaneous Recurring Costs

Recurring costs in each year, which are not covered in other entries above. The figure entered in the last year will be assumed to continue throughout the remainder of the modeled years. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

Miscellaneous Recurring Savings

Recurring savings in each year, which are not covered in other entries above. The figure entered in the last year will be assumed to continue throughout the remainder of the modeled years. (Allowed entries 0 to 999,999 $K)

Land Purchases/Sales

The purchase or sale price of land during each scenario year. (Allowed entries -99,999 to 999,999 $K)

Construction Schedule

The user may enter the percent of construction to be completed (and therefore the percent of construction costs incurred) in each year. User must have turned on Auto Time-Phase? on Screen 1; otherwise COBRA will calculate the construction schedule based on percentage of personnel moving in the next year (this is so construction is finished before the people who require those facilities are moved. (Allowed entries 0 to 100 percent)

Student Force Structure Changes

The total number of military student position changes at the base in each year, **independent of the closure/realignment action**. Costs/savings resulting from force structure changes are excluded from COBRA calculations. (Allowed entries -30,000 to 30,000 civilians)

Officer Scenario Changes

The total number of officer and warrant officer positions added or eliminated at the base in each year, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Savings resulting from positions eliminated are included in COBRA calculations. (Allowed entries -30,000 to 30,000 officers)

Enlisted Scenario Changes

The total number of enlisted positions added or eliminated at the base in each year, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Savings resulting from positions eliminated are included in COBRA calculations. (Allowed entries -30,000 to 30,000 enlisted)

Civilian Scenario Changes

The total number of civilian positions added or eliminated at the base in each year, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Savings resulting from positions eliminated are included in COBRA calculations. (Allowed entries -30,000 to 30,000 civilians)

Officer Scenario Changes (No Salary Savings)

The total number of officer and warrant officer positions eliminated at the base in each year, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. There are no salary savings resulting from these positions eliminated. (Allowed entries 0 to -30,000 officers)

Enlisted Scenario Changes (No Salary Savings)

The total number of enlisted positions eliminated at the base in each year, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. There are no salary savings resulting from these positions eliminated. (Allowed entries 0 to -30,000 enlisted)

Civilian Scenario Changes (No Salary Savings)

The total number of civilian positions eliminated at the base in each year, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. There are no salary savings resulting from these positions eliminated. (Allowed entries 0 to -30,000 civilians)

Military Caretakers

The total number of military personnel added to or subtracted from a caretaker force at the base for each year. It is assumed that military caretakers are enlisted personnel. This should be used only if the base is deactivating. (Allowed entries -30,000 to 30,000 military)

Civilian Caretakers

The total number of government civilian personnel added to or subtracted from a caretaker force at the base for each year. This should be used only if the base is deactivating. (Allowed entries -30,000 to 30,000 civilians)

4.7 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 7 - BASE INFORMATION (CONSTRUCTION)

For each base identified in the scenario (listed on Screen 1) the user will enter the specific information below. A separate page will be presented for each base (see Figure 42). If construction is not needed at the base, the Screen should be left blank.



FIGURE 42 - Screen Seven - Base Information (Military Construction)

Description

The description of a construction and/or rehabilitation effort required to support the closure/realignment scenario. (Allowed entries up to 20 characters)

Category

The MILCON category of the requirement, from Standard Factors Table 4 (see Section 4.13). The user may, if desired, only type in the first three letters, and the program will automatically complete the entry from those categories on the Construction Standard Factors Table. If the entry is not listed on Standard Factors Table 4, COBRA will change it to "OTHER". (Allowed entries up to 5 characters)

New Construction

The size of the new construction required, in the appropriate units of measure (SF, SY, LF, BL), from Standard Factors Table 4 (see Section 4.13). This value times the unit cost on Standard Factors Table 4, is the basis of new construction costs. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 of the unit of measure)

Rehabilitation

The size of the rehabilitation requirement, in the appropriate units of measure (SF, SY, LF, BL), from Standard Factors Table 4 (see Section 4.13). This value times the unit cost and rehabilitation vs new construction, on Standard Factors Table 2, is the basis of rehabilitation costs. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 of the unit of measure)

Total Cost

The total cost, for the requirement where it is listed, for new construction and/or rehabilitation needed to support the closure/realignment action. **When the user enters a figure here construction costs are not calculated but the figure entered here is accepted as the total cost; COBRA then disregards the New Construction and Rehab figures for Military Construction cost calculations (although these figures are used elsewhere, and must be entered).** Requirements in the "OTHER" category have no unit costs in the Standard Factors table, and must have their Total Costs entered here. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 $K)

Comments

This is a place for the user to enter up to a full line of text to describe or clarify the scope of the construction listed. The screen only shows a small window of this text at one time, however when printed on the Military Construction Assets Report (see Section 5.8) the entire line will appear on the line right below that showing the numerical information for the requirement. (Allowed entries up to 78 characters)

4.8 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 8 - BASE INFORMATION (UNIQUE ACTIVITIES)

This Data Entry screen is available for those situations where the model's standard algorithms do not apply. "Unique Activities" are defined as those installations for which the model's overhead, support for move, caretaker/mothball, and equipment/vehicle movement algorithms cannot be used. Most industrial activities can be accommodated without the use of this screen. In those cases where Screen 8 is required, the user must first designate the base as a Unique Activity on Screen 4 (see Section 4.4). A separate page will be presented for each indicated base (see Figure 43).



FIGURE 43 - Screen Eight - Base Information (Unique Activities)

Administrative and Planning Overhead Costs

The administrative and planning overhead costs for each scenario year. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Operating Overhead Costs

The operating overhead costs for each scenario year; the figure entered for the last year will be assumed to continue through the remainder of the study years. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Mothball Overhead Costs

The mothball overhead costs for each scenario year. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Caretaker Overhead Costs

The caretaker overhead costs for each scenario year; the figure entered for the last year will be assumed to continue through the remainder of the study years. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Other Overhead Costs

The overhead costs for each scenario year which are not included in the overhead costs listed above; the figure entered for the last year will be assumed to continue through the remainder of the study years. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Operating Overhead Savings

The operating overhead savings for each scenario year; the figure entered for the last year will be assumed to continue through the remainder of the study years. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Other Overhead Savings

The overhead savings for each scenario year which are not included in the operating overhead savings listed above; the figure entered for the last year will be assumed to continue through the remainder of the study years. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Packing/Unpacking Moving Costs

The packing and unpacking moving costs for each scenario year. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Freight Moving Costs

The freight moving costs for each scenario year. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Vehicle Moving Costs

The vehicle moving costs for each scenario year, excluding those vehicles which are driven. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

Driving Moving Costs

The costs of driving vehicles during their movement. (Allowed entries 0 to 9,999,999 $K)

4.9 DATA ENTRY SCREEN 9 - EXPLANATORY NOTES

A single page screen is provided for the user to make any end notes that are desired (see Figure 44). These may explain the overall scenario or expand on information input on a specific Data Entry or Standard Factors screen. This information will be printed only on the Input Data Report (see Section 5.12).



FIGURE 44 - Screen Nine - Explanatory Notes

Explanatory Notes for Input Data Report:

A free text input of user's notes referring to one or more screens. (Allowed entries 16 lines of up to 78 characters: although only 74 characters show per line on this screen at one time)

Pages Footnoted:

User indicates screen(s) to which the note(s) apply, by clicking on the space for that screen, or by moving the cursor to highlight that screen and pressing the Space Bar, or by typing the highlighted number/letter of the screen. These screens will then be identified as having note(s) on the Input Data Report (see Section 5.12). (Allowed entries On [X] or Off [ ])

4.10 STANDARD FACTORS TABLE 1 - PERSONNEL (see Figure 45)

This and the other Standard Factors Tables contain information common to all bases in the scenario. This data will not change for any one scenario, and should change very little, if at all, from one scenario to another. These Standard Factors tables should be saved for use in subsequent scenarios (see Section 3.4.6).

```
[■]──────────── Table One - Standard Personnel Factors ────────────

        Officers Married:                  %   Civ Retired Pay Factor:                  %
        Enlisted Married:                  %       Priority Placement:                  %
 Enlisted Housing MilCon:                  %     PPS Place Involv PCS:                  %
                                                     Civ PCS Cost ($):
  Officer Salary ($/Year):                         New Hire Cost ($):
 Officer BAQ w/Depdts ($):
 Enlisted Salary ($/Year):                  Nat Median Home Price($K):
Enlisted BAQ w/Depdts ($):                   Home Sale Reimburse Rate:                  %
Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week):                  Max Home Sale Reimburs($):
Unemploy Eligible (Weeks):                  Home Purch Reimburse Rate:                  %
 Civilian Salary ($/Year):                  Max Home Purch Reimbur($):
                                                 Home Ownership Rate:                  %
       Civilian Turnover:                  %     HAP Home Value Rate:                  %
Civilian Early Retirement:                 %      HAP Receiving Rate:                  %
  Civilian Regular Retire:                 %     RSE Home Value Rate:                  %
  Civilian RIF Pay Factor:                 %      RSE Receiving Rate:                  %

   Standard Factors File
  Description:                                   Next                Done
```

FIGURE 45 - Table One - Standard Personnel Factors

Officers Married

The percent of total officers who are married. Married officer couples, assigned to the same base should be counted as one married officer (i.e. Do not double-count two officers who are married to each other). This is used to calculate HAP, HHG transportation, and Family Housing budget. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Enlisted Married

The percent of total enlisted personnel who are married. Married enlisted couples, assigned to the same base should be counted as one married member (i.e. Do not double-count two enlisted members who are married to each other). This is used to calculate HAP, HHG transportation, and Family Housing budget. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Enlisted Housing MILCON

The percent of new Family Housing and Bachelor Quarters construction to be assigned to enlisted personnel. This is used to determine the allocation of newly constructed on-post housing/barracks. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Officer Salary

The average officer annual salary. This is used to calculate the savings of elimination of officer positions. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 99,999.99 $/Year)

Officer BAQ - With Dependents

The average Basic Allowance for Quarters for officers, with dependents. This is used to calculate costs/savings of changes in the officer population living off-post. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 20,000.00 $/month)

Enlisted Salary

The average enlisted annual salary. This is used to calculate the savings of elimination of enlisted positions. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 99,999.99 $/Year)

Enlisted BAQ - With Dependents

The average Basic Allowance for Quarters for enlisted, with dependents. This is used to calculate costs/savings of changes in the enlisted population living off-post. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 20,000.00 $/month)

Average Unemployment Costs

The average weekly unemployment cost. This is used to calculate unemployment costs over the period of unemployment eligibility. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 2,000.00 $/week; Default is $216/week)

Unemployment Eligibility

The number of weeks over which unemployment payments are paid. Used in conjunction with Average Unemployment Costs and personnel positions lost to calculate unemployment costs. (Allowed entries 0 to 52 weeks; Default is 26 weeks)

Civilian Salary

The average annual salary for government civilian employees. This is used to calculate costs/savings of changes in the size of the civilian workforce. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 99,999.99 $/Year)

Civilian Turnover

The average percent of government civilian employees who normally leave their positions each year for reasons **not related to closure/realignment actions**. This is used to adjust the size of the civilian workforce for normal turnovers. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Civilian Early Retirement

The average percent of government civilian employees who retire early each year **as a result of closure/realignment actions**. This is used to adjust the size of the civilian workforce for early retirements, and to calculate early retirement costs. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Civilians regular Retirement

The average percent of government civilian employees expected to retire each year but **not as a result of closure/realignment actions**. This is used to adjust the size of the civilian workforce for normal retirement. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Civilian RIF Pay Factor

The average percent of government civilian employee annual pay that will be paid as severance pay to those losing their jobs **as a result of Reduction In Force associated with the closure/realignment action**. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Civilian Retired Pay Factor

The average percent of increase in government civilian retirement pay as a result of early retirements. This is used to calculate the costs of early retirements. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Priority Placement

The average percent of government civilian employees who receive other government jobs as a result of the Priority Placement System. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

PPS Placements Involving PCS

The percent of personnel who receive jobs through the Priority Placement System who must move more that 50 miles. This is used to calculate moving costs. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Civilian PCS Cost

The average cost of relocating a government civilian employee to a new location, who has received a job through the Priority Placement System (if the move is over 50 miles). An average Permanent Change of Station cost is used since PPS placements will result in relocations to undetermined locations. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 99,999.99 $)

New Hire Cost

The average cost to hire a new civilian employee. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 10,000.00 $)

National Median Home Price

The median home cost over the entire United States. This is adjusted by the base Area Cost Factor, and then used to calculate HAP and RSE costs. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 2,500.00 $K)

Home Sale Reimbursement Rate

The average percent of home sales reimbursement. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Maximum Home Sale Reimbursement

The maximum reimbursement for home sales. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 25,000.00 $)

Home Purchase Reimbursement Rate

The average percent of home purchase reimbursement. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Maximum Home Purchase Reimbursement

The maximum reimbursement for home purchase. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 25,000.00 $)

Home Ownership Rate

The average percent of military personnel and government civilian employees who own their homes. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) Home Value Rate

The percent of house value that HAP will pay. This is used to calculate HAP costs, which reported on the HAP/RSE line of the output Reports. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent; Default is 37%)

Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) Receiving Rate

The average percent of homeowners who will be provided with this service. HAP will only be costed at a base when RSE is not applied, and it will be reported on the HAP/RSE line of output Reports. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent; Default is 20%)

Relocation Service Entitlement (RSE) Home Value Rate

The percent of house value that RSE will pay. This is used to calculate RSE costs, which reported on the HAP/RSE line of the output Reports. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent; Default is 23%)

Relocation Service Entitlement (RSE) Receiving Rate

The average percent of Civilian homeowners who will be provided with this service. RSE will only be costed at a base when HAP is not applied, and it will be reported on the HAP/RSE line of output Reports. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent; Default is 15%)

Standard Factors File Description

A free-text entry for the user to describe the Standard Factors file. This is only used when the user calls-up the File Directory (see Section 3.4.3). (Allowed entries up to 20 characters)

4.11 STANDARD FACTORS TABLE 2 - FACILITIES (see Figure 46)

```
[■]──────────── Table Two - Standard Facilities Factors ────────────

RPMA/BOS MODIFIERS                          MILCON PERCENTAGES
   RPMA Building SF Index:                     Rehab vs. New Construct:      %
     BOS Population Index:                     Info Management Account:      %
  Program Managemt Factor:      %                  Design Percentage:      %
    (Indices are used as exponents)                 SIOH Percentage:      %
                                                Contingency Percentage:     %
CARETAKER COSTS                                   Site Prep Percentage:     %
    Admin Space (SF/Pers):
     Mothball Cost ($/SF):                   NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT
                                                 NPV/ROI Discount Rate:     %
AVERAGE SIZES                                   NPV/ROI Inflation Rate:    %
   Bachelor Quarters (SF):
     Family Quarters (SF):

APPROPRIATION REPORT INFLATION RATES
        1994      1995      1996      1997      1998      1999     Beyond
         %         %         %         %         %         %         %

                                   Next      Previous      Done
```

FIGURE 46 - Table Two - Standard Facilities Factors

RPMA Buildings Index

The exponent of base building square footage, used in Real Property Maintenance Activity Non-Payroll cost calculations. This represents the nonlinearity of the relationship between change in base building area and the change in RPMA costs; normal value of this index is $\leq$ 1.0. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 5.00)

BOS Population Index

The exponent of base population, used in Base Operations Support Non-Payroll cost calculations. This represents the nonlinearity of the relationship between change in base population and the change in BOS costs; normal value of this index is $\leq$ 1.0. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 10.00)

Program Management Factor

Coefficient that the Base Operations Support (Payroll and Non-Payroll) is multiplied by to calculate the costs of administrative support for movements of personnel and equipment. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0)

Caretaker Admin Space Needs

The average administrative space required for each caretaker. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 1,000,000.0 SF)

Mothball Cost

The average cost to mothball facilities. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 $/square feet)

Average Bachelor Quarters Size

The average square feet of bachelor quarters. This is used to convert square feet of construction into sets of bachelor quarters. (Allowed entries 0 to 500 square feet)

Average Family Quarters Size

The average square feet of family quarters. This is used to convert square feet of construction into sets of family quarters. (Allowed entries 0 to 2,000 square feet)

Rehabilitation vs New Construction Costs

The average percent of new construction costs required to rehabilitate a space of equal size. This is used to adjust costs for rehabilitation rather than new construction requirements. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

Information Management Account Percentage

The average percent of construction cost required to provide communications; only used for categories measured in square feet. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

Design Percentage

The average percent of construction cost which must be added to accomplish planning and design. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

SIOH Percentage

The average percent of construction cost which must be added to cover project supervision, inspection, and overhead. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

Contingency Percentage

The average percent of construction cost which must be added to cover unforseen (contingency) requirements. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

Site Preparation Percentage

The average percent of construction cost which must be added to cover site preparation of the construction area. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100.0 percent)

NPV/ROI Discount Rate

The discount rate to be used for the Net Present Value and Return On Investment calculations (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2). (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

NPV/ROI Inflation Rate

The inflation rate to be used for the Net Present Value and Return On Investment calculations (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2). (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

Appropriation Report Inflation Rates

The inflation rate projected for each of the six years of the scenario. These are used for the Appropriations Detail Report only (see Section 5.3) in inflation is enabled (see Section 3.3.7). (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 percent)

4.12 STANDARD FACTORS TABLE 3 - TRANSPORTATION (see Figure 47)

```
[■]──────── Table Three - Standard Transportation Factors ────────

Material/Assignd Pers(Lb):                Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton):
                                            Milit Light Vehic($/Mi):
   Officer HHG(Lb/Family):                   Heavy/Spec Vehic($/Mi):
  Enlisted HHG(Lb/Family):                  POV Reimbursement($/Mi):
  Military HHG(Lb/Single):                 Air Transport($/Pass Mi):
  Civilian HHG(Lb/Person):                  Misc($/Direct Employee):

 Total HHG Costs($/100Lb):                 Avg Mil Tour Length(Yrs):
                                          Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour):
                                          One-Time Off PCS Cost($):
                                          One-Time Enl PCS Cost($):

                                   Next        Previous        Done
```

FIGURE 47 - Table Three - Standard Transportation Factors

Material Per Assigned Person

The average weight of material per person assigned, other than mission and support equipment which is included on Screen 3. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 10,000.00 pounds per person)

Officer HHG

The average pounds of household goods per officer family. (Allowed entries 0 to 100,000 pounds/family)

Enlisted HHG

The average pounds of household goods per enlisted family. (Allowed entries 0 to 100,000 pounds/family)

Military HHG

The average pounds of household goods per single military member. (Allowed entries 0 to 10,000 pounds/military)

Civilian HHG

The average pounds of household goods per government civilian employee. (Allowed entries 0 to 100.000 pounds/employee)

Total HHG Costs

The average cost of packing, storing, and unpacking 100 pounds of household goods. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100.00 $/100lb.)

Equipment Packing and Crating

The cost for packing and crating of material to be moved. (Allowed entries 0.0 to 100,000.00 $/ton)

Military Light Vehicle

The average cost per mile of driving military light vehicles. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 1,000.00 $/mile)

Heavy/Special Vehicle

The average cost per mile of transporting (not driving) heavy or special military vehicles. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 1,000.00 $/mile)

POV Reimbursement

The average reimbursement rate for driving Personally Owned Vehicles. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100,000.00 $/mile)

Air Transport

The average cost of air transporting a passenger. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100,000.00 $/mile)

Miscellaneous

The average moving cost per direct employee, not covered by other moving costs. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100,000.00 $/employee)

Average Military Tour Length

The average length of military assignments. This is used to adjust the moving costs to account for those personnel who would move each year, independent of the closure/realignment action. (Allowed entries 1.00 to 20.00 years; Default is 3.00 years)

Routine PCS Costs

The average routine PCS costs per military position, per move. This is used in conjunction with the Average Military Tour Length to offset PCS costs to account for personnel who would move each year, independent of the closure/realignment action. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100,000.00 $/person/move)

One-Time Officer PCS Costs

The average one-time costs of officer PCSs, per person. This is used in conjunction with the number of officer positions eliminated to estimate costs of moving officers to their "final" locations. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100,000.00 $/person)

One-Time Enlisted PCS Costs

The average one-time costs of enlisted PCSs, per person. This is used in conjunction with the number of enlisted positions eliminated to estimate costs of moving enlisted personnel to their "final" locations. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 100,000.00 $/person)

4.13 STANDARD FACTORS TABLE 4 - CONSTRUCTION (see Figure 48)



Figure 48 - Table Four - Standard Construction Factors

Cost per Unit of Measure

The average cost per Unit of Measure (UM) for new construction of each of the military construction categories listed. (Allowed entries 0.00 to 99,999.99 $/UM)

Bachelor Quarters Construction Units

This construction category unit of measure is entered by the user as either SF or EA. (Allowed entries up to two characters: Default value is 'SF')

Family Quarters Construction Units

This construction category unit of measure is entered by the user as either SF or EA. (Allowed entries up to two characters: Default value is 'SF')

Environmental Construction Units

This construction category line is for construction required for environmental mitigation. The units of measure for this category may be filled in by the user (Allowed entries 2 characters e.g. KG, TN, etc.). Only include actual on-base construction here; non-construction environmental mitigation costs are entered on Screen 5.

Optional Categories/Units

These are lines for entry of up to 18 construction requirements (and UM) which do not fit into the listed categories, or that the user wishes to specifically separate from other requirements in a category which is listed. (Allowed entries up to 20 characters for categories, 2 characters for units)

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CHAPTER 5

COBRA REPORT OUTPUT

CHAPTER 5 - COBRA REPORT OUTPUT

This chapter will cover the various Reports that COBRA generates. Although most Reports provide outputs in terms of dollar costs and savings, several also provide non-dollar value information (such as numbers of personnel, square feet of construction, etc.). Both costs and savings can be reported as positive or negative numbers. A cost reported as a positive number represents an actual cost, and a negative cost represents an actual savings. Similarly, a savings reported as a positive number represents an actual savings, and a negative savings represents an actual cost. The viewing and printing of individual and group Reports was discussed earlier (see Section 3.7.5) and therefore, will not be discussed again here. Appendix B contains sample COBRA Reports.

5.1 REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (File name COBSUM.RPT)

The key output of the COBRA model is the Realignment Summary. This Report is contained on one or two pages (see Section 3.3.7), which display key values with which to evaluate the modeled scenario and to compare it with other scenarios.

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ROI Year (Years to Break Even)

This is Fiscal Year (and the years it takes, after completion of the closure/realignment action) to generate enough savings to offset the Total Costs and reach the break even point. In other terms, this is the Payback Period.

Option NPV in (Year 20)

The Net Present Value of the costs (if negative number, savings) of the realignment in discounted constant First Year dollars. This is a measure of the total costs (over the 20-year period of analysis) to be realized by taking the closure/realignment actions in the scenario. The larger the negative value of NPV, the more the net savings and the more advantage there is to the realignment. If the NPV is not a negative number the realignment will result in a net cost over the 20-year period.

Total One-Time Cost

The cost of doing the closure/realignment modeled. This is the amount that must be offset by the net savings generated by the action.

Net Costs, Military Construction

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in construction requirements.

Net Costs, Personnel

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in housing allowances, salary savings for eliminated personnel positions and associated costs such as severance pay.

Net Costs, Overhead

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in overhead; primarily caused by changes on Real Property Maintenance Activities, Base Operations Support, and Program Planning.

Net Costs, Moving

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to movement of personnel and material.

Net Costs, Mission

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, realized by the operations of the organizations that are involved in the closure/realignment. These are in such areas as fuel, supplies, contracts, etc. which are not part of normal base overhead functions.

Net Costs, Other

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to factors not covered in the other net costs lines. Examples are sales of real estate, non-construction environmental mitigation, procurement changes, and CHAMPUS.

Officer Positions Eliminated

The total number of officer positions eliminated each year at the bases, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Does not include positions eliminated with no salary savings.

Enlisted Positions Eliminated

The total number of enlisted positions eliminated each year at the bases, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Does not include positions eliminated with no salary savings.

Civilian Positions Eliminated

The total number of civilian positions eliminated each year at the bases, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Does not include positions eliminated with no salary savings.

Officer Realignments

The total number of officer positions realigned each year.

Enlisted Realignments

The total number of enlisted positions realigned each year.

Student Realignments

The total number of student positions realigned each year.

Civilian Realignments

The total number of civilian positions realigned each year.

Total Realignments

The total number of all types of positions realigned each year.

Summary/Description:

If the user has entered a text description of the scenario, it will be printed here (see Section 4.1)

Note: The following values will not be included if the "COBRA Summary Second Page" option in COBRA Setup is disabled (see Section 3.3.7).

Costs, Military Construction

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in construction requirements.

Costs, Personnel

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in housing allowances, salary savings for eliminated personnel positions and associated costs such as severance pay.

Costs, Overhead

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in overhead; primarily caused by changes on Real Property Maintenance Activities, Base Operations Support, and Program Planning.

Costs, Moving

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to movement of personnel and material.

Costs, Mission

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, realized by the operations of the organizations that are involved in the closure/realignment. These are in such areas as fuel, supplies, contracts, etc. which are not part of normal base overhead functions.

Costs, Other

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to factors not covered in the other net costs lines. Examples are non-construction environmental mitigation, procurement changes, and CHAMPUS.

Savings, Military Construction

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to changes in construction requirements.

Savings, Personnel

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to changes in housing allowances, salary savings for eliminated personnel positions and associated costs such as severance pay.

Savings, Overhead

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to changes in overhead; primarily caused by changes on Real Property Maintenance Activities and Base Operations Support.

Savings, Moving

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to movement of personnel and material.

Savings, Mission

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, realized by the operations of the organizations that are involved in the closure/realignment activities. These are in such areas as fuel, supplies, contracts, etc. which are not part of normal base overhead functions.

Savings, Other

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to factors not covered in the other net savings lines. Examples are sales of real estate, procurement changes, and CHAMPUS.

5.2 NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (File name NPV.RPT)

Another key COBRA Report is the Net Present Values (NPV) Report. This is usually contained on a single page, which displays the Cost and Inflated Cost for each year, and NPV of the cost of the realignment for each of the years of the analysis period (only uses more than one page if the years to achieve a net savings is large). The point where the NPV goes from a positive value (a cost) to a negative value (a savings) is the ROI of the scenario; also shown on the COBRA Realignment Summary Report.

Year

The scenario year for which the costs are reported.

Cost

The cost in each year of the analysis (Base-Year dollars).

Adjusted Cost

The inflated/discounted cost in each year of the analysis (Then-Year dollars).

NPV

The Net Present Value of the cumulative cost in each year of the analysis. These are the discounted values of the respective inflated costs for each year.

5.3 APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (File name APPDET.RPT)

This Report provides detailed yearly costs, savings, and net costs of the closure/realignment. If the total net costs have not become a negative number (meaning a net savings) at or before the "Beyond" year, no savings are realized for the closure/realignment action. Note that this report may contain pages for each individual base, or be inflated, depending upon the options in the COBRA Setup (see Section 3.3.7).

5.4 ONE-TIME COST REPORT (File name 1TIMCOST.RPT)

This Report provides the total one-time costs, savings, and net costs for the total scenario. The total of the yearly one-time net costs shown on the Appropriations Detail Report is identical to the Total Net One-Time Costs shown on this Report. Note that this report may contain pages for each individual base, depending upon the options in the COBRA Setup (see Section 3.3.7).

5.5 RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (File name RPMABOS.RPT)

This Report shows changes in Real Property Maintenance Activity, Base Operations Support, and Housing costs for each year of the scenario.

5.6 BOS, LAND, SF, AND RPMA DELTAS REPORT (File name DELTAS.RPT)

This Report shows, for each base, the number and percent change in personnel, Base Operations Support costs, Real Property Maintenance Activity costs, combined RPMA and BOS costs, and building square footage. Also shown are the ratio of changes in BOS, RPMA, RPMA plus BOS, acreage, and square footage to changes in personnel.

5.7 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS REPORT (File name MILCONAS.RPT)

This Report provides a single-page summary of costs for all bases involved in the closure/realignment where construction or rehabilitation will be required. The cost of each requirement includes not only the construction costs, but also the design, SIOH, site preparation, information management, and contingency costs; also shown are land purchases and construction avoidances. Note that this report may contain pages showing requirements and costs for each individual base, depending upon the options in the COBRA Setup (see Section 3.3.7).

5.8 PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (File name PERSIMP.RPT)

This Report shows a one-page summary of yearly civilian personnel realignments and eliminations for the entire scenario. Note that this report may contain pages for each individual base, depending upon the options in the COBRA Setup (see Section 3.3.7).

5.9 PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (File name PERSSUM.RPT)

This Report totals of all personnel Force Structure Changes, Scenario Changes, and Positions Realigning to and from each base.

5.10 PERSONNEL YEARLY PERCENTAGES REPORT (File name PERSPERC.RPT)

This Report shows the yearly number and percentage of personnel changes at each base (percentages are used for automatic scheduling of construction and facilities to be shut down). Also shown are the time-phasings as calculated from the yearly personnel changes. This report is only generated if the "Auto Time-Phase" option on Screen 1 is enabled (see Section 4.1).

5.11 INPUT DATA REPORT (File name INPUTDAT.RPT)

This Report is a print-out of all Data Entry Screens and Standard Factors Tables selected on the COBRA Setup screen (see Section 3.3.7), showing the scenario inputs upon which the other Reports are based.

5.12 SCENARIO ERROR REPORT (File name ERROR.RPT)

This Report is created only if COBRA finds inconsistencies in scenario data. Since all Reports are generated at once, the other Reports will have been made using potentially incorrect data. When a Scenario Error Report is present, therefore, it should be checked immediately to determine if data corrections should be made. Once corrections are made to scenario data the Reports must be executed again before they are used for analysis purposes. The specific data inconsistencies that COBRA checks for are:

Option Package Name, Department

If the Department is not recognized by COBRA, the Report will say so. COBRA will also remind the user if no Option Package Name has been entered.

Base Names

COBRA will alert the user if there are two bases with the same Name, or if a base has no name.

Close Year/Deactivate

COBRA will alert the user if a base is deactivating with no year to be deactivated entered.

Activity Code

COBRA will list all bases with no Activity Code defined on Input Screen 4 (Section 4.4).

Time-Phasing of Construction or Shutdown

If the user is entering these schedules (rather than letting COBRA do them automatically) COBRA will alert if the yearly percentages do not total to 100%.

Caretakers

COBRA will check that no base loses more caretakers than it has, and than none are assigned to a base unless it is to be deactivated.

Personnel Movement/Migration

COBRA will check that no base loses more personnel than it has, and that none remain or move, after it closes.

Personnel Realignments

COBRA checks that civilians retiring, civilian turnover, civilians quitting, and civilians not willing to move never exceed 100%.

Military Construction

COBRA will alert the user if a requirement uses a unit cost of $0. Also, no requirement with an "OTHER" category must have the total cost specified.

RPMA Calculations

COBRA will alert the user if a base has more square feet shutdown than it had, or if a base still holds facilities after it closes.

CHAPTER 6

OPERATING ADDER

CHAPTER 6 - OPERATING ADDER

ADDER has been designed to operate as closely to COBRA as possible; so that users of COBRA will find ADDER's operation relatively familiar. However, this section should be read completely; and after an initial reading, users need generally refer only to the section(s) where he or she has a question.

6.1 INITIATING ADDER

To open the ADDER program, access the disk/directory where COBRA and ADDER have been installed (see Chapter 2), type "ADDER" and press <ENTER>. The "About ADDER" window will then appear (see Figure 49).

This welcome screen identifies the ADDER model and its version number; the telephone number of R&K Engineering, the COBRA developer, is also provided.

To close the "About ADDER" window and access the Main Menu, click on the "OK" at the bottom-center of the window. Other methods of closing the window are: clicking on the Close Window Square [■] at the upper-left of the window border; clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border; pressing <ENTER>; or pressing <ESC>.

6.2 THE MAIN MENU

The Main Menu is the starting point for using the ADDER program. Upon closing the initial display of the "About ADDER" window, the screen will display the Main Menu (see Figure 50). Along the top of this screen are displayed the "Help", "File", "Reports", "Windows", and "Quit" menu selections. During the use of ADDER additional menu windows, reports, and other data are displayed on the screen; however, the Main Menu selections will always remain displayed behind any other active displays. Each of the Main Menu selections is summarized below.



FIGURE 49 - "About ADDER" Window



FIGURE 50 - Main Menu

6.3 HELP

From the Main Menu the Help selection is made by either clicking on the word "Help" along the top of the Main Menu screen, or by pressing <ALT-H>. The Help menu will appear (see Figure 51). By clicking on the words "About ADDER" or by pressing <A>, the "About ADDER" window will again be displayed (see Section 6.1, above). The Help menu may be closed by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, by clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border, or by pressing <ESC>. Note that the ADDER Help Menu is identical to the COBRA Help Menu (see Section 3.3) except for the lack of a "Files Used" command, and for differences in the ADDER Setup (described below).

6.3.1 Changing ADDER Set-Up

ADDER has several options for generating and printing its reports that can be changed by using the "ADDER Setup" Window (see Figure 52). By clicking on the words "ADDER Setup" or by pressing <S> from the Help Menu, the "ADDER Setup" window is displayed. To cancel any change(s), close the window and return to the Main Menu click on the word "Cancel", or click on the Close Window Square, or press <ESC>. Click on "OK" to save changes. Note that COBRA and ADDER use the same configuration file (COBRA.INI), so that any changes made in one affect them both.

ADDER will format its output for most dot matrix (those that are EPSON/IBM compatible) and laser (those that are are HP LaserJet compatible) printers, or print them unformatted (requiring a wide-carriage printer for most reports). The user can select which type of printer is to be used, along with a printer device name for that printer. The default device name is "PRN" which will work with most system configurations. Should a system not be able to print with this setting (a LAN for example), or should the system have multiple printers (a LaserJet on LPT1: and a dot matrix on LPT2:, for example) the correct device name can be entered in the appropriate "Device Name" field.

If the user wants to change the directory to be used to store Reports, the new entry can be typed into the "Report Directory" field. This may be useful if the user wants to run a new scenario or set of Reports, while continuing to save the current Reports in memory. Unless the directory is changed, any new Reports will automatically overwrite the old ones.

Other options available are whether or not inflation will be applied to the ADDER Appropriation Detail report, and whether or not to include a second page with the ADDER Summary report listing total Costs and Savings. Click on the desired options, or press <ALT> and the highlighted letter, to turn that option on or off (those options with an "X" next to them will be used in future reports.



FIGURE 51 - Help Menu



FIGURE 52 - "ADDER Setup" Window

6.4 FILE

The File selection is made by either clicking on the word "File" along the top of the Main Menu screen, or by pressing <ALT-F>. The File menu will appear (see Figure 53). The File menu may be closed by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, by clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border, or by pressing <ESC>. Note that the DOS Shell, Change Dir, and Exit options operate in the same manner for ADDER as the do for COBRA (see section 3.4).

6.4.1 Loading Data Files

By clicking on the words "Load Data File" on the File menu or by pressing <L>, the "Select File(s) to Load" window is displayed (see Figure 54). This window consists of one or more pages listing all COBRA output files (in the form "*.OUT") in the current directory. The user may now select as many files as desired to be loaded from the disk into Program memory. The files are selected by clicking on the space in front of the file name, or by typing the highlighted number/letter for the file, or by scrolling to the file name and pressing <SPACE BAR> to select it. A selected file will appear with [X] in front of it on the list. The selected file(s) are loaded into Program memory by clicking on the word "Open", by pressing <O>, or by pressing <ENTER>. To see other pages of this window, click on "Next" or "Previous", or press <N> or <P>. The "Next" and "Previous" selections load the files selected on the current page, and then move to the new page. To do a quick search for a file, type the file name in the "Search for:" field and click on "Open" or press <O>. Search can also be invoked by pressing <ENTER> once to complete the file name entry, and again pressing <ENTER> to start the search. ADDER will load any files selected on the current page, and then move to the page containing the name of the file searched for. This window may be closed with no further loading, and the user returned to the Main Menu, by clicking on the word "Cancel", by clicking on the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>. This window may also be opened from the Main Menu, by pressing <ALT-L>. Any new files loaded are **added to whatever data is already in ADDER Program memory. To clear Program memory before loading in COBRA output file(s), use the Clear Data (see Section 6.4.5) option before the Load Data File option.** The file name of the first data file loaded will be displayed at the bottom border. Note that if different COBRA output files have different values for inflation/discount rates, starting year, etc., the values in the first file loaded will be used.

6.4.2 Loading ALL Files

This option will load ALL COBRA output files (in the form "*.OUT") in the current directory, unlike the Load Data File option (see above) which requires the user to pick and choose files. Note that the Change Dir command (described in section 3.4.8) allows the user to change the current directory. Used in conjunction with the Load ALL Files command, this will allow the user to load all COBRA output files in any directory.



FIGURE 53 - File Menu



FIGURE 54 - "Select File(s) to Load" Window

6.4.3 Saving Current Data

Combined COBRA output files can be saved into a single file for future retrieval and use. By clicking on the words "Save Data File" on the File menu or by pressing <S>, the "Save Data File" window is displayed (see Figure 55). This window may also be opened from the Main Menu, by pressing <ALT-S>. The saving of the current data set is done by typing the Data file name desired or leaving the previously saved file name, and then clicking on the word "Save". The file may also be saved by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the save canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>. Note that combined data files have an extension of ".OPT", instead of ".OUT" like single-scenario files.

6.4.4 Clearing the Data Set

To create a new ADDER scenario combination from scratch, the Program memory should be cleared of any currently loaded Data before loading new COBRA output files (see Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). By clicking on the words "Clear Data Set" on the File menu or by pressing <C>, the currently used Data is removed from the ADDER Program memory (If previously saved, it remains saved on disk). A new Data Set can then be created by loading in other COBRA output files. This window may be closed and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.

6.4.5 Deleting Saved Data

The user may want to permanently remove COBRA or ADDER output files from disk when they are outdated and/or no longer under consideration. By clicking on the words "Delete Data File" on the File menu or by pressing <D>, a "Delete Data File" window (see Figure 56). The deletion of a saved Data file is done by double clicking on the file to be deleted. The Data File list may also be accessed by pressing <TAB> to move the cursor to the list, with the <↑> <↓> keys then being used to highlight the desired Data file. The highlighted Data file can then be deleted and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "OK" or by pressing <ENTER>. This window may be closed, the delete function canceled, and the user returned to the Main Menu by clicking on the word "Cancel", or by clicking the Close Window Square, or by pressing <ESC>.



FIGURE 55 - "Save Data File" Window



FIGURE 56 - "Delete Data File" Window

6.5 REPORTS

ADDER output Reports are created, viewed on the screen, and printed using the Reports selection on the Main Menu. The Reports selection is made by either clicking on the word "Reports" along the top of the Main Menu screen, or by pressing <ALT-R>. The Reports menu will then appear (see Figure 57). The Reports menu may be closed by clicking on another Main Menu selection, by clicking on an open area of the screen surface, by clicking on the words "ESC-Close window" on the bottom border, or by pressing <ESC>. Note that the ADDER Reports menu is identical to the COBRA Reports menu (see Section 3.7) in all ways but the following:

6.5.1 Generating Reports (Running ADDER)

The user must generate ADDER Reports using the current Data files loaded before these Reports can be viewed or printed. By clicking on the word "Execute" on the Reports menu or by pressing <E>, the ADDER program will generate all Reports. **This must be done before Reports can be viewed in the screen or printed.** Reports can also be executed from the Main Menu by pressing <ALT-E>. Output Reports are covered in detail in the Chapter 7. Note that ADDER Reports have an ".ART" extension, rather than the ".RPT" extension used in COBRA. If while it is executing, ADDER detects inconsistencies in the data an ADDER Error Report will be generated (see Section 7.6). **This Report should be reviewed, and errors resolved, before the other ADDER Reports are used for analysis purposes.** ADDER also generates a data file for the Economic Impact Database. This file has the same name as the ADDER data in memory, but with an ".EIR" extension.

6.5.2 Viewing or Printing a Group of Reports

ADDER uses the same Group files (in the format ".GRP") that COBRA does; considering, for example, the COBRA Summary Report and ADDER Summary Report as equivalent. Since ADDER generates less reports than COBRA, however, the "Reports in Group" window is different (see Figure 58). Other than that, all Group functions work identically for COBRA and ADDER (see Section 3.7.5).



FIGURE 57 - Reports Menu



FIGURE 58 - "Reports in Group" window

6.6 WINDOWS

The ADDER Windows Menu (see Figure 59) is in every way identical to the COBRA Windows Menu (see Section 3.8).

6.7 QUIT

Clicking on the Word "Quit" or pressing <ALT-Q> from the Main Menu is the same as exiting ADDER from the File Menu.

6.8 ADVANCED OPERATIONS (Using Command-Line Parameters)

To allow for more efficient use of ADDER, the user may issue some commands to ADDER **directly** from the DOS command line by use of Command-Line Parameters. These advanced features are completely optional. The user may choose never to use them.

To specify which files ADDER should load, enter "ADDER" followed by as many filenames (including wildcards) as desired. For example, all of the following are legal usages of ADDER:

```
ADDER *.OUT
ADDER TESTDATA.OUT MULTI.OUT
ADDER C:\COBRA\ARMY\*.OUT C:\COBRA\NAVY\*.OUT C:\COBRA\USAF\*.OUT
```



FIGURE 59 - Windows Menu

CHAPTER 7

ADDER REPORT OUTPUT

CHAPTER 7 - ADDER REPORT OUTPUT

This chapter will cover the various Reports that ADDER generates. Although most Reports provide outputs in terms of dollar costs and savings, several also provide non-dollar value information (such as numbers of personnel, etc.). Both costs and savings can be reported as positive or negative numbers. A cost reported as a positive number represents an actual cost, and a negative cost represents an actual savings. Similarly, a savings reported as a positive number represents an actual savings, and a negative savings represents an actual cost. The viewing and printing of individual and group Reports was discussed earlier (see Section 3.7) and therefore, will not be discussed again here. Appendix C contains sample ADDER Reports.

7.1 ADDER REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (File name ADRSUM.ART)

The key output of the ADDER model is the Realignment Summary. This Report is contained on one or two pages (see Section 6.3.1), which display key values with which to evaluate the modeled scenario and to compare it with other scenarios.

ROI Year (Years to Break Even)
This is Fiscal Year (and the years it takes, after completion of the closure/realignment actions) to generate enough savings to offset the Total Costs and reach the break even point. In other terms, this is the Payback Period.

Option NPV in (Year 20)

The Net Present Value of the costs (if negative number, savings) of the realignments in discounted constant First Year dollars. This is a measure of the total costs (over the 20-year period of analysis) to be realized by taking the closure/realignment actions in the scenario. The larger the negative value of NPV, the more the net savings and the more advantage there is to the realignment. If the NPV is not a negative number the realignment will result in a net cost over the 20-year period.

Total One-Time Cost

The cost of doing the closure/realignments modeled. This is the amount that must be offset by the net savings generated by the actions.

Net Costs, Military Construction

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in construction requirements.

Net Costs, Personnel

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in housing allowances, salary savings for eliminated personnel positions and associated costs such as severance pay.

Net Costs, Overhead

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in overhead; primarily caused by changes on Real Property Maintenance Activities, Base Operations Support, and Program Planning.

Net Costs, Moving

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to movement of personnel and material.

Net Costs, Mission

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, realized by the operations of the organizations that are involved in the closure/realignment. These are in such areas as fuel, supplies, contracts, etc. which are not part of normal base overhead functions.

Net Costs, Other

The net costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to factors not covered in the other net costs lines. Examples are sales of real estate, non-construction environmental mitigation, procurement changes, and CHAMPUS.

Officer Positions Eliminated

The total number of officer positions eliminated each year at the bases, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Does not include positions eliminated with no salary savings.

Enlisted Positions Eliminated

The total number of enlisted positions eliminated each year at the bases, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Does not include positions eliminated with no salary savings.

Civilian Positions Eliminated

The total number of civilian positions eliminated each year at the bases, **as a direct result of the closure/realignment action**. Does not include positions eliminated with no salary savings.

Officer Realignments

The total number of officer positions realigned each year.

Enlisted Realignments

The total number of enlisted positions realigned each year.

Student Realignments

The total number of student positions realigned each year.

Civilian Realignments

The total number of civilian positions realigned each year.

Total Realignments

The total number of all types of positions realigned each year.

Note: The following values will not be included if the "ADDER Summary Second Page" option in COBRA Setup is disabled (see Section 6.3.1).

Costs, Military Construction

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in construction requirements.

Costs, Personnel

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in housing allowances, salary savings for eliminated personnel positions and associated costs such as severance pay.

Costs, Overhead

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to changes in overhead; primarily caused by changes on Real Property Maintenance Activities, Base Operations Support, and Program Planning.

Costs, Moving

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to movement of personnel and material.

Costs, Mission

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, realized by the operations of the organizations that are involved in the closure/realignment. These are in such areas as fuel, supplies, contracts, etc. which are not part of normal base overhead functions.

Costs, Other

The costs (if negative number, savings) in each year, due to factors not covered in the other net costs lines. Examples are non-construction environmental mitigation, procurement changes, and CHAMPUS.

Savings, Military Construction

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to changes in construction requirements.

Savings, Personnel

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to changes in housing allowances, salary savings for eliminated personnel positions and associated costs such as severance pay.

Savings, Overhead

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to changes in overhead; primarily caused by changes on Real Property Maintenance Activities and Base Operations Support.

Savings, Moving

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to movement of personnel and material.

Savings, Mission

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, realized by the operations of the organizations that are involved in the closure/realignment activities. These are in such areas as fuel, supplies, contracts, etc. which are not part of normal base overhead functions.

Savings, Other

The savings (if negative number, costs) in each year, due to factors not covered in the other net savings lines. Examples are procurement changes, and CHAMPUS.

7.2 ADDER NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (File name NPV.ART)

Another key ADDER Report is the ADDER Net Present Values (NPV) Report. This is usually contained on a single page, which displays the Cost and Inflated Cost for each year, and NPV of the cost of the realignments for each of the years of the analysis period (only uses more than one page if the years to achieve a net savings is large). The point where the NPV goes from a positive value (a cost) to a negative value (a savings) is the ROI of the scenario; also shown on the ADDER Realignment Summary Report.

Year

The scenario year for which the costs are reported.

Cost

The cost in each year of the analyses (Base-Year dollars).

Adjusted Cost

The inflated/discounted cost in each year of the analyses (Then-Year dollars).

NPV

The Net Present Value of the cumulative cost in each year of the analyses. These are the discounted values of the respective inflated costs for each year.

7.3 ADDER APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (File name APPDET.ART)

This Report provides detailed yearly costs, savings, and net costs of the closure/realignments. If the total net costs have not become a negative number (meaning a net savings) at or before the "Beyond" year, no savings are realized for the closure/realignment actions. Note that this report may be inflated, depending upon the options in the ADDER Setup (see Section 6.3.1).

7.4 ADDER ONE-TIME COST REPORT (File name 1TIMCOST.ART)

This Report provides the total one-time costs, savings, and net costs for the totalled scenarios. The total of the yearly one-time net costs shown on the Appropriations Detail Report is identical to the Total Net One-Time Costs shown on this Report.

7.5 ADDER INPUT DATA REPORT (File name INPUTDAT.ART)

This Report is a listing of all COBRA scenarios which were combined into this ADDER scenario.

7.6 ADDER ERROR REPORT (File name ERROR.ART)

This Report is created only if ADDER finds inconsistencies in scenario data. Since all Reports are generated at once, the other Reports will have been made using potentially incorrect data. When an ADDER Error Report is present, therefore, it should be checked immediately to determine if data corrections should be made. Once corrections are made to scenario data the Reports must be executed again before they are used for analysis purposes. The specific data inconsistencies that COBRA checks for are:

COBRA Scenario Names

If the same COBRA Scenario filename appears more than once (meaning that that scenario was probably double-counted), the Report will say so.

7.7 ADDER ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT (File name EIR.ART)

This Report displays economic information that can be used to assess economic impact.

APPENDIX A

TABLE of ACRONYMS

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APPENDIX A - TABLE of ACRONYMS

Acronym	Meaning
AMC	Army Material Command
BAQ	Basic Allowance for Quarters
BL	Barrel
BOS	Base Operations Support
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Disk Operating System
EA	Each
GAO	General Accounting Office
HAP	Homeowners Assistance Program
HHG	Household Goods
K	Kilobytes
LAN	Local Area Network
LF	Linear Foot (Feet)
MILCON	Military Construction
NPV	Net Present Value
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
PPS	Priority Placement System
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
RIF	Reduction in Force
RITA	Relocation Income Tax Allowance
ROI	Return on Investment
RPMA	Real Property Maintenance Activities
RSE	Relocation Service Entitlement
SF	Square Foot (Feet)
SIOH	Supervision, Inspection, and Overhead
SY	Square Yard(s)
TDY	Temporary Duty
UM	Unit of Measure
VHA	Variable Housing Allowance
$K	Thousands of Dollars

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APPENDIX B

SAMPLE COBRA REPORTS

APPENDIX B - SAMPLE COBRA REPORTS

This appendix contains a set of sample COBRA reports, generated from a fictional closure/realignment scenario. All standard COBRA reports are included, except the Input Data Report (which is only a printout of the input data that makes-up the scenario). Also removed are additional base-specific sections of reports when one such section adequately illustrates COBRA output.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

Starting Year : 1992
Final Year : 1997
ROI Year : 2000 (3 Years)

NPV in 2011($K): -44,749
1-Time Cost($K): 66,866

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total	Beyond
MilCon	20,697	7,346	7,346	8,141	0	0	43,531	0
Person	-468	-3,085	-6,565	-8,877	-10,374	-10,923	-40,293	-10,923
Overhd	1,076	1,094	1,183	1,234	1,145	971	6,704	918
Moving	2,022	1,111	2,232	3,695	2,488	338	11,886	0
Missio	0	-340	-714	-2,414	-3,094	-3,400	-9,962	-3,400
Other	1,877	1,877	1,877	-70	-7,026	-5,066	-6,531	-233
TOTAL	25,204	8,004	5,360	1,710	-16,861	-18,081	5,335	-13,638

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	TOTAL
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	10	10	10	10	0	0	40
Enlisted	10	10	10	10	0	0	40
Civilians	10	70	40	40	30	0	190
TOTAL	30	90	60	60	30	0	270
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Officers	60	60	60	60	60	0	300
Enlisted	60	60	60	60	60	0	300
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	60	0	30	30	30	0	150
TOTAL	180	120	150	150	150	0	750

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.01) - Page 2
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total	Beyond
MilCon	21,492	8,141	8,141	8,141	0	0	45,916	0
Person	491	607	190	231	290	274	2,085	274
Overhd	1,096	1,298	1,518	1,732	1,792	1,752	9,190	1,699
Moving	2,082	1,171	2,292	3,755	2,548	338	12,186	0
Missio	0	550	1,155	3,905	5,005	5,500	16,115	5,500
Other	2,110	2,110	2,110	163	140	0	6,633	0
TOTAL	27,272	13,878	15,407	17,928	9,775	7,864	92,125	7,474

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total	Beyond
MilCon	795	795	795	0	0	0	2,385	0
Person	959	3,692	6,755	9,108	10,664	11,198	42,377	11,198
Overhd	21	204	335	498	648	781	2,486	781
Moving	60	60	60	60	60	0	300	0
Missio	0	890	1,869	6,319	8,099	8,900	26,077	8,900
Other	233	233	233	233	7,166	5,066	13,164	233
TOTAL	2,068	5,874	10,047	16,218	26,637	25,945	86,790	21,112

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

Year	Cost($)	Adjusted Cost($)	NPV($)
1992	25,204,105	24,031,171	24,031,171
1993	8,003,836	6,937,598	30,968,769
1994	5,359,776	4,223,426	35,192,196
1995	1,709,619	1,224,687	36,416,882
1996	-16,861,245	-10,980,511	25,436,371
1997	-18,080,759	-10,704,266	14,732,105
1998	-13,638,511	-7,340,312	7,391,793
1999	-13,638,511	-6,673,011	718,783
2000	-13,638,511	-6,066,373	-5,347,591
2001	-13,638,511	-5,514,885	-10,862,476
2002	-13,638,511	-5,013,532	-15,876,007
2003	-13,638,511	-4,557,756	-20,433,763
2004	-13,638,511	-4,143,415	-24,577,178
2005	-13,638,511	-3,766,741	-28,343,919
2006	-13,638,511	-3,424,310	-31,768,228
2007	-13,638,511	-3,113,009	-34,881,237
2008	-13,638,511	-2,830,008	-37,711,245
2009	-13,638,511	-2,572,734	-40,283,980
2010	-13,638,511	-2,338,849	-42,622,829
2011	-13,638,511	-2,126,227	-44,749,056

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS -----($K)-----	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	16,270	6,508	6,508	6,508	0	0	35,795
Fam Housing	3,527	1,411	1,411	1,411	0	0	7,759
Land Purch	1,250	0	0	0	0	0	1,250
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	126	315	0	0	0	0	441
Civ Retire	171	147	73	73	49	0	514
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	149	0	126	126	119	0	520
POV Miles	7	0	6	6	5	0	25
Home Purch	280	0	237	237	218	0	972
HHG	527	0	438	438	405	0	1,808
Misc	19	0	16	16	15	0	66
House Hunt	134	0	112	112	105	0	463
PPS	2	15	9	9	6	0	42
RITA	165	0	139	139	129	0	573
FREIGHT							
Packing	4	3	4	4	3	0	18
Freight	84	225	255	871	396	142	1,972
Vehicles	0	158	174	790	316	142	1,580
Driving	0	59	65	296	118	53	592
Unemployment	34	84	0	0	0	0	118
OTHER							
Admin/Plan	223	168	126	94	71	53	735
Shutdown	26	26	26	26	22	0	128
New Hire	140	0	15	15	25	0	195
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	73	73	73	73	73	0	364
POV Miles	28	28	28	28	28	0	141
HHG	538	538	538	538	538	0	2,691
Misc	71	71	71	71	71	0	357
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	163	163	163	163	140	0	792
Environmental	945	945	945	0	0	0	2,835
Info Manage	445	222	222	222	0	0	1,112
1-Time Other	1,002	1,002	1,002	0	0	0	3,006
TOTAL ONE-TIME	26,405	12,163	12,783	12,269	2,855	391	66,866

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.01) - Page 2
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS -----($K)-----	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	39	94	125	164	180	180	782	180
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	24	30	30	30	112	30
BOS	87	145	218	290	362	362	1,465	362
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	720	865	1,000	1,127	1,127	1,127	5,967	1,127
MIL PERSONNEL								
House Allow	20	61	102	142	216	274	816	274
OTHER								
Mission	0	550	1,155	3,905	5,005	5,500	16,115	5,500
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	867	1,715	2,623	5,659	6,920	7,474	25,259	7,474
TOTAL COST	27,272	13,878	15,407	17,928	9,775	7,864	92,125	7,474

ONE-TIME SAVES -----($K)-----	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	795	795	795	0	0	0	2,385
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
Mil Moving	60	60	60	60	60	0	300
Elim PCS	101	101	101	101	0	0	406
OTHER							
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	2,100	0	2,100
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	956	956	956	161	2,160	0	5,191

RECURRINGSAVES -----($K)-----	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	1	4	7	10	12	13	48	13
BOS	19	200	328	488	635	768	2,438	768
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	175	1,575	3,500	4,900	6,125	6,650	22,925	6,650
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	4,833	4,833	9,666	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	322	967	1,611	2,255	2,578	2,578	10,310	2,578
Enl Salary	135	405	676	946	1,081	1,081	4,324	1,081
House Allow	226	644	867	905	880	889	4,411	889
OTHER								
Procurement	233	233	233	233	233	233	1,398	233
Mission	0	890	1,869	6,319	8,099	8,900	26,077	8,900
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	1,112	4,918	9,090	16,056	24,477	25,945	81,598	21,112
TOTAL SAVINGS	2,068	5,874	10,047	16,218	26,637	25,945	86,790	21,112

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.01) - Page 3
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

ONE-TIME NET -----($K)-----	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	15,475	5,713	5,713	6,508	0	0	33,410
Fam Housing	3,527	1,411	1,411	1,411	0	0	7,759
O&M							
Civ Retir/RIF	297	462	73	73	49	0	955
Civ Moving	1,371	461	1,581	3,044	1,837	338	8,632
Other	423	278	167	136	118	53	1,176
MIL PERSONNEL							
Mil Moving	549	549	549	549	651	0	2,847
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	163	163	163	163	140	0	792
Environmental	945	945	945	0	0	0	2,835
Info Manage	445	222	222	222	0	0	1,112
1-Time Other	1,002	1,002	1,002	0	0	0	3,006
Land	1,250	0	0	0	-2,100	0	-850
TOTAL ONE-TIME	25,449	11,206	11,827	12,107	695	391	61,675

RECURRING NET -----($K)-----	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	39	94	125	164	180	180	782	180
O&M								
RPMA	-1	-4	17	20	17	16	64	16
BOS	68	-54	-110	-198	-273	-406	-973	-406
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	720	865	1,000	1,127	1,127	1,127	5,967	1,127
Civ Salary	-175	-1,575	-3,500	-4,900	-6,125	-6,650	-22,925	-6,650
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	-4,833	-4,833	-9,666	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	-457	-1,372	-2,287	-3,201	-3,659	-3,659	-14,635	-3,659
House Allow	-205	-583	-765	-763	-664	-615	-3,595	-615
OTHER								
Procurement	-233	-233	-233	-233	-233	-233	-1,398	-233
Mission	0	-340	-714	-2,414	-3,094	-3,400	-9,962	-3,400
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-244	-3,202	-6,467	-10,397	-17,556	-18,477	-56,340	-13,638
TOTAL NET COST	25,204	8,004	5,360	1,710	-16,861	-18,081	5,335	-13,638

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	35,795,226	
Family Housing Construction	7,759,477	
Information Management Account	1,111,752	
Land Purchases	1,250,000	
Total - Construction		45,916,455
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	441,000	
Civilian Early Retirement	514,500	
Civilian New Hires	195,000	
Unemployment	117,936	
Total - Personnel		1,268,436
Overhead		
Administrative Support	734,887	
Mothball / Shutdown	128,000	
Total - Overhead		862,887
Moving		
Civilian Moving	4,427,587	
Civilian PPS	42,000	
Military Moving	3,553,819	
Freight	4,162,500	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		12,185,907
Other		
HAP / RSE	791,775	
One-Time Unique Costs	3,885,000	
Total - Other		6,632,775
Total One-Time Costs		66,866,46[illegible]
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	2,385,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	300,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	406,360	
Land Sales	2,100,000	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		5,191,360
Total Net One-Time Costs		61,675,101

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

Net Change($K)	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	-1	-4	17	20	17	16	64	16
BOS Change	68	-54	-110	-198	-273	-406	-973	-406
Housing Change	39	94	125	164	180	180	782	180
TOTAL CHANGES	106	35	32	-14	-76	-209	-126	-209

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

	Personnel		SF		
Base	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
Ft Deluxe	-1,008	-50%	-128,000	-1%	127
Camp Swampy	125	3%	71,938	1%	575
Ft Beach	125	3%	71,938	1%	575
Camp Dusty	125	3%	71,938	1%	575
Camp Frozen	125	3%	71,938	1%	575
Ft Buffalo	125	3%	71,938	1%	575
Base X	125	0%	0	0%	0

	RPMA($)			BOS($)		
Base	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
Ft Deluxe	-13,496	-1%	13	-767,700	-30%	762
Camp Swampy	4,510	0%	36	72,407	2%	579
Ft Beach	6,274	0%	50	72,407	2%	579
Camp Dusty	6,274	0%	50	72,407	2%	579
Camp Frozen	6,274	0%	50	72,407	2%	579
Ft Buffalo	6,274	0%	50	72,407	2%	579
Base X	0	0%	0	0	0%	0

	RPMABOS($)		
Base	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
Ft Deluxe	-781,196	-17%	775
Camp Swampy	76,917	1%	615
Ft Beach	78,682	1%	629
Camp Dusty	78,682	1%	629
Camp Frozen	78,682	1%	629
Ft Buffalo	78,682	1%	629
Base X	0	0%	0

TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

All Costs in $K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
Ft Deluxe	0	0	0	0	0
Camp Swampy	9,050	231	250	-2,385	7,146
Ft Beach	8,485	216	250	0	8,951
Camp Dusty	7,919	202	250	0	8,371
Camp Frozen	7,919	202	250	0	8,371
Ft Buffalo	10,182	260	250	0	10,691
Base X	0	0	0	0	0
Totals:	43,555	1,112	1,250	-2,385	43,531

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

	Rate	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		60	0	30	30	30	0	150
Early Retirement*	8.00%	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Regular Retirement*	10.00%	6	0	6	6	6	0	24
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	12	0	6	6	6	0	30
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		30	0	18	18	18	0	84
Civilian Positions Available		30	0	12	12	12	0	66
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		10	70	40	40	30	0	190
Early Retirement	8.00%	1	6	3	3	2	0	15
Regular Retirement	10.00%	1	7	4	4	3	0	19
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	2	11	6	6	5	0	30
Priority Placement#	44.00%	4	31	18	18	13	0	84
Civilians Available to Move		2	15	9	9	7	0	42
Civilians Moving		2	0	9	9	7	0	27
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	15	0	0	0	0	15
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		60	0	30	30	30	0	150
Civilians Moving		32	0	27	27	25	0	111
New Civilians Hired		28	0	3	3	5	0	39
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		7	6	3	3	2	0	21
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		6	15	0	0	0	0	21
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		4	31	18	18	13	0	84
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		28	0	3	3	5	0	39

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

\+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Moving (Voluntary RIFs) varies by base.

\# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: Ft Deluxe, CA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1992, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
500	500	0	1,000

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: Camp Swampy, LA

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Enlisted	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	10	0	5	5	5	0	25
TOTAL	30	20	25	25	25	0	125

To Base: Ft Beach, CA

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Enlisted	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	10	0	5	5	5	0	25
TOTAL	30	20	25	25	25	0	125

To Base: Camp Dusty, NV

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Enlisted	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	10	0	5	5	5	0	25
TOTAL	30	20	25	25	25	0	125

To Base: Camp Frozen, NY

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Enlisted	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	10	0	5	5	5	0	25
TOTAL	30	20	25	25	25	0	125

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.01) - Page 2
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

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To Base: Ft Buffalo, KS

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Enlisted	10	10	10	10	101442X0		50
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	10	0	5	5	5	0	25
TOTAL	30	20	25	25	25	0	125

To Base: Base X

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Enlisted	10	10	10	10	10	0	50
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	10	0	5	5	5	0	25
TOTAL	30	20	25	25	25	0	125

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of Ft Deluxe, CA):

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	60	60	60	60	60	0	300
Enlisted	60	60	60	60	60	0	300
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	60	0	30	30	30	0	150
TOTAL	180	120	150	150	150	0	750

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	-10	-10	-10	-10	0	0	-40
Enlisted	-10	-10	-10	-10	0	0	-40
Civilians	-10	-70	-40	-40	-30	0	-190
TOTAL	-30	-90	-60	-60	-30	0	-270

CARETAKER REQUIREMENTS:

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Officers	0	0			0	0	0
Civilians	0	1	1	1	0	0	6
TOTAL			2	2	0	0	12

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
160	166	0	666

PERSONNEL YEARLY PERCENTAGES (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:52 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\STDFCTRS.SFF

Base: Ft Deluxe, CA

	Moving In		MilCon	Move Out/Elim		ShutDn
Year	Total	Percent	TimPhas	Total	Percent	TimPhas
1992	0	0.00%	33.33%	210	20.59%	20.59%
1993	0	0.00%	16.67%	210	20.59%	20.59%
1994	0	0.00%	16.67%	210	20.59%	20.59%
1995	0	0.00%	16.67%	210	20.59%	20.59%
1996	0	0.00%	16.67%	180	17.65%	17.65%
1997	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	1020	100.00%	100.00%

Base: Camp Swampy, LA

	Moving In		MilCon	Move Out/Elim		ShutDn
Year	Total	Percent	TimPhas	Total	Percent	TimPhas
1992	30	24.00%	40.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1993	20	16.00%	20.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1994	25	20.00%	20.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1995	25	20.00%	20.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1996	25	20.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	125	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: Ft Beach, CA

	Moving In		MilCon	Move Out/Elim		ShutDn
Year	Total	Percent	TimPhas	Total	Percent	TimPhas
1992	30	24.00%	40.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1993	20	16.00%	20.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1994	25	20.00%	20.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1995	25	20.00%	20.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1996	25	20.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	125	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

SCENARIO ERROR REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 15:37 03/19/1991, Report Created 14:53 09/21/1994

Department : US Army
Option Package : ALFA
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR
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PERSONNEL MOVEMENT:
Ft Deluxe has 12 caretakers but is not being deactivated.
Ft Deluxe*p416X68dofficers present after closing.
Ft Deluxe had 166 enlisted personnel present after closing.
Ft Deluxe had 666 civilians personnel present after closing.

OVERHEAD/RPMA:
Ft Deluxe still had 9,872 KSF of facilities after closing.

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APPENDIX C

SAMPLE ADDER REPORTS

APPENDIX C - SAMPLE ADDER REPORTS

This appendix contains a set of sample ADDER reports, generated from a group of fictional closure/realignment scenarios. All standard ADDER reports are included, except the Input Data Report (which is only a printout of the list of files makeing up the scenario).

ADDER REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (ADDER v5.01)
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

ADDER Data File: C:\COBRA\SOURCE\ZIP.OUT

Starting Year : 1994
Final Year : 1998
ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2013($K):-3,459,272
1-Time Cost($K): 1,360,583

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total	Beyond
MilCon	-137,252	-461,803	229,286	-7,417	-33,700	-21,800	-432,686	0
Person	-144,579	-162,093	-372,157	-270,084	-165,157	-166,256	-1,280,327	-166,256
Overhd	21,070	14,961	-30,625	-70,514	-133,212	-134,713	-333,033	-134,819
Moving	21,025	55,154	61,379	57,807	4,976	675	201,017	0
Missio	-5,694	-8,204	-8,952	-12,352	-13,712	-14,324	-63,238	-14,324
Other	1,332	2,600	40,714	-8,632	-13,852	-10,132	12,029	-466
TOTAL	-244,097	-559,385	-80,355	-311,193	-354,658	-346,550	-1,896,238	-315,866

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	114	92	391	147	0	0	744
Enlisted	726	558	2,202	1,227	0	0	4,713
Civilian	20	842	986	371	60	0	2,279
TOTAL	860	1,492	3,579	1,745	60	0	7,736
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Officers	581	1,600	1,393	1,092	120	0	4,786
Enlisted	2,651	9,919	10,293	6,588	120	0	29,571
Students	0	40	0	1,800	0	0	1,840
Civilian	138	1,152	930	588	60	0	2,868
TOTAL	3,370	12,711	12,616	10,068	300	0	39,065

ADDER REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (ADDER v5.01) - Page 2
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

ADDER Data File: C:\COBRA\SOURCE\ZIP.OUT

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total	Beyond
MilCon	445,276	297,227	273,176	16,283	0	0	1,031,962	0
Person	3,164	18,001	31,759	33,722	33,221	33,190	153,057	33,190
Overhd	23,458	37,636	55,873	62,975	52,517	51,283	283,742	51,177
Moving	22,262	58,875	66,242	62,813	5,096	675	215,964	0
Missio	0	1,100	2,310	7,810	10,010	11,000	32,230	11,000
Other	6,120	5,220	41,180	876	479	0	53,875	0
TOTAL	500,280	418,059	470,539	184,479	101,324	96,148	1,770,830	95,367

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total	Beyond
MilCon	582,528	759,030	43,890	23,700	33,700	21,800	1,464,648	0
Person	147,742	180,094	403,916	303,807	198,379	199,447	1,433,384	199,447
Overhd	2,388	22,674	86,497	133,490	185,729	185,996	616,775	185,996
Moving	1,237	3,721	4,863	5,006	120	0	14,946	0
Missio	5,694	9,304	11,262	20,162	23,722	25,324	95,468	25,324
Other	4,788	2,620	466	9,508	14,332	10,132	41,846	466
TOTAL	744,377	977,443	550,894	495,672	455,982	442,699	3,667,068	411,233

ADDER NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (ADDER v5.01)
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

Year	Cost($)	Adjusted Cost($)	NPV($)
1994	-244,096,833	-235,977,315	-235,977,315
1995	-559,384,652	-505,399,584	-741,376,899
1996	-80,355,245	-67,850,771	-809,227,670
1997	-311,192,953	-245,576,345	-1,054,804,015
1998	-354,657,919	-261,566,826	-1,316,370,841
1999	-346,550,268	-238,866,619	-1,555,237,459
2000	-315,865,774	-203,473,575	-1,758,711,034
2001	-315,865,774	-190,162,219	-1,948,873,253
2002	-315,865,774	-177,721,700	-2,126,594,954
2003	-315,865,774	-166,095,047	-2,292,690,001
2004	-315,865,774	-155,229,016	-2,447,919,017
2005	-315,865,774	-145,073,847	-2,592,992,863
2006	-315,865,774	-135,583,034	-2,728,575,897
2007	-315,865,774	-126,713,116	-2,855,289,014
2008	-315,865,774	-118,423,473	-2,973,712,487
2009	-315,865,774	-110,676,143	-3,084,388,630
2010	-315,865,774	-103,435,648	-3,187,824,277
2011	-315,865,774	-96,668,829	-3,284,493,107
2012	-315,865,774	-90,344,700	-3,374,837,807
2013	-315,865,774	-84,434,299	-3,459,272,107

ADDER APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (ADDER v5.01)
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

ONE-TIME COSTS -----($K)-----	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	368,139	246,997	199,585	13,016	0	0	827,737
Fam Housing	73,748	49,785	73,146	2,822	0	0	199,501
Land Purch	2,500	0	0	0	0	0	2,500
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	252	1,899	1,462	813	0	0	4,426
Civ Retire	343	448	321	264	98	0	1,474
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	327	2,273	2,616	1,425	238	0	6,879
POV Miles	15	10	20	31	11	0	88
Home Purch	622	3,813	4,476	3,274	436	0	12,621
HHG	1,088	1,864	2,818	2,506	810	0	9,086
Misc	41	211	254	208	30	0	744
House Hunt	285	1,345	1,614	949	210	0	4,403
PPS	4	1,297	1,642	1,057	13	0	4,013
RITA	361	2,143	2,514	1,649	259	0	6,926
FREIGHT							
Packing	188	621	909	523	7	0	2,250
Freight	5,411	9,107	11,060	15,645	791	284	42,300
Vehicles	3,581	711	513	1,735	632	284	7,458
Driving	4	130	135	629	237	107	1,242
Unemployment	67	3,022	3,527	551	0	0	7,166
OTHER							
Admin/Plan	12,791	9,594	5,421	4,066	1,295	106	33,273
Shutdown	492	4,568	4,078	2,868	45	0	12,052
New Hire	280	0	30	30	50	0	390
1-Time Move	1,014	14,456	13,010	7,178	0	0	35,658
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	1,515	903	1,178	987	146	0	4,729
POV Miles	436	739	447	650	56	0	2,329
HHG	6,227	15,886	18,648	19,850	1,077	0	61,688
Misc	1,142	3,364	4,385	4,513	143	0	13,548
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	326	326	326	326	279	0	1,583
Environmental	3,790	2,890	1,890	0	0	0	8,570
Info Manage	889	445	445	445	0	0	2,223
1-Time Other	2,004	2,004	38,964	550	200	0	43,722
TOTAL ONE-TIME	487,885	380,851	395,437	88,564	7,064	781	1,360,583

ADDER APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (ADDER v5.01) - Page 2
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

RECURRINGCOSTS -----($K)-----	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	1,696	5,089	9,606	12,483	12,514	12,514	53,902	12,514
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	11,541	11,553	11,553	11,553	46,201	11,553
BOS	5,544	15,162	21,732	28,256	23,360	23,360	117,414	23,360
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	1,440	1,730	1,999	2,255	2,255	2,255	11,935	2,255
MIL PERSONNEL								
House Allow	2,221	12,633	26,419	32,064	33,073	33,190	139,601	33,190
OTHER								
Mission	0	1,100	2,310	7,810	10,010	11,000	32,230	11,000
Misc Recur	1,494	1,494	1,494	1,494	1,494	1,494	8,964	1,494
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	12,395	37,207	75,102	95,915	94,260	95,367	410,247	95,367
TOTAL COST	500,280	418,059	470,539	184,479	101,324	96,148	1,770,830	95,367

ONE-TIME SAVES -----($K)-----	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	500,730	629,030	43,890	23,700	33,700	21,800	1,252,850
Fam Housing	81,798	130,000	0	0	0	0	211,798
O&M							
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
Mil Moving	1,237	3,721	4,863	5,006	120	0	14,946
Elim PCS	856	592	1,959	1,318	0	0	4,726
OTHER							
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	4,200	0	4,200
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	584,620	763,343	50,712	30,024	38,020	21,800	1,488,520

RECURRINGSAVES -----($K)-----	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	1,034	8,578	16,531	17,995	18,017	18,017	80,172	18,017
O&M								
RPMA	841	10,408	42,471	58,996	95,218	95,220	303,154	95,220
BOS	513	3,688	27,495	56,498	72,495	72,759	233,449	72,759
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	350	11,217	33,544	53,443	62,580	63,630	224,765	63,630
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	9,666	9,666	19,332	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	2,667	7,134	15,808	26,119	29,556	29,556	110,842	29,556
Enl Salary	6,581	17,264	37,534	65,667	77,632	77,632	282,310	77,632
House Allow	137,288	143,887	315,071	157,260	28,609	28,627	810,742	28,627
OTHER								
Procurement	4,788	2,620	466	9,508	466	466	18,314	466
Mission	5,694	9,304	11,262	20,162	23,722	25,324	95,468	25,324
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	159,756	214,100	500,182	465,648	417,962	420,899	2,178,548	411,233
TOTAL SAVINGS	744,377	977,443	550,894	495,672	455,982	442,699	3,667,068	411,233

ADDER APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (ADDER v5.01) - Page 3
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

ONE-TIME NET -----($K)-----	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	-132,591	-382,033	155,695	-10,683	-33,700	-21,800	-425,112
Fam Housing	-8,050	-80,215	73,146	2,822	0	0	-12,297
O&M							
Civ Retir/RIF	595	2,346	1,782	1,078	98	0	5,900
Civ Moving	11,928	23,526	28,573	29,634	3,675	675	98,011
Other	14,645	31,639	26,067	14,692	1,390	106	88,540
MIL PERSONNEL							
Mil Moving	7,227	16,579	17,837	19,677	1,301	0	62,622
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	326	326	326	326	279	0	1,583
Environmental	3,790	2,890	1,890	0	0	0	8,570
Info Manage	889	445	445	445	0	0	2,223
1-Time Other	2,004	2,004	38,964	550	200	0	43,722
Land	2,500	0	0	0	-4,200	0	-1,700
TOTAL ONE-TIME	-96,736	-382,492	344,725	58,540	-30,956	-21,018	-127,937

RECURRING NET -----($K)-----	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	662	-3,489	-6,925	-5,512	-5,503	-5,503	-26,270	-5,503
O&M								
RPMA	-841	-10,408	-30,929	-47,443	-83,664	-83,667	-256,953	-83,667
BOS	5,031	11,474	-5,764	-28,242	-49,134	-49,399	-116,035	-49,399
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	1,440	1,730	1,999	2,255	2,255	2,255	11,935	2,255
Civ Salary	-350	-11,217	-33,544	-53,443	-62,580	-63,630	-224,765	-63,630
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	-9,666	-9,666	-19,332	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	-9,248	-24,398	-53,342	-91,786	-107,189	-107,189	-393,151	-107,189
House Allow	-135,067	-131,254	-288,652	-125,196	4,464	4,563	-671,142	4,563
OTHER								
Procurement	-4,788	-2,620	-466	-9,508	-466	-466	-18,314	-466
Mission	-5,694	-8,204	-8,952	-12,352	-13,712	-14,324	-63,238	-14,324
Misc Recur	1,494	1,494	1,494	1,494	1,494	1,494	8,964	1,494
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-147,361	-176,893	-425,080	-369,733	-323,702	-325,532	-1,768,301	-315,866
TOTAL NET COST	-244,097	-559,385	-80,355	-311,193	-354,658	-346,550	-1,896,238	-315,866

ADDER ONE-TIME COST REPORT (ADDER v5.01)
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	827,737,571	
Family Housing Construction	199,501,008	
Information Management Account	2,223,502	
Land Purchases	2,500,000	
Total - Construction		1,031,962,081
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	4,425,823	
Civilian Early Retirement	1,473,932	
Civilian New Hires	390,000	
Unemployment	7,166,560	
Total - Personnel		13,456,315
Overhead		
Administrative Support	33,273,077	
Mothball / Shutdown	12,052,120	
Total - Overhead		45,325,197
Moving		
Civilian Moving	40,748,968	
Civilian PPS	4,013,076	
Military Moving	82,294,116	
Freight	53,249,488	
One-Time Moving Costs	35,658,000	
Total - Moving		215,963,648
Other		
HAP / RSE	1,583,554	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	8,570,000	
One-Time Unique Costs	43,722,000	
Total - Other		53,875,554
Total One-Time Costs		1,360,582,795
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	1,252,850,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	211,798,000	
Military Moving	14,946,244	
Eliminated Military PCS	4,725,738	
Land Sales	4,200,000	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		1,488,519,982
Total Net One-Time Costs		-127,937,187

ADDER ERROR REPORT (ADDER v5.01)
Report Created 15:24 09/21/1994

ADDER Data File: C:\COBRA\SOURCE\ZIP.OUT

COBRA Scenario File(s) used more than once:
C:\COBRA\SOURCE\TESTDATA.CBR

ADDER ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT (ADDER v5.01) - Page 2
Report Created 09:08 09/30/1994

Installation: Camp Rocky

State: OH Service: ARMY Year: 1994

Current Base Pers- Off: 200, Enl: 200, Civ: 200, Stu: 100

Action: REALIGNED

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Mil Reloc(OUT)	0	0	50	50	100	0	0	0
Mil Dis (OUT)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Reloc(OUT)	0	0	20	20	40	0	0	0
Civ Dis (OUT)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Reloc(OUT)	0	0	10	20	20	0	0	0
Mil Reloc (IN)	50	50	50	50	0	0	0	0
Civ Reloc (IN)	20	20	20	20	0	0	0	0
Stu Reloc (IN)	5	10	15	20	0	0	0	0

APPENDIX D

FILES DIRECTORY

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APPENDIX D - FILES DIRECTORY

This Appendix lists the File Name and the Title/Description of files provided with COBRA V5.01 (Help files and Reports files). They are listed here to assist the user who may not recognize the File Name as it appears on the COBRA screen or window. This information is also available to the user through Context-Sensitive Help (see Section 3.3.3). Should the user need similar information on user-defined files (Data files and Standard Factors files) it is available through the on-screen Files Directory (see Section 3.4.3)

HELP FILES

File Name	Title/Description
BACKGRND.HLP	Background, Capabilities, & Operations
CONTENTS.HLP	List of Help & Reports files
DATABASE.HLP	Description of DataBase Menu options
FILE.HLP	Description of File Menu options
HELP.HLP	Description of Help Menu options
INPUT.HLP	Description of Input Data Menu options
OUTPUT.HLP	Description of Output Reports (see list below)
REPORTS.HLP	Description of Reports Menu options
SCREEN1.HLP	Description of General Scenario Data Entry
SCREEN2.HLP	Description of Distance Table Data Entry
SCREEN3.HLP	Description of Movement Table Data Entry
SCREEN4.HLP	Description of Static Base Data Entry
SCREEN5.HLP	Description of Dynamic Base Data Entry
SCREEN6.HLP	Description of Personnel Base Data Entry
SCREEN7.HLP	Description of Military Construction Data Entry
SCREEN8.HLP	Description of Unique Activity Data Entry
SCREEN9.HLP	Description of Explanatory Notes Data Entry
STDFCTR1.HLP	Description of Personnel Standard Factors
STDFCTR2.HLP	Description of Facility Standard Factors
STDFCTR3.HLP	Description of Transportation Standard Factors
STDFCTR4.HLP	Description of Construction Standard Factors
WINDOWS.HLP	Description of Windows Menu options

COBRA REPORT FILES

File Name	Title/Description
1TIMCOST.RPT	One-Time Costs Report
APPDET.RPT	Appropriations Detail Report
COBSUM.RPT	Realignment Summary Report
DELTAS.RPT	BOS, Land, SF, and RPMA Deltas Report
ERROR.RPT	Scenario Error Report
INPUTDAT.RPT	Input Data Report
MILCONAS.RPT	Military Construction Assets Report
NPV.RPT	Net Present Values Report
PERSSUM.RPT	Personnel Summary Report
PERSIMP.RPT	Personnel Impact Report
PERSPERC.RPT	Personnel Yearly Percentages Report
RPMABOS.RPT	RPMA/BOS Change Report

ADDER REPORT FILES

File Name	Title/Description
1TIMCOST.ART	One-Time Costs Report
ADRSUM.ART	Realignment Summary Report
APPDET.ART	Appropriations Detail Report
EIR.ART	Economic Impact Report
ERROR.ART	Scenario Error Report
INPUTDAT.ART	Input Data Report
NPV.ART	Net Present Values Report

EXTENSIONS USED BY COBRA/ADDER

Extension	Type of File
*.ART	ADDER Report
*.BAK	COBRA Scenario/Standard Factors Backup File
*.CBD	COBRA Scenario Data File
*.CSH	COBRA/ADDER Context Sensitive Help File
*.DBS	COBRA Base Database
*.DDS	COBRA Distance Database
*.EIR	Economic Impact Database Report
*.GRP	COBRA/ADDER Group File
*.HLP	COBRA/ADDER Help Text File
*.OUT	COBRA Output/ADDER Input File
*.RPT	COBRA Report
*.SFF	COBRA Standard Factors File

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WORLDWIDE

LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS (MAJOR, MINOR & SUPPORT)

1992





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Military Installations and Properties
United States
September 1991

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines	Total
ALABAMA	4	1	5	0	10
ALASKA	3	1	7	0	11
ARIZONA	2	0	6	1	9
ARKANSAS	2	0	3	0	5
CALIFORNIA	10	34	16	7	67
COLORADO	3	0	6	0	9
CONNECTICUT	0	1	2	0	3
DELAWARE	0	0	2	0	2
DIST OF COLUMBIA	2	4	1	1	8
FLORIDA	0	14	10	0	24
GEORGIA	6	3	5	1	15
HAWAII	4	6	2	2	14
IDAHO	0	0	2	0	2
ILLINOIS	4	2	5	0	11
INDIANA	3	2	3	0	8
IOWA	0	0	2	0	2
KANSAS	2	0	2	0	4
KENTUCKY	3	1	1	0	5
LOUISIANA	1	1	3	0	5
MAINE	0	2	3	0	5
MARYLAND	7	8	2	0	17
MASSACHUSETTS	3	1	7	0	11
MICHIGAN	2	0	4	0	6
MINNESOTA	0	0	2	0	2
MISSISSIPPI	0	4	5	0	9
MISSOURI	2	0	6	1	9
MONTANA	0	0	2	0	2
NEBRASKA	0	0	2	0	2
NEVADA	0	1	3	0	4
NEW HAMPSHIRE	0	1	2	0	3
NEW JERSEY	4	3	2	0	9
NEW MEXICO	1	0	3	0	4
NEW YORK	6	1	8	1	16
NORTH CAROLINA	2	2	4	3	11
NORTH DAKOTA	0	0	4	0	4
OHIO	1	1	9	0	11
OKLAHOMA	2	0	5	0	7
OREGON	0	0	2	0	2
PENNSYLVANIA	7	7	3	0	17
RHODE ISLAND	0	2	3	0	5
SOUTH CAROLINA	1	4	4	2	11
SOUTH DAKOTA	0	0	2	0	2
TENNESSEE	1	2	4	0	7
TEXAS	6	5	15	0	26
UTAH	4	0	2	0	6
VERMONT	0	0	1	0	1
VIRGINIA	12	12	2	3	29
WASHINGTON	1	6	4	0	11
WEST VIRGINIA	0	0	2	0	2
WISCONSIN	1	0	2	0	3
WYOMING	0	0	2	0	2
TOTAL	112	132	204	22	470

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
United States
September 30, 1991

Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
ALABAMA									
Army									
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	ANNISTON	36201	2	47	4293	4340	15279		LOGISTICS DEPOT
MCCLELLAN, FORT	ANNISTON	36205	1	6377	1423	7800	45679		MIL POLICE SCHOOL & TNG CTR
RUCKER, FORT	DALEVILLE	36362	1	6532	3825	10357	60078		AVIATION CENTER & SCHOOL
REDSTONE ARSENAL	HUNTSVILLE	35898	1	3299	17919	21218	38235	91 R	ROCKET&GUIDED MSL,R&D,SCH&C
Navy									
NAVAL STATION MOBILE	MOBILE	36601	2	295	90	385	100		HOMEPORT
Air Force									
ABSTON AGS	ABSTON	36112	2	1	15	16	31		280 COMM SQ (ANG)
BIRMINGHAM MAP AGS	BIRMINGHAM	35217	2	4	337	341	86		117 RECON WING (ANG)
HALL AGS	DOTHAN	36301	2	1	46	47	18		115 TAC CONTROL SQ
DANNELLY FIELD AGS	MONTGOMERY	36105	2	4	315	319	51		187 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
MAXWELL AFB	MONTGOMERY	36112	1	2355	2070	4425	3528		AIR UNIVERSITY
ALASKA									
Army									
RICHARDSON, FORT	ANCHORAGE	99505	1	4047	1429	5476	61329		172ND INFANTRY BRIGADE
GREELY, FORT	DELTA JUNCTION	98733	3	426	334	760	639086		R&D TEST CENTER(ARTIC TNG C
WAINWRIGHT, FORT	FAIRBANKS	99703	1	5423	1217	6640	656232		172ND INFANTRY BRIGADE
Navy									
NAVAL AIR STATION, ADAK	ADAK	98791	2	2055	204	2259	61000		PATROL AIRCRAFT
Air Force									
SHEMYA AFB	ALEUTIANS	98736	1	587	146	733	3520		5073 AIR BASE GROUP
ELMENDORF AFB	ANCHORAGE	99506	1	7056	2134	9190	13130		21 FIGHTER WING
KULIS AGB	ANCHORAGE	99502	2	4	424	428	129		176 COMPOSITE GROUP (ANG)
CLEAR AFS	ANDERSON	99704	2	113	279	392	11438		MISSILE WARNING
EIELSON AFB	FAIRBANKS	99702	1	3534	837	4371	19940		343 FIGHTER WING
GALENA AIRPORT AFS	GALENA	99741	2	310	65	375	182		FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION
KING SALMON AIRPORT	NAKNEK	99613	2	277	69	346	86		FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
United States
September 30, 1991

Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
			ARIZONA						
Army									
HUACHUCA, FORT	SIERRA VISTA	85613	1	6591	5721	12312	121449	88 R	COMM CMD&INTELLIGENCE SCH
YUMA PROVING GROUND	YUMA	85365	2	296	1794	2090	1009736		R & D TEST CENTER
Air Force									
WILLIAMS AFB	CHANDLER	85224	1	1217	1410	2627	4762	91 C	82 FTW
GILA BEND AFS	GILA BEND	85337	2	151	177	328	1886		AUXILIARY FIELD
LUKE AFB	LITCHFIELD PARK	85321	1	4275	1377	5652	4258		58 FIGHTER WING
PHOENIX SKY HARBOR IAP AGS	PHOENIX	85034	2	3	339	342	51		161 AIR REF GROUP (ANG)
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB	TUCSON	85707	1	4627	1592	6219	10982		355 FIGHTER AIR WING
TUCSON IAP AGS	TUCSON	85706	2	27	852	879	86		162 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
Marine Corps									
MCAS, YUMA	YUMA	85364	1	5031	581	5612	2930		JET TNG&TAC AVIATION (3DAW)
			ARKANSAS						
Army									
CHAFFEE, FORT	FORT SMITH	72905	2	326	784	1110	71773	91 R	RC & ACTIVE ARMY TNG
PINE BLUFF ARSENAL	PINE BLUFF	71611	2	97	1576	1673	14949		SM AVIATION/RC SUPPORT
Air Force									
EAKER AFB	BLYTHEVILLE	72315	1	1112	445	1557	3936	91 C	97 AIR REF WG
FORT SMITH MAP AGS	FORT SMITH	72901	2	3	289	292	98		188 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
LITTLE ROCK AFB	JACKSONVILLE	72076	1	5692	1268	6960	11552		314 AIRLIFT WING
			CALIFORNIA						
Army									
IRWIN, FORT	BARSTOW	92310	1	4210	2044	6254	636308		NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	HERLONG	96113	2	380	690	1070	96430		LOGISTICS DEPOT
HUNTER LIGGETT, FORT	JOLON	93928	3	581	299	880	164762		DIV TNG-CDEC
MONTEREY, PRESIDIO OF	MONTEREY	93940	2	3628	1239	4867	392		DEFENSE LANGUAGE SCHOOL
OAKLAND ARMY BASE	OAKLAND	94626	2	213	2332	2545	561		HARBOR & PORT
SACRAMENTO ARMY DEPOT	SACRAMENTO	95813	2	623	2864	3487	485	91 C	LOGISTICS DEPOT
SAN FRANCISCO, PRESIDIO OF	SAN FRANCISCO	94129	2	1585	2891	4476	1280	88 C	HQ&ADMIN/LETTERMN MED CTR
ORD, FORT	SEASIDE	93941	1	14306	2864	17170	28057	91 C	7TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH
SHARPE ARMY DEPOT	STOCKTON	95331	1	75	1381	1456	724		LOGISTICS DEPOT (DLA)
DEFENSE DEPOT, TRACY	TRACY	95376	2	14	2819	2833	448		LOGISTICS DEPOT (DLA)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
United States
September 30, 1991

Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
Navy									
NAS, ALAMEDA	ALAMEDA	94501	1	18597	4216	22813	2616		SUPPORT AIRCRAFT, NARF
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	ALAMEDA		2	30	3881	3911	10		AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
NAVAL HOSP, CAMP PENDELTON	CAMP PENDLETON	92055	2	840	532	1372	187		HEALTH CARE
NAVAL WEAPONS CTR, CHINA LAKE	CHINA LAKE	93555	3	1138	8317	9455	1127266	91 R	AIR WARFARE&MISSILE SYSTEMS
NAVAL WEAPONS STA, CONCORD	CONCORD	94520	3	2557	1616	4173	13023		WEAPONS PRODUCTION
NAVAL AIR FAC, EL CENTRO	EL CENTRO	92243	2	379	338	717	63137		FLEET AIR TRAINING SUPPORT
NAS, LEMOORE	LEMOORE	93245	1	5030	1766	6796	39173		ATTACK AIRCRAFT
LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD	LONG BEACH	90822	1	2336	4289	6625	350		SHIP ALTERATION&REPAIR
NAVSTA, LONG BEACH	LONG BEACH	90822	1	14016	1664	15680	1351	91 C	FLEET & SHORE SUPPORT
NAS, MOFFETT FIELD	MOFFETT FIELD	94035	1	4683	935	5618	3919	91 C	AREA COORDINATOR
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL	MONTEREY	93943	2	2440	1380	3820	619		PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TN
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NO. ISL.	NORTH ISLAND		2	30	4335	4365	10		AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
NAVAL HOSPITAL, OAKLAND	OAKLAND	94627	2	1864	819	2683	183		HEALTH CARE
NAVAL SUPPLY CTR, OAKLAND	OAKLAND	94625	3	1978	4815	6793	1133		SUPPLY SUPPORT
NAV CONST BN CTR, PT HUENEME	PORT HUENEME	93043	3	4205	5020	9225	2407		CONSTRUCTION FORCE SUPPORT
PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER	PT MUGU	93042	1	2953	8189	11142	27093	91 R	RDT&E AIR LAUNCHED WEAPONS
FLEET ASW TRAINING CTR, PAC	SAN DIEGO	92147	2	2187	98	2285	37		ASW TRAINING
FLEET COMBAT TNG CTR, PAC	SAN DIEGO	92147	2	770	510	1280	91		SPECIALIZED TRAINING
NAS, MIRAMAR	SAN DIEGO	92145	1	11908	1371	13279	23420		FIGHTER & ATTACK AIRCRAFT
NAS, NORTH ISLAND	SAN DIEGO	92135	1	26112	2794	28906	47864		EARLY WARNING&ASW AIRCFT,NA
NAV ELECTRONIC SYS ENG CTR	SAN DIEGO	92138	2	33	840	873	3	91 C	R&D-ELECTRONICS
NAV SUB BASE, SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	92106	1	6258	519	6777	314		SUBMARINE FORCE SUPPORT
NAVAL AMPHIB BASE, CORONADO	SAN DIEGO	92155	2	5042	483	5525	1095		AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TRAINING
NAVAL COMM STA, SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	92132	3	465	109	574	622		COMMUNICATIONS
NAVAL HOSPITAL, SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	92134	2	3921	1386	5307	121		HEALTH CARE
NAVAL OCEAN SYSTEMS CENTER	SAN DIEGO	92152	2	351	4444	4795	3890		OCEAN SYS R & D
NAVAL STATION, SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	92136	1	29119	6259	35378	1510		OPERATING BASE
NAVAL SUPPLY CTR, SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	92132	3	450	1512	1962	849		SUPPLY DEPOT
NAVAL TNG CTR, SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	92133	2	10378	862	11240	546		RECRUIT & SKILL TRAINING
NAVAL STATION TREASURE ISL.	SAN FRANCISCO	94130	2	2557	869	3426	1931		FLT&SHORE ESTABLISHMENT SPT
NAV WEAPONS STA, SEAL BEACH	SEAL BEACH	90740	3	401	5588	5989	13980		ORDNANCE SUPPORT
NAVAL COMM STA, STOCKTON	STOCKTON	95203	3	220	853	1073	2788		COMMUNICATIONS
MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD	VALLEJO	94592	2	3509	7455	10964	5621		SHIP ALTERATION&REPAIR
NAVAL STATION, MARE ISLAND	VALLEJO	94592	2	4090	415	4505	500		LOGISTIC SUPPORT
Air Force									
GEORGE AFB	ADELANTO	92392	1	2746	438	3184	53889	88 C	35 FIGHTER WING
LOS ANGELES AFB	EL SEGUNDO	90009	1	1794	1976	3770	102		SPACE SYSTEMS CENTER
TRAVIS AFB	FAIRFIELD	94535	1	8272	2528	10800	7545		60 AIRLIFT WING
FRESNO AIR TERMINAL AGS	FRESNO	93727	2	3	386	389	127		144 FIW (ANG)
VANDENBERG AFB	LOMPOC	93437	1	3345	4387	7732	98949		SPACE LAUNCH / MSL TEST CTR
BEALE AFB	MARYSVILLE	95903	1	3348	804	4152	22944		9 WING
CASTLE AFB	MERCED	95342	1	4542	695	5237	3257	91 C	93 WING
NORTH HIGHLANDS AGS	NORTH HIGHLANDS	95813	2	4	38	42	9		162 COMM GP (ANG)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
United States
September 30, 1991

Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
ONTARIO IAP AGS	ONTARIO	91761	2	1	25	26	39		148 COMM SQN (ANG)
CHANNEL ISLAND AGS	OXNARD		2	4	364	368	50		146 AIRLIFT WING (ANG)
MATHER AFB	RANCHO CORDOVA	95655	1	1856	1387	3243	5845	88 C	323 FLYING TRAINING WG
EDWARDS AFB	ROSAMOND	93523	1	4294	4548	8842	300667		AF FLIGHT TEST CENTER
MCCLELLAN AFB	SACRAMENTO	95652	1	3121	12797	15918	3137		AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
NORTON AFB	SAN BERNARDINO	92409	1	4716	2629	7345	2339	88 C	63 AIRLFT WG
MARCH AFB	SUNNYMEAD	92508	1	3181	1743	4924	6854	91 R	22 AIR REF WG
ONIZUKA AFB	SUNNYVALE	94088	1	756	744	1500	23		SATELLITE CONTROL OPS
Marine Corps									
MC LOGISTICS BASE	BARSTOW	92311	1	622	2172	2794	5688		DEPOT MAINT/SUPPLY & STORAG
MCAS, EL TORO	IRVINE	92709	1	6447	1067	7514	5220		HQ 3RD MAW/JET TNG/OPER SPT
MC BASE, CAMP PENDLETON	OCEANSIDE	92055	1	42875	1607	44482	186139		FMF GRND UNITS/TRP TNG/OPER
MCAS CAMP PENDLETON	OCEANSIDE	92055	1	3344	20	3364	343		HELO TNG/OPERATIONS
MC AIR GD CBT CTR 29 PALMS	PALM SPRINGS	92278	1	12420	651	13071	595589		COMBINED ARMS TNG, MCCES
MC RECRUIT DEPOT, SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	92140	1	7428	283	7711	503		RECRUIT TRAINING
MCAS, TUSTIN	TUSTIN	92710	1	4721	39	4760	1709	91 C	MAG-16/HELO TRAINING/OPER
			COLORADO						
Army									
FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL CTR	AURORA	80045	2	1694	2020	3714	577		HEALTH CARE
CARSON, FORT	COLORADO SPGS	80913	1	15868	2740	18608	137391		4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH
PUEBLO ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY	PUEBLO	81001	2	5	713	718	23124	88 R	LOGISTICS DEPOT
Air Force									
BUCKLEY AGB	AURORA	80011	1	618	739	1357	7007		140 FIGHTER WING (ANG)
CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN AFB	COLORADO SPGS	80914	1	1046	300	1346	519		AIR DEFENSE CMD/CONTROL
PETERSON AFB	COLORADO SPGS	80914	1	3100	3626	6726	1155		USSPACECOM & AFSPACECOM HQS
US AIR FORCE ACADEMY	COLORADO SPGS	80840	1	2365	2631	4996	53633		OFFICER ACQUISITION TRAININ
LOWRY AFB	DENVER	80230	1	2949	2121	5070	1934	91 C	TECH TRAINING CENTER
FALCON AFB	ELLICOTT	80912	1	1870	669	2539	2163		2 SPACE WING
			CONNECTICUT						
Navy									
NAVAL SUB BASE, NEW LONDON	GROTON	06349	1	10860	1784	12644	1394		SUBMARINE FORCES SUPPORT
Air Force									
ORANGE AGS	NEW HAVEN	06477	2	1	45	46	29		ACFT CONTROL/WARNING (ANG)
BRADLEY IAP AGS	WINDSOR LOCKS	06096	2	1	299	300	125		103 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
United States
September 30, 1991

Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
DELAWARE									
Air Force									
DOVER AFB	DOVER	19901	1	4234	1501	5735	3760		436 AIRLIFT WING
NEW CASTLE COUNTY APT AGS	NEWPORT	19720	2	5	255	260	57		166 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
DIST OF COLUMBIA									
Army									
MCNAIR, FORT LESLIE J.	WASHINGTON	20319	2	841	1689	2530	98		NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CTR	WASHINGTON	20012	1	3208	4348	7556	113		HEALTH CARE
Navy									
HQ NAV DISTRICT WASHINGTON	WASHINGTON	20374	3	1813	3996	5809	573		ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTICS
NAV SECURITY STA, WASHINGTON	WASHINGTON	20390	3	654	840	1494	38		COMMUNICATIONS
NAVAL OBSERVATORY	WASHINGTON	20390	2	12	2037	2049	364		NAVAL OBERVATORY
NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY	WASHINGTON	20375	3	158	5337	5495	1161		PHYSICAL SCIENCES RESEARCH
Air Force									
BOLLING AFB	WASHINGTON	20332	1	3231	1365	4596	604		AIR FORCE DISTRICT WASH
Marine Corps									
MARINE BARRACKS 8TH & I ST	WASHINGTON	20390	2	1068	44	1112	5		CEREMONIES/SECURITY
FLORIDA									
Navy									
NAS, CECIL FIELD	CECIL FIELD	32215	1	8247	1302	9549	20194		ATTACK & ASW AIRCRAFT
NAVAL SECURITY GP HOMESTEAD	HOMESTEAD	33039	3	360	52	412	815		SECURITY GROUP
NAS, JACKSONVILLE	JACKSONVILLE	32212	1	14714	2467	17181	12376		PATROL & ASW AIRCRAFT, NARF
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT JAX	JACKSONVILLE		2	30	3598	3628	10		AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
NAS, KEY WEST	KEY WEST	33040	2	3229	1005	4234	18615		RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
NAVAL STATION, MAYPORT	MAYPORT	32228	1	15998	1112	17110	818		OPERATING BASE
NAS, WHITING FIELD	MILTON	32570	2	1294	1098	2392	11326		FLIGHT TRAINING
NAVAL TRAINING CENTER	ORLANDO	32813	2	14153	1272	15425	2057		RECRUIT & SKILL TRAINING
NAV COASTAL SYSTEMS CENTER	PANAMA CITY	32407	3	595	1508	2103	1112	91 R	COASTAL REGION WARFARE
NAS, PENSACOLA	PENSACOLA	32508	1	7742	5082	12824	7512		FLIGHT TRAINING, NARF
NAV ED&TNG PRO MGMT SUP ACT	PENSACOLA	32509	2	283	947	1230	983		TRAINING PROGRAM DEVELOPMEN

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NAV TECH TNG CTR, CORRY STA	PENSACOLA	32511	2	2872	320	3192	431		TECHNICAL TRAINING
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT PENSACOL	PENSACOLA		2	30	3768	3798	10		AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
NAVAL OLF SAUFLEY	PENSACOLA	32506	3	260	1400	1660	3541		OUTLYING LANDING FIELD
Air Force									
AVON PARK AFS	AVON PARK	33825	2	61	83	144	5181		AUXILARY AIRFIELD
JACKSONVILLE IAP AGS	CALLAHAN	32229	2	3	392	395	332		125 FIG (ANG)
PATRICK AFB	COCOA BEACH	32925	1	3475	3146	6621	2341		AF EASTERN TEST RANGE
EGLIN AAF 3 (DUKE FIELD)	CRESTVIEW	32536	2	244	373	617	1348		919 SPECIAL OPS GROUP (AFR)
HOMESTEAD AFB	HOMESTEAD	33030	1	4520	1151	5671	3347		31 FIGHTER WING
EGLIN AAF 9 (HURLBURT FIELD)	MARY ESTHER	32544	1	8420	776	9196	6634		AF SPECIAL OPERATIONS CMD
TYNDALL AFB	PANAMA CITY	32401	1	4571	1430	6001	28824		AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS CENTER
CAPE CANAVERAL AFS	PORT CANAVERAL	32925	2	303	3184	3487	15435		SPACE LAUNCH OPERATIONS
MACDILL AFB	TAMPA	33608	1	6040	1026	7066	5767	91 R	56 FIGHTER WG
EGLIN AFB	VALPARISO	32542	1	8430	5705	14135	454214		DEVEL TEST CENTER
GEORGIA									
Army									
MCPHERSON, FORT	ATLANTA	30330	2	1350	2778	4128	488		FORSCOM HQ
GORDON, FORT	AUGUSTA	30905	1	11167	3120	14287	56498		SIGNAL CENTER & SCHOOL
BENNING, FORT	COLUMBUS	31905	1	23781	7581	31362	12138		THE INFANTRY CENTER & SCHOO
GILLEM, FORT	FOREST PARK	30050	2	1075	2735	3810	1427		SECOND ARMY HQ
STEWART, FORT	HINESVILLE	31314	1	14508	4112	18620	284381		24TH INFANTRY DIV (MECH)
HUNTER ARMY AIRFIELD	SAVANNAH	31409	2	3936	677	4613	5655		24TH INFANTRY DIVISION TNG
Navy									
NAVY SUPPLY CORPS SCHOOL	ATHENS	30606	2	276	50	326	58		SKILL TRAINING
NAVAL SUB BASE, KINGS BAY	KINGS BAY	31547	1	5668	3687	9355	16273		SUBMARINE BASE
NAS, ATLANTA	MARIETTA	30060	2	924	175	1099	165		RESERVE AIR TRAINING
Air Force									
MCCOLLUM AGS	KENNESAW	30144	2	1	47	48	13		ACFT CONTROL/WARNING (ANG)
DOBBINS ARB	MARIETTA	30060	1	83	1631	1714	1903		94 AIRLIFT WG (AFR/ANG)
SAVANNAH IAP AGS	SAVANNAH	31402	2	3	264	267	232		165 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
MOODY AFB	VALDOSTA	31601	1	2955	594	3549	5931		347 FIGHTER WING
ROBINS AFB	WARNER ROBINS	31098	1	3814	21377	25191	8790		AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
Marine Corps									
MC LOGISTICS BASE ICP	ALBANY	31704	2	1060	2782	3842	3327		DEPOT MAINT/SUPPLY & STORAG

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HAWAII									
Army									
DERUSSY, FORT	HONOLULU	96815	2	105	633	738	74		ARMY RESERVE HQ
SHAFTER, FORT	HONOLULU	96858	2	1185	2809	3994	590		HEADQUARTERS & ADMIN
TRIPLER ARMY MEDICAL CENTER	HONOLULU	96859	2	1393	1092	2485	368		HEALTH CARE
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS MIL RES	WAHIAWA	96857	1	14206	1311	15517	14506		25TH INF DIV/WHEELER AAF
Navy									
NAS, BARBERS POINT	BARBERS POINT	96862	1	4341	565	4906	4076		PATROL AIRCRAFT
NAVAL MAGAZINE LUALUALEI	LUALUALEI	96792	3	653	582	1235	12142		ORDNANCE SUPPORT
NAVAL STATION, PEARL HARBOR	PEARL HARBOR	96860	1	12964	3007	15971	5916		OPERATING BASE
NAVAL SUB BASE, PEARL HARBOR	PEARL HARBOR	96860	1	4823	369	5192	105		SUBMARINE FORCES SUPPORT
PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD	PEARL HARBOR	96860	2	155	5753	5908	160		SHIP ALTERATION & REPAIR
NAV COMM AREA MSTR STA, EPAC	WAHIAWA,HI	96786	3	850	240	1090	2422		COMMUNICATIONS
Air Force									
HICKAM AFB	HONOLULU	96853	1	4376	2081	6457	2912		HQ PACAF
KOKEE AFS	KEKAHA	96752	2	0	37	37	11		ACFT CONTROL & WARNING
Marine Corps									
CAMP H. M. SMITH	HONOLULU	96861	1	1897	73	1970	420		HQ FMF PAC/HQ CINPAC/HQ IPA
MCAS, KANEOHE BAY	KAILUA	96863	1	9782	472	10254	39392		1ST MAB/JET & HELO TNG OPNS
IDAHO									
Air Force									
BOISE AIR TERMINAL AGS	BOISE	83701	2	0	526	526	1994		124 RECON GROUP (ANG)
MOUNTAIN HOME AFB	MOUNTAIN HOME	83648	1	1749	764	2513	9113	91 R	366 WING
ILLINOIS									
Army									
CHAS M. PRICE SUPPORT CTR	GRANITE CITY	62040	3	61	460	521	752		COMMUNITY SUPPORT
SHERIDAN, FORT	HIGHLAND PARK	60037	2	1140	1447	2587	694	88 C	RECRUITING COMMAND HQ
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL	ROCK ISLAND	61299	1	479	7418	7897	913	91 R	R&D,PRODUCTION-TANK COMPONE
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY	SAVANNA	61074	2	20	586	606	13064		LOGISTICS DEPOT

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Navy									
NAS, GLENVIEW	GLENVIEW	60026	2	1648	1013	2661	1407		RESERVE AIR TRAINING
NAVAL TNG CTR, GREAT LAKES	GREAT LAKES	60088	2	37522	3581	41103	1012		RECRUIT & SKILL TRAINING
Air Force									
GREATER PEORIA APT AGS	BARTONVILLE	61607	2	4	257	261	386		182 TAC AIR SUPPORT GP (ANG
SCOTT AFB	BELLEVILLE	62225	1	6760	9781	16541	3172		HQ AIR MOBILITY CMD
O HARE IAP ARS	CHICAGO	60666	2	13	799	812	389		928 AIRLIFT GROUP (AFR/ANG)
CHANUTE AFB	RANTOUL	61868	1	1894	1545	3439	2174	88 C	TECH TRAINING CENTER
CAPITAL MAP AGS	SPRINGFIELD	62705	2	3	327	330	91		183 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
INDIANA									
Army									
CRANE ARMY AMMO ACT	CRANE		2	4	704	708	96430		NV WPS SUP PROD/RENOVATION
HARRISON, FT BENJAMIN	INDIANAPOLIS	46216	1	3803	7157	10960	25014	91 C	US ARMY INST OF PERS&RES MG
JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND	MADISON	47250	3	14	411	425	55273	88 C	R&D AMMO TEST CENTER
Navy									
NAV WEAPONS SUPPORT CTR	CRANE	47522	2	59	5388	5447	62509	91 R	WEAPONS SYSTEM & ORDNANCE S
NAVAL AVIONICS CENTER	INDIANAPOLIS	46218	2	31	3460	3491	185	91 R	AVIONICS REPAIR
Air Force									
GRISSOM AFB	BUNKER HILL	16970	1	2298	929	3227	3180	91 C	305 AIR REF WG
FT WAYNE MAP AGS	FORT WAYNE	46809	2	5	345	350	138		122 FIGHTER WING (ANG)
HULMAN REGIONAL APT AGS	TERRE HAUTE	47803	2	5	299	304	279		181 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
IOWA									
Air Force									
DES MOINES IAP AGS	DES MOINES	50321	2	1	332	333	113		132 FIGHTER WING (ANG)
SIOUX CITY MAP AGS	SERGEANT BLUFF	51054	2	3	280	283	106		185 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
KANSAS									
Army									
RILEY,	JUNCTION CITY	66442	1	[illegible]807	2804	18611	100695		1ST INFANTRY DIV (MECH)

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LEAVENWORTH, FORT	LEAVENWORTH	66027	1	4510	3012	7522	6995		CMD & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Air Force									
FORBES FIELD AGS	PAULINE	66620	2	3	379	382	200		190 AIR REF GROUP (ANG)
MCCONNELL AFB	WICHITA	67221	1	3022	1403	4425	7686		384 WING
			KENTUCKY						
Army									
CAMPBELL, FORT	CLARKSVILLE	42223	1	23183	2954	26137	36594		101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
LEXINGTON BLUEGRASS DEPOT	LEXINGTON	40511	2	119	2095	2214	780	88 C	LOGISTICS DEPOT
KNOX, FORT	LOUISVILLE	40121	1	14900	4301	19201	109225		US ARMY TRAINING CENTER
Navy									
NAV ORDNANCE STA, LOUISVILLE	LOUISVILLE	40214	3	11	2771	2782	150	91 R	ORDNANCE SUPPORT
Air Force									
STANDIFORD FIELD AGS	LOUISVILLE	40213	2	5	309	314	65		123 RECON WING (ANG)
			LOUISIANA						
Army									
POLK, FORT	LEESVILLE	71459	1	15572	4157	19729	198259	91 R	5TH INFANTRY DIV (MECH)
Navy									
NAS, NEW ORLEANS	NEW ORLEANS	70143	2	1274	691	1965	4921		RESERVE AIR TRAINING
Air Force									
ENGLAND AFB	ALEXANDRIA	71301	1	1112	376	1488	2642	91 C	23 FIGHTER WING
BARKSDALE AFB	BOSSIER CITY	71110	1	5476	1605	7081	22382		2 WING
HAMMOND AGS	HAMMOND	70401	2	0	28	28	22		236 COMM SQ (ANG)
			MAINE						
Navy									
NAS, BRUNSWICK	BRUNSWICK	04011	1	3114	548	3662	8742		PATROL AIRCRAFT
NAV SECURITY GROUP ACT	WINTER HARBOR	04693	3	333	73	406	603		COMMUNICATIONS

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Air Force									
BANGOR AGS	BANGOR	04401	2	4	371	375	302		101 AIR REFUELING WING (ANG
LORING AFB	LIMESTONE	04750	1	2861	651	3512	9791	91 C	42 WING
SOUTH PORTLAND AGS	SOUTH PORTLAND	04106	2	2	39	41	12		265 COMM SQ (ANG)
			MARYLAND						
Army									
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND	ABERDEEN	21005	1	5472	11151	16623	72518		R&D TEST/ORDNANCE SCH&CTR
HARRY DIAMOND LABS	ADELPHI	20783	2	55	1606	1661	1600	91 R	TEST SITE
HOLABIRD, FORT	BALTIMORE		2	20	608	628	94	88 R	CRIME RECORD/DEF INV SERVIC
DMA HYDRO/TOPOGRAPHIC CTR	BROOKMONT	20315	2	29	2582	2611	40		PROD OF MAPS/CHARTS (DMA)
RITCHIE, FORT	CASCADE	21719	2	1122	1160	2282	642		COMMUNICATIONS
DETRICK, FORT	FREDERICK	21701	2	891	3319	4210	1153		R&D ACTIVITIES
MEADE GEORGE G, FORT	ODENTON	20755	1	7116	25790	32906	13751	88 R	HEADQUARTERS & ADMIN, NSA
Navy									
US NAVAL ACADEMY	ANNAPOLIS	21402	2	5340	3883	9223	1747		OFFICER ACQUISITION TRAININ
D W TAYLOR NAV SHIP R&D CTR	BETHESDA	20084	2	71	2879	2950	327		R&D-SHIP TECHNOLOGY
NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND-NCR	BETHESDA	20814	2	3398	2649	6047	242		HEALTH CARE
NAVAL COMM UNIT, WASHINGTON	CHELTENHAM	20390	3	130	356	486	240		COMMUNICATIONS
NAV ORDNANCE STA, INDIAN HEAD	INDIAN HEAD	20640	3	490	3699	4189	3410	91 R	SOLID PROPELLENTS
NAV AIR TEST CTR, PAX RIVER	PATUXANT RIVER	20670	2	3428	5945	9373	7127		T&E AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
NAV SURFACE WEAPONS CTR	SILVER SPRING	20910	3	14	1939	1953	733	91 R	R&D-NAVAL WEAPONS
NAV ELECTRONIC SYS ENGR ACT	ST INIGOES	20684	3	69	1058	1127	969		T&E ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS
Air Force									
MARTIN STATE AGS	BALTIMORE	21220	2	7	483	490	175		135 ALFT GP/75 FTR GP (ANG)
ANDREWS AFB	CAMP SPRINGS	20331	1	10061	3162	13223	4971		89 AIRLIFT WING
			MASSACHUSETTS						
Army									
DEVENS, FORT	AYER	01433	1	4822	2156	6978	11576	91 C	INTELLIGENCE TRAINING
USA NATICK RSCH & DEV CTR	NATICK	01760	2	153	1090	1243	81		R&D ACTIVITIES
USA MAT & MECH RESEARCH CTR	WATERTOWN	02172	2	8	558	566	48		R&D ACTIVITIES
Navy									
NAS, [illegible] WEYMOUTH	SOUTH WEYMOUTH	02190	2	907	204	1111	2250		RESERVE AIR TRAINING

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Air Force									
HANSCOM AFB	BEDFORD	01731	1	3192	2590	5782	967		ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS DIVISION
CAPE COD AFS	BOURNE	02523	2	101	101	202	101		PAVE PAWS
WESTOVER ARB	CHICOPEE	01022	1	9	1000	1009	2592		439 AIRLIFT WING (AFR)
OTIS AGB	FALMOUTH	02542	1	3	734	737	3880		102 FIW (ANG)
WELLESLEY AGS	WELLESLEY	02181	2	3	41	44	8		253 COMM GP (ANG)
BARNES MAP AGS	WESTFIELD	01085	2	2	302	304	134		104 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
WORCHESTER AGS	WORCHESTER	01605	2	2	63	65	8		101 TAC CONTROL SQ (ANG)
			MICHIGAN						
Army									
US ARMY GARRISON, SELFRIDGE	SELFRIDGE		2	763	478	1241	520		TACOM SUPPORT ACT
DETROIT ARSENAL	WARREN	48090	1	314	5547	5861	388		R&D, PRODUCTION-TANKS
Air Force									
W K KELLOGG REGIONAL APT AGS	BATTLE CREEK	49016	2	4	246	250	315		110 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
K. I. SAWYER AFB	GWINN	49843	1	3151	521	3672	5214		410 BOMB WING
SELFRIDGE AGB	MT CLEMENS	48045	1	111	1354	1465	3081		127 FIGHTER WING (ANG/AFR)
WURTSMITH AFB	OSCODA	48753	1	2868	408	3276	5298	91 C	379 WING
			MINNESOTA						
Air Force									
DULUTH IAP AGS	DULUTH	55811	2	4	403	407	409		148 FIG (ANG)
MINNEAPOLIS/ST PAUL IAP ARS	MINNEAPOLIS	55450	2	18	643	661	302		934 AIRLIFT GROUP (AFR/ANG)
			MISSISSIPPI						
Navy									
NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE	BAY ST LOUIS	39522	2	87	1789	1876	1		NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC ACTIVIT
NAV CONST BN CTR, GULFPORT	GULFPORT	39501	3	3814	666	4480	4502		CONSTRUCTION FORCE SUPPORT
NAS, MERIDIAN	MERIDIAN	39309	2	2483	997	3480	13507		FLIGHT TRAINING
NAVAL STATION PASCAGULA, MS	PASCAGULA	39309	2	390	70	460	100		NAVAL STATION
Air Force									
KEESLER AFB	BILOXI	39534	1	5305	2689	7994	3489		TECH TRAINING CENTER
COLUMBUS AFB	COLUMBUS	39701	1	1182	1124	2306	6015		14 FLYING TRAINING WING

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ALLEN C THOMPSON FIELD AGS	FLOWOOD	39205	2	4	305	309	116		172 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
GULFPORT/BILOXI MAP AGS	GULFPORT	39501	2	1	113	114	219		READINESS TRNG SITE (ANG)
KEY FIELD AGS	MERIDIAN	39301	2	3	365	368	117		186 RECON GROUP (ANG)
			MISSOURI						
Army									
WOOD, FORT LEONARD	JEFFERSON CITY	65473	1	15594	5102	20696	62911		US ARMY TRAINING CENTER
ST LOUIS ARMY AMMO PLT	ST LOUIS	63120	2	8	521	529	26		PRODUCTION-PROJECTILES
Air Force									
RICHARDS GEBAUR ARS	BELTON	64030	2	6	649	655	433	91 C	442 FIGHTER WG (AFR)
ROSECRANS MEMORIAL APT AGS	ELWOOD	64503	2	6	273	279	302		139 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
WHITEMAN AFB	KNOB NOSTER	65301	1	3430	575	4005	25060		351 MISSILE WING
LAMBERT ST LOUIS IAP AGS	ST ANN	63145	2	20	431	451	354		131 FIGHTER WING (ANG)
DMA AEROSPACE CTR	ST LOUIS	63118	2	50	3288	3338	64		DEFENSE MAP AGENCY
JEFFERSON BARRACKS AGS	ST LOUIS	63121	2	2	60	62	135		ACFT CONTROL/WARNING (ANG)
Marine Corps									
MARINE CORPS SUPPORT ACTY	KANSAS CITY	64197	2	623	450	1073	98		LOG/ADMIN INCLUDES DFAS
			MONTANA						
Air Force									
GREAT FALLS IAP AGS	GREAT FALLS	59401	2	3	376	379	139		120 FIG (ANG)
MALMSTROM AFB	GREAT FALLS	59402	1	4296	736	5032	29198		341 MISSILE WING
			NEBRASKA						
Air Force									
OFFUTT AFB	BELLEVUE	68113	1	11384	3094	14478	3507		HQS USSTRATCOM
LINCOLN MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AGS	LINCOLN	68502	2	3	328	331	175		155 RECON GROUP (ANG)
			NEVADA						
Navy									
NAS, FALLON	FALLON	89406	2	987	1019	2006	141059		ATTACK AIRCRAFT TRAINING

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Air Force									
NELLIS AFB	LAS VEGAS	89110	1	6142	2191	8333	22115		FIGHTER WEAPONS CNTR
RENO CANNON IAP AGS	RENO	89504	2	4	322	326	123		152 RECON GROUP (ANG)
TONOPAH AFS	TONOPAH	89049	2	0	0	0	43		R&D ACTIVITIES
			NEW HAMPSHIRE						
Navy									
PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD	PORTSMOUTH	03801	1	879	7388	8267	297		SHIP CONSTRUCTION & REPAIR
Air Force									
NEW BOSTON AFS	MT VERNON	03057	2	25	179	204	2873		ELECTRONICS SITE
PEASE AGS	NEWINGTON	03801	2	4	358	362	229	88 C	133 AIR REFUELING SQ (ANG)
			NEW JERSEY						
Army									
MIL OCEAN TERMINAL-BAYONNE	BAYONNE	07002	2	179	2057	2236	679		HARBOR & PORT
PICATINNY ARSENAL	DOVER	07801	1	173	5148	5321	6491	91 R	R&D HEADQUARTERS
MONMOUTH, FORT	RED BANK	07703	1	2661	7897	10558	2105		R&D HEADQUARTERS
DIX, FORT	TRENTON	08640	2	2958	1958	4916	31066	91 R	RES COMP TRAINING CTR
Navy									
NAVAL WEAPONS STA, EARLE	COLTS NECK	07722	1	2836	989	3825	11158		ORDNANCE SUPPORT
NAVAL AIR ENG CTR, LAKEHURST	LAKEHURST	08733	2	473	2824	3297	7412	91 R	AIRCRAFT LAUNCH/RECOVERY SY
NAVAL AIR PROPULSION CENTER	TRENTON	08628	2	8	734	742	72	91 R	ENGINE T&E ACTIVITIES
Air Force									
ATLANTIC CITY MAP AGS	PLEASANTVILLE	08232	2	3	368	371	286		177 FIG (ANG)
MCGUIRE AFB	WRIGHTSTOWN	08641	1	4730	2038	6768	3820		438 AIRLIFT WING
			NEW MEXICO						
Army									
WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE	WHITE SANDS	88002	1	1047	5907	6954	1746720		R&D WEAPONS TEST CENTER

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Air Force									
HOLLOMAN AFB	ALAMOGORDO	88330	1	3250	1543	4793	58498		49 FIGHTER WING
KIRTLAND AFB	ALBUQUERQUE	87117	1	4961	3389	8350	44025		542 CREW TRG WG/AFOTEC
CANNON AFB	CLOVIS	88101	1	6002	682	6684	4571		27 FIGHTER WING
			NEW YORK						
Army									
HAMILTON, FORT	BROOKLYN	11252	2	538	316	854	177		ADMIN & LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
STEWART ANNEX	NEWBURGH	12550	2	991	216	1207	403		HOUSING
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	ROMULUS	14541	2	637	1019	1656	10830		LOGISTICS DEPOT
DRUM, FORT	WATERTOWN	13602	1	10538	2396	12934	107665		RC & ACTIVE ARMY TNG
WATERVLIET ARSENAL	WATERVLIET	12189	2	12	2396	2408	142		R&D,PROD-ARTILLERY COMPONEN
WEST POINT MILITARY RES	WEST POINT	10996	1	5421	3199	8620	14930		USMA-OFF ACQUISITION TNG
Navy									
NAVAL STATION NEW YORK	STAT IS/BKLYN	11251	2	964	1300	2264	141	88 C	NAVAL STATION/BKLYN TO CLOS
Air Force									
STEWART IAP AGS	NEW WINDSOR	12550	2	4	667	671	304		105 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
NIAGARA FALLS IAP ARS	NIAGARA FALLS	14304	2	5	744	749	985		914 AIRLIFT GROUP (AFR)
PLATTSBURGH AFB	PLATTSBURGH	12903	1	2116	461	2577	4818		380 WING
GRIFFISS AFB	ROME	13440	1	3988	2687	6675	4025		416 WING
ROSLYN AGS	ROSLYN	11576	2	2	48	50	50		273 COMM SQ (ANG/AFR)
SCHENECTADY AIRPORT AGS	SCHENECTADY	12301	2	7	246	253	106		109 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
HANCOCK FIELD AGS	SYRACUSE	13225	2	5	367	372	371		174 FIGHTER WING (ANG)
SUFFOLK COUNTY AIRPORT AGS	WESTHAMPTON BCH	11978	2	3	263	266	71		106 AIR RESCUE GROUP (ANG)
Marine Corps									
GARDEN CITY(1ST DISTRICT)	NEW YORK	11530	2	236	963	1199	7		RECRUITING
			NORTH CAROLINA						
Army									
BRAGG, FORT	FAYETTEVILLE	28307	1	42857	7300	50157	142081		82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
MIL OCEAN TERMINAL-SUNNY PT	SOUTHPORT	28461	3	13	301	314	16324		HARBOR & PORT
Navy									

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT CHERRY P	CHERRY POINT		2	30	3970	4000	10		AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
CAMP LEJEUNE NAVAL HOSPITAL	JACKSONVILLE		2	846	516	1362	10		HEALTH CARE
Air Force									
BADIN AGS	BADIN	28009	2	1	28	29	21		263 COMM SQ (ANG)
CHARLOTTE/DOUGLAS IAP AGS	CHARLOTTE	28208	2	4	322	326	69		145 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
POPE AFB	FAYETTEVILLE	28308	1	4484	603	5087	1890		317 AIRLIFT WING
SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB	GOLDSBORO	27530	1	4716	920	5636	4118		4 FIGHTER WING
Marine Corps									
MCAS, CHERRY POINT	HAVELOCK	28533	1	9839	1728	11567	26683		HQ 2ND MAW/JET TNG & OPNS/N
MC BASE, CAMP LEJEUNE	JACKSONVILLE	28542	1	32409	1933	34342	88432		FMF GRND UNITS/TRP TNG/OPN
MCAS, NEW RIVER	JACKSONVILLE		1	5212	315	5527	2773		MAG 26/HELO TNG/OPER SUPPOR
NORTH DAKOTA									
Air Force									
GRAND FORKS AFB	EMERADO	58201	1	4903	738	5641	23857		319 WING
HECTOR FIELD IAP AGS	FARGO	58102	2	6	382	388	133		119 FIG (ANG)
MINOT AFB	MINOT	58701	1	5005	867	5872	24498		5 WING
CAVALIER AFS	MOUNTAIN	58221	2	23	134	157	650		MISSILE WARNING
OHIO									
Army									
DEF CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY CTR	COLUMBUS	43215	2	30	2177	2207	566		ICP & LOGISTICS DEPOT (DLA)
Navy									
DEFENSE FIN + ACCT CTR	CLEVELAND	44199	3	114	1537	1651	36		ADMIN SUPPORT-FINANCE
Air Force									
GENTILE AFS	DAYTON	45444	2	31	2213	2244	165		DEF ELEC SUP CTR (DLA)
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	FAIRBORN	45433	1	4699	10834	15533	8245		AF MATERIEL COMMAND HQ
NEWARK AFB	HEATH	43055	1	78	2070	2148	72		LOGISTICS/AGMC
RICKENBACKER AGB	LOCKBOURNE	43217	1	0	1806	1806	2597	91 C	121 AIR REF WG (ANG/AFR)
MANSFIELD LAHM MAP AGS	MANSFIELD	44901	2	4	234	238	224		179 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
CAMP PERRY AGS	PORT CLINTON	43452	2	0	31	31	32		200 CIVIL ENGINEER SQN (ANG
SPRINGFIELD BECKLEY MAP AGS	SPRINGFIELD	45501	2	5	330	335	114		178 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
TOLEDO EXPRESS APT AGS	SWANTON	43558	2	4	289	293	84		180 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
YOUNGSTOWN MAP ARS	VIENNA	44473	2	5	365	370	740		910 AIRLIFT GROUP (AFR)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
			OKLAHOMA						
Army									
SILL, FORT	LAWTON	73503	1	16671	2783	19454	94222		FLD ARTILLERY CTR&SCH
MCALESTER ARMY AMMO PLT	MCALESTER	74501	2	19	1023	1042	44964		STORAGE-AMMO
Air Force									
ALTUS AFB	ALTUS	73521	1	3138	958	4096	4240		443 AIRLIFT WING
VANCE AFB	ENID	73701	1	754	1610	2364	3109		71 FLYING TRAINING WING
TINKER AFB	MIDWEST CITY	73145	1	7175	19752	26927	4668		AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
WILL ROGERS WORLD APT AGS	OKLAHOMA CITY	73159	2	5	262	267	133		137 AIRLIFT WING (ANG)
TULSA IAP AGS	TULSA	74115	2	2	298	300	82		138 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
			OREGON						
Air Force									
KINGSLEY FIELD AGS	KLAMATH FALLS	97601	2	3	373	376	425		114 FIGHTER TRG SQ (ANG)
PORTLAND IAP AGS	PORTLAND	97218	2	8	752	760	314		142 FIG (ANG)
			PENNSYLVANIA						
Army									
INDIANTOWN GAP, FORT	ANNVILLE	17003	2	593	746	1339	13		RC & ACTIVE ARMY TNG
CARLISLE BARRACKS	CARLISLE	17013	2	576	923	1499	403		US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	CHAMBERSBURG	17201	1	352	4649	5001	19243	91 R	LOGISTICS DEPOT
NEW CUMBERLAND DEPOT	NEW CUMBERLAND	17070	2	257	3537	3794	832		LOGISTICS DEPOT (DLA)
DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CTR	PHILADELPHIA	19101	2	119	4066	4185	86		PROC CLOTH/MED/SUPS (DLA)
CHARLES E.KELLY SPT FAC	PITTSBURG		3	168	288	456	208		RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	TOBYHANNA	18466	2	47	3716	3763	1294		LOGISTICS DEPOT
Navy									
NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CTR	MECHANICSBURG	17055	3	164	6751	6915	857		INVENTORY CONTROL POINT
NAVAL HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA	PHILADELPHIA	19145	2	420	425	845	48	88 C	HEALTH CARE
NAVAL STATION PHILADELPHIA	PHILADELPHIA	19112	2	1040	1714	2754	522	91 C	SHIP SUPPORT
NAVY AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE	PHILADELPHIA	19111	3	115	5561	5676	135		NAVAL AVIATION SUPPLY&DLA I
PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD	PHILADELPHIA	19112	1	7812	10353	18165	904	91 C	SHIP BLDG & REPAIR
NAVAL AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER	WARMINSTER	18974	3	256	3061	3317	921	91 R	AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY
NAS, WILLOW GROVE	WILLOW GROVE	19090	2	1501	840	2341	967		RESERVE AIR TRAINING

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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
Air Force									
GREATER PITTSBURGH IAP AGS	CORAOPOLIS	15232	2	23	921	944	596		171 AIR REF WG (ANG/AFR)
WILLOW GROVE ARS	HATBORO	19090	2	0	609	609	162		913 AIRLIFT GROUP (AFR/ANG)
HARRISBURG OLMSTED IAP AGS	MIDDLETOWN	17057	2	0	314	314	64		193 SPECIAL OPS GROUP (ANG)
RHODE ISLAND									
Navy									
NAV EDUCATION & TRAINING CTR	NEWPORT	02841	2	6655	1592	8247	1199		OFF INDOCTRIN & SKILL TNG
NAVAL UNDER WATER SYS CTR	NEWPORT	02841	2	174	7476	7650	371		UNDERSEA WARFARE R&D
Air Force									
COVENTRY AGS	COVENTRY	02816	2	0	40	40	17		281 COMM GROUP (ANG)
QUONSET STATE AIRPORT AGS	N KINGSTON	02852	2	6	268	274	60		143 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
NORTH SMITHFIELD AGS	SLATERSVILLE	02876	2	0	47	47	10		ACFT CONTROL/WARNING (ANG)
SOUTH CAROLINA									
Army									
JACKSON, FORT	COLUMBIA	29207	1	15522	2215	17737	52246		US ARMY TRAINING CENTER
Navy									
BEAUFORT NAVAL HOSPITAL	BEAUFORT		2	413	221	634	10		HEALTH CARE
CHARLESTON NAVAL SHIPYARD	CHARLESTON	29408	1	58	7721	7779	1923		SHIP/SUB REPAIR
NAV WEAPONS STA, CHARLESTON	CHARLESTON	29408	3	5351	2541	7892	17480		WEAPONS SYSTEMS SUPPORT
NAVAL STATION CHARLESTON	CHARLESTON	29408	1	22080	4491	26571	899		OPERATING BASE
Air Force									
CHARLESTON AFB	CHARLESTON	29404	1	4653	1437	6090	3733		437 AIRLIFT WING
MCENTIRE AGB	EASTOVER	29044	1	5	377	382	2473		169 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
MYRTLE BEACH AFB	MYRTLE BEACH	29577	1	1428	352	1780	3976	91 C	354 FIGHTER WING
SHAW AFB	SUMTER	29152	1	5472	951	6423	3416		363 FIGHTER WING
Marine Corps									
MCAS, BEAUFORT	BEAUFORT	29902	1	3208	489	3697	6676		MAG-31/JET TNG/OPN SUPPORT
MC RECRUIT DEPOT	PARRIS ISLAND	29905	1	7443	334	7777	8081		RECRUIT TRAINING

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
				SOUTH DAKOTA					
Air Force									
ELLSWORTH AFB	BOX ELDER	57706	1	6416	775	7191	28106		28 WING
JOE FOSS FIELD AGS	SIOUX FALLS	57104	2	4	294	298	163		114 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
				TENNESSEE					
Army									
DEFENSE DEPOT, MEMPHIS	MEMPHIS	38114	2	12	1699	1711	642		LOGISTICS DEPOT (DLA)
Navy									
NAS, MEMPHIS	MILLINGTON	38054	2	8339	1656	9995	3499		SKILL TRAINING
NAVAL HOSPITAL, MILLINGTON	MILLINGTON	38054	2	525	202	727	38		HEALTH CARE
Air Force									
MCGHEE TYSON AIRPORT AGS	ALCOA	37901	2	67	397	464	271		134 AIR REF GROUP (ANG)
ARNOLD AFB	MANCHESTER	37389	1	130	1743	1873	39081		R&D ACTIVITY
NASHVILLE METROPOLITAN APT AG	NASHVILLE	37217	2	5	371	376	85		118 AIRLIFT WING (ANG)
MEMPHIS IAP AGS	OAKVILLE	38118	2	11	259	270	85		164 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
				TEXAS					
Army									
CORPUS CHRISTI ARMY DEPOT	CORPUS CHRISTI	78419	2	40	3747	3787	5		HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE
BLISS, FORT	EL PASO	79916	1	16055	4623	20678	125300		AIR DEFENSE CENTER & SCHOOL
HOOD, FORT	KILLEEN	76544	1	30877	3474	34351	217345		1ST CAVALRY/2ND ARMORED DIV
BULLIS, CAMP	SAN ANTONIO	78234	3	1250	38	1288	27880		RESERVE COMPONENT TNG
SAM HOUSTON, FORT	SAN ANTONIO	78234	1	9560	6772	16332	3150		MEDICAL TRAINING HQ
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	TEXARKANA	75507	2	53	4812	4865	19084		LOGISTICS DEPOT
Navy									
NAS, CHASE FIELD	BEEVILLE	78103	2	835	847	1682	9633	91 C	FLIGHT TRAINING
NAS, CORPUS CHRISTI	CORPUS CHRISTI	78419	2	2348	5476	7824	4400		FLIGHT TRAINING
NAS, DALLAS	DALLAS	75211	2	3934	542	4476	799		RESERVE AIR TRAINING
NS, INGLESIDE, TX	INGLESIDE	78419	2	1570	100	1670	100		NAVAL STATION
NAS, KINGSVILLE	KINGSVILLE	78363	2	853	935	1788	5582		FLIGHT TRAINING

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
Air Force									
DYESS AFB	ABILENE	79607	1	5147	683	5830	6412		96 WING
BERGSTROM AFB	AUSTIN	78743	1	2496	891	3387	4170	91 C	67 RECON WING
LAUGHLIN AFB	DEL RIO	78840	1	1165	1178	2343	4745		47 FLYING TRAINING WING
ELDORADO AFS	ELDORADO	76936	2	94	92	186	129		PAVE PAWS
CARSWELL AFB	FORT WORTH	76127	1	4569	981	5550	3269	91 C	7 WING
GARLAND AGS	GARLAND	75041	2	3	35	38	6		254 COMM SQN (ANG)
ELLINGTON FIELD AGS	HOUSTON	77029	2	3	410	413	215		147 FIG (ANG)
LA PORTE AGS	LA PORTE	77571	2	1	16	17	12		272 ENG INSTAL SQ (ANG)
REESE AFB	LUBBOCK	79489	1	1067	1282	2349	3293		64 FLYING TRAINING WING
GOODFELLOW AFB	SAN ANGELO	76903	1	2258	419	2677	1136	91 R	TECH TRAINING CTR
BROOKS AFB	SAN ANTONIO	78235	1	1490	1553	3043	1310		HUMAN SYSTEMS CENTER
KELLY AFB	SAN ANTONIO	78241	1	4232	20812	25044	4704		AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
LACKLAND AFB	SAN ANTONIO	78236	1	6065	3667	9732	6726		BASIC MILITARY TRG
RANDOLPH AFB	UNIVERSAL CITY	78148	1	4468	3085	7553	3183	91 R	AIR TRAINING CMD HQ
SHEPPARD AFB	WICHITA FALLS	76311	1	3158	2760	5918	5477		TECH TRAINING CENTER
UTAH									
Army									
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND	DUGWAY	84022	2	315	1332	1647	802724		R&D TEST CENTER
DEFENSE DEPOT, OGDEN	OGDEN	84407	2	10	1458	1468	1326		LOGISTICS DEPOT (DLA)
STEVEN A. DOUGLAS, AFRC	SALT LAKE CITY		3	180	206	386	120		RES. COMP SUPPORT
TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	TOOELE	84074	2	79	3325	3404	24735		LOGISTICS DEPOT
Air Force									
HILL AFB	CLEARFIELD	84406	1	4878	17028	21906	946002		AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
SALT LAKE CITY IAP AGS	SALT LAKE CITY	84116	2	7	387	394	132		151 AIR REF GROUP (ANG)
VERMONT									
Air Force									
BURLINGTON IAP AGS	SO. BURLINGTON	05401	2	4	390	394	241		158 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
VIRGINIA									
Army									
BELVOIR, FORT	ALEXANDRIA	22060	1	4832	7007	11839	8655		ENGINEER CENTER & SCH
CAMERON STATION	ALEXANDRIA	22314	2	326	3660	3986	168	88 C	HQ DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
MYER, FORT	ARLINGTON	22211	2	2805	188	2993	256		ADMIN & LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
PENTAGON RESERVATION	ARLINGTON		1	14020	17786	31806	285		PENT,FOB2,H/A,SWG (DOD)
PICKETT, FORT	BLACKSTONE	23824	2	79	497	576	45160		RC & ACTIVE ARMY TNG
A.P. HILL, FORT	BOWLING GREEN	22427	3	112	228	340	76055		RC & ACTIVE ARMY TNG
MONROE, FORT	HAMPTON	23651	2	1033	2941	3974	570		TRADOC HEADQUARTERS
EUSTIS, FORT	NEWPORT NEWS	23604	1	7540	2706	10246	8229		TRANSPORTATION CTR & SCHOOL
LEE, FORT	PETERSBURG	23801	1	7594	4922	12516	5575		QUARTERMASTER CTR&SCH
DEF GENERAL SUPPLY CTR	RICHMOND	23297	2	35	2794	2829	647		ICP & LOGISTICS DEPOT (DLA)
STORY, FORT	VIRGINIA BEACH	23459	2	1763	117	1880	1451		AMPHIB & RC TRAINING
VINT HILL FARMS STATION	WARRENTON	22186	2	821	1132	1953	701		COMM & INTELLIGENCE ACT
Navy									
NAV SECURITY GRP ACT	CHESAPEAKE	23322	3	1303	183	1486	4118		COMMUNICATIONS
NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS CTR	DAHLGREN	22448	2	672	3959	4631	4320		RDT&E-ORDNANCE TECHNOLOGY
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NOFOLK	NOFOLK		2	270	4128	4398	4398		AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
NAS, NORFOLK	NORFOLK	23511	1	9145	6998	16143	1386		EARLY WARN/ASW AIRCFT,NARF
NAV AMPHIB BASE LITTLE CREEK	NORFOLK	23521	1	11747	1546	13293	11808		AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SUPPORT
NAVAL STATION, NORFOLK	NORFOLK	23511	1	54251	11367	65618	181		OPERATING BASE
NAVCOMM AREA MASTER STA LANT	NORFOLK	23511	3	351	109	460	1474		COMMUNICATIONS
NAVAL HOSPITAL, PORTSMOUTH	PORTSMOUTH	23708	2	2338	2004	4342	110		HEALTH CARE
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD	PORTSMOUTH	23709	2	720	15182	15902	1340		SHIP ALTERATIONS & REPAIR
FLEET COMBAT TNG CTR, LANT	VIRGINIA BEACH	23461	2	4817	760	5577	1038		SPECIALIZED TRAINING
NAS, OCEANA	VIRGINIA BEACH	23460	1	9748	1167	10915	15180		FIGHTER & ATTACK AIRCRAFT
NAVAL WEAPONS STA, YORKTOWN	YORKTOWN	23691	3	1056	2497	3553	10624		ORDNANCE SUPPORT
Air Force									
LANGLEY AFB	HAMPTON	23665	1	8123	1963	10086	5382		AIR COMBAT CMD HQ / 1 FW
RICHMOND IAP AGS	SANDSTON	23150	2	4	334	338	143		192 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)
Marine Corps									
CAMP ELMORE	NORFOLK	23511	2	851	5	856	22		HQ FMF LANT
MC CBT DEV CMD	QUANTICO	22134	2	8870	1538	10408	60647		OFF PROF TNG/SKILL TNG/MC I
HQMC, HENDERSON HALL	WASHINGTON DC	22214	2	1784	194	1978	21		HQ USMC

WASHINGTON

Army									
LEWIS, FORT	TACOMA	98433	1	14721	4659	19380	86190		9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Navy									
NAVA[illegible] MARINE BASE, BANGOR	BANGOR	98315	1	5845	3122	8967	6691		SUBMARINE BASE
NAV [illegible]EGIC WEAPON FAC PAC	BREMERTON	98315	3	115	655	770	0		ORDNANCE SUPPORT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD	BREMERTON	98314	1	5316	24978	30294	1392		SHIP ALTERATION & REPAIR
NAV UNDERSEA WARFARE ENG STA	KEYPORT	98345	3	313	5217	5530	4939	91 R	UNDERWATER WEAPONS SUPPORT
NAS, WHIDBEY ISLAND	OAK HARBOR	98278	1	8431	1438	9869	70998		ATTACK&ELEC WARFARE AIRCRAF
NAVAL STATION, PUGET SOUND	SEATTLE/EVERETT	98115	2	1401	1808	3209	271	91 C	FLT SPT\SEATTLE TO CLOSE
Air Force									
FAIRCHILD AFB	AIRWAY HEIGHTS	99011	1	4079	943	5022	6060		92 WING
FOUR LAKES AGS	CHENEY	99004	2	1	41	42	156		ACFT CONTROL/WARNING (ANG)
SPOKANE IAP AGS	SPOKANE	99219	2	2	41	43	79		242 COMM SQ (ANG)
MCCHORD AFB	TACOMA	98438	1	4220	1424	5644	5745		62 AIRLIFT WING
WEST VIRGINIA									
Air Force									
YEAGER AIRPORT AGS	CHARLESTON	25311	2	4	240	244	236		130 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
SHEPHERD FIELD AGS (EWVRA)	MARTINSBURG	25401	2	0	288	288	349		167 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
WISCONSIN									
Army									
MCCOY, FORT	SPARTA	54656	2	673	1601	2274	62689		RC & ACTIVE ARMY TNG
Air Force									
TRUAX FIELD AGS	MADISON	53707	2	4	291	295	155		128 FIGHTER WING (ANG)
GEN MITCHELL IAP ARS	MILWAUKEE	53207	2	10	696	706	214		440 AIRLIFT WING (AFR/ANG)
WYOMING									
Air Force									
CHEYENNE MAP AGS	CHEYENNE	82003	2	5	256	261	67		153 AIRLIFT GROUP (ANG)
FRANCIS E. WARREN AFB	CHEYENNE	82001	1	3573	722	4295	19916		90 MISSILE WING

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

TERRITORIES & POSSESSIONS

LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS (MAJOR, MINOR & SUPPORT)

1992

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Military Installations and Properties
United States Territories and Possessions
September 1991

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines	Total
GUAM	0	3	1	0	4
PUERTO RICO	1	2	1	0	4
TOTAL	1	5	2	0	8

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
United States Territories and Possessions
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Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
			GUAM						
Navy									
NAS, AGANA	AGANA, GUAM	96637	2	2920	391	3311	16080		PATROL ELEC WARFARE AIRCRAF
NAVAL SHIP REPAIR FAC, GUAM	AGANA, GUAM	96630	1	133	950	1083	183		FLEET MAINTENANCE
NAVAL STATION, GUAM	AGANA, GUAM	96630	2	70221	4894	75115	0		FLEET SUPPORT
Air Force									
ANDERSEN AFB	AGANA, GUAM	96910	1	2503	584	3087	20740		633 AIR BASE WING
			PUERTO RICO						
Army									
BUCHANAN, FORT	SAN JUAN	00934	2	331	1661	1992	726		RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING
Navy									
NAVAL STA, ROOSEVELT ROADS	ROOSEVELT RDS	34051	2	3409	1865	5274	32161		OPERATING BASE
SECURITY GROUP PUERTO RICO	SABANA SECA	34053	3	368	97	465	2618		SECURITY GROUP
Air Force									
PUERTO RICO IAP AGS	SAN JUAN	00914	2	3	289	292	120		156 FIGHTER GROUP (ANG)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FOREIGN AREAS

LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
(MAJOR, MINOR & SUPPORT)

1992

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Military Installations and Properties
Used by U.S. Forces in Foreign Areas
September 1991

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines	Total
AUSTRALIA	0	1	1	0	2
BELGIUM	1	0	0	0	1
BERMUDA	0	1	0	0	1
CANADA	0	1	0	0	1
CUBA	0	1	0	0	1
DIEGO GARCIA	0	1	0	0	1
GERMANY, FEDERAL REP OF	15	0	8	0	23
GREECE	0	0	1	0	1
GREENLAND	0	0	1	0	1
ICELAND	0	1	0	0	1
ITALY	2	2	2	0	6
JAPAN	2	6	3	3	14
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	4	0	2	0	6
NETHERLANDS	1	0	1	0	2
PANAMA	1	2	1	0	4
PHILIPPINES	0	3	0	0	3
PORTUGAL	0	0	1	0	1
SPAIN	0	1	1	0	2
TURKEY	2	0	4	0	6
UNITED KINGDOM	1	3	10	0	14
TOTAL	29	23	36	3	91

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
Used by U.S. Forces in Foreign Areas
September 30, 1991

Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
			AUSTRALIA						
Navy									
NAV COMMSTA, HAROLD E HOLT	EXMOUTH		3	364	170	534	18155		COMMUNICATIONS/END OPS
Air Force									
WOOMERA AIR STATION	WOOMERA		2	201	73	274	33		ELECTRONICS SITE
			BERMUDA						
Navy									
NAVAL AIR STATION, BERMUDA	BERMUDA		2	1156	412	1568	1453		PATROL AIRCFT/REDUCE OPS
			BELGIUM						
Army									
80TH ASG	MONS		2	2079	1974	4053	1235		HQ/ADMIN
			CANADA						
Navy									
NAVAL FACILITY, ARGENTIA	ARGENTIA,N'LAND		3	474	247	721	9066		OCEAN RESEARCH/REDUCE OPS
			CUBA						
Navy									
NAV STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY	GUANTANAMO BAY		2	2484	1299	3783	28817		OPERATING BASE
			DIEGO GARCIA						
Navy									
NAVAL SUPPORT FACILITY	DIEGO GARCIA		3	1492	1845	3337	7000		SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
Used by U.S. Forces in Foreign Areas
September 30, 1991

Installation Name	City	Zip	Cat Code	Mil	Civ	Tot	Size	BRAC	Major Function
47TH ASG	BURTONWOOD		3	39	819	858	1735		OTHER
Navy									
NAVAL SECURITY GP ACT, EDZELL	EDZELL,SCOTLAND		3	833	234	1067	457		COMMUNICATIONS
NAVAL SUPPORT ACT, SCOTLAND	HOLY LOCH		3	1970	73	2043	70		FLEET SUPPORT/END OPS
NAVAL ACTIVITIES, U.K.	LONDON		3	1266	332	1598	38		FLEET, SHORE ESTAB. SUPPORT
Air Force									
RAF ALCONBURY	ALCONBURY		1	2180	476	2656	1465		39 SPECIAL OPS WING
RAF CROUGHTON	CROUGHTON		2	310	52	362	694		2130 COMMUNICATIONS GP
RAF BENTWATERS	EYKE		1	3148	504	3652	1089		81 FIGHTER WING
RAF FAIRFORD	FAIRFORD		2	88	119	207	1785		STANDBY BASE
HIGH WYCOMBE AIR STATION	HIGH WYCOMBE		2	221	75	296	109		SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
RAF LAKENHEATH	LAKENHEATH		1	3281	743	4024	2376		48 FIGHTER WING
RAF MILDENHALL	MILDENHALL		1	3166	715	3881	1144		100 AIR REFULING WG
RAF CHICKSANDS	SHEFFORD		2	1267	162	1429	411		7274 AIR BASE GROUP
RAF UPPER HEYFORD	UPPER HEYFORD		1	3903	647	4550	2126		20 FIGHTER WING
RAF WOODBRIDGE	WOODBRIDGE		2	165	0	165	994		78/91 FIGHTER SQS