



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

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May 18, 1993

JON/LOG
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The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of The Air Force
(Installations)
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Please refer to this number
when responding 930518-31

Dear Mr. Boatright:

During the San Diego and Newark Regional Hearings the March AFB and McGuire AFB communities submitted presentation materials to the Commission containing substantial comments opposing the Air Force's proposed realignments (Attachments 1 and 2, respectively).

Many of the arguments presented by the communities are based on disagreement with the color coding of criteria and subelements in the Air Force's base realignment and closure recommendations. Other points of opposition are in the data provided in response to the base questionnaires or contained in the COBRA model. The Commission requests the Air Force review the attached material and provide responses to each point addressed by the two communities.

Please provide your response to the Commission by June 17, 1993.

Thank you for your continued cooperation and support.

Sincerely,

JIM COURTER
Chairman

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Attachments:

- 1. March AFB Arguments, April 1993
- 2. McGuire AFB



**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209**

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: June 3, 1993

TO: Mr. James Boatright/Maj. George Auten

FAX #: 37568

FROM: Frank Cirillo

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 2

COMMENTS: Due to the Commission's schedule for deliberation hearings which will commence on June 18th, we will need the information requested in the attached letter by June 11, 1993, not June 17 as originally stated.

Document Separator



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SAF/MII
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12 JUN 1993

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter

This letter responds to your May 18, 1993 request for review of community presentations on March AFB, CA, and McGuire AFB, NJ. The point-by-point analysis of the March presentation is attached. The McGuire analysis is still underway and will be provided as soon as it is complete.

I hope this information is useful.

Sincerely

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

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1.1.B Other Force Structure (Vol. 5, pg 66)--March rated Yellow.

ASSERTION:

In FY 95/4 other forces located at March are scheduled to be KC-135's and C-141s. How does this adversely impact operational readiness?

March rating should be GREEN.

RESPONSE:

March received a yellow rating because there are significant programmed reductions in the other forces located at March (C-141s and KC-135s). Similarly, Barksdale AFB received a Yellow for Primary force structure (B-52) reductions.

This element of criteria is designed to measure future mission requirements and is not a readiness issue. It considers force structure at a particular base in accordance with the approved Defense Force Structure Plan.

Yellow: Force structure is an integral part of the force structure plan - but has significant programmed reductions.

1.2.B Air Traffic Control Delay (Vol 5, pg 67) March rated Yellow.

ASSERTION:

March rating must be GREEN.

RESPONSE:

A Yellow was awarded for ATC delays between 10 and 20 minutes. March reported a historic average of 7 ATC delays for an average of 15 minutes each. This information was forwarded by the base and validated by the MAJCOM. Air Traffic Control delays are not decisive in and of themselves; they are considered along with all other criteria data when evaluating an installation. March is located in a region with high air traffic density relative to the other installations in the Bomber Tanker subcategory.

The fact that delays are caused by simultaneous departures from March, Norton and Ontario only serves to highlight the congestion in the Los Angeles basin.

New automated equipment will not change the pattern of growing air traffic congestion in the region. Hopefully, such equipment will help smooth the operational interface with the air traffic control system.

Finally, March AFB operational limitations were not "showstoppers;" the base will remain an important Air Force Reserve installation that will continue to provide support to the Air Mobility Command.

I.2.H Bomber Mission (Vol 5, pg 80) March rated Yellow +.

ASSERTION:

March is still rated as a SAC base. Why?

RESPONSE:

The BCEG placed March in the large aircraft subcategory because that is what it is. It was ranked against other large aircraft bases for both tanker and bomber missions because that has been its historic mission. Also, it was screened along with other bases for the west coast Air Mobility Wing. The installation was not rated a SAC base as stated. Bases were rated relative to other installations in the subcategory and not by Major Command.

It is impossible to draw the conclusion that March and Travis would score identically if placed in the same subcategory. The issue is hypothetical.

I.2.K Tanker Mission (Vol 5, pg 81) March Rated Yellow +.

ASSERTION:

March is again rated as SAC base with the old SIOP (Cold War) mission. Why?

RESPONSE:

Again, bases were rated with respect to primary mission and not Major Command. Whether or not bombers and tankers are on alert has nothing to do with installation mission compatibility.

March is not rated Red for polar routes as stated in the challenge booklet (pg 2). March received an overall Yellow + for suitability for the Bomber mission. Looking at the Criteria rollup on Vol 5, pg 80, the growth potential actually reduced the rollup grade.

There is no question that March can support the Tanker mission, and in fact, will continue to do so.

I.2.A Weather - (Vol 5, pg 74) March rated Green.

ASSERTION:

March has some of the best flying weather in the world with ceilings above 300 feet and visibility one mile or more over ninety-nine percent of the time. The proposed receiving location has winter fog problems (twenty-five days each year - an average of eight days of fog in December and January alone).

RESPONSE:

The challenge compares March weather to Travis weather. March and Travis were not in

competition with each other; they were in different subcategories (March: Bomber-Tanker; Travis: Airlift). The challenge is attempting to establish a competition that did not exist. In any case, based on the 20 year records of the Air Weather Service, both bases score Green.

I.2.3 Tanker Saturation - (Vol 5, pg 76) March Rated Yellow (balanced)

ASSERTION:

Moving tankers north to Travis will affect tanker operations in northwest quadrant. Malmstrom and Fairchild are now rated R; Beale is rated Y.

RESPONSE:

Disagree that moving KC-10s north from March to Travis will create an imbalance in the Northwest US. March will still retain AFRES and ANG tankers. The tanker saturation in the region will remain balanced. March will remain an important base.

The KC-10 only is being moved to Travis to create an Air Mobility Wing on the west coast. By centrally locating the KC-10s at Travis, the new wing will respond more efficiently to a trans-Pacific profile through either Hickam, Hawaii, or the great circle route north from Seattle.

The fact that tankers (SIOP committed assets) were pulled from Travis in 1983 has no bearing on the creation of an Air Mobility Wing in 1993. The creation of a mobility wing with KC-10 tankers takes advantage of the combined effects of basing large airlifters and tankers together.

Finally, the challenge paper does not understand that giving a Green rating to March would not be correct. Tanker saturation is balanced (Yellow) and not poor (Green).

COMMENT:

I.2.M Mobility Mission - (Vol. 5, pg 93)

II.3.B&C (March Rated Yellow - Airspace Encroachment and Access)

ASSERTION:

The AF comments that flying operations at March are complex to coordinate with FAA (Ontario TRACON) and Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) arrivals and departures. Ontario air traffic controllers indicate that communications with March is routine and is not considered a problem. Furthermore, there is no interface with LAX arrivals and departures, so there is no need to coordinate with them....

RESPONSE:

Flying operations at March AFB are complex because of the high density traffic into and out of the southern California airspace. For example, large military exercises, in which air refueling aircraft are departing March AFB for air refueling tracks and anchors must be very well coordinated with Los Angeles and Ontario Air Traffic Control facilities. These aircraft have air refueling control times for meeting receivers and are impacted by any delays or rerouting for commercial and civilian traffic. Arriving and departing military traffic from March AFB is impacted by the arrivals and departures into and out of Los Angeles International Airport.

ASSERTION:

Another AF comment indicates that commercial and civilian air traffic in and around March AFB is expected to increase in the future. The most recent regional aviation system study indicates that general aviation traffic has stabilized and is declining slightly in some areas. Commercial traffic is expected to increase at Ontario International Airport, but that traffic is controlled by other radar sectors and will not affect March air traffic...

RESPONSE:

Due to the high density air traffic that already exists in southern California, any increase will impact flight operations at March AFB - as noted with the future increase in operations at Ontario. Regardless of future growth, the existing level of flights in the region impacts military flight operations at March.

ASSERTION:

The AF documents claim that airports to the south (Perris, Hemet, French Valley) all have traffic and activity that complicate local flying environment at March. However, all three airports are primary Visual Flight Rules (VFR) airports and do not affect either the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or VFR patterns at March AFB. In addition, special procedures have been arranged for parachutingGliders from Hemet fly well to the east of March, and air traffic from the new French Valley Airport is 21 miles to the south and is not a factor...

RESPONSE:

One of the biggest factors of airspace encroachment is the mixing of VFR and IFR traffic. This is one of the main factors that makes March AFB air traffic complex and constrained. Southern California is one of the most critical flying environments in the country and has the highest number of reported near mid-air collisions. March AFB has the highest number of reported near misses in California. Norton AFB was close behind. Of the 2059 reported near-misses, March AFB and Norton AFB reported 65 and 43 respective for almost one third of all near misses reported in the U.S.. The majority of these reports were between civilian and military aircraft. This data is from the Air Force Safety Agency at Norton AFB, CA. March AFB airspace environs is very congested and encroached and the proper rating is and should remain YELLOW.

COMMENT:

IM Mobility Mission - (Vol. 5, pg 93)

II.3.B,C (March Rated Red - Community Encroachment).

ASSERTION:

This rating is not justified. There is no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. March is rated G in accident potential zone (APZ) and G in noise compatibility (Vol V, page 102). All surrounding communities totally support March's AICUZ plan. According to the March Survey and Questionnaire, communities are 98 percent compatible with no future threat. March rating should be GREEN..

RESPONSE:

Moreno Valley, while accepting the intent, has not officially adopted the AF AICUZ study. Currently, there is approximately 5% incompatibility in the APZs. March AFB also has incompatible development in the Clear Zone to the south. One measure of community encroachment is the number of noise complaints received. Although development within AICUZ noise contours rated green, the actual number of noise complaints, especially from the new high density residential developments to the west of the base continue to be a serious issue. March AFB has one of the highest numbers of noise complaints per month in the Air Force. March AFB averages over 30 noise complaints a month. Residential development to the west of the base appears to be growing. Since the high terrain to the east of the base restricts March AFB traffic to the west, there is potential for noise concerns to increase.

I.M. Hydrants - (Vol. 5, pg 93)

II.1.C

ASSERTION:

Travis AFB fuel system will take twice as long to refuel a KC-10.

RESPONSE:

With the acceptance testing of March AFB's new Type III hydrant refueling system, both March and Travis AFB will have two Type III hydrant refueling systems. The Type III system is capable of uploading a KC-10 with 100,000 pounds of gas in thirteen minutes using HSV 12 hydrant servicing carts.

CRITERION II: THE AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF LAND, FACILITIES, AND ASSOCIATED AIRSPACE AT BOTH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL RECEIVING LOCATIONS.

II.2.B Condition of Infrastructure (March rated YELLOW)

ASSERTION:

Capacity infrastructure is not rated in summary report of Criterion II. March has over-capacity in virtually all utilities, and conditions are being significantly improved.

"Base utilities are not limiting factors to the location of additional missions at March AFB. Some excess capacity exists in all major utility systems, and most infrastructure deficiencies are being eliminated through programmed or ongoing construction projects." (page 15 March Facilities and Capacity Study)

March uses less than fifty percent of water capacity and has a new electrical substation (open in May) which will totally eliminate distribution problems and provide significant excess capacity.

There is excess capacity in the waste water treatment plant, natural gas supply, and the POL system.

March rating should be GREEN.

RESPONSE:

We agree that March AFB has excess infrastructure capacity. However, infrastructure *capacity* was not rated by the Air Force, because data available did not accurately reflect capacity. For example, linear feet of lines did not accurately measure capacity of an electrical distribution system. Instead, the Air Force rated infrastructure *condition*, and compared results against bases in the same mission category. We compared March AFB with the other bases in the large aircraft category, and gave credit for projects under construction. Using this method, infrastructure at March AFB is rated YELLOW when compared to other similar bases.

II.2.C Family Housing Capacity (March rated YELLOW)

ASSERTION:

The current family housing deficit shown in the March survey is 113. The 910 units shown in the housing capacity study, however, do not include 264 units at Norton which are available to meet March needs in July, 1993.

Additionally, appropriated FY 93 MILCON funds would replace below standard Arnold

Heights housing.

Communities have worked diligently with Air Force officials to address off-base military housing needs. Community funds may be available to address potential housing shortfalls. Cost and suitability of off-base housing has substantially improved for military families.

March rating should be GREEN.

RESPONSE:

Although the current housing deficit at March AFB is 113 units, the Air Force used the projected FY 96 housing deficits for its analysis. March AFB reported a projected FY 96 deficit of 492 units - including the 264 housing units at Norton AFB. Although projects under construction were credited, the FY 93 project was not under construction and was therefore not credited. When compared with deficits at other bases in the large aircraft category, March AFB rated YELLOW.

COMMENT:

II.4.B Existing Low Level and Future Low Level MOAs - (VOL. 5, pages 101) (March Rated Yellow).

ASSERTION:

Base Capacity Analysis states that there are excellent military operating areas (MOAs) and military training routes (MTRs) available for fighter/attack training requirements and there is excess capacity. March AFB should be rated - GREEN.

RESPONSE:

While there are MOAs and MTRs close and available, the amount of aviation congestion in the southern California (civilian and commercial) in comparison to the rest of the country makes this one of the more difficult areas to accomplish military flight training.

In the analysis, the potential for future use of existing flight training areas will probably be constrained due to conflicting demands from other military services and priorities of test and development (R&D) missions at the Edwards AFB complex.

Nellis AFB ranges are being used for major exercises (Red Flag, etc.) for units located across the country that do not have adequate airspace for large scale composite type training which will grow in importance in the future. Due to the civilian and commercial air traffic in the Los Angeles basin, the capability to expand or modify existing military airspace to accommodate new weapon systems and tactics will be limited. The proper rating is and should remain YELLOW.

COMMENT:

II.4.C Environs Airspace Existing and Future - (Vol. 5, page 102) (March Rated RED)

ASSERTION:

The environs airspace states that March AFB is located in one of the busiest air traffic control environments in the country - this is simply not the case. The FAA radar sector which controls March is outside the major traffic flow in the Los Angeles basin. March AFB is located adjacent to busy airspace, but is not in it.

RESPONSE:

It is the case. March AFB is located in southern California which has a large volume of civilian, commercial, and military aviation activities. Not only is there congestion from arrival and departures from the major Los Angeles and Ontario airports, the smaller French Valley, Perris, and Hemet airports also cause congestion. Within the constrained airspace are Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations at Perris Airport including one of the busiest skydiving schools in the country. Also, approximately 60 ultralight aircraft operate from Perris. Hemet Airport has a published Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) approach serviced by March AFB GCA. Hemet Airport also has a sky diving operation and an intense glider operation. French Valley Airport is a large general aviation airport with a new terminal and projections for tremendous growth. This airport is currently VFR only but has asked for an instrument approach. These activities and the mixture of traffic at March all are within the March Airport Radar Service Area (ARSA) and require the GCA and tower to provide separation between aircraft in the airspace. With military training areas located throughout southern California, getting to and from these areas requires March AFB flight traffic to enter and exit the "busy airspace" surrounding the base. Based on the "southern California" flying environment and the local terrain (mountains to the east of March AFB which restrict east traffic patterns and departures), the flying environs at March AFB when compared to other parts of the country are constrained.

ASSERTION:

March AFB airspace is severely constrained laterally and vertically -there is simply no airspace structure which constrains March AFB airspace laterally and vertically. In fact, March AFB area contain the least constrained airspace remaining in the Los Angeles basin.

RESPONSE:

As stated above, operations at Perris Airport, Hemet Airport, and French Valley Airport all impact flight operations at March AFB. Smog in the valley creates marginal visibility many days of the year - this requires more separation in the pattern. It was noted during a USAF Air Traffic System Analysis (1992) there were several IFR delays from Ontario Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) (20-30 minute delays). Ontario indicated that Ontario TRACON was working combined sectors at the time. It should be noted that Ontario TRACON moved up from number 20 to number 10 of the busiest FAA TRACONs in 1991.

Due to transiting two to three sectors of Ontario TRACON in the local transition pattern, instrument approach training at March AFB is more difficult than other bases and reduces the amount of training available. The base averages seven to ten delays a month. Commercial and civilian aviation traffic is forecast to increase in the southern California region in the future.

ASSERTION:

There appears to be little or no excess capacity for increased flight operations at March AFB. Again, this is not the case. March operations were at 33% of capacity in 1992, VFR traffic pattern capacity in 1992 were at half the 1989 volume suggesting significant unused capacity.

RESPONSE:

Aircraft flying into and out March AFB face departure delays and arrival procedures which keep them high and away from arrival and departure traffic into and out of Los Angeles and Ontario airports. The congestion from the surrounding airports as stated above impact the true "capacity" of available training in the March AFB flying environment. Further complicating the limited airspace at March AFB are the constraints imposed by very vocal residents about aircraft noise in the local traffic pattern.

ASSERTION:

The AF document indicates that complex airspace makes it difficult to fly the instrument approach from the north to Runway 14. However, fails to mention that less than 1% of the March air traffic ever fly that approach.

RESPONSE:

The reason that less than 1% fly the approach is because of the complex airspace and sectorization in Ontario TRACON all but precludes instrument approach work to Runway 14.

ASSERTION:

The Facility Survey indicates that the March VFR traffic pattern is sometimes saturated - this is an accurate finding. However, the documents fail to mention that there are daytime periods during the week when the VFR pattern is empty and has no air traffic...that there is no coordination of flight schedules among flying units at March...that the traffic pattern problem is a coordination and scheduling problem, not an airspace problem.

RESPONSE:

Flights are scheduled to accomplish several training events. Range time, air refueling control times, availability of Reserve and Air National Guard flight crews, and other requirements dictate the time of day that aircraft fly. The time an aircraft is available for traffic pattern

training is influenced by other factors. In order to have other training events accomplished, the March AFB traffic pattern does become saturated.

ASSERTION:

Another statement indicates that VFR congestion at March forces some March aircraft to do training at other bases. However, it is common and routine practice for military aircraft of all services to practice training at other bases. The AF documents fail to mention that military aircraft from other bases use the March VFR pattern for training on a regular basis.

RESPONSE:

It is true that military aircraft do some traffic pattern training at other locations than home base. As flying hour budgets shrink, more training will be done at home station. March aircraft go off station to train due to saturation during their available mission/flight time. Other services use the March pattern during the periods that are not saturated.

ASSERTION:

The AF documents express concern that March AFB does not have the VFR capacity to grow beyond existing level of operations....With the significant reduction in March Air operations...

RESPONSE:

It is true that March will now have increased VFR traffic capability with the reductions planned at March AFB. However, without the reductions, the saturation would continue in the long run. The conversion from RF-4 to KC135 aircraft will increase the pattern training requirements especially during the conversion and initial qualification training.

ASSERTION:

The facility survey states that " with the addition of the F-16 alert aircraft and the simulated flame out (SFO) approach requirements will complicate an existing complex VFR pattern." However none of the home-based aircraft at March have any requirements for SFOs and do not practice them. The ANG has been flying them since 1970...the lack of "ARSA protected airspace is a non-issue.

RESPONSE:

The simulated Flame Out (FSO) pattern is a training requirement for single engine aircraft. while there is a SFO pattern at March AFB, the current ANG alert aircraft practice the pattern on a very limited basis. A large number of SFOs would be required if a squadron was assigned and would be difficult to accomplish on a continuous basis. SFOs must be coordinated with tower and radar approach control due to the mix of heavy aircraft in the pattern. The requirement for SFOs complicate normal traffic pattern activity of heavy,

dissimilar aircraft.

ASSERTION:

The AF evaluation failed to mention improvements in FAA air traffic services throughout the Los Angeles basin over the past three years.....ATC delays are down throughout the system...the basin is being redesigned are expected to bring new efficiencies in ATC beyond those of today. This will benefit military air traffic, including March AFB.

RESPONSE:

There have been improvements to the air traffic services throughout the Los Angeles basin - due in part to the growth, complexity, and congestion that exists. Future growth is expected and the FAA will have to continue to improve their system.

Overall, the Air Force analysis that March Air Force Base is located within a very complex and congested flying environment compared to other locations is and should continue to be rated RED.

CRITERION III: THE ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE CONTINGENCY, MOBILIZATION, AND FUTURE FORCE REQUIREMENTS AT BOTH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL RECEIVING LOCATIONS.

III.1.F Contingency and Mobilization - Hot Cargo (Vol 5, pg 107) March rated red.

ASSERTION:

March has more than sufficient space to meet hot cargo pad needs. Taxiway #2 is the primary hot cargo area and Taxiway # 3 is the alternate if and when needed.

RESPONSE:

March has no dedicated hot cargo pad. Rating stands (Red = no; Green = Yes). This is a straight forward, yes or no, data point.

III.1.I Utility Infrastructure Capacity - (Vol. 5, pg 109) March rated red.

ASSERTION:

Supporting data indicates March has excess capacity in all infrastructure areas, and the condition of the infrastructure is now being extensively improved with BRAC monies already expended.

RESPONSE:

With the exception of sewage, March has no expansion capabilities in utility infrastructure without MILCON cost; therefore, according to the evaluation criteria, March was rated "RED."

III.2.A Future Force Requirements Support Future Mission - (Vol 5, pg 110) March rated Red. Red means that the base "Meets few requirements of the MACRO look." In this case, fighter MACRO requirements are the issue.

ASSERTION:

March successfully supports 18UE RF4 ANG mission. Two years ago, that unit flew F-4s. There were no problems whatsoever in supporting the fighter mission in the recent past; the unit converted to a reconnaissance mission due to changing Air Force requirements, not due to lack of support or training areas.

RESPONSE:

The MACRO requirements are listed in Vol 5, page 156. The BCEG analysis showed that March met few requirements of the fighter mission MACRO look. The MACRO requirements summary:

Proximity to adequate training airspace:

- Supersonic airspace with ACMI capability, surface to 50,000 feet
- Low altitude MOAs
- Low altitude training routes
- Scorable air-to-ground ranges with tactical target arrays
- Join/Composite training areas capable of supporting fighter tactical maneuvering

Good flying weather

Adequate divert and alternate airfields

Minimum ATC delays

Infrastructure to support mobility operations

Low encroachment ground/airspace

III.1.G Geographic Location - (Vol. 5, pg 108) March rated GREEN

ASSERTION:

Travis AFB may be less capable of providing critical air refueling support in winter months due to weather, specifically fog. Travis has 8 days average in December and January where visibility goes below 1/2 mile.

RESPONSE:

We do not feel weather is a major factor at either location. On the average, weather is very good at both bases. Using fog days at Travis is a weak argument. In December 92 and January 93, March AFB had 7 days where visibility was less than 1/2 mile (source: March AFB WX shop). In addition, most AMC crews are qualified for operations down to 1000 RVR for takeoff.

ASSERTION:

March's proximity to Edwards AFB and active duty forces capability to provide 24 hour-a-day, short-notice air refueling support is cited as being important.

RESPONSE:

The 20 (10 currently) KC-135s at March may not be able to provide the exact same service

as the KC-10's do, but the AFRES will continue to support Edwards Complex air refueling missions as they have in the past. The same Edwards support missions flown from March can be flown from Travis on 7 day, 24 hour basis and be able to accommodate mission slips. Bottom line is Edward's complex support missions do not have to be flown out of March. Most air refueling missions for Edwards support are scheduled far enough in advance enabling AFRES participation to the maximum extent. Although there are some missions requiring active duty crews, they can be tasked from Travis just as easily as they are from March.

The Air Force Reserve has approximately 25% of their forces available for very short notice tasking (volunteers) within 24 hours. Contingencies operations will normally have at least 24 hours lead time for preparation.

ASSERTION:

Interservice Coordination on decision to realign March AFB: Delegation sites no interservice coordination on realignment decision and March Reserves will not be capable of supporting Marine deployments.

RESPONSE:

The Air Force recommendation to realign March AFB was reviewed by each service, including the Department of the Navy, the JCS and CINC's. No concerns were expressed about the ability of the Air Force to conduct mobility operations at March once it becomes a Reserve base.

March AFB is and will continue to be, after realigning to the Reserves, a contingency aerial port. All the ramp space, facilities, and trained personnel will continue to be on hand to rapidly deploy Marine elements in all known scenarios. The 60th Airlift Control Squadron (60 ALCS) is designated as the primary unit tasked with deploying Marines from March AFB. All necessary augmentation will continue to be on hand to meet Marine OPlan deployment time lines.

CRITERIA IV: COST AND MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS

QUESTION:

Did the DoD consider the increased costs to other federal services, such as unemployment compensation or other social service programs, from the impact of unemployed workers?

RESPONSE:

The Air Force did not consider budget impacts to social service programs outside the Department of Defense. Unemployment compensation costs that directly impact the Air Force budget were considered.

CRITERION V: COSTS AND SAVINGS

QUESTION:

One issue that the Support Group would like to suggest the Commission review is the total lack of analysis done on the cost benefit of the base support active duty personnel provided to the Air National Guard and Reserve units. Who will provide these services if the base is realigned?

RESPONSE:

The Air Force Reserve, which would become the host organization for March AFB after realignment, estimated that 350 additional civilian positions would be required to provide base operations and support functions now provided by the active component. Only 68 caretaker positions were shown in the COBRA model; the other positions were assumed to be conversions of existing civilian manpower authorizations at March. The annual cost for these civilian employees is approximately \$14 million. This cost was considered in calculating recurring savings in the Air Force recommendation.

ASSERTION:

The COBRA Model appears to assume that flying active duty personnel to March AFB to assist in mobility during contingency operations will have no cost. We believe that subsequent, sizable military operation after March realignment will result in significant duty costs.

RESPONSE:

Air Force COBRA cost comparisons were based solely on routine, planned operating expenses. Contingency operations, which can neither be predicted or measured, were not considered. Contingency response costs are not a COBRA input.

CRITERION VI: SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS (MARCH AFB)

LOCAL APPROACH:

The local group studied Riverside and San Bernardino counties combined in assessing employment, population, income and local government finance impacts and the cumulative effects of closure and/or realignment at George AFB, Norton AFB, and March AFB, as well as, defense industry employee reductions in the same geographic area.

AIR FORCE APPROACH:

Per the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Closure Office, as advised by the Office of Economic Adjustment in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD), Riverside and San Bernardino counties were treated separately for impact analysis purposes. This was true in 1991 and 1993 closure analyses. Therefore, the region used for March impact analysis was Riverside county alone. This difference in area can easily explain most of the rating differences.

The local groups concentrated much of their analysis on the cumulative impact of base closures and defense industry reductions; however, the Air Force did not study cumulative impacts to determine ratings for each economic variable.

The Air Force used the Economic Resource Impact Statements, prepared by each base, to provide inputs for the Economic Impact Forecast System (EIFS) to determine the ratings for each of 101 Air Force, Guard and Reserve bases subject to analysis under 10 USC 2687. EIFS was developed and maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineering Research Laboratories at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, and is operated on a daily basis by the Department of Urban and Regional Planning of the University of Illinois. The Air Force has used EIFS for close to 15 years for socioeconomic analysis.

COMMENT:

VI.1 Employment (March Rated Yellow)

(The employment impact rating by the Air Force for the realignment of March AFB was yellow. The local group believes it should be "green".)

ASSERTION:

The local analysis used potential employment base changes and current unemployment rates to arrive at its rating of green. The Air Force only evaluates losses to the employment base. Additionally, the Air Force only studied March AFB realignment impacts on Riverside county and did not consider the cumulative impact of all base closures and defense cutbacks in the entire Riverside-San Bernardino Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA). These differences in analytic approach most

likely account for the differences in the ratings.

RESPONSE:

The local analysis used potential employment base changes and current unemployment rates to arrive at its rating of green. The Air Force only evaluates losses to the employment base. Additionally, the Air Force only studied March AFB realignment impacts on Riverside county and did not consider the cumulative impact of all base closures and defense cutbacks in the entire Riverside-San Bernardino Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA). These differences in analytic approach most likely account for the differences in the ratings.

COMMENT:

VI.3 Income (March Rated Red)

(The income impact by the Air Force was red, while the local group indicates it should have been yellow.)

RESPONSE:

Again, the local group used the Riverside-San Bernardino PMSA while the Air Force looked at Riverside county alone. Also, the local group included the impact of three base closings and defense industry reductions, while the Air Force only studied the impact of the March AFB realignment. These difference in approach lead to the differences in ratings.

COMMENT:

VI.4 Local Government Operating Revenues/Expenditures (March Rated Yellow)

(The Air Force rating in this area is yellow, while the local group believes it should have been green).

RESPONSE:

The rating standard used by the Air Force across all 101 bases studied is that if government expenditures saved is over 100% of revenues lost, the rating is red; if expenditures saved are between 75% and 100% of revenues lost the rating is yellow; and if expenditures saved are less than 75% of revenues lost the rating is green. Using the Economic Resource Impact Statements of March AFB as inputs for the EIFS model for March AFB, the EIFS model forecasts expenditures saved to be 77% of revenues lost, which results in a yellow rating. Additionally, the EIFS model draws on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of the Census, as well as the local base data provided by the Economic Resource Impact Statement at each base.

VII.1.A Community Infrastructure: Off-Base Housing (March rated RED)

ASSERTION:

Affordable - There is affordable and acceptable housing in the Riverside and Moreno Valley areas which surround March Air Force Base.

Maximum monthly housing cost allowance/with dependents:

\$521.94 for E1 classification

\$866.50 for E9 classification

This allowance affords a two bedroom rental to a four bedroom in both cities.

Maximum monthly housing cost allowance/without dependents:

\$391.45 for E3 classification

\$657.72 for E9 classification

Based on the comparative cost of housing shown in the chart, affordable housing is clearly more available at March than at the proposed receiving installation.

Acceptable - If military personnel reside outside the base in rental units such as these, they are considered acceptable so long as they fall within the above maximum monthly housing cost allowances.

March should be rated GREEN

REPLY: The report states that housing is both affordable and acceptable and they want a rating of RED changed to GREEN on both variables. They provide a chart and compare their data with Travis AFB and state "based on the comparative cost on housing shown in the chart, affordable housing is clearly more available at March that at the proposed receiving installation." While I will not compare data across installations, I will note that Travis AFB received a rating of RED on Housing Affordability. The original data is clear on these variables. According to the March AFB housing office, housing is neither affordable nor acceptable at March AFB. The original data states, "Housing is generally available for all ranks, but most exceed the DoD maximum allowable cost ceiling. All ranks except E4 and below are able to afford the average two bedroom units. Only officer ranks O3 and above and enlisted E8 and above can afford the average three bedroom units, and only officer ranks O5 and above are able to afford the average four bedroom rental units in the area." Based on the original data, the ratings will remain RED.

VII.1.B.2 Community Infrastructure: Transportation (March rated YELLOW)

ASSERTION:

Municipal Airports

Riverside Municipal Airport	30 min	18 mi
Ontario Airport	30 min	30 mi
Palm Springs Regional Airport	60 min	50 mi
John Wayne Airport	85 min	75 mi
Los Angeles International Airport	110 min	90 min

March is a freeway-close, 30 minutes to Ontario International Airport, a major regional airport, and hub for Southwest Airlines. All major carriers connect to or fly out of Ontario. While the specified mileage slightly exceeds the guidelines for a green rating in this category, the value and ease of access to Ontario makes it clear that:

March rating should be GREEN.

RESPONSE: The report states that Ontario International Airport is 30 miles from March AFB. This supports our data. However, the report wants to change the rating for access to municipal airports from YELLOW to GREEN because of "the value and ease of access to Ontario." We must use our objective criteria. The rating remains YELLOW.

VII.1.F.1,2 Local Crime Rate (March rated RED - Violent Crime, Property Crime)

ASSERTION:

The March AFB questionnaire stated that the information included in the response was provided by the Moreno Valley Police Department Records Division. Moreno Valley Police department staff cannot verify this assertion. The corrected Agency information is provided in the Technical Appendices under criterion Tab VII.

Moreno Valley is home to the majority civilian and off-base military families working at March. Based on Moreno Valley's crime rate per 100,000 residents:

March rating should be YELLOW.

RESPONSE: The new report questions the validity of the crime statistics. According to this report, the crime statistics for March AFB are incorrect. Furthermore, the report states that the Moreno Valley Police Department does not remember being contacted by March AFB regarding these crime statistics. The new report wants both violent crime and property crime rates to be changed from RED to YELLOW. According to SMSgt Shields (DSN 947-3206) March AFB used the published FBI statistics for Moreno Valley. However, for the record,

SMSgt Shields did note that the original statistics were incorrect. The original data submitted states the violent crime rate is 1770. The correct rate is 1270. The original data stated the property crime rate is 8900. The correct rate is 6670. According to SMSgt Shields, his office resubmitted this new data to MAJCOM on 21 Oct 92. However, I did not receive the corrected data. However, the ratings still remain in the RED for both violent and property crime. Since March AFB used published (and therefore verifiable data), the ratings will remain RED.

VII.2.F Education - Students that go on to College (March rated RED)

ASSERTION:

The March questionnaire states that approximately 22% of graduating high school students from the Moreno Valley Unified School District (MVUSD) go on to college. The actual percentage of students going to college from the MVUSD is 45%.

RESPONSE: The report states that the March questionnaire incorrectly stated that 22% of high school students go on to college. The new report states that 45% go to college and they want the rating changed from RED to YELLOW. According to Capt Hall (DSN 576-2251) at HQ AMC the 22% rate was given by Dr. Linda Wisher, Assistant Superintendent of Instructional Services (714-485-5600), at the Moreno Valley Unified School District. Since we have a document audit trail, the rating will remain RED.

VII.3.A Spousal Employment (March rated YELLOW)

ASSERTION:

The source of the data contained in the March Questionnaire response is clouded. The response states that "...specific data is not available. The figure is based on our best estimate given the information we have available." During research for this presentation, we contacted the State of California Employment Development Department Office in Riverside and the Riverside County Private Industry Council (JTPA), two groups who provide job placement within the county. Neither agency tracks data of this nature. It is likely that the estimated data is not representative of the number of nonappropriated funds spouses successfully seeking employment in the Moreno Valley area. Additionally, it is important to note that since the response was prepared, the City has created in excess of 3,000 service and retail jobs which have been available through a special hiring effort coordinated with the Employment Development Department for Moreno Valley residents. The new businesses include The Price Club, the Mall at TownGate and Smith's Food King.

March rating should be GREEN.

RESPONSE: The report questions the validity of the spousal employment data. In addition the report notes that since the response was prepared, the City has created in excess of 3,000 service and retail jobs which have been made available through a special hiring effort coordinated with the Employment Development Department for Moreno Valley residents. The question has been validated through other bases. In addition, it would be unfair for other Air Force installations to change the rating for March based upon events since the time the questionnaire was submitted. The rating will remain YELLOW for spousal employment.

VII.4.A,B Local Medical Care (March rated RED - Available Community Physicians, Hospital Beds)

ASSERTION:

Moreno Valley is statistically a very young community with the median age of 27.2 years. Based on this fact we have a reduced need for medical care and hospitalization usually required in communities with large elderly populations.

The medical needs of most Moreno Valley residents are met through the outpatient services provided by emergency/urgent care centers in the community.

Available Community Physicians

Non-military physicians in Riverside County	1,837
Riverside County	1.8/1,000
National Norms as per DoD	2.1/1,000

Available Community Hospital Beds

Hospital beds in Riverside County	3,407
Riverside County	3.4/1,000
National Norms as per DoD	4.0/1,000

The ratio of physicians to population between Riverside county and the national norm is minimal, while there is a difference in the ratio of hospital beds to population between Riverside County and national nor, Moreno Valley's youthful population and proliferation of urgent care outpatient centers clearly meets the community need for medical care. Additionally, the three year old Moreno Valley Community Hospital historically operates with 37% beds available on a regular basis. Based on this data:

March rating should be GREEN

RESPONSE:

The report concurs that the ratio of physicians (1.8) and the ratio of hospital beds (3.4) are both below the national average. However, they believe March AFB should receive a GREEN rating for both variables because of Moreno Valley's youthful (median age of 27.2) population and proliferation of urgent care outpatient centers. All installations must use the

same objective criteria. Both ratings remain RED.

Overall Rating

ASSERTION:

Based on this supplemental data we have provided to the committee on the ability of the community infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel:

March's overall rating for Criteria VII should be GREEN.

RESPONSE:

The Overall Rating for Criteria VII as established by the BCEG was YELLOW. Based on the supplemental data the report states the overall rating for Criteria VII should be GREEN. Based upon this analysis the only changes occurred in Off-Base Recreation (Zoo and Winter Sports). However, since the BCEG already gave March AFB a rating of GREEN for off-base recreation these two changes do not impact the rating for off-base recreation and, in turn, there is no impact upon the overall rating for Criteria VII.

CRITERION VIII: The Environmental Impact (March AFB)

COMMENT:

"VIII.1 Air Quality - (Vol. 5, page 140)
March Rated Red"

RESPONSE:

March AFB was given a rating of red because it is in area of air quality non-attainment for the following pollutants:

- Ozone (extreme)
- CO (serious)
- NO2
- Particulates (PM-10)

The rating system used in assessing air quality at all Air Force bases required (1) a rating of green if the base is in attainment for all pollutants; (2) yellow if the base is in a non-attainment area with a classification of pollutants being moderate or marginal; and (3) red if the base is in a non-attainment area with a classification of pollutants as serious or worse. These classifications were based upon existing U.S. EPA definitions/classifications.

COMMENT:

"VIII.2 Water - (Vol. 5, Page 141)
(March Rated Yellow)

RESPONSE:

No response necessary

COMMENT:

"VIII.4.A, B, C Biological Resources - (Vol. 5, page 145) (March rated Yellow)"

RESPONSE:

It is the Air Force's understanding that the habitat set aside on March AFB was to be permanent. Any changes to this agreement would have to be coordinated through the Nature Conservancy, Air Force and USF&WS. Further, the USF&WS would have to develop a biological opinion for any decision that may relate to a "taking" under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. For purposes of base closure or realignment the habitat set aside on March AFB is considered in perpetuity, therefore the rating of yellow is appropriate.

COMMENT:

**"Cultural Resources - (Vol 5, page 146)
(March Rated Yellow)"**

RESPONSE:

We concur with your statement that the potential listing of specific buildings on the National register is a positive characteristic of March AFB. The Air Force endeavors to protect such historic facilities when and if possible. It should also be noted that several other areas are eligible for the National Register. The rating of yellow is appropriate to recognize the presence of cultural resources.

ASSERTION:

**"Soil - (Vol 5, page 149)
(March Rated Red)"**

RESPONSE:

Contamination is a constraint because siting and construction cannot take place until remediation efforts have reached specified levels and a site is closed out. Although the current Air Force goal is to have every contamination site under remediation by the year 2000, that does not mean that any given site will be ready for some sort of reuse in that time frame. Therefore, the appropriate rating is red.

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504



May 17, 1993

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
~~ARTHUR EVITT, JR.~~
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

Please refer to this number
when responding 930520-6

Dear Mr. Boatright:

As part of an independent analysis of excess capacity, the Commission would like to send a Los Angeles based GAO representative to three small aircraft bases. We have chosen Luke AFB, Arizona and Nellis AFB, Nevada to verify capacity analysis surveys and Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona to conduct a limited capacity analysis where no survey was conducted.

To facilitate the GAO effort, we request the Air Force coordinate the base visits with Air Combat Command. The Commission would like the GAO representative, Mr. Thaddeus Rytel, SSN 568-62-0003, to begin his analysis as soon as possible. Mr. Rytel has a SECRET clearance and can be reached at 213-346-8060 (FAX 213-346-8142), for direct coordination of exact dates and times of the planned visits.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Matthew P. Behrmann".

MATTHEW P. BEHRMANN
Director of Staff

mpb:kbd

Document Separator

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
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ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

May 24, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1660

Please refer to this number
when responding 130525-7

Dear Mr. Boatright:

On behalf of all the Commissioners, I would like you to testify again before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.


The purpose of your testimony is to provide the Commissioners with the Air Force's rebuttal to the significant issues the communities have raised with the Department of Defense recommended actions as they pertain to the Air Force. Commissioners feel strongly that Service representatives can best characterize the work of their Service against the allegations of potentially impacted communities. Communities have not only raised significant issues with the recommendations made by the Air Force but also raised concerns about the process used in arriving at these recommendations.

You should be prepared to discuss a number of issues concerning the Air Force process and recommendations. Some specific issues are; the East Coast Mobility Base issue, West Coast Tanker/Airlift base issue, the proposed consolidation of Naval Air Station Agana with Andersen Air Force Base, the SECAF guidance on maintaining four missile fields, especially as it relates to the capacity analysis supporting the excess of four large aircraft bases and depot capacity and issues regarding the installations recently added for review.

The hearing is scheduled for June 17, 1993 on Capitol Hill in a room to be determined. We will provide you with details as they become available. We would appreciate it if you would have your staff provide us with 100 copies of any formal comments you may care to provide for the record by June 14, 1993. Please contact our hearing coordinator, Lynn Conforti, at 703/696-0504 to confirm your availability for this important hearing.

Thank you once again for your time and consideration. I
look forward to your testimony on June 17th.

Sincerely,



JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
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Sen/Log
Rudolph

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

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HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

May 24, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of The Air Force
(Installations)
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1660

Please refer to this number
when responding 930525-4

Dear Mr. Boatright:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has received information regarding a potential problem with the proposed realignment of March AFB, California. The issue has been raised by Brigadier General Marvin Hopgood from Camp Pendleton, California. He has voiced opposition to the realignment because he believes the Air Force will be unable to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force rapid deployment requirements from March AFB without an active duty presence. The attached documents provide further details on this issue.

To assist our review and analysis of the March AFB realignment recommendation request the Air Force's views of the concerns expressed by General Hopgood. A response to the Commission by June 4, 1993 would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you for your continued cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

JIM COURTER
Chairman

Enclosures
R. Dicamillo

MEMORANDUM FOR AMC/XPP
TACC/CC

19 May 1993

SUBJ: Heads up on Negative Story, Riverside, Calif., Press-Enterprise

1. Marlowe Churchill, military reporter for the Riverside, Calif., Press-Enterprise, contacted AMC/PA today to indicate he will be running a story that will generally be negative toward AMC and the Air Force in tomorrow morning's edition. The negative remarks will be attributed a USMC Brig Gen Marvin Hoppood (MG-select) apparently second in command at Pendleton, and his Marine chief of staff Col. Jack Hawley. In an interview this morning, the Marines apparently provided some heated comments about the proposed March AFB closure, along these lines:

a. That the Air Force has "lied" to the Marine Corps. The Marines say a deal was struck when Norton was marked for closure that March would remain a viable staging base.

-- These Marines do not believe that March will be viable when it becomes a reserve base; that the Reserves do not have ability to surge to meet their immediate deployment needs.


-- That use of other bases (ie. Travis some 500 miles away) will not meet the Marines requirement to "be airborne in 18 hours."

-- That the Marines were left out of the decision-making process leading to March's recommended closure (since the Air Force knew they would object.)

b. That the Air Force will continue to attempt to use Travis vice March as staging point for future deployments. They cite "a terrible problem" with Somalia deployment and redeployment in which they contend AMC pressed hard to use Travis, and Marines "really had to scream" to get us to use March.

2. AMC/PA commented that the BRAC process is straightforward, that each base is reviewed on its total merits and that recommendations for closure occur at DoD levels and are reviewed by the BRAC before action. We declined to comment specifically on the March situation, but made two notes: that AMC has experience in moving forces to and from airstrips with absolutely no infrastructure, and that no one suggests that Somalia was not a very successful operation -- and that the Marines were moved from and to March AFB.

3. We have forwarded Mr. Churchill's request for specific comments to the BRAC public affairs office in Wash DC. For your information.



CECIL F. ROSS, Colonel, USAF
Chief of Public Affairs

CC, CV, DS, XP
SAF/PAM
OASD/PA: DDI/DPL
BRAC/PA
22 AREFW/PA



TALKING PAPER

FOR USE BY: LTGEN TIEBOUT

Subj: MARCH AIR FORCE BASE

Ref: (A) CG I MEF REAR 0121227 MAR 93 (U)

1. With Generals Johnston and Wilhelm in Somalia, Frat on the East Coast wargaming, and Don Lynch at LFTCPAC for a few days, I want to communicate most expeditiously. In your role with Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), I believe it imperative the USMC recognize/support retention of March Air Force Base (AFB).

2. Reference (a) requests CMC Coordinate with USTRANSCOM and HQ AMC to formally establish March AFB as the APOE/APOD for I MEF contingency deployments. This paper is intended to expand/emphasize USMC need for March AFB.

3. The Army's rapid response by either the XVIII Airborne Corps or the 7th ID has as an imperative assumption, the collocation of their ground force with a viable airhead (Pope & McChord AFBs). Seventh ID will utilize Travis until they complete their move from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis. As the MPF role of the Marine Corps has assumed a complementary status with our traditional amphibious capability, we have had to devote greater attention to our rapid deployability from airheads. Detailed planning, close coordination, and the greater use of automated planning programs have enabled us to rapidly deploy force modules from contiguous airhead locations such as the GCE/CSSE deployment from March AFB to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. Such a contiguous airhead location is deemed essential if I MEF is to retain its current response capability.

4. Currently, I MEF is responsive to five CINCs and holds the requirement for ACF in the Pacific (I MEF/III MEF). Additionally, with the current realignment of U.S. Army forces in the Western United States, the Marine Corps has assumed a significantly increased role for disaster relief missions and civil disturbances; i.e., LA Riots. As the only force available, we must be able to quickly deploy.

a. Norton Air Force Base closed its Air Transport Operations Center (ATOC) on 30 September 1992. The airhead is scheduled to close 30 September 1993.

b. With the closure of Norton AFB, it is necessary to establish a primary and alternate APOE. The primary APOE for the movement of I MEF is currently March AFB. The following justification pertains:

(1) March AFB has the facilities to operate an ATOC.

(2) March AFB has adequate staging and marshalling areas.

(3) Access and trafficking to March AFB allows for expeditious deployment. March AFB is 2.25 hours from Camp Pendleton by motor march, 1.5 hours from El Toro and 3 hours from 29 Palms.

(4) I MEF's strategic deployment requirements require a SOCAL airhead; i.e., March Air Force Base.

5. NAS Miramar, MCAS El Toro, NAS North Island and several SOCAL commercial airfields have several pluses that support APOE/APOD status; however, all of them have several serious, degrading conditions or lack of capabilities which prohibit them from serious consideration to serve as I MEF's primary APOE/APOD.

6. Travis AFB, near San Francisco, fourteen hours and 520 miles north of Camp Pendleton, was enthusiastically offered by USAF planners as an ideal APOE/APOD for our Somalia Deployment. I am fearful that the USAF prefers Travis over March as the USAF Base to support USMC deployments. I believe the USMC strong preference for March vice Travis should be part of the BRAC proceedings.

V/R
M. T. Hopgood, Jr.
 M. T. HOPGOOD, JR.
 BGEN USMC

FAX copies to:
 LtGen STACKPOLE
 LtGen JOHNSTON
 MGen WILHELM
 MGen BLOT
 MGen WILLIAMS
 BGen FRATARANGELO

*If we can't cross the street,
 we won't be invited to dance*

Deliver Copies to:
 BGen LYNCH
 Col STEED (C/S, I MEF)
 Col BAKER (C/S, 1st MarDiv)

=====
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
=====

HQ USAF/XOOR
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Fax# DSN 223-9707 or Commercial (703) 693-9707

DATE: 14 Jun 93

FROM: AF/XOOR

TO: DBCRC - AF Teams

ATTN: Mr DiCamillo

Fax #: 68550

NO. OF PAGES: 8 + 1 Cover Sheet = 9

REMARKS:

Rick
Copy for your info
"Rod" Thomas



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

10 JUN 1993

Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Installations)
Room 4C940, Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

*ECTS
930615-44*

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter

This letter is in reply to your May 24, 1993, letter concerning the issues raised by Brig Gen Marvin Hopgood from Camp Pendleton, California (CA), as to the ability of the Air Force to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force rapid deployment requirements from March Air Force Base (AFB), CA, once the base is realigned from an active duty base to a Reserve base.

We do not know the basis for Brig Gen Hopgood's statements, but it is clear he does not understand the planned concept of operations at March AFB. March AFB is and will continue to be, after realigning to the Reserves, a contingency aerial port. All the ramp space, facilities, and trained personnel will continue to be on hand to rapidly deploy the I MEF elements in all known scenarios. The 60th Airlift Control Squadron (60 ALCS) is designated as the primary unit tasked with deploying I MEF from March AFB. The 60 ALCS currently conducts I MEF affiliation training. All necessary augmentation will continue to be on hand to meet I MEF OPlan deployment time lines. Many of Brig Gen Hopgood's concerns were addressed in correspondence between Rep Ken Calvert (Atch 1) and General Fogleman, AMC/CC (Atch 2).

Let me assure you, our recommendation to realign March AFB was reviewed by each service, including the Department of the Navy, the JCS and CINC's. No concerns were expressed about the ability of the Air Force to conduct mobility operations at March once it becomes a Reserve base.

We hope this information is useful.

Sincerely



JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

2 Atch

1. Rep Calvert, May 27, 1993, ltr
2. AMC/CC, 6 Jun, 1993, ltr

Handwritten notes: "Sib-1 info on [unclear] to [unclear] done" and "M-1 PE CV" with initials.

KEN CALVERT
430 DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
SUBCOMMITTEES
NATIONAL PARKS, FORESTS
AND PUBLIC LANDS
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
NATIVE AMERICAN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,
SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
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AND AVIATION



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(909) 781-1000

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-0543

May 27, 1993

General Ronald R. Fogleman
Air Mobility Command, Headquarters
Department of the Air Force
402 Scott Drive, Room 132
Scott AFB, IL. 62225-5363

Dear General Fogleman,

I am writing to ask your assistance in evaluating the "who, what, when and where" of operating March AFB as a Reserve facility. Let me say that I have always appreciated your integrity, honesty and forthrightness and I take you at your word that the job can be done by the AMC through the Reserves with active augmentation. My skepticism stems from the details of the mission and aspects of timeliness and cost-effectiveness. I am not yet convinced that the job can be done quickly enough or at the predicted savings.

To help me find an answer to these questions I would like to ask:

- 1- Is there an agreement or MOU now on the books between the Air Force and the Marines regarding the Air Force's commitments to the Marines for deployment in general and/or specifically for March/Pendleton?
- 2- Could you please illustrate cost implications via "scenarios?" That is, could AMC work out a specific scenario with the Marines showing how Desert Shield/Storm would have been run from a reserve March, and an APOE Travis? Also, as a variant, please detail a scenario that includes a fogged-in Travis. The purpose of these scenarios is to obtain a detailed list of people and equipment, their point of origin and cost, necessary for rapid deployment of Marines from a Reserve March. I understand that the armed services use a program called Time Phase Force Deployment to compute personnel and materiel movements. If you use this program, could you please add the price tag to the figures on people and equipment.
- 3- Given what is at stake if assumptions about deploying the Pendleton Marines are in error, why doesn't the Air Force take a "Wait and Test" for BRAC 3. The "wait" part would be: secure the savings one would see from a realigned March by realigning Fairchild AFB (or other base) in BRAC 3. The "test" part is: over the next two years, run exercises based on the AF's detailed plans for deployment from a reserve March.

- 4- Point 3 begs the question: If AMC can meet their commitments to the Marines at Pendleton through a Reserve March, could not similar arrangements (and savings) be reached at McChord AFB for Fort Lewis and Pope AFB for Camp Lejeune? If so, why don't we wait and try this arrangement at these and other Air Force bases? If not, what is unique to the March/Pendleton relationship that does not exist with McChord/Lewis and Pope/Lejeune?

As you know, there is only one month left to present data to the BRAC commission. I would hope that you could answer the above questions by June 11. If you have any questions please contact me as soon as possible. Thank you for cooperation and candor throughout this process.

On a related topic, thank you for letting me see a copy of your letter to General Mundy. I have five questions regarding it.

- 1- How will the 60th ALCS get notified and get to March?
- 2- How much time will it take from notification to get 60th personnel to March and ready to deploy Marines?
- 3- Who will handle messing, security, lighting, portajohns, etc. for deployment?
- 4- With ramp space set aside for staging areas for people, equipment, explosives, etc., how will that affect civilian joint use which the Air Force proposes?
- 5- What are the exact numbers of active, reserve and civilian positions that will remain at March after realignment? (From the initial DOD release, through discussions with BRAC, and including today's Air Force force structure announcement, I have not seen the same set of numbers regarding personnel remaining at a realigned March.)

Again, thank you for your help.

Sincerely,



Ken Calvert, MC



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

6 JUN 1993

AMC/CC
402 Scott Drive, Rm 132
Scott AFB IL 62225-5363

The Honorable Ken Calvert
United States House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515-3003

Dear Mr Calvert

Reference your letter of 27 May 1993 requesting information regarding the proposed realignment of March AFB to a Reserve base. My staff has researched the issues outlined in your letter, and detailed responses are attached.

We stand ready to assist you in the future.

Sincerely,

RONALD R. FOGLEMAN
General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
AMC Staff Responses

cc: HQ USAF/XOOR

Response to Representative Calvert's questions, 27 May 1993

1. Is there an agreement or MOU now on the books between the Air Force and the Marines regarding the Air Force's commitments to the Marines for deployment in general and/or specifically for March/Pendleton?

We are not aware of an USAF/USMC MOU that addresses USMC deployments in general or a specific agreement that addresses Pendleton/March deployments. AMC, as the Air Force component to US Transportation Command, provides for the air transportation needs of all users as directed by JCS.

2. Could you please illustrate cost implications via "scenarios?" That is, could AMC work out a specific scenario with the Marines showing how Desert Shield/Storm would have been run from a reserve March, and an APOE Travis? Also, as a variant, please detail a scenario that includes a fogged-in Travis. The purpose of these scenarios is to obtain a detailed list of people and equipment, their point of origin and cost, necessary for rapid deployment of Marines from a Reserve March. I understand that the armed services use a program called Time Phase Force Deployment to compute personnel and materiel movements. If you use this program, could you please add the price tag to the figures on people and equipment.

AMC does not cost out scenarios as requested. The AMC mission drives toward the use of the best overall outload location for any given geographical user. Active duty and ARC Air Force bases, Army air fields, civilian airports, or unimproved airfields can and have been used as customer outload locations. The planned main outload location for Camp Pendleton Marines remains March AFB. Whatever AMC elements are required at any location to move a customer will be brought in as necessary to meet closure. An example of this was during DS/DS when Pendleton Marines were also deployed through EL Toro MCAS (AMC augmentation and equipment was brought in as required). Additionally, the only effect a fogged-in Travis AFB would have on the deployment mission would be to require support (ALCS) from another location. The Time Phase Force Deployment lists noted above are not used for costing calculations; they are merely the supported CINC's priority of movement and detail force movement requirements.

3. Given what is at stake if assumptions about deploying the Pendleton Marines are in error, why doesn't the Air Force take a "Wait and Test" for BRAC 3. The "wait" part would be: secure the savings one would see from a realigned March by realigning Fairchild AFB (or other base) in BRAC 3. The "test" part is over the next two years, run exercises based on the AF's detailed plans for deployment from a reserve March.

We have no reason to believe assumptions about deploying the Pendleton Marines are in error. The essential business of this command is mobility, and rapid deployment of I MEF and the Air Contingency Force rank high on our list of "deliverables". Deployments from a reserve base using its infrastructure, units and necessary augmentation forces is not a new concept to this command. We see no need for a "wait and test" strategy.

4. Point 3 begs the question: If AMC can meet their commitments to the Marines at Pendleton through a Reserve March, could not similar arrangements (and savings) be reached at McChord AFB for Fort Lewis and Pope AFB for Camp Lejeune? If so, why don't we wait and try this arrangement at these and other Air Force bases? If not, what is unique to the March/Pendleton relationship that does not exist with McChord/Lewis and Pope/Lejeune?

The decision on whether a military installation will host active duty versus reserve component forces is fundamentally based on factors which transcend the issue of the deployment of a proximate user. To date, the DoD, Base Closure Commission, President and Congress have collectively decided to maintain active duty forces at McChord AFB and Pope AFB for those myriad reasons. Similarly, the current DoD recommendation to realign March AFB focuses not on any alleged difference in "relationship" between two proximate bases as it does focus on those other factors.

On a related topic, thank you for letting me see a copy of your letter to General Mundy. I have five questions regarding it.

1. How will the 60th ALCS get notified and get to March?

During contingencies, the ALCS would be placed on alert status along with the rest of the 60th AW. They would be alerted for movement in accordance with established AMC alert procedures (i.e., message traffic, telephone). Movement would be via military aircraft and/or time permitting, surface transportation.

The Tanker Airlift Control Center Mission Support Planning Office at Scott AFB, Illinois will task the 60th by tasking order and phone call. In any time sensitive contingency the 60th will move to any outload location by air.

2. How much time will it take from notification to get 60th personnel to March and ready to deploy Marines?

From notification to in place at March should take 10-12 hours.

The 60th ALCS Designed Operational Capability (DOC) Statement requires the unit to be ready to deploy within 12 hours. This is primarily driven by the flight crew requirement to have 12 hours predeparture crew rest. Normally we can find a rested crew that can be redirected from another mission to transport the 60th to the specified location. During the recent LA riots, for example, the 60th ALCS was in place and ready to operate within 3 hours. Therefore, to support contingencies or existing war plans, the 60th ALCS would be in place to meet the I MEF time schedule.

3. Who will handle messing, security, lighting, porta-johns, etc. for deployment?

Under existing Air Force regulations, reception planning is a host base responsibility. For a contingency, additional personnel support requirements, above what March AFB can

handle, would be contracted from the local economy by contracting personnel. Costs would be paid for by March AFB and would be reimbursed at a later date. If Reserve contracting personnel were not available, additional contracting personnel would be brought in from other Air Force Bases. For exercises, agreements would be negotiated before deployments and funding secured prior to troop movement.

4. With ramp space set aside for staging areas for people, equipment, explosives, etc., how will that affect civilian joint use which the Air Force proposes?

We do not envision March's future mission having a significant impact on possible civilian joint use operations. However, depending on the scale of future joint use activities, additional airfield infrastructure may be required.

5. What are the exact numbers of active, reserve and civilian positions that will remain at March after realignment? (From the initial DOD release, through discussions with BRAC, and including today's Air Force force structure announcement, I have not seen the same set of numbers regarding personnel remaining at a realigned March).

There will be 33 military and 252 civilians tied to active duty Air Force activities (Air Force Media Center and Air Force Audit Agency) at March after realignment. There will also be 1297 military (reserve drill) and 315 civilians (277 air reserve technicians and 38 full time reserve civilians) tied to the reserve Air Force activity (452 Air Reserve Wing). Positions leaving March have been previously announced.

< CONFIRMATION REPORT >

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May 26, 1993

General Ronald R. Fogleman
Commander - Air Mobility Command
402 Scott Drive, Room 132
Scott Air Force Base, IL 62225-5363

Please refer to this number
when responding 930527-2

Dear General Fogleman:

On May 5, 1993 I completed a visit of another Air Mobility Command (AMC) base, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, as part of the Commission's process in reaching a final decision on the Department of Defense's recommendations. Again, I was very impressed with the pride, spirit, dedication, and professionalism of the men and women of the AMC. It must give you great pride and satisfaction to have such an outstanding group of professionals, military and civilian, working under your command. They did a superb job in hosting my staff analyst, Rick DiCamillo, the dignitaries accompanying us on our visit and me.

Please pass on my personal thanks to Brigadier General George Gray and his staff, especially Colonels Dave Mulkey and Walt Smith, Lieutenant Colonels John Andre and Bruce Bennet, Captain Dave Argyle, Lieutenant Beth Hicock and Master Sergeant Clarence Hucks for making the short visit very productive and noteworthy. My sincere thanks to all the other men and women of McGuire AFB who participated in my visit. They are all true professionals and a credit to the U.S. Air Force and our country.

Sincerely,

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo

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June 2, 1993

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Mr. David Berteau
 Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
 (Productions and Logistics)
 Office of the Secretary of Defense
 The Pentagon, SD Room 3E-808
 Washington, DC 20301-8010

Please refer to this number
 when responding 930602-11

Dear Mr. Berteau:

The March 1993 DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report-
 citing the need to "maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due
 to uncertainty with respect to START II,"- recommended the
 retention of four missile fields. One of these missile fields at
 Grand Forks Air Force Base represents an area of special interest
 to the Commission because of potential implications for the 1972
 Anti-Ballistic (ABM) Treaty.

By letter dated March 31 1993, (enclosure 1), I asked General
 Horner, CINCNORAD/USCINCSpace the following:

"In your opinion, does the U.S. designated ABM Treaty site
 preclude the consideration of Grand Forks AFB and its ICBM
 missile field for closure, both in 1993 and 1995? Please
 elaborate."

General Horner's April 13, 1993 response (enclosure 2)
 highlighted the point that any determination would require a U.S.
 Government position staffed through DoD and State Department
 channels for a final determination of the ABM Treaty and its
 affect on the question of Grand Forks. By letter dated April 15,
 1993, (enclosure 3) General Horner asked the Joint Staff, (J5-
 Conventional/Missile Arms Control Division) for assistance in
 getting a definitive reading and to respond directly to the
 Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

DoD has yet to respond to General Horner's request. Since
 Grand Forks has been added by the Commission for realignment or
 closure consideration it is imperative that we receive a response
 to this question by June 14, 1993. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

J. Courts
 JIM COURTER
 Chairman

Jon Log
DAVE TRACK

jac:cirillo
 Enclosures

1. Commission letter
2. Horner response
3. Horner letter to Joint Staff



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ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

March 31, 1993

General Charles A. Horner, USAF
CINCNOAD/USCINCSpace
250 South Peterson Boulevard, Suite 116
Peterson AFB, Colorado 80914-3010

Please refer to this number
when responding 930331

Dear General Horner:


As you know, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is reviewing the Defense Secretary's 1993 list of recommendations for closure and realignment. During the course of our review of the Air Force's methodology, an area of particular interest will be the impact of arms control agreements on strategic bomber and missile bases.

Citing the need to "maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due to uncertainty with respect to START II," the Air Force has recommended retention of the following ballistic missile fields: F.E. Warren AFB, WY; Malmstrom AFB, MT; Minot AFB, ND; and Grand Forks AFB, ND. Grand Forks represents an area of special interest to the Commission because of potential implications for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. I would appreciate your assistance in providing an answer for the record for the following question:

"In your opinion, does the U.S. designated ABM Treaty site preclude the consideration of Grand Forks AFB and its ICBM missile field for closure, both in 1993 and 1995? Please elaborate."

I would appreciate receiving your response by April 15, 1993. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely



JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo



UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

Please refer to this number
when recording: 930420-7

FROM: USCINCSpace
250 S Peterson Blvd Ste 116
Peterson AFB CO 80914-3010

13 April 1993

SUBJ: Grand Forks Air Force Base Closure/Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
(Your Letter of March 31, 1993, Number 930331-6)

TO: Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Base Defense Closure and Realignment Commission
Arlington VA 22209

1. The following comments are provided to the question from your letter, "In your opinion, does the U.S. designated ABM Treaty site preclude the consideration of Grand Forks AFB and its ICBM missile field for closure, both in 1993 and 1995?"
2. The Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area is unique in that the ABM Treaty specifically identifies it as the center point for the United States' designated ABM deployment area. This seems straightforward; however, interpretation of the intent of the treaty leads us to a gray area. A Joint Staff interpretation of the association between missile field and ABM site is "there is no strict obligation to defend a missile site; it is to limit both sides to a single deployment area." This interpretation dis-associates the missile field from the ABM site, having direct implications on retaining our ABM site at Cavalier which supports National Missile Defense. Again, this is only one interpretation.
3. The ABM Treaty implications on the closure of Grand Forks, if any, require a U.S. Government position staffed in the DoD and State Department channels. My staff has provided a copy of your letter to the Joint Staff and the Air Staff. I have asked them to assist in getting a definitive reading and to reply to your question directly. If I can be of further assistance, please contact me at your convenience.

CHARLES A. HORNER
General, USAF
Commander in Chief



UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

FROM: HQ USSPACECOM/J5
250 S PETERSON BLVD STE 116
PETERSON AFB CO 80914-3130

15 APR 1993

SUBJ: Review of ABM Treaty Impact on Base Closure

TO: JOINT STAFF, J5 (Conventional/Missile Defense Arms Control Div.)
WASHINGTON DC 20318

1. During the development of the response to the Chairman, Base Defense Closure and Realignment Commission (Atch 1), which requested the CINC's assistance in providing an answer to the question "In your opinion, does the U.S. designated ABM Treaty site preclude the consideration of Grand Forks AFB and its ICBM missile field for closure, both in 1993 and 1995?" the question of interpretation of the ABM Treaty became an unresolved issue. The CINC's response (Atch 2) highlighted the point that any determination would require a U.S. Government position staffed in the DoD and State Department channels for a final interpretation of the ABM Treaty and its affect on the question of closure of Grand Forks.

2. We request your assistance in providing a response to the Chairman's request. As the CINC mentioned in his letter, there is a corollary concern, that being the implications of the closure of the missile site at Grand Forks and the ramifications toward the ABM radar site at Cavalier which will support National Missile Defense. This is a very sensitive issue and any response should have the assurance that there is no impact.

3. Please respond directly to the Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. POC is LtCol Williamson, SPJ5X, DSN 692-5843

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John S. Boone".

JOHN S. BOONE
Colonel, USAF
Vice Director of Plans

2 Atchs
1. Chairman, Itr
2. CINC Response



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June 1, 1993

Major George Auten
Military Assistant
Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of The Air Force (Installations)
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1660

ECTS

Dear Major Auten *George*

Thank you for providing the points of contact at each MAJCOM headquarters and individual base.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has requested the assistance of GAO in evaluating the fuel capacity, resupply capability and aircraft parking capability at Plattsburgh, Griffiss and McGuire Air Force Bases. The GAO representative is Mr. Andy Marek and he can be reached at (202) 512-8472.

Mr. Marek plans to visit the bases beginning June 1st and will contact the MAJCOM and base POCs to confirm his itinerary. His tentative schedule is:

Plattsburgh AFB, June 1-2, 1993
Griffiss AFB, June 3-4, 1993
McGuire AFB, June 7-8, 1993

Your assistance in arranging these visits would be greatly appreciated. Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr.
FRANCIS A. CIRILLO, JR
Air Force Team Leader

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May 27, 1993

The Honorable David J. Berteau
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Room 3E-808, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-8000

Please refer to this number
when responding 930527-3

Dear Mr. Berteau:

As I informed Secretary Aspin in my letter of April 5, 1993, the Commission voted to consider Naval Air Station Agana, Guam, as a possible addition to the list of military installations recommended to be closed or realigned. This Commission will submit its report to the President by July 1, 1993.

It is the Commission's task to assess the feasibility of the closure of NAS Agana following the full requirements of Public Law 101-510, as amended, and specifically, the application of the eight selection criteria. In that regard, it is imperative that your office price out the option described below, in addition to those previously requested.


It is requested that you provide us all pertinent data to include manpower figures, operating costs, closing costs and specific COBRA analyses for the following scenario as provided to the commission by the Government of Guam:

•Close NAS Agana and consolidate the NAS Agana mission at Andersen AFB (AAFB). This move will involve minimal replication of NAS Agana facilities at AAFB (e.g., should modernization of present or construction of new hangar or maintenance spaces be required). It specifically involves the use of existing AAFB facilities (administrative, mission-related and housing). The phasing out of duplicate missions and personnel activities is considered a part of the consolidation process. This scenario can include either provisions for construction of no housing or provisions for construction of up to half the family housing and all bachelor housing, if necessary. Because AAFB appears to the Government of Guam to be an Air Force Base with a support mission for transient aircraft and contingency missions, with no aircraft assigned, consideration should be given to the benefits and savings that may be realized in converting AAFB to a Naval Air Station, with the Air Force becoming the tenant.

Please ensure that all the information is coordinated between the Navy and the Air Force and is available to the Commission no later than June 7, 1993.

Your time and cooperation are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,



JIM COURTER
Chairman

JAC:rr

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June 1, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Installations
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

Please refer to this number
when responding 930602-8

Dear Mr. Boatright:

To assist the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with its independent analysis of DoD recommended actions and bases added for consideration by the Commission on May 21, we request the following COBRA runs to be available no later than 12:00 noon on June 14, 1993:

Plattsburgh: Close Plattsburgh, establish McGuire as air mobility wing. Transfer 28 KC-135s from Plattsburgh to McGuire. Transfer 19 KC-10s from Barksdale to McGuire. Retain AFRES C-130s (12) at Willow Grove NAS, PA.

Fairchild (Option 1): Close Fairchild, March stays open. Realign 14 KC-135s from Fairchild to March. Realign ANG KC-135s to Spokane IAP. Realign B-52s to Barksdale/Minot. Survival school move to AF Academy.

Fairchild (Option 2): Same as option 1 except ANG KC-135s remain at Fairchild in cantonment area.

All Depots: Calculations for the closure of the Air Logistics Center, Defense Distribution Depot, DISA, and any other activities specifically located at these bases only because the Air Logistics Center is an active unit: Robins AFB, Tinker AFB, Kelly AFB, and McClellan AFB.

Tinker (Option 1): Close Tinker AFB, OK. Move B-1 workload to Kelly. Move B-52 workload to Kelly. Move E-3 workload to contractor. Move engine workload to Kelly. Move hydraulics/pneudraulics workload to McClellan. Move oxygen/gas generating equipment workload to Hill. Move 552 ACW E-3s to Offut. Move USN Strat Wing One E-6's to Robins. Leave ANG F-16s in cantonment.

*Jen
copy to each
of us p12
3*

McClellan and Tinker (Option 1): Close McClellan and Tinker AFBs. Move Hill C-130/Robins C-130 workload to Kelly. Move McClellan F-15 workload to Robins. Move McClellan A-10/F-111 workloads to Hill. Contract McClellan C-135s. Move Tinker B-52s to Kelly. Contract Tinker E-3s. Contract Tinker B-1s. Contract Kelly C-5's. Contract McClellan ground/comm-elect. Move McClellan instruments to Kelly. Move Tinker engines to Kelly. Move Tinker hydraulics to Kelly. Move Tinker oxygen/gas generating to Hill. Move McClellan AFR KC-135s to Beale. Move 552 ACW E-3s to Offut. Move McClellan 1849 EIS to Hill. Move McClellan HQ ARS to Langley. Move McClellan AFTAC Spec Ops Div to Offutt, NE.

Grand Forks (Option 1): Grand Forks close, March stay open. Realign KC-135s to March AFB including Griffiss tankers (31 KC-135s total). Griffiss B-52s realign to Minot/Barksdale.

Grand Forks (Option 2): Close entire base and move the 10 B-1s and the 7 KC-135Rs to Ellsworth AFB. Move the Minuteman III ICBMs to Malmstrom AFB as a replacement for the Minuteman IIs. Move the 4 HH-1Hs to Grand Forks International Airport to be used for missile field destruction contractor support.

Grand Forks (Option 3): Close missile field but leave the bomber and refueling missions intact. Move the Minuteman III ICBMs to Malmstrom AFB as a replacement for the Minuteman IIs. Move the 4 HH-1Hs to Grand Forks International Airport to be used for missile field destruction contractor support.

Grand Forks (Option 4): Close flying mission portion of the base but retain the missile field. Move the 10 B-1s and the 7 KC-135s to Ellsworth AFB.

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 1): Close Bergstrom AFB cantonment area. Move the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft, the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units, and the 10th Air Force (AFRES) Headquarters, to the expanded cantonment area at Carswell AFB.

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 2): Keep Bergstrom AFB cantonment area open. Move the 301st Fighter Wing from Carswell AFB to the Bergstrom AFB cantonment area.

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 3): Same as Bergstrom/Carswell #2, but leave 301st as is.

MacDill (Option 1): Return JCSE to MacDill (BRAC 91 moved) without identifying airfield operator.

MacDill (Option 2): Return JCSE with Department of Commerce (NOAA) as airfield operator.

MacDill (Option 3): Move JCSE to Charleston as passed by the 1991 Commission.

Warner Robins (Option 1): Close. Move the F-15, avionics, electrical, instruments and part of the software development Depot functions to McClellan; move the C-130, C141 and associated software updates to Kelly; move all helicopter support to Tinker. Move the U.S. AFRES HQ to Dobbins. Close the 9th Missile Warning Squadron. Move the 19th Air Refueling Wing to any base in the Southeast that can absorb the wing. Relocate JSTARS to Tinker. Terminate proposed spending of JSTAR MILCON dollars.

Warner Robins (Option 2): Close and relocate the Depot Functions and HQ AF Reserves and retain the 9th Squadron and the Airlift Wing. Retain 9th Squadron until closure in 1999. Retain 19th Air Refueling Wing at Robins.

Rickenbacker: Move Rickenbacker ANG to Wright Patterson AFB as directed by BRAC 91. Leave Springfield unit at Springfield.

For your information, the following is a list of COBRA runs that have previously been requested by the Commission. The date of request is annotated in parenthesis. Those we have received from the Air Force to date are marked with an asterisk. Again, all will be needed no later than 12:00 noon on June 14, 1993.

A) Griffiss AFB remains open as a bomber base; close Fairchild AFB; move KC-135s to Altus AFB (calculate as if the KC-135 CCTS move from Castle AFB to Altus AFB is approved); move KC-135s (ANG) to Spokane International Airport; move B-52s to Minot AFB and Barksdale AFB (calculate as if the B-52 CCTS move to Barksdale from Castle AFB is approved); move Survival School to the Air Force Academy (May 6 ltr).

B) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Fairchild AFB; move KC-135s to Altus AFB (calculate as if the KC-135 CCTS move from Castle AFB to Altus AFB is approved); move KC-135s (ANG) to Spokane International Airport; move B-52s to K.I. Sawyer AFB (calculate as if the B-52 CCTS move to Barksdale from Castle AFB is approved); move Survival School to the Air Force Academy (May 6 ltr).

C) COBRA cost estimates for the closure of Gentile AFS (April 28 ltr).

* D) Griffiss AFB remains open to host the Northeast Air Mobility Wing; B-52s move to Minot and Barksdale AFBs; realign McGuire AFB; move active C-141s to Griffiss AFB instead of Plattsburgh as recommended by DoD report; close Plattsburgh; move KC-135s to Griffiss AFB; move KC-10s from Barksdale AFB to Griffiss AFB (April 26 ltr).


- E) McGuire AFB remains open to host the Northeast Air Mobility Wing; Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended in the DoD report; close Plattsburgh AFB; move KC-135s to McGuire AFB; move KC-10s from Barksdale AFB to McGuire (April 26 ltr). Please note that the initial request, which was later corrected via phone conversation, had the KC-10s moving from Barksdale to Plattsburgh.
- F) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Minot AFB; move the B-52s and KC-135s to K.I. Sawyer; move the MM IIIs to Malmstrom AFB (April 26 ltr).
- G) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Grand Forks AFB; move B-1s to Ellsworth AFB; move KC-135s to K.I. Sawyer AFB; move MM IIIs to Malmstrom AFB (April 26 ltr).
- H) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Cannon AFB; move the F-111s to K.I. Sawyer AFB (April 26 ltr).
- I) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Seymour-Johnson; move F-15Es and KC-10s to K.I. Sawyer AFB (April 26 ltr).
- J) K.I. Sawyer AFB remains open; close Cannon AFB and Seymour-Johnson AFBs; move F-111s, F-15Es, and KC-10s to K.I. Sawyer AFB (April 26 ltr).
- K) The Air National Guard alert detachment returns to Homestead AFB (April 12 ltr).
- L) The alert detachment and the 482 Fighter Wing returns to Homestead AFB (April 12 ltr).
- M) In addition to the above, the 301 Rescue Squadron returns to Homestead AFB (April 12 ltr).
- N) The 482-Fighter Wing returns to Homestead AFB and assumes the alert commitment instead of the Air National Guard Detachment (April 12 ltr).
- O) The 482 Wing returns to Homestead AFB operating the KC-135 (April 12 ltr).

P) Develop Griffiss AFB as the east coast mobility base (April 7 ltr).

Q) Retain Rome Lab at Griffiss and operate the airfield in a standby status (April 7 ltr).

R) Compare costs to establish/operate Plattsburgh AFB plus Griffiss AFB in standby status and Rome Lab with the cost of closing Plattsburgh and establishing/operating Griffiss AFB as the east coast mobility base (April 7 ltr).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim Courter". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "J".

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo

Document Separator



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 1, 1993

Michael J. O'Neil
Counsel
House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee
H-226 Capitol Building
Washington D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. O'Neil:

As promised, attached are the letters requesting additional information from the Air Force concerning large aircraft bases and the responses we have received to date. (Atch 1) Also, we have highlighted how Fairchild AFB compares with the other large aircraft bases by Commission staff criteria in the areas of bomber and tanker military area. (Atch 2) If you have any questions about the attached information or anything else, please feel free to call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Matthew P. Behrmann".

MATTHEW BEHRMANN
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Document Separator



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

June 2, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installation)
Department of the Air Force
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
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ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

Please refer to this number
when responding 932603-3


Dear Mr. Boatright:


After reviewing the Air Force's detailed analysis and answering questions from the community, the Commission has the following questions for the Air Force:

- (1) If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, how does the Air Force plan to keep the runway open to support Fort Drum operations?
- (2) If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what are the one-time-costs to establish and/or modify the facilities and runway at Griffiss to support Fort Drum operations?
- (3) If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what will be the annual recurring costs to keep the runway open for Fort Drum support?
- (4) If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what will be the annual all-inclusive recurring costs of all the facilities located within the cantonment area?
- (5) If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what portion of the annual recurring costs will be to keep the Rome Lab open as a stand-alone facility?
- (6) If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what portion of the annual recurring costs will be to keep the North East Air Defense Sector open?

We regret the short suspense, but we require the information asked above to be provided to us no later than June 11, 1993. Thank you very much for all your support.

Sincerely,


JIM COURTER
Chairman


Jaulog
TRACK

jac:cirillo

Document Separator



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

14 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1660

EXCERPTS #?

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman

This is in response to your letter dated 2 Jun 93, (ref # 9300603-3) requesting additional information about Griffiss Air Force Base (AFB). The specific questions you have asked involve items that we normally address and finalize later in our process. During our initial analysis, we depended on the knowledge and judgement of experts and the COBRA model. Best available answers to your questions follow:

Question 1: If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, how does the Air Force plan to keep the runway open to support Fort Drum operations?

Answer: Operational plans have not been finalized for the post realignment minimum essential runway operations at Griffiss. Key information has been obtained from site surveys and discussions, but we need to fully analyze all options and do detailed costing before a final execution plan is developed. Excerpt from a site survey is attached.

Question 2: If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what are the one-time-costs to establish and/or modify the facilities and runway at Griffiss to support Fort Drum operations?

Answer: An initial site survey was accomplished to establish facility requirements and resulting costs to support Fort Drum operations. One-time costs of \$81,000 have been identified to date. We have not completed our analysis of all requirements. Therefore, this number could go up, but we are confident that the overall cost will be modest.

Question 3: If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what will be the annual recurring costs to keep the runway open for Fort Drum operations?

Answer: A rough estimate of \$1.1 million has been provided by the 416th Civil Engineering Squadron at Griffiss AFB on expected recurring costs to keep the runway in a minimum essential status. I must stress that this number is rough. Additional analyses and planning

will be needed before a reliable estimate can be made. However, we are confident that this activity and all other activities to be retained at Griffiss after realignment can be supported within the operating budget retained.

Question 4: If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what will be the annual all-inclusive recurring costs of all the facilities located within the cantonment?

Answer: HQ ACC provided a rough estimate on recurring costs of \$11.8 million. I must stress that this number is rough. A projected all-inclusive recurring cost is hard to define until final determination is made as to what facilities will be retained. This process normally takes several months. However, I must tell you that the rough number provided is based on DoD performing all required maintenance. In the end, it may be more cost effective to contract for facility maintenance. We have retained an operating budget of approximately \$25 million for the activities that will remain. This is a very conservative retention and we expect that once implementation plans are completed, we will not need all of this budget. Therefore, overall savings for this proposed realignment will likely increase.

Question 5: If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what portion of the annual recurring costs will be to keep the Rome Lab open as a stand-alone facility?


Answer: HQ ACC provided a rough estimate on recurring costs of \$10.2 million. I must stress that this number is rough. However, we are confident that this activity and all other activities to be retained at Griffiss after realignment can be supported within the operating budget retained.

Question 6: If Griffiss AFB realigns as recommended by DoD, what portion of the annual recurring costs will be to keep the North East Air Defense Sector open?

Answer: HQ ACC provided a rough estimate on recurring costs of \$0.5 million. I must stress that this number is rough. However, we are confident that this activity and all other activities to be retained at Griffiss after realignment can be supported within the operating budget retained.

I hope this information is useful.

Sincerely



JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Atch
Excerpt, HQ ACC/XPPB 26-30 Apr 93 Site Survey, pp. 2-6

INTRODUCTION

1. HQ ACC/XPPB led a facilities site survey at Griffiss AFB NY on 25-30 Apr 93. The survey team was composed of representatives from HQ USAF, HQ ACC, HQ AFSPACECOM, HQ AFMC, ANGRG, 152 ACG, 416 BW, Rome Laboratory, NEADS, 1st SPSS and 10th Mountain Division.

a. The purpose of this survey was to identify facility requirements/costs associated with the realignment of Griffiss AFB as directed by the Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations for Base Realignments and Closure Round III.

SPECIFICALLY:

(1) Propose a cantonment area for Rome Laboratory in existing facilities as a stand alone Air Force Lab.

(2) Propose a cantonment area for the North East Air Defense Sector to be run by the ANG.

(3) Identify replacement facilities (if required) for the 1st SPSS eliminated by the realignment of Griffiss AFB.

(4) Identify minimum essential requirements for a contractor to run the airfield on an "as needed, as required basis".

(5) Identify the necessary facilities to support the mobility/contingency/training of the 10th Infantry Division located at Fort Drum NY (operated by ANG when needed).

b. The following assumptions were made to establish a baseline to conduct the following site survey.

(1) Rome Lab:

(a) Facilities at Rome Lab annexes will not be impacted by the realignment of Griffiss AFB. Services provided by the 416 BW (Host) will be reviewed by the owning MAJCOM.

(b) No airfield operations (ILS/RAPCON/TOWER/RUNWAY) required.

(2) NEADS:

(a) Results of the NORAD consolidation study were not known for the site survey. Based on this fact the site survey assumes NEADS remains in existing facilities, runs a 24 hour scope operation, and the ANG will take over operations.

(b) No airfield operations (ILS/RAPCON/TOWER/RUNWAY) required.

(3) 1st SPSS:

(a) 1st SPSS will remain in existing facilities and not be effected by the realignment of Griffiss AFB.

(b) Services provided by 416 BW will be renegotiated through Host Tenant Support Agreements.

(4) Minimum Essential Airfield:

(a) Rwy 15/33 - Entire length of runway retained, with overruns at both ends. To have use of this runway, it will need to be maintained in all weather conditions. Snow removal efforts cannot be delayed; if drifts and ice layers are allowed to develop, it will be impossible to clear the runway in time for its use within N-hour constraints. Minimum maintenance required will be driven by mission requirements.

(b) Taxiways - All of the parallel taxiway (TW 8), and the hammerheads at both ends (TW 7 & 12), a single stub midfield (TW 10), the ramp area adjacent and surrounding Bldgs 101 and 100 (TW 16) needs to be retained sufficient to handle a C-141 equivalent MOG of 7. Also, TW 17 parallelling the ramp, and three stubs to connect the ramp to the parallels (TW 14, 15 & 18). Approximately half of TW 20 needs to be retained for isolated HAZMAT parking and handling.

(c) Airfield Lighting - Runway lighting to ensure the lowest current weather minimums for both runway approaches is recommended. Limfac is whatever civilian airlift contractors required to retain all-weather operation at Griffiss for mobility operations. Ramp lighting adequate; could be augmented as required by portable units.

(d) NAVAIDS - Current NAVAIDS should be retained and maintained, to include continuous certification, to the minimum level required for civilian airlift all-weather operations.

(e) ATC Services - Because of required 20-minute separation interval for IFR arrivals in non-radar environment, recommend radar approach control be retained, along with tower on-call to support Army mobility operations.

(f) Crash/Fire/Rescue - Should be retained, and sized based on heavy airlift aircraft. Our understanding is that CFR will be retained at Griffiss.

(g) Security - Only a skeleton security component would be required when not on mobility. Beefed up security would be required with airlift assets on the ground; mobilizing Army personnel cannot routinely provide for armed security because their weapons are cleared in preparation for transport and the ammunition stowed separately.

(h) Base Ops/Wx Services - To be handled via telephone/FAX remote to either FAA or tasked to nearby military facility.

(i) Transient Alert (Parking/refueling/minor MX) - No provider currently identified. Could be provided by airfield contractor.

(j) Aerospace Ground Equipment (powered and non-powered, military and commercial) - Operating and maintaining this equipment would be a function either provided by host or via contractor.

(k) Fuels - A small area including Bldg 772 and surrounding facilities needs to be retained to handle fuel storage, testing, handling and truck filling, and R-9 fueler parking. Concept of operations calls for all fuel to be trucked, avoiding the expense of maintaining and operating the alert ramp hydrant system.

(l) Vehicle Maintenance - A certain amount of transport vehicles over and above the AGE requirement will need to be maintained. Possible providers include host, contractor, or deployed Army detachment for mobility periods.

(m) Airfield Management (to include services coordination, grounds maintenance, snow removal, contract management, and other caretaker roles) - Provider not yet determined. Should AFMC become host, these services could be handled by them. At a minimum, a Government rep needs to be posted to monitor the contractor on a daily basis, given the level of services which will probably be contracted.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. HQ ACC/XPPB led a facilities site survey at Griffiss AFB on 26-30 Apr 93. The purpose of this survey was to:
 - a. Propose a cantonment area for Rome Lab in existing facilities as a stand alone Air Force lab.
 - b. Prepare a cantonment area for the North East Air Defense Sector to be run by the ANG.
 - c. Identify replacement facilities (if required) for the 1st SPSS eliminated by the realignment of Griffiss AFB.
 - d. Identify "minimum essential" requirement for a contractor to run the airfield on an "as needed, as required basis".
 - e. Identify the necessary facilities to support the mobility, contingency, training of the 10th Infantry Division (operated by the ANG).

2. Rome Lab:

With the proposed inactivation of the 416 BW many functions provided by the wing need to be assumed by Rome Lab to make there organization a stand alone Air Force laboratory. Many of these costs involve modifications to buildings which will now provide functions previously performed by the 416 BW. The proposed cantonment area assumes fire support, use of existing steam plant and vehicle/equipment fuel requirements can be contracted through the caretaker contractor.

3. NEADS:

The majority of costs associated with the proposed cantonment area involve the transition of this mission to the ANG. These costs are incurred due to the training and recruiting involved in going from a one-third full time to a two-thirds full time ANG. This transition is required to complete the mission.

4. 10th Infantry Division:

10th Infantry Division N-hour mobility tasking drives contractor airfield requirements. This tasking will require a contractor to maintain a daily presence at Griffiss AFB, especially during winter months when snowfall accumulations are significant. ANG assistance in 10th Infantry Division Mobilization appears impractical due to their inability to meet N-hour tasking.

10th Infantry Division facility/equipment requirements were reviewed during this site survey. Proposed facilities consolidate their requirements in two ramp side hangars. These hangars provide the necessary room to house equipment previously stored in 416 BW facilities.

5. Summary:

The proposed cantonment area will need to be coordinated closely with the inactivation of the 416 BW. Many assets required to ensure these organizations continue to function after the Bomb Wing inactivation can be sourced at Griffiss AFB. Although some costs are absorbed by BRAC funds each organization will require an increase in O&M funds.

There are some base projects (i.e. runway sealant) where funding is being held or not available pending an outcome of the BRAC Round III process. These projects will need to be reviewed by Griffiss AFB personnel in conjunction with MAJCOM functional area personnel.

Site survey team members wish to express their thanks to the men and women of the 416 BW for their superb support during this survey. A special thanks to SSgt Lesa Dubois from the 416 MSS and Ms Julie Reis from the 416 LSS for their assistance in the preparation of this report.

Document Separator



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: April 14, 1993

TO: James Boatright
(info copy to Col. Jim Casey)

FAX #: 37568 (39707)

FROM: Frank Cirillo

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 3

COMMENTS: Attached please find our letter of June 4, 1993. In it, we requested COBRA runs for specific scenarios. In order to produce Personnel Movement Reports, we would like the disks your team used to produce the output you provided to us. Per Lt. Col. Trask's telephone conversation with one of my staff members, Jennifer Atkin, we expect to receive this disk in our office sometime tomorrow morning (June 15th). This request was also confirmed by phone with Lt. Col. Thompson.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Frank Cirillo".



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
 1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
 ARLINGTON, VA 22209
 703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
 CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
 BEVERLY B. BYRON
 REBECCA G. COX
 GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
 ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
 HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
 ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 4, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
 for Installations
 Department of the Air Force
 Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20330

Please refer to this number
 when responding 930604-24

Dear Mr. Boatright:

Staff members from the Base Closure Working Group met with Commission staff to discuss the COBRA requests noted in my June 1, 1993 letter. As a result of the superb input and advice garnered from that meeting, we request that the following COBRA products be provided, in lieu of those requested in the letter. Please provide the following runs to the Commission no later than 12:00 noon on June 14, 1993:

LARGE AIRCRAFT BASES

BASE	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3	OPTION 4
FAIRCHILD	*	*		*
GRAND FORKS	*	*	*	
GRIFFISS	*			*
KI SAWYER	*	*	*	
MARCH				*
MCGUIRE	choose 1 to close	choose 1 to close	choose 2 to close	choose 1 to close
PLATTSBURGH				

* = close

DEPOTS

Update level runs for Robins, Tinker and Kelly. Also include a "level run" on Robins, Tinker and Kelly depot only closing. The following matrix of options will allow the staff to present other options to include closing or retaining McClellan AFB.

BASE	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3	OPTION 4	OPTION 5	OPTION 6
MCCLELLAN	*	*	*	*	*	*
ROBINS	*					
ROBINS (DEPOT ONLY)		*				
TINKER			*			
TINKER (DEPOT ONLY)				*		
KELLY					*	
KELLY (DEPOT ONLY)						*


* = close

OTHER

Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 1): Keep Bergstrom AFB cantonment area open. Move the 301st Fighter Wing from Carswell AFB to the Bergstrom AFB cantonment area.

Please express our thanks to the staff at the Base Closure Working Group for meeting with us and assisting us in clarifying our request.

Sincerely,



JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo

Document Separator



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

18 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1660

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter

The attached COBRA estimates were accomplished as requested in your June 4, 1993 letter. The time to do this is compressed, compared to that of the original analyses, but costing of the additional options has been accomplished to the best of our ability. Where force structure realignments were involved, the beddown followed the same guidelines the Air Force applied in the COBRA models on which the Air Force recommendations were based. Site surveys and additional analysis would be required to validate these estimates. These estimates are more comparable to our level playing field process than to the expanded analysis underlying our recommendations.

The Air Force strongly disagrees with the identification of Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB as alternatives or additional candidates for closure or realignments. Fairchild AFB has significantly greater military value than the bases recommended for closure. Fairchild AFB as a Northwest tanker base is essential for our warfighting posture in the Pacific. I will support major Pacific contingency response, such as defense of Korea. Its Northwest location is ideally suited to support major deployment refueling routes in the Pacific. The closure of Grand Forks AFB and the associated missile field would be premature. The OSD bottom-up review on the ICBM force mix is not final. We therefore recommend keeping four missile fields for flexibility due to START uncertainties. The closure of Grand Forks could open ABM Treaty issues since it is the only location in the United States where the treaty permits deployment of an ABM system. The Air Force will readdress missile bases in BRAC 95.

The Air Force strongly disagrees with using the 1987 baseline to compute excess depot capacity. That baseline has major flaws. In particular, it does not account for personnel and facility reductions between 1987 and 1991. Our analysis concluded that all depot's except

McClellan were cost-prohibitive to close. These COBRA estimates reinforce that analysis. Also, our analysis accurately portrays the military value of Air Force depot bases relative to each other. McClellan was the lowest. I urge the Commission to wait before cutting too deep in Air Force depots. Let DoD finish its "bottom-up review", then evaluate all DoD depots against better defined requirements.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James F. Boatright". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and "B".

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT


Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Atch

DBCRC Requested COBRAs

OPTION I

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



* POTENTIAL RECEIVER SITES WOULD HAVE TO BE SURVEYED BEFORE SITE SELECTION, HOWEVER, GENERIC COSTING IS AVAILABLE.

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF FAIRCHILD

FAIRCHILD HAS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER MILITARY VALUE THAN THE BASES RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE

LARGE N.W. TANKER BASE ESSENTIAL FOR WARFIGHTING POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC --SUPPORTS MAJOR PACIFIC CONTINGENCY RESPONSE (ex: OPLAN 5027--DEFENSE OF KOREA)

FAIRCHILD IS THE BEST NORTHWEST BASE (GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, CAPACITY, INFRASTRUCTURE) TO SATISFY REGIONAL TANKER REQUIREMENTS

IDEALLY LOCATED CLOSE TO MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REFUELING ROUTES

BASE INFRASTRUCTURE (RAMP, HYDRANTS, FACILITIES, LARGE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS STORAGE) IDEAL FOR LARGE TANKER/BOMBER BEDDOWN


	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	409.4		
OTHER	45.9		
TOTAL	455.3	-37.6	20 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: KC-135 AND B-52 CCTS REDIRECT IS APPROVED. DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE MODE (ALREADY FENCED).

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION I

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS

CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS AND ASSOCIATED MISSILE FIELD PREMATURE:

-- OSD BOTTOM UP REVIEW NOT FINAL ON ICBM FORCE MIX, CURRENTLY RECOMMENDS KEEPING FOUR MISSILE FIELDS FOR FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES

CLOSURE COULD OPEN ISSUES WITH RUSSIANS (IF U.S. ELECTED TO MOVE ABM SYSTEM WHICH IS TIED BY TREATY TO GRAND FORKS MISSILE FIELD)


MUST MAINTAIN FOUR MISSILE FIELDS TO RETAIN DESIRED FLEXIBILITY; AIR FORCE WILL READDRESS IN BRAC 95

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	50.8		
OTHER	39.7		
TOTAL	90.5	-65.9	IMMEDIATE

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION I



BEDDOWN LOCATIONS ARE DRIVEN BY ADDITIONAL BASE CLOSINGS BEING REVIEWED BY THE DBCRC AND DO NOT REPRESENT OPTIMUM CHOICES.

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF GRIFFISS

AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

GRIFFISS RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS--BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

RATED LOWER THAN PLATTSBURGH AND MCGUIRE IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

USAF WILL MAINTAIN ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE 10TH INFANTRY (LIGHT) DIVISION -- AIRFIELD REMAINS IN STANDBY STATUS

THE NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND ROME LAB REMAIN

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	134.0		
OTHER	55.1		
TOTAL	189.1	-39.4	5 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NEADS REMAINS. ROME LAB REMAINS. 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION I



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE CLOSURE OF KI SAWYER

AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN ICBM BASING FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES--FOUR MISSILE FIELDS REQUIRED

MORE ECONOMICAL TO OPERATE A BOMBER/MISSILE BASE THAN A BOMBER ONLY-BASE


KI SAWYER RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	106.5		
OTHER	37.1		
TOTAL	143.6	-46.0	3 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION I



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MCGUIRE AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MCGUIRE RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MCGUIRE EVALUATED AGAINST PLATTSBURGH IN HEAD-TO-HEAD ANALYSIS AS THE SITE FOR EAST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING

PLATTSBURGH BEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

FAA LONG -STANDING REQUEST FOR CIVIL USE OF MCGUIRE TO EASE REGIONAL CONGESTION (NEW YORK/PHILADELPHIA)


	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION II

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



* POTENTIAL RECEIVER SITES WOULD HAVE TO BE SURVEYED BEFORE SITE SELECTION, HOWEVER, GENERIC COSTING IS AVAILABLE.

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF FAIRCHILD

FAIRCHILD HAS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER MILITARY VALUE THAN THE BASES RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE

LARGE N.W. TANKER BASE ESSENTIAL FOR WARFIGHTING POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC --SUPPORTS MAJOR PACIFIC CONTINGENCY RESPONSE (ex: OPLAN 5027--DEFENSE OF KOREA)

FAIRCHILD IS THE BEST NORTHWEST BASE (GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, CAPACITY, INFRASTRUCTURE) TO SATISFY REGIONAL TANKER REQUIREMENTS

IDEALLY LOCATED CLOSE TO MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REFUELING ROUTES

BASE INFRASTRUCTURE (RAMP, HYDRANTS, FACILITIES, LARGE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS STORAGE) IDEAL FOR LARGE TANKER/BOMBER BEDDOWN


	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	419.2		
OTHER	45.3		
TOTAL	464.5	-39.3	20 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: KC-135 AND B-52 CCTS REDIRECT IS APPROVED. DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE MODE (ALREADY FENCED). 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION II

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS

CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS AND ASSOCIATED MISSILE FIELD PREMATURE:

-- OSD BOTTOM UP REVIEW NOT FINAL ON ICBM FORCE MIX, CURRENTLY RECOMMENDS KEEPING FOUR MISSILE FIELDS FOR FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES

CLOSURE COULD OPEN ISSUES WITH RUSSIANS (IF U.S. ELECTED TO MOVE ABM SYSTEM WHICH IS TIED BY TREATY TO GRAND FORKS MISSILE FIELD)

MUST MAINTAIN FOUR MISSILE FIELDS TO RETAIN DESIRED FLEXIBILITY; AIR FORCE WILL READDRESS IN BRAC 95

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	38.7		
OTHER	40.6		
TOTAL	79.3	-65.8	IMMEDIATE

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: 940th REDIRECT TO BEALE APPROVED.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION II



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE CLOSURE OF KI SAWYER

AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN ICBM BASING FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES--FOUR MISSILE FIELDS REQUIRED

MORE ECONOMICAL TO OPERATE A BOMBER/MISSILE BASE THAN A BOMBER ONLY-BASE


KI SAWYER RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	106.5		
OTHER	37.1		
TOTAL	143.6	-46.0	3 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION II



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MCGUIRE AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MCGUIRE RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MCGUIRE EVALUATED AGAINST PLATTSBURGH IN HEAD-TO-HEAD ANALYSIS AS THE SITE FOR EAST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING

PLATTSBURGH BEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

FAA LONG -STANDING REQUEST FOR CIVIL USE OF MCGUIRE TO EASE REGIONAL CONGESTION (NEW YORK/PHILADELPHIA)


	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION III

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS

CLOSURE OF GRAND FORKS AND ASSOCIATED MISSILE FIELD PREMATURE:

-- OSD BOTTOM UP REVIEW NOT FINAL ON ICBM FORCE MIX, CURRENTLY RECOMMENDS KEEPING FOUR MISSILE FIELDS FOR FLEXIBILITY DUE TO START II UNCERTAINTIES

CLOSURE COULD OPEN ISSUES WITH RUSSIANS (IF U.S. ELECTED TO MOVE ABM SYSTEM WHICH IS TIED BY TREATY TO GRAND FORKS MISSILE FIELD)


MUST MAINTAIN FOUR MISSILE FIELDS TO RETAIN DESIRED FLEXIBILITY; AIR FORCE WILL READDRESS IN BRAC 95

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	50.8		
OTHER	39.7		
TOTAL	90.5	-65.9	IMMEDIATE

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION III



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MCGUIRE AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASE THAN NEEDED)

MCGUIRE RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MCGUIRE EVALUATED AGAINST PLATTSBURGH IN HEAD-TO-HEAD ANALYSIS AS THE SITE FOR EAST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING
PLATTSBURGH BEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

FAA LONG-STANDING REQUEST FOR CIVIL USE OF MCGUIRE TO EASE REGIONAL CONGESTION (NEW YORK/PHILADELPHIA)

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION III



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MARCH AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MARCH RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MARCH ANALYZED WITH TRAVIS, BEALE, FAIRCHILD, MCCHORD AND MALMSTROM AS SITE FOR WEST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING

TRAVIS RANKS HIGHEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES


	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	116.4		
OTHER	18.4		
TOTAL	134.8	-46.9	2 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION IV

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



* POTENTIAL RECEIVER SITES WOULD HAVE TO BE SURVEYED BEFORE SITE SELECTION, HOWEVER, GENERIC COSTING IS AVAILABLE.

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF FAIRCHILD

FAIRCHILD HAS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER MILITARY VALUE THAN THE BASES RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE

LARGE N.W. TANKER BASE ESSENTIAL FOR WARFIGHTING POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC --SUPPORTS MAJOR PACIFIC CONTINGENCY RESPONSE (ex: OPLAN 5027--DEFENSE OF KOREA)

FAIRCHILD IS THE BEST NORTHWEST BASE (GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, CAPACITY, INFRASTRUCTURE) TO SATISFY REGIONAL TANKER REQUIREMENTS

IDEALLY LOCATED CLOSE TO MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REFUELING ROUTES


BASE INFRASTRUCTURE (RAMP, HYDRANTS, FACILITIES, LARGE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS STORAGE) IDEAL FOR LARGE TANKER/BOMBER BEDDOWN

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	363.8		
OTHER	45.3		
TOTAL	409.1	-33.6	20 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: KC-135 AND B-52 CCTS REDIRECT IS APPROVED. DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE MODE (ALREADY FENCED). 940th ALREADY LOCATED AT BEALE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION IV



BEDDOWN LOCATIONS ARE DRIVEN BY ADDITIONAL BASE CLOSINGS DICTATED BY THE DBCRC AND DO NOT REPRESENT OPTIMUM CHOICES.

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF GRIFFISS

AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

GRIFFISS RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS--BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

RATED LOWER THAN PLATTSBURGH AND MCGUIRE IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

USAF WILL MAINTAIN ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE 10TH INFANTRY (LIGHT) DIVISION -- AIRFIELD REMAINS IN STANDBY STATUS


THE NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND ROME LAB REMAIN

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	55.9		
OTHER	57.1		
TOTAL	114.3	-38.9	2 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NEADS REMAINS. ROME LAB REMAINS.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

OPTION IV



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MCGUIRE AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MCGUIRE RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MCGUIRE EVALUATED AGAINST PLATTSBURGH IN HEAD-TO-HEAD ANALYSIS AS THE SITE FOR EAST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING
PLATTSBURGH BEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES

FAA LONG -STANDING REQUEST FOR CIVIL USE OF MCGUIRE TO EASE REGIONAL CONGESTION (NEW YORK/PHILADELPHIA)

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	164.4		
OTHER	33.1		
TOTAL	197.5	-89.0	4 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

OPTION IV



THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS THE REALIGNMENT OF MARCH AFB

THE AIR FORCE HAS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LARGE AIRCRAFT CATEGORY (FOUR TO FIVE MORE BASES THAN NEEDED)

MARCH RANKED LOW COMPARED TO OTHER LARGE AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS -- BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA

MARCH ANALYZED WITH TRAVIS, BEALE, FAIRCHILD, MCCHORD AND MALMSTROM AS SITE FOR WEST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING
TRAVIS RANKS HIGHEST IN AIR MOBILITY WING ATTRIBUTES


	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	116.4		
OTHER	18.4		
TOTAL	134.8	-46.9	2 YRS

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE

NOTE: SAME AS SECDEF RECOMMENDATION.

DEPOTS

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSURES



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF ROBINS AFB .

ROBINS RANKED HIGHER THAN MCCLELLAN AGAINST THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA.

ROBINS SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

EXACERBATES TANKER SHORTFALL IN THE SOUTHEAST U.S.

COST OF CLOSURE OF ROBINS AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO MCCLELLAN MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH ROBINS AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	799.7		
OTHER	1,172.8		
TOTAL	1,972.5	-146.6	40 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: 9 SPACE WARNING SQUADRON (PAVE PAWS) REMAINS IN STAND-ALONE FACILITIES.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

**ROBINS
(ALC ONLY)**

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF WR-ALC.

WR-ALC SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF WR-ALC AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO SM-ALC MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS AND REDUCES SAVINGS FROM WORKFORCE CONSOLIDATION EFFICIENCIES.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH ROBINS AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	558.2		
OTHER	1,126.0		
TOTAL	1,684.2	-124.6	73 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.


COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

DEPOTS

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF TINKER AFB .

TINKER RANKED HIGHER THAN MCCLELLAN AGAINST THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA.

TINKER SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF TINKER, REALIGNMENT OF WORKLOAD, AND MOVEMENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE (ESPECIALLY AWACS AND TACAMO) IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO MCCLELLAN MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH TINKER AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	1,185.5		
OTHER	1,247.5		
TOTAL	2,433.0	-158.3	100+ YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSURES

**TINKER
(ALC ONLY)**

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF OC-ALC.

OC-ALC SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF OC-ALC AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO SM-ALC MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS AND REDUCES SAVINGS FROM WORKFORCE CONSOLIDATION EFFICIENCIES.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH OC-ALC AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS USAF EXCESS CAPACITY.

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	549.5		
OTHER	1,175.3		
TOTAL	1,724.8	-135.6	33 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.


COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL



THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF KELLY AFB .

KELLY RANKED HIGHER THAN MCCLELLAN AGAINST THE EIGHT DOD CRITERIA.

KELLY SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF KELLY AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO MCCLELLAN MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH KELLY AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	910.4		
OTHER	1,261.4		
TOTAL	2,171.8	-178.3	23 YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: AFIC HQ AND UNITS REMAIN. ARC F-16 REMAIN IN CANTONMENT. AFRES C-5s REMAIN IN CANTONMENT. KELLY PORTIONS OF IAAFA REMAIN IN CANTONMENT.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

DEPOTS

NOT AN AIR FORCE PROPOSAL

COMMISSION ASSUMES
MCCLELLAN CLOSES

**KELLY
(ALC ONLY)**

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF SA-ALC.

SA-ALC RANKED HIGHER THAN SM-ALC.

SA-ALC SUPPORTS ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM, ENGINE REQUIREMENTS, AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE OF SA-ALC AND REALIGNMENT OF MISSION WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

CLOSURE OF A SECOND MAJOR DEPOT IN ADDITION TO SM-ALC MAGNIFIES CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT COSTS AND REDUCES SAVINGS FROM WORKFORCE CONSOLIDATION EFFICIENCIES.

THE AIR FORCE HAS AN EXCESS CAPACITY OF 8.7 MILLION DPAH. MCCLELLAN AND NEWARK CLOSURES ELIMINATE 8.0 MILLION DPAH OF CAPACITY. CLOSING BOTH KELLY AND MCCLELLAN EXCEEDS OUR EXCESS CAPACITY.

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>	<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
MILCON	707.4		
OTHER	1,363.1		
TOTAL	2,070.5	-136.7	100+ YRS

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

COBRA ASSUMPTIONS: NONE.

NOTE: COSTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY SITE SURVEYS. (SEE COVER LETTER.)

Document Separator



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1660

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman

The attached COBRA printouts and data files are provided as you requested in your June 4, 1993 letter. They supplement the information provided you on June 14, 1993.

We have provided COBRA files for your requested "level run" on Robins, Tinker and Kelly, both for the complete installation and for the ALC only closing.

We have not included a COBRA run on Bergstrom/Carswell (Option 1) since Carswell was not included as a potential closure candidate in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission press release.

We hope this information will help you with your analysis.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

- Attachments
1. COBRA disk
 2. COBRA output
 3. Summary

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Group : DEPOT
 Service : USAF
 Option Package : Kelly closure

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2094+ (Year 101+)
 ROI Year : 2100+ (100+ Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) : 352,044
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) :1,203,747

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	42	127	-9,139	-23,575
Ovhd	-4,571	-47,175	-47,306	-45,412	-40,384	-31,364	-36,413
Cons	45,129	147,065	75,007	86,301	-8,352	0	0
Movg	11,020	99,999	55,110	75,096	73,076	64,471	0
Othr	7,500	15,010	37,630	88,755	125,083	104,841	0
TOT	59,078	214,899	120,441	204,782	149,551	128,809	-59,989

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	80	80
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	268	268
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	221	221
PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS							
Officers	0	0	0	33	68	647	748
Enlisted	0	0	0	126	251	3,126	3,503
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT MIL	0	0	0	159	319	3,773	4,251
Civilian	0	0	0	2,282	4,564	7,184	14,030
TOTAL	0	0	0	2,441	4,883	10,957	18,281

Summary:

 Close Kelly: F-16, C-5, IAFFA, and AFIC remain

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars							
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	42	127	1,148	1,148
Ovhd	-4,571	-47,175	-47,306	-45,412	-40,384	-31,364	-36,413
Cons	73,310	168,815	84,407	92,081	4,588	0	0
Movg	11,020	99,999	55,110	75,410	73,706	65,539	0
Othr	7,500	15,010	37,630	88,755	125,083	104,841	0
TOT	87,259	236,649	129,841	210,876	163,121	140,164	-35,264

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars							
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	0	0	10,287	24,724
Ovhd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cons	28,181	21,750	9,400	5,780	12,940	0	0
Movg	0	0	0	314	630	1,068	0
Othr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	28,181	21,750	9,400	6,094	13,570	11,355	24,724

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	2,282	-2,282
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	126	-126
	+ Officers	0	33	-33

	Total	0	2,441	-2,441
1998:	Civilians	0	4,564	-4,564
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	251	-251
	+ Officers	0	68	-68

	Total	0	4,883	-4,883
1999:	Civilians	0	7,184	-7,184
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	3,126	-3,126
	+ Officers	0	647	-647

	Total	0	10,957	-10,957
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	14,030	-14,030
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	3,503	-3,503
	+ Officers	0	748	-748

	Total	0	18,281	-18,281

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Tinker, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,620	0	1,620
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	89	0	89
	+ Officers	24	0	24

	Total	1,733	0	1,733
1998:	Civilians	3,240	0	3,240
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	178	0	178
	+ Officers	48	0	48

	Total	3,466	0	3,466
1999:	Civilians	3,240	0	3,240
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	177	0	177
	+ Officers	49	0	49

	Total	3,466	0	3,466
TOTAL:	Civilians	8,100	0	8,100
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	444	0	444
	+ Officers	121	0	121

	Total	8,665	0	8,665

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 3
 Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Hill, UT		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	160	0	160
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	9	0	9
	+ Officers	2	0	2
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	171	0	171
1998:	Civilians	320	0	320
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	18	0	18
	+ Officers	5	0	5
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	343	0	343
1999:	Civilians	319	0	319
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	5	0	5
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	341	0	341
TOTAL:	Civilians	799	0	799
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	44	0	44
	+ Officers	12	0	12
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	855	0	855

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 4
 Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Robins, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	502	0	502
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	28	0	28
	+ Officers	7	0	7

	Total	537	0	537
1998:	Civilians	1,004	0	1,004
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	55	0	55
	+ Officers	15	0	15

	Total	1,074	0	1,074
1999:	Civilians	1,004	0	1,004
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	55	0	55
	+ Officers	15	0	15

	Total	1,074	0	1,074
TOTAL:	Civilians	2,510	0	2,510
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	138	0	138
	+ Officers	37	0	37

	Total	2,685	0	2,685

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 5
 Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Lackland, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	2,363	0	2,363
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2,708	0	2,708
	+ Officers	524	0	524

	Total	5,595	0	5,595
TOTAL:	Civilians	2,363	0	2,363
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2,708	0	2,708
	+ Officers	524	0	524

	Total	5,595	0	5,595

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 6
 Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Base X		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	258	0	258
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	169	0	169
	+ Officers	54	0	54

	Total	481	0	481
TOTAL:	Civilians	258	0	258
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	169	0	169
	+ Officers	54	0	54

	Total	481	0	481

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 7
 Data As Of 14:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:46 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	828	0	-828
Enlisted	3,771	0	-3,771
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,599	0	-4,599
Civilians	14,251	0	-14,251
TOTAL	18,850	0	-18,850

Tinker, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,413	1,534	+121
Enlisted	5,576	6,020	+444
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	6,989	7,554	+565
Civilians	11,476	19,576	+8,100
TOTAL	18,465	27,130	+8,665

Hill, UT			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	582	594	+12
Enlisted	3,558	3,602	+44
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,140	4,196	+56
Civilians	9,045	9,844	+799
TOTAL	13,185	14,040	+855

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 8
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Robins, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	725	762	+37
Enlisted	3,025	3,163	+138
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,750	3,925	+175
Civilians	11,313	13,823	+2,510
TOTAL	15,063	17,748	+2,685

Lackland, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,716	2,240	+524
Enlisted	4,093	6,801	+2,708
Students	3,000	3,000	0
TOTAL MIL	8,809	12,041	+3,232
Civilians	2,740	5,103	+2,363
TOTAL	11,549	17,144	+5,595

Base X			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	569	623	+54
Enlisted	2,475	2,644	+169
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,044	3,267	+223
Civilians	7,843	8,101	+258
TOTAL	10,887	11,368	+481

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Group : DEPOT
 Service : USAF
 Option Package : Close Robins AFB

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2094+ (Year 101+)
 ROI Year : 2100+ (100+ Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) : 589,340
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) : 1,232,701

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars							
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	4,765	4,888	5,140	-5,588	-26,757
Ovhd	690	617	5,833	1,226	-5,648	-14,855	-20,945
Cons	32,111	294,136	65,532	42,232	0	-3,987	0
Movg	10,700	21,410	62,678	73,504	72,144	34,492	0
Othr	7,420	14,840	50,643	83,298	114,658	90,552	0
TOT	50,921	331,003	189,451	205,150	186,294	100,614	-47,703

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	128	128
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	684	684
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS							
Officers	0	0	395	22	44	152	613
Enlisted	0	0	2,004	16	34	331	2,385
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT MIL	0	0	2,399	38	78	483	2,998
Civilian	0	0	561	2,108	4,215	4,428	11,312
TOTAL	0	0	2,960	2,146	4,293	4,911	14,310

Summary:

 Close Robins.

Robins moves:

KC-135 --> Eglin, JSTARS --> Tinker, Pave Paws remains,
 HQ AFRES --> Dobbins Combat Comm --> Base X

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	4,765	4,888	5,140	6,285	6,285
Ovhd	690	617	5,833	1,226	-5,648	-14,855	-20,945
Cons	84,471	319,945	81,440	88,844	0	0	0
Movg	10,700	21,410	67,414	73,579	72,298	35,446	0
Othr	7,420	14,840	50,643	83,298	114,658	90,552	0
TOT	103,281	356,812	210,095	251,837	186,448	117,428	-14,660

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	0	0	11,874	33,043
Ovhd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cons	52,360	25,809	15,908	46,612	0	3,987	0
Movg	0	0	4,736	75	154	953	0
Othr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	52,360	25,809	20,644	46,687	154	16,814	33,043

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

McClellan, CA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,033	0	1,033
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	8	0	8
	+ Officers	11	0	11

	Total	1,052	0	1,052
1998:	Civilians	2,066	0	2,066
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	22	0	22

	Total	2,105	0	2,105
1999:	Civilians	2,065	0	2,065
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,103	0	2,103
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,164	0	5,164
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	42	0	42
	+ Officers	54	0	54

	Total	5,260	0	5,260

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Tinker, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	10	0	10
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	110	0	110
	+ Officers	30	0	30

	Total	150	0	150
1997:	Civilians	21	0	21
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	21	0	21
1998:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	42	0	42
1999:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	44	0	44
TOTAL:	Civilians	115	0	115
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	111	0	111
	+ Officers	31	0	31

	Total	257	0	257

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 3
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Hill, UT		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	42	0	42
1998:	Civilians	84	0	84
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	86	0	86
1999:	Civilians	85	0	85
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	87	0	87
TOTAL:	Civilians	211	0	211
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2	0	2
	+ Officers	2	0	2

	Total	215	0	215

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 4
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,012	0	1,012
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	8	0	8
	+ Officers	11	0	11

	Total	1,031	0	1,031
1998:	Civilians	2,023	0	2,023
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	16	0	16
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,060	0	2,060
1999:	Civilians	2,023	0	2,023
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,061	0	2,061
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,058	0	5,058
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	41	0	41
	+ Officers	53	0	53

	Total	5,152	0	5,152

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 5
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Robins, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	561	-561
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	2,004	-2,004
	+ Officers	0	395	-395

	Total	0	2,960	-2,960
1997:	Civilians	0	2,108	-2,108
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	16	-16
	+ Officers	0	22	-22

	Total	0	2,146	-2,146
1998:	Civilians	0	4,215	-4,215
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	34	-34
	+ Officers	0	44	-44

	Total	0	4,293	-4,293
1999:	Civilians	0	4,428	-4,428
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	331	-331
	+ Officers	0	152	-152

	Total	0	4,911	-4,911
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	11,312	-11,312
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	2,385	-2,385
	+ Officers	0	613	-613

	Total	0	14,310	-14,310

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 6
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Base X		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	40	0	40
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	830	0	830
	+ Officers	28	0	28

	Total	898	0	898
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	213	0	213
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	295	0	295
	+ Officers	108	0	108

	Total	616	0	616
TOTAL:	Civilians	253	0	253
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1,125	0	1,125
	+ Officers	136	0	136

	Total	1,514	0	1,514

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 7
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Eglin, FL		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	35	0	35
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	708	0	708
	+ Officers	189	0	189

	Total	932	0	932
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	35	0	35
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	708	0	708
	+ Officers	189	0	189

	Total	932	0	932

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 8
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Dobbins AFRB, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	476	0	476
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	356	0	356
	+ Officers	148	0	148

	Total	980	0	980
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	476	0	476
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	356	0	356
	+ Officers	148	0	148

	Total	980	0	980

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 9
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

McClellan, CA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	536	590	+54
Enlisted	2,680	2,722	+42
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,216	3,312	+96
Civilians	8,423	13,587	+5,164
TOTAL	11,639	16,899	+5,260

Tinker, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,413	1,444	+31
Enlisted	5,576	5,687	+111
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	6,989	7,131	+142
Civilians	11,476	11,591	+115
TOTAL	18,465	18,722	+257

Hill, UT			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	582	584	+2
Enlisted	3,558	3,560	+2
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,140	4,144	+4
Civilians	9,045	9,256	+211
TOTAL	13,185	13,400	+215

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 10
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	828	881	+53
Enlisted	3,771	3,812	+41
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,599	4,693	+94
Civilians	14,251	19,309	+5,058
TOTAL	18,850	24,002	+5,152

Robins, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	755	14	-741
Enlisted	3,135	66	-3,069
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,890	80	-3,810
Civilians	11,323	11	-11,312
TOTAL	15,213	91	-15,122

Base X			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	569	705	+136
Enlisted	2,475	3,600	+1,125
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,044	4,305	+1,261
Civilians	7,843	8,096	+253
TOTAL	10,887	12,401	+1,514

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 11
Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Eglin, FL			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,529	1,718	+189
Enlisted	6,641	7,349	+708
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	8,170	9,067	+897
Civilians	4,106	4,141	+35
TOTAL	12,276	13,208	+932

Dobbins AFRB, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	189	337	+148
Enlisted	756	1,112	+356
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	945	1,449	+504
Civilians	577	1,053	+476
TOTAL	1,522	2,502	+980

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Group : DEPOT
 Service : USAF
 Option Package : Close Robins AFB

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2094+ (Year 101+)
 ROI Year : 2100+ (100+ Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) : 589,340
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) :1,232,701

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	4,765	4,888	5,140	-5,588	-26,757
Ovhd	690	617	5,833	1,226	-5,648	-14,855	-20,945
Cons	32,111	294,136	65,532	42,232	0	-3,987	0
Movg	10,700	21,410	62,678	73,504	72,144	34,492	0
Othr	7,420	14,840	50,643	83,298	114,658	90,552	0
TOT	50,921	331,003	189,451	205,150	186,294	100,614	-47,703

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	128	128
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	684	684
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS							
Officers	0	0	395	22	44	152	613
Enlisted	0	0	2,004	16	34	331	2,385
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT MIL	0	0	2,399	38	78	483	2,998
Civilian	0	0	561	2,108	4,215	4,428	11,312
TOTAL	0	0	2,960	2,146	4,293	4,911	14,310

Summary:

 Close Robins.

Robins moves:

KC-135 --> Eglin, JSTARS --> Tinker, Pave Paws remains,
 HQ AFRES --> Dobbins Combat Comm --> Base X

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	4,765	4,888	5,140	6,285	6,285
Ovhd	690	617	5,833	1,226	-5,648	-14,855	-20,945
Cons	84,471	319,945	81,440	88,844	0	0	0
Movg	10,700	21,410	67,414	73,579	72,298	35,446	0
Othr	7,420	14,840	50,643	83,298	114,658	90,552	0
TOT	103,281	356,812	210,095	251,837	186,448	117,428	-14,660

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	0	0	11,874	33,043
Ovhd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cons	52,360	25,809	15,908	46,612	0	3,987	0
Movg	0	0	4,736	75	154	953	0
Othr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	52,360	25,809	20,644	46,687	154	16,814	33,043

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

McClellan, CA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,033	0	1,033
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	8	0	8
	+ Officers	11	0	11

	Total	1,052	0	1,052
1998:	Civilians	2,066	0	2,066
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	22	0	22

	Total	2,105	0	2,105
1999:	Civilians	2,065	0	2,065
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,103	0	2,103
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,164	0	5,164
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	42	0	42
	+ Officers	54	0	54

	Total	5,260	0	5,260

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Tinker, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	10	0	10
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	110	0	110
	+ Officers	30	0	30

	Total	150	0	150
1997:	Civilians	21	0	21
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	21	0	21
1998:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	42	0	42
1999:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	44	0	44
TOTAL:	Civilians	115	0	115
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	111	0	111
	+ Officers	31	0	31

	Total	257	0	257

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 3
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Hill, UT		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	42	0	42
1998:	Civilians	84	0	84
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1
	Total	86	0	86
1999:	Civilians	85	0	85
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1
	Total	87	0	87
TOTAL:	Civilians	211	0	211
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2	0	2
	+ Officers	2	0	2
	Total	215	0	215

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 4

Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,012	0	1,012
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	8	0	8
	+ Officers	11	0	11

	Total	1,031	0	1,031
1998:	Civilians	2,023	0	2,023
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	16	0	16
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,060	0	2,060
1999:	Civilians	2,023	0	2,023
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,061	0	2,061
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,058	0	5,058
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	41	0	41
	+ Officers	53	0	53

	Total	5,152	0	5,152

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 5
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Robins, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	561	-561
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	2,004	-2,004
	+ Officers	0	395	-395

	Total	0	2,960	-2,960
1997:	Civilians	0	2,108	-2,108
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	16	-16
	+ Officers	0	22	-22

	Total	0	2,146	-2,146
1998:	Civilians	0	4,215	-4,215
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	34	-34
	+ Officers	0	44	-44

	Total	0	4,293	-4,293
1999:	Civilians	0	4,428	-4,428
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	331	-331
	+ Officers	0	152	-152

	Total	0	4,911	-4,911
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	11,312	-11,312
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	2,385	-2,385
	+ Officers	0	613	-613

	Total	0	14,310	-14,310

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 6
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Base X		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	40	0	40
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	830	0	830
	+ Officers	28	0	28
	Total	898	0	898
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	213	0	213
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	295	0	295
	+ Officers	108	0	108
	Total	616	0	616
TOTAL:	Civilians	253	0	253
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1,125	0	1,125
	+ Officers	136	0	136
	Total	1,514	0	1,514

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 7
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Eglin, FL		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	35	0	35
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	708	0	708
	+ Officers	189	0	189

	Total	932	0	932
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	35	0	35
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	708	0	708
	+ Officers	189	0	189

	Total	932	0	932

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 8
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Dobbins AFRB, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	476	0	476
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	356	0	356
	+ Officers	148	0	148

	Total	980	0	980
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	476	0	476
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	356	0	356
	+ Officers	148	0	148

	Total	980	0	980

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 9
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

McClellan, CA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	536	590	+54
Enlisted	2,680	2,722	+42
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,216	3,312	+96
Civilians	8,423	13,587	+5,164
TOTAL	11,639	16,899	+5,260

Tinker, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,413	1,444	+31
Enlisted	5,576	5,687	+111
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	6,989	7,131	+142
Civilians	11,476	11,591	+115
TOTAL	18,465	18,722	+257

Hill, UT			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	582	584	+2
Enlisted	3,558	3,560	+2
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,140	4,144	+4
Civilians	9,045	9,256	+211
TOTAL	13,185	13,400	+215

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 10
 Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	828	881	+53
Enlisted	3,771	3,812	+41
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,599	4,693	+94
Civilians	14,251	19,309	+5,058
TOTAL	18,850	24,002	+5,152

Robins, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	755	14	-741
Enlisted	3,135	66	-3,069
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,890	80	-3,810
Civilians	11,323	11	-11,312
TOTAL	15,213	91	-15,122

Base X			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	569	705	+136
Enlisted	2,475	3,600	+1,125
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,044	4,305	+1,261
Civilians	7,843	8,096	+253
TOTAL	10,887	12,401	+1,514

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 11
Data As Of 13:30 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:49 06/16/1993

Eglin, FL			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,529	1,718	+189
Enlisted	6,641	7,349	+708
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	8,170	9,067	+897
Civilians	4,106	4,141	+35
TOTAL	12,276	13,208	+932

Dobbins AFRB, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	189	337	+148
Enlisted	756	1,112	+356
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	945	1,449	+504
Civilians	577	1,053	+476
TOTAL	1,522	2,502	+980

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Group : DEPOT
 Service : USAF
 Option Package : Tinker

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2094+ (Year 101+)
 ROI Year : 2100+ (100+ Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) :1,021,436
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) :1,768,095

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	5,756	5,850	6,037	-7,841	-31,061
Ovhd	910	682	4,612	1,184	-3,141	-16,044	-26,978
Cons	99,606	710,470	61,162	78,236	-17,420	-26,026	0
Movg	12,020	24,060	78,294	80,560	76,990	31,635	0
Othr	8,560	17,120	70,909	89,511	119,118	94,718	0
TOT	121,096	752,333	220,734	255,341	181,584	76,442	-58,038

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	91	91
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	705	705
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	154	154
PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS							
Officers	0	0	1,018	33	68	202	1,321
Enlisted	0	0	4,237	62	124	446	4,869
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT MIL	0	0	5,255	95	192	648	6,190
Civilian	0	0	991	2,004	4,007	4,221	11,223
TOTAL	0	0	6,246	2,099	4,199	4,869	17,413

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	5,756	5,850	6,037	6,494	6,494
Ovhd	910	682	4,612	1,184	-3,141	-16,044	-26,978
Cons	126,031	743,820	81,662	89,086	0	0	0
Movg	12,020	24,060	88,663	80,748	77,369	32,914	0
Othr	8,560	17,120	70,909	89,511	119,118	94,718	0
TOT	147,521	785,683	251,604	266,379	199,383	118,081	-20,484

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	0	0	14,334	37,554
Ovhd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cons	26,425	33,350	20,500	10,850	17,420	26,026	0
Movg	0	0	10,369	187	379	1,279	0
Othr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	26,425	33,350	30,869	11,037	17,799	41,639	37,554

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

McClellan, CA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	822	0	822
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	26	0	26
	+ Officers	14	0	14

	Total	862	0	862
1998:	Civilians	1,643	0	1,643
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	51	0	51
	+ Officers	28	0	28

	Total	1,722	0	1,722
1999:	Civilians	1,643	0	1,643
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	51	0	51
	+ Officers	27	0	27

	Total	1,721	0	1,721
TOTAL:	Civilians	4,108	0	4,108
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	128	0	128
	+ Officers	69	0	69

	Total	4,305	0	4,305

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Tinker, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	991	-991
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	4,237	-4,237
	+ Officers	0	1,018	-1,018

	Total	0	6,246	-6,246
1997:	Civilians	0	2,004	-2,004
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	62	-62
	+ Officers	0	33	-33

	Total	0	2,099	-2,099
1998:	Civilians	0	4,007	-4,007
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	124	-124
	+ Officers	0	68	-68

	Total	0	4,199	-4,199
1999:	Civilians	0	4,221	-4,221
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	446	-446
	+ Officers	0	202	-202

	Total	0	4,869	-4,869
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	11,223	-11,223
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	4,869	-4,869
	+ Officers	0	1,321	-1,321

	Total	0	17,413	-17,413

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 3
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Hill, UT		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 4
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,102	0	1,102
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	34	0	34
	+ Officers	18	0	18

	Total	1,154	0	1,154
1998:	Civilians	2,204	0	2,204
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	68	0	68
	+ Officers	37	0	37

	Total	2,309	0	2,309
1999:	Civilians	2,204	0	2,204
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	69	0	69
	+ Officers	37	0	37

	Total	2,310	0	2,310
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,510	0	5,510
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	171	0	171
	+ Officers	92	0	92

	Total	5,773	0	5,773

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 5
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Robins, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	80	0	80
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2	0	2
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	83	0	83
1998:	Civilians	160	0	160
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	5	0	5
	+ Officers	3	0	3

	Total	168	0	168
1999:	Civilians	161	0	161
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	5	0	5
	+ Officers	3	0	3

	Total	169	0	169
TOTAL:	Civilians	401	0	401
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	12	0	12
	+ Officers	7	0	7

	Total	420	0	420

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 6
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Base X		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	25	0	25
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	533	0	533
	+ Officers	29	0	29
	Total	587	0	587
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	213	0	213
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	321	0	321
	+ Officers	135	0	135
	Total	669	0	669
TOTAL:	Civilians	238	0	238
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	854	0	854
	+ Officers	164	0	164
	Total	1,256	0	1,256

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 7
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Beale, CA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 8
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Offutt, NB		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	681	0	681
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	3,702	0	3,702
	+ Officers	989	0	989

	Total	5,372	0	5,372
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	681	0	681
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	3,702	0	3,702
	+ Officers	989	0	989

	Total	5,372	0	5,372

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 9
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Langley, VA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 10
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Oklahoma City Airpt, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	285	0	285
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2	0	2
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	287	0	287
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	285	0	285
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2	0	2
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	287	0	287

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 11
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

McClellan, CA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	536	605	+69
Enlisted	2,680	2,808	+128
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,216	3,413	+197
Civilians	8,423	12,531	+4,108
TOTAL	11,639	15,944	+4,305

Tinker, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,413	1	-1,412
Enlisted	5,576	2	-5,574
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	6,989	3	-6,986
Civilians	11,476	99	-11,377
TOTAL	18,465	102	-18,363

Hill, UT			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	582	582	0
Enlisted	3,558	3,558	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,140	4,140	0
Civilians	9,045	9,045	0
TOTAL	13,185	13,185	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 12
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Kelly, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	828	920	+92
Enlisted	3,771	3,942	+171
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,599	4,862	+263
Civilians	14,251	19,761	+5,510
TOTAL	18,850	24,623	+5,773

Robins, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	755	762	+7
Enlisted	3,135	3,147	+12
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,890	3,909	+19
Civilians	11,323	11,724	+401
TOTAL	15,213	15,633	+420

Base X			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	569	733	+164
Enlisted	2,475	3,329	+854
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,044	4,062	+1,018
Civilians	7,843	8,081	+238
TOTAL	10,887	12,143	+1,256

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 13
 Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Beale, CA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	450	450	0
Enlisted	2,693	2,693	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,143	3,143	0
Civilians	435	435	0
TOTAL	3,578	3,578	0

Offutt, NB			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,975	2,964	+989
Enlisted	6,900	10,602	+3,702
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	8,875	13,566	+4,691
Civilians	1,276	1,957	+681
TOTAL	10,151	15,523	+5,372

Langley, VA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	2,185	2,185	0
Enlisted	6,612	6,612	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	8,797	8,797	0
Civilians	1,863	1,863	0
TOTAL	10,660	10,660	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 14
Data As Of 13:43 06/13/1993, Report Created 06:52 06/16/1993

Oklahoma City Airpt, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	2	+2
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	0	2	+2
Civilians	0	285	+285
TOTAL	0	287	+287

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Group : DEPOT
 Service : USAF
 Option Package : Kelly ALC Closure

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2094+ (Year 101+)
 ROI Year : 2100+ (100+ Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) : 583,803
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) : 1,138,686

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	1	3	-6,589	-15,289
Ovhd	-9,759	-27,365	-27,496	-25,602	-22,777	-21,184	-23,526
Cons	72,896	168,813	84,406	92,080	0	0	0
Movg	11,020	99,999	55,110	75,096	73,076	30,708	0
Othr	7,500	15,010	37,630	88,755	125,083	98,124	0
TOT	81,658	256,457	149,650	230,329	175,385	101,059	-38,815

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	33	33
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	153	153
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	175	175
PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS							
Officers	0	0	0	33	68	69	170
Enlisted	0	0	0	126	251	249	626
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT MIL	0	0	0	159	319	318	796
Civilian	0	0	0	2,282	4,564	4,563	11,409
TOTAL	0	0	0	2,441	4,883	4,881	12,205

Summary:

 Close Kelly ALC closure only

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars							
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	1	3	-42	-42
Ovhd	-9,759	-27,365	-27,496	-25,602	-22,777	-21,184	-23,526
Cons	72,896	168,813	84,406	92,080	0	0	0
Movg	11,020	99,999	55,110	75,410	73,706	31,336	0
Othr	7,500	15,010	37,630	88,755	125,083	98,124	0
TOT	81,658	256,457	149,650	230,643	176,015	108,233	-23,568

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars							
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	0	0	6,547	15,247
Ovhd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Movg	0	0	0	314	630	628	0
Othr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	314	630	7,174	15,247

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Kelly, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	2,282	-2,282
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	126	-126
	+ Officers	0	33	-33

	Total	0	2,441	-2,441
1998:	Civilians	0	4,564	-4,564
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	251	-251
	+ Officers	0	68	-68

	Total	0	4,883	-4,883
1999:	Civilians	0	4,563	-4,563
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	249	-249
	+ Officers	0	69	-69

	Total	0	4,881	-4,881
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	11,409	-11,409
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	626	-626
	+ Officers	0	170	-170

	Total	0	12,205	-12,205

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Tinker, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,620	0	1,620
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	89	0	89
	+ Officers	24	0	24

	Total	1,733	0	1,733
1998:	Civilians	3,240	0	3,240
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	178	0	178
	+ Officers	48	0	48

	Total	3,466	0	3,466
1999:	Civilians	3,240	0	3,240
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	177	0	177
	+ Officers	49	0	49

	Total	3,466	0	3,466
TOTAL:	Civilians	8,100	0	8,100
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	444	0	444
	+ Officers	121	0	121

	Total	8,665	0	8,665

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 3
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Hill, UT		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	160	0	160
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	9	0	9
	+ Officers	2	0	2

	Total	171	0	171
1998:	Civilians	320	0	320
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	18	0	18
	+ Officers	5	0	5

	Total	343	0	343
1999:	Civilians	319	0	319
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	5	0	5

	Total	341	0	341
TOTAL:	Civilians	799	0	799
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	44	0	44
	+ Officers	12	0	12

	Total	855	0	855

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 4
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Robins, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	502	0	502
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	28	0	28
	+ Officers	7	0	7

	Total	537	0	537
1998:	Civilians	1,004	0	1,004
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	55	0	55
	+ Officers	15	0	15

	Total	1,074	0	1,074
1999:	Civilians	1,004	0	1,004
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	55	0	55
	+ Officers	15	0	15

	Total	1,074	0	1,074
TOTAL:	Civilians	2,510	0	2,510
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	138	0	138
	+ Officers	37	0	37

	Total	2,685	0	2,685

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 5
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Lackland, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 6
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Base X		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 7
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Kelly, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	828	625	-203
Enlisted	3,771	2,992	-779
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,599	3,617	-982
Civilians	14,251	2,667	-11,584
TOTAL	18,850	6,284	-12,566

Tinker, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,413	1,534	+121
Enlisted	5,576	6,020	+444
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	6,989	7,554	+565
Civilians	11,476	19,576	+8,100
TOTAL	18,465	27,130	+8,665

Hill, UT			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	582	594	+12
Enlisted	3,558	3,602	+44
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,140	4,196	+56
Civilians	9,045	9,844	+799
TOTAL	13,185	14,040	+855

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 8
 Data As Of 14:20 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:37 06/15/1993

Robins, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	725	762	+37
Enlisted	3,025	3,163	+138
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,750	3,925	+175
Civilians	11,313	13,823	+2,510
TOTAL	15,063	17,748	+2,685

Lackland, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,716	1,716	0
Enlisted	4,093	4,093	0
Students	3,000	3,000	0
TOTAL MIL	8,809	8,809	0
Civilians	2,740	2,740	0
TOTAL	11,549	11,549	0

Base X			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	569	569	0
Enlisted	2,475	2,475	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,044	3,044	0
Civilians	7,843	7,843	0
TOTAL	10,887	10,887	0

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Group : DEPOT
 Service : USAF
 Option Package : Robins ALC Closure

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2094+ (Year 101+)
 ROI Year : 2100+ (100+ Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) : 457,078
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) : 944,352

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	32	98	-6,040	-15,896
Ovhd	690	83	-1,421	-2,386	-4,484	-7,790	-11,144
Cons	5,721	108,694	51,343	26,753	0	-3,987	0
Movg	10,700	21,410	53,510	73,504	72,144	32,631	0
Othr	7,420	14,840	37,090	83,298	114,658	85,504	0
TOT	24,531	145,027	140,522	181,202	182,416	100,318	-27,040

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	56	56
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	326	326
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS							
Officers	0	0	0	22	44	44	110
Enlisted	0	0	0	16	34	36	86
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT MIL	0	0	0	38	78	80	196
Civilian	0	0	0	2,108	4,215	4,215	10,538
TOTAL	0	0	0	2,146	4,293	4,295	10,734

Summary:

Close Robins ALC Only

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	32	98	-529	-529
Ovhd	690	83	-1,421	-2,386	-4,484	-7,790	-11,144
Cons	58,081	134,503	67,251	73,365	0	0	0
Movg	10,700	21,410	53,510	73,579	72,298	32,789	0
Othr	7,420	14,840	37,090	83,298	114,658	85,504	0
TOT	76,891	170,836	156,430	227,889	182,570	109,974	-11,674

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	0	0	5,511	15,367
Ovhd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cons	52,360	25,809	15,908	46,612	0	3,987	0
Movg	0	0	0	75	154	158	0
Othr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	52,360	25,809	15,908	46,687	154	9,655	15,367

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

McClellan, CA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,033	0	1,033
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	8	0	8
	+ Officers	11	0	11

	Total	1,052	0	1,052
1998:	Civilians	2,066	0	2,066
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	22	0	22

	Total	2,105	0	2,105
1999:	Civilians	2,065	0	2,065
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,103	0	2,103
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,164	0	5,164
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	42	0	42
	+ Officers	54	0	54

	Total	5,260	0	5,260

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Tinker, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	21	0	21
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	21	0	21
1998:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	42	0	42
1999:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	44	0	44
TOTAL:	Civilians	105	0	105
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	107	0	107

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 3
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Hill, UT		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	42	0	42
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	42	0	42
1998:	Civilians	84	0	84
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	86	0	86
1999:	Civilians	85	0	85
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	1	0	1
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	87	0	87
TOTAL:	Civilians	211	0	211
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2	0	2
	+ Officers	2	0	2

	Total	215	0	215

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 4
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Kelly, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,012	0	1,012
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	8	0	8
	+ Officers	11	0	11

	Total	1,031	0	1,031
1998:	Civilians	2,023	0	2,023
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	16	0	16
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,060	0	2,060
1999:	Civilians	2,023	0	2,023
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	17	0	17
	+ Officers	21	0	21

	Total	2,061	0	2,061
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,058	0	5,058
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	41	0	41
	+ Officers	53	0	53

	Total	5,152	0	5,152

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 5
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Robins, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	2,108	-2,108
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	16	-16
	+ Officers	0	22	-22

	Total	0	2,146	-2,146
1998:	Civilians	0	4,215	-4,215
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	34	-34
	+ Officers	0	44	-44

	Total	0	4,293	-4,293
1999:	Civilians	0	4,215	-4,215
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	36	-36
	+ Officers	0	44	-44

	Total	0	4,295	-4,295
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	10,538	-10,538
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	86	-86
	+ Officers	0	110	-110

	Total	0	10,734	-10,734

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 6
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Base X		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 7
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

McClellan, CA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	536	590	+54
Enlisted	2,680	2,722	+42
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,216	3,312	+96
Civilians	8,423	13,587	+5,164
TOTAL	11,639	16,899	+5,260

Tinker, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,413	1,414	+1
Enlisted	5,576	5,577	+1
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	6,989	6,991	+2
Civilians	11,476	11,581	+105
TOTAL	18,465	18,572	+107

Hill, UT			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	582	584	+2
Enlisted	3,558	3,560	+2
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,140	4,144	+4
Civilians	9,045	9,256	+211
TOTAL	13,185	13,400	+215

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 8
 Data As Of 13:12 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:41 06/15/1993

Kelly, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	828	881	+53
Enlisted	3,771	3,812	+41
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,599	4,693	+94
Civilians	14,251	19,309	+5,058
TOTAL	18,850	24,002	+5,152

Robins, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	755	589	-166
Enlisted	3,135	2,723	-412
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,890	3,312	-578
Civilians	11,323	785	-10,538
TOTAL	15,213	4,097	-11,116

Base X			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	569	569	0
Enlisted	2,475	2,475	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,044	3,044	0
Civilians	7,843	7,843	0
TOTAL	10,887	10,887	0

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Group : DEPOT
 Service : USAF
 Option Package : Tinker ALC closure

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2094+ (Year 101+)
 ROI Year : 2100+ (100+ Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) : 668,724
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) :1,055,506

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	55	164	-5,376	-15,232
Ovhd	910	682	512	655	-2,504	-9,560	-13,234
Cons	70,527	155,370	81,662	89,086	0	0	0
Movg	12,020	24,060	60,120	80,560	76,990	28,933	0
Othr	8,560	17,120	42,810	89,511	119,118	85,938	0
TOT	92,017	197,232	185,104	259,868	193,767	99,935	-28,466

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	56	56
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	326	326
Civilian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS							
Officers	0	0	0	33	68	67	168
Enlisted	0	0	0	62	124	125	311
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT MIL	0	0	0	95	192	192	479
Civilian	0	0	0	2,004	4,007	4,008	10,019
TOTAL	0	0	0	2,099	4,199	4,200	10,498

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	55	164	135	135
Ovhd	910	682	512	655	-2,504	-9,560	-13,234
Cons	70,527	163,325	81,662	89,086	0	0	0
Movg	12,020	24,060	60,120	80,748	77,369	29,312	0
Othr	8,560	17,120	42,810	89,511	119,118	85,938	0
TOT	92,017	205,187	185,104	260,055	194,146	105,824	-13,099

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Misn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers	0	0	0	0	0	5,511	15,367
Ovhd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cons	0	7,955	0	0	0	0	0
Movg	0	0	0	187	379	379	0
Othr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	7,955	0	187	379	5,890	15,367

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04)

Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

McClellan, CA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	822	0	822
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	26	0	26
	+ Officers	14	0	14

	Total	862	0	862
1998:	Civilians	1,643	0	1,643
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	51	0	51
	+ Officers	28	0	28

	Total	1,722	0	1,722
1999:	Civilians	1,643	0	1,643
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	51	0	51
	+ Officers	27	0	27

	Total	1,721	0	1,721
TOTAL:	Civilians	4,108	0	4,108
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	128	0	128
	+ Officers	69	0	69

	Total	4,305	0	4,305

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 2
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Tinker, OK		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	2,004	-2,004
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	62	-62
	+ Officers	0	33	-33

	Total	0	2,099	-2,099
1998:	Civilians	0	4,007	-4,007
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	124	-124
	+ Officers	0	68	-68

	Total	0	4,199	-4,199
1999:	Civilians	0	4,008	-4,008
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	125	-125
	+ Officers	0	67	-67

	Total	0	4,200	-4,200
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	10,019	-10,019
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	311	-311
	+ Officers	0	168	-168

	Total	0	10,498	-10,498

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 3
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Hill, UT		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 4
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Kelly, TX		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	1,102	0	1,102
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	34	0	34
	+ Officers	18	0	18

	Total	1,154	0	1,154
1998:	Civilians	2,204	0	2,204
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	68	0	68
	+ Officers	37	0	37

	Total	2,309	0	2,309
1999:	Civilians	2,204	0	2,204
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	69	0	69
	+ Officers	37	0	37

	Total	2,310	0	2,310
TOTAL:	Civilians	5,510	0	5,510
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	171	0	171
	+ Officers	92	0	92

	Total	5,773	0	5,773

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 5
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Robins, GA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	80	0	80
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	2	0	2
	+ Officers	1	0	1

	Total	83	0	83
1998:	Civilians	160	0	160
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	5	0	5
	+ Officers	3	0	3

	Total	168	0	168
1999:	Civilians	161	0	161
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	5	0	5
	+ Officers	3	0	3

	Total	169	0	169
TOTAL:	Civilians	401	0	401
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	12	0	12
	+ Officers	7	0	7

	Total	420	0	420

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 6
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Base X		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 7
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Beale, CA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 8
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Offutt, NB		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 9
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Langley, VA		Gains	Losses	Net Gains
		-----	-----	-----
1994:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1995:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1996:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1997:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1998:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
1999:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0
TOTAL:	Civilians	0	0	0
	+ Students	0	0	0
	+ Enlisted	0	0	0
	+ Officers	0	0	0

	Total	0	0	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 10
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

McClellan, CA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	536	605	+69
Enlisted	2,680	2,808	+128
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,216	3,413	+197
Civilians	8,423	12,531	+4,108
TOTAL	11,639	15,944	+4,305

Tinker, OK			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,413	1,189	-224
Enlisted	5,576	4,939	-637
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	6,989	6,128	-861
Civilians	11,476	1,457	-10,019
TOTAL	18,465	7,585	-10,880

Hill, UT			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	582	582	0
Enlisted	3,558	3,558	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,140	4,140	0
Civilians	9,045	9,045	0
TOTAL	13,185	13,185	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 11
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Kelly, TX			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	828	920	+92
Enlisted	3,771	3,942	+171
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	4,599	4,862	+263
Civilians	14,251	19,761	+5,510
TOTAL	18,850	24,623	+5,773

Robins, GA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	755	762	+7
Enlisted	3,135	3,147	+12
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,890	3,909	+19
Civilians	11,323	11,724	+401
TOTAL	15,213	15,633	+420

Base X			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	569	569	0
Enlisted	2,475	2,475	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,044	3,044	0
Civilians	7,843	7,843	0
TOTAL	10,887	10,887	0

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT REPORT (COBRA v4.04) - Page 12
 Data As Of 12:13 06/13/1993, Report Created 14:44 06/15/1993

Beale, CA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	450	450	0
Enlisted	2,693	2,693	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	3,143	3,143	0
Civilians	435	435	0
TOTAL	3,578	3,578	0

Offutt, NB			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	1,975	1,975	0
Enlisted	6,900	6,900	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	8,875	8,875	0
Civilians	1,276	1,276	0
TOTAL	10,151	10,151	0

Langley, VA			
	START	END	CHANGE
Officers	2,185	2,185	0
Enlisted	6,612	6,612	0
Students	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL	8,797	8,797	0
Civilians	1,863	1,863	0
TOTAL	10,660	10,660	0

**CLOSE ALC ONLY (ASSUMES MCCLELLAN IS OPEN
AND CLOSE ONE OF THE ALCs LISTED BELOW)**

	1- TIME COSTS		NET RECURRING	ROI
SAN ANTONIO	MILCON	418.2	-38.8	100+ YRS
	OTHER	720.0		
	TOTAL	1138.7		
WARNER ROBINS	MILCON	333.2	-27.0	100+ YRS
	OTHER	612.2		
	TOTAL	944.4		
OKLAHOMA CITY	MILCON	404.6	-28.5	100+ YRS
	OTHER	650.9		
	TOTAL	1055.5		

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF ANY OF THESE AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS.

ALL SUPPORT ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

COST OF CLOSURE FOR EACH AND REALIGNMENT OF WORKLOAD IS PROHIBITIVE.

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE.

ATCH 3 (1 of 2)

**CLOSE TOTAL BASE (ASSUMES MCCLELLAN IS OPEN
AND CLOSE ONE OF BASES LISTED BELOW)**

	<u>1-TIME COSTS</u>		<u>NET RECURRING</u>	<u>ROI</u>
KELLY	MILCON	423.2	-30.0	100+ YRS
	OTHER	780.5		
	TOTAL	1203.7		
ROBINS	MILCON	574.7	-47.7	100+ YRS
	OTHER	658.0		
	TOTAL	1232.7		
TINKER	MILCON	1040.4	-33.0	100+ YRS
	OTHER	727.7		
	TOTAL	1768.1		

THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF ANY OF THESE BASES

ALL ALC'S SUPPORT ENDURING WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND WARTIME SURGE CAPABILITY CANNOT BE RELOCATED COST EFFECTIVELY.

MOVING DLA, DISA, AND DRMO FUNCTIONS AND BUILDING NEW FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN COSTED. FORCE STRUCTURE MOVES ALIGNED WITH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATION WHEN FEASIBLE

Document Separator

10



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

File Copy
Copy to
ENCH AF-7
MMBR

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 4, 1993

Mr. David Berteau
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Production and Logistics)
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3E-808, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310

Please refer to this number
when responding 930607-3

Dear Mr. Berteau:

The differential cost to deliver and store aviation fuel to customers at various bases could well be a key factor in determining which bases to close or realign. The Air Force requirement to establish an East Coast mobility base has highlighted the importance of an in-depth review of these costs. The delivered fuel costs may be a significant factor in our analysis in decisions on other competing bases.

Please provide to the Commission by June 15, 1993 the projected annual fuel requirements in cost per gallon delivered to the base for the following locations: K.I. Sawyer AFB, Grand Forks AFB, Fairchild AFB, Homestead AFB, MacDill AFB, Tinker AFB, Kelly AFB, Robins AFB, McClellan AFB, Carswell AFB, O'Hare IAP AFRS, MCAS El Toro, MCAS Tustin, NAS Cecil Field, NAS Oceana, NAS Miramar, NAS Memphis, NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Alameda, NAS Barbers Point, NAS Glenview, NAS South Weymouth, NAS Dallas, NAS Meridian, NAF Martinsburg, NAF Johnstown, and NAF Detroit.

The importance of meeting our suspense, and the accuracy of the data, cannot be overemphasized. If you have any questions, please contact Ben Borden at (703) 696-0504. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Jim Courter
JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:borden

Document Separator



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 6/11/93

TO: THE HONORABLE JAMES BOATRIGHT

FAX #: 3-7568

FROM: Toby G. Messitt
→ Director of the Executive Secretariat

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 5

CONTENTS: URGENT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
RE: REDIRECT BREAKDOWN INVOLVING
BERGSTROM AFB, CARSWELL AFB

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CONTACT
FRANK CIRILLO, AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER AT
703/696-0504.

→ HARD COPY TO FOLLOW.



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USAF (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN M. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 11, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Installations
Department of the Air Force
Room 4-C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Please refer to this number
when responding 930611-16


Dear Mr. Boatright:

In a May 7, 1993 letter, the Commission asked the Air Force to provide us with a breakdown for redirect recommendations to include Bergstrom and Carswell. We asked that this breakdown be in the same format as the cost breakdown you provided for the Rickenbacker redirect (Attachment 1). We inadvertently omitted the alternative of leaving the 924th at Bergstrom and moving the Navy units from Detroit, Dallas and Memphis to Carswell's cantonment area with the 301st Fighter Wing.

Since the Commissioners wish to weigh this option prior to final deliberations, we respectfully request that you provide the Commission with this information no later than June 14, 1993.

Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation. I appreciate your attention to this urgent request.

Sincerely,



JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
 1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
 ARLINGTON, VA 22209
 703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN
 COMMISSIONERS
 CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
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 ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
 HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
 ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

May 7, 1993

Mr. James Boatright
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
 for Installations
 Department of the Air Force
 Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301

Please refer to this number
 when responding 930510-2

Dear Mr. Boatright:


As part of our on-going analysis of the DoD recommendations, the Commission has been compiling cost analyses for each of the redirect installations. Our goal is to find a comprehensive, useful format to portray this information.

Attachment 1 is a copy of a cost breakdown for the Rickenbacker redirect that was provided to the Commission by the Air Force. This format has been very helpful and as a result we would like the Air Force to provide us with a similar breakdown for the following redirect recommendations: Mather AFB, MacDill AFB, Bergstrom AFB and Carswell AFB. We would also welcome any updated information on Rickenbacker.

Attachment 2 is a copy of an operating costs breakdown on Rickenbacker that the Air Force has provided to the Commission. Again, this information has been very helpful. We request that the Air Force provide us with the annual operating costs (bottom line only) that would have been saved as a result of the 88/91 action, and similarly the annual operating costs that would be borne as a result of the 1993 redirect for the installations listed above.

We ask that all the information requested by this letter be provided to us no later than May 18, 1993. As always, your continued cooperation and assistance is appreciated.

Sincerely, _____


 JIM COURTER
 Chairman

jac:jra

REQUEST 6

Provide a copy of the cost analysis/operational impact assessment

RESPONSE

A copy of the COBRA summary for the Springfield realignment to Wright-Patterson AFB is in the COBRA Binder provided with the Air Force submissions of 15 March 1993.

The BCEG decision on Springfield ANGB was part of the BCEG deliberations on the redirect of the 1991 Base Closure Commission decision to realign the Rickenbacker ANG and AFRES units onto Wright-Patterson AFB (WPAFB). Below is a cost comparison of the 1991 Commission action costs on Rickenbacker versus the cost to revise that decision by realigning only the AFRES unit (907 ARG) onto WPAFB, consolidating the ANG units (121 ARW and 160 ARG) into a cantonment on Rickenbacker and realigning the 178 FG from Springfield ANGB onto WPAFB, in place of the 121 ARW and 160 ARG.

	BRAC 91 (Verified)	BRAC 93 (est.)	DELTA
<u>MILCON COSTS</u>			
Relocate 907 ARG to WPAFB	\$5.24M	\$5.24M	
Relocate Rickenbacker ANG units to WPAFB	\$15.24M	0.0	
Construct ANG cantonment at Rickenbacker	0.0	\$16.39M	
Relocate Springfield ANG to Rickenbacker	0.0	\$ 3.0M	
Avoided at Springfield (FY 92)	0.0	<u>(\$ 1.7M)</u>	
Totals	<u>\$26.48M</u>	<u>\$25.93M</u>	
1993 Redirect Recommendation MILCON cost estimated savings			(\$ 0.55M)
<u>OTHER ONE-TIME COSTS</u>			
Rickenbacker ANG to WPAFB	\$3.16M	0.0	
For Rickenbacker ANG cantonment	0.0	\$ 7.62M	
One-time cost to relocate 970 ARG to WPAFB	\$11.80M	\$11.80M	
To relocate Springfield ANG to WPAFB	0.0	<u>\$ 1.70M</u>	
Totals	<u>\$34.96M</u>	<u>\$21.12M</u>	
1993 Redirect Recommendation one-time cost savings			<u>(\$ 13.84M)</u>
Total estimated one-time savings of 1993 Redirect Recommendation			<u>(\$14.39M)</u>

REQUEST 1

How was the \$1.1 Million in annual operating savings determined?

RESPONSE

BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT

ELEMENT	<u>WRIGHT-PATTERSON</u>	<u>SPRINGFIELD</u>
Crash Rescuc	\$0.0M	\$1.1M
Lease Building Space	0.0	0.03
Tower & Navigation Aids	0.0	0.28
Security Police	\$0.49	0.70
Base Administration	0.06	0.0
Transportation support	0.04	0.0
Billeting	0.1	0.0
Communication Sec	0.03	0.0
Airport Use Agreement	0.0	0.03
Common Use Area	0.09	0.0
Bio Environmental	<u>0.19</u>	<u>0.0</u>
TOTALS	\$1.0M	\$2.1M

DELTA SAVING - \$1.1M per Annum

< CONFIRMATION REPORT >

06-11-1993(FRI) 08:32

[TRANSMIT]

NO.	DATE	TIME	DESTINATION	PG.	DURATION	MODE	RESULT
4775	6-11	08:30	7036937568	5	0'02'18"	NORM.E	OK
				5	0'02'18"		



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

10 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1660

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter:

The responds to your June 11, 1993 (930611-16) request that asked for a breakdown of cost for the following option: "Leave the 924th at Bergstrom and move the Navy units from Detroit, Dallas and Memphis to Carswell's cantonment area with the 301st Fighter Wing." The Air Force is not aware of all the Navy requirements; therefore, we can not provide you the exact cost you requested. However, we can provide a professional analysis of projected Carswell DoD cost and how they may be affected by your request.

As you might recall, the total estimated cost for DoD's recommendation as related to Carswell was \$126 million in MILCON. Of this total, \$82 million was earmarked for the Navy/Marine/Air Force Reserve beddown (Air Force portion of this was less than \$6 million). A key point that affects the solution of your request is the fact that, the 924th relocation from Bergstrom to Carswell would collocate into the 301st area and facilities with only minor add/alters. Therefore, the Air Force does not believe that the overall Carswell MILCON requirement would be reduced for the Navy--the Navy will not be able to take advantage of any 301st facilities to offset MILCON requirements, because the 301st will still be there.

Hopefully this information is helpful. I suggest you contact the Navy for specific information on Navy MILCON requirements at Carswell.

Sincerely,

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 930612-10

92

FROM: Jim Courter	TO: Leon Penetta
TITLE: Chairman	TITLE: Director
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: Off. of Mgmt. + Budget
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT
CHAIRMAN COURTER	✓			COMMISSIONER BOWMAN			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER BYRON			
SPECIAL ASSISTANT				COMMISSIONER COX			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER JOHNSON			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER LEVITT			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON			
				COMMISSIONER STUART			
PRESS SECRETARY				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A			
DIR./EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			PK	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF R & A			
				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				ISSUES TEAM LEADER	✓		
SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR				COBRA MODEL ANALYST			
DIR./INFO SERVICES DIVISION				DATABASE ANALYST (GIS)			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

⇒ Request for a comment on Dept. of commerce's proposal regarding Mac Dill.

Due Date: 6/26/93	Routing Date: 6/12/93	Date Received: 6/12/93	Mail Date:
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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 12, 1993

Please refer to this number
when responding 93C612-10

The Honorable Leon Panetta
Director
Office of Management and Budget
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Panetta: *Leon*

As you may know, Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown has written a letter to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin requesting a no-cost transfer of the airfield at MacDill AFB, Florida, to Department of Commerce (DOC) control. In his letter (attachment 1) Secretary Brown states that in order to complete a no-cost transfer, DOC would need to obtain your approval.

In order to completely review the Department of Defense's recommendation regarding MacDill AFB, we request your comment on DOC's proposal. Specifically, is the proposal valid and would it require budget realignments in order to implement it?

The Commission's deliberation hearing begin on June 17, 1993. Therefore, your response to the Commission by June 16, 1993 would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Ji
JIM COURTER
Chairman

JAC:jra



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

FOR INFORMATION
DATE 6/12/93 930612-10

DATE: June 12, 1993

TO: Diana

FAX #: (202) 395-3888

FROM: Jennifer Atkin

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 2

COMMENTS: Per our telephone conversation on June 11th, here is an advance copy of the letter I spoke of. A hard copy will follow in the mail. I can be reached at the number below if you have any questions. We need a response as soon as possible. Thanks.



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 12, 1993

Please refer to this number
when responding 930612-10

The Honorable Leon Panetta
Director
Office of Management and Budget
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Panetta: *Leon*

As you may know, Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown has written a letter to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin requesting a no-cost transfer of the airfield at MacDill AFB, Florida, to Department of Commerce (DOC) control. In his letter (attachment 1) Secretary Brown states that in order to complete a no-cost transfer, DOC would need to obtain your approval.

In order to completely review the Department of Defense's recommendation regarding MacDill AFB, we request your comment on DOC's proposal. Specifically, is the proposal valid and would it require budget realignments in order to implement it?

The Commission's deliberation hearing begin on June 17, 1993. Therefore, your response to the Commission by June 16, 1993 would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Ji
JIM COURTER
Chairman

JAC:jra

< CONFIRMATION REPORT >

06-12-1993(SAT) 13:51

[TRANSMIT]

NO.	DATE	TIME	DESTINATION	PG.	DURATION	MODE	RESULT
4854	6-12	13:50	45632	2	0° 00' 57"	NORMAL	OK
				2	0° 00' 57"		

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #

930671-3

FROM: <u>EDD [unclear]</u>	TO: <u>TIM COURTER</u>
TITLE: <u>DIRECTOR</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>CMB</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>MACDILL AFB FL</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT
CHAIRMAN COURTER	/			COMMISSIONER BOWMAN			
STAFF DIRECTOR	/			COMMISSIONER BYRON			
SPECIAL ASSISTANT				COMMISSIONER COX			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER JOHNSON			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER LEVITT			
				COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STUART			
PRESS SECRETARY				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A			
DIR./EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			<u>h...</u>	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF R & A			
				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	/		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				ISSUES TEAM LEADER			
SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR				COBRA MODEL ANALYST			
DIR./INFO SERVICES DIVISION				DATABASE ANALYST (GIS)			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

⇒ DEPARTMENT POSITION ON PROPOSED TRANSFER OF MACDILL AIRFIELD TO THE DEPT. OF COMMERCE.
 ↳ PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS FAVORABLE.
 ↳ NO ADDITIONAL COSTS.

Due Date: _____	Routing Date: <u>6-21-93</u>	Date Received: <u>6-21-93</u>	Mail Date: _____
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

THE DIRECTOR

June 16, 1993

Honorable Jim Courter, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to (778) 930621-3
when responding to 930621-3


Dear Mr. Courter:

Thank you for your June 12, 1993, letter concerning the Commission's review of the proposal to transfer the airfield at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, to control of the Department of Commerce. You have asked the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the validity of the proposal and its cost implications.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce has transferred its Aircraft Operations Center from Miami and currently is functioning out of MacDill. As the final disposition of the airfield is yet undetermined, it is apparent that Commerce wishes to assume control of the airfield in order to ensure continued access to the facility.

The Office of Management and Budget has not had sufficient time to evaluate the transfer proposal fully. However, we have discussed the proposal with the staff of the Department of Commerce. NOAA staff have assured the Department that there are no costs associated with the transfer to Commerce, nor would there be net additional costs associated with continued operation, by Commerce, of the airfield. Our preliminary assessment of the proposed transfer is favorable. Please note, however, that as the Base Closure and Realignment Commission has yet to finalize its recommendations for MacDill, no formal request for a no-cost transfer has been made to OMB.

Sincerely,



Leon F. Panetta
Director

c: Honorable Ronald Brown
Secretary of Commerce

Document Separator

42

June 20, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO: R&A Director
Staff Director *MRF*
Commissioners (IN TURN)

FROM: Air Force Team (Frank Cirillo) *fc*

SUBJECT: Independent Staff Analysis of Bases

The attached letter from Mr. Boatright is provided for your information. The Commission was given the copy at the Fairchild AFB base visit. Communities and the Air Force have challenged the independent analysis that we used for Staff Operational Scores under Criteria 1, 2, and 3. Some arguments are valid-- such as the scores are quantitative and don't show the subjective (qualitative) differences that the Air Force's Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) did using color codes and vast experience. We agree, and knew that when we started, however we were faced with the requirement to develop an independent review given the lack of specific decision related Air Force documentation. The intent of our numerical analysis was for more detailed data comparisons using the same certified questionnaire data the BCEG used. The staff also graded more data points than those graded by the Air Force. Again, these scores only reflected an independent view of the first three selection criteria. Where the certified data used in the scores was found to be in error the staff corrected the appropriate rating accordingly.

As staff noted during the course of the May 21st and June 18th hearings, the scores were intended to be but one factor in the decision process of the Commission. Commissioners will get the subjective comparisons of various base attributes within the base "issue" slides. For instance, although a base rated "Green" for POL storage and got 10 points in our analysis, the cost may be excessive because of distribution problems. Another example is where the number of Air Traffic Control delays might not reflect a problem but the number per sortie (aircraft operation) could indicate an air encroachment issue. In the latter case the encroachment could be discussed as an issue.


Shown at attachment 2 are copies of the questionnaire responses we graded in our independent analysis and the score sheets reflecting the scores as presented. The independent scores derived served the intended purpose by allowing focus on the issues that cannot be objectively scored and to an extent validated the Air Force BCEG approach for final selections but reiterated the need for a data driven model to sort objective certified data.

The independent staff analysis scoring procedure allowed the Commission to be able to focus on the relative attributes of a larger population of bases as the analysis progressed from general to specific compliance. During the final deliberations the scores are less a factor than the requirement to focus on the true discriminators relative to specific mission areas. The general rankings and scores of the independent data analysis could divert attention from those specific issues that truly separate the base military values. In that regard, staff recommends that the scores should not be formally presented from this point on as their purpose was served in numerically rating and displaying data and in identifying the pros and cons of objective analysis versus subjective assessment. This format could well be used by the Air Force in the 1995 round as an objective indicator to the Base Closure Executive Group prior to their actual recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force. Staff is available to discuss any specific questions that commissioners might have in this area.

Arch: 1. SA/MI ltr. June 3, 1993
2. Analysis Plan



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

03 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1660

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4705

Dear Mr. Speaker

This is in response to your May 26, 1993, request for comment on the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (DBCRC) Air Force (AF) Team Independent Analysis that led to Fairchild Air Force Base (AFB) being added to the list of bases considered for closure.

The process used by the Commission's AF Team to analyze bases for closure or realignment was a quantitative analysis. Individual attributes were selected and assigned point values. These values were then totalled to give relative rankings of bases. The Air Force considered this type of approach in 1991. It was rejected in favor of qualitative rating of objective data by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG). It is composed of 13 senior officials, seven General Officers and six Senior Executive Service civilians, drawn from a dozen functional areas and having a range of knowledge and experience covering all phases of Air Force activities.

This was done for several reasons. First, assigning point values involves a great deal of subjective judgement. What the judgement is and how it is arrived at are concealed by the seeming certainty of numbers. In fact, these numbers are less "objective" than the color rankings used by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. Second, quantitative ranking works best when the subjects of the analysis are as nearly identical as possible. This is not the case with Air Force bases. Geography, climate, the existing layout and facilities, support communities and environmental aspects are entirely non-standard. A ranking technique that allows broad-based subjective judgement of these differences is essential to arrive at a valid result. Third, the false objectivity of numerical ranking results in graded lists of bases, best through worst in numerical order. An experiment by the 1991 BCEG showed the inaccuracy of this approach. Rarely was there a significant difference between adjacent bases on the list. Grouping bases more appropriately reflects the complexity of the judgement required. In addition, numerical ranking makes it difficult to give the Secretary (or the Commission) alternative groupings by changing the emphasis given individual factors or criteria.

ATTCH 1

The evaluation process used by the Air Force starts with objective data, certified by bases and commands, and similarly certified judgements of non-quantitative items. The data points are assigned color code grades. This process allows the BCEG to factor in variations in bases that don't show up in purely numerical scores, such as the poor condition of an apparently large ramp, or a long history of encroachment and noise complaints not given sufficient credence by current base management. The color coded data points are combined by group judgement into color codings by DoD criteria, and then into groupings of bases. Each of these steps is "subjective" in that the colors are not assigned numbers. Perhaps members of the BCEG having different perspectives give slightly different weight to individual items in doing so. That is the point of a group process, rather than numerical scoring by individual experts. The result, in my judgment, provides the Secretary with a soundly based set of alternatives. They represent not just an adding up subjectively based numbers, but the painstaking application of highly experienced, broad-based judgement to a wide range of data.

As of this date we have not received a copy of the Commission's final analysis that put Fairchild on the list. Therefore, our comments will be limited to the latest "Draft," dated 27 May 1993, and will provide several examples which demonstrate why the quantitative approach is questionable invalid. The first relates to encroachment and will be discussed in detail.

All bases were evaluated by the BCEG for the extent to which off-base development is compatible with accident potential zones (APZs). A "Green" rating was given to Fairchild AFB and KI Sawyer AFB, because both bases have "generally compatible" off-base development (less than 5% encroachment). This rating was arrived at by evaluating several pieces of base questionnaire data and applying executive level judgement.

By contrast, the Commission's AF Team extracted one piece of subjective data from the questionnaire responses (whether or not the base believed that it is in compliance with its APZ) and applied a quantitative value to it (in compliance: ten points; not in compliance: zero points). There are several flaws with this approach. First, it substitutes the base level interpretation for the BCEG's. Fairchild officials apparently believed that since it had some encroachment, they should answer that the base was not in compliance. By contrast, KI Sawyer officials apparently believed that less than 5% encroachment put that base in compliance.

In accordance with the Air Force Internal Control Plan, the base questionnaire responses were reviewed and modified, as appropriate, by the Major Command headquarters, Air Staff experts, and ultimately by the BCEG. One of the key functions of these progressively higher levels of review is to ensure uniformity and consistency of the data among the bases. On the APZ data point, the Plan worked; the BCEG applied a uniform standard and reconciled apparently disparate base responses.

Another problem with the Team's quantitative approach is that it takes an "all-or-nothing" approach to an area where "all-or-nothing" does not exist. No base is 100% encroached. Even if KI Sawyer were 5% encroached and Fairchild were 20% encroached, it

would be wholly inappropriate to assign black or white (ten or zero) grades to data which more properly should be put on a continuum.

Additionally, there was an inconsistent methodology used in the application of this subelement. The point value assigned to encroachment was ten for bomber, and five for airlift/tanker aircraft bases. The point value should be consistent for all three type bases. The Commission's AF Team did not include any analysis of existing land use, future land use, or zoning efforts of the local communities. Other examples of the flawed methodology follow.

Ramp Space

- There is no consideration given to ramp configuration (rectangular, segmented, or Christmas tree).
- No consideration to PCN (weight bearing capability) of the ramp.
- No consideration to existing condition of ramp.

Hot Pad

- Point value biases analysis toward airlift/mobility bases (10 points) versus bomber/fighter bases (5 points).
 - Value should be constant throughout analysis, similar to encroachment argument presented earlier.

Fuel Hydrants

- Disregards configuration/layout of hydrants for refueling operations (taxi-on/taxi-off vs towing operations).
- No mention of the number of simultaneous refueling operations.

Air Traffic Control Delays

- No consideration of existing regional growth, aviation growth around the installation, and operational limitations reflecting unique procedures for operations around that installation.

Bombing Ranges

- Utility of bombing ranges and maintenance.
 - Considerations must include: Controlling authority; AF priority in range use; What type of range support is available (ground controlled/scorable range or air scored range); and, hours of availability.

Facilities


- Facilities were assigned a total of 25 points. In so doing, the percentage of the total value for any given base changed by type.
 - Tanker base facilities accounted for 17.8% of the total; bomber - 16.1%; airlift - 12.8%; fighter - 12.2%; and, mobility - 11.9%.
 - These values weight the analysis away from operations and focuses more attention on base facilities.

Also, applying the same point values to different subelements implies each subelement

is of equal military value. That is not the case. For example, on a bomber base, a Hot Pad was awarded five points, as was the number of low level routes within 200 nautical miles. However, a bomber wing's operational effectiveness would be more severely affected if low level routes were not available for aircrew training vice that base not having a Hot Pad. Therefore, the military value of low level routes should be much higher than that of Hot Pads.

We trust that these examples give you insight into the inadequate analysis that results when a team of technicians perform a short-notice quantitative analysis of some of the data relevant to the decision making process. We continue to strongly believe that there is no substitute for a methodical qualitative analysis performed by a group of Executive-level officials, and this is the approach that the Air Force used and continues to support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "James F. Boatright", written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned above the typed name and title.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

AIR FORCE TEAM LARGE AIRCRAFT MISSION ANALYSIS

Airlift Mission

- Runway length (8,000 feet minimum)
- Total usable ramp space
- Does the base have a hot pad (for loading and unloading munitions)
- C-141 maximum on ground (includes ramp space and equipment for loading aircraft for deployments above normal airlift ops)
- POL storage
- Number of fuel hydrants (for refueling large aircraft)
- Weather above 300' and [visibility greater than] 1 mile (large aircraft can take-off in worse weather than this, but indicates poor weather conditions)
- Weather above 3000' and 5 miles (weather for low-level flying)
- Distance to weather alternate (affects fuel loads-- have to carry extra fuel to fly to "alternate", therefore train less)
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones (this does not account for percent of encroachment-- we will cover that in the hearings)
- Number of noise complaints
- Distance to Drop zone (for dropping parachutists or practice)
- Army base within 150 miles (co-location better for Global Reach)
- Distance to rail (for equipment/ cargo movement)
- Distance to airborne units (parachutists for training and real)
- Distance to airlift customer (normal ops to fly to customer)
- Distance to Air Refueling Track (for training)
- Distance to large scale airdrop (for dropping cargo/ practice)
- Number of low level routes within 200 nautical miles (training)
- Base facilities
- Housing facilities

Tanker Mission

- Runway length (10,000' minimum)
- Total usable ramp space
- POL storage store
- Number of fuel hydrants
- Weather above 300' and 1 mile
- Distance to weather alternate
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones
- Number of noise complaints
- Distance to Air Refueling Track
- Distance to high density air refueling track (determines how close receivers are for training)
- Tanker saturation (determines other tankers are nearby competing for users)
- Base facilities
- Housing facilities

ATCH 2

Mobility Mission

Note: combines airlift and tanker attributes, except the base does not need ability to process cargo (rail) or many airlift and services all customer, so distance to airlift customer is irrelevant.

- Runway length
- Total usable ramp space
- Does the base have a hot pad
- C-141 maximum on ground
- POL storage store
- Number of fuel hydrants
- Weather above 300' and 1 mile
- Weather above 3000' and 5 miles
- Distance to weather alternate
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies for accident potential zones
- Number of noise complaints
- Drop zone
- Distance to airborne units
- Distance to Air Refueling Track
- Number of low level routes within 200 nautical miles
- Distance to large scale airdrop
- Distance to high density air refueling track
- Tanker saturation
- Number of KC-135 equivalents that can be parked on the ramp
- Base facilities
- Housing facilities

Bomber Mission

- Runway length (10,000 minimum)
- Total usable ramp space
- Does the base have a hot pad
- Number of refueling hydrants
- C-141 maximum on ground
- Weather 300' and 1 mile (bombers also can fly in worse weather and even do low levels in the weather)
- Distance to weather alternate
- Number of Air Traffic Control delays
- Compliance with ground encroachment policies
- Number of noise complaints
- Distance to Radar Bombing Site scoring facility (train crews without dropping a bomb, sites also have electronic warfare)
- Distance to Air Refueling Track
- Distance to bombing range (train crews dropping practice bombs)
- Distance to low altitude military operating area (flying training for co-pilots in T-37/T-38s and some training with fighters)
- Distance to electronic combat range (training for electronic warfare and defensive systems)
- Number of low level routes within 200 nautical miles
- Base facilities
- Housing facilities

TANKER BASE ANALYSIS

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INST_NAM	STATE	FORCES	RAMPMAX	RAMPMAX SCORE	WXMIN	WX SCORE	WXALT	ALT SCORE	ATCDLYNO	ATC DLY SCORE	AARTRK	AAR SCORE	NOISE	NOISE SCORE	ENCRCH SCORE	RWYLG	RWY SCORE	POL	POL SCORE	HYD #	HYD SCORE	OPS SCORE TOTAL	FACILITY SCORE	TOTAL SCORE	DIST TO RCVR	RCVR SCORE	SATURATION	SATUR SCORE	TOTAL SCORE	
LITTLE ROCK AFB	AR	C-130	680000	7	98.0	8	108	8	1	9	100	6	2	8	5	12000	10	106260	5	74	10	74	23	97	314	5	POOR	10	112	
DYESS AFB	TX	B-1/K135	859796	9	98.7	9	115	5	0	10	190	2	1	9	0	13500	10	119277	6	76	10	70	25	95	260	6	POOR	10	111	
TRAVIS AFB	CA	KC10/141	1040177	10	97.0	7	40	8	0	10	157	4	2	8	5	11000	9	192744	10	64	10	81	17	98	208	7	BALAN	5	110	
WHITEMAN AFB	MO		720000	7	98.0	8	14	9	0	10	80	7	0	10	5	12400	10	103396	5	22	4	75	19	94	225	6	POOR	10	110	
BARKSDALE AFB	LA	B-52	1042508	10	98.2	8	96	6	1	9	30	9	1	9	5	11756	9	142048	7	29	6	78	17	95	520	1	POOR	10	106	
ALTUS AFB	OK	C-141	649050	6	99.0	9	110	6	1	9	65	7	1	9	5	13440	10	88874	4	30	6	71	17	88	260	6	POOR	10	104	
BEALE AFB	CA	KC-135	213055	2	97.7	8	28	9	3	7	30	9	0	10	5	12000	10	129862	6	28	6	72	17	89	210	7	BALAN	5	101	
MINOT AFB	ND	B-52	420041	4	97.9	8	164	3	0	10	0	10	1	9	5	13200	10	63214	3	29	6	68	21	89	210	7	BALAN	5	101	
MARCH AFB	CA	KC10/135	1038421	10	99.0	9	28	9	1	9	290	0	30	0	0	13300	10	990048	10	40	8	65	21	86	73	9	BALAN	5	100	
ELLSWORTH AFB	SD	B-1	1374582	10	97.2	7	265	0	1	9	110	6	2	8	0	13497	10	144887	7	38	8	65	25	90	340	4	BALAN	5	99	
GRIFFISS AFB	NY	B52/135	515000	5	98.6	9	31	9	0	10	0	10	3	7	5	11820	9	73600	4	30	6	74	23	97	540	1	RICH	0	98	
PLATTSBURGH AFB	NY	KC135	954568	10	99.0	9	120	5	1	9	44	8	1	9	0	11760	9	100672	5	84	10	74	21	95	461	2	RICH	0	97	
MCCONNELL AFB	KS	B-1/K135	489269	5	97.8	8	72	7	0	10	110	6	12	0	0	12000	10	80985	4	22	4	54	21	75	115	8	POOR	10	93	
GRAND FORKS AFB	ND	B1B/K135	444160	4	98.3	8	68	7	0	10	100	6	2	8	5	12351	10	56666	3	26	5	66	17	83	360	4	BALAN	5	92	
K. I. SAWYER AFB	MI	B52/K135	416564	4	93.5	4	200	2	0	10	90	6	0	10	5	12300	10	41715	2	42	8	61	21	82	90	9	RICH	0	91	
FAIRCHILD AFB	WA	B52/K135	648960	6	94.5	5	205	2	0	10	50	8	0	10	0	13901	10	77831	4	30	6	61	21	82	370	4	RICH	0	86	
MCGUIRE AFB	NJ	C-141	944708	9	94.0	4	68	7	1	9	90	6	2	8	0	10001	8	95240	5	29	6	62	21	83	686	0	RICH	0	83	
CHARLESTON AFB	SC	C141/C17	656667	7	97.0	7	70	7	0	10	150	4	1	9	0	9001	0	77976	4	33	7	55	13	68	365	4	POOR	10	82	
MALMSTROM AFB	MT	KC-135	333541	3	98.8	9	263	0	0	10	67	7	2	8	5	11500	9	65952	3	15	3	57	17	74	484	2	RICH	0	76	
DOVER AFB	DE	C-5	605700	6	97.0	7	68	7	0	10	200	2	5	5	0	12902	10	97942	5	14	3	55	15	70	686	0	RICH	0	70	
MCCHORD AFB	WA	C-141	683000	7	95.0	5	95	6	0	10	150	4	14	0	0	10100	8	73604	4	23	5	49	17	66	425	3	RICH	0	69	
				X/100000		X-90		(250-X)/25		10-X		(250-X)/25		10-X		X<10000			X/20000		X/5									
				10		10		10		10		10		10	5		10		10		10	95	25	120		10			10	140

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

June 14, 1993

The Honorable James Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Installations
Department of the Air Force (SAF/MII)
Room 4C-940, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1660


Dear Mr. Boatright:

Please refer to this number
when responding **930614-38**

Attached please find questions that are being considered for use during the June 17, 1993 hearing. We ask that responses to all of the attached questions that are not asked during the hearing be provided for the record no later than noon, June 18, 1993.

I appreciate your attention to this important matter and thank you in advance for your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,



JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:cirillo

SEC ASPIN:

Do you plan on accepting the proposal by the Secretary of Commerce for a no-cost transfer of the operation of the airfield at MacDill AFB, FL to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA)?

Are the demographics available in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of Dallas FT. Worth to support the recruitment of 10,000 plus service veterans and/or civilians whose skills are directly transferrable to military aviation occupational specialties? Please describe your methodology to ascertain.

AIR FORCE:

GENERAL

What is the impact of the Air Force's force-structure announcement on the current basing strategy and the 1993 base-closure process? Specifically...

If Fairchild is to become one of the primary tanker bases, what are the plans for the weapons storage area? Will the munitions be transferred out, or will they be used in place by units deploying in?

The force-structure announcement generally reflected several 1993 DoD closure and realignment recommendations, but did not show deactivation of the 31st FW from Homestead, closure of Newark AFB, or realignment of the Springfield ANG, OH to Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Please elaborate.

You have provided Air Force comments on the majority of opposing community comments and concerns. Would you care to elaborate on any today, other than what you have already provided previously or in your testimony thus far?

LARGE AIRCRAFT BASES

You have seen correspondence from the Commission regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and its relationship to potential closure of Grand Forks AFB, ND. Would the relationship of the ABM site preclude closure of Grand Forks AFB and/or its attached ICBM missile field now or during the 1995 round of the base closure process?

The Air Force indicated an excess of between four and five large aircraft bases. If the Commission elects to recommend closure of the Grand Forks Missile field, should the rest of the

base be considered as one of four or one of five large-aircraft bases to close or realign?

Please explain why, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Air Force, it is too early to close one of the four active missile fields and thus bring the number of total ICBM silos to 550.

Given the winter fuel situation and the Accident Potential Zone (APZ) II encroachment violations at Plattsburgh AFB, do you feel that this base was the correct choice as the East Coast Mobility Base?

The Commission staff's independent evaluation of Air Force-provided data as related to criteria I, II and III indicate that Griffiss AFB is a strong bomber base. Obviously the Base Closure Executive Group saw some key detrimental elements that resulted in the Secretary's recommendation to realign Griffiss. Can you elaborate on those elements or the final decision?

If Fairchild AFB were closed instead of Griffiss AFB, would the Air Force make Griffiss AFB a tanker base, or a B-52 base instead of Minot AFB as is currently projected?

If Fairchild AFB were closed instead of K.I. Sawyer AFB, would the Air Force make K.I. Sawyer AFB a tanker base, or a B-52 base instead of Minot AFB as is currently projected?

The Air Force is currently converting all MM II silos at Malmstrom to MM III. Considering the actual number of MM III missiles in the inventory, why do you think this is necessary?

What will happen with the aerial port at McGuire if the base is realigned as an AFRES installation?

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, McGuire AFB processed several thousand passengers and tons of cargo and mail destined for the middle east. How does the Air Force envision meeting these requirements if McGuire is realigned as a Reserve installation?

DEPOTS

The Air Force has recommended the closure of McClellan AFB and Newark AFB. What impact would the closure of a second large air logistics center have on the Air Force's depot-maintenance capability?

The Air Force plans to decommission the non-destructive inspection facility at McClellan if the base is closed. What provisions has the Air Force made to retire the small nuclear reactor at the facility, and has the cost been included in the COBRA estimate? Also, McClellan has a cold-proof facility for stress testing of the F-111 aircraft. If McClellan is closed, and with the F-111 remaining in the inventory, will the stress testing still be required; if so, where will it be done?

SMALL AIRCRAFT BASES

The 301st Rescue Squadron realignment to Patrick is in support of an active-duty mission to support Space Shuttle launches. Are there any cost savings or operational concerns for moving the unit back to Homestead AFB?

AIR FORCE RESERVE BASES

The City of Chicago group requested relief on the time constraints for the Chicago O'Hare Air Reserve Station realignment, which was recommended to begin in 1995 and be completed by 1997. The public law would allow closure to continue through 1999. Is there a specific reason that the move must be completed by 1997?

The DoD recommendation for O'Hare Air Reserve Station specified that the move had to be made at no expense to the federal government, yet the request from the City of Chicago only referenced no costs to DoD. Please clarify.

All the proponents and opposition groups for the O'Hare Air Reserve Station desire that the units stay within Illinois. Would either the 928th Airlift Group (AFRES) or the 126 Air Refueling Group (ANG) be placed more in jeopardy during further force structure draw downs if in between moves?

REDIRECTS

Acting Secretary Donley sent a letter to the Commission notifying us of the offer by The Department of Commerce to operate the MacDill AFB, FL runway. Does that offer, if accepted, provide a viable alternative to the proposed MacDill AFB redirect and thus obviate the need to relocate the 482nd FW (AFRES) to MacDill to operate the runway?

If the Commission elects to retain the 482nd FW (AFRES) at Homestead as a realignment in lieu of the proposed closure, should that unit retain its existing weapon system (F-16) or convert to KC-135s as in the proposed redirect related to MacDill AFB? Who should pay the additional costs for bedding down KC-135s at Homestead?

You have provided the Commission new information regarding the proposed relocation of the Air National Guard unit at Springfield, Ohio to Wright-Patterson AFB and in fact did not include that realignment in the May 28 announcement. Should the Commission regard that particular aspect of the proposed Rickenbacker ANGB as no longer cost or mission effective?

DoD concluded there is adequate space at the Carswell cantonment area to support both the Air Force and Navy proposals of operating 186 aircraft. DoD also concluded that moving the 924th from Bergstrom to Carswell will be cost effective and will result in operational efficiencies. Please address the Austin community position which illustrates that operating 186 aircraft from Carswell's cantonment area would degrade operational readiness, increase operational costs, and unnecessarily increase risk.

The Austin community provided data to show that DoD could save about \$57 million in MILCON by leaving the 924th FG at Bergstrom and moving the 301st FW from Carswell to Bergstrom. If this is true, shouldn't consideration be given to the Austin community suggestion, especially since a commitment was made to leave the 924th at Bergstrom until at least 1996 if the city committed to moving its municipal airport to Bergstrom?

Since there seems to be many uncertainties surrounding the consolidation of 186 reserve aircraft from the Air Force, Navy, Army, Marines, Coast Guard, etc., at Carswell AFB, would leaving the 924th at Bergstrom give the Air Force some flexibility should Carswell prove to be overcrowded once all reserve units are in place?



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1660

JUN 21 1993

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209


Dear Mr. Chairman

This response to your 14 Jun 93 letter answers specific questions for the record concerning base closure and realignments. Hopefully, this information will be useful in your independent analysis.

Sincerely

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Attachment:
Questions and answers



SECDEF:

2. QUESTION: Are the demographics available in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of Dallas FT. Worth to support the recruitment of 10,000 plus service veterans and/or civilians whose skills are directly transferrable to military aviation occupational specialties? Please describe your methodology to ascertain.

RESPONSE: This question was previously answered by the OSD staff.

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3. QUESTION: The COBRA figure for privatizing Newark AFB in place did not address any aspect of transitioning the workload to contractor operation. What is the cost of transitioning the workload to contractor operation, and will it save money?

RESPONSE: We estimate the transition cost to be approximately \$1.9M (FY94\$). Based on our analysis the closure of Newark AFB and the privatization of most of its workload will save money and will be cost effective.

4. QUESTION: What is the Air Force plan for transitioning the Minuteman ICBM guidance repair workload that is presently done at Newark AFB? Presently, Newark is the only facility that can accomplish this work.

RESPONSE: We are evaluating three options for this workload; a. privatize, b. interservice, and c. contract out. We are confident this workload can be satisfactorily accomplished by one or more of these options.

5. QUESTION: It appears that the Air Force did not develop a clear transition plan for the privatization of Newark AFB? It appears high risk - what is your operational and economic risk assessment?

RESPONSE: The recommendation to privatize the Newark workload in place was based on a cost estimating model. Transition planning is still in its formative stages and cannot be completed until final decisions are reached regarding interservicing, contracting out, and privatization in place.

There appears to be adequate capability within the DOD and the commercial sector to assume the Newark workload within a reasonably short transition period. In addition, force reductions and improved system and component reliability have put us in a positive support posture. Therefore, we assess operational and economic risk to be acceptable.

6. QUESTION: What is the annual cost to contract for the total Newark workload including contract administration?

RESPONSE: The COBRA estimate for annual contract costs was \$68.09M. Program management and contract administration is estimated to be \$0.43M.

7. QUESTION: Does the capability to accept the entire Newark workload presently exist in the commercial sector? If not, how long will it take to develop such a capability?

RESPONSE: The commercial sector does have the capability to accept the entire Newark workload at this time. A recent meeting to discuss this issue was attended by approximately fifty contractors. While only one contractor expressed an interest in assuming the entire Newark workload, many individual and teamed contractors expressed interest in parts of the workload. The Navy also stated that they could accept much of the workload.

8. QUESTION: The Newark facility has approximately 1.7M DPAH. What is the commercial capacity? What is the commercial cost per labor hour?

RESPONSE: AFMC does not know the total capacity of the commercial sector to perform AGMC workloads. However, we received many favorable responses to our request for information from individual and teamed contractors. Based on these responses, we are confident that there is sufficient commercial capacity and enough interest in this work to achieve the benefits of competition.

At this time, we cannot state the commercial cost per labor hour. This will become known as we progress through the formal competition/contracting process.

What is the impact of the Air Force's force structure announcement on the current basing strategy and the 1993 base-closure process? Specifically...

9. QUESTION: If Fairchild is to become one of the primary tanker bases, what are the plans for the weapons storage area? Will the munitions be transferred out, or will they be used in place by units deploying in?

RESPONSE: In a recent force structure public announcement, the Air Force stated its intention to create a large KC-135 air refueling wing at Fairchild AFB. The large number of KC-135 aircraft would require relocation of the B-52H aircraft. Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs) will remain in the igloos at Fairchild, while gravity nuclear weapons and conventional munitions will most likely be moved elsewhere. Storage for nuclear cruise missiles will remain critical through 1998 when we can expect some decrease in STRATCOM's cruise missile requirement. Until then, we need 42 wide-door cruise missile storage igloos to hold the required missiles and their launchers. There are a total of 13 wide door igloos at Fairchild, 16 at Barksdale and 13 at Minot. Additionally, since plans call for conventional bombers to conduct missions directly from CONUS bases initially, conventional munitions will be co-located with the bombers. If necessary, the Air Force would fly aircraft into Fairchild and load cruise missiles. Then we would stage from Fairchild or rotate them to other locations for executions.

10. QUESTION: The force-structure announcement generally reflected several 1993 DoD closure and realignment recommendations, but did not show deactivation of the 31 st FW from Homestead, closure of Newark AFB, or realignment of the Springfield ANG, OH to Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Please elaborate.

RESPONSE: The 27 May 93 force structure announcement addressed the SECDEF's 12 Mar 93, Base Closure/Realignment recommendation only if there was expanded information from that released in the DoD Report/Air Force News Release. The information was included to make the announcement as comprehensive as possible by showing the total base impact should the closure/realignment recommendations become final. All previously announced information on the DoD recommendations remains valid. Rationale on the specific questions follows:

a. The 12 Mar 93 Air Force News Release contained the recommendation to inactivate the 31st Fighter Wing, so it wasn't readdressed in the 27 May 93 announcement. However, the actual number of Homestead AFB, FL, aircraft involved in the recommended closure was included because the numbers weren't included in the 12 Mar 93 Air Force New Release.

b. The Newark AFB, OH, closure wasn't readdressed in the 27 May 93, announcement because there wasn't any additional information to that released on 12 Mar 93.

c. The Air Force deleted the Springfield AGS, OH, F-16 unit move to Wright - Patterson AFB, OH, from the announcement because it appears that after site surveys, this relocation is no longer cost effective. The Commission was notified of this situation.

11. QUESTION: You have provided Air Force comments on the majority of opposing community comments and concerns. Would you care to elaborate on any today, other than what you have already provided previously or in your testimony thus far?

RESPONSE: Yes, I included additional comments in my written statement dated June 17, 1993 (Atch 1, pp. 15, 22, 25)

12. QUESTION: You have seen correspondence from the Commission regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and its relationship to potential closure of Grand Forks AFB, ND. Would the relationship of the ABM site preclude closure of Grand Forks AFB and/or its attached ICBM missile field now or during the 1995 round of the base closure process?

RESPONSE: In my 17 Jun 93 testimony to the Commission (Atch 1, pg 14), I commented on the effect of this proposed closure and the ABM treaty. I would like to expand on that answer. The ABM treaty would not preclude closure of Grand Forks AFB. A major provision of the treaty limits deployment of ABM systems to one site located either around the nation's capital or centered within a group of ICBM silo launchers. If the base is closed and all silo launchers are eliminated, the US would have the right to relocate the US ABM system to the nation's capital, not to another ICBM base or some other location. If we eliminate all the ICBM silo-launchers in the deployment area and chose not to relocate the ABM system, the ABM treaty is unclear whether the US may leave the ABM system in place without dismantling it or reactivate it someday. The existence of the ICBM launchers was a sine qua non for the initial deployment of the ABM system there pursuant to Article III. But, a review of the negotiating record would be required to determine whether the US would still have a right to an ABM system there. In any case, the US could seek explicit agreement of the Treaty Parties to have an ABM system there.

13. QUESTION: The Air Force indicated an excess of between four and five large aircraft bases. If the Commission elects to recommend closure of the Grand Forks Missile field, should the rest of the base be considered as one of four or one of five large-aircraft bases to close or realign?

RESPONSE: It should be considered one of five large aircraft bases to close or realign.

14. QUESTION: Congressman Boehlert forwarded an Air Mobility Command MILCON estimate for Griffiss AFB that totalled over \$500M. This seems an excessive cost to bring an operational base up to a new mission. Would you address this high cost estimate, in particular the \$66.0M for approximately 600,000 square yards of aircraft parking ramp and \$137.0M for about 1,270 military family housing units? Could you explain the "drag costs", rationale?

RESPONSE: The MILCON cost estimates for Griffiss AFB were addressed in my Jun 18, 1993 letter to the Commission (Atch 2).

15. QUESTION: Please explain why, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Air Force, it is too early to close one of four active missile fields and thus bring the number of total ICBM silos to 550?

RESPONSE: The response to this question was provided in a SAF/MII 20 May 93 response to the DBCRC (Atch 3).

16. **QUESTION:** Given the winter fuel situation and the Accident Potential Zone (APZ) II encroachment violations at Plattsburgh AFB, do you feel that this base was the correct choice as the East Coastal Mobility Base?

RESPONSE: Yes, the Air Force remains firmly convinced that Plattsburgh AFB is the best base for the east coast Air Mobility Wing. Please refer to the SAF/MII letters dated June 11, 1993, and June 12, 1993, to DBCRC (Atch 4) for additional details in regard to their operation.

17. QUESTION: The Commission staff's independent evaluation of Air Force-provided data as related to criteria I, II, and III indicate that Griffiss AFB is a strong bomber base. Obviously the Base Closure Executive Group saw some key detrimental elements that resulted in the Secretary's recommendation to realign Griffiss. Can you elaborate on those elements or the final decision?

RESPONSE: Griffiss has capably served as an effective bomber base for a number of years. When we compared Griffiss with all of the other bases in its category using all of the subelements of the eight DoD criteria, it ranked in the lowest grouping of bases and, thus, became a candidate for closure/realignment. Given we had 4 to 5 more large aircraft bases than we needed to support the approved Defense Force Structure Plan, Griffiss AFB was recommended for realignment. Griffiss is not a bad bomber base but it isn't as good as the bomber bases we have retained.

18. QUESTION: If Fairchild AFB were closed instead of Griffiss AFB, would the Air Force make Griffiss AFB a tanker base, or a B-52 base instead of Minot as is currently projected?

RESPONSE: The Air Force does not support the closure of Fairchild AFB. If forced to accept the loss of Fairchild, the Air Force would have to reevaluate the beddown of the force structure. Griffiss would most likely retain its bombers and tankers until final force structure decisions are made. Minot would still retain the intended bomber mission since bomber-ICBM bases are more cost effective than bomber-only bases. The Air Force intends to develop Plattsburgh as the Northeast Air Mobility wing with both tanker and airlift assets. Therefore, there would be no compelling need to develop a tanker operation at Griffiss. The hypothetical loss of Fairchild would not alter mobility wing plans.

19. QUESTION: If Fairchild AFB were to close instead of KI Sawyer AFB, would the Air Force make KI Sawyer AFB a tanker base, or a B-52 base instead of Minot as is currently projected?

RESPONSE: The Air Force does not support the closure of Fairchild AFB. Fairchild is ideally situated to support peacetime and contingency deployments to the Pacific. The base infrastructure (ramp, hydrants and facilities) are well suited to accommodating a large air refueling wing. KI Sawyer would be a much less desirable location for tanker assets since it is not as near the major deployment corridors as is Fairchild. If forced to retain KI Sawyer, the decision on what force structure to base there would be worked by the Air Staff and the MAJCOMs. However, retaining KI Sawyer would not alter the Air Force intention of basing bombers at Minot.

20. QUESTION: The Air Force is currently converting all MM II silos at Malmstrom to MM III. Considering the actual number of MM III missiles in the inventory, why do you think this is necessary?

RESPONSE: The underlying question is: how many ICBM bases and corresponding silos should we maintain--four bases for a total of 650 silos or three bases for a 500 silo total? In the spirit of the START I and II treaties we've been drawing down our 1000 missile Minuteman ICBM fleet since October 1992. Initially, we planned to consolidate our remaining land based, single warhead, Minuteman III ICBMs into three bases (500 silos). Given the world situation as it then existed, we felt this was the right number of ICBMs to maintain deterrence. Today, given the planned deactivation of Peacekeeper (FY2000-2003) coupled with the continuing uncertainty in the former Soviet Union, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to other countries and fiscal realities, we believe it is prudent to consider preserving some additional silos for land based ICBMs. Preserving these national assets--silos--instead of destroying them will allow us to relook the mix of our nuclear Triad forces and settle upon the most cost effective and militarily sound force structure for the future while we await the final outcome of the CIS drawdown. Preserving these silos also allows us time to examine another use for them. Perhaps a defensive, not offensive mission. Again, we need this time to assess and examine the world situation to insure we do the right thing. Given all the changes, both to the world and our own nuclear force structure, we should strive to maintain the best possible nuclear deterrence in today's fiscally constrained environment.

21. QUESTION: What will happen with the aerial port at McGuire if the base is realigned as an AFRES installation?

RESPONSE: The existing aerial port facility at McGuire AFB will be retained although operated at a reduced posture by ARC personnel. The ARC personnel which will remain at McGuire AFB will include two oversized aerial port squadrons which, upon activation, will operate either the McGuire AFB aerial port facility or deploy to some other operating location.

22. QUESTION: During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, McGuire AFB processed several thousand passengers and tons of cargo and mail destined for the Middle East. How does the Air Force envision meeting these requirements if McGuire is realigned as a Reserve installation?

RESPONSE: While the remaining Reserve aerial port facility will be able to process some cargo upon activation, much of the peacetime and wartime cargo previously handled at McGuire will be shifted to Dover AFB, Delaware with the McGuire AFB realignment. Westover AFB, Massachusetts will also be activated to accommodate additional wartime cargo. Most northeast U.S. military passenger service is handled through Philadelphia International although a portion of this service will also be shifted to Dover AFB and Westover AFB. Upon activation, McGuire reservists will also support limited passenger operations if tasked in place

23. QUESTION: The Air Force has recommended the closure of McClellan AFB and Newark AFB. What impact would the closure of a second large air logistics center have on the Air Force's depot-maintenance capability?

RESPONSE: The most devastating impact would be on the Air Force budget because of the extremely high cost of closing a second Air Logistics Center. Second would be the extensive disruption to the Air Force's depot maintenance capability by closing two large Air Logistic Centers simultaneously. It would likely take up to 10 years to return to a normal operation. Moving the individual work loads would be phased over a six year period; however, not all moves could be accomplished concurrently and there would be a period of time where the equipment being moved would be unusable. Since approximately 85% of the engineers, item managers, maintenance workers, and management personnel would not transfer to the new location (based upon previous experience), new workers would have to go through extensive retraining in order to function efficiently at their new position. This reduction in capability would result in increased interim production support costs to stockpile spares necessary to maintain operational capability. Learning curve effects plus the loss of corporate management knowledge of the weapon system and repair process would adversely affect production and quality for an interim period until it could be reacquired. Since planning is seldom perfect, there undoubtedly would be weapon system readiness impacts.

24. QUESTION: The Air Force plans to decommission the non-destructive inspection facility at McClellan if the base is closed. What provisions has the Air Force made to retire the small nuclear reactor at the facility, and has the costs been included in the COBRA estimate? Also, McClellan has a cold-proof facility for stress testing of the F-111 aircraft. If McClellan is closed, and with the F-111 remaining in the inventory, will the stress testing still be required; if so, where will it be done?

RESPONSE:

a. The Air Force has reviewed the requirements for the non-destructive inspection facility (including the nuclear reactor) at McClellan and has determined that the testing can be accomplished using other methods at the remaining ALCs. It would not be cost effective to reconstruct this facility at a new location or to maintain it at McClellan as an enclave. The facility can not be decommissioned until a disposal source for high level radioactive materials is identified by DOE. Until that time, a \$900K per year maintenance cost will be incurred. This cost was included in the AFMC data submission to Air Staff for the COBRA model. When a DOE disposal source is identified, the estimated cost for total decommissioning will be approximately \$50 million (includes environmental cleanup costs).

b. The cold-proof facility is required to support the F-111 aircraft. It is the only test capable of detecting specific types of stress fractures in the airframe. Presently the F-111 is subjected to structural testing during every second Program Depot Maintenance (PDM) cycle (approximately every 2500 flying hours). If McClellan is closed and the F-111 aircraft remains in the active inventory beyond 1999, then the cold-proof facility will have to be duplicated at the location selected to perform the PDMs on the F-111. The cost to replace the cold-proof facility is approximately \$15 million.

25. QUESTION: The 301st Rescue Squadron realignment to Patrick is in support of an active-duty mission to support Space Shuttle launches. Are there any cost savings or operational concerns for moving the unit back to Homestead AFB?

RESPONSE: The 301st Rescue Squadron's current mission is combat search and rescue with a secondary mission of shuttle support. Currently the 41st and 71st Rescue Squadrons, both active-duty squadrons stationed at Patrick AFB, have primary responsibility for shuttle support missions. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, the Reserve aircraft from the 301st would deploy temporarily from Homestead to Patrick to augment the shuttle support forces. The 301st will maintain a shuttle support role in either location.

The significant DoD costs associated with the 301st Rescue Squadron beddown are military construction and recurring base operating costs at Patrick versus Homestead. Below is a cost summary of various scenarios:

ACTION:	MILCON	RECURRING BOS
301st remains at Patrick	\$14.8M	\$4M
301st at Homestead (no other unit)	\$62.93M	\$16M

26. QUESTION: The DoD recommendation for O'Hare Air Reserve Station specified that the move had to be made at no expense to the federal government, yet the request from the City of Chicago only referenced no costs to DoD. Please clarify.

RESPONSE: This question was answered in the Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations (Volume V), March 1993 (Excerpt, Atch 5). Also, please refer to pages 22 and 23 of the Air Force Statement dated June 17, 1993 (Atch 1).

27. QUESTION: All the proponents and opposition groups for the O'Hare Air Reserve Station desire that the units stay within Illinois. Would either the 928th Airlift Group (AFRES) or the 126 Air Refueling Group (ANG) be placed more in jeopardy during further force structure draw downs if in between moves?

RESPONSE: At this time neither of these units are scheduled for reductions. However, we cannot insure that future reductions will not affect these units.

28. QUESTION: Acting Secretary Donley sent a letter to the Commission notifying us of the offer by The Department of Commerce to operate the MacDill AFB, FL runway. Does that offer, if accepted, provide a viable alternative to the proposed MacDill AFB redirect and thus obviate the need to relocate the 482nd FW (AFRES) to MacDill to operate the runway?

RESPONSE: The 482nd is not moving from Homestead to MacDill just to operate the airport. Homestead is recommended for closure, in no small part because of the awesome cost of rebuilding. All units previously assigned to Homestead will be relocated, including AFRES units. When we decided to convert the 482nd to tankers, MacDill became an optimum location. It is a much more cost-effective location, especially with the Department of Commerce operation of the airfield, than Homestead is, or is likely to be for many years.

29. QUESTION: If the Commission elects to retain the 482nd FW (AFRES) at Homestead as a realignment in lieu of the proposed closure, should that unit retain its existing weapon system (F-16) or convert to KC-135s as in the proposed redirect related to MacDill AFB? Who should pay the additional costs for bedding down KC-135s at Homestead?

RESPONSE:

a. The Air Force position is to convert the 482nd FW to tankers and move this unit to MacDill AFB as a BRAC realignment proposal. For many years the Air Force has tried to locate additional tanker assets in the Southeast US in order to fix a chronic tanker shortfall in that region. After the devastation of Homestead and subsequent re-examination of MacDill, the Air Force saw an opportunity to help the regional tanker problem at a significantly reduced cost over rebuilding Homestead AFB for fighters. If the Commission should elect to retain the 482 FW (AFRES) at Homestead, it would need to convert the unit to KC-135s. This would not be a good location for KC-135s.

b. Since new facilities would be required to beddown either mission at Homestead, we would recommend that BRAC funds pay for the total beddown costs.

30. QUESTION: You have provided the Commission new information regarding the proposed relocation of the Air National Guard unit at Springfield, Ohio to Wright-Patterson AFB and in fact did not include that realignment in the May 28 announcement. Should the Commission regard that particular aspect of the proposed Rickenbacker ANGB as no longer cost or mission effective?

RESPONSE: The Air Force provided information on the increased cost of moving the 173th Fighter Group from Springfield, Ohio, to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. this information was based on our site surveys, done after March 15, and shows that the move is not cost effective. the estimates on which our recommendation was made were in error. While we can make no recommendations to the Commission after March 15, we would expect the Commission would also find this move no longer justified.

31. QUESTION: DoD concluded there is adequate space at the Carswell cantonment area to support both the Air Force and Navy proposals of operating 186 aircraft. DoD also concluded that moving the 924th from Bergstrom to Carswell will be cost effective and will result in operational efficiencies. Please address the Austin community position which illustrates that operating 186 aircraft from Carswell's cantonment would degrade operational readiness, increase operational costs and unnecessarily increase risk."

RESPONSE: In a SAF/MII, 16 Jun 1993, response to the DBCRC (Atch 6), the Air Force responded to the Austin community position as put forth in their May 25, 1993 report.

32. QUESTION: The Austin community provided data to show that DoD could save about \$57 million in MILCON by leaving the 924th FG at Bergstrom. If this is true, shouldn't consideration be given to the Austin community suggestion, especially since a commitment was made to leave the 924th at Bergstrom until at least 1996 if the city committed to moving its municipal airport to Bergstrom?


RESPONSE: In a SAF/MII, 16 Jun 1993, response to the DBCRC, the Air Force provided the answer to this question (Atch 5).

33. QUESTION: Since there seems to be many uncertainties surrounding the consolidation of 186 reserve aircraft from the Air Force, Navy, Army, Marines, Coast Guard, etc., at Carswell AFB, would leaving the 924th at Bergstrom give the Air Force some flexibility should Carswell prove to be overcrowded once all reserve units are in place?"

RESPONSE: In a SAF/MII, 16 Jun 1993, response to the DBCRC, the Air Force provided the answer to this question (Atch 6).

34. QUESTION: The City of Chicago group requested relief on the time constraints for the Chicago O' Hare Air Reserve Station realignment, which was recommended to begin in 1995 and be completed by 1997. The public law would allow closure to continue through 1999. Is there a specific reason that the move must be completed by 1997?

RESPONSE: Public law mandates a no later than summer 1995 begin date, but we could be flexible on the completion date. However, we would like to keep to begin to end dates as close as possible. By law, the action must be completed by the summer of 1999.



SECDEF:

1. QUESTION: Do you plan on accepting the proposal by the Secretary of Commerce for a no-cost transfer of the operation of the airfield at MacDill AFB, FL to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA)?

RESPONSE: I would support that.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO
THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

17 JUNE 1993

SUBJECT: AIR FORCE TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BASE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS

STATEMENT OF: MR. JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(INSTALLATIONS)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the invitation to give the Commission a last overview of Air Force efforts in selecting bases to close, and to respond to some of the issues that have been raised. I suppose I should say I'm pleased to be here, but I'm really not. It's not your Commission, a hard-working and effective group for whom I have the greatest respect. It's the subject.

Closing the bases that I have personally spent most of my career building up is a painful matter. The Air Force has a base structure second to none, with good, even excellent, facilities, in good shape. We are not selecting the "worst" bases for closure, because there aren't any. We are choosing those which, under today's radically changed circumstances, have the least military value.

The Air Force base structure exists to support its force structure. We cannot afford to thin out our units to keep bases occupied and open. In fact, one of the steps we took in preparation for our deliberations in 1993 was a searching, hands-on study of base capacity, conducted by a team from headquarters with a great many on-site visits.

I want to emphasize that the Air Force strongly supports the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. These recommendations are the result of a very comprehensive analysis. It was based on the eight DOD Criteria, with emphasis on military value, and was carefully coordinated within the DoD. Now, after going through an extensive review process with the Commission and the public, which has brought out a variety of different views, we remain

convinced that the Secretary of Defense's recommendations represent the best way to reduce our base structure consistent with the declining forces provided for in the Defense Force Structure Plan.

Let me briefly review the Air Force process, which is formally embodied in the Internal Control Plan (ICP). The heart of this process was the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), consisting of 13 General Officers and Senior Executive Service civilians. They came from a number of functional areas and had a wide range of expertise. The BCEG oversaw the whole data collection and analysis process, and worked closely with the Secretary in developing his recommendations.

As required by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, OSD established eight criteria for evaluating bases for the FY 93 Commission. The Air Force developed over 160 subelements, or data points, to be used in its analysis of bases. In addition, an additional 11 subelements were identified specific to depot operations. Data for each subelement were collected from bases, verified by major commands, and re-checked at headquarters. At each step, each item was personally certified by the responsible officer. Air Force auditors looked at this process and concluded that it was highly accurate - less than 1% error rate. Of course, we recognize that this means that there were some errors, but we corrected them promptly upon discovery.

The BCEG placed bases in categories according to primary function (flying, depot,

etc.). Sixteen were excluded from further consideration because they had unique capabilities or were in geographically essential locations. Twenty were in categories excluded due to lack of excess capacity. The capacity study I referred to previously, combined with the DoD Force Structure Plan, led us to conclude that we did have excess capacity in the flying category, operations subcategory. This excess was primarily driven by force structure changes, i.e., bomber reductions and the 1991 Commission's rejection of our recommendation to close Moody AFB. Therefore, we identified an excess capacity of four to five large aircraft bases and one small aircraft base.

One of the excluded categories, bases whose primary mission is hosting Air Force Material Command product divisions and laboratories, has drawn some questions. There are three reasons why no product division bases are recommended for closure. First, there is no significant change in the budget, employment, or organization planned in this area, so consolidations would produce few savings. Second, since virtually everyone would have to be transferred and re-housed elsewhere, the current bases would be so costly to close that none would pay off within 20 years. Finally, we cannot relocate the product centers without also moving the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC's) which support them. Alternatively, the corporate Air Force would have to figure out another means of acquiring the technical contractor support that the FFRDCs now provide. We will be looking at the product division bases again in 1995. In the meantime, we plan to do considerable preparatory work.

We should point out that Air Reserve Component (ARC) bases were evaluated differently from active duty bases. ARC bases do not readily compete against each other, as these units enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. In fact, relocating Guard units across state boundaries is not a practical alternative. Careful consideration must be given to the recruiting needs of these units. Moreover, the DoD Force Structure Plan used during BRAC 93 did not significantly reduce ARC force structure. Thus, there was little apparent excess capacity in the ARC base structure. Because of these considerations, ARC units were evaluated only to see if there might be cost effective realignments onto active installations, or onto other ARC bases.

The data for each subelement were analyzed by the BCEG. They questioned data, called for additional research when not satisfied with it, and in some cases made their own judgements about it. Then they color-coded the subelements for six of the eight DoD criteria red, yellow or green. Green was for "keep," red for "close," and yellow in between. For criteria IV and V we used actual numbers instead of colors. After analyzing all the data and the subelement codings, the BCEG color coded the same six DOD criteria for each base under consideration. Then they assigned the bases in the large and small aircraft categories to one of three groups, in increasing order of desirability for retention. In the categories with few bases, they simply provided the Secretary with a chart showing the color coding for each criterion for each base, with actual numbers for criteria IV and V. Installations with Air Mobility Wing basing potential were further analyzed with a set of subelements reflecting

both specific suitability for that mission and for geographic location - one each in the East and the West. Mobility requirements precluded making this an open competition regardless of geographic location.

Acting Secretary Donley met a number of times with the BCEG before he finally completed his recommendations for bases to close or realign. His recommendations are based on the force structure plan, the Air Force capacity analysis, the base groupings and color coding of the eight criteria by the BCEG, and his own best judgement. The bases selected for closure came from the lowest group in the category, or the lowest bases based on color codings of the eight criteria, as applicable. The Secretary of Defense approved all of those recommendations except the closure of McClellan AFB, California.

I'd like to comment at this point on some objections that have been raised to this process. The General Accounting Office generally agreed with the process, but has observed that the decisions could not always be reconstructed. We acknowledge that their comment may be correct in some instances, but we have no reservations about the process. We designed a process that allows professional judgement to have a bearing on the outcome. In coding subelements, aggregating them for each of the eight criteria, and finally in grouping the bases by relative value, the BCEG members necessarily used some judgement. For example, all factors are not equal in value, and bases are not sufficiently similar that a point scale will compare them adequately. Assignment of numerical weights is in itself an exercise in judgement, despite the appearance of mathematical exactness.

Someone in the process has to be responsible for assuring that a point scale doesn't produce bizarre results. A flying base with atrocious weather, for example, could be at the top of the "flying-small aircraft" list based on its twin runways, excellent facilities, and proximity to a Navy range that is actually available only occasionally. There is no such base; this is just an example of the real problems that point systems can produce.

A great deal of experience and seasoned judgment are needed to assure that the values are proper, and nuances are given adequate consideration. The BCEG supplied this judgment, and on a clearly accountable basis. It included a wide range of expertise, at a very senior level. The Secretary knew exactly who color coded items and grouped bases. He could, and did, question the responsible parties, the BCEG members, directly. He didn't have to send someone to research "who did that, and what does it mean."

We have some concerns about the point systems devised by the Commission Staff. The version of the depot base system they showed us, for example, gave flying, an important but secondary activity, twice as many points as depot operations. In any point system, assumptions and subjective judgements underlie the numbers. We didn't agree with some of them in the depot system, and couldn't figure out where some others come from. Even though the numbers are only a numerical expression of a series of judgements, they convey a false sense of precision that can overwhelm wise decision-making. We hope that the Commission will not put too much emphasis on point systems, but will rely on its best judgement after considering all the evidence that has been placed before it.

The communities near bases being considered by the Commission, as well as your staff, have raised many issues about the color coding of specific data subelements at individual bases. We have responded to them in writing, and it would serve no purpose for me to repeat our reasoning and conclusions for each one. I welcome your questions, however, and will do my best to answer them.

Where we corrected errors as a result of community and Commission staff input, we rechecked to see if any of the base groupings changed as a result. None did. This illustrates a key point, not always well understood: An error in one of 160 data points is not decisive. It is unlikely to change the overall result. The data points aren't like 160 traffic lights in a row, any one of which can stop traffic. They are more like the lights on a parallel-wired Christmas tree. A few can change color or wink out without changing the appearance of the tree.

Now let me turn to some of the more significant concerns that have been raised about our recommendations. The subelement ratings, numbers, and analysis underlying our recommendations is contained in Volume V of the Secretary of Defense's report to the Commission. They have been amplified, and on occasion corrected, in numerous discussions and exchanges with you and your staff. In many cases, we have provided formal written inputs to the Commission. Rather than go over our reasoning process and recommendations again, I'd like to respond just to the major points that have been raised. These fall into four

groups: basing an East Coast Air Mobility Wing, and closing or realigning two other large aircraft bases in the Northeast; issues involving the two large aircraft bases recommended for closure by the Secretary of Defense, and two others added by the Commission for study; analysis of the depot structure and methods of reducing excess capacity; and Reserve basing issues. I'll take them up in that order.

EAST COAST AIR MOBILITY WING BASING

The issues arise from the Air Force selection of Plattsburgh AFB as the East Coast base for an Air Mobility Wing. The Secretary of Defense approved our recommendations to realign Griffiss AFB, New York, by removing the active flying mission and to realign McGuire AFB, New Jersey, to the Reserve forces. The Commission added Plattsburgh to the list of bases for study, so all three are candidates either for the mobility base or for closure/realignment.

There have been some heated allegations that the Air Force has not been objective in selecting Plattsburgh for the Air Mobility Wing and the other two bases for realignment. That just isn't so. I want to reassure the Commission that the Air Force dealt with these three bases equitably and on a level playing field. We did not start with a prejudgment in favor a particular base, or skew the data to show Plattsburgh was best or one of the others worse. We did make some mistakes, but we corrected them as quickly as they were discovered and the correct data ascertained.

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York. Many of the issues raised concerning the relative merits of Plattsburgh and Griffiss rest on misunderstandings, selective quotation, discovery of old but corrected errors, and a few valid points. None of them change the fact that Plattsburgh is the best location for the East Coast Air Mobility Wing, and Griffiss and McGuire are not. At the outset, I acknowledge that intuitively Griffiss would seem to have an edge - the necessity to keep the Rome Laboratory open, and to provide for contingency transportation of troops from the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum. In our recommendations we have provided least-cost solutions for both of these matters. At the same time, Plattsburgh is much richer in airfield infrastructure specific to an Air Mobility Wing, including an extraordinarily large parking ramp. The bottom line is that the construction cost to bed down a Mobility Wing is \$200 million greater at Griffiss than at Plattsburgh.

We did discover that our data for community encroachment on the approach/departure areas at Plattsburgh AFB needed correction. Based on a careful review of the situation, the BCEG concluded that commercial development in Accident Potential Zone II north of the base required a change in rating for that two data points, relating to present and future community encroachment, from Green to Yellow. There is more development there than we would like to see, but it will not adversely affect flying operations for the Air Mobility Wing. The overall rating was reviewed in light of these corrections, and it did not change.

We have had considerable difficulty working through the welter of charges to establish

the aircraft parking capacity and fuel storage capabilities of the two bases. Our certified data for aircraft parking is 156 KC 135-equivalent spaces for Plattsburgh and 63 for Griffiss. A "use all the concrete" plan tendered by the Griffiss community is unworkable. It puts planes everywhere there is concrete in an effort to reach 83 spaces, the approximate number needed for the Air Mobility Wing. Some of the concrete is so deteriorated, however, that heavy aircraft cannot be parked on it. Some of the "parking spots" were on taxiways, in front of hangars, or so close to other aircraft that operations would be both inefficient and expensive.

There has been a great deal of controversy over fuel storage and resupply at Plattsburgh. I'll skip the numbers and point out the significance: none. None of the bases have fuel storage for more than a few weeks in a major contingency. All can be resupplied with ample fuel to respond to one. Plattsburgh is normally supplied by pipeline from a large tank farm at Port Douglas, 18 miles away, that receives its supplies by barge up the Champlain Canal. The canal is closed five to six months a year. At present, Port Douglas can supply most of the fuel Plattsburgh would normally need during that time, and normal resupply by rail and road would make up for any actual shortfall. There are existing unused tanks at Port Douglas available for lease at reasonable cost that would bring winter storage capacity near to requirements. If emergency requirements develop, as in a contingency, the base could be supplied directly by rail or truck.

Griffiss Air Force Base. The Griffiss community has not made a serious challenge to the

Air Force's analysis which placed Griffiss in Group 3, or least desirable for retention, among the large aircraft bases. Instead, the community has focused on questioning the superiority of Plattsburgh over Griffiss as the location for the East Coast Air Mobility Wing. As I stated above, none of the reevaluations that the Air Force has conducted since March 15 change the fact that Plattsburgh is better suited to support this wing. To recap the key points, Plattsburgh has a much larger usable ramp. Its multiple pump system and the configuration of its hydrants allows for refueling more aircraft in a given period of time than Griffiss. The flying time from Griffiss to the European theater is approximately 42 minutes greater than from Plattsburgh. Finally, the construction cost to beddown this wing at Griffiss is \$200 million greater.

Despite the excess of large aircraft bases and Griffiss' nonselection for the East Coast Air Mobility Wing, the Air Force recognizes the value of certain features of this base. We plan to continue utilizing them. Accordingly, we have recommended that the Rome Laboratory remain at Griffiss, and that the airfield be maintained on a low cost standby basis to support deployments of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum. The Air National Guard will assume responsibility for the Air Defense Sector, in a cantonment area.

McGuire Air Force Base. The McGuire community has argued that the base has too much military value to close. This overlooks the fact that by converting McGuire AFB to a Reserve base, McGuire will remain available to support contingency mobilizations. However,

the lower operations tempo associated with a Reserve base will relieve the problems associated with operating in the midst of New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia air traffic congestion. The community questioned the extent of that congestion. In response, the Air Force reevaluated its data and confirmed that McGuire operations are constrained by air traffic delays. In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration reports that McGuire traffic adversely affects civil aviation. It underlies the principal approach route to Philadelphia International Airport, often delaying commercial aircraft in holding patterns or requiring circuitous routing. As air traffic in the Northeast continues to grow, congestion problems will increase for both civil and military traffic. It is impossible to overlook the fact that adding a large number of heavy aircraft to McGuire will only add to the problem. It may even make efficient operation of an Air Mobility Wing impossible.

The concern has been expressed that splitting the 438th and 514th Wings will lead to a less capable airlift system. At present, the 514th, a Reserve Associate Wing, supplies ground and air crews to fly and maintain aircraft assigned to the 438th, an active duty wing. As part of the realignment, the 514th is to receive its own aircraft. This, in conjunction with the Plattsburgh wing, will enhance the surge capability on the East Coast.

The McGuire area is an outstanding recruiting base for all Guard and Reserve units, and conversion of the runway to a civil airport should provide jobs. It will also help meet a long-stated FAA requirement for joint use of McGuire as a reliever for the congested airports in the Philadelphia region.

LARGE AIRCRAFT BASES

The Secretary of Defense recommended closure of K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, and realignment of March AFB, California, to the Air Reserve Component. Grand Forks Air Force Base, in North Dakota, and Fairchild AFB, Washington, were added by the Commission as bases that might be closed instead. In addition, we recommended transferring the Combat Crew Training Schools for the B-52 and KC-135 from Castle AFB, California to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, and Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, respectively. The 1991 Commission recommended that these missions be transferred to Fairchild. Under the Air Force force structure changes, Fairchild would become a major tanker base. It was a potential location for the West Coast Air Mobility Wing Base, but we found that Travis Air Force Base, California was a superior location for that mission.

Grand Forks. There were seven large aircraft bases ranked in Group 3, the lowest group, for the bomber mission. The same bases, except Malmstrom, also ranked in Group 3 for the tanker mission. We decided not to recommend Grand Forks AFB, Minot AFB, and Malmstrom AFB for closure, for the reasons given by the Acting Secretary of the Air Force in his statement to the Commission in March:

The Air Force must maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due to uncertainty with respect to START II. Under the START II treaty, the United States and Russia committed to significantly reduce nuclear warheads. While the treaty is a tremendous

achievement in reducing nuclear force levels, its entry into force requires START I to be in effect. Under the Lisbon Protocol to START I, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan must individually accede to START I and to the Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. Because of the national decision-making processes necessary before all accede to the required treaties, it is possible that START II will not become binding on the US for some time. Therefore it is appropriate for the US to move purposefully to implement the treaty, but not for it to prematurely foreclose militarily effective options in the event that reform in the former Soviet Union is set back. This places a premium on maintaining US options, within prudent treaty planning, for missile launch facilities. This requires the retention of four missile bases, one of which is Grand Forks AFB.

It is not clear when these uncertainties will be resolved, but it is obviously better to defer the issue of closing missile bases to 1995. Moreover, under the ABM Treaty Grand Forks is the only place where the United States is permitted to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. Again, in the current state of uncertainty about US relations with the other nuclear powers and successor powers, it would not be wise just yet to abandon the possibility of an ABM system by closing Grand Forks. In the meantime, it is more economical to retain an aircraft/missile base that must remain open for missiles than to maintain an aircraft-only base.

As you know, our excess capacity is "four to five" large aircraft bases. If we had not

decided to retain all three aircraft/missile bases, one of them would have been recommended for closure, based on large aircraft force structure. Accordingly, if the Commission should decide to close Grand Forks, it should be in addition to the four large aircraft bases whose closure we have already proposed. If we must lose an aircraft/missile base, we would find other means of basing its aircraft force structure.

The K.I. Sawyer community has questioned the wisdom of collocating two legs of the nuclear triad on one base, such as Grand Forks. Bombers and ICBMs have been collocated for decades. Collocation does not significantly raise the potential payoff of an enemy first strike. Survivability of the ICBM forces is accomplished by widely dispersed, hardened silos and control centers. Bombers are not fixed in place like ICBMs. Their survivability is based on varying levels of alert readiness and dispersal. Since collocation does not increase the benefit to an enemy from a first strike, its cost effectiveness and operational efficiency become dominant considerations.

K.I. Sawyer. The K.I. Sawyer community has argued that K.I. Sawyer was not considered for other missions. On the contrary, K.I. Sawyer was evaluated for its capability to support a mobility mission, and for a small aircraft mission. It did not meet the geographical requirements for an East Coast mobility mission, and did not compare favorably against the current small aircraft bases for capability to support a fighter mission. Specifically, the weather conditions are detrimental to year-round fighter operations; there are inadequate ranges within flying distance for fighter training; and there are too few low level training

routes to support a fighter mission. For example, the community expressed an interest in the F-111 mission. The F-111's are based at Cannon AFB, New Mexico. In addition to excellent flying weather, Cannon has a newly-expanded 70,000 acre range only 20 miles away. Clearly there would be no basis to close Cannon in favor of K.I. Sawyer. In fact, all of the current fighter bases, except perhaps Homestead with its terrible hurricane damage, are better suited to the fighter mission than K.I. Sawyer.

Fairchild. Fairchild is essential to the U.S. warfighting posture in the Pacific. It has significantly greater military value than the bases recommended by DoD for closure. Without extremely compelling reasons, a Group 2 base should not be selected for closure over a Group 3 base. As a tanker base, it supports our major Pacific contingency response (e.g., OPLAN 5027 - Defense of Korea) and it also has a unique weapon storage area (WSA). The WSA will continue to be used, with aircraft coming from other bases to pick up munitions when needed. Beyond these direct contributions for contingency operations, it has significant value for peacetime training. These operations depend heavily on a Northwest tanker base to satisfy regional tanker requirements. Major deployment refueling routes pass very close to Fairchild. The base infrastructure (ramp, hydrants, facilities, large conventional munitions storage area) is excellent for large tanker and bomber beddowns. Some have advocated K.I. Sawyer to fill this role. However, it would not be an attractive location, since it is much farther from the major west coast deployment corridors than Fairchild and would not satisfy Northwest regional tanker/receiver requirements.

In a recent public announcement, the Air Force stated its intention to create a large KC-135 air refueling wing at Fairchild AFB. This requires relocation of the B-52H aircraft. Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs) will remain in igloos at Fairchild uniquely configured for them, while the gravity nuclear weapons and conventional munitions will most likely be moved elsewhere. Storage for nuclear cruise missiles will remain critical through 1998, when we can expect some decrease in STRATCOM's cruise missile requirement. Conventional munitions will be co-located with the bombers. If necessary, the aircraft would fly into Fairchild and load cruise missiles. Then they would stage from Fairchild or rotate them to other locations for operations.

March Air Force Base. March AFB, near Riverside, California, was recommended for realignment to the Air Reserve Component. Like McGuire AFB, it is located in an area of heavy air traffic congestion, and its future operational use is significantly constrained. However, also like McGuire, its proximity to an extremely large population center (the Los Angeles basin) makes it an ideal location for Reserve recruiting. Keeping the airfield operating allows the Air Force to continue to accommodate airlift operations for Army and Marine forces responding to natural disasters or contingencies.

Concern has been expressed by our mobilization customers that a Reserve base cannot respond swiftly to short-notice deployments. All the ramp space, facilities, and trained personnel will be in place to meet all deployment requirements. An active-duty mobile aerial port squadron from Travis Air Force Base, California, has been tasked to deploy units from

March. It will train and exercise with the Marines to assure deployment capability is ready at all times.

We are aware of Commission studies on relocating Marine Corps helicopter units, with over 3700 active duty personnel, on to March AFB. The Air Force plans to close down the March AFB hospital, commissary, BX, and other functions associated with supporting active duty personnel once the base converts to Reserve status. Should the Marine units relocate to March, these support functions would be required. The Marine unit would be the largest active duty organization on base, and should become the host service. This would mean transferring March AFB from the Department of the Air Force to the Department of the Navy. The Air Reserve Component units would remain at March in a cantonment area.

AIR FORCE DEPOT STRUCTURE

A number of questions have arisen about the Air Force depot structure. The Secretary of Defense did not adopt the Air Force recommendation to close McClellan AFB, California. He did approve the closure of Newark Air Force Base, Ohio. We expect to privatize the majority of its operations and relocate the remainder to other locations. The Commission elected to place four of the five major depot bases, Kelly AFB, Texas; Robins AFB, Georgia; Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and McClellan on the list of bases for study (Only the tactical missile workload at Hill Air Force Base, Utah was included on the study list).

As stated in my June 14, 1993 letter, the Air Force disagrees with 1987 baseline used by the Commission's staff to compute excess depot capacity. Using this baseline significantly overestimates excess capacity, since it does not account for personnel and facility reductions accomplished between 1987 and 1991. We agree with the Secretary of Defense that none of our major depots should be selected for closure at this time.

The Air Force had to consider its depots primarily in the context of Air Force requirements, and to rate them only in comparison with each other. The major obstacle to closing depots is cost to close, Criterion IV. Four of our five major depots (Air Logistics Centers) cannot be closed without transferring the workload, at a cost in the vicinity of \$1 billion at each one. There is not enough saving in base operating support (BOS) to pay back this cost in, literally, a hundred years. It is more cost effective, at least until long term requirements are better defined, to continue reducing depot excess capacity by downsizing in place. This involves personnel reductions and mothballing or disposing of excess facilities and equipment. This may involve accepting some inefficiency in facility use, but the cost is negligible compared to the cost of transferring workload.

Our initial analysis indicated one major depot, McClellan, could be closed and payback achieved in 19 years. Further analysis showed that McClellan's workload will be declining over the next six years. Some of the weapon systems it supports are declining in numbers to the extent that contracting out or relocation will become cost effective. Since substantially less workload will have to be transferred if closure occurs in 1999, the cost to

close McClellan is around \$428 million, not the \$1 billion anticipated for the other four. The payback period after 1999 is only two years. Based on these results, the Secretary of the Air Force determined McClellan was the only major Air Force depot that was reasonable to consider for closure or realignment.

As you can see, this decision could be deferred until 1995 and still achieve closure by 1999. That would allow McClellan to compete with other depots in the DOD system to determine which ones are the most effective. McClellan could well win the right to stay open in that competition, based on workloads transferred from other Service depots. It wouldn't be eligible if it were slated for closing, even though the closing would still be years away. Therefore, we hope you will put closing McClellan, or any of the major depot bases, on hold until 1995.

On the other hand, if you believe that one major Air Force depot must be closed, it should be McClellan. Based on our analysis, the others are cost-prohibitive to close at this time. As you know, Criterion IV is part of the "military value" to which the Secretary of Defense directed us to give priority. The staggering cost to close contributes to a high military value rating for the other four depots compared to McClellan, though there are a number of other factors as well. For example, the others all have active or Reserve flying missions and the capacity to increase those missions.

More to the point, a list must be capable of implementation. A billion dollar closure

cost would extremely difficult to deal with in the severely strained defense budget.

Therefore, if the Commission chooses to recommend closure of a major Air Force depot this year, it should be McClellan. Not only can closure be accommodated within DOD cost and payback guidelines, but it was also the lowest ranked of the five major depot bases.

Newark Air Force Base. As stated earlier, the Secretary of Defense approved the Air Force's recommendation to close Newark AFB. While Newark is not an Air Logistics Center, the Air Force considers it a depot since its primary workload is depot level maintenance (overhaul/repair). Newark, like McClellan, ranked low in the Air Force's initial depot analysis and was identified by the Secretary of the Air Force as a closure/realignment candidate. Newark does not have an airfield and is not a traditional Air Force Base. Its capability to handle other major Air Force missions is almost nonexistent. Instead, it is a stand-alone, highly technical, industrial plant that is operated predominantly by a civilian work force, and is conducive to conversion to the private sector.

We expect a small portion of the workload to be transferred from Newark AFB to other Air Force locations, thus making more efficient use of those facilities. The privatization of the Newark facility could be a model for future efforts to convert organic work/facilities to the private sector. A private contractor could bring other types of workload to Newark. This would increase its capacity utilization and lead to lower costs. Additionally, military personnel support costs are eliminated under the privatized concept.

I have already replied to the Commission concerning the community's proposal that Newark remain open and become a DoD center, relocating other DoD work there. This proposal has been discussed at various times, including during the BCEG's discussions on how to reduce excess depot capacity. The proposal appears to have merit even though there is no data proving it would be more cost effective. The major drawback is difficulty in implementation. For example, the Navy has been reluctant to relocate the bulk of their guidance workload. They currently use their own facilities and private contractors, and are quite satisfied with this arrangement. Moving workload from a private contractor into a DoD operation would be extremely difficult without strong evidence that the contractor is not meeting the requirement and/or DoD can accomplish it at less cost. It also would be inconsistent with the current administration's initiative to privatize DoD workload wherever reasonable to do so.

AIR RESERVE FORCE BASE ISSUES

O'Hare Reserve Base, Illinois. The City of Chicago proposed closure of the Reserve base at O'Hare International Airport and transfer of the two Air Force units to Rockford, Illinois at the sole expense of the City of Chicago. This action was recommended to the Commission on the condition that the entire expense be borne by non-Federal funds.

The Air Force has no military requirement to move out of O'Hare Reserve Base, nor is there any economic benefit from doing so. The recruiting base for the units will be at least

somewhat diminished by a move to a smaller city, and the payback period would be infinity. This move is a City of Chicago initiative, serving very little military or Federal purpose. Thus, the move can be justified under the eight DOD criteria only if the City of Chicago, or other non-Federal government sources, pay the entire cost.

I want to emphasize how important it is that other non-DoD sources of Federal funds, such as those programmed by the Federal Aviation Administration, not be tapped to pay for any part of this transfer. In addition, it is our position that the City must also pay any added cost of environmental remediation arising out of their acquisition of the property. DoD will pay for cleanup as required by Federal and state law, on its priority schedule. If the City needs to have remediation accomplished sooner than DoD priorities will permit, or to higher standards than otherwise required by law, it will have to bear the cost. It cannot be reimbursed later on for this work by the Air Force.

The Air Force fully supports the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, and is prepared to work with the City of Chicago to achieve its implementation under the conditions the Secretary has specified, should the Commission approve the recommendation.

Springfield Municipal Airport, Ohio. We provided you with information on the increased cost of moving the 178th Fighter Group from Springfield, Ohio, to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. This information was based on our site surveys, done after March 15, and shows that the move is not cost effective. The estimates on which our recommendation was based

were in error. While we can make no recommendations to the Commission after March 15, we would expect the Commission would also find this move no longer justified.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Under the DoD recommendations, the Air Force Reserve unit formerly at Homestead would move to MacDill and be converted to KC-135s, more of which are needed in the Southeastern U.S. The Department of Commerce (National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration) has already relocated some aircraft from Miami International Airport to MacDill. Commerce would like to remain at MacDill and has forwarded a request to SECDEF requesting transfer of the airfield from DoD to Commerce.

Since there appears to be no current interest in local operation of MacDill as a civil airfield, we warmly endorse the Commerce initiative. It will minimize the cost of operating the Reserve KC-135 wing and the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), which we recommended stay in place at MacDill as a redirect request from the 1991 Commission recommendation. We will, of course, pay our fair share of the operating cost to Commerce. We will also endorse its request for an OMB waiver of the requirement to pay fair market value for the property. Should any hitch develop in Commerce's plans, the Air Force Reserve would temporarily operate the airfield on a limited basis for its requirements and the JCSE. However, we would still seek another potential owner/operator. The Air Force does not wish to readdress the 1991 Commission recommendation that the airfield close as a military airfield; we simply want to ensure a smooth transition of ownership.

The 482nd is not moving from Homestead to MacDill just to operate the airport. Homestead is recommended for closure in no small part because of the overwhelming cost of rebuilding. MacDill was clearly the best location in the area to beddown the 482nd, and we needed more tankers in the Southeast. It is a much more cost-effective location, especially with the Department of Commerce operating the airfield, than Homestead is, or is likely to be for many years.

Homestead Air Force Base. The Air Force reviewed Team Miami's presentation to the Commission. Team Miami is an advocacy group with the goal of returning Reserve units to Homestead AFB. Its presentation includes several errors, and is based on a number of faulty assumptions. Errors range from misidentifying bombing ranges to claiming inaccurate cost savings/operating expenses at Homestead and MacDill Air Force Bases. As a result, Team Miami's position on AFRES operating costs is wrong. It will cost the Air Force much more to operate from Homestead than MacDill. Their argument does not withstand scrutiny when compared to the Air Force closure process analysis.

Bergstrom AFB, Texas. The Secretary of Defense recommended transfer of the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) from Bergstrom AFB, Texas, to Carswell AFB, Texas. The Austin community has forwarded a report to the Commission espousing the consolidation of the Air Force Reserve's 301st Fighter Wing, currently located at Carswell, with the 924th Fighter Group at Bergstrom. This community plan would be in place of the DoD's proposal to consolidate the 924th Fighter Group with other Reserve and Guard units at Carswell. The

community's proposal to relocate the 301st Fighter Wing cannot be considered under current law, since the Secretary of Defense did not recommend Carswell for realignment and the Commission did not include it on the list of additional bases to be studied. Retaining the 924th Fighter Group alone at Bergstrom would require greater MILCON expenditures than the entire cost of consolidating both units at Carswell. It would also forego millions in annual recurring savings from consolidation at Carswell.

The proposed consolidation at Carswell AFB has full DoD, Carswell community, and FAA support. It will provide unique opportunities for training and efficiencies and is cost and operationally effective. We are satisfied that there is room at Carswell for both units and for activities proposed by other services to be relocated there.

CONCLUSION

Since March 15th, we have been inundated by the Commission, Congress, and the public with an overwhelming number of requests for data and further clarification of the rationale for our closure and realignment recommendations. Although this has kept many of us extremely busy, I firmly believe that this scrutiny is important and that the process should be as open and public as possible.

I would not suggest that the process of arriving at recommendations is totally quantifiable, because it isn't. The Secretary chartered the BCEG, a group of experienced

individuals drawn from many different functional areas, to apply their knowledge and judgement in a structured analytical process to assist him in arriving at his closure and realignment recommendations. Because the job they did can't be reduced to simple numbers, public review and questioning is vital to ensuring the credibility and larger public support of the eventual Commission recommendations.

I stated at the outset that closing bases is a painful experience. Unfortunately, as our budget and manpower continue to decline, further closures and realignments will be required. I am fully aware of the economic impacts to individuals and communities at large when bases close. Economic impacts, though highly visible, were only one of the eight DoD criteria that we were required to consider in developing our recommendations. Our primary responsibility was to base our recommendations on the Force Structure Plan and the DoD criteria, with emphasis on military value.

In finalizing its recommendations, we trust that the Commission will remember that we did a very comprehensive analysis and, after withstanding intense scrutiny, the Secretary of Defense's recommendations still make sense and achieve the downsizing mandated by the Force Structure Plan in a cost effective manner.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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1660 Air Force Pentagon
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JUN 18 1993

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman

This is a follow-up to my June 12, 1993 response to your letter dated April 7, 1993, which we received by fax on May 6, 1993. In my response I informed you that I had initiated a review of the Air Staff and Air Mobility Command (AMC) MILCON estimates for developing Griffiss AFB as the east coast mobility base.


Our table-top review indicates that the previous Air Staff estimate of \$241.3M MILCON (\$391.6M total one-time cost) did not fully cover the facilities required for a mobility base at Griffiss AFB. The estimate did not include the beddown facilities requirements for the additional 14 KC-135 aircraft (above the number already assigned) that would move to Griffiss AFB from Plattsburgh AFB. The AMC estimate correctly included these aircraft in their MILCON estimate of \$440.5M.

However our review which used the same force structure as that used by AMC (28 KC-135, 19 KC-10, and 36 C-141 aircraft), produced a COBRA comparison estimate of \$362.2M in MILCON (\$498.6 total one-time cost) to establish a mobility wing at Griffiss AFB. Differences from the AMC estimate include: the apron project was decreased to \$48M from \$66.4M, the dormitories were priced at \$17.5M instead of \$18M, and the MFH was downscoped to \$84M from \$137M. It appears AMC highlighted some areas that our earlier table-top estimates omitted, especially the facilities to support the additional KC-135s.

In an effort to show there would be one-time costs other than MILCON to establish a mobility wing at Griffiss AFB, AMC added line items pertaining to O&M expenses, such as procurement and additional civilian pay due to the movement of force structure from McGuire and Plattsburgh to Griffiss. AMC estimated those O&M closure/realignment costs at \$63.5M. Since the AMC estimate was not a COBRA estimate (the COBRA model has provisions for such one-time move costs and one-time unique costs) they wanted to ensure those costs were addressed. A site survey would be required to refine the costs in the AMC or Air Staff estimates.

We trust this information is useful in conducting your independent analysis.


Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James F. Boatright", written in a cursive style.

JAMES F. BOATRIGIT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

3 Attachments

1. COBRA Comparison
2. Cost Estimates
3. COBRA Disk (enclosed)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1660

20 MAY 1993

The Honorable Jim Courter
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman,

We appreciate the opportunity to address the concerns raised in your letter of April 26, 1993, No. 930428-8.

The Air Force is aware that the GAO claims that it was unable to independently determine the basis for grouping either KI Sawyer or Griffiss into the least desirable group for retention. The GAO's job would be easier--though the outcome would not necessarily be fairer--if the process of developing recommendations were quantifiable. However, the process involved consideration of many factors requiring the exercise of judgement which could not be reduced to a series of calculations. Those judgements were made by the Air Force's Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), composed of thirteen highly experienced individuals drawn from many different functional areas.

The eight DoD criteria, and the Air Force subelements, were applied to all of the bases within a particular category or subcategory. The BCEG members were thoroughly familiar with the subelements, and when subelements were aggregated into composite ratings, it was accomplished by vote. Individual BCEG members disagreed with each other sometimes both in whether emphasis should be given to a particular factor and in overall judgements, such as whether a base was a green minus, a yellow plus, or perhaps just a yellow with respect to a given subelement when subjective judgement was involved or an overall criterion. Differences of opinion were resolved by majority vote or by choosing a rating which best reflected the consensus of the varying options.

These disagreements among military professionals were the result of many factors: the small distinctions required to be made among military bases generally well-suited to their purposes; the different career experiences of each of the members; the different values held personally by each member; and so forth. The disagreements were a strength of the process--each member brought and articulated experience and views not always shared by the others. The disagreements always stimulated further discussion, which ultimately led to a consensus. The discussions and the results of the discussion are documented in the BCEG's minutes. Please be assured that all of the issues were thoroughly aired, each BCEG member carefully


considered every base and personally assigned it to one of the three groups, and the final grouping represented a consensus among all of the BCEG members. In the BCEG's view, this process led to the best possible recommendations, with full and detailed consideration of the DoD criteria.

Turning next to the specific proposals and comments from the representatives of the local communities from Griffiss AFB and KI Sawyer AFB, my staff has carefully reviewed these issues and prepared an extensive point-by-point response (attached). To summarize, the inputs from the KI Sawyer community reflect an inadequate understanding of the process of evaluating bases under the eight DoD criteria. For example, the community mistakenly believes that KI Sawyer was penalized for its Installation Restoration Program. In fact, the base received a favorable rating in this area. Regarding the community's alternative mission proposals, we note that the purpose of the base closure process is to reduce excess basing structure consistent with the DoD's planned force reductions, not to reorganize the Air Force or create new employment concepts.

The inputs from the Central New York Economic Development Council do not accurately portray the relative capabilities of Griffiss and Plattsburgh to support a large mobility wing. For example, the Council overstated parking spaces readily usable by a mobility wing, did not give a full picture of relative refueling capabilities of the two bases, and wrongly implied that Plattsburgh cannot support deployments from Ft Drum, New York. All appropriate details are in the attachment.

The Air Force closure and realignment recommendations are the result of a fair and impartial process which complied with the law. We will be pleased to provide whatever further information that the Commission requires.

Sincerely,



JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)


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Air Force Responses to Issues

COMMENT: (C) KI Sawyer AFB remains open; close Minot AFB; move the B-52s and KC-135s to KI Sawyer; move the MM IIIs to Malmstrom AFB.

RESPONSE: The proposal to move B-52s and KC-135s to KI Sawyer overlooks that fact that the Air Force has existing excess capacity to close between four and five large aircraft bases. The question then becomes which bases should be closed. The Air Force is attempting to retain critical base infrastructure and reap the most benefit and operational flexibility from remaining bases. The Air Force must maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due to uncertainty with respect to START II. Under the START II treaty, the United States and Russia committed to significantly reduce nuclear warheads. While the treaty is a tremendous achievement in reducing nuclear force levels, its entry into force requires START I to be in effect. Under the Lisbon Protocol to START I, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan must individually accede to START I and to the Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. Because of the national decision-making processes necessary before all accede to the required treaties, it is possible that START II will not become binding on the US for some time. Therefore it is appropriate for the US to move purposefully to implement the treaty, but not for it to prematurely foreclose militarily effective options in the event that reform in the former Soviet Union is set back. This places a premium on maintaining US options, within prudent treaty planning, for missile launch facilities. This requires the retention of four missile bases, one of which is Minot AFB. It is clearly more economical to retain an aircraft/missile base that must remain open for missiles than to maintain a bomber-only base. Based on the facts that KI Sawyer does not support ballistic missile operation and that it ranks low under the eight DoD criteria, it was recommended for closure. This proposal is inconsistent with sound military considerations as it ignores the missile basing flexibility requirements. Furthermore, if we had not decided to retain additional missile basing flexibility, we would have recommended closing five large aircraft bases instead of four. As indicated earlier, there is enough excess capacity to close five large aircraft bases. However, only four were selected in order to retain missile basing flexibility.

COMMENT: (D) KI Sawyer AFB remains open; close Grand Forks AFB; move B-1s to Ellsworth AFB; move KC-135s to KI Sawyer AFB; move MM IIIs to Malmstrom AFB.

RESPONSE: The proposal to move B-52s and KC-135s to KI Sawyer overlooks that fact that the Air Force has existing excess capacity to close between four and five large aircraft bases. The question then becomes which bases should be closed. The Air Force must maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due to uncertainty with respect to START II. Under the START II treaty, the United States and Russia committed to significantly reduce nuclear warheads. While the treaty is a tremendous achievement in reducing nuclear force levels, its entry into force requires START I to be in effect. Under the Lisbon Protocol to START I, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan must individually accede to START I and to the Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. Because of the national decision-making processes necessary before all accede to the required treaties, it is possible that START II will not become binding on the US for some time. Therefore it is appropriate for the US to move





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Installations)
Room 4C940, Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

JUN 11 1993

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter

This is a follow up to my May 19, 1993, letter addressing your request for information on fuel requirements and storage capability at Plattsburgh Air Force Base (AFB), NY. Since my previous letter, Air Mobility Command (AMC) has conducted a more detailed study (Atch) to determine the jet fuel requirements to support an Air Mobility Wing at Plattsburgh AFB. Also, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) has completed its review to determine an effective and economical mix of delivery modes and storage to meet these fuel requirements. This report was sent directly to you by DLA. The Air Force has evaluated the new AMC study and the DFSC review and has concluded that it does not change our recommendation. Plattsburgh AFB still remains our choice to base the east coast Air Mobility Wing.

The AMC study is based on consolidated C-141, KC-10, and KC-135 operations at Plattsburgh AFB as recommended by DoD. From this study, the anticipated monthly fuel requirement for normal operations is estimated to be 6.7 million gallons instead of the previously estimated 8.4 million gallons. From the AMC study, the jet fuel requirement for contingency operations for Plattsburgh AFB is estimated as follows:

<u>Day 1-30</u>	<u>Day 31-60</u>	<u>Day 61-90</u>	<u>Past Day 90</u>
8,700,000 gal	6,200,000 gal	6,400,000 gal	6,100,000 gal

The attachment gives a detailed explanation of the decrease in fuel requirements.

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
From its review, DFSC has determined it can support the projected jet fuel requirements at Plattsburgh AFB. DFSC has identified the lowest cost alternative to support the annual fuel requirements at Plattsburgh AFB which is estimated to be \$11,824,820. Also they determined the lowest cost alternative to support the same fuel requirement at each of the other bases under consideration by the Commission. The estimated costs are as follows:

	<u>Total</u>
Griffiss	\$6,277,913
McGuire	\$2,074,320

The above information should dispel any doubts about the ability of Plattsburgh AFB to receive enough fuel to meet any future requirement. With this issue put to rest, the Air Force remains firmly convinced Plattsburgh AFB is the best base for the east coast Air Mobility Wing. Although the cost for fuel supply is higher, the construction costs are significantly less. It has the ramp capacity to easily beddown well over the 70-80 large aircraft estimated requirement of an Air Mobility Wing. Most important, from an operational standpoint, it is an ideal staging facility for the large European/SWA airbridge and has ample airspace for present and future training with minimum encroachment.

We hope this information is useful.

Sincerely



JAMES F. BOATRIGIT

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Atch

AMC/CV ltr, 4 Jun 93 w/atc

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENTS ARE REMOVED



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE SECRETARY

JUN 12 1993

SAF/MI
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1660

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Courter

This letter provides a correction to the depiction of color-coded ratings for violent and property crime rates at K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base. The ratings in question are found in the Department of the Air Force Analyses and Recommendations (Volume V), page 130. The original data and recomputed data are as follows:

ORIGINAL DATA

Violent Crime Rate 646 (YELLOW)
Property Crime Rate 919 (GREEN)

RECOMPUTED DATA

Violent Crime Rate 509 (GREEN)
Property Crime Rate 1704 (GREEN)

This correction is necessary because K.I. Sawyer submitted revised data which they stated was erroneously computed using an 18-month period instead of a 12-month period. Further investigation by AF/DPP indicated additional errors by the base including use of an incorrect geographical area and an incorrect statistical procedure. These errors have been corrected and reviewed by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG). The BCEG determined that these errors did not change the overall rating of K.I. Sawyer under Criterion VII

Also, a correction of color-coded ratings for the Accident Potential Zones (APZ), Existing and Future Local/Regional Community Encroachment at Plattsburgh AFB is provided. The ratings in question are found in the Department of the Air Force Analyses and Recommendations (Volume V), Criteria II 4C and II 4D, page 102 & 103. Both grades were originally graded "Green" and both were changed to "Yellow" because information provided by the base was found to be in error. The BCEG with assistance of Air Staff experts reviewed information from a draft Air Installation Compatibility Use Zone (AICUZ) document prepared by a contractor and currently being reviewed by the Air Force. It was determined that this was the most current and accurate information available and based on the incompatible encroachment depicted in APZ II, the BCEG changed the ratings. The BCEG determined that this did not change the overall rating for Plattsburgh under Criterion II. In addition, the ratings on page 93 under "Plattsburgh-Community -- Exist and Future" were


changed from "Green" to "Yellow".

The BCFEG reviewed data on Newark AFB Metro Area, Criteria VII, Community Infrastructure, pg 308, and changed the grade from "Y" to "G" based on a correction of Newark's proximity to Columbus from one hour to 40 minutes. This correction did not cause a change in the Criteria VII rollup grade for Newark which remains a "Y+ ", pg 314.


Additionally, the BCFEG reviewed data on Newark AFB Environmental Impact, Criteria VIII, Mineral/Energy Resources, pg 322, and changed the grade from "Y" to "G" based on a correction to base measured data. This correction did cause a change in the Criteria VIII rollup grade for Newark from "Y" to "Y+", pp. 323, 324; however, this change would not have caused a change to the overall recommendation on Newark.

I hope this information is useful.

Sincerely



JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)



TAB 16
COMMUNITY REQUESTS FOR CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT

O'HARE IAP, AIR FORCE RESERVE STATION, ILLINOIS

Community Proposal: The City of Chicago proposes that the O'Hare Air Reserve Station (ARS) be closed and the flying units moved to a new facility to be constructed at Rockford, Illinois.

Recommendation: Close O'Hare ARS as proposed by the City of Chicago and relocate the assigned Air Reserve Component (ARC) units to the Greater Rockford Airport, or another location acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force, provided the City can demonstrate that it has the financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities, moving and environmental cleanup, without any cost whatsoever to the federal budget and that the closure/realignment must begin by July 1995 and be completed by July 1997. Chicago would also have to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare IAP.

Justification: O'Hare Reserve Base is in the Northwest corner of O'Hare IAP, enjoying immediate access to two runways. Two ARC units are based there: the host, the 928th Airlift Group (AFR), with C-130s; and the 126th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), with KC-135Es. An Army Reserve Center is located adjacent to the base. In addition, a large DLA activity occupies a government owned, recently renovated office building on the base; however, DLA is recommending realignment of this activity to other locations.

The City of Chicago has exercised its right under Section 2924 of P.L. 101-510 to propose closure of O'Hare ARS (Attachment 1). This provision of law mandates the Air Force to consider the proposal. The City desires to acquire the property for aviation-related commercial use. However, in a 1991 land exchange agreement intended to resolve all real property issues between the Air Force and the City at O'Hare IAP, the City specifically agreed that it would seek no more land from the O'Hare ARS (excerpt at Attachment 2).

The Air Force has repeatedly advised the City that the ARC units are adequately housed at O'Hare, and there is no basis for moving them (Attachments 3 & 4). There are no savings from moving; only costs. To justify this realignment under the DoD criteria, therefore, as a minimum all costs of closure/realignment would have to be funded entirely outside the Federal budget. (Neither Defense nor FAA funds, for example, could be involved.) The relocation site would have to meet all operating requirements, such as runway length and freedom from noise-related operating limitations, and be close enough to Chicago that the units would not suffer major loss of personnel. The day-to-day operating costs at the relocation site would have to compare favorably with those at O'Hare IAP.

The City proposes that the ARC units move to Greater Rockford Airport, 55 miles northwest of O'Hare IAP. Virtually no facilities for the units exist at Rockford, so an entirely new base would have to be constructed. The airfield is constrained on two sides by the Rock River and flood plain. At least one runway will have to be extended for KC-135E operations. There appear to be noise and other environmental problems to resolve before a final determination of siting feasibility can be made.

The COBRA model estimates that the cost to close is \$361 million. This estimate is based on the City of Chicago consultant's estimate of construction costs at Rockford, and normal COBRA estimating factors for other costs. There are no apparent savings to offset this cost.

The proceeds from disposal of the real property, which might offset some of the cost, are difficult to estimate. If the airport property were sold at fair market value, the estimated proceeds would be about \$33 million. The buildings may or may not be of use to a buyer. While some are new and all are usable for their current military use, their value to a commercial or civil aviation user are questionable. Demolition and disposal are estimated by the City's consultant to cost \$25 million, which would be an offset to the land value. However, most of the O'Hare ARS qualifies as aviation-related property, which the City could obtain in a no-cost public benefit transfer under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 50 U.S.C. App. 1622. The DLA building is severable from the Reserve Base and does not appear to be aviation property. However, the building is also of questionable value, and would not contribute much to the cost of relocating the O'Hare ARS activities. Thus, the net cost to close and realign is in a range from \$328 million, if the base is sold at fair market value and the reusable buildings are worth enough to a buyer to offset demolition costs for the others, to \$361 million if the base is turned over to the City in a public benefit transfer. Since there remain no savings in operational or other costs, in either case the payback period is infinity.

Our analysis of the proposal assuming Chicago or some other non-Federal source pays the full cost is as follows. The facilities at O'Hare ARS are adequate, with many new or recently renovated buildings. The recruiting base, the Chicago metropolitan area, is outstanding. There are no serious constraints on mission accomplishment, other than some air traffic control delays due to the dense commercial traffic. However, alert or other time-sensitive missions are not flown from O'Hare ARS. Since the base is adequate for its purpose, no savings would accrue from closing it. The aircraft remain in the force structure plan and the units are not planned for inactivation. In the case of the ANG, the governor's consent would be required to disband. Thus, closure of the base requires that both units be realigned.

The military value of an ARC base at Rockford, fully built up with all the necessary facilities, still does not exceed that of O'Hare. For retention of the mostly part-time ARC

personnel it is not as good, due to the distance from the homes of currently assigned personnel. Some personnel losses and retraining must be anticipated, effecting unit readiness and adding to the cost. It is not clear that the Rockford area alone can provide a steady stream of volunteers large enough to man two large ARC units. Recruiting from Chicago will still be required, but will be much harder due to the distance differential between O'Hare and Rockford.

Clearly, acceptance of this proposal must be based on benefits to the City of Chicago. The proposed move would make some considerable space available for airport related activities at this intensively used air carrier airport. Therefore, as a convenience to the City of Chicago, the Air Force could not object to the proposed closure of O'Hare ARS provided it would be done at no cost to the Federal budget.

Although the City of Chicago had previously stated (Attachment 5) that they did not expect the Air Force to fund relocation and facility replacement costs, the City has been unable to guarantee that it will pay the full cost of moving (Attachment 1, page 3). However, in its most recent correspondence (Attach 6), the City has made the following commitment, "At this time, we wish to commit that all costs associated with our plan will be at no cost to the Department of Defense and that the City of Chicago, together with the host airport, will provide suitable replacement facilities on either a square foot for square foot basis or with more cost efficient functionally equivalent facilities. This commitment of full cost coverage is contingent upon securing necessary financing, which we continue to pursue, and the approval of our governing council body."

Therefore, if the City of Chicago could demonstrate that it has financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities, moving and environmental cleanup, without any cost whatsoever to the federal budget and that the closure/realignment could begin by July 1995, as required by Section 2904 (a) (3) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, and the relocation could be completed by July 1997, the Air Force would not object to the proposal. The City would also have to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare IAP.

NOTE: Due to an organizational realignment, as a direct result of the DLA BRAC 93 process, the DLA activities on the O'Hare Reserve Base will be realigned to other locations.

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February 26, 1993

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City of Chicago
Richard M. Daley, Mayor

Department of Aviation

David R. Mosena
Commissioner

Suite 3000
30 North Clark Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 744-6892
(312) 853-0478 (TT/TDD)
(312) 744-1399 (FAX)

Mr. James F. Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force
SAF/MIT
Room 4C940
Washington, DC 20330-1000

Dear Mr. Boatright:

This letter amends, in part, my letter to you dated January 7, 1993 (enclosed), wherein the City of Chicago, under the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure process, and in accordance with Public Law 101-510, Div. B, Title XXIX, Sec. 2924, proposed the relocation of Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Units from O'Hare International Airport to the Greater Rockford Airport.

On January 7, 1993, the City of Chicago stated that we could not provide you with a firm commitment that all costs associated with our plan would be provided to the Department of Defense. At this time, we wish to commit that all costs associated with our plan will be at no cost to the Department of Defense and that the City of Chicago, together with the host airport, will provide suitable replacement facilities on either a square foot for square foot basis or with more cost efficient functionally equivalent facilities. This commitment of full cost coverage is contingent upon securing necessary financing, which we continue to pursue, and the approval of our governing council body.

It is our hope that this commitment will allow the Air Force to act favorably upon our request to include the relocation of O'Hare military units in its list of BRAC recommendations to the Department of Defense. We recognize such a recommendation must be conditioned upon our demonstrating that we have secured the necessary financing.

We look forward to working with you throughout this process towards achieving this mutually beneficial result. Again, thank you for your favorable consideration of this matter and please do not hesitate to contact me should you require additional information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David R. Mosena".

David R. Mosena
Commissioner

Enclosure

Copy to: The Honorable Les Aspin
United States Secretary of Defense

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City of Chicago
Richard M. Daley, Mayor

Department of Aviation

David R. Mosena
Commissioner

Suite 3000
20 North Clark Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 744-6892
(312) 853-0478 (TT/TDD)
(312) 744-1399 (FAX)

January 7, 1992

Mr. James F. Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force
SAF/MIT
Room 4C940
Washington, DC 20330-1000

Dear Mr. Boatright:

It was a pleasure meeting you and your staff during my recent visit to Washington, D.C., and I want to thank you again for clarifying for us the Air Force's position regarding the relocation and closure of its facilities.

On behalf of the City of Chicago, and in accordance with our status as an adjacent unit of general local government under Public Law 101-510, Div. B, Title XXIX, Sec. 2924, I am pleased to submit for your consideration our preliminary proposal regarding the O'Hare Air Reserve Forces Facility (ARFF) and the United States Army Reserve Center Fort Dearborn (USARC), located at O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, during the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure process. This proposal is in substitution of our proposal to you dated November 18, 1992.

We have endeavored to follow the Final Selection Criteria regarding Military Value, Return on Investment and Impacts as published in the Federal Register, 56 Fed. Reg. 6374 (February 15, 1991) and believe our conceptual proposal clearly meets these criteria.

This proposal results from our continuing desire to enhance the operational efficiency of O'Hare International Airport for the benefit of the national air transportation system. It is also the result of a Conceptual Facilities Replacement Plan (copy previously forwarded to you), a jointly funded \$270,000 study prepared for the City of Chicago and the Greater Rockford Airport Authority. The United States Department of Defense was also a participant in this study.

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Mr. James R. Boatright
January 7, 1992
Page 2

The purpose of this study was to provide preliminary technical information regarding the feasibility and costs associated with the relocation of the O'Hare ARFF/USARC to the Greater Rockford Airport. It should be noted that this study considered both the replacement and future expansion of such facilities. We believe that this study confirms the feasibility of the relocation of the existing military facilities and operations to the Greater Rockford Airport.

Our interest is in assisting you as you develop your force structure plan so as to achieve a result in the best interests of our national security as well as the beneficial impacts to civil aviation at O'Hare International Airport and our national air transportation system which would result from this proposal.

We believe that the relocation of the O'Hare military facilities to Rockford represents a unique opportunity for the Air Force for the following reasons:

- The Air Force Reserve and Illinois ANG will be relocated to newly constructed functional equivalent facilities with the ability to expand designed for maximum operational efficiency;
- Existing operational constraints experienced by the military at O'Hare International will not occur at Rockford since prohibitions relating to the number, type and hours of operation do not exist there;
- Military personnel will be advantaged by lower housing costs and lower cost of living expenses in the Rockford area. In addition, adequate facilities exist and are planned to house reservists and visitors;
- The Great Rockford Area, an expanding community, will provide more than an adequate recruitment base for the military both in numbers and demographics. Existing infrastructure exists (highway and rail) between Chicago and Rockford. Rockford is approximately 55 miles from O'Hare;

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Mr. James R. Boatright
January 7, 1992
Page 3

- The military will be the largest tenant/operator at Rockford. Current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force will be improved. All at a lower cost of doing business in the Rockford area. The Greater Rockford Airport Authority will provide the military with long-term assurances regarding a Joint Use Agreement on a dollar per year lease basis;
- Broad based community and political support for the relocation of the military to Rockford exists (see attached letters of support).

We had hoped to provide you with a firm commitment that all appropriate costs associated with our plan would be provided to the Department of Defense for suitable facilities at Rockford on a square foot for square foot basis as needed to relocate all flying units currently stationed at the O'Hare ARFF. We must, however, advise you that we cannot make such a commitment at this time, although it is still our desire to do so, until we determine the actual cost of the plan and identify the source of funds to cover the cost of the relocation.

We are compelled to take this position because it is the only responsible action for us to take at this time. We remain extremely interested in acquiring the military property at O'Hare and relocating the facilities to Rockford and will continue to work toward that goal whether within or outside of the current BRAC process. The benefits to the military, the City of Chicago and the City of Rockford are simply too great to pass by.

We look forward to working with you and the Department of Defense on this important matter and hope that you will favorably consider our proposal. We have already begun to identify potential sources of funding to accomplish the relocation of the O'Hare ARFF/USARC. Of course, we cannot commit the City of Chicago to this funding until we receive approval from our governing body to proceed.

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
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Mr. James R. Boatright
January 7, 1992
Page 4

We want to again emphasize our sincere interest to pursue this matter as evidenced by our substantial commitment of time and financial resources to date. I, as well as my staff, would be happy to meet with you or your representatives, should you decide to incorporate our proposal in your recommendations to the Department of Defense, so that it can be refined toward the end of developing a closure or realignment/relocation plan. We would also be happy to assist, at such time, in your financial analysis to determine all appropriate costs associated with the plan.

Again, thank you for your consideration of this matter and we look forward to your favorable response.

Sincerely,



David R. Mosena
Commissioner
City of Chicago
Department of Aviation

Copy to: The Honorable Richard Cheney
United States Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301

Mr. Frederick Ford
Greater Rockford Airport Authority
3600 Airport Drive
P. O. Box 5063
Rockford, Illinois 61125-0063

Colonel Jim Casey
Chairman, Base Closure Working Group
Chief, Base Realignment Division
HQ USAF/XOOR
Pentagon
Room # 50973
Washington, DC 20330

UNCLASSIFIED

LAND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY
OF CHICAGO AND THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

This Exchange Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Agreement") is entered into between the United States of America, represented by the Department of the Air Force (hereafter generally referred to as "the Government"), and the City of Chicago, Illinois (hereafter referred to as "the City"). The Agreement provides for the conveyance by the Government to the City and lease or granting of an easement to the Government by the City of certain parcels of land located at O'Hare International Airport, Cook County, Illinois (hereafter referred to as "O'Hare"), and the payment for or construction of certain Government Replacement Facilities at O'Hare by the City. In addition, the City and the Government make a number of other commitments related to the O'Hare Air Reserve Forces Facility (hereinafter referred to as the "military reservation") and O'Hare Airport, as further set forth therein.

It is understood and agreed that this Agreement was initiated by the City and is being undertaken for convenience of and at the expense of the City; that the City is to bear all of the costs of such Replacement Facilities for Government activities, either by paying the Government therefore or by accomplishing construction of the Replacement Facilities itself, as set forth herein; and that the City will make no claims against the Government in any way related to or arising out of the furnishing of the Replacement Facilities to be constructed by the City, other than as provided for in this Agreement. The primary purpose of the Agreement is to permit the City to obtain certain land contiguous to the military reservation at O'Hare for purposes of facilitating the completion of O'Hare Development Projects numbers 550 and

581. A Memorandum of Understanding was executed between the parties on April 26, 1986, regarding a somewhat different land exchange arrangement involving both the Air Force and the Army. A draft agreement was prepared on July 29, 1987, to effectuate that earlier version of the transaction.

The City assures the Government that its long-range plans for O'Hare do not involve acquiring from the Government any more land or causing any more boundary changes beyond those called for in this Agreement and the possible relocation to the north of Runway 27R (paragraph 7.i. herein). The City will continue to support a permanent Government presence at its established military reservation (as modified as a result of this Agreement) at O'Hare. The land to be conveyed or leased under this Agreement is identified in paragraph 2 below and on the map attached as an Exhibit hereto. The Replacement Facilities (hereinafter defined) are identified in paragraph 3. The land exchange and City payment for design and construction of Replacement Facilities will take place in two (2) phases, as described herein.

1. Authority

The Government is entering into this Agreement pursuant to the authority contained in Title 10, United States Code, Section 2233, and the National Defense Authorization Act, 1989, Section 2603. The City is entering into this Agreement pursuant to its Home Rule authority. Both parties warrant that they are authorized to act in the capacities and for the purposes represented.

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Daley

File



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000

NOV 7 1991

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

The Honorable Richard M. Daley
Mayor of the City of Chicago
City Hall
121 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602

Dear Mayor Daley:

Thank you for your letter of August 14, 1991, in which you stated that the City of Chicago does not expect the Department of the Air Force to fund any proposed relocation of Air Force activities from the O'Hare Air Reserve Forces Facility (ARFF) or construction of replacement facilities at a new location.

You also have asked for our thoughts as to how the City should proceed with its proposal. First, our participation in discussions with the City about the possibility of a relocation should not be interpreted as acquiescence or agreement in principle to such a proposal. The Air Force strongly prefers not to relocate from O'Hare. Instead, we wish to continue our operations there undisturbed in accordance with terms of the land exchange agreement signed by the City on July 14, 1989, which included a commitment by the City that its long-range plans did not involve acquiring any more land or changes in boundaries, and that the City would continue to support a permanent Government presence at its established military reservation at O'Hare. As I stated in my letter of July 18, 1991, the Air Force relied on these commitments in its planning at O'Hare, including construction of costly new facilities.

Recent Federal legislation governs virtually all base closures and realignments until 1996. On November 5, 1990, Congress enacted the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510, 10 USC 2687 note). Section 2909 of the Act, "Restriction On Other Base Closure Authority," states that the Act "...shall be the exclusive authority..." for selecting or carrying out any closure or realignment of a military installation within the United States through December 31, 1995, with the exception of a category of very small installations not applicable to the O'Hare ARFF. This legislation also established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and directed that it shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993 and 1995. As you know, the Commission has completed its deliberations for 1991.

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The Act also establishes specific procedures to be followed by the Secretary of Defense in developing closure and realignment recommendations to make to the Commission. Published criteria must be applied to force structure plans, which must be included with budget submissions for fiscal Years 1992, 1994 and 1996. By no later than April 15, 1993 and 1995, the Secretary may publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Commission and congressional defense committees a list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. The Military Departments expect to be asked to submit proposed recommendations for the Secretary's consideration in formulating the final recommendations which will be forwarded to the Commission.

To ensure concerns of nearby communities are fully considered, Congress included the following provision in the Act:

Sec. 2924. Community Preference Consideration In Closure And Realignment of Military Installations.

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

In light of this, should the City decide to pursue a relocation of the ARFF away from O'Hare, it would be my suggestion that a formal written proposal be prepared for consideration by the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for possible inclusion with the recommendations to be submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Commission in 1993 or 1995. Since Section 2924 seems clearly to provide for special consideration to be given to the views of what are known as the "collar communities" adjacent to O'Hare, any ARFF relocation proposal by the City should be coordinated with them to assure that their views are included in the proposal as well.

Any relocation proposal would have to meet the following minimum conditions to be acceptable to the Air Force. First, the relocation must be without cost to the Air Force, including moving costs. In addition, the total costs of long-term operations must not exceed the projected costs of continued operations at O'Hare. Of course, the relocation proposal must be acceptable to the receiving location. There also must be a recruiting base of eligible Guard and Reserve personnel available in the vicinity of the receiving location, which is acceptable to the Air Force


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Reserve and the Illinois Air National Guard and sufficient for their needs. Finally, the facilities at the receiving location, including runways, navigational aids and related support, must be sufficient to handle operational mission requirements of the Reserve and Air National Guard units concerned.

The Air Force will cooperate with you as you develop your proposal and will designate appropriate officials of the Air Force Reserve and Illinois Air National Guard to work with you and your staff for that purpose, particularly regarding the issues of adequacy of the recruiting base and the capability to support operational missions at any proposed receiving location.

If you should decide to go forward with a relocation proposal, I would appreciate being advised of the names of the appropriate people with the City who will be involved. Please let me know if there is any further information I can provide.

Sincerely,



JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

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567 *file*



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

5 OCT 1992

Ms. Kitty Freidheim
Deputy Commissioner of Aviation
City of Chicago
20 N. Clark Street, Suite 2400
Chicago, IL 60602

Dear Ms. Freidheim:

During the meeting on September 17, 1992, with you and representatives from Rockford, IL, Mr. Ford, Executive Director, Greater Rockford Airport Authority, ask us to help you define what would constitute a comprehensive and attractive proposal to relocate the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve activities from O'Hare IAP to Rockford. I responded by telling you that we would do our best to answer your questions and help you with your definitions, however, I stated that we would give serious consideration to any responsible proposal submitted pursuant to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510). The purpose of this letter is to recap key points which were discussed.

An attractive proposal would meet all of our operational requirements, would be at no cost to the Air Force, and would compare favorably with the current day-to-day operating costs at O'Hare. Some of the key points are as follows:


- Runway length should be 10,000 feet based on what is required for the present KC-135E aircraft.
- There should be ramp space to provide one parking space for each of the presently assigned aircraft.
- Required Hydrant refueling capability.
- Facility replacement costs should be based on replacing all facilities (at present square footage) that exist at O'Hare.
- Personnel and Equipment moving costs should include:
 - Equipment moving/hook-up costs.
 - Communications relocation costs to include additional communications required to provide dual operations during the moving phase.
 - Operational costs to keep the military mission intact during the move.
 - Personnel relocation costs to include all applicable government/military entitlements

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- Temporary storage costs if required.
- Personnel Travel Costs.
- Proposed Implementation Plan to include phasing that would keep units operational at all times during the move.
- Proposed Land conveyance at new site.
- Operational Comparisons.
 - BOS Costs.
 - Airport Joint Use Agreement Costs.
 - Fire/Crash/Rescue Agreement Costs.
 - Utility Costs.
 - Navigational Aids.
 - Airspace/Air Operations.
- Proposed Airport Master Plan.
- Community Coordination/Reactions (from both losing and gaining communities).
 - Commitment to fund an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
 - Commitment to provide documentation that the new site at Greater Rockford Airport is environmentally clean.

As we discussed, any proposal should be submitted by mid November in order to get full and complete consideration in the 1993 Base Closure/Realignment process. I trust this recap will be helpful. Should you have any questions please call my representative for Reserve Affairs, Col Joseph Feather, 703-697-4391. A similar letter has been sent to Mr. Fredrick C. Ford, Executive Director Greater Rockford Airport Authority.

Sincerely,



JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

UNCLASSIFIED

569



OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
CITY OF CHICAGO

RICHARD M. DALEY
MAYOR

August 14, 1991


Mr. James F. Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Installations
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Room 4C 940
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Boatright:

Thank you for your letter of July 18, 1991. I understand your concerns about the cost to the Air Force of a possible relocation of the O'Hare military facilities to Rockford or elsewhere. Of course, the City does not expect the Department of the Air Force to fund the proposed relocation from O'Hare or the construction of replacement facilities at a new location.

Now that this matter has been clarified, please give us your thoughts as to how you deem it best to proceed further on these issues. I look forward to fruitful discussions.

Sincerely,


Mayor

cc: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
Congressman Dan Rostenkowski

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

16 JUN 1993

SAF/MII
1660 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1660

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman

I received the enclosed June 4, 1993 letter from Mr. Bruce Todd, Mayor of the City of Austin. Attached to the letter was a report which was forwarded to the Commission espousing the consolidation of the Air Force Reserve's 301st FW, currently located at Carswell AFB, with the 924th FG at Bergstrom AFB in place of the DoD proposal to consolidate at Carswell AFB. However, the Commission did not add Carswell AFB to the supplemental list of bases to be considered for closure/realignment, therefore, Mayor Todd's proposal to consolidate these units at Bergstrom AFB appears to be a moot point.

Nevertheless, I believe it is appropriate to address some inaccuracies made in the report concerning Carswell AFB and the DoD proposed consolidation. Specifically, the following points need to be made or corrected:

STATEMENT: (BRACC Criterion, Section 2, Availability and Condition of Land and Facilities, subparagraph 3) "The potential for AFRES, the Navy and Air National Guard to expand within the existing Carswell fence will be further deteriorated by...anticipated projects such as the Federal Bureau of Prisons medical facility, a prison products distribution center...the King's branch Housing Development...70 units of housing for handicapped..."

COMMENT: The DoD has worked extensively with all services, the local community and other affected agencies to develop a land use plan for Carswell. This plan, which has been endorsed by all affected organizations, provides the AFRES, Navy, and National Guard with an area which has adequate space for all their documented present and future needs and provides the Federal Bureau of Prisons with the medical facility and required adjacent property while also providing the local community with many diverse reuse options. The needs of the DoD organizations at Carswell were carefully integrated into an overall plan which is a win-win proposition for all.

STATEMENT: (BRACC Criterion, Section 4, Cost and Manpower, Military Construction (MILCON) Funding, sub paragraph 1 (Carswell)) "The Naval Facilities Engineering Command anticipates the value of new construction will be between \$110,000,000 to \$140,000,000...The 924th FG estimates it would cost approximately \$7,500,000 to meet their requirements."

COMMENT: In our 18 May 1993 joint Air Force/Navy response to questions on the DoD's proposed joint use of Carswell AFB, we included revised COBRA estimates for Carswell. These figures show **total MILCON costs** at Carswell (Navy/Marine/Air Force Reserve/Texas ANG/Texas Army Guard & Reserve) to be **\$126.0M** with construction savings at NAS Dallas and Bergstrom of **\$40.6M**. The **total one-time cost** (Moving and Construction) for **all units** is estimated to be **\$146.0M**. In addition, the construction estimate to support the 924th move is incorrect. The refined site survey MILCON cost estimate at Carswell AFB for beddown of **both** the 301st and the 924th is **\$5.88M**. This amount can be reduced by **\$4.59M** in MILCON cost avoidance at Bergstrom AFB under the BRAC 91 proposal, making the total estimated cost **\$1.29M**.

STATEMENT: (BRACC Criterion, Section 4, Cost and Manpower, Military Construction (MILCON) Funding, sub paragraph 2 (Bergstrom)) "Current AFRES construction estimates to accommodate both units <at Bergstrom> are approximately \$21,000,000...If the Navy/Marine units were able to move into vacated 301st FW facilities at Carswell they will be able to avoid significant MILCON requirements. If current 301st facilities had to be constructed today it would cost approximately \$39,000,000. Assuming the Navy's RFP dollars of \$110,000,000 - \$140,000,000 are reasonable, then at least \$39,000,000 of that could be avoided by moving into facilities vacated by the move of the 301st FW to Bergstrom."

COMMENT: Even assuming the figure of \$21M to accommodate both units at Bergstrom is accurate (we believe it be closer to \$30M), this figure is still greater than our estimated cost of locating both units at Carswell. The "savings" of \$39M projected by moving the 301st out of their current facilities at Carswell and allowing other DoD use is highly suspect and based upon dubious assumptions. It assumes that both the 301st moving out and the other DoD units coming in require **exactly the same facilities** from the ground up. If this were true the DoD could save the MILCON costs by moving into vacated 301st facilities. This is generally not the case, although we have tried to use existing facilities as much as practical. Though I'm sure some of the DoD units could use the 301st facilities if they were vacated, it is highly improbable that no MILCON would be required to accommodate new tenants. Some MILCON would be required to match vacated facilities with new occupant requirements. Consequently it is doubtful that the total amount of savings projected in the City of Austin proposal would be realized.

STATEMENT: (BRACC Criterion, Section 5, Extent and Timing, sub paragraph 2 (Bergstrom)) "MILCON requirements of some \$21,000,000 for both units will be offset by MILCON savings at Carswell of some \$46,500,000. A net savings to DoD of \$25,500,000 in MILCON dollars will be realized upon 301st FW relocation to Bergstrom. Additionally, BRACC 91 allocated approximately \$31,000,000 to MILCON for the two units, so BRACC total savings are really \$56,500,000."

COMMENT: The report's estimated reduction of \$21M in MILCON costs for relocating both units to Bergstrom appears low and the suggested "MILCON savings" of \$46.5M is not supported. First, we expect the actual cost to relocate the 301st from Carswell to Bergstrom to be closer to \$30.0M. Additionally, the new Bergstrom airport plan tends to geographically separate the AFRES units in several locations -- a situation that is not cost nor operationally effective. The \$46.5M in "MILCON savings" the report alluded to appears to be derived from undocumented, uncertified estimates. The \$7.5M MILCON estimate for the 924th FG to relocate to Carswell, has been updated to \$5.88M. The MILCON cost avoidance assumption of \$39M if the 301st relocates to Bergstrom appears optimistic. As stated previously, these savings are based on an erroneous assumption that if the 301st vacates their facilities at Carswell, another DoD unit will be able to move in to the facilities with no MILCON costs required and that this projected savings equals the cost to build new facilities. The report also takes the \$25.5M in "MILCON savings" and adds \$31M in BRAC 91 MILCON cost avoidance to get a total savings of \$56.5M. The Air Force does not concur with these numbers. The actual BRAC 91 MILCON cost estimate for both Bergstrom and Carswell is \$22.3M. If we reduce our rough estimate of \$30.0M for relocation to Bergstrom by the \$5.88M relocation costs to Carswell and the \$22.3M in BRAC 91 costs, we would still incur an actual net cost of approximately \$2.0M to move to Bergstrom, not the \$56.5 savings projected by the report.

STATEMENT: (BRACC Criterion, Section 8, Environmental Impact, sub section 2, subparagraph 1 (Carswell)) "Cleanup efforts may take years to complete and in one instance may require shut down of the runway for an extended period."


COMMENT: The DoD is unaware of any problems which would cause the closure of the runway at Carswell.

GENERAL COMMENT: Throughout the City of Austin report there were numerous references and inferences about the airspace and operational problems at Carswell caused by its location in the Dallas/Ft Worth Metroplex and the number of aircraft to be located there. We concur that Carswell operations will have to be coordinated with other users in the area, including D/FW Airport, but with the proposed closure of NAS Dallas, airspace problems which have existed in the past will be lessened. The Regional Administrator of the FAA's Southwest Region, in a April 21, 1993 letter to the Carswell Redevelopment Authority states, "Consolidation of military aircraft at Carswell from NAS Dallas is very compatible with our existing and future D/FW Metroplex Air Traffic System Plan. The overall effect of closing NAS Dallas would be that the FAA would be able to provide a better service to the

<previous> NAS Dallas users and the closure of the base would improve procedural efficiency for all users in the D/FW area." Operational requirements for each of the assigned units at Carswell have been reviewed by the DoD and determined to be compatible with the proposed consolidation. The Air Force believes that this beddown is compatible with both mission requirements and the local airspace environment. In addition, we have already secured a letter of agreement between the Air Force and Navy setting up procedures for the smooth transition of Air Traffic Services from the Air Force to the Navy should the consolidation be approved.

We believe the DoD has previously addressed all of the points made in the City of Austin's report submitted to you by Mayor Todd. As stated to the Commission on numerous occasions, the DoD proposal will provide unique opportunities for training and efficiencies. The proposal also meets community development plans and results in substantial DoD savings. The DoD recommendation to move the 924th to Carswell will cost only \$5.88 million (with \$4.59M in MILCON cost avoidance) and allow over \$21M in annual recurring savings. This action is cost and operationally effective, and we see no mission degradation or loss of flexibility by the proposed DoD consolidations at Carswell. If you need any further information or clarification on this matter please let me know.

Sincerely



JAMES F. BOATRIGHT

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)

Attachment:

Mayor Todd's Ltr, June 4, 1993 w/o atch

72

July 13, 1993

General Ronald W. Yates
Commander Air Force Materiel Command
4375 Chidlaw Road, Suite 1
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 45433-5001

Dear General Yates:

I just wanted to pass on accolades from Commissioner Peter Bowman for the men and women at the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. Though the pace of the Commission was hectic, I heard nothing but great things from Commissioner Bowman from his visit to Kelly Air Force Base on June 5, 1993. Peter was a 30 year naval officer, with command-time at a Navy depot and Kelly Air Force Base impressed him. Besides a warm welcome by the City of San Antonio, Commissioner Bowman saw the facilities first-hand and heard outstanding briefings from some very sharp people.

Commissioner Bowman particularly wanted to thank Major General Lew Curtis for his hospitality and to especially recognize some of the people who made the visit so productive: Brigadier General William Moore, Mr. Edward Riojas, Colonel Edward McGann, Colonel David Rigsbee, Colonel Gary Spence, Colonel Gary Walston, Lieutenant Colonel Donna Pastor, Mr. John Stallings and Mr. Steve Doneghy. We at the Commission appreciate the effort from everyone to make his visit so memorable.

It is always a pleasure dealing with professionals. Pass on my gratitude to all of them.

Sincerely,

JIM COURTER
Chairman

jac:kbd

Document Separator

DRAFT ITINERARY FOR WEEK OF 13 DECEMBER

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TRAVEL INFO</u>	<u>CONTACT</u>	<u>TRAVELERS</u>
Dec 13	D.C. to San Antonio, TX	6:25 AA#205 Arv 10.29AM via AA#557	Kelly BOQ	Matt, Ben, Bob, Frank, Roger
Dec 14	Kelly AFB San Ant ALC	Day tour & late drive to Bergstrom	Chuck Duffin DSN945-9045	Same
Dec 15	Return to DC	via AA#236		Roger
Dec 15	Bergstrom AFB Austin, TX	Day Tour AM	BOQ	Matt, Ben, Bob, Frank
Dec 16	Start Tvl/Lv	Drive		Bob
Dec 16	Austin, TX to Carswell AFB DFW, TX	8:10 AM flt DL#990 for base tour	Will call in	Matt, Ben Frank
	DFW to DC	5:18 PM flt AA#846 arrv at 9:02 PM		Same

DRAFT

December 23, 1993

Brig. Gen. Bill Lawson
Commander
301st Fighter Wing
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, TX 76127-6200

Dear General Lawson:

Thank you very much for your assistance in facilitating our visit to Carswell AFB, TX on December 16th. Your comments were extremely helpful, not only in explaining the plans and status of the conversion process, but also in giving me and my team a better picture of the spinoffs and results of Commission recommendations. Through your efforts we were able to accomplish one of the major goals of trip, to allow us to develop and collect information necessary to enable the staff to prepare for the coming 1995 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission process.

We were equally appreciative of your comments and those of Colonel Ray Henley during our very successful and fruitful meeting with Cmdr. Mark Danielson, Olen Long and Derrick Curtis. The openness of that meeting was superb and can only serve to assist the tough process of right sizing the Department of Defense infrastructure to the needs of tomorrow's force structure.

Thank you again for taking time out of you busy schedule to meet with us. Please let me know if there is anything that I can help you with in the future

Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

DRAFT

December 23, 1993

Cmdr. Mark Danielson, ~~USNR~~
Transition Officer
Naval Air Station Dallas
Dallas, TX 75211

Dear Commander Danielson:

Thank you very much for your assistance in facilitating our visit to Carswell AFB, TX on December 16th. Your personalized tours and comments were extremely helpful, not only in explaining the plans and status of the conversion process, but also in giving me and my team a better picture of the spinoffs and results of Commission recommendations. Through your efforts we were able to accomplish one of the major goals of trip, to allow us to develop and collect information necessary to enable the staff to prepare for the coming 1995 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission process.

We were equally appreciative of your efforts in arranging the very successful and fruitful meeting with BGen Lawson, Col Henley, Ollin Long and Derrick Curtis. The openness of that meeting was superb and can only serve to assist the tough process of right sizing the Department of Defense infrastructure to the needs of tomorrow's force structure.

Thank you again for your professionalism and superb effort. It is obvious that the transition from Carswell AFB to NAS Ft. Worth Joint Reserve Base will be one of the more complex and successful results of the "BRAC" process.

Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

Copy: Captain Richard Miller
Commander, NAS Dallas
Commanding Officer

is this
Right

Paul

DRAFT

December 23, 1993

Mr. Ollin Long
Site Manager
Carswell AFB, TX 76127-6200

Dear Ollin:

Thank you very much for your assistance in facilitating our visit to Carswell AFB, TX on December 16th. Your comments and personal involvement in our meeting were extremely helpful, not only in explaining the plans and status of the conversion process, but also in giving me and my team a better picture of the spinoffs and results of Commission recommendations. Through your efforts we were able to accomplish one of the major goals of trip, to allow us to develop and collect information necessary to enable the staff to prepare for the coming 1995 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission process.

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Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

Copy: Mr. Alan K. Olsen
Director, Air Force Base Conversion Agency

DRAFT

December 23, --

Toby
For WH
of
28 Dec PLZ

Brig. Gen. Bill Lawson
Commander
301st Fighter Wing
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, TX 76127-6200

Can you
draft a quick
note to
Mark as
well

Geo.
Thanks
Frank

Dear General Lawson:

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Thank you again for taking time out of you busy schedule to meet with us. Please let me know if their is anything that I can help you with in the future

Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

Matt

I know you
said you wanted to pen your
own letter but I drafted this so
1) you can sign & pen a personal note on bottom
2) you can sign as is
3) you can use as thoughts for your note
4) you can trash
Frank

a memo from
FRANK CIRILLO

Toby

↓ (23)

I put 4 each
letters in your
Holding / AIR FORCE
File (this is one)
Please Release - Bob
CAN INS ANY ?⁵ TM



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
CAPT PETER B. BOWMAN, USN (RET)
BEVERLY B. BYRON
REBECCA G. COX
GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

December 23, 1993

Brigadier General Bill Lawson
Commander
301st Fighter Wing
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, TX 76127-6200

Dear General Lawson:

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We were equally appreciative of your comments and those of Colonel Ray Henley during our very successful and fruitful meeting with Commander Mark Danielson, Olen Long and Derrick Curtis. The openness of that meeting was superb and can only serve to assist the tough process of right sizing the Department of Defense infrastructure to the needs of tomorrow's force structure.

Thank you again for taking time out of you busy schedule to meet with us. Please let me know if there is anything that I can help you with in the future.

Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

mpb: cirillo



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HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

December 23, 1993

Commander Mark Danielson
Transition Officer
Naval Air Station Dallas
Dallas, Texas 75211

DUS 79
Dear ~~Commander Danielson~~:

Thank you very much for your assistance in facilitating our visit to Carswell AFB, Texas on December 16th. Your personalized tours and comments were extremely helpful, not only in explaining the plans and status of the conversion process, but also in giving me and my team a better picture of the spinoffs and results of Commission recommendations. Through your efforts we were able to accomplish one of the major goals of our trip - to allow us to develop and collect information necessary to enable the staff to prepare for the coming 1995 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission process.

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Thank you again for your professionalism and superb efforts. It is obvious that the transition from Carswell AFB to NAS Ft. Worth Joint Reserve Base will be one of the more complex and successful results of the "BRAC" process.

Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

Copy: Captain Richard Miller
Commanding Officer, NAS Dallas

mpb: cirillo



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
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703-696-0504

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ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

December 23, 1993

Mr. Dick Pautz
Site Manager
Operating Location G
Bergstrom AFB, TX 78743-5000

Dear Dick:

Thank you very much for your assistance in facilitating our visit to Bergstrom AFB on December 13th. Your comments and personal involvement in our meeting were extremely helpful, not only in explaining the plans and status of the conversion process, but also in giving me and my team a better picture of the spinoffs and results of Commission recommendations. Through your efforts we were able to accomplish one of the major goals of trip - to allow us to develop and collect information necessary to enable the staff to prepare for the coming 1995 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission process.

It is obvious that the transition from Bergstrom AFB to Austin's next airport will be one of the more complex and successful results of the "BRAC" process as a direct result of your effort and that of Scott Madole. Please pass on our thanks to Eldrige Wilson for his professional and informative tour of the Regional Corrosion Control Facility. Thank you again for taking time out of your busy schedule to make the visit happen.

Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

Copy: Mr. Alan K. Olsen
Director, Air Force Base Conversion Agency

mpb: cirillo



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

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GEN H. T. JOHNSON, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

December 23, 1993

Mr. Olen Long
Site Manager
Carswell Air Force Base
Carswell AFB, TX 76127-6200

Dear Olen:

Thank you very much for your assistance in facilitating our visit to Carswell AFB, Texas on December 16th. Your comments and personal involvement in our meeting were extremely helpful, not only in explaining the plans and status of the conversion process, but also in giving me and my team a better picture of the spinoffs and results of Commission recommendations. Through your efforts we were able to accomplish one of the major goals of our trip - to allow us to develop and collect information necessary to enable the staff to prepare for the coming 1995 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission process.

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Sincerely,

Matthew P. Behrmann
Director of Staff

Copy: Mr. Alan K. Olsen
Director, Air Force Base Conversion Agency

mpb: cirillo

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BRAC BASE CONSOLIDATION: A COMPLEX TASK

CDR MARK W. DANIELSON

PREFACE: With the turn of the century rapidly approaching, the "nineties" may well be remembered as the decade of United States (U.S.) military force reductions. While military reorganizations have routinely followed the conclusion of major conflicts, this is the first time in U.S. history that major force reductions have occurred primarily as a result of fiscal considerations.

Following the breakup of the Soviet military superpower, significant political debate continues over what the U.S. military force "right sizing" should be to counter today's unpredictable threats. At a time when more global theater conflicts exist than ever before, creating a balance between maintaining a strong military force and operating within budget constraints has become one of the most time consuming and challenging issues for top U.S. military leaders. Reducing the military force infrastructure has become an absolute necessity in order to operate within the shrinking military budget; joint base consolidation is one solution the Department of Defense has recommended to Congress as a means of maintaining National security.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this article is to provide insight into some of the complex issues as well as advantages of joint base consolidation as it applies to Naval Air Station (NAS) Dallas relocating to Carswell Air Force Base (AFB). This situation is unique in that the relocation is affected by both the 1991 and 1993 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 91, 93) laws.

BACKGROUND: Since the Navy was reluctant to reduce its force structure during the 1991 BRAC sessions, BRAC 91 primarily affected only Air Force Bases. With increasing economic pressure to reduce its infrastructure, the Navy was forced to recommend closure for half of its Reserve Naval Air Stations as well as several active duty Naval Air Stations. However, unlike their other Naval Air Stations, the Navy recommended "realignment" rather than closure for NAS Dallas. The 12 March 1993 DOD recommendation presented to the BRAC 93 Commission was for the Navy to relocate NAS Dallas thirty miles west to Carswell AFB and consolidate additional tenant commands from other Naval Air Stations recommended for closure. Upon Congressional approval of the BRAC 93 recommendation, the property at NAS Dallas would eventually be turned over to the community for reuse after NAS Dallas and its tenant commands vacated the premises.

Before the BRAC 93 commission was able to forward this recommendation to the President on 1 July 1993, basic questions involving aircraft beddown and MILCON expenses had to be answered. The Naval Reserve sent representatives from the Pentagon, Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force and a team of engineering planners from Southern Division, Naval Facilities Command (SOUTHDIV) to assist NAS Dallas in answering these questions during a joint

model, Joint Reserve and Guard base with the Naval Reserve as host of the new base. OSD concurred with this proposal and the recommendation was forwarded to the BRAC Commission.

COBRA MODEL: The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model, a standard program applied to all U.S. Armed Forces for BRAC considerations, indicated the return on investment for the proposed realignment (payback) for the NAS Dallas relocation was only three years. With the COBRA model averaging a payback of six years for other base realignments, this relocation was not only cost effective, but it eliminated airspace problems associated with the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) airport, retained a Naval Air Reserve base in the DFW Metroplex and offered future expansion capabilities. Considering these advantages, the Navy was willing to accept the one hundred and twenty six million dollar investment in MILCON and relocation expenses in order to create a model joint reserve base.

BRAC COMMISSION VISITS: Following visits from Commissioner Johnson on 10 April 1993 and Chairman Courter on 6 May 1993, the BRAC commissioners each left with an appreciative understanding that NAS Dallas already served as a joint reserve base currently hosting Navy, Marine, Army Guard, Army Reserve and Air National Guard aviation tenants. NAS Dallas tenants also included Reserve Headquarters for the Region 11 Readiness Command, Fleet Logistics Support Wing, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command, Recruiting Command III, as well as local organizations from the U.S. Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol, Selective Service System and surface fleet augmentation units. With an extremely large reserve force population currently residing within the DFW Metroplex, relocating NAS Dallas and its tenant commands to Carswell AFB was vital to maintaining the United States military force structure, not just the Naval Reserve.

BRAC COMMISSION REPORT: The 1993 DOD BRAC Commission Report to the President was very nonspecific in providing guidance for the NAS Dallas relocation. The official recommendation was to "Close the Naval Air Station (NAS) Dallas and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to Carswell Air Force Base: Naval Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) Dallas and REDCOM 11. Carswell AFB, Texas, will become a Navy-operated joint reserve center and accommodate the reserve units currently there and being relocated there by this 1993 Commission." While this language referenced tenants relocating from other bases identified for closure, it failed to address any of the non-Navy tenants presently located at NAS Dallas. Due to the lack of more specific BRAC language, Navy planners were forced to make an assumption that these tenants would all relocate since they would no longer have an airfield to operate from once the Navy vacated the Naval Air Station. While operating under this assumption, Navy planners were later advised of proposals by the Army Guard to relocate their CH-47s three miles away to Redbird Airport and replace their helicopters with ground tactical units at NAS Dallas while the Army Reserve remained uncommitted on their relocation. Although all of the

Base Disposal Agency (AFBDA), responsible for all DOD property located outside the 301st cantonment, was never mentioned in the BRAC 93 recommendation or the MOU. While the MOU permitted the Navy (NAS Dallas) to assume host responsibilities incrementally from the 301st AFRES at a rate which was mutually acceptable, the 301st did not have host responsibility for many base functions, or have any authority outside of their cantonment area. On 1 October, 1993 when BRAC 93 became law, the issue of turnover responsibility remained unresolved. As of 8 October 1993, Pentagon officials have been unable to draft MOUs which were acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force.

The Master Planning Team was led to believe the final BRAC language would contain specific guidance for the NAS Dallas relocation. However, neither the MOUs or final BRAC 93 language included any specific details on base boundaries, turnover issues, civilian RIF criteria, funding, community reuse or conflicts arising from two opposing BRAC laws. While it is understood that BRAC language cannot adequately address each unforeseen issue, more specific BRAC language for this realignment would have greatly assisted in the development of a Master Plan and eliminated many of the conflicts generated between BRAC 93 and BRAC 91.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES:

LIVE BOMBS: As NAS Dallas proceeded to develop a master relocation plan, it became apparent that several key operational issues were not adequately addressed during the April site survey. For example, were live bombs going to be carried at Carswell AFB (NAS Fort Worth)? If they were, the off-site storage facility, designated for civil reuse under BRAC 91, would be required by the military. Live ordnance also required bomb build-up areas which would prevent occupying much of the real estate at Carswell AFB; arcs associated with the bomb build-up areas created several unforeseen problems involving aircraft operations and beddown. Since the bomb build-up areas restricted routine operations from occurring within a 1250 foot arc, with limited space available in which to beddown all of the tenant commands, this issue became critical.

WEAPONS STORAGE: Prior to the BRAC 93 proposal, the Carswell Redevelopment Authority (CRA), a committee of community leaders who determine the reuse of former DOD property at Carswell AFB, had been negotiating with Texas Instruments for reuse of the off-site weapons storage facility under the terms of BRAC 91. Since these negotiations had already been initiated, SAF did not include the off-site storage facility in the BRAC 93 "DOD cantonment" boundary. As such, this facility was not considered in developing the Master Plan for the NAS Dallas relocation/consolidation. If the joint services required use of this facility, the Master Planning Team would first have to get approval from SAF. Since SAF was attempting to protect agreements reached with the CRA, the Air Force felt obligated to discuss any changes with the boundaries with the CRA. This process was often difficult and time consuming.

CHAIN OF COMMAND: Perhaps some of the most difficult relocation issues have been related to working with an unclear chain of command. When the Navy developed the proposal to relocate NAS Dallas to Carswell AFB, the USAF 7th Bomb Wing was the host command and the 301st their tenant. The AFBDA assumed host responsibilities for all DOD property located outside the 301st cantonment creating a third party sharing in base responsibility once the 7th Bomb Wing left. The AFBDA was responsible for the environmental cleanup for the base as well as manage the base facilities until reuse could be absorbed by the community. The 301st was to maintain facilities and environmental responsibility within their cantonment area. The AFBDA worked for Secretary Boatright and decisions involving reuse were being negotiated under BRAC 91 without direct Navy involvement. As future host of the base, NAS Dallas was attempting to develop a Master Plan for the use of existing base facilities. However, actual site approval authority for the distribution of the DOD facilities was retained by Air Force (Secretary Boatright) since BRAC 93 was not yet law. The conflicts involving property management and an unresolved chain of command created many unique and frustrating situations for the Navy, AFFES and AFBDA.

To help resolve the chain of command issue, another MOU was signed on 8 June 1993 between the Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of the Navy which identified the 301st as host of the facility during the transition period until the Navy could assume host functions by 30 September 1994. This MOU, signed before the President forwarded the BRAC recommendations to Congress, became the first official document recognizing BRAC 93 as something more than a recommendation which provided the Navy with some necessary clout to develop a master plan. However, while this MOU recognized the BRAC 93 proposal, it failed to give site approval authority to the Navy which resulted in the loss of the supply warehouse. This loss was subsequent to the OSD briefing which established the new DOD boundary. Following the Navy's strong objections to the BOP supply warehouse issue, a meeting between representatives from the Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of the Navy resulted in an agreement to be developed into an MOU which effectively granted site approval authority to the Navy. Although this agreement contained restrictions on the Navy siting authority, this action at least prevented any further changes to the Master Plan without joint approval by the Air Force and Navy.

DOD BOUNDARIES: During an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) meeting attended by representatives from the AFBDA, CRA, 301st, NAS Dallas and BOP on 8 September 1993, the BOP revealed a plan to annex additional DOD property at Carswell AFB. Since the new boundary significantly impacted military housing which the Navy intended to use, the plan was rejected by the Navy. Since the site approval agreement prevented any such boundary issues from being changed without concurrence from the Navy and Air Force, the BOP issue was dropped and the previously agreed to boundaries remained intact.

JOINT OPERATIONS: One of the more complicated issues involved having different operational orientations between the military services. As Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff, General Powell established "jointness" among

- * Medical/dental work arounds have not been funded.
- * Hangar and administrative space at Carswell AFB is insufficient to bed down all of the tenant commands.
- * Many buildings require major renovation; occupancy of such spaces would either significantly slow down or prevent construction.
- * Other base closures are forcing some squadrons to relocate to Fort Worth by September 1994.
- * MILCON design and engineering studies require months to finalize even using an accelerated schedule; any delays compound the workaround.
- * Necessary ramp improvement projects and renovations to flight line operations may prevent or significantly restrict aircraft operations should all tenants be relocated by July 1994.
- * The Reserve force structure has not been finalized; COMNAVAIRESFOR has made a final determination on which units will relocate to NAS Fort Worth.

Many of these workaround issues remain unresolved at this time. As of this writing, NAS Dallas is considering relocating tenants from other bases and Navy and Marine Corps tenants from NAS Dallas during the summer of 1994 and hold the Army Guard, Army Reserve and Texas Air National Guard in place at NAS Dallas until their new facilities can be constructed or renovated.

MEDICAL/DENTAL: Due to manpower shortages and no facilities work around for medical and dental, it is impossible to provide these services at both NAS Fort Worth and NAS Dallas. The only equitable decision is to keep the NAS Dallas facility open and provide emergency service at NAS Fort Worth. Since the 301st is modifying a building for use as a medical facility, the NAS Fort Worth medical work around plan was to assign an emergency medical technician and ambulance TAD to the 301st building during normal working hours. As with NAS Dallas, emergency ambulance services would transport injured personnel to the local civilian hospital. Once the new medical clinic is constructed at NAS Fort Worth, the medical and dental staff will relocate from NAS Dallas. Until the new facility is completed at NAS Fort Worth, military personnel will have to drive to the base which provides medical or dental services. While not a convenient solution, it appears to be the only fiscally acceptable one. The new medical/dental facility is expected to be completed in late 1995.

CONCLUSION: The NAS Dallas relocation has been a difficult proposition, yet the future benefits of creating a master reserve base are tremendous for all of the Armed Forces. Joint operations are expected to become the norm for future base realignments. Stationing a mixture of fighters at a single base provides more realistic and thorough training for fighter pilots, critical with the disestablishment of most adversary squadrons. The large ramps at NAS Fort Worth not only offer room for future expansion, but provide space for visiting squadron detachments to operate from during future joint exercises. Though the benefits of this BRAC 93 relocation may not be fully realized until a new generation of Reservists operate from the enhanced facilities at NAS

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CRP

NAVAL AIR STATION FORT WORTH
JOINT RESERVE BASE
BRAAC UPDATE BRIEFING
16 DECEMBER 1993

MISSION:

- * **ESTABLISH MODEL, JOINT RESERVE/
GUARD BASE.**
- * **RELOCATE NAS DALLAS, ITS TENANT
ACTIVITIES, AND TENANTS FROM NAF
DETROIT, NAS MEMPHIS AND NAS
GLENVIEW TO NAS FORT WORTH JRB
(FORMERLY CARSWELL AFB).**

BASE LOADING:

*** PERSONNEL:**

FULL TIME SUPPORT (MIL/CIV)	3,700
RESERVISTS/GUARDSMEN	8,700

*** DRILL WEEKENDS:**

**UNITS/PERSONNEL SPREAD EQUALLY
OVER 3 WEEKENDS PER MONTH**

*** TENANTS:**

**APPROXIMATELY 50, REPRESENTING
EACH MILITARY SERVICE (BOTH AIR
SURFACE AND GROUND UNITS)**

COSTS:

*** \$130M IN MILCON (APPROVED)**

*** \$13M FOR ONE-TIME MOVE COSTS**

TIMEFRAME:

- * RELOCATE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AVIATION ASSETS FROM NAS DALLAS, NAS GLENVIEW AND NAS MEMPHIS IN FY-94;**
- * RELOCATE REMAINING ACTIVITIES IN FY-96 AS SPACES ARE RENOVATED OR CONSTRUCTED. OPERATIONAL CLOSURE FOR NAS DALLAS EXPECTED TO BE LATE FY-96 DUE TO REQUIRED MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AT NAS FORT WORTH.**

- * LONG TERM PLAN NOT AFFECTED BY FY-94 FUNDING.**
- * DESIGN DOLLARS ARE DEDICATED FOR THE NAS DALLAS RELOCATION FOR FY-94.**
- * SLIDING THE INITIAL MOVE OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ASSETS FROM NAS DALLAS WILL HAVE MINIMAL AFFECT ON OVERALL CONSOLIDATION/RELOCATION AT NAS FORT WORTH JRB.**

FACTORS AFFECTING MOVE:

- * ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS)
- DUE 1 JULY 1994. UNABLE TO RELOCATE
ANY UNITS UNTIL EIS COMPLETE.**
- * MILCON SCHEDULE. FUNDING AVAILABLE
1994 OR 1995?**

FUNDING:

- * AS OF 7 DECEMBER 1993, NO FUNDS HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR RELOCATING NAS DALLAS IN FY-94. (TENANTS FROM NAS MEMPHIS AND NAS GLENVIEW MAY RELOCATED TO CARSWELL AFB AS TENANTS OF THE AFBCA DURING THE SUMMER OF FY-94 IF THEY RECEIVE BRAC RELOCATION FUNDING.)**

DEMOGRAPHICS:

*** DEMOGRAPHICS STUDIES BY MARINE CORPS INDICATE THERE IS NO PROBLEM RECRUITING TO SUPPORT TENANTS FROM OUT OF STATE. THERE IS NO AFFECT FOR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS COMMANDS PRESENTLY STATIONED AT NAS DALLAS.**

POSITIVE FACTORS FOR NAS FORT WORTH JRB:

- * PROVIDES LONG TERM COST SAVINGS FROM BASE CONSOLIDATIONS.**
- * GREATLY IMPROVED JOINT TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES.**
- * FORT WORTH COMMUNITY IS EXTREMELY RESPONSIVE TO DEVELOPMENT OF NAS FORT WORTH JRB.**

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07 Dec 93

**REVISED SUMMARY PLAN FOR RELOCATION OF
NAS DALLAS TO CARSWELL AFB (NAS FORT WORTH JRB)**

1. **PLAN:** Relocate NAS Dallas and all resident and BRAC 93 identified tenant activities to Carswell AFB. Per MOU, the Naval Reserve will assume host responsibilities from the 301st Combat Support Group and Air Force Base Consolidation Agency (AFBCA) no later than 1 Oct 94.

2. **TIMELINE:**

PHASE 1: Relocates Navy and Marine Corps air operations currently at NAS Dallas by 30 Sep 94; some maintenance and supply functions may remain at Dallas due to inadequate work around facilities. Designated non-flying organizations will remain at Dallas with maximum consolidation of spaces. VM3R-234 and VMFA-124 will relocate to NAS Fort Worth and operate from unrenovated spaces. Tentatively, the Texas Air National Guard, Army National Guard and Army Reserve will continue to operate from their existing spaces at NAS Dallas until their facilities become available. NAS Dallas would revert to a VFR tower operation with minimum support provided by the Navy.

PHASE 2: Relocates the Texas Air National Guard, Army Guard and Army Reserve to NAS Fort Worth incrementally once their facilities become available. NAS Dallas airfield operations cease once these moves are completed.

PHASE 3: Relocates REDCOM 11, NAVRESREDCOM and 14TH Marines to Carswell upon completion of the new joint facility. COMNAVRESINTCOM will relocate into renovated building. Due to the extensive MILCON required for building renovation and new construction at Carswell, it is anticipated Phase 2 or 3 will not occur until late FY96. While some satellite functions (PSD, BQ, food service and MWR) will remain in Dallas to provide support for these organizations, such satellite functions may severely degrade service at both sites without additional billets or temporary personnel assistance. A meeting will be convened in early January 1994 to determine specific requirements.

3. **TENANTS:** At this time, neither the Naval Air Reserve Force or Marine Corps Reserve have determined their force structure or which tenants will relocate to NAS Fort Worth. All tenants currently at NAS Dallas will relocate to NAS Fort Worth. With growth from other relocating units, it is anticipated approximately fifty tenant organizations will occupy NAS Fort Worth.

4. **MILITARY PERSONNEL:** All personnel assigned to NAS Dallas will relocate to NAS Fort Worth. Personnel loading will increase with subsequent relocations of tenants from NAS Detroit, NAS Memphis and NAS Glenview. Military personnel

from the 301st Fighter Wing presently at Carswell AFB will remain in place. Military support personnel will have to increase in some areas due to the size of the base increasing. Specific numbers are unknown at this time, but the plan is for 2,363 full time military and 8,700 drilling reservists at this time.

5. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: Reference item 4, specific numbers undetermined. Plan is for 1,240 civilian personnel at this time.

6. PROJECTS: CNARF has a copy of the master plan which lists the specific BRAC projects which are too extensive to list. The plan includes \$130M in MILCON and \$13M in one-time moving costs.

7. ENVIRONMENTAL/NEPA: The Air Force Base Consolidation Agency is responsible for the environmental cleanup at Carswell AFB. Their cleanup is expected to take twenty years. NAS Dallas has members of the EPA and an environmental contractor currently on board the station making an environmental assessment of the base. Environmental and NEPA issues are the responsibility of Southern Division, NAVFAC.

8. COMMUNITY INTERFACE: NAS Dallas has been working directly with the Carswell Redevelopment Authority in the development of NAS Fort Worth. NAS Dallas is also working directly with the City of Grand Prairie and the City of Dallas to develop a reuse plan. The Army Reserve (90th ARC), currently located in leased spaces in the DFW Metroplex, has expressed an interest to be included in the reuse plan for NAS Dallas once the relocation is complete. Many commercial activities/businesses have also expressed interest in the facility.

9. PROPERTY DISPOSAL: There is no specific plan for property disposal at this time. Since NAS Dallas is relocating and not closing, it is critical NAS Dallas be permitted to transfer all personal property to NAS Fort Worth as there is no funding allocated for any replacement property.

10. HOMEOWNERS ASSISTANCE: NAS Dallas has requested the VHA rates be grandfathered for NAS Dallas personnel due to a significantly lower VHA rate in Fort Worth. We have not received a response on this issue. Until relocating tenants can be determined, homeowners assistance cannot be provided by NAS Dallas.

11. BASE CLOSURE ORGANIZATION: The organization consists of the staff of NAS Dallas. CDR Danielson is responsible for the NAS Dallas relocation; LCDR McAdams is responsible for the closure of NAS Dallas.

12. HELP REQUIRED:

CARSWELL AFB FUNDING: No one has determined who will fund the operation at Carswell AFB as of 1 Oct 94. The MOU identifies the Navy but the Navy is not budgeted for this. THIS IS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF

THE RELOCATION SINCE IT IS APPARENT THERE IS NO WAY OF GETTING AROUND MAINTAINING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AT NAS DALLAS AND CARSWELL AFB UNTIL THE END OF CY-96.

SITE SURVEY FOR TEMPORARY WORKAROUND: It is imperative this survey be completed as soon as possible. Critical requirements must be identified and funded if NAS Dallas is to relocate any assets to NAS Fort Worth in FY-94.

ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP: The 28 October 1993 Air Force Base Disposal Agency (AFBDA) plan for environmental cleanup is inaccurate and undefined. The AFBDA is behind in completing an air emissions study for the base. Improper analysis of this emissions study could significantly impact the Navy's ability in operating from the new base.

PCS FUNDING: Civilian personnel who will have to drive an additional ten miles to work are entitled to a PCS move at government expense. These figures were included in the one time move costs. The one time costs have been cut in half meaning either the personnel or the assets can be moved, but not both. NAS Dallas will require full restoration of the one time move costs in order to relocate.

MANPOWER CONCERNS: It appears there has not been any final resolution on the military manpower allocations for NAS Fort Worth or the civilian personnel merge between Air Force DOD personnel and NAS Dallas personnel. While it appears the civilian issues are getting close to an understanding, there are questions on the number of billets which will be funded for civilian and military positions, particularly in the area of security, communications and public works. These manpower issues directly relate to the unresolved issues from the last Joint Services Conference.

ATC: ATC manpower requirements have been forwarded to CNARF. NAS Dallas is expected to receive six new controllers from A school this spring.

The funding for moving ATC equipment has been cut. If the Marine Corps relocates their GCA unit from Memphis to Carswell AFB, ATC should be able to function without any severe impact.

COMMUNICATIONS: What were the NCTC results from their visit to Carswell AFB? The 301st is currently providing telephone/ADP/communications support to the entire base and has offered to provide this service to the base when the Navy relocates. At this time, it appears the Navy is planning on assuming this host responsibility but it has a direct impact on DOD civilian manpower. If the most economic and efficient solution was for the 301st to provide this service, how will it be funded and how will the existing civilian personnel merge with Navy personnel?

BUREAU OF PRISONS: NAS Dallas is making a formal request to UNICOR to consider a suitable space at NAS Dallas for the UNICOR furniture showroom once NAS Dallas relocates to NAS Fort Worth. The Air Force awarded UNICOR building

1231 at Carswell AFB for a furniture showroom but the Navy could effectively use this space. NAS Dallas may require additional support on this issue.

HOUSING: NAS Dallas acquired fifty units located just outside the main gate from the Carswell Redevelopment Authority (CRDA). Many of these housing units are in overall excellent shape with the exception of needing new roofs. An environmental assessment can be made to permit personnel to move into the houses, but there must be funding associated with the housing units before occupancy can occur. Since this is available military housing, it would be advantageous for it to be funded as soon as possible to provide housing for military families regardless of when the relocation to Carswell actually occurs.

BASE EXCHANGE: With the AF Exchange operation undergoing a one year test program from 14 Jul 93 - 14 Jul 94, there are several questions which concern the Navy Exchange. Who will operate the Carswell AFB Exchange after 14 Jul 94? Can the Navy Exchange assume this operation if the NAS Dallas relocation is delayed? A separate letter will be sent via the Chain of Command requesting the Navy assume operation for the purpose of providing maximum resources to the MWR program.

13. **POINT OF CONTACT:**

RELOCATION: CDR M. W. Danielson DSN 874-6104/6101 Com (214) 266-6104

TRANSITION: (Closure) LCDR D. McAdams (same numbers as above)

FAX: (214) 266-6207

14. **MISCELLANEOUS:** Four Staffers for the BRAC Commission will visit Carswell AFB for a "how-goes-it" briefing. They will be met by CDR Danielson and receive a briefing from CDR Danielson, Col Henley, 301st, Mr. Olen Long,

AFBCA and Mr. Derrick Curtis, Carswell Redevelopment Authority. Emphasis is on development of joint base and master plan. BRAC team looking to Carswell AFB as a model for future relocations.


CO, NAS DALLAS

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE
NAVAL AIR STATION FORT WORTH
JOINT RESERVE BASE
CARSWELL FIELD

We, the undersigned, having convened on November 16-18, 1993, have reached consensus on the following issues concerning the operation and occupation of facilities at Naval Air Station (NAS) Fort Worth:

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. DRILL WEEKEND SCHEDULE | 15. COMMUNICATIONS/FIBER OPTIC |
| 2. AIRCRAFT PARKING | 16. BUNKER ALLOCATION |
| 3. VEHICLE MAINTENANCE | 17. VAN PADS |
| 4. MEDICAL/DENTAL | 18. COMPASS ROSE |
| 5. SUPPLY | 19. AIR OPERATIONS |
| 6. POL | 20. NON-BRAC RELATED ISSUES |
| 7. DINING | 21. READINESS CENTER |
| 8. TESTING FACILITIES | 22. SECURITY |
| 9. AIRCRAFT WASH RACKS | 23. BARRACKS |
| 10. PUBLIC WORKS/BCE | 24. ATC CONTROLLER AUGMENTATION |
| 11. NDI LAB | |
| 12. WEAPONS | |
| 13. FLIGHT SIMULATORS | |
| 14. PHOTO LAB/AUDIO-VISUAL | |

As a binding part of this document, issue papers with the agreed upon solutions are incorporated as attachments to this agreement. COMNAVRESFOR will issue a message requesting higher authority to validate AF 301st, Navy, Army and Marine Corps authorized square footage and other requirements for all functions. By attaching my signature below, I am indicating consensus on behalf of my respective agency and will agree to support the decisions of this document.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

Signature	Printed Name	Title	Agency
	CAPT RICK MILLER	CO	NAS DALLAS
	CAPT BRUCE ST. PETER	DCOS	COMNAVRESFOR
for Millard C. Rushing	LTC DON FAIRLEY	STAFF ENGR	TX ARNG
for DeLoe	MR. LARRY HALL	FAC SUPV	90TH ARMY RESERVE
for Rowland Wilson	COL ROWLAND WILSON	VICE COM	136 AW, TANG
for J.F. Goodman	COL J.F. GOODMAN	CO	MAG 41
for Ray Henley	COL RAY HENLEY	COMMANDER	301ST SUPPORT GROUP
for R.S. Tyler	CAPT R.S. TYLER	XO	SOUTHNAVFACENGCO
for H.A. Torok	CAPT H.A. TOROK	COMMANDER	REDCOM 11
for Don B. Dozier	MAJ DON B. DOZIER	DIR OF TRNG	CAP-USAF

DRILL WEEKEND SCHEDULE

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Joint use facilities will not accommodate all services drilling on the same weekend.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

There is no coordinated drill weekend schedule between services at NAS Fort Worth.

Basis of current Matching Plan assumes evenly distributed drill weekends.

Master plan will examine and recommend solutions, if necessary, to POV parking.

There will be 3 drill weekends per month for planning purposes.

Approximate base loading population will be 4000 per weekend.

The following is the Personnel Base Loading for NAS Fort Worth:

	ACTIVE DUTY	CIV	RESERVISTS
AFRES (301st)	0	585	1100
NAS DALLAS	631	308	1200
MARINE CORPS	650	0	2260
NAVY SQUADRON	475	0	550
NAVY SURFACE UNITS	164	26	1520
PERSONNEL SUPPORT (MEDICAL)	78	24	0
NAVAL RESALE	1	116	0
OTHERS (NAVY)	48	22	0
TANG	51*	217**	781
ARMY GUARD/RESERVE	<u>48</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>1213</u>
TOTALS	2146	1443	8624

TOTAL BASE LOADING 12,213

* Are present on drill

** 182 present on drill

GOAL

To evenly distribute personnel loading over available drill weekends per month.

To build facilities to accomplish mission within budget.

SOLUTION

Set up a drill weekend schedule system on a yearly basis with quarterly updates.

NAS Dallas Reserve PGM Director will establish through consensus a preliminary drill weekend schedule coordinated with all tenants by 17 Dec 93.

ACTION
COR OSSECK

18 NOVEMBER 1993

PHOTO LAB/AUDIO-VISUAL

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Joint use and operation of photo lab and audio-visual facilities has not been agreed upon.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

TANG has audio-visual training requirement, not including dark room.

MAG41/Navy has operational requirement for photo lab, including a dark room.

AF 301st has a photo studio in Bldg 1710 without a dark room.

TANG audio visual needs to be colocated with their communications.

TANG audio visual requirement is 2100 x \$100/SF = \$210,000

GOAL

To satisfy all facility and operational requirements in the most economical manner.

SOLUTION

NAS Dallas and TANG develop MOA for provision of services and joint use of photo lab/audio visual facilities.

SODIV investigate by 1 Dec 93:

Build SF in TANG headquarters building to accommodate audio-visual requirements.

Locating TANG, Navy, & Marine Corps photo-audio-visual requirements in new TANG building.

Locating non-mobility TANG function in Bldg 1445. (By co-locating with TANG C-130 simulator the need for additional communication network lines is reduced.)

Locating Navy/MAG 41 photo audio visual in 1445 and TANG audio visual in their own compound.

Action

18 NOVEMBER 1993

BUNKER ALLOCATION

PROBLEMS/ISSUE

Requests, exceeding authorized SF, have been received from some tenants for use of bunkers in weapons storage area (WSA).

FACTS/BACKGROUND

25 bunkers exist in WSA.

MATCS is authorized 3 bunkers to meet facility requirements.

AIMD (400) is authorized 2 bunkers for support of testing facilities.

BRAC funds are budgeted for renovation of the 5 designated bunkers.

Other requests for bunkers are: Army Reserve - 8, Army Guard - 2, AIMD (900) - 2, AIMD (700) - 2, MAG41 - 1. These requests are in addition to their authorized SF.

If bunkers are allocated to these units, they will be taken "as is". No BRAC funds may be spent.

GOAL

To determine a method to allocate excess bunkers.

SOLUTION

NAS Dallas (NAS Fort Worth) establishes agreements with users for bunker allocations.

*Post POME
Action*

18 NOVEMBER 1993

VAN PADS

PROBLEM/ISSUE

SOUTHDIV has been unable to confirm the number of vans relocating to NAS Fort Worth and the requirements for siting.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Many of MALS41 vans can be stacked.

BRAC guidelines allow for construction of van pads to support relocation of 180 existing MALS vans, 2 weather vans and 4 communication vans from NAS Dallas, NAS Memphis and NAS Glenview.

Total of 295 MALS vans, 2 weather vans for CMWSS and 4 communication vans. Of the 295 MALS vans, 180 vans will be open and operating daily. 115 MALS vans will be in storage but accessible for training and use.

Army Reserve has a requirement for a pad for 22 vans with a single electrical power source. (120V, 60HZ).

GOAL

To satisfy operational requirements in the most economical manner.

SOLUTION

180 operational vans will be located in a single van complex in the vicinity of Eldg 1055.

2 weather vans and 4 communications vans will be located next to Building 1410.

Aman ~~SODIV~~ will evaluate and recommend an existing location for the remaining 115 MALS vans (at no BRAC cost) and 22 Army vans (BRAC cost).

18 NOVEMBER 1993

COMPASS ROSE

PROBLEM/ISSUE

SCUTHDIV has not been able to define requirements for a compass rose.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Existing compass rose at NAS Fort Worth will not be usable due to siting of TANG facilities.

GOAL

To meet operational requirements.

SOLUTION

Construct/install compass rose that meets all aircraft requirements.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

AIR OPERATIONS

PROBLEM/ISSUE

SOUTHDIV has not been able to confirm Air Operations (OPS) requirements and therefore has been unable to optimally match to existing facilities.

FACTS\BACKGROUND

Need fire fighting pit. There is a fire fighting pit in Memphis that is used by MAG41.

Requirements for OPS have not been validated.

C-130 Assault strip with permanent lighting and helicopter landing pad landing as presented in Matching Plan is acceptable.

Helicopter landing pad location in 27 Oct matching plan not desirable but acceptable for Army.

Bldg 1416 is Condition Code 3, i.e. not acceptable for use.

MATCS will be relocated from NAS Memphis to NAS Fort Worth.

A facility is required to house AF 301st corrosion control insert.

MAG41 needs space for arresting gear, air operations personnel.

GOAL

To optimize matching of OPS requirements to existing facilities.

SOLUTION

Have COMNAVRESFOR and EFD validate Air OPS requirements.

SODIV develop optimal plan based on validated requirements.

Bldg 1402 will be used for 301st corrosion control.

SODIV investigate locating TANG weather flight personnel in Bldg 1425. Requirement is 3700 SF.

SODIV investigate providing Bldg 1410 for MAG41 Air Ops, Comm, Weather and Supply sections.

SODIV find alternate site for Navy supply.

NAS Dallas/SODIV investigate providing MAG41 one bunker for 4 crash/fire protection vehicles and equipment and providing access from bunker to taxiway.

SODIV determine if BRAC funds are available for fire fighting pit and if EPA will license a fire fighting pit.

NON-BRAC RELATED ISSUES

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Resolution of beddown at NAS Fort Worth for non-BRAC related activities is premature.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Planning for BRAC facility use takes precedence over non-BRAC requests.

Non-BRAC requests received include: 2/14th Marines, 20 acres for Army Reserve, Navy recruiting presently located in Grand Prairie, 28th Aviation Group and Navy Thrift Shop. These units will be given siting consideration after approval of final beddown for BRAC related activities.

BRAC law will not allow BRAC-CON funding to include any cost for renovation or construction related to non-BRAC activities.

Self-help projects could conflict and impact both design schedules and construction completion.

GOAL

To achieve beddown of all potential activities at NAS Fort Worth within the guidelines of BRAC.

SOLUTION

SOUTHDIV will continue to provide master planning and site approval services for NAS Fort Worth and tenants.

Throughout the realignment, self-help projects will be coordinated with SOUTHDIV Core team to eliminate conflicts with design and construction.

Give priority to relocating units with high lease costs.

Major claimants who desire to expand scope of BRAC projects should initiate required project.

READINESS CENTER NEW CONSTRUCTION

PROBLEM/ISSUE

REDCEN/REDCOM facility construction not resolved, to include:

- Resolution of site location
- Final determination of facility occupants with BFR's
- Review of cost estimates (planning costs)
- Review of cost estimates (construction costs)
- Identification of dedicated funding

FACTS

MILCON project is the largest of all projects (dollar wise) for Carswell redirect.

BFR review of major players yielded separate, exclusive BFRs. Joint usage not identified and, with changes received 16 Nov, is a moving target.

BFR/vehicle support requirements may exceed recommended site location capability: motor pools, associated HAZMAT, MIUW vehicles and compound for equipment.

Confirmed occupants are REDCEN, REDCOM 11, MIUW, Headquarters 14th Marines, Recruiting Det Area 3 Surface, Fleet Hospital 21 Headquarters Unit, MAG41 motor pool and parking, Marine recruiters.

GOAL

Provide final tenant list/BFR requirements to enable final BFR estimation using joint facility guidelines.

Identify dedicated funding.

Finalize site location.

SOLUTION

~~COMNAVRESFOR~~ validate occupant BFR requirements to SOUTHDIV.

Dedicate funding to commence project.

Claimants/MARRESFOR investigate augmenting BRACCON with MILCON to relocate non BRAC related activities to this facility such as 2/14th Marines.

AIRCRAFT PARKING

PROBLEM/ISSUE

There is insufficient aircraft parking apron adjacent to existing maintenance facilities to handle additional units.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Current aircraft parking layout is based on the following aircraft:

Navy Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve - MAG41
2 Squadrons of F-14 (24 planes)	2 Squadrons of FA-18 (24 planes)
1 Squadron of C-9 (4 planes)	1 Squadrons of KC-130 (12 planes)
NAS Dallas C-12 (2 planes)	
Texas Air National Guard (TANG)	Air Force 301st
1 Squadron of C-130 (8 planes)	1 Squadron (26 planes)
Army Reserve	Army National Guard
Army Reserve U-21 (5 planes)	16 CH-47 helicopters
30 OH-58 helicopters	5 UH-60 helicopters
18 UH-1 helicopters	1 UH-1 helicopters

North ~~east~~^{west} apron has no designated aircraft.

Fixed wing and rotary aircraft to utilize separate taxiways to minimize FOD danger.

Navy needs 4 parking spaces on apron for C-9's.

Army Reserve needs 5 parking spaces on apron for U-21's.

TANG needs 8 parking spaces on apron for C-130's.

Marine Corps need 10 parking spaces on apron for KC-130's.

GOAL

To provide adequate parking space for all aircraft.

SOLUTION

COMNAVRESFOR AND MARRESFOR finalize NAS Fort Worth aircraft loading ASAP.

SODIV reevaluate helicopter parking area with Army input by 1 Dec 93.

Accommodate helicopter transients in parking area plan.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

FLIGHT SIMULATORS

PROBLEM/ISSUE

SOUTHDIV has been unable to confirm what simulators will be relocated to NAS Fort Worth.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

There are F-4, F-14 (back seat), and TANG C-130 simulators at NAS Dallas.

Basic requirements are: "one F-14 (front seat) simulator, one F-14 (back seat) simulators, one FA-18 simulator and one TANG C-130 simulator will be located at NAS Fort Worth."

F-4 simulator at NAS Dallas will not relocate.

AIRRESFOR and N095 attempting to acquire a KC-130 simulator

GOAL

To confirm what simulators will be relocated to NAS Fort Worth.

SOLUTION

Co-locate all Navy and Marine Corps simulators in Bldg 1752 with appropriate utilities upgrade. Locate TANG C-130 simulator in Bldg 1445 with appropriate utilities upgrade.

SODIV design to basic requirements.

SODIV determine if facility can accommodate an additional F-14 front seat non-motion and back seat simulator.

SODIV determine where to accommodate KC-130 simulator.

MEDICAL/DENTAL

PROBLEM/ISSUE

OASD DMFO (Defense Medical Facilities Office) has not provided sizing criteria for consolidated Medical/Dental Facility.

DMFO sizing criteria does not include medical training space and reserve medical/dental treatment requirements.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

All services have Medical training and administration requirements.

TANG and AF 301st have a training/admin requirement of 4000 SF each.

TANG can joint use physical and dental exam facilities.

AF 301st has a project under construction to convert Bldg 1740 into a physical exam/training facility.

BUMED is considering use of Bldg 1740 and an adjacent building, Bldg 1780, as a part of a medical/dental complex.

Bldg 1780 is fully utilized by AF 301st medical administration, civilian personnel and security police.

DOD IG has recommended that DOD revisit decision to transfer existing hospital to Bureau of Prisons.

Army needs 375 flight physicals and some medical consults per year.

GOAL

To most economically meet medical/dental service and training requirements.

SOLUTION

SODIV make Bldg 1780 available for medical use by relocating civilian personnel and security police to equivalent facilities using BRAC funding.

SODIV develop medical/dental complex using Bldg 1740, Bldg 1780 and new construction to include training, admin, examination and treatment.

SODIV and NAS Dallas press DMFO for criteria decision.

SODIV Evaluate cost of consolidated vs "with unit" construction for AF 301st, REDCEN, MAG41 and TANG admin/training functions.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

WEAPONS

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Small arms range does not meet Navy criteria.

There exists a need to develop base capability for 1.3 inert ordnance.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Navy will host Small Arms Range.

Upgrading small arms range to Navy criteria is not in the budget.

Bldg 3355 will be a joint ordnance facility shared by AF 301st and Navy. (SF requirements not verified.)

An ESQD arc will be required around the new rocket assembly building. An ESQD arc requires siting the facility in a remote area resulting in longer utility runs. An arc also increases the cost per SF by requiring blast resistant construction.

AF 301st will store live missiles and work these in rocket assembly facility.

GOAL

To satisfy all weapons requirements in most economical manner. Build base capability to carry 1.3 inert ordnance.

SOLUTION

SODIV identify and correct small arms range deficiencies to meet Navy criteria for a pistol range. Fund with BRAC.

SODIV identify and correct deficiencies to meet Navy criteria for a rifle range.

MARRESFOR determine funding sources to correct rifle range deficiencies.

COMNAVAIRRESFOR have NAVAIR validate requirements for 1.3 inert ordnance. Develop capability if validated.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

AIRCRAFT WASHRACKS

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Army Reserve desires a separate washrack located adjacent to their hangar. (This precludes most economical and flexible solution which is to co-locate all washracks.)

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Based on Navy criteria, there is a requirement for two small (Type A, 803 SY) washracks and one large (Type B, 1822 SY) washrack to accommodate Navy, Marine Corps, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard Aircraft.

TANG and AF 301st wash aircraft in fuel cell hangars.

Washrack located adjacent to Army hangar would not be accessible to other units.

Separate washrack locations will require duplication of support facilities such as oil/water separators and support buildings.

Separate facilities are not in budget.

301st has a Type A washrack under design to be constructed FY 95.

Army Reserve has its own washrack at NAS Dallas.

GOAL

To provide maximum flexibility at least expense.

SOLUTION

Co-locate one Type A and one Type B aircraft washrack between Navy and Army aprons with access from both parking aprons.

Locate one Type A washrack adjacent to northeast corner of Bldg 4210.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

ATC CONTROLLER AUGMENTATION

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Navy manning is not adequate to man and provide controller upgrade training at two locations.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Navy provided ATC controllers to Carswell AFB to prevent costly hiring of DOD controllers. Navy was to move all flight operations to Carswell AFB during the summer of 1994 and cease operations at NAS Dallas. Savings to DOD was an estimated \$600,000/year.

Navy is unable to move all functions to Carswell in 1994, but is obligated to provide ATC services at Carswell under MOU signed between USAF and Navy.

Navy has shortage of ATC personnel, but has planned for six personnel to come from A-school to NAS Fort Worth during the Spring of 1994.

GOALS

Clearly identify ATC personnel requirements for manning two towers for a three year period.

SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION

Maintain Navy personnel at NAS Dallas and NAS Fort Worth until Navy can close NAS Dallas.

CNRF provide manning at NAS Dallas to support ATC functions at NAS Dallas and NAS Fort Worth.

RESOLUTION

ESC concurs with recommendation.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

POL

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Joint use of the existing POL facilities has not been agreed upon.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

The POL storage capacity is adequate.

The existing POL operations and lab building (Bldg 1101) is 1600 SF.

Navy, TANG, MAG41, Army and AF 301st have a training requirement.

The Navy will maintain and operate the fuel farm to provide POL to all tenants and transient aircraft.

Navy, TANG, AF 301st, and POL contractor have lab requirements.

AF 301st cancelled funding of POL lab, 2 jet fuel storage tanks, and 2 LOX facilities under BRAC 91.

MAG41 and Army need an environmentally safe expeditionary refueling site.

GOAL

To establish and operate a joint use POL fuel farm in the most economical manner.

SOLUTION

Higher authority validate AF 301st, MAG41, TANG and Navy POL operational requirements and provide additional facilities as required, such as admin and training.

Navy, AF 301st, TANG, MAG41 and contractor will share the lab in Bldg 1101.

NAS Dallas develop MOA between services for joint use of POL facilities by 30 Jun 94.

SODIV develop a project for expeditionary refueling site to be submitted as BRAC or as a joint MILCON project. The vicinity of assault strip should be considered for siting.

Action ?

18 NOVEMBER 1993

COMMUNICATIONS/FIBER OPTIC

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Host for base communication/phones/ADP requirements has not been established.
Communication components and associated budget are not well defined.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

TANG has a switch at NAS Dallas that has expansion capability.

Existing switch and communication lines at NAS Fort Worth are presently being leased.

TANG has identified a requirement for fiber optic connectivity between their facilities.

TANG has stated that funds are included in the ANGRIC BRAC O&M budget for fiber optic connections of adjacent facilities. Fiber optic connection to remote TANG facilities was not included.

Funds are not included in the BRAC Military Construction budget to upgrade or replace the existing communication system at NAS Fort Worth.

AF 301st will maintain existing activities.

GOAL

To provide a state of the art communication system for NAS Fort Worth and all tenants as budget allows.

SOLUTION

COMNAVRESFOR verify the availability and amount of BRAC O&M funds for TANG fiber optics. \$1.8M BRAC O&M budget request.

Reduce cost through use of joint facilities to allow for installation of state of the art communication system.

NAS Dallas develop MOA for Host designation and responsibilities.

AF 301st, TANG and Navy meet to develop concept of operations for ADP, communications and phone system operations that will meet all user needs and get approval of plan as required.

Action
Admin 0

18 NOVEMBER 1993

SECURITY

PROBLEM/ISSUE

How many security forces will there be at NAS Fort Worth?

What will be the limitations of security forces if more than one exist?

How can multiple security forces be justified?

How could a joint security force function with different rules/requirements?

FACTS/BACKGROUND

AFRES has different security requirements for flightline security.

AFRES agrees Navy can maintain host base security but requires to maintain their own flightline security.

TANG has state employees.

Base security force has not been clearly defined since no agreement has been reached on the type or size of the base security organization at NAS Fort Worth.

GOALS

Establish operating guidelines for security force(s) at NAS Fort Worth.

SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION

Establish a central security police force for Base Security to operate outside the flightline.

Establish policy for flightline security.

RESOLUTION

ESC will provide manpower inputs to consider consolidating into a single security force.

- Action Security*
- NAS Dallas security will be responsible for joint inputs and develop recommendations.

Inputs due to NAS Dallas by 1 Dec 93.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

DINING

PROBLEM/ISSUE

The existing Dining Facility has inadequate capacity to feed all reservists attached to NAS Fort Worth during one meal period.

Joint operation of the existing dining hall has not been agreed upon.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

10,000+ reservists attached to NAS Fort Worth.

Dining Hall will not feed 8000, but will meet training needs.

Recently constructed dining hall seating capacity is 300.

Navy criteria: Eating time per person is 18 minutes. Total serving/eating time is 90 minutes to 160 minutes.

Based on Navy criteria, the dining facility can feed up to 2650 people per meal period.

Co-located fast food take-out line provides additional feeding capability.

TANG, Army Reserve and AF 301st have training requirement.

No new dining hall in budget.

GOALS

To satisfy demand with existing dining facility.

SOLUTION

Establish a schedule to evenly distribute personnel loading over available drill weekends.

Action Support ○ NAS Dallas develop MOA to operate a single dining facility by 30 Jun 94.

TANG will manage and operate facility to meet TANG training requirements for noon meal on one drill weekend for approximately 10 months per year. TANG will require augmentees to manage and operate.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

TESTING FACILITIES

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Army Reserve opposes siting of testing facilities in "Matching Plan."

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Site location is accessible for in-frame and out-of-frame transport and maneuvering.

All utilities are available near the proposed site.

Noise generation from the test cell and hush house is less than aircraft take off and fly by operations.

Proposed site imposes minimal impact on air traffic control taxiway visibility.

A heat plume and high velocity exhaust will be generated by the test facilities.

GOAL

To accurately identify the facts and resolve any issues with siting.

SOLUTION

SODIV identify and resolve any issues with siting.

NAS Dallas schedule test facilities' operations to not interfere with helicopter operations.

SODIV investigate placing test cell, hush house, T-56 check pad, and T-14 check pad to north side of field, east of parallel taxiway, move power check jet to Lockheed side of runway. Develop cost estimate and shadow plan.

NAS Dallas place helicopter landing pad just south of bunkers on taxiway.

*ALMB
RESPONSE*

18 NOVEMBER 1993

NDI LAB

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Joint operation of NDI lab has not been agreed upon for non X-ray requirements.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

AF 301st will construct a new NDI lab within Bldg 1650 for non X-ray requirements.

Building 1414 has a completely functional NDI lab.

All X-ray NDI lab requirements will be performed in a joint use facility, Bldg 1414.

GOAL

To satisfy NDI requirements without additional construction beyond that programmed by the AF 301st.

SOLUTION

Perform all X-ray NDI lab operations in Bldg 1414.

For non X-ray requirements, TANG will jointly use existing NDI lab in Bldg 1414 or use AF 301st NDI lab to be constructed in Bldg. 1650, with their concurrence.

Validate/include TANG admin/training space in the TANG maintenance complex by 13 November 1993.

NAS Dallas develop MOA between services for joint use of NDI lab facility by 30 Jun 94.

*Acknow
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o*

18 NOVEMBER 1993

SUPPLY

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Existing square footage has not been optimally utilized due to poorly defined requirements.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

TANG needs 33,000 SF.

AF 301st occupies 55,000 SF out of 76,000 SF of Bldg 1251.

"Matching Plan" includes use of buildings 1229, 1233, 1237, 1238, and 1241 which are listed by the Air Force as Condition Code 3.

Condition Code 3 buildings will not be used.

Based on A/E's evaluation of these buildings, SOUTHDIV does not agree that Bldg. 1229 is Condition Code 3; therefore, it will be used in the "Matching Plan".

SF requirements for AF 301st, MAG41, and Navy supply have not been validated.

ANGRC has agreed to provide funding for the difference between the authorized SF and the existing SF for all TANG facilities.

Reserve center has space for 14th Marines supply.

UNICOR and BOP have been requested verbally to swap out NAS Dallas facility for Bldg 1231.

301st and NAS Dallas have agreed to share Bldg 1251 south end and north end respectively.

GOAL

To satisfy all supply requirements in the most efficient and economical manner.

SOLUTION

COMNAVRESFOR will issue message requesting higher authority validate AF 301st, Navy, Army and MAG41 authorized SF and other requirements for all functions.

Determine if all requirements can be satisfied using existing non Condition Code 3 buildings.

AFRES headquarters will validate supply requirements for AF 301st to be passed to SOUTHDIV.

MARRESFOR will validate MAG41 supply requirements.

COMNAVRESFOR will host early January meeting to discuss validation with all reserve components.

NAS Dallas will request, in writing, validation that UNICOR AND BOP will swap out NAS Dallas facility for Bldg 1231.

Action
A.O.

18 NOVEMBER 1993

BARRACKS

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Air Force Reserve requires reservations blackout for buildings 1565 and 1566 during their drill weekend period. Any rooms not required by 301st AFRES will be made available for all personnel.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

AFRES has agreed to Navy operating BOQs currently operated by 301st (buildings 1565, 1566) if Navy will give reservation priority to AFRES personnel in these two buildings during drill weekend.

AFRES has agreed to let Navy act as the central billeting custodian for all BOQ/BEQs.

AFRES has requirement for approximately 80 people for (1) drill weekend per month.

GOALS

Establish policy for BOQ/BEQ operation at NAS Fort Worth.

SOLUTION

Navy operate central billeting operation for joint BQs and provide reservation priority to 301st AFRES personnel during their drill weekends in buildings 1565 and 1566.

RESOLUTION

Will draft an MOU to ensure all tenant organizations have equal share of available billeting.

Supply
Action

18 NOVEMBER 1993

PUBLIC WORKS/BASE CIVIL ENGINEERING

PROBLEM/ISSUE

Joint operation of Public Works and Base Civil Engineering Shops (PW/BCE) has not been agreed upon.

FACTS/BACKGROUND

Responsibilities for Public Works and Base Civil Engineering functions have been agreed upon.

Individual services retain planning and programming responsibilities for sole use facilities.

Navy will serve as base host.

There are adequate existing PW/BCE facilities to maintain base.

TANG & AF 301st have a Prime Beef training requirement.

No new PW/BCE shops are in budget.

"Matching Plan" includes the use of Bldg. 1214 which is listed by the Air Force as Condition Code 3.

Condition Code 3 buildings will not be used.

AFBDA will relocate from Bldg 1215 to Bldg 210.

Carswell Redevelopment Authority (CRA) will relocate from Bldg 1330 to Bldg 260.

TANG, 301st and Navy Public Works will jointly use Bldg 1217.

GOAL

To establish MOA/ISSA on PW/BCE support requirements.

SOLUTION

NAS Dallas develop concept of operations for PW/BCE shops.


NAS Dallas formalize concept of operations with MOA between NAS Dallas, TANG and AF 301st.

NGB/CE and Headquarters AFRES validate 301st and TANG requirements for Disaster Preparedness for possible joint use by 18 November 1993.

Investigate joint use Prime Beef Training colocation for TANG and 301st.

Use of 1219 will be reevaluated by SODIV.

Action
PWS



ATTENDEES
 JOINT SERVICES CONFERENCE
 16 NOVEMBER 1993

NAS DALLAS EXTENSIONS (214)266-XXXX OR DSN 874-XXXX

NAME	ACTIVITY	PHONE
CDR BILL KNELL	CO VR-59	X6330
LDCR ED BAMRICK	VF-201	X6169
CDR RICHARD DODSON	XO VF-201	X6193/4
MAJOR DON B. DOZIER	CAP-USAF/SWLR	X6392/3
DAVID KERSHAW	90th ARCOM, USAR	201-221-4062
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LTC DON FAIRLEY	TX ARNG	512-465-5071
BILL BEATY	TX NATIONAL GUARD	512-406-6905
	AMORY GUARD	
MAJ CRAIG RUSHING	DAASF TXANG	X6560
CAPT RICK MILLER	CO NAS DALLAS	X6100
COL ROWLAND WILSON	136 AW, TXANG	214-269-3201
LT BOB BYTHEWOOD	OIC MEDICAL	X6220
LTCOL MOISUK	I-I STF, 14th MARINES	X6325
COL J.F. GOODMAN	CO, MAG-41	X6300
COL L.E. BANDY	AC/S G-5 MARRESFOR	DSN 363-4113/4
COL R.E. BRAITHWAITE	AC/S BOS MARRESFOR	DSN 363-6825
CAPT AL TOROK	REDCOM 11	X6530
CAPT JACK McGUIRE	OPNAV N095	DSN 225-5533
CAPT RON ALLOR	NAVRESREDCEN	264-7272/266-6540
KAY M. JACKSON	HRO, DALLAS FIELD OFF	X6129/6130
CDR TOM LIEDKE	SOUTHDIV	DSN 563-0713
CDR HANK HUFHAM	REDCOM 11	X6530
LCDR DENNIS GREENE	REDCOM 11	X6530
CAPT BRUCE WILLIAMSON	136 AW/RELOCATION OFF	X3435
CAPT C.C. VOKEY	I-I STAFF, 14th MARINES	X6325
RMC DAVE SELLARS	OIC NTCC DALLAS	X6120
HAL BRAZELTON	ANGRC/CEPD	301-981-8072
		DSN 858-8072
BILL FREGUSON	HQS/AFRES/CEC	912-327-1022
		DSN 497-1022
A. PATTERSON	NTCC DALLAS	X6126
LCDR BILL TILDEN	NRIC	X6144
LCDR G.R. MICKLE	VF-202	X6192
DONALD FULLERTON	PHK (A/E FIRM)	904-739-3655
MARVIN HILL	PHK (A/E FIRM)	904-739-3655
JACK McCARATHY	SOUTHDIV	DSN 563-0348
EFFIE MELETIS	SOUTHDIV	DSN 563-0349
DANNY BEESON	COMNAVIRRESFOR	DSN 363-5040
CAPT BRUCE ST. PETER	COMNAVRESFOR	DSN 363-5354
CDR GREG STACHELCZYK	AIMD DALLAS	X6490/1/2
CDR RON ROSKOWSKI	SUPPLY DALLAS	X6510/11
LDCR RICK ROTH	PWO NAS DALLAS	X6450
CDR DUSTY DANIELSON	NAS RELOCATION DALLAS	X6104
TIM BARRY	CARTER & BURGESS (A/E)	817-735-6269
DON YOUNG	CARTER & BURGESS (A/E)	817-735-6041
LYNDA ALLONACH	FREESE & NICHOLS (A/E)	817-735-7300
DARRELL MOLZAN	SOUTHDIV	DSN 563-0789
KATHY ALLISON	SOUTHDIV	DSN 563-0723

ATTENDEES JOINT SERVICE CONFERENCE

16 NOVEMBER 1993

STAN RODMAN	WR-59/CFLSW	X6330
CDR PAUL PAINE	WF201 OIC	X6194/5
WILLIAM H. LULL, JR	301 SPTR/SP	DSN 739-5250
WILLIAM F. PORTER II	301 SPTG/SC	DSN 739-7325
RIC GRIMLAND	KVG ARCHITECTS (A/E)	817-335-4991
BRIAN RICHARDS	FRESE & NICHOLS	817-735-7281
COL RAY HENLEY	301st SUPPORT GROUP	DSN 739-5646
	COMMANDER	
PATTY BRANNON	SOUTHDIV	DSN 563-0810

Document Separator

POINT PAPER
ON
COMMISSION STAFF TRIP TO TEXAS

-
DECEMBER 13 - 16, 1993

Summary: Five members of the staff will visit Kelly AFB (San Antonio) for one day; four staff members will go on to visit Bergstrom AFB (Austin) for one-half day; and three members will proceed on to Carswell AFB (Dallas/Ft Worth) for one-half day.

Travelers: Matt Behrmann, Staff Director
Ben Borden, Director of R&A
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader
Roger Houck, Special Assistant for Depot Matters


Benefits: Kelly AFB - During the Air Force Materiel Command's BOS Horizons conference at Warner-Robins AFB, Major General Lewis Curtis, the Commander of the San Antonio Air Logistics Center (SA-ALC), invited Matt and staff members to come to Kelly to discuss a number of issues in detail. Specifically, General Curtis wanted to exchange ideas about capacity, personally show a number of unique processes associated with SA-ALC, tour flying operations, and present other aspects of the DoD industrial base. General Curtis believed that such a meeting without the stress of the BRAC process would benefit all concerned.

Bergstrom AFB: The base has begun the closure process. It is the appropriate time for BRAC staff to visit both the base and the community to learn the pros and cons of the closure process to date. Even though the transition subsequent to closure is not a part of the BRAC charter, the lessons learned will benefit the staff when talking to community leaders during the 95 BRAC. Throughout the 93 process, communities had many questions about life after closures and the staff would like to remain as conversant as possible in these areas. This visit will assist to that end. Learning now what recommendations simply aren't workable in the real world of implementation may help prevent future difficulties. An added benefit is that the community has hired the ex-wing commander from the base to assist in the transition - he should provide a unique perspective from both the military and community standpoint.

Carswell AFB: This base is somewhat unique in that it will merge operations of guard/reserve units of two services. A one-half day visit will give the staff the views of the service elements and the community insofar as the process is concerned. As with Bergstrom, the insights of those undergoing the transition will enable the staff to interact with communities in the future more effectively, and develop better views on future interservice consolidations.

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr. is the Air Force Team Leader. Mr. Cirillo retired from the Air Force in 1992 as a colonel. His last assignment on active duty was as the Director of Programs for Civil Engineering, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

Mr. Cirillo received a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Maryland and a Master of Science degree in Environmental Engineering from San Jose State College. He is a registered Professional Engineer in Illinois. His military career included numerous assignments in civil and environmental engineering management and in all levels of engineering resource, programming and financial allocation to include management of all major engineering factors related to mission basing decisions in the Pacific Region. In addition, Mr. Cirillo was the installation engineer at two bases and the commander of a combat engineering unit. He has been with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission since October, 1992.



SOLUTIONS FOR A BETTER TOMORROW



Tetra Tech provides comprehensive environmental engineering and consulting services to companies and organizations with complex water contamination and other environmental problems. Founded in 1966, Tetra Tech has an experienced team of professionals who have established a proven track record of award-winning projects and satisfied clients. Today we have a nationwide network of over 20 offices with full-service capabilities ranging from environmental assessment and permitting to engineering design, construction management and remedial action.

Surface Water Quality Management and Engineering

Water Quality Management • Water Quality Monitoring and Sampling • Planning and Design of Pollution Controls • Hydrologic System and Water Quality Modeling • Stormwater Management • Wetlands Management • NPDES Permit Support • Data Management

Groundwater Investigations and Remediation

Aquifer Characterization • Monitoring and Sampling • Flow and Transport Modeling • Contamination Assessment, Remedial Design and Cleanup • Expert Testimony and Litigation Support

Hazardous Waste Management and Remediation

Remedial Investigations/Feasibility Studies • Treatment Process Design • Health and Environmental Risk Assessment • RCRA/CERCLA/SARA Compliance • Radioactive Waste Management • Remedial Design • Site Closure, Site Remediation and Construction Oversight • Underground Storage Tank Management

Environmental Science and Engineering

Environmental Impact Analysis • Air Quality Management • Marine, Coastal and Ecosystems Investigation • Modeling and Analysis of Aquatic Systems • Database Development and Management

Facilities Design, Engineering, Closure, and Cleanup

Commercial & Industrial Facilities Design • Infrastructure Planning and Design • Construction Management • Plant Environmental Controls and Waste Management • Plant Closure/Cleanup • Decontamination/Decommissioning






S U R F A C E W A T E R Q U A L I T Y M A N A G E M E N T

Acting under Congressional mandates and the public's demand to preserve and improve the quality of our rivers, lakes, and coastal waters, the EPA is implementing new regulatory programs

Photo: Tetra Tech is currently providing technical support for implementation of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, including evaluating the effectiveness of nonpoint pollution control practices.

to control pollution resulting from surface water runoff, which is estimated to

contribute nearly 50 percent of the pollutants entering our nation's waterways. Tetra Tech is assisting the EPA in the development of technically-



T A N D E N G I N E E R I N G

sound methods to define the magnitude and importance of these environmental risks and to develop scientifically-based remedial solutions. Tetra Tech has assisted the EPA in developing technical guidance to monitor pollution sources and their impact, as well as the technologies to improve surface water quality. Tetra Tech is a leader in computer simulation models, field measurement techniques, and information systems to evaluate pollutant impacts and implement cost-effective remedial solutions.



According to the EPA, groundwater contamination is one of the most severe environmental problems in the United States. Tetra Tech's activities in the groundwater field include identifying sources of chemical and/or radioactive contamination in groundwater; examining the nature

G R O U N D W A T E R I N V E S T I G A T I O N

and extent of contamination; analyzing contaminant migration using mathematical models; and designing and implementing remedial technologies, including pump and treat systems and other innovative technologies. We are nationally recognized for expertise in state-of-the-art flow and transport modeling and have developed some of today's most sophisticated three-dimensional groundwater models. As a result of our experience, we have earned a reputation for providing reliable and legally defensible groundwater data and solutions to groundwater problems.




S A N D R E M E D I A T I O N

Tetra Tech is conducting groundwater investigations in support of the Environmental Restoration Program at the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site

HAZARDO





U S W A S T E M A N A G E M E N T A N D R E M E D I A T I O N

Our highly trained and experienced engineers, hydrogeologists and environmental scientists provide the ability to assess all aspects of sites and to implement solutions for hazardous and radioactive waste sites. Services include industrial plant and property audits, remedial investigations, feasibility studies, underground storage tank removal/replacement and soil cleanup, and design


Photo: Tetra Tech completed an innovative bioremediation project at a diesel fuel contaminated site.

of remedial actions. In addition, cleanup cost estimates, recommendations, plans and specifications, and cleanup services are provided for an individual site or for an entire facility. Exposure pathways, characterization of risk, quantitative risk assessment, and mitigation measures are assessed through sophisticated analytical methods. Our staff develops cost-effective solutions for the unique problems encountered at each site.



A photograph of a large, ancient tree trunk in a forest. The tree trunk is the central focus, showing deep grooves and a rough, textured bark. Sunlight filters through the dense canopy of green leaves, creating a dappled light effect. The background shows more trees and a bright sky. A dark horizontal bar with white text is overlaid on the right side of the image.

ENVIRONMENTAL SCIEN



C E A N D E N G I N E E R I N G

Tetra Tech specializes in assessing the environmental impacts of large, complex projects involving multiple sites and alternatives. We are providing nationwide environmental impact analysis services to the U.S. Department of Energy in preparation for the reconfiguration of nuclear weapons production facilities. In addition, Tetra Tech has prepared environmental and economic impact assessments of proposed Navy and Air Force base closures and is a recognized leader in the development of computer models for environmental applications. We have also developed sophisticated environmental data management systems with applications including permit tracking and mapping of study areas, as well as storage, retrieval, and analysis of data.

Photos: Tetra Tech's mathematical models are applied to real-world problems such as global warming.



Tetra Tech's design and engineering capabilities are applied to

the construction of new facilities as well as the cleanup and closure of

older facilities prior to their sale or reuse. Award-winning projects

include industrial and infrastructure facilities, bioremediation of

waste sites, waste treatment plants, and commercial developments.

Services are provided for all phases of a project, from site planning

and layout to construction management. Services include process

engineering for waste minimization and plant environmental controls.

Tetra Tech's services for plant and facility closure and cleanup include

decontamination and demolition of existing structures and the preparation

FACILITIES DESIGN, ENGINEERING

of the property for new construction or land sale. Tetra Tech identifies

hazardous materials at the site, and manages their cleanup and disposal.



Tetra Tech is assisting a major aerospace corporation with cleanup of a 14-acre site prior to sale of the property.

CLOSURE, AND CLEANUP



Tetra Tech is proud of its record of providing high-quality, responsive service to solve complex problems in environmental management and remediation. With one of the lowest staff turnover rates in the industry, you can be assured that our corporate experience is translated directly to your project through the people assigned to work with you. We pride ourselves on being cost and schedule conscious and on delivering cost-effective solutions that will meet regulatory requirements. We are committed to excellence and client satisfaction in every project that we undertake, and we offer integrated services to solve your problem from beginning to end.

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