DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OPEN MEETING

8:30 a.m.

345 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Monday, June 12, 1995

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Senator Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Mr. Alton W. Cornella
Ms. Rebecca G. Cox
General J.B. Davis, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. S. Lee Kling
Rear Admiral Benjamin Montoya, USN (Ret.)
Major General Josue Robles, USA (Ret.)
Mrs. Wendi Louise Steele

C O N T E N T S

	PAGE
NEW MEXICO:	
Senator Pete Domenici	8
Senator Jeff Bingaman	12
Representative Joe Skeen	15
Representative Steve Schiff	18
Representative Bill Richardson	21
SOUTH CAROLINA:	
Senator Strom Thurmond	25
Senator Ernest Hollings	30
Representative Mark Sanford	34
Representative James Clyburn	37
ALABAMA:	
Senator Howell Heflin	40
Representative Glen Browder	45
Representative Tom Bevill	49
ALASKA:	
Representative Don Young	55
ARKANSAS:	
Senator Dale Bumpers	61
Senator David Pryor	67
Representative Jay Dickey	72
CALIFORNIA:	
Senator Barbara Boxer	78
Senator Dianne Feinstein	83
Representative Vic Fazio	90
Representative Robert Matsui	93
Representative John Doolittle	97
Representative Richard Pombo	100
Representative Wally Herger	107
Representative Sam Farr	111
Representative Andrea Seastrand	117
Representative Tony Beilenson	121
Representative Walter Tucker	125
Representative Ken Calvert	125
Representative Ron Lewis	243

COLORADO:	
Representative Pat Schroeder	141
CONNECTICUT:	
Senator Chris Dodd	146
Senator Joe Lieberman	151
FLORIDA:	
Representative Joe Scarborough	157
Senator Bob Graham	160
Representative Carrie Meek	163
Representative Bill McCollum	173
Representative C.W. Young	217
GEORGIA:	
Representative Bob Barr	180
Representative Mac Collins	183
Representative Saxby Chambliss	186
Representative Sanford Bishop	191
GUAM:	
Delegate Robert Underwood	195
ILLINOIS:	
Representative Don Manzullo	201
Representative Lane Evans	206
INDIANA	
Senator Dan Coats	219
Representative John Hostettler	224
Representative Lee Hamilton	229
KENTUCKY:	
Senator Wendell Ford	234
Senator Mitch McConnell	240
Representative Ron Lewis	243
Representative Mike Ward	246

MAINE:	
Senator Olympia Snowe	253
Representative James Longley	258
Representative John Baldacci	262
Senator Bill Cohen	285
NEW HAMPSHIRE:	
Senator Bob Smith	267
Senator Judd Gregg	272
Representative Bill Zeliff	276
Representative Charlie Bass	281
MARYLAND:	
Senator Paul Sarbanes	290
Senator Barbara Mikulski	295
Representative Steny Hoyer	300
Representative Robert Ehrlich	305
Representative Connie Morella	309
Representative Wayne Gilchrest	317
Representative Al Wynn	313
Representative Roscoe Bartlett	322
MASSACHUSETTS	
Representative Gerry Studds	331
Senator John Kerry	327
MICHIGAN	
Senator Carl Levin	335
Senator Spencer Abraham	341
Representative Sander Levin	346
MINNESOTA:	
Senator Paul Wellstone	350
Representative Martin Sabo	355
Representative Sonny Bono	358
Representative Eva Clayton	361
Representative Kilton Calleqly	366
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun	375
Representative Ed Royce	378

P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The chair is going to begin and the commissioners will be coming momentarily. It will be a long two days and I think it's imperative to honor the schedule.

Welcome to today's hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. My name is Alan Dixon, and I am Chairman of the Commission. With us today are my colleagues, Commissioners Al Cornella, Rebecca Cox, and S. Lee Kling. Other commissioners will be joining us later.

As most of you know, this Commission is heading into the final three weeks of its difficult and unpleasant task of recommending to the President which domestic military bases should be closed or realigned.

Since we received the Closure List from Secretary Perry 15 weeks ago, the commissioners have held 10 hearings here in Washington, 16 regional hearings around the country, and made 200 visits to some 75 military bases.

Today and tomorrow we will hear testimony from members of Congress whose states or districts are affected by the Base Closure List. This is an important part of the process. For the past three-and-a-half months, commissioners

and staff have been in regular contact with elected officials and community members. But our hearings today and tomorrow will us one more chance to hear sharply-focused arguments regarding bases on the list.

Let me assure members of Congress and everyone else, this Commission has made no decisions yet regarding which bases will close and which will not.

Information regarding many installations is still coming in and is still being evaluated by the commissioners and the Commission staff. That process will continue right up to June 22nd, when the Commission begins its final deliberations.

That is why we regard these two days of testimony as extremely valuable to each of the commissioners.

We have more than 200 members of Congress who have indicated their desire to speak before the Commission on these two days. We will hear testimony state-by-state, and each member will be limited to five minutes. We will be required to enforce that limit strictly.

Anyone who has longer remarks or who wishes to submit additional testimony for the record, is welcome to do so.

Page 7

1 Let me also say that the Base Closure Act requires
2 that all testimony given before the Commission will be made
3 under oath. Our staff counsels, Madelyn Creedon and
4 Elizabeth King, will swear in members before they testify so
5 that we keep things moving.
6 With that, I believe we are ready to begin.
7 Well, a very distinguished member of the United
8 States Senate, Senator Pete Domenici.
9 SENATOR DOMENICI: Thank you very much, Mr.
10 Chairman and members of the Commission. I am pleased to be
11 here with the New Mexico delegation, and I am very hopeful,
12 Mr. Chairman, that the entire delegation will follow your
13 admonition and that hopefully we will yield back, as the
14 Senate says, some of the time.
15 We were shocked in Albuquerque and in New Mexico
16 when we got word of Kirtland Air Force Base realignment.
17 Frankly, my thoughts were something really must be --
18 somebody must have made a bad mistake. Well, it turns out,
19 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, that we had a
20 very excellent group of professionals and lay people in our
21 state who got together and put up some resources and set
22 about to get the facts.

Page 8

1 I think some of you have now grown to know former
2 General Leo Marcus who is the -- our chief spokesman and the
3 director of our BRAC group in New Mexico. He was helped by
4 General Hugh Scott and Sherm McCorkle, John Bootsic and
5 Charles Thomas and Bob Francis and our very distinguished
6 mayor.
7 As a result of their efforts, when you had a
8 hearing in Albuquerque, none of us even testified. We just
9 decided to let you get the facts. It turned out, I thought,
10 it was an exciting and very well prepared presentation. And
11 then might I say to you, that we figured early on after a
12 hearing in one of our subcommittees that somehow or another
13 the Air Force had left out of their equation a very
14 significant portion of the costs that would be left to the
15 Defense Department after realignment.
16 You see, the Department of Energy's money that is
17 spent on Kirtland Air Force Base is Department of Defense
18 money. So it is kind of of interest to me how the Air Force
19 failed to understand that a very big portion of the
20 Department of Energy's residual costs were actually Defense
21 costs, but they are.
22 It turns out, in simple language, they thought they

Page 9

1 would save $500 million, it turns out they would lose $500
2 million. Put it another way, it would cost the taxpayers
3 instead of saving the taxpayers, and we think that is your
4 primary task.
5 We don't think we are the only ones saying this,
6 but we are very pleased today, and one of the reasons we
7 won't use all our time is that the Secretary of Defense who
8 had been very forthright with us, and said that, "If we are
9 mistaken, we will indicate that."
10 And I think you all now have a letter from the
11 Secretary of Defense who upon review of this and review by
12 the Air Force has concluded that, "After reviewing the
13 results of the site survey, it is my judgment," said the
14 Secretary, "that the recommendations for the realignment of
15 Kirtland Air Force Base no longer represents a financially or
16 operationally sound scenario. I ask that you take these
17 matters into consideration."
18 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, obviously
19 this matter is still in your hands, because until you rule,
20 it will be there. But it seems to me the Secretary of
21 Defense has clearly said to you, "We made a mistake. In
22 fact, we made a very big mistake. It will cost us about $500

Page 10

1 million if we move this, instead of saving any money."
2 I might add, as an aside, I think the mistake was
3 made because while this facility says Kirtland Air Force
4 Base, it is really not an air base. The entire Defense
5 Department should have evaluated it, because it's an Air
6 Force Base plus a lot of other things. And in looking at it,
7 they carved out the Air Force situation and forgot about the
8 rest, yet all the rest belongs to the -- for the most part --
9 belongs to the Defense Department and therefore it should
10 have been looked at in a very different way.
11 I'm very pleased today that we have this good
12 evidence from our Secretary, and I must tell you that the
13 Secretary of Defense is one of the most forthright and
14 honorable men I have dealt with in government. He told us,
15 "If we made a mistake, we will admit it." He has admitted it
16 and hopefully, in short order, you all will acknowledge that
17 they made a mistake and relieve the people of Bernalillo
18 County, Albuquerque, New Mexico, permanently, rather than
19 temporarily, permanently of this very, very serious problem
20 that hangs over their heads.
21 Thank you very much.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank the distinguished

Page 11

1 senior Senator from New Mexico. I thank him for setting the
2 precedent for the day by using only four of his five minutes.
3 The Chair would like to observe anybody can make a mistake,
4 the Chair just forgot to turn on his toggle switch, and so
5 the Chair wasn't on the air when he opened the meeting this
6 morning. I would admonish my commissioners, these mikes
7 aren't live, you have to turn the switch on with your left
8 hand.
9 We thank the distinguished senior Senator and we're
10 pleased to see his colleague and my old friend, a
11 distinguished Senator in his own right, Senator Jeff
12 Bingaman. We're pleased to have him here. Good morning.
13 [Microphone on]
14 SENATOR BINGAMAN: Thank you very much, Mr.
15 Chairman. It's an honor to be here and I'm gratified to see
16 that you keep to your time honored tradition of starting
17 meetings on time, which I certainly commend and it's
18 certainly out of step with the rest of the Senate and the
19 Congress.
20 Let me join Senator Domenici and the other members
21 of our delegation in complimenting our Secretary of Defense
22 for the way he has handled this matter. He did meet with us

Page 12

1 several times during the process, and he indicated to us that
2 he was going to give this his personal attention.
3 If there had been a mistake made in the
4 recommendation or in the calculation of savings, that he
5 would acknowledge that, and he would not do anything to cover
6 it up or in any way try to wiggle out of it. He did
7 acknowledge that in the letter that Senator Domenici read to
8 you, and he indicated that based on the new information that
9 he has, it does not make sense to proceed with realignment of
10 Kirtland Air Force Base.
11 I think the problem, as was stated, came about
12 because the Department of Defense did not take the
13 recommendations of either the Senate Arms Services Committee
14 or the General Accounting Office in deciding what costs to
15 include when it calculated cost savings or savings to the tax
16 payer.
17 The Armed Services Committee, in an earlier report,
18 in 1993, had said you should include the costs incurred by
19 other agencies, and the General Accounting Office agreed with
20 that. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense concluded
21 that, first, those costs would be very difficult to estimate
22 and, secondly, they would be minimal. I think they concluded

Page 13

1 they would probably be less than 2 percent of the total
2 savings involved, so that they would just ignore them.
3 That's what caused the problem that we encountered
4 here. When they ignored those costs, they essentially wound
5 up making about a billion dollar mistake in the case of
6 Kirtland Air Force Base. So it was not a 2 percent error in
7 the case of Kirtland, it was a billion dollar error, which
8 was nearly 100 percent error.
9 So that was the basis of the problem. I think it's
10 clear now that the Department has recalculated, they know
11 that it does not make sense to proceed, and I would just
12 point out to this Commission that you have the opportunity
13 here to do a great service to the people of the country early
14 in your deliberations and that is to save them a half-billion
15 dollars by turning down any suggested realignment of Kirtland
16 Air Force Base.
17 So we appreciate the chance to be here today.
18 Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you, Senator
20 Bingaman, and we appreciate that good comment by both of you.
21 And the Senators are excused if they care to go on about
22 their business.

Page 14

1 We're delighted to have members of the Congress,
2 distinguished Congressmen from that state, Representative Joe
3 Skeen.
4 REPRESENTATIVE SKEEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
5 I appreciate you being here and the fellow members of the
6 BRAC, or the BRAC Commissioners. And I appreciate you taking
7 the time to listen to this delegation. I'm sure that you
8 heard many of these stories over and over and over again.
9 In this case I think there was a terrible omission
10 in the data that was provided to you for the proposed closure
11 of Kirtland Air Force Base. I'd like to cover just that one
12 particular issue with you this morning.
13 As you know, from your visit to Albuquerque, one of
14 the most essential and critical missions of the Air Force at
15 the Kirtland facility involved nuclear assurity and safety.
16 And since the Manhattan Project, the Los Alamos National
17 Laboratory has developed our nation's nuclear arsenal. And
18 to complete the process, the Sandia National Lab was
19 established on Kirtland Air Force Base to engineer the
20 warheads and to use the weaponry and to make them into a
21 carrier weapons system.
22 The Atomic Energy Commission and its military

Page 15

1 counterpart of the Defense Nuclear Agency was based or were
2 based in Albuquerque. In conjunction with the nuclear safety
3 detachment of the Air Force Safety Center and with the
4 Security Police branch of the Air Force, they have been
5 responsible for safety, inspection, and procedures for the
6 safeguard of the warheads and the safe transportation and
7 operation thereof. And these functions rely on a daily
8 interaction between several agencies and are performed solely
9 with our nation's nuclear stockpile management and
10 stewardship mission in mind.
11 Safety is something you plan for, not something you
12 take for granted. Remarkable, under this arrangement, there
13 have been no accidents involving nuclear weapons which
14 involved the nuclear yield, and this is an achievement
15 regarding daily and constant interactive vigilance on the
16 stated condition, not only of the weapons themselves, but on
17 the delivery systems or the infrastructures in which they are
18 made in.
19 The Air Force has subsequently called attention to
20 these matters, noting in May 3rd memo to the BRAC that
21 alternatives are being reviewed to examine the retention of
22 DNA at Kirtland and military security operations at the

Page 16

1 Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Center.
2 I ask the Commission to consider the special
3 circumstances surrounding all tenants at Kirtland Air Force
4 Base that relate to the nuclear assurity mission and take
5 these important factors into account when you make your final
6 recommendations. I'm sure that you will, knowing the
7 fairness of which you usually accomplish your work. I
8 appreciate the fact that you folks have a distasteful job in
9 many cases, but you do it and you do it very well. Thank you
10 very much.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Representative Skeen,
12 for those excellent remarks. We're delighted to welcome
13 Representative Bill Richardson. Representative Steve Schiff.
14 And may I say, with respect to Representative Richardson, if
15 he arrives by 8:55, we will hear him. I want to say before
16 Representative Schiff makes his remarks. No one has a higher
17 regard or warmer feeling about the Congressmen and the
18 Senators in this great Congress than this Chair, but if you
19 don't arrive on time, you ain't going to be heard. And that
20 word can go out to the House and Senate first thing this
21 morning.
22 Representative Schiff.

Page 17

1 REPRESENTATIVE SCHIFF: I think that message was
2 just delivered loud and clear, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
3 would like to begin, first, by thanking the staff of your
4 Commission. All during this process, they were always
5 available and open to discuss facts and to exchange
6 information, I'm sure, not only with our state's
7 congressional delegation, but with other states and with the
8 Department of Defense officials. And I think that that
9 ability to exchange information has certainly furthered this
10 process along for all of us who participate in it.
11 Second of all, I would like to emphasize the
12 community view of Kirtland Air Force Base. We have not left
13 this towards the end because it's unimportant, quite the
14 contrary. The potential loss of number of jobs at our
15 state's largest military base, given a population which is
16 one of the smallest in the United States, would have a very
17 strongly adverse impact on our economy.
18 We've left it towards the end of this presentation
19 because we know that every state will present to you the idea
20 that they don't wish to lose jobs in their particular areas,
21 which is most understandable. However, we know that
22 decisions have to be made by the Department of Defense and

Page 18

1 ultimately this commission, and so we have chosen to
2 emphasize first the exact same approach that the Air Force
3 and the Department of Defense used in terms of bringing this
4 recommendation to the BRAC Commission in the first place.
5 The Air Force argued that by realigning Kirtland,
6 that they could save considerable money and not reduce
7 military efficiency, and the congressional delegation and the
8 community steering committee, which presented the testimony
9 before you in Albuquerque, took the position that if that's
10 true, then we would expect that realignment to go forward.
11 But we analyzed the facts according to the COBRA
12 model with respect to savings and according to military
13 efficiency as we understood it. And we came to the opposite
14 conclusion, that there would be no savings in the realignment
15 of Kirtland, only a cost shifting at best, and perhaps even
16 additional costs as remaining tenants had to struggle for
17 themselves to resupply the support that they were losing.
18 And second, there would be severe degradation of
19 the military mission with respect to nuclear facilities and
20 with respect to other operational tenants, such as the 58th
21 Special Operations Wing. And we believe that the letter that
22 you have just received from the Secretary of Defense, who as

Page 19

1 indicated, said he would send such a letter if we
2 demonstrated these facts, supports the position that we've
3 taken, that in fact there would not be a cost savings and
4 there would be an adverse effect on military readiness.
5 Mr. Chairman, one final word, we in the
6 congressional delegation are supremely aware that your
7 Commission has an independent responsibility to make a
8 judgment on this matter. We know fully well that this letter
9 from the Secretary of Defense does not end the issue as a
10 matter of law, that you have and you will take a separate
11 vote.
12 What we ask most respectfully, however, is this, we
13 ask that if there are any continuing questions on the part of
14 the Commission, that between today and whenever it is
15 established to take the vote, we ask that the Commission,
16 through its staff, advise us if there are any questions that
17 remain unanswered, so that we have the opportunity to further
18 address this issue.
19 But with that, we again thank the Commission for
20 its time, its attention, and its responsibility. Thank you,
21 Mr. Chairman.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank Representative

Page 20

1 Schiff for those very fine remarks and we are pleased to note
2 that Representative Bill Richardson has arrived precisely on
3 time, and he is recognized. Representative Bill Richardson
4 from the great State of New Mexico.
5 REPRESENTATIVE RICHARDSON: Mr. Chairman, thank you
6 very much, and I appreciate the nice courtesy and welcome to
7 the Commission.
8 Mr. Chairman, I'm glad that Secretary Perry has
9 forwarded a letter to the BRAC recommending the Commission
10 remove Kirtland from the list, and as this Commission
11 convenes for two days to discuss military installations from
12 all around the country. It's good to encounter very good and
13 well developed arguments to preserve various bases.
14 Quite frankly, every delegation that comes before
15 you wants to win, and with that in mind, I ask you to
16 consider the enormous amount of community effort, especially
17 in the City of Albuquerque that is involved in presenting
18 solid, convincing evidence to save an important local
19 commodity.
20 Clearly, the facts are on the side of Kirtland Air
21 Force Base, but more importantly, consider the necessary
22 teamwork of a community that is dedicated to saving a

Page 21

1 military installation. It is that dedication that has
2 brought out the facts about Kirtland.
3 It is the community that has presented these facts.
4 It is loyalty that not only maintains this base, but
5 preserves the security of our country. The letter confirms
6 what many of us in our delegation have long maintained, that
7 Kirtland is not a good choice for realignment, because it
8 does not save money and it jeopardizes our American security.
9 New Mexico has had a long history of military
10 cooperation and hospitality, and the outstanding relationship
11 between Kirtland and American national security are a big
12 part of our state's military future.
13 Mr. Chairman, when Kirtland was selected as the
14 base for centralized training for all rescue and special
15 operations forces, the climate, the vast, sparsely populated
16 areas for low-level training, mountains, water, desert,
17 forest, designated firing ranges, et cetera. All of these
18 were important factors that consistently rose to the top for
19 Kirtland.
20 And as a result of these natural advantages, DOD
21 has developed appropriate infrastructure at Kirtland to
22 provide the world's most technologically advanced and

Page 22

1 sophisticated training within the DOD. Besides that, its
2 energy and nuclear components that are so essential to this
3 base lead me to believe, Mr. Chairman, that Kirtland has
4 other values besides the training component.
5 Mr. Chairman, with that, let me conclude. Let me
6 thank you for your courtesy. Let me also state that I hope
7 that the Commission concludes its work with the same
8 excellence that it has developed as we move through this
9 process. But as somebody who has received a letter of good
10 news, at least, from the Secretary of Defense, on their base,
11 my hope is that other communities that have this status, that
12 may be justified in keeping their base, I hope they have the
13 same kind of luck and good sense that the State of New Mexico
14 has. Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
16 Representative Richardson. We thank the fine delegation from
17 the great State of New Mexico, and we recommend to the
18 Congress the high regard for brevity demonstrated by the
19 great State of New Mexico this morning. God bless you all.
20 Thank you for coming.
21 The Chair observes that State of New Mexico
22 dispatched its duties so remarkable well that there is a

Page 23

1 brief time here. But the Chair cautions everyone now that
2 the Chair will be very, very, very rigorous about his
3 devotion to the schedule.
4 And if there are people from South Carolina here,
5 the South Carolina delegation should note that their
6 presentation begins at 9:03 and ends at 9:23 and will be
7 firmly enforced.
8 (A brief interruption to the proceedings.)
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I inquire of my distinguished
10 colleague and old friend, the South Carolina delegation does
11 not have to move forward until 9:03, so that you have about
12 seven or eight minutes. I can accommodate my old friend and
13 hear him now and excuse him, if he is willing to accommodate
14 us, but I can wait.
15 SENATOR HOLLINGS: Mr. Chairman, I was
16 accommodating you and delighted to do so, because we do have
17 the telecommunications bill up and Senator Pressler and I
18 have got to get right back to the floor.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I want to say to my old
20 friend that it is a great and sincere pleasure to welcome to
21 this body -- and I see his colleague coming now. Do you two
22 gentlemen, both of whom are here well in advance of the time,

Page 24

1 have any order of sequence that you would like to follow,
2 because I will accommodate you, whatever way you want.
3 SENATOR HOLLINGS: I will yield to the Senior
4 Senator.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, it is my great pleasure to
6 say to the most senior Junior Senator I ever knew that we're
7 pleased to accommodate his colleague, the great President Pro
8 Tempore of the Senate of the United States, my old friend,
9 the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senior
10 Senator from the great State of South Carolina, Senator Strom
11 Thurmond.
12 SENATOR THURMOND: Thank you very much, Mr.
13 Chairman.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: My pleasure.
15 SENATOR THURMOND: It's a great pleasure to see you
16 again and see the members of this Commission again. I think
17 you're doing a fine job.
18 Chairman Dixon and members of the Base Closure
19 Commission, on behalf of the South Carolina congressional
20 delegation and the citizens of my great state, I want to
21 commend you, the members of the Commission and your staff for
22 the thorough and professional conduct of the proceedings

Page 25

1 during the past three months.
2 The Commission's openness and willingness to assist
3 our communities and their representatives are a credit to
4 your leadership and dedication to insuring that the base
5 closure process is credible. My appearance before the
6 Commission is in marked contrast to the appearances I made in
7 1991 and 1993.
8 On those occasions, I pleaded with the Commissions
9 to keep open two key South Carolina military bases. To
10 everyone's dismay, the Commission recommended the closing of
11 the Myrtle Beach Air Force Base and the Charleston Navy Base
12 complex. This year South Carolina is fortunate to be on the
13 receiving end of the BRAC list.
14 Although the Department of Defense is recommending
15 some closures or realignments in Charleston and Shaw Air
16 Force Base, it is also recommending the realignment of two
17 additional fighter squadrons to the Beaufort Marine Corps Air
18 Station, proposing the redirect of the Navy's Nuclear Power
19 Training Command to the Naval Weapons Station Charleston and
20 increasing the training load at Fort Jackson.
21 We believe these are sound recommendations and ask
22 for your favorable consideration. Mr. Chairman and members

Page 26

1 of the Commission, I want to point out that I would not be
2 here today had it not been for the misleading testimony
3 regarding Charleston that was provided to you during the May
4 5th regional hearing in New York.
5 The base closure process is painful enough without
6 adding salt to the wound by making inflammatory speeches
7 about other bases. My sole purpose this morning is to
8 present you with the facts regarding the Naval Weapons
9 Station in Charleston.
10 In my presentation, I will focus on the allegations
11 that the selection of the Naval Weapons Station Charleston as
12 a new home of the Nuclear Power Training Command was faulty.
13 Senator Hollings and Representatives Clyburn and Sanford will
14 respond to other comments at the regional meeting that was
15 slandered against moving the nuclear power school to
16 Charleston.
17 In one grievous statement uttered in New York was
18 that the proposed site for the school at the Naval Weapons
19 Station is all woods and wetlands. It is obvious that the
20 person who made this statement did not do his homework.
21 Although the photos used to illustrate woods and
22 wetlands were taken at the Naval Weapons Station, they were

Page 27

1 not at the proposed school location. The actual site is
2 located on a superb location that is approximately 100 acres
3 of highland and is immediately adjacent to base housing, a
4 community center, and exchange facilities.
5 Although we have woods and wetlands on the Weapons
6 Station, they will in no way impact, much less hinder, the
7 establishment of the Nuclear Power Training Command. In
8 fact, they provide a beneficial recreational environment for
9 the school facility, students and their families.
10 Those who oppose moving this school to Charleston
11 also throw up the smoke screen that the appropriate
12 environmental studies have not been completed. That
13 statement is misleading when you consider that the Army is
14 currently establishing a strategic mobility logistic base on
15 the Weapons Station and has encountered no environmental
16 problems.
17 I would point out that the Army's facility has a
18 much greater environmental impact than the academic
19 surroundings of the Nuclear Power Training Command.
20 Finally, it was alleged that Charleston did not
21 have the facilities nor the infrastructure to support the
22 Nuclear Power Training Command, anyone who has been to

Page 28

1 Charleston knows that the Naval Weapons Station Charleston is
2 the host command for the nuclear power training unit, the
3 Army's strategic mobility logistic base, the Navy's
4 consolidated brig, and military traffic management command.
5 To support these commands and their prospective
6 Nuclear Power Training Command, the weapons station has over
7 2,000 family housing units, extensive medical and dental
8 facilities, superb recreational facilities, and most
9 importantly, a community that cares for and supports our
10 nation's military.
11 The last point speaks for itself. Soldiers,
12 sailors, airmen and Marines have traditionally considered
13 South Carolina as one of the most desirable duty stations.
14 We all know that a reasonable cost of living, community
15 membership, and most significantly, security for families are
16 important to our armed forces personnel and for their quality
17 of life.
18 We provide all these criteria in South Carolina,
19 especially in the Charleston area. And Mr. Chairman, you and
20 your colleagues will soon end this strenuous and emotional
21 process. You have heard the facts regarding our facilities,
22 they speak for themselves. We trust your independent

Page 29

1 commission to render a fair and informed judgment of the
2 Navy's recommendation to relocate the Nuclear Power Training
3 Command to Charleston.
4 We believe that when the facts, the true facts, are
5 known, you will agree with the Navy's recommendation. I can
6 ask no more, nor can the people of South Carolina. We again
7 thank you for your consideration and best wishes to each of
8 you in the important work you're doing.
9 Thank you very much.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Senator Thurmond. And
11 we're delighted to have your distinguished colleague, who I
12 know has a great many obligations on the floor right now,
13 Senator Fritz Hollings. Pleased to have you, sir.
14 SENATOR HOLLINGS: Thank you very, very much, Mr.
15 Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission. I'm
16 very, very grateful for this opportunity. What happens here,
17 Mr. Chairman and distinguished commissioners, is that the
18 Nuclear Power School this very minute is split.
19 The school instructional is down in Orlando. The
20 hands-on training in New York and in South Carolina. The New
21 York hands-on training is a mark-up. The fact is, some six-
22 and-a-half, almost seven years ago, we took the -- under the

Page 30

1 SALT agreements -- submarines, the actual nuclear core out
2 and then anchored these subs out into the stream and we've
3 got two submarines there, nuclear subs for the hands-on
4 training.
5 And so, for six-and-a-half years now, we've had 700
6 faculty members and one-half of the 2225 scholars coming for
7 the hands-on training in Charleston. And if I were on the
8 Commission, and I'm sort of mentally posturing myself as a
9 member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for the
10 past 25 or so years, we're looking for every dollar we can
11 save, and here comes the Navy and saying we can save $71
12 million doing this.
13 The only reason they have suggested back in the '93
14 report that it go up to New London, is they had these
15 submarines repairs up there and thought it would be good to
16 start another branch of the school. This thing ought to be
17 coordinated.
18 If I were King for the day, I would put it all in
19 Charleston, because we've got the facilities. We're closing
20 down a 100-year old Naval base and Navy Yard with buildings,
21 housings and everything else galore and a Naval Weapons
22 Station.

Page 31

1 Out on those wetlands is an old plantation site,
2 right next to it is the oldest golf course in the world, Mr.
3 Chairman, that you would appreciate, Yeoman's Hole Golf
4 Course. This is beautiful country side down there. And
5 Senator Thurmond and others, we were just down there for
6 another dedication.
7 So right to the point, you can look at the savings.
8 The one time cost of initiating the school in Charleston by
9 record is $147 million. It's $163 million up in New London.
10
11 If you went up to New London, you could go up to
12 the --an officer with no dependents in Charleston, the offset
13 cost of living allowance by the Department of Defense is $69
14 monthly in Charleston, $215 monthly in New London.
15 A sergeant with no dependents is $38 monthly in
16 Charleston, it's $142 monthly in New London. And the
17 construction costs on a national average is 85 percent or
18 122, 85 in Charleston, 122 in New London. And the cost of
19 living index for each area, in Charleston it's 98.9 percent
20 of the average and 126.4 percent.
21 Now, I understand the Commission is to realign and
22 save money. Now, why in the Lord's world are we to start a

Page 32

1 new facility up in New London when the truth of the matter
2 is, you ought to take that mark-up and close it down, up in
3 New York and bring it to Charleston. Now, there is one thing
4 that I've got that my colleagues -- and I got to greatest
5 respect for Senator Lieberman and Senator Dodd and their
6 testimony up at that regional hearing, but the truth of the
7 matter is, I've got a certificate that I'm telling the truth.
8 They don't have that.
9 I've got the General Accounting Office and the
10 Navy, the Navy's Audit Office. They both have verified these
11 figures. They come out, "The Navy's process and
12 recommendations were sound on the location in Charleston." I
13 quote again, "We believe," this is GAO, "the Naval Audit
14 Service effort enhanced the Navy's process," and on and on.
15 So I ask unanimous consent that my full statement be included
16 in the record.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It's my pleasure to reproduce in
18 the record your entire statement, Senator Hollings.
19 SENATOR HOLLINGS: And I thank you and I thank the
20 Commission. Thank you very much.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, Senator, and I know
22 your obligations on the Senate floor. If you and the

Page 33

1 distinguished President Pro Tempore need to go, you're
2 certainly excused. We thank you for your valuable
3 contribution.
4 We're delighted to have here two distinguished
5 members of the house from the South Carolina delegation.
6 We're pleased to recognize Representative Mark Sanford.
7 Representative Sanford, thank you for coming.
8 REPRESENTATIVE SANFORD: It's a pleasure to be
9 here, sir. In fact, I'm delighted to not only be with you,
10 but to be with our two distinguished senators from my home
11 state.
12 The United States Navy for 200 years has enjoyed a
13 close working relationship with the Charleston area, and I
14 think we're all delighted of the Navy's intention to move the
15 Nuclear Power Training Command, NNPTC, into our community.
16 Because of this longstanding relationship, the
17 infrastructure for the school already exists in Charleston,
18 for the most part, and let me again reiterate that, already
19 exists.
20 Personnel support would be handled in existing buildings with
21 no extra cost. This includes military housing, medical and
22 dental support, extensive recreational facilities.

Page 34

1 The recently renovated Min Riv Facility which I
2 might add is the largest Navy housing complex in the United
3 States, has 2,089 units, is located in very close proximity
4 to this center. I mean, roughly three-quarters of a mile,
5 half-a-mile, just straight through the woods, if you will.
6 In addition, an elementary school, chapels,
7 commissaries already exist and would be convenient for on-
8 base personnel and their families. Building similar support
9 facilities in New London would cost $2.6 million.
10 In addition, Charleston needs to add about 15,000
11 square feet to its existing medical and dental facilities.
12 This would cost around $4 million, however, this is much less
13 than the $6 million proposed that would be required to add
14 the 23,000 square feet to New London medical and dental
15 facilities.
16 It will be necessary to construct new facilities
17 for NNPTC in Charleston. Again, this is much cheaper,
18 though, given the difference in building costs between that
19 new facility and renovating the older facilities in New
20 London, building cost index is .85 in Charleston, 1.25 in New
21 London.
22 As a result, the cost of a new facility in

Page 35

1 Charleston would be $27.7 million, again, much less than
2 renovation in New London at $42.7 million. And the
3 Charleston facility could be completed by 1999. Because the
4 NNPTC would be operating in the same area as other Navy
5 facilities, there would be fairly significant economies of
6 scale as well as lower operating costs over leaving the
7 school in Orlando.
8 Finally, the Charleston community has a long
9 tradition of working with the Navy, and because of the
10 reasons outlined, existing infrastructure, $2 million savings
11 with existing medical and dental facilities in place, $2.6
12 million savings in personnel support facilities in place, $ 20
13 million in the construction of a new facility versus rehab of
14 the old facility in New London, and a completion date of 1999
15 combined with the other reasons, I think outlined by my
16 colleagues, such as 50 percent savings the Senator was just
17 getting at by not moving to prototype training to other
18 places, and additionally, overall operating costs, and
19 frankly, the net present value.
20 I think that is the final number you've got to
21 look at, which is $71.1 million cheaper to move into
22 Charleston than to go to New London, says to me in this

Page 36

1 particular instance, the American taxpayer would be best
2 served by, I guess, capitalizing on the regional
3 infrastructure and advantages that go with the Charleston
4 site.
5 Doing this would continue a relationship with the
6 city whose people, I think, have ably served and welcomed the
7 United States Navy for almost 200 years. Thank you, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we are indebted to you. Thank
9 you very much, Representative Sanford, and we're delighted to
10 have your distinguished colleague, Representative James
11 Clyburn with us.
12 REPRESENTATIVE CLYBURN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
13 and members of the Commission. I'm pleased to be here this
14 morning and join my fellow South Carolinians in the Congress
15 as we voice our support of the Navy's recommendation to move
16 the Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center to
17 Charleston.
18 Let me say from the outset that I appreciate the
19 job before you. Those of us who have been through this
20 exercise know the concern communities experience as they face
21 the possibility of losing military installations.
22 I respect those emotions and I have the utmost

Page 37

1 respect for your integrity and impartiality in making these
2 very difficult decisions. I understand, though, that in
3 their zeal to advocate for their communities, some
4 individuals may have offered contradictory information in
5 their testimony.
6 I would like to address, myself, very briefly, to
7 the selection process used by the Department of Defense, and
8 hopefully, clarify any contradictions you may have heard.
9 First of all, Charleston was not considered in the
10 1993 BRAC process as a receiving site for the Nuclear Power
11 School. I am told this has been confirmed by the 1993 Base
12 Structure Evaluation Committee. Any implication otherwise
13 would be misleading.
14 Second, other options were considered this year.
15 Again, I am told the Navy Base Structure Analysis Team and
16 the Base Structure Evaluation Committee for 1995 BRAC did
17 consider New London and Orlando as optional site locations in
18 addition to Charleston.
19 Thirdly, I call your attention to the General
20 Accounting Office Report entitled, Military Bases Analysis of
21 DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and
22 Realignment. From Page 87 of this document I quote, "The

Page 38

1 Navy conducted a generally thorough and well-documented
2 evaluation of its basing requirements in developing its 1995
3 recommendations."
4 The following statement is also found on the same
5 page of the report, "Another improvement in the Navy's
6 process was the BSEC developed alternative scenarios for
7 review." And finally, Page 9 of this report contains the
8 GAO's recommendations to the BRAC regarding the Navy's
9 process, not one of these recommendations makes reference to
10 a problem with moving the Nuclear Power School to Charleston.
11 Again, I repeat, the GAO did not identify any
12 problem with the Secretary's recommendation to move the
13 Nuclear Power School to Charleston.
14 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, again,
15 let me express my appreciation for receiving testimony this
16 morning and for the fine work you are doing for our nation's
17 defense. I know that your objectivity will allow you to
18 complete this difficult task. Thank you and I will be happy
19 to respond to any questions you may have.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
21 Clyburn. We're indebted to you for this contribution. Are
22 there any questions from commissioners?

Page 39

1 (No response.)
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much and we
3 thank the distinguished South Carolina delegation for that
4 important contribution. Thank the President Pro Tempore for
5 giving us his time, great Chairman of the Armed Services
6 Committee.
7 Now, ladies and gentlemen, we're running a little
8 ahead of schedule. The Alabama delegation starts at 9:26,
9 but I note the presence of the distinguished Senior Senator
10 from the great State of Alabama, Judge Howell Heflin. We
11 would like to accommodate him if would care to go on early
12 and then he would be excused to go about his important
13 business for the great State of Alabama.
14 SENATOR HEFLIN: Well, thank you, sir. Maybe
15 you'll let me have a little extra time with that.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Judge, you're always trying to cut
17 an extra special deal for the State of Alabama. Here come
18 the Judge.
19 SENATOR HEFLIN: Mr. Chairman and members of the
20 Commission, I'd like to take a brief period of time to talk
21 about Red Stone Arsenal and the Anniston Army Depot first.
22 In both cases the readiness of our forces will not be

Page 40

1 jeopardized, instead, the only issue is savings. And in both
2 cases, the Army followed the last Commission's guidance to
3 consolidate the support of similar commodities.
4 Ninety-five percent of the Army's savings from this
5 consolidation at Red Stone Arsenal comes from the elimination
6 of over 1,000 ATCOM personnel whose jobs duplicate those of
7 MICON employees. Only 5 percent of the savings are due to
8 eliminating leased space. Obviously, the consolidation is
9 the issue, not the elimination of leased office space.
10 Furthermore, General Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of
11 Staff for the Army, in his June the 8th letter to me, which
12 the Commission has, stated, "It is not possible to eliminate
13 the same number of personnel by downsizing in place without
14 an unacceptable degradation of mission."
15 I urge the Commission's support of this proposal
16 which will save the Army $434 million over the next 10 years.
17 If the Commission does not approve the consolidation of the
18 Army depots, in 1999, Anniston Army Depot will be operating
19 at 48 of capacity, Red River at 32 percent, and even with the
20 consolidation, Anniston will only be operating at 78 percent
21 of capacity with just one normal shift.
22 With two shifts Anniston can handle the worst case

Page 41

1 wartime work load. Most importantly, the Army will save $100
2 million a year if the Commission approves this
3 recommendation. I hope the Commission will recognize the
4 importance of the Meridian Air Force Base, for it employs a
5 number of Alabamians.
6 But let me devote the major portion of my five
7 minutes to Fort McClellan and the major points of a detailed
8 position paper I am today filing with the Commission on
9 environmental and permitting issues. Clearly, proper permits
10 are needed. DOD officials have testified that Fort McClellan
11 should remain open if the Army cannot obtain the proper
12 permits.
13 On May 19, 1993, David Shaw the Director of the
14 Missouri Department of Natural Resources wrote the BRAC
15 Commission that the Army would have to have among other
16 permits, a hazardous waste permit. He stated in effect that
17 the hazardous waste permit would take from 17 to 26 months.
18 The Army waited too long to start on the permits. Missouri
19 faced a dilemma.
20 Director Shaw changed his mind and made a decision
21 that a hazardous waste permit was not needed. A local
22 environmental group appealed his decision. Just recently,

Page 42

1 the Missouri Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the
2 appeal, arguing that it was not an appealable order and
3 listed among other reasons, that the director did not have
4 the authority to make such a decision.
5 I wish I had time to quote in detail from the
6 Missouri Attorney General's brief. But let me recite just a
7 few lines for emphasis, "The MDNR position," that is the
8 Natural Resource group, "that a permit is not required does
9 not decide anything, because that department is not strictly
10 vested with the power to decide that issue. Second, that the
11 decision such as it is confers no rights on the Army."
12 Read my position paper on this in detail. There
13 are several pages in exhibits that are put here. It now
14 appears that the left hand didn't know what the right hand
15 was doing. Contrast the words between -- the words of
16 Director Shaw at the April 12th regional meeting in Chicago,
17 "A hazardous waste permit
18 is not required for the 34,000th time," and the words
19 contained in the brief of the Missouri Attorney General
20 raises the issue of the rushed and unreliable approach of
21 certain officials in Missouri as well as its timetable
22 consideration.

Page 43

1 A great number of other deficiencies on the part of
2 the Missouri agency are pointed out in my position paper, and
3 see particularly Pages 14, 15, and 16. The engineer's report
4 that the permit even puts the CDTF in the wrong county, not
5 even on Fort Leonard Wood. There are endangered species
6 problems which have not been addressed in spite of the voiced
7 concern by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the EPA.
8 I am told and understand that the Army has failed
9 to apply for Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses. The
10 fog-all permit given to the Army in Missouri is grossly
11 inadequate. I am told that an official of the Army's
12 Chemical School recently evaluated the permit and concluded
13 that it will essentially destroy the Chemical School's
14 ability to effectively do smoke training.
15 Mr. Chairman, a vote to close Fort McClellan is a
16 vote to close the live agent facility without any assurance
17 that one can be built. A vote to close Fort McClellan
18 conditionally upon the receipt of permits is a vote to leave
19 the local community in limbo. And finally, most importantly,
20 a vote to close Fort McClellan is a vote to leave us
21 unprepared for the dangerous world we now face.
22 I hope that we will be able to have a classified

Page 44

1 hearing on the threat of gases, chemical weapons in
2 connection with the world today and terrorist activity. I
3 have faith that this Commission will do the right thing as
4 previous Commissions on two occasions have done the right
5 thing in the past.
6 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Senator Heflin, and for
8 your information and for the information of your
9 distinguished colleagues, Representative Glen Browder and
10 Representative Tom Bevill that are here with you, the
11 classified hearing will be held Thursday morning at 8:30.
12 And we're pleased to recognize your distinguished
13 colleague, Representative Glen Browder from the great State
14 of Alabama.
15 REPRESENTATIVE BROWDER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman
16 and members of the Commission. Thank you for this
17 opportunity to testify before you here today.
18 I want to talk about Anniston Army Depot and Fort
19 McClellan, both of which are in my district in Alabama. Let
20 me comment briefly on Anniston Army Depot. The primary
21 issue, I understand, before you today, is the capacity issue,
22 whether Anniston Army Depot can handle the work from closing

Page 45

1 installations. I think that question was settled
2 unequivocally by Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan last
3 week when he wrote, "Of the three combat vehicle maintenance
4 depots, Anniston has the highest military value. Anniston
5 can certainly handle the work load. Anniston is the obvious
6 choice."
7 Let me spend most of my time on the really
8 contentious case, Fort McClellan, home of the Chemical School
9 and the only live agent training facility in the world. I'm
10 not here today to beg you to save Fort McClellan because it's
11 in my district or because it will have a direct, 17 percent
12 job loss impact on this community.
13 I am here to say that the recommendation to close
14 Fort McClellan is a mistake with significant and dangerous
15 ramifications for our military forces and countless American
16 civilians. I do not know why the Army put Fort McClellan on
17 that list again. In fact, I understand that it was placed on
18 the list right before the recommendations were sent to the
19 Commission over the strenuous objections of the top Defense
20 Department official with responsibility for dealing with the
21 threat of weapons of mass destruction.
22 Today I ask only two things of you, and you've

Page 46

1 granted one of them. First, I ask that you focus your
2 attention to what others, others that are more qualified and
3 impartial than I, say about Fort McClellan.
4 President Bill Clinton, "Fort McClellan will play a
5 special role in support of the Chemical Weapons Convention as
6 a training center for U.S. troops under our chemical defense
7 program." Our Commander in Chief wrote this statement after
8 the Commission had voted, had acted for the second time to
9 remove Fort McClellan from the Army's recommended list.
10 The Henry L. Stimson Center, "In closing," they
11 have written to you, "we believe that it would be wise for
12 the Commission to once again reject the recommendation to
13 close Fort McClellan." The Stimson Center is one of the most
14 respected arms control institutions in the world, located
15 here in the Nation's Capital.
16 Third, "The Commission should again act to keep
17 Fort McClellan open," writes to you a representative of
18 another of Washington's most prominent defense policy
19 institutions, the Center for Strategic and International
20 Studies."
21 Next, "We join with others in believing the
22 Commission should reject the recommendation to close Fort

Page 47

1 McClellan." That comes from representatives of another
2 leading institution, the Chemical and Biological Arms Control
3 Institute.
4 These are not the pleadings of parochial
5 congressmen for you to save my base. These are serious
6 policy statements from some of the -- from the President of
7 the United States and some of the premier national defense
8 and arms control organizations in the world.
9 Thus, I come to my second request, which you have
10 granted. I ask that you convene this classified session of
11 the Commission to ask some of our key defense and
12 intelligence officials about the threat of proliferation,
13 proliferating chemical weapons over the past two decades,
14 about our chemical defense training program, about our
15 international treaties and agreements regarding chemical
16 weapons, about our urgent initiatives to deal with terrorism,
17 about the role that Fort McClellan plays in this incredible
18 array of concerns, and about the disruption and degradation
19 that inevitably would accompany the closure of this
20 installation.
21 Twice before, in 1991 and 1993, the Army made
22 similarly shortsighted and dangerous recommendations to close

Page 48

1 Fort McClellan. Consequently, twice before, the Base
2 Realignment and Closure Commission demonstrated extraordinary
3 vision and courage and guaranteed the continuation of a
4 critical resource for America's men and women who are
5 required to fight and survive chemical warfare.
6 Mr. Chairman and members, you face this same
7 challenge. You have my support and my prayers as you face
8 this challenge, and I appreciate the opportunity to address
9 you today.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
11 Browder, and let me tell you and your entire distinguished
12 delegation that we will have a hearing Thursday morning at
13 8:30, it will be a classified hearing, neither state, Alabama
14 or Missouri will be invited. The Commissioners will hear the
15 classified questions on merit and we thank you for your
16 request.
17 And we're delighted to welcome Congressman Tom
18 Bevill.
19 REPRESENTATIVE BEVILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
20 members of the Commission. I appreciate your inviting me to
21 participate in your efforts to determine the best interests
22 of our defense needs and our economy regarding the military

Page 49

1 limitations recommended for closing or realignment. And I
2 want to let you know about my support for keeping Fort
3 McClellan open.
4 Though Fort McClellan is not in my district, I have
5 many constituents that are employed there and working there
6 and certainly it would have a very large -- the closing of
7 this base would have a very large negative impact for keeping
8 Fort McClellan open -- have a large support for keeping it
9 open.
10 And so I realize of course that's not the
11 controlling factor in your decision and they are certainly
12 not the only concern, but it is -- Fort McClellan is a
13 respected, productive and much needed military facility. It
14 provides essential training for defense against chemical
15 warfare and efficient and effective training for our military
16 police.
17 I think that in placing Fort McClellan on a list of
18 possible bases to be closed, the Defense Department
19 concentrated too much on estimated numbers and their page and
20 not enough on the real world circumstances.
21 Today more than ever the threat we face in chemical
22 weapons brings fear into every aspect of society. We need

Page 50

1 only to look at the terrorist nerve gas attack on the Tokyo
2 subway system to see that chemical weapons, that they have
3 not gone away. They are an essentially and easily obtained -
4 - they are an easily obtained threat to peace and safety.
5 Now is not the time for us to dismantle and move
6 the world's finest chemical warfare school. Now is the time,
7 however, to strengthen this base to better preserve our
8 defense, our security and our future.
9 As you know, Anniston Army Depot is one of several
10 sites in the country which soon will be destroying outdated
11 chemical weapons. From the outset, the people of North
12 Alabama have been told they would have Fort McClellan and its
13 experts standing by to assure safety in the destruction of
14 these weapons.
15 Now, this relationship uniquely binds Anniston and
16 Fort McClellan and its demise could threaten the continued
17 well-being of communities in this area. The BRAC report
18 estimates a net savings of $316 million closing Fort
19 McClellan, and all these estimates and so forth, but that too
20 is not really, in my judgment, the key point in your
21 consideration.
22 Frankly, I think if this -- if this base -- if Fort

Page 51

1 McClellan is closed, this commission will be opening a can of
2 worms that will be living with us for a long time to come,
3 because we've got this nerve gas stored there nearby. It's
4 got to be disposed of, and it's one that we don't have any
5 choice about, and it's one that deals with the nuclear waste
6 that I initiate the funding on my panel, that I've chaired
7 for 17 years. We're dealing with nuclear waste,
8 and I can tell you now, this will open up a can of worms to
9 close this base and the security that is going to be
10 necessary for disposing of the nerve gas that has to be
11 disposed of there, and it's just a question of whether it's
12 going to be done on site or whether it's going to be hauled
13 away, and it looks like it's going to be on site.
14 And an experiment is going on right now in the
15 Pacific to make this decision. So I'm just -- the fact is
16 that Fort McClellan is working not only for Alabama, but for
17 the military and we have a bond of trust there and we are
18 proud to house this important facility in our state.
19 I do not want to lose this existing partnership
20 while chasing doubtful benefits of what I feel are overstated
21 and paper savings. At the same time, we would be weakening
22 our chemical warfare defenses in the face of increased

Page 52

1 terrorist threats. For the economy of North Alabama, the
2 continued safety of our communities and the defense of this
3 nation, I request that the BRAC keep Fort McClellan open.
4 Thank you for allowing me to present this testimony
5 and thank you for your important efforts.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Congressman Tom Bevill, we
7 thank you for your important contribution and we thank the
8 distinguished Alabama, the State of Alabama and their
9 delegation for their excellent presentation.
10 Now, at this time, the time slot is the State of
11 Alabama, the great State of Alabama -- pardon me, the great
12 State of Alaska, Alabama having concluded. And we are a
13 little ahead of schedule and we are going to wait momentarily
14 for the distinguished congressman from the State of Alaska
15 who will be here well in advance of the slotted time for the
16 State of Alaska.
17 So the Commission and the room will be in temporary
18 recess until we resume with the State of Alaska.
19 (A brief recess was held.)
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: our friends from the House and the
21 Senate were briefed that we had a little bit of time. But I
22 have to continue to remind everybody that when 220-some

Page 53

1 members of the House and Senate want to testify, you just
2 have to be very tough about adhering to the schedule. The
3 Chair is going to be tough.
4 The State of Alaska has a time frame that extends
5 through 9:59 this morning. And the Chair will honor that
6 time frame. At 9:59, the gavel falls on Alaska, and we go to
7 the State of Arkansas. But we will have Congressman Don
8 Young here in plenty of time. And there may even be some
9 time left over.
10 But I hope the word is going back through staff
11 people -- I see staff people coming in and out -- to both the
12 House and Senate. You have to be in your time frame. We
13 cannot possibly accommodate people that aren't here in their
14 time frame.
15 (A brief recess was taken.)
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Will the Commission come to order,
17 please. And we are pleased to have the distinguished
18 Congressman from the great State of Alaska, Representative
19 Don Young here. And the Chair has instructed that your fine
20 colleagues from the Senate have clothed you with the
21 authority, Representative Young, to speak for the great State
22 of Alaska.

Page 54

1 And I would like to tell you to return to your
2 Senators and tell them that I read their book, "The One
3 Thousand Mile War." Fifty-three years ago this week, the
4 Japanese attacked Alaska on June 3, 1942, bombed the barracks
5 and killed 25 Americans. And I was moved to find that next
6 to Iwo Jima, the greatest lives lost on both sides in a war
7 on the Pacific Theater was a war on our soil in the great
8 State of Alaska.
9 I read the book, was enthralled by the book. Not
10 many Americans remember that remarkable chapter in our
11 history. And I am indebted to you and your colleges from the
12 Senate for making that information available to the Chair.
13 One learns something new every now and again in one's life,
14 and I found that book to be a remarkable documentary on a
15 phase in a history period in our existence that is something
16 remarkable for America.
17 And Congressman Don Young from the great State of
18 Alaska, we're delighted to have you here, sir.
19 REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
20 noticed in this little cheat sheet here it says, "Please
21 announce your name, state, and district." You've done all of
22 that. And, as you've mentioned, for the whole State of

Page 55

1 Alaska, I am the Congressman. I do thank you, the
2 Commission, and you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to appear
3 before you today. I'm delighted to offer my strong support
4 for Fort Greely, the Delta Junction, and the community of
5 Delta Junction.
6 Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, Alaska has played a
7 major role in our military presence in this world during War
8 World II, during the Cold War, and even today. Billy
9 Mitchell said that we were the center, we were the axis. We
10 were -- the person that controlled the Alaska could control
11 this world.
12 Well, I don't think we're seeking control, but at
13 least we're seeking the ability to defend our great nation.
14 Fort Greely is one of the most important parts of our
15 military structure. I am concerned about the implication of
16 BRAC's decision to realign Fort Greely, though, and the
17 effects upon the force closings will have upon the Delta
18 Junction community.
19 The Delta Junction community, in fact, was a
20 creation because of Fort Greely. The people have, in fact,
21 built their lives or careers around Fort Greely, as Fort
22 Greely has built its reputation around the community. They

Page 56

1 are a good working team.
2 As many of you know, Fort Greely was established in
3 1942, right after Pearl Harbor, as a land leased transfer
4 point. And, Mr. Chairman, may I bring this to the attention
5 of the Commission: Those 5,500 aircraft that went through
6 the transfer points from the United States to Russia, the
7 original MIG, was an American-built airplane.
8 If it had not been for the ability to transfer
9 those airplanes to Russia so they could combat the Nazis, I
10 doubt if we would have victory today. As I mentioned, the
11 Delta community grew up around and with the base itself.
12 And, very frankly, as I've mentioned, they have been good
13 neighbors.
14 The proposed realignment of Fort Greely will have a
15 disastrous impact. And may I suggest again to the BRAC
16 Commission, a large community that has what I call economic
17 and social structure makeup sometimes is not impacted as
18 hardly as the smaller communities. There not only are many
19 people dependent upon the variety of human service that Fort
20 Greely provides, but Fort Greely also provides jobs,
21 schooling, recreation, and hospital care for this expanding
22 population.

Page 57

1 By realigning Fort Greely or moving the core
2 function of this unique training and testing base 120 miles
3 away to Fort Wainwright, the Delta Junction community is
4 expected to suffer an economic impact or job loss of 70 to 80
5 percent. With this expected economic impact, many of the
6 citizens who call Fort Greely and Delta Junction home will be
7 required to move on.
8 I know you've heard these words many times, but
9 Alaska, I still think, is unique and different. The
10 estimated reduction in population will mean that the school
11 system will lose approximately 75 percent of a student
12 enrollment and will shred the fabric of this community.
13 While economic impact is not one of the highest
14 evaluation criteria, it remains a criteria for the BRAC
15 Commission to consider. In the view of the crushing impact
16 this proposed impact would have on the community of Delta
17 Junction, the Commission must consider alternatives to the
18 realignment suggested by the Army; in essence, by realigning
19 Fort Greely, you are realigning the community of Delta
20 Junction.
21 The second concept I will discuss is the proposed
22 use of Safari operations from Fort Wainwright. This idea

Page 58

1 simply does not make sense. I must ask the Commission
2 members, what are the operational benefits of moving the coal
3 rigging testing activity to Fort Wainwright? Because the
4 testing still will be conducted at Fort Greely.
5 By virtue of its unique, sustained arctic winter
6 weather conditions, many of the soldiers would require to
7 commute the 120 miles back to Fort Greely when conditions are
8 best for testing and worse for traveling. The concept was
9 tried once, if I can remind the Commission, and it failed. I
10 believe there's no need to repeat this experiment now.
11 By continuing the permanent retention of CRTA at
12 Fort Greely, the program will continue to become more
13 effective, reduce safety hazards associated with transit of
14 personnel, and provide for the oversight group of employees
15 who are proficient in the knowledge of the ranges and the
16 equipment.
17 Implementing Safari and distancing the assertive
18 mission for Fort Greely, abundant ranges will reduce the
19 familiarity of Army personnel with ranges and dramatically
20 increase the prospects of accidents associated with
21 unexplored munitions and hazard transportation.
22 The costs associated with Safari and the Army's

Page 59

1 proposed realignment do not correlate. The Army is trying to
2 save money by realigning Fort Greely to Fort Wainwright. But
3 while the quarters at Fort Greely will be closed and declared
4 excess, this move will require the construction of more
5 quarters at Fort Wainwright. The Army will incur costs in
6 the form of TDY pay, the families will be separated by having
7 to test or train at Fort Greely.
8 Essentially, this will cause logistic problems,
9 delays in testing, and additional burdens on the soldiers and
10 civilians who have a mission to accomplish. When added to
11 the hazard of their travel during poor conditions and the
12 costs associated with reduction in training time, this
13 proposed realignment places significant costs on the Army and
14 their mission.
15 In closing, Mr. Chairman and fellow commissioners,
16 please consider the dramatic impact that the Army's proposed
17 realignment will have on the community of Fort Greely and
18 Delta Junction. Consider the integral link and strategic
19 cooperation that exists between Fort Greely, the military,
20 and the community. And continue to look for a viable
21 solution to the community's needs, should you decide to
22 realign Fort Greely.

Page 60

1 As you consider the value Fort Greely possesses and
2 the troublesome issue this realignment presents, please
3 remember that by realigning Fort Greely, you're dramatically
4 affecting the lives of those who live in Delta Junction.
5 I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today,
6 Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your opening statement.
7 Alaska's proud of its military heritage. Alaska's proud of
8 the military activity in the past, present, and the future.
9 I suggest respect for this realignment will have a severe
10 impact on a small community that grew up because of the
11 creation of Fort Greely.
12 Fort Greely has worked well as a testing site,
13 primarily for arctic equipment. Before the Cold War
14 collapsed, that was the area that we suggested that should be
15 testing all our equipment and the proficiency of our
16 personnel itself. Now, just because the Big Bear has now
17 gone a little bit dormant, I can't take that for granted
18 forever, nor can I accept the Army's suggestion that it is
19 so.
20 I suggest respectfully that we keep Fort Greely
21 active as it is today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you, Congressman Young.

Page 61

1 And we thank the great State of Alaska.
2 REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG: And I love it. I timed that
3 just right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, the Chair takes note of the
5 fact that the great State of Arkansas is not up for hearing
6 until 10 o'clock. But in his usual manner, my old friend
7 Senator Dale Bumpers from the great State of Arkansas is here
8 on Lombardi time, a little early. And I am much aware of the
9 obligations of that Senator and the Senate on a day like
10 today. And we would hear him now, if he's ready. He's going
11 to do a little show and tell here. He has got some displays.
12 SENATOR BUMPERS: I'm going to make it easy for
13 you, Mr. Chairman.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're delighted to recognize my
15 old friend, Senator Dale Bumpers, from the great State of
16 Arkansas.
17 SENATOR BUMPERS: Mr. Chairman, I thank you very
18 much and the members of the Commission for allowing us to
19 come over and make these presentations. And I'm going to
20 make it easy. But first, let me say, we have sort of
21 allocated the time between the Texas delegation and the
22 Arkansas delegation on Red River. Others are going to be

Page 62

1 very forceful on that. I'm going to mention Red River and
2 talk about it for just a moment, and then I'll go to Fort
3 Chaffee.
4 First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to remind this
5 Commission that in the last Base Closing Commission,
6 Arkansas, outside of Arizona and California, took the biggest
7 hit of any state in that base closing. And I know the
8 Chairman's home state took a big hit, too.
9 Secondly, Red River arsenal will cause the loss of
10 over 7,000 direct and indirect jobs. Now, I understand that
11 you're charter does not include economic circumstances. But
12 if you're a Senator from the State of Arkansas and
13 representing Texarkana, Arkansas, you don't overlook things
14 like that. So we once again find ourselves at the top of the
15 totem pole this time at Red River arsenal taking the biggest
16 hit of anybody in the country.
17 And secondly, let me say, it is a strange thing
18 that Red River arsenal, which has won the most prestigious
19 award of any military facility in the United States, as being
20 the very best -- not just the best arsenal in America,
21 probably the best arsenal in the world. And it makes no
22 sense whatever.

Page 63

1 Bear in mind that if Red River is closed, the
2 entire Western and the Northern part of the country will have
3 to come all the way to the East, Letterkenny in Philadelphia,
4 to get any assistance. Now, I won't pursue that any further.
5 Senator Hutchinson, Senator Pryor will talk about it. But
6 let me go to Fort Chaffee.
7 Just take that one down. First of all, Mr.
8 Chairman, the primary responsibility -- and I don't have to
9 remind this Commission -- the primary responsibility of this
10 Commission is to do two things: Number one, save money;
11 number two, do it without impairing readiness. Now, at Fort
12 Chaffee, I give you not just a win-win situation, but add an
13 additional win. Because it leaves 10,000 acres for community
14 use.
15 Now, here's what we're doing. We're saying, keep
16 50 percent of the cost and 100 percent of the value. Bear in
17 mind -- Brian, just go ahead and put all of those up and let
18 me pull them off, okay? That's okay. Put them up in any
19 order you want.
20 There's 72,000 acres at Chaffee. My home is two
21 miles from the border of Fort Chaffee. Lake Charleston,
22 where our water supply comes from, abuts it. So I've known

Page 64

1 this place for 50 years. Seventy-two thousand acres. If you
2 leave 62,000 acres and scale back the use of that, close the
3 PX, closing the swimming pool, close the movies -- and I'll
4 come back to the cost savings in a minute -- but leave 62,000
5 of that 72,000 acres for maneuvering, you can do the same
6 thing you're doing right now there.
7 If we went with the Army's proposal -- and I think,
8 frankly, everybody's willing to back off of this, the Guard,
9 the Army, everybody -- I think the Army and the Guard are
10 both now willing to accept this proposed realignment. I
11 would like to believe that, anyway. But the way they
12 proposed it, there can be no weekend training there, or there
13 can be some weekend training, but you can't fire 135
14 Howitzers.
15 Fort Chaffee is the only place in Arkansas where an
16 artillery brigade can train. It's the only place big enough.
17 And believe you me, I laid awake a lot of nights back during
18 the wars listening to the pounding of those artillery shells.
19 But my point is, we can do everything we're doing right now
20 at Fort Chaffee.
21 And this brigade, the 39th Brigade, that's one of
22 those round-out brigades, you know, for a division -- I know

Page 65

1 the Commission understands that. If you were to close Fort
2 Chaffee and leave a small enclave there only for small arms
3 fire, here's what you do. You're going to send all those
4 organizations -- there are about 20 of them that train there,
5 including the razor-back bombing room.
6 We have the 188th Fighter Group in Fort Smith,
7 Arkansas, which is 12 miles from their bombing run. You
8 close Fort Chaffee, they have to fly 250 miles before they
9 can start their bombing runs. It's 150 miles average around
10 Arkansas for all of our brigades, the 39th Brigade and
11 others, to get to Fort Chaffee. If we have to go to Fort
12 Polk, there's the mileages. Fort Riley, 512 miles.
13 The 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, which I jus
14 mentioned, it's 63 miles for them to go up there for their
15 summer training. And to go to Fort Sill, which is the plan,
16 326 miles. And I'll just mention, the fighter group in Fort
17 Smith would have to go to Fort Leonardwood, which you can
18 see how far it is.
19 Let me just -- I see my time is running very short.
20 Here's the proof, Mr. Chairman, on the other side. Can you
21 see these numbers okay?
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Yes, sir, and we have got this.

Page 66

1 SENATOR BUMPER: The small enclave plan was 13.4
2 million savings. The National Guard Bureau and the Arkansas
3 National Guard, the Missouri National Guard, and the Oklahoma
4 Guard, which also train there, did a study which shows it
5 will cost 11.9 million to send all of these organizations,
6 Fort Riley, Fort Polk, Fort Leonardwood, wherever. The
7 actual savings under the Army plan is $1 million and-a-half.
8 We're saying, scale it back to a large enclave of
9 62,000 acres, spend $6.9 million, and save 6 and-a-half
10 million. If you want to subtract the 1 and-a-half million
11 from that, the minimum savings would be 5 million. Now, Mr.
12 Chairman, how can you beat that? You save 3 and-a-half
13 million, minimum, more than the Army's proposing to save, and
14 you train all the same units that are training there now
15 without swimming pools, movies, and what have you.
16 Just quickly, as I said a moment ago, you have an
17 additional 10,000 acres there other than 62,000 that the
18 community can use and offset some of the economic dislocation
19 that's going to be caused even by the reduction in the use of
20 the fort.
21 Mr. Chairman, I've already run over my allocation.
22 I appreciate your indulgence, allowing me to make this

Page 67

1 presentation.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And may I say to you, my old
3 friend, Senator Bumpers, that all of this material you've
4 given us will be placed in the record and will be reviewed by
5 staff. And should you and your distinguished colleague,
6 Senator Pryor, and the others in your delegation care to send
7 us any correspondence further developing this theme, that
8 will be reviewed by staff, as well.
9 SENATOR BUMPERS: Thank you very much.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my old friend.
11 SENATOR BUMPERS: It's good to see you again, Mr.
12 Chairman.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good to see you, Senator Bumpers.
14 We're delighted to see your distinguished
15 colleague, Senator David Pryor. Good morning, old friend.
16 SENATOR PRYOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and ladies
17 and gentlemen of the Commission. I want to thank you for
18 allowing me to participate this morning and for the
19 invitation to speak and to speak briefly.
20 I would like to first state that I am here today,
21 Mr. Chairman and our commissioners, on behalf of two
22 installations -- one, the Red River Army Depot in Texarkana,

Page 68

1 and Fort Chaffee in Fort Smith, Arkansas. First, I would
2 like to associate myself with the remarks of my friend and
3 colleague, Senator Dale Bumpers. I concur fully with the
4 information and the opinions that he has relayed to this
5 Commission.
6 I understand my time is short. I will be brief,
7 and I will get right to the point. First, to each
8 commissioner on this panel, I want to express our sincere
9 appreciation and deep gratitude for the time and attention
10 you have given to the Red River Depot. I know that most of
11 you have been to Texarkana and that Commissioners Cox and
12 Davis will be going on Thursday. And on behalf of the Red
13 River family, we would like to thank you for your interest
14 and your time in dedicating yourselves to this.
15 Although Red River is physically located in the
16 State of Texas, over 1,000 Arkansans work at this facility.
17 We are so proud of Red River. We're proud of its
18 achievements, its awards, its efficiencies, its performance
19 in the Persian Gulf, and its overall contribution to the
20 security of this great country of ours.
21 By now, you have visited bases all over this land.
22 Across the United States in undoubtedly each city, each

Page 69

1 politician and each leader has told you how the various
2 economies would suffer if this Commission chose to close
3 their particular base. However, I feel compelled to address
4 the economic impact of closing Red River, simply because it
5 would be much greater than most, if not all of the bases
6 currently under consideration by this Commission.
7 Closing Red River Army Depot would be devastating
8 to the economy of this area. It is the largest employer in
9 this region. One out of five Texarkana area jobs is a Red
10 River job. Red River expenditures account for 15 percent of
11 the Texarkana economy. If Red River closes, local
12 unemployment would rise from the current rate of 8 percent to
13 over 21 percent.
14 Today, there are only 3,000 unemployed citizens
15 living in the Texarkana area. If Red River would close, that
16 number will rise almost overnight and dramatically to some
17 8,500 citizens. Since this Commission is required by law to
18 consider the economic impact of each closure, I truly hope
19 this distinguished Commission will take into account the
20 disastrous impact of closing Red River.
21 Because most of you have visited Red River
22 personally, you know firsthand the outstanding military value

Page 70

1 of this facility. You know its geographic location. My
2 colleagues in the Texas delegation will testify tomorrow in
3 detail as to how Red River is an asset, and the Army simply
4 cannot afford to lose this asset.
5 Switching gears for a moment to Fort Chaffee. I
6 first want to thank Commissioner Robles for visiting Fort
7 Chaffee. This 72,000 acre installation has helped train
8 American soldiers since 1941. The people who train there
9 swear by this unique terrain and immeasurable opportunities
10 it affords in training facilities.
11 I was surprised and, I must say, confused when the
12 Army recommended closing Fort Chaffee. I have two issues to
13 highlight in that regard. The first, I believe, is slowing
14 resolving itself. I hope so. This issue involves the
15 concept of an enclave that the Army has proposed locating at
16 Fort Chaffee.
17 The proposed enclave is simply too small to
18 accommodate the training needs of the National Guard and the
19 Army Reserves. The Army initially proposed closing Chaffee
20 and sending Arkansas Guard and Reserves to Fort Riley, as
21 Senator Bumpers has stated, and Fort Polk in Louisiana to
22 train.

Page 71

1 However, any savings realized from closing Fort
2 Chaffee are going to be spent transporting our troops over
3 long distances to receive their training. In short, closing
4 Fort Chaffee simply makes no sense.
5 Oddly enough, it appears the Army actually agrees
6 with this position. In a meeting last Thursday, June the
7 8th, at your Commission headquarters, Brigadier General James
8 Shane, Jr., of the Office of Army Chief of Staff and Mr. John
9 Nerger, the deputy director of the Army Basing Study,
10 admitted that the Army had erred by recommending that Fort
11 Chaffee should not be used for annual training.
12 I have a copy of those minutes, Mr. Chairman and
13 members of the Commission, from this meeting. And I am
14 respectfully requesting that they be inserted in the record
15 following my remarks.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Those will be inserted in the
17 record, Senator, if you convey those to us.
18 SENATOR PRYOR: In closing, Mr. Chairman and
19 members of the Commission, I'm so pleased that the Army now
20 feels that the training area at Fort Chaffee can remain in
21 use. I have been informed by the Arkansas National Guard
22 that they will require 62,000 of the 72,000 acres for their

Page 72

1 annual training. The remaining 10,000 acres can be returned
2 to the local community for development.
3 I urge this Commission to take the necessary steps
4 to ensure that annual training at Fort Chaffee can continue
5 for years to come. Mr. Chairman, I have gone beyond my time.
6 I would ask unanimous consent of our members of the
7 Commission that the balance of my remarks be placed in the
8 record. And once again, I thank the Commission for allowing
9 me to appear.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished Senator
11 from the great State of Arkansas. And his remarks will be
12 reproduced in the record in full. We're indebted to him and
13 his colleague, two great Senators from the great State of
14 Arkansas.
15 And we're pleased to have their ally, Congressman
16 Representative Jay Dickey. Congressman Dickey, we're
17 delighted to have you, sir.
18 REPRESENTATIVE DICKEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
19 represent the Southern part of Arkansas, which includes the
20 Arkansas part of Texarkana. And I want to wish you all a
21 good morning, each of you.
22 I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you

Page 73

1 about the Red River Army Depot and the Defense Distribution
2 Depot Red River, sometimes referred to collectively as "Red
3 River."
4 Red River is a true military complex. It needs to
5 be considered as a whole, rather than the separate parts.
6 Red River employs 3,700 persons directly, including around
7 1,200 persons from my district. The mission of Red River is
8 one that is very important to the Army. Red River performs
9 77 percent of the Army's maintenance support for mechanized
10 division tracked vehicles.
11 Red River is the Army's most profitable depot. It
12 performs its mission in a highly sufficient manner. Eighty
13 percent of Red River's distribution mission is for external
14 customers, including the following major Army installations:
15 Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Carson, Colorado;
16 and Fort Riley, Kansas.
17 Over 50 percent of all stateside military posts,
18 camps, and stations are located in the Red River central
19 distribution area. It is a modernized, responsive depot that
20 has ample and immediate expansion capacity, including 2,139
21 acres of land available for unrestricted development.
22 We believe that the Army needs two combat vehicle

Page 74

1 maintenance depots. We further believe that the 1995 BRAC
2 Commission should recommend closure of the Letterkenny Army
3 Depot, rather than Red River. Army COBRA shows that the
4 largest net present value savings will occur if Letterkenny
5 is closed. The figure is $144 million greater from the
6 closure of Letterkenny than Red River.
7 The Department of Defense has recommended that the
8 combat vehicle maintenance mission at Red River be moved to
9 the Anniston Army Depot. We think that this is a mistake,
10 because it will overload Anniston, limit surge capacity, and
11 jeopardize readiness.
12 In 1995, information collected during the BRAC data
13 call ranked Red River higher in military value than
14 Letterkenny. In fact, Letterkenny ranks dead last in
15 military value, and Red River's score is more than double
16 that of Letterkenny.
17 The Department of Defense has substantially
18 understated the cost to close Red River by $382 million, as
19 well as the recurring savings of $116 million. The return on
20 investment for closing Red River is in the range of 60 years,
21 rather than immediately as claimed by the Army. The Army
22 also completely overlooked the missile recertification

Page 75

1 mission that is performed at Red River.
2 Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the
3 Commission, let me take a moment to emphasize the devastating
4 effect that the closure of Red River would produce in the
5 Texarkana area. According to the March 1995 Department of
6 Defense Base Closure and Realignment report, closing Red
7 River would result in the loss of 7,256 direct and indirect
8 jobs.
9 Unemployment in the Texarkana area is already above
10 the nation's average, at 8.1 percent. If BRAC proceeds to
11 close Red River, unemployment is expected to swell to over 21
12 percent. That is a disproportionately harsh result for this
13 economically depressed part of the country and, of course, it
14 would be the burden of this country to make up for the
15 employment.
16 In fact, under the Department of Defense plan, Red
17 River sustains the largest job loss in the entire country.
18 The largest in the entire country. Congressman Jim Chapman
19 of the first district of Texas has previously provided the
20 Commission with a detailed analysis of the cost in terms of
21 unemployment compensation that would be associated with the
22 closing of Red River, a staggering $52 million.

Page 76

1 The chances of these displaced workers being able
2 to find comparable, permanent employment is slim, indeed, and
3 the cost to our government is unbelievable.
4 I hope that the Commission will take a close look
5 at the actual ability of Anniston to accept the massive work
6 requirements that are performed at Red River. I mm confident
7 that a fair review will result in a recommendation that will
8 close Letterkenny and retain two combat vehicle maintenance
9 depots for the Army, Anniston and Red River. This would keep
10 the military readiness at the needed level.
11 Mr. Chairman and members of the 1995 BRAC
12 Commission, thank you for your time and your consideration in
13 this matter.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you for that fine
15 presentation, Congressman Dickey. And this Commission is
16 indebted to you and Senators Bumpers and Pryor for your
17 excellent presentation on behalf of the great State of
18 Arkansas.
19 Now, ladies and gentlemen, the great State of
20 California is to be here for their presentation at 10:20. We
21 stand in temporary recess, the Commission and the room, until
22 10:20, unless either of the two Senators should arrive prior

Page 77

1 to that time and want our indulgence on an early basis.
2 (A brief recess was taken.)
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I want to say to my friend, the
4 distinguished Senator from the great State of California,
5 that we will be happy to accommodate her and start a minute
6 or two early. She is, as usual, early. We're indebted to
7 her for that. But I'm sure she would like to have a few
8 commissioners here.
9 I'm notifying them that, as usual, the Senator from
10 the great State of California is early. And as soon as I can
11 get a couple more commissioners here, we're going to hear
12 from Senator Barbara Boxer from the great State of
13 California, if she'll be patient with me.
14 (A brief recess was taken.)
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The hour of 10:20 has arrived. We
16 are indebted to the great State of California for being here
17 prepared to make its presentation. And I wonder if my
18 friend, Senator Barbara Boxer, is prepared to go forward.
19 We're appreciate of your being here, Senator. And please
20 begin your presentation.
21 SENATOR BOXER: I even brought my little stand with
22 me so I could actually see you.

Page 78

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator, fortunately, for a short
2 man, I make the observation that height has nothing to do
3 with intellectual capacity or ability to serve. We're
4 pleased you're here, and we thank you for your great service.
5 Senator Barbara Boxer.
6 SENATOR BOXER: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and
7 members of the Commission. I'm going to skip over the thank
8 yous and the niceties, because I'm so concerned about
9 California, I want to get right to the heart of the matter.
10 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,
11 California has taken more than its fair share of base
12 closures, 22 major base closures and realignments, far more
13 than any other state. And when these closures are completed,
14 I think conservative estimates show that we're going to lose
15 200,000 jobs and $7 billion in economic activity.
16 Of course, I know that you're aware, Mr. Chairman
17 and members, that you are charged with looking at the
18 cumulative economic impact on each state. And I just urge
19 you to do that to the best of your ability. And I'm
20 convinced if you do that, you'll recognize that what I'm
21 saying is accurate.
22 We're looking at possibly another two dozen bases

Page 79

1 in California. In the worst case scenario, this BRAC could
2 be as bad as any other to our state.
3 I want to discuss some of the bases under
4 consideration very quickly, because in addition to the
5 cumulative economic impact, these base closures are ill-
6 advised on the merits. And I think you're looking for that,
7 as well.
8 McClellan. In the strongest possible terms, I urge
9 the Commission to abide by the recommendations of the
10 Secretary of Defense and keep McClellan open. I understand
11 several commissioners have concerns about the Air Force's
12 recommendations and believe that at least one depot should be
13 closed.
14 However, I would make one observation for your
15 consideration. In my extensive experience dealing with base
16 closures from the time I was in the House and served on the
17 Armed Services Committee, I learned that there is only one
18 constant in this process, and that is that closure costs are
19 underestimated, and projected savings are overestimated. And
20 in this reality, I think you really need to hear that I think
21 the Air Force has made sense in its plan.
22 McClellan is a facility for the future, high tech

Page 80

1 depot services pioneering the way for private industry, joint
2 ventures, and partnerships with nonDOD customers. President
3 Clinton has praised McClellan many times because it is truly
4 forward-thinking and forward-acting.
5 I urge the Commission to consider cumulative impact
6 in the Sacramento area. In 1988, nearby Mather Air Force
7 Base was closed. And three years later, the 1991 BRAC
8 Commission closed Sacramento Army Depot. This would be
9 devastating to do McClellan. So on the merits and cumulative
10 impact, please keep it open.
11 Long Beach Naval Shipyard. From a military value
12 perspective, I have serious reservations about the Defense
13 Department's recommendation to close Long Beach. It's
14 strategically located, only 80 miles from San Diego Megaport,
15 home to nearly 70 percent of the Pacific Surface Fleet. If
16 it's closed, the nearest public shipyard, Mr. Chairman and
17 members, would be Brimmerton, Washington, three days'
18 steaming time from San Diego.
19 Colin Powell said about Long Beach, "Closure would
20 seriously degrade dry dock capability for all large ships in
21 the Southern California area." The Long Beach community
22 already lost 100,000 jobs -- 100,000 jobs, Mr. Chairman -- as

Page 81

1 a result of the closure of naval stations in '91.
2 I would make one final observation, Mr. Chairman
3 and members, that I made to you when you were so kind to
4 visit California. What kind of message do we send to our
5 young people, to our workers, to our business, when we close
6 the only Naval shipyard that is consistently making money for
7 the military? You told them to shape up in the last round.
8 They did. To have them closed, I think, would be a huge
9 mistake.
10 Onizuka Air Force Base. I must also question the
11 Department's recommendation to downsize to only one satellite
12 control facility by realigning Onizuka. If this
13 recommendation is enacted, Mr. Chairman, a single failure
14 could leave us unable to control scores of orbiting military
15 satellites.
16 One computer error, I say to my friends, one
17 natural disaster, one terrorist attack, could separate us
18 from our satellites for hours or even days. At Onizuka, we
19 have a private sector work force second to none. We lose
20 that by closing Onizuka.
21 Mr. Chairman, Sierra Army Depot. I have to say,
22 the recommendation was based on a faulty study. Because I

Page 82

1 don't have enough time to go into it, I would ask unanimous
2 consent that my statement be included in the record. It
3 would be a shame to close an Army depot that was based on a
4 faulty study.
5 And on Point Magu, I would simply say, the cost of
6 moving facilities from there greatly outweigh any savings. I
7 urge the Commission to abide by the recommendations of the
8 Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and chief of
9 Naval operations and not close Point Magu.
10 In my last 12 seconds, Mr. Chairman, I do want to
11 thank all of you. It is difficult for my state. It is tough
12 for us to deal in only 5 minutes, when we're such a large
13 state with 32 million people. And we're hurting from these
14 base closures. We simply cannot brutalize the largest state
15 in the nation like this, a state that represents nearly 14
16 percent of GDP and a state whose unemployment is more than 2
17 percent above the national average.
18 And finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the
19 Commission, we're a state that is proud that its bases make
20 an extraordinary contribution to our national defense. Thank
21 you very much, Mr. Chairman. Please think of California, the
22 impacts that you would have on this state, and also the great

Page 83

1 military value the state affords to our country. Thank you
2 very much.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Boxer, we thank you for
4 that excellent presentation. I'm sure I speak for the entire
5 Commission when we all say we recognize the inadequacy of the
6 time. We recognize the devotion of each of you to your great
7 state, the largest state in our union.
8 And I know that you all understand that the time
9 frame for what these commissioners has done is a short one,
10 too. And we apologize. You have served your state, as
11 usual, in this whole process in an excellent and exemplary
12 way, and we thank you.
13 SENATOR BOXER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
14 members.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we're privileged to have your
16 distinguished colleague, the distinguished senior Senator
17 from the great State of California. We thank her for coming
18 and thank her for her past contributions, as well.
19 SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much, Mr.
20 Chairman.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Diane Feinstein.
22 SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much. I would

Page 84

1 like to concentrate my comments on three things. One is the
2 cumulative impact. The second is, really, the two big bases,
3 the biggest bases. And that would be McClellan and Long
4 Beach.
5 No state has had the cumulative economic impact of
6 base closure as California has. I think it might be helpful
7 for the Commission to know that today, California has 363,000
8 fewer jobs than it did in 1990. It's a state that gains
9 about 700,000 people a year, and yet has 363,000 fewer jobs
10 than it did in 1990.
11 The impact of both defense downsizing and base
12 closure is not to be underestimated. In defense downsizing
13 alone, we have lost 250,000 jobs to date. And the estimate
14 is that before the process is completed, we will lose another
15 250,000 jobs. My plea to you today is to raise cumulative
16 economic impact above what you do today when you look at the
17 base closure situation in California.
18 We have had 22 bases closed. We have another list
19 of bases before us now. The total job loss, civilian and
20 military, direct job loss, is 36,000 from those bases listed
21 today. The three big bases alone, McClellan, Magu, and Long
22 Beach, have a total of 27,000 jobs. That's military and

Page 85

1 civilian jobs directly employed on those bases.
2 My point to you is, with the job loss that we have
3 had of 363,000, there really is no other employment for these
4 people today in defense-related industry in California.
5 California, as you can see -- and these are net, net, net
6 jobs. This is a slightly different figure. This is taking
7 into consideration jobs that have remained in the state in
8 this figure.
9 Of the 148,859 nationally, almost 89,000 of those
10 net, net jobs lost have come from California alone. So
11 California alone in net, net, net job loss has lost more than
12 half of the total of the nation. I think that this is my
13 case to elevate net cumulative economic impact of this round
14 of base closures on the State of California.
15 Let me say one thing. The unemployment rate, which
16 my colleague mentioned to you is 8 and-a-half percent today,
17 unemployment in the state has gone up each of the past three
18 months. This would indicate that California could tip back
19 into a recession. And I think you must consider this job
20 loss, in view of what is now rising unemployment once again.
21 If I may, I would like to speak on the two bases.
22 I know we have 25 members of the House who will eloquently

Page 86

1 speak on many of the bases in their district. I want to
2 touch on McClellan.
3 Following the Oakland testimony, my staff
4 introduced into the record a letter by General Mormon. And
5 if I might just briefly quote from it. "The skilled workers
6 and leadership at McClellan are essential to the United
7 States Air Force. The Air Force strongly opposes the closure
8 of any of our depot installations, including McClellan Air
9 Force Base."
10 Now, with regard to McClellan's prohibitively high
11 closure costs, let me make these points. The one-time cost
12 to close McClellan is estimated at more than $500 million.
13 That does not include environmental cleanup. There are 254
14 sites at McClellan being investigated for potential
15 contamination. That represents 80 percent of the entire
16 base. So if you close it, they will not be able to reuse it
17 unless the military is willing to come up with a cleanup cost
18 in the range of 1.4 billion to $2 billion.
19 The cost to close one of the ALCs would be greater
20 than the total cost the Air Force has budgeted over the next
21 six years for all of its base closures and realignments. It
22 would cost 2.7 billion to replace McClellan's state-of-the-

Page 87

1 art facilities. Any purported savings would be wiped out by
2 the high closure and cleanup cost of McClellan.
3 One specific matter that I believe deserves the
4 Commission's attention is McClellan's one-of-a-kind
5 industrial nuclear reactor. There is presently no nuclear
6 reactor operating in the United States quite like the one at
7 McClellan. Its costs were not considered in the COBRA
8 analysis.
9 In a nutshell, I believe it makes no sense to close
10 McClellan, because you will not recover those costs from the
11 closure, and it will cost more than virtually all of the
12 other bases together for the Air Force.
13 Let me speak for a moment on Long Beach. As I said
14 in my prior testimony, it's a marvel to me why Long Beach has
15 been put on this list. It's strategically located. It's
16 close to the Pacific Fleet, where 70 percent of the fleet is
17 concentrated. It is the most cost-effective shipyard.
18 My understanding is that based on the rumors that
19 have come out of this process, the Commission is prepared to
20 maintain a shipyard that is not nearly as cost-effective as
21 Long Beach and yet close Long Beach. In just the last six
22 fiscal years, Long Beach has been consistently under budget

Page 88

1 and 102.7 million has been returned to the Navy's budget.
2 It has the largest dry dock capability South of
3 Puget Sound, and it's large enough to accommodate every class
4 of ship in the entire fleet. New information recently
5 presented to me by Long Beach Mayor Beverly O'Neil details
6 examples of where the Navy substantially deviated from the
7 force structure plan and established BRAC selection
8 criteria.
9 According to this document, which I would like to
10 submit for the record, the Navy ignored a $100 million offer
11 by the Port of Long Beach to consolidate facilities from the
12 Naval station for shipyard convenience.
13 Two, it did not include Long Beach in the regional
14 maintenance center concept, even though Puget Sound and Pearl
15 are included. And three, it lowered the military value of
16 Long Beach, which had a military value of 48.7 in 1993 and
17 only 38.04 in 1995. And it underestimated the cost of
18 closure by $758 million. I will submit those papers to your
19 Commission for your consideration.
20 I completely agree with former Chairman of the
21 Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, who said in 1991, "The
22 closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard would seriously degrade

Page 89

1 the dry dock capability for all large ships in the Southern
2 California area. Alternatives in Hawaii and Washington simply
3 could not provide the services found at Long Beach."
4 What perplexes me is, a closure of Long Beach would
5 mean that all of the ships located at San Diego, which will
6 become the major home port on the Continental U.S., will
7 either have to go to Puget Sound or to Pearl for their work.
8 In just steaming time alone, in family dislocation, that does
9 not seem to me to make very good sense. So I would urge the
10 Commission to look carefully at Long Beach.
11 I have previously testified on behalf of other
12 California bases on the closure list. But bottom line, Mr.
13 Chairman, I think the argument -- no state can make an
14 argument of cumulative economic impact like the State of
15 California can -- 363,000 fewer jobs than 1990, unemployment
16 up three months in a row, two points above the national
17 unemployment figure.
18 Over 50 percent of the net, net, net jobs from base
19 closure have occurred in the State of California, and the
20 three big bases alone, representing 27,000 of the some 38,000
21 jobs affected in this base closure. The 1988 and 1991 rounds
22 and the third round are now beginning to take place in

Page 90

1 California.
2 I would urge this Commission to consider net
3 economic impact and leave out the State of California from
4 this round of base closures. I thank the Commission.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, Senator Feinstein.
6 And we're delighted to welcome a distinguished
7 member of the House, my old friend, representative Vic Fazio.
8 Vic Fazio, we're glad to see you again.
9 REPRESENTATIVE FAZIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 The four members from our region are going to try to
11 integrate our testimony during the 20 minutes that have been
12 allocated to us.
13 That mountain of mail over there, I think,
14 testifies to the degree to which we have support in our
15 community. I know the degree to which all of you who have
16 paid attention to our problem makes that perhaps unnecessary.
17 You understand that. We do appreciate all of the attention
18 you've given.
19 But as we enter the last weeks of deliberations, I
20 want to emphasize just a couple of points. First, the world
21 continues to be a dangerous place, and events are changing
22 rapidly. Recent activities in Bosnia simply underscore that

Page 91

1 we live in a dynamic world and that we must be prepared to
2 respond to any contingency.
3 Our military forces, including depot facilities,
4 must be in position to respond to the dynamic nature of world
5 events. In this regard, DOD and the Air Force have spent a
6 lot of time working on force structure issues, infrastructure
7 requirements, and budget considerations, to arrive at an
8 appropriate balance that will permit our military forces to
9 meet the challenges of the future.
10 On the Air Force depots in particular, I believe
11 the downsizing recommendation is a reflection of the
12 difficult nature of balancing each of these considerations.
13 Ultimately, the Air Force and DOD selected what they believed
14 to be the best alternative available to them at this time.
15 The downsizing option recognizes that each ALC has unique
16 capabilities and characteristics that are essential elements
17 of supporting the war fighters.
18 Further, it recognizes that closing any ALC is an
19 extremely costly proposition. And finally, it recognizes
20 that certain capabilities at each of the ALCs could be lost
21 for years under a closure scenario.
22 If anything, as a whole, DOD needs to maintain its

Page 92

1 flexibility and preserve its capabilities to respond to an
2 ever-changing world environment. The downsizing option
3 maximizes both flexibility and capabilities of DOD.
4 I have seen no evidence which refutes the Air
5 Force's and DOD's downsizing recommendation. Nothing
6 presented to me so far diminishes the rationale behind the
7 downsizing alternative. And nothing suggests to me that the
8 Air Force and DOD did not do their job.
9 A second point I want to make is that military is a
10 changing entity, becoming more reliant on technology. The
11 world of high technology is here, and we believe McClellan is
12 positioned to provide critical mission support for the Air
13 Force and DOD well into the next century. McClellan's
14 emphasis is on technology. It's widely recognized as the
15 high tech depot. Its focus is on space systems and
16 communications in electronics.
17 McClellan is also host to a one-of-a-kind nuclear
18 radiation center that Senator Feinstein mentioned, an
19 unequalled state-of-the-art hydraulics facility, and the
20 foundry of the future.
21 This slide illustrates what are McClellan's unique
22 capabilities. We break them down into three categories:

Page 93

1 unique product or service, centers of excellence, and only
2 DOD source of repair, indicating, as well, where our cross-
3 service capabilities are greatest.
4 Understanding these unique characteristics of
5 McClellan is important, because closure will have a
6 significant negative impact on the Air Force's and DOD's
7 mission support capabilities. McClellan's capabilities as a
8 depot are captured very well in the joint cross-service group
9 analysis of functional value. Congressman Matsui will
10 address specific issues in this area for the Commission.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're delighted to have our good
12 friend, Congressman Robert Matsui, here.
13 REPRESENTATIVE MATSUI: Thank you, Chairman Dixon
14 and members of this Commission. We would like to thank you
15 for giving us this opportunity.
16 We would like to raise some concerns regarding the
17 Air Force's military value analysis, because it fails to
18 accurately portray McClellan's value to our nation's defense
19 industrial base.
20 I am here because McClellan has proved over and
21 over again in workload competitions that it is the strongest
22 depot. McClellan is leading the way in cross-servicing and

Page 94

1 cost-efficient production. Cross-servicing was, indeed, the
2 cornerstone of BRAC '95. DOD acknowledged in the Weant study
3 that the greatest amount of excess capacity was between
4 services and not within the individual services.
5 So DOD set up the joint cross-service group to
6 establish a fair and impartial process to eliminate excess
7 capacity between services. The JCSG developed functional
8 value to measure a depot's capacity to do cross-servicing.
9 Here's a slide which breaks down the relative weights that
10 the JCSG gave various depot functions.
11 The JCSG defined "functional value" as "The merit
12 of performing a cross-service function at a given site or
13 activity." As a reflection of the importance of cross-
14 servicing, functional value comprised 56 percent of the first
15 Base Closure criteria on military value.
16 Now, as this second overhead slide shows, the JCSG
17 found that of over 50 commodity groups that were evaluated,
18 McClellan scored highest in 6 of the groups. McClellan was
19 only surpassed by one other depot. In order to develop an
20 overall ranking of functional value, we combined the
21 individual JCSG commodity scores using the Air Force's
22 methodology.

Page 95

1 As you can see on the left-hand side of this slide,
2 the results show that McClellan scored the highest among all
3 5 ALCs and the second highest among all 22 depots evaluated.
4 The JCSG then plugged its data into six different
5 optimization models.
6 Ultimately, two alternatives were submitted for
7 consideration. Despite McClellan's high ranking and
8 functional value, JCSG recommended in one alternative that
9 Kelly and McClellan be closed.
10 How did this happen? The GAO found that in this
11 model, the JCSG had included a determination of military
12 value that was developed by the Air Force. The Air Force
13 estimation of military value was developed in secret and is
14 based upon subjective judgement.
15 After considerable review, the GAO concluded that
16 they could not audit the methodology for developing this
17 military value. This subjective factor is what wrongly makes
18 McClellan a closure candidate under JCSG alternative number
19 two.
20 In contrast, the Air Force decided to alter the
21 impartial model developed by the JCSG and did a separate
22 analysis, ending up with different results. And let me

Page 96

1 identify just some areas of bias.
2 First, the Air Force included depot capacity as a
3 primary factor, attributing 40 percent of the overall score,
4 which favors, of course, large depots. But why are they
5 giving bonus points for capacity, when excess capacity is
6 what the BRAC is trying to cut?
7 Second, no credit was given to core cross-service
8 workload. McClellan performs more core cross-service
9 workload than any other ALC.
10 Third, the Air Force combined seven separate ground
11 communications electronic commodity groups into but one
12 category, which further reduced McClellan's overall score.
13 In conclusion, I ask that the Commission consider
14 the independent evaluations of the JCSG and the GAO in
15 determining McClellan's value to the nation's defense
16 infrastructure. Their objective measurements show
17 indisputably that McClellan has critical skills and
18 productivity rates that are not duplicated elsewhere in DOD.
19 Our desire to save McClellan derives not from a
20 parochial interest to keep our local communities intact, but
21 from an even greater interest in keeping our national defense
22 infrastructure strong.

Page 97

1 Now, I would like to introduce Congressman
2 Doolittle, who will discuss another area in the Air Force
3 analysis which lowers McClellan's overall military value
4 ratings.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Matsui.
6 And we are delighted to have the distinguished Congressman
7 from California, Congressman John Doolittle.
8 REPRESENTATIVE DOOLITTLE: Thank you very much, Mr.
9 Chairman and members. That area that I shall discuss
10 pertains to the costs of depot operations. Under the Air
11 Force's criteria in one analysis, the cost of depot
12 operations represents 14 percent of the overall rating.
13 The Air Force used two indicators, annual operating
14 costs and labor rates, to rate the ALCs on costs. McClellan
15 was rated red plus for cost of depot operations. We believe
16 this rating and the indicators used to derive the rating
17 completely belie McClellan's true value in terms of cost-
18 effectiveness and productivity.
19 We are convinced that McClellan should be green for
20 costs of depot operations. Here's why. The use of annual
21 operating costs as an indicator captures the total cost of
22 depot operations, but it ignores the complexity of work and

Page 98

1 does not account for any variance in skills, equipment,
2 training, and overhead costs for differing workloads.
3 It is interesting to note that the two high tech
4 depots, Hill and McClellan, received red plus ratings for
5 annual cost of operations. This fact underscores the impact
6 of high tech workloads and highly skilled employees in the
7 cost of depot operations.
8 The other indicator used to determine the cost of
9 depot operations was labor rates, which do not reflect
10 productivity, efficiency, or performance. McClellan's basic
11 wage rates are higher than the other ALCs, but our
12 performance and efficiency are better.
13 We looked at the AFMC's own performance indicators
14 to assess efficiency, productivity, and overall performance
15 of the ALCs. These indicators have been documented by the
16 U.S. General Accounting Office since 1988. Since 1988,
17 McClellan is the number one Air Force depot in meeting annual
18 operating results which measures costs versus revenues.
19 The goal is not to make a profit, but to achieve a
20 zero balance on an annual basis. This indicator is a primary
21 measurement of management effectiveness. For other
22 performance indicators, McClellan is number one in direct

Page 99

1 labor efficiency. McClellan is number two in output per paid
2 man day. McClellan never ranks lower than third for any
3 standard performance indicator aggregated over the 1988 to
4 1994 time frame.
5 By way of summary, then, McClellan is at the top
6 among Air Force depots, both in terms of functional value and
7 cost-effectiveness. McClellan gives its DOD customers more
8 bang for the buck. The Air Force analysis does not capture
9 the full value of McClellan as a depot. McClellan should be
10 green for depot evaluation and green for criterion one.
11 If these issues had been evaluated to capture
12 McClellan's true criterion one value, McClellan's overall
13 military value would be higher, and we believe that the
14 JCSG's alternative DM number 2 would not have identified
15 McClellan as a closure candidate.
16 I would like to indicate now that Congressman Pombo
17 will shed some additional light on McClellan's value as a
18 depot on a cross-servicing basis.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Doolittle.
21 And we are delighted to have the distinguished
22 Congressman from the State of California, representative

Page 100

1 Richard Pombo.
2 REPRESENTATIVE POMBO: Thank you. We understand
3 that our friends at Tobyhanna Army Depot have been making
4 claims that Tobyhanna should be the DOD source of repair for
5 all communications and electronics work. We believe that a
6 review of the evidence will clearly indicate that if there is
7 to be a single DOD source of repair for ground communications
8 and electronics, that it would not be Tobyhanna, but, in
9 fact, it would be McClellan.
10 One need only review the JCSG functional evaluation
11 to understand why. The information I will present comes
12 directly from JCSG's depot maintenance study. It represents
13 the closest apples-to-apples comparison you will find,
14 because we are talking about communications and electronics
15 categories defined by the JCSG and performed by Tobyhanna and
16 McClellan.
17 As the next slide indicates, in the JCSG functional
18 value scores for communications and electronics commodities,
19 Tobyhanna only ranks higher than McClellan in one instance.
20 McClellan ranks higher than Tobyhanna in the other six
21 commodities, as well as in software support commodities,
22 which are essential to supporting communications and

Page 101

1 electronics workloads.
2 The software support capability is particularly
3 important, since it is an essential component of supporting
4 communications and electronics workload. Virtually
5 everything that DOD uses today is software-driven. Radars
6 track using software. Satellites are controlled using
7 software. And test equipment is software-driven.
8 A level 3 classification of software development
9 capabilities is mandatory in order to do business with the
10 Air Force. McClellan has a level 3 classification.
11 Tobyhanna has no classification.
12 Further, the next slide shows that for doing
13 communications and electronics work, McClellan is the better
14 buy. Our budgeted labor hour costs for communications
15 electronics, which is what is charged to the customer, is
16 lower than Tobyhanna's.
17 In this next slide, we illustrate Tobyhanna and
18 McClellan's current capabilities to support core
19 communications and electronics work load. The JCSG study
20 reveals that McClellan is the only DOD facility with core
21 capability in all communications and electronics categories.
22 What this means is that McClellan has the technology in place

Page 102

1 to support all commodity types.
2 The final slide clearly demonstrates that McClellan
3 has existing capacity to support all of DOD's communications
4 and electronics depot maintenance workload requirements. The
5 bottom line is that if this Commission wants to take an
6 historic step and implement cross-servicing on a significant
7 scale in the area of communications and electronics, then the
8 evidence clearly demonstrates that McClellan should be the
9 DOD single source of repair for communication and electronics
10 workload.
11 Congressman Fazio will now conclude our
12 presentation by discussing certain costs of closure issues.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Fazio.
14 REPRESENTATIVE FAZIO: Mr. Chairman, our review of
15 closure costs in the COBRA model for McClellan reveals
16 significant errors. The next slide highlights the errors and
17 what their impact is on steady state savings.
18 We provided your staff with information on this
19 subject earlier. What we are presenting today represents an
20 update of the numbers based on the latest COBRA runs and the
21 best available information we could obtain.
22 We understand that personnel reductions have

Page 103

1 already been taken within the Air Force Materiel Command
2 programs which are not reflected in the unit manpower
3 document. The UMD was the source of the personnel numbers
4 used by the Air Force in the COBRA model.
5 Essentially, the UMD had not yet been updated.
6 AFMC even alerted the ALC manpower offices that the numbers
7 were suspect. We have attached a letter from headquarters on
8 this subject for your reference. We are not certain of what
9 the impact of this discrepancy will be on one-time costs and
10 steady state savings, but bring it to your attention because
11 the closure savings estimates ought to be accurate.
12 The other errors relate to base operation support,
13 or BOS, personnel. We have identified 76 positions counted
14 as BOS for the base, when these positions are actually
15 mission support positions that will relocate with the 940th
16 Air Refueling Group.
17 This is the same scenario for 91 positions that
18 were counted as BOS but which are actually mission support
19 and will move with the communication squadron. The other 32
20 positions are already eliminated as part of the F-111
21 drawdown unrelated to BRAC. However, they were included in
22 the COBRA personnel eliminations column.

Page 104

1 So after correcting for these errors using standard
2 factors from the COBRA model, we estimate that McClellan's
3 steady state savings are reduced approximately 8.5 million.
4 We have also uncovered several areas where errors occurred in
5 one-time costs. The three most significant errors involve
6 McClellan's nuclear radiation center, the cold-proof
7 facility, and the hydraulics facility.
8 First, the radiation center. The COBRA assumptions
9 used by the Air Force provide a shut-down cost of 20 million
10 and an annual maintenance cost of 300,000. In reality, one-
11 time decommissioning costs will run as high as 55 million.
12 Annual recurring costs will be $700,000 per year.
13 The capabilities of the nuclear radiation center
14 provide critical support for DOD for nuclear treaty
15 verification purposes, as well as strategic materials
16 production. These capabilities must be replicated to support
17 national security requirements. The costs to replicate this
18 capability is 48 million, which does not consider the length
19 of time and difficulty in getting the regulatory licenses and
20 permits needed to operate a nuclear reactor.
21 For the cold-proof facility, the Air Force included
22 zero in its COBRA analysis for this capability, even though

Page 105

1 the facility will be needed to support our fall in military
2 sales obligations with Australia and may be required to
3 support the EF-111s if they remain in the inventory. The
4 cost to replicate the facility is 8.1 million.
5 I would ask you to talk to General Fogleman when he
6 appears before you on Wednesday about the role these planes
7 are now providing. The F-111 is back up over Bosnia just in
8 the last week.
9 Finally, on the hydraulics facility, the Air Force
10 included just under 1 million in the COBRA model for
11 replicating this capability elsewhere. As many of you saw
12 firsthand when you visited McClellan, the state-of-the-art,
13 high-pressure hydraulics capabilities at McClellan need
14 specialized facilities. These facilities are not currently
15 found anywhere else in DOD. The cost to replicate them is
16 $21.7 million.
17 So when added together, we find a total
18 underestimate of one-time costs of 111 million just on these
19 facilities alone.
20 The next slide demonstrates the impact of these
21 corrections on the cost of closure. We see McClellan's one-
22 time cost increase to 683 million, steady state savings

Page 106

1 decrease to 76 million, payback increased from 8 years to 11
2 years, and the net present value decrease from 370 million to
3 169 million. We're most anxious to have all of this data
4 updated on all five of the ALCs.
5 We encourage the Commission to look closely at
6 these costs of closure and other issues. We must have a full
7 understanding of what the impacts of closure are on mission
8 readiness and sustainability and the Air Force and DOD
9 budgets, as well. We ask that you not foreclose the Air
10 Force and DOD's flexibility to respond to changing national
11 security requirements.
12 We want to emphasize our people, the workforce that
13 many of you found unique, located in Northern California
14 close to the centers of excellence in their areas of
15 professional capability.
16 Please allow Secretary Perry's recommendation to go
17 forward, sending more work and more missions to McClellan in
18 the areas of composites, instruments and displays, hydraulics
19 and newdraulics, retaining our expertise in microelectronics,
20 ground communications, electronics, and neutron radiography.
21 We are the second most modern in terms of assets
22 and equipment facility in the ALC, $450 million invested in

Page 107

1 the last decade. We understand how tough the task is, but we
2 do it better, faster, and cheaper. And so we would once more
3 make our argument that McClellan is a unique national asset,
4 not just another Air Force base.
5 In closure, let me say that we believe that you
6 need to look at all the five logistics centers in terms of
7 focused COBRA runs. Put all of us on a level playing field
8 before you make a final decision. We are not taking shots at
9 any of our colleagues. We believe we all have a role to
10 play.
11 But what we hope you will do is be the umpire, the
12 arbitrator that this Commission has been so often in the
13 past. We wish you well in what is a very difficult task and
14 thank you for the degree that you have given attention to
15 this particular facility.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
17 Dick Fazio.
18 And we're delighted to welcome the Honorable Wally
19 Herger, distinguished Congressman from the State of
20 California.
21 REPRESENTATIVE HERGER: Thank you very much,
22 Chairman Dixon and members of the Commission, for this

Page 108

1 opportunity to testify on behalf of the Sierra Army Depot.
2 I wish to acknowledge the tremendous effort that
3 each member of the Commission has devoted to the BRAC
4 process. I wish to especially thank Commissioner Steele, who
5 spent a full day at Sierra Army Depot viewing the facility
6 and gathering data about its mission.
7 In the final analysis, it is firsthand observations
8 like this which will enable this Commission to reach an
9 intelligent and informed conclusion regarding the future of
10 Sierra Army Depot.
11 Today, I would like to again draw the Commission's
12 attention to a few specific points which are crucial to a
13 fair evaluation of Sierra. These factors are critical to
14 both the efficient operation of the Department of Defense and
15 the overall military readiness of our country.
16 The facts about Sierra speak for themselves. The
17 facility is ideally located. It is cost-effective. It has
18 unmatched transportation capabilities. It has storage
19 conditions that rate fourth overall in the Army system. It
20 is unparalleled demilitarization capability. It stores and
21 services three of the Army's largest operational stocks.
22 Significant realignment would be costly to the

Page 109

1 taxpayers. Combined, these factors alone present a
2 compelling case against realignment of the facility.
3 Unfortunately, however, these facts have been consistently
4 understated and manipulated in the data which has been
5 provided to this Commission. I wish to cite a few examples.
6 First, Sierra's demilitarization capability has
7 been grossly understated by the Army and misconstrued in both
8 Navy and Air Force reports. The fact is that Sierra has the
9 largest and most cost-effective demil capacity in the
10 country.
11 Furthermore, it has the flexibility to decommission
12 START I and START II, thereby enabling the United States to
13 expeditiously fulfill its military-related treaty
14 obligations.
15 Secondly, Sierra has been repeatedly evaluated
16 strictly as an ammunition depot when, in fact, 55 percent of
17 its mission is to store and maintain three of the Army's
18 largest operational stocks. These operational stocks are
19 critical to the Army force projection and were used
20 extensively during the Gulf War.
21 Thirdly, Army reports have frequently
22 underestimated Sierra's ideal location and transportation

Page 110

1 facilities. Sierra is the most proximate of any depot to the
2 West Coast military seaports. It is traversed by two major
3 rail lines and is the only depot with an air field capable of
4 supporting C-5 aircraft. Closure or realignment would
5 dramatically increase transportation costs for shipping
6 munitions to port.
7 Furthermore, closure of the facility would
8 eliminate a source of virtually unlimited munitions, storage,
9 and training space.
10 Fourthly, although Army data suggests that
11 realignment of Sierra would save taxpayers dollars, the
12 opposite, in fact, is true. The initial cost of transporting
13 Sierra's ammunition to other bases, combined with subsequent
14 increases in the cost of redeployment and demilitarization
15 will negate any one-time savings and, in the long run, cost
16 taxpayers more money.
17 These four examples suggest that this Commission
18 should carefully reexamine all the data regarding Sierra Army
19 Depot. As it does so, I urge the commissioners to give
20 particular credence to the information gathered by
21 Commissioner Steele.
22 With the national security and a growing deficit

Page 111

1 hanging in the balance, it is imperative that any final
2 determination regarding Sierra be predicated upon
3 unimpeachable information. I am confident that such
4 information is now available to the Commission, and I ask
5 that it be given the weight that it deserves.
6 In closing, I again thank you, Chairman Dixon, and
7 your associates for your dedicated efforts. Your decisions
8 over the next few weeks will affect our country's military
9 capabilities for decades. I urge you to consider all the
10 facts, particularly your firsthand knowledge, and predicate
11 your decisions on what is best for our country.
12 I'm confident that as you do so, you will elect to
13 retain Sierra Army Depot as a fully operational facility.
14 Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
16 Representative Herger.
17 And we're delighted to have the distinguished
18 Congressman from the State of California, Representative Sam
19 Farr here. Representative Farr.
20 REPRESENTATIVE FARR: Good morning, commissioners.
21 Thank you very much. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to
22 discuss the DOD's recommendation to realign TEXCOM

Page 112

1 Experimentation Center at Fort Hunter, Liggett, California,
2 to Fort Bliss, Texas.
3 First, I would like to take this opportunity to
4 mention the presence of two highly qualified experts in both
5 operational testing and the capabilities of Fort Hunter
6 Liggett who are with me this morning, Dr. Marion Bryson,
7 director of TEXCOM Experimentation Center, and Colonel Eldee
8 "Red" Walklee, retired Army garrison at Fort Hunter Liggett.
9 They're working closely with the Commission's staff
10 on the military aspects of the terrain and isolation of Fort
11 Hunter Liggett for conducting operational testing and the
12 significant flaws that are in the COBRA model analysis.
13 First, under operational testings, operational
14 testing is the final phase of DOD's testing for evaluating
15 materiel, doctrine, tactics, training, and organization. And
16 this phase must be accomplished in an operationally realistic
17 combat environment. This environment must include total free
18 play of the opposing forces involved in the test.
19 More importantly, this combat environment must
20 challenge the minds of the soldiers and the officers to
21 ensure the systems and technology are thoroughly evaluated.
22 Free play and varied terrain challenge the minds of our

Page 113

1 fighting forces. The more varied the terrain, the higher the
2 probability of the quality of testing.
3 There are few restrictions to the creation of an
4 appropriate environment in the hills and valleys of Fort
5 Hunter Liggett. For example, high energy lasers can be used
6 360 degrees. But they can be used in the arid desert
7 environment only, where sufficient hills can back stop their
8 energy.
9 As such, free play is lost at a place such as Fort
10 Bliss, which lacks the appropriate terrain to facilitate two-
11 way, unrestricted laser use.
12 Another example is the ability to use the broad
13 spectrum radio jamming at Fort Hunter Liggett. Broad
14 spectrum radio frequency jamming reduces the ability of the
15 leader to communicate with the forces and produces a
16 realistic battlefield condition of confusion, thus requiring
17 individual initiative, thereby contributing to the quality of
18 the test.
19 Broad frequency radio jamming can interfere with
20 television and AM/FM radio reception, emergency networks, and
21 foreign frequency usage. There are few restrictions at Fort
22 Hunter Liggett on jamming, many at Fort Bliss.

Page 114

1 Finally, the terrain is both friend and foe to
2 forces engaging in testing. Again, leadership and initiative
3 only come into play when forces are confronted with hills,
4 valleys, rivers, lakes, manzanita thickets, and oak forests.
5 In addition to the terrain, the vegetation, the possibility
6 of a wild line fire or wild variants of climatic conditions
7 at Fort Hunter Liggett relates to the vast regions of the
8 nondesert world.
9 The weapons, mobility, and technology provided to
10 our forces are key to the success on the battlefield. I
11 believe our soldiers deserve the very best that industry,
12 innovation, and research can provide. I also believe that
13 the place for ensuring this quality is on the proving grounds
14 and testing areas, not on the battlefield.
15 An example of this would be the testing of the
16 Apache Long Bow. Equipped as a state-of-the-art mast mounted
17 radar fire control system along with navigation and
18 communication systems, the Long Bow Apache was designed to be
19 affordable 21st century Army weapon to detect and engage
20 multiple targets on the battlefield.
21 This test was conducted at Fort Hunter Liggett. It
22 had been originally scheduled at Fort Bliss and was switched

Page 115

1 for many of the reasons I just stated above.
2 The analysis that COBRA prepared for you. DOD made
3 a recommendation based on the COBRA analysis that there would
4 be a substantial return on investment if you realign TEC.
5 Their analysis led to the following results: They said there
6 would be a one-time cost to realign TEC to Fort Bliss of 6.6
7 million. All costs would be recovered in one year, and the
8 Army says there will be accumulated savings of 67.6 million
9 at the end of the BRAC period, 2015.
10 Return on the investment. Let's look at this. The
11 Army's COBRA analysis was flawed in that it made assumptions
12 in salary and base operations costing data. Assuming the TEC
13 element to be bigger than it actually will be, the Army
14 anticipated moving 384 personnel in FY '98. Due to the
15 planned force structure, which is independent of the BRAC
16 process, the TEC will only be 206 personnel.
17 Omitting the costs of moving the TEC element to
18 Fort Bliss, including the conversion of office space,
19 laboratory facilities, and recalibration of the replacement
20 of TEC instrumentation to avoid frequency interference were
21 not calculated in the Army COBRA analysis.
22 I am submitting for the record copies of the Army's

Page 116

1 working papers -- they're attached to my testimony here --
2 from 30 May '95, technical assessment cost estimate meeting
3 at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, which illustrates that there is a
4 one-time cost of 40.9 million to move TEC element. This data
5 was compiled by TEC, Fort Bliss, and Fort Ritchie, Maryland,
6 working groups planning the proposed realignment of TEC from
7 Fort Hunter Liggett to Fort Bliss.
8 Again, this data adds 34.4 million to the Army
9 COBRA projections of the 6.5 million one-time cost, for a
10 total of 40.9 million or a 620 percent increase in the COBRA
11 projection. I'm providing this data in the form of a TEC
12 working document and a Fort Ritchie summary page from its
13 cost assessment meeting.
14 I strongly believe that we have shown that the
15 military value of Fort Hunter Liggett for operational testing
16 is vastly superior to that of Fort Bliss and that there will
17 be a one-time significant cost to the taxpayer, with no -- no
18 recurring savings.
19 As the Army downsizes, technological advancements
20 play an even greater part in the role of battlefield success.
21 Throughout history, victory has gone to the side that makes
22 the best use of available technology. Even if this proposed

Page 117

1 move made operational sense, there is no return on the
2 investment. The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated
3 from the BRAC criterion number 5.
4 Therefore, I urge the Commission to reject the DOD
5 recommendation to realign TEC from Fort Hunter Liggett to
6 Fort Bliss. Thank you very much.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
8 Farr.
9 We are delighted to have the distinguished
10 Congresswoman from the great State of California,
11 Representative Andrea Seastrand.
12 REPRESENTATIVE SEASTRAND: Mr. Chairman,
13 distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for the
14 opportunity to come before you today and address the
15 recommended realignment of the TEC's COM Experimentation
16 Center at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, to Fort Bliss,
17 Texas.
18 As you have just heard from Congressman Farr's
19 testimony, Fort Hunter Liggett is of great value to our
20 military. Technology has been and will continue to be
21 America's military advantage. This fact was proven in the
22 Gulf War. Although the coalition forces were smaller than

Page 118

1 those of Iraq's, our men and women were able to achieve a
2 decisive victory over the aggressor.
3 They won because of the superior training, weapons
4 systems, and technologies provided them through a demanding
5 developmental and operational test and experimentation
6 program. The Gulf War was the first real test of the Apache
7 helicopter, the Kiowa Scout helicopter, the improved tow
8 vehicle, the Hummer, and the Marine Corps' light armored
9 vehicle. All of these systems were operationally tested and
10 certified at Fort Hunter Liggett.
11 Another combat system that used Fort Hunter Liggett
12 as its proving ground was the Sergeant York anti-aircraft
13 gun. However, the $3 billion system did not appear in the
14 Gulf War. Although the Sergeant York tested favorably at
15 Fort Bliss in the early '80s, when this system was sent to
16 Fort Hunter Liggett for a confirmation operational test, it
17 failed.
18 The system failed because the acquisitional radar
19 became confused among the vegetation and variation or the
20 varied terrain of Fort Hunter Liggett. The system could not
21 successfully engage enemy aircraft in this type of
22 environment. And so, because of this failure, the program

Page 119

1 was eventually canceled, thus saving millions of dollars.
2 Fort Hunter Liggett again proved its worth.
3 Now, I would like to also move on to the COBRA
4 analysis. I want to stress the fact that even if the
5 recommended realignment of TEC at Fort Hunter Liggett made
6 military or operational sense, there is no return on
7 investment. In developing its return on investment analysis,
8 the Army began with data that was inaccurate.
9 It failed to accommodate force structure changes
10 for the TEC element, and next, the Army analysis failed to
11 provide for the mission essential costs, instrumentation,
12 reprogramming, and laboratory facilities. These all must be
13 borne at Fort Bliss to enable the TEC element to perform its
14 mission at that location.
15 It makes no sense to move the element if it saves
16 no money and cannot perform once moved. The community
17 analysis merely rectifies these errors.
18 In summary, the 20-year savings do not equal the
19 one-time costs of moving the TEC from Fort Hunter Liggett to
20 Fort Bliss. As a result, the recommendation for realignment
21 represents a substantial deviation from BRAC criterion 5.
22 As you deliberate the possible realignment of the

Page 120

1 test and experimentation command from Fort Hunter Liggett to
2 Fort Bliss, I trust you will reexamine this issue based on
3 the testimony you have heard today. I believe it is in the
4 best interest of our military, our community, and our nation
5 to keep the test and experimentation command in its current
6 configuration at Fort Hunter Liggett.
7 In closing, I want to repeat the DOD's own words
8 from the report it sent to the Commission, Volume III, page
9 78. And I quote: "As the enemy downsizes, technological
10 advances play an even greater role in battlefield success.
11 Throughout history, victory has gone to the side that makes
12 the best use of available technology."
13 I believe these new technological advances can best
14 be operationally tested at Fort Hunter Liggett. Thank you so
15 very much.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
17 Representative Seastrand. And you know how to appeal to the
18 Chair. I was the one that killed the Sergeant York.
19 Chairman Barry Goldwater chaired the Senate Armed Services
20 Committee in those days, and I was the freshman member on the
21 minority side.
22 Flew to El Paso, Texas, in February. Thought we

Page 121

1 would play golf while we were there, but it was snowing. And
2 came back and reported to the chairman that the thing was
3 supposed to be an idiot gun, but even I couldn't shoot it.
4 And we killed the Sergeant York, saved the taxpayers $4
5 billion. Thanks for coming here, Representative Seastrand.
6 We're delighted to have a distinguished Congressman
7 from the State of California, Representative Tony Beilenson.
8 Congressman Beilenson.
9 REPRESENTATIVE BEILENSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
10 and members of the Commission. I am Congressman Tony
11 Beilenson from California, the 24th district. I appreciate
12 very much your making time for me in your schedule today. I
13 had hoped to be able to speak to you when you held your
14 regional meeting in San Francisco a couple of weeks ago, but
15 scheduled votes in the House and a very important family
16 commitment made it impossible for me to come to San
17 Francisco.
18 I did submit a report for that hearing, Mr.
19 Chairman. I'm here today to emphasize, albeit very briefly,
20 my strong, continued support for Point Magu. I also want to
21 say that we who live out that way appreciate very much the
22 fact that two of the commissioners were kind enough to spend

Page 122

1 a full day of their time out there just a couple of weeks
2 ago. It was good seeing them, and we appreciate their having
3 come out there.
4 I hope very much that after you've studied all of
5 the information, Mr. Chairman, that you'll decide that adding
6 Point Magu to the closure list was ill-advised and should be
7 reversed.
8 We all assumed that the potential cost savings was
9 a major reason you decided to add Point Magu to your closure
10 list. I followed very carefully the debate over the
11 potential cost savings that might result from closing or
12 realigning Point Magu, and I believe that it's pretty clear
13 that these presumed savings will not be realized.
14 As Congressman McGallagly, I think, mentioned in
15 his testimony in San Francisco two weeks ago, I was present
16 at a meeting with the DOD Inspector General's Office, at
17 which time my staff and I, as well as representatives from
18 Mr. McGallagly's office and from our two Senator's offices,
19 heard the IG's office acknowledge that the data in their
20 frequently quoted report is out of date.
21 They also conceded that events have overtaken the
22 report, so that its findings probably no longer reflect an

Page 123

1 accurate picture of the situation today. I shan't belabor
2 that point here today. I know that you've heard from the
3 community and from the Navy in detail about this matter and
4 that you'll study their interpretation of the one-time
5 closure costs and the recurring annual costs of your plan.
6 The essence of our argument, Mr. Chairman, was
7 spelled out at your San Francisco hearing by Admiral McKinney
8 that Point Magu -- and I quote him -- "has an exceptionally
9 high military value and that the Navy does not agree with the
10 savings that the IG report predicted."
11 And I continue the quote, that "the redundant
12 facilities and idle workers envisioned in the DODIG report do
13 not exist, nor do the savings claimed in that report, that
14 the proposed scenario will not reduce the excess capacity in
15 DOD test and evaluation, and in my opinion" -- that was the
16 admiral speaking -- "will not result in an acceptable return
17 on investment.
18 "If executed, it will result in the fragmentation
19 of an efficiently integrated research development test and
20 evaluation center resulting in cost inefficiencies that will
21 jeopardize a national test and evaluation asset which
22 supports a significant fleet concentration." And that was

Page 124

1 the end of the quote from his testimony.
2 From all the evidence, Mr. Chairman and members of
3 the Commission, Point Magu is a necessary base in strategic
4 and military terms. In fact, it ranked so high in military
5 value that its closure would seem to make no good sense at
6 all.
7 Again, I appreciate very much having this
8 opportunity to speak with you. I hope very much that Point
9 Magu will be preserved in the manner and for the purposes for
10 which it currently operates. And, as you're well aware, it
11 has been changed a lot over the last few years. The
12 redundancies have been obliterated, and it has been brought
13 down to its proper size.
14 And that you'll find that you're in agreement with
15 the Navy and the Department of Defense, both of which
16 specifically decided against recommending Point Magu for
17 closure in the first place for what I believe -- and I hope
18 you come to believe, too -- were very sensible and good
19 reasons. And I thank you very much for letting me stop by
20 today to see you.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
22 Representative Tony Beilenson, for a very fine presentation.

Page 125

1 We thank you, and we're delighted to have your distinguished
2 colleague from the great State of California, Representative
3 Walter Tucker.
4 Representative Tucker.
5 REPRESENTATIVE TUCKER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman
6 and members of the Commission. My name is Walter Tucker, and
7 I represent the 37th Congressional district. And I want to
8 speak to you this morning about the Long Beach Naval
9 Shipyard.
10 I had the pleasure of speaking with several of your
11 colleagues upon their site visit out to the Naval shipyard a
12 few weeks ago. And today, I would like to tailor my comments
13 specifically to the area of economic impact.
14 The Department of Defense in its recommendation of
15 military base closures to the BRAC Commission stated that the
16 closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard could result in a
17 maximum reduction of 13,261 jobs in the five-county Southern
18 California primary measurement statistical area in that
19 economic area. This represents just three-tenths of 1
20 percent of the total area employment.
21 But by blending the number of job losses into the
22 PMSA economic area, the DOD has greatly -- it mitigated the

Page 126

1 actual economic impact that would occur in the Long Beach
2 area. I think that economic impact has to be put into its
3 proper perspective, Mr. Chairman.
4 In 1991, the closure of the Long Beach Naval
5 Shipyard, Long Beach Naval Station, I should say, and
6 hospital cost the city over 16,000 Navy personnel and
7 additional 1,000 civilian jobs. The total direct and
8 indirect economic losses from that decision exceeds $1
9 billion.
10 If the decision to close the Long Beach Naval
11 Shipyard is allowed to stand, we will lose an additional
12 6,600 civilian jobs, either associated directly with the
13 shipyard or with shipyard-based tenant commands. These jobs
14 generate another 3,500 secondary jobs within the immediate
15 area surrounding Long Beach, not in communities located in
16 other counties 60 miles from the shipyard.
17 The total economic impacts of the shipyard are
18 estimated to be over $750 million. Now, the DOD may feel
19 that 27,000 jobs and almost $2 billion in combined economic
20 impacts are not significant. Let me set the record straight.
21 With the economic impact problems that have burdened the Long
22 Beach area for the last five years, every job that is

Page 127

1 threatening us is significant.
2 I was astounded to learn that if all civilian job
3 losses from previous BRAC rounds were added together to those
4 proposed for 1995, Long Beach would not only lead all cities
5 in California but would also lead 46 states. Long Beach
6 would trail only Virginia, Pennsylvania, Texas, and its own
7 State of California.
8 The City of Long Beach does not mind being out
9 front in many areas of endeavor, I might add. Indeed, we
10 strive for it. But in this particular instance, we feel that
11 it's a dubious distinction, at best.
12 I must tell you that I am troubled with the Navy's
13 methodology for selecting the facilities to place on their
14 list of facilities recommended for closure, Mr. Chairman. As
15 you will hear, there have been unbelievable but no less real
16 apparently accidental oversights in the Navy's estimated
17 costs for closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
18 And let me add at this point, I believe that some
19 of my colleagues, such as Steve Horn, will be addressing this
20 issue of the undervaluation, shall I say, of the cost of
21 closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, which we believe at
22 this point is up to the tune of $900 million.

Page 128

1 In light of the Navy's apparent gross oversight, I
2 am troubled that they have used different economic data and
3 thresholds in their analysis of installations for closure.
4 The Secretary of Defense's guidance in the BRAC process
5 stipulates that economic impact is to be assessed at the
6 economic level of that economic area, metropolitan
7 statistical area or county.
8 The Navy evaluated the potential impact of closing
9 the Long Beach Naval Shipyard based on this criteria.
10 However, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, four
11 California installations were removed from the BRAC closure
12 list by the Navy due to cumulative total direct and indirect
13 job change, even though military value considerations
14 presented them as viable candidates for closure.
15 I don't need to recount for you all, all of
16 Southern California's disasters in the recent years. And we
17 certainly understand the need to downsize the military
18 infrastructure in our country to meet the realities of the
19 21st century. But why must the people of Long Beach carry
20 this burden?
21 We believe, as you have stated to us, that military
22 value should be paramount and should be the dispositive

Page 129

1 criteria in this particular instance. And so with that, I
2 hope that you will take another very serious look at the Long
3 Beach Naval Shipyard. And with that as the criteria, I
4 believe that you'll believe, as I do, that it should not be
5 closed. I thank you very much for your time on this day.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
7 Representative Walter Tucker, for your fine presentation.
8 We're delighted to welcome the distinguished
9 Congressman from the State of California, Representative Ken
10 Calvert.
11 Representative Calvert.
12 REPRESENTATIVE CALVERT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13 I want to thank you and the Commission for your hard work and
14 diligence in doing an extremely difficult job. Commissioners
15 Cox and Montova made a thorough and fair evaluation of NWAD
16 in Corona, California, and the community certainly thanks
17 you.
18 NWAD Corona is a one-of-a-kind organization. It
19 should be evaluated based upon its unique mission of
20 providing independent assessment of military systems and
21 fleet readiness. NWAD should not be evaluated as a warfare
22 center. Relocating its mission to a warfare center raises a

Page 130

1 possibility of a conflict of interest.
2 In addition to military value, with the proposed
3 closure of the warfare assessment lab at NWAD, the Department
4 of Defense would lose the ability to provide real time
5 assessment of fleet readiness for up to 6 to 10 years. When
6 the considerations of retaining an independent organization
7 and the warfare assessment lab are reviewed, the proposed
8 cost savings also become questionable.
9 For these reasons, I urge the Commission to retain
10 the Naval warfare assessment division, Corona, at its present
11 location.
12 Also, this BRAC is in a unique historical position
13 to clean up and make the most of the three previous rounds of
14 BRAC. One such possibility is what we call the March
15 opportunity. We propose moving Marine helicopters to March
16 Air Force Base instead of the proposed location at Miramar.
17 From an operational and safety perspective, the
18 single setting of fast-moving, fixed-wing, and rotary
19 aircraft is undesirable. The attempt to relocate more than
20 100 Tustin helicopters to Miramar, where approximately 150 F-
21 18s will be flying tens of thousands of annual airfield
22 operations in congested air space, is an invitation, in my

Page 131

1 mind, to disaster.
2 Never before in peacetime has an attempt been made
3 to permanently combine so many aircraft with such dissimilar
4 performance characteristics in such a confined air space.
5 Collocating helicopters with the relatively few larger and
6 slower and less frequently flown cargo and tanker aircraft at
7 March does not pose a similar problem.
8 Marine helicopters stationed at March would be much
9 closer to training areas in Cleveland National Forest and 29
10 Palms than if flying from Miramar. The Marines would,
11 therefore, be able to operate at existing mountainous area
12 landing sites and confined area landing sites located in the
13 March vicinity.
14 Additionally, March would reduce helicopter
15 transient time to training ranges located at the Marine air
16 ground combat center, 29 Palms, which would result in better
17 utilization of flying hours for operational training.
18 Redirecting helicopter assets to March tremendously improves
19 the worldwide rapid deployment posture of these assets by
20 collocating them at the first Marine Force aerial port of
21 embarkation.
22 For example, having March helicopters based at

Page 132

1 March would save 12 to 18 hours deployment time over the
2 first scenario. Also, as a consequence of March becoming a
3 Marine facility, elements of the first Marine Corps
4 expeditionary force can preposition supplies, ammunition, and
5 people to further facilitate rapid deployment.
6 The 1st MEF is tasked with rapid mobility missions
7 throughout the Pacific Theater of operations. The Marine
8 March opportunity is safer, cheaper, and more efficient. I
9 ask you to take a very close look at it.
10 I would also like to thank Congressman George
11 Brown, who could not be with us today, for his help in this.
12 And I would like to submit his statement for the record.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: His statement will be admitted in
14 the record, Congressman.
15 REPRESENTATIVE CALVERT: Thank you very much, Mr.
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're indebted to you, Congressman
18 Calvert, for your fine presentation. I'm greatly pleased to
19 see your distinguished colleague from the State of
20 California, Representative Dana Rohrabacher, here.
21 Congressman Rohrabacher.
22 REPRESENTATIVE ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much,

Page 133

1 Mr. Chairman and commissioners. I'm here today to join with
2 several of my other Southern California colleagues on behalf
3 of retaining the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Unlike some of
4 my other colleagues, however, I would not oppose shutting
5 down the shipyard if it were the best course of action for
6 our nation's Naval effectiveness and for fiscal health.
7 I believe that the jobs that might be lost and actually
8 could be lost there at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard could be
9 made up through other waterfront uses, provided there the
10 entire base, including dry dock number 1, was made available
11 for reuse.
12 So, in fact, if it wasn't for what the Navy needs
13 and what's best for the Navy, I would think the shipyard
14 should actually be shut down, and other uses could be brought
15 to play that would be better used for the benefit of the
16 local community. However, I am here to argue that, in fact,
17 for the benefit of the Navy and for the best use of limited
18 tax dollars, it's better to keep the Long Beach Shipyard
19 open. And I will discuss that.
20 After examination of the pertinent facts, I believe
21 that realignment rather than closure of the shipyard makes
22 the most sense for the Navy and for the taxpayers.

Page 134

1 Realignment by converting the shipyard to a ship repair
2 facility would allow substantial budget savings without huge
3 expenses that are involved in recreating Long Beach's unique
4 capabilities in other locations.
5 With realignment, the Navy would save by
6 consolidating redundant overhead functions at Puget Sound.
7 It could increase those savings by similarly reducing the
8 Pearl Harbor Shipyard on its own. Production capacity would
9 also be reduced in both locations as necessary.
10 On the other hand, simply closing the shipyard, the
11 Long Beach Naval Shipyard, shows a savings only when the
12 costs of duplicating its necessary capabilities elsewhere are
13 disregarded. Dry dock number 1 is often described as
14 necessary for "emergent or unexpected repair work." But as
15 four of you learned on your visit to Long Beach, the dry dock
16 number 1 is on the regular ship repair schedule.
17 In other words, the Navy can't even handle at this
18 time the routine work without the dry dock, and much less try
19 to handle the work that's unexpected. The Navy has to have
20 this capability. And if they can't have it at Long Beach
21 with dry dock number 1, they will have to bear the huge
22 expense of recreating it someplace else.

Page 135

1 Closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, on the other
2 hand, makes sense. Its submarine repair work can be easily
3 absorbed by Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Newport News
4 Shipbuilding and Electric Boat. In fact, moving repairs from
5 Portsmouth to Electric Boat would produce additional savings
6 by reducing the amount of unnecessary submarine construction
7 work that we are giving to Electric Boat just to keep them
8 alive.
9 In fact, it appeared that the Navy had agreed that
10 Portsmouth was the right shipyard to close, until President
11 Clinton mentioned his preference in a speech in New
12 Hampshire.
13 In closing and in conclusion, in conclusion and
14 closing to Portsmouth Yard and realigning the Long Beach Yard
15 makes the most sense for the nation and for the taxpayers.
16 And let me just reiterate by saying this. There is no sense
17 at all for us to be building submarines with the excuse that
18 we have got to keep our capacity to build submarines alive
19 and then end up building unneeded submarines at a time when
20 we are actually retiring submarines that have a long life
21 still on them.
22 If the only excuse is basically keeping our

Page 136

1 capacity alive, that capacity can be kept alive by giving
2 submarine repair work to the facility that is constructing
3 submarines. Thus, in the future, if they have to construct
4 submarines, that infrastructure will be available.
5 But to spend billions and billions of dollars on a
6 weapons system that not only is unnecessary but is already
7 retiring submarines is a total waste of the taxpayers' money.
8 I say when you look at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, in
9 terms of the big picture, in terms of what it will cost to
10 reproduce the necessary situation with dry dock number 1,
11 that it makes much more sense for the American taxpayer and
12 the Navy to keep that open and to focus on realignment.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I want to thank you very much,
14 Congressman Rohrabacher, for that excellent presentation.
15 And may I say on behalf of the Commission that we thank you
16 and all the distinguished members of the California
17 delegation. You are the largest state with the largest
18 delegation, and your entire delegation have made a very fine
19 presentation. We thank you for it.
20 REPRESENTATIVE ROHRABACHER: Mr. Chairman, members,
21 thank you very much.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

Page 137

1 Rohrabacher. And we are going to stand in recess until about
2 11:45 or so to permit the Colorado delegation to get here.
3 We are in recess.
4 (A brief recess was taken.)
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I inquire about my
6 distinguished friend, the Senator from Colorado, Senator Hank
7 Brown? You are here, as is your usual habit, a little ahead
8 of time. I would like to accommodate you, if you're prepared
9 to go, but we'll not rush you.
10 SENATOR BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we're delighted to have with
12 us the distinguished Senator from Colorado, Senator Hank
13 Brown, on behalf of the great State of Colorado.
14 SENATOR BROWN: Mr. Chairman, it's a privilege to
15 see you again and appear before the Commission. I want to
16 wish you well in your endeavors. It's a job I wouldn't have.
17 And frankly, Mr. Chairman, it was a job I thought you were
18 too smart to take.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your observation is well taken,
20 and I have no defense.
21 SENATOR BROWN: I would like to submit at this time
22 the testimony of Senator Campbell and Senator Heflin for the

Page 138

1 record, if we may.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That will be admitted in the
3 record in full, Senator. Thank you.
4 SENATOR BROWN: Mr. Chairman, you have a tough job.
5 The Commission has a very tough job. I simply want to extend
6 one concern that I hope you will be willing to look at.
7 The Colorado delegation has been different than
8 some. We have welcomed the Base Closing Commission. We have
9 welcomed the review. We understand the need to control
10 defense expenditures. We have had a number of bases in our
11 state shut down. And we have supported, by and large, with
12 very few exceptions, the Base Closing Commission's
13 recommendations, as we have supported the Commission.
14 We do find ourselves, though, somewhat shocked at
15 what has happened with regard to Fitzsimons. And let me be
16 specific.
17 While most states have reacted to this process by
18 saying, "Don't close anything in our state," Colorado has
19 said, "Look, let's have an objective look at it. If it can
20 be done more cost-effectively somewhere else, we'll support
21 that. But if it is most cost-effective here, we want to know
22 the facts. And if it is, it should stay open." In other

Page 139

1 words, help the taxpayer.
2 In that regard, this delegation itself was backing
3 a series of cost analyses looking at Fitzsimons. In 1987, an
4 analysis was done by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
5 Health Affairs. Fitzsimons passed. In 1991 in March, an
6 economic analysis of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center was done.
7 Fitzsimons passed.
8 In November of '91, that analysis was updated.
9 Fitzsimons passed. In the BRAC Commission of 1993.
10 Fitzsimons was examined. Fitzsimons passed. Mr. Chairman,
11 what we're looking at are four studies that have looked at
12 Fitzsimons that we have backed, and all have come back from
13 an objective analysis and said it makes sense to have it
14 open, and it saves money.
15 My question is simply this -- because it comes out
16 of a very unhappy discussion with the Secretary of the Army
17 and the Administration over this. We met with them and asked
18 what was wrong with the previous studies. If there was a
19 factor that said this was worth keeping open, what did the
20 studies miss? Because what has happened is, the Army simply
21 said, "Close Fitzsimons."
22 They haven't said, "Here's what's wrong with the

Page 140

1 other studies." Now, we think it's reasonable -- and we hope
2 this Commission will do this -- look at the other studies.
3 If there's something wrong with them, let us know what's
4 wrong with them.
5 This is a tough decision. You have to make tough
6 decisions. But we think the areas affected ought to at least
7 know the facts. In making the recommendation, the
8 Administration has not chosen to deal with the facts or deal
9 with the studies. They have simply offered a conclusion.
10 Mr. Chairman, I hope the Commission will do a
11 couple things. One, they will read the studies about
12 Fitzsimons and know the facts before they make a decision.
13 And if their decision is they have to reduce hospital beds or
14 health care for the military, that they'll be willing to take
15 an objective look at all the resources.
16 There's one last factor I know other members of the
17 delegation will cover, but I hope you'll pay special
18 attention to -- veterans from a wide range, one of the
19 biggest, I think, in our nation, need health care and need it
20 at Fitzsimons. It is the closest facility to a large number
21 of veterans. And I hope that will be considered when the
22 Commission makes its decision. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Page 141

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Senator Brown, we thank you
2 for your usual fine presentation on behalf of your great
3 State of Colorado.
4 And we're delighted to have here with you your
5 colleague, the outstanding representative from the State of
6 Colorado, who I had the great privilege of conferencing with
7 through several sessions of the Congress when I chaired
8 Readiness in the Armed Services Committee on the Senate side.
9 And she was always a great advocate of her positions and a
10 fine person to deal with.
11 And the Chair on behalf of the Commission is
12 delighted to welcome the distinguished Representative from
13 the State of Colorado, Pat Schroeder.
14 REPRESENTATIVE SCHROEDER: Well, thank you very
15 much, Mr. Chairman and commissioners. I don't envy your job
16 at all, as the distinguished Senator said. But let me just
17 try and summarize why this is so troubling to those of us in
18 Colorado.
19 We thought base closure was about excess capacity.
20 And I don't know how the Army defines "excess capacity," but
21 we don't define it the way they're defining it vis a vis
22 Fitzsimons. Fitzsimons serves almost one-third of this

Page 142

1 country. One-third of this country. It is the only military
2 tertiary hospital in one-third of this country.
3 And suddenly, they decided it was excess capacity,
4 but Walter Reed in Washington, D.C., wasn't, where there's
5 all sorts of duplication of federal facilities. I would just
6 like the Commission to go down and count the number of
7 retirees that go to Walter Reed every day and match them
8 against those who rely on Fitzsimons.
9 Because here, you've got all sorts of other places
10 that you could go. Here, that's it. That is what the
11 federal government has in that region. And what we're really
12 saying is, they don't want to bother that region.
13 Our mayor wrote a wonderful letter to you, the
14 Mayor from Aurora, in which they went through all the
15 details. And I really hope the commissioners look at this
16 letter. Because what we think this whole thing is based on
17 -- it's like if you pull the top plank off, the top of the
18 plank might look great. But underneath that plank, there's a
19 gazillion termites that totally undermine, I think, the
20 Army's decision.
21 The mayor points out, they use this basis on square
22 footage. I mean, no private sector ever looks at a medical

Page 143

1 facility and bases it on square footage. They never did that
2 before in any of the other reports that Senator Brown looked
3 at.
4 And not only did they look at it in square footage,
5 but they also left out a whole lot of square footage that
6 they had been using for four decades for instruction. And
7 they said they left those out because they were temporary.
8 Well, four decades doesn't sound too temporary to me. I
9 mean, that really looks like you're doing everything you
10 possibly can to skew the data.
11 Then, they used the deployment formula, which had
12 never been used before, vis a vis hospitals. They're using
13 the deployment formula that they use for regular bases on how
14 many train lines come in.
15 Well, when did we start moving people who are ill
16 by train? We move them by plane. If you look at plane, we
17 have got the best, most advanced airport and air facilities
18 in the country. Not only that, it is inland, where it is
19 more protected, rather than on the coast.
20 And they also look at whether or not we have a
21 port. Well, there's also a reason to have it internally,
22 where it is more protected. So all of those things make us

Page 144

1 think that they just were looking for a real reason.
2 We have got many faxes -- they have kind of been
3 sub-rosa faxes -- from installation personnel who were
4 engaged in these preliminary measurements. And they beg the
5 Commission to please peel off this top plank and look at the
6 discrepancies between what they sent in and what the Army
7 sent you and ask, "Why?" Ask, "Why?"
8 We also want to know why, when they looked at the
9 cost of duty personnel, why they only used a 40-mile radius
10 around Fitzsimons, rather than the entire region. Because it
11 serves the whole region. That also didn't make sense.
12 The stand-alone facilities. They decided they
13 would only compare those, which left them with Tripler in
14 Hawaii -- and we understand why it's very important in that
15 Pacific region -- Walter Reed in Washington, D.C., and
16 Fitzsimons in the middle. Well, if you do the stand-alone,
17 shouldn't you look at what stands around it? And Walter Reed
18 has a whole lot of things standing around it, whereas we
19 really do stand alone. We're much more like Tripler in that
20 mindset.
21 Or why don't we look at things that are on bases
22 that are duplicating facilities? I don't think I need to

Page 145

1 tell this distinguished group that there's all sorts of
2 duplications all over Texas.
3 I think bottom line, Colorado feels and our
4 retirees in this region feel, they're just being told, "Move.
5 If you don't like it, move. We're done with you. We have
6 thrown you out." That may be the Army's position, but I
7 never thought that that was the United States government's
8 position. And I must say, I am very dismayed by this
9 decision.
10 I have been supportive of base closure when it's
11 excess capacity. But to say to people, "We're done with you
12 now; have a nice day" -- none of these people subscribe to
13 Medicare Part B. Nobody has got an answer for them as to
14 where to go, and they're saying, "Move." If your family
15 lives there, if your plans were there, I think that's wrong.
16 And I would really hope that the Base Closure
17 Commission could peel off that top plank, study those
18 termites that they have put so well in that letter to you,
19 and we can document this every way from the moon. And thank
20 you very much for letting me be here.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Representative Schroeder,
22 thank you for that fine presentation. You and Senator Brown,

Page 146

1 your distinguished senior Senator, are to be congratulated on
2 the fine job you've done for the State of Colorado, and we're
3 indebted to you, ma'am. Thank you.
4 REPRESENTATIVE SCHROEDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, the
6 Commission is going to stand in adjournment for about 15
7 minutes. The next state to be heard will be the great State
8 of Connecticut. And we will be in recess now for about at
9 least 10 minutes or so, maybe as much as 15 minutes.
10 (A recess was taken.)
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, the
12 Commission will come back to order. I'm delighted to have an
13 old and dear friend, the distinguished senior Senator from
14 the great State of Connecticut, in this room. He and I came
15 to the Senate together in a very small class in 1980 in the
16 great Reagan landslide, and he has proved that he is, if
17 anything, certainly a survivor. And he's also a very fine
18 Senator.
19 And we're delighted to have him here on behalf of
20 the great State of Connecticut, that state's great senior
21 Senator, Chris Dodd.
22 SENATOR DODD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Page 147

1 Mr. Cornello, we thank you very much for the opportunity to
2 appear before you again today. And, Mr. Cornello, I want to
3 personally thank you again for taking the time to visit our
4 State of Connecticut and to visit the two facilities that are
5 under discussion here today.
6 So, Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying on behalf
7 of myself, our entire delegation, and our state, we deeply,
8 deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before this
9 Commission and also to thank you and the Commission publicly
10 for the tremendous amount of hard work that you and your
11 staffs have done. I don't think people realize how much work
12 goes into these efforts to comply with the Base Closure
13 Commission law.
14 And so I didn't want to miss the opportunity within
15 these five-minute times to express that gratitude to you and
16 to the members of the Commission and the staff, who I know do
17 a tremendous amount of work.
18 Mr. Chairman, this is my third Congressional
19 appearance before the Base Closure Commission, yet I've never
20 found myself to say, very candidly, so strongly opposed to
21 the recommendations by the Department of Defense. The basis,
22 Mr. Chairman, of my reaction, is very simple. The closure

Page 148

1 recommendations in Connecticut simply do not meet or adhere
2 to the selection criteria as prescribed by law, period.
3 Without question, one of the most important aspects
4 of this entire base closure process is the anticipated or
5 projected return on investment. It is the fiscal soul, if
6 you will, of this entire five-year exercise that we have been
7 going through. But what do you do when the figures are
8 incorrect, and what do you do when the initial assumptions
9 are flat-out wrong?
10 That is the precise situation, Mr. Chairman, we
11 face with respect to the Naval Underwater Warfare Center in
12 New London, Connecticut. The projected return on investment
13 claims to save money by consolidation to Newport, Rhode
14 Island.
15 What is compelling, however, is the unfortunate
16 lack of flexibility in the recommendation to look at the
17 bigger picture and say, "There is a very unique synergy here.
18 The Navy can retain this facility at less cost" -- and the
19 numbers bear that out -- "while keeping our technical center
20 of excellence alive and retaining some of the greatest
21 acoustic engineers and engineering in our entire nation. To
22 me, that is a return on investment on all points.

Page 149

1 The same argument, Mr. Chairman, is true for the
2 Stratford Army Engine Plant. When considered for closure,
3 Stratford was placed in the awkward position of being
4 compared with other unrelated industrial facilities within
5 the Army structure. You talk about apples and oranges.
6 What is even worse, however, is the terrible
7 dilemma of having to tear apart a unique industrial facility
8 that supports both Army tank and aircraft engine repair.
9 Because of the shared operations between the two production
10 lines, the Army has placed itself in the dreadful, awkward
11 position of having to make a Solomon's choice.
12 You really cannot save or move one line without
13 completely killing the other. In light of the recent $47
14 million public investment, taxpayer investment in the
15 Stratford Physical Plant, again, I ask, where is the return
16 on the taxpayer investment in that decision?
17 And finally, Mr. Chairman, in what has been one of
18 the most curious, curious recommendations from the Department
19 of Defense of this entire base closure round, the Navy has
20 now decided to redirect its nuclear power school from one
21 previously closed installation to another previously closed
22 installation.

Page 150

1 What makes that decision even more puzzling is the
2 complete reversal of an ongoing construction plan at the
3 original receiving site, the Groton submarine base. More
4 than $11 million of taxpayer money has already been expended
5 at Groton, and existing classroom space is available. That
6 is the truth, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.
7 That is why the 1993 BRAC correctly recommended placing the
8 school in Groton initially.
9 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, the decisions
10 before you are critical to the structural health of our
11 nation's military. Connecticut, as you both know, has
12 historically played a very critical role in that effort, and
13 we will continue to do so in the years ahead.
14 And as you prepare for final deliberations, I know
15 that you will take every possible opportunity to review the
16 complete return, the complete return on investment on all
17 three of these vital Connecticut and United States
18 installations. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity
19 to appear before you.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, my dear friend, I thank you,
21 Senator Dodd, for that fine presentation on behalf of the
22 great State of Connecticut. And I appreciate your giving us

Page 151

1 your time. And we're delighted to have here your
2 distinguished colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman.
3 SENATOR DODD: My much older colleague, but my
4 junior.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That's true. I apologize for that
6 joke the last time. I've been hearing ever since that you
7 don't look a day older than Joe Lieberman, and I just wanted
8 to make the record clear on that.
9 SENATOR DODD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Lieberman, we're delighted
11 to have you, sir.
12 SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Mr. Chairman, Senator Dixon,
13 great to see you again. Commissioner Cornella, thank you
14 very much for your extraordinary devotion of time, both of
15 you, to this effort.
16 I appreciate the opportunity to testify and to
17 follow my friend and colleague, the young, vibrant
18 Christopher Dodd.
19 It is my firm belief that the three recommendations
20 before you which Senator Dodd has discussed are not in the
21 national interest and, in fact, threaten the operational
22 readiness of our forces. And I say that as a member of the

Page 152

1 Committee and the Senate Armed Services which you, Mr.
2 Chairman, were such a stalwart and productive member of for
3 so many years.
4 Each of these three recommendations, in our
5 opinion, will cost the American taxpayer more than has been
6 predicted by the Pentagon in dollars and, more critically, in
7 knowledge, skills, and expertise lost. These are intangible
8 but essential qualities that will not just move to another
9 location. They will be gone forever.
10 I'm not going to try to repeat all the details
11 you've been given at the New York regional hearing or from my
12 colleague a few moments ago, but I want to address
13 particularly those issues relating to the military value of
14 these three facilities.
15 First, the nuclear power school. As you know, the
16 1993 BRAC Commission upheld the Secretary of Defense's
17 recommendation to close the Naval training center in Orlando
18 and to relocate the nuclear power schools to the Naval
19 submarine base in New London.
20 Now, less than two years later, after having spent
21 over $11 million for planning and design of the training
22 facility in New London, the Navy has recommended changing the

Page 153

1 receiving site to Charleston, though Charleston was
2 considered and rejected during the 1993 process.
3 You may recall those famous photographs -- we hope
4 they were memorable -- from our hearing before you in New
5 York, that the site of the proposed power school in
6 Charleston currently consists of not available buildings to
7 move into but 400 acres of woods and possible wetlands. No
8 design work has been done to determine the real costs of
9 constructing facilities and infrastructure there.
10 This recommendation, in short, does not take
11 advantage of existing capacity in New London, which will
12 require minimal new construction and offers full
13 infrastructure to meet the needs of the students who will be
14 coming there. So we ask you to reject the requested redirect
15 of the nuclear power school to Charleston and leave in effect
16 the 1993 decision.
17 Second, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center. The
18 Navy has recommended closing Newark and New London and
19 relocating its facilities to Newport. This recommendation
20 destroys the synergy, the productive interaction which exists
21 at New London, where scientists, where the people who work on
22 the submarine fleet at the great base there and the submarine

Page 154

1 builder, Electric Boat, are all located within a five-mile
2 radius.
3 The fact is that the customer is in New London, not
4 in Newport. And that's where the Underwater Warfare Center
5 ought to be. The Navy's cost estimates to implement the 1995
6 recommendation, in our opinion, are understated, much as they
7 were in 1991 when, in fact, the record shows the costs of
8 moving to Newport have nearly doubled.
9 But as important as the dollars are, even more
10 importantly, our nation stands to lose many of the finest
11 acoustic scientists and engineers in the business, who simply
12 have told us that they will not pick up their families, sell
13 their homes, and move to another site. So we urge you to
14 reject the Navy's recommendation and allow the Underwater
15 Warfare Center in New London to continue to be the acoustic
16 research and development center of excellence for the Navy.
17 And finally, I want to address the Stratford Army
18 Engine Plant. In the recommendation to close Stratford, the
19 Army does not question the military value of the
20 installation. They simply suggest that the tank and
21 helicopter engine work which the Army admits it needs and is
22 being done well in Stratford could be moved to depots at

Page 155

1 Anniston or Corpus Christi.
2 Respectfully, I say to you that the Army is wrong
3 in this case. Splitting the manufacturing capability will
4 simply not work. Stratford is an integrated, dual use
5 facility operated for the government by Allied Signal. The
6 equipment and the plants produce military and commercial
7 products for both aviation and ground use.
8 The Army will not be able to replicate these
9 capabilities without paying a very significant price, which
10 is not included in their estimated savings of closing the
11 plant.
12 February 14, 1995, just four months ago, the
13 Assistant Secretary of the Army, Gil Decker, announced a plan
14 to maintain a strong engine industrial plant base by
15 investing $47 and-a-half million in a three-year program at
16 Stratford, which a short while later, another section of the
17 Army came along and said, we think mistakenly, ought to be
18 closed.
19 When this Decker proposal is implemented, Stratford
20 Army Engine Plant will be realigned as a smaller, more cost-
21 competitive facility which preserves key components of the
22 tank engine industrial base.

Page 156

1 Mr. Chairman, commissioner, the Army's
2 recommendation to close Stratford is short-sighted, when you
3 consider the military value of the Stratford facility and the
4 understated cost of closing the plant. A realigned Stratford
5 Army Engine Plant is the most cost-effective decision.
6 Mr. Chairman, harkening back to an earlier stage of
7 your own distinguished career in public service, I note the
8 clock. And, therefore, I would ask that the full text of the
9 remainder of my statement be submitted and printed in the
10 record.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your statement will be reproduced
12 in the record in full, Senator. And we thank you and your
13 distinguished colleague for that outstanding presentation on
14 behalf of the State of Connecticut by Senators Dodd and
15 Lieberman.
16 SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Thank you, commissioner.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much.
18 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to be in recess
19 until 12:30, when we will hear from the great State of
20 Florida.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA [Presiding]: Representative
22 Scarborough, would you please come to the podium? And we

Page 157

1 would like to move ahead, if you don't mind.
2 REPRESENTATIVE SCARBOROUGH: I don't mind at all.
3 Thank you very much, Mr. Commissioner. Mr. Chairman, members
4 of the Commission, I thank you for the opportunity to come
5 before you to testify in opposition to the DOD's proposed
6 consolidation of electronic combat test evaluation
7 facilities.
8 In my opinion, this proposal is not only flawed,
9 but it also seriously undermines the intent of the laws
10 passed by Congress in the 1995 authorization.
11 I'll explain that view in a moment, but first, let
12 me assure you that I certainly understand the awesome
13 responsibility that has been entrusted to this Commission.
14 Fiscal realities demand that tough decisions be made to
15 reduce the cost burden of our nation's military
16 infrastructure.
17 But at the same time, however, the world situation
18 makes it clear that we must sustain a strong national defense
19 posture. I'm here today because I'm convinced that the DOD
20 recommendations for realignment of Air Force infrastructure
21 for electronic combat test and evaluation will not produce
22 savings but will actually, in fact, result in a serious risk

Page 158

1 to this nation's war fighting capabilities.
2 Only one of three EC units on the BRAC list,
3 specifically, the EC open air range at Eglin Air Force Base,
4 is located in my district. My remarks, however, will also be
5 applicable to the nation's other two facilities, the Air
6 Force Electronic Warfare Environmental Simulator facility in
7 Fort Worth, Texas, and also the real time digitally
8 controlled analyzed processor, our Red Cap facility, in
9 Buffalo, New York.
10 After studying the recommendations supporting
11 BRAC's analysis provided by the DOD, my position is in
12 opposition to these recommendations and is based upon the
13 answer to three critical questions. The first question is,
14 are the DOD recommendations on EC test and evaluation
15 facilities consistent with the 1995 DOD authorization
16 requirement that an EC consolidation master plan be submitted
17 to Congress prior to any reorganization of the facilities?
18 Now, Congress originally had asked for the plan,
19 because none of the services had wished to consolidate their
20 EC test facilities. And its formulation was deemed to be
21 necessary to overcome the interservice dispute on the matter.
22 The absence of this plan is troubling to me, especially as a

Page 159

1 member of national security. And taking action in this area
2 without the guidance of this plan that was requested in the
3 1995 authorization bill is unwise.
4 The second question we need to ask is, do the
5 proposals protect the needs of our war fighters? In other
6 words, would consolidation have a measurable impact on the
7 quality of EC facilities which would, in turn, impact the
8 ability of our forces in the field to meet a variety of
9 combat and noncombat situations in which electronic warfare
10 would be encountered.
11 Thirdly, do the proposals reduce the cost to the
12 taxpayer? Quite frankly, we have to ask ourselves whether
13 we're getting the best bang for the buck. Are the savings
14 that are proposed in consolidation the types that would bring
15 forth sufficient and significant savings, or would they
16 actually cost more both in the long and the short term?
17 As I've previously noted in my remarks, the
18 direction to develop an EC master plan was the result of
19 DOD's demonstrated inability to pursue joint cross-service
20 realignments in the EC infrastructure. The intent was to
21 motivate cross-service reductions in T&E infrastructure and
22 provide a context within which to judge DOD recommendations

Page 160

1 impacting electronic combat facilities.
2 DOD BRAC documentation clearly shows that a
3 rigorous analysis plan to pursue such cross-service
4 opportunities was approved by all the service departments.
5 This plan was to identify those facilities most appropriate
6 for cross-service consolidation, with the intention being
7 that such analysis would be used as the basis for the final
8 BRAC recommendations.
9 Inexplicably, however, the Office of the Secretary
10 of Defense decided not to use the data revealed by the cross-
11 service consolidation study. Instead, OSD opted to pursue
12 another approach without any statistical analysis to back it
13 up.
14 Clearly, in my view, this approach is noncompliant
15 with the intent of the EC master plan that was called for
16 under the 1995 Defense Authorization Act, and, therefore, it
17 would be inappropriate to act on it.
18 As to the question of meeting the needs of our war
19 fighters, I wish to point out that DOD ranked Eglin's EC air
20 range as number one in this country for military value. But
21 against that assessment, the OSD recommendations to
22 consolidate EC test facilities at the Nellis range failed to

Page 161

1 define a crucial concept. Specifically, it failed to show
2 how its proposal for combining Air Force open air ranges
3 could accommodate the needs of real world EC operations.
4 Accessibility of the Nellis range complex, distance
5 of the range from Edwards Air Force Base, and other known
6 obstacles appear to have been simply wished away. Based on
7 these facts, it seems that we're unnecessarily putting our
8 proven support capabilities at risk for no obvious return.
9 I ask the Commission, what is the purpose in fixing
10 something that is clearly not broken and that has worked for
11 so long at Eglin Air Force Base, and again, at a range that
12 was ranked number one in this country for EC capabilities?
13 This brings me to the reported cost-benefits
14 associated with the consolidation of various Air Force
15 ranges. There is no evidence out that at all to suggest that
16 there would be any significant savings to the taxpayer from
17 the proposed consolidation. In fact, in the long run, it's
18 more likely that there would be an increased cost burden.
19 This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the
20 costs of dismantling Eglin were not only underestimated, but
21 the increase in those costs of using Nellis for testing
22 purposes were ignored, as well. The result is an estimated

Page 162

1 cost savings based on highly dubious assumptions.
2 Given these considerations, one is left with a very
3 strong impression that the sole objective of dismantling
4 Eglin's EC test range is to solve an Air Force materiel
5 command operations and maintenance funding issue. This is
6 rather surprising, in that it will come even at the expense
7 of procurement programs and other Air Force commands, such as
8 air combat command and Air Force special operations command.
9 My conclusion is that none of the three EC T&E
10 recommendations represent true reductions in infrastructure
11 cost burdens. All will disrupt our ability to meet the needs
12 of our forces in the field and will ultimately serve to
13 undermine Congressional directions as far as the 1995
14 Authorization Act goes.
15 Respectfully, I would strongly urge the Commission
16 to reject the proposed EC realignments. This would allow
17 Congress to have more time to carefully review DOD's EC
18 master plan before any changes are made which could seriously
19 impact this nation's war fighting capability. Let's keep the
20 best EC range in America open and also save the taxpayers
21 money at the same time. And I thank you all for your time.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We thank the distinguished

Page 163

1 representative from Florida, Mr. Joe Scarborough.
2 Ladies and gentlemen, I apologize for the starting
3 and stopping of the hearing, but remember that we're trying
4 to accommodate over 200 members of Congress over these 2
5 days. And that does cause a small bit of confusion. But
6 things are really moving along very well, and we beg your
7 indulgence.
8 So we will resume that break for about another four
9 or five minutes. Thank you.
10 (A brief recess was taken.)
11 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX [Presiding]: We will come
12 back to order from our brief recess. And we're very pleased
13 to recognize the distinguished Congresswoman from Florida,
14 Congresswoman Carrie Meek.
15 REPRESENTATIVE MEEK: Thank you, Commissioner Cox,
16 Mr. Chairman, and commissioners. I'm Carrie Meek, a member
17 of the United States Congress, 17th Congressional district.
18 I'm here to talk about Homestead Air Reserve Base, which is
19 in my district.
20 We welcome the recent visit to Homestead by General
21 Davis. Today, I'm asking you again to keep Homestead, our
22 reserve base, open. It's a model base realignment. As you

Page 164

1 know, BRAC '93 ordered the realignment of Homestead into a
2 reserve base and a joint military civilian airport, an
3 extremely cost-effective arrangement for the Air Force.
4 Since that decision two years ago, the realignment
5 process has been moving forward smoothly and efficiently. By
6 all accounts, the realignment of Homestead has included
7 first-rate planning, optimal use of resources, and tremendous
8 support and involvement from citizens' groups, our Dade
9 County government, and the City of Homestead.
10 In fact, Defense Secretary Perry declared Homestead
11 a model base realignment for the entire nation. This is a
12 significant point. Other bases around the country come to
13 Homestead and learn how to manage their realignment process
14 as well as ours. Every base in the country has wanted to
15 duplicate Homestead's success, its professionalism, and the
16 results of our realignment process.
17 We have done all that BRAC has asked us to do. We
18 ask now that you let us continue to do what we have already
19 proven that we could do so well. It has been cost-effective.
20 Proponents of some bases, notably those from Bergstrom Air
21 Reserve Base, have presented material to this Commission
22 which purports to show that the Defense Department will save

Page 165

1 millions by closing Homestead. I say to you, Commission,
2 that is not correct.
3 The Bergstrom presentation widely overstates the
4 so-called "savings" to the government from closing Homestead.
5 In addition, it grossly understated the dual use economies of
6 DOD of operating out of Homestead's joint use airport. To
7 support our position, we presented detailed financial
8 estimates on these points to you last Friday in Atlanta.
9 The MILCON for the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st
10 Rescue Squadron are already fully funded out of a special
11 supplemental appropriations bill that Congress approved in
12 1992 for hurricane relief at Homestead. In addition, Dade
13 County will be subsidizing the operation of Homestead
14 beginning on October 1st of this year, the first installment
15 of 1.4 million.
16 In addition to that, Dade County will also expand
17 24 million in capital construction for air field improvements
18 that will benefit the Air Force. The bottom line,
19 Commission, looking at it directly as a financial
20 transaction, keeping open Homestead Air Reserve Base is a
21 bargain for the Defense Department.
22 Community support is there. Our entire community

Page 166

1 is overwhelmingly supportive of Homestead Air Reserve Base,
2 in terms of money, time, and effort. Dade County has
3 formally agreed to pay the $1.4 million. Support for our Air
4 Force Reserves is so high that the F-16 Falcons of the 482nd
5 Fighter Wing could probably fly low over downtown Homestead
6 and not even get a noise complaint.
7 Hurricane Andrew destroyed a large part of our
8 community. The realignment of Homestead Air Reserve Base is
9 an essential part of our rebuilding and recovery. If you
10 vote to close Homestead Air Reserve Base, you would devastate
11 our community in a way much worse than Hurricane Andrew ever
12 did.
13 I have here in writing promises that the 301st
14 Rescue Squadron would return to Homestead just like BRAC
15 ordered. I have written assurances from an Air Force
16 colonel, major general, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
17 Force, and even from the Secretary of the Air Force herself.
18 Why is it true that the 301st Rescue Squadron
19 supports the space shuttle? Its primary mission is combat
20 rescue. The MILCON needed for the 301st at Homestead is
21 completely funded. I ask that you return the 301st Rescue
22 Squadron back to Homestead. Homestead Air Reserve is located

Page 167

1 in a fantastic recruiting area. It has over 2 million
2 people. The aviation industry is the largest employer in
3 Dade County.
4 Homestead has training areas and training equipment
5 which are the best of any reserve fighter base in the country
6 and superior to most of them. Because of the location,
7 Homestead is like an aircraft carrier in the Caribbean.
8 Military actions in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti were largely
9 supported from Homestead.
10 Also, as you know, Dade County is the new site of
11 the United States Southern Command. And currently, Homestead
12 Air Force Base is being evaluated for potential support
13 functions.
14 I want to thank you for having me return in front
15 of you again and to say that Homestead Air Force Base is
16 worthy of being kept open. It is a reserve station that will
17 be a credit to the BRAC and to this country. Thank you very
18 much.
19 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much,
20 Congresswoman.
21 And now, we're very pleased to recognize the
22 distinguished Senator from Florida, Senator Bob Graham.

Page 168

1 SENATOR GRAHAM: Thank you, Madame Commissioner,
2 General Davis. It's a pleasure to be able to meet with you
3 this afternoon and discuss some of the issues of particular
4 relevance to our state.
5 First, my colleagues from Florida from the House
6 have or will already provide to you specific remarks
7 concerning facilities and operations within their district.
8 Unfortunately, due to a Joint Economic Committee hearing, my
9 colleague, Senator Connie Mack, is not able to be with us
10 today. He chairs that important committee, and they have a
11 long scheduled hearing.
12 Senator Mack has drafted written testimony for the
13 Commission, and I provide a copy of that to you on his
14 behalf.
15 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. We'll be
16 happy to include it.
17 SENATOR GRAHAM: Also, Madame Chairperson, I will
18 be providing a full statement of my remarks and will
19 summarize them orally.
20 I would open with the following remarks, which I am
21 certain are shared by all of the members of the Florida
22 delegation. I am very pleased that the Defense Department

Page 169

1 and your Commission have already recognized the high military
2 value of many Florida installations.
3 Included in this are MacDill, Patrick, and Tindell
4 Air Force Bases, Naval Air Stations Whiting Field, Pensacola,
5 Key West in Jacksonville, Naval Station Mayport, the Panama
6 City Coastal Systems Station, and the Army and Navy's
7 simulation training operations located in Orlando.
8 I'm also pleased that the efficiency and cost-
9 effectiveness of the Naval aviation depot in Jacksonville
10 have been acknowledged and affirmed. I heartily endorse and
11 concur with these sound decisions that you have made.
12 However, let me just highlight a few concerns which
13 the Commission will be considering in the next three weeks,
14 issues that are of particular strategic relevance to our
15 nation. Although I am pleased that the military and the
16 Commission appreciate the value of Eglin Air Force Base, I am
17 concerned that the decision to relocate electronic combat
18 test and evaluation assets from Eglin could significantly
19 impact our Air Force's ability to properly test and evaluate
20 weapons systems.
21 It takes many years and significant investment in
22 developing effective weapons systems. Having just

Page 170

1 experienced a downing of an American fighter jet and having
2 seen during the Gulf War the amazing capabilities of our
3 weapons, we should be ever sensitive of the need for our
4 military to remain on the cutting edge of technology in
5 testing and evaluation.
6 The services must preserve their ability to fully
7 and rigorously test and evaluate our weapons systems. If the
8 electronic combat assets are moved from Eglin's test ranges,
9 which are endowed with unique land-water contrast along the
10 shoreline, the Air Force will lose a critical testing
11 environment.
12 Any consolidation of weapons testing and evaluation
13 assets should be deferred pending the completion of a
14 Congressionally mandated Department of Defense electronic
15 combat master plan.
16 While acknowledging that the Commission is
17 considering numerous issues in many facilities nationwide
18 which do not meet the BRAC personnel threshold for
19 consideration, in the case of Eglin's realignment, choosing
20 to not act on the Air Force recommendation pending a
21 definitive Department of Defense study as directed seems to
22 be both logical and intelligent.

Page 171

1 Regarding Homestead Air Force Base, I am surprised
2 -- frankly, sadly surprised -- to see that we are again
3 forced to consider the future fate of Homestead, a facility
4 which has been repeatedly proven for its military value. In
5 1993, your predecessor, the Base Closure Commission of that
6 year, stated that the military value of Homestead was "indeed
7 high, due to its strategic location."
8 Even as the base was being repaired from the
9 devastation it suffered during Hurricane Andrew, it met the
10 challenge of providing valuable logistical and operational
11 support for the Haiti invasion operations for Army Blackhawk
12 helicopters and Air Force KC-135 tanker support cells.
13 And we cannot forget or ignore that approximately
14 100 miles off the coast of Homestead stands the only
15 Communist nation in our hemisphere. Cuba remains a threat to
16 the slow but very successful democratization of the Western
17 hemisphere. Our military and security planners will only be
18 hampered should they need to prepare for future operations in
19 the region without Homestead to rely upon.
20 To use the words of Major General Sherrod, Vice
21 Commander of the Air Force Reserve, during his testimony
22 before you last week, "Homestead Air Force Base is most

Page 172

1 certainly one of our better locations, and its closure would
2 be most unfortunate."
3 I see that my time has expired. If I could just
4 take a few moments to mention one last item. Since the
5 original 1993 BRAC mandated receiving site at New London,
6 Connecticut, for the Navy's nuclear propulsion training
7 center has been determined to be unavailable, careful
8 consideration should be given to the high cost of moving and
9 rebuilding this expensive, sophisticated training facility.
10 We should not inadvertently through miscalculation
11 be found that we have been led to a negative impact on the
12 Naval Research Laboratory's underwater sound reference
13 detachment in Orlando. I hope the Commission will see to it
14 that such errors are corrected, with the reversal of any such
15 recommendation, and that the BRAC 1991 mandate to move
16 Armstrong Labs to Orlando is fulfilled.
17 Thank you very much for your courtesies today and
18 throughout this process. It is my full expectation that you
19 will continue to focus keenly on strategic military value. I
20 am confident the Commission will reach the best decisions
21 based on what is in the interest of our nation's defense.
22 Thank you.

Page 173

1 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much,
2 Senator. And we would be happy to have your additional
3 remarks for the record, as well.
4 SENATOR GRAHAM: Thank you very much.
5 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
6 And now, I'm most pleased to recognize the
7 distinguished Congressman from Florida, Congressman McCollum.
8 REPRESENTATIVE McCOLLUM: Thank you very much,
9 Commissioner Cox, Commissioner Davis, and all of the
10 commissioners. I would like to spend my brief five minutes
11 with you discussing the three items that Senator Graham just
12 mentioned very briefly at the end of his statement. They're
13 all three related to Orlando. And I'm going to be as
14 succinct as possible.
15 Later today or tomorrow, you'll be receiving a copy
16 of a detailed report on all three of these we prepared with
17 COBRA runs, et cetera, for your consideration, as well as a
18 copy of a formal statement in detail.
19 First of all, let me talk about the underwater
20 laboratory in Orlando. This is called the Navy Research
21 Laboratory Underwater Sound Reference Detachment. It's a
22 huge mouthful. There are no active duty Navy personnel

Page 174

1 associated with it. It has been there for 51 years, and the
2 reason why it's being recommended for closure and realignment
3 is, I guess, a consolidation of the research capacities that
4 are located there.
5 It does sonar research. It does transuser
6 research. It does calibrations, very highly sophisticated
7 calibrations of a technical nature for submarine purposes in
8 terms of development of those items that are important to our
9 submarine warfare.
10 The recommendation is to move this laboratory up to
11 Newport, Rhode Island. There is just one catch to this, and
12 I would urge you to have your staff really look at this from
13 a technical standpoint, as a technical matter.
14 There is a lake associated with this called The
15 Lake at Leesburg which is unique. It's spring-fed. It is
16 one that if you, according to all of the sources we've talked
17 to, take the testing away from this lake the calibrations
18 will not be nearly as accurate.
19 It is a fundamental question not so much of what is
20 good for Orlando but what is going for the Navy that I'm
21 arguing this case. This particular laboratory has a very
22 limited impact on my community. It employs a very few

Page 175

1 personnel, but I'm very concerned that the Navy's interest
2 isn't going to be served by this.
3 We also don't believe that the Navy or the Defense
4 Department looked at the question of possibly realigning to
5 Orlando some similar functions, and if they did, we've done a
6 COBRA run to show you there would be a $30 million greater
7 present value over 20 years savings and a $10.3 million less
8 one-time cost, and therefore we think there was substantial
9 deviations from Criteria 1, 2 and 5.
10 Now, the remainder of my time I want to devote to
11 Nuclear Power Training Command at Orlando and to the
12 Armstrong Laboratory. They're very much related. They're
13 both redirects on your list, the redirect from -- actually,
14 it's from New London, Connecticut, for the Navy Nuclear Power
15 School to Charleston, South Carolina, from Orlando
16 originally, from the base closure of last time.
17 And this simply doesn't make sense. There is no
18 common sense involved with it. We don't think -- and I think
19 your staff has looked at this, and I don't believe they think
20 the Navy ever really seriously considered keeping the nuclear
21 power school in Orlando and cordoning it off.
22 If they had looked at it that way, and we've

Page 176

1 calibrated this with regard to COBRA runs, you could have
2 over 20 years a savings of over $157 million just by keeping
3 it in Orlando versus $71 million 20-year savings but putting
4 it in Charleston instead of New London on the basis of moving
5 it from New London to Charleston is cost in the first place.
6 In the second place, there is only an $8 million
7 one-time cost expenditure for keeping nuclear power in
8 Orlando versus $147 million in one-time cost in new
9 construction in Charleston of the Navy's own figures.
10 And again, your Base Closure staff have looked at
11 our figures. We believe they'll confirm the $8 million
12 figure, and all of this extrapolates out to a huge dollar
13 savings by bringing home the matter that is already there,
14 just not making the move.
15 New construction is silly and foolish. There are
16 facilities there. There is a Navy exchange that is going to
17 stay in Orlando long after NTC Orlando is closed, and there
18 are facilities of all types that are available, and they've
19 all been factored into these figures that I've given you.
20 As a consequence, there are a number of the
21 criteria that, in my judgment, that are violated, but
22 certainly Criteria 5 has been, and just boldly looking at it,

Page 177

1 it is. And I really, really, in the strongest terms, ask you
2 to look at this.
3 This is a gross dollar and cents mistake that just
4 doesn't make any sense. Armstrong Laboratory is a much
5 smaller dollar and cents matter, but it's similar. In 1991,
6 the Base Closure Realignment Commission directed Armstrong to
7 be moved to Orlando.
8 The Armstrong Laboratory from Arizona is an Air
9 Force simulation center. It is the research and development
10 arm for the Air Force. The Navy and the Army research
11 facilities are already in Orlando at the Orlando Research
12 Park.
13 The idea was to consolidate all training, all
14 simulation training centers of the three branches of the
15 service in Orlando. Made sense then. Makes sense now. The
16 problem is the Armstrong Laboratory, according to the Air
17 Force now, couldn't find a home there. It costs too much.
18 It's too expensive.
19 There is no evidence in any of the data calls that
20 they really looked. They assumed they'd have to build a
21 building for $13.6 million. The fact of the matter is that
22 we have a building in the research park partly now leased by

Page 178

1 the Army for its simulation center they would have acquired,
2 bought for 4.5 million, still on the market today.
3 They didn't look either at the closing Orlando
4 Naval Training Center for facilities. Their cost analysis is
5 just plain wrong. They didn't do the job, and in addition to
6 that, they have made the allegation that there are no fighter
7 pilots in the area since Cecil Field Naval Air Station is
8 being closed in the future for use in their training
9 facilities.
10 They didn't take into account you still have
11 fighter pilots at Homestead, at Eglin Air Force Base in
12 Florida, for a period of time at MacDill, not to mention the
13 potential for bringing them out of Georgia.
14 There is absolutely no basis for the kind of
15 presentation that they made to you for the redirect. And the
16 last comment, and I know my time has expired, there is an
17 irony in this, Commissioner Cox and Commissioner Davis and
18 Commissioner Steele.
19 And that is the very argument, although at a much
20 lower dollar level being made for not going ahead with the
21 Armstrong move is precisely the reverse of the argument being
22 made with regard to the Naval Training Center's Nuclear Power

Page 179

1 School.
2 In other words, they're saying, "We're going to
3 save money, and therefore, we should not make this move from
4 Armstrong at all. We ought to leave it out there in the Air
5 Force."
6 On the other hand, a much bigger dollar amount
7 involved with Nuclear Power School in Orlando, they're
8 saying, "We've got to make this move. We're closing Orlando,
9 and we've got to make the move regardless. We didn't even
10 look at keeping it in Orlando."
11 DOD wearing two different hats, I guess, with two
12 different branches of the service have come to diametrically
13 opposite conclusions. Again, the dollar amount with
14 Armstrong is very small compared to the dollar amount with
15 nuclear power.
16 The savings of keeping Orlando's Nuclear Power
17 School in Orlando is enormous, and I really urge you to look
18 at it. The savings, as we've said, for keeping Armstrong in
19 Arizona, if you really looked at it, is very, very, very
20 minimal. And at the very least, tit for tat we're getting
21 the short end of the straw in Orlando. The military service
22 is getting the short end of the straw, both services in this

Page 180

1 case, and I think it's an ideal thing.
2 I know redirects are not your number one priority,
3 but it's an ideal thing to look at for the bottom line
4 criteria, and I thank you very, very much for letting me have
5 my time today.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much for those
7 excellent remarks, and now the Base Closure Commission will
8 stand in recess until 1:20, when we will pick up with the
9 State of Georgia.
10 (A brief recess was taken.)
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Good afternoon. We are now
12 ready to begin with testimony on behalf of the Great State of
13 Georgia, and I'm very happy to note Congressman Barr is here
14 to speak. Welcome.
15 REPRESENTATIVE BARR: Thank you very much,
16 Commissioner Cox and Commissioner Davis and Commissioner
17 Steele. It's an honor to be here today. I represent the
18 Seventh Congressional District in which NAS Atlanta is
19 located, and I would first like to thank all of the BRAC
20 Commissioners and the staff that visited NAS Atlanta last
21 Monday for the tour of the facility and then who attended the
22 regional hearing Friday in Atlanta at the Fox Theater.

Page 181

1 I would like to invite all of you back to Georgia
2 and to NAS Atlanta when you have more time to explore our
3 great state and region in more detail.
4 Today, however, I would like to share with the full
5 Commission some of the highlights of the testimony
6 articulated over the past week in Atlanta. NAS Atlanta has
7 many virtues which substantiate the Department of the Navy's
8 recommendation to retain NAS Atlanta and support the redirect
9 of additional squadrons to NAS Atlanta from BRAC 1993.
10 NAS Atlanta has exceptional demographics and, in
11 fact, recruiters always make 100 percent of their recruiting
12 goals, and the base has no problem filling current and future
13 billets.
14 NAS Atlanta is well-suited for fleet support,
15 training missions and, I might add of particular interest to
16 me as a former United States Attorney, drug interdiction
17 operations.
18 For example, in a letter written to Chairman Dixon
19 and submitted to the Commission Mr. Raymond McKinnon, special
20 agent in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration
21 Atlanta Field Division Office wrote, "We at DEA have relied
22 heavily on NAS Atlanta in the past, and we are planning an

Page 182

1 expanded role for the base in the future."
2 NAS Atlanta is run at low cost. Quite simply, in
3 fact, it is the Navy's most economical reserve air station.
4 No other Naval Reserve air station could support the
5 additional squadrons scheduled to move to NAS Atlanta or to
6 receive NAS Atlanta's current squadrons without military
7 construction expenditures.
8 Additionally, to redirect the two F-18 squadrons
9 and the E-2 squadron to NAS Atlanta will require no military
10 construction. NAS Atlanta is co-located at Dobbins Air
11 Reserve Base and is one of only a handful of facilities in
12 the entire country that is home to each of the six Department
13 of Defense reserve components.
14 And it is without a doubt one of this country's
15 finest examples of interservice coordination and cooperation.
16 NAS Atlanta is a vital link in the total force structure, and
17 failure to utilize its ready infrastructure, its available
18 capacity, its joint use savings and its rich demographics
19 would not be in the best interests of national security
20 considerations or of the American taxpayer.
21 In closing, I want to state that the men and women
22 of our nation's armed services and the communities that

Page 183

1 support them are heros to the United States regardless of the
2 location of their duty station.
3 The question before us now, however, is what is
4 right for the total force structure of the United States
5 Navy. The answer to that question is undeniably to retain
6 NAS Atlanta.
7 NAS Atlanta has the demographics, is cost-effective
8 and is a vital asset to the Navy and the Marine Corps' total
9 force structure. Again, I'd like to thank the Commission for
10 allowing me to appear here today as the member of Congress
11 representing NAS Atlanta, and I do so without equivocation
12 and in the strongest possible terms. Thank you very much.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much for those
14 remarks. Representative Collins, Mat Collins.
15 REPRESENTATIVE COLLINS: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
16 Madam Chairman and members of the Commission, I appreciate
17 this opportunity to appear before you today. A few short
18 days ago, many of you were in Atlanta for the regional
19 hearing.
20 Members of the Georgia delegation and citizens of
21 Georgia want to thank you for allowing Atlanta and the State
22 of Georgia the opportunity to tell our military story. As we

Page 184

1 say in the south, you all come back. We would like to see
2 you back in Georgia when Atlanta hosts the 1996 Olympics next
3 summer.
4 The Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich; Senator
5 Sam Nunn and Senator Paul Coverdell took part in base visits
6 in regional hearings last week. They did not want to impose
7 upon the Commission's limited time to hear from other members
8 of Congress.
9 However, with the Chairman's permission, I would
10 like to submit for the record the statements of my Georgia
11 delegation colleagues.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: We would be most happy to have
13 those for the record. Thank you.
14 REPRESENTATIVE COLLINS: Following my remarks and
15 the remarks that you just heard from Congressman Bob Barr
16 about Georgia's military heritage, its installations and its
17 service members, Congressmen Saxby Chambliss and Sanford
18 Bishop will testify to the significance of Robins Air Base to
19 the greatest military force in the world.
20 Let me start by saying that history tells us
21 Georgia and America's military history and security have been
22 linked before the United States was the United States.

Page 185

1 Elijah Park stood with 700 Georgians to face the British at
2 Kettle Creek in 1779.
3 Eighty years later, Georgians stood with General
4 Joseph E. Johnson on the battlefields not far from where we
5 were gathered last Friday for the regional hearing in
6 Atlanta.
7 Georgians were there with Pershing, MacArthur,
8 Taylor and Westmorland, and just a few years ago, when the
9 call came from the Middle East, Georgians who were born in
10 Georgia or serve in Georgia climbed to their tanks, their
11 fighters and their aircraft, their helicopters, their
12 submarines and deployed to meet the new enemy.
13 The ones who stayed behind made sure the ones who
14 went had the best maintained and operational equipment in the
15 desert. Commissioners, if you look at the forts, the
16 airfields, marine and Navy bases in the Southeast, you're
17 looking at America's Rapid Deployment Force.
18 Years ago we closed the military bases that are no
19 longer needed in Georgia. Those which remain today, both
20 community and military leaders have worked endlessly over the
21 past few decades to further enhance the contributions they
22 make to our nation's security.

Page 186

1 What remains is the hub of that juggernaut that
2 goes into battle first. Georgians are not there two months
3 after the battle begins. Georgians are there for the echoes
4 of the first shelling subsides.
5 You have two bases before you that are being
6 compared to their counterparts elsewhere in this great nation
7 of ours. Ladies and gentlemen, there is no comparison. The
8 Naval Air Station Atlanta is unmatched anywhere in its
9 ability to recruit fixed and rotary wing pilots and crew
10 members, train them for battle and assemble them in a joint
11 war fighting environment.
12 Robins Air Base is the only air logistics center
13 east of the Mississippi River. It maintains the fighters,
14 the transports and special operations aircraft that are ready
15 when this great nation of ours is least ready.
16 The bottom line is when America is threatened, we
17 launch or response from the Naval Air Station in Atlanta and
18 Robins Air Force Base. We thank you, and now you'll hear
19 from one of our colleagues, Congressman Saxby Chambliss.
20 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, and we're
21 happy to recognize Congressman Chambliss.
22 CONGRESSMAN CHAMBLISS: Thank you. Since this is

Page 187

1 my last opportunity to appear before you all, I won't repeat
2 what I said on Friday of last week. Members of the
3 Commission, I'd like to take this one final opportunity to
4 publicly thank you for your hard work on behalf of the
5 American people.
6 You folks have a very difficult job, and you have
7 some very tough decisions to make, but you certainly handle
8 yourselves in a very professional manner, and I commend you
9 for it.
10 One decision that has taken the center stage in
11 this round of base closures is focused on the issue of air
12 logistics. The five air bases have made their case to you in
13 one form or another, and I know that the Commission has
14 conducted on-site visits.
15 I appear before you today to underscore the case
16 for Robins Air Force Base. Over the last 53 years, the
17 community of Robins, Georgia, has grown up around its air
18 base. Generations of middle Georgia workers have made Robins
19 their livelihood, and the importance of the Robins ALC to the
20 middle Georgia community and the economy cannot be
21 overstated.
22 As you have already come to learn, Robins accounts

Page 188

1 for 19 percent of the Macon MSA payroll. More importantly,
2 the closure of Robins Air Force Base would consequently
3 result in a 50 percent reduction in jobs under MSA.
4 If it is economic impact that concerns you, the
5 numbers bear out the most severe of consequences for middle
6 Georgia. Obviously, any decision to close a depot would put
7 tremendous strain on the economy of that area. After all, in
8 most cases, the ALC is the largest industrial employer in its
9 state.
10 And that is a key point. An ALC represents the
11 most business similar activities our Department of Defense
12 operates. As such, the decision you will make as a
13 Commission must be put in that business context.
14 And in a business context, Robins sets the
15 standards, and let's look at the facts. One, Robins is a
16 company town. There is no disputing it. The Robins ALC is
17 the largest employer and the biggest industrial complex in
18 Georgia.
19 The people of Georgia have a long and storied
20 commitment to their military. Above all else, the community
21 and the employees make all the awards and good work possible.
22 In middle Georgia, there is no bigger game in town.

Page 189

1 At every turn, when the Air Force has asked
2 anything of the middle Georgia community, the answer has
3 always been yes -- land, schools, infrastructure and skilled
4 workers. Whatever the need, middle Georgia has responded
5 with the resources at a cost of over $800 million for the
6 future.
7 Secondly, Robins was named the best base in the Air
8 Force. Recently, the Commander-in-Chief named Robins the
9 best base in the Air Force, a true indication of the all-
10 around success Robins has achieved over the years. Robins is
11 not just an ALC. It is the heart of the Air Force.
12 Three, Robins was rated by the Air Force in its top
13 tier of bases. One of only two ALCs named in the top tier,
14 the missions carried out at Robins are Priority One for the
15 readiness of our armed forces.
16 The F-15, the C-130, the C-141, electronic warfare,
17 the Special Operations 130s and avionics all make the mission
18 at Robins the highest percentage of core workload in the
19 command.
20 Fourth, Robins has received numerous environmental
21 awards. This is where Robins stands tall above all others.
22 Not only did Robins earn the Air Force's award for best

Page 190

1 environmental program, but the best -- but the Department of
2 Defense named Robins the base with the highest quality
3 environmental program in the Department.
4 As an industrial complex, the people at Robins have
5 worked tirelessly to be the best stewards of the land in
6 middle Georgia. As an example, Robins has in place the most
7 modern and the most environmentally friendly plating shop in
8 the command, which will allow Robins to operate more cleanly
9 well into the 21st Century.
10 We are proud at Robins of our environmental record.
11 The processes are in place to reduce pollution, and by the
12 year 2000, all priority restoration sites will have been
13 cleaned, a remarkable statement for a military industrial
14 complex.
15 Members of the Commission, the business decision
16 you face will impact the most important business of this
17 country, our national defense. If your decision is to close
18 a base, Robins Air Force Base has the community support, the
19 capacity to accept workload and the environmental program to
20 accept workload without going out of compliance.
21 From a business perspective, the decision becomes
22 clear. Robins should be the model and not the victim. Thank

Page 191

1 you very much for your attention.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much,
3 Congressman, and I believe we have next Congressman Bishop,
4 who I thought I saw a minute ago. Yes. Congressman,
5 welcome.
6 CONGRESSMAN BISHOP: Thank you very much,
7 Commissioner. Mr. Chairman -- Madam Chairman today, other
8 Commissioners, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to
9 express my support for Robins Air Force Base.
10 As a result of a base visit and testimony during
11 the regional hearing in Atlanta, many of you have heard
12 compelling arguments in support of maintaining Robins and
13 Warner Robins Air Logistics Center as key components of our
14 long-term basin strategy.
15 I associate myself with these past remarks of
16 support. I want to take this brief opportunity, however, to
17 speak to yesterday's achievements, today's capabilities and
18 tomorrow's opportunity for Robins Air Force Base.
19 Robins has long been recognized around the globe
20 for its past combat support to front line forces in the
21 field. In fact, one of Robins's managed products have been
22 actively involved in virtually all post Cold War contingency

Page 192

1 operations from Iraq to Somalia to Bosnia.
2 Time after time it was not only the superiority of
3 our highly trained combat personnel that contributed to these
4 successful missions but the people at home who managed and
5 maintained the advanced war-fighting equipment used in the
6 field.
7 Personnel at Warner Robins have, on average, 10 to
8 15 years experience in complex engineering and computer
9 related skills. Much of this experience and expertise is
10 attributed to past emphasis on the value of training.
11 State and local leaders recognized this need and
12 have invested more than $51 million in establishing
13 vocational and technical training schools and programs.
14 We've made these investments in people, but what about
15 facilities?
16 Since 1984, the Air Force and the American taxpayer
17 have invested more than $295 million in new state-of-the-art
18 facilities. These facilities are among the newest in the Air
19 Force Material Command.
20 As a further sign of local commitment, the
21 community invested more than 1.5 million to purchase property
22 in the accident potential zone to clear all encroachment

Page 193

1 concerns for the operation of the air base.
2 What is the evidence of yesterday's achievements?
3 Robins has been awarded several top honors, from Outstanding
4 Combat Logistics Squadron to Best in the Air Force for
5 Contracting and Small Business, to Pride in the Air Force for
6 Depot Maintenance.
7 It should come as no surprise that a month ago the
8 President named Robins as the Commander-in-Chief's
9 Installation Excellence award winner, signifying Robins as
10 the best base in the Air Force.
11 Today, Robins is home to the Fifth Combat
12 Communications Group, the 19th Air Refueling Wing,
13 Headquarters Air Force Reserve and 39 other tenant
14 activities.
15 Robins Air Force Base is not only a busy operations
16 air base, but its also home to Georgia's largest industrial
17 complex. Robins is a big and busy installation that is
18 operating in full compliance with all federal, state and
19 environmental regulations and complementing environmentally
20 sensitive processes in its everyday work.
21 For example, Robins uses a bicarbonate of soda
22 paint stripping technique which reduces the use of industrial

Page 194

1 toxins. The procedure is the most environment friendly paint
2 stripping technique in the Air Force.
3 Robins has the Defense Department's largest
4 electronic warfare complex which houses indoor antenna
5 ranges, electronic failure labs among other assets.
6 We have a tremendous number of capabilities at
7 Robins, but I would just like to share one thing with you.
8 The Defense Department has recommended maintaining all five
9 air logistic centers while continuing to downsize the work
10 force.
11 Frankly, I'm concerned about any policy that
12 produces less than optimum efficiency and effectiveness. Is
13 it cost-effective to spread a reduced work force across an
14 existing system while maintaining five separate sets of
15 overhead, or should operations be concentrated at the
16 strongest facilities like Robins where expansion can be
17 accommodated?
18 Let's confront the problems now and emerge from
19 this process with the most efficient and effective air
20 logistics systems possible. I believe that the arguments
21 that you've heard over the past few weeks are compelling in
22 favor of Robins, and I certainly feel confident that after

Page 195

1 all is said and done that Robins will maintain its place as
2 the number one air base in America's arsenal. Thank you very
3 much.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you, Congressman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Delegate Underwood, are you
6 willing to go ahead right now, sir? In your usual fashion,
7 you're early. Are you satisfied to go ahead now.
8 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: I'm quite satisfied as long as
9 we have our map.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, on behalf of Guam, we're
11 delighted to have our old friend, Delegate Underwood here.
12 We have heard him before in our hearings, seen him in the
13 visitations, and we are delighted to have him again.
14 Delegate Robert Underwood for the Guam presentation.
15 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Chairman Dixon
16 and members of the Commission, especially Commissioner
17 Steele. Thank you for allowing me the time, five minutes,
18 although I must complain that I feel short-changed because
19 even Kato Kaelin got 15 minutes of fame.
20 As you may know, Guam is the hardest hit community
21 under the –
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: If it makes you feel any better,

Page 196

1 he wouldn't get 15 minutes here, Delegate.
2 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: But he endorses our position.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're going to give you a point on
4 that.
5 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: As you may know, Guam is the
6 hardest hit community under the Department of Defense
7 recommendations. Our potential job loss of over 2,600
8 civilian positions would increase unemployment by 10 percent
9 alone, and it's estimated by the Department of Defense to
10 impact over 25 percent of our economy.
11 And yet when we tell people that Guam is being
12 slated for DOD base closures, there is always a sense of
13 disbelief because no one can fathom that Guam has somehow
14 lost its military value to the U.S.
15 Guam has not lost its military value. Guam is
16 still important to DOD contingency plans. Guam is American
17 soil unaffected by the politics of the moment that seem to
18 sway the reliability of some foreign countries.
19 We always talk about planning for another Korea or
20 another Desert Storm. Try planning another anything in Asia
21 or the Middle East without Guam. I did not bring pie charts
22 or bar graphs, which might impress bean counters, but I did

Page 197

1 bring a map of the Western Pacific showing Guam's location,
2 which should impress strategists.
3 DOD wants to close the ship repair facility on
4 Guam, SRF, disestablish the fleet and industrial supply
5 center, transfer the military sealift command supply ships to
6 Hawaii, transfer the HC-5 Helicopter Squadron to Hawaii and
7 realign other naval activities.
8 The lion's share of saves would come from the
9 closing of SRF and FISC. DOD would also retain assets that
10 it believes are necessary for contingencies. We understand
11 the need to downsize. We understand the role that Guam has
12 in contingencies, including its role as the fall-back
13 position for whatever may happen to foreign bases.
14 We ask in turn that you try to understand Guam's
15 needs and in particular our need for assets that would ensure
16 our economic survival. Team Guam has placed several
17 alternatives on the table.
18 There are three important considerations for an
19 arrangement that we can all live with. First, SRF and FISC
20 should be kept open if not by the Navy then in a
21 collaborative arrangement with the Government of Guam or
22 allow the Government of Guam to privatize these assets.

Page 198

1 By keeping these activities open, the Navy will
2 ensure that it also always have an SRF to go to in the Far
3 East, and it will always have a secure source of supplies.
4 Like horseshoes and hand grenades, close counts,
5 and for a forward-deployed Navy, Guam is closer to the action
6 than any other American base.
7 The second consideration is the MSC supply ships
8 and the HC-5 Helicopter Squadron. We urge you to leave the
9 ships and the helos on Guam. This is the Achilles Heel of
10 the DOD proposal, and this is where Guam's military value is
11 most apparent.
12 I have heard of scenarios that are almost laughable
13 in order to make the DOD recommendation for the helicopter
14 squadron work. The Navy may have to deploy the helos to Guam
15 on a TDY basis anyway, or the Navy may have to airlift the
16 helos from Guam just to get them in a position where they can
17 be useful.
18 The Navy would be in the awkward position of
19 depending on the Air Force to move their helos around the
20 Pacific. It seems like everybody in the flying community
21 knows that helo pilots don't get enough respect, but the DOD
22 deployment scenarios for HC-5 might have been devised by

Page 199

1 Rodney Dangerfield himself.
2 Guam needs the ships so that a new SRF venture can
3 be successful. We need a minimum level of work that the
4 ships can give us, at least in the first few years of this
5 venture.
6 The supply ships also provide a minimum level of
7 activity at the FISC, and I would like to remind the
8 Commission that while no one knows where in Kaneohe Bay Air
9 Station in Hawaii the helos will be housed, the new $17
10 million hangar that BRAC '93 directed for the helos at
11 Anderson Air Force Base on Guam is nearing completion.
12 The third important consideration is the transfer
13 of other assets no longer needed by the Navy. This includes
14 excess officer housing at the former Naval Air Station, which
15 was closed by the BRAC '93 and lands identify as excess in
16 Navy Guam's Land Use Plan '94 study.
17 As you know, some of these assets are controlled by
18 the Public Work Center. While we support the transfer of
19 excess housing and land, you urge you to limit the
20 realignment of the PWC to these issues. PWI Guam continues
21 to maintain a workload that justifies its retention as a
22 separate activity.

Page 200

1 Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, Guam is unique in that
2 unlike domestic bases we are not competing against another
3 base to be spared from closure. We are competing against the
4 financial incentive to close realignment or naval
5 activities.
6 Our proposal meets the savings test. 71 percent of
7 the DOD annual recurring savings are achieved by the Guam
8 proposal. Our proposal preserves the military value of
9 Guam's location for the Navy, and our proposal gives Guam the
10 assets it needs to secure its economic future.
11 I know you have tough decisions ahead of you, and I
12 appreciate the time and the opportunity to go over this with
13 you today. Thank you.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Delegate
15 Underwood. And may I say to you, sir, that while you did not
16 have as much time as Kato Kaelin, fortunately for the people
17 of Guam, I find you considerably more believable in the
18 things that you're telling us.
19 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. We're
20 going to stand in a recess until 1:55, ladies and gentlemen,
21 when the Great State of Illinois will make its presentation.
22 (A brief recess was taken.)

Page 201

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, the Chair
2 will declare this hearing back in session. We are pleased to
3 see that representatives of the Illinois delegation are here,
4 and the Distinguished Congressman from the northern part of
5 our state is here, and I'm delighted to recognize
6 Representative Don Manzullo from the Great State of Illinois.
7 REPRESENTATIVE MANZULLO: It's a great state, isn't
8 it, Mr. Chairman?
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman, we're delighted to
10 have you, sir.
11 REPRESENTATIVE MANZULLO: Thank you. Chairman
12 Dixon, Commissioners, thank you for allowing me the
13 opportunity to speak to you today regarding the proposed
14 closing of the Savannah Army Depot activity and relocation of
15 the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School known as
16 USDAC, currently located in Joe Daviess and Carroll Counties
17 in Illinois.
18 I also would like to briefly address the Air
19 National Guard and Air Force Reserve units located at O'Hare
20 International Airport.
21 The Integrated Ammunition Stockpile Management Plan
22 dated May 1994 recommends the closure of all Tier 3 caretaker

Page 202

1 ammunition depots, which includes the Savannah Army Depot.
2 The Army also has proposed the relocation of USDAC to
3 McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma.
4 Savannah Depot and USDAC employ 421 people
5 combined. I believe the data and recommendations presented
6 of the integrate the plan are flawed in terms both of
7 military value and potential cost savings.
8 First and foremost, these recommendations will
9 negatively impact military readiness. The most recent
10 wholesale ammunition stockpile program prepared for the joint
11 logistical commanders indicates that we currently have no
12 excess ammunition storage capacity.
13 This year the Army is spending about $100 million
14 to demilitarize approximately 95,000 short tons of
15 serviceable -- I'm sorry, of unserviceable ammunition.
16 However, the demilitarization budget will be cut by
17 more than two-thirds by 1997 while the Army continues to
18 generate about 100,000 short tons of ammunition each year.
19 In addition, there are currently over 800,000 tons
20 of unserviceable ammunition located overseas which must be
21 brought back to this country for demilitarization.
22 As the Army continues to generate ammunition and

Page 203

1 the demilitarization -- I can't pronounce that word --
2 demilitarization budget continues to decrease, this problem
3 will continue to grow, and the existing facility in Savannah
4 will become more and more critical.
5 The relocation of USDAC would also significantly
6 impede military readiness. The USDAC is a one-of-a-kind
7 facility with a critical mission. The personnel are highly
8 trained and available to respond to emergency and contingency
9 requirements worldwide.
10 The impacts of moving in on DOD readiness will be
11 significant through the loss of this professional and
12 technical expertise that is unique to it. Replacement of
13 this personnel would require four to five years in order to
14 teach the level of expertise now available.
15 The Army has estimated a one-time cost of $38
16 million dollars to close the depot. However, the Savannah
17 Senior Study Group has pointed out these costs of relocating
18 ammunition currently stored at Savannah have been ignored.
19 The Army has estimated tiering costs at 22.3
20 million. The Savannah Senior Study Group has estimated an
21 additional cost of $185 million to achieve only partial
22 tiering. This estimate is based on the movement of

Page 204

1 approximately 25 percent of the stockpile at $350 per ton,
2 and new Army estimates from the Army itself estimate movement
3 at $440 per ton, raising the total cost to $231 million.
4 These flaws indicate an additional 185 million not
5 included in the Army's analysis. Much of this data, and I
6 would refer you to it, is in a memo dated May 19, 1995, from
7 the Commander of the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command
8 in Rock Island to the Commander of the U.S. Army Material
9 Command dated May 19, 1995.
10 I submitted a copy of this memorandum which, in the
11 words of the Army itself, should be dispositive of the issue
12 that the Savannah Army Depot should not be closed.
13 Turning, then, to the consideration of the O'Hare
14 Reserve Station Chicago, I want to emphasize the importance
15 of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units to our
16 national force structure.
17 These are outstanding units with extraordinary
18 personnel who perform their mission tasks with the highest of
19 professional standards. The 126th Air Refueling Wing in
20 particular has contributed to most of the U.S. military
21 operations conducted in foreign countries over the last
22 several years.

Page 205

1 The unit has participated in Operation Desert
2 Shield, Desert Storm, Operation Restore Hope, Operation
3 Uphold Democracy and most recently in Bosnia. In addition,
4 the 126th participated in the Captown '93 airlift in May of
5 '93, provided the first KC-135 to land in mainland China.
6 These units have received significant awards.
7 I do not know why the base was put on the list for
8 consideration to be closed, but I know that the 1993 BRAC
9 recommended that as a result of Mayor Daley's interest in
10 developing the land the O'Hare Air Reserve Station should be
11 relocated to Rockford or a site acceptable to the Air Force.
12 The city of Rockford stands ready to welcome both
13 of these units. Only 55 miles away, Rockford is the only
14 site that meets the important criteria of recruitment,
15 retention and readiness.
16 I ask you, Mr. Chairman and the Commission to
17 consider the importance of both of Savannah Army Depot and
18 the O'Hare Reserve Station. Both are vital components of
19 this nation's force structure and to the defense of this
20 nation. And thank you for the opportunity to testify.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you, Representative
22 Manzullo. And we're delighted to see a colleague of your

Page 206

1 from the State of Illinois, Representative Lane Evans.
2 REPRESENTATIVE EVANS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
3 appreciate this opportunity, and I also want to thank the
4 Commission for sending out Commissioner cling to Savannah. I
5 think that's an important part of the process and appreciate
6 his efforts on a rather bumpy day up the air, as I recall, on
7 that day he came out to Savannah.
8 I want to talk about Savannah. I want to talk a
9 little bit about the Rock Island Arsenal and O'Hare Reserve
10 Unit in the allotted time that I have
11 Concerning the Savannah Army Depot, I believe that
12 DOD's recommendation is greatly flawed. This move would
13 result in the loss of important and hard-to-replicate
14 capabilities, increased costs above the Army's estimates to
15 close the base and move its function and reduce ammo storage
16 capability below critical military need.
17 There are important capabilities present at
18 Savannah which would be difficult to replace. For example,
19 the depot is one of the most efficient in the entire Army.
20 During Operation Desert Storm, Savannah had the highest out-
21 loading rate of any Army depot.
22 It is also one of the few with adequate rail

Page 207

1 service to major shipping centers. These national assets
2 would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.
3 In addition, the Army's estimate of the cost of
4 closing Savannah and relocating the Army Defense Ammunition
5 Center and School is too low. DOD stated that it would cost
6 $38 million to close the installation and to relocate
7 functions.
8 However, the Savannah Army Depot Realignment Task
9 Force estimates that the cost of closing the facility and
10 moving the school is much higher, as much as $88 million.
11 Thus includes new construction that will have to take place
12 at McAlester to complete the move.
13 Even more importantly, I question whether DOD's
14 decision to close ammunition storage facilities has taken
15 into account storage needs. The Army's 1993 Wholesale
16 Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with
17 11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside
18 storage will be needed to match our nation's future
19 ammunition stockpile.
20 This does indicate that the ammunition study is
21 flawed. I hope you will review the study to see if the plan
22 to enact a tier system for depots provides enough space to

Page 208

1 meet future storage needs.
2 Our ammunition depots are national assets that will
3 be needed to meet future mobilization needs. The Commission
4 should reverse DOD's decision to close Savannah or consider
5 other means such as operating it as a government-owned
6 contractor-operated facility in order to preserve this
7 important resource.
8 The Commission should also consider relocating the
9 ammo school at Rock Island Arsenal instead of McAlester. As
10 you will see in my testimony, Rock Island has easily the
11 administrative space to accommodate such a move.
12 I've also been given estimates that moving the
13 school to Rock Island instead of Oklahoma would save up to
14 $20 million in up-front costs due to savings created by
15 remodeling space at the arsenal instead of building new
16 construction.
17 As to the concern that actual ammunition storage
18 facilities are needed for a school for adequate training,
19 this is not a problem because most of the training is being
20 performed with dummy ammo and mock-ups. These concerns
21 should not really be worked to impede this proposal. I hope
22 that the Commission will give this proposal a full review.

Page 209

1 Concerning the Detroit Army Tank Plant, I strongly
2 support DOD's recommendation to close this facility. This
3 move would eliminate excess capacity and increase savings.
4 Currently, we have two tank plants, the Detroit and
5 Lima facilities. Of the two plants, Lima is more modern and,
6 as opposed to Detroit, configured for advanced tank
7 production.
8 In addition, the only function performed at Detroit
9 is the production of gun mounts for the M-182 tank, work that
10 is also performed at Rock Island. Because of these factors,
11 DOD has determined that Detroit is excess capability.
12 This move would achieve substantial savings. Total
13 tank gun mount production is evenly split between the two
14 plants, and Army costs comparison that examine the options of
15 keeping the split, moving the work to Detroit or moving the
16 work to Rock Island concluded that it would be cheaper to
17 move all of the work to the arsenal.
18 Considering these factors, I strongly support DOD's
19 recommendation and hope the Commission will as well. The
20 possibility addition of the O'Hare Air Reserve Station to the
21 base closing is an issue that I hope the Commission will
22 consider closely.

Page 210

1 The decision of the 1993 Commission regarding this
2 matter should stand. The closure of the station and its C-
3 130 unit would be a blow to Illinois and a sad chapter in one
4 of the nation's finest military units.
5 The 928th Airlift Wing has one of the most
6 distinguished records of any reserve unit in our country. A
7 highlight of that is that for 46 years and over 166,000 hours
8 we have been flying that unit without an accident, the
9 longest stretch of accident-free flying by any civilian or
10 military organization in our country.
11 Mr. Chairman, my time is over. I appreciate this
12 opportunity, and I will submit my entire statement for the
13 record.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your statement will be reproduced
15 in the record in full. Thank you very much, Representative
16 Evans, and we'll stand in temporary recess until 2:30 p.m.,
17 but the Chair will announce that should any member of the
18 Illinois delegation arrive prior to that time in the allotted
19 time for Illinois, that member will be heard. At 2:30, the
20 Commission will hear from the State of Indiana. We are in
21 recess.
22 (A brief recess was taken.)

Page 211

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The room will come to order, and
2 the Commission will come to order. We are prepared to hear
3 the Distinguished Congressman from my own district, my old
4 friend. Representative Jerry Costello. We're delighted to
5 have you, Congressman Costello.
6 CONGRESSMAN COSTELLO: Chairman Dixon, thank you,
7 and I'm delighted to be here. First, let me thank you and
8 the other members of the Commission for holding this final
9 hearing today and for giving me an opportunity to testify
10 once again concerning the Charles Melvin Price Army Support
11 Center in my congressional district in Granite City,
12 Illinois.
13 As you know from my previous testimony and the site
14 visit by Mr. Kling from this Commission, the price center
15 currently performs a vital service for the United States
16 Army.
17 Its strategic location adjacent to the Mississippi
18 River has proven to be a valuable resource not only to the
19 Army but also to the other federal agencies currently
20 operating from the facility.
21 The price center currently employs almost 500
22 military and civilian employees. It currently has 25

Page 212

1 tenants, including the Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard,
2 Department of Defense and other federal agencies.
3 It serves as support and a quality of life center
4 for tens of thousands of both military and retired civilian
5 and active duty personnel in the entire St. Louis
6 metropolitan area.
7 Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Army's
8 recommendation to close AATCOM, the Army Aviation Troop
9 Command Center in St. Louis, Missouri, that as a direct
10 result the recommendation of closing AATCOM comes as a direct
11 result they want to close the Price Center.
12 Basically, simply put, they're saying if AATCOM
13 goes to Alabama and is closed and relocated, then the price
14 center has to close.
15 Mr. Chairman, in my limited time, and I'll be very
16 brief, I want to make three points to the Commission. One is
17 that AATCOM is only a small part of the Charles Melvin Price
18 Center.
19 Two is I believe that the assumptions made by the
20 Army concerning the military housing at the Price Center that
21 the Army -- I think there are some errors in their
22 resumptions, and number three is I want to stress the value

Page 213

1 of this center to other federal agencies.
2 About 75 percent of the activities and functions at
3 the Price Center are nonAATCOM related. In other words, the
4 recommendation for the Army to close AATCOM, for them to say
5 that the Price Center has to close if AATCOM goes we believe
6 is not true.
7 We think that if you look at the activities at the
8 Price Center. 75 percent of the activities there are
9 nonAATCOM represented. In fact, AATCOM only occupies 17
10 percent of the family housing at the Price Center, 21 percent
11 of the administrative space and less than 1 percent of the
12 enclosed warehouse space at the Price Center.
13 While AATCOM is a valuable -- is valuable and
14 important to the Price Center, it's only a small part of the
15 operation.
16 Mr. Chairman, regarding the assumptions made by the
17 Army concerning the military housing at the Price Center, I
18 would quickly make the following points.
19 One is that in the St. Louis region there currently
20 is a waiting list of over one year for military family
21 housing. In other words, people who are on a waiting list
22 who qualify, they are waiting for over one year for military

Page 214

1 family housing.
2 If all of the personnel associated with AATCOM left
3 the Price Center tomorrow, family housing units, we would
4 still have a one-year waiting list in the St. Louis
5 metropolitan area for family housing.
6 Clearly, closing all of the family housing at the
7 Price Center, as the Army proposes to do, will not result in
8 a cost savings to the federal government. Regarding the
9 value of the Price Center to other federal agencies, as I
10 stated in my testimony, there are 25 other tenants at the
11 Price Center currently, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy,
12 the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense and other federal
13 agencies.
14 Last fall we were pleased to convince the Coast
15 Guard to relocate their facilities in the Second District of
16 St. Louis. We were wiped out by the flood of 1993. We were
17 able to convince them to come to the Price Center.
18 There are other federal agencies and state agencies
19 interested in locating at the Price Center, but they will
20 only do so if in fact the center remains open.
21 Mr. Chairman, there are many other points I could
22 make. I see my time is down to about 30 seconds, but let me

Page 215

1 close by saying that if the decision of the federal
2 government is to padlock the Price Center and close down the
3 housing, I believe that that decision is not in the best
4 interests of the Army or of the taxpayers of this country.
5 Keeping the Price Center open will provide much
6 needed military family housing to military families in the
7 entire St. Louis metropolitan area. It will provide
8 facilities for the Army, the Air Force, the Coast Guard and
9 other federal agencies.
10 And let me also say that I believe that we have an
11 obligation both to our active duty personnel and our retired
12 military folks as well as the civilians in the area to
13 provide quality of life services, and this facility provides
14 those services, as I said, to over tens of thousands of
15 people.
16 Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by thanking you
17 again. Mr. Kling, as you know, visited the Charles Melvin
18 Price Center just a few months ago. We had the opportunity
19 to brief him. I have had previous testimony submitted to
20 this Committee, and we would ask that you carefully consider
21 the points that we have made.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,

Page 216

1 Congressman Jerry Costello. We thank you for your
2 contribution to your state and for your important
3 contribution to the work of this Commission. We're greatly
4 appreciative.
5 REPRESENTATIVE COSTELLO: Mr. Chairman, thank you.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, sir. We'll stand in
7 recess and resume again with the Great State of Indiana at
8 2:30, and staff will be checking with Indiana. If anyone
9 from Indiana gets here before the hour of 2:30, we will
10 proceed with the individuals that arrive. Otherwise, we
11 stand in recess until the assigned time slot for Indiana,
12 which is 2:30.
13 (A brief recess was taken.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'll call the Commission back to
15 order. Congressman C.W. Young of the Great State of Florida
16 was unable to be here because of other business obligations
17 in the Congress at the allotted hour for Florida and asked
18 whether we could accommodate him later.
19 And the Great State of Indiana had an open spot and
20 was glad to give it to Congressman Young, and Congressman
21 Young, we are delighted, sir, to see you, and the Commission
22 recognizes Representative C.W. Young, State of Florida.

Page 217

1 REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG: Mr. Chairman, thank you very
2 much, and I thank you for accommodating the school and the
3 Indiana delegation also for being willing to do that. If I
4 look a little bit wet and sloppy, it's because I was outside
5 in the rain as part of the welcoming ceremony for CAPT Scott
6 O'Grady.
7 It was a great and exciting time, and CAPT O'Grady,
8 as an Air Force officer, leads me into my subject, and that's
9 MacDill Air Force Base. As you know, prior to the last
10 Commission meeting on BRAC, the Department of Defense had
11 indicated a desire to establish a fuel retankering unit at
12 MacDill.
13 The theory was to take the F-16 Reserve squadron
14 that had been moved out of Homestead because of the
15 hurricane, convert that to tankering and establish them at
16 MacDill.
17 That didn't work out because the Base Relocation
18 and Closure Commission decided that they needed to help
19 establish some activity at Homestead, which is fine, is
20 working out very well.
21 But again, the Department of Defense has identified
22 to the committee that I chair, the Defense Appropriations

Page 218

1 Committee, the need for tankering capability in the
2 Southeastern part of the United States.
3 So I'm here, basically, to just say we support very
4 strongly the recommendation of the Department of Defense to
5 establish tankering capability at MacDill.
6 And I would say this to you, that they would be
7 very welcome by the community, but also at MacDill Air Force
8 Base we have one of the best underground fuel storage
9 capacities anywhere in the world, which would be a very
10 natural transition, as far as establishing this unit.
11 That's, basically, my story, Mr. Chairman. I do
12 have a rather lengthy statement that I would like to submit
13 for your record along with some correspondence between myself
14 and the Department of Defense and the Air Force on this same
15 subject. And unless you have questions, that what I'm here
16 to ask you for is your support of that recommendation.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman, thank you for that
18 fine presentation. Your entire statement will be reproduced
19 in the record in full. I ask staff to be sure that they
20 obtain that from Congressman Young.
21 And I just want to say, sir, I'd have been proud to
22 stand in the rain with you to welcome that great man. Thank

Page 219

1 you for your fine presentation.
2 REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG: Mr. Chairman, members of the
3 Commission, thank you very much for accommodating me.
4 (A brief recess was taken.)
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Commission will come to order.
6 The Chair is delighted to recognize the Distinguished
7 Congressman from the State of Indiana, Representative John
8 Hostettler -- oh, excuse me. Would you yield to your
9 senator, John? We're delighted to recognize my old friend
10 Senator Dan Coats from the Great State of Indiana. Senator
11 Coats, we're delighted to have you, sir.
12 SENATOR COATS: Well, Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure
13 to be able to see you in the chairman's chair and call you
14 Mr. Chairman. We miss you. You look happy and well, and we
15 trust life after Congress is treating you well. It sure
16 looks like it is.
17 I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to
18 testify before you. Obviously, a difficult task that you
19 have. We appreciate your service to the country. The
20 implications of your decisions have, obviously, widespread
21 ramifications not only for this nation and our military
22 preparedness but also for the communities that are affected.

Page 220

1 I want you to know and I think you do know that I
2 have a long history associated with this ever since I've been
3 in the Senate. Beginning in 1989 and through the last round,
4 I have supported the decisions of the Base Closing
5 Commissions even though they have adversely impacted my
6 state.
7 I announced in 1989 that this was something that we
8 needed to do for the military, for the future of our
9 military, for the country, and at considerable political risk
10 and certainly sometimes swimming against the tide I took a
11 stand saying that if the decisions were made on an equitable
12 basis, on a fair basis, I would support those decisions, and
13 I have.
14 So I think my credibility and my commitment to the
15 process is well-established. We've taken our share of cuts
16 in Indiana, Grissom Air Force Base, Jefferson Proving Ground,
17 Fort Benjamin Harrison, but on each of those, after carefully
18 reviewing the record, I determined that the decisions were
19 made on an objective basis, and therefore I would support
20 them and did.
21 We now look at Round 4, and in evaluating the
22 latest list, the Naval Air Warfare System in Indianapolis is

Page 221

1 on that list. I come today to you with a somewhat unique
2 proposal, and I know you're familiar with it because our
3 Senior Senator and other Mayor from Indianapolis presented to
4 the Base Closing Commission regional hearing in Chicago their
5 proposal.
6 It's unique because we have not objecting to the
7 closing of the base on the base closure list. What we are
8 offering is an alternative to the Commission to examine an
9 alternative that we believe brings an innovative public-
10 private partnership to replace the outright closure of the
11 air warfare facility.
12 So we're not fighting the recommended closure. We
13 are offering a much less expensive alternative that reduces
14 military costs and commitments but yet preserves military
15 readiness.
16 An independent review of the Department of Defense
17 analysis of the closure proposal found that outright closure
18 offers no apparent cost savings, efficiencies or military
19 value, and with these factors in mind we went to work in
20 Indiana, principally the Mayor of Indianapolis with the
21 support of the Governor, the support of myself and other
22 members of the delegation to find an alternative.

Page 222

1 Frankly, I think the process, the decision process
2 that was made by the Department of Navy was flawed. It was
3 flawed because I believe that an early decision was made by
4 the Department to protect naval air warfare systems at China
5 Lake and Patuxent River at the expense of Indianapolis.
6 So here is what we have to offer to the Commission to
7 examine, an alternative that meets the Navy's goal of closing
8 the facility as a DOD site, ownership of the site by either
9 the city or a combination of city and state, retention of the
10 DOD employees as a detachment of the Crane Naval Surface
11 Warfare Center just down the road in Congressman Hostettler's
12 district and retention of as many of the released employees
13 as possible as employees of private companies which would
14 promote work under contract for the Department of Defense.
15 We estimate that the actual cost of the complete
16 closure of the air warfare center is about $226 million.
17 Estimates for implementing the city's proposal are about $42
18 million. It's privatization, and it's privatization with a
19 purpose.
20 We ask the Commission specifically for two things.
21 One, first, we would like a BRAC favorable recommendation of
22 the Indianapolis alternative proposal. Such a recommendation

Page 223

1 would have to be stronger than a statement of permission.
2 It would need to make crystal clear that the city's
3 proposal is the preferred closure option, and we have
4 provided your staff with appropriate language to examine our
5 offer and the language that we would suggest that you take
6 under consideration and offer.
7 Secondly, we believe that it's important for the
8 Commission to establish a period of time to allow the
9 negotiations between the city, the Navy and other interested
10 parties, the state, to take place, perhaps for up to a year.
11 This would permit all the participants to structure the
12 partnership agreement in a reasonable time period.
13 Mr. Chairman, in closing, the alternative proposal
14 has received considerable support with the Navy all up and
15 down the line, including the undersecretary -- the aviation
16 program managers and the Undersecretary of the Navy,
17 Mr. Danzig.
18 We urge your careful consideration of this proposal
19 and consideration of this idea, and as someone, again, who
20 has not been here trying to defend his state's position
21 against the base closure's recommendations, I would just ask
22 your favorable consideration of this particular proposal, and

Page 224

1 thank you very much for the time.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much, Senator
3 Dan Coats for that very fine contribution, and may I say that
4 staff assures me that they do have the information that your
5 distinguished Indiana delegation has given to staff. It's
6 being carefully evaluated.
7 We're indebted to you for this fine contribution,
8 and we thank you for bringing along a Distinguished Colleague
9 from the House, Representative John Hostettler. We're
10 delighted to hear him now as well. Thank you, Senator.
11 REPRESENTATIVE COATS: Chairman Dixon and
12 Commissioner Steele, thank you very much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Representative
14 Hostettler, we're delighted to have you, sir.
15 REPRESENTATIVE HOSTETTLER: Thank you, and good
16 afternoon. Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I
17 appreciate your attention to today's testimony. Having sat
18 through a number of hearings in recent months, I know how
19 hard it can be to remain focused in long hearings even when
20 the issues being presented are exceedingly important as they
21 are today.
22 I represent the Eighth Congressional District of

Page 225

1 Indiana located in the Southwestern part of the state. It's
2 two largest cities are Evansville, a leading industrial city
3 along the Ohio River, and Bloomington, a city located 45
4 miles south of Indianapolis and the home of Indiana
5 University.
6 The district covers a large rural area of Indiana
7 composed of rolling forested countryside in the east and
8 large tracts of fertile farm land in the west. It also
9 contains a number of wholesome Indiana towns like historic
10 Vincennes founded in 1732; Bedford, the limestone capital of
11 the world; and French Lick, the home town of basketball
12 legend Larry Bird.
13 Finally, and the reason for my being here today,
14 the district is also the home of the Crane Naval Surface
15 Warfare Center's Crane, Indiana site located in Martin County
16 Indiana.
17 As you know, the Secretary of Defense has
18 recommended that several activities at the Indianapolis Naval
19 Air Warfare Center and the Crane Naval Surface Warfare
20 Center's Louisville, Kentucky, site be transferred to the
21 Martin County facility.
22 My purpose today is not to enter into the

Page 226

1 privatization debate which my colleagues and friends are
2 bringing to your attention. I will only say that I, like my
3 constituents, want the very best decisions to be made for
4 America.
5 As a member of the House National Security
6 Committee, I fully appreciate the decisions regarding our
7 military force structure must be made as free from politics
8 as possible. My testimony is, however, to help assure you
9 that if you should decide to follow the Secretary of
10 Defense's recommendations, the Martin County site of the
11 Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center is ready, available and in
12 good condition to be the receiving location.
13 I also want to assure you that the local
14 communities are fully capable of implementing the Secretary's
15 recommendations and that the facility has ample capacity to
16 absorb the consolidated missions.
17 The Crane site in Martin County Indiana is a unique
18 national asset. To truly appreciate this base, a person
19 really needs to visit there. The base's physical statistics
20 are amazing and sound more like that of a national park than
21 of a military base.
22 It contains over 62,000 rolling acres, which

Page 227

1 translates to 97 square miles and includes over 50,000 acres
2 of beautiful forest. In fact, the United States Navy has
3 recently informed me that its Crane, Indiana, site is among
4 its ten largest facilities in the world.
5 The size of the base has proved to be an ideal
6 location for the storage of munitions. For that reason, the
7 Martin County site is also home to the United States Army's
8 Crane Army Ammunition activity, a tenant of the Navy.
9 Because of the facility's size, munitions can be
10 safely stored and all security needs easily met. The base's
11 infrastructure reflects its physical dimensions. It has
12 approximately 75 miles of perimeter fence, 185 miles of paved
13 streets and highways, 226 miles of unpaved roads and 170
14 miles of railway.
15 It also has a large variety of facilities ranging
16 from ammunition storage bunkers to state-of-the-art
17 technology centers supporting the well over 2,500 current
18 Crane engineers, scientists and technicians.
19 Since 1987, there has been approximately $344
20 million in new construction completed at the site, resulting
21 in state-of-the-art product support facilities.
22 Approximately $12 million in new construction is currently

Page 228

1 underway, including a $7.9 million electrophic center.
2 Given its physical size and up-to-date
3 infrastructure, it is my view that the Crane, Indiana, site
4 would, if called upon, meet the Navy's needs for the
5 foreseeable future as a premier product engineering and
6 industrial activity.
7 The people of Southwestern Indiana are by nature
8 patriotic midwesterners. We wholeheartedly support the work
9 of Navy at Crane, and if the Secretary of Defense's
10 recommendations are followed, we are ready to do our part.
11 According to an Indiana University study requested
12 by the South Central Indiana Coalition immediately prior to
13 the last BRAC round, the local communities surrounding Crane
14 are fully capable of absorbing even 100 percent expansion in
15 the Crane work force.
16 There exists ample housing, schools, transportation
17 and utilities to handle the projected influx. I believe that
18 this conclusion continues to be valid. I also believe that
19 this area has a trained work force with an excellent work
20 ethic.
21 I would be remiss if I did not add that
22 Southwestern Indiana is a great place to live. The cost of

Page 229

1 living in the area is low, as is crime. In addition, there
2 exists a choice between living in a relatively remote rural
3 area and a sophisticated urban environment.
4 In conclusion, I fully support the concept of the
5 Midwest Navy. I think that the history of the Indianapolis,
6 Louisville and Crane, Indiana sites have shown the value of
7 these Midwest facilities. I thank are for your work on the
8 difficult task you face in determining the region's future
9 force structure. Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
11 Representative Hostettler. We're delighted to have that
12 information from you. We thank you for it. We're pleased to
13 see your distinguished colleague from the Indiana delegation,
14 Representative Lee Hamilton, an old friend. Nice to have you
15 here, Congressman Hamilton.
16 REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON: Thank you very much.
17 Good afternoon, Senator Dixon and members of the Commission.
18 I want to thank you for the privilege of commenting on the
19 Defense Department's decision to close Naval Ordinance
20 Station Louisville on its 1995 closure list.
21 Senator Dixon, I want to thank you particularly and
22 Commissioner Kling for taking the time to visit the Naval

Page 230

1 Ordinance facility in Louisville. I know your schedule is
2 most demanding, and we're deeply appreciative of your
3 willingness to do that, to see the facility.
4 I, as you gather, oppose the Defense Department's
5 decision to close the ordinance station. My very decided
6 preference is to remove the Naval Ordinance Station from the
7 closure list.
8 In the alternative, I would urge the Commission to
9 endorse the establishment of a naval gun center in
10 Louisville, which will be argued here in a moment with
11 eloquence from some of my Kentucky colleagues.
12 I express my support for keeping the Naval
13 Ordinance Station open for several reasons. First and really
14 the most important, the Naval Ordinance Station is the last
15 naval-owned facility capable of gun system design,
16 manufacturing, prototyping and remanufacturing.
17 If Louisville is closed, the Navy loses that
18 capability as well as the capability to reconstitute a full
19 industrial base capacity in the event of an emergency. I
20 simply cannot understand why the Navy would make that choice.
21 Second, the ordinance station has had a superb
22 record of service to the Navy and to the country. Its

Page 231

1 engineering capability and design, in-service engineering,
2 advance gun system management and development has been a
3 tremendous asset to the Navy. It can perform its work in a
4 cost-effective manner with an outstanding work force.
5 Third, the closing of the ordinance station has an adverse
6 impact, of course, on communities in my congressional
7 district. Across the river from Louisville, Kentucky, 320 of
8 the 1,836 employees reside in Indiana. That puts them out of
9 work, cause them hardship and, of course, costs the state
10 millions of dollars in lost income.
11 Fourth, you folks who close these bases have really
12 hit Indiana very hard over a period of years. I just don't
13 think it's fair for us to sustain additional cutbacks in base
14 closure process.
15 Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana Army Ammunition
16 Plant, both of which are in my district, Fort Benjamin
17 Harrison, Grissom Air Force Base have all been listed for
18 closure or inactivation.
19 I don't know how you judge these things from your
20 perspective, but believe you me you have delivered some
21 roundhouse punches to Indiana, you and your predecessors.
22 Thousands of jobs are being lost, and I'm under the decided

Page 232

1 impression that we have taken a disproportionate share of the
2 closures.
3 I understand that the Base Closure Commission has
4 explored the possibility of establishing in-service depots.
5 I believe Naval Ordinance has the capabilities to provide
6 depot work for the Navy as well as for other services, and I
7 ask you to give that opinion consideration as well.
8 If the Commission decides to support the
9 recommendations of the Defense Department, of course I hope
10 you do not, I would then urge that it consider endorsing the
11 creation of a naval gun center of excellence at Louisville.
12 Senators Ford and McConnell and Congressman Ward
13 will discuss in more detail in their testimony. The City of
14 Louisville and Jefferson County have proposed establishing a
15 naval gun center of excellence at the Naval Ordinance Center.
16 That proposal includes several elements. The Navy
17 would close the Naval Ordinance Station with language in the
18 BRAC report to assure that the Navy will work to privatize in
19 place the majority of the work performed at the station.
20 The City of Louisville and/or Jefferson County,
21 Kentucky, would assume ownership of the facility. One
22 contractor would lease part of the facility to perform the

Page 233

1 five-inch gun work and other activities. Another contractor
2 would lease part of the facility to perform work on the
3 Phalanx system.
4 The Navy would lease part of the facility to
5 maintain an engineering presence. Contractors would hire
6 Naval Ordinance Service Station employees that would -- who
7 would be displaced by the closure.
8 I understand that the City of Louisville and
9 Jefferson County Kentucky recently signed a memorandum of
10 agreement with two contractors to operate portions of the
11 proposed center, and I think that proposal has several
12 benefits.
13 So I'd ask that you give this consideration very
14 careful consideration. It would keep jobs at the Naval
15 Ordinance, and I would like to see the facility stay a
16 government facility -- that's my preference -- but the work
17 force remain a government force, but if that's not possible,
18 then I'd like to see the good paying jobs kept in Louisville.
19 I ask the Commission, then, and each of you to give
20 full consideration to these requests, and I thank you for the
21 opportunity to make this appearance.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much,

Page 234

1 Congressman Hamilton, and we'll say to you that all of the
2 material you have alluded to is in our possession. We're
3 indebted to you for your remarks, as I'm sure the Great State
4 of Kentucky is as well, and we thank you, Congressman Lee
5 Hamilton.
6 And we are now going to go to the Kentucky
7 delegation. We're pleased to see the Distinguished Senior
8 Senator from the Great Commonwealth of Kentucky here, and --
9 SENATOR FORD: Keep it up. I like it. Go ahead.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I recognize him as the democrat
11 whip, and in my time he was the majority whip, and I served
12 as his chief deputy, and I never had a better boss. Now,
13 you're ahead now, Wendell. Don't mess it up. Senator
14 Wendell Ford of the Great State of Kentucky.
15 SENATOR FORD: We miss you, Al. As my father would
16 say, Mr. Chairman, we come not today with visual aids or
17 theatrical productions. We only come armed with the silver
18 tongue of the truth.
19 Chairman Dixon and members of the Base Closure
20 Realignment Commission, let me begin by thanking all of you
21 for the opportunity to share my views with you this morning
22 and also to express my thanks for the interest you, as

Page 235

1 individual members and as Chairman of the Commission, have
2 shown in trying to see every facility so you would understand
3 as well as you can the good, bad and indifferent in the
4 recommendations that you have received.
5 So I do compliment you for your good work. I know
6 that you will have some tough decisions to make in the next
7 few weeks, but I hope that the homework your staff has
8 already done on Naval Ordinance Station Louisville and the
9 testimony that you hear here today will convince you that
10 Louisville should not be taken off the -- should be taken off
11 the base closure list.
12 The Naval Ordinance Station Louisville is
13 considered an outstanding facility because of its quality
14 work and its cost-effectiveness. It was never more evident
15 than during the Gulf War when Louisville employees literally
16 made house calls to the Persian Gulf war zone providing
17 critical on-site assistance, particularly when the USS
18 Princeton hit a mine.
19 Louisville is a full-service organization and has
20 the only remaining major caliber gun barrel manufacturing
21 facility in the Navy and the only close-in weapon system
22 depot public or private. Louisville is the lead activity for

Page 236

1 the development of the latest improvements to the naval
2 gunnery and the congressionally mandated -- I underscore
3 that -- naval fire support program.
4 The activity does research and development to
5 include design, production, in-service support and depot
6 functions. And as all of the Commission members who visited
7 Louisville know firsthand, the state-of-the-art in
8 environmental compliance exceeding EPA and state regulations
9 plating facility is the most modern and effective in the
10 entire Defense Department.
11 In fact, in 1993, former Base Closure and
12 Realignment Commission Chairman called the station a
13 modernized operation that does a range of overhaul,
14 engineering and research work on Navy gun systems and said he
15 was, and I quote, "convinced that it is certainly not a
16 facility we should close."
17 He was supported by all members of the Commission.
18 They understood that the central location of Naval Ordinance
19 Louisville provides critical rapid deployment capabilities
20 for the Navy of systems equipment material and technical
21 personnel to the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf Coasts.
22 Furthermore, your own staff has discovered that

Page 237

1 Navy numbers on the cost savings that would occur because of
2 closure and moving equipment from Louisville were over-
3 enthusiastic.
4 In fact, in terms of both military construction and
5 labor rates, the cost of shutting down Naval Ordinance
6 Louisville would be much higher than the original Navy
7 estimates.
8 I understand that these tight fiscal times demand
9 tough decisions, but these numbers alone should be a clear
10 indication that even if the Commission makes what we consider
11 an adverse decision there should be no question that BRAC
12 needs to direct the Navy in no uncertain terms to retain the
13 equipment and current missions of Naval Ordinance and
14 negotiate with local officials to privatize the facility.
15 In particular, I request that your Commission
16 provide enabling language allowing the Navy work to continue
17 at Louisville for at least two years until the privatization
18 process is completed.
19 Two companies, Hughes and United Defense, have
20 signed a memorandum of understanding with the City of
21 Louisville and Jefferson County committing to do the work at
22 Louisville.

Page 238

1 They have also met with your staff to outline in
2 detail their plans. So this is clearly no pie-in-the-sky
3 proposal. As Louisville representatives testified back in
4 April at your Chicago hearing, this plan to create the Naval
5 Gun Center of Excellence would safe the Navy in excess of
6 $300 million, more than they would save by moving the
7 operations to another location, reduce the Navy's
8 infrastructure in Louisville to nearly zero while maintaining
9 world class gun operations the Navy has come to depend on.
10 Let me reiterate that every person who will testify
11 today believes without question that Naval Ordinance
12 Louisville is a unique integral part of our nation's defense
13 and should be removed from the base closure list.
14 However, faced with the fact that the Pentagon has
15 put Louisville on the list, we have worked diligently to
16 produce a plan to meet the overall downsizing BRAC is
17 attempting to address.
18 More important, the privatization plan will put
19 Louisville on the forefront of recent recommendations by
20 Dr. White, head of the Commission on Roles and Missions of
21 the Armed Forces, a former chairman of this Commission and
22 now the man chosen by the President and Secretary of Defense

Page 239

1 to be the number two man in the Defense Department.
2 In that document, Dr. White called for privatizing
3 in place those depots, and Mr. Chairman, I'd like to make a
4 part of the record the statement of Dr. White recommending as
5 to privatizing.
6 In closing, I know my little red light is on, but
7 I've had that happen to me before, Mr. Chairman, it has been
8 brought to my attention that there are those who are wrongly
9 questioning the legal authority of this Commission to direct
10 the Department of Defense to privatize an installation.
11 As the author of the original base closure
12 legislation, you do not need reminding about the authority
13 and reach of this Commission. I hope you will exercise that
14 authority in the best interests of the Naval Ordinance.
15 Let me close again by saying I thank you and look
16 forward to working with you, hopefully to keep Naval
17 Ordinance Louisville open, if not, meet some of the other
18 recommendations that we've offered to the Commission. Thank
19 you, Mr. Chairman.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Senator Ford, and
21 Dr. White's statements will be reproduced in the record as
22 well as the entirety of your remarks. And we are delighted

Page 240

1 to see your distinguished colleague, my old neighbor, the
2 Distinguished Junior Center from the Great Commonwealth of
3 Kentucky, my old friend Senator Mitch McConnell. Senator
4 McConnell.
5 SENATOR MCCONNELL: Allen, it's good to see you
6 again. Ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, I appreciate
7 the opportunity to be here. As others in our delegation have
8 indicated, everyone agrees that the most desirable option is
9 to keep the Naval Ordinance Facility open as is.
10 NOSL is a unique asset with state-of-the-art
11 engineering industrial facilities. Louisville is the only
12 remaining major caliber gun barrel manufacturing facility in
13 the Navy and one of only two major caliber gun barrel plating
14 facilities.
15 NOSL is the only remaining facility public or
16 private providing full spectrum engineering industrial life
17 cycle support, including manufacturing, assembly, overhaul,
18 repair, renovation, alteration and modification of gun and
19 gun fire control systems and missile system launchers.
20 NOSL is centrally located and provides rapid
21 deployment capabilities of systems, equipment, material and
22 technical personnel. NOSL is the only close-in weapons

Page 241

1 system depot.
2 However, if maintaining the status quo is not an
3 option, we would encourage the Commission to explore the
4 possibility of privatization and the creation of a Naval Gun
5 Center of Excellence.
6 This proposal was presented to the Commission
7 during the April regional hearing and formally transmitted to
8 Secretary Dalton last week. The proposal enjoys bipartisan
9 support, Mayor Abramson, Judge Armstrong, Congressman Ward,
10 Senator Ford and the local chamber of commerce have all
11 enthusiastically worked together in developing this
12 proposition.
13 NOSL union leadership testified in favor of the
14 plan during the April regional hearing. A privatized NOSL
15 industrial complex would become the centralized Navy source
16 of gun systems as the nation's Gun Center of Excellence,
17 teaming with community, Navy and Defense contractors.
18 The proposal would reduce the Navy's
19 infrastructure, protect the gun weapons system expertise now
20 resident at NOSL and protect the workers at NOSL and the
21 important contribution they make to the regional community.
22 The proposal supports the May '94 Commission Roles

Page 242

1 and Missions of the Armed Forces recommendation. This urges
2 that DOD move to a depot maintenance system relying on the
3 private sector.
4 The local community, as indicated, has signed
5 cooperative agreements to establish the Gun Center of
6 Excellence with two leading defense contractors, Hughes
7 Missile Systems and United Defense LP.
8 UDLP has already agreed in writing to execute all
9 repair and overhaul work it is required to perform under the
10 follow-on technical support prime contract at the newly
11 created center. This could mean an additional 90 to 100
12 jobs.
13 We would like to see the Commission approve a
14 recommendation that achieves the following: transfer
15 ownership from the Navy to the local government, leave in
16 place key NOSL functions encompassing both the Navy Gun
17 System Replacement Program and the Phalanx, retain the in-
18 service engineering support currently at NOSL as a Navy
19 function at the center.
20 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the
21 opportunity to join with my colleagues in making our
22 presentation on this most important facility in Kentucky.

Page 243

1 Thank you for your time.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
3 Senator McConnell. Thank you for your fine presentation.
4 REPRESENTATIVE LEWIS: I could probably make this
5 very short by just saying ditto with my colleagues, but I'll
6 go ahead and give my prepared statement. I want to thank
7 you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Commission
8 for this opportunity to testify today and to express my
9 strong support for the Naval Surface Warfare Center in
10 Louisville, Kentucky.
11 Mr. Chairman, my first priority here today is to
12 support the Naval Surface Warfare Center as a viable,
13 important part of our Navy's success. Although the station
14 is not in my district directly, I do represent the southern
15 portion of Jefferson County.
16 I represent over 400 of the engineers, planners and
17 technicians at the station. These are hard working,
18 dedicated people. These people are the heart and soul of
19 that facility, and they know its true capabilities. They are
20 the reason that the Naval Ordinance has achieved a reputation
21 of excellence in the quality of its work. They are the
22 reason for the Center's innovative success over the years.

Page 244

1 The record clearly shows the unique capabilities
2 and vital importance of Naval Ordinance to our national
3 defense. I'm sure that we all can agree that our nation's
4 commitment to readiness is the driving force that keeps our
5 military forces the best in the world.
6 The support services of our military have proven
7 their worth time after time when the security of our nation
8 and its future were in jeopardy. Naval Ordinance is an
9 important link in maintaining that readiness edge.
10 As you know, Naval Ordinance has been there when
11 called to duty. It responded swiftly and accurately during
12 the Gulf War to develop solutions and execute swift repairs
13 of equipment. It is the only close-in weapons system depot
14 available to the Navy.
15 It is also the only remaining major caliber gun
16 barrel manufacturing facility of its kind. Naval Ordinance
17 possesses a full spectrum of capability from development and
18 design to production to maintenance of technology and
19 equipment for the Navy.
20 It clearly has a unique and vital capability. Of
21 course, in these times of growing federal budget deficits, we
22 must find ways to curb spending in all sectors of the federal

Page 245

1 budget. The Base Closure Commission has an important job to
2 do in finding ways to reduce excess military facilities while
3 at the same time maintaining our military excellence.
4 I commend you and the other Commissioners for the
5 task that you are undertaking. In that light, the idea of
6 moving towards cross-servicing has been discussed as a
7 possible direction for military readiness efforts in the
8 future. It certainly has merits from a budgetary point of
9 view and is an idea that previous BRAC commissions have
10 supported.
11 Mr. Chairman, Naval Ordinance can be a key player
12 in this effort. Naval Ordinance has joint service
13 capabilities in place that are operating today, but if we
14 dismantle that capability, that opportunity will be lost.
15 As I stated before, my priority in this effort is
16 to keep Naval Ordinance open and continue its unique,
17 qualified role in the readiness efforts of our military
18 machine. Some have suggested that privatization is a
19 direction that we should go, and this is an idea that has
20 great merit.
21 But I am not ready to give up on maintaining the
22 status quo at Naval Ordinance, and this Commission shouldn't

Page 246

1 give up on that goal either. In my judgment, maintaining the
2 Naval Ordinance Welfare Center and its unique capabilities is
3 the best thing for our national defense.
4 Again, I commend you and the members of the
5 Commission for the fine job you are doing in the important
6 task before you. The Navy has been well served by the Naval
7 Ordinance Warfare Center in Louisville. It is the last
8 operation of its kind due to its complete service ability and
9 its work for whose dedication cannot be matched.
10 It is a key ingredient for the continued
11 superiority of our nation's military readiness. Thank you
12 again for this opportunity to testify. Thank you.
13 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you, Representative
14 Lewis. I'm glad you didn't ditto. The eloquence of your
15 statement was needed. Thank you very much. Representative
16 Ward.
17 REPRESENTATIVE WARD: I hope I hear you say the
18 same. First let me thank you for having this opportunity to
19 testify today on behalf of the Naval Surface Warfare Center,
20 Crane Division Louisville, the facility which we know in
21 Louisville as the Naval Ordinance Station.
22 Thank you, too, for the site visit on April 6th by

Page 247

1 Chairman Dixon, Commissioner Kling and Commissioner Cornella
2 who came to Louisville and gave the attention that we feel we
3 needed in order to make our case and to make our presentation
4 and for the Commission's attention to our community
5 presentation in Chicago on April 12th.
6 In addition, the Base Closure Commission staff has
7 diligently responded to our serious concerns about the
8 handling of data call information regarding Naval Ordinance.
9 I'm here today along with my colleagues to talk
10 with you about two approaches which we feel might be used to
11 preserve the core gun system capabilities at Naval Ordinance,
12 capabilities which are essential to our nation's defense.
13 As I sketch these two alternatives, I want to
14 emphasize that the process of developing these proposals
15 began immediately after the BRAC '93 process concluded. We
16 come to you as a community. Every level of our government is
17 represented.
18 Every level of our government is represented by the
19 Kentucky-Indiana congressional delegation, the Governor and
20 Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky, the Mayor of Louisville, the
21 County Judge Executive of Jefferson County have worked
22 together in a bipartisan manner to develop our proposals.

Page 248

1 In fact, here with us today is my predecessor,
2 former Louisville Congressman Ron Mazzoli, who is a veteran
3 of these wars and who has stayed in the field and chairs our
4 Community Naval Ordinance Task Force.
5 Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Commission seriously
6 examine providing future gun systems capability by keeping
7 Naval Ordinance Station open as a Department of the Navy
8 facility performing Navy work and cross-services work
9 presently being evaluated by the Commission staff. Frankly,
10 I believe this would be the best option for the taxpayers and
11 for our national defense.
12 As the Commissioners who visited Louisville saw
13 firsthand, Naval Ordinance is a unique repository of
14 engineering, mechanical, electronics and industrial knowledge
15 of gun systems. No other facility provides the Department of
16 the Navy and the Department of Defense with the full spectrum
17 of gun systems expertise, research, development, design,
18 manufacture, upgrade and overhaul provided at the Naval
19 Ordinance facility.
20 The important and unique assets at Naval Ordinance
21 Station include a state-of-the-art environmentally compliant
22 plating shop with the only vertical gun barrel plating

Page 249

1 capability within the Department of Defense, as you've heard,
2 the only remaining major caliber gun barrel manufacturing
3 facility within the Department of the Navy, and as you've
4 heard the only Phalanx close-in weapons system depot public
5 or private.
6 But the real gold mine at Naval Ordinance are the
7 synergies created by the co-location of engineers and
8 ordinance workers. This co-location of engineers and workers
9 has made invaluable the contributions to gun systems
10 technology and must not be lost.
11 Closure of the Naval Ordinance Station, the last
12 remaining facility public or private providing full spectrum
13 engineering and industrial life cycle support for naval gun
14 systems would be analogous to closure of the last public
15 sector shipyard and would clearly be eating our corn seed, as
16 you, Commissioner Davis put it, in reference to another
17 facility at your hearing on May 10th.
18 For this reason, I urge the Commission to remove
19 the Naval Ordinance Station from the list of facilities to be
20 closed.
21 If the commission does not overturn the Department
22 of Defense's recommendation to close the Naval Ordinance

Page 250

1 Station, the Commission can retain critical skills in
2 Louisville by altering the Naval recommendation to assure
3 implementation of the community proposal to privatize the
4 work at Louisville under Department of Navy supervision.
5 The Department of Navy strongly supports the
6 community's privatization initiative which would maintain at
7 Naval Ordinance and potentially expand the gun systems
8 capabilities which reside in Louisville.
9 The community's privatization initiative offers the
10 best alternative to outright closure. The Louisville plan
11 would serve the best interests of the Department of the Navy,
12 the Department of Defense, the Louisville, Kentucky, and
13 Southern Indiana communities and two important defense
14 contractors who have signed memorandums of understanding with
15 the city and the county.
16 The privatization plan would allow the Navy to
17 reduce its infrastructure by removing a large facility from
18 its ownership. It would support maintaining the private
19 defense industrial base by enabling the two contractors to
20 gain access to overhaul and upgrade work, facilitate dual use
21 of technologies and facilities which have military and
22 commercial applications such as our state-of-the-art plating

Page 251

1 shop.
2 It would assure uninterrupted ability to meet fleet
3 readiness requirements by retaining the experienced and
4 highly skilled employees at Naval Ordinance for Phalanx
5 overhaul and gun systems work.
6 I urge you, in closing, to recommend that the Naval
7 Ordinance Station remain open as a Department of Navy
8 facility, and if that is not possible that your
9 recommendation should include at least assurance that the gun
10 core systems work at Louisville is privatized in place and
11 that the nation retains the co-location of Department of the
12 Navy engineering capability alongside the depot overhaul
13 capabilities that we have in Louisville.
14 I also urge you to be mindful of providing time for
15 a smooth transition from public to private. Again, let me
16 express my gratitude for the continuing work which you and
17 the BRAC staff are doing to make these difficult judgments
18 necessary to reduce our defense infrastructure while
19 preserving a strong national defense. That is what we are
20 all after here, and I appreciate your all's commitment to
21 that. Thank you.
22 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Representative Ward, also a

Page 252

1 very eloquent statement. I'd like to thank the congressional
2 delegation of Kentucky for clearly a very important statement
3 but also flexibility in the process. Thank you very much.
4 We'll stand adjourned for two minutes.
5 (A brief recess was taken.)
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Commission is delighted to see
7 representatives of the Great States of Maine and New
8 Hampshire here, and the Chair is told that it is the desire
9 of the two delegations to proceed with the State of Maine,
10 which is on our list first, beginning with Senator Olympia
11 Snowe, the Distinguished Senator from the Great State of
12 Maine and then go forward and then through the State of New
13 Hampshire and by agreement between the two states close with
14 the Senior Senator from the Great State of Maine, Senator
15 Cohen.
16 Is that understood to be the procedure? And we are
17 delighted to accommodate both states with that request, and
18 if the two states are prepared to go forward, or if those
19 from the State of Maine are prepared to go forward, we're
20 delighted to receive the statement of the Distinguished
21 Senator from the Great State of Maine, Olympia Snowe.
22 Senator Snowe, we're delighted to have you here.

Page 253

1 SENATOR SNOWE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members
2 of the Commission. On behalf of the Maine and New Hampshire
3 delegation, let me first thank all eight Commissioners for
4 visiting Portsmouth Naval Shipyard ten days ago as well as
5 the regional hearing in Boston.
6 We are confident that what you saw and heard
7 confirms what we in the Navy already know to be the case,
8 that America's submarine future and America's naval strength
9 truly runs deep, and its home base is Portsmouth. That's the
10 bottom line.
11 Those responsible for our national security made a
12 military judgment in recommending the retention of
13 Portsmouth. It was based on their professional assessment of
14 the threats confronting this nation in the next century and
15 the force structure required to deal with them.
16 And furthermore, in a report required by law, the
17 GAO reported the Navy's view, and I quote that, "Portsmouth
18 should not be closed because of uncertainties in the future,
19 the Sea Wolf program and the nature of the evolving submarine
20 threat."
21 Clearly, this was a military decision, no more and
22 no less. Admiral Borda, Admiral Demarrs and Vice Admiral

Page 254

1 Sterner all emphatically spoke on behalf of Portsmouth's
2 military value. They said closing Portsmouth was an
3 unacceptable risk and that they needed Portsmouth on the Navy
4 team.
5 They said Portsmouth is a critical asset to the
6 future and that America has an obligation to retain the
7 shipyards needed to support the fleet. They said closing
8 Portsmouth was put us in an unacceptable margin for
9 performing nuclear submarine work.
10 As you can tell, they don't exactly mince words
11 when it comes to Portsmouth, and for good reason. So why is
12 Portsmouth vital to the Navy? Because when it comes to
13 submarines, they know from experience that there is no more
14 modern shipyard than Portsmouth, the only shipyard in the
15 nation public or private that can perform the full range of
16 prepare and maintenance functions on the 688 Class submarine.
17 And it will be the 688 that will make up virtually
18 98 percent of the attack submarine force by the end of the
19 decade. It will be the backbone of our submarine fleet well
20 into the 21st Century at least until the year 2020.
21 Because only one shipyard, Portsmouth, currently
22 supports all 688 requirements, the Navy determined that it

Page 255

1 should be removed from consideration for closure because, and
2 I quote, "its unique role as a center of excellence for the
3 SSN 688 Class submarine," again the Navy's words.
4 In arriving at its determination to retain
5 Portsmouth, the Navy had to consider not just the amount of
6 nuclear shipyard work it had to perform but the type as well.
7 The Navy knows that 58 percent of its nuclear
8 workload will be on submarines in the year 2001, and that is
9 shown in this chart right here, and the Navy knows that even
10 more significantly it already has complex shipyard work
11 planned for the 688 through the year 2018, again shown on
12 this chart and the outline of their work contemplated.
13 In addition, a NAVSEA report stated that over the
14 next ten years the Navy submarine refueling complexes will be
15 93 percent utilized, and NAVSEA stated that the loss of just
16 one of the nation's nuclear shipyards would render its depot
17 maintenance program "inexecutable without creating additional
18 facilities at another location."
19 And that's why at the Boston hearing Admiral
20 Sterner told the Commission that the loss of Portsmouth would
21 pose, in his words, an unacceptable risk to his ability to
22 support the fleet as well as to our national security.

Page 256

1 Those aren't idle words. That's our nation's
2 military leadership, our armed forces speaking out for
3 Portsmouth.
4 To put this in context, the Navy has aggressively
5 used the base closure process to reduce its shore base
6 infrastructure. Since the '91 round, the Navy has
7 recommended closure of four out of eight shipyards, a 50
8 percent reduction.
9 Admiral Sterner said, and I quote again, "The
10 difference is that we no longer have any surplus," and he
11 added, "I don't have a Mare Island to go to." You see, the
12 Navy knows Portsmouth's 5 years' experience with the 688 is
13 unrivaled.
14 The Navy knows Portsmouth was the first naval
15 shipyard to overhaul a 688. The Navy knows Portsmouth was
16 also the first naval shipyard to perform a 688 refueling
17 overhaul. The Navy knows Portsmouth is also the first in
18 overhaul nuclear submarine experience.
19 It has completed more major submarine overhauls
20 than any other shipyard. Furthermore, Admiral Sterner
21 described a submarine refueling overhaul as probably the most
22 complex industrial undertaking known to man, but this is what

Page 257

1 Portsmouth does best, and they're getting more efficient.
2 Its first refueling took 141 days, the second 133
3 days, and the third is projected to take 102 work days. The
4 Navy knows that its crown jewel for submarine overhaul is
5 Portsmouth Covered Dry Dock No. 2, the only dry dock in the
6 entire country currently configured to perform the complex
7 nuclear refueling of a 688.
8 Its unique singular features are a permanent part
9 of that dry dock. They're not portable. They're not
10 interchangeable with any other dry dock anywhere.
11 So knowing these facts, why would anyone want to
12 attempt to replicate a facility that has always been the
13 first and the best at what it does? With the case of
14 Portsmouth, it simply cannot be done.
15 We cannot afford to play a military shell game with
16 a superlative one-of-a-kind shipyard like Portsmouth. In
17 conclusion, I must point out that never before in this
18 process have so many in the Navy said so much in defense of a
19 base that is so critical to the defense of our country.
20 And if I could recall one moment in this process
21 that said it all, it is this: When the Chief of Naval
22 Operations, Admiral Borda, in his only site visit to a base

Page 258

1 in this round stood before all of you at the Portsmouth yard
2 and said, "The Navy not only wants Portsmouth, it needs
3 Portsmouth," and I would add, Mr. Chairman, so does America.
4 Thank you.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you, Senator
6 Olympia Snowe for that very excellent presentation. The
7 Commission is indebted to you, and we're pleased to have from
8 the Maine delegation your Distinguished Congressman
9 Representative James Longley. Congressman Longley.
10 REPRESENTATIVE LONGLEY: Mr. Chairman, members of
11 the Commission, I want to begin by thanking each of you by
12 taking the time that you've taken over this arduous three or
13 four months to carefully review the bases and the facilities
14 that you've been charged with a heavy responsibility for
15 complaining.
16 I don't envy you. As a new member of Congress, it
17 has been overwhelming to me to learn the extent of our
18 national defense issues and how complex they are.
19 I think we all are concerned about the defense
20 industrial base, and to pick up on what Senator Snowe just
21 said to say that we recognize that the industrial base is
22 more than bases. It represents skills, facilities and

Page 259

equipment, but first of all it represents people.

There are particular skills that are unique in the nuclear ship building arena, especially in the nuclear submarine arena. I'm advised, for instance, that it takes a minimum of five to ten years to train anyone from a shipfitter, electrician, pipe fitter, outside machinist.

Let's talk for a minute about a nuclear welder. It's one thing to be a welder. It's something else to be a nuclear qualified welder, and the standards require an ability to literally weld while hanging upside down using a mirror in the confined spaces that one would find in a submarine.

And I think you've all been through the yard. Again, we appreciate your time and energy and devotion to your duty to do that. And if you've been inside a 688 Class submarine, you understand how extremely cramped the work spaces are and yet how highly critical all of the components are that go into that piece of equipment.

Of the remaining nuclear shipyards, there are only four. Portsmouth has conducted 25 refuelings; Puget, 23;, Pearl 11; Norfolk, 3. Portsmouth has clearly provided most of the major refuelings, and as you know, Portsmouth's most

Page 260

recent start was 1994, Puget's 1989, Pearl in 1981 and Norfolk way back in 1972.

Portsmouth is the remaining shipyard with the most refueling experience, the most current refueling experience, and it's the only shipyard with 688 Class refueling experience, and as you know, and you're going to be hearing more about this later, with the uncertainty that we face in the future direction of our submarine program, maintaining the skilled work force with the experience, the superb state-of-the-art facilities at one of the most modern bases in the world -- and I might mention, given the nuclear environment, one of the most secure naval shipyards in the world -- only Portsmouth is in a position to -- Portsmouth is in a very vital position as far as our Navy is concerned.

I want to end on this note, perhaps more of a personal note. Again, I appreciate the energy that each one of you has devoted to the task ahead of you, and in many ways we're all serving our countries or have served our country in different ways.

I was fortunate to serve on active duty during Desert Storm, and there was one particular moment in that experience that I think, perhaps, sums of for me the

Page 261

difficulty of the issues confronting you, and that was on the day that I found myself in Eastern Turkey about to get on a helicopter bringing people across the border in Northern Iraq.

And we're flying at about 15 feet, and a door gunner pulls back the bolt on a 15 caliber machine gun, and thankfully we didn't have to use it, but the significance of the click, the sound of metal on metal that only a veteran can understand still rings in my years, because you realize at that point in time that you are there. You're doing your duty, but your frame of reference is limited.

You have to have faith and confidence in the superiors, the commanders over you, and you recognize that for good or ill your life is in their hands.

And I would only submit that you've heard a lot of technical arguments, a lot of technical issues, but there is a reason why we are charged and you as a Commission are charged to give some amount of deference to the Department of the Navy.

And I would submit that there are adequate reasons on the record for the preservation of the important role that Portsmouth plays. As a veteran, I wanted to underscore the

Page 262

1 fact that there are many, many issues that just may not be on
2 the record that may play into that decision and that only the
3 officers and the commanders who are charged with that most
4 serious responsibility of sending men and women into combat
5 understand.
6 And again, I would end on that. I appreciate very
7 much your courtesy in attending to our arguments today.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
9 Representative James Longley. And we're delighted to have
10 here with you from your Maine delegation your Distinguished
11 Colleague Representative John Baldacci.
12 REPRESENTATIVE BALDACCI: Thank you very much,
13 Mr. Chairman, Distinguished members of the Commission. I'm
14 honored to be before you today to speak about the people of
15 Portsmouth and the valuable experience they bring to the Navy
16 and this country.
17 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard's mission is to provide
18 quality overhaul, repair, refueling and modernization of the
19 nuclear submarines in a safe, timely and cost-effective
20 manner.
21 The experience and skills acquired and handed down
22 since 1914 have made Portsmouth Naval Shipyard the lead

Page 263

1 nuclear facility in the country. These experienced men and
2 women have become experts in their field and have developed
3 efficient techniques over the years.
4 Mr. Chairman, the people at Portsmouth are second
5 to none. It is the Navy's foremost nuclear submarine
6 shipyard successfully and efficiently doing its job for over
7 80 years.
8 This expertise is absolutely essential to the
9 continued strength of the United States naval infrastructure
10 and the national security interest of our nation. The
11 working men and women of the shipyard are proud of this
12 practice addition, and their work ethic will see that the
13 Navy and the country are not disappointed.
14 This expertise cannot be recalled overnight. In
15 fact, it cannot ever. Portsmouth has completed more
16 submarine major availabilities than any other shipyard, which
17 includes eight depot maintenance periods, 32 nonrefueling
18 overhauls and 24 of the highly technical and complex
19 refueling overhauls to date.
20 This also includes the 688 refueling overhaul. A
21 second one is now underway, always on time and done right.
22 My father used to tell me it's cheaper and quicker to do it

Page 264

1 right the first time because it's more expensive to keep
2 doing it over and over again.
3 Portsmouth continues that proud tradition.
4 Portsmouth has been at the cutting edge of submarine
5 technology. It has produced work like the Sea Wolf, the
6 Nautilus, the Tubalee, the Jack, and the Albacore.
7 Furthermore, Portsmouth is the program manager for
8 the Deep Sea Submergence Systems program providing the Navy
9 with the deep sea capabilities. Portsmouth is the only
10 remaining shipyard with 688 Class submarine refueling
11 experience.
12 These submarines are the backbone of our fleet. In
13 addition to performing this crucial task, Portsmouth has the
14 breadth of knowledge and experience to perform work on
15 surface ships as well, including the work on the destroyers,
16 the frigates, the cruisers and Coast Guard cutters.
17 The workers at Portsmouth have become the Navy's
18 experts in performing component parts such as the propulsion
19 shafts and the motor generator sets. Portsmouth has
20 continually proven that it is the most effective nuclear yard
21 in the country by not only providing the essential service to
22 the Navy's nuclear submarines but also by providing a wide

Page 265

1 array of fleet support.
2 Portsmouth is the most reliable, efficient and
3 cost-effective yard in the country for overhauls, depot
4 maintenance records and periods and refuelings of the 688
5 Class submarines. This record serves as a bench mark for
6 other shipyards, and the work performed at Portsmouth is a
7 result of the hard work and breadth of experience of the
8 working people of Maine and New Hampshire, a proud tradition
9 handed down generation by generation.
10 And I am proud to speak to you today about the
11 people who have made Portsmouth a facility that is
12 indispensable to the Navy. Theirs is a tradition of quality
13 work, Yankee ingenuity and more importantly the national
14 security interests of the United States.
15 These people have proven their worth through their
16 unparalleled skill and experience. The Navy has continually
17 expressed the absolute importance of Portsmouth's unique
18 experience to the United States naval fleet.
19 The Department of Defense and top naval officials
20 all realize the unequivocal necessity of maintaining this
21 yard and the experience and proficiency that has been
22 acquired over the last 80 years.

Page 266

1 There is no other public or private yard in the
2 country that is better prepared, equipped or trained than
3 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to overhaul these submarines.
4 We have an express in Maine, if it doesn't broke,
5 don't fix it, and I urge you to keep this national asset
6 because it isn't broke and because it's right for this
7 country. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
9 Baldacci. It is interesting to note that my father told me
10 the same things your father told you, and we've got the same
11 statement in Illinois. If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
12 In all serious any, ladies and gentlemen of the
13 Maine and New Hampshire delegations, the Chair is informed
14 that Representative Bill Zeliff and Representative Charlie
15 Bass may be still on route in a bad weather condition.
16 The best I can offer your delegation is this: We
17 would stay an extra ten minutes this evening. The last
18 testimony is from 6:05 until 6:10. We do not have a slot
19 open between now and then.
20 There have been no cancellations, but if my
21 colleagues will permit, we will accommodate Representative
22 Zeliff and Bass at 6:10 and 6:15, when they get here, if that

Page 267

1 is satisfactory. I'm sorry. It's the best I can do.
2 We're delighted to welcome my old friend the
3 Distinguished Senior Senator from the Great State of New
4 Hampshire, Senator Bob Smith.
5 SENATOR SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
6 you for that courtesy. They may be here before we get
7 finished, but we're not certain of that.
8 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, again
9 thank you for hearing us again. I hope you're not at the
10 saturation level yet. I want to thank you also for visiting
11 the yard, Portsmouth Shipyard, as you did all of you. It
12 shows that you're not only committed to the process but
13 committed to making a fair and informed decision.
14 Today I want to discuss with you the current
15 international security environment and the role of submarines
16 in our national defense. As a member of the Armed Forces
17 Committee, I am constantly analyzing this national security
18 threat, and I can tell you without hesitation that submarine
19 threats to the United States are real, and they're growing.
20 For instance, Russia is continuing to aggressively
21 modernize its nuclear attack submarine force and is placing
22 enormous emphasis on acoustic and magnetic quieting programs,

Page 268

1 and today Russia's front line submarines are as quiet or
2 quieter in some respects than America's best.
3 By the year 2000, the Office of Naval Intelligence
4 estimates that 20 percent of Russia's nuclear powered subs,
5 attack subs, will be quieter than the U.S. Navy's front line
6 improved LA Class submarines.
7 In addition, Russia is exporting highly capable
8 Kirov Class submarines to both Iran and China. These diesel
9 submarines will fundamentally shift the balance of power in
10 Southwest Asia and allow Iran to threaten the sea lanes
11 within and surrounding the Persian Gulf.
12 In China, these submarines will substantially
13 enhance Chinese power projection capabilities and provide the
14 muscle to back China's recently asserted expansion of its
15 territorial waters in the South China Sea.
16 The Office of Naval Intelligence, Mr. Chairman, has
17 released an analysis of worldwide submarine proliferation. I
18 have provided or will provide a copy of that to the Committee
19 if you don't have it.
20 And in particular I want to highlight a quote from
21 Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev from June 8, 1993, in
22 which General Grachev states, and I quote, "A nuclear

Page 269

1 submarine fleet is the future of the armed forces. The
2 number of tanks and guns will be reduced as well as the
3 infantry, but a modern Navy is a totally different thing.
4 The governments of all developed countries understand this
5 very well."
6 The U.S. Navy and will intelligence community have
7 studied this threat very carefully. They have conducted --
8 they have concluded, rather, that the U.S. must maintain a
9 robust, modern submarine fleet to counter the global
10 submarine threat as well as the nuclear maintenance
11 infrastructure to service and maintain our fleet, and this is
12 precisely where Portsmouth fits in.
13 Before I address the military value, let me again
14 emphasize the fluid state of our program. Numerous flag
15 officers have advised me that we need more submarines than
16 are currently programmed.
17 In fact, I've been told we should have 60 to 65
18 rather than the 40 to 45 to 55 that are funded in the current
19 administration program. The only way we can reach these
20 levels is to refuel additional LA Class submarines. Again,
21 this is where Portsmouth fits in.
22 Portsmouth is the only shipyard that has performed

Page 270

1 and is currently performing refueling overhauls on these
2 subs. It's a true national asset. I want to emphasize that
3 there is a big, big difference between a defueling or an
4 inactivation of a submarine and a refueling overhaul which
5 extends its service life.
6 Defuelings are relatively small, relatively
7 uncomplicated work packages; whereas refueling overhauls
8 entail roughly seven times as many man days as defueling and
9 are extremely complex.
10 Let me summarize, Mr. Chairman, examine conclude my
11 presentation with a couple of brief observations. Submarine
12 threats to our nation are real, and they're growing. The
13 size and nature of our future submarine fleet is indefinite
14 and is very likely to increase above the levels funded in the
15 current administration budget.
16 Portsmouth is the only naval shipyard that performs
17 all LA Class requirements, including lead engineering. The
18 closure of Portsmouth would result in the cumulative loss of
19 50 percent of Navy's nuclear capable shipyards, 73 percent of
20 naval ship depot maintenance activities and reduce total
21 shipyard excess capacity to an unacceptable level of only 1
22 percent.

Page 271

It would leave the Atlantic Fleet with only a single naval shipyard providing dedicated support to its assets. Members of the Commission, today's national security environment is uncertainty translates into risk.

If down the road we determine that Portsmouth is no longer necessary, then we can close it, but if you close it now and we find out we need it later, there is nothing we can do it.

And that is why the Navy so forcefully made the presentation that it made to you personally with Admiral Demarrs and with Admiral Borda. It is why Admiral Borda delayed his trip to Bosnia to be there personally to tell you that.

And I would just say in conclusion, we went through a closure a few years ago at Pease Air Force Base. The entire New Hampshire congressional delegation supported the closure of that base because it had contributed to national security and was no longer needed.

For 200 years, Portsmouth has contributed to national security, and it is still very much needed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,

Page 272

Senator Bob Smith for that fine presentation from the Great State of New Hampshire, and we're pleased to have your Distinguished Colleague, Senator Judd Gregg here as well, and we recognize Senator Gregg.

SENATOR GREGG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of your Commission. I appreciate your courtesy, as we all do. I understand that you're going to hear – or I read in the paper you're going to hear from over 200 members of Congress today. That, sort of, gives new meanings to the term cruel and unusual punishment, and I admire you.

I also want to thank you for taking the time as an entire Commission for coming to New Hampshire and visiting with us and seeing what we think is an extraordinary facility.

In a unique and ironic way, this has created a great relationship between our two states. The enthusiasm and the energy which our communities have pulled together in support of Portsmouth has been a special event.

And so although we would rather not have gone through this process, we feel that there has been some positive coming out of it through the pride and energy that we've been able to demonstrate on behalf of our wonderful

Page 273

facility.

I would give you, basically, five words as to why Portsmouth should remain open – nuclear, nuclear, nuclear, nuclear, nuclear. I'll give you a sixth, nuclear.

This is a unique facility. Once closed, it will not be closed or reconstituted anywhere else. You could not, in this century or the next, site a nuclear shipyard on an open – on a port, a major seaport anywhere in this country without going through literally tens if not hundreds or twenties of years, many, many years, in any event.

You could not replace the workers who would be lost. This is not a facility where the workers have been trained in a few months, a few years. They've been trained by generations, generations of individuals going from father to son, father to daughter, daughter to son working at this facility and learning the art of dealing with a ship that is extraordinarily complex and brings with it the questions of how you deal with a nuclear overhaul.

And you could not reconstitute a customized facility of this nature, which has been built specifically for the purpose of overhauling the nuclear submarine which is the backbone of the Navy fleet, the 688 Class.

Page 274

So it is a facility which cannot be replicated. There has, as we know, been some discussion of, well, wouldn't the private yards do this. And is it possible that you could shift this work to the private yards, but the cost of shifting it would be exorbitant, and the capacity to have those yards up to speed would be time expensive to say nothing of the loss of work force that you would incur.

So you're not really sure that you could produce the same product in a private yard, and what you are sure of is that once you went to a private yard you could never reconstitute a public yard.

And as the Navy has so appropriately stated on a number of instances before this panel, the need to have public control over the ability to refurbish its ships, especially its nuclear ships, is absolutely critical to carrying out its mission.

The loss would be unique, and it would be irreplaceable if this yard were to be closed. As Admiral Demarrs I think summarized it really well, to error on the side of closing this yard would be an error which, if it were proved not to be an appropriate decision would cost the Navy the capacity to adequately defend this nation.

Page 275

To error on the side of keeping this yard open is to still give you the opportunity later on to take another look at that as appropriate. We don't happen to think it will be, but if appropriate you could look again in a few years, but you would at least have the yard and the facility there for the next generation to use.

There is no question but if we are to pursue a national defense policy which is based on the use of the submarine and the nuclear submarine that you must have the capacity to overhaul the nuclear submarine.

And there is no question but the premier yard and the only yard, for that matter, which has the capacity to overhaul the nuclear submarine in the public sector is the shipyard in Portsmouth.

And therefore, we strongly support and hope that you will also the continuation of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard as our only nuclear overhaul facility in the public sector for submarines. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Senator Judd Gregg, for a very fine presentation. And the Chair is pleased to see that Representative Bill Zeliff has weathered the storm. We're honored you would come and contribute.

Page 276

Representative Bill Zeliff of New Hampshire.

REPRESENTATIVE ZELIFF: We thank you very much, and I also would like to thank the Chair for your willingness to give us time at the end and re-juggle and be flexible as we did just arrive. So thank you, sir.

I also want to thank all the members of the Commission for going out to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and see firsthand that beautiful facility.

Chairman Dixon and Commissioners, I would like to address the economic implications associated with the closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and amplify a few points that were presented in Boston on the 3rd of June.

You first heard Governor King speak to the grave economic impact that the closure would cause to the local communities in the states of New Hampshire and Maine. You then heard Governor Merrill speak to the difficulties associated with the redevelopment of Pease Air Force Base closed by BRAC '91.

It is the latter topic that I would like to address this afternoon. We note that private buyers are not rushing in to purchase real estate at closing military bases anywhere in the country.

Page 277

1 Local communities face large utility and
2 maintenance bills for streets, power and water as bases
3 close. As a matter of fact, at this time the City of
4 Portsmouth and the Pease Development Authority are at an
5 impasse at how to pay for or who will pay for the
6 improvements to the water treatment infrastructure at the
7 former Pease Air Force Base.
8 Recently, U.S. News and World Report pointed out
9 that base closure property in the San Francisco Bay area sits
10 vacant and unused. Buyers are simply not stepping forward to
11 purchase these properties.
12 The cost to maintain utilities is too large for
13 local communities or potential investors to absorb. Pease
14 Air Force Base has its share of ups and downs, I can assure
15 you. While it is viewed as a success story overall, the
16 final chapters have yet to be written.
17 Redevelopment has occurred, and plans for the
18 future do continue, but as Governor Merrill pointed out there
19 is other land both available and being marketed more
20 successfully for potential investors in the local community.
21 Environmental issues at Pease makes competing for
22 investors more challenging. Right now a lawsuit instigated

Page 278

1 by an out-of-state private environmental organization has
2 prevented any transfer of property from the Air Force to the
3 local redevelopment authority for the next several years.
4 Fortunately, an advantage Pease has over other
5 closed bases is its land development characteristics. This
6 includes an airstrip that can be used by an aviation investor
7 and fairly substantial plots of land to facilitate
8 construction which would include adequate parking facilities
9 for employees.
10 In spite of these advantages, investors are not
11 waiting in line. Adding Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and this
12 is, again, a facility that is two miles up the road, into the
13 economic equation presents an entirely different picture.
14 Bear in mind that I said Portsmouth is a mere –
15 and I said two miles – two to three miles away from the
16 former Pease Air Force Base, which puts it not only in the
17 same town but in the same economic market.
18 Closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has extremely
19 grave consequences not only for the City of Portsmouth but
20 also for any further development of Pease. Attempts at
21 redevelopment and/or conversion in an already economically
22 depressed area would be difficult at best.

Page 279

1 The situation would be compounded by the fact that
2 the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard does not have the advantages
3 for redevelopment and/or conversion that were noted for
4 Pease.
5 Short of a like ship repair industry assuming the
6 entire real estate, attracting potential investors to parts
7 and pieces of the heavily industrialized facility will be
8 extremely difficult.
9 The shipyard has a central utility system for
10 electricity, water, sewer and heating. These services are
11 all underground. All buildings are heated with steam or hot
12 water from the central power plant.
13 Investors would have to place heat systems into
14 individual buildings. Other difficulties potential multiple
15 tenants would have to face would include buildings that do
16 not meet current state and local building codes.
17 Fifty-eight buildings are on the register of
18 historic places, which limits the scope and the nature of any
19 renovation projects, buildings constructed with individual
20 offices rather than open spaces, building density that
21 prohibits new construction without demolition of existing
22 structures, parking lots that are not centrally located near

Page 280

1 the high occupancy office and shop buildings.
2 Access is limited to 2 two-lane bridges. Two
3 prehistoric archeological sites have been identified and
4 would have to be managed by the local community.
5 Assuming all of the above problems were overcome,
6 one must return to the fact that heavy industry is moving to
7 foreign shores, leaving the ever-growing service industry
8 here in the United States. With this transition, some jobs
9 that are less technical command lower salaries.
10 Regardless of how successful redevelopment
11 commissions are in converting real estate in the region, they
12 will never offset the bottom line dollar and economic impacts
13 of closing both Pease Air Force Base and Portsmouth Naval
14 Shipyard.
15 In summary, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
16 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard remains a vital Navy asset, a vital
17 community technological base and a vital part of our local
18 economic community.
19 The Navy and the community would never recover from
20 this loss. Actually, Mr. Chairman, it would be devastating.
21 We implore you to listen to the Navy, the Department of
22 Defense and the GAO and your visit up there, and we just hope

Page 281

1 and pray that for all those reasons that the Portsmouth Naval
2 Shipyard will remain a vital part of our future defense for
3 our country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
5 Representative Zeliff, and we're delighted to see that your
6 Colleague, Congressman Charlie Bass is here, also survived
7 the weather. Representative Charlie Bass.
8 REPRESENTATIVE BASS: Thank you very much,
9 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. It's a pleasure
10 to be here, and I really appreciate you're accommodating us
11 today. We've had a very active trip down from New Hampshire,
12 as you alluded to.
13 I also appreciate the opportunity to appear here
14 today to testify on behalf of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
15 Although the shipyard is not located within my district, it
16 is nonetheless a very critical issue to the State of New
17 Hampshire, obviously the State of Maine and Northern
18 Massachusetts as well as, in my opinion, the strategic
19 interests of the United States.
20 However, I am here today to discuss with you the
21 validity of the cost of base realignment action model or
22 COBRA as it's called as a decision factor in your

Page 282

1 deliberations on Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
2 While the COBRA model is acceptable as a one size
3 fits all tool for estimating closure or realignment costs,
4 its use as major decision criterion is questionable for two
5 reasons.
6 First, like any structured analytical model, the
7 COBRA is only as good as the data or input it receives from
8 the service analysts. For BRAC '95, we believe that the data
9 provided by the Navy analysts significantly overstates the
10 20-year net present value savings for Portsmouth Naval
11 Shipyard.
12 As an example, in BRAC '93, the 20-year net present
13 value savings for Portsmouth and several other large nuclear
14 capable shipyards was approximately $680 million each. In
15 BRAC '95, the 20-year savings for Portsmouth was computed to
16 be 2.3 billion. This is nearly a four-fold increase over the
17 BRAC '93 for a shipyard that now has 20 percent fewer
18 positions than it did in BRAC '93.
19 I guess it makes one wonder what happened between
20 1993 and 1995. An independent analysis also shows that the
21 20-year savings for Portsmouth Naval Shipyard should be no
22 more than about one half of the savings provided by the Navy

Page 283

COBRA model.

In conducting the independent analysis, they took a conservative approach, even going so far as to use some of the Navy's desired performance goals, goals that have never been attained by any shipyard in recent history.

Yet, we were compelled to correct other Navy data when the data clearly overstated the real cost of closure. For example, in BRAC '95, Navy analysts erroneously moved only direct labor workload from closure scenario shipyards to gaining shipyards in developing their closure cost.

This implies that gaining shipyards can accomplish the realignment work with no indirect or overhead and leave allowances. There isn't a business operation public or private that can reasonably make that assumption. Overhead costs to include leave are normal in the expected cost of any business.

Now, my time does not allow me to provide you with an in-depth COBRA analysis and especially the methods used by the Navy to generate input data that overstates savings.

Mr. Jackson of your staff has been provided with extensive details on this independent analysis, and it will reveal a much lower 20-year savings for Portsmouth.

Page 284

Also, as the Navy testified during the Joint Cross Service hearing on the 17th of April, the COBRA model guarantees significant savings in all cases of depot activity closure vis-a-vis realignment scenarios.

In fact, the bigger industrial activity, the bigger the industrial activity the greater the savings. Therefore, if COBRA savings are significant decision criteria, then larger shipyards should have been considered.

The second question concerning COBRA is whether or not it is a true representation of true costs of closing a base. As mentioned by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Borda, during the visit to Portsmouth a couple weeks ago, COBRA does not include the total cost of closure.

As you are well aware, environmental cleanup and civilian conversion costs, among others, are specifically not included in the COBRA model, but these real bottom line costs should be considered and should not be ignored.

In closing, I hope that you will seriously consider the following factors: One, the COBRA results provided are grossly overstated by virtue of inaccurate input data.

Number two, the COBRA results do not make a complete assessment of total closure costs; and thirdly, the

Page 285

COBRA results may be viewed as a short-term windfall when, in reality, any savings is spread thinly over 20 years.

The COBRA results could lead one to believe the closure of Portsmouth is a sound financial decision. Commissioners, in reality, it is not. And I thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much, Congressman Charlie Bass for that fine contribution on behalf of the State of New Hampshire and your region. And we're pleased to recognize to close for the Great States of Maine and New Hampshire the Distinguished Senior Senator from the Great State of Maine my old friend Bill Cohen. Senator Bill Cohen.

SENATOR COHEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. Let me add to all of the other statements that have preceded me. My thanks to all of you for visiting Portsmouth. It was unprecedented, and I think it did, in fact, reflect the great dedication that all of you have given to this job.

I'm not sure that everyone anticipated what was involved in the job before taking it, but we've seen an example of the hard work that you've all put in it.

Page 286

1 Mr. Chairman, based on the regional hearing that
2 was held in Boston and knowing how much of a premium you put
3 on brevity, especially the retroactive endorsement of my
4 former opponent in 1990 --
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: A thing for which I offer my
6 humblest apologies. I did not know he ran against you, and I
7 withdraw the remarks.
8 SENATOR COHEN: He ran a fine campaign, and the
9 result was much appreciated by me, but I'll try to stay well
10 within the five minutes allotted to me.
11 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, three
12 consecutive BRAC procedures the Navy and Defense Department
13 have strongly supported Portsmouth over other naval yards
14 with relative or comparable skills and capabilities such as
15 Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards.
16 And they've done so for the sole purpose of
17 reducing excess capacity while maximizing the remaining
18 assets in its core facilities. They selected Portsmouth to
19 remain its premier nuclear submarine overhaul and ship repair
20 yard for three principal reasons.
21 Senator Gregg said there were six. I'll just give
22 you three. I told him before I was a bit more conservative

Page 287

1 than him, but I'll give you three, and they don't begin with
2 nuclear. They begin with E -- experience, expertise and
3 efficiency.
4 Portsmouth, as you've heard through Congressman
5 Longley, it's the yard that has the most overall experience,
6 the most recent refueling experience and the only shipyard
7 with a 688 Class refueling experience.
8 Another key point is that the average amount of
9 experience that the workers have at Portsmouth is 15 years,
10 15 years of experience. And that expertise, in turn, has led
11 to the kinds of efficiencies which I think all of you bore
12 witness to during the course of your visit.
13 There was and is a place for everything at that
14 yard, and as you noticed, nothing was out of place. And I
15 think this accounts for the Navy decision to name Portsmouth
16 as the Center for Excellence.
17 As Admiral Borda pointed out during your visit, if
18 Portsmouth were to be closed, it could not be simply
19 eliminated or wiped off the books. It would have to be
20 replicated elsewhere, and that would cost the Navy valuable
21 time and money, time and money it doesn't have.
22 There is, of course, the further complicating

Page 288

1 factor as where would that replication take place. Private
2 yards are not currently facilitized to handle the refueling
3 and overhaul of 688 Class submarines.
4 And as I mentioned during the hearings in Boston,
5 the congressional funding uncertainties I think make any
6 consideration of turning over such work to the private yards
7 an unreasonable risk.
8 It would be possible, as others have said, given
9 enough time and money, to train a work force to the level of
10 proficiency that currently is exhibited at Portsmouth in
11 order to replicate this capability in another public yard,
12 but the Navy and Defense Department have made the million
13 father judgment not to concentrate all of its nuclear eggs in
14 either one or two baskets.
15 Today once again we heard the advocates for Long
16 Beach urge the Commission to reverse and overrule the Defense
17 Department's judgment by closing Portsmouth and keeping Long
18 Beach open.
19 Once again let me respond by saying the two yards
20 are not at all comparable. They possess entirely different
21 functions, skills and capabilities, and to equate the two it
22 seems to me -- and seek to trade them off would undermine the

Page 289

1 Navy's goal of preserving a unique nuclear asset and maximize
2 its military value.
3 Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me say that the
4 Navy needs Portsmouth because of its experience in submarine
5 design, construction, overhaul and refueling work developed
6 during the past 80 years.
7 The men and women of Portsmouth possess the skills
8 and the discipline, the dedication to perform the most
9 complicated of work, and that is the overhaul and refueling
10 of submarines.
11 Congressman Baldacci offered you a personal note,
12 and I'd like to close with one of my own. He and I are from
13 different parties, and we're also from the same home town.
14 My father and family are in the business of making bread, and
15 his family is in the business of serving Italian food.
16 Together, the two of them – my father is now 86,
17 still works 18 hours a day -- his family and my family have a
18 combined level of experience exceeding well over 100 years.
19 There is one rule that both of our families understand is if
20 you got a great product, don't change it.
21 It is my fervent hope that you will conclude that
22 the Navy has got a great product, it made the right decision

Page 290

1 for the right reasons and that you will affirm the Defense
2 Department's judgment to retain Portsmouth for the Navy's
3 future and for the nation's security, and I thank you very
4 much.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Senator
6 Cohen, and I thank you for that fine presentation on behalf
7 of your two states, congratulate both the State of Maine and
8 the State of New Hampshire for that very fine presentation to
9 the Commission and for Senator Cohen's summation.
10 And we will now hear from the Great State of
11 Maryland – from my colleague and friend, the Senior Senator
12 from the great state of Maryland, prepared to make his
13 presentation for his state.
14 SENATOR SARBANES: When do our five minutes start,
15 Mr. Chairman, before I answer that question?
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Only when you start talking,
17 Senator Sarbanes. I'm delighted to present to the Commission
18 distinguished Senior Senator from the State of Maryland,
19 Senator Paul Sarbanes. And your time starts now.
20 SENATOR SARBANES: Well, Mr. Chairman and members
21 of the Commission, we appreciate this opportunity to come
22 again before you. We want to thank the Commission and its

Page 291

1 staff for the courtesies they've shown to us over this
2 process. We've had a very good interaction both with the
3 individual commissioners, and with the staff. And we're very
4 appreciative of that.
5 Many of the arguments you've heard before – we
6 hope to summarize them very quickly here today. And I want
7 to very quickly cover – state wide, my colleagues from the
8 particular districts will address the facilities within their
9 districts. We believe that the recommendations are faulty in
10 many respects, and we want to highlight some of the principle
11 areas where we believe the department deviated substantially
12 from the Commission's Base Closure and Realignment criteria.
13 There are two facilities that have been through a
14 previous BRAC, and the recommendations this time would, in
15 effect, reverse past decision. I want to touch on those very
16 quickly. Two years ago, BRAC unanimously rejected the
17 recommendation of the department to disestablish the
18 Annapolis Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center.
19 We don't think anything has changed to reconsider
20 that decision. In fact, we think the arguments are even –
21 even stronger, particularly given the work they're doing in
22 non-CFC research and development. There's no excess capacity

Page 292

1 at Annapolis. The cost estimates are wrong. The Navy said
2 they could move machinery and personnel, this time, for the
3 same cost they were only moving personnel the last time.
4 The Base Structure Evaluation Committee has
5 acknowledged those estimates are faulty; that it's used the
6 wrong base operating data. The data we've reviewed indicate
7 that the figure is low by at least $58 million. Secondly, if
8 you close it, you lose some very important military
9 facilities. The Deep Ocean Pressure and Submarine Dynamics
10 facilities, which members have seen, which were considered to
11 be vital to the Navy's mission.
12 But most importantly, we lose a dedicated team of
13 scientists, engineers, and technicians, which will reduce the
14 Navy's Machinery R&D capability. And I want to underscore
15 the importance of that. Finally, we can get real savings
16 there by consolidating the joint spectrum command. 1993 BRAC
17 approved the recommendation that the headquarters of the
18 Naval Sea Systems Command move from high cost lease space in
19 Crystal City to the Navy's White Oak facility.
20 Here again, we see no reason this decision should
21 be reopened as it's now proposed to do, by going to the Navy
22 Yard. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff talked about

Page 293

1 the unique wind pipe -- Hyper Velocity Wind Tunnel
2 facility – a unique national capability, which we cannot
3 afford to lose. If you try to duplicate those facilities,
4 you're talking about hundreds of millions -- hundreds of
5 millions of dollars.
6 The Navy itself concedes it's more expensive to go
7 to the Navy Yard than to go to White Oak. And we think the
8 previous decision of the BRAC should remain in place.
9 Thirdly, Fort Ritchie provides critical support for Site R.
10 We think there's a synergism between their existing tenants
11 and their customers, located primarily on the east coast.
12 The cost analysis of the Department of Defense was
13 egregiously in error.
14 In fact, more than 60 percent in error, and we
15 think that the savings analysis was so severely flawed, that
16 it cast doubt over the whole recommendation of the
17 Department. And we think there's a very strong rationale for
18 keeping Fort Ritchie open. The Army Publication Distribution
19 Center in Baltimore is a very efficient operation.
20 We urge the Commission to use the authority which
21 it has to request that Baltimore be removed from the BRAC
22 list, and then be part of a fair and independent study of a

Page 294

1 DOD-wide consolidation of publication distribution centers.
2 We believe there are tremendous savings that can be realized
3 if they consolidate throughout the Department of Defense the
4 publication distribution centers.
5 The Army's consolidating here, but that's sort of
6 oblivious to what could be done if you address the other
7 service branches. The Fort Meade Kimbrough Hospital – we
8 think a tremendous presentation was made to this Commission
9 by the community group at that time we had the hearing in
10 Baltimore, where they clearly demonstrated, in our opinion,
11 that downsizing Kimbrough will not save money.
12 That was a dynamite presentation, and we think that
13 the way to actually realize cost savings is to maintain that
14 facility at its present level. And finally, I want to touch
15 very quickly on the Naval Medical Research Institute in
16 Bethesda. We support the proposals to shift some of those
17 activities to the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research in
18 Fort Glen, Maryland – Forest Glen, Maryland. We think that
19 makes sense.
20 We do not think though that the man-diving research
21 component ought to be moved to Panama City. The head of the
22 Deep Submergence Branch for the Navy raises concerns about

Page 295

that shift. He thinks it should remain where it is, with the adequate existing research facilities, which otherwise would be lost. So, we think that part of that little piece ought not to take place. That, very quickly, is a quick review of the facilities in Maryland.

My colleagues will develop -- the Congress people will develop the facilities within their district in greater detail. Again, let me thank the Commission for its courtesies, and we look forward to continuing to interact closely with you as you approach your decision making at the end of the month. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank the distinguished Senior Senator from the great State of Maryland. We're delighted to see his great colleague, the great lady and the great United States Senator from the State of Maryland, my old friend, Senator Barbara Mikulski.

SENATOR MIKULSKI: Thank you very much Chairman Dixon, and I would like to thank you, all of the commissioners, and your staff for the way that you've approached this BRAC 1995. You've conducted yourself with professionalism, patience, and a very definite hands-on approach. We in Maryland are grateful for the fact that each

Page 296

one of our bases was visited by a commissioner, and often by more than one.

You've listened attentively to the workers and to the community. And you've poured over thousands and thousands of pages of documentation. We in Maryland come to you, not with hand wringing, or whining, but we come to you to advocate our bases on the basis of your own criteria: Military value, and service to the nation. That's why we think these bases in Maryland should be left intact. We make our strong case, really, on three -- on a triad.

One, because they have a unique physical and intellectual infrastructure. Often in each one of the bases, they are one-of-a-kind facilities that cannot be replaced. And last, but not at all least, we have a work force that is highly talented, completely dedicated, and brings the same patriotism as the United States military that they seek to support. You've met the people in our Maryland bases. You saw their skills, their extraordinary work ethic. Mr. Chairman, they work by the book.

They don't work by the clock. You've been also there to see the facilities, and seen the technologies that cannot be duplicated anywhere in the world. It would either

Page 297

be expensive, or difficult to recreate. Also, our military facilities are in close proximity to civilian laboratories, outstanding higher education institutions, always with availability of new knowledge, as well as the entire support of the Pentagon.

In the private sector, these areas would be called centers of excellence, not to be -- to be fostered, not by bases to be closed. When Commissioner Cox visited the Naval Surface Warfare Center at White Oak, she saw the wind tunnel that General Shatley spoke so eloquently of, as well as our ocean chamber.

When others visited the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Annapolis, they saw one of the most productive labs in the Navy, where they developed the quietest faced, safest, fastest, ships and submarines in the world. The one-of-the-kind facilities, like the Deep Ocean Simulation facility, cannot be replicated. There, 82 percent of the work force are scientists and engineers, backed up by a highly trained work force, who work hands-on with the engineers.

This is something the private sector would love to have. And a word about the Army Publications Distribution Center -- I support Senator Sarbane's recommendation to take

Page 298

it off of BRAC, and do a DOD evaluation. But if you came to the Publications Center, you would see that it's fully automated, and that when our troops are called up, they don't reach for their documents, they reach for their weapons.

But at Middle River, you will see that they pack up the documents, go right across the street to the National Guard, and ship them to anywhere in the world that our military is. We essentially have our own military federal express, right there at Fort Meade -- excuse me, at Middle River, and we don't want to see it closed. And at Fort Meade, we have the Kimbrough Hospital, which is very important to backing up not only the United States military, but to the retired federal employees.

And up at Fort Ritchie, you once again visited Site R, an underground Pentagon, and saw how men and women of Fort Ritchie provide unique and vital support to make sure it's fit for duty, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. These facilities are not superfluous. Many of them we saw in full operation during Desert Storm.

When the commander in chief dialed 911, whether it was to Fort Ritchie, whether it was for Kimbrough to stand sentry to receive casualties, whether it was the Army

Page 299

Publication Center to do the back up for the military, they were on the job, just as they are now. And they are not superfluous, and I believe that in this new world order, they need to be there to stand sentry, and be ready as they currently are.

And our federal laboratories provide those smart technologies for our smart soldiers. Technology cannot be a substitute for character or conviction, but they can certainly back up the military that has it. We were able to bring CPT Scott O'Grady home because he had the technology there in Bosnia as he hid out to signal where he was. It was our United States military going on with their anti-jammer, and all the other technology that brought him home.

He recognized a higher power in which he placed himself. But while he placed himself in the hands of a higher power, we want to make sure we have the smart weapons to back up our super smart patriotic soldiers. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much for that fine presentation by you and your colleague, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Barbara Mikulski, on behalf of the great State of Maryland. And we're pleased to see a great leader from the House, my old friend, Representative Steny Hoyer.

Page 300

Congressman Hoyer.

REPRESENTATIVE HOYER: Thank you very much, members of the Commission. You've been at this since 9:00. I'm trying to think of something I could say -- some bells and whistles that would make this a little different. But I'm pleased to join Senator Sarbanes and Senator Mikulski in talking about the base closure process. I want to thank all of you for your attention. I particularly want to thank Rebecca Cox for taking the time to visit with us, and others of you who have visited with us.

Our citizens, as you know Mr. Chairman, and I think as others of you may know, have supported the state's Army, Navy, Air Force and Department of Defense installations in Maryland. And I know that at the May 14th regional hearing, many of you saw first hand the tremendous relationship that exists with the facilities that have been targeted in the state.

I first want to comment, Mr. Chairman, briefly on the Secretary's proposal to move much of the Naval Air -- Warfare Center's Aircraft Division at Lakehurst, New Jersey, to the Pax River Naval Air Station. Previous commissions have moved personnel from two elements of the aircraft

Page 301

1 division -- Warminster in Trenton, as well as headquarters of
2 the Naval Air Systems Command to the station. We have
3 created an unparalleled facility for test and evaluation of
4 Naval aircraft at Pax.
5 The 700 jobs that would transfer from Lakehurst
6 would further enhance the synergism of that base. Clearly,
7 Patuxent River will be an enormous asset to the Navy, the
8 Department of Defense, and to our country as we enter the
9 next century. The Southern Maryland community has welcomed
10 the other relocations with open arms, and I want to assure
11 you that they will work closely with the Navy to ensure the
12 smooth transfer for the men and women from Lakehurst.
13 While I urge you to approve this recommendation, I
14 join with the delegation in asking you to reject several
15 others. Before I do, however, let me also say that, again,
16 not on your list is the continuing consolidation of
17 energetics work in the Navy at Indian Head. I turned around
18 and talked to somebody from -- who used to be from Indian
19 Head.
20 When O'Grady got out of the F-16, he was propelled
21 out by a cab pad -- a cartridge or propellant activated
22 device, which got him very quickly out of the plane as you

Page 302

1 have to get out -- that was done at Indian Head. Indian Head
2 is whole under the proposal. I know the Commission will keep
3 it as such. I want to talk about, as my colleagues have
4 done, about the Kimbrough Army Hospital at Fort Meade.
5 It has a long and -- history, as a vital part of
6 the service we offer to soldiers stationed at Fort Meade, and
7 to many military retirees in the region. It also fulfills
8 unique round the clock needs of the National Security Agency.
9 So it is a very purple type activity. The community is
10 preparing cost data for the Commission, which I hope you will
11 review carefully, and I know you will.
12 I also want to encourage you to take a closer look
13 at the Naval Surface Warfare Center's Annapolis Detachment.
14 The center's machinery work requires specialized facilities
15 that the Navy cannot afford to duplicate elsewhere, despite
16 our need to accelerate submarine research. We can't afford
17 to lose our submarine silencing capability, or the people who
18 make it work. And I ask you to duplicate the '93 Commissions
19 unanimous vote against this proposal.
20 The move the Naval Sea Systems Command to White Oak
21 continues to make sense. The Navy recommended it two years
22 ago. They've changed their mind. But, ladies and gentlemen

Page 303

1 of the Commission, it made sense then, and it makes sense
2 now. A proposal to locate space at Naval Air Force Systems
3 Command with NAVSEA at White Oak: Like the co-locations at
4 Pax River, this proposal has the potential to create enormous
5 synergism.
6 And I hope you will approve it. You will be
7 hearing from -- when I say approve it, approve the move, and
8 reject the Navy's proposal. You will be hearing from my
9 colleagues about the equally strong arguments for the Army
10 Publications Distribution Center in Baltimore, and Fort
11 Ritchie, in Cascade. Mr. Chairman, I trust that each of you
12 will carefully consider all the information available to you
13 on Maryland installations.
14 I thank each of you, and all of your staff for the
15 time you have spent. This is a very time consuming, and very
16 difficult task you have taken on. For a citizen to give so
17 much time from very active and productive and financially
18 rewarding lives is a great benefit to our country. My
19 experience in '91 and in '93 is that you will make
20 conscientious decisions based upon what you think is best for
21 America.
22 We will continue in the next few days between now

Page 304

1 and the 21st, 22nd of June, to discuss with you and your
2 staff the possible alternatives to some of the proposals that
3 you have before you that were made by the Department of
4 Defense, and actions that you took yourself, which did not
5 necessarily involve our state. In that time frame, we hope
6 that we will convince you that the testimony you've heard
7 today is given, yes, in the light of those of us who
8 represent Maryland.
9 But I want to tell you, Mr. Chairman and members of
10 the Commission, I don't think in '93, Southern Maryland, Pax
11 River, Saint Indigos and Indian Head won because Steny Hoyer
12 advocated them, or it was good for Maryland. The Commission
13 made a determination of what was good for America; what was
14 good for our defense capability.
15 We believe that the work done in Maryland,
16 particularly the high-tech work that is critical even in a
17 downsized environment, and the people that we have in
18 Maryland, are the kind of people that we want to continue to
19 have working on behalf of our country. Thank you very much
20 for the opportunity to be with you.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: (Presiding.) (Mike off) --
22 believe it is your time now. If -- we appreciate your

Page 305

1 comments.
2 REPRESENTATIVE EHRLICH: Thank you Mr. Chairman;
3 members of the Commission. I want to thank the Senators,
4 too. Senators Mikulski and Sarbanes for all of their great
5 help. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I'm a
6 freshman, and I've never been through this process before,
7 but I have to tell you that --
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: That makes two of us.
9 REPRESENTATIVE EHRLICH: -- I hope to never repeat
10 this process. And I'm sure that that makes two of us, as
11 well. I received a phone call a day or two after I was
12 elected, and I was flushed with the thrill of victory at that
13 time, and it was some people from Middle River at the
14 publications depot in Middle River, Maryland, and they wanted
15 me to come down to visit. And obviously, they had some
16 foresight and they had heard through the grapevine that they
17 could end up on BRAC.
18 And I went down there, Mr. Chairman and members of
19 the Commission, as a -- prior to being sworn in, and I have
20 to tell you, I was impressed with what I saw. You all, I
21 know, were impressed by what you saw at the regional hearings
22 on May 4th at UMBC, really -- I cannot add to what is

Page 306

1 included in this booklet that the fine people of Middle River
2 presented to you on May 4th, and have put together. But I
3 would like to emphasize a few points.
4 The first few points concern the Army's
5 justification for consolidation. And, as it's stated in the
6 booklet, the Army claims that this is a manual operation. As
7 Senator Mikulski said, this is in no way a manual operation.
8 Baltimore is fully automated. It employs a fully integrated
9 warehouse system. It monitors from orders from start to
10 finish. It is truly state of the art.
11 In fact, personnel from the private sector come in
12 to see the way, in fact, they perform their jobs at Middle
13 River. Secondly, the Army claims that consolidation would
14 combine the wholesale and retail functions of St. Louis and
15 Baltimore, and I would just direct your attention to Figure 4
16 in the booklet, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission --
17 Baltimore has, for many years, engaged in both retail and
18 wholesale -- and that simply is not correct.
19 Lastly, the Army states that, combining the two
20 leases -- two expensive leases into one would be less costly.
21 The fact is, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, St.
22 Louis admits it cannot stop all of what Baltimore has, and,

Page 307

1 in fact, it has admitted that it would have to get another
2 facility at Granite City, Missouri, in order to fulfill -- in
3 order to fill, in fact, the stock from Baltimore.
4 The folks in Baltimore are a family. That struck
5 me my first day. It struck members of my staff, and I know
6 it struck the members of your staff during their visit.
7 These people sweat together, they work together on behalf of
8 our country. Think about this statistic: they average one
9 turnover, every 15 years. One turnover, every 15 years.
10 They believe in one another. They are a true family.
11 I understand that term is overused many, many
12 times. Particularly in the context of BRAC. Your staff has
13 been there. You've seen it. I've seen it. I've been
14 impressed. Moreover, they've won the awards -- they've won
15 Vice President Gore's Hammer Award, as you all know. And
16 this year, they are finalists in the Army Communities of
17 Excellence contest as well.
18 The bottom line here is, Mr. Chairman and members
19 of the Commission, we do not want to punish success. That is
20 the bottom line to what these people have done. They live
21 it, they work it, they sweat it, they believe it. They're
22 friends, and they have certainly impressed me and my staff.

Page 308

1 But all is not in the negative, because we not only disagree
2 with what the Army said, but we have a remedy for you.
3 And as you all know, that remedy is consolidating
4 all of DOD's publication centers into two or three regional
5 centers, turning a negative into a positive. We respectfully
6 ask that a joint cross-service study into DOD consolidation
7 be made. We believe that this could be accomplished by
8 consolidating all of the military publication centers, as I
9 said, into two or three regional facilities.
10 Our center, located on the east coast, is a
11 wonderful opportunity for one of those centers. We have a
12 direct link to every form of transportation you can mention.
13 The Port of Baltimore, rail facilities, BWI Airport, the
14 major interstate. We have the technology, we have the
15 expertise, we have the experience, and just to raise the
16 example, Desert Storm, we outperformed St. Louis during that
17 very critical mobilization time.
18 Our throughput time there outperformed St. Louis,
19 and that's simply a fact. We are flexible. We would like to
20 not just close our mission, we would like to expand our
21 mission, and we certainly have the expertise to do it. Our
22 location, as Senator Mikulski mentioned, is ideal. Our

Page 309

1 property is ideal. And I know what struck your staff is what
2 struck me -- right next to our fully automated facility is a
3 warehouse where -- is an Air Force Warehouse that is purely
4 manual. That is truly a manual warehouse.
5 In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, members of the
6 committee, we believe that our automation can be easily
7 adopted for a DOD consolidation. We respectfully request a
8 joint cross-service study be accomplished. That you take
9 Middle River, Baltimore, off BRAC. I truly appreciate your
10 consideration here today, and I respectfully ask that, in
11 fulfilling your mission which is true cross savings, you look
12 at the great opportunity Middle River offers you, and the
13 people that have given their sweat equity for this country.
14 Thank you all, very much.
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: Congressman Ehrlich, that may
16 be your first time, but it's a very good first time. Thank
17 you very much. We now have Representative Connie Morella,
18 please.
19 REPRESENTATIVE MORELLA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
20 and members of the Commission.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: You're welcome.
22 REPRESENTATIVE MORELLA: I just want to, first of

Page 310

1 all, commend you for the kind of dedication and the hard work
2 that you've put into this operation. And I appreciate the
3 opportunity to testify before you. This is not my first time
4 in so doing. It was years ago with regard to White Oak, and
5 I commended you in 1993 on the decision you made with regard
6 to White Oak, and now I'm here to say I hope you adhere to a
7 position where you are absolutely right.
8 And because you have heard so much about it, and I
9 know Commissioner Cox spent a whole day there, I thought I
10 would deal with two facets of why I think that BRAC '93 was
11 right. And why Navy Sea System Command should move to White
12 Oak. I'm going to talk to you about military value, and
13 dollars and cents. Because I think these two very important
14 reasons, perhaps the most important reasons why this
15 Commission should reaffirm the BRAC '93 decision on White
16 Oak.
17 With regard to military value, the record is clear
18 that it's an extremely high military value attached to at
19 least three of the facilities now operating at White Oak.
20 The Hyper Velocity Wind Tunnel, the Nuclear Effects Test
21 Facility, and the Magnetic Silencing Facility. The Navy
22 proposes to shut down the Wind Tunnel and Nuclear Test

Page 311

1 Facility, and to move the Magnetic Silencing Facility at a
2 cost of at least $850,000.
3 I would submit that, with regard to the wind tunnel
4 and the Nuclear Test Facility, this is not the Navy's
5 decision to make. These are multi-service facilities that
6 benefit all services in the nation as a whole. Their fate
7 should be decided on a Department of Defense wide basis. And
8 not just because the Navy feels it can no longer afford to be
9 the custodian for them.
10 Also, there's overwhelming evidence demonstrating
11 that these national assets must continue to operate. No less
12 a military authority than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
13 Staff has expressed concern about the possible shut down of
14 the wind tunnel. And a defense nuclear agency which sponsors
15 the Nuclear Test Facility is on record that it is relying on
16 this facility for its critical testing.
17 Therefore, if you conclude as I do, that these
18 facilities must remain operating because of their high
19 military value, what alternative makes the most economic
20 sense? Well, I believe what makes the most sense is keeping
21 these facilities at White Oak, and moving NAVSEA there. Why?
22 It's much too costly to move the key facilities from White

Page 312

1 Oak, or replicate them elsewhere.
2 For example, according to certified data, the cost
3 to replicate the wind tunnel is $143 million. To move it
4 would cost $102 million. Additionally, the certified cost to
5 move or replicate Nuclear Test Facility is between $37 and
6 $40 million. Also, the Navy is planning to move the Magnetic
7 Silencing Facility to Carderock at a cost of at least
8 $850,000. The certified data indicates that this move could,
9 in fact, cost millions more.
10 By moving NAVSEA to White Oak, all of these
11 expenses are avoided. Furthermore, the Navy has already
12 spent $6 million in planning for the move, following the BRAC
13 '93 decision, which would be an additional savings. By
14 contrast, if NAVSEA goes to the Washington Navy Yard, it is
15 eventually going to cost in excess of $50 million more to do,
16 than to move NAVSEA to White Oak. This is according to the
17 communities analyses, which closely scrutinized all of the
18 Navy's numbers.
19 Another important point. It now costs more than
20 $10 million a year to operate the key facilities at White
21 Oak. This is about the same amount the Navy said that it
22 will save annually by having NAVSEA at the Navy Yard, rather

Page 313

1 than White Oak. But even if you agree with the Navy's
2 estimate of the savings from having NAVSEA at the Navy Yard,
3 which the community believes is overstated, these savings
4 would be offset entirely by continued operation of the key
5 facilities, either at White Oak, or somewhere else.
6 So finally, Mr. Chairman and Commissioner Davis, if
7 the Commission agrees that the national assets at White Oak
8 cannot be shut down because of their high military value,
9 then the best alternative from a dollars and cents
10 perspective is to move NAVSEA to White Oak. I hope that you
11 will retain the decision that you made in 1993 because that
12 made the most sense in 1993, and it makes the most sense now.
13 And I thank you very much.
14 COMMISSIONER KLING: Congresswoman Morella, thank
15 you very much for those comments.
16 REPRESENTATIVE MORELLA: Thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER KLING: We appreciate it, and we'll
18 now have the Honorable Al Wynn. Congressman?
19 REPRESENTATIVE WYNN: Thank you very much Mr.
20 Chairman and members of the Commission. I, also, would like
21 to express my appreciation for the hard work and patience
22 you've shown during this process. I thank you for the

Page 314

1 opportunity to appear, and I would also note particularly the
2 work done by Commissioner Cox in visiting our White Oak
3 facility. She listened to our citizens, heard our arguments,
4 and I think she did an outstanding job in giving us an
5 opportunity to present our case.
6 I would say that first -- in the first instance, I
7 would echo the sentiments expressed by my colleague, Ms.
8 Morella. We share that community in White Oak, and I think
9 she has made it abundantly clear. And you have a great deal
10 of evidence to the effect that we have strategic assets at
11 White Oak, in the form of the Hyper Velocity Wind Tunnel, and
12 also the Nuclear Effect Facility, and the Magnetic Silencing
13 Facility, that warrant their attention.
14 The strongest argument, of course, being made by
15 the Joint Chiefs, that these are strategically valuable --
16 invaluable, actually, assets. I would like to focus on the
17 aspect of the equation dealing with the move to White Oak. I
18 believe the Commission made the correct decision in 1993,
19 when they concluded that we ought to move NAVSEA to White
20 Oak. Currently, the recommendation of the Navy is, of
21 course, to move to the Navy Yard.
22 I believe that the Navy's recommendation is based

Page 315

1 on a faulty cost analysis. White Oak is cheaper. Second, I
2 believe the Navy fails to consider the fact that, both in the
3 long term and in the short term, the land and facilities at
4 White Oak are far superior to those at the Navy Yard. First,
5 let me talk about the issue of cost. By its own analysis,
6 the Navy concedes that it's going to cost almost $3 million
7 more to move NAVSEA to the Navy Yard than it would cost to
8 move them to White Oak.
9 But beyond this, the Navy has failed to consider
10 two other key cost items that further increases the cost of
11 the Navy Yard option. First, let me speak about the fact
12 that the National Capital Planning Commission, the District
13 of Columbia Historic Preservation Office, and the Advisory
14 Counsel on Historic Preservation have approved a master plan
15 for the Navy Yard. All these groups must approve the
16 designed plans for the Navy Yard that's being contemplated.
17 The Navy's COBRA does not include NAVSEA share of
18 the full implementation of this master plan, which will
19 provide the needed quality of life improvements for a one --
20 a 10,000 employee population, which would be created if
21 NAVSEA moves in. NAVSEA's cost of that expense would be $9.8
22 million, which has not been included in its COBRA's

Page 316

1 calculations. The Navy's COBRA calculations do not include
2 an additional 752 parking spaces that would be needed.
3 It was overlooked in the Navy's MILCON estimates.
4 This is an additional $9 million cost. Thus in reality, the
5 Navy Yard option would cost $179 million, plus $10 million,
6 calculated by the Navy for moving cost, for a total
7 relocation cost of $189 million, rather than the $160 million
8 that has been suggested. On the other hand, however, the
9 cost of moving NAVSEA to White Oak have been overstated.
10 By applying the same calculations and assumptions
11 used by the Navy, our own community expert determined that
12 the cost of White Oak would be $110 million, which is $23
13 million lower than the official estimate. This data's
14 available for your examination. Bottom line difference: $55
15 million cheaper at White Oak. There's a second reason that
16 ought to be emphasized. White Oak is a better facility.
17 White Oak is a sprawling 700 acre facility. The
18 Navy Yard is a cramped 70 acres in the middle of an
19 overcrowded city. White Oak has an excellent security
20 reputation. It has not had problems protecting the highly
21 classified activities conducted there. However, I would note
22 for the Commission that approximately 400,000 visitors visit

Page 317

1 the Navy Yard every year. I suggest that security
2 considerations way heavily in favor of White Oak.
3 We must be realistic in this process. White Oak is
4 a better, cheaper option. It ought to be considered. It was
5 considered in 1993. I believe the commission's wisdom in '93
6 was correct. I hope you will concur with that and reverse
7 the Navy's decision, and keep the White Oak facility open.
8 Thank you.
9 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you so much, Congressman
10 Wynn. We appreciate your being with us. We now have
11 Representative Wayne Gilchrest. Welcome, and we're glad to
12 have you here, sir.
13 REPRESENTATIVE GILCHREST: Thank you for this
14 opportunity to talk about the facilities in our state and in
15 our district. All of us from Maryland come before this
16 Commission as representatives of the people that live in our
17 district, but we also understand the nature of the military
18 defense establishment, in that if this country is to remain
19 vital, defense spending must be tied to military strategy.
20 And so, our arguments now are key to the nation's interest.
21 They may appear to reflect the interest -- the
22 parochial interest that we have in the State of Maryland.

Page 318

1 But as we have sat on numerous occasions, our interests are
2 truly those for the nation as a whole. Mr. Chairman and
3 members of the Commission, I would like to thank you for this
4 opportunity to come before you and testify on behalf of the
5 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Annapolis
6 Detachment.
7 As some of you may recall, I was here under similar
8 circumstances about two years ago, when the Commission in its
9 wisdom determined that a similar proposal would not achieve
10 the savings benefits originally projected. In 1993, the
11 Commission concluded that $25 million was not enough money to
12 move the personnel of the Annapolis Detachment to the
13 Philadelphia shipyard.
14 I find it difficult to comprehend how the Navy
15 would now hope to move both the personnel and eight
16 facilities from Annapolis to Philadelphia, with only $25
17 million. I am sure you will agree that these cost estimates
18 are unrealistic. Exhibit A, which you have, and I have a
19 copy of it here, outlined the discrepancy between the COBRA
20 results, based on BCEG data, and those based on all certified
21 Navy data, not used by BCEG.
22 Using certified Navy data, the total cost of the

Page 319

1 BCEG recommendation is now well over $83 million, more than
2 three times the BCEG's estimate. Similar discrepancies exist
3 between the estimates for annual savings. The COBRA results
4 using Navy data show an annual savings, which is just over a
5 third of those figures calculating, using the BCEG data.
6 Please review carefully these figures presented to you in
7 writing when making your decision.
8 As you know, the work conducted at the Annapolis
9 Detachment is exclusively focused on Machinery R&D. The
10 commission has recognized the crucial importance of the
11 testing conducting in many of the centers unique
12 laboratories, and has proposed that this experimentation
13 continue in eight relocated facilities in Philadelphia, and
14 in a replicated Magnetics Facility at Carderock, Maryland.
15 However, the BCEG has recommend the two
16 irreplaceable facilities completely close without proposing
17 how or where these functions will be fulfilled in the future.
18 By abandoning the Deep Ocean Simulation Facility, and the
19 Submarine Fluid Dynamics Facility, the Navy loses these
20 capabilities all together. These two facilities are
21 presently busy, and self sustained.
22 To close them would compromise reliability of

Page 320

1 equipment, and the safety of personnel in the Naval fleet.
2 Small, short term savings will result from the initial
3 elimination of these laboratories. However, the need for
4 these tests will not disappear. And the BCEG has not
5 included in its cost projections the expense of replacing
6 these functions elsewhere. Take into consideration this
7 comparison.
8 The tests run on the last 24 items, tested in the
9 Deep Ocean Pressure Simulation Facilities, cost $600,000. If
10 the facility were closed, and the tests were to be conducted
11 at sea, human costs, and human lives risked would be
12 enormous, and the test would cost more than $5 million. The
13 tests conducted at the facility present are about $600. If
14 the tests were to be conducted at sea, the cost would rise to
15 $5 million. I don't think that anyone present would conclude
16 that these figures reflect any real savings.
17 The Annapolis Detachment presently conducts a
18 unique research program dedicated to the development of non-
19 CFC refrigeration and cooling. BCEG's proposal to move the
20 program to Philadelphia does not include the relocation of
21 the experienced personnel involved in implementing the
22 program – personnel who have collected, to this date, 13

Page 321

1 patents in this area – more than six times the number for
2 the entire Philadelphia facility.
3 Now I'm sure the people at Philadelphia are fine
4 people, and they work very hard. But if you compare what
5 they do to the people in Annapolis, from these figures, there
6 are no comparisons. Now there might be an advantage in
7 moving to Philadelphia, because they're a little closer to
8 Veteran Stadium, and if you're a Philadelphia fan, that's a
9 positive thing. But if you're an Orioles fan, it isn't. I'm
10 not sure if that joke was appreciated, but I through it in
11 anyway.
12 The time and cost of training replacements in
13 Philadelphia will inevitably interrupt the progress of the
14 CFC program, and thus delay the deployment of ships and non-
15 CFC cooling systems. Such a delay is beneficial to no one,
16 and the impact of it cancels out any potential savings in the
17 projected costs. The talented personnel involved in non-CFC
18 research are the only ones whose jobs are at stake.
19 Many men and women who are dedicated to their
20 respective fields will not be allowed to follow their former
21 positions to Philadelphia, and we see this as a tragedy. The
22 Philadelphia facility in its entirety has had over 71

Page 322

1 patents, and this is an enormous advantage, by keeping these
2 people together. The geographic location of the Annapolis
3 Detachment should also be taken into consideration in your
4 decision.
5 It is right next door to the Naval Academy. When
6 these cadets train, they train also in real life situations,
7 and one of those real life situations is the facility that we
8 are trying to hold on to in Annapolis. The costs are not
9 correct. The facility is outstanding. The individuals that
10 work there provide for the Navy, for this facility, for the
11 nation, and an extraordinary amount of experience would be
12 broken up and could not be replaced if the facility moved to
13 Philadelphia.
14 I ask the Commission to take all of this into
15 consideration, and I thank you very much for the opportunity
16 to testify.
17 COMMISSIONER KLING: And now we have Congressman
18 Roscoe Bartlett. (Microphone off) – and we thank you, sir.
19 REPRESENTATIVE BARTLETT: Thank you very much.
20 This is my first appearance before a BRAC Commission, and no
21 offense, but it would be nice if it were my last.
22 COMMISSIONER KLING: We might second some of those

Page 323

1 statements.
2 REPRESENTATIVE BARTLETT: I'm sure you would, this
3 late in the day. Relative to Fort Ritchie, the Army and DOD
4 have substantially deviated from compliance with a number of
5 base closure selection criteria in all three of BRAC's major
6 categories. That is, military value, return on investment,
7 and impacts. The Fort Ritchie military affairs committee,
8 that is, FORMAC, the community base group reviewing the Fort
9 Ritchie issue has uncovered a multitude of data errors,
10 omissions, and faulty rationale in the Army, DOD, BRAC's
11 mission.
12 To make a decision to close Fort Ritchie, Maryland,
13 based on those errors would make a mockery of the BRAC
14 process. Notwithstanding the fact they have been shown the
15 specific errors and omissions by FORMAC, the Army continues
16 to submit completely invalid data. I will provide the BRAC
17 Commission with some major examples in a few moments, and
18 submit a statement for the record.
19 FORMAC has documented all of their findings, and
20 has shared those findings along with detailed backup data
21 with representatives from the Army, the BRAC Commission
22 staff, and five of the BRAC commissioners, both at Fort

Page 324

1 Ritchie on March 24, and in Baltimore on May 4. In every
2 meeting with the Army, FORMAC has reiterated errors and
3 omissions which continue to refute the Army's claim that Fort
4 Ritchie should close, and its tenants be disbursed.
5 There are 18 specific areas in the COBRA model
6 which the Army DOD failed to address, or for which they
7 submitted completely erroneous data. For example: One,
8 claiming credit for Fort Richie support personnel savings a
9 full two years before the people receiving that support would
10 vacate Fort Ritchie. This is completely premature, and
11 thereby unsubstantiated.
12 Two, stating in their original submission to the
13 BRAC Commission that they are, and I quote – that there are,
14 and I quote, "no known environmental impediments at the
15 closing or receiving installations." And then refusing to
16 pursue the issue after FORMAC demonstrated unequivocally that
17 there was potentially a very serious environmental issue at
18 the receiving site, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, concerning the
19 San Pedro basin water supply.
20 And three, including a fiscal year 1993 $2 million
21 one-time family housing capital investment as the continuing
22 recurring expenditure. This error alone translates into

Page 325

1 approximately a $12 million overstatement by the Army of the
2 net-present value, and approximately $28 million in constant
3 dollars relative to Fort Ritchie for the 20 year period. And
4 lastly, four, changing the number of family units -- family
5 housing units required at Fort Detrick, Maryland, from 354
6 units in their original submission, to only 57 units in their
7 most recent proposal.
8 There's no explanation given by the Army DOD for
9 this change in strategy. It certainly smacks of data
10 manipulation simply to reflect the lower initial cost item.
11 There's no rationale from Army DOD to support the shift from
12 military family housing to variable housing allowance, that
13 is, off post subsidized housing. This capricious action
14 results in a comparative advantage in the DOD Army Analysis
15 for deferring expenditures into out years, with reduced net-
16 present value.
17 FORMAC has also identified a lost opportunity.
18 There's approximately $9 million that can be saved simply by
19 consolidating geographically disbursed elements of
20 headquarter's Defense Information Systems, Western
21 Hemisphere -- that is, DISA-WESTHEM, at Fort Ritchie. The up
22 front cost of relocating the DISA-WESTHEM Denver staff is

Page 326

1 approximately only $2.3 million, which would be advertised
2 over only 3 years. There would also be an additional
3 intangible benefit to approve the operational efficiency.
4 A careful review of General Shalikashvili's April
5 17, '95 letter to Chairman Dixon reveals several shortfalls.
6 For instance, General Shalikashvili's letter said the Site R
7 is serviced by a fire suppression system. In fact, the
8 Hyaline Fire Protection System covers only 10 percent of the
9 Site R operating space. FORMAC will address this, and
10 several other operational issues raised in General
11 Shalikashvili's letter with senior members of the BRAC staff,
12 on June 16, 1995.
13 It seems axiomatic to me, personally, that it would
14 be prudent that needed support personnel be able to reach
15 Site R in less time than it takes an ICBM to reach the U.S.A.
16 from Central Asia. In summary, it is imperative that the
17 BRAC Commission reject the Army DOD recommendations to close
18 Fort Ritchie due to deviation from final selection criteria
19 one, two, four, five, six, seven, and eight.
20 Furthermore, it is my recommendation that DOD be
21 directed as soon as possible to relocate the DISA-WESTHEM
22 Denver staff from leased space to Fort Ritchie. Thank you

Page 327

1 very much for your attention to this matter.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: And we thank you, Congressman
3 Bartlett, and to the entire delegation for Maryland, thank
4 you for being with us for your good and helpful comments. We
5 thank you. Nice to see you, Senator Sarbanes. And, if now
6 we would have the very fine State of Massachusetts. And I
7 guess we will start off with you, Senator, and we certainly
8 welcome you to be with us, Senator Kerry.
9 SENATOR KERRY: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman,
10 and members of the Commission.
11 COMMISSIONER KLING: You're welcome.
12 SENATOR KERRY: I know this has been an
13 extraordinarily long process, and a very long day for you.
14 We are incredibly appreciative of the long effort of the
15 Commission to listen to us, and that is precisely what this
16 Commission was put together to do, and we think you've done
17 that. A number of the commissioners have visited South
18 Weymouth, and each time, we believe they've come away
19 impressed by very legitimate arguments.
20 Our plea to you has never been save jobs. Our plea
21 to you has really never been, I think, a contrived effort to
22 try to create military value where it isn't there. Our plea

Page 328

1 to you has never been to try to sort of, you know, distort or
2 play with the analyses of the Navy. Our plea to you is to do
3 precisely what the prior BRAC did, which was measure the
4 analyses themselves. Look at what the Navy said in the
5 committee analysis of military value. Of demographics.
6 Look at the rationale of the last BRAC that
7 reversed a bias in some minds in the Navy to close South
8 Weymouth. And it's our judgment, and we say this to you very
9 respectfully, that that analysis dictates precisely what the
10 last BRAC found, which was that there is a value -- a
11 military value, a demographic value, that cannot be replaced
12 in keeping South Weymouth open.
13 Now the entire analysis of the Navy which followed,
14 which was sound -- the Navy rated by category -- it set up an
15 operational category, it set up a reserve category. And it
16 measured bases according to those two categories. By the
17 measurement of those two categories, in very thorough
18 analyses, the Navy came up and said that it had a very clear
19 idea of what it wanted. And among those, it measured the
20 larger operational air stations.
21 Five -- those with more than five squadrons. There
22 was one, N-A-S Brunswick, that scored lowest in military

Page 329

1 value. Its age -- its facilities were aging; its anti-
2 submarine division was diminishing; its excess capacity was
3 growing; and therefore, prior to the date of December 1st,
4 1994, every operational air station scenario discussed by the
5 Navy said Brunswick will close. Likewise, in the Reserve
6 category, one base stood out as a clear loser, and that was
7 N-A-S Atlanta.
8 It finished a huge 10 points lower in overall
9 rating than any other reserve station in the military value
10 rating. Atlanta's rating was dragged down because of severe
11 air space problems, and because of its last place ranking in
12 demographics. The only reserve station, N-A-S Reserve
13 considered for closing in the months prior to December 1st of
14 1994, was N-A-S Atlanta. So operationally, Brunswick
15 closing, Atlanta closing.
16 Suddenly in December, there are a couple of
17 meetings, and all of a sudden, on sink glanced, sole
18 undocumented recommendation, still to this date without
19 adequate documentation -- without any documentation -- sink
20 glance says we kind of feel like we're going to measure the
21 reserve against the operational, and all of a sudden,
22 contrary to all of the tracking of analysis, you have

Page 330

1 Weymouth slated for closing, and Brunswick stays open.
2 And all of a sudden, Atlanta, which had the last
3 rating on demographics, they find has rich demographics, and
4 they're going to keep open over the air station that has the
5 richest demographics of all. So, we are here to ask the
6 Commission to do precisely what this Commission was
7 established to do, which is to take the politics out of this.
8 Take the bias out of this. Adhere to the track which was
9 established in the Navy analysis itself.
10 You're going to lose an extraordinary capacity if
11 we were to lose the people in the Boston area, and the
12 greater Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut area. Those
13 who are able to serve today, but will not be able to make
14 that airlift distance to Brunswick. That doesn't make sense.
15 You will take away from the richest educational
16 network in the country -- the capacity of people who have all
17 of the technical skills after the last BRAC even moved people
18 from Detroit -- they've now bought homes in the area of
19 Weymouth, and they're suddenly going to be told they're going
20 to moved again. After we've made tower improvements, airport
21 improvements, hanger improvements -- spent millions of
22 dollars. The economics of keeping Weymouth open work.

Page 331

They work against the tiny dobbin stations that exist today down in Atlanta, and when you measure the military value, the demographic value, and long term value, but most importantly, when you measure the importance of this Commission keeping faith with the American people, to keep politics out of this base closing structure, and make sure that we are adhering to the best analytical standards, we implore you to adhere to the judgment of the prior BRAC, into what we feel is the best judgment available today within the military itself to keep our base open. Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER KLING: Senator Kerry, we certainly thank you for being us and for your find comments. We appreciate it. And now my friend, Representative Studds.

REPRESENTATIVE STUDDS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, long suffering and undercompensated members of this Commission, I -- you have my awe at the end of the day like this, and my appreciation. I particularly want to thank Commissions Kling and Davis for their recent visit to South Weymouth, and Commissioner Robles for his visit in April. Two years ago, as you very well know, this panel unanimously rejected a similar Navy proposal to close the Weymouth facility.

Page 332

In so doing, they found that the Navy had inaccurately and misleadingly portrayed South Weymouth's capacity and capabilities. As you have heard Senator Kerry say, we very strongly believe the Navy has done just that once again. As far as we can determine, their case to close South Weymouth is based on anecdotal information that is not supported by their own empirical analysis and data.

And we're also disturbed that the Navy has not presented this Commission with COBRA scenarios which would keep South Weymouth open, and take advantage of its potential. As I think you know, we submitted detail proposals to the Commission several weeks ago, in which South Weymouth will remain open, and receive new aviation squadrons.

To our knowledge, the Navy has not provided the Commission with those COBRAs, even after Commissioner Davis requested them during his visit to Weymouth.

And we strongly urge you to fully examine all potential scenarios with regard to Weymouth. The Navy has ignored its own evaluation, as Senator Kerry pointed out, which ranks South Weymouth higher in military value than two other facilities, both Fort Worth and Atlanta. Additionally,

Page 333

Weymouth is ranked first in demographics, and Atlanta, as you have heard, is ranked last.

The Navy also decided in this great mystery of this particular chapter to give greater weight to the unrecorded operational recommendations of sink class, than to the rest of its own certified data. It would appear that the only factor which lead to the Navy's decision to close South Weymouth is both uncertified and undocumented. The Navy indicates that it will move Naval Air Reserve units from Weymouth to Brunswick.

Not only have they given insufficient consideration for the demographic ramifications of that, they have down played the attrition that these units will suffer as a result of this move. We believe the Navy makes a tremendous leap of faith in assuming the reservists from Southern New England will travel great distances in harsh winter weather, to drill in Maine. By the Navy's own admission, these units may lose over a third of their personnel.

Finally, if I may briefly mention an issue that I think was raised at your regional hearing last week in Georgia, with regard to Atlanta's ability to accommodate an F-18 squadron from Florida. It is my understanding that in

Page 334

response to a question from Commissioner Robles, the commander in Atlanta stated that his facility did not have an encroachment problem.

However, the Air Force, which owns and operates the air field in Atlanta has declared the facilities infrastructure unsuitable for fighter missions of any kind. Furthermore, the Navy's own data identifies severe encroachment problems at Atlanta. We believe, as Senator Kennedy said so well, that the Navy has substantially deviated from its own selection criteria in recommending South Weymouth for closure.

And those of us who lived through this process a couple of years ago, I think I said this to you in New York, this Commission went a long way in restoring some public faith in the system. That the system can work, and that, in this instance, a statutory mandate to remove politics from the most difficult of all decisions made here, can indeed work. And it is precisely in that spirit, as Senator Kerry has just said, that we ask you to do this again.

No fair minded person could ask more than you make this decision to the best of your knowledge, ability, and interest to the Navy, and the interest to the country. And

Page 335

that is all we ask of you again. Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you, Congressman Gerry Studds. We appreciate your comments, and being with us. And with that we -- let's see -- with that, we are now ready to begin and hear from the very fine Senator from Michigan, Senator Carl Levin. Thank you, gentlemen.

SENATOR LEVIN: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. Thank you for giving us all the opportunity to testify, and I particularly want to thank Commissioner Steele for her visit, and all of you for taking the time that you take to look into these matters. As you heard many times, it's a thankless job. All we can do is say thanks. And we can ask you for one other thing, of course, which we do, and that is to look at the facts in our cases.

And I'm going to highlight just a couple facts in the few minutes that I have been allotted. We have two facilities that I would like to chat with you about this afternoon. First is the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant. The bottom line is this: That the COBRA model took a standard formula. It used the standard formulas to how much it would cost to close the facility. It came up with a figure of $1.4 million closing costs over 6 years.

Page 336

That figure is wrong. It's 20 to 40 times that, probably. But the only way you're going to find that out is if you ask the command, or if you ask the contractor. You have to take the initiative to ask, as we have. We asked the Army, well, what are the real closing costs? Not just the computer modeling -- not a standard per foot closing cost of this government owned contractor operated facility. What are the real closing costs? They said they'd get back to us.

They said they'd get back to us in May. They didn't. Now we understand what the figures are, from both the contractor and the Army, and all I can tell you is what my understanding is. It's 20 to 40 times that. Now, maybe a $30 or $40 million difference is not a lot in terms of the numbers you folks have to deal with; in terms of the numbers I have to deal with on the Armed Services Committee. It's the life/death issue for this Plant.

This is the remnant of the arsenal democracy. It's what we got left. We've been hit very, very hard in Michigan. We've lost all of our sack bases. We're the seventh highest percentage, in terms of reduction of defense department personnel in the country, through rounds one through three. And so, what we need you to do is get the

Page 337

1 real figures of closing this plant from the contractor, or
2 from the Army command.
3 We understand in the last few hours, the Army
4 itself is going to stick with its computer figure. We need
5 you to cut through it. We're asking you to cut through it,
6 to talk with the command and talk with the contractor, and
7 get the facts as to what it will cost to close this facility.
8 Not in a theoretical model, in a real world. Now what the
9 Army says is they're not really going to know the cost until
10 after they close the facility.
11 That is intolerable. We can't close a facility
12 based on an assumed theoretical cost of a million four, and
13 then be told by the Army that the real costs can't be known
14 until after the facility is closed, and after the plan is
15 implemented to reuse it. That is offensive to us. We've
16 been hit too hard in the real world, to accept that kind of a
17 response that we'll let you know the real costs after we
18 close it, and after the reuse plan.
19 We're asking you to find out the real costs before.
20 Now, to make the best estimates you can, in a real world,
21 based on the Army command and the contractor. Now we have a
22 second facility in Selfridge. It's the Army Garrison and

Page 338

1 International Guard base. And a National Guard base that is
2 called Selfridge, famous to the National Guardsmen around the
3 world, and what the Army has done here is simply said that we
4 are going to close -- we're going to remove our Garrison at
5 this facility.
6 The facility is not going to be closed. The Army
7 is going to remove its Garrison. Now, that Garrison does the
8 following: It maintains and repairs about 100 buildings.
9 What are we going to do with the buildings? Are they not
10 going to be maintained and repaired? Well, sure they are.
11 This is an ongoing facility. It will be some other service.
12 Not the Army. What about running the health clinic? What
13 about running the child care programs?
14 What about running the employment office? What
15 about running all of the facility at Selfridge that the Army
16 now runs? Who's going to run them? The Army says not us,
17 we're pulling out the Garrison. If the roof leaks, it's
18 going to have to be some other service. It's not going to be
19 us. We got -- this is the only truly joint base in the
20 country. All five services, including the Coast Guard.
21 There's none like it.
22 The Defense Department is supposed to be promoting

Page 339

1 these bases. In fact, one of its criteria is that it will
2 promote joint use. It's the -- I'm now reading from the BRAC
3 '95 requirements -- it's the DOD policy to make maximum use
4 of common support assets. DOD components should, throughout
5 the BRAC '95 analysis process, look for cross service or
6 intraservice opportunities to share assets, and to look for
7 opportunities to rely on a single military department for
8 support.
9 The Army's pulling out its Garrison -- let the
10 Navy, let the Marines, let the Air Force, let the Coast Guard
11 maintain the roads that we're now maintaining. Fix the roofs
12 that we're now maintaining. Run the clinic that we're now
13 running. In other words, the DOD did not look at this
14 operation as a joint operation. The Army took the savings to
15 the Army by pulling out its Garrison, and no one figured out
16 what the costs will be to maintain those same services,
17 through the use of the other services.
18 It runs smack in the face of everything that we
19 have been fighting for in Washington, which is jointness.
20 The joint operation of facilities using one service where
21 possible to perform the services and the functions of many
22 services. It just absolutely -- it contradicts everything

Page 340

1 we've been fighting for for 5 years. I plead with you. Ask
2 the DOD. Are you not going to run the health -- the clinic?
3 Are you not going to fix the roofs on 100 buildings at an
4 operating base?
5 This isn't a base. It's closing. This is one
6 Garrison that's helping to maintain that base that's saying
7 we're pulling out. Are we not going to plow the roads? Of
8 snow? Just because the Army Garrison isn't there to plow it?
9 No. Some other unit will pick it up. And the Army says,
10 well that's some other guy's cost. But they haven't figured
11 it out, what the cost is. So there's no cross service, cost
12 analysis that's been done here.
13 And it's so fundamental that that be done, that
14 we're asking this Commission to do what the DOD did not do
15 when they submitted this one Garrison closing. I think I've
16 run over my -- whoops, I have.
17 COMMISSIONER KLING: You did a very good job
18 though, doing it.
19 SENATOR LEVIN: I hope I came close to my 5 1/2
20 minutes, at any rate.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you so much, Senator.
22 SENATOR LEVIN: Thank you very much, all of you.

Page 341

1 Thanks for your service to the nation.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. And we now have
3 Senator Spencer Abraham, and before we begin, since somebody
4 said before that they -- this was their first appearance at
5 BRAC, and I said this is also -- that makes two of us, I
6 don't know if you all -- if we sing happy birthday, or we
7 just say happy birthday to those that are testifying here.
8 But we say happy birthday to you, sir.
9 SENATOR ABRAHAM: Well it is my birthday, sir.
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, 40 -- 43, we have.
11 SENATOR ABRAHAM: That's right. Yes.
12 Notwithstanding, I was very nervous because in the hallway,
13 when I was sworn in, they promised -- they asked me to swear
14 that I would tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
15 the truth, but I thought I was going to get away with maybe a
16 little fudge on my birthday, but I'm a -- I can't lie about
17 that.
18 COMMISSIONER KLING: We couldn't have said are you
19 really 38?
20 SENATOR ABRAHAM: That's right. I was going to
21 come in and claim otherwise, but I'm sworn to the truth here
22 today. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

Page 342

1 Commission, I appreciate it. I want to cover some of the
2 same issues that Senator Levin has already done. He, of
3 course, is a valued member of our Senate Armed Services
4 Committee, and as a long standing member of that committee I
5 think brings far more insight into these issues than I do at
6 this point, but I certainly reinforce the comments he made.
7 In my testimony before this Commission in Chicago,
8 I raised serious concerns over the methodology and the data
9 used by the Department of the Army in proposing to close the
10 Selfridge Army Garrison, and the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant.
11 Since that time, the Army has done little in my judgment to
12 alleviate the concerns I raised. I still believe the Army's
13 proposals are poorly developed and unwarranted. Therefore, I
14 strongly recommend that you reject these proposals to close
15 Selfridge and the Detroit Tank Plant.
16 On 21 May, the Army attempted to respond to our
17 original by completing a second run of its closure cost
18 computer model. As a result, they claimed that the
19 Department of Defense would still save almost $7.3 million
20 per year, and that there would be an immediate return on that
21 investment. I still believe these assumptions are wrong, and
22 want to outline my reasons for saying so. First, I believe

Page 343

1 the Department of Defense will not save any money by closing
2 the Selfridge Army Garrison.
3 The Army claims that the recurring base operation
4 support and miscellaneous costs will be only $3.2 million per
5 year. However, non-housing base operations expenses for the
6 Garrison were over $10.1 million in fiscal year 1994 -- a
7 difference of $6.9 million. The only way the Army could
8 realize such significant reductions is by wholesale
9 elimination of the support it provided. However, as Senator
10 Levin's already indicated, this will not happen.
11 The Army cannot assume that the need for such
12 support services will miraculously disappear. They will not.
13 The military personnel at the Garrison make up less than
14 1/10th of one percent of the total Selfridge base military
15 population. Yet they provide almost all of the base
16 operation housing and moral support services. If the
17 Garrison closes, the other units at the base will have to
18 pick up the tab for the support the Garrison previously
19 provided.
20 The 16 May Base Realignment Closure Cost Estimate
21 Validation Study, conducted by the Michigan International
22 Guard's 127th Fighter Wing, invalidated by every commander at

Page 344

1 Selfridge, save the Garrison, concluded that the other units
2 will still have to fund over $10.8 million in operation and
3 maintenance costs, after the Garrison leaves. I do not think
4 that the remaining units at Selfridge can move elsewhere.
5 Nowhere has the Department of Defense proposed moving or
6 eliminating any units at Selfridge, beside the Garrison.
7 In fact, they proposed adding additional units at
8 the base, mainly the Marine Wing Support Group 47. Your
9 Commission is charged with ensuring the current military base
10 structure supports the total military force structure. I
11 believe it is clear the plan military force structure is
12 based upon the continued existence of the Selfridge
13 International Guard Base, and all its tenant units.
14 The current force level requirements assume the
15 continuation of all Selfridge activities at Selfridge. These
16 forces will require the infrastructure services provided by
17 the Army Garrison. The Army's most recent analysis is also
18 lacking in consideration of off base housing costs. Although
19 the Army now recognizes that the closing of the Selfridge
20 housing will evict the current tenants, they continue to
21 grossly underestimate off base housing costs, at $1.286
22 million year.

Page 345

1 692 families currently reside in the Selfridge
2 housing. Given these current Department of Defense residents
3 in the amount they would be provided in basic allowance for
4 quarters and variable housing allowance, the total annual
5 cost would be almost $4.8 million, a difference of just under
6 $3.5 million a year. Last, the Army's calculations for
7 salary savings are not correct.
8 The Army has not changed the status since I point
9 this out in Chicago, that the more than $3.5 million dollars
10 in annual civilian and military salary savings are based on
11 average salaries that are 50 to 100 percent above the actual
12 averages. The fact remains that the Army is claiming $2.3
13 million more in salary savings than would otherwise be
14 indicated. And the bottom line is that the Army continues to
15 consistently overstate the prospective savings, consistently
16 understate the prospective costs, and grossly overlook vital
17 economic impact data.
18 The Army expects to realize a current -- a net
19 annual savings of $7.291 million by 1998. However, with the
20 information I presented here, the Army has underestimated
21 continuing annual base operations and support expenses by
22 $7.2 million, underestimated housing costs by $3.5 million

Page 346

1 per year, and overestimated salary savings by $2.3 million.
2 Given these costs, I estimate that the Department
3 of Defense will actually spend $5.7 million more per year
4 with the Garrison closed than if it were to continue to rely
5 on the Garrison to provide these vital services, and
6 realize -- and never realize a return on its investment. For
7 these reasons, I strongly hope that the Commission will reach
8 the conclusion to reject these recommendations, and maintain
9 the Garrison at Selfridge.
10 I also have further comments which I will insert
11 directly into the record, and that my time is up, and I want
12 to make sure that you have a chance to hear from Congressman
13 Levin with respect to the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant. I
14 thank you very much for giving me the opportunity, and hope
15 you'll look favorably on our proposals.
16 COMMISSIONER KLING: Well, we thank you very much,
17 Senator. Thank you -- and now, Congressman Levin? That
18 makes two Levin's, right?
19 REPRESENTATIVE LEVIN: That's right.
20 COMMISSIONER KLING: For the price of one.
21 REPRESENTATIVE LEVIN: And I hadn't seen by brother
22 for a couple days. It gives me a chance --

Page 347

1 COMMISSIONER KLING: Well, look what we do --
2 that's how BRAC operates, right? It brings people together.
3 REPRESENTATIVE LEVIN: Absolutely. You keep
4 families together. Mr. Chairman and members of the
5 Commission, I'm Sandy Levin, and I'm glad to join both
6 Senators for Michigan here this afternoon, and I want to talk
7 about the Army's recommendation to close the Detroit Tank
8 Plant. The Army announced its recommendation to close it on
9 February 28th, and we've been working since that time to
10 secure from the Army an answer to three basic issues.
11 Number one, who's affected? Number two, how much
12 will it cost? And number three, what are the implications
13 for the Tank program. And the reason I'm here today is that
14 after all this time, the Army's answers, unfortunately, are
15 very unconvincing. Now, with three weeks left, the
16 Commission still lacks the information necessary to make an
17 informed judgment on the Detroit Tank Plant. For example,
18 who's affected?
19 From the beginning, it was clear that the
20 recommendations to close the Tank Plant contained obvious
21 flaws. For example, the Army claimed that closing the Tank
22 Plant would not, and I quote, "affect any jobs in the Detroit

Page 348

1 area." We asked the Army how this could possibly true when
2 over 250 workers are employed at the Plant. And the Army's
3 reply was, well, only .0067 percent of the labor force in the
4 area would be affected. Clearly, jobs would be affected. If
5 the Tank Plant closes, real people will lose real jobs.
6 But all other issues aside, the most fundamental
7 shortcoming -- and this has been commented on earlier -- of
8 the Army's recommendation, is the lack of a credible estimate
9 of the cost of closing the Tank Plant. The Army's original
10 claim was that closing the Tank Plant would result in a one-
11 time cost of only $1.4 million. When the Army was asked how
12 it arrived at the figure, it said the estimate was based on a
13 standard formula that sets building closing costs at $1.25
14 per square foot.
15 A buck and a quarter per square foot isn't going to
16 do the job. Unlike most Army installations, the Detroit Tank
17 Plant is not a base that houses and trains troops. Nor is it
18 an administrative office. The Detroit Tank Plant is an
19 industrial facility. It has been manufacturing tanks for
20 nearly 50 years. I sincerely doubt 1.4 million will be
21 enough. And during your visit to the Tank Plant last April,
22 Commissioner Steele heard a broad range of testimony.

Page 349

1 And she asked the Army to repair a revised cost
2 estimate by mid-May. Well, here we are, mid-June, and the
3 Army still hasn't submitted a revised closing cost estimate
4 for the Tank Plant. We do know that TACOM in Warren,
5 Michigan requested and received detailed closing data from
6 the contractor at the Plant. This information was provided
7 weeks ago. We also know using this data, TACOM prepared a
8 revising closing cost estimate.
9 It was forwarded to Washington a few weeks ago, and
10 I've been informed that the Army rejected the new cost
11 estimate, and is sticking with its original one. My office
12 has received reports that the true closing costs are at least
13 25 times, I repeat that, 25 times higher than the Army's
14 original calculations. We simply cannot legislate in the
15 dark. Members of Congress and the Base Closure Commission
16 should have timely access to the reliable information
17 necessary to make informed judgment.
18 So I would like the assurance of this Commission
19 that it will take no action to close the Detroit Tank Plant
20 without first reviewing the closing costs data prepared by
21 the General Dynamics Land Systems, and by TACOM. Thank you
22 very, very much for giving us this opportunity. Thank you.

Page 350

1 COMMISSIONER KLING: We thank you so much,
2 Congressman Levin.
3 REPRESENTATIVE LEVIN: Thank you.
4 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you for being with us,
5 and I guess that finishes Michigan, and we can now turn to
6 Minnesota, and I see we have the very fine Senator, Paul
7 Wellstone. Welcome, sir, and thank you for being with us,
8 and it's your time.
9 SENATOR WELLSTONE: Thank you very much. You all
10 have been very patient to be here all day, and Commissioner
11 Cornella, thank you for your on-site visit to Minnesota. Mr.
12 Chairman and members of the Commission, thank you for the
13 opportunity to join Congressman Sabo, and to briefly express
14 our views on the Commissions decision to review the 934th
15 Airlift Wing located at the Minneapolis/St. Paul Airport for
16 possible realignment or closure.
17 I know you've been here for many hours today --
18 many, many hours I think you would say, hearing from many
19 members of the Congress, and so I will keep my comments
20 short, and I will submit my full statement for the record.
21 I'm proud to represent those that work at this base, and all
22 Minnesotans who have an interest in its future at this

Page 351

1 hearing.
2 I believe that as you move forward with your
3 deliberations and review the extraordinary quality of this
4 unit -- and I would emphasize that -- it's people, and the
5 reasons for its retention will become clear to the
6 Commission. Let me say at the outset that I come before you
7 today as a firm proponent of post-cold war defense
8 downsizing.
9 I have argued throughout my tenure in the Senate
10 that as a nation, we continue to spend too much on
11 breathtakingly sophisticated, expensive, and sometimes
12 redundant weapon systems, on maintaining large and expensive
13 active duty forces scattered over the globe, and on the
14 maintenance of a cold war defense infrastructure that is in
15 some ways obsolete and in need of thorough restructuring.
16 And I give specifics in my full statement.
17 There are a number of factors which argue for a
18 decision by the Commission to retain this unit, even when
19 compared to other C-130 Air Force air reserve bases across
20 the country.
21 The unit's distinguished flying record, its prime
22 location at a major aviation hub, its significant economic

Page 352

1 contributions to our state, its relationship to other key
2 military tenants of the base, including the Navy Reserve and
3 a National Guard unit which share some inventory,
4 maintenance, and other resources and facilities, and its
5 ability to draw on skilled Minnesotans who work in our large
6 and growing technical aviation and medical sectors to operate
7 efficiently and cost effectively, all argue for its
8 retention.
9 The basic mission of the air reserve unit is to
10 support the active duty Air Force by providing seasoned
11 professional air crews and planes ready to perform technical
12 air lift and aeromedical evacuation worldwide, as the need
13 arises. The unit augments the active duty forces with over
14 1,000 well trained support personnel.
15 In recent years, because of their excellent record,
16 reputation, and training, they have been called on to
17 undertake humanitarian air lift, or medical evacuation
18 missions in Bosnia, in Somalia, the Persian Gulf, Haiti, and
19 elsewhere, where they have performed in award winning --
20 award winning fashion. They can either air drop, or actually
21 land cargo and personnel into the midst of combat, or other
22 critical situations, or evacuate people out who are in need

Page 353

1 of medical attention.
2 And they have done so. They have done so with
3 extraordinary courage and skill over the years. The 934th
4 has an excellent working relationship with the metropolitan
5 airport's commission. This unusual arrangement allows the
6 sharing of fire fighting capabilities, snow removal
7 equipment, and runway, saving taxpayers well over $2 million
8 annually. The FAA operates the control tower for both
9 civilian and military flights, thus producing further
10 substantial savings.
11 The station also owns 21 joint use facilities that
12 are shared with other military customers at a large overall
13 savings. There are other benefits of retaining this unit in
14 Minnesota as well. Drawing on the vast technical engineering
15 and other skills of Minnesotans who work in large Twin Cities
16 based firms like Honeywell, Tonka, 3-M, Cray Computers,
17 Seridian, and others over the years, the unit has been
18 staffed with technicians who are the tops in their fields.
19 In addition, Minnesota's position as international
20 headquarters, and a major hub for Northwest Airlines provides
21 a large pool of skilled pilots, ground, and maintenance
22 crews, for which -- from which recruiters can draw.

Page 354

1 Similarly, relying on Minnesota's vast network of excellent
2 health care facilities for highly skilled personnel, the unit
3 has consistently set a standard for readiness and performance
4 of aeromedical evacuation for air reserve units nationally.
5 Finally, closing the 934th would pose serious
6 geographic problems for those personnel currently working
7 there. With the next closest unit currently located in
8 Madison, Wisconsin, closing this station would make it very
9 difficult for members of the unit to continue to serve in the
10 Air Force Reserve.
11 Mr. Chairman, and other members of the Commission,
12 I am convinced that when you and other members of the Defense
13 Based Closure and Realignment Commission examine all the
14 facts, you will conclude that the 934th Air Force Reserve
15 Station located at the Minneapolis/St. Paul Airport, should
16 remain open.
17 I appreciate your taking the time to hear from me,
18 and other members of our delegation on this matter, so
19 important to Minnesota, though what I would argue by the
20 criteria of cost effectiveness, concentrated expertise -- so
21 important to the nation as well. I thank you.
22 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you, Senator Wellstone

Page 355

1 for those fine comments. We appreciate it, and now I think I
2 see that fine Congressman, Martin Sabo.
3 REPRESENTATIVE SABO: Thank you, Commissioner
4 Kling, Commissioner Cornella. I see I'm supposed to say my
5 name, state, and district. I'm Martin Sabo of Minnesota, 5th
6 District. And Mr. Cornella, it's good to see you again. I
7 appreciated your visit to Minnesota, and I take this
8 opportunity to testify in support of the 934th Air Force
9 Reserve Air Lift Wing in Minnesota.
10 We in Minnesota are rightfully proud of the 934th,
11 and I'm confident that your Commission reviewing this
12 installation will recognize that the 934th Air Wing serves
13 vital military and humanitarian roles that are particularly
14 important to maintain in this time of restructuring our
15 national defense operation. Commissioner Cornella visited
16 the base just two weeks ago, observed first hand some of the
17 major assets of the 934th.
18 It has proven itself as a consistent, capable,
19 efficient, combat ready support force for our ever changing
20 national defense needs. By providing vital air lift
21 assistance, the 934th served effectively in the Persian Gulf
22 War, and more recently, in Haiti, Panama, and Somalia. In

Page 356

1 Bosnia alone, they have deployed 500 personnel during three
2 rotations in 1992, 1993, and 1994. They've delivered over
3 2,000 tons of critical humanitarian assistance to the
4 troubled area.
5 While its military record is solid, the 934th is
6 also known for its cost effectiveness. Of the six Air Force
7 Reserve bases now under consideration by the Commission, the
8 934th has the lowest operating budget, and ranks in the top
9 third of all Air Force Reserve full spaces, for cost
10 efficiency and operating and maintenance costs. The 934th is
11 modeled cooperation working with other military civilian air
12 services.
13 The unit shares 21 joint use facilities on the base
14 with the Army, Navy, Marines, and International Guard. It
15 cooperates and shares services with Minneapolis/St. Paul
16 International Airport. It shares runways, air traffic
17 control, fire and emergency support service, resulting in
18 substantial savings to the American taxpayer. Senator
19 Wellstone indicated fire fighting shared capabilities alone
20 save $2 million annually. Clearly, this base is important to
21 our Twin Cities' economy.
22 It directly employs 500 full-time Defense

Page 357

1 Department personnel, and more than 1,100 reservists. It has
2 an operating budget of $34.7 million, total economic impact
3 of $70 million. But it's more than simply a source of
4 defense dollars for Minnesota. It serves as a strong
5 military presence that attracts quality recruits. The
6 nearest Air Force Reserve Base is in Milwaukee, 337 miles
7 from Minneapolis.
8 The 934th puts forth a powerful image in the Twin
9 City metropolitan area, bringing recruits into the reserve
10 service, and keeps them at a higher rate than the reserve
11 targets. And I think this is important. The unit has a
12 reenlistment rate hovering around 99 percent, well above the
13 target of 90 percent set for the Air Force Reserve units. It
14 serves vital military domestic missions; does so in the
15 efficient cost effective manner.
16 The 934th is in high demand, and its mission
17 performance is accredited to the Air Force. It should also
18 be noted the 934th Wing has flown over 142,000 flying hours
19 without a single major mishap, giving it the second best
20 flying safety record in the entire Air Force. Commissioner
21 Cornella's fact finding visit to the base, and your
22 willingness to hear from those from Minnesota, shows the

Page 358

1 Commissions commitment to make a well informed decision.
2 I believe the 934th should continue its current
3 mission. And I would be happy to provide you with further
4 information as the Commission proceeds with its review.
5 Commissioners, it's a cost efficient, highly capable, air
6 wing that provides a very vital function for our nation's
7 defense, and I thank you.
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: And we thank you so much,
9 Congressman Sabo, and to you also, Senator Wellstone, for
10 being with us today. Thank you, gentlemen. I believe we
11 have five more representatives that are coming along, so
12 we'll just hold up here for a few minutes and wait and see
13 who we get to. Sonny Bono is coming. Okay. But we will
14 take just a couple minutes recess here.
15 (A brief recess was taken.)
16 COMMISSIONER KLING: Congressman Sonny Bono, thank
17 you for coming over here, and right on schedule, I might add.
18 REPRESENTATIVE BONO: Thank you very much, Mr.
19 Chairman. I appreciate you hearing out my issue here, and
20 before I read the text, I just want to say that it is very
21 important to our district, as you know. You have the worst
22 job in the world, making these decisions. And I appreciate

Page 359

1 you considering all of us and recognizing that these are all
2 important to us. I'll read the text.
3 I would like to thank each member of the Commission
4 for holding these hearings. The status of March Air Force
5 Base has been the minds and close to the hearts of many of us
6 for some time. As an independent Commission, BRAC should be
7 praised for its hard work and tough decisions. You have been
8 to Southern California bases, and you know what work has
9 already been done to downsize these facilities.
10 With respect to March, I urge you – I urge the
11 Commission to adopt a Marine proposal, and make the most of
12 the previous BRAC rounds. As we proceed, we must try to save
13 taxpayer dollars, but we must also keep in mind operational
14 safety, preserving our military readiness, and common sense.
15 True saving money and consolidation are important goals. But
16 nothing is saved by closing March. First and most
17 importantly, we must look at the service people's safety.
18 Second, I want to address the potential savings
19 that the public may expect from our closure or realignment.
20 Before we make what will certainly be drastic changes to our
21 military readiness, there must be an accurate study. Of
22 course there was a study, but in my view, it was a faulty

Page 360

1 one. Mr. – tough name – Mr. Nemfako's data analysis
2 ignored boys in the field that risked lives on the military
3 effectiveness and operational safety concerns.
4 In truth, it is the Marine proposal that saves the
5 country money. Finally, I want to reemphasize the
6 redirecting the Marines to March is also important to our
7 national defense. March is – has a high military value.
8 The Marine redeployment would be better positioned to the
9 Marines for combat, and put them closer to their training
10 centers. It is – it is a fine – it is fine for honorable
11 people to disagree, but let's get this right.
12 There is no turning back for a potential disaster
13 in this. In summary, the Marine proposal is safer, cheaper,
14 more efficient by efficient choice. By adopting the marine
15 proposal, this Commission can strike a blow for preserving
16 our national defense. It can strike a blow for the
17 taxpayers, it can strike a blow for operational safety.
18 Please do not shoehorn the interservice forces together at
19 Miramar. There is too much at stake for all of us, including
20 the service people, and all the Americans.
21 We rely on them for our defenses. Thank you. I
22 just wanted to come here on behalf of March Air Force Base,

Page 361

1 and ask you to please give it a consideration.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: We certainly will, and we
3 certainly thank you, Congressman.
4 REPRESENTATIVE BONO: I again thank all the members
5 of the Commission for doing a very hard job.
6 COMMISSIONER KLING: Well, thanks for coming on
7 over here at this late date. Thank you. And I think
8 another – we'll take another very short recess.
9 (A brief recess was taken.)
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: Would you like to say
11 something? Congresswoman Clayton, thank you for coming on
12 over this afternoon. It's kind of a late – we got you a
13 late time here. I hope it's not too late for you.
14 REPRESENTATIVE CLAYTON: No, I appreciate you
15 allowing me to present this.
16 COMMISSIONER KLING: From North Carolina –
17 REPRESENTATIVE CLAYTON: Mr. Chairman and members
18 of the Defense Closure and Realignment Commission, I want to
19 thank you again for the further opportunity to present the
20 case for relocating the Naval Wings from Cecil Fields,
21 Florida, to Cherry Point Station, in Havlock, North Carolina.
22 But my colleagues in Congress, and our governor and I

Page 362

1 appeared before this Commission in Maryland, and May 4th, I
2 said at the time, and I believe also that we had a compelling
3 case.
4 Now that the facts are unfolding, we think the case
5 is even more compelling, for several reasons. First, the
6 very integrity of the base closure and the realignment
7 process is at issue here. In 1993, the decision was made
8 based upon solid factors: Cost savings, military value, land
9 use, safety, environment impact, and joint service training.
10 Cherry Point was selected.
11 This decision was careful, thoughtful,
12 dispassionate, disinterested, impartial, and calculated on
13 where best to relocate the FA-18 jets. Less than 18 months
14 later, this decision has changed. Second, the cost figures
15 upon which the Navy relied in 1993 differ by close to half a
16 billion dollars in 1995. One must seriously question the
17 accuracy of these figures. How can the Navy make a $385
18 million mistake?
19 Faulty information, inflated figures seem to be
20 driving decision to switch from Cherry Point to Oceana Naval
21 Air Station. Third, there are serious problems with the
22 Oceana location that can affect the operational readiness.

Page 363

1 For more than two decades now, it has been documented that
2 Oceana, which depends heavily on Virginia Beach for its water
3 supply, does not have a sufficient water yield. This is
4 particularly true during the periods of dry weather, or
5 draught.
6 And this will remain true, even if the Lake Gaskin
7 pipe line project is finally approved by Virginia and my
8 state. The Virginia Beach area is counting on 95 million
9 gallons of water a day from Lake Gaskin. I live at Lake
10 Gaskin on the North Carolina side. This, men, has been an
11 issue for more than 10 years, and I can tell you that a
12 resolution of this additional water flow into Virginia Beach
13 is by no means certain fact. It is with grave doubt.
14 I am most distraught – disturbed, however, Mr.
15 Chairman, because the exaggerated estimates upon which the
16 Navy seem to rely first was surfaced in three correspondence
17 from Secretary John Warner of Virginia, himself a former
18 Secretary of the Navy, and now our competitor. Surely, some
19 reservation must be raised about estimates generated by those
20 who have a direct interest in the outcome of the Commission's
21 decision.
22 Finally, it should not be overlooked, Mr. Chairman,

Page 364

1 that in reliance upon the decision that was first made by
2 this Commission, and anticipation of a relocation to Cherry
3 Point, the people of North Carolina have expended
4 considerably resource money and energy in preparation for the
5 move from the Navy Wing. $40 million in housing and other
6 upgrades alone have been spent.
7 Millions more have been expended by excessive
8 planning, infrastructure improvement, bond issues, planning a
9 new school, housing development, comprehensive water and
10 sewer planning, and transportation needs. Based upon the
11 first decision to relocate to Cherry Point, the State of
12 North Carolina has been looking forward to the move, and
13 making plans to ensure that the Navy Wings was well
14 accommodated.
15 We have done our part best we know. We have been
16 making arrangement and getting ready for the nearly 5,000
17 military and civilian personnel who will come with this move.
18 To say that we have relied on – at our detriment, on the
19 1993 decision, puts the situation mildly, at best. This
20 change, if it prevails will be felt throughout the state, and
21 will have a long term effect on the people of North Carolina.
22 One final point, Mr. Chairman and the Commission, I

Page 365

1 would urge the Commission to make sure it takes a close look
2 at the environment impact that a move of the Navy will have
3 on the State of Virginia. Indications that I am aware of
4 suggest that there are significant sensitive environmental
5 concerns in the area of Virginia in which the change is
6 proposed. I urge the Commission to reconsider the decision
7 to relocate to Cherry Point, once again.
8 Cherry Point was, and remains a sound selection.
9 The rationale for changing appears to be rather shallow and
10 based upon inaccurate information. The critical water supply
11 issues are swerving around the Oceana location, and the
12 people of North Carolina rely on good faith on the original
13 decision. Moreover, the environmental concerns, which seem
14 to be paramount in Virginia and to Cherry Point. The case
15 continues, Mr. Chairman, to be compelling.
16 And I ask the Commission, I believe they –
17 reconsideration is obliged. At the very least, a fresh and
18 closer look is warranted. Thank you for hearing my
19 testimony.
20 COMMISSIONER KLING: And thank you, Congresswoman
21 Clayton. We certainly thank you for being with us. And now
22 we have that fine representative, Congressman Elton Gallegly,

Page 366

1 California.
2 REPRESENTATIVE GALLEGLY: Thank you very much, Mr.
3 Chairman and members of the Commission. I appreciate this
4 opportunity to address you today. As you have heard me
5 testify previously, I am strongly opposed to the closure and
6 realignment facilities at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons
7 Division, Point Mugu, as proposed and considered by the
8 Commission. I believe we've come a long way in the analysis
9 of the realignment proposal since it was first presented at
10 the Adds Hearing on May 10th.
11 I would like to take this opportunity to detail for
12 you that progression – where we started, and where we are
13 today in the evaluation of this proposal. Prior to your
14 decision to add Point Mugu for closure consideration, you
15 heard of a DOD Inspector Generals Report detailing alleged
16 potential savings that could be achieved by closure of Point
17 Mugu.
18 The IG decided that the highly valued and extremely
19 sophisticated sea range operations could be housed in
20 facilities at a nearby construction battalion base at Fort
21 Wainemee. The IG also believed the laboratory and flight
22 test functions could be transferred to China Lake because the

Page 367

1 IG assumed they were duplicative of operations at China Lake.
2 Finally, the IG assumed that future tests and
3 evaluation work load targeted for performance by Point Mugu
4 and China Lake would be drastically reduced by allowing
5 substantial work force reductions at the two bases. In fact,
6 the bulk of the IG's projected savings in its report is
7 derived from personnel consolidations. Since May – the May
8 10th Adds Hearing, the Commission has had benefit of a site
9 visit to Point Mugu, and China Lake.
10 You received detailed community testimony through
11 the regional hearing process. Finally, you have received
12 comprehensive and definitive analysis from the Navy. All of
13 these – all these points out the fallacy of relying on the
14 IG Report, and its flawed data as justification to close
15 Point Mugu. During your site visit on May 30th, you heard
16 how critical the fleet mission was, and readiness is to
17 the -- to have the sea ranges operation located at Point
18 Mugu, immediately adjacent to the range.
19 Further, you learned that the Fort Wainemee
20 buildings suggested to the IG are as an alternate site,
21 either unavailable, or dilapidated as to their usable for
22 range operations without substantial and costly renovation.

Page 368

1 You were advised that, although both Point Mugu and China
2 Lake performed test evaluation functions, the weapon systems
3 of which each is devoted are completely different. Each
4 requires a unique laboratory and engineering capability.
5 As a result, functions – as a result, functions,
6 but not capabilities, are duplicated at each site. The
7 Commission was briefed on the concept of DBOF, the Defense
8 Business Operations Fund, and advised all laboratory
9 engineering functions at Point Mugu and China Lake are DBOF
10 functions. That means they must pay for themselves from user
11 customers. DBOF requires that workload dictates personnel
12 levels.
13 You were shown that – how wrong the IG was in the
14 estimate projected work load is compared to actual levels.
15 Consequently, there are no excess personnel at China Lake
16 that could perform the Point Mugu work. Therefore, the IG
17 assumption about savings derived from consolidation is wholly
18 invalid. Finally, you heard how the Navy has consolidated
19 activities at Mugu over the last two years, reducing
20 personnel and achieving a 20 year savings of $2.8 billion.
21 Although we tried to communicate these points to
22 the Commission prior to the Adds Hearing, I understand and

Page 369

1 appreciate that the proof had to be presented by factual
2 testimony, empirical evidence at site visits, and detailed
3 economic analysis provided by the Navy. I am confident that
4 that strong definitive case has now been made. The
5 Commission proposed scenario suggests retaining the Sea Range
6 operation, but closing the runways and transferring
7 laboratory and engineering functions to China Lake.
8 At the site visit and the regional hearings,
9 Commissioners were informed by the commander of the pacific
10 fleet and the director of the Navy's weapons test and
11 evaluations – just show how important it is for the missions
12 capability and fleet readiness – to have the collocation of
13 the laboratory and engineering capabilities with a range.
14 You were shown the incredible inefficiencies that would
15 result from the closure of the air field, and the transfer of
16 range targets operations to a point 160 miles away.
17 Not only would this be a ridiculous from
18 operational perspective, it would also add significant costs.
19 The Commission has shown the negative impact this scenario,
20 and have the Air National Guard and operations of the nearby
21 Surface Warfare Center. Finally, you were shown that the one
22 time closure estimated at $800 million, and reoccurring

Page 370

1 annual costs, were so high as to preclude any reasonable
2 return on investment for at least 64 years.
3 Members of the Commission, I can understand why
4 superficially, Mugu may have appeared a tempting target for
5 closure. I can only hope that now you have had a chance to
6 explore the matter in depth. You will agree that closing or
7 further realignment of Mugu simply does not make sense.
8 Given these facts just outlined, I ask you to
9 please delete Mugu from the closure and realignment list that
10 allowed this important Navy facility to continue its vital
11 functions in the service of our country's national defense.
12 Thank you very much.
13 COMMISSIONER KLING: Congressman, we thank you so
14 much for being with us for those fine comments. Thank you,
15 sir. And we will wait – I believe we have – one more
16 Congressman is on his way. He'll be here in a couple
17 minutes, so we'll just hold a recess for couple minutes.
18 (A brief recess was taken.)
19 COMMISSIONER KLING: How do you do, Senator.
20 Welcome, Senator.
21 SENATOR MOSELEY-BRAUN: Thank you very much.
22 COMMISSIONER KLING: And we have with us Senator

Page 371

1 Carol Moseley-Braun. Braun.
2 SENATOR MOSELEY-BRAUN: Thank you very much. I can
3 see this. Commission Kling, Chairman Dixon, members of the
4 committee – Commission, I am delighted to have a chance to
5 talk – to testify before you this afternoon. We thought, as
6 a matter of fact, there were votes scheduled, and that would
7 have precluded this. But, to specifically talk about where
8 the BRAC is now is part of the process.
9 I have a written statement, and I'll just try to
10 synopsize parts of the testimony there. I've testified
11 before this Commission on the first of March, with regard to
12 the Charles Melvin Price Support Center and Savanna, at Army
13 Depot, and then again on the 10th of May, with regard to your
14 decisions the 10th of May, when the Commission decided to add
15 O'Hare Reserve Station to the base closure list. The Base
16 Realignment and Closure Commission ensures that the base
17 closure process is fair.
18 Under BRAC's guidelines, the Commission uses three
19 categories of criteria to evaluate the Secretary's
20 recommendations. First the Commission assesses the military
21 value of each base, and determines the extent of which
22 closing the base will impair the current and future mission

Page 372

1 requirements, and the operational readiness, on the
2 Department of Defense's total force.
3 Second, the Commission measures the return on
4 investment of closing the base, and the extent and timing of
5 potential costs and savings. And finally, the Commission
6 evaluates both the economic and environmental impact of the
7 base closure on the community. The responsibility falls to
8 the commissioners to confirm that these criteria have been
9 met, and that the facts support the decisions made.
10 I submit, as I have submitted previously, that in
11 the case of the Charles Melvin Price Support Center and the
12 Savanna Army Depot, that the facts do not support the closure
13 of those bases, and the criteria of the BRAC process have not
14 been met. Charles Melvin Price Support Center provides
15 administrative and logistical support services to the
16 Department of Defense, and other federal government agencies
17 in the St. Louis area.
18 It is home to some 436 jobs. The Department of
19 Defense's recommendation to close Price is related to its
20 decision to relocate the ADCOM Command from St. Louis.
21 During your visit to Price, you heard that ADCOM is not the
22 primary user of Price. ADCOM soldiers occupy only 17 percent

Page 373

1 of the military family housing at price, and constitutes only
2 4 percent of the transportation workload. ADCOM occupies
3 only 21 percent of the administrative space on the
4 installation.
5 And it occupies almost none of the warehouse space,
6 or open storage facilities. The Department of Defense's
7 expected savings from closing the base did not take into
8 consideration long term costs. The Army, I believe
9 overestimated the total savings from closing down the
10 military housing units at Price by – in the area of $30
11 million, because most of the residents of this housing are
12 not connected to ADCOM, and will not be transferred out of
13 the area.
14 Instead, they will require housing subsidies if
15 they are required to move off the base. More than half the
16 housing units at Price were completed 5 years ago. In light
17 of Secretary Perry's recent comments about the inadequacy of
18 the military's housing stock, and its negative impact on
19 retaining good people, I believe that the recommendation to
20 close Price is ill advised indeed.
21 I also believe that it is misguided to close the
22 Savanna Army Depot, which stores ammunition and is home to

Page 374

1 the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and school. It
2 employs 400 people. Savanna is being recommended for closure
3 because it has been characterized by the Army as a Tier 3
4 caretaker depot, which stores unserviceable ammunition that
5 is slated to be demilitarized, or disassembled. The
6 Secretary recommended that all Tier 3 depots close.
7 However, the most recent worldwide Ammunition
8 Storage Program Report prepared for the Joint Logistical
9 Commanders stated that all depots are full, and, in fact,
10 there's ammunition being stored outside. And so, the Army's
11 budget for demilitarizing unserviceable ammunition will drop
12 dramatically over the next few years, while the Army will
13 continue to generate about 100,000 short terms – to short
14 tons of ammunition for each year of demilitarization.
15 In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of
16 tons of unserviceable ammunition positioned overseas that
17 must be brought back to the United States to be disassembled.
18 The Army simply will not be able to disassemble this
19 ammunition fast enough to keep up with the storage
20 requirements for the amounts of ammunition designated for
21 demilitarization. The storage facilities at Savanna,
22 therefore, are critical.

Page 375

1 I also would like to stress that the environmental
2 clean up costs to clean up Savanna will be astronomical. An
3 environmental impact report recently released stated that it
4 will cost some $260 million to clean up the base, and an
5 additional $50 million for ground water treatment. Although
6 the Department of Defense says that it is obligated for the
7 cost to clean up all the bases, and does not factor
8 environmental costs in the decision to close a base.
9 In reality, Savanna may never be able to house a
10 commercial tenant. Finally, commissioners, the Commission
11 has decided to add the O'Hare Air Reserve Station to the list
12 of base closures under review. More than 3,000 men and women
13 belong to the 928 Airlift group, and the 126th Air Refueling
14 Wing at O'Hare. The 928 has one of the highest percentages
15 of minority representation in the Reserves, and is one of the
16 safest flying units in the Air Force.
17 The 928th and the 126th have served in Somalia,
18 Turkey, Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia. These units benefit from
19 the talented and diverse recruiting environment of the
20 Chicago metropolitan area. The Air Force wants to be in this
21 area to take advantage of the unique resources that the large
22 metropolitan area, and the biggest air transportation hub in

Page 376

1 the country can provide.
2 I recognize, on the one hand, the economic
3 development potential for the city of Chicago, at O'Hare
4 Airport. I recommend, therefore, and I support the idea that
5 moving the units now at O'Hare to other sites in Illinois, so
6 that the United States does not lose the ability to take
7 advantage of the very talented and able aviation community in
8 the Chicago metropolitan area, that that is the direction
9 that would make sense to head.
10 Disbanding the units, or moving them to locations
11 where the current and future reservists and guardsmen reside
12 in Northern Illinois could not participate would represent a
13 real loss to our nation, and to our national defense. Mr.
14 Chairman, I believe that every part of our federal budget,
15 including our defense budget, needs to be reviewed. The BRAC
16 Commission plays an important role in that review.
17 As we move forward into the 21st century, the
18 United States military must become more efficient, and more
19 capable of responding to political and military situations
20 worldwide. Price and Savanna – and Savanna perform very
21 necessary duties to integrate into the larger mission of the
22 United States military. The success of the military is that

Page 377

1 the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
2 This is a synergy between the different bases,
3 personnel, supplies, and other parts of the military system.
4 Price and Savanna, I believe, are essential to maintaining
5 that synergy – that efficiency, if you will, in a
6 restructured military. And we also need to find a way to
7 ensure that the United States does not lose access to the
8 skills and capabilities of the largest commercial aviation
9 community in the United States.
10 Finally in closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to say,
11 when I came in the door, I was sworn in. And I don't know
12 if, since we've been sworn in before, I don't know if that
13 was in response to a recent ruling to suggest the testimony
14 before Congress or related bodies may be different than
15 testimonies before the Executive, or why it was necessary,
16 but I did it anyway. It was fine. I had no problem.
17 And so, in the context of having just taken the
18 oath to tell the truth here, let me add what may sound like a
19 more partisan and parochial comment that's not part of my
20 formal statement. And that has to do with the notion that
21 Illinois really has paid its fair share in terms of base
22 closures.

Page 378

1 There's not question but that while you have to
2 review the situation nationally, and while you have to take
3 into account the parochial and the immediate needs of
4 communities all over these United States as part of your
5 decision making, that I hope that this Commission will see
6 its way clear to take into account the overall picture, and
7 the history. The past really is prologue in decisions like
8 this as well.
9 And Illinois, certainly, has paid its price, has
10 contributed and stepped to the plate – has contributed its
11 sacrifice, and done its share as part of this downsizing
12 challenge. And so, having said that, again, there's a lot to
13 be gained I believe, by keeping Price and Savanna open, and
14 by allowing the Reserve units at O'Hare to stay in the State
15 of Illinois. Thank you.
16 COMMISSIONER KLING: And we thank you, Senator
17 Braun, for being with us. Thank you for your good comments.
18 And now, we'd like to have Congressman Ed Royce from
19 California. Welcome, Congressman.
20 REPRESENTATIVE ROYCE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
21 I want to thank the members of the Commission as well for the
22 opportunity to appear before you today to speak of a matter

Page 379

1 of vital importance to our nation, and certainly to Southern
2 California, and that is the future of the Long Beach Naval
3 Shipyard.
4 My colleague, Steve Horn, and others have addressed
5 many of the economic and technical and legal issues involved
6 in this debate, and they've discussed the deviation from base
7 closure law criteria, the disparities in the Navy's
8 application of those criteria, errors in excluding workman's
9 comp benefits associated with the closure of Long Beach, and
10 the economic impact on the Long Beach, Los Angeles area of
11 closing Long Beach, worth an estimated three quarters of a
12 billion dollars annually.
13 They've also mentioned the outstanding record of
14 Long Beach as the only public shipyard operating in the
15 black, and returning money to the taxpayers the last 6 years
16 in a row. Accordingly, I would like to focus on another
17 perspective, and that is the essential contributions that
18 Long Beach Naval Shipyard makes to America's military
19 capability, and to America's security presence in Asia and
20 the pacific.
21 Our economic well being for the 21st century is
22 tied to Asia, and the pacific realm. So is our national

Page 380

1 security. Current and incipient military trade and regional
2 disputes involving Russia, and China, and Japan, Taiwan, the
3 Koreas, the Philippines, Philasia, Indonesia, Vietnam, India,
4 Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf, and Eastern Africa, all argue
5 for a stout and reliable force projection from the west coast
6 of America. Please note that three of the nations that I
7 named are nuclear powers.
8 The pacific and its adjacent waters have become, in
9 this century, America's ocean. And they need to be secure
10 for American commerce, and American sea power. Long Beach
11 Naval Shipyard is an essential element of that formulation.
12 For example, the overall Chinese defense budget increased by
13 22 percent last year, and is going up by another 25 percent
14 this year. No other country in the world comes close to
15 these levels of growth in military spending.
16 A large portion of this increased defense spending
17 is going to the Chinese Navy. Earlier this year, the Chinese
18 bought two submarines from Russia as the first part of a
19 package deal, in which they'll buy more than a dozen more.
20 The expanding forward presence of Chinese ships in the seas
21 of Southeast Asia is another example. The Chinese Navy
22 already has tried to occupy islands in the South China sea

Page 381

1 that are claimed by other Asian countries.
2 These are but some of the ways in which communist
3 China has sought to develop a bigger and more powerful blue
4 water navy with nuclear and ballistic missile capability. In
5 fact, no other area of the world has witnessed a greater arms
6 race in recent years, than the countries of South and East
7 Asia. All of this is taking place while the United States
8 has been shrinking its own Naval force.
9 Our ability to project force abroad when necessary
10 depends on readiness, and on capacity, and on balance of
11 power. And Long Beach contributes immeasurably in each of
12 these three factors. No other port facility provides the
13 services to Naval fleets in a single location as does Long
14 Beach, including a carrier capable dry dock, large overhaul
15 capacity, surface and conventional ship servicing capacity,
16 and a tremendously skilled work force.
17 Losing such a valuable shipyard would deal a
18 tremendous blow to an American Navy which already has seen a
19 sharp decline in available funds for routine maintenance.
20 The advantage of Long Beach's central geographic mainland
21 location allows it to serve as a funnel point for projecting
22 American military power for the rest of the United States to

Page 382

1 the Pacific in ways that the Puget Sound, or Pearl Harbor
2 cannot duplicate.
3 Long Beach also stands as one of only two west
4 coast bases with dry docks capable of servicing aircraft
5 carriers. If Long Beach were to close, our future capability
6 to service our carriers -- a weapon with unparalled
7 capability to convey American power would be severely
8 compromised. We know that foreign ports cannot substitute
9 for the reliability and the range of services found in the
10 Long Beach shipyard.
11 We also know that we cannot depend on foreign ports
12 to provide essential services and access to our Navy.
13 Already, China's military buildup and influence in the region
14 have led nations such as the Philippines, Thailand, and
15 Indonesia, to deny or request to float pre-positioned
16 American equipment and supplies for our use in future global
17 emergencies.
18 The only way that we can be certain of having a top
19 quality Naval facility available when we need it in the
20 future, is to maintain the facility ourselves, and we already
21 have it in Long Beach. In sum, when future regional or
22 global crisis occur, as inevitably they will, and when such

Page 383

1 crisis calls for action by the United States Navy, we will
2 require the continued presence of the Long Beach Naval
3 Shipyard to project America's strength abroad.
4 So I urge you not to deprive us of that capability,
5 and I thank you very much for the opportunity to testify here
6 today, Mr. Chairman.
7 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you, Congressman Royce.
8 And with that conclusion, we'll have two announcements. One,
9 I would like everybody to know what a tough ship our Chairman
10 runs. He had this set for adjournment at 6:10, and it is now
11 exactly 6:10. Pretty good. And, second of all, the -- we're
12 going to stand in adjournment now until 8:30 tomorrow, when
13 the Congressional Hearings will continue, and they will take
14 place on the Senate side in the Hart Senate Office Building,
15 Room 216. And with that, we stand in adjournment.
16 Thank you, all.
17 (Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the Hearing was
18 adjourned.)

BRAC HEARING

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

8:30 a.m.

216 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, June 13, 1995

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Senator Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Mr. Alton W. Cornella
Ms. Rebecca G. Cox
General J.B. Davis, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. S. Lee Kling
Major General Josue Robles, USA (Ret.)
Mrs. Wendi Louise Steele

* * * * *

C O N T E N T S

	PAGE
Opening Remarks of The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission	7
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY:	
MICHIGAN:	
Representative Bonior	124
MISSISSIPPI:	
Senator Thad Cochran	9
Senator Trent Lott	12
Representative Sonny Montgomery	19
MISSOURI:	
Sen Kit Bond	23
Senator John Ashcroft	29
Representative Dick Gephardt	36
Representative William Clay	40
Representative James Talent	45
Representative Ike Skelton	51

MONTANA:	
Senator Max Baucus	63
Senator Conrad Burns	54
NEW JERSEY:	
Senator Bill Bradley	58
Senator Frank Lautenberg	68
Representative Jim Saxton	73
Representative Chris Smith	77
Representative Frank Pallone	81
Representative Robert Menendez	87
Representative Dick Zimmer	91
NEW YORK:	
Senator Pat Moynihan	96
Senator Al D'Amato	99
Representative Gary Ackerman	102
Representative Susan Molinari	105
Representative Sherwood Boehlert	110
Representative Jack Quinn	114
Representative John LaFalce	119
NORTH CAROLINA:	
Representative Walter Jones	129
NORTH DAKOTA:	
Senator Kent Conrad	132
Senator Byron Dorgan	139
Representative Earl Pomeroy	135
OHIO:	
Senator John Glenn	143
Senator Mike Dewine	148
Representative Tony Hall	152
Representative Dave Hobson	155
Representative Jim Traficant	160
Representative Rob Portman	511
Representative John Kasich	454
OKLAHOMA:	
Senator Don Nickles	165
Senator Jim Inhofe	170
Representative Bill Brewster	174
Representative J.C. Watts	181
Representative Ernst Istook	185
Representative Frank Lucas	177
PENNSYLVANIA:	
Senator Rick Santorum	225
Representative Tom Foglietta	234
Representative Robert Borski	221
Representative Jon Fox	205
Representative Tim Holden	191
Representative Curt Weldon	266
Representative Bud Shuster	216
Representative Ron Klink	261
Representative Mike Doyle	247
Representative Frank Mascara	251
Representative Phil English	516
Representative George Gekas	195
Representative Paul Kanjorski	231
Representative Joe McDade	201
PUERTO RICO:	
Delegate Carlos Romero-Barcelo	255
RHODE ISLAND:	
Senator Claiborne Pell	443
Senator Chafee	271
Representative Jack Reed	275
TENNESSEE:	
Senator Bill Frist	281
Senator Fred Thompson	285
Representative Harold Ford	289
Representative Ed Bryant	294

TEXAS:	
Senator Phil Gramm	297
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison	301
Representative Jim Chapman	305
Representative Joe Barton	309
Representative Lloyd Doggett	314
Representative Charles Stenholm	331
Representative Larry Combest	323
Representative Henry Gonzalez	336
Representative Lamar Smith	339
Representative Henry Bonilla	343
Representative Martin Frost	328
Representative Greg Laughlin	351
Representative Kika de la Garza	354
UTAH:	
Senator Orrin Hatch	357
Senator Bob Bennett	361
Representative Jim Hansen	364
Representative Enid Waldholtz	370
VIRGINIA:	
Senator John Warner	308
Senator Chuck Robb	378
Representative Owen Pickett	384
Representative Bobby Scott	403
Representative Norm Sisisky	395
Representative Jim Moran	407
Representative Tom Davis	412
WISCONSIN:	
Senator Herb Kohl	417
Senator Russ Feingold	421
Representative Thomas Barrett	425
MISCELLANEOUS STATES:	
Senator Richard Shelby	428
Representative Bud Cramer	434
Representative Maxine Waters	439
Representative Sam Gejdenson	446
Representative Rosa DeLauro	457
Representative Ileana Ros Lehtinen	450
Representative Charles Canady	462
Representative Andy Jacobs	465
Representative Patrick Kennedy	278
Representative Tim Hutchinson	301
Representative Chris Shays	478
Representative Dick Durbin	493
Representative Anna Eshoo	50
Representative Bill Orton	37
Representative Steve Horn	47
Representative Solomon Ortiz	49

* * * * *

Page 7

1 PROCEEDINGS
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, ladies and
3 gentlemen, and welcome to today's hearing of the Defense Base
4 Closure and Realignment Commission. My name is Alan Dixon.
5 I'm Chairman of the Commission. With us today are my
6 colleagues, Commissioners Al Cornella, Rebecca Cox, S. Lee
7 Kling, Joe Robles, and Wendi Steele. Other commissioners
8 will be arriving through the morning.
9 As most of you know, this Commission is heading
10 into the final three weeks of its difficult and unpleasant
11 task of recommending to the President of the United States
12 which domestic military bases should be closed or realigned.
13 Since we received the closure list from Secretary Perry 15
14 weeks ago, the commissioners have held ten hearings here in
15 Washington, D.C., 16 regional hearings around the country,
16 and made 200 visits to 75 military bases.
17 Yesterday, we heard testimony from 82 Members of
18 the Congress whose states or districts are affected by the
19 base closure list, and today, believe it or not, we will hear
20 from 121 more. This is an important part of the process.
21 For the past three-and-a-half months, commissioners
22 and staff have been in regular contact with elected officials

Page 8

1 and community members, but our hearings yesterday and today
2 will give us one more chance to hear sharply focused
3 arguments regarding bases on the list.
4 Let me assure Members of the Congress and everyone
5 else, this Commission has made no decisions yet regarding
6 which bases will close and which ones will not. Information
7 regarding many installations is still coming in and is still
8 being evaluated by the Commission and the Commission staff.
9 That process will continue right up until the 22nd day of
10 June of this month when the Commission begins its final
11 deliberations. That is why we regard these two days of
12 testimony as extremely valuable to us.
13 As was the case yesterday, we will today hear
14 testimony state-by-state, and each member will be limited to
15 five minutes. We will be required to enforce that limit
16 strictly, because 121 Members of the House and Senate will
17 testify today. Anyone who has longer remarks, or who wishes
18 to submit additional testimony for the record, is welcome to
19 do so.
20 Let me also say that the Base Closure Act requires
21 that all testimony given before the Commission be made under
22 oath. Our staff counsel will swear in Members before they

Page 9

1 testify so that we can keep things moving, and we usually do
2 it before they come in the door.
3 With that, I believe we're ready to begin. We
4 begin today with the great State of Mississippi, and we have
5 here the distinguished Senior Senator from the State of
6 Mississippi, my old friend, Senator Thad Cochran; and we're
7 delighted to have him. Senator Cochran, pleased to have you
8 here, sir.
9 SENATOR COCHRAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
10 Chairman, we appreciate very much the opportunity to talk
11 with you this morning about Columbus Air Force Base and
12 Meridian Naval Air Station, both of which are located in the
13 State of Mississippi.
14 I think it's clear from the facts that military
15 requirements support keeping both bases open. The Department
16 of Defense has not recommended closing Columbus Air Force
17 Base. The Air Force continues to support keeping that base
18 open, and it was clearly stated by General Boles, who was in
19 Columbus just last week. He's the incoming commander of the
20 service's Air Education and Training Command, and I was
21 pleased to be able to attend that site visit.Air Force
22 The base is up to date, it's modern in every way,

Page 10

1 it's efficient. It has excellent air space and weather, a
2 bombing range that would be very difficult to recreate
3 anywhere else, excellent or magnificent runways, as one
4 person has described them, no encroachment problems, and it
5 has the enthusiastic support of the state and local
6 community.
7 Meridian Naval Air Station has been scrutinized by
8 three successive Base Closure Commissions. The question
9 before the Commission is whether the Navy can single-site all
10 undergraduate pilot training at one base. The primary
11 mission of Naval Air Station Meridian is to conduct
12 undergraduate pilot training.
13 The pilot training rate provided by the Navy to the
14 Commission is wrong, by the Navy's own admission. Only last
15 week there was an article in Defense News, which I'd like to
16 submit to the Commission for inclusion in the record, where
17 senior Navy officials say that the Navy will have to keep six
18 additional squadrons in its force structure, six more than it
19 had planned to decommission by 1997.
20 I would also like to submit, Mr. Chairman, for the
21 record, a recent memorandum from Admiral Boorda, the Chief of
22 Naval Operations, dated May 10, 1995, which directs his staff

Page 11

1 to increase the pilot training rate from 336, the number
2 supplied to the Commission by the Navy, to 360, the result of
3 keeping six additional squadrons in the force structure.
4 The facts clearly show that one base cannot conduct
5 all of the required strike undergraduate pilot training.
6 Admiral Hayden, the Chief of Naval Air Training, has
7 acknowledged that, at a PTR -- pilot training rate -- out of
8 360, there is no surge capability and, when the E2C2 training
9 rate is included in this, as it must be, the pilot training
10 rate comes out to be 382.
11 Your charter, as you well know and have eloquently
12 stated, is to save the Department of Defense money by closing
13 or realigning unnecessary infrastructure while, at the same
14 time, maintaining infrastructure for the military to be able
15 to carry out its missions. I hope you will ask the Chief of
16 Naval Operations tomorrow if he believes the Navy can meet
17 its mission requirements with Naval Air Station Meridian.
18 Back in December, Mr. Chairman, when you were
19 talking to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, you said, very
20 correctly:
21 "Base closing should not be simply a budget-cutting
22 tactic. It should be undertaken to reduce our defense

Page 12

1 infrastructure in a deliberate way that will improve our
2 long-term military readiness and ensure that we are spending
3 taxpayer dollars in the most efficient way possible. We
4 should not make hasty decisions that will eliminate important
5 military assets based on our near-term budget imperatives."
6 Mr. Chairman, you will have the facts to
7 demonstrate that military requirements necessitate keeping
8 both Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian Naval Air Station.
9 Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my old friend, the
11 distinguished Senior Senator from the great State of
12 Mississippi.
13 We're delighted to have here with him his
14 colleague, my old friend, the Majority Whip, the fine Senator
15 from the State of Mississippi. I served with him as chairman
16 of the Readiness Subcommittee. He was my ally and friend,
17 the Ranking Member, and nobody ever had a better-mannered
18 friend to work with in the United States Senate -- Senator
19 Trent Lott of Mississippi.
20 SENATOR LOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we
21 did some good work together.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Amen, brother.

Page 13

1 SENATOR LOTT: It's a pleasure to appear before you
2 today and, of course, I remember those experiences as we sat
3 beside each other in committee hearings. Members of the
4 Commission, thank you very much for giving us the opportunity
5 to testify to you regarding the two Mississippi bases that
6 are under consideration by you today.
7 As my distinguished colleague has just said, of
8 course, there has been a recommendation to close Meridian
9 Naval Air Station. That was on the list that came from the
10 Pentagon. But you added Columbus Air Force Base in order to
11 fully evaluate the Department's decision to recommend closure
12 of Reese Air Force Base.
13 I'd like to start with Columbus Air Force Base.
14 Columbus was not recommended for closure by the Secretary for
15 three very sound reasons.
16 First, it is a top-ranked pilot training base in
17 the Air Force today. Columbus has great weather, great
18 facilities, and an outstanding record of training pilots for
19 the Air Force.
20 Second, Columbus has the best facilities of all Air
21 Force pilot training bases. As an old SAC base, its 12,000-
22 foot runway and top-of-the-line support facilities provides

Page 14

1 Columbus with the flexibility needed by the Air Force as it
2 continues to train our undergraduate pilots for the future,
3 even with fewer bases.
4 Third, the cost of training pilots at Columbus is
5 the second lowest in the entire Air Force. Based on the
6 future defense budget, of course, it's essential that we
7 retain one of our most cost-effective bases.
8 For these reasons, I believe the Department was
9 correct when it identified the military value of Columbus Air
10 Force Base and recommended retention of that base, and I
11 encourage you to follow the Secretary's recommendations and
12 keep Columbus, simply because the Department did not deviate
13 from closure criteria.
14 Regarding Meridian Naval Air Station, you are
15 largely being asked to review the work of the two previous
16 Commissions. It has been quite an experience. What was it?
17 I think that we had a great Prime Minister of England one
18 time who said, "There's nothing more exhilarating than being
19 shot at and missed." We've been shot at twice and missed,
20 and we'd like to do that one more time.
21 We think that the Commissions made the right
22 decisions in the past. They rejected the Department's

Page 15

1 recommendations, and I think that you should do the same.
2 I can tell you that the previous Commissions
3 carefully reviewed the closure recommendations in the past
4 and determined that the Navy could not meet their pilot
5 training rate requirements if Meridian was closed. That is a
6 critical part of that decision, and I think that was the
7 point that the Commission made the decision on two years ago.
8 This year, you're in the same situation faced by
9 these previous Commissions. If Meridian Naval Air Station is
10 closed, the Navy will not be able to meet their strike pilot
11 requirement. As my colleague just pointed out, there would
12 be a tremendous responsibility on the one remaining base.
13 In order to meet their strike training requirement,
14 that one base at Kingsville, they would have to operate that
15 base 16 hours a day, five days a week, all year long. Under
16 this scenario, we can provide the only surge capacity
17 available, and this surge capability will cost you time-and-
18 a-half on Saturdays and double time on Sundays.
19 This op. tempo would equate to 26 aircraft taking
20 off every hour, one every 2.3 minutes and, during that hour,
21 an average of six jets are in the landing pattern at the home
22 field, six at Corpus Christi, and four jets in the pattern at

Page 16

1 Alice Orange Grove, all day, five days a week, all year long.
2 It's just not practical, not safe, and probably not even
3 possible.
4 After the Meridian community presented this
5 information to you in Birmingham, the Navy re-evaluated their
6 pilot training rate calculations and made several changes.
7 First -- and this is important -- they delayed the
8 closure date of Meridian from 1999 to 2001. This was done
9 primarily to delay the impact of increasing the extremely
10 high op. tempo required at Kingsville. In effect, the Navy
11 has agreed that the op. tempo at Kingsville, due to the
12 Secretary's recommendation, is difficult and stressful, so
13 much so that they want to delay its impact as long as
14 possible.
15 Secondly, the Navy increased their strike PTR
16 requirement from 336 to 360 and expedited the shift of the
17 E2C2 training mission to a strike base. This increase in PTR
18 exemplifies the difficulty of predicting the Navy's pilot
19 requirements in the future. It could go up again and, if it
20 does, the Navy has an even bigger problem in the future.
21 The cumulative impact of these changes validates
22 the essential need to maintain two strike training bases for

Page 17

1 the Navy. Without two bases, they have no flexibility, very
2 limited surge capability, and face an undue and unacceptable
3 risk.
4 You essentially face four questions regarding the
5 proposed Meridian closure:
6 Can the Navy meet their strike PTR requirements
7 with only one base? The answer is no.
8 Does one strike base provide the Navy sufficient
9 surge capability in the event of war or other PTR increases
10 in the future? The answer is clearly no.
11 Is it reasonable to safely expect student pilots to
12 learn to fly jets at one base, particularly when that one
13 base forces you to operate with very small margins for error,
14 delay, or precision? And I think the answer is no.
15 Is Meridian, Lauderdale County, and the State of
16 Mississippi receiving equitable treatment compared to the
17 exemptions granted to California bases due to impact
18 economic? According to the GAO, the answer is no.
19 In closing, I want to repeat the statement made by
20 the Meridian community every year that the Commission has
21 reviewed their fate: if a fair review of the numbers showed
22 that Meridian should not be closed and that there was a

Page 18

1 substantial deviation existing, then shouldn't the base be
2 kept open?
3 I urge you to accept the recommendation to retain
4 Columbus Air Force Base and reject the idea that the United
5 States Navy can meet their strike pilot requirements at only
6 one base. If you support these two positions, the Air Force
7 and Navy will be better off and the country will benefit from
8 your wisdom. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
9 of the Commission.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much, Senator
11 Lott, and the Commission is indebted to both you and your
12 colleague, Senator Cochran, for your great work on behalf of
13 your state and your fine testimony.
14 We simply want to say that I know you're now going
15 to introduce your congressional friend from the House side --
16 SENATOR LOTT: I just want to say, Mr. Chairman,
17 besides that, both of these bases are in Sonny's district.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, let me tell you, I just want
19 to say this about Representative Sonny Montgomery. We've had
20 ten hearings in Washington, D.C. and Congressman Montgomery
21 has been at all ten, and that's more than I can say for my
22 commissioners.

Page 19

1 So Sonny, you're not a strange looking fellow.
2 We've seen you here before. So I guess you might as well
3 drop your whole load now. Representative Sonny Montgomery
4 from the great State of Mississippi.
5 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: I don't know whether I
6 really need to say anything or not, Mr. Chairman.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You've been doing pretty good just
8 staring at us, Sonny.
9 (Laughter.)
10 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: He thinks that I'm
11 tired of looking at him every day.
12 (Laughter.)
13 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: Mr. Chairman and
14 Commissioners, I moved from the front row to the pulpit this
15 morning. Now, tomorrow, I'll be back on the front row.
16 As has been said, I speak on behalf of the two
17 bases, Meridian Naval Air Station and Columbus Air Force
18 Base. Three of you have been to the Meridian Naval Air
19 Station, and General J.B. Davis has agreed to go there on
20 Friday, to the Meridian Naval Air Station.
21 Commissioners Cornella and Steele visited Meridian
22 on June the 8th. It was 90- degree weather, but over 20,00

Page 20

1 people turned out in support of the base. When General
2 Robles was in Meridian, we had 12,000 people and 70 degrees.
3 The Navy Meridian team makes a strong case that the
4 Navy was on shaky ground in saying it could meet future pilot
5 training requirements at just one base. Since Meridian was
6 put on the closure list, things have changed, as has been
7 pointed out by my colleagues this morning.
8 The Navy says it needs more air squadrons and has
9 revised the pilot training rate, and we have charts there
10 that will follow my remarks. The training rate was at 336
11 and now it has been moved up by the Navy to 382, to train
12 pilots. Now the Navy says if Meridian is closed, it needs to
13 be kept open for two more years, from 1999 to the year 2001.
14 You've seen the letter to me from Admiral Mike
15 Boorda, where he says that, operating at maximum capacity --
16 these are his words -- that one base, to meet the projected
17 PTR, the pilot training, would be difficult and
18 uncomfortable. The admiral also says it would be
19 unsatisfactory if the Navy had to increase pilot training for
20 a significant surge requirement.
21 To reach the required pilot training, or PTRs, on
22 only one base, NAS Kingsville would have to operate at near

Page 21

1 capacity, including increased work days. Operating at that
2 level simply does not allow for a surge in pilot training.
3 Also, with one strike base, a tornado or hurricane hitting
4 Kingsville puts the Navy out of business in training carrier
5 pilots.
6 In voting to keep Meridian open in 1993, BRAC
7 commissioners found that two full strike training bases were
8 needed when the PTR, pilot training, was 384. The projected
9 PTR is now up to 382.
10 NAS Meridian has different missions. We are fully
11 utilizing that base.
12 First, it's the training of aviators to land in fly
13 off of carriers.
14 Second, the base has a Naval Technical Training
15 Center which trains 5,000 sailors and Marines.
16 Third, the anti-drug school, that was not
17 recommended for closure. Some of you have seen that school.
18 Fourth, the Chief of the Naval Reserve has said if
19 Meridian is not closed, he will move a 200-person Reserve
20 unit from Jackson, Mississippi to Meridian.
21 The criteria guiding this Commission gives priority
22 to military value. The facts are clear that, for operational

Page 22

1 readiness, the Navy needs two strike training bases.
2 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that your
3 commissioners visited Columbus Air Force Base on June the 7th
4 and June the 8th, and four commissioners did come. The key
5 word with Columbus is flexibility. It can support any of the
6 five Air Force flying missions.
7 Having once been a Strategic Air Command base, it
8 has, as has been mentioned, the longest runway in the South,
9 at 12,000 feet. It can accommodate any aircraft that's in
10 the Air Force inventory, large or small.
11 In addition, Columbus is the only undergraduate
12 pilot training base with the use of a gun range. That is a
13 big plus. It has an abundance of air space and no
14 encroachment problems of any kind.
15 Strong community support brought the base to
16 Columbus in 1941 and that relationship is just as strong
17 today. The Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Study Group
18 both rank Columbus as the number one undergraduate pilot
19 training base.
20 The highest priority ought to be given to bases
21 with the ability to adapt to new missions. Columbus is in
22 that category. Columbus has updated facilities, air space,

Page 23

1 and community support, which makes a compelling case to keep
2 Columbus Air Force Base open.
3 Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I'll
4 be back tomorrow.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, it's great to finally hear
6 from you, Sonny.
7 We're indebted to the great State of Mississippi,
8 its fine Senators and its fine Congressman for a first-class
9 presentation. Thank you very much.
10 We'll now hear from the great State of Missouri and
11 Senator Kit Bond, its distinguished Senior Senator. My old
12 friend, Senator Kit Bond. I'm telling all these stories
13 about being ranking. I was chairman of a Subcommittee on
14 Banking. My old friend, Senator Bond, was ranking on that,
15 and we had a fine, warm relationship, and I'm delighted to
16 see an old friend and neighbor, the distinguished senior
17 Senator from the great State of Missouri, Senator Kit Bond.
18 SENATOR BOND: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
19 Those are the good old days when the Cardinals weren't 12
20 games out, as well.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're not going to make it this
22 year, Kit.

Page 24

1 SENATOR BOND: Well, practice, I guess, makes
2 perfect.
3 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I thank you for
4 affording all of us, the Senators and the Congressmen from
5 Missouri, an opportunity to address you on this issue of
6 great national importance, the streamlining of our national
7 defense system.
8 There are three specific issues we need to address:
9 the Army Publications Center in St. Louis, Fort Leonard Wood,
10 and ATCOM.
11 First, we fully support the Army's plan to
12 consolidate the Army Publications Center in St. Louis. The
13 construction of an additional loading bay, scheduled to begin
14 this year, has been approved by the Secretary of the Army,
15 and the funds have been released to accomplish this. We are
16 well on our way to ensuring the move will occur with minimal,
17 if any, impact on operations.
18 Now, with respect to the more of the Army's
19 Chemical Warfare Training School and Military Police School
20 to new facilities at Fort Leonard Wood, this has been a
21 contentious issue, though I don't think it should be. I know
22 the Commission is well aware of the commitment and support of

Page 19

1 So Sonny, you're not a strange looking fellow.
2 We've seen you here before. So I guess you might as well
3 drop your whole load now. Representative Sonny Montgomery
4 from the great State of Mississippi.
5 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: I don't know whether I
6 really need to say anything or not, Mr. Chairman.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You've been doing pretty good just
8 staring at us, Sonny.
9 (Laughter.)
10 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: He thinks that I'm
11 tired of looking at him every day.
12 (Laughter.)
13 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: Mr. Chairman and
14 Commissioners, I moved from the front row to the pulpit this
15 morning. Now, tomorrow, I'll be back on the front row.
16 As has been said, I speak on behalf of the two
17 bases, Meridian Naval Air Station and Columbus Air Force
18 Base. Three of you have been to the Meridian Naval Air
19 Station, and General J.B. Davis has agreed to go there on
20 Friday, to the Meridian Naval Air Station.
21 Commissioners Cornella and Steele visited Meridian
22 on June the 8th. It was 90- degree weather, but over 20,00

Page 20

1 people turned out in support of the base. When General
2 Robles was in Meridian, we had 12,000 people and 70 degrees.
3 The Navy Meridian team makes a strong case that the
4 Navy was on shaky ground in saying it could meet future pilot
5 training requirements at just one base. Since Meridian was
6 put on the closure list, things have changed, as has been
7 pointed out by my colleagues this morning.
8 The Navy says it needs more air squadrons and has
9 revised the pilot training rate, and we have charts there
10 that will follow my remarks. The training rate was at 336
11 and now it has been moved up by the Navy to 382, to train
12 pilots. Now the Navy says if Meridian is closed, it needs to
13 be kept open for two more years, from 1999 to the year 2001.
14 You've seen the letter to me from Admiral Mike
15 Boorda, where he says that, operating at maximum capacity --
16 these are his words -- that one base, to meet the projected
17 PTR, the pilot training, would be difficult and
18 uncomfortable. The admiral also says it would be
19 unsatisfactory if the Navy had to increase pilot training for
20 a significant surge requirement.
21 To reach the required pilot training, or PTRs, on
22 only one base, NAS Kingsville would have to operate at near

Page 21

1 capacity, including increased work days. Operating at that
2 level simply does not allow for a surge in pilot training.
3 Also, with one strike base, a tornado or hurricane hitting
4 Kingsville puts the Navy out of business in training carrier
5 pilots.
6 In voting to keep Meridian open in 1993, BRAC
7 commissioners found that two full strike training bases were
8 needed when the PTR, pilot training, was 384. The projected
9 PTR is now up to 382.
10 NAS Meridian has different missions. We are fully
11 utilizing that base.
12 First, it's the training of aviators to land in fly
13 off of carriers.
14 Second, the base has a Naval Technical Training
15 Center which trains 5,000 sailors and Marines.
16 Third, the anti-drug school, that was not
17 recommended for closure. Some of you have seen that school.
18 Fourth, the Chief of the Naval Reserve has said if
19 Meridian is not closed, he will move a 200-person Reserve
20 unit from Jackson, Mississippi to Meridian.
21 The criteria guiding this Commission gives priority
22 to military value. The facts are clear that, for operational

Page 22

1 readiness, the Navy needs two strike training bases.
2 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that your
3 commissioners visited Columbus Air Force Base on June the 7th
4 and June the 8th, and four commissioners did come. The key
5 word with Columbus is flexibility. It can support any of the
6 five Air Force flying missions.
7 Having once been a Strategic Air Command base, it
8 has, as has been mentioned, the longest runway in the South,
9 at 12,000 feet. It can accommodate any aircraft that's in
10 the Air Force inventory, large or small.
11 In addition, Columbus is the only undergraduate
12 pilot training base with the use of a gun range. That is a
13 big plus. It has an abundance of air space and no
14 encroachment problems of any kind.
15 Strong community support brought the base to
16 Columbus in 1941 and that relationship is just as strong
17 today. The Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Study Group
18 both rank Columbus as the number one undergraduate pilot
19 training base.
20 The highest priority ought to be given to bases
21 with the ability to adapt to new missions. Columbus is in
22 that category. Columbus has updated facilities, air space,

Page 23

1 and community support, which makes a compelling case to keep
2 Columbus Air Force Base open.
3 Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I'll
4 be back tomorrow.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, it's great to finally hear
6 from you, Sonny.
7 We're indebted to the great State of Mississippi,
8 its fine Senators and its fine Congressman for a first-class
9 presentation. Thank you very much.
10 We'll now hear from the great State of Missouri and
11 Senator Kit Bond, its distinguished Senior Senator. My old
12 friend, Senator Kit Bond. I'm telling all these stories
13 about being ranking. I was chairman of a Subcommittee on
14 Banking. My old friend, Senator Bond, was ranking on that,
15 and we had a fine, warm relationship, and I'm delighted to
16 see an old friend and neighbor, the distinguished senior
17 Senator from the great State of Missouri, Senator Kit Bond.
18 SENATOR BOND: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
19 Those are the good old days when the Cardinals weren't 12
20 games out, as well.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're not going to make it this
22 year, Kit.

Page 24

1 SENATOR BOND: Well, practice, I guess, makes
2 perfect.
3 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I thank you for
4 affording all of us, the Senators and the Congressmen from
5 Missouri, an opportunity to address you on this issue of
6 great national importance, the streamlining of our national
7 defense system.
8 There are three specific issues we need to address:
9 the Army Publications Center in St. Louis, Fort Leonard Wood,
10 and ATCOM.
11 First, we fully support the Army's plan to
12 consolidate the Army Publications Center in St. Louis. The
13 construction of an additional loading bay, scheduled to begin
14 this year, has been approved by the Secretary of the Army,
15 and the funds have been released to accomplish this. We are
16 well on our way to ensuring the move will occur with minimal,
17 if any, impact on operations.
18 Now, with respect to the more of the Army's
19 Chemical Warfare Training School and Military Police School
20 to new facilities at Fort Leonard Wood, this has been a
21 contentious issue, though I don't think it should be. I know
22 the Commission is well aware of the commitment and support of

Page 25

1 the people of Missouri for this move. I've seen it firsthand
2 and I can explain it at great length to anybody who has any
3 questions about it.
4 We've had to face what's been a well-financed and
5 clever onslaught by the friends of Fort McClellan. I do
6 believe we have successfully defended the Army's plan and
7 exposed some of the subterfuges used by those opposed to the
8 move.
9 Time Magazine, you may have seen, in its May 22
10 issue, characterized the opposition as conducting guerilla
11 warfare to sabotage the move and blackmail -- harsh words,
12 not mine, they're Time Magazine's. But I have seen some of
13 the desperate methods employed by these people.
14 They've created havoc during the process, extending
15 even to attempts on the floor of the Congress to slip, into
16 unrelated legislation during the dark of night, draconian
17 regulatory restrictions on future Army facilities while
18 exempting the Alabama site from even a modicum of regulation.
19 Fortunately, we were able to undo that effort.
20 We're aware that there is a classified meeting to
21 be held shortly that was requested by the friends of Fort
22 McClellan. We have spoken with the Department of Defense and

Page 26

1 have been assured that there is no threat to our national
2 security or our ability to meet our commitments due to the
3 move, and that this has been fully considered and examined by
4 the DOD. The commissioners will learn of that firsthand.
5 I also submit to the Commission a survey conducted
6 by the people of Missouri of the people of Missouri, not some
7 group employed by Missouri's opposition, showing that this is
8 well supported. And I would ask that the Commission make
9 that a part of the record.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be a part of the record,
11 Senator.
12 SENATOR BOND: I also know you're aware of
13 extensive regulatory oversight and permitting requirements
14 this move has required of the Army and the State of Missouri.
15 I'm proud to let you know that Governor Carnahan has signed
16 the final permit. I have a copy of that here. Again, I ask
17 that that be accepted as part of the record.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be put in the record,
19 Senator.
20 SENATOR BOND: This oversight and regulation
21 process on the chemical warfare facilities may seem tedious
22 to some, but I really think it's necessary to ensure the

Page 27

1 safety of the personnel at the facilities, the local resident
2 population, the environment, and national security overall.
3 These tests have been met. This will be the finest
4 state-of-the-art facilities, designed to keep our soldiers
5 superbly trained and ready. I think that's extremely
6 important.
7 Mr. Chairman, on the other hand, the proposal to
8 disperse the Army's Aviation and Troop Command from St.
9 Louis, I believe will be found to be unwise and outdated, as
10 it does not reflect proposal of the DOD's Roles and Missions
11 Commission. The Army Management Control Plan clearly shows
12 that leased facilities were excluded from a military value
13 assessment, a critical factor for all other base closure
14 determinations, but GAO found no documentation that they'd
15 done so.
16 The Army based its decision to close ATCOM
17 primarily on personnel savings, but the 780 positions they
18 anticipate to eliminate did not include the 533 positions
19 that must be retained if ATCOM is closed.
20 The Army also has created a new command
21 infrastructure to include a general officer and staff at the
22 Soldier System Command at Natick. To the best of our

Page 28

1 knowledge, the Army has not calculated this in its personnel
2 savings assumption.
3 In our opinion, this expands, rather than
4 consolidates, the Army's infrastructure, in direct opposition
5 to the BRAC mandate. Additionally, leaving behind hundreds
6 of highly trained workers, re-establishing their positions,
7 training their replacements, essentially rebuilding the
8 program from scratch, will affect readiness.
9 The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
10 Forces, chaired by Mr. John White, has recommended that DOD
11 co-locate all Army, Navy, and Air Force program management
12 officers responsible for development, production, and support
13 of military aircraft and related equipment.
14 As the deputy secretary, Mr. White will be
15 responsible for that, and we should not want to spend
16 millions of dollars to disperse ATCOM to the four corners of
17 the United States only to have it reconsolidated and
18 relocated to a DOD-wide site in a few years. That means the
19 return on our investment won't occur until well after our
20 children have children so, in all likelihood, the savings
21 will never be achieved.
22 Mr. Chairman, I ask your consent that a copy of my

Page 29

1 full statement be included in the record.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your entire statement, Senator,
3 will be included in the record and we're indebted to you for
4 those fine remarks.
5 SENATOR BOND: I thank the Chair and the
6 Commission. Thank you very much.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished senior
8 senator from the great State of Missouri.
9 Now, if his colleague would want to catch his
10 breath for a moment, we can take another member of the
11 delegation. Or is the Senator ready? We're delighted to se
12 the distinguished Senator from the great State of Missouri,
13 Senator John Ashcroft.
14 SENATOR ASHCROFT: Good morning, and thank you Mr
15 Chairman and members of the Commission.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, Senator.
17 SENATOR ASHCROFT: I want to thank the Commission
18 for this opportunity to testify before you.
19 Every community affected by the base closure
20 process asks, at a minimum, that it be given a fair
21 evaluation, an honest review, and even-handed deliberations
22 and I thank you for your participation in the development of

Page 30

1 this process.
2 Unfortunately, in the case of the Army's decision
3 concerning ATCOM and St. Louis, the Army has not followed
4 these basic requirements of fairness. It's true that, in
5 1993, the BRAC instructed the armed services to include a
6 separate category for leased facilities in the 1995 process.
7 While that instruction somewhat altered the
8 evaluation process, the Army, unlike the Navy and the Air
9 Force, evidently used the instruction as a basis for
10 excluding leased facilities from any evaluation based on the
11 military value criteria established by the Department of
12 Defense. As a result, the Army has targeted leased
13 facilities for closure, while failing to comply with the
14 law's requirement that leased facilities be evaluated in the
15 same manner as other military installations, based on
16 "military value."
17 Let me repeat this for emphasis: of the eight
18 specific criteria identified by the Department of Defense for
19 closing facilities, the Army failed to evaluate ATCOM based
20 on the first four criteria related to military value, despite
21 the Department of Defense's instruction that these four
22 military value criteria be given priority in all evaluations.

Page 31

1 Let me just briefly review a few facts concerning
2 ATCOM, the failure of ATCOM to receive the military value
3 assessment.
4 First, the Army Management Control Plan. The
5 framework used by the Army in its closure and realignment
6 review process shows that ATCOM and other leased facilities
7 were not included in the installation assessment phase of the
8 process until after the Army had evaluated all other
9 facilities and assigned them military values.
10 Second, military value assessment summaries for
11 leased facilities should have been presented to the Secretary
12 of the Army before his decisions were made, but the record
13 shows that such a value assessment was simply not there for
14 ATCOM at that stage of the decision-making process.
15 The Army's response to this glaring omission was
16 the blanket and clearly erroneous statement that, "Leased
17 facilities in general, not necessarily the operations they
18 house, have low military value." This sweeping conclusion
19 obviously has no military value assessment to back it up,
20 which is why Missouri's entire Congressional delegation is
21 concerned about this issue and is making the kind of appeal
22 to you that it is today.

Page 32

1 The last, and perhaps most incriminating evidence
2 of the Army's failure to evaluate ATCOM's military value as
3 required by law, is the fact that, in the Army's own report
4 to the Commission, military value assessment summaries are
5 included for all facilities' categories except one -- leased
6 facilities.
7 As the Chairman of the Commission will recall,
8 Brigadier General Shane, in his April 14 letter to the
9 Chairman, stated categorically that the Army's evaluation
10 process for leased facilities, "might be said to have
11 differed slightly from its process for other types of
12 installations." Well, the General Accounting Office said the
13 same thing more forcefully when it found that the Army, "did
14 not formally adhere to its regular process for installations
15 in assessing military value when recommending minor and
16 leased facilities for closure."
17 GAO also found no documentation "supporting an
18 analysis of or addressing the military value of leases" and
19 the GAO recommended that the Commission, and I quote, "make a
20 determination, under its legislative authority, whether these
21 variances represent substantial deviation from the selection
22 criteria."

Page 33

1 Again, as I stated earlier, the Army was the only
2 -- the only -- service that did not evaluate its leased
3 facilities for their military value. Both the Navy and the
4 Air Force performed military value analysis of their leased
5 facilities. The bottom line is that the Army's own documents
6 show that its decision to close ATCOM in St. Louis was based
7 solely on a flawed cost-savings analysis and not on all eight
8 criteria of the evaluation, as required by the law.
9 The second issue I'd like to address is the
10 Pentagon's recommendation to transfer the Army's Chemical and
11 Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan in Alabama to
12 Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri.
13 As the Commission is aware, the state-of-the-art
14 Military Engineer Center at Fort Leonard Wood now conducts
15 training for officers, non-commissioned officers, and
16 enlisted personnel for the Army and other personnel from the
17 Department of Defense. The addition of the Chemical and
18 Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan would allow for
19 the joint development of doctrine, and expand opportunities
20 for training in all three of the schools.
21 Thus, combining al three schools at Fort Leonard
22 Wood would create a synergy that will do more than just save

Page 34

1 money. It will improve the Army's ability to meet its
2 mission.
3 I want to remind the Commission that Missouri state
4 officials worked tirelessly to ensure that a series of
5 necessary environmental and construction permits and one
6 variance were secured in accordance with a 1993 BRAC
7 directive. The final permit, issued just last week by the
8 Missouri Department of Natural Resources, will allow for the
9 construction of a smoke training facility at Fort Leonard
10 Wood to teach soldiers how to perform in smokescreen type
11 conditions.
12 While we're on the subject of smokescreens, I want
13 to briefly call attention to several concerns that have been
14 raised about this measure by environmental groups and their
15 concerns about the use of real chemical agents at the site.
16 Exhaustive research by the Missouri Department of Natural
17 Resources, and others, makes it clear that the chemicals will
18 pose no danger, because there is never more than milliliter
19 -- a fraction of an ounce -- of agent mixed at any one time.
20 Fort Leonard Wood has already coordinated its
21 proposed new training with both the Missouri Department of
22 Natural Resources and the Army's Training and Doctrine

Page 35

1 Command, to ensure that the required training standards will
2 be met and that the environment is protected.
3 Another smokescreen that's been raised would have
4 us believe that the U.S. national security interests would be
5 adversely affected by moving the Army's Military Police and
6 Chemical Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood.
7 Given the fact that the move will be a phased operation, not
8 a wholesale move at once, there will be no lag time as the
9 transition occurs.
10 Simply stated, as the individual facilities are
11 completed in Missouri, the corresponding facilities in
12 Alabama will close. Let me add, in closing, that Fort
13 Leonard Wood is enthusiastically supported by the surrounding
14 community. The Army could not find a better home for the
15 Army's Military Police and Chemical Schools.
16 I want to thank you again for the care and concern
17 with which this Commission has addressed these issues and for
18 the fact that, on numerous occasions, you've allowed us to
19 participate in your discussions, including your visit to St.
20 Louis at ATCOM, and it's my pleasure to be with you and to be
21 with you today.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Senator.

Page 36

1 We're delighted to welcome to the rostrum the
2 distinguished Democratic leader of the United States House of
3 Representatives, Representative Dick Gephardt. Congressman
4 Gephardt, thank you for coming.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GEPHARDT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
6 very much. I'm very appreciative of the opportunity to be
7 here and make this testimony to this distinguished
8 Commission. I know how hard you're all working to do your
9 responsibilities and to do the right thing for our country.
10 For weeks now, you've heard testimony against
11 various base closings, often arguing that the armed services'
12 numbers simply don't add up. While that sort of argument may
13 seem compelling, that's not the argument that I intend to
14 make. In the case of the Army's Aviation and Troop Command,
15 the numbers do add up. The problem, in my view, is that
16 they're the wrong numbers. Let me explain.
17 The Army claims that, while the closure of ATCOM
18 will cost $152 million, it will also result in the
19 elimination of 786 jobs, saving $56 million each year and
20 yielding a return on the investment in just three years.
21 Despite requests from your staff, the Army has not
22 provided any analysis to support these reductions. At the

Page 37

1 same time, your staff has received Army data which shows that
2 only 48 positions could be eliminated through the closure of
3 ATCOM. I'd like to summarize the data briefly for you.
4 The Army has included savings from 205 positions
5 that will be eliminated at ATCOM regardless of any base
6 closure. The Army's own base closure plan agrees that these
7 positions should not be counted as savings.
8 The Army claims savings from 56 positions that must
9 remain in St. Louis to fulfill contractual obligations to
10 other agencies, such as Defense Finance Accounting Service,
11 FEMA, and the Department of Agriculture.
12 The Army claims savings from 90 positions that must
13 be maintained and transferred to receiving bases to perform
14 base operations functions.
15 The Army claims savings from 387 positions that
16 must be maintained and transferred to receiving bases in
17 order to keep performing ATCOM's functions at these other
18 sites.
19 The bottom line is that, if you subtract these
20 positions from the Army's claims of 786 personnel cuts, then
21 only 48 positions can be eliminated by closing ATCOM.
22 Translating this into costs and savings, ATCOM's closure will

Page 38

1 still cost $152 million but will achieve no annual savings
2 and no return on investment, ever.
3 You don't have to take it from me. Take it from
4 the Army's own officers, the people who have to put this into
5 practice.
6 First, Army's deputy commander has confirmed that
7 these personnel must be kept, regardless of their location,
8 for the Army to continue to perform its support functions.
9 Second, the Tank Command in Detroit and the
10 Communications Command in New Jersey have confirmed that
11 additional personnel will have to be transferred from ATCOM
12 to ensure the Army's operations in these areas continue.
13 Finally, for Red Stone Arsenal, the Army Materiel
14 Command has determined that any shortfall in the number of
15 personnel transferred from ATCOM will be filled by excess
16 personnel presently at Red Stone.
17 When I learned this last piece of information, I
18 asked how many excess personnel does Red Stone Arsenal have?
19 According to the Army's own stationing and installation plan,
20 Red Stone Arsenal currently has 900 more personnel than it
21 needs to perform its mission. This is astounding to me. By
22 the Army's own admission, it's planning to use the closure of

Page 39

1 ATCOM to solve an overstaffing problem at Red Stone Arsenal.
2 As far as I'm concerned, if the Army has too many
3 people at Red Stone, it should downsize there. It shouldn't
4 waste over $150 million to move ATCOM functions and kick 700
5 people out the door in St. Louis -- people who, as you know,
6 have dedicated their lives to the nation's defense -- in
7 order to avoid hard choices at Red Stone.
8 ATCOM has made these tough decisions over the past
9 several years, reducing over 3,000 personnel since 1989. I
10 think now it may be Red Stone's turn.
11 You all know that the BRAC process was not intended
12 to allow DOD to arbitrarily pick winners and loses among
13 civilian personnel. It was intended to reduce the cost of
14 government to the taxpayer and to make the Department of
15 Defense more efficient. Closing ATCOM, in my view, will
16 simply not achieve this goal.
17 Finally, the strength of our Defense Department
18 comes from its people. These are some of the most highly
19 skilled, trained, dedicated people in our entire nation.
20 This is true for each unit of the military, and I know it's
21 particularly true of the individuals that make up ATCOM.
22 I know this Commission is seriously looking at all

Page 40

1 of these issues. I tremendously admire the dedication and
2 work that you're all doing to make the right decisions. I
3 urge you to look at these facts on ATCOM. They are, I think,
4 compelling facts, and I believe that, if you look at them
5 closely, you may come to the conclusion I have. And that is
6 that closing ATCOM in St. Louis will not increase the
7 efficiency, will not increase the savings to the United
8 States Government.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished
10 Democratic leader of the House for his fine remarks, and we
11 are pleased to welcome his distinguished colleague from the
12 Missouri delegation, Representative William Clay.
13 REPRESENTATIVE GEPHARDT: Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman.
15 Congressman Bill Clay. We're delighted to have
16 you, sir.
17 REPRESENTATIVE CLAY: Mr. Chairman and members of
18 the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear this
19 morning.
20 The Army Aviation and Troop Command should be
21 retained in St. Louis, which is the world center for the
22 military and civilian aviation industry. In addition to the

Page 41

1 highly skilled personnel at ATCOM, which have just been
2 described by my colleague, Mr. Gephardt, numerous businesses
3 located in St. Louis support the Army with the most efficient
4 and cost-effective methods of conducting product development
5 and procurement.
6 Uniquely skilled personnel associated with ATCOM's
7 aviation operations, local contractors, and academic
8 institutions combine to provide the Army with an ideal pool
9 of aviation expertise. Moving ATCOM's aviation support
10 functions to Red Stone Arsenal would be counterproductive and
11 definitely cannot achieve the projected cost savings.
12 It seems that the Army has over-estimated cost
13 savings by failing to account for the downsizing already
14 underway at ATCOM and the Army has also failed to adequately
15 access the viable alternatives that would generate genuine
16 cost savings. Fair consideration to alternatives to ATCOM's
17 closure were not given.
18 ATCOM's efforts to reduce personnel and increase
19 efficiency were not thoroughly examined. Plans to reduce
20 personnel by over 200 positions in the next five years will
21 result in savings of almost $10 million annually with an
22 immediate return on investment.

Page 42

1 Moreover, this staff reduction will increase
2 efficiency, reduce overhead, permit a reduction in the amount
3 of space leased from the General Services Administration, and
4 streamline activities, thus accomplishing all of the goals of
5 the Army's stationing strategy.
6 The Army did give some attention to the possibility
7 of relocating the Space and Strategic Defense Command -- SSDC
8 -- from a leased facility in Huntsville, Alabama to Red Stone
9 Arsenal, but this suggestion should have been thoroughly
10 addressed. Apparently, the SSDC proposal was dismissed on
11 the mistaken notion that it would be more costly than closing
12 ATCOM and would not achieve the same efficiencies, synergies,
13 or cost reductions.
14 However, there is no basis for this contention and,
15 in fact, the Army's own data supports the notion that
16 disestablishing SSDC and downsizing ATCOM is a superior
17 choice. Documentation presented by the Army to the
18 Commission indicates that the relocation of SSDC to Red Stone
19 Arsenal would cost much less than the closure at ATCOM -- $21
20 million versus $150 million in one-time costs and $2 million
21 versus $12 million in recurring cost.
22 There's reason to believe the one-time costs may be

Page 43

1 even less than the $21 million claimed by the Army, since the
2 Army assumed that a new facility would have to be constructed
3 at Red Stone to accommodate SSD personnel when, in fact, both
4 the Army Materiel Command and the Office of the Assistant
5 Chief of Staff for Installation Management have stated that
6 Red Stone Arsenal currently possesses sufficient space to
7 accommodate approximately 1,500 personnel.
8 The BRAC staff has also confirmed this fact and
9 determined that minimal renovation would be required for Red
10 Stone to accommodate SSD's 950 employees. Based on the BRAC
11 Commission staff's renovation estimates, it may be calculated
12 that the actual one-time costs required to relocate SSDC to
13 Red Stone Arsenal is approximately $1 million, not $21
14 million as claimed by the Army.
15 Using this data, the relocation of SSDC would
16 generate an immediate return on investment, annual savings of
17 at least $1.3 million, and a 20-year net present value of as
18 much as $23 million. This is a much more cost-effective
19 prospect than the closure at ATCOM.
20 Further, the relocation of SSDC to Red Stone
21 Arsenal is entirely consistent with the Army's stationing
22 strategy. The Army's COBRA report for SSDC demonstrates that

Page 44

1 it's relocation would increase efficiency and reduce overhead
2 by eliminating $3.8 million in lease costs and generating
3 only $2.5 million in additional overhead costs at Red Stone
4 Arsenal, for a net savings of $1.3 million annually.
5 Documentation presented by the Army Basing Study
6 Office to the under secretary of the Army stated that the
7 relocation of SSDC would achieve synergy with major program
8 managers and Missile Command and Red Stone. The Army's own
9 data and assertions to its leadership demonstrate that the
10 relocation of SSDC would fulfill the goals of a stationing
11 strategy to reduce overhead and lease space, eliminate excess
12 capacity, and co-locate activities.
13 Finally, if the Department of Defense is to achieve
14 maximum cost savings and the most efficient realignment of
15 its facilities' infrastructure, ATCOM should not be
16 disestablished before SSDC. This action would be wholly
17 contrary to the Army's own findings of just two years ago.
18 When referring to ATCOM, the Army stated that, and
19 I quote: "The high relocation costs make realignment or
20 closure impractical and prohibitively expensive."
21 Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission, I
22 thank you for this opportunity and hope that you give it the

Page 45

1 kind of weight that I think it should be given. Thank you.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
3 Clay.
4 We're delighted to welcome your colleague, the
5 distinguished Congressman from Missouri, Representative James
6 Talent.
7 REPRESENTATIVE TALENT: I thank the Chairman. And,
8 before I start, I'd like to, as the other Members have,
9 extend my appreciation to the commissioners and your staff.
10 You're working diligently to assess the merits of each
11 recommendation and argument put before you, and I really
12 congratulate you on your tenacity and patience in listening
13 to all this testimony.
14 Having said that, I want to discuss Army readiness
15 this morning as it relates to the proposed disestablishment
16 of the Aviation and Troop Command in St. Louis. Much of the
17 discussion so far has concerned the actual cost, in terms of
18 new buildings, real estate, leased facilities,
19 infrastructure, and additional overhead of moving the ATCOM
20 functions.
21 I concur in the comments that have been made by my
22 colleagues here this morning, but I want to focus attention

Page 46

1 this morning squarely on the issue of Army aviation
2 readiness, rather than solely on cost issues, especially as
3 it relates to the proposed closing of the ATCOM installation
4 in St. Louis and specifically on whether or not the Army will
5 retain the skilled personnel who represent an enormous asset
6 to our services and to this particular function.
7 By my estimates, we will probably lose between 50
8 and 80 percent of the roughly 400 engineers and 400 logistics
9 personnel who presently work at the ATCOM, if we go ahead
10 with this move. These people represent a collective body of
11 knowledge that the Army will simply lose, and then have to c
12 completely recreate at another installation.
13 Without wanting to exaggerate the point, this
14 relearning process will take many years. It could take as
15 many as three to five years. In the meantime, this crawl,
16 walk, run scenario will, at the user level in the Army,
17 manifest itself in terms of shortcomings in acquisitions,
18 logistics, and engineering.
19 For example, because so many of the more
20 experienced ATCOM employees will remain in the St. Louis area
21 and will not make the move, we can realistically expect
22 greater delays in parts requisitions for helicopters, which

Page 47

1 will be reflected in greater maintenance backlogs, because
2 parts will be slower in working their way through the
3 pipeline.
4 This, in turn, means that any given aviation
5 battalion's operational readiness rate will drop
6 considerably. The average Army aviation unit's fully
7 mission-capable OR -- its operational readiness rating --
8 today is about 70 to 75 percent. If the proposed relocation
9 takes place, we can expect that rating to drop, possibly to
10 as low as 50 percent, at least in the short term, and remain
11 below average for as long as it takes to reconstitute the
12 command's expertise.
13 In addition, we can also expect that response time
14 to safety of flight decisions will be delayed, due to the
15 loss of experienced engineering personnel. Let me convey the
16 importance of this matter. When a given fleet of, for
17 example, CH-47s is grounded for some reason, ATCOM engineers
18 are the ones who must issue a safety of flight authorization
19 before those helicopters can once again fly. Until then, the
20 whole fleet is grounded. Over the pat year, ATCOM has issued
21 16 such safety of flight authorizations.
22 Finally, I'd like to use an example which

Page 48

1 illustrates the importance of ATCOM's day-to-day operations.
2 It's very timely, given what's happened in the last couple
3 weeks.
4 We all recall the tragedy of Desert One, which was
5 the rescue mission for the hostages in Iran in the late
6 1970s. At that time, we put a total of, I think, about six
7 SH-53s into the air in support of that rescue mission. It
8 would have been ideal, at the time, to have had a great many
9 more helicopters involved, but the unfortunate truth was that
10 maintenance problems, among other concerns, made that mission
11 much less likely to succeed, from the start. The support
12 system that ATCOM maintains today was not there when it was
13 needed, in the late 1970s.
14 Contrast that tragedy with the success of last
15 week's rescue mission. Everything worked as it had to work.
16 It's ATCOM's business, in part, to keep those helicopters in
17 the air.
18 I want to mention one other consideration. The
19 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, led by
20 Mr. John White, has recommended that the Department of
21 Defense co-locate or consolidate all Army, Navy, and Air
22 Force program management offices responsible for development,

Page 49

1 production, and support of military aircraft and related
2 equipment. In other words, the services are seeking to
3 consolidate to have joint, inter-service management of these
4 programs.
5 As the deputy secretary of defense, Mr. White will
6 have primary responsibility for implementing this
7 recommendation. Since implementation of the recommendation
8 will cause ATCOM's aviation functions to be consolidated with
9 similar functions from the other services at a yet-to-be-
10 determined site, the transfer of ATCOM's aviation functions
11 now to Huntsville would, if that co-location or consolidation
12 subsequently occurs, be an expense of over $100 million in
13 moving and construction costs that are just going to have to
14 be duplicated down the road when we do the consolidation
15 within the services.
16 Our long-term strategy has to be the same as the
17 Army's stationing strategy to optimize the operational
18 efficiency of the Army's research, development, testing, and
19 evaluation and material maintenance management functions.
20 Based on this reasoning, even apart from the other
21 cost considerations which we've discussed today, we ought to
22 set aside the proposal and, instead, seek to integrate the

Page 50

1 command's responsibility within a reorganization concept that
2 is more strategic in scope, and which the services are
3 considering even as we speak.
4 In closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to repeat a very
5 keen and simple observation that General Shalikashvili made
6 in testimony before the House National Security Committee
7 earlier this spring, that our personnel, especially those
8 with years of leadership experience and specialized
9 knowledge, are the Army's greatest asset.
10 While it may take ten years to design and produce a
11 given weapons system, it usually takes about 18 years to
12 prepare an officer for command and well over 20 years for
13 division command. The critical investment that we've made in
14 each of these individuals is, in many respects, immeasurable.
15 Much the same can be made of our more experienced
16 ATCOM personnel. They are part of a proven team that, I
17 submit, will simply go away if this relocation takes place.
18 Again, I want to thank the Commission.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Talent.
20 We're delighted to welcome your colleague, the
21 distinguished Congressman from the State of Missouri,
22 Representative Ike Skelton.

Page 51

1 REPRESENTATIVE SKELTON: Mr. Chairman and members
2 of the Commission, thank you for this opportunity to testify
3 before you.
4 I support the Department of Defense and the Army's
5 recommendation to move the Army Chemical and Military Police
6 Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood. Because of
7 the ending of the Cold War, our country has downsized its
8 military considerably and it continues to do so.
9 The Army, just prior to the Gulf War in 1990, Mr.
10 Chairman, had 764,000 active duty soldiers. Today, there are
11 532,000 active duty soldiers. Pentagon plans call for an
12 Army of 475,000, which I don't like, but that's what the
13 Pentagon wants.
14 Thus, it's necessary for the Army to close bases.
15 If the Army is forced to keep unneeded infrastructure, we
16 will be forced to have a hollow Army in the future. The Army
17 must maintain its effectiveness and become more efficient.
18 America does not need a financially strapped or bankrupt
19 Army.
20 A recent TRADOC memorandum states: "The relocation
21 of the Chemical and Military Police Schools is the first
22 piece in the TRADOC commanding general's strategic vision for

Page 52

1 the future structure of the command." General Norman
2 Schwarzkopf, back in 1973, was involved in an attempt to
3 close Army bases, including Fort McClellan. General
4 Schwarzkopf has written that the Fort McClellan base was the
5 least efficient in the entire U.S. Army.
6 Today, it makes sense not only to reduce the Army
7 infrastructure, but to co-locate various branches and
8 schools. There are two major standards or criteria this
9 Commission should consider: military value and return on
10 investment.
11 Concerning the first, military value, a transfer to
12 Fort Leonard Wood would increase readiness by co-locating the
13 Chemical, Military Police, and Engineering Schools,
14 especially in river crossing training, counter-drug
15 operations, operations in rear areas, and protection of
16 supply routes training.
17 Second, Fort Leonard Wood is a logical location for
18 all these schools. It has 63,000 acres -- 17,000 more than
19 Fort McClellan. Fort Leonard Wood has 26 percent more work
20 space, 66 percent more family housing, and 32 percent more
21 barracks. Fort Leonard Wood facilities can easily
22 accommodate contingencies, as it is near transportation

Page 53

1 outlets. Consolidation allows better use of Army manpower,
2 integrating all three branches in one place.
3 Concerning return on investment, the Army computes
4 that there will be a return on investment in six years by
5 moving the schools to Fort Leonard Wood. There will be a 45
6 million dollar per year savings.
7 The last Base Closure Commission stated the Army
8 should pursue all the required permits and certification for
9 the new site. The permits have been applied for by the Army
10 and they have been granted.
11 The Army recently sent this Commission a letter,
12 concluding six points. We have the environmental permits.
13 The smoke training has no impact on unit readiness.
14 Relocating the Military Police and Chemical Schools is an
15 integral component of the Army's strategic vision. The
16 relocation will cause minimal disruption, if any, to
17 training. No linkage exists between Fort McClellan and
18 international treaties, such as the still unratified Chemical
19 Weapons Convention. And care should be taken not to confuse
20 the installation of Fort McClellan with the institution
21 Chemical School.
22 There's been a major public relations effort, Mr.

Page 54

1 Chairman, to collaterally attack the Army and the Department
2 of Defense's recommendation. The necessary permits have been
3 issued. They've been issued by the State of Missouri.
4 Taxpayer dollars will be saved, and the Army will be made all
5 the more ready to perform its mission with its new, smaller
6 size.
7 I urge this Commission to approve the
8 recommendations of the Department of Defense and of the
9 United States Army to move the Chemical School and the
10 Military Police School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
11 REPRESENTATIVE SKELTON: Thank you very much,
12 Congressman Skelton. We're indebted to you, sir. And thank
13 you, from the Commission, for the fine presentation by the
14 State of Missouri.
15 We are delighted to see the distinguished Senator
16 from the great State of Montana, Senator Conrad Burns, here
17 Pleased to have you, Senator Burns.
18 SENATOR BURNS: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
19 thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to testify
20 before you this morning, taking time to take my comments, and
21 I commend you on the effort that you're making with regard to
22 your duties, and I look forward, as chairman of the Military

Page 55

1 Construction and Appropriations Subcommittee, to help you
2 execute whatever your decision may be.
3 This morning, I'd like to address my cost and
4 savings logic to various options with regard to Malmstrom Air
5 Force Base in Montana. I strongly believe realigning
6 Malmstrom's 12 KC-135s is a foolish idea, and I give these
7 reasons:
8 It generates a suspect, at best, half million
9 dollars in annual savings; it generates a 20-year net present
10 value cost of around $8.3 million; and it ignores and would
11 mothball, over $100 million of state-of-the-art tanker
12 support facilities. The cost savings analysis of a realigned
13 Malmstrom scenario is based on what I think is an error in
14 the Air Force data which count as savings in the cost to run
15 MacDill Air Force Base's runway, which is over $4 million.
16 The reopening of MacDill's runway is a separate
17 recommendation, and the costs associated with that
18 independent action, which the Air Force says must occur
19 regardless of Commission recommendations on tankers to
20 MacDill, is inappropriate to count in the Malmstrom
21 recommendation.
22 The corrected projected savings of less than a half

Page 56

1 a million dollars annually does not take into account the
2 cost to continue the missiles operation at Malmstrom, and
3 these costs include new commercial airport hot pad, critical
4 parts support, medical evacuation flights, commercial
5 mobilization support, helicopter traffic control, and, of
6 course, weather support. After these changes are in place
7 and paid for, annual net costs will accrue from the realigned
8 Malmstrom recommendation.
9 Now, to me, what makes sense is the complete
10 closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota; and I
11 say this because it maximizes savings with a total closure.
12 In other words, it is clean. The action pays back in only
13 one year. It produces reoccurring annual savings of over $87
14 million and it produces a 20-year net present value of over
15 $1.88 billion -- not million, billion.
16 Also Mr. Chairman and other Commissioners,
17 Malmstrom Air Force Base is a prime location to keep the
18 tankers. If you look at the facts surrounding the cost,
19 you'll see that it also makes sense financially.
20 Thank you very much for letting me present these
21 figures to you, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Burns, we're indebted to

Page 57

1 you for that outstanding presentation. Now, let me mention
2 to you that the time frame for the great State of Montana is
3 9:26 through 9:41. I understand that your colleagues have,
4 in the one case, some traffic difficulty and, in the other
5 case, another problem.
6 But I hope you'll understand, with 121 members
7 testifying today, the Chair is obligated to be very, very
8 strict about time so that, if your delegation doesn't get
9 here on time, I will have to go to the State of New Jersey at
10 9:44.
11 SENATOR BURNS: I understand that, and I would ask
12 the Chairman, if they do not make it, can their testimony be
13 made part of the record?
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It can be made part of the record
15 and, unless we get into too late an hour, they could come in
16 at the end of the day, although the Chair admonishes my good
17 friend that we are working through the 7 O'clock hour
18 already, and so the hour may get somewhat late.
19 SENATOR BURNS: I was here early, because I know
20 how tight your schedule is, and I know mine is just as tight
21 as yours, so I'm going to --
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'd like to accommodate, but you

Page 58

1 can see that we have 120 Members.
2 SENATOR BURNS: I understand. I understand. And
3 the Chairman, when I served with him in the United States
4 Senate, was always known to be a fair Senator, and I would
5 imagine he's the same kind of a Chairman. Thank you very
6 much.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much for those
8 kind remarks and I thank you for your contribution, Senator.
9 Ladies and gentlemen, Senator Burns's colleague is
10 stuck in traffic. That's happened to this former Member a
11 lot of times. The State of New Jersey has been called, and
12 we will be in temporary recess for about six or seven
13 minutes.
14 (A brief recess was taken.)
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair takes note of the fact
16 that the distinguished senior Senator from the great State of
17 New Jersey is here. As usual, he is early, which is to his
18 credit, and we are pleased to welcome before the Commission
19 the distinguished senior Senator from the great State of New
20 Jersey, Senator Bill Bradley.
21 SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman
22 and Commissioner Kling, Commissioner Cox for giving me the

Page 59

1 opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of two very
2 important military assets.
3 I've already had the opportunity to appear before
4 some of you at the Commission's regional hearing in New York
5 to demonstrate why closing the Military Ocean Terminal at
6 Bayonne and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Lakehurst would
7 undermine the goals of this Commission.
8 Shutting down these installations would not reduce
9 unnecessary infrastructure and would not save taxpayer money.
10 What it would do is cause a dangerous reduction in the level
11 of military readiness that is critical to maintaining our
12 strong national defense.
13 I testified then and I maintain today that
14 decisions to close these installations were based upon
15 incorrect premises, incomplete analysis, and insufficient
16 understanding of their unique attributes. As you well know,
17 I'm certainly not alone in the assessment on these two bases.
18 The director of the largest general cargo port on
19 the East and Gulf Coasts successfully challenged the premise
20 for closing Bayonne. Lillian Liburdie conveyed to you on May
21 5th that commercial ports are increasingly unable to deal
22 with the disruptions that result from military activity.

Page 60

1 They have, in fact, turned away military shipments, due to
2 the pressures of commercial business.
3 And yet, the Army wants to close the Bayonne
4 terminal, because it believes, "Bayonne provides the Army
5 with few military capabilities that cannot be accomplished at
6 commercial ports."
7 I must ask, where is the study and the accompanying
8 analysis to back up this assertion? What evidence does the
9 Army use as a basis for eliminating -- not moving, not
10 downsizing, but eliminating -- the capability that Bayonne
11 provides.
12 Mr. Chairman, there is no study, and there is no
13 evidence, and the conclusion is simply indefensible. It
14 would be a grave mistake to force shipments of munitions and
15 equipment for our troops to wait in line behind commercial
16 cargo. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the
17 delays this move may cause to deploying troops and equipment
18 cannot be quantified.
19 To sacrifice Bayonne would be to sacrifice a
20 military asset that has proven its value to this nation again
21 and again. This move would come to haunt our military in the
22 event of another sudden deployment, such as Desert Storm or

Page 61

1 Operation Restore Hope.
2 Mr. Chairman, those of you who were present at the
3 hearing on May 5th will no doubt remember the powerful
4 testimony of another expert, Commander Michael Hagy of the
5 Save Lakehurst Committee. I'm sure you remember. It was a
6 very dramatic moment, one of the more dramatic moments that
7 I've participated in in these base closure hearings.
8 He demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the
9 recommendation to tear apart Lakehurst is not just unfounded
10 and misguided, it is downright senseless. Lakehurst designs
11 and tests aircraft catapult and arresting gear. This is the
12 gear that ensures that our pilots can safely take off from
13 and land on aircraft carriers.
14 Our pilots put their lives in the hands of the
15 people at Lakehurst and the Lakehurst team's virtually
16 perfect safety record has demonstrated that those lives are
17 in good hands. Yet, the recommendation demands that the Navy
18 rip apart this model of excellence and scatter it up and down
19 the East Coast of the United States.
20 The Navy recommends that we tear machines and
21 equipment out of the ground in New Jersey and then rebuild
22 those same machines in Florida. How is this going to save

Page 62

1 taxpayers any money? How does this scenario relieve the
2 military of unnecessary infrastructure? And, most
3 importantly, how does this continue to ensure that our pilots
4 are in capable and experienced hands?
5 The answer to all these questions is the same. It
6 does not. This move would put hundreds of miles between
7 people who engineer catapult and arresting gear and the
8 experts that test them to ensure that it is safe for our
9 pilots to rely on them.
10 Today, if a piece of equipment for an aircraft
11 carrier needs to be reworked or fine tuned, it is shipped
12 across the grounds at Lakehurst to the machine shop. In this
13 new scenario, it will have to be shipped from Florida all the
14 way back up to Lakehurst and then back to Florida again --
15 Mr. Chairman, a senseless plan.
16 This Commission has a number of difficult decisions
17 to make during this process. It must scrutinize an extensive
18 list of recommended closures and realignments and make sure
19 that these recommendations were based upon a fair and
20 rational assessment of the value of those bases.
21 Mr. Chairman, I hope we in New Jersey have helped
22 to demonstrate to you that fair and rational are not words

Page 63

1 that can be used to describe the recommendations to close
2 Bayonne and to realign Lakehurst. I hope the facts will lead
3 you to reject those recommendations. Thank you very much.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank the distinguished senior
5 Senator from the great State of New Jersey, Senator Bill
6 Bradley.
7 We are going to revert to Montana very briefly, to
8 hear from the distinguished senior Senator from Montana,
9 Senator Max Baucus.
10 SENATOR BAUCUS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
11 Before I begin, I just want to thank all of you, all the
12 commissioners, for performing a great public service in
13 taking the time, frankly, to go to all the communities
14 affected around our country, ask a lot of questions, dig deep
15 into what's going on here.
16 I must say that's one way to help restore some of
17 the lost confidence the American people have in the federal
18 government -- that is, your extra effort in going to listen
19 to people and talk to people; and I just want to commend you
20 all for it.
21 Mr. Chairman, thank you again for calling this
22 hearing and giving me an opportunity to testify. This

Page 64

1 process, as you know better than I, was created to keep
2 politics out of base closing. You will decide to keep a base
3 and its missions going if they are cost effective parts of a
4 national security strategy.
5 I believe the air refueling mission at Malmstrom
6 Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana is just that. As home
7 of the 341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom is our country's premier
8 Minuteman-III missile base, undisputed and, as the base of
9 the 43rd Air Refueling Group, it supports virtually every
10 major contingency operation, including refueling flights to
11 Europe, Asia, Middle East, and Central America.
12 In March, the Department of Defense reviewed these
13 missions and it concluded that the missile mission ranked as
14 one of the nation's best, and should remain in place, but it
15 also said the flying mission had limited utility at should
16 move to Florida.
17 The main reason for this latter recommendation
18 seems to be the general conclusion that the Southeast needs
19 more tankers, and they have to come from somewhere. Maybe,
20 Commissioners, the Southeast does need some more tankers but,
21 before reviewing the data in detail, I must say that they
22 should not come from the Northwest.

Page 65

1 Malmstrom is ideal for peacetime training and
2 wartime operations. We have more air space, fewer big
3 cities, and a drier climate than almost any part of the
4 country. As several of you commissioners saw when you
5 visited Malmstrom, encroachment, noise abatement, and
6 restricted flight paths are not a problem. They don't call
7 us the Big Sky State for nothing. We've got a lot of wide
8 open space.
9 In conflicts, tankers from the Northwest and
10 Malmstrom, in particular, can reach their destinations faster
11 than tankers from the Southeast, by flying over the North
12 Pole to Asia or Russia. These are the places where politics
13 are unstable, armies are large, and potential threats are
14 high.
15 Now, let's look at the numbers. Here, Malmstrom's
16 flying mission comes up just as well as the common sense look
17 at the big picture would suggest, and much better than the
18 principal competitor in Grand Forks.
19 The Air Force itself, in its February 1995 report
20 to BRAC, rates Malmstrom's flying mission -- underline the
21 word "flying" -- very high. On a scale of green, down
22 through yellow to red -- green being the best, red the worst

Page 66

1 -- Malmstrom's flying mission was rated a green-minus.
2 Malmstrom has an excellent alternative air field
3 with extra runway capacity at Great Falls International
4 Airport. The dry air prevents rust and corrosion, meaning
5 that aircraft based at Malmstrom have low maintenance and
6 operating costs, and the Air Force rated all these factors,
7 along with the basic weather and other flying conditions, a
8 green.
9 When it comes to condition and support, Malmstrom
10 again fares well. Its infrastructure and buildings are in
11 excellent condition. Its utilities have great excess
12 capacity. The lack of nearby urban development means
13 Malmstrom can expand significantly if necessary during a war.
14 The Defense Department has invested millions of
15 dollars to give Malmstrom state-of-the-art support equipment
16 such as a new fuel dispensing center and a three-bay hangar,
17 so Malmstrom's facilities are more than adequate for its
18 flying mission and, at relatively minor expense, it could
19 handle a larger mission than it has today.
20 To give both sides, the major complaint in the Air
21 Force report was that Malmstrom has relatively small runway
22 and parking capabilities. Yet the Air Force also rated the

Page 67

1 air field capabilities, the runways, the taxis, and the
2 aprons, a perfect green for the tanker mission and even for
3 wide-bodied aircraft.
4 In comparison, Grand Forks Air Force Base received
5 an overall flying mission rating of yellow-plus. Its
6 infrastructure got a yellow-plus, while the building
7 condition ranked yellow. So the choice boils down to a
8 choice between a student earning As and Bs -- Malmstrom --
9 and another student earnings Cs and Ds. The choice should
10 not be difficult.
11 If Grand Forks were completely closed, as now being
12 considered by BRAC, a squadron or more of its four tanker
13 squadrons could move to the Southeast and a squadron to
14 Malmstrom. This would satisfy the Air Force's need for more
15 tankers in the Southeast and, as the Air Force also requires,
16 it would still keep a solid presence in the North.
17 Finally, a word on behalf of our service personnel.
18 They work very hard, take big risks for their country. They
19 do not make much money for it. To them, Great Falls offers a
20 high quality of life at a low cost. There is plenty of on-
21 base and off-base housing, transportation is convenient,
22 school system excellent; and all of it is cheap, especially

Page 68

1 compared to a place like Tampa Bay, where they're supposed to
2 move.
3 In closing, whether you're looking at national
4 security, the budget, or the morale of our servicemen and
5 women, Malmstrom makes sense. It's a good deal, and I
6 believe the flying mission should stay there. Again, thank
7 you once again. I very much appreciate the job you're doing.
8 You're not being praised very much for all that you're doing
9 but it's a job that has to be done, and I thank you very much
10 for your service.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished senior
12 Senator from the great State of Montana.
13 We're delighted to have the distinguished Senator
14 from the great State of New Jersey, Senator Frank Lautenberg.
15 SENATOR LAUTENBERG: Good morning. Chairman Dixon,
16 welcome to Washington, sir.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you.
18 SENATOR LAUTENBERG: It's nice to see all of you
19 again and to thank you for the work that you and your staffs
20 have done these past months and, on behalf of New Jersey and
21 the country, I want to thank you. It is not a task for which
22 you're often complimented, but the fact is that you've been

Page 69

1 assigned this duty and you're doing it, in my view, fully
2 comprehensively and without question.
3 America's current military strategy depends so much
4 on forward deployment, power projection, and rapid
5 reinforcement. Each of New Jersey's bases on the Pentagon's
6 list -- Lakehurst Naval Engineering Station, Military Ocean
7 Terminal Bayonne, and Fort Dix -- plays an essential role in
8 making our strategy a success.
9 As America's permanent military presence overseas
10 is reduced, our forward deployment depends more and more on
11 the Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups. And, with that,
12 it's critical to note that the Lakehurst Naval Air
13 Engineering Station is the key to our carrier operations.
14 Lakehurst is an acknowledged pioneer in something
15 called concurrent engineering. By developing, testing and,
16 in the case of some critical components, manufacturing
17 catapult and arresting gear, Lakehurst brings the entire
18 research, development, testing, engineering cycle under one
19 roof.
20 The result has been an astounding, near perfect
21 degree of reliability and safety in American carrier
22 operations, with over 2 million -- 2 million -- successful

Page 70

1 launches and retrievals in just the past five years. Even
2 reducing the reliability of the Lakehurst mission by one-half
3 percent could mean that six aircraft and their crews would be
4 lost each day of carrier operations.
5 At that rate, America's strategic choices would be
6 grim -- either shut down carrier operations or suffer losses
7 that, in a year, would exceed our entire inventory of
8 carrier-based aircraft. And yet, the Pentagon's plans are to
9 dismantle this unique facility and scatter it to the winds,
10 hoping that Lakehurst skills can be duplicated elsewhere.
11 Doing so would not save as much money as the
12 Pentagon would have us believe. We've seen those questions
13 raised.
14 For example, in its report on the BRAC, the GAO
15 noted the Pentagon's recommendation to close Lakehurst is
16 based on substantial changes to original estimates by the
17 Navy's BRAC team. These changes artificially reduce the cost
18 of closing comparisons for Lakehurst from almost $220 million
19 to just under $97 million.
20 Commissioners, the Pentagon's plans to close
21 Lakehurst are shortsighted and unsound. They spell a high-
22 risk gamble for American carrier operations and for our

Page 71

1 strategy of forward deployment.
2 Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne is a perfect
3 complement with Lakehurst, with America's efforts to project
4 military power from the Continental United States to overseas
5 in time of crisis. No other port on the East or the Gulf
6 Coast, commercial or military, can duplicate Bayonne's unique
7 combination of capabilities.
8 Unlike commercial ports, moving mixed cargo to
9 Bayonne is fast, economical, and unimpeded. Bayonne
10 straddles the huge, highly developed multi-modal
11 transportation network of the American Northeast Corridor.
12 Now, unlike most commercial ports, once cargo
13 arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast
14 covered and uncovered staging areas in a secure mode and,
15 unlike any commercial ports, these staging areas are fully
16 protected and any military cargo can be accommodated there.
17 Unlike any commercial port, all types of cargo --
18 from heavy, outsized, non-containerized weapons, like the M-
19 182 Abrams tanks to munitions to provisions -- can be loaded
20 by Bayonne's very, very unique, well-trained labor force,
21 using state-of-the-art dedicated rail lines.
22 Bayonne has the best steaming time to Europe -- a

Page 72

1 full day's advantage, potentially the difference between life
2 and death in combat -- of any U.S. port, bar none.
3 Beyond all of these advantages, however, one thing
4 about Bayonne stands out above all else, as our recent
5 operations in the Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti have proven beyond
6 doubt. Bayonne's heavy sealift capabilities are always
7 available to us.
8 Unlike commercial ports, which can be commandeered
9 only in times of a declared national emergency, Bayonne has
10 no for-profit impediments. No contracts need to be broken,
11 no commercial cargo to displace.
12 So, Commissioners, I would ask that you please
13 consider that the Pentagon has recommended closing Bayonne in
14 favor of using commercial ports without first examining
15 whether these ports are both available and able to handle
16 Bayonne's mission.
17 I thank you once again for hearing us, for the
18 visits that many of you have made to these installations in
19 New Jersey. I'm sure that, having done that, those who have
20 had a chance to see it recognize the unique excellence of all
21 of these facilities; and I thank you for your time and your
22 efforts.

Page 73

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much, Senator
2 Lautenberg.
3 And, from your House delegation, we're delighted to
4 welcome Representative Jim Saxton. Representative Saxton,
5 from the great State of New Jersey.
6 REPRESENTATIVE SAXTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you
7 very much, and Commissioners. It's -- gee, I'm so used to
8 starting speeches by saying "It's a pleasure to be here," but
9 it doesn't seem quite appropriate. But it is, really.
10 (Laughter.)
11 REPRESENTATIVE SAXTON: I'd just like to do two
12 things.
13 First, I'd like to thank you very much for your
14 cooperation with regard to fine-tuning that was necessary on
15 the recommendation for Fort Dix. The Chief of Staff of the
16 Army, General Reimer, the Commander of the Reserve force, the
17 U.S. Army Reserve, General Barritz and their staffs and your
18 staff, have been wonderful partners in making sure that we
19 end up with a recommendation with regard to the new mission
20 at Fort Dix that is workable and staffed correctly; and we
21 thank you very much for that.
22 Let me secondly talk about some success stories

Page 74

1 which will lead up to, I think, the crux of the issue with
2 regard to Lakehurst Naval War Center, success stories that
3 we're able to experience through BRAC and through our
4 military services, otherwise. I think there are three very
5 good examples that I'm very, very close to.
6 First of all, Commissioner Cox was here two years
7 ago when a decision was made with regard to McGuire Air Force
8 Base and the power projection facility that was made possible
9 because of a decision that was made here. That facility, in
10 conjunction with Fort Dix, is now the power projection
11 platform for the northeastern part of the country through
12 which people and material fly off to far parts of the world
13 on a daily basis.
14 It is, in fact, a success story that was brought
15 about because of a consolidation -- a very key word, I
16 believe -- a consolidation of activities that took place,
17 that now take place on a very efficient basis.
18 Secondly, I'm intimately familiar with one of the
19 Navy's weapon systems that is a tremendous success story and
20 advances each year into new and better facilities. That, of
21 course, is known as the AEGIS System, which is a weapon
22 system that is, for all practical purposes, the backbone of

Page 75

1 our Naval tactical defense system, in that it protects our
2 fleets when they're out to sea
3 The facilities are consolidated at the now
4 Lockheed-Martin facility in Morristown, New Jersey where the
5 components are brought together and engineered and put
6 together in a way that makes the AEGIS system a very, very
7 good system and, as a matter of fact, I would say, without
8 question, second to none of anyplace in the world.
9 The third success story currently takes place at
10 Lakehurst where the facilities that are necessary to carry
11 out our Naval air carrier activities are engineered and
12 designed in one compact, efficient operation which is
13 currently in place at Lakehurst. I don't think anybody
14 questions how important it is to have a facility coordinated,
15 an activity carried out, where engineer and design and
16 testing and production all take place simultaneously in one
17 location.
18 The recommendation of the Navy, to my way of
19 thinking at least, destroys that third success story, because
20 it separates the engineering and design, testing and
21 production, and sends part of it to Florida, sends part of it
22 to Virginia, and keeps part of it in New Jersey.

Page 76

1 It has been successful, and the third success story
2 that I speak of, because of the mere fact that we've been
3 able to carry out -- in a successful way, in a productive
4 way, in an efficient way, in a cost-effective way -- the
5 activities that have gone on at Lakehurst and to destroy
6 that, to separate it, and to diminish it, as Senator
7 Lautenberg says, by as little as one-half of one percent
8 costs lives, costs efficiency, costs dollars.
9 We appeal to you today -- and I know that
10 Commissioner Cox will be -- hopefully, I'll be able to
11 accompany her on Friday, if my schedule allows, to take a
12 second look at Lakehurst and, of course, Commissioner
13 Cornella was already there, to experience that success story
14 that I speak of.
15 So we thank you very much for giving us the
16 opportunity to make these points this morning and we look
17 forward to keeping that success story alive. Thank you very
18 much.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Saxton, we thank you
20 for your important contribution.
21 We're delighted to have your colleague,
22 Representative Chris Smith.

Page 77

1 REPRESENTATIVE SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
2 members of the Commission.
3 Mr. Chairman, the Pentagon's recommendation to
4 radically realign the missions of Lakehurst Naval Air Warfare
5 Center puts carrier aviation at risk, especially in the short
6 term, and may cost two or three times more than the Pentagon
7 suggests. Navy Lakehurst is a unique, one of a kind, world
8 class facility whose primary function is to ensure that
9 aircraft safely launch and recover from the deck of a carrier
10 or other platform, and that support equipment assists in the
11 service of planes, parts, and ordnance at sea.
12 Navy Lakehurst has long been distinguished, and had
13 a long and distinguished record in technological development,
14 engineering, developmental evaluation and verification,
15 systems integration, prototype manufacturing of air launch
16 and recovery equipment, known by the acronym ARA, and support
17 equipment.
18 There is no doubt that the Navy benefits from the
19 synergy of co-locating the means of development,
20 manufacturing and testing of aircraft carrier, catapult and
21 arresting gear, and support equipment. The burden, it seems
22 to me, Mr. Chairman, is on the Navy to clearly demonstrate

Page 78

1 how carrier aviation is improved or at least remains the
2 same, by proceeding with realignment. It is a burden they
3 cannot meet.
4 Research conducted over the past several months by
5 our Save Lakehurst Committee has raised serious questions
6 that flight ops may suffer and the fleet may become
7 unnecessarily vulnerable if the Lakehurst mission is torn
8 apart. It is impossible for the Navy to replicate its almost
9 perfect success rate of carrier takeoffs and landings without
10 first experiencing a costly and potentially dangerous period
11 of interruption. Why, Mr. Chairman, should we put the
12 linchpin of Navy aviation at risk?
13 Interestingly, our concerns are echoed, to some
14 extent, by BCEG itself. In a May letter to the Commission by
15 Charlie Nemfakos, the vice chairman of BCEG, he pointed out,
16 and I quote: "Some industrial, economic, performance
17 advantages may be lost by separating ARA, manufacturing, and
18 prototyping and support equipment from ARA testing.
19 One has to ask, Mr. Chairman, if performance
20 advantages may be lost, wy break it up? In almost every
21 instance at sea, our planes now launch as advertised. Our
22 aircraft are recovered without incident. If a glitch is

Page 79

1 found in design of a flight-critical item, they call
2 Lakehurst.
3 There at Lakehurst, the requisite problem solvers
4 are immediately available, in close proximity to one another,
5 to design it, to manufacture it, and to fix it without delay.
6 The DOD scenario says, relocate the prototype
7 manufacturing of ARA to the Navy depot in Jacksonville, and
8 the support equipment to Pax River. Artificially separating
9 the evaluation and testing capabilities from the prototype
10 manufacturing function defies logic. Our research shows
11 that, in a crisis situation, this could mean delays, costly
12 delays, that put a mission in jeopardy.
13 Here again, Mr. Nemfakos agrees. In his letter he
14 explains that the distance between the functions that
15 remained at Lakehurst and those that were moved to
16 Jacksonville will mean -- and I quote -- "two additional days
17 to transport between a shop in Jacksonville to a Lakehurst
18 test site."
19 You know, it reminds me of the song by Willie
20 Nelson, On The Road Again. We will have flight critical
21 items going back and forth, back and forth, being retested
22 over and over again. Where it could have just gone two

Page 80

1 miles, they now will be going hundreds of miles.
2 Delays, whether measured in hours or days, during a
3 crisis could quickly put the lives of our pilots, our crews,
4 and our sailors at risk. Any delays are likely to mean a
5 degradation of mission competence and safety, and I defy
6 anyone to make the case that flight readiness and safety are
7 improved or even remain the same when design and manufacture
8 of flight-critical prototype items are separated from the
9 test and evaluation function.
10 Mr. Chairman, the question has to be raised, can
11 tearing apart a textbook case of concurrent engineering which
12 has proven itself over and over again be justified to save
13 money? I think not. But, incredibly, the DOD scenario
14 doesn't even save money. It actually costs taxpayers more
15 money than keeping the current system in place.
16 The actual cost of realignment is likely to be
17 between two and three times higher than what DOD said it
18 would be. That is not a minor miscalculation. That's a
19 gross error. The DOD recommendation estimates a one-time
20 cost of realignment at just $97 million. The certified data
21 from Admiral Bowes put it at 162, the Save Lakehurst
22 Committee at 218, and a more recent figure puts it at $260

Page 81

1 million.
2 We're seeing a doubling, perhaps as much as a
3 tripling of the cost and again, it puts our mission
4 competence at grave risk.
5 I know that Commissioner Cox will be making a trip
6 to Lakehurst on Friday. Commissioner Cornella has been kind
7 enough to come and take a good, hard look. I strongly invite
8 other Commissioners to come. Seeing is believing, and I
9 think when you see what goes on there and the importance of
10 concurrent engineering, you, too, will be convinced we should
11 not break up Lakehurst. It works. It works well. It would
12 be a gross error to break it up.
13 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
15 Smith.
16 (Applause.)
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We are delighted to have
18 Congressman Frank Pallone here.
19 REPRESENTATIVE PALLONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
20 and Commissioners. I do appreciate the opportunity to be
21 able to testify before you today.
22 I'm going to talk about primarily Fort Monmouth, as

Page 82

1 a facility for C4I capabilities. As I think you know, your
2 Commission essentially has an opportunity today to begin the
3 process of consolidation and co-location of C4I capability --
4 which is command, control, communication, computers, and
5 intelligence -- and the opportunity for cross-servicing these
6 functions. A goal which so often has been sought and so
7 consistently eluded, I think, by the Pentagon will not arise
8 again soon.
9 My real statement to you today is to say please,
10 take this opportunity, which is unique with the BRAC, to go
11 ahead with the cross-servicing notion, with regard to Fort
12 Monmouth.
13 I think you know that the concept of cross-
14 servicing is not new. The '93 BRAC report to the President
15 noted that the Department of Defense has been attempting, for
16 about 20 years, without significant success, to inter-service
17 and, as a result, the '93 Commission recommended exhaustive
18 review of the issue of cross-servicing for this BRAC '95
19 deliberations.
20 During the '95 process, the Laboratory Joint Cross-
21 Service Group recommended Fort Monmouth as the site for C4I
22 relocation. Unfortunately, the only co-location that was

Page 83

1 recommended as part of the Pentagon's recommendation to you
2 was with regard to the Air Force and the Rome Labs.
3 There were other opportunities there, but they were
4 missed, and the Accounting Office, the General Accounting
5 Office actually noted that it would have been a good idea if
6 there were more opportunities, but this is the only one,
7 essentially, that you have before you today.
8 You've heard from the Rome Labs supporters, who I'm
9 sure are going to be also talking again today, and they've
10 argued that it's too expensive to close the Rome Labs but,
11 after close examination, I believe it is apparent that
12 dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom Air
13 Force Base does produce annual savings and a return on
14 investment within four to six years, and significant return
15 on investment.
16 The first COBRA, which some of the Rome people have
17 cited, dated October 13th of '94, indicated an estimated one-
18 time cost of $133 million and estimated it would take more
19 than 100 years to recoup the costs, but that was before the
20 Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs suggested relocation and,
21 in a sense, dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and
22 Hanscom.

Page 84

1 Once that alternative was calculated and the COBRA
2 was done again, in February 23rd of this year, it illustrated
3 the one-time cost at $52.8 million with a four-year return on
4 investment and, as you know, another COBRA was conducted just
5 a few weeks ago on May 23rd. And, although the one-time cost
6 under that COBRA increased to $79.2 million, the return on
7 investment would still be only six years, which is a short
8 time.
9 In addition, the latest COBRA analysis found the
10 most cost savings, $13 million per year. Over a 20-year
11 period, in excess of $180 million would be saved by this
12 closure.
13 I know that you've looked at this and you're going
14 to look at it again over the next few weeks or so, but there
15 are significant savings resulting from Rome being split
16 essentially between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom, and I think
17 that the Air Force has shown that.
18 Fort Monmouth, I think as you know -- Commissioner
19 Cornella has been there and Commissioner Cox was there a
20 couple of years ago -- provides an excellent environment for
21 the co-location of C4I capabilities for a number of reasons.
22 We have an ideal integrated command structure. We

Page 85

1 already have existing C4I joint activities in many areas. We
2 have the physical space to accommodate the Rome Labs, and we
3 have the technological academic base to make cross-servicing
4 of C4I activities a success.
5 We've been the center of gravity for C4I activities
6 and innovations for many years, and I think that we're
7 uniquely postured to achieve the vision, if you will, of
8 cross-servicing that has been talked about by the previous
9 BRAC, as well as by the Joint Cross Service Working Group on
10 Labs.
11 I wanted to also mention two other suggestions for
12 additional functions to come to Fort Monmouth.
13 One is with regard to the Aviation Troop Command at
14 St. Louis. There, we are asking basically or the Pentagon
15 has asked that the realigning research and development
16 portion of the life cycle of six ATCOM business areas be
17 relocated to Fort Monmouth.
18 By realigning the rest of the life cycle to CECOM,
19 BRAC '95 would eliminate duplication of efforts and achieves
20 the efficiencies and mission enhancement of one command
21 managing the entire life cycle. We already have a number of
22 these functions at Fort Monmouth, pursuant to the previous

Page 86

1 BRAC, and it only makes sense for this one from ATCOM to come
2 here.
3 Lastly, I wanted to talk about Bayonne. I wanted
4 to add to the others from the New Jersey delegation who do
5 not support the closure of Bayonne. I don't think it should
6 close. I think that would be a mistake.
7 But, as you may know, and I'm sure you've looked at
8 it, the Pentagon recommendation says that if Bayonne does
9 close, then significant functions are suggested to come to
10 Fort Monmouth, and I would suggest that, if you do mistakenly
11 close Bayonne, that it would certainly make sense for those
12 functions to come to Fort Monmouth, because of our proximity
13 to the port facilities and the fact that it would lessen the
14 personal impact of this BRAC recommendation if those
15 employees, who are primarily in New Jersey, were allowed to
16 come to Fort Monmouth.
17 I appreciate your involvement in this, and thank
18 you very much.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Pallone.
21 We're delighted to see your distinguished
22 colleague, Representative Robert Menendez here.

Page 87

1 REPRESENTATIVE MENENDEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
2 members of the Commission. I want to thank all the
3 commissioners for continuing to be engaged, Commissioners
4 Kling and Cornella for their visit to the site, Commissioner
5 Cox, who had an opportunity to speak, and others. We
6 appreciate your continuing involvement. I hope you will not
7 disappoint Congressman Pallone and make sure that he doesn't
8 have to get all that excess out of Bayonne to his site.
9 The MOPF closure recommendation is still, still
10 based on the unstudied and untested assumption that dedicated
11 military port facilities can be eliminated and that
12 commercial capacity will be available to handle all current
13 and future mission requirements, and it's a very tenuous
14 assumption, because in closing MOPF, you're not reducing
15 excess capacity, you are losing an essential military
16 capability which cannot be reestablished.
17 We believe the Army proposal to close MOPF
18 substantially deviates from the four selection criteria,
19 starting with number one, the impact on the operational
20 readiness of the DOD's total force.
21 There still is no study or test which examines,
22 evaluates, or supports the assumption that sufficient

Page 88

1 commercial port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts are
2 available to support power projection requirements with a
3 minimum loss to operational capacity. MTMC first started
4 looking at this in April of this year, after the decisions
5 were made.
6 Availability of facilities at both the existing and
7 potential receiving locations is the second criteria.
8 Existence of commercial port capacity is not the same as
9 availability. Lillian Liburdie, one of the nation's leading
10 experts on the New York-New Jersey Port Authority testified
11 to this before the full Commission, in essence stating that
12 exactly that is the case.
13 The third criteria is the ability to accommodate
14 contingency mobilization and future total force requirements
15 at both existing and potential receiving locations. The
16 operational impacts and risks to rapid mobilization and
17 future force projection needs, I think, are incalculable now
18 that both MOPF and MOFFA could be closed.
19 Criterion four is cost and manpower implications.
20 As I said, there are no costs related to the mission, the
21 cost studies, the movement of cargo and, without the cost
22 studies, we may never be able to control costs for the

Page 89

1 movement of cargo.
2 The Army tab study has been forced to change, as we
3 suggested to you at the hearing that it would have to change
4 its COBRA costs and savings estimates and, while they're
5 termed "refinements," I would consider the initial figures to
6 be drastically wrong.
7 As I suggested in our full presentation, and now by
8 their own admission, the MOPF estimates were off -- 20
9 percent off for return on investment, 75 percent off on
10 changes to costs and savings over the implementation period.
11 and 77 percent off net present value change; and those are
12 only the figures for the Army.
13 You've heard, at the presentations and the site
14 visits, that the enclave supposedly left behind, they
15 basically take the position that they cannot do it on their
16 own; there will be significant cost to them if they become
17 the landlords at the base. That has not been calculated
18 here. So the percentages that are off are just dealing what
19 Army costs.
20 They've acknowledge the gross error in the assembly
21 of its COBRA model. Our figures from our financial analysts,
22 Coopers and Lybrand, indicate that it will take over 30 years

Page 90

1 for the Army to recoup the costs necessary to close MOPF and
2 create a stand-along enclave for selective tenants, and these
3 areas seriously call into question the assumptions on which
4 this closure recommendation is based.
5 Finally, the most overarching cost problem is
6 totally unstudied. It is the cost to the military for the
7 mission of moving military cargo and the disruption of
8 commercial ports. Military port usage is already among the
9 most commercialized activities in the entire DOD.
10 Defense agencies must pay for services on the basis
11 of commercial tariffs and are responsible for all costs
12 arising from the loss of business, and no labor costs were
13 included in the estimates of the cost of purchasing
14 commercial port services.
15 There's no legal authority to disrupt commercial
16 port operation in the absence of a declared emergency. By
17 that time, it would be long after the need to mobilize and
18 use the ports. The Kuwait invasion, as an example, was in
19 August of 1990. Congress authorized the use of force five
20 months later. That's not going to be able to work at
21 commercial port activities.
22 Now, there's no absolute assurance and timely

Page 91

1 access to ports for fast power projection without MOPF. MTMC
2 claims that MOPF will result in the loss of few capabilities.
3 We reject that. These capabilities are critical, time-
4 sensitive. I've talked a lot about costs, but that's not
5 only the decisions you have to make.
6 Military value is about things we can't buy. We
7 can't buy back time when there is delay in the arrival of
8 equipment. We cannot buy back an American soldier's life
9 when reinforcements come too late. The selection criteria
10 are right. The MOPF decision to close is wrong. And I'll be
11 submitting additional information to the Commissioners for
12 their consideration. Thank you so much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And your additional information
14 will be reproduced in the record. Thank you, Congressman
15 Menendez.
16 We're delighted to have your distinguished
17 colleague, Representative Dick Zimmer.
18 REPRESENTATIVE ZIMMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
19 members of the Commission. I would like to address the issue
20 that my colleague, Frank Pallone, discussed, which is the
21 consolidation and co-location of functions from the Rome Lab
22 to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

Page 92

1 Operation Desert Storm demonstrated dramatically
2 the transformation of modern warfare. It showed that a fully
3 integrated battlefield is increasingly important to our
4 country's military success. Because of the importance of
5 interoperability of information systems in battle space,
6 United States technology supervision must be maximized to
7 fully integrate all elements of the sea, land, air
8 battlefield. This can best be done through cross-servicing.
9 The Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs agreed with
10 this assessment, recommending Fort Monmouth as the site for
11 C4I co-location, one of few inter-servicing steps taken by
12 the Department of Defense in BRAC '95, and right in line with
13 BRAC '93 guidance for more cross-servicing.
14 Co-location of the leading Air Force and Army C4I
15 centers will ensure that a coordinated C4I development
16 procurement test and implementation plan is pursued. It will
17 promote joint interoperability and create a world class C4I
18 center, a national center of information warfare.
19 I believe Fort Monmouth has the expert, experienced
20 staff to lead the DOD effort in C4I. Fort Monmouth is the
21 leader in four mission areas chosen for consolidation at Fort
22 Monmouth -- photonics, electromagnetics, radio communication,

Page 93

1 and communications networks.
2 The fort has 68 research and development agreements
3 with leading edge academic institutions, including nearby
4 Princeton, Rutgers, New Jersey Institute of Technology, and
5 Stevens Institute. It has public-private partnerships with
6 New Jersey leaders in C4I technology, such as AT&T, Bell
7 Labs, and IT&T, and is located in the state that enjoys the
8 highest concentration of scientists and engineers in the
9 nation per capita.
10 In terms of physical space, Fort Monmouth possesses
11 extensive, low-cost expansion capacity. The fort includes
12 more than 1,000 acres on the main post and Charles Wood area,
13 and, because of previous BRAC decisions, has available more
14 than 500,000 square feet of fully modernized, professional
15 work space.
16 The fort has state-of-the-art facilities to support
17 C4I mission, including a variety of unique high-technology
18 facilities, such as the digital integrated lab, the Myers
19 Center and, in particular, includes world-class laboratory
20 space and state-of-the-art infrastructure to house the
21 thousands of engineers and scientists who work there today,
22 on the cutting edge of information technology.

Page 94

1 BRAC and non-BRAC-related movements from the post
2 have created significant expansion potential for cross-
3 servicing. This potential is complemented by available
4 housing for military families and the full range of medical,
5 dental, shopping, and recreational activities on post to
6 support them.
7 Fort Monmouth has the ideal integrated commodity
8 command structure, already predominates the C4I joint arena,
9 and has the physical space and technological and academic
10 environment to make cross-servicing of C4I activities there a
11 success.
12 I strongly support the Joint Cross-Service Group
13 recommendations. Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
15 Representative Zimmer. We thank the distinguished New Jersey
16 delegation for their very fine presentation and we ask our
17 friends from Lakehurst to file out silently, and we thank
18 them for being here.
19 We will go next to the New York delegation. Let
20 the Chair first make this announcement, please, as the folks
21 from New Jersey are leaving the room. Yesterday, we had 81
22 Members of the House and Senate and, from 8:30 until 6:10

Page 95

1 p.m., in direct compliance with the schedule, we heard 81
2 Members of the House and Senate.
3 There's something in the water today, and the Chair
4 is obligated to say that he and the Commission are obligated
5 to hear today 121 Members of the House and Senate. Of the
6 first 18 this morning, only three of the 18 testified within
7 the five-minute framework.
8 I am obligated to say to my friends in the Congress
9 -- and I guess only a Member can say this -- five minutes is
10 five minutes and, whenever you talk longer, we go later; and
11 we are going to do the very best we can to slog through 121
12 Members. But I would hope, in all fairness to everybody
13 involved, everyone would try to honor the five-minute sign.
14 There is the green light, the red light, and the
15 yellow light. The colors are red, yellow, green. There's a
16 green light, a yellow light, and a red light. No one
17 realizes more than a man who spent 42 years in elected public
18 service how wonderful it is to hear one's own voice.
19 (Laughter.)
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Spare us. Spare us.
21 (Laughter.)
22 COMMISSIONER COX: We are delighted -- and I say

Page 96

1 this on the verge of hearing two of the most eloquent men in
2 the United States Senate, so this is probably a terrible time
3 to make this speech, because I am so pleased to see the great
4 senior Senator from the great State of New York, my friend,
5 Senator Pat Moynihan.
6 SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Mr. Chairman, members of this
7 honorable Commission, I will speak as the voice of
8 disinterested science, principally on behalf of the Rome
9 Laboratories, and to say to you, in great seriousness, that I
10 am formerly a member of the President's Science Advisory
11 Committee, which President Eisenhower established to provide
12 an independent source of advice on weapons development.
13 I'm formerly vice chairman and member of the board
14 of directors of the American Association for the Advance of
15 Science and I am now chairman of the Commission on the
16 Protection and Reduction of Government Secrecy, which was
17 established by statute in the last Congress.
18 I'll say two things. The work at Rome Labs,
19 primarily in photonics, is now in its third generation. It
20 is science at its most fundamental. It concerns photonics,
21 which I think can fairly be judged, at this point, as much as
22 you would know. What electronics has been to the 20th

Page 97

1 century, photonics will be to the next century.
2 On Sunday, I gave the commencement address at Union
3 College in Schenectady, its 200th anniversary. One of the
4 honorees, who got a medal, was the inventor, Class of '41, of
5 laser -- LASER, light amplification by stimulated emission of
6 radiation.
7 This work has been going along from roughly
8 Schenectady, across the Mohawk Valley, to Rochester, the
9 Kodak Labs, down to Cornell, and back by way of Corning and
10 Alfred and Syracuse. It is not a warehouse. This is not an
11 Air Force Base. This is an intellectual activity in its
12 third generation and its moment of peak productivity.
13 To rip it out by the roots would be a form of
14 vandalism, and the Air Force apparently is prepared to do
15 that. I don't know what's happened to their sense of
16 science.
17 One of the problems is that what's going on there
18 is classified, and it ought not be. In 1971, the Pentagon
19 set up a Commission under Frederick Sites, who was then
20 chairman of the Rockefeller University, and Jack Rouena from
21 MIT, Edward from California were on it. They recommended
22 that all weapons development secrecy would be stopped at the

Page 98

1 science level, just stop it. It gets in your way, it slows
2 you down. At best, no more than five years.
3 So the people at Rome have been pathetic with
4 respect to telling people what they do. They don't dare even
5 hint, for fear of some awful transgression of rules which
6 ought not to be there in the first place, but that is the
7 case.
8 The state of photonics is evidence of the work
9 done. I tell you, it would be seriously, grievously set back
10 if it's not continued in the research mode that has been
11 established. Thirty years ago, you began to hear about light
12 in those circles, and now you begin to see the consequences.
13 My distinguished colleague, Senator D'Amato, will
14 continue in this matter. I have friends on the other body
15 who will speak about specific places.
16 I would add a special word, though, for the Niagara
17 base. It is the only Air Force Reserve unit in the State of
18 New York. You ripped out two great Air Force bases -- not
19 you, but the last time around -- including the oldest
20 military base in the United States, built to fight off the
21 British on the shores of Lake Champlain, and a stone barracks
22 in 1818, standing there abandoned and forlorn. I'm hoping,

Page 99

1 in some measure of equity, you might at least save Niagara
2 and Rome. Thank you very much.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my erudite friend, the
4 distinguished senior Senator from the great State of New York
5 for continuing to educate me and others, and we appreciate
6 his contribution.
7 We're delighted to see his distinguished friend and
8 colleague, the great Senator from the State of New York, the
9 chairman of the Banking Committee, my old friend, Senator Al
10 D'Amato.
11 SENATOR D'AMATO: Mr. Chairman, it's good to be
12 here. Let me first thank you and the Commission and really
13 thank the Commission for the work that you do. I mean,
14 having 80-plus and then 100-plus Members come in is more
15 than, I think, anyone could possibly be asked to endure. It
16 goes beyond public service. You could call it something
17 else.
18 (Laughter.)
19 SENATOR D'AMATO: So I'm going to attempt to do
20 something that most people would say is impossible, and that
21 is to keep within the time constraints. I'm going to ask
22 that my full statement be entered into the record as if read

Page 100

1 in its entirety, and I am sure that you will read every
2 single word of the statement, even though it is 92 pages.
3 (Laughter.)
4 SENATOR D'AMATO: Let me say that, number one, I
5 honestly believe that, Mr. Chairman, that what was done, for
6 whatever reason, was that a decision was first made and
7 formulated to close the Rome Lab, not on economics, not in
8 terms of what work they were doing or weren't and that, once
9 that decision was made, we had to find numbers to justify it
10 I don't think there's any other case where the
11 books were cooked more than in this particular case --
12 cooked. The numbers don't add up.
13 I'm simply saying to this Commission, let's do the
14 right thing. What is the right thing to do? You're going to
15 lose, as Senator Moynihan has testified to, a great team.
16 Then we hear about now, we have this new thing that we're
17 going to get into this joint cross-service business, and it
18 just doesn't apply here.
19 Let me say the Joint Cross-Service Report issued by
20 the Special Department of Defense BRAC Task Force is
21 supposedly of one the reasons for this move -- just cooked it
22 up. Let's look at the record. There will be no cross-

Page 101

1 servicing because there is no Navy at Hanscom, there's no
2 Army at Hanscom, there's none at Monmouth, either. In fact,
3 the Army's Electronic Technological Device Lab, currently at
4 Fort Monmouth, is being moved to Maryland.
5 This is a fiasco. It's a farce. And let me not
6 say here for the Commission's benefit what I believe has
7 empowered it, because I think the Commission and its members
8 have their own expertise and understands the body politic.
9 There's a time for politics and there's a time for
10 doing what's right. We were promised -- we being the people
11 at Rome, the State of New York -- that this lab would be kept
12 open and, based upon that, we made very specific commitments.
13 Millions of dollars, both by the state and the
14 private sector, have been poured in as it relates to a re-use
15 program; and I daresay there are very few others throughout
16 this country that can demonstrate that. We took up Mr.
17 Boatright on his promise. We pointed that out to the
18 Commission in the past.
19 I just ask this Commission to do the right thing,
20 because it's the right thing to do. No savings here. Pure
21 politics. It's wrong. You don't spend the time that you do
22 here because of political concerns but, rather, you do it

Page 102

1 because you're trying to make a difference for this country
2 and you have touch decisions to make.
3 I feel confident, if you take a look at all the
4 facts and really look at this carefully, based upon what the
5 state has committed, what we have done, and what the facts
6 are, this lab will be preserved. I thank the Commission.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank our friend, the
8 distinguished Senator from New York State and his
9 distinguished colleague.
10 We're pleased to have your Member from the House of
11 Representatives, Gary Ackerman. Congressman Ackerman.
12 REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN: Thank you very much, Mr.
13 Chairman, members of the Commission. I'm testifying on
14 behalf of Fort Totten, which is in Queens County on the North
15 Shore.
16 As I noted in my testimony last month, the current
17 proposal regarding Fort Totten is to close the fort, except
18 for an enclave reserved for the headquarters of the 77th Army
19 Reserve Command. That command will actually increase at the
20 end of this fiscal year by 2,000 Reservists.
21 The increase will also bring additional full-time
22 military personnel, which leaves us with the question of

Page 103

1 where to house service members and their families. The
2 Army's answer foolishly continues to be that Fort Totten be
3 closed and the Army pay $3.1 million to the Navy to house
4 service members and their families at Mitchell Field.
5 Despite the fact that the Army will pay the Navy
6 $3.1 million to upgrade their housing, the Army is guaranteed
7 as much as one cot for housing, as the Navy will continue to
8 give the right of first refusal to Navy and Marine personnel.
9 This may force Army personnel to look for housing
10 on the open market, in arguably one of the most, if not the
11 most, expensive markets in the country. I believe the
12 proposal is both unfair and unwise.
13 The proposal is unfair to service members, who
14 would prefer to live in Bayside, where easy access to major
15 transportation arteries places the entire tri-state area and
16 its military facilities well within reach of the base.
17 Closing Fort Totten would also deprive service members of the
18 ability to enroll their children in two of New York's top-
19 rated school districts, Numbers 25 and 26. It's also unfair
20 to force service members and their families to search for
21 housing in such an expensive market.
22 Army personnel in New York will receive a 6 percent

Page 104

1 COLA for a maximum additional payment of $270 a month. Even
2 with this additional $270 in their pocket, that payment is
3 unlikely to provide them the ability to find adequate housing
4 at all and certainly not near the high-quality schools and
5 shopping and easy transportation that Fort Totten provides.
6 It is unwise for the Army to pay the Navy to
7 upgrade Navy housing when the Army could spend that $3
8 million to upgrade housing at Fort Totten and permit the
9 continuation of residences which are close to the expanding
10 Reserve facility in a superior location.
11 Closing Fort Totten would be also unwise from the
12 standpoint of morale. Secretary Perry and the President have
13 both committed to upholding the morale and the welfare of
14 service members and their families. The combination of
15 amenities and superior quality of life in the Bayside market
16 make Fort Totten an attractive housing option for service
17 members and their families. In fact, the Citizens Committee
18 of New York rated the Bayside area one of the top communities
19 in which to raise a child within the City of New York.
20 The Fort Totten community, in the Bay Terrace
21 section of Bayside, is right on the Long Island Sound. It's
22 on the water's edge. It's a little peninsula jutting out.

Page 105

1 It overlooks the Long Island Sound. It overlooks New York
2 Harbor. It looks straight through the Whitestone and four
3 different bridges. It is one of the most prime pieces of
4 real estate in the entire northeast region, and it would be
5 foolhardy for the Army to give this up.
6 In short, Fort Totten should remain open because of
7 the continuing military housing needs in New York, the high
8 cost of housing in the New York area, and because it will
9 improve the morale and welfare of service members and their
10 families, and I urge the Commission to remove Fort Totten
11 from the list of facilities to be closed. The savings, if
12 any, certainly are not worth it.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank Congressman Gary Ackerman
14 for those very enlightening and fine remarks.
15 We're delighted to see his distinguished colleague,
16 Representative Susan Molinari.
17 REPRESENTATIVE MOLINARI: Thank you and good
18 morning.
19 Let me just follow up on the comments that have
20 been prepared by my colleague, Congressman Ackerman, and talk
21 briefly about Fort Hamilton, which is basically going through
22 the same growing pains.

Page 106

1 Before I get into the meat and potatoes of my
2 presentation, I'd like to just ask you to please, in your
3 deliberations, note that there have been revised figures
4 since last we met. The Army's original projections for
5 savings were approximately $7.2 in annual savings and they
6 have since concluded that they made a mistake and it's a
7 little over $3 million.
8 That being said, we don't disagree with the
9 fundamental concept that the Department of Defense is trying
10 to put forth, particularly in light of the fact that, coming
11 from New York city, we have developers that we've talked to
12 who have indicated that they would be interested and willing
13 to work with the community to come into Brooklyn, revitalize
14 the housing, and lease it out back to the military.
15 However, there is going to be a gap if this
16 Commission accepts the Army's recommendations between when
17 that is legitimately possible and the military families can,
18 in fact, move into suitable housing.
19 The Army, as you know, has recommended to divest
20 itself of 442 units at Fort Hamilton. At the same time, the
21 Army has concluded that those military missions at Fort
22 Hamilton are necessary and, gratefully, this committee

Page 107

1 concluded the same thing, and did not put to close Fort
2 Hamilton's mission on the final list.
3 So now you have 442 families who are going to look
4 for a place to live. Remember one thing. The Department of
5 the Army is counting on legislation passing in order to do
6 what needs to be done. That legislation is moving through
7 the House this week. It has yet to see the Senate. Will it
8 be attached to a piece of legislation signed into law by the
9 President? None of us know.
10 So now we are going to create a gap where 442
11 members of our armed services are going to be put out on the
12 Brooklyn economy, getting a variable housing allowance plus
13 basic pay for an E-3, which is approximately what is the
14 predominant makeup of Fort Hamilton, which is about $600.
15 I'm sending you attachments that you should have
16 before you show you that the average advertisement for
17 housing in and around the base is about $1,500. Where are
18 these military personnel going to go on a housing allowance
19 of $600?
20 You have stated that their mission is valuable and,
21 therefore, the fort must remain open. You have stated, the
22 Department of Defense has stated that they want private

Page 108

1 developers to come over and they want you to make that
2 decision now, not knowing when legislatively that is going to
3 be capable. So we're going to create a gap for a member of
4 our armed services to try and live on $600 in an economy that
5 demands $1,500 for affordable housing, and that's not luxury
6 housing.
7 Let me suggest to you, Chairman -- and I will
8 conclude with this -- and members of the Commission, 442
9 housing units does not need Base Closure Commission
10 recommendations.
11 You can recommend that these housing units stay in
12 the Department of the Army and, at any point in time that is
13 below the threshold the Department of the Army can negotiate
14 with developers in the New York City area when the
15 legislation is passed, when it's signed into law, and when
16 there can be an orderly transition for our members of the
17 armed services to proceed out and back in.
18 We can do that. We cannot do that in the amount of
19 time that will be allowed if you vote to close us down on 442
20 housing units that legislation allows to be rented back out
21 to developers.
22 We are going to supply you, as I said, with the

Page 109

1 names of the building construction industry we've been
2 working with in New York to show you, in good faith, we're
3 willing to proceed on this. In fact, the community thinks it
4 would benefit by having private developers take over the
5 housing, revamp it, and lease it back to the Army.
6 But what we are creating is a disaster in the
7 making for our military families if the Base Closure
8 Commission votes to do it before we are ready to proceed on
9 that course, from both a legislative standpoint where we're
10 allowed to do it and negotiations with the developers.
11 Last line, I'll say it again: this does not need
12 base closure action. It's below the threshold. So nothing
13 stands to be gained except for another line under the
14 Department of the Army to say "closure" and, in the best
15 interests of our military families, we can accomplish the
16 same purpose with an orderly transition if you vote to remove
17 Fort Hamilton from the realignment list.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
19 Representative Molinari.
20 REPRESENTATIVE MOLINARI: Thank you, Chairman
21 Dixon.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're indebted to you for that

Page 110

1 fine contribution. May I observe, I hope that you and my
2 friend, Senator D'Amato, and others that are referencing
3 printed material and other information, be sure to give it to
4 our staff. Thank you very much.
5 We're delighted to have your colleague and friend,
6 Representative Sherwood Boehlert here. Congressman Boehlert.
7 REPRESENTATIVE BOEHLERT: Mr. Chairman and members
8 of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify
9 once again on behalf of Rome Laboratory.
10 Today, I want to focus on just two issues that have
11 arisen since your New York City hearing last month -- the
12 revised Air Force cost estimates and state funding of the re-
13 use plan for Griffiss Air Force Base.
14 I'm afraid my discussion of the latest Air Force
15 figures will sound painfully familiar. That's because the
16 Air Force continues to overestimate the annual savings from
17 relocating Rome Lab while underestimating the cost. Indeed,
18 the Air Force has done exactly what we predicted in our New
19 York testimony -- come back with slightly more realistic cost
20 estimates while further distorting the savings estimates.
21 The May estimate is just a new ruse to obscure one
22 central fact: relocating Rome Lab will cost money, lots of

Page 111

1 it, not save any. As you well know, the Army has costed out
2 the relocation of Rome Laboratory on several occasions, with
3 wildly different results. In the latest figures, as in
4 February, the projected annual saving is the fatal flaw.
5 The Air Force now maintains it would save almost
6 $13 million a year by moving Rome Lab. The actual figure is
7 closer to $1 million a year, resulting in an impossibly long
8 payback period. Remember, these are not net savings but,
9 rather, savings that must be used to offset the cost of
10 moving, costs in excess of $100 million. Spending $100
11 million up front, to save an estimate $1 million per year --
12 not a very prudent or wise business decision.
13 How could this discrepancy occur? First, the Air
14 Force chose to grossly overestimate the cost of real property
15 maintenance at Rome. For the Air Force's figures to be
16 accurate, Rome would have to be paying $45 per square foot
17 for maintenance while comparable Air Force facilities pay
18 only 60 cents per square foot.
19 Here's another problem. Even though the test sites
20 at Rome must remain in operation, the Air Force assumes that
21 every last square foot of space at Rome will be shut down and
22 mothballed. That's not going to happen. And the Air Force

Page 112

1 estimate of total square footage at Rome is off by almost an
2 order of magnitude. The Air Force 177,000 square feet at a
3 facility that site surveys has over 1.3 million square feet
4 of space.
5 These kinds of glaring, obvious, demonstrable
6 errors hardly build confidence in the Air Force's
7 calculation, and these are not minor mistakes. If we correct
8 just these errors in maintenance costs and square footage,
9 and accept absolutely every other Air Force assumption, the
10 payback period for shutting down Rome Lab jumps to 16 years.
11 That's right -- 16 years.
12 Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
13 that the Air Force itself has said that base closures are not
14 economical if the payback period goes into double digits.
15 Indeed, Mr. Boatright and General Blume reiterated that point
16 in a meeting with representatives of the Rome community on
17 June 1st, and no BRAC Commission has closed an Air Force
18 facility with a payback of more than eight years.
19 Of course, maintenance costs and square footage are
20 not the only problems with the Air Force's latest estimates.
21 The Air Force now says Rome's support manpower levels will be
22 cut by 93 positions, almost double the figure in the February

Page 113

1 estimate. What has happened since February to justify this
2 conclusion? The Air Force has provided no credible answer to
3 that question.
4 I will submit, for the record, our enumeration of
5 that other faulty assumptions in the Air Force's latest COBRA
6 estimates, and it's voluminous. When all of them are taken
7 into account, it turns out that the payback period for
8 closing Rome Laboratory is in excess of 100 years, just as
9 the Air Force itself had concluded in October of last year.
10 The Air Force's proposal to dismember Rome
11 Laboratory contrasts starkly with the community's effort to
12 strengthen it, so let me now turn to the Griffiss reuse plan
13 in which the Commission has shown so much interest.
14 Commissioners have repeatedly asked us for evidence
15 that the commitment for the reuse plan is real. New York
16 State just concluded its budget process and the new budget
17 continues to make good New York State's commitment of $12
18 million to the New York State Technology Enterprise
19 Corporation.
20 In short, the decision to take Rome Lab off the
21 closure list should be an easy one. In New York, we've
22 demonstrated that the relocation of Rome meets none of the

Page 114

1 BRAC criteria. The events of the past six weeks have done
2 nothing but strengthen our case. Closing Rome Lab will cost
3 money and damage a vital military asset. It will be
4 excessively costly and totally disruptive of critically
5 important research and development. I urge you to remove
6 Rome Lab from the list; and I think you for your courtesy.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Boehlert.
8 We're delighted to see your friend, the
9 distinguished member of the New York House delegation.
10 Representative Jack Quinn, here.
11 REPRESENTATIVE QUINN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
12 good morning, Commissioners.
13 As you may know, this is my second appearance
14 before the Commission, as well, as I join other colleagues
15 here and, since we last testified in New York City, for the
16 U.S.S. Intrepid, new news has surface that the Niagara Falls
17 Air Force Base has been added to the list so, this morning, I
18 would briefly like to talk to the Commission about the
19 Niagara Falls Air Force Base, as well as REDCAP in the
20 Calspan Corporation in Buffalo.
21 For the record, just once, REDCAP, as you know, we
22 all do, is the Realtime Digitally Controlled Analyzer

Page 115

1 Processing Facility. Thank goodness for abbreviations like
2 REDCAP.
3 Although I do not envy the task that you have here
4 today, listening to all of these Members, plus all the
5 testimony that you've already heard over these past months
6 and will hear in these next few weeks, I have to tell you
7 that, as a proponent of both deficit and wasteful government
8 spending reduction as well as a strong national defense, I
9 commend all of you for your efforts.
10 I'd also like to take a minute just to thank
11 General Davis for his visit to Western New York some weeks
12 ago at the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station last month. The
13 entire community remains grateful for your visit to see,
14 firsthand, the activities there.
15 I'm here also as a representative, of course, of
16 constituents in my district, the 30th District of New York,
17 Buffalo and Western New York. Even though the Niagara Falls
18 Air Force Base isn't located in my district, I think we all
19 understand and we're aware that congressional boundaries
20 isn't where these kinds of things begin and end.
21 Indeed, I've talked with several representatives,
22 also constituents in Buffalo and Western New York, about the

Page 116

1 importance of this, and I also want to take a minute right
2 now, if I can, to congratulate my colleague, John LaFalce, a
3 member of the other party. I think we're pointing up now,
4 we're different parties, but this issue is one that's
5 bipartisan in nature and importance. I congratulate John for
6 the great effort he's put together on behalf of the Niagara
7 Falls Air Force Base.
8 It's also my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the
9 base has the support of the Defense Department, the Air
10 Force, of course the entire congressional delegation from New
11 York. General MacIntosh, the Chief of the Air Force Reserve,
12 in fact, has indicated the Air Force's strong support, also,
13 for the retention of the base.
14 The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station and the 914th
15 Air Lift Wing are valuable, combat-proven assets to the Air
16 Force. The 914th Air Lift Wing has operated both
17 independently and in conjunction with active forces in
18 Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Any action to close this station
19 will sacrifice the cohesion of a unit that has been battle-
20 tested and recognized for the performance by the Department
21 of Defense.
22 We also know, as Mr. LaFalce will point out, it's

Page 117

1 the only C-130 unit activated for Operation Desert Storm. No
2 other Air Force Reserve C-130 unit has received a higher
3 ranking during the last nine years.
4 In addition, closure of the base will not achieve
5 any significant savings over any other C-130 Reserve base
6 currently under study.
7 Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn my comments
8 toward the REDCAP facility. It's apparent that I believe,
9 and others, that it's in the best interest of the country to
10 keep the REDCAP in Buffalo. I think, when we last discussed
11 this issue in New York, many of us agreed that we weren't
12 even certain how and why REDCAP got on the list in the first
13 place.
14 This facility is being currently being fully
15 utilized. Any move simply would change the location of the
16 work, without providing any consolidation or savings. In
17 fact, costs would probably increase.
18 The Calspan Corporation, which has operated the
19 REDCAP facility, is a private company that has operated it
20 for over 30 years. It's built up a unique body of knowledge
21 that enables the facility to provide high value to their test
22 customers at a very, very low cost. Moving the facility,

Page 118

1 therefore, would destroy a valuable asset that the taxpayers
2 of this country have built over many years.
3 In addition, something that we're talking about in
4 the Congress now, and we have for some time, as many of you
5 are aware, this move at this facility for REDCAP would simply
6 take jobs that are out of the private sector and move them
7 into the government sector. At this time, with shrinking
8 budgets, I think most of us are trying to do the opposite.
9 Finally, we believe, as I said, in New York, and
10 others have agreed, that REDCAP simply doesn't meet the
11 criteria for consideration under the BRAC process. It has
12 far less than the required 300 employees and it's not even a
13 base, in the first place. It's providing a significant
14 service, as is evidenced by its high utilization. The facts
15 show that New York has been hit hard. We know that from the
16 other testimony.
17 I appreciate your time this morning and the time in
18 the past, and wish you all well in your deliberations.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Quinn. We appreciate those very helpful remarks.
21 We're delighted to have a distinguished Member of
22 your House delegation, my old friend, Representative John

Page 119

1 LaFalce, here.
2 REPRESENTATIVE LaFALCE: Chairman Dixon and members
3 of the Commission, it's a pleasure to appear before you
4 again. This is my third appearance before either General
5 Davis or the Commission.
6 I appear before you today with respect to both the
7 Niagara Falls Air Force Base and REDCAP, joining forces with
8 Congressman Jack Quinn, in whose district REDCAP resides. A
9 brief word about that, first.
10 REDCAP has been operated by either Calspan or its
11 predecessor, Cornell Aeronautical Labs, for over 30 years. I
12 know a bit about this because, in my prior incarnation as an
13 attorney, my law firm represented the employees at Calspan.
14 They're some of the most brilliant Ph.D.'s in the world. I
15 don't think you'll find a finer group.
16 It's inconceivable to me that this recommendation
17 would be before this Commission. This is not a base
18 realignment or closing. This is not a government employee
19 group. These are some of the best civilian Ph.D.s in the
20 world, doing work under private contract with the United
21 States Government that cannot be done by any other group.
22 It shouldn't be before you. You shouldn't be

Page 120

1 considering that. If the Air Force wants to do this, the Air
2 Force can do it on their own, although they would get
3 considerable objection. They couldn't perform the type of
4 in-flight testing that it would be necessary to accomplish
5 for a fraction of the cost that these simulated tests can do.
6 Take this off the possible closing list. It
7 doesn't belong there.
8 Now, with respect to Niagara Falls, Chairman Dixon
9 and each and every Commissioner, when you think of Niagara
10 Falls, don't even think of the Air Reserve Station. Just
11 think of the honeymoon capital of the world and where you
12 should go for your second honeymoon.
13 (Laughter.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Don't let my wife hear that, John.
15 REPRESENTATIVE LaFALCE: Because, when you go on a
16 honeymoon in Niagara Falls, you have a virtual perfect
17 marriage, the type of perfect marriage that has existed
18 between the Air Force and the Niagara Falls community since
19 the Niagara Falls community has been host to the 914th Air
20 Lift Wing. Don't mess around with this perfect marriage.
21 Now, why is it such a perfect marriage? Because
22 you have this union of Air Force wants and desires and needs,

Page 121

1 and community wants, desires, and needs.
2 Let me talk about the Air Force desires and needs.
3 What does the Air Force desire? They desire to have the very
4 best C-130 outfit in the world continue. And you know what?
5 According to last year's ORI -- overall readiness inspection
6 -- we received an excellent rating, and there is no unit in
7 the United States that's received a higher rating in the past
8 nine years.
9 For the past five years, we've done it. We've done
10 it with outstanding excellence. We did it in Operation
11 Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We did it in Bosnia. We did
12 it in Somalia. We did it in Turkey and Iraq, et cetera. We
13 want to continue doing it.
14 Now, the Air Force also needs us. I don't just
15 assert that. I can cite data which prove it, letters that
16 prove it.
17 First of all, when they made a recommendation
18 earlier this year, they recommended that Pittsburgh be
19 closed, and they did this on the assumption that Chicago
20 O'Hare was going to be closed -- not closed, but relocated,
21 not closed, because the '93 BRAC commission said, "Well,
22 Chicago O'Hare should be relocated to Rockport at the City of

Page 122

1 Chicago's expense. But the City of Chicago couldn't afford
2 that.
3 When they recommended Pittsburgh, they said
4 "because Pittsburgh is so close to Youngstown that we won't
5 lost the Reservists." Now, on Friday, they sent the
6 Commission a new letter saying:
7 "It's imperative that we only close one C-130. We
8 cannot close two and, if it's going to be one, we now want to
9 revise our opinion and recommend Chicago O'Hare, because the
10 City of Chicago, as testified in the Chicago hearing, doesn't
11 want it there. They need that space for commercial
12 expansion. And so we now recommend that BRAC close it at
13 BRAC expense for the Air Reserve and let the City of Chicago
14 handle the expense of relocating the Air National Guard,
15 which they can afford."
16 But, underlying either their Pittsburgh or their
17 O'Hare recommendation is that, if they closed either of
18 those, they would not be losing the most important ingredient
19 that any military has -- its people, its personnel -- because
20 the Reservists at Pittsburgh could go to Youngstown, or vice
21 versa, and the Reservists at O'Hare could go to Milwaukee or
22 vice versa, because each is within approximately a one-hour

Page 123

1 drive of the other whereas, at Niagara Falls, if you were to
2 close the 914th, you'd lost the Reservists, because it's at
3 least a four-to-five-hour drive to the next closest base.
4 That's why the Air Force wants and needs our 914th
5 so much, and we want and need it, I think more than any other
6 unit. Now, how do you know that? How do you quantify
7 community support?
8 Well, you can quantify community need by looking at
9 the data, and the revised data show that our job loss would
10 be 1.1 percent, Youngstown's .5 percent, three of the others
11 .1 percent, and Chicago O'Hare is .0 percent.
12 Now, what does that mean? That means that our need
13 and, therefore, our community support, is more than twice as
14 great as Youngstown, 11 times greater than Pittsburgh or
15 Minneapolis or Milwaukee and, Chairman Dixon, infinitely
16 greater than Chicago's, which has a .0 job loss.
17 Again, when you have such a union, a marriage,
18 between Air Force wants and needs and community wants and
19 needs, you do not put that marriage asunder. Again, come to
20 Niagara Falls for your second honeymoon. Thank you very
21 much.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

Page 124

1 LaFalce. We thank the great New York State delegation. The
2 Chair observes that, out of seven there, five were able to do
3 it in five minutes. The quality of presentations is
4 substantially improving in length and the Chair urges other
5 delegations to emulate the great State of New York. Let the
6 word go forth to the Congress and the world that five of
7 their seven did it in the five minutes.
8 There is out there some delegation desperately
9 wanting to please the Chair by having 100 percent of their
10 delegation make their presentation within the magic time of
11 five minutes.
12 The State of New York is concluded.
13 COMMISSIONER COX (presiding): We are now most
14 pleased and honored to have with us the distinguished
15 Minority Whip, on behalf of the State of Michigan.
16 REPRESENTATIVE BONIOR: Thank you, Madam Chairman
17 and Commissioners. I want to thank you for the opportunity
18 to speak with you this morning about the Army garrison at
19 Selfridge Air National Guard Base, and for your hard work and
20 your patience during this process.
21 In particular, I want to think Commissioner Steele
22 for taking the time last April to come to Selfridge and hear

Page 125

1 our concerns firsthand, as well as the Chairman for all the
2 courtesies that he has extended me.
3 I want to echo, this morning, some of the comments
4 made last night by my distinguished colleagues, Senators
5 Levin and Abraham. We in Michigan, as you know, are very,
6 very proud of our Selfridge Air National Guard base and proud
7 of the role it continues to play in the defense of our
8 country.
9 As much as we all recognize the need to downsize
10 the military, we believe that closing the Army garrison at
11 Selfridge is a bad idea, for two reasons: first, because it
12 would seriously undermine the morale and quality of life of
13 the military families who serve at Selfridge and, second,
14 that it would do so needlessly, because closing the Army
15 garrison wouldn't save the taxpayers or the DOD a dime.
16 Now, to understand why, you have to understand one
17 thing. Selfridge is the premier joint military base in the
18 country and a perfect model of the kind of base this
19 Commission is working so hard to promote. At Selfridge, we
20 have the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines, the
21 Coast Guard, the National Guard, both active duty and
22 Reserve, and they're all working together as a team.

Page 126

1 The reason they work so well together is because
2 they've made a special effort at Selfridge to make military
3 life compatible with family life. We do so because, as
4 Secretary of Defense Perry pointed out in a statement on the
5 8th of May, we recognize that the key to maintaining
6 readiness and the key to retaining good quality soldiers is
7 to provide good quality housing, because we recognize that
8 most soldiers today have families and they have to come to
9 expect more than just a bunk. They have to expect a home.
10 694 military families, 78 unaccompanied service
11 members who call Selfridge home share family housing,
12 education, counseling services, and recreational facilities.
13 By closing the Army garrison we will, in effect, be evicting
14 nearly all of those families and dismantling the very
15 structure that promotes the quality of life that Secretary
16 Perry said was so important.
17 Here is the worst part: closing this facility
18 won't save the taxpayers a dime, because we believe the Army
19 based its COBRA model, on erroneous calculations and
20 incorrect information. When the Army prepared its COBRA
21 model, it only took into account the cost of providing the
22 substitute housing for Army personnel.

Page 127

1 The problem is, less than half of the families and
2 military personnel at Selfridge are Army personnel. In other
3 words, as Commissioner Cornella pointed out at a hearing
4 seven weeks ago, it appears as though the Army's projected
5 savings at Selfridge come only as a result of making housing
6 somebody else's problem, and that's just plain wrong.
7 The Army has an agreement with other branches at
8 Selfridge. They can't just up and leave. Yet, none of the
9 other branches were even consulted about this move.
10 What's more, the Army also assumed that families at
11 Selfridge could find affordable housing elsewhere but this,
12 too, isn't supported by the facts. Nearly 85 percent of the
13 families affected by this closure are enlisted personnel --
14 and listen to this -- with a monthly housing allowance
15 ranging from $427 a month to $740 a month.
16 A recent study in the area around the base showed
17 an insufficient number of houses available for rent, at an
18 average cost of $736 a month. Not only is there not enough
19 housing available, there's no way these families could afford
20 to pay even if they could find housing. Unless you want the
21 men and women who defend our country being forced to live in
22 seedy motels, the other branches are going to have to come up

Page 128

1 with the additional housing money, and that will all but wipe
2 out the cost savings projected by the Army.
3 Keep in mind, this isn't a run-down facility that
4 we're talking about. If we close the Army garrison at
5 Selfridge, we will be shutting down a state-of-the-art
6 facility. Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, and members of the
7 board, I know you have a difficult decision to make, and it
8 seems to me that if we truly want to improve the quality of
9 life for military families, as Secretary Perry has said time
10 and time again, we should be providing more of what is
11 offered at Selfridge, not less.
12 I would urge that, before you make a decision that
13 will significantly affect the lives of over 1,800 men, women,
14 and children at Selfridge, you reconsider the Army's
15 recommendations because, if you do, I am convinced that you
16 will reach the same conclusions we have -- that the Army
17 garrison at Selfridge should be removed from the base closure
18 list.
19 I thank you for your time and your courtesies this
20 morning.
21 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much for that
22 fine and concise explanation.

Page 129

1 Now, we'll move on to the great State of North
2 Carolina, and we're pleased to see Congressman Walter Jones.
3 REPRESENTATIVE JONES: Thank you, Madam Chairman,
4 Commissioners. I am Walter Jones, Jr., Congressman from the
5 Third District of Eastern North Carolina, home for Camp
6 LeJeune, Cherry Point Marine Air Station, and the 2nd Marine
7 Air Wing. Thank you for taking time to hear my testimony.
8 At issue is the final disposition of the 10
9 squadrons F-18 Hornets from Cecil Field, Florida which were
10 directed by the '93 BRAC Commission to Cherry Point Marine
11 Air Station. I am here to express three simple ideas:
12 First, I will ask you to consider, in the context
13 of the integrity of the BRAC process, why the '93 BRAC
14 Commission's recommendation to use Cherry Point was reversed
15 by the Department of Defense.
16 Secondly, I would like to talk about the simple
17 matter of fairness. Many or all of the airplanes in
18 question, if stationed at Oceana, will operate in the air
19 above Eastern North Carolina, which means we would receive
20 the air and noise pollution without receiving the benefit
21 connected with the presence of those planes on the ground.
22 Finally, I would ask you to take a second look at

Page 130

1 the long-term costs associated with maintaining and operating
2 these squadrons at Oceana. The case for Oceana may not be as
3 clear cut as once believed.
4 First, the integrity of the BRAC process. Madam
5 Chairman, less than 18 months after the '93 BRAC Commission
6 rendered its decision to designate Cherry Point as the prime
7 operating base for the Hornets, DOD had developed a plan to
8 change the decision to Oceana. However, Cherry Point made so
9 much sense that millions of dollars were spent in
10 preparation.
11 At the recommendation by Secretary Perry that the
12 F-18s be sent to Oceana, I immediately questioned the
13 reversal, since the previous BRAC panel had conducted
14 extensive studies on both bases in the areas of military
15 value, cost savings, and environment impact.
16 In addition to the basic criteria, Cherry Point was
17 also cited, by the '93 BRAC, as an excellent location to
18 conduct joint use training. It should be especially noted
19 that joint use training is not possible at Oceana. Our staff
20 has briefed your staff on the detailed background on the
21 departure from the '93 recommendation.
22 Now, the issue of fairness. Eastern North Carolina

Page 131

1 and the Cherry Point area are well-known for their flight
2 training and ground target areas. The Marine Corps, the U.S.
3 Air Force, and Navy planes regularly make use of these areas
4 which also means that we receive the noise and pollution
5 associated with these planes. The noise and pollution will
6 only increase if the planes in question operate from Oceana.
7 Our citizens are well aware of both the pros and
8 cons connected with the arrival of jet squadrons, but the
9 environmental cost of these planes in the air, without the
10 economic benefit of having them stationed on the ground,
11 would become a burden our citizens will not want to bear, nor
12 should our citizens bear such a burden, without the benefits.
13 Finally, some comments on costs. I was very
14 pleased that your staff recently visited Cherry Point Air
15 Station. The main point I would like to make is that a
16 second look at the whole picture at Oceana will raise serious
17 questions regarding the wisdom of the move.
18 Aerial photos of both Oceana and Cherry Point
19 clearly show the tremendous difference in the safety factor
20 due to crowding around Oceana. The presentation we made to
21 you at the public hearing in Baltimore on May 4th cited a
22 difference between the 1993 and 1995 cost estimates of $385

Page 132

1 million. I have yet to hear a satisfactory answer for why
2 there is this nearly half-a-billion dollar discrepancy. The
3 bottom line is that there is more to the costs at Oceana than
4 meets the eye.
5 Madam Chairman, in conclusion, I think we all know
6 that any issue can be seen in different ways by different
7 people, but I believe that whatever time you spend on this
8 issue will bring to you and to our country a more secure
9 position for all.
10 The civilians and military personnel who represent
11 Cherry Point are ready and able to take on the future,
12 whatever it may bring. We just want to be treated fairly,
13 based upon the facts which have been made available to us.
14 Please do not forget us in the shuffle and please do not
15 forget the integrity of the BRAC process itself.
16 Thank you for hearing me today.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman,
18 for those excellent remarks.
19 We're now pleased to move on to the great State of
20 North Dakota, and hope to have Senator Kent Conrad start.
21 Thank you, sir.
22 SENATOR CONRAD: Thank you very much. I especially

Page 133

1 want to thank the commissioners who came to North Dakota,
2 Commissioner Cox, Commissioner Kling, Commissioner Steele.
3 We deeply appreciate that you would take the time to come and
4 see, firsthand, the base that we are defending here today.
5 Here is what our top military leaders have told us.
6 The Secretary of Defense, Josh Gotbaum, who is Assistant
7 Secretary who is in charge of the base closure process, he
8 said, and I quote, "Although complete closure may appear
9 attractive from a cost savings perspective, it does not take
10 account of the preeminent military factors considered by the
11 department in its realignment considerations."
12 Air Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman, said,
13 "I can not overstate my support for retention of a core
14 refueling wing at Grand Forks." Admiral Hank Chiles, head of
15 the Strategic Command, said, and I quote, "U.S. Strategic
16 Command views retention of a core tanker wing at Grand Forks
17 as an important element in support of our nation's strategic
18 deterrent capability."
19 And most recently, General Rutherford, head of the
20 Transportation Command, has said, and I quote, "Grand Forks
21 Air Force Base with its strategic central location and
22 extensive infrastructure is ideally suited to support the

Page 134

1 single integrated operational plan force deployments to
2 Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific area."
3 You know, in real estate -- Commissioner Kling, you
4 know this well -- they always say location, location,
5 location. That is Grand Forks. We have got the location.
6 No other base has got it. That is why you ought to keep
7 Grand Forks.
8 First and foremost, Grand Forks supports our
9 nuclear deterrent as a part of the single integrated
10 operational plan. Tankers at Grand Forks have quick response
11 time, maximum range -- maximum range -- and a secure position
12 from which to operate. Other bases being considered simply
13 don't meet those tests.
14 Grand Forks is also perfectly suited to support a
15 variety of conventional contingencies. Tankers from Grand
16 Forks can reach Europe or Asia faster than tankers from any
17 other base. That is why General Rutherford said in a letter
18 to you, "Keep Grand Forks." Location, location, location.
19 Strategic location is one of the reasons Grand Forks was the
20 busiest tanker base in the Air Mobility Command last year.
21 General Tonoso in Chicago, you may recall, said to
22 you, "Importance of Grand Forks as a war fighting base is

Page 135

1 key." He stressed that we select our combat bases to prepare
2 for war. To prepare for war. That is why Grand Forks became
3 a core tanker base and that is why it ought to be retained.
4 One final note on location, if you will permit me.
5 Grand Forks, under the ABM treaty, is our chosen site for a
6 ballistic missile defense system. Congress is taking steps
7 to speed up possible deployment of such a system. One option
8 would use Minuteman boosters from Grand Forks to launch
9 missile interceptors. Missile defense options reinforce the
10 importance of keeping Grand Forks.
11 If you close Grand Forks, you lose all of those
12 advantages. Closing Grand Forks will damage our ability to
13 effectively respond to crises and conflicts, to carry out
14 national policy, and to fight and to win a war.
15 For those reasons, we urge you to retain Grand
16 Forks. Thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, Senator,
18 and we are pleased to move to the distinguished Congressman
19 from North Dakota, Congressman Pomeroy.
20 REPRESENTATIVE POMEROY: Thank you very much,
21 Commissioner Cox. I want to echo my appreciation for each of
22 you who took the time to visit the outstanding bases in North

Page 136

1 Dakota. I have enjoyed becoming personally acquainted with
2 you in the course of your visits and believe that you are
3 bringing terrific talent and dedication to the difficult
4 judgments before you.
5 I used to practice law in a small town, and as I
6 would approach a case would try and figure out what are the
7 key issues relevant to the determination before you. Here
8 the key issue is whether or not the Grand Forks tanker
9 mission ought to be added to the base closure list.
10 The key burden of proof attaching to that
11 determination is whether or not the Department of Defense
12 substantially deviated from the base closure criteria in not
13 having it on their recommended closure list. The criteria
14 are eightfold. The first four involve military value. Just
15 to briefly summarize: impact on operational readiness;
16 availability of land facilities and air space; availability
17 to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future force
18 requirements; and, finally, cost and manpower implications.
19 Now, the record before you shows that these
20 considerations were very much at the heart of the decision to
21 establish core tankers bases and place one in Grand Forks.
22 The move is a natural response to the closure of twelve bases

Page 137

1 formerly housing tankers. It established operational
2 efficiencies and long-term stability for tankers charged with
3 maintaining global reach, a worldwide presence based
4 increasingly on domestic military basing considerations.
5 Grand Forks was chosen because of infrastructure, location
6 and capacity. There is not another base that offers those
7 three considerations as an alternative.
8 Your decision to add the Grand Forks flying mission
9 to the base closure list for review has given our commanders
10 an opportunity to show you exactly why they made the
11 decisions that they did, and they have been rather emphatic
12 in their demonstration to you.
13 Chief of Staff Fogleman spoke to both the readiness
14 and the facilities issue when he, in his correspondence to
15 you, noted why they established a core mission at Grand
16 Forks. He cited national military strategy, including the
17 two major regional conflict issue, strategic nuclear
18 deterrence, as well as peacetime operations. He noted the
19 base's capacity, its infrastructure, and the importance in
20 terms of readiness for the military personnel which have been
21 relocated and shuffled about throughout this closure period.
22 Admiral Chiles, taking a slightly different

Page 138

1 perspective, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stressing
2 the importance of Grand Forks in terms of supporting the
3 SIOP. He called it "an important element in support of our
4 nation's strategic deterrent capability due to its strategic
5 location to support the bomber leg of the triad."
6 Yet another perspective on the importance of the
7 Grand Forks Air Force Base, General Rutherford, commander of
8 TRANSCOM, responsible for delivering our military forces to
9 any theater in the globe, because Grand Forks is now
10 structured as a cohesive, integrated core tanker base capable
11 of supporting operations in both Asian and European theaters.
12 General Rutherford has stated in correspondence to you that
13 the closure of Grand Forks would "impair our ability to
14 effectively execute national military missions."
15 Viewed in this framework, the Department of Defense
16 concurred with the Air Force determination that there ought
17 to be a core tanker base and it ought to be based in Grand
18 Forks. Assistant Secretary Gotbaum in correspondence to you
19 said that, "The Pentagon's analysis supported this
20 determination as militarily and fiscally sound."
21 Again, the issue before you is whether the DOD and
22 the Air Force have substantially deviated from base closure

Page 139

1 criteria by including the flying mission at Grand Forks Air
2 Force Base in their future operational and strategic
3 planning. The information has been emphatic. Fogleman,
4 Chiles, Rutherford and Gotbaum all have made it very clear
5 there was no substantial deviation from the criteria and, in
6 fact, those criteria of military value were at the heart of
7 why they established core bases and placed one in Grand
8 Forks.
9 I am confident that after you evaluate carefully
10 all of these considerations you will find no substantial
11 deviation and, in fact, that the Air Force have done just
12 what we wanted them to: build a defense strategy for the
13 21st Century by creating efficient core tanker bases and
14 utilizing the outstanding facilities and location of Grand
15 Forks for this mission.
16 North Dakota is proud to be a host for the Grand
17 Forks Air Force Base and hopes to continue this role for a
18 long time to come. Thank you.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, and now we
20 are pleased to have the Senator from North Dakota, Senator
21 Byron Dorgan.
22 SENATOR DORGAN: Madame Chairman, thank you very

Page 140

1 much. Mercifully, I suppose, for the commission that you are
2 nearing the end of a packed agenda yesterday and today and
3 you are no doubt on the edge of your chairs on every word
4 with respect to every base, because all of us who come here
5 believe that our military installation is the most important
6 installation for this country. We understand that and we
7 make the best cases we can.
8 But we in North Dakota are not here to make the
9 case on our behalf. We are here to make the case that has
10 been made to the commission by General Fogleman, by Admiral
11 Chiles, by Assistant Secretary Gotbaum and others, who say
12 that they made the determination that Grand Forks should be
13 one of three supertanker bases, and they believe in the
14 interests of this country, both strategically and for
15 military value purposes, that that flying mission of the
16 Grand Forks Air Force Base should remain.
17 All of these issues are put in the context of the
18 larger case. Let me give you a quote from Staff Sergeant
19 Merrifield, who is at Grand Forks. He is with the tanker
20 mission. He spent 300 days TDY last year from Grand Forks in
21 almost every theater -- SOUTHCOM and South America, Saudi
22 Arabia, England, Turkey. He says, "I am very proud to serve

Page 141

1 my country in all hotbed theaters where the action is. I am
2 proud to see the Grand Forks tail flash on airplanes all
3 around the world."
4 His point is that he is part of a unit, a core
5 tanker unit, one of three supertanker bases at the Grand
6 Forks Air Force Base, and they have moved all across the
7 world at the request of the Pentagon to do this country's
8 military business. Fortunately, we have never had to have a
9 live test of our nuclear war fighting capability, but General
10 Fogleman's recent white paper makes it crystal clear, I
11 think, to you and to us that Grand Forks would be a premiere
12 refueler for SIOP contingencies because he said, "It can ease
13 command and control issues and minimize turmoil when tanker
14 assets are transferred to the United States Strategic
15 Command."
16 Admiral Chiles, Commander in Chief of the U.S.
17 STRATCOM, stated in a letter to you that, "The core refueling
18 wing at the Grand Forks Air Force Base provides critical
19 support to strategic and contingency operations."
20 And General Rutherford, Commander in Chief of U.S.
21 TRANSCOM, made the same thing clear to you. "The wisdom of
22 establishing a refueling wing at Grand Forks was validated

Page 142

1 during the recent high priority operations, including Vigil
2 Warrior in Iraq and Support Hope in Rwanda."
3 We are very proud of this space, proud of its
4 mission, and proud of its contribution to this country. But
5 we don't, again, come to you as a Congressional delegation or
6 as a community or a state to say save this base because it's
7 in our state. We come to you and say that the Chief of Staff
8 of the Air Force, that the Defense Department itself, says
9 this base is strategically critical for this country's
10 military mission.
11 And that is why we believe that this commission
12 should make a decision to keep the flying wing at the Grand
13 Forks Air Force Base up, open, and operating and helping be
14 part of the defense of this country for the long-term future.
15 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I was
16 offering an amendment on the floor of the Senate a few
17 moments ago and then rushed as quickly as I could to the
18 Cannon Caucus Room to be there at 11:08. And when I
19 discovered you were not at the Cannon Caucus Room, which was
20 my error, I have set a new record in running from the Cannon
21 Building to the Hart Building only so that I would not be
22 late to present this vital testimony.

Page 143

1 And I hope that even as I perspire about the run I
2 have just made and perspire also about the decision you are
3 going to make in the coming days, that you will be guided in
4 that decision by the wisdom of the Chief of Staff of the Air
5 Force and so many others who viewed this mission at the Grand
6 Forks Air Force Base as critically important to the military
7 mission of our country.
8 Thank you very much.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, Senator,
10 and we are indeed pleased that you were able to make it and
11 present those fine remarks. And I might also say on behalf
12 of the chairman that we are also pleased that the North
13 Dakota delegation and the North Carolina delegation have both
14 100 percent made their five-minute limit. We are deeply
15 appreciative of that, and I know that the chairman, when he
16 returns, will be very happy to hear it.
17 We are also happy now to move on to the great State
18 of Ohio and recognize Senator John Glenn.
19 SENATOR GLENN: Thank you, Madame Chairman. Thank
20 you very much. And I just came down from upstairs so I
21 didn't have any problem getting here this morning. But I
22 don't envy you your task. You do have a tough task and

Page 144

1 everybody wants to defend what is in their state, of course.
2 The first issue I wanted to bring up this morning
3 relates to a 1993 recommendation by the commission which I
4 have questioned. It is a recommendation to privatize the
5 Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at NORC Air Force
6 Base in Heath, Ohio. The commission approved the
7 recommendation to close NORC in '93, but as that continued
8 the cost data became available and I asked GAO to take a look
9 at this whole thing. And it looks as though it may actually
10 cost the government taxpayer money, perhaps as much as $456
11 million over the next five years, instead of saving money.
12 Now, I think the GAO -- this is the only time that
13 GAO has done a study and recommended that a former decision
14 be reconsidered. And I would recommend that to you because
15 everything we have seen so far at least looks like it is
16 going to cost more than it will save if NORC is closed.
17 As it currently stands, the Air Force will receive
18 privatization proposals on June 17th. That is the deadline,
19 so right up on that. And the Air Force has already alerted
20 the commission that it may need to reevaluate what happens at
21 NORC, and all of our indications are that that should be
22 done. So I urge the commission to consider revisiting that

Page 145

1 '93 closure decision, particularly if those proposals
2 demonstrate that privatization will actually cost more than
3 current operations.
4 A second closure issue is the proposed closure of
5 Brooks Air Force Base and the realignment of its Armstrong
6 Laboratory Human Systems Center School of Aerospace Medicine
7 and Systems Acquisition School to Wright-Patt in Dayton. As
8 I understand it, the commission is considering an alternative
9 proposal under which these activities would be cantoned at
10 Brooks. In terms of military value, consolidation of these
11 activities at Wright-Patt takes advantage of the outstanding
12 aerospace research and development work already located there
13 while reducing overall Air Force infrastructure.
14 Further, the Air Force provided the commission with
15 its cost analysis on the cantonment proposal and found that
16 while the up-front costs, the up-front cost of base closure,
17 could be avoided through cantonment, movement of these
18 activities to Wright-Patt is more cost-effective than
19 cantonment because after a six-year payback period then there
20 are annual recurring savings in excess of $20 million per
21 year on into the future. So it appeared to me that that was
22 certainly the best way to go. These are Air Force figures,

Page 146

1 also, so they have made a good estimate of this.
2 Disapproving a recommendation merely to avoid up-front costs
3 of base closure seems to me to be at odds with the whole base
4 closure process and the purpose of it.
5 A third issue involves the proposed closure of the
6 Springfield Air National Guard Base and the groups, the
7 units, based there. Let me say first that a similar
8 recommendation was made in '93 but the Air Force reversed its
9 position before the commission when the costs of the move
10 were questioned. They have questioned those costs again this
11 year, questioned by the local community.
12 And according to the local community's cost data,
13 it would take 23 years before the Air Force would obtain a
14 return on its $30 million investment. That would be a $30
15 million investment essentially to walk away from the fully
16 modern taxpayer-purchased facilities at Springfield. Given
17 the past record on Springfield and the issues that have been
18 raised this year by the local community, I urge you to look
19 very carefully at the Air Force's figures on this.
20 Congressman Hobson, who is with us here this morning, will be
21 giving more detail on that.
22 And, finally, I urge the commission to reconsider

Page 147

1 its actions with respect to the Youngstown Air Reserve
2 Station. The commission added this facility to the closure
3 list along with several other C-130 reserve bases. Neither
4 the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of the Air Force
5 recommended closing Youngstown; rather, the Air Force
6 recognizes Youngstown's military value and plans to expand
7 the number of C-130 aircraft at Youngstown, making the 910th
8 Airlift Wing the largest C-130 wing in the Air Force Reserve.
9 The 910th also performs the aerial spray mission.
10 They are the only unit in the Air Force that has that as an
11 assigned mission, either Reserve or regular, the only unit
12 that performs a technically demanding mission and for which
13 unique maintenance facilities have been constructed and are
14 there at Youngstown now. It is an extremely modern facility.
15 Eighty-six percent of its buildings have been constructed or
16 upgraded in the last ten years.
17 So I would conclude my remarks by noting that the
18 costs associated with the closure argue against closure, I
19 believe. Youngstown has the lowest operating cost of the
20 bases under construction, would have among the highest
21 closure costs because more aircraft would have to be
22 relocated and the facilities and training associated with the

Page 148

1 aerial spray mission would have to be reduced elsewhere.
2 So thank you for your opportunity to appear before
3 the commission. I know I am running through these rapidly.
4 I am glad to see our chairman, my friend, Alan
5 Dixon, back in the chair there again this morning. I am
6 sorry you missed my brilliant expose, Alan, this morning
7 here, but we do -- I don't envy any of you your jobs on this
8 commission. I know it is a tough job. We hope you can
9 reconsider these here as I present them this morning. I had
10 a handout down here earlier to be given to each one of the
11 commissioners, if you wanted to review that.
12 Thank you very much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my good friend, the
14 distinguished senior senator from the great State of Ohio,
15 Senator Glenn, for his good remarks this morning and his
16 great service to his state and nation. We are delighted to
17 have Senator Mike Dewine here as well. Thank you for coming
18 this morning, Senator Dewine.
19 SENATOR DEWINE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank
20 you very much. I am very grateful for the opportunity to be
21 here today to discuss four specific issues facing the
22 commission.

Page 149

1 First is NORC. It has been recommended that the
2 NORC Air Force Base be privatized in place. It is our
3 understanding based on GAO report that this proposed
4 privatization would really not be cost-effective. The GAO
5 says privatizing NORC in place would actually cost more than
6 closing the base outright.
7 On June 17th, the Air Force expects to receive bids
8 on that privatization project and if indeed, as we are led to
9 believe, this project will be too expensive, I certainly
10 recommend that status quo be maintained. The only conclusion
11 we can draw from the analysis that has been made and what the
12 facts are is that NORC should, in fact, be kept open.
13 Let me turn second to Youngstown. A proposal has
14 been made to close the Youngstown Air Reserve Station. Our
15 summary of this would indicate that, really, it's a one-of-a-
16 kind project. It has a runway that has been paid for, a
17 bigger facility than its counterparts, and to shut down this
18 base would really incur costs that could not -- that would
19 not be incurred by closing any of the other five bases. The
20 additional costs of closing the Youngstown station will
21 really be in the millions of dollars. BRAC, we believe,
22 should reconsider this decision to shut down the Youngstown

Page 150

1 station.
2 Third, let me turn to Springfield. The proposal
3 has been made to relocate the 178th Air National Guard
4 Fighter Group from the Springfield Air National Guard Base in
5 Springfield to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Mr.
6 Chairman, the total cost of moving the 178th and closing the
7 Springfield base is 29.8 million. That is nearly $30
8 million. It will take the taxpayers at least 13 years, and
9 perhaps as long as 23 years, to recoup that investment. We
10 believe that the 30 million could certainly be spent more
11 wisely. Congressman Hobson, as Senator Glenn, has indicated,
12 will give you more details and statistics that we believe
13 demonstrate that even that, even that $30 million figure, is
14 flawed and that it will cost even more than that.
15 Fourth, let me turn to Wright-Patterson. The Air
16 Force has proposed moving most of the functions of the Brooks
17 Air Force Base in Texas to Wright-Patterson. The case for
18 keeping Brooks open is based on a plan that would divide up
19 the base so that parts of it can be kept running. It is
20 argued that this would avoid the cost of closing Brooks by
21 keeping part of the base open.
22 I don't think, though, that we should make any

Page 145

1 '93 closure decision, particularly if those proposals
2 demonstrate that privatization will actually cost more than
3 current operations.
4 A second closure issue is the proposed closure of
5 Brooks Air Force Base and the realignment of its Armstrong
6 Laboratory Human Systems Center School of Aerospace Medicine
7 and Systems Acquisition School to Wright-Patt in Dayton. As
8 I understand it, the commission is considering an alternative
9 proposal under which these activities would be cantoned at
10 Brooks. In terms of military value, consolidation of these
11 activities at Wright-Patt takes advantage of the outstanding
12 aerospace research and development work already located there
13 while reducing overall Air Force infrastructure.
14 Further, the Air Force provided the commission with
15 its cost analysis on the cantonment proposal and found that
16 while the up-front costs, the up-front cost of base closure,
17 could be avoided through cantonment, movement of these
18 activities to Wright-Patt is more cost-effective than
19 cantonment because after a six-year payback period then there
20 are annual recurring savings in excess of $20 million per
21 year on into the future. So it appeared to me that that was
22 certainly the best way to go. These are Air Force figures,

Page 146

1 also, so they have made a good estimate of this.
2 Disapproving a recommendation merely to avoid up-front costs
3 of base closure seems to me to be at odds with the whole base
4 closure process and the purpose of it.
5 A third issue involves the proposed closure of the
6 Springfield Air National Guard Base and the groups, the
7 units, based there. Let me say first that a similar
8 recommendation was made in '93 but the Air Force reversed its
9 position before the commission when the costs of the move
10 were questioned. They have questioned those costs again this
11 year, questioned by the local community.
12 And according to the local community's cost data,
13 it would take 23 years before the Air Force would obtain a
14 return on its $30 million investment. That would be a $30
15 million investment essentially to walk away from the fully
16 modern taxpayer-purchased facilities at Springfield. Given
17 the past record on Springfield and the issues that have been
18 raised this year by the local community, I urge you to look
19 very carefully at the Air Force's figures on this.
20 Congressman Hobson, who is with us here this morning, will be
21 giving more detail on that.
22 And, finally, I urge the commission to reconsider

Page 147

1 its actions with respect to the Youngstown Air Reserve
2 Station. The commission added this facility to the closure
3 list along with several other C-130 reserve bases. Neither
4 the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of the Air Force
5 recommended closing Youngstown; rather, the Air Force
6 recognizes Youngstown's military value and plans to expand
7 the number of C-130 aircraft at Youngstown, making the 910th
8 Airlift Wing the largest C-130 wing in the Air Force Reserve.
9 The 910th also performs the aerial spray mission.
10 They are the only unit in the Air Force that has that as an
11 assigned mission, either Reserve or regular, the only unit
12 that performs a technically demanding mission and for which
13 unique maintenance facilities have been constructed and are
14 there at Youngstown now. It is an extremely modern facility.
15 Eighty-six percent of its buildings have been constructed or
16 upgraded in the last ten years.
17 So I would conclude my remarks by noting that the
18 costs associated with the closure argue against closure, I
19 believe. Youngstown has the lowest operating cost of the
20 bases under construction, would have among the highest
21 closure costs because more aircraft would have to be
22 relocated and the facilities and training associated with the

Page 148

1 aerial spray mission would have to be reduced elsewhere.
2 So thank you for your opportunity to appear before
3 the commission. I know I am running through these rapidly.
4 I am glad to see our chairman, my friend, Alan
5 Dixon, back in the chair there again this morning. I am
6 sorry you missed my brilliant expose, Alan, this morning
7 here, but we do -- I don't envy any of you your jobs on this
8 commission. I know it is a tough job. We hope you can
9 reconsider these here as I present them this morning. I had
10 a handout down here earlier to be given to each one of the
11 commissioners, if you wanted to review that.
12 Thank you very much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my good friend, the
14 distinguished senior senator from the great State of Ohio,
15 Senator Glenn, for his good remarks this morning and his
16 great service to his state and nation. We are delighted to
17 have Senator Mike Dewine here as well. Thank you for coming
18 this morning, Senator Dewine.
19 SENATOR DEWINE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank
20 you very much. I am very grateful for the opportunity to be
21 here today to discuss four specific issues facing the
22 commission.

Page 149

1 First is NORC. It has been recommended that the
2 NORC Air Force Base be privatized in place. It is our
3 understanding based on GAO report that this proposed
4 privatization would really not be cost-effective. The GAO
5 says privatizing NORC in place would actually cost more than
6 closing the base outright.
7 On June 17th, the Air Force expects to receive bids
8 on that privatization project and if indeed, as we are led to
9 believe, this project will be too expensive, I certainly
10 recommend that status quo be maintained. The only conclusion
11 we can draw from the analysis that has been made and what the
12 facts are is that NORC should, in fact, be kept open.
13 Let me turn second to Youngstown. A proposal has
14 been made to close the Youngstown Air Reserve Station. Our
15 summary of this would indicate that, really, it's a one-of-a-
16 kind project. It has a runway that has been paid for, a
17 bigger facility than its counterparts, and to shut down this
18 base would really incur costs that could not -- that would
19 not be incurred by closing any of the other five bases. The
20 additional costs of closing the Youngstown station will
21 really be in the millions of dollars. BRAC, we believe,
22 should reconsider this decision to shut down the Youngstown

Page 150

1 station.
2 Third, let me turn to Springfield. The proposal
3 has been made to relocate the 178th Air National Guard
4 Fighter Group from the Springfield Air National Guard Base in
5 Springfield to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Mr.
6 Chairman, the total cost of moving the 178th and closing the
7 Springfield base is 29.8 million. That is nearly $30
8 million. It will take the taxpayers at least 13 years, and
9 perhaps as long as 23 years, to recoup that investment. We
10 believe that the 30 million could certainly be spent more
11 wisely. Congressman Hobson, as Senator Glenn, has indicated,
12 will give you more details and statistics that we believe
13 demonstrate that even that, even that $30 million figure, is
14 flawed and that it will cost even more than that.
15 Fourth, let me turn to Wright-Patterson. The Air
16 Force has proposed moving most of the functions of the Brooks
17 Air Force Base in Texas to Wright-Patterson. The case for
18 keeping Brooks open is based on a plan that would divide up
19 the base so that parts of it can be kept running. It is
20 argued that this would avoid the cost of closing Brooks by
21 keeping part of the base open.
22 I don't think, though, that we should make any

Page 151

1 mistake. This option represents savings only over the
2 extremely short term. The cost of operations at Wright-
3 Patterson is so much lower than at Brooks that the relocating
4 would pay for itself within just six years. And the Air
5 Force's own estimate named Wright-Patterson as the highest
6 rated research and development center and Brooks as the
7 lowest R & D center. If we can consolidate the functions of
8 the lowest rated facility into the highest rated facility and
9 make back the investment on that consolidation in just six
10 years, I believe that that is a pretty good outcome. That,
11 in fact, is the kind of outcome that certainly BRAC was
12 established to achieve.
13 I appreciate the opportunity to address members of
14 the commission. I don't envy your very, very tough task.
15 Following me, of course, will be some members of the Ohio
16 delegation from the House. Thank you very much, Mr.
17 Chairman.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Dewine, we thank you and
19 your distinguished colleague for a fine presentation on
20 behalf of the State of Ohio. We are delighted to have one of
21 your distinguished members from the House, Representative
22 Tony Hall, here.

Page 152

1 REPRESENTATIVE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
2 members of the commission. I want to thank you very much for
3 the opportunity to speak to you today. I am here to testify
4 in support of the Defense Department's recommendation to
5 close Brooks Air Force Base and move some of the functions to
6 Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, which is partially in my
7 district.
8 I want to leave you with three points: One, my
9 community of Dayton, Ohio, was hit very hard by the Base
10 Closure Commission in 1991 and '93; two, locating all the Air
11 Force human systems functions at Wright-Patterson will
12 benefit the Defense Department and will produce the greatest
13 military value; and, three, if the goal of this process is to
14 reduce excess capacity and consolidate activities, then
15 Brooks should be closed.
16 My first point is that my community has already
17 lost a large number of defense jobs. In the last four years
18 we lost about 10,000 government defense related jobs with the
19 closure of Gentille Air Force Station, the closure of The
20 Mound Defense Nuclear Production Facility, the loss of the
21 4950 Test Wing, and downsizing in the Air Force Materiel
22 Command. The number of jobs from Brooks is a fraction of the

Page 153

1 very deep losses my community has already suffered from
2 defense downsizing.
3 My second point is that combining the functions at
4 Brooks with Wright-Patterson is a move that offers the
5 greatest military value. By co-locating the human systems
6 activity now at Brooks with the aeronautical activities at
7 Wright-Patterson, we will create a complete system for the
8 research, development, and acquisition of manned air
9 vehicles. This approach offers enormous advantages for the
10 Defense Department. It is the most effective way of
11 integrating pilot and aircraft to create a total weapons
12 system.
13 I want to stress that Wright-Patterson and the
14 Dayton area are already home to a great deal of medical
15 research and teaching. It was, in fact, at Wright-Patterson
16 where Captain Harry G. Armstrong founded the first aerospace
17 medicine research unit, and since that time Wright-Patterson
18 continuously has been a major center of aerospace medical
19 research and conducts joint efforts with the Army, Navy,
20 NASA, and other federal agencies. Some of the human systems
21 activities now at Brooks were originally transferred from
22 Wright-Patterson in a time of expanding military, and now in

Page 154

1 a time of shrinking military those activities can be
2 transferred back to Wright-Patterson with little disruption
3 in mission.
4 There is also the potential for a powerful working
5 relationship between Wright-Patterson and Wright State
6 Medical School, which is immediately adjacent to the base.
7 Wright State is the nation's only civilian degree-granting
8 university for aerospace medicine. The Air Force continues
9 to emphasize the importance of the military value of this
10 move. As recently as last week, the Air Force provided the
11 commission a detailed point paper again underscoring the
12 military value, which is this point right here. That was
13 issued last week. And I would urge the members of the
14 commission to study this paper before making a decision.
15 My third point is that the purpose of this
16 commission is to reduce excess capacity, consolidate
17 functions, and eliminate overhead costs. Let us not confuse
18 the military value of Brooks with the military value of its
19 mission. The human systems activities that take place at
20 Brooks are very important, but they can be done at Wright-
21 Patterson. The military value of the physical facilities at
22 Brooks does not justify maintaining this expensive plant in

Page 155

1 the long term.
2 The Defense Department financial calculations
3 demonstrate conclusively that there are long-term cost
4 savings with closing Brooks. The Defense Department
5 recommendation satisfies all the criteria for this
6 commission: It will have a long-term increase in the
7 military value for the Department of Defense; it will produce
8 the greatest return on investment; and it satisfies the
9 impact criteria. In sum, this is a move that works for the
10 Defense Department and our nation's taxpayers and I would
11 urge you to accept the Defense Department's recommendation.
12 Thank you for the chance to be here, Mr. Chairman
13 and members. I appreciate it.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
15 Hall, for that excellent presentation that is most helpful to
16 us. We are delighted to have you, and we welcome
17 Representative David Hobson.
18 REPRESENTATIVE HOBSON: Mr. Chairman, members of
19 the commission, I would like to say I am delighted to be here
20 today but, as Commissioner Cox will recall, this is a little
21 deja vu for me and I am sorry that I have to come back.
22 But I have five minutes to convince you not to

Page 156

1 waste $30 million. My arguments are based solely on the
2 numbers. Although the community will survive, the numbers
3 are flawed and, frankly, this just isn't fair.
4 This decision results from a desire on the part of
5 the Air Force to fill a hole at Wright-Patterson Air Force
6 Base with pointed-nose airplanes. The numbers were backed
7 into in an attempt to prove this as a cost-effective move.
8 Just as in 1993, the numbers are flawed. They are based on
9 improper assumptions. Had the right assumptions been used in
10 the COBRA model, the base wouldn't even be on the list in the
11 first place. Even using the current flawed COBRA run, which
12 you see in red there which just arrived Friday afternoon,
13 June 9th, 1995, there is an 11-year return on investment,
14 24.6 million one-time cost, a 2.8 million annual savings.
15 The base shouldn't even be on the list.
16 Let me show you a few problems from the numbers and
17 why this should be investigated further. One, a major
18 dispute is manpower saving. AFMC and the Guard say 31 people
19 are needed and authorized at Wright-Patterson to accommodate
20 the move. Air Force headquarters says only 13 will be
21 allowed because they assume that the current regulation may
22 be changed sometime in the future, although no one knows

Page 157

1 when. Annual recurrent savings at Wright-Patterson are
2 reduced by $1 million if you take the assumption that was
3 there in 1993. This blows the Air Force's whole position on
4 the move. In '93 this wasn't an issue; however, in order to
5 make the numbers look bad for Springfield, the Air Force
6 makes this assumption -- in my opinion; cooks the books.
7 Number two, there are asbestos and lead paint in
8 the buildings to be provided at Wright-Patterson. No
9 contractor is going to go in and renovate around asbestos.
10 The liability is just too great. But that is the position
11 taken by Wright-Patterson. We believe that there is going to
12 be an estimated increase in military construction costs by $5
13 million due to the asbestos.
14 And let me give you really one that blows my mind.
15 The telephone bill currently at Springfield is $13,000, but
16 it is assumed to be, and this is the number that the Air
17 Force gave us, $82,020 at Wright-Patterson. This is
18 ridiculously stupid and part of why I question the numbers.
19 Number four, the Air Force refuses to admit that an
20 expanded dining hall is needed. Just wait. A military
21 construction request for more capacity will come down the
22 pike in a year or two after the move. This is just another

Page 158

1 one million in mil con costs.
2 Number five, in questioning these and other open or
3 disputed areas, the Air Force says don't worry, we'll take
4 care of it after the move. If you want to see how these
5 things are taken care of, go back and look at the General
6 Accounting Office study and, specifically, the move of the
7 445th Air Force Reserve Unit. Compare the lower assumed
8 costs versus the higher actual costs to the result from these
9 moves.
10 Springfield has always received more than a fair
11 hearing from the BRAC staff. I believe your analysts
12 understand the problem and how the numbers are being cooked
13 to put pointed-nose airplanes at
14 Wright-Patterson. Why waste $30 million plus and take, even
15 by Air Force flawed assumptions -- and we think it would be
16 much higher than 11 years, more as to what Senator Glenn and
17 Senator Dewine have testified to -- to change what is already
18 at Springfield?
19 We should not build a hole at Wright-Patterson in
20 this costly manner and waste taxpayers' dollars just because
21 they are available through the BRAC process. The Air Force
22 should bring back on Wright-Pat the tenants for whom their

Page 159

1 leasing space are based and use this space for that purpose.
2 Springfield should not be abandoned. It is a well-
3 functioning facility and needs nothing and has already a new
4 engine shop completed. Springfield should be allowed to
5 continue to do the cost-effective job it has been doing. Do
6 this by the numbers and I am confident, just as in '93, it
7 will be reversed.
8 I implore you to look at the numbers. It is
9 irresponsible to put a base on the list with false numbers
10 and continue to use false assumptions. Think about the
11 taxpayer and what is cost-effective, not what some general
12 would like to see on the flight line.
13 I am also submitting some material in support of
14 the material which has been testified to on the move from
15 other places into Wright-Patterson, but we have had great
16 difficulty getting the right numbers because people want to
17 see pointed-nose airplanes. And I don't blame them, but it
18 is just not cost-effective to do at Wright-Patterson in
19 comparison to the way they are operating in Springfield.
20 I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
22 Congressman Hobson, for your valuable contribution on behalf

Page 160

1 of the State of Ohio, and we are pleased to see your clean-up
2 man is here, Representative Jim Traficant from the great
3 State of Ohio.
4 REPRESENTATIVE TRAFICANT: Thank you, Chairman,
5 General Davis, members of the commission. I am glad to be
6 here with you again. I believe that you have heard the
7 salient points of my testimony. I would ask that my official
8 document here submitted be incorporated into the record.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And it will be in the record,
10 Congressman.
11 REPRESENTATIVE TRAFICANT: Fine. Thank you. And I
12 would just like to say several things. I know you have this
13 little library somewhere and there is some rumors that have
14 been persisting about our base. The airport used to be under
15 the control of the City of Youngstown. They have fallen on
16 hard times economically and there are those that say that the
17 City of Youngstown can't afford to keep that airport open and
18 the Air Force would have to pick up a big, huge cost in
19 maintaining that great infrastructure.
20 That is the furthest from the truth. We are able
21 to politically bring together all the components of those two
22 county areas and create a regional port authority. That port

Page 161

1 authority is now on solid ground. That airport in itself is
2 growing. The State of Ohio, through workings with myself and
3 others, have designated that airport as a future air cargo
4 international jet port. That is a tremendous facility.
5 There is no financial problems that bear on that airport
6 whatsoever as far as the Air Force is concerned. In fact,
7 for very small fees they have an unlimited use of one of the
8 finest infrastructures in the entire country, I am sure, as
9 General Davis can attest to.
10 Let me also say this: Because of the near
11 proximity of Cleveland and Pittsburgh, all those big planes
12 are landing in Cleveland and Pittsburgh taking away the
13 passenger service from our airport, which means that we have
14 an under-utilized commercial airport that is extremely open
15 and available for the complete unlimited use of the Air
16 Force.
17 With nearby Ravenna Arsenal and Lake Erie and with
18 the joint cooperation now of the Air Force Reserve and the
19 Coast Guard, there is oil spill abatement programs underway
20 and we are actively involved in that. So I would like to
21 state here that the financial aspects of that airport have
22 been completely mitigated and removed and there are no

Page 162

1 overlying factors there.
2 Let me say one other thing: You could take the
3 troops and you can move them; you can take the planes and you
4 can move them, but we have the aerial spray mission, the only
5 one of its kind for the entire Pentagon. We not only go
6 around the country and spray military bases, but FEMA in some
7 of their hurricane activities have called upon our unit, the
8 910th Aerial Spray Mission, to, in fact, go around the nation
9 for specific mitigation of some of these pesticide problems
10 and that comes from us.
11 And let me say this: The only building of its kind
12 in the world, state-of-the-art, is located at that base. The
13 only short filled runway in the Air Force Reserve located at
14 that base. There is not a wetland problem on that base and
15 there is not one environmental problem that down the road can
16 cause financial factor process engagement for the Pentagon.
17 Now, there are people in our community who are saying, look,
18 when the bombs were flying we made those bombs, we built the
19 helmets, we built the guns and the steel mills. The steel
20 industry is now gone. We have fallen on hard times. The
21 only double digit unemployment in the entire state.
22 But that isn't a reason to keep our base open. The

Page 163

1 reason to keep our base open, quite frankly, is the value
2 that exists there for the Pentagon. So I would just like to
3 say to you that hopefully when this process is all over you
4 all will come out there and pay us a visit.
5 But I would like the BRAC Commission to endorse the
6 expansion that is planned there by the Pentagon -- the
7 building and development of a regional air service facility
8 to service planes from around the nation -- because of that
9 good availability without traffic congestion that exists
10 there.
11 So there has been some talk about Congressional
12 add-ons. I don't apologize for them. I don't apologize for
13 any member that takes care of the Pentagon, first of all,
14 and, second of all, for taking a look at the issues that the
15 Pentagon experiences in their own district. I am proud of
16 that record. I will continue to support that record and
17 fight hard to make sure the procurement by the Pentagon, in
18 fact, does most of its activity in the states here.
19 So that is where I am. I would like my record
20 incorporated into the minutes. I want, when it is all over,
21 your endorsement of our expansion. That is unusual
22 testimony, I am sure, that you have had, but I know you have

Page 164

1 an important mission. I don't want to slight that mission.
2 I wish you the very best in doing what you can to keep our
3 military forces at a level that can protect our great nation
4 and, in fact, do it in a way that is cost-effective for our
5 taxpayers for that mutual marriage that is so necessary to
6 keep America free.
7 So we are very proud to have General Davis there.
8 I want to say that. And people are very impressed with the
9 fact of his knowledge of his mission and what we do there.
10 So I am very proud to have had the opportunity to
11 testify again before you and all those people who come down
12 here and want to punch everybody in the nose, I think, if you
13 would talk about closing it. That is how important that base
14 is, the fourth largest employer in our community but, in
15 fact, a very effective training facility, one of the best --
16 in fact, the model of its kind in all of America.
17 So, with that, I appreciate your goodwill in
18 accepting my testimony.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Traficant, and we thank the great State of Ohio and its
21 distinguished delegation for an outstanding contribution.
22 Now, ladies and gentlemen, the chair labored

Page 165

1 mightily earlier this morning and fell behind and fell
2 behind. And as we always see, we gave the job to a woman and
3 she did an outstanding job and Commissioner Rebecca Cox
4 straightened everybody out and now we have caught up.
5 And because of the good work of the women, we are
6 presently in a position where the next delegation testifies
7 at 12:04, the Oklahoma delegation. Now, we have called them
8 and told them if they can get here early we would like to
9 hear them. But in fairness to that delegation, Commissioner
10 Rebecca Cox and her excellent service have served to bring us
11 up to date and we are going to have a recess for a few
12 minutes till someone from Oklahoma arrives.
13 (A brief recess was taken.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chair will declare the
15 commission back in session. We are pleased to see our
16 friends from the Oklahoma delegation here. We have been with
17 them in the last several days at a visitation in their great
18 state, and we are honored and delighted to have the
19 distinguished senior senator from the great State of
20 Oklahoma, my old friend, Senator Don Nickles, here to lead
21 off for the Oklahoma delegation.
22 SENATOR NICKLES: Chairman Dixon, thank you very

Page 166

1 much. And to Commissioner Cornella and Commissioner Steele,
2 we appreciate your patience and endurance. We were delighted
3 to have all of you in Oklahoma last Wednesday. I had the
4 pleasure of speaking to you also in Fort Worth, as well as my
5 colleague, Senator Inhofe, and several of the Oklahoma
6 delegation. So we know that you have been more than
7 attentive. We know that this has been a 100 percent job for
8 you for the last several months and we compliment you for the
9 work that you have done and the work of your staff.
10 This may be repetitive for a couple of us because
11 we have talked to you now for, let's see, this will be the
12 third time within a week, but it nevertheless shows the
13 importance of the issue because you have a very, very
14 difficult job and I think you are on the right path.
15 I don't envy you for your task but I compliment you
16 for your diligence and I know that you look forward to the
17 conclusion of it. But I look forward to you doing a good job
18 and having the results of your work be something that will be
19 successful, both with the administration and with Congress,
20 and so I compliment you.
21 You have a difficult job in concerning the Oklahoma
22 bases because you are dealing with both the air logistics

Page 167

1 centers and the undergraduate pilot training bases. On the
2 ALCs, Air Force has made it very clear we have got excess
3 capacity, and you have a couple of options. You can downsize
4 all five or you can close one or two.
5 A couple years ago the Air Force said we ought to
6 close at least one. When I found out the capacity rates were
7 only working on an average about 50 percent capacity of all
8 five, that tells you we have a lot of excess capacity. My
9 background is in the business field, and in the business
10 field that would say that's really not the way to do it and
11 the real solution isn't just to downsize all of them. That's
12 not a very effective management.
13 And so my guess is that, ultimately, one or two are
14 going to have to be closed. Air Force recommended closing
15 one a couple of years ago. The Joint Cross Service Group for
16 depot maintenance recommended closing one or two. That was
17 this year. And the Air Force Base Closure Group Executive
18 Group recommended closing one or two. I think they are
19 probably right.
20 I feel somewhat comfortable in Tinker Air Force
21 Base because I think if you look and compare the five, we
22 come out on top in almost any scenario. We have the

Page 168

1 location, we have the two large runways, we have the large
2 maintenance facility, we do joint work with the Navy. And it
3 has worked very well.
4 We do work on time. I asked my staff to do an on-
5 time delivery comparison of Tinker versus Kelly on aircraft
6 and we were 91 percent on time. Kelly was only 10 percent.
7 There is a big difference there. And also on parts, the
8 parts were pretty close. We were 97 percent on time and
9 Kelly was 96 percent on time. On engines we were 99 percent
10 on time and Kelly was 93 percent on time. And also the
11 comparisons on aircraft where we were 91 percent and McLellan
12 was 80 percent.
13 So I submit those. Those, I think, have already
14 been given to you. But we do work on time. We do quality
15 work and Air Force people -- I know General Davis will tell
16 you -- want to have their work done at Tinker because they do
17 such quality work.
18 At Vance Air Force Base, likewise, I know that you
19 are going to have to close one pilot training base. Vance
20 should not be that one base. It is the least costly of any
21 of the bases. It saves money, and one of the purposes of
22 this commission is to try to save money.

Page 169

1 We have more airspace than any other pilot training
2 bases, and that airspace is closer to Vance. It is closer to
3 the air base. They don't have to fly. We don't have an
4 encroachment problem. We don't have a big city. We don't
5 have a city surrounding the base. We have the economy, we
6 have the community support.
7 If you close Vance, the economic impact would be
8 devastating. Enid, which some of you had the opportunity to
9 visit, is population of 45,000. Compare that to Lubbock.
10 It's a population of almost 200,000. There is a lot of
11 difference, so the economic impact would be much, much
12 greater in Enid than it would be in Vance.
13 We have the community support. We have a
14 scholarship program at Vance. And this didn't just start as
15 an effort to show our love and support of Vance Air Force
16 Base, but we pay -- the government pays 75 percent of the
17 cost of a pilot's extra education or tuition. We pay the
18 other 25 percent and we pay 50 percent for a spouse if they
19 wish to have continued education and 50 percent for their
20 dependents. That is already done so the community support is
21 very strong for both bases and I think it is certainly in the
22 best interest of Oklahoma, but also in the best interest of

Page 170

1 our country to keep both Vance and Tinker Air Force Base.
2 And I compliment the commission for doing an
3 outstanding job. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank the distinguished
5 senior senator from the great State of Oklahoma for doing a
6 good job and we are pleased to see his colleague and friend,
7 Senator Jim Inhofe here. Senator Inhofe, we are delighted to
8 have you, sir.
9 SENATOR INHOFE: Thank you very much. I suspect
10 you folks are just about as happy that this is coming to a
11 close as we are. I think we have all heard so many
12 presentations, seen so many charts, and it has to be
13 confusing. But I have to tell you and compliment all of you.
14 You have been out hands-on to the site and have been willing
15 to really take it seriously enough that you get beyond the
16 rhetoric and into the actual details of what we have, what
17 resources are out there.
18 And I think you have done a wonderful job but it's
19 coming very rapidly to a close. And you know a lot of this
20 would be redundant from some of our previous presentations,
21 but I can remember during the confirmation hearings that took
22 place right in this room -- it seems like several months ago,

Page 171

1 it was a few months ago -- and we talked about the criteria
2 that was going to be used by the commission. And I think we
3 came to the conclusion that the military recommendation
4 probably should be the first criteria that should be
5 considered. And so I think that is what I hope that we can
6 leave you with is to look and see how the military is -- what
7 they are recommending.
8 As far as Tinker is concerned, you know, I think
9 Senator Nickles stated it very well. Tinker stands alone in
10 two respects, anyway. One is in its facilities and the other
11 is in readiness, because we approach the readiness from two
12 fronts. We have the Air Force with its AWACS and the Navy
13 with the TACAMO. And I commented, I guess somewhat jokingly,
14 down in Fort Worth that our Navy and Air Force actually talk
15 to each other and like each other. And I don't think anyone
16 will question that we have been the model for inter-servicing
17 throughout the nation.
18 So I hope when you look at Tinker that you will
19 agree that the three areas where we are number one would be
20 in the facilities and the quality of the facilities, the
21 inter-servicing and then, of course, the greatest
22 contribution to readiness.

Page 172

1 Now, at Vance you have heard from Senator Nickles
2 and others the impact on the community, and certainly no one
3 could question that it has such tremendous impact on the
4 community, being in Oklahoma a relatively small community.
5 But also the contribution of the community too to Vance in
6 terms of land. You have seen the charts and the maps and all
7 of the contributions that have been made -- the educational
8 contributions. Down in Fort Worth I saw a banner of St.
9 Mary's Hospital. They were holding it up. Well, St. Mary's
10 Hospital has directly saved the Department of Defense $58,000
11 in the first six months of this year.
12 Don mentioned the airspace. I am a pilot. That is
13 what I was professionally. And I look down every time I go
14 across there and I see we have closer airspace, 24 low-level
15 routes that are much closer, within 50 nautical miles of
16 Vance. You can't say that about Columbus, you can't say that
17 about Reese, you can't say that about Laughland.
18 And so I think that we -- the conclusion is that we
19 can train cheaper and better, and that is what we are
20 supposed to be doing. But I would like to ask you to take it
21 out of the sense that you are listening today to -- I don't
22 know how many members of the House and of the Senate -- who

Page 173

1 are all prejudiced. You know, we all want to protect our own
2 bases.
3 So I would ask you to look at the professional
4 people who really don't have a horse in the race and the ones
5 that are looking at this through the objective criteria that
6 they are using to make analyses. One was the Air Force
7 analysis. The Air Force analysis came out with the
8 conclusion that in the case of Vance we can train better and
9 cheaper than the rest of them can.
10 In the case of the Joint Cross Services Group, they
11 came to the same conclusion: Vance trains better and trains
12 cheaper. The Air Education Training Command, the AETC, that
13 is General Facilio. I mean, you stop and realize he doesn't
14 do anything else for a living. His job is to make a
15 determination as to how we can train better and cheaper, and
16 he came to this conclusion.
17 So, lastly, I would suggest to you that I got on
18 the House Armed Services Committee and the House of
19 Representatives when I represented only Tulsa County. There
20 weren't any facilities there. Then I came over to the Senate
21 Armed Services Committee. I didn't have any axe to grind. I
22 was concerned about one thing, and that is what is happening

Page 174

1 to our military today. We are operating on a budget that
2 deeply concerns me and it is that much more important that we
3 get the very most out of the resources we have today.
4 So I would like to suggest to you that when you
5 look at Vance and you look at Tinker, that you can only come
6 to the conclusion as you listen not to the politicians but to
7 the experts who are trained in making these decisions, that
8 both Vance and Tinker should be not only saved but should be
9 expanded in the best national security interests of our
10 nation.
11 Thanks so much for all of your hard work.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much, Senator
13 Inhofe. We are indebted to you and your distinguished
14 colleague, Senator Nickles, for a fine presentation on behalf
15 of the folks in Oklahoma. And we are delighted to see
16 distinguished members of your House delegation here, and the
17 chair recognizes Representative Bill Brewster.
18 REPRESENTATIVE BREWSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 commissioners. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
20 before you today. I appreciate the time and effort each of
21 you has spent to bring this round of the BRAC process to a
22 close. I certainly do not envy your task.

Page 175

1 I am here with the Oklahoma colleagues to testify
2 in support of Tinker Air Force Base in the defense of our
3 country, as well as the important role Tinker plays in the
4 economy of Oklahoma. Tinker's past record speaks for itself.
5 Tinker has consistently been ranked as one of the Air Force
6 superior depots. This record has been achieved while working
7 on some of the Air Force's most complex planes, such as the
8 B-52, B-1, KC-135, and the maintenance of the B-2 bomber will
9 soon be underway at Tinker.
10 We in Oklahoma do not understand why a base like
11 Tinker, with its excellent record of performance, could even
12 be considered a target for downsizing. In fact, every entity
13 which has reviewed the situation except the Pentagon has
14 recommended the closure of one or more bases less efficient
15 than Tinker. Moreover, I am confident Tinker's capabilities
16 will keep it off any list the commission may propose.
17 We have now reached a point where the optimal
18 operating levels may be sacrificed if we continue personnel
19 reductions; however, increased savings could be achieved by
20 efficiently utilizing the facility, thereby reducing the
21 overhead expenses per person. By downsizing personnel levels
22 below efficient levels, more overhead costs are borne by the

Page 176

1 remaining work force.
2 Currently, it costs $60 per man/hour to operate
3 Tinker; however, if the base were operating at capacity the
4 cost would be reduced to $50 per man/hour. The increased
5 operating capacity could be achieved by reassigning work
6 currently being done at other facilities. Tinker has excess
7 capacity available to absorb a significant increase in
8 duties. Its potential for sizable growth will allow Tinker
9 to absorb new missions with minimal construction.
10 For example, Tinker once maintained approximately
11 350 B-52 bombers. The number has now dropped to around 100.
12 As a result of the lower number of B-52s, Tinker has
13 sufficient excess ramp space to absorb up to five million
14 man-hours of additional duties without additional
15 construction. The C-5 mission is representative of a mission
16 which Tinker could absorb with minimal additional
17 construction.
18 With the exception of the state government, Tinker
19 Air Force Base is the single largest employer in the State of
20 Oklahoma. Employees live in 37 of our state's 77 counties.
21 The positive economic impact on the State of Oklahoma by the
22 base is tremendous. Likewise, the loss of this employment

Page 177

1 source would be devastating. Tinker's positive impact is not
2 restricted to the Oklahoma City metro area or the State of
3 Oklahoma, but to the nation as a whole. Thank you, Mr.
4 Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
6 Congressman Brewster. We are delighted to have that fine
7 testimony. We recognize your colleague, Representative Frank
8 Lucas.
9 REPRESENTATIVE LUCAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
10 commissioners, for granting me the opportunity to visit with
11 you again on behalf of Vance Air Force in Enid, Oklahoma.
12 And thank you for your patience as you listen to testimony
13 you have heard again and again over the past weeks.
14 Vance is a necessary and integral part of the Air
15 Force's readiness efforts. It is a superior training
16 facility with a successful history and a bright future.
17 Community support for Vance is very strong, as some of you
18 witnessed at the base visit last Wednesday. An estimated
19 12,000 people attended the rally to welcome the commissioners
20 and cheer for Vance. In a town with a population of
21 approximately 40,000, that is a pretty impressive feat, I
22 think.

Page 178

1 Further evidence was the huge crowd of over 1,000
2 at the regional hearing in Fort Worth just this past
3 Saturday. Enid is at least a five-hour drive from Fort
4 Worth, longer, I am sure, for the 17 bus loads of folks who
5 came down for the hearing.
6 Vance is clearly the pride of Enid and the pride of
7 America. If you were to drive around Enid you would see huge
8 billboard signs on the way into town and at the entrances of
9 the base that sum up the Vance/Enid relationship as such.
10 The pride of Enid, the pride of America. And also you would
11 see signs in every retail store, on many vehicles, on many,
12 many tee shirts throughout the town that state Vance and
13 Enid, partners in the sky.
14 We in northwest Oklahoma obviously realize how
15 important the base is to our survival. Vance has been a
16 stable pillar of the community, especially during some of the
17 area's darkest days, such as the oil bust, farm crisis, and
18 the resulting loss of many small businesses in the area.
19 Enid works to make the Air Force feel welcome and
20 it is evident that they succeed. Many former pilots who
21 trained at Vance retire to the Enid area and make it their
22 permanent home. The morale of the student pilots at Vance is

Page 179

1 high. While touring the base last Wednesday, the
2 commissioners got an opportunity to talk to some of those
3 students and many told that Vance was their first choice.
4 They chose Vance because their buddies who had
5 trained there told them it was the best. They commented on
6 the education program available to them and their spouses by
7 the community of Enid. Most of the pilots we met that day
8 were furthering their education because of this program.
9 They were also pleased with the accessibility of housing in
10 Enid and believed it to be a great place to raise their
11 families. And, finally, even a couple stated that the bigger
12 cities might perhaps offer too many distractions. On paper,
13 Vance is equally impressive. If the reason for the base
14 closure process is to save money, then clearly Vance should
15 remain open. Being a contractor-operated base, it makes for
16 the most cost-effective UPT base, saving over $81,000 per
17 graduate over the command average. That totals more than $10
18 million this year alone.
19 The base has one of the best, if not the best,
20 training environments in the country. As a result, Vance has
21 trained some of the finest pilots in the Air Force. No one
22 in the Air Force trains as well, primarily because of the

Page 180

1 close and unencumbered Oklahoma airspace, which is the
2 largest of all the UPT bases, at 8,400 square miles. As a
3 result, Vance students get up to 15 percent more training
4 time than any other UPT base.
5 Perhaps most importantly, the hardworking people at
6 Vance make it stand out above the crowd. Throughout this
7 past year, my first year to represent this area, I have had
8 the privilege, I should say, of visiting Vance often and have
9 been impressed with every visit. The people take their jobs
10 seriously and they serve their country with dignity. You
11 will not find a stronger work ethic anywhere else in the
12 nation. Oklahomans today are direct descendants of the
13 pioneers who settled this vast, rough region of the heartland
14 only 100 years ago.
15 After visiting the base and after all of your
16 deliberations and analysis, I hope you will come to the same
17 conclusion I have: The Air Force made the right decision in
18 leaving Vance open. No substantial deviation from the Air
19 Force recommendation has been found. I thank the
20 commissioners again for your dedicated efforts.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I want to thank you,
22 Congressman Lucas, for that fine presentation. We appreciate

Page 181

1 your contribution on behalf of the great State of Oklahoma.
2 We are delighted to see Representative J.C. Watts here.
3 Congressman Watts.
4 REPRESENTATIVE WATTS: Good morning, and thank you,
5 Mr. Chairman and distinguished commissioners. Let me again,
6 by stating my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to
7 tell the Tinker story, as we have done several times in the
8 last couple months.
9 The Oklahoma Air Logistics Center will be the
10 centerpiece of my comments today, obviously, and in the past
11 two days lawmakers have come before you to state their case.
12 You have heard these messages before during on-site visits
13 and regional hearings. You have listened to success stories
14 and had a chance to witness firsthand the excellence that is
15 at work at these depots, bases, posts, and ports across this
16 great country.
17 We talk and you listen, and now the process is
18 concluding. It is the time for summary and a final
19 opportunity to recommend a course of action. You have heard
20 the men and women of the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center tell
21 their story. It is a story of pride, commitment to customer
22 satisfaction, and a willingness to cooperate with the

Page 182

1 changing profile of the American military industrial complex.
2 We have demonstrated an unmatched work ethic that
3 serves as the linchpin for Tinker's day-to-day activities,
4 which are integral to the military readiness of this great
5 country. Those contributions include fabricating parts to
6 keep our most sophisticated aircraft, like the B-2 bomber in
7 the mission ready status.
8 We have shown how the men and women of Tinker
9 perform a unique maintenance task on missiles such as the air
10 launch cruise missile, the short-range attack missile, the
11 Navy's Harpoon, or advanced cruise missile. Tinker has shown
12 their capable stewardship in managing a current year-end
13 industrial fund budget of almost $1 billion and supervising
14 the maintenance of more than 17,000 jet engines.
15 In this regard, the Department of Defense's own
16 depot maintenance operations indicators reports states that
17 during the period ending in the second quarter of fiscal year
18 1994, Tinker's average engine process days were greater than
19 one-third better than the competition. In addition, Tinker's
20 schedule indicator index for the period between April '93 and
21 February '94 was second best in Air Force Material Command.
22 We have shown that Tinker led the fleet in the area

Page 183

1 of technology innovation and partnering. Tinker's technology
2 advancement coalitions address a wide spectrum of
3 environmental issues. One such venture joins all Department
4 of Defense installations in Oklahoma as a coalition to cross-
5 feed information on compliance actions and improve the
6 partnership between the Environmental Protection Agency and
7 other federal agencies.
8 Further, Tinker blazes a trail in alternative fuel
9 use by adapting some 551 vehicles to run on propane,
10 compressed natural gas, and electric battery power. Nearly
11 300 fleet vehicles have been converted to dual fuel clean
12 natural gas, giving Tinker the distinction of having one of
13 the largest dual fuel armada in the nation.
14 In summary, you saw pride, commitment to customer
15 satisfaction, and a willingness to cooperate with the
16 changing profile of the American military industrial complex.
17 That being the case, let me close with the recommended course
18 of action.
19 I have confidence in the commission's objectivity.
20 I know you will be making some of the most difficult
21 decisions since the BRAC process began. While those
22 decisions will not be easy, they must be made. I know that

Page 184

1 you will honor the data that is put before you and not allow
2 politics to play an overwhelming role.
3 The American military industrial complex is
4 changing. This change is forcing people to disrupt their
5 professional lives, the lives of the families, and the lives
6 of the communities in which they live. The duty owed to the
7 citizens of this country is to make that change as rational a
8 decision as possible and avoid political correctness.
9 The people have told their story. The politicians
10 have told their story. Now let demonstrated performance and
11 proven statistics tell their story. I am confident the data
12 representing Tinker Air Force Base and, more specifically,
13 the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center, tell the story of a work
14 force committed to pride, customer satisfaction, and a
15 willingness to pursue excellence at every turn.
16 Mr. Chairman and honorable commissioners, I thank
17 you for your listening ear.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Congressman Watts, we
19 certainly thank you and we thank the entire Oklahoma
20 delegation, which gets the accolades of the commission for
21 giving their presentations in every individual case within
22 the five minutes allotted to their eternal credit. We are

Page 185

1 grateful. Ever since Commissioner Rebecca Cox took over,
2 things have immeasurably improved and we are indebted to her
3 We thank the great State of Oklahoma.
4 The only thing I could object to is Commissioner
5 Cox has done such a fine job that the chairman is obligated
6 to declare another recess until we can find some more people
7 to come over here. We are running now a little ahead of
8 schedule, briefly. May I say to my friends in the Congress
9 in both houses, please do not interpret this to mean we
10 encourage you to exceed your five minutes. We thank the
11 Oklahoma delegation once again for their 100 percent
12 performance.
13 (A brief recess was taken.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chair is delighted to see
15 Congressman Ernest Istook here and we are pleased to have him
16 be the clean-up man for the Oklahoma delegation, which has
17 done extremely well and will now do even better.
18 Congressman Istook.
19 REPRESENTATIVE ISTOOK: Thank you, Chairman Dixon.
20 I appreciate the opportunity. I didn't realize with the time
21 change that I might be clean-up, but I will accept whatever
22 position in the batting order is available.

Page 186

1 As the commission well knows, I am here to testify
2 on behalf of Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. Tinker
3 is one of five air logistics centers. From my perspective,
4 not only as a person who has been very, or tried to be very
5 tight-fisted with the taxpayers' dollar, but also as a member
6 of the Appropriations Committee and a member of the Military
7 Construction Subcommittee, I am very sensitive to the
8 interest in changing the current structure of the air
9 logistics centers. And I realize that this commission seeks
10 to honor its oath and its obligations to take an objective
11 look at what is the right size, what is the proper size, to
12 be able to fulfill the military mission to meet the needs of
13 our national security, and yet have the most economical
14 circumstances for the taxpayer.
15 Now, there is only two viable ways to squeeze the
16 most bang for the buck out of our shrinking defense budget to
17 make the most of what you've got and look for the synergy
18 that you can through things such as inter-servicing. If you
19 maximize the use of existing military facilities, and I know
20 you have heard testimony regarding what are the needs when it
21 comes to the logistics centers of the Air Force, the needs
22 are to find if you can locate things in a smaller number of

Page 187

1 locations and not only have overall savings but put them into
2 facilities that are most cost-effective, I believe that
3 Tinker Air Force Base satisfies those objectives.
4 It certainly has the flexibility. I think you have
5 received prior testimony that Tinker, for example, could
6 maintain all of the engines in the Air Force, that only what
7 are comparatively minor modifications are necessary to be
8 able to house all of the aircrafts for servicing purposes,
9 such as the C-5, I believe, was mentioned in particular. The
10 main servicing building at Tinker, which is Building 3001, is
11 flexible in the types of configurations in which it can be
12 utilized.
13 I think you have probably seen this chart
14 previously, which shows the ability to simultaneously be
15 doing air frame work on larger aircraft and smaller aircraft
16 and it is capable of being reconfigured in many different
17 ways. With depots, these are very expensive facilities.
18 Just in the last couple of years, the military construction
19 budget in FY '94 for air logistics centers was $120 million
20 when spread over five facilities; for FY '95, $70 million
21 when spread over five facilities. FY '96, of course, is
22 still unknown.

Page 188

1 But if you have the opportunity to minimize the
2 cost of military construction as well as the cost of military
3 maintenance and performing the mission, I believe that Tinker
4 offers the cost advantages. It was pointed out in the
5 hearing Saturday that one of the comparative figures from one
6 of the other ALCs evidently misstated the cost advantage that
7 actually exists per hour for Tinker personnel being able to
8 perform the services for $11 per man/hour less than the
9 comparable ALC in that.
10 I agree wholeheartedly with the former chairman of
11 this commission, Jim Courter, where he said that if we
12 maintain excess capacity it only takes resources away from
13 the ability to modernize, to train, to procure, and to take
14 care of the quality of life for our current servicemen.
15 That is why I take seriously the interest that this
16 commission has in decreasing the number of ALCs and believe
17 that Tinker Air Force Base not only has proven by its
18 performance, by its on-time delivery of engines of avionics
19 and of air frames; has proven that it operates more
20 efficiently and effectively and more flexibly than other ALCs
21 and has the existing facilities that can absorb additional
22 work: that can absorb transfers of missions, which is one of

Page 189

1 your criteria in considering realignment, a very important
2 one.
3 If Tinker can do more for less than is being done
4 at the other ALCs, I believe it should be considered as a
5 candidate not for closing but for receiving missions that may
6 come from ALCs that are closed because they are not as
7 efficient, they are not as effective, they do not deliver on
8 time, they do not have the history of inter-servicing such as
9 Tinker has established with Navy aircraft, air frames, and
10 engines.
11 I thank you for your time and I appreciate it.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Congressman
13 Istook, for your fine contribution. Let me say that I see
14 several members of the Pennsylvania delegation, in their
15 usual interest to serve their constituency, arriving a little
16 early. We are grateful.
17 As soon as a couple more come so that the chair
18 sees some continuity, in the next couple of minutes, we will
19 start on the Pennsylvania delegation. You are slated to
20 begin at 12:37. You are here early. I see several more
21 coming. I appreciate it. In about a minute or two we will
22 take up Pennsylvania. We will be right with you and I thank

Page 190

1 you very much.
2 (A brief recess was taken.)
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, ladies and gentlemen, we're
4 indebted to the distinguished members of the Pennsylvania
5 delegation for coming here early. I've noted the order of
6 their arrival. There are four of them here. We appreciate
7 the fact that Congressman Holden, Congressman Gekas,
8 Congressman McDade, and Congressman Fox would all be here.
9 We're going to start a little early, because
10 they're on the ball, and they got here early. And my
11 understanding is that in the Senate right now, there's an
12 amendment about to be pending in which a member of your
13 delegation will be required to be working the well, which I
14 understand as a member of the Senate for a few years.
15 And so we're going to, if it's all right with your
16 delegation, start with your House members and let the
17 Senators come in as they're able to come in. And we'll
18 recognize the four of you in the order in which you arrived.
19 And the Commission is indebted to you for accommodating us
20 and the country by being so prompt.
21 And we're going to hear first from Representative
22 Tim Holden. And Congressman Holden, we thank you for being

Page 191

1 here, sir.
2 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3 And good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and commissioner. I would
4 like to thank you for this opportunity to testify before you
5 on matters relating to Fort Indiantown Gap and to Tobyhanna
6 Army Depot.
7 I would first like to discuss Fort Indiantown Gap.
8 As you are probably aware, the Army's financial analysis of
9 the savings was based on bad data and flawed analysis,
10 resulting in a serious overestimation of the projected
11 savings. The Army, using more accurate data from the Fort
12 Indiantown Gap Coalition, revised its annual projected
13 savings down from 23 million to $6.7 million, admittedly a 75
14 percent error and correction.
15 Using actual expenditure figures for the
16 elimination of on-hand civilians as opposed to those
17 authorized but not funded, the actual repair and maintenance
18 data, the annual cost savings is only $2.3 million. The
19 Army's final $6.7 million annual savings is further
20 undermined in that they did not include all the costs in
21 their analysis, and only the cost of moving active component
22 units and functions were considered.

Page 192

1 Their ignoring the cost of moving the U.S. Army
2 Reserve equipment concentration site to Fort Dix and the cost
3 to move the Pennsylvania Guard's equipment site currently
4 located at Fort Pickett, Virginia, to another site is a
5 serious mistake.
6 Significantly, the Army has seriously
7 underestimated the Gap in military value in a number of other
8 ways. The Army clearly did not fully understand the
9 complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to
10 the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In fact, the other
11 services were not even questioned as to their training
12 requirements at Fort Indiantown Gap.
13 The Marine Corps Reserves, the Air Force, and the
14 Navy all train at the installation and on the bombing and
15 staffing range, a national asset which is nearly impossible
16 to replace. Not included was the Northern training area at
17 Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square
18 miles used for Army aviation training.
19 Tank qualification ranges, Tank Table 8, were not
20 considered in the Army's analysis of the military value. The
21 Army wants to shift training to Fort Dix and AP Hill, neither
22 of which can support tank qualification gunnery. The Army

Page 193

1 did not recognize the number and types of Reserve component
2 schools, the Reserve component units, and maintenance
3 activities which are assigned to the Gap.
4 None of the seven schools, design Reserve component
5 units, and the aviation and ground maintenance activities are
6 scheduled to leave the Gap upon closure. The active Army is
7 attempting to pass the cost of running the infrastructure of
8 the post to the state. Thereby, the state would be in the
9 business of subsidizing the training of federal troops, a
10 responsibility which clearly should remain with the federal
11 government.
12 The Army's analysis determined Reserve component
13 annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in
14 that its results are based on a 12-month availability of
15 Reserve component units and that the proposed alternative
16 training sites are not able to accommodate the additional
17 training load.
18 This impact of an increased training load on the
19 alternative training sites was not part of the Army's
20 analysis. The affected installations were not consulted.
21 Representatives from Fort Drumm have told Fort Indiantown Gap
22 before the Fort Indiantown Gap Coalition, number one, that

Page 194

1 they were already saturated for annual training, and number
2 two, the increased training load will adversely affect range
3 and training facility maintenance and increase existing
4 environmental problems in the training areas.
5 Two of the proposed alternative training sites are
6 unsuitable for the required kind of training. The Army
7 erred, in that proposed sites cannot meet all existing
8 training requirements of the units which currently train at
9 the Gap.
10 Given the totality of these errors and omissions,
11 it is clear that the Army substantially deviated from the DOD
12 selection criteria, and as a result of its higher than
13 estimated military value to all the Department of Defense,
14 Fort Indiantown Gap should be removed from the closure list.
15 Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly turn your
16 attention to the Tobyhanna Army Depot. I urge you and the
17 Commission members to accept the recommendation of the
18 Secretary of Defense and keep Tobyhanna open, because it is
19 an outstanding facility. Tobyhanna offers the highest
20 military value and is very cost-effective. Tobyhanna is a
21 truly valuable military asset to the Department of Defense
22 which should be retained.

Page 195

1 Tobyhanna is a great bargain for the taxpayers, and
2 its modern facilities provide great potential for
3 interservicing agreements. The state-of-the-art facilities
4 and highly skilled workforce at Tobyhanna provide an
5 outstanding opportunity for the communications and
6 electronics work for other services to be consolidated as
7 part of interservicing agreements.
8 In today's modern, digitized battlefield, the high
9 tech facilities at Tobyhanna are critical to our national
10 security. Pennsylvanians have always answered the call to
11 duty, but the proposed cuts in BRAC 1995 would have an unfair
12 and drastic effect on the Commonwealth.
13 I deeply appreciate your consideration in this
14 matter and ask that you remove Fort Indiantown Gap and
15 Tobyhanna from the BRAC list. Thank you very much,
16 commissioners.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
18 Holden.
19 And we will now call upon your distinguished
20 colleague, Representative George Gekas.
21 REPRESENTATIVE GEKAS: I thank you. To the
22 chairman and to the members of the Commission, we bring you

Page 196

1 greetings from Lebanon Valley, Pennsylvania, the heart of
2 Central Pennsylvania. And Indiantown Gap is the heart of the
3 heart of Central Pennsylvania.
4 The written statement that I wish to submit to the
5 Commission, with your consent, contains the fact sheet that
6 replicates what Representative Holden was able to convey to
7 you. And the numbers are adequately presented in the record
8 already in the previous functions that brought forth the
9 story of Indiantown Gap.
10 What I would like to concentrate on with the
11 Commission, if it please the Commission, is as follows: When
12 last the BRAC considered Indiantown Gap, it was the Pentagon
13 which urged the Commission, along with the advocates of
14 maintaining Indiantown Gap, the Pentagon itself who pressed
15 for retention of the Indiantown Gap facility; that is, your
16 predecessor in the Commission was listing it as a possible
17 closure or realignment.
18 But the Pentagon felt that the military value and
19 the investment that they had thus far up to that juncture
20 made justified its being removed from the BRAC consideration.
21 Now, we have a reversal of form, as it were. And I need to
22 focus the attention of the Commission on the rationale for

Page 197

1 that change, that 360 turnaround in the Pentagon and in the
2 BRAC considerations.
3 If, indeed, the Pentagon and BRAC, your
4 predecessors, already had found that Indiantown Gap should
5 remain open, then they found that the economic impact of
6 closure would be adverse to the community, which we all would
7 know. That's a matter of fact. And secondly, more
8 importantly, the military value required that it remain in
9 its present state.
10 Now, what has happened since then? Not only did
11 the Pentagon endorse its remaining in place, that Indiantown
12 Gap remain in place with its function, but also poured
13 additional dollars into it to modernize certain facilities
14 and to make the training that Indiantown Gap has historically
15 been performing even more feasible and more valuable, more
16 worthwhile, to the Pentagon itself.
17 And so we have now the anomaly of a Pentagon
18 endorsement in the last BRAC round, a Pentagon increased and
19 a Congressionally increased investment in Indiantown Gap, an
20 upgrading of its functions, its training capacities. And
21 then, we have Desert Storm data to show that immediate
22 mobilization was a factor that was commented on by every

Page 198

1 person of military strength in the whole nation as being a
2 remarkable feat for Indiantown Gap or any mobilization point.
3 And now, we have the BRAC Commission considering
4 closing the new investment made in Indiantown Gap. That has
5 to be taken into consideration by the Commission. It would
6 be like throwing bad dollars after good dollars. We have
7 heard that trite expression thousands of times, but it
8 pertains here.
9 Why increase the tank artillery range capacity of
10 Indiantown Gap and then close it down? Why invest more money
11 and then determine, "Well, we'll realign it or close it down
12 altogether"? These are the kinds of considerations that go
13 beyond just the fact sheets which we present to you but go
14 onto questions of common sense, application of the value in
15 Indiantown Gap.
16 I want to close with two anecdotes. A high Cabinet
17 official in a previous Administration, a resident of Virginia
18 who himself served in the Reserves of that state, commented
19 to me after he heard about it. He said, "How are they going
20 to close Indiantown Gap?"
21 This was a member of a previous Cabinet in a
22 previous Administration. "That's where I trained," he told

Page 199

1 me, as a Reserve, "and there was no other place for us in
2 Virginia," he felt, or perhaps some regions of Virginia, "to
3 go for this type of training except Indiantown Gap. Anything
4 else would be cost-defective," if that's a phrase. I'll
5 incorporate it into my testimony, coin a new phrase, "cost-
6 defective."
7 And so I was pleased to hear that, because that's
8 our contention. And this was from an out-of-state, other
9 state resident who served in the Reserves and who trained in
10 Indiantown Gap.
11 Second anecdote. Right after Desert Storm had been
12 completed successfully, on a chance stop at the Chalet
13 Restaurant in Dillsburg, also in Central Pennsylvania, I
14 happened to see sitting in a booth a familiar face. And I
15 went down to join him for a cup of coffee. It was General
16 Gus Pagonas, who was the officer in charge of all the
17 logistics required in Desert Storm.
18 And I sat down with him and asked him just on a
19 casual basis how would he evaluate the role of New Cumberland
20 Army Depot, which is in Central Pennsylvania, and Indiantown
21 Gap and Mechanicsburg Naval Depot in what happened so
22 successfully in Desert Storm. He was quick to tell me that

Page 200

1 the mobilization that took place in Indiantown Gap and the
2 logistics capacity of New Cumberland were key measures in the
3 successful exercise of Desert Storm.
4 That was very important to me, because then what he
5 had told me justified the additional funding that the
6 Pentagon and the Congress poured into Indiantown Gap
7 following Desert Storm for an update and modernization and
8 fulfillment of the capacity of Indiantown Gap. That was very
9 important to me.
10 I speak for, of course, on a parochial, selfish,
11 political basis, many would ascribe my testimony as being.
12 And I accept that, because I want Indiantown Gap to be saved.
13 But what I've tried to outline here is objective data, the
14 Pentagon's opinion in the last BRAC, the BRAC's last BRAC
15 opinion, the gentleman from Virginia who served in a Cabinet
16 of a previous Administration, and the general that was in
17 charge of all the Indiantown Gap and other facilities in the
18 country were able to do during Desert Storm.
19 This is the gist of my testimony to you, and I
20 would urge you to review the record of your predecessor BRAC
21 as to the value of Indiantown Gap.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Gekas.

Page 201

1 We're delighted to have you here, and we're pleased to have
2 my old friend, Congressman Joe McDade.
3 Representative McDade.
4 REPRESENTATIVE McDADE: Mr. Chairman, members of
5 the Commission, thank you once again for the privilege of
6 having the opportunity to speak to you again on behalf of
7 what I consider to be the best depot in the entire DOD
8 system, Tobyhanna Army Depot.
9 Let me say that I know that you've had thousands of
10 miles and thousands of hours of information presented to you,
11 and I'm going to try to be brief and certainly not present to
12 you any more slides today or charts. I know you've probably
13 seen the ultimate in every slide possible.
14 Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I did bring a
15 piece of hardware. It's a little, tiny radio. It weighs
16 about two pounds. It's designed to operate for about 15
17 hours on a single battery. It is called a PRC-111 in the
18 jargon of the military, and it is maintained, enhanced, and
19 repaired at the Tobyhanna Army Depot.
20 There's something else about it I want you to know,
21 too. This is the kind of survival radio that was used by
22 Scott O'Grady to be recovered in conjunction with all the

Page 202

1 rest of our forces in Bosnia.
2 Tobyhanna does this for everybody in the military,
3 and it indicates the unique nature of their interservicing
4 capabilities and, in my opinion, as well, the requirement
5 that we have absolutely well-maintained equipment if our
6 youngsters are to survive. That's the kind of radio that we
7 see maintained at Tobyhanna, enhanced at Tobyhanna, kept
8 ready there so that it can help our youngsters to get on
9 back.
10 I want to say that I know that you've had enormous
11 data presented to you and mountains of briefing papers and
12 point papers. I only want you to keep in mind, if I might
13 ask you to, as you come to your conclusion just a couple of
14 points about the Tobyhanna Army Depot that I think really cut
15 to the core, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, and
16 something that we all have to do as we try to make decisions
17 in a committee environment, where we get an awful lot of
18 material presented to us.
19 What are those salient points? First, we need to
20 realize that Tobyhanna Army Depot is the single largest
21 communications electronics depot in the entire Department of
22 Defense. It is a single commodity, dedicated facility used

Page 203

1 by the Department with the largest single concentration in
2 that one depot on this one single commodity.
3 It is also, Mr. Chairman and members of the
4 Commission, the lowest cost, most productive by DOD standards
5 GCE facility in the entire system. Now, we can do a lot and
6 you've heard a lot about rates here and there, but I want to
7 give you two rates, both of which are published DOD rates.
8 One is the Air Force commodity rate for electronics at
9 Sacramento ALC. And the rate per hour in that particular
10 depot is $88.35.
11 For the same work at Tobyhanna Army Depot, the rate
12 published by the Army Depot Systems is $55.95, a savings of
13 $30 an hour for work performed on similar work, identical
14 work at Tobyhanna.
15 And all of you are faced with this enormous problem
16 of figuring out how to deal with the shortages that confront
17 not just our military; but everybody in the country has to
18 look at that, because any dollar you spend that has that kind
19 of a wage rate differential at Tobyhanna indicates that you
20 can get the job done much less costly and, indeed, enhance
21 readiness by making these scarce dollars available at other
22 places.

Page 204

1 I want to indicate, too, that in the Commission's
2 decision last time to eliminate the Sacramento Army Depot,
3 Tobyhanna was permitted to compete against McClellan Air
4 Force Base on five occasions. Head to head, as you mandated
5 in competition, four out of five of those competitions were
6 won on bid rate packages by Tobyhanna. They were lower, they
7 were of equal quality, they did the work better. They
8 deserve to be rewarded for that, Mr. Chairman.
9 So I submit to you that the only logical place that
10 we can look at is Tobyhanna because of that wage rate,
11 because of its efficiency, and because it has the capacity.
12 If we were to say today, "What is the depot in the United
13 States of America that can expand in ground control
14 communications electronics and make these type survival
15 radios with efficiency and cost efficiency and material
16 efficiency?" the resounding answer is, "Tobyhanna Army
17 Depot."
18 It is the only depot that could accept additional
19 work without one cent of military construction dollars
20 required. There would be, of course, some minor facilitation
21 dollars, but that's it. I submit to the Commission -- and
22 you've heard it many times, and I know you know it's

Page 205

1 accurate -- Tobyhanna is the best GCE depot in the system.
2 We need to keep the best for our country and for
3 the Scott O'Gradys who might have to use its resources later
4 on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission.
5 Thank you very much.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you for an excellent
7 presentation. We appreciate it very much. Representative
8 Joe McDade.
9 Our next presentation will be by Congressman Jon
10 Fox of the Pennsylvania delegation. Representative Fox,
11 we're delighted to have you. My wife's maiden name was Fox,
12 so you have a gentle audience.
13 REPRESENTATIVE FOX: I hope you'll be thinking of
14 your wife as you decide for Pennsylvania affirmatively on all
15 of our requests. From one Fox to another, I thank you very
16 much for her help. I hope she'll talk to you after hours
17 like I'm talking to you during hours.
18 Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, thank
19 you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I also
20 join the expressions of Colonel Burton, who led the rescue
21 mission for Scott O'Grady. He's from my district, and he
22 joins me in the spirit of these remarks.

Page 206

1 As a new member of Congress, I certainly appreciate
2 the importance of your mission of cost-cutting and
3 consolidation, and I salute you for your efforts to preserve
4 our national defense by streamlining and reducing
5 inefficiencies.
6 And while I do believe that we all must share in
7 the burden of reducing the size and cost of the federal
8 government, I must emphasize the tremendous impact of base
9 closures and realignments on Philadelphia and on Pennsylvania
10 as a whole. Pennsylvania had 45,435 total defense personnel
11 as of September 30, 1994; as a result of action by the '88,
12 '91, and '93 Defense Base Closure and Realignment
13 Commissions, Pennsylvania lost 13,305 of those positions.
14 Including the 1995 Department of Defense
15 recommendations, Pennsylvania will have lost 16,600 jobs.
16 This is a 36.6 percent cut in defense personnel, higher than
17 any other state in the Union. Moreover, Philadelphia
18 closures account for more than 75 percent of Pennsylvania job
19 losses.
20 Mr. Chairman and fellow commissioners, Pennsylvania
21 has given its fair share towards accomplishing our goal. I
22 would like to take this opportunity to share my thoughts with

Page 207

1 you concerning four specific issues before the Commission,
2 the Navy facilities in Warminster, Pennsylvania; the defense
3 industrial supply center in Philadelphia; realignment and
4 consolidation affecting Naval Surface Warfare Center in
5 Philadelphia; and the Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.
6 These issues are of great importance to me and our
7 colleagues here in Pennsylvania and the citizens of
8 Montgomery County who I'm privileged to represent.
9 First, I would like to urge the Commission to
10 closely examine the options for the naval air warfare center
11 in Warminster, Pennsylvania. I believe that we must do
12 everything possible to ensure the success of reuse efforts
13 and to protect the regional economy.
14 Moreover, I would like to bring to your attention
15 the value of the Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance
16 Center, the RDT&E divisions detachment in Warminster. As you
17 know, the Navy has erroneously proposed that the functions of
18 this detachment be relocated to the Naval command in San
19 Diego and the Naval Oceanographic Office in St. Louis.
20 It should be noted that the Philadelphia detachment
21 is of great military value to both the Navy and joint forces
22 programs. The proposed transfer would have an extremely

Page 208

1 negative effect on the detachment's core capability to
2 continue to support these programs.
3 Moreover, the cost assumptions for the move do not
4 include personnel and equipment transfer costs and do not
5 consider the detachment's locally employed outsourced
6 technical support. We are concerned that the Department did
7 not investigate the possibility of relocating locally.
8 Secondly, as I emphasized in my letter to you of
9 April 14th, I strongly support the defense industrial supply
10 center in Philadelphia. As you know, the Defense Logistics
11 Agency has recommended that DISC be disestablished. Although
12 the DLA claimed that this action will eliminate 385 direct
13 jobs, I understand that the jobs of more than 1,800 other
14 employees at DISC would be at risk because the current
15 employees would have no right of placement or transfer
16 function entitlement at any job within the DLA's inventory
17 control point.
18 In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overruled the
19 Department of Defense's recommendation to close DISC. This
20 facility is still crucial to military readiness, and I urge
21 you to uphold the decision of the '93 Commission.
22 The workforce at DISC has been recognized as a

Page 209

1 model of efficiency. DISC has the highest proportion of
2 military requisitions and still maintains the highest level
3 of support of all hardware centers. In addition, DISC has
4 the lowest number of below goal systems and consistently
5 provides better availability to weapons systems items than
6 any other ICPs.
7 Because DISC is housed along with a Navy weapons
8 management ICP and a weapons engineering facility, a talented
9 pool of experienced logistics personnel has developed. As a
10 result, DISC and the Aviation Supply Office have developed a
11 strong working relationship that promotes cooperation and
12 productivity. There is no rationale for choosing to
13 eliminate DISC among the four Defense Logistics Agencies.
14 Of all four ICPs, DISC manages 35 percent of all
15 weapons systems hardware and processes 40 percent of all
16 military customer requisitions. In spite of these facts,
17 Defense Logistics Agency recommended moving DISC's weapons
18 coded workload to the general supply center, which currently
19 manages the least amount of weapons coded workload of the
20 ICPs.
21 It is essential that we preserve DISC in order to
22 maintain our defense logistics at the highest level of

Page 210

1 readiness, promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness and save
2 the jobs, of course, of dedicated DISC employees.
3 Third, I would like to speak in support of the DOD
4 recommendations to realign Naval Surface Warfare Center
5 Annapolis with Naval Service Warfare Center Philadelphia, as
6 well as the City of Philadelphia's recommendation to
7 consolidate NAVSEA 03 with the Naval Surface Warfare Center
8 in Philadelphia.
9 As the former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman,
10 is quoted as saying, "Realigning NSWC Annapolis with the NSWC
11 Philadelphia center of excellence is of critical importance
12 to the Navy." Consolidation of the machinery engineering
13 life cycle will improve the operational readiness of the
14 fleet and save 14.5 million a year, for a total 20-year
15 savings of 175.1 million.
16 I would also like to finally strongly urge the
17 Commission to approve the City of Philadelphia's proposal to
18 consolidate NAVSEA 03650 employees with the Naval Surface
19 Warfare Center Philadelphia, 1,600 employees and tremendous
20 facility infrastructure. The consolidation will eliminate
21 unnecessary duplication, save about $166 million over 20
22 years.

Page 211

1 Finally, I'm pleased to offer my support for Fort
2 Indiantown Gap. I'm concerned about the harm that a closure
3 of this fort would cause to our national security and our
4 local security. I believe that the fort is essential for
5 military readiness.
6 In addition, as I stated in my letter to the
7 Commission of May 12th, Fort Indiantown Gap is the only
8 convenient training site for Reserve and National Guard units
9 in our area. Elimination of Fort Indiantown Gap would be a
10 grave error, and I urge the Commission to reexamine this
11 proposal.
12 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you
13 for consideration of my thoughts. With your permission, I
14 would like to have my remarks submitted for the record.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your remarks will be reproduced in
16 the record in full, Congressman Fox. We're indebted to you.
17 May I ask my friend, the distinguished Senator from
18 Pennsylvania, whether he has voted? You have voted. Then,
19 if you don't object, Senator, I'm going to go by the numbers
20 here as the folks have arrived.
21 And we now recognize Congressman Paul McHale.
22 CONGRESSMAN McHALE: Mr. Chairman, members of the

Page 212

1 Commission, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before
2 you today. My colleagues in the Pennsylvania delegation who
3 preceded me to the microphone have eloquently defended the
4 capabilities available at Fort Indiantown Gap.
5 Although I'm a member of Congress and a member of
6 the National Security Committee and previously a member of
7 the Armed Services Committee, I bring a slightly different
8 perspective to the comments that I make regarding Fort
9 Indiantown Gap. I'm a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps
10 Reserve, and I often have said and think of myself as a
11 Marine rifleman on temporary duty with the United States
12 Congress.
13 From 1984 to 1987, I served as a Marine infantry
14 officer with the Reserve unit located in Harrisburg,
15 Pennsylvania. That's Echo Company 225. For a year, I was a
16 rifle platoon commander with that unit. For the last two
17 years, 1985 to '87, I was the commanding officer of that
18 unit. That unit is located 20 miles from Fort Indiantown Gap
19 and on many, many, many occasions, I trained at the Gap.
20 Following the Gulf War in which I had the
21 opportunity to serve, I was the operations officer of the 2nd
22 Battalion 25th Marines. That battalion frequently trained,

Page 213

1 in whole or in part, at Fort Indiantown Gap. I know every
2 range at the Gap. I have fired virtually every infantry
3 weapon that is available to the American Armed Services at
4 the Gap, and I've scheduled training and supervised training
5 at the Gap.
6 I'm a grunt. I clean rifles. And I am familiar
7 with the training that takes place at the Gap. Let me assure
8 you as sincerely and as forcefully as I can, the live fire
9 training opportunities now available at Fort Indiantown Gap
10 are among the finest in the nation. I've been training as a
11 Marine for over 20 years. I have never had better live fire
12 training opportunities on the East Coast of the United States
13 than I have experienced at Fort Indiantown Gap.
14 I've said that modern warfare is not brain surgery;
15 it is more complicated than that. When we move combined
16 armed forces forward on the battlefield, particularly if we
17 are to retain the protection of our air power, it is
18 absolutely essential that we have synchronized utilization of
19 the various weapons systems available to us.
20 At Fort Indiantown Gap as nowhere else that I have
21 ever experienced it on the East Coast of the United States --
22 and I'm including places that are much better known, such as

Page 214

1 Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; Quantico, Virginia -- nowhere
2 else have I and the Marines that I served with had an
3 opportunity such as that available at Fort Indiantown Gap to
4 combine and synchronize tank, artillery, mortar, machine gun,
5 and close air support.
6 If you close the Gap for our active duty and
7 particularly for our Reserve forces, there will be no
8 substitute for the training opportunities, particularly the
9 live fire training opportunities now routinely available and
10 readily accessible at Fort Indiantown Gap. You can spend a
11 lot of time in uniform without having the opportunity to
12 exercise live fire the way it is available during the week
13 and on every weekend at Fort Indiantown Gap.
14 Let me close with this, if I may. We make a
15 serious mistake of judgement, a mistake of judgement that
16 will cost lives, if in the interest of economy, we foreclose
17 training opportunities that very nearly replicate what real
18 combat is about.
19 I am a firm believer in training during peacetime
20 in a manner that as nearly as possible duplicates that which
21 we expect of our soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen in
22 time of war. And I'm telling you, what is available at Fort

Page 215

1 Indiantown Gap is unique.
2 If you close those live fire ranges, there will be
3 nowhere else on the East Coast within a reasonable distance
4 of the units to be trained where that kind of live fire
5 training, exactly the kind of utilization of live fire that
6 won the Gulf War, will be available to such units.
7 I have no parochial interest in Fort Indiantown
8 Gap. My district is two hours away. There are no jobs
9 affected, to the best of my knowledge, in any significant
10 number within my district by your decision one way or the
11 other.
12 But please, I urge you, before you close the Gap,
13 before you make what I believe to be a serious misjudgment,
14 look at the live fire training opportunities available at
15 Fort Indiantown Gap, realize as I have that those training
16 opportunities are not available elsewhere, and reconsider any
17 decisions that you might have otherwise made to close those
18 training ranges.
19 Nowhere else on the East Coast will our Reserve
20 units in particular have the chance to go out and coordinate
21 mortars, artillery, tanks, and air power as they will be
22 expected to do so in the next conflict. Please reconsider

Page 216

1 your decision and think about the training of those young men
2 who are dependent upon your judgement. I thank you very
3 much.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman McHale. We
5 appreciate it very much. The Chair would remind everybody
6 again, as a former member of the Congress speaking to the
7 Congress, this is green, this is yellow, this is red. I know
8 it's difficult.
9 The Chair is delighted to recognize a distinguished
10 member of the House from the great Pennsylvania delegation,
11 Congressman Bud Shuster.
12 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: Thank you very much for the
13 opportunity to appear here today to highlight the reasons why
14 we believe this Commission should reaffirm the BRAC '93
15 unanimous decision to consolidate missiles at Letterkenny and
16 continue the teaming of track vehicles.
17 Just as DOD did in 1993 and as the 1993 BRAC
18 Commission concluded at that time, the Department has again
19 substantially deviated from criteria 1 and criteria 4. The
20 methodology they use to compute capacity drives both of these
21 criteria and is not based on true military worth. The
22 capacity computation ignores the value of the actual

Page 217

1 maintenance mission performed, and it rewards installations
2 who work on small items.
3 How can Letterkenny have more land, more
4 facilities, more square feet, and be ranked last in capacity?
5 A better assessment of military worth would be to look at the
6 requirements of the future and consider the successes in
7 interservicing and in teaming and the overall value to DOD.
8 In this case, Letterkenny would rank at the top of all the
9 depots.
10 Additionally, we have recently become aware of an
11 important new development that supports the BRAC 1993
12 decision. We have seen an internal Army document dated 31
13 May to the Undersecretary of the Army which states -- and I
14 quote -- "The Army's recommendation to realign Letterkenny's
15 tactical missile workload was footed in a faulty stationing
16 strategy. Due to an oversight in the document's preparation,
17 provision of a tactical missile capability was neglected,
18 even though this commodity is key to DOD's war fighting
19 capability."
20 As the Commission knows, Letterkenny is not a
21 single depot like most in the inventory. We perform several
22 missions, including ammunition storage, joint service missile

Page 218

1 maintenance, and combat vehicle maintenance. We're the only
2 depot with these capabilities. To realign Letterkenny simply
3 does not make sound business sense.
4 The way to save money is to have a clean kill. It
5 is to totally close an installation. We all know that
6 Letterkenny will not be totally closed because of the
7 strategic need to maintain the ammo storage mission. It's
8 true that base operation costs will go down, but the cost to
9 maintain 19,000 acres and a staff of 672 for the continued
10 support and several million square feet of building space
11 will remain.
12 So to realign the joint tactical missiles will cost
13 MILCON, training, transportation of equipment, and personnel
14 costs. The best estimate is that the cost to realign the
15 depot is definitely not only the $53 million that is the TABS
16 estimate, because that TABS estimate does not include DLA,
17 SYMAC, and the logistics support activity.
18 More probably, the best evidence indicates it will
19 cost in excess of $230 million to realign, along with the
20 recurring annual costs to operate the remaining functions at
21 Letterkenny.
22 The point that seems to often be missed is that

Page 219

1 there are zero added costs to retain Letterkenny, not to
2 realign Letterkenny. After four years of tactical missile
3 studies and several DODIG investigations, it has been
4 conclusively concluded that Letterkenny is the best of the 19
5 depots studied to perform the joint services tactical missile
6 maintenance program.
7 As a result of this decision, Letterkenny already
8 has completed the transition of 13 of the 21 missile systems,
9 shipped and installed over $100 million in specialized
10 equipment, and hired and trained an additional 262 technical
11 missile experts. What businessman would recommend changing
12 course this far into a business decision without overwhelming
13 justification?
14 No other depot in the United States can perform
15 joint missile integration. None have adequate storage
16 capability. None have adequate maintenance space. And none
17 have the capacity for missile ground support equipment. To
18 claim otherwise without significant construction and other
19 major associated costs is simply false.
20 As the DODIG concluded last month, this program,
21 the BRAC '93 program of consolidation of missiles, is within
22 budget and on schedule. We're also aware of the Army Chief

Page 220

1 of Staff's letter of just 8 June which reinforces the closure
2 of Red River and states that the justification is
3 "compelling."
4 Well, with the closure of Red River, keeping
5 Letterkenny open is even more important. Because Letterkenny
6 is the only other depot which can provide surge capacity to
7 Anniston in time of war.
8 Currently, Letterkenny is performing vehicle
9 maintenance on Palladin, as well as others. We have entered
10 into a partnership agreement with United Defense on the
11 program and in two short years have saved over $60 million.
12 This model procurement program has already eliminated
13 substantial bureaucracy.
14 In summary, Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen,
15 the Department has again substantially deviated from criteria
16 1 and 4. The 1993 BRAC decision was a sound decision. And
17 we urge this Commission to reaffirm that BRAC 1993 decision
18 to consolidate missiles and to continue the public-private
19 teaming of track vehicles at Letterkenny. Thank you very
20 much.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
22 Bud Shuster.

Page 221

1 And on behalf of the Pennsylvania delegation,
2 Representative Robert Borski.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BORSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
4 members of the Commission, for giving me the opportunity to
5 testify today. Two years ago, I came before you to argue
6 against the Pentagon's proposal to close and relocate nearly
7 every defense facility in the City of Philadelphia.
8 Recognizing that the true military value of these
9 facilities is its skilled workforces, the Commission wisely
10 rejected the Pentagon's proposal and instead approved a more
11 cost-effective alternative that consolidated these facilities
12 at the ASO compound in Philadelphia.
13 Regrettably, in BRAC '95, the Pentagon has chosen
14 to ignore the wisdom of your decision. DLA has proposed to
15 disestablish DISC on the ASO combat. This proposal does not
16 close a base. Eighty percent of its claimed savings come
17 from eliminating personnel positions.
18 I will not go into the details of the flaws behind
19 DLA's stated savings. The employees at DISC have already
20 provided you with detailed information. Instead, as you
21 examine whether this proposal will save any money, I ask that
22 you keep in mind the following points about this proposal's

Page 222

1 impact on military readiness.
2 DLA is disestablishing DISC, which by every measure
3 is DLA's most efficient weapons supply center. DISC manages
4 the most weapons system items and has the highest customer
5 support rate, yet has the lowest rate of error. Because DISC
6 is DLA's best supply center, it has served as a prototype for
7 DLA's future missions requirement.
8 The employees at DISC have been reinventing government long
9 before Vice President Gore's initiatives.
10 Disestablishing DISC will also result in the
11 permanent loss of a unique joint service synergy that exists
12 between DISC and ASO. In BRAC '93, the Commission pointed to
13 this synergy as a reason for keeping both on the same
14 compound.
15 DLA's proposal will throw the items it manages into
16 a whirlwind beyond its control. If this proposal is
17 approved, more than 66 percent of DLA's workload will move
18 from one facility to another in the next four years. No item
19 transfer of this magnitude has ever been accomplished.
20 Disestablishing DISC will not close any bases. It
21 will only reshuffle workload. DLA is essentially asking the
22 Commission established to close bases to endorse its agency

Page 223

1 reorganization plan.
2 Mr. Chairman and commissioners, each of these
3 points begs a fundamental question: Is this really worth the
4 risk? This mission is still essential to the reliability of
5 our high technology weapons systems and military missions
6 around the world.
7 For example, DISC manages 41 percent of the
8 consumable items on the CH-53 Superstallion helicopters that
9 rescued Captain Scott O'Grady in Bosnia. We often take for
10 granted the role that supplies play in these missions. If
11 these helicopters are not equipped with the proper parts,
12 they risk malfunction or worse. It would have been tragic if
13 this mission had not succeeded because of a malfunction
14 caused by inexperienced supply management.
15 As you examine DLA's proposal and look at the
16 disruption it will cause, ask yourself whether it's worth the
17 risk of jeopardizing the future success of missions such as
18 this, all for savings which are questionable at best and do
19 not even involve a base closure.
20 Mr. Chairman, I support the goals of DLA's
21 reorganization, which would ultimately consolidate DLA's
22 weapons workload into two supply centers. But clearly, DISC

Page 224

1 deserves to be one of these weapons centers. The Commission
2 should reject this misguided proposal, so the DLA can
3 reorganize in a more sensible manner and time frame outside
4 of the BRAC process. To do otherwise would place an
5 unacceptable risk to the reediness of our armed services.
6 I would also like, Mr. Chairman, to briefly discuss
7 the Navy's proposed relocations of the Naval air technical
8 services facility and the Naval engineering service unit to
9 California. Like the DISC proposal, the Navy proposals do
10 not close bases. They merely move these facilities from
11 Philadelphia to the other side of the country.
12 Such a move would completely dismantle two skilled
13 workforces that are still essential to the readiness of our
14 armed services. In response to the Navy's proposal, the
15 employees of NAVSAV and NAVSU have developed counterproposals
16 that preserve their workforces and achieve even better
17 savings by consolidating their functions with ASO. These
18 proposals provide the Commission with an opportunity to
19 consolidate without sacrificing military value.
20 Finally, I would like to express support for DOD's
21 proposed realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center from
22 Annapolis to Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia's

Page 225

1 proposal to consolidate the NAVSEA headquarters engineering
2 directorate with Philadelphia. These proposals will result
3 in a combined savings of nearly 340 million over seven years
4 and are strongly supported by former Secretary of the Navy
5 John Lehman.
6 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the
7 employees of Philadelphia's defense facilities are the true
8 military value of these facilities. Since BRAC '93, they
9 have risen to the challenge of doing more and better with
10 less. I hope the Commission recognizes this valuable asset
11 to our country and builds on the correct ruling it made in
12 1993. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Borski.
14 And we're delighted to have the distinguished
15 Senator from the State of Pennsylvania, Senator Rick
16 Santorum, here. Senator Santorum.
17 SENATOR SANTORUM: Thank you. Mr. Chairman. And I
18 appreciate the opportunity to come now for the third time and
19 speak before the Commission. I appreciate your indulgence in
20 having me do so. And I want to thank you for the fine work
21 and continued participation that we have had. And I
22 appreciate that, also, very much.

Page 226

1 As we all know, the BRAC process is a necessary
2 process for all services. And I want to emphasize again that
3 all services should share in this process. And that's why I
4 have testified that I am troubled to see that with respect to
5 depots, not all services are participating. It frankly sort
6 of angers me to see what the Air Force is doing relative to
7 what the Army is doing.
8 In the past BRACs, the Army has closed three major
9 depots -- Lexington in '88; Sacramento in '91; and Tooele in
10 1993. The Air Force has only closed one very small base in
11 1993, the Aerospace Guidance and Meteorology Center in
12 Newark, Ohio.
13 In this round, the Air Force comes to the table
14 with no depot closings, zero. They basically shuffle the
15 deck tiers in the Titanic but keep in place all of their
16 ALCs.
17 In addition, they go through a six-year realignment
18 instead of the two- to four-year period that the other
19 departments are proposing and what was recommended by the
20 BRAC. And they don't eliminate positions until the sixth
21 year. This is punting. This was not what this Commission is
22 all about. This is not what the Congress wanted to see from

Page 227

1 the United States Air Force.
2 Mr. Chairman, what I am proposing and what's being
3 proposed, as you heard in testimony from Congressman Shuster
4 and Congressman McDade, is to have a little shared sacrifice
5 between the services, between the Air Force and the Army.
6 And Pennsylvania is a place where you can see some of that
7 shared sacrifice be brought to bear.
8 In the case of ground communications, you heard
9 Congressman McDade talk about the excess capacity at
10 Tobyhanna and the ability for them to consolidate ground
11 communications from Sacramento to Tobyhanna. The same thing
12 is in the case with Letterkenny with respect to the missile
13 consolidation which was proposed in the BRAC round of 1993
14 and should be sustained in this BRAC round. We should share.
15 I know that there is concerns with at least members
16 of the Armed Services Committee about the Army eating its
17 seed core with reducing to the depot level that they have
18 suggested. I would hope that this Commission would look very
19 carefully at sharing the sacrifice across the bases.
20 With respect to the Pittsburgh Air Force Reserve
21 Station, as you all know, the numbers that were thrown in the
22 COBRA models initially were wrong. The Air Force has

Page 228

1 admitted they're wrong.
2 The numbers as they have been recranked out again
3 have Pittsburgh in much better shape and, in fact, provide
4 not only good numbers and good cost and military value
5 numbers, but also the fact that there's 77 acres of ready
6 ramp space sitting there from the former Pittsburgh Airport
7 terminal sitting there ready to deal with surge operation or
8 any other contingency that may come along makes this a very
9 valuable piece of property because of the fact that it's at a
10 major airport with lots of runway space, et cetera.
11 In addition, as you know, the Secretary of the Air
12 Force sent a letter dated June 9 to the chairman -- and I
13 quote -- "In view of these circumstances" -- the
14 "circumstances" are referring to the problems of relocating
15 Chicago O'Hare -- "it would appear that the inactivation of
16 the Air Force Reserve C-130 unit at O'Hare IAP, instead of
17 the C-130 unit at Pittsburgh IAP is a reasonable
18 alternative."
19 So now, you have the Secretary of the Air Force
20 suggesting that O'Hare because of the problems with the City
21 of Chicago and being able to finance it really is the better
22 place to close, as opposed to the Pittsburgh base. I would

Page 229

1 agree with Congressmen McHale and Gekas who testified on Fort
2 Indiantown Gap.
3 I speak for Governor Ridge. I know there was some
4 question about the governor's position on this. He is
5 strongly behind Indiantown Gap and it remaining open. And
6 the fact of the matter is, this is not going to save money.
7 This is a basis -- Congressman McHale testified, a
8 vibrant and active base is going to stay active with its
9 Guard and Reserve and all the other training components that
10 it has. And we're going to have to come back for
11 supplemental appropriations to fund the Reserve operations
12 there if we don't do it through an active unit. So if you're
13 looking to save money, the Gap is not the place to do it.
14 I would also support one DOD recommendation with
15 the consolidation of Annapolis and NSWC at the Philadelphia
16 NSWC. We have the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, which was hit
17 worse, biggest closure in the entire BRAC process. We need
18 at least some sort of economic development draw. And having
19 NSWC there and the work that they're doing consolidated -- in
20 addition, the City of Philadelphia has suggested NAVSEA
21 from -- the NAVSEA center here in Crystal City to move up to
22 Philadelphia to consolidate into a more manageable plan.

Page 230

1 It would be another, I think, big thing for the
2 City of Philadelphia. I'm gong to submit the rest of my
3 testimony for the record, as my light came on, and try to
4 keep with the chairman's recommendation. Thank you.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Senator Rick
6 Santorum. We appreciate it.
7 Now, the Chair is advised that a vote is going on
8 in the House and that it would accommodate the Pennsylvania
9 delegation for me to tell you the order in which the Chair
10 shows you arriving. Senator Santorum was the eighth person
11 to testify for Pennsylvania.
12 The next that we have noted in attendance -- I hope
13 you'll not blame the Chair if we didn't note him correctly --
14 is Representative Paul Kanjorski, number nine. We show
15 Representative Tom Foglietta as number 10. Representative
16 James Greenwood is number 11. The distinguished senior
17 Senator, Senator Arlin Spectre, number 12, was in the room
18 and I presume is at hand. Representative Kurt Weldon, number
19 13, and Representative Ron Klink, number 14.
20 Now, there may be others here that the Chair has
21 not been told about, but this is the order. I'm hopeful to
22 accommodate the Pennsylvania delegation in any manner that I

Page 231

1 can. I'm going to call Representative Paul Kanjorski.
2 Please note that we have staff here that will work with you.
3 We're trying to solve your problem. I want you to know, it's
4 difficult, with the kind of day we have, with 121 witnesses.
5 We're delighted to recognize Representative Paul
6 Kanjorski.
7 REPRESENTATIVE KANJORSKI: Thank you very much, Mr.
8 Chairman. And I'm going to ask unanimous consent that my
9 formal testimony be admitted into the record.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That will be done.
11 REPRESENTATIVE KANJORSKI: Mr. Chairman, I thought
12 that the proposition before the Commission is very important,
13 because you're going to have a very tough decision. And
14 those of us that have been in the Congress for the last
15 several years probably -- I've been there 10 years -- have
16 discovered the Commission form of answering very serious
17 political and other national questions has been reliable.
18 Certainly, the BRAC Commission has proved that over the
19 years.
20 But probably the decisions made by this BRAC
21 Commission will bring into question the decisions that are
22 not based on fact, on recommendations, and efficiency and

Page 232

1 effectiveness of our military alignment.
2 When I argue for the Tobyhanna depot, I make a very
3 simple argument. We have the facts, we have the
4 recommendations, and we have the community support. Before
5 the Commission, I know some of the commissioners had the
6 opportunity to come up and see Tobyhanna. You know what that
7 community is like.
8 Before you are over 15,000 personal letters and
9 more than 100,000 signatures on petitions. This has been a
10 very traumatic experience for Northeastern Pennsylvania
11 because up to four weeks ago, we didn't think we had a
12 problem. Now, we do have a problem.
13 Those of us that represent Pennsylvania and
14 Northeastern Pennsylvania were rather shocked with this
15 opening up and putting Tobyhanna on the list. I hope it
16 never happens again. It is a very traumatic experience for
17 communities.
18 I cannot see the justification or the reason why
19 Tobyhanna would be closed. I can understand some alignment.
20 I can understand some additions. All I would urge you is,
21 the facts are very simple. The Defense Department has said
22 it's the most effective and efficient depot system in the

Page 233

1 United States Army. The recommendation from the United
2 States Army and the Defense Department is that it is number
3 one in depots and should be kept open.
4 Finally, for the community, I don't think you'll
5 have experienced a stronger support system from a community
6 behind the depot and in support of it the activities they
7 have taken.
8 As a member of Congress representing half of the
9 depot area with Joe McDade, I just think that anything less
10 than retaining Tobyhanna would send probably the most
11 negative message to Congress to ever exercise the Commission
12 form of activity again to solve serious national problems
13 where the legislature of this country cannot face the
14 political problem that needs to be solved.
15 So I urge this Commission to use your charge and
16 your conscience to resolve the question for Tobyhanna. And
17 if you do, I'm sure you'll keep the best. Thank you.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
19 Kanjorski. That was a very moving presentation on behalf of
20 your Congressional district. The Chair knows a little about
21 politics and recognizes there's a little division in the
22 Pennsylvania delegation. So I'm going to have to request

Page 234

1 that you take the boxes out of the front of the room so that
2 others who represent another district will not be embarrassed
3 by having the wrong sign in the television picture.
4 Can the folks do that as quickly as they can? I'm
5 going to go on with the work, but I would appreciate it.
6 Congressman Tom Foglietta, we're delighted to see
7 you here, Congressman. Thank you for coming.
8 REPRESENTATIVE FOGLIETTA: First of all, I would
9 like to thank you, Chairman Dixon and other members of the
10 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, for
11 convening today's hearing. My appearance today is much
12 different than the last time I spoke before the Commission in
13 Newark, New Jersey.
14 In 1991, the Commission was reviewing the Navy's
15 recommendation to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
16 This September, when the overhaul is complete on the USS John
17 F. Kennedy on time and on budget, she will steam out of the
18 Navy yard, and the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard will close.
19 Based on that decision and others, Philadelphia has
20 the unfortunate distinction of being the only city to be
21 impacted on every base closure around. All totalled, the
22 Philadelphia region will lose 38,000 jobs as a result of

Page 235

1 these three BRAC rounds.
2 I'm here today to urge your support of the Navy's
3 recommendation to consolidate Navy engineering functions at
4 the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Philadelphia.
5 Additionally, I strongly support the proposal submitted to
6 the Commission by the City of Philadelphia to build on the
7 Navy's recommendation by further consolidating Navy
8 engineering functions by realigning the engineering
9 directorate at Naval Sea Systems Command headquarters in
10 Philadelphia.
11 The recommendations will promote the readiness of
12 our armed forces, lower our Navy machinery life cycle costs,
13 and improve efficiency while assisting the conversion of the
14 Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
15 I also strongly urge the members of the Commission
16 to maintain the 1993 Commission's decision to move the
17 Defense Personnel Support Center from its present location to
18 the site of the Navy Aviation Supply Office in Northeast
19 Philadelphia. The DPSC performs the critical task of buying
20 and moving clothing, medical supplies, and other support
21 products for the military services.
22 In this capacity, DPSC played an important role in

Page 236

1 restoring credibility to military procurement, putting to
2 rest the images of gold-plated toilet seats, hammers, and
3 ashtrays.
4 Furthermore, it is important that the Commission
5 give certainty to past Commission orders rather than exposing
6 the Defense Department to a revolving door of inconsistent
7 decisions. The Commission can build on the success of DPSC's
8 imposing track record by merging it with the Defense
9 Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia.
10 These important activities could be consolidated
11 under one base operating support structure. This alternative
12 would enhance military readiness, better utilize a valued
13 workforce, and achieve significant cost savings. The NSWC
14 Philadelphia is the Navy's only source for in-service
15 engineering and for testing and evaluating ship machinery
16 systems.
17 A full 20 percent of the Navy's annual budget is
18 devoted to life cycle costs for these vital systems. By
19 continuing the consolidation of Philadelphia engineering
20 functions in Philadelphia, a process which began as a result
21 of the 1991 BRAC decision, the Navy estimates that they can
22 save $175 million over the next 20 years.

Page 237

1 Furthermore, this realignment can be completed in a
2 cost-effective manner. The Navy calculates that the
3 realignment will cost $25 million. This recommendation will
4 also greatly improve operational efficiency and military
5 readiness by consolidating life cycle support for machinery
6 systems in one central location. This would streamline the
7 Navy's acquisition and development process and enable the
8 purchases of more capable systems at lower costs.
9 The second proposal which I mentioned earlier would
10 build on the Navy's recommendation by moving NAVSEA's
11 engineering directorate to Philadelphia. This consolidation
12 would provide a major return on investment by reducing
13 duplication of activities between the 650 employees at NAVSEA
14 and the 1,600 workers at NSWC in Philadelphia.
15 The Navy's own internal studies have confirmed that
16 there is duplication and that NAVSEA's engineers should be
17 separated from headquarters and moved to the field.
18 Furthermore, it has been estimated that this proposal would
19 save the Navy $13.4 million per year and a total savings over
20 20 years of $165 million.
21 As I mentioned earlier, Philadelphia has been
22 battered by the base closure process. However, efforts to

Page 238

1 convert the Philadelphia Naval Yard and develop commercial
2 ship-building in place of the Navy work are succeeding. Even
3 before the Kennedy leaves, we have two established commercial
4 maritime operations which are interested in building ships at
5 the yard -- building ships, reviving the ship-building
6 industry in this country. This would mean 3,800 new jobs for
7 Navy yard workers.
8 Additionally, the Westinghouse Corporation and the
9 Garvey Precision Machine Company have committed to moving to
10 the yard and creating 150 jobs. All of these businesses have
11 cited NSWC's location at the Navy yard as a major factor in
12 their decision to come to Philadelphia. These are excellent
13 recommendations which will boost military readiness, save
14 money, and greatly assist our work to revitalize the
15 commercial ship-building industry at the Philadelphia Naval
16 Shipyard.
17 The experts agree. Former Navy Secretaries John
18 Lehman and Shaun O'Keefe have strongly endorsed these
19 proposals. In fact, Secretary Lehman testified before the
20 Commission at the regional hearings in Baltimore in support
21 of these recommendations.
22 With these outstanding benefits in mind, saving

Page 239

1 money, enhancing readiness, and boosting defense conversion
2 in Philadelphia, I sincerely and strongly urge the Commission
3 to adopt these recommendations. And I thank you.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And I thank you very much,
5 Congressman Foglietta, for that fine contribution on behalf
6 of the State of Pennsylvania.
7 Now, let me say, the situation is this -- there's a
8 vote in the House. Members of the delegation have left us,
9 as is their responsibility to their constituency, to vote.
10 Thank you. You are excused, Congressman Foglietta. Thank
11 you so much.
12 Senator Spectre was in the room. He had on a prior
13 occasion when it was his time to testify been obligated to
14 work the floor in connection with an amendment. I see him
15 walking in at this very moment. He left his lunch, let the
16 people of Pennsylvania know. We see this poor, starving man
17 walking into the room.
18 Senator, let me say before you begin, I'm not quite
19 sure what we'll do about the balance of your delegation. We
20 have heard from 10 of your Congresspeople or 11, as the case
21 may be, counting Senator Santorum. There's a vote in the
22 House. Many have gone back to discharge their obligations to

Page 240

1 their constituency in that connection.
2 I can't find places to work them in in the next few
3 minutes or so if they don't get in here by 1:50. But I say
4 that so far as this Commission is concerned, if the Chair's
5 the only one here, we'll hear them this evening at the end if
6 they want to, but it's going to be in the seven-ish to eight-
7 ish hour, I'm afraid. I'm sorry about that, Senator.
8 I hope you understand, there's 121 members of the
9 Congress wanting to be heard, and the schedule is just a
10 couple of pages. But anyway, we'll try to work with you,
11 sir, as the senior Senator from the great State of
12 Pennsylvania, and we're honored to have the distinguished
13 senior Senator, Senator Arlin Spectre.
14 SENATOR SPECTRE: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for
15 your comments and for your diligent work. And I thank the
16 Commission for undertaking this arduous task. And I
17 understand with the lengthy list of those who are to appear
18 before you that it is an Herculean job on scheduling.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: If I may interrupt once more,
20 Senator, that would be six members of the House who were
21 listed to testify and had to leave. And we can supply your
22 office with the names of those members. Senator Spectre.

Page 241

1 SENATOR SPECTRE: All right. I shall transmit that
2 to those who could not be here, and they can then come back.
3 I know how arduous the job is for this Commission.
4 And in a sense, it is a very difficult matter to sit here
5 listening to witness after witness making the argument,
6 almost cruel and unusual punishment for the commissioners and
7 really hard to ingest and digest it all.
8 This is the third time that I have appeared before
9 this distinguished Commission in Baltimore and Boston and now
10 here in Washington. There have been very strenuous arguments
11 made on behalf of the many installations in Pennsylvania.
12 And without going through the details on the substantive
13 arguments, they're all set forth in my brief, and they're all
14 set forth by others who have argued.
15 In alphabetical order, I would submit that the
16 Kelly Support facility and the Defense Industrial Supply
17 Center and the Fort Indiantown Gap and Letterkenny and the
18 Naval Air Technical Service and Naval Surface Warfare 9th Air
19 Lift Unit in Pittsburgh and Tobyhanna all have very, very
20 substantial national defense purposes.
21 And I say that to you based on my experience on the
22 Defense Appropriation Subcommittee. And I know the

Page 242

1 distinguished chairman has had extensive experience on the
2 Armed Services Committee.
3 What I would submit to you is a little different
4 kind of an argument, after having considered the military
5 capabilities of all of these units, and with special emphasis
6 on Letterkenny and Tobyhanna. That poses an unusual problem
7 for those of us who are statewide officeholders, as I
8 analogize it to a dispute between my two sons. In trying to
9 be as fair and as evenhanded as possible, I submit that both
10 have a very, very high military purpose.
11 And in alphabetical order, Letterkenny did not get
12 a fair shake on some of the military evaluations which were
13 done early in the process. And I know this distinguished
14 Commission has all those facts before it.
15 Tobyhanna has been given extraordinarily high
16 ratings for all who have taken a look at it. And while the
17 closure of any of the facilities would be very problemsome,
18 not only for the individuals involved, but also for the
19 communities, the closure of either of these installations
20 would be absolutely devastating, Letterkenny in South Central
21 Pennsylvania and Tobyhanna in the Northeastern part of the
22 state with a very large number of individuals employed at

Page 243

1 each of these installations.
2 But let me give you a broader picture, if I may,
3 which I know you will impart to your fellow commissioners.
4 And that is an overall assessment as to what has happened to
5 Pennsylvania in all of the base closures, going back to 1991.
6 We have had only 2.6 percent of the national military
7 installations but have suffered approximately 11 percent of
8 the job loss. And that is a valid consideration by this
9 Commission.
10 And in making those representations to you under
11 oath, that's to the best of my knowledge, information, and
12 belief as supplied to me. When the Philadelphia Navy Yard
13 was closed, Pennsylvania took a very hard hit. And it was
14 broader than just the City of Philadelphia and the Delaware
15 Valley Region. It was statewide. It rippled throughout the
16 state.
17 And I ask the Commission to consider that
18 especially, because it was the expectation of the Commission
19 at that time and it was the expectation of the Congress at
20 that time that there would be judicial review on the
21 contention which I made that material evidence was withheld
22 because we were not advised that two Navy admirals had said

Page 244

1 the base should be kept open but downsized.
2 And I know you, Chairman Dixon, will recall in your
3 capacity as Senator, when you provided on the subcommittee
4 reviewing the work when we took the matter to the Congress
5 after the Commission had ruled and the President had signed
6 off, as you said and the record will show -- and I know you
7 recall from your nods now -- that there would be judicial
8 review.
9 You said, "Senator, take it to the court," which we
10 did, with the full expectation that there would be judicial
11 review. And in a very complex case, the Court of Appeals for
12 the Third Circuit said we were entitled to judicial review.
13 And then, on a very complex argument in the Supreme Court on
14 separation of power and delegation of authority, the Supreme
15 Court disagreed. So we never had that judicial review.
16 And I think that that has impacted really unfairly
17 on Pennsylvania without an opportunity to have had what was
18 the expectation of the Commission and the Congress at that
19 time. So I would ask this Commission to weigh that factor in
20 addition to the other factors before the Commission. And I
21 think as a matter of fairness, Pennsylvania really ought to
22 be spared these closures.

Page 245

1 And I would ask it as the Senator from Pennsylvania
2 on behalf of all of the ones which I have enumerated, where
3 those communities have been very hard hit. And the people
4 who were displaced as the ripple effect went up across
5 Pennsylvania have taken other jobs that if any of these
6 facilities were to be closed, it would limit the employment
7 opportunities of those who would be put out of work on any of
8 these facilities.
9 We are unique in that respect. That is the only
10 case which went to the Supreme Court of the United States
11 where there had been the expectation of judicial review and
12 that did not occur. So I ask for that special consideration
13 for the Commission on Pennsylvania's military installations.
14 In conclusion, I thank you, commissioners, Mr.
15 Chairman, for your diligent service. I know what it's like.
16 I have been in that chair as chairman of the Intelligence
17 Committee or the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism or the
18 various other committees. You have an arduous task, and you
19 have our thanks. And we do ask you for your special
20 consideration for the working men and women of Pennsylvania.
21 Thank you.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, Senator Spectre, for

Page 246

1 your fine presentation, the distinguished senior Senator from
2 the State of Pennsylvania.
3 The Chair is advised that Representative Mike Doyle
4 has arrived. We're delighted to have you, Representative
5 Doyle.
6 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: Mr. Chairman, my speech was
7 to be in conjunction with the Western Pennsylvania
8 delegation, Congressmen Klink, Coyne, myself, and Mr.
9 Mascara. And we just got called for a vote. And I've
10 already voted. And I think they're on their way. And the
11 way our presentation is intended is to go in a certain order.
12 So I would ask to defer from speaking until the rest of my
13 delegation is able to do so.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I'm greatly distressed that I
15 cannot honor your request, Representative Doyle. Let me tell
16 you the problem. I recognize the obligation to vote. It is
17 a duty to your constituency that the Chair is very sensitive
18 to, having served 12 years in this place. But I have an
19 obligation to the entire Congress to hear everybody in order.
20 At 1:50, we go to Puerto Rico. So I'm going to
21 have to hear whoever comes here and put the rest of you at
22 the end of the evening. Now, I hate to do that, but the

Page 247

1 Chair will penalize himself by staying. I'm distressed I
2 have to do that.
3 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: I understand, Mr. Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I hope you're sensitive to the
5 problem of the Chair.
6 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: And I see members of our
7 delegation coming in, so perhaps I'll begin, then.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Fine. Representative Mike Doyle.
9 Thank you, sir.
10 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
11 want to begin by thanking the commissioners for holding this
12 hearing and for offering to myself and others the opportunity
13 to testify before you today.
14 I want to use this opportunity to speak about the
15 Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and why it should not be
16 selected for closure and, in fact, should never have been
17 considered for closure.
18 The Western Pennsylvania Coalition, after
19 identifying multiple errors throughout the data supplied by
20 the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve, determined that a
21 closer look at the grading of the criteria was necessary.
22 After analyzing these individual errors, it became clear that

Page 248

1 the final rankings of the C-130 bases were affected by these
2 mistakes.
3 The coalition then proceeded to evaluate the
4 standings through the grading and weighing process as used by
5 the Air Force. Criteria 4 and 5 were evaluated through use
6 of the COBRA program, and the results of that analysis will
7 be described in detail by my distinguished colleague,
8 Congressman Mascara, in a few minutes.
9 I'm going to focus on criteria 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8,
10 which were evaluated using raw Air Force scores from their
11 analysis and recommendations Volume 5. The results of our
12 study differed significantly from the Air Force's findings.
13 Many of the identified errors negatively affected these raw
14 scores. We have focused on three of these errors within this
15 study, which I would like to submit for the record at this
16 time.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Those will be admitted in the
18 record. Thank you, sir. Will someone from staff get those,
19 please?
20 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: First, the Pittsburgh Air
21 Reserve Station received a low rating for the condition of
22 its airfield pavement. This rating was based upon data that

Page 249

1 is 14 years old. A 1994 study, however, conducted by the Air
2 Force Civil Engineer Support Agency rates the pavement's
3 ability as being capable of handling any aircraft and Air
4 Force inventory.
5 The second error addressed was the future growth
6 ability and the attainment status of our air quality. Our
7 installation was graded red for its future growth ability and
8 yellow for attainment status. The EPA has reviewed Allegheny
9 County's air quality and reached the conclusion contained in
10 the following quote: "The area attained the ozone standard
11 at this time. Thus, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station has
12 no restrictions on its air quality."
13 The third error I wish to highlight pertains to the
14 environmental impact of this facility. Despite the 911th Air
15 Wing's answer to the BRAC questionnaire, it was graded red
16 for wetlands. A 1994 study by GEONEX reports there are no
17 wetlands apparent at your installation.
18 Underscoring the credibility of our points is the
19 fact that each of these studies was either in progress or
20 were under contract prior to the Air Force BRAC questionnaire
21 process which occurred during the spring of '94. Supporting
22 data can be found in the appendices of the study that I have

Page 250

1 submitted for the record.
2 By eliminating these errors and using the same
3 analysis, Pittsburgh qualifies for the top ranking for
4 criteria 1, 2, and 8. As you can see, the net effect of
5 these clarifications is quite substantial.
6 Furthermore, the coalition recognizes the
7 importance of correct data and accurate assessment of that
8 data for your deliberations. Thus, we have also taken the
9 Air Force's grading system one step further in order to
10 evaluate the criteria's rankings fairly and objectively.
11 Although there are many ways to accomplish this
12 task, we chose the method that weighs each criteria equally
13 and produces a numeric value based upon each of the rankings
14 within each criteria. We believed that this weighted method
15 would yield better results in general, and using the
16 corrected data bodes well for Pittsburgh because of its
17 consistent high rankings across the full range of criteria
18 used by the BRAC.
19 Commissioners, as you already know and as this
20 study and the corrected COBRA data clearly show, the
21 Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should not have been on the
22 Department of Defense Closure list and certainly should not

Page 251

1 be selected for closure.
2 I want to conclude my testimony by reiterating my
3 thanks for the opportunity to testify before you today and by
4 respectfully requesting that you closely examine the
5 empirical data we have supplied.
6 Finally, I want to introduce my friend and
7 colleague, Frank Mascara, who will detail the corrected COBRA
8 data and its positive impact on the Pittsburgh Air Reserve
9 Station. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Doyle.
11 And we're delighted to have Representative Frank
12 Mascara. Congressman Mascara.
13 REPRESENTATIVE MASCARA: Thank you. Thank you very
14 much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the Commission who has
15 presented me with an opportunity to address the Commission
16 relative to two issues.
17 First is regarding the Kelly support facility in
18 Oakdale, Pennsylvania; and second, the 911th Airlift Wing.
19 Regarding the Kelly facility, the Army and the DOD were
20 recommending a significant realignment. It is my
21 understanding that because of the questions from the local
22 community and from the Commission, the Army has reviewed its

Page 252

1 position and is seeking to modify its original
2 recommendation.
3 Now, the Army is recommending a far less drastic
4 realignment and is not recommending the closure of the
5 exchange and the commissary. If the Army and the DOD have
6 modified their recommendation in that fashion, then I would
7 urge the Commission to approve it. I believe the Army review
8 has proven the worth of the Kelly support facility. It is a
9 great facility with great people. It does the essential work
10 of logistics and maintenance, and it gets the job done.
11 Now, the 911th Airlift Wing. The COBRA cost data
12 used to arrive at the decision to close the Pittsburgh Air
13 Reserve Station was, quite simply, incorrect. Substantial
14 deviations existed on three counts -- incorrect cost data,
15 partial year cost data, and totally missing cost data.
16 Subsequent corrected COBRA runs by the Air Force and your own
17 BRAC analysts have consistently demonstrated that Pittsburgh
18 is the most cost-effective base among C-130 installations on
19 civilian airfields.
20 The original COBRA analysis also failed to consider
21 savings benefits from MILCON cost avoidance. Of the six
22 installations at civilian airfields, Pittsburgh has the

Page 253

1 lowest projected MILCON over the COBRA analysis period. By
2 contrast, another considered base has projected MILCON 775
3 percent greater than Pittsburgh, money that would largely be
4 spent to needlessly duplicate capabilities already available
5 at Pittsburgh.
6 We believe that Air Force generated COBRA data
7 continues to seriously understate MILCON cost avoidance at
8 some bases. I am presenting corrected Western Pennsylvania
9 Coalition COBRA scenarios results which most accurately
10 reflect time comparison figures, data which, by the way, is
11 agreed with by the BRAC staff.
12 As you heard Congressman Klink -- if he has not
13 testified, you will hear so -- he has correctly explained
14 that the Air Force Reserve presently enjoys military benefits
15 and special facilities at the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station
16 that do not now exist and cannot be duplicated elsewhere
17 without enormous military construction costs.
18 Pittsburgh already has the assets needed to expand
19 its mission at no cost to the United States. These expansion
20 capabilities include additional existing concrete ramp space,
21 an acreage on installation, high capacity tarmac at the
22 adjacent, and a band-in passenger terminal. In all Air Force

Page 254

1 assessments of military value, Pittsburgh rates at or near
2 the top.
3 In summary, commissioners, when corrected COBRA
4 results, military value expansion, capability, recruiting,
5 environmental impact, and community support are considered,
6 Pittsburgh is, without question, the least favorable closure
7 candidate among C-130 bases. This was undoubtedly the
8 Commission's hypothesis at the add-on hearings.
9 Further discovery, investigation, and analysis
10 since then has convincingly validated that conclusion. Most
11 recently, the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall,
12 announced in a letter to Chairman Dixon that inactivation of
13 the Air Force Reserve 130 unit at O'Hare instead of the C-130
14 unit at Pittsburgh is a reasonable alternative.
15 Considering the facts in Pittsburgh's favor and the
16 change in the Air Force position regarding the closure of the
17 911th, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should remain open.
18 And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much for
20 that very fine contribution, Representative Frank Mascara.
21 And I understand that members of your delegation are arriving
22 even as I speak.

Page 255

1 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to leave the
2 State of Pennsylvania momentarily and accommodate the
3 distinguished delegate from Puerto Rico. And then we're just
4 going to go on Murphy's rules for a little while around here
5 because of the vote in the House.
6 And the Chair is pleased to recognize the
7 distinguished delegate from Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero-
8 Barcello.
9 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we're delighted to have you,
11 Delegate Romero-Barcello.
12 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you very much.
13 It's a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
14 the opportunity.
15 First of all, I would like to extend my
16 appreciation to the Commission for allowing me the
17 opportunity to express in person my serious concerns over the
18 proposed closure of Fort Buchanan, the only active Army
19 installation in the whole Caribbean region. And I say
20 "closure" in a deliberate way, because the term "realignment"
21 is a misnomer under the circumstances facing the fort.
22 Although the former Camp Buchanan was originally

Page 256

1 established as a training site for the 65th United States
2 Infantry Regiment in 1923, its role has changed dramatically
3 over the years. The main mission of Fort Buchanan at present
4 is to prepare and assume responsibility for the mobilization
5 of Reserve component forces in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
6 Virgin Islands.
7 The fort also provides administrative and
8 logistical support to active Reserve components of the U.S.
9 Armed Forces in Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, including
10 Puerto Rico Reserve Officers Training Corps, the ROTC. And
11 this includes recruiting services for the Army, the Navy, and
12 the Air Force, as well as providing mobilization support for
13 all Reserve components in case of war.
14 Fort Buchanan also provides support for the
15 planning, the coordination, and the execution of all Army-
16 related counter-terrorism actions on the island.
17 In recent military operations, such as the
18 Operation Desert Shield/Storm, an operation to uphold
19 democracy where Reserve forces and National Guard units have
20 been mobilized, Fort Buchanan as a lead mobilization station
21 has played a key role serving as a support hub to bring
22 together all elements of support, assuring the quick

Page 257

1 validation and the deployment of the mobilized units.
2 Also proven during these operations was the fact
3 that the total Army concept really works, thereby firmly
4 establishing the trend that Reserve component units will
5 continue to be mobilized along with the active component.
6 If Fort Buchanan is closed, where will the support
7 for future mobilizations in Puerto Rico come from? Fort
8 Buchanan is a mobilization station. While its parent
9 installation, Fort MacPherson in Georgia, is solely an
10 administrative support headquarters which has remained in
11 touch by BRAC, to close the Fort Buchanan garrison while
12 maintaining Fort MacPherson does not meet the test to
13 consolidate and economize on military spending.
14 Although the Department of Defense proposal asked
15 for a realignment of Fort Buchanan, this would constitute,
16 for all practical purposes, a closure. In effect, the fort
17 will cease operations as an active Army enclave. All active
18 Army personnel, military and civilian, will leave. All
19 active army functions will cease. All family housing must be
20 abandoned and all morale support activity stopped.
21 If this realignment were to take place, it would
22 result in a potential reduction of at least 500 jobs. The

Page 258

1 Commission is definitely being misled by the figures
2 presented in the Department of Defense Base Closure and
3 Realignment report stating that only 128 jobs would be lost.
4 At this time, Fort Buchanan services 2,486 active
5 duty and civilian personnel. It also serves five sizeable
6 groups, comprising some 73,170 persons who would also be
7 negatively impacted. These five groups include 175 active
8 Guard Reserve personnel and their families, 15,410 Reserve
9 component soldiers, 19,835 family members of Reserve
10 component soldiers, and 13,260 retirees and 34,890 family
11 members of retirees.
12 Fort Buchanan is a symbol of the Department of
13 Defense and the Army's interests in the Caribbean Basin, and
14 its presence brings stability to the region. To realign or
15 close this installation will not only negatively impact on
16 the critical support to the active and Reserve component
17 forces but would also added to the unemployment problem of
18 the island.
19 But perhaps the strongest argument in favor of
20 keeping Fort Buchanan on the active list is that the supposed
21 monetary savings to be achieved by closing the post are
22 highly questionable. The efficiency and combat readiness of

Page 259

1 Reserve component organizations will certainly suffer. A
2 mobilization of these organizations will eventually take
3 place at a much higher cost to taxpayers than if Fort
4 Buchanan were to be maintained on the active list.
5 Is it worth risking part of our national security
6 to allegedly save a few dollars here and there? Will the
7 Army be able to rapidly and efficiently mobilize our Reserve
8 component units for a future conflict without Fort Buchanan?
9 In Puerto Rico, we have the Reserve units and the National
10 Guard, which are bilingual and very necessary and very
11 important in the use of any conflict or any military action
12 in the Caribbean or Central America or even South America.
13 I believe it is in our best national security
14 interest that the active Army facilities at Fort Buchanan
15 remain open, particularly now with the upcoming termination
16 of the U.S. military presence in Panama under the terms of
17 the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.
18 Puerto Rico has a proud and long tradition of
19 supporting national defense. This has been shown time and
20 time again as hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans, in
21 spite of their obvious second-class citizenship, have
22 consistently and promptly answered the nation's call to arms

Page 260

1 without hesitation.
2 From the vital defenses of Panama during the First
3 World War and practically every theater of operations during
4 the Second World War to the frozen planes of Korea, the
5 hardships of Vietnam, the interventions in Grenada and Panama
6 and the sands of the Middle East, Puerto Ricans have been
7 there and have shed their blood.
8 Throughout all these operations, Fort Buchanan has
9 always stood ready to support us and has been a principal
10 place for mobilization and coordination, particularly for the
11 Grenada efforts, for the people who were going to the
12 Operation Desert Shield in the Gulf Coast, for the trainees
13 that were organized in Puerto Rico. Today more than ever, we
14 in Puerto Rico stand ready to assume an even greater role in
15 the Army of the 21st century.
16 Closing Fort Buchanan, the only active Army
17 installation in Puerto Rico and the whole Caribbean region,
18 is certain to lead us in the wrong direction. I strongly
19 urge you to remove Fort Buchanan from any proposed base
20 closure list.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Delegate
22 Romero-Barcello. We appreciate it. Thank you.

Page 261

1 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Chaffee, I hate to have to
3 tell you, we're on Murphy's rules. A House vote interrupted
4 the Pennsylvania delegation. There are two members who have
5 returned, and I want to accommodate them, if you will give me
6 that courtesy. And I appreciate that usual courtesy from my
7 friend from the great State of Rhode Island.
8 And we're delighted to honor and recognize
9 Represent Ron Klink.
10 REPRESENTATIVE KLINK: I thank the members of the
11 Commission. I thank Senator Chaffee for also stepping aside
12 for a few moments. I know that you've heard from some of my
13 fellow Congressmen. I just wanted to come before you and
14 again ask for unanimous consent that my entire statement be
15 permitted into the record.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And it will be reproduced in the
17 record in full, Congressman.
18 REPRESENTATIVE KLINK: Thank you very much. Again.
19 I want to talk on behalf of the 911th Airlift Wing, like the
20 other members of the Pennsylvania delegation. The 911th, as
21 you're probably aware by now, operates very economically on
22 about 115 acres of land. It's a tremendous facility that

Page 262

1 comprises the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport.
2 This is the largest land mass airport in the Mid-
3 Atlantic and Northeastern part of the United States. And it
4 is the fourth largest in the entire country. The airport
5 contains more than 12,000 acres of land, and much of it is
6 still available for airport-related development.
7 The Pittsburgh Airport is USAIR's largest hub. It
8 will handle over 20 million passengers and 450,000 airlift
9 operations this year alone. Pittsburgh International
10 Airport, for example, has resources that are not available at
11 many smaller airfields across this country, three of the most
12 important services I think the Commission should be available
13 of because they're provided to the 911th direct benefits that
14 are offered at practically no cost -- runway construction and
15 maintenance, aircraft rescue, as well as firefighting.
16 In the case of field and runway maintenance,
17 Allegheny County each year allocates $6.5 million for runway
18 building and upkeep, which includes about 120 personnel on
19 approximately 30 pieces of snow clearance and removal
20 equipment valued at about $15 million. When the snow flies,
21 the operation goes on.
22 And, in fact, we will tell you that over the past

Page 263

1 12 years, not one minute has been lost in takeoffs and
2 landings at Greater Pittsburgh International Airport because
3 of snow and ice. The airport's all-weather capability, in my
4 view, is a very strong selling point, and these runways are
5 available to the 911th Airlift Wing.
6 This is something that is greatly in their favor.
7 Currently, the airlift wing operates on four runways at
8 Greater Pittsburgh. And this runway length runs from 8,100
9 feet to 11,500 feet. And even more significant is the fact
10 that the airport has the ability to build two additional
11 runways, a northern parallel one and a southern parallel one,
12 without the need to purchase a single additional acre of
13 land.
14 Currently, the ability exists to handle
15 simultaneous arrivals and departures on runways 28R and 28L
16 when the southern parallel is built. It is next slated
17 runway construction with environmental review underway with
18 proposed construction in 1998.
19 The airport will have the capability for
20 simultaneous triple arrivals and departures. Only
21 Dallas/Fort Worth and the new Denver International Airports
22 can perform this type of sequence. Such rapid deployment is

Page 264

1 not possible on a runway operation. If you blow a tire on
2 one runway airport, you're out of business. You shut down.
3 At Pittsburgh, if this happens, you move to runway 2. You
4 move then to runway 3 or 4 or the fifth runway.
5 The cost of constructing new runway space can be
6 15,000 to $20,000 per running foot of 24-inch thick concrete
7 or anywhere from 150 million to 250 million for an 8,500 foot
8 runway. This is a cost that neither the 911th nor the
9 federal government has to bear. It is being absorbed by the
10 locality.
11 All of the land and expansion capabilities that
12 have been mentioned are currently being leased from Allegheny
13 County for $1 per year. The 911th Air Wing has a compact and
14 efficient infrastructure. All the facilities and buildings
15 are well maintained. In February of 1994, the 911th Air Wing
16 signed a memorandum of agreement with Allegheny County to
17 utilize 21.7 acres of land.
18 Additionally, the county has offered 30 acres of
19 prime ready ramp space to the Air Force in 1994. And
20 recently, Allegheny County offered an additional 47 acres of
21 concrete ramp space adjacent to the existing ramp at no cost
22 to the Air Force. The Air Force is not required to possess

Page 265

1 nor maintain this valuable acreage. It will be held in
2 escrow for future Air Force utilization. And again, it will
3 be held at no cost.
4 This is a unique arrangement. It should not be
5 overlooked by the Commission when they're considering what to
6 do. This offer is the outcome of a $500,000 study that was
7 begun back in 1983 and in 1988 at the 911th Air Lift Wing
8 Base at their comprehensive plan. The exceptional capacity
9 and capability of the 911th to accommodate contingency
10 mobilization and future total requirements are demonstrated
11 in the comprehensive summary that was submitted to the
12 Commission.
13 I will try to wrap up by just saying that I would
14 like you to also if you haven't done so thus far to also
15 submit to the record the letter that was written by the
16 Secretary of the Air Force Widnall, that states unequivocally
17 that the deactivation of the C-130 Reserve unit at Chicago's
18 O'Hare Airport, rather than the 911th in Pittsburgh, is more
19 cost-effective. And I would ask that that be submitted for
20 the record. And I thank you.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
22 Congressman Klink.

Page 266

1 And we now call upon your distinguished colleague,
2 Representative Kurt Weldon.
3 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
4 also ask unanimous consent to insert my system in the record.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And may I say to you, Congressman,
6 Weldon, that request is granted. Now, we do recognize that
7 two members of your delegation have been prevented from
8 speaking because of the roll call. They are welcome to come
9 tonight. I regret to say it will be after 7 o'clock,
10 Congressman.
11 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: I'll pass the word to them.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're very kind. I hope you
13 understand the problem with the Chair.
14 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: I do. Mr. Chairman, we
15 thank you for your leadership and the leadership of the
16 members of the Commission. I come today as a five-term
17 member of the National Security Committee, as an original
18 supporter of the BRAC process, and as chairman of the
19 Research and Development Subcommittee on the National
20 Security Committee in this Congress.
21 But I also come as a former teacher to give you a
22 report card, Mr. Chairman, in three areas. The three areas

Page 267

1 of interest that I have, I would give you an A, an
2 incomplete, and an F. The A, Mr. Chairman, is for the
3 recommendation of DOD and the Commission's acceptance of a
4 recommendation to consolidate machinery operations from
5 Annapolis to Philadelphia.
6 The former NAVSES operation, now Naval Surface
7 Warfare Center operation in Philadelphia, has become a crown
8 jewel of Navy surface ship engineering work. It makes sense,
9 it's logical, and it will save us a significant amount of
10 money.
11 For that, I give DOD and the Commission an A for
12 its foresight and would hope that you would follow through on
13 that recommendation. It's the direction that Congress is
14 going in in terms of consolidation. And as chairman of the
15 Research and Development Committee, I think it makes sense.
16 The second proposal I would like to talk about, I
17 give you an incomplete because you have not yet taken action,
18 even though it has been brought up by several of my
19 colleagues. And that is to continue Naval consolidation into
20 the NSWC at Philadelphia as it relates to machinery
21 operations. And this would consolidate NAVSEA's engineering
22 directorate for machinery systems, the 03 operation into

Page 268

1 Philadelphia, eliminating unnecessary duplication.
2 By fully integrating ship systems, life cycle
3 management, and in-service engineering into a cohesive
4 organization, the cost of designing and introducing new
5 systems into the fleet will be greatly reduced.
6 This proposal, Mr. Chairman, which has the support
7 of former Navy Secretaries John Lehman, as well as Shaun
8 O'Keefe, would save $165 million over 20 years, compared to
9 only $10 million in savings which would be realized if you
10 locate the 03 directorate at the Washington Navy Yard, as now
11 proposed. The Crystal City operation, in my opinion, should
12 be moved to Philadelphia. It will be logical, it will save
13 the Navy money, and I think would be more consistent in terms
14 of our future direction in regards to consolidations.
15 Let me give you my third area, Mr. Chairman. And
16 for that, I have to give you an F. Not you personally, but
17 the Commission. Because for the nine years that I've been in
18 Congress, I've been the only member coming before you trying
19 to close the facility. And each year, you've rejected me.
20 As a matter of fact, this year, the Commission did
21 not even consider my request, despite the support of the city
22 where the facility is housed, the county government that has

Page 269

1 gone on record, and all of the people in the area, we still
2 have an Army operation operating Naval tugs, Naval seagoing
3 tugs. To me, that's outrageous.
4 As a strong supporter of the military and a strong
5 supporter of defense, as a nine-year member of the committee
6 and as chairman of the R&D Committee, I think this Commission
7 is doing this country a disservice by not closing a facility
8 that's in my old hometown where I happen to be the mayor. We
9 have requested it. This year, you didn't look at it.
10 So while I give you an A for the one proposal, an
11 incomplete for the second, you fail in the third. That's a
12 shame, because your failure is a failure to the taxpayers.
13 It is unnecessary, it is an operation where the Reserve
14 officers there are protecting their own little operation and
15 little place along the Delaware River which is not necessary.
16 And I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, in your deliberations to
17 go back and look at this again.
18 Because I commit to you as a member of the National
19 Security Committee, I'm going to continue to pursue why the
20 Army has to have ocean-going tugs, when we have a fully
21 equipped Navy, which I'm a big supporter of, when we have the
22 necessary potential to meet any need that we have on the

Page 270

1 seas, and why we still have to have the Army operating ocean-
2 going tugs is beside me.
3 But the two consolidations at Philadelphia do make
4 sense. They are not in my Congressional district. They make
5 sense because they are right for the Navy.
6 As someone who voted for BRAC, in spite of knowing
7 that the Philadelphia Navy Yard was a possible candidate for
8 closure, these two consolidations make sense for the
9 taxpayers. They make sense for the Navy. They make sense
10 for the people of the region. They are right, they are
11 logical, and they will allow us to better utilize the
12 shrinking defense dollars that we're fighting on the floor to
13 keep in place at this very time working on the House National
14 Security legislation.
15 I thank you for your time. I thank you for your
16 indulgence in allowing me to come back. And I would hope
17 that when I come back the next time, that report card can be
18 switched to all As, and I can announce as a former teacher
19 that you've passed with flying colors. Thank you, Mr.
20 Chairman.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you, Congressman
22 Weldon. And I am properly chastised as Chair. But I'm going

Page 271

1 to give you an A anyway, because you did your job within five
2 minutes, and only three in your delegation did. You get an
3 A, Congressman Weldon, a solid A.
4 Now, ladies and gentlemen, this isn't very funny
5 work, I know, but maybe I've been sitting here too long. I'm
6 going to turn the Chair over to my distinguished colleague,
7 Commissioner Al Cornella, for the Rhode Island and Tennessee
8 delegations.
9 And I've been asked to announce that my old friend,
10 the distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island, Senator
11 Pell, as Senator Chaffee knows, is attending a funeral for
12 his friend and my own friend, former Secretary of Defense and
13 our former colleague, Les Aspin, a memorial service for him,
14 I should say. And we understand that, and we're going to
15 hear Senator Clayburn Pell later in the day.
16 And it's my delight to recognize an old friend,
17 Senator John Chaffee. I hope he'll understand that I have to
18 excuse myself for a few minutes.
19 SENATOR CHAFFEE: Thank you very much, Senator
20 Dixon and members of the Commission. First of all, I want to
21 thank you for the service to our nation that you're giving in
22 this very, very difficult task.

Page 272

1 I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
2 Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of
3 Defense Base Closures. I'll summarize my full statement and
4 would like to have it placed in the record.
5 My testimony will be somewhat different from what
6 you usually hear, because I give you good news. I support
7 all the recommendations that affect us in Rhode Island, three
8 in all, dealing with the Navy's presence in Newport. These
9 recommendations, of course, came from the Defense Department.
10 And as I mentioned, I supported each one of them.
11 First is the proposed consolidation of the Naval
12 Undersea Warfare Centers that are currently one in Newport,
13 one in New London. The proposal is they be consolidated in
14 Newport. I'm for that. I'm convinced the Newport
15 laboratories constitute an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art
16 facility.
17 Its upgrading in 1991 -- this is the facility in
18 Newport -- to a super lab status enhanced its reputation
19 which it had already earned as a center of excellence in
20 submarine research and development. The center is well-
21 prepared to increase its contribution to national security.
22 In fact, a $12 million laboratory was just opened in January,

Page 273

1 and two more major labs, one costing 11.2 million, the other
2 costing 21.7 million, are under construction and scheduled to
3 open in 1996.
4 These last two facilities are being built
5 specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and the BRAC '95
6 influx of personnel and their activities from New London over
7 to Newport. Consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare
8 Center at Newport will save DOD scarce resources by
9 eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies.
10 The 1991 action already appears well on its way to
11 reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will
12 result in further savings of $91.2 million over 20 years.
13 For the reasons cited above, I urge you to approve
14 the Navy's proposal to consolidate the Naval Underwater
15 Warfare Center's New London detachment into the Newport
16 headquarters.
17 Second, the Navy has recommended the relocation of
18 the Naval Research Laboratory Underwater Sound Reference
19 Detachment currently in Orlando, Florida, moving to Newport.
20 This proposal will achieve savings of 30.1 million over 20
21 years and will further strengthen the Navy's undersea
22 research and development effort. I heartily endorse that.

Page 274

1 Third, I would like to address the Navy's
2 recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training
3 Center in Meridian, Mississippi, some to Athens, Georgia, and
4 some to Newport's Naval Education Training Center. In
5 advancing this proposal, the Navy seeks to streamline its
6 operations and achieve savings by moving several
7 administrative schools from Meridian to Newport.
8 The Naval Education and Training Center at Newport
9 has long maintained a sterling reputation. It consists of
10 institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface
11 Warfare Officers' School, and many others which have provided
12 the fleet with the best educated, highest quality personnel.
13 The learning environment of the Naval Education and Training
14 Center in Newport is ideal for incorporation of the
15 administrative schools at Meridian.
16 Its classrooms in Newport are modern, housing is
17 plentiful, and the community will welcome students with open
18 arms. The move of this center to Newport will achieve needed
19 cost savings. Annual reoccurring savings after
20 implementation of the Naval air station Meridian, a closing
21 of the total facility at Meridian, is $26.9 million, with net
22 savings over 20 years of 344 million. That isn't all the

Page 275

1 part that's going to Newport. That's the complete closure of
2 the facility at Meridian.
3 For all these reasons, I urge the Commission to
4 approve the Navy's proposed transfer of the Naval Technical
5 Training Center in Meridian to Athens and to Newport. Again,
6 I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to
7 appear today to give this testimony. Thank you very much,
8 Mr. Commissioner.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA [Presiding]: Thank you, sir.
10 We thank the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Senator
11 John Chaffee.
12 SENATOR CHAFFEE: Thank you. And I came in under
13 time.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: And we appreciate that.
15 We'll move now to Representative Jack Reed.
16 REPRESENTATIVE REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
17 this opportunity to address the Commission and for your work
18 on behalf of the country and our defense.
19 I have a prepared statement which I would like to
20 submit and summarize that statement for the benefit of the
21 commissioners.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We would be glad to enter

Page 276

1 that into the record.
2 REPRESENTATIVE REED: Thank you very much, Mr.
3 Chairman. I rise in support along with my colleagues of the
4 proposals the Department of the Defense and Department of the
5 Navy to consolidate facilities in Newport, Rhode Island.
6 This is a continuation of policies that have been in effect
7 for several years.
8 It makes sense in terms of cost-effectiveness, it
9 makes sense in terms of the availability of the intellectual
10 capital we have built up in terms of scientists and
11 researchers and technicians in Newport. It also makes sense
12 in terms of the physical facilities at Newport, which will
13 readily accommodate all of these proposed transfers.
14 This is the type of, I think, sensible program and
15 programmatic changes that will strengthen our defense and
16 also save the taxpayers valuable dollars. Newport has long
17 been a center of research and Naval education. This proposal
18 will enhance that center and that ability to educate our Navy
19 and to provide the research we need as we face a
20 technological revolution in warfare over the next several
21 decades.
22 One other point I would like to add is that in

Page 277

1 terms of the human factors involved in some of these
2 consolidations, it's always very difficult because people
3 have attachments to localities, it's disruptive of the lives
4 of people to move. But particularly with respect to New
5 London and to Newport, my district sits squarely between the
6 two communities.
7 I have many people who live in my district and work
8 in New London or work in Newport and vice versa. And I think
9 this proposal not only will be sensible in terms of the
10 bottom line to the Navy and the mission of the Navy, but it
11 will be something that will accommodate in the easiest way
12 the lives and the futures of all the personnel that are
13 proposed to move.
14 So I would urge the Commission to support these
15 proposals, continue the consolidation of Naval underwater
16 research and testing and evaluation at Newport. It will be
17 in the best interest of the nation, and it will be in the
18 best interest of our taxpayers. And I thank the
19 commissioners for their efforts.
20 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Representative
21 Reed.
22 Representative Patrick Kennedy.

Page 278

1 REPRESENTATIVE KENNEDY: Mr. Chairman, members of
2 the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to testify along
3 with my colleagues from the Rhode Island delegation in
4 support of the Department of Defense Base Closure and
5 Realignment recommendations for the Naval Undersea Warfare
6 Center and the Naval Education Training Center, both located
7 in Newport, Rhode Island.
8 I realize that yesterday, the Commission heard a
9 day of testimony and today will continue to hear testimony
10 well into this evening, so I'll make my remarks brief. The
11 U.S. Navy has a long and rich history in Newport, Rhode
12 Island. Throughout that history, from the Revolutionary War
13 onward to this present day, the local community has actively
14 and vigorously supported a strong Naval presence in Rhode
15 Island.
16 Currently, the Navy is the largest single employer
17 in Newport County. And I am proud to say that the Navy
18 personnel, both military and civilian, play an integral role
19 in the community. It is in that vein and in that view that I
20 am pleased to represent the spirit of the Newport County
21 community and voice my support for the recommendations in the
22 BRAC '95.

Page 279

1 As you are well aware, DOD BRAC '95 recommendations
2 for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center built upon the previous
3 BRAC decisions. If the BRAC '95 recommendations are
4 implemented, they will complete the realignment of the Naval
5 underwater research and development and test and evaluation
6 functions in Newport.
7 The recommendations to consolidate undersea warfare
8 functions at Newport are consistent with the Navy's goals of
9 geographically consolidating compatible RDTE facilities,
10 interacting technical capabilities and resources, and
11 decreasing infrastructure and operating costs while at the
12 same time increasing the military value of those activities
13 not selected for closure.
14 Finally, I respectfully request that the Commission
15 support the incorporation of various Naval air training
16 activities at the Naval Education Training Center in Newport,
17 the Navy's premiere training site for officers, officer
18 candidates, senior enlisted personnel, and prospective
19 midshipmen. Such a realignment would result in a significant
20 return on investment in both the relatively short term, as
21 well as the long-term basis.
22 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I believe

Page 280

1 the DOD recommendations represent a win-win situation, as has
2 been said by my colleagues. They're cost-effective measures
3 and in the best interests of both the taxpayers, as well as
4 our military.
5 Having visited these facilities every weekend since
6 I've first been elected, I can tell you that the proximity of
7 the Naval Education Training Center with the Naval Undersea
8 Warfare Center next to the Naval War College is tremendous
9 and will only be enhanced by these BRAC recommendations.
10 There is compatibility and synergy because of their
11 collocation.
12 And, as I said before, Newport's proud of its
13 tradition of supporting the Navy. The whole community is
14 very actively anxious to facilitate in this process, and they
15 have the expertise to do so. I might add, the Chamber of
16 Commerce in Newport, as well as other retired military
17 personnel, are all active in preparing any of the movement
18 that needs to take place as a result of these
19 recommendations, so it's easy to make.
20 We have even got the superintendents of local
21 schools participating on this to show their interest in
22 making sure that the families have a quality of life that

Page 281

1 will be fitting for them in Newport. And, as you know,
2 quality of life is the number one issue, as recommended by
3 Defense Secretary Perry. And I think that in that spirit,
4 these recommendations should be implemented and would ask for
5 that consideration. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Kennedy.
8 And we thank the delegation from Rhode Island for
9 their testimony and also staying within the time limits. As
10 long as we're giving out grades here today, we'll give you an
11 A plus for that.
12 We'll now move on to the great State of Tennessee.
13 First to testify, the distinguished Senator, Bill Frist.
14 SENATOR FRIST: Mr. Chairman, commissioners, thank
15 you for this opportunity to testify in support of the defense
16 depot in Memphis, Tennessee.
17 Mr. Chairman, as I hope the testimony given today
18 by myself and my colleagues will demonstrate, the Memphis
19 depot is critical to the efficient and effective distribution
20 of material to our nation's armed forces, so critical, in
21 fact, that I believe the Defense Logistics Agency will not be
22 able to meet its distribution requirements in times of war or

Page 282

1 contingency operations if the current plan to disestablish
2 the Memphis depot is upheld.
3 Mr. Chairman, under the current plan, the DLA will
4 distribute and store military supplies through two primary
5 distribution sites, one on the Atlantic Coast and one on the
6 Pacific Coast. However, such a plan leaves a vast and
7 disturbing gap in coverage and in service for the Central
8 United States.
9 Moreover, as was dramatically demonstrated during
10 the Persian Gulf War, coastal PDS sites cannot support CONUS
11 facilities as efficiently as can a centrally located
12 distribution site. During both Operation Desert Shield and
13 Operation Desert Storm, goods shipped from the coast are
14 backed up almost to the point of gridlock, to use Admiral
15 Straw's word, while DDMT experienced no difficulty at all in
16 getting its goods shipped to military users.
17 In fact, not only was the Memphis depot ranked
18 number one in materiel support for our nation's fighting
19 forces in the Gulf, but it has subsequently participated in
20 every major military and humanitarian mission undertaken by
21 the Department of Defense. DDMT is the closest depot to the
22 largest concentration of our military forces, and 10 of the

Page 283

1 top 15 water ports in the United States are located on the
2 Gulf of Mexico in close proximity to DDMT.
3 Not only does it have the ability to support the
4 Southern hemisphere and the rest of the Western world, which
5 is more prone to multiple insurgencies, but it is a primary
6 distribution site and third partner to the coastal DLA depots
7 which service the European and Pacific Rim outport
8 requirements.
9 Mr. Chairman, by both quantitative and qualitative
10 measures, DDMT is superior and is more accessible than the
11 other depots. Thanks to its centralized location and depot
12 capabilities, DDMT provides truck services to 115 U.S.
13 installations of 100 persons or more. It has the ability to
14 outreach and service by truck 66 percent of active duty CONUS
15 military personnel within 48 hours. And 700,000 troops, or
16 42 percent of all CONUS based military personnel, can be
17 supported within a 24-hour period.
18 In terms of transportation infrastructure, the
19 Memphis depot is also unparalleled. This is demonstrated by
20 the fact that many major national and international
21 corporations have moved their distribution centers to Memphis
22 in recent years. Not only located on both East-West, as well

Page 284

1 as North-South interstates, it is home to over 200 trucking
2 companies.
3 It sits at the crossroads of 6 class 1 railroads --
4 6 railroads -- with 96 freight trains arriving and departing
5 daily. And it has unrivaled intermodal capability. It
6 boasts the world's second largest cargo airport, the second
7 largest in the world, with 9 airlines, 44 carriers. And
8 unlike Susquehanna, which was closed for 22 days last year
9 because of inclement weather, it has minimal constraints
10 imposed by weather conditions.
11 It also has two military air terminals. As
12 America's second largest inland port, with three harbors that
13 handle 11 million tons of cargo annually, Memphis is home to
14 six commercial barge lines and can accommodate ocean-going
15 ships 10 months of every year.
16 Mr. Chairman, the Defense Logistics Agency's
17 coastal PDS strategy has the advantage of simplicity. This
18 approach might even be adequate, were the DLA a commercial
19 entity that only has to meet the usual demands and deadlines
20 of commercial traffic. However, the DLA is not a commercial
21 entity, but rather the one agency responsible for supplying
22 America's fighting forces in times of peace, as well as times

Page 285

1 of war.
2 At such times, the movement of materiel both within
3 the U.S. and across the globe is critical. We must be
4 absolutely certain that the depot that is chosen can support
5 our military forces, and that is why I ask you to reconsider
6 the decision to disestablish the defense distribution depot
7 in Memphis, Tennessee.
8 Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and yield
9 to my colleague, Senator Thompson.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Senator, thank you for your
11 testimony.
12 We now call Senator Thompson.
13 SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, members of the
14 Commission, obviously, we're dealing here with a subject much
15 more important than even impact to the community or to the
16 jobs that are involved. We're dealing with a matter of
17 national defense and national security. And that's why I
18 applaud the efforts of the Department of Defense and the Base
19 Closure and Realignment Commission to streamline our nation's
20 defense system.
21 I must point out that the closure of the defense
22 distribution depot in Memphis would hurt, not help, our

Page 286

1 country's defense structure. As my colleagues will tell you,
2 Memphis and DDMT have the things that are needed when it
3 comes to serving our troops in emergency operations in the
4 field and at home.
5 From World War II to Desert Storm, the Memphis
6 depot has a proven record of service and continues to provide
7 top support to our men and women in uniform. It has
8 accomplished this through DDMT's modern, highly automated and
9 integrated facility. Goods are delivered efficiently
10 because, as many national and international companies know,
11 Memphis's excellent transportation system and central
12 location have helped make it America's distribution center.
13 At a time when the private sector finds Memphis
14 such an appealing place to set its business, why is the
15 Defense Department recommending that one of its prime
16 logistics centers be closed in a city with such assets? Part
17 of DOD's recommendations entail lessening the amount of
18 capacity in its storage system. As its closure list stands,
19 there would be a 22 million cubit foot shortfall in storage
20 requirements.
21 The Defense Logistics Agency has stated that the
22 Air Force Logistics Centers, the ALCs, coupled with direct

Page 287

1 vendor delivery, would make up that shortfall. As you know,
2 the Air Force never addressed the need to close any of its
3 maintenance depots or ALCs, and the Commission is presently
4 examining their role in future military operations.
5 This calls into question DLA's reliance on this
6 space, especially if any of the air logistics centers are
7 closed. If any of the centers are closed, then DLA will need
8 more storage capacity. The closure of even the smallest ALC
9 will result in a 17.8 million cubit foot shortfall in the
10 Defense Department storage of the materiel handling capacity.
11 Only a depot like DDMT can fulfill the requirement
12 for storage space and materiel handling facilities that DOD
13 will need. The Memphis depot's transportation assets and
14 central location are exceptional in comparison with any other
15 DLA facility. Even though DLA claims that its movements
16 toward a direct vendor delivery system will help facilitate
17 many of its future capacity needs, this system has never been
18 proven in wartime.
19 In fact, most vendors are small- to medium-sized
20 businesses which do not have a wide range of transportation
21 capabilities. Most vendors also do not have the warehousing
22 abilities that the depot system provides. Distribution depot

Page 288

1 Memphis is a vital link between contractors and soldiers for
2 the vendors who cannot ship directly to the troops.
3 While direct vendor delivery is an option for
4 distributing goods to our military men and women, the
5 customers -- that is, our American troops -- could be placed
6 in jeopardy if a direct vendor system were fully in place.
7 DLA has observed that this could be a problem and that an
8 intermediary depot would be required to meet our military
9 needs.
10 In summary, I ask the Commission to reconsider
11 fully Air Force and DLA's base closure procedures. There
12 appear to be many shortcomings, and the timely delivery of
13 military supplies could be threatened. It must be made clear
14 that the Memphis depot is the only DLA depot that has a
15 wealth of modern automated facilities, central location, and
16 exceptional transportation assets to meet the needs of our
17 military and other emergency operations.
18 And I believe that points out the uniqueness of
19 this situation. We're very well aware of the appeals that
20 are made before this Commission and the exceptions that are
21 pointed out. But here, we do have a unique situation. We
22 ask that this not be lost in the shuffle. Whether you're

Page 289

1 looking at matters of transportation or location or
2 automation, this facility is a unique facility.
3 It was the Memphis depot and its 1,300 employees,
4 many of whom or some of whom are here today, that would be,
5 frankly, disproportionately affected as minority employees if
6 this closure goes through. These employees have helped ship
7 supplies to relieve workers in Oklahoma City the day of the
8 federal building bombing disaster.
9 During Operation Desert Storm, it was DDMT that was
10 the number one shipper of supplies to our troops in the
11 Persian Gulf. DDMT must be retained, because during war and
12 peace, it has a proven record of serving men and women in the
13 military and the people of this country, and closing it will
14 mean the loss of a valuable resource for this nation.
15 I thank you for the opportunity that we have to
16 present this case and ask you to consider these points ahead,
17 as I know you will, as the Commission formulates its final
18 list for the President. Thank you very much.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Senator Thompson, we thank
20 you for your excellent testimony.
21 And we now welcome Representative Harold Ford.
22 REPRESENTATIVE FORD: Thank you very much, Mr.

Page 290

1 Chairman and the members of the BRAC Commission. I
2 appreciate the opportunity to join with my colleagues from
3 Tennessee to make this case of the defense distribution depot
4 in Memphis.
5 I want to express my appreciation to the
6 commissioners and the staff. Everybody has been courteous
7 and certainly have been accommodating throughout this whole
8 process.
9 I particularly would like to thank Commissioner
10 Kling, who visited the site in Memphis, and would also like
11 to take the opportunity to thank Chairman Dixon and to
12 Commissioner Steele, Commissioner Cornella, along with
13 Commissioner Cox for taking time to meet with us and talk
14 about some of the problems that we see and the things that we
15 wanted to highlight in Memphis.
16 Our two Senators making compelling arguments who
17 have already testified before your Commission today about the
18 depot's strategic geographic location, unmatched
19 transportation infrastructure, and the importance of
20 maintaining the depot to fill the anticipated shortfalls in
21 storage capacity in the DOD distribution system, it is a
22 pleasure for us to testify, but it is very critical for us in

Page 291

1 the Tennessee area and those of us who live in the mid-South
2 area of Memphis.
3 Senators Thompson and Frist have explained in the
4 clearest terms the potential negative impact that closure of
5 the depot will have on the Department of Defense and its
6 distribution system.
7 I would like to cover another important area. That
8 is, the rationale behind the DLA's closure recommendation.
9 Before I do that, let me say that I am the Congressman from
10 the area that this defense base is located, and I am
11 extremely concerned about the economic impact that this
12 closure would have on the Memphis community. And I would
13 urge the Commission members to be sensitive to the adverse
14 impact of the closure in the workforce that we have in the
15 Memphis area.
16 The primary issue that I would like to address
17 today is the rationale behind the closure recommendation.
18 The Defense Logistics Agency has taken great pains to point
19 out that its decision to close DDMT was the result of an
20 evaluation of a continuation of factors called "BRAC
21 evaluation tools." And I believe a fresh look at DLA's own
22 BRAC evaluation tools will reveal that defense depot should

Page 292

1 remain open in Memphis, Tennessee.
2 These tools include military value, DOD force
3 structure plan, concept operations, joint service decisions,
4 and excess capacity. The first factor is military value. By
5 DLA's own analysis, Memphis was ranked third in military
6 value among stand-alone depots. However, DLA chose to
7 disregard DDMT's high military value ranking in favor of an
8 installation analysis which is of questionable merit.
9 DOD logistics strategic plan states that
10 transportation, not storage capacity, is critical military
11 value factor. And, as you have heard, DDMT is located in the
12 industry accepted transportation capital of the U.S. and
13 basically the world. Why, therefore, was DLA military
14 analysis structured to ensure that DDMT receive only 20 out
15 of 2,000 possible points for transportation resources?
16 The DLA's concept of operation requires that it
17 will be able to support two major regional conflicts by using
18 both coasts. Prior to BRAC '95, defense depot Memphis was
19 the primary war-fighting depot during the only major conflict
20 in Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm. Today, DLA has not
21 included a mobilization plan to determine how it would
22 provide without the capabilities provided by the DDMT in

Page 293

1 Memphis.
2 With respect to joint service decisions and excess
3 capacity, even though the DLA negotiated with the Air Force
4 and Navy for extra storage space, DLA has admitted there will
5 be a shortfall as a result of the closure of a maintenance
6 depot. And I believe that the shortfall requires DLA to
7 reassess its future capacity requirements in whether or not
8 it can afford the closure of a stand-alone depot like
9 Memphis, Tennessee.
10 In conclusion, members of the Commission, Mr.
11 Chairman, I ask that you and the Commission members go beyond
12 the mere cost considerations in your decisions on our defense
13 distribution system.
14 I ask that you consider the human and economic
15 consequences of displacing a community with
16 disproportionately high unemployment rates as important as
17 the Commission will make these decisions to make sure that
18 during wartime and peacetime, that the Department of Defense
19 and the Pentagon will have those logistics centers that can
20 meet the need and the building that will require the military
21 defense. Thank you.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman

Page 294

1 Ford.
2 And we welcome Representative Ed Bryant.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BRYANT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
4 and other members of the Commission. I appreciate very much
5 the opportunity along with the rest of the Tennessee
6 delegation to speak to this Commission.
7 My district does not include the Memphis depot.
8 However, as a former Army veteran and as a representative of
9 the area next to the depot, I am very much of one community
10 with Congressman Ford in urging this committee to relook at
11 their decision in closing the Memphis depot.
12 Memphis, in our opinion, is the most cost-effective
13 stand-alone depot in the nation and the Defense Department.
14 I am resolute in my belief that the important fact cannot and
15 must not be ignored by anyone through the remainder of the
16 process in the weeks ahead. Mr. Chairman, I believe our
17 performance in Memphis in carrying out our intricate mission
18 for our military is indicative of its importance for the
19 Defense Department and the security needs of America.
20 I think it would be accurate to say that Memphis
21 has strengthened our military effectiveness and readiness. I
22 would like to just pick up, if I could, and skip over a

Page 295

1 couple of comments. I know I've got a little bit shorter
2 time. But I wanted to follow up on Senator Thompson's
3 comments about the idea of the concept of direct vendor
4 system.
5 Mr. Chairman. I would question the efficiency and
6 the effectiveness of such a system envisioned to supposedly
7 supplant the already proven distribution process in Memphis.
8 In essence, the direct vendor system could very well be a
9 scatter shot approach for an operation which requires
10 organization, timeliness, and efficiency. And I have grave
11 concerns about this concept.
12 I also don't believe our military effectiveness
13 should be gambled -- our readiness should be gambled and our
14 security of our country in an effort to save money through
15 this type of concept. I would also like to point out the
16 fact that Memphis -- and follow up to what the Congressman
17 has said -- has gained an outstanding reputation as a
18 nationwide distribution center.
19 And I know this Commission has heard this before,
20 but I'll put aside my notes and just talk to you briefly
21 about this. Last week, I had the privilege of attending
22 another national corporation's grand opening in Memphis in

Page 296

1 Shelby County of a distribution center. And Memphis has
2 proven itself over the years through its railway system, its
3 highway system, its waterway system.
4 And now, with the addition of Federal Express, we
5 have that unique ability to place orders and get supplies out
6 by midnight the night before and delivered the next day,
7 which I don't think any other depot in this country has. And
8 because of our central location to either coast, we're able
9 to meet the needs of any contingent in any war anyplace in
10 this world, I think, better than any other department and
11 depot in this nation.
12 And it begs the question, I think -- it's something
13 of concern I've always had, when I sit back as a Congressman
14 from this district and see America's best industries,
15 America's best companies coming to Memphis and recognizing it
16 as a distribution center and yet I see my very own government
17 moving away from Memphis. And I think that's an important
18 issue. I think that would be a good example for us to look
19 at as we make this decision.
20 I would urge this Commission, in summary, to look
21 at these issues of location, proven effectiveness, the
22 caliber of work that we have already done for this country,

Page 297

1 and I ask you to seriously reconsider your decision to close
2 the Memphis depot. And I would again thank you on behalf of
3 our delegation. Thank you.
4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you very much.
5 As long as we have most of the people here from
6 Texas, I would like to open with a comment that we will try
7 to hold all testimony to five minutes. We have over 200
8 members of Congress testifying before us.
9 And with that, I will begin with the senior Senator
10 from Texas, Senator Phil Gramm.
11 SENATOR GRAMM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
12 Chairman, let me repeat to you what I said in Fort Worth this
13 weekend. And that is, your work is critically important. I
14 congratulate each of you for your willingness to serve. And
15 I'm confident that you're going to do your best to try to
16 make a determination as to what is in the country's interest
17 and that you're going to be fair in each and every case that
18 you deal with.
19 I've got a short time. I want to touch on just a
20 few key points. First of all, in terms of Red River Army
21 Depot, I believe that credible evidence has been presented to
22 question whether or not one heavy depot can do all the

Page 298

1 peacetime work in the Army. I think there is a very serious
2 question as to whether one heavy depot can meet a wartime
3 surge and, as a result of that question, and even if you were
4 looking at only it alone, I think the Red River Army Depot
5 should not be closed.
6 I could outline the fact that it won the
7 President's Quality Award this year. The economic impact at
8 Red River Army Depot would be larger than any other proposed
9 closing on your list. I'm confident when you look at all
10 those things, it's going to stay open.
11 I support the single siding of the T-45 in Corpus
12 Christi. I support unifying the mine warfare helicopters.
13 And I also agree with those who say that there is room to
14 continue the T-44 training at Corpus Christi.
15 In terms of Reese Air Force Base, I think if you
16 look at the factors that are critical to pilot training in
17 the Air Force, that Reese stacks up well. Secondly, I want
18 to urge you to look not just at air space today, but the
19 relevant question is, what is air space going to look like 20
20 years from now. When you look at that, the argument for
21 Reese skyrockets.
22 Finally, Reese has a major university, a major

Page 299

1 city. The quality of life there, the access to education and
2 jobs for spouses is, I think, very strong.
3 In terms of Kelly Air Force Base, Kelly is the
4 lowest labor cost, the highest labor productivity, and in
5 terms of the quality of workmanship, the number one logistics
6 center in the Air Force. I mentioned in Fort Worth this
7 weekend that the commodity-based comparison makes absolutely
8 no sense economically, and I want to urge you to challenge it
9 and reject it. I am confident if you do, that you're going
10 to keep Kelly open.
11 Finally, the biggest surprise on the base closing
12 list to me was Brooks Air Force Base. Long ago, we should
13 have turned this into a scientific center. It has facilities
14 that are very specialized. It does all the drug testing for
15 the military. It is basically a science and research center.
16 It has brand-new facilities.
17 It seems to me that operating in Military City, USA
18 under a contonement plan where it is basically run out of
19 Kelly, that we can save tens of millions of dollars by
20 keeping this facility open, limiting its function to
21 research, having it supervised out of Kelly.
22 And I want to remind you that you're dealing with

Page 300

1 Ph.D.s, with scientists, who are not simply going to get up
2 and leave the research center in San Antonio. Many of them
3 are going to refuse to move. And I think if you look at this
4 decision on Kelly, you're going to conclude that it was the
5 poorest decision that was made in the whole base closing
6 recommendation.
7 A final point. Our love affair in Texas with our
8 military bases didn't happen the day that they went on the
9 Base Closing Commission list. Texans have always believed in
10 a strong defense. We have always been supportive of defense.
11 We want to continue to play a leadership role. We ask you to
12 look at the arguments that we have made to make a judgement
13 on the merits.
14 And we're confident that when that judgement is
15 made, that Kelly is going to be kept open, that Brooks is
16 going to be kept open, that Red River Army Depot is going to
17 be kept open.
18 And we believe that if you will look 20 years into
19 the future at air space, if you will look at quality of life,
20 which is not a major factor, but it's a significant factor,
21 and if you will compare Reese on those factors that are
22 important to the function Reese performs, pilot training in

Page 301

1 the Air Force, that Reese will also stay open.
2 I want to thank the committee for their
3 consideration and thank you for the good work you're doing.
4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Senator Gramm.
5 And now, we call Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson.
6 SENATOR HUTCHINSON: I certainly appreciate the
7 opportunity to be here with you again. Since I only saw you
8 three days ago, I'm tempted to say, we have got to stop
9 meeting like this. Since I'm your 167th witness in two days,
10 I know you would agree.
11 I want to talk briefly about our Texas bases. The
12 capacity and quality of Laughlin Air Force Base makes it the
13 Air Force's premiere undergraduate pilot training base. And
14 its location will make it remain forever so in the entire
15 United States.
16 Bergstrom Air Force Reserve Base has been a great
17 one and would continue to be. Carswell has the unique
18 mission of joint training that is a model for future
19 interservice cooperation in efficiencies, and it has been a
20 perfect model. The San Antonio community presented an
21 innovative plan to keep the function of Brooks Air Force Base
22 in San Antonio at reduced cost to the taxpayers and also

Page 302

1 providing the savings above the original Air Force proposal.
2 Brooks is not an Air Force base. It's a research
3 center. Its excellence would be compromised if the technical
4 staff didn't move, and the statistics show that they probably
5 won't. The Brooks contonement is the most innovative
6 proposal of the entire BRAC this time. I think it meets your
7 standard of substantial deviation, and I hope you will reward
8 innovation, excellence, and efficiency.
9 We in Texas support the consolidation of Navy
10 strike pilot training at Kingsville NAS. Also, Corpus
11 Christi NAS in South Texas provides the best air space and
12 training conditions for Navy pilot training. We are not
13 contesting the Navy's proposal, but T-44 training should stay
14 at Corpus.
15 Your Commission staff not only ranks Reese higher
16 in military value than its nearest competitor, but it also is
17 the clear choice of pilots and instructors. The Commission
18 heard sworn testimony from Brigadier General McFalls that he
19 chose Reese as the first Navy Air Force joint training base
20 because it was clearly the Air Force's best place to do it.
21 When you're looking at roughly equal facilities,
22 quality of life should be the tie breaker. Reese has job

Page 303

1 opportunities for spouses and a great university for
2 continued education of our military personnel and spouses.
3 Now, I want to talk about the two depots that are
4 on the list from Texas, and I want to talk about readiness.
5 We have a goal of winning two major regional conflicts that
6 are near simultaneous. We don't know what "near
7 simultaneous" means. We know that other potential aggressors
8 will have learned Saddam Hussein's lesson that you can't let
9 America have time to gear up, or you will pay a price.
10 Anyone who talks about readiness, anyone who talks
11 about the ability of our smaller armed services to meet the
12 test of two MRCs is talking first about lift capacity. As a
13 member of the Armed Services Committee, every service Chief
14 and every Secretary has come to us and said, "We must have
15 adequate air lift." Adequate air lift includes a dependence
16 to a great extent on the C-5.
17 There is only one hangar in America that can take a
18 C-5, and that is at Kelly. The competitors said last
19 Saturday that they could build a hangar to take Kelly for
20 about $52 million. Those numbers are not correct. It will
21 take $275 million to replicate the hangar at Kelly that can
22 take a C-5.

Page 304

1 We cannot afford to take this chance on readiness
2 by moving the expertise and moving away from the one hangar
3 that is there that can provide the C-5, which is going to be
4 a major part of our air lift capacity for the years to come.
5 Another major issue for readiness is maintenance of
6 equipment not being replaced. Red River Army Depot maintains
7 Bradleys, multiple launch rocket systems, and M-113 families
8 of vehicles. Not one of those is going to come online to be
9 bought new in the next year, probably not in the next two or
10 three years, which makes maintenance and the expertise even
11 more important.
12 The Army is suggesting that we put all of our
13 capabilities into one place, Anniston. Anniston's terrific.
14 Red River is terrific. Red River has proven in every
15 competition that it is the best. Red River maintains these
16 vehicles. We cannot afford by military strategy to put all
17 our eggs in one basket, and most certainly if we have a surge
18 need, we're not going to be able to fill it if we're at 100
19 percent capacity at Anniston.
20 Most certainly, if we had something terrible like a
21 natural disaster, having all our eggs in one basket does not
22 make sense. So I am just going to say that we have the case

Page 305

1 to be made on the merits for these very important readiness
2 issues for Texas. And I want to end by saying that our Texas
3 delegation comes to you, Republicans and Democrats. We
4 support the military. We have done it on the merits for
5 years and years and years.
6 We are not a delegation that comes to you voting
7 against the defense budgets, against the defense increases,
8 and then asks you to spend more by saving our bases. We are
9 supporting our military. We support it because it's right
10 for our national defense. And we thank you for all the
11 efforts you're putting forward. Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Senator
13 Hutchinson.
14 Again, I will reiterate that we want to try to stay
15 within our five-minute time limit if we could, please, as
16 each speaker comes to the podium.
17 It was appropriate, I guess, to finish with Red
18 River. So we'll continue on with that. Representative Jim
19 Chapman.
20 REPRESENTATIVE CHAPMAN: Commissioners, thank you
21 very much. I see that I stand before a group all but one of
22 whom have been to Red River Army Depot. And we will cure

Page 306

1 that situation on Thursday. Commissioner Davis, we are
2 pleased and excited that you are coming along with
3 Commissioner Cox and look very much forward to your visit.
4 I want to echo what Senator Hutchinson has said.
5 First, I want to thank all of you. Knowing the terrific and
6 burdensome job that you have, I want to thank you for having
7 taken the time to come to Bowie County.
8 I want to remind you, though, at the same time
9 within the allotted time that I have that Red River Army
10 Depot is unique. It is the only depot in the Army that is a
11 combination of maintenance, supply, ammunition storage,
12 collocated with a large ammo plant, Lone Stone Army
13 Ammunition Plant.
14 It is the largest depot in the system. It is by
15 age of facilities the newest. Senator Hutchinson has already
16 said, we believe it is the best, not from the subjective
17 opinion of the hometown Congressmen, but from the objective
18 analysis and awards that have been won by this facility. It
19 was named as the President's quality leader award as one of
20 the finest facilities not in DOD but in the entire federal
21 government, one of four winners this year and the only winner
22 in the Department of Defense.

Page 307

1 The capacity is the issue in the depots. We know
2 that. Capacity, we believe, if you try to put all of the
3 work that could result from the work that would be necessary
4 in the two theater scenario that Senator Hutchinson
5 mentioned. To pour all of that or attempt to pour all of
6 that into a single ground maintenance facility, we believe,
7 is a terrible mistake.
8 We believe that Anniston is a good facility. We
9 believe Red River is even better. And we believe it is a
10 mistake to put all of your eggs in one depot basket. Red
11 River Army Depot is unique. It is the only facility in the
12 world that maintains over 75 percent of the ground vehicles
13 that you find in an Army mechanized division. Nowhere else
14 in the world is that work done today.
15 The Army's workload numbers support the contention
16 that if we consolidate all of this into one facility,
17 Anniston will not have surge capacity, we will not be able to
18 respond, and we think it would be a mistake.
19 You all know -- and, Commissioner Davis, you'll
20 hear me later this week take issue -- substantial issue, in
21 many cases, with some of the Army's numbers. We have tried
22 to make a case individually and collectively that we believe

Page 308

1 the costs of closure are grossly understated when it comes to
2 Red River Army Depot and that the savings are overstated.
3 Last week or a few days ago, the Army redid its
4 COBRA numbers. And, while we still believe the case to be
5 that costs of closure are understated and savings overstated,
6 at least we now find that if it comes to the situation of
7 comparing Red River to its depot competition, its military
8 value is double that of Letterkenny, and the savings are
9 greater by realigning Letterkenny than closing Red River.
10 We believe the win-win scenario -- and that's what
11 we have called it -- is to keep your two best depots,
12 Anniston and Red River. We believe you should downsize to
13 core. And we believe that by doing so and that partnering
14 with private industry, everybody wins, the taxpayers, the
15 Army, the military, national security, private industry. We
16 all win. We believe that is what we ought to do.
17 And finally, let me just say, as you all know too
18 well, of the BRAC recommendations this year, the economic
19 impact is most severe at Red River Army Depot. In fact, of
20 all of the recommended closures and realignments, of all of
21 the negative impact of this BRAC, 10 percent of the total
22 impact falls from the closure of Red River Army Depot.

Page 309

1 It is, according to the Army's numbers, going to
2 drive our unemployment rate to almost 22 percent. And those
3 of you who have been there and seen the statistics know, it
4 will likely stay there for many, many years.
5 I know the negative impact is going to be great in
6 every community that is adversely impacted by your decisions.
7 But I suggest to you that closing the best installation,
8 loading all of your eggs in one basket, and by doing so,
9 devastating and driving the unemployment rate in this
10 community this high for many, many years is the wrong thing
11 to do.
12 We trust your judgement. We hope that you will
13 view all of the facts and in your final analysis vote to
14 remove Red River from the list. And Commissioner Davis, we
15 look forward to seeing you on Thursday. Mr. Chairman, I
16 thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
18 Chapman.
19 Representative Joe Barton.
20 REPRESENTATIVE BARTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
21 I'm here to make a plea for the 301st Air Force Reserve Unit
22 at Naval Air Station Fort Worth which this Commission has

Page 310

1 asked to be looked at for deactivation or relocation.
2 The problem with the idea of moving the 301st is
3 that it will not close a base and actually might keep one
4 open. It won't save money. In fact, it will cost $16 and-a-
5 half million more. Deactivating the 301st would result in no
6 base closure, no base closure savings, and would cost the
7 American taxpayer millions of dollars each and every year as
8 far as the eye can see.
9 The fact is that base operations and overhead at
10 Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base must continue with or without
11 the 301st. In fact, other units at the Joint Reserve Base
12 must pick up support contributions that are now presently
13 borne by the 301st Air Force Reserve unit. Over $1.2 million
14 has been identified as a potential cost that the Navy must
15 pick up.
16 Deactivating the 301st is a force structure issue.
17 DOD analysis correctly shows that such an action would never
18 result in a payback.
19 On the contrary, closing Bergstrom Air Force Base
20 and moving the 10th Air Force headquarters to the Naval air
21 station joint Reserve base in Fort Worth results in complete
22 closure of a DOD installation. This action would have an

Page 311

1 immediate or one-year payback. Annual recurring savings
2 would continue in the amount of about $4 and-a-half million
3 annually. This 4.5 million is understated due to substantial
4 annual savings associated with joint training operations at
5 the joint Reserve base.
6 At the request of the BRAC, COBRA models were run
7 on May 5, 1995, and May 10, 1995, that compared deactivating
8 the 301st in Fort Worth and closing Bergstrom and moving the
9 10th Air Force headquarters to Fort Worth. This focus is
10 based on a comparison with Bergstrom, since Bergstrom is the
11 DOD recommendation for closure that has been presented to the
12 Commission.
13 This analysis shows closing Bergstrom to be clearly
14 the most cost-effective. The COBRA models confirm that
15 closing a base saves more money than not closing a base.
16 It's not even a close call.
17 The first item the COBRA model looked at was the
18 net one-time cost to deactivate the 301st in Fort Worth which
19 would be $2,946,000. The total one-time cost to close
20 Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force headquarters to Fort
21 Worth would be $4,362,000. So the net savings to close
22 Bergstrom versus deactivating the 301st would be that

Page 312

1 difference, or $16,584,000.
2 The second big area the COBRA models evaluated was
3 the annual recurring savings. The steady state savings to
4 close Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force would be
5 $17,666,000. The steady state savings to deactivate the
6 301st at Naval Air Station at Fort Worth would be
7 $13,195,000. So the annual recurring savings to close
8 Bergstrom as a net difference of the two are $4,471,000.
9 Again, deactivating the 301st Naval Air Station
10 Fort Worth Joint Reserve unit results in no base closure, no
11 base closure savings, and never pays back. Instead, there
12 would be recurring costs to other DOD units at that remaining
13 base.
14 Another issue that I would like to address very
15 quickly concerns a supposed promise to Austin and reliance on
16 that promise. Austin Mayor Todd in the Austin delegation had
17 represented that somehow, the Air Force made a promise about
18 locating the Air Force Reserve unit at the Bergstrom site.
19 Congressman Geren and others have clearly shown that there
20 was no promise or commitment made, even given the benefit of
21 the doubt, beyond 1996.
22 During her site visit to Fort Worth last week,

Page 313

1 Commissioner Cox assured me that the promise was no longer an
2 issue for BRAC '95. Austin wants only one thing, the
3 economic advantages of the Bergstrom location for a civilian
4 airport. And they're to be commended for that.
5 I would like to submit for the record a news
6 article of June the 5th in the Austin American Statesman that
7 shows right now, there is a big controversy between the
8 airlines that want to use the new airport and the airport
9 authority about whether to build a second runway. They're
10 going to issue bonds in Austin this fall for about $600
11 million to build the second runway. And the airlines do not
12 want the second runway built.
13 If the second runway is not built, you can't have
14 the Air Force unit there, because it would only be one
15 runway. I don't have that article with me, but I will submit
16 it for the record.
17 In short, it doesn't make sense to deactivate the
18 301st. It doesn't make sense to move the 301st. It's a part
19 of a joint concept that's working very well with the Navy,
20 the Army, the Texas Air National Guard, the Marine Air Corps,
21 and the Air Force Reserve. Thank you very much.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman.

Page 314

1 Congressman Lloyd Doggett.
2 REPRESENTATIVE DOGGETT: Thank you very much. And
3 I thank all of you members of the Commission. There is
4 clearly no way that we're going to achieve both economic
5 security with a balanced budget and military security unless
6 we achieve savings through base closure.
7 And I'm going to take a little different position
8 than perhaps some of your other Congressional witnesses,
9 because I want to emphasize that if the Air Force unit in the
10 10th Congressional district that I represent cannot pass
11 muster under your applicable criteria, I think you ought to
12 close it.
13 The taxpayers of America and the taxpayers of
14 Travis County are not going to benefit if we keep a unit that
15 is not efficient and is not economical. But I would say to
16 you, if the taxpayers in Travis County and throughout this
17 country are receiving a benefit as compared with other bases
18 and if you evaluate that benefit on a level playing field and
19 you compare it to the alternatives, then you have a
20 responsibility under the same standards to maximize the use
21 of that facility.
22 All that we are asking in the City of Austin is

Page 315

1 that you evaluate our base relative to others on a level
2 playing field. Let me just summarize a very few of the
3 special things about Bergstrom Air Force Base. During the
4 1991 BRAC process, as you know, Bergstrom was recommended for
5 closure.
6 After that, the citizens of Austin approved by a
7 vote the conversion of that base into a civilian airport.
8 And it's moving faster than luggage through the Denver
9 airport, I can assure you. The cargo operations are now
10 scheduled to begin in 1996. And there's no reason, newspaper
11 clipping aside, to assume they won't. And passenger
12 operations will begin in 1988.
13 The relative cost of keeping the 924th as a tenant
14 in the Austin Airport have to be evaluated not just on 1994
15 and 1995 before the new airport is ever opened, when costs
16 are at their peak. But I think you have to consider the fact
17 that the cost will drop when cargo gets there. And then,
18 they're going to drop dramatically when we have passenger
19 operations underway in 1998, which I have no reason to assume
20 will not occur.
21 Now, there is some disagreement. I think it's
22 sparked by an unfortunate disagreement not of my making and

Page 316

1 not of the making of any of my colleagues, but which you've
2 seen, I'm sure in other parts of the country between some
3 people in Austin and some people in the Fort Worth area over
4 the two relative bases.
5 I don't plan to participate in that disagreement,
6 except to this extent. As far as what Austin was promised by
7 the BRAC in the past or what it has not been promised, our
8 position has never been that the 1991 BRAC could or did say
9 that we would have a unit there for the rest of civilization.
10 Rather, it was our understanding that if we
11 proceeded as we have done with the conversion, with the
12 investment of local funds in a conversion to a domestic or
13 civilian airport, that the unit wouldn't be moved
14 immediately. And now, we're to a point where we're
15 fulfilling our obligations and feel that the Air Force in
16 proposing to move the unit is not fulfilling its.
17 Our frustration is, we met the 1996 deadline.
18 We're doing that. And we believe that the unit should not be
19 taken away on that basis. But I think the focus has got to
20 be not just on the promise but on the cost, because that's
21 what we're concerned about. And when you look at the
22 facility that will be there in terms of its size, in terms of

Page 317

1 its runways, in terms of its training areas, it has ample
2 capacity for inclusion of additional units with varied
3 missions.
4 It's uniquely located, the closest unit to Fort
5 Hood, which will soon hold 40 percent of the United States
6 Army's combat power. Bergstrom is the only Air Force Reserve
7 facility located in such close proximity to that
8 installation.
9 In addition to its logistical superiority, the
10 924th has itself proven in its winning members in the long
11 shot '95 competition at Nellis Air Force Base with the
12 missions that flew just in March over at Bosnia what a
13 winning unit it is, without a single sortie canceled due to
14 mechanical or equipment failure.
15 Finally, we have the support there in Austin with a
16 high tech economy, the most highly educated populace of any
17 county in the country, with a city of over 250,000, 65
18 percent of our manufacturing workforce in the technology
19 area. It's the kind of city that is compatible with having
20 the kind of Air Force Reserves that we need. And we're
21 backed up and are immensely proud of the veterans
22 organizations and the many veteran retirees that we have

Page 318

1 there in the Austin area.
2 In summary, we believe we're going to have a first-
3 class airport that works and that we can provide the Air
4 Force a first-class, well-placed, well-trained Reserve unit.
5 Thank you.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Doggett, for your testimony.
8 And we now recognize Representative Pete Geren.
9 REPRESENTATIVE GEREN: Thank you, members of the
10 Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
11 you today. And for those of you who were fortunate enough to
12 make the trip to Fort Worth last Saturday, I hope that you
13 enjoyed our hospitality. And we appreciated very much your
14 taking the day and spending it there.
15 I'm going to touch on a couple of points today. In
16 addition to the 301st in Fort Worth, I would also like to
17 note the AFUS facility in Fort Worth, as well. I'm going to
18 go back over some of the points I made on Saturday. For
19 those of you who were there, I apologize for that. But I
20 think the issue that I want to emphasize is so important in
21 the consideration of this, I wanted to go over it with you.
22 But first, regarding the AFUS facility in Fort

Page 319

1 Worth. It's recommended for closure and realignment to
2 Edwards Air Force Base. I have some questions and additional
3 testimony I would like to submit regarding some of the data
4 used In any decision we make regarding AFUS that develops
5 and tests electronic warfare capability, it's a need
6 dramatically demonstrated by the shooting down of our F-16
7 pilot over Bosnia.
8 It's very important, and we believe that the
9 decision to move it out of Fort Worth is not cost-effective.
10 And we would like to provide additional information for the
11 record.
12 Regarding the JRB Fort Worth's military value, at
13 the hearing on Saturday, a couple of very important points
14 were emphasized. No less of an authority than the Chairman
15 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, sent a
16 letter that was introduced into the record on Saturday.
17 And let me quote from that record: "JRB Fort
18 Worth, which includes the 301st, it offers a prime
19 opportunity to demonstrate the viability of joint basing and
20 holds great promise for streamlining our infrastructure and
21 enhancing joint operational effectiveness."
22 Regarding Bergstrom, which unfortunately has become

Page 320

1 our competition in this initiative, General Shali also went
2 on to say that "The CINCs, chiefs of the services and I have
3 reviewed the proposal to close Bergstrom and determined that
4 it would not impair our ability to execute the national
5 military strategy."
6 Assistant Secretary of Defense Debbie Lee also sent
7 you a letter stating in part that it was imperative that the
8 301st remain part of JRB Fort Worth. The military value of a
9 joint operations base, particularly as we ask the Reserves to
10 do more with less, is we not only shrink our military but ask
11 it to get better at the same time. It's critical that we
12 heed the recommendations of these military experts in this
13 regard.
14 It is a success. In fact, it's a BRAC success. We
15 all started JRB Fort Worth in 1993. The outstanding men and
16 women out there are making it a success, and we urge that
17 BRAC let the success go forward.
18 The commitment whether or not the BRAC '93 or BRAC
19 '91 made a commitment to Austin somehow supersedes all of
20 your other considerations has worked its way as a primary
21 concern of the Commission. And you have to be fair. Our
22 government has to be fair. We understand that. I think it's

Page 321

1 important, though, to look at some of the words of the people
2 in Austin that have supposedly relied on this commitment to
3 see what their understanding of it was.
4 The mayor of Austin sent a letter to the DOD in
5 which he said, and I quote from it -- and a copy of it's in
6 the packet -- he understood that the 924th would remain there
7 until at least September 30, '96. Congressman Pickle said in
8 a public statement, "The Pentagon is committed to keeping the
9 unit there until 1996." So they all understand that your
10 commitment, if there is one, extended no further than that.
11 The city council actually passed a resolution
12 authorizing the move to Bergstrom. August 1, 1991, they laid
13 out the conditions for the move. They did not mention
14 anything about the Reserves. They said, "If we get the land
15 from the government, if we get the FAA to approve the master
16 plan, and if it's affordable, we'll move." The very same
17 day, they had another resolution that says, "Please leave the
18 924th there." It wasn't a condition.
19 They emphasize a statement by -- I say "they" --
20 Austin emphasizes a statement by Secretary Boatwright in
21 which he talked about leaving the Reserves at Austin. He did
22 say, if you took one sentence out of context, that it was

Page 322

1 their plan to leave those Reserves at Austin. But he went on
2 to say -- and he made it very clear -- and we showed a tape
3 of the hearing to the Commission on Saturday -- he said, "But
4 I can't make any long-standing commitment."
5 Secretary Boatwright is a professional. He does
6 not get out on a limb and promise something he can't deliver.
7 He didn't have the authority to bind the BRAC. But even if
8 he had, he made sure that he didn't do that. He said, "I
9 cannot make a long-standing commitment." And you have a copy
10 of the transcript of Mr. Boatwright's so-called "promise" in
11 your text.
12 And in closing, let me just mention a couple of
13 things. There's the understanding, I think, by some that
14 this move out of inner city Austin to this new site was
15 something that came about as a part of BRAC. Austin has been
16 trying to move its airport for 20 years. They decided about
17 10 years ago to move to Maynard, a little town outside of
18 Boston, and build the Green Field Airport.
19 When they got put on the BRAC list in 1990 by
20 Secretary Cheney, Secretary Cheney's whole list was rejected.
21 But when they got put on the BRAC list, then, they decided to
22 move from Maynard to Bergstrom, because it saved them $108

Page 323

1 million. It had nothing to do with the commitments you made.
2 My time is out. I see the gavel going up. I
3 appreciate very much the opportunity to meet with you, and
4 again, I appreciate your making the time to come to Fort
5 Worth last Saturday. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Geren.
8 Representative Larry Combest.
9 REPRESENTATIVE COMBEST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I know how
11 seriously you take your role in this Commission. That's why
12 I know that you appreciate the serious impact of closing any
13 undergraduate pilot training base, because pilot training is
14 the very core of our military readiness.
15 Here, you're being asked to make a very close call.
16 Your inclination might be to follow the Air Force
17 recommendations. However, as your own BRAC staff have
18 confirmed, the Air Force data was flawed, the wrong
19 recommendation was made. Reese does not belong at the bottom
20 of the list.
21 Had the Air Force data been correct, then another
22 base would be on the bottom, and your decision might be made

Page 324

1 amid less murky circumstances. I recall very clearly that
2 Commissioner Davis expressed a concern at the May 10th
3 hearing that the Commission not cut back too far in the area
4 of pilot training.
5 Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is going to need all of
6 its pilot training capability and capacity to fulfill the
7 pilot training requirements of the Air Force into the 21st
8 century. If in the future, the Air Force needs to reopen a
9 base that you recommend for closure, reopening will cost
10 eight times more than the estimated savings that would be
11 presented.
12 The initial perception was that the Air Force had
13 excess capacity in pilot training, and one undergraduate
14 pilot training base could be closed. However, both the Navy
15 and the Air Force have begun to revise their future training
16 projections. Their pilot training requirements are going up.
17 One reason is the forecast demand for 51,000 pilots in
18 civilian aviation in just nine years, as massive numbers of
19 pilots begin to retire.
20 Also, retention rates in all the services are going
21 down. With a big hiring binge by the airlines, the Air Force
22 and the Navy will lose pilots by the hundreds. Additionally,

Page 325

1 the needs of the Air National Guard will increase demand on
2 Air Force training. There is no margin for error if Reese
3 Air Force Base is closed.
4 If pilot training requirements turn out to be
5 higher than were projected a year or more ago, then the Air
6 Force will be in the very dilemma that General Davis
7 described. I urge the Commission to press the Air Force on
8 this question and projected requirements. It is my
9 understanding that there may be much larger requirements for
10 pilots than originally projected.
11 There are five clear reasons that you should reject
12 the recommendation to close Reese. First, Reese has a higher
13 military value than any other UPT base which would be
14 retained or than other UPT bases which would be retained.
15 Your own staff revealed this fact in their analysis that
16 ranked Reese ahead of two other UPT bases. Their analysis
17 proved that there were substantial errors in the Air Force
18 DOD analysis.
19 Second, quality of life is the key to retaining
20 quality professional military personnel, and retention is one
21 of the keys to readiness.
22 Any successful business that prides itself on

Page 326

1 attracting and retaining quality people looks for a location
2 that provides a quality lifestyle, plentiful housing,
3 excellent medical facilities, jobs for spouses, easy access
4 with an international airport, and outstanding educational
5 opportunities. Reese Air Force Base had the highest rating
6 of any base in the Air Force in regards to quality of life.
7 Third, DOD tells Congress that housing is one of
8 the most important elements of quality of life. Their
9 military doctrine is, we enlist soldiers, but we reenlist
10 families. Retention is 15 percent higher at bases with good
11 housing. Reese has spent millions of dollars to ensure that
12 they have the finest housing of any UPT base. This is an
13 asset that cannot be ignored and cannot be matched without
14 considerable cost.
15 Fourth, it is a sad but indisputable fact proven
16 again just recently at Shepherd Air Force Base that flying in
17 training is a dangerous business. But it need not be a
18 hazard for innocent civilians if we pay special attention to
19 encroachment.
20 Both of the bases with less military value than
21 Reese have encroachment problems that place homes,
22 businesses, and public places in the direct path of daily

Page 327

1 training operations. By contrast, Reese does not have an
2 encroachment problem.
3 Fifth, Reese is the Air Force premiere
4 undergraduate pilot training base. It's the first to receive
5 the T-1 trainer, the first and only with joint Navy training,
6 the first to receive the new JPATS aircraft, and Reese is
7 also the number one base of preference of student and
8 instructor pilots in the air education and training command.
9 Our young men and women in the Air Force vote to
10 keep Reese every day by choosing to serve at Reese. Ladies
11 and gentlemen of the Commission, as I said, this is a close
12 call. Reese should not be closed. The data is flawed. The
13 planning assumption is clearly wrong, and I thank you very
14 much for your time.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
16 Combest.
17 Many members – in fact, all members of Congress
18 have worked real hard in this process, but I would have to
19 say that we have probably seen more of Mr. Combest than
20 anyone. He has certainly represented his constituents well.
21 We're going to have a little change in our
22 schedule, and we're going to move up. Representative Martin

Page 328

1 Frost.
2 REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3 I'm here on the same subject as the three witnesses you heard
4 right before Mr. Combest, and that's why I had asked to be
5 heard at this point. And I appreciate the opportunity to be
6 here today to express my opposition to the proposal to remove
7 the 301st Fighter Wing from the joint Reserve base in Fort
8 Worth.
9 And I will focus my remarks strictly on the issue
10 of jointness. I recognize that you have many difficult
11 decisions to make as part of the 1995 Base Closure and
12 Realignment process. However, this is not one of them.
13 Keeping the 301st Fighter Wing in Fort Worth is an easy
14 decision, a decision that is strongly and enthusiastically
15 supported by the North Texas Congressional Delegation. Fort
16 Worth city officials, and the community at large and by the
17 military.
18 You have already received detailed information
19 concerning the role and mission of JRB Fort Worth, so I won't
20 try to go over the same ground. However, I do believe it's
21 worthwhile to reemphasize a couple of points. It's critical
22 that we better utilize the defense assets we have as defense

Page 329

1 spending declines. In other words, to promote cost savings
2 and efficiencies, it would be necessary for the services to
3 eliminate duplicate efforts and find ways to work and train
4 together.
5 Admittedly, there are questions about whether such
6 joint ventures can be successful, yet you have in Fort Worth
7 proof that collaborative efforts are possible. Already, the
8 301st Fighter Wing and the Naval Reserve have developed an
9 operations plan which clearly reduces costs and promotes
10 efficiency through mutual support. No other base in the
11 United States offers this opportunity in the way it is
12 occurring at JRB Fort Worth.
13 Further proof that it is working can be seen in
14 support expressed for what's happening in Forth Worth by the
15 Department of Defense. As Congressman Geren just mentioned,
16 in a letter to this Commission, Assistant Secretary of
17 Defense Deborah Lee referred to JRB Fort Worth as "one of the
18 most successful products of BRAC '91 and BRAC '93."
19 In a memorandum provided to this Commission, Navy
20 Rear Admiral T.F. Hall stated that JRB Fort Worth "is on
21 track to be our nation's first master Guard Reserve base. As
22 such, it serves as a model for future consolidations."

Page 330

1 Admiral Hall concluded by saying that "Reversing the BRAC '93
2 decision establishing JRB Fort Worth would be a mistake and
3 that we should continue to pursue our present course of
4 action, which makes this joint Reserve base a model for the
5 future."
6 Let me note that some of the Reserve and Guard
7 units being reassigned to Fort Worth are coming from NAS
8 Dallas, which is in the area I represent and which was closed
9 as a part of BRAC '93 process. I was initially concerned
10 about the closure of NAS Dallas, but it's clear that
11 consolidation of these units with other Reserve and Guard
12 units at JRB Fort Worth makes sense.
13 So this experiment in joint service operations is
14 working. It is an experiment that we should not disturb by
15 removing a major part of the team. If we are to validate the
16 concept of joint preparation, training, and operations at one
17 facility by the services, it's essential that the 301st
18 Fighter Wing remain in place as originally planned. To do
19 otherwise would be disruptive and deny the services the
20 opportunity to demonstrate the efficiencies gained from joint
21 operations.
22 I urge the Commission to let this experiment

Page 331

1 continue, let the military have a chance to show how a joint
2 venture between the services will not only be cost-effective
3 but will ultimately best serve the needs of our national
4 security by improving defense preparedness.
5 Again, I appreciate having this opportunity to be
6 here today. I believe that the right decision is to permit
7 the 301st Fighter Wing to remain a part of this joint Reserve
8 base in Fort Worth. Thank you.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Frost, thank you for
10 your testimony.
11 Congressman Charles Stenholm.
12 REPRESENTATIVE STENHOLM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
13 commissioners. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
14 today. I want to express my strong support for all of the
15 excellent military facilities that we have in Texas. Also, I
16 want to make you aware of the primary defense department
17 facility in my own district, Dais Air Force Base, and the
18 options it makes available to you as you go through the BRAC
19 decision process.
20 But first, I want to also express my strong support
21 for Goodfellow Air Force Base located in St. Angelo, which I
22 represent together with Lamar Smith. Although Goodfellow is

Page 332

1 in Lamar's district, it is literally across the street from
2 my district line. Therefore, I do represent many of the men
3 and women who work and serve at Goodfellow, so I feel it is
4 part of my district.
5 To call Goodfellow an "Air Force base" is a little
6 misleading, because it has a proven track record as a joint
7 service training facility. In fact, the latest in new state-
8 of-the-art firefighting school facility is tops in the world.
9 At times, in fact, there may be more Army personnel at
10 Goodfellow than Air Force.
11 I bring this to your attention because of my
12 concerns and efforts to find cost savings in the federal
13 budget and my belief that joint missions whenever possible
14 could be helpful in finding cost savings in the defense
15 budget. In that regard, I would like to see more training
16 missions go to Goodfellow. The City of St. Angelo is a good
17 partner to the military, and I know they would welcome the
18 growth at the base and would actively help accommodate any
19 new needs caused by new missions at the base.
20 As a whole, the people of Texas have proven
21 themselves to be very supportive of our bases and the men and
22 women who serve there. While I am supportive of all the

Page 333

1 Texas facilities, there are two -- Reese Air Force Base, as
2 you've just heard from Mr. Combest, and Naval Air Station;
3 Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, formerly Carswell, currently
4 being considered for closure, which I would like to speak to
5 you about.
6 Although these bases are not in my district, again,
7 I know that they are exceptional bases and encourage the
8 Commission to reconsider the decision to close them.
9 Secretary Widnall has stressed the importance to the Air
10 Force of Air Force training and quality of life issues. The
11 decision to close Reese, which was ranked the number one base
12 by the Air Force for quality of life and which has an
13 excellent training record, contradicts previously stated Air
14 Force goals.
15 If Reese does close, I believe the Air Force will
16 regret the decision, because it could result in a lack of
17 well-trained pilots in the future. Moreover, it is my
18 understanding that mistakes were made in the Air Force
19 Department of Defense analysis of Reese, and I believe that
20 it deserves another look and should remain open.
21 JRB Fort Worth is another facility that does not
22 warrant closure. The 301st Fighter Wing is not a base

Page 334

1 closure issue, and it will not result in long-term cost
2 savings. JRB Fort Worth is supported by the Pentagon and
3 should be taken off the closure list.
4 Turning to Dais Air Force Base, it is the training
5 base for the B-1 bomber, and it is also the home of two
6 squadrons of C-130s. Until last year, Dais also handled KC-
7 135 tankers. The Air Force has consistently rated Dais in
8 tier 1, one of the best bases. It has excellent
9 infrastructure, almost all of which is in virtually new
10 condition.
11 Dais has extra capacity available to handle
12 additional aircraft. It has near perfect flying conditions,
13 and its airfield has no encroachment problems. The base
14 presently has a primary aircraft inventory of 60 and could
15 handle another 40. I would also like to mention that Dais is
16 an attainment area under the Clean Air Act. Accordingly,
17 additional aircraft could be relocated there without raising
18 any air pollution concerns whatsoever.
19 I understand that the Commission is considering
20 several scenarios which would relocate KC-135 tankers or C-
21 130s. Dais could handle either plane with little or no
22 MILCON cost and would be an excellent location for both

Page 335

1 assets. I am aware that the proposal to move tankers to Dais
2 may not be consistent with they Air Force's stated one base,
3 one boss policy.
4 In fact, the Air Force moved 17 tankers out of Dais
5 in 1994 solely because of this policy, even though the base
6 has and is capable of handling KC-135 tankers. The
7 combination of B-1, C-130s, and KC-135s at Dais worked very
8 well there for over 10 years.
9 Mr. Chairman, commissioners, the need to save money
10 due to budgetary restraints requires much greater flexibility
11 in locating different types of aircraft such as bombers and
12 tankers at the same base. This one base, one boss policy
13 should not be the driving factor in matters resolving sound
14 fiscal decisions and operational logic.
15 In closing, ladies and gentlemen, take a hard look
16 at the Texas installations such as Dais and Goodfellow and
17 others. The one common thread is that the people of my state
18 are staunch supporters of defense and have prepared their
19 installations to perform the mission of defense in the United
20 States for the next century.
21 Texas has always trained our troops for conflict
22 such as World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. That

Page 336

1 was a conscientious decision made by our government due to
2 its citizens and location. We thank you very much.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
4 Stenholm.
5 The Chair now recognizes Representative Henry
6 Gonzalez.
7 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: Thank you very much. I
8 sympathize very much. The Commission is confronted with a
9 task of staggering complexity and of monumental importance to
10 the safety and the well-being of our country. What you
11 decide will have a profound impact on the ability of our
12 country to protect itself and its interests around the world
13 and to do so with shrinking budgets.
14 The case for Kelly Air Force Base is this. First,
15 it's the most efficient, most effective of all of the air
16 logistic centers. Second, it has capabilities that are
17 unique, cannot be easily replaced, and cannot, economically,
18 be moved. If you were to take Kelly and its current workload
19 and try to do it at any other logistics center, it would cost
20 anywhere from $30 million to $60 million more per year, based
21 on today's labor and overhead costs.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Gonzalez, could you

Page 331

1 continue, let the military have a chance to show how a joint
2 venture between the services will not only be cost-effective
3 but will ultimately best serve the needs of our national
4 security by improving defense preparedness.
5 Again, I appreciate having this opportunity to be
6 here today. I believe that the right decision is to permit
7 the 301st Fighter Wing to remain a part of this joint Reserve
8 base in Fort Worth. Thank you.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Frost, thank you for
10 your testimony.
11 Congressman Charles Stenholm.
12 REPRESENTATIVE STENHOLM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
13 commissioners. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
14 today. I want to express my strong support for all of the
15 excellent military facilities that we have in Texas. Also, I
16 want to make you aware of the primary defense department
17 facility in my own district, Dais Air Force Base, and the
18 options it makes available to you as you go through the BRAC
19 decision process.
20 But first, I want to also express my strong support
21 for Goodfellow Air Force Base located in St. Angelo, which I
22 represent together with Lamar Smith. Although Goodfellow is

Page 332

1 in Lamar's district, it is literally across the street from
2 my district line. Therefore, I do represent many of the men
3 and women who work and serve at Goodfellow, so I feel it is
4 part of my district.
5 To call Goodfellow an "Air Force base" is a little
6 misleading, because it has a proven track record as a joint
7 service training facility. In fact, the latest in new state-
8 of-the-art firefighting school facility is tops in the world.
9 At times, in fact, there may be more Army personnel at
10 Goodfellow than Air Force.
11 I bring this to your attention because of my
12 concerns and efforts to find cost savings in the federal
13 budget and my belief that joint missions whenever possible
14 could be helpful in finding cost savings in the defense
15 budget. In that regard, I would like to see more training
16 missions go to Goodfellow. The City of St. Angelo is a good
17 partner to the military, and I know they would welcome the
18 growth at the base and would actively help accommodate any
19 new needs caused by new missions at the base.
20 As a whole, the people of Texas have proven
21 themselves to be very supportive of our bases and the men and
22 women who serve there. While I am supportive of all the

Page 333

1 Texas facilities, there are two -- Reese Air Force Base, as
2 you've just heard from Mr. Combest, and Naval Air Station;
3 Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, formerly Carswell, currently
4 being considered for closure, which I would like to speak to
5 you about.
6 Although these bases are not in my district, again,
7 I know that they are exceptional bases and encourage the
8 Commission to reconsider the decision to close them.
9 Secretary Widnall has stressed the importance to the Air
10 Force of Air Force training and quality of life issues. The
11 decision to close Reese, which was ranked the number one base
12 by the Air Force for quality of life and which has an
13 excellent training record, contradicts previously stated Air
14 Force goals.
15 If Reese does close, I believe the Air Force will
16 regret the decision, because it could result in a lack of
17 well-trained pilots in the future. Moreover, it is my
18 understanding that mistakes were made in the Air Force
19 Department of Defense analysis of Reese, and I believe that
20 it deserves another look and should remain open.
21 JRB Fort Worth is another facility that does not
22 warrant closure. The 301st Fighter Wing is not a base

Page 334

1 closure issue, and it will not result in long-term cost
2 savings. JRB Fort Worth is supported by the Pentagon and
3 should be taken off the closure list.
4 Turning to Dais Air Force Base, it is the training
5 base for the B-1 bomber, and it is also the home of two
6 squadrons of C-130s. Until last year, Dais also handled KC-
7 135 tankers. The Air Force has consistently rated Dais in
8 tier 1, one of the best bases. It has excellent
9 infrastructure, almost all of which is in virtually new
10 condition.
11 Dais has extra capacity available to handle
12 additional aircraft. It has near perfect flying conditions,
13 and its airfield has no encroachment problems. The base
14 presently has a primary aircraft inventory of 60 and could
15 handle another 40. I would also like to mention that Dais is
16 an attainment area under the Clean Air Act. Accordingly,
17 additional aircraft could be relocated there without raising
18 any air pollution concerns whatsoever.
19 I understand that the Commission is considering
20 several scenarios which would relocate KC-135 tankers or C-
21 130s. Dais could handle either plane with little or no
22 MILCON cost and would be an excellent location for both

Page 335

1 assets. I am aware that the proposal to move tankers to Dais
2 may not be consistent with they Air Force's stated one base,
3 one boss policy.
4 In fact, the Air Force moved 17 tankers out of Dais
5 in 1994 solely because of this policy, even though the base
6 has and is capable of handling KC-135 tankers. The
7 combination of B-1, C-130s, and KC-135s at Dais worked very
8 well there for over 10 years.
9 Mr. Chairman, commissioners, the need to save money
10 due to budgetary restraints requires much greater flexibility
11 in locating different types of aircraft such as bombers and
12 tankers at the same base. This one base, one boss policy
13 should not be the driving factor in matters resolving sound
14 fiscal decisions and operational logic.
15 In closing, ladies and gentlemen, take a hard look
16 at the Texas installations such as Dais and Goodfellow and
17 others. The one common thread is that the people of my state
18 are staunch supporters of defense and have prepared their
19 installations to perform the mission of defense in the United
20 States for the next century.
21 Texas has always trained our troops for conflict
22 such as World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. That

Page 336

1 was a conscientious decision made by our government due to
2 its citizens and location. We thank you very much.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
4 Stenholm.
5 The Chair now recognizes Representative Henry
6 Gonzalez.
7 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: Thank you very much. I
8 sympathize very much. The Commission is confronted with a
9 task of staggering complexity and of monumental importance to
10 the safety and the well-being of our country. What you
11 decide will have a profound impact on the ability of our
12 country to protect itself and its interests around the world
13 and to do so with shrinking budgets.
14 The case for Kelly Air Force Base is this. First,
15 it's the most efficient, most effective of all of the air
16 logistic centers. Second, it has capabilities that are
17 unique, cannot be easily replaced, and cannot, economically,
18 be moved. If you were to take Kelly and its current workload
19 and try to do it at any other logistics center, it would cost
20 anywhere from $30 million to $60 million more per year, based
21 on today's labor and overhead costs.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Gonzalez, could you

Page 337

1 just pull the microphone down a bit, please.
2 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: Sure.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir, sorry to
4 interrupt.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: No, sir. And that
6 assumes that you could move the workload at no cost. There
7 are thousands of skilled, experienced workers at Kelly, and
8 they are efficient -- 99 percent of their work is defect-
9 free. And Kelly stands behind it. Kelly produced the first
10 organic product warranty in the Department of Defense. You
11 can't find a better workforce anywhere. Kelly has unique
12 capabilities.
13 Every outsized cargo carrier in the Air Force --
14 engines and airplanes alike -- is maintained there. It would
15 be impossible to move this operation without a severe adverse
16 effect on the airlift capability. And as you all well know,
17 the ability to move vast cargos over great distances in a
18 very short time is absolutely essential to our ability to
19 respond to the many different kinds of threats that exist
20 throughout the world today.
21 Kelly repairs and manages 60 percent of the engines
22 of our front line fighter aircraft, and 100 percent of the

Page 338

1 secondary power systems of this aircraft. Moving this
2 workload would disrupt fighter operations for a significant
3 period, and cost more than $1 billion, according to the Air
4 Force studies. While some may argue that all primary engine
5 work could be done in a single location, I would urge caution
6 on this.
7 Only a few years ago, the entire engine repair
8 facility at Tinker Air Force Base was shut down for many
9 months by a disastrous fire. Thus, we have practical, recent
10 experience that should caution everyone not to place all of
11 an essential workload at one place where an accident, hostile
12 action, or some other mishap could wreck readiness capability
13 overnight.
14 Anyone who has been to Kelly knows that this
15 installation is at the heart and soul of the Air Force
16 logistics. It has the best engine facility in the Department
17 of Defense. Its paint shops can handle any airplane. Its
18 hangers can house any airplane. It is a leader in cross
19 servicing. Its airlift capability is second to none. There
20 is no workforce anywhere that can match Kelly in skill, in
21 craftsmanship, pride, or cost. And there's no way that the
22 taxpayer will be well served by relocating its functions.

Page 339

1 Kelly has proved its worth to the nation time after
2 time. Kelly has earned its place, and keeping Kelly is the
3 only course of action that makes sense. Finally, I want to
4 urge the commission to consider carefully San Antonio's well
5 thought out, thoroughly cost effective plan to reconfigure
6 Brooks Air Force Base. This plan saves twice as much as the
7 proposed transfer of Brooks missions to other facilities
8 without disrupting ongoing operations or compromising
9 capability.
10 And I want to thank you, and express my gratitude
11 for this opportunity to appear before you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir, for your
13 excellent testimony. Representative Lamar Smith.
14 REPRESENTATIVE SMITH: Chairman, commissioners,
15 thank you for this opportunity to discuss the importance of
16 Brooks and Kelly Air Force Bases. These bases are not just
17 important to our hometown of San Antonio, they're also
18 important to the American taxpayer and to our nation's
19 defense. Everyone in this room is familiar with the
20 important contributions that the people of San Antonio have
21 made to our nation's defense.
22 The families of Military City have sent their sons

Page 340

1 and daughters into harm's way for their country in record
2 numbers. This record has fostered a patriotism and
3 commitment to the military that makes San Antonio truly
4 unique. It was apparent when most of you saw more than
5 35,000 San Antonians lining the entrance to Kelly Air Force
6 Base, displaying Kelly Proud; and on April 6th, when you saw
7 several thousand people displaying Brooks Proud, during your
8 visit to that base.
9 Those are not slogans invented for your visit.
10 They are a way of life, a way of working, that resonate
11 throughout the Department of Defense, and translate into top
12 quality, top efficiency, and top productivity. This
13 commitment to the military makes Kelly and Brooks as
14 important to the American taxpayer as they are to San
15 Antonio. San Antonio provides a one of a kind military
16 community that nourishes the critically important research
17 and aerospace medical training at Brooks.
18 In addition to the human system center, the
19 Armstrong Laboratory, the School of Aerospace Medicine, the
20 Center for Environmental Excellence, and the human systems
21 program office are all at Brooks. The Air Force personnel
22 center, the repository for all Air Force personnel data, and

Page 341

1 the Lackland military training center, the home of the Air
2 Force basic training, also are in San Antonio.
3 San Antonio's outstanding and absolutely unique
4 biomedical community is the other part of this productive
5 partnership that exists in our hometown, and that cannot be
6 duplicated anywhere else. The University of Texas Health
7 Science Center, the University of Texas at San Antonio, the
8 Texas Research and Technology Foundation, Southwest Research
9 Institute, the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research,
10 Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center, and Brooks Army
11 Medical Center all contribute to the research synergies from
12 which the work at Brooks and the taxpayers who provide it and
13 the military missions that need it benefit.
14 When you combine these synergies with the very
15 small up front cost to the San Antonio cantonment proposal
16 that is before you, and with the long term savings from such
17 cantonment, that are twice as large as the DOD's proposals to
18 uproot the missions, then keeping the research work in San
19 Antonio makes sense and saves dollars.
20 Keeping the logistics depot at Kelly is an even
21 easier decision. That's because Kelly is the most cost
22 effective location in the Department of Defense to conduct

Page 342

1 aircraft depot maintenance. Kelly's labor costs are lower;
2 the quality of work higher; and the productivity greater than
3 at any other depot.
4 Your task is not easy, but it is clear that moving
5 the cost effective missions at Kelly or Brooks elsewhere
6 would not provide the taxpayers the value for their dollar
7 they are receiving now, nor would it assure continued top
8 quality support for our military personnel in missions around
9 the world. We live in a world where danger still lurks. It
10 lurks in the dreams of tyrants, like Saddam Hussein; in the
11 access of terrorist organizations to weapons of mass
12 destruction; and in instability and uncertainty on all
13 continents.
14 Danger of another kind lurks right here at home. In
15 out of control budget deficits that threaten the futures of
16 all of our children. This commission was charged with
17 combatting both dangers. And today I'm here to say that by
18 continuing the good work at Kelly and Brooks, driven by the
19 people of San Antonio in Military City, we can protect
20 against both such dangers.
21 Mr. Chairman, thank you and thank you
22 commissioners, as well.

Page 343

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Smith. We
2 recognize Representative Henry Bonilla.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BONILLA: Thank you, Chairman, very
4 much; it's nice to see you again.
5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
6 REPRESENTATIVE BONILLA: You can walk into almost
7 any room, after walking down any hallway in the city, on any
8 given day of the week in this city, the most powerful city on
9 Earth, and find a hearing going on. But this hearing that's
10 being conducted here today, there is none more important,
11 none more significant to the people of South Texas as the
12 decisions are being formulated the next several weeks, based
13 on the information that you're hearing today and that you've
14 gathered while out visiting the bases.
15 The last seven days have been profound for me, and
16 they have been a time that I'll remember for the rest of my
17 life -- watching 35,000 people line the streets of San
18 Antonio during your visit; then watching close to 20,000 in
19 Del Rio coming out to save Laughlin Air Force Base. And
20 frankly, I was delighted to see the looks on some of the
21 faces of the commissioners that visited that day -- looking
22 at the signs, reading what people had come out to tell you

Page 344

1 after their businesses had closed to allow them to come out
2 and show their support.
3 And hopefully, what has happened in the last seven
4 days has touched your life as well, and will be taken into
5 consideration as you make some very tough choices. Let me
6 take this opportunity to share with you my perspective, as a
7 member of the National Security Subcommittee of the House
8 Appropriations Committee. As a member of that committee, I'm
9 constantly reminded of the very real constraints that we are
10 experiencing in the defense budget.
11 We're having increasingly difficult times ensuring
12 that our military is provided with an adequate quality of
13 life and the tools and training to remain number one in terms
14 of our fighting force in this world. I personally welcome
15 your assistance in this effort to cut costs and make our
16 military more economically efficient. Laughlin and Kelly Air
17 Force Bases are the low cost providers for the United States
18 Air Force.
19 Closing either one of these bases will not be cost
20 effective, and will not serve the taxpayers' best interest.
21 We should not close facilities unless it saves money. A few
22 short days ago, a few of you were with us, as I mentioned in

Page 345

1 my opening remarks, and you visited Del Rio. You saw with
2 your own eyes the strong case for Laughlin. No other
3 undergraduate pilot training facility matches Laughlin. Its
4 weather and air space remain unsurpassed by any other
5 facility. And what this means is, dollars saved -- dollars
6 saved by fewer canceled missions; dollars saved by less time
7 traveling to useable air space; dollars saved by a low cost
8 and efficient workforce.
9 Laughlin trains the best pilots in the United
10 States Air Force. That is Laughlin's first contribution to
11 our national defense. Laughlin's cost effectiveness is its
12 second contribution to our national defense. These savings
13 free up additional dollars to be spent on quality of life, on
14 procurement, and training. These savings are vital for our
15 national defense. Without Laughlin, America would simply be
16 weaker.
17 I am proud to be Laughlin's representative, and the
18 people of Del Rio are very proud to be the home of the best
19 little base in the Air Force. And now for Kelly. I grew up
20 in the shadows of Kelly Air Force Base. My father worked at
21 Kelly for roughly 30 years. I probably would not be here
22 today were it not for what Kelly Air Force Base provided for

Page 346

1 my family, and the opportunities it provided for many other
2 San Antonians as well.
3 Kelly is the lowest cost depot. Kelly has the
4 lowest labor cost, the highest quality, and this is nothing
5 that you've heard for the first time. This has been Kelly's
6 story for decades. As a member of the Appropriations
7 Committee, it would trouble me if we did not make cost
8 effective choices. I'm working hard to stretch federal
9 dollars. Assets like Kelly help me make my job much easier.
10 Our government must learn to deliver service as
11 well as for a lower cost. The BRAC can make that task easier
12 for all of us. I urge you to make cost efficiency a goal in
13 your decision-making process. We gain little and, in fact,
14 hurt ourselves, if closures cost money. Our goal must always
15 be saving money, not just closing bases. In simple terms, we
16 are closing bases to save money.
17 If it costs us money to close them, then we are
18 defeating the purpose of the base closure process. Kelly is
19 a tool we need in the battle to control government spending.
20 We should be looking at transferring workload to Kelly to
21 control costs. Low costs benefit the taxpayers, and make
22 dollars available for other vital Department of Defense

Page 347

1 missions. In fact, the issue of excess capacity is only
2 relevant in terms of its cost impact.
3 Now, to Brooks. San Antonio's cantonment proposal
4 maximizes the returns for taxpayers from closing Brooks Air
5 Force Base. This proposal results in considerable savings
6 with few closure costs. In addition, it keeps in tact the
7 workforce which has made Brooks a world-class facility. I
8 know you will give this proposal the serious consideration it
9 deserves. I don't have to tell you how strongly the people
10 of Del Rio and San Antonio support their military bases --
11 many of you have seen that firsthand.
12 You have personally witnessed this, and I sincerely
13 doubt that there are any communities in this great nation
14 with such strong and long standing support for our military.
15 That's why we are proudly known, in San Antonio, as Military
16 City, USA. Thank you for giving me a chance to testify
17 before your committee today. I appreciate your help with the
18 effort to save taxpayer dollars. Your jobs are very tough,
19 and I know you have some very difficult decisions ahead. And
20 we appreciate your commitment to this country.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. We
22 recognize Representative Frank Tejeda.

Page 348

1 REPRESENTATIVE TEJEDA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
2 members of the commission. We are both here for the same
3 purpose, and that's to save taxpayers' dollars. As a
4 representative of the 28th congressional district, I have
5 been sent to Washington to be an effective steward of the
6 taxpayers' dollars. As created by Congress, the Defense Base
7 Closure and Realignment Commission is charged with making
8 decisions which must maximize military value and cost
9 savings.
10 The decisions this commission will make aren't
11 necessarily more difficult than the previous commissions.
12 I'm here to discuss two San Antonio bases, each of which have
13 served this nation for more than 75 years, First, Kelly Air
14 Force Base. Kelly is the most cost effective and productive
15 depot in the Defense Department today. Part of Kelly's
16 success is its low cost of labor, measured by the actual
17 overall labor and overhead rate.
18 According to figures published in DOD manuals, San
19 Antonio has maintained the lowest rates of all Air Force and
20 Navy depots from 1987 through 1993. Although its rates went
21 up in 1994, according to monthly DOD reports, San Antonio is
22 once again the lowest in 1995. In fact, San Antonio was the

Page 349

1 only ALC whose rates went down instead of up from 1994 to
2 1995. Closing Kelly would be an unacceptable financial
3 investment.
4 For example, the cost of military construction for
5 another ALC to absorb the C-5 workload would exceed $80
6 million. The 1994 headquarters Air Force material command's
7 AFMC-21 study estimated the MILCON costs at $52 million for
8 program maintenance of 13 aircraft. For the current
9 projected annual workload for 21 C-5s, that figure increases
10 to $82 million. However, this estimate does not include
11 transfer of equipment and personnel, training costs, or added
12 production costs, which would add another $147 million.
13 The resulting cost would provide only the minimal
14 maintenance facilities to do the job. The gaining depot
15 still would not have the same superb wide body aircraft
16 capability that Kelly already possesses. A complete
17 replication of these one of a kind facilities would raise the
18 costs to an astronomical level. On the other hand, San
19 Antonio can absorb a small aircraft workload in addition to
20 the C-5 workload, without building any new facilities.
21 That is military value, and that is cost
22 effectiveness. Two thoughts on Brooks Air Force Base.

Page 350

1 First, the enormous up front cost to move its missions
2 elsewhere is unacceptable, given the small return on such an
3 investment. In fact, such costs may rise above the original
4 estimate. In fact, attempting to relocate these missions
5 elsewhere, without most of the personnel, will seriously
6 disrupt the valuable work being performed.
7 Moving the work away from San Antonio will result
8 in the loss of many, if not most, of the scientists who would
9 not relocate. The missions at Brooks will not disappear.
10 Brooks is home to the only integrated human systems research
11 effort in the Defense Department. The Armstrong Lab is a
12 world leader in its mission area, with such unique facilities
13 as hyperbaric chambers, altitude chambers, one of three
14 spatial disorientation demonstrators in the world, directed
15 energy chambers, and a centrifuge.
16 The Armstrong Lab provides 30 percent of the
17 faculty of the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine. This
18 is the nation's leading aerospace medical training program.
19 In addition, the one of a kind configuration of biomedical
20 research and teaching activities in San Antonio provides an
21 invaluable resource for the Defense Department. Also at
22 Brooks, the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence is

Page 351

1 essential to long term Air Force environmental programs in
2 the areas of compliance, hazardous waste clean up, and
3 environmental planning.
4 The permanent facility is currently under
5 construction, and will be completed in the very near future.
6 The San Antonio community has worked hard in support of an
7 alternative to the Air Force's recommendation. The
8 community's plan is innovative, and merits very serious
9 consideration. The pay off will avoid the high and somewhat
10 uncertain up front costs, save more than $100 million over 20
11 years, and avoid disruption to vital research and
12 environmental programs, without the loss of many scientists.
13 Mr. Chairman, that is military value, and that is
14 cost effectiveness. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman.
16 The Chair recognizes Representative Greg Laughlin.
17 REPRESENTATIVE LAUGHLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
18 and distinguished commissioners. I'm here today to speak on
19 behalf of the men and women of the 14th district who proudly
20 serve in the 924th Air Force Reserve unit. But before doing
21 so, I certainly would echo the words of my colleagues, Frank
22 Tejeda and Henry Bonilla, for I'm familiar with their bases,

Page 352

1 also having constituents that work and serve there.
2 Today I come before you to speak in behalf of a
3 commitment made by Secretary Boatright when, on behalf of the
4 BRAC, he told the citizens of Austin that if they were to
5 pass a bond election and the airport operational by 1996,
6 then they would be able to keep their reserve unit. No one
7 in his or her right mind would think that this commitment was
8 made for eternity. But certainly, as we talk about saving
9 dollars, the commitment of the federal government ought to be
10 worth a few dollars and cents.
11 And certainly the commitment ought to be honored
12 past the opening date of that facility. The 1986 Goldwater-
13 Nichols Act mandates combined commands and joint operations
14 between the various services of the government, military
15 services. With Fort Hood, our nation's largest military
16 facility, 50 nautical miles from Bergstrom, and with the
17 924th operating in approximately 25 percent of all joint
18 training exercises at Fort Hood, military preparedness and
19 military defense of our nation mandates that the 924th at
20 Bergstrom remain there.
21 That training can take place with minimal cost to
22 the taxpayer. Currently, only two Air Force reserve

Page 353

1 facilities are located in air quality attainment areas.
2 Bergstrom Air Force Base is one of those areas. And isn't it
3 ironic that at a time we talk about closing vital bases such
4 as Bergstrom, the American taxpayer is paying billions of
5 dollars to subsidize our allies' defense by keeping overseas
6 bases open.
7 Instead of closing Bergstrom, we should close bases
8 overseas, which were originally constructed and are still
9 kept open to counter a Soviet threat which no longer exists.
10 And finally, it seems to me incredible that so many Air Force
11 reserve bases and units have been added to the closure
12 consideration list, while not a single Air National Guard
13 unit has been mentioned.
14 I raise this question as an oddity of sober
15 deliberation, or is it rather the product of naked political
16 maneuvering? The question remains, as was asked by one of my
17 Republican colleagues on the National Security Committee last
18 month, why we have a separate Air National Guard from an Air
19 Force Reserve unit. And he asked the question because, as I
20 recall, he was from the state of Indiana, did the witness
21 have any information that the state of Illinois or Ohio have
22 a plan of attack or aggression.

Page 354

1 And so I ask you to simply consider, why is it that
2 no Air National Guards are on this list? And if it's a
3 matter of state pride for our governors, then we as a
4 responsible committee should ask them to pick up the
5 financial tab. Because as you well know, the federal
6 government pays in excess of 95 percent of the Guard's
7 expense and operation.
8 So I submit to you today that there is no reason to
9 close the 924th, when just a few weeks ago, men and women of
10 that unit were flying combat missions under the direction of
11 our Commander-in-Chief. So it's a question today of our
12 government keeping a commitment to a few American citizens.
13 I thank you very much.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
15 Laughlin. Now a gentleman who's been waiting so patiently.
16 I believe he was the first member of the delegation to
17 arrive, Representative Kika de la Garza.
18 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Thank you very much.
19 Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, and I don't mind
20 waiting. My district has been spared. I'm here to speak in
21 behalf of all of my colleagues, and the people of the state
22 of Texas. It's good to have this opportunity to appear

Page 355

1 before you today. And as is evident from the Texas presence
2 here this afternoon, we are very concerned about some of the
3 recommendations for the closure and realignment in our state.
4 In fact, I think that all of my Texas colleagues
5 will attest to the fact that some of the targets of the BRAC
6 95 unfairly impact us. Each member here has presented strong
7 and compelling details, and specific about their bases. Mr.
8 Chairman, I'll be very brief. There is no one that could
9 challenge the Texas strong and solid military tradition. My
10 family came in 1605, the original ones, as members of the
11 armed forces of the Kingdom of Spain. And we've been there
12 since.
13 And every generation has served, including myself
14 and the generation after me. I would like to make one
15 specific note, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, and ask
16 that the commission reconsider the Navy's recommendation to
17 realign T-44 training to NAS Pensacola. Quite simply, with
18 the new pilot training rate requirements, there is not
19 sufficient capacity at NAS Pensacola to train multi-engine
20 pilots.
21 In addition, what would seem to me to be a very
22 practical consideration is the fact that South Texas has

Page 356

1 vast, unencumbered air space and good weather unmatched by
2 any area in this nation. The decisions that you will make in
3 the final weeks will, I know, be based on the information
4 presented here today. And I know that you will consider it
5 carefully and thoughtfully and with the seriousness that it
6 matters.
7 And I join all of my Texas colleagues in asking you
8 that your decisions be made on the facts presented here
9 today; and for that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. Before you
11 leave, I'd like you to introduce the young gentleman you have
12 with you. I notice he's been waiting just as patiently.
13 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Well, he's been asking
14 how many more to go. This is grandson, Phil Ferias, from
15 Austin, Texas, that's helping me out for this week.
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Welcome.
17 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Thank you, Mr.
18 Chairman.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: He must be your advisor,
20 right, sir? Before we move into Utah, I will relinquish the
21 chair. I'd like to thank the great and diverse state of
22 Texas for keeping us on time, and for the excellent

Page 357

1 presentations they've given us. With that, I'd like to turn
2 it over to my distinguished colleague, Commissioner Wendi
3 Steele.
4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: [Presiding.] Good afternoon.
5 I'd like to recognize Senator Orrin Hatch, please.
6 SENATOR HATCH: Madame Chairman, and distinguished
7 BRAC commissioners, let me try to be brief. Hill Air Force
8 Base is simply the best of the best. And I'm not saying that
9 just to be saying it. It is the best operational base, and
10 it is the best depot. Two rating groups have come to this
11 conclusion. Their findings have been twice verified by Air
12 Force Under Secretary Rudy de Leon.
13 First, in evaluating the five air logistics centers
14 for both operational and depot excellence, the Air Force Base
15 Closure Executive Group found that only Hill was rated as
16 tier one in both the operations and depot categories. Hill
17 received 33 out of a maximum 39 points. Tinker Air Force
18 Base was second, with 29 points. Second, the joint cross
19 service group, in evaluating military value, gave Hill and
20 Warner Robins the highest rating.
21 Now, what makes Hill the best of the best? It is
22 the pervasive winner mentality of its workforce. Let me give

Page 358

1 you just five examples, and I could give you many more.
2 First, Hill's two F-16 wings have won two of the last four
3 Gunsmoke competitions. Base wings are co-located on the Air
4 Force's best depot and on the Utah test and training range --
5 the best exercise facility in the world.
6 This combination has produced winners where it has
7 counted most of all, and that's in battle. Secondly, Hill is
8 the only maintenance site for the nation's ICBM fleet, with a
9 workforce cited by Vice President Al Gore as the heroes of
10 reinvention. And Hill is the single most important
11 inspection site of the START I treaty. Third, the commanders
12 of the units that fly into danger have cited Hill as the
13 leader in two level maintenance support.
14 Its successful programs for critical F-16 avionics
15 and radar equipment led to substantial savings for our Air
16 Force. And its avionics, such as the radar systems that
17 detect missiles targeted on our aircraft, of course, have
18 saved lives. Fourth, Hill won the cross service competition
19 to provide maintenance to the Navy's FA-18 tactical fighter.
20 The GAO recently confirmed that Hill's performance was
21 $11,000 per aircraft cheaper or less than the best competing
22 naval depot.

Page 359

1 And fifth, in the past two years, Hill has won five
2 environmental awards, culminating with its win of the
3 Secretary of Defense's environmental quality award as the
4 "best" in the DOD. Hill spills over with excellence, and its
5 vast capacity offers savings and successes with each
6 potential expansion of its base mission. Let me give you
7 just four reasons why our future air power will depend on
8 Hill.
9 First, Hill is now the logistics manager and depot
10 for the world's largest aircraft fleet, the F-16, used by 21
11 nations which share our regional and global security
12 objectives. Secondly, the cross service competition has
13 proven that Hill Air Force Base, perhaps more than any other
14 DOD installation, will become the Defense Department's most
15 cost efficient tactical fighter depot. Third, it is already
16 the world's largest overhaul facility for landing gear,
17 struts, wheels and brakes, accommodating 70 percent of DOD's
18 work; and with the capacity to do it all and to do it very
19 well.
20 And fourth, Madame Chairman and members of the
21 commission, Hill is clearly the logical source to consolidate
22 tactical missile work. It already does 92 percent of the Air

Page 360

1 Force mission, and 48 percent of DOD's, and can manage an
2 expanded mission with ease, efficiency, and economy. In
3 summary, Madame Chairman, Hill should be workloaded to its
4 fullest capacity.
5 We all know what the results are certain to be.
6 When everything is said and done, the one lingering
7 obligation that morally hangs over all of our heads is to
8 insist on a standard of excellence, even if that means the
9 loss of some of our installations. I thank the commission
10 for its consideration of my remarks, and for its visits to
11 Utah defense installations, including the defense depot
12 Ogden, which, in my opinion, is still the best in the DLA.
13 And I hope you'll consider that, as well. I
14 believe the commission will act in the best interest of our
15 national defense. I believe you're committed to do that, and
16 I urge you to do that. But we all need to remember this --
17 it is the young people in our military services, like my
18 brother who was killed in the Second World War, like CPT
19 Scott O'Grady, who risk their lives for our nation, and who
20 ought to expect the very best equipment and maintenance of
21 that equipment that our nation can provide.
22 And Hill Air Force Base is doing just exactly that.

Page 361

1 Let me just say that I believe in you, and I believe you'll
2 do what is best for our country, and I urge you to do so, and
3 not let any politics enter into it at all. Do what's right.
4 And in the end, I think most people will accept that. Thanks
5 so much.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator Hatch.
7 And now, your colleague, Senator Bennett.
8 SENATOR BENNETT: Thank you very much, Madame
9 Chairman. I'm here as a senator, but I can't shake my past,
10 which is primarily in the business world. I have sympathy
11 for what you're doing, because I've had to do it myself --
12 downsize a corporation. It's always painful; it means people
13 get laid off; it means people get exciting plans postponed,
14 if not killed; and it's never fun.
15 However, there are some particular guiding
16 principles that apply, I think, in business or government.
17 And if I may be so presumptuous, I will try to suggest some
18 of them to you. One, of course, is that after you've visited
19 the facility and you've gotten the feel of things and you've
20 got a sense of smell about it, you go back and look at the
21 numbers. And if the numbers are properly compiled, they
22 don't lie to you, and they usually confirm the sense of smell

Page 362

1 that you have.
2 The numbers on Hill, Senator Hatch has given you
3 some. I won't belabor them. It is rated number one in
4 military value, the top rated base. But look at the
5 financial numbers. The return on your investment if you
6 close Hill is 29 years. And anybody who's tried to make a
7 return on investment calculation knows that 29 years is long
8 enough that it's going to slip.
9 In other words, there is a very good possibility,
10 from the numbers that you're being given, that in fact,
11 you'll get no return, ever, on your investment on closing
12 Hill, if it's that far out in the future. Of the ALCs you're
13 looking at, the one time cost of closing Hill is the highest.
14 If you decide we have to close one ALC, the most expensive
15 one you can close is Hill, at $1.418 billion.
16 Those are what the numbers say. I could give you a
17 great deal more. You've heard it all; you've examined it
18 all. I highlight those, and assume that since I'm so
19 brilliant and have convinced you that Hill must stay open, I
20 want to take the advantage of asking you to give Hill more
21 work, rather than less. And in your procedures, it's good
22 business sense to consolidate tactical missile workload to

Page 363

1 Hill.
2 Once again, let's look at the numbers. The depot
3 maintenance operation indicator report, the cost at Hill is
4 $69, compared to $101 at Letterkenny. Based on the cost
5 comparability handbooks the Army report, depot hourly rates
6 Hill at $49, compared to $65 at Letterkenny. There will be a
7 $15 million per year cost of savings if you bring that work
8 to Hill.
9 So convinced you in the first instance to keep
10 Hill, and now as a salesman still wearing my business suit,
11 tell you, send Hill more work. One other comment. Reference
12 has been made to DDOU. And several of you were at DDOU and
13 saw that. I understand, looking at the numbers, DDOU didn't
14 come out so well. So am I going to change my tune now and
15 say, no, don't look at the numbers this time; look at
16 something else?
17 No, I say look at the numbers because we understand
18 that the calculation made on the cost to close DDOU was made
19 on the assumption that DEPMEDS -- and those of you that were
20 there remember those as the medical things that go in boxes
21 and all the rest of this -- were included. In fact, through
22 some kind of error, DEPMEDS was left out of the statistical

Page 364

1 analysis, which means that the numbers you have, without
2 keeping the DEPMEDS program going, are wrong.
3 And I ask you to go back to DLA and recalculate the
4 DDOU circumstance, saying, oops, we left DEPMEDS out of the
5 calculation before; we need to put it in. And having said
6 that, I think then I can go back to my original pitch and say
7 you can trust the numbers. So I conclude by giving you my
8 best wishes for the challenge that you have; my conviction
9 that you will do it right and intelligently; and my certainty
10 that if you do, Hill will stay open, Hill will receive more
11 work, and DDOU will get a second look. Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Senator, thank you for your
13 testimony, and for your kind note that you sent the other
14 day, as well. And now, Congressman Hansen, who so faithfully
15 traveled about the state with us, as we looked at your
16 installations.
17 REPRESENTATIVE HANSEN: Well, thank you. It's good
18 to see you again. I appreciate the work you folks do. I
19 can't think of a harder job than the one you folks have. And
20 thank you for all you've done, in coming to Utah as many
21 times as you do. Let me take a moment and address a few of
22 the specific issues facing us in Utah. First is the Army's

Page 365

1 recommendation to significantly realign Dougway Proving
2 Grounds by closing the English Village housing area and
3 realigning over 250 vital support positions, including fire
4 fighters and medical personnel.
5 The current proposal also reallocates between six
6 and eight vital command and control positions. To this date
7 I cannot find anyone -- except for General Shane of the BRAC
8 office -- that supports this recommendation. Even prior to
9 the release of the original BRAC list, the Pentagon chief
10 scientists, Mr. Philip Coyle and Mr. John Burke, called this
11 decision a major show-stopper, and actually recommended the
12 Department of Defense develop recommendations to relocate and
13 consolidate all chemi-bio testing and research activities to
14 Dougway.
15 Let me remind everybody what we're talking about.
16 Dougway Proving Ground is the size of Rhode Island. It is
17 the only place in the country where we can do the critical
18 chemical and biological test missions currently done at
19 Dougway. I do not have to tell you how important the work
20 is, protecting our military forces and civilian population in
21 an increasing dangerous world.
22 Commissioner Kling and Steele can tell you, have

Page 366

1 both been there. Dougway is very isolated. If the dedicated
2 professionals at Dougway Proving Ground are to be doing this
3 important and dangerous work safely and with the decent
4 quality of life, they must live at Dougway. There is simply
5 no housing outside the gate. In fact, there is no housing
6 for over 60 miles, over a high mountain pass which is covered
7 with snow as late as last week.
8 I feel so strongly about this issue that I've told
9 the Army if they cannot see the tremendous military value of
10 keeping English Village open to provide the necessary support
11 for Dougway Proving Grounds, then I'll just as soon fight to
12 close the whole thing. I'll do like I did once before, and
13 put in a bill to close that base. I really can see no reason
14 to do it any other way.
15 You simply cannot have Dougway Proving Ground
16 without the support of English Village. I hope you will move
17 to resolve this issue with the Army at tomorrow's hearing.
18 On another subject, I must repeat my disappointment with the
19 decision not to add any Defense Logistic Agency distribution
20 depots for further analysis. Studying these facilities
21 arbitrarily left out the original DLA analysis is the only
22 way to guarantee a full and fair hearing based on real

Page 367

1 numbers for the Defense Depot at Ogden, Utah.
2 The one thing the Peat Marwick study does tell us
3 is that DLA has no idea who is their most cost efficient and
4 productive depot. I would continue to argue that the depot
5 that continually returns money to the department, the one
6 that makes a profit is the most efficient, and ought to be
7 kept. I strongly believe that DLA is closing their best
8 depot and the best deal for the American taxpayer.
9 I ask you to reconsider the DLA recommendation to
10 close DDOU. I believe a re-look at this decision is
11 particularly imperative, as you consider closing even more
12 DLA warehouse facilities associated with the closure of any
13 more air logistics centers. I also want to point out that if
14 DDOU is recommended for closure, there are a number of
15 important and independent missions performed at the depot,
16 including the DEPMEDS, the computer design center and the
17 Defense Reutilization and Marketing, that would be
18 dramatically affected by relocation, with no military
19 economic benefit.
20 I would also note here that I find it interesting
21 that the cost to move the DEPMEDS mission was not included in
22 the DLA's COBRA analysis of the cost to close DDOU. And I

Page 368

1 think that's an important point. They would have represented
2 one of the single largest costs. The fact is that all these
3 important missions should be left at Ogden. The Ogden
4 community is more than willing to come up with a creative
5 solution that meets everyone's needs.
6 I believe the lease back arrangement your staff has
7 been briefed on presents a win-win possibility. I hope you
8 have a chance to discuss these issues with DLA tomorrow in
9 their hearing. Lastly, I would be remiss not to repeat what
10 my other colleagues have already said, as has the senior
11 leadership of the Air Force, regarding Hill Air Force Base
12 and Ogden Air Logistics Center.
13 Hill is simply the best depot and the best
14 operational base from among the other depots. To my mind, it
15 makes both military and economic sense to fully workload your
16 best facility and reduce your excess capacity by closing one
17 or two depots. I believe, and I think the Air Force will
18 testify tomorrow, if questioned, that Hill Air Force Base is
19 the future for fighter aircraft maintenance and testing.
20 Hill's combination of maintenance facilities,
21 operational wings and the Utah Test and Training Range is
22 just simply unmatched. But you don't have to take my word

Page 369

1 for it. I know you have all seen the letter from the
2 assistant secretary, Rudy de Leon, which placed Hill Air
3 Force Base in the top tier. Now let me tell you some things
4 you probably don't know.
5 This week I will be attending an Air Force ceremony
6 at the Pentagon, honoring Hill Air Force Base and the 388th
7 fighter wing for maintenance excellence. I've also just
8 received a draft report in which GAO confirms, which we have
9 always known, that the Ogden Air Logistics was a less
10 expensive option for the maintenance of the Navy's FA-18s.
11 At the risk of sounding like a broken record, Ogden is the
12 best, and should be fully workloaded to give the American
13 people and the American soldiers their best value.
14 I also believe that Hill should be the Air Force's
15 center of excellence for airborne tactical and missile
16 maintenance, and should also be considered for single site
17 consolidation, if the decision reached in BRAC 93 is to be
18 reversed. Again, I thank you for your hard work, and the
19 honest deliberations you've given us, and for coming out to
20 Utah. It's been great to be with you, and I thank you so
21 very much for what you're doing. I hope you take these
22 things into consideration.

Page 370

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congressman, and
2 thank you for your testimony. Now, Congresswoman Enid
3 Waldholz.
4 REPRESENTATIVE WALDHOLZ: Thank you, Madame
5 Chairman, commissioners. I want to thank you for the
6 opportunity to speak on behalf of the people of Utah,
7 particularly the second district, which I represent, in
8 detailing for you just a few of the reasons why Hill Air
9 Force Base, together with the Ogden Air Logistics Center is
10 so vital not only to our state and its citizens, but to the
11 overall military capability of the United States.
12 Hill Air Force Base, together with the towns and
13 cities that surround it, make up a thriving American
14 community, anchored by the jobs of more than 21,000 men and
15 women who work round the clock to do their part to keep
16 America and its allies free. Utahans have long been
17 emotionally attached to Hill Air Force Base. They've shed
18 tears at the passing of its pilots and crews. They've shared
19 great pride at the news of successful missions of Hill's
20 fighter wings in conflicts around the world.
21 And they've shared the success of Utah's team when
22 Hill's active and reserve fighter wings have taken top prize

Page 371

1 at the Air Force Gunsmoke competitions. And from a purely
2 economic point of view, Utahans, particularly those that live
3 along the Wasatch Front, have benefitted both directly and
4 indirectly from the powerful economic presence of Hill Air
5 Force Base.
6 If Hill were to close, the negative economic impact
7 would be nearly double that of any other state with an air
8 logistics center. Current Department of Defense
9 recommendations are going to reduce jobs in Utah by 20
10 percent, and that's in addition to the 53 percent overall
11 defense cuts Utah has already taken in the last seven years.
12 If Hill were to close, that figure will rise up to an
13 incredible 90 percent cut of defense spending in Utah in the
14 last nine years.
15 Utahans have always answered the call of their
16 country to aid in its defense, and they fully expect to
17 continue to do their part as the nation starts to tighten its
18 belt. But it's clear from these figures that Utah has
19 already taken more than its share of cuts. Whether you look
20 at the state by state figures or the overall national
21 figures, you can clearly see that Utah has been the recipient
22 of very severe cuts over the past several years.

Page 372

1 Looking at the economics from a different angle, I
2 hope you'll consider that, as a percentage of personal
3 income, Utah is fourth in civilian defense salary, behind
4 only Washington, D.C.; Virginia; and Hawaii, with a total
5 annual impact in excess of $2 billion. With the military
6 history that's been fully representative of our nation's
7 fighting forces spanning many, many decades, and fully
8 utilizing Utah's unique landscape and geographical assets,
9 Utah has become economically dependent on the defense
10 establishment for the simple reason that the defense
11 establishment has been equally dependent on Utah.
12 While every state that comes before you can and
13 will talk about its economic ties to the military, not every
14 state has been subjected to fallout from nuclear tests or
15 stores volatile chemical weapons for the nation's arsenal.
16 But Hill Air Force Base doesn't just deserve to stay open for
17 the sake of the Utah economy or for other reasons of
18 fairness.
19 Let me remind you briefly what America is getting
20 for the dollars it is spending in Utah. Utah has long been
21 known in all business and manufacturing circles as having one
22 of the highest skilled, best trained, and most highly

Page 373

1 motivated workforces in the nation. Hill Air Force Base is
2 home to more than 21,000 of these industrious, hardworking
3 and dedicated individuals. And our country's military is the
4 beneficiary.
5 Accordingly, it can't be said enough, Hill Air
6 Force Base is the highest rated ALC for military value in the
7 Air Force. There simply is no other way to state Hill's
8 importance to our country's military fighting forces. And
9 there is no other factor that should be more significant in
10 determining which ALCs should remain in service. Our
11 military is built on a bedrock of fairness, honor and
12 excellence. And simply put, on objective criteria, Hill is
13 the best.
14 For our nation's sake, it should remain open. In
15 closing, let me express my gratitude to the commissioners for
16 their careful and their dedicated consideration of Hill Air
17 Force Base. You've taken the time to visit Hill, to listen
18 to those of us who advocate its value to America as well as
19 to the people of Utah. Please support the continued
20 effectiveness and excellence of one of the brightest stars in
21 America's defense team, and vote to keep Hill Air Force Base
22 and the Ogden ALC open.

Page 374

1 Thank you again for your time and consideration.
2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congresswoman, and
3 you made it under your five minutes, so you get a bonus or
4 something here. In closing out the Utah delegation, we have
5 Representative Bill Orton.
6 REPRESENTATIVE ORTON: Thank you, commissioners.
7 And if we would get a bonus sufficient to keep the bases
8 open, I would yield back the balance of my time.
9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Actually, one of your
10 colleagues used extra time, so it's probably a wash, if you
11 must know.
12 REPRESENTATIVE ORTON: Okay. Well, it is a
13 pleasure for me to come and join with you to express my
14 support and views on the status of Hill Air Force Base, DDO
15 Utah, as well as Dougway Proving Ground. As the only
16 Democrat in the Utah delegation, I can tell you this is not a
17 partisan or a political issue. We are a united delegation
18 who have worked together tirelessly.
19 And I would like to commend the other members of
20 the delegation for their work and their testimony here today.
21 As a member of Congress and a member of the Budget Committee,
22 I come to you as one, who, from the very beginning of time,

Page 375

1 when I was elected, have supported downsizing of military
2 bases; have supported consolidation; have supported the very
3 reductions which are what you're striving to accomplish.
4 I understand your difficult job, and support what
5 you're doing in it. Even though I do not represent the
6 district in which these bases are located, I grew up there.
7 I know the workforce. I know that, in fact, the people
8 employed at these bases are the best workforce anywhere in
9 the country. In fact, I began my career as a civilian
10 employee at Defense Depot Ogden.
11 My father retired after 30 years of service as a
12 civilian employee at the fire department at Hill Air Force
13 Base. My brother-in-law and uncle currently work there.
14 It's no accident that people are wanting to move to Utah and
15 Ogden in order to live and raise their family. We have a
16 tremendous work ethic in Utah. The quality of our workforce
17 is outstanding -- well-educated, loyal, and growing.
18 The availability there of a growing, or of a well-
19 educated workforce is a tremendous asset to the federal
20 government. Now, for the most part, you're not going to be
21 hearing any new information here. But let me just refer the
22 commission to a study which did occur recently, which you

Page 376

1 have just received information on -- a COBRA study that has
2 been mentioned by a couple of other members of our
3 delegation.
4 The DLA, in analyzing the cost to close Defense
5 Depot Ogden did not include the cost of moving the DEPMEDS.
6 These DEPMEDS -- deployable medical centers -- the only place
7 in the country they are deployed from is Defense Depot Ogden.
8 The COBRA study will indicate to you that it will cost
9 upwards of $380 million to move that segment of what occurs
10 at DDO. So you thought it was $110 million, add $380
11 million, you're up almost to $500 million to close that
12 facility and move it. So it does deserve a second look.
13 I believe -- and in fact, what I want you to do is
14 what is best for the Defense Department. You're going to
15 hear from everybody here today, all the members, saying don't
16 close the base in my backyard. I'm asking the commission to
17 do the best thing for the Department of Defense, the best
18 thing for the people of this nation; and that is, look at the
19 facts, look at the resources, look at the cost efficiencies,
20 analyze the human resource asset, analyze the unique missions
21 and the irreplaceable missions, analyze the efficiency on
22 these bases.

Page 377

1 I'm confident if you do that, you will reach the
2 same conclusion that I and the other members of our
3 delegation have reached. So in closing, I would ask you to
4 keep in mind the following points. Defense Depot Ogden, in
5 direct comparison with other depots, ranks at or near the top
6 in overall efficiency of operations. The '94 study done by
7 Peat Marwick found Defense Depot Ogden the most cost
8 efficient of the five depots studied.
9 Hill Air Force Base, in any comparison with other
10 bases or air logistic centers, emerges as a superb facility,
11 if not number one, with critical missions and significant
12 capacity for expansion. The support that this gives the Utah
13 Test and Training Range is a great variety of unique
14 capabilities which cannot be replaced. In order for the
15 Department of Defense to continue to operate in the most cost
16 effective manner, while maintaining operational capabilities
17 which include surge ability and adequate infrastructure to
18 meet worldwide commitments, it must retain its best
19 facilities.
20 Defense Depot Ogden, Hill Air Force Base, and
21 Dougway are top notch facilities which qualify among the very
22 best, and need to be retained. So in closing, I am mindful

Page 378

1 of the very tough choices you're facing. I recognize
2 everyone coming here is going to be asking you not to close
3 their bases. And all I ask is that you consider the
4 facilities in Ogden from a fair and objective analysis.
5 I'm confident, in doing so, that you will come to
6 the same conclusion, that these bases cannot be spared. So
7 thank you very much for your consideration.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congressman, and
9 thank you for the testimony on behalf of your whole
10 delegation. We appreciate it. Now we're moving along to the
11 state of Virginia. And I notice, in spite of back to back
12 votes, Senator Robb has shown up. Would you like to lead
13 off?
14 SENATOR ROBB: Madame Chair, thank you, and I do
15 appreciate it. We do have two back to back votes on, and I'm
16 sneaking over between the votes, if I may. I thank you again
17 for the opportunity to present the legislative perspective on
18 this last round of base closings. Yours is certainly not an
19 easy task, and we appreciate the fair and open manner in
20 which the BRAC hearings have proceeded. And I would say
21 simply that our differences with the DOD recommendations are
22 few, but they are important.

Page 379

1 Let me begin by joining Virginia's senior senator
2 who, if he has not already testified, will testify; and I
3 join in his testimony in strongly urging you to reverse the
4 DOD recommendation to withdraw support for Fort Pickett.
5 Clearly, the Army did not take into account the utilization
6 of this key facility by other services, or the impact on East
7 Coast armor training readiness if this facility is closed.
8 Transferring control of Fort Pickett to the
9 National Guard under a so-called enclave may decrease the
10 Army's budget very slightly, but the cost to the taxpayer
11 will remain unchanged. The need for this strategically
12 located training facility has not been challenged. We
13 believe the Army should share the cost of operating it with
14 the other services who are presently using those ranges.
15 Secondly, and critically important, Madame
16 Chairman, the Navy's planning process surrounding the
17 proposal to move SPAWAR to San Diego was seriously flawed,
18 and the decision ought to be reversed. In 1993, the BRAC
19 directed that SPAWAR relocate in government owned space
20 "within the national capital region."
21 Undersecretary Danzig reinforced this policy by
22 issuing a policy imperative in April 1994 that "The

Page 380

1 Department of the Navy must co-locate the acquisition
2 workforce with the service acquisition executive, the
3 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RD&A, to ensure
4 efficiency, timeliness, and effectiveness of the acquisition
5 workforce."
6 As you know, Madame Chairman, the service
7 acquisition executive is located in the Pentagon, not in San
8 Diego. SPAWAR is the major acquisition command for hardware
9 and software for electronic systems in the world. In this
10 capacity, it works with commands and activities of the
11 national capital region and on the East Coast. Over the
12 years, they have been extraordinarily successful in carrying
13 out this role.
14 As the nation watched events unfold in Bosnia last
15 week, it struck me that the electronics aboard the ships
16 which guided the successful mission to rescue CPT O'Grady was
17 due, in large part, to SPAWAR's ability to work closely with
18 both the contractors and their ultimate fleet customers. It
19 makes no sense at all to move this critical command, with its
20 unique workforce, over 3,000 miles away from the assistant
21 secretary and their primary customers.
22 In doing the BRAC analysis for the move to San

Page 381

1 Diego, the Navy conducted COBRA models for a move to Fort
2 Monmouth and Hanscom Air Force Base. But despite the obvious
3 practical reasons to stay within the NCR, inexplicably, the
4 Navy did not even conduct COBRA runs on alternatives within
5 the national capital region.
6 In addition, the Navy did not calculate, in its
7 analysis for the San Diego move, any construction costs
8 associated with the transcontinental move, despite the fact
9 that four years ago, it spent over $10 million to relocate
10 just two blocks to its present location. And independent
11 analysis, which did conduct COBRA runs for alternatives in
12 the NCR, shows savings values in the NCR to be three to four
13 times greater than the amount projected for savings from a
14 move to San Diego.
15 This data has been made available to the staff for
16 their review. It has also come to our attention recently,
17 Madame Chairman, that the Navy is now preparing plans to
18 consolidate the systems commands. The object is to merge
19 redundant staffs and restructure the planning, budgeting and
20 acquisition roles of the system commands. We applaud this
21 move, which has been recommended by cross service groups for
22 years; most recently by the White House Commission on Roles

Page 382

1 and Missions in the Armed Forces.
2 But we would argue, Madame Chairman, that it simply
3 does not make sense to be scattering key elements of these
4 commands all across the country, even while we work to
5 rationally and efficiently consolidate our efforts. Finally,
6 Madame Chairman, nearly 40 percent of the personnel in SPAWAR
7 are in support or overhead positions, not in the line
8 positions, performing the critical functions of this command.
9 Elimination of this overhead, and combining
10 redundant functions with the other systems commands could
11 achieve the hoped for savings, without a major move, and
12 would enable this command to continue its service to its
13 primary customers, which are co-located with them in this
14 part of the country.
15 To quickly summarize my point, Madame Chairman, I
16 believe the DOD recommendation to move SPAWAR to San Diego
17 should be overturned for the following reasons. One, the
18 COBRA analysis and cost estimates were seriously flawed in
19 that they understate realistic construction costs and fail to
20 consider the more practical and efficient alternative sites
21 in NCR. Two, moving this command at this time complicates
22 efforts to consolidate the Navy systems commands.

Page 383

1 The force structure of SPAWAR suggests that the
2 planned savings can be associated by staying in their present
3 location and reducing unnecessary and redundant functions.
4 And three, keeping SPAWAR in the NCR keeps them co-located
5 with their customers and with the ASN RD&A, as required by
6 Navy policy imperatives. Madame Chairman, the Navy's own
7 data calls specified that, and I quote, "if SPAWAR were
8 relocated outside the NCR, the mission would be performed
9 slower with greater technical risk and greater expense."
10 Decreasing the efficiency of our critical commands
11 and increasing their costs, Madame Chairman, was not the
12 intent of the BRAC process. Our mission is to increase our
13 efficiency and reduce our costs. For SPAWAR, this can only
14 be done by keeping it in the national capital region. With
15 that, Madame Chairman, I thank you. I went a couple seconds
16 over. I appreciate your allowing me to not only testify
17 quickly, but to leave very briefly, because another vote is
18 in progress.
19 And Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to see you as well
20 as other members of the commission, and I thank you.
21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator. I think
22 you win for the speaking speed award. And you may take off

Page 384

1 for your vote. Thank you, sir. I believe Senator Warner is
2 voting, if I'm not mistaken, so the delegation has asked that
3 Congressman Pickett testify next.
4 REPRESENTATIVE PICKETT: Thank you, Madame Chairman
5 and members of the commission. I welcome this opportunity to
6 speak on behalf of the city of Virginia Beach and its sister
7 communities in greater Hampton Roads. We speak as one, in
8 support of the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to
9 realign all Navy F-14 squadrons and to redirect the bulk of
10 the Atlantic fleet FA-18 Hornet assets to Naval Station
11 Oceana.
12 As you're well aware, BRAC 93 recommended Cherry
13 Point as a primary receiving site for Cecil Field F-18s. My
14 distinguished colleagues in North Carolina questioned the 95
15 directive, and asked, what has changed to justify this
16 modification? The obvious answer is force structure. BRAC
17 93 did not anticipate the immediate retirement of the entire
18 A-6 community, nor did it take into account the 50 percent
19 reduction in the number of F-14 squadrons that has occurred.
20 This leaves ample capacity at Oceana to accommodate
21 both the single-siting of all F-14s and the Cecil Field FA-18
22 squadrons. The Navy and DOD wisely chose to capitalize on

Page 385

1 Oceana's available capacity, and avoid the high cost of
2 constructing entirely new facilities at Cherry Point. The
3 military construction money saved by this decision is equal
4 to the cost of constructing an entirely new air station.
5 While there may not be agreement on exact dollar
6 values, it should be obvious to anyone that it is cheaper to
7 bear down these squadrons that are half-empty master jet
8 base, than at an air station already loaded and operating at
9 or near its maximum capacity. The cost issue and other
10 matters raised by North Carolina at the Baltimore public
11 hearing are dealt with more fully in this written rebuttal,
12 prepared by our Oceana community support group.
13 With your kind permission, I submit this document
14 for the record, and will restrict my remaining comments to a
15 few key points.
16 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We'd be delighted to insert
17 that in the record.
18 REPRESENTATIVE PICKETT: Thank you. The 1995
19 recommendations clearly provide the most cost effective
20 basing plan for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. But they
21 also provide significant operational advantages. Tomcat and
22 Hornet squadrons fly into combat together from Navy carrier

Page 386

1 decks. Now they will train together from a common base
2 located only a few miles from their aircraft carrier home
3 port, within a major concentration of Navy schools and
4 training facilities, and the primary Navy and joint
5 headquarters for the Atlantic theater.
6 It is little wonder Oceana ranks first in military
7 value among the 20 Navy and Marine Corps operational air
8 stations. Oceana has a long and proud history as a master
9 jet base for carrier-based fighter and attack aircraft. This
10 excellent base offers a well-deigned airfield, capable of
11 high intensity operations; direct Navy controlled access to
12 extensive off shore training areas; comprehensive support
13 facilities; a modern infrastructure; and all necessary
14 amenities to enhance the quality of life of our military
15 personnel and their families.
16 Land encroachment at Oceana imposes no significant
17 operational limitations on aircraft landing, approaches, or
18 departures. Unlike Cherry Point, the standard left-hand
19 pattern, required by carrier pilots, is available on all
20 runways. To protect Oceana's future, the city of Virginia
21 Beach has enacted a new comprehensive airport zoning
22 ordinance, and recently required the land and budgeted $25

Page 387

1 million to relocate two 40-year-old elementary schools that
2 now marginally infringe a runway approach.
3 Oceana's unencroached outlying field at Fentriss
4 provides intensive day and night carrier landing practice on
5 a full length 8,000-foot runway, fully equipped to handle
6 emergency landings. Water supply and water quality at Oceana
7 is an absolute non-issue. Along with all other Navy bases in
8 South Hampton Roads, NAS Oceana gets its water supply
9 directly from the city of Norfolk, under a blanket contract,
10 dating back to 1947.
11 Norfolk and the Navy enjoy a longstanding
12 partnership and responsible water supply management,
13 including a 1981 joint venture for deep wells at Driver,
14 Virginia, to guarantee the Navy's water supply in an
15 emergency. In response to the air quality conformity
16 statement requirement noted in DOD's recommendation for
17 Oceana, the appropriate Virginia authorities have already
18 completed their analysis of the proposed base loading, and
19 issued documentation attesting to no impact on conformity
20 determinations for the Hampton Roads area.
21 Let me clearly and forcefully stress the fact that
22 after implementation of the 95 recommendations, Oceana will

Page 388

1 still have fewer aircraft and fewer military personnel than
2 its successfully hosted and supported during the late 1980s.
3 As mayor Obendorf of Virginia Beach told you in Baltimore,
4 the citizens of Virginia Beach are ready to roll out the red
5 carpet and welcome the Navy's best and brightest to NAS
6 Oceana, the Navy's Fightertown East.
7 Thank you very much.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much. And I
9 notice Senator Warner has arrived, and we'd be delighted to
10 hear your testimony at this time.
11 SENATOR WARNER: Thank you, Madame Chairman, and I
12 shall not take all my time. As the commission knows, we're
13 engaged in votes at this present time. Seeing my former
14 colleague and good friend, the senator from Illinois, Mr.
15 Dixon, I have to share with you an experience several of us
16 had not more than an hour ago at a beautiful service, a
17 memorium for Congressman Les Aspin.
18 And during the course of remarks from several
19 persons, including Congressman Spratt, Spratt noted the
20 following about the history of the BRAC process, and at one
21 time, Secretary Cheney took it upon himself -- and you
22 remember that, Senator, because you and I were tasked, in the

Page 389

1 Armed Services Committee, to draw up the legislation.
2 Secretary Cheney decided it wasn't needed, a BRAC commission
3 And this is what Spratt recounted in a hearing
4 public for the Armed Services Committee, whereupon Chairman
5 Aspin leaned down and said to Secretary Cheney, you remind me
6 of Claude Raines' immortal line in Casablanca, when he said
7 I am shocked that politics would ever enter this issue; i.e.,
8 base closing. That's a direct quote.
9 Madame Chairman, and other members of the
10 commission, forgive me, I thought maybe a little moment of
11 levity --
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: It was greatly appreciated,
13 actually.
14 SENATOR WARNER: Particularly as it related to one
15 who was so knowledgeable and so influential, and provided
16 such warm friendship to those of us who are now before you
17 today. We miss him very much, and we did work with him on
18 this process. My colleagues have covered a number of items
19 here, and of course we are very appreciative of the various
20 decisions relating to Oceana, the Washington Navy Yard.
21 And on that, I would have to say that we fought the
22 battle to retain it in Virginia. I still think that's the

Page 390

1 best option. But if it's to go to the Navy Yard, that will
2 enable much of the industrial base and, indeed, many of the
3 employees to retain their offices in their homes, minimizing
4 a lot of serious dislocation; and preserving, in Crystal
5 City, a part of the economic base associated with the
6 facilities that are to be moved to the Yard.
7 It's a sound decision in terms of efficiency, and
8 therefore, we support that. I'm going to ask that my
9 statement be included, because we have another vote here
10 momentarily.
11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We will include it in its
12 entirety.
13 SENATOR WARNER: Thank you. While I agree with the
14 Navy regarding Naval Air Station Oceana and the NAVSEA. I
15 cannot see how their recommendation to move the Space and
16 Naval Warfare Systems Command from Arlington to San Diego,
17 California, would enhance readiness in any way. In fact, the
18 move to San Diego would adversely affect how that entity
19 accomplishes its mission.
20 Most of the business is conducted with other
21 government and civilian agencies in and around Washington.
22 putting the efficient accomplishment of this entity in

Page 391

1 considerable doubt. Now I turn to the Army installations.
2 The Army's recommendations to realign Fort Lee's Kenner Army
3 Community Hospital to a clinic would indeed degrade readiness
4 at a key power projection and personnel training site.
5 And I'm sure my colleagues are going to very
6 carefully cover that, because they have been far more
7 intimately connected with that decision than others. Among
8 other things Fort Lee is an important training installation
9 that supports, on the average, nearly 4,000 military students
10 each day. For purposes of efficiency and morale, sick and
11 injured trainees who require in-patient care should be
12 hospitalized in a facility which is as close as possible to
13 their unit.
14 Perhaps the Army's medical infrastructure needs to
15 be reduced, but those reductions should not be made at
16 facilities with a high density of military students who often
17 engage in the risky training. If you could underline the
18 risky training, I think that's the key part of that decision.
19 And therefore, I join with my colleagues in urging you to
20 maintain the Army community hospital there as a full-service
21 facility.
22 Finally, I want to address the Army's proposed

Page 392

1 closure at Fort Pickett, one of the most cost effective bases
2 in America. And I had the opportunity, once again in the
3 past few days, to, on a one on one basis, discuss that issue
4 with the Army chief of staff, General Sullivan, who will soon
5 be concluding his most distinguished career. And I judged
6 from our exchange that he agrees with me on that. On May
7 4th, this commission heard me express my strong belief that
8 the true facts about Fort Pickett seriously deviate from what
9 the Army has reported to you.
10 You also heard former commandant of the Marine
11 Corps, General Al Gray testify to the significant military
12 value of Fort Pickett. Additionally, this Friday,
13 Commissioner Cornella will have the opportunity to view
14 firsthand Fort Pickett's many attributes, and receive a
15 briefing on and among other things, the importance of the
16 Fort to the Army and Marine Corps tank gunnery on the East
17 Coast.
18 Therefore, I want to emphasize to you again today
19 that the Army's plan is not to close Fort Pickett, but rather
20 to keep its ranges and maneuver areas open, while drastically
21 cutting jobs through the use of an enclave concept. In
22 addition to being a detriment to readiness, which I will

Page 393

1 explain momentarily, this enclave concept would negate
2 community reuse of Fort Pickett, and make it nearly
3 impossible to create jobs to offset those eliminated by the
4 closure.
5 That fact alone makes it an unfair, and I underline
6 unfair, recommendation. In other words, everybody loses;
7 everybody loses with this type of decision. And therefore,
8 we encourage you to consider leaving the fort as it is, and
9 continuing to serve both the Army and the Marine Corps and,
10 indeed, other services. The Army says the enclave will save
11 the government the money. But careful analysis shows that
12 the savings they have announced are greatly exaggerated.
13 By all indication, the Army's plan to keep Fort
14 Pickett running by licensing necessary ranges and maneuver
15 areas to the National Guard. It's interesting, in another
16 hearing before the Armed Services Committee this morning, we
17 had the nominee, Mr. White, up, who was to be the number two
18 man in the Department of Defense. And the Base Closure
19 Commission addressed perhaps the changing of a lot of the
20 National Guard units.
21 And therefore, that seems to me to be in conflict
22 with any decision on this area. In their COBRA runs,

Page 394

1 however, the Army has not factored in the resulting cost to
2 the federal government caused by the licensing. According to
3 National Guard bureau estimates, these costs would be over
4 $7.5 million a year -- an amount that is nearly half of the
5 present annual operating budget of Fort Pickett.
6 Therefore, the Army's actual study states savings
7 from closing Fort Pickett would be significantly less than
8 what they have projected. Most significantly, in addition to
9 being unfair and uneconomical, the enclave concept represents
10 a half-hearted and potentially dangerous approach to
11 readiness. The enclave and licensing action combined would
12 still leave Fort Pickett seriously undermanned.
13 As a result, there would be poorly planned, poorly
14 supported and unsafe training. Readiness would ultimately
15 suffer. Fort Pickett is crucial to the continued readiness
16 of our armed forces. The Army agrees that it should remain
17 open, and that's essentially what General Sullivan told me.
18 But their proposed means to do so -- the enclave -- is flawed
19 from both the readiness and fiscal standpoints.
20 I strongly urge the commission to overturn the
21 recommendation to close Fort Pickett. In closing, I thank
22 all of you for your attention this afternoon, and for your

Page 395

1 service to the nation in this critical work that you're
2 doing. And I thank you for your patience while I was able to
3 deliver this statement.
4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator, very
5 much, for your testimony. And now, Congressman Sisisky,
6 who's been waiting very patiently in the wings.
7 REPRESENTATIVE SISISKY: Thank you very much,
8 members of the commission; and I thank you, Madame Chairman,
9 for not using that gavel on my very senior senator.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I took the time off yours.
11 REPRESENTATIVE SISISKY: -- who happens to be three
12 months older than I am, so I can call him my senior senator.
13 My colleagues here will go into depth on Fort Pickett and
14 Kenner Army Hospital -- both of them are in my district. And
15 although the staff will probably tell you the Kenner decision
16 does not involve substantial deviation from the criteria,
17 that doesn't mean that it's very smart.
18 Fort Lee needs the ability to provide in-patient
19 services and isolate soldiers from the barracks. Of course,
20 there's sufficient private capacity to do that; but at what
21 cost? Past BRAC decisions increased Fort Lee's training
22 load, and Kenner serves 30,000 beneficiaries that are not

Page 396

1 reflected in the data because they're outside any catchment
2 areas.
3 Since these people weren't counted, the cost of the
4 decisions are likely to escalate beyond anyone's rejections.
5 That's why Tri-Care has questions about whether it was the
6 right decision. Yet the Army and joint group never consulted
7 Tri-Care. And as of last week, neither had your staff. The
8 easy way, obviously, out is to simply wash your hands of the
9 whole thing, and accept the recommendation. But I ask you
10 sincerely to apply your good sense.
11 Please do not do anything to degrade the quality of
12 life for our young warriors -- men and women who train at
13 this post. Now, the recommendation to close Fort Pickett
14 involves substantial deviation from all four military value
15 criteria. Criteria one evaluates current and future mission
16 requirements, and the impact on DOD's total force. Army
17 reserve data calls contain major areas -- not just little
18 areas, but major areas -- that they confess to, such as rail
19 that they said was not available, and C-141 capable airport.
20 And the Army issued no data calls to anyone,
21 anyone, regarding other uses of Fort Pickett. Air Force,
22 Navy, Marine and Special Ops use of Fort Pickett were

Page 397

1 completely ignored. Criteria two is the availability of land
2 facilities and air space at both existing and receiving
3 locations. The Army said annual training conducted at
4 Pickett could easily be conducted at Fort Bragg, AP Hill, and
5 Camp Dawson.
6 Yet on March 17th, the Army testified that Fort
7 Bragg needs $15 million to buy 15,000 acres to make up a
8 100,000 acre shortfall in training land. What's laughable is
9 that they want to buy outpost woodpecker habitat to credit
10 against the onpost woodpecker habitat that led to current
11 training restrictions. They spend $1 million a year to
12 protect woodpeckers, and now they want to go out and buy
13 more.
14 But let me tell you a little secret. We already
15 own 47,000 acres -- woodpecker-free acres at Fort Pickett.
16 With the exception of the national combat training centers at
17 Fort Irwin and Polk, Pickett's air space exceeds that
18 available anywhere else in the United States. And how can
19 Camp Dawson, which is in West Virginia, absorb some of the
20 training load? Camp Dawson is smaller than Rock Creek Park,
21 believe it or not. We've measured the acreage there.
22 Criteria three is the ability to accommodate total

Page 398

1 force requirements at existing and receiving locations. This
2 criteria was also ignored by the Army. For example, they
3 recommended moving Pickett's petroleum training facility to
4 Fort Dix. Yet on April 21st, representatives of Fort Dix
5 told your staff that the Army plan did not assign sufficient
6 personnel to Fort Dix to support these requirements.
7 This is the problem discussed in the memo, where
8 the new Army chief of staff asks, "think we need to rework
9 the figures." Now, criteria four involves cost and manpower
10 implications. If the Army had really wanted to save money at
11 Pickett, they should have done a manpower survey and
12 developed a more efficient staffing pattern. Instead, they
13 propose to enclave 93 percent of the post and transfer it to
14 the Guard.
15 But an enclave can't be operated by 16 people
16 identified by the COBRA model. DOD's recommendation, I
17 think, is a shell game designed to let the Army have their
18 cake and eat it, too. They get to keep using Fort Pickett
19 while someone else pays the bill. If I could leave you with
20 one thought now, and I know my time is fleeting, it is to
21 remember what General Al Gray said up in Baltimore.
22 The former commandant of the Marine Corps, General

Page 399

1 Gray came to you on his own time, on his own time, because he
2 loves his country. He believes that the decision to close
3 Fort Pickett is a terrible, horrible mistake. After he
4 finished his presentation, and I think you were there, people
5 said it was almost like having a religious experience.
6 General Gray said that after the 2nd Marines smashed into
7 Kuwait City, they said it was easy; it was just like at Fort
8 Pickett.
9 Fort Pickett is too valuable a resource, and I beg
10 you not to give it up. Let me, at this time, thank you very
11 much, and I sincerely mean it, for your service. I know how
12 difficult it can be. I've already talked to Chairman Dixon
13 on that. And I think the whole country appreciates whatever
14 you do. Thank you so much.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Well, thank you, sir, very
16 much, for your testimony. And now, Congressman Payne.
17 REPRESENTATIVE PAYNE: Madame Commissioner and
18 members of the commission, thank you for giving me this
19 opportunity to testify. I want to follow up on some of the
20 comments that have just been made about Fort Pickett.
21 Congressman Sisisky has outlined how the recommendation
22 involves substantial deviation from the military value

Page 400

1 criteria.
2 And I want to first call your attention to criteria
3 six, which is the economic impact on communities. I believe
4 the Army understated the adverse impact, by using Dinwiddie
5 County as a basis for their calculations, although much of
6 the post lies in Dinwiddie County, very few Fort Pickett
7 employees actually reside there. Most come from Nottoway
8 County and Lunenberry County, which is in my district, which
9 have unemployment rates of 6.3 percent and 10.4 percent,
10 respectively.
11 The total impact of this recommendation would
12 amount to nearly 7.5 percent of the current workforce in
13 those counties. This would be one of the most serious
14 impacts on a locality anywhere in the nation. Having served
15 in the Army both on active duty and in the Reserves, I also
16 want to comment on two of the military issues. Out of
17 loyalty to my service, I must confess that I wish the Army
18 had done a better job on this one.
19 The colonel who directs the Army basing study has
20 written, and I quote, "We believe the Marine Corps schedules
21 training at Fort Pickett as an alternative training area for
22 Camp LeJeune, on occasions where ranges and training areas

Page 401

1 are not available on Camp LeJeune." As most of you are
2 aware, nothing could be farther from the truth.
3 The Marines do not train at Fort Pickett simply
4 because of scheduling problems at Camp LeJeune. They train
5 at Fort Pickett because it offers a unique training
6 environment that is not duplicated at LeJeune or anywhere
7 else. They can put young Marines in an unfamiliar
8 environment, and teach them how to work together. The best
9 description of this is in a letter the commission has already
10 received from General O.K. Steele, former commander of the
11 2nd Marine Division.
12 I'm told he'll be in the commission offices on this
13 coming Thursday, and would be most happy to visit with any of
14 you who want to take advantage of this opportunity to speak
15 with him about Fort Pickett. General Steele said, and I
16 quote, "The training value and improvements in operational
17 readiness a unit commander can accrue at Fort Pickett, and
18 have always exceeded the relative low cost of the
19 investment."
20 One of the specific issues that the use of tank
21 ranges at Camp LeJeune is restricted only to stationary
22 firing. And even that can only happen during the suspension

Page 402

1 of boat traffic on the Intercoastal Waterway. Pickett, on
2 the other hand, offers tank training for both the Army and
3 Marines. In the Eastern United States, only Fort Knox,
4 Benning, Drum, and Camp LeJeune, with its restrictions, have
5 more ranges than Fort Pickett, capable of firing tank tables
6 I-VIII.
7 During the winter at Fort Drum, you learn more
8 about how to operate your tank heaters than you do about how
9 to fire tank tables. And that's why the 10th Mountain
10 Division, headquartered in Fort Drum, trains at Fort Pickett
11 during the winter. Those of you who attended the Baltimore
12 hearing remember that former Marine commandant Al Gray had a
13 number of things to say about Fort Pickett.
14 General Gray said Fort Pickett is the only place
15 east of the Mississippi where you can conduct the kind of
16 combined arms warfare that teaches the thought process that
17 goes beyond the art of war. He said, "If you didn't have a
18 Fort Pickett, you'd have to invent one." General Gray also
19 explained why Pickett's training figures over the last two
20 years do not accurately reflect their mission.
21 It's because people who normally train there were
22 around the world in places like Somalia, Haiti, and off the

Page 403

1 coast of Bosnia. Just last week, they were in position to
2 rescue Air Force pilot Scott O'Grady. General Gray
3 concluded, and again I quote, "In my military judgment, based
4 on 41 years of being a Marine and four years as a joint
5 chief, closing Pickett is ludicrous; it's absolutely
6 ridiculous."
7 And I hope that the commission will come to the
8 same conclusion, and turn this decision around. Thank you
9 very much, and thank you for the good service that you are
10 providing this nation.
11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much,
12 Congressman. Representative Scott will be next.
13 REPRESENTATIVE SCOTT: Thank you, Madame Chairman,
14 Mr. Chairman, and other commissioners. Thank you for the
15 opportunity to be with you today. I'm here to oppose the
16 recommendation to realign Kenner Memorial Hospital at Fort
17 Lee in Virginia. Currently, Kenner provides a full range of
18 in-patient and out-patient services to beneficiaries in its
19 catchment area.
20 Its catchment area is large because the nearest
21 military facility is over an hour and 20 minutes away. We
22 must remember that in any case, whatever we do in this

Page 404

1 recommendation, the same number of people will be sick or
2 injured and need the same medical service. So the question
3 is how we can best provide those services. The options
4 before you are to reject the recommendation and maintain
5 Kenner as it is now; or realign Kenner and depend on the
6 private in-patient and out-patient services totally; or
7 establish medical services on base, ranging from simple out-
8 patient services or an infirmary or a super clinic, providing
9 99 percent of the services now provided at Kenner.
10 The proposed recommendation before you is just to
11 realign Kenner. But that's as specific as the proposal gets.
12 How to provide for the services that will be needed and the
13 cost and the convenience of those services is still under
14 review by the joint medical working group. There are several
15 critical problems with the proposal to realign Kenner.
16 First, it's not clear that there is sufficient medical
17 services on a private basis to meet the needs of Kenner
18 beneficiaries.
19 And in any case, those who use those services will
20 have significant travel requirements, which means that the
21 active duty personnel will have to spend more time getting
22 there. And others will have the inconvenience and additional

Page 405

1 expense of co-pays, deductibles, and exclusions associated
2 with Champus and Medicare. Second, there will not be an
3 emergency room on the base, because if you don't have an in-
4 patient facility, you can't have an emergency room.
5 Third, according to evidence I've seen, an
6 uncontradicted analysis, that there will be an increase -- as
7 much as $20 million -- to provide the same services that
8 people will need and are getting at Kenner, as they get now.
9 And the point of BRAC is to reduce expenses for the federal
10 government. I would hope we would not shift $20 million to
11 another budget, just to save the Defense Department a little
12 money.
13 Because we cannot make an intelligent decision
14 without the necessary information, I'm asking the commission
15 not to make a decision about Kenner Army Hospital until the
16 joint medical working group has finished its work and fully
17 understands the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense.
18 Time is not important at this point. When the joint medical
19 working group completes its work, the Secretary of Defense
20 and, by extension, the government will still have an
21 opportunity to make informed decisions and right-size the
22 defense medical establishment.

Page 406

1 It is not necessary to make a decision about Kenner
2 during the BRAC process because the size of the number of
3 employees involved is under the BRAC threshold of 200. Let
4 me conclude by reiterating what's at issue and what's at
5 stake with the options before you. First of all, the same
6 number of people will be sick or injured and need the same
7 level of services. And the issue is how we can best provide
8 those needs.
9 Further, there will be additional expense and
10 inconvenience to the beneficiaries, if they have to go
11 elsewhere. There are problems of what to do about
12 emergencies, infectious diseases such as chicken pox, because
13 they cannot be admitted an in-patient in private hospitals.
14 They have to be put somewhere. And furthermore, by
15 realigning Kenner, there's a potential $20 million additional
16 expense to the federal government.
17 Until these matters are fully evaluated, we cannot
18 make an intelligent decision. There's no necessity to make
19 the decision now. And for those reasons, I urge you to
20 reject the recommendation to realign Kenner at this time, to
21 allow us to make an informed decision based on the
22 appropriate information. Otherwise, we run the risk of

Page 407

1 putting form before substance and ending up with greater
2 costs and inconvenience to all concerned.
3 Madame Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be
4 with you and Mr. Chairman and other members of the
5 commissions. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much for your
7 testimony, Congressman. Representative Jim Moran.
8 REPRESENTATIVE MORAN: Good afternoon, Mrs. Steele
9 and Chairman Dixon, Mr. Clinger.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome.
11 REPRESENTATIVE MORAN: I'm going to talk to you
12 about SPAWARS. It's a technical command; it's what they call
13 a C4I command, primarily intelligence gathering. It's
14 currently located in Crystal City. There's four reasons why
15 we don't think that it should be moved. The first is stated
16 by the Navy in the BRAC data call 31. They say if SPAWARS
17 were relocated outside the Washington area, their mission
18 would be performed slower, with greater technical risk and
19 greater expense, due to a different, less experienced work
20 force.
21 That's the best argument -- the one that the Navy
22 used in the data call -- for not moving SPAWARS. The second

Page 408

1 is that SPAWARS provides a great deal of support for our
2 international allies. There's a current memorandum of
3 understanding that we have to comply with that requires
4 coordination and development of all the C4I projects, to take
5 place within the Washington metropolitan area.
6 SPAWARS works with our allies that need the ready
7 and secure access to their embassies in order to facilitate
8 information exchanges. And as I say, the C4I
9 interoperability -- you move them to the West Coast, and they
10 clearly couldn't perform that function, which is necessitated
11 by the current memorandum of understanding. The third point
12 is the contractors that work primarily with SPAWARS.
13 They also work with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, the Defense
14 Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, OPA, the
15 National Science Foundation. They work for virtually all of
16 these various naval systems commands. There's about 4,000
17 experts that SPAWARS needs. They're going to find it very
18 difficult to move out to San Diego. It will break up that
19 network of expertise, and as a result, SPAWARS needs will not
20 be as well met.
21 The last reason is that the personnel savings were
22 overstated and the construction costs were understated. The

Page 409

1 personnel savings, we feel, could well be achieved simply by
2 consolidation. Some of the management reforms that have been
3 discussed for a long time -- you could consolidate the common
4 support functions across the technical commands. There's
5 been several suggestions for consolidating some of the
6 commands themselves. That's up to the Navy.
7 But the reality is that the personnel savings that
8 are supposed to be achieved by moving SPAWARS could even more
9 readily achieved by leaving it where it is. Because where it
10 is gives you the opportunity to consolidate functions,
11 particularly the overhead support functions that they share
12 with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and all of the other commands. They're
13 all co-located here.
14 That makes a lot of sense. It gives us an
15 opportunity to achieve personnel savings, many of which have
16 been recommended for a long time. You move it out to San
17 Diego, and you're going to have to create new overhead costs,
18 and those additional people are going to cost more money than
19 if you were to share many of the functions. Construction
20 costs -- they are not addressed in this recommendation. It's
21 hard to assume that if you move 11,060 personnel and all the
22 associated equipment, that it's not going to require a build-

Page 410

1 out of the work spaces, the installation of computer
2 equipment.
3 You're going to have to pay for improvements to the
4 secure compartmented information facility, SCIF is the
5 acronym. Three years ago, SPAWARS moved just a short
6 distance within Crystal City; and it cost $10 million to
7 build a new SCIF, the secure compartmented information
8 facility. They had to install a new local area network and
9 construct a new communications lab. Well, you're going to
10 have to at least do that if you move out to San Diego.
11 And construction costs were not figured into this
12 analysis. So we urge the commission to reconsider the
13 SPAWARS move; to look at the loss of the corporate memory
14 that you have and the contractors that serve all the
15 commands; to weigh the impact that this is going to have on
16 current memoranda of understanding that we have to comply
17 with, and we couldn't if we moved to San Diego; and to review
18 the unstated personnel and construction costs that are not
19 included in this cost analysis.
20 We think those are compelling arguments for leaving
21 SPAWARS where it is. And finally, let me just say, I heard
22 something that is hard to believe, but that is that NAVSEA

Page 411

1 could still move to White Oak, which I would hope would not
2 be considered, for all the reasons that were given to the
3 previous base closure commission. It was not intended for an
4 office building.
5 It doesn't have the capacity for office building,
6 unless you're willing to spend more than it would cost to
7 build a new office building. They can't even accommodate the
8 commercial offices that would be needed for the contractors.
9 And they don't have the public transportation which is
10 required in the national capital region.
11 They would be in violation of the agreements that
12 the federal government has made with national capital
13 planning commission; that you have every facility beyond a
14 public transit have public transit access, which White Oak
15 doesn't.
16 So with that, I'm sure my time is expired. I
17 appreciate your indulgence, by not gavelling me to order.
18 And thanks for all the work you're putting into this. Thank
19 you.
20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much,
21 Congressman, for your testimony. And lastly, but not least,
22 from the Virginia delegation, is Congressman Tom Davis.

Page 412

1 REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2 commissioners. The Army has proposed moving the Information
3 Systems Software Development Center, ISSC, from leased space
4 in Fairfax County to government space at Fort Meade,
5 Maryland. Now, this move from leased space to government
6 owned space may look good, and it could save the government
7 money, but none of the 400 military and civilian personnel
8 would be laid off, and the move is from Virginia to just
9 across town in Maryland.
10 But I think it's a bad decision for the Army and
11 the government, and I want to urge yo to have the Army
12 reconsider this move, and let me tell you why. The Army ISSC
13 has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. A couple of
14 years ago, when the Army looked to move the facility from
15 outdated facilities in Fairfax, Virginia, the Army asked the
16 GSA to find space for ISSC in Northern Virginia. They even
17 specified the boundaries.
18 The Army sought a location close to Fort Belvoir
19 and the Pentagon customers, and close to where most of its
20 employees had settled during the past 20 years. This was the
21 Crown Ridge building located at the junction of I-66 and
22 Route 50. GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease

Page 413

1 with Crown Ridge Associates for six years, at a cost of $3
2 million a year. That lease started a little over a year ago,
3 and it runs through May 28, 2000; and that's important.
4 Also, a total of $7.2 million was spent by Crown
5 Ridge, GSA, and the Army, to upgrade the buildings to meet
6 the unique requirements of the Army ISSC. The agreement with
7 GSA allows the Army to move out of the current space without
8 penalty, if appropriate notice is given. But the GSA is
9 still stuck with the lease until May 28, 2000. Now, after
10 spending all this money, the Army is proposing moving the
11 ISSC to Fort Meade, Maryland.
12 The Army claims that it will save $8 million over
13 20 years. Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer,
14 GSA is still obligated for the six-year term of the lease.
15 If the Army moves out, GSA is stuck with an empty building.
16 This will not be easy space to fill, considering it was built
17 to suit ISSC and is not in reasonable proximity to mass
18 transit.
19 To quote GSA, regarding the Army's plan to move out
20 of this building, "The building was leased specifically for
21 the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs.
22 Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the

Page 414

1 location, and the building might be difficult to market."
2 Now, the office vacancy rate out in this area is about 12
3 percent today, and I think they will have a hard time
4 marketing it or subletting the facility, given the
5 particularities of particularly building needs used today.
6 In addition, the Army is going to have to convert
7 or build facilities at Fort Meade. The COBRA model figures
8 used by the Army indicate that it will have to spend roughly
9 $5 million to renovate space at Fort Meade and move ISSC. So
10 at a minimum, the government spends $11 million in renovation
11 and moving costs, and ISSC has to go through two moves in
12 three years. But the government will also be stuck with the
13 $3 million per year lease for a building which may sit empty
14 for three years -- another $9 million.
15 This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process
16 to work. The objective is to reduce costs for the
17 government, not just the military services. All this move
18 would accomplish is a cost shift from the Army to GSA -- a
19 tactic Congress has discouraged BRAC from endorsing. But
20 more importantly, while this is listed as an in-area move,
21 one only has to look at Washington rush hour commute from
22 Western Fairfax to Fort Meade, Maryland, to know that it will

Page 415

1 require people to move or spend hours commuting.
2 ISSC civilian personnel, roughly two-thirds of the
3 command's personnel, have built their lives in Fairfax County
4 over the past 20 years. With the signing of a new six-year
5 lease last year, personnel felt comfortable making plans to
6 stay in this area. Now the command will be moved again, and
7 literally to the other side of the Washington metropolitan
8 area.
9 Those working at ISSC are software experts with
10 very specialized and valuable skills. Certainly some will
11 move to Maryland and some will take the long commute from
12 Northern Virginia. But it's also likely that a significant
13 number will choose to find other jobs. The Army will lose
14 talented people, and there will be a real operational impact
15 on ISSC.
16 I think that if you look at the big picture, this
17 decision has never made sense for the government. It may
18 save the Army some money, if you don't count the disruption
19 and operations caused by another move and the potential loss
20 of skilled people. But ultimately, however, this move will
21 cost the government millions in moving and renovation costs,
22 and leave the GSA with a $3 million annual lease obligation

Page 416

1 on a building without tenants.
2 If you want to move it, wait until the end of the
3 lease, in the year 2000. Then, I think the savings could be
4 there. In closing, I repeat, with this move, we are shifting
5 the cost of the operation from the Army to GSA, we're not
6 saving any money. This is not what Congress intended when
7 the base closure process was set up. Thank you very much.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank
9 Congressman Davis for finishing within the time limit. And
10 as you assume the chair, Mr. Chairman, may I make this
11 observation one more time. The great state of Virginia, with
12 eight people making a presentation, succeeded in having half
13 honor the request that their remarks be made within the five
14 minute period.
15 I congratulate Congressman Davis. I would have
16 been reluctant to make these remarks had he not finished
17 within the period. I would say again, it's five minutes.
18 There are 25 witnesses still to go today. Green is talk;
19 yellow is slow down; red is stop. Red is not talk another
20 minute; red is not talk another two minutes; red is not now
21 I'm all set to conclude, no, no, no, no. Red is stop. We
22 thank you very much, Congressman.

Page 417

1 REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Thank you, Senator.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you.
3 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Dixon.
4 And our final clean-up scheduled state delegation is the
5 great state of Wisconsin, and leading off will be Senator
6 Kohl.
7 SENATOR KOHL: Mr. Chairman and members of the
8 Commission, it is an opportunity that I appreciate very much
9 to testify before you today on behalf of the 440th Airlift
10 Wing, an Air Reserve unit based at General Mitchell
11 International Air Reserve Station Milwaukee.
12 I have a statement with me from Congressman Kleczka
13 which I would like to insert for the record.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be admitted.
15 SENATOR KOHL: When you close an Air Reserve
16 station, you are not just closing an installation, you are
17 making a decision to dismantle a unit, and in the case of the
18 440th Airlift Wing, the Air Force would be losing some of the
19 best highly trained C-130 pilots and maintenance crews.
20 From D-Day to the Cuban Missile Crisis, from Desert
21 Shield and Desert Storm to Haiti the 440th has demonstrated
22 its importance to our nation. Even now, as we consider the

Page 418

1 future of this historic unit, the 440th is ready as the lead
2 wing in the event of an evacuation of United Nations Forces
3 from Bosnia.
4 In 1993, the 440th accomplished what no other C-130
5 airlift wing has ever accomplished, and that includes active
6 duty Air National Guard and Reserve units.
7 An unprecedented performance in the Air Mobility
8 Command's Rodeo known as the olympics of airlifters, the
9 440th won the competition for the best C-130 air drop crew,
10 the best C-130 air drop wing, the best C-130 wing and the
11 best U.S. Air Force Mobility Wing.
12 As General Fogleman so aptly stated about the
13 440th, and I quote, "They are the best of the best." The
14 excellence of this unit is a reflection of the high quality
15 of the training provided at General Mitchell Air Reserve
16 Station and at other training venues in Wisconsin.
17 There are no traffic delays in Milwaukee. While
18 other airports experience significant air traffic delays
19 keeping Air Reserve pilots on the ground waiting to take off,
20 Milwaukee's pilots have minimum waiting time and maximum time
21 in the air flying.
22 Wisconsin Fort McCoy, an Army Reserve base, and

Page 419

1 Bulk Field, an Air National Guard installation offer unique
2 opportunities for joint training and provide local facilities
3 for flying air drops and training on dirt runways, which are
4 essential for combat training.
5 More important, the flying time from General
6 Mitchell to Fort McCoy or Bulk Field is 40 minutes. The C-
7 130 training mission requires that pilots fly for at least 30
8 minutes at low levels before they perform air drops, which
9 makes the location of the 440th in relation to Fort McCoy
10 ideal for efficient training.
11 Mr. Chairman, during Commissioner Steele's site
12 visit and again at the regional hearing in Chicago, pilots
13 from the 440th who fly commercially out of airports around
14 the country testified about how they like to fly out of
15 Milwaukee because of the unrestricted and unencroached
16 airspace and the lack of air track control delays.
17 The fact that Mitchell International Airport is not
18 a hub for a major international airline means that pilots do
19 not have to plan their flying time around jumbo jets. Again,
20 all of these conditions translate into for flying time for
21 pilots.
22 In addition to the obvious military value, the

Page 420

1 440th provides there are some unique and innovative cost
2 savings that make the installation extremely cost-effective.
3 The 440th owns its own facilities, and thus it has
4 no lease costs. The 440th has reduced landing fees at the
5 airport in exchange for providing crucial fire support.
6 And the training efficiencies in using of drop
7 zones at Fort McCoy and other training facilities around
8 Wisconsin translate into real savings for the Air Force.
9 So Mr. Chairman, I'm committed to finding ways for
10 the federal government to reduce the deficit, and I am
11 supportive of the base closing process. We should make the
12 hard decisions to eliminate bases we no longer need.
13 In the case of General Mitchell Air Reserve
14 Station, however, it would be contrary to the goals of
15 deficit construction. The 440th represents value for the
16 taxpayer dollar. It has the unique combination of
17 characteristics that has produced a top C-130 unit in an
18 extremely cost-effective manner.
19 America and Wisconsin cannot afford to lose this
20 unit which truly is the best of the best. I thank you for
21 your attention.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Kohl.

Page 421

1 Senator Feingold.
2 SENATOR FEINGOLD: Chairman Dixon and
3 Commissioners, thank you for giving me also this opportunity
4 to speak to you today about the 440th Air Reserve Unit at
5 Mitchell Airport.
6 I've always been a strong supporter of the base
7 closure process. Since 1993, I've actually worked to close
8 Wisconsin only naval installation in the state, Project Ill
9 Health, the extremely low frequency communications system,
10 and I've introduced legislation and wrote to you advocating
11 that it be placed on the list for consideration for closure.
12 In my view, it exemplifies an installation whose
13 mission is of little, if any, military strategic value, and
14 it therefore should be closed.
15 The 440th Airlift Wing, on the other hand, has time
16 and time again demonstrated its strategic value as a part of
17 our nation's overall defense forces. During the Persian Gulf
18 War, Haiti, Somalia or recent and future missions in Bosnia,
19 the men and women of the 440th have consistently served our
20 nation with honor, distinction and excellence.
21 You've already heard from Senator Kohl about the
22 unprecedented number of military honors the 440th has

Page 422

1 received in recognition of its training levels and
2 preparedness.
3 I believe that a primary reason has met with such
4 incredible success is the quality of the reservists who serve
5 there. I want to review very briefly for the Commission some
6 of the notable achievements of the 440th recruiting
7 operation.
8 First, the 440th is the recognized leader for
9 excellence in Air Force Reserve recruiting. As you all know,
10 it is important that reserve units be staffed at over 100
11 percent to ensure that they can be relied upon to do their
12 job, which is to back up the active duty in any case.
13 Few bases have been able to do that consistently,
14 but the staffing levels of the 440th have been over 100
15 percent nine out of the last ten years. For the Reserves,
16 this is not excess staffing. It is assurance that the 440th
17 has the personnel strength to activate for any mission
18 anywhere at any time.
19 Second, as Wisconsin's federal Air Force
20 installation, the 440th draws reservists from every one of
21 the nine congressional districts in the state, ensuring full
22 support of its mission.

Page 423

1 Third, with the regional hubs of both of the United
2 Parcel Service and Federal Express located at Mitchell Field,
3 the 440th has a large pool of trained pilots, loadmasters and
4 mechanics from which they can successfully recruit.
5 Recruiting is a critical element to the readiness
6 of any reserve unit. The 440th has demonstrated that their
7 recruit efforts far outdistance those of any other C-130
8 reserve unit.
9 I know some of you have heard this fact repeatedly
10 during the state visit to the 440th and at the regional
11 hearing that was recently held in Chicago. The 440th Airlift
12 Wing also provides the essential support for other federal
13 agencies in the Midwest.
14 As you consider its future, I'd like to point out
15 the concurrent negative impact that closing the 440th would
16 have on other government agencies.
17 First, the 440th is the headquarters of the
18 regional personnel office that currently services a seven-
19 state region, including Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana,
20 Minnesota, Ohio, Colorado and Oregon.
21 If the 440th closed, this function and the related
22 personnel would have to be duplicated at another site so that

Page 424

1 there would not be a net savings coming from the closure.
2 Second, the 440th is a regional federal
3 communications center and is the only authorized provider of
4 satellite and classified messages to other military and law
5 enforcement agencies, including DOD, FBI, DOT, DOE, Secret
6 Service and FEMA. It would be problematic for those agencies
7 were the 440th's communication center to be terminated.
8 Third, the 440th is a regional national disaster medical
9 system's site tasked with providing emergency airlift
10 services, casualty triage processing and as a medical
11 disaster communications hub in times of national crisis.
12 It is clear that our nation cannot afford to lose
13 the many functions that the 440th now provides for our
14 national security. There could be no doubt that this unit
15 plays a serious, strategic role in our nation's defense.
16 The Air Force has time and time again recognized
17 the military value of the 440th. For these reasons, the Air
18 Force has indicated that it does not want to close the 440th.
19 Further, as you all know, the Department of Defense
20 did not even recommend this unit for consideration for
21 closure. The State of Wisconsin is proud of the
22 accomplishment of the members of the 440th Airlift Wing and

Page 425

1 remains wholly committed to keeping this unit in Milwaukee.
2 It has demonstrated quality, superiority and
3 strategic value that should not be lost. I hope the
4 Commission will concur, and I thank you for your time.
5 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Feingold.
6 Representative Barrett.
7 REPRESENTATIVE BARRETT: Thank you. I'd like to
8 thank Chairman Dixon and the members of the Commission for
9 giving us the opportunity to speak on behalf of the 440th
10 Airlift Wing in Milwaukee.
11 And I'd also like to thank Commissioner Steele
12 again for her visit to Milwaukee. We appreciated the
13 opportunity to show off the best of the best. I'm also
14 pleased to be the last speaker from the last state, and I'm
15 sure that you are, too, at least prior to the filler-ins that
16 come after me.
17 I join Congressman Kleczka, Senator Kohl and
18 Senator Feingold in my strong support for the 440th, and I
19 would like to conclude our testimony by highlighting some of
20 the arguments against closing the base.
21 In the most recent COBRA provided for the
22 Commission, the Air Force overstated by $1.85 million the

Page 426

1 potential savings to be achieved by closing the 440th. Also,
2 the costs associated with closing the base were understated
3 by $9.4 million in one-time costs and $2.6 million in
4 recurring costs.
5 These inaccuracies can be traced to several
6 factors. The regional civilian personnel office at the 440th
7 serves seven states and will have to be relocated if the Air
8 Force moves out of Wisconsin. The salaries of the 41 people
9 assigned to the 440th CPO therefore cannot be counted as
10 savings.
11 The Air Force Reserve has invested $7.7 million in
12 the 440th digital fiber optic communication system, the only
13 working system as required by the PY 2001 POM decision.
14 Although all bases will eventually receive such a
15 system, the Air Force Reserve will need to assemble a new
16 system at another base immediately if the 440th is closed,
17 substantially increasing the cost to close the 440th.
18 Another factor contributing to the increased cost
19 of closing the 440th is the need to maintain the support
20 functions such as drop zone operations at nearby Fort McCoy
21 that must continue even if the 440th closes.
22 The locate of the 440th at Mitchell International

Page 427

1 Airport provides unrestricted unencroached airspace and
2 minimal ground traffic delays for more efficient flight
3 operations than any other C-130 base.
4 The airport can annual any aircraft in the Defense
5 Department inventory in all weather and has been designated a
6 weather testing site for the C-17. In addition, enough space
7 exists to accommodate four additional C-130 aircraft
8 immediately.
9 Lastly, I would like the emphasize the strong and
10 constructive relationship that exists between the 440th and
11 the community. When members of the 440th flew to Bosnia,
12 Panama and Haiti, the community stepped in to help the
13 families they left behind.
14 When future emergencies call the reservists of the
15 440th to duty, the people of Wisconsin will be there again.
16 I hope you will all agree that the 440th makes an important
17 contribution to the Milwaukee area and to the State of
18 Wisconsin as a whole.
19 If the 440th is closed, the Air Force will no
20 longer have any presence in the State of Wisconsin. Our
21 national defense and our local community will surely suffer.
22 Thank you, and I would also, in closing, like to

Page 428

1 point out Chairman Dixon complimented Virginia. All our
2 speakers finished in time, and we did so to show the
3 efficiency that we work with the 440th. Thank you very much.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
5 Barrett. In fact, all three of you came under the time, and
6 I commend you for your performance.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman, I was just in the
8 back room making some certificates, some gold certificates
9 for the three of you from Wisconsin, which I'm going to
10 present personally.
11 CONGRESSMAN BARRETT: And it's just an example of
12 how well the 440th works. We couldn't have done it without
13 the 440th. Thank you very much.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We will now hear from a
15 number of members of Congress who, for scheduling reasons,
16 were not able to appear with their delegations. We'll start
17 with Senator Shelby from Alabama.
18 SENATOR SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, members of the
19 Commission, I regret that I was not able to be with you
20 yesterday. I would first ask that my full written statement
21 be made part of the record, and we have some exhibits that
22 Chairman Dixon taught me years ago could be made part of it,

Page 429

1 too.
2 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Without objection, your full
3 statement and the exhibits will be entered.
4 SENATOR SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you
5 and other members of the Commission for giving me here today
6 the opportunity to speak before you briefly, and I'll try to
7 be brief.
8 The major focus of my comments this afternoon is
9 the ill-advised Army proposal to close Fort McClellan and
10 move the chemical and military police schools to Fort Leonard
11 Wood.
12 In addition, I will also highlight in my remarks
13 the proposed relocation of the aviation mission of the
14 Aviation Troop Command to Red Stone Arsenal and the movement
15 of the Army depot maintenance and defense distribution
16 functions from Red River and Letterkenny Army Depots to
17 Anniston Army Depot.
18 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I believe
19 that the rush to grab Fort McClellan's training missions has
20 resulted in a shoddy, very shoddy permitting process that has
21 completely disregarded our nation's military readiness for
22 the sake of short-term gains in jobs, yes, and prestige.

Page 430

1 Let me be clear that this is the final round for
2 the foreseeable future for BRAC. You know it and I know it.
3 The decisions you make in the coming days are irrevocable.
4 If you choose to the Army chemical training
5 functions to Fort Leonard Wood, this nation I believe will be
6 taking an enormous risk. The current permits, as
7 corroborated by expert commentary, are completely inadequate
8 for duplicating our current chemical training activities at
9 Fort McClellan.
10 This morning, this very day you heard from the
11 distinguished representative from the congressional district
12 in which Fort Leonard Wood is located. He made two
13 statements to you which require correction.
14 First, he told you that there would be an increase
15 in readiness because rear area protection in river crossings
16 would have the chemical school and MP school together with
17 the engineering school.
18 Second, he told you here that the Army sent a
19 letter stating that it can properly perform its mission under
20 the existing environmental permits.
21 As far as the first statement, I ask that you
22 consider whether at this point in history we should place a

Page 431

1 higher priority on river crossings than on the emergent
2 reaction to the use of chemical and biological agents,
3 particularly in urban areas, which provides lucrative targets
4 for weapons of mass destruction.
5 Secondly, I too have a letter dated yesterday from
6 the Chief of Staff of the Army Training and Doctoring Command
7 which states unequivocally that the smoke training permit
8 does not allow the chemical school to train as it currently
9 does at Fort McClellan. It also has other things in it, and
10 I'm sure you have that.
11 The letter then indicates that the Army will have
12 to modify its operations if the relocation is executed.
13 Because of the shortcutting of the permit process, the
14 lengthy litigation has already begun and I predict will
15 continue in Missouri.
16 As a result, any decision, yes, any decision to
17 move chemical training to Fort Leonard Wood bears substantial
18 risk to our nation's military readiness.
19 In contrast, Fort McClellan is a functional
20 facility with the proper permitting, the facilities and
21 experience for chemical warfare training. You know that.
22 In regard to the smoke permit, it's my

Page 432

1 understanding that a Memorandum for the Record was prepared
2 dated June 9, 1995, by Colonel Koflin, Director of Training
3 at the Army Chemical School.
4 This memorandum was approved by Colonel Mashburn,
5 Assistant Commandant of the Chemical School, also approved by
6 General Wooten, Commandant at the Army Chemical School and
7 transmitted to the assistant to the Chief of Staff for
8 Operations at TRADOP.
9 I respectfully this afternoon request that the
10 Commission obtain the Koflin memorandum to obtain a true
11 picture of the smoke permit. The Alabama delegation has
12 requested the document but have been refused by TRADOP. I do
13 not believe they will refuse you, Mr. Chairman.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We will do that, Mr. Senator.
15 SENATOR SHELBY: I will now turn to the movement of
16 the aviation component at ATCOM to Red Stone Arsenal forming
17 the Aviation and Missile Command, which is proposed.
18 The Army will achieve significant savings through
19 this realignment with little economic impact to the effected
20 community from which it's moved. This movement will allow
21 the Army aviation function to be located at a major Army
22 installation that has, yes, has an existing research

Page 433

1 development and engineering center.
2 This is an excellent fit because MICOM, the missile
3 command, and ATCOM have closely related commodity missions
4 and expertise, a synergism that is not found between the Army
5 chemical, military police and engineering schools, leading to
6 a very much more efficient AMC organization.
7 Why is this move cost-effective, we might ask?
8 It's cost-effective, Mr. Chairman, because the return on the
9 investment is only 2.3 years. I believe that answers itself.
10 In regard to the Anniston Army Depot, the depot maintenance
11 and defense supply movements will improve, yes, improve
12 readiness by consolidating all track vehicle maintenance in
13 one depot and will result in the need for only one depot to
14 support on-site operations such as Operation Desert Storm, as
15 opposed to the current situation where three depots are
16 necessary.
17 I know that the Commission has taken a close look
18 at the issue of capacity, and you should, questioning the
19 ability of Anniston Army Depot to perform the maintenance and
20 supply functions that would be transferred from Red River and
21 Letterkenny Army Depots.
22 The Army and Anniston Army Depot have analyzed the

Page 434

1 out-year workload levels and have concluded, Mr. Chairman,
2 that Anniston can perform all the maintenance and supply
3 functions with one eight-hour shift during a five-day
4 workload.
5 They also analyzed workload levels under other
6 conditions such as wartime conditions and have concluded that
7 all functions can be performed with just one extra shift, not
8 three.
9 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I ask you
10 that you validate the decisions of your predecessors in this
11 Commission and keep the current chemical training programs at
12 Fort McClellan and move the aviation function of ATCOM to Red
13 Stone Arsenal and move Army depot maintenance and supply
14 functions to Anniston Army Depot. I appreciate your
15 consideration this afternoon.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator. Next
17 will be representative Bud Cramer also from Alabama.
18 REPRESENTATIVE CRAMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
19 and members of the Commission. I thought perhaps I might be
20 the very last of just a few members of Congress that would
21 testify before you for these two days, but it looks like my
22 colleague from California will, in fact, follow me over a

Page 435

1 different issue.
2 I'm sure you've heard a lot of different arguments
3 from a lot of different members of Congress. This is my
4 third time to testify before this Commission. So I want to
5 thank you again for your attention.
6 What I'm going to attempt to do is summarize some
7 of the past points that I and other representatives of my
8 community have I think effectively made in the Birmingham
9 regional hearing and the Atlanta hearing this past Friday as
10 well.
11 I follow Senator Shelby. I come from north
12 Alabama, the Fifth Congressional District, so our Alabama
13 concern there really runs along a parallel of issues over Red
14 Stone Arsenal, one of the Army's finest military bases, one
15 of the most recognized and honored military bases in this
16 country.
17 We are speaking on behalf of the Army's
18 recommendation, the Army's recommendation to close the
19 Aviation and Troop Command in St. Louis and create, as
20 Senator Shelby said, the Army Aviation and Missile Command at
21 Red Stone Arsenal.
22 Now again, in Atlanta, we gave you examples of

Page 436

1 during the Gulf War how those two commands had to communicate
2 with one another from the separate sites there, and that was
3 done effectively but how much more effectively that could be
4 done if this move or recommendation is in fact followed.
5 We want to stress what we think, obviously, you
6 know the BRAC process is all about, and that is that if we're
7 to maintain military readiness and modernize our forces, then
8 what the BRAC process was intended to do was that of saving
9 money and that of forcing us to face tough decisions and
10 forcing us to close facilities that are recommended to be
11 closed.
12 We do that, again, to save money, but we want to do
13 it fairly. The Army and other services went through a
14 detailed and involved process to determine the installations
15 that they will need to carry out their current missions.
16 The Army then applied the selection criteria
17 established by law and made its base closure recommendations,
18 and the Army recommends that the Aviation and Troop Command
19 in St. Louis be closed. They would be consolidated there at
20 Red Stone Arsenal.
21 Now, the savings to be realized are enormous, and
22 they're quickly realized. There will be $46 million in

Page 437

1 savings every year with a 20-year savings total of $453
2 million.
3 The one-time cost of this consolidation will be
4 returned in less than three years, in fact in 2.3 years. The
5 Army obviously saves money and achieves what Chairman Dixon
6 has referred to in the past as the purposes of the BRAC
7 process in fact transferring ATCOM there to Red Stone.
8 The ATCOM closure is the largest Army commodity
9 command restructuring in the history of the base closing
10 process. The savings from this one closure represents 3
11 percent of the total DOD base closure savings this year.
12 The recommendation, if followed, will reduce the
13 Army commodity commands by more than 15 percent, and again
14 this meets the DOD recommendation.
15 Now, we've had a confusing issue, in my opinion,
16 that has been added over ATCOM. It has been suggested that
17 as an alternative to ATCOM moving to Red Stone that the Army
18 move the Space and Strategic Defense Command, which is in
19 Huntsville, in Research Park in rented facilities, that it
20 move that command to Red Stone Arsenal instead of closing
21 ATCOM.
22 Now, let me again point out that SSDC and ATCOM are

Page 438

1 totally separate commands, but I think the suggestion is a
2 smoke screen, and the suggestion seems to give the impression
3 that if SSDC is moved to Red Stone, then we wouldn't have
4 room for ATCOM there; we wouldn't need ATCOM to be there.
5 That is not true. There are no savings, none
6 whatsoever that would result from the move of SSDC to Red
7 Stone, and I think analysis is being run and has been run
8 that would show that.
9 So the return on the investment of the
10 recommendation of SSDC to Red Stone is never in fact
11 achieved. So I hope that issue doesn't confuse the members
12 of this Commission.
13 And let me, in conclusion, point out that again the
14 BRAC process was established to reduce our military
15 infrastructure by closing bases and consolidating activities.
16 This, of course, saves money.
17 The savings achieved with these closures are
18 crucial, again, to maintain military readiness and continuing
19 military modernization. Right now on the floor of the House
20 we're debating the House Armed Services Authorization Bill
21 This is a tough atmosphere here, and we're debating the very
22 issues of military readiness in the field.

Page 439

1 So I think again, in today's atmosphere, we've got
2 to face these tough decisions. So we ask you to move ATCOM
3 to Red Stone Arsenal, and don't be fooled by the smoke screen
4 over SSDC.
5 If you in fact choose to close SSDC and move it
6 onto Red Stone Arsenal, we can, in fact, accommodate both of
7 those commands. So I want to offer that as a final
8 alternative as well.
9 Again, I want to thank the Commission, I want to
10 congratulate the Commission for its patience, for this
11 practically thankless job and for hearing me now three times.
12 Thank you.
13 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you very much,
14 Representative Cramer. Next we'll hear from Maxine Waters
15 from the state of California.
16 REPRESENTATIVE WATERS: Thank you very much,
17 Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission. I've very
18 appreciative for the opportunity to testify today. As you
19 may have guessed, I will focus my remarks on your report's
20 proposed closing of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
21 I am well acquainted with the military value and
22 the enormous economic impact the shipyard has not just in

Page 440

1 Long Beach but throughout Southern California. The rationale
2 for closing Long Beach is based on the assumption that the
3 private San Diego port facility currently in operation can be
4 upgraded to meet the needs now served by Long Beach.
5 For several reasons, I would urge the Commission to
6 carefully reconsider this finding. First, there are
7 significant questions about the cost estimates made by the
8 Commission associated with transforming the San Diego
9 facility.
10 Many familiar with the operations of both Long
11 Beach and San Diego's capabilities believe the overhaul
12 required by San Diego could cost up to five times the Navy's
13 original estimate.
14 At the same time, government savings from closure
15 of Long Beach would be far less than the 2 billion over 20
16 years the Navy has projected. There have also been serious
17 environmental issues raised which might render the
18 restructuring of San Diego's port unsafe.
19 These concerns about closing Long Beach are not
20 just my own. I site an enclosure to this Commission's report
21 of two years ago. With a majority of the Pacific Fleet home
22 ported in San Diego, there are distinct advantages to be

Page 441

1 gained by continuing to use Long Beach Naval Shipyard in the
2 Navy's ship repair program.
3 At the time that statement was written, 1993, 30
4 percent of the Pacific Fleet home ported in San Diego. That
5 percentage has increased to 70 percent today.
6 If anything, the value of the Long Beach Shipyard
7 and its ability to service the Pacific Fleet is greater today
8 than it was in 1993.
9 Second, in addition to the cost question, I believe
10 there is a real chance that San Diego's port cannot
11 reasonably be altered to absorb the capacity of the Long
12 Beach Shipyard. Again, quoting from a letter by the last
13 Commission's Base Structure Evaluation Committee Chair, "The
14 commitment of the private sector to maintain the skills and
15 facilities necessary to accomplish complex Navy workloads
16 without the ensured profit of a continuous construction and
17 maintenance workload is unknown.
18 Principal dependency on the private sector to
19 accomplish this workload and to respond to unplanned emergent
20 and urgent repair puts fleet readiness at risk and outside
21 Navy control.
22 Finally, I'd like to comment on one of the

Page 442

1 Commission's professed goals; that is, the maintenance of a
2 balanced work force racially, ethnically and in terms of
3 gender.
4 The Long Beach Naval Shipyard is the most diverse
5 military base in the country. I've tried to put together
6 some figures that will be in my written testimony about the
7 makeup of that work force.
8 And while its ethnic diversity is not in and of
9 itself a reason to keep it open, I believe this factor helps
10 us meet the Navy's expressed goal of diversity.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. I'm sorry. We've
12 got people coming in and out of here. We're trying to keep
13 track of the inventory who is in here, who is not in here.
14 REPRESENTATIVE WATERS: I know. This factor along
15 with the other reasons cited earlier in my testimony makes a
16 strong case for maintaining the Long Beach facility.
17 In conclusion, Long Beach has twice been judged
18 essential by the Department of Defense and the Department of
19 the Navy. That conclusion was affirmed by an independent
20 assessment done by the General Accounting Office.
21 For these reasons, I implore you to rethink your
22 preliminary decision to close Long Beach for the good of its

Page 443

1 employees, for the good of the entire Southern California
2 region, for the economy of the state of California and most
3 importantly for the good of our military I'd like to please
4 ask you to keep the Long Beach Shipyard operational. And I
5 thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
7 Waters. Next we'll hear from Senator Pell from the State of
8 Rhode Island.
9 SENATOR PELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
10 opportunity and I admire your patience and strength. You
11 must be pretty enured to what we say, so I'll be extra brief
12 and within the limit.
13 This marks the third time I've testified before
14 this mandated Commission. My testimony today represents a
15 continuation of what I've previously stated and also more
16 importantly reflects the continuity of the consecutive
17 actions which were taken by your predecessor commissions.
18 Two years ago, the Commission determined to
19 relocate surface ships from Newport and other coastal states.
20 The move represented the departure of naval vessels that have
21 graced Narragansett Bay for more than two centuries.
22 At the same time, however, they continued the

Page 444

1 consolidation of functions at both -- in Newark and at NETC,
2 thus solidifying Newport's unique role as the Navy's
3 preeminent center for indoctrination, classroom instruction,
4 laboratory research.
5 At that time I concluded that with the Commission's
6 decision Newport has trained sailors and traded sailors for
7 science. Quite frankly, I believe that the previous actions
8 by the predecessor commissions worked out well for the Navy,
9 for Rhode Island and more important for the taxpayer.
10 Given my brief time, I'd like to leave you with
11 just two thoughts. I would ask that a copy of the full text
12 of these remarks be made a part of the Commission's record.
13 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: They will be made a part of
14 the record.
15 SENATOR PELL: I thank you. First, I strongly
16 support DOD's recommendation to relocate Newark headquarters
17 in Newport, the central functions from both Naval Undersea
18 Warfare Center Detachment to New London and the Naval
19 Research Underwater Lab in Fort Orlando, Florida.
20 The BRAC recommendations are consistent with the
21 Navy's stated desire to geographically consolidate full
22 spectrum laboratories and training facilities in a manner

Page 445

1 that simultaneously increases military value, decreases the
2 infrastructure and reduces the operating cost.
3 Based on information gathered from top Navy staff
4 when I last visited Newport less than two weeks ago, I'm
5 convinced of the accuracy of the official data provided by
6 the Navy and the analysis who ranked the Newport site in
7 Newark third out of 64 of all the Navy technical centers in
8 terms of military value. Without any hesitation, I would
9 urge you to sustain the recommendation.
10 Secondly, I strongly support the recommendation to
11 relocate training functions from the Naval Training Center in
12 Meridian, Mississippi, to Naval Education and Training Center
13 in Newport.
14 As you know, NATC Newport is recognized as the
15 crown jewel of excellence in naval education, training and
16 indoctrination. After the removal of the North Atlantic
17 Fleet from Newport in the 1970s, NATC was formed as a large
18 campus noted for its excellent schools.
19 The various commands currently at Newport include
20 the Naval War College, which dates back to 1884 and is the
21 oldest of its kind in America. I thank you for your
22 consideration and, as I say, admire your ability to hear so

Page 446

1 many. Thank you.
2 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Pell.
3 Next we'll hear from Representative Sam Gejdenson from
4 Connecticut.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GEJDENSON: Thank you very much.
6 I'll be very brief. I'm impressed by your sitting ability
7 and by your kidneys to hang out as long as you have.
8 I just want to say a couple of quick things. We're
9 all coming in here arguing for our districts. Go back, look
10 at the numbers. I think that the BRAC decisions, and I have
11 great admiration for Senator Pell, frankly from the first day
12 were based on faulty numbers.
13 When you look at where we are today, we see there
14 are two new buildings that the Navy is talking about adding
15 to the Newport facility at a time when we have all these
16 empty buildings in New London.
17 About a decade ago a friend of mine, Charlie Rose,
18 a gentleman I met in New York who is a builder said this to
19 me. He says, "I used to build buildings in New York City,
20 and those buildings would have every fifth floor for
21 computers.
22 And we had all our secretarial staff, and we had

Page 447

1 everybody in New York City, the most expensive real estate in
2 the world." He says, "Today there are no more floors for
3 computers. The management's in New York City, but the staff
4 is in Nebraska because it's cheaper to have it out there than
5 in New York City."
6 The logic in an era of computers and
7 telecommunications to take an isolated function that exists
8 today in New London and move it 45 minutes to an hour and a
9 half up to Rhode Island makes no sense when you look at the
10 cost of the program, to build new buildings when there are
11 perfectly good buildings providing these functions in New
12 London.
13 In an area where it is the individuals who make up
14 the expertise, to uproot those people or lose them will be
15 far more damaging to the government and costly. So I will
16 ask you to think of what the private sector does.
17 The private sector does not move all of its people
18 into one facility, building new buildings and cramming them
19 in together just so they can say they're on one physical
20 site. With computers, telecommunications and modern means of
21 communication, you can have the staff in Nebraska, and you
22 can have the bosses in Rhode Island.

Page 448

1 You can certainly have the management in Rhode
2 Island and this function that exists in New London kept in
3 New London. I will ask you to look at that photo that we are
4 bringing up to you now.
5 In New London, we build the submarines. We have
6 the submarine base with all of the submarine schools destined
7 to be there, and if this Commission agrees with last year's
8 Commission, including the Nuclear Power School, and we have
9 Newark.
10 Now, what sense it makes to take that function and
11 expend maybe 20- maybe $40 million more to put in Rhode
12 Island, with all deference to Senator Pell doesn't make sense
13 to me.
14 It doesn't make sense for the people who work there
15 to either make them travel further or sell their homes, up
16 root their families. There is no benefit to the government.
17 If anything, it's clear to me there is a cost to the
18 government.
19 And it seems clear that this Commission wants to do
20 the right thing for the government, as I think all of them
21 have wanted to do. If you look at the facts, make a decision
22 that makes sense, not just one that, you know, follows the

Page 449

1 flow. It will help government, and you'll help the people of
2 the country.
3 Let me now go to the debate about the Nuclear Power
4 School. I understand that others have come here and argued
5 about that photograph. I think your staff has been down
6 there.
7 There is nothing in Charleston except for trees,
8 what appears to be a dirt road, and the only debate exists as
9 to whether there is real swamp in the background. Now, there
10 is no infrastructure. There is no sewers. There's no
11 telephone lines. There are no buildings.
12 This is the building in Connecticut, less than nine
13 years old. It is perfectly suited for the Nuclear Power
14 School, and think of flying people back up to Connecticut to
15 do part of their work, down to Charleston to do some of their
16 work.
17 You can put virtually all the training in
18 Connecticut where the previous BRAC said it made sense to do
19 it. We have the space. We have physical assets in place,
20 and we have spent $11 million of the taxpayer monies to
21 redesign these buildings to the standard that the Navy
22 wanted.

Page 450

1 To now midstream turn around and go into that --
2 you know, it's not as pretty as Connecticut countryside, but
3 it's fairly decent for the scrub they have down there, and
4 flatten it, hope you get through the environmental problems
5 and then proceed to put in all the infrastructure you need,
6 buildings, doesn't make sense.
7 I ask you to look at the facts. I know you've got
8 a lot before you. Each of us comes and says save our people
9 I'm saying only do it if it makes sense for the country. I
10 think we've made that case, and I thank you gentlemen for
11 your time.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. Thank you
13 Representative Gejdenson. Next we'll hear from
14 Representative Ros-Lehtinen from Florida.
15 REPRESENTATIVE ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much,
16 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. As you know, in
17 1993, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission decided
18 that a portion of Homestead Air Force Base would to function
19 as the Homestead Air Reserve Base and would be the home of
20 two mutually supportive reserve units, the 482nd Fighter Wing
21 and the 301st Air Rescue Squadron.
22 Working closing with the BRAC and other federal

Page 451

1 agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Dade County
2 worked out a dual use plan for the base based on the military
3 and civilian use of that facility.
4 The cornerstone of that redevelopment plan was the
5 presence of both the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st Air
6 Rescue Squadron. Secretary Perry described this existing
7 plan as an exemplary model of military-civilian partnership
8 for future base closures and realignments.
9 Undoing this careful plan not only undermines the
10 viability of this project in our home base of Dade County but
11 will also serve to undermine other procedures to mitigate the
12 impact of the BRAC's decisions on affected communities by
13 undercutting the reliability of your decisions.
14 It is therefore unconscionable that even the
15 presence of the 482nd Fighter Wing has been called into
16 question through the actions of a community whose joint use
17 airport operation lacks efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
18 Allow me to briefly review the compelling reasons
19 that led to the current plan and how these reasons retaken
20 their force today.
21 As in real estate, the value of a base lies in its
22 location, and Homestead's location allows it to support a

Page 452

1 number of crucial missions. South Florida rests at the
2 crossroads of South America and the Caribbean.
3 Neither the location nor the importance of these
4 areas has changed since the original BRAC plan. This fact
5 was demonstrated during the Haitian operation when Homestead
6 was used in the movement of troops and supplies.
7 Thus, Homestead remains a critical forward base for
8 these important areas. The geo political importance of South
9 Florida has been collaborated by the Defense Department's
10 decision to locate the United States Southern Command here.
11 When the announcement was made, DOD officials
12 stressed that this area was simply the only logical choice.
13 The arrival of SOUTHCOM also reenforces the utility of this
14 base as a possibility support facility.
15 The mission of the 301st Air Rescue Squadron is to
16 locate and recover Air Force personnel and other defense
17 personnel involved with the U.S. defense activities as well
18 as provide rescue and recovery support for man flight
19 operations.
20 Thus, the decision to relocate the rescue squadron
21 to Homestead, home of the 482nd Fighter Wing fulfills a
22 compelling operational and maintenance justification as the

Page 453

1 squadron would be in a position to support a combat-ready war
2 fighting unit.
3 Moreover, the 301st has traditionally provided air
4 rescue around the tip of Florida, thus its location at
5 Homestead will allow it to respond quickly and effectively.
6 Reality dictates that the decision of BRAC should be
7 affirmed.
8 This Commission heard the arguments to relocate the
9 squadron to Homestead and after careful deliberation reached
10 the correct decision. Failure for this Commission to stick
11 to its decision would invite endless attempts to undo the
12 Commission's work and would threaten the entire mechanism for
13 rationale reallocation of resources.
14 To move the 301st Air Rescue Squadron should not be
15 reconsidered, and beyond the obvious issues of military
16 efficiency, the reversal of the BRAC decision would put in
17 serious peril the future of South Dade and the reconstruction
18 efforts of this community.
19 The South Dade community has worked tirelessly to
20 rebuild our community after Hurricane Andrew, and the center
21 of these efforts lie in the base. Stopping the move of the
22 301st to Homestead would severely put into question the

Page 454

1 future viability of this plan.
2 Moreover, the rebuilding plans which count on the
3 move of the 301st would be dealt a serious setback and could
4 have great negative implications for the economic future of
5 our community.
6 In 1993, the Commission recognized the importance
7 of our base to this nation's defense. That reality has been
8 reaffirmed by subsequent events, and this base remains an
9 essential part of U.S. military readiness.
10 In conclusion, I strongly urge you and the other
11 Commissioners to keep Homestead Air Reserve Base open by
12 retaining the 482nd Fighter Wing at Homestead and reaffirming
13 the decision to return the 301st to Homestead in 1995-'96.
14 These are the right decisions for the military, for
15 our community and indeed for our nation. I thank you very
16 much for your patience.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
18 Ros-Lehtinen. Next we'll hear from Representative Kasich
19 from Ohio.
20 REPRESENTATIVE KASICH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
21 come before the Commission sometimes to recommend closing
22 things, sometimes to dispute facts. I'm not here to keep

Page 455

1 something open. It just depends what the facts are.
2 I'm here today to talk to you about the Newark Air
3 Force Base for one reason. The Government Accounting Office
4 and come out with, I'm told, the only report that has
5 criticized the BRAC findings since this situation started.
6 And it says that contrary to the fact that we would
7 save $3.8 million a year after the first eight years, they
8 say in the report that it might take somewhere between 17 and
9 100 years to get any savings.
10 I don't know if they're right. I think we need to
11 look at it. I don't want you to do the wrong thing. I'm not
12 asking you to do the wrong thing. I'm asking you to take a
13 look at whether these numbers are right.
14 The GAO, as Chairman Dixon will tell you, sometimes
15 they do great work. Sometimes their work is less than great.
16 Sometimes their work is flat out wrong. I don't know what it
17 is in this case, although the people at the base obviously
18 have done a lot of work themselves.
19 When Newark was first recommended for closing, I
20 didn't do anything other than to argue we've got to make sure
21 that the numbers are right. This GAO report calls to mind
22 the fact that we've just got to take a look at it.

Page 456

1 If in fact the Base Closing Commission, which I
2 strongly support -- I wrote part of the bill that created
3 it -- if they determine that the savings will be there and it
4 needs to be done, I will support you.
5 But if you find out that the numbers aren't right,
6 then I think you got to come back and take a look at it.
7 I've been before the Commission two other times. One was to
8 argue the closing of BCSC in the last year where our numbers
9 proved to be correct when we did receive some consolidation.
10 The first round of base closing was to close the
11 base in Columbus, Ohio, and I came before the Commission and
12 said I was prepared to support that.
13 So I'm here today not as an advocate other than an
14 advocate of anything other than the process. I just think
15 that when a report comes out that shows these kind of
16 distinctions -- and it's my understanding the Commission is
17 already aware of this.
18 So take a look at it. If it turns out to be smart
19 to keep the operation open, then I'd urge you to do that, if
20 it's going to save the taxpayers money.
21 If, in your judgment, the GAO is wrong, then you
22 got to close it, going to privatize it there, and that's what

Page 457

1 we're going to have to live with, but I felt an obligation to
2 come here and say that with this kind of a report raising
3 these kind of questions it's necessary to bring it to your
4 attention, and I think many people would like to have the
5 questions answered. So Commissioner, thank you.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you very much,
7 Representative Kasich. I'll guarantee you have looked at it,
8 and we'll continue to take a good, hard look at that
9 particular report you cited and the whole issue of Newark.
10 Thank you. Next we'll hear from Representative DeLauro from
11 Connecticut.
12 REPRESENTATIVE DeLAURO: Mr. Chairman and
13 distinguished members of the Commission, I appreciate the
14 opportunity to testify today about the proposed closure of
15 the Stratford Army Engine Plant.
16 Between the visits to Stratford by Commissioners
17 Cornella and Kling and our presentation at the New York
18 regional hearing, I know that the Commission is familiar by
19 now with the issues surrounding the Stratford plant.
20 Rather than repeat all of the details, I want to
21 highlight several key points that I urge you to keep in mind
22 during your final deliberations.

Page 458

1 Our argument for keeping the Stratford plant open
2 is a simple one. We believe the Army has substantially
3 understated the military value of the Stratford plant, and it
4 has substantially unit estimated the cost of closing the
5 facility and reconstituting its capabilities elsewhere.
6 Let me first address the military value question.
7 As you know from previous testimony, the AGD 1500 engine will
8 be in use in the Abrams tank for the next 30 years, and the
9 Army has no other tank engine in development, no other tank
10 engine in development.
11 Historically, the Army procured two spare engines
12 for every tank produced. With the Abrams, the Army procured
13 only one spare engine per three tanks. So not only must
14 tanks equipped with the AGD 1500 last for 30 more years, they
15 must also make due with fewer spares.
16 The Stratford Army Engine Plant is the only place
17 in the country where we build the AGD 1500 and critical spare
18 parts such as the recuperator. In my view, it is a
19 tremendous risk to national security to close this plant and
20 to lose its unique capabilities given the continuing
21 dependency of our tank fleet on the AGD 1500.
22 We need the Stratford plant to extend the life of

Page 459

1 the engines that are now in use, to build critical spares, to
2 provide field expertise to resolve the unique problems of the
3 battlefield and to quickly build new engines should that be
4 required by a military emergency.
5 The second point I want to leave you with is that
6 reconstituting the capabilities of the Stratford plant
7 elsewhere simply is not feasible. Stratford is not just an
8 Army engine plant. It is a dual use military and civilian
9 facility that manufactures a wide range of products.
10 These range from the exclusively military AGD 1500
11 tank engine to the exclusively commercial jet engine. In
12 between there is a continuum of helicopter and hover craft
13 engines with both military and commercial applications.
14 The Army has proposed moving the helicopter work to
15 Corpus Christi and the tank work to Anniston. This is much
16 simpler said than done. The same equipment and the same work
17 force teams at the plant produce military and commercial
18 products for both aviation and for ground use.
19 All but two of 11 manufacturing cells are dual use,
20 as is the vast majority of the machinery. As those who work
21 at the plant like to say, splitting this capability is like a
22 very bad divorce in which one spouse takes the dining room

Page 460

1 table and the other gets the chairs. It will be very
2 expensive to get a complete set again.
3 The third point that I would like to leave you with
4 is that the Army has substantially underestimated the cost of
5 closing the plant. The greatest cost is for environmental
6 cleanup. The Army's calculations did not include any
7 environmental costs, but a November 1994 study conducted by
8 the Army Corps of Engineers estimated a minimum cost of $17.5
9 million just for environmental stabilization of the plant.
10 The study estimated that cleanup sufficient for
11 plant reuse could cost as much as $422 million. This is but
12 one of several costs that were understated by the Army. The
13 plant's operating contractor, Allied Signal Aerospace,
14 believes the Army also has understated closing costs,
15 recurring costs to secure the facility, relocation costs and
16 personnel costs as well.
17 Altogether, the contractor estimates that closing
18 the plant the cost $100 million over the next 20 years rather
19 than save $80 million as the Army has concluded. The much
20 better option for the Stratford Army Engine Plant is to
21 continue the work underway to downsize the facility, complete
22 its conversion into a dual use manufacturing plant.

Page 461

1 The Army is committed to investing $47.5 million in
2 this program. The employees of the plant, the union members
3 and the management have joined together to make the plan
4 work. They are cutting costs, improving productivity and
5 diversifying the product line into the commercial
6 marketplace.
7 This dual use approach maintains the vital military
8 value of the Stratford Army Engine Plant while reducing costs
9 to the Army by expanding commercial use of the plant.
10 This is the best option for national security and
11 the best option for the taxpayers. That is our case, Mr.
12 Chairman. We hope that the Commission will support us, and
13 we thank you and sincerely thank you for all of the time and
14 consideration that you have given to us. Thank you very,
15 very much for letting me come by today.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
17 DeLauro. Next we'll hear --
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Chairman, I understand that a
19 member of the conference has a conference with you, and I'd
20 be glad to take the next two witnesses while you undertake
21 your obligation.
22 We're delighted to have Representative Charles

Page 462

1 Canady of Florida. Congressman Canady, we're pleased you
2 could come.
3 REPRESENTATIVE CANADY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I want to begin
5 by thanking for the opportunity to testify today.
6 My purpose in offering a statement today is to urge
7 your support for the redirect of MacDill Air Force Base in
8 Tampa, Florida, as recommended by the Department of Defense.
9 The continued health and well-being of MacDill is
10 very important to my many constituents who are employed at
11 the base. Throughout its long and distinguished history,
12 MacDill has contributed much to our national security. The
13 facilities there have accommodated many diverse missions over
14 the years, from a home base for a fighter wing to massive
15 airlifts of personnel and equipment during Operations Desert
16 Shield and Desert Storm.
17 It boasts easy access to a first-class training
18 facility and bombing range at Avon Park in Central Florida.
19 Generations of fighter pilots have honed their skills there
20 and in other training areas over the Gulf of Mexico.
21 In my view, the decision by DOD to redirect the
22 1993 Base Closure Commission's recommendation with regard to

Page 463

1 MacDill make strategic and operational sense. Recent massive
2 airlift operations such as last year's deployment of
3 personnel and equipment to the Persian Gulf have demonstrated
4 the clear need for a fully operational military run runway at
5 MacDill.
6 MacDill is a unique asset among military
7 facilities. It is the only installation which is home to two
8 joint unified commands from which national command authority
9 missions are directed. U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special
10 Operations Command are both headquartered at the base.
11 The contributions of these commands to our
12 country's security in recent years is well known. An
13 integral part of their success has been the first-class
14 facilities at MacDill.
15 Earlier in this process, you heard testimony from
16 General Wayne Downing of Special Operations Command and
17 Lieutenant General Butch Neal of U.S. Central Command. Both
18 have indicated that airfield support at MacDill is critical
19 to their missions.
20 The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
21 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have both validated the command's
22 requirements. The Air Force, for its part, has performed

Page 464

1 internal studies which have determined that the best facility
2 to support these requirement is the MacDill airfield.
3 I am confident you will reach the same conclusion
4 and support the Department of Defense's recommendation that
5 you will return the MacDill Airfield to MacDill Air Force
6 Base.
7 Another action you have before you is the 43rd Air
8 Refueling Group's transferring to MacDill. As you know, the
9 force structure review found a shortage of air refueling
10 units in the Southeastern United States.
11 27 percent of the demand for tankers is found in
12 this area, and only 9 percent of the supply is located there.
13 These figures, along with the Secretary of Defense's
14 recommendations to support the unified command's needs at
15 MacDill created the opportunity to relocate a tanker unit
16 from the asset-rich northern area to the south.
17 The location, the infrastructure and the physical
18 plant at MacDill make it ideal for the relocation of tanker
19 aircraft. Having met with the principals and toured the
20 base, I am confident MacDill can accommodate the 43rd Air
21 Refueling Group and other aircraft units in need of
22 relocation.

Page 465

1 I want to close, Mr. Chairman, by stressing the
2 commitment of the Tampa Bay area community to our Air Force
3 base. The citizens and leaders in our part of Florida know
4 that a fully operational MacDill Air Force Base will make an
5 important contribution to our success as a community.
6 We appreciate the affirmative steps taken by the
7 military to maximize the use of its assets at MacDill. We
8 urge you to support the recommendations of the Department of
9 Defense with regard to the MacDill redirect. Thank you, Mr.
10 Chairman.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Canady, and
12 we are always indebted to a distinguished member of the
13 Congress who does it inside five minutes. We appreciate it.
14 CONGRESSMAN CANADY: Thank you very much.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Andy Jacobs of
16 Indiana. We're delighted to have your here, Representative
17 Jacobs. Thank you for coming.
18 REPRESENTATIVE JACOBS: Thank you, Senator. I note
19 in the paper that the Hello Dolly is joining a renaissance,
20 and so I would like to say to you it's not to see you back
21 where you belong.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you.

Page 466

1 REPRESENTATIVE JACOBS: I incorporate my reference,
2 which you already know, about Mayor Goldsmith's proposal not
3 to obstruct or object to the closing of the Naval Warfare
4 Center in Indianapolis but to close it in a way that is best
5 for the Navy, best for the country and indeed best for the
6 community.
7 As I understand it, an issue here is whether the
8 Commission has the authority to use this innovative proposal,
9 rather like the traditional question of whether you can get
10 there from here.
11 I have written to each of you, but just to mention
12 again the former Base Closure Commission came to Indianapolis
13 with a recommendation that Fort Benjamin Harrison be closed
14 and no recommendation that the Army Finance Center located at
15 Building One, the second largest building in the United
16 States Government's inventory anywhere be torn down or be
17 discontinued.
18 One of the Commissioners took a tour of that
19 building, came back to the Commission meeting and insisted
20 that the Commission recommend that that enormous building be
21 razed, and that was not recommended by the Army.
22 As a matter of fact, the Army had asked for an

Page 467

1 appropriation to refurbish it. If that isn't precedent
2 enough, I really don't know what would be.
3 I'll just add this simple thing, two simple things
4 about whether it's practical, whether you can do what is
5 best, whether you can accomplish a sensible goal.
6 Bill Malden, in one of his World War II cartoons,
7 shows four GIs on a jeep in a clearing, And Germany small
8 arms rounds are coming in puffing up all around, and the
9 driver, obviously, is refusing to move the jeep into the
10 woods.
11 And the caption is, "I hate like hell to run on a
12 flat." And I might add, too, that a few years ago they
13 finished the downtown inner loop in Indianapolis, and they
14 had what they called Dead Man's Curb, because it went under
15 several bridges, overpasses, and it just kept turning and
16 kept turning, and truck drivers were being killed, about one
17 every 30 days on that turn.
18 I wrote to Governor Bowen, then Governor Bowen of
19 Indiana, and suggested that they use the ramp chevrons which
20 indicate to you that you keep turning and don't speed up
21 where you logically would think you might.
22 He turned it over to his highway department, and

Page 468

1 after 50 days of due consideration he wrote back and told me
2 they reported that those -- according to regulation could
3 only be used on ramps to highways.
4 That very day I received that letter one more man
5 was killed on that curve, and I picked up the phone and
6 called the Governor and said, "Are you ready to employ a
7 little common sense?" He said, "Quite."
8 And they put the chevrons up. There has not been
9 an accident, let alone a fatality since, and that's several
10 years ago.
11 So I implore the Commission do the practical thing
12 here. Help the Navy. Help the country, which includes
13 Indianapolis. Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you. Thank you very
15 much, Congressman. We appreciate Representative Jacobs'
16 contribution. We're delighted to have Representative Tim
17 Hutchinson of the great state of Arkansas.
18 REPRESENTATIVE HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr.
19 Chairman. Let me first of all thank you, as chairman, for
20 your leadership on this important issue and the job that
21 you're doing.
22 During the few minutes that I have, I would like to

Page 469

1 point out the adverse economic impact that the closure of
2 Fort Chaffee Arkansas would have not on the local communities
3 but rather on the training of our armed forces.
4 As you all know, as enunciated in the policy
5 guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense for the 1995 BRAC
6 round, it was directed that when reviewing the potential
7 action to be taken at a certain installation priority
8 consideration be given to the fundamental military criteria,
9 which includes the current and current mission requirements
10 and impact on operational readiness of the Department of
11 Defense total force, the availability and condition of land,
12 facilities and associated airspace at the potential receiving
13 locations and the cost and manpower applications.
14 There could be no doubt that if the annual training
15 which is currently conducted at Fort Chaffee is forced to be
16 relocated to another major training area that there will be
17 extensive additional costs involved.
18 In addition to the monetary increase, our reserve
19 component units would be faced with a loss of training time
20 due to additional travel coupled with the limited
21 availability of maneuver training areas at alternate sites.
22 It is also my understanding that these moves will

Page 470

1 violate the travel requirements in United States Army Forces
2 Command National Guard Regulation 351.
3 It has been estimated that traveling to alternate
4 annual training sites will involve a minimum of two
5 additional training days per soldier per year. Obviously,
6 additional funds would be required to pay for these added
7 days.
8 And let us also not forget since these troops are
9 Reserve or National Guard units they're still held
10 accountable for the extra training days by their full-time
11 private sector employers.
12 Currently, the National Guard can operate Fort
13 Chaffee at a cost of $6.9 million a year. This includes real
14 property and operations maintenance costs for 1 million
15 square feet, an environmental and training area management of
16 62,000 acres.
17 If the National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve units
18 are forced to relocate to Fort Sill, the total funding
19 increase for annual individual training will be between $6.75
20 million and $11 million.
21 Relocation to Fort Riley, a distance which would,
22 in fact, preclude inactive duty training, annual costs could

Page 471

1 exceed an additional expenditure by the Army of $3.5 million
2 per year.
3 A third option that has been mentioned is Fort
4 Polk, and it does not even have the facilities to train any
5 additional units from Fort Chaffee until the year 2001.
6 I'll tell you that these figures which I have used
7 were obtained from Army officials. Obviously, training and
8 readiness will be greatly degraded for those units that
9 normally drill at Fort Chaffee.
10 Also, the 188th Tactical Fighter Group, which is
11 based at the Fort Smith Airport, would have to have their
12 training areas reassigned with projected cost increases of
13 over $900,000 annually to utilize the nearest alternate
14 aerial bombing or strafing site.
15 This figure does not reflect additional cost of
16 other aerial component units training at alternate sites.
17 The need for sufficient training areas for the reserve
18 components was recognized by the Director of the U.S. Army
19 National Guard, Major General John Derouge, and the Director
20 of Management for the Office of the Army Chief of Staff,
21 Brigadier General James Shane during a meeting on June 8th
22 with staff members of your Commission.

Page 472

1 At that meeting Major General Derouge contended
2 that he, "Needs ranges, maneuver training areas and impact
3 areas for individual and unit training on weekends." These
4 Army officials stated that in fact their recommendation to
5 the Department of Defense did not include the words "training
6 areas" as part of the enclave because they were inadvertently
7 edited out.
8 In addition, the Army representative stated that
9 the Department has identified $20 million to pay for enclave
10 expenses at several major training areas to include Fort
11 Chaffee. Brigadier General Shane stated at the completion of
12 the meeting that, "The Army as an obligation to ensure that
13 the National Guard and the Reserve can train." I strongly
14 concur with General Shane's observation.
15 In conclusion, let me say that clearly the
16 statements by these officials demonstrate that Fort Chaffee
17 can continue to provide the necessary facilities to allow for
18 the proper training of our armed forces.
19 Being that the Army has already determined how to
20 allocate the funding for keeping this post operating, our
21 nation will be the loser of our armed services are denied the
22 opportunity to use the unique training areas provided by the

Page 473

1 post.
2 I believe that a rigorous cost benefit analysis
3 will reveal that the long-term cost of a shutdown of Fort
4 Chaffee will far exceed any apparent short-term savings.
5 Therefore, Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission. I
6 strongly urge you to keep this valuable training installation
7 available to our citizen soldiers, and I thank you.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Hutchinson, we're
9 indebted to you for that very fine contribution on behalf of
10 the great state of Arkansas. And we're pleased to have with
11 us the Distinguished Congressman from the great state of
12 California, Congressman Steve Horn.
13 REPRESENTATIVE HORN: Nice to see you again, Mr.
14 Chairman, and Commissioners and all visitors to Long Beach
15 We're going to get the Chairman there yet.
16 I represent the 38th Congressional District of
17 California that includes the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, which
18 is the closest public shipyard to the largest fleet
19 concentration in the world with over 70 percent of the
20 Pacific Fleet home ported just 81 nautical miles away.
21 I'm concerned that the Navy and the Department of
22 Defense substantively deviated from the future force

Page 474

1 structure plan and the preestablished final selection
2 criteria when they made the recommendation to close Long
3 Beach.
4 First, the Navy uses a new force structure plan as
5 the justification for no longer needing Dry Dock No. 1. In
6 1991 and 1993, the Navy stated that Dry Dock No. 1 was
7 essential as the primary West Coast aircraft carrier emergent
8 dry dock and that the Navy could not fulfill its Pacific
9 Fleet mission requirement without Dry Dock No. 1.
10 What has changed? Frankly, nothing. There are
11 still six carriers in the Pacific Fleet. The percentage of
12 large deck ships in the new force structure is increasing.
13 Dry Dock No. 1 is one of only two dry docks on the entire
14 West Coast capable of docking every ship in the Navy.
15 Without Long Beach a carrier would have to travel
16 1,100 nautical miles to Puget Sound from San Diego or 2,600
17 nautical miles to Pearl Harbor for repair, and they can't
18 handle the work they already have on time.
19 It is essential that the Long Beach Shipyard Dry
20 Dock No. 1 be kept open. History shows that mothballing or a
21 government-owned, contractor-operated approach for preserving
22 dry docks simply doesn't work.

Page 475

1 Economic vitalization is denied a community which
2 has already lost thousands of jobs with the closure of the
3 naval station, the naval hospital and the economy generally,
4 and the Navy is unable to maintain the dry dock in a way that
5 would be of any value in a time of need. Once this asset is
6 lost, it's lost forever.
7 Second, the Navy justifies its recommendation to
8 close Long Beach and not Portsmouth Naval Shipyard by stating
9 that the future uncertainties of the force structure prevent
10 the closure of Portsmouth.
11 I'm not here to denigrate Portsmouth, but Public
12 Law 101.510, which is your charter, clearly states that the
13 force structure plan for Fiscal Years 1995 through 2001 are
14 not some mythical formulation, but that period is what counts
15 in the decision-making, and that's to be the basis for making
16 recommendations.
17 Third, the base structure analysis team developed
18 data call scenarios, military value criteria and then
19 evaluation criteria in a manner that was prejudicial and
20 caused Long Beach's initial value scores to be lower by over
21 10 points in 1995.
22 The Department of Defense did not establish new

Page 476

1 selection criteria between 1993 and 1995, yet only Long
2 Beach's military value scores substantially changed from its
3 consistent position as a strong third in military value
4 behind only Puget Sound and Norfolk. What has changed?
5 Nothing.
6 Fourth, the Navy badly underestimated the cost of
7 closure at only $74.5 million with an immediate break-even
8 point and a 20-year return on investment of at least $1.9
9 billion. Internal Navy documents reveal something else, a
10 budget request of 433 million or six times the amount now
11 claimed by the Navy to this Commission.
12 Neither the Navy's fictional figure given to you
13 and the rest of us nor its partially realistic internal
14 figure includes over 500 million of additional workers's
15 compensation. Neither their fictional one or the real one in
16 their files from the shipyard doesn't say a thing about the
17 half billion dollars in worker's comp costs over 20 years.
18 Ask Charleston, ask Mare Island what those figures
19 meant and what they are now when they were closed. Using the
20 realistic cost of closure numbers, a break-even point is
21 about 40 years out rather than the Navy's claim of an
22 immediate return on investment.

Page 477

1 Finally, the Navy recommended the closure of Long
2 Beach and not Portsmouth despite the fact that the Navy
3 consistently in 1991, 1993, now 1995 ranked Long Beach higher
4 in military value than Portsmouth.
5 The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria are weighted
6 heavily toward military value, as they should be. The Navy
7 contends that nuclear issues significantly outweigh the
8 established selection criteria. Therefore, Portsmouth should
9 not be closed.
10 Since this is a substantial deviation from the
11 established selection criteria, if Portsmouth remains open,
12 then Long Beach should also remain open. Is the Commission
13 ready to close the one public shipyard that complied with the
14 Department of Defense guidance to install more efficient
15 management and reduce overhead, the only public shipyard to
16 return money to the taxpayers six years in a row?
17 Long Beach is the only public shipyard operating in
18 the black. If closed, what kind of a message does that send
19 to the taxpayers of the United States and those in charge of
20 other federal facilities that are attempting to become more
21 efficient?
22 And it's the only yard within 1,100 miles of the

Page 478

1 largest ship concentration in the Pacific that can dry dock
2 the carriers and amphibious ships that are the heart of our
3 force projection capability in the Pacific.
4 On the merits, based on the military criteria, Long
5 Beach deserves to stay open. It's an irreplaceable asset
6 that we cannot afford to lose, and I thank you very much for
7 the opportunity.
8 Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a letter to the
9 Commissioners for the record with a few attachments,
10 including the law that guides the Commission with which I'm
11 sure you're familiar, but I think you will find the
12 attachments that spell out the substantial deviation most
13 helpful, and I believe staff has it here.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have the letter. Thank you,
15 Representative Horn.
16 REPRESENTATIVE HORN: You have it. Very good. I
17 thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know and I'm confident
18 in this group you're going to do the right thing. Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Horn. And
20 we're delighted to have the Distinguished Congressman from
21 the great state of Connecticut, Representative Chris Shays.
22 REPRESENTATIVE SHAYS: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman

Page 479

1 and members of the Committee. I appreciate you for all your
2 hard work and the tough decisions you'll be making. And let
3 me say to you that whatever your decision on the issue that
4 I'm most concerned with, and that's Allied Signal, I intend
5 to support the process and know that we've all been given a
6 fair hearing and hope you agree with my conclusions. But
7 whatever they are, I intend to support the Base Closing Bill.
8 Chairman Dixon and members of the Commission, I
9 appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today
10 regarding the recommendation to close the Stratford Army
11 Engine Plant. This is an extremely important issue not only
12 to the state of Connecticut but to our country, and that's
13 the reason for which I'm here.
14 As I'm sure you are aware, Connecticut as a
15 distinguished history of contributing to our national
16 defense. From aircraft to tanks and submarines, Connecticut
17 plays an integral role in maintaining our national security.
18 At a time of scarce resources and absolute
19 necessity for the implementation of a plan to balance the
20 budget, we must explore every option to help in achieving
21 this goal. Your efforts and suggestions will play,
22 obviously, a major role in this effort.

Page 480

1 I've repeatedly opposed increases in national
2 defense spending and feel Congress has an historic
3 opportunity to make meaningful reductions in the amount of
4 money we spend on defense, hence my support for the concept
5 and your efforts.
6 And there is little doubt military spending will
7 decrease in real terms over the coming years, I think also in
8 absolute terms, obviously.
9 Make no mistake, I support a strong national
10 defense and believe our forces should be prepared to deal
11 with whatever threats they may face, but the Cold War is over
12 and America has won.
13 The fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the
14 Warsaw Pact, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the spread
15 of democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics are
16 harbingers of a new era.
17 Now we can and should reduce defense spending and
18 determine the best way in which we can save money. However,
19 it must be done in a fashion which preserves our national
20 security interests and realigns military objectives to meet
21 the threats of the post Cold War era.
22 The Stratford Army Engine Plant is a perfect

Page 481

1 example of how we can achieve both. As you are aware from
2 the May 5th presentation in New York Stratford is just more
3 than just a tank engine plant.
4 Not only are products manufactured exclusively for
5 the military, such as the AGT 1500 engine used in the Abrams
6 Tank M-1 produced at the plant, engines like the LF-507 Turbo
7 Fan which powers the Averroe regional jet aircraft are also
8 built at this site.
9 Through a dual use program, Allied Signal, which
10 conducts operations in the facility, has the ability to
11 produce engines for both the military and commercial sector,
12 and by next year they expect to have a production rate of at
13 least 70 percent commercial and 30 percent military. We
14 think it may actually go up to 80 percent commercial.
15 As you also know from the New York presentation,
16 Stratford has taken steps to downsize while maintaining its
17 ability to produce these necessary products. This plan will
18 reduce military production capacity from 200 to 10 engines
19 per month, cut the occupied area from 1.8 million to 1
20 million square feet and decrease the number of machines owned
21 by both Allied Signal and the Army by nearly 50 percent.
22 As a result, the costs are expected to be cut in

Page 482

1 half. Aside from making an effort to diversify Stratford,
2 it's extremely important that we remember -- and this is the
3 key point, I think -- the value this plant has to the
4 military.
5 It is the only plant that produces vital parts such
6 as the recuperative plates for the AGT 1500 and is the source
7 of repair parts for the engine, which is expected to be in
8 service for at least 30 more years.
9 While the Army may suggest it has the capability to
10 repair engines elsewhere, I believe this point proves that
11 theory incorrect. While I was not at the hearing in New York
12 last month, I'm aware of Commissioner Cornella's questions
13 regarding the amount of time an overhauled engine can last.
14 I believe the response of between 1,200 and 1,300
15 hours if done in Stratford compared to 400 hours in completed
16 at the Alabama depot again illustrates the value of this
17 facility.
18 As you may know, many of the machines needed to
19 produce the engines, such as the AGT 1500 and aviation
20 products, are owned by Allied Signal and that most are used
21 for the production of both. They use the machine to produce
22 both. Therefore, the Army would be unable to separate this

Page 483

1 manufacturing capability and, obviously, the cost savings as
2 well.
3 With all the concerns associated with closing the
4 plant, including its military value and the cost of closing
5 it -- excuse me. With all the concerns associated with
6 closing the plant, including its military value and the cost
7 of closing it and reconstituting its capabilities to other
8 areas, I don't believe it would be in our best interests, our
9 country's best interests.
10 I don't see the logic behind the Army's suggestion
11 that they close the plant. Simply stated, I believe the Army
12 has miscalculated the true costs and benefits of closing this
13 facility and request that you reject its proposal to do so,
14 and I thank you both, all three.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
16 Congressman Shays, for that important contribution on behalf
17 of the great state of Connecticut. And we're now delighted
18 to hear from the Distinguished Senior Senator from the state
19 of Alaska.
20 And as he moves towards the podium, I want to say I
21 thank him for the book on the 1,000 Mile War. That war began
22 53 years and 10 days ago on June 3, 1942, when the Japanese

Page 484

1 bombed Alaska and killed 25 Americans in a barracks, and also
2 the second largest number of people on both sides in the
3 Pacific Theater next to Iwo Jima was lost in the great state
4 of Alaska. I read the book from cover to cover. Excellent
5 book. I thank my friend from Alaska.
6 SENATOR MURKOWSKI: It was a good book. That
7 gentleman went on to be a good novelist. Thank you very
8 much.
9 Let me commend you and your staff for the fine work
10 you've done to try and make this a fair process. Since the
11 regional hearing in San Francisco, I've worked with the Delta
12 Junction Community members on serious concerns over the
13 realignment of Fort Greely.
14 Congressman Don Young testified before you
15 yesterday. I'll try not to duplicate his comments. My point
16 is this is not just a realignment. It really is the closing
17 of a small community in a remote part of the United States
18 that is economically dependent upon the Department of
19 Defense.
20 Fort Greely provides the Army with a training and
21 testing base that is roughly half the size of the state of
22 New Jersey, a post in which varied terrain and arctic

Page 485

1 conditions provide a real ability to train our troops for
2 winter warfare.
3 It permits rigorous testing of advanced weapons and
4 supports systems in an arctic weather environment which
5 cannot be replicated in a test chamber. The proposal before
6 you has been called a safari concept. It attempts to operate
7 the missions currently performed at Fort Greely, particularly
8 training and testing, from Fort Wainwright.
9 Common sense dictates that this is an inefficient
10 system and destroys the training proficiency of the
11 operation. There is also one overriding significant obstacle
12 to the Fort Greely scenario, because the bulk of the safari
13 concept will take place during our long, dark Alaska winter.
14 It is night all along, all night up there. It's dark all
15 night up there during the period of this time.
16 Transiting 120 miles to and from the Greely
17 training area in subzero temperatures in nighttime
18 conditions, coping with ice, fog and snowy conditions is like
19 traveling the distance between the snowy shores of Lake
20 Michigan in Chicago and the place I was born in Indianapolis.
21 You now how far away that is.
22 Now, they would do that on a steady basis. More

Page 486

1 importantly, from a human perspective, the safari concept
2 adds further risk to our men and women who are required to
3 shift their operations back and forth between these two
4 bases.
5 You've also heard about the devastating impact of
6 this proposed realignment on the community from Don Young, as
7 I said, the significant loss of jobs and economic viability,
8 but the overall economic impact on this community is a
9 staggering 70 percent.
10 I don't think there is any other base realignment
11 or closure concept before the Commission that hits that
12 level. 70 percent of the economy of this area will be
13 eliminated. As you know, that is a real difficult
14 proposition.
15 If it were a true realignment, the community would
16 not face extinction. I ask you to examine, really, this
17 catastrophic impact on this community and see if something
18 can't be done.
19 I think there are alternatives to realignment,
20 retaining portions of the mission at Fort Greely. I think it
21 could be largely a governmental-civilian operation retaining
22 the core functions currently performed at Fort Greely and

Page 487

1 keep them there without the costs that have been indicated be
2 necessary at Fort Wainwright.
3 We became aware recently of significant military
4 construction requirements that the Army in Alaska say are
5 necessary if this realignment takes place. That raise
6 serious concerns over the true cost of the program.
7 I've asked that that memo be made available to you
8 and your staff, and I've asked the General Accounting Office
9 to review the discrepancy in the information that has been
10 provided to us from the various portions of the Army. But
11 the specific details of the Army's plan need, I think, review
12 by the Commission, and I would urge you to do so.
13 In closing, if you find it absolutely essential to
14 realign this community, at a minimum, I implore you to look
15 at the realignment time line as proposed by the Army.
16 The Army now plans to abandon the facilities at
17 Fort Greely during the next Alaskan winter. Hundreds of
18 millions of dollars in investments made over the years in
19 this base infrastructure will be destroyed in a matter of
20 months.
21 This effectively eliminates any real chance for the
22 community of Delta Junction to develop a reuse plan for those

Page 488

1 facilities. To abandon them in the middle of an Arctic
2 winter is just wrong. I think that you could adopt some fair
3 form of the Army's realignment but direct that it take place
4 solely so that the place can be kept in good operating
5 condition and the plans can be made in the following summer.
6 Again, I appreciate your courtesy in allowing me to
7 be here. It's a tough job that you have, and I commend you
8 for doing it. Thank you very much.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank my friend, the
10 Distinguished Senior Center from the great state of Alaska
11 for his great presentation today, for the book and for his
12 friendship. Thank you very much, Senator.
13 We're delighted to have -- I'm going to ask that my
14 colleagues indulge me. Congressman Solomon Ortiz has been
15 waiting here a while. We're going to call him. Congressman
16 Solomon Ortiz. I want to give my colleague from Illinois a
17 moment to catch his breath. Congressman Ortiz.
18 REPRESENTATIVE ORTIZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
19 Commissioners. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
20 you this afternoon. I will focus on those facilities that
21 have been impacted by the Department of Navy's base closure
22 recommendations. Naval Air Station Corpus Christi and Naval

Page 489

1 Air Station Kingsville.
2 Naval Air Station Kingsville with its outlying
3 field and its neighbor, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, can
4 meet the single-sited T-45 strike training needs of the Navy,
5 offers best weather, uncongested airspace, plenty of runways,
6 good outlying fields, protected from infringement, access to
7 over-water training areas, strong community support and its
8 highest naval air training rating make this statement
9 possible, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.
10 I am aware that criticism for the Navy plan has
11 surfaced regarding the ability of the South Texas complex to
12 meet this single-sited T-45 strike requirement. Using the
13 most conservative capacity estimate of the most expensive
14 training requirements with generous surge included, South
15 Texas remains the most cost-effective alternative for advance
16 strike training for the Navy.
17 Careful analysis the demonstrate that Naval Air
18 Station Kingsville and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi have
19 sufficient capacity to meet the strike training needs of the
20 Navy. Should the Commission have concern about this ability,
21 I would suggest that the OLF, a current Navy asset could be
22 used for surge capability.

Page 490

1 Naval Air Station Kingsville is the Navy's finest
2 pilot training facility with tremendous capacity and growth
3 potential. NAS Corpus Christi has consistently demonstrated
4 superior military value and versatile utility for our
5 nation's military.
6 It is home to the three aviator training
7 essentials, uncongested airspace, good weather and plenty of
8 concrete for runways and outlying fields. It is a federal
9 complex housing 47 tenant commands, including Customs, the
10 Coast Guard, a major joint DOD research center and the Corpus
11 Christi Army Depot, the world's largest helicopter repair
12 facility.
13 In addition to its current mission as an
14 Undergraduate Pilot Training base for Navy, Marine and Air
15 Force pilots, NAS Corpus Christi serves as the home to the
16 Navy Mine Warfare Command. It is a key component in the
17 ongoing Navy plan to establish a center of excellence for
18 mine warfare in South Texas that combines all elements of
19 mine warfare training and operations in a central location.
20 The Navy has recommended the transfer of its West
21 Coast mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi in
22 support of the mine warfare center of excellence. I strongly

Page 491

1 endorse this proposal which serves to advance the Navy's plan
2 to co-locate its mine warfare assets to secure maximized
3 training opportunities and operational advantages.
4 This is a small redirect action that is
5 noncontroversial and reaps enormous economic benefits for the
6 taxpayer.
7 I strongly support the retention of the T-44, move
8 the engine training at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi.
9 Joint multi-engine maritime training with the Air Force has
10 already begun at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi.
11 In those studies of maritime training conducted by
12 the Department of Defense, NAS Corpus Christi has the highest
13 military value. The T-44 used for multi-engine training is
14 already single-sited at NAS Corpus Christi in compliance with
15 the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Navy policies
16 that functional pilot training be consolidated.
17 Transfer of this undergraduate training function
18 could only result in disruption to pilot training pipelines,
19 duplication of facilities and expenses and the unnecessary
20 incurring of a significant military construction cost.
21 The increased NFO PTR requirements and ongoing
22 activities at NAS Pensacola make the transfer of the T-44

Page 492

1 mission to Pensacola quite complex, most unsafe and
2 impossible from a capacity standpoint.
3 The Navy's substantially deviates from the base
4 closure criteria in recommending the transfer of the T-44,
5 and I urge you to reject this portion of the Navy's proposal.
6 The South Texas community has reluctantly decided not to
7 oppose the transfer of primary pilot training from NAS Corpus
8 Christi to NAS Whiting Field in order to accommodate the
9 single-siting of primary air training.
10 I support the analysis that asserts that both
11 strike training and primary training may be consolidated
12 based on the 1994 PTR rates with a reasonable surge.
13 However, it must be noted that the single-siting of primary
14 air training results in a much tighter management of aviation
15 assets that the single-siting of advanced strike training
16 since a much greater access capacity currently exists in the
17 training facility.
18 I want to briefly discuss, and I'll finish in a few
19 seconds, the Navy recommendation to realign NAS Corpus
20 Christi to a naval air facility in support of NAS Kingsville.
21 This seems like an internal Navy decision on the operational
22 status of this facility.

Page 493

1 However, let me suggest that this may, in fact,
2 hinder the future operation of the base and the well-being of
3 numerous tenants. The recommendation to realign Naval Air
4 Station Corpus Christi to a naval air facility is based on
5 its proposed status as an outlying field.
6 However, I do not believe that this proposal takes
7 into full consideration the complexity of the base as a
8 federal facility. I appreciate the Commission listening to
9 me today, Mr. Senator, Mr. Commissioner.
10 Good to see some of my friends on the Commission,
11 and I know and I have all the faith that you will do what is
12 best or our country, and I just wanted to relay some of our
13 concerns of my constituents back in South Texas.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
15 Ortiz. We're delighted to have you. We're pleased to
16 welcome the Distinguished Congressman from the great state of
17 Illinois, Congressman Dick Durbin.
18 REPRESENTATIVE DURBIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 Let me at the outset thank both you, Mr. Kling, whom I know,
20 and the other members of the Commission for your service to
21 your country in this regard. It is a momentous task, and we
22 are most appreciative of the public service which you are

Page 494

1 rendering.
2 I might say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, this last
3 Sunday in a paper you're familiar with, the St. Louis Post
4 Dispatch, there was an excellent article printed about the
5 two facilities that I'm discussing by Mr. Harry Levins,
6 including a very nice picture of the Chairman, and I would
7 recommend it to you, and I'll leave it if you would like to
8 look at it informally or as part of the record, because I
9 think it sets out in detail the importance of the two
10 facilities I'll discuss today.
11 These facilities are the Aviation Troop Command,
12 better known as ATCOM, in St. Louis, and the Charles Melvin
13 Price Support Center in Granite City. I am from the Illinois
14 side of the river, but we have a regional approach to these
15 issues as we did with Metrolink and many others, and we are
16 hoping that your Commission will view this as a regional
17 asset in both instances.
18 The Army's recommendation to close ATCOM and
19 realign the Price Center does not fairly and accurately
20 represent the military value of these facilities and
21 exaggerates the resulting return on investment.
22 To follow an admonition I have given so many

Page 495

1 witnesses, I will, in fact, condense my remarks which are
2 made part of this record and just say to you that I believe
3 that at the outset the Army's recommendation to close ATCOM
4 exaggerates the savings in annual overhead cost.
5 The original estimate of 17.6 million has now been
6 re-estimated to 3.5 million. In addition, the close of ATCOM
7 is premature and would cost more than $100 million in moving
8 and relocation costs, and it would place the Army's aviation
9 mission in turmoil at this moment when, in fact, this
10 decision should be deferred until after the Department of
11 Defense has decided on a site for department-wide aviation
12 acquisition organization.
13 On the Price Support Center named after a mutual
14 friend of ours who gave a life of public service in support
15 of the armed services, I would say that I hope you'll
16 consider that the estimated cost of realigning the Price
17 Center would result in savings of 8.6 million a year, and, in
18 fact, the Army has over estimated these savings by about 6
19 million.
20 First, the Army estimated savings of 1.8 million
21 for closing the military family housing. Local data has
22 assigned the figure of 1 million instead of 1.8.

Page 496

1 Second, the Army failed to take into account the
2 cost of relocating the Price Support Center families which
3 would be about $1.45 million.
4 Third, the Army did not include the reimbursable
5 amount they now receive from tenants, which is almost $1
6 million a year. In fact, the Army has admitted to the
7 Commission is miscalculated the savings of realigning the
8 Price Center over the implementation period by $10 million
9 from an original estimate of 35 million to a revised estimate
10 of 25 million.
11 In sum, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,
12 the best alternative for the Army is not to close ATCOM or
13 the Price Support Center. The best alternative is to
14 establish an aviation command in St. Louis and retain the
15 Price Support Center.
16 I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you. I
17 urge the Commission to reject the Army's recommendations, and
18 I ask that my written remarks be entered in the record of
19 this hearing.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you so much, Congressman
21 Dick Durbin, the Congressman from the great state of
22 Illinois, and his remarks will be reproduced in the record in

Page 497

1 full. Will staff please obtain the remarks from the
2 Distinguished Congressman. Thank you very much, Congressman
3 Durbin.
4 And we're delighted to have Congressman Norm Mineta
5 from the great state of California.
6 REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: Mr. Chairman, if I might
7 approach the desk to give you a report, sir?
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Norm.
9 REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: Mr. Chairman and members of
10 the Commission, it really does give me an honor and a
11 privilege to have this opportunity to appear before you
12 today.
13 Mr. Chairman, I am here this evening to bring to
14 your attention information which seriously calls to question
15 the credibility of the Air Force and unless acted upon would
16 challenge the credibility of the BRAC process.
17 The Department of Defense's recommendation that the
18 750th Space Group "realigned" to Falcon Air Station should be
19 described as what it is, a base closure. There are three
20 principal occupants at Onizuka Air Force Base, and the DOD
21 recommendation calls for two to move and one to eventually
22 disappear.

Page 498

1 Specifically, under the DOD recommendation, the
2 750th is being realigned to Falcon. The research group or
3 Detachment 2, will move to another facility in a "non-BRAC
4 action." And the remaining top secret tenants will remain at
5 Onizuka until no longer needed and then just go away.
6 Under any definition that I can imagine, the
7 absence of all units from a facility is a closure, and that
8 is exactly what is going on here.
9 Mr. Chairman, let me explain why the Air Force has
10 gone to such lengths to define its request as a realignment
11 and not as a closure. Just last year the Air Force studied
12 the cost of closing Onizuka. It studied five options for
13 relocating the three units at that facility.
14 This very Air Force study, which I have before me
15 right now and have now handed to the Chair of the Commission,
16 shows that the one-time costs of closing Onizuka is $699
17 million.
18 Mr. Chairman, the reason the DOD recommendation
19 with regard to Onizuka Air Station is being called a
20 realignment is the Air Force knows how much it would cost to
21 close the base and to deal with each of its occupants, and it
22 is doing everything it can do define away those costs from

Page 499

1 the start.
2 It is the responsibility of this Commission to
3 honestly consider the impact of a DOD recommendation on the
4 taxpayers both financially and from a national security
5 perspective.
6 The study I have before me shows that the Air Force
7 knows exactly how much its request would cost and is
8 attempting to redefine the effort in such a way to hide its
9 worst problems.
10 The numbers in this study must be seriously
11 examined, and we must recognize that what is being requested
12 is really a stealth closure and not a realignment. Mr.
13 Chairman, in my chairman, if it looks like a duck, quacks
14 like a duck and walks like a duck it is probably a closure.
15 We strongly urge the Commission to consider how the
16 DOD recommendation actually differs from a base closure and
17 to then use the Air Force's own numbers to examine what the
18 true costs of a closure really are.
19 Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity
20 to appear before this very distinguished Commission to
21 testify this evening, and I really want to thank all of the
22 members of the Commission for the very, very hard work and

Page 500

1 the time and the effort that you have put the last several
2 months in the issues that are facing this Commission and wish
3 to thank all of you for your very fine and hard work, and
4 thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much,
6 Congressman Norm Mineta, a Distinguished Member of the House
7 from the great state of California, and we welcome his
8 colleague and friend Representative Anna Eshoo from the great
9 state of California as well. We've heard her before. We
10 look forward to hearing her again.
11 REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
12 that warm welcome and to the members of the Commission. It's
13 wonderful to hear about the great states that we come from
14 and the great members of Congress that you think we are.
15 Let's hope that you find our testimony to be great and
16 important.
17 It's a privilege to appear before you once again,
18 and I'd like to follow-up on some of the points my colleague,
19 Congressman Mineta, did make. I want to express to you how
20 troubled I am by the actions of the Defense Department,
21 specifically the Air Force, with respect to Onizuka Air Force
22 Base and the implications it has for our nation's

Page 501

1 intelligence gathering capabilities.
2 I think that we had a very fine discussion on this
3 very issue when you were in California, and I think very
4 important groundwork was laid on this very point.
5 Throughout this process, the Air Force has provided
6 us with a set of costs that show the saves our government
7 could make by closing Onizuka. In March, my staff directly
8 asked the Air Force for any other studies that were done by
9 them, and we told there were none.
10 Again in April, Senator Fienstein's staff asked the
11 Air Force in writing whether there were any studies done on
12 the costs of closing Onizuka. Both times the Air Force said
13 there were none, yet last week Mr. Mineta and I received an
14 Air Force report -- and not from the Air Force, obviously --
15 which demonstrates that just last year the Air Force did a
16 study on closing Onizuka, and the costs were astronomically
17 higher than the figures we had been given.
18 Not only does it show there are no savings in
19 closing or even realigning Onizuka, it shows that unless
20 there is some magic bullet developed our intelligence
21 gathering capabilities would be more costly and less
22 efficient.

Page 502

1 Essentially, the Air Force says not to worry, and
2 although we didn't tell you about this report, which
3 contradicts our own numbers, it doesn't matter because we
4 will have a classified capability that makes the report you
5 found out about insignificant.
6 I ask can the Air Force guarantee this capability
7 by the time the President must decide to proceed with an
8 Onizuka mothballing? Evidently, the answer is no.
9 Mr. Chairman and Commission members, as recently as
10 two months ago the GAO criticized the Air Force for its
11 credibility regarding figures it has provided in the BRAC
12 process. Now again there is another case of the Air Force
13 essentially boiling the books.
14 In the process, a United States Senator and at
15 least a few members of Congress were misled, and upon further
16 inquiry regarding the conflicting cost figures that the Air
17 Force has given us they are relying on unfounded assumptions
18 that it will be capable of providing an architecture that
19 would reduce costs, an architecture which intelligence
20 sources raise serious questions as to estimates of
21 operational capability with respect to the so-called savings
22 that would be realized under the Onizuka closure.

Page 503

1 Mr. Chairman, I know that the Commission works
2 under a strong mandate to reduce defense costs while ensuring
3 a strong national defense. I support your mission, and my
4 support must include the Commission closing redundant and
5 unnecessary facilities throughout this country, including my
6 district.
7 But in fact the operations at Onizuka Air Force
8 Base are very different, but in the name of savings for its
9 own line item, the Air Force has provided an incomplete
10 picture and faulty numbers to Congress and to the Commission
11 itself.
12 Its answer to substantive questions about real
13 costs is to assert it will have an R&D answer by the time we
14 need it. I urge the Commission to reject this approach and
15 require the DOD to provide a more convincing fiscal case
16 before indeed our intelligence gathering capabilities are
17 reduced.
18 The Air Force has made its choice how it wants to
19 proceed in this manner. I believe that BRAC must insist on
20 more. Thank you once again for the opportunity to provide
21 testimony to you and for the work that you are engaged in. I
22 know that it is difficult, but I trust that your judgment

Page 504

1 will be a sound one. Thank you.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we appreciate very much your
3 valuable contribution, Representative Eshoo and you and your
4 colleagues who have so ably contributed to our efforts on
5 behalf of the great state of California. Thank you very
6 much.
7 REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO: Thank you.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Dan Burton of the
9 great state of Indiana.
10 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Great state of Indiana,
11 Senator.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good to see you, Dan.
13 Representative Burton.
14 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Thank you, Senator. I want
15 to thank you and the committee for permitting me to testify
16 before you this evening. I appreciate the opportunity to
17 support a very innovative and unique privatization proposal
18 for the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis.
19 This proposal was developed by an Indianapolis task
20 force which included Mayor Goldsmith and has received
21 positive reaction from the highest levels of the Pentagon and
22 I believe from BRAC Commissioner Lee Kling, who I see here

Page 505

1 today and had an opportunity to meet with when he was out in
2 Indianapolis.
3 In fact, I have in front of me a letter from
4 Richard Dansig, the Undersecretary of the Navy, that he has
5 forwarded to you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Dixon, which
6 expresses the Navy's interest in working with the City of
7 Indianapolis on this plan.
8 As some of you may know, I have been a fiscally
9 conservative member of Congress, and I consistently look for
10 ways to eliminate the wasteful use of taxpayers' dollars.
11 The partnership plan for the Naval Air Warfare Center I
12 believe does exactly that.
13 It actually saves more money, it saves more money
14 than the DOD's recommendation to completely close the
15 facility. The actual cost for closing the Naval Air Warfare
16 Center in Indianapolis is $226 million or almost three times
17 what the DOD estimate in its most costly COBRA analysis.
18 We are not talking about small change here. We're
19 talking about an unnecessary, and I want to emphasize
20 unnecessary, expenditure of 184 million taxpayers' dollars if
21 the DOD plan is used.
22 On the other hand, by complementing the partnership

Page 506

1 plan, the costs of closure are reduced by that $184 million.
2 Under the partnership plan, the implementation time is also
3 much shorter. It is hard to understand implementing a plan
4 which will cost taxpayers an unnecessary $150 million when
5 there is an alternative plan which will save $184 million.
6 I have two requests for you, the members of the
7 BRAC Commission, today. First, I request that the Commission
8 alter the present DOD recommendation by inserting the
9 partnership plan in its place. At the very least, the
10 Commission must make it clear that the partnership proposal
11 is the preferred closure option.
12 The Commission has nothing to lose by doing this.
13 The plan saves taxpayers' dollars. Technically, a closure
14 has been achieved, and the plan will protect and preserve a
15 very vital part of our national security and, I might add,
16 the jobs of nearly 2,500 of my constituents.
17 And second, I request the Commission establish a
18 time frame in which the negotiations between the city and the
19 Navy must occur, perhaps maybe a year. This would set a time
20 period within which the Navy and the city would be required
21 to structure the agreement upon which the partnership must be
22 based.

Page 507

1 These are two significant requests but are both
2 within the scope and jurisdiction of your Commission. I hope
3 you agree this alternative makes good sense and that you will
4 look with favor on this proposal. And with that,
5 Mr. Chairman, I'll be happy to try to answer any questions
6 you might have.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have no questions,
8 Representative Burton. We are very much aware of the plan,
9 and we appreciate your valuable contribution. It's under
10 serious consideration.
11 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Thank you very much.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very kindly. We're
13 delighted to have my old friend the great Congressman from
14 the great state of Florida, Representative Sam Gibbons. Good
15 to see you, Sam.
16 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Mr. Chairman and
17 Commissioner Kling, I first of all want to thank you for the
18 job you're doing for our country. It's very important, and
19 we know you'll do a good job. Secondly -- I've found
20 somebody's glasses here. I don't know whose they are.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: As the sign of an honest
22 politician, he found some glasses, and he's going to return

Page 508

1 them to the proper source. This will be in your credit, Sam.
2 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: All right. Thank you. I
3 represent MacDill Air Force Base. I am from Tampa, Florida,
4 and obviously I am here to talk about MacDill. And all I ask
5 you to do about MacDill is to follow the request of the
6 Defense Department and of the Air Force.
7 The Air Force wants to keep MacDill open to provide
8 the services that they must provide for the two joint
9 commands that are headquartered at MacDill, Special
10 Operations Command and Central Command.
11 We're honored to have those two very important
12 installations there. They need an airport to accomplish
13 their mission. The cheapest and best way is to allow the Air
14 Force to continue, as has been recommended to you, to operate
15 that airfield and of course to allow the Commerce Department
16 to have their NOAA operations there, their air wing there.
17 There is plenty of room at MacDill. I helped build
18 it in 1939, opened it way back then. As a college student, I
19 laid concrete for those runways. I'm very familiar with it.
20 I became a second lieutenant on active duty there in 1941,
21 and I have had it as my charge ever since.
22 Plenty of room. If you want to put some more

Page 509

1 tanker wings down there, we can take care of all of them that
2 you got, and as you know, the United States is short of
3 tanker wings in the southern part of the country, and the
4 northern part of the country is over tanker-winged according
5 to the DOD estimates.
6 So put as many tankers there as you want. We'll be
7 glad to take them all or anybody else that you got that you
8 need a home for and just do what the Department of Defense
9 has asked you to do as far as keeping MacDill open and
10 operated so Central Command and Special Operations Command
11 can both carry out their missions. Thank you very much. Any
12 questions, I'll be glad to answer them. It's nice to see you
13 back.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have no questions. We've been
15 down to your fine base and had a look at it. We thank you,
16 Representative Sam Gibbons, for your great contribution on
17 behalf --
18 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: And I assume that my
19 formal statement will be a part of the record.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your formal statement will be
21 reproduced in the record in full. Do we have it?
22 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Yes. If you don't, I will

Page 510

1 hand you one right now.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, you're going to give it to
3 the director right there. You're giving it to the top dog.
4 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: All right. Good. Thank
5 you very much and have a nice day.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you. Good to see you,
7 Sam. Representative Gibbons?
8 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Yes, sir.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I just wanted to ask do you still
10 get any of that Schlitz around?
11 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: I've got cases of Schlitz
12 now, you know that?
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I read that article. It's getting
14 kind of hard to get Schlitz. I was just wondering.
15 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Well, you know, I didn't
16 know they made Schlitz any more, Mr. Chairman. I was down at
17 the White House before the 50th anniversary of D-day. We
18 were supposedly briefing the President on what it was like,
19 and after the dinner the waiter came in with a silver tray,
20 and on the tray were two cans of Schlitz beer.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I love it.
22 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: So I took them back to

Page 511

1 Normandy and drank them with my family at the same spot on
2 the road to where I had consumed the first ones 50 years ago.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: My god, you done the right thing,
4 Sam.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: This time I didn't leave
6 the empties, though.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Bless your bones.
8 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Good to see you.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Thank you, Sam. We're
10 delighted to have the Distinguished Congressman from the
11 great state of California, Congressman Rob Portman, here, and
12 we're pleased to hear from him.
13 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: Thank you, Senator. I'd
14 like to claim California as my own, but I'm actually from
15 Ohio.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, let the record show that
17 that's the first mistake the Chairman has made in about 46
18 years, and I want the record to be eminently clear now that I
19 charge my Commission to understand that this Distinguished
20 Congressman, Rob Portman, is from the great state of Ohio.
21 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: There you go. There you
22 go.

Page 512

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: My apology to you, Congressman.
2 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: Not at all, Senator. I'm
3 just from the great Midwest like you, and I'm proud of it.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I can tell by the cut of
5 your jib.
6 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: There you go. I'm very
7 pleased to be here. Thank you for having me. I'm here to
8 talk about Brooks Air Force Base at San Antonio and Wright-
9 Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.
10 I don't represent Dayton Ohio. I do represent
11 Southwestern Ohio and have some interests in being sure that
12 Wright-Patterson continues to be a viable Air Force base and
13 continues to be given the responsibilities I think that it
14 deserves based on its rating.
15 And you've got a lot of tough decisions to be made
16 here. I served in the White House back in the Bush
17 Administration when the Base Closure Commission was first
18 getting going, and I understand I think as well as anybody
19 the need to keep it bipartisan, nonpartisan and apolitical,
20 and I think you should make the decisions on the merits and,
21 you know, there is a good reason to appoint an independent
22 commission, and I support entirely.

Page 513

1 I applaud the Commission, in fact, for its role. I
2 think you've been a very constructive force, and you've made
3 a lot of difficult decisions in terms of downsizing while
4 maintaining our readiness and modernization.
5 So I'm here today not to support a parochial view,
6 although I tend to think consolidation works better than
7 another but instead simply to urge you to act on the merits
8 in this situation, and that's what the Commission is all
9 about as I see it, and that's what you've done so well.
10 In accordance with BRAC, the Air Force has
11 determined that it's necessary to reduce its laboratory
12 research facilities around the country to carry out its
13 mission in the most thorough and cost-effective way, and I'm
14 sure you're very aware of that.
15 And to do this the Secretary of Defense has
16 recommended consolidating Brooks Air Force Base in San
17 Antonio with Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, in
18 Dayton, Ohio.
19 This decision I think is consistent with both the
20 long-term force structure plan as well as the selection
21 criteria under the Base Closure and Realignment Act. Indeed,
22 the Air Force has rated Wright-Pat as a Tier 1 base, and

Page 514

1 Brooks was rated as a Tier 3 base.
2 Furthermore, the Air Force has indicated that
3 Wright-Patterson and the surrounding area have sufficient
4 level of qualified personnel, expertise, support, technical
5 facilities to incorporate the activities from Brooks at
6 Wright-Pat efficiently and effectively.
7 The one-time costs of closure and consolidation
8 should be more than offset by the long-term savings that the
9 study indicates that would be associated with reducing
10 personnel and reducing infrastructure.
11 The Air Force has also determined that
12 consolidation will eliminate almost twice as many positions
13 as the cantonment policy suggested by supporters of Brooks,
14 almost twice as many positions.
15 This fact in addition to the reduction in overhead
16 and other costs, is expected to result in an annual savings
17 of about $32 million compared with only $10.5 million in
18 annual savings associated with the other approach.
19 All of these are Air Force data, mind you, and they
20 aren't fine. It comes straight from DOD. The services,
21 including the Air Force, I think you've correctly been given
22 the discretion to determine how best to restructure forces in

Page 515

1 a more efficient organization while preserving the ability to
2 protect our great nation, and in this case they've decided
3 that consolidation will result in the best military value for
4 the Air Force.
5 So I urge you to consider the merits of the cost-
6 effectiveness of the measure as you review the Air Force
7 recommendation in accordance with the Defense Base Closure
8 and Realignment Act.
9 Sound decisions are based on sound policy -- I
10 don't have to tell you all that -- divorced from politics,
11 and I know that you will carry out your responsibilities, but
12 I hope that in this case those sound decisions will help make
13 your recommendations and the work of this Commission all the
14 more credible and all the more persuasive to the American
15 people as we're going through this tough downsizing.
16 I thank you very much for allowing me to say a few
17 words here today, Senator.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Congressman Portman, thank
19 you very much. I'm sorry that I hadn't had the pleasure to
20 meet you during my service here, sir. You've made a very
21 fine presentation on your behalf and the State of Ohio. I'm
22 pleased to advise you you are the 200th member of the

Page 516

1 Congress to come before this panel in a little over 20 hours
2 so far, and you've discharged your obligation very well, and
3 we thank you for it.
4 REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: I think you are very
5 patient with us, and I appreciate you're getting the input.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
7 Portman. Ladies and gentlemen who have had the stamina to
8 stay -- I hope you guys are getting overtime over there at
9 that table. God bless you.
10 Now, we have two more coming, one member of the
11 House and one in the Senate, and they're on their way. And
12 should they show up in apt time, which I'm sure they will,
13 we're going to accommodate them.
14 Now, earlier in the day the great state of
15 Pennsylvania encountered difficulties because a substantial
16 number of members from the House were here and had to return
17 for a vote, and one of them demonstrating his devotion to his
18 district and his state, having sped back to the House, having
19 cast his vote, having served his constituency all day coming
20 back here tonight, and we're delighted to see Congressman
21 Phil English from the great state of Pennsylvania.
22 REPRESENTATIVE ENGLISH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Page 517

1 I'm grateful for the opportunity to testify, and I appreciate
2 the fact that the Base Closure and Realignment Commission has
3 to make some decisions that would challenge the wisdom of
4 Solomon. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf
5 of the Youngstown-Warren Air Reserve Station that currently
6 serves the Pennsylvania Chenango Valley.
7 I believe that this facility is a significant
8 resource for our national defense, and I believe my
9 colleague, Mr. Traficant, is going to be offering or has
10 offered testimony to the Commission to that effect.
11 What I wanted to do in support his comments, since
12 I cannot claim to be an expert on all aspects of military
13 preparedness, is to relay to the Commission the significance
14 of the Air Reserve base to the Mercer County Pennsylvania
15 community.
16 Over 400 reservists as well as nearly 150 civilian
17 employees from Pennsylvania work at or otherwise utilize the
18 910th. The Youngstown Air Reserve Station has become one of
19 the area's largest single employers, and its loss would have
20 serious consequences upon the local community and on the
21 regional economy.
22 I believe that one could compare the beneficial

Page 518

1 effects of such a base on the local economy to that of a
2 significant company. This is particularly significant in
3 view of the fact that this region of Pennsylvania has
4 experienced a very substantial downturn in recent years and
5 hasn't fully recovered from the recession of the early 1980s.
6 I am here to emphasize the support and initiative
7 of the 910 personnel that they have given to their Air
8 Reserve station. They have an exceptional operational record
9 recognized regularly by the Department of Defense.
10 My view is that after reviewing the Youngstown Air
11 Reserve Station's military value, its capabilities and its
12 strong community support this Commission will see the merits
13 of its continued service.
14 Currently, the 910th Airlift Wing consists of two
15 tactical units, the 757th Airlift Squadron, the 773rd Airlift
16 Squadron as well as the Aerial Spray Branch and its
17 supporting units covering all facets of Air Force
18 requirements.
19 It is under the command of the 10th Air Force at
20 the Bergstrom Air Force Base in Texas and the Air Force
21 Reserve Headquarters at the Robins Air Force Base in Georgia.
22 To briefly give you a sense of its size, the

Page 519

1 Youngstown Air Reserve Station employs nearly 500 people, is
2 utilized by 1,100 reservists, sits on 230 acres on the north
3 side of the Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport while using a
4 total of 1,300 acres when counting all of the facilities
5 used.
6 The mission of the 910 is two-fold. In wartime, it
7 deploys the C-130H in the combat operations of tactical
8 airlift. These operations include low-level infiltration
9 into combat environments where the aircraft can deliver
10 personnel and materials by airdrop and air-land techniques.
11 In peacetime, the Wing's mission is to direct the
12 organizing, equipping and training of Air Force Reserve air
13 crews in the tactical airlift tactics and techniques, and as
14 required, the unit will also be available to provide
15 nonmilitary humanitarian assistance.
16 In this capacity, since February of 1993, the 910
17 Air Wing has provided airlift and personnel for humanitarian
18 flights to Bosnia. Having offered this general testimony,
19 and I welcome you to review the balance of it in a
20 submission, I would love to field any questions you might
21 have and appreciate the opportunity to participate.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,

Page 520

1 Congressman English, for your fine contribution. We thank
2 you for the statement you're placing in the record, and we
3 appreciate your efforts on behalf of your district and your
4 state. Thank you very much.
5 REPRESENTATIVE ENGLISH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
6 and again I appreciate all of the efforts of this Commission
7 and wish you well.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman. Now, let
9 me say that the man who will be last is a man from a family
10 that has always been first. What a great way to end two days
11 of hearings by having an old friend who is always first come
12 in here as our 202nd witness.
13 He is last but not least the great Senior Senator
14 from the great state of Massachusetts, Ted Kennedy.
15 SENATOR KENNEDY: What an introduction. We missed
16 you out in your home state yesterday, Mr. Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That's in your credit, Mr.
18 Senator, in your credit.
19 SENATOR KENNEDY: That's indiscreet for me to
20 mention that at this time I know I'm the last thing between
21 you and a wonderful dinner somewhere.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're quite right, Senator, and a

Page 521

1 cold drink. Let your conscious be your guide.
2 SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, with that I will sit down,
3 I think. I'll just really take just a moment or two. First
4 of all, to thank all of you for the wonderful attention that
5 you've given in performing an extraordinarily national
6 service.
7 I think, Senator Dixon, and Lee Kling and General
8 Robles and General Davis have all had distinguished and
9 wonderful careers, and the fact that you've been willing to
10 run through this whole process and procedure you deserve the
11 highest commendations and the medals of our country for
12 service to our nation, and I say it very sincerely.
13 I thank you, and I want to thank Mr. Kling and
14 Generally Robles for coming up through Massachusetts, General
15 Davis as well. Every one in those communities are enormously
16 grateful, and they feel that you've given attention. You've
17 listened to their case.
18 I am a great believer in the case that has been
19 made and a great believer in the credibility of the case that
20 has been made, but I want to tell you that part of this whole
21 process was getting out and listening and asking people
22 questions and asking their participation. This really has

Page 522

1 served the process well.
2 To you, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for presiding
3 over this. From the decks of the Intrepid to the halls here
4 in Congress, your service has been exemplary as always.
5 Let me just finally mention this. There was a
6 procedure that was established by the Defense Department that
7 believed it was in the best interest of the security of this
8 nation and that is that they were going to treat the reserve
9 bases and the active duty bases as two different kind of
10 entities, and they did so with the exception of the South
11 Weymouth.
12 As you well know and as the record as we've gone
13 over reflects, the Brunswick Station was to be closed, South
14 Weymouth to remain open, and then, on the basis of
15 interventions and, quite frankly, the CINCLAN Fleet's
16 opinions ought to be listened to.
17 But at other times when his advice was sought, it
18 had reached a different conclusion, and all we're saying is
19 that the record has been made or not made with regards to
20 that intervention we do not believe that this Commission
21 giving the consideration of all these other factors should
22 deviate from what has been a tested, tried, evaluated process

Page 523

1 which says consider the active duty operation bases and
2 consider the reserve bases in a different scale.
3 Now, I'm not here to review where South Weymouth
4 comes out in the reserve bases other than to say it is a
5 superb base, and with regards to the manning issue, though
6 are men and women who are ready to serve the reserve
7 function.
8 There is no real competition between what is
9 available at South Weymouth and at other reserve bases. I
10 respect the demographic issue as it relates to other bases,
11 but with regards to the different criteria which were used in
12 terms of the reserve, that South Weymouth makes that and
13 makes it in a strong way.
14 What we are saying is that -- and I think General
15 Robles, Mr. Kling, General Davis when they were out there and
16 listened to the details and went through the various
17 presentations that were made to them in terms of the assets
18 of that base, and not to denigrate others, but the fact of
19 the matter is when you look at all the other reserve bases we
20 ought to be one that is maintained.
21 That was the initial recommendation. That is the
22 one that ought to be followed. If at some other time there

Page 524

1 is going to be a different criteria in terms of bringing the
2 reserve in operation and bringing a different kind of
3 criteria, then so be it.
4 But to single this out as the only situation in the
5 whole BRAC procedure that deviates from the clear, specific
6 requirements which were established, and when the clear,
7 specific requirements were established they reached a certain
8 result, and when they circumvented those procedures, they
9 reached a certain result in the termination or the closing
10 will south Weymouth.
11 And we believe that we have a base with men and
12 women that will perform that function, the reserves, with
13 great distinction. I thank you very much. We have responded
14 to all of the various sort of questions. I thank the members
15 of the community, Representative Haley, the others that are
16 here.
17 I think Generally Robles, Mr. Kling, General Davis
18 would feel that in that time of that presentation really
19 important information and analysis was made available by
20 these really outstanding citizens.
21 As you know, Representative Haley flies planes as a
22 part of the military service, takes great pride, as all our

Page 525

1 reservists do, but is someone who probably has assets in
2 terms of understanding these relationships with an insight
3 which is really very special and very unique.
4 And I want to thank him and to thank our whole
5 group very much for being here and yield whatever time
6 remains back to our Chair. I thank you very much. You're
7 wonderful to permit to me and the other members of the
8 Committee to testify, and we know whatever the results we've
9 been treated fairly and with respect, and we're very, very
10 grateful to you.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Senator, you continue to
12 give your complete devotion to your state. It honors us all
13 that you do that, and we thank you for coming here with your
14 friends on behalf of your great state of Massachusetts.
15 The great Senior Senator from Massachusetts,
16 Senator Ted Kennedy, leads me to say that this meeting is
17 adjourned.
18 (Whereupon, at 7:30 p.m., the meeting of the Base
19 Closure and Realignment Committee was adjourned.)
20 * * * * *

Page 79

1 in California. In the worst case scenario, this BRAC could
2 be as bad as any other to our state.
3 I want to discuss some of the bases under
4 consideration very quickly, because in addition to the
5 cumulative economic impact, these base closures are ill-
6 advised on the merits. And I think you're looking for that,
7 as well.
8 McClellan. In the strongest possible terms, I urge
9 the Commission to abide by the recommendations of the
10 Secretary of Defense and keep McClellan open. I understand
11 several commissioners have concerns about the Air Force's
12 recommendations and believe that at least one depot should be
13 closed.
14 However, I would make one observation for your
15 consideration. In my extensive experience dealing with base
16 closures from the time I was in the House and served on the
17 Armed Services Committee, I learned that there is only one
18 constant in this process, and that is that closure costs are
19 underestimated, and projected savings are overestimated. And
20 in this reality, I think you really need to hear that I think
21 the Air Force has made sense in its plan.
22 McClellan is a facility for the future, high tech

Page 80

1 depot services pioneering the way for private industry, joint
2 ventures, and partnerships with nonDOD customers. President
3 Clinton has praised McClellan many times because it is truly
4 forward-thinking and forward-acting.
5 I urge the Commission to consider cumulative impact
6 in the Sacramento area. In 1988, nearby Mather Air Force
7 Base was closed. And three years later, the 1991 BRAC
8 Commission closed Sacramento Army Depot. This would be
9 devastating to do McClellan. So on the merits and cumulative
10 impact, please keep it open.
11 Long Beach Naval Shipyard. From a military value
12 perspective, I have serious reservations about the Defense
13 Department's recommendation to close Long Beach. It's
14 strategically located, only 80 miles from San Diego Megaport,
15 home to nearly 70 percent of the Pacific Surface Fleet. If
16 it's closed, the nearest public shipyard, Mr. Chairman and
17 members, would be Brimmerton, Washington, three days'
18 steaming time from San Diego.
19 Colin Powell said about Long Beach, "Closure would
20 seriously degrade dry dock capability for all large ships in
21 the Southern California area." The Long Beach community
22 already lost 100,000 jobs – 100,000 jobs, Mr. Chairman – as

Page 81

1 a result of the closure of naval stations in '91.
2 I would make one final observation, Mr. Chairman
3 and members, that I made to you when you were so kind to
4 visit California. What kind of message do we send to our
5 young people, to our workers, to our business, when we close
6 the only Naval shipyard that is consistently making money for
7 the military? You told them to shape up in the last round.
8 They did. To have them closed, I think, would be a huge
9 mistake.
10 Onizuka Air Force Base. I must also question the
11 Department's recommendation to downsize to only one satellite
12 control facility by realigning Onizuka. If this
13 recommendation is enacted, Mr. Chairman, a single failure
14 could leave us unable to control scores of orbiting military
15 satellites.
16 One computer error, I say to my friends, one
17 natural disaster, one terrorist attack, could separate us
18 from our satellites for hours or even days. At Onizuka, we
19 have a private sector work force second to none. We lose
20 that by closing Onizuka.
21 Mr. Chairman, Sierra Army Depot. I have to say,
22 the recommendation was based on a faulty study. Because I

Page 82

1 don't have enough time to go into it, I would ask unanimous
2 consent that my statement be included in the record. It
3 would be a shame to close an Army depot that was based on a
4 faulty study.
5 And on Point Magu, I would simply say, the cost of
6 moving facilities from there greatly outweigh any savings. I
7 urge the Commission to abide by the recommendations of the
8 Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and chief of
9 Naval operations and not close Point Magu.
10 In my last 12 seconds, Mr. Chairman, I do want to
11 thank all of you. It is difficult for my state. It is tough
12 for us to deal in only 5 minutes, when we're such a large
13 state with 32 million people. And we're hurting from these
14 base closures. We simply cannot brutalize the largest state
15 in the nation like this, a state that represents nearly 14
16 percent of GDP and a state whose unemployment is more than 2
17 percent above the national average.
18 And finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the
19 Commission, we're a state that is proud that its bases make
20 an extraordinary contribution to our national defense. Thank
21 you very much, Mr. Chairman. Please think of California, the
22 impacts that you would have on this state, and also the great

Page 83

1 military value the state affords to our country. Thank you
2 very much.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Boxer, we thank you for
4 that excellent presentation. I'm sure I speak for the entire
5 Commission when we all say we recognize the inadequacy of the
6 time. We recognize the devotion of each of you to your great
7 state, the largest state in our union.
8 And I know that you all understand that the time
9 frame for what these commissioners has done is a short one,
10 too. And we apologize. You have served your state, as
11 usual, in this whole process in an excellent and exemplary
12 way, and we thank you.
13 SENATOR BOXER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
14 members.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we're privileged to have your
16 distinguished colleague, the distinguished senior Senator
17 from the great State of California. We thank her for coming
18 and thank her for her past contributions, as well.
19 SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much, Mr.
20 Chairman.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Diane Feinstein.
22 SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much. I would

Page 84

1 like to concentrate my comments on three things. One is the
2 cumulative impact. The second is, really, the two big bases,
3 the biggest bases. And that would be McClellan and Long
4 Beach.
5 No state has had the cumulative economic impact of
6 base closure as California has. I think it might be helpful
7 for the Commission to know that today, California has 363,000
8 fewer jobs than it did in 1990. It's a state that gains
9 about 700,000 people a year, and yet has 363,000 fewer jobs
10 than it did in 1990.
11 The impact of both defense downsizing and base
12 closure is not to be underestimated. In defense downsizing
13 alone, we have lost 250,000 jobs to date. And the estimate
14 is that before the process is completed, we will lose another
15 250,000 jobs. My plea to you today is to raise cumulative
16 economic impact above what you do today when you look at the
17 base closure situation in California.
18 We have had 22 bases closed. We have another list
19 of bases before us now. The total job loss, civilian and
20 military, direct job loss, is 36,000 from those bases listed
21 today. The three big bases alone, McClellan, Magu, and Long
22 Beach, have a total of 27,000 jobs. That's military and

Page 85

1 civilian jobs directly employed on those bases.
2 My point to you is, with the job loss that we have
3 had of 363,000, there really is no other employment for these
4 people today in defense-related industry in California.
5 California, as you can see -- and these are net, net, net
6 jobs. This is a slightly different figure. This is taking
7 into consideration jobs that have remained in the state in
8 this figure.
9 Of the 148,359 nationally, almost 39,000 of those
10 net, net jobs lost have come from California alone. So
11 California alone in net, net, net job loss has lost more than
12 half of the total of the nation. I think that this is my
13 case to elevate net cumulative economic impact of this round
14 of base closures on the State of California.
15 Let me say one thing. The unemployment rate, which
16 my colleague mentioned to you is 8 and-a-half percent today,
17 unemployment in the state has gone up each of the past three
18 months. This would indicate that California could tip back
19 into a recession. And I think you must consider this job
20 loss, in view of what is now rising unemployment once again.
21 If I may, I would like to speak on the two bases.
22 I know we have 25 members of the House who will eloquently

Page 86

1 speak on many of the bases in their district. I want to
2 touch on McClellan.
3 Following the Oakland testimony, my staff
4 introduced into the record a letter by General Mormon. And
5 if I might just briefly quote from it. "The skilled workers
6 and leadership at McClellan are essential to the United
7 States Air Force. The Air Force strongly opposes the closure
8 of any of our depot installations, including McClellan Air
9 Force Base."
10 Now, with regard to McClellan's prohibitively high
11 closure costs, let me make these points. The one-time cost
12 to close McClellan is estimated at more than $500 million.
13 That does not include environmental cleanup. There are 254
14 sites at McClellan being investigated for potential
15 contamination. That represents 80 percent of the entire
16 base. So if you close it, they will not be able to reuse it
17 unless the military is willing to come up with a cleanup cost
18 in the range of 1.4 billion to $2 billion.
19 The cost to close one of the ALCs would be greater
20 than the total cost the Air Force has budgeted over the next
21 six years for all of its base closures and realignments. It
22 would cost 2.7 billion to replace McClellan's state-of-the-

Page 87

1 art facilities. Any purported savings would be wiped out by
2 the high closure and cleanup cost of McClellan.
3 One specific matter that I believe deserves the
4 Commission's attention is McClellan's one-of-a-kind
5 industrial nuclear reactor. There is presently no nuclear
6 reactor operating in the United States quite like the one at
7 McClellan. Its costs were not considered in the COBRA
8 analysis.
9 In a nutshell, I believe it makes no sense to close
10 McClellan, because you will not recover those costs from the
11 closure, and it will cost more than virtually all of the
12 other bases together for the Air Force.
13 Let me speak for a moment on Long Beach. As I said
14 in my prior testimony, it's a marvel to me why Long Beach has
15 been put on this list. It's strategically located. It's
16 close to the Pacific Fleet, where 70 percent of the fleet is
17 concentrated. It is the most cost-effective shipyard.
18 My understanding is that based on the rumors that
19 have come out of this process, the Commission is prepared to
20 maintain a shipyard that is not nearly as cost-effective as
21 Long Beach and yet close Long Beach. In just the last six
22 fiscal years, Long Beach has been consistently under budget

Page 88

1 and 102.7 million has been returned to the Navy's budget.
2 It has the largest dry dock capability South of
3 Puget Sound, and it's large enough to accommodate every class
4 of ship in the entire fleet. New information recently
5 presented to me by Long Beach Mayor Beverly O'Neil details
6 examples of where the Navy substantially deviated from the
7 force structure plan and established BRAC selection
8 criteria.
9 According to this document, which I would like to
10 submit for the record, the Navy ignored a $100 million offer
11 by the Port of Long Beach to consolidate facilities from the
12 Naval station for shipyard convenience.
13 Two, it did not include Long Beach in the regional
14 maintenance center concept, even though Puget Sound and Pearl
15 are included. And three, it lowered the military value of
16 Long Beach, which had a military value of 48.7 in 1993 and
17 only 38.04 in 1995. And it underestimated the cost of
18 closure by $758 million. I will submit those papers to your
19 Commission for your consideration.
20 I completely agree with former Chairman of the
21 Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, who said in 1991, "The
22 closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard would seriously degrade

Page 89

1 the dry dock capability for all large ships in the Southern
2 California area. Alternatives in Hawaii and Washington simply
3 could not provide the services found at Long Beach."
4 What perplexes me is, a closure of Long Beach would
5 mean that all of the ships located at San Diego, which will
6 become the major home port on the Continental U.S., will
7 either have to go to Puget Sound or to Pearl for their work.
8 In just steaming time alone, in family dislocation, that does
9 not seem to me to make very good sense. So I would urge the
10 Commission to look carefully at Long Beach.
11 I have previously testified on behalf of other
12 California bases on the closure list. But bottom line, Mr.
13 Chairman, I think the argument -- no state can make an
14 argument of cumulative economic impact like the State of
15 California can -- 363,000 fewer jobs than 1990, unemployment
16 up three months in a row, two points above the national
17 unemployment figure.
18 Over 50 percent of the net, net, net jobs from base
19 closure have occurred in the State of California, and the
20 three big bases alone, representing 27,000 of the some 38,000
21 jobs affected in this base closure. The 1988 and 1991 rounds
22 and the third round are now beginning to take place in

Page 90

1 California.
2 I would urge this Commission to consider net
3 economic impact and leave out the State of California from
4 this round of base closures. I thank the Commission.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, Senator Feinstein.
6 And we're delighted to welcome a distinguished
7 member of the House, my old friend, representative Vic Fazio.
8 Vic Fazio, we're glad to see you again.
9 REPRESENTATIVE FAZIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 The four members from our region are going to try to
11 integrate our testimony during the 20 minutes that have been
12 allocated to us.
13 That mountain of mail over there, I think,
14 testifies to the degree to which we have support in our
15 community. I know the degree to which all of you who have
16 paid attention to our problem makes that perhaps unnecessary.
17 You understand that. We do appreciate all of the attention
18 you've given.
19 But as we enter the last weeks of deliberations, I
20 want to emphasize just a couple of points. First, the world
21 continues to be a dangerous place, and events are changing
22 rapidly. Recent activities in Bosnia simply underscore that

Page 91

1 we live in a dynamic world and that we must be prepared to
2 respond to any contingency.
3 Our military forces, including depot facilities,
4 must be in position to respond to the dynamic nature of world
5 events. In this regard, DOD and the Air Force have spent a
6 lot of time working on force structure issues, infrastructure
7 requirements, and budget considerations, to arrive at an
8 appropriate balance that will permit our military forces to
9 meet the challenges of the future.
10 On the Air Force depots in particular, I believe
11 the downsizing recommendation is a reflection of the
12 difficult nature of balancing each of these considerations.
13 Ultimately, the Air Force and DOD selected what they believed
14 to be the best alternative available to them at this time.
15 The downsizing option recognizes that each ALC has unique
16 capabilities and characteristics that are essential elements
17 of supporting the war fighters.
18 Further, it recognizes that closing any ALC is an
19 extremely costly proposition. And finally, it recognizes
20 that certain capabilities at each of the ALCs could be lost
21 for years under a closure scenario.
22 If anything, as a whole, DOD needs to maintain its

Page 92

1 flexibility and preserve its capabilities to respond to an
2 ever-changing world environment. The downsizing option
3 maximizes both flexibility and capabilities of DOD.
4 I have seen no evidence which refutes the Air
5 Force's and DOD's downsizing recommendation. Nothing
6 presented to me so far diminishes the rationale behind the
7 downsizing alternative. And nothing suggests to me that the
8 Air Force and DOD did not do their job.
9 A second point I want to make is that military is a
10 changing entity, becoming more reliant on technology. The
11 world of high technology is here, and we believe McClellan is
12 positioned to provide critical mission support for the Air
13 Force and DOD well into the next century. McClellan's
14 emphasis is on technology. It's widely recognized as the
15 high tech depot. Its focus is on space systems and
16 communications in electronics.
17 McClellan is also host to a one-of-a-kind nuclear
18 radiation center that Senator Feinstein mentioned, an
19 unequalled state-of-the-art hydraulics facility, and the
20 foundry of the future.
21 This slide illustrates what are McClellan's unique
22 capabilities. We break them down into three categories:

Page 93

1 unique product or service, centers of excellence, and only
2 DOD source of repair, indicating, as well, where our cross-
3 service capabilities are greatest.
4 Understanding these unique characteristics of
5 McClellan is important, because closure will have a
6 significant negative impact on the Air Force's and DOD's
7 mission support capabilities. McClellan's capabilities as a
8 depot are captured very well in the joint cross-service group
9 analysis of functional value. Congressman Matsui will
10 address specific issues in this area for the Commission.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're delighted to have our good
12 friend, Congressman Robert Matsui, here.
13 REPRESENTATIVE MATSUI: Thank you, Chairman Dixon
14 and members of this Commission. We would like to thank you
15 for giving us this opportunity.
16 We would like to raise some concerns regarding the
17 Air Force's military value analysis, because it fails to
18 accurately portray McClellan's value to our nation's defense
19 industrial base.
20 I am here because McClellan has proved over and
21 over again in workload competitions that it is the strongest
22 depot. McClellan is leading the way in cross-servicing and

Page 94

1 cost-efficient production. Cross-servicing was, indeed, the
2 cornerstone of BRAC '95. DOD acknowledged in the Weant study
3 that the greatest amount of excess capacity was between
4 services and not within the individual services.
5 So DOD set up the joint cross-service group to
6 establish a fair and impartial process to eliminate excess
7 capacity between services. The JCSG developed functional
8 value to measure a depot's capacity to do cross-servicing.
9 Here's a slide which breaks down the relative weights that
10 the JCSG gave various depot functions.
11 The JCSG defined "functional value" as "The merit
12 of performing a cross-service function at a given site or
13 activity." As a reflection of the importance of cross-
14 servicing, functional value comprised 56 percent of the first
15 Base Closure criteria on military value.
16 Now, as this second overhead slide shows, the JCSG
17 found that of over 50 commodity groups that were evaluated,
18 McClellan scored highest in 6 of the groups. McClellan was
19 only surpassed by one other depot. In order to develop an
20 overall ranking of functional value, we combined the
21 individual JCSG commodity scores using the Air Force's
22 methodology.

Page 95

1 As you can see on the left-hand side of this slide,
2 the results show that McClellan scored the highest among all
3 5 ALCs and the second highest among all 22 depots evaluated.
4 The JCSG then plugged its data into six different
5 optimization models.
6 Ultimately, two alternatives were submitted for
7 consideration. Despite McClellan's high ranking and
8 functional value, JCSG recommended in one alternative that
9 Kelly and McClellan be closed.
10 How did this happen? The GAO found that in this
11 model, the JCSG had included a determination of military
12 value that was developed by the Air Force. The Air Force
13 estimation of military value was developed in secret and is
14 based upon subjective judgement.
15 After considerable review, the GAO concluded that
16 they could not audit the methodology for developing this
17 military value. This subjective factor is what wrongly makes
18 McClellan a closure candidate under JCSG alternative number
19 two.
20 In contrast, the Air Force decided to alter the
21 impartial model developed by the JCSG and did a separate
22 analysis, ending up with different results. And let me

Page 96

1 identify just some areas of bias.
2 First, the Air Force included depot capacity as a
3 primary factor, attributing 40 percent of the overall score,
4 which favors, of course, large depots. But why are they
5 giving bonus points for capacity, when excess capacity is
6 what the BRAC is trying to cut?
7 Second, no credit was given to core cross-service
8 workload. McClellan performs more core cross-service
9 workload than any other ALC.
10 Third, the Air Force combined seven separate ground
11 communications electronic commodity groups into but one
12 category, which further reduced McClellan's overall score.
13 In conclusion, I ask that the Commission consider
14 the independent evaluations of the JCSG and the GAO in
15 determining McClellan's value to the nation's defense
16 infrastructure. Their objective measurements show
17 indisputably that McClellan has critical skills and
18 productivity rates that are not duplicated elsewhere in DOD.
19 Our desire to save McClellan derives not from a
20 parochial interest to keep our local communities intact, but
21 from an even greater interest in keeping our national defense
22 infrastructure strong.

Page 97

1 Now, I would like to introduce Congressman
2 Doolittle, who will discuss another area in the Air Force
3 analysis which lowers McClellan's overall military value
4 ratings.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Matsui.
6 And we are delighted to have the distinguished Congressman
7 from California, Congressman John Doolittle.
8 REPRESENTATIVE DOOLITTLE: Thank you very much, Mr.
9 Chairman and members. That area that I shall discuss
10 pertains to the costs of depot operations. Under the Air
11 Force's criteria in one analysis, the cost of depot
12 operations represents 14 percent of the overall rating.
13 The Air Force used two indicators, annual operating
14 costs and labor rates, to rate the ALCs on costs. McClellan
15 was rated red plus for cost of depot operations. We believe
16 this rating and the indicators used to derive the rating
17 completely belie McClellan's true value in terms of cost-
18 effectiveness and productivity.
19 We are convinced that McClellan should be green for
20 costs of depot operations. Here's why. The use of annual
21 operating costs as an indicator captures the total cost of
22 depot operations, but it ignores the complexity of work and

Page 98

1 does not account for any variance in skills, equipment,
2 training, and overhead costs for differing workloads.
3 It is interesting to note that the two high tech
4 depots, Hill and McClellan, received red plus ratings for
5 annual cost of operations. This fact underscores the impact
6 of high tech workloads and highly skilled employees in the
7 cost of depot operations.
8 The other indicator used to determine the cost of
9 depot operations was labor rates, which do not reflect
10 productivity, efficiency, or performance. McClellan's basic
11 wage rates are higher than the other ALCs, but our
12 performance and efficiency are better.
13 We looked at the AFMC's own performance indicators
14 to assess efficiency, productivity, and overall performance
15 of the ALCs. These indicators have been documented by the
16 U.S. General Accounting Office since 1988. Since 1988,
17 McClellan is the number one Air Force depot in meeting annual
18 operating results which measures costs versus revenues.
19 The goal is not to make a profit, but to achieve a
20 zero balance on an annual basis. This indicator is a primary
21 measurement of management effectiveness. For other
22 performance indicators, McClellan is number one in direct

Page 99

1 labor efficiency. McClellan is number two in output per paid
2 man day. McClellan never ranks lower than third for any
3 standard performance indicator aggregated over the 1988 to
4 1994 time frame.
5 By way of summary, then, McClellan is at the top
6 among Air Force depots, both in terms of functional value and
7 cost-effectiveness. McClellan gives its DOD customers more
8 bang for the buck. The Air Force analysis does not capture
9 the full value of McClellan as a depot. McClellan should be
10 green for depot evaluation and green for criterion one.
11 If these issues had been evaluated to capture
12 McClellan's true criterion one value, McClellan's overall
13 military value would be higher, and we believe that the
14 JCSG's alternative DM number 2 would not have identified
15 McClellan as a closure candidate.
16 I would like to indicate now that Congressman Pombo
17 will shed some additional light on McClellan's value as a
18 depot on a cross-servicing basis.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Doolittle.
21 And we are delighted to have the distinguished
22 Congressman from the State of California, representative

Page 100

1 Richard Pombo.
2 REPRESENTATIVE POMBO: Thank you. We understand
3 that our friends at Tobyhanna Army Depot have been making
4 claims that Tobyhanna should be the DOD source of repair for
5 all communications and electronics work. We believe that a
6 review of the evidence will clearly indicate that if there is
7 to be a single DOD source of repair for ground communications
8 and electronics, that it would not be Tobyhanna, but, in
9 fact, it would be McClellan.
10 One need only review the JCSG functional evaluation
11 to understand why. The information I will present comes
12 directly from JCSG's depot maintenance study. It represents
13 the closest apples-to-apples comparison you will find,
14 because we are talking about communications and electronics
15 categories defined by the JCSG and performed by Tobyhanna and
16 McClellan.
17 As the next slide indicates, in the JCSG functional
18 value scores for communications and electronics commodities,
19 Tobyhanna only ranks higher than McClellan in one instance.
20 McClellan ranks higher than Tobyhanna in the other six
21 commodities, as well as in software support commodities,
22 which are essential to supporting communications and

Page 101

1 electronics workloads.
2 The software support capability is particularly
3 important, since it is an essential component of supporting
4 communications and electronics workload. Virtually
5 everything that DOD uses today is software-driven. Radars
6 track using software. Satellites are controlled using
7 software. And test equipment is software-driven.
8 A level 3 classification of software development
9 capabilities is mandatory in order to do business with the
10 Air Force. McClellan has a level 3 classification.
11 Tobyhanna has no classification.
12 Further, the next slide shows that for doing
13 communications and electronics work, McClellan is the better
14 buy. Our budgeted labor hour costs for communications
15 electronics, which is what is charged to the customer, is
16 lower than Tobyhanna's.
17 In this next slide, we illustrate Tobyhanna and
18 McClellan's current capabilities to support core
19 communications and electronics work load. The JCSG study
20 reveals that McClellan is the only DOD facility with core
21 capability in all communications and electronics categories.
22 What this means is that McClellan has the technology in place

Page 102

1 to support all commodity types.
2 The final slide clearly demonstrates that McClellan
3 has existing capacity to support all of DOD's communications
4 and electronics depot maintenance workload requirements. The
5 bottom line is that if this Commission wants to take an
6 historic step and implement cross-servicing on a significant
7 scale in the area of communications and electronics, then the
8 evidence clearly demonstrates that McClellan should be the
9 DOD single source of repair for communication and electronics
10 workload.
11 Congressman Fazio will now conclude our
12 presentation by discussing certain costs of closure issues.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Fazio.
14 REPRESENTATIVE FAZIO: Mr. Chairman, our review of
15 closure costs in the COBRA model for McClellan reveals
16 significant errors. The next slide highlights the errors and
17 what their impact is on steady state savings.
18 We provided your staff with information on this
19 subject earlier. What we are presenting today represents an
20 update of the numbers based on the latest COBRA runs and the
21 best available information we could obtain.
22 We understand that personnel reductions have

Page 103

1 already been taken within the Air Force Materiel Command
2 programs which are not reflected in the unit manpower
3 document. The UMD was the source of the personnel numbers
4 used by the Air Force in the COBRA model.
5 Essentially, the UMD had not yet been updated.
6 AFMC even alerted the ALC manpower offices that the numbers
7 were suspect. We have attached a letter from headquarters on
8 this subject for your reference. We are not certain of what
9 the impact of this discrepancy will be on one-time costs and
10 steady state savings, but bring it to your attention because
11 the closure savings estimates ought to be accurate.
12 The other errors relate to base operation support,
13 or BOS, personnel. We have identified 76 positions counted
14 as BOS for the base, when these positions are actually
15 mission support positions that will relocate with the 940th
16 Air Refueling Group.
17 This is the same scenario for 91 positions that
18 were counted as BOS but which are actually mission support
19 and will move with the communication squadron. The other 32
20 positions are already eliminated as part of the F-111
21 drawdown unrelated to BRAC. However, they were included in
22 the COBRA personnel eliminations column.

Page 104

1 So after correcting for these errors using standard
2 factors from the COBRA model, we estimate that McClellan's
3 steady state savings are reduced approximately 8.5 million.
4 We have also uncovered several areas where errors occurred in
5 one-time costs. The three most significant errors involve
6 McClellan's nuclear radiation center, the cold-proof
7 facility, and the hydraulics facility.
8 First, the radiation center. The COBRA assumptions
9 used by the Air Force provide a shut-down cost of 20 million
10 and an annual maintenance cost of 300,000. In reality, one-
11 time decommissioning costs will run as high as 55 million.
12 Annual recurring costs will be $700,000 per year.
13 The capabilities of the nuclear radiation center
14 provide critical support for DOD for nuclear treaty
15 verification purposes, as well as strategic materials
16 production. These capabilities must be replicated to support
17 national security requirements. The costs to replicate this
18 capability is 48 million, which does not consider the length
19 of time and difficulty in getting the regulatory licenses and
20 permits needed to operate a nuclear reactor.
21 For the cold-proof facility, the Air Force included
22 zero in its COBRA analysis for this capability, even though

Page 105

1 the facility will be needed to support our fall in military
2 sales obligations with Australia and may be required to
3 support the EF-111s if they remain in the inventory. The
4 cost to replicate the facility is 8.1 million.
5 I would ask you to talk to General Fogleman when he
6 appears before you on Wednesday about the role these planes
7 are now providing. The F-111 is back up over Bosnia just in
8 the last week.
9 Finally, on the hydraulics facility, the Air Force
10 included just under 1 million in the COBRA model for
11 replicating this capability elsewhere. As many of you saw
12 firsthand when you visited McClellan, the state-of-the-art,
13 high-pressure hydraulics capabilities at McClellan need
14 specialized facilities. These facilities are not currently
15 found anywhere else in DOD. The cost to replicate them is
16 $21.7 million.
17 So when added together, we find a total
18 underestimate of one-time costs of 111 million just on these
19 facilities alone.
20 The next slide demonstrates the impact of these
21 corrections on the cost of closure. We see McClellan's one-
22 time cost increase to 683 million, steady state savings

Page 106

1 decrease to 76 million, payback increased from 8 years to 11
2 years, and the net present value decrease from 370 million to
3 169 million. We're most anxious to have all of this data
4 updated on all five of the ALCs.
5 We encourage the Commission to look closely at
6 these costs of closure and other issues. We must have a full
7 understanding of what the impacts of closure are on mission
8 readiness and sustainability and the Air Force and DOD
9 budgets, as well. We ask that you not foreclose the Air
10 Force and DOD's flexibility to respond to changing national
11 security requirements.
12 We want to emphasize our people, the workforce that
13 many of you found unique, located in Northern California
14 close to the centers of excellence in their areas of
15 professional capability.
16 Please allow Secretary Perry's recommendation to go
17 forward, sending more work and more missions to McClellan in
18 the areas of composites, instruments and displays, hydraulics
19 and newdraulics, retaining our expertise in microelectronics,
20 ground communications, electronics, and neutron radiography.
21 We are the second most modern in terms of assets
22 and equipment facility in the ALC, $450 million invested in

Page 107

1 the last decade. We understand how tough the task is, but we
2 do it better, faster, and cheaper. And so we would once more
3 make our argument that McClellan is a unique national asset,
4 not just another Air Force base.
5 In closure, let me say that we believe that you
6 need to look at all the five logistics centers in terms of
7 focused COBRA runs. Put all of us on a level playing field
8 before you make a final decision. We are not taking shots at
9 any of our colleagues. We believe we all have a role to
10 play.
11 But what we hope you will do is be the umpire, the
12 arbitrator that this Commission has been so often in the
13 past. We wish you well in what is a very difficult task and
14 thank you for the degree that you have given attention to
15 this particular facility.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
17 Dick Fazio.
18 And we're delighted to welcome the Honorable Wally
19 Herger, distinguished Congressman from the State of
20 California.
21 REPRESENTATIVE HERGER: Thank you very much,
22 Chairman Dixon and members of the Commission, for this

Page 108

1 opportunity to testify on behalf of the Sierra Army Depot.
2 I wish to acknowledge the tremendous effort that
3 each member of the Commission has devoted to the BRAC
4 process. I wish to especially thank Commissioner Steele, who
5 spent a full day at Sierra Army Depot viewing the facility
6 and gathering data about its mission.
7 In the final analysis, it is firsthand observations
8 like this which will enable this Commission to reach an
9 intelligent and informed conclusion regarding the future of
10 Sierra Army Depot.
11 Today, I would like to again draw the Commission's
12 attention to a few specific points which are crucial to a
13 fair evaluation of Sierra. These factors are critical to
14 both the efficient operation of the Department of Defense and
15 the overall military readiness of our country.
16 The facts about Sierra speak for themselves. The
17 facility is ideally located. It is cost-effective. It has
18 unmatched transportation capabilities. It has storage
19 conditions that rate fourth overall in the Army system. It
20 is unparalleled demilitarization capability. It stores and
21 services three of the Army's largest operational stocks.
22 Significant realignment would be costly to the

Page 109

1 taxpayers. Combined, these factors alone present a
2 compelling case against realignment of the facility.
3 Unfortunately, however, these facts have been consistently
4 understated and manipulated in the data which has been
5 provided to this Commission. I wish to cite a few examples.
6 First, Sierra's demilitarization capability has
7 been grossly understated by the Army and misconstrued in both
8 Navy and Air Force reports. The fact is that Sierra has the
9 largest and most cost-effective demil capacity in the
10 country.
11 Furthermore, it has the flexibility to decommission
12 START I and START II, thereby enabling the United States to
13 expeditiously fulfill its military-related treaty
14 obligations.
15 Secondly, Sierra has been repeatedly evaluated
16 strictly as an ammunition depot when, in fact, 55 percent of
17 its mission is to store and maintain three of the Army's
18 largest operational stocks. These operational stocks are
19 critical to the Army force projection and were used
20 extensively during the Gulf War.
21 Thirdly, Army reports have frequently
22 underestimated Sierra's ideal location and transportation

Page 110

1 facilities. Sierra is the most proximate of any depot to the
2 West Coast military seaports. It is traversed by two major
3 rail lines and is the only depot with an air field capable of
4 supporting C-5 aircraft. Closure or realignment would
5 dramatically increase transportation costs for shipping
6 munitions to port.
7 Furthermore, closure of the facility would
8 eliminate a source of virtually unlimited munitions, storage,
9 and training space.
10 Fourthly, although Army data suggests that
11 realignment of Sierra would save taxpayers dollars, the
12 opposite, in fact, is true. The initial cost of transporting
13 Sierra's ammunition to other bases, combined with subsequent
14 increases in the cost of redeployment and demilitarization
15 will negate any one-time savings and, in the long run, cost
16 taxpayers more money.
17 These four examples suggest that this Commission
18 should carefully reexamine all the data regarding Sierra Army
19 Depot. As it does so, I urge the commissioners to give
20 particular credence to the information gathered by
21 Commissioner Steele.
22 With the national security and a growing deficit

Page 111

1 hanging in the balance, it is imperative that any final
2 determination regarding Sierra be predicated upon
3 unimpeachable information. I am confident that such
4 information is now available to the Commission, and I ask
5 that it be given the weight that it deserves.
6 In closing, I again thank you, Chairman Dixon, and
7 your associates for your dedicated efforts. Your decisions
8 over the next few weeks will affect our country's military
9 capabilities for decades. I urge you to consider all the
10 facts, particularly your firsthand knowledge, and predicate
11 your decisions on what is best for our country.
12 I'm confident that as you do so, you will elect to
13 retain Sierra Army Depot as a fully operational facility.
14 Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
16 Representative Herger.
17 And we're delighted to have the distinguished
18 Congressman from the State of California, Representative Sam
19 Farr here. Representative Farr.
20 REPRESENTATIVE FARR: Good morning, commissioners.
21 Thank you very much. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to
22 discuss the DOD's recommendation to realign TEXCOM

Page 112

1 Experimentation Center at Fort Hunter, Liggett, California,
2 to Fort Bliss, Texas.
3 First, I would like to take this opportunity to
4 mention the presence of two highly qualified experts in both
5 operational testing and the capabilities of Fort Hunter
6 Liggett who are with me this morning, Dr. Marion Bryson,
7 director of TEXCOM Experimentation Center, and Colonel Eldee
8 "Red" Walklee, retired Army garrison at Fort Hunter Liggett.
9 They're working closely with the Commission's staff
10 on the military aspects of the terrain and isolation of Fort
11 Hunter Liggett for conducting operational testing and the
12 significant flaws that are in the COBRA model analysis.
13 First, under operational testings, operational
14 testing is the final phase of DOD's testing for evaluating
15 materiel, doctrine, tactics, training, and organization. And
16 this phase must be accomplished in an operationally realistic
17 combat environment. This environment must include total free
18 play of the opposing forces involved in the test.
19 More importantly, this combat environment must
20 challenge the minds of the soldiers and the officers to
21 ensure the systems and technology are thoroughly evaluated.
22 Free play and varied terrain challenge the minds of our

Page 113

1 fighting forces. The more varied the terrain, the higher the
2 probability of the quality of testing.
3 There are few restrictions to the creation of an
4 appropriate environment in the hills and valleys of Fort
5 Hunter Liggett. For example, high energy lasers can be used
6 360 degrees. But they can be used in the arid desert
7 environment only, where sufficient hills can back stop their
8 energy.
9 As such, free play is lost at a place such as Fort
10 Bliss, which lacks the appropriate terrain to facilitate two-
11 way, unrestricted laser use.
12 Another example is the ability to use the broad
13 spectrum radio jamming at Fort Hunter Liggett. Broad
14 spectrum radio frequency jamming reduces the ability of the
15 leader to communicate with the forces and produces a
16 realistic battlefield condition of confusion, thus requiring
17 individual initiative, thereby contributing to the quality of
18 the test.
19 Broad frequency radio jamming can interfere with
20 television and AM/FM radio reception, emergency networks, and
21 foreign frequency usage. There are few restrictions at Fort
22 Hunter Liggett on jamming, many at Fort Bliss.

Page 114

1 Finally, the terrain is both friend and foe to
2 forces engaging in testing. Again, leadership and initiative
3 only come into play when forces are confronted with hills,
4 valleys, rivers, lakes, manzanita thickets, and oak forests.
5 In addition to the terrain, the vegetation, the possibility
6 of a wild line fire or wild variants of climatic conditions
7 at Fort Hunter Liggett relates to the vast regions of the
8 nondesert world.
9 The weapons, mobility, and technology provided to
10 our forces are key to the success on the battlefield. I
11 believe our soldiers deserve the very best that industry,
12 innovation, and research can provide. I also believe that
13 the place for ensuring this quality is on the proving grounds
14 and testing areas, not on the battlefield.
15 An example of this would be the testing of the
16 Apache Long Bow. Equipped as a state-of-the-art mast mounted
17 radar fire control system along with navigation and
18 communication systems, the Long Bow Apache was designed to be
19 affordable 21st century Army weapon to detect and engage
20 multiple targets on the battlefield.
21 This test was conducted at Fort Hunter Liggett. It
22 had been originally scheduled at Fort Bliss and was switched

Page 115

1 for many of the reasons I just stated above.
2 The analysis that COBRA prepared for you. DOD made
3 a recommendation based on the COBRA analysis that there would
4 be a substantial return on investment if you realign TEC.
5 Their analysis led to the following results: They said there
6 would be a one-time cost to realign TEC to Fort Bliss of 6.6
7 million. All costs would be recovered in one year, and the
8 Army says there will be accumulated savings of 67.6 million
9 at the end of the BRAC period, 2015.
10 Return on the investment. Let's look at this. The
11 Army's COBRA analysis was flawed in that it made assumptions
12 in salary and base operations costing data. Assuming the TEC
13 element to be bigger than it actually will be, the Army
14 anticipated moving 384 personnel in FY '98. Due to the
15 planned force structure, which is independent of the BRAC
16 process, the TEC will only be 206 personnel.
17 Omitting the costs of moving the TEC element to
18 Fort Bliss, including the conversion of office space,
19 laboratory facilities, and recalibration of the replacement
20 of TEC instrumentation to avoid frequency interference were
21 not calculated in the Army COBRA analysis.
22 I am submitting for the record copies of the Army's

Page 116

1 working papers -- they're attached to my testimony here --
2 from 30 May '95, technical assessment cost estimate meeting
3 at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, which illustrates that there is a
4 one-time cost of 40.9 million to move TEC element. This data
5 was compiled by TEC, Fort Bliss, and Fort Ritchie, Maryland,
6 working groups planning the proposed realignment of TEC from
7 Fort Hunter Liggett to Fort Bliss.
8 Again, this data adds 34.4 million to the Army
9 COBRA projections of the 6.5 million one-time cost, for a
10 total of 40.9 million or a 620 percent increase in the COBRA
11 projection. I'm providing this data in the form of a TEC
12 working document and a Fort Ritchie summary page from its
13 cost assessment meeting.
14 I strongly believe that we have shown that the
15 military value of Fort Hunter Liggett for operational testing
16 is vastly superior to that of Fort Bliss and that there will
17 be a one-time significant cost to the taxpayer, with no -- no
18 recurring savings.
19 As the Army downsizes, technological advancements
20 play an even greater part in the role of battlefield success.
21 Throughout history, victory has gone to the side that makes
22 the best use of available technology. Even if this proposed

Page 117

1 move made operational sense, there is no return on the
2 investment. The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated
3 from the BRAC criterion number 5.
4 Therefore, I urge the Commission to reject the DOD
5 recommendation to realign TEC from Fort Hunter Liggett to
6 Fort Bliss. Thank you very much.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
8 Farr.
9 We are delighted to have the distinguished
10 Congresswoman from the great State of California,
11 Representative Andrea Seastrand.
12 REPRESENTATIVE SEASTRAND: Mr. Chairman,
13 distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for the
14 opportunity to come before you today and address the
15 recommended realignment of the TEC's COM Experimentation
16 Center at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, to Fort Bliss,
17 Texas.
18 As you have just heard from Congressman Farr's
19 testimony, Fort Hunter Liggett is of great value to our
20 military. Technology has been and will continue to be
21 America's military advantage. This fact was proven in the
22 Gulf War. Although the coalition forces were smaller than

Page 118

1 those of Iraq's, our men and women were able to achieve a
2 decisive victory over the aggressor.
3 They won because of the superior training, weapons
4 systems, and technologies provided them through a demanding
5 developmental and operational test and experimentation
6 program. The Gulf War was the first real test of the Apache
7 helicopter, the Kiowa Scout helicopter, the improved tow
8 vehicle, the Hummer, and the Marine Corps' light armored
9 vehicle. All of these systems were operationally tested and
10 certified at Fort Hunter Liggett.
11 Another combat system that used Fort Hunter Liggett
12 as its proving ground was the Sergeant York anti-aircraft
13 gun. However, the $3 billion system did not appear in the
14 Gulf War. Although the Sergeant York tested favorably at
15 Fort Bliss in the early '80s, when this system was sent to
16 Fort Hunter Liggett for a confirmation operational test, it
17 failed.
18 The system failed because the acquisitional radar
19 became confused among the vegetation and variation or the
20 varied terrain of Fort Hunter Liggett. The system could not
21 successfully engage enemy aircraft in this type of
22 environment. And so, because of this failure, the program

Page 119

1 was eventually canceled, thus saving millions of dollars.
2 Fort Hunter Liggett again proved its worth.
3 Now, I would like to also move on to the COBRA
4 analysis. I want to stress the fact that even if the
5 recommended realignment of TEC at Fort Hunter Liggett made
6 military or operational sense, there is no return on
7 investment. In developing its return on investment analysis,
8 the Army began with data that was inaccurate.
9 It failed to accommodate force structure changes
10 for the TEC element, and next, the Army analysis failed to
11 provide for the mission essential costs, instrumentation,
12 reprogramming, and laboratory facilities. These all must be
13 borne at Fort Bliss to enable the TEC element to perform its
14 mission at that location.
15 It makes no sense to move the element if it saves
16 no money and cannot perform once moved. The community
17 analysis merely rectifies these errors.
18 In summary, the 20-year savings do not equal the
19 one-time costs of moving the TEC from Fort Hunter Liggett to
20 Fort Bliss. As a result, the recommendation for realignment
21 represents a substantial deviation from BRAC criterion 5.
22 As you deliberate the possible realignment of the

Page 120

1 test and experimentation command from Fort Hunter Liggett to
2 Fort Bliss, I trust you will reexamine this issue based on
3 the testimony you have heard today. I believe it is in the
4 best interest of our military, our community, and our nation
5 to keep the test and experimentation command in its current
6 configuration at Fort Hunter Liggett.
7 In closing, I want to repeat the DOD's own words
8 from the report it sent to the Commission, Volume III, page
9 78. And I quote: "As the enemy downsizes, technological
10 advances play an even greater role in battlefield success.
11 Throughout history, victory has gone to the side that makes
12 the best use of available technology."
13 I believe these new technological advances can best
14 be operationally tested at Fort Hunter Liggett. Thank you so
15 very much.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
17 Representative Seastrand. And you know how to appeal to the
18 Chair. I was the one that killed the Sergeant York.
19 Chairman Barry Goldwater chaired the Senate Armed Services
20 Committee in those days, and I was the freshman member on the
21 minority side.
22 Flew to El Paso, Texas, in February. Thought we

Page 121

1 would play golf while we were there, but it was snowing. And
2 came back and reported to the chairman that the thing was
3 supposed to be an idiot gun, but even I couldn't shoot it.
4 And we killed the Sergeant York, saved the taxpayers $4
5 billion. Thanks for coming here, Representative Seastrand.
6 We're delighted to have a distinguished Congressman
7 from the State of California, Representative Tony Beilenson.
8 Congressman Beilenson.
9 REPRESENTATIVE BEILENSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
10 and members of the Commission. I am Congressman Tony
11 Beilenson from California, the 24th district. I appreciate
12 very much your making time for me in your schedule today. I
13 had hoped to be able to speak to you when you held your
14 regional meeting in San Francisco a couple of weeks ago, but
15 scheduled votes in the House and a very important family
16 commitment made it impossible for me to come to San
17 Francisco.
18 I did submit a report for that hearing, Mr.
19 Chairman. I'm here today to emphasize, albeit very briefly,
20 my strong, continued support for Point Magu. I also want to
21 say that we who live out that way appreciate very much the
22 fact that two of the commissioners were kind enough to spend

Page 122

1 a full day of their time out there just a couple of weeks
2 ago. It was good seeing them, and we appreciate their having
3 come out there.
4 I hope very much that after you've studied all of
5 the information, Mr. Chairman, that you'll decide that adding
6 Point Magu to the closure list was ill-advised and should be
7 reversed.
8 We all assumed that the potential cost savings was
9 a major reason you decided to add Point Magu to your closure
10 list. I followed very carefully the debate over the
11 potential cost savings that might result from closing or
12 realigning Point Magu, and I believe that it's pretty clear
13 that these presumed savings will not be realized.
14 As Congressman McGallagly, I think, mentioned in
15 his testimony in San Francisco two weeks ago, I was present
16 at a meeting with the DOD Inspector General's Office, at
17 which time my staff and I, as well as representatives from
18 Mr. McGallagly's office and from our two Senator's offices,
19 heard the IG's office acknowledge that the data in their
20 frequently quoted report is out of date.
21 They also conceded that events have overtaken the
22 report, so that its findings probably no longer reflect an

Page 123

1 accurate picture of the situation today. I shan't belabor
2 that point here today. I know that you've heard from the
3 community and from the Navy in detail about this matter and
4 that you'll study their interpretation of the one-time
5 closure costs and the recurring annual costs of your plan.
6 The essence of our argument, Mr. Chairman, was
7 spelled out at your San Francisco hearing by Admiral McKinney
8 that Point Magu -- and I quote him -- "has an exceptionally
9 high military value and that the Navy does not agree with the
10 savings that the IG report predicted."
11 And I continue the quote, that "the redundant
12 facilities and idle workers envisioned in the DODIG report do
13 not exist, nor do the savings claimed in that report, that
14 the proposed scenario will not reduce the excess capacity in
15 DOD test and evaluation, and in my opinion" -- that was the
16 admiral speaking -- "will not result in an acceptable return
17 on investment.
18 "If executed, it will result in the fragmentation
19 of an efficiently integrated research development test and
20 evaluation center resulting in cost inefficiencies that will
21 jeopardize a national test and evaluation asset which
22 supports a significant fleet concentration." And that was

Page 124

1 the end of the quote from his testimony.
2 From all the evidence, Mr. Chairman and members of
3 the Commission, Point Magu is a necessary base in strategic
4 and military terms. In fact, it ranked so high in military
5 value that its closure would seem to make no good sense at
6 all.
7 Again, I appreciate very much having this
8 opportunity to speak with you. I hope very much that Point
9 Magu will be preserved in the manner and for the purposes for
10 which it currently operates. And, as you're well aware, it
11 has been changed a lot over the last few years. The
12 redundancies have been obliterated, and it has been brought
13 down to its proper size.
14 And that you'll find that you're in agreement with
15 the Navy and the Department of Defense, both of which
16 specifically decided against recommending Point Magu for
17 closure in the first place for what I believe -- and I hope
18 you come to believe, too -- were very sensible and good
19 reasons. And I thank you very much for letting me stop by
20 today to see you.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
22 Representative Tony Beilenson, for a very fine presentation.

Page 125

1 We thank you, and we're delighted to have your distinguished
2 colleague from the great State of California, Representative
3 Walter Tucker.
4 Representative Tucker.
5 REPRESENTATIVE TUCKER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman
6 and members of the Commission. My name is Walter Tucker, and
7 I represent the 37th Congressional district. And I want to
8 speak to you this morning about the Long Beach Naval
9 Shipyard.
10 I had the pleasure of speaking with several of your
11 colleagues upon their site visit out to the Naval shipyard a
12 few weeks ago. And today, I would like to tailor my comments
13 specifically to the area of economic impact.
14 The Department of Defense in its recommendation of
15 military base closures to the BRAC Commission stated that the
16 closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard could result in a
17 maximum reduction of 13,261 jobs in the five-county Southern
18 California primary measurement statistical area in that
19 economic area. This represents just three-tenths of 1
20 percent of the total area employment.
21 But by blending the number of job losses into the
22 PMSA economic area, the DOD has greatly -- it mitigated the

Page 126

1 actual economic impact that would occur in the Long Beach
2 area. I think that economic impact has to be put into its
3 proper perspective, Mr. Chairman.
4 In 1991, the closure of the Long Beach Naval
5 Shipyard, Long Beach Naval Station, I should say, and
6 hospital cost the city over 16,000 Navy personnel and
7 additional 1,000 civilian jobs. The total direct and
8 indirect economic losses from that decision exceeds $1
9 billion.
10 If the decision to close the Long Beach Naval
11 Shipyard is allowed to stand, we will lose an additional
12 6,600 civilian jobs, either associated directly with the
13 shipyard or with shipyard-based tenant commands. These jobs
14 generate another 3,500 secondary jobs within the immediate
15 area surrounding Long Beach, not in communities located in
16 other counties 60 miles from the shipyard.
17 The total economic impacts of the shipyard are
18 estimated to be over $750 million. Now, the DOD may feel
19 that 27,000 jobs and almost $2 billion in combined economic
20 impacts are not significant. Let me set the record straight.
21 With the economic impact problems that have burdened the Long
22 Beach area for the last five years, every job that is

Page 127

1 threatening us is significant.
2 I was astounded to learn that if all civilian job
3 losses from previous BRAC rounds were added together to those
4 proposed for 1995, Long Beach would not only lead all cities
5 in California but would also lead 46 states. Long Beach
6 would trail only Virginia, Pennsylvania, Texas, and its own
7 State of California.
8 The City of Long Beach does not mind being out
9 front in many areas of endeavor. I might add. Indeed, we
10 strive for it. But in this particular instance, we feel that
11 it's a dubious distinction, at best.
12 I must tell you that I am troubled with the Navy's
13 methodology for selecting the facilities to place on their
14 list of facilities recommended for closure, Mr. Chairman. As
15 you will hear, there have been unbelievable but no less real
16 apparently accidental oversights in the Navy's estimated
17 costs for closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
18 And let me add at this point, I believe that some
19 of my colleagues, such as Steve Horn, will be addressing this
20 issue of the undervaluation, shall I say, of the cost of
21 closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, which we believe at
22 this point is up to the tune of $900 million.

Page 128

1 In light of the Navy's apparent gross oversight, I
2 am troubled that they have used different economic data and
3 thresholds in their analysis of installations for closure.
4 The Secretary of Defense's guidance in the BRAC process
5 stipulates that economic impact is to be assessed at the
6 economic level of that economic area, metropolitan
7 statistical area or county.
8 The Navy evaluated the potential impact of closing
9 the Long Beach Naval Shipyard based on this criteria.
10 However, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, four
11 California installations were removed from the BRAC closure
12 list by the Navy due to cumulative total direct and indirect
13 job change, even though military value considerations
14 presented them as viable candidates for closure.
15 I don't need to recount for you all, all of
16 Southern California's disasters in the recent years. And we
17 certainly understand the need to downsize the military
18 infrastructure in our country to meet the realities of the
19 21st century. But why must the people of Long Beach carry
20 this burden?
21 We believe, as you have stated to us, that military
22 value should be paramount and should be the dispositive

Page 129

1 criteria in this particular instance. And so with that, I
2 hope that you will take another very serious look at the Long
3 Beach Naval Shipyard. And with that as the criteria, I
4 believe that you'll believe, as I do, that it should not be
5 closed. I thank you very much for your time on this day.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
7 Representative Walter Tucker, for your fine presentation.
8 We're delighted to welcome the distinguished
9 Congressman from the State of California, Representative Ken
10 Calvert.
11 Representative Calvert.
12 REPRESENTATIVE CALVERT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13 I want to thank you and the Commission for your hard work and
14 diligence in doing an extremely difficult job. Commissioners
15 Cox and Montova made a thorough and fair evaluation of NWAD
16 in Corona, California, and the community certainly thanks
17 you.
18 NWAD Corona is a one-of-a-kind organization. It
19 should be evaluated based upon its unique mission of
20 providing independent assessment of military systems and
21 fleet readiness. NWAD should not be evaluated as a warfare
22 center. Relocating its mission to a warfare center raises a

Page 130

1 possibility of a conflict of interest.
2 In addition to military value, with the proposed
3 closure of the warfare assessment lab at NWAD, the Department
4 of Defense would lose the ability to provide real time
5 assessment of fleet readiness for up to 6 to 10 years. When
6 the considerations of retaining an independent organization
7 and the warfare assessment lab are reviewed, the proposed
8 cost savings also become questionable.
9 For these reasons, I urge the Commission to retain
10 the Naval warfare assessment division, Corona, at its present
11 location.
12 Also, this BRAC is in a unique historical position
13 to clean up and make the most of the three previous rounds of
14 BRAC. One such possibility is what we call the March
15 opportunity. We propose moving Marine helicopters to March
16 Air Force Base instead of the proposed location at Miramar.
17 From an operational and safety perspective, the
18 single setting of fast-moving, fixed-wing, and rotary
19 aircraft is undesirable. The attempt to relocate more than
20 100 Tustin helicopters to Miramar, where approximately 150 F-
21 18s will be flying tens of thousands of annual airfield
22 operations in congested air space, is an invitation, in my

Page 131

1 mind, to disaster.
2 Never before in peacetime has an attempt been made
3 to permanently combine so many aircraft with such dissimilar
4 performance characteristics in such a confined air space.
5 Collocating helicopters with the relatively few larger and
6 slower and less frequently flown cargo and tanker aircraft at
7 March does not pose a similar problem.
8 Marine helicopters stationed at March would be much
9 closer to training areas in Cleveland National Forest and 29
10 Palms than if flying from Miramar. The Marines would,
11 therefore, be able to operate at existing mountainous area
12 landing sites and confined area landing sites located in the
13 March vicinity.
14 Additionally, March would reduce helicopter
15 transient time to training ranges located at the Marine air
16 ground combat center, 29 Palms, which would result in better
17 utilization of flying hours for operational training.
18 Redirecting helicopter assets to March tremendously improves
19 the worldwide rapid deployment posture of these assets by
20 collocating them at the first Marine Force aerial port of
21 embarkation.
22 For example, having March helicopters based at

Page 132

1 March would save 12 to 18 hours deployment time over the
2 first scenario. Also, as a consequence of March becoming a
3 Marine facility, elements of the first Marine Corps
4 expeditionary force can preposition supplies, ammunition, and
5 people to further facilitate rapid deployment.
6 The 1st MEF is tasked with rapid mobility missions
7 throughout the Pacific Theater of operations. The Marine
8 March opportunity is safer, cheaper, and more efficient. I
9 ask you to take a very close look at it.
10 I would also like to thank Congressman George
11 Brown, who could not be with us today, for his help in this.
12 And I would like to submit his statement for the record.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: His statement will be admitted in
14 the record, Congressman.
15 REPRESENTATIVE CALVERT: Thank you very much, Mr.
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're indebted to you, Congressman
18 Calvert, for your fine presentation. I'm greatly pleased to
19 see your distinguished colleague from the State of
20 California, Representative Dana Rohrabacher, here.
21 Congressman Rohrabacher.
22 REPRESENTATIVE ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much,

Page 133

1 Mr. Chairman and commissioners. I'm here today to join with
2 several of my other Southern California colleagues on behalf
3 of retaining the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Unlike some of
4 my other colleagues, however, I would not oppose shutting
5 down the shipyard if it were the best course of action for
6 our nation's Naval effectiveness and for fiscal health.
7 I believe that the jobs that might be lost and actually
8 could be lost there at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard could be
9 made up through other waterfront uses, provided there the
10 entire base, including dry dock number 1, was made available
11 for reuse.
12 So, in fact, if it wasn't for what the Navy needs
13 and what's best for the Navy, I would think the shipyard
14 should actually be shut down, and other uses could be brought
15 to play that would be better used for the benefit of the
16 local community. However, I am here to argue that, in fact,
17 for the benefit of the Navy and for the best use of limited
18 tax dollars, it's better to keep the Long Beach Shipyard
19 open. And I will discuss that.
20 After examination of the pertinent facts, I believe
21 that realignment rather than closure of the shipyard makes
22 the most sense for the Navy and for the taxpayers.

Page 134

1 Realignment by converting the shipyard to a ship repair
2 facility would allow substantial budget savings without huge
3 expenses that are involved in recreating Long Beach's unique
4 capabilities in other locations.
5 With realignment, the Navy would save by
6 consolidating redundant overhead functions at Puget Sound.
7 It could increase those savings by similarly reducing the
8 Pearl Harbor Shipyard on its own. Production capacity would
9 also be reduced in both locations as necessary.
10 On the other hand, simply closing the shipyard, the
11 Long Beach Naval Shipyard, shows a savings only when the
12 costs of duplicating its necessary capabilities elsewhere are
13 disregarded. Dry dock number 1 is often described as
14 necessary for "emergent or unexpected repair work." But as
15 four of you learned on your visit to Long Beach, the dry dock
16 number 1 is on the regular ship repair schedule.
17 In other words, the Navy can't even handle at this
18 time the routine work without the dry dock, and much less try
19 to handle the work that's unexpected. The Navy has to have
20 this capability. And if they can't have it at Long Beach
21 with dry dock number 1, they will have to bear the huge
22 expense of recreating it someplace else.

Page 135

1 Closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, on the other
2 hand, makes sense. Its submarine repair work can be easily
3 absorbed by Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Newport News
4 Shipbuilding and Electric Boat. In fact, moving repairs from
5 Portsmouth to Electric Boat would produce additional savings
6 by reducing the amount of unnecessary submarine construction
7 work that we are giving to Electric Boat just to keep them
8 alive.
9 In fact, it appeared that the Navy had agreed that
10 Portsmouth was the right shipyard to close, until President
11 Clinton mentioned his preference in a speech in New
12 Hampshire.
13 In closing and in conclusion, in conclusion and
14 closing to Portsmouth Yard and realigning the Long Beach Yard
15 makes the most sense for the nation and for the taxpayers.
16 And let me just reiterate by saying this. There is no sense
17 at all for us to be building submarines with the excuse that
18 we have got to keep our capacity to build submarines alive
19 and then end up building unneeded submarines at a time when
20 we are actually retiring submarines that have a long life
21 still on them.
22 If the only excuse is basically keeping our

Page 136

1 capacity alive, that capacity can be kept alive by giving
2 submarine repair work to the facility that is constructing
3 submarines. Thus, in the future, if they have to construct
4 submarines, that infrastructure will be available.
5 But to spend billions and billions of dollars on a
6 weapons system that not only is unnecessary but is already
7 retiring submarines is a total waste of the taxpayers' money.
8 I say when you look at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, in
9 terms of the big picture, in terms of what it will cost to
10 reproduce the necessary situation with dry dock number 1,
11 that it makes much more sense for the American taxpayer and
12 the Navy to keep that open and to focus on realignment.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I want to thank you very much,
14 Congressman Rohrabacher, for that excellent presentation.
15 And may I say on behalf of the Commission that we thank you
16 and all the distinguished members of the California
17 delegation. You are the largest state with the largest
18 delegation, and your entire delegation have made a very fine
19 presentation. We thank you for it.
20 REPRESENTATIVE ROHRABACHER: Mr. Chairman, members,
21 thank you very much.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

Page 137

1 Rohrabacher. And we are going to stand in recess until about
2 11:45 or so to permit the Colorado delegation to get here.
3 We are in recess.
4 (A brief recess was taken.)
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I inquire about my
6 distinguished friend, the Senator from Colorado, Senator Hank
7 Brown? You are here, as is your usual habit, a little ahead
8 of time. I would like to accommodate you, if you're prepared
9 to go, but we'll not rush you.
10 SENATOR BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we're delighted to have with
12 us the distinguished Senator from Colorado, Senator Hank
13 Brown, on behalf of the great State of Colorado.
14 SENATOR BROWN: Mr. Chairman, it's a privilege to
15 see you again and appear before the Commission. I want to
16 wish you well in your endeavors. It's a job I wouldn't have.
17 And frankly, Mr. Chairman, it was a job I thought you were
18 too smart to take.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your observation is well taken,
20 and I have no defense.
21 SENATOR BROWN: I would like to submit at this time
22 the testimony of Senator Campbell and Senator Heflin for the

Page 138

1 record, if we may.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That will be admitted in the
3 record in full, Senator. Thank you.
4 SENATOR BROWN: Mr. Chairman, you have a tough job.
5 The Commission has a very tough job. I simply want to extend
6 one concern that I hope you will be willing to look at.
7 The Colorado delegation has been different than
8 some. We have welcomed the Base Closing Commission. We have
9 welcomed the review. We understand the need to control
10 defense expenditures. We have had a number of bases in our
11 state shut down. And we have supported, by and large, with
12 very few exceptions, the Base Closing Commission's
13 recommendations, as we have supported the Commission.
14 We do find ourselves, though, somewhat shocked at
15 what has happened with regard to Fitzsimons. And let me be
16 specific.
17 While most states have reacted to this process by
18 saying, "Don't close anything in our state," Colorado has
19 said, "Look, let's have an objective look at it. If it can
20 be done more cost-effectively somewhere else, we'll support
21 that. But if it is most cost-effective here, we want to know
22 the facts. And if it is, it should stay open." In other

Page 139

1 words, help the taxpayer.
2 In that regard, this delegation itself was backing
3 a series of cost analyses looking at Fitzsimons. In 1987, an
4 analysis was done by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
5 Health Affairs. Fitzsimons passed. In 1991 in March, an
6 economic analysis of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center was done.
7 Fitzsimons passed.
8 In November of '91, that analysis was updated.
9 Fitzsimons passed. In the BRAC Commission of 1993,
10 Fitzsimons was examined. Fitzsimons passed. Mr. Chairman,
11 what we're looking at are four studies that have looked at
12 Fitzsimons that we have backed, and all have come back from
13 an objective analysis and said it makes sense to have it
14 open, and it saves money.
15 My question is simply this -- because it comes out
16 of a very unhappy discussion with the Secretary of the Army
17 and the Administration over this. We met with them and asked
18 what was wrong with the previous studies. If there was a
19 factor that said this was worth keeping open, what did the
20 studies miss? Because what has happened is, the Army simply
21 said, "Close Fitzsimons."
22 They haven't said, "Here's what's wrong with the

Page 140

1 other studies." Now, we think it's reasonable -- and we hope
2 this Commission will do this -- look at the other studies.
3 If there's something wrong with them, let us know what's
4 wrong with them.
5 This is a tough decision. You have to make tough
6 decisions. But we think the areas affected ought to at least
7 know the facts. In making the recommendation, the
8 Administration has not chosen to deal with the facts or deal
9 with the studies. They have simply offered a conclusion.
10 Mr. Chairman, I hope the Commission will do a
11 couple things. One, they will read the studies about
12 Fitzsimons and know the facts before they make a decision.
13 And if their decision is they have to reduce hospital beds or
14 health care for the military, that they'll be willing to take
15 an objective look at all the resources.
16 There's one last factor I know other members of the
17 delegation will cover, but I hope you'll pay special
18 attention to -- veterans from a wide range, one of the
19 biggest, I think, in our nation, need health care and need it
20 at Fitzsimons. It is the closest facility to a large number
21 of veterans. And I hope that will be considered when the
22 Commission makes its decision. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Page 141

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Senator Brown, we thank you
2 for your usual fine presentation on behalf of your great
3 State of Colorado.
4 And we're delighted to have here with you your
5 colleague, the outstanding representative from the State of
6 Colorado, who I had the great privilege of conferencing with
7 through several sessions of the Congress when I chaired
8 Readiness in the Armed Services Committee on the Senate side.
9 And she was always a great advocate of her positions and a
10 fine person to deal with.
11 And the Chair on behalf of the Commission is
12 delighted to welcome the distinguished Representative from
13 the State of Colorado, Pat Schroeder.
14 REPRESENTATIVE SCHROEDER: Well, thank you very
15 much, Mr. Chairman and commissioners. I don't envy your job
16 at all, as the distinguished Senator said. But let me just
17 try and summarize why this is so troubling to those of us in
18 Colorado.
19 We thought base closure was about excess capacity.
20 And I don't know how the Army defines "excess capacity," but
21 we don't define it the way they're defining it vis a vis
22 Fitzsimons. Fitzsimons serves almost one-third of this

Page 142

1 country. One-third of this country. It is the only military
2 tertiary hospital in one-third of this country.
3 And suddenly, they decided it was excess capacity,
4 but Walter Reed in Washington, D.C., wasn't, where there's
5 all sorts of duplication of federal facilities. I would just
6 like the Commission to go down and count the number of
7 retirees that go to Walter Reed every day and match them
8 against those who rely on Fitzsimons.
9 Because here, you've got all sorts of other places
10 that you could go. Here, that's it. That is what the
11 federal government has in that region. And what we're really
12 saying is, they don't want to bother that region.
13 Our mayor wrote a wonderful letter to you, the
14 Mayor from Aurora, in which they went through all the
15 details. And I really hope the commissioners look at this
16 letter. Because what we think this whole thing is based on
17 -- it's like if you pull the top plank off, the top of the
18 plank might look great. But underneath that plank, there's a
19 gazillion termites that totally undermine, I think, the
20 Army's decision.
21 The mayor points out, they use this basis on square
22 footage. I mean, no private sector ever looks at a medical

Page 143

1 facility and bases it on square footage. They never did that
2 before in any of the other reports that Senator Brown looked
3 at.
4 And not only did they look at it in square footage,
5 but they also left out a whole lot of square footage that
6 they had been using for four decades for instruction. And
7 they said they left those out because they were temporary.
8 Well, four decades doesn't sound too temporary to me. I
9 mean, that really looks like you're doing everything you
10 possibly can to skew the data.
11 Then, they used the deployment formula, which had
12 never been used before, vis a vis hospitals. They're using
13 the deployment formula that they use for regular bases on how
14 many train lines come in.
15 Well, when did we start moving people who are ill
16 by train? We move them by plane. If you look at plane, we
17 have got the best, most advanced airport and air facilities
18 in the country. Not only that, it is inland, where it is
19 more protected, rather than on the coast.
20 And they also look at whether or not we have a
21 port. Well, there's also a reason to have it internally,
22 where it is more protected. So all of those things make us

Page 144

1 think that they just were looking for a real reason.
2 We have got many faxes -- they have kind of been
3 sub-rosa faxes -- from installation personnel who were
4 engaged in these preliminary measurements. And they beg the
5 Commission to please peel off this top plank and look at the
6 discrepancies between what they sent in and what the Army
7 sent you and ask, "Why?" Ask, "Why?"
8 We also want to know why, when they looked at the
9 cost of duty personnel, why they only used a 40-mile radius
10 around Fitzsimons, rather than the entire region. Because it
11 serves the whole region. That also didn't make sense.
12 The stand-alone facilities. They decided they
13 would only compare those, which left them with Tripler in
14 Hawaii -- and we understand why it's very important in that
15 Pacific region -- Walter Reed in Washington, D.C., and
16 Fitzsimons in the middle. Well, if you do the stand-alone,
17 shouldn't you look at what stands around it? And Walter Reed
18 has a whole lot of things standing around it, whereas we
19 really do stand alone. We're much more like Tripler in that
20 mindset.
21 Or why don't we look at things that are on bases
22 that are duplicating facilities? I don't think I need to

Page 145

1 tell this distinguished group that there's all sorts of
2 duplications all over Texas.
3 I think bottom line, Colorado feels and our
4 retirees in this region feel, they're just being told, "Move.
5 If you don't like it, move. We're done with you. We have
6 thrown you out." That may be the Army's position, but I
7 never thought that that was the United States government's
8 position. And I must say, I am very dismayed by this
9 decision.
10 I have been supportive of base closure when it's
11 excess capacity. But to say to people, "We're done with you
12 now; have a nice day" -- none of these people subscribe to
13 Medicare Part B. Nobody has got an answer for them as to
14 where to go, and they're saying, "Move." If your family
15 lives there, if your plans were there, I think that's wrong.
16 And I would really hope that the Base Closure
17 Commission could peel off that top plank, study those
18 termites that they have put so well in that letter to you,
19 and we can document this every way from the moon. And thank
20 you very much for letting me be here.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Representative Schroeder,
22 thank you for that fine presentation. You and Senator Brown,

Page 146

1 your distinguished senior Senator, are to be congratulated on
2 the fine job you've done for the State of Colorado, and we're
3 indebted to you, ma'am. Thank you.
4 REPRESENTATIVE SCHROEDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, the
6 Commission is going to stand in adjournment for about 15
7 minutes. The next state to be heard will be the great State
8 of Connecticut. And we will be in recess now for about at
9 least 10 minutes or so, maybe as much as 15 minutes.
10 (A recess was taken.)
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, the
12 Commission will come back to order. I'm delighted to have an
13 old and dear friend, the distinguished senior Senator from
14 the great State of Connecticut, in this room. He and I came
15 to the Senate together in a very small class in 1980 in the
16 great Reagan landslide, and he has proved that he is, if
17 anything, certainly a survivor. And he's also a very fine
18 Senator.
19 And we're delighted to have him here on behalf of
20 the great State of Connecticut, that state's great senior
21 Senator, Chris Dodd.
22 SENATOR DODD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Page 147

1 Mr. Cornello, we thank you very much for the opportunity to
2 appear before you again today. And, Mr. Cornello, I want to
3 personally thank you again for taking the time to visit our
4 State of Connecticut and to visit the two facilities that are
5 under discussion here today.
6 So, Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying on behalf
7 of myself, our entire delegation, and our state, we deeply,
8 deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before this
9 Commission and also to thank you and the Commission publicly
10 for the tremendous amount of hard work that you and your
11 staffs have done. I don't think people realize how much work
12 goes into these efforts to comply with the Base Closure
13 Commission law.
14 And so I didn't want to miss the opportunity within
15 these five-minute times to express that gratitude to you and
16 to the members of the Commission and the staff, who I know do
17 a tremendous amount of work.
18 Mr. Chairman, this is my third Congressional
19 appearance before the Base Closure Commission, yet I've never
20 found myself to say, very candidly, so strongly opposed to
21 the recommendations by the Department of Defense. The basis,
22 Mr. Chairman, of my reaction, is very simple. The closure

Page 148

1 recommendations in Connecticut simply do not meet or adhere
2 to the selection criteria as prescribed by law, period.
3 Without question, one of the most important aspects
4 of this entire base closure process is the anticipated or
5 projected return on investment. It is the fiscal soul, if
6 you will, of this entire five-year exercise that we have been
7 going through. But what do you do when the figures are
8 incorrect, and what do you do when the initial assumptions
9 are flat-out wrong?
10 That is the precise situation, Mr. Chairman, we
11 face with respect to the Naval Underwater Warfare Center in
12 New London, Connecticut. The projected return on investment
13 claims to save money by consolidation to Newport, Rhode
14 Island.
15 What is compelling, however, is the unfortunate
16 lack of flexibility in the recommendation to look at the
17 bigger picture and say, "There is a very unique synergy here.
18 The Navy can retain this facility at less cost" -- and the
19 numbers bear that out -- "while keeping our technical center
20 of excellence alive and retaining some of the greatest
21 acoustic engineers and engineering in our entire nation. To
22 me, that is a return on investment on all points.

Page 149

1 The same argument, Mr. Chairman, is true for the
2 Stratford Army Engine Plant. When considered for closure,
3 Stratford was placed in the awkward position of being
4 compared with other unrelated industrial facilities within
5 the Army structure. You talk about apples and oranges.
6 What is even worse, however, is the terrible
7 dilemma of having to tear apart a unique industrial facility
8 that supports both Army tank and aircraft engine repair.
9 Because of the shared operations between the two production
10 lines, the Army has placed itself in the dreadful, awkward
11 position of having to make a Solomon's choice.
12 You really cannot save or move one line without
13 completely killing the other. In light of the recent $47
14 million public investment, taxpayer investment in the
15 Stratford Physical Plant, again, I ask, where is the return
16 on the taxpayer investment in that decision?
17 And finally, Mr. Chairman, in what has been one of
18 the most curious, curious recommendations from the Department
19 of Defense of this entire base closure round, the Navy has
20 now decided to redirect its nuclear power school from one
21 previously closed installation to another previously closed
22 installation.

Page 150

1 What makes that decision even more puzzling is the
2 complete reversal of an ongoing construction plan at the
3 original receiving site, the Groton submarine base. More
4 than $11 million of taxpayer money has already been expended
5 at Groton, and existing classroom space is available. That
6 is the truth, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.
7 That is why the 1993 BRAC correctly recommended placing the
8 school in Groton initially.
9 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, the decisions
10 before you are critical to the structural health of our
11 nation's military. Connecticut, as you both know, has
12 historically played a very critical role in that effort, and
13 we will continue to do so in the years ahead.
14 And as you prepare for final deliberations, I know
15 that you will take every possible opportunity to review the
16 complete return, the complete return on investment on all
17 three of these vital Connecticut and United States
18 installations. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity
19 to appear before you.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, my dear friend, I thank you,
21 Senator Dodd, for that fine presentation on behalf of the
22 great State of Connecticut. And I appreciate your giving us

Page 151

1 your time. And we're delighted to have here your
2 distinguished colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman.
3 SENATOR DODD: My much older colleague, but my
4 junior.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That's true. I apologize for that
6 joke the last time. I've been hearing ever since that you
7 don't look a day older than Joe Lieberman, and I just wanted
8 to make the record clear on that.
9 SENATOR DODD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Lieberman, we're delighted
11 to have you, sir.
12 SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Mr. Chairman, Senator Dixon,
13 great to see you again. Commissioner Cornella, thank you
14 very much for your extraordinary devotion of time, both of
15 you, to this effort.
16 I appreciate the opportunity to testify and to
17 follow my friend and colleague, the young, vibrant
18 Christopher Dodd.
19 It is my firm belief that the three recommendations
20 before you which Senator Dodd has discussed are not in the
21 national interest and, in fact, threaten the operational
22 readiness of our forces. And I say that as a member of the

Page 152

1 Committee and the Senate Armed Services which you, Mr.
2 Chairman, were such a stalwart and productive member of for
3 so many years.
4 Each of these three recommendations, in our
5 opinion, will cost the American taxpayer more than has been
6 predicted by the Pentagon in dollars and, more critically, in
7 knowledge, skills, and expertise lost. These are intangible
8 but essential qualities that will not just move to another
9 location. They will be gone forever.
10 I'm not going to try to repeat all the details
11 you've been given at the New York regional hearing or from my
12 colleague a few moments ago, but I want to address
13 particularly those issues relating to the military value of
14 these three facilities.
15 First, the nuclear power school. As you know, the
16 1993 BRAC Commission upheld the Secretary of Defense's
17 recommendation to close the Naval training center in Orlando
18 and to relocate the nuclear power schools to the Naval
19 submarine base in New London.
20 Now, less than two years later, after having spent
21 over $11 million for planning and design of the training
22 facility in New London, the Navy has recommended changing the

Page 153

1 receiving site to Charleston, though Charleston was
2 considered and rejected during the 1993 process.
3 You may recall those famous photographs -- we hope
4 they were memorable -- from our hearing before you in New
5 York, that the site of the proposed power school in
6 Charleston currently consists of not available buildings to
7 move into but 400 acres of woods and possible wetlands. No
8 design work has been done to determine the real costs of
9 constructing facilities and infrastructure there.
10 This recommendation, in short, does not take
11 advantage of existing capacity in New London, which will
12 require minimal new construction and offers full
13 infrastructure to meet the needs of the students who will be
14 coming there. So we ask you to reject the requested redirect
15 of the nuclear power school to Charleston and leave in effect
16 the 1993 decision.
17 Second, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center. The
18 Navy has recommended closing Newark and New London and
19 relocating its facilities to Newport. This recommendation
20 destroys the synergy, the productive interaction which exists
21 at New London, where scientists, where the people who work on
22 the submarine fleet at the great base there and the submarine

Page 154

1 builder, Electric Boat, are all located within a five-mile
2 radius.
3 The fact is that the customer is in New London, not
4 in Newport. And that's where the Underwater Warfare Center
5 ought to be. The Navy's cost estimates to implement the 1995
6 recommendation, in our opinion, are understated, much as they
7 were in 1991 when, in fact, the record shows the costs of
8 moving to Newport have nearly doubled.
9 But as important as the dollars are, even more
10 importantly, our nation stands to lose many of the finest
11 acoustic scientists and engineers in the business, who simply
12 have told us that they will not pick up their families, sell
13 their homes, and move to another site. So we urge you to
14 reject the Navy's recommendation and allow the Underwater
15 Warfare Center in New London to continue to be the acoustic
16 research and development center of excellence for the Navy.
17 And finally, I want to address the Stratford Army
18 Engine Plant. In the recommendation to close Stratford, the
19 Army does not question the military value of the
20 installation. They simply suggest that the tank and
21 helicopter engine work which the Army admits it needs and is
22 being done well in Stratford could be moved to depots at

Page 155

1 Anniston or Corpus Christi.
2 Respectfully, I say to you that the Army is wrong
3 in this case. Splitting the manufacturing capability will
4 simply not work. Stratford is an integrated, dual use
5 facility operated for the government by Allied Signal. The
6 equipment and the plants produce military and commercial
7 products for both aviation and ground use.
8 The Army will not be able to replicate these
9 capabilities without paying a very significant price, which
10 is not included in their estimated savings of closing the
11 plant.
12 February 14, 1995, just four months ago, the
13 Assistant Secretary of the Army, Gil Decker, announced a plan
14 to maintain a strong engine industrial plant base by
15 investing $47 and-a-half million in a three-year program at
16 Stratford, which a short while later, another section of the
17 Army came along and said, we think mistakenly, ought to be
18 closed.
19 When this Decker proposal is implemented, Stratford
20 Army Engine Plant will be realigned as a smaller, more cost-
21 competitive facility which preserves key components of the
22 tank engine industrial base.

Page 156

1 Mr. Chairman, commissioner, the Army's
2 recommendation to close Stratford is short-sighted, when you
3 consider the military value of the Stratford facility and the
4 understated cost of closing the plant. A realigned Stratford
5 Army Engine Plant is the most cost-effective decision.
6 Mr. Chairman, harkening back to an earlier stage of
7 your own distinguished career in public service, I note the
8 clock. And, therefore, I would ask that the full text of the
9 remainder of my statement be submitted and printed in the
10 record.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your statement will be reproduced
12 in the record in full, Senator. And we thank you and your
13 distinguished colleague for that outstanding presentation on
14 behalf of the State of Connecticut by Senators Dodd and
15 Lieberman.
16 SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Thank you, commissioner.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much.
18 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to be in recess
19 until 12:30, when we will hear from the great State of
20 Florida.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA [Presiding]: Representative
22 Scarborough, would you please come to the podium? And we

Page 157

1 would like to move ahead, if you don't mind.
2 REPRESENTATIVE SCARBOROUGH: I don't mind at all.
3 Thank you very much, Mr. Commissioner. Mr. Chairman, members
4 of the Commission, I thank you for the opportunity to come
5 before you to testify in opposition to the DOD's proposed
6 consolidation of electronic combat test evaluation
7 facilities.
8 In my opinion, this proposal is not only flawed,
9 but it also seriously undermines the intent of the laws
10 passed by Congress in the 1995 authorization.
11 I'll explain that view in a moment, but first, let
12 me assure you that I certainly understand the awesome
13 responsibility that has been entrusted to this Commission.
14 Fiscal realities demand that tough decisions be made to
15 reduce the cost burden of our nation's military
16 infrastructure.
17 But at the same time, however, the world situation
18 makes it clear that we must sustain a strong national defense
19 posture. I'm here today because I'm convinced that the DOD
20 recommendations for realignment of Air Force infrastructure
21 for electronic combat test and evaluation will not produce
22 savings but will actually, in fact, result in a serious risk

Page 158

1 to this nation's war fighting capabilities.
2 Only one of three EC units on the BRAC list,
3 specifically, the EC open air range at Eglin Air Force Base,
4 is located in my district. My remarks, however, will also be
5 applicable to the nation's other two facilities, the Air
6 Force Electronic Warfare Environmental Simulator facility in
7 Fort Worth, Texas, and also the real time digitally
8 controlled analyzed processor, our Red Cap facility, in
9 Buffalo, New York.
10 After studying the recommendations supporting
11 BRAC's analysis provided by the DOD, my position is in
12 opposition to these recommendations and is based upon the
13 answer to three critical questions. The first question is,
14 are the DOD recommendations on EC test and evaluation
15 facilities consistent with the 1995 DOD authorization
16 requirement that an EC consolidation master plan be submitted
17 to Congress prior to any reorganization of the facilities?
18 Now, Congress originally had asked for the plan,
19 because none of the services had wished to consolidate their
20 EC test facilities. And its formulation was deemed to be
21 necessary to overcome the interservice dispute on the matter.
22 The absence of this plan is troubling to me, especially as a

Page 159

1 member of national security. And taking action in this area
2 without the guidance of this plan that was requested in the
3 1995 authorization bill is unwise.
4 The second question we need to ask is, do the
5 proposals protect the needs of our war fighters? In other
6 words, would consolidation have a measurable impact on the
7 quality of EC facilities which would, in turn, impact the
8 ability of our forces in the field to meet a variety of
9 combat and noncombat situations in which electronic warfare
10 would be encountered.
11 Thirdly, do the proposals reduce the cost to the
12 taxpayer? Quite frankly, we have to ask ourselves whether
13 we're getting the best bang for the buck. Are the savings
14 that are proposed in consolidation the types that would bring
15 forth sufficient and significant savings, or would they
16 actually cost more both in the long and the short term?
17 As I've previously noted in my remarks, the
18 direction to develop an EC master plan was the result of
19 DOD's demonstrated inability to pursue joint cross-service
20 realignments in the EC infrastructure. The intent was to
21 motivate cross-service reductions in T&E infrastructure and
22 provide a context within which to judge DOD recommendations

Page 160

1 impacting electronic combat facilities.
2 DOD BRAC documentation clearly shows that a
3 rigorous analysis plan to pursue such cross-service
4 opportunities was approved by all the service departments.
5 This plan was to identify those facilities most appropriate
6 for cross-service consolidation, with the intention being
7 that such analysis would be used as the basis for the final
8 BRAC recommendations.
9 Inexplicably, however, the Office of the Secretary
10 of Defense decided not to use the data revealed by the cross-
11 service consolidation study. Instead, OSD opted to pursue
12 another approach without any statistical analysis to back it
13 up.
14 Clearly, in my view, this approach is noncompliant
15 with the intent of the EC master plan that was called for
16 under the 1995 Defense Authorization Act, and, therefore, it
17 would be inappropriate to act on it.
18 As to the question of meeting the needs of our war
19 fighters, I wish to point out that DOD ranked Eglin's EC air
20 range as number one in this country for military value. But
21 against that assessment, the OSD recommendations to
22 consolidate EC test facilities at the Nellis range failed to

Page 161

1 define a crucial concept. Specifically, it failed to show
2 how its proposal for combining Air Force open air ranges
3 could accommodate the needs of real world EC operations.
4 Accessibility of the Nellis range complex, distance
5 of the range from Edwards Air Force Base, and other known
6 obstacles appear to have been simply wished away. Based on
7 these facts, it seems that we're unnecessarily putting our
8 proven support capabilities at risk for no obvious return.
9 I ask the Commission, what is the purpose in fixing
10 something that is clearly not broken and that has worked for
11 so long at Eglin Air Force Base, and again, at a range that
12 was ranked number one in this country for EC capabilities?
13 This brings me to the reported cost-benefits
14 associated with the consolidation of various Air Force
15 ranges. There is no evidence out that at all to suggest that
16 there would be any significant savings to the taxpayer from
17 the proposed consolidation. In fact, in the long run, it's
18 more likely that there would be an increased cost burden.
19 This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the
20 costs of dismantling Eglin were not only underestimated, but
21 the increase in those costs of using Nellis for testing
22 purposes were ignored, as well. The result is an estimated

Page 162

1 cost savings based on highly dubious assumptions.
2 Given these considerations, one is left with a very
3 strong impression that the sole objective of dismantling
4 Eglin's EC test range is to solve an Air Force materiel
5 command operations and maintenance funding issue. This is
6 rather surprising, in that it will come even at the expense
7 of procurement programs and other Air Force commands, such as
8 air combat command and Air Force special operations command.
9 My conclusion is that none of the three EC T&E
10 recommendations represent true reductions in infrastructure
11 cost burdens. All will disrupt our ability to meet the needs
12 of our forces in the field and will ultimately serve to
13 undermine Congressional directions as far as the 1995
14 Authorization Act goes.
15 Respectfully, I would strongly urge the Commission
16 to reject the proposed EC realignments. This would allow
17 Congress to have more time to carefully review DOD's EC
18 master plan before any changes are made which could seriously
19 impact this nation's war fighting capability. Let's keep the
20 best EC range in America open and also save the taxpayers
21 money at the same time. And I thank you all for your time.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We thank the distinguished

Page 163

1 representative from Florida, Mr. Joe Scarborough.
2 Ladies and gentlemen, I apologize for the starting
3 and stopping of the hearing, but remember that we're trying
4 to accommodate over 200 members of Congress over these 2
5 days. And that does cause a small bit of confusion. But
6 things are really moving along very well, and we beg your
7 indulgence.
8 So we will resume that break for about another four
9 or five minutes. Thank you.
10 (A brief recess was taken.)
11 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX [Presiding]: We will come
12 back to order from our brief recess. And we're very pleased
13 to recognize the distinguished Congresswoman from Florida,
14 Congresswoman Carrie Meek.
15 REPRESENTATIVE MEEK: Thank you, Commissioner Cox,
16 Mr. Chairman, and commissioners. I'm Carrie Meek, a member
17 of the United States Congress, 17th Congressional district.
18 I'm here to talk about Homestead Air Reserve Base, which is
19 in my district.
20 We welcome the recent visit to Homestead by General
21 Davis. Today, I'm asking you again to keep Homestead, our
22 reserve base, open. It's a model base realignment. As you

Page 164

1 know, BRAC '93 ordered the realignment of Homestead into a
2 reserve base and a joint military civilian airport, an
3 extremely cost-effective arrangement for the Air Force.
4 Since that decision two years ago, the realignment
5 process has been moving forward smoothly and efficiently. By
6 all accounts, the realignment of Homestead has included
7 first-rate planning, optimal use of resources, and tremendous
8 support and involvement from citizens' groups, our Dade
9 County government, and the City of Homestead.
10 In fact, Defense Secretary Perry declared Homestead
11 a model base realignment for the entire nation. This is a
12 significant point. Other bases around the country come to
13 Homestead and learn how to manage their realignment process
14 as well as ours. Every base in the country has wanted to
15 duplicate Homestead's success, its professionalism, and the
16 results of our realignment process.
17 We have done all that BRAC has asked us to do. We
18 ask now that you let us continue to do what we have already
19 proven that we could do so well. It has been cost-effective.
20 Proponents of some bases, notably those from Bergstrom Air
21 Reserve Base, have presented material to this Commission
22 which purports to show that the Defense Department will save

Page 165

1 millions by closing Homestead. I say to you, Commission,
2 that is not correct.
3 The Bergstrom presentation widely overstates the
4 so-called "savings" to the government from closing Homestead.
5 In addition, it grossly understated the dual use economies of
6 DOD of operating out of Homestead's joint use airport. To
7 support our position, we presented detailed financial
8 estimates on these points to you last Friday in Atlanta.
9 The MILCON for the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st
10 Rescue Squadron are already fully funded out of a special
11 supplemental appropriations bill that Congress approved in
12 1992 for hurricane relief at Homestead. In addition, Dade
13 County will be subsidizing the operation of Homestead
14 beginning on October 1st of this year, the first installment
15 of 1.4 million.
16 In addition to that, Dade County will also expand
17 24 million in capital construction for air field improvements
18 that will benefit the Air Force. The bottom line,
19 Commission, looking at it directly as a financial
20 transaction, keeping open Homestead Air Reserve Base is a
21 bargain for the Defense Department.
22 Community support is there. Our entire community

Page 166

1 is overwhelmingly supportive of Homestead Air Reserve Base,
2 in terms of money, time, and effort. Dade County has
3 formally agreed to pay the $1.4 million. Support for our Air
4 Force Reserves is so high that the F-16 Falcons of the 482nd
5 Fighter Wing could probably fly low over downtown Homestead
6 and not even get a noise complaint.
7 Hurricane Andrew destroyed a large part of our
8 community. The realignment of Homestead Air Reserve Base is
9 an essential part of our rebuilding and recovery. If you
10 vote to close Homestead Air Reserve Base, you would devastate
11 our community in a way much worse than Hurricane Andrew ever
12 did.
13 I have here in writing promises that the 301st
14 Rescue Squadron would return to Homestead just like BRAC
15 ordered. I have written assurances from an Air Force
16 colonel, major general, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
17 Force, and even from the Secretary of the Air Force herself.
18 Why is it true that the 301st Rescue Squadron
19 supports the space shuttle? Its primary mission is combat
20 rescue. The MILCON needed for the 301st at Homestead is
21 completely funded. I ask that you return the 301st Rescue
22 Squadron back to Homestead. Homestead Air Reserve is located

Page 167

1 in a fantastic recruiting area. It has over 2 million
2 people. The aviation industry is the largest employer in
3 Dade County.
4 Homestead has training areas and training equipment
5 which are the best of any reserve fighter base in the country
6 and superior to most of them. Because of the location,
7 Homestead is like an aircraft carrier in the Caribbean.
8 Military actions in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti were largely
9 supported from Homestead.
10 Also, as you know, Dade County is the new site of
11 the United States Southern Command. And currently, Homestead
12 Air Force Base is being evaluated for potential support
13 functions.
14 I want to thank you for having me return in front
15 of you again and to say that Homestead Air Force Base is
16 worthy of being kept open. It is a reserve station that will
17 be a credit to the BRAC and to this country. Thank you very
18 much.
19 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much,
20 Congresswoman.
21 And now, we're very pleased to recognize the
22 distinguished Senator from Florida, Senator Bob Graham.

Page 168

1 SENATOR GRAHAM: Thank you, Madame Commissioner,
2 General Davis. It's a pleasure to be able to meet with you
3 this afternoon and discuss some of the issues of particular
4 relevance to our state.
5 First, my colleagues from Florida from the House
6 have or will already provide to you specific remarks
7 concerning facilities and operations within their district.
8 Unfortunately, due to a Joint Economic Committee hearing, my
9 colleague, Senator Connie Mack, is not able to be with us
10 today. He chairs that important committee, and they have a
11 long scheduled hearing.
12 Senator Mack has drafted written testimony for the
13 Commission, and I provide a copy of that to you on his
14 behalf.
15 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. We'll be
16 happy to include it.
17 SENATOR GRAHAM: Also, Madame Chairperson, I will
18 be providing a full statement of my remarks and will
19 summarize them orally.
20 I would open with the following remarks, which I am
21 certain are shared by all of the members of the Florida
22 delegation. I am very pleased that the Defense Department

Page 169

1 and your Commission have already recognized the high military
2 value of many Florida installations.
3 Included in this are MacDill, Patrick, and Tindell
4 Air Force Bases, Naval Air Stations Whiting Field, Pensacola,
5 Key West in Jacksonville, Naval Station Mayport, the Panama
6 City Coastal Systems Station, and the Army and Navy's
7 simulation training operations located in Orlando.
8 I'm also pleased that the efficiency and cost-
9 effectiveness of the Naval aviation depot in Jacksonville
10 have been acknowledged and affirmed. I heartily endorse and
11 concur with these sound decisions that you have made.
12 However, let me just highlight a few concerns which
13 the Commission will be considering in the next three weeks,
14 issues that are of particular strategic relevance to our
15 nation. Although I am pleased that the military and the
16 Commission appreciate the value of Eglin Air Force Base, I am
17 concerned that the decision to relocate electronic combat
18 test and evaluation assets from Eglin could significantly
19 impact our Air Force's ability to properly test and evaluate
20 weapons systems.
21 It takes many years and significant investment in
22 developing effective weapons systems. Having just

Page 170

1 experienced a downing of an American fighter jet and having
2 seen during the Gulf War the amazing capabilities of our
3 weapons, we should be ever sensitive of the need for our
4 military to remain on the cutting edge of technology in
5 testing and evaluation.
6 The services must preserve their ability to fully
7 and rigorously test and evaluate our weapons systems. If the
8 electronic combat assets are moved from Eglin's test ranges,
9 which are endowed with unique land-water contrast along the
10 shoreline, the Air Force will lose a critical testing
11 environment.
12 Any consolidation of weapons testing and evaluation
13 assets should be deferred pending the completion of a
14 Congressionally mandated Department of Defense electronic
15 combat master plan.
16 While acknowledging that the Commission is
17 considering numerous issues in many facilities nationwide
18 which do not meet the BRAC personnel threshold for
19 consideration, in the case of Eglin's realignment, choosing
20 to not act on the Air Force recommendation pending a
21 definitive Department of Defense study as directed seems to
22 be both logical and intelligent.

Page 171

1 Regarding Homestead Air Force Base, I am surprised
2 -- frankly, sadly surprised -- to see that we are again
3 forced to consider the future fate of Homestead, a facility
4 which has been repeatedly proven for its military value. In
5 1993, your predecessor, the Base Closure Commission of that
6 year, stated that the military value of Homestead was "indeed
7 high, due to its strategic location."
8 Even as the base was being repaired from the
9 devastation it suffered during Hurricane Andrew, it met the
10 challenge of providing valuable logistical and operational
11 support for the Haiti invasion operations for Army Blackhawk
12 helicopters and Air Force KC-135 tanker support cells.
13 And we cannot forget or ignore that approximately
14 100 miles off the coast of Homestead stands the only
15 Communist nation in our hemisphere. Cuba remains a threat to
16 the slow but very successful democratization of the Western
17 hemisphere. Our military and security planners will only be
18 hampered should they need to prepare for future operations in
19 the region without Homestead to rely upon.
20 To use the words of Major General Sherrod, Vice
21 Commander of the Air Force Reserve, during his testimony
22 before you last week, "Homestead Air Force Base is most

Page 172

1 certainly one of our better locations, and its closure would
2 be most unfortunate."
3 I see that my time has expired. If I could just
4 take a few moments to mention one last item. Since the
5 original 1993 BRAC mandated receiving site at New London,
6 Connecticut, for the Navy's nuclear propulsion training
7 center has been determined to be unavailable, careful
8 consideration should be given to the high cost of moving and
9 rebuilding this expensive, sophisticated training facility.
10 We should not inadvertently through miscalculation
11 be found that we have been led to a negative impact on the
12 Naval Research Laboratory's underwater sound reference
13 detachment in Orlando. I hope the Commission will see to it
14 that such errors are corrected, with the reversal of any such
15 recommendation, and that the BRAC 1991 mandate to move
16 Armstrong Labs to Orlando is fulfilled.
17 Thank you very much for your courtesies today and
18 throughout this process. It is my full expectation that you
19 will continue to focus keenly on strategic military value. I
20 am confident the Commission will reach the best decisions
21 based on what is in the interest of our nation's defense.
22 Thank you.

Page 173

1 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much,
2 Senator. And we would be happy to have your additional
3 remarks for the record, as well.
4 SENATOR GRAHAM: Thank you very much.
5 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
6 And now, I'm most pleased to recognize the
7 distinguished Congressman from Florida, Congressman McCollum.
8 REPRESENTATIVE McCOLLUM: Thank you very much,
9 Commissioner Cox, Commissioner Davis, and all of the
10 commissioners. I would like to spend my brief five minutes
11 with you discussing the three items that Senator Graham just
12 mentioned very briefly at the end of his statement. They're
13 all three related to Orlando. And I'm going to be as
14 succinct as possible.
15 Later today or tomorrow, you'll be receiving a copy
16 of a detailed report on all three of these we prepared with
17 COBRA runs, et cetera, for your consideration, as well as a
18 copy of a formal statement in detail.
19 First of all, let me talk about the underwater
20 laboratory in Orlando. This is called the Navy Research
21 Laboratory Underwater Sound Reference Detachment. It's a
22 huge mouthful. There are no active duty Navy personnel

Page 174

1 associated with it. It has been there for 51 years, and the
2 reason why it's being recommended for closure and realignment
3 is, I guess, a consolidation of the research capacities that
4 are located there.
5 It does sonar research. It does transuser
6 research. It does calibrations, very highly sophisticated
7 calibrations of a technical nature for submarine purposes in
8 terms of development of those items that are important to our
9 submarine warfare.
10 The recommendation is to move this laboratory up to
11 Newport, Rhode Island. There is just one catch to this, and
12 I would urge you to have your staff really look at this from
13 a technical standpoint, as a technical matter.
14 There is a lake associated with this called The
15 Lake at Leesburg which is unique. It's spring-fed. It is
16 one that if you, according to all of the sources we've talked
17 to, take the testing away from this lake the calibrations
18 will not be nearly as accurate.
19 It is a fundamental question not so much of what is
20 good for Orlando but what is going for the Navy that I'm
21 arguing this case. This particular laboratory has a very
22 limited impact on my community. It employs a very few

Page 175

1 personnel, but I'm very concerned that the Navy's interest
2 isn't going to be served by this.
3 We also don't believe that the Navy or the Defense
4 Department looked at the question of possibly realigning to
5 Orlando some similar functions, and if they did, we've done a
6 COBRA run to show you there would be a $30 million greater
7 present value over 20 years savings and a $10.3 million less
8 one-time cost, and therefore we think there was substantial
9 deviations from Criteria 1, 2 and 5.
10 Now, the remainder of my time I want to devote to
11 Nuclear Power Training Command at Orlando and to the
12 Armstrong Laboratory. They're very much related. They're
13 both redirects on your list, the redirect from -- actually,
14 it's from New London, Connecticut, for the Navy Nuclear Power
15 School to Charleston, South Carolina, from Orlando
16 originally, from the base closure of last time.
17 And this simply doesn't make sense. There is no
18 common sense involved with it. We don't think -- and I think
19 your staff has looked at this, and I don't believe they think
20 the Navy ever really seriously considered keeping the nuclear
21 power school in Orlando and cordoning it off.
22 If they had looked at it that way, and we've

Page 176

1 calibrated this with regard to COBRA runs, you could have
2 over 20 years a savings of over $157 million just by keeping
3 it in Orlando versus $71 million 20-year savings but putting
4 it in Charleston instead of New London on the basis of moving
5 it from New London to Charleston is cost in the first place.
6 In the second place, there is only an $8 million
7 one-time cost expenditure for keeping nuclear power in
8 Orlando versus $147 million in one-time cost in new
9 construction in Charleston of the Navy's own figures.
10 And again, your Base Closure staff have looked at
11 our figures. We believe they'll confirm the $8 million
12 figure, and all of this extrapolates out to a huge dollar
13 savings by bringing home the matter that is already there,
14 just not making the move.
15 New construction is silly and foolish. There are
16 facilities there. There is a Navy exchange that is going to
17 stay in Orlando long after NTC Orlando is closed, and there
18 are facilities of all types that are available, and they've
19 all been factored into these figures that I've given you.
20 As a consequence, there are a number of the
21 criteria that, in my judgment, that are violated, but
22 certainly Criteria 5 has been, and just boldly looking at it,

Page 177

1 it is. And I really, really, in the strongest terms, ask you
2 to look at this.
3 This is a gross dollar and cents mistake that just
4 doesn't make any sense. Armstrong Laboratory is a much
5 smaller dollar and cents matter, but it's similar. In 1991,
6 the Base Closure Realignment Commission directed Armstrong to
7 be moved to Orlando.
8 The Armstrong Laboratory from Arizona is an Air
9 Force simulation center. It is the research and development
10 arm for the Air Force. The Navy and the Army research
11 facilities are already in Orlando at the Orlando Research
12 Park.
13 The idea was to consolidate all training, all
14 simulation training centers of the three branches of the
15 service in Orlando. Made sense then. Makes sense now. The
16 problem is the Armstrong Laboratory, according to the Air
17 Force now, couldn't find a home there. It costs too much.
18 It's too expensive.
19 There is no evidence in any of the data calls that
20 they really looked. They assumed they'd have to build a
21 building for $13.6 million. The fact of the matter is that
22 we have a building in the research park partly now leased by

Page 178

1 the Army for its simulation center they would have acquired,
2 bought for 4.5 million, still on the market today.
3 They didn't look either at the closing Orlando
4 Naval Training Center for facilities. Their cost analysis is
5 just plain wrong. They didn't do the job, and in addition to
6 that, they have made the allegation that there are no fighter
7 pilots in the area since Cecil Field Naval Air Station is
8 being closed in the future for use in their training
9 facilities.
10 They didn't take into account you still have
11 fighter pilots at Homestead, at Eglin Air Force Base in
12 Florida, for a period of time at MacDill, not to mention the
13 potential for bringing them out of Georgia.
14 There is absolutely no basis for the kind of
15 presentation that they made to you for the redirect. And the
16 last comment, and I know my time has expired, there is an
17 irony in this, Commissioner Cox and Commissioner Davis and
18 Commissioner Steele.
19 And that is the very argument, although at a much
20 lower dollar level being made for not going ahead with the
21 Armstrong move is precisely the reverse of the argument being
22 made with regard to the Naval Training Center's Nuclear Power

Page 179

1 School.
2 In other words, they're saying, "We're going to
3 save money, and therefore, we should not make this move from
4 Armstrong at all. We ought to leave it out there in the Air
5 Force."
6 On the other hand, a much bigger dollar amount
7 involved with Nuclear Power School in Orlando, they're
8 saying, "We've got to make this move. We're closing Orlando,
9 and we've got to make the move regardless. We didn't even
10 look at keeping it in Orlando."
11 DOD wearing two different hats, I guess, with two
12 different branches of the service have come to diametrically
13 opposite conclusions. Again, the dollar amount with
14 Armstrong is very small compared to the dollar amount with
15 nuclear power.
16 The savings of keeping Orlando's Nuclear Power
17 School in Orlando is enormous, and I really urge you to look
18 at it. The savings, as we've said, for keeping Armstrong in
19 Arizona, if you really looked at it, is very, very, very
20 minimal. And at the very least, tit for tat we're getting
21 the short end of the straw in Orlando. The military service
22 is getting the short end of the straw, both services in this

Page 180

1 case, and I think it's an ideal thing.
2 I know redirects are not your number one priority,
3 but it's an ideal thing to look at for the bottom line
4 criteria, and I thank you very, very much for letting me have
5 my time today.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much for those
7 excellent remarks, and now the Base Closure Commission will
8 stand in recess until 1:20, when we will pick up with the
9 State of Georgia.
10 (A brief recess was taken.)
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Good afternoon. We are now
12 ready to begin with testimony on behalf of the Great State of
13 Georgia, and I'm very happy to note Congressman Barr is here
14 to speak. Welcome.
15 REPRESENTATIVE BARR: Thank you very much,
16 Commissioner Cox and Commissioner Davis and Commissioner
17 Steele. It's an honor to be here today. I represent the
18 Seventh Congressional District in which NAS Atlanta is
19 located, and I would first like to thank all of the BRAC
20 Commissioners and the staff that visited NAS Atlanta last
21 Monday for the tour of the facility and then who attended the
22 regional hearing Friday in Atlanta at the Fox Theater.

Page 181

1 I would like to invite all of you back to Georgia
2 and to NAS Atlanta when you have more time to explore our
3 great state and region in more detail.
4 Today, however, I would like to share with the full
5 Commission some of the highlights of the testimony
6 articulated over the past week in Atlanta. NAS Atlanta has
7 many virtues which substantiate the Department of the Navy's
8 recommendation to retain NAS Atlanta and support the redirect
9 of additional squadrons to NAS Atlanta from BRAC 1993.
10 NAS Atlanta has exceptional demographics and, in
11 fact, recruiters always make 100 percent of their recruiting
12 goals, and the base has no problem filling current and future
13 billets.
14 NAS Atlanta is well-suited for fleet support,
15 training missions and, I might add of particular interest to
16 me as a former United States Attorney, drug interdiction
17 operations.
18 For example, in a letter written to Chairman Dixon
19 and submitted to the Commission Mr. Raymond McKinnon, special
20 agent in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration
21 Atlanta Field Division Office wrote, "We at DEA have relied
22 heavily on NAS Atlanta in the past, and we are planning an

Page 182

1 expanded role for the base in the future."
2 NAS Atlanta is run at low cost. Quite simply, in
3 fact, it is the Navy's most economical reserve air station.
4 No other Naval Reserve air station could support the
5 additional squadrons scheduled to move to NAS Atlanta or to
6 receive NAS Atlanta's current squadrons without military
7 construction expenditures.
8 Additionally, to redirect the two F-18 squadrons
9 and the E-2 squadron to NAS Atlanta will require no military
10 construction. NAS Atlanta is co-located at Dobbins Air
11 Reserve Base and is one of only a handful of facilities in
12 the entire country that is home to each of the six Department
13 of Defense reserve components.
14 And it is without a doubt one of this country's
15 finest examples of interservice coordination and cooperation.
16 NAS Atlanta is a vital link in the total force structure, and
17 failure to utilize its ready infrastructure, its available
18 capacity, its joint use savings and its rich demographics
19 would not be in the best interests of national security
20 considerations or of the American taxpayer.
21 In closing, I want to state that the men and women
22 of our nation's armed services and the communities that

Page 183

1 support them are heros to the United States regardless of the
2 location of their duty station.
3 The question before us now, however, is what is
4 right for the total force structure of the United States
5 Navy. The answer to that question is undeniably to retain
6 NAS Atlanta.
7 NAS Atlanta has the demographics, is cost-effective
8 and is a vital asset to the Navy and the Marine Corps' total
9 force structure. Again, I'd like to thank the Commission for
10 allowing me to appear here today as the member of Congress
11 representing NAS Atlanta, and I do so without equivocation
12 and in the strongest possible terms. Thank you very much.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much for those
14 remarks. Representative Collins, Mat Collins.
15 REPRESENTATIVE COLLINS: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
16 Madam Chairman and members of the Commission, I appreciate
17 this opportunity to appear before you today. A few short
18 days ago, many of you were in Atlanta for the regional
19 hearing.
20 Members of the Georgia delegation and citizens of
21 Georgia want to thank you for allowing Atlanta and the State
22 of Georgia the opportunity to tell our military story. As we

Page 184

1 say in the south, you all come back. We would like to see
2 you back in Georgia when Atlanta hosts the 1996 Olympics next
3 summer.
4 The Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich; Senator
5 Sam Nunn and Senator Paul Coverdell took part in base visits
6 in regional hearings last week. They did not want to impose
7 upon the Commission's limited time to hear from other members
8 of Congress.
9 However, with the Chairman's permission, I would
10 like to submit for the record the statements of my Georgia
11 delegation colleagues.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: We would be most happy to have
13 those for the record. Thank you.
14 REPRESENTATIVE COLLINS: Following my remarks and
15 the remarks that you just heard from Congressman Bob Barr
16 about Georgia's military heritage, its installations and its
17 service members, Congressmen Saxby Chambliss and Sanford
18 Bishop will testify to the significance of Robins Air Base to
19 the greatest military force in the world.
20 Let me start by saying that history tells us
21 Georgia and America's military history and security have been
22 linked before the United States was the United States.

Page 185

1 Elijah Park stood with 700 Georgians to face the British at
2 Kettle Creek in 1779.
3 Eighty years later, Georgians stood with General
4 Joseph E. Johnson on the battlefields not far from where we
5 were gathered last Friday for the regional hearing in
6 Atlanta.
7 Georgians were there with Pershing, MacArthur,
8 Taylor and Westmorland, and just a few years ago, when the
9 call came from the Middle East, Georgians who were born in
10 Georgia or serve in Georgia climbed to their tanks, their
11 fighters and their aircraft, their helicopters, their
12 submarines and deployed to meet the new enemy.
13 The ones who stayed behind made sure the ones who
14 went had the best maintained and operational equipment in the
15 desert. Commissioners, if you look at the forts, the
16 airfields, marine and Navy bases in the Southeast, you're
17 looking at America's Rapid Deployment Force.
18 Years ago we closed the military bases that are no
19 longer needed in Georgia. Those which remain today, both
20 community and military leaders have worked endlessly over the
21 past few decades to further enhance the contributions they
22 make to our nation's security.

Page 186

1 What remains is the hub of that juggernaut that
2 goes into battle first. Georgians are not there two months
3 after the battle begins. Georgians are there for the echoes
4 of the first shelling subsides.
5 You have two bases before you that are being
6 compared to their counterparts elsewhere in this great nation
7 of ours. Ladies and gentlemen, there is no comparison. The
8 Naval Air Station Atlanta is unmatched anywhere in its
9 ability to recruit fixed and rotary wing pilots and crew
10 members, train them for battle and assemble them in a joint
11 war fighting environment.
12 Robins Air Base is the only air logistics center
13 east of the Mississippi River. It maintains the fighters,
14 the transports and special operations aircraft that are ready
15 when this great nation of ours is least ready.
16 The bottom line is when America is threatened, we
17 launch or response from the Naval Air Station in Atlanta and
18 Robins Air Force Base. We thank you, and now you'll hear
19 from one of our colleagues, Congressman Saxby Chambliss.
20 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, and we're
21 happy to recognize Congressman Chambliss.
22 CONGRESSMAN CHAMBLISS: Thank you. Since this is

Page 187

1 my last opportunity to appear before you all. I won't repeat
2 what I said on Friday of last week. Members of the
3 Commission, I'd like to take this one final opportunity to
4 publicly thank you for your hard work on behalf of the
5 American people.
6 You folks have a very difficult job, and you have
7 some very tough decisions to make, but you certainly handle
8 yourselves in a very professional manner, and I commend you
9 for it.
10 One decision that has taken the center stage in
11 this round of base closures is focused on the issue of air
12 logistics. The five air bases have made their case to you in
13 one form or another, and I know that the Commission has
14 conducted on-site visits.
15 I appear before you today to underscore the case
16 for Robins Air Force Base. Over the last 53 years, the
17 community of Robins, Georgia, has grown up around its air
18 base. Generations of middle Georgia workers have made Robins
19 their livelihood, and the importance of the Robins ALC to the
20 middle Georgia community and the economy cannot be
21 overstated.
22 As you have already come to learn, Robins accounts

Page 188

1 for 19 percent of the Macon MSA payroll. More importantly,
2 the closure of Robins Air Force Base would consequently
3 result in a 50 percent reduction in jobs under MSA.
4 If it is economic impact that concerns you, the
5 numbers bear out the most severe of consequences for middle
6 Georgia. Obviously, any decision to close a depot would put
7 tremendous strain on the economy of that area. After all, in
8 most cases, the ALC is the largest industrial employer in its
9 state.
10 And that is a key point. An ALC represents the
11 most business similar activities our Department of Defense
12 operates. As such, the decision you will make as a
13 Commission must be put in that business context.
14 And in a business context, Robins sets the
15 standards, and let's look at the facts. One, Robins is a
16 company town. There is no disputing it. The Robins ALC is
17 the largest employer and the biggest industrial complex in
18 Georgia.
19 The people of Georgia have a long and storied
20 commitment to their military. Above all else, the community
21 and the employees make all the awards and good work possible.
22 In middle Georgia, there is no bigger game in town.

Page 189

1 At every turn, when the Air Force has asked
2 anything of the middle Georgia community, the answer has
3 always been yes -- land, schools, infrastructure and skilled
4 workers. Whatever the need, middle Georgia has responded
5 with the resources at a cost of over $800 million for the
6 future.
7 Secondly, Robins was named the best base in the Air
8 Force. Recently, the Commander-in-Chief named Robins the
9 best base in the Air Force, a true indication of the all-
10 around success Robins has achieved over the years. Robins is
11 not just an ALC. It is the heart of the Air Force.
12 Three, Robins was rated by the Air Force in its top
13 tier of bases. One of only two ALCs named in the top tier,
14 the missions carried out at Robins are Priority One for the
15 readiness of our armed forces.
16 The F-15, the C-130, the C-141, electronic warfare,
17 the Special Operations 130s and avionics all make the mission
18 at Robins the highest percentage of core workload in the
19 command.
20 Fourth, Robins has received numerous environmental
21 awards. This is where Robins stands tall above all others.
22 Not only did Robins earn the Air Force's award for best

Page 190

1 environmental program, but the best -- but the Department of
2 Defense named Robins the base with the highest quality
3 environmental program in the Department.
4 As an industrial complex, the people at Robins have
5 worked tirelessly to be the best stewards of the land in
6 middle Georgia. As an example, Robins has in place the most
7 modern and the most environmentally friendly plating shop in
8 the command, which will allow Robins to operate more cleanly
9 well into the 21st Century.
10 We are proud at Robins of our environmental record.
11 The processes are in place to reduce pollution, and by the
12 year 2000, all priority restoration sites will have been
13 cleaned, a remarkable statement for a military industrial
14 complex.
15 Members of the Commission, the business decision
16 you face will impact the most important business of this
17 country, our national defense. If your decision is to close
18 a base, Robins Air Force Base has the community support, the
19 capacity to accept workload and the environmental program to
20 accept workload without going out of compliance.
21 From a business perspective, the decision becomes
22 clear. Robins should be the model and not the victim. Thank

Page 191

1 you very much for your attention.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much,
3 Congressman, and I believe we have next Congressman Bishop,
4 who I thought I saw a minute ago. Yes. Congressman,
5 welcome.
6 CONGRESSMAN BISHOP: Thank you very much,
7 Commissioner. Mr. Chairman -- Madam Chairman today, other
8 Commissioners, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to
9 express my support for Robins Air Force Base.
10 As a result of a base visit and testimony during
11 the regional hearing in Atlanta, many of you have heard
12 compelling arguments in support of maintaining Robins and
13 Warner Robins Air Logistics Center as key components of our
14 long-term basin strategy.
15 I associate myself with these past remarks of
16 support. I want to take this brief opportunity, however, to
17 speak to yesterday's achievements, today's capabilities and
18 tomorrow's opportunity for Robins Air Force Base.
19 Robins has long been recognized around the globe
20 for its past combat support to front line forces in the
21 field. In fact, one of Robins's managed products have been
22 actively involved in virtually all post Cold War contingency

Page 192

1 operations from Iraq to Somalia to Bosnia.
2 Time after time it was not only the superiority of
3 our highly trained combat personnel that contributed to these
4 successful missions but the people at home who managed and
5 maintained the advanced war-fighting equipment used in the
6 field.
7 Personnel at Warner Robins have, on average, 10 to
8 15 years experience in complex engineering and computer
9 related skills. Much of this experience and expertise is
10 attributed to past emphasis on the value of training.
11 State and local leaders recognized this need and
12 have invested more than $51 million in establishing
13 vocational and technical training schools and programs.
14 We've made these investments in people, but what about
15 facilities?
16 Since 1984, the Air Force and the American taxpayer
17 have invested more than $295 million in new state-of-the-art
18 facilities. These facilities are among the newest in the Air
19 Force Material Command.
20 As a further sign of local commitment, the
21 community invested more than 1.5 million to purchase property
22 in the accident potential zone to clear all encroachment

Page 193

1 concerns for the operation of the air base.
2 What is the evidence of yesterday's achievements?
3 Robins has been awarded several top honors, from Outstanding
4 Combat Logistics Squadron to Best in the Air Force for
5 Contracting and Small Business, to Pride in the Air Force for
6 Depot Maintenance.
7 It should come as no surprise that a month ago the
8 President named Robins as the Commander-in-Chief's
9 Installation Excellence award winner, signifying Robins as
10 the best base in the Air Force.
11 Today, Robins is home to the Fifth Combat
12 Communications Group, the 19th Air Refueling Wing,
13 Headquarters Air Force Reserve and 39 other tenant
14 activities.
15 Robins Air Force Base is not only a busy operations
16 air base, but its also home to Georgia's largest industrial
17 complex. Robins is a big and busy installation that is
18 operating in full compliance with all federal, state and
19 environmental regulations and complementing environmentally
20 sensitive processes in its everyday work.
21 For example, Robins uses a bicarbonate of soda
22 paint stripping technique which reduces the use of industrial

Page 194

1 toxins. The procedure is the most environment friendly paint
2 stripping technique in the Air Force.
3 Robins has the Defense Department's largest
4 electronic warfare complex which houses indoor antenna
5 ranges, electronic failure labs among other assets.
6 We have a tremendous number of capabilities at
7 Robins, but I would just like to share one thing with you.
8 The Defense Department has recommended maintaining all five
9 air logistic centers while continuing to downsize the work
10 force.
11 Frankly, I'm concerned about any policy that
12 produces less than optimum efficiency and effectiveness. Is
13 it cost-effective to spread a reduced work force across an
14 existing system while maintaining five separate sets of
15 overhead, or should operations be concentrated at the
16 strongest facilities like Robins where expansion can be
17 accommodated?
18 Let's confront the problems now and emerge from
19 this process with the most efficient and effective air
20 logistics systems possible. I believe that the arguments
21 that you've heard over the past few weeks are compelling in
22 favor of Robins, and I certainly feel confident that after

Page 195

1 all is said and done that Robins will maintain its place as
2 the number one air base in America's arsenal. Thank you very
3 much.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you, Congressman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Delegate Underwood, are you
6 willing to go ahead right now, sir? In your usual fashion,
7 you're early. Are you satisfied to go ahead now.
8 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: I'm quite satisfied as long as
9 we have our map.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, on behalf of Guam, we're
11 delighted to have our old friend, Delegate Underwood here.
12 We have heard him before in our hearings, seen him in the
13 visitations, and we are delighted to have him again.
14 Delegate Robert Underwood for the Guam presentation.
15 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Chairman Dixon
16 and members of the Commission, especially Commissioner
17 Steele. Thank you for allowing me the time, five minutes,
18 although I must complain that I feel short-changed because
19 even Kato Kaelin got 15 minutes of fame.
20 As you may know, Guam is the hardest hit community
21 under the --
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: If it makes you feel any better,

Page 196

1 he wouldn't get 15 minutes here, Delegate.
2 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: But he endorses our position.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're going to give you a point on
4 that.
5 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: As you may know, Guam is the
6 hardest hit community under the Department of Defense
7 recommendations. Our potential job loss of over 2,600
8 civilian positions would increase unemployment by 10 percent
9 alone, and it's estimated by the Department of Defense to
10 impact over 25 percent of our economy.
11 And yet when we tell people that Guam is being
12 slated for DOD base closures, there is always a sense of
13 disbelief because no one can fathom that Guam has somehow
14 lost its military value to the U.S.
15 Guam has not lost its military value. Guam is
16 still important to DOD contingency plans. Guam is American
17 soil unaffected by the politics of the moment that seem to
18 sway the reliability of some foreign countries.
19 We always talk about planning for another Korea or
20 another Desert Storm. Try planning another anything in Asia
21 or the Middle East without Guam. I did not bring pie charts
22 or bar graphs, which might impress bean counters, but I did

Page 197

1 bring a map of the Western Pacific showing Guam's location,
2 which should impress strategists.
3 DOD wants to close the ship repair facility on
4 Guam, SRF, disestablish the fleet and industrial supply
5 center, transfer the military sealift command supply ships to
6 Hawaii, transfer the HC-5 Helicopter Squadron to Hawaii and
7 realign other naval activities.
8 The lion's share of saves would come from the
9 closing of SRF and FISC. DOD would also retain assets that
10 it believes are necessary for contingencies. We understand
11 the need to downsize. We understand the role that Guam has
12 in contingencies, including its role as the fall-back
13 position for whatever may happen to foreign bases.
14 We ask in turn that you try to understand Guam's
15 needs and in particular our need for assets that would ensure
16 our economic survival. Team Guam has placed several
17 alternatives on the table.
18 There are three important considerations for an
19 arrangement that we can all live with. First, SRF and FISC
20 should be kept open if not by the Navy then in a
21 collaborative arrangement with the Government of Guam or
22 allow the Government of Guam to privatize these assets.

Page 198

1 By keeping these activities open, the Navy will
2 ensure that it also always have an SRF to go to in the Far
3 East, and it will always have a secure source of supplies.
4 Like horseshoes and hand grenades, close counts,
5 and for a forward-deployed Navy, Guam is closer to the action
6 than any other American base.
7 The second consideration is the MSC supply ships
8 and the HC-5 Helicopter Squadron. We urge you to leave the
9 ships and the helos on Guam. This is the Achilles Heel of
10 the DOD proposal, and this is where Guam's military value is
11 most apparent.
12 I have heard of scenarios that are almost laughable
13 in order to make the DOD recommendation for the helicopter
14 squadron work. The Navy may have to deploy the helos to Guam
15 on a TDY basis anyway, or the Navy may have to airlift the
16 helos from Guam just to get them in a position where they can
17 be useful.
18 The Navy would be in the awkward position of
19 depending on the Air Force to move their helos around the
20 Pacific. It seems like everybody in the flying community
21 knows that helo pilots don't get enough respect, but the DOD
22 deployment scenarios for HC-5 might have been devised by

Page 205

1 The unit has participated in Operation Desert
2 Shield, Desert Storm, Operation Restore Hope, Operation
3 Uphold Democracy and most recently in Bosnia. In addition,
4 the 126th participated in the Captown '93 airlift in May of
5 '93, provided the first KC-135 to land in mainland China.
6 These units have received significant awards.
7 I do not know why the base was put on the list for
8 consideration to be closed, but I know that the 1993 BRAC
9 recommended that as a result of Mayor Daley's interest in
10 developing the land the O'Hare Air Reserve Station should be
11 relocated to Rockford or a site acceptable to the Air Force.
12 The city of Rockford stands ready to welcome both
13 of these units. Only 55 miles away, Rockford is the only
14 site that meets the important criteria of recruitment,
15 retention and readiness.
16 I ask you, Mr. Chairman and the Commission to
17 consider the importance of both of Savannah Army Depot and
18 the O'Hare Reserve Station. Both are vital components of
19 this nation's force structure and to the defense of this
20 nation. And thank you for the opportunity to testify.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you, Representative
22 Manzullo. And we're delighted to see a colleague of your

Page 206

1 from the State of Illinois, Representative Lane Evans.
2 REPRESENTATIVE EVANS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
3 appreciate this opportunity, and I also want to thank the
4 Commission for sending out Commissioner cling to Savannah. I
5 think that's an important part of the process and appreciate
6 his efforts on a rather bumpy day up the air, as I recall, on
7 that day he came out to Savannah.
8 I want to talk about Savannah. I want to talk a
9 little bit about the Rock Island Arsenal and O'Hare Reserve
10 Unit in the allotted time that I have
11 Concerning the Savannah Army Depot, I believe that
12 DOD's recommendation is greatly flawed. This move would
13 result in the loss of important and hard-to-replicate
14 capabilities, increased costs above the Army's estimates to
15 close the base and move its function and reduce ammo storage
16 capability below critical military need.
17 There are important capabilities present at
18 Savannah which would be difficult to replace. For example,
19 the depot is one of the most efficient in the entire Army.
20 During Operation Desert Storm, Savannah had the highest out-
21 loading rate of any Army depot.
22 It is also one of the few with adequate rail

Page 207

1 service to major shipping centers. These national assets
2 would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.
3 In addition, the Army's estimate of the cost of
4 closing Savannah and relocating the Army Defense Ammunition
5 Center and School is too low. DOD stated that it would cost
6 $38 million to close the installation and to relocate
7 functions.
8 However, the Savannah Army Depot Realignment Task
9 Force estimates that the cost of closing the facility and
10 moving the school is much higher, as much as $88 million.
11 Thus includes new construction that will have to take place
12 at McAlester to complete the move.
13 Even more importantly, I question whether DOD's
14 decision to close ammunition storage facilities has taken
15 into account storage needs. The Army's 1993 Wholesale
16 Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with
17 11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside
18 storage will be needed to match our nation's future
19 ammunition stockpile.
20 This does indicate that the ammunition study is
21 flawed. I hope you will review the study to see if the plan
22 to enact a tier system for depots provides enough space to

Page 208

1 meet future storage needs.
2 Our ammunition depots are national assets that will
3 be needed to meet future mobilization needs. The Commission
4 should reverse DOD's decision to close Savannah or consider
5 other means such as operating it as a government-owned
6 contractor-operated facility in order to preserve this
7 important resource.
8 The Commission should also consider relocating the
9 ammo school at Rock Island Arsenal instead of McAlester. As
10 you will see in my testimony, Rock Island has easily the
11 administrative space to accommodate such a move.
12 I've also been given estimates that moving the
13 school to Rock Island instead of Oklahoma would save up to
14 $20 million in up-front costs due to savings created by
15 remodeling space at the arsenal instead of building new
16 construction.
17 As to the concern that actual ammunition storage
18 facilities are needed for a school for adequate training,
19 this is not a problem because most of the training is being
20 performed with dummy ammo and mock-ups. These concerns
21 should not really be worked to impede this proposal. I hope
22 that the Commission will give this proposal a full review.

Page 209

1 Concerning the Detroit Army Tank Plant, I strongly
2 support DOD's recommendation to close this facility. This
3 move would eliminate excess capacity and increase savings.
4 Currently, we have two tank plants, the Detroit and
5 Lima facilities. Of the two plants, Lima is more modern and,
6 as opposed to Detroit, configured for advanced tank
7 production.
8 In addition, the only function performed at Detroit
9 is the production of gun mounts for the M-182 tank, work that
10 is also performed at Rock Island. Because of these factors,
11 DOD has determined that Detroit is excess capability.
12 This move would achieve substantial savings. Total
13 tank gun mount production is evenly split between the two
14 plants, and Army costs comparison that examine the options of
15 keeping the split, moving the work to Detroit or moving the
16 work to Rock Island concluded that it would be cheaper to
17 move all of the work to the arsenal.
18 Considering these factors, I strongly support DOD's
19 recommendation and hope the Commission will as well. The
20 possibility addition of the O'Hare Air Reserve Station to the
21 base closing is an issue that I hope the Commission will
22 consider closely.

Page 210

1 The decision of the 1993 Commission regarding this
2 matter should stand. The closure of the station and its C-
3 130 unit would be a blow to Illinois and a sad chapter in one
4 of the nation's finest military units.
5 The 928th Airlift Wing has one of the most
6 distinguished records of any reserve unit in our country. A
7 highlight of that is that for 46 years and over 166,000 hours
8 we have been flying that unit without an accident, the
9 longest stretch of accident-free flying by any civilian or
10 military organization in our country.
11 Mr. Chairman, my time is over. I appreciate this
12 opportunity, and I will submit my entire statement for the
13 record.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your statement will be reproduced
15 in the record in full. Thank you very much, Representative
16 Evans, and we'll stand in temporary recess until 2:30 p.m.,
17 but the Chair will announce that should any member of the
18 Illinois delegation arrive prior to that time in the allotted
19 time for Illinois, that member will be heard. At 2:30, the
20 Commission will hear from the State of Indiana. We are in
21 recess.
22 (A brief recess was taken.)

Page 211

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The room will come to order, and
2 the Commission will come to order. We are prepared to hear
3 the Distinguished Congressman from my own district, my old
4 friend. Representative Jerry Costello. We're delighted to
5 have you, Congressman Costello.
6 CONGRESSMAN COSTELLO: Chairman Dixon, thank you.
7 and I'm delighted to be here. First, let me thank you and
8 the other members of the Commission for holding this final
9 hearing today and for giving me an opportunity to testify
10 once again concerning the Charles Melvin Price Army Support
11 Center in my congressional district in Granite City,
12 Illinois.
13 As you know from my previous testimony and the site
14 visit by Mr. Kling from this Commission, the price center
15 currently performs a vital service for the United States
16 Army.
17 Its strategic location adjacent to the Mississippi
18 River has proven to be a valuable resource not only to the
19 Army but also to the other federal agencies currently
20 operating from the facility.
21 The price center currently employs almost 500
22 military and civilian employees. It currently has 25

Page 212

1 tenants, including the Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard,
2 Department of Defense and other federal agencies.
3 It serves as support and a quality of life center
4 for tens of thousands of both military and retired civilian
5 and active duty personnel in the entire St. Louis
6 metropolitan area.
7 Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Army's
8 recommendation to close AATCOM, the Army Aviation Troop
9 Command Center in St. Louis, Missouri, that as a direct
10 result the recommendation of closing AATCOM comes as a direct
11 result they want to close the Price Center.
12 Basically, simply put, they're saying if AATCOM
13 goes to Alabama and is closed and relocated, then the price
14 center has to close.
15 Mr. Chairman, in my limited time, and I'll be very
16 brief, I want to make three points to the Commission. One is
17 that AATCOM is only a small part of the Charles Melvin Price
18 Center.
19 Two is I believe that the assumptions made by the
20 Army concerning the military housing at the Price Center that
21 the Army -- I think there are some errors in their
22 resumptions, and number three is I want to stress the value

Page 213

1 of this center to other federal agencies.
2 About 75 percent of the activities and functions at
3 the Price Center are nonAATCOM related. In other words, the
4 recommendation for the Army to close AATCOM, for them to say
5 that the Price Center has to close if AATCOM goes we believe
6 is not true.
7 We think that if you look at the activities at the
8 Price Center, 75 percent of the activities there are
9 nonAATCOM represented. In fact, AATCOM only occupies 17
10 percent of the family housing at the Price Center, 21 percent
11 of the administrative space and less than 1 percent of the
12 enclosed warehouse space at the Price Center.
13 While AATCOM is a valuable -- is valuable and
14 important to the Price Center, it's only a small part of the
15 operation.
16 Mr. Chairman, regarding the assumptions made by the
17 Army concerning the military housing at the Price Center, I
18 would quickly make the following points.
19 One is that in the St. Louis region there currently
20 is a waiting list of over one year for military family
21 housing. In other words, people who are on a waiting list
22 who qualify, they are waiting for over one year for military

Page 214

1 family housing.
2 If all of the personnel associated with AATCOM left
3 the Price Center tomorrow, family housing units, we would
4 still have a one-year waiting list in the St. Louis
5 metropolitan area for family housing.
6 Clearly, closing all of the family housing at the
7 Price Center, as the Army proposes to do, will not result in
8 a cost savings to the federal government. Regarding the
9 value of the Price Center to other federal agencies, as I
10 stated in my testimony, there are 25 other tenants at the
11 Price Center currently, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy,
12 the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense and other federal
13 agencies.
14 Last fall we were pleased to convince the Coast
15 Guard to relocate their facilities in the Second District of
16 St. Louis. We were wiped out by the flood of 1993. We were
17 able to convince them to come to the Price Center.
18 There are other federal agencies and state agencies
19 interested in locating at the Price Center, but they will
20 only do so if in fact the center remains open.
21 Mr. Chairman, there are many other points I could
22 make. I see my time is down to about 30 seconds, but let me

Page 215

1 close by saying that if the decision of the federal
2 government is to padlock the Price Center and close down the
3 housing, I believe that that decision is not in the best
4 interests of the Army or of the taxpayers of this country.
5 Keeping the Price Center open will provide much
6 needed military family housing to military families in the
7 entire St. Louis metropolitan area. It will provide
8 facilities for the Army, the Air Force, the Coast Guard and
9 other federal agencies.
10 And let me also say that I believe that we have an
11 obligation both to our active duty personnel and our retired
12 military folks as well as the civilians in the area to
13 provide quality of life services, and this facility provides
14 those services, as I said, to over tens of thousands of
15 people.
16 Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by thanking you
17 again. Mr. Kling, as you know, visited the Charles Melvin
18 Price Center just a few months ago. We had the opportunity
19 to brief him. I have had previous testimony submitted to
20 this Committee, and we would ask that you carefully consider
21 the points that we have made.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,

Page 216

1 Congressman Jerry Costello. We thank you for your
2 contribution to your state and for your important
3 contribution to the work of this Commission. We're greatly
4 appreciative.
5 REPRESENTATIVE COSTELLO: Mr. Chairman, thank you.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, sir. We'll stand in
7 recess and resume again with the Great State of Indiana at
8 2:30, and staff will be checking with Indiana. If anyone
9 from Indiana gets here before the hour of 2:30, we will
10 proceed with the individuals that arrive. Otherwise, we
11 stand in recess until the assigned time slot for Indiana,
12 which is 2:30.
13 (A brief recess was taken.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'll call the Commission back to
15 order. Congressman C.W. Young of the Great State of Florida
16 was unable to be here because of other business obligations
17 in the Congress at the allotted hour for Florida and asked
18 whether we could accommodate him later.
19 And the Great State of Indiana had an open spot and
20 was glad to give it to Congressman Young, and Congressman
21 Young, we are delighted, sir, to see you, and the Commission
22 recognizes Representative C.W. Young, State of Florida.

Page 199

1 Rodney Dangerfield himself.
2 Guam needs the ships so that a new SRF venture can
3 be successful. We need a minimum level of work that the
4 ships can give us, at least in the first few years of this
5 venture.
6 The supply ships also provide a minimum level of
7 activity at the FISC, and I would like to remind the
8 Commission that while no one knows where in Kaneohe Bay Air
9 Station in Hawaii the helos will be housed, the new $17
10 million hangar that BRAC '93 directed for the helos at
11 Anderson Air Force Base on Guam is nearing completion.
12 The third important consideration is the transfer
13 of other assets no longer needed by the Navy. This includes
14 excess officer housing at the former Naval Air Station, which
15 was closed by the BRAC '93 and lands identify as excess in
16 Navy Guam's Land Use Plan '94 study.
17 As you know, some of these assets are controlled by
18 the Public Work Center. While we support the transfer of
19 excess housing and land, you urge you to limit the
20 realignment of the PWC to these issues. PWI Guam continues
21 to maintain a workload that justifies its retention as a
22 separate activity.

Page 200

1 Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, Guam is unique in that
2 unlike domestic bases we are not competing against another
3 base to be spared from closure. We are competing against the
4 financial incentive to close realignment or naval
5 activities.
6 Our proposal meets the savings test. 71 percent of
7 the DOD annual recurring savings are achieved by the Guam
8 proposal. Our proposal preserves the military value of
9 Guam's location for the Navy, and our proposal gives Guam the
10 assets it needs to secure its economic future.
11 I know you have tough decisions ahead of you, and I
12 appreciate the time and the opportunity to go over this with
13 you today. Thank you.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Delegate
15 Underwood. And may I say to you, sir, that while you did not
16 have as much time as Kato Kaelin, fortunately for the people
17 of Guam, I find you considerably more believable in the
18 things that you're telling us.
19 DELEGATE UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. We're
20 going to stand in a recess until 1:55, ladies and gentlemen,
21 when the Great State of Illinois will make its presentation.
22 (A brief recess was taken.)

Page 201

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, the Chair
2 will declare this hearing back in session. We are pleased to
3 see that representatives of the Illinois delegation are here,
4 and the Distinguished Congressman from the northern part of
5 our state is here, and I'm delighted to recognize
6 Representative Don Manzullo from the Great State of Illinois.
7 REPRESENTATIVE MANZULLO: It's a great state, isn't
8 it, Mr. Chairman?
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman, we're delighted to
10 have you, sir.
11 REPRESENTATIVE MANZULLO: Thank you. Chairman
12 Dixon, Commissioners, thank you for allowing me the
13 opportunity to speak to you today regarding the proposed
14 closing of the Savannah Army Depot activity and relocation of
15 the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School known as
16 USDAC, currently located in Joe Daviess and Carroll Counties
17 in Illinois.
18 I also would like to briefly address the Air
19 National Guard and Air Force Reserve units located at O'Hare
20 International Airport.
21 The Integrated Ammunition Stockpile Management Plan
22 dated May 1994 recommends the closure of all Tier 3 caretaker

Page 202

1 ammunition depots, which includes the Savannah Army Depot.
2 The Army also has proposed the relocation of USDAC to
3 McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma.
4 Savannah Depot and USDAC employ 421 people
5 combined. I believe the data and recommendations presented
6 of the integrate the plan are flawed in terms both of
7 military value and potential cost savings.
8 First and foremost, these recommendations will
9 negatively impact military readiness. The most recent
10 wholesale ammunition stockpile program prepared for the joint
11 logistical commanders indicates that we currently have no
12 excess ammunition storage capacity.
13 This year the Army is spending about $100 million
14 to demilitarize approximately 95,000 short tons of
15 serviceable -- I'm sorry, of unserviceable ammunition.
16 However, the demilitarization budget will be cut by
17 more than two-thirds by 1997 while the Army continues to
18 generate about 100,000 short tons of ammunition each year.
19 In addition, there are currently over 800,000 tons
20 of unserviceable ammunition located overseas which must be
21 brought back to this country for demilitarization.
22 As the Army continues to generate ammunition and

Page 203

1 the demilitarization -- I can't pronounce that word --
2 demilitarization budget continues to decrease, this problem
3 will continue to grow, and the existing facility in Savannah
4 will become more and more critical.
5 The relocation of USDAC would also significantly
6 impede military readiness. The USDAC is a one-of-a-kind
7 facility with a critical mission. The personnel are highly
8 trained and available to respond to emergency and contingency
9 requirements worldwide.
10 The impacts of moving in on DOD readiness will be
11 significant through the loss of this professional and
12 technical expertise that is unique to it. Replacement of
13 this personnel would require four to five years in order to
14 teach the level of expertise now available.
15 The Army has estimated a one-time cost of $38
16 million dollars to close the depot. However, the Savannah
17 Senior Study Group has pointed out these costs of relocating
18 ammunition currently stored at Savannah have been ignored.
19 The Army has estimated tiering costs at 22.3
20 million. The Savannah Senior Study Group has estimated an
21 additional cost of $185 million to achieve only partial
22 tiering. This estimate is based on the movement of

Page 204

1 approximately 25 percent of the stockpile at $350 per ton,
2 and new Army estimates from the Army itself estimate movement
3 at $440 per ton, raising the total cost to $231 million.
4 These flaws indicate an additional 185 million not
5 included in the Army's analysis. Much of this data, and I
6 would refer you to it, is in a memo dated May 19, 1995, from
7 the Commander of the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command
8 in Rock Island to the Commander of the U.S. Army Material
9 Command dated May 19, 1995.
10 I submitted a copy of this memorandum which, in the
11 words of the Army itself, should be dispositive of the issue
12 that the Savannah Army Depot should not be closed.
13 Turning, then, to the consideration of the O'Hare
14 Reserve Station Chicago, I want to emphasize the importance
15 of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units to our
16 national force structure.
17 These are outstanding units with extraordinary
18 personnel who perform their mission tasks with the highest of
19 professional standards. The 126th Air Refueling Wing in
20 particular has contributed to most of the U.S. military
21 operations conducted in foreign countries over the last
22 several years.

Page 217

1 REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG: Mr. Chairman, thank you very
2 much, and I thank you for accommodating the school and the
3 Indiana delegation also for being willing to do that. If I
4 look a little bit wet and sloppy, it's because I was outside
5 in the rain as part of the welcoming ceremony for CAPT Scott
6 O'Grady.
7 It was a great and exciting time, and CAPT O'Grady,
8 as an Air Force officer, leads me into my subject, and that's
9 MacDill Air Force Base. As you know, prior to the last
10 Commission meeting on BRAC, the Department of Defense had
11 indicated a desire to establish a fuel retankering unit at
12 MacDill.
13 The theory was to take the F-16 Reserve squadron
14 that had been moved out of Homestead because of the
15 hurricane, convert that to tankering and establish them at
16 MacDill.
17 That didn't work out because the Base Relocation
18 and Closure Commission decided that they needed to help
19 establish some activity at Homestead, which is fine, is
20 working out very well.
21 But again, the Department of Defense has identified
22 to the committee that I chair, the Defense Appropriations

Page 218

1 Committee, the need for tankering capability in the
2 Southeastern part of the United States.
3 So I'm here, basically, to just say we support very
4 strongly the recommendation of the Department of Defense to
5 establish tankering capability at MacDill.
6 And I would say this to you, that they would be
7 very welcome by the community, but also at MacDill Air Force
8 Base we have one of the best underground fuel storage
9 capacities anywhere in the world, which would be a very
10 natural transition, as far as establishing this unit.
11 That's, basically, my story, Mr. Chairman. I do
12 have a rather lengthy statement that I would like to submit
13 for your record along with some correspondence between myself
14 and the Department of Defense and the Air Force on this same
15 subject. And unless you have questions, that what I'm here
16 to ask you for is your support of that recommendation.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman, thank you for that
18 fine presentation. Your entire statement will be reproduced
19 in the record in full. I ask staff to be sure that they
20 obtain that from Congressman Young.
21 And I just want to say, sir, I'd have been proud to
22 stand in the rain with you to welcome that great man. Thank

Page 219

1 you for your fine presentation.
2 REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG: Mr. Chairman, members of the
3 Commission, thank you very much for accommodating me.
4 (A brief recess was taken.)
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Commission will come to order.
6 The Chair is delighted to recognize the Distinguished
7 Congressman from the State of Indiana, Representative John
8 Hostettler -- oh, excuse me. Would you yield to your
9 senator, John? We're delighted to recognize my old friend
10 Senator Dan Coats from the Great State of Indiana. Senator
11 Coats, we're delighted to have you, sir.
12 SENATOR COATS: Well, Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure
13 to be able to see you in the chairman's chair and call you
14 Mr. Chairman. We miss you. You look happy and well, and we
15 trust life after Congress is treating you well. It sure
16 looks like it is.
17 I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to
18 testify before you. Obviously, a difficult task that you
19 have. We appreciate your service to the country. The
20 implications of your decisions have, obviously, widespread
21 ramifications not only for this nation and our military
22 preparedness but also for the communities that are affected.

Page 220

1 I want you to know and I think you do know that I
2 have a long history associated with this ever since I've been
3 in the Senate. Beginning in 1989 and through the last round,
4 I have supported the decisions of the Base Closing
5 Commissions even though they have adversely impacted my
6 state.
7 I announced in 1989 that this was something that we
8 needed to do for the military, for the future of our
9 military, for the country, and at considerable political risk
10 and certainly sometimes swimming against the tide I took a
11 stand saying that if the decisions were made on an equitable
12 basis, on a fair basis, I would support those decisions, and
13 I have.
14 So I think my credibility and my commitment to the
15 process is well-established. We've taken our share of cuts
16 in Indiana, Grissom Air Force Base, Jefferson Proving Ground,
17 Fort Benjamin Harrison, but on each of those, after carefully
18 reviewing the record, I determined that the decisions were
19 made on an objective basis, and therefore I would support
20 them and did.
21 We now look at Round 4, and in evaluating the
22 latest list, the Naval Air Warfare System in Indianapolis is

Page 221

1 on that list. I come today to you with a somewhat unique
2 proposal, and I know you're familiar with it because our
3 Senior Senator and other Mayor from Indianapolis presented to
4 the Base Closing Commission regional hearing in Chicago their
5 proposal.
6 It's unique because we have not objecting to the
7 closing of the base on the base closure list. What we are
8 offering is an alternative to the Commission to examine an
9 alternative that we believe brings an innovative public-
10 private partnership to replace the outright closure of the
11 air warfare facility.
12 So we're not fighting the recommended closure. We
13 are offering a much less expensive alternative that reduces
14 military costs and commitments but yet preserves military
15 readiness.
16 An independent review of the Department of Defense
17 analysis of the closure proposal found that outright closure
18 offers no apparent cost savings, efficiencies or military
19 value, and with these factors in mind we went to work in
20 Indiana, principally the Mayor of Indianapolis with the
21 support of the Governor, the support of myself and other
22 members of the delegation to find an alternative.

Page 222

1 Frankly, I think the process, the decision process
2 that was made by the Department of Navy was flawed. It was
3 flawed because I believe that an early decision was made by
4 the Department to protect naval air warfare systems at China
5 Lake and Patuxent River at the expense of Indianapolis.
6 So here is what we have to offer to the Commission to
7 examine, an alternative that meets the Navy's goal of closing
8 the facility as a DOD site, ownership of the site by either
9 the city or a combination of city and state, retention of the
10 DOD employees as a detachment of the Crane Naval Surface
11 Warfare Center just down the road in Congressman Hostettler's
12 district and retention of as many of the released employees
13 as possible as employees of private companies which would
14 promote work under contract for the Department of Defense.
15 We estimate that the actual cost of the complete
16 closure of the air warfare center is about $226 million.
17 Estimates for implementing the city's proposal are about $42
18 million. It's privatization, and it's privatization with a
19 purpose.
20 We ask the Commission specifically for two things.
21 One, first, we would like a BRAC favorable recommendation of
22 the Indianapolis alternative proposal. Such a recommendation

Page 223

1 would have to be stronger than a statement of permission.
2 It would need to make crystal clear that the city's
3 proposal is the preferred closure option, and we have
4 provided your staff with appropriate language to examine our
5 offer and the language that we would suggest that you take
6 under consideration and offer.
7 Secondly, we believe that it's important for the
8 Commission to establish a period of time to allow the
9 negotiations between the city, the Navy and other interested
10 parties, the state, to take place, perhaps for up to a year.
11 This would permit all the participants to structure the
12 partnership agreement in a reasonable time period.
13 Mr. Chairman, in closing, the alternative proposal
14 has received considerable support with the Navy all up and
15 down the line, including the undersecretary -- the aviation
16 program managers and the Undersecretary of the Navy,
17 Mr. Danzig.
18 We urge your careful consideration of this proposal
19 and consideration of this idea, and as someone, again, who
20 has not been here trying to defend his state's position
21 against the base closure's recommendations, I would just ask
22 your favorable consideration of this particular proposal, and

Page 224

1 thank you very much for the time.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much, Senator
3 Dan Coats for that very fine contribution, and may I say that
4 staff assures me that they do have the information that your
5 distinguished Indiana delegation has given to staff. It's
6 being carefully evaluated.
7 We're indebted to you for this fine contribution,
8 and we thank you for bringing along a Distinguished Colleague
9 from the House, Representative John Hostettler. We're
10 delighted to hear him now as well. Thank you, Senator.
11 REPRESENTATIVE COATS: Chairman Dixon and
12 Commissioner Steele, thank you very much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Representative
14 Hostettler, we're delighted to have you, sir.
15 REPRESENTATIVE HOSTETTLER: Thank you, and good
16 afternoon. Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I
17 appreciate your attention to today's testimony. Having sat
18 through a number of hearings in recent months, I know how
19 hard it can be to remain focused in long hearings even when
20 the issues being presented are exceedingly important as they
21 are today.
22 I represent the Eighth Congressional District of

Page 225

1 Indiana located in the Southwestern part of the state. It's
2 two largest cities are Evansville, a leading industrial city
3 along the Ohio River, and Bloomington, a city located 45
4 miles south of Indianapolis and the home of Indiana
5 University.
6 The district covers a large rural area of Indiana
7 composed of rolling forested countryside in the east and
8 large tracts of fertile farm land in the west. It also
9 contains a number of wholesome Indiana towns like historic
10 Vincennes founded in 1732; Bedford, the limestone capital of
11 the world; and French Lick, the home town of basketball
12 legend Larry Bird.
13 Finally, and the reason for my being here today,
14 the district is also the home of the Crane Naval Surface
15 Warfare Center's Crane, Indiana site located in Martin County
16 Indiana.
17 As you know, the Secretary of Defense has
18 recommended that several activities at the Indianapolis Naval
19 Air Warfare Center and the Crane Naval Surface Warfare
20 Center's Louisville, Kentucky, site be transferred to the
21 Martin County facility.
22 My purpose today is not to enter into the

Page 226

1 privatization debate which my colleagues and friends are
2 bringing to your attention. I will only say that I, like my
3 constituents, want the very best decisions to be made for
4 America.
5 As a member of the House National Security
6 Committee, I fully appreciate the decisions regarding our
7 military force structure must be made as free from politics
8 as possible. My testimony is, however, to help assure you
9 that if you should decide to follow the Secretary of
10 Defense's recommendations, the Martin County site of the
11 Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center is ready, available and in
12 good condition to be the receiving location.
13 I also want to assure you that the local
14 communities are fully capable of implementing the Secretary's
15 recommendations and that the facility has ample capacity to
16 absorb the consolidated missions.
17 The Crane site in Martin County Indiana is a unique
18 national asset. To truly appreciate this base, a person
19 really needs to visit there. The base's physical statistics
20 are amazing and sound more like that of a national park than
21 of a military base.
22 It contains over 62,000 rolling acres, which

Page 227

1 translates to 97 square miles and includes over 50,000 acres
2 of beautiful forest. In fact, the United States Navy has
3 recently informed me that its Crane, Indiana, site is among
4 its ten largest facilities in the world.
5 The size of the base has proved to be an ideal
6 location for the storage of munitions. For that reason, the
7 Martin County site is also home to the United States Army's
8 Crane Army Ammunition activity, a tenant of the Navy.
9 Because of the facility's size, munitions can be
10 safely stored and all security needs easily met. The base's
11 infrastructure reflects its physical dimensions. It has
12 approximately 75 miles of perimeter fence, 185 miles of paved
13 streets and highways, 226 miles of unpaved roads and
14 miles of railway.
15 It also has a large variety of facilities ranging
16 from ammunition storage bunkers to state-of-the-art
17 technology centers supporting the well over 2,500 current
18 Crane engineers, scientists and technicians.
19 Since 1987, there has been approximately $344
20 million in new construction completed at the site, resulting
21 in state-of-the-art product support facilities.
22 Approximately $12 million in new construction is currently

Page 228

1 underway, including a $7.9 million electrophic center.
2 Given its physical size and up-to-date
3 infrastructure, it is my view that the Crane, Indiana, site
4 would, if called upon, meet the Navy's needs for the
5 foreseeable future as a premier product engineering and
6 industrial activity.
7 The people of Southwestern Indiana are by nature
8 patriotic midwesterners. We wholeheartedly support the work
9 of Navy at Crane, and if the Secretary of Defense's
10 recommendations are followed, we are ready to do our part.
11 According to an Indiana University study requested
12 by the South Central Indiana Coalition immediately prior to
13 the last BRAC round, the local communities surrounding Crane
14 are fully capable of absorbing even 100 percent expansion in
15 the Crane work force.
16 There exists ample housing, schools, transportation
17 and utilities to handle the projected influx. I believe that
18 this conclusion continues to be valid. I also believe that
19 this area has a trained work force with an excellent work
20 ethic.
21 I would be remiss if I did not add that
22 Southwestern Indiana is a great place to live. The cost of

Page 229

1 living in the area is low, as is crime. In addition, there
2 exists a choice between living in a relatively remote rural
3 area and a sophisticated urban environment.
4 In conclusion, I fully support the concept of the
5 Midwest Navy. I think that the history of the Indianapolis,
6 Louisville and Crane, Indiana sites have shown the value of
7 these Midwest facilities. I thank are for your work on the
8 difficult task you face in determining the region's future
9 force structure. Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
11 Representative Hostettler. We're delighted to have that
12 information from you. We thank you for it. We're pleased to
13 see your distinguished colleague from the Indiana delegation,
14 Representative Lee Hamilton, an old friend. Nice to have you
15 here, Congressman Hamilton.
16 REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON: Thank you very much.
17 Good afternoon, Senator Dixon and members of the Commission.
18 I want to thank you for the privilege of commenting on the
19 Defense Department's decision to close Naval Ordinance
20 Station Louisville on its 1995 closure list.
21 Senator Dixon, I want to thank you particularly and
22 Commissioner Kling for taking the time to visit the Naval

Page 230

1 Ordinance facility in Louisville. I know your schedule is
2 most demanding, and we're deeply appreciative of your
3 willingness to do that, to see the facility.
4 I, as you gather, oppose the Defense Department's
5 decision to close the ordinance station. My very decided
6 preference is to remove the Naval Ordinance Station from the
7 closure list.
8 In the alternative, I would urge the Commission to
9 endorse the establishment of a naval gun center in
10 Louisville, which will be argued here in a moment with
11 eloquence from some of my Kentucky colleagues.
12 I express my support for keeping the Naval
13 Ordinance Station open for several reasons. First and really
14 the most important, the Naval Ordinance Station is the last
15 naval-owned facility capable of gun system design,
16 manufacturing, prototyping and remanufacturing.
17 If Louisville is closed, the Navy loses that
18 capability as well as the capability to reconstitute a full
19 industrial base capacity in the event of an emergency. I
20 simply cannot understand why the Navy would make that choice.
21 Second, the ordinance station has had a superb
22 record of service to the Navy and to the country. Its

Page 231

1 engineering capability and design, in-service engineering,
2 advance gun system management and development has been a
3 tremendous asset to the Navy. It can perform its work in a
4 cost-effective manner with an outstanding work force.
5 Third, the closing of the ordinance station has an adverse
6 impact, of course, on communities in my congressional
7 district. Across the river from Louisville, Kentucky, 320 of
8 the 1,836 employees reside in Indiana. That puts them out of
9 work, cause them hardship and, of course, costs the state
10 millions of dollars in lost income.
11 Fourth, you folks who close these bases have really
12 hit Indiana very hard over a period of years. I just don't
13 think it's fair for us to sustain additional cutbacks in base
14 closure process.
15 Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana Army Ammunition
16 Plant, both of which are in my district, Fort Benjamin
17 Harrison, Grissom Air Force Base have all been listed for
18 closure or inactivation.
19 I don't know how you judge these things from your
20 perspective, but believe you me you have delivered some
21 roundhouse punches to Indiana, you and your predecessors.
22 Thousands of jobs are being lost, and I'm under the decided

Page 232

1 impression that we have taken a disproportionate share of the
2 closures.
3 I understand that the Base Closure Commission has
4 explored the possibility of establishing in-service depots.
5 I believe Naval Ordinance has the capabilities to provide
6 depot work for the Navy as well as for other services, and I
7 ask you to give that opinion consideration as well.
8 If the Commission decides to support the
9 recommendations of the Defense Department, of course I hope
10 you do not, I would then urge that it consider endorsing the
11 creation of a naval gun center of excellence at Louisville.
12 Senators Ford and McConnell and Congressman Ward
13 will discuss in more detail in their testimony. The City of
14 Louisville and Jefferson County have proposed establishing a
15 naval gun center of excellence at the Naval Ordinance Center.
16 That proposal includes several elements. The Navy
17 would close the Naval Ordinance Station with language in the
18 BRAC report to assure that the Navy will work to privatize in
19 place the majority of the work performed at the station.
20 The City of Louisville and/or Jefferson County,
21 Kentucky, would assume ownership of the facility. One
22 contractor would lease part of the facility to perform the

Page 233

1 five-inch gun work and other activities. Another contractor
2 would lease part of the facility to perform work on the
3 Phalanx system.
4 The Navy would lease part of the facility to
5 maintain an engineering presence. Contractors would hire
6 Naval Ordinance Service Station employees that would – who
7 would be displaced by the closure.
8 I understand that the City of Louisville and
9 Jefferson County Kentucky recently signed a memorandum of
10 agreement with two contractors to operate portions of the
11 proposed center, and I think that proposal has several
12 benefits.
13 So I'd ask that you give this consideration very
14 careful consideration. It would keep jobs at the Naval
15 Ordinance, and I would like to see the facility stay a
16 government facility – that's my preference – but the work
17 force remain a government force, but if that's not possible,
18 then I'd like to see the good paying jobs kept in Louisville.
19 I ask the Commission, then, and each of you to give
20 full consideration to these requests, and I thank you for the
21 opportunity to make this appearance.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much,

Page 234

1 Congressman Hamilton, and we'll say to you that all of the
2 material you have alluded to is in our possession. We're
3 indebted to you for your remarks, as I'm sure the Great State
4 of Kentucky is as well, and we thank you, Congressman Lee
5 Hamilton.
6 And we are now going to go to the Kentucky
7 delegation. We're pleased to see the Distinguished Senior
8 Senator from the Great Commonwealth of Kentucky here, and –
9 SENATOR FORD: Keep it up. I like it. Go ahead.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I recognize him as the democrat
11 whip, and in my time he was the majority whip, and I served
12 as his chief deputy, and I never had a better boss. Now,
13 you're ahead now, Wendell. Don't mess it up. Senator
14 Wendell Ford of the Great State of Kentucky.
15 SENATOR FORD: We miss you, Al. As my father would
16 say, Mr. Chairman, we come not today with visual aids or
17 theatrical productions. We only come armed with the silver
18 tongue of the truth.
19 Chairman Dixon and members of the Base Closure
20 Realignment Commission, let me begin by thanking all of you
21 for the opportunity to share my views with you this morning
22 and also to express my thanks for the interest you, as

Page 235

1 individual members and as Chairman of the Commission, have
2 shown in trying to see every facility so you would understand
3 as well as you can the good, bad and indifferent in the
4 recommendations that you have received.
5 So I do compliment you for your good work. I know
6 that you will have some tough decisions to make in the next
7 few weeks, but I hope that the homework your staff has
8 already done on Naval Ordinance Station Louisville and the
9 testimony that you hear here today will convince you that
10 Louisville should not be taken off the -- should be taken off
11 the base closure list.
12 The Naval Ordinance Station Louisville is
13 considered an outstanding facility because of its quality
14 work and its cost-effectiveness. It was never more evident
15 than during the Gulf War when Louisville employees literally
16 made house calls to the Persian Gulf war zone providing
17 critical on-site assistance, particularly when the USS
18 Princeton hit a mine.
19 Louisville is a full-service organization and has
20 the only remaining major caliber gun barrel manufacturing
21 facility in the Navy and the only close-in weapon system
22 depot public or private. Louisville is the lead activity for

Page 236

1 the development of the latest improvements to the naval
2 gunnery and the congressionally mandated -- I underscore
3 that -- naval fire support program.
4 The activity does research and development to
5 include design, production, in-service support and depot
6 functions. And as all of the Commission members who visited
7 Louisville know firsthand, the state-of-the-art in
8 environmental compliance exceeding EPA and state regulations
9 plating facility is the most modern and effective in the
10 entire Defense Department.
11 In fact, in 1993, former Base Closure and
12 Realignment Commission Chairman called the station a
13 modernized operation that does a range of overhaul,
14 engineering and research work on Navy gun systems and said he
15 was, and I quote, "convinced that it is certainly not a
16 facility we should close."
17 He was supported by all members of the Commission.
18 They understood that the central location of Naval Ordinance
19 Louisville provides critical rapid deployment capabilities
20 for the Navy of systems equipment material and technical
21 personnel to the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf Coasts.
22 Furthermore, your own staff has discovered that

Page 237

1 Navy numbers on the cost savings that would occur because of
2 closure and moving equipment from Louisville were over-
3 enthusiastic.
4 In fact, in terms of both military construction and
5 labor rates, the cost of shutting down Naval Ordinance
6 Louisville would be much higher than the original Navy
7 estimates.
8 I understand that these tight fiscal times demand
9 tough decisions, but these numbers alone should be a clear
10 indication that even if the Commission makes what we consider
11 an adverse decision there should be no question that BRAC
12 needs to direct the Navy in no uncertain terms to retain the
13 equipment and current missions of Naval Ordinance and
14 negotiate with local officials to privatize the facility.
15 In particular, I request that your Commission
16 provide enabling language allowing the Navy work to continue
17 at Louisville for at least two years until the privatization
18 process is completed.
19 Two companies, Hughes and United Defense, have
20 signed a memorandum of understanding with the City of
21 Louisville and Jefferson County committing to do the work at
22 Louisville.

Page 238

1 They have also met with your staff to outline in
2 detail their plans. So this is clearly no pie-in-the-sky
3 proposal. As Louisville representatives testified back in
4 April at your Chicago hearing, this plan to create the Naval
5 Gun Center of Excellence would safe the Navy in excess of
6 $300 million, more than they would save by moving the
7 operations to another location, reduce the Navy's
8 infrastructure in Louisville to nearly zero while maintaining
9 world class gun operations the Navy has come to depend on.
10 Let me reiterate that every person who will testify
11 today believes without question that Naval Ordinance
12 Louisville is a unique integral part of our nation's defense
13 and should be removed from the base closure list.
14 However, faced with the fact that the Pentagon has
15 put Louisville on the list, we have worked diligently to
16 produce a plan to meet the overall downsizing BRAC is
17 attempting to address.
18 More important, the privatization plan will put
19 Louisville on the forefront of recent recommendations by
20 Dr. White, head of the Commission on Roles and Missions of
21 the Armed Forces, a former chairman of this Commission and
22 now the man chosen by the President and Secretary of Defense

Page 239

1 to be the number two man in the Defense Department.
2 In that document, Dr. White called for privatizing
3 in place those depots, and Mr. Chairman, I'd like to make a
4 part of the record the statement of Dr. White recommending as
5 to privatizing.
6 In closing, I know my little red light is on, but
7 I've had that happen to me before, Mr. Chairman, it has been
8 brought to my attention that there are those who are wrongly
9 questioning the legal authority of this Commission to direct
10 the Department of Defense to privatize an installation.
11 As the author of the original base closure
12 legislation, you do not need reminding about the authority
13 and reach of this Commission. I hope you will exercise that
14 authority in the best interests of the Naval Ordinance.
15 Let me close again by saying I thank you and look
16 forward to working with you, hopefully to keep Naval
17 Ordinance Louisville open, if not, meet some of the other
18 recommendations that we've offered to the Commission. Thank
19 you, Mr. Chairman.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Senator Ford, and
21 Dr. White's statements will be reproduced in the record as
22 well as the entirety of your remarks. And we are delighted

Page 240

1 to see your distinguished colleague, my old neighbor, the
2 Distinguished Junior Center from the Great Commonwealth of
3 Kentucky, my old friend Senator Mitch McConnell. Senator
4 McConnell.
5 SENATOR MCCONNELL: Allen, it's good to see you
6 again. Ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, I appreciate
7 the opportunity to be here. As others in our delegation have
8 indicated, everyone agrees that the most desirable option is
9 to keep the Naval Ordinance Facility open as is.
10 NOSL is a unique asset with state-of-the-art
11 engineering industrial facilities. Louisville is the only
12 remaining major caliber gun barrel manufacturing facility in
13 the Navy and one of only two major caliber gun barrel plating
14 facilities.
15 NOSL is the only remaining facility public or
16 private providing full spectrum engineering industrial life
17 cycle support, including manufacturing, assembly, overhaul,
18 repair, renovation, alteration and modification of gun and
19 gun fire control systems and missile system launchers.
20 NOSL is centrally located and provides rapid
21 deployment capabilities of systems, equipment, material and
22 technical personnel. NOSL is the only close-in weapons

Page 241

1 system depot.
2 However, if maintaining the status quo is not an
3 option, we would encourage the Commission to explore the
4 possibility of privatization and the creation of a Naval Gun
5 Center of Excellence.
6 This proposal was presented to the Commission
7 during the April regional hearing and formally transmitted to
8 Secretary Dalton last week. The proposal enjoys bipartisan
9 support, Mayor Abramson, Judge Armstrong, Congressman Ward,
10 Senator Ford and the local chamber of commerce have all
11 enthusiastically worked together in developing this
12 proposition.
13 NOSL union leadership testified in favor of the
14 plan during the April regional hearing. A privatized NOSL
15 industrial complex would become the centralized Navy source
16 of gun systems as the nation's Gun Center of Excellence,
17 teaming with community, Navy and Defense contractors.
18 The proposal would reduce the Navy's
19 infrastructure, protect the gun weapons system expertise now
20 resident at NOSL and protect the workers at NOSL and the
21 important contribution they make to the regional community.
22 The proposal supports the May '94 Commission Roles

Page 242

1 and Missions of the Armed Forces recommendation. This urges
2 that DOD move to a depot maintenance system relying on the
3 private sector.
4 The local community, as indicated, has signed
5 cooperative agreements to establish the Gun Center of
6 Excellence with two leading defense contractors, Hughes
7 Missile Systems and United Defense LP.
8 UDLP has already agreed in writing to execute all
9 repair and overhaul work it is required to perform under the
10 follow-on technical support prime contract at the newly
11 created center. This could mean an additional 90 to 100
12 jobs.
13 We would like to see the Commission approve a
14 recommendation that achieves the following: transfer
15 ownership from the Navy to the local government, leave in
16 place key NOSL functions encompassing both the Navy Gun
17 System Replacement Program and the Phalanx, retain the in-
18 service engineering support currently at NOSL as a Navy
19 function at the center.
20 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the
21 opportunity to join with my colleagues in making our
22 presentation on this most important facility in Kentucky.

Page 243

1 Thank you for your time.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
3 Senator McConnell. Thank you for your fine presentation.
4 REPRESENTATIVE LEWIS: I could probably make this
5 very short by just saying ditto with my colleagues, but I'll
6 go ahead and give my prepared statement. I want to thank
7 you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Commission
8 for this opportunity to testify today and to express my
9 strong support for the Naval Surface Warfare Center in
10 Louisville, Kentucky.
11 Mr. Chairman, my first priority here today is to
12 support the Naval Surface Warfare Center as a viable,
13 important part of our Navy's success. Although the station
14 is not in my district directly, I do represent the southern
15 portion of Jefferson County.
16 I represent over 400 of the engineers, planners and
17 technicians at the station. These are hard working,
18 dedicated people. These people are the heart and soul of
19 that facility, and they know its true capabilities. They are
20 the reason that the Naval Ordinance has achieved a reputation
21 of excellence in the quality of its work. They are the
22 reason for the Center's innovative success over the years.

Page 244

1 The record clearly shows the unique capabilities
2 and vital importance of Naval Ordinance to our national
3 defense. I'm sure that we all can agree that our nation's
4 commitment to readiness is the driving force that keeps our
5 military forces the best in the world.
6 The support services of our military have proven
7 their worth time after time when the security of our nation
8 and its future were in jeopardy. Naval Ordinance is an
9 important link in maintaining that readiness edge.
10 As you know, Naval Ordinance has been there when
11 called to duty. It responded swiftly and accurately during
12 the Gulf War to develop solutions and execute swift repairs
13 of equipment: It is the only close-in weapons system depot
14 available to the Navy.
15 It is also the only remaining major caliber gun
16 barrel manufacturing facility of its kind. Naval Ordinance
17 possesses a full spectrum of capability from development and
18 design to production to maintenance of technology and
19 equipment for the Navy.
20 It clearly has a unique and vital capability. Of
21 course, in these times of growing federal budget deficits, we
22 must find ways to curb spending in all sectors of the federal

Page 245

1 budget. The Base Closure Commission has an important job to
2 do in finding ways to reduce excess military facilities while
3 at the same time maintaining our military excellence.
4 I commend you and the other Commissioners for the
5 task that you are undertaking. In that light, the idea of
6 moving towards cross-servicing has been discussed as a
7 possible direction for military readiness efforts in the
8 future. It certainly has merits from a budgetary point of
9 view and is an idea that previous BRAC commissions have
10 supported.
11 Mr. Chairman, Naval Ordinance can be a key player
12 in this effort. Naval Ordinance has joint service
13 capabilities in place that are operating today, but if we
14 dismantle that capability, that opportunity will be lost.
15 As I stated before, my priority in this effort is
16 to keep Naval Ordinance open and continue its unique,
17 qualified role in the readiness efforts of our military
18 machine. Some have suggested that privatization is a
19 direction that we should go, and this is an idea that has
20 great merit.
21 But I am not ready to give up on maintaining the
22 status quo at Naval Ordinance, and this Commission shouldn't

Page 246

1 give up on that goal either. In my judgment, maintaining the
2 Naval Ordinance Welfare Center and its unique capabilities is
3 the best thing for our national defense.
4 Again, I commend you and the members of the
5 Commission for the fine job you are doing in the important
6 task before you. The Navy has been well served by the Naval
7 Ordinance Warfare Center in Louisville. It is the last
8 operation of its kind due to its complete service ability and
9 its work for whose dedication cannot be matched.
10 It is a key ingredient for the continued
11 superiority of our nation's military readiness. Thank you
12 again for this opportunity to testify. Thank you.
13 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you, Representative
14 Lewis. I'm glad you didn't ditto. The eloquence of your
15 statement was needed. Thank you very much. Representative
16 Ward.
17 REPRESENTATIVE WARD: I hope I hear you say the
18 same. First let me thank you for having this opportunity to
19 testify today on behalf of the Naval Surface Warfare Center,
20 Crane Division Louisville, the facility which we know in
21 Louisville as the Naval Ordinance Station.
22 Thank you, too, for the site visit on April 6th by

Page 25

1 cannot fund these. We believe that we can meet the surge
2 requirement as needed. Those are the reasons we do these
3 COBRA analyses, the reason we make these military value
4 assessments.
5 If you need a specific answer to the suggestion
6 that in order to meet a surge, we would have to work -- as
7 you said, I'm going to defer to General Shane in just a
8 second. But I need to assure you that we don't take these
9 decisions to go down from, say, three that are doing
10 relatively similar functions, although different kinds of
11 vehicles, to one lightly.
12 Do you want to add anything to that, General
13 Sullivan?
14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Just in general, I think the
15 Secretary has made the point. We can surge at Anniston or up
16 in Pennsylvania. We have capability to surge there, if
17 necessary, natural disaster or going to war and two MRCs.
18 And their alignment tank facility also could do some.
19 I think it's an acceptable risk. We don't have the
20 dollars to keep it open. That's an insurance policy that I
21 don't think we need to pay.
22 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: I'm glad to hear both

Page 26

1 of you are at a level of comfort. I must admit, I'm not
2 there yet. I'll let my colleagues follow up on that, because
3 I've been to some installations that they haven't, so I would
4 like to dig into some of their --
5 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, I'm sure there are other
6 views on it. We're taking a risk, and I understand that.
7 And my name is on the line on it. And I don't say it
8 lightly. This is sworn testimony. And I just told you that
9 I think we can take a risk.
10 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, general. A
11 lighter subject, Sierra Army Depot. It's the only
12 installation at which START Treaty mandated destruction of
13 rocket motors may be carried out. You did address Sierra in
14 the sense of changing our recommendation to allow for
15 storage. But how would the Department meet those treaty
16 obligations if the realignment with that change is accepted?
17 GENERAL SHANE: Let me refer to my staff just for
18 one second on that issue. My staff has informed me, number
19 one, which I knew, was the treaty had not been ratified. But
20 more importantly, there are other locations at which that
21 work can be done if we needed to do it. So there is a
22 spillover capability, Commissioner Steele.

Page 27

1 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: All right. Sierra's
2 demil capability is 22 percent of all of the ammunition demil
3 capability and 43 percent of the open demil capability. I
4 also understand that there's a pending 10-year permit for
5 doing all that open detonation in California.
6 Given the increasing volume of ammunition that will
7 need to be demilled, if we're already changing the
8 recommendation on Sierra, would it not make sense to keep the
9 installation open to allow the Department the flexibility to
10 use those open pits, which I might add, I thoroughly enjoyed
11 with your folks out there blowing up things in all 14 of them
12 the day I was visiting.
13 SECRETARY WEST: I don't think we need them. Our
14 problem with places like Sierra is that we can make an
15 argument for keeping almost everything we have on our list.
16 We haven't offered up almost anything as to which there is a
17 universal opinion it should go. We are making hard decisions
18 here, commissioner.
19 And I would say to you, yes, it probably wouldn't
20 hurt. But the fact is, we don't need them. And what we do
21 need is the savings we can get from these closures to fund
22 the things we absolutely do need.

Page 28

1 So I won't deny that it wouldn't be harmful to have
2 that capability that you mentioned, but if you ask the
3 professional judgement of my staff officers who have worked
4 the COBRA analysis, who have worked the back process, the
5 answer is, no, we don't need that.
6 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: I'm not sure we have
7 done this, and I would like to know if you have, the costs
8 and benefits of saving additional outdoor storage for that
9 which you can't demil versus keeping Sierra and getting rid
10 of it. Have you addressed that at the Army?
11 SECRETARY WEST: I think we have addressed the cost
12 implications. If you want more numbers from us, I'm sure we
13 can provide them for you. But my sense is that having looked
14 at it, we have concluded -- and let's don't misunderstand it.
15 We will come to you for permission to retain only the bare
16 minimum.
17 And what you're saying is, wouldn't we really
18 rather keep more? Yes, I think we have addressed the cost
19 implications. I don't have the number answers right here for
20 you, but we can provide them to you.
21 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: If we could do that,
22 only because I remember during that visit, the COBRA was off

Page 29

1 by half on the amount of personnel that would need to stay.
2 So the savings had already dramatically decreased. And we
3 were talking about a very limited number of personnel to be
4 able to retain that capability for the Department.
5 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, if I could add,
6 our original savings was 29 million. Our current savings is
7 28 million annually. So we have revised them, and that's the
8 latest estimate that we have.
9 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.
10 Mr. Chairman, I defer the rest of my time.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank the distinguished
12 commissioner for her line of questioning. I would want to
13 observe before I recognize the next commissioner that I think
14 we're all here with a complete understanding of why we're
15 here. We would all like to have more.
16 I was chairman of Readiness in the Senate Armed
17 Services Committee, and you know my record when I was in that
18 place. And they have reduced the appropriations and
19 authorized amounts 40 percent; in the force level, 30
20 percent. And if we did everything on this list, we would
21 reduce your excess capacity by 21 percent.
22 And they did the budget resolution week before

Page 30

1 last. And our friends, Senator Thurmond and Nunn, speaking
2 for, I think, the two most powerful positions in either party
3 in the United States Senate, gave the Senate an opportunity
4 to increase the authorized and appropriated amounts, and the
5 Senate rejected it 60 to 40. I think the message is pretty
6 clear. It isn't there. And that's why we're here.
7 Commissioner Robles.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm
9 going to follow up on the depot question, because it is
10 clearly the most pervasive issue we're dealing with in this
11 particular round, in my personal judgement.
12 And just to set the record straight, we're not
13 challenging your assertions. All we're telling you is,
14 there's inconsistency between the services, and we're trying
15 to figure out what the right level is.
16 So having said that as a backdrop -- and I
17 understand risks, General Sullivan. I work in my civilian
18 job in the risk business. I'm in the business of financial
19 risk and operational risk, also. And I do the risk
20 assessments. And so I'll ask the question in this way.
21 As you know, we have put Letterkenny down as a
22 possible closure. Just assume that Letterkenny was closed.

Page 31

1 So now, you are down to one ground depot, one air depot, and
2 one communications and electronic depot. And I just have to
3 say that in the civilian world, you don't put all your
4 computing power or all your capacity power at one location.
5 You try to find what they call a contingency offset.
6 And I know there are some analogs, but in the
7 ground combat vehicle world, there are not many analogs in
8 the civilian world. There are in the communication and
9 electronic world, there are in the aviation and maintenance
10 world, but they're not allowed in the combat vehicle world.
11 And so I worry about natural disasters, explosions, other
12 things that could occur.
13 And I understand you lost 40 cents on the dollar.
14 I know that as well as anybody, and that you think the risk
15 is acceptable. But I'm not sure that we think the risk is
16 acceptable. So have you really run some scenarios what would
17 happen if you were down to just those three depots with no
18 other depot as a backup and had to do a natural disaster
19 excursion or an explosion excursion and what that would do to
20 your future readiness?
21 SECRETARY WEST: Do you mean an explosion that took
22 out one of our depots? Is that what you mean?

Page 32

1 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Yes. You had a tornado, a
2 hurricane. You had an explosion, a fire. That is not
3 unheard of. Tinker had a fire not too long ago. And if that
4 did it to one of your depots and you had no backup -- let's
5 say Letterkenny was gone -- do you still feel as comfortable
6 as you said before on your risk?
7 SECRETARY WEST: Well, I hesitate to answer too
8 quickly here, commissioner, because quite frankly, one of the
9 first things that occurs to me is, there are just some risks
10 that we can keep on trying to guard against, and we will just
11 run out of money to guard against them.
12 You're right that there's less risk that there will
13 be three explosions to take out three ground depots than that
14 there is one that will take out one. But it strikes me that
15 trying to do that particular analysis, the "what if," may not
16 really help us in what we're trying to provide for you.
17 I understand your point is that it will help in
18 what you're trying to do, and I'll see what my colleagues say
19 about that. But for me, at the outset, the risk that by
20 going from three at this point clearly redundant ground
21 depots to one, essentially, will leave us somehow unable to
22 do what we need to do in an emergency is one that my

Page 33

1 professional officers tell me they are prepared to undergo.
2 Having said that, let me now turn to them.
3 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Commissioner Robles, I think
4 it's a manageable risk. You've got LIMA -- I've got LIMA
5 where I could turn. I could turn to the civilian sector to
6 do some of it. I believe the United States Marine Corps has
7 some capability in that area.
8 Of all of the problems we have got in the
9 sustainment of the force -- the sustainment of the force, now
10 -- this is probably the one that's the most manageable. And
11 I think that the insurance bill to keep depots which are --
12 or the bill, not the insurance bill. That's your business,
13 not mine. The bill to keep depots which are significantly
14 under capacity is too high, given the amount of dollars, to
15 the chairman's point.
16 You know, we have got an organization to hold
17 together here. And that's where I am. I think Jimmy has got
18 some --
19 GENERAL SHANE: Well, I just wanted -- Mr.
20 Chairman, General Shane -- to add to that. We did look at
21 that. We thoroughly understand the risk associated with
22 this. But nevertheless, as we look at the excess capacity,

Page 34

1 as the Chief Staff of the Army has pointed out, we just had
2 almost 50 percent excess capacity, two depots' worth.
3 And, as you tackle that and you present these
4 scenarios -- and you presented one as a natural disaster. So
5 now, you've got a situation which impacts on the national
6 security of this country.
7 So naturally, Department of Defense is going to
8 rally to that and the Marine Corps and LIMA facilities. And
9 our private sector would rally to it. And I think the
10 resource is out there to accommodate that unpredictable risk
11 that you pose to us.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Good. I just want to make
13 sure we're on the record here, because this will give us the
14 baseline for other service discussions about this particular
15 issue, which is, very candidly, not uniform across the
16 services.
17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: You know that in the last big
18 war, we did a lot of that maintenance in Japan. We did a lot
19 of maintenance of some of those vehicles, track vehicles in
20 Japan, as you know.
21 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, may I just add, at
22 the early stage of development of the proposal, we were

Page 35

1 asking the same kinds of questions that you are asking. We
2 went to our war fighters. We went to the deputy Chief of
3 Staff for operations.
4 And we said, "What is your view on this?" And his
5 view -- the people who have ultimate responsibility for
6 providing Army equipment for the war fight said it was an
7 acceptable risk. And that was the basis of our
8 recommendation.
9 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. I just want to make
10 sure we're all on the same sheet of music as we go through
11 this very tough issue with the rest of the services.
12 SECRETARY WEST: I would like to add one more word.
13164x1662Y And I know you want to move on. I think, frankly, that our
14 analysis tells us that the Department of Defense is bleeding
15 depot money. We are just spending money on capacity that we
16 simply do not need now.
17 If we have to make our contribution from the
18 Department of the Army point of view, it is clear what it is
19 we need to retain. And that is, perhaps, the most important
20 thing to us, the way in which we have retained the ones --
21 Tobyhanna to do its mission, consolidating our ground vehicle
22 maintenance at one depot.

Page 36

1 We know what we need, and that is the key thing.
2 But we simply cannot continue to keep open capacity that we
3 are not presently using. And yes, we do have to do some
4 thinking about what do we do in a crisis. And we think we
5 have done that.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. I would like to switch
7 to an equally noncontroversial subject. It has to do with
8 the movement of the chemical facility from Fort McClellan to
9 Fort Leonard Wood. I was at Anniston last Friday and got a
10 briefing from the McClellan folks. And their issues are two,
11 and I would just like you to address those two issues.
12 Issue number one, they're concerned about the
13 permits. Understanding that the State of Missouri said
14 they're going to issue the permits and there are all the
15 permits they need and that everything is good to go, but
16 there is some concern that maybe all the permits were not
17 issued and they were issued too hastily and not a proper
18 analysis was done.
19 In some cases, they whited-out the permit from
20 three or four years ago and inserted them. And there's going
21 to be a legal challenge. And the environmental groups are
22 starting to get up in arms, et cetera. So that was one

Page 37

1 issue.
2 The second issue is that there will be a
3 degradation of the smoke training mission, mobile spoke
4 specifically, because the permits they have don't let you do
5 use fog oil to do some of the smoke training that's required.
6 And the third issue and probably the one that got
7 my attention the most is that there is a belief by the
8 Military Police Corps and the Chemical Corps that they're
9 going to become second-class citizens when they move to Fort
10 Leonard Wood, that they have spent 20 years building up the
11 infrastructure and getting the facilities required to have a
12 quality MP force, which are always the first to deploy, as
13 all of us know, and the Chemical Corps that sort of bounced
14 around for several years looking for a home -- and now, we're
15 going to move them to Fort Leonard Wood, and they will become
16 second-class citizens and take a step down and that mission
17 will be subsumed.
18 Those are the three issues, as candidly and as
19 clearly as I understand them. So would you please address
20 them?
21 SECRETARY WEST: Let me start there, since I was so
22 directly involved in those decisions. Let's take the last

Page 38

1 one first, second-class citizenship. I think that there is
2 no one more grateful, first of all, to the communities that
3 have housed the Army over time, certainly to the community
4 that has housed these schools. Our soldiers have been
5 treated well, and they have been made to feel good there.
6 And yes, it is always more comfortable to remain in
7 the place where you were assigned and where you have over
8 time built up your stature both on the post -- and I think
9 your question referred more to on the post -- but also in the
10 community.
11 Even so, in our Army, particularly when we're
12 talking about branches of the services or the schools, it is
13 the commanders themselves of those institutions, the cadre,
14 who when they move to their new location will determine what
15 their status is on their new post. I hold them as
16 accountable for whether or not they're second-class citizens
17 in their new location as I do anybody else.
18 But even so, of course, the answer you would expect
19 from me is that we will make sure that at the new location,
20 they have the status, they have the -- and I think the other
21 thing they're concerned about is access to support that they
22 want. I would say that that's not a real worry on our part,

Page 39

1 but I understand why you raised it.
2 The other two are more recent issues. Let me take
3 the first of those two, which is permits generally, whether
4 we're getting them and whether we're going to get what we
5 need. Our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense -- and
6 it was one that the Chief of Staff and I specifically placed
7 our emphasis on as it worked its way up to us -- was that we
8 would not move -- there will be no moving unless we get the
9 permits we need to operate in the new location.
10 That was the basis on which we recommended that the
11 Secretary send the list to you. And I think that is the way
12 that recommendation comes to you. That pledge on the part of
13 the Chief of Staff and on the Secretary of the Army remains
14 in effect. Our recommendation to you is that we not move,
15 that we don't move unless we get the permits.
16 But the second part of that is, from all I
17 understand from those who I trust and the Chief trusts to
18 follow this information for us, we now have those permits,
19 every one of them, and to the extent we need them to do our
20 job.
21 Is that right?
22 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, it is. And let me

Page 40

1 reinforce that, and then I'll get to the other one. To the
2 best of my knowledge, we have the permits that we need.
3 I understand that because Missouri is a regulated
4 state regarding some of the environmental aspects of smoke,
5 that their permit is a little bit less open than Alabama, but
6 I believe we can get to the level of training we need with
7 the permits as I understand them, now. You know, as I have
8 seen them to this date. Now, certainly --
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Could I interrupt at that point,
10 general? You have legal counsel that advises you about these
11 matters, I take it?
12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. Yes. Now, regarding
13 the second aspect of your question, I'm committed to
14 maintaining the essence of America's Army. And it troubles
15 me, obviously, when someone says that they think a move such
16 as this will put them into second-class citizenship in the
17 Army.
18 We're certainly not going to let that happen, and
19 I'm sure General Reimer, if he were here, would say the same
20 thing. I mean, we have seen a lot of change here in the last
21 four years, an enormous amount of change. And we have kept
22 the vibrancy and the credibility of this organization.

Page 41

1 And moving the chemical school and the MP school to
2 Fort Leonard Wood, in my view, will not be detrimental to
3 that in the long-term readiness of the United States Army.
4 And we will work -- and I know General Reimer will; I'm sure
5 I'm speaking for him -- to ensure that that just doesn't
6 happen. But it's important for me to hear. It's feedback.
7 And obviously, I'll take a look at it.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My
9 time has expired.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Commissioner Montoya.
11 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Let me stay on the same
12 topic for a moment, general, but come at it from another
13 issue that has come to our attention, the issue of permits.
14 There's a real trap there, in that there in the world of
15 environmental issues, you get permits to construct things
16 which are fairly easy to obtain compared to permission to
17 operate things.
18 It's those operating permits that generally don't
19 come till after you finish construction or nearly the time
20 construction is done that really tie your hands. And so I
21 don't seek to tell you that you aren't getting good advice,
22 but I just mention that it's a long process and a very

Page 42

1 unpredictable process.
2 And in that regard, I've seen correspondence where
3 the moving of the chemical school could, in fact, jeopardize
4 a remaining mission that you have in mind for Anniston, which
5 is the disposal of chemical stockpile.
6 The State of Alabama, I think, has written that
7 part of the conditions that they had contemplated in writing
8 permits or awarding permits for construction in later
9 operation was the assurances that there would be adequate
10 cleanup or reaction forces associated with the chemical
11 school if there were an accident or if there were a spill,
12 what have you.
13 And so they would reconsider issuing construction
14 and operating permits for your disposal activity at the
15 existing site. Can you address that for me?
16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, I don't believe there's a
17 direct link between the two, although I understand that I'm
18 sure there is someone somewhere who is trying to draw that
19 link. But I don't believe there's a link between McClellan
20 and Anniston in that regard.
21 Now, to your other point, I'm not the lawyer here.
22 There's a lot of attorneys here in this room, and there's a

Page 43

1 lot of attorneys that can handle the other aspects of it.
2 I'm aware of the pitfalls involved in a move such as this
3 with permits to construct and permits to operate. And there
4 will be views on all of that.
5 I think what the Secretary said is important. We
6 have proposed to move these two schools from Alabama to
7 Missouri because we feel that is the most efficient way to
8 operate three schools and the most efficient way to be
9 operating the Army.
10 We are not going to do it if it will jeopardize our
11 mission. And that -- we'll just have to play this out. I
12 believe we have what we need to do that now. Look, we're
13 walking a fine line here. I've got to get the money to run
14 this organization. And I think the way to do it is to get
15 out of McClellan.
16 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And general, I accept that
17 on its face. I'm not going to quarrel with that. What I'm
18 suggesting is, there are people in state government, and
19 there are environmental folks that could care less about your
20 money, your mission.
21 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
22 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And they will stop you. As

Page 44

1 sure as I'm sitting here, they will stop you. And I'm not
2 convinced that today, that your path is so clear that you
3 have the assurance that you can execute. That's this
4 commissioner's concern at this point in the process. I
5 haven't seen the evidence that you can execute,
6 notwithstanding your correctness.
7 SECRETARY WEST: Commissioner, if I might have a
8 chance to address that. I'm not the lawyer here, either, but
9 I am a lawyer. And the Chief and I have a number of lawyers
10 who have been addressing that very issue. That's one of the
11 reasons we wrote that condition into our approval. And I am
12 familiar with the very point you make. And we are very
13 careful about it.
14 That is why I've emphasized that. But I also don't
15 want to mislead you. It is true that we believe right now
16 that we have the permits we will need, and we also believe
17 that we will be able to carry through in the place that we
18 will move to. We were very careful about analyzing that.
19 And we realized that working through the permitting process
20 is a series of landmines.
21 It is why when we did the review, the Chief and I
22 asked the basic question which I suspect occurs to you as

Page 45

1 well underneath all of this, which is, "Why would you leave a
2 place where you've got all your permits where you are able to
3 operate without legal impediment to go to a place where
4 you've got to go through the process that not only regulators
5 but those who come in to influence regulators, the public,
6 might somehow derail that effort?"
7 And the answer is, the logic of the move, the
8 savings, the intelligence in the way we can operate our force
9 dictate it. That being the case, we have walked as carefully
10 as we know how through the permits. And at this moment, we
11 are encouraged. We believe we are there in terms of what we
12 need now, and we believe we will continue to have the
13 cooperation of the receiving states' authorities, even though
14 there will from time to time be issues that arise.
15 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner Montoya, if I might
16 add one thing on the chemical demilitarization issue. The
17 Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for the
18 Secretary of Defense to build eight such chemical
19 demilitarization plants throughout the United States. And
20 the Army is committed in each one of those cases to provide
21 exactly the amount and the level of support that's needed for
22 the safe operation of those chemical demilitarization plants.

Page 46

1 In none of the other locations is there a military
2 base such as Fort McClellan. So we believe that it is not
3 required for the safe operation of the plants that we will
4 provide exactly the level of support that is required.
5 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And I accept that, too. The
6 issue is, will Alabama accept that. And they're on record
7 saying they won't. And we have 50 independent states like
8 you have 8 independent commissioners, and they don't always
9 work in concert.
10 One question to the depots, and it's a substantive
11 question. Again, looking at a total cost as we look at these
12 issues, we have some data that indicates that the cost of
13 unemployment compensation in the Army number is less than a
14 million dollars; the community's estimating costs that could
15 be in excess of $50 million. And that presumes that none of
16 the people or very few of the people will move from one place
17 to the other.
18 That has two implications -- that great cost
19 disparity implication; the other one is, there is clearly
20 workload at Red River. Having been there, there is a lot of
21 work there and more work contemplated. Two questions: Can
22 you absorb the workload at Anniston that is there today?

Page 47

1 And secondly, does your analysis indicate that
2 large numbers of people are going to move, or are you going
3 to be able to replace the skills -- if they don't move,
4 you're going to lose a tremendous resource. I was really
5 impressed with the people, by the way, at Red River, their
6 attitude, their management skills and approach.
7 You're going to lose a great resource, not only in
8 plant, but in people if they don't move. And have you
9 analyzed how you're going to make that up to handle that
10 workload? What is your view of those people?
11 SECRETARY WEST: Well, I was going to say,
12 commissioner, we share your view. That's one of our top
13 depots. They won an award. They are a fine representation
14 of employees and people who work for the United States doing
15 the United States' business and doing it well, and we're
16 proud of them.
17 We do not make this plan lightly. We make it in
18 view of the fact that if we are going to combine the depot
19 maintenance, we are driven to combine it at the facility that
20 has the heavy maintenance capability. And I think that's
21 sort of where we had to go on that.
22 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And you can do the work, you

Page 48

1 think, with the people you've got at Anniston, or do you see
2 some growth in personnel?
3 SECRETARY WEST: Yes. Your question about
4 migration, for example, I don't know what our personnel
5 expectations are.
6 GENERAL SHANE: There's no question that we can do
7 the work, Commissioner Montoya. We looked at that. We
8 coordinated that with the Army Materiel Command. The
9 headquarters does that. Everything seems to be in place.
10 Your concern with regards to the 10 million and $50
11 million difference that you brought up with regards to
12 working compensation, let me comment about that. Our numbers
13 -- and this is a point I think we need to keep in mind, that
14 the Army's numbers have been audited by the Army Audit Agency
15 and GAO at almost every step in the process.
16 So I feel fairly comfortable with the numbers. It
17 doesn't mean that we haven't collectively made a minor
18 mistake. But I think that those numbers are good for the
19 Army, 10 million is a good number. But regards to the work,
20 no question. Anniston can assume that workload.
21 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner

Page 49

1 Montoya.
2 Commissioner Kling.
3 COMMISSIONER KLING: One quick question back to
4 the chemical. Will a general officer be heading up the
5 Chemical Corps if it moves to Fort Leonard Wood?
6 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
7 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, it will be?
8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
9 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you.
10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes. Each of the schools will
11 be separate and distinct, I'm sure. Now, that doesn't mean
12 that there wouldn't -- you know, I think there will be some
13 management efficiencies which could take place, obviously,
14 since there would be overlap in some of the --
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: We had just heard that there
16 wouldn't be a general officer in that.
17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: You did?
18 COMMISSIONER KLING: That there would not be, and
19 that's really why I'm asking you. Let me turn to the matter
20 of the leases, if I could, a second. We have had a lot of
21 back and forth information, and I'm referring to ATCOM, which
22 you just, Mr. Secretary, briefly touched on the military

Page 50

1 value of leases.
2 But the Missouri delegation and the community have
3 expressed their concern that the Army has not complied with
4 the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of '90. Can you
5 just explain why you believe that the Army's recommendation
6 concerning leases are consistent with the force structure and
7 the final selection criteria giving priority to military
8 value?
9 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir. And there are several
10 points to be made here, and then I think I will also defer to
11 General Sullivan, as well. First of all, the question is,
12 the military value of what? Are we talking about the
13 military value of the lease itself and the facility, as we
14 often do when we talk about the military value, say, of an
15 Army installation, the military value of Fort Bragg and all
16 those ranges and the like?
17 Because if we're talking about that, then the
18 military value of the leases in a building in essentially an
19 office setting is simply not that significant. No, I
20 overstated. It's not significant. So the only other
21 question, then, is the appropriateness of the economic
22 decision made there, the business decision, on the one hand

Page 51

1 and of the implications of how we are organizing ourselves to
2 do the defense business.
3 That is, should ATCOM remain together for the
4 synergy of its many component parts; or if, as we're planning
5 to spin some things off, will that somehow lessen their
6 ability to do their job? And I think maybe you want me to
7 really get to that latter point.
8 So first of all, on the leases, as a business
9 matter, I would like to see the Army out of as many leases as
10 we could get out of. Now, that's simply not possible to do.
11 There are too many instances in which when you look at the
12 contrasting alternatives, it makes much better business sense
13 to be in that lease there.
14 That is not the case with ATCOM in St. Louis. It
15 does not make better business sense for us to be in those
16 high-cost leases. It makes better business sense if we have
17 a way consistent with the Chief of Staff's force structure
18 needs, to be somewhere in space that is on a post or that the
19 Army owns and where there can be some synergy with other like
20 activities.
21 And on the second part, a decision which
22 essentially moves components of ATCOM to do like things with

Page 52

1 like components seems to us, again, to make sense in terms of
2 the needs of the Army at that time. And on those alignments,
3 I think I'm prepared to pass along to the Chief.
4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I think leases, while important,
5 I think we need to just consolidate all of them as much as
6 possible.
7 GENERAL SHANE: If I could?
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, sir, General Shane.
9 GENERAL SHANE: Commissioner Kling, let me make a
10 comment on this. First, with regards to Missouri delegation,
11 as you recall, I provided I think it was a 14-page letter
12 which laid out the Army's position on that in detail. And
13 what I think the bottom line of that was is not a question of
14 criterias.
15 It's really a question of process and how you go
16 about assessing and going through the rigorous analysis of
17 coming up with the term "military value." With normal
18 installations, what we did, we use what we call the
19 "installation assessment plan." And we used a computer model
20 called Decision Pad to come up with a list of ratings based
21 on some attributes that were established.
22 The difference is the fact that we looked at each

Page 53

1 individual list, but we did not necessarily use the Decision
2 Pad model or the installation assessment plan to do that. So
3 when I read through what the delegation was saying to me, I
4 think there may be a little bit of information here that was
5 kind of left out.
6 And that was the fact that they may just did not
7 understand clearly with regards to what military value was
8 and confused it with the issue of the installation assessment
9 of leases. So once again, I would ask that for testimony
10 today, that we provide for you or make a matter of record the
11 memorandum I provided to the Commission's staff.
12 COMMISSIONER KLING: That would be fine, sir.
13 SECRETARY WEST: Commissioner, there was one point
14 left untouched, and I should just make a note. The other
15 point, the utility of actually separating those units out,
16 separating aviation from troop support, which is what ATCOM
17 is right now. It's basically a combination of two different
18 functions.
19 What our proposal will do as part of the process
20 is, we'll return those to like locations. Aviation will be
21 with like activity. Troop support will be, I think, with the
22 solider support at Fort Nadick. And that makes sense to us

Page 54

1 in terms of the synergy of those operations.
2 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, if I might add
3 just one point on what the Secretary just said. In addition
4 to that, it results in a substantial cost savings. The
5 annual savings from the recommendation is $56 million
6 annually once it's executed. That's 9 percent of the entire
7 savings of the entire package before the Commission. That is
8 a substantial savings in this one instance.
9 COMMISSIONER KLING: That's a good lead-in, Mr.
10 Secretary, to the second question. And this really is
11 getting down more to it. The Army estimates, as I understand
12 -- we have a slide here that we'll put up, but the Army
13 estimates that 786 civilian positions could be eliminated by
14 combining the aviation troop command and the missile command.
15 However, the community believes that the personnel
16 savings are significantly overstated, and from the 786, only
17 48 positions would be eliminated as shown on this slide in
18 which we may not be able to see, but I believe you all have
19 it in front of you.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Do you have the slide?
21 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
22 COMMISSIONER KLING: I wonder if you might just

Page 55

1 comment on each of these categories as we go down it,
2 Secretary Walker or whoever.
3 SECRETARY WEST: We'll let General Shane.
4 COMMISSIONER KLING: General Shane?
5 GENERAL SHANE: Commissioner Kling, let me discuss
6 that. First of all, let me state that the Army stands by its
7 number 786. And let me explain why. First of all, at every
8 juncture -- and I'll discuss each one of these points in just
9 a minute.
10 But at every juncture, once again, the Army
11 Auditing Agency and GAO checked our numbers. So they have
12 been validated by some analysts and reviewed. So we feel
13 pretty comfortable with regards to that. Let me give you
14 just a take.
15 First of all, we start with additional force
16 structure reductions. I would like to point out a couple of
17 things. They use in here the October '94 program budget
18 guidance, which talks to man years and dollars and not
19 authorizations. And they talk -- plus the February command
20 plan changes, which has not been confirmed by the Army.
21 So what we used was what we were directed to by
22 DOD, and that was the November '94 ASIP. And once again, we

Page 56

1 stand by those numbers. The 205 you see here are not just
2 Army numbers. Those consist of Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy,
3 and other DOD people. So the 205 number, we simply do not
4 support that number.
5 The area support positions, the bottom line there
6 is the fact that once again, we do not support it because the
7 workload is being absorbed elsewhere. And we get down to the
8 last two areas which talk about 90 and 387 as base OPS
9 personnel.
10 What they're saying is the fact that you do not
11 recognize any savings when associated with streamlining,
12 downgrading, reengineering a headquarters, which was in our
13 proposal.
14 And we simply have discussed this in detail with
15 the major command, and they agree that these numbers here are
16 overstated. So the bottom line is, the 48 number which they
17 say which constitutes no savings for the Army is not correct.
18 COMMISSIONER KLING: The biggest numbers are the 90
19 and the 387. And what you're saying to me, I believe, if I
20 would understand from a business life, is that you absolutely
21 are going to be instructing when the move takes place that
22 these positions are not to be filled, period?

Page 57

1 GENERAL SHANE: That's correct. That's correct.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: So you stand by the fact that
3 these -- we will not be replacing these numbers of people
4 when this move is done?
5 GENERAL SHANE: That's correct. And I have
6 personally gone down and talked to the commander of MICOM,
7 Major General Link, and discussed this issue with him in
8 talking about this in conceptual terms. And we feel
9 comfortable with our number -- 786 is the right number.
10 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, if I might add one
11 thing. After this list was submitted to the Commission, the
12 staff continued to work on looking at the estimates to make
13 sure that they were correct. This has been revised downward.
14 The original estimate was for 1,022 personnel savings. And
15 we have looked at it again, and the current estimate is 786.
16 So we have taken into account those concerns in the
17 recommendations.
18 COMMISSIONER KLING: I guess the other point is the
19 savings.
20 SECRETARY WALKER: Yes. And as a result of that,
21 we still found that the savings not only held up but
22 increased. The original recommendation indicated that annual

Page 58

1 savings would be 46 million. We now calculate those savings
2 to be 56 million annually after completion.
3 SECRETARY WEST: So the bottom line, commissioner,
4 is every time we review this, it looks better to us.
5 COMMISSIONER KLING: I've been told my time has
6 expired, so Mr. Chairman, I turn it back to you. And by the
7 way, gentlemen, I certainly thank the Army. In all the
8 visits we had, the people were splendid. The Corps is
9 wonderful. It has been a great experience.
10 GENERAL SHANE: Thank you.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Commissioner Kling.
12 General Sullivan, you made an interesting remark in
13 your presentation about the fact that this is the last BRAC.
14 And, of course, you and I know that under law, it is the last
15 BRAC. Have I shocked you? You did make that --
16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, I did.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, let me make this observation.
18 It clearly is the last BRAC provided by law. There isn't any
19 question that we have got a 40 percent reduction in
20 authorized and appropriated amounts. There isn't any
21 question we have got a 30 percent force level reduction.
22 There isn't any question we haven't come up to the

Page 59

1 mark in this BRAC round even if we exceeded the
2 recommendations of the Department of Defense to take care of
3 the excess capacity. I believe all that's a given. But you
4 interrupt me if I'm wrong. I'm shocked to see staff show me
5 figures that show we're back down to about the 1950 level. I
6 think that's regrettable, if it's factual.
7 But I think the trend does not look very good.
8 Were it up to me, I would advise differently, but I'm
9 satisfied that Congress is doing nothing more but reflecting
10 the views of their constituency and, for the time being, we
11 have to live with that.
12 In any event, it brings me to this point.
13 Obviously, no one would tolerate another BRAC in a couple of
14 years. I think everybody has a belly full of this for right
15 now, and I can understand why. Certainly, the Chair has a
16 belly full of it. But it occurs that there's a lot of excess
17 capacity out there still to be looked at again.
18 There has been some discussion about the
19 possibility of maybe after a couple of Presidential elections
20 intervene and the dust settles and everybody has had an
21 opportunity to review their own house again -- maybe I'm
22 throwing out a figure of something like 2001, there's an

Page 60

1 election in '96, and there's an election in 2000.
2 And by that time -- and that's the end,
3 incidentally -- I believe I'm correct -- that's the end of
4 the reach of these BRACs, 2001. So it strikes me that out
5 there six years away where nobody needs to lie awake nights
6 right now, maybe we could look at this again. And I only ask
7 you -- you're leaving in six days. You don't have a dog in
8 this fight. What do you think of that?
9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I think the way you're going is
10 probably the right line of reasoning. Certainly, nobody
11 knows what the dollars are going to do. But if they continue
12 to go down, the only way to do it is to have a BRAC
13 Commission, in my view.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I don't want to have one
15 sitting around for six years.
16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No, no. I mean, if you were to
17 ask me, "Okay, what would you recommend?" I would recommend
18 that after this all runs its course, then consider
19 resurrecting the Commission.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Let me ask you another
21 thing. We have seen here -- I don't mean this as any
22 reflection on you -- a lot of changes in the evolution of the

Page 61

1 BRAC process. You know, you take off things, you put them
2 back on, you realign, you realign again, you subtract, you
3 add to. I'm not finding fault with that.
4 Now, there may be some of that after this, and the
5 question has occurred to us, without reaching out beyond what
6 you've done, we are thinking we need to address how you make
7 changes in BRAC over the next six years. If you want to come
8 to us, say, "We have kind of looked at this again, and this
9 needs a little bit more tuning up."
10 So do you think that's something we -- the reason I
11 ask all these things, Senator Thurmond has asked us to come
12 in about the middle of July when the dust has at least
13 partially settled if we can get back into town, and we'll
14 wear bulletproof vests and come in in the dead of night like
15 Abraham Lincoln did after the election that time over 100
16 years ago. But if we do that, is that a thing we should be
17 looking at?
18 GENERAL SULLIVAN: In my opinion, it is. I think
19 the leaders of these organizations need the flexibility to
20 manage their assets so that they can hold these organizations
21 together. And I can't predict -- I don't think anybody can
22 predict what's going to happen here. And I think there has

Page 62

1 to be some mechanism so we can move things around.
2 I think Commissioner Montoya's question is
3 certainly -- look, we're paying attention to that. Now, we
4 don't want to slavishly hold to preconceived plans or
5 preconceived notions if it doesn't seem correct. And locking
6 us in, fencing us in, will be dysfunctional. Could be.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And Secretary, you're nodding
8 "yes." If you have anything you want to --
9 SECRETARY WEST: No. On a different matter, your
10 comment about the Chief not having a dog in this fight, of
11 course, we know how he feels about the Army. He always will
12 have a dog in this fight.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Oh, I understand that. Well, we
14 respect and love him for it. Now, I'm going to ask two more
15 questions. They're highly repetitious. But, you know, by
16 now, let's all be adults about this. We know what the hot
17 spots are around here. And everybody knows that some things
18 are not going to be a lot of trouble, and other things are
19 highly controversial. Let's face that.
20 Now, the fight between Alabama and Missouri has
21 gotten into the national magazines and everything else. And
22 it's a pretty good fight, and I respect both sides for going

Page 63

1 at it and making their best cases. Now, challenges are
2 taking place before the commissions right now at the
3 administrative level. I have no doubt this is going into
4 courts and so forth. I'm a lawyer. That's how I make my
5 living in my other life.
6 But you fellows are here saying that you stake your
7 reputations on the fact that what you have now, the permits
8 you have now satisfy the Army regarding this matter.
9 SECRETARY WEST: To the extent we know and with the
10 advice we have, which yes, as you pointed out, does include
11 our counsel.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I want to tell you
13 something. We're going to start voting next Thursday, the
14 22nd day of June. And I ask you both, General Sullivan and
15 Secretary West -- let's see; you're going to leave here six
16 days from now -- but I would ask you all to let us know if
17 there's any changes in this. Because as far as the Chair's
18 concerned, I indicate not at all how we'll vote. There may
19 even be divisions here.
20 But the point is, I act on the assumption you're
21 saying you're satisfied about the permits on whatever this
22 chairman finally will do.

Page 64

1 SECRETARY WEST: And that's a correct assumption,
2 sir.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, finally, I want to make this
4 clear in my own mind. There's a lot of discussion here. All
5 my colleagues have asked these questions. These questions
6 are in our mind. You have five depots out there, and we all
7 know we're looking at good stuff now. I've said from the
8 beginning, "Hey, you have an '88 round; you have a '91 round;
9 you have a '93 round."
10 I played baseball and sports when I was a kid --
11 not so good -- but I remember, you had a bunch of cuts. By
12 the time you got the cuts finished, you had what you thought
13 was your team left. And this is the fourth cut. All this
14 stuff's good. Most of these places have had awards of
15 excellence and all kinds of tributes to the fine work they
16 do, right?
17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, you've got five depots out
19 there, and you're telling us with the excess capacity you've
20 got, you can live with cutting out two and having three left.
21 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And you are saying to us that

Page 65

1 that's better than downsizing, so far as the Army is
2 concerned, without any judgement of what some other service
3 may do?
4 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir. That is exactly what
5 we're saying.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You say you save money by closing
7 and not downsizing.
8 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You've looked at downsizing?
10 SECRETARY WEST: By "downsizing," you mean simply
11 shrinking the particular five to a smaller size?
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Get them smaller and in place.
13 SECRETARY WEST: We have, and we have concluded
14 that that is not the way to go and that those who may be
15 going that way are not making as good judgements as we are.
16 (Laughter.)
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, that's a stronger response
18 -- I'm a luckier lawyer than I thought I would be on that
19 one.
20 (Laughter.)
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair recognizes Commissioner
22 Davis.

Page 66

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: From the United States Air
2 Force.
3 (Laughter.)
4 SECRETARY WEST: Who are, incidentally, making fine
5 judgements.
6 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Formerly of the Air Force.
7 First, I would like to join my colleagues up here in wishing
8 General Sullivan well. And we hope that he doesn't go away,
9 that he provides his advice and counsel for years to come.
10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thanks.
11 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Mr. Secretary, I'm going to
12 have to beg your indulgence. You know, it's a wonderful
13 thing when -- the commissioners are really worried that
14 either agreeing with you or not agreeing with you would do
15 severe damage to your capability. And I recognize the job
16 General Sullivan and you have done in trying to map this
17 strategy out.
18 I also recognize that your budget flex is not very
19 high and that if you don't get the savings, you probably
20 jeopardize your readiness and your modernization accounts,
21 which is really very critical. By the same token, as you can
22 see, we're not up here to challenge the U.S. Army on their

Page 67

1 depot choices.
2 We're just worried that we leave you with the
3 proper capability when we're finished. And natural disaster
4 has already been covered rather well. And that's something
5 we should worry about.
6 Let me ask you another question in sort of a
7 counter-natural disaster question. Given that you -- if Red
8 River is closed and Anniston will be almost completely at
9 capacity by shifting the workload, have you considered using
10 Letterkenny as a backup to increase their workload with some
11 other vehicles -- the Palladin runs out in, I think, '97 --
12 if you just do the active Reserves, you do the Guard and
13 Reserve, then you've got a continuing Palladin, so we're told
14 by Letterkenny -- and increase it with something like some
15 other vehicle like the Bradley fighting vehicle or something
16 like that?
17 SECRETARY WEST: We have looked at a lot of
18 different options, commissioner. That is one we specifically
19 have not chosen. As you know, we are realigning Letterkenny,
20 or at least we are proposing to. The Palladin, incidently,
21 is, in our view, not jeopardized by this. It will be done by
22 the time these occur.

Page 68

1 And so my answer is, no, using Letterkenny in that
2 capacity is not our plan. I think, however, your reference
3 to natural disasters and the like, again, maybe you want to
4 hear a little bit more from us on that point. And I'm going
5 to let the Chief respond.
6 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, we're all concerned
7 about your surge capacity. You know, if you close a depot,
8 whether it be Red River or some other one, your surge
9 capacity has been properly protected.
10 SECRETARY WEST: Surge capacity is one of the
11 things we spend the most time thinking about.
12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, we worry about that. I
13 think a million men and women in the United States Army, 10
14 divisions, is the -- I don't need to go through that litany
15 with you, because you know it. And I'm down here -- we are
16 right at the edge of taking more force structure and getting
17 into some big-time cuts here.
18 And I think, frankly, that this is the best
19 approach. And it wasn't easy to take eight divisions out of
20 the United States Army and 600,000 people. And we have got
21 to have this kind of money. And, as the chairman pointed
22 out, nobody knows where these dollars will go in the future.

Page 69

1 And that's really what we're after.
2 And when surge -- we'll have to take care of surge
3 and figure it out. I think we can figure it out, when push
4 comes to shove. I'm sure American industry -- corporate
5 America has always been with us, and we're gong to be able to
6 handle it in corporate America.
7 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: As a follow-on, General
8 Sullivan, then, the latest study indicates that we ought to
9 do more privatization. Would that be part of your scheme?
10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: In that case, in the surge case.
11 You know, some natural disaster, which you're hypothesizing,
12 I would figure something out. And then I'm sure somebody
13 would step up and say, "Chief, we can handle that; give it to
14 us."
15 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, I hope you take comfort
16 from the fact that we're worrying about this almost as much
17 as you are.
18 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I do, and I appreciate your
19 concerns. And as you know, J.B., I'm trying to balance all
20 of this to do what I have to do in the larger sense, which is
21 to provide an Army which is capable of doing what the country
22 wants it to do and not work on the margin in the total sense.

Page 70

1 These are big dollars. They're not marginal
2 dollars. But they start cutting into readiness. I
3 understand readiness when you get into war, but some of these
4 things, natural disasters, I think I can overcome.
5 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yes, sir. Now that I've got
6 the big question off our minds, some lesser ones. Does the
7 recent sarin incident trouble you in the movement of the
8 chemical training facility?
9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No. The recent sarin incident
10 troubles me, but moving the chemical -- I've moved divisions
11 all over the place. I've moved hundreds of thousands of
12 troops. We're not going to lose our capability vis a vis
13 that issue by moving from Alabama to Missouri or moving from
14 Alabama to anyplace. I'll keep the capabilities I need, and
15 we know how to do this kind of stuff.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right, sir. The Michigan
17 delegation yesterday talked about the Army pulling its
18 garrison out of Selfridge, and they were worried about who
19 was going to pick up the process. And, of course, I think
20 the Army's the only one that has any active duty people at
21 the Selfridge station. Is that, in fact, true, and where
22 should we go on that one?

Page 71

1 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Jimmy, you may want to talk to
2 that.
3 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: You may want to provide it for
4 the record, Jim.
5 GENERAL SHANE: This is General Shane. I would
6 prefer to comment on the record in writing, if I may.
7 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Sure. And my last question
8 is, according to the Army data, the Sierra Army Depot's the
9 only Army installation out of which START Treaty mandated
10 destruction of rocket motors can be carried out. How is the
11 Department of Defense -- Mr. Secretary, if you close Sierra
12 Army Depot, how is the Department of Defense going to -- are
13 they going to recertify another depot?
14 SECRETARY WEST: I would think so. I think we have
15 an alternative to it. I just don't know what it is right off
16 the top of my head, commissioner.
17 Do you know, Jimmy?
18 GENERAL SHANE: I really don't know the answer to
19 that. But I think it's not being closed, and I think we need
20 to specify for the record it's being realigned. So there's a
21 big difference.
22 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: But the capability there --

Page 72

1 GENERAL SHANE: But the capability there with
2 regards to that --
3 GENERAL SULLIVAN: We'll give you an answer.
4 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right, sir. And, Mr.
5 Secretary, one final question. I'm sorry. I had to leave
6 the dais for a second. But you do not plan to close English
7 Village under the current plan?
8 SECRETARY WEST: We had been negotiating with the
9 National Guard about English Village before we made our
10 recommendation on Dugway. And, quite frankly, commissioner,
11 we believe that what we announced on Dugway probably had some
12 impact on how that was going forward.
13 It is our desire to keep English Village available.
14 The question is, who will keep it available. It is our hope
15 that that will be transferred to the Guard.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So it's the intent for the
17 U.S. Army to keep it open, but who funds it is at question?
18 SECRETARY WEST: The intent is to pass it over to
19 the Guard.
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you very much, sir.
21 Mr. Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much,

Page 73

1 Commissioner Davis.
2 Commissioner Cox?
3 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. Mr.
4 Secretary, both you and the chairman have eloquently pointed
5 out that we have to make do with less. And one of the things
6 that we seem to be doing successfully DOD-wide is taking
7 advantage of our Reserve components.
8 And we have seen that in several facilities, both
9 facilities and in several incidents over the last couple of
10 years how important the Reserve and Guard are to our efforts.
11 And for that reason, I want to ask you some questions about
12 some of the training ground recommendations that you've made
13 because, as we continue to rely even more on the Reserve
14 components, it's obviously important that they be well ready
15 and trained.
16 You all have proposed not closing exactly but
17 realigning, I take it, and enclaving Fort Pickett, Fort
18 Chaffee, and Indiantown Gap. My understanding in talking to
19 folks who train there today is that your proposal is not that
20 we close them but that they enclave those training areas and
21 facilities which are needed so that we will have those
22 training grounds but that it be funded and run by our

Page 74

1 Reserves and the National Guard.
2 In each case, in Indiantown Gap, my understanding
3 is they're looking at almost 100 percent of the facilities
4 and land being enclaved; at Fort Pickett, somewhere between
5 85 and 95 percent; and I'm not as clear at Fort Chaffee what
6 kind we're looking at. So we're essentially looking at
7 keeping the whole thing but running it differently, for which
8 we sow an enormous amount of savings.
9 I wonder if you might comment on, I guess, just
10 sort of an overall concern that if we're not closing them and
11 we're going to be running 85 or 100 percent of them, where do
12 we really get the savings in having the Guard run it versus
13 the Army?
14 SECRETARY WEST: Well, I'm not sure about the 100
15 percent versus 85 percent looking at the numbers. But the
16 question for us is always the same one, commissioner. It is
17 whether we are operating the particular facility or
18 installation in a way that reflects present-day realities,
19 both in terms of our use of our personnel and of our funding.
20 And the fact is that in each case, yes, we do show savings,
21 because the savings occur because we take away some
22 housekeeping and post-oversight authority and those kind of

Page 75

1 support facilities and turn it into solely the operation for
2 which it's going to be used.
3 That's what the enclaves say. The enclaves say
4 there is a lesser mission, there is a portion of it that's
5 less than the whole that can be isolated. If isolated, we
6 can better cost it out, better trace where the funding needs
7 to be, and also take away the incidentals that are no longer
8 necessary there.
9 Your point, I think, is are we somehow pushing this
10 off into a budget item under different colors.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Yes. If you're enclaving 85 to
12 100 percent of it, and, for example, at Fort Indiantown Gap
13 you don't have a number of the things that you might consider
14 quality of life, so there aren't sort of post things that
15 could go away, you do wonder.
16 From our perspective, and I understand you're
17 looking at it from an Army perspective, we're looking at it
18 as an overall government-wide expenditure on important
19 training. Just moving it to somewhere else doesn't help us.
20 MR. WEST: Well, it does. It makes the people who
21 use it, and who are therefore funding it, a little bit more
22 careful about how much funding they wish to lavish on it.

Page 76

1 Basically, the way I think, now you've got me on a broader
2 philosophy, a philosophical point, and I think I better get
3 off it pretty quickly, but basically I think the way we
4 protect the integrity of the federal budget is by making
5 individuals, individual organizations, entities of the
6 Executive Branch responsible not only for being the
7 proponents but the explainers of how they spend their funds.
8 In this instance, sure, we may be moving
9 responsibility over to someone, but it is the very someone
10 who should be responsible for looking at how that is going to
11 be used. At the same time, we are going to realize savings.
12 I think what you would like to know is whether the number, in
13 terms of savings to the Federal Government or the Department
14 of Defense, is exactly the same as the savings we show to the
15 active Army and whether there is maybe a smaller increment
16 there, because I am convinced that there is an increment, and
17 it is significant enough for us to propose this change to
18 you.
19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: It's about 50 -- you take all
20 three of them. If we could do what we wanted to with all
21 three, it's about 50 million a year.
22 COMMISSIONER COX: To the Army?

Page 77

1 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: With the National Guard, as I
3 understand it, and --
4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I've got some MPA and O&M costs.
5 I've got some MPA, military personnel, in there. So I would
6 say that their costs, they're there anyway in most cases, so
7 their costs are already accounted for.
8 COMMISSIONER COX: My understanding, and maybe we
9 could ask the general of the National Guard, as I see is
10 here, is that they're looking at costs of about $29 million
11 or so for running these three facilities. Maybe that's a few
12 other facilities too?
13 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: Commissioner Cox,
14 Brigadier General Shane. Let me touch on that.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: Surely.
16 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: In our analysis, we need
17 to point out that in the COBRA runs, we put aside $20 million
18 to run those three installations. I think if you talk to the
19 National Guard, General D'Araujo is here, he'll tell you his
20 requirement is about $21.6 million for those three
21 installations. So it's in the ballpark.
22 This is not done in a vacuum with regards to the

Page 78

1 requirement for training. We've coordinated and I've talked
2 direct with the National Guard. The bottom line is there are
3 some missions here that we need to divest ourselves of, that
4 he doesn't want to do. We don't to do them and we don't want
5 to pay for them. That's the thrust of our recommendation
6 here.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: And when you say, and maybe we
8 should ask D'Araujo here as well -- in fact, could I ask you
9 if you feel comfortable? Brigadier General Shane has just
10 indicated that the funding is at about $20 million for the
11 National Guard. That is for this year or is that over a
12 period of time? How does that work?
13 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: That's to establish the
14 enclaves and to operate the enclaves.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: To establish the enclaves.
16 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: That's programmed in the
17 operating costs for that.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: And, General, do you feel
19 comfortable that you can continue to run the training areas
20 that you need and that others who train there need, and that
21 you'll be able to get that money?
22 MAJOR GENERAL D'ARAUJO: Yes. The figures that you

Page 79

1 just heard about, $21 million, is our estimate for the
2 operating costs for the three installations you referred to
3 based on the minimum essential enclave we feel we need to
4 support, our weekend and annual training requirement.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I interrupt? For the record,
6 that's MG John R. D'Araujo, Director of the Army National
7 Guard. Does the reporter have all that? Could the reporter
8 hear the distinguished general's remarks?
9 MG D'ARAUJO: I think so, sir.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we don't want to think so.
11 I respect that.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: Actually, I'm having a hard time
13 hearing the general's remarks.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It's my responsibility to reserve
15 the integrity of the record here. State your name. Have you
16 been sworn?
17 MG D'ARAUJO: Yes, I have. Let me restate what I
18 just said.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
20 MG D'ARAUJO: General Shane's comments are correct.
21 What we've identified are the enclaves we require for our
22 IDTR weekend and annual training requirements to support the

Page 80

1 Guard forestructure as we see it unfolding through the years.
2 Our estimates for those enclaves that we've defined working
3 with the Army runs about $21 million for those three
4 installations you referred to.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: For those three installations?
6 MG D'ARAUJO: That is correct.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: And are you comfortable that
8 those annual costs of $21 million, presumably saving the Army
9 something more than $21 million, will be forthcoming?
10 MG D'ARAUJO: I expect that they will be, yes.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: GEN Sullivan, you will be gone,
12 but some of the rest of you all -- will you be supporting
13 that request?
14 MR. WEST: Well, let me just say, as the Secretary
15 of the Army, I'm responsible for all three components and
16 their budgets. So either General D'Araujo is speaking with
17 my authority or I'm speaking in support of him.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: And you do support him?
19 MR. WEST: I support him. Secretary Walker, let me
20 add that we've been working very closely with the Director of
21 the National Guard as well as with the state tags. The $20
22 million will be forthcoming, I can assure you, in the future

Page 81

1 budget programs.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: But that's a one-time cost.
3 MR. WALKER: No. That's an annual cost of
4 operation, I believe; is that correct?
5 COMMISSIONER COX: I'm sorry. The COBRA was -- the
6 $20 million, what was that that General Shane referred to?
7 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: That's the programmed
8 operating cost to operate the enclaves we're leaving behind.
9 MR. WEST: That's correct.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: And you all feel comfortable
11 that that money -- you all will support each other in asking
12 the Congress for that money; is that correct?
13 MR. WALKER: The continuation of this training is
14 important in those locations. There's no question.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: As I understand it, there are a
16 number of other services training there as well, not just the
17 Army Guard. The Navy has got some training at some of these
18 facilities.
19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: The Marines.
20 COMMISSIONER COX: The Marines have some training
21 at some of these facilities. Have you been coordinating with
22 them, and are you comfortable that that training will

Page 82

1 continue to be accomplished at a reasonable cost?
2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: That's at Pickett, yes. That's
3 where they do most of -- the Marines do a lot of training at
4 Pickett. We're working that action.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: And are those costs including --
6 your $21 million is the National Guard cost?
7 MG D'ARAUJO: That is correct.
8 COMMISSIONER COX: Are the costs for the Marine
9 training, I think the Navy Seals training at Fort Pickett,
10 are those also included in that $21 million that's in the
11 COBRA? That's in addition?
12 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: What you're talking about
13 are reimbursable expenses, but you're not including the COBRA
14 model.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: Right.
16 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: So we would expect the
17 Navy, the Marines to reimburse the National Guard for
18 training opportunities.
19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Whatever they do there, they
20 would reimburse them. That's in their budget line.
21 COMMISSIONER COX: And the National Guard, when
22 you're looking at enclaving and picking up the $21 million

Page 83

1 cost, I assume if you're not enclaving 100 percent of it, you
2 are enclaving enough that it would also cover the training by
3 the Marines and the Seals.
4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Sure.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: So, virtually all training that
6 is going on today at Pickett, Indiantown Gap and Chaffee will
7 continue at Pickett, Indiantown Gap and Chaffee?
8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I don't know. I wouldn't want
9 to sign up for that, but I would sign up for if whatever the
10 MEF is on the East Coast, if CG of the Marine forces on the
11 East Coast wanted to do training at Fort Pickett, he would
12 come up and negotiate with the commander of Fort Pickett
13 United States Army National Guard and he would, in fact,
14 reimburse him or her for whatever training he did as
15 appropriate out of his training funds, as would the regular
16 Army.
17 If the active Army wanted to go in and jump, as the
18 82nd does or 18th Airborne Corps, they would pay the Virginia
19 National Guard so much to do whatever they do. It would be a
20 business operation, but it would not be in this -- I urge you
21 not to try to relate $20 million to 50 because there's no
22 correlation.

Page 84

1 COMMISSIONER COX: That's part of what I'm
2 concerned about, unfortunately.
3 MR. WEST: I think we can certainly agree with you
4 on two points. One, yes, we've made our best good faith
5 effort to enclave sufficiently so that the training that
6 needs to be done by the Guard Bureau and those can be done.
7 Secondly, you are right, I think, that there may indeed be
8 other costs to the United States Government that don't get
9 caught up in what we've said here. But it is our belief that
10 the savings exist nonetheless and that we can isolate those
11 costs, try to get them together so that you'd see it.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: That would be helpful.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now let me say this, if the Chair
14 may interrupt. We only have 12 minutes left and I'm going to
15 honor the right of my last commissioner to ask questions.
16 But two commissioners have now indicated they would like to
17 send you some questions in writing.
18 It occurs to me, if my colleague would accommodate
19 me, that Commissioner Cox could pursue this assiduously
20 working with staff to get to the finite results of what she
21 wants in writing with you folks. I know Commissioner Kling
22 has questions in writing. So there may be others.

Page 85

1 I'm sure you're all willing between now and the
2 22nd day of this month to answer those questions because her
3 line of questioning is certainly important to us. Thank you
4 very much, Commissioner Cox.
5 Commissioner Cornella.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
7 GEN Sullivan, I have to empathize with you today. I can't
8 think of anything, if I were in your position, that I'd care
9 less about doing than appearing before this Commission. With
10 six days left, I would hope the next five days are nothing
11 but military bands, troop reviews and ticker tape parades.
12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thank you, sir.
13 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: GEN Shane, I'm a poor
14 stenographer, but you said a few minutes ago, in regard to
15 the question on depots that -- and I believe I have you
16 quoted correctly here. You say we looked at that. We
17 coordinated with the Army Materiel Command and everything
18 seems to be in place.
19 I would want to say in response to some earlier
20 discussion that the reason for this commission is to
21 challenge the recommendations of the Departments. It's not
22 to question judgment as much as it is to, I think, question

Page 86

1 the recommendations. If that was not necessary, I guess this
2 Commission would not exist.
3 Now, I would like to put up a slide that is not of
4 six months ago but is of less than or about two weeks ago. I
5 hope you can read it. It says "closing Red River and Letter
6 Kenny proposes unnecessary risks to concentrating all ground
7 combat workloads into Anniston." That quote is from Michael
8 Sandusky, Chief, Special Analysis Office, Headquarters, Air
9 Material Command.
10 I know we've been very careful here today to talk
11 about acceptable risks. I think there's a tremendous
12 difference between acceptable risk and unnecessary risk. So
13 could you respond to that slide, GEN Shane?
14 (A slide is shown.)
15 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: Well, the first thing I
16 would say is I disagree with it. I think unnecessary is a
17 term that is subjective in nature and views one's own
18 personal opinion. Now, when we looked at that and we shared
19 that with Mr. Sandusky -- and we're very well familiar with
20 the 43 percent requirement for wartime requirements. I think
21 if you talked to him, what he would tell you is the fact that
22 there are surge capability at Anniston because -- that allows

Page 87

1 us to do the workload that we have programmed. So that's my
2 comment.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: But now you can see through
4 the slide what we have to deal with.
5 MR. WEST: Commissioner, may I add a point?
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Yes, sir.
7 MR. WEST: Once we consolidate at Anniston, it is
8 our prediction it will operate at about 78 percent of its
9 capacity with just one shift working one normal eight-hour
10 day, 78 percent of its capacity.
11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You mean after this --
12 MR. WEST: After the consolidation.
13 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: If the BRAC follows your
14 recommendations, it will still only be on one shift 78
15 percent?
16 MR. WEST: One shift, 78 percent of its capacity,
17 eight hours a day, five days a week. We believe it can
18 handle the wartime requirements of two MRCs by adding a
19 second shift with minimal overtime. We believe if we did
20 that we could actually exceed those requirements by expanding
21 to a seven-day operation.
22 Now, it seems to me that we've given a lot of

Page 88

1 thought to this. This is our thinking. I can't give you a
2 guarantee. What I can tell you is those are our numbers, 78
3 percent after consolidation, these kinds of plans if we have
4 to meet surge. As I said before, surging is something that
5 the Army thinks a whole lot about.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. I want to move
7 into another area, and that's ports. Defense officials, port
8 authorities and community groups have defended military
9 ownership of continental U.S. ocean terminals with the
10 arguments that the flexibility of staging on-site equipment
11 on short notice, the security of military property and the
12 capability to handle overweight, outsized and noncontainer
13 equipment give military ports unique advantages unavailable
14 at commercial ports.
15 Now, GEN Sullivan, a few moments ago you talked
16 about the importance of sustainment. I think sustainment
17 also plays an important part in ports, does it not, sir?
18 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, it does, and if you --
19 look, I'm one of the strongest supporters of retaining
20 Oakland. What you have is, as I'm sure you know, on the East
21 Coast and the Gulf ports, you have a lot of ports that we
22 can, in fact, outload outsized cargo tanks, Howitzers and so

Page 89

1 forth and so on.
2 In my view, and the numbers show this, I believe,
3 it was prudent for us to close Bayonne. We didn't need
4 Bayonne. The West Coast is not quite as rich without ports
5 for any number of reasons, not the least of which is harbors,
6 which is really not my profession, but that's a fact on the
7 West Coast. Because of that, I felt we needed Oakland.
8 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: When you say you didn't
9 need Bayonne, do you mean because of Sunny Point?
10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I can use Sunny Point. I can
11 use Charleston, Savannah. We outloaded the 24th out of
12 Savannah, Charleston. We can use the Gulf ports, Galveston,
13 Houston, on and on and on, New Orleans. We've got
14 Jacksonville. I mean, there are a lot of ports that we can
15 use. The Marines have Blount Island. There's just a lot of
16 capacity.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Now is there a problem,
18 though, getting into civilian port if no national emergency
19 is declared, not in the case of Haiti?
20 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Not in the case of Haiti. I
21 outload out of Savannah all the time, and we haven't had any
22 problem, Wilmington. The Marines, we're in and out of

Page 90

1 Wilmington and Savannah and Charleston all the time.
2 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Could I have the slide for
3 the 12 Division Force, please? This is the slide that we
4 were briefed by the Army in Oakland when we made our base
5 visit. It shows the 12 Division Force and we were given the
6 argument of the necessity of Oakland Army Depot because of
7 the deployment of the units out of Colorado, Fort Carson and
8 Fort Riley, Kansas. Now, as we go and have moved, you
9 mentioned a 10 Division Force. I'm not sure where they are
10 at this point, but could we have that slide?
11 (A slide was shown.)
12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: We'll be close to it. Only 10
13 percent of the Army, and, by the way, as you know, I'm sure
14 you know, we deployed about 300,000 to the Gulf four. Only
15 10 percent of what we shipped went through Bayonne.
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, there's a question.
17 I'm not really talking about Bayonne at the moment. I'm
18 talking about Oakland. A commission staff analysis of the
19 stationing plan for the 10 Division Army questions whether
20 Oakland Army Base will deploy any combat units of the 5-17 3
21 division power projection?
22 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, there's a lot of other

Page 91

1 units other than divisions that would go. My hunch is -- not
2 my hunch is, but the facts are yes. We would sustain the
3 force as we have in the past out of Oakland. We would also
4 use Seattle-Tacoma and Long Beach. I'm not diminishing the
5 necessity for those ports, but those ports aren't under my
6 control. Oakland is. Oakland, as you know, was used as the
7 major receiving point for casualties in the last war in the
8 Pacific. So, in our judgment, Oakland is important.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I believe that there is a
10 necessity sometimes to pay for readiness. Can you tell me
11 how many ships went out of Oakland and how many went out of
12 Bayonne in 1994? How many ships were sent out of those two
13 ports?
14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I can't tell you. I'm sure I
15 could get it for you.
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I can tell you. I've got
17 it right here. You can check my figures for me. Out of
18 Bayonne 88 ships were deployed, and out of Oakland 16 ships.
19 Are the savings greater for closing Bayonne or for closing
20 Oakland and closure costs? GEN Shane, do you have that at
21 your fingertips?
22 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: I don't have that. I can

Page 92

1 provide it for the record.
2 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I think we're rapidly
3 running out of time, fortunately for some. Nothing was meant
4 by that. Don't misunderstand that, please. Talking about
5 Pickett, Indiantown Gap and Chaffee, 85 to 95 percent of the
6 reduction is going to be -- I should say 85 to 95 percent of
7 the infrastructure will be enclaved, condoned.
8 Isn't it true that the bulk of the savings will
9 come from personnel reduction not infrastructure reduction?
10 I know that's the desire of the Army to get out from
11 underneath that overhead. I mean, I think we've covered
12 that. Why weren't you able just to go through a manpower
13 reduction because you're under threshold, and address that?
14 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: I'm not familiar with the
15 numbers of 85 to 90 percent retention of infrastructure with
16 regards to these installations. I think the agreement that
17 we had with the National Guard is we're going to reduce those
18 to the bare minimums that they need to perform the training
19 requirements. We're working to define, number one, the
20 training requirements and, number two, trying to decide
21 exactly what the divestiture level is going to be for those
22 installations.

Page 93

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: But that would be the mass
2 on the installation, right, okay. Is there any intention, if
3 the Army moves to Missouri with Fort McClelland, is there any
4 intention to move from live agents to simulated agents? I
5 know that's been discussed. Are you considering that?
6 MR. WEST: I don't know the answer to that.
7 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Does that mean you have not
8 discussed it if you don't know the answer?
9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I have not discussed it with
10 anyone.
11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay.
12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: That doesn't mean that somebody
13 hasn't discussed it, but I haven't.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I would just like to make
15 one last statement. In regard to the request that we have
16 only limited funds, you have to close these bases because of
17 that, I would say, this commissioner thinks, that if that
18 installation should not be closed, I'm sorry that the Army is
19 going to have to find some way to keep that thing open and to
20 pay for it.
21 That's not going to be our concern because I don't
22 necessarily feel that we were given the options to -- if we

Page 94

1 had another installation that we wanted to remove, that we
2 could take some off. We did not have those options in regard
3 to, for example, a maneuver base. If you had to make these
4 recommendations today, would there be any change on
5 consideration of one of the large active duty maneuver bases?
6 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No.
7 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay. Thank you very much
8 for your time.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much,
10 Commissioner Cornella. I apologize to the Army for running
11 over a little, although we're going to accommodate the Air
12 Force precisely on time. We thank you for being very
13 forthright in all of your remarks. Good luck to you, GEN
14 Sullivan.
15 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr.
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'll have the Air Force. God
18 bless you, General.
19 [Panel excused.]
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I have to request that the room be
21 cleared in a quiet and timely manner in order to keep on
22 schedule. Please clear the room in a quiet and orderly

Page 95

1 manner. Please discontinue visitation and clear the room in
2 a quiet and orderly manner, ladies and gentlemen, so that we
3 can accommodate, in a timely way, the distinguished Secretary
4 of the Air Force and the Chief of the Air Force and others.
5 Please clear the room.
6 Ladies and gentlemen, we will now hear from the
7 Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila E. Widnall. With
8 Secretary Widnall is Chief of Staff of the Air Force, GEN
9 Ronald R. Fogleman. We also have MG J.D. Blume, Special
10 Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Base Realignment and
11 Transition, and James Boatright, Consultant to the Secretary.
12 If the Air Force representatives will please stand
13 and raise their right hands, I'll administer the oath.
14 [Panel sworn.]
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I ask if the group of you
16 would have any objection -- the time shown is 10:15 to 11:45.
17 We're getting started a little bit late -- if we run just a
18 few minutes late, but we will not impose into the lunch hour,
19 I assure you. We thank you all for being here.
20 Madame Secretary, on the part of the Commission, we
21 thank you for the fine cooperation of the Air Force
22 throughout this process. We are delighted, Madame Secretary,

Page 96

1 to recognize you again this morning. Secretary Widnall of
2 the Air Force.
3 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Thank you. Mr. Chairman,
4 members of this Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to
5 appear before you again to discuss the 1995 Air Force BRAC
6 recommendations. Since I was last here, I know that you and
7 your staff have been very busy with your review.
8 The Air Force has also been working steadily to
9 refine the cost and savings analysis associated with our BRAC
10 1995 recommendations and to provide you with updated covert
11 products and additional information. This further
12 consideration has reconfirmed my view that, with an exception
13 I will discuss later, the Secretary of Defense's
14 recommendations represent the best choice for reduction of
15 excess Air Force infrastructure, considering current and
16 future operational and fiscal requirements.
17 This morning I would like to focus on some of the
18 issues that have been raised by communities and your staff
19 regarding our recommendations. Because the Commission added
20 all five Air Force depot installations for consideration for
21 closure or further realignment, and because of the very
22 significant potential impact of that action, I will spend the

Page 97

1 majority of my time discussing depots.
2 Let me state at the beginning, I strongly support
3 the depot downsizing recommendations as the best and indeed
4 the only really viable course for reducing Air Force depot
5 infrastructure and excess logistics capacity. This
6 recommendation consolidates depot activities along the lines
7 of technical repair centers. It reduces infrastructure and
8 capacity, ensures future efficiencies and savings and, at the
9 same time, avoids the very significant one-time costs
10 associated with the closures of such large and complex
11 installations.
12 Additionally, it postures the Air Force well for
13 future privatization opportunities. Some have suggested that
14 the downsizing proposal achieves neither capacity nor
15 infrastructure reduction, but would simply result in empty
16 unused buildings on our logistic centers. That clearly is
17 not true.
18 Early in the process, the Air Force analysis
19 concluded that there is approximately one depot equivalent of
20 excess capacity and approximately one-and-a-half depot
21 equivalence of excess infrastructure measured by square
22 footage.

Page 98

1 Our site surveys have identified over a depots
2 worth of excess capacity that would be eliminated through our
3 recommendation. Infrastructure equivalent to one-and-a-half
4 depots has been specifically identified by building number
5 for elimination or potential reuse by other agencies.
6 As a result of the consolidation and downsizing
7 initiative, both capacity and square footage will be reduced
8 dramatically. The refined costs and savings estimates
9 provided to your staff, including some improved
10 consolidations, indicate a one-time cost of $233.5 million,
11 annual savings of over $92 million and a 20-year net present
12 value savings of $973.3 million.
13 The consolidation recommendation also achieves
14 maximum commodity-specific efficiencies. By permitting us to
15 focus on individual commodity workloads and to consider their
16 best distribution throughout the Air Force, we have been able
17 to isolate and take advantage of efficiencies not available
18 with a total closure scenario. For example, McClellan has
19 the most modern state-of-the-art facility specifically
20 designed for repair of hydraulic components.
21 Under our recommendation, we will move hydraulic
22 work from two other depots into this facility and gain the

Page 99

1 benefits of consolidation into this most efficient facility.
2 If McClellan AFB is closed, the entire hydraulics workload
3 will be moved to another depot without existing facilities
4 designed for this function, necessarily increasing the number
5 of people required for this specific work. We cannot achieve
6 this spectrum of Air Force-wide, commodity-specific
7 efficiencies if we close a depot and move every workload at
8 that depot to a new location.
9 The Commission staff has suggested the possibility
10 of substantially increased savings from depot closures if
11 greater manpower reductions and faster closure schedules are
12 assumed. They have suggested that the Air Force eliminates
13 only seven percent of depot positions in its closure
14 scenarios. That figure is incorrect.
15 When measured properly against depot-related
16 manpower authorizations, Air Force closure scenarios
17 eliminated between 12 and 15 percent of the total ALC
18 positions, including 20 percent of the overhead and over half
19 of the base-operating support positions dedicated to running
20 the installations.
21 More importantly, however, I want to stress that
22 greater manpower savings cannot be achieved and therefore

Page 100

1 should not be assumed with the closure of an Air Force depot
2 because of the unique characteristics of those installations
3 and our workload.
4 First, depot-related positions typically account
5 for less than a third of the total population at an Air Force
6 depot installation. Operational missions, DOD and non-DOD
7 tenants and other Air Logistics Center functions account for
8 a large segment of our depot base population. The closure of
9 a depot activity by itself would not reduce the manpower
10 required for these other missions.
11 Second, we do not believe the wholesale relocation
12 of a depot workload would result in significant reductions of
13 even depot-specific manpower. Due to past workload
14 consolidation efforts at our depot, there is little redundant
15 execution of workload at the different depots.
16 As a result, most depot-related manpower positions
17 and equipment at the closed facility would have to be
18 transferred to a receiving depot. There would be manpower
19 savings related to overhead and management functions, but
20 they are already properly reflected in the Air Force
21 analysis.
22 Although the suggested use of higher assumed

Page 101

1 manpower savings may be appropriate for small, single use
2 depot maintenance facilities, this approach is most
3 inappropriate for the very large multifaceted missions
4 supported on Air Force logistic center installations.
5 Assumptions regarding manpower savings do not, in any event,
6 touch the fundamental concern we face in contemplating depot
7 installations closures, that is, the cost to close.
8 As I have previously discussed, the one-time cost
9 associated with the closure of the depot, even for the
10 various scenarios provided by your staff, are very
11 significant. Indeed, the least expensive scenario is priced
12 at over $560 million. To understand the full impact of these
13 costs, it is important also to consider their distribution by
14 year.
15 The nature of BRAC actions requires that expenses
16 related to relocating missions and workload, such as military
17 construction, be incurred early to accommodate the necessary
18 mission relocation before a closure can take place. Our
19 current estimates of cost across fiscal years 1996 to 2001
20 compared to available budget resources indicates considerable
21 budget shortfalls in some years if the Commission approves
22 all of our original recommendations except the Kirtland

Page 102

1 realignment.
2 Although we have sufficient funds to cover the
3 one-time costs associated with these closures and realignment
4 actions across the entire period, we have a shortfall in
5 fiscal years 1996 and 1997 ranging from $50 million to almost
6 $250 million each year. We will likely deal with these
7 short-term problems by delaying closure dates on certain
8 actions and thus moving expenses into later years where funds
9 remain.
10 We will not be able to do this if we have to close
11 a depot. If a depot base is closed, we will have a shortfall
12 across the entire period in excess of $317 million. There
13 will be no reserve in the later years to solve the large
14 shortfalls in the early years. This problem would be further
15 exacerbated if your staff suggestion of accelerated closures
16 were followed, since more costs would be required in those
17 early years.
18 The closure of a depot would have dramatic adverse
19 impacts on our budget and necessarily draw essential funds
20 from top priority readiness, modernization and quality of
21 life initiatives that are so critical to our future Air
22 Force. Quite simply, the methods suggested to increase

Page 103

1 savings and make a closure more attractive do not resolve our
2 difficulties and do not make closure a fiscally viable or
3 operationally attractive alternative.
4 I continue to believe that a dispassionate review
5 of the proposed reductions in capacity, square footage and
6 personnel, potential efficiencies and the necessary
7 constraints imposed by operational and fiscal realities will
8 lead you to the conclusion that the Air Force recommendation
9 is the most prudent and cost effective alternative. I
10 strongly support it, and I urge you to do the same.
11 I would like to turn briefly to the closure of Rome
12 Laboratory. The refined costs presented to you as a result
13 of our site surveys are the best estimates for implementing
14 this recommendation and include appropriate calibration and
15 installation costs. This action is cost effective and
16 operationally sound with a reasonable payback of the
17 investment within six years. The closure of Rome Lab is also
18 an important step towards the broader goal of implementing
19 cross service consolidation of laboratory assets.
20 The recommendation to close Brooks AFB is likewise
21 sound and should be approved. The contonement option proposed
22 by the San Antonio community, from our perspective, is not a

Page 104

1 viable option. That proposal would retain a substantial
2 installation without its own support establishment requiring
3 cumbersome scheduling and travel for routine maintenance,
4 personnel services and other normal day-to-day requirements.
5 The large number of personnel who would remain at
6 Brooks would not receive adequate support. The
7 recommendation to close Brooks AFB with the majority of its
8 activities relocating to Wright-Paterson will achieve the
9 long-term reduction in laboratory capacity and infrastructure
10 we need for a reasonable investment.
11 As you know, the Air Force is proceeding to
12 implement the 1993 BRAC recommendation to close Newark AFB
13 and is pursuing an option of privatizing the workload. We
14 have been advising your staff of the status of our efforts.
15 We will continue to do so and expect to provide additional
16 information within the next week or so.
17 I understand there may be some confusion as to the
18 Air Force position concerning the 1995 Secretary of Defense
19 recommendation regarding Letter Kenny Army Depot. Let me
20 make clear the Air Force is not seeking to have a share of
21 the workload at Letter Kenny moved to the Ogden Air Logistics
22 Center. The Air Force fully supports the DOD recommendation

Page 105

1 and the enhanced cross servicing that it achieves.
2 As the Secretary of Defense has communicated to
3 you, the recommendation to realign Kirtland AFB no longer
4 represents a cost effective measure. With this one
5 exception, I strongly urge the Commission to approve the
6 Secretary of Defense's recommendations to close or realign
7 Air Force installation.
8 I would like now to turn to GEN Fogleman to provide
9 additional comments on various operational considerations
10 related to the recommendations.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we thank you, Secretary
12 Widnall.
13 We're delighted to have GEN Fogleman, Ron Fogleman,
14 Chief of Staff of the Air Force, with us today.
15 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the
16 Commission, thank you for inviting us here this morning.
17 The United States Air Force realizes that there's a
18 need to reduce excess infrastructure if we're going to meet
19 our security needs in the future, but we also think and
20 believe very strongly that this action must be taken in a
21 fiscally responsible manner.
22 I've spent a lot of years of my life in the Air

Page 106

1 Force programming business. I think I understand out-year
2 programs and I would tell you that, during the period of FY
3 '96 to 2002, all the services are in a critical period in
4 terms of limited procurement funds, overall DOD funding, but
5 any additional funding that get laid in as a result of not
6 considering the fiscal outcomes of base closure actions, I
7 think, will have a tremendous impact on our program.
8 I think the Air Force has been at the forefront of
9 DOD closure and realignment efforts. I've said before, since
10 the 1988 Base Closure Commission, we've saved $18 billion.
11 That's 71 percent of all the DOD savings to date. We have a
12 proven track record. I think we know how to do this.
13 Having said that, I would like to acknowledge, as
14 the Secretary has, that the Air Force has worked with both
15 DOD and the Commission to modify the SECDEF's original
16 recommendations as a result of site surveys and further
17 information. Particularly, the Secretary has mentioned
18 Kirtland Air Force Base.
19 The other one that we have continued to look at is
20 an outgrowth of the FY '93 BRAC, and that is the potential
21 for realignment of the Air National Guard and Air Force
22 Reserve Unit at O'Hare Field, in light of Air National Guard

Page 107

1 and Air Force Reserve recommendations, as part of this
2 program.
3 My purpose in being here today, Mr. Chairman, is I
4 want to express operational concerns over the expanded list
5 of potential Air Force installations for realignment and
6 closure. To one degree or another, I may be off-base here,
7 but I think that --
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're never off-base, General.
9 Tell it as it is.
10 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, I tell you, Mr. Chairman,
11 I don't think that the operational considerations were fully
12 voiced strongly enough before the '93 Commission, and I think
13 there was a mistake made as a result of that. It was a
14 mistake that we chose to live with. It was the law of the
15 land, and we have supported that. But I did not want to have
16 anybody misunderstand where the operational Air Force was
17 coming from on the issues that are here, and so that's why I
18 am here today.
19 First and foremost, I'm deeply concerned over the
20 addition of Grand Forks Air Force Base. Two of our unified
21 commanders, CINCTRANS and CINCSTRAT, have indicated the loss
22 of this base would seriously impair their war-fighting

Page 108

1 capabilities. I think we owe it to them to give them their
2 full support.
3 I'd like to provide you some background on this
4 issue. I hope that it's not one of those "invented here"
5 syndromes. But two years ago we began a rebasing effort, or
6 a KC-135 fleet, to form core air refueling wings at Grand
7 Forks, Fairchild and McConnell Air Force Bases.
8 We did that because the world has changed. The
9 manner in which we have organized our forces has changed and
10 the days of penny-packet KC-135 outfits being co-located with
11 bomber outfits, that's Cold War stuff. We're in a new
12 environment. We restructure.
13 We carefully organized and located these larger
14 wings to realize economies of scale in operations, logistics,
15 organization in wartime as well as peacetime missions
16 requirements. I think the actual operations at Grand Forks
17 over the past year-and-a-half have confirmed these
18 advantages.
19 Moreover, the base possesses unique attributes that
20 enhance its value as a core tanker wing. It offers some of
21 the best infrastructure in the Air Force for large tanker
22 fleets, including a very modern hydrant refueling system, a

Page 115

1 the same time.
2 I very much appreciate the statements of the
3 Secretary and the Chief, and I think your positions are very
4 clear in that process. I will deal probably with just two
5 subjects, making sure that I don't hog all the time on Air
6 Force issues.
7 Madam Secretary, your position on the depots has
8 been very consistent and very clear, and I would hope maybe
9 you would indulge me a little fantasy here, or what-if,
10 because the questions keep coming, and we're certainly
11 responsible not only to our own conscience, but to the
12 congressional delegations and the communities.
13 If we were to close one depot -- it doesn't make
14 any difference, the cheapest one to close -- let's just take
15 that for an example. It doesn't make any different which one
16 it is. What would that do to your out-year budgeting? You
17 stated that there would be some shortfalls, but what impacts
18 would that have and what kind of things would you have to do
19 to your budget to manage that process?
20 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I think, as I stated in
21 my testimony, even excluding the whole issue of environmental
22 costs, which is a complexity, we're talking about shortfalls

Page 116

1 on the order of $320 million.
2 As we move into this, I would say, very uncertain
3 budget climate that we see before us, I think our goal is to
4 keep our significant modernization programs on target, while
5 providing today's readiness and quality of life. Even in the
6 best of circumstances, we think this is going to be a tough
7 challenge. To be faced with a shortfall on the order of $320
8 million over this is simply going to make this much more
9 difficult.
10 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And specifically, what
11 accounts would you at least take a look at?
12 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I'm not prepared to kind
13 of reprogram here on the spot. Actually, the Chief has had a
14 lot more experience with that. I don't know if you want to
15 try to respond to that question. We would need to look at
16 it: that's clear.
17 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I would only say this, that, in
18 near term, the kinds of dollars we end up talking about are
19 O&M funds, and O&M funds are directly related to readiness.
20 So, if you start looking for $300 million in the O&M account
21 in the near term, you could come up with all kinds of
22 examples of how many flying hours does that equate to, how

Page 117

1 much RPMA is that for bases that will not get to go in and
2 repair facilities, et cetera.
3 Then, if we're responsible, if we're forced into
4 this, what we will have to do is, rather than sit here every
5 year and have this cascade of unfunded O&M fall on us, and
6 try to fix it in the execution year, we sit down and we'll
7 program that out. And the way you end up doing it is, you
8 end up looking at all your programs and, in all likelihood,
9 procurement is going to end up being impacted by this.
10 $300 million is about the kind of money that you
11 spend on, totally on JPATs in one year; it's the kind of
12 money that we spend on our precision munitions programs; it's
13 about the magnitude of the money that we'll be spending on
14 the conventional munitions upgrade program for the B-1
15 bomber.
16 So it's hard to say, "Yes, I'm going to trade this
17 off or that off." What you end up doing is, you go in there
18 and, in an era in which we're supposed to be recapitalizing
19 the force, you just end up pushing that further out to the
20 right and the people end up operating either in less than
21 optimum facilities or with less than modern equipment.
22 That's the kind of impact.

Page 118

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: And, of course, for us the
2 bottom line is that we view this as a totally unnecessary
3 expenditure that does not provide any real value for the Air
4 Force.
5 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yes, ma'am. So you would
6 probably characterize it as at least painful, if not very
7 painful?
8 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes, I would say very painful.
9 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Then, there is kind of a
10 folklore out that the Air Force could, in fact, close two
11 depots and still --
12 (Laughter.)
13 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: How would you characterize
14 that?
15 SECRETARY WIDNALL: It's ridiculous.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you, Madam Secretary.
17 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Maybe we should talk a little
18 bit about how we actually measure capacity. There is the
19 statement that we have an "excess capacity of one-and-a-half
20 depots." What that means is square footage and work
21 stations.
22 I want to make it very clear that we do not have

Page 119

1 extra people. One of the reason why our direct labor shows
2 so small a savings when we talk about realigning depots is
3 that we have already taken the people. We have downsized the
4 workforce at our depots 28 percent since, say, 1986, if
5 that's a reasonable base year.
6 So, when you start looking for "personnel savings"
7 as a result of capacity reductions, those people aren't
8 there. When we talk about capacity reductions, we're talking
9 about work stations and buildings which, under our proposal,
10 we fully intend to get rid of and downsize.
11 I guess I also want to emphasize that we believe
12 this proposal sets us up for future realignment under the new
13 leadership that is coming into AFMC and also for some
14 privatization initiatives. We intend to continue to be
15 creative at reducing Air Force infrastructure and we think
16 this depot proposal sets us up to be able to do that over the
17 coming years.
18 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Mr. Chairman, could I comment
19 just on the depot thing?
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yes, sir.
21 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I very much appreciate the time
22 that the commissioners have spent out there looking at our

Page 120

1 installations. Anybody who has been to one of our air
2 logistics centers and characterizes it as a depot hasn't been
3 looking around, and I don't think that's the case with the
4 commissioners. I think there's a lot of people that
5 characterize it that way because they've never been there.
6 Our air logistics centers are megabases. You know
7 that. In fact, they are the kind of installations that this
8 Commission is trying to get us to build. They are trying to
9 get us to put more than one activity, maximize the use of
10 ramp space, et cetera.
11 We have done that in the past and, as I tried to
12 say before the Commission in the past, this isn't a case of
13 the arsenal by Fort whatever, at Window Rock. This is a
14 megabase that has been built over time as a result of past
15 base closure activities. We've consolidated on there.
16 That's why we have so many tenants that need to be moved.
17 That's why we have operational missions on these bases.
18 And, as you know, when you start getting down to
19 the depot part of that, it becomes a very small part of these
20 installations. I just hope that, as a result of the
21 commissioners' visits out there, that that's come through
22 loud and clear.

Page 121

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I very much appreciate you
2 giving me the latitude to play some what-ifs because,
3 clearly, we need to hear the views of the Secretary and the
4 Chief on that subject, because it's been a very difficult
5 subject.
6 The last subject area I'm going to deal with is
7 UPT. GEN Fogleman and I, in a previous life, spent a lot of
8 time in UPT and working the models to sort of describe what
9 our out-year UPT requirements are and, as GEN Fogleman knows,
10 especially as the commander of AMC, the vagaries of those
11 figures sometimes depend on a lot of things such as the pilot
12 retention rates, increased airline hiring, the requirements
13 for the Air Force Reserve, because they account for certain
14 folks coming out.
15 And every time I get ready to say that we ought to
16 close a UPT base, my palms start to sweat, simply because I
17 was in that UPT buildup when we went from non-Vietnam to
18 Vietnam and found out that in the first year it cost us more
19 pilots to increase our capacity, because we had to open up
20 capabilities that we did not have.
21 You state in your statement that, in fact, Air
22 Training Command has -- and you've looked at, it and I know

Page 122

1 it's not just AETC, but it happens to be XLO, when some other
2 folks have looked at it.
3 How confident are you that, if we close a UPT base,
4 that we will have sufficient capacity -- You stated that we
5 will increase significantly in the out years -- if a surge
6 would be required, and if we did not continue on, if we had
7 some halt in the jointness of our UPT? Can you give us your
8 views on that, Chief, please?
9 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, again, I tried to very
10 carefully craft my words there, that I think, within the
11 FYDEP, we will probably have the capacity, but it's based
12 upon some assumptions about doing business differently than
13 we do today.
14 It assumes, for instance, that the pilot bonus
15 program continues, as it is today, and it's a program that we
16 have to come fight for and revalidate every year. If that
17 program goes away, then our retention rates are going to go
18 down.
19 It assumes that there is no great increase in
20 airline hiring, that we sort of stay with what we've been
21 through here recently in steady state. There are those who
22 will tell you that the airline business is about to reach a

Page 123

1 drop-off point in their senior captain ranks, but it's a
2 little bit like the mythical shortfall in pilots -- it's
3 always another year out.
4 One of the very concrete things, though, that does
5 give me concern, and it falls slightly outside the FYDEP, is
6 the fact that, in order to sustain our Air National Guard and
7 our Air Force Reserve units, today roughly 50 percent of all
8 of our aviators that leave active duty sign up with the Air
9 National Guard and the Air Force Reserve; so that keeps their
10 requirement for initial pilot training lower.
11 They are starting to see some drop-off in those
12 numbers and have, in fact, within the FYDEP, come in and
13 asked for additional pilot training slots. We have been able
14 to accommodate those within the FYDEP.
15 But, in the year 2003 and beyond, because we have
16 been producing so few pilots in the early 1990s, if the Air
17 Reserve and the Guard were able to capture 100 percent of all
18 pilots leaving active duty, they would not be able to fill
19 their cockpits, and they will have to come for more pilot
20 training.
21 Now, I've probably just confused the picture more,
22 but it's within those assumptions that we say, "Okay, we

Page 124

1 think we can do it within the FYDEP and meet the build up
2 that we have planned." And it is required, as a result of
3 how much we throttle back. You know the dynamics.
4 Beyond that, it gets very soft, out beyond 2002,
5 looking at what our requirements are across the force, but we
6 do know, specifically, Guard and Reserve requirements are
7 going to go up.
8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I have one other question on
9 UPT, and I'll submit that for a formal answer. I'm drunk
10 with power with this Chair. I've exceeded my time and so
11 I'll have to pass.
12 I'm going to deviate slightly and go to
13 Commissioner Kling, because he has an appointment at 11:15,
14 and then I'll come back to my right.
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. You know, I've
16 still got a problem with this depot issue, and I'm sure you
17 realize that a lot of us do, and I'm not trying to be
18 obnoxious with it or anything you want to say.
19 But, Secretary Widnall, you testified that the
20 biggest factor in closing an air logistics center is the
21 initial up front cost and the involvement there.
22 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.

Page 125

1 COMMISSIONER KLING: And yet, Secretary Perry
2 recently, in his decision to withdraw the recommendation to
3 realign Kirtland, that really freed up about $270 million --
4 278, I think, to be exact -- in closing costs, up front, and
5 adding this amount to the 127 million currently projected as
6 the cost of closing an Air Force depot, really would provide
7 $405 million of up front costs available right now, or 70, 80
8 percent of what you have.
9 Wouldn't this have some bearing on how you look at
10 closing a depot, in light of your statement about the up
11 front costs?
12 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I believe the number that I had
13 in my testimony is that we would still be short roughly $300
14 million. But I guess one of the ways I look at it is there
15 are actually a lot of similarities between the reason why
16 Kirtland was too expensive to close and why a depot is too
17 expensive to close.
18 It has to do with the big MILCON bill for moving
19 tenants and moving activities. The earlier Air Force
20 successes in BRAC -- which, as the Chief mentioned, we are,
21 to date, responsible for 70 percent of the DOD savings in
22 BRAC -- a lot of that had to do with the fact that we were

Page 126

1 closing force structure bases at the same time we were
2 drawing down force structure, so we did not have a big MILCON
3 bill to transfer force structure to another base.
4 As we looked at the Kirtland realignment, a lot of
5 the expenses -- really, the majority of the expenses -- had
6 to do with building new facilities for tenants on that base
7 who were perfectly well-housed where they were, and that's
8 true at a depot as well.
9 As the Chief mentioned, I think, there are three
10 types of personnel who are on a typical air logistics
11 organization:
12 There are the people who do the actual depot work.
13 There are the people who do the air logistics work, which is
14 the inventory, the parts, and all of that. Those two
15 together represent, say typically, 50 percent of the base
16 personnel.
17 And then there are the tenants, and these tenants
18 are just an incredible variety of units. They have
19 facilities requirements. They use big simulators. They have
20 good facilities. So one of the fundamental bills you have to
21 pay is the big MILCON bill for moving these tenants, as well
22 as for moving the specialized equipment that each individual

Page 127

1 depot has for doing the kind of work that they do.v0B
2 Our conclusion is that that simply does not make
3 sense, that there are other ways to use those resources --
4 the downsizing in place, the sort of ridding oneself of
5 excess buildings, setting it up for future downsizing, which
6 we intend to pursue aggressively over the years ahead, and
7 also gives us a base to explore the use of excess facilities
8 by the surrounding civilian community.
9 Much of the work that we do in our depots is
10 obviously aviation related. There's a big aviation community
11 out there in the civilian world. There may be some
12 opportunities at some of these installations to do public-
13 private partnerships that would allow us to get some of our
14 work done by the private sector, in new relationships, as the
15 Roles and Missions Commission has recommended, and also to
16 provide facilities for those private sector partners to do
17 work for the civilian world.
18 So we see a lot of opportunities. What doesn't
19 make sense to me is simply replicating really good facilities
20 at other installations.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: I understand the up front
22 costs are the big thing, of course, and we do have some

Page 128

1 figures, though, that we're working up that show that the
2 savings are really quite, quite substantial and very, very
3 material, on closing the base.
4 And, you know, I've visited, I think, every one of
5 the depots, and every time I went to some, I saw a plating
6 operation, I saw a painting operation, I saw a machine shop,
7 and I recognized and I also saw a specialized hydraulic unit
8 at one place, and so forth.
9 But common sense kind of tells you that we don't
10 need all those plating and machine shops in some of those
11 operations. That's where I come from.
12 SECRETARY WIDNALL: That's right.
13 COMMISSIONER KLING: I also know of an instance
14 recently of a company that has a fulfillment center and a
15 depot operation -- a service company. They bought another
16 company that had the same types of operation, that was losing
17 a lot of money, but they bought it knowing that they would be
18 able to close that one down and move it into this one, taking
19 a loss of millions to making a profit of millions. And
20 that's really kind of what we're looking at.
21 I know we can argue that, but that's where I come
22 from.

Page 129

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Let me just respond that your
2 example, in fact, characterized the essence of our proposal.
3 We do intend to combine like facilities.
4 Our consolidation is oriented to avoiding
5 duplication, consolidating like workloads at single
6 facilities -- the one that it makes the most sense. That's
7 not without cost. We estimate an investment of over $200
8 million to accomplish that, but a net present value in
9 savings of close to $1 billion.
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: The overhead costs, by closing
11 entirely, there's an awful lot saved. You know, we can argue
12 that, I'm sure, different ways, and I appreciate your
13 comment, but let me just ask you another question.
14 If we were going to suggest the closing of a depot,
15 do you stand by the Air Force's tiering evaluation? If we
16 were going to recommend that a depot close, would you stand
17 by the tiering evaluation, presently?
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I suppose it depends a little
19 bit on how you view the purpose of the tiering.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I interrupt, Madam Secretary?
21 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Could we put that graph up on the

Page 130

1 screen?
2 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chart that has the tiering
4 evaluation -- do we have that here? Apparently we do not
5 have that one.
6 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I think I sort of know this by
7 heart. Let me just make a few points about the tiering.
8 First of all, it's important to remember that the
9 tiering basically is a good, better, best sort of tiering,
10 that there is no bottom, in the sense that they're
11 alphabetically listed. I believe we had two air logistics
12 centers in the bottom tier.
13 I would say that the tiering, to me, represents
14 what I would say is the platform for judgment, that you take
15 the tiering and then you begin to apply some judgment. We
16 never just cut through and simply checked off things in the
17 lower tier and said "That's our list." We always applied
18 judgment -- operational considerations, environmental
19 concerns, and the specifics of what was actually going on in
20 an installation.
21 So I guess the answer to your question is, of
22 course I support the results of the Air Force analysis that

Page 131

1 allowed us to identify bases that were in the bottom tier,
2 but it is only the beginning of our process, it's not the end
3 of it.
4 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. Just a last -- can
5 I have one fast question?
6 If you turn to Brooks Air Force Base, and we were
7 looking at that there's a one-time cost to close Brooks of
8 $211 million and a savings of $32 million.
9 And, if you would consider even the cantonment
10 suggestion of the community, the cost to close goes down to
11 $11 million and the annual savings goes down from 32 to 17
12 but, if you took that money and applied that large up front
13 money again to closing a depot, and applying it there, you
14 would well have covered your cost of closing one depot from
15 the budget standpoint and you would still have materially,
16 materially higher savings; and I guess that's where we're
17 coming from.
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Let me make a remark about
19 that. I'm not sure --
20 COMMISSIONER KLING: Excuse me. The only reason I
21 say that is Brooks is certainly a fine operation there, and
22 it's something we can all be proud of, I'm suer.

Page 132

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Right. And, of course, our
2 depots are also fine operations.
3 COMMISSIONER KLING: You better believe it.
4 SECRETARY WIDNALL: And I guess, in the case of
5 Brooks, we see some real synergism within the scientific
6 communities at Wright-Patterson and Brooks that will be
7 gained if we move those researchers to a single place.
8 We also see some quite substantial problems
9 associated with the cantonment, which I indicated in my
10 opening statement. So that is a proposal we do not support.
11 MR. BOATRIGHT: If I could just add one additional
12 comment there, with the cantonment, we don't close anything.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner
14 Kling. Have you concluded?
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, I think so.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Commissioner Cox.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much. GEN
18 Fogleman, I really didn't mean to get into UPT bases, but if
19 I could just follow up and ask for some information for the
20 record, I'm concerned that your comment that one of the
21 assumptions that you're using in believing that you have
22 enough capacity in UPT bases even if you closed one is based

Page 133

1 on the last, I think you said, couple of years' retention
2 rate as to commercial airline hiring.
3 As you undoubtedly know, the airline industry has
4 lost $13 billion in the last five years. We didn't do too
5 well in the year or two before that. We have virtually hired
6 no one in the last five years and very few in the couple
7 years before that.
8 I'm concerned that if your retention rate is based
9 on us only hiring the amount of pilots we've hired in the
10 last five, seven, even ten years, that it nay not be
11 realistic. The FAA, as you know, predicts an enormous
12 increase in pilot hiring, in every year for the foreseeable
13 future. I don't know if that's true or not, but that's their
14 prediction.
15 So I would be interested if you would provide for
16 the record what those retention rates are that you're using,
17 how much, what would be the impact on capacity if the FAA
18 projections for airline hiring are, in fact, true and if we
19 use sort of pre-1989 commercial airline hiring from the DOD.
20 I was at the Department of Transportation for many
21 years when the DOD was terribly concerned that the commercial
22 airlines were benefitting from your training of pilots, and I

Page 134

1 think the commercial airlines appreciated that then and may
2 well in the future.
3 So if you wouldn't mind providing that for the
4 record, that would be helpful.
5 GEN Blume, I would like to ask you some questions
6 about Onizuka. I understand that you all have proposed
7 realigning Onizuka at this moment, and are not proposing
8 closing it, for a variety of reasons.
9 One of those reasons is that you agree that we
10 should have dual-node capacity and you're leaving the
11 facilities there for a period of time while you develop a
12 dual-node capacity that could be used at Falcon, and that
13 that dual-node capacity includes networking dual-node
14 capacity as well.
15 When would you believe that you would have the
16 dual-node, single-site capacity available at Falcon, or in
17 some other form?
18 GENERAL BLUME: First, let's say that we feel
19 strongly that a dual-node control satellite node has been,
20 during the Cold War, a reality and a necessity, but it will
21 not be required in the future.
22 As you recall, in the briefing that you and I both

Page 135

1 sat in, the communications function of that capability will
2 be retained at Onizuka as long as required to support the
3 tenants that are there. The dual-node capability will not be
4 required at the closure of, or, excuse me, the realignment of
5 Onizuka.
6 Therefore, this architecture, the communications
7 network architecture that you're referring to will come on-
8 line about 2002, 2004, and it will be in effect at that time;
9 and that will negate the requirement for even the
10 communications portion of the dual capacity.
11 Now, there will be a single node at Falcon Air
12 Station.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: But we will have the ability for
14 a redundant system, I guess you're saying, by the year 2001,
15 2002?
16 GENERAL BLUME: That's right. It wouldn't be dual,
17 it will be multi-faceted, yes.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: Right. And let me just ask you
19 a question, because my understanding had been that you were
20 working toward that and that, in fact, those costs were, to
21 a great extent, already accounted for and, therefore, were
22 not in our COBRA costs, obviously.

Page 136

1 GENERAL BLUME: Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: I am concerned, because I have
3 an R&D budget item justification sheet for the satellite
4 control network, and it was in a 1994 study which I
5 understand, in some ways, is overtaken by events.
6 However, what it shows is that basically, between
7 1994 and the year 2001 and continuing after that --
8 indicating that the R&D will not be complete even in the year
9 2001 -- roughly $1 billion being spent on this system.
10 I'm not sure that that's not inconsistent with the
11 "We already know where we're going and we'll have completed
12 it in the year 2001." I just want to ask you to comment on
13 that. Maybe this is a different program. Why don't I just
14 give you a copy of that?
15 GENERAL BLUME: I can't comment on that specific
16 thing, but I would like to have it, and will look at for the
17 record.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: I'll be happy to send that to
19 you for the record.
20 Then moving on, just to also point out that the
21 decreasing cost savings that COBRA changes from you all on
22 Onizuka, as I understand it now, get the annual savings down

Page 137

1 from 30 million to about 16.1. Is that the COBRA numbers are
2 those just our numbers?
3 GENERAL BLUME: That's right. The recurring
4 savings is 16.1.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: Great. Thank you very much.
6 Other savings numbers that have changed -- and, Mr.
7 Boatright, maybe this is your area -- the most recent Air
8 Force estimate for the one-time cost to close the Rome lab
9 has increased from $52.8 million to $79.8 million. Our own
10 Commission estimates estimate that cost at about 118.6
11 million.
12 Assuming we're right, the Commission estimates
13 versus your latest estimates, which have come up as well, we
14 also reduced the annual savings from about $13 million to
15 $5.9 million, and that increases the return on investment
16 period from 6 to 31 years.
17 Presuming we're right for a minute -- and I
18 understand that you don't necessarily presume that we're
19 right -- would you want to close, based on a 31-year return
20 on investment? Would you still recommend that?
21 MR. BOATRIGHT: I would tell you that a 31-year
22 return on investment is not a good return on investment. I

Page 138

1 would tell you that we strongly disagree with the cost
2 numbers and the savings numbers you're using.
3 We have gone through these numbers very, very
4 carefully. We've done site survey up there. We're very
5 comfortable that we, in fact, can carry out this closure
6 action with the costs, and we'll realize the savings that we
7 have projected.
8 We believe that it's still a very cost-effective
9 proposal. From an operational standpoint, it is one of the
10 few actions that's being taken that is truly consistent with
11 the cross-servicing that we're trying to achieve within the
12 Department. We think that's a very important consideration
13 here.
14 COMMISSIONER COX: And we appreciate the work that
15 you all have done with us to go through these numbers and the
16 fact that you have changed them where you believed there were
17 changes necessary and, obviously, that process will continue
18 right up through June 22nd.
19 MR. BOATRIGHT: One other correction, if I could.
20 You gave us a number that indicated that our cost of closure
21 was 79.8.
22 COMMISSIONER COX: That's the number I have.

Page 139

1 MR. BOATRIGHT: I think it's 79.9 is the number
2 that I have.
3 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. I'll check, on that.
4 Two other just real quick questions, to follow upon
5 some information that we've seen.
6 Secretary Widnall, if the Commission does reject --
7 which is purely hypothetical at the moment -- the
8 recommendation to close Reese Air Force Base, for whatever
9 reason, do you believe that we should close another Air Force
10 Base or would you recommend that we simply not close one?
11 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I would recommend that you not
12 close one.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Not close one at all? Thank
14 you. And then, in sort of the same vein, GEN Fogleman, if we
15 do not close Bergstrom Air Force Base as recommended, or
16 Reserve Base, as recommended by the Air Force, would you
17 recommend that we close an alternative or that we not close
18 any?
19 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, the problem that the
20 Reserve is they have a force structure in the fighter
21 business that's coming down. They have to close a fighter
22 unit.

Page 140

1 COMMISSIONER COX: And if we didn't close
2 Bergstrom, how would you accomplish that? Would you want us
3 to close something else?
4 My understanding, for example, is that MG McIntosh
5 has said that if Bergstrom is not closed, the Air Force will
6 use its own conversion actions to meet the F-16 program and
7 presumably would prefer that they do it that way, rather than
8 we close Dallas-Forth Worth, Carswell, or Homestead. Would
9 you concur with that?
10 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Yes, I would.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner
13 Cox. Commissioner Cornella.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
15 General Fogleman, I know we've had some discussion
16 on UPT. I'd like to continue along those lines, if we could.
17 You mentioned the JPATS, and I'm not sure we mentioned the
18 JPATS in regard to the Navy's training requirement, but I've
19 been told that, if a turbo jet aircraft is chosen for the
20 JPATS aircraft candidate, instead of a turbo prop, that the
21 Navy's primary training capacity would be reduced.
22 Would you be prepared to absorb additional primary

Page 141

1 training for the Navy if Reese Air Force Base was closed?
2 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: We would have a limited
3 capability to do that, I guess again, as I looked at the
4 assumptions that I've said there, because what we have said
5 is, with the assumptions, within the FYDEP, if we close one
6 base, we can meet our requirements and we have a very slim
7 surge capability that could, in theory, be used to absorb
8 more Navy training, if we had to.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I'm getting the impression,
10 from an earlier comment, too -- you said something along
11 these lines, and I think I have one word correct, and that's
12 the "must." It says: "If the Commission must close a UPT
13 base" -- now, has the recommendation of the Air Force
14 changed?
15 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: What I was trying to put in
16 context there is, back to the Secretary's point, if you're
17 going to close a UPT base, we think the analysis says Reese
18 is the base to close. That's really what I was trying to get
19 to.
20 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You evidently have concerns
21 about closing even one UPT base; is that correct?
22 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I'm sorry?

Page 142

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You even have concerns,
2 though, about closing one UPT base?
3 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I have signed up to, and the Air
4 Force and the ATC has signed up to, closing one UPT base,
5 because we think we can meet the requirements within the
6 FYDEP, as I've said for our people, with the assumptions,
7 again, that I have agreed to provide to Commissioner Cox.
8 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We've all heard arguments
9 that downsizing saves more money than closing, and I will
10 add, in some instances, have you ever considered that for UPT
11 bases?
12 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I think there's a different util
13 involved in UPT bases.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Secretary Widnall, in your
15 opening statement I believe you mentioned that the 7 percent
16 that was figured was across all tenants, not just the ALC
17 personnel or the depot personnel.
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Right.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Can you tell us what the
20 percentage is of depot personnel?
21 SECRETARY WIDNALL: If you count ALC personnel,
22 which is both the ALC part and the depot part, it's a number

Page 143

1 in the range of 12 to 15 percent, so it is certainly in the
2 ballpark of other large depot closures by the other services.
3 Again, I remind you that the workload reductions,
4 the people have already been reduced. So, in either
5 realigning or closing, we're not looking for major direct
6 labor drawdowns, because we have already been there, done
7 that.
8 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, then, I want to
9 follow up with a question right along the lines of why we
10 might need the amount of labor that we have.
11 As we visited each base containing an air logistics
12 center, they presented data they are operating at
13 approximately one-half of their 1987-89 capacity. For
14 example, both Tinker and Kelly are maintaining engines at
15 approximately 2 million hours each versus 5 million hours of
16 capacity that they have.
17 How can this be cost-effective, to downsize when
18 both require significant overhead?
19 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I guess, in order to do that, I
20 might ask Mr. Boatright or GEN Blume, because it's the whole
21 question of how did we make the choices on the different
22 commodities and whether or not it is prudent to retain

Page 144

1 capacity to do engines at two different places. That's sort
2 of a readiness issue, as well as an efficiency issue.
3 I don't know, Mr. Boatright, if you want to respond
4 to that. It's a real detail of our planning.
5 GENERAL BLUME: Let me comment, just for a second.
6 And that is the fact that, you know, the realignment and the
7 Air Force option was to realign, to consolidate all that
8 workload, but to retain those two particular elements, one at
9 Tinker and one at Kelly.
10 But there's a lot more there, at either Tinker or
11 Kelly, than just the engine workload, so you can take one
12 piece of it, but that is a consolidation, and there would be
13 many, many other consolidations, as you know, at the other
14 depots.
15 MR. BOATRIGHT: I think that our whole proposal to
16 realign and consolidate is, we have taken and looked at,
17 across the Air Force depot structure, looked for those
18 activities that have the greatest potential for manpower
19 savings through consolidation, and what we've done is, we've
20 put that package together to create a very cost-effective
21 proposal.
22 Now, if you take and close a depot, what happens to

Page 145

1 you is that you can no longer pick and choose; you have to
2 take everything out of that depot and you have to relocate it
3 somewhere else and, in doing that, we create some
4 inefficiencies in addition to some efficiencies, and our
5 belief is, based on our analysis, that the realignment that
6 we've proposed is far superior to a closure action.
7 And it's really no more complicated than that.
8 That's basically what we've done, and we believe that that's
9 the right way to go about doing this. These are very, very
10 complex installations that have an awful lot on them and, to
11 consider closing one, in our opinion, is not the way to go.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: The current Brooks facilities
13 are very modern and built for their current use. In our
14 staff visit to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the buildings
15 proposed for the Brooks move are widespread and significantly
16 inferior to those at Brooks. Do you believe this could cause
17 serious degradation of the Brooks mission if the Commission
18 accepts that recommendation?
19 SECRETARY WIDNALL: No, I really don't believe that
20 because, while Wright-Patterson may be widespread, they will
21 be co-located with the Aeronautical Systems Center, so we
22 actually believe there will be a lot of synergism between

Page 146

1 members of the scientific community. We might find people
2 sort of shifting fields and contributing to other projects
3 that are in the Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-
4 Patterson. So I think, in fact, it would have a synergistic
5 effect.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: As we've visited many of
7 those types of installations over the past few months, we've
8 learned that not many of the highly technical people really
9 want to make a move.
10 Now, can you tell me the percentage that you've
11 projected of personnel from Brooks that would actually move,
12 other than military people that would actually be assigned to
13 move?
14 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I don't have that number. Do
15 we have an estimate for that? We'll have to provide that for
16 the record.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay. Then I'd like to
18 finish off with GEN Fogleman.
19 In the last four years, the Air Force basing
20 decisions have been strongly influenced by a one base, one
21 wing/one boss concept. With a vast amount of excess
22 infrastructure, or some excess infrastructure, and declining

Page 147

1 budgets, why does it make sense for the Air Force to continue
2 to adhere to this concept?
3 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: In fact, we're not continuing to
4 adhere to it, and I think, if we were going to attack the one
5 base/one boss philosophy, we're doing it at the wrong time
6 because the one base/one boss philosophy cost was the up
7 front cost to get people moved around.
8 I understood this question may come up, so I went
9 back and I tried to look at our infrastructure to see where
10 one base/one boss forced us into excess infrastructure and I
11 must tell you, when I go to the large aircraft base
12 facilities, for instance, I find three core tanker bases that
13 are choc-a-block. You can't get any more airplanes onto
14 Fairchild, onto Grand Forks, or onto McConnell Air Force
15 Base.
16 I see two bomber bases that you might walk the ramp
17 and say "These are under-utilized," but you start getting
18 into other things like trying to combine the nuclear bombers
19 from Minot with non-nuclear bombers at, say, Ellsworth. You
20 go to a place like Barksdale. You know, it's a pretty full
21 base with what we're doing with the B-52 operation and what
22 we're doing with some Reserve conversions.

Page 148

1 So I must tell you, Mr. Commissioner, I would need
2 some help on identifying my excess infrastructure being
3 driven by one base/one boss. If somebody can show me where
4 that's really forcing us to be inefficient, then I will go to
5 work on this, but I think, in the main, where the so-called
6 inefficiencies had occurred, they were things associated with
7 the initial stand-up, not so much with sustained operation
8 and, as a result of our previous BRACs, we've kind of got
9 ourselves pretty well skinnied down.
10 I look at Charleston Air Force Base. You might be
11 able to shoehorn some more airplanes into Charleston and, if
12 we get C-17s, trust me, we'll do that. McGuire is pretty
13 well maxed out with everything that we're doing. The same
14 thing is true of our West Coast Air Mobility Wing at Travis.
15 So, as I look around, there may be pockets where
16 there would be some excess capacity, but I don't think it's
17 driven necessarily by one base/one boss. For instance, at
18 McChord Air Force Base, we have some excess capacity as a
19 result of fighter force structure coming down.
20 So there was a case where that fighter force
21 structure coming down wasn't driven by one base/one boss. It
22 was the fact we were told to go to 20 TAC fighter wings, and

Page 149

1 it's very difficult and expensive to put any other kind of
2 force structure in there.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: So I would take your answer
4 to be that philosophy has changed and, if you had a base that
5 had some excess capacity and you could put another mission in
6 there, you would; is that correct, sir?
7 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: If it made sense from all the
8 other operational considerations. This is one of those
9 things that I tried to look at the Commission's request for
10 "How would you relocate assets, say, if you closed Grand
11 Forks?" And the next thing I saw was we were looking at
12 penny packet stuff -- stuffing a squadron into Seymour
13 Johnson or two squadrons there or two squadrons here, and it
14 completely undercuts our operational concept and the way
15 we're doing things.
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. I yield
17 back to the Chairman.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank Commissioner Cornella.
19 Commission Steele.
20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome. We're doing a lot
21 of UPT base talking, and I tell you, the Reese community,
22 someone along the parade line had a pretty interesting

Page 150

1 proposal that said, "Save Reese, close the Pentagon."
2 (Laughter.)
3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And the steady-state savings
4 if you ran a COBRA run might really be something you want to
5 look at.
6 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: They've got my vote.
7 (Laughter.)
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We'll note that. It was
9 under oath.
10 Looking at the UPT issue across the Navy the Air
11 Force, if I could, a UFT, if -- and this is an if -- we're
12 down to three Air Force UPT base -- and you talked about
13 increasing the workload or the throughput by about 52 percent
14 through 2002.
15 On the one hand, I believe Commissioner Cornella
16 asked a question, "Would you have room at, say, Columbus to
17 absorb some of the Navy strike training if they had a
18 shortfall?" And I don't expect you to address the Navy
19 training, but they're maxing out Kingsville and there's a
20 question of if they would have the capacity they need in the
21 out years.
22 I guess I'd like to look at the issue both on

Page 151

1 Columbus, specifically ability to absorb strike training, or
2 the reverse of that, if you feel you're really maxing out in
3 the Air Force, your ability to achieve the throughout you
4 need for pilot training, could the Air Force benefit by the
5 retention of Meridian for capacity's sake?
6 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, as I've said, within the
7 FYDEP, we can close one UPT base and still have the capacity
8 to have some small amount of surge or absorb some training
9 from somewhere else.
10 We look at that as a system, though. We don't look
11 at it by base, for a lot of different reasons. So what we
12 will end up doing as we build a PFT for the year, then we
13 kind of get base-specific. But we kind of look at it in the
14 aggregate, because, in any given year, attrition will vary by
15 base, these kinds of things.
16 So I'm not prepared to try and address a question
17 that says, "If we have some excess capacity, is that excess
18 capacity all at Columbus?" The answer is no, it's not going
19 to be at Columbus. It's going to be spread across the force.
20 I mean, that's the way you're going to spread it.
21 And then -- I'm not prepared to answer the
22 question, but we might be able to go back and model it --

Page 152

1 "Given that you had excess capacity of 100 slots, how many of
2 them would you think would be at Columbus," then I think we
3 could go back and give you an answer to that. But I can't
4 answer that here.
5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I said Columbus specifically
6 because of their capability to also train for strike, should
7 we need to do that.
8 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: But all our bases, under our
9 SUPT scheme that we're going to go to as we continue to look
10 at how we bed this down -- I mean, Columbus will have that
11 capability; we'll have that capability at other places, also.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. If it's all right, I
13 may follow up with a question in writing --
14 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Okay. That would be useful.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- to try to bring the Navy's
16 comments last week and your thoughts on this together. It
17 would be very helpful.
18 Returning to Brooks for a second, if I might, and
19 this is a tad redundant with Commissioner Cox's question, but
20 given that the one-time cost in the Air Force proposal is
21 $211 million to close with annual savings of 32.2, San
22 Antonio community's cantonment proposal, the costs are only

Page 153

1 11 and the annual savings are half of the Air Force savings.
2 I'll give you that, in the long haul, under your
3 proposal, just looking at this, and if you don't count loss
4 of personnel or the question of perhaps the infrastructure
5 not being on par at Wright-Patt with what they currently have
6 in San Antonio, you would have more savings under your
7 proposal in the long, long haul.
8 But if, going to the ALC issue, if up front costs
9 are your issue, this would provide you an additional $200
10 million that could go toward a closure of a single ALC. And
11 we all know that the steady state savings on an ALC are
12 significant versus looking at the 32 million versus 17.6
13 million.
14 Looking at that as an entire picture, could that
15 $200 million be much better spent in the long term for the
16 Air Force to go toward a complete closure of one ALC?
17 SECRETARY WIDNALL: No, I don't believe so. I view
18 the proposal that we submitted as really the optimum proposal
19 in the best interests of the Air Force. Again, I think with
20 respect to Brooks, I think the cantonment makes very little
21 sense. I think it would be very hard on the people. They'd
22 have to go driving over to one of the other San Antonio

Page 154

1 installations for every little personnel matter, everything
2 they needed to do to get Air Force support.
3 I think we would be missing an opportunity to
4 locate the scientific communities together to get the kind of
5 synergism that we need if we're going to move forward in the
6 future and sort of integrate human factors into aeronautical
7 systems.
8 So I think, from the technical point of view, it
9 just makes more sense to relocate Brooks to Wright-Patterson.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Madam Secretary.
11 Switching to the Northern Tier, GEN Fogleman, the
12 Secretary has notified us that there will be no determination
13 by the Secretary that would require retention of the missile
14 group at Grand Forks. If the 321st Missile Group is
15 inactivated, will it be necessary to demolish or relocate
16 Grand Forks' ABM facilities, and do you know what the
17 associated costs would be of demolishing?
18 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: We have looked into this, and
19 the answer is no. We have been told there will be no
20 requirement to demolish or relocate that ABM facility.
21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Under the treaty, the State
22 Department checks off on that also, that we don't have a

Page 155

1 treaty obligation to demolish?
2 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: This was a position that was
3 provided to us by the deputy secretary of defense after
4 inter-agency consultation, so if there's somebody out there
5 that has some additional information, they haven't been up in
6 the net.
7 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Switching gears for a
8 moment, we've heard about a tanker shortfall in the
9 Southeast. Could you address specifically what that
10 shortfall might be and the number of squadrons?
11 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: What I would kind of prefer to
12 do is talk to it in terms of we have some numbers I'll share
13 with you, if I could.
14 We look at it in terms of peacetime demand, and
15 that is an important dimension. This is peacetime, peacetime
16 demand versus basing. And the issue is how many air-
17 refueling-capable airplanes do you have in a certain part of
18 the country versus your tankers?
19 What we have in the Southeast is 27 percent of the
20 demand is in the Southeast. Without any rebasing, 7 percent
21 of our capability is in the Southeast.
22 In the Northern Tier, we have 5 percent of the

Page 156

1 demand and 15 percent of our tankers based there but what the
2 Northern Tier gives us is optimum location for the support of
3 the bombers in the wartime scenario. And so we have been
4 trying to work a way to help redress this imbalance in the
5 South. This has been this way for years.
6 And, of course, that's at the heart of our
7 Malmstrom recommendation, to move those tankers to MacDill.
8 That helps some. It doesn't help a lot. It's 12 tankers.
9 But it helps some, and it helps us work the problem of we are
10 currently obligated to run an air field at MacDill Air Force
11 Base and we have no force structure on it.
12 By the same token, we are obligated to run an air
13 field at Air Force Base in a place where we have excess force
14 structure, a relatively small unit that we think would have
15 minimum impact on the people and the unit to transfer it to
16 the Southeast. And so that's really what we're trying to
17 address.
18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Switching back to Northern
19 Tier a little bit, if the Commission decides not to try to
20 find a home for the tankers at Grand Forks, looking only at
21 the two missile fields, if we go just back to Minor and Grand
22 Forks.

Page 157

1 Having visited Grand Forks a week-and-a-half ago,
2 two weeks ago -- time is becoming a bit of a blur here -- I
3 was told pretty much by everyone that day that those missile
4 fields are largely interchangeable, which is why the original
5 recommendation, though it said closure of Grand Forks was
6 preferred, the Secretary was willing to close Minot should
7 that letter not be able to come forward to us during this
8 process.
9 My question is -- given I know it's an A system and
10 a B system and there had been issues that react with the B
11 system, but they've cleared those, et cetera, and the Air
12 Force's testimony that there is not a water problem at Grand
13 Forks -- would it perhaps make sense for the Air Force, in
14 the long haul, to have the Commission close Minot's missile
15 field, under the scenario we're touching the tankers at Grand
16 Forks, to provide you the opportunity in a future BRAC in,
17 say, 2001 or whatever, to have the chance to move the bombers
18 from Minot to close a base, to then save you that operating
19 cost, if Grand Forks is going to stay a place you want to
20 operate from, from now till whenever?
21 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: First of all, I was not aware
22 that the Air Force says there's not a water problem at Grand

Page 158

1 Forks, because I can tell you the numbers they show me
2 consistently is that we're spending considerably more money
3 to operate those silos at Grand Forks than we are at Minot or
4 anywhere else and, if they're not spending it on the water
5 issue, I don't know what they're spending it on.
6 But we break it out by base, sort of cost per silo,
7 and everything I have ever seen says that it is more costly
8 to operate silos at Grand Forks than it is at the other
9 locations and it has always been attributed to the water
10 problem. So you may have some new information that I don't
11 have. I don't know who testified to that.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Actually, General, I had
13 always heard that, as well, but it was said pretty
14 consistently and some of the senior command had come in also
15 during my visit and also addressed that issue and said that
16 it was no longer a problem.
17 Say it still is a problem. How would the cost
18 compare with fixing a water problem on a silo every X amount
19 of years versus maintaining the operations of the base in the
20 long haul? And my time is expired.
21 MR. BOATRIGHT: If I could comment on this, in
22 regard to our analysis, the Air Force did a rather detailed

Page 159

1 analysis comparing each of the missile bases, one to another,
2 to determine which base was the best base, which was the next
3 best base, and right down the line.
4 We did that analysis, considering a number of
5 factors. One, water table level, because that affects the
6 hardness of the site, and that has something to do with the
7 survivability of the site. When we did that, Grand Forks
8 clearly comes out as the one that would be closed. That is,
9 it doesn't do as well in that comparative analysis as the
10 other sites.
11 Now, the next one up the ladder is Minot. That's
12 the reason why the Air Force focused on Grand Forks, because
13 retaining the other three gives us the best possible missile
14 field structure that the Department of Defense can maintain.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you. Staff slipped me
16 a note that says that Grand Forks is the third -- how do I
17 say this -- the second cheapest, third most costly, expensive
18 to run, missile field. I know there's a lot of issues
19 involved in this and I don't want to take any more time from
20 my colleagues on this issue.
21 GENERAL BLUME: As the chief said, it is the most
22 costly, also.

Page 160

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner
3 Steele. Commissioner Robles.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
5 Madam Secretary, as you said in your opening remarks, the Air
6 Logistics Center issue is the centerpiece of your discussion.
7 It is clearly the centerpiece of our mind. So I'm going to
8 talk a little more about it, and I'm going to try to
9 crystallize a couple of thoughts that I think we heard today,
10 just to make sure that you understand the difficulty we have.
11 The reason I'm saying that is because we have
12 between now and the 22nd to gather all the facts. Then,
13 we're going to go into a voting mode and we want to make sure
14 we have all the evidence, all the numbers we need to make a
15 clear, fair, objective decision.
16 The second thing I will say is, as you know, I've
17 spent most of my adult life in the analysis and numbers
18 business, so I have a particular interest in the numbers that
19 support your decision. I asked the staff -- all of us have,
20 but I particularly have been asking them -- that I'm not
21 saying the numbers are wrong, the numbers are perfectly
22 right.

Page 161

1 It's the assumptions that I quibble with; it is the
2 parameters that I quibble with; it is things like the number
3 of years to close, the year you start the closure, the 15-
4 percent productivity you get when you downsize and zero
5 percent productivity when you consolidate -- on and on and on
6 and on -- the PCS costs, the workmen's comp cost, the whole
7 string of numbers that are the underpinning for this
8 analysis.
9 When you do all that, the staff will show us next
10 week a rather detailed analysis that shows that there is
11 significant deviation in the numbers. So let's just agree to
12 disagree for right now. We have a different set of numbers
13 than you do and we will be briefed on what those numbers are.
14 So, if that is the case, I guess what I'm asking
15 you is, we have to take a good, serious look at whether we
16 close one or two depots, and we're going to look at that.
17 I'm not saying we're going to vote to do that, but we're
18 going to take a good, hard look at that. I think you
19 certainly got that, from the tone of our discussion.
20 My question to you is, given your BCEG rankings and
21 given all your analysis, one more time, should we stick with
22 your rankings as we come to grips with this issue of closing

Page 162

1 one or two of these depots?
2 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I think I responded to
3 that question that certainly I stand behind the Air Force
4 tiering, and just to remark that our tiering is alphabetical
5 by tier so that, you know, if Kelly and McClellan end up in
6 the bottom tier, then K comes before M, and so that's all you
7 can attribute to the relative listing of those two bases.
8 But I do view the results of the tiering as the
9 beginning of a process and not the end of a process, and that
10 is the very process that the Air Force went through in trying
11 to make its recommendation.
12 So I don't know how else to respond to your
13 question, except to say that it is certainly my fervent hope
14 that you make the right decision, because I truly believe
15 that you have the future of the Air Force in your hands, at
16 least for the near term, and the recommendations that this
17 Commission will make, I believe will determine the health of
18 the Air Force over the next ten years.
19 So I fervently hope you make the right decision,
20 because, for us, it is a big risk.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We understand that, and we
22 asked the Army who was before you, about risk management.

Page 163

1 And, see, we have two different analyses here. We
2 have a risk-averse solution, which is basically your
3 maximizing the aversion to risk so you can have capability
4 for the out-years, and you have the Army who says, "We're
5 going to be risk takers and we're going to go down to three
6 depots, one of each, and that's it." And so we're wrestling
7 with that.
8 Do we have to have a cookie-cutter approach?
9 Absolutely not. But the fact of the matter is, they also
10 have readiness at stake, just like you do, and so we have to
11 see what is the right answer. And I understand there are
12 different depot structures and there are different cost
13 involved.
14 But, to the extent that your costs and your savings
15 -- your up front costs and your savings -- are not what is in
16 this analysis -- and we believe that -- then that makes this
17 risk strategy a lot clearer for us to make a decision on
18 because, then, maybe there isn't as much risk.
19 Now, capacity, we'll put up a chart, the capacity
20 chart. See, this is what we're wrestling with.
21 SECRETARY WIDNALL: You may be wrestling with it,
22 but I can't see it.

Page 164

1 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Well, this is a chart of your
2 data going to the BCEG. Turn the other side around.
3 SECRETARY WIDNALL: It's not getting any better.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Maybe it's clearer on that
5 chart.
6 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Our problem is, we have an angle
7 shot at it.
8 SECRETARY WIDNALL: That's fine.
9 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: That chart was prepared on --
10 no, I need the capacity chart, is the one that I'd like to
11 see. They understand their own ranking system. This chart
12 right there, that chart. Do you have a copy of that chart?
13 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes. I have it.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: This one?
15 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I don't have that one,
16 but I have this one.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: If you would look at this
18 chart, please, this is your data that you sent to the Joint
19 Cross-Service Group, and there are two charts. The first one
20 is the Air Force depot maximum potential capacity, and it was
21 normalized according to your input; so we didn't create this
22 number, these are numbers you gave us.

Page 165

1 It clearly shows that there is at least 50 percent
2 excess capacity in the Air Force structure by the year 1999.
3 So there it is, and that's what we're using, your number.
4 Then the second chart is just how that's broken
5 down by depot, and it shows, if you take that capacity and
6 spread it around the depots, so there's clearly no
7 misunderstanding in our mind that there's excess capacity.
8 So, given that there's excess capacity, we are now
9 trying to come to grips with -- and you said that up front --
10 is it one or two? And you say downsizing is your preferred
11 alternative. We say maybe that's your view, and we
12 appreciate it, and that's your professional judgment. But we
13 need to take a look at all the parameters and all the
14 financial support data.
15 GENERAL BLUME: I think we said one-and-a-half, or
16 about one-and-a-half and, if you went to two, there would be
17 some severe disruption, some out-sourcing, some things that
18 would have to do with other services and things of this sort,
19 that there was not that much excess capacity.
20 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Which are good, right? I
21 mean, we are looking to --
22 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: We're looking at that, Mr.

Page 166

1 Commissioner, but the one thing we would ask this Commission
2 to keep in mind is, that looks at this, is the United States
3 Air Force has not been out on the street crying about
4 readiness. We understand readiness. We have a system we've
5 built to keep us a ready force. We understand getting rid of
6 excess capacity.
7 You all will, I hope, as you do this analysis, not
8 try and reinvent how the Air Force does business, because I
9 think that's beyond your charter. You will fold your tent
10 and go away this summer, and we will get to live with this --
11 I will get to live with it -- for several more years, as the
12 Secretary will.
13 So if, as a part of your analysis, you're
14 fundamentally changing the way we do business, then I would
15 ask that we be able to sit down and talk about this.
16 On the other hand, I think that the position we
17 have taken, relative to downsizing in place gives, us the
18 flexibility to do things such as respond to the Roles and
19 Mission Commission of doing more out-sourcing, privatization
20 in pace, et cetera, with far less impact on the work force
21 and the readiness of our Air Force.
22 You start closing these depots, and I will tell

Page 167

1 you, there is no way that you're not going to impact our
2 combat readiness for a couple years, when you start moving
3 these things around.
4 Now, is it worth having it impacted, to get the
5 long-term savings? I mean, those are the kinds of value
6 judgments that have to be made. And, as we look at it, and
7 we look at the savings and the flexibility this gives us, we
8 say we've got a complete package.
9 Now, that's kind of where we're coming from on
10 that.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I understand. I understand
12 your bottom line and, just so there's no misunderstanding,
13 we're every bit as attuned to the readiness issue as you are,
14 and we have made a commitment that we're not going to tell
15 anybody, prescribe how to do things. There's going to be
16 plenty of broad flexibility, as you should have, as you're
17 required to have, as the leadership of the Air Force, to do
18 whatever has to be done.
19 But all I wanted to make sure of, was to underscore
20 the point that we're going to come to grips with this issue
21 here over the next four or five days, and this is not an easy
22 issue, and there is a difference in opinion on the total up

Page 168

1 front costs and the total savings; and that is going to be a
2 major impact on this equation.
3 So if you have any final adjustments, there is some
4 time sensitivity here, so enough on that.
5 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Let me just remind you -- and
6 I've said it in my opening statement -- that, when you look
7 at one of these bases, Air Force bases, that we call depots,
8 I would say that certainly less than 50 percent of the people
9 who are on that base are actually involved in the depot, and
10 50 percent of them are involved in some other activity with
11 facilities and equipment.
12 A lot of the major cost has to do with moving those
13 tenants who are needed, they're in our plans, they're part of
14 what we do, and they cannot be downsized.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I understand. The second
16 question is a question that you also alluded to in your
17 opening remarks, which has to do with tactical missile
18 workload. And you appropriately said that you weren't
19 looking for work. We're the ones who added the list.
20 We are the ones who said we ought to take a look at
21 it, based on the last BRAC Commission's recommendation about
22 more jointness and the fact that we just want to know if we

Page 169

1 could, in fact, look at an option that moves tactical missile
2 workload from an Army depot to an Air Force depot.
3 We've heard both sides of the argument, as you
4 would expect.
5 On the one side, we hear that "It would require
6 much more construction, primarily for additional igloos at
7 Hill Air Force Base, that there are some very large costs to
8 do that and, oh, by the way, Hill doesn't have the expertise
9 or would have difficulty building up the expertise to do this
10 missile work."
11 On the other side, on the ground at Hill, when I
12 was there, they told me "It would not require additional
13 igloos, we do have the capability to do this kind of work,
14 we've done it in the past, we're doing some of it now, and we
15 could do more in the future."
16 So could you please just give us your thoughts and
17 your analysis on this whole issue?
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: As i say, I think we would feel
19 rather relaxed with your ultimate decision on this matter.
20 You're obviously in a position, both by virtue of your recent
21 activities and your background, to make this decision. So I
22 think we feel comfortable with however it comes out.

Page 170

1 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I would really like to know
2 if you know of any construction requirements, because it
3 appeared to be a service-unique standard for storage of
4 missiles that caused that additional construction. I'd just
5 like to get a little insight on that issue.
6 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I guess we'd be glad to work
7 with the staff.
8 GENERAL BLUME: That is the way we understood that
9 the analysis was performed, also, and that the requirement
10 was that, if you had to store all the missiles there, that
11 there would be a significant cost increase. Is that an
12 absolute requirement?
13 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And the answer is?
14 GENERAL BLUME: And the answer is no.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: So you would not have to
16 build those additional igloos to meet the same separation
17 distance and storage requirements that the Army requires of
18 its storage?
19 GENERAL BLUME: That's maybe a little bit different
20 question. I'm not sure what we would have to do. We'd have
21 to go in and look at it. But it depends upon the concept
22 that you work under. As I understand it, they're going to

Page 171

1 take the missiles apart, was what you had asked them to do
2 anyway, or what the Army's proposal, that is, was to do, and
3 going to farm out part of the workload.
4 So I guess what I would say is that it depends
5 upon, there were two different options. One was the air-to-
6 air, the IR missiles, and that sort of thing, what's being
7 done there now, and the other one was, I think, all the
8 missile activity was there.
9 But, if you don't store all the missiles there, if
10 you store the missiles at some other thing, my understanding
11 was that the capacity was there.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. Well, if you could
13 give us some feedback on that, the option is very simply not
14 splitting the two like the Army's proposal, but taking the
15 missiles, moving them in their entirety, all the missile
16 inventory, to Hill Air Force Base, doing the required
17 maintenance there.
18 And then we were told at Hill you don't have to
19 store them there; it's not an operationally sound concept to
20 store all the missiles at that base. You would put them out
21 in storage facilities that are geographically separated and
22 then you would ship them from there to wherever the theater

Page 172

1 of operations is. That's the way I used to do it when I was
2 in the war-fighting business.
3 So would you just kind of tell us, could you do
4 that and would there be large additional expenditures for
5 construction if you did it under that concept or that scheme?
6 GENERAL BLUME: We'll look into that for you.
7 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I
8 yield back my time.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much,
10 Commissioner Robles. Commissioner Montoya.
11 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: My comments are going to be
12 more in that nature than asking a question, because this is a
13 final opportunity under oath to make sure that I understand
14 the Air Force position because, to the extent that I
15 understand it and support it, I have trouble with the Army's,
16 and vice versa.
17 The Secretary of Defense has given us the dilemma,
18 because we have some inconsistent positions in looking at
19 similar activities, and I'm going to try -- the engineer side
20 of me says -- I'm going to try to factor through all that and
21 deliver a consistent vote that SECDEF will have to live with,
22 whoever that SECDEF is.

Page 173

1 So I'm going to try to say in my own words what I
2 think your position is and have you concur or not concur, or
3 fix it, because I want to leave this session with that
4 understanding, not to suggest that I agree with it or not,
5 but I do want to understand it.
6 Before I do that, I've got to respond to a comment
7 the general made. It's the second time it's been made in
8 about two weeks. And senior people in government, to infer
9 that we should make the right choice because we'll be gone 1
10 July and, therefore, leave you with a problem, really offends
11 me in this sense.
12 When you take off that uniform, you will live the
13 rest of your life with the decisions that you've made, good
14 or bad and, when I take off this Commission uniform, I'll
15 feel the same way. So we are working very hard to come up
16 with the right answer, General, because we do appreciate what
17 it is we're doing, what's in our hands.
18 I assure you I won't be going home 1 July and
19 forgetting about it. I'll live with this the rest of my
20 life, also.
21 Now, this is what I think the Air Force is saying.
22 And I want to distinguish between capacity and idle

Page 174

1 industrial capability.
2 I think what the Air Force is saying -- and it's a
3 cash flow analysis that you're presenting to us, really --
4 you're saying that, given the workload that you have in the
5 Air Force today, or anticipate, that, through your managerial
6 approaches -- and they are wide-ranging, and I won't
7 categorize them all -- you are trying to size and keep sizing
8 your capacity to meet that workload. Whatever percent excess
9 you need, you'll figure that out, but you're optimizing your
10 capacity, which includes people, machines, and facilities.
11 You admit that, beyond that, minus the people,
12 you've got some industrial capability that is idle. That's
13 facilities and machines.
14 And you're also saying that you are more willing to
15 carry the cost, or you are willing to carry the cost of that
16 idle industrial capability as part of your everyday
17 budgeting, that that is cheaper than closing an Air Force
18 depot and having to move practically all the positions, not
19 the overhead, but practically all the positions that you are
20 working in an ALC, because you have sized it to proper
21 capacity and, therefore, that's an incremental workload that
22 you've got to move in total someplace else.

Page 175

1 That cost is greater than owning the capacity, plus
2 the idle capability, at one place. That's what you're
3 saying, I think.
4 From a business perspective, there are some numbers
5 that you leave out, and maybe that's okay in government.
6 From a business perspective, we would have to cost that idle
7 industrial capability. We would have to put a cost for the
8 investment we made and the carrying costs, plus the
9 depreciation costs, plus the operations and maintenance cost.
10 That is not necessarily entirely a cash-flow
11 analysis and, therefore, for you, it's a sum cost and you can
12 live with that under your economic model much better than I
13 could in the world that I live in.
14 I think that's what you are essentially saying to
15 us, is that it's cheaper for you to live with how you've
16 reorganized and how you've squeezed. You can pay for that
17 stuff that isn't being used. That's a better answer than
18 trying to close everything at one place and moving it in real
19 dollars that you have to spend this year, next year, and the
20 following year.
21 That's what I'm hearing, and I want to see if I'm
22 hearing that correctly.

Page 176

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Okay. I think I can supplement
2 that, because I think that you have laid it out, but let me
3 make some additions.
4 First of all, it is not our intent to carry the
5 idle capability. We have identified buildings for
6 demolition, and this really does happen. When I visit an Air
7 Force Base, I'm always overjoyed to see a building in the
8 stages of demolishing, because if we do not need buildings,
9 the best thing, after some point, is to simply tear them
10 down.
11 So the fact of the matter is that we want to get
12 rid of idle capability and, as I often remarked when we were
13 in the BCEG, what I'd like to see us do is to turn this into
14 grass. That's got a number of advantages, not the least of
15 which is that it is another form of long-term environmental
16 remediation, to let the land return to its natural state.
17 There is also, of course, the possibility that we
18 can free up some of either part of the base or some of those
19 buildings for use by the civilian community in a public-
20 private partnership and, certainly, in some of our more
21 modern facilities, we would want to look at that. That, of
22 course, is part of our planning that we think will take place

Page 177

1 over the next few years, with our new leadership at AFMC.
2 I guess the only other part I would really want to
3 emphasize is the large number of productively employed
4 tenants on our bases. These are healthy organizations with
5 major facilities, and to simply take them and move them has
6 always seemed to me to be a big unnecessary expense.
7 So those are the two additions I would want to
8 make.
9 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I think your first comment
10 fits the model I laid out, in that you will make a subset
11 tradeoff, whether it is cheaper to keep a building in place
12 for future use and maintaining it, as opposed to tearing it
13 down. That will be an economic subset.
14 And the other will be to further reduce those
15 carrying costs of maintenance, by having somebody else occupy
16 and use it. So I don't think that's inconsistent with the
17 oversimplification I made.
18 I think I'm finally understanding what it is you're
19 saying, after self-searching and writing myself notes from
20 places I've been. And so, to the extent that we can come to
21 agreement that we understand each other, I'll leave it at
22 that.

Page 178

1 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Perhaps, Mr. Commissioner, I
2 could add one thing. While we are not required, as you say,
3 to follow the same business accounting rules that you are,
4 it's interesting that, within the logistics business, because
5 of our defense business operating fund activities, more so
6 than in some of the operational parts of the Air Force, we
7 are sort of required to account for this overhead and
8 infrastructure and all that.
9 And I would ask that, as a data point, perhaps the
10 Commission go look at the services and how they have done in
11 DFOB and DBOF funding over the last several years, and I
12 think you will find that the Air Force, through its model,
13 has generated excesses to this fund or, at least, we have
14 been in the contributing versus the withdrawal mode.
15 I think it may be an indication of precisely what
16 you said in terms of, as we drew down our workforce to kind
17 of match up with what our requirements were, while
18 infrastructure stayed there, our real capacity came down; and
19 that's sort of reflected.
20 But it's a measure of merit that, anytime you start
21 talking about DBOF, you get on icy --
22 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I lived in that DBOF world

Page 179

1 for a number of years.
2 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: -- icy treads, as you well
3 remember.
4 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Yes. NIF world, we used to
5 call it.
6 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Yes.
7 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Yes, sir.
8 GENERAL BLUME: And let me assure you that those
9 costs for that mothballing, as you might say, or destruction,
10 or whatever, those were captured, as far as the analysis was
11 concerned.
12 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And that's what I heard at
13 Kelly, particularly, that even with those costs included, I
14 heard a labor rate number that was better than any of these
15 by some considerable amount. So I'm going to ask the Navy,
16 why is the Air Force so much better than you all? That's for
17 another day, though.
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: We've been asking that for
19 years.
20 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: One last comment, Mr.
21 Chairman. I am really impressed with your facilities
22 management, General, in the Air Force. It is a real pleasure

Page 180

1 to visit Air Force bases. Treatment, facilities, appearance
2 -- I would have to say that they're equal to one of our
3 nuclear submarines in quality of life.
4 (Laughter.)
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Commissioner Montoya.
6 Madam Secretary, I'll have only about four
7 questions, and we'll be able to break for lunch.
8 Now, in your earlier comments back in March, the
9 Air Force, your argument to us then, in connection with this
10 novel idea of downsizing instead of closing any of your
11 depots, was that you could not afford to close a depot with
12 the funding you have available. That was our understanding,
13 and we've examined that record, and we're satisfied that was
14 the argument then.
15 Our staff -- I want to be candid with you -- now
16 believes they've showed that it is affordable and that it
17 does make economic sense, and they are now concerned that
18 you're raising instead operational concerns, really, for the
19 first time now, that it was entirely an argument of the
20 funding earlier and that you have reconfigured your position
21 somewhat in connection with our second meeting.
22 Is an unfair characterization by our staff?

Page 181

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes. Well, I guess maybe I
2 might characterize our earlier statement as sort of an
3 enthusiasm for the proposal, based on the obvious point that
4 the DOD had some very serious budget problems in the year
5 ahead. But, really, from an operational and management point
6 of view, I've always believed that the real attractiveness
7 had to do with the consolidation of the individual
8 commodities.
9 But, clearly, at that sort of top-level testimony
10 that we gave at that point, we certainly didn't spend our
11 time talking about hydraulics consolidating at this base, and
12 the instrumentation consolidating at this base. We didn't go
13 into that level of detail.
14 And we certainly didn't talk, at that point, about
15 the obvious fact, as I've tried to emphasize here, that the
16 presence of so many tenant units on our installations makes
17 the cost to consider moving very, very large. I think these
18 were clearly things we realized at the time.
19 But you recall Secretary Perry's presentation and
20 Mr. Deutch's presentation really, I think all of us were
21 flushed with the enthusiasm of the net present value for this
22 approach, and that's, I'm sure, the emphasis we gave. But I

Page 182

1 believe we've always seen it as a complete package.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Okay. Did you want to say
3 something, General?
4 GENERAL BLUME: Madam Secretary, could I just tag
5 on?
6 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.
7 GENERAL BLUME: Even the Joint Cross-Service Group
8 had significant operational concerns with the closure of one
9 or two of the air logistics centers, and we certainly have
10 always had that concern. Our voice is being heard, maybe, a
11 little bit more now, but certainly the affordability, as the
12 Secretary said, is very important.
13 The less disruption that we can have is certainly
14 an important fact, and the operational concerns, as far as
15 the Chief made, as far as readiness, are extremely important
16 also.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I hear all that. Now, let me
18 review the bidding, because these figures are the figures we
19 have to work with. There's been a 40 percent reduction in
20 authorized and appropriated amounts since the high point in
21 the Reagan Administration when I served in the United States
22 Senate. There's been a 40 percent reduction.

Page 183

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes, in the budget, right.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: There's been a 30 percent force
3 reduction. If we honor every request of the Department of
4 Defense -- every one of them -- and don't do anything else,
5 we will only achieve a 21 percent reduction in the capacity
6 out there. I think that's factual.
7 The next thing is -- and I regret this -- you know
8 my record when I was in the United States Senate, so I don't
9 advocate what has occurred. But the downsizing has actually
10 resulted in a downsizing, unbelievably, to about the 1950
11 level, which I find, quite candidly, quite shocking.
12 I take it, it is only the Congress reflecting the
13 constituency views. I can only accept that as the reason why
14 because, from a national security standpoint, no one could
15 defend it. But that's factual.
16 Now, continuing the bidding, in the BRACs, through
17 '93, the Navy has closed one-half of their aircraft depots --
18 three of six. If we only do what the Navy requests this
19 time, if we only support that, the Navy will have closed half
20 their shipyards. The Army will have closed, if we only do
21 what they say -- assuming we do what they say -- six of the
22 nine depots.

Page 184

1 So I wonder at what point the force reductions in
2 the authorized and appropriated amounts get to the level
3 where one says, "Hey, what are we going to do with all this
4 capacity?" You know, one has to say, in honesty, General,
5 that if you've been there and you've seen them and eye-balled
6 them, which we've done, there is humongous space. Humongous
7 is the only fair way to describe it.
8 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Mr. Chairman, could I --
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: General, I love you; I'd be
10 delighted to hear your defense.
11 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I won't try to defend. What I
12 will try to do, though, is hopefully amplify.
13 I have before me a list of those depots, Army,
14 Navy, that you have described. I can go down through three
15 Army depots, three Naval aviation depots, and add up their
16 total base population, and they do not equal the base
17 population of Kelly Air Force Base. I mean, we're talking in
18 terms of scale.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I wouldn't argue that with you.
20 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: But, if the Air Force were
21 structured so that we had these little depots our here, then
22 I think we could compare. We would have apples to apples,

Page 185

1 oranges to oranges.
2 We have taken the position based on past actions.
3 I mean, we have consolidated activities into these megabases.
4 You have to go back into the past to see the same kinds of
5 drawdowns that we've had to get us into this position.
6 Again, I think Commissioner Montoya has put his
7 finger on what we're trying to do with what we have left. So
8 I think people who will put forward this comparison of
9 numbers versus looking at the complexion of these
10 installations, you know, it's not quite apples to apples.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Okay. Let me ask you a couple
12 more quick questions. You are saying to us that the
13 reevaluation indicates that Kirtland should not be closed,
14 are you not?
15 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes, that's right. That's
16 right.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: So that we don't have any
18 difference of opinion about that.
19 SECRETARY WIDNALL: That's right.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: All right. Now finally -- and
21 this is procedural -- this is the last BRAC. There isn't any
22 question, when we conclude this BRAC, we are leaving a lot of

Page 186

1 excess capacity out there that everybody has to deal with,
2 that gives you problems when you want to do procurement,
3 gives you problems on force levels, a lot of other things.
4 Also, I don't think it's subject to debate that
5 there's no stomach in the Congress and probably not in the
6 country for another round in a couple of years, and it's also
7 fairly clear that Presidential politics can get involved in
8 this, to some extent. And I don't mean that critically.
9 Thank God for a country where those things are part of the
10 great debate.
11 There's some thinking that, when the dust is
12 cleared and everybody has dusted themselves off and relaxed
13 and reviewed it more carefully, that after a couple of
14 Presidential elections, maybe we ought to have an opportunity
15 to look at it again, having in mind the statutory inability,
16 really, to do anything without a BRAC.
17 There's some talk about 2001. That would let two
18 Presidential elections intervene. It also has the nice
19 result that all BRAC stuff will be finished by then.
20 I ask you -- all of you and particularly Mr.
21 Boatright and MAJ Blume, who are the guys who have to figure
22 these things out -- whether you think that makes some sense

Page 109

1 large ramp, and a recently resurfaced runway.
2 Its north central location readily supports our
3 nuclear deterrent posture and our global crisis response
4 capability, plus it offers the ability to economically
5 service northern air refueling tracks in essentially
6 uncluttered air space.
7 Closing Grand Forks would eliminate these benefits
8 and it would add turmoil to our tanker force, which has
9 suffered in the closing and realigning of 12 tanker bases
10 since the initial BRAC in 1988. Last summer I had 67 percent
11 of the Air Refueling Force in PCS status as a result of that
12 realignment.
13 We have now come to closure on these core bases,
14 and so a decision to blow up one of these core bases and
15 start to move those assets around will not only have a
16 negative impact, operationally, but it will also impact
17 adversely on our people, who have been drawn through a
18 knothole in this business.
19 My second concern is that of looking at Guard and
20 Reserve activities in base realignment and closure. Again, I
21 think the Air Force track record in total force utilization
22 of Reserve and Guard forces is unequalled. We've spent a lot

Page 110

1 of time and effort making this work.
2 In all deference to one of your commissioners, he
3 played a role. Commissioner Davis had me assigned to the Air
4 Reserve Personnel Center as a youth, and I had the
5 opportunity, as a young major, to learn a little bit about
6 Air Reserve Personnel activities.
7 I learned the importance of knowing the
8 demographics and the connectivity to communities and, as I
9 have grown up in our Air Force, I have come to appreciate
10 that one of the reasons that these Guard and Reserve units
11 can contribute so much to active duty Air Force day-to-day
12 operations is because of their ties back to those
13 communities.
14 The Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard
15 are experts on demographics, basing, and recruiting, and so I
16 think we should pay attention to them when they speak on
17 these issues. I think they have come forth, and we've played
18 in a forthright manner during this operation.
19 So I would strongly urge that we support GEN
20 McIntosh's recommendation that we close no more than one F-16
21 and one C-130 Reserve outfit.
22 Now, the opportunity to inactivate a Reserve unit

Page 111

1 at O'hare International represents a good solution, perhaps,
2 to the C-130 portion of this equation. We had originally
3 recommended looking at Pittsburgh as the closure but, as we
4 moved forward in our negotiations with the City of Chicago,
5 it now appears as though there may be a solution on the
6 horizon where closing the C-130 unit at O'Hare and moving the
7 KC-135 Air National Guard unit down to Scott Field would work
8 out to everyone's benefit and allow us to go back and clean
9 up some FY '93 or '93 Commission activities.
10 On the other hand, I disagree with any action that
11 would result in the inactivation of the Reserve F-16 unit at
12 Carswell Field. Co-location of the Navy and Air Force Reserve
13 operations at this location, as per the '93 BRAC Commission
14 recommendation, I think has paid off very, very well.
15 For the Air Force Reserve, this represents a very
16 cost-effective tenant operation in a location that has both
17 great recruiting and retention activities. The unit's
18 location on a military installation will result, I think, in
19 few savings to DOD from its inactivation.
20 Remaining Reserve unit are really necessary to
21 flesh out our Air Force force structure required to sustain
22 the growing Reserve contribution to the Air Force contingency

Page 112

1 operations around the globe, and so that's why I would
2 strongly urge you to impact no more than one F-16 and one C-
3 130 Reserve out there.
4 I would tell you that I share Secretary Widnall's
5 fear that attempting to fix our excess capacity with depot
6 closures would be extremely costly. I think it would
7 adversely impact Air Force readiness and modernization
8 efforts, particularly if we tried to accelerate such an
9 effort.
10 In particular, we have come to rely increasingly on
11 rapid depot-level repair and return capabilities under our
12 so-called lean logistics program, which is a model program
13 for DOD. It has allowed us to significantly reduce the size
14 of our installation intermediate-level repair shops and
15 enhance the deployability of our combat units.
16 Consequently, I will tell you that the entire Air
17 Force senior leadership supports Air Force depot downsizing
18 as the best recommendation of this action. I bring this up
19 intentionally, because there's apparently some word out there
20 in the street somehow that there is a division between the
21 senior Air Force leadership, that the blue-suiters may not be
22 supporting this. In fact, a couple of my four-stars have

Page 113

1 been named by name as recommending to the Commission some
2 other activity.
3 I will tell you, unless you know something I don't
4 know, I spoke to both of those gentlemen -- one within the
5 last 24 hours, the other within the last 30 minutes -- and,
6 as we confirmed last week when we got together at the Four-
7 Star Corona, the Air Force senior leadership supports our
8 approach to this depot downsizing.
9 The last issue I'd like to talk about is, I would
10 like to reconfirm our recommendation for closure of no more
11 than a single undergraduate pilot training installation.
12 That is, Reese Air Force Base.
13 Air Education and Training Command is determined
14 that we have excess capacity of one undergraduate pilot
15 training base in the near term and, based on our assessment,
16 if the Air Force must close a UPT base, we think Reese is the
17 right installation to close.
18 I understand this recommendation has been supported
19 by every analysis performed by your staff, the air staff, the
20 Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training.
21 We should be able to meet our anticipated pilot production
22 requirements during the FYDEP with one less UPT installation

Page 114

1 as our joint pilot initiatives begin to mature.
2 The United States Air Force is going to increase
3 its pilot production 52 percent between 1996 and the year
4 2002, and we have looked closely at this, because we have had
5 some concerns about the rate at which JPAT aircraft would
6 come on, some of the other assumptions that might be made
7 but, at this point, we think that this is a reasonable risk,
8 if you will, to continue with our recommendation and, if we
9 are to close a UPT base, we support our original analysis.
10 As I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I tell you, I think
11 it's important again that I remind the commissioners that I
12 recused myself from considering both small aircraft bases and
13 laboratories, based on a ruling by our general counsel. So,
14 with this overview, sir, I am prepared to answer your
15 questions.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, GEN Fogleman
17 and Secretary Widnall.
18 The Chair has to answer several phone calls out
19 here. I'm going to ask my colleague and friend, GEN J.B.
20 Davis, to chair in my absence.
21 COMMISSIONER DAVIS (presiding): A terrible
22 responsibility, to be the first questioner and the Chair, at

Page 187

1 MR. BOATRIGHT: Yes, sir. I think your analysis
2 makes sense to me. I think that definitely we can't predict
3 with any great accuracy what's going to happen over the next
4 six years in regard to force structure, in regard to budgets.
5 I would tell you that today, while we may not have
6 every base or installation that we could have closed or
7 realigned out of the Air Force structure, we're down to a
8 position, assuming that we get a reasonable closure in this
9 round, to a level that I think will serve the Air Force very
10 well over the next six years and, at that point in time, if
11 there is a need for one, for some additional realignment and
12 closure actions, I think that would be the time that we ought
13 to be considering such a thing.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Is that an appropriate reflection
15 of the views of all of you?
16 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes. Yes.
17 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Perhaps, If I could, one
18 comment, Mr. Chairman.
19 That is, it would be very useful for us if somehow
20 the Commission could, in its report, stipulate that the
21 actions that have been directed, you know, from all the
22 previous BRACs and, in fact, the actions from this, that

Page 188

1 there's some sunset clause on prohibitions to move force
2 structure around because, quite frankly, we really do reach
3 the point where our hands are tied by BRAC legislation, and
4 it prevents us from doing some things that emerge as
5 opportunities to --
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'd like to have your suggestions
7 on that, because my final question was this one that we find
8 that there are changes in the succeeding BRACs, and you want
9 to re-evaluate, and that makes good sense and it's
10 understood.
11 And we think there ought to be some authority for
12 you to continue to be able to do that with existing BRAC
13 things, not an authority for you to act on a base,
14 independently existing statues, or anything, but to let you
15 review what you've done with all these BRACs.
16 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Yes, sir.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That would be good? And if you
18 could give us -- we asked the same thing of the Army, we'll
19 ask the same thing of the Navy -- your ideas about all those
20 things, we would find that useful.
21 Incidentally, we don't want to create some extra
22 bureaucracy out there, particularly, to do that kind of

Page 189

1 stuff.
2 We want to find some way to do that that the
3 Congress, in its wisdom, will see makes good sense, because
4 Senator Thurmond has asked us to come over there in the
5 middle of July and make these recommendations and defend what
6 we've done and, as I said to the Army, if we can get our
7 bulletproof vests and come in, in the dark of night, we'll
8 probably come back then to answer the questions.
9 We sure thank you all.
10 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Thank you.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Madam
12 Secretary.
13 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Thank all of you.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much. We're in
15 recess until 1 O'clock..
16 (Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a luncheon recess was
17 taken.)

Page 190

1 AFTERNOON SESSION
2 (1:00 p.m.)
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: [Presiding.] Good
4 afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Our morning session ran a
5 little bit over time, so the rest of our commissioners will
6 be joining us shortly. This afternoon, we will begin with
7 the representatives of the Navy, who will be with us until
8 2:30 p.m. They are the Honorable John Dalton, the Secretary
9 of the Navy; ADM J.M. Boorda, the Chief of Naval Operations;
10 General Carl Mundy, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
11 the Honorable Robin Pirie, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
12 for Installations and Environment.
13 At 2:30 p.m., we will welcome Joshua Gotbaum, the
14 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security; Robert
15 E. Bayer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Installations;
16 GEN George T. Babbitt, Jr., Principal Deputy Director of the
17 Defense Logistics Agency; and Marge McMananay, BRAC Team
18 Chief for the Defense Logistics Agency.
19 If the panelists will please rise and raise their
20 right hands, I will administer the oath.
21 [Witnesses sworn.]
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Secretary Dalton, you may

Page 191

1 begin.
2 SECRETARY DALTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
3 have a complete statement I'd like to submit for the record,
4 but would like to give an abbreviated version of that, if I
5 could, at this time.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We will do that, sir.
7 SECRETARY DALTON: Thank you very much. Mr.
8 Chairman, members of the commission, it's once again an honor
9 to be before you today. Today I will present our position on
10 the installations which the commission added to the list for
11 consideration on May 10, 1995. In approaching this
12 assignment, I must reiterate our objective in this round of
13 base closure -- to achieve a more streamlined, efficiently
14 located and responsive base line of support, capable of
15 meeting the needs of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
16 We in the Department of the Navy continue to have
17 confidence in our previous recommendations. When taken
18 together with the decisions made in prior rounds, we believe
19 these recommendations are the right recommendations for the
20 department. Recommendations that result in an infrastructure
21 able to support the four deployed Navy and Marine Corps
22 expeditionary force that projects this nation's resolve

Page 192

1 around the world.
2 In my testimony before you on March 6th, I reviewed
3 our recommendations in detail, and explained the basis for
4 them. While I will not repeat that description of our
5 analysis, we'll be happy to respond to your questions on our
6 recommendations and process. My purpose today, Mr. Chairman,
7 is to speak specifically about that portion of the
8 commission's expanded list of Department of Defense
9 recommendations which relate to the Navy and Marine Corps.
10 I recognize and applaud the care and diligence that
11 you and your staff have brought to the process. There are
12 five basic areas of additions that i believe warrant your
13 careful reflection. I will address them starting with our
14 valuable assets on the Atlantic, and then move to the Pacific
15 area. Mr. Chairman and members of the commission, the
16 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is an integral component of our
17 nuclear powered, fast attack submarine program and mission.
18 It is extremely important for the support of our
19 SSNs and the Department of the Navy's depot infrastructure.
20 Following are the four ship maintenance depot closures that
21 have already been approved in the base closure process, and
22 one closure conducted outside of the process, our

Page 193

1 recommendation to close the Long Beach Naval Shipyard and the
2 ship repair facility in Guam reduced the remaining excess
3 capacity by about half.
4 To reduce this excess further, our recommendation
5 transfers additional depot workload to the remaining
6 shipyards from other department activities, predominantly
7 technical centers. Including our present recommendations, we
8 will have left only five of the original 12 ship depot
9 activities, resulting in two per fleet and one overseas in
10 the Western Pacific.
11 Each of the remaining four shipyards is nuclear
12 capable, thus providing robust support and the required
13 flexibility for all aspects of fleet operational readiness.
14 The commission's proposal to close Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
15 would bring the excess capacity in our shipyards down to
16 about 1 percent, creating an unacceptable risk as we strive
17 to support ever-increasing global initiatives with dwindling
18 numbers.
19 The retention of some excess shipyard capacity was
20 not an oversight, Mr. Chairman. It was a military judgment
21 decision by senior department of the Navy and military and
22 civilian leadership. This conscious decision was made to

Page 194

1 provide necessary flexibility to meet future uncertainties in
2 nuclear shipyard requirements. Let me speak for a moment
3 about he uncertainty of future requirements.
4 Mr. Chairman, the ultimate size and nature of the
5 nuclear submarine fleet is in the throes of dramatic and
6 fluid changes. The SSN force level is projected to decline
7 by nearly 50 percent. There is a debate concerning
8 introduction of new classes of submarines. These factors, as
9 well as world events, affect decisions on whether to refuel
10 or defuel our Los Angeles class fast attack submarines.
11 These boats are the backbone of our submarine
12 force. Decisions to refuel, defuel, or inactivate nuclear
13 powered submarines have a significant impact on nuclear depot
14 workload to be assigned to Portsmouth. Our recommendation,
15 which retains Portsmouth, protects nuclear capacity for
16 greater flexibility. Whatever the future holds, it is clear
17 that the SSN 688 attack submarine will be the mainstay of our
18 submarine fleet into the next millennium.
19 In that context, it is important to remember that
20 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard currently is the center of
21 excellence for our SSN 688 class submarine depot maintenance.
22 It is the only planning yard within the Navy where

Page 195

1 engineering modifications and maintenance procedures are
2 designed for this class of submarine. As the regional
3 maintenance hub of the Northeast region, it is within 170
4 miles of the major submarine concentration at New London,
5 Connecticut.
6 Twenty-two of 57 SSN 688 class major depot
7 availabilities are planned to be performed at Portsmouth
8 Naval Shipyard through Fiscal Year 2005. That's 39 percent
9 of the availabilities for major submarine depot maintenance.
10 The anticipated nuclear workload for Fiscal Years 2001
11 through 2005 requires four nuclear shipyards. And there is
12 no room for any slippage.
13 Delays of any kind could result in the removal of
14 ships from the operating fleet. When an SSN 688 submarine
15 reaches the end of its 120-month operating cycle, it is
16 restricted from submerging, and is lost as a fleet
17 operational asset. Without Portsmouth, our remaining dry
18 docks and facilities would have to be scheduled hell to toe.
19 There would be no time allowed for required maintenance on
20 the dry docks themselves, and considerable schedule
21 adjustments would have to be made for non SSN ships.
22 If any significant accident occurs, or emergent

Page 196

1 repair is required, or if any ship maintenance availability
2 is altered for any reason, we will have fast attack
3 submarines surfaced and tied up at the dock, waiting for
4 maintenance. In our opinion, Mr. Chairman, we would be
5 operating on and perhaps over the edge, and be in jeopardy of
6 not meeting our global commitments.
7 The question might be asked, what about private
8 shipyards? Mr. Chairman, no SSN refueling workload is
9 available or manned in the private sector. The Department
10 estimates it would take about three years to stand up and man
11 such a facility, at a cost between $45 million to $100
12 million. Skeptics point to Electric Boat Company in Gratin,
13 Connecticut, as a potential refueling source.
14 But Gratin has not refueled any type of submarine
15 for over 20 years, and does not currently have the necessary
16 facilities to do so. While Newport News Shipbuilding Company
17 has previously refueled fleet ballistic missile submarines,
18 it does not currently have the facilities for Los Angeles
19 class fast attach submarines. If you seriously contemplate a
20 private shipyard, consideration must be given to the
21 requirement to extensively train and maintain a dedicated
22 private workforce, in place, under contract.

Page 197

1 You can't begin such an effort when the problem
2 emerges; it just takes too long. Therefore, we believe that
3 assignment to the private sector is not a prudent choice.
4 The cost of closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and then
5 replicating it in the private sector just doesn't make sense.
6 Mr. Chairman, the right answer, the essential answer, is to
7 retain Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
8 Maintaining a modest nuclear excess capacity
9 provides the flexibility and a critical edge against future
10 uncertainties. This retention is absolutely necessary to
11 meet the requirements of the future force structure, given
12 both maintenance and operational constraints. Turning now to
13 Naval Air Station Atlanta. Mr. Chairman, we believe NAS
14 Atlanta is a future cornerstone of the future Navy and Marine
15 Corps reserve force.
16 When we evaluated closing the naval reserve air
17 station in Atlanta, a number of factors became evident. For
18 example, NAS Atlanta has low overhead because of its adjacent
19 location to Dobbins Reserve Air Force Base. The synergies
20 created by Dobbins maintaining the runway, and NAS Atlanta
21 operating the medical facilities are examples of how six
22 reserve components at this joint facility have woven an

Page 198

1 operating network that reduces cost for all.
2 NAS Atlanta is our least expensive reserve naval
3 air station to operate by over $4.5 million a year. Most
4 importantly, the demographics of Atlanta show a very positive
5 trend for purposes of reserve recruiting. The fact that the
6 more mature Air Force Reserve units on the base complex at
7 Dobbins are manned at excess of 100 percent shows the richest
8 of the demographic base in Atlanta.
9 Additionally, the Atlanta area is the regional
10 Marine Corps Reserve base for the Southeastern United States
11 Like the facility created in BRAC 93 at Fort Worth, if NAS
12 Atlanta is left open, it will be a model for the future of
13 the joint reserve force. Mr. Chairman, your objective and
14 ours is to reduce excess capacity. Closing NAS Atlanta would
15 require the department to incur significant costs to create
16 additional capacity at other air stations, which certainly
17 does not meet our common objective.
18 Since NAS Atlanta can accommodate and man the three
19 additional squadrons proposed to be stationed there with no
20 military construction expenditures, we believe NAS Atlanta
21 should remain open as an important part of our Navy-Marine
22 Corps-Air Reserve structure and our future Navy and Marine

Page 199

1 Corps total force. We have recommended the closure of Naval
2 Air Station South Weymouth, and the transfer of P-3 and C-130
3 squadrons from South Weymouth to the active air station at
4 Brunswick.
5 This recommendation not only reduces air station
6 excess capacity, but also furthers the integration of active
7 and reserve force structure. With this closure, all
8 remaining reserve air stations will be joint facilities.
9 With regard to the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
10 at Point Mugu in California, this activity is a critical
11 national asset for research, development, training and
12 engineering for the Navy.
13 Point Mugu has been studied extensively in BRAC 91,
14 93 and 95. BRAC 91 resulted in a major consolidation of the
15 China Lake and Point Mugu sites, which focused on eliminating
16 duplication and intertwining organizations. BRAC 91 and
17 subsequent management actions have resulted in China Lake and
18 Point Mugu rating number one and two in military value among
19 all Navy technical activities, and have already reduced
20 staffing at these two activities by 2,000 employees.
21 We now have an efficient, irreplaceable set of land
22 and sea ranges, co-located with and integral to research and

Page 200

1 development laboratories that are critical to the Department
2 of Defense. Point Mugu also provides a broad range of
3 support for Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, and active
4 forces, including the training and embarkation of weapons
5 qualification facilities for Pacific fleet SeaBees.
6 Mr. Chairman and commissioners, the current
7 integrated mix of facilities and capabilities at the China
8 Lake and Point Mugu sites represent five years of
9 consolidation and realignment efforts. Redundant
10 organizational structures and functions have been eliminated,
11 and the remaining functions are critical. The Navy has
12 already accomplished significant infrastructure reductions
13 with the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division in the
14 smartest and most economical manner.
15 Spreading the Point Mugu functions to several other
16 locations would undermine the unique synergy created through
17 the previous BRAC rounds. Next, Mr. Chairman, I want to
18 clarify what I believe is a significant point concerning the
19 public works center at Guam. This facility was not
20 recommended to me for closure, but was thoroughly considered
21 by the base structure evaluation committee.
22 With retention of the telecommunications center,

Page 201

1 the naval magazine, naval hospital and other government
2 facilities for a total of more than 3,300 personnel, plus
3 approximately 2,600 personnel assigned by the Air Force,
4 there is more than a sufficient customer base to warrant
5 retention of a public works center. Obviously, the size of a
6 public works center is going to be dependent on the number of
7 operations it supports.
8 Given the current size of the activities being
9 supported, we believe the appropriate course of action is as
10 we recommended -- the retention of the public works center,
11 Guam. As in the case of Guam, other communities are coming
12 forward with initiatives to privatize certain facilities
13 recommended for closure by the Department of the Navy.
14 We support privatization initiatives such as have
15 been suggested by the Naval Air Warfare Center in
16 Indianapolis, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center in
17 Louisville, so long as they entail private sector facilities
18 and employees competing under applicable statutes, policies
19 and regulations. Flexibility in language is essential to
20 providing the ability to consider all of these options, since
21 the Department of the Navy will, of course, be bound by any
22 final commission recommendation language with regard to these

Page 202

1 facilities or others.
2 As in any business transaction, however, the best
3 interest of the Department of the Navy and the nation must
4 prevail. Mr. Chairman, as a result of further analysis by
5 your staff, and in discussions they have had with affected
6 communities and with our base closure staff, it has been
7 suggested that I address certain issues related to the
8 Department of the Navy's recommendations.
9 In my complete written statement for the record, I
10 have specifically addressed the major concerns. But I would
11 like to reemphasize now the obvious fact that our budgetary
12 top line has come down dramatically. Finally, and frankly,
13 we can no longer afford to keep bases for which we have no
14 mission requirement, as in the case of NAS Adak.
15 Additionally, our force and reserve resource levels
16 have gone down to the point that we do not need certain
17 things any longer to get the job done, like Long Beach Naval
18 Shipyard. Finally, wherever we can consolidate activities
19 and do the work in one facility that is now being done at
20 two, with little or no loss of efficiency, that is what we
21 think we should do.
22 Examples of such consolidations are demonstrated in

Page 203

1 the recommendations for the Naval Surface Warfare Center
2 detachment at Annapolis, and for the movement of SPAWAR to
3 San Diego. We have, in each case, kept the activity that
4 provides us the greater benefit, and we have consolidated
5 like operations to achieve efficiencies and economies of
6 scale.
7 I would like to conclude by saying, once again,
8 that we take no joy in our recommendations. This is a
9 painful process, which I'm sure you fully recognize, as a
10 result of your extensive and ambitious schedule of base
11 visits throughout the nation. In each location, concerned
12 citizens have gathered hearings, hopeful that somehow,
13 someone would turn back the tide and stop the closure of
14 their facilities.
15 Your task of ensuring the recommendations presented
16 to the President are the right recommendations for the
17 Department of Defense and the nation is both difficult and
18 critical. We are heartened, however, by the growing number
19 of communities that are recognizing the opportunities that
20 can come from the re-use of these facilities. We have opened
21 dialogues with several of these groups, and are hopeful that
22 the outcomes will be beneficial to all parties.

Page 204

1 As I have said before, these communities will
2 forever be a part of the extended Navy family. This
3 concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I, along with my
4 colleagues, will be happy to respond to your questions.
5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Secretary
6 Dalton. ADM Boorda, did you wish to make any statement?
7 ADM BOORDA: No, I agree, obviously, with my
8 Secretary's statement, and I'd be happy to answer any
9 questions.
10 GENERAL MOODY: I have no statement, Mr. Chairman.
11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Secretary Pirie?
12 SECRETARY PIRIE: No, sir.
13 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I would ask the timekeeper
14 to extend 10 minutes to each commissioner, and we'll begin
15 with Retired ADM Ben Montoya.
16 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: GEN Mundy, you got a free
17 ride last time. We're going to start with you today.
18 GENERAL MUNDY: Just because I was pouring the
19 drinks.
20 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I have a couple of
21 questions. The first one is BRAC related, to a previous BRAC
22 action. We've been advised,and maybe you're aware of the

Page 205

1 fact that the community in Glenview, Illinois, has been
2 speaking with the Marine Corps about the possibility of being
3 able to, after they become owners, going through the
4 statutory process of Glenview, to lease back facilities, or
5 the facility, to keep the Marine Corps there
6 We've looked at that very carefully, and it
7 requires a statute, I think, to overcome some statutory
8 procedures. And my question is, is the Marine Corps
9 interested in that? And would you want this commission to
10 consider that proposal and write some appropriate language to
11 facilitate that?
12 GENERAL MUNDY: Commissioner, as you've accurately
13 portrayed, on the heels of the previous BRAC actions, the
14 decision was made to close the naval air station at Glenview.
15 And that's a good Marine community, always has been. We have
16 a great deal of affection for the community. But it was to
17 achieve economies for all the right reasons. Now, the new
18 factor that has come in is the proposal, as you suggest.
19 As we have looked at that, there are legal
20 complications with that, if not restrictions, prohibitions
21 that would be not currently within the latitude of the
22 Secretary, or any of us, for that matter, I think, to go

Page 206

1 around. There are -- if the circumstances evolved, as has
2 been at least portrayed by the city of Glenview there, it
3 certainly is an interesting offer.
4 And I would think that right now, we have fairly
5 specific language that directs us to move that Marine air
6 control group down to Dandalk, Virginia. If the commission
7 saw fit to relax that language to give some flexibility to
8 the department to look at the most economical and the most
9 effective, from the standpoint of demographic recruiting and
10 that sort of thing, that would certainly not be harmful in
11 the next couple of years, as that proposal could be
12 considered.
13 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: One of the thoughts, if we
14 were to redirect, and write some language, it would be in an
15 either or category. If there's a statutory fixed, you'd be
16 permitted to stay; if there isn't by a certain date, you'd
17 move. The 93 recommendation, in rewriting a finding as of
18 this BRAC, the clock will start again. It is our counsel's
19 judgment, you'd have another six-year term.
20 You may not want that. But I think that's
21 something that if you're interested in, we'd be more than
22 pleased to work with your staff and work some language that

Page 207

1 might give you that flexibility.
2 GENERAL MUNDY: Well, I think as the Secretary used
3 the term here, the flexibility in the options, or flexibility
4 in the language, would certainly be, in my view, in the best
5 interest.
6 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: The other question is as
7 much an observation. I understand that there has been
8 continual dialogue in trying to have the Marines reconsider
9 the helicopter portion of their move to Miramar, and take it
10 to March Air Force Base. The community has been very active
11 in lobbying for that. It's our understanding that that
12 Department of the Navy decision, based upon operational and
13 funding reasons, is committed to the Miramar move.
14 And my observation is this. I lived for a number
15 of years in the San Diego area in my Navy life. And one of
16 the biggest issues in San Diego, and I think it remains there
17 is the helicopter noise down on the Silver Strand.
18 Helicopters seem to be more of an intrusion because of their
19 flight patterns and flight characteristics than jet aircraft.
20 And Miramar has been a base that is not quite like El Toro,
21 but it's sort of in that category from an encroachment
22 perspective.

Page 208

1 And I just wonder if you feel comfortable that
2 you'll be able to, for the long haul, move there and be able
3 to execute operationally, given the characteristics of
4 helicopters in the community.
5 GENERAL MUNDY: Commissioner, I feel comfortable
6 that we'd be able to do that. There's no question that the
7 relocation to Miramar puts a good number of aircraft that
8 would be on, at any given time, I think, about 150 to 200
9 flying machines of one sort or another -- jet or helicopter
10 or even C-130s – operating out of there. For Marines, we do
11 that at a lot of other places. We do it out at Yuma, only
12 few miles to the east.
13 We do it up at 29 Palms. We do it off the decks of
14 amphibious ships. So we are accustomed to operating
15 helicopters and fixed wings together. Yes, the noise pattern
16 for the heavy lift helicopters is certainly a consideration.
17 There's a long track here, and I think you must be aware of
18 it. When the decision was made in BRAC 91 to close Tustin,
19 that in effect forced the issue. We had nowhere to put the
20 largest aircraft group in the Marine Corps, which was the
21 helicopter group at Tustin.
22 The BRAC proposed at that time, and I think the

Page 209

1 Defense Department endorsed the movement of the group up to
2 29 Palms, building what would have turned out to be about a
3 $650 million base there. That became impractical, and that
4 was turned around in BRAC 93, and we were told to go in the
5 direction that we're going. So we really are without a lot
6 of viable options, other than to proceed as we're going. And
7 I think we can do that effectively.
8 As far as March Air Force Base, it is a good base.
9 We have been out there over the years. It's one of our -- it
10 is in fact our principal area port of departure when we ship
11 Marines out of the West Coast, out to crisis response. But
12 the fact is that, as I understand it, the Air Force, of
13 course, has closed that as an active base. It will be a
14 Reserve and an Air National Guard base.
15 The policy and the capacity of the Reserve and
16 Guard is not to be able to operate that as a base with us as
17 a tenant. Under those circumstances, we can certainly
18 consider relocating there. But we cannot operate the base we
19 have -- neither the structure, the people, or the resources
20 within the department. And it would be the creation of an
21 additional base at a time when we are trying to draw down the
22 numbers of bases.

Page 210

1 So my recommendation to you, much as the March
2 option might be, is that we continue with no change to the
3 BRAC 91 and 93 decisions, or recommendations.
4 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you, General. ADM
5 Boorda, this question may require an answer for the record,
6 but in the course of looking at all these bases of all the
7 services, it's become apparent in hearings and also visiting
8 that you all are right -- one must be very careful if you
9 dispose of ranges, industrial capacity or waterfront.
10 Because once gone, it's gone. And so that has been a
11 constant thought in our minds as a result of hearing from the
12 leaders in our military services.
13 And so one of the issues for me, in looking at the
14 Long Beach Naval Shipyard, has been the issue of home-
15 porting aircraft carriers. You can't avoid that; it keeps
16 coming up. It comes up in the Alameda context, in the
17 Edwards context, and now we're talking about San Diego. In
18 looking into that further, I have seen some of the San Diego
19 plans for home-porting. And there is considerable dredging
20 and filling that I think is part of that contemplated
21 construction involved.
22 And the concern I have there is, notwithstanding

Page 211

1 our good intentions and notwithstanding our great plans, if I
2 were disposed to want to stop the Navy from coming, that to
3 me -- I'd like to be the attorney on the side of the
4 environmentalists who would say, no dredging, no filling and
5 so forth. So I'd like to know where we are in the
6 environmental process regarding creating a mega home port in
7 San Diego, given those characteristics; and the Navy's
8 assessment of its probability of success, community
9 involvement to date and so forth.
10 Because Long Beach is a wonderful waterfront
11 facility, I think we would agree to that. And I hesitate to
12 vote to close something without some assurance that we really
13 can go somewhere else on the West Coast. Do you have any
14 current information regarding that?
15 ADM BOORDA: The issue for me, with regard to San
16 Diego is one where I think we're not writing on a blank page
17 anymore. We've really gone quite a ways down the road toward
18 creating two major carrier locations on the West Coast of the
19 United States -- one in San Diego, and one in the Pacific
20 Northwest.
21 There is a history of that, as you said, and there
22 is a lot of work now with the community, with the port

Page 212

1 authority in San Diego, that controls the entire port
2 complex, including the airports there. I think the best
3 thing for us would be to give you, for the record, a
4 chronology of all the things we've done -- which are
5 basically a list of successes at this point -- and a
6 prospective look at what we're going to do.
7 And of course we think we're going to be
8 successful. The idea of closing Long Beach was not an easy
9 one. And one of the things we looked at was San Diego versus
10 Long Beach for home-porting. In previous BRACs, we closed
11 the naval station and moved those ships to other ports. So
12 we had already started that process. But I'd be glad to
13 provide you -- there's a lot of environmental details here,
14 for the record.
15 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I have a feeling there is.
16 Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I'm completed.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner
18 Montoya. Commissioner Lee Kling.
19 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, let
20 me begin by saying thanks to you and all the officers in
21 personnel, as we visited, for their indulgence. They
22 probably put a lot of people out, but we really appreciate

Page 213

1 all the support and help that we got. I also would like to
2 say I personally appreciate your comments concerning
3 privatization, particularly dealing with Indianapolis and
4 Louisville, because I do know that they're moving along.
5 And your support of that and your statement of that
6 was very positive. And they're concerned, probably, about
7 whether we, say, make some kind of recommendation to you,
8 which is a question of how much authority we have. But if we
9 make the suggestion that we would like to see it encouraged
10 -- privatization -- I think they'll be a lot more comfortable
11 now by your statement. So I thank you very much for that,
12 and I think it's a wonderful direction to go.
13 Let me just hop around with a few different
14 questions, if I can. We talked about the naval reserve, and
15 certain of questions have been raised, and I'd just like to
16 ask about the -- the Navy believes that we can move the
17 reserve from Boston to New Brunswick, and that's about 150
18 miles away, I believe. Is there any concern about moving
19 away from a population center and being able to continue to
20 maintain that reserve situation?
21 SECRETARY DALTON: Yes, sir, it is, Mr. Kling. We
22 looked at that situation with respect to how it affects

Page 214

1 reserves. And we found that as far as the recommendation to
2 move to Naval Air Station Brunswick, that 60 percent of the
3 reservists live within 150 miles of that facility. And we
4 expect that for -- the air aspect and the service aspect will
5 be done in Quincy, so overall, the reserves in the Northeast
6 are adequately considered and taken care of with respect to
7 our recommendation with that.
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: So you're comfortable with it?
9 SECRETARY DALTON: I am comfortable with it.
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: Turning to South Weymouth, and
11 of course, there's concern there about closing. Rightly so,
12 every community should. But the community there has stated
13 that the Navy has violated their analysis procedures by
14 considering a closure scenario that closes a reserve air
15 station and moves its units into an active air station.
16 Could you maybe touch on that, and why you believe your
17 recommendation was developed with the Navy procedure? And
18 maybe ADM Boorda could -- or whoever.
19 SECRETARY DALTON: I'll be happy to, and I'll be
20 happy for the CNO and Mr. Pirie to comment as well, with
21 respect to that. We feel like we did comply with the proper
22 analysis procedures. The Navy and the naval reserve have

Page 215

1 always tried to maximize operational capabilities together as
2 part of the total force. And closing NAS South Weymouth
3 reduced excess capacity at both active and reserve air
4 stations; provided substantial savings; and maintained the
5 most capable air station in the Northeast United States, vice
6 two underutilized air stations.
7 And we do feel like that we complied with the
8 spirit and the letter of the regulations. But would you like
9 to add to that?
10 ADM BOORDA: Sure. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
11 There's a synergism here which is even better than many of
12 the others we get. In maritime patrol air, about half the
13 flight hours that reservists fly are flown in active
14 missions, contributing with the active force -- not just
15 training, but actually out doing it. In the case of
16 logistics -- and when some of the airplanes move up, there
17 will be logistics aircraft, 130s -- our entire logistics
18 lift, other than what is on the aircraft carriers themselves
19 is in the reserves. So this is a good move, putting reserves
20 and active together in aviation.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you, ADM Boorda. Could
22 I ask a question, further, Admiral? Concerning the

Page 216

1 undergraduate pilot training, and your letter of May 25th, to
2 Congressman Montgomery on this subject, could you please
3 elaborate on your concern, your comments? Specifically the
4 risks associated in conducting all intermediate advanced
5 strike training at a single base.
6 In your words, you stated that this would be a
7 difficult task and reduce the capacity for surge operations,
8 and that could be unacceptable, considering the increased
9 pilot training requirements I think we all know are there.
10 Do you still support this recommendation to close Meridian?
11 And do you have any concerns about it?
12 ADM BOORDA: Well, let me be very clear that what
13 I'm going to say is my own personal opinion. The
14 Department's opinion --
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: Good enough for me.
16 ADM BOORDA: Okay. The Department's opinion is as
17 stated in the submission. This was a tough call, Meridian.
18 Looking at the BCEG's figures, there's about an 18 percent --
19 and Mr. Pirie may want to be more specific than that in a
20 moment -- about an 18 percent excess capacity if you do it
21 all, all the strike training, at Kingsville-Corpus complex.
22 That should be enough. As we watch, and for affordability

Page 217

1 reasons, properly at that time, in my opinion, Meridian ended
2 up on the list.
3 As we look at this year's budget work that we're
4 doing, we see that we're a little bit light on fixed wing
5 aviation, and particularly in the strike community. And
6 there's already been a decision made that we will pick up the
7 Air Force's AF-111 mission, which is going to keep about four
8 squadrons of EA6Bs for us. And they train in the strike
9 pipeline.
10 None of this is a whole lot more training. It's
11 small numbers. Could we do all that at Kingsville-Corpus
12 complex? The answer is yes. We could, if everything
13 happened the way I said in that letter, eat up almost all
14 that excess and have no surge capability.
15 Again, speaking only personally, I would more
16 comfortable if I had a little surge capacity if we didn't
17 guess right on what we're doing. It is an affordability
18 issues though. And as I said in that letter, the real issue
19 is risk versus cost.
20 I would hope, and in our initial hearing I believe
21 I said something very similar to this, that we could do a
22 better job of figuring out how to work better with the Air

Page 218

1 Force and the base just to the north of there. This was good
2 air space. There's a bombing range right there. We can do
3 lots of good things together. There are reserves on the base
4 and National Guard.
5 So I would hope that in your deliberations, you
6 could find a way to keep something at Meridian, to keep that
7 base alive providing the surge capability without large
8 expense to us. And that we could be smart enough to get the
9 benefits at Kingsville. That would require a lot of work,
10 and I have to tell you that is my own personal opinion and
11 not shared by the department.
12 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you, Admiral. Maybe I
13 could see if there's any other personal opinions on this
14 subject that might help, by the way.
15 SECRETARY PIRIE: Yeah, my personal opinion
16 coincides with the opinion of the department in this case.
17 And it is as ADM Boorda states. We can, in fact, do the
18 stick training at Kingsville-Corpus. It will, in fact, be
19 tight. Particularly if we bring on the extra squadrons that
20 may be contemplated; if we can afford them and do that.
21 And it is a cost benefit analysis. It's $30
22 million a year. And that's a considerable benefit to the

Page 219

1 department if we can realize those savings. Having said that
2 -- that's the view from the technical side.
3 COMMISSIONER KLING: I understand. I just wonder,
4 Secretary Dalton, do you have any different feeling on that?
5 I don't want to stay with this subject, I know we've got
6 others now.
7 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Kling, as the CNO and Mr.
8 Pirie have said, this was a thorough analysis. It was a
9 difficult recommendation because it's a relatively new
10 facility and it's certainly well supported by the community.
11 It really came down to an affordability issue and the
12 savings. And the savings being approximately $350 million
13 over the twenty-year period that caused the recommendation
14 that it be closed. But it was a tough decision. It's a fine
15 facility with fine people, but that's the reason we came to
16 the conclusion that we did.
17 COMMISSIONER KLING: Just a last question on that
18 subject and I'll relinquish my time. In all the figures that
19 you have put together, those figures, you still feel are
20 correct and adequate on this.
21 SECRETARY DALTON: Yes, sir, our projection in this
22 case, I think it's $345 million over a twenty-year period, is

Page 220

1 what we anticipate the savings to be.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner.
4 Commissioner Wendi Steele.
5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: One moment, I didn't think he
6 was going to jump my way. Give me a second here. I'll start
7 off with something that's not big on scope or substance, but
8 it's kind of a principle issue and I'd just like to bounce it
9 off you and see what your thoughts are, Mr. Secretary.
10 The Oakland FISC, as you're well aware, there was
11 special legislation passed to circumvent the BRAC process, to
12 allow the FISC to return to the city for a dollar a year for
13 fifty years versus going through the BRAC process and
14 closing. My personal concerns with that is, take a look at
15 Chicago, they're willing to pay to move tenants out of the
16 base. They want that land for city expansion.
17 But in this case, now we have a city that gets it
18 for a buck instead of some sort of market value or cost to
19 move. My questions for the Navy on this are twofold. One,
20 the Navy is, as I understand, is still going to have to pay
21 to move the remaining tenants. I know there are not a lot of
22 them; that's something you're going to have to pick up in

Page 221

1 your budget. With not getting any money from the property,
2 it wouldn't revert to the city.
3 And secondly, a legal question. Would the Navy,
4 under the lease, be liable for any environmental damage that
5 might happen while this becomes a megaport in the next fifty
6 years?
7 SECRETARY PIRIE: I think we're going to have to
8 give you a detailed answer for the record, Commissioner. The
9 question about whether FISC Oakland should be closed or not,
10 is that the department recommends that it should be closed.
11 But the secretary, in his discretion, removed it from the
12 list.
13 So our recommendation is to remain in status quo at
14 Oakland. Liability for environmental restoration remains
15 with the department regardless of whatever the disposal of
16 the property happens to be. We're well under way in working
17 that.
18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I'm sorry. The liability
19 part I meant was from now, in the future. I understand the
20 department is liable up until now, but if the properties went
21 through a normal BRAC processing and got returned to the
22 city, then the city becomes, or whoever buys the property --

Page 222

1 My, I'm not a lawyer, one of few in the room, my
2 layman's understanding would be, whoever owns the property
3 would be liable. But in this case, the Navy would retain
4 ownership for the next fifty years for a whopping proceed of
5 fifty dollars. But would have to have, my guess would be the
6 liability for any damage to that property, to whoever they
7 lease it to.
8 SECRETARY PIRIE: The liability for the past
9 environmental restoration is inescapable and stays with us
10 regardless of the disposal. For future environmental damage,
11 I'm not really clear what the terms of the lease would be,
12 but it seems to me that we would write the lease in a
13 protective way so that we would be covered for whatever is
14 done in the future, by whoever is the tenant.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And Secretary Dalton, I
16 wondered if you would comment on if you think we ought to
17 have the FISC go through the BRAC process or allow the
18 special legislation to proceed?
19 SECRETARY DALTON: Madam Commissioner, I'd like to
20 elaborate further for the record, if I could, on that. I
21 don't have anything to add from what Mr. Pirie has answered
22 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay, thank you very much

Page 229

1 happened, since you were at Portsmouth, to change your mind
2 on the kind of risks that we'd be taking if we close
3 Portsmouth.
4 ADMIRAL BOORDA: In the House mark-up Sea Wolf did
5 not make it. We still have to see what's going to happen in
6 the Senate. We're hopeful. I think I'd like to echo what
7 the Secretary has said before, and that is that this is an
8 uncertain business, that the 688s are going to be with us for
9 a long time, depending on how construction plans and funding
10 go; and I hope we'll be totally successful, but depending on
11 how they go, the 688 could become even more important for
12 even longer. And it's a pretty risky business shutting down
13 the center of excellence that takes care of that submarine.
14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Lastly, Mr. Secretary, I'd
15 like to thank you personally for every place I've been on a
16 naval base, they did not chastise me for my secondary
17 education.
18 (Laughter.)
19 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And they were very kind to us
20 and they were very forthright in their answers. It was a
21 pleasure to be back on a naval base.
22 SECRETARY DALTON: Thank you very much,

Page 230

1 Commissioner. We appreciate having you, and want to
2 compliment you and all the commissioners for the exhaustive
3 schedule that you've had since we last met, all the places
4 you've been and the schedule that you've been on to get
5 around to hear from everyone. And we certainly welcomed you
6 aboard our naval facilities and appreciate having you and
7 commend you for all that you've done.
8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you very much. Mr.
9 Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner
11 Davis. Commissioner Rebecca Cox.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. I want to start by
13 just following up on a couple of questions that have been
14 asked by other commissioners, to make sure I understand.
15 General Mundy, if I could start with you on the
16 March Air Force Base issue. You indicated that certainly the
17 Marines are working with fixed and rotary aircraft in many
18 places, and that that's a doable situation. If we do
19 everything that the DOD has recommended, you'll have over 100
20 fixed wing, I think, and over 100 helicopters at Miramar.
21 Are you operating with that kind of volume and that kind of
22 air space with a mixed group?

Page 231

1 GENERAL MUNDY: Rarely. Probably in an exercise
2 or, you know, certainly operationally; but not on a routine
3 day-to-day basis.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: Not on a day-to-day basis?
5 GENERAL MUNDY: No.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: So that at least the volume
7 itself is different.
8 GENERAL MUNDY: The volume is considerable. There
9 are a lot of -- as I think you well know -- El Toro has four
10 runways, Miramar has one. So there are some complications.
11 You have the Marine layer that comes in from the sea that
12 complicates air traffic control, IFR versus VFR, from time to
13 time, seasonally.
14 So there will be more difficulty in operating there
15 than there would be if they were separated. But, again, my
16 fundamental belief is it's possible to do it.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: You could do it. It would be
18 safer to do it at March, were that an option? I mean, you
19 wouldn't disagree -- or El Toro or somewhere outside, if that
20 were an option.
21 GENERAL MUNDY: Well, I'd prefer not to say safer,
22 although that's debatable. I would prefer to say it would be

Page 232

1 less complicated maybe to do it, but we would hope to be safe
2 at both locations.
3 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. And then finally on that,
4 let me ask you a question because we asked some of your folks
5 out in -- Drax Williams, specifically, in Marine West Coast
6 Aviation, who is in charge of it -- for some numbers to look
7 at the March option, and he provided us with some numbers.
8 And I will say we worked with him in '93, too, and frankly he
9 was closer on the numbers than the DOD was, as it well turned
10 out.
11 Those numbers that he provided the Base Closure
12 Commission -- us, personally and our staff, at our request --
13 are vastly different than the numbers that we have gotten
14 from the Navy on the cost of the March option. I realize
15 you're not an expert on numbers, but my experience with Mr.
16 Williams is that his numbers have been very good.
17 I wonder if you just might comment -- these are not
18 even close, as you know, we're tens of millions of dollars
19 apart in a year. Could you give us, at least, some comment
20 on whether you think it might be somewhere in between, or
21 perhaps your folks didn't get to look at the whole picture or
22 -- how do you explain that enormous difference?

Page 233

1 GENERAL MUNDY: Well, let me say first and then I'm
2 going to turn here -- we have a convenient system here of
3 passing off to the guy on the end of the table.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: I see. I was hoping to get you
5 to answer to that one.
6 (Laughter.)
7 GENERAL MUNDY: You make a good point, and I would
8 say that in support of Major General Williams and his crew
9 out there that, indeed, the amount of money that it has cost
10 us to move from El Toro down to Miramar is I think as you
11 know already beyond what -- we've already been given more
12 money than was initially estimated.
13 So they have been, they're on scene and they look
14 at a lot of different things. Some of that relates, I think,
15 to the facilities that are available and to the perception of
16 the replacement versus the acceptance of a facility. For
17 example, we know we're closing a lot of housing, some 2,700
18 units up around El Toro, as we move south. They, on the West
19 Coast, understandably -- and I would, too, if we had the
20 money to do it -- would like to go down and rebuild a
21 quantity of housing in another area.
22 So some of that has been as a result of the

Page 234

1 difference in those --
2 COMMISSIONER COX: Right. Although the numbers, as
3 I understand, that they've given us on housing do not assume
4 we're going to build more, but do assume because San Diego
5 cost of living is higher that our costs are going to go up
6 moving to San Diego, which I assume even the Navy doesn't
7 disagree with.
8 GENERAL MUNDY: Yeah. As far as the other cost
9 factors, again, can I pass off to you on that, Robert?
10 MR. PIRIE: Well, if the issue is does the actual
11 estimated cost of the move from El Toro to Miramar exceed the
12 estimations in the COBRA model, I think that's not a
13 surprise; because the COBRA model, for one thing, excludes
14 environmental restoration costs.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: That's really not the issue. In
16 fact, the COBRA model was wrong, it now appears, by a three-
17 fold factor -- of actual spent dollars, not projected costs,
18 from El Toro to Miramar.
19 But that's not the issue. My only point was at the
20 time Mr. Williams and the very same BRAC staff told us that
21 the costs would be about where they're going to come out,
22 which is three times more than the Navy projected at that

Page 223

1 Switching to Guam. Secretary Pirie, in your letter to
2 Representative Underwood, you stated that through long term
3 leases, outright transferrals, or any other mutually
4 agreeable arrangement, as much of the land and facilities as
5 possible on Guam, you'd work out such agreements.
6 Do you feel that it's most beneficial for you if
7 the Commission just lays hands off and allows you to proceed
8 as you would; or would it help, given the past history of
9 negotiations between the department and Guam, if we had
10 language to help the revitalization move forward quicker
11 MR. PIRIE: Well, as you know, we're advocates of
12 flexible language wherever it can be supplied to us. We've
13 had a number of discussions with Representative Underwood and
14 Governor Guiterez of Guam, and others about the disposition
15 of the property. And I think we can come to an amicable
16 understanding in this case.
17 In particular, the location of the MSC ships and
18 the helicopter squadron seem to me that rather than directive
19 language for the relocation of those, language that allows
20 the fleet commander the flexibility to put those squadrons
21 where it best suits his operational needs would be very
22 helpful. And that would permit him to locate them in Guam

Page 224

1 for part or all of the future as may be best for them.
2 Back to the disposition of the property. I think
3 that we are on a good track with the government of Guam. I
4 think we can do it without a great deal of help. The more
5 flexible the language, the better for us.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Somebody can help
7 remind me -- the recommendation that we received, were the
8 MSC ships to go to Hawaii?
9 MR. PIRIE: Yes.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: So you'd like to open that up
11 further and not designate Hawaii, specifically, in our
12 report.
13 MR. PIRIE: Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. The fuel farm on
15 Guam -- just kind of finish Guam off here -- bad choice of
16 words, excuse me, delegate -- finish the issue of Guam --
17 working out the operational chain of command on our visit we
18 were told that you had actually -- the department as a whole
19 would like to retain the fuel farm, that it was an oversight
20 to have it on the list. Would you all concur with that?
21 MR. PIRIE: We would like access to the fuel farm.
22 We would like to be able to use the fuel farm. Whether we

Page 225

1 own it or not is I think a matter of relative indifference to
2 us.
3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Well, we'll follow
4 through with that one in writing just to make sure that we
5 have the language that would be most flexible.
6 Only because I was caught off guard -- this is very
7 rare -- I'm going to yield the balance of my time.
8 COMMISSIONER CORNELL: Thank you, commissioner.
9 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you, Ms. Sector. I'm
10 sorry, because of inefficient management on my part I was
11 unable to be here for your stirring opening statement. But
12 I've read it very quickly and I do appreciate it, and I'm
13 sorry that I missed it.
14 My questions are I guess pretty much along the same
15 line I had before. Again, I appreciate Admiral Boorda's very
16 thoughtful remarks about the pilot training. As you know, I
17 was very concerned about the search capability and he's been
18 very forthright in that process.
19 I do have another, I guess, pilot training question
20 and I will try to get through it reasonably quick. In
21 looking at the pilot training and talking to the Air Force
22 and that kind of meshing that you are doing with the Air

Page 226

1 Force, I think that will work out very well. And then the
2 prospect of moving -- no, I'm sorry -- setting up the pilot
3 training and the way you've got it set up -- right now, just
4 in Corpus Christi. It's my understanding you move all the T-
5 44s to Pensacola. And with the increased NFO and WSO or
6 basic NAV training, navigator training, do you have room to
7 do all that down at Pensacola?
8 ADMIRAL BOORDA: It fits, J.B. I don't want to
9 give anybody the impression that we can't fit it the way we
10 have it, it's a surge issue. Are we going to do more
11 consolidation in the Air Force? I think we'd like to, and I
12 think the Air Force would like to and we're going to keep
13 working the problem. But right now, no, things fit where we
14 got them.
15 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And this morning with the Air
16 Force, Admiral Boorda, it came up that if the JPATS goes to
17 be a turbo jet versus a turbo prop, that may cause the Navy
18 some problems. Do you want to comment on that?
19 ADMIRAL BOORDA: Well, as you well know, we're
20 going to have air space issues, depending on what JPATS looks
21 like. And without knowing what JPATS looks like it's a
22 little hard to anticipate that. I think that whatever

Page 227

1 happens, if JPATS is an airplane that requires bigger AQs,
2 different kind of issues, you're going to see us have to
3 consolidate more. That's the way we would deal with it. But
4 that's really speculative until we know what the airplane
5 looks like.
6 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: As you all can suspect, we've
7 had a lot of help with some of things we're doing. And we
8 even gave you a little help with the sight out at Corona, in
9 that we've added it -- put it on to take a look at it. And
10 as I pull on that string I find there are several maybe down
11 sides to that process, that you've got all that consolidated,
12 it's a fairly independent organization sitting there. And by
13 moving it does that you cause you some distress, even though
14 you deferred it because of the economic impact?
15 ADMIRAL BOORDA: I think -- if it's all right, I'd
16 ask Mr. Pirie to answer it, because the real issues were not
17 whether we could consolidate or move the functions at the
18 tech facility but, rather, what was the employment in that
19 area and what had happened in that area.
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Basically, what we're getting
21 from the communities is that it is a independent unit, it
22 needs to stay as an independent unit because of the service

Page 228

1 it provides to both the second and third fleets. I just
2 really need some of your guidance.
3 ADMIRAL BOORDA: We are technically more capable
4 than we were four or five years ago, GPS, a lot of recording
5 systems, a lot more 3-D radars, a lot more ability to know
6 what happened and evaluate it makes that not as good a case
7 as it might have been in the past. But the issues there are
8 really employment issues.
9 Do you want to --
10 MR. PIRIE: No, I mean, I agree with your answer.
11 Technically, the DSEC looked at moving part of that activity
12 to the Naval PG School where it would be co-located with the
13 operations research faculty. And that looked to us to be a
14 real kind of winning alignment. The other parts of it, some
15 of it goes to China Lake, some to other Naval air research
16 facilities. We did not see that we would lose anything that
17 couldn't be -- wasn't really redundant elsewhere.
18 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And I think my last question
19 is that -- of course, $64,000 question -- which I thought
20 that you answered rather eloquently, Admiral Boorda. I
21 haven't read the papers yet, but I don't know how the Sea
22 Wolf fared in the mark-up, but is there anything that's

Page 235

1 time. My only point is that's a done deal, it's over, those
2 issues are -- nobody is looking at reopening El Toro. My
3 only point was that his track record on numbers, at least in
4 that area and involving those assets, has been a whole lot
5 better than the Navy's.
6 And I was wondering if, perhaps, you all might be
7 willing to give that a closer look given his track record.
8 MR. PIRIE: Well, I'm always interested in new
9 ideas. And not having the numbers before me and not having -
10 -
11 COMMISSIONER COX: We'd be happy to do it for the
12 record.
13 MR. PIRIE: -- had an opportunity to do a detailed
14 analysis of them, I can't tell you whether I believe them or
15 not.
16 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. Maybe you'd just take a
17 look at both sets. That would be helpful.
18 GENERAL MUNDY: But let me reinforce, Commissioner,
19 if I may, again -- I'd like to say your thesis is not without
20 some degree of accuracy and that, yes, the projections out
21 there were pretty close because it looks like where we're
22 going.

Page 236

1 That notwithstanding, the prospect of moving to
2 March is more a function of just people and resources that we
3 don't have to be able to run that base.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: Sure.
5 GENERAL MUNDY: Were the base available could we go
6 there as a tenant?
7 COMMISSIONER COX: You'd love to.
8 GENERAL MUNDY: We would opt for it just like that.
9 But that's not possible.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: I understand. And I didn't mean
11 to follow-up that closely. Secretary Dalton also to follow-
12 up on the Corona issue and, frankly, you know I wish in a
13 sense you hadn't looked at it on a political basis because
14 there are a lot of military arguments for Corona and I wonder
15 if you might take a look at that.
16 I'm in the airline business, we have the National
17 Transportation Safety Board. It's an independent group, it
18 oversees everything from our training to accidents to whether
19 the FAA is doing the right thing. There are a lot of people
20 who -- I'm sure Boeing would like to have the NTSB working
21 out of Boeing's offices. The FAA itself wouldn't mind having
22 the NTSB under it.

Page 237

1 But we've all decided, as an airline industry, that
2 it's important to have that independent outside look where
3 they don't have any other role -- they're not involved in
4 planning or procurement or promotion of GPS or anything else.
5 They can look at it independently.
6 I see Corona coming out of the airline business
7 very much in that same category, they're an independent
8 group. And you all are proposing to move them to the -- you
9 aren't, Secretary Dalton -- Secretary Perry and the Navy are
10 proposing to move them to the equivalent of the FAA or
11 Boeing. And I worry about that on an independent assessment
12 basis. I wonder if you wouldn't mind, Secretary Dalton, I
13 know you took them off the list on a political basis and
14 maybe, therefore, didn't have an opportunity to look at the
15 military independent assessment issue -- if you wouldn't mind
16 commenting on that.
17 SECRETARY DALTON: Well, Commissioner, as I
18 indicated, I don't really have anything much to add beyond
19 what I told you at our previous meeting. It was the decision
20 that I made with respect to looking at the total impact of
21 what had been done in BRAC '93, BRAC 91, and looking at BRAC
22 '95, the recommendations we were making to the states of

Page 238

1 Florida and South Carolina and California, had all been hit
2 significantly --
3 COMMISSIONER COX: No, I understand that you --
4 SECRETARY DALTON: -- and those are the reasons
5 that we made the decision. And after the recommendation that
6 we made on Long Beach, which was painful but we thought was
7 necessary, we made the decision that we did with respect to
8 those other facilities.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: I guess what I'm saying is it
10 might be helpful if you would look at it not an economic
11 impact basis, but on a military value added basis because I
12 think we would be interested in your thoughts on that, too.
13 And, Admiral Boorda, you look like you wanted to
14 say something on that?
15 ADMIRAL BOORDA: No. Only that, in fact, we've
16 done that. And that's why it would have been on the list had
17 it not been for economic issues. The independent look that
18 you talk about -- and I'm not suggesting you put it on the
19 list, I mean, it's not on the list now, you added it for
20 consideration --
21 COMMISSIONER COX: We added it, right.
22 ADMIRAL BOORDA: But the independent look you talk

Page 239

1 about could be done easily from another place, and that's the
2 postgraduate school. They also are not fleet operators.
3 They do assessments for us in a lot of areas.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. And I have just two other
5 quick questions, and they're really sort of "what if." You
6 all proposed that we reverse a '93 decision to move NAVSEA to
7 White Oak and instead move it to the Navy Yard.
8 Also in '93 we indicated that SPAWAR ought to stay
9 in the area, although I don't think we specifically said --
10 if we did not take your redirect on NAVSEA to White Oak, the
11 SPAWAR people have indicated that they believe that there are
12 more synergies with what they do here than what they do in
13 San Diego and prefer to stay in the area.
14 If we did not would you be supportive -- not move
15 White Oak, if we left White Oak open and moved NAVSEA to
16 White Oak would you be interested in leaving SPAWAR at the
17 Navy Yard?
18 SECRETARY DALTON: That's pretty convoluted. Our
19 plan is -- we think that what we're recommending to you makes
20 the most sense and we recommend that you take it. But the
21 hypothetical, I'll ask Robert to --
22 MR. PIRIE: Yes. That is a hypothetical question I

Page 240

1 would dearly love to leave severely alone.
2 (Laughter.)
3 MR. PIRIE: We're recommending moving SPAWAR to San
4 Diego because it allows us to achieve a considerable
5 consolidation of staff and support for SPAWAR and
6 considerable savings over the years. And that savings is not
7 allowable with other options, such as Navy Yard, such as
8 Hanscom Air Force Base.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: So unrelated to the fact that if
10 we move NAVSEA to the Navy Yard, you would not have room for
11 SPAWAR -- you would still recommend that we move SPAWAR to
12 San Diego?
13 MR. PIRIE: Yes. Absolutely.
14 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. And then, lastly,
15 Secretary Dalton, we recently received a letter from the
16 Secretary of Transportation expressing concern about the
17 Coast Guard at Adak. I wonder if operations of the Coast
18 Guard were given consideration on the Adak proposal.
19 SECRETARY DALTON: I haven't seen that
20 correspondence, Commissioner. I'll be happy to take a look
21 at it. With respect to the Coast Guard at Adak --
22 MR. PIRIE: I've seen it -- and it came in very

Page 241

1 late, as a matter of fact. And we believe that the Coast
2 Guard has other options in the Aleutian Chain and elsewhere
3 in Alaska to support their operations. However, if they wish
4 to take over NAS Adak and pay $25 million a year to operate
5 it, I'm sure that we can come to some kind of an agreement.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: You're willing to work with
7 them, to work out their operation problems.
8 MR. PIRIE: I'm willing to work with the Coast
9 Guard any time.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner.
12 It's my distinct privilege at this time to introduce our
13 chairman, the distinguished chairman of the 1995 Defense Base
14 Closure and Realignment Commission, former senator from the
15 great state of Illinois, Alan Dixon.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
17 Gentlemen, may I first say to you I apologize for being gone
18 during some of your testimony. As men of your importance, I
19 hope you understand there are some housekeeping duties by now
20 with the vote starting next Thursday. I'm only going to ask
21 three questions.
22 One is one I would rather not ask. And I say in

Page 242

1 advance of the question, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Boorda,
2 that I know and respect you both for everything you do; and
3 even when I don't agree with you, I understand pretty clearly
4 what your position is.
5 Now, I'm compelled to make this statement and ask
6 this question. I hope you understand it. I'm not trying to
7 put you on the spot, but eight of us have to vote.
8 You recently revised the projected pilot training
9 rate -- now, it's been discussed a little but we haven't
10 gotten specific -- to reflect increases in pilot training
11 requirements, including the introduction of additional FA-
12 18s, EAG-P squadrons. I have seen, and it is in our packet,
13 Admiral Boorda, the letter you sent to the distinguished
14 congressman from that district who all of us have great
15 affection for.
16 Now, you conclude -- I won't bore the audience with
17 the whole question by saying this -- the combination of
18 increased strike PTR in a single-strike training base makes
19 successful completion of our projected PTR more difficult and
20 reduces our capacity for surge operations, and that could be
21 unacceptable. I understand that.
22 But the trade-off remains the degree of difficulty

Page 243

1 or risks versus costs to operate two strike training bases.
2 And I understand that. Now, this morning one of my
3 distinguished colleagues asked General Sullivan, and
4 Secretary Togo said, "Now, here, you're closing two depos" --
5 and then they went through kind of a hypothetical case. And
6 I said, "Isn't there a lot of risk in this?" He said, "Yeah.
7 There's a lot of risk in that, but we considered it as an
8 acceptable risk; in view of the cost, we recommend doing it."
9 And, you know, I'm going to be honest with you now.
10 This is one of them that we're going to have a tough time
11 with around here, so I'm compelled to ask both of you in a
12 specific way about Meridian. Now, what are you telling us
13 here? We know you're getting it down to one, you're going to
14 save a lot of money, but is it an unacceptable risk? Now, is
15 it acceptable or isn't it acceptable? I guess that's what I
16 have to ask you.
17 ADMIRAL BOORDA: As I was -- Mr. Secretary, do you
18 want to go first?
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I almost hesitate to use your own
20 words to ask the question, but --
21 ADMIRAL BOORDA: No, I'm glad you did. Inasmuch as
22 they were mine, let me answer your question. I think we

Page 244

1 talked about it a minute ago.
2 It's my personal opinion -- it's not the
3 Department's opinion -- that we're right on the margin of
4 surge capability. I agree with the numbers that the BCEG has
5 done. And that would give us about 18 percent excess
6 capacity training at Kingsville, using the Kingsville-Corpus
7 complex. That requires everything to go just right.
8 I would like -- personally, not the Department's
9 position -- to be able to find a way to work better with the
10 Air Force to keep some residual capability there for surge;
11 to keep that place open, not totally closed, and still try to
12 get the flexibility to get the savings from combining things
13 at Kingsville. That would require you to give us more
14 flexibility than we have asked for. And that's why I say
15 it's my personal opinion.
16 If everything goes exactly as planned, we'll be
17 okay and we will close a very good and very new base that was
18 hard for us to put on the list.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I hear you, but let me tell
20 you my problem with -- I respect the answer. Let me tell you
21 my problem, now. I was here in the Reagan years. I voted
22 for the build-up. If I was here I'd still be voting against

Page 245

1 the reductions. All right? But that's Alan Dixon, and
2 that's not the country, and that's not the Congress right
3 now. And I accept that. There's a change.
4 Now, all of us wish there was more. And we're
5 going to have to make some tough choices here. Now, there's
6 a 40 percent reduction in authorized and appropriated
7 amounts, and a 30 percent reduction in force level. And if
8 we give you everything that all of you have asked for --
9 nothing more than that, let's assume that, it's not the way
10 it's going to happen, exactly, but let's just assume that for
11 the purposes of our discussion -- if we give the DOD
12 everything they ask for, it's 21 percent. So there's excess
13 capacity out there.
14 Now, I know there's a lot of risk and a lot of
15 stuff we're doing, but I have to say that, unfortunately,
16 you, the guys that are going to have to make these judgmental
17 decisions in many cases -- now, I don't say we can't change
18 these things, some of them we're arguing about, we might have
19 some different ideas, in fact, and all the services might
20 have some different ideas, some at the margin, some at the
21 heart, maybe. But it's on numbers where there's an arguable
22 difference.

Page 246

1 But it's hard for those of us, I will say in due
2 respect we have three distinguished men that had the
3 experiences you had up here that I'm privileged to serve with
4 here -- but it's hard for us to make that kind of a judgement
5 about this doggone thing. I just want to level with you
6 about that. I don't feel comfortable with it. I don't want
7 to take an unnecessary risk. So I hate to pursue it beyond
8 that.
9 I don't know, Mr. Secretary, do you have anything
10 further you want to say?
11 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, as the CNO has
12 indicated, this was a tough recommendation for us because of
13 the points that he has outlined. We do feel like that the
14 Kingsville-Corpus Christi complex has sufficient capacity to
15 single side all our Department of the Navy strike training.
16 Even if we do add the 10 flight squadrons and relocate the
17 E2-C2 train to Kingsville.
18 He's made the point with respect to what would
19 happen. We don't plan on bringing on 10 additional squadrons
20 at this time. As a matter of fact, we're talking with
21 discussions between three and six. But if we did, we could
22 make it. So we have the ability to do it. It still makes it

Page 247

1 a painful recommendation that it be closed, but that is our
2 recommendation.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, here's what I'm going to ask
4 you to do. We're going to vote starting next Thursday
5 morning at 8:30 a.m. I'd like my colleagues and friends here
6 on this panel here to have one day of rest of prayer.
7 Sometime by the end of the day Tuesday we'd like to hear
8 further from you on this close call that will resolve in your
9 mind your judgement as our leaders in that field about the
10 risk versus cost thing that you ultimately make your decision
11 on it.
12 Because if you leave it this way -- I'm willing to
13 have you leave it that way, and then we'll hassle with it.
14 But we do see what you're saying to us. We understand it.
15 It's just kind of hard for us to make a call. We've got it
16 on the list. It takes five to take it off -- I would remind
17 you -- we'll all eight be here. And I think it's one we need
18 to know more about. All right? Sorry to put it back in your
19 lap --
20 SECRETARY DALTON: Sure. That's fine.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Okay. Two more. I put this, Mr.
22 Secretary, to the other services and I put it to you and your

Page 248

1 colleagues, that what we are seeing here in this unpleasant
2 duty that we're undertaking to the best of our individual
3 abilities is doing this job and recognizing you are going to
4 leave some excess capacity out there. We all see that,
5 everybody tells us that in these public meetings and in
6 private. And probably ought to look again sometime.
7 Now, everybody knows nobody wants to look in two
8 years. I don't see any congressmen come up to me and say,
9 "I'd like to have another round two years from now."
10 (Laughter.)
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ain't too much demand for it. And
12 I don't really think there's much stomach for it in the
13 country, to be truthful with you. But I think it is true we
14 ought to look again sometime.
15 And recognizing presidential politics and all,
16 there's beginning to be a kind of a consensus that maybe
17 about 2001 -- which lets two presidential elections
18 intervene, and also has the nice number there because it's a
19 culmination of all the BRACs out there. And we're thinking
20 that we might take a look at the possibility or recommending
21 one more to take another look after the dust has settled, and
22 wondered whether you have a positive or negative view -- any

Page 249

1 of the four of you as experts in the field -- about that.
2 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, I think that the
3 process is a good process. It is one that has worked well.
4 It's difficult -- and it's a difficult job that you have --
5 but it is one that I think was properly devised and one that
6 does offer the opportunity to close excess capacity and get
7 rid of things that we don't need.
8 As we all know, as our budgets have come down, we
9 had too much infrastructure and this process has done a great
10 deal to eliminate what we don't need. I would think that
11 that sort of time frame would allow the consolidation to, in
12 fact, occur, that has happened in BRAC '88, '91, '93, '95.
13 And most of '95 would have been complete by then, in terms of
14 the six years.
15 So that is a time frame that I think would give
16 each service the opportunity to see how it is operating with
17 the new structure, see if indeed the excess capacity at the
18 margin or if it really is more than is necessary. And if
19 that were the case, I think that another round at that time
20 would indeed make sense, and it seems to me that would be an
21 appropriate consideration for discussion.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you for that. Now, the

Page 250

1 last and final thing related to that is that we take note of
2 the fact that throughout these rounds there have been
3 alterations, realignments and changes and so forth, in the
4 BRACs. And we suspect that there's a probability some of you
5 may want to revisit some of those things in the future. I'm
6 not talking about any other bases haven't been touched.
7 But I'm talking within the BRAC process. And we'd
8 like to hear from you, we've asked the other services -- we
9 don't want to set up some bureaucracy out there that's going
10 to cost the taxpayers a lot of money -- but we'd like to have
11 your suggestions about how the idea of reviewing these BRACs,
12 so you're comfortable with everything you have done, would be
13 -- in other words, Senator Strom Thurmond is asking us to
14 come before the Armed Service Committee in the Senate in a
15 couple weeks, and we'd like to be able to say, "Here's what
16 we think about BRAC in the future. Here's what we think
17 about reuse. We've got people working on it. Here's what we
18 think about realignments or reviews of this BRAC stuff in the
19 next several years."
20 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, we'd be happy to
21 provide that, our opinions to you on that subject.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Well, I just want to

Page 251

1 say that, General Mundy, we all understand you're retiring at
2 the end of the month. And we just want to say we appreciate
3 you spending part of your last few weeks with us. We honor
4 and congratulate you, sir, for your distinguished career of
5 service to the nation and the Marine Corps, we're proud of
6 you. Thank you, sir.
7 ADMIRAL BOORDA: I thank you very much, Mr.
8 Chairman. And you have just spoiled my rapport with the CNO
9 because he has sworn that if he comes up here and has to
10 listen to anymore compliments about me he's not going to
11 invite me over for dinner or something.
12 (Laughter.)
13 ADMIRAL BOORDA: So I told him if he'd wait three
14 years, it will be his turn.
15 SECRETARY DALTON: I thought we were going to get
16 through a whole hearing without that, for once, but we
17 didn't.
18 (Laughter.)
19 ADMIRAL BOORDA: Thank you, sir, it's a pleasure to
20 serve.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Chairman Dixon.
22 Commissioner Joe Robles.

Page 252

1 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I just have one question. I
2 know you've had a long afternoon. It relates to an issue
3 that we've been, sort of, wrestling with which private sector
4 versus in-service work across a whole gamut of activities.
5 And my question directly relates to the Portsmouth
6 visit. You're using the private sector to do some nuclear
7 refuelings for your carriers. With the closure of Long
8 Beach, you're going to have to rely more on the private
9 sector to do some of that work.
10 What about the submarine force? Have you
11 considered or is there some overriding operational -- we saw
12 the intricacies of nuclear work and the intricacies of
13 submarine work, the closed bases, the very highly specialized
14 facilities, but you seriously looked at moving some of that
15 workload into the private sector?
16 ADMIRAL BOORDA: Long Beach has -- I know you know
17 this, but just so the record will be right, Long Beach has
18 nothing to do with any of that nuclear work.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: No, I understand, non-
20 nuclear work.
21 ADMIRAL BOORDA: With respect to submarine nuclear
22 work, we have a lot of work in the private sector. Right now

Page 253

1 most of that work is construction. The construction of a
2 submarine and the putting together of the nuclear power plant
3 and fueling it is a much different operation than refueling
4 or defueling.
5 Oddly -- probably not oddly enough, I think you'd
6 probably understand refueling and defueling is a much more
7 complex operation because you're work a hot reactor, and
8 you're working with radioactive materials from the very
9 beginning in a confined space. We had not planned on moving
10 that work to the private sector.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: So there is really no plan,
12 long term-plan even to consider doing that function or piece
13 of that function?
14 ADMIRAL BOORDA: As long as we have to do
15 refueling, defueling and overhaul work for the -- focus on
16 the 688 Class for a minute -- for the 688 Class, and in
17 everything goes exactly like it's supposed to -- the last 688
18 doesn't go away until 2026 -- then it would make sense for us
19 to do that work in public yards rather than in the private
20 sector.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner

Page 254

1 Robles. I would like to finish up with a few questions that
2 I have. Going back to the consideration of Guam, not to be
3 redundant but to be a little more precise on some of the
4 testimony we received, in regarding to the MSC ships and HC-
5 5, we understand that the senior leadership in the Navy has
6 had discussions with Governor Goodarest and Congressman
7 Underwood from Guam concerning the MSC ships and their
8 helicopter squadron HC-5.
9 We also heard that you and a delegation from Guam
10 are in essential agreement as to a change in the
11 recommendation that will be a win-win position for both
12 parties.
13 It appears to us that the decision to relocate or
14 locate the MSC ships and HC-5 at a particular location is not
15 a decision that depends on whether a particular base is
16 closed or not and whether either unit has more than 300
17 civilian personnel.
18 Consequently, would it be acceptable to you if the
19 Commission made no decision as to the final location of MSC
20 ships and HC-5 and recommended any such decision be made by
21 the Navy at some time in the future when the leadership of
22 the Navy found it necessary?

Page 255

1 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, that would
2 certainly be acceptable. We did have a meeting. I had a
3 short meeting with Mr. Perry, met with the Governor and the
4 delegate at length.
5 SECRETARY PIRIE: As did Admiral Boorda.
6 SECRETARY DALTON: And I defer to him.
7 ADMIRAL BOORDA: Because you don't have to make
8 that decision and we can, it will give us some added
9 flexibility. It will help Guam, and particularly in the case
10 of those MSC ships, they're not often in their own port
11 anyway. They're out working wherever we want them to work.
12 That's why they're in the MSC.
13 So I think it makes good sense. The Governor,
14 Secretary, Assistant Secretary and I all agreed that the
15 flexibility would be useful, and then we can make that
16 decides when the time is right.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. In addition,
18 some comments about what's called the Glut '94 Lands. We're
19 interested in helping ease the process of transferring excess
20 federal land in Guam to the Government of Guam.
21 And we understand that there are some 4,000 acres
22 of Navy land included in a report known as Glut '94 that the

Page 256

1 Navy has declared to be excess to their needs.
2 Also, we understand that there is no disagreement
3 within the Navy as to the recommendations of this report.
4 Would the Navy have any objection if this Commission included
5 in its report recommendations to transfer those Navy lands in
6 the Glut '94 report to the Government of Guam under the
7 procedures of the Base Closure Act?
8 SECRETARY DALTON: That would be fine, Mr.
9 Chairman. We would have no objection.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
11 A question or two on Lakehurst. That is something we haven't
12 talked about today. Lakehurst, as you gentlemen know,
13 handles all the launch and recovery, research and
14 prototyping, procurement, testing.
15 It appears that little would be moved from there
16 other than some of the heavy machinery and the
17 remanufacturing of some of the equipment, the manufacturing
18 of single-point items, items that if they failed would cause
19 a ship to go over the deck.
20 What would remain would be, basically, in my
21 understands now, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but the
22 engineering buildings would remain. Three buildings would

Page 257

1 remain.
2 The testing facilities would remain, the launch
3 testing facilities, the test tracks, the airport. Most of
4 those types of facilities would remain.
5 It's my understanding that in determining the cost
6 of the closure that the cost of moving that equipment was not
7 figured -- there are about 300 pieces of equipment there --
8 and that when it was determined they were not included, the
9 local command was asked to arrive at the number of pieces of
10 equipment they needed to move in order to do the job, and
11 they came up with a number somewhere, as I remember, around
12 124.
13 They were told that that number really did not fit
14 into the model, and that 74 was the right number. I have two
15 questions, I guess. One would be your feelings on that
16 comment, if you feel they are accurate in regard to that move
17 and whether or not you feel it makes sense to overhaul those
18 large launch valves, the steam launch valves in Jacksonville
19 and then ship them to Lakehurst for testing. If you could
20 answer those two questions for me, please?
21 SECRETARY PIRIE: With respect to the first issue,
22 what is the proper amount of equipment to be shipped, that

Page 258

1 was a discussion between the chain of command of Lakehurst
2 and the commanding officer, and it is perfectly consistent
3 with our system for the chain of command to decide what's the
4 appropriate amount of stuff to move when a base is closed.
5 The normal dialogue that takes place when a base is
6 nominated for closure is that the command immediately says,
7 "Well, you can close me, but you have to replicate my entire
8 base at a piece of real estate of my choosing brand new."
9 And discussion goes on from there about, "No.
10 That's not what we had in mind. That's excess capacity we're
11 talking about. We want you to close the base entirely."
12 That discussion goes on, and that is provided for in our
13 system.
14 So what you have seen in all that is the product of
15 that. Certainly, the command doesn't like being told, "No.
16 only 74 pieces, not 124," but that's the prerogative of the
17 system's commander to decide that.
18 Now, with respect to overhauling the valves in
19 Jacksonville, I think that's an entirely reasonable position.
20 It's a fine industrial facility, and there is no reason for
21 us to replicate industrial facilities all along the East
22 Coast.

Page 259

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You know I understand that
2 explanation, and I could believe it if we could take and
3 close that facility. So you tell me what kind of advantages
4 are to be gained other than back-filling Jacksonville by
5 moving that equipment out at Lakehurst.
6 SECRETARY PIRIE: The real problem was that the
7 expense of moving the test facilities which are in place
8 was -- we really couldn't come to closure on that. It would
9 have been better, if the expense had been right, to relocate
10 all of that stuff at Patuxent River.
11 But in the end, we really -- it was a very hard
12 decision, and we really decided that was the engineering and
13 the test facilities that we had to leave. It would have been
14 better to close the whole place, yes, sir.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. And I
16 thank all of you gentlemen, and I'm going to make Admiral
17 Boorda sit through this one more time because I, too, was
18 going to thank General Mundy for his many years of stellar
19 service and leading the young men of this country in the
20 Marine Corps. We appreciate your service to our country,
21 sir. Thank you.
22 GENERAL MUNDY: Thank you very much, Commissioner.

Page 260

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: And we would also like to
2 submit written questions for the record. We will be getting
3 those over to you. Thank you.
4 (A brief recess was taken.)
5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We will continue. I'd like
6 to introduce the next panel, Ms. Marge McManamay -- I'm going
7 to get it right this time -- Lieutenant General Babbitt,
8 Secretary Josh Gotbaum and Mr. Bob Bayer. Welcome.
9 Secretary Gotbaum.
10 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, members of the
11 Commission --
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Excuse me one moment. We
13 need to swear you in. If you would please rise and raise
14 your right hand. We almost made it through the first day
15 without making that mistake, but we'll get it done here.
16 (Panel sworn.)
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Secretary
18 Gotbaum.
19 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: I'm sorry to hear that we're
20 the first group you've heard today that you were sufficiently
21 worried you had to swear them in.
22 After all of the hundreds of hours of hearings that

Page 261

1 you all have done, frankly, on behalf of the Secretary and
2 the Department the first thing I want to say is we're very
3 thankful for the opportunity you're giving us to get a last
4 word in, since there is, obviously, a lot that has happened.
5 Before I get to specifics, if I may, I'd like to
6 make a couple of points, not necessarily because you will not
7 have heard them before but because we think they are
8 sufficiently important that we make them.
9 The first one is that an aggressive program of base
10 closure remains absolutely necessary. Without it we simply
11 are not going to have the funds we need to maintain the
12 forces we have to have for readiness in the next generation.
13 There has been a lot of rhetoric recently about the
14 end of the decline of the defense budget, and there is even a
15 prospect that our budget at the Department of Defense may be
16 increased some this year.
17 But whether it is or is not, the fact of the matter
18 is that the Defense budget is still going to be down versus
19 the mid-'80s by about 40 percent. Our force structure is
20 going to be down about 40 percent, and our infrastructure is
21 down about 20 percent.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Is that correct, Mr. Gotbaum?

Page 262

1 I've been seeing 30 percent on force structure, and I want to
2 know if I am corrected on that.
3 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: I will tell you, sir, that when
4 I first said that we don't have very good measures of
5 infrastructure, we have even fewer -- or rather, we have even
6 more measures of force structure.
7 So when I say generally a third to 40 percent, what
8 I'm really doing is giving you a melange between number of
9 fighter wings, number of active duty troops, number of ships,
10 et cetera. It's somewhere between 30 and 40 percent. I
11 promise you we can gen up a statistic that will confirm your
12 view.
13 But the critical point is by whatever measure our
14 force structure is down considerably more than our
15 infrastructure, which is down about 20 percent.
16 The recommendations the Secretary of Defense placed
17 before you would reduce our infrastructure by about another 5
18 or 6 percent.
19 It would result in savings to the Department or the
20 taxpayers over a couple of decades net by something on the
21 order of $18 billion. That's money we need. That's really
22 my first point. It's our most important point by far.

Page 263

1 Second point, our process is not perfect, but it is
2 considerably more objective than some of the stuff that we
3 have heard that has been presented to you all.
4 Like you, and in some cases with you over the last
5 three -- we have, over the last three months, gone over our
6 recommendations and alternatives that have been suggested in
7 light of the sustained analysis and criticism from
8 communities, their consultants, et cetera.
9 And with very few exceptions, some but very few, we
10 still feel that the recommendations we made to you are sound.
11 They're still right. Both the recommendations for closure
12 and the ones that ought to endure.
13 This does not mean that the results are perfect or
14 without error. We already last week sent a letter to the
15 Commission admitting that our analysis of Kirtland was not
16 right and therefore withdrawing our recommendation that it be
17 realigned.
18 And I would like to deliver today and insert for
19 record a similar review of some work in the Army,
20 particularly at Dugway in which we conclude that for a
21 variety of reasons more operational than cost-driven we don't
22 think that recommendation makes sense in light of the

Page 264

1 continued analysis that has gone on.
2 So not perfect, not that there are no mistakes, but
3 the law has required and we've tried to be very objective and
4 do so. That's not always the case with everything you've
5 heard before you, and I know you know it, but I think it's
6 important for us to remind you.
7 You've spent a lot of time now going through this
8 stuff. You've heard talk from communities, from their
9 consultants, many expert consultants, including some very
10 distinguished flag officers and in each case urging you to do
11 a little less, do a little different, keep a piece on this
12 base, move some workload here, et cetera, leave just a few
13 active operations, whatever.
14 You have also, I suspect strongly, have heard from
15 within DOD from officers who would like to keep or add to
16 their existing infrastructure but without the responsibility
17 for paying those costs.
18 As you weigh this, and you obviously must, and we
19 know you will competently, all we ask is that you remember
20 that these folks do not have an obligation to protect the
21 national defense within a fixed budget, and we do, and we
22 would assert you do.

Page 265

1 As part of that, we would ask as you continue your
2 review that like my other court of review, which this
3 Commission obviously is, that you recognize the professional
4 operational and military judgment that has gone into these
5 recommendations and give it appropriate deference.
6 As you know, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
7 Staff has testified, and as you've seen before you a lot of
8 very senior military as well as civilian time went into these
9 because this is not just a matter of counting beans.
10 This is not just a matter of dollars. It's a
11 matter of operations, and there are some recommendations
12 which are, obviously, controversial but which we made based
13 on strong military advice.
14 I'll give you one example that I know is before the
15 Commission is Grand Forks. In our view, the issue is not
16 whether you could save money or not but closing all of Grand
17 Forks.
18 But it is the considered judgment of the Chief of
19 Staff of the Air Force, of the rest of the military
20 leadership, in fact of each of the operational commanders
21 that that is a facility which we want to keep on an operating
22 basis. So as you review, as you take this into account, we

Page 266

1 hope you would give appropriate deference.
2 My last general point before I get down to
3 individual cases and open up to questions is very simple.
4 Regardless of what we do here, regardless of what you do
5 here, we are going to need future base closure authority.
6 If you take all the BRACs that have gone thus far
7 and you take the most robust estimate of the most aggressive
8 closure scenario that you are doing, I suspect that you will
9 not get an infrastructure reduction that comes close to our
10 force structure reduction or our budget reduction.
11 One of the things that this Commission has done
12 that is enormously heartening is, in fact, raise the question
13 of future base closure authority. We hope you will consider
14 the matter carefully, and we hope you will consider the
15 matter strongly in the affirmative.
16 If I may now, I'd like to get to some specific
17 cases, and I'm not going to spend a lot of time on each of
18 them. There are many, as you know, and you've already heard
19 from the service Secretaries and Chief, but I'd like to
20 discuss a couple of them and then just open it up for
21 questions.
22 In most cases, because they make a broader point,

Page 267

1 let me start, if I may, with the proposal made by the folks
2 in Utah to close all of Letterkenny and move that work to
3 Hill.
4 Let's be clear what we're not saying. Hill has
5 excess capacity. That's undeniable, but we don't think the
6 way to fill that excess capacity is to tear down a joint
7 operation just when the investments have been made and it has
8 begun to work.
9 We have, as a result of a recommendation of the
10 Commission in '93, consolidated on an interservice basis
11 missile maintenance at Letterkenny. We have proposed, after
12 considering the matter, to resize and restructure and
13 downsize a lot of Letterkenny but to keep most of that effort
14 and to ally it with the electronics capability that is
15 already availability at Tobyhanna.
16 We've already spent a lot of money, over $20
17 million, to develop that capability. We've moved people
18 there. We've moved workload there. In fact, we've moved
19 about 70 percent of that workload there already.
20 Is it theoretically possible to do that work at
21 Hill? Yes, it is. It would clearly require some MILCON or
22 recognizing that you'd need to store things in multiple

Page 268

1 facilities not necessarily at Hill.
2 But in our view, it simply makes no sense to do a
3 180 now because we are engaging here in joint maintenance,
4 and we're doing it on a basis that we think is cost-
5 effective. So that's one issue on tactical missiles and the
6 question of how we resolve excess capacity.
7 Let me talk, if I may, a minute about labs and how
8 we reduce lab capacity. You know almost as well as we,
9 probably as well as we that the local community is concerned
10 about the closure of Rome Labs, that Rome is an excellent
11 facility whose closure would affect the entire central New
12 York region.
13 We recognize that. We just don't think that there
14 is an alternative. We have excess lab capacity throughout
15 the Department of Defense. We believe, and we have looked at
16 the issue again and we have not changed our view, we believe
17 that consolidating those efforts at two other very good labs,
18 at Hanscom and Monmouth, will achieve simultaneously a
19 reduction in costs, an encouraging of interservicing and a
20 maintaining of quality.
21 And that is precisely the kind of activity that the
22 Joint Cross Service Group, which Joint Cross Service Group we

Page 269

1 set up at the urging of the Commission suggested. We're
2 doing it. We think it will save costs. We think it will
3 save money, et cetera.
4 Not that Rome isn't a good facility. It's a
5 terrific facility, but unfortunately, we have more excellent
6 facilities than we can handle. Brooks is -- and I know that
7 the Commission has been concerned with Brooks as well -- is a
8 similar story.
9 We are proposing to close it and consolidate those
10 activities at Wright-Patt not because Brooks isn't a good
11 facility -- it is a very good facility -- but because we have
12 more capacity than we need, and leaving that capacity open
13 means that we're not reducing lab capacity.
14 I want to talk about a couple of other issues
15 because they're general, and they come on my plate at OSD.
16 One is housing. This Commission has made the point in
17 several of its hearing, in my view entirely appropriately,
18 that the Department of Defense should not shut a base down
19 and then waste perfectly good housing.
20 And you have asked us whether or not we need
21 authority or direction or whatever to use housing on closing
22 bases, and I want to be very clear this is an issue that we

Page 270

1 send a lot of time and a great deal thinking about and
2 worrying about, but the truth is we already have that
3 authority.
4 We already have the ability at closing bases to
5 transfer housing to another service or for another use, and
6 we use it. As it happens, I'm the person in DOD that signs
7 off on this, so I can tell you personally that the Air Force
8 took over Navy housing at Moffett.
9 The Navy took over Army housing at Fort Sheridan,
10 and in each case at a closing base we review it. We see
11 whether it makes sense because some of the housing at closing
12 bases, like our housing at the bases we retain, is not up to
13 snuff and see whether it makes sense to keep it and use it.
14 So we think we've got the authority. What we ask
15 the Commission not to do is to require us to keep housing in
16 cases where it won't make sense.
17 This gets me to a similar case, which is
18 privatization. We have the authority right now to contract
19 for work with the Department of Defense. We are encouraging
20 efforts at Louisville and at Indianapolis to develop private
21 alternatives to the facilities that are being -- that we have
22 recommended to be closed there.

Page 271

1 I personally have spoken to the mayor of
2 Indianapolis a lot of times. We think we have the authority
3 to do that right now. What we ask from the Commission is
4 that you not force us to do something that doesn't make
5 sense, because it's one thing to permit privatization. It's
6 one thing to permit a facility to be used to bid on the
7 Department's business.
8 It's quite another thing to say to the Department
9 of Defense you must keep working this place, and you've got
10 to keep excess capacity open, because that, then, keeps us
11 from doing the mission which is, in fact, to reduce capacity.
12 Those are the sorts of issues that we thought we
13 ought to raise specifically. I guess before opening up to
14 questions I would like to remake the point that I made the
15 first time I came here.
16 This is a miserable process. We don't like it. It
17 is an absolutely necessary process. We are enormously
18 grateful and we appreciate the Commission's role because you
19 are the court of review. You are the assurance to the
20 Congress and to the public that what we do, in fact, is
21 consistent with the force structure and, in fact, is
22 consistent with the criteria.

Page 272

1 So we appreciate that. We appreciate all the work
2 you've done. We look forward to keep on answering the two or
3 three questions that might be left outstanding, and we look
4 forward with only a modest amount of nervousness to your
5 conclusions.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Secretary
7 Gotbaum. General Babbitt, do you have an opening statement,
8 sir?
9 GENERAL BABBITT: Very briefly, I just wanted to
10 point out that the original testimony given to the Commission
11 on behalf of DLA was given by General Larry Farrell. He has
12 since departed DLA and moved to a job in the Air Force.
13 Upon his departure, I took over his duties with
14 regard to BRAC. I have really nothing to add to his original
15 testimony, but you have added some things as potential
16 closures in the interim period, and I'm here to answer any
17 questions that you may have.
18 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Ms. McManamay, do you
19 have --
20 COMMISSIONER KLING: Just one question about
21 General Farrell. I just have to advise you that I think we
22 named him the shadow because I think General Farrell was at

Page 273

1 every location we have been to. He probably knows everything
2 as well as we know.
3 GENERAL BABBITT: If he was only here.
4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: He probably is.
5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Bayer.
6 SECRETARY BAYER: I have nothing to add, sir.
7 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: What I'd ask is that the
8 timekeeper extend each Commissioner seven minutes, and we'll
9 open the questioning with Chairman Dixon.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
11 First of all, Mr. Secretary, to you and your colleagues at
12 that table I thank you for your full and complete
13 cooperation. You've been very helpful to us. We are
14 indebted to you, sir, and my questions will be very brief.
15 First of all, I appreciate your remarks concerning
16 the need of a future BRAC, and we've talked to the various
17 services about that today. Now, candidly, my recollection of
18 the earlier remarks by both you and your distinguished
19 colleague, our new head of the CIA, John Deutsche, the two of
20 you I believe suggested about three years or so from now
21 having another BRAC.
22 I'm candid in saying to you that the sense I get in

Page 274

1 talking to people here in the Commission, around the country
2 and in the Congress and other places is that we'd better
3 leave it alone a little while.
4 I think that everybody is kind of full of BRAC
5 right now, and our thought is in view of the Presidential
6 elections and other things that do have a way of impacting
7 these things to some extent that we might think about 2001.
8 I know that's a ways off, but 2001 is at the end of
9 the BRAC process. It permits two Presidentials to intervene,
10 and it gives us some time to catch our breath and gives
11 everybody a time to review everything.
12 That may not be as much as you would have wanted,
13 but I ask you whether you think that it's a solution we could
14 live with in view of the fact we have to report to the Armed
15 Services Committee in a couple of weeks.
16 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, let me be very
17 direct on this point because I think it's important. My view
18 is real simple. We have found and we have proved that
19 without a BRAC process we can't close our infrastructure.
20 And notwithstanding that we hope you will endorse
21 our recommendations and help us a lot in this thing, there is
22 clearly a lot left over. My suspicion is that in the

Page 275

1 fullness of time we will discover sometime before 2001 that
2 this problem is a real problem.
3 But this is the world of the possible, and any BRAC
4 is better than no BRAC authority at all, and therefore we
5 think it is most important that the Commission be strong that
6 there be some.
7 As to when that would be, I'll tell you, sir, the
8 Secretary of Defense's view was three to four years. There
9 were others even within the building who said five, six
10 years. I don't think we should be dogmatic about time as
11 much as about the importance that there be a process.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I appreciate the answer.
13 The numbers are really compelling, I will say, but I just
14 sense that, you know, there is some -- I even find in the
15 public sector less of an enchantment with this idea than
16 there was in the beginning.
17 And it's like any unsavory thing that you encounter
18 after a while. You aren't so interested in continuing the
19 process, and I think we'll just take a look at it. We'll be
20 talking to you, and we'd appreciate you talking to staff.
21 We're going to try to work out what's best.
22 The other part of that that's awfully important is

Page 276

1 that you see and we see this fact that there are changes in
2 what is done in the BRAC process over the years. We see
3 places that were losers becoming winners and vice-versa.
4 So it's all part of the evolutionary process, and
5 we are very interested in hearing from you and particularly
6 Mr. Bayer, who has had a lot of experience in this field
7 about your suggestions how best we can do that without
8 setting up some big bureaucracy, which we do not want to do,
9 to permit the BRAC accommodations that need to be made
10 between now and 2001.
11 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Very important point.
12 Actually, may I make one further point?
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Yes. Please do, Josh.
14 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: I promise you that even though
15 it is absolutely the case that you and your staff and the
16 communities are tired and would like a breather there is a
17 small office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
18 that would like a breather just as much.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I believe it.
20 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Let me, if I may, defer
21 directly to Bob Bayer on the question of what interim
22 authorities we need.

Page 277

1 SECRETARY BAYER: I think there are two or three
2 points, Mr. Chairman. One of them is, obviously, the longer
3 the interval is between this BRAC round and the next one the
4 more compelling is the reason to have some sort of a
5 practical interim authority either to make changes that we
6 see from the recommendations that you and the President and
7 the Congress ultimately agree to in this round and also
8 closure or realignment actions that become compelling, time
9 compelling, during that interim period of time.
10 So the authority that we would have to fall back on
11 right now would be 10 USC 2687, which has clearly been
12 impractical and in fact as been made moot by this process.
13 The only other two points I'd like to make on this
14 issue are one of the key factors that made this whole process
15 work was the waiving of the National Environmental Policy Act
16 with regards to the specific closure and realignment
17 decisions, not the decisions to reuse the property. I think
18 that clearly has to be in any interim authority.
19 And the other point I would make with regards to
20 any interim authority that it be done in such a way that it
21 be expedited enough that communities won't be hung out
22 inordinately.

Page 278

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Yeah. I think that's all very
2 good.
3 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, may I add one
4 further one? Part of my job which I don't discuss very
5 often, although this Commission was nice enough to ask about
6 it at one point, is the reuse area.
7 The Congress has been enormously gracious in
8 providing legislative authority that permits much speedier
9 property disposal at closing bases, and I would say it's
10 equally important that we find a way to maintain those
11 streamlined procedures for property disposal on a going-
12 forward basis even in the interim.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much.
14 Incidentally, I misspoke before. I didn't mean to say
15 unsavory. I think unpleasant would do it.
16 I wonder if I could bother General Klugh for just a
17 minute. Was he sworn?
18 GENERAL KLUGH: Yes, sir.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: General, would you come up next to
20 my friend Bob Bayer by the mike so we get it in the record?
21 I just want to ask you a question. I hope I'm not putting
22 you on the spot, but you chaired the Cross Service Working

Page 279

1 Group so I guess you are on the spot.
2 Now, your alternatives offered closures when you
3 chaired the Cross Service Working Group, but in no instances
4 did you recommend downsizing. We also take note that in the
5 past certain services that now recommend only downsizing were
6 intrigued before with closures.
7 Now, all of this is very interesting, I guess I
8 ask will you please tell this Commission why you recommended
9 closures but did not recommend any downsizing?
10 GENERAL KLUGH: Well, Chairman Dixon, I would tell
11 you that we were focused in the Joint Cross Service Group on
12 the amount of excess capacity that we had with an objective
13 of downsizing the depots to meet core logistics requirements.
14 And we did not have any way of managing or determining
15 downsizing of multiple locations to get to that excess
16 capacity.
17 There are two ways of getting at the excess
18 capacity, particularly in the Air Force, and that is
19 downsizing or closure of a depot, closure of two depots,
20 closure of one depot and shrinking the rest of them to get to
21 the excess capacity and shrinking all depots in place to get
22 to the excess -- get down the excess capacity.

Page 280

1 We chose in the Joint Cross Service Group two
2 alternatives. We offered the Air Force two alternatives.
3 One is close one and shrink in place to get rid of the excess
4 capacity; that is, through interservicing send work out to
5 the private sector.
6 Second, to close two depots. The Air Force chose
7 the third alternative of shrinking or downsizing five depots
8 in place. I would say to the extent that the Air Force could
9 rid itself of the excess capacity, that is a good
10 alternative.
11 The objective we had in the Joint Cross Service
12 Group was and still is to rid ourselves with the excess
13 capacity.
14 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, can I make one
15 additional point to my colleague?
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: That's quite all right.
17 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: The Joint Cross Service Group
18 process, as you know, was rough. What was done in the depot
19 Joint Cross Service Group is we developed a linear
20 programming model and said to it, in effect, go out in a
21 relatively mechanistic way, close things until you got down
22 to a particular capacity.

Page 281

1 Now, we know that there's a considerable amount of
2 controversy and question and examination which you're going
3 to undertake on the question of downsizing versus whole
4 closures.
5 But the fact that we didn't have a computer model
6 that was sophisticated enough to close 20 percent at 5
7 places, versus making a 0/1, close-it/don't-close-it decision
8 at depots, I don't think should be -- should be the basis on
9 which you make the judgment. We really were trying to get
10 some rough measure of capacity reduction, using a, frankly,
11 rough computer model.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I respect that, and I don't
13 need a computer model if I got eyeballs, though, Mr.
14 Secretary. There's an awful lot of excess capacity out there
15 that I saw with my eyeballs. General Klugh, you had the Navy
16 on your staff when you did the cross servicing of the depots?
17 The working group?
18 GENERAL KLUGH: Yes, I did. Yes, sir.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I'll ask you, sir, whether it was
20 your opinion that there was substantial excess capacity, even
21 in excess of two of the five depots on the basis of what you
22 and your group saw, that led you to believe that you could

Page 282

1 recommend closing one, and downsizing in place for the
2 balance, or closing two.
3 GENERAL KLUGH: If I understand your question,
4 would that be excess capacity, the remaining after?
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Was there adequate capacity
6 remaining if you -- in the judgment of you and your cross
7 service group, you close two?
8 GENERAL KLUGH: Yes. If we close two -- the FO's
9 depot, as I remember specifically, appeared to be about a
10 depot and three quarters, in terms of depot equivalence
11 excess. And, therefore, by closing two depots and shifting
12 workload to other existing bases that must remain open for
13 various reasons using that capacity better, then that
14 certainly could take place.
15 Getting into privatization, as a matter of fact,
16 some of that work load -- in other words, having one and
17 three quarters depot excess, certainly privatization of some
18 of that remaining workload could, in fact, give us room for
19 closing two depots. We felt that it was certainly,
20 economically, driven to get that excess capacity to the best
21 utilization that we possibly could.
22 So I guess in some I would say that -- three ways

Page 283

1 of getting to that excess capacity. One was to close one
2 depot, and downsize everything else, but still taking the
3 excess capacity out. And second was to close two depots and
4 sending whatever little workload left that was excess to
5 capacity to other services in an interservice matter or
6 privatization. And then third, shrink all the depots in
7 place, which is a challenge.
8 But then, what do you do with that excess capacity
9 of those facilities that you declare excess? So, the answer
10 is -- I guess, the best I could.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, General Klugh, for
12 that response, which is helpful for the record.
13 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Chairman Dixon.
14 Commissioner Cox.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: Well, I'm honored to be right
16 after the Chairman. Secretary Gotbaum, in previous testimony
17 to the Commission, you had stated that the COBRA analysis
18 provides an estimate of closure costs, as we all know.
19 However, the Navy has excluded certain base closure costs
20 related from its COBRA analysis, where those costs are DOD --
21 apparently, civilian labor costs.
22 And it says the effect of making one time costs

Page 284

1 shown on the COBRA for at least the Navy analysis understate
2 the true costs of implementing the recommendations. In some
3 cases, this is somewhat significant. For example, including
4 the cost for disassembly, reassembly, and calibration of lab
5 equipment for the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Annapolis,
6 would raise the one-time cost for this recommendation from
7 about $25 million to $50 million.
8 Has somehow the DOD taken to this -- into account
9 in your evaluation of the DOD numbers?
10 MR. GOTBAUM: No.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: No.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: I guess, if I may --
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Of course.
14 MR. GOTBAUM: The direct answer to your question is
15 no, pending contradictions by my colleague.
16 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. But?
17 MR. GOTBAUM: But -- and this is a very but -- as
18 you know, this is a process in which we try -- we are
19 required by law, and we try to be as objective, as
20 comprehensive, as auditable, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, as
21 possible. And, we have in a couple of instances, been faced
22 with the question: Why don't you add more costs to the mix?

Page 285

1 And, in most cases, it turns out that, either
2 because we couldn't get those costs in a bases that was
3 sufficiently secret that wouldn't raise cain, just to -- you
4 to you asked the question -- or, because they turned out to
5 be relatively small, and we've declined to do so. Now there
6 are some exceptions to that, okay? One of them is Kirkland.
7 Okay? That was --
8 COMMISSIONER COX: And we, I might say I thought it
9 was a very gracious letter on Kirkland, and we very much
10 appreciated everything you all did to get to the bottom of
11 those costs, and, you know, it was well done.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: I'm not sure if -- I'm lousy at
13 quoting people verbatim, but I will tell you what the
14 Secretary of Defense said is something almost as direct as,
15 if we made a mistake, let's say so. Period. Okay. What I
16 found, however, is that most of the time, when we incorporate
17 unincorporated costs, or when we refine analysis in an
18 objective fashion, it still turns out we've got a lot of
19 excess capacity, and the rank ordering still looks an awful
20 lot alike.
21 And so, my caveat earlier on in my opening
22 statement about -- where -- we are required to be -- we are

Page 286

1 required to be objective. The folks who are basically trying
2 to ding the recommendations are not -- is the only addition I
3 would make. What I will do, if I could, is go back, and with
4 your permission, come back for the record with a guesstimate
5 of what are the implications of this failure to include DOD
6 civilian -- would that be all right?
7 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. That would be helpful,
8 and you're right. In some cases, it may not make a big
9 difference, and at least the numbers we have on that one --
10 it's twice the one time costs. It still may not make a
11 difference.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: Well, let's be clear what the process
13 is, okay? Because I've been -- I've been a neutral analyst,
14 and I have been an advocate, okay? It's what -- one of the
15 side effects of being an investment banker. When I am a
16 neutral analyst, it's my job to say this is our guess. The
17 odds of being wrong up need to be about the same as the odds
18 down. When I am an advocate, I can get enormously creative
19 at adding costs that these obviously competent people at DOD
20 fail to include.
21 And, I can be also enormously creative at
22 forgetting to include costs, as well.

Page 287

1 COMMISSIONER COX: Right. And I understand that,
2 and I understand that this is not a science, and we are not
3 going to get every dollar right. There is not question about
4 that. However, we would like to save money for the Defense
5 Department.
6 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes, ma'am.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: If we know, for a fact, that
8 there are additional costs, I don't think we should stick our
9 head in the sand, and pretend like we're saving a whole lot
10 more money than we are. And so, you know -- once we get past
11 the sort of generalities, where there are specifics and we do
12 know them, I would like to consider them, even though the
13 COBRA model itself may not be capable of doing that.
14 MR. GOTBAUM: Can I give you the counter argument,
15 just to give you a for instance?
16 COMMISSIONER COX: Sure.
17 MR. GOTBAUM: One of the things I have observed as
18 I look at the BRAC process is that, of course, none of us
19 knows exactly what a closure cost is, right? But, it turns
20 out there are three stages in the life of a cost estimate.
21 Estimate number one is when the recommendation has made the
22 initial COBRA cost, and that closure cost is $10.

Page 288

1 Estimate number two is when the base commander at
2 the closing base realizes that his base is on the list, and
3 the base commander at the receiving base realizes that he's
4 about to get an opportunity for initial MILCON, and that cost
5 goes to $12, or $20. Okay? Estimate number three is when
6 the controller's office in the relevant service, the
7 controller's office in the -- we're talking about the
8 Secretary of Defense -- and the budgeteers get at it.
9 And generally, what we find is, when we actually go
10 and spend the money, it ends up being a little less than the
11 $10 we started out with. So --
12 COMMISSIONER COX: No, I understand that -- anyway.
13 Let me go on. We, as you all can probably tell from my
14 fellow commissioners today, in the Air Force, there is at
15 least some concern about the Air Force downsizing. And I
16 don't know where that time -- where that's going to go. But,
17 assuming, for a moment that it is the decision to close one
18 or more Air Force depots, would it be your view that we
19 should encourage interservicing, by making that part of the
20 recommendation?
21 Or do you see that as your job, and we should
22 simply say send it where you may?

Page 289

1 MR. GOTBAUM: Let me start with what's desirable,
2 and what's possible. We're in favor of interservicing, and
3 we are doing it, and we are -- and any place where it is
4 encouraged, should be encouraged. What we have found though,
5 is that the BRAC process by itself happens not to be a very
6 good way to encourage interservicing, because the BRAC
7 process is precisely the time at which every single commander
8 knows that his or her capacity is on the line.
9 And so, what we discovered in our joint cross
10 service groups is that we are most effective at getting
11 interservicing before or after the decision, rather than
12 during the decision. Now, that doesn't mean that the
13 commission could not, and should not in its recommendation,
14 whatever it decides, say DOD interservicing makes sense,
15 would save money, and you ought to do more of it.
16 But, I guess what we would hope is that you would
17 recognize that the actual process for deciding where workload
18 ought to go is sufficiently complicated, sufficiently subtle,
19 that I think it really ought to be a management judgment.
20 Maybe one done on an interservice basis by, for example, the
21 Depot Maintenance Council, that General Klugh runs. But
22 that, essentially, it ought to be a judgment made after, not

Page 290

1 as part of the closure decision.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner J.B. Davis.
4 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Mr. Secretary, as you noted,
5 we've been getting a lot of help on some of this stuff, and -
6 - from various sides. But in each case, there are some that
7 ring a truth in the process. And I'd like to go back to
8 General Klugh's discussion -- you know, it's still the DS --
9 OSD position that -- the Air Force position, i.e., downsizing
10 the depots, is the preferred option.
11 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes, sir. And let's be clear why.
12 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: As General Klugh said, we're
13 looking for reductions of capacity on a cost effective basis.
14 That's what the name of the game is. And we had a computer
15 model, which helped us guess what you ought to do, but that's
16 what it was. It was a computer model to help us guess what
17 you ought to do. The first mission is to reduce capacity.
18 The Air Force made the case, and backed it up with
19 some analysis that they could reduce a lot of the capacity at
20 lower cost, by chomping pieces out of five air logistic
21 centers, and by closing a whole air logistic center, large --
22 because depots turn out to be only parts of the ALC, in the

Page 291

1 case of, for example, Kelly.
2 The depot is half of the ALC, and the ALC is about
3 two thirds of the total base. So that -- they made their
4 case. They backed it up with numbers that, in effect, they
5 could reduce capacity, and they could do so on a cost
6 effective basis by downsizing. To us, we looked at it. I'll
7 tell you Bob and his staff looked at it, and it seemed to us
8 that was fulfilling the requirement on a cost effective
9 basis.
10 We are very well aware and we are perfectly happy
11 that the Commission is looking at this issue, because we know
12 that it is controversial, and we know that you will be
13 objective about it. But the reason we support, and supported
14 was because we are trying to do just that -- reduce capacity
15 on a cost effective basis.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I hate to beat a dead horse,
17 but I asked the Secretary of the Air Force that if we closed
18 one, would the Air Force be able to sustain its readiness and
19 modernization accounts, and the out years with the costs
20 involved with closing the cheapest one, whatever that one
21 was. Whether OSD will be able to handle that, from a -- from
22 the budgeting process --

Page 292

1 MR. GOTBAUM: I have learned, sir, in my one year
2 at the Department of Defense, never to make promises about
3 what OSD can pay for, especially in the current environment.
4
5 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Given that's a maybe answer --
6 what about two?
7 MR. GOTBAUM: Let me say this. We have not, at
8 least, not recently, looked at what the up front closure
9 costs are, or would be, for closing a whole depot. The -- we
10 did look when the Air Force came forward and said our
11 estimate of closure costs is -X-, and they did, in fact, seem
12 to us to be plausible at the time. And that was, as I
13 recall, a very substantial sum approaching a billion dollars.
14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: It's a little more than that
15 now, isn't it?
16 MR. GOTBAUM: And, there is no denying that up
17 front costs do matter, and up front costs do constrain us.
18 And, there is no denying that even something as important as
19 base closure has to be measured against modernization, and so
20 I don't want to leave you with the impression that we are
21 confident or comfortable that we could take a depot closing,
22 and pay for it with the budgets that we have allocated for

Page 293

1 BRAC. I can't give you that assurance, sir.
2 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: That's two maybe's, sir, we'll
3 accredit you for. I'd like to follow up on something
4 Commissioner Cox said. You know, we're always looking for
5 interservicing. And one of the things the community came
6 forward on was moving the Marines, because the congestion of
7 the area down in San Diego at Miramar -- moving the Marines
8 to March Air Field -- or March Air Force Base, depending on
9 how old you are -- and, the answer we basically got from the
10 Commandant today was, yes, he'd like to do that.
11 But, he'd like somebody else to pay the bill. We
12 asked each one of the services -- would they step up to that
13 process, and each one of them respectfully declined. Now I -
14 - would OSD be willing to step up to that process? I mean,
15 what is the OSD position on it?
16 MR. GOTBAUM: I'll tell you, sir. This is easy.
17 We -- if we had our druthers, we wouldn't do any of this. It
18 is because we have to pay the bill that we're doing this. I
19 am very well -- very familiar with the proposal that we put
20 this capacity in March, rather than where we have slotted it
21 in the various places we've slotted it. The issue is that it
22 would cost money. It would cost money, you should pardon the

Page 294

1 expression, up front.
2 And we are clearly budgeted concerning that in the
3 interim. And it would -- furthermore, it would, in effect,
4 add an active duty component, and add the infrastructure for
5 an active duty component at a base which is now strictly a
6 reserve base. So, it would cost a fair amount of money. So
7 I'm not surprised that the Commandant said sure, as long as
8 you'd pay for it, I'd take it.
9 Okay. But, the issue is, from the perspective of
10 the taxpayers and the Department of Defense as a whole,
11 because we do have to pay for it, we think there are better
12 ways to do it.
13 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, could I have one
14 more short question?
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You certainly may.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Being an aviator, I am very
17 concerned about wind tunnels, and things like that. And, and
18 then NSWC at White Oak -- that Hypersonic Wind Tunnel? And
19 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to this
20 facility as a national treasure -- unique national
21 capability. National treasure is my word. Have you looked
22 at your requirements from an OSD perspective of wind tunnels?

Page 295

1 I mean, you've got one in Tennessee, you have one
2 in White Oak. Is that excess to your requirements, even
3 though it has a unique capability?
4 MR. GOTBAUM: Unfortunately, sir, the answer to
5 that, unfortunately, for those who would like for us to keep
6 that facility is open, the answer is yes. It is excess to
7 our requirements. Let me give you -- this is a case in which
8 -- to go back to the Commandant's example about, if I don't
9 have to pay for it, I'd like to use it? Okay.
10 The folks who operate that wind tunnel at White
11 Oak, with whom I have personally spoken, I'll tell you, tell
12 me that they have for a number of years been trying to get
13 other components of DOD to pay the operating costs. It
14 costs, if I recall correctly -- and if I'm off by half a
15 million dollars, I apologize -- about $3.5 million a year to
16 operate that facility.
17 And they are having trouble getting a half a
18 million dollars of other support from other DOD components.
19 What that says to me is that, yes, if it's free, this is
20 something we like. But right now, it's not free. And
21 therefore, with respect, we think it's better that in fact,
22 we concentrate our capacity elsewhere.

Page 296

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, thank you Mr. Secretary,
2 and Mr. Chairman, if I had another time, I'd ask what about
3 private industry, but I think I'll pass on the wind tunnel.
4 Thank you.
5 A PARTICIPANT: Oh. It's one of my other
6 questions.
7 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Lee Kling.
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. I noticed that you
9 made some statements about the labs, and wanting to do that.
10 And I don't want to get into that, but I would just like to
11 make a comment that leads me almost to my next one, is that
12 is -- I think we ought to be careful when we tear apart the
13 labs in our high tech areas, and so forth, and split them up
14 and send them to the winds.
15 And I recognize that you think that, but I happen
16 to think that our future is the high tech, and is the labs,
17 and is those things, as opposed to storage. So -- which
18 makes me then ask the question of you that, on March -- and I
19 want to read you a little bit -- on March 1st, the DOD
20 submitted 146 realignment or closure actions to the
21 Commission.
22 And to date, the services have revised 63 of these

Page 297

1 146 recommendations, resulting in an increase in the one-time
2 cost of $170 million, and a decrease in the annual savings of
3 $130 million. And that's shown on the chart that we have, or
4 hopefully -- I hope we're passing to you something you can
5 see a little bit better than that, Mr. Secretary.
6 MR. GOTBAUM: I will admit to being blind, sir, but
7 that one's tough.
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: You have one. I guess -- this
9 is what you originally showed us, in essence. This is where
10 we are today. And my first question is, do you agree --
11 I'll wait for a minute -- the question is, do you agree with
12 these revised estimates of the cost and savings that we now
13 have in front of us, in essence.
14 MR. GOTBAUM: Commissioner, I would -- having spent
15 most of my life working with numbers and estimates, and
16 especially when I'm under oath, I am not going to be so naive
17 or so cavalier as to tell you that yes, I subscribe to these
18 numbers exactly. I think what we can say on this, just
19 having seen this piece of paper, is that the following things
20 are true.
21 One is, we are re-estimating, partly as the result
22 of your request, partly as the result of suggestions on the

Page 298

1 part of community, and partly because we want to make sure
2 that we're doing this right. We are re-estimating from the
3 moment we make a recommendation.
4 COMMISSIONER KLING: Again, I -- excuse me.
5 MR. GOTBAUM: That, always in the first round,
6 raises the costs. Lowers the savings. I personally take
7 some comfort in the fact that what you're telling me is that
8 after that process has gone through, we're still talking
9 about something which would save the taxpayers -- I said
10 eighteen, you're saying nineteen billion dollars -- so that
11 overall, in fact, the savings are substantially on the same
12 order of magnitude as they are.
13 Does that mean there aren't changes? Yes, sir,
14 there are -- I would characterize them, though, as -- in
15 percentage terms -- relatively small. And I would also want
16 to point out and make a very important part of the record, is
17 that I am absolutely confident -- as confident as I was that
18 the numbers would change between March 1 and today, I am
19 equally confident they will change again once you make your
20 decision.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: And I agree and we all know
22 that that is what happens to these numbers but when you look

Page 299

1 and say from where we started that we're now down $130
2 million on an annual in saving and we have to add to that now
3 -- in the cost of -- we have to add to that Kirkland now
4 because Kirkland is not going to provide the savings that was
5 originally provided into these number.
6 And I guess really the question I'm trying to ask
7 you is that you have certain items budgeted going forward in
8 the process and you counted on certain of these savings and
9 these costs there and my only simple question is if we're
10 falling off of these savings that we encounter, wouldn't you
11 encourage us to look for alternate ways to beef these back up
12 to find things such as -- such as -- and I'm back because all
13 of us are on the depot business but such as looking at
14 something like that that maybe could take us back up into the
15 savings level if it was sound.
16 I'm not trying to get to a specific dollar number.
17 MR. GOTBAUM: No, no, you raise a serious point and
18 I think it deserves a serious answer. The answer is it is
19 clearly the case that we're looking for the Commission to
20 help us lower infrastructure costs and as we said when we
21 first testified, we would hope that in any case you decide
22 that we have made a mistake, if you can, that you find a

Page 300

1 substitute that you discuss it with us because there are
2 always military and operational implications for all these
3 changes.
4 Having said that, one of the things that I hope the
5 Commission is cognizant of is this issue of up-front costs is
6 a real issue and it is helpful long term but maybe not
7 feasible short term to help us by adding hundreds of millions
8 of dollars to the BRAC budget in '97 if that's the way we
9 achieve the 2001 savings.
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: But if we found that the cost
11 of closing was that we could get a payback in three to four
12 years, then you would support that?
13 MR. GOTBAUM: Let me be clear. There are lots of
14 issues that are not on this table that have paybacks in
15 three, four, five, six years, okay, and they are not there
16 because they would require substantial chunks of money up
17 front. It is partly for that reason, frankly, that most of
18 the flag officers with whom I'm spoken -- and I can't say
19 everyone but a lot have said I do want another round of BRAC
20 and usually the answer is longer than three or four years but
21 that period of time but remember that three or four year
22 payback ignores the question of how much you pay up front and

Page 301

1 how much you pay up front is really what we are budgeting to.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: My time is up but just
3 specifically, if we found -- and I don't have this as a
4 fact -- if we found at a depot the cost to close was $450
5 million and the annual savings was $150 million, how would
6 you feel about that?
7 MR. GOTBAUM: And that this was -- and the
8 Department had made a recommendation which would have saved
9 less money in a way that was less military --
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: I'm just saying in theory, if
11 a cost to close of a depot was at $450-500 million 400 and we
12 could save and that the savings figure would end up to be
13 $150 million a year, how would you just feel about that?
14 MR. GOTBAUM: I would think it would be something
15 which when we can afford it, we would like to do and the
16 issue is can we afford it. I'm really not trying to dodge
17 your point but I think it is genuinely important to
18 understand that there is a budge constraint under which we
19 operate.
20 Now, I will tell you that I meant what I said about
21 the rhetoric of more money for defense has colored people's
22 views because a lot of folks within the building, even, have

Page 302

1 said "Whoa, well, now we're going to have more money and
2 therefore, we don't need to close as much." But what they
3 don't see and what the controller of the Department of
4 Defense reminded me as recently as yesterday is for every
5 additional dollar that the Congress is promising us, there
6 are $5 of claimants and so my suspicion is when we "get a
7 little more money", we're not going to have a little more
8 money; we're going to have a little less money and as you do
9 your deliberations, we hope you will take quite seriously
10 into account sir.
11 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Montoya.
13 MR. MONTOYA: I guess the day is approaching when
14 our second guessing you all is going to end and it's going to
15 turn the other way and I'm beginning to feel that heat and
16 therefore, though I find your answers today, as last time,
17 very interesting and you're a very interesting witness but at
18 the same time, your glibness gives me some discomfort because
19 I sense that we're all over the line on so many things and I
20 sense it not so much from you, Mr. Gotbaum, but the result of
21 SECDEF whatever guidance you gave or did not give the
22 services because we've got a number of theories of how you

Page 303

1 deal with excess capacity and the Air Force has one, the Army
2 has another and the Navy has something in between those two.
3
4 I'll give you an example of your own words. You
5 talked about Brooks Air Force Base and closing the base down
6 and moving things to another place and you're getting rid of
7 lab capacity. I would argue that using the Air Force
8 definition of ALCs, you aren't getting rid of any capacity
9 because what you're doing is you're taking a right-side
10 laboratory supposedly, fully worked and you're going to move
11 it someplace else and what you're really doing is trying to
12 reduce infrastructure support by closing the entire base.
13 You're going to take advantage of another base's overhead by
14 moving this lab capacity that you have to another location.
15 The Air Force's argument with us is really saying,
16 Commission, we have right-sized our capacity to meet our work
17 load in a different way than closing things. You're going to
18 cost us more money by forcing us to move our capacity around.
19 Then we have that other stuff we've accounted for, the empty
20 spaces and the idle machines, that's all been factored into
21 our cost structure and so we don't have excess capacity. We
22 have right-sized.

Page 304

1 As we look at things where the Navy closes a
2 shipyard, now, that's closing excess capacity and that's
3 getting rid of excess capacity because something has gone a
4 way. Closing a wind tunnel, your other example, that's
5 getting rid of excess capacity. It's gone.
6 And so to the extent a service closes something, no
7 longer needing it, I think you'd give them great deference to
8 that decision but when they're not closing something like
9 Kirkland, just moving it around, then it becomes a matter of
10 cost. I think your hurdle is higher to overcome our
11 questioning when you're closing nothing but you're merely
12 moving things about and I think that's where Kirkland failed.
13 So, let me try to pin your down on Long Beach,
14 having used that as a backdrop. We really need to know
15 specifically what it costs to close a shipyard because we're
16 entering a very difficult decision phase and I have seen the
17 official Navy numbers to close Long Beach is something on the
18 order of -- I think it's less than $100 million, the cost to
19 do that.
20 I'm also aware of an internal NAVSEA memorandum
21 from the shipyard commander to his hierarchy that he's
22 talking about closure costs in excess of $400 million. Now,

Page 305

1 that is a huge variation and I would ask you to find out -- I
2 didn't ask the Navy specifically because I wanted OSD to take
3 a role in this. I'd like to know what are the facts of
4 closing Long Beach Naval shipyard and secondly, I think in
5 the case of shipyards, we have the further benefit of other
6 closures. There seems to be some history that estimates for
7 closing shipyards have been far lower than actual experience
8 and so we have some empirical evidence to better calculate
9 the closing of the Long Beach Naval shipyard.
10 So, for the record and before the 22nd, I would
11 really like to get from you what that answer is because it is
12 so important and I think I understand Air Force's -- and one
13 of your definitions of excess capacity. You might have two
14 or three more but I think I understand one.
15 MR. GOTBAUM: I will not be glib. I will give you
16 a one-word answer; yes.
17 MR. MONTOYA: Thank you.
18 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Robles.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Just a couple of quick
20 questions and you can well imagine the depo issue is going to
21 hit you right between the eyes one more time with feeling and
22 I just have the first question, kind of an interesting

Page 306

1 question and you understand this has been a very interesting
2 day. We started off the day with one service telling us that
3 they want to take all their capacity, wring it out, get down
4 to the very most optimum, leanest structure they can, take
5 risks, admitted risks because they think it's manageable risk
6 because of -- there's actually other things.
7 Then we're followed up by another service that says
8 oh, by the way, we're very risk averse and so we're not going
9 to close anything. We want to just downsize it, lay it away
10 and get ready for the big one. And then right in the middle
11 of it, the Navy says we're kind of halfway there. So we're
12 trying to wrestle with this issue.
13 And then I was also interested in hearing that the
14 United State Air Force just told us that 71 percent of all
15 DOD closure savings have been achieved by the Air Force
16 Now, Mr. Gotbaum, does it make sense that the United States
17 Air Force has to date, achieved 71 percent of all BRAC
18 savings? Is that a true number? A number you can certify
19 to?
20 MR. GOTBAUM: Can I deal with the easy ones first?
21 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I mean, this was in testimony
22 today, we were told that they had been a leader in closures

Page 307

1 in the United States Air Force, that they, in fact, have
2 saved some $18 billion, that is 71 percent of all the savings
3 achieved by the Department of Defense in this base closure
4 process and I thought that was a very interesting number.
5 MR. GOTBAUM: And Commissioner, since I cannot,
6 right now, from memory, let me absolutely circle back on that
7 one.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Could you please get back to
9 us on that and validate the voracity. There are some
10 assumptions there we're not understanding and that didn't go
11 along with that number.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: Right,, if I can deal with your first
13 question, which is why is it that my father's house has many
14 restructuring plans. That, I'll tell you sir, is not to me -
15 - and I spent a lot of time in the private sector doing
16 restructuring -- that, by itself, is not a surprise.
17 Let's go back and take the previous commissioner's
18 point about the wind tunnel, okay, in which we're "closing
19 one facility and actually shrinking our use of land but we're
20 actually using the land next door." And this is genuinely a
21 case in which there is no one-size-fits-all approach.
22 As you know, much better than I, the Department is

Page 308

1 big place, it has a range of activities. I'm trying to worry
2 about -- and so frankly, I would not be surprised that there
3 were circumstances in which we saved money by closing an
4 installation entirely and also that there were times when we
5 saved more money by cutting out pieces. That frankly does
6 not surprise me at all. The issue for us and the issue for
7 the Commission and I'm not going to be glib about it; I'm
8 going to be blunt about it, is which is the one that saves
9 money most cost effectively and maintains the military
10 mission. That's the question and we know it's a question on
11 the Commission's plate. We're glad that it's on your plate
12 and we're going to deal with that.
13 My staff, proving that they are as competent as I
14 like to claim in public, reminds me that it is probably true
15 that the Air Force statement, as made, is true because in the
16 early rounds -- the way you get savings in this business, as
17 you know, is you spend a lot of money up front and then -- so
18 the first three years, you don't save anything; you spend and
19 then you start getting savings. And in the earliest rounds
20 of BRAC, '88 and '91, the Air Force closed a lot of
21 facilities, okay.
22 So, I suspect that it is true that if you looked as

Page 309

1 savings achieved to date, not of costs, that the Air Force is
2 responsible for a lot of them. One thing I can tell you
3 though, is that we, as part of our analysis, when the
4 Secretary's recommendations came to the Department of
5 Defense, Bob and I looked at all three services' estimated
6 savings from the three rounds that we've had and the rounds
7 that we're recommending and I will tell you, sir -- and
8 frankly, I was surprised -- they were very close to the same
9 for each service.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And that's what I thought.
11 I'd just like for you to make that available to us.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: And we will send you those numbers.
13 So, over the fullness of time, the three rounds plus the ones
14 there, truth is they look like every service was making a
15 very serious effort.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And I didn't want to add on
17 about the numbers because your one-size-fits-all A to Z
18 approach would be okay if the numbers were all consistent but
19 when they're also major differences in assumptions about what
20 gets saved, what doesn't get saved, what's a cost, what's a
21 savings, it really causes us perplexing problems and this is
22 what we're dealing with right now.

Page 310

1 The second question has to do with the depo joint
2 cross service groups and I know they went through a lot of
3 deliberation but we heard today for the first time -- at
4 least I heard it for the first time, I won't speak for the
5 other commissioners -- that readiness was an issue. Never
6 before had I heard that when you all did the deliberations,
7 there was a readiness impact but today, it was testified that
8 now we're raising the readiness specter and saying oh, by the
9 way, we can't close because if we do that, there will be a
10 readiness impact and I just had never heard that and I
11 wondered if you had heard that in the joint cross service
12 groups or any other time?
13 MR. GOTBAUM: Not having the benefit of the
14 testimony this morning, it is very clear and that part of the
15 reason General Klugh -- and I should probably let him answer
16 this -- we're in a process, not as difficult or as miserable
17 as this process, but pretty difficult last year with the
18 services trying to define core. Why were they trying to
19 define core? Because they were trying to define that level
20 of work load which, in order to maintain our ability to fight
21 wars, which is how we define readiness, okay, ought to be in-
22 house.

Page 311

1 So with respect I think that the job that General
2 Klugh was trying to do was precisely one of saying how much
3 capacity can I reduce before I threaten readiness. And
4 although we do not run around very often in the Department of
5 Defense saying tick, tick, tick, tick, oh, killed readiness
6 etc. We try to make judgments about what capacity we can
7 afford and what level of risks and that's what the level of
8 debate is.
9 But if nobody has said that if we eliminated all
10 depo capacity, we would not be ready, then that's clearly
11 true. The issue here is what levels do we need.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And that's a good
13 clarification. I just wondered if any other service, the
14 Army, the Air Force, the Navy brought up the readiness issue
15 as saying if we got rid of the proposed over capacity, we
16 would run into a readiness problem. What you're telling me
17 is that would not -- your recommendations were consistent
18 with maintaining readiness and yet, being able to downsize
19 the infrastructure and getting rid of excess capacity.
20 MR. GOTBAUM: Keep in mind, sir, that what we, in
21 effect, did is ask the service, both military and civilian
22 what is your judgment, keeping military value first, as to

Page 312

1 the kinds of reductions you can recommend consistent with
2 readiness. And so in every service there were depot
3 facilities in which the service said I want this one, I need
4 this one and therefore, we're not going to touch it, in every
5 service.
6 With your permission, sir, I'd like to let General
7 Klugh, who is responsible for this in the --
8 GENERAL KLUGH: Briefly, Commissioner Robles, I
9 will just say that the readiness issue was addressed, as Josh
10 was saying, through sizing the depots to core. And that we
11 were protecting the capability to support all of the key
12 weapons systems that might be involved in a JCS scenario.
13 None of the alternatives that we sent forward to
14 the services violated that. All of those alternatives, both
15 in DM1 and DM2, took the core under consideration and,
16 therefore, readiness under consideration.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, sir. So what I'm
18 hearing you say, then, is if you right-size the depots to be
19 able to meet that core capacity that you identified in your
20 group, you should not have a readiness problem.
21 GENERAL KLUGH: That is correct.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, sir.

Page 313

1 MR. BAYER: Commissioner Robles, I'd like to add
2 one further point, in terms of readiness. And that is that
3 the Joint Cross Service group was looking at readiness from
4 the logistics point of view, i.e., sizing to core. But when
5 the services then looked at their bases, particularly in the
6 Air Force where there were multi-service or multi-mission
7 bases, their readiness construct for that base was broader
8 than simply logistics. So that might be another reason why
9 you received that input.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. I understand.
11 Because they have air fields there and they do other
12 ancillary missions there that may have a readiness impact.
13 But again, we're not talking about reducing those.
14 The argument has always been about taking the depot
15 maintenance function within an air logistics center, for
16 example, and downsizing it to do core capacity work. And so
17 that ought not have a readiness impact unless you have to
18 degrade the base support structure sufficiently such that it
19 may affect other missions. I thought I understood the
20 equation. I was just making sure.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, commissioner.
22 Commissioner Steele.

Page 314

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Good afternoon. Am I correct
2 in that the Secretary's guidelines for the Department for
3 BRAC '95 instructed the services not to include or consider
4 environmental cleanup costs in putting forth their
5 recommendations. Is my memory of that memo right?
6 MR. GOTBAUM: From day one -- and I mean day one
7 like 1988 or certainly the 1991 round -- it has been the
8 policy of the Department of Defense -- in other words, it is
9 not just this Secretary of Defense, but it's been all of
10 them -- essentially that environmental cleanup -- we know
11 that we have to clean up our land whether it is active or
12 not. And we therefore did not want to bias ourselves, in
13 effect, against doing cleanup where we ought, by putting that
14 on the table since we have to pay the freight whether it's
15 open or closed.
16 And so yes, it is true in this round, and it was
17 true in previous rounds, that they estimate operating costs,
18 they estimate compliance costs, but they don't estimate
19 cleanup costs, and they leave those off to the side. Now, it
20 is of course absolutely true that once we make a closure
21 decision we in fact -- if we want to do reuse, we have to do
22 that cleanup, and that's why that cost gets factored into our

Page 315

1 BRAC recommendations. Is that clear?
2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Sure. My follow-up question
3 then would be, the Secretary of the Air Force this morning
4 specifically said that we should not consider an ALC due to
5 environmental costs. There were some other issues mentioned,
6 but that was mentioned specifically. Given the Secretary of
7 Defense's guidance to the Department and the testimony we
8 heard this morning, how would you counsel the Commission on
9 whether or not we consider environmental cleanup costs as we
10 proceed into this final week?
11 MR. GOTBAUM: Again, I don't have the benefit of
12 the Secretary of the Air Force's testimony but, having
13 discussed this issue with her in the past, I think the issue,
14 as I tried to say it before, which is we try to keep
15 environmental cleanup costs off the decision of which base
16 you close.
17 In other words, if we have two bases, one that has
18 a lot of environmental cleanup and another that doesn't,
19 okay, we don't think environmental cleanup ought to get into
20 that factor because if we did, every base commander in the
21 world would understand that what he ought to do is drop a lot
22 of oil drums in sensitive places. We don't want to do that,

Page 316

1 okay. That would be a mistake.
2 So we try to be try to be neutral in this and make
3 the decision. But we are under a budget constraint and, as a
4 result -- and it is true not just in the Air Force; the Army
5 and the Navy, too -- they keep a running tab of how much
6 money they think they have for base closure. And as a
7 result, in effect, what we do -- and this gets to a point
8 that the other commissioner made -- some things don't come on
9 this list because they simply add a lot of upfront cost, even
10 though they are nominally high payoff.
11 And that is, I believe, the context in which the
12 Air Force said, Is there a payoff for closing a depot?
13 Answer: Yes, there is. Is there an upfront cost? Answer:
14 Yes, there is. Is it large? Yes, and therefore if we can do
15 it more cheaply we will.
16 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. And to follow up
17 there, and this is sort of a continuation of a couple of my
18 colleagues' questions. If you could put on your investment
19 banker hat for me, please, for a moment, and you have a
20 choice here, looking at ALCs. We've got the $276 million
21 that was budgeted for the closure of Kirtland.
22 MR. GOTBAUM: Seventy-eight.

Page 317

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I think I have that number
2 right, or close. If you look at Brooks Air Force Base and
3 the community's contonement plan, true, the steady-state
4 savings are half the department's recommendation, but we're
5 talking numbers of 17.6 versus 32.2. But the upfront cost
6 for Brooks, if we do the Department's recommendation, it's
7 211 million; the community's is only 32.
8 I can give you, Mr. Investment Banker, 200 million
9 upfront for Brooks, two hundred and whatever I said --
10 seventy-six million -- for Kirtland, and give you a steady-
11 state savings a heck of a lot bigger than the difference
12 between 11 and 17, is this a proposal you would interested
13 in?
14 MR. GOTBAUM: Having spent a lot of time on both
15 sides of the table, buying and selling, I think it's very
16 important to ask the question of, Am I buying or selling? If
17 I'm selling --
18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Short answer, please.
19 MR. GOTBAUM: Okay. I think the issue is what the
20 numbers really are. We -- let's be very direct. Whenever a
21 community comes to us and says, "We can save you money as
22 long as you leave capacity lying around," I cover my wallet.

Page 318

1 And that is what in many, many, many cases communities have
2 done.
3 We don't like this process, okay. It is miserable.
4 But that is all too often exactly what people are saying.
5 That's what's going on at Brooks. It's what going on at
6 Rome. And as a result, can we "save" money? Sure, we can
7 save money by leaving excess capacity.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I can save you a lot more
9 money in the long haul by providing to the Department the
10 upfront costs that were testified a couple months ago that,
11 had they been there, the Air Force would have gone a
12 different course. So, all right, one more last question
13 here.
14 I really do commend all of you on the work of the
15 Joint Cross Service groups. I think they really did do a
16 good job. My frustration in this chair is they had the
17 responsibility, but they didn't have the authority to make it
18 happen. Getting back to Commissioner Davis' comment about
19 interservicing, I would like to provide the Department the
20 greatest flexibility with the recommendations -- they're not
21 recommendations -- with the report that we send forth.
22 However, given the track record on

Page 319

1 interservicing -- you mentioned depot maintenance council as
2 a suggestion on should we close a depot or two, where that
3 workload could be best directed. Does the depot maintenance
4 council have the authority to make it happen?
5 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Interservice? Okay. I just
7 want to be sure.
8 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes, it does.
9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Lastly, General
10 Babbitt, the Ogden community has forwarded a concept paper
11 which basically allows DOD to divest ownership of the DDO
12 property but allow DLA to lease it back to meet its short-
13 term capacity needs for storage, which I guess are stated at
14 21 million if we accept the Department's recommendation. I
15 guess that number has since maybe become a little bit iffy.
16 Given the shortfall in storage capacity and the
17 potential additional shortfall should the Commission proceed
18 to do a different approach to the ALC issue, have you had an
19 opportunity to look at the Ogden community's proposal? And
20 could you comment on that?
21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Yes, we have. The
22 risk of a shortfall -- the 21 that was originally stated,

Page 320

1 what we now feel is closer to 10 million, if there are no
2 other changes made -- is truly a risk. And we would there is
3 some reasonable probability it would never be required. To
4 now enter into an agreement with Ogden to lease space that we
5 never need didn't seem prudent to us. And therefore we
6 reject that offer now.
7 If in fact it should come to pass that some of that
8 capacity is required, certainly it is available to us, that
9 we would enter into agreement either Ogden or communities
10 that have facilities -- other facilities that might be
11 affected by closure to cover a short-term shortfall. And we
12 would propose that was one of our risk management approaches.
13 COMMISSIONER STEELE: To my surprise, I haven't
14 been handed a note that says my time is expired, so I'm going
15 to follow up and ask you what happened to this 21 million
16 shortage. I mean, back at the beginning, when we heard that
17 was out there --
18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Why did it go from 21
19 to --
20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- and that was one of the
21 reasons where the ALCs said, "Oh, well, look, we'll have
22 room, another good reason to downsize." Do you not need that

Page 321

1 room -- oops, I got my note.
2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Does that mean I don't
3 have to answer? We had proposed $21 million as a prudent
4 risk long before there was any offer made by the Air Force
5 for excess capacity at the five ALCs if none were closed.
6 And we still feel that's a prudent rise, and we still feel
7 that that's a lean forward approach that DLA should make.
8 There is the possibility that inventory
9 requirements will go down even further than we've been able
10 to estimate now. And therefore we would still feel there's a
11 possibility we will never require that additional space.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay, thank you. And I wish
13 you look in your new post as you replace our shadow.
14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Thank you.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We do have to have a little
16 humor once in a while.
17 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Very little.
18 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Even in this process. I
19 just have two quick questions and then we'll be finished.
20 Mr. Gotbaum, you had said in answer to Commissioner Kling's
21 question about -- he gave you -- about the scenario involving
22 400, 500 million dollars to close and 150 annual savings, you

Page 322

1 had said if you could find that kind of money to close a
2 depot, you would do that. Is that correct? Did I hear your
3 answer correctly?
4 MR. GOTBAUM: What I said is, we're looking for the
5 payoffs that we can afford. And that is precisely what we
6 are doing throughout this process.
7 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: If I took the 278 million
8 that would be saved now that we're not going to Kirtland, and
9 I take the 127 million that would be saved on the down-sizing
10 of a depot, that would give us 405 million. Wouldn't that go
11 a long ways towards the closure of a depot, assuming it was
12 in the 400 to 600 million dollar range.
13 MR. GOTBAUM: At the risk of being contentious, are
14 we also including in the ledger the increase costs that we've
15 discovered in all the other places that the Commission still
16 agrees should be close.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, if we want to do
18 that, we can start including in a lot of other costs, too,
19 and savings. Like if we have savings of $50 million dollars
20 a year by not upgrading equipment that is on that site -- you
21 know, there has been a figure out that infrastructure costs
22 and improvements over a 30-year period, I believe, but I'd

Page 323

1 have to go back and get those numbers. But anyway, it
2 amounts to $50 million a year to keep upgrading the equipment
3 and repairing it and replacing it and the infrastructure and
4 everything that exists in the depots.
5 So I mean, we can play a lot of numbers games here.
6 But my question is, Couldn't that money be used for closure
7 then?
8 MR. GOTBAUM: The answer is, yes, sir. And I don't
9 want to play numbers games, but I want to be very direct.
10 The congress does not give us infinite year money. The
11 congress gives us money year by year. And therefore there
12 are a lot things, dozens of things, that this Department
13 would love to do that would save billions of dollars that
14 require upfront costs of only tens of millions or hundreds of
15 millions, that we do not do.
16 And all I ask is, as you consider our
17 recommendations, and as you form your own, keep in mind both
18 parts of the equation. That's all.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We will do that, sir. And
20 I thank you. I have one last question for General Babbitt.
21 If the closure of one or more ALCs would happen, would
22 that -- how would that affect your previous recommendations

Page 324

1 in regard to DLA activities. Would some of those
2 recommendations have to be changed? Or would there be
3 sufficient capacity to pick up whatever would come out of
4 those ALCs?
5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: First of all, Mr.
6 Commissioner, it depends on other recommendations in part,
7 that the commission may recommend. And say, for example, you
8 had considered the alternatives of Letterkenny and Tobyhanna
9 Army Depots and also Red River Army Depot in your discussions
10 so far. And whatever decisions you might recommend there
11 would also affect our capacity and requirement for storage.
12 But, because I don't know the answer to that, I'll
13 qualify my answer and say if you assume that only the four
14 depots that DLA originally recommended for closure are going
15 to be closed, then we proposed a 21 million cubic foot
16 shortfall as a risk. And we honestly felt that it was a good
17 possibility that that shortfall would disappear by 2001 and
18 therefore would never have to be replaced.
19 We still feel that we can manage that risk, and we
20 have tried to be reasonable about that by saying how would we
21 manage that, and we have a list of a number of alternatives,
22 which exceed by quite a bit the 21 million cubic feet, that

Page 325

1 we would use to manage the risk if the need came about.
2 That shortfall represented about 5 percent of our
3 expected capacity in 2001, and we thought it was prudent.
4 That 21 million shortfall has now changed to 10 because of
5 some fact-of-life changes, which I could itemize for you. We
6 have already presented those to the Commission in written
7 form. But I'd say those are fact-of-life changes,
8 information that has changed since we submitted our report.
9 If the Commission were to recommend no closures of
10 AlCs, we would certainly have more than enough capacity at
11 the ALCs, the five ALCs, excess to handle any shortfall that
12 might eventually happen. If you closed one ALC, it's our
13 assessment that we would still have sufficient risk
14 management capability to not change our recommendation at
15 all.
16 If, on the other hand, you close two ALCs, we would
17 still propose to manage 15 to 20 million cubic feet of risk.
18 And that would leave probably somewhere in the neighborhood
19 of 18 to 20 million cubic feet that should probably be
20 considered reestablishment through some other means.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: So if an ALC was closed,
22 the depot at that site would also be closed, the DLA depot?

Page 326

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Our position on what
2 we have called collocated depots is, there purpose for being
3 there is to support the maintenance depot. And therefore, if
4 the maintenance depot were to close, we would also close the
5 associated distribution depot.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Before we close, I would
7 just like to return to Mr. Gotbaum, because I think he has
8 one more thing he wants to say.
9 MR. GOTBAUM: Actually, sir, it's a request. This
10 Commission and this staff has been absolutely terrific in
11 making clear what the Commission's concerns are and asking
12 the Department for information. And I hope we have been as
13 forthcoming in providing it.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You have.
15 MR. GOTBAUM: It's clear from your questions and
16 clear from your concerns that you're considering a lot of
17 mixing and matching. And I would offer and ask that, as you
18 consider the alternatives, we would obviously like to, both
19 because we know something about this and because there is
20 military judgment and other things involved, help in that
21 process, participate in the process anytime. I can assert
22 with absolute confidence that we have a 24-hour-a-day

Page 327

1 operation.
2 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I appreciate your patience
3 with this chairman, as I've asked you the questions today. I
4 know it's been a long and arduous process for us. I know
5 we've had -- we just went nonstop for the last few months.
6 So if there was any shortness, I apologize for that.
7 MR. GOTBAUM: Sir, all I can promise you is that,
8 if I could substitute you for any of several committee
9 chairmen in Congress who I am not dumb enough to name, I'd do
10 it in a second. Thank you, sir.
11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Before we read the closing
12 statement, I would turn to Commissioner Montoya for just a
13 comment.
14 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: General, I failed to mention
15 one thing. As a courtesy to two flag officers, a retired
16 flag officer, a supply corps friend of mine has written me a
17 rather contentious letter with lots of supply corps language.
18 I don't understand the letter yet. And I also got a very
19 fine, eloquent rebuttal from another supply corps flag
20 officer, which I also don't understand. But would you please
21 tell Admiral Straw that I have is response, and I will do my
22 homework, and I will understand it before this is over.

Page 328

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: I'll be happy to do
2 that.
3 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you very much.
4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We have now concluded the
5 29th and final public hearing of the 1995 base closure
6 commission. And I want to say, and I want you to carry this
7 back to all the branches of service, to other members of the
8 Department of Defense, any installation commanders you may
9 come across, that we thank you for your hospitality, your
10 cooperation, your openness through this process, and your
11 patience with us, as we struggle to find the truth and to
12 arrive at a decision.
13 I want to thank all the witnesses that have
14 appeared before us today. The information you've brought us
15 has been extremely valuable, and I mean that, Mr. Gotbaum.
16 And we will take your remarks into very serious
17 consideration.
18 We will next meet in this room on Thursday, June
19 22, to begin our final deliberations. This hearing has
20 ended.
21 (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was
22 concluded.)