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Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

Installations

BRAC Knowledge Base

BRAC 95
Department of the Army
Binder II of II

1. Army Stationing Strategy, July 1994

2. The Army Basing Study (TABS): BRAC 95 Management Control Plan, March 1994

3. Data from the Army Basing Study (TABS), 1995—Minutes of all Deliberative Meetings. Briefing Charts.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

DAMO-FDO

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: The Army Stationing Strategy

1. Reference VCSA memorandum, 16 August 1993, Subject: Strategic Requirements for BRAC '95.

2. As directed in referenced memorandum, DCSOPS constituted a Stationing Task Force (co-chaired by ADCSOPS and ACSIM) to develop an operational blueprint for use as a departure point for BRAC '95 planning and analysis. The Army Stationing Strategy outlines that operational blueprint and is to be used by The Army Basing Study Group (TABS) in their analysis. As with other aspects of the BRAC '95 process, this document remains "closehold/sensitive" and is releasable only as a component of the Army's BRAC '95 recommendation package.

3. The Stationing Strategy does not outline specific stationing decisions nor does it recommend the closure or realignment of any installation. It does, however, provide an operational context within which base closure planning and analysis may be conducted. The Strategy permits the Army to balance various, and often competing, considerations, and to ensure that the base closure recommendations are developed without incurring unacceptable risks to the Army's operational requirements.

4. This stationing strategy is not an application of the selection criteria promulgated under the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) recommendation process. It is however, provided to TABS for its use in the BRAC recommendation process. The Stationing Task Force will continue to support TABS, providing the operational perspective and ensuring that the impact of any significant changes in force structure or resourcing levels are appropriately reflected in the operational blueprint.

Encl

J. H. BINFORD PEAY III
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

14/7/94

12 JUL 1994

THE ARMY STATIONING STRATEGY

Stationing Requirements



Operational Blueprint



PREFACE

This stationing strategy does not outline specific stationing decisions nor does it recommend the closure or realignment of any installation. It does, however, provide the operational context within which base closure planning and analysis may be conducted. The strategy permits the Army to balance various, and often competing, considerations, and to ensure that base closure recommendations are developed without incurring unacceptable risks to the Army's operational requirements. This stationing strategy is not an application of the selection criteria promulgated under the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) recommendation process. It is, however, provided to the Army Basing Study Group (TABS) for its use in the BRAC recommendation process.

I. Introduction

The National Military Strategy, and subsequently America's Army, is undergoing a profound transformation driven by world events, technology, and fiscal realities. This transformation takes advantage of the latest technological advances, yet is tempered by a historical tradition and ethos of service to nation extending back 218 years.

As the United States moves from a Cold War strategy of containment to a post Cold War strategy of engagement, the Army is changing to execute the new strategy and to prepare itself for the challenges of the twenty-first century. No longer oriented on defending against a superpower onslaught in Europe, America's Army today is becoming a US-based power projection force. This force is capable of remaining engaged in a complex international security environment and of responding to threats against United States interests around the globe. This extraordinarily rapid change in strategy is evidenced by the fact that in 1989, only 62 percent of the Army was stationed in the continental United States. However, by 1995, the new strategy and resultant restationing of forces will increase the percent of Army forces stationed in the continental United States to 80 percent.

The new power projection Army gives the President and Secretary of Defense the option of employing tailored infantry, armored, airborne, air assault, and special operations forces to meet crises wherever they occur. Supported by the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the Army can project a ground combat force anywhere in the world to meet the strategic needs of the nation.

This strategic mobility requires Army installations that are true power projection platforms, capable of sending large forces to war quickly and sustaining those forces after deployment. The post Cold War Army drawdown has created an expensive infrastructure surplus. To maintain trained and ready forces with available resources, the Army must divest unneeded, unaffordable installations and ensure that remaining installations maintain quality services and facilities. Just as the conduct of warfare has evolved to include the joint application of power from all services, so to must the supporting infrastructure be tailored to economically satisfy the common needs of all services.

The National Military Strategy translates into broad operational requirements that, when considered in the context of

fiscal reality and projected force structure, result in stationing requirements that govern the final stationing plan. In support of this effort, the Army stationing strategy provides the strategic framework for formulating stationing requirements and an operational blueprint for stationing forces and defining the infrastructure required by the new strategy.



II. Strategic Setting

The Cold War that governed United States strategy for over 40 years is over. Although the threat of global or nuclear war has receded, the still-evolving international environment poses four fundamental dangers to the security of the United States: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, collapse of democratic reform in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe, and economic dangers to national security. Dangers to our national interests did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. For example, American interests are increasingly confronted with a new set of dangers, often referred to as transnational because they reach beyond territorial borders (e.g., international terrorism/crime and illegal drug trafficking). Such transnational dangers impede economic progress, destabilize developing new democracies, and contribute to regional instability. At the other end of the spectrum, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical, and biological -- and their associated means of delivery is perhaps the most troubling danger confronting the United States. The current effort to obtain such weapons by a number of countries, particularly those historically unfriendly to the West, presents great risk for the United States and our allies.

The threats we face today are both widespread and uncertain - with conflict probable yet unpredictable. The United States must prepare for a challenge from a potentially well-equipped, but ill-defined enemy. Confronting these dangers demands an increasingly versatile, trained and ready military.

Although these evolving dangers pose new and often complex challenges, economic realities dictate that the United States meet them with smaller, higher quality armed forces. In addition, operations other than war such as peacekeeping and disaster relief are increasing in scope and frequency. The very real potential for future armed conflict, increasing missions, and decreasing force structure suggests little likelihood of a decrease in the Army's operational requirements or operational pace.

III. Planning Assumptions

The following assumptions were made in formulating the stationing strategy:

a. When published, The National Military Strategy will be consistent with the Bottom-Up Review.

b. When published, the Force Structure Plan will reflect the force structure decisions outlined in the Bottom-Up Review. This assumption is reinforced by the interim 1995 Base Realignments and Closures Force Structure Plan, dated 7 February, 1994. Should the final Force Structure Plan significantly deviate from the interim report, this stationing strategy will be updated accordingly.

c. The Army's future force structure will consist of 10 fully structured active component divisions. Elements of two active divisions will be stationed in Europe while elements of a third will be stationed in Korea. The National Guard will consist of approximately 42 National Guard brigades, 15 of which are enhanced readiness brigades. The Active Component end strength is projected to be 495 thousand with 575 thousand projected for the Reserve Components.

d. Near-term changes in the international security environment will not alter the requirement for a US-based power projection Army.

e. The Army will retain the ability to expand the capacity of its infrastructure to meet any force generation requirement resulting from a threat to American interests.

f. Operations other than war will continue to constitute a major part of Army operations. This will, however, be an evolutionary development with minimal stationing impact. The focus on these unique operations in no way diminishes the requirement to fight and achieve decisive victory in support of the National Military Strategy.

IV. Strategic Requirements

In response to the evolving international environment, the Department of Defense conducted a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and is preparing a revised National Military Strategy to define the

strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities. This new strategy has significant implications for how the Army stations its forces.

The nation's basic security goals remain unchanged: to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans at home and abroad; to maintain the political freedom and independence of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact; and to provide for the well-being and prosperity of the Nation and its people. In addition to these fundamental goals, America promotes core values of democracy and human rights, the peaceful resolution of conflict, and the maintenance of open markets in the international economic system.

To protect and advance these goals, the United States is pursuing a strategy of political, economic, and military engagement. This approach helps avoid the risks of global instability, shapes the international environment to protect and advance long-term United States interests, and seeks to prevent threats to our interest from arising.

Remaining engaged with allies and friends around the world, through regional cooperation and constructive interaction, promotes stability and potential coalition relationships. To this end, the Army is working to strengthen the local self-defense capabilities of its friends and allies through training programs, combined exercises, interoperability and shared defense with potential coalition partners, military-to-military contacts, and security assistance programs that include judicious foreign military sales. This strategy envisions that the United States will remain the leading security partner in Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia.

The Bottom-Up Review gives the following major objectives for the armed forces:

- deter the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the United States, its forces, and its allies.

- deter and, if necessary, defeat major aggression in regions important to the United States.

- fight and win two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

- prepare United States forces to participate effectively in multilateral peace enforcement and unilateral intervention operations.

- protect fledgling democracies from subversion and external threats.

- redirect resources to investments that improve both our defense posture and our competitive economic position.

- facilitate reinvestment that allows defense industries to shift to non-defense production.

- use our long-standing security relationships to build a bridge to greater economic cooperation and to sustain and enhance global free trade.



V. Operational Requirements

The strategic requirements outlined in the Bottom-Up Review translate directly into operational requirements that ensure the Army is trained and ready to support the National Military Strategy. Should the Army fail to satisfy these critical requirements, the nation's military strategy will be at risk. These requirements form the basis of the operational blueprint governing the stationing of Army forces. The operational requirements that significantly affect Army installations and readiness are outlined below:

Power Projection

Operational Requirement: Develop and maintain the capability to rapidly deploy and sustain decisive combat force from bases in the United States to any region of the world.

To respond effectively to crises, the nation adopted a power projection strategy requiring trained and ready forces to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. This strategy is designed to confront a threat that develops quickly, possesses technologically advanced weapons, but whose size and location is currently unknown. As the dominant land force, the Army is the strategic core of the nation's joint warfighting capability.

The advent of the power projection strategy marks a new era for Army installation management and philosophy. The strategy requires installations to play a more sophisticated and difficult role than the traditional "home to the force" and "work and training base." The new role is that of a "power projection platform." Many of our installations are not only responsible for training and deploying forces stationed at them during peacetime, but for training and deploying reserve component units upon mobilization, reconstituting forces following redeployment from the theater of operations (possibly enroute to a second regional conflict), and ultimately reconstituting a national reserve once all forces have been committed.

The concept of "power projection platform" is not limited to installations housing only combat forces. As well as projecting combat power, power projection platforms may launch and recover critical sustainment packages like personnel replacements, communications, materiel, and technology.

Versatility

Operational Requirement: Maintain the capability to respond to a wide variety of missions, across the full range of military operations and environments; performing at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare; while smoothly transitioning from one mission to another.

The uncertain international security environment requires the Army to maintain versatile and reliable forces - capable of employment across the entire continuum of military operations. An appropriate mix of light, armored, and special operations Army forces - and of combat, combat support and combat service support units - must be maintained in a ready status to ensure America can respond appropriately to any future situation. These forces must remain flexibly organized to facilitate the creation of adaptive joint force packages that can respond to any type of conflict or conflict resolution requirement anywhere in the world.

Similarly, Army leaders must be flexible and adaptable enough to be able to shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently. Versatility is the result of well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped forces; high standards; and detailed planning. Versatility ensures that units can conduct many different kinds of operations, either sequentially or simultaneously, with the same degree of success.

Strategic Agility

Operational Requirement: Develop and maintain the ability, through strategic mobility and stationing, to deploy and strike faster than a potential enemy.

Strategic agility is the ability to deploy and strike faster than the enemy. It is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Stationing forces to ensure the most rapid response time to the theater of operations is a vital component of strategic agility. Stationing forces close to a potential theater of operations (such as in Alaska and Hawaii) can significantly reduce the response time required to deploy combat forces and facilitates sustainment of these forces once committed.

A rapid response time is also a function of strategic mobility. As such, the capability of an installation's local transportation network to connect with national transportation

assets is pivotal to its success as a power projection platform. Similarly, national assets must be sufficiently robust to accommodate rapid deployment of large scale military forces to any region of the world.

Deterrence

Operational Requirement: Maintain sufficient global military capability to convince adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed any possible gain.

Deterrence can be achieved through actual or perceived intimidating presence, as well as through partnerships, alliances, and forward stationing. The United States has a continuing commitment to allies in Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia. Stationing American forces on foreign soil demonstrates American resolve and commitment to our allies. We must station forces in areas that leverage strategic agility and serve as deterrence to potential aggressors.

Training and Education

Operational Requirement: Maintain a high quality of combined, joint, and service specific training in both individual training conducted at institutional schools and collective training conducted at home station, major training areas, and Combat Training Centers.

Training is the key to maintaining a trained and ready Army to ensure success on the battlefield. Training builds versatility into our leaders and converts warfighting doctrine into tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting military operations. The cornerstone of the Army training process is an individual and collective training system that conducts training in accordance with set tasks, conditions, and standards. The Army's institutional schools provide individual training required to prepare for combat. They also provide the Army's doctrinal foundation. Tactical units sustain individual training while conducting collective training at home station, major training areas, or the Army's Combat Training Centers.

Technological advancements directly impact training requirements. Today's weapons shoot farther than ever before and tactical units maneuver over greater expanses of terrain than ever. Well-trained forces require sufficiently large maneuver areas and firing ranges to allow them to exercise the full, integrated capabilities of their weapons systems, practice the tenants of maneuver warfare, replicate the stress of combat, and synchronize the battlefield operating systems. While advanced

simulations now complement field training for units of division size and above, smaller units rely on tightly coordinated maneuver, fire control, and teamwork not adequately replicated by simulations. The Army must maintain training areas and ranges to conduct this training.

Leader Development

Operational Requirement: Provide for the continuous professional development of Army leaders - a requirement paramount to achieving battlefield success with the minimum cost in terms of lives and resources.

The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Leaders inspire soldiers with the will to win. They provide purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leaders determine how maneuver, firepower, and protection are used, ensuring these elements are effectively employed against the enemy. Thus, no peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession, understanding the human dimension of leadership, becoming tactically and technically proficient, and preparing for war. These help them understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders. The regular study and teaching of military doctrine, theory, history, and biographies of military leaders are invaluable.

Over the past 15 years, the Army has built the best professional military education system in the world. The versatility and capability we expect from tomorrow's Army leaders depends on our ability to maintain this quality military education system. The infrastructure supporting the professional military education system is essential to leader development and a professional military.

Sustainment

Operational Requirement: Develop and maintain the ability to sustain large scale, ground combat forces from bases in the United States, thereby insuring the viability of the nation's power projection strategy.

The Army's mission is to conduct sustained land combat. A dependable, uninterrupted logistics sustainment system helps the fighting force seize and maintain the initiative, while an inadequate system can cause defeat. Future conflicts may be located in areas with inadequate host nation support infrastructure, as demonstrated in Somalia. The requirement for

the CONUS sustainment base may therefore, be the total sustainment of the force, without reliance on potentially non-existent host nation resources. While these scenarios are envisioned within the context of joint operations, the lack of mature host nation support will significantly affect all components of the joint force.

The CONUS sustainment base is the strategic foundation of the logistics system and includes the national industrial base. The decentralized execution of sustainment operations at the operational and tactical levels of war, a basic ingredient of battlefield success, is facilitated with centralized management and distribution of supplies and materiel at the strategic level. The sustainment infrastructure must strike a balance of sufficient support without burdening the Army by requiring a greater percentage of the resources than is necessary to succeed.

Technology Development

Operational Requirement: Maintain technological superiority to counterbalance potential adversaries, reduce risk, and enhance the potential for swift, decisive conflict termination.

One of the keys to the Army's success in recent conflicts and future power projection is the application of advanced technology to warfare. Developing those technologies into military applications requires extensive research, development, engineering, and testing. The requirement for continuous modernization will intensify as the development of new systems slows. The Army will pursue high payoff, emerging technologies to generate system enhancements. Reduction of the cycle time and risks involved in developing these technologies will be a high priority. The use of advanced distributed simulation and technology demonstrations will expand, bringing Army researchers, industry, and the user together into a seamless technology generation process. Putting technology into the hands of our soldiers within the acquisition cycle of our adversaries will be a key to battlefield dominance.

Our reliance on the private sector, academia, international community, and other government agencies for technology generation will expand. The Army will increase the use of private sector technology, and aggressively pursue opportunities to form consortia to reduce the costs, risks, and development time for technology generation. Key in-house research and development capabilities must be retained in order to produce technologies that are responsive to Army imperatives. The Army will strive to incorporate excellence, emphasizing continuous improvement as we move toward attaining world class status in technology generation for the Army. The Army needs dedicated laboratory, engineering and test facilities integrated with

acquisition and logistics support to retain the technological edge on the modern battlefield.

Acquisition Excellence

Operational Requirement: Provide a flexible industrial base, capable of providing an uninterrupted flow of critical supplies, on short notice, without major retooling.

The Army must be supported by a responsive and flexible industrial base and acquisition process that fully integrates the capabilities of the commercial sector and Army Reserve Stocks (formerly War Reserve Stocks) to achieve an uninterrupted flow of critical supplies. The industrial base must be flexible enough to provide for our continuing technological superiority and to produce required numbers of critical items on short notice without major retooling. Our acquisition system must balance the levels of risk and cost in all areas to ensure we get the highest quality products from the most reliable producers, proven by past performance, at the most affordable life cycle price.

All aspects of the acquisition process, to include test and evaluation, must reflect a commitment to quality and concurrent engineering principles. The Defense Industrial Base will be smaller, but must still be capable of supporting a deployable, strategic Army capable of force projection for the full spectrum of contingency missions to include humanitarian relief operations. We must take an aggressive role in identifying the qualities that we are looking for in our suppliers and then ensure that those qualities are enumerated in our acquisition strategies. The qualities we are looking for must be in those requests for proposal and in our source selection process. If they are, we will be buying not just the immediate product, but also the Defense Industrial Base that will support us into the next decade.

Force Generation

Operational Requirement: Size the operational and industrial base infrastructure to support force generation contingencies resulting from the requirement to conduct two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

The Army must be able to constitute additional forces rapidly in response to a deterioration of the international order or the emergence of a major threat to United States interests.

Active component forces engaged overseas in lower priority missions may be recalled, reorganized, and retrained to meet these emergencies. To backfill active forces and to prepare for unforeseen contingencies, some reserve component forces can expect to be mobilized immediately and remain on active duty throughout the conflict, even if they are not directly involved with the conflict. As the level of conflict escalates, reserve component combat units will be mobilized, trained, and deployed to join the conflict on a time-phased basis. Infrastructure must be available to support these contingencies, not simply sized to support the current active component force structure. The Army must be able to expand the capabilities of the operational and industrial base infrastructure to meet these force generation contingencies.

Fiscal Responsibility

Operational Requirement: Adequately fund a balanced program of critical operational and infrastructure requirements, assisted by the reduction of infrastructure costs commensurate with the force drawdown.

While remaining focused on winning the nation's wars, the Army will remain sensitive to the needs of the domestic economy. By reducing infrastructure capacity that is no longer affordable, the Army can conserve scarce resources better used to support operations. The Army must also reconcile requirements among installation categories to achieve the best overall balance between competing fiscal requirements. Excessive spending in any category will negatively affect overall readiness.

Environmental Stewardship

Operational Requirement: Conserve environmental resources to ensure availability of training lands both now and in the future.

Proper maintenance of the natural resources entrusted to the Army's care is not only a civic responsibility, but an important component of readiness. The Army depends heavily upon land resources for training purposes. Like any other resource, it is important to conserve and maintain it for future use. To ensure proper management of these resources, the Army has developed an environmental vision as part of its environmental strategy for the twenty-first century. The vision states that "the Army will

be a national leader in environmental and natural resource stewardship for present and future generations as an integral part of our mission." To this end, the Army will focus on environmental planning, restoration, compliance, conservation, and pollution prevention.

Quality of Life

Operational Requirement: Provide soldiers and their families a quality of life designed to attract and retain quality volunteers to man a modern, professional Army.

Modern warfare requires high quality soldiers able to use and maintain complex weapons systems. Today's Army is an army of volunteers. To attract and retain volunteers of sufficient quality to man a modern force, the Army must sustain quality of life programs that benefit soldiers and their families. An adequate quality of life requires an investment in installations that provide soldiers and their families with programs and living conditions that reinforce their desire to serve their nation. Such an investment ultimately results in lower early discharge rates, lower training costs, and greater combat effectiveness.



VI. The Army Stationing Strategy

General

a. Description:

As discussed earlier, stationing is the combination of force structure and installation structure to satisfy an operational requirement. To facilitate analysis of Army stationing requirements, installations are grouped into thirteen categories according to their primary function. The installation categories are:

- Maneuver Installations
- Major Training Areas
- Training Schools

- Professional Education
- Command & Control and Administrative Support Installations
- Commodity Oriented Installations
- Depots
- Ammunition Production Facilities
- Ammunition Storage Facilities
- Proving Grounds
- Industrial Facilities
- Ports
- Medical Centers

b. Facility Capacity:

The capacity of the fixed facility assets are one of the most important determining factors in stationing. Capacity measures vary widely between the categories of installations, and excess capacity in one category is not always a suitable substitute to fill a requirement in another category.

Our installations' facilities have not kept pace with rapid changes in weapon systems, force structure design, or the higher quality of life standards required to man a volunteer Army. Unit stationing is based first upon readiness. This criteria requires a combined arms team balance, including all of the support and service units required to sustain it. In order to meet this requirement, many units occupy facilities that were not designed to accommodate them, thereby creating some excess capacity due to design/utilization mismatch. It is not unusual to have an installation with some excess capacity, but no plausible way to reduce it without an adverse effect on unit readiness.

Within many of the industrial categories, capacity is measured in terms of workload. The Department of Defense has adopted the concept of "core" workload to govern workloading of facilities. This concept is designed to meet the readiness and sustainability requirements of weapon systems that support warfighting missions. Core capabilities comprise only the minimum facilities, equipment and skilled personnel necessary to ensure a ready and controlled source of required technical competence.

Whether considering the capacity of training land, facilities, or industrial infrastructure, any reduction of capacity must be limited by the requirement to maintain unit readiness, organizational effectiveness, and operational versatility and adaptability.

c. Operational Requirements:

The multi-functional nature of many of the Army's installations makes it difficult to consider the relationship between operational requirements and installation categories in terms of absolutes. As explained earlier, installations are assigned to categories based upon the "primary" function of the installation. In many cases, more than one function exists on a single installation. Ft Sill presents an excellent example. Considered a "training school" because it is the home of the Field Artillery School, Ft Sill also serves as a "maneuver installation" in support of III Corps Artillery. Continued realignment and consolidation will create increasingly multi-functional installations. While routine stationing decisions consider primarily the operational implications of the specific action, base closure decisions must weigh a broader range of operational concerns as many different types of tenants may be affected.

Each category supports the operational requirements differently. The following table summarizes the relationship between the operational requirements and the installation categories that support them.

Relationship Between Operational Requirements and Installation Categories

Operational Requirements	MVR	MTA	TNG SCH	PROF ED	C2 ADM	CMDY	DEP	AMMO PROD	AMMO STRG	PRVG GRND	IND FAC	PORT	MED CNTR
Power Projection	P		S		C	P	S	P	P			P	
Versatility	P		P	P	C								
Strategic Agility	P		S		C							P	
Deterrence	P				C								
Training and Education	P	P	P		C								P
Leader Development	S		P	P	C								
Sustainment			P		C	P	P	P	P		P		P
Technology Development			S		C	P				P			
Acquisition Excellence					C	P		P			P		
Force Generation	P	P	P		C	P	P	P			P		
Fiscal Responsibility	P	P	P	P	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Environmental Stewardship	P	P	P	P	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Quality of Life	P	P	P	P	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P

P = primary function **S = secondary function** **C = command & control relationship**

Regardless of the category, all installations affect the operational requirements of "fiscal responsibility," "environmental stewardship," and "quality of life." During this period of reduced fiscal resources, stationing actions must be affordable. Significant new construction costs may eventually be offset by base closure savings, but the initial cost of relocation can be devastating if not considered in the context of the overall Army budget. A balance must be achieved between the need to reduce the cost of operating a base, and the expense of implementing the associated relocation strategy. However, base closure decisions should not be made solely on the basis of economic factors. It is imperative that operational requirements continue as the primary focus of all such decisions.

The Army depends heavily upon land resources for training purposes. Like any other resource, it is important to conserve and maintain it for future use. The Army is committed to preserving the nation's natural resources as a matter of routine installation management. In order to allow the land to recover from the impact of maneuver exercises, large tracts of land are set aside to lay dormant while training occurs in other areas of

the installation. This land rotation policy successfully protects the land, but also limits the amount of land available for training. In practical terms, environmental stewardship decreases the functional size of many of the Army's primary training installations.

The quality of life afforded soldiers and their families must be maintained as the Army downsizes. Adequate facilities and services supporting quality of life should be included in all stationing plans. Providing housing, community services, medical support, and recreational opportunities for soldiers and their families are also important missions of installations. If this operational requirement is not satisfied, the Army will neither attract nor retain the quality soldiers necessary to maintain readiness levels commensurate with success on a high-tech battlefield.

d. Stationing Requirements:

Stationing requirements provide specific guidelines to ensure that operational requirements are met during redesign of the post Cold War Army. The final stationing and infrastructure solution must satisfy all stationing requirements outlined in this document.

e. Operational Blueprint:

The operational blueprint provides the parameters within which infrastructure decisions can be made without incurring unacceptable risk to the Army's operational requirements. This portion of the stationing strategy provides a road map for each category of installation. The following stationing guidelines apply to all installations but are listed here to avoid redundancy:

1. Eliminate excess capacity.

2. Minimize use of leased space in lieu of government-owned property.

3. Eliminate functions and installations whose purposes are not relevant to the post Cold War security environment.

4. Privatize functions where economic benefits can be achieved while satisfying current and future operational requirements.

5. Collocate tenants from different major commands where functional synergy can be obtained and facility support is available. Developing "multi-functional" installations is not an end in itself, but is encouraged where appropriate.

6. Achieve the greatest degree of efficiency by reducing operating and support costs.

7. Maximize inter-service integration of similar functions.

8. Minimize the surcharge paid by Defense Business Operations Fund(DBOF) customers to support infrastructure costs generated by retention of excess infrastructure.

The following sections provide brief category descriptions, explanations of how each category supports the Army's operational requirements, specific stationing requirements, and the operational blueprint for use in reducing infrastructure for each of the thirteen installation categories.

Maneuver Installations



a. Description:

Maneuver installations are power projection platforms upon which our major combat forces are stationed. They provide facilities and resources to house, sustain, maintain, train, and deploy these forces. On a regional basis, maneuver installations also support both active and reserve activities that do not have immediate local access to required services and may be used as training and mobilization stations for the reserve force.

b. Operational Requirements:

Maneuver installations, due to their size and flexibility, support the broadest array of operational requirements. In support of "power projection," these installations generate the majority of the Army's military power through trained and ready combat forces, and project that power using local transportation networks connected to national transportation assets.

The large land areas and range facilities associated with maneuver installations support the critical "training" requirement. It is at these installations that doctrinal education is put into practice and internalized at both individual and unit levels. The synergy of combined arms operations and the synchronized application of combat power can only be experienced through unit training.

The unsettled international security environment presents challenges across the entire spectrum of military operations. The Army's ability to respond to these challenges is a measure of the operational requirement of "versatility." Armored, light, airborne, air assault and special operations forces each play a vital role in maintaining the Army's versatility. The Army must, therefore, maintain this variety of units, each requiring access to a specific type of terrain or facilities, in order to respond to challenges across the entire continuum of military operations.

Reliance on these characteristics to support mobilization, as well as their ability to accommodate potential increases in force structure demonstrate maneuver installation support of the "force generation" requirement.

The remaining operational requirements, "deterrence" and "strategic agility" are supported by the location of the installation as well as other specific characteristics such as the servicing transportation network. In both cases, the ability to position large combat units relative to evolving international situations is uniquely characteristic of this category of installations and vital to the National Military Strategy. Because of their proximity to the region, forces stationed in Alaska and Hawaii best support these operational requirements with respect to the Pacific Region. Such stationing sends a clear message to both allies and potential adversaries alike, that the United States intends to remain actively engaged in this vital region of the world. Beyond that, deployment times to potential hot spots throughout the region are minimized by the reduced distances.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain the capability to station 10 division equivalents (30 maneuver brigades) and two Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs) in the United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) along with the "echelons above division" command and control and support force structure as outlined in the Bottom Up Review.

2. Leverage deterrent and crisis response by maintaining forward presence through forces stationed in Hawaii and Alaska.

3. Maintain the capability to station three corps headquarters with support elements in the United States.

4. Station armored forces in the western United States to facilitate power projection to the Pacific theater.

5. Facilitate power projection of assigned units.

6. Provide the ability to train tenant units and ensure their readiness.

7. Ensure sufficient land and range facilities are available to support mobilization and training requirements of the reserve components.

8. Provide sufficient training land and range facilities to support joint and combined training exercises.

d. Operational Blueprint:

The current maneuver installation structure accommodates the size and composition of the force (as established by the Bottom-Up Review), includes sufficient land and facilities to support a

trained and ready force, and provides adequate flexibility to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.

Within the continental United States (CONUS), maneuver installations with certain unique characteristics are operationally crucial to the National Military Strategy and must be retained. These unique characteristics include the capability to support two, division-size units; close proximity to large port facilities; and special facilities designed to support unique military capabilities such as airborne or air assault units. Unique facilities at Ft Bragg (airborne/special operations) and Ft Campbell (air assault), joint operations at Ft Bragg and Pope Air Force Base (providing rapid deployability), immediate access to large port facilities from Ft Stewart and Ft Lewis (providing rapid deployability), and operational synergies and efficiencies resulting from collocation of large maneuver forces at Ft Hood, all provide operational capabilities unique to those installations and critical to the Army's warfighting mission.

In order to support USCINCPAC strategy in the Pacific Theater, the Army must maintain a credible force stationed in Alaska and Hawaii. Installations there provide the unique opportunity to accomplish this forward presence while stationing forces within the United States. In addition to reinforcing our long-standing regional relationships, forces stationed in Alaska and Hawaii present clear evidence of American commitment in the Pacific Theater - assuring our allies and deterring potential adversaries. Operationally, these forces provide the requisite warfighting capability for immediate USCINCPAC use; support forward presence, contingency, and combat operations; contribute significantly to joint interoperability; and are positioned to rapidly deploy in support of regional contingencies. As the force structure in Alaska is downsized from a maneuver division to a maneuver brigade with associated support elements, the installation structure can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the current force structure. Flexibility to meet future contingencies should, however, be maintained by placing any excess infrastructure in layaway status. Such action will preserve the land for future training purposes while reducing the rate of facility deterioration, allowing cost-effective use of the buildings in the future.

As the post Cold War international security environment continues to evolve, the Army must retain the stationing flexibility to respond to these changes. Major unit relocations could be prompted by such changes. As a major component of strategic agility, unit location may need to be changed as security threats evolve in different areas of the world. Similarly, changes in the international security environment may reduce the need for forward presence. In either case, as long as the National Military Strategy includes the requirement to fight and win two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts, the Army requires a 10 division force (as determined by the Bottom Up Review). Whether stationed overseas or in the United States, the location of the force does not alter the force structure required to generate decisive victory. The Army must retain the flexibility to locate these units in the United States.

Should the Army fail to maintain the maneuver installation structure required to accommodate these scenarios, implementation of future stationing decisions may not be possible without the expenditure of billions of dollars and considerable delay. The international security environment is subject to change. The Army must retain the stationing flexibility necessary to respond in support of the National Military Strategy. The nation can ill afford the risk of allowing near-term installation structure decisions to dictate future force structure/stationing decisions.

The table below outlines the capacity of existing maneuver installations (in terms of maneuver brigades only), and the potential capacity of these installations achievable through a significant investment in new construction.

Note: This simplified analysis is intended to demonstrate the thought process and is not intended to substitute for a detailed, formal capacity analysis. Additionally, it does not consider the stationing requirements generated by the substantial number of additional, non-brigade forces currently stationed both in the United States and abroad.

CAPACITY REQUIREMENT TO STATION BOTTOM-UP REVIEW FORCE
(19 Mechanized Brigades and 13 Light Brigades)

INSTALLATION	W/O CONSTRUCTION	W/ CONSTRUCTION
Bragg	3*	3*
Campbell	3*	3*
Carson	2	3
Drum	2*	3*
Hood	5	5
Lewis	2	3
Richardson	1*	1*
Riley	2	2
Stewart	2	2
Wainwright	1*	2*
Schofield Barracks	3*	3*
Benning	1	1
Bliss	1	4
Knox	-	1
Polk	1*	2*
	15/14*	21/17*

* light forces only

Currently, 24 maneuver brigades (12 mechanized and 12 light) and 2 ACRs (1 mechanized and 1 light) are to be stationed in the United States. As shown in the table above, current installation capacity can accommodate 29 brigades (15 mechanized and 14 light) without additional construction. This is less capacity than required to station the force in the United States (19 mechanized brigades/ACRs and 13 light brigades/ACRs). Any further reduction

in the Army's ability to station tactical forces in the United States creates excessive operational risk and carries with it, the potential for future expenditures (facility construction and land acquisition) far in excess of savings achieved through base closure.

Major Training Areas



a. Description:

Major training areas provide facilities to both active and reserve components for large unit training exercises. With the exceptions of the Combat Training Centers located at Fort Irwin and Fort Polk, no active tactical units are stationed at these locations, which vary in characteristics, capabilities, and organization.

b. Operational Requirements:

Major training areas primarily support the collective component of the "training" requirement. The Combat Training Centers provide state-of-the-art training, while other installations in this category serve as training areas for reserve forces. These installations not only support sustainment training, but as major components of our mobilization strategy, they also support the "force generation" requirement by serving as mobilization stations and locations for major unit training of mobilized reserve component forces.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain Combat Training Centers for both armored and light forces.

2. Retain sufficient training acreage and range facilities to meet current and potential needs of both the active and priority reserve component forces (Contingency Force Package units, Special Operations Forces, and National Guard Enhanced Brigades).

3. Minimize the number of major training areas focused primarily on reserve component training support.

d. Operational Blueprint:

Combat Training Centers(CTC) are one of the primary reasons the Army was able to recover from the era of "hollowness" that developed during the 1970's. Installations supporting these

Combat Training Centers must be retained to insure continued support for this vital component of readiness.

Major training areas that support reserve components should be realigned to accomplish the mission in the most cost effective manner. As field training is the focus, cantonment areas can be minimized by eliminating all functions other than those required to support unit training in a field environment. Additionally, installations where the workload can be reasonably relocated to other installations may be closed with minimal impact on operational requirements. Priority of training support will go to Contingency Force Package units, Special Operations Forces, and National Guard Enhanced Brigades.

Training Schools



a. Description:

Training installations provide a home for the institutional component of the Army's training system. The functions the Army must perform on the battlefield are encompassed by the Army's branches which are housed on these posts. At the foundation of each branch, is a school where the branch's doctrine is written; functional training takes place; leader development accomplished; warfighting organizations designed; and modernization requirements developed. These posts also provide space for initial entry training where civilians begin the soldierization process. Additionally, these installations house schools that provide purely specialized training, such as language training.

These schools represent a training system unique among the military services. This system has evolved and matured over time. It is the foundation for the nation's land warfare university and, as such, represents a national resource.

b. Operational Requirements:

Training schools primarily support the "training and education" requirement. Schools and training centers located on these installations focus on the individual combat and functional skills a soldier requires to be effective on the battlefield. In doing so, they provide tactical units with the foundation needed to achieve successful collective training. The schools on these installations combine classroom education, state of the art simulations, and hands on field training to produce soldiers capable of functioning in today's technologically complex Army. Without successful individual training, combat units cannot achieve the level of collective training required to maintain readiness.

The operational requirement of "leader development" for both commissioned and noncommissioned officers is also conducted at training installations. They provide our noncommissioned officer corps with opportunities to expand their leadership skills and learn advanced technical skills associated with their military occupational specialty. Similarly, an officer's basic and advanced military skills are developed at the branch schools located on training installations.

A companion to "leader development," the operational requirement of "versatility" is, in part, a product of the flexibility and adaptability of military leaders at all levels. The Army's training and education programs train our soldiers in the skills required to successfully lead our forces in an ever expanding variety of difficult missions.

Finally, training schools must retain the capability for accommodating fluctuations in the student workload in support of the "force generation" requirement. In times of conflict, these schools provide refresher training for mobilized individual reservists and must meet the needs of an expanding force. In this role, training schools also support the operational requirement of "sustainment." By training individual soldiers, they sustain the strength of deployed forces through a steady flow of trained replacements.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Retain a branch school for each branch.

2. Locate branch schools to facilitate combined arms training and operational efficiency.

3. Consolidate basic training, advanced individual training, and one station unit training to accomplish the mission in the most efficient manner.

4. Ensure that the entire range of military skills can be trained.

5. Provide sufficient area (land, airspace, and water) with proper facilities to adequately support training, combat development, and doctrine development.

6. Maintain the capability to support "logistics over the shore" training.

7. Maintain a training capacity sized to support the peacetime operational and sustainment needs of the force (both active and reserve).

8. Provide adequate training airspace and facilities to support rotary wing pilot training.

9. Provide adequate facilities to establish and support a single ROTC Summer Camp.

d. Operational Blueprint:

The ongoing reshaping of the force and concurrent drawdown affects the workload on training installations. However, not all trends indicate a decrease in student workloads. For example, beginning in 1997, Army accessions are projected to increase from 70,000 to 90,000 per year. This increase in accessions will result in significantly higher student workloads in Basic Combat Training, Advanced Individual Training, and many other related schools. Additionally, the continued growth of joint and combined force warfighting doctrine will increase the training requirement at selected training schools. As a result of these and other fluctuations in student workload, little excess facility capacity will be created, certainly not enough to warrant closure of an institution or installation. Changes in the training base workload are often the result of influences beyond the control of the training community (i.e., international environment, personnel policy decisions, new courses resulting from technological developments, etc.). Such changes do not afford the training schools time or resources to construct additional training capacity. Therefore, infrastructure savings in this category must result from the relocation of an existing institution, not its inactivation.

As the Army approaches "steady state," opportunities will, however, exist to consolidate functionally similar training schools on fewer, high capacity, modernized installations. Such consolidation is intended to facilitate the integration of leader development, functional training, doctrine writing, and combat development for branches that support a common battlefield operating system.

From an operational standpoint, certain consolidations initially suggest themselves. These include a Mobility/ Survivability Center, formed from assets of the Engineer, Chemical and Military Police schools and a Logistics Center, formed using assets from the Ordnance, Ordnance Missile and Munitions, Quartermaster, Transportation schools and the Army Logistics Management College. Additionally, seek to collocate language training to facilitate follow-on training and/or employment. Finally, consolidate basic combat training at fewer locations consistent with the projected workload.

School consolidation should allow closure of installations. However, training schools are facility intensive, making such consolidation extremely expensive, as no installation is currently structured to receive another institution without significant new construction. Additionally, training school relocation creates tremendous turmoil throughout the force. When combined with the trauma of the drawdown, the continuity and readiness of the Army could be threatened by an overly aggressive restructuring of training schools. While the temptation exists to redesign the entire school system at once, the Army cannot withstand the financial and destabilizing effects of such a grand realignment. By focusing on the recommended options, both costs and turmoil can be adequately contained while achieving the operational benefits of warfighting centers and reaping base closure savings.

Professional Education Installations



a. Description:

Professional education institutions provide professional military education for officers and Department of the Army civilian employees. This education is the combat multiplier that separates the United States Army from all others and provides the intellectual basis upon which the future of the Army will be built. Each facility provides an academic environment geared to a specific level of professional military education. Officer professional education ranges from the tactical level at the US Military Academy at West Point, through the operational level at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and culminates at the strategic level in the senior service colleges at Fort McNair and Carlisle Barracks.

b. Operational Requirements:

These primarily academic installations support the operational requirement of "leader development." The professional education received at these installations develop the competent leaders that are critical to success on the modern battlefield. As one of the six imperatives for a trained and ready force, leader development enables the Army to remain the world's premier land combat force without having to be the largest.

The operational requirement of "versatility" is, in part, a product of the flexibility and adaptability of military leaders at all levels. The Army's educational programs imbed in our soldiers, the skills required to successfully lead our forces in an ever expanding variety of difficult missions.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Meet the Army's requirements for trained, professional leaders.

2. Maintain the unique characteristic of each academic level (tactical, operational, and strategic).

3. Maintain educational capacity to support the peacetime needs of the force and the flexibility to respond to significant fluctuations in student workload.

d. Operational Blueprint:

For most of our Army's history, these academic institutions have formed the professional foundation upon which our Army has been built. This vital function must continue if we are to sustain a professional Army. The current force drawdown may affect student workloads at these institutions, but not to the extent that such excess facility capacity is created as to warrant realignment of the institutions or closure of the installations.

Command & Control and Administrative Support Installations



a. Description:

Installations in this category provide facilities through which the Army leadership commands, controls, and manages the systems that generate combat and sustaining forces. Major Army Command(MACOM) headquarters such as Forces Command(FORSCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC), provide command and control over units and organizations which are functionally organized to perform a specific mission. These headquarters, like other command and control organizations, require ready access to modern communications facilities in order to efficiently exercise their command and control functions. Continental United States Army(CONUSA) headquarters are critical to the mobilization and deployment of reserve component forces. They are regionally oriented to facilitate their mission. The field army headquarters must be stationed with ready access to other joint headquarters and have the ability to rapidly deploy in the event of a crisis. Army Force(ARFOR) command and control headquarters locations are primarily dictated by the location of the supported joint headquarters. Joint planning activities, reliable communications, and rapid deployment capability all influence the positioning of these elements. In addition to these command and control functions, many of these installations primarily provide housing and quality of life services to soldiers and their families.

b. Operational Requirements:

The functions accomplished at these installations support the entire range of operational requirements. Command, control, management, and integration functions generate decisions significantly affecting support for both current and future operational requirements. Without these functions, the Army could not exist as a viable organization.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain the capability to station one field army headquarters, a minimum of 2 Continental United States Army(CONUSA) headquarters, all major army command(MACOM) headquarters, and a United States Army Reserve Command(USARC) headquarters in the United States.

2. Facilitate ARFOR command and control for regionally-oriented, US-based, unified commands and the Special Operations Command.

3. Maintain installations for the sole purpose of providing family housing and other quality of life functions only where fiscally advantageous.

d. Operational Blueprint:

The high operational value of many of these installations is derived from the installations unique geographic location as it supports the mission requirements of the tenant units. In these cases, the installations should be retained. Included in this group are Ft Myer, and Ft Belvoir.

Ft Myer is uniquely located to provide immediate support to the Pentagon, Arlington National Cemetery, and other key facilities in the nations capital. The missions associated with units stationed at Ft Myer cannot be satisfactorily accomplished from another installation.

In addition to housing several key organizations, Ft Belvoir provides the Army the opportunity to relocate organizations from leased facilities in the National Capital Region to federally owned property.

TRADOC Headquarters should be stationed in the joint environment of the Tidewater Region to allow immediate access to doctrine development processes of other Services as well as Joint organizations stationed at Fort Monroe and in the region.

In cases where an installation exists solely to provide quality of life functions for forces stationed in the immediate area, closure should be considered only when similar quality of life can be provided through a less costly alternative.

In most situations, current stationing is not vital to successful mission accomplishment of tenant units. Any closure recommendations should, however, carefully consider operational requirements when considering relocation options.

Finally, Ft Meade offers a unique situation among installations in this category. Despite its relatively large size, Ft Meade does not possess significant operational value to the Army. The vast majority of the installation exists to support non-Army organizations. Those Army units currently stationed at Ft Meade are not operationally dependent upon that installation and can be easily relocated.

Commodity Oriented Installations



a. Description:

Commodity oriented installations include integrated centers for research, development and engineering, fielding and sustainment of weapons systems; laboratories; National Inventory Control Points and acquisition. They perform extensive research and engineering development, integrated materiel management, acquisition, technical assistance, security assistance and matrix support to Program Executive Officers. At the installation level, commodity-oriented engineering and logistics functions are largely the melding of the private and public industrial base whereby support is provided to Army and Department of Defense Program Managers, and equipment is placed in the hands of soldiers.

b. Operational Requirements:

Commodity oriented installations support the operational requirement for "power projection" by coordinating the flow of supplies, equipment and repair parts into the theater of operations. Additionally, Supply and Maintenance Technical Assistance personnel are often provided to assist with new equipment fielding, maintenance, and other aspects of supply operations.

The "sustainment" requirement is enhanced through their role in providing uninterrupted logistics support from the wholesale level to the retail level. Commodity oriented installations are a key component of the acquisition process, providing matrix support to Program Executive Officers and Project Managers. In this manner, they support the operational requirement of "acquisition excellence."

The research and development centers imbedded in multi-functional commodity commands play a significant role in developing technologies that are suitable for military use. As such, they support the "technology development" operational requirement.

These same functions that provide supply support to active duty forces, support mobilizing forces as the Army expands to meet the needs of the situation. These functions, therefore, support the operational requirement of "force generation."

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Preserve only crucial research, development, test and evaluation capabilities that the private sector and academia cannot or will not sustain with their own investment.

2. Optimize the operational efficiency of the Army's RDT&E and materiel/maintenance management functions.

3. Provide seamless item materiel management across all commodity groupings.

4. Maintain the capability to support reconstitution of Army forces in transition from one theater of operations to another, or following two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

d. Operational Blueprint:

Efficiency, achieved through collocation and integration of research, engineering, acquisition and logistics functions, as well as reduced overhead, should be the key considerations in stationing commodity-oriented organizations. Collocation or consolidation of similar functions (e.g., commodity-specific research, engineering support, acquisition, item management, logistics support, and matrix support to Program Executive Officers) provides a more efficient solution than maintaining separate installations organized to perform only commodity-specific research and engineering support.

Commodity Commands are generally comprised of three interrelated functional elements. The first is oriented on research and development of a commodity group, focusing primarily on new technology and product improvement, but also including engineering support to items in production. The second element is focused on the acquisition function, supporting the development and production requirements of Program Managers. The third is oriented on the sustainment of the commodity group through acquisition and distribution of repair parts, higher level maintenance, and technical support to the field. These three elements function best when a high degree of organizational integration and collocation are achieved. Given the expense of the facility requirements, the most cost-effective, long term stationing solution is the collocation or consolidation of these like elements.

Increasingly sophisticated technology is best bred in a cross-disciplined environment. The Army can rapidly leverage the skills of its research and development, acquisition and logistics network force only if its components are concentrated in a relatively few locations. While it is unlikely that all research and development functions can be focused at a single location, it is possible to consolidate into a smaller number of integrated commodity management centers.

At the same time, the Industrial Operations Command at Rock Island Arsenal provides a base upon which to station the sustainment-oriented elements of commodity commands. The significant commonality between the Industrial Operations Command and these sustainment elements of the commodity commands suggests that infrastructure and operating efficiencies can be achieved by collocating or consolidating these elements.

While Ft Detrick is a very small installation, it is of significant military value in that it is home to the Medical

Research Development Command. This unique facility conducts highly specialized research in the medical field and would be extremely difficult to replicate at another location.

The reorganization and relocation of commodity command elements can assist in the development of a single integrated materiel management system for all commodity groups, improve efficiency in the research and development field, and reduce costly infrastructure overhead. Similar efficiencies may also be achieved by taking advantage of interservicing opportunities.

Depots



a. Description:

Depots perform a variety of maintenance, supply, and storage missions. They overhaul, rebuild, modify, convert, repair, and fabricate Army equipment. Depots provide logistics and supply support for weapons, operate repair facilities, distribute maintenance information, respond to maintenance questions, recondition materiel, and conduct maintenance testing, repair, storage, and disposal of commodities.

b. Operational Requirements:

Maintenance depots support the "sustainment" requirement by replenishing Army equipment stocks at the wholesale level and by providing immediate on-site technical assistance to field units as required. These same functions support mobilizing forces, thereby contributing to the operational requirement of "force generation."

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Retain only core capabilities sized to support the sustainment needs of the force.

2. Maintain the capability to support reconstitution of Army forces in transition from one theater of operations to another, or following two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

d. Operational Blueprint:

The specialized equipment and expensive facilities inherent in this category, argue for reduction of facility capacity to the level required to support only the core workload. In cases where similar workloads are performed at separate locations, consolidation should be the primary objective. Further reduction

in facility requirements is possible by pursuing commercial alternatives to materiel stockage. Consolidation of workload and infrastructure reduction are necessary in order to achieve maximum efficiency and reduce unaffordable operating and overhead costs.

To this end, depot facilities should be reduced and realigned according to commodity group workloads. While multi-functional depots are possible, long term requirements suggest separate ground, air, and electronic-oriented maintenance depots best match the Army's battlefield functions of the future.

Interservicing may offer the best solution to improving efficiency and reducing duplication of depot functions within the Department of Defense and should be considered before arriving at a stationing decision incorporating Army workload only.

Ammunition Production Facilities



a. Description:

These facilities manufacture, receive, issue, store, renovate, test, and demilitarize conventional and chemical ammunition . They also provide quality assurance for special ammunition and depot storage for ammunition and strategic materials.

b. Operational Requirements:

Ammunition production facilities support the operational requirement of "power projection" by producing ammunition, a key component of military power. The requirement for "acquisition excellence" is supported with facilities that produce state-of-the-art munitions as well as conventional ammunition. With many ammunition plants in layaway status, the Army is positioned to bring several production lines into action should changes in the international environment dictate. In this way, ammunition production facilities also support the operational requirement of "force generation." The ammunition produced at these facilities helps sustain warfighting forces deployed in support of the power projection strategy. In this way, these facilities support the operational requirement of "sustainment."

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain a core capability sized to support the peacetime training needs of the force.

2. Maintain the capability to "accelerate" current production to support two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

3. Maintain the capability to reconstitute ammunition stockpiles following two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

4. Retain critical production capabilities that cannot be readily reconstituted during mobilization or duplicated by commercial manufacturers.

5. Maintain capability to act as Department of Defense executive agent for ammunition.

d. Operational Blueprint:

As is common in all Army-operated industrial facilities, similar functions should be collocated or consolidated for greatest efficiency. However, this particular set of facilities and installations provides an additional requirement for redundancy, either within the public or the private sector. In many cases, functions can be combined based upon capacity analysis. However, such consolidation would necessitate the loss of a critical redundant capability, needed in the event of a catastrophic, production line failure caused by an explosion.

Given these considerations, the Army has reduced ammunition production facilities to the minimum number required to meet the needs of two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts while providing the necessary production line redundancy.

Ammunition Storage Facilities



a. Description:

Ammunition storage facilities receive, store, maintain, demilitarize, and dispose of conventional and special ammunition and other commodities. They store critical and strategic commodities and perform quality assurance surveillance for ammunition and strategic storage.

b. Operational Requirements:

Ammunition storage facilities support the operational requirement of "power projection" by managing ammunition stockpiles for use in executing the National Military Strategy. These stockpiles help sustain warfighting forces deployed in support of the power projection strategy. In this way, these facilities support the operational requirement of "sustainment."

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain a core capability sized to support the peacetime storage requirements for training and readiness sustainment, as well as combat requirements necessary to fight and win two near simultaneous major regional conflicts.

2. Retain critical capabilities that cannot be readily reconstituted during mobilization.

3. Maintain capability to act as Department of Defense executive agent for ammunition.

d. Operational Blueprint:

Storage capacity requirements of current ammunition stockpiles has reached and exceeded the design capacity of the storage facilities for two reasons. First, the drawdown in Europe has brought ammunition items back to the continental United States, to facilities that were not projected to store the additional European stocks. Second, the ammunition demilitarization program is being slowed by environmental constraints and a lack of funding on the scale needed to remove excess or obsolete ammunition from the inventory. Even so, several of the smaller ammunition storage sites are projected to be excess to Army requirements within the next several years. The Army is focusing resources for demilitarization of ammunition stockpiles at these installations in order to close excess facilities as rapidly as possible.

The Army has adopted a "tiered concept" to manage ammunition storage facilities. This concept reduces the number of active storage sites and creates efficiencies by realigning the required and non-required stockpile into an appropriate tier activity level. The ammunition stockpile is being distributed within geographically oriented regions using a minimum of installations in each region. Regional distribution fully supports area training requirements and provides an active installation within the proximity of sea ports of embarkation for supporting power projection requirements.

Three levels, or tiers, of installations are organized within each region for identifying the level of activity an installation performs. Tier I supports a normal/full-up daily activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks for demilitarization. Tier II performs static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements and will eventually store production offset stocks and limited non-required demilitarization stocks. Tier III will be minimally staffed until the non-required stocks are completely reduced to a zero balance and the facilities closed.

Proving Grounds



a. Description:

Proving grounds support developmental tests that evaluate the battlefield application of new technology over a wide range of terrain and climatic conditions. This testing includes all types of equipment and munitions, including specialized weapons systems.

b. Operational Requirements:

Proving grounds provide capabilities in support of "technology development" requirements not available in private industry. As the Army downsizes, technological advancements play an even greater role in battlefield success. Throughout history, victory has gone to the side that makes the best use of available technology. The twenty-first century will be no different.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain adequate acreage, range capacity, and facilities to support the Army testing program.

2. Retain those proving grounds with the greatest capability for facility and range expansion.

3. Maintain the capability to evaluate materiel over the full range of terrain and climatic conditions.

4. Locate soldier-intensive testing at installations with large soldier populations such as maneuver installations.

d. Operational Blueprint:

Proving grounds have, over time, been developed at several different geographic locations. The testing community has gradually aligned its facilities around specific commodities, attempting to minimize duplication of facilities. Operationally, the best approach to achieving greater efficiency is collocation of test functions. This could be done on as few as two of the major proving ground installations with smaller test facilities located on installations from other categories. Additionally, proving grounds should be sized to minimize duplication of capabilities available in either private industry or the Department of Defense.

Collocation of proving grounds allows closure of installations and realignment of affected testing facilities. However, proving grounds are facility intensive, making

relocation extremely expensive as no installation is currently structured to receive another testing facility without significant new construction. Interservicing may offer the best solution to improving efficiency of proving grounds and reducing duplication of functions within the Department of Defense.

Industrial Facilities



a. Description:

Industrial facilities include manufacturing plants that receive, store, and incorporate raw materials and sub-components into the manufacturing process for end-items and components They perform quality assurance and conduct acceptance testing of their products.

b. Operational Requirements:

Industrial facilities manufacture end-items and components, thereby supporting the operational requirement for "acquisition excellence." The products manufactured at industrial facilities help sustain warfighting forces deployed in support of the power projection strategy. As such, they support the "sustainment" operational requirement. These facilities also maintain some surge capability in support of the "force generation" requirement.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Retain critical capabilities that cannot be readily reconstituted during mobilization or duplicated by commercial manufacturers.

2. Maintain the capability to assist in the generation of forces required to support two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

d. Operational Blueprint:

The industrial base that was developed in response to potential Cold War requirements is no longer needed to support the National Military Strategy. Wherever possible, the nation's commercial industrial capacity should be used to provide military production requirements. Given the similarity of some production facilities and the commodities they produce, consolidation at the largest, most modern facility is advisable. In general, this consolidation can be accomplished with little additional construction or renovation. Only those industrial production

lines that have requirements programmed in Army POM 96-01 and the FY95 President's Budget should be retained. Facilities that produce unique products, not readily available in the private sector, should be retained or, if not currently funded, be mothballed for future use.

Ports



a. Description:

Ports are industrial facilities, including ocean terminals and an ammunition terminal, that support the deployment of US-based power projection forces. These installations conduct transportation engineering, traffic management, and terminal operations. They provide terminal facilities as well as staging areas for forces and equipment.

b. Operational Requirements:

Ports provide support for the operational requirements of "power projection" and "strategic agility." Without ports, the power resident in the United States could not be projected to the appropriate theater of operations. Proper location, capacity, and ease of access to port facilities contribute significantly to the fast reaction times required for strategic agility.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain the capability to support the Army's power projection strategy.

2. Maintain the capability to project forces from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts.

3. Maintain the capability to ship unique cargo not allowed in commercial ports.

d. Operational Blueprint:

Sufficient commercial port capacity is available on each coast to support the power projection requirements of the National Military Strategy. While military ports provide control and security not available at commercial facilities, there are few unique military requirements that cannot be accomplished at commercial ports.

There is no operational requirement to retain military ports whose primary capabilities can be duplicated at a commercial port. However, military ports that satisfy unique military

requirements such as shipping large, bulk quantities of live ammunition must be retained.

Medical Centers



a. Description:

Medical centers provide patient care, graduate medical education, and medical research. Patient care ranges from simple outpatient treatment to sophisticated specialty care and includes referral care from other facilities. Graduate medical education provides military-oriented graduate medical training essential to the recruitment and retention of military physicians. Medical center research has produced significant medical advances.

b. Operational Requirements:

Medical centers support the operational requirements of "sustainment" and "training and education." Whether by providing medical care to casualties of war or preventive medicine for soldiers in training, medical centers sustain the human dimension of combat power. Modern technology has enhanced the direct impact of medical centers on battlefield medicine by linking CONUS-based medical experts with combat medics through satellite communications. By increasing the medical expertise available on the battlefield, preventive medicine and treatment of minor wounds make a significant contribution to the sustainment of combat power in theater.

The graduate medical education (GME) conducted at Army medical centers supports the operational requirement of "training and education." This specialized training allows medical students to focus on aspects of medicine peculiar to the Army. By concentrating on the illnesses and wounds most likely to impact on soldiers, Army medical training provides the most efficient and effective use of scarce resources.

c. Stationing Requirements:

1. Maintain the capability to conduct graduate medical education and research.

2. Using a combination of military and private service, meet peacetime requirements for military and military family patient care.

3. Maintain the capability to medically support two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

4. Maintain the capability to support reconstitution of Army forces in transition from one theater of operations to another, or following two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

5. Where possible, maintain the capability to provide wartime medical support at a facility located in the theater of operations.

6. Avoid significant construction costs due to recapitalization of substandard facilities where reasonable alternatives are available.

d. Operational Blueprint:

Where possible, medical centers should reduce excess patient capacity, minimize uneconomical referral practices, eliminate duplication of Graduate Medical Education (GME) programs, and focus on providing efficient medical support to active duty populations. The Army cannot afford to maintain medical facilities that primarily support a retired population. Medical centers not collocated with sizable active component populations do not provide cost-effective medical care, nor do they contribute to the quality of life for active component soldiers and their families. In such cases, the medical center fails to support the operational requirements of the Army.

On the other hand, medical centers that, as a result of geographical location, provide support directly to a potential theater of operations possess significant military value and should be retained.

THE ARMY'S VISION



America's Army, trained and ready to fight, a strategic force, serving the nation at home and abroad, capable of decisive victory... into the 21st century.



Relationship Between Operational Requirements and Installation Categories

Operational Requirements	MVR	MTA	TNG SCH	PROF ED	C2 ADM	CMDY	DEP	AMMO PROD	AMMO STRG	PRVG GRND	IND FAC	PORT	MED CNTR
Power Projection	P		S		C	P	S	P	P			P	P
Versatility	P		S		C								
Strategic Agility	P		S		C							P	
Deterrence	P		S		C								
Training	P	P	P		C								P
Leader Development			P	P	C					P			
Sustainment			P		C	P	P	P	P		P		P
Reconstitution	P		S		C	P	P	P			P		P
Technology Development					C	P				P			
Acquisition Excellence					C	P		P			P		
Expandability	P	P			C	P	P	P			P		
Fiscal Responsibility	P	P	P	P	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Environmental Stewardship	P	P	P	P	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Quality of Life	P	P	P	P	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P

P = primary function S = secondary function C = command & control relationship

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Maneuver Installations

Stationing Requirements

Station:

- BUR force structure in U. S.
- Forces in Alaska + Hawaii

Support:

- Training
- Power Projection
- Mobilization and RC training

MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS

Ft Bragg
Ft Campbell
Ft Carson
Ft Drum
Ft Hood
Ft Lewis
Ft Richardson
Ft Riley
Ft Stewart
Ft Wainwright
Schofield Barracks

Operational Blueprint



- Maintain unique capabilities (Hood, Bragg, Campbell, Lewis, Stewart)
- Station forces in Alaska and Hawaii to support USCINCPAC strategy
- Size base structure in Alaska to support one maneuver brigade and associated support units
- Retain all CONUS maneuver installations to enable stationing of BUR force in U.S.

Potential Impact

Wainwright

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Force Structure







STATIONING TASK FORCE

" J. Gray "

THE ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

BRAC 95 MANAGEMENT CONTROL PLAN

MARCH 94

DACS-TAB 30 MAR 94

MEMORANDUM TO ALL TABS PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: The Army Basing Study Management Control Plan

1. Reducing the Department of the Army's installation structure through base closures and realignment is a top Army priority. We have made good progress through past BRAC actions. I look to you, individually and collectively, to recommend further reductions consistent with the force structure plan and DoD Selection Criteria.

2. As we begin the 1995 base realignment and closure process, significant reductions can only be achieved after careful studies involving excess capacity and structural change.

3. The attached Management Control Plan (MCP) establishes the management controls to be used during this process. This guidance is in compliance with Public Law 101-501, as amended, Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum dated 7 JAN 94, and Chief of Staff, Army memorandum dated 21 MAR 94. This supersedes the BRAC 93 Management Control Plan dated AUG 1992.

MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, The Army Basing Study

Attachment

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MANAGEMENT CONTROL PLAN

The Army Basing Study
Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army
Base Realignment and Closure Process (BRAC 95)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

The exclusive procedures by which the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) may pursue closure or realignment of military installations, inside the United States, are contained in Part A, Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, entitled as the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990; as amended; hereafter referred to as Base Closure Act (Annex A). The Base Closure Act also includes a provision for the President to appoint an independent Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review the SECDEF recommendations in calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) memorandum dated 7 January 1994 (Annex B), sets forth policy guidance, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for the forthcoming base closure and realignment study effort for 1995. DEPSECDEF guidance includes a requirement for the establishment of BRAC-95 Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSG) in five functional areas to identify significant cross-service opportunities as well as a sixh JCSG to develop improvements in economic impact assessments.

The Army Basing Study (TABS) Charter establishes the authority of the TABS office and assigns responsibilities for execution of the BRAC 95 process (Annex C). The charter was signed by the Acting Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff, Army on 1 August 1993.

The Chief of Staff of the Army memorandum dated March 1994 (Annex D), kicks off the BRAC 95 process and identifies the policy oversight role of the Under Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment) is responsible for policy and management of all BRAC initiatives. The Director of Management will coordinate the BRAC 95 effort, identifing actions and milestones critical to synchronizing the Army's effort with that of DoD and the other Services.

B. Mission

TABS will examine the issues surrounding the realignment and closure of Army installations within the 50 States, the District of Columbia and U.S. commonwealths, territories and possessions, and make recommendations to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff

concerning potential realignments and closures. Additionally, TABS will serve as the single point of contact with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, established under the provisions of the Base Closure Act.

TABS will assess the Army's CONUS installations resources, identify the Army's CONUS basing requirements, and present base realignment and closure recommendations consistent with Department of Defense (DoD) force structure plans and BRAC selection criteria.

C. Purpose

The purpose of this Management Control Plan (MCP) is to provide a consistent set of management controls for the Army's BRAC 95 process. The objective of the controls, presented herein, is to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integration of all information upon which Secretary of the Army recommendations for base closure and realignments are based and to limit the possibility of disclosure of BRAC 95 information prematurely. This MCP meets the requirements established by the DEPSECDEF memorandum, Army BRAC 95 memorandum, and the Charter for The Army Basing Study (TABS) regarding the Army's process. This MCP also identifies procedures for integrating the efforts of the Joint Cross-Service Groups into the Army process.

D. Critical Success Factors

To ensure success of the TABS mission and objectives, the following factors were identified as critical.

- Senior Army Leadership commitment to significantly reduce the installation infrastructure to meet the Defense Guidance as well as goals set forth in the DEPSECDEF memorandum.

- Coordination with the Joint Cross-Service Groups, other Services and Defense Agencies to identify significant cross-service or intra-service opportunities to consolidate activities.

- Adherence to a well defined scope, definitive objectives, and accountable process.

II. SELECTION CRITERIA AND RELATED ISSUES

A. General

The Base Closure Act requires the DoD to submit to Congress and the Commission a force structure plan and the selection criteria that are used in developing DoD recommendations. These documents are the cornerstone of the Army procedures and process.

Title 10 U.S.C. 2687 establishes closure and realignment numerical thresholds that require Congressional review. The threshold for closure is an installation/activity that employs at least 300 permanent-type civilians. The threshold for realigning/reducing an installation/activity is the reduction of more than 1000 permanent-type civilians or 50% of that installation/activity's authorized civilians, whichever is less.

B. DoD Force Structure

The force structure plan incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of Defense of the probable threats to the national security, and takes into account the anticipated levels of funding for the period 1996 through 2001. The plan is comprised of a military threat assessment, a need for overseas basing, and a force structure. This plan is used by the ARSTAF along with other operational guidance in developing the Army's Stationing Strategy.

C. DoD Selection Criteria

The final eight selection criteria published by DoD cover a broad range of military, fiscal, and environmental considerations (see figure II.1). The first four criteria relate to the military value of that installation, the fifth criteria is concerned with the fiscal implications of a potential recommendation, while the last three criteria address a recommendation's impact on the economy, community and installation infrastructure, and environment.

The Army assesses the military value of an installation by first grouping like installations into functional categories. The militay value ranking of each installation is established by comparing installation quality assessments with the operational needs of the Army. Quality assessments are derived from the first four criteria of the DoD selection criteria, commonly referred to as military value. These criteria are mission requirements, land and facilities, contingency and future mission, and cost and manpower. The needs of the services are documented in the Army's Stationing Strategy. Installations that place relatively lower in military value assessment are examined as potential candidates for BRAC. The return on investment calculation for each alternative and associated scenarios are accomplished using DoD approved Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) model, version 5.0. The impacts of an alternative are evaluated using the DoD approved Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) model for economic impacts, while environmental baseline studies are used to determine the infrastructure and environmental impacts on the affected installations and economic area.

DoD SELECTION CRITERIA

IN SELECTING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT, DOD GIVING PRIORITY CONSIDERATION TO MILITARY VALUE (THE FIRST FOUR CRITERIA BELOW), WILL CONSIDER:

MILITARY VALUE:

1. THE CURRENT AND FUTURE MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND THE IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL READINESS OF DOD's TOTAL FORCE.

2. THE AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF LAND AND FACILITIES AT BOTH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL RECEIVING LOCATIONS.

3. THE ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE CONTINGENCY, MOBILIZATION, AND FUTURE TOTAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS AT BOTH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL RECEIVING LOCATIONS.

4. THE COST AND MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS.

RETURN ON INVESTMENT:

5. THE EXTENT AND TIMING OF POTENTIAL COST SAVINGS, INCLUDING THE NUMBER OF YEARS, BEGINNING WITH THE DATE OF COMPLETION OF THE CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT, FOR THE SAVINGS TO EXCEED THE COSTS.

COMMUNITY IMPACTS:

6. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES.

7. THE ABILITY OF BOTH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL RECEIVING COMMUNITIES' INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT FORCES, MISSIONS, AND PERSONNEL.

8. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.

Figure II.1 - DoD Selection Criteria

D. Installations

Active Army installations will be included in the assessment process if they meet the following requirements:

> "... an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, controlled by and at which an Active Army unit or activity is permanently assigned." (Army BASOPS Primer, JAN 93)

Therefore three criteria must be present: real property, people, and control by the active component. Using this definition, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installations (ACSIM) queries the real property inventory and provides TABS with the installations to be considered.

E. Leases

Leases are considered in one of three categories, as a stand alone lease (installation), as part of the off-post assets of a active installation, or as part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area

(MSA). All stand alone leases, above and below threshold, are included in the installation assessment process. The other two categories will be considered for inclusion in the BRAC 95 process if mission changes suggest a closure or realignment.

F. Reserve Enclaves

Reserve enclaves, Reserve and National Guard, will be considered in four steps. They are:

- The first step is to evaluate all enclaves/installations in the same manner as other Army installations on federal land. The milestones are given in figure IV.3 for the first phase and are the same for the rest of the process thereafter. This includes the development of a set of attributes that describe military value (DoD Criteria 1-4) and analyze those installations for realignment or closure. This evaluation should be commensurate with the Reserve and National Guard reductions of 25.9%, adjusted for the over-facilitized nature of enclaves.

- The second step will be to consider total force structure, mobilization, and contingency requirements in all categories of active installations. This is done by establishing attributes that evaluate reserve needs in the military value criteria (DoD Criteria 3).

- The third step is to evaluate all potential active installation closures for impact on Reserve and National Guard training requirements.

- The last step is to evaluate the potential transfer and use by the Reserve and National Guard, as a installation enclave.

III. CONTROLS

A. General

The General Accounting Office has established the internal control standards that include general, specific and audit standards. This plan establishes the uniform guidance that: defines data requirements and sources; documents the procedures for selecting bases for closure or realignment and provides for the certification of the recommendations as accurate and complete; and, set up procedures for checking data, and independent testing of internal controls. The techniques to accomplish this are:

- Documenting the process to be used by TABS.

- Establishing standing operating procedures (SOP) for administrative and analytical procedures to be followed by TABS personnel.

- Establishing a training program to ensure knowledgeable employees.

- Establishing internal control mechanisms to check all aspects of the TABS process.

B. Process

The TABS process is documented in section IV of this MCP. In general, the process is grouped into three time periods. The first period, March - June 94, will evaluate its installations military value, in a quantitative terms, using measures derived from DoD selection criteria. The second period, July 94 - February 95, will assess feasibility of potential BRAC alternatives while incorporating Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations and assessing all required impacts. The last period, March - September 95, begins the support process to the BRAC Commission.

Section IV documents this three period process through each of the five phases of the TABS process. These five phases are process preparation in time period 1. In time period 2 are detailed analysis, DA review, and OSD review. Commission support makes up time period 3.



This is reflected in the following chart (see figure III.1).

Figure III.1 - TABS Time Periods and Phases

C. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

Two SOPs are established to document the procedures to be used by TABS personnel in support of all administrative and analytical work conducted by the TABS office.
The TABS Administrative SOP is the single-source document on procedures and formats to be followed in all staff actions. The Administrative SOP is published in a separate document. The Analytical SOP will establish the detailed procedures to be used in the conduct of evaluating all candidate installations. It will establish the categories of installations through the BRAC recommendation. The Analytical SOP is located in Annex J of this MCP.

D. Training

The training plan, Annex K, provides the detailed training that is provided to all TABS personnel ensuring they have the basic knowledge and skills to conduct the mission as stated in this MCP. This training includes BRAC process orientation, TABS process (e.g. analytical, environmental, economic, etc.), software training (e.g. COBRA, D-PADS, Powerpoint, Word Perfect, OEA, DSS, etc), and DA staff proponent orientation (e.g. JAG, DCSOPS, DM, ASA (IL&E)).

E. Internal Controls

An Internal Control Plan, Annex H, provides a consistent set of management controls to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integration of all information upon which the Secretary of the Army recommendations for base closure and realignment are derived and to limit the possibility of disclosure of BRAC 95 information prematurely.

IV. PROCESS DESCRIPTION

A. Overview

The TABS process was developed using the Integrated Definition (IDEF) modeling techniques, and the activity based analysis approach promoted by the Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative as the optimum methodology for business process improvement. This technique permits functional experts to assess the efficiency of the business through examination of its activities, and through the analysis, discover improvement opportunities.

The activity models developed are a representative of the TABS' functions and its relationship with the BRAC process. At a high level, the models may be used to understand what work is performed in the BRAC process (e.g. the five phases described above). At a lower level, the models will depict how the work is performed (described below). All activities will transform a set of inputs into products, enabled by resources and constrained by a set of controls.

TABS has identified the key issues associated with each activity and translated these issues into this management plan and its associated milestones. The first level of the process is defined by the five phases displayed in the node diagram above (figure III.1). These five phases are then transformed into the first level process diagram shown below (figure IV.1).



Figure IV.1 - TABS Process Overview

This diagram shows the top level phases of the TABS process with their associated inputs, outputs, controls, mechanisms, and the inter-relationships of the sub activities in the process. This diagram gives an overview of information flow through the TABS process.

B. Process Preparation Phase

The process preparation phase is the first phase of the TABS process and sets the foundation for all work to follow. There are five key sub-processes that encompass this phase of TABS. These sub-processes are policy development, training, installation assessment, installation environmental assessment, and installation reviews. This phase is illustrated below (figure IV.2).



Figure IV.2 - Process Preparation Phase

This phase of the process is started by the planning cell of TABS, see charter in Annex C, and is developed as the office is brought up to full strength. The challenge is to train incoming analysts, define all requirements for the process, assist in the development of the Joint Cross-Service Groups, and develop, staff, and implement the installation review/assessment functions.

The key products that emerge from this phase are the TABS program policy, trained analysts, COBRA model 5.0, and the initial review and assessment of all installations to be

analyzed in the next phase of the process. The milestones associated with process preparation are illustrated below. Included in the milestones below are the AAA audit validation objectives and their respective time lines (figure IV.3).

1. Policy Development



Figure IV.3 - Process Preparation Milestones

TABS does not generate BRAC policy or make BRAC policy decisions; however, TABS, as well as the other Service BRAC offices, are involved in all aspects of the formulation of BRAC policy. Throughout the TABS Process there are a number of control devices within

which all actions must occur. These controls include:

Time: Milestones are established as the points in time when products must be delivered. Those products are identified as outputs throughout the process. A milestone example is 1 January 1995, the Service recommendations are due to OSD.

Law: The Base Closure Act governs all BRAC procedures.

The Army Stationing Strategy and Force Structure: These inputs from Department of the Army provide the guidance on the shape of the force of the present and future by which TABS analysts formulate alternatives and scenarios.

DoD Criteria: These eight criteria define and prioritize military value analysis. Within the framework of the TABS Process are a series of inputs which influence and provide direction to the development of policies for the TABS operation. The inputs include:

Lessons Learned: These include all documentation on the subject from previous BRAC processes and reports, and historical data and paper files on each installation. Each previous BRAC published lessons learned as part of the project.

Joint Cross-Service Group Input: The JCSG will provide guidance to TABS for the purpose of studying 6 areas of interest to the OSD. The primary purpose of these studies is to identify common support functions with related candidate alternatives and scenarios for cross-service consolidation. This guidance includes an assessment methodology to be used by all Services to evaluate excess capacity within each common support function. The areas are:

- Laboratories (LABS)
- Test & Evaluation (T&E)
- Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT)
- Depots
- Graduate Medical Training (GME)
- Economic Impact

The process preparation section includes the development of all internal control mechanisms to be used to control the TABS process. This includes the MCP, internal control plan, training plan, and the AAA audit plan. These documents become controls on the process once they are approved.

The final area involved in process preparation is the establishment of a Joint Process Action Team (JPAT) to develop and improve the COBRA model. The result of this process is the current approved model COBRA 5.0 that will be used by all Services in the BRAC 95.

2. Training: The TABS Detailed Training Plan is contained in Annex L of this

document. Because of the sequential build-up of the TABS group and the need to train all analysts, prior to the conduct of analysis, it is necessary to implement a training plan that is flexible and builds upon the experience of current members. Training covers BRAC and TABS process orientations, DA Staff orientations and their specific roles in the BRAC process, Management Directorate orientation, TABS models and application orientation, TJAG participation and availability and the BRAC law, Joint Cross-Service Group participation and purpose, summaries of economic and environmental considerations of BRAC, PC software, office procedures summaries, and HQ, DADSS classes and certification.

3. Installation Assessment: The BRAC 95 Installation Assessment (AI) program is designed to provide the senior Army leadership a measure of the relative military value of installations and facilities used by Army organizations. The proponent office for the IA process is TABS.

The IA process is a systematic method to assess and compare the value of installations with similar functions. This process ranks all installations within a set category (1 to n) on an order of merit list. Installations are staffed with the Army's Major Commands (MACOM) to determine the appropriate categories. The categories for BRAC 95 are: Maneuver, Training Areas, Training Schools, Professional Schools, Maintenance Depots, Ammunition Production, Ammunition Storage, Industrial, Commodity Oriented, Ports, Medical Centers and Leases. There are about 100 installations included within these categories.

Each category of installations is compared using a set of attributes such as square feet of facilities, size of maneuver and impact areas, cost to operate, etc. There are 20 to 30 attributes per category. Each attribute is linked to one of the four DoD selection criteria that measure Military Value: Mission Requirements, Condition of Land and Facilities, Cost and Manpower, and Future Requirements.

The IA process requires MACOMs to provide products and data to HQDA that will be published in the Army's BRAC recommendations. Because of this, all IA data must be certified. AAA will work with TABS in insuring the process and data meet the certification requirements.

4. Installation Environmental Assessment: The environmental analysis process required in support of the Army's BRAC 95 recommendations is shown in the chart below (figure IV.4). The environmental analysis is performed by the Environmental Review Committee (ERC). The ERC is composed of several Subject Matter Experts from the Army's Environmental Programs Directorate and are designated as trusted agents working in a close hold forum for TABS. The TABS Environmental Integrator will have oversight over the ERC and be responsible for the integration of the analysis into the Army's recommendations.

The environmental analysis runs concurrently with TABS' recommendation process during which coordination and the transaction of data between TABS and ERC is required. During the first stages of the recommendation process, the Installation Environmental Baseline Summary (IEBS)



data call is analyzed by the ERC, producing an initial environmental assessment of all BRAC installation study candidates from both a closure and realignment perspective. This assessment

Figure IV.4 - Environment Process

indicates an installation's environmental carrying capacity and potential hurdles for a BRAC recommendation. These IEBS are then incorporated into the installation reviews.

As the Army's recommendations become site specific, the ERC will study each case in greater detail and will provide TABS with a finalized environmental assessment during the Detailed Analysis phases. In addition to the final analysis, the ERC will be utilized by TABS in an ancillary support role during DoD, Congress and the Commissions review.

5. Installation Reviews: Installation reviews represents a one stop information source for all above threshold installations. Each review will include historical research, location information, missions, units supported, basic budget information, personnel summaries, past BRAC actions, new missions, new/planned facilities, range improvements, restructuring actions, DoD selection criteria / attributes, environmental considerations, facility capacities, economic profile, and installation unique characteristics. The format for these reviews is in Annex N. These reviews will be researched, compiled, and briefed by the functional area expert to the TABS group to educate and surface concerns and to develop possible alternative candidates for analysis, either as a gaining or losing installations. The draft form of these reviews will be completed prior to MACOM and installation visits and finalized with the certified and installation visit data. These installation reviews will be published by installation category as supporting documentation to BRAC 95 recommendation.

C. TABS Detailed Analysis Phase:

This phase is at the heart of the TABS process. During this phase, TABS analyzes potential BRAC alternatives to develop the initial recommendations to be reviewed in follow-on phases. The controls during this phase remain constant from the previous phase and the following inputs are carried forward: lessons learned, Task Force output, and MACOM input. New inputs include certified data from the IA data call, an installation order of merit list (OML), installation review narratives, environmental installation baseline studies (IEBS). These combined inputs are used to develop the Military Value Assessment from the installation IA OML. Once the values are determined, the installations are placed into three bands of consideration; enduring installations, high military value, and lesser military value. Installation category screening is performed to determine feasible category candidates and possible scenarios. At this point, COBRA, and OSUB models are run to examine scenarios and identify initial affordable candidates. These initial candidates will then go through an integration process that looks at cross-category solutions. Additional inputs at this level will include Leased facility data and JCSG activity candidate data. The detailed procedures for this analysis is contained in the Analytical SOP located at Annex K.

The key outputs from this phase include the final Environmental Impact Considerations (EIC), Detailed Installation Narratives, and the Initial Army Recommendations for closure and

realignment.

The following charts show the detailed process (figure IV.5) and milestones (figure IV.6) associated with this second phase of the TABS process.



Figure IV.5 - Detailed Analysis Phase



Figure IV.6 - Detailed Analysis Milestones

1. Installation Military Value: The installation military value bands are developed from the IA OML developed in the Policy Preparation phase of the TABS process. The IA OML is evaluated and adjustments are made in accordance with operational requirements of the Army Stationing Strategy (TASS), provided by Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS). The Stationing Strategy incorporates the MACOM level requirements to meet the needs of the Army. Banding of installations into enduring, high military value, and lower military value is achieved through a combination of the stationing strategy requirements, ACSIM facility capacity/requirements system and by a general statistical process. These bands are then used to start the detailed alternative analysis.

2. Initial Category Screening: The focus of this operation is determining losing and gaining installations based on the military value bands and JCSG activity recommendations; and determining possible scenarios within each category of installations. The product is feasible category candidates for scenario runs. At this point the study candidates must be identified using a standard format contained in the analytical procedures SOP. The steps at this stage are:

- Identifying organizations and installations by source, e.g. MVA band, TASS, MACOM Vision, etc.

- Data review of the installation per the ASIP Troop List Ordered by Major Unit and the Station Report.

- Using the HQRPLANS Stationing Data Input and Output Report Work sheet to prepare

stationing scenarios.

3. Category Scenario Development: Inputs include the previous information plus leased facilities. At this point cost, economic, and environmental inputs are considered and the product of initial affordable candidates is presented. Detailed instructions for this action is contained in the TABS Analytical Procedures SOP. The steps included in this process include:

- Record the BRAC Alternative using the TABS standard system.

- Analyze the BRAC Alternatives using Stationing Reports from HQRPLANS.

- Entered data into COBRA.

- Analyze COBRA output.

- Terminate analysis as not feasible or consider it as an initial BRAC Recommendation.

- Document alternative analysis.

4. Cross-Category Integration: This is the integration of and further development of candidates using all the same sources of information and tools previously, but now looking at the Army view of what is best for the Army (may include installations changing categories). The JCSG inputs may influence the analysis at this point and will be considered in all analyses and recommendations. Additional alternative scenarios will be analyzed and documented, the same as above. The output from this phase is the initial Army BRAC recommendations to be reviewed.

D. DA Review Phase

This phase begins the review and revision process that will ultimately culminate in the DoD BRAC 95 recommendations approved through Congress. This phase involves the review by Department of the Army by the Environmental Review Boards, ARSTAF Task Force, Program Budget Committee (PBC), Select Committee (SELCOM), and finally by the Secretary of the Army. This is a two step process that is cycled through all review groups. This process will be iterative by nature. Recommendations from the Army will be evaluated and alternative scenarios run, analyzed, and documented as necessary and set forth in the Detailed Analysis phase. This process is shown below (figure IV.7):



Figure IV.7 - DA Review Phase



Figure IV.8 - DA Review, OSD Review and Commission Support Milestones

The first review will be conducted by the ARSTAF Task Force, using a "hot wash" process. The review panel will review analyses and scenarios for completeness, accuracy, logic, and potential for cross-category possibilities. The results of the reviews will then enter the formal Army Staff review process and will continue to cycle through the various layers of review until the Secretary of the Army approves the recommendations using the milestones above (figure IV.8).

E. OSD Review Phase

This phase begins with a review of the Army BRAC 95 Recommendation with respect to incorporating any Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations by the BRAC 95 Review Group and OSD BRAC office, and a review by the JCSG for Economic Impact of the cumulative economic impacts of all Service recommendations. These reviews will be iterative by nature. Suggested recommendations from the OSD will be evaluated and alternative scenarios run, analyzed, and documented by TABS, as necessary, and set forth in the Detailed Analysis phase. Finally, OSD will recommend to the Secretary of Defense that the Service Recommendations should be recommended as the DoD BRAC 95 Recommendations. The process shown below (figure IV.9) and the milestones shown above (figure IV.8) document the TABS process for this phase.



Figure IV.9 - OSD Review Phase

F. Commission Support Phase

The primary responsibility at this point in the process is historical, statistical, and decisional support to the Army representatives to the Commission (figure IV.10).

1. Data: This process includes providing the commission with all requested information to include the Army Annex to DoD Recommendations, Army Leadership input, Certified Data, Installation OML and Installation Review Narratives.

2. Hearing Preparation: This process consists of review and organization of all previous documentation to ensure rapid response to questions regarding process, alternatives and scenarios, and recommendations. A library of standard format professional quality briefing books needs to be available prior to entry into this phase of the process. Design, preparation, and construction responsibility will be the TABS administration section's. This information will be cross referenced to ensure easy access to all information for all Army officials who must testify. There are two phase of hearings. The first is early in the commission support phase and is an overview of the process and recommendations from the services. The second set of hearings are more detailed testimony details of each recommendation or lack of a recommendation. These hearings are after the community visits and commission analysis.



3. Analysis: This analysis will again be an iterative process in accordance with

Figure IV.10 - Commission Support Phase

the detailed analysis phase of the process. A system of Army Review will have to be established

for rapid return requests from the Commission for any non-evaluated alternative scenarios.

4. Community Visit Support: TABs personnel will accompany the Commission to Army installations to hear and record the testimony provided to the Commission. This record of visits will be used in follow-on Army official testimony to the Commission.



- This briefing is based on my participation in the Army's BRAC 95 base closure analysis and does not contain US Army policy on methodology or candidates for future US Army base closures

- BRAC 95 was the third and last round of base closures authorized by the BRAC Act of 1990.

- The Army's methodology, assumptions, data and procedures were refined and improved during each round of base closures.

- The General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed and reported on BRAC analysis after every BRAC round. Its report on BRAC 95 states:

"The Army completed its BRAC 1995 review using basically the same process it had used in prior BRAC rounds. The Army's process for recommending installations for closure and realignment generally complied with legislation and OSD policy guidance, was well documented, was supported by generally accurate data, and appeared reasonable. "

AGENDA

- The Army Process
- Key Players
- Guidance
- The Army Study Team
- The Army Methodology
- Timeline
- Base Closure Example
- Summary

- This briefing provides a quick review of the Army's overall process for selecting bases to close or realign during the BRAC 95 round of base closures.

- I will briefly cover several key areas of the process including the key personnel, the structure of the study group, the methodology and the timeline.

- I will use an example of a base the the Army recommended for closure to show the type of analysis the Army provided to the senior leaders.

THE ARMY PROCESS

- Establish the Study Team
- Receive Guidance
- Develop Methodology
- Gather Data
- Conduct the Analysis
- Present Alternatives
- Prepare the Recommendations
- Defend BRAC Recommendations

GOAL

ALIGN BASE STRUCTURE WITH FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

- This shows the step by step process that the Army used during BRAC 95 to select bases for closure or realignment.

- The Army's goal was to align the base structure with the future requirements of the Army.

DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

BRAC 95
ARMY KEY PLAYERS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND ENVIRONMENT	• POLICY GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT • CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS	• STATIONER OF THE ARMY • ESTABLISH ARMY REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATIONS MANAGEMENT	• INSTALLATION MANAGER • IMPLEMENTS BRAC LAW
ARMY AUDIT AGENCY	• AUDIT OVERSIGHT • GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE/ INSPECTOR GENERAL INTERFACE
THE DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT/ THE ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)	• FORMULATES BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS • ARMY INTERFACE TO COMMISSION STAFF

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THE ARMY BASING STUDY

4

- This chart shows that Base Closure analysis requires many specialists - in areas such as:
  - Policy
  - Congressional liaison
  - Operational requirements
  - Priorities
  - Law
  - Installation Support
  - Auditors
- These specialist assist and direct the study effort as required.
- It was important to provide a consistent message about the Army's base closure efforts to the Public, Congress and the Base Closure Commission.

THE ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS) MISSION

The Army's BRAC study team mission -

- **Examine the issues surrounding the realignment and closure of Army installations within the 50 States.**
- **Make recommendations to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff concerning potential realignments and closures.**
- **Serve as the single point of contact with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.**
- **Assess the Army's CONUS installations resources, identify the Army's CONUS basing requirements, and present base realignment and closure recommendations consistent with Department of Defense (DoD) force structure plans and BRAC selection criteria.**

GOAL

Provide Sound Recommendations that are Approved by The Department Of Defense and the Base Closure Commission

To accomplish the mission assigned, the study group completed the following sequential tasks:

- Organize and train the study group
- Develop Methodology for Selecting Installations
- Gather data
- Conduct Analysis
- Provide analysis to Army leaders for decision
- Prepare the Army's BRAC Recommendations
- Assist in Defending BRAC Recommendations

BRAC GUIDANCE

(SENIOR ARMY LEADERSHIP GUIDANCE)

ARMY GUIDANCE

- Support the Future Army
- Develop Stationing Strategy
- Reduce Excess Infrastructure While Preserving Readiness
- Size Installations Properly
- Ensure Analysis is Rigorous and Auditable
- Maintain Power Projection Capability
- Retain Heavy and Light Combat Training Centers
- Seek to Locate Reserve Units to Active Bases
- Study Consolidation of Schools and Logistics
- Retain Affordable, World-class Power Projection Platforms as Enduring Installations

- This broad guidance was provided to direct the study group.

- It follows and augments the guidance provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.



• A small group of analysts worked on base closure issues between the BRAC rounds. This small group prepared the training program and computer models for the full study group.

• This study group was formed about 1 year in advance of the Base closure recommendations. Each analyst received about 1 month of training on BRAC computer models and methodology before the group began to conduct analysis.

• The members of this group came from different staff sections within the Army staff. They served as BRAC analysts for one year, then returned to their staff position.

• This study group worked independently for the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army.

• Information concerning base closure candidates was not released outside of this study group.



- This chart shows the overall Base Closure strategy - - achieve balance between the requirements for bases and the number of bases.

- The Army must station, maintain, train, and deploy units to accomplish a wide variety of missions.

- The number and type of forces and their requirement to train and deploy determine the requirements for land and facilities.

- We want to create the correct balance between forces and installations, but that will cost money to accomplish. How much can the Army afford to pay for base closures?

- The result of poor analysis and poor timing can have a negative affect

  - close too many bases then training and readiness will suffer immediately, due to lack of facilities.

  - close too few bases then training funds will be used to keep bases open that we do not need, that provides less have less money to conduct training later.



- The Army's methodology for BRAC 95 was structured to analyze all 8 of the DoD's criteria.
    - Mission Requirements
    - Land and Facilities
    - Future Requirements
    - Cost and Manpower
    - Fiscal Impact
    - Economic Impact
    - Environmental Impact
- Starting in the lower right corner, the Army began with the Installation Assessment and the Stationing Strategy. These two studies, when combined, measured each installation's military value to the Army.
- Analysis of the study candidates included fiscal, economic and environmental analysis. The resulting analysis was provided to the Army Leadership for review and decision.



- This slide reviews how the Army determined the military value of its installations for BRAC 95.

- The installation assessment is an objective measurement of characteristics that an installation provides, such as: Land, Facilities and the cost to operate the installation.

- The Army Stationing Strategy used the National Strategy to determine strategic and operational requirements. The stationing strategy is developed based on subjective military judgment.

- When the Installation Assessment and the Stationing Strategy are combined, military value is the result.

- The Army evaluated 11 categories of installations in this manner for BRAC 95.

- All installations of low military value were studied as closure candidates

- Installations determined to be critical for mission accomplishment were excluded from further closure consideration



- The Army started the base closure process almost 1 year before the recommendations were due to OSD

- The initial inventory of installations was 97.

- After studies and analysis were conducted, the list of closure candidates became smaller. Only the installations determined to be low in military value were selected for further study.

- The analysis methodology reduced the number of closure candidates from 94 to 36. In some cases an installation of low military value was too expensive to close or closure was infeasible, in that case it was dropped from further study.

- The Army's leaders reviewed each of the final study candidates and selected 26 installations for closure or realignment.



- This slide shows the timeline followed by the Army during BRAC 95.

- Almost 1/2 of the available time (Feb to August) was used to determine which bases would be studied for closure or realignment. That time was used to gather data and conduct the military value analysis.

- The second 1/2 of the time was used to analyze the study candidates and determine which closure options were best.

- Major decisions by the senior Army leaders were required on three occasions:
    - Approve study candidates
    - Refine the study Candidates to eliminate installations that cost too much to close
    - Approve the final closure recommendations



• This chart shows how the Army analyzed the military value of all training installations. The Army conducted similar analysis for 11 other categories of installations.

• The box on the left shows the Installation Assessment, a ranking of the bases from the best to the worst. This ranking is based on adding together a list of weighted factors, such as: amount of maneuver land, number and type of facilities available, cost to operate.

• The highest ranking installations were generally larger and more efficient to operate.

• In the center of the chart is a list of the operational strategy for Training installations

• On the right side of the chart is the final Military Value ranking, this list is was constructed by combining the installation Assessment and the Operational requirements.

• The study candidates are highlighted, these are the bases that were studied further for closure or realignment.



• This is an example of the analysis the Army provided to senior leaders for all study candidates.

• This chart shows the closing base (FT McClellan) and where all the units move when the base closes. In this case the Military Police and Chemical schools move to Ft Leonard Wood. Basic Training courses move to 3 different locations and the polygraph institute moves to Ft Jackson.

• On the right side of the chart is a group of financial results of the closure. The **COSTS ($M)** are the investments needed to build new facilities at the gaining locations, transfer personnel and transfer equipment.

• In general closures are judged to be economical if the payback period is around 6 years or less.

DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT MCCLELLAN, AL

OPERATIONAL:

- DoD's recommendation to close rejected by Commission during BRAC 91 and BRAC 93
- Collocates Engineer, Military Police, and Chemical training schools in accordance the with Stationing Strategy
- Rebuilds necessary training facilities at Fort Leonard Wood

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	STUDENTS
REDUCTIONS	230	537	
REALIGNMENTS	2384	764	7620

ENVIRONMENTAL: Chemical Defense Training Facility requires expedited permitting before Commission convenes

ECONOMIC: 22% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 48K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED Close Leonard Wood and realign Engineer School to McClellan and BT to Sill, Knox and Jackson. Cost = $ 612M / 8 yrs.

UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT THE ARMY BASING STUDY 15

- This chart provided information to the senior Army leaders for each study candidate.

- This information helped our leaders make decisions about which bases to close.

- This information was also used to answer questions about our recommendations and provide some of the operational reasons for closing the base.

- Key information, such as the number of personnel reductions and transfers is provided, as well as the impact of job losses on the local economy. This information is important to the Congress, local officials and the news media.

- Additionally, this slide lists other alternatives considered and shows that the Army recommendation is the best alternative.



- In summary, the BRAC 95 recommendations for the Army provides an annual savings of over $700 Million per year after the end of implementation in 2001.

- The cost to implement these recommendations was estimated at $1.1 Billion.

- The Army closed or realigned 26 Army installations.

Data from The Army Basing Study (TABS) 1995

Minutes of all Deliberative Meetings

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DACS-TABS 3 Mar 95

MEMORANDUM FOR BRAC 95 - COMMISSION STAFF - MR. EDWARD BROWN

SUBJECT: Data from The Army Basing Study (TABS)

1. The following are provided by TABS to your office:

TAB	Information Need
1	Minutes of all deliberative meetings
2	Internal Control Plan
3	Lists of leases
4	Ammunition Study
5	All guidance Memorandums
6	ASIP
7	EHSC document -- U.S. Army Real Property Inventory Annual PRV Analysis
8	CSS Consolidation Study - Final Report

3. TABS cannot provide the following:

Information Need	Reason
* Ammunition Plant Study	One does not exist. See Ammo Tiering Study
* Results of May 94 -- Wainwright/ Richardson Consolidation Study	One does not exist per Forces Command
* FORSCOM Master Plan -- Gillem to McPherson (May 94)	One does not exist per Forces Command
* Any special studies done by anyone for TABS	None requested by TABS

4. TABS will provide Commission Staff with the following as soon as possible:

Information Need

* Documentation for all alternatives
* Data call responses with documentation for any changes
* ACSIM Buyout Analyses
* Index of installations
* RAND Study of Language Training Alternatives
* Breakout of 45k force structure reduction by installation
* Breakout of Depot maintenance capabilities
* COBRA Screen 4 for all installations

DACS-TABS
SUBJECT: Data from The Army Basing Study (TABS)

* Base Operating Support Manpower Data

5. The following can be found in our reference volume set:

Information Need	Source
* D-PAD algorithms	Volume II
* D-PAD input	Volume II
* All COBRAs	COBRA Reports. Detail COBRAs will be provided in Beddown packages.

6. Information provided to Commission Staff, has also been provided to each Congressional Library. POC for this action is Cathy Polmateer at (703)-693-0077/8.

MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, The Army Basing Study

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DACS-TABS

8 Mar 95

MEMORANDUM FOR BRAC 95 - COMMISSION STAFF - MR. EDWARD BROWN

SUBJECT: Data from The Army Basing Study (TABS)

1. The following are provided by TABS to your office:

Information Need

* Real Property Index for Army Installations
* Executive Summary - Economic Impacts by State/Installation

2. TABS cannot provide the following:

Information Need	Reason
* RAND Study of Language Training Alternatives	One does not exist per RAND/ARSTAF

3. TABS will provide the following as soon as possible:

Information Need

* Documentation for all alternatives
* Data call responses with documentation for any changes
* Breakout of 45k force structure reduction by installation
* Breakout of Depot maintenance capabilities
* COBRA Screen 4 for all installations
* Base Operating Support Manpower Data

4. Information provided will also been provided to each Congressional Library. The information forwarded is accurate and complete to the best of our knowledge and belief.

MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, The Army Basing Study

Department of the Army
Office of the Chief of Staff
The Army Basing Study

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for the Secretary of the Army, December 9, 1994, 1530-1730 hours

1. The purpose of this meeting was to:

a. prepare for the decision briefing, scheduled for December 22nd,
b. provide information on the overall strategy for BRAC 95, preliminary recommendations and the Joint Cross Service Groups.

2. Principal attendees: Mr. West, Mr. Reeder (Undersecretary), GEN Tilelli (Vice Chief of Staff), Mr. Walker (Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics & Environment), Mr. Coleman (General Counsel), Mr. Baskir (Principal Deputy General Counsel), and Mr Takakoshi (Special Assistant to the Undersecretary). COL Jones (Director,TABS) gave the briefing.

3. After discussing the purpose of the meeting, COL Jones stated BRAC 95 holds the promise of producing greater savings and a quicker return on investment than the previous rounds combined. He explained that a strategy which minimizes cost and maximizes savings seems to be advantageous to the Army. After reviewing major milestones to date, he reported TABS is evaluating whether the recent force structure announcement affects any analyses. COL Jones highlighted the remaining study candidates (36 installations and 9 leases) and identified an additional 13 minor installations recently declared excess by major commands. Although any BRAC action involving these properties would be below threshold, he explained the advantages of including them in the BRAC process. COL Jones surveyed each of the installations and leases on the preliminary list of recommendations, addressing pertinent operational and financial considerations.

4. There was general agreement on the desirability of adding the 13 minor installations to the BRAC process. There was a general discussion of the recent force structure announcement and whether that announcement would have an effect on any study candidate. It was felt that the announcement could have implications for Fort Drum only. The Secretary returned Fort Drum to the current list of active study candidates. After listening to the information presented, Secretary West also moved Fort Dix and Fort Buchanan from the category of "unlikely" recommendations to the category of "likely" recommendations. He expressed overall satisfaction with the briefing.

Enclosure
- Briefing Slides

Mr. Nerger/697-1766
Approved by: COL M. Jones

BRAC 95

IN PROGRESS REVIEW

9 DEC 94

PURPOSE

- PREPARE FOR DECISION BRIEFING ON 22 DEC
- PROVIDE INFORMATION ON:
  - BRAC 95 STRATEGY
  - PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS
  - JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUPS



BRAC PERSPECTIVE

	# INSTALLATIONS (CLOSURE / REALIGNMENT)	COST	SAVINGS
BRAC 88	77 / 57	$1.4 B	$259 M
BRAC 91	5 / 23	$1.6 B	$304 M
BRAC 93	1 / 3	$ .3 B	$ 53 M
TOTAL	83 / 83	$3.3 B	$616 M

CUM



BRAC 95 STRATEGY



BALANCED APPROACH THAT:

- FOCUSES ON FUTURE - FORCE XXI
- CONSISTENT WITH STATIONING STRATEGY
- MEETS OSD EXPECTATIONS (ROBUST LIST)
- MAXIMIZES SAVINGS / MINIMIZES COST

UNDERSTANDING TRADE-OFFS

	CLOSE 1 HIGH COST INSTALLATION	CLOSE 22 OTHER* LOWER COST INSTALLATIONS
COST	$ 688 M	$ 691 M
STEADY STATE SAVINGS	$ 118 M	$ 592 M
PAYBACK	6 YEARS (2005)	1 YEAR (1999)
PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE (PRV)	$1,721 M	$ 9,961 M
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) (20 YEARS)	$ 827 M	$ 6,950 M

*OTHER

STRATFORD ENGINE PLANT (C)
SIERRA DEPOT (C)
DETROIT TANK PLANT (R)
SELFRIDGE (C)
PRICE SUPPORT CTR (R)
FT PICKETT (C)
FT CHAFFEE (C)
RED RIVER DEPOT (R)
FITZSIMMONS AMC (C)
FT INDIANTOWN GAP (C)
SENECA DEPOT (C)
FT HUNTER LIGGETT (R)
FT HAMILTON (C)
FT GREELEY (R)
CROWN RIDGE (L) (R)
SAVANNA (R)
FT RITCHIE (C)
BAYONNE (C)
KELLY SUPPORT (C)
DUGWAY PG (R)
HQ, ATCOM (L) (R)
CAA (L) (R)

C - CLOSURE
R - REALIGN
L - LEASE

BOTTOM LINE:

- 5 TIMES THE ANNUAL SAVINGS
- 6 YEARS SOONER BREAK-EVEN
- 6 TIMES THE PRV
- 8 TIMES THE NPV

ARMY BRAC 95 PROCESS

FEB 94
97 INSTALLATIONS
15 LEASES

ORIGINAL STUDY LIST

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

AUG 94
45 INSTALLATIONS
15 LEASES

REDUCED STUDY LIST THROUGH MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT



INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

OCT 94
36 INSTALLATIONS
9 LEASES

REDUCED STUDY LIST DUE TO HIGH COST & INFEASIBILITY

JAN 95
PRELIMINARY LIST

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

CURRENT BRAC 95 STUDY CANDIDATES



MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS

1. FT RILEY
2. ~~FT DRUM~~
3. FT RICHARDSON
4. ~~FT WAINWRIGHT~~

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. FT AP HILL
2. FT CHAFFEE
3. FT GREELY
4. FT PICKETT
5. FT DIX
6. FT HUNTER LIGGETT
7. FT INDIANTOWN GAP
8. FT McCOY

PROVING GROUNDS

1. DUGWAY PG

TRAINING SCHOOLS

1. FT EUSTIS/STORY
2. FT LEE
3. FT McCLELLAN
4. ~~PRESIDIO, MONTEREY~~
5. FT LEONARD WOOD

C2/ADMIN CENTERS

1. PRICE SPT CENTER
2. FT BUCHANAN
3. ~~FT GILLEM~~
4. FT MEADE
5. FT MONROE
6. FT RITCHIE
7. KELLY SPT CENTER
8. FT HAMILTON
9. ~~FT TOTTEN~~
10. ~~PRESIDIO, SF~~
11. SELFRIDGE

COMMODITY INSTALLATIONS

1. NATICK RDEC
2. PICATINNY
3. ~~COLD REGION LAB~~

AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. SAVANNA DEPOT
2. SENECA DEPOT
3. SIERRA DEPOT
4. ~~PUEBLO DEPOT~~
5. ~~UMATILLA DEPOT~~

PORTS

1. BAYONNE
2. OAKLAND

MEDICAL FACILITIES

1. FITZSIMONS AMC

DEPOTS / INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

1. LETTERKENNY DEPOT
2. RED RIVER DEPOT
3. LIMA TANK PLANT
4. STRATFORD ENG PLANT
5. (DETROIT TANK PLANT)

LEASES

1. HQ AMC
2. HQ ATCOM
3. ~~HQ PERSCOM~~
4. USA PERS CTR
5. ~~HQ SDC~~
6. BAILEY'S X-ROAD
7. ~~USA SPACE COM~~
8. CAA
9. ~~ARO~~
10. PARK CTR
11. BALLSTON-WEBB
12. CRYSTAL CITY
13. ~~FOREIGN TECH~~
14. ~~JAG SCHOOL~~
15. MELPAR / CROWN RIDGE

MINOR INSTALLATIONS (13)

EAST FT BAKER, CA
CAMP BONNEVILLE, WA
BELLMORE, WA
SIEVER-SANDBERG, NJ
CAMP KILMER, NJ
FT MISSOULA, MT
BIG COPPETT KEY, GA
RIO VISTA USARC, CA
SUDBURY TRAINING ANNEX, MA
HINGHAM [illegible]ASSET USARC, MA
RECREATION CENTER #2, NC
BRANCH USDB, LOMPOC, CA
BALTIMORE PUBS CENTER, M

LETTERKENNY DEPOT, PA

FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

COST: $ 105 M

ROI: IMMEDIATE (1999)

ANNUAL SAVINGS: $ 118 M

POM NET: $ 253 M

20 YR NPV: $ 1.4 B

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

- RECEIVED DOD MISSILE WORKLOAD IN BRAC 93
- AMC DOES NOT SUPPORT CLOSURE
- STATIONING STRATEGY SUPPORTS 3 DEPOTS VICE 5
- JCSG IDENTIFIED LETTERKENNY AND RED RIVER DEPOTS FOR CLOSURE
- SOME RISK TO WARTIME CORE, NONE TO FUNDED WORKLOAD

BOTTOM LINE

IMMEDIATE PAYOFF
BUT SOME OPERATIONAL RISK

PICATINNY, NJ

FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

COST: $ 236 M

ROI: 6 YEARS (2004)

ANNUAL SAVINGS: $ 47 M

POM NET: - $ 75 M

20 YR NPV: $ 388 M

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

- LOW MILITARY VALUE
- CONSOLIDATION SUPPORTED BY STATIONING STRATEGY
- AMC MAY NOT SUPPORT
- POTENTIAL RECEIVER FOR OTHER MILDEP WORKLOAD

BOTTOM LINE

MODERATE PAYOFF
ANALYSIS SUPPORTS CLOSURE

SUBJECT TO LAB
JCSG ANALYSIS

RECOMMENDATIONS
UNLIKELY

	RATIONALE
FORSCOM	
FT AP HILL	OPERATIONALLY INFEASIBLE DUE TO RC TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
FT DIX	BRAC LANGUAGE CHANGE TO ELIMINATE AC GARRISON, AND IS OPERATIONALLY INFEASIBLE DUE TO RC TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
FT McCOY	OPERATIONALLY INFEASIBLE DUE TO RC TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
FT RILEY	HIGH COST ($688 M), UNABLE TO EXCUTE STATIONING STRATEGY
FT BUCHANAN	BRAC 91 REJECTION, INFEASIBLE DUE TO ENCLAVE REQUIREMENTS
AMC	
LIMA TANK PLANT	REQUIRE 1 TANK PLANT - DETROIT TANK PLANT RECOMMENDED
TRADOC	
FT LEONARD WOOD	HIGH COST ($632 M) - RECOMMEND FT McCLELLAN
FT MONROE	BRAC 93 REJECTION, JOINT WARFARE CENTER
FT EUSTIS	HIGH COST ($832 M), LONG PAY-OFF 10 YEARS
FT LEE	BRAC 93 REJECTION, HIGH COST ($703 M), LONG PAY-OFF 30 YEARS
USARPAC	
FT RICHARDSON	SIGNIFICANT COST ($373 M), UNIQUE ENVIRONMENT
MDW	
NCR LEASES*	LONG PAY-OFF 16 YEARS
FT MEADE	HIGH COST ($648 M), LONG PAY-OFF 11 YEARS
HQ, AMC LEASE	LONG PAY-OFF 26 YEARS
OTHER	
USAR PERSONNEL CTR LEASE	LONG PAY-OFF 29 YEARS

* INCLUDES BAILEY'S CROSS ROADS, CRYSTAL CITY, BALLSTON, AND WEBB

MILDEP - JCSG INTEGRATION

DEC — JAN

JCSG ALTERNATIVES

INITIAL IMPRESSION REPORT

ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATION

ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS

- GREATLY COMPRESSED CYCLE
- DEMANDS TRI-SERVICE COOPERATION
- INCOMPLETE ANALYSIS MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP ALTERNATIVES SUMMARY

JCSG	GENERAL	ARMY IMPACT	1st IMPRESSION *
TEST & EVALUATION	REALIGN MINOR WORKLOAD	GAINERS: YUMA, WHITE SANDS, HUACHUCA LOSERS: RUCKER, REDSTONE	NO BRAC IMPACT
LABORATORIES	REALIGN MINOR WORKLOAD	GAINERS: PICATINNY, MONMOUTH, REDSTONE, ADELPHI LOSERS: REDSTONE, RUCKER, ARI	SUPPORTS PICATINNY RETENTION/ OTHERS UNDER REVIEW
UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING	AF & NAVY LOSE 2&3 INSTALLATIONS; ARMY GAINS HEL UPT	GAINERS: RUCKER LOSERS: NONE	NO EFFECT ON ARMY RECOMMENDATION
MEDICAL	AF LOSES 3 MEDCEN & 5 HOSPITALS; NAVY LOSES 2 HOSPITALS; ARMY LOSES 1 MEDCEN & 5 HOSPITALS	GAINERS: WALTER REED LOSERS: FITZSIMMONS, MEADE, BELVOIR, LEE, McCLELLAN, RUCKER	SUPPORTS FITZSIMMONS RECOMMENDATION / OTHERS UNDER REVIEW
DEPOT	NAVY LOSES 4-5 DEPOTS AF LOSES 1-2 DEPOTS ARMY LOSES 2 DEPOTS	GAINERS: ANNISTON, TOBYHANNA LOSERS: RED RIVER, LETTERKENNY, ANNISTON	SUPPORTS LETTERKENNY AND RED RIVER RECOMMENDATIONS

* PREMATURE TO ESTABLISH ARMY POSITION

BRAC SUMMARY



- CLOSES / REALIGNS 25 - 27 INSTALLATIONS (+ 13 SMALLER SITES)
  - 1-TIME COST: $ 1.1 B - $1.5 B
  - ANNUAL SAVINGS: $0.7 B - $0.9 B
  - 20 YR NET PRESENT VALUE: $7.8 B - $9.6 B
  - CIVILIAN REDUCTIONS: 7.8 - 9.6 K
  - MILITARY SPACE SAVINGS: 638 - 864

BRAC RESULTS

- REDUCES INFRASTRUCTURE AND OVERHEAD SIGNIFICANTLY
- PRODUCES SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS QUICKLY AT AN AFFORDABLE COST
- RETAINS INSTALLATIONS WITH HIGH MILITARY VALUE FOR FUTURE
- MINIMIZES LOSS TO MANEUVER LAND
- COMPLETES RESHAPING EFFORT BEGUN IN BRAC 88
- REFLECTS JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS RECOMMENDATIONS



OTHER ALTERNATIVES
($M)

PACKAGE	1 TIME COST	STEADY STATE SAVINGS	ROI YEAR	POM NET	20 YR NPV	REASON
FT LEONARD WOOD	554	43	2017	-478	-29	COST/McCLELLEN
FT RILEY	682	118	2005	-324	853	COST
FT EUSTIS	832	99	2008	-506	476	COST/LEE
FT AP HILL	4	12	1998	39	155	RC REQUIRED
FT DIX	19	52	1998	167	667	RC REQUIRED
FT McCOY	33	79	1998	248	1,004	RC REQUIRED
FT BUCHANAN	70	24	2001	12	238	QUALITY OF LIFE
FT MONROE	108	20	2005	-63	134	BRAC 93 REJECTION
FT MEADE	847	63	2016	-669	-36	COST/LEASES
LIMA TANK PLANT	2	1	2002	0	5	DETROIT TANK
DUGWAY PG	28	17	2002	-3	66	SAFARI COST
USA PERSONAL CTR (L)	47	4	2013	-35	6	LONG ROI
BAILEY'S X-ROADS (L) / BALLSTON (L)	28	2	2021	-23	-5	LONG ROI
CRYSTAL CITY (L)	5	0	100+	-4	-3	LONG ROI

POM NET AND 20 YR NPV

NEG - INVESTMENT STILL NOT RECOVERED
POS - SAVINGS ABOVE RECOVERED INVESTMENT

SUMMARY

HIGH PAYOFFS (29)

FT RICHARDSON (C)
FT CHAFFEE (C)
FT PICKETT (C)
FT INDIANTOWN GAP (C)
FT RITCHIE (C)
SAVANNA DEPOT (C)
SENECA DEPOT (C)
SIERRA DEPOT (C)
RED RIVER DEPOT (R)
STRATFORD ENGINE PLANT (C)
DETROIT TANK PLANT (R)
KELLY SUPPORT (C)
SELFRIDGE (C)
FT HUNTER LIGGETT (R)
FT HAMILTON (C)
FITZSIMMONS AMC (C)
FT GREELEY (R)
~~BAYONNE (C)~~
OAKLAND (C)
LETTERKENNY DEPOT (R)
PRICE SUPPORT CTR (R)
HQ, AMC (L) (R)
HQ, ATCOM (L) (R)
CAA (L) (R)
PARK CENTER (L) (R)
NATICK (C)
PICATINNY (C)
FT McCLELLAN (R)
FT LEE (C)

(C) - CLOSURE
(R) - REALIGN

OTHER ALTERNATIVES (16)

FT LEONARD WOOD	HIGH COST / SELECTED McCLELLEN
FT RILEY	HIGH COST
FT EUSTIS	HIGH COST / SELECTED LEE
FT AP HILL	RC REQUIRED
FT DIX	RC REQUIRED
FT McCOY	RC REQUIRED
FT BUCHANAN	QUALITY OF LIFE
FT MONROE	BRAC 93 REJECTION
FT MEADE	HIGH COST - RECEIVER SITE
LIMA TANK PLANT	SELECTED DETROIT
DUGWAY PG	LONG RO
USA PERSONAL (L)	LONG RO
BAILEY'S CROSS-ROADS (L)	LONG ROI
BALLSTON (L)	LONG ROI
CRYSTAL CITY (L)	LONG ROI
MELPAR (L)	NO LONGER A ACTIVE LEASE

PROPER MIX

REQUIRES JUDGMENTS
CONCERNING MILITARY VALUE
AND FISCAL CONSTRAINTS

POTENTIAL BELOW THRESHOLD MACOM ADD-ONS

- ISSUE: SHOULD ARMY ADD BELOW THRESHOLD INSTALLATIONS
- PROS
  - AMPLIFIES BRAC 95 EFFORTS
  - SUPPORTS MACOMS
  - HOUSE CLEANING
  - MINIMAL CONTROVERSY
- CONS
  - DIFFERENT PROCESS
  - MINOR SAVINGS
- RECOMMENDATION: REVIEW FOR INCLUSION ON ARMY'S LIST

INSTALLATIONS (18)

FORSCOM
EAST FT BAKER, CA
CAMP BONNEVILLE, WA
BELLMORE, WA
SIEVER-SANDBERG USARC, NJ
CAMP KILMER, NJ
FT MISSOULA, MT
BIG COPPETT KEY, GA
RIO VISTA USARC, CA
DEFENSE SUPPORT ACTIVITY-BOSTON
SUDBURY TRAINING ANNEX, MA
HINGHAM COHASSET USARC, MA
RECREATION CENTER #2, NC
BOTHELL USARC, WA
BRANCH USDB, LOMPOC, CA
FT WARDEN CEMETERY, WA
FT STEVENS CEMETERY, OR

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AMC
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MILESTONES


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PRESENT TO COMMISSION

Department of the Army
Office of the Chief of Staff
The Army Basing Study

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for the Secretary of the Army, 19 December 1994, [illegible]-1200

1. The purpose of this meeting was to:

a. prepare for the decision briefing scheduled for 22 December;

b. provide information on the overall strategy for BRAC 95, preliminary recommendations, and the Joint Cross Service Groups.

2. Principal attendees: Mr. West (SA); General Sullivan (CSA); Mr. Reeder (USofA); General Tilelli (VCSA); Mr. Walker (IL&E); Ms. Lister (M&RA); Ms. McCoy (FM&C); Mr. Decker (SARDA); Mr. Coleman (SAGC); Mr. Hamilton (SAAA); General Salomon (CG, AMC); LTG Dominy (DAS); LTG Wilson (DCSLOG); Mr. Reardon (TAG); MG Putman (DCSOPS); MG Nardotti (TJAG); MG Harrison (SALL); and BG Shane (DM). BG Shane gave the introductory portion of the briefing; COL Jones (Director, TABS) and Mr. Nerger (Deputy Director, TABS) were briefers.

3. BG Shane began the briefing with an overview of the Army's BRAC 95 strategy. Additionally, he presented the BRAC 95 process that has led to the reduction of an original study list of 97 installations and 15 leases, to the current focus on 37 installations, 9 leases, and 15 minor sites suggested by MACOMs. COL Jones then discussed the status of Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG) and gave a summary of first impressions of JCSG alternatives. COL Jones and Mr. Nerger provided TABS recommendations for closure and realignment. The 42 recommendations for closure and realignment included 24 installations, 3 leases, and 15 minor sites. A detailed discussion of each recommendation was presented to the group. Also, two installations, Picatinny Arsenal and Letterkenny Depot, were briefed as possible additions. COL Jones indicated that economic impact assessment data were tentative due to a late breaking change in the way OSD calculates it. These data will have to be recalculated.

4. The following decisions were made: (1) add Fort Totten, NY back into the study effort. Due to its interrelationship with Fort Hamilton and the recommendation of FORSCOM, further analysis supports a closer look at its potential for realignment and closure. (2) The list of 15 minor installations recommended by MACOMs will be added to the Army's study list. There were no further decisions made. Because of time constraints, the IPR will reconvene on 20 December to review the "not recommended" installations.

Enclosure
- Briefing Slides

LTC Lamb/697-1766
Approved by: COL M. Jones

ARMY BRAC 95
PRELIMINARY REALIGNMENTS & CLOSURES

FT CHAFFEE
FT GREELY
FT PICKETT
FT DIX
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
DUGWAY PROV GRD
FT McCLELLAN
PRICE SPT CTR
FT BUCHANAN
FT RITCHIE
KELLY SPT CTR
FT HAMILTON
SELFRIDGE

NATICK
SAVANNA DEPOT
SENECA DEPOT
SIERRA DEPOT
BAYONNE
OAKLAND
FITZSIMMONS AMC
RED RIVER DEPOT
STRATFORD ENG PLT
DETROIT TANK PLT
HQ, ATCOM LEASE
CAA LEASE
MELPAR/CROWN RIDGE LEASE

POM WEDGE
$729 M

RECOMMEND →

42 INSTALLATIONS / SITES
- 24 INSTALLATIONS
- 3 LEASES
- 15 MINOR SITES

COST - $ 1.3 B
ROI: IMMEDIATE (2000)
ANNUAL SAVINGS: $ 718 M
POM NET: $ 1.0 B
20 YR NPV: $ 7.9 B

MINOR SITES (15)

FT FT BAKER, CA	FT MISSOULA, MT	RECREATION CENTER #2, NC
CAMP BONNEVILLE, WA	BIG COPPETT KEY, GA	BRANCH USDB, LOMPOC, CA
BELLMORE, WA	RIO VISTA USARC, CA	BALTIMORE PUBS CENTER, MD
SILVER SANDBERG, NJ	SUDBURY TRAINING ANNEX, MA	CAVEN POINT, NJ
CAMP KIMMER, NJ	HINGHAM COHASSET USARC, MA	VALLEY GROVE LEASE, WV

POSSIBLE →

PICATINNY ARSENAL

LETTERKENNY DEPOT

2 INSTALLATIONS - THE "TOUGH CALLS"

NOT RECOMMENDED →

FT RILEY
FT DRUM
FT RICHARDSON
FT A P HILL
FT McCOY
FT EUSTIS/STORY
FT LEE
FT LEONARD WOOD

FT MEADE
FT MONROE
LIMA TANK PLT
HQ, AMC LEASE
USA PERS CTR LEASE
BAILEY'S X-ROADS LEASE
PARK CTR LEASE
BALLSTON LEASE
CRYSTAL CITY LEASE

17 INSTALLATIONS
- 11 INSTALLATIONS
- 6 LEASES
- HIGH COST
- OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

12/16/94

INSTALLATION INDEX GUIDE

RECOMMENDED

MAJOR TNG AREA	FT CHAFFEE	11
	FT GREELY	13
	FT RICKER	
	FT DIX	17
	FT HUNTER LIGGETT	21
PROVING GRD	DUGWAY PROV GRD	23
TRAIN SCH	FT McCLELLAN	25
C2 ADMIN	PRICE SPT CTR	27
	FT BUCHANAN	29
	FT RITCHIE	31
	KELLY SPT CTR	33
	FT HAMILTON	35
	FT TOTTEN	37
	SELFRIDGE	39
COMMODITIES	NATICK	41
	PICATINNY ARSENAL	43
AMMO STG	SAVANNA DEPOT	45
	SENECA DEPOT	47
	SIERRA DEPOT	49
PORTS	BAYONNE	51
	OAKLAND	53
MEDICAL	FITZSIMMONS AMC	55
DEPOT	RED RIVER DEPOT	57
	LETTERKENNY DEPOT	59
	LETTERKENNY & RED RIVER	63
INDUSTRIAL	STRATFORD ENG PLT	65
	DETROIT TANK PLANT	67
LEASES	HQ, ATCOM LEASE	69
	CAA LEASE	71
	CROWN RIDGE LEASE	73
	MINOR INSTALLATIONS	75

NOT RECOMMENDED

MANEUVER	FT RILEY	79
	FT DRUM	81
	FT BRAGG/POLK	83
MAJOR TNG AREA	FT A P HILL	85
	FT McCOY	87
TRAIN SCH	FT EUSTIS/STORY	89
	FT LEE	91
	FT LEONARD WOOD	93
C2/ADMIN	FT MEADE	95
	FT MONROE	97
INDUSTRIAL	LIMA TANK PLT	99
LEASES	HQ, AMC LEASE	101
	USA PERS CTR LEASE	103
	NCR LEASES	105
	BAILEY'S X-ROADS LEASE	
	PARK CTR LEASE	
	BALLSTON LEASE	
	CRYSTAL CITY LEASE	

PURPOSE

- PROVIDE INFORMATION ON:
  - BRAC 95 STRATEGY
  - PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS



BRAC PERSPECTIVE

	# INSTALLATIONS (CLOSURE)	# INSTALLATIONS (REALIGNMENT)	COST	SAVINGS
BRAC 88	77	57	$1.4 B	$259 M
BRAC 91	5	23	$1.6 B	$304 M
BRAC 93	1	3	$ .3 B	$ 53 M
TOTAL	83	83	$3.3 B	$616 M

CUMULATIVE
(COST + SAVINGS)



BRAC 95 STRATEGY



BALANCED APPROACH

- FOCUSES ON FUTURE - FORCE XXI
- CONSISTENT WITH STATIONING STRATEGY
- MEETS OSD EXPECTATIONS (ROBUST LIST)
- MAXIMIZES SAVINGS / MINIMIZES COST

UNDERSTANDING TRADE-OFFS

	CLOSE 1 HIGH COST INSTALLATION	CLOSE 23 OTHER* LOWER COST INSTALLATIONS
COST	$ 715 M	$ 715 M
ANNUAL SAVINGS	$ 118 M	$ 589 M
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) (20 YEARS)	$ 752 M	$ 6,826 M
PAYBACK	7 YEARS (2006)	IMMED (2000)
PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE (PRV)	$1,721 M	$ 9,961 M

*OTHER

STRATFORD ENGINE PLANT
SIERRA DEPOT
DETROIT TANK PLANT
BELFRIDGE
PRICE SUPPORT CTR
FT PICKETT
FT CHAFFEE
RED RIVER DEPOT
FITZSIMMONS AMC
FT SIDNEY DAM GAP
SENECA DEPOT
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT HAMILTON
FT GREELEY
CROWN RIDGE
SAVANNA
FT RITCHIE
BAYONNE
KELLY SUPPORT
DUGWAY PG
FT BUCHANAN
CROWN RIDGE
OAKLAND

BOTTOM LINE

- 5 TIMES THE ANNUAL SAVINGS
- 9 TIMES THE NPV
- 7 YEARS SOONER PAYBACK
- 6 TIMES THE PRV

ARMY BRAC 95 PROCESS



CURRENT BRAC 95 STUDY CANDIDATES



MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS

1. FT RILEY
2. FT DRUM
3. FT RICHARDSON
4. ~~[illegible]~~

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. FT AP HILL
2. FT CHAFFEE
3. FT GREELY
4. FT POLK
5. FT DIX
6. FT HUNTER LIGGETT
7. FT INDIANTOWN GAP
8. FT McCOY

PROVING GROUNDS

1. DUGWAY PG

TRAINING SCHOOLS

1. FT EUSTIS STORY
2. FT LEE
3. FT McCLELLAN
4. ~~PRESIDIO MONTEREY~~
5. FT LEONARD WOOD

C2/ADMIN CENTERS

1. PRICE SPT CENTER
2. FT BUCHANAN
3. ~~FT GILLEM~~
4. FT MEADE
5. FT MONROE
6. FT RITCHIE
7. KELLY SPT CENTER
8. FT HAMILTON
9. ~~FT TOTTEN~~
10. ~~PRESIDIO SF~~
11. SELFRIDGE

COMMODITY INSTALLATIONS

1. NATICK RDEC
2. PICATINNY
3. ~~COLD REGIONS CRL~~

AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. SAVANNA DEPOT
2. SENECA DEPOT
3. SIERRA DEPOT
4. ~~PUEBLO DEPOT~~
5. ~~UMATILLA DEPOT~~

PORTS

1. BAYONNE
2. OAKLAND

MEDICAL FACILITIES

1. FITZSIMONS AMC

DEPOTS / INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

1. LETTERKENNY DEPOT
2. RED RIVER DEPOT
3. LIMA TANK PLANT
4. STRATFORD ENG PLANT
5. (DETROIT TANK PLANT)

LEASES

1. HQ AMC
2. HQ ATCOM
3. ~~HQ PERSCOM~~
4. USA PERS CTR
5. ~~HQ DOC~~
6. BAILEY'S CROSSROADS
7. ~~USA SPACE COM~~
8. CAA
9. ~~SRO~~
10. PARK CTR
11. BALLSTON-WEBB
12. CRYSTAL CITY
13. ~~FORDING ROAD~~
14. ~~WARBERNOOL~~
15. MELPAR CROWN RIDGE

MINOR SITES (15)

[illegible]

TOTAL
- 37 INSTALLATIONS
- 9 LEASES
- 15 MINOR SITES

RECOMMENDATIONS

ARMY BRAC 95
PRELIMINARY REALIGNMENTS & CLOSURES

FT CHAFFEE
FT GREELY
FT PICKETT
FT DIX
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
DUGWAY PROV GRD
FT McCLELLAN
PRICE SPT CTR
FT BUCHANAN
FT RITCHIE
KELLY SPT CTR
FT HAMILTON
SELFRIDGE

NATICK
SAVANNA DEPOT
SENECA DEPOT
SIERRA DEPOT
BAYONNE
OAKLAND
FITZSIMMONS AMC
RED RIVER DEPOT
STRATFORD ENG PLT
DETROIT TANK PLT
HQ ATCOM LEASE
CAA LEASE
INELPARK/BROWN RIDGE LEASE

MINOR SITES (15)
FT MONMOUTH
BIG COPPER HOT GA
BIG BEAR LOGPOL CA
RECREATION CENTER AL MC
BRANCH USDB LOGPOL CA
BAL TRAINING PUBS CENTER MD
CAMDEN POINT NJ
VALLEY GROVE LEASE WV

POM WEDGE
$729 M

RECOMMEND →
42 INSTALLATIONS / SITES
- 24 INSTALLATIONS
- 3 LEASES
- 15 MINOR SITES

COST - $1.3 B
ROI IMMEDIATE (2000)
ANNUAL SAVINGS $718 M
POM NET $1.0 B
20 YR NPV $7.9 B

PICATINNY ARSENAL
LETTERKENNY DEPOT

POSSIBLE →
2 INSTALLATIONS -
THE "TOUGH CALLS"

FT RILEY
FT DRUM
FT McPHERSON
FT A P HILL
FT McCOY
FT BUSTIS/STORY
FT LEE
FT LEONARD WOOD

FT MEADE
FT MONROE
USA TANK PLT
HQ AMC LEASE
USA PERS CTR LEASE
BAILEY'S X-ROADS LEASE
PARK CTR LEASE
BALLSTON LEASE
CRYSTAL CITY LEASE

NOT RECOMMENDED →
17 INSTALLATIONS
- 11 INSTALLATIONS
- 6 LEASES
- HIGH COST
- OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS

DEC — JAN

4 GROUPS
- T&E
- LAB
- UPT
- MED
- DEPOT

JCSG ALTERNATIVES

ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATION

ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS

- GREATLY COMPRESSED CYCLE
- DEMANDS TRI-SERVICE COOPERATION
- INCOMPLETE ANALYSIS MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP ALTERNATIVES SUMMARY

JCSG	GENERAL	ARMY IMPACT	1st IMPRESSION *
TEST & EVALUATION	REALIGN MINOR WORKLOAD	GAINERS YUMA WHITE SANDS HUACHUCA LOSERS RUCKER REDSTONE	NO BRAC IMPACT
LABORATORIES	REALIGN MINOR WORKLOAD	GAINERS PICATINNY MONMOUTH REDSTONE ADELPHI LOSERS REDSTONE RUCKER ARI	SUPPORTS PICATINNY RETENTION OTHERS UNDER REVIEW
UNDERGRADUUATE PILOT TRAINING	AF & NAVY LOSE 2&3 INSTALLATIONS ARMY GAINS HEL UPT	GAINERS RUCKER LOSERS NONE	NO EFFECT ON ARMY RECOMMENDATION
MEDICAL	AF LOSES 3 MEDCEN & 5 HOSPITALS NAVY LOSES 2 HOSPITALS ARMY LOSES 1 MEDCEN & 5 HOSPITALS	GAINERS WALTER REED LOSERS FITZSIMMONS MEADE BELVOIR LEE McCLELLAN RUCKER	SUPPORTS FITZSIMMONS RECOMMENDATION / OTHERS UNDER REVIEW
DEPOT	NAVY LOSES 4-5 DEPOTS AF LOSES 1-2 DEPOTS ARMY LOSES 2 DEPOTS	GAINERS ANNISTON TOBYHANNA LOSERS RED RIVER LETTERKENNY ANNISTON	SUPPORTS LETTERKENNY AND RED RIVER RECOMMENDATIONS

* PREMATURE TO ESTABLISH ARMY POSITION

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
FT POLK
FT IRWIN
FT. DIX
FT. A.P. HILL
FT. BRAGG
FT. GREELY
FT. HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETT
FT. INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE

FORT CHAFFEE, AR



FT CHAFFEE → GARRISON

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 12
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 3
TOTAL	$ 12

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMED
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1999
STEADY STATE ($M)	$23 (1999)
20 YEAR NPV($M)	$286

CLOSE FT CHAFFEE

- ENCLAVE RC BLDG AND RETAIN SMALL ARMS RANGES FOR USE BY RC

IMPACT SUMMARY
FT CHAFFEE, AR

OPERATIONAL:

- No unacceptable adverse operational impacts due to closure
- Supports 9+ RC BNS training ; can divert to other installations
- BRAC 91 Commission retained AC garrison to support RC training after JRTC left
- Provides DS/GS maint for USAR in Northern AR, Northeast TX, Southeast OK

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	2	187
REALIGNMENTS	37	26

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.9 % direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 86K.

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close Ft Chaffee (no enclave)
- Cost = $ 46 M
- Payback = 2 years

FORT GREELY, AK

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT A.P. HILL
FT MCCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE

Fort Wainwright

Cold Regions Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC)

Fort Greely



COSTS ($M)

O&M	8
MILCON	12
OTHER	3
TOTAL	23

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	1
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1999
STEADY STATE ($M)	20 (1999)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	243

REALIGN FT GREELY
- MOVE UNITS TO FT WAINWRIGHT
- DOWNSIZE GARRISON
- "SAFARI" TO FT GREELY FOR CRTA & NWTC
- NO RC ENCLAVE NEEDED
- RETAIN SMALL CARETAKER FORCE

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT GREELY, AK

OPERATIONAL:
- Home of Cold Regions Test Activity & Northern Warfare Training Center
- Closure operationally infeasible because of NWTC & CRTA rqmts
- Realignment retains cold weather testing at FGA
- Keeps open test site at Bolio Lake and Black Rapids for Northern Warfare Training Center
- No recommendations from any previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	150	126
REALIGNMENTS	259	56

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations; however, an inactive nuclear power plant is located on main post. Scheduled to be removed in 2023.

ECONOMIC: 45 % direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 2,100

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
(1) Delta Junction's public school is located on Ft Greely
(2) Delta Junction's morale/welfare needs are accommodated by Ft Greely

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT A P HILL
FT McCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE

FORT PICKETT, VA



FT PICKETT → GARRISON

CLOSE FT PICKETT

- ENCLAVE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND TRAINING AREA FOR RC

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 12
MILCON	$ 12
OTHER	$
TOTAL	$ 24

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMD
BREAK EVEN YEAR	IMMD
STEADY STATE ($M)	$22 (2001)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	$254

IMPACT SUMMARY
FT. PICKETT, VA

OPERATIONAL:
- Supports 4+ RC BNS
- Mobilization site for one enhanced brigade
- Army Reserve installation
- Only FORSCOM petroleum training module (FPTM).
- Provides water and sewage treatment to town of Blackstone, VA
- BRAC 91 Commission's recommendation to transfer to RC rejected

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	8	226
REALIGNMENTS	1	19

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significations limitations

ECONOMIC: 5 % direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 16K.

OTHER SERVICE DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close (no enclave)
- Cost = $62 M
- Payback = 3 yrs

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

FT DIX
FT A.P. HILL
FT McCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETT
FT BOWLING GREEN

FORT DIX, NJ



FT DIX → AC GARRISON

REALIGN FT DIX, NJ

- ENCLAVE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND TRAINING AREA FOR RC
- TRANSFER TO USAR COMMAND

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 25
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 1
TOTAL	$ 26

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMD
BREAK EVEN YEAR	IMMD
STEADY STATE ($M)	$52 (2001)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	$ 634

IMPACT SUMMARY
FT. DIX, NJ

OPERATIONAL:
- BRAC 91 Commission: "Realign to support RC through retention of AC Garrison and essential facilities (which include portions of Walston Army Hospital and housing facilities), ranges and training areas".
- Supports 15+ RC BNs ; training area being retained
- Closing trng area causes 5 RC BNs to travel > 300 miles.

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	7	483
REALIGNMENTS	303	46

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC:
0.4 % direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 2.3 M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, FBI, Federal Corrections, NJ Police Academy, Pemberton School, NJ Prisons

MAJOR TENANTS
Army (1027)
Federal Corrections (600) (3200)
NJ State Police Academy (200)
Pemberton School (425)
Air Mobility Warfare Center (228)
AF Hospital (392)
Army Reserve (188)
National Guard (23)
Other (1505)
Total Pop 7.8 K

Housing
Army 526
Other 671

Acres:
Cantonment: 4.2 K
Training 26.6 K

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Closing Ft. Dix is operationally infeasible due to RC trng requirement
Cost = $190 M / Payback = 3 yrs

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT A.P. HILL
FT. MCCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CA

FT BLISS

TEC

FT HUNTER LIGGETT

GARRISON

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 4
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 2
TOTAL	$ 6

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 1

BREAK EVEN YEAR 1999

STEADY STATE ($M) $ 6 (1999)

20 YEAR NPV ($M) $ 72

REALIGN FT HUNTER LIGGETT

- Move Texcom to Ft Bliss (only active mission)
- Retain minimum essential facilities for enclave
- Retain training area

IMPACT SUMMARY
FT. HUNTER LIGGETT, CA

OPERATIONAL:

- Army Reserve installation
- Supports 15+ RC BNS training.
- Closing will cause 12+ BNS to travel over 300 miles to train

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	17	5
REALIGNMENTS	376	80

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 1.1% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 154K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT A.P. HILL
FT MCCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT. CHAFFEE

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA



FT INDIANTOWN GAP → GARRISON

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 12
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 1
TOTAL	$ 13

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	1
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1999
STEADY STATE ($M)	$22 (1999)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	$280

CLOSE FT INDIANTOWN GAP

- RETAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES FOR RC ENCLAVE

IMPACT SUMMARY
FT. INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

OPERATIONAL:
- Large mobilization mission
- Support 8+ RC BNS training
- State owned property leased by active component
- Maintains enclave for EOD team and RC
- BRAC 91 Commission's recommendation to transfer to RC rejected

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	4	315
REALIGNMENTS	132	70

ENVIRONMENTAL: No signification limitations.

ECONOMIC: 0.5% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 314 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close (no enclave) Ft Indiantown Gap
- Cost = $323 M
- Payback = 11 years

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
WHITE SANDS
YUMA
ABERDEEN
DUGWAY

DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS



REALIGN DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS

- CLOSE ENGLISH VILLAGE
- RELOCATE SMOKE & TROPIC TESTING TO YUMA
- RELOCATE CHEM / BIO TESTING TO ABERDEEN
- RETAIN UNIQUE TESTING FACILITIES

COSTS ($M)

O&M	18
MILCON	10
OTHER	1
TOTAL	29

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMED
BREAK EVEN YEAR	IMMED
STEADY STATE ($M)	27 (2000)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	318

IMPACT SUMMARY
DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS, UT

OPERATIONAL:
- Only DoD site that performs defense tests using lethal agents
- Transfer of Smoke / Obscurants to Yuma requires permitting (2 Yr lead)
- Includes "Safari" test costs – $2.6M/ year per diem
- 167 personnel retained as warm-bed force
- No recommendations during previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		329
REALIGNMENTS	149	173

ENVIRONMENTAL: None

ECONOMIC: 16 % direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 12K
Reuse opportunity very limited
State interested in obtaining the housing

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: Adjoins USAF Utah Test & Training Range

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED Closure operationally infeasible

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

TRAINING SCHOOLS
FT BLISS
FT BENNING
FT JACKSON
FT KNOX
FT GORDON
FT SILL
FT HUACHUCA
FT RUCKER
FT SAM HOUSTON

FT LEONARD WOOD
FT McCLELLAN
FT LEE
FT EUSTIS / FT STORY
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY

FORT MCCLELLAN



COSTS ($M)

O&M	37
MILCON	200
OTHER	21
TOTAL	258

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	6
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2005
STEADY STATE ($M)	47 (2000)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	350

CLOSE McCLELLAN
- RELOCATE MP & CM SCHs TO LEONARD WOOD
- RELOCATE POLYGRAPH INSTITUTE TO JACKSON
- RELOCATE BASIC TNG FROM LW TO SILL KNOX & JACKSON
- RC ENCLAVE
- LICENSE PELHAM RANGE TO ALABAMA NATIONAL GUARD

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

THE ARMY BASING STUDY

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT MCCLELLAN, AL

OPERATIONAL:
- DoD's recommendation to close rejected by Commission during BRAC 91 and BRAC 93
- Collocates Engineer, Military Police, and Chemical training schools IAW Stationing Strategy
- Rebuilds CDTF at Leonard Wood ($30 mil)
- Increased cost due to:
  - ITRO decision which added approximately 1600 students & trainers that used much of excess facilities
  - new barracks standard (1 + 1 instead of 2 + 2)

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	STUDENTS
REDUCTIONS	230	537	
REALIGNMENTS	2384	764	7620

ENVIRONMENTAL: CDTF requires expedited permitting before Commission convenes

ECONOMIC: 22% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 48K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close Leonard Wood and realign Engineer School to McClellan and BT to Sill, Knox and Jackson. Cost = $ 612M / 8 yrs

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

THE ARMY BASING STUDY

RECENT MILESTONES

11 AUG	STUDY CANDIDATE BRIEF	(SA / CSA)
23 SEP	BRIEF DEPSECDEF	(SA / CSA)
29 SEP	BRAC REVIEW GROUP	(USofA / VCSA)
11 OCT	MID - COURSE GUIDANCE	(USofA / VCSA)
4 NOV	BRAC REVIEW GROUP	(VCSA / ASA)

ARMY BRAC PROCESS

- APPROVE STUDY CANDIDATES
- DEVELOP BRAC ALTERNATIVES
- PERFORM ANALYSIS
  - OPERATIONAL
  - FINANCIAL (COBRA MODEL)
  - ENVIRONMENTAL
  - ECONOMIC (OSD MODEL)
- REFINE STUDY LIST



MID - COURSE GUIDANCE

- REASONS TO DISCONTINUE STUDY
  - IF COST PROHIBITIVE
  - IF UNABLE TO EXECUTE
- ADVANTAGES
  - FOCUSES ANALYSIS ON REMAINDER
  - BETTER POSTURED TO INTEGRATE JCSG INPUT
- RESULTS
  - 45 ACTIVE STUDIES
  - STILL 3 1/2 TIMES AS MANY CANDIDATES AS IN BRAC 93

STUDY CANDIDATES BRAC 95



MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS

1. FT RILEY
2. ~~FT DRUM~~
3. FT RICHARDSON
4. ~~FT WAINWRIGHT~~

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. FT AP HILL
2. FT CHAFFEE
3. FT GREELY
4. FT PICKETT
5. FT DIX
6. FT HUNTER LIGGETT
7. FT INDIANTOWN GAP
8. FT McCOY

PROVING GROUNDS

1. DUGWAY PG

TRAINING SCHOOLS

1. FT EUSTIS/STORY
2. FT LEE
3. FT McCLELLAN
4. ~~PRESIDIO, MONTERY~~
5. FT LEONARD WOOD

C2/ADMIN CENTERS

1. PRICE SPT CENTER
2. FT BUCHANAN
3. ~~FT GILLEM~~
4. FT MEADE
5. FT MONROE
6. FT RITCHIE
7. KELLY SPT CENTER
8. FT HAMILTON
9. ~~FT TOTTEN~~
10. ~~PRESIDIO, SF~~
11. SELFRIDGE

COMMODITY INSTALLATIONS

1. NATICK RDEC
2. PICATINNY
9. ~~COLD REGION LAB~~

AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. SAVANNA DEPOT
2. SENECA DEPOT
3. SIERRA DEPOT
4. ~~PUEBLO DEPOT~~
5. ~~UMATILLA DEPOT~~

PORTS

1. BAYONNE
2. OAKLAND

MEDICAL FACILITIES

1. FITZSIMONS AMC

DEPOTS / INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

1. LETTERKENNY DEPOT
2. RED RIVER DEPOT
3. LIMA TANK PLANT
4. STRATFORD ENG PLANT
5. (DETROIT TANK PLANT)

LEASES

1. HQ AMC
2. HQ ATCOM
3. ~~HQ PERSCOM~~
4. USA PERS CTR
5. ~~HQ SDC~~
6. BAILEY'S X-ROAD
7. ~~USA SPACE COM~~
8. CAA
9. ~~ARO~~
10. PARK CTR
11. BALLSTON-WEBB
12. CRYSTAL CITY
13. ~~FOREIGN TECH~~
14. ~~JAG SCHOOL~~
15. MELPAR BLDG

45 OF ORIGINAL 60 CANDIDATE INSTALLATIONS REMAIN FOR BRAC 95

~~ STUDY DISCONTINUED 11 OCT

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS

JCSG		STATUS	ANTICIPATED IMPACT
LABS	------	ALTERNATIVES RECEIVED	WORKLOAD SHIFTS
DEPOTS	------	ALTERNATIVES BY MID-NOV	1 TO 2 DEPOTS
MEDICAL	------	"	UNKNOWN
T & E	------	"	WORKLOAD SHIFTS
UPT	------	"	CONSOLIDATION AT FT RUCKER

AFFORDABILITY ISSUES

- SMALL POM WEDGE $ 729M
- MIX OF INSTALLATIONS IS CRUCIAL
- ARMY CAN ACHIEVE AN AGGRESSIVE BRAC BY IDENTIFING INSTALLATIONS THAT:
  - MINIMIZE UP FRONT COST
  - MAXIMIZE SAVINGS IN THE OUT YEARS
  - ACHIEVE SAVINGS QUICKLY

STRATEGY

- OPTIMIZE POM WEDGE ($729M)
  - MAXIMIZE # INSTALLATIONS
  - MAXIMIZE OPERATIONAL BENEFIT TO ARMY
- BUILD OPTION PACKAGES
- DEVELOP RESOURCE PLAN TO IMPLEMENT OPTION PACKAGES
- BE PREPARED TO SEEK ADDITIONAL DOD FUNDS
- DEVELOP AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

MILESTONES


NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
ARMY
17
USA/CSA IPR
22
ARSTAFF
1
PBC
5
SELCOM
HQDA REVIEWS
19
SA/CSA
3
FINALIZE PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS
2
SUPPORT OSD EVALUATION OF ARMY RECOMMENDATION
9
PUBLISH ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS
13
PRESENT TO OSD
JCSG / OSD REQUIREMENTS
23
JCSG ALTERNATIVES
7
INITIAL RESPONSE
11
EVALUATION OF JCSG ALTERNATIVES (INCL COBRA)
2
HQDA REVIEW
SA/CSA
3
CUM ECONOMIC ANALYSIS JCSG REVIEW
22
SECDEF APPROVAL
27
PUBLISH OSD RECOMMENDATIONS
1
PRESENT TO COMMISSION

Department of the Army
Office of the Chief of Staff
The Army Basing Study

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for the Undersecretary of the Army and Vice Chief of Staff, November 17, 1994, 1430-1530 hours

1. The purpose of this meeting was to:

a. reexamine two maneuver installations (Ft Drum & Ft Wainwright) and obtain a decision whether the most current data support keeping them off the active study list;
b. provide information on preliminary cost assessments and an approach for making an affordability assessment for BRAC 95;
c. obtain approval to evaluate a number of smaller, below-threshold sites for possible inclusion in the BRAC process;
d. review the remaining milestones for BRAC 95.

2. Principal attendees: Mr. Reeder (Undersecretary), GEN Tilelli (Vice Chief of Staff), Mr. Walker (Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics & Environment), LTG Dominy (Director of the Army Staff), MG Putman (Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans), Mr. Stockdale (Deputy General Counsel), BG Shane (Director of Managernent), BG Heebner (Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation) and Ms Menig (Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management). COL Jones (Director,TABS) gave the briefing.

3. After reviewing the two maneuver bases, COL Jones advised that the updated analyses warranted keeping them off the active study list. Next, he discussed plans for upcoming deliberative sessions and reminded everyone that all recommendations must be consistent with the force structure plan and are evaluated in terms of DoD's selection criteria. While noting that each recommendation must stand on its own financially, he explained the desirability of pursuing an overall strategy which addresses the financial implications of the BRAC 95 recommendations as a whole. He added that preliminary analyses showed that a significant number of closures and realignments were possible. COL Jones requested permission to review a list of excess real property holdings recently submitted by the major commands. Although any BRAC action involving these properties would be below threshold, he explained the advantages of including them in the the BRAC process. Lastly, COL Jones reviewed major milestones for BRAC 95.

4. The Undersecretary and Vice Chief of Staff revalidated the original decision on October 11 to discontinue study of Fort Drum and Fort Wainwright and asked TABS to review the below-threshold sites for possible inclusion in the final list. They expressed general agreement with the need for developing an overall strategy for BRAC 95.

Enclosure
- Briefing Slides

Mr. Nerger/697-1766
Approved by: COL M. Jones

DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BRAC 95

USA / VCSA UPDATE

17 NOV 94

CURRENT BRAC 95 STUDY CANDIDATES

MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS

1. FT RILEY
2. ~~FT DRUM~~
3. FT RICHARDSON
4. ~~FT WAINWRIGHT~~

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. FT AP HILL
2. FT CHAFFEE
3. FT GREELY
4. FT PICKETT
5. FT DIX
6. FT HUNTER LIGGETT
7. FT INDIANTOWN GAP
8. FT McCOY

PROVING GROUNDS

1. DUGWAY PG

TRAINING SCHOOLS

1. FT EUSTIS/STORY
2. FT LEE
3. FT McCLELLAN
4. ~~PRESIDIO, MONTEREY~~
5. FT LEONARD WOOD

C2/ADMIN CENTERS

1. PRICE SPT CENTER
2. FT BUCHANAN
3. ~~FT GILLEM~~
4. FT MEADE
5. FT MONROE
6. FT RITCHIE
7. KELLY SPT CENTER
8. FT HAMILTON
9. ~~FT TOTTEN~~
10. ~~PRESIDIO, SF~~
11. SELFRIDGE

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2. PICATINNY
3. ~~COLD REGION LAB~~

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2. HQ ATCOM
3. ~~HQ PERSCOM~~
4. USA PERS CTR
5. ~~HQ SDC~~
6. BAILEY'S X-ROAD
7. ~~USA SPACE COM~~
8. CAA
9. ~~ARO~~
10. PARK CTR
11. BALLSTON-WEBB
12. CRYSTAL CITY
13. ~~FOREIGN TECH~~
14. ~~JAG SCHOOL~~
15. MELPAR BLDG

97 ORIGINAL INSTALLATIONS
- REDUCED TO 60 ON 11 AUG
- REDUCED TO 45 ON 11 OCT

~~ DISCONTINUED STUDY 11 OCT

FORT DRUM, NY



MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

- FT HOOD
- FT LEWIS
- FT BRAGG
- FT STEWART
- FT CARSON
- FT CAMPBELL
- SCHOFIELD BRKS

- FT RILEY
- FT DRUM
- FT WAINWRIGHT
- FT RICHARDSON

450/100



COSTS ($M)	ORIGINAL	NEW
O&M	98	81
MILCON	243	229
AFH	313	313
OTHER	299	269
TOTAL	953	892

ORIGINAL

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 10
BREAK EVEN YEAR 2009
STEADY STATE ($M) 127 (2000)

NEW

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 9
BREAK EVEN YEAR 2008
STEADY STATE ($M) 116 (2000)

REALIGN FT DRUM

- INACTIVATE 2AD HQS, SPT CAP, AND ONE BDE AT HOOD
- REMAINING 2AD BDE TO CARSON & REFLAG AS 3RD BDE, 4ID
- MOVE LT DIV TO HOOD
- RETAIN RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE AT DRUM

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT DRUM, NY

OPERATIONAL:
- Option maintains 10th ID (-) integrity
- Based on available land and range resources
- Five maneuver brigades remain at Hood
- Retains Drum's training land

PERSONNEL:

	ORIGINAL		NEW	
	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	328	578	341	1,095
REALIGNMENTS	14,185	1,102	14,040	195

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 38% direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 39,500

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
(1) Potentially large leased buyout costs for 801 housing, water & sewage, and heat plant
(2) New post, most facilities are 10 years old
(3) Large RC training facility - largest in NE - Mob Station for 65,000 soldiers
(4) Large area support mission
(5) Departure airfield - Griffiss AFB

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Closure of Ft Drum (RC training requirements prevents complete closure)

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

FT HOOD
FT LEWIS
FT BRAGG
FT STEWART
FT CARSON
FT CAMPBELL
SCHOFIELD BRKS

FT RILEY
FT DRUM
FT WAINWRIGHT
FT RICHARDSON

FORT WAINWRIGHT, AK



Ft Wainwright

Brigade (-), Garrison (-), and Arctic Support Brigade (-)

Ft Richardson

COSTS ($M)	ORIGINAL	NEW
O&M	38	30
MILCON	99	82
AFH	191	131
OTHER	43	114
TOTAL	371	357

ORIGINAL

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 14
BREAK EVEN YEAR 2013
STEADY STATE ($M) 36 (2000)

NEW

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 1
BREAK EVEN YEAR 2006
STEADY STATE ($M) 62 (2000)

REALIGN FT WAINWRIGHT

- MOVE ALL UNITS FROM WAINWRIGHT TO RICHARDSON
- RETAIN A RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE AT WAINWRIGHT

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT WAINWRIGHT, AK

OPERATIONAL: - Consolidates all Brigade units at Richardson (consolidation at Wainwright is much cheaper)

PERSONNEL:

	ORIGINAL		NEW	
	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	232	318	489	408
REALIGNMENTS	4,271	540	3,492	111

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 20.5 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 37,000

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

(1) Large training land at Wainwright - 878,000 acres vs 45,000 at Richardson
(2) Can fire all weapons systems at Wainwright
(3) Large population of soldiers to move to Richardson - larger construction bill at Richardson
(4) US Army Hospital at Wainwright

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Richardson to Wainwright:

(1) Construction costs are less -- $61M vs $245M
(2) One-time costs are less -- $112M vs ~~373M~~ 357
(3) Steady state savings -- marginal difference -- $61M vs $63M

BRAC 95 STRATEGY



A SET OF ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT:

- MEETS OSD EXPECTATIONS
  - REDUCE INFRASTRUCTURE
  - ROBUST LIST
  - SAVE AS MUCH AS ALL PAST BRACs
- MATCHES SECRETARY OF ARMY AND CSA GUIDANCE
- CONSISTENT WITH ARMY'S STATIONING STRATEGY
- ACCOMMODATES FISCAL / ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
- PROVIDES FOUNDATION FOR FORCE XXI
- GIVES SENIOR LEADERSHIP FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE DECISIONS

BRAC 95 DELIBERATIONS

LEADERSHIP REVIEW

- EXECUTIVE SELCOM (19 DEC)
- SA/CSA DECISION BRIEFING (22 DEC)
- SUBMISSION TO SECDEF (3 JAN)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN
- DoD SELECTION CRITERIA
  - MILITARY VALUE (OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY) (1-4)
  - IMPACTS
    - FINANCIAL (5)
    - ECONOMIC (6)
    - COMMUNITY (7)
    - ENVIRONMENTAL (8)

FINANCIAL IMPACT

INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- COST
- STEADY STATE SAVINGS
- RETURN ON INVESTMENT

DoD COBRA MODEL

CUMULATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

- AFFORDABILITY
- TRADE OFFS
- CONSTRAINTS

FINANCIAL GAME PLAN

BRAC 95 WEDGE
($M)

	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
COSTS	538.0	898.0	1265.0	534.0	534.0	534.0	4303.0
SAVINGS	360.0	615.0	997.0	1263.0	1263.0	1263.0	5761.0
NET	178.0	283.0	268.0	-729.0	-729.0	-729.0	-1458.0

POM



ILLUSTRATIVE BASE CASE

PACKAGE	1-TIME COST	STEADY STATE SAVINGS
DETROIT TANK PLANT	$ 1 M	$ 2 M
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	$ 11 M	$ 23 M
RED RIVER DEPOT	$ 54 M	$127 M
STRATFORD ENGINE	$ 2 M	$ 5 M
SENECA DEPOT	$ 10 M	$ 20 M
SIERRA DEPOT	$ 26 M	$ 46 M
FT HUNTER LIGGETT	$ 22 M	$ 23 M
FT HAMILTON	$ 6 M	$ 18 M
SELFRIDGE	$ 8 M	$ 13 M
FT RITCHIE	$ 42 M	$ 64 M
SAVANNA DEPOT	$ 30 M	$ 13 M
FT CHAFFEE	$ 10 M	$ 23 M
FT RICHARDSON	$ 66 M	$ 61 M
FT PICKETT	$ 9 M	$ 21 M
KELLY SPT CTR	$ 18 M	$ 5 M

ALL HAVE ROI WITHIN POM, WITH HIGH COST / SAVINGS RATIO

BUILDING A BRAC LIST FROM THE BASE



MUST CHOOSE ADDITIONAL INSTALLATIONS THAT:

- MINIMIZE COST UP FRONT
- MAXIMIZE SAVINGS FOR THE FUTURE
- ACHIEVE SAVINGS QUICKLY

SOURCE: COBRA

UNDERSTANDING TRADE-OFFS

	CLOSE HIGH COST INSTALLATION	CLOSE 22 OTHER* LOWER COST INSTALLATIONS
COST	$622 M	$626 M
STEADY STATE SAVINGS	$120 M	$775 M
PAYBACK	2005	1999
PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE (PRV)	1.6 B	12.2 B
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) (20 YEARS)	$853 M	$8,809 M

BOTTOM LINE:

- 6 TIMES THE ANNUAL SAVINGS
- 6 YEARS SOONER BREAK-EVEN
- 8 TIMES THE PRV
- 10 TIMES THE NPV

* BASE CASE+LEAD+PORTS+ FAMC +GREELEY+HQ, AMC+OPTEC

EXAMPLE OPTION PACKAGES
($M)

PACKAGE	1 TIME COST	STEADY STATE SAVINGS	STEADY STATE YEAR	ROI YEAR	TOTAL POM NET	20 YR NPV
POM	N/A	729	1999	1998	1,458	
BASE CASE (15)	316	462	2003	1998	1,191	5,623
LETTERKENNY	103	151	2001	1999	366	1,811
FITZSIMMONS	37	94	1999	1999	198	536
PORTS	108	40	1998	1999	55	437
PRICE SPT CTR	3	10	1998	1997	43	136
FT GREELEY	20	16	1999	1999	35	186
HQ, AMC	23	7	1999	2002	2	71
CAA	3	1	1999	2000	2	16
OPTEC	14	4	1999	2002	-2	33
ATCOM	186	44	1999	2003	-38	392
BASE + 1	755	813	2003	1999	1,880	9,688
PICATINNY	234	62	2000	2002	22	581
NATICK	159	26	1999	2005	-81	176
FT McCLELLAN	221	56	2004	2004	-93	456
BASE + 1 + 2	1,369	957	2004	2000	1,685	10,900
#3 FT LEE	500	27	2028	2027	-433	-157
BASE + 1+ 2 + 3	1,869	984	2028	2000	1,252	10,743

OPTION PACKAGES ANALYSIS



ANNUAL BUDGET ANALYSIS & PROBLEMS

BASE+1 ALWAYS UNDER POM



EXAMPLE OPTION COMPARISON

	BASE+1	BASE+1+2	BASE+1+2+3
NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS	25	28	29
PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE (PRV)	12.2B (8.04%)	13.9B (9.14%)	14.6B (9.6%)
I-TIME COST	$755 M	$1,369 M	$1,869 M
STEADY STATE SAVINGS	$813 M	$957 M	$984 M
NET PRESENT VALUE (20 YEARS)	$9.7 B	$10.9 B	$10.7 B
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE ELIMINATION	9,528	10,999	11,853

COMMENTS:

- BEST FIT TO WEDGE
- REQUIRES WEDGE $26M TO MEET 1-TIME COST

- EQUIVALENT TO PAST BRACS
- ACHIEVES GREATER SAVINGS ($144M) AND NPV ($1.28B)

- HIGH COST OPTION
- REQUIRES $500M INCREASE IN 1-TIME
- $540 M SHORTFALL IN FY97 - FY98
- SMALL DECREASE IN NPV

RECOMMENDED FOR DEFERRAL



MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS

1. FT RILEY
2. ✓ FT DRUM
3. FT RICHARDSON
4. ✓ FT WAINWRIGHT

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. ✓ FT AP HILL
2. FT CHAFFEE
3. FT GREELY
4. FT PICKETT
5. ✓ FT DIX
6. FT HUNTER LIGGETT
7. FT INDIANTOWN GAP
8. ✓ FT McCOY

PROVING GROUNDS

1. DUGWAY PG

TRAINING SCHOOLS

1. FT EUSTIS/STORY
2. FT LEE
3. FT McCLELLAN
4. ☑ PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY
5. FT LEONARD WOOD

C2/ADMIN CENTERS

1. PRICE SPT CENTER
2. FT BUCHANAN
3. ☑ FT GILLEM
4. FT MEADE
5. FT MONROE
6. FT RITCHIE
7. KELLY SPT CENTER
8. FT HAMILTON
9. ☑ FT TOTTEN
10. ☑ PRESIDIO OF SAN FRAN
11. SELFRIDGE

COMMODITY INSTALLATIONS

1. NATICK RDEC
2. PICATINNY
3. ☑ COLD REGION LAB

AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. SAVANNA DEPOT
2. SENECA DEPOT
3. SIERRA DEPOT
4. ☑ PUEBLO DEPOT
5. ☑ UMATILLA DEPOT

PORTS

1. BAYONNE
2. OAKLAND

MEDICAL FACILITIES

1. FITZSIMONS AMC

DEPOTS / INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

1. LETTERKENNY DEPOT
2. RED RIVER DEPOT
3. LIMA TANK PLANT
4. STRATFORD ENG PLANT
5. (DETROIT TANK PLANT)

LEASES

1. HQ AMC
2. HQ ATCOM
3. ✓ HQ PERSCOM
4. USA PERS CTR
5. ☑ HQ SDC
6. BAILEY'S X-ROAD
7. ☑ USA SPACE COM
8. CAA
9. ☑ ARO
10. PARK CTR
11. BALLSTON-WEBB
12. CRYSTAL CITY
13. ☑ NAT'L GRD INT CTR (FSTC)
14. ✓ JAG SCHOOL
15. MELPAR BLDG

42 OF ORIGINAL 60 CANDIDATE INSTALLATIONS REMAIN UNDER CONSIDERATION

BACK-UP SLIDES

MANEUVER
FT HOOD
FT LEWIS
FT BRAGG
FT STEWART
FT CARSON
FT CAMPBELL
SCHOFIELD BRKS

FT RILEY
FT DRUM
FT WAINWRIGHT
FT RICHARDSON

FORT RILEY





COSTS ($M)

O&M	44
MILCON	221
AFH	282
(AVOID)	- 23
MPA	15
HAP	3
OTHER	52
TOTAL	594

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 5

BREAK EVEN YEAR 2004

STEADY STATE ($M) 122

REALIGN FT RILEY

- MOVE ONE HVY BDE TO CARSON & REFLAG AS 3RD BDE, 4ID
- INACTIVATE 1ID HQS & ONE HVY BDE AT RILEY
- INACTIVATE 2AD HQS & SPT CAP AT HOOD
- REFLAG TWO REMAINING 2AD BDES AT HOOD AS 1AD AND 1ID
- RETAIN A RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE AT RILEY

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT RILEY, KS

OPERATIONAL:
- Five maneuver brigades remain at Ft Hood
- Retains training land in Midwest at Ft Riley

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	658	1,375
REALIGNMENTS	5,084	333

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 69 % direct and indirect job loss

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
(1) Large area support mission
(2) Departure Airfield - Forbes Field

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Closure not feasible because of RC training requirement

MANEUVER
FT HOOD
FT LEWIS
FT BRAGG
FT STEWART
FT CARSON
FT CAMPBELL
SCHOFIELD BRKS

FT RILEY
FT DRUM*
FT WAINWRIGHT
FT RICHARDSON

FORT DRUM & RILEY



COSTS ($M)

O&M	146
MILCON	473
AFH	793
(AVOID)	- 24
MPA	69
HAP	6
OTHER	298
TOTAL	1,731

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 7

BREAK EVEN YEAR 2006

STEADY STATE ($M) 311

REALIGN FT DRUM & FT RILEY

- INACTIVATE 2AD HQS, SPT CAP, & ONE BDE AT HOOD
- REMAINING 2AD BDE TO CARSON AND REFLAG AS 3RD BDE, 4ID
- MOVE LT DIV TO HOOD
- MOVE TWO HVY BDES ALIGNED W/ 1ID & 1AD TO BLISS
- RETAIN RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE AT DRUM & RILEY

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT DRUM & FORT RILEY

OPERATIONAL:
- Five maneuver brigades remain at Ft Hood
- Possible C2 problem at Ft Bliss
- Retains training lands in Midwest and NE at Ft Riley and Ft Drum

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	907	3,005
REALIGNMENTS	22,607	693

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: Ft Drum Area - 40 % direct and indirect job loss
Ft Riley Area - 69 % direct and indirect job loss

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

MANEUVER
FT HOOD
FT LEWIS
FT BRAGG
FT STEWART
FT CARSON
FT CAMPBELL
SCHOFIELD BRKS

FT RILEY
FT DRUM
FT WAINWRIGHT
FT RICHARDSON

FORT RICHARDSON





COSTS ($M)

O&M	34
MILCON	15
AFH	85
MPA	6
HAP	3
OTHER	10
TOTAL	153

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 2

BREAK EVEN YEAR 2001

STEADY STATE ($M) 82

REALIGN FT RICHARDSON

- RELOCATE TO WAINWRIGHT
- RETAIN A RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE AT RICHARDSON

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT RICHARDSON

OPERATIONAL:
- All Brigade units at one installation - ease of C2
- Newer facilities at Ft Wainwright
- Can fire all weapons systems at Wainwright - no need to travel to train

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	289	970
REALIGNMENTS	1,978	324

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 4% direct and indirect job loss

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
(1) Richardson/Elmendorf is the planned site for the Joint Mobility Complex
(2) Alaskan ARNG HQS, TAG, and Reserve Coordination Center are located on Richardson
(3) CDR, USARAK (MG) located at Richardson
(4) Anchorage is the HQS for most Federal Agencies: FBI, FAA, ATF, BLM, DOE, EPA, etc
(5) Insufficient housing at Wainwright to support increase in population

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Closure of Ft Richardson

KELLY SUPPORT CENTER



C2 / ADMIN
- FT BELVOIR
- FT McPHERSON
- FT MYER
- FT SHAFTER

- FT MEADE
- FT MONROE
- FT RITCHIE
- FT GILLEM
- SELFRIDGE
- PRICE SUPPORT CTR
- FT BUCHANAN
- PRESIDIO OF SF
- KELLY SUPPORT CTR
- FT HAMILTON
- FT TOTTEN



COSTS ($M)

O&M	5
MILCON	4
OTHER	1
	10

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	3
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2001
STEADY STATE ($M)	4

CLOSE KELLY SPT CTR

- REALIGN 99th ARCOM TO FORT MEADE
- REALIGN RC UNITS TO FT INDIANTOWN GAP

IMPACT SUMMARY
KELLY SUPPORT CENTER, PA

OPERATIONAL:
- demographics may not support additional RC units at Ft Ind Gap
- significant impact on readiness of USAR units
- 97th ARCOM at Ft Meade slated to deactivate

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	1	
REALIGNMENTS	138	125

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 1.1 M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

Department of the Army
Office of the Chief of Staff
The Army Basing Study

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for the Secretary of the Army , November 9, 1994, 1700-1800 hours

1. The purpose of this meeting was to provide a progress report.

2. Principal attendees: Secretary West, Mr. Reeder (Undersecretary),Mr. Walker (Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics & Environment), LTG Dominy (Director of the Army Staff), Mr. Stockdale (Deputy General Counsel) and BG Shane (Director of Management). COL Jones (Director of TABS) presented the briefing.

3. COL Jones reviewed the major milestones since first briefing the Secretary on the original list of study candidates on August 11, 1994. He reported that of the initial list of 97 Army installations assessed, 60 had been selected as study candidates. He added the Undersecretary and Vice Chief of Staff decided to discontinue study of 15 of these candidates on October 11, leaving 45 active candidates remaining. COL Jones discussed the latest status for each of the Joint Cross Service Groups and noted schedule changes affecting the delivery of final recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. He also raised the issue of affordability and the importance of a sound strategy, given the fiscal constaints on funding for BRAC 95 in the Program Objective Memorandum.

4. The Secretary acknowledged the efforts of the study effort and was pleased with the progress made thus far. He asked the Undersecretary and Vice Chief of Staff to review their decision to discontinue the studies of two maneuver bases (Fort Drum and Fort Wainwright) at the next in-progress-review to be certain that the most current data support keeping these installations off the active study list. Mr. West asked that they provide their advice at the earliest opportunity.

Enclosure
- Briefing Slides

Mr. Nerger/697-1766
Approved by: COL M. Jones

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY



BRAC 95

UPDATE

SEC ARMY IPR
9 NOV 94

Department of the Army
Office of the Chief of Staff
The Army Basing Study

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for the Under Secretary and Vice Chief of Staff to discuss BRAC 95 study candidates, August 8, 1994, 1500 hours.

1. The purpose of this meeting was to review the study candidates for base closure and realignment being proposed by The Army Basing Study (TABS) for more detailed analysis.

2. Principal attendees: Mr. Reeder, GEN Tilelli, LTG Dominy (Director of the Army Staff), LTG Blackwell (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans), Mr. Baskir (Acting General Counsel), MG Little (Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management), and Mr. Johnson (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Installations and Housing). COL Jones (Director of TABS) presented the briefing.

3. COL Jones discussed the methodology for selecting study candidates and the milestones for the study process. He indicated TABS would report on the results of its initial analysis in 2 months to obtain further guidance before continuing its evaluation. TABS will assess the costs and savings associated with each scenario using the COBRA model and identify any environmental and local economic impacts. While all installations are initially eligible to be selected as study candidates, COL Jones said the proposed list considers both the results of the installation assessments along with the operational guidance expressed in the Army's stationing strategy. The proposed list includes installations both above and below the reporting threshold (300 direct hire civilians). He reminded the audience that the lengthy list of study candidates was not an endorsement of the closure or realignment of any specific installation. In response to a question, he remarked that there were opportunities to add additional study candidates at a later date, if necessary.

4. The Under Secretary directed TABS to present the briefing to the Secretary for review later in the week. Several changes were suggested to the format, not the content, of the briefing slides.

Enclosure
- Briefing Slides

Mr. Nerger/697-1766
Approved by: COL M. Jones

DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BRAC 95

STUDY LIST

BRIEFING

FOR
USA AND VCSA

8 AUGUST 1994

AGENDA

- BACKGROUND
- CATEGORY BY CATEGORY REVIEW
- WHAT NEXT?



PURPOSE: AZIMUTH CHECK ON THE INITIAL STUDY CANDIDATES FOR BRAC 95

THE ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS) MISSION

- DEVELOP METHODOLOGY FOR SELECTING INSTALLATIONS
- PREPARE THE ARMY'S BRAC PACKAGE FOR 1995
- ASSIST IN DEFENDING BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS

GOAL

ELIMINATE EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH BASE CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT TO SUPPORT THE VISION OF THE ARMY OF THE 21st CENTURY.

BRAC 95 TABS PROCESS



BRAC TIME LINES LEADERSHIP REVIEWS



THE STATIONING STRATEGY

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATIONING DECISIONS . . .

- "MAINTAIN CAPABILITY TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY AND SUSTAIN COMBAT FORCES"
- "ENSURE SUFFICIENT LAND AND RANGE FACILITIES TO SUPPORT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS"
- "RETAIN CAPABILITY TO STATION THE BUR FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES"
- "PROVIDE A FLEXIBLE INDUSTRIAL BASE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING CRITICAL SUPPLIES"
- "ELIMINATE EXCESS CAPACITY, MINIMIZE LEASED SPACE, COLLOCATE TENANTS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY"



ARMY BRAC METHODOLOGY



- PROCESS NOT PRE-JUDGMENTAL
- ALL INSTALLATIONS LOOKED AT EQUALLY
- RECOMMENDATIONS DRIVEN BY ANALYSIS

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

oD CRITERIA *

ILITARY VALUE

1. he current and future mission requirements and the impact operational readiness.
2. he availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving location.
3. ie ability to accommodate ingency, mobilization, and e total force requirements at the existing and potential iving location.
4. he cost and manpower ications.
5. The extent and timing of ntial cost savings, ...
6. conomic impacts .....
7. .... communities infrastructure
8. The environmental impacts.

FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN *

NATIONAL STRATEGY

MACOM INPUTS

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT (IA)

US ARMY STATIONING STRATEGY

ORDER OF MERIT LIST BY CATEGORY

1. ----
2. ---
3. ---
4. ---
5. ---

NON - STUDY CANDIDATES

STUDY CANDIDATES

OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT BY CATEGORY

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

* REQUIRED BY LAW

INSTALLATION CATEGORIES

MANEUVER AREAS

BRAGG
CAMPBELL
CARSON
DRUM
FORT HOOD
LEWIS
RICHARDSON
RILEY
STEWART
WAINWRIGHT
SCHOFIELD BKS

MAJOR TNG AREAS

•AP HILL
•CHAFFEE
DIX
•GREELY
HUNTER-LIGGETT
INDIANTOWN GAP
IRWIN
McCOY
•PICKETT
POLK

C2/ADMIN SUPPORT

BELVOIR
BUCHANAN
GILLEM
•KELLY SPT
•HAMILTON
McPHERSON
MEADE
MONROE
MYER
PRICE SPT
•PRESIDO, SF
RITCHIE
•SELFRIDGE
SHAFTER
•TOTTEN

TRAINING SCHOOLS

BENNING
BLISS
EUSTIS/STORY
GORDON
HUACHUCA
JACKSON
KNOX
LEE
LEONARD WOOD
McCLELLAN
POM
RUCKER
SAM HOUSTON
SILL

PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

CARLISLE BKS
LEAVENWORTH
McNAIR
WEST POINT



• BELOW BRAC THRESHOLD

INSTALLATION CATEGORIES

AMMO PRODUCTION

- *HOLSTON*
- *IOWA*
- *LAKE CITY*
- *LONE STAR*
- McALESTER
- *MILAN*
- PINE BLUFF
- *RADFORD*

AMMO STORAGE

- BLUE GRASS
- *HAWTHORNE*
- *PUEBLO*
- SAVANNA
- SENECA
- SIERRA
- TOOELE
- *UMATILLA*

COMMODITY

- *COLD REGION*
- ALDELPHI
- DETRICK
- DETROIT ARSENAL
- MONMOUTH
- NATICK RESEARCH
- PICATINNY ARSENAL
- REDSTONE ARSENAL
- ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL

PORTS

- BAYONNE
- OAKLAND
- *SUNNY POINT*

DEPOTS

- ANNISTON
- LETTERKENNY
- RED RIVER
- TOBYHANNA
- (CORPUS CHRISTI)

PROVING GROUNDS

- ABERDEEN
- DUGWAY
- WHITE SANDS
- YUMA

MEDICAL CENTERS

- FITZSIMONS
- TRIPLER
- WALTER REED

INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

- *(DETROIT TANK PLANT)*
- *LIMA TANK PLANT*
- *STRATFORD ENG PLANT*
- WATERVLIET ARSENAL



•BELOW BRAC THRESHOLD

MANEUVER





OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- RETAIN ALL CONUS MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS
- MAINTAIN FORCES IN HAWAII IN SUPPORT OF USCINCPAC STRATEGY
- SIZE BASE STRUCTURE IN ALASKA TO SUPPORT ONE MANEUVER BDE AND SPT FORCES

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (7.7) FT HOOD
2. (7.0) FT LEWIS
3. (6.6) FT BRAGG
4. (6.5) FT STEWART
4. (6.5) FT CARSON
6. (5.5) FT CAMPBELL
7. (4.8) FT RILEY
8. (4.4) FT DRUM
9. (3.5) SCHOFIELD BRKS*
10. (3.4) FT WAINWRIGHT
11. (2.1) FT RICHARDSON

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

FT HOOD
FT LEWIS
FT BRAGG
FT STEWART
FT CARSON
FT CAMPBELL
FT RILEY
FT DRUM
SCHOFIELD BRKS*

FT WAINWRIGHT
FT RICHARDSON

ISSUES:

- NONE

STUDY CANDIDATES

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- RETAIN INSTALLATIONS SUPPORTING CTCs
- MINIMIZE MTA STRUCTURE BY ELIMINATING FUNCTIONS AND REALIGNING RC TRAINING WORKLOAD

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (6.5) FT POLK
2. (6.4) FT IRWIN
3. (4.7) FT DIX
4. (4.4) *FT GREELY*
5. (4.2) *FT AP HILL*
6. (4.1) FT McCOY
7. (3.5) HUNTER-LIGGETT
8. (2.9) *FT PICKETT*
9. (2.8) FT INDIANTOWN GAP
10. (2.5) *FT CHAFFEE*

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT GREELY
FT AP HILL
FT McCOY
HUNTER-LIGGETT
FT PICKETT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE

STUDY CANDIDATES

ISSUES:

- RC TRAINING

TRAINING SCHOOLS



INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

6.6) FT BLISS
5.8) FT BENNING
5.3) FT JACKSON
5.1) FT KNOX
5.1) FT GORDON
4.8) FT SILL
4.6) FT LEONARD WOOD*
4.2) FT McCLELLAN*
4.0) FT HUACHUCA
3.9) FT RUCKER
11.(3.8) FT SAM HOUSTON
12.(3.7) FT LEE*
13.(3.0) FT EUSTIS/STORY
14.(1.6) POM

OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- CONSOLIDATE SCHOOLS:
  - MOBILITY + SURVIVABILITY (EN, CM, MP)
  - LOGISTICS CENTER (OD, QM, TC)
- RETAIN TRAINING AIRSPACE AND FACILITIES TO SUPPORT ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING
- RELOCATE LANGUAGE TRAINING TO FACILITATE FOLLOW-ON TRAINING

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

FT BLISS
FT BENNING
FT JACKSON
FT KNOX
FT GORDON
FT SILL
FT HUACHUCA
FT RUCKER
FT SAM HOUSTON

FT LEONARD WOOD*
FT McCLELLAN*
FT LEE*
FT EUSTIS/STORY
POM

STUDY CANDIDATES

ISSUES:

- DLI / POM
- CDTF

PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS



OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- RETAIN EXISTING INSTALLATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (7.6) FT LEAVENWORTH
2. (4.7) WEST POINT
3. (2.5) FT McNAIR
4. (2.4) CARLISLE BRKS

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

FT LEAVENWORTH
WEST POINT
FT McNAIR
CARLISLE BRKS

NO STUDY CANDIDATES

ISSUES:

- NONE

COMMAND AND CONTROL / ADMINISTRATIVE CENTERS





INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (7.4) FT BELVOIR
2. (6.9) FT MEADE*
3. (6.0) FT McPHERSON
4. (5.1) FT MONROE
5. (4.8) FT RITCHIE
6. (4.7) FT GILLEM
7. (3.9) FT MYER*
8. (3.7) FT SHAFTER*
8. (3.7) *SELFRIDGE*
8. (3.7) PRICE SPT CENTER
11. (3.5) FT BUCHANAN
12. (3.4) *PSF*
13. (2.9) *KELLY SPT CENTER*
14. (2.6) *FT HAMILTON*
15. (2.5) *FT TOTTEN*

ISSUE:

- CONUSA DECISION

OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- DOWNSIZE ARMY PRESENCE AT FT MEADE
- RETAIN FT BELVOIR AND MYER DUE TO LOCATION AND MISSION IN NCR
- STATION TRADOC HQ IN TIDEWATER REGION
- MAINTAIN FT SHAFTER (USCINCPAC OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT)

STUDY CANDIDATES

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

FT BELVOIR
FT McPHERSON
FT MYER*
FT SHAFTER*

FT MEADE*
FT MONROE
FT RITCHIE
FT GILLEM
SELFRIDGE
PRICE SPT CENTER
FT BUCHANAN
PSF
KELLY SPT CENTER
FT HAMILTON
FT TOTTEN

COMMODITY



OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- CONSOLIDATE SINGLE PURPOSE INSTALLATIONS
- RETAIN INSTALLATIONS WHICH SUPPORT INTEGRATED LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT
- RETAIN FT DETRICK DUE TO MEDICAL RESEARCH

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (7.1) REDSTONE
2. (6.4) PICATINNY*
3. (5.0) DETROIT
4. (4.7) ROCK ISLAND
5. (4.6) FT MONMOUTH
6. (3.6) ADELPHI
7. (3.5) FT DETRICK
8. (2.7) *COLD REGION*
9. (2.7) NATICK RDEC

STUDY CANDIDATES

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

REDSTONE
DETROIT
ROCK ISLAND
FT MONMOUTH
ADELPHI
FT DETRICK

PICATINNY*
COLD REGION
NATICK RDEC

ISSUES:

NONE



AMMUNITION PRODUCTION





OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- RETAIN EXISTING STRUCTURE

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (6.4) McALESTER
2. (5.9) *LONE STAR*
3. (5.4) *RADFORD*
4. (5.1) *HOLSTON*
5. (5.0) *MILAN*
6. (4.9) PINE BLUFF
6. (4.9) *LAKE CITY*
8. (4.4) *IOWA*

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

McALESTER
LONESTAR
RADFORD
HOLSTON
MILAN
PINE BLUFF
LAKE CITY
IOWA

NO STUDY CANDIDATES

ISSUES:

- NONE

AMMUNITION STORAGE





OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- ELIMINATE TIER III (CARETAKER) INSTALLATIONS
- ELIMINATE EXCESS CAPACITY FOLLOWING DEMIL

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (6.6) *HAWTHORNE*
2. (6.2) TOOELE
3. (5.3) SENECA*
4. (4.7) BLUE GRASS
5. (4.4) SAVANNA*
6. (3.9) *PUEBLO*
7. (3.5) SIERRA
8. (3.2) *UMATILLA*

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

HAWTHORNE
TOOELE
BLUE GRASS

SENECA*
SAVANNA*
PUEBLO
SIERRA
UMATILLA

STUDY CANDIDATES

ISSUES:

NONE

PROVING GROUNDS



OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- RETAIN MOST EXPANDABLE
- CONSOLIDATE TESTING FACILITIES
- REDUCE DUPLICATION ACROSS SERVICES

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

. (7.0) WSMR
. (6.1) YUMA PG
. (5.9) ABERDEEN PG
4. (3.6) DUGWAY PG

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

WSMR
YUMA
ABERDEEN PG

DUGWAY PG

STUDY CANDIDATE



ISSUES:

NONE

DEPOTS

OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- SIZE TO "CORE"
- CONSOLIDATE FUNCTIONALLY, MAINTAINING SEPARATE C&E, GROUND, AIR DEPOTS

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (6.4) TOBYHANNA
2. (6.2) ANNISTON
3. (4.9) RED RIVER
4. (2.3) LETTERKENNY

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

TOBYHANNA
ANNISTON

RED RIVER
LETTERKENNY

STUDY CANDIDATES

ISSUES:

- CORPUS CHRISTI DEPOT
- DOD MISSILE MISSION ASSIGNED TO LETTERKENNY IN BRAC 93



INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT
- CONSOLIDATE PRODUCTION CAPACITY
- RETAIN CRITICAL CAPABILITIES THAT CAN NOT BE RECONSTITUTED DURING MOBILIZATION

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (7.0) WATERVLIET
2. (6.0) *STRATFORD ENG*
3. (4.8) *LIMA TANK*

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

WATERVLIET

STRATFORD ENG
LIMA TANK PLT

ISSUE:

NONE

STUDY CANDIDATES



PORTS





OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- ELIMINATE PORTS WHOSE CAPABILITY CAN BE DUPLICATED AT COMMERCIAL SITES

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (5.7) BAYONNE
2. (5.3) OAKLAND
3. (5.0) *SUNNY POINT**

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

*SUNNY POINT**

BAYONNE
OAKLAND

STUDY CANDIDATES

ISSUES:

- NONE



MEDICAL CENTERS



OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- REDUCE EXCESS PATIENT CAPACITY
- ELIMINATE UNECONOMICAL REFERRALS
- PRIORITY TO MEDICAL CENTERS NEAR LARGE AC SOLDIER POPULATIONS

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (5.8) WALTER REED
2. (5.6) TRIPLER
3. (4.6) FITZSIMMONS

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

WALTER REED
TRIPLER

FITZSIMMONS

ISSUES:

NONE

STUDY CANDIDATE

LEASES



METHODOLOGY:

- INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP OF LEASES IN SUPPORT OF A SINGLE TENANT
- LEASES COSTING GREATER THAN $200K
- EXCLUDES: PORT FACILITIES, RECRUITING, MILITARY ENLISTING PROCESSING CENTERS, AND INSTALLATION CONTROLLED LEASES
- CONSIDER COST/BENEFIT OF REALIGNMENT ONTO GOVERNMENT OWNED PROPERTY

TENANTS:

1. HQ ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND - NCR
2. HQ AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND - MO
3. HQ PERSONNEL COMMAND - NCR
4. USA PERSONNEL CENTER - MO
5. HQ SPACE DEFENSE COMMAND - AL
6. BAILEY'S X-ROAD - NCR
7. USA SPACE COMMAND - CO
8. CONCEPT ANALYSIS AGENCY - NCR
9. ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE - NC
10. PARK CTR - NCR
11. BALLSTON-WEBB - NCR
12. CRYSTAL CITY - NCR
13. FOREIGN TECH - VA
14. JAG SCHOOL - VA
15. MELPAR BLDG - NCR
16. MDW ADMIN - NCR



SUMMARY:

GROUPS OF LEASES	16
LEASES INVOLVED	67
ADMIN SQFT	4.5 M
TOTAL COST / YR	$68.3 M

ISSUES:

EPG

KELLY SUPPORT CENTER, PA



COSTS ($M)	
O&M	4
MILCON	29
OTHER	3
TOTAL	36

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	5
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2005
STEADY STATE ($M)	5 (2006)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	33

REALIGN CHARLES E KELLY SUPPORT CENTER

- CLOSE 2 OF 5 PARCELS
- ENCLAVE READINESS SPT GRP (SITE 62)
- ENCLAVE DS/GS ON NEVILLE ISLAND
- VACATE LEASED USARC SITE (VALLEY GROVE AMSA) AND RELOCATE TO ENCLAVE (SITE 63)

IMPACT SUMMARY
KELLY SUPPORT CENTER, PA

OPERATIONAL:

- 12 miles SW of Pittsburgh; 5 separate properties; sub-installation of Drum
- Home to 99th ARCOM & Readiness Group Pittsburgh
- Recommendation maintains readiness of USAR units
- Recommendation closes approximately 237 acres; retains 50 acres
- No recommendations during previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	98
REALIGNMENTS	0	37

TENANTS facility usage	
GARRISON	71%
COMMISSARY	15%
USAR	8%
RES SPT GP	5%
VET DET	1%

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations.

ECONOMIC: 0% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 0.9 M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

FT HAMILTON, NY



CAVEN POINT USARC → FT HAMILTON

REALIGN FT HAMIILTON

- REDUCE GARRISON FUNCTIONS
- CLOSE HOUSING
- DISPOSE OF EXCESS PROPERTY
- CLOSE CAVEN POINT USARC AND RELOCATE TO FT HAMILTON

COSTS ($M)

O&M	2
MILCON	
OTHER	
TOTAL	2

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMED
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1999
STEADY STATE ($M)	7 (2000)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	79

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT HAMILTON, NY

OPERATIONAL:
- Supports protocol mission of NYAC.
- Eliminates family housing for appox 261 families.
- Considered by Commission in 91 and 93.

PERSONNEL

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	43
REALIGNMENTS	3	9

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations.

ECONOMIC: 0% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 3.5 M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

Navy housing at Mitchell Manor

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

None

HOUSING	
USA	261
USN	13
USAF	13
OTHERS	66
VACANT	89

TENANTS	
NYAC	30%
OTHERS	26%
USAREC	12%
COMMISSARY	8%
MEPS	7%
USAR	7%
MED	5%
AAFES	5%

FORT TOTTEN, NY



FT TOTTEN

CLOSE FORT TOTTEN

- RETAIN ERNIE PYLE USARC

COSTS ($M)

O&M	1
MILCON	
OTHER	3
TOTAL	4

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	1
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2001
STEADY STATE ($M)	2 (2002)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	19

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT TOTTEN, NY

OPERATIONAL:
- Eliminates costly old houses with high RPMA
- Does not effect readiness of USAR units.
- BRAC 91 Commission's recommendation to transfer to RC rejected

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	21
REALIGNMENTS	11	11

TENANTS	
USAR	62%
GARRISON	33%
OTHERS	5%

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: No impact

HOUSING	
USA	109
USN	13
OTHERS	6
VACANT	61

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close with no USAR enclave
- costs = $73 M
- payback = Never

U.S. ARMY GARRISON SELFRIDGE, MI





CLOSE SELFRIDGE

- Eliminate most of TACOM Support Activity
- Relocate some Army tenants to Detroit Arsenal
- Relocate other Service tenants

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 6
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 1
	$ 7

PAYBACK PERIOD (YRS)	IMMED
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1997
STEADY STATE ($M)	$ 10
(YR)	1998
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	139

IMPACT SUMMARY
U.S. ARMY GARRISON SELFRIDGE, MI

OPERATIONAL:
- Displaces wide variety of tenants (Other Services and multiple Army organizations)
- Loses high quality housing community; displaces occupants onto Warren, MI community
- No recommendations during previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	19	61
REALIGNMENTS	268	81

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.1% direct & indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 2 million

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
- USN/USMC, USCG & AF ANG will need to absorb several below threshold activities

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
DETROIT
ROCK ISLAND
FORT MONMOUTH
ADELPHI
FORT DETRICK
COLD REGION
NATICK RDEC

NATICK , MA

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE

HQ TEST & EVAL CMD (TECOM)

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND

NATICK

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 68
MILCON	$ 81
OTHER	$ 11
TOTAL	$ 160

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	7
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2005
STEADY STATE ($M)	27 (1999)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	184

CLOSE NATICK
- Realign missions to Aberdeen Proving Ground
- Realign HQ TECOM from Aberdeen Proving Ground to White Sands Missile Range

IMPACT SUMMARY
NATICK, MA

OPERATIONAL:
- Natick's mission is to develop materials and technologies (food, clothing, shelter, etc.) to sustain the soldier in order to improve combat effectiveness and quality of life
- Aligns Natick RDEC with soldier support site to Aberdeen Proving Ground
- Aligns HQ TECOM with primary test site to White Sands Missile Range
- No recommendations from previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	6	139
REALIGNMENTS	149	1240

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.2% direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 3.8 M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: Navy Clothing and Textile Research Facility (48) moves with Natick RDEC to Aberdeen

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close Natick and realign missions to Rock Island Arsenal:
- Cost = $219 M
- Payback = 8 Years

AMMO STORAGE
HAWTHORNE
TOOELE
BLUE GRASS

SENECA
SAVANNA
PUEBLO
SIERRA
UMATILLA

SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY

McALESTER AAP
↑
USADACS
|
SAVANNA

COSTS ($M)

O&M	15
MILCON	20
OTHER	1
TOTAL	35

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	1
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2002
STEADY STATE ($M)	13 (2002)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	118

CLOSE SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY
- RELOCATE NON-AMMO MATERIAL
- RELOCATE USADACS TO McALESTER AAP

IMPACT SUMMARY SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY, IL

OPERATIONAL:
- Tier III installation
- Ammunition will relocate or be demilitarized

PERSONNEL:

	Military	Civilian
Reductions	4	174
Realignments	6	266

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 8% Direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 8 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: The non-ammo material not transferred to Tier II / III depots will relocate to DLA depots

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

AMMO STORAGE
HAWTHORNE
TOOELE
BLUE GRASS

SENECA
SAVANNA
PUEBLO
SIERRA
UMATILLA

SENECA ARMY DEPOT

SENECA

CLOSE SENECA ARMY DEPOT

- ENCLAVE HAZARDOUS MATERIAL ORE
- RELOCATE NON-AMMO MATERIAL TO DLA

COSTS ($M)

O&M	14
MILCON	0
OTHER	1
TOTAL	15

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMED
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2001
STEADY STATE (SM)	20 (2002)
20 YEAR NPV (SM)	231

IMPACT SUMMARY
SENECA ARMY DEPOT, NY

OPERATIONAL:
- Tier III installation
- Ammunition will relocate or be demilitarized
- Hazardous material stocks will be enclaved

PERSONNEL:

	Military	Civilian
Reductions	2	312
Realignments	7	2

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 3% Direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 16K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: General supply and industrial plant equipment stocks will relocate to DLA depots.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

AMMO STORAGE
HAWTHORNE
TOOELE
BLUE GRASS

SENECA
SAVANNA
PUEBLO
SIERRA
UMATILLA

SIERRA ARMY DEPOT



COSTS ($M)

O&M	15
MILCON	0
OTHER	1
TOTAL	16

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMED
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2001
STEADY STATE ($M)	37 (2002)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	427

REALIGN SIERRA ARMY DEPOT

- REALIGN DEPOT TO DEPOT ACTIVITY
- ENCLAVE OPERATIONAL PROJECT STOCKS / ORE

IMPACT SUMMARY
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT, CA

OPERATIONAL:

- Tier III installation
- Ammunition will relocate or be demilitarized
- Infeasible to relocate operational project stocks

PERSONNEL:

	Military	Civilian
Reductions	36	477
Realignments	17	28

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 8% Direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 10K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED:

PORTS

SUNNY POINT

BAYONNE
OAKLAND

BAYONNE MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL (MOT)

FORT MONMOUTH

1301st MAJOR PORT COMMAND

MTMC EASTERN AREA COMMAND

BAYONNE

COSTS ($M)

O&M	34
MILCON	27
OTHER	6
TOTAL	67

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	4
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2002
STEADY STATE ($M)	18 (1999)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	175

CLOSE BAYONNE MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL
RELOCATE MTMC EASTERN AREA HQ & 1301ST MAJOR PORT COMMAND TO FORT MONMOUTH

IMPACT SUMMARY
BAYONNE MOT, NJ

OPERATIONAL:
- Some loss to operational capability, stationing strategy supports closure
- Assumes commercial port capacity will be available to support power projection requirements
- Cost includes tariff charges
- Action expected to lower current surcharge rate at other Eastern Area port facilities
- No recommendations from previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL

	Military	Civilian
Reductions	8	185
Realignments	31	616

TENANTS

Navy:
- Sealift Cmd 659
- Resale 164

National Archives 100

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 1.4 % Direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 250K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS [illegible] tenants

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
WALTER REED AMC
TRIPLER AMC
FITZSIMMONS AMC

FITZSIMMONS AMC



COSTS ($M)	DOD	ARMY
O&M	$ 32	32
MILCON	$ 54	29
OTHER	$ 54	53
	$ 141	114
COST AVOIDANCE	-255	
	114	

PAYBACK PERIOD (YRS) IMMEDIATE

BREAK EVEN YEAR 2000

STEADY STATE ($M) $ 37 86
(YR) 2001 2001

20 YEAR NPV ($M) $560 1006

CLOSE FITZSIMONS AMC
- Relocate Medical Military to other Medical Centers
- Close Graduate Medical Education program
- Relocate Optical School to Ft Sam Houston
- Enclave U.S. Army Reserve Center
- Pay $49M/YR in CHAMPUS

IMPACT SUMMARY
FITZSIMMONS AMC, CO

OPERATIONAL
- Pays $49M/YR in CHAMPUS to offset MedCtr loss; shifts load to other Medical Centers
- Closes Graduate Medical Education pgm for surgery, internal med, pediatrics & radiology
- Moves Optical School/Lab to FT Sam Houston with other medical schools
- Increases Ft Carson Hospital (Evans) services
- No recommendations during previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	1309
REALIGNMENTS	1043	292

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.8 % direct & indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 928 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
- All care eliminated at FAMC; load shifted to other Medical Ctrs & offset by CHAMPUS

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

POTENTIAL AMENDMENTS TO PREVIOUS COMMISSION DECISIONS

- FT DIX (BRAC 91):
  - ADJUST REALIGNMENT LANGUAGE TO PERMIT RC GARRISON (VICE AC)
  - RATIONALE: ALIGNS MANAGEMENT WITH PRIMARY USER
- TRI SERVICE RELIANCE (BRAC 91):
  - DO NOT RELOCATE TOXICOLOGY RESEARCH TO WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB
    - REALIGN PORTION TO ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND
    - REMAINDER STAYS AT FT DETRICK
  - RATIONALE: NO OPERATIONAL BENEFITS
- LETTERKENNY (BRAC 93):
  - ADJUST REALIGNMENT LANGUAGE ON MISSILE CONSOLIDATION
  - RATIONALE: NO FINANCIAL BENEFIT

DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BRAC 95

STUDY LIST

BRIEFING

FOR
SA AND CSA

10 AUGUST 1994

IMPACT
CLOSING 2 GROUND DEPOTS



TRADE-OFFS
CLOSING 2 GROUND DEPOTS

PROs	CONs
• SUPPORTS STATIONING STRATEGY • RETAINS 3 CORE DEPOTS	• STATIONING STRATEGY INCURS RISK
• JSCG SUPPORTS	• JCSG FAILS TO CONSIDER SURGE ROMTs
• SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL SAVINGS • $ 118 MILLION ANNUALLY	• SAVINGS DON'T JUSTIFY OPERATIONAL RISK

• DOES NOT AFFECT FUNDED WORKLOAD, OVERRATED RISK TO WARTIME SURGE
  • INSTALLATION DOLs
  • INDUSTRIAL BASE FACILITIES
  • OTHER MILDEP CAPABILITIES
  • OUT SOURCING
	• 46% SHORTFALL IN WARTIME (2 MRC) ROMT FOR COMBAT VEHICLES

• ANNISTON CAN ACCEPT GROUND WORK	• MAY STRESS ANNISTON'S CAPABILITIES
• PALADDIN CHASSIS COMPLETE IN FY 97	• PALADDIN EFFORT IS MODEL OF DOD / CONTRACTOR COOPERATION

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT
TOBYHANNA AD
ANNISTON AD
CORPUS CHRISTI AD
RED RIVER AD
LETTERKENNY

LETTERKENNY AND RED RIVER ARMY DEPOTS



CLOSE RED RIVER AND LETTERKENNY

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 128
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 6
TOTAL	$ 134

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMEDIATE
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2000
STEADY STATE ($M)	201
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	2,400

IMPACT SUMMARY
LETTERKENNY AND RED RIVER ARMY DEPOTS

OPERATIONAL:
- Stationing stratego supports retention of 3, not 5 depots
- Some operational risk to wartime core, none to funded workload, if closing 2 depots
- JCSG supports closing Red River & Letterkenny



PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	34	3214
REALIGNMENTS	56	2583

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC:
RRAD 11 % direct & indirect job loss from total civilian employment
LEAD 9 %

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: LEAD designated as the DoD missile center by BRAC 93 w/ consolidations on-going into 1998. RRAD is DLA regional distribution center. Both depots do some maintenance for other services.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: One depot only

STRATFORD ARMY ENGINE PLANT, CT

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

WATERVLIET ARS

DETROIT TANK PLT
LIMA TANK PLANT
STRATFORD

STRATFORD

AIR EQUIP → CORPUS CHRISTI

GROUND EQUIP → ANNISTON

CLOSE STRATFORD

- TRANSFER EQUIPMENT TO CORPUS & ANNISTON DEPOTS

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$	2
MILCON	$	0
OTHER	$	0
TOTAL	$	2 M

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMEDIATE
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1998
STEADY STATE ($M)	$ 5
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	69

IMPACT SUMMARY
STRATFORD ARMY ENGINE PLANT, CT

OPERATIONAL:
- GOCO (2130 contract employees), manufacturer of turbine engines
- Does engine development, testing and technological upgraded for all services but primarily for Army
- No recommendations during previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	2	0
REALIGNMENTS	0	0

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0 % direct & indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 432 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: Limited engine work for the Navy

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: (1) Mothball facility.
(2) Close, move equipment to ANAD (ground) & CCAD, (air) and have contractor establish technological center at ANAD.

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

WATERVLIET ARS

DETROIT TANK PLT
LIMA TANK PLANT
STRATFORD

DETROIT ARSENAL, MI

DETROIT ARSENAL

REALIGN DETROIT ARSENAL
- CLOSE AND MOTHBALL TANK PLANT

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 1.4
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 0
TOTAL	$ 1.4

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMEDIATE
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1998
STEADY STATE ($M)	$ 2
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	$ 32

IMPACT SUMMARY
DETROIT ARSENAL, MI

OPERATIONAL:
- Arsenal and tank plant are contiguous
- Duplicate tank plant that is a GOCO with no current production contract
- No recommendations during previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	0
REALIGNMENTS	0	0

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

AVIATION-TROOP COMMAND (ATCOM)



COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 69
MILCON	$ 53
OTHER	$ 18
TOTAL	$ 140

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	3
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2001
STEADY STATE ($M)	47
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	469
ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M)	7.6

CLOSE & VACATE LEASE

- Relocate missions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Detroit Arsenal, Fort Monmouth and Redstone Arsenal.

IMPACT SUMMARY
AVIATION TROOP COMMAND (ATCOM), MO

OPERATIONAL:

- ATCOM's mission is to provide research, development, engineering and logistical support for the Army's airmobile system and troop support items
- Scenario vacates ATCOM lease and realigns Aviation and Troop Commodities into an integrated life cycle management.
- BRAC 91 Commission approved merger of Aviation Systems Command and Troop Support Command into ATCOM, but recommended that the Army consider relocation from leased space and make appropriate recommendations to subsequent Commission.

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	44	1020
REALIGNMENTS	203	2866

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.6% direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 2.5M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED:

CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY BETHESDA, MD

FT MEADE

↑

USACAA

CLOSE & VACATE LEASE
- RELOCATE TO FT MEADE

COSTS ($M)

O&M	0.3
MILCON	3.2
OTHER	0
TOTAL	3.5

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 3

BREAK EVEN YEAR 2001

STEADY STATE ($M) 1.5 (1999)

20 YEAR NPV ($M) 15

ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M) 1.5

IMPACT SUMMARY
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY, MD

OPERATIONAL:
- None / Local Move
- Occupy CONUSA building after inactivation
- Engineer Proving Ground option
- No recommendations during previous BRAC rounds

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	57	144

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Realign to FT BELVOIR Renovate
- cost = $3.4 M
- payback = 3 years
- NPV = $11M / Steady State = $1M (1999)

NCR LEASE - CROWN RIDGE FAIRFAX, VA



FT BELVOIR

↑

US ARMY INFORMATION SOFTWARE COMMAND

CROWN RIDGE (formerly MELPAR)

VACATE LEASE
- RELOCATE TO FT BELVOIR
- COLOCATE IN DLA HQ BUILDING

COSTS ($M)

O&M	[illegible]
MILCON	0
OTHER	2.1
TOTAL	2.2

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	2
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2000
STEADY STATE ($M)	2 (1999)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	18
ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M)	2.3

IMPACT SUMMARY
NCR LEASE - CROWN RIDGE, FAIRFAX VA

OPERATIONAL: - Elements of Information Systems Command (Software Development)
- No recommendations from previous BRAC rounds
- Engineer Proving Ground option

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	141	191

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None/Local Move

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: Based on AAA audit identifying available space in the Defense Logistics Agency building.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

MINOR INSTALLATIONS

Closures:	One Time Costs ($M)	Steady State Savings ($M)
• East Ft Baker, CA	$ 7.8	$ 1.7
• Rio Vista USARC, CA	$ 0	$ 0.1
• Bellmore Log Facility, NY	$ 0	$ 0.3
• Big Coppitt Key, FL	$ 0	$ 0.01
• Camp Bonneville, WA	$ 0.04	$ 0.2
• Sudbury Training Annex, MA	$ 0.8	$ 0.1
• Higham Cohasset, MA	$ 0	$ 0.2
• Rec Center #2, NC	$ 0	$ 0
• Branch USDB, Lompoc, CA	$ 0	$ 0
• Caven Point, NJ - see Ft Hamilton closure		
• Baltimore Publications, MD	$ 6.4	$ 3.2
• Valley Grove, WV - see Kelly Spt Ctr closure		
Close, Except RC enclave		
• Sievers Sandberg, NJ	$ 0.1	$ 0.4
• Camp Kilmer, NJ	$ 0.1	$ 0.2
• Fort Missoula, MT	$ 0.4	$ 0.2

COSTS ($M)	
O&M	$ 5
MILCON	$ 6
OTHER	$ 5
TOTAL	$ 16

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 2

BREAK EVEN YEAR 2000

STEADY STATE ($M) 7 (2000)

20 YEAR NPV ($M) 73

IMPACT SUMMARY
MINOR INSTALLATIONS

OPERATIONAL:
- All actions are below the BRACthreshold
- All properties are excess to the Army's needs
- Recommendations provided by MACOM HQ

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		97
REALIGNMENTS	86	137

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations identified

ECONOMIC: Minimal

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

ARMY BRAC 95
PRELIMINARY REALIGNMENTS & CLOSURES

FT CHAFFEE
FT GREELY
FT PICKETT
FT DIX
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT MOUNTAIN GAP
DUGWAY PROV GRD
FT McCLELLAN
PRICE SPT CTR
FT BUCHANAN
FT RITCHIE
KELLY SPT CTR
FT HAMILTON
SELFRIDGE

NATICK
SAVANNA DEPOT
SENECA DEPOT
SIERRA DEPOT
BAYONNE
OAKLAND
FITZSIMMONS AMC
RED RIVER DEPOT
STRATFORD ENG PLT
DETROIT TANK PLT
HQ ATCOM LEASE
CAA LEASE
SELPARC/CROWN RIDGE LEASE

POM WEDGE
$729 M

MINOR SITES (15)

EAST FT BAKER CA	FT BIG BOLE A MT	RECREATION CENTER AL MC
CAMP BONNEVILLE WA	BIG CONNETTY NEV NV	BRANCH WOOD LOMPOC, CA
BELLMORE NY	SAN VISTA USARC CA	BALTIMORE PUBLIC CENTER, MD
WEST SANDBURG NJ	SUDBURY TRAINING ANNEX MA	CAVEN POINT NJ
CAMP NEWPORT IL	HINGHAM "CONNERY" USARC MA	VALLEY GROVE LEASE WV

RECOMMEND →
- 42 INSTALLATIONS / SITES
- 24 INSTALLATIONS
- 3 LEASES
- 15 MINOR SITES

COST - $1.3 B
ROI IMMEDIATE (2000)
ANNUAL SAVINGS $ 718 M
POM NET $1.0 B
20 YR NPV $7.9 B

POSSIBLE →

PICATINNY ARSENAL
LETTERKENNY DEPOT

2 INSTALLATIONS - THE "TOUGH CALLS"

NOT RECOMMENDED →

FT RILEY
FT DRUM
FT RICHARDSON
FT A P HILL
FT McCOY
FT EUSTIS/STORY
FT LEE
FT LEONARD WOOD

FT MEADE
FT MONROE
LIMA TANK PLT
HQ AMC LEASE
USA PERS CTR LEASE
BAILEY'S X-ROADS LEASE
PARK CTR LEASE
BALLSTON LEASE
CRYSTAL CITY LEASE

17 INSTALLATIONS
- 11 INSTALLATIONS
- 6 LEASES
- HIGH COST
- OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

NOT RECOMMENDED

	RATIONALE
MANEUVER	
FT RILEY	HIGH COST ($715 M), NOT SUPPORTED BY STATIONING STRATEGY
FT DRUM	SIGNIFICANT COST ($359 M) NOT SUPPORTED BY STATIONING STRATEGY
FT RICHARDSON	SIGNIFICANT COST ($391 M), UNIQUE ENVIRONMENT
MTA	
FT AP HILL	HEAVY RC TRAINING LOAD, CLOSURE NOT FEASIBLE
FT McCOY	HEAVY RC TRAINING LOAD, CLOSURE NOT FEASIBLE
TRAINING SCHOOL	
FT EUSTIS	HIGH COST ($588 M) 8 YEAR PAY-OFF
FT LEE	HIGH COST ($705 M) 30 YEAR PAY-OFF, BRAC 93 REJECTION
FT LEONARD WOOD	HIGH COST ($613 M) 8 YEAR PAY-OFF, RECOMMEND FT McCLELLAN
C2/ADMIN	
FT MEADE	HIGH COST ($651 M) 11 YEAR PAY-OFF
FT MONROE	JOINT WARFARE CENTER, BRAC 93 REJECTION
INDUSTRIAL	
LIMA TANK PLANT	REQUIRE 1 TANK PLANT - RECOMMEND DETROIT TANK PLANT
LEASES	
HQ AMC LEASE	27 YEAR PAY-OFF
USAR PERSONNEL CTR LEASE	29 YEAR PAY-OFF
BAILEY'S X-ROADS LEASE*	19 YEAR PAY-OFF
PARK CTR LEASE*	19 YEAR PAY-OFF
BALLSTON LEASE*	19 YEAR PAY-OFF
CRYSTAL CITY LEASE*	19 YEAR PAY-OFF

* RUN AS ONE NCR LEASE SCENARIO

FORT RILEY, KS

Ft Carson

1 Heavy Brigade

Ft Riley

COSTS ($M)

O&M	73
MILCON	263
AFH	319
OTHER	59
TOTAL	715

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	7
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2006
STEADY STATE (SM)	117 (2000)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	752

REALIGN FT RILEY

- MOVE ONE HVY BDE TO CARSON & REFLAG AS 3RD BDE, 4ID
- RETAIN RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE

IMPACT SUMMARY FORT RILEY, KS

OPERATIONAL:
- Alternate force structure scenario (1 bde vs 2 bde)
- Retains training land
- Sub-optimizes Fort Riley
- Risk of "Ft Dix" phenomenon would reduce savings
- No recommendations during any previous BRAC round
- Retention supported by stationing strategy

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	627	1,238
REALIGNMENTS	5,051	475

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 28% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 38,000
Retention of installation makes economic recovery difficult

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
(1) Large area support mission
(2) Departure Airfield - Forbes Field
(3) RC units dependent upon training assests of Ft Riley

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Completely closing Ft Riley not feasible because
tng land needed to support RC units in midwest

FORT DRUM, NY



CLOSE FT DRUM

- MOVE LT DIV TO FT CARSON
- RETAIN RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE

ASSUMPTION

RECENT FORCE STRUCTURE DECISION MODIFIED
- 3 ACR REMAINS AT FT BLISS
- NO MOVEMENT OF ADA BRIGADES

COSTS ($M)

O&M	124
MILCON	90
OTHER	145
TOTAL	359

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	3
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2002
STEADY STATE ($M)	126 (2000)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	1190

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT DRUM, NY

OPERATIONAL:
- Most modern installation in Army
- Option retains training land and support mission (250-man)
- Not supported by Army's stationing strategy
- Largest RC training facility in NE - Mob Station for 65 K soldiers
- Large area support mission
- Large leased buyout costs for 801 housing, water/sewage, & heat plt
- BRAC 91 Commission's recommendation to close was rejected

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	154	1,468
REALIGNMENTS	10,261	118

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 41 % direct and indirect job loss from emplyment base of 39,500

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: Departure airfield - Griffiss AFB

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close Ft Drum, relocate Lt Inf Div to Ft Hood and relocate 2AD Bde to Ft Carson where it would reflag as 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
- Cost = $ 900 M
- Payback = 9 years
- Annual savings = $116 M

FORT RICHARDSON, AK

Ft Wainwright

Brigade (-), Garrison (-), and Arctic Support Brigade (-)

Ft Richardson

COSTS ($M)

O&M	42
MILCON	74
AFH	238
OTHER	35
TOTAL	391

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	8
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2007
STEADY STATE (EOY)	56 (2000)
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	306

CLOSE FT RICHARDSON

- MOVE UNITS TO WAINWRIGHT
- RETAIN RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE

IMPACT SUMMARY FORT RICHARDSON, AK

OPERATIONAL:
- Locates all Brigade units at one installation - eases cmd & control
- Newer facilities at Ft Wainwright
- Can fire all weapons systems at Wainwright
- BRAC 91 Commission's recommendation to close was rejected

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	262	437
REALIGNMENTS	1,730	695

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 4% direct and indirect job loss from total civilian employment of 125,000

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:
(1) Richardson/Elmendorf is the planned site for the Joint Mobility Complex
(2) Alaskan ARNG HQS, TAG, and Reserve Coordination Center located on Richardson
(3) CDR, USARAK (MG) located at Richardson
(4) Anchorage is the HQS for most Federal Agencies: FBI, FAA, ATF, BLM, DOE, EPA

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close Ft Richardson (no enclave) - infeasible because facilities needed to support RC mission

LABORATORY - JCSG SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS

	PAX-RIVER NAVY → FIXED WING → ST. LOUIS AVRDEC	TINKER AF → FIXED WING → ST. LOUIS AVRDEC	ORLANDO NAVY → MANPOWER & PERS → ALEXANDRIA ARI	ORLANDO NAVY → TRAINING → ALEXANDRIA ARI
COSTS ($M)				
O&M	.87	.78	1.2	.6
MILCON	0	0	0	0
OTHER	.07	.07	.4	.2
TOTAL	.94	.85	1.6	.8
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	NEVER	NEVER	NEVER	NEVER
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	NEVER	NEVER	NEVER	NEVER
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	-.02	-.004	-.5	-.4
(YEAR)	1999	1999	1997	1997
20 YR NPV ($M)	-.3	-.136	-9	-4
PERSONNEL:				
ELIMINATIONS	0	0	0	0
REALIGNMENTS	4	4	61	29

ANALYSIS SUMMARY
LABORATORY

- SEVEN BASIC ALTERNATIVES WERE EVALUATED - ALL WERE POOR FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS
  - OPEN TO OPEN INSTALLATION MOVES
  - RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
  - DID NOT RESULT IN BASE CLOSURE
- PICATINNY UNLIKELY TO GAIN NAVY AND AF WORKLOAD
- FT MONMOUTH LIKELY TO GAIN AF AND NAVY WORKLOAD

BOTTOM LINE

NO IMPACT ON CURRENT ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS

Joint Cross-Service Working Group MEDICAL

	FITZSIMONS ARMY MED CTR	LEE KENNER HOSPITAL	McCLELLAN NOBLE HOSPITAL
	CLOSE	CLINIC	CLINIC
COSTS ($M)			
O&M	37	1.8	1.9
MILCON	103	0	0
OTHER	5	0.3	0.2
TOTAL	145	2.1	2.1
RECURRING CHAMPUS COST ($M)	$49/YR	$5.7/YR	$5.6/YR
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	3	1	1
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	2003	1997	1997
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	37	3.8	4.0
(YEAR)	2001	1997	1997
20 YR NPV ($M)	327	51	56

PERSONNEL:	FITZSIMONS MIL	FITZSIMONS CIV	LEE KENNER MIL	LEE KENNER CIV	McCLELLAN NOBLE MIL	McCLELLAN NOBLE CIV
ELIMINATIONS	0	1309	99	106	98	109
REALIGNMENTS	1069	301	0*	0*	0	0

Joint Cross-Service Working Group MEDICAL



	MEADE KIMBROUGH HOSPITAL → CLINIC	BELVOIR DEWITT HOSPITAL → CLINIC	RUCKER LYSTER HOSPITAL → CLINIC
COSTS ($M)			
O&M	1.3	1.4	1.2
MILCON	0	0	0
OTHER	0.4	0.1	0.1
TOTAL	1.7	1.6	1.4
RECURRING CHAMPUS COST ($M)	$2.9/YR	$23.6/YR	$6.3/YR
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	1	NEVER	NEVER
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	1997	NEVER	NEVER
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	3.5	-16.5	-0.5
(YEAR)	1997	1997	1997
20 YR NPV ($M)	49	-259	-12

PERSONNEL:	MEADE MIL	MEADE CIV	BELVOIR MIL	BELVOIR CIV	RUCKER MIL	RUCKER CIV
ELIMINATIONS	55	74	65	76	77	62
REALIGNMENTS	0	0	0*	0*	0	0

ANALYSIS SUMMARY
MEDICAL

- CLOSURE OF FITZSIMMONS CONSISTENT WITH ARMY RECOMMENDATION
- RECOMMENDATION TO REALIGN FT LEE AND MEADE HOSPITALS SUPPORTABLE
- CLOSE FT McCLELLAN HOSPITAL IAW ARMY RECOMMENDATION
- REJECT FT RUCKER AND FT BELVOIR ALTERNATIVES DUE TO COST AND OPERATIONAL IMPACTS

BOTTOM LINE

NEED TO ADD TWO REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CURRENT ARMY PACKAGE

Joint Cross-Service Working Group DEPOT



	OGDEN AF	NORTH ISLAND NAVY	CHERRY POINT NAVY	CHERRY POINT NAVY
	LANDING GEAR	AVIONICS	APU'S	ENGINES
	CORPUS CHRISTI	CORPUS CHRISTI	CORPUS CHRISTI	CORPUS CHRISTI
COSTS ($M)				
O&M	.16	.076	.057	2.8
MILCON	0	0	0	1.86
OTHER	.01	.006	.006	.09
TOTAL	.17	.08	.06	3.8
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	7	0	0	1
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	2003	1996	1996	2000
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	.03	.2	.2	2.9
(YEAR)	2004	1997	1997	2001
20 YR NPV ($M)	.3	3.1	3.0	32.8
PERSONNEL:				
ELIMINATIONS	0	4	4	53
REALIGNMENTS	7	0	0	75

Joint Cross-Service Working Group DEPOT

	ANNISTON	BARSTOW MARINES	OGDEN AF	ANNISTON	BARSTOW MARINES
	SP ARTY	MISSILES	MISSILES	MISSILES	OWED ARTY
	LETTERKENNY	LETTERKENNY	LETTERKENNY	LETTERKENNY	LETTERKENNY
COSTS ($M)					
O&M	5.9	.76	1.4	5.19	.737
MILCON	0	0	.4	18.37	0
OTHER	.2	.03	.09	.2	.02
TOTAL	6.1	.8	1.9	23.8	.75
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	9	9	7	58	3
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	2006	2005	2004	2054	1999
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	1	.1	.3	.8	.3
(YEAR)	2007	2006	2006	2054	2000
20 YR NPV ($M)	6.1	.8	1.9	-11.4	3.0
PERSONNEL:					
ELIMINATIONS	0	0	0	0	3
REALIGNMENTS	258	30	56	239	23

Joint Cross-Service Working Group DEPOT

	ANNISTON	NORTH ISLAND NAVY	SACRAMENTO AF	SACRAMENTO AF	ALBANY MARINES
	MISSILES	AVIONICS	COMMEL	COMMEL	SMALL ARMS
	TOBYHANNA	TOBYHANNA	TOBYHANNA	TOBYHANNA	ANNISTON
COSTS ($M)					
O&M	.8	4.2	1.4	.1	2.7
MILCON	4.7	0	.4	.6	.3
OTHER	.04	.2	.1	.01	.2
TOTAL	5.7	4.4	1.9	.7	3.2
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	100+	7	5	100+	5
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	100+	2007	2002	100+	2003
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	.2	.4	.4	.005	.8
(YEAR)	1997	1999	1998	1997	2004
20 YR NPV ($M)	-3.2	2.4	4.1	-.6	6.6
PERSONNEL:					
ELIMINATIONS	0	18	5	0	13
REALIGNMENTS	37	150	49	5	131

Joint Cross-Service Working Group DEPOT

	ANNISTON	ANNISTON	ANNISTON	ALBANY MARINES
	MISSILES	COMBAT VEHICLES	COMBAT VEHICLES	CONSTR EQUIPMENT
	RED RIVER	RED RIVER	RED RIVER	RED RIVER
COSTS ($M)				
O&M	.8	14.6	1.3	.2
MILCON	5.1	10.0	5.0	0
OTHER	.06	1.1	.1	.02
TOTAL	6.0	25.7	6.4	.2
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	60	11	45	0
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	2056	2007	2041	1996
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	.2	3	.3	.6
(YEAR)	2052	2008	2037	1997
20 YR NPV ($M)	-208.0	17.8	-2.5	8.8
PERSONNEL:				
ELIMINATIONS	0	0	0	11
REALIGNMENTS	36	708	66	0

ANALYSIS SUMMARY
MAINTENANCE DEPOT

- ACCEPT JCSG RECOMMENDATION ON CLOSURE OF LETTERKENNY AND RED RIVER
- ARMY INCORPORATED OVER 50% OF JCSG-DM ALTERNATIVES - IN TOTAL OR WITH MODIFICATION
- TOBYHANNA, CORPUS CHRISTI, AND ANNISTON WORKLOAD PACKAGES NOT INCLUDED DUE TO:
  - OPEN TO OPEN SCENARIOS
  - OPERATIONAL IMPACTS
  - MISSION COSTS OUT WEIGH RELOCATION COSTS
- OTHER CONCERNS:
  - FUNDED NON-CORE WORKLOAD ELIMINATED AND CONTRACTED OUT
  - INCREASES OTHER MEIDEP DEPOT EFFICIENCY AT EXPENSE OF THE ARMY
  - PAST SERVICE MAINTENANCE COMPETITIONS NOT CONSIDERED
- UNLIKELY OTHER SERVICE WORKLOAD WILL TRANSFER TO ARMY DEPOTS

BOTTOM LINE

ARMY RECOMMENDATION IMPROVES JCSG-DM ALTERNATIVE

SUMMARY

- PROPOSED CHANGES TO CURRENT ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS
  - ADD PROJECT RELIANCE REDIRECT
  - ADD REALIGNMENT OF FT LEE HOSPITAL TO CLINIC
  - ADD REALIGNMENT OF FT MEADE HOSPITAL TO CLINIC
- THE FOLLOWING FINANCIAL CHANGES OCCUR:

	CURRENT	PROPOSED
1-TIME COST ($B)	$1.1	$1.1
RECURRING STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	$723	$730
RETURN ON INVESTMENT		
# OF YEARS	IMMEDIATE	IMMEDIATE
YEAR	2000	2000
20 YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE ($B)	$8.1	$8.2

STUDY LIST SUMMARY



ABOVE THRESHOLD

1. FT RICHARDSON
2. FT WAINWRIGHT
3. FT DIX
4. FT HUNTER LIGGETT
5. FT INDIANTOWN GAP
6. FT McCOY
7. PRICE SPT CENTER
8. FT BUCHANAN
9. FT GILLEM
10. FT MEADE
11. FT MONROE
12. FT RITCHIE
13. FT LEONARD WOOD
14. FT EUSTIS/STORY
15. FT LEE
16. FT McCLELLAN
17. POM
18. SAVANNA DEPOT
19. SENECA DEPOT
20. SIERRA DEPOT
21. NATICK RDEC
22. PICATINNY
23. BAYONNE
24. OAKLAND
25. DUGWAY PG
26. FITZSIMONS AMC
27. LETTERKENNY DEPOT
28. RED RIVER DEPOT

+

BELOW THRESHOLD

1. FT AP HILL
2. FT CHAFFEE
3. FT GREELY
4. FT PICKETT
5. KELLY SPT CENTER
6. FT HAMILTON
7. FT TOTTEN
8. PSF
9. SELFRIDGE
10. PUEBLO DEPOT
11. UMATILLA DEPOT
12. COLD REGION LAB
13. LIMA TANK PLANT
14. STRATFORD ENG PLANT
15. (DETROIT TANK PLANT)

+

LEASES

1. HQ AMC
2. HQ ATCOM
3. HQ PERSCOM
4. USA PERS CTR
5. HQ SDC
6. BAILEY'S X-ROAD
7. USA SPACE COM
8. CAA
9. ARO
10. PARK CTR
11. BALLSTON-WEBB
12. CRYSTAL CITY
13. FOREIGN TECH
14. JAG SCHOOL
15. MELPAR BLDG
16. MDW ADMIN

= INITIAL STUDY LIST

28 OF 74 (38%) + 15 OF 23 (65%) + 16 = 59 STUDIES

43 OF 97 (44%)

MANEUVER
FT HOOD
FT LEWIS
FT BRAGG
FT STEWART
FT CARSON
FT CAMPBELL
SCHOFIELD BRKS

FT RILEY
FT DRUM
FT WAINWRIGHT
FT RICHARDSON

FORT WAINWRIGHT





COSTS ($M)

O&M	38
MILCON	99
AFH	191
MPA	11
HAP	2
OTHER	30
TOTAL	373

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	14
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2013
STEADY STATE ($M)	36

REALIGN FT WAINWRIGHT

- MOVE ALL UNITS FROM WAINWRIGHT TO RICHARDSON
- RETAIN A RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE AT WAINWRIGHT

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT WAINWRIGHT

O ERATIONAL:
- consolidates Brigade units at Richardson (consolidation at Wainwright is much cheaper) - generates large construction bill
- can fire all weapon systems at Wainwright
- large amount of training land at Wainwright - 878,000 acres vs 45,000 at Richardson

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	232	318
REALIGNMENTS	4,271	540

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 20.5 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 37K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

Wainwright hospital also supports Eielson AFB

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Closure infeasible due to military value of maneuver area

FORT A P HILL



MAJOR TRNG AREAS
FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT AP HILL
FT MCCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETTT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE



COSTS ($M)

O&M	5
MILCON	10
INFO MGMT	1
OTHER	1
TOTAL	17

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	1
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1999
STEADY STATE ($M)	14

CLOSE FT A P HILL
- REALIGN UNITS TO OTHER LOCATIONS

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT A P HILL, VA

OPERATIONAL:

- supports training for 20 RC Bn equivalents
- closure would require 8 RC FA Bns to travel more than 300 miles
- current avg distance for RC units, 108 miles, would grow to 257 miles

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	179
REALIGNMENTS	121	33

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 4 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 10K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

TENANTS

USAR units
- CoA, 11SF Bn
- 80 Div Ldr School

ARNG
- HHC 2-29 Inf Bde
- VA ARNG Mil Acd
- Light Ldr Course

Night Vis on Lab

FORT DIX



MAJOR TRNG AREAS
FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT AP HILL
FT MCCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETTT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE



COSTS ($M)

O&M	39
MILCON	101
INFO MGMT	10
HAP	3
OTHER	4
TOTAL	157

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	3
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2001
STEADY STATE ($M)	51

CLOSE FT DIX
- REALIGN UNITS TO OTHER LOCATIONS

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT DIX, NJ

OPERATIONAL:
- BRAC 91 Commission directed retention of an AC garrison to support RC training requirements
- supports training for 14 RC Bn equivalents (51 units)
- closure would require 4 Bns to travel over 300 miles
- current avg distance for RC units, 108 miles, would grow to 264 miles

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	610
REALIGNMENTS	893	889

TENANTS
Fed Corrections
N J Police Acad
N J State Prison
Pemberton School
US Postal Service
Navy, AF
USAR
National Guard

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.6 % job loss from employment base of 2.3 M

FACILITY USE
Garrison - 46%
Outgranted - 43%
Excessed - 11%

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT McCOY, WI

OPERATIONAL:
- USARC installation
- supports training for 29 RC Bn equivalents
- closure would require 17 RC Bns to travel more than 300 miles
- current avg distance for RC units, 151 miles, would grow to 296 miles

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	1110
REALIGNMENTS	22	462

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 16 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 18K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: None

TENANTS
- USAR units
  - 86 ARCOM
  - 85 Tng Div
  - RTS - Maint
  - RTS - Med
- WI Nat'l Guard
  - MATES
  - Mil Academy
- WI State Police
- DRMO
- DFAS

FORT McCOY

MAJOR TRNG AREAS
FT POLK
FT IRWIN

FT DIX
FT AP HILL
FT MCCOY
FT GREELY
FT HUNTER LIGGETT
FT PICKETTT
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
FT CHAFFEE





CLOSE FT McCOY
- REALIGN UNITS TO OTHER LOCATIONS

COSTS ($M)

O&M	33
MILCON	48
INFO MGMT	5
HAP	3
OTHER	1
TOTAL	90

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	1
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1999
STEADY STATE ($M)	106

IMPACT SUMMARY
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CA

OPERATIONAL:
- home of Defense Language Institute
- BRAC 93 Commission recommended retention of POM and consolidation of base operations with Naval Post Graduate School
- OSD determined language training cannot be outsourced

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	0	123
REALIGNMENTS	408	1185

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 3.6% direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 154K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: possibility of DoD or Navy (Naval Postgraduate School) accepting BASOPS function

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED Goodfellow AFB, TX
- costs = $ 354 M
- payback = 12 years

C2 / ADMIN
FT BELVOIR
FT McPHERSON
FT MYER
FT SHAFTER

FT MEADE
FT MONROE
FT RITCHIE
FT GILLEM
SELFRIDGE
PRICE SUPPORT CTR
FT BUCHANAN
PRESIDIO OF SF
KELLY SUPPORT CTR
FT HAMILTON
FT TOTTEN

FORT GILLEM





COSTS ($M)

O&M	14
MILCON	16
OTHER	2
TOTAL	86

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	2
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2000
STEADY STATE ($M)	16

CLOSE FT GILLEM

- REALIGN SECOND CONUSA TO FT BENNING
- RELOCATE BASOPS TO FT McPHERSON
- ENCLAVE USAR & AAFES

C2 / ADMIN
FT BELVOIR
FT McPHERSON
FT MYER
FT SHAFTER

FT MEADE
FT MONROE
FT RITCHIE
FT GILLEM
SELFRIDGE
PRICE SUPPORT CTR
FT BUCHANAN
PRESIDIO OF SF
KELLY SUPPORT CTR
FT HAMILTON
FT TOTTEN

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO



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COSTS ($M)

O&M
MILCON
OTHER

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) _____

BREAK EVEN YEAR _____

STEADY STATE ($M) _____

IMPACT SUMMARY
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CA

OPERATIONAL:
- BRAC 88 closure
- BRAC 93 permitted 6th CONUSA to remain
- recent MOA changes status to tenant site

PERSONNEL: N/A

ENVIRONMENTAL: N/A

ECONOMIC: N/A

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: N/A

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: N/A

COMMODITY
REDSTONE
DETROIT
ROCK ISLAND
FT MONMOUTH
ADELPHI
FT DETRICK

PICATINNY
COLD REGION
NATICK RDEC

COLD REGION LAB





COSTS ($M)

O&M	4
MILCON	29
OTHER	3
	37

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	8
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2006
STEADY STATE ($M)	5

CLOSE COLD REGION LAB

- REALIGN TO APG OR NATICK

IMPACT SUMMARY
COLD REGION LAB, NH

OPERATIONAL:
- laboratory conducts research on physical science & engineering problems unique to cold regions; civil works effort focuses on cold weather problems in harbors & inland waterways
- unique facility, cannot be outsourced
- nation's only major low temperature physical science complex
- 50% lab; 30% civil works; 20% RDEC

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		34
REALIGNMENTS		141

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: .1 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 39 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: May be included in Lab JCSG alternatives

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

Realignment to Natick, MA:
- costs $53 M
- payback in 16 years

PUEBLO & UMATILLA DEPOT ACTIVITIES



AMMO STORAGE
HAWTHORNE
TOOELE
BLUE GRASS

SENECA
SAVANNA
PUEBLO
SIERRA
UMATILLA

UMATILLA

PUEBLO

CLOSE UMATILLA & PUEBLO

COSTS ($M)

O&M	16
MILCON	
OTHER	
	16

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMED
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2001
STEADY STATE ($M)	48

IMPACT SUMMARY
PUEBLO, CO & UMATILLA, OR

OPERATIONAL:

- BRAC 88 realigned both to depot activities & recommended closure upon completion of chemical demilitarization
- Projected completion for chemical demil is 2nd Qtr 2004
- Cannot meet BRAC 95 execution timelines

PERSONNEL:

	PUEBLO / UMATILLA	
	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	3/9	353/222
REALIGNMENTS		

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: Pueblo: 3% direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 49 K
Umatilla: 3% direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 28 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

LEASES

USA PERSONNEL COMMAND



COSTS ($M)

O&M	0
MILCON	116
OTHER	11
TOTAL	127

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	NEVER
BREAK EVEN YEAR	NEVER
STEADY STATE ($M)	2

ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M)	9
LEASE COST/PERSON/YEAR	2.1 K
BASOPS/PERSON/YEAR	4.0 K

VACATE LEASE

- REALIGN PERSCOM TO FT BELVOIR

IMPACT SUMMARY
PERSCOM, ALEXANDRIA VA

OPERATIONAL:
- None, local move
- Requirement for large workforce

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	833	3554

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED Realign to Ft Meade:
- cost = $ 127 M
- payback = 43 years

LEASES

SPACE & STRATEGIC DEFENSE COMMAND





VACATE LEASE

- REALIGN SSDC TO REDSTONE ARSENAL

COSTS ($M)	
O&M	0
MILCON	19
INFO MGMT	2
TOTAL	21
PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	NEVER
BREAK EVEN YEAR	NEVER
STEADY STATE ($M)	1
ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M)	1.7
LEASE COST/PERSON/YEAR	1.8 K
BASOPS/PERSON/YEAR	4.2 K

IMPACT SUMMARY
SPACE & STRATEGIC DEFENSE COMMAND, HUNTSVILLE, AL

OPERATIONAL:
- none, local move
- synergy with major PMs and Missile Command at Redstone

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	35	915

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

LEASES

ARMY SPACE COMMAND





COSTS ($M)

O&M	0
MILCON	14
INFO MGMT	1
TOTAL	15

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	NEVER
BREAK EVEN YEAR	NEVER
STEADY STATE ($M)	0.3

ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M)	0.5
LEASE COST/PERSON/YEAR	1.1 K
BASOPS/PERSON/YEAR	2.2 K

/ACATE LEASE

- REALIGN SPACE COMMAND TO FT CARSON

IMPACT SUMMARY
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA

OPERATIONAL: UVA Law School tenant

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	56	37

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.6 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 68 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

Realign to Fort Belvoir:
- cost = $ 33 M
- payback = 14 years

ARMY BRAC 95 TIME LINES



TRAINING SCHOOLS
FT BLISS
FT BENNING
FT JACKSON
FT KNOX
FT GORDON
FT SILL
FT HUACHUCA
FT RUCKER
FT SAM HOUSTON

FT LEONARD WOOD
FT McCLELLAN
FT LEE
FT EUSTIS / FT STORY
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY

PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY





COSTS ($M)

O&M	34
MILCON	318
INFO MGMT	35
AFH	33
MPA	2
HAP	2
TOTAL	424

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	22
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2022
STEADY STATE ($M)	26

CLOSE PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY

- REALIGN TO FORT HUACHUCA, AZ.

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT GILLEM, GA

OPERATIONAL:
- examined & rejected by BRAC 93 Commission
- inextricably linked to Ft McPherson (BASOPS)
- minimal buildable area at Ft McPherson

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	13	195
REALIGNMENTS	978	286

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0.1 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 1.7 M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS:

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: closure with no enclave costs $350 M, primarily because of the high cost to relocate AAFES

TENANTS
- HQ, 2d Army (-)
- 3d Army (-)
- AAFES Dist Ctr
- HQ, Regional CID
- Criminal Inv Lab
- USARC
- DOL / DEH
- PX & Commissary
- Storage Facilities
  - Red Cross
  - FEMA
  - other

FACILITY USE
- AAFES - 33%
- USAR - 20%
- Garrison - 20%
- GA NG - 5%
- DRMO/FEMA -5%
- Other - 17%

FORT TOTTEN



C2 / ADMIN
- FT BELVOIR
- FT McPHERSON
- FT MYER
- FT SHAFTER

- FT MEADE
- FT MONROE
- FT RITCHIE
- FT GILLEM
- SELFRIDGE
- PRICE SUPPORT CTR
- FT BUCHANAN
- PRESIDIO OF SF
- KELLY SUPPORT CTR
- FT HAMILTON
- FT TOTTEN



COSTS ($M)

O&M	1
MILCON	78
OTHER	7
TOTAL	86

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	NEVER
BREAK EVEN YEAR	NEVER
STEADY STATE ($M)	3

CLOSE FT TOTTEN

- REALIGN RC UNITS TO FORT HAMILTON
- ENCLAVE COAST GUARD STATION

IMPACT SUMMARY
FORT TOTTEN, NY

OPERATIONAL:
- home of Ernie Pyle USAR Center, largest in USAR
- few base opns savings ($2M) to offset MILCON
- relocating RC units outside of NY area has adverse readiness impact
- retention of housing in high-cost area is a quality of life consideration

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	11	11
REALIGNMENTS	236	280

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 0 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 3.5 M

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Retain USAR in enclave and relocate other USAR units:
- no room at Ft Hamilton to build; limited excess facilities
- nearest site is Ft Monmouth, 70 miles away - too costly

TENANTS
USAR
- 77 ARCOM
- Other (28 units)

Coast Guard
Other
- NY Police
- NY Fire
- Emergency Med

FACILITY USE
USAR - 62%
Garrison - 23 %
Coast Guard - 9%
Other - 6%

IMPACT SUMMARY
ARMY SPACE COMMAND, CO

OPERATIONAL:
- none, local move
- synergy with CINCSPACE at Peterson AFB

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	363	105

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

LEASES

ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE



ADELPHI, MD

↑

ARO

COSTS ($M)

MILCON	3
O&M	2
OTHER	1
TOTAL	6

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	NEVER
BREAK EVEN YEAR	NEVER
STEADY STATE ($M)	2

ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M	0.4
LEASE COST/PERSON/YEAR	3.4 K
BASOPS/PERSON/YEAR	18.9 K

VACATE LEASE

- REALIGN ARO TO ADELPHI LAB

IMPACT SUMMARY
ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE, NC

OPERATIONAL:
- coordinate research efforts with academic institutions
- R&D efforts provide advances in physics, chemistry, biology, materials science, electronics & engineering, environmental science, mathematics and computer sciences
- located in Research Triangle

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	2	107

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: Director, Defense Research & Engineering requested Army to examine relocating ARO to NCR leased space (Ballston)

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
- Aberdeen PG: cost = $2 M; payback = never
- NCR lease: cost = $2 M; payback = 7 years

LEASES

NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CTR

FORMERLY FOREIGN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CTR





COSTS ($M)	
O&M	10
MILCON	17
OTHER	1
INFO MGMT	2
TOTAL	30

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	100+
BREAK EVEN YEAR	100+
STEADY STATE ($M)	0.4

ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M)	1.3
LEASE COST/PERSON/YEAR	2.1 K
BASOPS/PERSON/YEAR	1.3 K

VACATE LEASE

- REALIGN TO FT MEADE

IMPACT SUMMARY
NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CTR
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA

OPERATIONAL: Foreign materiel exploitation and intelligence support

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	108	522

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: 1.2 % direct and indirect job loss from employment base of 68 K

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

LEASES

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL





COSTS ($M)	
O&M	1
MILCON	5
OTHER	0
INFO MGMT	0
TOTAL	6

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	13
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2011
STEADY STATE ($M)	0.6

ANNUAL LEASE COST ($M)	0.9
LEASE COST/PERSON/YEAR	4.9 K
BASOPS/PERSON/YEAR	1.3 K

VACATE LEASE

- REALIGN TO FT MEADE

ARMY BRAC 95 TIME LINES



DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS

THE TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY BRIEFING
BRIEFER - MR. JENKINS
8 APRIL 97, 1000-1030HRS

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

SELECTION PROCESS - INTRODUCTION:

- Army effort to reduce unnecessary infrastructure began with SECDEF's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988.
- Army initiatives resulting from 1988 SECDEF Commission recommendations:
  - Reduced AC soldiers from 770K to 540K.
  - Reduced active divisions from 18 to 12.
  - Closed 77 installations (US) and was in the process of closing 6 others.
  - Over overseas 500 sites (mostly in Europe) were returned to host nation w/ plans to return 150 more.
  - Announced further end strength reduction in force to 495K and division reduction from 12 to 10 by FY 96.

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS CHARTER:

- TABS Planning Office (TABS PO) was established under auspices of the Director of Management - effective 1 Aug 93.
- TABS Study Group (TABS SG) was established under auspices of the Director of Management - effective 1 Aug 94.
- Both organizations were disestablished on 31 Jul 95 as promulgated by the charter.
- TABS (PO/SG) organizations were to provide the Army the capability to comply with provisions of BRAC Law of 1990, (Public Law 101-510) - as amended.
- The planning and execution of Army's development of BRAC recommendations for BRAC 95 were accomplished via two Phases:
  - Phase I - Effective 1 Aug 93 thru 31 July 94, TABS PO executes its mission as delineated by the charter.
  - Phase II - Effective 1 Aug 94, TABS PO transitions to a fully staffed/operational TABS SG. TABS SG is to execute its mission as delineated by the charter.

HISTORY

12 DIVISION FORCE DESIGNATIONS

2ID



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

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HISTORY

10 DIVISION FORCE



TRANSFORMING ARMY DECISION

BRAC '95

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

SELECTION PROCESS CONTINUED - ARMY's INTENT:

- Develop a stationing strategy that provides an operational context for planning and analysis:
  - The National Military Strategy was used to develop the Stationing Strategy.
  - The Strategy:
    - » Develop stationing guidelines.
    - » Influence type of installations needed for the future.
    - » Set parameters that reduce infrastructure without jeopardizing future requirements.
- Conduct a comprehensive review of all installations.
- Group the installations into categories with similar missions, capabilities, and characteristics.

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS PLANNING OFFICE

MISSION STATEMENT

Examine lessons learned from BRAC 93 study, make refinements to study process, and lay the groundwork for BRAC 95 study efforts. TABS PO personnel will provide a foundation for the fully staffed TABS Study Group when it begins the detailed analysis of realignment and closure scenarios.

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

STATIONING TASK FORCE - (DAMO-FDO [lead]/TABS PO [assist])

RESPONSIBILITIES:

- Develop operational blueprint
  - » Requirements
  - » Stationing Strategy
  - » Prioritize installations
- Incorporate MACOM/ARSTAF input
- Conduct installation assessments
- Identify candidates for realignment/closure

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

DAMO-FDO - Stationing, Realignment, and Reflagging Division
ORGANIZATIONAL, STRUCTURE, AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS



DAMO-FDO STAFF (Full-time basis):

- **5 Military Officers**
- **3 Enlisted**
- **Note: DAMO-FDO is the DCSOPS element of the Strategy Task Force to provide stationing alternatives (that were subject to the BRAC Act of 1990) to the TABS Study Group for evaluation.**

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS PLANNING OFFICE

RESPONSIBILITIES:

- Refine analytical process & decision support tools used in BRAC 93.
- Act as DoD executive agent to provide program management & contractor supervision for the development and refinement of the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model.
- Conduct comprehensive, detailed military value assessments of CONUS Army installations.
- Initiate, monitor, & report on any independent studies/research conducted to address unresolved issues from BRAC 93 to prepare for BRAC 95.
- POC for Army staff for BRAC 95. Maintain visibility of BRAC process and BRAC 95 milestones. Conduct updates to Army leadership on BRAC study/analytical process.
- Review current/planned Army/OSD initiatives which may affect CONUS basing realignments.
- Conduct on-site visits to installations as needed to update/verify data elements for use in BRAC 95 analytical process.
- Update standard factors used in cost analysis of BRAC study candidates. Collect/analyze data elements to be used in cost analysis for BRAC 95. Collect data from previous BRAC actions to establish a body of historical data to support BRAC 95 analysis.
- TABS PO/AAA develop & implement effective internal control procedures to maintain accurate & validation of processes, methodology, assumptions, calculations and data used by TABS PO.
- Co-ordinate realignment and closure actions being implemented with BRAC Office.
- Keep ASA (IL&E) and the ACSIM informed of mission accomplishments.

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS PLANNING OFFICE
ORGANIZATIONAL, STRUCTURE, AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS



TABS PLANNING OFFICE STAFF (Full-time basis):

- **3 Military**
- **2 Civilians**

Note: 3 DMOs and 2 Civilian overhires were authorized to satisfy manpower requirements - not to exceed 21 Jul 95

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS STUDY GROUP
MISSION STATEMENT

Examine the issues surrounding the realignment and closure of Army installations within the 50 territories and possessions, and make recommendations to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff concerning potential realignments and closures. The Study Group will also serve as the Army's single point of contact with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, established under the provisions of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

The Study Group will assess the Army's CONUS installation resources, identify the Army's CONUS basing requirements, and present base realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations, consistent with Department of Defense (DoD) force structure plans and BRAC selection criteria, which may be necessary to meet requirements.

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS STUDY GROUP

PRINCIPLES TO OBSERVE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MISSION:

- Comply with Defense BRAC Act of 1990 and other relevant legislation.
- Comply with OSD/SECARMY/CSA guidance.
- Maximize productive use of existing installation resources.
- Balance long-term BRAC savings with near term affordable implementation costs.
- Ensure CONUS base structure supports training, modernization, mobilization, deployment, reconstitution, and sustainment of the Total Army.

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS STUDY GROUP

RESPONSIBILITIES:

- Develop/document BRAC alternatives.
- Evaluate all BRAC alternatives for consistency - consistent w/Army, OSD, and BRAC Commission selection criteria.
- Develop, document, and publish BRAC recommendations to be submitted to OSD and Defense BRAC Commission for 1995.
- Document the Army's process for identifying BRAC options and recommendations.
- TABS SG/AAA will co-develop, document, and implement effective internal control procedures to review the accuracy/validate Study Group's processes, methodology, assumptions, calculations and data.
- Co-ordinate w/Army BRAC Office on matters that implicate BRAC actions currently being implemented.
- Ensure that all relevant documents pertaining to the TABS process for BRAC 95 are provided to the Chief, BRAC Office upon conclusion of Study Group's activities.

TOTAL ARMY BASING STUDY (TABS)

Click to add title

TABS STUDY GROUP
ORGANIZATIONAL, STRUCTURE, AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS



NOTE:
- Full time TABS SG staff of 14 personnel, augmented by 3 auditors from either AAA or GAO.
- Three Military/2 Civilians from TABS PO (*) form the nucleus of the TABS Study Group.
- Duration of detail - 1 Aug 94 to 31 Jul 95.

BRAC 95 PROCESS



TASK FORCE

- DEVELOPS OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT
  - REQUIREMENTS
  - STATIONING STRATEGY
  - PRIORITY INSTALLATIONS
- INCORPORATES MACOM/ARSTAF INPUT
- CONDUCTS INSTALLATION ASSESSMENTS
- IDENTIFIES CANDIDATES FOR REALIGNMENT/ CLOSURE

TABS

- REFINES CANDIDATES
- DOCUMENTS THE ARMY PROCESS
- PROVIDES RECOMMENDATIONS TO ARMY/ OSD LEADERSHIP
- SUPPORTS COMMISSION REQUIREMENTS

BRAC 95 TABS PROCESS



PROPOSED STATIONING TIMELINES



STATIONING TIMELINES



AN OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE





Stationing Task Force

- Operational perspective
- Co-ordinate MACOM input
- The Army Stationing Strategy

The Army Basing Study

- Governed by Public Law 101-510
- DoD Selection Criteria
- Certified Data
- Army recommendations

The Army Stationing Strategy Concept













Maneuver Installations

Stationing Requirements



Station:

- **BUR force structure in U. S.**
- **Forces in Alaska + Hawaii**

Support:

- **Training**
- **Power Projection**
- **Mobilization and RC training**

MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS

Ft Bragg
Ft Campbell
Ft Carson
Ft Drum
Ft Hood
Ft Lewis
Ft Richardson
Ft Riley
Ft Stewart
Ft Wainwright
Schofield Barracks

Operational Blueprint



- **Maintain unique capabilities (Hood, Bragg, Campbell, Lewis, Stewart)**
- **Station forces in Alaska and Hawaii to support USCINCPAC strategy**
- **Size base structure in Alaska to support one maneuver brigade and associated support units**
- **Retain all CONUS maneuver installations to enable stationing of BUR force in U.S.**

Potential Impact

Wainwright

Major Training Areas



Stationing Requirements

- Retain heavy + light CTCs
- Support RC training strategy (CFP, SOF, EB)

MAJOR TRAINING AREA INSTALLATIONS

Ft Dix
Ft Irwin
Ft McCoy
Ft Polk
*Ft A.P. Hill
*Ft Chaffee
*Ft Hunter-Liggett
*Ft Indiantown Gap
*Ft Pickett

* Below BRAC threshold



Operational Blueprint

- Minimize MTA structure to accomplish RC training strategy
- Consolidate workload on RC controlled installations and mothball excess
- Eliminate AC force structure stationed on MTAs (excluding CTCs)

Potential Impact

A.P. Hill
Hunter-Liggett
FIG
Dix
Chaffee

NOTE: OPTEC will be relocated from Ft Hunter-Liggett

Respond to Potential OSD Bogey

Current Stationing Strategy

Affected Installations:

Ritchie
Fitzsimmons
Oakland
Greely
Gillem
Wainwright
Savanna AD
Detroit Tk Plt
Presidio of San Francisco
FIG
Chaffee
McClellan
Bayonne
A.P. Hill
ATCOM Lease
Red River AD
Seneca AD
Sierra AD
Stratford Army Engine Plt
Totten
Hunter-Liggett
Dix

Further Study:

Probable:

Natick
Tobyhanna
Price

Possible:

Selfridge
Adelphi
Monmouth
Letterkenny
Detroit Ars
Dugway PG
Buchanan
POM
Eustis
Lee
Yuma PG
Picatinny Ars

Expanded Stationing Strategy

Long Term Savings: $90M
Net over POM: cost $102M
Payback: 8 years





Long Term Savings: $102M
Net over POM: save $207M
Payback: 4 years

Cost/Savings Analysis

Affected Installations:

- Ritchie
- *Fitzsimmons
- Oakland
- Greely
- Gillem
- Wainwright
- Savanna AD
- *Detroit Tk Plt
- Presidio of San Francisco
- FIG
- *Chaffee
- McClellan
- Bayonne
- A.P. Hill
- ATCOM Lease
- Red River AD
- Seneca AD
- Sierra AD
- *Stratford Army Engine Plt
- *Totten
- Hunter-Liggett
- * Dix

* estimated cost analysis



Long Term Savings: $397M
Net over POM: save $296M
Payback: 6 years

Further Study:

Probable:

- Natick
- Tobyhanna
- Price

Possible:

- Detroit Ars
- Selfridge
- Adelphi
- Monmouth
- Letterkenny
- Dugway PG
- Buchanan
- POM
- Eustis
- Lee
- Picatinny Ars
- Yuma PG



Probable		Possible
$462M	Long-Term Savings	$726M
save $243M	POM Savings	cost $884M
6 years	Payback	8 years

Respond to Potential OSD Bogey

Current Stationing Strategy

Affected Installations:

Ritchie	McClellan
Fitzsimmons	Bayonne
Oakland	A.P. Hill
Greely	ATCOM Lease
Gillem	Red River AD
Wainwright	Seneca AD
Savanna AD	Sierra AD
Detroit Tk Plt	Stratford Army Engine Plt
Presidio of San Francisco	Totten
	Hunter-Liggett
FIG	Dix
Chaffee	

Further Study:

Probable:	Possible:	
Natick	Selfridge	Buchanan
Tobyhanna	Adelphi	POM
Price	Monmouth	Eustis
	Letterkenny	Lee
	Detroit Ars	Yuma PG
	Dugway PG	Picatinny Ars

Expanded Stationing Strategy



Long Term Savings: $90M
Net over POM: cost $102M
Payback: 8 years

Long Term Savings: $102M
Net over POM: save $207M
Payback: 4 years



Long Term Savings: $119M
Net over POM: save $166M
Payback: 5 years

Long-Range Operational Blueprint AMC



Ft Riley

Impact: Population decrease - 5594 soldiers (33%)
Unit decrease - 8 battalions and 10 separate companys



Excess Facilities



Type	Excess(SF)
Operations	43%
Maintenance	56%
Barracks	28%

Caretaker Costs

Deactivate	$1.5M
Maintain	$1.8M/yr
Reactivate	$2.3M
over POM	$11.0M

Excess Training Capacity

- Minimum of 8 battalions and 10 separate companys of excess training capacity

Ft Hood

Facility Shortfall

Current



Type	Shortfall(SF)*
Operations	-782K
Maintenance	-450K
Barracks	-524 spaces

*required/on hand

w/o Div base + Bde



Type	Shortfall(SF)*
Operations	-279K
Maintenance	-181K
Barracks	+2936 spaces

*required/on hand

w/o III Corps



Type	Shortfall(SF)*
Operations	-386K
Maintenance	-139K
Barracks	+2404 spaces

*required/on hand

Minimum essential buyout of existing facilities shortfall = $327.4M

Tooele Army Depot, Utah. Ranks 4/11 Depots. Tooele Army Depot has responsibility for the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles and power generation equipment plus all associated secondary items. In addition, Tooele performs the regular depot mission of receipt, storage and issue of a wide variety of supplies and equipment. The renovation, modification, maintenance and demilitarization of conventional guided missile and chemical munitions is another of Tooele's prime missions. Selected for study in BRAC 93.

Lexington - Blue Grass Army Depot Activity, Kentucky. Ranks 7/11 depots. Lexington - Blue Grass Activity is responsible for the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, demilitarization and renovation of all ammunition operations, including conventional, toxic/non-toxic chemical and rocket systems. Lexington - Blue Grass serves as the center for Special Operations Forces (SOF), a government owned-contractor operated mission. The GOCO operation provides support for various types of nonstandard equipment in rotary aircraft and provides engineering and logistical support for all aircraft modifications. As a result of the 1988 Commission's decision, Lexington is closing with functions realigning to Blue Grass. Deferred from further study.

Pueblo Army Depot Activity, Colorado. Ranks 9/11 Depots. BRAC I identified Pueblo for closure following demilitarization of chemical ammunition stocks. Pueblo is responsible for demilitarization of chemical munitions. The Army is taking action to close this installation after the demilitarization mission is completed.

Savanna Depot Activity, Illinois. Ranks 9/11 Depots. The mission of Savanna Army Depot Activity is the receipt, storage, and issue of conventional ammunition as well as critical strategic material. The installation provides support service to the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School located on the installation. Deferred from further study.

Umatilla Army Depot Activity, Oregon. Ranks 11/11 Depots. BRAC I identified Umatilla for closure following demilitarization of chemical ammunition stocks. Umatilla is responsible for demilitarization of chemical munitions. The Army is taking action to close this installation after the demilitarization mission is completed.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendations

- Realign Letterkenny Depot to a depot activity. Transfer depot maintenance functions and associated workload. Retain the conventional ammunition storage and the regional Test Measurement Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) missions. Retain the Systems



COMMODITY ORIENTED INSTALLATION MILITARY VALUE SCORES

Note: This quantitative assessment provides a starting point in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It does not produce a decision on which base should close or be realigned. Although the assessment offers a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure and realignment, it is just one element in the Army's overall evaluation.

3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, Maryland. Ranks 8/12 commodity oriented installations. The mission of ARL is to conduct a broad program of scientific research and advanced technology directed toward new and improved materials, components, subsystems, techniques, and processes; and perform independent analyses of weapon system performance including atmospheric effects, MANPRINT, and vulnerability and/or lethality. Since the 1991 commission realigned laboratory functions, this installation was deferred from further study.

Belvoir Fuels Research Activity, Texas. (Leased) Ranks 12/12 commodity oriented installations. The BFRA research program responds to a broad range of Army and national needs.

The scope ranges from exploration of the basic fundamentals of lubrication, fuel chemistry, and combustion phenomena to field application studies. The program objectives are determined by requirements such as insecure defense fuel supplies, changes in crude sources/refinery processing techniques, demands for enhancement of armored vehicle fire safety, environmental quality and control of hazardous wastes, advanced fuel/energy systems, and the need for advanced lubrication concepts. The nature of the program conducted by the facility during 35 years of its existence has encouraged development of breadth in technical capability. Since closure or realignment does not break any threshold of the BRAC Act, this installation was deferred from further study.

Cold Regions Research Laboratories, New Hampshire. Ranks 7/12 commodity oriented installations. The research conducted by CRREL addresses: (1) problems associated with the winter battlefield which affect design criteria for material developers; (2) winter and Arctic operational requirements for training, wargaming, and doctrinal literature; (3) cold regions base support requirements for design, construction and operation of facilities; (4) requirements of the other DOD services including sea ice characterization and modeling for the Navy and design and operation of strategic facilities for the Air Force; and (5) the Corps of Engineers Civil Works mission by improving the nation's ability to efficiently manage and utilize the inland waterways system in winter and exploitation of remote sensing technology for Civil Works planning and operational activities. Since closure or realignment does not break any threshold of the BRAC Act, this installation was deferred from further study.

Detroit Arsenal, Illinois. (including Keweenaw Field and Selfridge Air National Guard Base) Ranks 5/12 commodity oriented installations. The mission of the Detroit Arsenal is to provide services to the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command in support of their mission to provide the Army's tank automotive research, development and readiness missions. The Army is already downsizing the Detroit Tank Plant as a result of a DoD initiative in 1990. The 1988 Commission closed Pontiac Storage Activity, a sub-installation of this base.

Fort Detrick, Maryland. Ranks 6/12 commodity oriented installations. Fort Detrick is a multi-mission installation providing space for offices, laboratories, and advanced communication facilities. The Army Medical Department uses Fort Detrick as a state-of-the-art microbiological containment research center. Because of its unique capabilities, it was deferred from further study. It is already affected by the 1991 Commission's realignment of the Army's medical research labs.

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. (including leased space, Evans, Charles Wood and Wayside) Ranks 4/12 commodity oriented installations. The Communication Electronics Command mission is to exercise life cycle integrated management of assigned communications and electronics materiel/systems. Selected for study in BRAC 93 as a result of ongoing restructuring actions (restationing of the Military Intelligence brigade) and high lease costs.

Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center, Massachusetts. Ranks 11/12 commodity oriented installations. The primary mission of Natick is the maximum survivability, sustainability, and supportability of the individual soldier in all environments through research, development and engineering in the areas of food, clothing, shelters, airdrop individual and organizational equipment. Because of it's unique capabilities, it was deferred from further study.

Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. Ranks 2/12 commodity oriented installations. The U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) is responsible for research, development and life cycle engineering for all assigned armament and munitions systems and materials. Since the Army Material Command identified no significant restructuring initiative, it was deferred from further study. However, planned workload reductions will result in a significant reduction of operations at this installation, an action that does not break the BRAC Act thresholds (10 U.S.C., Sec 2687).

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Ranks 1/12 commodity oriented installations. The Missile Command's mission is to conduct, perform, or manage basic and applied research and engineering, acquisition, integrated logistics material readiness management and maintenance support functions for all missile weapons systems/subsystems and associated equipment. This includes execution of assigned missions in support of PEOs/PMs and other DoD elements having centralized management responsibility for specific weapon systems or items. It was deferred from further study.

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois. Ranks 3/12 commodity oriented installations. The arsenal's material responsibility currently includes infantry weapons, artillery and air defense weapons, armament for tanks and vehicles, copper crush gages, common tools and maintenance equipment for items managed by more than one command, and special tools and tool sets related to its assigned items. It was selected for further study due to the availability of administrative space and because the Army Materiel Command requested a re-examination of the 1991 Commission's realignment of Armaments, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM).

has affiliation agreements with many local hospitals and universities for training, consultant and interchange and teaching. Selected for study as a result of a recommendation from the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendations

None.

b. Justification

The Army excluded Fitzsimons Army Medical Center from further study due to an unacceptable return on investment (closure did not pay back). DoD must complete its ongoing studies of graduate medical education and medical infrastructure before building sound rationale to justify divestiture of medical facilities.

5. PERSONNEL IMPACTS

Not Applicable.



MANEUVER INSTALLATION MILITARY VALUE SCORES

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3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Has high military value. Ranks 2/11 for maneuver installations. 82nd Airborne Division is retained under the Force Structure Plan and is a member of the five-division contingency force. Home of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and the 1st Special Operations Command, as well as the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Ranks 6/11 for maneuver installations. 101st Air Assault Division is retained under the Force Structure Plan and is a member of the five-division contingency force. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Carson, Colorado. Ranks 5/11 for maneuver installations. Ft Carson has been designated as the future home of the 10th Special Forces Group. 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is retained under the Force Structure plan. Therefore it was deferred from further study.

Fort Drum, New York. Ranks 9/11 for maneuver installations. The 10th Infantry Division (MTN) is retained under the Force Structure Plan. Selected for study as a result of the plan to inactivate two light divisions.

Fort Hood, Texas. Ranks 1/11 for maneuver installations. Ft Hood is the home of III Corps and five additional separate brigades. 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd Armored Division are retained under the Force Structure Plan with the 1st Cavalry Division being a member of the five-division contingency force. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Lewis, Washington. Ranks 3/11 for maneuver installations, is the home of I Corps and numerous non-divisional units and has high military value. Ft Lewis was scheduled to receive the 7th Infantry Division (Light), being restationed from Ft Ord, California. Two brigades of the 7th ID (L) are inactivating, leaving one brigade at Ft lewis. The excess capacity resulting from this action is being retained in the event forces return from overseas. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Richardson, Alaska. Ranks 11/11 for maneuver installations. This installation, along with Ft Wainwright, supports the 6th Infantry Division (Light). The division is being downsized to a separate infantry brigade, with support forces.

Fort Riley, Kansas. Ranks 8/11 for maneuver installations. The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) is retained under the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Ranks 10/11 for maneuver installations and is home to the 25th Infantry Division (Light). Selected for study.

Fort Stewart, Georgia. Ranks 4/11 for maneuver installations. The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is retained under the Force Structure Plan and is a member of the five-division contingency force. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.



MAJOR TRAINING AREA MILITARY VALUE SCORES

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3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

FORT CHAFFEE, AR. Ranks 5/10 for Major Training Areas. A Sub-installation of Ft Sill and the temporary home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). A major Reserve Component (RC) training area for Fifth Army. Examined as a candidate for transfer to the U.S. Army Reserve Command or the Army National Guard. The 1991 Commission realigned this installation to semi-active status.

FORT DIX, NJ. Ranks 8/10 for Major Training Areas. A major Reserve Component (RC) training area for First Army. Command and operational control transferred from Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to Forces Command (FORSCOM) on 1 Oct 92. The 1991 Commission realigned this installation to support the reserve component force structure.

FORT GREELY, AK. Ranks 3/10 for Major Training Areas and is a sub-installation of Ft Richardson. Home of the Northern Warfare Training Center, and is a critical cold weather training and testing

site. It is a one of a kind installation in that it contains the only extensive, fixed instrumentation to support this critical mission.

FORT A.P. HILL, VA. Ranks 7/10 for Major Training Areas and is a sub-installation of Ft Meade. The main usage is as a site for weekend training and annual training for Reserve Component units. Examined as a candidate for transfer to the US Army Reserve Command or the Army National Guard.

FORT HUNTER-LIGGETT, CA. Ranks 5/10 for Major Training Areas. A site for a large test and evaluation activity and is a site for weekend training and annual training for Reserve Component units. It is currently a sub-installation of Ft Ord, and plans are to transfer command and control to Ft Lewis. Other than Fort Irwin, it is the only large maneuver and training area in California. Examined as a candidate for transfer to the US Army Reserve Command or the Army National Guard.

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA. Ranks 10/10 for Major Training Areas and is a sub-installation of Ft Meade. First Army NCO Academy is currently located at Ft Indiantown Gap, but movement to Ft Dix is under review. Its main usage is as a site for weekend training and annual training for Reserve Component units. Provides a major combat arms training area for First Army. Site for weekend training and annual training for Reserve Component units.

FORT IRWIN, CA. Ranks 1/10 for Major Training Areas. Home of the National Training Center. Ft Irwin contains fixed instrumentation to support its unique training mission for armor and mechanized units. It would be extremely costly to replicate this unique capability elsewhere, especially due to the maneuver training acreage requirement. One of two major training area installations to extensively train active component units stationed within its boundaries.

FORT McCOY, WI. Ranks 4/10 for Major Training Areas. Largest mobilization station in this category and the only major Reserve Component (RC) training area in the old Fourth Army area. Serves numerous Reserve Component units as a training area. Examined as a candidate for transfer to the US Army Reserve Command or the Army National Guard.

FORT PICKETT, VA. Ranks 9/10 for Major Training Areas. A sub-installation of Ft Bragg whose main usage is as a site for weekend training and annual training for Reserve Component units. Site for weekend training and annual training for Reserve Component units. Examined as a candidate for transfer to the US Army Reserve Command or the Army National Guard.

FORT POLK, LA. Ranks 2/10 for Major Training Areas. Will be the permanent home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Is

scheduled to accept its first JRTC rotation during 4th QTR FY 93. One of two major training area installations to extensively train active component units stationed within its boundaries.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendations

None.

b. Justification

Several of the installations in this category were studied to determine requirements to support RC training. Forts Dix, Chaffee, A.P. Hill, Hunter-Liggett, Indiantown Gap, McCoy, and Pickett were studied for retention to support RC training. Our analysis indicates the retention of these Major Training Areas is necessary to ensure sufficient training areas are available to support RC training in accordance with applicable training standards. There are minimal changes in the programmed RC end strength, suggesting that the existing training areas are still required. Although the complete study of RC training support requirements will not be finalized until the end of 1993, interim results indicate that these Major Training Areas will be fully utilized in support of RC training.

The Army is now evaluating the feasibility of transferring most of the installations in this category to the U.S. Army Reserve or the Army National Guard.

5. PERSONNEL IMPACTS

Not Applicable.



INITIAL ENTRY/ BRANCH INSTALLATION MILITARY VALUE SCORES

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3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Fort Benning, Georgia. Ranks 2/13. It is home of the U.S. Army Infantry School, the School of Americas, the 75th Ranger Regiment headquarters and 3d Battalion, and three FORSCOM deployable units (3d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division; 36th Engineer Group and the 988th Military Police Company). Fort Benning is a large installation with approximately 182,000 acres or 284 square miles. As a major training base there is an extensive range and/or maneuver space requirement. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Bliss, Texas. Ranks 1/13. It is the home of Air Defense Artillery School, the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, and various deployable FORSCOM units (3d Armored Calvary Regiment and the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade). As a major training base there is an extensive range and/or maneuver space requirement. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Eustis and Fort Story, Virginia. Ranks 11/13. Fort Story is a subpost of Fort Eustis. They are the home of Transportation School, Aviation Logistics School and the 7th Transportation Group. Training conducted is unique to ports and Fort Eustis and Fort Story have unique port facilities not found at other Army installations. The Army is currently studying consolidating the following combat service support functions which are below BRAC thresholds: logistics, transportation, aviation logistics, ordnance, and missiles and munitions training. Therefore, it was deferred from further study under BRAC.

Fort Gordon, Georgia. Ranks 6/13. It is home of the Army Signal School, the National Science Center for Communications and Electronics, and the Army Graduate Medical Education program at Eisenhower Medical Center. The Military Intelligence Brigade from Fort Monmouth will relocate to Fort Gordon in FY 93. There are no additional restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Ranks 11/13. It is home of the Intelligence School and Center, Headquarters, US Army Information Systems Command, the Electronic Proving Grounds, the 11th Signal Brigade and various other tenants. The Intelligence School at Fort Devens is being consolidated with the Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca as the result of a decision by the 1988 Commission. Fort Huachuca provides a unique and irreplaceable condition of an electromagnetic-free environment for test and evaluation of communications and electronic systems training and testing of intelligence and electronic warfare systems. There are no additional restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Included in this report is a recommendation to realign the Defense Language Institute to this installation.

Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Ranks 7/13. Fort Jackson is the only Army Training Center without a branch school. In FY95 the Soldier Support Warfighting Center will be established here. The Adjutant General School, Finance School, the Recruiting and Retention School, and the Non Commissioned Officers Academy will move to Fort Jackson. It trains about one half of the Army's basic training soldiers and represents a significant capability to accept rapid growth in basic training under emergency

conditions. The 1991 Commission realigned the Soldier Support Center from Ft Benjamin Harrison to this installation. There are no additional restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Included in this report is a recommendation to realign the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson.

Fort Knox, Kentucky. Ranks 3/13. It is home of the Army's Armor School (one of the largest branches) and the US Army Recruiting Command. Numerous training simulation facilities are only part of the 600,000 SF of applied instructional facilities for armor and mechanized simulation. As a major training base there is an extensive range and/or maneuver space requirement. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Lee, Virginia. Ranks 11/13. Home of the Army's Quartermaster School, Army Logistics Center, Army Logistics Management College, and the Defense Commissary Agency. Fort Lee is a multifunctional post with a significant number of tenants. The Army is currently studying consolidating the following combat service support functions which are below BRAC thresholds: logistics, transportation, aviation logistics, ordnance, and missiles and munitions training. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Ranks 5/13. It is the home of the Engineer School. As a major training base, there is an extensive range and/or maneuver space requirement. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Included in this report is a recommendation to realign the Military Police and Chemical Schools to Fort Leonard Wood.

Fort McClellan, Alabama. Ranks 9/13. It is the home of the Chemical and Military Police Schools and the DOD Polygraph Institute. It is the smallest branch school installation in terms of population and facilities. TRADOC identified an initiative to collocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools with the Engineer School. DOD submitted a recommendation to close Fort McClellan to the 1991 Commission. The Commission did not accept this proposal. Therefore, it was selected for further study in BRAC 93.

Fort Rucker, Alabama. Ranks 10/13. It is the home of the Army Aviation School and the Army Safety Center. As a major training base, there is an extensive range and/or air space requirement. The Army is currently studying consolidating the following combat service support functions which are below BRAC thresholds: logistics, transportation, aviation logistics, ordnance, and missiles and munitions training. Army controlled airspace and the extensive airfields and aviation facilities

represent a unique asset. Therefore, it was deferred from further study under BRAC.

Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Ranks 8/13. Home of the Academy of Health Sciences which trains solders in medical skills and provides initial and professional development training for medical and Medical Service Corps personnel. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Ranks 4/13. Home of the Army's Field Artillery School. As a major training base, there is an extensive range and/or maneuver space requirement. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS

a. Recommendation

- Close Fort McClellan. Realign the US Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities through licensing to the Army National Guard (ARNG). Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

b. Justification

(1) Military Value

Collocation of the schools provides substantial advantages for operational linkages among the three branches. These linkages enable the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development of three key maneuver support elements. Synergistic advantages of training and professional development programs are: coordination, employment, and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; internal security/nation assistance operations; operations in rear areas or along main supply routes; and counter drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated. Some example are:

Operation-River Crossing: Engineer-assault crossing, rafting and float bridging; Chemical-smoke obscuration; Military Police-traffic control.

Operation-Combined Arms Obstacle Breaching: Engineer (with Combined Arms team)-breach obstacles, mark lanes; Chemical-obscurants; Military Police-traffic control.



PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS MILITARY VALUE SCORES

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3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Ranks 5/5. Home of the Army's War College. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Ranks 1/5. Home of the Army's Command and General Staff College. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Leslie McNair, Washington, DC. Ranks 4/5. Home of the National Defense University, which includes the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Presidio of Monterey, California. Ranks 3/5. Home of the Defense Language Institute. The Commander, TRADOC, through his vision, requested it be reviewed under BRAC 93.

United States Military Academy, New York. Ranks 2/5. West Point is a special one-of-a-kind installation whose purpose is to

provide quality academic, military and physical development of this nation's future military leaders. The main post area is designated as a National Register of Historical Places site. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendation

- Close the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and the Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord). Relocate the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and contract the foreign language training with a public university which must be able to provide training at or near Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

b. Justification

(1) Military Value

The Defense Language Institute currently has a staff and student population of over 4000 personnel. This institute offers training in over 20 languages (e.g., Russian, Somali, Swahili, Ukrainian). However, it has a high operating overhead in both facilities and staff. A new approach to the operation of the Institute should be considered.

Contracting foreign language training with an existing university level-institution will create significant savings in operational overhead, both in instructors (many of whom may already be on staff at a university), and in administration. The high base operations cost at the Presidio of Monterey would be avoided.

Fort Huachuca is the home of the Army Intelligence School. Military intelligence has the largest requirement for linguists in all services. The foreign language skill is most often used to interact with allies and better understand foreign military capability and intentions. Locating military personnel on Fort Huachuca provides advantages to both the soldier and the Army. First, it enables the Army to care for the needs of the soldiers during their formative training. It ensures "Solderization" which is a critical factor in the development of all military personnel. Finally it will enable the Army to integrate the students into the military intelligence concept during their training.

Army students in the human intelligence field are currently assigned to Fort Huachuca at the end of their foreign language training. Soldiers can attend the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and continue with advanced language

training or attend the Advanced Non Commissioned Officers Course and then continue with intermediate language training. This would save travel and per diem costs.

An agreement of this kind is not unique. For example, the University of Virginia at Charlottesville is the location of the Judge Advocate General School and the University of Syracuse sponsors the Army Comptroller graduate education program.

The Army, as Executive Agent for the Defense Language Program, will ensure that the same high level of training currently taught at DLI will continue. They will continue to serve as the technical authority and provide qualitative assessment of foreign language training activities. In addition they will also conduct research and evaluation on training development methodologies, instructional methodologies and techniques; computer based training computer assisted instruction; and establish or approve standards or criteria for language training and provide various tests and evaluation procedures.

(2) Return on Investment

The Cost of Base Closure and Realignment Actions (COBRA) model used for ranking alternative closure/realignment actions distributes the costs into six major categories. They are Mission, Personnel, Overhead, Construction, Moving and Other. A short explanation and description of each category follows.

Mission: Direct mission costs are not addressed in this exercise. However, those changes in mission costs result from a closure or realignment action are estimated and are captured in this element.

Personnel: This cost category captures all those costs associated with military and civilian pay and allowances (not including closure generated Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves.) Besides savings of service funded salaries due to decrease in authorizations, differentials in variable housing allowance and/or basic allowance for quarters are also included.

Overhead: Changes in Real Property Maintenance, Base Operations Support, and Family Housing maintenance requirements are the primary components of Overhead. Costs associated with the maintenance and caretaking of an installation are also included as are administrative and support costs generated in the accomplishment of a closure or realignment.

Construction: Military construction (MILCON) cost and avoidances are the main components. MILCON includes estimates for design; supervision, inspection, and overhead; contingency; and site preparation. Site preparation includes the supporting



COMMAND AND CONTROL INSTALLATION MILITARY VALUE SCORE

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3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Ranks 1/11. It is located in the National Capital Region (NCR) and contains the only land available to the Army, in the NCR proper, for expansion. Under the provisions of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, Fort Belvoir is scheduled to receive the majority of the missions and activities from Cameron Station, VA, which was directed to be closed. Additionally, the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Commission encouraged the Army to develop the Engineer Proving Grounds (EPG) as an administrative center to decrease the amount of leased space occupied by the Army in the NCR. In 1989, the Congress passed unique legislation, Public Law 101-189, Section 2821, which allows the Army to pursue a public-private development venture at the EPG. Further, Fort Belvoir is the largest source of Army housing in the NCR, a region with extremely high housing costs. These Fort Belvoir housing assets

are an important part of providing well maintained, affordable housing for a large number of service members and their families. Fort Belvoir's assets are key to the Army's long term presence in the NCR. As a result of initial analysis, Fort Belvoir was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure. See the chapter on the NCR, Tab N, for discussion on the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC).

Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. Ranks 9/11. It is the only Active Army installation in the Caribbean Sea and is located six miles southeast of metropolitan San Juan. Fort Buchanan is a Lead Mobilization Station and serves as the coordinating and supporting installation for all Reserve Components in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It was identified for review as a result of BRAC 91. Since Fort Buchanan supports the mobilization mission and other Reserve Component activities, the Reserve Component may be interested in taking over management of Fort Buchanan. The Reserve Component is currently proposing to take over management of some Active Component installations. The Reserve Component's preference is to work into the arrangement by taking over management of a few (Forts McCoy, Pickett, Hunter-Liggett and Chaffee) and develop lessons learned before taking on other installations. Although selected for study during BRAC 93, as a result of the Reserve Components demonstrated interest in managing Active Component installations, Fort Buchanan was deferred pending possible transfer to the Reserve Component.

Fort Gillem, Georgia. Ranks 8/11. It is a sub-post of Fort McPherson and is located within metropolitan Atlanta. Fort Gillem supports the operation of HQ, Forces Command (FORSCOM), 3rd U.S. Army, 2nd U.S. Army, the Army Air Force Exchange Regional Distribution Center and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Lab. Fort Gillem provides a significant amount of general administrative and warehouse space for HQ FORSCOM, 3rd U.S. Army and the Fort McPherson Garrison. The space is required to supplement the deficit of these facilities on Fort McPherson. The realignment or closure of Fort Gillem is dependant upon the actions taken at Fort McPherson to correct the deficit of administrative and warehouse requirements. Although selected for study during BRAC 93, Fort Gillem was excluded from further consideration.

Fort Hamilton, New York. Ranks 10/11. It is located in Brooklyn and supports the operations of the New York Area Command (NYAC). This post is the administrative center for all Army activities in the New York metropolitan area. Fort Hamilton performs support missions and functions for the active duty population of the Armed Forces that are stationed in the area. The installation provides essential quality of life services including on post housing for area active duty soldiers and their families. Fort Hamilton was studied during BRAC 93 and deferred from further consideration during the analysis due to its site

specific mission. Realignment or closure of this installation does not break the thresholds in the BRAC Act.

Fort Meade, Maryland. Ranks 2/11. It is located approximately 20 miles north of Washington D.C. and is the home of the 1st U.S. Army and the National Security Agency (NSA). Under the provisions of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, selected activities realigned to other posts from Ft Meade and approximately 9,000 acres of training area was excessed. Fort Meade's role in supporting the NSA is absolutely critical to national security. Any disruption of NSA's operation caused by realignment or closure activities would be unacceptable. Additionally, Fort Meade offers some expansion possibility for Army activities within the NCR. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, Fort Meade was deferred from further study.

Fort McPherson, Georgia. Ranks 4/11. It is located in metropolitan Atlanta and supports HQ FORSCOM and the 3rd U.S. Army. The location of HQ FORSCOM and 3rd U.S. Army are not site specific. Since HQ FORSCOM's area of responsibility includes the entire continental United States, it could be located anywhere that adequate facilities and transportation support is available. The 3rd U.S. Army is the Army component to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and is a deployable headquarters. The major requirements for this headquarters are adequate facilities and the ability to deploy. Force structure decisions, driven by budget and mission changes, are imminent. It is anticipated that these decisions will significantly impact tactical and supporting units assigned to FORSCOM. HQ FORSCOM will have to manage force structure adjustments while maintaining current military operations and warfighting capabilities of the Army. Following initial analysis in BRAC 93 which included cost analysis using COBRA, Fort McPherson was eliminated from further consideration for realignment or closure as it would be imprudent to consider any relocation of this major headquarters given the current force structure turmoil.

Fort Monroe, Virginia. Ranks 6/11. It is located in the Norfolk-Newport News area of southeastern Virginia. Fort Monroe supports Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Cadet Command. The locations of HQ, TRADOC and Cadet Command are not site specific. There are no strategic nor long term requirements for these activities to remain in their current locations. HQ TRADOC is currently deeply involved in the task of restructuring the combat development, doctrine, and training support systems, as well as their internal command management organizations to better mesh with the ongoing warfighting restructuring and down-sizing of the Army. They, like HQ FORSCOM will be faced with additional adjustments following release of pending force structure decisions. Although it was selected for study in BRAC 93, Fort Monroe was deferred because of operational

reasons.

Fort Myer, Virginia. Ranks 4/11. It is located in Arlington, Virginia and supports the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard), the Military District of Washington headquarters activities and a significant amount of family housing. The post directly supports the operation of Arlington National Cemetery and the extensive protocol requirements mandated within the Washington area. Fort Myer also provides a significant portion of the General Officer housing available in the NCR, including quarters for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army. Its role in supporting the Army's long term operations in the NCR is critical and is expected to remain. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, Fort Myer was deferred from further study.

Fort Ritchie, Maryland. Ranks 7/11. It is located in western Maryland approximately 70 miles northwest of Washington, D.C. and supports the 7th Signal Command and the Alternate Joint Communications Center and the National Military Command Center (Site R) and Camp David, MD. Because these organizations depend directly on Fort Ritchie's support and infrastructure its existence is site specific. Fort Ritchie was deferred as a study candidate since there were no restructuring or reshaping initiatives affecting the installation. Subsequently, OSD directed the Army to study the impact of closing Site R. The possible elimination of Site R will represent only a minor impact on Fort Ritchie.

Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Ranks 3/11. It is located on the island of Oahu and supports the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), the Pacific Ocean Division of the Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii. The installation supports the headquarters and planning functions for all Army forces assigned as elements of USARPAC, the Army component of the United States Pacific Command. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, Fort Shafter was deferred from further study.

Fort Totten, New York. Ranks 11/11. It is located in Queens and as a sub-installation of Fort Hamilton also supports the operations of the New York Area Command (NYAC) and reserve component training. The primary mission of Fort Totten is to serve as a regional reserve component training site. Its primary link to the NYAC mission is to provide family housing. Following initial analysis, it was determined that Fort Totten is below the threshold for Base Closure and Realignment actions. The Army, using its discretionary authority, is examining possible down-sizing of this installation.



DEPOT MILITARY VALUE SCORES

Note: This quantitative assessment provides a starting point in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It does not produce a decision on which base should close or be realigned. Although the assessment offers a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure or realignment, it is just one element in the Army's overall evaluation.

3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Anniston Army Depot, Alabama. Ranks 2/11 depots. Anniston Army Depot has the mission to receive, store, issue and maintain equipment and ammunition and to operate a depot maintenance, rebuild, and production overhaul facility for tracked and wheeled combat vehicles. The depot provides logistics support for assigned missile systems; operates a small arms repair facility; and performs a calibration mission for six southeastern states. Selected for study in BRAC 93.

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Ranks 4/11 depots. Letterkenny Army Depot has the mission to receive, store, preserve, package, issue and ship ammunition and missiles. This also involves the renovation, modification and demilitarization of ammunition materials. Letterkenny performs interservice missions for the Air Force SIDEWINDER, SPARROW, FALCON and Strike

Missile Systems. Selected for study in BRAC 93.

Red River Depot, Texas. Ranks 3/11 depots. Red River Army Depot is the Army's primary depot for the overhaul and conversion of the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier family of vehicles. As part of its mission, the depot operates a 24 hour hotline to answer maintenance questions from the field. The depot is also the designated maintenance point for overhaul of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Multiple Launch Rocket System. In addition, Red River serves as the Center of Technical Excellence for the M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the M981 Fire Support Team Vehicle (FIST-V). Other unique missions include the overhaul of the Chaparral Guided Missile Launcher; sole source, CONUS and OCONUS for the HAWK air defense missile, maintenance testing, repair and storage of the Patriot missile; overhaul of the Vulcan air defense system; storage, issue, maintenance and disposal of hundreds of assigned commodities; extensive training and logistical support for Army Reserve and National Guard Units. Selected for study in BRAC 93.

Seneca Army Depot, New York. Ranks 6/11 Depots. The mission of Seneca Army Depot is the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, demilitarization and disposal of special weapons, conventional ammunition and other commodities. The special weapons mission is departing, under agreement with the Department of Energy. Selected for study in BRAC 93. The Army, using its discretionary authority, is taking action to realign this installation to a depot activity since it does not break the thresholds (10 U.S.C., Sec. 2687) under the BRAC Act.

Sierra Army Depot, California. Ranks 7/11 depots. The mission of Sierra Army Depot is the receipt, storage, maintenance surveillance, issue, demilitarization and calibration of special weapons, conventional ammunition and general supplies. This mission also includes the storage of Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Operational Project (SWAPDOP) and Water Support Equipment Project for the U.S. Army. Destruction of obsolete and unsafe munitions by detonation in a complex of 14 demolition pits. The special weapons mission is departing, under agreement with the Department of Energy. Selected for study in BRAC 93. The Army, using its discretionary authority, is taking action to realign this installation to a depot activity since it does not break the thresholds (10 U.S.C., Sec. 2687) under the BRAC Act.

Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Ranks 1/11 Depots. The mission of Tobyhanna Army Depot is to receive, store, ship and maintain a variety of assigned communications-electronics equipment and general supplies. Tobyhanna's primary maintenance mission is providing for the overhaul, rebuild, modification, conversion repair and fabrication of strategic and tactical communications and photographic equipment. Selected for study in BRAC 93.

St Louis Federal Center, Missouri. (includes the Charles M. Price support center, the Leased federal building and the St Louis Army Ammunition Plant.) Ranks 10/12 commodity oriented installations. ATCOM is responsible for the research, development, engineering and logistical support for Army airmobile systems and support of field and troop support items. The Charles Melvin Price Support Center provides administrative, logistics, and morale, welfare and recreation services to Army reserve components and other federal government elements in the St. Louis metropolitan area, as delineated in support agreements and/or area support assignments. Most assigned mission responsibilities are executed by service contractor. As recommended by the 1991 Commission, it was selected for study to determine whether this command could relocate to government-owned facilities. The high relocation costs make realignment or closure impractical and prohibitively expensive.

Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia. Ranks 9/12 commodity oriented installations. The mission of Vint Hill Farms Station is to provide base operations support to resident CECOM activities and other tenant organizations to support intelligence and electronic warfare systems. Selected for study because of the basing strategy to consolidate similar functions and close small single purpose installations where feasible.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendations

- Close Vint Hill Farms Station, VA. Realign the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Materiel Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Depot, PA; realign the remaining elements of IMMC, the Signal Warfare Directorate, and the program evaluation officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.

- Realign the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space near Ft Monmouth, NJ, to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and realign the Chaplain School to Ft Jackson, SC. Vacate leased space adjacent to Ft Monmouth and consolidate activities from Evans and Wayside sub-posts onto the main post and Charles Woods sub-post. Dispose of excess facilities on main post at Ft Monmouth and at the Charles Woods and Evans sub-posts.

- Instead of sending the materiel management functions Of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, AL, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, realign these commodities under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) and leave the functions in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.



PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS MILITARY VALUE SCORES

Note: This quantitative assessment provides a starting point in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It <u>does not</u> produce a decision on which base should close or be realigned. Although the assessment offers a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure or realignment, it is just one element in the Army's overall evaluation.

3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Nevada. Ranks 3/13 Production Installations. Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant receives, issues, stores, renovates, tests, demils, and provides QASAS/Depot storage for conventional ammunition. It also operates a calibration lab and ballistics test facility; maintains the capability to receive/ship containerized cargo; and maintains the capability to LAP ammunition items. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Holston Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Tennessee. Ranks 10/13 Production Installations. Holston Army Ammunition Plant manufactures explosives and chemical materials and stores

strategic and critical materials. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Iowa. Ranks 6/13 Production Installations. Iowa Army Ammunition Plant manufactures 8 inch rocket assisted artillery ammunition, demolition blocks, mine dispensing systems, and various warheads. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Missouri. Ranks 8/13 Production Installations. Lake City Army Ammunition Plant manufactures small arms ammunition and chemical materials, proof tests small arms ammunition and maintains the capability to receive/ship containerized cargo. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Texas. Ranks 6/13 Production Installations. Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant loads, assembles and packs ammunition items, and maintains the capability to receive and/or ship containerized cargo. In addition, Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant performs quality assurance ammunition and storage surveillance functions. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Oklahoma. Ranks 2/13 Production Installations. McAlester Army Ammunition Plant produces, renovates, demils and stores conventional ammunition and related components, performs industrial engineering and product assurance and operates a calibration lab. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Milan Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Tennessee. Ranks 5/13 Production Installations. Milan Army Ammunition Plant loads, assembles, and packs ammunition items; maintains the capability to receive/ship containerized cargo; handles and stores ammunition; and, provides QASAS/storage surveillance functions. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. Ranks 4/13 Production Installations. Pine Bluff Arsenal has the mission to operate and maintain production facilities for manufacture of assigned materiel, store, survey and ship supplies and equipment. it also performs demilitarization of chemical munitions, and produces binary munitions. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Radford Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Virginia. Ranks 8/13 Production Installations. Radford AAP has been identified as a Group Technology Center for Propellants, (Solvent/Solventless and Single Base). Radford AAP is the center of expertise for Propellant manufacture and is the last active plant capable of producing TNT. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.

Saginaw Army Aircraft Plant, Texas. Ranks 13/13 Production Installations. The plant is a government-owned facility that was contractor-operated by Bell Helicopter-Textron to store and refurbish aircraft and provide test flight capability for Department of Defense helicopters. Due to economic reasons, Bell Helicopter-Textron suspended operations, discontinued the lease agreement, and vacated the premises in January 1989. Since that time, the facility has been vacant and idle. The Army, using its discretionary authority, is taking action to close this plant since it does not break any threshold under the BRAC Act.

Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut. Ranks 11/13 Production Installations. Stratford Army Engine Plant is a government-owned engine manufacturing facility which, unlike the usual GOCO facility, is contractor-operated under a no-fee facilities contract. The contract provides for rent-free use of real and personal property on government contracts, and rental use of same on commercial contracts. The facility is staffed and operated solely by contractor personnel. The "resident" contractor, Textron Lycoming, has been operating in the plant since 1951. The AGT-1500 engine used in the M1 Abrams Tank is the primary military product line. Aviation engine product lines are the T55 series engine for CH/MH-47 application, and the out-of- production T53 series engine used on the UH-1, AH-1 and OV-1. There are also some active contracts for the Navy and other Defense agencies. A study is underway which examines options to:(a) transfer Army workload to a contractor-owned facility; (b) transfer Army workload t a government-owned facility; and (c) dispose of the plant. The study will be complete by August 1993. The Army, using its discretionary authority, is taking action to close this plant since it does not break any threshold under the BRAC Act.

Tarheel Army Missile Plant, North Carolina. Ranks 12/13 Production Installations. Preliminary Assessment Study in process to determine condition and cleanup requirements. Current plan is to maintain and protect, as required, pending release to GSA as excess to Army requirements. The Army, using its discretionary authority, is taking action to close this plant since it does not break any threshold under the BRAC Act.

Watervliet Arsenal, New York. Ranks 1/13 Production Installations. Watervliet Arsenal's mission is to perform procurement, fabrication, industrial engineering, and product assurance of assigned materiel. The arsenal also provides administrative and logistical support services to tenant activities. Primary materiel responsibilities include mortars, recoilless rifles, canons for tanks, towed and self- propelled artillery, components, special tool sets, and related training devices and simulators. Deferred from study in BRAC 93.



MILITARY VALUE SCORE – PROVING GROUNDS

Note: This quantitative assessment provides a starting point in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It does not produce a decision on which base should close or be realigned. Although the assessment offers a logical basis for judging possible opportunities or closure and realignment, it is just one element in the Army's overall evaluation.

3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (APG). Ranks 1/4 proving grounds. The mission of Aberdeen Proving Ground is a major Army Research, Development and Testing installation. APG provides administrative management to numerous organizations. This support includes readiness and mobilization preparedness. As AMC's only Mobilization Station APG is the host to a potential of 25 to 50 company sized Army Reserve and National Guard units. In addition, APG is the host of the AMC Mobilization Deployment Processing Center. APG has extensive facilities and infrastructure in place. APG has the highest replacement value of any Army installation. The high cost to duplicate or replace facilities requires APG to be deferred from consideration as a closure candidate.

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah (DPG). Ranks 4/4 proving grounds. DPG plans, conducts, and reports the results of developmental tests of chemical warfare munitions, chemical and biological defense systems and flame, incendiary, smoke obscurant and illuminating weapons systems. The proving ground safeguards, stores, transports, and uses chemical surety materiel, and provides security and removal/disposal of unwanted chemical surety materiel. Also, it plans, conducts, and reports the results of performance and survivability of DoD materiel in a tropical environment. Although Dugway was considered for closure or realignment, it ultimately was excluded due to its unique

capability to conduct chemical and biological testing.

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico (WSMR). Ranks 2/4 proving grounds. WSMR is operated and maintained primarily for support of research, development, and testing of weapon and space systems, subsystems, and components. The major range and test facility base is available to all DOD components, other government agencies and domestic commercial agencies and foreign governments when sponsored by the U.S. Government. White Sands Missile Range is unique because it is one of the only sites in the United Stated that is large enough (2 million + acres) to fire all organic missile and artillery systems. Because of this unique capability, WSMR was deferred from study for closure or realignment.

Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona (YPG). Ranks 3/4 proving grounds. YPG plans, conducts, analyzes, and reports the results of developmental tests and other tests; reviews plans; and monitors developmental testing planned or conducted by proponent materiel developers, producers, and contractors for the following types of materiel: tube artillery systems, aircraft armament systems, air delivery systems, and air mobility equipment. The proving ground also performs desert environmental tests on all classes of Army materiel. YPG is designated as a National Test Range and has unique facilities for Joint testing that cannot be replicated without a large capital investment. Because of the unique facilities available, YPG was deferred from study for closure. It is also receiving functions as a result of the 1988 Commission"s decision to close Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendations

None.

b. Justification

Although Dugway Proving Grounds was considered as a candidate for closure, no recommendation is being made due to its unique chemical and biological testing mission. The other installations in this category were deferred from further study after initial evaluation due to their unique military value.

5. PERSONNEL IMPACTS

Not Applicable.



PORTS MILITARY VALUE SCORES

Note: This quantitative assessment provides a starting point in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It <u>does not</u> produce a decision on which base should close or be realigned. Although the assessment offers a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure and realignment, it is just one element in the Army's overall evaluation.

3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

SUNNY POINT, NC. The mission of Military Ocean Terminal. Sunny Point is to plan, coordinate, and accomplish movement of ammunition and other dangerous cargo to support the Department of Defense. No other Army-owned ammunition terminal exists on the east, West, or Gulf coasts. Sunny Point is also a prime US Army Reserve training site for rail, terminal, and port security units. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

BAYONNE, NJ. Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne provides the only Army secure water terminal facility in support of European, African, and Southwest Asian Theaters of Operation. Current location and facilities meets the criteria for handling throughput of a brigade-sized element with little, if any, difficulty. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

OAKLAND, CA. Military Ocean Terminal, Oakland, provides the only Army secure water terminal facility in support of the Pacific and Far East Theaters of Operation. Current location and facilities meets the criteria for handling throughput of brigade-sized elements with little difficulty. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.



MEDICAL CENTER MILITARY VALUE SCORES

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3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC. Ranks equally with Fitzsimons Medical Center in military value. Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) is the Army's largest medical center and has more than 61,400 beneficiaries in the immediate Washington metropolitan area. WRAMC supports the Army in three important areas of medical science: patient care, or the maintenance of the Army's fighting strength; medical education; and training and medical research. WRAMC is the principal clinical teaching hospital for the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences as well as a teaching hospital for medical students from George Washington, Howard, and Georgetown Universities. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this medical center. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL CENTER, AURORA, CO. Ranks equally with Walter Reed Army Medical Center in military value. Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC) is one of seven Army medical centers in the US and has two catchment areas of service. With a roughly 40-mile radius, it provides primary care for approximately 67,000 beneficiaries. The second catchment area region includes Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Missouri, with more than 500,000 beneficiaries eligible for tertiary care when needed. FAMC provides daily health care, medical training, mobilization, and installation support. Graduate medical education is offered at the intern, resident and fellowship levels. FAMC also supports medical training for active duty and reserve component personnel including courses for licensed practical nurses, operating-room and radiology technicians, occupational and physical therapy specialists, nurse anesthetists, and critical care nurses. FAMC

3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

The analysis of ARNG installations focused on the federally owned Army real estate or facilities under license, permit, or executive order to the ARNG. These properties are listed in the HQDA Integrated Facility System (HQIFS) and account for 4% of total ARNG installations. This category does not include all ARNG facilities on active installations, leased facilities, or other non-Army federal facilities. Facility requirements were determined using the FY92 ARNG force structure pending HQDA reconciliation of the FY93 Congressional mandated versus DOD programmed end strength.

The assessed category consists of 154 properties. 126 of these properties have buildings, while 28 are training land only. Each of the properties was analyzed, however the assessment of facilities on each was limited to the following major types of facilities: Armory, Organizational Maintenance Shop (OMS), Combined Support Maintenance Shop (CSMS), Mobilization and Training Equipment Site (MATES), Unit Training Equipment Site (UTES), and aviation facilities. A total of 167 facilities (in an assessed categories) are located on the 126 properties with facilities:

- 119 Armories. (64 are temporary buildings for the Alaska Scout units.)

- 26 Organizational Maintenance Shops.

- 5 Combined Support Maintenance Shops.

- 3 Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites.

- 9 Unit Training Equipment Sites.

- 5 Aviation Facilities.

All the assessed properties fall below the thresholds established by U.S.C. 2687. Cost reductions, without adverse impacts on ARNG unit readiness, are achieved through the efficient management of installation and facility infrastructure. As force structure changes occur and specific unit inactivations are determined, potential candidates for realignment or closure may be identified. Three of the assessed installations have been identified as excess and are in the process of being closed.

Except for the three properties identified as excess, the existing facilities directly support the ARNG missions of manning, equipping, maintaining, training, and mobilizing combat ready units.

Accessibility and modernization of training facilities and

supporting installation infrastructure is an imperative for Army National Guard mission readiness.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

There are no recommended realignments or closures in this category. All of the ARNG installations reviewed fall below the threshold of U.S.C. 2687. However, three properties were identified as excess and are being closed.

Expandability	-Land available for future expansion? -Capacity for additional units to term leases? -Would expansion create environmental problems? -Local utilities have capacity for expansion? -Existing information management/telecommunication systems able to accommodate facility expansion?
Quality of Life	-USAR presence considered an asset by community? -Facility provide a healthy work environment for assigned personnel? -Crime rate in area have negative impact on mission training and personally on unit members? -Proximity of community support facilities (exchange, commissary)?

c. **Summary.**

The process used to assess reserve facilities involved a number of actions. The 3 Jun 92 version of the Army Stationing and Installation Plan (ASIP) Volume IV (USAR) was updated by the MUSARC to develop a current and complete list of facilities. This list was then compared with the inventory developed in preparation for BRAC 91 which resulted in the addition of 55 new locations, most of which are leases. Responses for the attributes were then developed for the additional facilities.

Having developed the attribute responses for the additional facilities enables analysis of the entire facility inventory to identify those which are of lessor value and therefore more susceptible to closure.

3. **INSTALLATION SCREENING**

All reserve facilities are below the threshold prescribed by Section 2687, Title 10, U.S.C. for nomination to the BRAC process. The USAR is therefore not bound by the BRAC timetable and a facility can be turned-in to the controlling installation for disposal as soon as it becomes excess. The Army Reserve is continually reviewing its real property inventory in this manner to identify opportunities for reducing costs and improving utilization and conditions whenever possible.

This assessment confirmed that the Army Reserve has a low percentage of facilities "on-hand" versus what is "required" as stated in paragraph 1 above, the lowest when compared to reserve components of other services. To help bridge the gap, the Army Reserve has acquired a considerable number of leases. These leased facilities are costly and are of marginal utility since they are not designed in accordance with reserve specifications. Although they do not fully support the varied training needs of the tenant units, they must be retained until new training facilities can be constructed.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

There were no reserve centers or facilities above the BRAC threshold identified for closure as a result of this assessment. However, two other properties were identified as excess and are being closed.

Congress has directed an FY 93 end-strength for the Army Reserve 22,225 below the FY 92 level. A five-phase unit inactivation plan has been developed to achieve this reduction and sent to the field for review prior to implementation. MUSARC Commanders have been directed to consider maximizing facility utilization and reducing leases when developing the stationing portion of the plan and to reinforce that guidance, USARC has set a goal to reduce lease costs by $3 million per year in FY 93 and FY 94. When this "Winter Command Plan" is finalized it will be possible to identify excess facilities and determine the best disposition.

Where inactivations cause a facility to become vacant or underutilized it can be either filled with units from a nearby overcrowded facility, used to reduce or terminate a lease, or declared excess and turned in for disposal. In recent years the Army Reserve has been able to identify and terminate 38 leases through this process for a savings of $1,452,485. A preliminary scrub of the inactivation plan indicates there will be more opportunities to vacate excess facilities and terminate unneeded leases when implemented.

c. Quality of Life.

Places Rated Almanac.

Health Care Support Index -- The Army needs to ensure that its active duty personnel, dependents, government employees and retirees are afforded the best health care possible.

3. SCREENING

Under the direction of the Deputy Secretary for Defense, the DA&M conducted a study of DoD activities and during Phase I defined which must remain in the NCR and which activities may be susceptible to relocation. Phase II of the study required an economic review of each activity selected to determine which relocations, if any, would be feasible and cost effective.

The activities listed below are those activities identified in the DA&M study for review in Phase II which met Army criteria for relocation outside of the NCR.

- Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC). (See below)

- Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC). (The Army has a plan which is expected to relocate the majority of OPTEC outside the NCR.)

- Recruiting Support Command. (The Army has already taken action to relocate this activity to Ft Knox, KY.)

None of these activities trigger the thresholds of the Base Realignment and Closure Act, requiring submission to the Commission. However, they are being included IAW DoD policy guidance.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendation

Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Disestablish the BRDEC. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

b. Justification

(1) Military Value

On July 21, 1992, the Secretary of the Army requested that the Army Science Board appoint a panel of members and consultants to conduct a review of the Army Materiel Command Research, Development and Engineering Center (RDEC) business plans. Specifically, the Secretary requested the panel determine which RDEC capabilities the Army can afford during the POM, as well as address funding decreases across the POM of 10, 20 and 30 per cent compared to today. The panel based its findings on an objective assessment of the missions, functions, business areas, core capabilities, customers' needs and major fields of technical endeavor of each RDEC measured against at least the following criteria to determine which RDEC capabilities are essential and affordable: Relevance to the Army customer; Availability from other sources; R&D Quality; and In-house cost and efficiency. The study identified technical areas to be emphasized, de-emphasized and eliminated. Areas identified for elimination are Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Support Equipment and Construction Equipment. The Army Science Board panel recommended closure of the Belvoir RDEC and dispersal of the business areas that were not recommended for elimination.

The relocation of the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel/Lubricant business areas to TARDEC is consistent with the conclusions of the Army Science Board Study. There is a synergy between these functions and the mission of building military vehicles. For example, the bridging area requires heavy vehicles such as tanks, and heavy mobile logistics to move across demountable bridges and light spans. Supply, Fuel/Lubricants, Water Purification and Counter Mobility also complement the mission of TARDEC. Realignment of the Fuel/Lubricant business area is part of DoD Project Reliance and has already commenced.

The transfer of operational control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas from the Belvoir RDEC to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), also located in the same general area of Fort Belvoir supports the study recommendations, while avoiding any additional costs.