

**Team Guam's Preferred Option
and
Cost Savings**

The Scenario: Team Guam's Preferred Option

Under Team Guam's alternative Scenario (Preferred Option) in contrast to the Pentagon's proposal ("Close Guam Piers"), the MSC Combat Logistics Force vessels now forward deployed in Guam would remain so stationed. All vessels (including fleet tugs), the MSC operations personnel, appropriate levels of PWC and other NavAct (STA) personnel to support continued MSC operations, and METOC assets would remain in place under a consolidated NavActs command. Approximately sixty percent (60%) of the savings for personnel, RPMA and BOS identified under the "Close Guam Piers" scenario would continue under Team Guam's Preferred Option.

Also under the scenario, both FISC and SRF, Guam would be closed. However, remaining MSC operations in Guam, 70% and 50% (respectively) of earlier identified savings at the closure of these facilities would be continued through a privatization/contractual relationship.

Under Team Guam's Preferred Option the U.S. Navy aviation squadron HC-5 would remain at Anderson Air Force Base (Guam).

Comparative Savings

Following is a cost/savings comparison between Team Guam's Preferred Option and the Pentagon's "Close Guam Piers" scenario (in thousands).

	Team Guam	Pentagon	Team Guam as % of DoD
* 1-Time Cost to Implement	\$ 65,348	\$ 163,739	39.9%
* Net of All Costs and Savings	\$ 536,679	\$ 600,455	89.3%
* Annual Recurring Savings	\$ 96,045	\$ 134,330	71.5%
* Net Present Value in 2015	\$1,449,176	\$1,875,901	77.3%

Team Guam's Preferred Option by Activity

Following is an overview of Team Guam's Preferred Option by U.S. Navy activity designated for closure, realignment, disestablishment or redirect. This overview provides a brief description of the actions contemplated under the scenario and adjustments made to the COBRA input data in the

actions contemplated under the scenario and adjustments made to the COBRA input data in the Preferred Option via-a-vis the Pentagon's proposal.

Naval Activities, Guam

Under Team Guam's Preferred Option, the Pentagon's plan to move MSC vessels to various bases in Hawaii would be reversed and the MSC's CLF vessels (and fleet tugs) would remain forward deployed in Guam. However, since the MSC support is being largely civilianized, significant cuts at Naval Activities Guam would occur and the remaining activities would be consolidated into a new Naval Activities command including the navy's magazine function.

The Preferred Option puts off the final realignment of Naval Station (Naval Activities) into Naval Magazine (Naval Activities) until the year 2000 instead of 1997 as proposed under the Pentagon's "Close Guam Piers" scenario. The phasing of the implementation of the Preferred Option, which begins in 1996 is also somewhat different (See Attached Worksheet "Navacts to NavActs(M) Move").

Under the Pentagon's COBRA, 1,098 officer, enlisted and civilian personnel positions would be eliminated. Team's Guam's Preferred Option, would add back in 437 of these positions. Added back in from the Pentagon's scenario are; approximately one-third (1/3) of the positions at Naval Station (Naval Activities), Guam which were slated for elimination; almost half of the positions at PWC slated for elimination; all positions related to METOC operations in Guam; and, miscellaneous positions such as the Navy Legal Services, OICC and COMNAVMAR necessary to support continuing activities in Guam (See Attached Worksheet "NavActs Eliminations").

Also, under Team Guam's Preferred Option, a "Recurring Savings" is added in which did not appear in the Pentagon's scenario. This savings in the Preferred Option reflects the cost of operating an additional T-AFS if the move to Hawaii were to occur. While no other such "scenario-change costs" were factored into Team Guam's Preferred Option, this addition was necessary to reflect the Pentagon's COBRA's failure to account for the requirement that an additional AFS be added to the existing CLF vessel mix to meet tempo and CHOP string requirements should the move to Hawaii occur. This cost savings in the Preferred Option is established at \$21.535 million per annum -- a cost of operating an MSC/T-AFS provided by the Department of the Navy to the Office of Guam's Congressional delegate.

Also adjusted from the Pentagon's COBRA was in the area of facilities shut-down area. This amount was increased from 442 (KSF) to a conservative 500 (KSF) to account for a reduction in BOS for pier maintenance and activities. Additionally, the milage distance between NavSta and NavMag was amended from 10 miles to five (5) miles.

All other COBRA input data in the Pentagon's "Close Guam Piers" scenario remained unchanged.

Fleet Industrial & Supply Center

Under the Preferred Option, FISC, Guam would close down in 1998. Like the Pentagon's scenario, 86 civilian and 13 enlisted personnel would be transferred to Naval Station (Naval Activities) and 19 to Anderson AFB. These FISC movements into Naval Station, represent the personnel necessary to support supply functions at Naval Activities. Additionally, MILCON cost avoidances identified under the Pentagon's scenario would be realized.

The Preferred Option, would transfer an additional five (5) officers and ten (10) enlisted personnel into Naval Activities for contract oversight and administration of FISC-like activities that would continue vis-a-vis the MSC (AFS's, MPSRON, COMPSRON and DEGAR) load out and resupply operations under a private contract.

Unlike the Pentagon's scenario, after 1998, 70% of the cost- savings that would be realized in the Pentagon's proposed disestablishment of FISC Guam, would be made available for the privatization of FISC's function in relation to MSC support. This amount is \$18,269,000. This figure reflects 70% of the savings the Pentagon's scenario identified in RPMA, BOS, Military and Civilian salaries and Mission and Miscellaneous Costs.

The only other factor altered from the Pentagon's scenario was the adjustment of the distance between FISC and NavActs (from 5 to 1 mile).

Ship Repair Facility, Guam

Under the Preferred Option, SRF, Guam would close down in 1998. Like the Pentagon's scenario, 31 civilian, three (3) enlisted and one (1) officer personnel would be transferred to Naval Station (Naval Activities) and the CINCPACFLT Rep., Guam. Additionally, MILCON cost avoidances identified under the Pentagon's scenario would be realized. All remaining personnel positions would be eliminated by 1998 under a phasing scenario which leaves the majority of the cuts until that year.

Unlike the Pentagon's scenario, after 1998, 50% of the cost- savings that would be realized in the closure of SRF, Guam would be made available for the privatization of SRF's function in relation to MSC work and other work that could be assigned by CINCPACFLT. This amount is \$18,342,000. This figure reflects 50% of the savings the Pentagon's scenario identified in RPMA, BOS, Military and Civilian salaries and Mission and Miscellaneous Costs.

Navy Air at Anderson Air Force Base

Under the Preferred Option, HC-5 would continue to operate out of Anderson Air Force Base (AAFB) in support of MSC operations that would remain in Guam. The VQ-1 and VQ-5 squadrons which have already moved to CONUS would remain in their present locations.

Like the Pentagon's scenario, the Preferred Option includes MILCON at VQ-1 and VQ-5's new locations as well as the cost avoidance at AAFB in relation to those squadrons movement to CONUS.

Unlike the Pentagon's scenario, however, Team Guam's Preferred Option does not reflect the cost of moving the personnel and equipment of VQ-1 and VQ-5 since these movements have already taken place and the costs of the moved already incurred. An additional change to the Pentagon's scenario is an adjustment to the Recurring Cost savings identified. Instead of a recurring savings of almost \$27 million for the annual operational cost at AAFB, the amount was reduced to \$19.2 million to reflect the cost savings attributable only to VQ-1 and VQ-5's (\$11.7 and \$7.5 million respectively) movement from AAFB. The estimated \$7.5 million in costs of operating HC-5 at AAFB was eliminated from the Pentagon's identified \$27 million recurring savings since HC-5 would continue to operate at AAFB.

A final adjustment made in the Team Guam Preferred Option for Navy Air at AAFB, is that one (1) officer and 40 enlisted positions (security) that were to be eliminated in the Pentagon's scenario were added back in to support HC-5's operations at AAFB.

Document Separator

ADDER Data File: C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.OUT

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 2000
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015(\$K):-1,449,176
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 65,348

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	-168,286	-13,717	3,458	13,354	-6,561	0	-171,752	0
Person	-717	-6,018	-27,001	-62,972	-84,711	-85,150	-266,569	-85,150
Overhd	-14,996	-15,081	-20,098	-3,833	17,368	10,640	-26,000	10,640
Moving	31	1,329	5,066	5,764	699	0	12,890	0
Missio	0	0	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-86,140	-21,535
Other	116	118	663	0	0	0	897	0
TOTAL	-183,852	-33,369	-59,447	-69,222	-94,739	-96,045	-536,675	-96,045

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	1	11	15	42	0	0	69
Enl	45	110	88	68	0	0	311
Civ	0	112	578	637	16	0	1,343
TOT	46	233	681	747	16	0	1,723

POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	3	10	21	16	91	0	141
Enl	38	39	25	44	1,845	0	1,991
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	86	316	174	652	297	0	1,525
TOT	127	365	220	712	2,233	0	3,657

ADDER Data File: C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.OUT

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	7,263	2,463	9,308	14,454	1,212	0	34,701	0
Person	68	701	1,883	2,725	1,191	1,159	7,727	1,159
Overhd	4,317	5,640	6,263	27,335	51,048	49,949	144,552	49,949
Moving	31	1,329	5,066	5,764	699	0	12,890	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	116	118	663	0	0	0	897	0
TOTAL	11,795	10,251	23,183	50,278	54,151	51,108	200,767	51,108

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	175,550	16,180	5,850	1,100	7,773	0	206,453	0
Person	785	6,719	28,883	65,697	85,903	86,309	274,296	86,309
Overhd	19,312	20,721	26,361	31,168	33,680	39,309	170,552	39,309
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	21,535	21,535	21,535	21,535	86,140	21,535
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	195,647	43,620	82,630	119,500	148,890	147,153	737,441	147,153

ADDER NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (ADDER v5.08)
Report Created 22:45 05/22/1995

Year	Cost (\$)	Adjusted Cost (\$)	NPV (\$)
1996	-183,851,771	-181,374,781	-181,374,781
1997	-33,369,100	-32,038,468	-213,413,250
1998	-59,447,140	-55,549,018	-268,962,268
1999	-69,222,039	-62,951,775	-331,914,043
2000	-94,739,581	-83,851,961	-415,766,004
2001	-96,045,078	-82,732,290	-498,498,294
2002	-96,045,078	-80,518,044	-579,016,338
2003	-96,045,078	-78,363,060	-657,379,398
2004	-96,045,078	-76,265,751	-733,645,149
2005	-96,045,078	-74,224,576	-807,869,725
2006	-96,045,078	-72,238,030	-880,107,755
2007	-96,045,078	-70,304,652	-950,412,406
2008	-96,045,078	-68,423,019	-1,018,835,425
2009	-96,045,078	-66,591,746	-1,085,427,171
2010	-96,045,078	-64,809,485	-1,150,236,656
2011	-96,045,078	-63,074,925	-1,213,311,581
2012	-96,045,078	-61,386,788	-1,274,698,369
2013	-96,045,078	-59,743,832	-1,334,442,201
2014	-96,045,078	-58,144,849	-1,392,587,051
2015	-96,045,078	-56,588,661	-1,449,175,712

ADDER ONE-TIME COST REPORT (ADDER v5.08)
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(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
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Construction		
Military Construction	34,700,644	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		34,700,644
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	2,812,208	
Civilian Early Retirement	658,818	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	757,432	
Unemployment	429,084	
Total - Personnel		4,657,542
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	10,158,341	
Mothball / Shutdown	2,044,999	
Total - Overhead		12,203,340
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	11,980,800	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	909,216	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		12,890,016
Other		
HAP / RSE	590,846	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	306,000	
Total - Other		896,846

Total One-Time Costs		65,348,388

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	206,453,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		206,453,000

Total Net One-Time Costs		-141,104,612

ADDER APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (ADDER v5.08) - Page 1/3
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ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	7,263	2,463	9,308	14,454	1,212	0	34,701
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	306	1,171	1,315	20	0	2,812
Civ Retire	0	66	270	313	9	0	659
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	1,238	5,011	5,587	144	0	11,981
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	31	91	55	177	555	0	909
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	47	182	197	3	0	429
OTHER							
Program Plan	3,530	2,647	1,961	1,218	801	0	10,158
Shutdown	23	518	728	478	298	0	2,045
New Hire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	68	213	191	285	0	0	757
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	118	473	0	0	0	591
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	116	0	190	0	0	0	306
TOTAL ONE-TIME	11,031	7,707	19,541	24,026	3,043	0	65,348

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RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	88	135	153	153	530	153
BOS	764	2,475	3,486	6,234	12,184	12,184	37,328	12,184
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	230	461	461	1,152	461
Enl Salary	0	0	0	315	630	630	1,576	630
House Allow	0	68	68	68	68	68	342	68
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	19,269	37,611	37,611	94,491	37,611
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	764	2,543	3,642	26,252	51,108	51,108	135,418	51,108
TOTAL COST	11,795	10,251	23,183	50,278	54,151	51,108	200,767	51,108
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	175,550	16,180	5,850	1,100	7,773	0	206,453	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	175,550	16,180	5,850	1,100	7,773	0	206,453	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	45	603	1,881	3,314	4,566	5,169	15,578	5,169
BOS	67	918	5,280	8,654	9,913	14,940	39,773	14,940
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	2,902	20,784	52,821	70,286	70,693	217,487	70,693
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	38	499	1,497	3,685	5,298	5,298	16,316	5,298
Enl Salary	746	3,318	6,602	9,190	10,318	10,318	40,494	10,318
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	21,535	21,535	21,535	21,535	86,140	21,535
Misc Recur	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	115,200	19,200
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	20,097	27,440	76,780	118,400	141,117	147,153	530,988	147,153
TOTAL SAVINGS	195,647	43,620	82,630	119,500	148,890	147,153	737,441	147,153

ADDER APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (ADDER v5.08) - Page 3/3
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ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	-168,286	-13,717	3,458	13,354	-6,561	0	-171,752	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	372	1,441	1,628	29	0	3,471	
Civ Moving	31	1,329	5,066	5,764	699	0	12,890	
Other	3,553	3,212	2,871	1,893	1,103	0	12,632	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	68	213	191	285	0	0	757	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	118	473	0	0	0	591	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	116	0	190	0	0	0	306	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	-164,518	-8,472	13,691	22,926	-4,730	0	-141,105	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Beyond 0
O&M								
RPMA	-45	-603	-1,794	-3,178	-4,413	-5,016	-15,048	-5,016
BOS	696	1,557	-1,794	-2,420	2,271	-2,755	-2,446	-2,755
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-2,902	-20,784	-52,821	-70,286	-70,693	-217,487	-70,693
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	-785	-3,817	-8,100	-12,330	-14,525	-14,525	-54,082	-14,525
House Allow	0	68	68	68	68	68	342	68
OTHER								
Prccurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-86,140	-21,535
Misc Recur	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	69	18,411	18,411	-20,709	18,411
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-19,333	-24,897	-73,138	-92,148	-90,009	-96,045	-395,570	-96,045
TOTAL NET COST	-183,852	-33,369	-59,447	-69,222	-94,739	-96,045	-536,675	-96,045

ADDER INPUT DATA REPORT (ADDER v5.08)
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ADDER Data File: C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.OUT

Discount Rate for NPV.ART/ROI: 2.75%

Inflation Rate for NPV.ART/ROI: 0.00%

APPDET.ART Inflation Rates:

1995: 0.00% 1997: 0.00% 1998: 0.00% 1999: 0.00% 2000: 0.00% 2001: 0.00%

COBRA Scenario Files used:

C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR

C:\COBRA\HC5_STAY.CBR

C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR

C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR

Document Separator

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 2000
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015(\$K): -619,657
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 41,425

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	4,186	1,251	8,096	13,243	0	0	26,776	0
Person	-717	-3,275	-10,691	-23,225	-31,145	-31,584	-100,637	-31,584
Overhd	3,207	3,207	2,824	5,106	8,831	2,102	25,278	2,102
Moving	31	253	1,608	1,876	699	0	4,467	0
Missio	0	0	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-86,140	-21,535
Other	0	0	190	0	0	0	190	0
TOTAL	6,707	1,437	-19,508	-24,535	-43,150	-51,017	-130,065	-51,017

POSITIONS ELIMINATED	Constant Dollars						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	1	4	7	37	0	0	49
Enl	45	70	68	68	0	0	251
Civ	0	23	179	187	16	0	405
TOT	46	97	254	292	16	0	705

POSITIONS REALIGNED	Constant Dollars						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	3	5	17	16	91	0	132
Enl	38	2	20	44	1,845	0	1,949
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	86	199	174	652	297	0	1,408
TOT	127	206	211	712	2,233	0	3,489

Summary:

 Repatriate waterfront assets and retain only such activities as are necessary to support MSC homeporting in Guam.

SCEN MSC_GUAM

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	4,186	1,251	8,096	13,243	0	0	26,776	0
Person	68	194	623	1,336	1,123	1,091	4,435	1,091
Overhd	3,320	3,776	4,299	7,793	13,640	12,541	45,370	12,541
Moving	31	253	1,608	1,876	699	0	4,467	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	190	0	0	0	190	0
TOTAL	7,605	5,475	14,815	24,248	15,463	13,632	81,238	13,632

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	785	3,469	11,314	24,561	32,268	32,675	105,072	32,675
Overhd	112	569	1,474	2,687	4,809	10,439	20,091	10,439
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	21,535	21,535	21,535	21,535	86,140	21,535
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	897	4,038	34,323	48,783	58,613	64,648	211,303	64,648

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Year	Cost(\$)	Adjusted Cost(\$)	NPV(\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	6,707,502	6,617,133	6,617,133
1997	1,436,940	1,379,640	7,996,773
1998	-19,508,361	-18,229,141	-10,232,368
1999	-24,534,828	-22,312,416	-32,544,784
2000	-43,149,968	-38,191,107	-70,735,891
2001	-51,016,716	-43,945,299	-114,681,190
2002	-51,016,716	-42,769,148	-157,450,338
2003	-51,016,716	-41,624,475	-199,074,813
2004	-51,016,716	-40,510,438	-239,585,251
2005	-51,016,716	-39,426,217	-279,011,468
2006	-51,016,716	-38,371,014	-317,382,481
2007	-51,016,716	-37,344,052	-354,726,534
2008	-51,016,716	-36,344,577	-391,071,111
2009	-51,016,716	-35,371,851	-426,442,961
2010	-51,016,716	-34,425,159	-460,868,120
2011	-51,016,716	-33,503,804	-494,371,924
2012	-51,016,716	-32,607,109	-526,979,033
2013	-51,016,716	-31,734,412	-558,713,446
2014	-51,016,716	-30,885,073	-589,598,518
2015	-51,016,716	-30,058,465	-619,656,984

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	26,775,806	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		26,775,806
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	812,724	
Civilian Early Retirement	192,126	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	573,976	
Unemployment	128,412	
Total - Personnel		1,707,238
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	7,727,318	
Mothball / Shutdown	557,500	
Total - Overhead		8,284,818
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	3,600,000	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	867,453	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		4,467,453
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	190,000	
Total - Other		190,000

Total One-Time Costs		41,425,315

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		41,425,315

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	812,724	
Civilian Early Retirement	192,126	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	573,976	
Unemployment	128,412	
Total - Personnel		1,707,238
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	7,727,318	
Mothball / Shutdown	557,500	
Total - Overhead		8,284,818
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	3,600,000	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	867,453	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		4,467,453
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	190,000	
Total - Other		190,000

Total One-Time Costs		14,649,509

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		14,649,509

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		0

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		0

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	4,383,893	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		4,383,893
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Methball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----		-----
Total One-Time Costs		4,383,893
-----		-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		-----
Total One-Time Savings		0
-----		-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		4,383,893

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	22,391,914	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		22,391,914
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		22,391,914

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		22,391,914

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
NAVACTS (STA) GUAM	0	0	0	0	0
NAVMAG LUALUALEI	0	0	0	0	0
NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR	0	0	0	0	0
NCTAMS WESTPAC	4,384	0	0	0	4,384
NAVACTS GUAM	22,392	0	0	0	22,392
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Totals:	26,776	0	0	0	26,776

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

MilCon for Base: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Medical dental facility	MEDFC	9,500	4,384	0	0	4,384

Total Construction Cost:	4,384
+ Info Management Account:	0
+ Land Purchases:	0
- Construction Cost Avoid:	0
TOTAL:	4,384

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

MilCon for Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Other Operations	OPERA	30,000	9,147	1,000	406	9,553
MWR Rehab						
Administrative Training space	ADMIN	10,000	3,378	0	0	3,378
Personnel Support PDS, OICC, etc.	ADMIN	24,000	8,108	0	0	8,108
Administrative Admin spaces	ADMIN	0	0	3,000	1,351	1,351
Total Construction Cost:						22,392
+ Info Management Account:						0
+ Land Purchases:						0
- Construction Cost Avoid:						0
TOTAL:						22,392

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
237	2,417	0	2,672

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	-16	0	0	0	0	0	-16
Enlisted	90	0	0	0	0	0	90
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	-76	0	0	0	0	0	-76
TOTAL	-2	0	0	0	0	0	-2

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
221	2,507	0	2,596

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
Enlisted	0	0	0	19	0	0	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	25	0	0	25

To Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	3	5	17	10	91	0	126
Enlisted	38	2	20	25	1,845	0	1,930
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	86	199	174	652	297	0	1,408
TOTAL	127	206	211	687	2,233	0	3,464

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	3	5	17	16	91	0	132
Enlisted	38	2	20	44	1,845	0	1,949
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	86	199	174	652	297	0	1,408
TOTAL	127	206	211	712	2,233	0	3,489

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	-1	-4	-7	-37	0	0	-49
Enlisted	-45	-70	-68	-68	0	0	-251
Civilians	0	-23	-179	-187	-16	0	-405
TOTAL	-46	-97	-254	-292	-16	0	-705

POSITIONS ELIMINATED (No Salary Savings):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	-10	0	0	-10
TOTAL	0	0	0	-10	0	0	-10

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
40	307	0	773

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
13	143	0	123

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
13	143	0	123

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
716	7,126	0	1,419

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
716	7,126	0	1,419

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
58	979	0	99

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
Enlisted	0	0	0	19	0	0	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	25	0	0	25

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
Enlisted	0	0	0	19	0	0	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	25	0	0	25

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
Enlisted	0	0	0	19	0	0	19
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	25	0	0	25

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
-----	-----	-----	-----
70	1,017	0	99

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
-----	-----	-----	-----
17	260	0	107

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Officers	3	5	17	10	91	0	126
Enlisted	38	2	20	25	1,845	0	1,930
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	86	199	174	652	297	0	1,408
TOTAL	127	206	211	687	2,233	0	3,464

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into NAVACTS GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Officers	3	5	17	10	91	0	126
Enlisted	38	2	20	25	1,845	0	1,930
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	86	199	174	652	297	0	1,408
TOTAL	127	206	211	687	2,233	0	3,464

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
-----	-----	-----	-----
143	2,190	0	1,515

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/6
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	23	179	197	16	0	415
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	2	18	20	2	0	42
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	1	9	10	1	0	21
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	3	27	30	2	0	62
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	1	11	12	1	0	25
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	14	107	118	10	0	249
Civilians Available to Move		0	2	7	7	0	0	16
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	2	7	7	0	0	16
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
Civilians Moving		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	2	18	20	2	0	42
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	3	18	19	1	0	41
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	14	107	118	10	0	249
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	23	179	197	16	0	415
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	2	18	20	2	0	42
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	1	9	10	1	0	21
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	3	27	30	2	0	62
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	1	11	12	1	0	25
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	14	107	118	10	0	249
Civilians Available to Move		0	2	7	7	0	0	16
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	2	7	7	0	0	16
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	2	18	20	2	0	42
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	3	18	19	1	0	41
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	14	107	118	10	0	249
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SPF

Base: NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SPF

Base: NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT								
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN								
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT								
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN								
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
Civilians Moving		86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS (STA) GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	40.00%	173	4.12%	4.12%
1997	0	0.00%	20.00%	303	7.21%	7.21%
1998	0	0.00%	20.00%	465	11.06%	11.06%
1999	0	0.00%	20.00%	1,014	24.12%	24.12%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	2,249	53.50%	53.50%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	4204	100.00%	100.00%

Base: NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	50	100.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	50	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	127	3.67%	9.61%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	206	5.95%	6.09%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	211	6.09%	19.83%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	687	19.83%	64.46%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	2,233	64.46%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	3464	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
----- (\$K) -----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	4,186	1,251	8,096	13,243	0	0	26,776
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	59	357	377	20	0	813
Civ Retire	0	9	82	91	9	0	192
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	201	1,555	1,699	144	0	3,600
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	31	51	52	177	555	0	867
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	9	56	59	3	0	128
OTHER							
Program Plan	2,533	1,900	1,425	1,068	801	0	7,727
Shutdown	23	40	62	134	298	0	557
New Hire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	68	116	127	263	0	0	574
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	190	0	0	0	190
TOTAL ONE-TIME	6,841	3,638	12,003	17,112	1,831	0	41,425

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	16	47	47	47	156	47
BOS	764	1,837	2,796	5,544	11,494	11,494	33,928	11,494
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	230	461	461	1,152	461
Enl Salary	0	0	0	315	630	630	1,576	630
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	764	1,837	2,812	7,136	13,632	13,632	39,812	13,632
TOTAL COST	7,605	5,475	14,815	24,248	15,463	13,632	81,238	13,632
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	45	169	369	756	1,619	2,222	5,180	2,222
BOS	67	400	1,105	1,931	3,190	8,216	14,911	8,216
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	584	5,718	15,019	20,178	20,585	62,085	20,585
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	38	230	653	2,342	3,762	3,762	10,788	3,762
Enl Salary	746	2,654	4,943	7,200	8,328	8,328	32,199	8,328
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	21,535	21,535	21,535	21,535	86,140	21,535
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	897	4,038	34,323	48,783	58,613	64,648	211,303	64,648
TOTAL SAVINGS	897	4,038	34,323	48,783	58,613	64,648	211,303	64,648

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	4,186	1,251	8,096	13,243	0	0	26,776	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	69	439	468	29	0	1,005	
Civ Moving	31	253	1,608	1,876	699	0	4,467	
Other	2,556	1,949	1,543	1,262	1,103	0	8,413	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	68	116	127	263	0	0	574	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	190	0	0	0	190	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	6,841	3,638	12,003	17,112	1,831	0	41,425	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	-45	-169	-352	-710	-1,572	-2,175	-5,024	-2,175
BOS	696	1,436	1,690	3,613	8,304	3,277	19,017	3,277
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-584	-5,718	-15,019	-20,178	-20,585	-62,085	-20,585
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	-785	-2,884	-5,596	-8,996	-10,999	-10,999	-40,259	-10,999
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-86,140	-21,535
Misc Recur	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-133	-2,201	-31,511	-41,647	-44,981	-51,017	-171,491	-51,017
TOTAL NET COST	6,707	1,437	-19,508	-24,535	-43,150	-51,017	-130,065	-51,017

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 4/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	59	357	377	20	0	813
Civ Retire	0	9	82	91	9	0	192
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	201	1,555	1,699	144	0	3,600
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	31	51	52	177	555	0	867
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	9	56	59	3	0	128
OTHER							
Program Plan	2,533	1,900	1,425	1,068	801	0	7,727
Shutdown	23	40	62	134	298	0	557
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	68	116	127	263	0	0	574
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	190	0	0	0	190
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,655	2,387	3,907	3,870	1,831	0	14,649

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 5/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS (STA) GUAM, GU								
RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000
 TOTAL COSTS	 2,655	 2,387	 3,907	 4,870	 2,831	 1,000	 17,649	 1,000
 ONE-TIME SAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
 RECURRINGSAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	 Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	45	169	369	756	1,619	2,222	5,180	2,222
BOS	67	400	1,105	1,931	3,190	8,216	14,911	8,216
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	584	5,718	15,019	20,178	20,585	62,085	20,585
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	38	230	653	2,342	3,762	3,762	10,788	3,762
Enl Salary	746	2,654	4,943	7,200	8,328	8,328	32,199	8,328
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	21,535	21,535	21,535	21,535	86,140	21,535
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	897	4,038	34,323	48,783	58,613	64,648	211,303	64,648
 TOTAL SAVINGS	 897	 4,038	 34,323	 48,783	 58,613	 64,648	 211,303	 64,648

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 6/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU								
ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	69	439	468	29	0	1,005	
Civ Moving	31	253	1,608	1,876	699	0	4,467	
Other	2,556	1,949	1,543	1,262	1,103	0	8,413	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	68	116	127	263	0	0	574	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	190	0	0	0	190	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,655	2,387	3,907	3,870	1,831	0	14,649	
RECURRING NET								
----- (\$K) -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	-45	-169	-369	-756	-1,619	-2,222	-5,180	-2,222
BOS	-67	-400	-1,105	-1,931	-3,190	-8,216	-14,911	-8,216
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-584	-5,718	-15,019	-20,178	-20,585	-62,085	-20,585
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	-785	-2,884	-5,596	-9,541	-12,090	-12,090	-42,987	-12,090
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-21,535	-86,140	-21,535
Misc Recur	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-897	-4,038	-34,323	-47,783	-57,613	-63,648	-208,303	-63,648
TOTAL NET COST	1,758	-1,651	-30,417	-43,913	-55,782	-63,648	-193,654	-63,648

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 7/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 13/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	362	0	4,022	0	0	0	4,384
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	362	0	4,022	0	0	0	4,384

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 15/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	362	0	4,022	0	0	0	4,384	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	362	0	4,022	0	0	0	4,384	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	176	176	176	527	176
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	545	1,091	1,091	2,728	1,091
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	721	1,267	1,267	3,254	1,267
TOTAL NET COST	362	0	4,022	721	1,267	1,267	7,638	1,267

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 16/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	3,824	1,251	4,074	13,243	0	0	22,392
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	3,824	1,251	4,074	13,243	0	0	22,392

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 18/18
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	3,824	1,251	4,074	13,243	0	0	22,392	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	3,824	1,251	4,074	13,243	0	0	22,392	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
REMA	0	0	16	47	47	47	156	47
BOS	764	1,837	2,796	5,368	11,318	11,318	33,401	11,318
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	764	1,837	2,812	5,415	11,365	11,365	33,558	11,365
TOTAL NET COST	4,588	3,088	6,886	18,657	11,365	11,365	55,950	11,365

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
NAVACTS (STA) GUAM	-4,204	-79%	-446,000	-42%	106
NAVMAG LUALUALEI	0	0%	0	0%	0
NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR	0	0%	0	0%	0
NCTAMS WESTPAC	50	4%	0	0%	0
NAVACTS GUAM	3,464	902%	4,000	2%	1

Base	RPMA (\$)			BOS (\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
NAVACTS (STA) GUAM	-2,222,079	-39%	528	-8,216,525	-57%	1,954
NAVMAG LUALUALEI	-0	0%	0	0	0%	0
NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR	0	0%	0	0	0%	0
NCTAMS WESTPAC	0	0%	0	175,643	2%	3,513
NAVACTS GUAM	46,654	1%	13	11,318,405	247%	3,267

Base	RPMABOS (\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
NAVACTS (STA) GUAM	-10,438,604	-52%	2,483
NAVMAG LUALUALEI	-0	0%	0
NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR	0	0%	0
NCTAMS WESTPAC	175,643	2%	3,513
NAVACTS GUAM	11,365,059	145%	3,281

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	-45	-169	-352	-710	-1,572	-2,175	-5,024	-2,175
BOS Change	696	1,436	1,690	3,613	8,304	3,277	19,017	3,277
Housing Change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CHANGES	652	1,268	1,338	2,903	6,731	1,102	13,994	1,102

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:27 12/16/1994, Report Created 22:38 05/22/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU	Realignment
NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI	Realignment
NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI	Realignment
NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU	Realignment
NAVACTS GUAM, GU	Realignment

Summary:

 Repatriate waterfront assets and retain only such activities as are necessary to support MSC homeporting in Guam.

SCEN MSC_GUAM

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU	NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI	3,807 mi
NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU	NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI	3,805 mi
NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU	NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU	10 mi
NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU	NAVACTS GUAM, GU	5 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU to NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	6	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	19	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU to NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	3	5	17	10	91	0
Enlisted Positions:	38	2	20	25	1,845	0
Civilian Positions:	86	199	174	652	297	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAVACTS (STA) GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	237	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	5,645
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,417	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	14,444
Total Civilian Employees:	2,672	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	17,645
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	743
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,072	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	61755
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI

Total Officer Employees:	13	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	3,776
Total Enlisted Employees:	143	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	2,989
Total Civilian Employees:	123	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,702
Mil Families Living On Base:	78.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	697
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.73
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,210	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	679	Activity Code:	68297
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	554		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	167	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI

Total Officer Employees:	716	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	26,093
Total Enlisted Employees:	7,126	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,489
Total Civilian Employees:	1,419	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	46,427
Mil Families Living On Base:	78.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	3,415
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.68
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	3,270	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	679	Activity Code:	62813
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	554		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	167	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

Total Officer Employees:	58	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	3,194
Total Enlisted Employees:	979	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	7,464
Total Civilian Employees:	99	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,459
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	1,782
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	497	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	70243
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	17	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	3,250
Total Enlisted Employees:	260	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	4,580
Total Civilian Employees:	107	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,872
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	1,002
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	259	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	60872
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	190	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	21,535	21,535	21,535	21,535
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	1,000
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	446					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: NAVMAG LUALUALEI, HI

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR, HI

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Req(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Req(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Req(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: NAVACTS(STA) GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	-16	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	90	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	-76	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	-1	-4	-7	-37	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	-45	-70	-68	-68	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	-23	-179	-187	-16	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	-10	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	6	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	19	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: NCTAMS WESTPAC, GU

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
Medical dental facility	MEDFC	0	9,500	0

Name: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
Other Operations	OPERA	1,000	30,000	0
MWR Rehab				
Administrative Training space	ADMIN	0	10,000	0
Personnel Support PDS, OICC, etc.	ADMIN	0	24,000	0
Administrative Admin spaces	ADMIN	3,000	0	0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	71.70%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	60.10%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	98.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	76,781.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,925.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	0.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	33,178.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,251.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	50,827.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	NAVY O&M,N BRAC95	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	75.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	9.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	5.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	39.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	294.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00%		1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%	

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.31
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	3.38
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.17
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	3,763.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	4,527.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	1,403.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	61	Optional Category A	()	0
Waterfront	(LF)	10,350	Optional Category B	()	0
Air Operations	(SF)	122	Optional Category C	()	0
Operational	(SF)	111	Optional Category D	()	0
Administrative	(SF)	123	Optional Category E	()	0
School Buildings	(SF)	108	Optional Category F	()	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	102	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	96	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	78,750	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	94	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	165	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	120	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	165	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	129	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	160	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	12	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	160	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	168	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
Option Package : Privatize Guam Piers
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\MSC_GUAM.SFF

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

In this scenario, MSC vessels remain forward-deployed at Guam.

By the year 2000, NAVACTS (NAVSTA) are realigned to NAVACTS (M) (NAVMAG).

Some personnel (by activity) earlier slated for elimination under the "Close Guam Piers" scenario, as proposed by DoD, have been added back in to support the MSCs and attendant requirements.

In this scenario, \$21.5 million in recurring costs is included to compensate for the failure of the "Close Guam Piers" scenario to account for the cost of an additional MSC vessel required in the proposed move to Hawaii.

Document Separator

NAVACTS TO NAVACTS(M) MOVE

DOD ELIMINATIONS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTALS
Officers	4	7	24	36	0	0	71
Enlisted	83	40	98	98	0	0	319
Civilians	86	186	353	83	0	0	708
TOTAL	173	233	475	217	0	0	1098
GUAM ELIMINATIONS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTALS
Officers	1	4	7	37	0	0	49
Enlisted	45	45	78	83	0	0	251
Civilians	0	23	179	187	16	0	405
TOTAL	46	72	264	307	16	0	705
DIFFERENCE	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTALS
Officers	3	3	17	-1	0	0	22
Enlisted	38	-5	20	15	0	0	68
Civilians	86	163	174	-104	-16	0	303
TOTAL	127	161	211	-90	-16	0	393
TO NAVMAG (COBRA)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTALS
Officers	0	2	11	91	0	0	104
Enlisted	0	7	10	1845	0	0	1862
Civilians	36	0	756	313	0	0	1105
TOTAL	36	9	777	2249	0	0	3071
TO NAVMAG (ADJUSTED) *	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTALS
Officers	0	2	0	11	91	0	104
Enlisted	0	7	0	10	1845	0	1862
Civilians	0	36	0	756	313	0	1105
TOTAL	0	45	0	777	2249	0	3071
TO NAVMAG (GUAM)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTALS
Officers	3	5	17	10	91	0	126
Enlisted	38	2	20	25	1845	0	1930
Civilians	86	199	174	652	297	0	1408
TOTAL	127	206	211	687	2233	0	3464
* Note: Moved 36 civilians in 1997 instead of 1996; all 1998 and 1999 moves have been delayed by 1 year.							

NavActs Cuts							
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
NAVACTS							0
Off		2	3	0			5
Enl			6	47			53
Civ			17	54			71
BAND							0
Off							0
Enl			18				18
Civ							0
COMNAVMAR							0
Off				9			9
Enl				16			16
Civ			4	4			8
DECA							0
Off							0
Enl							0
Civ				19			19
PWC							0
Off				3			3
Enl							0
Civ			150	100			250
OICC							0
Off		1	1	4			6
Enl							0
Civ				10	16		26
SECURITY							0
Off							0
Enl		20	4				24
Civ							0
NCISRA							0
Off							0
Enl							0
Civ			8				8
NAVY LEGAL SERVICES							0
Off				5			5
Enl				6			6
Civ							0
FSC							0
Off				1			1
Enl				3			3
Civ							0
DENTAL							0
Off				8			8
Enl				8			8
Civ							0
FLT IMAG							0
Off				1			1
Enl				3			3
Civ							0
ARMY VET							0
Off			1				1

Enl			7					7
Civ								0
INFO PROCESS								0
Off		1						1
Enl		25						25
Civ		23						23
USS HOLLAND								0
Off	1							1
Enl	45							45
Civ								0
PSD								0
Off			2					2
Enl			26					26
Civ								0
FISC								0
Off					6			6
Enl			17					17
Civ								0
TOTAL								705
	46	72	264	307	16	0		
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL	
Off	1	4	7	37	0	0		49
Enl	45	45	78	83	0	0		251
Civ	0	23	179	187	16	0		405

Document Separator

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1998
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015(\$K): -92,946
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 6,655

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	-16,180	-1,400	-1,100	0	0	-18,680	0
Person	0	-1,874	-10,429	-18,128	-18,128	-18,128	-66,688	-18,128
Overhd	599	705	-3,361	12,968	12,968	12,968	36,845	12,968
Moving	0	549	2,162	0	0	0	2,711	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	118	473	0	0	0	591	0
TOTAL	599	-16,682	-12,555	-6,261	-5,161	-5,161	-45,220	-5,161

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	6	7	0	0	0	13
Enl	0	25	20	0	0	0	45
Civ	0	60	249	0	0	0	309
TOT	0	91	276	0	0	0	367

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	4	4	0	0	0	8
Enl	0	34	5	0	0	0	39
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	86	0	0	0	0	86
TCT	0	124	9	0	0	0	133

Summary:

AFS Loadout/Resupply and DGAR Support RSS remains in Guam under contract
 HHG/POV, HAZMAT Minimization, Freight Dlvty and warehousing commissary
 and Navy Exchange Stores to NAVACTS Guam
 Tripler Army Vets to Base X (Anderson AFB), and are so reflected under this
 scenario. Could remain at present FISC site upon agreement w/contractor.

SCEN MSC_GUAM

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars								
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	296	839	68	68	68	1,340	68
Overhd	599	1,505	1,580	18,959	18,959	18,959	60,561	18,959
Moving	0	549	2,162	0	0	0	2,711	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	118	473	0	0	0	591	0
TOTAL	599	2,468	5,054	19,028	19,028	19,028	65,203	19,028

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars								
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
MilCon	0	16,180	1,400	1,100	0	0	18,680	0
Person	0	2,170	11,268	18,197	18,197	18,197	68,028	18,197
Overhd	0	800	4,941	5,992	5,992	5,992	23,715	5,992
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	19,149	17,609	25,288	24,188	24,188	110,423	24,188

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Year	Cost (\$)	Adjusted Cost (\$)	NPV (\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	598,636	590,570	590,570
1997	-16,681,953	-16,016,741	-15,426,170
1998	-12,554,751	-11,731,499	-27,157,670
1999	-6,260,726	-5,693,618	-32,851,288
2000	-5,160,726	-4,567,648	-37,418,935
2001	-5,160,726	-4,445,399	-41,864,334
2002	-5,160,726	-4,326,422	-46,190,757
2003	-5,160,726	-4,210,630	-50,401,387
2004	-5,160,726	-4,097,937	-54,499,324
2005	-5,160,726	-3,988,260	-58,487,584
2006	-5,160,726	-3,881,518	-62,369,102
2007	-5,160,726	-3,777,633	-66,146,735
2008	-5,160,726	-3,676,529	-69,823,264
2009	-5,160,726	-3,578,130	-73,401,394
2010	-5,160,726	-3,482,365	-76,883,759
2011	-5,160,726	-3,389,163	-80,272,922
2012	-5,160,726	-3,298,455	-83,571,377
2013	-5,160,726	-3,210,176	-86,781,553
2014	-5,160,726	-3,124,258	-89,905,811
2015	-5,160,726	-3,040,641	-92,946,452

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	634,321	
Civilian Early Retirement	141,807	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	121,986	
Unemployment	100,224	
Total - Personnel		998,338
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	1,384,345	
Mothball / Shutdown	970,000	
Total - Overhead		2,354,345
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	2,678,400	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	33,065	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		2,711,465
Other		
HAP / RSE	590,845	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		590,845

Total One-Time Costs		6,654,993

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	18,680,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		18,680,000

Total Net One-Time Costs		-12,025,007

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	634,321	
Civilian Early Retirement	141,807	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	121,986	
Unemployment	100,224	
Total - Personnel		998,338
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	1,384,345	
Mothball / Shutdown	970,000	
Total - Overhead		2,354,345
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	2,678,400	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	33,065	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		2,711,465
Other		
HAP / RSE	590,845	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		590,845

Total One-Time Costs		6,654,993

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	18,680,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		18,680,000

Total Net One-Time Costs		-12,025,007

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----		-----
Total One-Time Costs		0
-----		-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		-----
Total One-Time Savings		0
-----		-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----		-----
Total One-Time Costs		0
-----		-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		-----
Total One-Time Savings		0
-----		-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SPF

Base: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		0

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
FISC GUAM	0	0	0	-18,680	-18,680
FISC PEARL HARBOR	0	0	0	0	0
NAVACTS GUAM	0	0	0	0	0
ANDERSON AFB GUAM	0	0	0	0	0
Totals:	0	0	0	-18,680	-18,680

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

MilCon for Base: FISC GUAM, GU

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total Construction Cost:						0
+ Info Management Account:						0
+ Land Purchases:						0
- Construction Cost Avoid:						18,680

TOTAL:						-18,680

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FISC GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 21	----- 84	----- 0	----- 518

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	-123	0	0	0	0	0	-123
TOTAL	-123	0	0	0	0	0	-123

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 21	----- 84	----- 0	----- 395

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	1	4	0	0	0	5
Enlisted	0	18	5	0	0	0	23
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	86	0	0	0	0	86
TOTAL	0	105	9	0	0	0	114

To Base: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Enlisted	0	16	0	0	0	0	16
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	19	0	0	0	0	19

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of FISC GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	4	4	0	0	0	8
Enlisted	0	34	5	0	0	0	39
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	86	0	0	0	0	86
TOTAL	0	124	9	0	0	0	133

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	-6	-7	0	0	0	-13
Enlisted	0	-25	-20	0	0	0	-45
Civilians	0	-60	-249	0	0	0	-309
TOTAL	0	-91	-276	0	0	0	-367

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 0	----- 0	----- 0	----- 0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
20	42	0	426

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
20	42	0	426

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
17	260	0	107

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: FISC GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	1	4	0	0	0	5
Enlisted	0	18	5	0	0	0	23
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	86	0	0	0	0	86
TOTAL	0	105	9	0	0	0	114

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into NAVACTS GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	1	4	0	0	0	5
Enlisted	0	18	5	0	0	0	23
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	86	0	0	0	0	86
TOTAL	0	105	9	0	0	0	114

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
22	283	0	193

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
0	0	0	0

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: FISC GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Enlisted	0	16	0	0	0	0	16
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	19	0	0	0	0	19

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Enlisted	0	16	0	0	0	0	16
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	19	0	0	0	0	19

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
3	16	0	0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	60	249	0	0	0	309
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	6	25	0	0	0	31
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	3	12	0	0	0	15
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	9	37	0	0	0	46
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	4	15	0	0	0	19
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	36	149	0	0	0	185
Civilians Available to Move		0	2	11	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	2	11	0	0	0	13
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
Civilians Moving		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	6	25	0	0	0	31
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	6	26	0	0	0	32
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	36	149	0	0	0	185
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	60	249	0	0	0	309
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	6	25	0	0	0	31
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	3	12	0	0	0	15
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	9	37	0	0	0	46
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	4	15	0	0	0	19
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	36	149	0	0	0	185
Civilians Available to Move		0	2	11	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	2	11	0	0	0	13
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	6	25	0	0	0	31
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	6	26	0	0	0	32
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	36	149	0	0	0	185
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SPF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
Civilians Moving		0	86	0	0	0	0	86
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	0.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	0.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	66.67%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1997	0	0.00%	33.33%	215	43.00%	43.00%
1998	0	0.00%	0.00%	285	57.00%	57.00%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	500	100.00%	100.00%

Base: FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	92.11%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	105	92.11%	7.89%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	9	7.89%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	114	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

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 Less moving in
 OK.

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	19	100.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	19	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

OK

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/15
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Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	119	515	0	0	0	634
Civ Retire	0	27	114	0	0	0	142
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	518	2,160	0	0	0	2,678
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	31	2	0	0	0	33
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	19	81	0	0	0	100
OTHER							
Program Plan	599	449	337	0	0	0	1,384
Shutdown	0	417	553	0	0	0	970
New Hire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	62	60	0	0	0	122
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	118	473	0	0	0	591
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	599	1,761	4,296	0	0	0	6,655

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	638	690	690	690	690	3,399	690
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	68	68	68	68	68	342	68
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	18,269	18,269	18,269	54,807	18,269
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	707	759	19,028	19,028	19,028	58,548	19,028
TOTAL COST	599	2,468	5,054	19,028	19,028	19,028	65,203	19,028
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	16,180	1,400	1,100	0	0	18,680	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	16,180	1,400	1,100	0	0	18,680	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	375	1,281	1,860	1,860	1,860	7,236	1,860
BOS	0	425	3,659	4,132	4,132	4,132	16,479	4,132
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	1,525	9,377	15,705	15,705	15,705	58,019	15,705
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	230	729	998	998	998	3,954	998
Enl Salary	0	415	1,161	1,493	1,493	1,493	6,055	1,493
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	2,969	16,209	24,188	24,188	24,188	91,743	24,188
TOTAL SAVINGS	0	19,149	17,609	25,288	24,188	24,188	110,423	24,188

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
----- (\$K) -----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	-16,180	-1,400	-1,100	0	0	-18,680	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	146	630	0	0	0	776	
Civ Moving	0	549	2,162	0	0	0	2,711	
Other	599	885	971	0	0	0	2,454	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	62	60	0	0	0	122	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	118	473	0	0	0	591	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	599	-14,419	2,896	-1,100	0	0	-12,025	
RECURRING NET								
----- (\$K) -----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	-375	-1,281	-1,860	-1,860	-1,860	-7,236	-1,860
BOS	0	214	-2,969	-3,441	-3,441	-3,441	-13,080	-3,441
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-1,525	-9,377	-15,705	-15,705	-15,705	-58,019	-15,705
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	-645	-1,891	-2,491	-2,491	-2,491	-10,009	-2,491
House Allow	0	68	68	68	68	68	342	68
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	18,269	18,269	18,269	54,807	18,269
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	-2,263	-15,450	-5,161	-5,161	-5,161	-33,195	-5,161
TOTAL NET COST	599	-16,682	-12,555	-6,261	-5,161	-5,161	-45,220	-5,161

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 4/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	119	515	0	0	0	634
Civ Retire	0	27	114	0	0	0	142
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	518	2,160	0	0	0	2,678
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	31	2	0	0	0	33
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	19	81	0	0	0	100
OTHER							
Program Plan	599	449	337	0	0	0	1,384
Shutdown	0	417	553	0	0	0	970
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PCV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	62	60	0	0	0	122
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	118	473	0	0	0	591
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	599	1,761	4,296	0	0	0	6,655

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 5/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC GUAM, GU

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	18,269	18,269	18,269	54,807	18,269
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	18,269	18,269	18,269	54,807	18,269
 TOTAL COSTS	 599	 1,761	 4,296	 18,269	 18,269	 18,269	 61,462	 18,269
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	16,180	1,400	1,100	0	0	18,680	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	16,180	1,400	1,100	0	0	18,680	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	375	1,281	1,860	1,860	1,860	7,236	1,860
BOS	0	425	3,659	4,132	4,132	4,132	16,479	4,132
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	1,525	9,377	15,705	15,705	15,705	58,019	15,705
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	230	729	998	998	998	3,954	998
Enl Salary	0	415	1,161	1,493	1,493	1,493	6,055	1,493
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	2,969	16,209	24,188	24,188	24,188	91,743	24,188
 TOTAL SAVINGS	 0	 19,149	 17,609	 25,288	 24,188	 24,188	 110,423	 24,188

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 6/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: FISC GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	-16,180	-1,400	-1,100	0	0	-18,680	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	146	630	0	0	0	776	
Civ Moving	0	549	2,162	0	0	0	2,711	
Other	599	885	971	0	0	0	2,454	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	62	60	0	0	0	122	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	118	473	0	0	0	591	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	599	-14,419	2,896	-1,100	0	0	-12,025	
RECURRING NET								
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	-375	-1,281	-1,860	-1,860	-1,860	-7,236	-1,860
BOS	0	-425	-3,659	-4,132	-4,132	-4,132	-16,479	-4,132
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-1,525	-9,377	-15,705	-15,705	-15,705	-58,019	-15,705
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	-645	-1,891	-2,491	-2,491	-2,491	-10,009	-2,491
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	18,269	18,269	18,269	54,807	18,269
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	-2,969	-16,209	-5,919	-5,919	-5,919	-36,936	-5,919
TOTAL NET COST	599	-17,389	-13,313	-7,019	-5,919	-5,919	-48,962	-5,919

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 7/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SPF

Base: FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 10/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
----- (\$K) -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 12/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RECURRING NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS								
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	638	690	690	690	690	3,399	690
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	638	690	690	690	690	3,399	690
TOTAL NET COST	0	638	690	690	690	690	3,399	690

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 13/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 15/15
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RECURRING NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	68	68	68	68	68	342	68
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	68	68	68	68	68	342	68
TOTAL NET COST	0	68	68	68	68	68	342	68

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FISC GUAM	-500	-100%	-776,000	-100%	1,552
FISC PEARL HARBOR	0	0%	0	0%	0
NAVACTS GUAM	114	30%	0	0%	0
ANDERSON AFB GUAM	19	0%	0	0%	0

Base	RPMA(\$)			BOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FISC GUAM	-1,860,000	-100%	3,720	-4,131,621	-100%	8,263
FISC PEARL HARBOR	0	0%	0	0	0%	0
NAVACTS GUAM	0	0%	0	690,241	15%	6,055
ANDERSON AFB GUAM	0	0%	0	0	0%	0

Base	RPMABOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
-----	-----	-----	-----
FISC GUAM	-5,991,621	-107%	11,983
FISC PEARL HARBOR	0	0%	0
NAVACTS GUAM	690,241	9%	6,055
ANDERSON AFB GUAM	0	0%	0

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	-375	-1,281	-1,860	-1,860	-1,860	-7,236	-1,860
BOS Change	0	214	-2,969	-3,441	-3,441	-3,441	-13,080	-3,441
Housing Change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CHANGES	0	-161	-4,250	-5,301	-5,301	-5,301	-20,316	-5,301

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 14:24 11/21/1994, Report Created 16:23 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
FISC GUAM, GU	Closes in FY 1998
FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI	Realignment
NAVACTS GUAM, GU	Realignment
ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU	Realignment

Summary:

 AFS Loadout/Resupply and DGAR Support RSS remains in Guam under contract
 HHG/POV, HAZMAT Minimization, Freight Dlvty and warehousing commissary
 and Navy Exchange Stores to NAVACTS Guam
 Tripler Army Vets to Base X (Anderson AFB), and are so reflected under this
 scenario. Could remain at present FISC site upon agreement w/contractor.

SCEN MSC_GUAM

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
FISC GUAM, GU	FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI	3,807 mi
FISC GUAM, GU	NAVACTS GUAM, GU	5 mi
FISC GUAM, GU	ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU	20 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from FISC GUAM, GU to NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	1	4	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	18	5	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	86	0	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from FISC GUAM, GU to ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	3	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	16	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FISC GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	21	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,860
Total Enlisted Employees:	84	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	5,148
Total Civilian Employees:	518	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	2,311
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	742
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	776	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	61119
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: FISC PEARL HARBOR, HI

Total Officer Employees:	20	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,252
Total Enlisted Employees:	42	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	2,730
Total Civilian Employees:	426	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,097
Mil Families Living On Base:	78.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	139
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.80
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	2,910	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	679	Activity Code:	00604
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	554		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	167	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	17	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	3,250
Total Enlisted Employees:	260	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	4,580
Total Civilian Employees:	107	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,872
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	1,002
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	259	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	60872
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	0	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Total Enlisted Employees:	0	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Total Civilian Employees:	0	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	0.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	0
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	0.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.00
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	0	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	LOCLGU
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	0	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.00	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: ANDERSON AFB GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Req'd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: FISC GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	-123	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	-6	-7	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	-25	-20	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	-60	-249	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	71.70%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	60.10%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	98.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	76,781.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,925.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	0.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	33,178.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,251.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	50,827.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	NAVY O&M,N BRAC95	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize FISC Guam
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\FSC_GUAM.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index: 0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost: 75.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population): 0.54	Info Management Account: 0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)	MilCon Design Rate: 9.00%
Program Management Factor: 10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate: 6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care): 162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate: 5.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF): 1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate: 39.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF): 294.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF): 1.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 0.00%
APPEDET.RPT Inflation Rates:	
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00%	1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb): 710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton): 284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb): 14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile): 0.31
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb): 9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile): 3.38
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb): 6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile): 0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb): 18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years): 4.17
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb): 35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour): 3,763.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile): 0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$): 4,527.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ): 700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$): 1,403.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	61	Optional Category A	()	0
Waterfront	(LF)	10,350	Optional Category B	()	0
Air Operations	(SF)	122	Optional Category C	()	0
Operational	(SF)	111	Optional Category D	()	0
Administrative	(SF)	123	Optional Category E	()	0
School Buildings	(SF)	108	Optional Category F	()	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	102	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	96	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	78,750	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	94	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	165	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	120	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	165	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	129	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	160	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	12	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	160	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	168	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

Disestablish FISC and privatize MSC-attendant activities.

Under this scenario, the closure date is moved back one year. Additionally, five officer and ten enlisted positions are transferred to NAVACTS GUAM to oversee contract administration and support.

Document Separator

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1999
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015(\$K): -271,884
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 9,227

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	-7,773	0	-7,773	0
Person	0	-870	-5,880	-21,619	-35,438	-35,438	-99,244	-35,438
Overhd	398	207	-433	-2,796	14,663	14,663	26,703	14,663
Moving	0	527	1,296	3,888	0	0	5,711	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	398	-136	-5,017	-20,527	-28,547	-20,774	-74,603	-20,774

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	1	1	5	0	0	7
Enl	0	15	0	0	0	0	15
Civ	0	29	150	450	0	0	629
TOT	0	45	151	455	0	0	651

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Enl	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	31	0	0	0	0	31
TOT	0	35	0	0	0	0	35

Summary:

Close SRF Guam; retain AFDM-8 in coordination with privatized SRF Guam; CPF Rep assigned in Guam.
 Fifty percent of COBRA's RPMA and BOS costs, civilian and military salaries, and mission and miscellaneous (saves in the moves in the closure) are retained as miscellaneous recurring costs for MSC and other CINCPACFLT-assigned work.

SCENARIO MSC_GUAM

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	211	421	1,320	0	0	1,952	0
Overhd	398	359	314	493	18,342	18,342	38,248	18,342
Moving	0	527	1,296	3,888	0	0	5,711	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	398	1,097	2,031	5,702	18,342	18,342	45,911	18,342

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	7,773	0	7,773	0
Person	0	1,080	6,301	22,939	35,438	35,438	101,196	35,438
Overhd	0	152	746	3,289	3,679	3,679	11,545	3,679
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	1,232	7,047	26,229	46,889	39,116	120,514	39,116

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Year	Cost (\$)	Adjusted Cost (\$)	NPV (\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	398,248	392,883	392,883
1997	-135,838	-130,421	262,461
1998	-5,016,911	-4,687,937	-4,425,476
1999	-20,527,142	-18,667,755	-23,093,231
2000	-28,547,317	-25,266,615	-48,359,846
2001	-20,774,317	-17,894,794	-66,254,640
2002	-20,774,317	-17,415,858	-83,670,497
2003	-20,774,317	-16,949,740	-100,620,237
2004	-20,774,317	-16,496,097	-117,116,334
2005	-20,774,317	-16,054,596	-133,170,930
2006	-20,774,317	-15,624,911	-148,795,841
2007	-20,774,317	-15,206,726	-164,002,567
2008	-20,774,317	-14,799,733	-178,802,300
2009	-20,774,317	-14,403,633	-193,205,933
2010	-20,774,317	-14,018,134	-207,224,067
2011	-20,774,317	-13,642,953	-220,867,021
2012	-20,774,317	-13,277,813	-234,144,834
2013	-20,774,317	-12,922,446	-247,067,280
2014	-20,774,317	-12,576,590	-259,643,870
2015	-20,774,317	-12,239,990	-271,883,860

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	1,365,162	
Civilian Early Retirement	324,882	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	61,470	
Unemployment	200,448	
Total - Personnel		1,951,963
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	1,046,678	
Mothball / Shutdown	517,500	
Total - Overhead		1,564,178
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	5,702,400	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	8,698	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		5,711,098
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		9,227,239

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	7,773,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		7,773,000

Total Net One-Time Costs		1,454,239

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	1,322,501	
Civilian Early Retirement	310,115	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	52,734	
Unemployment	194,184	
Total - Personnel		1,879,534
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	971,508	
Mothball / Shutdown	517,500	
Total - Overhead		1,489,008
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	5,443,200	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	8,698	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		5,451,898
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----		-----
Total One-Time Costs		8,820,441
-----		-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	7,773,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		-----
Total One-Time Savings		7,773,000
-----		-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		1,047,441

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SPF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	42,661	
Civilian Early Retirement	14,767	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	8,736	
Unemployment	6,264	
Total - Personnel		72,429
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	75,169	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		75,169
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	259,200	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		259,200
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----		-----
Total One-Time Costs		406,798
-----		-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		-----
Total One-Time Savings		0
-----		-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		406,798

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		0

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
Option Package : Privatize SRF
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM	0	0	0	-7,773	-7,773
NAVACTS GUAM	0	0	0	0	0
Local CPF Rep-GUAM	0	0	0	0	0
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Totals:	0	0	0	-7,773	-7,773

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SPF

MilCon for Base: NAVSHIPREFFAC GUAM, GU

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total Construction Cost:						0
+ Info Management Account:						0
+ Land Purchases:						0
- Construction Cost Avoid:						7,773

TOTAL:						-7,773

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
8	48	0	714

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	-30	0	0	0	0	0	-30
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	-54	0	0	0	0	0	-54
TOTAL	-84	0	0	0	0	0	-84

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
8	18	0	660

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Enlisted	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	30	0	0	0	0	30
TOTAL	0	34	0	0	0	0	34

To Base: Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	1

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Enlisted	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	31	0	0	0	0	31
TOTAL	0	35	0	0	0	0	35

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	-1	-1	-5	0	0	-7
Enlisted	0	-15	0	0	0	0	-15
Civilians	0	-29	-150	-450	0	0	-629
TOTAL	0	-45	-151	-455	0	0	-651

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
0	0	0	0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
190	2,099	0	251

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Enlisted	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	30	0	0	0	0	30
TOTAL	0	34	0	0	0	0	34

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into NAVACTS GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Enlisted	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	30	0	0	0	0	30
TOTAL	0	34	0	0	0	0	34

POSITIONS ELIMINATED (No Salary Savings):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1
Enlisted	0	-3	0	0	0	0	-3
Civilians	0	-30	0	0	0	0	-30
TOTAL	0	-34	0	0	0	0	-34

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
190	2,099	0	251

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
0	0	0	0

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	1

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	1

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
Option Package : Privatize SRF
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 0	----- 0	----- 0	----- 1

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SPF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	31	0	0	0	0	31
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	31	0	0	0	0	31
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	59	150	450	0	0	659
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	6	15	45	0	0	66
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	3	8	23	0	0	34
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	9	23	68	0	0	100
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	4	9	27	0	0	40
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	35	90	270	0	0	395
Civilians Available to Move		0	2	5	17	0	0	24
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	2	5	17	0	0	24
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	31	0	0	0	0	31
Civilians Moving		0	31	0	0	0	0	31
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	6	15	45	0	0	66
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	6	14	44	0	0	64
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	35	90	270	0	0	395
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVSHIPREFPAC GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	31	0	0	0	0	31
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	31	0	0	0	0	31
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	29	150	450	0	0	629
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	3	15	45	0	0	63
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	1	8	23	0	0	32
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	4	23	68	0	0	95
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	2	9	27	0	0	38
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	17	90	270	0	0	377
Civilians Available to Move		0	2	5	17	0	0	24
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	2	5	17	0	0	24
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	3	15	45	0	0	63
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	4	14	44	0	0	62
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	17	90	270	0	0	377
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	30	0	0	0	0	30
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	18	0	0	0	0	18
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	30	0	0	0	0	30
Civilians Moving		0	30	0	0	0	0	30
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	3	0	0	0	0	3
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	2	0	0	0	0	2
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	18	0	0	0	0	18
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Civilians Moving		0	1	0	0	0	0	1
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

PERSONNEL YEARLY PERCENTAGES (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	50.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1997	0	0.00%	25.00%	80	11.66%	11.66%
1998	0	0.00%	25.00%	151	22.01%	22.01%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	455	66.33%	66.33%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	686	100.00%	100.00%

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1997	34	100.00%	0.00%	34	100.00%	100.00%
1998	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	34	100.00%	100.00%	34	100.00%	100.00%

Base: Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	1	100.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	1	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	128	299	938	0	0	1,365
Civ Retire	0	29	74	221	0	0	325
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	518	1,296	3,888	0	0	5,702
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	19	44	138	0	0	200
OTHER							
Program Plan	398	299	200	150	0	0	1,047
Shutdown	0	60	114	343	0	0	517
New Hire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	34	4	23	0	0	61
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	398	1,097	2,031	5,702	0	0	9,227

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	18,342	18,342	36,684	18,342
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	18,342	18,342	36,684	18,342
 TOTAL COST	 398	 1,097	 2,031	 5,702	 18,342	 18,342	 45,911	 18,342
 ONE-TIME SAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	7,773	0	7,773	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	7,773	0	7,773	
 RECURRINGSAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	 Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	59	231	697	1,087	1,087	3,162	1,087
BOS	0	93	515	2,592	2,592	2,592	8,383	2,592
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	793	5,688	22,096	34,402	34,402	97,383	34,402
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	38	115	345	537	537	1,574	537
Enl Salary	0	249	498	498	498	498	2,239	498
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	1,232	7,047	26,229	39,116	39,116	112,741	39,116
 TOTAL SAVINGS	 0	 1,232	 7,047	 26,229	 46,889	 39,116	 120,514	 39,116

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	-7,773	0	-7,773	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	157	372	1,160	0	0	1,690	
Civ Moving	0	527	1,296	3,888	0	0	5,711	
Other	398	378	358	631	0	0	1,765	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	34	4	23	0	0	61	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	398	1,097	2,031	5,702	-7,773	0	1,454	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	-59	-231	-697	-1,087	-1,087	-3,162	-1,087
BOS	0	-93	-515	-2,592	-2,592	-2,592	-8,383	-2,592
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-793	-5,688	-22,096	-34,402	-34,402	-97,383	-34,402
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	-287	-613	-843	-1,035	-1,035	-3,813	-1,035
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	18,342	18,342	36,684	18,342
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	-1,232	-7,047	-26,229	-20,774	-20,774	-76,057	-20,774
TOTAL NET COST	398	-136	-5,017	-20,527	-28,547	-20,774	-74,603	-20,774

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 4/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	85	299	938	0	0	1,322
Civ Retire	0	15	74	221	0	0	310
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	259	1,296	3,888	0	0	5,443
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	12	44	138	0	0	194
OTHER							
Program Plan	355	266	200	150	0	0	971
Shutdown	0	60	114	343	0	0	517
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PCV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	25	4	23	0	0	53
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	355	733	2,031	5,702	0	0	8,820

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 5/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	18,342	18,342	36,684	18,342
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	18,342	18,342	36,684	18,342
 TOTAL COSTS	 355	 733	 2,031	 5,702	 18,342	 18,342	 45,504	 18,342
 ONE-TIME SAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	7,773	0	7,773	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	7,773	0	7,773	
 RECURRINGSAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	 Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	59	231	697	1,087	1,087	3,162	1,087
BOS	0	93	515	2,592	2,592	2,592	8,383	2,592
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	793	5,688	22,096	34,402	34,402	97,383	34,402
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	38	115	345	537	537	1,574	537
Enl Salary	0	249	498	498	498	498	2,239	498
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	1,232	7,047	26,229	39,116	39,116	112,741	39,116
 TOTAL SAVINGS	 0	 1,232	 7,047	 26,229	 46,889	 39,116	 120,514	 39,116

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 6/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU								
ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	-7,773	0	-7,773	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	100	372	1,160	0	0	1,633	
Civ Moving	0	268	1,296	3,888	0	0	5,452	
Other	355	339	358	631	0	0	1,683	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	25	4	23	0	0	53	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	355	733	2,031	5,702	-7,773	0	1,047	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	-59	-231	-697	-1,087	-1,087	-3,162	-1,087
BOS	0	-93	-515	-2,592	-2,592	-2,592	-8,383	-2,592
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-793	-5,688	-22,096	-34,402	-34,402	-97,383	-34,402
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	-287	-613	-843	-1,035	-1,035	-3,813	-1,035
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	18,342	18,342	36,684	18,342
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	-1,232	-7,047	-26,229	-20,774	-20,774	-76,057	-20,774
TOTAL NET COST	355	-500	-5,017	-20,527	-28,547	-20,774	-75,010	-20,774

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 7/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	43	0	0	0	0	43
Civ Retire	0	15	0	0	0	0	15
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	259	0	0	0	0	259
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
OTHER							
Program Plan	43	32	0	0	0	0	75
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	43	364	0	0	0	0	407

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 9/12
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	57	0	0	0	0	57	
Civ Moving	0	259	0	0	0	0	259	
Other	43	38	0	0	0	0	81	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	9	0	0	0	0	9	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	43	364	0	0	0	0	407	
RECURRING NET								
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL NET COST	43	364	0	0	0	0	407	0

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM	-686	-100%	-414,000	-100%	603
NAVACTS GUAM	0	0%	0	0%	0
Local CPF Rep-GUAM	1	0%	0	0%	0

Base	RPMA (\$)			BOS (\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM	-1,087,000	-100%	1,584	-2,591,654	-100%	3,778
NAVACTS GUAM	0	0%	0	0	0%	0
Local CPF Rep-GUAM	0	0%	0	0	0%	0

Base	RPMABOS (\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM	-3,678,654	-103%	5,362
NAVACTS GUAM	0	0%	0
Local CPF Rep-GUAM	0	0%	0

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	-59	-231	-697	-1,087	-1,087	-3,162	-1,087
BOS Change	0	-93	-515	-2,592	-2,592	-2,592	-8,383	-2,592
Housing Change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CHANGES	0	-152	-746	-3,289	-3,679	-3,679	-11,545	-3,679

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:47 11/18/1994, Report Created 13:56 05/20/1995

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU	Closes in FY 1999
NAVACTS GUAM, GU	Realignment
Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU	Realignment

Summary:

 Close SRF Guam; retain AFDM-8 in coordination with privatized SRF Guam; CPF Rep assigned in Guam.
 Fifty percent of COBRA's RPMA and BOS costs, civilian and military salaries, and mission and miscellaneous (saves in the moves in the closure) are retained as miscellaneous recurring costs for MSC and other CINCPACFLT-assigned work.

SCENARIO MSC_GUAM

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU	NAVACTS GUAM, GU	1 mi
NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU	Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU	1 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU to NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	1	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	3	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	30	0	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU to Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	1	0	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAVSHIPPREPFAC GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	8	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,087
Total Enlisted Employees:	48	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	2,909
Total Civilian Employees:	714	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	1,079
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	965
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	414	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	62586
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	190	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	5,645
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,099	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	14,444
Total Civilian Employees:	251	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	17,645
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	743
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,072	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	61755
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: Local CPF Rep-GUAM, GU

Total Officer Employees:	0	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Total Enlisted Employees:	0	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Total Civilian Employees:	0	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	0.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	0
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	LOCLGU
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: NAVSHIPREPFAC GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	-30	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	-54	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	-1	-1	-5	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	-15	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	-29	-150	-450	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: NAVACTS GUAM, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	-1	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	-3	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	-30	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	71.70%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	60.10%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	98.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	76,781.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,925.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	0.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	33,178.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,251.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	54,694.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc: NAVY DBOF BRAC95		RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

Department : Team Guam/U.S. Navy
 Option Package : Privatize SRF
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SRF_GUAM.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index: 0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost: 75.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population): 0.54	Info Management Account: 0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)	MilCon Design Rate: 9.00%
Program Management Factor: 10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate: 6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care): 162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate: 5.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF): 1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate: 39.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF): 294.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF): 1.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:	
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00%	1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb): 710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton): 284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb): 14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile): 0.31
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb): 9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile): 3.38
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb): 6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile): 0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb): 18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years): 4.17
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb): 35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour): 3,763.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile): 0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$): 4,527.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ): 700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$): 1,403.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	61	Optional Category A	()	0
Waterfront	(LF)	10,350	Optional Category B	()	0
Air Operations	(SF)	122	Optional Category C	()	0
Operational	(SF)	111	Optional Category D	()	0
Administrative	(SF)	123	Optional Category E	()	0
School Buildings	(SF)	108	Optional Category F	()	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	102	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	96	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	78,750	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	94	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	165	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	120	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	165	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyards Maintenance	(SF)	129	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	160	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	12	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	160	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	168	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

Includes changes to Force Structure base loading.

Document Separator

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1996
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015(\$K): -464,688
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 8,041

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	-172,472	1,212	-3,238	1,212	1,212	0	-172,075	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	-19,200	-19,200	-19,129	-19,111	-19,093	-19,093	-114,826	-19,093
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	116	0	0	0	0	0	116	0
TOTAL	-191,556	-17,988	-22,367	-17,899	-17,881	-19,093	-286,786	-19,093
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
POSITIONS REALIGNED								
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Summary:

 Guam aviation units except HC-5 are moved off-island.

VQ-1 and VQ-5.

This scenario represents the costs/benefits of keeping HC-5 in Guam as opposed to moving the squadron to MCB-Hawaii. One-time costs of moving VQ-1 and VQ-5 are not included, since expenditures for movement have already been incurred. MILCON costs and savings for all squadrons are included.

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	3,078	1,212	1,212	1,212	1,212	0	7,925	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	0	0	71	89	107	107	373	107
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	116	0	0	0	0	0	116	0
TOTAL	3,194	1,212	1,283	1,301	1,318	107	8,414	107

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	175,550	0	4,450	0	0	0	180,000	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	115,200	19,200
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	194,750	19,200	23,650	19,200	19,200	19,200	295,200	19,200

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
Anderson AFB	0	0%	0	0%	0
MCB HAWAII	0	0%	0	0%	0
NAS NORTH ISLAND	0	0%	3,550	0%	0
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND	0	0%	42,037	2%	0

Base	RPMA (\$)			BOS (\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
Anderson AFB	0	0%	0	0	0%	0
MCB HAWAII	0	0%	0	0	0%	0
NAS NORTH ISLAND	6,625	0%	0	0	0%	0
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND	100,057	1%	0	0	0%	0

Base	RPMABOS (\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
Anderson AFB	0	0%	0
MCB HAWAII	0	0%	0
NAS NORTH ISLAND	6,625	0%	0
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND	100,057	0%	0

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
Anderson AFB, GU	Realignment
MCB HAWAII, HI	Realignment
NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA	Realignment
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA	Realignment

Summary:

 Guam aviation units except HC-5 are moved off-island.

VQ-1 and VQ-5.

This scenario represents the costs/benefits of keeping HC-5 in Guam as opposed to moving the squadron to MCB-Hawaii. One-time costs of moving VQ-1 and VQ-5 are not included, since expenditures for movement have already been incurred. MILCON costs and savings for all squadrons are included.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
Anderson AFB, GU	MCB HAWAII, HI	3,806 mi
Anderson AFB, GU	NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA	6,182 mi
Anderson AFB, GU	NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA	5,900 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: Anderson AFB, GU

Total Officer Employees:	219	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Total Enlisted Employees:	994	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Total Civilian Employees:	0	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	86.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	0
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	2.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	0	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	AFGUAM
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	230	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Navy
Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: MCB HAWAII, HI

Total Officer Employees:	665	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,516
Total Enlisted Employees:	6,789	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	17,082
Total Civilian Employees:	545	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	37,048
Mil Families Living On Base:	63.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	18
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.72
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities (KSF):	3,838	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	679	Activity Code:	00318
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	554		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	167	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

Total Officer Employees:	1,798	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	12,550
Total Enlisted Employees:	15,828	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	506	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,895
Total Civilian Employees:	1,492	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	49,017
Mil Families Living On Base:	19.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	500
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.16
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities (KSF):	6,254	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	353	Activity Code:	00246
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	224		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	116	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

Total Officer Employees:	992	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	7,170
Total Enlisted Employees:	6,605	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	333	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	14,150
Total Civilian Employees:	235	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	34,527
Mil Families Living On Base:	38.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	489
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.10
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities (KSF):	2,800	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	201	Activity Code:	00620
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	171		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	75	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: MCB HAWAII, HI

Total Officer Employees:	665	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,516
Total Enlisted Employees:	6,789	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	17,082
Total Civilian Employees:	545	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	37,048
Mil Families Living On Base:	63.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	18
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.72
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	3,838	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	679	Activity Code:	00318
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	554		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	167	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

Total Officer Employees:	1,798	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	12,550
Total Enlisted Employees:	15,828	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	506	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,895
Total Civilian Employees:	1,492	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	49,017
Mil Families Living On Base:	19.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	500
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.16
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	6,254	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	353	Activity Code:	00246
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	224		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	116	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

Total Officer Employees:	992	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	7,170
Total Enlisted Employees:	6,605	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	333	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	14,150
Total Civilian Employees:	235	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	34,527
Mil Families Living On Base:	38.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	489
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.10
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	2,800	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	201	Activity Code:	00620
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	171		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	75	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: Anderson AFB, GU

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	175,550	0	4,450	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSP):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: MCB HAWAII, HI

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSP):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	40	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSP):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	76	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
Supply Storage	STORA	3,550	0	0

Name: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
Hangar 6 Renovation	AIROP	0	0	34
Bachelor Quarters	BACHQ	42,037	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	71.70%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	60.10%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	98.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	76,781.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,925.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	0.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	33,178.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,251.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	50,827.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	NAVY O&M,N BRAC95	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SPF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index: 0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost: 75.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population): 0.54	Info Management Account: 0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)	MilCon Design Rate: 9.00%
Program Management Factor: 10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate: 6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care): 162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate: 5.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF): 1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate: 39.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF): 294.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF): 1.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:	
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00%	1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb): 710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton): 284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb): 14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile): 0.31
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb): 9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile): 3.38
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb): 6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile): 0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb): 18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years): 4.17
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb): 35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour): 3,763.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile): 0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$): 4,527.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ): 700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$): 1,403.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	61	Optional Category A	()	0
Waterfront	(LF)	10,350	Optional Category B	()	0
Air Operations	(SF)	122	Optional Category C	()	0
Operational	(SF)	111	Optional Category D	()	0
Administrative	(SF)	123	Optional Category E	()	0
School Buildings	(SF)	108	Optional Category F	()	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	102	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	96	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	78,750	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	94	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	165	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	120	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	165	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyards Maintenance	(SF)	129	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	160	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	12	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	160	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	168	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

Department : Navy
Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SPF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Anderson AFB	0	0	0	-180,000	-180,000
MCB HAWAII	0	0	0	0	0
NAS NORTH ISLAND	633	0	0	0	633
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND	7,292	0	0	0	7,292
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Totals:	7,925	0	0	-180,000	-172,075

Department : Navy
Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

MilCon for Base: Anderson AFB, GU

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*

			Total Construction Cost:			0
			+ Info Management Account:			0
			+ Land Purchases:			0
			- Construction Cost Avoid:			180,000

			TOTAL:			-180,000

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

MilCon for Base: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Supply Storage	STORA	0	0	3,550	633	633
Total Construction Cost:						633
+ Info Management Account:						0
+ Land Purchases:						0
- Construction Cost Avoid:						0
TOTAL:						633

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

Department : Navy
Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SPF

MilCon for Base: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Hangar 6 Renovation	AIROP	0	n/a	0	n/a	34
Bachelor Quarters	BACHQ	0	0	42,037	7,258	7,258

Total Construction Cost: 7,292
+ Info Management Account: 0
+ Land Purchases: 0
- Construction Cost Avoid: 0

TOTAL: 7,292

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
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Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SPF

Year	Cost(\$)	Adjusted Cost(\$)	NPV(\$)
-----	-----	-----	-----
1996	-191,556,159	-188,975,370	-188,975,370
1997	-17,988,251	-17,270,949	-206,246,319
1998	-22,367,118	-20,900,441	-227,146,760
1999	-17,899,342	-16,277,986	-243,424,746
2000	-17,881,569	-15,826,591	-259,251,337
2001	-19,093,318	-16,446,797	-275,698,134
2002	-19,093,318	-16,006,615	-291,704,749
2003	-19,093,318	-15,578,214	-307,282,963
2004	-19,093,318	-15,161,279	-322,444,242
2005	-19,093,318	-14,755,503	-337,199,745
2006	-19,093,318	-14,360,586	-351,560,331
2007	-19,093,318	-13,976,240	-365,536,571
2008	-19,093,318	-13,602,180	-379,138,751
2009	-19,093,318	-13,238,131	-392,376,883
2010	-19,093,318	-12,883,826	-405,260,709
2011	-19,093,318	-12,539,003	-417,799,712
2012	-19,093,318	-12,203,410	-430,003,122
2013	-19,093,318	-11,876,798	-441,879,920
2014	-19,093,318	-11,558,927	-453,438,847
2015	-19,093,318	-11,249,564	-464,688,412

Document Separator

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	7,924,836	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		7,924,836
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	116,000	
Total - Other		116,000
Total One-Time Costs		8,040,836

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	180,000,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		180,000,000
Total Net One-Time Costs		-171,959,164

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: Anderson AFB, GU
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----		0
Total One-Time Costs		0

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	180,000,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		180,000,000
Total One-Time Savings		180,000,000

Total Net One-Time Costs		-180,000,000

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: MCB HAWAII, HI
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		0

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	632,895	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		632,895
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	40,000	
Total - Other		40,000

Total One-Time Costs		672,895

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		672,895

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	7,291,940	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		7,291,940
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	76,000	
Total - Other		76,000
-----	-----	-----
Total One-Time Costs		7,367,940
-----	-----	-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----	-----	-----
Total One-Time Savings		0
-----	-----	-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		7,367,940

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/15
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Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	3,078	1,212	1,212	1,212	1,212	0	7,925
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	116	0	0	0	0	0	116
TOTAL ONE-TIME	3,194	1,212	1,212	1,212	1,212	0	8,041

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/15
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Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	71	89	107	107	373	107
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	71	89	107	107	373	107
 TOTAL COST	 3,194	 1,212	 1,283	 1,301	 1,318	 107	 8,414	 107
 ONE-TIME SAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	175,550	0	4,450	0	0	0	180,000	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	175,550	0	4,450	0	0	0	180,000	
 RECURRINGSAVES	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 Total	 Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	115,200	19,200
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	115,200	19,200
 TOTAL SAVINGS	 194,750	 19,200	 23,650	 19,200	 19,200	 19,200	 295,200	 19,200

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/15
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Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	-172,472	1,212	-3,238	1,212	1,212	0	-172,075	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	116	0	0	0	0	0	116	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	-172,356	1,212	-3,238	1,212	1,212	0	-171,959	
RECURRING NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	71	89	107	107	373	107
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-115,200	-19,200
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-19,200	-19,200	-19,129	-19,111	-19,093	-19,093	-114,826	-19,093
TOTAL NET COST	-191,556	-17,988	-22,367	-17,899	-17,881	-19,093	-286,786	-19,093

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 5/15
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: Anderson AFB, GU

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL COSTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	175,550	0	4,450	0	0	0	180,000
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	175,550	0	4,450	0	0	0	180,000

RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	115,200	19,200
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	19,200	115,200	19,200
TOTAL SAVINGS	194,750	19,200	23,650	19,200	19,200	19,200	295,200	19,200

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 6/15
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: Anderson AFB, GU

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	-175,550	0	-4,450	0	0	0	-180,000	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	-175,550	0	-4,450	0	0	0	-180,000	
RECURRING NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-115,200	-19,200
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-115,200	-19,200
TOTAL NET COST	-194,750	-19,200	-23,650	-19,200	-19,200	-19,200	-295,200	-19,200

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 7/15
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: MCB HAWAII, HI	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PCV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 10/15
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SPF

Base: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	246	97	97	97	97	0	633
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PFS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	40	0	0	0	0	0	40
TOTAL ONE-TIME	286	97	97	97	97	0	673

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 12/15
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Base: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	246	97	97	97	97	0	633	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	40	0	0	0	0	0	40	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	286	97	97	97	97	0	673	
RECURRING NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	4	5	7	7	23	7
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	4	5	7	7	23	7
TOTAL NET COST	286	97	101	102	103	7	696	7

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 13/15
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_E.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Base: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	2,832	1,115	1,115	1,115	1,115	0	7,292
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	76	0	0	0	0	0	76
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,908	1,115	1,115	1,115	1,115	0	7,368

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 15/15
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SPF

Base: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	2,832	1,115	1,115	1,115	1,115	0	7,292	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	76	0	0	0	0	0	76	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,908	1,115	1,115	1,115	1,115	0	7,368	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	67	83	100	100	350	100
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	67	83	100	100	350	100
TOTAL NET COST	2,908	1,115	1,182	1,198	1,215	100	7,718	100

Document Separator

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/5
 Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: Anderson AFB, GU	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: MCB HAWAII, HI	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Base: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Base: Anderson AFB, GU

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: MCB HAWAII, HI

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

Base: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	16.67%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
 Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMALT.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: Anderson AFB, GU

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
219	994	0	0

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
219	994	0	0

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: MCB HAWAII, HI

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
665	6,789	0	545

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
665	6,789	0	545

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
1,798	15,828	506	1,492

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
1,798	15,828	506	1,492

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
992	6,605	333	235

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
992	6,605	333	235

Screen
Base info
Static

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 12:38 5/18/1995, Report Created 21:19 05/18/1995

Department : Navy
Option Package : Move Guam NAVAIR_ALT
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\GUAMAV_B.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N950MALT.SFF

Net Change (\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	0	71	89	107	107	373	107
BOS Change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Housing Change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CHANGES	0	0	71	89	107	107	373	107

Document Separator

The Way

FORWARD . . . from GUAM

**TEAM GUAM REPORT
on
DOD CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
for
BRAC '95**

**DRAFT FINAL REPORT
APRIL 28, 1995**


THE WAY FORWARD ... FROM GUAM:
Team Guam Report On DOD Closure & Realignment Recommendations For Brac 95


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**FEDERALLY-HELD LANDS
IN
GUAM**

Prepared By: Bureau of Planning, Government of Guam
APRIL 1985

Note: Not all the parcels within the War In The Pacific Park boundary have been acquired by the Federal Government.

PART 1 THE U.S. NAVY IN GUAM

I. Overview and History of U.S. Military Activities in Guam

In this section, current U.S. property holdings, the U.S. military mission in Guam, an historical overview of U.S. property taking in Guam, and an economic view of the impact of U.S.-held property will be undertaken.

A. Lands Held by the U.S. Government in Guam

The disposition of real estate in Guam, at present is divided between private property owners (51.3%), the U.S. Government (33.0%) and the Government of Guam (15.7%).

Private property holdings are estimated at 19,700 acres in over 40,000 separate land parcels. Southern Guam now contains most of the large land parcels. However, their location in volcanic uplands adversely affects developability of these parcels. Smaller lots, usually 5,000 to 10,000 square feet for residential use, characterize the north/central portion of Guam where three-fourths of Guam's population resides.

The U.S. government presently occupies 44,468.86 acres of property in Guam or approximately 33.7% of all real estate in Guam.¹ This real property provides operational area for 19 separate military installations and support areas as well as 6 separate parcels of land which make up the War in the Pacific National Historical Park. Federally-held property holdings are estimated broken down as follows: Navy, 23,583.91 acres; Air Force, 19,434.86 acres; Department of Interior, 1,412.99 acres and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 37 acres. Federally-held properties are characterized by large concentrations of continuous property in contrast to private and GovGuam properties which are scattered pockets of smaller parcels.

The following table provides a listing of all federally-held property in Guam by installation or parcel.

Table 1-1 Federally-Held Property in Guam

Bases, Installations and Support Facilities			
Installation	Acres	Installation	Acres
Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB)	10,775.61	Naval Regional Medical Center	111.79
Andersen South (various parcels)	2,356.22	Old Apra Housing	228.62
Andersen Barrigada Annex	451.62	Northwest Field	4,007.80
COMNAVMAR/Nimitz Hill Area	758.69	South Finegayan Housing	728.15
NCTAMS/Old FAA Housing Area	3,806.89	Sasa Valley/Tenjo Vista	1,217.77
Naval Magazine/Fena Watershed	8,877.00	Harmon Annex	1,680.97
Naval Air Station (NAS), Agana	1,886.74	Camp Edusa	102.00
NCTAMS Barrigada	1,848.00	Asan Annex	17.00
Naval Station/Apra Heights	4,201.00		
		Total	43,055.87
Other U.S. Held Property			
National Historic Memorial Park	722.53	Outside Park	273.93
Ritidian (U.S. Fish & Wildlife)	370.60	Lot 7133	45.93
		Total	1,412.99
TOTAL Federally-held Land			44,468.86

Among the lands held are two (2) munitions storage areas, the islands largest ground-water reservoir, 81% of the available fastland within a 2 mile radius of the islands' only deep-water port, two (2) large POL sites with an 85 mile pipeline network, three (3) separate antenna/communication infrastructure facilities and fifteen (15) separate housing areas. This sporadic development, although in part historically marked by strategic requirements (e.g. the need for deep water port access as well a large airfields immediately after WWII) is also noteworthy for the abundance of unused federally-held real estate on and between installations as well as redundant stand-alone service operations.²

In general, it is clear that the military land use requirements have not, since WWII, come close to matching operational demands for property. As will be further discussed in this report, in addition to the possession of property not utilized, significant underutilization of installation facilities is evident.


Non-military real estate holdings can be accounted for by the tract of FAA property along Cross Island Road as well as parcels identified for the War in the Pacific National Historical Park. Of the 958.22 acres in six separate parcels set aside for the National Historical Park, 653.38 acres were transferred by the Department of Interior - after receipt of these properties from the Government of Guam - and the Navy to the National Park Service (NPS) and 69.15 acres were purchased by NPS from private owners. Only 64.78 acres that may be owned by GovGuam remain to be transferred while 170.91 acres of privately owned property, needs to be acquired in order for NPS to control all fastlands within the Congressionally-designated boundary.

A prospective federal designation of Guam real estate for non-military use is for the establishment of an area for "critical habitat." The designation of a "critical habitat area" would overlay 29,347 acres of existing federally-held property, 5,338 acres of Government of Guam property, and 1,007 acres of privately-held property. The critical habitat designation proposal was withdrawn and the proposal for a "Wildlife Refuge" an alternative to critical habitat designation, was consummated through a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Refuge (USFWS), the Navy, and the Air Force without participation by GovGuam. The Wildlife Refuge overlays 22,477 acres of federally-held lands which will be managed through cooperative agreements among the Navy, Air Force, and the USFWS. An additional 371 acres is held in fee title by the USFWS.

Over 63% or 28,141 acres of federally-held properties are located in northern Guam, of which 21,486 acres are concentrated in a continuous block from the Andersen Harmon Annex to Andersen Air Force Base. Two smaller concentrations in the north include Andersen South and the Marbo area (2,356 acres) and the Naval Air Station, Agaña, NCTAMS Barrigada and the Andersen Barrigada Annex (4,122 acres). These three concentrations account for 99% of the federally-held property in northern Guam.

Approximately 37% of federally-held land is located in southern Guam, in four contiguous parcels. The Naval Magazine/Fena Watershed (8,877 acres), Naval Station/Sasa Valley/Apra Heights Housing Areas (5,647 acres), Interior lands in or around the National Park (996 acres) and Nimitz (759 acres) total 15,483 acres. These four areas account for almost 95% of federally-held properties in southern Guam.

In the area of Apra Harbor, the largest deepwater port in the Marianas, the U.S. government holds 81% of the fast lands within a two (2) mile radius of inner Apra Harbor or 60.5% within a three (3) mile radius. Within these radii, the U.S. government holds most of the developable property. What is not held by the U.S. government (with the exception of the 584 acres of fast land at the Port Authority of Guam), is either landlocked by military holdings or undevelopable. The existence of developable federally-held properties in proximity of the harbor, in itself restricts expansion of industries around the port. This impediment has been recognized by the U.S. government through the return of lands in the port area (P.L. 96-418). Under this law, however, only 927 acres were transferred, including 500 acres of submerged lands. Moreover, the strategic location of federal lands around the port prevents access to over 5% (204 acres) of public and GovGuam lands within a 3 mile radius, east of Sasa Valley. The existence of protected wetlands just south of the federal landholding at Sasa Valley prevents their development. Additionally, military controlled easements to the private and GovGuam property between the Sasa and Tenjo Vista Tank Farms prohibit their development. (See following maps with radii).



Legend

■ Federally-Held Land

PROPERTIES WITHIN A
2 MILE RADIUS OF APRA HARBOR

Government of Guam property includes 26,868 acres of surveyed land and an estimated 5,695 acres of unsurveyed property for an estimated total of 32,563 acres. Over 40% of the properties owned by GovGuam are found in the southern villages of Inarajan, Umatac, Merizo, Talofofo, and Yona. Most of these properties are located in the mountains characteristic of the south. These lands are generally undeveloped as a result of the topographic and geologic conditions prevalent in the area.

Approximately 35% of GovGuam landholdings occur in the northern villages of Dededo and Yigo. These properties are highly suited for development given their relatively flat topography. However, most of these lands have been designated as the "principal source aquifer" placing importance on the need to protect Guam's primary source of potable water. Over 70% of Guam's population is served by the water that is pumped from over 70 water wells that dot the north.

Management of land uses over this aquifer by the Government of Guam requires improvement. However, pressures for development of this area are constantly experienced as a result of the comparatively low cost of site preparation for development, the area's proximity to population centers, and the general lack of land similarly situated. The principal source aquifer is bordered on three sides by federally-held property.

Guam Land Use Plan (GLUP) 1977


The Guam Land Use Plan was prepared in response to a December 1974 Assistant Secretary of Defense request that the Navy and Air Force jointly study the Department of Defense's (DOD) landholdings on Guam. The objectives of the study were:

- to determine the landholdings required to support the mid-range (8 years) DOD presence on Guam;
- to examine joint use of land and facility consolidations to promote effective and efficient use of real property resources and to eliminate the patchwork pattern of military landownership on Guam; and
- to determine which landholdings could be released by DOD pursuant to Executive Order 11954 (this order establishes the policy of executive agencies reviewing their real property holdings to assure maximum use) and which landholdings could also be used to meet the development needs of the Government of Guam.

The GLUP, completed in September 1977 and issued in February 1978, represented DOD's desired mid-range land use goals and was viewed as a general guideline for all DOD components in future facility planning on Guam. The Plan included recommendations on facility consolidations, acquisition of land, and the release of land not required by DOD agencies.



GUAM



 SLOPES - 15% OR GREATER

The GLUP recommended that 5,180 acres of land on Guam be released which included 2,517 acres of Navy-held land and 2,663 acres of Air Force-held land. Of the total 5,180 acres, 2,625 acres were identified as available for outright release and exchange purposes, while the remaining 2,555 acres will be available contingent upon construction of replacement facilities.

Subsequently, these lands were withdrawn from releasable status as DOD decided it needed to reassess its land requirements on Guam. While several acres have been transferred to the Government of Guam, the majority of these lands remained under DOD control. On October 1994, 17 years after completion of GLUP, congressional legislation (HR 2144) was passed into law (USPL 103-339) which provided for the return of approximately 3,200 acres of federal-held lands (DOD and Federal Aviation Administration) to the Government of Guam. Most of the parcels identified in PL 103-339 were initially on the GLUP 1977 report.

Guam Land Use Plan (GLUP) 1994

In mid-1993, USCINCPAC requested the Air Force and the Navy to review their landholdings on Guam and to develop a master plan for Department of Defense (DOD) land use on the island. USCINCPAC designated the Navy, through the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (PACNAVFACENGCOM), as executive agent for the land use plan.

Pursuant to USCINCPAC's request, the Navy submitted its draft GLUP 94 report for review and conducted a briefing to the Government of Guam in April 1994. The briefing indicated GLUP 94's intent which included the following:

- to develop a rationale for military landholdings based on foreseeable mission taskings and force levels;
- to develop a comprehensive plan for all DOD land requirements on Guam which considers combined service use of real property where feasible;
- to identify opportunities for functional consolidations and joint use arrangements, and address environmental considerations that affect land use; and
- to address specific functional requirements identified by the services.

Over 7,600 acres of land were identified to be releasable, and another 450 acres as potentially releasable, for a total of over 8,100 acres. Additionally, the Navy recommended obtaining development controls on approximately 130 acres of non-federal lands. The recommendations in the draft GLUP 94 report represent an 18 percent reduction in the DOD footprint on Guam, and a one-fourth overall reduction if previous GLUP parcels (USPL 103-339) are included. DOD land ownership would be reduced from a current one-third of all land on Guam, to approximately one-fourth.

Although the GLUP 94 proposes to reduce DoD's control of federally-held property in Guam, over one-third of the lands identified are within the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's, "Guam

Wildlife Refuge." Thus DoD's proposal to "excess" unneeded property provides no assurance that such lands will be put to economic use.

B. The U.S. Military Mission

The U.S. military mission in Guam has changed throughout the U.S.-Guam colonial relationship. From a site selected for its value as a "coaling station" at the turn of the century, an abandoned outpost prior to WWII, to a WWII Naval Operating Base (NOB) in preparation for the invasion of Imperial Japan and a frequently utilized logistic base in regional conflicts from the 1950's through the early 1990's. The Pentagon's recommendations to BRAC 95, if implemented, would return Guam to a status the military first envisioned in the late 1800's.

1. History of the Military Mission

Prior to WWII, although some military planners saw "Guam: The Key of the Western Pacific",³ Guam was left unfortified pursuant to the Five-Powers-Treaty of 1921. As one authoritative observer noted:

"(I)n the view of American statesmen the risk of precipitating a disastrous naval race with Japan if the United States did not accept Article XIX (of the Five-Powers-Treaty) seemed especially unwarranted, considering the opinion of virtually all observers, including the big-navy advocates, that Congress would never consent to spend the vast sums required to build or fortify bases in Guam and the Philippines."⁴

Up until WWII, Guam played a minimalist role for U.S. military activities in the Pacific given the agreements to limit naval capacity and Pacific island fortifications pursuant to the 1921 Five-Powers-Treaty.

Prior to Guam's reoccupation by the United States in 1944, plans were in progress to enhance Guam's strategic military status. As the war ended, Guam was one giant military base and with the emergence of a Soviet security threat, the bases in Guam were seen to be of assistance in the event of operations in the Far East or even the Soviet Union.⁵ After 1949, China was seen as the main communist threat in Asia. In the vein of the prevailing military view that Guam was "a base of immeasurable strategic importance,"⁶ and with the complicity of U.S. civilian administrators, Guam remained under a veil of security control until 1962.

The overall mission was to deter aggression by being able to strike strategic targets in China and the Soviet Union with nuclear armed bombers and missiles, and to counter with conventional forces, the communist inspired insurgencies within friendly countries. United States nuclear capabilities in the Pacific were tied into the United States Strategic Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP); a program to deal with worldwide nuclear war based on a triad of deterrent weapons systems: bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

The strategic role Guam played for the U.S. military focused on long-range Air Force bombers with concomitant weapons and petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) support. The Island's port also served as a forward logistical service and communications location and submarine base, while aircraft carrier-based and regional sea surveillance was carried out from a Naval aviation field. Technological limitations on the range of nuclear-capable bombers and submarines from the 1950's through the 1970's involved the use of Guam in two components of SIOP: bombers and submarines (and support facilities). Additionally, the sound surveillance system (SOSUS) processing center at Ritidian provided a critical intelligence component for anti-submarine warfare (ASW): a pivotal U.S. element for directing military activities under the SIOP. A complex early warning electronic and communication system supported the U.S. strategic posture in Guam.

The island's most active military role after WWII, however, came at the end of the Vietnam conflict. During this period the island effectively served in a dual capacity as a support facility and long-range bombing base for conventional forces and weapons and as an operational base for strategic deterrence. By the late 1970's, however, both U.S. policy and military technology had changed. A slow U.S. rollback from the forward deployment on the Asian rim had first been announced in Guam in 1969 by President Nixon as the "Guam Doctrine/Nixon Doctrine." The return of Okinawa to the Japanese, the reduction of military commitments to Taiwan, the renegotiation of base rights with the Philippines and the U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam and Thailand -- all in the 1970's -- served to lessen the forward deployment of U.S. conventional forces in the Asia and the western Pacific.

Technology, as well, began to have an impact on the strategic importance of Guam. In addition to the development of longer-range bombers capable of striking Soviet targets from the United States and advances in the technological capabilities of the intercontinental ballistic missile, Guam's role as a bomber base in the U.S. SIOP was seen to be on the decline by the late 1970's. On the Navy side, the launching of the Trident-class submarine (with its longer range weapons systems) led to the removal of Polaris submarine Squadron 15 from Guam in April of 1980.

With the revival of U.S. military projection in the 1980's and the growing Soviet military presence in Vietnam, Guam's strategic role briefly increased. Along with the projected increase of the Navy to 600 ships, nuclear strategies were enhanced. In 1981, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) announced plans for "improving the nuclear force effectiveness of those assets under Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC)...(and)...enhancing Pacific nuclear targeting capability and assisting PACOM staffs to determine specific TNF weapons systems requirements."⁷ In Congressional testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1984, PACOM commander, Admiral William Crowe stated:

"In my view, all of our military efforts in the PACOM area must rest on the foundation of a viable and credible nuclear deterrent. I cannot hypothesize a situation where it is in our interest to be dealing nuclear inferiority. Upgrading our

theater nuclear posture combined with supporting survivable and enduring C³ (Command, Control and Communications) system is also important."⁸

A 1985 publication, Nuclear Battlefields, noted Guam as "the center of U.S. nuclear planning and storage in the western Pacific"⁹ with the island storing 428 nuclear weapons, giving it the distinction of having the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons per square mile.¹⁰ Large stockpiles of conventional weapons at Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB) and Naval Magazine, extensive POL facilities at both AAFB and the Apra Harbor area, as well as early warning ballistic missile satellite system, DoD communications systems, and the SOSUS processing facility at Ritidian, and sea-surveillance/attack ASW capabilities (operating out of both AAFB and Naval Air Station (NAS) Agaña), continued to play important roles in the U.S. strategic framework for the western Pacific.

The future of military activities in Guam through the end of the 1980's and the early 1990's witnessed a period of speculation vis-a-vis the U.S. military role in the Republic of the Philippines as well as a period of reality with respect to U.S. budget-tightening measures. The possibility of Guam acting as a fallback site for a larger U.S. Pacific military presence, (depending on the outcome of the renegotiation of U.S. base rights in the Philippines), was considered simultaneous to other rollback activities proposed for the region. For example, the East Asian Strategy Initiative (EASI, also referred to as the Nunn-Warner initiative) required an orderly, phased reduction of authorized U.S. military personnel in Japan and Korea.

By the late 1980's the impact of tightening U.S. budgets and technology began to usher in a new era of rollback from Guam. In 1990, the once nuclear-capable B-52G's at AAFB were removed from Guam as a result of budget cutting measures in the U.S. Congress.¹¹ In 1991, the U.S. government began a process of base closures through an independent Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC). Also, in the early 1990's, as a result of meeting budgetary reduction measures, the "600 ship Navy" projected during the 1980's was slated to be a 340 ship Navy before the end of the century.

While the U.S. government's budget tightening process in 1989 resulted in the removal of the nuclear capable B-52G's from Guam and other general budget cutting measures seemed sure to impact U.S. military activities in Guam, the situation in the Republic of the Philippines with respect to future U.S. base rights promoted speculation about a significantly larger military role for Guam in the event of a "fallback."¹² However, when the U.S. and Republic of the Philippines governments failed to reach terms on a renewed bases rights agreement in 1991, the U.S. Navy proposed that only 1,380 Navy billets or personnel (as well as an estimated 1,450 dependents) were slated for transfer to Guam by 1992.¹³ Even this number, however, was an overstatement of the permanent relocation of U.S. personnel from the Philippines that would result from the closure of Philippine bases.¹⁴

As noted in Navy documents, among the factors affecting the relatively small size of the U.S. Navy's rollback from the Republic of the Philippines to Guam was the "end of the Cold War and severe reductions in the military budget, affecting the military's ability to operate and maintain overseas bases."¹⁵ It is significant to note that even prior to the failure of the renegotiation of base rights in the Philippines, the U.S. Administration had in August of 1990 proposed a new national security strategy which marked the end of the U.S. government's Cold War "global containment strategy." A November 1990 action by the U.S. Secretary of Defense approved a CINCPAC plan to adjust U.S. troop levels in East Asia (including those afloat) downward by over 11% by 1992.¹⁶ Clearly, the demise of the Soviet Union (and its fallback from Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam) reduced U.S. strategic concerns for deployment in the Pacific. This decline of a symmetric threat in the Pacific region, the costs of relocating *in toto* U.S. military operations in the Philippines to another/other Pacific site(s), together with ever tightening military budgets, resulted in only limited plans to use Guam as a "fallback" location.

Beginning in the 1990's the U.S. military mission in the Pacific changed from the "offensive" posture supported by the "600 ship Navy" and emphasis on nuclear deterrence, to a strategy of "flexibility." "(F)lexibility derives from its focus on regional, not global conflict; selective engagement in critical regions of the world; and international cooperation with...friends and allies."¹⁷ With the decline of a symmetric conventional and nuclear threat to the United States and the pressure on the U.S. budgetary process, the U.S. military "presence" in the Pacific will continue, but significant adjustments will be made which require less expenditure of U.S. funds. The fundamental security missions in the Pacific (which are acknowledged to now be secondary to other "U.S. regional roles"¹⁸ are defined as:

- * defending Alaska, Hawaii and the connecting lines of communication (LOCs) to the continental United States;
- * protecting U.S. Territories and Freely Associated States for which the U.S. has defense responsibilities;
- * assisting our allies in defense;
- * maintaining the security of the LOCs throughout the Pacific as well as the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and the East and South China Seas."¹⁹

Guam's role in the current U.S. flexibility posture was evident by the early 1990's in the operations of both the Air Force and the Navy.

The once heavily utilized Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB) has had no Air Force planes assigned since 1990. However, as a "hardened" operational center in the event of contingencies, AAFB now serves as a "ready dispersal" and "recovery" base for bombers, as was successfully demonstrated during the Gulf War. While not an active base in 1994 -- rather a base waiting for a

mission to develop in the event of conflict -- AAFB retains extensive munitions, POL and communications infrastructure which are ready-to-use in the event of hostilities.

Decreases in the active role of the U.S. Navy were also evident in the proposal by the Commander, Naval Forces Marianas in early 1994 to remove from Guam the ASW nuclear capable P-3 Orion aircraft and the carrier-based electronic reconnaissance ES-3A Viking aircraft and well as the 17 aircraft assigned to the Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (VRC-50) which transferred from Cubi Point, Republic of the Philippines in 1992.²⁰ Additionally, homeported Navy vessels in Guam (all combat stores ships) are projected to decline from five in 1991 to just one -- the USS Holland, a submarine tender -- by 1993. In 1994, the decommissioning of the Holland was acknowledged and while a replacement was "planned" the certainty of replacement was far from certain.²¹ Three decommissioned supply ships (the USS Niagara Falls, the USS White Plains and the USS San Jose) were to be converted to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and homeported out of Oakland, California and forward deployed to Guam.

It is not insignificant that the majority of the activities associated with the Navy's proposed rollback from Guam in the early to mid-1990's were activities that arrived in Guam in the 1980's²² as a part of the "offensively oriented and increasingly aggressive surveillance, exercise and training schedule" that made the Pacific a priority for U.S. war planners.²³ In effect, most of the cut backs in military activities between 1989 and 1994 brought Guam back to a level of activity that would otherwise have been in place if the military build-up of the 1980's had not occurred. In retrospect, the Navy activities introduced to Guam in the early 1980's were a short-term occurrence in relation to the aggressive military activity of the period which budgetarily extended the role of the military beyond sustainable levels.

In January of 1994, a report prepared by the Governor of Guam, the Speaker of the Guam Legislature, Guam's Congressional Delegate and Chairman of the Guam Legislature's Federal and Foreign Affairs Committee noted:

Guam's intermittent use (if at all) as a forward operating location in regional conflict ranges from the complete use of all civilian and military facilities to a limited role for existing military facilities. However, most contingency operations (such as the use of AAFB airfield, its munitions and POL facilities and munitions storage at Naval Magazine during the Gulf War) involve the transfer of most support operations and personnel. This places only a minimal burden on existing infrastructure since: 1.) Guam acts as a reserve for munitions storage with munitions coming from more distant areas first (e.g. Concord Naval Weapons Station) and 2.) operational facilities for aircraft (e.g. production and technical equipment support) are secondary to equipment that arrives with incoming squadrons and their War Readiness Supply Kit (WRSK) resources.

The primary mission of Guam now appears to be among a network of "dispersal" facilities that are "recoverable" in the event of conflict. Large munitions and POL facilities, supported by available airfields and berthing facilities pose a "contingency" role for Guam; facilities that are available in the event of hostilities. Additionally, space and electronic warfare capabilities are expected to continue for the near future but many are clearly going to be impacted by technological advances.²⁴ Except during regional training exercises or during a period of conflict, the active U.S. military presence in Guam is likely to decline through the end of the 1990's. (Team Guam, *The Next Liberation*, January 1994 p.17)

In October 1994, the process leading up to the Department of Defense's recommendations to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission of 1995 was evident in the consolidation of the Naval Station, Guam and Naval Magazine, Guam into a consolidated operation called Naval Activities, Guam.

The recommendations of the Department of Defense to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission of 1995 to close operations at the Naval Ship Repair Facility, and the Fleet Industrial and Supply Center, and to essentially mothball the recently created Naval Activities command illustrate the continuing decline of Guam's importance for the forward deployment of an active U.S. military presence. From another view, the recommendations of the Department of Defense to BRAC 1995 reflects changes in the U.S. military presence in Guam which might have occurred earlier had it not been for the brief period of nuclear build up in the Pacific under the U.S. offensive posture of the early to mid-1980's.

Given the absence of a symmetric military opponent on a global scale, the U.S. government's flexible approach to its military strategy will endure. In this strategic environment, together with continued military "right-sizing" and U.S. national belt-tightening, the recommendations of the Department of Defense to the BRAC 1995 represent the near end-yun of Guam's decline as a forward U.S. military outpost.

As is clear in the Department of Defense's recommendations to the BRAC Guam's near-term value to the U.S. military will be that of a recoverable asset and dispersable center to support very limited mobilization and/or contingency operations to meet emergent military needs.

2. Long-term U.S. contingencies and contingency planning in Guam.

A complete review of the U.S. long-term contingency plans for the region is obviously impossible without reference to classified U.S. contingency plans. However, several themes run throughout U.S. long-term policy for the region. Foremost is a long-term policy of "strategic

denial" which has its roots in the U.S. post-WWII/Cold War posture of assuring military access on a contingency basis and at a minimum limiting the utilization of areas/islands by other nations. Access and development of a forwardly deployed basing activity, however, are two different things.

In Micronesia, the U.S. government's acquisition of basing ability in the the case of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, occurred during the process of the island nations' evolution from a U.S. administered Trust Territory to a decolonized status.²⁵ In the case of Guam, the permanent basing ability (and active utilization of property for such purposes) was acquired through accession.

The purpose of holding basing rights, in part, is answered by the international geopolitical conditions during which the U.S. began administering the Trust Territories after WWII, and the Cold War that followed. It is not insignificant that the United Nations Security Council's approval of the termination of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (in which the former Soviet Union has veto powers) occurred only after the demise of communist control of the former Soviet Union.²⁶ While the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union does not mean that long-term U.S. contingency planning for the region has ended, (nor are the plans any less ambitious over an extended period of time) it is clear that the drive which underscores such contingencies has been dramatically affected by advancements in technology and realistic budgetary limitation.

The United States has historically relied on its military to project itself as a "Pacific nation", indeed the commercial interest of the United States propelled the "imperialist movement" of even Navy strategists such as Captain Alfred Mahan²⁷ and the U.S. "Open Door Policy" at the turn of the century.²⁸ Although the U.S. projection of military power into the Pacific region has not resulted in the economic expectations "imperialists" might have imagined, it is clear that the diplomatic power of a military presence is a mainstay of U.S. policy in the Pacific. The adoption of the "flexibility" posture is but a more sophisticated and regionalized projection of policy interest than the offensive nuclear policy of the 1980's, but requires less capital and recurring budgetary expenditure. Again, however, it is important to note that the level of U.S. military activity has decreased coincident with budget constraints, technological advances and the rise of more interactive/confidence-building policies such as flexibility.

It is a fair assumption that the United States has an enduring interest in retaining a forward access as a Pacific military presence in its projection as a Pacific nation. From the present vantage, the U.S. military basing structure is in the "forward" Pacific centers around Japan and Korea with an increasing array of Asian Rim nations providing logistical support.²⁹ Nations providing forward basing support and those hosting intermittant access are distinguished by the commitment of land resources for continuing military activities. The intermittant access is meant to engender goodwill through a friendly show of force, by activities such as joint military exercises, port calls and procurement of goods and services, but does not involve the costs nor the political aspects (in host

countries) of forward basing. However, such confidence building activities, while promoting bilateral goodwill and advancing U.S. political and military objectives, does not assure the projection of military power from such host nations in times of conflict.

Although the nature of the missions of existing military basing activities in foreign countries is considerably different than the role -- and strategic potential -- of Guam, military strategists undoubtedly foresee the termination of existing basing rights in foreign countries. Under such "foreseeable" conditions, Guam is seen by military strategists (particularly real estate and war planners) as an insurance policy. Since the U.S. government at present holds real estate in Guam, for which no future premiums are "due," Guam represents the best kind of insurance policy for military strategists.

Even as an insurance policy (in the minds of real estate planners) for future U.S. rollbacks from Japan and Korea, the range of military activities which can be conducted from Guam are not limitless. The harbor is constrained in accommodating aircraft carriers and thus full scale SRF activities; tactical aircraft are too far from potential operating areas to be based out of Guam; and the basing of deployable troops in Guam offers no significant advantage over Hawaii or even CONUS. The role of Guam, however, as the pivot of the Marianas-Belau defense arch,³⁰ could possibly give rise to increased military activity. The costs, however, of producing the infrastructure to support such a diversification of deliverable military force was prohibitive for the Philippine rollback, and given technological advances is not likely to be necessary over the long-term.

The role of real estate planners and uniform officers in overstating the true military requirements for contingencies is obvious from Guam's experience since WWII. Given the absence of a future cost factor for retaining property in Guam, from the perspective of military real estate planners and active commands, any worst-case scenario is reason enough to justify retention of real property. No one in such a position is willing to guarantee that the U.S. will not require real estate for some future military use. As history has shown, however, military planners are always ahead of the will of the U.S. government to commit resources to plans. As was the case well before WWII, Navy planners viewed Guam as a location which should be heavily fortified to inhibit Japanese imperialism.³¹ Just as some U.S. Navy planners imagined Guam as being a heavily fortified location prior to WWII, U.S. policy did not create such an environment. The future should be regarded with a skepticism that accounts for overstatements of contingencies and plans of the past.

Proposals to homeport a carrier task force in Guam in 1980 -- the beginning a peacetime military resurgence -- were declined based on prohibitive costs and security concerns. The costs of dredging Apra harbor to accommodate the reasonable mobility of a carrier and task force vessels, amounted to over \$300 million. Additionally, the narrow harbor entrance presented logistical as well as security problems, while the high incidence of typhoons presented additional homeporting concerns.³² Military planners, even given the feasibility of the costly operations to make the Apra harbor minimally capable to accommodate aircraft carriers, did not believe the political will existed

to expend the resources (and to give up the economic and political impact of a homeported carrier task force) to improve the area (Ibid).

The numerous U.S. contingencies for the use of Guam in a Philippine base rollback certainly did not occur. Moreover, several of the military construction projects included in the limited movement of operations from the Philippines (as defined in the *Final EIS*) are no longer being pursued or have not met with Congressional approval. As has historically been the case, the priority of U.S. expenditures, even in the midst of intense activity, does not necessarily result in the commitment of resources for permanent facilities outside of the United States mainland.³³ In the face of military budget cuts that reduce the size of activities in CONUS (which has resulted in base closures nationwide notwithstanding the concerns of representatives of the people of the U.S.), Guam's possible future development as a more expansive military facility would be at least secondary to a reinvigoration of military operations in the United States.

Technology also weights heavily into the equation with respect to the future U.S. military requirements for Guam. When "Lion Six" was planned for Guam in 1944, a carrier task force was made up of "100 ships, four hundred attack aircraft, and heavy anti-aircraft artillery typical of a 1940s carrier task force."³⁴ By the 1980's a carrier task force was made up of nine ships, less than 50 aircraft and missile systems. (Ibid). Planners for "Lion Six" could not account for such technological changes.

Guam's experience is ample demonstration of the impact of technology on military deployments. Guam's incipient role as a coaling station was strategically surpassed by petroleum driven vessels whose capacity has been passed by nuclear-powered vessels. Submarine launched inter-continental ballistic missiles once required a forward basing operation to be effective against targets in the U.S.S.R. By 1980, in the wake of the new Trident submarine, the Polaris Submarine Squadron 15 was disestablished from Polaris Point, Apra Harbor. Similarly, the permanent basing of a nuclear-capable bomber wing in Guam was not considered necessary given technological advances in other weapons delivery systems. Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence (C³I) operations in Guam are now clearly under "threat" from technology. As noted by Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle (Director, Space and Electronic Warfare, CNO) in *SeaPower* (August, 1993, pp. 9-13).

"Seapower: What do you mean by a 'lights out' operation?"

Tuttle: First of all I mean these big NCTAMS -- Navy Computer Telecommunications Area Master Station. They are run by an inordinate number of people. They have all these rooms and compartments. They have a naval forest of antennas...I want to close down these NCTAMS" (Ibid. p.13).

The military mission in Guam will continue to be affected as much by technology than by budgetary cycles; i.e. advances in technology will likely affect the U.S. military mission in Guam

more significantly than periods of budgetary escalation or decline. While U.S. policy planners may consider the forward basing of a military presence a necessary well into the next decade, even the establishment of a suitable infrastructure to sustain a Marianas-Belau defense arc would not require the amount of land in Guam that is presently held by real estate planners within the U.S. Department of Defense.

C. Pre-takings use of Guam real estate.

In taking Guam properties after WWII, the U.S. government assumed control over the most developable properties: those where properties "bearing capacity" was "excellent" in northern Guam as opposed to southern Guam where "poor" or "poor to fair" conditions exist. (Military Geology of Guam pp.225-253). Given the relative quality of lands taken by the military it is not surprising that these same lands were a vital part of the web of civilian "society" in pre-World War II Guam, through the war and before condemnation by the U.S. government.

Aside from the roads, utility easements and petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) lines, the U.S. condemned lands in large tracts for military complexes. Condemnations were of two general types, leaseholds where the government needed temporary bases and fee condemnations where the bases were deemed permanent. Temporary and permanent were determined by perceived national security needs of the time. The term "complexes" is used because they included a series of interdependent support facilities that collectively formed a self-supporting community segregated socially and physically from the native Chamorro population.

Because the government condemned these lands in large tracts and because property had not been subdivided into smaller lots (except in Agana and Sumay) it is fairly easy to determine use of the area utilizing appraisal reports of that time.³⁵ Only property presently possessed by the U.S. government is addressed in this section.

There were four large areas condemned by the Federal for military complexes.

1. Naval Ammunition Depot (presently Naval Magazine, Fena Valley, Reservoir and Watershed Area).

Although this "complex" does not have many buildings, its physical plant primarily consists of a water reservoir and treatment area, munitions storage area (including nuclear weapons) and extensive security zones. This area of taking consists of approximately 28.6 million square meters later amended to 21.1 million square meters.

Prior to WWII this area was a vital agricultural area, supporting the surrounding villages of Agat, Piti, Sumay, and to lesser extent the village of Umatac and later the villages of Talofofu and Santa Rita. It is also the source of the most significant surface water in Guam at the time. Fena Dam was created by the U.S. government utilizing fresh water springs on condemned Lot 357, Agat

and through earthmoving other sizable condemned lots. Guam being an agrarian society at that time and primarily using the barter system of trade, the order of land value is completely opposite that of today. Large food producing agricultural tracts were preferable over village residential lots.

The typical Chamorro family had a village residential lot (usually in Sumay or Agana) and a "lancho", agricultural tracts used for subsistence farming and production for barter goods in the active agrarian economy (usually in Fena for the southern part of the island or Barrigada for the northern part).

Primary use of area: Agricultural breadbasket

2. Apra Harbor Complex (Apra Harbor, Piti, Sumay and Agat).

This complex is a naval base, with base personnel and fleet support facilities (including fuel storage and island wide distribution lines) and seaport facilities (the best deep water port in the western Pacific). This area included later a military airfield (Orote airfield) and the site of the island wide electrical generation system.

This area of taking was approximately 10 million square meters. Its pre-war use (Apra Harbor and Sumay) was as the commercial center of Guam. The island's link to the outside world (cable communications, seaplane facilities, and radio communications) were located in Sumay and Apra Harbor. Additionally, the island's largest rice growing areas were located between Sumay and Piti in areas subsequently condemned. Sumay was the largest Chamorro village in the south.

The typical Chamorro family in this area had a Sumay residential lot and a "lancho" around the Sumay area all the way east to Fena Valley as well as a contiguous area extending from Sumay to Asan.

Primary use of central area: Government, Commercial, Residential

Primary use of surrounding area: Agricultural

3. Naval Air Stations (NAS) and Radio Barrigada.

This area of taking consisted of approximately 19 million square meters. Pre-war use of this area was as an extensive agricultural area with large farms that supported sporadic clusters of families in the area, as well as Agaña, the island's largest village. This area was flat on a high plateau with good depth of farming soil from the Maite cliffline all the way east to the Marbo cliffline. The Japanese began construction of an airfield during World War II at the site of the present day NAS. The U.S. Government built an extensive land-intensive communications antenna system in the area.

Primary use: Extensive Agricultural breadbasket

4. Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Communications Station (presently NCTAMS), Northwest Field, Marbo Base Command, Marbo Base Command Sewage Disposal, Ritidian Communications Area, Harmon Air Field and Harmon Aviation Gas Fuel Farm.

This area of taking is approximately 39.2 million square meters. Pre-war use of this area was sporadic agricultural use but primarily family subsistence farms. However in the northwest quadrant of this taking-area there were spot areas where there were extensive commercial activity by different enterprises that annually contributed significantly to the economy of pre-war Guam. These activities included commercial farming for profit, a sawmill, copra plantations and a copra loading area for ships.

A significant but overlooked use of this area is its wildlife aspect: as a community hunting ground. Although this area was private property before the war, it sustained large tracts of forest and undergrowth. The nature of such areas made it quite difficult to restrict trespassing and maintain exclusive use of property by owners. As such it was classified or zoned by the native Chamorro population as "halom tano" (inside the land or the deep forest) and was quite readily used as community hunting grounds and an area to gather edible flora. The wildlife aspect and the halom tano aspect made it valuable as a source of fresh meat and a source of consumable plants. Although landowners probably did not particularly like encroachments by non-owners, no extensive measures were taken to prevent them from utilizing the property.

Primary use: Agricultural, sporadic extensive commercial ventures, large tracts of "halom tano" serving as dietary supplement.

D. Overview of takings and "rationale" for holding.

Several overarching issues involved in the process of the takings. These issues involve the psychological, social and economic condition of the population of Guam after WWII; the U.S. military's projection of power in the region which was seen, in part to be sustained by interest in Guam land; as well as the military's ability to directly influence unilateral U.S. decision over the affairs of Guam.

The effects of Guam's occupation by Japanese forces and devastating recapture by American troops on the Chamorro psyche vis-a-vis U.S. requests for "real property assistance" after WWII are too complex to be dealt with fully in this paper. However, the consequences of emancipation by American troops, together with an appreciation for the phenomenal power and "needs" of the U.S. military for property, are woven throughout the post-war history of the Chamorro people and U.S. land takings.³⁶ Moreover, the land takings themselves resulted in the complete displacement of Guam's agrarian economy which had been stymied by Japanese occupation and shattered by the bombardment during the U.S. reoccupation. The impact of the changes in Guam brought on by military land taking, land use and support activities were radical,

not only with respect to displacement from property, but also economically, socially and culturally.³⁷

The process of the land-takings by the U.S. military which stretched from 1944 to 1965,³⁸ is itself testimony to the uncertainty of the U.S. Government with respect to its real land needs in Guam. Moreover, it symbolizes the arbitrary manner in which such important matters to the Chamorro people were handled almost casually by the U.S. Government.³⁹ Not unlike regular criticism of U.S. military strategy in the Pacific -- which from a posture of power assumes the cooperation of its allies⁴⁰ -- an arrogance of power marked the process of land takings after WWII. A preponderance of U.S. documents -- both military and civilian -- point to U.S. military interests as the first order of business in Guam in the immediate post-war period and indeed very overtly until the lifting of the security clearance in 1962.⁴¹ Clearly, these interests -- together with the attitudinal framework of the U.S. government's unilateral decision-making authority over Guam's affairs -- resulted in the real estate takings without serious deference to the needs of the civilian community.

Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the fact that the military's land-taking program treated civilian land needs with indifference is seen not only in the taking of lands that were utilized by the Chamorro people, but also the self-established claim that the best lands in Guam were taken. Federal records indicate repeated references by military officials that the island's best agricultural properties were taken.⁴² During a House Naval Affairs Committee hearing on H.R. 6547 (79th Congress, Second Session) on May 23, 1946, Commander Albert O'Bannon (the Naval officer in charge of the Real Estate and Land Acquisition Division of the Lands and Claims Commission) responded to questioning from Congressman Drewery:

"Mr. Drewery: We are proposing to buy...some of the most valuable land on the island of Guam; is that so?

Commander O'Bannon: That is the fact.

Mr. Drewery: That land we are buying is among the most valuable on the island then?

Commander O'Bannon: I would say so. I would say it is valuable to this extent, because it is tillable land, and can be used for cultivation, and of course, you have the water front area that is used there in the harbor, and down from the water."⁴³

Military strategy continues to drive primary U.S. interests in Guam. Obviously, real estate to accommodate these interest and from which these interests can be projected is necessary. Unfortunately, significant strains of the military's post-WWII attitudinal framework remain in place in Guam today: military planners have by and large refused to acknowledge the value of real estate to the community of Guam despite historically declining military usage. "Possible future mission" requirements and "contingencies" have become the mainstay of the military's rationale for retaining unused and underutilized federally-held property. As succinctly put by the Planning Assistance Team study for Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB):

"ISSUE: Development of Andersen AFB South (Andy South)

DISCUSSION: Andy South is relatively undeveloped and there is some pressure on the Air Force to dispose of some of this underutilized land. A logical extension of land use at Andy South would be for additional family housing and land uses which are compatible. Andy South currently has land resources which can support a major build-up of U.S. forces on Guam.

RECOMMENDATION: All existing land at Andy South be retained by the Air Force for possible future missions."

(1987: at p. 50).

Military holdings of Guam property that accommodate existing activities often tend to be underutilized. This matter will be examined in greater detail in this report. However, it is significant to note that in general, excess operational capacity is either "justified" by providing tenant commands with exclusive jurisdiction over operational facilities (e.g. berthing space at Apra Harbor Naval Complex: See Chapter 6., A.1.) or designation for contingency purposes.⁴⁴

The reliance on "contingency" as a rationale to prevent the return of unused lands or forego consolidation of operational activities is prospectively, and has been in practice, incongruous. First it must be understood that "contingencies" include a wide range of options, including worst-case scenarios. Such situation reviews (in their classified form) include such scenarios as military conflict with allies and non-hostile nations.⁴⁵

Beyond the grandiose aspects of "worst-case-scenario" contingency planning, the mundane aspect of land utilization during periods of intensive military use have shown that the full extent of U.S. land-holdings since WWII have never been required. This was evident from the beginnings of the taking of Guam property in 1946 by the U.S. military when far more land was taken than was needed. The advent of the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam Conflict -- despite massive operations from Guam during the latter -- have further failed to demonstrate that full-scale operations from Guam require the amount of property occupied by the U.S. military.

Given the current U.S. posture of "flexibility", budget constraints (which will take the U.S. well into the next century), and "right-sizing," the active role for Guam is further minimized. Contingencies under the "flexibility" approach rely on available facilities not only in Guam, but also amongst Pacific allies. As was demonstrated during the Gulf War, while usage of U.S. military facilities in Guam increased, the deployment of operational groups with WRSKs minimized the reliance on many operational facilities to engage in technical support.

While the U.S. military's retention of the present amount of Guam property can not be fully justified in relation to operational requirements, there is little doubt that land in Guam is desirable to U.S. military officials because it is retained/available and because there are no recurrent costs

associated with holding such property. This myopic view places little or no consideration on the value of land in Guam for civilian use. Correction of this perspective has long been encouraged by Guam as well as other observers. As former Secretary of Navy James H. Webb wrote in his 1974 publication, Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980's:

"Although military planners have assumed for planning purposes that the 1970 military population will have doubled on Guam by the year 2000, they have not referred to specific plans or reasons why this is so. A stricter accounting for land usage will require a concrete plan for justification of retention of these present land areas....First we should recognize that this is not 1945....Second, we are depriving a land-poor island of one-third of its land, while its population and tourist economy are rapidly expanding. Finally, many sensitive Guamanians feel strongly about the loss of native culture attendant to such an expansive military presence"⁴⁶

A long-standing central point of dissension between the U.S. military and the people of Guam has been the military's land use plans and long-term contingencies vis-a-vis Guam's civilian community's requirement for land. This contentious issue has been well manifest in the DoD's recommendation to the BRAC 95: a recommendation which proposes even less use of existing U.S.-held property in Guam, but which does not propose the transfer of significant property already being sought by Guam for its rapidly expanding population and tourist economy.

The BRAC 1995 should be aware of this situation as its gravity is serious. If bases are closed, but assets and land retained for "necessary access", "operational and forward basing considerations" and "emergent requirements" the BRAC 95 process will likely become the flashpoint of long-standing tensions between the Navy's view of Guam as an "insurance policy" and Guam's need to develop its economy.

II. The Economic Value of Land in Guam

A. Summary

The occupation of significant areas of land in Guam by the federal government, predominantly by the Department of Defense, has caused and continues to cause substantial impairment of the performance of the civilian economy. From the pre-War days, when sanctioned economic activities were narrowly limited and even land transfers among residents were strictly controlled, until today, when simple ownership "rights" and proximity-related conditional usage severely constrain further civilian economic development, the federal use of land in Guam and issues related to such usage have had a negative impact on the economic well-being of the people of Guam. Much of the land held by the federal government today could generate a great deal more economic value to the people of Guam if it were converted to civilian use; ironically, much of the land that meets this description is held as idle land, albeit still in the federal estate. As a resource that is extremely scarce (particularly in the context of an isolated 212 sq. mi. island), land holds enormous economic value to the people of Guam, a value far greater than that of the relatively

inconsequential spin-offs of income from the expenditures of the federal government in Guam incidental to its use of the island's land.

Beginning with the strict limitations on how privately-owned land could be used in Guam under U.S. governance prior to World War II, the people of Guam have faced numerous restrictions on the use of their land that would normally be considered to be unduly onerous and generally unacceptable in a capitalistic democracy. Before the War, almost any use of land other than for agricultural pursuits or housing was discouraged; similarly, the market price for land was arbitrarily distorted because of the requirement that private land transactions first be approved by the Naval Governor, who regularly denied transactions in which he perceived the price to be "too high." During the War and immediately after the reoccupation of Guam by U.S. forces, private property rights were simply disregarded whether or not they conflicted with purely military interests in the use of land for the war effort. After the War, the "best" land, especially the most productive agricultural land, was taken for military use because of its topographical properties; other land that would be considered "prime" by today's standards (i.e., cliff line and smaller plots of more fertile property) was also taken without regard to the value (either real or potential) to the civilian population. Much of the remaining agricultural land was used for the relocation of civilians who had been displaced by land takings in other areas of the island. Development of civilian land was further constrained, partly by severe limitations on the availability of the capital necessary for development projects and partly by regulatory restrictions accompanying the particular military uses of adjacent federal lands.

Today, these "proximity" restrictions continue; for example, civilian commercial development in and around Apra Harbor is limited due to the "blast arc" around munitions handling facilities at Naval Station, and land development around Naval Air Station and Andersen Air Force Base is constrained in the attendant Air Installation Compatibility Use Zones. Access to private lands is blocked in several places, and in at least one case this is accomplished (in part) on the grounds that private vehicular traffic could interfere with sensitive electronic instruments used by the military, so that civilian development of private land is prohibited by military considerations. As Guam's civilian economy has developed despite these constraints, its growth (particularly that of the tourism industry) has been constricted by federal holdings of unused land. This is land which is not made available for civilian use, either because it is held as a "security buffer" to ongoing military operations, it is being retained for undefined "contingency purposes," or simply because the technical aspects of a method for returning the land to civilian control have taken on a low priority for the federal government.

The economic well-being of the people of Guam has been and continues to be negatively affected by the pattern of federal land use in Guam. The level of standards of living has been adversely affected; the distributions of income and wealth have been haphazardly distorted; the structure of relative prices has been contorted to the point that many development opportunities are hampered, and even the socio-political interests of the United States itself have suffered.

B. The Impact of Federal Land Use in Guam Prior to World War II

Although the premise may be contestable, it is held here that the very presence of the federal government in Guam and Guam's governance under the authority of a Naval Governor had an important influence on the economic use of land in the pre-War period, as well as on the overall economic development of the island. The economy of Guam was closely controlled by the military government, and only those activities that were in the interests of the military mission (or at least not even remotely in conflict with said mission) were sanctioned. Guam was occupied by the U.S. exclusively because of its strategic geographic location and its deep-water harbor. However, because Guam was already populated by indigenous civilians, it was necessary for the military government to encourage certain types of economic activity and development so as to minimize the costs of colonial administration and to protect the welfare of U.S. troops stationed here.

In the early years of the Navy's colonial administration of Guam, several public health projects were undertaken, such as the establishment of reliable supplies of potable water, the eradication of some of the more dangerous diseases (such as diphtheria and tuberculosis), and the disposal of environmental wastes. Roads and bridges were built in order to facilitate the transportation of military supplies and personnel, as well as to make law enforcement easier. Rudimentary schools were formed to generate an employable labor pool to meet periodic military needs and to educate the civilian population in agricultural and animal husbandry skills to foster greater economic self-sufficiency. Trading companies were licensed to provide a market for agricultural surplus so that the local people could earn the wherewithal to purchase those necessary items that they could not produce themselves. Overall, the economic development that was sanctioned (and, in some cases, encouraged) by the military government was a success (however imperfect) in the eyes of the colonial establishment; the U.S. extracted a great deal of value from Guam in terms of both military defense and the diplomatic advantage of a projected threat of force, while the costs of obtaining these benefits from the colony were maintained at a bare minimum.

Because of the nature of the colonial administration of Guam and the granting of certain low-level employment positions to some civilian residents during the pre-War period, it was common in the central part of the island for people to live on their "ranches" (farms) during the week and to migrate to more or less organized villages over the weekend. This had also been true during the Spanish era in Guam, when the localized provision of public services and the proximity to the government's administrative offices and private commercial establishments engendered this practice.

Thus, in the pre-War period, the economic impact of federal ownership of land in Guam (along with the socio-economic impact of the federal presence at its very basis) was to concentrate the population in easily controlled sub-municipal villages, to improve health and educational standards (principally to protect the interests of the military establishment and its personnel, as well as to gain the good will of Guam' residents with regard to the military presence), and to limit the types of civilian economic activity that were economically viable.

Particularly in the late pre-War period, the military control of land prices in Guam had an important effect on economic organization and performance. The premise under which land transactions required prior approval by the Naval Governor was that it protected the residents of Guam (who were considered to be relatively unsophisticated by the military leaders) from exploitation by those from outside of Guam who might otherwise take advantage of them. This was despite the fact that land ownership by individuals from outside of Guam was strictly prohibited. Whether this control of land prices showed foresight in preparation for the post-War condemnations of land at extremely low prices is not the immediate issue here, although there are some who view it in retrospect as a concerted plot to enable the militarization of Guam for purposes of regional hegemony at a minimum cost. What is at issue is that the distortion of the price structure in Guam resulting from artificially low prices for land had (and continues to have) adverse effects on the efficient allocation of land resources in the process of economic development. Any economic good, including the land resource, that is administratively undervalued will be overutilized and, in many cases, wasted. This is particularly problematic in a place such as Guam, where land resources are so limited that any waste whatsoever brings with it serious reductions in the wealth and standards of living of the community. These informal land price controls in Guam before the War had a negative impact on the civilian economy, but led to far greater economic difficulties beginning with the reoccupation of Guam in 1944 and extending up to the present day.

C. The Post-Reoccupation Impact of Federal Land Use in Guam (Late WWII)

Prior to the landing of U.S. Marines in Guam on July 21, 1944, there had been a battle raging in the air and in the waters surrounding Guam off and on for several weeks. For ten days immediately before the landing of the Marines south of Apra Harbor and south of Agaña, air battles had shredded the landscape with .50 caliber rounds and aerial bombardment, while the Navy engaged in the shelling of the island's major population centers from vessels off-shore; the forests had burned and the rivers had run red with the color of Guam clay. Some 26,000 artillery rounds had been fired from Navy ships, day and night, leaving the leeward coast of Guam in tatters. Even so, the invading Marines faced bloody resistance from the Japanese forces, as the Imperial Army desperately tried to defend its honor as much as the island it had taken, almost without resistance from the U.S., just 32 months earlier.

The Navy's justification for having so viciously devastated the land and, more particularly, the major villages of Guam was that they did not want to fight another bloody urban guerrilla war like the one they had just finished in Saipan, to the north of Guam. No one seems to be certain of how the decision to raze Agaña, Asan, Piti and Sumay was made, but it has been widely reported that Marines were surprised to find survivors in the concentration camps in Guam. The seemingly endless bombardment did, though, utterly ruin what had been the lush, beautiful paradise that was the western coast of Guam. The coming years of military construction projects to fortify Guam would take again as much land, and denude as much once more.

With the U.S. invasion of Guam in July 1944, and the routing of Japanese Imperial Army forces from the island by mid-August of that year, federal use of Guam land expanded dramatically, almost overnight. While there may have been other factors involved, the exigencies of full-scale war were used as justification for the outright disregard for private property rights by the occupying U.S. military forces. At one point during the final year of the war, the U.S. military occupied as much as 82% of the island's land, with the larger part of this acreage being private land for which no rent or lease had been paid, much less agreed upon. Some accounts relate that a landowner could be shot on sight by military personnel simply for entering his own property to harvest his produce or recover personal items. The gist is that representatives of the federal government in the persons of U.S. military forces occupying Guam showed no regard whatsoever for the private property rights of the civilian residents of Guam; those property rights which America holds to be so true and dear, those rights upon which the very foundation of the capitalistic system of economic organization is anchored, were clearly unimportant to the United States government in the face of the retreating, nearly defeated Japanese.

This is an extremely important point in these discussions: property rights, whether private or public, are the primary basis for the existence of governments. Governments are formed initially for the mutual protection of one group from the unwanted advances of another. These advances are most often acquisitory in nature, so it is property (and the rights thereto, as defined by the group to be governed) that forms the fundamental basis for the existence of government. As a protector of property rights, the government ultimately also defines those rights. This is another central role, indeed, a central purpose, of government, both with regard to external aggressors and in internal relationships. In this, governments deter anarchy. Defense requires arms and armies, the tools of defense and warfare require payment, this payment requires taxes, and everything needs order, and thus, regulation; so grow governments. In the process, though, at least in a democratic society, it is the prime responsibility of the government to maintain and enhance the interests and welfare of its subjects, both collectively and individually. It is not only the responsibility of the government to protect the physical well-being and safety of its subjects, but to uphold their economic security and access to opportunities, as well. This is true in part because of the inordinate power of government relative to that of the common man, but even more so (at least in a democratic society) because the government obtains all of its just powers through the consent of the governed. Without such consent, governments fail.

In the months immediately after the U.S. invasion of Guam in 1944, the property rights of the resident civilians were almost totally disregarded. They were grateful for their "liberation" from the horror and atrocities of Japanese occupation, although their living conditions improved only moderately at first. They were loyal subjects of the U.S. government, even though they were U.S. nationals rather than citizens and their status as subjects was without their formal consent. However, not only were their respective property rights not defended by their government (or by the government's primary enforcement arm), those rights were usurped and abused by the occupying power. Land was taken indiscriminately by the U.S. military, stripped of its pre-War economic value as agricultural land, and damaged beyond reasonable recovery by the activities of a

wartime army. Incredibly (or nearly so, even when one accounts for the attitudes held by Guam's people toward the Japanese at that time), the people of Guam were willing to waive their property rights in support of the war effort. This would be an enormous sacrifice for any people, but even more so for a people who were already economically disadvantaged after 42 years of American colonial occupation and nearly three years as hostages under Japanese bondage. The people did not, though, realize that their property rights were lost forever. They expected that the government would return to them what was rightfully theirs, once the hostilities had ended. The government never completely fulfilled its responsibility to the people of Guam as its subjects, but as unenfranchised nationals (and later, unenfranchised "citizens"), the people of Guam have had no reasonable avenue to assert their rights in these matters.

To put the scope of federal use of Guam land during this period into perspective, some population figures might be illustrative: In 1940, the U.S. Census enumerated 22,290 people in Guam, excluding military personnel; "natives" comprised 93.2% of the total population of 23,067, while "others" comprised the remainder. By the end of World War II in 1945, there were more than 200,000 U.S. military personnel stationed at Guam's many bases; adding these to the surviving civilian population, Guam had approximately one and one-half times the population that it has today. There were airfields, supply depots, fuel storage complexes, ports and docks, field hospitals, barracks and all other manner of land uses on a magnitude sufficient to accommodate the overwhelming influx of personnel in support of the war effort. Vast areas of the island that had escaped the ravages of the pre-invasion bombardment were now reduced to a level of economic value that was similar. There was no consideration of aesthetics, there were no environmental impact assessments or studies. Bulldozers simply stripped the land to make room for the troops and their logistical support.

At the end of the War, virtual mountains of munitions, material, structures, fuel, vehicles, and all manner of waste were left behind as the "boys" went home. To this day, the Navy maintains an explosive ordinance disposal team in Guam to handle the several discoveries of hazardous remnants of WWII each year (at this writing, 12/31/93 two such incidents were reported in this evening's news and there was a small underground explosion at San Vicente elementary school last year). Each year another few chlorine tanks burst underground at the undocumented sites of temporary water treatment facilities. There are many other toxic waste sites that have not been identified, but even many of those that are known are not cleaned up because the cost to the military would be "too high." The economic view of federally-held property in Guam is greatly complicated by the fact that there are so many unknown impacts today that are the direct result of federal land use here in the last days of the second World War.

D. The Post-War Impact of Federal Land Use in Guam (Latter 1940s)

By the time World War II had ended, it was evident that the United States was the preeminent world power, and that the nation had become the *de facto* "defender of the free world." To carry this role, though, the nation would have to be prepared to project military force anywhere

in the world on short notice; there was also the matter of policing the unstable powers that were left in the wake of Japan's adventurism, a crusade that had affected Asia and the Pacific for many years through its influence on China, Korea and the Soviet Union. Guam proved to have the right combination of characteristics to win its preference as a forward strategic base for U.S. military, commercial, and diplomatic interests. The vestiges of the military interest may be the most visible on the island, but the military interest takes on its value because of the commercial and diplomatic leverage that it provides. On the trail of its victories in Europe and the Pacific, the United States chose Guam for the privilege of being a place where the nation could fight its wars away from its own shores.

The War had left Guam with far greater capacity for warfare than could be economically sustained during times of peace. The U.S. had to decide what its ongoing mission in Guam would be, and what resources were necessary to support that mission. At the same time, though, there were marvelous military facilities that had been constructed during the War, and these facilities might be needed if war broke out once more. It was in the interests of the U.S. to retain these facilities as a "contingency" in the event that they were needed some time in the indefinite future. Consequently, much of the land that had been developed for full-scale warfare in Guam was retained by the military in the post-War years for potential use in the nation's new global strategy.

As stated earlier, much of the land that had been taken during the last year of the war was the best land that Guam had to offer: It was the flat land, also best for housing and for cultivation; it was the land surrounding the harbor, Guam's economic lifeline to the outside world; it was the cliff line, with the most spectacular views of the island's beauty and that of the surrounding waters; it was the interior river basin, which would have been the most significant source of surface water for a developing economy; it was the narrow coastal plain that had held most of Guam's population before the War. In short, it was the most valuable land on the island.

Rather than return Guam's land to its rightful owners after the end of the War, the Navy "condemned" it, using its eminent domain powers; the total amount of money appropriated for this purpose was a mere \$1.6 million, so land prices had to be set in order to fall within this budget. The artificially-set pre-War prices of record were used as a basis for compensation in the proceedings. Much of the land taken in this manner was not in use by the military at the time, but was acquired for contingency purposes; the greater proportion of this land has still not been used, but is still in the federal estate; other portions are now used as "buffer" or "security" zones around land that is devoted to one or another military mission.

The military takings of land in Guam in the post-War period were not uniform; some people (and families, given Guam's land tenure traditions) were treated worse than others. Many lost the bulk of their estates, while others were left unscathed; some were offered land exchanges (albeit for inferior plots), while others were only paid paltry sums of money, which had little practical value in Guam's controlled economy at that time. Consequently, the distribution of wealth that had prevailed in the pre-War period was overthrown, disrupting the social and economic structure to

which the people had become accustomed in peacetime; the distribution of income was similarly disturbed, which compounded the result.

Guam had never had a well-developed economy, but what progress it had made had been undone by the Japanese occupation, the pre-invasion bombardment, the post-invasion fortification and the post-War radical transformation of traditional land tenure and use patterns. Again, the power and privilege of government was abused to the detriment of people who stood powerless in their own defense (there were not even any civilian attorneys in Guam at the time to defend the property interests of the civilians living here). The cumulative result was a radical, violent and complete upheaval of the economic system of the island.

What had been very nearly an agricultural subsistence economy just one decade earlier, based upon barter in casual exchange transactions, was suddenly transformed into a wage-based service economy with mismatched labor opportunities and the monetary trappings of a modern exchange system. Huge areas of traditional farmlands had been taken for semi-permanent military purposes, while much of the remaining farmland had been converted into villages where the people were relocated from their pre-War homes. Many jobs were available in the construction trades for military projects (as well as some for private housing and small commercial establishments), and for minor roles in the military government's administration of the civilian population; virtually no employment was available for the agricultural skills most civilian residents held, and foreign workers were often imported to meet the military's labor needs, further depriving Guam's people of economic opportunity.

In all of this, the government disregarded its responsibilities to its subjects. Not only were the people of Guam abandoned at the outset of a massive multinational war, they were also subjected to massive bombardment during the reoccupation; not only were their lands taken for the war effort and ruined beyond recognition, they were then kept by the current occupying power and held idle while denying their use for traditional purposes; not only was the economy overturned several times in succession, there was ultimately no direct assistance forthcoming from the national government to aid in the economic recovery of the people of Guam from the catastrophe they had experienced. When the interests of a government conflict with the interests of its people, it is the well-being of the people that should prevail; in Guam, the well-being of the people was not only disregarded, it was denied. The government, the United States government, did not meet its obligations to the people of Guam, and actually used its powers of eminent domain to deprive the people of Guam of many of the economic opportunities available to them. That this was done for the convenience of the U.S. military in executing its part in national foreign policy does not justify the economic deprivation that the people of Guam have individually and collectively suffered because of the loss of the use of their land.

E. The Impact of Federal Land Use in Guam Under the Organic Act and Naval Security Requirements

The Organic Act of Guam (1950) gave Guam a degree of civilian government for the first time in nearly 300 years, but the Navy maintained most of its powerful influence on civilian affairs. Although the Guam Legislature was a popularly elected body, the Governor of Guam was appointed by the President and had veto power over legislation that could not be overturned by civilian authorities in Guam (only the President of the U.S. could override a veto exercised by the Governor of Guam). This allowed the Navy to continue its influence on civil affairs in Guam, but another tool proved to be even more effective: all persons entering or leaving Guam first had to receive security clearance from the Navy.

In light of the massive military buildup that was taking place in Guam at the time, it is understandable that the Navy would want to take the convenient security measure of closing Guam to all but strictly controlled entrance and egress; otherwise, maintaining security would have been far more difficult and costly. However, this restriction on travel also closed most avenues available for civilian economic development. It has been claimed that the security clearance requirements protected the people of Guam from exploitation by outsiders, but this is a questionable view, since many select outsiders (U.S. citizens and foreigners alike) were allowed into Guam during the period, and collectively dominated civilian commerce in many markets. It was during this period that large landholdings in Guam were privately accumulated by American expatriates, so the "protection" accorded by Navy security clearance requirements was not as effective as it might have been if that were truly a part of its intent.

The main problem that faced the resident civilian population during this period, aside from adapting to the new economic order that had been arbitrarily imposed in the wake of WWII, was an inability to maintain reliable relationships with suppliers and other business associates outside of Guam. Another key problem was the shortage of accumulated capital necessary to spur internally-funded economic development projects. In combination, these factors kept the value of Guam land low, and the Navy was still able to secure additional pieces of property as it saw fit at relatively depressed market prices. Those businesses that did develop during the period were predominantly small-scale groceries, saloons, restaurants, service stations, clothiers and amusement halls, along with a few small department stores (which were mostly owned by outsiders).

During this period, from 1950 through late 1962, Guam's economy was almost entirely dependent on military spending. The closure of Guam virtually ensured that outside civilian investment was kept to a minimum, but also that internal wealth could not accumulate. Without the creation of wealth in the local civilian economy, even that land which had been retained by the civilian community through the war years and the subsequent rounds of eminent domain condemnations could not be substantially improved. Even had the wealth existed, the closure of Guam made any form of large-scale development economically impractical. Whether intentionally

or otherwise, regulations accompanying federal land-use patterns in Guam denied the civilian community both the means and the incentive to develop its land.

F. The Impact of Federal Land Use in Guam After the Lifting of Naval Security Requirements

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, base construction in Guam was coming to a close. Federal spending in Guam was declining correspondingly, and Naval security clearance became increasingly unnecessary. In August, 1962, the security clearance requirement was ended. This presented Guam with a dilemma: federal funds flowing into Guam were diminishing rapidly, but the civilian economy was not sufficiently developed to compensate for the decline in income. Efforts to attract business capital investment from the States were largely unsuccessful, in part because of the image of Guam as an armed camp covered with military installations and Quonset huts, but mostly because Guam could not provide the amenities (transportation, communications, education, entertainment and retail outlets) that would be demanded by U.S. firms' expatriate employees.

The Organic Act had placed Guam squarely under the control of federal regulation, and the decade of the 1960s saw these regulations grow rapidly in both range and depth. Attempts to develop manufacturing in Guam for export to the United States failed repeatedly as regulations (and their interpretation and application by federal officials) changed. Environmental and land-use regulations designed for the States were inappropriately applied to Guam, to an economy that had been intentionally stunted by centuries of colonial repression; these restrictions hampered much of the potential for economic development that would otherwise have been available to the civilian community.

Guam finally hit upon tourism as a viable industry in the late 1960s, and the economy began to grow in spite of federal interference. The early 1970s brought the first true economic boom to Guam, with rapid development of hotels and other facilities to accommodate the growing tourism trade. Even though federal land use in Guam during the Viet Nam conflict caused social disruption and endangered the well-being of civilians (nightly bombing runs by B-52s and the transportation of heavy munitions through civilian population centers created a present danger to public safety, and disturbed civilian work and sleep patterns that had been established), the growth of the civilian economy continued almost unimpeded.

The end of the Viet Nam conflict and the depression of the tourism industry due to oil price escalation led to a severe recession in Guam in the latter half of the 1970s; while these cannot be blamed on federal land-use patterns *per se*, the mis-application of federal regulations attendant to federal land use did undermine any hopes of economic recovery in 1978, when the infamous "Adverse Effect Wage Rate" went into effect. The rising affluence of the civilian population in Guam in direct response to tourism development, coupled with the destruction caused by Supertyphoon Pamela in 1976, had created a surge in housing demand; in order to meet the labor

needs of the construction industry, contractors had started bringing in foreign workers on temporary visas. Under the premise that these foreign workers were displacing U.S. citizens from jobs in Guam's construction industry, thus creating an "adverse effect," the U.S. Department of Labor imposed the requirement that the foreign workers be paid according to wage scales derived from compensation standards in the industry in some 33 U.S. mainland cities. Being far higher than any comparable wage rates that had ever been paid in Guam (at one time, the Naval government imposed a three-tiered wage structure in Guam, with American expatriates being paid the most and foreign workers being paid more than resident civilians), these wage rates most certainly had an adverse effect: the construction industry in Guam collapsed, as did the aspirations of Guam's people for adequate modern housing. By the time federal courts overturned the Department of Labor's ill-conceived wage structure, it was too late: irresponsible federal monetary policies had driven Dollar-based interest rates so high that construction financing was well beyond the reach of most civilian residents in Guam. Even the land that was available for housing construction in Guam could not be developed because of the impact of federal policies here; this impact was indirectly due to federal land interests on the island.

Three factors combined to stimulate a return to economic prosperity in Guam during the mid-1980s: Dollar-based interest rates declined, Japanese affluence resumed its rapid long-term growth pattern, and protectionist pressures from the U.S. Congress induced Japan to encourage investment of its trade surplus back into U.S. jurisdictions (including Guam). The forced devaluation of the Dollar relative to the Deutschmark and the Yen at mid-decade merely accelerated the rapid development of new hotels and other tourism facilities in Guam, and attempts by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to once more undermine the economy by cutting off Guam's supply of temporary foreign construction workers were unsuccessful. From 1984 through 1991, Guam experienced unprecedented economic growth, with real income more than doubling on a *per capita* basis.

As the decade of the 1980s progressed, though, land became more and more of a constraint to further economic development. Guam's tourism industry is centered in Tumon, north of Agaña on the leeward coast of the island. In 1984, land could be purchased in Tumon for approximately \$200 per square meter. Tumon, though, was hemmed in by housing and medical developments to the southwest and by unused federally-held land to the northeast. As a result, land prices in Tumon increased to as much as \$2,200 per square meter by 1990. Hotel and other tourism-related projects that would have been feasible at reasonable land prices were abandoned. While nothing could be done to increase the availability of land to accommodate tourism expansion to the southwest, expansion to the northeast through the release of unused federal land (or allowing access to civilian-owned land) was denied under the auspices of "national security" and "contingency plans." Combined with the world-wide recession of the early 1990s, federal land-use (or, in this case, non-use) patterns in Guam once more brought the economic development of the island to a screeching halt.

While tourism may not be the only economically viable industry for Guam, it is certainly the one that has garnered the most attention over the past quarter-century. The development potential of the industry, though, is severely limited by the fact that the federal government retains (or restricts access to) most of those areas that are best suited to the visitor industry: cliff line property, leeward beach-front property and undisturbed forest vistas. The historical pattern of federal land use has been one based upon a view of land as being virtually costless (land taking values stood at an average of a fraction of a cent per square meter), so land resources were generally wasted. For instance, if a radio transmitter needed a radiation buffer zone surrounded by a security perimeter, forty acres of land could be devoted to this use; if another transmitter needed similar conditions, it would be accorded its own forty acres, rather than sharing all or part of the land devoted to the first transmitter. In this hypothetical illustration, twice as much land is used as is necessary to accomplish a particular set of purposes; in reality, though, this "nuclear" pattern of land use by the military in Guam absorbs many times as much land as would be reasonably necessary to accomplish the same national security objectives. Indeed, it is likely that the U.S. military could accomplish its mission in Guam with considerably less land than it actually occupies and very little of that land would have to be the best that the island has to offer.

Thus, federal land-use (and particularly land-use patterns) in Guam constrains civilian economic development; as the economy continues to grow, these constraints are becoming more binding and far more costly in terms of the opportunities for economic development that are denied to the civilian community. Even if the lands held by the federal government in Guam were of the same quality as civilian-held land, the impact of withholding roughly one-third of the island's land from civilian development would be enormous. The impact of federal land holdings on the price of land alone forces the cost of civilian development to be much higher than it would otherwise be. This discourages much of the potential economic development in Guam, reducing the range and number of job opportunities, thus holding wage rates down; it reduces the opportunity to earn profits from the use of the land. By reducing the amount of income generated within the civilian economy, it holds the standards of living of the people of Guam at a level below what they would otherwise enjoy. At the same time, it forces the cost of meeting basic human needs, such as food and housing, to be higher than it should be. It also reduces the potential revenues of the civilian government of Guam, adversely affecting the availability and provision of public services.

These adverse effects only consider one side of the equation, though; they are, of course, partially offset by the beneficial impacts of the federal presence, such as the incomes of civilian employees of the military and the flow of funds in the civilian community generated by the expenditures of the government on procurement and the spending of military personnel within the civilian community. Each year, the various branches of the military in Guam release economic impact statements specific to Guam, detailing the expenditures they have made in the community under various expenditure categories. Using gross levels of expenditures on military operations in Guam and applying adjustment factors (such as an income "multiplier," which is intended to reflect the cumulative impact of multiple rounds of expenditures made in successive transactions wherein the seller in one transaction becomes the buyer in the next), a total economic impact is computed.

However, there are several flaws in the analyses. For instance, only a portion of the gross budgetary expenditures are actually made in Guam at all; much of the money is spent on procurement of supplies and material in the States, and the physical goods are shipped to Guam. Of those funds that are actually spent in Guam, only a fraction is spent on civilian payroll, and many of those civilians are either military dependents or hired "stateside," and have base exchange privileges, and consequently spend only a small portion of their income in civilian establishments; similarly, military personnel spend only a very small fraction of their income outside the gates of the base, and then generally in a specialized segment of the business community that caters to their particular tastes. As David MacKinnon of the Office of Economic Adjustment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, wrote in the Summer 1991 edition of *Federal Planner's Network*,

Military bases are unique micro environments. Understanding how each one works is important to assess the impact of closure. Each will be different. However, generally speaking, *military families tend to be taxed elsewhere, spend a major portion of their salaries on the military base at the exchange, commissary, and recreational facilities. This spending does not enter the local or regional economy* (Emphasis added).

Similarly, a joint research project between the Departments of Defense and Commerce came to the conclusion that:

The [economic] impact caused by a military base, in large part, depends on the extent to which the local economy supplies the input requirements of the base, the amount that military personnel consume in the local economy, and the number of local civilians the base employs.⁴⁷

Further, because military employees can make purchases at the base facilities, all of their consumption expenditures do not take place in the local economy. Therefore it is necessary to reduce military consumption expenditures by the level of base sales to give an estimate of consumption expenditures in the local economy.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the economic impact statements tend to imply that the full effect of the military expenditures benefits the people of Guam. To add to the overstatements in the analyses, the "multipliers" that are used in the respective reports are based upon the structure of the United States economy, and not on the economy of Guam. Because Guam must import virtually all of the consumer and capital goods used here, expenditures circulate (on average) far fewer times than in the States before the funds leave the island to pay for imported products; consequently, the multiplier in Guam is much smaller than that in, say, Omaha, Nebraska. Rather than cumulative income being on the order of three times as high as the initial expenditure (as the multiplier used by the Air Force under the direction of Strategic Air Command headquarters just south of Omaha several years ago), the multiplier in Guam ranges from roughly 1.2 to 1.8, depending on the

characteristics of the initial multiplier; the multiplier for the types of expenditures made from funds that actually are spent outside the gates of the various bases here would fall at the lower end of that range.

It is important to note that there is a distinction made here between "the economy of Guam" and the activities that take place within the military bases. For all intents and purposes, there is a separation of base activity from the civilian community, a separation which is only highlighted by the gates and the fences, but actually derives from the difference between residents of Guam and the transients stationed at the military facilities here. The only workable perspective on the economy holds that the well-being of military personnel living on the bases is separate and distinct from the civilian economy; the well-being of military personnel and their dependents is administered by the federal government, and does not depend upon the performance of the economy here in any way. In a sense, there is no economy on the bases at all, since the allocation of resources and the distribution of goods and services is exogenous to the system altogether. One bomber, one missile, one ship more or less has no direct impact upon the economic well-being of the civilian community, other than through the expenditures that are made in the civilian community based upon different force levels; consequently, these must be considered to be outside the economy. Only those activities of the military in Guam that affect the civilian community can rightfully be said to impact upon the "economy of Guam," and this effect (although strictly unmeasurable) is most probably around 10% of the total impact claimed in the military's economic impact studies, or (generously) about \$100 million per year.⁴⁹

One hundred million dollars in economic impact by the military, as compared to an overall economy that is estimated at well over \$2 billion annually; less than 5% of what could be considered to be the gross domestic product of Guam. In exchange for this, the federal government holds approximately the same amount of land as that which generates the remaining 95% under private civilian usage. There is a gross imbalance in this, a gross misallocation of resources; the well-being of the people of Guam is harmed by the scope as well as the pattern of federal land use on the island. As time goes on and the population grows, as available land becomes more scarce and, consequently, more expensive to civilians, as Guam's image as a tourist destination (as well as for other types of lucrative civilian economic activity) improves, the losses in income experienced by the civilian community escalate, and the opportunity cost of the federal presence borne by the civilian community rises accordingly. This constitutes a negligent failure on the part of government to meet its responsibility even to protect the economic interests of its subjects, let alone to enhance those interests. While the exercise of government authority is necessary for the stability of the economy, the faith of the civilian residents of Guam in that authority continues to deteriorate in the face of harmful federal land-use practices in Guam, risking a return to virtual anarchy.

G. The Impact of Changing Federal Land Use Patterns in Guam

Prior to World War II, Guam was predominantly an agricultural economy with a relatively low population. The federal government held only a moderate amount of land on the island, and

the land resource did not represent a significant constraint to civilian economic well-being. After the War, though, the federal government absorbed vast acreage of land in Guam for military purposes, and even intended to take Tumon, the core of Guam's economic development in modern times, as a recreation area exclusively for military personnel. Without the intervention of community leader Simon A. Sanchez and others, the economy of Guam would never have advanced to its present level of development.

As time, technology, and the world political condition have changed, though, so has the pattern of federal land use in Guam. Most of that change has resulted in declining federal land requirements, but not in declining land holdings. As a consequence, the federal government is left with unnecessarily high administrative and other costs in Guam; as peculiar as it may seem, it has been left to the local government of Guam to explain how those costs can be reduced by altering federal land use patterns. As an example of this, the Navy determined that it was economically unfeasible to relocate military aviation activities from Naval Air Station - Agaña in the center of Guam to Andersen Air Force Base at the northern end of the island, consolidating Navy and Air Force operations there. The government of Guam was able to prove that the move would pay for itself through cost savings within a reasonable period of time; otherwise, the cost to the federal government of its land use in Guam would have been higher than necessary.

A disturbing aspect of the decision-making process in moving NAS operations to Andersen AFB is that federal costs were the only effective consideration; the costs (either direct or "opportunity costs") to the local government and the private sector were unimportant. This belies an attitude on the part of the federal government relative to its activities in Guam that has surfaced time and again over the past 95 years: the interests of the government are all-important, and those of the civilian community are unimportant. This attitude directly contrasts with the most basic precepts of government, particularly in a democratic society. Rather than the government existing for the benefit of the people, the people (and their land) is viewed as existing for the benefit of the government; there is something very wrong with this view of the world, and any economic system which is based upon it is doomed to fail (witness the recent collapse of the Soviet Union as a secular example).

In the future, the situation will become even more unbalanced. As time goes on, the constraint of limitations on available land area will affect the civilian economy of Guam more and more; consequently, the costs of the land constraint to the civilian community will rise, while the cost to the federal government of the land that it holds in Guam will remain relatively constant (since there is no mechanism for compensating the people of Guam for the use of their land on an ongoing basis). More land will be needed for housing as the population grows; more land will be needed for schools, government services, retail establishments, hotels and recreation areas, for warehousing, manufacturing, transportation facilities, and all of the other things that are needed by and define a community. More land will be needed for all of the ways in which the workers within an economy earn their income, and more land will be needed for all of the ways in which households spend their income.

The demand for land will increase, pushing civilian land prices upward, while a substantial portion of Guam land is artificially withheld from the market by an administered governmental costing system that (as of today) disregards the market mechanism entirely in its resource-allocating decisions. There will be no more land in Guam; the island will not grow (at least not appreciably). The expansion of demand in the context of a fixed supply adds exclusively to price; it does not draw forth any additional quantity of anything that exists only in a finite amount. Thus, as the economy of Guam grows, increasing the demand for land, the cost to the civilian community of federal land holdings rises rapidly to unbearable levels. This is not to say that there are no other constraints to Guam's economic growth and development; other resources, though, are variable over time, while the available quantity of land is immutable. This is a fundamental reality facing a growing economy that has no practical frontier: when the land resource is limited, eventually only changes in technology allow economic progress. With a wider availability of land in Guam, though, both present levels of income and the rate of economic growth would be dramatically improved, and the upper limit on Guam's economic potential in the future would be both expanded and postponed.

As time goes on, there will be numerous opportunities for the federal government to reduce its land use in Guam. As technology advances, the need for redundant communications facilities will diminish, new weapons systems will supplant the need for remote logistics support and munitions storage, proximate air fields and surface craft facilities will become obsolete, and extravagant federal land holdings for "contingency" purposes will place an increasingly unnecessary burden on the public purse. Technological advancement, though, is not a discrete process; it is a continuum, and much of the technology necessary to reduce federal land holdings in Guam is already available and has been implemented. For example, the Navy no longer needs sensitive underwater microphones to "listen" for the engines of enemy submarines, since it can now "watch" their thermal signatures from orbiting satellites; the B-52 bombers that were long a staple of strategic preparedness are now obsolete, replaced by faster, longer-range bombers that do not require remote air fields; the Polaris submarines have been replaced by the Tridents, which can stay submerged for months on end; even fighter jets are losing their value in the military arsenal to Tomahawk missiles that can deliver destruction with greater accuracy at a lower cost.

The effect of these changes in technology is clearly reflected in the pull-back from U.S. bases in the Philippines. Of the tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel that were stationed at Clark Air Force Base and the Naval Station at Subic Bay (along with several other, smaller bases), only a small fraction are being relocated to Guam and other points in the Asian-Pacific theater; the rest are being re-deployed in Hawaii or the States, along with some being reassigned to posts that are not associated with this part of the world at all. A lesson that was learned in Guam from this pull-back is that the "contingency plans" that were used for decades to justify inordinate land holdings in Guam never actually existed: once it became clear that the Philippines would not renew the base agreements, the U.S. military had to scramble its planners to create the plans for re-deployment. The people of Guam, as well as those of countless other places, had been deceived for

decades into believing that the military actually had a firm idea of what their land would be used for in the event of unanticipated changes in the world power structure; these people are now left to question what other convenient terms have been used to withhold property and other economic opportunities in the name of "national security."

The world is also changing in terms of international tensions and the posture of "world powers." With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the justification for the U.S. to maintain a large standing army has all but disappeared. The popular term today is "downsizing" (although the Pentagon seems to prefer "right-sizing," apparently for budgetary reasons), but whatever moniker is used, the huge military force of the U.S. is being reduced, partly in recognition of its unnecessary costs, partly because its threatening stature risks a resurgence in countervailing power, and partly because there is simply no major enemy left to fight. Coupled with the burgeoning budget deficit, the United States can no longer afford the extravagance of a 2 million-plus standing army, and is forced to make the difficult decisions that it has been able to avoid for so long.

Not only is the holding of unused federal land for dubious "contingency" purposes costly to the federal government in budgetary terms; such land holdings are costly in terms of credibility, once the absence of actual contingency plans is discovered, but they are also costly in terms of faith in the United States' political ideology. Further, it is a poor exhibition of the capitalist spirit to withhold economic opportunity unnecessarily from the people who make up the nation. The actions of the federal government in Guam not only affect how the civilian population here perceives the value of the American political and economic system; they affect how the U.S. is viewed by many developing and newly-developed countries in the region. Their view of the U.S. is diminished when they witness a government that harms its own people economically, and as a result they are far more skeptical of the motives of the U.S. in their dealings with the nation. The narrow budgetary view of federal land use patterns grossly understates the total costs of that use, yet this is the view that has dominated land use decisions in recent years.

The question has recently turned, though, from, "what do we have, and how do we use it so that we can keep it?" to, "what do we need, and how do we obtain it at the lowest possible cost?" While this latter question will be answered in different ways in different places, the concern here is with land use in Guam. While it is certainly time for the federal government to carefully reconsider its land use patterns in Guam, it is also time to consider the impact of that use on the performance of the civilian economy here. Land in Guam is divided among the federal government, the local, civilian government, and private holdings, with roughly one-third share going to each. The land held by the local government generates very little economic income, but serves to directly support the income generated by the private sector; federal land generates even less income in Guam, although it can also be said to support privately-generated income, albeit to a lesser degree. Work performed on private land in Guam generates some \$2.1 billion in income annually, but (despite the annual economic impact statements of the Navy and the Air Force) work performed on military land provides something less than five percent as much to the civilian community.

Thus, the value of privately-held land in Guam in terms of civilian standards of living is roughly 20 times that of federally-held land, disregarding the fact that the higher-quality land held by the military should be producing more per square meter than the relatively inferior land held by private citizens. By keeping the generation of income and the formation of wealth in Guam below its potential, federal land-use patterns diminish the income and wealth of United States citizens in a U.S. jurisdiction under U.S. control; they diminish the wealth of the nation. By all appearances, this is simply because no one will decide how to use the land more efficiently.

The process of change in land use need not be sudden or disruptive to either the military or the civilian communities. In the short-term, those areas of land that are idle and not held for any specific planned and budgeted project should be released to civilian use without any long-term conditions being placed upon their use. Over the intermediate term, a plan for the eventual consolidation and minimization of federal land usage in Guam should be developed (jointly with the people of Guam), and those facilities that can be moved or are scheduled for replacement should be relocated to their respective positions within the area(s) to be retained as federal land (although placing military equipment and/or facilities on leased private land should also be considered). Over the long-term, all federal facilities in Guam should be relocated so as to minimize the federal government's need to own land in Guam. Throughout the process, land that becomes unused by the federal government should be returned to civilian control under the same conditions that apply to land that is already unused. This will allow the federal government to minimize its land-related costs in Guam, and will allow the civilian economy to perform to its greatest potential. It must be noted that this in no way necessarily precludes federal access to and use of Guam land and its attached facilities during times of war or other emergencies; on the contrary, not only do war powers generally override simple civilian economic considerations, but the improvements to the land provided by private development would undoubtedly surpass the utility to the military during these periods of land held exclusively by and for the military.

There are other considerations to be made in the return of land from the federal government to Guam. Among these are the changes that have affected the land since it was first taken nearly 50 years ago. In some ways, some of the land has been dramatically improved; the land being transferred with the closure of Naval Air Station - Agaña will serve a very valuable purpose for the people of Guam as a civilian airport, and it will serve in ways that it never could while still under the control of the Navy. At the same time, much of the value of other land has been destroyed by stripping its topsoil, using it for waste (even hazardous waste) disposal, or flattening it into an unbroken plane. It will be necessary to find some way of restoring land in this condition to a more reasonable economic value when it is returned to the people of Guam.

When options present themselves in the process of planning for the relocation of federal facilities to a consolidated profile, the plan should be biased in favor of prioritizing those actions which will result in the greatest economic return to the people of Guam. That land best suited to the overall development of the civilian economy should be released first, or at least have its facilities moved if those facilities adversely affect the development of adjacent civilian land. For

example, as land is released on the Naval Station side of Apra Harbor, it will be quite useful for the munitions wharf to be moved first; this would allow the civilian development of the harbor to the greatest degree possible. (Perhaps no munitions wharf is necessary at all, given today's airlift capacities and the consolidation of Air Force and Naval aviation activities at Andersen AFB.) As land in the interior is released, the Fena watershed should be released to civilian control, as should the ocean waters surrounding other released federal lands. As with the land itself, both fresh and salt water are extremely valuable resources of the people of Guam, and their access should not be unnecessarily denied; as with the land, their value is far greater to the nation as a whole when held within the civilian economy.

There are many civilian concerns and there will be several opinions expressed relating to the prospective loss of jobs in Guam as the result of declining military land use here. However, what is suggested here is not the employment of fewer people (or, more accurately, no fewer than would otherwise be the case in a regime of diminishing military activity in Guam), but merely the federal control of less land; existing activities can and should be consolidated in a much smaller acreage. It should be obvious that the release of land will create more jobs in Guam, on net, and that many of these jobs will be more appealing to the worker than any federal position could be. There may be a temporary decline in job opportunities as some federal activities are discontinued, but those activities are not dependent on land availability, they derive from the national budget and other factors in world politics. If federal land in Guam is released now, and particularly if more land is released as federal land use patterns are consolidated, there can be a massive expansion in civilian employment opportunities without any decline in the availability of existing employment (other than that which would have occurred anyway).

As federal land in Guam is returned to civilian ownership, that land will be put to economic use. This means that the existing facilities will be activated for profitable ventures that will generate income and wealth. As this wealth accumulates, further improvements will be made to the property, improvements that are not necessarily incompatible with contingent federal uses. For example, a floating dry dock can be used to service any vessel that will fit inside, whether it is a civilian or a military craft; a pier is a pier, but if the adjacent waters have to be dredged to a greater depth to meet the needs of civilian vessels or the gantry operators have true professional skills, this should not reduce its value for military purposes during a time of emergency (or even if changing world political conditions in the future require the legitimate exercise of eminent domain).

H. Conclusion

The magnitude of federal land holdings in Guam far surpasses the need of the federal government, and works as an economic detriment to federal and local governments alike, along with the civilian private sector. In addition to the fact that the federal budget can no longer sustain wasteful expenditures, the nation can no longer afford to waste its economic resources in this era of heightened international competition. It is time for a wholesale reassessment of federal land use in Guam, with an eye toward the overall economic value of property, not just the narrow budgetary

interests of a single agency within the federal government. There is the potential that the overall well-being of all parties involved will be enhanced through this exercise, and there is the strong possibility that the methods and constructs learned in Guam can be applied more generally throughout the federal land tenure system.

Endnotes (Part 1)

1. Over 1,000 acres of this property, encompassing the non-housing areas of the Naval Air Station, Agaña (Brewer Field) are slated for return to as a result of the recommendations of BRAC '93.
2. For example, until the BRAC 1993 decision, military planners appeared to have supported the indefinite maintenance of separate Air Force and Navy aviation installations although both were significantly underutilized. Likewise, both the Navy and the Air Force maintain separate munitions storage facilities (cumulatively occupying approximately 10,000 acres of property or over 20% of Guam's real estate) despite the fact that the Navy has traditionally serviced Air Force munitions requirements.
3. Bywater, Hector, Seapower in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem (Houghton Muffin Co., N.Y.: 1921) This quote comes from Map No. 2 in the 1921 prospectus for war or peace in the Pacific between the United States and Japan. Shortly after this book was printed, the Five Power Naval Treaty of Washington Conference resulted in Guam's purported potential to limit Japanese imperial developments in the Pacific being curtailed by American agreement not to fortify the island.
4. Osgood, Robert, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Affairs (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1953) p. 339.
5. President H.S. Truman to Admiral Forrestal and Forrestal to Truman, May 7, 1946. NR, Official Correspondences, May 1946, MARC.
6. U.S. Department of the Navy, "Guam:1958" (ComNavMar, 1958).
7. Defense Nuclear Agency Budget Justification, in Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Justification of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1982." (Jan. 1981).
8. *Statement on the Pacific Area before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Feb. 23, 1984 p.14
9. Arkin, W.M. and Fieldhouse, R.W., Nuclear Battlefields, (Ballinger Pub.Co., Canbridge, MA: 1985) p. 123.
10. *Ibid.* p. 147. At p. 224, Guam was identified as having 150 nuclear bombs at AAFB, with 60 SRAM (short range attack missiles -- nuclear) proposed to be delivered in 1986. Naval Magazine's nuclear arsenal was identified as being a compliment of 45 artillery projectiles, 75 bombs and 98 nuclear depth bombs.
11. Since October 1988, the B-52's at AAFB were conventionally configured. In November 1989 a House-Senate Appropriations Bill Conference slashed \$47 million from the B-52 program resulting in a move to close one of three B-52 bases. The choices were between the squadrons in Guam, or those in Barksdale AFB (Louisiana) or Loring AFB (Maine). Senators J.B. Johnston (D-LA) and W. Cohen (R-ME) intervened to protect the squadrons in their states. "B-52's Out of Guam" in *Pacific Research* (Vol 3. No. 1, February 1990).

12. See various studies: Henry D., Crane, K. and Webb., *The Philippine Bases: Background for Negotiations* (RAND Corporation, for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Department of State: August 1989); Bowen, A., *Philippine Bases: U.S. Redeployment Options* (Congressional Research Service 86-44F, February, 1986); Gannon, W., *Alternative Sites for U.S. Philippine Bases*, (CRS, 1977)

13 . U.S. Navy, *Final Environmental Impact Statement for Proposed Facilities Development and Relocation of Navy Activities to the Territory of Guam from the Republic of the Philippines* (Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific Division: July 1993) p. ES-1.

14 . See Chapter 6, A.1.a.

15 . U.S. Navy, *Final EIS*, op.cit. p. ES-1

16 . See U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress* (1992)

17 . Ibid.

18 . Ibid p.4

19 . Ibid, p.13

20 . The nature of these projected cuts is acknowledged by the U.S. Navy, (Conversation of Mr. Mike Cruz, Acting Director Guam Bureau of Planning with Commander Jim Poole, USN, NAS Añañeta Base Transition Coordinator; January 10, 1994), although documentation outlining these issues were not available at that time. The ES3-A and P-3 Squadrons were originally to be consolidated at AAFB under the decision of BRAC 93, but in early 1994 the Navy decided to move the squadrons off-island. The Department of Defense formalized the 1994 actions with a recommendation to BRAC 95 that the squadrons be assigned to "other naval or DoD air squadrons in the Continental United States and Hawaii." (Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report, March 1995 p.5-98). See Chapter __ for a detailed discussion of the situation surrounding the movement of the squadrons.

21 . The Holland's decommissioning was acknowledged during a briefing at COMNAVMAR in March of 1994 (for Guam's Governor, Lt. Governor, Legislative Speaker and Congressional delegate) on the Navy's Guam Land Use Plan 1994. (GLUP 94) The Holland's decommissioning was not a proffered by COMNAVMAR but was acknowledged by RADM Kristensen in response to a direct question. The "planned" replacement is the USS McKee presently homeported in San Deigo, CA.

22 . The USS San Jose, Niagara Falls, and White Plains were homeported in Guam between 1981-1984. The USS Haleakala was homeported in Guam in 1986.

23 . Arkin and Fieldhouse, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

24 . See "Seaside Sonata: Interview with Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle" in *SeaPower Magazine*, (August 1993) pp. 9-13.

25 . Numerous books and articles have been written on this subject. For a U.S. perspective see, Armstrong, J., "Strategic Underpinnings of the Legal Regime of Free Association: The Negotiations for the Future Political Status of Micronesia", *The Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 7(2). 1991, pp.179-223. For a perspective less sympathetic to the U.S. view see, Smith, G., Micronesia: Decolonization and US Military Interests in the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, (Australian National University, Canberra: 1991)

26. Kiste, R.C., "New Political Statuses in American Micronesia", Contemporary Pacific Societies (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs: 1992), p.78
27. Mahan wrote in the preface of The Influence of Seapower Upon History: 1660-1783
"There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of seapower upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations."
28. Crapol E.P. and Schonberger H, "The Shift to Global Expansion: 1865-1900", From Colony to Empire (Wiley, New York: 1972), pp.135-202 and Vinacke, H.M., History of the Far East in Modern Times (Crofts, New York: 1928) p.155
29. See Stament of Admiral Richard C. Macke, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chied United States Pacific Command, Before the House National security Committee, Posture Hearing, February 28, 1995. Mackes entire testimony focuses on "Cooperative Engagement."
30. Webb, op.cit., pp. 66-76 and pp. 88-93.
31. See Baywater, H., Seapower in the Pacific : A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem (Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston: 1921) Chapter IX, "Strategy in the Pacific."
32. Personal interview with former Captain (USN) Richard Wettenbach, Homeporting Officer, CINCPACFLT Staff, 1979 -1982. The review of Guam (along with several other Pacific ports -- Perth, Australia, Singapore, and Subic) determined these deficiencies.
33. Courter Tour of Andersen AFB. An Air Force officer noted to Mr. Courter that AAFB, even when a SAC base, was not funded for base administrative and personnel support operations like similar bases were in CONUS.
34. Hayes, et. al., op.cit., p.163
35. Appraisal Reports required by U.S. Public Law 79-224 are available in the U.S. Navy Archives. Copies on file with the Administrative Director, Chamorro Land Trust (Mr. Joe Borja).
36. For a sense of the impact of these factors from a first-person perspective see, Statement of B.J. Bordallo on H.R. 5540, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, to the House Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs (September 14, 1972). Part of Bordallo's testimony provides an insight into the situation Chamorros found themselves in at the time of the land-takings.

"Some of you are perhaps wondering why these things were not raised at the time of the takings? Why didn't the people of Guam shout and scream bloody murder? A combination of factors led to many people accepting the terms of the taking.

We were in the hands of the enemy for over 30 months. From December 1941 to July 1944. permit me to relate my own experience during the japanese occupation...One night, in 1942, in the middle of the night, the Japanese took me from my home and marched me to jail. Unknown to me at the time, they also took my wife and my 13 children, the youngest being about 7 days old and marched them to jail. My family was released the next day. My second oldest son then about 12 years old received several blows from a pipe to his shins. They tried to have him admit that I was hiding George Tweed.

I was detained for six days and beaten within an inch of my life. Upon being released, I was given 20 days to find Tweed or forfeit my life. Needless to say, I did not find Tweed and they changed their minds

about my life....I had other less painful but just as harrowing experiences throughout the occupation. Other have suffered a worse fate in the hands of the enemy.

Words cannot therefore describe our joy, happiness and gratitude upon the return of the United States. This deep sense of gratitude still pervaded us during the land takings.

Another factor which influenced us as well as the military is the complete absence of those institutions that protect the rights of individuals. The island was strictly and absolutely under the control of the Navy. Our judges were appointed by the Navy and served at the pleasure of the Navy. We did not have a jury system. We did not have sufficient attorneys.

My family's property was condemned. I was offered what they said the land was worth. They never informed me that I could accept the money and still protest the value fixed by them. I was told that if I accepted the value placed, then my war claims, which was an entirely different matter and overly delayed, would be paid promptly."

37. As put by Admiral W.H. Smith, Chief Planning Officer, U.S.N. in Senate Hearings on S. 1362 (Authorizing the Navy to transfer lands for resettlement purposes) Oct. 18, 1945:

"I would say practically the entire population is or was self-supporting before the war. Their economies have been completely deranged by our occupation and by the Japanese occupation."

Also see Chapters 4 and 5.

38 . The period 1944-46 is characterized as "trespassory occupancy," condemnations began in 1946 and the period of fee takings was concentrated between 1950 and 1953. After 1953, most of the takings were for easements (Joseph Borja).

39 . See Statement of B.J. Bordallo, op.cit., (September 14, 1972). Bordallo summarized the Chamorro experience, and pointed directly to the excessive manner of military land-takings.

"The lands condemned showed that the military totally disregarded the interest, feelings and welfare of the people and grossly exaggerated the defense needs at the time...The passage of time has shown that the military in its condemnation policy completely disregarded the future needs of the civilian community and grossly exaggerated its own needs."

40 . See Babbage, Ross, "The future of U.S. maritime security and the Pacific military balance" in Superpower Maritime Strategies in the Pacific (Routledge, Chapman and Hall, N.Y.: 1990)

41 . See Chapter 5.

42 . See p. 22, 23 and 27 of "Repressive Socio-Economic Conditions in Guam Created by the Naval Government (1898-1950)" Submitted in the Guam Land Claims Cases, Master File No, 77-00072 MF, on January 26, 1986, District Court of Guam.

43 . The military plans to utilize certain types of properties began even before Guam was reoccupied by U.S. troops in mid-1944. As noted by the Deputy Chief for Naval Operations (Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman) in testimony on S. 1139, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (October 18, 1945):

"In late 1943 and early 1944 we made our plans for the recapture and development of Guam, and these plans made the maximum use of the natural facilities of the island, of the harbor, of existing roads, and of the land which was best suited to most readily be adapted for construction projects which we had to press at maximum speed after the capture of the islands of the group. In many cases the best sites for airfields were located on land which because it was well drained, reasonably level, and accessible had been sites for agriculture and for the life of the natives before we took the island."

In 1945 during a Senate Naval Affairs Committee on S.1139 (June 26, 1945) Senator Tydings noted:

"I do not know of any finer wards that we have got in the world than in Guam. They are absolutely loyal. They have suffered like they have suffered everywhere. Their men, women and children have been killed in the course of the fighting. We have taken over their best lands in many cases for Army or Navy installations, primarily naval installations. (p. 32)

44 . Such was the case made by the Air Force for the excess operational capacity at AAFB during discussions about the movement of aviation operations from NAS Agaña to AAFB. While NAS Agaña and AAFB maintained equivalent military populations, and NAS's GAO determined operational, maintenance, supply, medical, administrative and (non-housing) community facilities were only eight percent (8%) of AAFB's assets, the Air Force maintained that full integration of NAS operations was not possible given "contingency requirements." (Personal conversation of AF officials to Mr. James Courter (BRAC Chairman) during a visit to the base 10/20/93: witnessed by Mr. Vince Leon Guerrero and Mr. Leland Bettis). See *Na'na'lo I Lugat Tiyan (The Return of Tiyan): A Call for the Consolidation of Naval Air Station Agana with Andersen Air Force Base*(March 1993) pp.32-3

45 . The various "Rainbow Plans" prior to WWI (and subsequently developed up to WWII) contemplated war with continental neighbors of the U.S. such as Canada (and the possible involvement of Great Britain in such a conflict).

46 . Webb, James H., Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, N.Y.; 1973) p. 71 and 75-6. Webb writes extensively about the need for the U.S. military to be realistic about its land requirements in Guam and the necessity of entering into a "true partnership" with the people of Guam which clearly defines U.S. interests.

47 . Cartwright and Beemiller, "The Regional Impact of Military Base Spending," November 1980, p. 1.

48 . Cartwright and Beemiller, p. 12.

49 . Barakat & Chamberlin, "Analysis of the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on Guam," (Draft; 1992), PP. 22-28.

PART 2. RECOMMENDATIONS & THE INSTALLATIONS

A. DoD Recommended Closures and Realignment

1. Overview of DOD Recommendations as Presented

The Department of Defense concurred in all the recommendations for the closure and/or realignment of facilities in Guam forwarded to them by the Department of the Navy. Under "Major Base Closures," the recommendations listed the Ship Repair Facility, Guam. Naval Activities, Guam, appeared as a "Major Base Realignment," and Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam, appeared as a "Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignments, Disestablishments or Relocations." Finally, the Department recommended a "Redirect" of the Naval Aviation assets of the former NAS Agana to bases inside the Continental U.S. under "Changes to Previously Approved BRAC Recommendations." The specific recommendations and justifications were as follows:

Ship Repair Facility, Guam

The Navy/DOD recommendation for this facility was to "Close the Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam, except transfer appropriate assets, including the piers, the floating drydock, its typhoon basin anchorage, the recompression chamber, and the floating crane, to Naval Activities, Guam."

The report justified this closure on the basis that, despite "substantial reduction in depot maintenance capability" in prior BRAC rounds, additional excess capacity remained. The key part of the recommendation said that "While operational and forward basing considerations require access to Guam, a fully functional ship repair facility is not required." The DON desired the retention of the waterfront facilities to allow them the "ability to meet voyage repair and emergent requirements that may arise in the Western Pacific." The recommendation did not describe the specific circumstances that underlay these requirements.

The return on investment estimated a one-time cost to implement of **\$8.4 million**, a net of all costs and savings over the period as a savings of **\$171.9 million**, an annual recurring savings after implementation of **\$37.8 million**, an **immediate return on investment**, and a net present value over 20 years of **\$529 million of savings**.

The economic impact reported by DOD, assuming no economic recovery, is 1,321 jobs (663 direct and 658 indirect) over the 1996-to-2001 period, or 2.0% of the economic area employment for SRF alone. The report also includes a comment that the closure of SRF "will have a generally positive impact on the environment because a significant industrial operation will be closed, including the removal of stationary emission sources associated with this operation. This, of course, ignores any potential industrial use by the Government and citizens of Guam.

Naval Activities, Guam

The DOD recommendation for the harbor area in Guam was "Realign Naval Activities, Guam. Relocate all ammunition vessels and associated personnel and support to Naval Magazine, Lualualei, Hawaii, Relocate all other combat logistics force ships and associated personnel and support to Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Relocate Military Sealift Command personnel and Diego Garcia support functions to Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center-WESTPAC, except for the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, which relocates to the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the Afloat Training Group-WESTPAC. All other Department of Defense activities that are presently on Guam may remain either as a tenant of Naval Activities, Guam or other appropriate naval activity. Retain waterfront assets for support, mobilization, and contingencies and to support the afloat tender.

This recommendation justifies this realignment by stating that the Navy force structure will sustain another 10% reduction by the year 2001 and they must eliminate additional excess capacity. The Navy wanted to retain only that infrastructure to support the future force "without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force." They state that "shifting deployment patterns in the Pacific" and thus reduce the need for a "fully functional naval base" in Guam. "Operational and forward basing considerations," however, "require access to Guam." They go on to say that since there are no combatant ships homeported in Guam, there is essentially no day-to-day need for the base, as long as they retain "access."

The return on investment estimated there would be a one-time cost to implement of **\$93.1 million**, a net of all costs and savings over the period as a savings of **\$66.3 million**, an annual recurring savings after implementation of **\$42.5 million**, an **return on investment expected in one year**, and a net present value over 20 years of **\$474.3 million of savings**.

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam

The DOD report for BRAC 95 recommends "Disestablishment of the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam (FISC Guam). It states that FISC Guam is a "follower" activity, and in view of the other closures and realignments on Guam, the FISC can be disestablished and its activities assumed by other FISCs outside of Guam or by activities that remain in Guam.

The estimated return on investment estimated there would be a one-time cost to implement of **\$18.4 million**, a net of all costs and savings over the period as a savings of **\$143 million**, an annual recurring savings after implementation of **\$31.1 million**, an **immediate return on investment**, and a net present value over 20 years of **\$437.3 million of savings**.

The economic impact reported by DOD, assuming no economic recovery, is 580 jobs (413 direct and 167 indirect) over the 1996-to-2001 period, or 0.9% of the economic area employment for FISC alone. The report also includes a comment that a significant factor in the closure of FISC "further contributing to an overall positive impact on the environment in Guam is the shutdown of fueling facilities at Guam, especially Sasa Valley and Tenjo." This, of course,

ignores any potential reuse by the Government and citizens of Guam and the need to use the facility by the Federal Government or some other entity to continue a ready supply of fuel to Andersen AFB, a facility for which there is no closure recommendation by Air Force.

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam (A Redirect)

During BRAC 93 the Government of Guam argued successfully that the Navy should be made to consolidate their air operations from the Naval Air Station up to underused Andersen Air Force Base. As a consequence, the aircraft from VQ-1 (EP-3 aircraft), VQ-3 (ES-3 aircraft), and HC-5 (CH-47 helicopters) were to move from the NAS to the AFB, along with their officers and enlisted, and the housing was to be continued in operation to support Navy married and bachelor officers and enlisted men island-wide.

Rather than consolidate with the Air Force, an operation which both opposed and neither pursued with any conviction, the Navy violated the spirit and the letter of the BRAC 93 recommendation and transferred "temporarily" VQ-1 to NAS Whidbey Island, WA, and VQ-3 to NAS North Island, CA. To escape further embarrassment, the Navy is asking to codify this "fact of life" by seeking a redirect for the two VQ squadrons.

The only portion of this recommendation that tracks with the other recommendations for SRF, FISC, and Naval Activities is the request to move HC-5 to Hawaii. Without the MSC ships homeported in Guam, there is no apparent need to homebase the helicopters in Guam.

The specific recommendation asks to "Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission Report for 'the aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment' from the closing Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam from 'Andersen AFB, Guam' to 'other naval or DoD air stations in the Continental United States and Hawaii.'"

The justification for the change was listed as the movement of the MSC ships and other "operational synergies" desired by the Fleet Commander-in-Chief "for his surveillance aircraft, which results in movement away from Guam." The recommendation goes on to discuss the need to collocate similar aircraft and avoid constructing new facilities at Andersen.

The estimated return on investment for the redirect estimated there would be a one-time cost to implement of **\$43.8 million**, a net of all costs and savings over the period as a savings of **\$213.8 million**, an annual recurring savings after implementation of **\$21.7 million**, an **immediate return on investment**, and a net present value over 20 years of **\$418 million of savings**.

The economic impact reported by DOD, assuming no economic recovery, is 1,641 jobs (1,272 direct and 369 indirect) over the 1996-to-2001 period, or 2.5% of the economic area employment. The report also includes a comment that the redirect will have a negative environmental effect at NAS North Island.

Summary of Recommendations

The total impact of the DOD recommendations to close, realign or redirect the SRF, the FISC, Naval Activities, and aviation assets in Guam were as follows (all costs in millions):

•One-time Cost to Implement:	\$163.7
•Net of all Costs and Savings (Savings):	\$595.0
•Annual Recurring Savings:	\$133.1
•Net Present Value of the Savings over 20 years:	\$1,858.6
•Maximum potential reductions in jobs:	\$6,901.0
•Maximum potential reductions in direct jobs:	\$4,769.0
•Maximum potential reductions in indirect jobs:	\$2,132.0
•Percent Reduction of the Economic Area Employment:	10.4%

2. Shortcomings of DoD's Recommendations

The DoD recommendations appear short-sighted with respect to military readiness and future military use for contingencies. The recommendations do not seem to recognize the strategic value of Guam; are inconsistent with other DoD recommendations; complicate the operation of supply ships and do not take political considerations into account. Because of these shortcomings, military commanders in the Pacific have expressed their concern about the results of a BRAC decision which validated the DoD recommendations.

a. Strategic Value of Guam

Guam's geographic position in the Western Pacific on the other side of the international dateline is evidence of its strategic value. Guam is only a three hour flight from Japan, four hours from North Korea, and three hours from the South China Sea. By sea, Guam is ten days from Hawaii and four days from the Korean Peninsula. This close proximity to Asia and distance from the nearest U.S. soil is the reason why Guam has played a vital role in conflicts involving the United States from World War II to Operation Desert Storm.

Military commanders in the Pacific recognize the strategic value of Guam. This is apparent in the Data Call statements of the COMSUBPAC N46 and other notes which indicate that the value of Guam is something less than that described by force operators. The Commander of submarines in the Pacific noted that Guam is:

...the only forward deployed U.S. Naval activity on U.S. soil. It is of utmost strategic value to have a forward deployed base on U.S. territory where we are not subject to the dramatic effects of changes in a foreign government's political climate...Additionally,...Guam is of a tremendous benefit because of our capability and flexibility to do both nuclear and non-nuclear complex maintenance there.¹

DoD's decision to maintain the tender on Guam is a perfect example of the value of Guam. The Scenario Development Data Calls note that a tender would need to remain in Guam between FY96 and FY2002. The Navy is relying on the tender on Guam because there is no such facility available in the Western Pacific or Asia. For political reasons, Japan and other nations in Asia do not accommodate American nuclear-powered submarines. In this case, DoD recognizes that they cannot rely on foreign installations to accommodate their needs, but fail to realize that these same political uncertainties is the reason why Guam is so strategically important.

Moreover, military commanders at Pacific Command and Pacific Fleet have expressed their concern about the effect of the recommendations on their ability to forward deploy in the Western Pacific and Asia. Admiral Zlatopor, Commander in Chief PACFLT, has stated on the record that the removal of the MSC ships from Guam will complicate his ability to deploy his forces in the Pacific. If the MSC ships are moved to Hawaii, then they would have to be placed on permanent cruises. In the event of a crisis, the location of the MSC ships would have to be coordinated to meet up with the battle ships.

As reported by "Inside the Pentagon" on March 2, 1995, Admiral Macke, Commander in Chief Pacific Command, has also objected to the recommendations on two counts. First, he did not want to give U.S. allies in the Pacific the impression that the United States is pulling back, despite repeated U.S. statements that the nation will retain its forward presence in the region. Second, and more seriously, Macke has raised objections on a warfighting basis.

Admiral Macke's objections to the recommendation are based primarily on how the DoD recommendations will affect his ability to respond to the DoD policy outlined in the Bottom Up Review (BUR), which requires that DoD have the ability to respond to two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts about the size of Operation Desert Storm. During Desert Storm, Guam served as the major staging ground for materials transported to the Persian Gulf. Under the BUR scenario, if a conflict erupted in the Persian Gulf and North Korea, at nearly the same time, DoD would need the capability to flexibly respond. This response would mean that DoD would be required to transport thousands of tons of materials across the Pacific.

The DoD BRAC recommendation does not address how DoD would be able to respond to two major nearly simultaneous regional conflicts without the same capability that Guam provided during the last major conflict. The strategy outlined in the BUR demonstrates why Guam would be a essential strategic staging ground to respond to these two nearly simultaneous conflicts and why Admirals Macke and Zlatopor's have expressed their concerns about the DoD's recommendations.

b. The proposal to move the Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels to Hawaii will create an additional strain on the supply "pipeline" and create new inefficiencies in requisitioning needed supplies for the deployed and afloat 7th Fleet.

The movement of the MSC vessels and FISC, Guam activities to Hawaii would put a new and "undetermined" physical and fiscal strain on the 7th Fleet's replenishment activities. The fundamental issue is that the movement of vessels to Hawaii will add an additional twenty (20) days (round-trip) transit time to each deployment cycle in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean of the T-AFS and T-AE vessels that currently operate out of Guam. While it is not impossible to conduct such activities out of Hawaii (at a greater operational costs for the MSC vessels), we have identified the military value analysis (and matrix) as biasing Guam's strategic value.

While excess capacity may exist system-wide in relation to existing and the future force structure,² the exercise of full-scale contingency operations in Guam requires a certain "Guam capacity" to take advantage of the island's unique location. From discussions with uniformed personnel, from Admirals to Seamen, the strategic advantages Guam's unique location are undercut by the Pentagon's recommendation.

The Pentagon's analysis matrix does not identify this unique capacity and in fact uses evaluation standards which negatively bias the island's advantages. The "Guam" capacity/requirement, then, is not given sufficient weight in the military value weighing matrix. For example, all FISC activities recorded that they provided a "strategic or geographical advantage" and thus all were weighted the same. For mariners afloat who are serviced by this activity the "strategic and geographic advantages" offered by San Diego, Oakland, Puget, Pearl Harbor and Guam are different -- particularly Guam because of its more forward location. Additionally, over 10% of the evaluation of FISC's Operational Infrastructure was rated on whether or not the FISC was located with a "fleet concentration." While the "evaluators" felt that a FISC being located with a fleet concentration was worth over 10% of the Operational Infrastructure military value, they created a bias against Guam's unique logistical support capacity to be AHEAD OF THE FLEET. A CONUS-based bias in the military value matrix serves to diminish Guam's relative usefulness in other ways; for example, matrix questions such as "Is the FISC serviced by railroad" and whether the "FISC (is) within 25 miles of all transportation mode" clearly are impossible (and unexpected) in an island.

Simply put, the military value analysis and matrix can in no way compare a largely CONUS-based bias with the unique environment of secure forward positioning. It is not surprising then that Guam activities, such as FISC, ranked poorly in terms of military value. The domino effect began once the "matrix" determined that FISC Guam was not highly rated, and that cost-savings could occur by cutting military and civilian personnel in Guam while absorbing the mission at other places with "excess capacity" (e.g. Pearl Harbor and Yokusaka). If money could be saved at FISC, Guam, then the vessels which FISC Guam supports would also move. Even though the movement of the MSC vessels would accrue new recurring costs for operations -- for both the vessels and their helicopter re-supply support -- if the ships moved, more "cost-savings" could accrue by closing the "excess capacity" on a depot maintenance facility.

Notwithstanding our view that the military value matrix maintains a CONUS-bias which underestimates Guam's value, it must be also be noted that while there may be greater stress on the supply line and vessel rotation, the combat logistics mission in the PACFLT Area of Responsibility (AoR) could be carried out from Hawaii, Japan or even the U.S. West Coast. Moreover, given the "flexibility doctrine" which drives the U.S. post-Cold War military posture, the forward location of a FISC may be less important as U.S. AFS's operating in the PACFLT AoR frequently load supplies (for underway replenishment to the battle groups) at Jebel Ali and Singapore -- areas much closer to the Indian Ocean and Gulf operations than is Guam.

In carrying out this mission from a deployment base further from afloat activities, however, either the area command "strings" will have to be relaxed for battle groups or additional stores vessels will be required in the mix of CLF support ships. We have no information which indicates that changes in the operational commands of CINCPAC and CINCCENT are planned to accommodate the movement of MSC vessels to Hawaii. We anticipate that additional stores support capability (i.e. more vessel support) would be required to resolve the tempo and retention difficulties created by the movement of the MSC vessels to Hawaii.

c. DoD Recommendations Are Inconsistent With Other DoD Decisions

While the Pentagon's recommendations are perplexing with respect to the future military value of Guam, they are also perplexing in that they are inconsistent with other DoD recommendations. While we are not privy to all information with respect to U.S. plans which are increasingly focused on "interoperability"³ we do note inconsistency of the recommendations with other proposals proffered by the Department of Defense.

An inconsistency which has emerged since the DoD recommendations to the BRAC is clear in the recent decision to establish a regional depot level maintenance facility in Japan. Under this decision, Japan and Hawaii serve as the two regional maintenance centers of the Pacific.

While both Japan and Pearl Harbor have higher levels of depot maintenance capacity than Guam, the decision to "set-up" in Japan is inconsistent with the Pentagon's decision not to move FISC, Guam to Yokusaka (Alternative 1), and instead to Hawaii (Alternative 2). In the two scenarios for moving FISC, Guam into areas with excess capacity, the move to Yokusaka would have resulted in 40% more 20-year (NPV) cost-savings than the move to Hawaii.⁴ Despite the higher cost the move to Pearl Harbor (compared to Yokusaka) and Yokusaka's more forward location, the BSEC decided against Yokusaka.

In reviewing Alt1 the BSEC discussed the possibility of a future rollback from Japan, and questioned the wisdom of moving additional assets there. BSEC deliberations 11.23.94 RP-0455-F8)

Because rollback from Japan is a major strategic concern the BSEC saw little point in putting more assets in Japan. (BSEC deliberations, 12.19.94 RP-0514-F10)

It is perplexing to examine the issue of military value vis-à-vis these disparate decisions. The Pentagon, on one hand, decided not to base its warehousing and operational structure in Japan because of the instability in future basing considerations. Yet, in this political environment, the Pentagon, on the other hand, decided to place its Pacific area forward depot maintenance capability in Japan; an activity which will likely include nuclear maintenance in the near future.

- d. Political considerations are not incorporated in DoD's recommendations. DoD would be forced to rely on foreign bases which are less reliable.**

The political aspects of the Pentagon's recommendation are ignored. These "values" and "costs" could not have been evaluated by the computer driven model as they involve complex interpersonal and dynamic group responses to the recommendation. These sensitive values have been ignored in the recommendations, which, if implemented, would be further disquieted.

Recent events prove that bases in Asia are less reliable than those on Guam. In the fall of 1994, when CINCPAC proposed to station propositioned ships in Southeast Asia, our "allies" rejected his request because of political considerations. Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia all formally refused to go along with the DoD plan for American military supply ships to be based in South-East Asia. They rejected the proposal after expressing concerns that it would result in a possible religious and political backlash, that the pre-positioning plan might raise suspicions in China and complicate relations with nearly nations such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma. Consequently, CINCPAC was forced to fall back on more reliable bases.

Similarly, recent statements by Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota raise concerns about the U.S. reliance on military installations on foreign soil. The mission of U.S. forces in Okinawa is to provide a forward presence in the Western Pacific, with the air base at Kadena being the largest American air base in the Far East. Kadena's purpose in a contingency situation would be to give the United States air superiority in the Western Pacific. Gov. Ota has argued that the role of U.S. forces in Okinawa could be fulfilled as well on Guam as on Okinawa and that the forces should be withdrawn. Japan is coming under increased pressure from the Governor of Okinawa to force U.S. forces out of the island, and these pressures are likely to increase as a new post Cold War political, economic and military environment emerges.

As DoD approaches the next century, these political considerations demonstrate why the U.S. cannot fully rely on bases in Asia, even those on the soil of our allies. From an operational point of view, military commanders cannot pursue long-term planning if they are uncertain of their ability to rely on bases in Asia. Questions that now abound about the U.S. military's long-term presence in Asia are not considerations on Guam. Guam has already shown its loyalty and reliability over the past fifty years and it is the only piece of American soil in the Western Pacific that the U.S. would fall back on if it loses access to bases in Asia. However, Guam's reliability cannot be calculated in a computer model, but still needs to be considered by the commission.

3. The Economic Impact of the Recommendations on Guam

The Pentagon's proposal would result in major cuts in employment, the island's salary base, and government revenues in Guam. Additionally, in calling for the BRAC to allow the military to retain control of affected land and assets, the prospects for economic revitalization are not guaranteed. Lease arrangements by the military to local communities have proven to be poor vehicles for economic revitalization given the onerous conditions on reuse under such arrangements and the military's inability to appreciate private sector dynamics.

Guam is an insular rural economy over 3,800 miles from the nearest U.S. metropolitan area. Any federal decision that directly affects a significant portion of the island's U.S. citizen work-force will have a similarly significant effect on indirect employment, Guam's overall salary base, personal income and government revenues to support the general population.

The impact of the elimination of 4,796 work-force positions under the DoD proposal (3,487 civilian jobs and 1,309 combined officer and enlisted military positions) would occur rapidly. Of the direct jobs lost, 63% of the civilian positions and 69% of the military positions would be lost within two (2) years, with the remaining loss of direct jobs occurring within the following two (2) years. This near-immediate loss of employment positions, without a workable period of transition, merely compounds the economic damage that Guam will suffer and further complicates our prospects for recovery.

In addition to the direct employment effects, there will be indirect job losses associated with the net loss of income flowing into Guam and expenditures in the civilian community derive from DoD payrolls. Based upon employment multipliers provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce (and received via the U.S. Navy) and an estimated employment multiplier applied to Non-Appropriated Fund positions that will be lost to Guam, approximately 2,011 additional, indirect jobs are expected to be lost as a result of the DoD proposal.

In 1994, the government of Guam commissioned the development of an economic forecasting model by KPMG's Washington-based Policy Economics Group. A computer simulation of the impacts of the DoD proposal under this model indicates that the level of "Gross Island Product" (Guam's Gross Domestic Product) will exhibit a cumulative reduction of \$942 million through 1999 (with a present value estimated at \$789 million); extension beyond the capacity of the five-year model indicates a reduction in Guam's GIP at a net present value of \$4.2 to \$4.5 billion (depending upon which discount factor is used) during the remainder of the twenty-year evaluation period used in the COBRA model. Thus, the total present value of the reduction in Guam's GIP over the next twenty years under the DoD proposal is estimated to be approximately \$5.1 billion, if it is assumed that there is no replacement of the jobs or income lost through the realignment and closure process.

Historically, the government of Guam has collected revenues at a rate of approximately one-sixth of GIP, so the losses to the government under the DoD proposal would be substantial at a time when revenues have already been reduced due to a series of natural disasters in 1992 and 1993, along with a recession in the island's tourism industry due to Japan's slow recovery from the recent world-wide downturn. These losses should approximate \$9 million in 1996, \$34 million in 1997, \$54 million in 1998 and \$61 million in 1999, severely limiting the government's capacity to

provide the level of public services and infrastructure improvements necessary during this stage of Guam's economic development; with the prospective increased level of unemployment and the associated increased public costs, the government's available finances would be even further strained.

An "Assessment of Economic Impact to Guam of Recommendations contained in a Report by the Department of Defense (DOD) to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission in March, 1995" is submitted as an attachment to this report. This document is an overview of the effect of the Pentagon's proposal on direct employment, indirect employment, Guam's salary base and Guam's GIP prepared by the Special Economic Service of the Guam Finance Commission. These impacts are projected through the year 1999 utilizing the economic forecasting model developed for Guam in 1994 by KPMG's Washington-based Policy Economics Group.

The Department of Defense's recommendation for Guam is exceptionally vague in respect to the issue of how assets from the closed facilities will be disposed of. It states that DoD will retain "appropriate assets" at Naval Activities. The actual wording of the recommendation seems to demonstrate that the local community would not be afforded access to those assets in order to regain the lost employment and economic stimulus. Local military officers at COMNAVMAR have generally agreed with this reading of the recommendation.

The proposal to retain assets, where employment activity is being eliminated, negates economic revitalization. As has been noted by states and local reuse authorities, even where properties are being returned to communities under the BRAC process, the "plethora of legal restrictions has created a number of critical problems."⁵ Given Guam's finite land resources and the economic value of the harbor complex lands which are to be retained under the Pentagon's recommendations, the prospects for recovery from the loss of employment and economic activity is grim.

4. Critique of the COBRA Model.

During Guam's review of the COBRA model that is used by the Navy in preparing its analysis of the impacts of its recommendations to the BRAC Commission, several potential problems were discovered with the model itself. Perhaps the most troublesome of these is the use of a secular real interest rate rather than a long-term real interest rate to discount future cost and saving flows in the computation of a prospective action's net present value. The rate used, according to BRAC staff, is based upon the difference between current long-bond (30-year U.S. Treasury Bond) rates and the current rate of inflation, as per Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94; however, the nature of the bond market and the current rate of inflation will lead to almost continual changes in the real interest rate derived using this method.

While it is gratifying to learn that the BRAC (and the COBRA model, the GAO and OMB) has adopted the method recommended by the contingent from Guam during the 1993 BRAC process, it is disappointing that the government only partially implemented the appropriate procedure. As recommended in 1993, the appropriate real interest rate to use would be based upon long-term *historical* data, taking the difference between average long-bond prices

and average rates of inflation, both averages taken over a period of at least twenty years to remove the differential variability caused by the fluctuations in inflation and interest rates over the course of the business cycle. The reason that this is the appropriate approach is that it gives a more accurate estimation of the prospective difference between the two rates over the period of investigation related to the cost savings that the BRAC is working to discover. This rate should be somewhere in the vicinity of the long-term real growth rate of the U.S. economy (plus a few other, minor factors), or about 2.2% per annum. Guam's presentation this year uses this rate in comparison with the 2.75% rate used in the COBRA model; it is important to note that the lower discounting rate yields a higher net present value of net cost savings in the case of each of action proposed for bases in Guam (and would do the same in all other recommendations under the BRAC Commission's consideration).

Another of the comments that Guam has to make concerning the COBRA model in relation to the computation of any particular action's net present value is the apparently arbitrary selection of a twenty-year period in the computation of cost savings. While we have no particular objection to this, given that it treats all proposals equally and a sufficient period of time is allowed to test the comparisons among the different BRAC alternatives, we are left to wonder why the model does not use the relatively simple algorithm required to compute the net present value of any particular action's effect in perpetuity. While this may extend beyond the period in which the BRAC Commission is immediately interested, it would certainly provide a better estimation of the relative merits of various alternative actions.

Critique of the COBRA Scenarios Relative to Proposed Actions in Guam

In our review and analysis of the scenarios input into the COBRA model regarding the four actions proposed for Guam, one of the most disturbing factors involved the military and civilian salaries that were used. The figures for officer, enlisted and civilian compensation appear to be gross overstatements of the salaries actually paid; this perception was verified by data provided for each of the Navy commands in Guam by COMNAVMAR. While we understand that the figures used in the COBRA scenarios possibly reflect the fully-loaded costs of employing these personnel (i.e., including insurance premiums, retirement contributions and so forth), we still feel that they are far too high for the purposes to which they are put.

The scenario applied to SRF in Guam supposes compensation of \$76,781.00 annually for officers, \$33,178.00 for enlisted personnel and \$54,694.00 for civilians; that applied to the other proposed actions assumes supposes the same \$76,781.00 annually for officers and \$33,178.00 for enlisted personnel, but \$50,827.00 for civilians; the factors in the "standard" scenario, in contrast, use figures of \$64,440.50 for officers, \$27,028.50 for enlisted personnel and \$35,000.00 for civilians. Although COMNAVMAR does not distinguish between officers and enlisted personnel in the data that was provided, the average salary given for active-duty personnel is \$29,847.94, while the average salary for civilians is \$25,113.93. There are obvious discrepancies among these figures. Regardless, it would seem more appropriate to use actual compensation levels rather than the figures plugged at O-5 for officers, E-6 or 7 used for enlisted personnel or GS-9 through 11 for civilians in the standard scenario (as reported by BRAC staff); the actual compensation levels would be far more reliable in the BRAC Commission's decision-making

process than the much higher levels used in COBRA scenarios N95OM.SFF (for SRF) and N95DBOF.SFF (FISC, NAVACTS and NAVAIR), or even in STDFCTRS.SFF, which is presumably the standard used as a basis for all of the COBRA scenarios.

Also in the Guam scenarios, there are costs and savings associated with the Military Sealift Command vessels being re-deployed from Guam to Hawaii that appear to be out of line. First, there are costs associated with the movement of some 773 civilian mariners, when those seamen are actually homeported in Oakland; these costs, therefore, are illusory. In addition, many familiar with MSC operations note that there may be a requirement for one additional MSC vessel to meet mission needs, since Hawaii is some ten days further from the region served, yet there is no allowance for the cost of operating this vessel; the scenario, then, may understate the cost of the move by approximately \$59,900 per day, or \$21.9 million annually, the vessel operating cost.

With the proposed realignment of Navy aviation assets from "Base X" (Andersen AFB) to other points (one of which has not even been identified), there are claimed cost savings of \$180 million in avoided MILCON, yet it is Guam's understanding that this construction (required by a BRAC '93 action) has never been funded; BRAC staff informs us that this is a violation of the "rules" of COBRA assessment, in that no savings can be realized by foregoing unfunded construction. There is, however, ongoing construction at Andersen AFB to accommodate the movement of Navy aviation assets from the former Naval Air Station - Agaña under the 1993 BRAC decision; it appears that this construction is to be completed and then abandoned, since there is no allowance for cost savings by terminating the construction activity, nor is there any funding in the model scenario for mothballing or caretaker maintenance.

WHU?

The deviations from actual costs and potential savings that are reflected in the COBRA model are bothersome, both because it complicates Guam's efforts to assess the prospective impacts of whatever action the BRAC Commission deems to be appropriate for bases in Guam and because of our concern that the BRAC Commission may make its decisions based upon faulty information, and that these decisions may consequently lead to sub-optimal results. We believe that the BRAC Commission should interpret the results of the COBRA model with extreme caution, not only as those results apply to bases in Guam, but for all bases under consideration in the BRAC '95 process.

1. Military Value Analysis, Data Call Work Sheet, Naval Station Guam, p. 16
2. BSAT Memo to the BESC 2.21.95 Enclosure 13 (FISC).
3. "...the ability to operate in concert with friendly and allied forces -- so that in the future we can easily participate fully as part of a formal multinational response to "ad hoc" coalitions forged to react to short-notice crisis situation." *Forward...From The Sea*, U.S. Department of the Navy, 1994.
4. BSEC deliberations of 12.05.94 (RP-0490-F9) The 20 year net savings for move to Yokusaka were \$831.9 million while the move to Pearl Harbor was only \$495.7 million
- 5.. Report of the California Military Base Reuse Task Force to the Governor of California. p. XI.

B. INSTALLATION ANALYSIS

Introduction

The following provides an overview of the installations in Guam which would be directly affected by the Pentagon's recommendation to the BRAC 1995. In preparing this review, "Team Guam" recognizes that our knowledge of current military activities in Guam is incomplete. Moreover, we have no special knowledge on future military developments and requirements, except for that which might be gleaned from commonly available sources and publications, as well as the exercise of common sense and a modicum of reason.

Unfortunately, much of the information which was received from various quarters—the Data Calls, COBRA analysis and information requested of local commands through the Commander, U.S. Naval Force Marianas—is often inconsistent and unreconcilable. Throughout this presentation we have attempted to note data sources. In most instances we have relied on DoD presented data (Data Calls and COBRA), except where such information resulted from the application of a standard or common factor which did not reflect actual conditions in Guam. For example, in the following review of the installations, we have relied on information provided by COMNAVMAR.¹

The following overview examines the existing and the DoD recommended utilization of the following installations and tenants:

- 1. Closure: Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam**
 - a. Definition**
 - i. Command Structure and Associated Units**

SRF is a self-contained unit with its own command structure. This structure allows SRF to promote its own interests and activities with respect to its facilities and property. SRF is under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and under the area coordination of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas. The organizational structure consists of the Business, Administrative, Strategic, and Planning; Planning and Engineering; Production; Staff Civil Engineer; Supply/Comptroller; Occupational Safety and Health; and Command Evaluation Offices. The following is the Command Organization and its associated units:

Commanding Officer - (Highest ranking Officer at SRF)

- Production Officer
- Planning Officer
- Staff Civil Engineer
- Supply Officer / Comptroller
- Business Manager

OIC AFDM
Occupational Safety / Health Manager
Command Evaluation

Production Officer - (Also serves as the Executive Officer)

Repair Officer
Senior Ship Superintendents
Structural Group
Machinery Group
Production Support
Hull, Mech. and Elec. Test Branch
Electrical and Electronics Group
Meteorology Division

Planning Officer

Chief Design Engineer
Design Superintendent
ADP Officer

Business Manager

Total Quality leadership Office
Business Office / Scheduling
Administration

ii. Land

The Ship Repair Facility was established in 1945 as the Industrial Department of the Naval Operating Base. In 1951, it was redesigned as SRF. Its mission was and is to provide drydocking, alteration, conversion, voyage and emergency repairs, and other services for U.S. Naval ships, service crafts, and other U.S. Government ships. SRF is located in the inner Apra Harbor Naval Complex adjacent to Sumay Cove. The SRF land area occupies approximately 231 acres out of more than 4,000 acres of property in the Apra Harbor complex and includes about 4,200 feet of berthing extending from Lima (main industrial wharf) to Romeo.


Physical plant facilities include three floating drydocks, the island's only foundry and largest motor rewind facility, as well as pipefitting, sandblasting, painting and electronic module shops. Other facilities include a tool shop, a sheet metal shop, boilermaking shop, shipfitting shop, an acoustic range lab and the Reserve Craft berthing area on Drydock Island which is now under license to the Port Authority of Guam.



GRAPHIC SCALE



Location



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy

Existing Use
SRF

Wharf	Berthing footage
Lima	1,110 ft
Mike	270 ft
November	540 ft
Oscar	570 ft
Papa	510 ft
Quebec	251 ft
Romeo	1,035 ft

Waterfront facilities (Lima, Mike, November, Oscar, Papa, Quebec and Romeo wharves) are capable of providing complete ship-to-shore services. With the exception of two buildings, all SRF facilities are in the main industrial complex where ship repair operations are conducted. According to the 1986 Apra Harbor Master Plan, a land use pattern has been established for operational requirements consisting of operations, maintenance and storage uses organized into specialized work zones.

SRF is the only U.S. owned, land-based repair facility on American Territory within 4,000 miles.

iii. Assets

- SRF has 78 building facilities with over 444,041 square feet, including an industrial laboratory, foundry, motor rewind, sandblasting and painting, corrosion control facility, compressed air plant, shop facilities for tool, sheetmetal boilermaking, shipfitting etc.
- Wharf footage of 4,932 feet with full utilities, including three floating cranes with lifting capacity of 125 and 100 tons.
- Two floating drydocks that are 622 feet long, including 35 ft outriggers at 124 feet wide overall.
- Docking capacity of 16,000 long tons at 18 inch freeboard.

(Source: SRF Mission Briefing Handbook, 3/7/95)

iv. Personnel

There are approximately 676 civilian workers at SRF. Specifically, there are 666 permanent and 10 temporary employees. In addition, there are 15 stateside-hire workers who have return rights and 39 military personnel of which 32 are enlisted and seven are officers.

The occupation breakdown is as follows:

Executive, Administrative and Management	47
Engineers	17
Architects and Surveyors	3
Computer and Operations Research	8
Physical Science Tech/Chemistry	3
Administrative Support & Clerical	45
Mechanics, Installers and Repairers	607

By Fiscal Year 1997, thirty one positions will move to NAVACTS to maintain drydock activities, and by 1999, these positions will move to NavMag. Of the 676 civilian workers, 377 have priority placement, 94 have retirement rights, 94 turnover, 64 RIF's and 26 are moving or relocating. The average civilian salary is \$33,107.72

SRF has a four year apprentice program that was started in 1957. It covers all major trades. There were 631 graduates under this program as of February 1995, and there are 33 personnel currently under the program. There are 386 apprentice graduates are currently working for SRF.

v. Tenant Commands and Associated Activities

There are no tenant commands at SRF. The Ship Repair Facility is itself a tenant command under Naval Activities.

Associated activities and description include:

1. Business, Administration, Strategic Planning Department
 - Availability Planning Division
 - Administrative Division
 - Total Quality Leadership Division
 - Surveys

2. Planning / Engineering Department
 - Capabilities Division
 - Information Processing Division

3. Operations Group
 - Shipfitter Shop
 - Sheetmetal Shop
 - Welding Shop
 - Corrosion Control
 - Boilermaker Shop
 - Pipefitter Shop
 - Process Control & Inspection
 - Technical Support

- Industrial Laboratory Services
 - Machine Shop
 - Foundry / Patternmaker Shop
 - Marine Machinery Shop
 - Electrical Shop
4. Support Group
 - Paint Shop
 - Rigging Shop
 - Fabric Shop
 - Shipwright Shop
 - Engine/Pump Operation / Labor Shop
 - Temporary Services
 5. Production Support
 - Preventive maintenance
 - Repair Shop
 - Toolroom Shop
 - Crane Shop
 - AFDM-8 Docking capability
 6. Special Capabilities
 - Welding School
 - Phosphating Facility
 - Corrosion Control
 - Silver Brazing School
 - Piping Alignment
 7. Dive Locker Services
 - Recompression Treatments & Support
 - Underwater Ships Husbandry
 8. Training / Employee Development Office

b. A Brief History of the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF) Guam

The U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam, occupies a unique position in the Department of Defense battery of bases: it is the only facility of its kind on U.S. soil in the western Pacific. A second, similar facility is located on foreign soil in Yokosuka, Japan. SRF's mission is to provide drydocking, overhaul, voyage repairs, emergency repairs, shore industrial support, and other services for U.S. Navy ships, service craft and other U.S. government vessels.²

SRF currently occupies 231 acres on a point at the entrance of inner Apra Harbor. There are 4,300 linear feet of berthing space at SRF, from Lima 1 and 2, the main industrial wharf, to Romeo 1 and 2 (Chart 1). Facilities at the waterfront provide complete ship-to-shore services. Current staffing levels are 676 civilian and 39 military personnel.³

SRF Guam is under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and under the area coordination of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas (COMNAVMAR).

Just before the turn of the century, Captain Alfred Mahan recommended a coaling station be established in the Ladrones Islands, "probably Guam."⁴ The Navy recognized the importance of the deep water port of Apra Harbor, and its advantages have attracted U.S. political and military interests since that time. (Apra's leeward location and deep, easily navigable waters are perfectly suited for port activities and other maritime support, including ship repair.)

Prior to World War II, Apra was used primarily for the movement of military cargo, and the port facilities were known as the Navy Yard. The land surrounding the harbor was, in most part, privately held, and the village of Sumay was the center of commerce for the island.

Apra Harbor was designated "Lion Six" immediately after Guam's recapture from the Japanese in 1944.⁵ It was later changed to the Naval Operations Base (NOB) Guam, and the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF) was established in January, 1945, as the Industrial Department of the NOB. The activity was initially designed to meet wartime needs and was manned entirely by military personnel under the direction of an Industrial Manager.⁶

Near the end of World War II, the NOB was at peak staffing, with over 4,000 personnel, utilizing 11 floating drydocks and performing repairs on as many as 166 vessels at one time. These repairs ranged from minor operational maintenance to the complete rehabilitation of aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers.⁷ In 1945, more military cargo was moved in and out of Apra than any other harbor in the western Pacific.⁸

Long range military plans called for the development of the protected waters of inner and outer Apra Harbor as a base to rival Pearl Harbor, but the end of World War II reduced the need for such a major facility. The proposal to build a "Little Pearl" never became reality.⁹

In August, 1951, the Industrial Department became a Ship Repair Facility, under the command of an Engineering Duty Officer.¹⁰ Navy personnel were gradually replaced by civilian employees, primarily Filipino contract workers and "stateside hires," civil service employees recruited from the mainland United States and granted special benefits not available to locally recruited civilians.

In 1957 a four-year Apprenticeship Program was established to train and develop skilled local personnel as future key employees and supervisors. The program has been extremely successful, allowing SRF to gradually replace hundreds of stateside hires with local employees. In 1995, SRF's complement of civilian employees includes only 15 stateside hires. Including the March, 1995, graduating class of 25, nearly 631 apprentices have successfully completed the program, with 386 currently employed at SRF.¹¹

Guam was devastated by two strong storms in the early 1960's, Super Typhoon Karen in November, 1962, and Typhoon Olive in April 1963. The storms caused major damage to SRF buildings, facilities and equipment.

The number of personnel assigned to SRF slowly declined until the onset of the Vietnam War brought an increased need for its services. By 1969, manning had peaked at nearly 2,400 civilians, including about 1,200 contract hires from the Philippines, and over 200 military personnel

The withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam several years later, and the subsequent reduction of workload, caused manning to decline again. In 1971, 450 contract and civil service workers were released. In 1975, Destroyer Escort Squadron 15 and other activities were moved from SRF Guam to Yokosuka, and the Navy announced the facility would be closed. A reduction in force reduced SRF personnel even further until manning reached an all-time low of 500 civilians and 113 military in 1976.¹² An uproar from the community and a well-organized campaign to save SRF helped to convince the DOD to rescind their decision.

Guam was once again struck by a major storm, Super Typhoon Pamela, in May of 1976. SRF suffered major damage. The decision to rebuild indicated a commitment to keep the facility functioning.

The number of civilian personnel grew to 700 in 1977 and it stabilized at that figure until 1982. Temporary civil service employees were brought on board to supplement permanent staff on an as-needed basis.

The first AFS vessel to be home ported on Guam, the USS San Jose, arrived in 1981, followed by the USS Niagara Falls (1983) and the USS White Plains (1984). Civilian employment at SRF once again began to grow, peaking at over 1,000 in 1987.

Two typhoons, Russ in December, 1990, and Yuri in November, 1991, affected several SRF buildings. Russ caused extensive damage to the Supply Storage area, and Yuri damaged the Richland's mooring facilities.¹³

Between Russ and Yuri, DOD implemented a hiring freeze and SRF's complement of personnel, both civilian and military, began a slow decline to present levels.

SRF has facilities and capabilities unique to Guam and the western Pacific. It is the only U.S. Department of Transportation certified facility in this part of the world for recertification requirements for breathing air and high pressure air cylinders. SRF has the only foundry, environmentally controlled sandblasting and painting facility and micro-miniature circuit board and corrosion control facilities on Guam. Its floating cranes, with a lifting capacity of 100 and 125 tons respectively, are the only ones of their type on Guam. SRF also has the only shore-based recompression chamber in the region, manned and operated by SRF divers, who have performed over 300 humanitarian missions.¹⁴

c. Recent Activities at the Installation

Activities

SRF Guam provides shore industrial support, repair, maintenance, overhaul and drydocking services to U.S. Seventh Fleet ships, USS WHITE PLAINS (AFS 4), USS HOLLAND (AS 32); homeported Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, USNS SPICA (TAFS 9), USNS KILAUEA (TAE 26), USNS CATAWBA (TATF 168), USNS NARRAGANSETT (TATF 167), USNS MARS (TAFS 1); to the U.S. Coast Guard ships BASSWOOD (WPB 388) and GALVESTON ISLAND (WPB 1349); and, NOGALES (YTB 777), KETCHIKAN (YTB 795) and WEEHAWKEN (YTB 776).¹⁵

Current Missions

- Emergent and scheduled docking support for USN submarines, surface ships, MSC ships, service craft, and vessels of other governmental agencies. SRF Guam has the only floating dry dock in the Mariana Islands and is the only nuclear capable docking facility in the area.
- Diving and salvage services/maintenance and operation of the island's only hyperbaric chamber.
- Overhaul, repair, and alteration of USN ships, MSC ships, service craft and vessels of other governmental agencies.
- Emergent infrastructure maintenance and repair as requested by other federal agencies.¹⁶

Current Unique Missions

- Recompression Chamber
- Industrial Lab (chemical and metallurgical)
- Drydocking
- Diving and Salvaging
- Farthest Western Pacific U.S. Territory capable of ship repair in consonance with Title 10 USC.¹⁷

Customer Funding

Over the last eight years, funding for SRF was generated from four sources, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the Naval Surface Pacific (SURFPAC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and OTHER categories (Other Naval Activities, Army, Air Force, Federal

Agencies, Coast Guard, Government of Guam, Commercial Agencies and foreign military governments).

SRF's funding level over the last eight years has dropped by 46% from \$52m in FY 1988 to the current fiscal year level of \$28 m. The highest funding level was \$61 m in 1991 and the most significant drops occurred in FY 1991 by 46.5% and FY 1994 by 33.3% and is attributable to the downsizing program.

Analysis of the funding sources for SRF indicates that from FY 1988 to FY 1993, SURFPAC accounted for the majority (over 50%) of the workload in the shipyard, and the highest level was in FY 1989 at 79.2%. With the downsizing in FY 1994, a shift occurred in 1995 so that funding from NAVSEA and SURFPAC are now insignificant, and the shipyard is now dependent on MSC and the OTHER category.

Manning Profile

During the last eight years, the total workforce has declined by 35% from 1,096 in FY 1988 to the current level of 712. The decrease in manpower was most significant in the last two (2) years, 19.8% in FY 1994 and 15.1% in FY 1995. SRF civilian workers have been encouraged to take early retirement and voluntary resignation. In 1994 alone, 39 personnel took early retirement (VERA) and 18 personnel took early resignation incentives.

Civil servants make up the majority of SRF's personnel. In FY 1986, they were 81.0% of the workforce compared with the current level of 93.7%. The impact of the Navy's downsizing was significant in FY 1995 with the 64.2% decline in the number of military personnel.

Regional Support

Since SRF Guam is the only industrial repair facility in Guam, it provides valuable service to other branches of the military as follows.

Activity Name	Location	Support Function
USAF (OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENT)	ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE GUAM	REPAIR/CALIBRATION OF TEST EQUIPMENT & MISC. EQUIPMENT, CORROSION CONTROL - ISSA
U.S. ARMY RESERVE (OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENT)	SUMAY, GUAM	REPAIR/CALIBRATION OF TEST EQUIPMENT & MISC EQUIPMENT - ISSA
GUAM NATIONAL GUARD	TAMUNING, GUAM	REPAIR/CALIBRATION OF TEST EQUIPMENT & MISC EQUIPMENT - ISSA

U.S. COAST GUARD (OTHER FEDERAL AGENCY)	NAVSTA VESSELS GUAM	REPAIR COAST GUARD
U.S. ARMY (OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENT)	SCHOEFIELD BARRACKS HI	REPAIR ARMY VESSELS
NCTAMS WESTPAC (U.S. NAVY COMMUNICATION STATION)	FINEGAYAN GUAM	REPAIR & CALIBRATION OF MISC EQUIPMENT
NAPRA (NAVAL AIR PACIFIC REPAIR ACTIVITY)	BARRIGADA GUAM	REPAIR & MFG OF VARIOUS EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS
AIMD (U.S. NAVY)	BARRIGADA, GUAM	REPAIR & MFG OF VARIOUS EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS
EOD MU-5 (U.S. NAVY)	NAVAL MAGAZINE, GUAM	REPAIR/TEST MISC EQUIPMENT
HC-5 (U.S. NAVY)	ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM	MFG & TEST MISC COMPONENTS (I.E. SLINGS, EQUIPMENT PARTS, ETC.)
MOMAG UNITS (U.S. NAVY)	NAVAL MAGAZINE, GUAM	REPAIR/TEST MISC EQUIPMENT
NCCOSC ISE WEST FACILITY (U.S. NAVY)	FINEGAYAN GUAM	PROVIDE TECHNICAL LABOR INSTLN OF ELEC/ELEX EQUIPMENT
NCCOSC ISE WEST FACILITY (U.S. NAVY)	PEARL HARBOR, HI	TEST/CALIBRATE ELEX TEST EQUIPMENT AND RADIAC EQUIPMENT
COMNAVSPECWARGRU (U.S. NAVY)	NAVSTA, GUAM (SUMAY)	REPAIR/TEST PATROL BOATS ONE /CRAFT AND MISC EQUIPMENT

PWC (U.S. NAVY)	NAVSTA, GUAM (SUMAY)	FLOATING CRANE ASSIST AND REPAIR/TEST EQUIPMENT
FISC (U.S. NAVY)	NAVSTA,	FLOATING CRANE ASSIST GUAM (SUMAY) CRAFTS, BOATS & MISC EQUIPMENT
NAVACTS	NAVSTA, GUAM (SUMAY)	OVERHAUL/TESTER VICE CRAFTS, BARGES & MISC EQUIPMENT
COMSCWESTPAC (MILITARY SEA LIFT COMMAND, WESTPAC)	NAVSTA, GUAM (SUMAY)	OVERHAUL/TEST MSC SHIPS
COMLOGWESTPAC (U.S. NAVY)	NAVSTA, GUAM (SUMAY)	OVERHAUL/TEST SHIPS AND CRAFT UNDER COMNAVSURFPAC COG ASSIGNED TO GUAM AVAILS
COMSUBGRU SEVEN (U.S. NAVY)	PITI, GUAM	PROVIDE REPAIR ASSIST AND REP MFG. OF VARIOUS EQUIPMENT PARTS FOR SUBMARINE & SUBMARINE TENDER

SRF also provides repair of various equipment, the manufacturing of parts and floating crane services to the Government of Guam through the Guam Power Authority, Port Authority of Guam and the Public Utility Agency of Guam. Without SRF, these Government of Guam agencies would have to seek off-island services in the U.S. mainland or Asia.¹⁸

2. Realignment: Naval Activities (NavActs), Guam

a. Definition

Naval Activities, Guam is a command established on 24 October, 1994 encompassing the former Naval Station (Guam) and Naval Magazine (Guam). Naval Activities supervises a broad range of facilities and subordinate commands with the mission of supporting U.S. Navy operations on Guam. The mission of Naval Activities is:

1. to operate and maintain base facilities for the logistical support of homeported units and visiting operating forces in the Pacific Fleet and designated tenants and shore activities;
2. to receive, renovate, maintain, store and issue ammunition, explosives, expendable ordinance items, weapons and technical ordinance material;
3. to perform other duties as may be directed by higher authority.

In this review of Naval Activities, a distinction between "Naval Station" and "Naval Magazine" operations is made for two reasons. First, most of the data collected in the BRAC data calls makes the distinction since it was collected prior to the consolidation of the separate commands under "Naval Activities, Guam" in October 1994. Secondly, although presently under one command, the magazine occupies an area that is separated from the Naval Station and the majority of its tenant activities.

Despite this distinction, and the BRAC Scenario Development Data Call which proposes to consolidate "Naval Activities Guam" into a command called "Naval Magazine, Guam" in 1999, it is assumed that "Naval Activities" will continue as the command. It is assumed that the Scenario Development Data Call's proposal to consolidate NavActs into Naval Magazine, Guam in 1999, was driven by the absence of an understanding of the command consolidation that occurred in October of 1994.

Discussing the history of Naval Activities on Guam is synonymous to discussing the entire period of American history in Guam since 1898, when U.S. Navy warships seized the island from Spain. Prior to Guam's capture, Captain Alfred Mahan had recommended a coaling station be established in the Marianas Islands, "probably Guam."³ This posture was reflected in the original protocols of the Treaty of Peace between the U.S. and the Empire of Spain which provided that the U.S. would take one of the islands of the Marianas. When the Treaty of Peace was finalized, Guam was the island in the Marianas selected by the U.S. Government.



The Navy recognized the importance of the deep water port of Apra Harbor, and its advantages have attracted U.S. political and military interests since that time. Apra's leeward location and deep, easily navigable waters are perfectly suited for port activities and other maritime support, including ship repair. The role of the Navy has, either directly or indirectly, been responsible for determining the course of the island's development. This Navy interest has largely been driven by port requirements and access.

i. Command Structure & Associated Units


The Commanding Officer, Naval Activities, Guam is under the immediate supervision of the Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Area Coordination and the Major Claimant are under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).

As earlier noted, NavActs encompasses both port (and related) activities as well as munitions storage and handling. Within the port area of the Apra Harbor Complex, additional commands operate, including a Naval Ship Repair Facility, a Fleet Industrial Supply Center and a Public Works Center.


Numerous units are located with NavActs; from area command coordination (COMNAVMAR), homeported ship operations, large follower activities (such as the Public Works Center and the Naval Exchange) to small units such as the Navy Legal Services Office.



Legend



- Conservation
- Historic Preservation
- Recreation
- Medium Density Development
- Commercial
- Public Use
- Low Density Development
- Light Industrial
- Heavy Industrial
- Retained by the Navy



Existing Use -- Apra Harbor Complex



GRAPHIC SCALE

MILES 2 3 4 5 6

Location



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy

Existing Use

Naval Magazine



GRAPHIC SCALE


MILES 1 2 3 4 5 6

Location



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy



*Existing Use
Nimitz Hill*

ii. **Land**

Apra Harbor Complex

The following table depicts the amounts of land (inclusive of POL facilities and housing in the Apra Heights area) in the Apra Harbor Naval Complex under the control of the four commands.

Lands Under Separate Command at Apra Harbor Naval Complex

Naval Station (NavActs), Guam	4,659.66
Public Works Center, Guam	2,135.69
Fleet Industrial Support Center, Guam	1,454.41
Ship Repair Facility, Guam	231.0
TOTAL	8,480.76

Source: Apra Harbor Master Plan (1986) p. B-34

Naval Magazine and Fena Watershed

In addition to the land in the Apra Harbor Complex, the area of the magazine and a watershed area for surface water (Fena Lake) is also under the Command of NavActs. The "naval magazine" component of Naval Activities is located in Santa Rita, Guam. The magazine area is inclusive of 5,026 acres of property covering the naval magazine proper, 3,670 acres of which is located in the Fena watershed area. 181 acres of property (in two parcels) have been identified as "releasable" since 1977 and are designated for return to Guam under U.S. Public Law 103-339.

Nimitz Hill

The Nimitz Hill Annex comprises an area of approximately of 758.69 acres, of which 217 acres have been identified by the Navy as "releasable" since 1977. The Nimitz Hill Annex host several functions: Headquarters for the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas (COMNAVMAR), a oceanographic/typhoon warning center as well as housing and other navy ancillary activities.

iii. **Assets**

The primary facilities under NavActs include Orote Point, Barracks and Administration, Apra Harbor Waterfront, NEX Commissary Complex, Polaris Point, Nimitz Hill, and Camp Covington. Assets also include the former Naval Magazine since Oct., 1994.

Waterfront

The following table defines the command structure and size of the wharf areas in the Apra Harbor Complex assigned to Naval Activities and other commands.

Command	Wharf	Berthing (ft)
NAVAL STATION		
NavSta/U.S.C.G	Alpha	520
	Bravo	500
	Uniform	1,219
	Victor - 1,2,4,5,6	2,665
	Victor - 3	400
	Victor - 3,5	400
Total NavSta		5,704
FLEET INDUSTRIAL AND SUPPLY CENTER		
	Delta	800
	Echo	800
	Sierra - 1,2,3,4	1,982
	Tango - 1,2,3	1,495
	X-Ray - 1,2,3	1,476
Total FISC		6,553
SHIP REPAIR FACILITY		
* Excludes Drydocks	Lima - 1,2	1,110
	Mike	270
	November	540
	Oscar	570
	Papa	510
	Quebec	251
	Romeo - 1,2	1,035
Total SRF		4,286
NAVAL MAGAZINE		
	Kilo	400
TOTAL NAVY WHARF SPACE IN APRA HARBOR		16,943

The waterfront area contains operational areas along the wharves (Uniform and Victor) with community and personnel support services located further inland. NAVSTA's berthing areas are primarily used for visiting vessels, Coast Guard berthing and the small vessel operations of the NSWU-1 ("SEALS").

Orote Area

Orote Point is considered a low density development area as a result of the ESQD zone generated by the Ammunition Dock at Kilo wharf. Facilities on Orote include a pistol and rifle range, the Marines' jungle warfare training school, GabGab Beach, and the BOQ (Bachelor Officers Quarters).

Polaris Point

Polaris Point, located at the eastern side of the entrance of Apra Harbor is operated entirely by Submarine Group 7 Guam (tenant) and the submarine tender USS Holland. A warehouse-like facility for repairs and supplies provides support for activities at Polaris Point.

Nimitz Hill

The Nimitz Hill Annex, an area of 217 acres, is primarily used as an island wide command center and for residential purposes. The area possesses no strategic value.

The principal non-residential use of the Nimitz Hill Annex is the headquarters of COMNAVMAR. The commander's responsibilities include serving as the regional coordinator for the U.S. PACFLT and monitoring the activities of the various naval operational commands in Guam. Like the role of the NAVSTA commander in Apra Harbor, the COMNAVMAR is designated to facilitate the activities of eight separate commands with no direct jurisdiction over specific actions.

In addition to administrative offices for COMNAVMAR staff the headquarters building also provides office space for the analysis of regional oceanographic and weather conditions. The Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography Center/ Joint Typhoon Warning Center (NPMOCW/JTWC), which operates in the COMNAVMAR Headquarters, provides weather analysis (together with NOAA) for the region and even the Indian Ocean area.

The residential quarters in the Nimitz Hill Annex consist of 147 lodging facilities for officers and enlisted men (including "historic" Flag Circle),¹⁹ bachelor quarters. Morale and Welfare facilities on this small and outlying residential/operational area with spectacular vistas include a club (TOP'O MAR), two tennis courts, and a fire station.

Through the southeast corner of Nimitz Hill Annex are major GPA power lines and military operated POL lines. Fuel is conveyed from Apra Harbor to tank farms in the Sasa Valley and Tenjo Vista, and transferred to NAS Agana, and eventually AAFB.

Barracks, Administration and other Operational Assets

The command maintains extensive quarters for Bachelors (both BOQ and BEQ), as well as messing areas. Moral and welfare facilities to support housed personnel (including those in PWC administered houses) are situated throughout the command area. The reputedly largest NEX in the Navy and a new commissary (under construction), together with numerous self-help stores provide on-base consumers with a self-contained access to all measure of commodities.

Administrative, medical and training facilities are also dispersed throughout the port area. They are primarily located near the entrance of the "Naval Station" although others are dispersed throughout the NavActs area.

Operational assets include maintenance and production facilities, storage areas and utilities assets (power and wastewater). A network of roads connect the various assets in the NavaActs area.

The Magazine

The magazine also hosts numerous activities including administrative, housing and community, operations and training, as well as maintenance and utilities facilities. The Fena reservoir treatment plant and four smaller reservoirs (ranging from 0.5 to 5.0 million gallons) as well as the Boña Springs (and pump station) are also in the Naval Magazine.

At present the magazine has the following capacity:

- 7.6 million pounds (lbs) of Net Explosive Weight (NEW) High Explosive (HE) Magazine capacity or 241,244 SF capacity;
- 5.7 million lbs NEW capacity for Smokeless Powder and Projectile (SP&P) ordnance or 42,043 SF capacity;
- 3.6 million lbs NEW Open Ammunition Storage Pad capacity or 10,209 SY of space (to stow bomb type ammunition in event of an emergency.);

as well as 64,000 lbs NEW (8,367 SF) and 10,398 SF capacity in Mine Assembly Facilities and Ammunition (Bomb and Projectile) Renovation Facilities respectively.²⁰ Under construction are two (2) 9,000 (SF) magazines for approximately 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles relocated to Guam from Subic's magazine facilities in the Philippines.²¹ Additionally, an inert storehouse of 17,000 SF is to be constructed to accommodate increased usage of Naval Magazine as a result of ordinance removal from the Philippines.

The Fena reservoir, originally constructed in 1951, was in 1990, estimated to have a capacity of 2,339,555,000 gallons.²² The production capability of the Fena Reservoir varies between a rainy season high of 10.5 million gallons per day (MGD) to a low during the dry season of approximately 9.5 MGD.²³ The Almagaso Spring, (together with the Boña Spring on Naval Magazine) produce an additional 3.5 MGD during the rainy season and 1.5 MGD during the dry season. The production of the Fena Valley reservoir and wells located within the Naval magazine and watershed is approximately 33.6% of the island's total water production; inclusive of water produced by the U.S. Air Force and private well operators.²⁴

The use of the Fena Valley reservoir was clearly intended to serve the Fena reservoir, Naval Station as well as Navy Housing in the Apra and Nimitz Hill areas.²⁵ However, in 1993, the Public Utility Agency of Guam (PUAG) purchased around half of the water produced by the reservoir and springs in the area covered by the Naval Magazine. PUAG buys water from the Navy at \$1.50 per thousand gallons, with the stipulation that a 15.533% surcharge is added if PUAG resells the water to customers.

Unlike in stateside jurisdictions where the military procures water from civilian authorities, in Guam the military sells water to the civilian community²⁶. The Navy's control of over 30% of the island's water production from the Fena area alone nearly mirrors the amount of real property held by the military in Guam. And like the military's control of land, it is clear that the control of water resources is beyond the Navy's demonstrable requirements. Moreover, the situation with respect to water resources held by the Navy provides an allegory with respect to the economic impact of the military's occupation of land in Guam: i.e. the people of Guam pay for impact of federal property holdings.

These, amongst other reasons has led to the Navy's control over the water resources of the Fena Valley area being a source of contention. In 1982, a court action was brought against the U.S. government with respect to the ability of the President to reserve the Fena watershed area (and other utilities) as military reservation areas under Executive Order 10178 as provided for in Section 28(a) of the Organic Act of Guam. Initially filing a suit based on Legislative authorization²⁷ the legal action was dismissed by the District Court of Guam based on separation of power²⁸ the Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court. Subsequently, the Plaintiff was deputized as an Attorney General of Guam, and the appeal was withdrawn. A new (and identical case) was filed but the case was dismissed because the Quiet Title statute of limitations had expired by 9 days.²⁹ In 1986, the 18TH Guam Legislature adopted Resolution No. 106, calling for the return of the Fena Valley Reservoir.

iv. **Personnel and Associated Activities and Tenant Commands**

"Big Navy", as the "Naval Station" has been known since the end of WWII, hosts numerous tenants and has long been the largest military installation in Guam. Following is an overview of the personnel of "Naval Activities" and the associated tenants as well as the personnel assigned to those activities.

Naval Activities (including NavSta and NavMag)

Naval Activities has a billeted military population of 393 military personnel. Just over 100 of these billets are assigned to the magazine with the remainder based in the former naval station. There are 448 appropriated civilian personnel currently employed at NavActs with an additional 179 non-appropriated personnel employed at the activity.

Homeported Ships

Following are the vessels which are homeported or forward deployed in Guam.

USS Holland

A submarine tender, which is expected to be replaced by another tender in FY95. It is manned by 1,445 military personnel. A tender in Guam is apparently viewed as a continuing requirement, at least until such time as the arrangements are made for nuclear repairs to be done in foreign nations.

AFS Forward Deployed

Following are the Military Sealift Command (MSC) combat logistic force (CLF) ships which are homeported in Oakland, CA but which are forward deployed to Guam:

- USNS Mars (refrigerator stores ship)
- USNS San Jose (refrigerator stores ship)
- USNS Spica (refrigerator stores ship)
- USNS Niagara Falls (refrigerator stores ship)
- USNS Kilauea (ammunition ship)
- USNS Flint (ammunition ship)

USNS Catawba (fleet tug boat)
USNS Narrangansett (fleet tug boat)

The MSC vessels are largely manned by civilian crews (approximately 120 civilians per vessel), with a contingent of military personnel (around 50). The fleet tugs are also manned by a mix of military (four positions) and civilian mariners (16).

In the early 1980's, three AFS's (stores ship) and one AE (ammunition ship) were transferred from Oakland, California, to Guam for two reasons. First, the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships were being over-extended on their operations tempo because of their scarcity in numbers and their great distance from Oakland to their operational areas in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Navy determined that deployments greater than six (6) months from homeports was the cutting point for retention.

Second, the wharf facilities at Naval Station, Guam had been upgraded in anticipation of a destroyer squadron being assigned to Guam and work was mandated for SRF by Congressional action (\$21 million per year). Therefore, there was a base waiting for ships and there were ships needing a base closer to their operating areas. Accordingly, the store ships and the ammunition ship were homeported at Guam.

In the late 1980's the decision was made to convert the active service AFS's and AE's to civilian-manned MSC ships in order to save funds and to be able to deploy the ships greater than six months at a time. The last AFS in the U.S. Navy, the U.S.S. White Plains was decommissioned in Guam on April 17, 1995.

Currently, there are four T-AFS's "forward deployed" to Guam: USNS MARS (T-AFS), USNS SAN JOSE (T-AFS), USNS SPICA (T-AFS) and the NIAGARA FALLS (under conversion). As for ammunition ships, there are currently two "forward deployed" to Guam: USNS KILAUEA (T-AE) and the USS FLINT (AE) which is being turned over to MSC in August, 1995. The MSC ships are technically homeported at a CONUS port while "forward deployed" to Guam. This designation has an impact for the dependents of the military detachments on these ships. The dependents of the military detachments on the T-AFS have two year tours on Guam while the dependents of the military personnel embarked on the other MSC ships do not get transferred to Guam.

There are three more ammunition ships based at Oakland (HOOD, SHASTA, and KISKA), plus the CAMDEN and SACRAMENTO (AOE) (combination oil and ammunition), plus few oilers (AO) in the Combat Logistics Force for the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The Secretary of Defense establishes military requirements for presence throughout the world, upon the recommendations of the Unified Commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These requirements are called "strings" by the military planners and operators. Currently, the strings for the Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups is one present in the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central Command's (USCINCCENT) Area of Operations. This area is the

Persian Gulf and Northern Arabian Sea as defined by a line drawn from the tip of India due west to the coast of Africa.

Another Battle Group must be present in the waters of the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, under the operational command of the U.S. Command-in-Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC). This part of USCINCPAC's area of responsibility (AOR) comes under a subordinate operational commander, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet. This requirement for a battle group in the Seventh Fleet is normally satisfied by the INDEPENDENCE Battle Group based in Yokosuka, Japan.

The operational commanders have mandated that deployed with each battle group are either: (1) an AOE and AFS, or (2) an AO, AE, and an AFS.

Therefore, to support these battle groups, the operational commanders require that an AFS be present in the USCINCENT area and that another one be present in the Indian Ocean/Western Pacific (Seventh Fleet's Area of Operation) at all times. (The division between the "Western Pacific" and the Third Fleet's area is roughly the International Date Line." This is called a "1.0" presence requirement - "1.0" for USCINCENT and "1.0" presence for Seventh Fleet. Additionally, the operational commander likes to keep on ammunition ship in the local waters near Guam to support the INDEPENDENCE Battle Group.

With four AFS/T-AFS operating from Guam, these presence requirements can be met without the operating tempo rates becoming too extensive. Even with civilian-manned MSC ships, there comes a point where excessive deployments produce too much wear and tear on the ships. It is known by information obtained from military officials, that if the AFS ships are reverted back to the Pearl Harbor area, that the "1.0" presence can not be maintained. It is also understood that this analysis has been made known to the BRAC commissioners and staff by the military.

COMPSRON THREE

This is a contingent of Maritime Prepositioning Ships which are owned and operating by the AMSEA Corporation and time -chartered to the Military Sealift Command. Their assigned Forward Operating Areas is Saipan/Guam.

MV Lummus
MV Button
MV Williams
MV Lopez

AWR-3

Army Heavy Brigade Afloat Ships forward deployed to the Saipan/Guam area. The ships are U.S. Maritime Administration assets on charter to the U.S. Army.

MV Cape Washington
MV Cape Wrath
MV Gibson

MV Titus
SS Gopher State
SS American Osprey

Diego Garcia Resupply -- The SS Cleveland provides eight (8) resupply shuttles to support U.S. military personnel and activities in Diego Garcia. The vessel is operated under charter by Sealift Inc.

Navy Public Works Center Guam (PWC)

PWC is the largest employer of civilian personnel of any military activity in Guam, with almost 1,450 civilian billets. Fourteen (14) military personnel are assigned to the PWC. Civilian salaries for GS and WG personnel totals more than \$46 million per year, with military salaries amounting to over \$650,000 per annum.

PWC provides maintenance for the shops and offices buildings for all naval activities in Guam. Additionally PWC is responsible for electrical power distribution and generation, water treatment and distribution, sewage collection and treatment and road maintenance on Navy facilities as well as contracting support for road-side maintenance along some public roads leading to naval bases in Guam. The Public Works Center also provides support for several fleets of Navy vehicles.

PWC Guam also manages and maintains the following navy housing areas:

NAS Agana
Lockwood (NS)
Lockwood Ter. (NS)
North Tupalao
Naval Hospital
Nimitz Hill
NavCams WestPac
Andersen Annex Housing
NavCams Barrigada
Naval Magazine
New Apra Heights
Old Apra Heights
South Finegayan
South Tupalao
Sumay

Tenant commands of PWC include the Defense Printing Service Detachment Branch Office, Guam (DPSDBO). This office produces or procures all the DOD printing requirements on Guam. The main production facility is located at the PWC complex and reprographic facilities at SRF and FISC. Also included as a tenant command under PWC are the NAVMAR federal Credit Union, Ship Repair Calibration, Defense Finance & Accounting Service, and OICC, Marianas.

Commander, Naval Forces Marianas (COMNAVMAR) Headquarters

With the responsibility for regional area coordination, COMNAVMAR assures support for the 7th Fleet and shore activities of naval personnel on Guam. COMNAVMAR also holds the title of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Pacific Representative (CINCPACFLT) for Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Belau.

Currently 52 military personnel are assigned to COMNAVMAR. Ten (10) civilian personnel are also assigned to the activity. Total military and civilian salaries amount to approximately \$1.3 million per year.

CINCPACFLT Band

Assigned to COMNAVMAR, is a 21 member (enlisted personnel) Navy Band. Annual salaries for the band amount to over \$544,000 per year.

NTCC Nimitz Hill

Navy Telecommunications Command Center. This unit is under the authority of NCTAMS but is located at COMNAVMAR headquarters in Nimitz Hill.

Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific Representative (COMLOG WESTPAC REP)

The mission of COMLOGWESTPACREP is to provide representation for the AFS ships homeported in Guam and support to the 7th Fleet ships visiting the island. One (1) military and one (1) civilian personnel are billeted for the activity. Annual salary for the activity is around \$100,000.

Explosive Ordnance Maintenance Unit 5

Located at Naval Station, the unit is divided into two shore detachments which provide explosive ordnance disposal of all explosive ordnance including chemical and nuclear weapons located on U.S. Naval activities and ships in the Western Pacific. Ninety-six (96) military personnel are assigned to this activity. The annual salary for the activity is over \$3.5 million.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCISRA GU) and NavActs Security Detachment

The law enforcement detachment for Naval Activities in Guam include approximately ten (10) civilians assigned to NCISRA and over 100 military personnel are billeted to the NavActs Security Detachment.

Navy Family Services Center

The purpose of the center is to provide active duty personnel and their families with information and assistance on a broad range of matters. The center is located at three sites: Naval Hospital, Naval Station, and the U.S. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, Western Pacific (NCTAMS). Four (4) military personnel are assigned to the Family Service Center and an additional 25 civilian billets. Salaries for the activity amount to over \$785,000 per year.

Navy Resale Activity (NEX)

Navy Exchange Guam is one of the largest in the world. For authorized patrons, it provides a broad range of merchandise services. NEX outlets are located at Naval Station (including Camp Covington), NCTAMS, Naval Hospital, and Naval Magazine. One (1) military billets and almost 1,000 civilian (non-appropriated) billets are assigned to NEX activities. The total annual salaries earned at the NEX amount to over \$10.3 million.

Defense Commissary Agencies (DECA)

Guam has two Commissaries or DECA stores, one located at Andersen Air Force Base, and other at Naval Station. The staffing for DECA at naval installations in Guam is two (2) military personnel and fifty-eight (58) civilian personnel. Total salaries per annum amount to approximately \$1.4 million.

Naval Educational & Training Support Center

Float training center for ships homeported or operating in Guam waters. Five (5) civilian personnel are assigned to this activity with annual salaries amounting to about \$125,000.

Naval Reserve Unit 120

This unit is located at Naval Station with 41 personnel presently assigned.

USPACOM SA

One military personnel is assigned for the U.S. Pacific Command special assistant billet to the staff of CINCPACREP Guam.

U.S. Army Veterinary Detachment

The detachment has 30 military personnel. Its mission includes food hygiene, quality assurance, sanitary inspections, and medical care for military working dogs assigned to Naval Station and Andersen Air Force Base.

Military Sealift Command Western Pacific, Guam (MSC WESTPAC)

MSC WESTPAC has 297 military and 11 civilian personnel assigned in Guam. Annual salaries for the activity amount to over \$8.9 million per year. The mission of the MSC in Guam is to provide logistical and operational support for MSC controlled vessels.

Officer in Charge of Construction, Marianas(OICC Marianas)

OICC Marianas has 14 military and 76 civilian personnel for a total staff of 90. Annual salary for the activity amounts to almost \$3.4 million. OICC is responsible for the administration of construction contracts. It is a tenant command of PWC, and the OICC Marianas position is dual hatted with that of the Commanding Officer, PWC.

Personnel Support Activities Detachment Guam (PERSUPPDET GUAM)

PERSUPPDET Guam has 93 military and 10 civilian personnel for a total staff of 103. Annual salary for the activity is around \$3 million. PSD is located at Naval Station with additional customer service desks at NCTAMS and Naval Hospital and provides personnel and pay-related customer service to personnel island-wide.

Naval Dental Center

The Naval Dental Center has a staff of 52 military and seven (7) civilian personnel. Total annual payroll for the Dental Center activities is over \$2.0 million. The Navy Dental Center clinics are located at Naval Station and NCTAMS.

Naval Legal Service Office, Guam (NLSO)

NLSO has 17 military and 2 civilian personnel for a total staff of 19. Annual salaries at the activity is around \$730,000. The NLSO is located in the CQ building in the Apra Heights annex of Naval Station and provides all legal services and lawyer counsel to Navy and Marine Corps commands and activities located on Guam.

Officer in Charge, Third Naval Construction Brigade Detachment Civic Action Teams (COMTHIRDNCB DET CAT Guam)

The Civic Action detachment has 13 military and 2 civilian personnel for a total staff of 15. Annual salaries amount to approximately \$450,000. The CB's CAT DET provides logistic and administrative support to and exercise operational control of DoD sponsored civic action teams in Micronesia.

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB-40)

NMCB-40, Otherwise know as the "Seabees", a total staff of 464 military personnel with an annual salary of over \$6.6 million. The NMCB-40, like other CB's groups, performs military construction of buildings, roads and other general construction projects.

Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center (NPMOCW/JTWC)

The Meteorology Center contains 114 military and 8 civilian personnel for a total staff of 122. Total salaries for the activity is around \$4.0 million per year. The warning center activity occupies the annex to and a portion of the COMNAVMAR headquarters building in Nimitz Hill and provides operational oceanographic services to military units and weather warnings to the civilian community in Micronesia.

Submarine Group Seven (SUBGROUP 7 REP)

SUBGROUP 7 has a small military staff of seven personnel and is the representative of the operational commander with oversight authority of the submarine tender (presently USS Holland) homeported on Guam.

Naval Special Warfare Unit One (SEALTEAM ONE)

SEALTEAM ONE transferred to Guam after the closure of Subic Bay. The Seals unit is manned by 33 military personnel. Annual salary for the activity is over \$1.1 million.

U.S. Coast Guard, Marianas Section

There are four separate Coast Guard active duty commands on Guam: Guam, Marianas Section (MARSEC); Marine Safety Office (MSO) and Two Cutters: CGC Galveston Island & Basswood

3. Disestablishment: Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Guam

a. Definition

i. Command Structure & Associated Units

FISC is commanded by a Navy Captain in the Supply Corps. Its administrative commander is the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, in Washington, D.C. For area coordination it reports to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas. It is a land (Class 1) holder with its main compound in Apra Harbor, collocated with U.S. Naval Activities, Guam.

The mission of FISC is broad. Its Guam-oriented mission is to provide supply and support services to fleet and shore activities on Guam. It provides supply support to homeported and transient ships and specified support to every military activity on Guam. FISC provides supplies, fuel, and freight terminal services for major customers such as Navy Public Works Center, Naval Ship Repair Facility, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Center, and Naval Activities. FISC also stocks food items for issue for ships, clubs, enlisted dining facilities, exchanges and the commissaries. FISC also provides limited support to various federal government agencies in Guam and in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau.

FISC also has tenant activities. The Defense Commissary Agency (DECA) is a tenant along with the Defense Accounting Office (DAO), Military Traffic Management (MTMC) the Information Processing Center (IPC), Defense Reutilization & Marketing Officer (DRMO), the Fitting Out & Supply Support Assistance (FOSSAC), and the Army Vet Detachment from the Tripler Army Medical Center. There are presently a total of 116 tenant personnel residing on FISC land.

The mission of FISC, however, is broader than that associated with Guam and the local regional customers. The FISC booklet commemorating its fiftieth anniversary, stated: "The closure of Subic Bay in 1992 increased the importance of FISC Guam dramatically. As the last navy supply facility in the South Pacific, NSD Guam took over many of the functions that had previously belonged to NSD Subic Bay. These included support of deployed AFS's, support of Diego Garcia, and management responsibility for Ready Supply Stores (RSS) located thousands of miles away in Diego Garcia, Singapore, and the Middle East."

This expanded mission came when the MSC ocean tugboat USNS SIOUX, the MSC stores ship USNS SPICA, and the MSC ammunition ship USNS KILAUEA were transferred to Guam from Subic as a result of the closure of Subic Bay.

ii. Land

FISC land is grouped into four compounds as indicated on the attached maps. The first compound is the Sierra/Tango Wharf Compound that includes the Administrative area. The second

compound is the X-Ray Wharf Compound where the dehumid/cold storage warehouses are located, the third is the Fuel Department compound containing the Sasa Valley and Tenjo Vista Tank Farms, and the last compound is the Fuel Wharves area. Each of these compounds has a map, attached, indicating the details of structures located within them.

iii. Assets

A building inventory of FISC assets is attached to this report. Sixty-three structures exist in the inventory, ranging from a 135,793 square foot transit shed to a flag pole. Among these assets are dehumid/cold storage warehouses, a new warehouse being constructed for handling containers (integrated storage), and another new facility being constructed for a consolidated island-wide storage and handling facility for toxic materials.

The total value of inventory is \$165 million. This inventory does not include the fuel tanks or the fuel piping systems nor does it include the wharves under FISC control. The fuel department handles an annual fuel throughput of over three million barrels (over 120 million gallons). The FISC fuel facility has tank storage capacity of over 1.4 million barrels. The products include JP5, JP8, Diesel, and Low Sulfur fuels. There are a total of 39 tanks. Anderson Air Force Base is supplied through a twenty mile pipeline system. It is one, ten inch underground line that stretches from FISC to the former Naval Air Station. The Air Force then takes custody of the fuel at that location and transports it through its one, eight-inch above ground line. The former Naval Air Station receives JP5 fuel from FISC through a separate, underground, ten inch line.

FISC owns two fuel piers, Delta and Echo with 42 ft depths for each. These are the deepest draft wharves/piers in Apra Harbor. The last U.S. Navy aircraft carriers to berth at the fuel piers were the USS MIDWAY and the USS CORAL SEA in the 1960's. In 1990 the battleship USS NEW JERSEY berthed at the fuel piers. FISC also owns a de-ballasting facility when enables tanker loading. It also operates a petroleum testing laboratory. It has the required equipment to meet Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requirements for the testing of oily water/waste oil. The FISC Fuel Department also operates a complete Used Oil Reclamation Facility that produces a product called Low Sulfur Fuel (FSL). FISC has the ability to accomplish the full spectrum of tests on waste oil from various activities to ensure acceptability.

An inventory of FISC's assets attached to this report.

iv. Personnel

The annual salaries of the civilian FISC personnel equate to \$12,566,433.00. The annual military payroll is \$2,356,294, slightly different from the amount in the DoD report to BRAC '95.


The Cobra Data for BRAC indicates that the mean civilian salary for FISC is \$54,694 per annum, RPMA Payroll is \$1,860,000, BOS Non-Payroll is \$5,146,000 per annum, BOS payroll is \$2,311,000 per annum, and Family Housing is \$742,000 per annum.



GRAPHIC SCALE



Location



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy

*Existing Use
FISC*

There are currently 62 military personnel (17 officers and 45 enlisted) and 414 civilian personnel assigned to FISC. This is a total of 476 personnel. The Data Call varies slightly by stating that there are 19 officers, 75 enlisted and 518 civilians attached to FISC for a total of 612. Elsewhere in the data call papers there is a FY94 listing showing 18 officers, 45 enlisted, and 441 civilians for a total of 504 assigned. It also indicates that 73 military positions were authorized, although only 63 were filled.

The variance between the 612 total in the data call and the 8476 (actually on board in April 1995) or (504 in another part of the data call) totals for FISC, evidently arises from the addition of FISC tenant activities in the Data Call figures. DECA is listed as a tenant with 6 officers and 17 civilians (out of a total of 60 currently assigned), Defense Accounting Office (DAO) is listed with 28 civilians, Military Traffic Management (MTMC) is listed with 2 civilians, Information Processing Center (IPC) is listed as a tenant with one officer, 5 enlisted and 23 civilian positions, Defense Reutilization & Marketing Officer (DRMO) with 5 enlisted and 23 civilians, Fitting Out & Supply Support Assistance (FOSSAC) with 5 enlisted, and one Army Vet from the Tripler Army Medical Center. This is a total of 116 tenant personnel, bringing the figures closer together (620 compared to 612).

For contract workyear data, the DoD recommendation has FISC holding 29 total contract workyears and MSC Guam holding 2 contract workyears. The recommendation has 26 of the FISC contract workyears being eliminated with 4 workyears being transferred along with the 2 MSC workyears being transferred.

It further states that NAVACTS GUAM will receive from FISC 2 enlisted and 16 civilians, from DECA 6 enlisted and 17 civilians, from DAO 28 civilians, from MTMC 2 civilians, and from DRMO 5 enlisted and 23 civilians for a total of 13 enlisted and 86 civilians. These figures are based on the assumption that the X-Ray subsistence compound is turned over to NAVACTS for DECA and Navy Exchange use. All of these personnel realignments will occur in FY97 according to the data analysis.

Therefore, a total of one officer, 16 enlisted, and 128 civilian positions will move under the scenario. The data call scenario has the transfer to NAVBASE Pearl (FISC Pearl Harbor) of one officer, 3 enlisted, and 42 civilians in FY1997.

The elimination of 18 officers (4 in FY96 and 14 in FY97), 59 enlisted (10 in FY96 and 49 in FY97), and 267 civilian positions (60 in FY96 and 207 in FY97) will occur under this scenario. The total personnel figures are therefore 145 billets/positions being moved with 344 being eliminated for the total figure of 489 personnel as contained in the scenario.

The difference of 123 billets/positions between the 612 listed in the summary sheets and the 489 billets/positions either moved or eliminated is a cryptic notation of a reduction of 123 civilian positions due to "force structure changes." It must be assumed that these positions are also "eliminated." Therefore, the true total of eliminated civilian positions should be the 267 plus the 123 for a true total of 390 jobs. It is also significant that all of these jobs are programmed to be lost by the end of FY97 under this scenario, just over two years from now.

All of the FY96 eliminated billets/positions are from FISC. The FY97 eliminations are from FISC plus cuts from its tenants: IPC, FOSSAC, and the Army Vet. Interesting, the data call states that there is one officer and seven enlisted assigned to the Vet tenant for purposes of billet eliminations while elsewhere, the data call states earlier that one officer and no enlisted are assigned to the Vet tenant. Currently, there are 30 military personnel assigned to the Army Vet Detachment Guam.

The Cobra Data for BRAC also indicates that it is anticipated that of the civilian positions, that 31 will take early retirement (6 in FY96 and 25 in FY97), 15 will take regular retirement (3 in FY96 and 12 in FY97), 46 will be cut by civilian turnover (9 in FY96 and 37 in FY97). These figures, presumably, are to be subtracted from the 390 civilian jobs eliminated, for a bottom-line "unemployed" figure of 298.

v. Associated Activities and Tenant Commands

As stated above, FISC has several tenant commands. They are: a portion of DECA, an office of the DAO-Cleveland, Guam DRMO, Guam IPC, Guam MTMC, Fitting Out & Supply Support Assistance, a portion of NEX Guam, and the Tripler Army Medical Center, Army Vet Detachment.

The current status of personnel for some of these tenant activities differs somewhat from the data call as indicated below:

DECA (island-wide):	5 officers, 58 appropriated civilian personnel with an annual military payroll of \$146,238 and a civilian payroll of \$1,268,582.
IPC:	5 military personnel and 24 appropriated civilian personnel with an annual payroll of \$205, 440 and \$729,676 respectively.
DRMO:	25 appropriated civilian personnel with an annual payroll of \$726,099.
Army VET:	30 military personnel.

An important associated activity for FISC is the resupply of Diego Garcia by the SS CLEVELAND. That ship makes eight trips per year to Diego Garcia, carrying provisions, consumables, and parts from FISC Guam. FISC Guam also provides commercial resupply for U.S. Navy requirements at Jebel Ali in the Persian Gulf area by weekly sailing from Guam Commercial Port with approximately 25 days sailing time. For this resupply commercial 20ft and 40ft vans (dry/refrigerated/freeze) are utilized.

The DoD Scenario Development Data Call for FISC Guam states that an additional supply ship for Diego Garcia will be required in order to maintain the cycle of eight trips per year. This means that \$9.1 million additional funding will be required in order to provide for the added supply ship.

b. A Brief History of FISC

FISC evolved from a supply support group that came to Guam with the initial landing force in July of 1944. The supply group was called D-1, a component of Lion Six. A "Lion" was the code name adopted for identifying a complete advanced area Naval Operating Base.

The first shipment of supplies arrived on August 7, three days before the island was formally declared secured. On November 11, 1944, the Navy Supply Depot (NSD) Guam was officially commissioned. The expansion in the first year was tremendous.

NSD Guam grew from two small supply outlets known as "Alligators" on Agat Beach into 1,804,000 square feet of covered space, 302,000 square feet of transit shed space, more than 200 fuel storage tanks with a total capacity in excess of 1,000,000 barrels, and a total area of over 6,384 acres, occupying Orote Point.

As the principal Pacific logistics base for the planned invasion of Japan, the initial nucleus of 1,500 NSD personnel grew to 13,165 personnel by 1946. It was manned entirely by military personnel until 1945. They worked around the clock to supply the Pacific Fleet with the tools of war and earned the nickname "The Pacific supermarket."

At the height of its operations, the depot unloaded as many as 120 liberty ships and 20 tankers in a single month, the Fuel Branch serviced an average of 75 ships a day. Total issues exceeded a billion dollars in the first ten months of operation.

When the war ended, the mission changed and the Navy demobilized what had been the largest supply effort in history. Tons and tons of equipment had to be redistributed. An exodus of thousands of troops had to be orchestrated. With that accomplished, NSD business was far less robust and was reduced to basic support of island commands and a few ships.

Though a few part time office workers came on board in late 1945, the first full time civil service employees began in August 1946, and approximately 500 foreign workers arrived about the same time.

Approximately 2,000 Japanese POWs were drafted into service in 1946, but the language barrier prevented extensive utilization. The POWs were repatriated later in 1946. By April 1948, the level of foreign workers had been increased to about 1,500. There were, at that time, 984 stateside civil service workers and 133 Chamorros. Military enlisted men, by April 1948, had been reduced to 1,075 with 53 officers.

Through the Cold War, NSD Guam was mainly concerned with local area and homeported ship support. In 1991, the Philippines Senate rejected extension of the base treaties with the U.S. and the Navy decided to close its bases there within 12 months. By February 1992, NSD Guam received the first of what would become a mountain of material shipped from Subic over a 10 month period.

In addition to all the material, NSD Guam picked up new tasks as well:

- Pacific and Middle East theaters.
- Support of Diego Garcia and its 3,500 residents.
- Support of ready supply stores in Diego Garcia, Singapore, and the Middle East.

Almost as soon as the work force caught up to the massive influx of tasks, the playing surface was again skewed. In the spring of 1992, FISC's was asked to reshape in response to then Defense Secretary Cheney's Defense Management Review. In CONUS, the Defense Logistics Agency took over physical distribution functions. NSD Guam, along with the other overseas stock points, retained that function, but its accounting and data processing functions were placed under the Department of Defense activities.

The data processing function transferred to the Information Processing Center (IPC) Guam under the Defense Information Systems Office (DISO) and accounting functions passed to Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).

Finally, on March 1, 1993, Naval Supply Depot, Guam became U.S. Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Guam." This change meant all U.S. Naval Supply Centers and Naval Supply Depots carried the same official title for the first time in history.

c. Recent Activity at the Installation.

During the past year, FISC has entered into partnerships with other naval commands on Guam and implemented other cost cutting initiatives such as "interweaving" or regionalizing some functions to cut costs and remain competitive.

The current statistics regarding FISC's activities are: Annually, FISC has \$62 million in annual sale of goods, \$41 million in fuel sold, 187,000 requisitions processed, and 95,000 inventory line items stored.

4. Redirect: Guam Navy Aviation Assets at Andersen AFB, Guam

BRAC 93 and the Navy's Actions

NAS Agana is situated on 1,823 acres at the heart of the island. It is bordered by the villages of Tamuning, Dededo, Mongmong-Toto-Maite and Barrigada, which contain 47.4% of Guam's total population and the bulk of Guam's commercial and tourist activities. The economic potential for civilian reuse of NAS Agana and the significant underutilization of similar facilities 8 miles away at Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB) prompted local leaders to initiate the closure of NAS Agana in the 1991 hearings of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. At that time, however, uncertainties concerning the renewal of the basing agreement with the Republic of the Philippines negated the possibility for closure of NAS Agana.

Location




GRAPHIC SCALE

MILES 1 2 3 4 5 6

Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy



Existing Use
NAS

In 1993, the U.S. government agreed with the Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to close NAS in response to Guam's call for reuse of the facilities. The 1993 Commission found excess land and operations, maintenance, and administrative capacity existed at Andersen AFB to allow consolidation of the mission, personnel, aircraft and support equipment of NAS Agana at Andersen AFB. The Commission found the consolidation was economically feasible and due to the elimination of duplicate base operating and administrative costs, the closure would be paid back in 11 years. Consequently, the BRACC decided to:

close Naval Air Station Agana. Move aircraft, personnel and associated equipment to Andersen AFB, Guam. Retain housing at NAS Agana necessary to support Navy personnel who have relocated to Andersen AFB. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and criteria.

The decision to transfer aviation operations to AAFB provided the best of both worlds since the military would remain in Guam to contribute to the growing Guam economy, while freeing up land for more productive, non-military economic and community use. In 1994, however, the U.S. Navy announced its plans to transfer aviation squadrons directly from NAS to bases on the West Coast.³⁰ In that memorandum, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VQ1) would "temporarily" relocate to NAS Whidbey Island, Washington effective December 31, 1994 while Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron FIVE (VQ5) would "temporarily" relocate to NAS North Island, San Diego effective October 1, 1994. To avoid the appearance that relocation to the West Coast was in contravention of the BRACC '93 decision, the military emphasized that such a move would be temporary and the squadrons would return upon construction of facilities at AAFB. Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FIVE (HC-5) would be relocated to AAFB, Guam effective October 1, 1994. HC-5 would utilize facilities vacated by the disestablished VRC-50 Squadron (which relocated from the Philippines to AAFB), including a newly constructed hangar, administrative offices, ramps and aprons and storage buildings³¹ Since no funding has even been requested by the Department of Defense (although funding was requested by the Navy) to begin construction, it is clear to the local population that the squadrons will never return. The recent DoD report on the recommended NAS redirect to BRACC 1995 simply confirmed local suspicions that the Navy never really planned to "temporarily" transfer aviation squadrons but rather that the move was permanent.

Since the approval of the BRAC 93 decision by Congress in September 1993, Naval authorities have opted to deviate from the BRAC orders and the NAS base closure process as well. By preempting the request for a BRAC 95 redirect, the timetable for NAS Agana to close operationally was accelerated forward to March 1995 rather than October 1997 as initially projected. While on one-hand claiming that the "temporary relocation" of the squadrons was just temporary, the Navy also espoused the view that their actions would permit the to excessing of NAS nearly four years ahead of schedule to meet "local needs."³²

The acceleration of the base closure date coupled with the Navy's decision to move the operational flying units to CONUS bases rather than relocating them 8 miles away to Andersen

AFB as directed by BRACC '93 provides evidence that *in Guam* the Navy cannot be counted on to follow BRAC decisions or the BRACC process. The Governor of Guam, the Speaker of the Guam Legislature and Guam's Congressional delegate, in a joint letter pointed out that the Navy's actions in ignoring the BRAC language was in conflict with other positions taken by the Department of the Navy in treating the BRAC decisions as having the force of law, including those recommendations which related to "relocations of operating forces."³³

Following Congressional approval of the 1993 BRACC decision to relocate NAS squadrons to AAFB, the Navy decided to process the airfield and attendant facilities for closure and to retain housing areas in the north side of the base and "quality of life" facilities and areas on the south side of the base, as so-called "retention requirements" for Navy's AAFB operations. Subsequently, a representative of the Chief of Naval Operations offered GovGuam to close base enlisted housing and quality of life areas if GovGuam supported a permanent move of NAS tenant squadrons to CONUS. This offer constituted another signal that the squadrons would never return. GovGuam's support was not given since it has always been Guam's position that Navy did not need these areas anyway. Formal notification of the closure of the enlisted housing and quality of life areas was received on May 17, 1994 in the form of a letter from Steven S. Honigman, the General Counsel of the Navy. Subsequent closure of these areas and inclusion of the DoD recommendation to redirect BRAC 1993 decision provides validity to the position taken by Team Guam.

The transfer of VQ-1 and VQ-5 affected not only the squadrons shown in the table below, but also 132 appropriated-fund employees and over 260 NAFI employees.

Once the decision to move to VQ- and VQ-5 to CONUS, officer and enlisted personnel were transferred with the relocating squadrons while the civil service employees either retired or sought jobs elsewhere. In addition, 185 NAFIMWR civilians and 80 NEX employees lost their jobs as a direct result of the relocation of VQ-1 and VQ-5 to CONUS.

Even with the transfer of squadrons in 1994 to CONUS and the subsequent release of over 350 units of enlisted family housing on the north side of the base and quality of life facilities on the south side, Navy continues to retain the 148 units of Officer Family Housing on 88 acres of land on the cliffline overlooking the Philippine Sea. Recent Navy correspondence indicates that the need for this housing will be reassessed after the BRACC '95 process is completed, while local Navy commanders privately agree that such housing is excess to Navy needs. Retention of this small housing area in the heart of the island contradicts military land use policy stated in GLUP II of consolidating military activities in two central locations, AAFB in northern Guam and Naval Station (NAVACTS) in southern Guam. Moreover, retention of the Officers Family Housing Area at the former NAS Agaña, is in contradiction to the Navy's stated claim for sending VQ-1 and VQ-5 to CONUS; to meet local needs for reuse. A housing needs analysis is contained in a separate section of this report.

5. Cumulative Impacts

a. Personnel

A following attachment indicates the disposition of personnel directly affected by the Pentagon's recommendations. Among the civilian personnel whose jobs in Guam would be either eliminated or move to other jurisdictions (3,497 civilian positions) are:

- 773 civilian mariners who are not homeported in Guam, do not pay taxes in Guam and who spend little time in Guam; and,
- 1,019 non-appropriated fund personnel employed by the Navy Exchange, an activity which if it continues will not result in the reported number of civilians losing their jobs.

Although the full impact of these "direct job losses" on the job multiplier for "indirect jobs" lost may be smaller than identified in the report, these numbers have been included in calculations throughout this report. Other job losses not identified in the Pentagon's recommendation are likely to off-set the above mentioned overstated "direct jobs" affected. These jobs are: continuing military-funded construction and maintenance projects which employ U.S. citizens; MWR (NAFI) civilian positions which are likely to decline in relation to a reduction in military activity; and, a decline in NEX and Commissary civilian positions even if the NEX operation continues. While non-appropriated civilian positions are not usually included in the job impact of BRAC activities, these loss of these positions are, in fact, job losses affecting the local community.

An overview of the impact of the Pentagon's recommendation to BRAC on civilian and military personnel is shown in Attachment .

b. Housing Assets and Requirements

The Pentagon's recommendations to the BRAC do not address the disposition of the Navy housing requirements in Guam that would be affected by the impact of personnel reductions. Following is an overview of the existing state of the Navy's housing assets in Guam.

Data sources on the total number of military in Guam are obtained from the COMNAVMAR Shareholder's FY94 Report submitted by the Navy 5,487 personnel were assigned to Guam's bases. These figures include personnel who are attached to ships homeported in Guam but remain at sea the majority of the time.

Approximately 535 houses are presently in the process of being returned (or identified for return) to Guam. Excluding these housing areas identified for return, the Navy has a continuing inventory of 4,575 living spaces. Of these living spaces, 712 (or 16%) are officers spaces. An additional 3,863 spaces are available for enlisted personnel. Following are tables which reflect the number of quarters in Guam which are perspectivevely available for use by military personnel.

Navy Officer Quarters in Guam			
Officers Housing		Officers Bachelors Quarters	
NAS	136	Naval Station	72
Lockwood Terrace	62	Camp Covington	34
Naval Hospital	27	Naval Hospital	25
Nimitz Hill	67	Temp Lodging Fac.	18
Old Apra Heights	72	NCTAMS	31
South Finegayan	137		180
Sumay	28		
Nav Cams WestPac	2		
Naval Mag	1		
	532		

Navy Enlisted Quarters in Guam			
Enlisted Housing/excluding GLUP II,		Enlisted Barracks (Current)	
South Finegayan	434	NavSta/CampCov	763
North Tipalao	450	NCTAMS (F)	294
NCTAMS (Fin.)	302	Naval Hospital	112
NAVSTA (new)	300	NavMag	100
South Tipalao	230	NCTAMS (B)	60
Apra Hts.	308	NavMag	100
Lockwood Ter. (NS)	240		1429
Sumay	104		
Naval Hospital	44		
NCTAMS (B)	22		
	2434		

In addition to Navy personnel, over 230 non-Navy families reside in Navy housing at installations throughout Guam. The non-Navy families residing in Navy housing units throughout the island represents about eight percent (8%) of the continuing inventory of Navy houses.

Endnotes (Part 2-B)

¹ In this regard, we are appreciative of the last minute work which activity commands in Guam labored over to provide baseline data. The latest push by COMNAVMAR to respond to baseline data requests forwarded by Guam (since 3.08.95) began during the week of April 17, 1995. Coordination of the information submitted by commands was conducted by COMNAVMAR staff CPTN T. Thorsen and LT. G. Robinson.

² U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Capabilities Handbook (October, 1994) p. 2A

³ U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Mission Briefing Book (March, 1995) p. 7A

⁴ Farrell, D.A., The Americanization: 1898-1918 (Micronesia Publications, Guam: 1986) p. 38

⁵ Hammer, Harry, Lion Six (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD; 1947

⁶ U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Capabilities Handbook, op. cit. p. 2A

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sanchez, Pedro, Guam: The History of our Island (Sanchez Publishing, Guam: 1988) p. 252

⁹ Pomeroy, Earl, Pacific Outpost in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford University Press: 1951) pp. 176, 177

¹⁰ U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Capabilities Handbook, op. cit. p. 2A

¹¹ Ibid. p. 2B and U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Apprentice Graduation Ceremony, March 30, 1995

¹² U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Mission Briefing Book, op. cit. p. 13

¹³ Ibid. p. 4B

¹⁴ U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Capabilities Handbook, op. cit. p. 2C

¹⁵ Data Call 1: General Installation Information, UIC: 62586, p. 4.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 5.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 8-10.

¹⁸ U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, Mission Briefing Book, March 7, 1995 Visit of Governor Gutierrez & GovGuam Staff, p. 8B

¹⁹ The house occupied by the COMNAVMAR was first built by Admiral Nimitz. The tradition was long established but was interrupted by Typhoon Omar (1992) The House of Nimitz was reconstructed by the Navy at the cost of \$1 million (a celebration of the reopening was held by RADM Kristensen on 01/09/94). Although the "Nimitz House" may be of some historic significance, renovation plans were not subjected to State or national historic preservation screenings and approval.

²⁰ U.S. Navy, Master Plan, U.S. Naval Magazine, Guam, Mariana Islands (1984) Table D-7, p. D-35. Seven HE Magazines (Bldgs. 816-822) and the ordnance disposal site are located within the Fena watershed.

²¹ 4. Belt Collins, Ibid., p. 15. The military construction project for these facilities (MILCON Project P-289) was awarded to Hanil Resort Corporation 9/22/93

22. U.S. Geological Survey, Storage Capacity of Fena valley Reservoir, Guam, Mariana Islands, (Water-Resources Investigation Report 92-4114) The U.S.G.S. review indicated that as a result of sediment depositions, the reservoir capacity has been reduced by 13.5% since its construction.

²³ Actual production varies depending on the length of the dry season and other factors (e.g. Guam's August 1993 earthquake). The figure provided here as well as all other figures with respect to water production are available from the U.S. Navy Public Works Center (Guam), Engineering Branch.

²⁴ Public Utilities Agency of Guam, Water Facilities Master Plan Update, (Prepared by Barrett Consulting Group, February 1992). See Table 5-1 at p. 5-4.

²⁵ 10. Naval Magazine Master Plan, op.cit. Figure D-14.

²⁶ 11. In the Washington D.C. area for instance, Bolling AFB, McNair Army Base and Navy Yard all procure water from the D.C. Water Service Administration. According to Mr. Edward Scott, Director of the WSA, military water purchases are made under contract at the "local rate." If military usage is less than the contractual amount, the military pays the contract amount. Meters are placed outside the gates of the military installation for civilian monitoring purposes. (Telephone conversation with Director of the Washington Office of the Governor of Guam, 20 December, 1993.)

²⁷ 12. Guam Public Law 16-53, Section 10.

²⁸ Government of Guam vs. United States of America, Civil Case No 82-0001, District Court of Guam, August 1982.

²⁹ 14. See Government of Guam vs. United States Case No. 83-2237, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit Court (Decided Oct. 4, 1984)

³⁰ July 13, 1994 Memorandum for Interested Members of Congress from Navy Captain Jay M. Cohen, Deputy Chief of Legislative Affairs. This likelihood was earlier noted in *The Next Liberation* (January, 1994)

³¹ July 15, 1994 letter from Melvin Kaku, Environmental Planning Division, NAVFAC, Pearl Harbor to the Bureau of Planning requesting a federal consistency determination with the Guam Coastal Management Program.

³² News Release dated June 2, 1994 issued by the Public Affairs Office of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas. Just a year and a half earlier the Navy had vehemently opposed the relocation of NAS to AAFB.

³³ Team Guam letter to The Honorable Robert Perry, June 23, 1994. The letter referenced the position taken by former Navy Secretary William Ball and the 12 August 1993 opinion of the NAVSEA General Counsel on the BRAC 93 recommendation for the Naval Undersea Warfare center, Newport, Norfolk, VA.

C. Effect of the Proposed Recommendations

In preparing an overview of potential affect of the proposed Pentagon actions yet another significant obstacle was encountered: this is the absence of a clear understanding of how the recommendations would be implemented. While uniform personnel in the region have sometimes publicly (but mostly privately), told us that the decisions simply do not make sense strategically, logistically or otherwise. This mind-set has contributed to uniformed personnel not preparing for the real scenario which would unfold if the recommendations were implemented. Today in Guam some Navy personnel are trying to justify, and are planning for the continued control of assets which will be without staff support, an incoming ship, and without moneys to maintain them.

Added to this difference of view of those in the field and what the recommendations appear to entail, most uniform personnel are clearly unaware of the intent of the planners in Washington who have laid out the recommendations and who will drive the implementation of the same. More disturbingly, it seems that there are obvious — and significant — structural problems in communications between Pentagon officials and planners and the uniformed officers in the field. This results in uniformed personnel in the field being unaware of what the Pentagon's planners envision. Moreover, given the differences of echelon, there is no way for direct communication to occur between those who would be tasked with actually implementing the Pentagon's recommendations and those who will make the decisions which drive the recommendations.

Another significant obstacle in assessing the potential impact of the recommendations is obvious. In the rush (48 hour turn-around) to complete data calls and get data into COBRA scenarios to evaluate, some information was submitted which is inconsistent with BRAC guidelines and which were not detected by the BSAT and COBRA. This has led to some of the data behind the recommendations (and the cost savings) possibly not reflecting what would actually occur. For example, 1,019 non-appropriated civilian employees at the NEX being identified as "eliminated billets," when in fact it is more likely that NEX activities will continue after the BRAC decision. Additionally, although the Data Calls, COBRA and recommendations indicate that all of the FISC fuel tanks would be emptied and closed down, the Navy apparently overlooked the fact that these tanks provide support for the Department of Defense war reserve fuel supplies. These are but two of the "confusing" recommendations which all parties have difficulty in sorting through now that the recommendations have been submitted to BRAC.

With these caveats noted, following is a review of the possible affect of the DoD recommendations on Navy activities and installations in Guam.

1. Ship Repair Facility

The Pentagon's recommendation to the BRAC 95 would close the Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam. 625 current civilian employees and 21 military billets would be eliminated under the proposal. The industrial facility would be closed down for Navy purposes.

However, given the military's existing limitations on performing nuclear repairs in foreign nations, the recommendations would maintain the capability of the floating drydocks and cranes. Personnel to support emergent maintenance requirements would presumably be met by Navy "Tiger Teams" (rapid response units).

To maintain the drydocks and cranes for emergent operations, a handful of civilian (30) and military (4) personnel will transfer to Naval Activities. The labor and materials costs for the maintenance and overhaul of the drydock are programmed at \$5.2 million a year. The maintenance of the floating cranes is programmed at \$1.0 million. Two other military personnel now billeted at SRF will transfer to other activities in Guam (1 to NavFac, Guam and another to CINCPACFLT (Rep) Guam).

The disposition of the other industrial assets at SRF, valued at over \$20 million, is less clear. While these plant assets are not state-of-the-art, they are of the same standards that is found in most other shipyards in the Navy; thus they have significant future value. The Pentagon's recommendation makes no provision for these assets to be mothballed nor for a caretaker status for the SRF despite the fact that the Pentagon's overall recommendations appear to place some value on the "contingency" use of Guam and these assets.

While it is unclear what the Navy intends to do with these assets, we have assumed that they would either be turned over in a reuse process. However, the manner in which the Navy proposes reuse options will affect the viability of this possibility. A lease of the SRF area and assets would clearly render the success of reuse activities less effective than the outright transfer of the SRF area and "personal property" situated there. If arrangements could not be worked out for effective civilian reuse, the disposition of the plant equipment at SRF is less clear. Alternatives include moving the equipment into warehouses for storage and periodic maintenance by PWC personnel; movement of the equipment off-island to other DoD depot maintenance centers; or, allowing them to deteriorate at their present site. The latter two options would render Guam's immediate readiness impotent in the event of a significant contingency because equipment would not be available. The first alternative, while maintaining readiness (albeit at costs higher than is identified in the data Calls and the COBRA), would displace economic revitalization opportunities available to the local community.

2. Naval Activities

The Impact of the Recommendations

The Pentagon's recommendations to the BRAC 95 would significantly alter the current level of activities in Apra Harbor and the command structure of Naval Activities. The significant changes involve the absence of utilization of Apra Harbor by vessels supporting the 3rd and 7th Fleets, a reduction in the follower activities of NavActs tenants (such as PWC) and a major cutback in other tenant activities.

i. Maritime Activity

Vessel activity in Apra Harbor would be dramatically reduced by the Pentagon's recommendation to BRAC 95. This probable reduction in activity is directly related to the

proposed relocation of all combat logistics force ships, ammunition vessels and associated personnel and support to naval bases in Hawaii by 1998.

The transfers are slated to be implemented in accordance with the following timetable:

1996

USNS Catawba (fleet tug boat)	transferred to Pearl Harbor
USNS Spica (refrigerator stores ship)	transferred to Pearl Harbor
USNS Kilauea (ammunition ship)	transferred to Lualelualei
USNS Flint (ammunition ship)	transferred to Lualelualei

1997

USNS Narrangansett (fleet tug boat)	transferred to Pearl Harbor
USNS San Jose (refrigerator stores ship)	transferred to Pearl Harbor

1998

USNS Mars (refrigerator stores ship)	transferred to Pearl Harbor
USNS Niagara Falls (refrigerator stores ship)	transferred to Pearl Harbor

Concurrent with this move is the relocation of the supporting Military Sealift Command personnel (MSC WESTPAC) to Pearl Harbor over the 1997-98 period. COMPSRON THREE and the AWR ships will remain in Guam waters.

The movement of the T-AFS and T-AE (MSC) vessels to Hawaii will require additional support to maintain their mission. Given the fact that seven to ten additional sailing days (each way from the new support base in Pearl Harbor to their operational waters) for the combat logistics support ships is required, one of two things can happen. Either the "strings" will be relaxed for the battle groups - for example, moving the "CHOP" (Change of Operational Command) lines from the tip of India to the South China Sea, in order to "cheat" a bit on fulfilling the presence requirement for USCINCCENT (with the possibility that a battle group will be too far from a breaking crisis in the Persian Gulf) or; an additional supply ship will have to be provided in the inventory. The former option is not likely given the volatility of the Persian Gulf region.

The cost of adding an additional T-AFS to the inventory has not been mentioned in the DoD Report to BRAC as an associated cost. According to the Military Sealift Command, the cost of operation of an MSC vessel in the Pacific is \$59,000 per day. At a minimum the addition 120 sailing days to Hawaii, will result in approximately \$7.1 million in costs for steaming to the new location in Hawaii. An additional T-AFS vessel being added to the mix of four existing vessels (to meet the 1.0 ratio of AFS's to Carrier Battle Groups) would be an additional cost of \$21.5 million per year. Again, these costs are not reflected in the DoD's Scenario Development Data Calls, nor the COBRA analysis.

Furthermore, the fleet tugboats cannot be ignored. For the same reasons of operational tempo and close support assets for the warships, there are two fleet ocean going tugboats

operating out of Guam at this time. With these ocean tug-boats relocated further back east, their support for the battle groups is compromised. There are possible negative strategic implications involved in homeporting AFS vessels at bases further away from strategic interests in Asia and the Indian Ocean, and important questions related to moving the fleet tug boats from Guam. Should DoD retain use of the shore assets for some prospect of servicing future arrival of vessels, it would seem obvious to retain on Guam the necessary infrastructure to support such a move. However, the removal of the fleet tug boats raises questions as to how effectively that can be done under the scenario outlined by DOD.

Additionally, the Diego Garcia resupply activity, presently conducted by the SS Cleveland out of Guam and Singapore would be relocated to Hawaii. This movement to Hawaii, and the additional steaming time involved, may necessitate the addition of another resupply vessel after FY97. The Development Scenario Data Call and the COBRA analysis indicate that the annual recurring cost for an additional vessel is \$9.125 million.

The only remaining military-related maritime activity in Apra harbor would be that of a tender (presently the HOLLAND, a vessel which will likely be replaced), the U.S. Coast Guard and the small boat activity of the SEALs. Presently these activities are conducted from Victor Pier (USCG and the SEALs) and from Alpha and Bravo Piers at Polaris Point (Tender). The Pentagon's recommendation does describe the possible consolidation of these existing activities.

ii. Public Works Center Guam (PWC)

The level of activity of PWC is directly related to the overall level of U.S. military activities in Guam. As decreases in activity occur, so does the mission of PWC, particularly as it relates housing and facility maintenance.

As outlined in the BRAC 95 Scenario Development Data Call, PWC would be realigned with personnel transferred to Naval Magazine by 1998. The scenario also call for the elimination of 5 military billets and 553 civilian positions over the next three years.

iii. Nimitz Hill

The principal tenant command at Nimitz Hill aside from COMNAVAMAR HQ is NPMOCW/JTWC. The Pentagon has recommended to the BRAC that this command essentially be disestablished except for the Joint Typhoon Warning Center which is being relocated to Pearl Harbor..

To accommodate the continued requirement for weather forecasting in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the move to Hawaii requires that "near real-time" satellite imagery from the regions under surveillance be down-linked in Hawaii. The cost of this requirement is estimated at \$550,000 per annum. Statements made by NPMOCW senior leadership cast serious doubt as to whether this unit's mission can be fully carried out at its new site.

The oversight role of COMNAVAMAR does not require Navy's occupation of a specific administrative area. The headquarters of COMNAVAMAR could be situated at any administrative

area in the island. As the U.S. Navy (and military) continues "down-sizing" in Guam some thought must be given to consolidation of the disparate Navy commands. It is likely that the CINPAC's Representative in Guam would be moved from COMNAVMAR headquarters to "Naval Station" where the majority of Navy activities will operate. Although not specifically mentioned in the Pentagon's recommendations, the reductions of COMNAVMAR staff and similar reductions/removal of the other tenant commands at Nimitz Hill would support the logic of such consolidation at Naval Station. The future use of the Nimitz Hill Annex must be understood within the context of the Navy's "requirement" for a building that supports a non-operational naval function.

iv. **The Magazine**

According to the supporting data behind the Pentagon's recommendations to the BRAC 95, Naval Activities, Guam appears to be merged into a new command entitled "Naval Magazine, Guam", although a continuation of a consolidated "Naval Activities" is anticipated.

The primary mission of the facility to provide conventional and (nuclear ordnance as necessary) support to units of the Pacific Fleet operating in the western Pacific appears to be a continuing one. The maintenance of Kilo Wharf -- the primary munitions wharf -- under the DoD's recommendations clearly demonstrates the continued role of the magazine in the near future.

From the Navy's perspective, munitions storage in Guam will continue to be necessary for tactical deployment. A wide range of weapons systems (ranging from ASW weapons, projectiles, and bombs) are likely to continue to be stored in Guam for ready use and disbursement. The increase in the number of Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) in Guam also speaks of the importance of ready reserves of these advanced weapons systems to support the U.S. Pacific military mission.¹ Of the nearly 4,000 Tomahawk SLCMs to be fully deployed by the mid-1990's, 2,739 of the total will be for surface ships and 1,255 for submarines.² The U.S. Navy's *Final EIS*, notes that wharves at "Polaris Point will also be experiencing greater use for loading and unloading of Tomahawk missiles" (at p.2-6), indicating a significant submarine based mission for Guam-stored Tomahawk SLCMs.

Although the Navy may desire a separate facility for ammunition storage, the primary munitions storage concern in Guam is to support the aviation mission. Given the size (and opportunities for expansion) of the facilities at AAFB, the future use of Guam real estate at the Naval Magazine may not be a necessity if joint use (or use under a joint operational command) were established.

Moreover, the necessity of large forward-based munitions storage areas will continue to decline vis-à-vis sea and airlift capabilities. The Middle East altercation of 1973 amply demonstrated the capability of sealift and airlift munitions and equipment over long distances. This was reiterated by the Gulf War. Present munitions storage requirements are based on the projected need to engage in a high-intensity conflict over an extended period of time without replenishment. Given the fact that Guam's future military role will primarily be as a "dispersal" and "recoverable" forward location -- with the firepower delivery systems having to be brought

NOTE

in -- the "supply train" would effectively arrive in Guam with the first wave of weapons delivery systems. In mobilizing for the Gulf War, CONUS munitions storage areas were tapped before those in Guam, even though Guam was closer to the theater of engagement and attached to the PACFLT with direct jurisdiction over the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Clearly the future need of two separate munitions facilities in Guam requires further review. Given the large amounts of land use required for such operations (including prohibitions on development resulting from ESQD's), the consolidation of munitions storage should be seriously examined.

v. Fena Watershed

The Fena Water shed area is not addressed by the Pentagon's recommendations. However, given the decline of the military population, the civilian population's reliance on the potable water from the reservoir and needed maintenance at the site, consideration to that areas use requires an examination. Dredging of the reservoir is an increasingly necessary development vis-à-vis its current use and would increase the capacity of the reservoir by over 315 million gallons.

The presence of ESQD's (originating in the munitions storage area at Naval Magazine) overshadowing the Fena Valley watershed area pose no significant problems for water source production, nor have they resulted in the extinguishment of habitat to date. Moreover, the necessity of maintaining an ordnance storage facility at Naval Magazine is not likely to be a defensible requirement in the near future. The continued use of the explosive ordnance demolition area, however, would continue with the return of lands below the cliffline at AAFB.

vi. Other Affected Areas/Activities

Among other areas/activities within Naval Activities affected by the DoD recommendations are the Naval Exchange (NEX), the staffing of Naval Activities, security personnel at the command (Security Det and NCISRA), the Naval Legal Service Office (NLSO), the Navy Dental Center and DECA.

Activities which appear to be eliminated under the Pentagon's recommendations are the Naval Exchange (1,019 billets eliminated), and the NLSO (18 billets eliminated). Naval Activities personnel support under the recommendations would be reduced by over 20%.

vii. Personnel Transferring Out

			1997		1998		1999		Total	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
NAVY COMMAND										
Naval Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pers Supt Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSW U1(SEALS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSW U1(SEALS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DET CAT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Navy Band CINPACFLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NMCB-133	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMTHIRDNCB DET CAT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMTHIRDNCB DET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMNAVMAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Def Comm Agency	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PWC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OICC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nav Base Sec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NCISRA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USPACOM SA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAV E&T PMGMT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUBGRUSEVEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nav Leg Serv Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nav Fam Serv Ctr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMLOG WESTPAC REP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NTCC Nimitz Hill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Navy Dental Ctr a/	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	7	0
NPMOC W SCIF a/	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	10	0
NAV Pac Met Ocea/JTWC a/	0	0	0	0	37	2	0	0	37	2
ATG WestPac a/	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
FLT IMAGING a/	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0
MIL SEA COMM a/	0	0	15	10	3	3	0	0	18	13
USNS CATAWBA a/	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
USNS NARRAGANSET a/	0	0	4	16	0	0	0	0	4	16
USNS SAN JOSE a/	0	0	49	124	0	0	0	0	49	124
USNS SPICA DET a/	49	108	0	0	0	0	0	0	49	108
USNS MARS a/	0	0	0	0	49	124	0	0	49	124
USNS NIAGARA FALLS a/	0	0	0	0	49	124	0	0	49	124
USNS FLINT b/	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	0
USNS KILAUEA DET b/	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	0
Nav Res Act (NEX) 1/ c/	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	10
Army Vet Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DPSDBO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Proc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FOSSAC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRMO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DFAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DFAS(PWC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MTMC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MPSRON 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NavFac Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	133	108	68	150	155	263	5	0	361	521

viii. Personnel Eliminated

NAVY COMMAND	1996		1997		1998		1999		Total	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
Naval Activities	0	0	36	0	38	0	40	48	114	48
Pers Supt Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSW U1(SEALS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSW U1(SEALS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DET CAT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Navy Band CINPACFLT	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0
NMCB-133	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMTHIRDNCB DET CAT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMTHIRDNCB DET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMNAVMAR	0	0	0	0	0	4	35	4	35	8
Def Comm Agency	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	19
PWC	1	86	1	166	3	304	0	0	5	556
OICC	2	0	4	20	6	32	0	0	12	52
Nav Base Sec	20	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	24	0
NCISRA	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	8
USPACOM SA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAV E&T PMGMT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUBGRUSEVEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nav Leg Serv Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	18	0
Nav Fam Serv Ctr	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0
COMLOG WESTPAC REP	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
NTCC Nimitz Hill	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	7	0
Navy Dental Ctr	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	16	0
NPMOC W SCIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAV Pac Met Ocea/JTWC	0	0	0	0	60	5	0	0	60	5
ATG WestPac	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FLT IMAGING	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0
MIL SEA COMM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS CATAWBA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS NARRAGANSET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS SAN JOSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS SPICA DET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS MARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS NIAGARA FALLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS FLINT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS KILAUEA DET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nav Res Act (NEX) 1/	0	94	0	337	8	588	1	0	9	1,019
Army Vet Det	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0
DPSDBO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Proc	0	0	6	23	0	0	0	0	6	23
FOSSAC	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
DRMO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DFAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DFAS(PWC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MTMC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MPSRON 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NavFac Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	41	180	64	546	115	941	126	71	346	1738

ix. Personnel "Transferring In"/Remaining

NAVY COMMAND	1996		1997		1998		1999		Total	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Total	Civ	Mil	Civ
Naval Activities	0	0	2	16	0	0	213	271	215	287
Pers Supt Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	49	0	49	0
NSW U1(SEALS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
NSW U1(SEALS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	49	0	49	0
DET CAT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Navy Band CINPACFLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NMCB-133	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMTHIRDNCB DET CAT	0	0	3	0	0	0	13	3	16	3
COMTHIRDNCB DET	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0
COMNAVMAR	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
Def Comm Agency	0	36	6	17	0	0	0	0	6	53
PWC	0	0	0	0	11	665	0	0	11	665
OICC	0	0	0	0	1	15	0	0	1	15
Nav Base Sec	0	0	0	0	0	0	83	0	83	0
NCISRA	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
USPACOM SA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
NAV E&T PMGMT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
SUBGRUSEVEN	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
Nav Leg Serv Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nav Fam Serv Ctr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMLOG WESTPAC REP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NTCC Nimitz Hill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Navy Dental Ctr	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	25	0
NPMOC W SCIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAV Pac Met Ocea/JTWC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATG WestPac	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FLT IMAGING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL SEA COMM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS CATAWBA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS NARRAGANSET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS SAN JOSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS SPICA DET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS MARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS NIAGARA FALLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS FLINT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USNS KILAUEA DET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nav Res Act (NEX) 1/	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Army Vet Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DPSDBO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Proc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FOSSAC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRMO	0	0	5	23	0	0	0	0	5	23
DFAS	0	0	0	28	0	0	0	0	0	28
DFAS(PWC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MTMC	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
MPSRON 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NavFac Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12
TOTAL	0	36	22	86	14	687	438	289	474	1098

3. Fleet and Industrial Supply Center

The DoD recommendation proposes to disestablish FISC, whose existence the DoD report notes depends upon active fleet units in their homeport area. A residual role for FISC-like activities (and

that of some FISC tenants) will be absorbed into Naval activities in FY96 and FY97, with an even smaller number of "FISC" personnel realigning into to Naval Magazine in FY99.

Given the system-wide excess capacity in FISC's and the excess of personnel to activity in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the mission of FISC Guam is recommended to be absorbed with any significant transfer of personnel. However, the disestablishment scenario provides for 150 pieces of MHE (the equipment and vehicles, such as fork lifts, used to move containers and handle pallets of material), amounting to 750 Metric tons of equipment, will be relocated to Pearl Harbor.

The data analysis for workload and missions shows that FISC Pearl Harbor would gain the AFS Loadout/Resupply and Diego Garcia Support RSS Management. Although FISC Pearl Harbor can continue the mission of FISC, Guam, its more distant location from the area of afloat operations will involve increased steaming time for the MSC vessels transporting supplies and this impact on ship-board endurance levels is "undetermined."

In a presentation to BRAC, the Commanding Officer of FISC Guam, Captain Skirm, indicated that the movement to Pearl Harbor would reduce the number of cycles for resupplying the Diego Garcia. The number of cycles would drop from eight to six per year and, whereas right now material has to be ordered eight months in advance, they will have to order in excess of a year in advance.

The DoD recommendation is that "the remaining workload can efficiently be handled by other activities on Guam or by other FISCs." FISC fuel activities also appear to be completely closed down.³

The Data Call and COBRA analysis feeding into the DoD Recommendation has the DECA, DAO, DRMO, and MTMC personnel and functions realigning to the newly structured NAVACTS and later NAVMAG. Other existing FISC tenants -- the Army Vet, FOSSAC, and the IPC -- would be disestablished.

The scenario also indicates that the dehumid/cold storage facility will be transferred to NAVACTS for holding DECA items. However, given the movement of MHE equipment it is difficult to determine how NAVACTS will be able to use the retained warehouses. It also indicates that the consolidated handling warehouse and the hazardous material storage facility, now being built, will be completed. Other projects, such as the gas bottle storage facility and a new cold storage warehouse will not be constructed.⁴

Information from the scenarios also show that NAVACTS Guam would receive the functions of Household Goods/POV Shipments, Hazardous Material Minimization, Freight Delivery from Air Terminal, and Warehousing of Commissary and Navy Exchange Stores. It would, as mentioned above, also receive the DECA, DAO, DRMO, MTMC tenants as well as a Navy Exchange (NEX) tenant function, although the data shows no personnel assigned to the latter tenant activity.

The Scenario Development Data Call for FISC assumes that the "X-ray subsistence compound is turned over to NAVACTS for DECA and Navy Exchange use." The functions of the X-ray subsistence would enable DECA and the Navy Exchange to have an additional cold storage facility. This compound is being retained even though the new commissary opening up later this year at the Naval Station has its own self-contained cold storage facility. While some area could be retained by the Navy in order to accommodate the storage needs of the exchange, it is unnecessary to retain the entire X-ray subsistence compound.

Despite the essential shutdown of FISC activities in Guam to support regional mobilization, the Pentagon's recommendations provide no process for the transfer of property and assets which would largely be vacated. In fact, it appears that DoD will continue to use some of the fuel tanks at FISC in order to continue to fill pipeline to Anderson AFB. According to their figures, 36% of the oil from FISC is routed for Anderson AFB. No reference is made in the recommendation for how the fuel needs currently being serviced by FISC would be accommodated after its disestablishment.

Additionally, the recommendation and data calls do not address the disposition of the hazardous material storage currently being built at FISC. There is no reference to what facilities on Guam or elsewhere would take these functions over. Since construction of the storage facility is still continuing in spite of the DoD recommendation, it is unclear whether or not the Navy would retain this storage facility in order to meet requirements.

As a result of the fact that the DoD recommendations are vague, Team Guam is concerned that DoD will continue to retain assets such as the X-ray subsistence, certain fuel tanks for the transport of fuel to AAFB, and the hazardous material storage facility. While the Navy has stated that they are willing to cooperate with Guam on reuse of these facilities and Guam is willing to accommodate their mission requirements, retaining the assets would preclude economic revitalization.

4. Guam Navy Aviation Assets and Andersen AFB

DoD's Base Closure and Realignment Report to BRACC '95 recommends:

Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report at page 1-21) for "the aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment" from the closing Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam from "Andersen AFB, Guam" to "other naval or DoD air stations in the Continental United States and Hawaii." (at page 5-98)

DoD provides three reasons for requesting the redirect:

- To co-locate the helicopter squadron with the vessels they support, which are recommended for transfer to Hawaii;
- To co-locate VQ-1 and VQ-5 with similar assets on the West Coast for operational synergies (a "completed" process which the redirect is called for to sanction); and,
- To avoid additional construction costs at AAFB to house the squadrons.

While it is clear that HC-5 should be co-located with the vessels they support, questions concerning the military value of relocating these vessels to Hawaii are addressed in other sections of the report. Should the BRAC decide against the DoD and allow vessels to remain on Guam, HC-5 should also remain for the same reason provided by the DoD in recommending its relocation. It should be pointed out that HC-5 is the only helicopter equipped squadron that performs search and rescue (SAR) operations in Micronesia. It averages over 30 SAR cases and saves over forty lives per year. Should HC-5 be transferred, additional costs would be incurred by the Air Force in carrying out aviation exercises at AAFB. Additional costs would also be incurred by the U.S. Coast Guard on Guam which does not have but is required to have SAR capabilities. These additional costs are not factored into the COBRA analysis.

Co-location of VQ-1 and VQ-5 with similar assets stateside is understandable given today's need to cut costs. In any event, the squadrons were relocated in 1994, with never any hope locally for their return. However, avoiding additional construction cost at AAFB is flawed reasoning given the excess capacity that currently exists at AAFB, as pointed out to the Navy and DoD by Team Guam in the 1993 BRAC process. Use of the "cost avoidance rationale" for HC-5 is also unsupported since HC-5 utilizes a newly constructed \$17 Million hangar as well as other aviation facilities vacated by VRC-50 on the north side of AAFB and shares Air Force housing, maintenance and operational facilities on the south side of the base.

The DoD report estimates:

"the one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$43.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$213.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$21.7 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$418 million." (page 5-98)

Cost Savings Overstated

As identified in the COBRA report, the net of all costs and savings estimated by DoD to be \$213.8 million is incurred primarily by avoiding the construction of facilities at AAFB to house VQ-1, VQ-5 and HC-5, estimated at \$180 million. While the data call and the COBRA report identifies the \$33 million in construction that is needed to house squadrons at the receiving bases, DoD does not address how the \$180 million for construction at AAFB is derived.

The data call does not specify a need for new facilities to house HC-5 because HC-5 is currently located in a \$17 million facility on which construction was begun in 1994. Since no new facilities would be needed at AAFB, cost avoidance should only equate to \$4.45 million, for the only MILCON currently funded. Moreover, MILCON for hangers and aviation-support infrastructure at AAFB is unnecessary since the existing Air Force infrastructure is well in excess of Navy's requirements and supports no Air Force planes based at AAFB.

The Pentagon has now recommended that all remaining Naval air squadrons at AAFB be relocated. However, new Navy facilities exist at AAFB (air support and administration buildings) and these facilities are not recommended for closure. Since the Scenario Development

Data Call explicitly notes that none of the Navy's assets at AAFB are to be "shutdown."⁵ If this is the case, then the Pentagon's recommendations should include the costs of mothballing Navy-owned assets at AAFB or alternatively, include the Air Force cost of operating these facilities since they are not being recommended for transfer to the local government.

The data call and COBRA analysis also includes costs for personnel, overhead and moving for the squadrons that have already left. These costs should include only those costs related to the moving of the only existing squadron at AAFB, namely HC-5.

5. Cumulative Impacts

i. Personnel

The contingent of Navy personnel in Guam would be significantly impacted by the Pentagon's recommendation. The present level of billets (approximately 5,200) would be reduced by approximately 1,200 if the recommendations went into effect; a reduction of 23%. In addition to the Pentagon's recommendations to BRAC 95, force reductions are also planned for NCTAMS, Guam which may reduce the number of military personnel by as many as 250. The possibility of personnel reductions at Naval Hospital is also likely given the general decline of the military population in Guam.

If the recommendations are approved, the population of military personnel in Guam would be no higher than 4,200 and possibly as low as 3,500. Of this amount, over 1,400 would be afloat personnel assigned to the tender operating out of Polaris Point.

ii. Housing

Military requirements in Guam are driven by personnel loading. The Pentagon's recommendation to the BRAC 95 does not specifically address this issue. Rather the DoD prefers to leave the decision on how to implement quarters requirements until after a decision by BRAC is made. This leaves the military with a level of discretionary authority which -- in the case of the closure of NAS -- has been demonstrated to be adverse to revitalization activities.

In an attempt to assist the BRAC is defining the areas which will actually be required by the Navy for quartering personnel, the following adjustments to the existing housing and barracks inventory are recommended. These recommendations offered are consistent with the Navy's "Guam Consolidation" plans (Phase III) which would bring all housing in the Apra Harbor area onto Orote Peninsula. The housing areas which are recommended for closure under the BRAC 95 process should the Pentagon's recommendations be accepted are indicated by **bold type** in the following tables.

Navy Officer Quarters in Guam			
Officers Housing		Officers Bachelors Quarters	
NAS	-136	Naval Station	72
Lockwood Terrace	62	Camp Covington	34
Naval Hospital	27	Naval Hospital	25
Nimitz Hill	-67	Temp Lodging Fac.	18
Old Apra Heights	72	NCTAMS	31
South Finegayan	137		180
Sumay	28		
Nav Cams WestPac	2		
Naval Mag	-1		
	124		

Navy Enlisted Quarters in Guam			
Enlisted Housing		Enlisted Barracks	
South Finegayan	434	NavSta/CampCov	763
North Tipalao	450	NCTAMS (F)	294
NCTAMS (Fin.)	302	Naval Hospital	112
NAVSTA (new)	300	NavMag	-100
South Tipalao	230	NCTAMS (B)	60
Apra Hts.	-308		
Lockwood Ter. (NS)	240		1129
Sumay	104		
Naval Hospital	44		
NCTAMS (B)	22		
	1818		

The following table projects the remaining number of quarters for officers and enlisted personnel in relation to force levels.

Projected Navy Quarters Levels--Without NAS, Nimitz & Apra				
	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Percentage
TOTAL Living Spaces	304	3,563	3,867	
Personnel (high)			4,200	92.07%
Personnel (medium)			3,800	101.76%
Personnel (low)			3,500	110.49%

Endnotes

¹As the Gulf War demonstrated, the use of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are an important element of U.S. offensive strategy. In addition to the Tomahawk's ability to "significantly increase the Pacific Fleet's theater nuclear arsenal and provide the capability to strike land targets from survivable sea-based platforms (Navy before SASC, FY1983 DoD Budget, prt.5 p.3083) they would also be a part of the U.S. post-global nuclear war reserve (Admiral Kelso, SASC, Strategic Force Modernization Programs, FY 1982, 97th Congress, First Session, p.203; both references in Arkin and Fieldhouse, op.cit., pp 125-6.)

² Arkin and Fieldhouse, op.cit., p. 125.

³ The Pentagon's recommendations note (in the section on FISC, Guam, Environmental Impact) that the fuel tanks would be "empty." Additionally, monies are programmed for "tank cleaning/gas free inspection" (FISC, Guam (FISC Pearl Harbor Scenario) BRAC-95 Scenario Development Data Call, p.2-10)

⁴ FISC, Guam Data Call 64 and the COBRA Milcon One-Time Savings

⁵ Guam Aviation Assets, Scenario Development Data Call, p. 2-20, 21.

PART 3. BRAC 95 LANDS

As our analysis demonstrates thus far, DOD's recommendation first neglects to consider the historical role Guam has played in maintaining U.S. forward presence in the Pacific and the sacrifices that the people of Guam have borne in this regard. The DoD recommendation identifies Guam for large reductions in forces levels on the island despite the historical role Guam has played without adequate planning for the return of closed and realigned assets for the citizens of Guam to provide for their own economic revitalization. The citizens of Guam have been "at the tip of the spear" for decades, so they more than any other U.S. citizen understand the impact of force reductions. They have also been subject to so many restrictions in their lives, tracing all the way back to the initial U.S. occupation after the Spanish-American War, that they have only been able to develop an infant private sector over the past 25 years. The citizens of Guam understand that when the military cuts back its forces and its forward presence, they are the ones to pay the price. They are willing to accept this burden, but they want assistance in this transition to a new period of private economic enterprise.

Secondly, from an operational point of view, it is militarily essential to keep reliable access to American soil in the Western Pacific to respond to contingencies and readiness demands. Moving the Navy's critical supply ships back to Hawaii seven to ten days sailing away from the Western Pacific and closing or realigning all related activities in Guam will complicate operations greatly and affect CINCPAC's ability to respond to a contingency. Without maintaining the readiness of the facilities in Guam and a skilled work force, DoD will not be able to respond to two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts as is required under the Bottom Up Review (BUR) without costly expenditures of time and materials, which in this era of rapid military responses may be woefully late. The citizens and Government of Guam believe that in this transition and the new era, Guam still provides an effective base for the United States in the Pacific. They believe that in partnership with the military in the Pacific they can provide less expensive, cost-effective basing alternatives for the continued presence of military resupply and contingency forces.

Additionally, the economic impact of the DoD recommendations are greater than projected for any other American community. The recommendations will affect about 25 percent of our economy and approximately 10 percent of the work force. To put these reductions in perspective, if this magnitude of cuts was undertaken in California, then about 1.5 million people would lose their jobs.

The Preferred Option

Given these conclusions, Team Guam's position addresses positively the concerns of military commanders in the Pacific regarding the strategic military value of Guam, DOD's need to save money, and Guam's effort to adjust to the economic impact. Team Guam's recommendations accomplish this by responding to the final selection criteria. Our preferred option is:

- To keep the MSC ships forward deployed in Guam indefinitely with language clarifying that they will continue to receive repairs from SRF-Guam and provide a core level of work for SRF.

- SRF will continue to repair Navy ships, but a collaborative arrangement would be worked out with the Navy to allow SRF to conduct private-sector work;
- FISC will remain open in order to continue to supply the MSC ships requirements but private sector co-utilization could occur ? *OPINAT?*
- HC-5 would be maintained in Guam in order to operate the MSC ships.

This position allows the military commanders in the Pacific to respond to the current and future mission requirements and improve on operational readiness, the first criteria. By maintaining the MSC ships forward deployed in Guam, military commanders would retain the flexibility to respond to a contingency. Instead of keeping the MSC ships on constant cruises and be forced to coordinate those cruises to meet up with a battle fleet in case of a contingency, as would be necessary under the DoD recommendation, the Team Guam position gives the commanders in the field the flexibility that they need. Admiral Zlapoter, the Commander of the Navy's Pacific Fleet, has stated on public record that the Team Guam option is more desirable from an operational standpoint than the DoD recommendation.

The Team Guam proposal would also give military commanders more flexibility since they would not be forced to rely on foreign bases in the future. The examples cited earlier of how our allies in Asia rejected DOD's request to deploy maritime prepositioned ships and Okinawa's efforts to remove the U.S. military bases from their island is evidence of need for the flexibility that bases in Guam provide.

The Team Guam proposal also responds to the second criteria, the availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and receiving locations. The Team Guam proposal averts the problem that the DoD recommendation is facing with the transfer of the HC-5 squadron to Hawaii. With an over-capacity at facilities in Hawaii, DoD has now been left without a receiving site for HC-5 and has yet to make a decision about where this realignment will be placed.

Team Guam's recommendation is more responsive to the third criteria, regarding the availability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations, than DOD's recommendations to retain the assets. It will enhance the ability of military commanders to respond to a contingency more quickly and efficiently. MSC ships will already be placed in Guam, seven days ahead of the battle fleet and ready to respond.

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) strategy proposed by the Secretary of Defense requires that DoD have the ability to respond to two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies about the size of Desert Storm. Guam proved its strategic military value during Desert Storm, and FISC-Guam played a critical role in providing the logistics needed for a massive operation of this size. If a conflict erupted in the Persian Gulf and Korea, at nearly the same time, a mobilization greater in size than the one undertaken during Desert Storm would be necessary.

Team Guam's proposal will save DoD money with a downsized presence in Guam and a collaborative effort at SRF, the fourth selection criteria. DoD will have reduced operating and overhead costs as a result of the collaborative arrangement at SRF. Moreover, DoD will not be forced to spend money on maintaining the MSC ships on permanent cruises and the added cost of an additional MSC vessel, which is about \$21 million annually and \$400 million over twenty years. This additional cost is roughly the amount that DoD projects it will save in their return on investment over twenty years as a result of the closure of FISC.

From the perspective of our local community in Guam, Team Guam's recommendation would ease the economic impact on the island's economy. A certain core employment base would be maintained since 70% of SRF's work comes from the supply ships. SRF would be able to expand its operations to accommodate private sector work. Additionally, the employment base at FISC would be maintained to service the MSC vessels, since its customer base is anchored in the 42% of sales that are attributed to the MSC supply ships.

The Minimum Option

Team Guam recognizes the military changes that are imperative in the post-Cold War environment and the need to downsize. If BRAC decides against these two options, then it is the position of Team Guam that at a minimum, Guam should be allowed a reasonable transition and unfettered access to the assets -- primarily through land transfers --to allow Guam to better revitalize its economy

Therefore, if a thorough collaborative effort is not achievable, Team Guam recommends that BRAC 95 direct that DOD's recommendations be accepted with the following difference: the Commission should direct that no actions to close, realign, disestablish or redirect military forces or facilities in Guam until four (4) years after the passage of the BRAC 95 enabling legislation so as to complete those actions by the end of the required six (6) year period.

The BRAC 95 Commission should encourage the Departments of Defense and Navy to work closely with the Government of Guam to affect a meaningful dual-use of the facilities in Guam and an effective transition to the final closure actions. In this manner, the interests of the citizens of Guam and the military in the Pacific are protected and the transition to economic revitalization is assured. It is then up to the Government of Guam and its representatives to work with the military in putting a real transition into place. If the military does not cooperate with the Government of Guam, at a minimum the people of Guam have four years in which to prepare for the final reductions.

During this period, some of the actions that could take place are as follows:

- The transition of the MSC ships out of Guam over a four year period. This period would enable CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT to adjust to the new scenario and give Guam a chance to transition SRF to more commercial and private-sector work

- A collaborative arrangement would be worked out with the Navy to allow SRF to transition to private-sector work;
- Guam would work with the military to privatize FISC operations;
- HC-5 would be maintained to accompany and support the MSC ships;
- The assets currently controlled by the Navy in relation to their operations at SRF, FISC and Naval Station would be transferred to Guam under lease or preferably outright transfers, and the Navy would still retain access to the assets in time of a contingency.

As noted earlier, DOD's original recommendation with regard to the disposition of the assets was unclear. Recently, however, in a letter from Assistant Secretary Robert Pirie, the Department of the Navy clarified its intentions stating that it intends "to convey, through long-term leases, outright transfers, or any other mutually agreeable arrangement, as much of the land area and facilities as possible." Mr. Pirie further stated that it is not the Navy's intention to hinder in any way the economic revitalization of Guam, and that it stands ready to work with Guam to ensure the vitality of the local economy.

DOD's recommendations needs clarification in the BRAC report. Although the Navy has expressed their willingness to work with Guam on its economic revitalization, clarifying language is needed because in order to follow through on DOD's stated intentions on assisting Guam revitalize the local economy.

The absence of a clearly defined process by which economic revitalization could occur at the activities affected by the Pentagon's recommendations favors military discretion over Guam's economic needs. The history of the military's discretionary authority in Guam as it relates to Guam's economic needs lends little confidence to a successful revitalization effort.

The Pentagon's recommendation to retain waterfront assets after closure of SRF and the realignment of most maritime activities to Hawaii vests the U.S. Department of the Navy with discretionary authority over future use. This discretionary authority is unwarranted because the Navy will not require the assets for any planned or frequently level activity during non-hostile periods. Moreover, there are a sufficient number of case-studies where similar actions (close-but-retain) have demonstrated that the Navy is unable to satisfactorily use its discretionary authority to accommodate reuse.

In Guam's case, the Navy has proposed civilian utilization of its existing under-utilized assets in Inner Apra Harbor has for some time. The Navy's response to this -- under its existing discretionary authority (for which there are no recommended changes) -- has been less than enthusiastic and ultimately not accommodating. Examples of the Navy's absence of a willingness to accommodate Guam's growing economic development requirements for waterfront property are even indicated in the Data Calls for BRAC 95. Following is an example:

...there is a proposal by (the) Government of Guam to use parts of Inner Apra Harbor for civilian shipping (specifically Victor Wharf). This proposal would impact vessel traffic patterns in the Inner Harbor, vehicle traffic on the Naval Station, security of Naval Station and the environment.

The Navy's desire to maintain discretionary authority is clear in its responses -- through the BRAC -- to questions asked of the Secretary of Defense. In response to a question about the facilities being "turned over to the Government of Guam for economic development with the proviso that they be used for military contingency operations at the request of the Federal Government," the DoD response was:

...Since our recommendation is clear that we need to maintain access to this strategic location, a careful balance will be struck between community reuse and the retention of the necessary facilities for potential operational contingencies. Decisions regarding the retention of specific property in Guam will not be finalized until the BRAC recommendations are approved. (Answer to Question 1.)

The Pentagon's unwillingness to identify and commit facilities for civilian reuse and economic revitalization in the areas to be affected by a closure or operational slow down, would continue the military's discretionary control over areas of vital economic importance to the people of Guam. From Guam's experience, this control has historically meant complete economic control over economically vital assets such as waterfront property. The Pentagon's proposal to govern the continued use of these underutilized assets even further leaves little confidence in the possibility of constructive joint-use (peacetime) scenario.

A transition period is not spelled out in the DoD recommendation that would allow for an economic revitalization. The timeframe of the Pentagon's recommendation for closures is not defined. It does not provide for a transition period during which time Guam can adjust to the new economic circumstances. It assumes that the facilities would be closed without providing the local community with the opportunity to adjust to the change.

This transition period would direct that the base closures would not move forward for a set number of years after the BRAC decision. This period would give Guam the time it would need to make a transition toward a private sector operation of these facilities. In order to make this a workable transition, BRAC would have to direct the Navy to work within certain set parameters and a set number of years to be determined.



A Proposal to Delay the Closure of Bases in Guam

Should the Commission decide to adopt any or all of the DoD recommendations concerning Guam, we request that the execution of the action(s) be delayed. This would allow both a reasonable transition period and a partial mitigation of the potentially catastrophic impacts on the civilian economy of the island. While delaying the action(s) would reduce the present value of the overall cost savings of closure and/or realignment activities, we believe that the offsetting benefits to the citizenry of Guam deserves at the very least this relatively small consideration.

We propose, as an alternative to the DoD proposals, that whatever actions are taken be pushed back by a mere two years, so that the bulk of the closure and/or realignment activity takes place in 1998 and 1999, rather than in 1996 and 1997. All closure and/or realignment activities would still fall within the required six-year time frame. The impacts on the net present value of the prospective cost savings are as outlined below:


Transition Cost Savings Under the Proposal and the Proposed Delay					
(\$K)	Discounting Rate	Six-Year NPV		Twenty-Year NPV	
		2.20%	2.75%	2.20%	2.75%
DoD Proposal					
SRF		168,181	164,798	594,067	562,829
FISC *		127,075	124,605	443,965	420,768
NAVACTS		55,976	53,616	506,090	474,290
NAVAIR		205,264	203,254	435,054	418,014
Total		556,495	546,274	1,979,177	1,875,901
Guam's Alternative Proposal					
SRF		85,205	83,058	517,840	487,605
FISC *		70,946	69,177	387,164	364,691
NAVACTS		(26,825)	(26,656)	430,712	401,154
NAVAIR		159,258	156,629	389,048	371,388
Total		288,583	282,208	1,724,764	1,624,838
Difference (\$K)					
SRF		(82,975)	(81,740)	(76,228)	(75,224)
FISC *		(56,129)	(55,427)	(56,801)	(56,077)
NAVACTS		(82,801)	(80,272)	(75,378)	(73,136)
NAVAIR		(46,007)	(46,626)	(46,007)	(46,626)
Total		(267,912)	(264,065)	(254,413)	(251,062)
Difference (%)					
SRF		49.34%	49.60%	12.83%	13.37%
FISC *		44.17%	44.48%	12.79%	13.33%
NAVACTS		147.92%	149.72%	14.89%	15.42%
NAVAIR		22.41%	22.94%	10.57%	11.15%
Total		48.14%	48.34%	12.85%	13.38%

* Note: FISC figures reflect a correction to the COBRA model to account for the time-phasing of MILCON and shutdown.



Legend

-  *Conservation*
-  *Historic Preservation*
-  *Recreation*
-  *Medium Density Development*
-  *Commercial*
-  *Public Use*
-  *Low Density Development*
-  *Light Industrial*
-  *Heavy Industrial*
-  *Retained by the Navy*




Proposed Use - Apra Harbor Complex



GRAPHIC SCALE

MILES 1 2 3 4 5 6

Location



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy

Proposed Use
Ship Repair Facility

REUSE CONCEPTS

Guam's position in the Western Pacific is a crucial link between the east and the west. As part of the burgeoning "New Pacific," Guam's leadership is presently developing "Vision 2001," a strategic plan aimed at developing Guam into a center for business and commerce. A crucial element of this strategic plan is the potential for Guam to become a transshipment hub for the central Pacific basin. Guam today is a leader in the Micronesia area for transportation, communications, tourism and financial services. Its attractiveness stems from its location and the fact that Guam is the westernmost American soil, which provides a sense of stability both politically and financially.

Planning strategically, Guam is aggressively generating new investment opportunities, including the creation of new industries designed to create jobs, generate profits for new businesses, and increase overall government revenues to replace the potential loss of federal and defense funding and jobs as a result of the DoD recommendations.

To do so, Guam must think competitively, utilizing all possible tools at its disposal to maximize the value of its strategic location as an established link for businesses between Asia and the United States. Its political stability and English-speaking workforce makes it a natural setting. However, to do so will require that Guam be given the opportunity for its burgeoning private sector to mature into a main player in the Western Pacific.

The Apra Harbor area is the only developed and certified deep water port facility within a 1,500 mile radius of Guam. This makes Guam a vital link to the surrounding Micronesian islands, and creates the potential for the island to become a major base of operations for short-haul commercial shipping and fishing industries for the entire Pacific Rim. The reuse of the Naval Facilities in and around Apra Harbor by the local government and private sector would provide for a wealth of opportunities, placing Guam in the forefront for transshipment and transportation. Moreover, it would still allow for the U.S. military to operate successfully through the joint use of existing facilities.

Ship Repair Facility (SRF)

Under our reuse plan, the existing Ship Repair Facility can easily accommodate both military and civilian markets. Our proposal is to preserve the military's ability to support its fleet operations while expanding our commercial opportunities for private ship repair and industrial support of our public and private operations through a joint use agreement. Some of the reuse opportunities we envision for SRF include:

Military Ship Overhauls and Repairs:

The Military Sealift Command operates numerous vessels in the Western Pacific region, including several prepositioning ships which are situated around Guam. While the T-AFS and T-AE forward deployed afloat vessels are recommended for movement to Hawaii under the

recommendations to BRAC 95, the Military Prepositioning vessels located in the Marianas will be a continued source for replenishment activities. Expansion of these services into maintenance activities is a possibility, and could range from voyage repairs to bi-annual overhauls. Presently, these vessels travel to CONUS every second year for overhaul.

The MSC vessels which are recommended for movement to Hawaii could also be a source of intermittent voyage repairs (a relatively minor operation). These activities could encompass overhauls when work schedules at the proposed depot-level maintenance facilities in Japan and Hawaii are occupied with other, time-sensitive repairs.

Emergent repairs could be a continuing source of intermittent work. This is particularly the case with U.S. nuclear vessels operating in the Western Pacific, since such vessels cannot presently undergo repairs in foreign countries.

Arrangements providing for U.S. military vessels to receive preferential treatment at a civilian run industrial/ship repair facility in Guam would be welcomed by the Government of Guam in economic revitalization proposals

Commercial Ship Overhaul and Repair:

Aside from providing for the military's ability to support fleet operations, we envision the reuse of SRF to include opportunities to market Guam as a main port-of-call for the repair and overhaul of commercial and private ships. This includes container ships, fuel ships, passenger liners, and most importantly, fishing fleets. Presently, there are 8 fishing fleets that utilize Guam's port facilities as a transshipment, minor repair and provisioning station. This industry represents some \$37 million in its infancy stage. To date, we have received numerous inquiries from fishing fleets operating in and around the Micronesian Islands as to the potential for expanding our existing facilities. With our proposal to keep the MSC ships forward deployed in Guam as a core level of work, in addition to our vision of commercial use of the facilities, there is no doubt that the SRF will become a central focus in Guam's economic revitalization.

General Industrial Production

The facilities at the SRF represent great opportunities for the support of commercial and public businesses, operations and maintenance activities. These include utilization of the existing facilities for repair of equipment, calibration, die casting for parts, metal works, metal fabrication, and a whole host of other uses, including services to the dive industry through use of the existing decompression chambers. Presently, the government of Guam and the private sector are forced to send much of their repair work and fabrication of parts to Asia and the United States. This includes everything from baseline power generators to construction cranes and aircraft parts. With the expansion of the Guam International Airport and Continental Micronesia's routes, as well as the addition of new air carriers, the need for precision repair and fabrication facilities is growing rapidly. Moreover, Guam's economy is poised for expansion in

tourism, having reached its room inventory saturation point of 1.4 million visitors by the end of this year. This will require another push for the construction of some 2500 additional hotel rooms, which will underscore the need for the repair and maintenance of construction equipment and fabrication of parts for the construction industry.

Small Commercial Ship and Private Vessel Construction

One aspect of use that could be of great importance to Guam would be the actual construction of small commercial ships and private vessels. With the increased interest in Guam as a major port-of-call in the Pacific, interest in the construction of small commercial ships and private vessels is growing, as well. Guam's proximity to major ports and marinas provides a unique opportunity in this industry. This is underscored by the increased interest and inquiries from ship builders in the Asian markets.

Naval Activities/Apra Harbor

Cruise Ship Passenger Terminal

As Guam continues its tourism expansion, the need for options in travel and leisure activities will continue to grow. One area of great interest is in the passenger cruise industry. In recent years, Guam has enjoyed very limited opportunities in this area due to the lack of facilities to accommodate these "floating hotels." To date, Guam has hosted Club Med cruise ships, Windjammer Cruises, Major Japanese cruise ships and the Queen Elizabeth II. With Guam's location being an average of 3.5 hours from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the possibility of fly/cruise travel packaging is very real for Guam. The area known as Victor Wharf is well-suited to serve as docking space for passenger liners stationed in or visiting Guam. With the addition of a first class passenger terminal and the support facilities available in FISC, there is no doubt that this will be a major source of revenue enhancement for the Territory.

Commercial Fishing Fleet Support:


Presently, as stated before, Guam is host to 8 major fishing fleets, which use Guam as a port-of-call for transshipment of tuna into the Asian markets. Guam now moves 9 million metric tons of tuna per year through its very limited and restrictive facilities at the existing commercial port. We have been repeatedly approached by Taiwanese and Chinese fishing fleets to homeport in Guam, which translates into a potential for up to 250 vessels. Moreover, Guam's proximity to the Asian fish markets makes it an ideal location for auctioning of fresh fish for those markets prior to shipment, bringing the cost to the buyers far below the costs they are presently paying. This translates into major revenue potentials for Guam.



GRAPHIC SCALE



Location



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy

Proposed Use
FISC




GRAPHIC SCALE



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy



Proposed Use
NAS




GRAPHIC SCALE



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
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*Proposed Use
Nimitz Hill*

Pacific Fleet in World War II and lived in housing on the hill after the war. It contains the area know as "Flag Circle," which contains the housing for the island's most senior naval officers, an officer and enlisted family housing area, the command complex for the Commander, Naval Forces Marianas (COMNAVMAR) -- a junior one-star flag billet -- and several recreation facilities.

The Government of Guam requests that Nimitz Hill be recommended for closure by the BRAC 95 commission. The enlisted family area is already included in GLUP 94. With all the other closures and realignments in Guam, there appears to be no real reason that the officer family housing can not be included with it.

Secondly, with the number of closures and realignments in Guam, there would seem to be a serious question about the viability of the position and staff of COMNAVMAR. Thus, it would seem that the headquarters should be closed. Even if the flag billet and the appropriate staff remain viable, they will be smaller in size and should be consolidated into facilities on the new and smaller Naval Activities. Finally, with the departure of the families and the flag officer and his staff, and with the decreased size of the Navy contingent in Guam, there is no reason to continue operating the MWR facilities at Nimitz Hill, and they should also be recommended for closure.

Other Housing Areas: Apra Heights and Nimitz Hill

The officer and enlisted family housing area at Nimitz Hill was mentioned in the paragraphs above. The other area GovGuam would like the BRAC 95 to consider for closure is the Apra Heights housing area, which contains 72 officer and 308 enlisted family housing units. GovGuam estimates that these housing units are excess to the Navy's needs, and these estimates are supported within the Navy civil engineering community.

Fena Watershed

The Fena watershed is a 3,670 acre area that sits in the southern and mountainous area of the island surrounding the Fena reservoir. It was constructed in 1951 and is the only remaining viable reservoir in the lower tropical latitudes. Thanks to a pristine watershed surrounding the reservoir and periodic violent typhoons, the reservoir remains a viable and long-term source for water. All other viable reservoirs are located in the higher latitudes where the freezing and thawing and other violent weather control the growth of organism in the water that, when unchecked, can clog and "kill" a reservoir. The reservoir was built in 1951 and has an estimated storage capacity of over 2.3 billion gallons. The reservoir and its associated springs can produce between 9.5 and 10.5 million gallons per day, depending on the season.

The reservoir is also used for recreation for the exclusive use of the personnel stationed at the Naval Magazine. This policy has changed periodically, depending on the whims of the commanding officer of the Magazine, a circumstance that Guam has seen for almost 100 years of Navy governance and management of facilities in Guam. Stories abound from the history of the Navy in Guam that are almost identical. For some time in the recent past, citizens of Guam were

allowed to visit and use the reservoir in limited numbers, but after a change of command that policy changed.

The reservoir sits under the "explosive arcs" of the Naval Magazine, and thus some argue the land cannot be returned to GovGuam. GovGuam, on the other hand, intends to use the land for the same purpose as it is used by the Navy: i.e., as a watershed and for low-impact recreation, but it will also be used for all the citizens of Guam, not just for the benefit of a special elite.

GovGuam will requests that BRAC 95 to return the reservoir to the Government of Guam. GovGuam will prohibit any major development within the watershed and will establish controlled low-impact recreation programs for fishing, camping, hunting and other conservation-based programs.

Naval Magazine

The Naval Magazine in Guam encompasses over 1,300 acres located in the village of Santa Rita and just north of and adjacent to the Fena Reservoir. The magazine has a capacity to store over 17 million pounds of explosives of three basic types for the Navy, as well as other materials used by the Navy's explosive program.

There is more than adequate acreage at Andersen Air Force Base to include all of the Navy's requirements. There may, however, be some military construction required to store all of the Navy ordnance. It is the sense of the leadership in Guam that the consolidation of munitions storage be effectuated by the military.



GRAPHIC SCALE



Legend

-  Conservation
-  Historic Preservation
-  Recreation
-  Medium Density Development
-  Commercial
-  Public Use
-  Low Density Development
-  Light Industrial
-  Heavy Industrial
-  Retained by the Navy

Proposed Use

Naval Magazine

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center

Military Sealift Cargo and Fuel Support

U.S. military vessels operating in the Western Pacific will continue to find Guam a convenient and welcome port-of-call. Presently, the MSC receives reprovisioning at various points in their area of operations. Since Guam's cargo-handling capacity will expand with the availability of additional dock space and warehousing assets, reprovisioning in Guam can continue to be of benefit to the military. Additionally, the fuel capacity which Guam currently maintains, (together with additional storage facilities that may be available with the closure of FISC Guam), will allow Apra Harbor to be a convenient site for refueling. Just as Apra Harbor currently serves the military as a one-stop port for replenishment, a civilian run operation will be of interest to military vessels seeking a strategic site for meeting maritime needs.

Commercial Warehousing

The existing Fleet and Industrial Supply Center provides an excellent opportunity for Guam's economic future. The existing warehouses can provide the anchor for a "Free Trade or Special Processing Zone" for the transshipment business. This could include bonded warehouses for products destined for the United States and Asia, light assembly industries and manufacturing of capital goods and supplies, and a major redistribution center for markets throughout Asia. Moreover, the area in and around the FISC offers excellent opportunities for fish processing, cold storage and warehousing for industrial park development.

Sasa Valley and Tenjo Fuel Farms

The present capacity of 1.4 million barrels of oil storage capacity in these areas is without a doubt a major opportunity for Guam's economic future. The possibilities for refineries, holding tanks for private oil storage, fueling for commercial ships and a whole host of related industries are within Team Guam's visions of the future.

In conclusion, there is no doubt as to the importance of these assets and properties to Guam's future. With our reuse proposal, we fully intend to maximize our economic activities to their fullest potential. These brief sketches represent only a narrow glimpse of our vision for a future that includes the return of these assets. The true potential for Guam's economic future relative to these areas cannot be overstated by any stretch of the imagination. Team Guam is focused on developing a strategic plan that includes the reuse of these areas. It is a vision that sees Guam's true potential as a center for finance, telecommunications, transshipment and tourism. It is a vision of the Way Forward for Guam's people.

Officer Family Housing at NAS Agaña

As a result of the recommendations of the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission, the Department of the Navy was directed to move their air operations at NAS

Agaña to the little-utilized Andersen Air Force Base 10 miles to the north. NAS Agaña also included 136 units of Officer Family Housing, 352 units of Enlisted Family Housing, a Bachelor Officer Quarters with room for 96 personnel, and a Bachelor Enlisted Quarters with room for 841 personnel. At the time, Team Guam requested that the entire operation, including the housing occupants, move to Andersen. Team Guam wrote a report that postulated that the Navy had excess housing in Guam and did not need the NAS housing units. The GAO reviewed Guam's data and the Navy data. They did not agree totally with the Navy position, but neither could they confirm Team Guam's position.

During the debate by the Commissioners during the hearing at which they made their unanimous decision, it was clear that the Commission staff and the Members understood the proximity of the two fields, the fact that many of the housing units held Navy personnel not stationed at the airfield, and that many of the airfield personnel lived outside of the air station. Since the Commission could not justify the cost of rebuilding the housing at Andersen, despite the lack of evidence that it was unnecessary, they chose instead to impose a compromise that ordered the Navy to move the air operations only. However, the Commission left the housing areas intact. In the debate during the Commission hearing, the Commissioners felt the officers and sailors could easily commute to their jobs at Andersen, especially since roughly half did not live within the air station and were already commuting.

After the Navy began to actually execute the decision, they altered the direction of the BRAC decision in two fundamental ways. First, they disestablished VRC-50 (already stationed at Andersen, having moved from the Philippines to Guam), transferred the two electronic fixed wing squadrons (VQ-1 flying EP-3 aircraft and VQ-3 flying ES-3 aircraft) "temporarily" to bases on the west coast of the Continental U.S., and moved HC-5 and their CH-47 support helicopters up to Air Force spaces at Andersen to await the construction of a new hangar and support spaces. They obviously felt that their moves of the two VQ squadrons had to be temporary because otherwise it would violate the direction of BRAC 93.

The General Counsel of the Navy called Guam's Delegate in Washington to discuss this issue. The Navy would not admit that they intended to ask for a "redirect" to bring them into compliance with the law, but it was obvious to most observers in Guam that they would have to obtain a redirect none-the-less. Consequently, the current DOD recommendation requests just such a move. In fact, given the proposed reduction of forces at Naval Activities, it goes one step further and recommends moving the helicopter squadron to Hawaii.

The second fundamental change to the NAS Agaña move was the Navy's realization that they indeed had no need for most of the housing at the air station. Within a year, the Navy's position began to change, and over the last two years they have voluntarily relinquished their control over all the enlisted bachelor and family housing, all the Moral, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) facilities and land, and the officer bachelor housing. They have, however, continued to insist (with one known exception) upon the need to retain the officer housing. The one exception which reflects that the chain of command was at times split as to the real need was a statement by a senior civil engineer on Guam that the housing would be returned. He later was forced to recant his position.

To add fuel to the fire, at one point the senior leadership of Guam was being told that the housing would be retained for use by the Navy doctors. This was especially egregious because the doctors had no operational reason to be close to the air station and had been housed quite comfortably in their own block of housing adjacent to the hospital for years, even when the size of the hospital staff was larger. The citizens of Guam could not help but conclude that the superior views available from the NAS officer housing units had convinced the doctors and others that this piece of property was "essential" to the viability of the Navy's mission on Guam.

The plot of land at the now former NAS Agaña that contains the 136 units of officer family housing not only has some of the best views of the waters of the Philippine Sea and the areas around the community of Agaña, but it is also extremely convenient to the new civil air terminal now under construction and, more importantly, completely clear of the airports AICUZ zones. As a consequence, it is one of the most desirable and developable plots of land at the airport for the benefit of the citizens of Guam in their drive towards true economic revitalization. In all scenarios of reuse, this piece of property is a key element, as it is superbly located for use as an airport hotel area, a convention site, a business center area, or some combination of those and other uses, all of which would enhance the desirability and profitability of travel to and business in Guam.

As a result, Team Guam is requesting that the Officer Housing Area at the former NAS Agaña be closed by the 1995 BRAC Commission and returned to the Government of Guam for reuse.

Return of Excess Lands identified in the Guam Land Use Plan of 1994

The Department of the Navy, through the Department of Defense, has declared over 6,000 acres of DOD land to be excess to their needs, excluding the lands encompassed by the Naval Air Station. This land is proposed for the Government excessing process in a document called the Guam Land Use Plan of 1994. Given the experience of the Government of Guam with the eccentricities of the federal Government's excessing program, GovGuam would prefer to have the GLUP 94 lands included in the BRAC 95 process.

Guam is only now about to receive over 3,000 acres of excess DOD land that will help immeasurably in their process of satisfying the long-standing land claims of the citizens of Guam and in the development of business opportunities in Guam. Unfortunately, this land was first declared to be excess in a document referred to as THE GUAM LAND USE PLAN OF 1977. Indeed, these 3,000 acres were first proposed for excess in 1977. The land was about to be transferred in 1985 when the then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet weighed in, over the objections of his Fleet Civil Engineer, and said the land was critical to the Pacific Fleet.

The issue was then referred to the Secretary of Defense and on to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Many interviews, hours of research and visits to Guam later, the Secretary issued a report, The Army Report of 1985, stating that indeed the land was still excess to DOD's needs. This, however, did not end the issue.

The basic principle of the GSA process is that excess land should be returned at "fair market" value. Given how little the Federal Government had paid for the land when it was first "condemned," and the height of the property values during the peak of the expansion of the Japanese travel industry, the fair market price was unaffordable to most citizens of Guam and far exceeded the price the Government had paid for it, even including the cost of actual inflation -- a "fair market" price recommended in the Army Report.

In 1994 the Congress passed special legislation allowing the land to be transferred to GovGuam, through GSA, at no cost for "public" use.

By putting the GLUP 94 lands into BRAC 95, the excessing process can be streamlined and made more efficient. One of the basic tenets of the BRAC process as expanded upon by President Clinton is the acceleration and additional streamlining of the return of excess land to allow each community to better provide for its own economic revitalization. The land must still be transferred using the GSA excessing process, but that process is put under the management control of the Department of the Navy (in the case of Guam lands).

There is no theoretical reason why the GSA process when managed by the Navy, should be any faster or more efficient than the same process managed by GSA themselves. Actual experience, however, proves the contrary. The excess property process as managed by the Navy, and probably the other military services, has proved to be far more rapid, and the land has been transferred more quickly into the hands of the local governments where it can be more expeditiously returned to productive use. There are at least two possible explanations: one is that the President's Five-Point Policy has definitely provided methods and motivation to accelerate the process and make it more "community-friendly;" the second possible explanation is that the Navy is not normally in the land excessing business, and they want to get the land off their records as soon as possible.

Whatever the reason, the evidence of the past two BRAC cycles has proven that the return of excess DOD property to the local communities is better handled by the BRAC process than it is by GSA themselves, even though the basic procedures used in both are similar. Thus, given this opportunity, the Government and citizens of Guam would far prefer to include the recommended GLUP 95 land transfers in this round of base closures. The closure process is underway, the DOD has recommended that over 6,000 acres of land in Guam be declared excess, and the last two BRACs have proven that transfers handled by the Services even using GSA procedures are far quicker than when handled exclusively by GSA. Consequently, GovGuam will recommend that the lands in GLUP 94 be included in the recommended closures in BRAC 95.

Nimitz Hill

Nimitz Hill is a 217 acre parcel on a hill overlooking the Philippine Sea and the Apra Harbor complex. It is named after Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz who commanded the Navy's

