

REBUTTAL TO AIR FORCE JULY 29, 2005 MEETING RESPONSE (DCN: 5895)
REGARDING C130 INSTALLATION REALIGNMENTS

Pittsburgh PA , Niagara NY, Milwaukee WI, Charleston WV

The Air Force met with BRAC representatives on July 29, 2005 to address the BRAC Commission questions on realignment or closure of C-130 facilities (DCN: 5895). The Air Force position is still very shallow and ignores available data. The Air Force lack of an in depth evaluation of the entire C-130 proposal was again obvious during the August 10, 2005 Pope / Ft. Bragg hearing in Washington DC. Sworn witnesses there stated that the Air Force had never even informed the Army of what necessary base and mission support functions they would have to assume under the turnover of control of Pope AFB. While we maintain that it is possible to run these functions as tenant Air Force units on an Army Airfield without permanently stationed C-130 aircraft, the question of cost savings and practicality of the entire proposal becomes crucial.

The issue of whether to close Pope AFB, realign Pope and Little Rock AFB units and aircraft using closed Air Reserve Component (ARC) base resources, or leave the affected bases as they are, is one that has repeatedly been termed as decision making fraught with "errors and significant deviations" from what the Air Force reported.

This coalition of BRAC Task Forces strongly agrees with and maintains the position of the individual ARC bases, that it is an extremely unwise, and potentially harmful to national defense to close and consolidate ARC bases. Numerous factors associated with the proposed actions have been totally ignored by the Air Force in making its recommendations for C-130 moves.

Part of the Air Force's justification for moving resources to Pope Air Force Base is the opportunity for joint operations. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Wings provide an equal value in joint operations at Pope and Little Rock from their present home stations without the high costs of closures and moves and associated impracticalities. These ARC units regularly operate and train with the 18th Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division-clear examples of joint operations already underway. The present proximity to Fort Bragg of these many C-130 units scheduled to either be closed or realigned by this BRAC action, enhance "joint operations" at Pope. With the number of Reserve and Air Guard units scheduled to close or realign, the inventory of C-130s available to support the Joint Airborne / Air Transportability Training (JA / ATT) mission will be cut in half. This brings into question the potential impact of these proposed BRAC actions on the Army requirements for airlift support.

Little or no consideration has been given to the other joint missions these units perform with Army, Navy, and Marine forces both active and reserve. This proposed BRAC action will have a negative impact on readiness as these ARC Wings play a significant role in unit training and movements.

The web of uncertainty surrounding the involvement of the ARC into the moves between Pope and Little Rock dictates withdrawal of those forces from the equation and that the disbursement

of the Active Duty C-130's between Pope and Little Rock be left to future Air Force and Army study and force structure decisions. In rebuttal to the Air Force meeting summary of July 29, 2005 and to the Pope / Bragg hearing on August 10, 2005, the BRAC Task Forces of Pittsburgh, Niagara, Milwaukee (General Mitchell), and Charleston (Yeager), provide the following:

Section 1 - The C-130 J program cancellation cited by the Air Force may not have influenced the number of aircraft recommended for a certain location (per the Air Force meeting summary), however, the resumption of that program and the subsequent acquisition of these new aircraft will certainly provide more airlift capacity than that planned for under the Air Force BRAC recommendations. The more capable C-130 J's mean more capacity per aircraft than the C-130 E's and C-130 H's. It would stand to reason that the Air Force would not have to rely on joint basing of ARC C-130 aircraft at Little Rock AFB and Pope AFB, leaving these cost effective ARC units at their current locations to support the Fort Bragg missions as previously proposed with Pope closure (see Attachment 2). The Air Staff members participating in the 29 Jul 2005 meeting acknowledged that the C-130 changes only occurred after the "cancellation of the J Model contract". This acknowledgement confirms the position that the C-130 changes have nothing to do with BRAC, as provided by law. The J model cancellation caused the Air Force to seek an alternative method of acquiring additional aircraft, by doing a force structure change within the Guard and Reserve. The other ARC bases statistics are quite similar to those of Pittsburgh, and show minimal extra cost from supporting Ft. Bragg missions in this manner (see Attachment 3).

The 1998 GAO Report and the AFIT / GAO / ENS / 2002 report on the Life Cycle Cost Analysis of the proposed Replacement of Pope C-130 E Fleet, have thoroughly studied and recommended the replacement of the C-130 E with the C-130 J. The Air Force construction programs already begun at Pope (as noted in the August 10, 2005 Pope Hearing Testimony) were in response to these C-130 J recommendations until the program was halted in 2004 (pre-BRAC). Since that C-130 J program has been resumed (post-BRAC announcement), the questions raised by the Air Force as to aging equipment and mission capability should be again resolved without incorporation of ARC aircraft. Some increased ARC support missions might be necessary during the transition period to newer aircraft, but that can be easily accomplished as previously discussed.

Section 2 - This coalition has found no reference or any documentation in the BRAC library regarding the Air Force claim related to Pope AFB, that AFRC recognized "an opportunity to fill a mission there and supported the creation of the associate unit." Quite in opposition to this statement are the Air Force Reserve Command Capacity Analysis Briefing to the Base Closure Executive Group, 28 April 2004 and the Air Force Reserve Command Phase II Capacity Analysis, 25 August 2004. Both briefings cite the alleged lack of land availability at Pittsburgh as a "showstopper" and explore little other detail on the location after tagging it as such. Similar situations prevail at the other ARC bases involved here. Associate units could also be formed at many of the present ARC unit locations, but this approach was apparently not explored by the Air Force. The Phase II Capacity Analysis even specifically points out as special issues that the Pittsburgh location is a "candidate for associate build with ANG" and that Pittsburgh is a "large metropolitan area with a major airline hub good for recruiting." An estimate of cost savings by closure of Pope AFB, as requested by the BRAC staff of the Air Force at the July 29, 2005

meeting, is partially addressed at Attachments #4 and #5. While again demonstrating the ability of the current 19 ARC C-130 bases (159 C-130 aircraft) within a 2 hour flight time of Pope AFB to fulfill the Ft. Bragg mission, this chart also demonstrates the relatively low cost of this sort of support operation versus the high cost of moving and maintaining these units as proposed (Attachments #4 and #5).

Niagara Falls was slated for expansion until January 2005, and in fact has a higher military value index than certain other bases being expanded, a fact shared by other ARC bases once a true analysis is performed. Then, in January 2005, Niagara Falls was placed on the BRAC list for closure, based on "military judgment". This alleged "military judgment" amounted to lack of proper analysis and planning, which has abounded within the Air Force recommendations for ARC installations in BRAC.

It is unclear why the Army allegedly requested that C-130 aircraft be left at Pope. No documentation on this request has been located in the BRAC library. It is well known that support for a Crisis Response Team, an alleged Army concern, would primarily be filled by other than C-130 airlift aircraft. Any C-130 requirement in this regard could likewise be fulfilled by off station aircraft. A thorough review of the missions associated with the Little Rock / Pope proposals by this Joint BRAC Task Force can find no reason why it would be better suited to have these Reserve Forces C-130's at Pope and Little Rock rather than at their present locations. If those at Pope can unequivocally prove the mission requirement for continued active duty presence with the 43rd Airlift Wing, so be it. If so, there is no further need for ARC C-130 aircraft basing at Pope. Likewise, with the logical basing of active duty replacement C-130 aircraft at Pope and Little Rock, there is no need for further basing of ARC C-130's at either location. The high cost and seriously negative impact on the ARC structure could be enormous with the Air Force proposed actions. This is not in the best interest of this country, especially during a time of war, when all the affected assets are deeply involved in wartime support. The proposed changes at Little Rock only aggravate their limited airspace problems there. Their single runway operation is a clear reason for not moving ARC C-130's to this central location.

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POINT PAPER

PITTSBURGH IAP ARS JA/ATT MISSIONS

Purpose:

Address the ability of the 911th Airlift Wing to support multiple Army and Navy units with 1-day Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) missions. See map on last page.

Discussion:

The 911AW has always been a committed participant in JA/ATT missions. Over the years we have taken advantage of our base's proximity to Army and Navy JA/ATT users. Our location allows us to fly "out-and-back" missions to multiple users' locations. An "out-and-back" is one in which we can accomplish the mission in one day or evening, without staying overnight. Traditional Reservists (TR) can fly an out-and-back" after working their civilian job and then returning home in time to get a night's sleep and continue back with their civilian careers the following day. In addition this paper will discuss two regularly scheduled JA/ATTs that involve a single overnight. User locations to be discussed are: Pope AFB/Mackall AAF, NC, Fort Campbell AAF, KY, Wheeler-Sack AAF, Fort Drum, NY, Norfolk NAS, VA, Quartermaster Corps, Fort Lee, VA, and Natick Labs, MA. Camp Atterbury, IN and the Alpena/Grayling AAF, MI will not be covered in this paper because they are not used as regularly as the previously mentioned bases, but are sites within an hour of Pittsburgh where we have conducted JA/ATT missions in the past.

Pope AFB/Mackall AAF

- Missions are flown in support of either the 82nd Airborne Division or the XVIII Airborne Corps or the Combat Control Teams (CCT) at Pope
- Enroute time from Pittsburgh IAP ARS to landing is approximately 1 ¼ hours
 - Normally flown in high level Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) formation
 - This positioning leg has also been flown as high-low profile and low-level profiles
- Typical mission includes 2 to 3 aircraft loading 60 jumpers each
 - Fly a low level formation to a dropzone in Ft. Bragg's range, performing multiple passes
 - Recover back to Pope AFB/Mackall AAF to load a second lift, with multiple passes
 - Drop remaining personnel at Pope AFB/Mackall AAF and return to 911AW single ship
- * **Accomplishments:**
 - 240 to 360 paratroopers dropped, training gained by Army and Air Force
 - High-level SKE formation training
 - Low-level formation training
 - No impact on civilian employment

Fort Campbell AAF

- Missions are flown in support of 101st Airborne Division
- Enroute time from Pittsburgh IAP ARS to landing is approximately 1 ¼ hours
 - Normally flown in high level Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) formation

- This positioning leg has also been flown as high-low profile and low-level profiles
- Typical mission includes 1 to 2 aircraft loading 30-60 jumpers each
 - Fly a low level formation to a dropzone in Ft. Campbell's range, performing multiple passes
 - Recover back to Ft. Campbell AAF to load a second lift, with multiple passes
 - Drop remaining personnel at Ft. Campbell AAF and return to 911AW single ship
- * **Accomplishments:**
 - 60 to 240 paratroopers dropped, training gained by Army and Air Force
 - High-level SKE formation training
 - Low-level formation training
 - No impact on civilian employment

Wheeler-Sack AAF, Fort Drum

- Missions are flown in support of 10th Mountain Division
- Enroute time from Pittsburgh IAP ARS to landing is approximately 1 hour
 - Normally flown in high level Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) formation
 - This positioning leg has also been flown as high-low profile and low-level profiles
- Typical mission includes 1 to 2 aircraft loading 30-60 jumpers each or equipment
 - Fly a low level formation to a dropzone in Ft. Drum's range, performing multiple passes
 - Recover back to Wheeler-Sack AAF to load a second lift, with multiple passes
 - Drop remaining personnel at Wheeler-Sack AAF and return to 911AW single ship
- * **Accomplishments:**
 - 60 to 240 paratroopers dropped, training gained by Army and Air Force
 - Heavy equipment (HE) and Container Delivery System (CDS) drop training
 - High-level SKE formation training
 - Low-level formation training
 - No impact on civilian employment

Norfolk NAS

- Missions are flown in support of the Navy SEALs
- Enroute time from Pittsburgh IAP ARS to landing is approximately 1 hour
 - Normally flown as high level single-ship
- Typical mission includes 1 aircraft loading a Seal Team and equipment
 - Fly a low level formation to a water dropzone off Virginia's coast
 - Drop remaining personnel at Norfolk NAS and return to 911AW
- * **Accomplishments:**
 - Seal Team dropped, training gained by Navy and Air Force
 - Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) dropped
 - Low-level route training
 - This is normally a daytime mission and would require a TR to take leave from their civilian employer (unless they were working a night shift)

Quartermaster Corps, Fort Lee

- Missions are flown in support of the Army Quartermaster Corps at Fort Lee, VA


- Enroute time from Pittsburgh IAP ARS to landing at Langley is approximately 1 hour
 - Normally flown as high level single-ship
- Typical mission includes 1 aircraft loading HE, CDS and paratroopers
 - Fly a low level route to Blackstone DZ on Blackstone AAF, VA
 - Drop HE; fly racetrack to a CDS drop; then multiple personnel drop passes
- * **Accomplishments:**
 - Quartermaster Corps training on rigging and loading airdrop loads
 - All required drops for 6-month training period accomplished for Air Force crew
 - Low-level route training
 - The Quartermaster Corps requires this to be a single overnight mission. They load the aircraft upon arrival on the afternoon of the first day. The airdrops are accomplished the following morning.
 - TRs would be forced to take, at a minimum, 1½ days of leave from their jobs
 - The outstanding point here is that all airdrop requirements for the training period are accomplished on this mission

Natick Labs, MA

- Missions are flown in support of the Natick Labs tests
- Enroute time from Pittsburgh ARS to landing at Westover ARB is approximately 1¼ hours
 - Normally flown as high level single-ship; has been flown low level through LATN area
- Typical mission includes 1 aircraft loading test HE or CDS and paratroopers
 - Fly a low level route to Bean Bag DZ on Westover ARB, MA
 - Drop HE or CDS; then multiple personnel drop passes
- * **Accomplishments:**
 - Natick Labs testing accomplished and personnel training drops completed
 - Low-level route training
 - This mission can had has been flown as a single day mission but normally departs the previous night and supports the 439 AES unit at Westover ARB
 - TRs would be forced to take one day of leave to support the Natick portion of the mission

See map on next page.

911th Airlift Wing “Out-and-Back” JA/ATT Missions



JA/ATT Missions Scheduled Jun 02 - Jun 05

Location	MAJCOM	Unit	JA/ATT Missions Scheduled	Missions for 18th Abn Corps	Aircraft for 18th Abn Corps	Missions for 82nd Abn Div	Aircraft for 82nd Abn Division	Missions Supporting Both	Total Aircraft	Avg A/C per month to
Pope	AMC	43 AW	368	97	203	105	145	202	348	9.4
Pittsburgh	AFRC	911 AW	178	24	66	5	8	29	74	2.0
Dyess ³	AMC	317 AG	282	7	7	33	38	40	45	1.2
Charlotte	ANG	145 AW	98	2	2	21	22	23	24	0.6
Yeager	ANG	130 AW	40	6	19	3	5	9	24	0.6
Milwaukee	AFRC	440 AW	120	9	13	1	1	10	14	0.4
Little Rock	AMC	314 AW	19	2	8	3	6	5	14	0.4
Niagara	AFRC	914 AW	126	9	9	2	3	11	12	0.3
Quonset ⁴	ANG	143 AW	28	10	12	0	0	10	12	0.3
Youngstown	AFRC	910 AW	154	4	7	2	4	6	11	0.3
Willow Grove	AFRC	913 AW	170	5	2	13	8	18	10	0.3
Keesler ⁴	AFRC	403 AW	58	8	7	3	3	11	10	0.3
Dobbins	AFRC	94 AW	108	4	3	2	6	6	9	0.2
Martinsburg	ANG	167 AW	104	0	0	7	9	7	9	0.2
Nashville	ANG	118 AW	43	4	8	0	0	4	8	0.2
Louisville	ANG	123 AW	77	3	3	5	2	8	5	0.1
Mansfield	ANG	179 AW	40	4	4	1	1	5	5	0.1
Selfridge	ANG	171 AS	51	0	0	2	3	2	3	0.1
Maxwell	AFRC	908 AW	133	1	2	0	0	1	2	0.1
Peoria	ANG	182 AW	62	1	1	1	1	2	2	0.1
New Castle	ANG	166 AW	26	0	0	2	2	2	2	0.1
Savannah	ANG	165 AW	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Martin State ⁴	ANG	135 AS	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0

Click in Header Cells with red text to sort by that column.

¹ Statistics extracted from JA/ATT Annex C. Period covered from Jun 2002 through Jun 2005 (37 Months). Scheduled missions does not take into account cancellations due to weather, maintenance, etc. Assumed level playing field for all due to OIF and OEF commitments.

² Extracted numbers only include JA/ATT missions providing support to 18th Airborne Corps and 82 Airborne Division at Fort Bragg.

³ Aircraft numbers are those assigned to the mission. It does not take into account a single aircraft assigned to a multi-day mission

⁴ Conversion to C-130J and associated airdrop restrictions may have affected JA/ATT participation.

Cost Analysis of Pope AFB closing versus additional costs incurred by supporting Fort Bragg training from ARC within 2 hour flying radius

1. Average aircraft per month supplied by 43 AW supporting 18 th Airborne Corps and 82 nd Airborne Division ¹	9.4
2. Total aircraft supplied for one year	
3. Additional round trip flying hours to support missions from ARC C-130 bases	113
	4.0
4. Total additional flying hours per year ²	
5. Average AFRC Cost Per Flying Hour (CFPH) ³	452
6. Total yearly cost	\$1857
	\$839,364

1 See attached spreadsheet with JA/ATT Annex C extracted data.

2 These hours are already allocated into the ARC's budget. "Additional" refers to hours flown that would not be flown by aircraft stationed at Pope AFB.

3 See attached spreadsheet with AFRC/LGQP CPFH figures.

COBRA Model Excursions 5 (Jul 21, 1320 Eastern)
Pittsburgh BRAC Task Force

At the request of the task force, a series of excursions using the COBRA data supporting the Department of Defense (DoD) recommendations that impact Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) and area units were completed.

1. Excursion Name: Pittsburgh Actions Only.

- a. Overview: The purpose of the excursion was to determine the costs and savings associated only with actions directly attributable to the 911th Airlift Wing's (AW) closure and distribution of its aircraft and personnel.
- b. Baseline COBRA File: USAF 0122V3 (316.3).
- c. Modification to AF COBRA assumptions: Deleted all actions, costs and savings other than those directly associated with the closure of the 911th AW and distribution of its aircraft and personnel.
- d. Result: The changes in significant cost/savings data are displayed in the table below with the most significant presented in **bold** font. The AF Recommendation COBRA data is presented in the first row for comparison to the Excursion results displayed in the second row in **blue**. This row displays the cost/savings results from the COBRA Model for only the actions associated with the 911th AW.

Scenario	Payback Period (Years)	Costs/Savings (\$K)*				
		20 - Year NPV	1-Time	Personnel (2006 – 2011)	Total (2006 – 2011)	Annual Total Recurring
USAF 0122V3 (316.3)	Immediate	-2,706,756	90,101	-772,995	-815,558	-200,497
Community Excursion 1	3	-144,323	47,169	-36,464	-1,715	-14,826

* Negative numbers represent savings.

- e. Discussion: As the comparison demonstrates, the Pittsburgh Only action is a part of the scenario that generates costs, but the 3-year payback still makes it financially attractive.

C130H FY04 CPFH Final Execution Rates	
Unit	BQ/FAS
Milwaukee	\$1,722
Niagara	\$1,956
Maxwell	\$2,224
Dobbins	\$2,145
Peterson	\$1,709
Youngstown	\$1,751
Pittsburgh	\$1,494
	\$1,857
	Average CPFH

Notes:

Command funded @ \$2699 total CPFH Rate

CPFH execution rates are based upon total costs divided by total flying hours flown

BQ is the Accounting System used to report total costs, i.e. DLRs, Consumable items,

CPFH GPC FAS "Purple Hub" is the system used to report Aviation fuel consumption

and costs Minn-St Paul not reflected, unit had C130E acft in FY04