DCN 4282

NEPA



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103-06A –RH11 – State Input (PA)
Regional Hearing– July 7, 2005 – National Capital Area
BRAC COMMISSION – FY 2005
COFF:_____ DISPOSITION: Permanent

Northeastern Pennsylvania Alliance
Tobyhanna Army Depot – Keep the Best

Supporting Information for the
2005 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission

Transfer Work from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA
To Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD), PA

BRAC Recommendation: "Consolidate depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Electro-Optics/Night Vision/Forward-Looking Infrared, Generators, Ground Support Equipment, Radar, and Radio at TYAD" Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations VOL IV p. J-3, and Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignrnent Report Vol I, Part 2 of 2, DoN - 6.

Description of the Recommendation: This recommendation recognizes that TYAD is the Defense Department's premier depot for communications-electronics equipment, known as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). This recommendation identifies TYAD as a Department of Defense (DoD) Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence. The recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD by consolidating or eliminating 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. This recommendation also results in utilization of DoD capacity to facilitate performance of interservice workload. Interservicing of maintenance workload increases Jointness, a key element of the BRAC law.

Data reports show that 172.9K number of Direct Labor Hours (DLHs) will transfer to TYAD. See Appendix A. The data indicate that 128 civilian personnel (122 + six contractors) and three military personnel (two officer positions and one enlisted position) presently perform this work at Barstow.

Return on Investment: The COBRA report shows an immediate Return on Investment if the recommendation is accepted.

TYAD Capabilities: TYAD possesses an extensive C4ISR capability and is a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence for this equipment. In assessing its maintenance facilities for BRAC 2005, DoD's evaluations gave Tobyhanna more first place rankings than all but one of 49 maintenance facilities. In fact, Tobyhanna was rated first or second in 16 of the 19 commodity areas for which it

currently has maintenance capabilities. Furthermore, Tobyhanna was rated first in logistics among all Army installations. TYAD currently has the facilities, skills and capabilities to perform additional work of this type. This experience enables TYAD to easily increase the present operation, which supports numerous weapon system platforms, to include: Firefinder and other radar systems, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, the Forward Area Air Defense System; sensor and surveillance systems; numerous types of radio systems, generators and ground support equipment. Currently, TYAD executes approximately 5 million DLHs per year of C4ISR-related overhaul and repair in support of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and other customers. This additional workload, which is less than 3.5 percent of TYAD's current workload, can transition to TYAD and be performed within the existing infrastructure.

TYAD also provides worldwide support to the Warfighter through a Forward Repair Activity infrastructure that spans the globe – ready and capable to support the Warfighter in the field and Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow customers.

TYAD Capacity: Within TYAD's existing industrial configuration, there is sufficient capacity available to perform the Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Electro-Optics/Night Vision/Forward-Looking Infrared, Generators, Ground Support Equipment, Radar, and Radio workload. BRAC documentation shows current usage of 1.671.3 million hours annually for these commodities, with a maximum capacity of 6.24 million man-hours, leaving more than enough capacity available to perform the additional work. See Appendix A.

TYAD Infrastructure: TYAD has sufficient information technology, utilities, and environmental permit capacity to accomplish this workload. This additional work will not result in any significant environmental impacts to air, water, or lands. Existing environmental permits, to include a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection-issued Air Quality Program Permit, provide more than enough capacity to allow TYAD to perform this additional workload.

TYAD's facilities already include sufficient floor space to integrate this workload within existing shop areas. Only minor facilitization of existing, available industrial areas would be required to assume this workload.

NEPA Infrastructure: Northeastern Pennsylvania has outstanding schools, available and affordable housing, outstanding computer infrastructure, and excess utility capacity to accommodate this workload and any workers interested in transferring to the area. Northeastern Pennsylvania enjoys a relatively low cost of living rate, and both the state and community are committed to minimizing the impact on transferring employees and their families. The area was recently ranked among the top six locations in the country, for enjoying relative freedom

from crime and extreme weather hazards. As a result of prior BRAC rounds, the community has a record of successfully accommodating new workload and new employees into the region. Employees transferring from the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow would find a friendly, supportive environment in Northeastern Pennsylvania.

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USN	CO_MCLB_BARSTOW_CA						
		Aircraft Other Components	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0 .. 0.0
		Aircraft Rotary	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0 .. 0.1
		Amphibious Vehicles	133.7	155.8	118.2	205.7	-22.1 .. 49.9
		Armament & Structural Components	1.1	1.1	0.0	1.5	0.0 .. 0.3
		Combat Vehicles	175.8	162.1	124.8	193.1	13.6 .. 30.9
		Construction Equipment	28.2	19.9	28.2	34.2	0.0 .. 6.0
		Conventional Weapons	1.7	2.5	0.0	2.2	-0.8 .. -0.3
		Electronic Components (non-airborne)	32.6	75.0	0.0	83.0	-42.3 .. 8.1
		Electro-Optics/Night Vision/FLIR	4.6	4.7	0.0	5.9	-0.1 .. 1.2
		Engines/Transmissions	21.6	41.5	18.9	34.9	-19.9 .. -6.7
		Fire Control Systems & Components	7.4	7.7	0.0	12.8	-0.3 .. 5.1
		Generators	4.5	5.8	0.8	7.7	-1.4 .. 1.8
		Ground Support Equipment	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0 .. 0.1
		Material Handling	12.6	0.6	12.6	12.6	0.0 .. 0.0
		Other	3.7	4.1	0.0	5.3	-0.3 .. 1.2
		Other Components	10.1	16.1	0.0	24.5	-6.0 .. 8.4
		Other Equipment	7.9	11.8	6.0	15.5	-3.9 .. 3.7
		PowerTrain Components	1.4	1.4	0.0	2.2	0.1 .. 0.8
		Radar	153.9	84.2	153.9	153.9	0.0 .. 0.0
		Radio	3.0	2.9	0.1	3.9	0.1 .. 0.9
		Small Arms/Personal Weapons	6.8	11.2	1.6	10.0	-4.4 .. -1.3
		Starters/Alternators/Generators	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0 .. 0.0
		Strategic Missiles	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 .. 0.0

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USN	**CO_MCLB_BARSTOW_CA**						
		Tactical Missiles	25.5	47.0	25.2	40.1	-21.6 .. -7.0
		Tactical Vehicles	234.5	203.0	231.5	282.0	3.0 .. 50.5
		TMDE	5.5	13.8	0.0	14.2	-8.3 .. 0.4
		Wire	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 .. 0.0
		Site Total	**876.8**	**872.9**	**721.6**	**1,145.9**	**-114.6 .. 154.4**
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					**0.4% .. 23.8%**
USN	**COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_PATUXENT_RIVER_MD**						
		Ground Support Equipment	539.0	539.0	0.0	539.0	0.0 .. 0.0
		Site Total	**539.0**	**539.0**	**0.0**	**539.0**	**0.0 .. 0.0**
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					**0.0% .. 0.0%**

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USA	**TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT**						
		Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components	317.5	268.1	131.9	404.9	49.4 .. 136.8
		Aircraft Other Components	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	-0.4 .. -0.4
		Calibration	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	-3.7 .. -3.7
		Computers	271.0	257.9	252.4	320.7	13.1 .. 62.8
		Crypto	196.5	159.4	28.0	248.9	37.2 .. 89.6
		Depot Fleet/Field Support	34.2	25.6	19.5	34.2	8.5 .. 8.5
		Electronic Components (non-airborne)	698.3	547.0	1,354.4	1,496.6	-656.2 .. 142.2
		Electronic Warfare	402.4	312.0	154.1	546.2	90.5 .. 234.2
		Electro-Optics/Night Vision/FLIR	251.7	184.1	97.8	395.2	67.7 .. 211.2
		Fabrication & Manufacturing	274.2	225.5	78.0	328.8	48.6 .. 103.2
		Fire Control Systems & Components	179.5	150.5	0.0	216.5	29.0 .. 66.0
		Generators	51.2	35.2	34.9	56.8	16.0 .. 21.6
		Ground Support Equipment	166.1	129.5	182.1	187.2	-16.0 .. 5.1
		Navigational Aids	62.9	37.5	40.8	76.7	22.1 .. 36.0
		Other	40.3	36.7	150.6	52.2	-110.3 .. -98.4
		Other Equipment	0.0	0.0	43.7	0.0	-43.7 .. -43.7
		Radar	295.5	232.3	132.7	379.0	63.2 .. 146.7
		Radio	824.3	543.2	211.6	1,064.8	281.0 .. 521.5
		Software Weapon System	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	-6.0 .. -6.0
		Tactical Missiles	167.9	87.5	50.6	184.1	80.4 .. 96.7
		Tactical Vehicles	109.8	94.4	18.0	122.7	15.4 .. 28.3
		TMDE	70.5	35.8	172.6	98.2	-102.1 .. -74.4
		Wire	28.9	18.1	121.1	28.9	-92.2 .. -92.2

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USA	**TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT**						
	Site Total		4,442.7	3,380.3	3,285.0	6,242.5	-208.4 .. 1,591.4
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						23.9% .. 45.9%
USA	**TOOELE ARMY DEPOT**						
	Other		116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Site Total		116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						61.7% .. 69.3%

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

Northeastern Pennsylvania Alliance
Tobyhanna Army Depot – Keep the Best

Supporting Information for the
2005 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission

Transfer Work from the Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG), Lackland Air Force Base (AFB)
To Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD), PA

BRAC Recommendation: "Realign Lackland AFB, TX by relocating the depot maintenance of Computers, Crypto, Electronic Components (Non-Airborne) and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pa." Industrial Joint Cross Service Group (IJCSG) Final Report, page 36.

Description of the Recommendation: This recommendation recognizes TYAD's expertise in repairing and maintaining a variety of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment for the Department of Defense. This recommendation minimizes the number of industrial base sites performing depot maintenance functions, and eliminates redundant overhead structures, thereby eliminating unnecessary costs. Moving this workload to TYAD, a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) for C4ISR workload, capitalizes on TYAD's expertise and increases Jointness, a key element of BRAC. As stated in the BRAC justification, this recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance across DOD by consolidating and eliminating 30 percent of the duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. Additionally, this recommendation supports transformation of DoD depot maintenance by increasing utilization of existing capacity and facilitates performance of interservice workload.

Data reports show that 147,000 Direct labor Hours (DLHs) will transfer to TYAD. The work consists of Computers, Crypto (Communications Security (COMSEC) and Signal Intelligence (SI)), Electronic Components (non-airborne), and Radio. See Appendix A. The data indicate that 137 civilian employees presently perform this work.

Return on Investment: The BRAC Recommendation shows an immediate Return on Investment if the recommendation is accepted. The present value of the savings to the Department over 20 years is $27,996,000.

TYAD Capabilities: TYAD possesses the necessary capabilities, to include facilities and skills, to perform this work. These capabilities include -

TYAD is a Center of Excellence for COMSEC

Full INFOSEC (Information Security) maintenance capability

Secure CRYPTO facility

U.S Air Force Alternate Key data Processor Loading and Installation Facility

Test Program Sets management and configuration

Joint certification training center

National Security Agency-certified destruction and demilitarization center

COMSEC Field repair Activity In Southwest Asia.

Secure receipt, storage, issuance and distribution of retail and wholesale items.

In assessing maintenance facilities for BRAC 2005, Defense Department evaluations gave Tobyhanna more first place rankings than all but one of 49 maintenance facilities. In fact, Tobyhanna was rated first or second in 16 of the 19 commodity areas for which it currently has maintenance capabilities. Furthermore, Tobyhanna was rated first in logistics among all Army installations.

TYAD Capacity: Within TYAD's existing facility, there is sufficient capacity available to perform the Crypto (COMSEC/SI), Computers, Electronics Components (non-airborne), Radio, and Other work. As documented in the IJCSG Capacity Analysis Report for TYAD (page 30 and 31), TYAD's current usage for this work is 1.507.3 million hours with a maximum depot capacity of 6.242 million hours. TYAD has more than enough capacity available to perform the additional work. See Appendix A.

TYAD Infrastructure: TYAD has sufficient information technology, utilities, and environmental permit capacity to accomplish this workload. This additional work will not result in any significant environmental impacts to air, water and lands. Existing environmental permits, to include a Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Protection-issued Air Quality Program Permit, have more than enough capacity to allow TYAD to perform this additional workload.

Only minor facilitization of existing, available industrial areas would be required to assume this workload. TYAD's COMSEC facilities constitute a full-service maintenance and supply depot, with comprehensive electronics maintenance, industrial support, supply, storage and distribution, and destruction and demilitarization capabilities already in place.

NEPA Infrastructure: Northeastern Pennsylvania has outstanding schools, available and affordable housing, outstanding computer infrastructure, and excess utility capacity to accommodate this workload and workers interested in transferring to the area. Northeastern Pennsylvania enjoys a relatively low cost of living rate, and both the state and community are committed to minimizing the impact on transferring employees and their families. The area was recently ranked among the top six locations in the country for enjoying relative freedom from crime and extreme weather hazards. As a result of prior BRAC rounds, the community has a record of successfully accommodating new workload and new employees to the region. Employees transferring from Lackland would find a friendly, supportive environment in Northeastern Pennsylvania.

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
	USAF HILL AFB						
		Site Total	7,948.3	9,073.3	7,668.0	10,653.0	-2,826.0 .. -121.3
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					-14.2% .. 14.8%
	USAF LACKLAND AFB						
		Computers	64.0	33.0	0.0	64.0	31.0 .. 31.0
		Crypto	63.0	23.0	0.0	63.0	40.0 .. 40.0
		Electronic Components (non-airborne)	17.0	11.0	0.0	17.0	6.0 .. 6.0
		Other	54.0	70.0	0.0	54.0	-16.0 .. -16.0
		Radio	23.0	10.0	0.0	23.0	13.0 .. 13.0
		Site Total	221.0	147.0	0.0	221.0	74.0 .. 74.0
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					33.5% .. 33.5%
	USA LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT						
		Fabrication & Manufacturing	74.1	53.1	49.0	98.8	21.0 .. 45.7
		Generators	217.4	0.0	144.1	289.9	73.3 .. 145.7
		Other Equipment	93.6	55.4	62.1	124.8	31.5 .. 62.7
		Tactical Missiles	1,040.6	1,060.3	776.0	1,387.9	-19.7 .. 327.6
		Tactical Vehicles	149.5	69.0	99.1	199.3	50.4 .. 100.2
		Site Total	1,575.2	1,237.8	1,130.3	2,100.7	156.4 .. 682.0
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					21.4% .. 41.1%

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
	USA	**TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT**					
		Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components	317.5	268.1	131.9	404.9	49.4 .. 136.8
		Aircraft Other Components	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	-0.4 .. -0.4
		Calibration	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	-3.7 .. -3.7
		Computers	271.0	257.9	252.4	320.7	13.1 .. 62.8
		Crypto	196.5	159.4	28.0	248.9	37.2 .. 89.6
		Depot Fleet/Field Support	34.2	25.6	19.5	34.2	8.5 .. 8.5
		Electronic Components (non-airborne)	698.3	547.0	1,354.4	1,496.6	-656.2 .. 142.2
		Electronic Warfare	402.4	312.0	154.1	546.2	90.5 .. 234.2
		Electro-Optics/Night Vision/FLIR	251.7	184.1	97.8	395.2	67.7 .. 211.2
		Fabrication & Manufacturing	274.2	225.5	78.0	328.8	48.6 .. 103.2
		Fire Control Systems & Components	179.5	150.5	0.0	216.5	29.0 .. 66.0
		Generators	51.2	35.2	34.9	56.8	16.0 .. 21.6
		Ground Support Equipment	166.1	129.5	182.1	187.2	-16.0 .. 5.1
		Navigational Aids	62.9	37.5	40.8	76.7	22.1 .. 36.0
		Other	40.3	36.7	150.6	52.2	-110.3 .. -98.4
		Other Equipment	0.0	0.0	43.7	0.0	-43.7 .. -43.7
		Radar	295.5	232.3	132.7	379.0	63.2 .. 146.7
		Radio	824.3	543.2	211.6	1,064.8	281.0 .. 521.5
		Software Weapon System	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	-6.0 .. -6.0
		Tactical Missiles	167.9	87.5	50.6	184.1	80.4 .. 96.7
		Tactical Vehicles	109.8	94.4	18.0	122.7	15.4 .. 28.3
		TMDE	70.5	35.8	172.6	98.2	-102.1 .. -74.4
		Wire	28.9	18.1	121.1	28.9	-92.2 .. -92.2

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USA	**TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT**						
	Site Total		4,442.7	3,380.3	3,285.0	6,242.5	-208.4 .. 1,591.4
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						23.9% .. 45.9%
USA	**TOOELE ARMY DEPOT**						
	Other		116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Site Total		116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						61.7% .. 69.3%

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

Northeastern Pennsylvania Alliance
Tobyhanna Army Depot – Keep the Best

Supporting Information for the
2005 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission

Transfer Work from Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA
To Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD), PA

BRAC Recommendation: "Relocate the depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Fire Control Systems and Components, Radar, and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA." Industrial Joint Cross Service Group (IJCSG) Final Report, p. 40.

Description of the Recommendation: This recommendation recognizes TYAD's extensive expertise, capability, capacity and experience in maintaining a variety of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems for the Department of Defense (DoD). The recommendation minimizes the number of industrial base sites performing depot maintenance functions, and eliminates redundant overhead structures, thereby eliminating unnecessary costs. Moving this workload to TYAD, a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) for C4ISR workload, capitalizes on TYAD's expertise and increases Jointness, a key element of BRAC. As stated in the BRAC justification, this recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance across DoD by consolidating and eliminating 30 percent of the duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. Additionally, this recommendation supports transformation of DoD depot maintenance by increasing utilization of existing capacity and facilitates performance of interservice workload.

Data reports show that 86,000 Direct Labor Hours (DLHs) will transfer to TYAD as a result of this recommendation. See Appendix A. The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) report indicates that 31 government employees and 16 contractor employees presently perform this work at the Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA.

Return on Investment: The BRAC detailed recommendations show a $1.618M annual recurring savings to the Department of Defense (DoD) after implementing the overall recommendation to realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach. The

COBRA data projects a Return on Investment in one year if the recommendation is accepted. Copies of this data are enclosed.

TYAD Capabilities: TYAD possesses an extensive C4ISR capability and is a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence for this equipment. In assessing maintenance facilities for BRAC 2005, Defense Department evaluations gave Tobyhanna more first place rankings than all but one of 49 maintenance facilities. In fact, Tobyhanna was rated first or second in 16 of the 19 commodity areas for which it currently has maintenance capabilities. Furthermore, Tobyhanna was rated first in logistics among all Army installations. TYAD currently has the facilities, skills and the capability to perform additional work of this type. This experience enables TYAD to easily increase the present operation, which supports numerous weapon system platforms, to include: Firefinder Radars, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, Forward Area Air Defense Systems; sensor systems; and numerous radio communications systems. TYAD capabilities include, the full spectrum repair, maintenance, testing, engineering for airborne and ground electronics, a state of the art Missile Facility, Class 1,000 through 300,000 clean rooms, Laser test and Threat Emitter Ranges. In addition, TYAD has Anechoic Chambers, two Near Field probes, a Tactical End Item Repair Facility, Phased Array Radar Capability and an Industrial Operations Facility for support services. Currently, TYAD executes approximately 5 million DLHs per year of C4ISR-related overhaul and repair in support of the US Army, the US Air Force, the US Navy, the US Marine Corps, and other customers. This additional workload, which equals less than 2 percent of TYAD's current workload, can be transitioned to TYAD and executed within the existing infrastructure.

TYAD also provides world-wide support to the war fighter through a Forward Repair Activity infrastructure that spans the globe – ready and capable to support the war fighter in the field and Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach customers.

TYAD Capacity: Within TYAD's existing industrial configuration, there is sufficient capacity available to perform the Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Fire Control Systems and Components, Radar, and Radio workload identified in the BRAC recommendation. Workload performed on these commodities equals 1.5 million hours with a maximum capacity of 6.24 million hours, leaving more than enough capacity available to perform the additional work. See Appendix A.

TYAD Infrastructure: TYAD has sufficient information technology, utilities, and environmental permit capacity to accomplish this workload. This additional work will not result in any significant environmental impacts to air, water, or lands. Existing environmental permits, to include a Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Protection-issued Air Quality Program Permit, have more than enough capacity to allow TYAD to perform this additional workload.

TYAD's facilities already include sufficient floor space to integrate this workload within existing shop areas. Only minor facilitization of existing, available industrial areas would be required to assume this workload.

NEPA Infrastructure: Northeastern Pennsylvania has outstanding schools, available and affordable housing, outstanding computer infrastructure, and excess utility capacity to accommodate this workload and any workers interested in transferring to the area. Northeastern Pennsylvania enjoys a relatively low cost of living rate, and both the state and community are committed to minimizing the impact on transferring employees and their families. The area was recently ranked among the top six locations in the country, for enjoying relative freedom from crime and extreme weather hazards. As a result of prior BRAC rounds, the community has a record of successfully accommodating new workload and new employees into the region. Employees transferring from the Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach would find a friendly, supportive environment in Northeastern Pennsylvania.

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USN	NAVWPNSTA_SEAL_BEACH_CA						
		Electronic Components (non-airborne)	25.0	21.0	19.0	25.0	4.0 .. 4.0
		Fire Control Systems & Components	49.0	17.0	17.0	49.0	32.0 .. 32.0
		Material Handling	15.0	8.0	8.0	15.0	7.0 .. 7.0
		Other Components	14.0	5.0	5.0	14.0	9.0 .. 9.0
		Radar	61.0	43.0	37.0	61.0	18.0 .. 18.0
		Radio	6.0	5.0	5.0	6.0	1.0 .. 1.0
		Tactical Missiles	46.0	6.0	6.0	46.0	40.0 .. 40.0
		Site Total	**216.0**	**105.0**	**97.0**	**216.0**	**111.0 .. 111.0**
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					**51.4% .. 51.4%**
USN	NAWCAD_LAKEHURST_DET_MAYPORT_FL						
		Depot Fleet/Field Support	27.0	31.2	0.0	30.4	-4.3 .. -0.8
		Other	3.8	3.8	0.0	3.8	0.0 .. 0.0
		Site Total	**30.8**	**35.1**	**0.0**	**34.3**	**-4.3 .. -0.8**
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					**-13.9% .. -2.4%**
USN	NAWCAD_LAKEHURST_DET_NORFOLK_VA						
		Depot Fleet/Field Support	76.7	78.5	0.0	86.9	-1.8 .. 8.4
		Site Total	**76.7**	**78.5**	**0.0**	**86.9**	**-1.8 .. 8.4**
		Percent of Capacity Not Utilized					**-2.4% .. 9.7%**

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USA	**TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT**						
		Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components	317.5	268.1	131.9	404.9	49.4 .. 136.8
		Aircraft Other Components	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	-0.4 .. -0.4
		Calibration	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	-3.7 .. -3.7
		Computers	271.0	257.9	252.4	320.7	13.1 .. 62.8
		Crypto	196.5	159.4	28.0	248.9	37.2 .. 89.6
		Depot Fleet/Field Support	34.2	25.6	19.5	34.2	8.5 .. 8.5
		Electronic Components (non-airborne)	698.3	547.0	1,354.4	1,496.6	-656.2 .. 142.2
		Electronic Warfare	402.4	312.0	154.1	546.2	90.5 .. 234.2
		Electro-Optics/Night Vision/FLIR	251.7	184.1	97.8	395.2	67.7 .. 211.2
		Fabrication & Manufacturing	274.2	225.5	78.0	328.8	48.6 .. 103.2
		Fire Control Systems & Components	179.5	150.5	0.0	216.5	29.0 .. 66.0
		Generators	51.2	35.2	34.9	56.8	16.0 .. 21.6
		Ground Support Equipment	166.1	129.5	182.1	187.2	-16.0 .. 5.1
		Navigational Aids	62.9	37.5	40.8	76.7	22.1 .. 36.0
		Other	40.3	36.7	150.6	52.2	-110.3 .. -98.4
		Other Equipment	0.0	0.0	43.7	0.0	-43.7 .. -43.7
		Radar	295.5	232.3	132.7	379.0	63.2 .. 146.7
		Radio	824.3	543.2	211.6	1,064.8	281.0 .. 521.5
		Software Weapon System	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	-6.0 .. -6.0
		Tactical Missiles	167.9	87.5	50.6	184.1	80.4 .. 96.7
		Tactical Vehicles	109.8	94.4	18.0	122.7	15.4 .. 28.3
		TMDE	70.5	35.8	172.6	98.2	-102.1 .. -74.4
		Wire	28.9	18.1	121.1	28.9	-92.2 .. -92.2

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USA	**TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT**						
	Site Total		4,442.7	3,380.3	3,285.0	6,242.5	-208.4 .. 1,591.4
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						23.9% .. 45.9%
USA	**TOOELE ARMY DEPOT**						
		Other	116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Site Total		116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						61.7% .. 69.3%

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

Northeastern Pennsylvania Alliance
Tobyhanna Army Depot – Keep the Best

Supporting Information for the
2005 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission

Transfer Work from Red River Army Depot (RRAD)
To Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD), PA

BRAC Recommendation: "Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Vehicles to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA and Letterkenny Depot, PA." Department of the Army Analysis and Recommendations, VOL III p. 96.

Description of the Recommendation: This recommendation recognizes that in addition to Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) expertise, TYAD possesses extensive capability, capacity, and experience in repairing a variety of tactical vehicles for the Department of Defense. The recommendation minimizes the number of industrial base sites performing depot maintenance functions, and eliminates redundant overhead structures---thus eliminating unnecessary costs.

Data reports show that 90,000 Direct labor Hours (DLHs) will transfer to TYAD as a result of this recommendation. See Appendix A. The data indicates that approximately 65 employees presently perform this work at RRAD.

Return on Investment: The COBRA data show a $76.5M annual recurring savings to the Department of Defense after implementing the overall recommendation to close RRAD. The COBRA data projects a Return on Investment in four years, if the recommendation is accepted.

TYAD Capabilities: TYAD possesses an extensive industrial capability and proven track record in the maintenance and repair of a wide variety of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. TYAD currently has the facilities, skills and the capability to perform additional work of this type. This experience enables TYAD to easily increase the present operation, which supports numerous vehicle-mounted weapon system platforms, to include: Firefinder Radars, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, Forward Area Air Defense System, and various communications and sensor systems, for a wide variety of customers within the active and reserve components. Tactical Wheeled Vehicles supported at TYAD include High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs); Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs); the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV); 5-Ton trucks; and 2 ½-Ton trucks. Between 2003 and 2005, TYAD

repaired or overhauled hundreds of these vehicles. TYAD provides full-spectrum mechanical support for drive train, chassis, and body work; full-spectrum electrical support; inspection and testing services; and associated engineering design and fabrication expertise. Component repair inherent in this workload includes brakes, steering, hydraulics, fuel, suspension, engine, transmission, and other systems within the vehicle. These capabilities also are applied to the maintenance of numerous types of trailers used in conjunction with a variety of C4ISR systems.

TYAD also provides world-wide support to the war fighter through a Forward Repair Activity infrastructure that spans the globe – ready and capable to support the Warfighter in the field.

TYAD Capacity: Within TYAD's existing maximum capacity of 6.24 million hours, there is substantial available capacity to perform work on Tactical Vehicles. Workload performed on Tactical Vehicles during 2003 and 2004 ranged from 94,000 to 105,000 hours annually, leaving more than enough capacity available to perform the additional work. See Appendix A.

TYAD Infrastructure: TYAD has sufficient information technology, utilities, and environmental permit capacity to accomplish this workload. This additional work will not result in any significant environmental impacts to air, water, or lands. Existing environmental permits, to include a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection-issued Air Quality Program Permit, have more than enough capacity to allow TYAD to perform this additional workload.

Only minor facilitization of existing, available industrial areas would be required to assume this workload. TYAD's facilities already include extensive back shop facilities (i.e. painting, sandblasting, cleaning, and plating operations); overhead cranes for equipment movement; and its own modified Munson road test site where Tactical Wheeled Vehicles are put through a rugged driving course designed to simulate the challenging conditions found in the field. In addition to the extensive highway and airlift connections available to TYAD, the depot's own railhead provides a cost effective transportation option, as well as access to a double-decker unloading ramp to allow vehicles to be driven on/off rail cars in the most efficient manner possible. The rail lines enable TYAD to ship throughout the Continental United States, to include the Strategic Port of Philadelphia

NEPA Infrastructure: Northeastern Pennsylvania has outstanding schools, available and affordable housing, outstanding computer infrastructure, and excess utility capacity to accommodate this workload and any workers interested in transferring to the area. Northeastern Pennsylvania enjoys a relatively low cost of living rate, and both the state and community are committed to minimizing

the impact on transferring employees and their families. The area was recently ranked among the top six locations in the country, for enjoying relative freedom from crime and extreme weather hazards. As a result of prior BRAC rounds, the community has a record of successfully accommodating new workload and new employees into the region. Employees transferring from RRAD would find a friendly, supportive environment in Northeastern Pennsylvania.

IJCSG - Depot Maintenance Capacity Analysis Report - Capacity by Site

Function	Site	Commodity Group	Current Capacity (dlh(k))	Current Usage (dlh(k))	Current Core Reqt. (dlh(k))	Maximum Capacity (dlh(k))	Excess Capacity (dlh(k))*
Depot Maintenance							
USA	**RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT**						
		Armament & Structural Components	13.6	9.6	0.0	17.3	4.0 .. 7.7
		Combat Vehicles	868.2	621.7	800.0	1,099.6	68.2 .. 299.6
		Construction Equipment	278.8	275.2	250.0	342.4	3.6 .. 67.2
		Conventional Weapons	0.0	0.0	12.0	0.0	-12.0 .. -12.0
		Depot Fleet/Field Support	7.9	6.1	10.0	9.8	-2.1 .. -0.2
		Engines/Transmissions	241.8	231.1	250.0	299.3	-8.2 .. 49.3
		Fabrication & Manufacturing	269.0	342.7	200.0	324.7	-73.7 .. -18.0
		Fire Control Systems & Components	4.2	3.2	3.5	5.6	0.7 .. 2.1
		Other	61.3	65.7	50.0	79.7	-4.3 .. 14.0
		PowerTrain Components	6.9	4.8	10.0	8.6	-3.1 .. -1.4
		Starters/Alternators/Generators	3.5	3.3	2.5	4.7	0.2 .. 1.3
		Tactical Missiles	93.2	189.2	200.0	119.3	-106.8 .. -80.7
		Tactical Vehicles	541.4	368.8	500.0	672.1	41.4 .. 172.1
	Site Total		**2,389.8**	**2,121.6**	**2,288.0**	**2,983.0**	**-92.2 .. 501.0**
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						**4.3% .. 23.3%**

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Depot Maintenance							
	USA	**TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT**					
		Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components	317.5	268.1	131.9	404.9	49.4 .. 136.8
		Aircraft Other Components	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	-0.4 .. -0.4
		Calibration	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	-3.7 .. -3.7
		Computers	271.0	257.9	252.4	320.7	13.1 .. 62.8
		Crypto	196.5	159.4	28.0	248.9	37.2 .. 89.6
		Depot Fleet/Field Support	34.2	25.6	19.5	34.2	8.5 .. 8.5
		Electronic Components (non-airborne)	698.3	547.0	1,354.4	1,496.6	-656.2 .. 142.2
		Electronic Warfare	402.4	312.0	154.1	546.2	90.5 .. 234.2
		Electro-Optics/Night Vision/FLIR	251.7	184.1	97.8	395.2	67.7 .. 211.2
		Fabrication & Manufacturing	274.2	225.5	78.0	328.8	48.6 .. 103.2
		Fire Control Systems & Components	179.5	150.5	0.0	216.5	29.0 .. 66.0
		Generators	51.2	35.2	34.9	56.8	16.0 .. 21.6
		Ground Support Equipment	166.1	129.5	182.1	187.2	-16.0 .. 5.1
		Navigational Aids	62.9	37.5	40.8	76.7	22.1 .. 36.0
		Other	40.3	36.7	150.6	52.2	-110.3 .. -98.4
		Other Equipment	0.0	0.0	43.7	0.0	-43.7 .. -43.7
		Radar	295.5	232.3	132.7	379.0	63.2 .. 146.7
		Radio	824.3	543.2	211.6	1,064.8	281.0 .. 521.5
		Software Weapon System	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	-6.0 .. -6.0
		Tactical Missiles	167.9	87.5	50.6	184.1	80.4 .. 96.7
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		Wire	28.9	18.1	121.1	28.9	-92.2 .. -92.2

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	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						23.9% .. 45.9%
USA	**TOOELE ARMY DEPOT**						
	Other		116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Site Total		116.3	44.6	0.0	145.4	71.7 .. 100.8
	Percent of Capacity Not Utilized						61.7% .. 69.3%

*Excess Capacity is computed on the larger of Current Usage or Core Requirement

Northeastern Pennsylvania Alliance

NEPA

TO: Anthony J. Principi, Chairman, Base Realignment & Closure Commission

FROM: Cameron Moore, Co-Chairman, Tobyhanna Army Depot Blue Ribbon Task Force (BRTF) CM

DATE: July 7, 2005

RE: Negative Impacts on Maintenance Depots Resulting From Supply and Storage Recommendations

1. Attached is a detailed paper addressing major concerns with the Supply and Storage Recommendations as they relate to maintenance depots. The paper outlines the extensive damage that this ill-thought proposal will have on the efficiencies, productivity and cost effectiveness of DoD's network of maintenance centers. The Blue Ribbon Task Force has the benefit of the vast knowledge, experience and expertise of Mason Linn, former civilian executive assistant at Tobyhanna Army Depot. His contributions to this paper are invaluable. This paper clearly reflects his extensive logistics knowledge and his continuing commitment to providing the finest possible support to our Warfighters. He could not stand by and allow this recommendation to detract from that vital support provided by Tobyhanna Army Depot and all of DoD's maintenance centers.

2. Your service on this commission demonstrates that you share his commitment, and with that commonality of purpose, I urge you to investigate, question and ultimately to reject this recommendation.

Northeastern Pennsylvania Alliance
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Memo
To: 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission
From: Northeast Pennsylvania Blue Ribbon Task Force
Subject: Supply and Storage (S&S) Joint-Cross Service Group's (JCSG's) Recommendations Regarding Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD)

The S&S JCSG recommends consolidating what are currently depot maintenance functions under the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The specific recommendation can be found on page 21 of the S&S JCSG's 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume XI. We strongly oppose this recommendation. It is contrary to the intent of the BRAC legislation, contrary to Core Logistics statutes, fails to recognize the critical requirements of the depot maintenance functions, violates and restricts a maintenance depot commander's command and control authority, lacks sufficient analysis/justification, places unjustified reliance on unsupported business process engineering, and jeopardizes the maintenance depots' ability to support the Warfighter. We ask the nine members of the independent BRAC Commission to exercise their authority to reject this flawed recommendation.

The Introduction to the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group Report calls out guidelines and target areas for group focus and data calls, but quickly follows with a set of recommendations that significantly violates its own organizational philosophy on supply, storage and distribution. The report clearly states an "appropriate level of S&S involvement" must focus on "above installation" activities--essentially wholesale levels of supply, storage and distribution. Yet a significant segment of the group's recommendations insert DLA into the middle of depot maintenance production and clearly interfere with "installation and below" production processes, such as TYAD.

We believe the data gathering and subsequent analyses did not provide the S&S Group with a full understanding of functions that are critical components of complex depot maintenance operations. And if approved, this recommendation will result in transfer of technically-oriented, vital maintenance/supply interactive functions not compatible with DLA's automated, high volume business practices and will seriously jeopardize efficiency and effectiveness of military service industrial maintenance production capabilities.

Any useful delineation of the S&S JCSG's proposed approach to consolidating these service "supply activities," how it might function under DLA management control, and where it might improve operational efficiency, is totally absent from the report. There is also no analysis of imposed command and control changes and impacts. It appears that top level compilation of DoD-wide manpower and infrastructure with any remote association with "supply & storage," drew conclusions that redundancy, excess capacity and underutilized resources can be eliminated by transferring ownership to a single command: DLA. This simple thesis is dangerous, flawed with misunderstanding of current methods, invokes multiple impacts on industrial production line efficiencies, and will ultimately result in warfighter sustainment shortfall.

This set of S&S recommendations must be fully understood, studied, analyzed and impartially evaluated. In our view, the proposed changes are mind boggling, impacts are serious, and consequences are far reaching. Transformation goals are essential, but cannot be used as a cover for overly aggressive raids of vital processes and functions from within other command core work areas.

The basis of the BRAC S&S recommendation is "transformation." However, transformation is a nebulous term that should not be confused with logical reasoning and a rational assessment of impact on mission, cost, and savings. The United States General Accountability Office Report, GAO-5-785 (July 2005), expresses uncertainty with the S&S recommendation. (See GAO-05-785, pages 5 and 25-26). The GAO urged the BRAC Commission to review these recommendations in more detail. We strongly urge you to do the same, but also ask that you investigate the impact of the recommendation on the depot maintenance missions.

The S&S Recommendation has wide-reaching implications for the entire Defense Department which must be addressed.

Specifically:

1. DLA Wholesale Supply versus Depot Maintenance "Shop Stock"

The JCSG mistakenly assumes that because the maintenance depots must requisition parts and materials, store work-in-process and customer owned equipment, and move work in process among various production shops, those functions must be the same as the supply functions DLA performs. They are not. In fact, there are essential differences.

Depot maintenance personnel do not requisition materiels for resale or redistribution; they requisition repair parts for maintenance programs and induct reparable materiel already in storage at the co-located DLA depot for maintenance repair. The parts are ordered by technicians who are intimately involved with the repair process and parts availability. Many of the parts are customer-owned (e.g., PEO/PM- or field user-owned). This is "shop stock." Should DLA attempt to take over this function, they would still have to receive the information from a depot technician, there would still be a need for the depot to perform functions from a shop floor perspective, etc. The co-located DLA distribution depot currently provides no requisitioning services for a depot and merely operates as a distribution center -- receiving, storing and issuing wholesale materiels for the Services' inventory control points. Similarly, materiel movement positions within a depot are solely in support of in-house maintenance functions. These personnel may deliver repair parts/shop stock that are already owned by the depot or a customer to a specific shop but also move items that are under any type of repair from one shop to another, such as moving an asset from an electronics technician's work bench to sandblast to a paint booth. They are performing intershop movements in direct support of the depot maintenance mission. Under the S&S recommendation, however, the clear-cut accountability that exists at the maintenance depots today would be destroyed. Under the S&S recommendation, a depot maintenance employee would remove the engine from a

tactical vehicle, turn the body over to DLA to transport it to another depot maintenance shop for painting, call DLA to return the painted body once completed, reinstall the engine, and then turn the completely overhauled vehicle over to DLA for final shipment. Under the S&S recommendation, these simple internal movements of equipment and material among the various industrial shops would now involve two separate organizations, and two separate chains of command for what is really one single mission/function (i.e. depot maintenance).

2. Job Order Control

At TYAD, parts are ordered and pre-positioned in an Automated Storage and Retrieval System (ASRS) pending decision to floor the work order. ASRS provides high grade inventory protection, control, and security for a variety of production materials. Work-in-process, assemblages, bill of material parts, etc. are binned, palletized or packaged and set aside in ASRS with full confidence that the combination will be available for withdrawal and return to shop as called. Prior to construction of ASRS, in-process assemblages were set aside within shop, under work benches, in shop storage racks, anywhere where they could be readily accessed when needed. Flexible, rapid response, storage capability is a critical part of a clean efficient maintenance work loading system. Flexibility permits technicians to pull in process work from ASRS inventory, add parts, check quality, apply the modification, and return it to a location with inventory records noted for update. Command and control of the ASRS is essential for the maintenance depot to provide a lean work area free of all items/assemblages except those currently being worked. Moreover, all ASRS parts are costed on receipt, stored and accounted for by depot maintenance work or job order. Release to the shop floor is by production order and work breakdown structure number. This accounting and tracking method is essential to properly identify costs directly to the correct depot maintenance repair program on the shop floor. DLA accounts for wholesale inventories by federal stock number and has no mission to store, account and control by production order. Differences between a supply and a maintenance production environment invite disharmony.

3. Work-In-Process (WIP)

Tobyhanna's ASRS inventory includes numerous pallets of WIP -- repairables partly worked, parts, components, partial assemblages where work has started but set aside from the work bench for a variety of causes (such as new work with urgent priority, lack of parts, or change of customer specification). Work-in-process, assemblages, and parts are tagged, palletized, assigned a temporary stock number for identification and stored/reserved by job order pending later return to performing shops. The multi-purpose inventory control system must be stored "as is" in order to protect, control and account for this WIP. Electronics is a commodity that requires flexibility and responsiveness for rapid change of work schedule, clearing of work space and induction of new work in organized, controlled manner. The maintenance depot's command and control over WIP is key to success. Why would any company give control and management of WIP to another entity?

The importance of job order control and WIP to the maintenance mission cannot be dismissed. The success of a maintenance depot rises and falls on its ability to effectively manage its job orders and WIP. DLA cannot control, store, or issue by job order. It doesn't fit anywhere in their systems because DLA manages by stock number. When you move from stock number to job order number, you've crossed an important line. You are no longer talking about moving sealed packages, unit pack, or controlled humidity storage. With a job order focus, the packages are opened and on the work bench, where the blue collar maintenance worker who paints the metal and installs an engine on the production line can pull one widget from the box when (s)he needs it. This is not within the DLA mission or expertise, and it undermines the viability of the depot maintenance mission.

4. Command Authority

The maintenance depot commanders are responsible for ensuring weapon systems are repaired and returned to the Warfighter on time, within cost allowances, and at the highest level of quality possible. To do that, they need to control the total maintenance function, to include managing the supplies and materials inherent to that function. A commander needs the authority to prioritize, schedule, and direct all aspects of that function. Breaking that command and control authority, as the JCSG recommends, would seriously jeopardize mission accomplishment. The commanders would no longer control critical sub-processes that are vital to the overall maintenance activity and ultimately providing expeditious service to the warfighter.

5. Systems Compatibility

DLA functions use the Distribution Supply System (DSS) for various supply-related processing functions such as receipt, storage, issue, inventory, etc. The Army is presently implementing the Logistics Management Program (LMP). In addition, the Automated Storage and Retrieval System (ASRS) being used at depots is a stand alone system for which the software has been configured to interface with LMP, a customized system for file transfer from the ASRS to LMP and back. This in turn interfaces with other elements of LMP in financial and production areas. DLA's ability to effectively merge these two systems into a cohesive Enterprise Resource Planning system has not yet been demonstrated. Failure to "prove out" processing compatibility before implementation would cripple the depot maintenance mission.

6. Central Depot Concept

In 1997, U.S. Army Audit Agency issued Report AAA97-161, titled, "Management of Repair Parts for Maintenance." The report described costly problems and redundancies in a Service's and the DLA supply operations. The report did, however, praise the viability of an initiative called Central Depot Concept (CDC). CDC took responsibility for receipt of depot maintenance equipment FROM DLA and gave it back TO the Army. This restructuring allowed the DLA to drastically reduce its manpower footprint within the Army facility by eliminating the DLA receiving functions within the Army depot.

This initiative also eliminated the redundancy of having two receiving functions on the installation, one DLA- and one Service-owned. Prior to the implementation of the CDC, DLA would receive the material, then hand it to the Depot receiving functions where it would be received again. Elimination of these redundancies saved the DLA millions. It also saved the Army millions by eliminating the payment of the required DLA transaction fees for receipt, storage and issue of these materials. The Army implemented CDC as a National Performance Review (NPR) initiative. Following an extensive analysis of alternatives by a team of Army and DLA experts, the CDC study concluded that the best and most cost-effective alternative was to consolidate inventories and store installation supply activity material in the depot maintenance retrieval system (ASRS) under Army, not DLA control, establish central receiving areas for shop stock at the retrieval system under depot, not DLA control, and assign responsibility for managing all retail inventories, including shop stock, to the depot. In essence, the CDC eliminated a layer of inventory and the redundant handling of material that occurred between the DLA activity and the depots, resulted in savings of at least $5 million annually, reduced retail inventories by at least $60 million, decreased delivery times, decreased the amount of excess material, and improved inventory visibility. The report identified net savings and cost avoidances exceeded $40 million. The CDC initiative resulted in the receipt of the Hammer Award by Vice President Gore for making a government that "works better and costs less." If not questioned by this Commission, the Secretary's BRAC 2005 recommendation would now reverse the highly successful CDC. The Army would be required to, for example, re-establish duplicative receiving and inspection points for material, lose visibility over material and assets, increase in-shop inventories, and delay delivery of critical weapon systems.

7. Service-Managed Shop Stock Is Essential

The S&S recommendation would retain only "the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support (the depot), and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point". This portion of the recommendation is consistent with the CDC initiative noted above. In effect, the only supply and storage resources left at the depot would be those required to support their single, dedicated customer---the maintenance depot. Therefore, a more logical recommendation would be to retain existing resources under the Command and Control of the maintenance depot, rather than place it under DLA. In addition, experience shows that DLA frequently takes credit for alleged cost-cutting measures, such as outsourcing, which may show savings on the DLA ledger, but translate into decreased responsiveness to the depot maintenance mission. If the S&S recommendation is implemented, the depot maintenance mission will suffer.

8. Differences in Command and Control

The S&S JCSG claims that the recommendation "eliminates redundant supply and storage functions at industrial installations." In reality, there is a clear distinction between the functions performed by DLA and those performed by the maintenance depots. DLA performs supply, storage, and distribution for wholesale supply purposes.

Its focus is on common commodities used by multiple customers and on stocking large quantities of those commodities for extended periods in case the wholesale system requires it. The maintenance depots, however, deal only with their own unique below retail, customer-owned supplies specifically required for those specific customers. Their focus is on specialized limited quantities of high turnover supplies needed specifically for their maintenance customers. They are two distinctly different systems serving two distinctly different purposes. The Depot's inventory is "retail inventory" -- parts and equipment already purchased by the Depot (from DLA and other sources). This is considered "restricted stock" for specific maintenance programs at the Depots; it is NOT available for anyone else to purchase or request. The maintenance depot inventory solely supports the depot maintenance mission -- materials and parts needed to repair weapon systems. Transferring these functions from the depots to DLA would result in the loss of depot scheduling flexibility to meet production requirements.

9. Need for Objective Independent Analysis

There is great variety in the missions, staffing, productivity, and resources of "supply, storage, and distribution" work currently performed at each industrial facility. Yet the S&S JCSG appears to have consistently assumed an arbitrary reduction in staffing at each industrial site. How could such substantive variety in the missions and resources at each site, have yielded such a consistent level of savings? The analysis for consolidating parts management functions (budget, funding, contracting, cataloging, requisition, processing, customer service, item management, stock control, weapon system secondary item support, requirements determination, integrated material management technical support inventory control pint functions for consumable items) is lacking. There is no evidence to show that transferring such critical, sophisticated missions to entities with no experience in these missions will meet warfighter requirements. An objective, independent study needs to be done before this recommendation receives any further consideration.

10. DLA Overextended Its Capabilities

In Report Number D-2001-076, dated March 13, 2001, the Department of Defense Inspector General (IG) identified inadequate procurement support by a DLA supply center which was exacerbated by the BRAC 1995 recommendation to transfer additional workload to that center. The IG found that inadequate procurement support was largely responsible for a 48% increase in backorders and a purchase request backlog increase of 40%. Before BRAC 1995 was implemented in July 1999, purchase requests were being awarded in 85 days and were filled from stock at an 88% rate. In 2000, DLA averaged 107 days to award a purchase request and the requisition from stock rate fell to 83%. Consequently, depot maintenance was not being performed on time, equipment was not returned to the warfighter as scheduled, idle hours rose while repair work was delayed, and major components were overscheduled for repair in order to "rob back" parts (removing parts from one component in order to complete the repair process on another component). In addition, the IG determined that the DLA Center initiated new, untested business practices instead of focusing on traditional business activities, thereby diverting

resources from priority needs and reducing the number of personnel, and overworking remaining personnel needed to process purchase requests. Concerns had been raised that the Service maintenance depots by-pass the supply system by directly procuring required parts and materials. Yet the DoD IG Report highlights the primary reason for this: DLA's failure to procure and deliver materials and parts on a timely basis. The DoD IG report verifies that DLA overestimated its capabilities in BRAC 1995. As a result, warfighter support was negatively impacted. Thorough analysis with supporting documentation must be performed to ensure that DoD does not repeat the painful lessons of the past.

11. Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities

Title 10 USC 2464 declares as a matter of national defense policy and law that the Department of Defense must possess core logistics capabilities necessary to maintain and repair the weapon systems and other military equipment required to fulfill strategic and contingency plans prepared by the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In essence, this law recognizes the criticality of depot maintenance to our national security. Another law, 10 USC 2460, defines depot maintenance to include the material maintenance or repair requiring overhaul, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or subassemblies, testing and reclamation of equipment. Clearly, Congress placed significant emphasis on the performance of depot maintenance, recognizing that a ready and able maintenance workforce is critical to national defense.

Subsumed in the definition of depot maintenance are the hundreds of technical skills required to ensure that these missions are accomplished. It includes the skilled people at the maintenance centers who handle military equipment, manage the shop stock to ensure the components are in the right shop at the right time, schedule and track the work through the facility to ensure the equipment is repaired on time and at the right price, track materials and equipment in the maintenance center, or deliver the equipment from a maintenance holding area directly to the worksite when it's required – and not a day late. These individuals do not move equipment from storage to the loading dock; they manage the equipment pursuant to specific technical requirements for the system. These individuals do not order supplies, they manage the materials and the equipment as it passes from one depot maintenance process to another, ensuring that the maintenance schedules and cost estimates are honored. Without them – as an integral part of the depot maintenance mission -- the performance of core logistics work cannot be efficiently accomplished.

12. Scheduling Production

Repairables and prepositioned parts are inducted to the shop floor based on work order priority, customer requirement, analysis of parts inventory, shop capacity and sequence of production. Analysis of raw stock and parts on hands frequently allows selected shop work to reach sub-assembly completion incrementally. Parts availability data by job order is critical to decisions on when, where and how much shop work can commence. This intimate

knowledge of the depot maintenance mission, so critical to the success in scheduling depot maintenance work, is not found in DLA.

13. Non-Standard Consumable Inventory

Prepositioned consumables come from multiple sources – requisition, depot purchase, fabrication, disassembly, cannibalization, customer furnished. Parts held for overhaul may be mostly standard items of supply while raw stocks, parts, assemblages for special fabrication projects (a large part of the TYAD workload) are likely to be non-stock-numbered, unique, special order, acquired per customer spec. All are customer costed and owned, held by job order pending production schedule and flooring decisions. Frequent monitoring of job order inventory is critical for all production decisions. This is another example of how depot maintenance requires a retail focus, not a wholesale focus within the expertise of DLA.

14. Team Managed Inventory

Production engineers, production controllers, requisitioners, expediters, equipment specialists, and shop leaders are all part of a team working together, dedicated to order completion on time, within budget, with customer satisfaction. Each has acquired technical knowledge of end item/reparable performance requirements and all share vital data on work problems and status of parts needed for job completion – on hand, on order, back ordered, long lead, support shop fabrication. This kind of expertise is not resident within DLA and is not within its core competencies.

15. Excess Determinations

With most normal overhaul work, close-out of a job order generates action to excess/dispose of unused parts. Standard parts are returned to wholesale inventory with or without credit pending standard need-to-buy retention criteria. Excessing takes a different route with most reimbursable projects – prototype, manufacture, fabrication, and high cost jobs. All parts are customer owned, hence consultation with customers takes place, decisions are based on other existing or anticipated job orders calling for same parts. Standard demand-oriented excessing procedures – used by DLA -- would result in bad decisions, waste, and unnecessary costs. In short this is a function which is inextricably tied to the requirements of the maintenance depot, not the DLA supply system.

16. Requisitioners

TYAD's requisitioners are assigned work on a commodity basis. Because purchase actions frequently involve engineer specification review, engineer/requisitioner interaction is critical, as is interaction with suppliers to view samples for form and fit concerns. TYAD's requistioners have developed sufficient technical expertise to assist with best buy results for success on the production line. This is particularly true for prototype and new design fabrication orders. This is yet another function tied to the requirements of the maintenance depot, not to DLA's core competencies.

17. Labor Cost Controls

Jobs related to DLA are normally charged as direct overhead. Prototype and new design assemblies may call out specific engineer/supply tasks within the negotiated statement of work (SOW). Program Executive Officers, Program Managers, and commodity managers seek explicit initial cost data for follow on production planning. Such SOWs encourage and require direct charge of supply related work hours. Coordinating budget, bid, negotiation and costing with another command would be cumbersome, impractical, and time consuming for any maintenance depot. On the other hand, omitting supply costs will change final cost calculations called out in the SOW. This further demonstrates that the recommendation attempts to artificially segment what is really a single functional entity, namely depot maintenance.

18. Communications Security (COMSEC)

TYAD has a unique COMSEC maintenance mission involving highly classified cryptographic equipment. As a result of those requirements, the COMSEC equipment and materiels are received, stored and maintained at a single, specially designed facility separate from the rest of the maintenance mission. Any attempts to segment this singular function by injecting DLA in the receipt, storage, and issue portions of the operation would create needless redundancies, break the currently clear chain of custody/accountability, and would interfere with the National Security Agency (NSA) requirement to track COMSEC equipment by serial number—a capability/system for which TYAD has the interface. DLA does not receive or issue materiel by serial number nor do they report those issues and receipts to the National Security Agency (NSA), which is vital to these commodities. In fact, DLA does not comply with any of the COMSEC requirements.

This summary of our concerns substantiates that the S&S recommendations must be thoroughly reviewed by the BRAC Commission and its staff. More information and data can be forwarded as needed. We appreciate the opportunity to challenge the soundness of these proposals and recommendations. More work is required.

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Essential to the Transformation
Of
The Department of Defense (DoD)
In The 21st Century

Keep The Best!

1

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Tobyhanna: ***Supporting Our Warfighters***

Tobyhanna: ***Proving Jointness Works***

Tobyhanna: ***Easily Expandable***

Tobyhanna: ***A Great Neighbor in Northeastern Pennsylvania***

Keep The Best!

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The Best
In Military Value

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Tobyhanna
Rated the # 1 Army depot
in both the
1993 & 1995
BRAC rounds

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The Assessment Rated Installations in such categories as:

- Mission Requirements
- Operational Readiness
- Land and Facilities
- Contingency
- Mobilization
- Cost
- Manpower
- Future Requirements

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The Joint Cross Service Working Group For Depot Maintenance concurred in 1995 when it directed Army, Air Force and Navy workload transferred from the Sacramento Air Logistics Center and Letterkenny Army Depot

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Previous BRAC Decisions Impacting Tobyhanna Army Depot

1988 – BRAC directs a secure communications mission from Lexington – Blue Grass Army Depot to Tobyhanna. *Gain 85 civilians & military positions.*

1991 – BRAC closes Sacramento Army Depot and conducts a competition for its communications-electronics workload. *Tobyhanna wins four packages of workload, which are incorporated into the existing mission/work force.*

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1993 – BRAC closes Vint Hill Farms Station, VA, and realigns Tooele Army Depot, Utah. *Tobyhanna gains 20 positions for Intelligence Electronic Warfare workload from Vint Hill and a topographical map mission from Tooele.*

1995 – BRAC closes McClellan Air Force Base, Sacramento, CA, and transfers the maintenance of ground communications-electronics systems to Tobhyanna, which equates to 825 civilian positions. *BRAC realigns Letterkenny Army Depot and transfers tactical missile guidance and control system workload to Tobyhanna, 80 civilian positions.*

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

- Tobyhanna-Most cost effective, efficient & productive of all DoD depots
- Consistently lowest labor rates and overall cost among all DoD industrial facilities
- Productivity consistently exceeds the DoD standard *(measure of the amount of productive hours generated per employee)*
- Well-trained, experienced and flexible work force *- adjust to changes in product mix*

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Certified

ISO 9001 -2000
Quality Management Standard

ISO 14001
Environmental Management Standard

Permanent Navy certification for the Sidewinder missile

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Lean Manufacturing at Tobyhanna

- Aggressively implementing processes and techniques
- Increasing throughput
- Reducing costs and repair times
- Evaluate shops, product lines and processes

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Lean Manufacturing at Tobyhanna

To date,
the depot has realized
almost $18.4 million
Through lean manufacturing
in savings and cost avoidance

Example:
Repair time
for 1 critical system
reduced by 40%

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Already DoD'S Joint Depot

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

- More than 40 percent of workload for non-Army customers
- Most interservice workload of all depots
  (according to Joint Depot Maintenance Analysis Group)
- Worldwide Depot maintenance & fielding support
- Depot has a network of 25 forward repair activities, including 8 in Southwest Asia
- Provides all of DoD with tactical & strategic satellite communications support

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

- Repair all ground communications-electronics systems for the Air Force
- Repair Navy and Air Force tactical missile guidance and control systems
- Repair, overhaul & upgrade earth terminals for Defense Satellite Communications System

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Vital Support to:

Global War on Terrorism

Operation Iraqi Freedom

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

FY-04

40% Workload Increase

Repaired 207,000 Different Items

FY-05

20% Workload Increase

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

- **Blue Force Tracking**
- **Common Ground Station**
- **Aircraft Survivability Equipment**
- **Firefinder Radar**
- **Survival Radios**
- **Army Reset Program**
- **Army Recapitalization Program**
- **Forward Repair Activities**
- **137 Reset Programs in FY-04**
- **Met all schedules for:**
  - *-3rd & 4th Infantry Divisions*
  - *-82nd & 101st Airborne Divisions*

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TOBYHANNA
ARMY DEPOT EXCELLENCE IN ELECTRONICS

Electronics:

The Present & Future of Warfare

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

- Emerging technologies
- Future Combat System
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
- Unmanned Guided Vehicles

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Our Good Neighbor In Northeastern Pennsylvania

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

- Region's Largest Employer
- Hired 1,900 personnel since 2000- *Including 1,100 in FY04 & 270 in FY05*
- Skilled, well-paying positions
- Annual state economic impact- *$1.4 billion*
- Annual regional economic impact- *$1.0 billion*
- Impacts all sectors of regional economy
- Recognized for Hiring Special-Needs Individuals- *30 Deaf Employees*
- Army Environmental Quality Installation Award Winner- *Candidate for DoD Award*

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Blue Ribbon Task Force

- Best support in the nation during BRAC 95
- Task Force remained in place, facilitated transition of BRAC 95 missions
- 110 members representing government, business and education sectors

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Cooperative Education Program

Keeping our Young People Home

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Tobyhanna Training Consortium:

Addressing Current & Future Workforce Needs at the Depot

- Governor's Action Team
- Governor's Northeast Office
- NEPA Industrial Resource Center
- NEPA Technology Institute
- College Misericordia
- East Stroudsburg University
- King's College
- Keystone College
- Lackawanna College
- Luzerne County Community College
- Johnson Technical College
- Marywood University
- Northampton Community College
- Penn State University
- University of Scranton
- Wilkes University

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NEPA Welcomes

New Missions and Personnel at Tobyhanna

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A Key to DoD Transformation

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

By all Objective Measures,

Tobyhanna is DoD's

Best Industrial Installation

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

- Highly skilled work force
- Strong regional skill base to accommodate growth
- Modern facilities
- Excellent transportation networks
- Moderate cost of living
- High quality of life
- No encroachment issues

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Hundreds of acres for expansion

- Additional infrastructure capacity in utilities and IT
- Existing environmental permits allow for sizeable increase in workload
- First federal facility designated as an EPA Waste Minimization Partner

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Conclusion

Use BRAC 2005 to foster transformation:

Establish Tobyhanna as DoD's Joint Electronics Depot

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TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

Build on Tobyhanna's existing interservice and joint missions.

Low cost to accommodate new missions at Tobyhanna.

Additional workload would reduce Tobyhanna's already low cost of doing business.

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TOBYHANNA
THINKING
BIG
AT TOBYHANNA
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