DCN 463

NAS Ft Worth Joint Reserve Base



Site Visit

5 June 1995

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BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Secretary of the Air Force
Office of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20330-1690

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT A. McINTOSH

Major General Robert A. McIntosh is chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., and commander, Air Force Reserve, a field operating agency located at Robins Air Force Base, Ga. As chief of Air Force Reserve, General McIntosh serves as the principal adviser on Reserve matters to the Air Force chief of staff. As commander of Air Force Reserve, he has full responsibility for the supervision of all U. S. Air Force Reserve units around the world.

The general entered the Air Force in 1966 as a graduate of the Ohio University Reserve Officer Training Corps program, and earned a bachelor of science degree in business administration. He has commanded an Air Force Reserve wing, two Reserve numbered air forces and served as vice commander of the Air Force Reserve. He separated from active duty in August 1971 to join the air reserve technician program as a full-time civil service employee with active participation as an Air Force reservist. He is a command pilot with more than 4,000 flying hours in the A-10, A-37 and F-4.

General McIntosh and his wife, Susan, have a son, Mark, and a daughter, Amy.

EDUCATION:

1966 Bachelor of science degree in business administration, Ohio University
1977 Industrial College of the Armed Forces

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. May 1966 - April 1967, student, pilot training, Webb Air Force Base, Texas
2. May 1967 - January 1968, student, F-4D fighter training, Homestead Air Force Base, Fla.
3. February 1968 - March 1968, student, A-37 training, England Air Force Base, La.
4. April 1968 - March 1969, A-37 pilot, 604th Special Operations Squadron, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam
5. April 1969 - August 1971, A-37 pilot, 4406th Combat Crew Training Squadron, England Air Force Base, La.
6. September 1971 - October 1975, A-37 instructor pilot, 910th Tactical Fighter Group, Youngstown Municipal Airport, Ohio
7. November 1975 - January 1977, chief, standardization and evaluation, 434th Tactical Fighter Wing, Grissom Air Force Base, Ind.
8. February 1977 - December 1977, operations officer, 46th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Grissom Air Force Base, Ind.
9. January 1978 - December 1978, director of operations, 426th Tactical Fighter Group, Naval Air Station New Orleans, La.
10. January 1979 - December 1981, deputy commander for operations, 926th Tactical Fighter Group, Naval Air Station New Orleans, La.

11. January 1982 - December 1983, commander, 442nd Tactical Fighter Group, Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Mo.
12. January 1984 - June 1989, vice commander and later commander, 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing, Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Mo.
13. July 1989 - November 1990, commander, 10th Air Force, Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas
14. December 1990 - June 1993, vice commander, Headquarters Air Force Reserve, Robins Air Force Base, Ga.
15. July 1993 - October 1994, commander, 22nd Air Force, Dobbins Air Force Base, Ga.
16. November 1994 - present, chief of Air Force Reserve and commander, Air Force Reserve, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION:

Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 4,000
Aircraft flown: A-10, A-37, F-4, C-130

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Medal with 18 oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Vietnam Service Medal with three service stars
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant	Jan 28, 1966
First Lieutenant	Jan 28, 1969
Captain	May 4, 1969
Major	May 10, 1977
Lieutenant Colonel	Dec 14, 1981
Colonel	Aug 1, 1985
Brigadier General	Nov 11, 1988
Major General	Aug 3, 1991

(Current as of February 1995)

Rear Admiral

Thomas F. Hall, USN

Chief of Naval Reserve,
Commander, Naval Reserve Force,
and Director, Naval Reserve

Chronology of key former assignments:

—Commander, Iceland Defense Force/Fleet Air Keflavik
—Deputy Director, Naval Reserve
—Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Bermuda and Bermuda Antisubmarine Warfare Sector
—Chief of Staff, Fleet Air Keflavik
—Commanding Officer, VP-8

A native of Barnsdall, Oklahoma, Rear Admiral Hall graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1963 and was designated a naval aviator in 1964. He holds a Master of Science degree in Public Personnel Management from George Washington University and is a graduate of the Naval War College and the National War College. He was selected to flag rank in 1988 and in August of 1991 was promoted to Rear Admiral (Upper Half).

Rear Admiral Hall brings to the Naval Reserve a leadership style and focus developed through combat, fleet and staff assignments around the world. His assignments include command of Patrol Squadron EIGHT (VP-8), Naval Air Station Bermuda, Fleet Air Keflavik and the Iceland Defense Force. He has also served tours with the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group and Head of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Development Section as well as several assignments in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Among his awards are the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (two awards), Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Unit Commendation, and various unit and campaign awards. In July 1992, RADM Hall was awarded the Icelandic Order of the Falcon, Commander's Cross with Star, by the President of Iceland.

Rear Admiral Hall is married to the former Barbara Ann Norman of Jacksonville, Florida. They have one son, Thomas David.

Rear Admiral
Thomas F. Hall, USN

Chief of Naval Reserve
Commander, Naval Reserve Force
and
Director, Naval Reserve

Chronology of key former assignments:

- Commander, Iceland Defense Force/Fleet Air Keflavik
- Deputy Director, Naval Reserve
- Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Bermuda and Bermuda Antisubmarine Warfare Sector
- Chief of Staff, Fleet Air Keflavik
- Commanding Officer, VP-8

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RADM Hall is married to the former Barbara Ann Norman of Jacksonville, Florida. They have one son, Thomas David, who is a senior at Northeastern State University in Tahlequah, Oklahoma.

BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Secretary of the Air Force
Office of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20330-1690

COLONEL BOB L. EFFERSON

Colonel Bob L. Efferson is commander of the Air Force Reserve's 301st Fighter Wing, NAS Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Texas. The 301st is equipped with the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

Colonel Efferson was born and raised in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and entered the Air Force in 1967 after commissioning through the Reserve Officer Training Corps. He has been the air commander of one reserve fighter group and two reserve fighter wings. Colonel Efferson served as an F-105 combat pilot in Southeast Asia, flying 103 combat missions. Colonel Efferson was recalled to active duty in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm and served as Forward Operation Location commander and A-10 combat pilot at Al Jouf Air Field, Saudi Arabia, and was then placed in command of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing/Provisional (Deployed) commanding active duty and reserve components. He is a command pilot with more than 5,300 hours of flying time, with more than 4,000 hours in fighter aircraft and more than 300 hours of combat time in two wars.

Colonel Efferson is married to the former Darlyn Curry of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. They have two sons, Michael and David. Captain Michael Efferson is an active-duty Air Force pilot flying the F-16 Fighting Falcon; 2nd Lt. David Efferson completed undergraduate pilot training at Reese AFB, Texas, in May 1994, and is assigned to the 301st Fighter Wing at NAS Fort Worth, JRB, Texas flying the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

EDUCATION:

1967	Bachelor's degree in Forestry and General Studies, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La.
1975	Squadron Officer School, correspondence.
1981	Air Command and Staff College, correspondence.
1985	Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. March 1967 - March 1968, student, pilot training, Craig Air Force Base, Alabama.
2. June 1968 - December 1968, gunnery training, F-105 Thunderchief, 4519th Tactical Training Squadron, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas.
3. January 1969 - December 1969, F-105 combat pilot, 333rd Tactical Fighter Squadron, Takhli Royal Air Force Base, Thailand.
4. January 1970 - July 1972, T-38 instructor pilot, Moody Air Force Base, Ga.

5

5. July 1972 - July 1987, F-105 instructor pilot, safety officer, scheduling officer, training officer, chief of standardization and evaluation, squadron operations officer, assistant deputy commander of operations and wing deputy commander of operations, 301st Tactical Fighter Wing, Carswell Air Force Base, Texas.
6. July 1987 - December 1992, Commander, 926th Fighter Group, Air Force Reserve, Naval Air Station New Orleans, La.
7. January 1993 July 1994, Commander, 442nd Fighter Wing, Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Base, Missouri.
8. July 1994 - present, Commander, 301st Fighter Wing, Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, Texas.

FLIGHT INFORMATION:

Rating: Command pilot.
Flight hours: More than 5,300 flight hours, with more than 4,000 in fighter aircraft, and more than 300 combat hours in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf War.
Aircraft Flown: F-105, F-4, A-10, F-16, T-38.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying cross with one oak leaf cluster
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal with seven oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Presidential Unit Citation with one oak leaf cluster
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with distinguished "V" device and one oak leaf cluster
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with device
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal
Kuwait Liberation Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant	26 Jan1967
First Lieutenant	22 Sep 1968
Captain	22 Mar 1970
Major	10 May 1977
Lieutenant Colonel	21 Sep 1983
Colonel	1 Jul 1987

(Current as of Feb 1995)

5. July 1972 - July 1987, F-105 instructor pilot, safety officer, scheduling officer, training officer, chief of standardization and evaluation, squadron operations officer, assistant deputy commander of operations and wing deputy commander of operations, 301st Tactical Fighter Wing, Carswell Air Force Base, Texas.
6. July 1987 - December 1992, Commander, 926th Fighter Group, Air Force Reserve, Naval Air Station New Orleans, La.
7. January 1993 July 1994, Commander, 442nd Fighter Wing, Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Base, Missouri.
8. July 1994 - present, Commander, 301st Fighter Wing, Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, Texas.

FLIGHT INFORMATION:

Rating: Command pilot.
Flight hours: More than 5,300 flight hours, with more than 4,000 in fighter aircraft, and more than 300 combat hours in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf War.
Aircraft Flown: F-105, F-4, A-10, F-16, T-38.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying cross with one oak leaf cluster
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal with seven oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Presidential Unit Citation with one oak leaf cluster
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with distinguished "V" device and one oak leaf cluster
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with device
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal
Kuwait Liberation Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant	26 Jan1967
First Lieutenant	22 Sep 1968
Captain	22 Mar 1970
Major	10 May 1977
Lieutenant Colonel	21 Sep 1983
Colonel	1 Jul 1987

(Current as of Feb 1995)

Captain James D. Cannon, USNR

Captain James D. Cannon was born and raised in Philadelphia, Penn. He graduated from Temple University in 1970 and pursued graduate studies at St. John's University in New York City until reporting to NAS Pensacola, Fla. for Aviation Officer Candidate School in April 1971. Commissioned in August 1971 and designated a Naval Flight Officer in March 1972, he reported to VF-101, NAS Oceana, Va. for training in the F-4 Phantom. Captain Cannon reported to VF-32 in December 1972 and made a Mediterranean Sea deployment onboard USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in 1973.

In January 1974, Captain Cannon was selected for transition to the new F-14A Tomcat. He reported to VF-124 for transition training and made the first east coast deployment of the F-14 with VF-32 on the "JFK" in 1975. By May 1976, Captain Cannon was accepted to a Reserve Management billet (TAR), and assigned to the "Stallions" of VF-302, NAS Miramar, San Diego, Calif. Subsequent tours with VF-202 "Superheats" at NAS Dallas, Texas and again in VF-302, he held all department head billets and Officer-in-Charge duties at VF-302 from August 1984 until July 1985.

Captain Cannon served on Staff, Commander Naval Air Reserve Force, New Orleans, La. in July 1985 as Fighter (VF), Fighter Reconnaissance (VFP), and Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Programs Manager. In August 1987, Captain Cannon reported to VF-302 as Executive Officer. He became the 12th Commanding Officer of VF-302 on 18 March 1989. During his tenure, the "Fighting Stallions" were awarded the 1989 Noel Davis Battle Excellence Award, the 1989 COMNAVAIRESFOR Maintenance Unit Award, twice nominated (89/90) for the CNO Safety Award and the 1989 F. Trubee Davison Tailhook Squadron of the Year Award.

In June 1990, Captain Cannon reported for duty as Commander, Carrier Air Wing Reserve 20, NAS Cecil Field, Fla. The Wing executed 35,200 flight hours to enhance combat and mobilization readiness. It won five CNO Safety Awards, three Noel Davis Battle "E" Awards, and two Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force "Golden Helm" Retention Excellence Awards. Captain Cannon has flown more than 4,200 mishap free flight hours in the F-4 and F-14 aircraft. In July 1993, he reported as Director, Naval Reserve Plans and Policy Division at the Bureau of Naval Personnel in Washington, D.C. Then on July 23, 1994, Captain Cannon assumed the duties as Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas.

Captain Cannon's personal and unit decorations include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Star, Navy Achievement Medal with Gold Star, three Meritorious Unit Commendations, six Battle "E" Unit Ribbons, two National Defense Service Medals, Sea Service Ribbon and the Armed Forces Reserve Medal.

Captain Cannon is married to the former Patricia Brugger of North Hills, Penn. They and their two youngest children, Kristen and Daniel reside in Quarters "A", NAS Dallas. Their eldest son Jeff is a second degree cadet at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, Springs, Colo.

Biography

United States Air Force

301st Fighter Wing Office of Public Affairs Carswell Air Reserve Base, Texas. 76127-6200

Colonel Raymond L. Henley

Colonel Raymond L. Henley is the Support Group Commander, 301st Fighter Wing. Col Henley was born 10 Nov 1946 in Greenville, Texas. He graduated in 1969 from East Texas State University. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.

Colonel Henley was commissioned in 1969 through the United States Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and graduated from Undergraduate Navigator Training at Mather Air Force Base, Ca., in 1970. He was subsequently assigned to George Air Force Base, Ca., for flight training in the F-4 Phantom II. Upon completion of F-4 training, he was assigned to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon, Thailand, where he flew 200 combat missions and participated in the Linebacker Campaign. He was reassigned to Homestead Air Force Base, Fla. In December 1972, he returned to South East Asia with the 8th Wing. He flew another 100 combat missions and as a result of his two combat tours received the Silver Star, two Distinguished Flying Crosses and twenty-two air medals.

In 1976, while still assigned to Homestead AFB, Fla., Colonel Henley was selected and attended the Air Force Fighter Weapons Instructor Course at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. Following graduation, he was assigned to the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines, where he served first as Squadron Weapons Officer in the 3rd Tactical Fighter Squadron and then as Flight Commander in the 90th Tactical Fighter Squadron. During this tour, Colonel Henley received the Pacific Air Force Able Aeronaut Award and participated in the William Tell fighter competition.

In 1978, Colonel Henley was reassigned to Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., as chief of the Fighter Weapons School instructional systems development team and project officer for introduction of the F-4 computerized bombing system.

Colonel Henley joined the Air Force Reserve in 1980 as Standardization Evaluation Officer at the 704th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas. He subsequently held positions as Chief of Fighter Training and Director of Operations Plans at Headquarters, Tenth Air Force. Col. Henley became the 301st Support Group Commander in January 1992 and was appointed project officer for the conversion of Carswell Air Force Base to Carswell Air Reserve Base.

He was promoted to Colonel September 1, 1991.

Colonel Henley is married to the former Elaine Maulding of Fairfield, IL. They have four daughters, Rebecca, Stephanie, Jenny and Jill.

Current as of April 1994.

DENNIS T. BEAVER, CAPTAIN, USNR

Biography

Captain Dennis T. Beaver is a native of Clark, New Jersey. He graduated from Arthur L. Johnson Regional High School, Clark, New Jersey in June 1967 and Trenton State College, Ewing, New Jersey in May 1971 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Health and Physical Education.

In November 1971 he commenced Naval Flight Officer Candidate training in Pensacola, Florida. He received his wings in October 1972 at Naval Air Station, Glynco, Georgia. In November 1972, he reported to VF-121, Naval Air Station Miramar, San Diego, California and commenced F-4 replacement aircrew training. After completion of F-4 "PHANTOM" training, Captain Beaver reported to the "SCREAMING EAGLES" of VF-51 and made two Western Pacific deployments aboard the U.S.S. Coral Sea, from August 1973 through December 1975, participating in the evacuation of Saigon and the rescue of the merchant ship MAYAGUEZ.

In December 1975, Captain Beaver was released from active duty and affiliated with Naval Air Reserve unit VF-2021, an F-4 augment unit, drilling with VF-302 as a Selected Reserve. In July 1976, he was selected as a Training and Administration of Reserve Officer on active duty and in August 1976 reported to VF-202, onboard Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas, flying the F-4. During two tours in VF-202 and one tour as the Naval Air Station F-4 augment unit program manager, he coordinated the transition and training of squadron personnel from the F-8 "CRUSADER" to the F-4N and finally the F-4S. In June 1984, Captain Beaver reported to VF-302 and served as the assistant operations officer, administration officer and then as the Officer in Charge, where he supervised the transition to the F-14 "TOMCAT". In July 1987, Captain Beaver was assigned to Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force, New Orleans, Louisiana, as a program manager. From November 1990 to August 1993, he was assigned to Naval Air Station New Orleans as the Executive Officer. In June 1994, Captain Beaver graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces with a Master of Arts degree in National Resource Management.

During his military career Captain Beaver has flown 3, 192 hours in the F-4 "PHANTOM", over 800 hours in the F-14 "TOMCAT", accumulated over 300 carrier arrested landings and over 4,200 total flight hours. His decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), Navy Commendation Medal (two awards), Navy Achievement Medal (three awards), Meritorious Unit Commendation (four awards), Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (two awards), Humanitarian Service Medal, Sea Service Ribbon, Armed Forces Reserve Medal (two awards), Unit Battle "E" Award (four awards), and a Secretary of the Navy Letter of Commendation. He has two daughters, Sara (20) and Ann (16).

Biography

United States Air Force Reserve

Colonel Thomas A. Dyches

Colonel Dyches graduated from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington with a degree in Business Administration Management in 1969 and was commissioned later that year through the Air Force Officer Training School. He graduated from Undergraduate Pilot Training in 1970 and was assigned to Luke AFB, Arizona where he completed initial fighter conversion training in the F-100D Super Sabre aircraft, receiving the Outstanding Graduate and Top Gun awards.

Following an operational tour at Cannon AFB, New Mexico in the F-100, he converted to the F-4E Phantom and was assigned to combat duty at Udorn, Thailand with the 13th Fighter Squadron and later, with the 555th Fighter Squadron, also known as the "Triple Nickel". Follow on F-4 duty included tours at Homestead AFB, Florida and Nellis AFB, Nevada as an instructor pilot in the USAF Fighter Weapons School, where he received the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing Outstanding Instructor Award.

Colonel Dyches separated from the active duty in 1978 and was one of the original cadre of pilots recruited into the 93d Fighter Squadron at Homestead AFB, the first F-4 squadron in the Air Force Reserve. He served as a traditional Reservist for ten years, while in the employ of Eastern Airlines as a commercial airline pilot. During that time he held several positions, including Weapons and Tactics Officer at both the squadron and wing levels, Flight Commander, and Assistant Operations Officer. He was selected Detachment Commander and flight leader for every gunnery competition the unit entered, including the first Gunsmoke of the modern era in 1981. He wrote statements of need and additional supporting documents that helped the Air Force Reserve modernize its fighter fleet with improvements such as low smoke engines, low observable paint schemes, Have Quick jam resistant radios, ALE-40 chaff/flare dispensers, and AIM-9L/M heat seeking missiles.

He became an Air Reserve Technician in 1988, and was assigned as Chief of Standardization and Evaluation. In that capacity, he received an "Outstanding,...Best seen to date" rating during the Unit Effectiveness Inspection following conversion to the F-16A aircraft. He was named Commander of the 93d Fighter Squadron in 1990 and again received an "Outstanding" rating for Command and Control during the unit's first Operational Readiness Inspection in the F-16. He also received the TAC Outstanding Intelligence Contributor Award for 1990. In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, he worked closely with numerous civilian and military organizations, including the Air Force Association, to provide emergency assistance to those devastated by the storm. He continued to lead the long term recovery effort which culminated in the unit's return to what is now Homestead Air Reserve Base.

In June 1993, he was appointed Commander of the 301st Operations Group at what is now NAS Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, Texas, the position he currently holds. Colonel Dyches commanded a joint Air Reserve Component force which deployed to Aviano Air Base, Italy from mid-November 1993 through early February 1994 in support of Operation Deny Flight. He was responsible for all facets of the planning and execution of that effort. The force consisted of 24 F-16 and A-10 aircraft and approximately 1,000 volunteers from 8 separate Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. During that time combat missions were flown into the Bosnia Area of Responsibility in order to enforce the no fly provisions of two United Nations resolutions. Nearly 4,000 flight hours were logged without aircraft loss or damage. Every sortie tasked by the United Nations Protection Force was flown. This was the first time a large all volunteer rainbow fighter force had been assembled to support contingency flight operations and it will no doubt serve as a benchmark for such operations in the future. Colonel Dyches' performance was commended by a number of senior military and civilian leaders who personally visited and inspected the force, including Mr. Bartholomew, United States Ambassador to Italy, General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral Borda, Commander of Forces Southern Region, and Lt General Ashy, Commander of Air Forces Southern Region. He was selected Air Force Association Officer of the Year for the state of Texas in 1994, primarily due to his work on Operation Deny Flight.

He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College and was promoted to Colonel May 1, 1995. Colonel Dyches lives in Fort Worth with Pamela, his wife of 20 years, Heather, his 17 year old daughter, and his mother, Geneva.


Site Visit
NAS Ft Worth Joint Reserve Base
Welcome



Introductions

- Congressman Pete Geren
- Congressman Joe Barton
- Congressman Martin Frost
- Mayor Kay Granger
- Major General Robert A. McIntosh, AFRES Commander
- Rear Admiral Steve Keith, Commander Naval Coordinator Mid-South
- Captain Dennis Beaver, NAS JRB Site Commander
- Colonel Bobby Efferson, 301 Fighter Wing Commander
- Colonel Ray Henley, 301 Support Group Commander
- Colonel Larry Patterson, 301 Logistics Group Commander
- Colonel Tommy Dyches, 301 Operations Group Commander

Capt Beaver:



(After Lunch)

Captain Beaver:

- Re-welcome Commissioner Cox
- Introduce Congressman Geren



Site Visit

NAS Ft Worth Joint Reserve Base

Bon Appétit



Pete Geren:

- Remarks



Gen McIntosh:

- Remarks



RAdm Keith:

- Remarks



Colonel Efferson:



Colonel Efferson (w/CB):

• ***A National Imperative:***

• NAS Ft. Worth JRB complies with Title 10 USC 18231(2) requirements that facilities for reserve components be shared by two or more components

• NAS Ft. Worth JRB, a DOD "model" for joint use

• Deborah Lee, Undersecretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in her 18 May '95 letter to the Chairman, DBCRC, said of NAS Ft Worth JRB:

> *To maximize the economies and efficiencies envisioned for this first JRB, it is imperative that the Air Force Reserves' 301 Fighter Wing, a major tenant and leader in the experiment, remain assigned to the JRB Fort Worth*

A Benchmark for the future:

• Referring again to Ms Deborah Lee's letter, Fort Worth JRB was called "*one of the more successful products of BRAC '91 and BRAC '93*"

•***Consolidation+Readiness=Affordable Combat Power:***

• NAS Ft. Worth JRB provides a true experiment in jointness and the economies associated with it

• Additional savings realized from concept and lessons learned here will be applied at other bases



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:

- **DIRECTION**
  - Reduce costs by combining functions while maintaining mission effectiveness
  - Establish a partnership of Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force Reserve units at a single location that provides a high quality training facility at reduced costs using economy of scale
- **IMPERATIVE**
  - Provide all partners with the affordable degree of autonomy required for mission accomplishment
  - Provide each service with what is required to accomplish its unique mission, while reducing cost by eliminating duplication of function
  - Optimize opportunities for joint training and interoperability



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:

- **Reduce Costs**
  - **Combine Functions While Maintaining Mission Effectiveness**
  - **Eliminate Duplication of Function**
  - **Economy of Scale**
- **Partnership**
  - **Provide All Partners With the Affordable Degree of Autonomy Required for Mission Accomplishment**
  - **Provide Each Service With What Is Required to Accomplish Its Unique Mission**
- **Joint Training**
  - **Optimize Opportunities for Training and Interoperablity**

■ See supplemental data at TAB-5



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:



Colonel Henley *(w/ CE)*:

• **BRAC 91** ended the forty+ year of history Carswell as an active duty base and established a portion of the area as Carswell Air Reserve Base

• **BRAC 93** began the closure process of NAS Dallas and realigned Carswell ARB as NAS Fort Worth JRB. Units from other closures were consolidated at this JRB

• **BRAC 95** added the 301 FW (a tenant on NAS Fort Worth JRB) for consideration to move to Bergstrom ARS



Captain Beaver *(w/ CE)*:



	Active Duty	Civilin	Reservists
AFRES (301 FW)	8	437	1269
NAS DALLAS	680	310	1200
MARINE CORPS	650	0	2260
NAVY SQUADRONS	475	0	550
NAVY SURFACE UNITS	164	26	1520
PERSONNEL SUPPORT	78	24	0
AAFES (RESALE)	0	393	0
NAVY (OTHER)	48	22	0
TEXAS ANG	51	217	788
ARMY GUARD	23	63	430
	2169	1492	8017

Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:

• Purpose of this slide is to show current planned loading. It demonstrates capacity to expand by at least 50%



Colonel Henley *(w/CB)*:

• The Dallas/Ft.Worth area is an excellent location to recruit aviation reservists.

- American Airlines, Delta, Southwest, and others have headquarters or major hubs associated with DFW Airport.
- Pilots, technicians, and other support personnel are readily available to support the Joint Reserve operation.
- Proximity to Sheppard and Dyess Air Force bases (for members getting off active duty)

• DoD costs are substantially lower when compared to other bases because of savings in travel and lodging costs.

• For example, the 301 FW is authorized 1269 prsonnel. Only 141 are authorized billeting, because most persnonnel reside within the commuting area (The cost to billet on base is $8 per day. Off base billeting ranges from $32 to $36 per night. Unlike some other bases, we house 100% of eligible on-base, and enjoy the attendant cost savings).



Colonel Henley (w/CB)

• Data supports NAS Ft. Worth JRB as an excellent recruiting base within a 50/100 mile radius.

• Bergstrom appears to look better when evaluated at the 100 mile radius, but only because they pick up San Antonio

  • Where they also have to compete with the 4000+ reservists at Kelly Air Force Base

• 50 mile recruiting radius supports recruiting requirements

  • reduced travel time, no travel payments (short commute)

  • reduced billeting requirements/ costs ($8 on base, $34 off base)

  • reduced response time in a mobility recall

  • 100 % mission/contingency support

• Response to ASBG's questioning of the 301FW's ability to recruit quality reservists when competing against all the other commands that will be based at the NAS Ft. Worth JRB:

  • We have always competed against the units located at NAS Dallas, so having the units relocate to NAS Ft. Worth JRB will have little impact on the 301FW ability to recruit quality reservists. There are also added benefits to having these units and their recruiters centrally located, it will enable the recruiter to appropriately place the recruit within the needs of the base as well as fulfill the desires of the recruit.

301 FW MILITARY PERSONNEL

MILITARY POSITIONS	AUTH	ASGN
OFFICER	165	145
ENLISTED	1104	1049
TOTAL	*1269*	*1194**

*** Intentionally at less than 100% to absorb *already trained* personnel from closing units**

Colonel Henley *(w/CB)*:

- Wing's policy of recruiting below what recruiting base would allow in order to be in a position to absorb *trained* personnel at other units scheduled to deactivate.
- Previously less than 95% due to programmed aircraft drawdown



Colonel Henley *(w/CB)*:

• The reduced BOS personnel package of 208 is made possible by the joint occupation of the base

• 92 saved positions translates to approximately 31% savings in BOS personnel expenses



Colonel Henley *(w/CB)*:

- Savings of $2.9 million annually
- The figures shown as BOS costs are from 301 FW Financial Management section. They are the most conservative estimate of BOS savings resulting from operating jointly with the Navy. COBRA models may show *greater* savings.

Joint Reserve Base
Aircraft Loading

Unit	Aircraft	Number
AFRES (301 FW)	F-16	15
VF-201	F-14	16
VR-59	C-9	4
NAS JRB	C-12	1
VMGR-234	KC-130	12
VMFA-112	F/A-18	12
VMFA-124	F/A-18	12
136 TAW (TANG)	C-130	8
TEXAS ARMY GUARD	HELOs	24
	GRAND TOTAL:	104
	CAPACITY:	186

Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:

• In addition to the flying units, the facility affords the capability to sustain these other units



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:



Captain Beaver *(w/CE)*:



Colonel Henley*(w/CB)*:

• Although the flying mission is first priority, the support squadrons of the wing also have a mobility requirement and a wartime mission to which they must train

• The facilities on Fort Worth JRB provide our fire fighters, civil engineers, security police, and mission support personnel with all they need to meet their DOC (dedicated operational commitment) taskings

• For example, our engineers can decontaminate buildings, practice rapid runway repair, practice force beddown, dig and repair simulated bomb craters, etc.. This is possible because of the space available, the equipment made available by the military host and the host's willingness to control airfield operations in support of this training

• Another example of training opportunity lies in our joint small arms firing range and most recently, in the establishment of a fire arms simulator that will support joint training

• Other examples are simply too numerous to mention



Colonel Henley *(w/CB)*:

•



Colonel Dyches *(w/CB)*:

• Commissioner so far we have been talking mostly about the support activities needed to operate a base, but I'd like to change gears now and talk about the flying mission. In essence what my guys do is fight and win America's wars, whenever and wherever the President says, and its **real important that we get it right the first time.** Four main ingredients go into a successful recipe toward that end, and I'll address each one. My **objective** really is to make sure you understand that we have **everything** we need here to get that mission done. Our **airfield** is not a problem. Our **airspace** is not a problem. The **airframes** we have here are not a problem, and the **cast of characters** we are assembling present no problem. In fact, quite the contrary is true. We have **major advantages** over many other places in **all four areas**.



Colonel Dyches *(w/CB)*:

• As you know, this airfield has served the country very well for many years and continues to offer substantial capabilities in this post Cold War transitional period we are going through

• We have the ***capacity*** to bed down at least 186 aircraft today (Hurr-evac last evening)

• That figure includes a mix of fighters, rotary wing and heavy tactical aircraft

- At this point, ***Occupancy*** is planned to be 104 aircraft,
- Therefore, an 82% growth is possible without pouring new concrete

• Additional areas for expansion exist next to the flightline and the southern portion of the base. It is significant to note that this is an exclusive use facility. By that I mean we don't share it with commercial airliners or other civilian traffic. Its just us military guys. One of the many advantages associated with being an exclusive use facility is that expansion can take place relatively quickly if the country's needs change. Another example would be an Operational Readiness Inspection, which is one of the main ways we evaluate our ability to do the mission and is like a week long simulated war with a very high level of activity. It's easy for us to control all activity here, but not so easy to tell a civililian airline company, "sorry, but we'd just as soon you folks stop operating here for a week so we can have this war."

• A number of opportunities are available to us **because** of the JRB concept and we intend to fully exploit them. For example,

- Special military rules afford us an opportunity to practice Large Force Employment packages while maintaining expeditious Departure & Arrival flows. Again this is something that would not be possible at a civilian airfield with equivalent numbers of aircraft
- We have already combined a number of support functions and we fully expect to be able to capitalize on additional unforeseen opportunities resulting from JRB concept

1 Naval Facilities Command, Southern Division, NAS Ft Worth JRB Master Plan. December 1993



Colonel Dyches *(w/CB)*:

•This is a depiction of ingredient number 2: **airspace for training**

•One very important customer of ours is the US Army. As you can see, the JRB is favorably located between **two** major Army installations (Ft Hood and Ft Sill), and we fly in support of both regularly. Fort Hood is 86 miles away and Fort Sill is 126 miles away.

• As you can see we have a very nice assortment of airspace available the JRB. The unit can specifically tailor mission training to get the most bang for our buck every day

> • A **major benefit** to reservists' employers is that the employees are not required to deploy in order to get training that is already available locally. This is far more significant today than in the past, because the nation relies on its reserve forces, particularly its Air Reserve Component forces, much more now to accomplish the mission, i.e. our **deployments these days are not so much for training as they are to cover real world contingency operations such as Deny Flight and Provide Comfort II.**



Colonel Dyches:

• Much has been made of our proximity to the DFW Airport and the problems that supposedly that exist in that area, so I'd like to point out a few facts along those lines for clarity.

• First of all, the FAA is fully supportive of the consolidation of aircraft at NAS Ft Worth JRB. It is clearly to their advantage and they have said so:

– "Very compatible with existing and future DFW Metroplex Air Traffic System plan" - FAA letter to Carswell Redevelopment Authority dated Apr 21, 1993

• Secondly, we don't have a delay problem here, **period**



Colonel Dyches *(w/CB)*:

- Departures:
  - Over 90% of all departures are "standard" and go out to the west. That's where our principal airspace is - west.
  - Delays are so rare in fact that the tower stopped keeping statistics because the number of delays was *statistically insignificant*
  - Only "east" departures (Hog/Razorback/Rivers) require slight jog to north to clear DFW corridor
    - Although we seldom use the ranges to the east, it's nice to have them so we always have a backup place to go in the event poor weather shows up in our normal airspace



Colonel Dyches *(w/CB)*:

- Arrivals are no problem either:
    - Arrivals will not burden FAA, due to addition of dedicated Navy approach control (GCA)
- **Key Point:**
    - NAS Ft Worth JRB is situated ***west*** of the approaches into DFW
    - Military traffic travelling to/from training areas encounter little or no conflict with DFW area air traffic
- **BOTTOM LINE**:

    No Encroachment Impacts !



Colonel Dyches *(w/CB)*:

• So at this point we have established that we have a perfectly fine airfield to operate from, and perfectly fine airspace in which to train.

• In order to have a complete understanding of our operational effectiveness, we must assess the missions we are tasked to do and the assets we have to do them with, i.e. the **last two ingredients in our recipe.**



Military Value

Military (Flying) Requirements

Joint Training Opportunities with the F-16

Mission	Participating Aircraft
DCA	Navy F-14, USMC F-18
Sweep/Escort	TANG C-130, USMC KC-130
SEAD	Army HH-60
AI	Navy F-14, USMC F-18
JMO	Navy F-14, USMC F-18
CSAR	TANG C-130, Army HH-60 & CH-47
JAAT	Army HH-60
HVA Protection	TANG C-130, USMC KC-130

Colonel Dyches:

• The intent of this slide is not to baffle you with a lot of military acronyms for the different missions we do. There is a legend in the little briefing book to tell you what those all mean.

•The main message here is that the 301 FW is tasked to do all those missions on the left and we have all the actors for this play right here at the JRB. We benefit greatly by having them here, and they benefit as well by having us here.

• Only at major exercises such as Red Flag do you find a comparable array of assets. The other place you find them of course is in real world operations. This is, **in fact**, the way we fight today's wars. **It only makes sense to train the way we plan to fight**

• The F-16 is the predominant multi-role fighter in the world today and will be for some time to come. 3500 of them have been built and are in service in 19 countries around the world. It is integral to every war fighting commander's air campaign plan as well as any real world contingency operation. It is basically inconceivable to think that we would attempt any serious combat effort without substantial F-16 involvement. Removing the F-16 from the JRB plan would cripple the effort

• *Value-added* benefits: *zero* travel costs/ *Face-to-face* briefings and debriefings/ Improved *realism* by training with dissimilar assets

•Legend:

- DCA: Defensive Counter Air Tactics: Protection of key ground points/areas so friendly troops can conduct effective air and ground operations

- Sweep and Escort Tactics: Protection of friendly bomber/air drops in hostile territory from enemy aircraft

- SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses: Neutralize, destroy or degrade enemy's air defense capability. Can be done with fighters and/or helicopters

Legend (cont):

- AI: Air Interdiction: Composite force (attack aircraft, fighters, and electronic combat assets) used to destroy enemy's military potential

- JMO: Joint Maritime Operations: Operations with Naval and Marine forces in bays, estuaries, islands, and coastal areas

- CSAR: Combat Search and Rescue: Coordinated usually among fighters, C-130, and helicopter aircraft to recover downed aircrew in hostile territory

- JAAT: Joint Air Attack Tactics: Mixed force of attack helicopter teams and fighters operating together to locate, engage and destroy tanks and other battlefield targets

- CAS: Close Air Support: Flown in response to needs of ground troops

- HVA: High Value Asset Protection: Missions flown to protect C-130, AWACS, etc.



Colonel Dyches:

The 301 Fighter Wing has a long history of excellence. Here are some *documented* examples that speak for themselves:

- 100% Sortie Effectiveness during two major overseas deployments
  - Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia)
  - Operation Aces North (Australia)
- OUTSTANDING rating on 1995 Operational Readiness Inspection (Highest rating available)
- Top F-16 unit (Ops and Maintenance teams) at Long Shot '95
- Best Flight Safety record of *any* unit in AFRES
- Chosen to represent AFRES at Gunsmoke '95 in October
- Selected to return to Europe in Feb 96 to support Operation Deny Flight
- By any measure, this organization is bringing home the bacon. The JRB concept will only allow us to keep getting better and holds a promise of effective, economic Total Force training. The routine exchange of flying, maintenance, and support procedures will provide to the units an environment within which to develop, refine, and practice joint operation plans and tactics necessary to integrate their varied capabilities
- F-16 is the premier fighter in the world today. To remove it from the JRB would be a golden opportunity squandered.



Col Dyches

•JOINTNESS:

Commissioner, we are onto something here. Joint training, joint staging, joint deployment, and shared common facilities is clearly what we need to be doing. It is important for America that we be allowed to follow through on what we have started. This is the way we **will** fight and I'll say again that **we must train that way**.

• COST EFFICIENCY:

Joint basing results in large cost savings; savings that will **increase** as we learn more about one another and get smarter about operating together.

•MISSION EFFECTIVENESS:

This is what it all really boils down to for a professional soldier. When the balloon goes up, we have to put the ball in the end zone. We **have to win.** We cannot rely on having a grossly incompetent adversary as we did in Desert Storm, who gave us 6 months in the desert to train together and work most of the kinks out of our Coalition force. The JRB concept allows us to have major parts of that force together planning, briefing, flying, debriefing and recycling lessons learned every day. We can absolutely do our mission better if we train together as a joint force. This is an incredible opportunity; one that the country cannot afford to miss.



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

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

Gen McIntosh:

- Remarks



Captain Beaver:



RAdm Keith:

- Remarks

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

RESERVE AFFAIRS

18 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Naval Air Station, Joint Reserve Base, Fort Worth (Carswell AFB)

I wanted to personally let you know that one of the more successful products of BRAC 91 and BRAC 93 is the Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Forth Worth. This base will provide facilities for the Naval Reserve assets at Naval Air Station (NAS) Dallas, the Air Force Reserves' 301st Fighter Wing, the Marine Reserve Air Group 41, and elements of the Texas Air and Army National Guard. This joint base conforms to the requirements of Title 10 USC 18231(2) that facilities for Reserve components be shared by two or more components while providing a true experiment in jointness and the economies and efficiencies associated with it.

I have visited the base and seen first hand how the structure of the Air Force Reserve components can supplement and complement the Naval Reserve squadrons that must rely on others for support. Through the efforts of the energetic commanders assigned to the JRB, parochial service barriers are broken down and efforts at commonality are established. The integration of assets and potential to reduce cost will provide effecient day-to-day training in a joint atmosphere while not impacting readiness.

To maximize the economies and efficiencies envisioned for this first JRB, it is imperative that the Air Force Reserves' 301st Fighter Wing, a major tenant and leader in the experiment, remain assigned to the JRB Fort Worth.

I encourage you to personally visit the base and see the progress that Captain Beaver, U.S. Navy; the site commander, and Colonel Efferson, U.S. Air Force; the 301st Wing commander, have made toward creating a truly joint installation.

Deborah R. Lee

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

Ser N955/5U569624
10.2 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Subj: NAVAL AIR STATION, FORT WORTH, JOINT RESERVE BASE, CARSWELL FIELD

1. As you know, as a result of BRAC 93 decisions, we are well on the way to closing NAS Dallas and transitioning all units to NAS Fort Worth, JRB. Most significantly, NAS Fort Worth, JRB is on track to be our Nation's first master Guard/Reserve base. As such, it serves as a model for future consolidations. It is one of the many success stories of BRAC 93 and the base will take advantage of joint operations, training and infrastructure for Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Reserve and National Guard units. Serving more than 100 aircraft and 11,000 personnel, the enhanced facilities at NAS Fort Worth, JRB will increase the training opportunities and readiness of the Guard/Reserve, while taking advantage of efficiencies associated with a truly joint operation. The Navy took responsibility for the operation of the facilities on 1 October 1994 and we are already seeing the wisdom of this operation and realizing efficiencies in all areas of operation.

2. Key to the joint nature of NAS Fort Worth, JRB are the Air Force Reserve's 1,269 Reservists and 437 civilians of the 301st Fighter Wing, who are a major component of the joint base concept. They comprise the wing headquarters, combat support, civil engineering, aerial port squadron, communications, maintenance squadron, and one flying squadron. Fort Worth is the long time home for these units, providing a well established demographic base of skilled and dedicated Reservists.

3. Through a collaborative process, the 301st Fighter Wing and the Naval Reserve have developed an operations plan which clearly reduces costs and promotes efficiency through mutual support. No other base in Texas offers this opportunity and no other base in the USA offers it to this degree. If the 301st Fighter Wing should leave NAS Fort Worth, JRB it would greatly alter the equation for taking advantage of the joint synergism which benefits all services, and the taxpayers.

Subj: NAVAL AIR STATION, FORT WORTH, JOINT RESERVE BASE, CARSWELL FIELD

4. I am encouraged that the commission will visit NAS Fort Worth, JRB and will have the opportunity to see first hand this superb model of joint efficiency. I believe it would be a mistake to reverse the decisions of BRAC 93 with respect to NAS Fort Worth, JRB. We should continue to pursue our present course of action which will make this joint reserve base a model for the future.

T.F. Hall

T. F. HALL
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director of Naval Reserve

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U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Southwest Region
Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas

Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0000

MAY 2 4 1995

Mr. Derrick Curtis
Executive Director
Carswell Redevelopment Authority
P.O. Box 27136
Fort Worth, TX 76127

Dear Mr. Curtis:

In 1993, the Base Realignment Commission (BRAC 93) approved the establishment of the Naval Air Station (NAS) Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base (JRB). The JRB was the result of consolidating units from NAS Dallas and several other bases across the country.

NAS Fort Worth is located in the extreme western portion of the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex. The predominant direction of flight for training mission activity is to the west and southwest. As a result, the amount of airspace interaction between NAS Fort Worth and other Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex air traffic is significantly reduced. Moreover, the airspace is segregated so that a specific pattern for traffic landing at NAS Fort Worth can be utilized. This traffic pattern enhances training and will be maintained in future airspace plans.

Current and projected air traffic operations at NAS Fort Worth are compatible with present and future airspace plans within the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex. I would like to reaffirm the Federal Aviation Administration's position to fully support the NAS Fort Worth, JRB.

Sincerely,

Clyde DeHart, Jr.

Clyde M. DeHart Jr.
Regional Administrator
Southwest Region

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Inter-Service Joint Training Opportunities
NAS Fort Worth JRB

The multi-service make up of NAS Fort Worth JRB offers many excellent opportunities for joint, inter-service technical training and the shared use of facilities and equipment. As the base is still in the build up phase, not all services are represented yet, and much of the joint training and facility/equipment sharing is still in the planning and developmental stage. As NAS Fort Worth JRB comes on line, many new areas for joint operations will continually surface. The full potential of joint operations will not be realized until NAS Fort Worth JRB comes up to full strength and all services are working side by side with a common goal. Even at this early stage, with only a small portion of the players present, there are numerous examples of jointness already in effect, or planned for the near future.

Base Fuels

The 301 Fuels Flight refuels all 301 FW and other transient Air Force Reserve Aircraft. They also supplement the Navy Fuels contractor by refueling transient aircraft when the workload exceeds the contractor's capabilities. 301st Fuels personnel have no Fuels Lab and train side by side with Navy personnel in the Navy Fuels Lab. Both services are currently developing common/compatible multi-service fuels testing procedures which will be used by all services. The procedure from the service with the most stringent requirement will take precedence. 301st personnel also train with the Navy on fuels storage activities utilizing Navy facilities and equipment.

Transportation

The 301 Packing and Crating function will move from their present facility and combine with the Navy function when it relocates to NAS Fort Worth JRB from Navy Dallas. Both units will utilize the same facility and equipment.

The 301 is host for the Base Motor Pool. Navy personnel will be assigned to the 301 Motor Pool once the Navy relocates to NAS Fort Worth JRB. All base vehicles, regardless of service, will be maintained using multi-service standards. The most demanding standard of a particular service will take precedence and be used on all vehicles, regardless of service assigned.

As the Navy comes aboard, there will also be joint inner-service training and operations in the areas of household/personal goods shipping, vehicle operator licensing, and passenger and air freight movement.

Base Supply

Initially, as the different services relocate to NAS Fort Worth JRB, each will operate its own individual Base Supply function. However, there is already a study underway to combine all Base Supply functions into one joint service supply organization. This will be a long term project formed in small steps. Individual problems will worked out as they arise. The end result will be a supply system which will accommodate the requirements of all services. This will be a much needed leading edge model for others to use.

NDI

All services will utilize the Navy NDI facility for X-Ray operations and training. All engine oil samples (SOAP) will be analyzed in the 301 NDI Lab and all services will use the 301 facility for SOAP operations and training.

Aircraft Maintenance Back Shops

Areas of jointness for training in aircraft maintenance back shops is in the early planning stages. A meeting is scheduled between Navy and 301st aircraft maintenance supervisors on 21 June to discuss possible areas of joint training/support. This will be an ongoing process and other services will be included as they come aboard. Examples of joint use of facilities/equipment: currently the Marines utilizes the 301 Survival Equipment Shop to pack parachutes and maintain life rafts and other survival equipment. 301 Corrosion Control Technicians use Marine facilities for aircraft touch up painting.

Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE)

The Navy transient maintenance contractor has no AGE and utilizes 301st AGE in the maintenance and servicing of all transient aircraft.

Munitions Storage Area

The Munitions Storage area is a totally joint operation. All services utilize the common munitions storage and area and munitions maintenance facilities. All services will operate under a combined inter-service directive, designed to the use the most stringent requirement from each particular service. When other services locate to NAS Fort Worth JRB there will be combined inter-service Munitions Control and Munitions Inspection functions. There will also be inter-service munitions build up and transportation training.

Civil Engineers

301 CE maintenance personnel train jointly with the Navy in Navy shops using Navy equipment.

301 heavy equipment operators are not authorized equipment and plan to train on Navy heavy equipment once it becomes available at NAS Fort Worth JRB.

301 Fire Department personnel share facility with the Navy and train on Navy equipment.

Disaster Preparedness

301 DP personnel are the sole source of level 1 and 2 hazardous material training. 301 DP currently trains the Navy Fire Department and will furnish this same training to other services as the requirement comes up.

All services participate in scheduled inter-service disaster/major accident exercises. All services will participate in actual disaster/accident response.

Services

301 services personnel plan to utilize Navy facilities and equipment for the following training: Messing (Galley), Pass and ID, Family Services and Mortuary Affairs. These services will continue to be run as joint operations in common facilities.

Firing Range

The operation of the firing range is totally dependent upon jointness. The firing range is a Navy facility, utilizes 301 equipment, and is run by DOD police. The joint use of the rifle and pistol range, and fire arms simulator provides an opportunity to train all service members economically at home station while limiting environmental concerns.

Security Police

The 301 Security Police and the TANG Security Police have similar missions and plan to train jointly as much as possible once the TANG relocates to NAS Fort Worth JRB. Areas of joint training with other services are being explored.

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Directions for Defense

Report of the
Commission on Roles and Missions
of the Armed Forces

May 24, 1995

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMISSION ON ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES
1100 WILSON BLVD. SUITE 1200F
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

We are pleased to present this report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, in accordance with Section 954(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.

The Department of Defense is a remarkably successful institution. The women and men who serve today are better educated, better trained, and more skilled than ever before. But we have concluded that DOD must do more to ensure its ability to conduct effective, unified military operations — the overarching goal of America's National Security Strategy. This means that the Military Services and all other elements of the Department of Defense must focus their energies on supporting the unified Commanders in Chief who plan for and conduct our military operations, as directed by the President and by the Secretary of Defense.

The traditional approach to roles and missions — attempting to allocate them among the Services in the context of the Key West Agreement of 1948 — is no longer appropriate. That approach leads to institutional quarrels (as reported in the press during our deliberations) and unsatisfactory compromises (as discussed in our report). More importantly, it does not lead to achieving the Department's goals.

I cannot stress our message too strongly. It means a change in orientation for many. It means fully implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

You will find many recommendations in the report, grouped in terms of joint military operations, efficient and responsive support, and improved management and direction. All of them are designed to improve joint military operations.

We are convinced that lasting solutions to the problems you asked us to address depend on setting the right directions for the future, not merely adjusting the boundaries — which are increasingly artificial — among the various defense organizations. Redefining those problems makes them no less daunting. Our report, *Directions for Defense*, lays out our contribution to the solution.

John P. White
Chairman

PREFACE

Almost everyone we talked to during the past year was sure of four things: First, that America has the very best and most capable military forces in the world – the strength of the U.S. Military lies in its ability to provide the right mix of air, land, and naval capabilities to meet any threat. Second, that in the future, the U.S. Military will be called on to perform a broader array of missions in more diverse contingency situations than they did in the past while still maintaining a capability for large-scale regional conflicts. Third, that information technologies, space, stealth, and precision-guided weapons will be increasingly important to military success. And finally, that Defense funding will remain limited.

In this context, three findings are particularly clear: first, that the United States relies on the regional commanders in chief to conduct the Nation's military operations. Second, that America's combat forces are becoming increasingly accustomed to working together, but more needs to be done. And third, that there are opportunities for large-scale savings from adjustments in the Defense infrastructure.

Our most important finding is that traditional approaches to roles and missions issues are no longer appropriate. The context has changed significantly in the years since the 1948 Key West Agreement addressed the question of who should do what in the U.S. Military. Today, it is clear that the emphasis must be on molding DOD into a cohesive set of institutions that work toward a common purpose – effective unified military operations – with the efforts of all organizations, processes, and systems focused on that goal from the very beginning.

The question is no longer "who does what," but how do we ensure that the right set of capabilities is identified, developed, and fielded to meet the needs of unified commanders. The Services, the defense agencies, OSD, and the Joint Staff – who make these decisions and develop these capabilities – are at the forefront of this effort.

What this means to those who read this report is that you are not going to see a listing of roles and missions disputes among the Services, or sharp Commission recommendations on how to resolve those disputes. You are not going to find a series of "put and take" statements that rearrange U.S. forces from one Service to the other. To have addressed our task in that way would have perpetuated the narrow institutional perspectives that inhibit development of a true joint warfighting perspective.

What you are going to read is our view of significant changes that need to be made in order to develop a Department of Defense able to handle the challenges of an uncertain and constantly changing future security environment. There are a few surprises in this report. For example, as I have discussed our findings with many in the defense, academic, and business communities, I found them very surprised by our finding, for example, that while DOD needs to increase jointness throughout the system, it is necessary to place a high value on broad Service competition. To some this is a counter-intuitive finding. But competition among the Services produces innovation in weapon systems, forces,

doctrine, and concepts of operations that yield the dramatically superior military capabilities we need. America must not lose that edge. At the same time, DOD must find ways of reducing the costs of maintaining that competition – through early decisions on which competing ideas should be developed.

As you read this report, I believe you will find it properly focused on the future, with a realistic appreciation of past and current improvements.

I want to express my thanks to Congress for the unique and far-reaching opportunity they gave this Commission. I am especially grateful to Secretary of Defense William J. Perry for the opportunity to chair this Commission and to work with some of our nation's brightest and most capable private citizens, our Commissioners, and a staff of first-rate defense professionals. Finally, thank you to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili and the many members of DOD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services whose cooperations made our job so much easier.

The unique, informed but different perspectives brought by the ten who joined me on the Commission ensured a deep and penetrating look at the Nation's defense establishment. They also provided the wealth of experience needed to ensure that we resisted traditional approaches to roles and missions questions, and, I believe, allowed us to offer a contribution more enduring than would otherwise have been possible.

We have dedicated this report to the late Secretary Les Aspin. In many ways, Les was a guiding force for our work. Any who know his work will see evidence of his ideas throughout this report. We are all especially grateful for the privilege of serving with him, and for all that he taught us not only on the Commission, but throughout his long and distinguished career of public service. Les was a strong supporter and participant in the Commission's efforts and endorsed our final report. It is our firm hope that this report reflects the spirit of Les Aspin's dedication to the Nation and his quest for excellence in defense. The Nation will miss his contributions and we will miss him as a friend.

I am compelled to say a few words about the quality of staff I have been privileged to work with. There is not time or room here to say enough about each individual member of the staff. Their performance has been superb, and confirms that every Service and element of DOD offered the Commission its most capable men and women. The same is true for those who joined the staff from industry, research firms supporting our efforts, and academia. In each case, we had only the best to work with. This staff exhibited the kind of joint purpose, cooperation, and trust that make successful unified military activity possible.

John P. White
24 May 1995
Washington, D.C.

CHAPTER 2

Effective Unified Military Operations

The primary goal of DOD is to achieve effective military operations. Improving joint military capabilities is the key to reaching this goal. America has been moving in that direction since World War II and now is the time to make the necessary adjustments.

Future military operations will call on the capabilities of all the Services along with support from the defense agencies, other government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Pulling these capabilities together for complex, dangerous joint military operations is the responsibility of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs). They can fulfill this responsibility only if the Services and other supporting organizations provide the capabilities needed.

Our specific recommendations for improving overall joint operational effectiveness fall into twelve categories, which are discussed in this chapter:

- Create a unified vision for joint operations.
- Strengthen joint doctrine.
- Strengthen support for the CINCs' missions.
- Improve joint training.
- Create a functional unified command responsible for joint training and integration of forces based in the Continental United States.
- Develop and implement joint and future readiness indicators.
- Review CINCs' geographic responsibilities.
- Prepare for changing mission priorities.
- Concentrate Service efforts on military core competencies.
- Further integrate the Reserve Components.
- Review capabilities in the aggregate.
- Set outdated arguments aside.

We reaffirm the role of the CINCs that has evolved in law and in practice: CINCs are responsible for fighting America's wars and employing military forces in pursuit of national security objectives. CINCs must have greater influence over the processes and priorities used by DOD to acquire the capabilities they need to accomplish their missions. But they must not be burdened with responsibilities that could detract from their primary role of preparing for and conducting military operations.

CREATE A UNIFIED VISION FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that the military capabilities developed separately by each of the Services are individually superb. But they do not work well enough *together*. We believe this happens because, in the absence of a unifying vision to guide their efforts, each Service develops capabilities and trains its forces according to its own vision of how its forces should contribute to joint warfighting. Not surprisingly, the Services' ideas about how to integrate all forces reflect their own perspectives, typically giving the other Services a role supporting the "main effort."

> "No military task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to national security objectives. Genuine unity is indispensable at this starting point. No amount of subsequent coordination can eliminate duplication or doctrinal conflicts which are intruded into the first shaping of military programs."
>
> — President Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Message to Congress*, 3 April 1958

Each Service's vision informs and guides its internal decisions on systems acquisition, doctrine, training, organization, management of forces, and the conduct of operations. Forward . . . From the Sea; Force XXI; and Global Reach, Global Power are vision documents published by the Departments of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, respectively. They are valuable statements of how each Service views its role. These Service visions help form a joint vision, but collectively they cannot replace it. Competing elements exist in these visions that must be reconciled. They are also incomplete. There is no joint command and control or joint logistics. The Service visions do not explain collectively how a joint force commander can integrate Service capabilities to achieve the most effective mix for specific warfighting purposes.

> Recommendation: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should propose, for the Secretary of Defense's approval, a future joint warfighting vision to help guide Service force development efforts.

Basically, competition among warfighting visions is a strength. Indeed, this is among the principal benefits of the uniquely American organization for defense. The variety of Service perspectives adds breadth, flexibility, and synergy to military operations. Nevertheless, integrating their warfighting concepts must receive more emphasis. Otherwise, the Services can only work to develop the capabilities they need to fulfill their own particular visions.

We find a pressing need for a central vision to harmonize the Services' own views. This vision should drive joint requirements and serve as a basis f

elevating the importance of joint operations as an essential "core competency" of all joint commands and agencies.

In addition to the general aim of providing an overarching guide for developing joint warfighting requirements, a unified vision will accomplish several other direct and indirect purposes. Among the direct aims are giving the Services guidance regarding the capabilities they should supply to unified military operations. With a common base of understanding, the CINCs and Services can have congruent expectations of the capabilities of forces assigned to the CINCs by the Military Departments. The unified vision will provide a framework for the development of the common operational and organizational concepts needed for "baseline" joint force headquarters, and a common base for assessments of current and future joint capabilities. Indirect purposes include encouraging the Services to "mature" their own visions by incorporating an accurate concept of how they contribute to DOD's total capabilities.

The unified vision for joint operations needs to be part of the overall vision that should guide DOD's long-term planning. The development of such a vision is also discussed in Chapter 4.

Strengthen Joint Doctrine

> "At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory."
>
> —General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) assigned responsibility for developing doctrine for the joint employment of the U.S. Armed Forces to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since then, a first generation of joint doctrine has been developed. In many cases, it represents a compendium of competing and sometimes incompatible concepts (often developed by one "lead" Service). Joint doctrine should be developed on the basis of the unifying joint vision discussed above to better guide Service efforts to build and integrate the capabilities needed for joint operations.

> Recommendation: Revise the joint doctrine development process. Make one joint agency the leader for "capstone" doctrine.

The practice of designating one Service to act as the lead agent for the overarching doctrine that broadly guides all Service activities – such as Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations*, for which the Army took the lead – can produce widely differing interpretations and confusion. To preclude this problem in the future, we recommend revising the joint doctrine development process. A joint agency should be designated to lead the process, thus eliminating use of one Service as lead agent for capstone joint doctrine. Service participation in the development of capstone doctrine is still essential, and

assignment of Service lead agents is still appropriate for more narrowly focused doctrine.

> "Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."
>
> —General George H. Decker, USA

We reaffirm the role of the Military Services in developing concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that derive from their core competencies. Ultimately, the Chairman of the JCS must use his authority to lead the joint doctrine process. Doctrinal products should be based on accepted principles and not rigid rules. CINCs and Joint Force Commanders should be given flexibility in applying joint doctrine to specific circumstances.

The Joint Warfighting Center, established in June 1994, is responsible for assisting the Chairman, the unified CINCs, and the Service Chiefs in conceptualizing, developing, and assessing current and future joint doctrine. We believe the responsibilities assigned to the Joint Warfighting Center are important, and we urge the Secretary of Defense to provide the people and money necessary for the Center to fulfill these responsibilities. The Center also should assist the Chairman in developing training and equipment standards for core elements of joint force headquarters to provide standardization and interoperability from theater to theater. We urge the Services to assign their top warfighters to these efforts.

Disagreements over the specifics of doctrine are compounded by deeper differences among the Services. They define and use doctrine differently. We believe that suitable joint professional military education and greater Service cooperation in joint activities are fundamental to effective joint doctrine.

Strengthen Support for the CINCs' Missions

The CINCs must have greater influence over the processes and priorities used to acquire the weapons, equipment, and forces they need to accomplish their warfighting and other missions; but, they must not be burdened with responsibilities that could detract from the execution of those missions. The CINCs must also have peacetime authority over forces, planning, and training commensurate with their responsibility for unified military operations. This authority should include peacetime mechanisms to ensure inter-Service cooperation, which must be consciously – even aggressively – developed through better joint training and greater attention to interoperability to ensure effective joint operations.

To this end, several actions can be centralized to assist the CINCs in their integration of Service capabilities and to facilitate interoperability of joint forces. We recommend that the Chairman of the JCS:

- In coordination with the CINCs, develop a near-term, integrated theater air and missile defense concept with a corresponding doctrine and functional architecture.

- Continue refinement of joint concepts, doctrine, and requirements for future theater air and missile defense, fire support, deep attack, and other major warfighting functions that cross Service boundaries.

- With CINC participation, develop an integrated architecture for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^4I) to increase effectiveness when operating across the boundaries among CINCs' areas of responsibility.

- Develop appropriate concepts, doctrine, organizations, and procedures to enhance joint logistics capabilities available to the CINCs, including integrating national-level support and Service logistics support in the theater.

Recent management initiatives – such as the Expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council and its Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process – provide geographic and functional CINCs with better linkages of their operational needs to the decision-making and management processes that develop, fund, and deliver the needed forces, equipment, and support essential to successful operations. These initiatives should be strengthened, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Command, Control, and Communications Support

Recommendations: (1) Better integrate C^4 architectures and systems for CINC use. (2) Give the CINCs more peacetime control over theater communications resources.

The CINCs must participate in the development of communications support systems to ensure that their needs are met. In most cases, this should be done through the management system that we recommend in Chapter 4. But, in some cases, the CINCs may need specific authority. We recommend that geographic CINCs manage communications resources (e.g., radio frequencies, bandwidth, power output, and capacity) within their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs). Organizations that perform this function already reside within the European and Pacific Command AORs, but they are assigned to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and only come under the CINCs' operational control in wartime. To give the CINCs the ability to manage communications resources

within their theaters, these organizations should be placed under the CINCs' control in peacetime as well. CINCs should also have authority to tailor solutions specific to their AORs, consistent with DOD concepts, standards, and architectures.

Intelligence Support

> Recommendation: Give CINCs more control over intelligence support.

The CINCs need more influence over the establishment of intelligence requirements, setting of collection priorities, and dissemination of intelligence products in their geographic or functional areas. The intelligence community can provide more timely and responsive intelligence support to joint commanders during military operations by realigning roles and responsibilities among the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. Because the structure and functions of the entire U.S. intelligence community are being reviewed by the Commission on Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, we deferred to that group on most intelligence-related issues. But our analyses led us to conclude that some steps can be taken now to improve the support provided to the CINCs by intelligence components within DOD. Accordingly, we recommend the following:

- The Secretary of Defense should centralize authority for developing intelligence support capabilities within DOD under a senior military intelligence officer with authority to review, evaluate, and revise intelligence programs. This officer would advise the Secretary on intelligence organization, structure, and spending for all DOD-funded intelligence programs.

- The Chairman of the JCS should give unified commanders a greater voice in the development of intelligence capabilities to support their planning and operations.

- The Chairman of the JCS and the CINCs should ensure that operational unit commanders have a feedback mechanism that tracks the status of their intelligence collection requests.

Space-Based Support

Space-based systems are increasingly important to unified military operations and integral to the combat capabilities fielded by the Services. But the availability of some critical space-based information is not controlled within DOD; national systems under the control of the intelligence community provide information that can multiply combat effectiveness.

> Recommendations: (1) Increase DOD influence over space-based support. (2) Give DOD a greater voice in satellite tasking.

Under current law, the Secretary of Defense, through the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), acquires and operates space-based reconnaissance systems to satisfy the requirements of all elements of the intelligence community. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) establishes intelligence collection requirements and priorities. Within DOD, space programs are carried out by the NRO and the individual Services. An integrated space program, using the best practices of the NRO, the Services, and the civil and commercial sectors, would result in lower acquisition and operational costs for space systems and improve responsiveness to all users of space systems.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense integrate the management of military and intelligence space activities; assign responsibility for developing an integrated architecture for military and intelligence space systems to a joint-Service office reporting to the Secretary; and assign the Air Force primary (not sole) responsibility for acquisition and operation of multi-user space-based systems. The implementation of this recommendation should preserve and extend the streamlined acquisition practices of the NRO.

The committee structure under the DCI that manages the tasking of satellites should be made more responsive to the CINCs' requirements. The process for requesting and obtaining intelligence products should be simplified and standardized among the system-specific review committees, which should be consolidated. There should also be greater DOD access to committee meetings that review CINC requests and make tasking decisions.

Coalition Interoperability Support

> Recommendation: Expand planning and preparation for coalition operations.

Many future military operations will be conducted with coalition partners. The CINCs need to expand their planning and preparation for such operations. Consequently, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

- Assign CINCs the responsibility for ensuring that current information on likely partners – including communications systems, procedures, and infrastructure – is available for contingency planning.
- Encourage the CINCs to train with potential coalition partners.
- Provide for coalition liaison teams to enhance operations with likely coalition partners. These teams would train and operate with coalition command

elements to provide access to U.S. intelligence; command and control; combat support; and, where appropriate, logistics.

- Ensure the availability of equipment (particularly communications gear) to facilitate the work of coalition liaison teams in enabling coalition partners to participate in peacetime combined exercises and actual operations.

- Substantially increase funding for the International Military Education and Training Program and the Military-to-Military Contact Program from the current levels of $27 million and $12 million, respectively.

Improve Joint Training

Training is the key to maintaining Service core competencies and joint training is critical to the success of unified military operations. Joint training is not being done as well as Service training. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently noted, this is a chronic problem: "... When you look at joint training ... it's an embarrassment to me. I have gone to more joint exercises and walked away from them more embarrassed than anything else."[2]

> Recommendations: (1) Fully fund joint training. (2) Give the CINCs more authority over the joint portions of Service component training budgets.

Emphasis on joint training throughout DOD must be increased. To this end, we recommend that joint training be fully funded in DOD's budget and that the CINCs be given more control over the portions of Service component training budgets that are integral to joint training. In particular, they should have authority to disapprove the diversion of Service funds from joint training. The CINCs also need improved simulation techniques, more rigorous training readiness standards, and better tools for conducting and evaluating joint training.

> Recommendation: Extend joint evaluation to the unit level.

We endorse the development of unified command-level "Joint Mission Essential Tasks Lists" and we recommend extending this concept to tactical-level Service units. This would mean, for example, that Army maneuver units would be evaluated on their ability to integrate fixed-wing close air support into their tactical plans; Marine units would be judged on their ability to integrate Army Multiple Launch Rocket System units. Failing to demonstrate proficiency for any reason, including the inability of another Service to provide the necessary people or equipment, would cause a degraded readiness rating. This should cause the appropriate CINC to direct a

[2] General John M. Shalikashvili, speech to the Association of the United States Army Land Warfare Forum, 1 September 1994.

higher priority for this type of joint training by Service component commanders.

> Recommendation: Increase joint training activities.

Other changes are necessary: Joint training should be increased for close air support, and for all elements of theater air and missile defense forces, even at the expense of some Service-unique training. Core joint task force headquarters elements should be identified and exercised. Intelligence systems should be used during joint exercises, along with the battle management systems and command, control, and communications equipment needed to ensure connectivity of joint task forces. The functional CINC responsible for joint training and integration of U.S.-based forces (discussed below) should have the funding needed to develop enhanced joint training techniques within the revised DOD management system that we recommend in Chapter 4.

Create a Functional Unified Command Responsible for Joint Training and Integration of Forces Based in the Continental United States

> "One of the lessons which have most clearly come from the costly and dangerous experience of this war is that there must be unified direction of land, sea, and air forces at home as well as in all other parts of the world where our Armed Forces are serving."
>
> — President Harry S Truman, Message to Congress, 19 December 1945

The National Security Act of 1947 provided for the operation of the Armed Forces under unified control and "for their integration into an efficient team of land, air, and naval forces."[3] The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the CINCs authority over the forces assigned to their commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. It also gave them specific authority to organize and employ assigned forces as they deemed necessary.[4] Therefore, every CINC is responsible for training and integrating assigned forces.[5] Most U.S. military units are now stationed in the Continental United States (CONUS), although they can be apportioned to, and employed in, the area of responsibility (AOR) of any geographic CINC. A recent example is the deployment of the Army's 25th Infantry

[3] Public Law 253 — 80th Congress, Section 2, 26 July 1947.

[4] 10 U.S.C. 164(c).

[5] "Assigned" means that a force has been placed under the command authority of a CINC by direction of the Secretary of Defense. "Apportioned" means that the force has been made available *for planning purposes* to another CINC or several CINCs (including, possibly, the CINC to which the force is assigned).

Division from its base in the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR to Haiti, which is in the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) AOR.

> "This important proposal would make CINCACOM responsible for ensuring that forces that will fight together also train together."
>
> — Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, letter to Senator Sam Nunn, 29 March 1993

This flexibility in deploying units to any CINC's AOR puts even more emphasis on joint training. American forces must have the appropriate knowledge, training, and interoperability for adapting quickly to the different CINCs' warfighting needs. A command that concentrates on preparing the forces stationed in CONUS for joint operations, to include deployment planning, is of particular importance. Therefore, we endorse the assignment of the functional mission of preparing joint forces to the U.S. Atlantic Command in October 1993. However, ACOM's new capacity as "joint force integrator" has not been adequately developed. This function must be better defined, understood, and accepted by all the CINCs. We also find that ACOM's geographic AOR detracts from its functional responsibilities. Therefore, we recommend that the President and Secretary of Defense do the following:

> Recommendation: Create a functional command responsible for joint training and integration.

- Separate the geographic and functional "joint force integrator" missions currently assigned to ACOM — creating a functional unified command.
- Assign all CONUS-based general purpose forces, including West Coast forces assigned to PACOM, and Reserve Component forces, to the resulting functional unified command.
- Give the CINC of this functional unified command specific responsibility to
  - assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in integrating the requirements of the geographic CINCs that flow from their individual contingency plans;
  - provide forces to geographic CINCs and ensure those forces are trained and integrated as joint forces and are capable of carrying out the tasks assigned to them;
  - support the joint training requirements and in-theater exercises of all unified CINCs and, through this process, provide an overarching input to the Chairman on joint warfighting requirements based on "lessons learned" during training;
  - train and assess the readiness of CONUS-based Active Duty and Reserve Component forces to meet integrated operational requirements;

- assist in the development of tools for conducting and evaluating joint training, such as better joint training readiness standards and measurement techniques, and greater use of simulation techniques; and

- assist in the development and validation of future joint warfighting concepts that will guide long-term force structure and modernization plans.

Develop and Implement Joint and Future Readiness Indicators

Unified commanders do not have an effective mechanism for assessing the joint readiness of the forces assigned to them in peacetime, much less for assessing the readiness of forces that are apportioned to them for planning purposes, but which are assigned to other CINCs.

Readiness has two dimensions: (1) the readiness of individual force elements to perform assigned tasks and (2) the ability of these force elements to integrate into the unified command structure to accomplish their portions of the joint mission. The first of these two dimensions is the responsibility of the Services; individual force readiness should be assessed against standards derived from the particular contingency plan(s) to which each force element is apportioned.

While Service assessments highlight strengths, weaknesses, and risks for all their forces, there are differences in methodology among the Services. Moreover, they do not evaluate the joint readiness of major force "packages" designed for contingency plans. And they do not provide estimates of future unit readiness, since they cannot forecast readiness as a function of resource projections.

> Recommendation: Develop a joint readiness assessment system.

A measurement system should be developed to determine and forecast the joint warfighting capabilities of forces assigned to the CINCs. The geographic CINCs need joint readiness assessments to plan for the employment of forces not assigned to them in peacetime. Perhaps more importantly, the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense need these assessments to help them plan future forces.

The information from such a measurement system should be factored into the up-front assessment and budget planning processes recommended in Chapter 4.

REVIEW THE CINCs' GEOGRAPHIC RESPONSIBILITIES

We believe that the Unified Command Plan (UCP) should reflect the regional focus and new missions emphasized in the National Security Strategy. Adjustments are needed to foster more rapid adaptation to changing threats and better align the unified command structure with the national security strategy. Specifically, we believe that the AORs of the geographic CINCs should be adjusted to eliminate "seams" that may impede joint operations between military theaters of operation and better align CINC responsibilities with regional strategies and strategic interests.

We recommend that periodic reviews of CINC missions and forces apply six broad principles:

- The geographic responsibilities of the CINCs should correspond to areas of recognized or likely strategic interest to the United States.

- The size of each AOR should accommodate the CINC's representational obligations and other responsibilities. The CINCs spend much of their time involved with politico-military dealings with security officials of countries in their respective AORs; the number of those countries is a major factor in the CINC's "span of control." Other significant factors include the political, economic, religious, and cultural diversity of the region; its physical size; and the presence of strategically important areas of conflict (or potential conflict) such as territorial disputes or other hostilities among countries.

- Seams between CINCs' AORs should be reviewed to ensure that they do not split areas of strategic interest or exacerbate existing political, economic, religious, or cultural differences.

- Sufficient land area, sea area, and airspace should be included in each AOR for the CINC to carry out assigned missions and, if necessary, wage an effective unified military campaign against any plausible adversary.

- The distinction between geographic and functional CINCs should be preserved (i.e., functional CINCs should not have AORs).

- The responsibilities assigned to the functional CINCs should be reviewed periodically for overlap and consolidated where practical.

We evaluated opportunities to consolidate unified commands. In all cases, we found potentially high costs associated with the CINCs' span of control and only limited cost savings. The continuing requirement for global military leadership, and increased demands for the attention of U.S. military leaders from more nations, may argue for exactly the opposite – in favor of more geographic CINCs with smaller AORs or more extensive use of sub-unified commands.

Northeast Asia typifies the need for continual review based on the principles stated above. The economic vitality of the region and its position as a major U.S. trade partner represent vital strategic interests of the United States. Northeast Asia lies entirely within PACOM's AOR, with politico-military affairs managed by PACOM and its two subunified commands in Korea and Japan. PACOM's AOR is the largest, in terms of area, and contains several points of strategic interest that compete for the attention of U.S. authorities. Once tensions have been reduced on the Korean peninsula, the warfighting responsibilities of the peninsula's U.S. command may diminish sufficiently to consider whether it is more desirable to reallocate resources and establish a unified command for Northeast Asia, or to retain an integrated view of Asia in PACOM.

Another example of how these principles could be applied involves the current placement of India in PACOM's AOR and Pakistan in the Central Command (CENTCOM). Tensions between these two countries and their nuclear potential might argue for assigning responsibility for them to the same unified command (the State Department has both countries under a single bureau). Movement of the seam between India and Pakistan, however, would necessarily create a new seam elsewhere, either between India and China or between Pakistan and its Islamic neighbors. Furthermore, putting India and Pakistan in either PACOM's or CENTCOM's AOR would decrease the span of control of one CINC, but perhaps not as significantly as it would increase the span of control of the other.

The responsibility for making these tough choices is rightfully vested by Congress in the President, with the advice of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS. In Chapter 4, we propose a strategy review at the beginning of each Presidential term that could provide the appropriate timing and means for reviewing questions about the assignment of AORs and the UCP in general.

Prepare for Changing Mission Priorities

Congress specifically told us to identify emerging or "new" missions to ensure that the Nation will have the military capabilities necessary for the future. Based on our view of the future, we conclude that four areas demand immediate attention from the Federal Government generally, not just from DOD. The four areas discussed below will provide significant security challenges and opportunities in the years ahead. While they demand higher priority treatment from DOD, we caution that they should not replace preparation for fighting major conflicts as the single most important priority of the Department. The four areas we nominate for concerted attention are combating proliferation, information warfare, peace operations, and the collection of other activities known in DOD as "operations other than war."

Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requires the combined resources of a variety of law enforcement, technical, intelligence, diplomatic, and defense organizations to identify proliferation threats and deal with them effectively. The range of needed activities includes diplomatic and commercial efforts to prevent the proliferation of commercial technologies essential to developing WMD; intelligence and domestic and international law enforcement capabilities to identify and intercept proliferation; diplomatic actions to redress proliferation; and military capabilities to deter and, if necessary, remove proliferation threats. These functions span many organizations.

Recommendations: (1) Put the Vice President in charge of integrating a national capability to combat proliferation. (2) Increase the CINCs' role.

The President has declared combating proliferation a national emergency. We recommend putting the Vice President in charge of an interagency effort for integrating national capability to combat proliferation until an effective process is in place. Furthermore, we recommend establishing an interagency working group (IWG) of the National Security Council with broad responsibility for all aspects of the proliferation mission – from diplomatic efforts to military action. A multi-agency, interdisciplinary planning staff should be established to support the IWG.

We endorse the Secretary of Defense's recent assignment to the geographic CINCs of responsibility for planning, targeting, and executing specific regional activities to combat proliferation – along with the ongoing preparation of a DOD directive on combating proliferation, which will communicate departmental policy, assign responsibilities, and establish procedures. To further enhance DOD's efforts to combat proliferation, we recommend the following:

- The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) should set up a DOD "combating proliferation coordinating committee" to coordinate policy and all administrative activities (e.g., funding, research and development, coordination, and mission support).

- The Chairman of the JCS should develop a procedure for integrating the capabilities of the functional CINCs into DOD's overall planning for combating proliferation.

Information Warfare

In the past, victory in war hinged on ability to dominate airspace, land, and the oceans. Today and in the future, major strategic and tactical advantages can be gained by controlling an adversary's access to information while protecting

one's own information – and capitalizing on the difference. The growing worldwide dependence on digital communications and data storage, much of which is vulnerable to manipulation and destruction, creates both dangers and opportunities for the United States and its allies.

In information warfare (IW), vulnerabilities are exploited through electronic means, psychological operations, and other measures designed to manipulate, deceive, disable, or destroy an opponent's information systems. Current and potential U.S. adversaries are vulnerable. IW techniques carried out during wartime or other periods of conflict can disrupt a state's leadership of troops, its allies, or its own population.

Like other forms of warfare, IW has a flip side. It is just as important to take effective measures to prevent an adversary from exploiting one's own vulnerabilities. Its heavy reliance on digital communications and control systems, coupled with a tradition of openness, makes the United States a particularly rich target for an opponent capable of waging IW. Such an adversary could cripple major civil and military support functions – financial, transportation, and communications – without even entering the country. America's clear conventional military superiority may cause opponents to see IW and other nontraditional forms of power as available means to achieve their goals.

> "Tomorrow's terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb."
>
> – *Computers in Crisis*, Report of the National Research Council

A wide variety of IW activities are underway within the U.S. Government. During the past few years, IW efforts, both offensive and defensive, have received a great deal of official attention. But the U.S. Government, as in the case of combating proliferation, lacks a comprehensive, integrated approach to the problems and opportunities raised by the explosive growth in reliance on information technology. In short, there is no overarching, government-wide concept for using IW to promote and protect U.S. national interests. An example is the statutory separation of responsibilities for protection of Federal government information systems between the National Institute for Standards and Technology and the National Security Agency. A more intense focus on resources, policy, and interagency cooperation on information security is needed. Therefore, we focus our recommendations on reducing U.S. information systems' vulnerability while leaving the exploitation of the potential of offensive warfare to the appropriate DOD activities.

Peace Operations

The President's National Security Strategy is clear about peace operations, stating that, "We must prepare our forces for peace operations . . . in some cases

their use will be necessary or desirable and justified by U.S. national interests."[6] The central purpose of peace operations – to prevent, halt, or contain conflict – requires combat-ready military forces sufficient to accomplish the missi[illegible] Peace operations share characteristics of both warfighting and other conflicts. They are a vital part of the National Security Strategy. We must not underestimate the difficulty of these efforts:

> Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the difficulty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either to succeed, policy makers must still spell out their interests, set priorities among cases, and balance goals with resources. The President will still need to educate the American people about the rationale behind a policy and convince them of the need for action. Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.[7]

Peace operations have the potential to deal with precursor instabilities and, thus, to prevent conflicts from reaching a stage where U.S. forces could be thrust into an active combatant role at considerably more expense and greater risk. Despite their value as investments in stability, and the continued likelihood of these occurrences in the next decade, military planners now treat peace operations as a subset of the "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW) category.[8] This treatment ignores the full range of approaches to resolving conflicts by assuming that military forces exist only to "fight and win nation's wars." While that notion ma[illegible] deter some conflicts, others are not affected.

The challenges here are as follows: First, identify conflicts that might be deterred or mitigated by peace operations and are of sufficient U.S. national interest to warrant commitment of forces. Second, determine how best to integrate peace operations into operational planning and training regimes. Third, determine how best to organize DOD and non-DOD assets to conduct these operations. Fourth, ensure that peace operations are paid for without undermining the readiness of forces not directly involved in them to effectively respond to other contingencies.

Lack of expeditious funding for peace operations degrades overall force readiness. The lag between conducting operations and receiving reimbursement forces DOD to deplete operations and maintenance (O&M) funds that had been

[6] *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995, p. 16.

[7] Stedman, Stephen John, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling Preventive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995.

[8] In categorizing military operations, DOD uses the term "operations other than war" as a convenient way of grouping together military activities required to accomplish objectives that do not have combat or the military defeat of an enemy as their central purpose. Included in this category are those civil, humanitarian, peacekeeping, and other activities that are increasingly occupying the Nation's Armed Forces.

programmed for training and maintenance, and some force modernization efforts.

> Recommendations: (1) Assign proper priority to peace operations. (2) Integrate other agency resources. (3) Ensure funding without degrading readiness.

The question for DOD and the government is not whether the Armed Forces will conduct these operations – each case will depend on choices made by policy makers – but how they can be planned and carried out with a minimum of disruption to DOD's core mission of preparing for and fighting the Nation's wars. Peace operations are integral to the roles of all Services and an important mission for the geographic CINCs. They warrant appropriate training and equipping. While the overall size of the current force is adequate to meet the current level of peace operations, additional forces uniquely applicable to such operations could be needed if these missions increase in frequency or intensity.

To give U.S. forces the capabilities to conduct these operations successfully, we recommend the following:

- The Secretary of Defense should change DOD directives and planning guidance to acknowledge the value of peace operations, align them with contingency planning rather than as part of the general, all-inclusive category of OOTW, and assign them an appropriate priority.

- The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS should reflect the likely use of the Military for peace operations in programming and contingency planning guidance and provide for suitable training and selected equipment stockage.

- All concerned should continue to support streamlined funding mechanisms to provide necessary funds promptly. Continued use of emergency supplemental appropriation requests appears preferable to creating special contingency funds or requiring advance congressional approval of any nonroutine movement or use of military forces.

Operations Other Than War

Our discussion above deals with peace operations, which DOD currently considers a part of operations other than war (OOTW). But in recent years, the Services also have been called upon to perform a spectrum of operations short of traditional combat operations – such as restoring civil order and providing humanitarian relief. The limited use of DOD forces for these operations will continue to be appropriate in circumstances where speed is essential or other

capabilities are not available. This is also true for some domestic natural disasters and humanitarian efforts.

> Recommendation: DOD should integrate OOTW capabilities into overall mission planning and assign proper priorities.

The challenge is to integrate the military capabilities required to perform peace operations into the DOD mission set, assign proper priorities, and develop training and other support activities to avoid degrading the readiness of U.S. forces for major combat operations.

Whether in the aftermath of U.S. combat operations, such as in Grenada and Panama, or during peace operations, as in Somalia and Haiti, one of the more difficult tasks once the shooting has stopped and a semblance of order has been restored is to hand over responsibility for law enforcement to other authorities. In the course of each of these military operations, civilian law and order broke down and no agency took responsibility for its restoration. A particularly contentious aspect of the debate was the issue of creating a local public security or "constabulary" force to maintain order after U.S. forces departed.

We expect DOD will continue to be called upon to carry out law enforcement operations in the future. Our recent experience in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa shows that there are no civilian agencies capable of short-notice law enforcement operations and training in hostile, demanding environments. By default, these missions — like other OOTW missions, such as large-scale delivery of food, water, or medicine into hostile areas — fall to the Military.

> Recommendations: (1) Remove legislative impediments to the training of foreign police by U.S. Armed Forces. (2) Assign the lead to the Army for short-term constabulary training.

For constabulary activities *per se*, we recommend that DOD formally acknowledge its emergency law enforcement and short-term constabulary training functions. The Secretary of Defense should assign these tasks to the Armed Forces, including the Reserve Components. The Army should have lead responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping U.S. forces to conduct law enforcement-related activities, although longer-term training should remain a civilian agency responsibility. Finally, legislation that restricts the ability of the Federal government to conduct constabulary training (e.g., Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act) should be amended to allow greater DOD participation.

We also recommend the following:

- The President should limit the use of military forces in both peace operations and OOTW to tasks that cannot be more appropriately assigned to others.

- The Secretary of Defense should propose to the National Security Council a Presidential Decision Directive ordering executive branch agencies to take the necessary steps to broaden the base of resources for peace operations and OOTW by planning for the extensive use of military reservists and other governmental agencies, contractors, and non-governmental organizations for tasks in their areas of competency. We specifically recommend action to improve the ability of a U.S. civilian agency to conduct longer-term law enforcement training.

An effective model for OOTW is the U.S. Coast Guard. While an agency of the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard is a branch of the Armed Forces. Its military characteristics (e.g., chain of command, discipline, and 24-hour response capability) enable the Coast Guard to perform maritime safety, law enforcement, and marine environmental protection roles – and still meet its national security mission. The Coast Guard's success in meeting its multi-mission responsibilities results from effective coordination of all aspects of operations – from planning through execution – with DOD and other Federal, state, and local agencies.

Summary

In recommending these approaches to the emerging mission areas outlined above, we recognize some limitations on the ability of DOD and the NSC process to develop successful policies and programs. First, many agencies have roles in these areas, but at the same time have other priority tasks. Second, in areas where many departments have strong interests and responsibilities – information warfare is a prime example – there is often reluctance to share information or be subordinate to others. Finally, effective new programs and efforts require funding, at a time when budgetary pressures are severe for the entire executive branch.

For all of these reasons, there is a premium on leadership within the NSC system – by the President, the Vice President, and other principals. We have tried to be specific about how various interagency efforts should come together, and we have identified specific leadership roles where appropriate. In all four of these mission areas, it is quite logical to assume that an effective interagency process will lead to new programs and responsibilities for various agencies; the Administration must be ready to restructure budgetary priorities to execute these initiatives.

Concentrate Service Efforts on Military Core Competencies and Their Support of the CINCs

We reaffirm the roles of the Services that have evolved as DOD has matured. The Services provide the military capabilities essential to the accomplishment of missions assigned to the CINCs. They develop tactical concepts; manage research and development; acquire weapons and supporting systems; recruit, educate, and train personnel; develop leaders; and organize, train, and equip the specific forces that the CINCs need to accomplish their assigned missions. The Services' planning horizon extends well into the future, while the CINCs, of necessity, focus on near- and mid-term planning.

We recommend reemphasizing traditional Service functions, sharpening the boundaries in some areas where unneeded overlap occurs, and relieving them of responsibilities that detract from their core competencies.

The "core competencies" of each Service are the heart of the warfighting capabilities essential to effective unified military operations. A prerequisite to improved joint military effectiveness is ensuring these Service capabilities. However, many elements of each Services' core competencies must be carefully integrated across Service boundaries. This is especially true for Service capabilities that need to be interoperable with other Services' capabilities. Other areas common among the Service component commands assigned to each CINC also must be integrated.

Interoperability applies to more than just the obvious functions, such as communications. It is important for operational flexibility in munitions, other expendables, electronic support, and elsewhere. In the long term, interoperability can be enhanced through greater attention to commonality early in the

What Are 'Core Competencies'?

Core competencies are the set of specific capabilities or activities fundamental to a Service or agency role. They define the Service's or agency's essential contributions to the overall effectiveness of DOD and its unified commands.

As viewed by the Commission, Service core competencies include the following: *for the Air Force*, air superiority, global strike/deep attack, and air mobility; *for the Army*, mobile armored warfare, airborne operations, and light infantry operations; *for the Navy*, carrier-based air and amphibious power projection, sea-based air and missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare; *for the Marine Corps*, amphibious operations, over-the-beach forced entry operations, and maritime pre-positioning; and *for the Coast Guard*, humanitarian operations, maritime defense, safety, law enforcement, and environmental protection.

Among the core competencies of joint organizations are planning and conducting joint and combined military operations.

requirements-generation process, as discussed in Chapter 4. In the near term, it is important to support specific interoperability initiatives, such as

- upgrading the Navy/Marine Corps EA-6B force to meet all DOD airborne electronic stand off jamming needs;
- equipping enough Air Force KC-135 aircraft and replacement tankers with multipoint capability to refuel Navy, Marine, and coalition aircraft; and
- ensuring that all munitions, especially the growing inventory of laser-guided bombs and other precision munitions, are useable by the combat aircraft of all Services.

Presence

Each Service is a major contributor to achieving the objectives of peacetime overseas presence — influencing nations and events, reassuring friends and allies, deterring would-be aggressors, and responding promptly to emergencies with combat forces. The President's National Security Strategy places a high priority on maintaining continued engagement overseas and the National Military Strategy calls on capabilities provided by all Services to meet the CINCs' overseas presence objectives.[9]

Overseas presence is challenging because it is difficult to relate specific results to the efforts expended by the Military. Nevertheless, in a changing world, DOD must look for more efficient and effective ways to achieve the objectives of presence. We agree with the assessment of the Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command that "It is time to reconsider what is really required and what has simply become automatic."[10] The CINCs must state realistic requirements for presence and look at innovative alternatives to traditional types of presence. One option would be to give each geographic CINC a notional presence "budget."

> Recommendation: Revise the process for determining the CINCs' overseas presence requirements.

In addition, inter-Service competition should yield significant benefits. The possibilities have been suggested by the Chairman: "Maybe I don't need to deploy the

> Recommendation: Experiment with new approaches for achieving overseas presence objectives.

[9] *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995; and *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*, 1995.

[10] Vice Admiral H.W. Gehman, Jr.; letter to Dr. John P. White, "Overseas Presence," 1 December 1994.

same capability all the time. Maybe I can build my forward presence around an Aegis cruiser . . . and the air . . . I forward deploy and put on the ground."[11] We recommend a vigorous experimentation program to encourage innovation, exploit the full range of Service capabilities, and evaluate alternative methods and mixes of forces to adequately achieve presence objectives. The functional CINC responsible for joint training and integration of CONUS-based forces should take the lead in this effort, in coordination with the geographic CINCs. Alternatives developed through this experimentation must provide forces capable of achieving the objectives of the geographic CINCs, particularly combat-ready forces to respond to crisis situations.

As stated in connection with cultivating potential coalition partners, we believe that many military-to-military contact and other foreign military interaction programs are a low-cost, but effective means for developing American influence in other nations. We encourage measures to further integrate and coordinate these programs within DOD and with other government agencies. In particular, we recommend that DOD, in coordination with the Department of State, give high priority to adequately funding military interaction programs.

Combat Search and Rescue

Recommendations: (1) Give the Air Force Executive Agent responsibility for CSAR. (2) Air Force increase availability to meet needs of ongoing operations.

The requirement for combat search and rescue (CSAR) support in peace operations and operations other than war is likely to arise quickly, and it may generate steady-state requirements in more than one theater at a time (which has been the case recently). Too frequently, uniquely trained special operations units are called upon to provide day-to-day CSAR support, at the expense of their readiness to perform special operations activities.

Our focus on core competencies leads us to recommend that the Secretary expand the Air Force's executive agent responsibilities for escape and evasion to include responsibility for CSAR. Furthermore, in light of the persistent requirement for CSAR support, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Air Force to provide CSAR capability sufficient for ongoing operations without using special operations forces.

[11] General John M. Shalikashvili, "Readiness: It's a Balancing Act," *Air Force Times*, 2 January 1995.

Further Integrate the Reserve Components

Since establishing the Total Force policy in 1973, DOD has endeavored to make better use of Reserve Component forces. DOD should continue its efforts to ensure that the Reserve Components contribute as much as practical to executing the national strategy. Significant savings and public goodwill can be generated by using Reserve forces wherever and whenever they can provide a required military capability.

There are ways that DOD can make better use of the Reserve Components. Some reserve forces are not organized, trained, or equipped appropriately for the types of operations they are likely to face in the future. In particular, the Army, which has the largest Reserve Components, has a combat structure that exceeds requirements for fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. At the same time, the Army reports shortages in deployable support forces.

We recommend the application of five general principles for sizing, shaping, and employing the Total Force to better integrate Reserve Components:

Recommendations: Size and shape the Reserve Component forces according to principles reflecting Total Force needs.

- First, the Total Force should be sized and shaped to meet the military requirements of the national security strategy.

  The Reserve Components should be assigned all tasks that they can accomplish within the mobilization and deployment times envisioned in the National Security Strategy. Maximum reliance on the Reserve forces conserves resources for other critical needs and involves the American people more broadly with their Armed Forces.

  All units should be evaluated on the basis of their readiness to accomplish assigned tasks within the time frames specified.

  The Secretary of Defense should clarify the extent to which the following Reserve Component tasks are intended to determine force requirements:

  - Warfighting and forward presence
  - General support forces and mobilization capability
  - Strategic reserve or reconstitution
  - General military service, including National Guard (militia) forces for domestic operations (e.g., disaster relief, civil disturbance, and border control) to the extent that these forces are funded by the Federal Government.

- Second, because not all units need to maintain the same level of readiness, the Secretary of Defense should fully implement the policy of "tiered" resource allocation. Units that are scheduled to deploy early and frequently should have higher priority for training resources, personnel, and equipment. DOD should allocate resources appropriate to the planned mission and the response time required. This will correct situations where some late or nondeploying units have funding priorities equal to, or higher than, early deploying units. However, planners should keep in mind that tiered resourcing deliberately leads to tiered readiness. Forces that get less resources are less ready, and less capable.

  More specifically, the Army should resolve the question of the readiness of National Guard "enhanced readiness brigades." Although the Army is committed to the readiness of these units, many in DOD doubt whether these 15 brigades can be ready in time to meet deployment schedules associated with the two major regional conflict scenario. We believe that designated Reserve Component units can be ready in time if policies are changed and sufficient resources are provided – for example, by raising the percentage of full-time leaders, active duty advisors, and skilled technicians in each unit. Providing many qualified advisors to the enhanced readiness brigades will place additional demands on active forces that are already fully committed. The Army's leadership must balance these competing demands.

- Third, Reserve Component forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill force shortfalls in higher priority areas. For example, the Army has eight National Guard combat divisions with approximately 110,000 personnel spaces that were required for possible war with the former Soviet Union, but they are not needed for the current national security strategy.[12] At the same time, the Army estimates that there is a shortage of 60,000 combat support and combat service support troops to adequately support the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps in two regional conflicts. The Secretary of Defense should verify this shortfall and direct the Army to restructure its combat divisions to provide the additional support forces needed.[13] This would still leave the Total Army with about 50,000 more combat spaces than required. The excess should be eliminated, from the Active or Reserve Components.

[12] These Army National Guard divisions are not used in any major regional conflict currently envisioned in DOD planning scenarios. The conflicts would be finished long before the National Guard divisions can be ready. The Bottom-Up Review did assign these eight divisions secondary missions such as providing the basis for wartime rotation, serving as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes, and supporting civil authorities at home. We believe eight divisions is too large a force for these secondary missions.

[13] We recognize that there are equipment implications. Some units will not need significant reequipping when they are restructured, such as a division artillery that transitions to a nondivisional field artillery brigade. Other units would need significant reequipping, such as an infantry unit being converted to an ammunition handling unit.

This principle should be applied to all Reserve Components of all the Services.

- Fourth, the Services should ensure that individuals and units of the Reserve Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational plans and actually used in the execution of those plans. We have concluded that accessibility to Reserve forces is adequate. There is sufficient authority to call on them when needed, and the last two Presidents have used it. Reserve Components should participate in actual contingency operations commensurate with their training, demonstrated readiness, and availability.

- Fifth, greater integration and cooperation is required between Active and Reserve Components. Seamless integration is the key to effective Reserve support of the Total Force. The most effective Reserve units have strong, recurring association and cooperation with the Active components.

  Reserve Component units should be trained to perform specific tasks to the same standards as the Active component units, though they might not train to the same spectrum of tasks. For instance, Reserve Component units may specialize in a particular area (such as desert operations) or task (such as rear area security) and may defer more complex tasks for post-mobilization training.

  All Reserve Component units in the United States should be assigned in peacetime to the unified command responsible for the joint training and integration of U.S.-based forces (discussed above). That CINC should oversee the training and readiness of all assigned forces — Reserve as well as Active — to fulfill statutory responsibility for the preparedness of the command to carry out assigned missions. The Active components — given appropriate authority to establish standards and conduct evaluations and inspections — should be held responsible for Reserve Component training readiness.

  Other useful mechanisms to encourage Active/Reserve integration include joint training, common management information systems, personnel exchanges for professional development and experience, and making duty with the Reserve Components career-enhancing for active duty members of all Services.

  Finally, where significant uncertainties or differences of opinion exist, we recommend that DOD establish a series of tests, experiments, and pilot programs to determine whether Reserve Component units can perform to standards and whether different organizational and training arrangements would be more effective. This program will help match Reserve Component forces to requirements; identify the broadest set of opportunities for Reserve Component participation; clarify the resource levels needed to meet

operational standards; and encourage innovation in the structure and use of the Reserve Component.

Review Capabilities in the Aggregate

Fixing Responsibility

> "Strategy, program, and budget are all aspects of the same basic decisions. Using the advice of our scientists and our intelligence officers, we must make the wisest estimate as to the probable nature of any future attack upon us, determine accordingly how to organize and deploy our military forces, and allocate the available manpower, materiel, and financial resources in a manner consistent with the over-all plan."
>
> – President Harry S Truman. Message to Congress, 19 December 1945

The traditional "who gets to do what" view of roles and missions is fundamentally flawed. The question should be "who needs what" and the emphasis should be on the needs of the CINCs. That is, does the full set of available capabilities include everything they need to fulfill their missions? In the absence of a unifying concept for joint warfighting, each Service is fully engaged in trying to deliver to the CINCs what the Service views as the best possible set of its specific capabilities – without taking into account the similar capabilities provided by the other Services. When we reviewed the traditional roles and missions issues in the context of what the CINCs need to accomplish their missions, rather than what the Services need to fulfill their own visions of themselves, the results were enlightening.

Deep Attack

Perhaps the best-remembered argument among the Services over who gets to do what was the 1949 debate over whether to fund a Navy "supercarrier" or an Air Force bomber. That debate centered on long-range delivery of nuclear weapons. Today, the nuclear aspect is less central, but the debate continues.

> ". . . Until long-range bombers are developed capable of spanning our bordering oceans and returning to our North American bases, naval air power launched from carriers may be the only practicable means of bombing vital enemy centers in the early stages of a war."
>
> – Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Department of the Navy Press Release, 6 January 1948

For the purposes of our evaluation in this area, we defined deep attack as encompassing all actions that can apply force outside the area of close combat. In a world with weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated air defense systems, there is great value in fighting from as far as possible beyond an enemy's reach. The

CINCs have available several different weapon systems that can attack land and sea targets at varying ranges. The Services field a mix of land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based cruise missiles, and a growing inventory of precision-guided weapons and standoff weapons delivered by aircraft. All of these capabilities are useful. In the Gulf War, all were used. No CINC that we talked to proposed eliminating any of these capabilities, and it is almost inconceivable that one ever would, because they allow the Joint Force Commander to bring force to bear in a near simultaneous manner against the full array of enemy capabilities and sources of strength.

However, it is not clear that DOD has the correct balance of these various weapons. Currently, no one in DOD has specific responsibility for specifying the overall number and mix of deep attack systems. This is a primary example of the need for a unified vision as discussed earlier in this chapter. It also illustrates the more general problem discussed in Chapter 4 of the lack of a comprehensive process to review capabilities and requirements in the aggregate. It is of particular importance here because of the large number and high cost of deep attack systems. We believe that process improvements recommended in Chapter 4 provide the means for addressing this and similar issues in the future.

Recommendations: (1) Conduct an assessment of all Services' deep attack systems to determine appropriate force size and mix. (2) Defer decision on B-2 bomber funding pending analyses of the industrial base impact. (3) Accelerate funding for precision-guided munitions.

Moreover, DOD may have greater quantities of strike aircraft and other deep attack weapons systems than it needs. Overall deep attack capability is increasing with the refocus of the bomber force on conventional operations, growing inventories of improved precision-guided munitions, and procurement plans for stealth aircraft (which can provide a deep attack capability equivalent to that of many nonstealth aircraft in many instances). Because hostile states have available modern surface-to-air missile systems, stealth can be especially important. Precise standoff weapons that improve capability in high-threat environments are expensive, and nonstealthy aircraft require support from other aircraft to attack heavily defended targets.

Capability improvements based on stealth and precision technologies portend major changes in force size and structure in the future. Consequently, we recommend prompt initiation of a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness study focused on finding the appropriate combination and quantities of deep attack capabilities currently fielded and under development by all Services. Only by approaching capabilities in the aggregate, from the CINCs' perspective rather than the Services', can this particular "who needs what" question be answered.

At congressional direction, we examined whether production of the B-2 bomber should be stopped, as planned by DOD. The answer to this complex question requires a broad examination in the context of DOD's overall deep attack capability.

The Commission's staff reviewed more than 20 studies addressing bombers. We were briefed on the most recent study prepared for the Secretary of Defense by the Institute for Defense Analyses. From these studies, briefings, and our own assessments, we reached two conclusions.

First, in the context of the force-sizing scenario of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (as currently defined by DOD), we agree that the production of additional B-2s would be less cost effective than buying additional precision weapons for existing bombers and other strike aircraft, or otherwise improving the conventional warfighting capabilities of existing bombers.

Our second conclusion is based more on our review of DOD's overall planning in the deep attack area (or more precisely, the lack of such overall planning) than on individual bomber studies. We recommended above that the Secretary of Defense immediately institute a broad-based review of the Nation's planned inventory and mix of weapons and platforms for deep attack, to include bombers. We also believe that no final decision should be made on further B-2 funding until the industrial base portion of the OSD bomber study has been completed and reviewed. Our reasoning is that a final, concrete decision to halt B-2 funding should be made only when the full ramifications of the decision are understood. No bomber development program is currently underway. As has been the case with the B-52, the B-2 will likely be in service for 40 to 50 years. It is not possible to predict what requirements will exist that far in the future, and we are concerned that tomorrow's CINCs should not be deprived of adequate numbers of bomers because of a decision made today without the most careful deliberation.

While further study of deep attack capabilities and B-2 bomber funding is warranted, the capabilities provided by precision-guided munitions are proven. We recommend accelerating funding for the precision-guided munitions most needed by the CINCs.

Set Aside Outdated Arguments

Viewed from our distinct perspective, some perennial roles and missions problems are not problems at all. As stated in Chapter 1, we reached this conclusion concerning the aggregate combat capabilities of the Marine Corps and the Army – the "two land armies" question; the assignment of Close Air Support functions; and the "four air forces" issue. In each case, our analysis of the aggregate capabilities available to the unified CINCs proved that popular perceptions

of large-scale duplication are wrong. We are firmly convinced that putting old "who gets to do what" arguments like these into proper perspective – and therefore, to rest – is an essential step toward focusing on joint military capability.

Two Land Armies

Perhaps no issue illustrates the need to move beyond thinking about roles and missions in terms of who gets to do what as vividly as the question of whether the Army and the Marine Corps unnecessarily duplicate each other. The Conference Report leading to the 1952 legislation that wrote the Marine Corps' role into law specifically stated "there is no intention of converting the Marine Corps into a second land Army." We found that the Marine Corps has never been structured to be a second land army, yet the "two land armies" issue persists. We believe that 50 years is long enough. It is time to put outdated arguments like these aside.

> Recommendations: (1) Enable Army and Marine Corps field headquarters to command and support forces of both Services. (2) Eliminate Marine Corps ground-based medium-altitude air defense capabilities; rely on the Army's core competency. (3) Relieve the Marine Corps of non-expeditionary engineering responsibilities. (4) Assign responsibility for afloat pre-positioning to the Marine Corps and ashore pre-positioning to the Army.

We endorse the core competencies of both the Army for sustained land operations and the Marine Corps as the landward extension of naval force. In areas of apparent overlap, such as forced entry, the two Services provide complementary rather than duplicative capability. The CINCs – and the Nation – need both. However, we believe DOD may improve military operational capabilities and reduce Army and Marine Corps field headquarters structure through better integration.

We recommend enhancing the command, control, and communications capabilities of Army corps and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters so that either can command and support forces from both Services. These enhancements should provide enough flexibility to permit headquarters reductions and other efficiencies.

We find, for example, that the Army's core competence in ground-based area air defense is duplicated, in part, in the Marine Corps. Once the command and control enhancements recommended above are in place, we recommend retiring the Marine Corps' Hawk missile units and giving the Army responsibility for ground-based area air defense for all land forces operating beyond the range of naval air and missile defense systems. The Marine Corps should retain its low-altitude, ground-based air defense weapons and the command, control, and

communications capabilities to support an integrated joint air and missile defense system.

We also find that efficiencies can be achieved by consolidating heavy engineering capabilities, which perform infrastructure construction and maintenance during sustained land operations. We recommend assigning this responsibility to the Army, and focusing the Marine Corps' engineering capability on tasks supporting expeditionary operations. We also recommend single management of afloat pre-positioning by the Marine Corps and single management of ashore pre-positioning by the Army to improve support to the unified CINCs.

Close Air Support

Another perennial roles and missions issue concerns Close Air Support (CAS) – the use of aircraft to attack enemy targets in close proximity to friendly forces. Today, CAS is performed by all Services. In our view, this is appropriate. CAS is a vital capability that complements other fire support options. It is essential to the combined arms force that underpins U.S. military success.

> "Fortunately, during Desert Storm, the enemy did not choose to attack often, but in those cases where he did, the use of CAS was absolutely critical to the outcome of the battle."
>
> – General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Close Air Support is only one of many functions performed by both fixed- and rotary-wing aviation. Combat aircraft are not "single use" weapons. The helicopters and attack, fighter, and bomber aircraft provided by the Services perform a range of critical combat functions, only one of which is CAS. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the value of multi-mission aircraft. It is clear that no significant savings would result from removing the CAS function from one or more of the Services unless inventories of multi-mission aircraft were reduced. It is equally clear that overall capabilities would decrease and the forces in the field would be weakened. CAS is an important and demanding function. We recommend increased joint CAS training for all the Services' pilots and ground forces.

Four Air Forces

The central aviation issue is not the existence of "four air forces," but whether the Services provide the appropriate mix and quantity of combat and support aircraft meet the unified CINCs' requirements and accomplish national objectives. Aircraft provided by all the Services permit versatile air operations in support of the Joint Force Commander's overall warfighting objectives. The integration of the particular capabilities provided by all the Services gives the Joint

Force Commander a highly prized degree of flexibility and synergism on the battlefield.

The successful initial attacks of the Gulf War demonstrate how these separate capabilities can be integrated to accomplish the CINC's objectives. In the first attack, Air Force stealth fighters surprised vital command, control, and communications targets in Baghdad, while Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Pave Low helicopters led Army attack helicopters against two air defense facilities to clear a path for other allied aircraft. That first night, the mix of aviation capabilities from all the Services – cruise missiles, bombers based in the United States, deployed fighters, and a host of important support airplanes – produced a highly effective attack.

While we conclude that the "four air forces" question is not a real issue, we also note that, as with deep attack, there are important questions about whether the Nation has too much combat aviation capability overall, and whether the current mix of combat aircraft is the right one. That is, do we have the right mix of aircraft in terms of stealth, range, basing (land- and sea-based), air-to-air and air-to-ground, and all-weather capabilities?

> "Military air power consists of Air Force, Navy, and Marine corps air power ..." – *Unification and Strategy: A Report of Investigation by the Committee on Armed Services*, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1 March 1950.
>
> "America has only one Air Force ... The other Services have aviation arms essential to their specific roles and functions but which also work jointly to project America's air power ... It is a potent combination, proven over and over in combat."
>
> – General Colin Powell, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*

In Chapter 3, we address various aviation infrastructure efficiencies, the key aspect of the true "four air forces" problem. The more efficient we can make the infrastructure that supports the "four air forces," the smaller will be the cost penalty of preserving this valuable flexibility. Our specific recommendations in the next chapter should enable significant cost reductions.

Support the Commanders in Chief

Setting outdated "who gets to do what" arguments aside is an essential step toward focusing on joint military capability. The real question is whether the sets of capabilities developed by the Services to fulfill their individual visions provide, in the aggregate, the right set of capabilities to enable the CINCs to accomplish their assigned missions. We address the means for resolving such questions in Chapter 4 with our recommendations for changes in requirements

and budgeting processes. But first we discuss ways of making DOD's extensive support establishment more efficient to customers.

CONCLUSION

The Future

The future will continue to reflect the profound change we experience today. The geographic CINCs will have to perform an array of operations in support of our global national interests – from winning the nation's wars to preserving the peace and preventing larger conflicts. Accomplishing those missions requires the CINCs to mold a broad range of Service-provided capabilities into a unified effort. Ensuring that the right capabilities exist, and that they can work successfully together, is the purpose of every element of the Department of Defense. It is also the purpose of our report.

In the preceding pages we have detailed our perspective on roles, missions, and functions, as well as our view of how the Department must approach the future. Key to both of these is our unanimous belief that DOD has come far toward unified military operations. American forces operate together successfully. But it is now time to do more. It is time to extend jointness into the management and decision-making processes that produce the capabilities required in the future, and into the support organizations that maintain our defense capabilities. And those are the fundamental directions we set throughout this report.

Implementing our vision of a more unified DOD, in which every component understands completely its individual role as a contributor, presents DOD with a significant challenge. But it is a challenge the Department is up to. More importantly, it is the challenge of producing the Department's only real product: *effective unified military operations.* And it is the challenge of meeting the Department's ultimate purpose: *securing the future for the American people.*