

COMMITTEES:
NATIONAL SECURITY
SCIENCE
DCN470

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4312

PETE GEREN
12TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2448 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-8071

DISTRICT:
1600 W. 7TH STREET
SUITE 740
FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76102
(817) 338-0900
(800) 894-3726

June 1 1995

Colonel Tommy Dyches
Group Operations Commander
AFRES 301st Fighter Wing
NAS Fort Worth JRB
Fort Worth, Texas 76107

Dear Tommy:

As part of our community response to Austin's submission to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission on April 19 and May 10 1995, some input from the 301st FW is required.

Therefore, I would appreciate your assistance in providing a response to certain data that I will submit to the commission as part of this response.

Thank you.

Sincerely,


Pete Geren
Member of Congress


PG:pr

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
301 FIGHTER WING (AFRES)
NAVAL AIR STATION, JOINT RESERVE BASE
FT. WORTH TEXAS 76127 6200**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Congressman Pete Geren 5 June 95
FROM: 301 OG/CC
SUBJ: Request for Information

1. Our response to your 1 June 1995 letter is at attachment 1.
2. In order to insure a complete understanding of our responses, the following format was used to address each statement in which a response was warranted:
 - a. the original Austin-Bergstrom Support Group (ABSG) statement, as submitted to the DBCRC at the Dallas Regional Hearing on 19 April 1995
 - b. the official response to the ABSG 19 April paper from HQ USAF/RT
 - c. the "Austin Update" of May 10 1995 which addressed the HQ USAF/RT response
 - d. the 301 FW response
3. If we can be of any other service to you or your staff, please feel free to call on us.

1 Atch: 301 FW Response
cc: 301 FW/CC


Thomas A. Dyches, Colonel, USAFR
Commander, 301 Operations Group

History and Previous BRACC Decisions

Bergstrom Air Force Base was established in 1942 as the Del Valle Army Air Base on land purchased for that purpose by the City of Austin. For the next 50 years, the Base served our nation as the home of Continental Air Command C-47's, Strategic Air Command B-52's and KC-135's and Tactical Air Command P-82's, F-101's and RF-4's, among other aircraft. In addition to its flying operations, the base served as the home of the 12th Air Force, the TAC Senior NCO Academy, West and the Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF).

The 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommended and the President and Congress concurred that Bergstrom AFB be closed as an active duty Air Base. In addition, the law stated that *"The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport. If no decision on a civilian airport is reached by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed. If the Reserve units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be distributed."*

In a City Council work session on February 21, 1992, James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Military Installations, USAF, told the citizens of Austin that the 1991 BRAC law gave them until June 1993 to decide whether or not they were going to build a municipal airport at Bergstrom and that the Air Force would abide by that time line with regard to any decision about the Reserve unit. Secretary Boatright also stated, *"Our plan is still, and will remain, and our planning efforts will be toward operating that unit at Bergstrom assuming that there is going to be an airport."* and again, *"Certainly we would like to see an airport there because then we could leave the unit right where it is. But that's your decision, the community's decision, however you decide it we'll make it work for the Department of the Air Force."*

On **May 1, 1993**, the citizens of Austin by a vote of 63% to 37% overwhelmingly approved a \$400 million referendum to move the airport to the Bergstrom site. Subsequent to that vote, planning was begun on the airport master plan, to include the Reserve cantonment area. That plan includes a schedule which will move the cargo operations to the new site by 1996 and the passenger operations by 1998. The vote preceded the law's June 1993 deadline and this schedule meets the timetable of making Bergstrom *"an economically viable entity by the end of 1996"*.

The 1991 law also said that, *"The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for the Air Force to operate it there."* This facility strips and paints fighter aircraft in the most environmentally advanced airplane painting facility in the Air Force. At the same time, the RCCF saves the Air Force between \$1.5 and \$2.0 million a year over the cost of painting those 100 aircraft at a depot.

Even so, in 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended to the BRAC and the '93 Brac agreed to *"Close or relocate the Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority assumes the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date"*. Subsequently, the DOD ruled that the City must contract with an independent contractor, who would then bid on the Air Force's work. The city and DOD continue to work on this issue. Currently, the city, at its expense, has provided temporary electrical service and is rerouting utilities to the RCCF to insure its continued operation.

Also in 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended, *"The 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units will move to Carswell AFB, Texas. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom AFB will be closed unless..."* At that time, the Base had not officially closed and the airport master planning was in its early stages.

The citizens BRAC task force questioned whether the Air Force had considered all services, MILCON funds in its justification. The task force showed that the DOD (Navy) could save approximately \$57 million in MILCON funds at NAS Ft. Worth by collocating the 301st FW at Bergstrom and having the Navy utilize the buildings currently used by the 301st FW and those which would be used if the 704th FS moved there. This was substantially more than the \$6.7 million in MILCON funds which the Secretary of Defense stated would be saved with the Bergstrom move.

They also questioned whether a base which was located in airspace with the second highest trafficked airport in the nation could effectively meet its training and unit readiness obligations. In 1991, Carswell AFB was closed in part due to, *"...the worst ground and regional air space encroachment in its category. The regional air space will continue to be stressed by aggressive aviation growth in the area."* Moving more aircraft onto the "closed" base than were there when it was an active duty base did not seem reasonable.

Although the BRAC did not recommend moving the 301st FW to Austin, *"The Commission was concerned the Air Force failed to consider the recruiting problems that*

may exist by moving approximately ten thousand reservists to the Fort Worth area." and "The Commission also had concerns with locating 186 aircraft in an area that has ground-encroachment problems and is in a high density aircraft traffic pattern." The '93 BRAC law did reaffirm the '91 BRAC law by providing that the "Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom cantonment area until at least the end of 1996."

In September of 1993, Bergstrom Air Force Base was closed as an active duty base. The 67th Reconnaissance Wing was deactivated and the 12th Air Force Headquarters and ancillary units moved to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. With the closure, Austin lost 3,870 military and 1,256 civilian jobs in addition to 6,628 military dependents. Austin's economy lost approximately \$330 million a year due to the base closing.

Since September of 1993, the City of Austin has worked with the Air Force to identify a cantonment area(s) which minimizes the cost of any new construction for AFRES. They have designed the airport site plan based upon the location and configuration of that cantonment area. Designs are nearing completion and demolition and construction have begun with a projected opening of passenger service scheduled for October 1998.

Because of the Air Forces repeated promises, the '91 and '93 BRAC laws and Austin's commitment to the Reserves remaining, the city has committed to incurring additional costs in the design and construction of the new airport. These costs and/or design considerations include:

1. Location of the terminal and access to the north side of the site instead of south side. (location of the cantonment area)
 - a. North location would have required less demolition of existing leasable buildings and ramp space.
 - b. An additional access road would not have been required. (\$3,250,000 contract)
2. 6,200' spacing between runways required due to cantonment area and RCCF. Also, additional cross taxiway is required due to runway spacing. (FAA requires minimum 4,300' spacing for concurrent ILS approaches)
3. Secondary runway design to be 9,000' for Reserves use, instead of 7,500' airlines wanted.

4. Relocation of cargo operations from existing airport two years prior to passenger operations, to meet '91 BRAC law (approx. \$1,000,000 expense per year)
5. City's commitment of \$6000,000 to the Reserves for the cantonment area.
6. City's commitment to reroute existing utilities to site. (\$464,897 already spent)

In recognition of the Bergstrom AFB history and the Bergstrom Air Reserve Station, the City Council voted in 1994 to name the new airport the *Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (A-BIA)*.

In addition to sharing the cost of operations with a civilian airport beginning in 1996, other DOD units have committed or expressed an interest in sharing the 430 ac. cantonment area. These units include: the Army National Guard Aviation Brigade (committed), the Naval Reserve Center (currently sharing some facilities) and NASA (base U-2 airplanes). This led Sherri W. Goodman, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security) in June of 1994 to say, "*Bergstrom is the perfect example of base reuse this administration is looking for.*"

"The Air Force in the 21st Century is going to be lean, is going to be agile, and is going to be higher-tech than the one we know today." The Air Force of tomorrow, which Gen. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, USAF, was referring in February 1995, will be required to be highly educated and technically competent. Austin, Texas provides just such a recruitment base. This community is the most highly educated among cities with a population of over 250,000. 83%, 25 yrs. or older, are high school graduates, 32% have bachelor's degrees and 11% have graduate or professional degrees. There are seven colleges and universities with over 100,000 students, including the third largest state University in the US. The University of Texas, located in the Austin area. Texas A&M, with 43,000 students is only 90 miles away. Austin is known as the "best read city in the nation" with more bookstores per capita than any other city in the US.

Austin is also recognized as one of three high tech centers in the United States, "Silicon Hills". Of 800 manufacturers, 300 are high-tech, employing 33,600 people, or 65% of the manufacturing workforce. Austin is also the home of "Pickle Research Center," a major defense research lab and numerous defense contractors. These include: Tracor, Lockheed, Motorola, Radian, Texas Instruments, and others.

Supporting the Air Force's recruiting efforts is a city with over 14,000 military retirees and their dependents and over 115 different military organizations with 103,000 members.

Austin is a military town with all the branches of the Armed Services represented here, including the Headquarters, Texas Army and Air National Guard. In addition, there are four AFROTC and 14 AFJROTC programs in the area.

"Quality personnel are the most critical part of any organization." When Secretary Widnall said that in February 1995, instead of the Air Force as a whole, she could have been talking about the men and women of Bergstrom Air Reserve Station and Austin, Texas. For that is what Austin provides the Air Force, a quality reservist, a quality facility, a quality civilian employer and a quality environment in which to live, work and rear a family.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Forward (Community responds)

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995):

Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements

Appendix 7, Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations ("AF Analysis") shows the overall evaluation for several AFRES installations for each of the eight Criteria used by the Air Force in their evaluation. Criteria I.1.A and I.1.B are excluded and appear to apply only to Active Duty installations. As shown below, according to the objective criteria specified in the AF Analysis, Bergstrom ARS is an outstanding location for any Air Force Reserve Mission.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1

Overall: Mission (Flying) Requirements

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -
Overall Mission Requirements	Yellow -	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1

Overall: Mission (Flying) Requirements

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green	Yellow -
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -	Yellow
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow -
Overall Mission Requirements	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow -

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green -	Red +

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -
Air Quality	Green -	Green
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -	Red +
Air Quality	Green -	Green	Green -
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -	Yellow

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I and II

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission (Flying) Requirements	Yellow -	Green -
Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I and II

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Mission (Flying) Requirements	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow -
Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -	Yellow

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C

Airfield Capabilities

Appendix 7 of the AF Analysis is further broken down into subelements. Criteria I.1.C. "Airfield Capabilities," lists Bergstrom as a Yellow Minus, but in actuality is Green. The "Airfield Capabilities" category is further broken down into subelements: runways, taxiways, and aprons to determine the rating.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.1.

Runway/Taxiway for Fighter mission, shows Bergstrom as Green which is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.C.1

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.1

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.1

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.2.

Runway/Taxiway for Bomber mission, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 200 ft wide and at least 10000 ft. long.
Taxiway at least 75 ft. wide.
Apron at least 278400 sq. ft.
Pavement strength supports bomber mission.
Red = Anything else.
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Runway - 300 ft. wide and 12250 ft. long.
 - (b) Taxiway - 75 ft. wide stressed/150 ft. wide total.
 - (c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft. or 2.85 times requirement.
 - (d) Pavement - will support bomber mission.
 - (e) Source -
 - 924 SPTG/BCE
 - Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.C.2

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - The grade of Red for Runway/Taxiway for bomber missions is correct. The actual goal posts used to evaluate this area were approved by the Base Closure Executive Group (attached). A typographical error in the Air Force Report incorrectly stated the apron requirements in square feet, rather than square yards. The actual value used to compute Bergstrom's Apron Grade was 104,553 square yards (II.1.B.1.c), which was significantly less than the required 278,400 square yards required for a Green grade.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.2

When the Reserve Ramp or "D" Ramp was constructed in the early 1960s, it was designed

to accommodate KC-135As. Using this as a baseline for comparison, this and the next two criteria shows that a ramp of 278,400 square yards is capable of handling 42 KC-135s. (Methodology: 278,400 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds per aircraft (AF requirements) equals 42 KC-135s. 88,125 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds/KC-135 equals 14 KC-135s on D ramp.)

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.2

The data cited in the ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995) claims 88,125 square yards available for the Bomber Mission. The corrected BCEG criteria states that 278,400 square yards are required for a GREEN rating. The BCEG credited Bergstrom ARS as having 104,553 square yards available (16,428 square yards more than cited by Bergstrom in the initial report). Nonetheless, whichever total is used, Bergstrom ARS falls well short of the required area for a GREEN rating.

TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the RED rating, assigned Bergstrom ARS, utilizing the current grading criteria.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.3

Runway/Taxiway for Tanker mission, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 150 ft. wide and at least 8000 ft. long.
Taxiway at least 75 ft. wide.
Apron at least 283 sq. ft.
Pavement strength support bomber mission.
Red = Anything else
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Runway - 300 ft. wide and 12250 ft. long.
 - (b) Taxiway - 75 ft. wide stressed/150 ft. wide total.
 - (c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft. or 2.8 times requirement.
 - (d) Pavement - will support tanker mission.
 - (e) Source -
 - 924 SPTG/BCE
 - Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.C.3:

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - The grade of Red for Runway/Taxiway for tanker missions is correct. The actual goal posts used to evaluate this area were approved by the Base Closure Executive Group (attached). A typographical error in the Air Force Report incorrectly stated the apron requirements in square feet, rather than square yards. The actual value used to compute Bergstrom's Apron Grade was 104,553 square yards (II.1.B.1.c), which was significantly less than the required 283,200 square yards required for a Green grade.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.3

Using the above data and the same methodology, a ramp of 283,200 square yards can accommodate 43 KC-135s. (283,200 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds/KC-135 equals 43 KC-135s)

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.3

The data cited in the ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995) claims 88,125 square yards available for the Tanker Mission. The corrected BCEG criteria states that 278,400 square yards are required for a GREEN rating. The BCEG credited Bergstrom ARS as having 104,553 square yards available (16,428 square yards more than cited by Bergstrom in the initial report). Nonetheless, whichever total is used, Bergstrom ARS falls well short of the required area for a GREEN rating.

TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the RED rating, assigned Bergstrom ARS, utilizing the current grading criteria.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.4

Runway/Taxiway for Airlift mission, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 150 ft. wide and at least 8000 ft. long.
Taxiway at least 75 ft. wide.
Apron at least 433104 sq. ft.
Pavement strength supports airlift mission.
Red = Anything else
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Runway - 300 ft. wide and 12250 ft. long.
 - (b) Taxiway - 75 ft. wide stressed/150 ft. long.
 - (c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft. or 1.83 times requirement.
 - (d) Pavement - will support airlift mission.
 - (e) Source -
 - 924 SPTG/BCE
 - Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: Criteria I. 1.C.4

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - The grade of Red for Runway/Taxiway for airlift missions is correct. The actual goal posts used to evaluate this area were approved by the Base Closure Executive Group (attached). A typographical error in the Air Force Report incorrectly stated the apron requirements in square feet, rather than square yards. The actual value used to compute Bergstrom's Apron Grade was 104,553 square yards (II.I.B.1.c), which was significantly less than the required 433,104 square yards required for a Green grade.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.4

Using the above data and the same methodology, a ramp of 433,104 square yards can accommodate 66 KC-135s. (433,104 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds/KC-135 equals 66 KC-135s).

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.4

The data cited in the ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995) claims 88,125 square yards available for the Airlift Mission. The corrected BCEG criteria states that 433,104 square yards are required for a GREEN rating. The BCEG credited Bergstrom ARS as having 104,553 square yards available (16,428 square yards more than cited by Bergstrom in the initial report). Nonetheless, whichever total is used, Bergstrom ARS falls well short of the required area for a GREEN rating.

TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the RED rating, assigned Bergstrom ARS, utilizing the current grading criteria..

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C

Overall: Airfield Capabilities

<u>Airfield Capability</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Fighter Mission	Green	Green
Bomber Mission	Red	Green
Tanker Mission	Red	Green
Airlift Mission	Red	Green
Overall	Yellow -	Green

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C

Overall: Airfield Capabilities

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Fighter Mission	Green	Green	Green
Bomber Mission	Red	Green	Red
Tanker Mission	Red	Green	Red
Airlift Mission	Red	Green	Red
Overall	Yellow -	Green	Yellow -

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D

Operational Effectiveness

Criteria I.1.D, ARC Operational Effectiveness, shows Bergstrom as Yellow minus. Operational Effectiveness is further broken down (AF Analysis pages 7-12) into subelements "Base Operating Support Integration" and "ARC Training Effectiveness" to determine the rating.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1

Base Operating Support Integration, lists Bergstrom as overall Yellow. The rationale for the subelements is unclear and refers to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements (IX.16). Based on the subelements and the criteria listed in the document, it appears that the overall rating of Yellow is currently correct, but probably incorrect after construction of the Austin/Bergstrom Airport. For example, the criteria asks, "Are there other Government aviation units collocated on the airfield?" Based on the fact that the Texas National Guard Aviation Department will be basing their helicopters, now located at Mueller Airport, here in 1998, it seems only prudent to include them in any future plans or data.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1

The community states that the rationale for subelements of Base Operating Support are unclear. The interactive computerized base questionnaire, question IX. 16, asked if there were any other government agencies on the base. If the response was no, as is Bergstrom's case, then all services are provided by the host. For installations where the answer was yes, detailed questions followed for each support component.

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994. Projected force structure changes such as the move of the Texas National Guard Aviation Department in 1998 were not, and should not have been considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1

Operational Effectiveness:

The USAF response to the four Criteria listed (I.1.D.1; I.1.D.1.a; I.1.D.1.d; and I.1.D.1.e) are all based on data used in the summer of 1994 without any consideration for changes in the future. This very much skews the true picture and the figures used to obtain that picture. If one of the major Criteria is Net Present Value Savings over 20 years, it stands to reason that any factors that would affect that value should be looked at. It appears the Air Force used only the statistics that supported their particular view or point. The actions we listed in this section are all programmed and will occur prior to 1998. In addition, it appears there are additional units that are interested in occupying portions of the cantonment area and thereby sharing in the costs which in turn reduces the cost to operate the 924 FW. To not consider these factors results in a picture that is less than complete and does not offer the BRAC all the options available.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1 (**Community responds**) The ABSG appears to be accusing the BCEG of "cooking the data" here; a serious charge requiring substantiation. There is no factual evidence offered to that effect.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.a

Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Yellow
- (2) Correct Status - Yellow (Current)/Green (Future)
- (3) Criteria: Green Joint or Civil
 Yellow Tenant or Host
 Red Separate

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data

(a) Based on current conditions Yellow is correct but that will probably change when the National Guard (NG) relocates here in 1998. Since they use the same fuel (JP-8), it makes sense for them to utilize the AFRES fuel farm.

(b) Source -

- 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
- 924 SPTG/CC

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.a

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Current Status Yellow, Future Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994. Projected force structure changes such as the move of the Texas National Guard Aviation Department in 1998 were not, and should not have been considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.a

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.a (Community responds)

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.b

Security, shows Bergstrom as Yellow which is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.b

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.b

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.b

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.c

Base Supply shows Bergstrom as Yellow which is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.c

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.c

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.c

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.d

Tower/Air Traffic Control, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis Status - Yellow
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green Joint or Civil
 Yellow Tenant or Host
 Red Separate

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) Bergstrom currently manages the ATCALs contact with a civilian contractor for the airfield at a cost of \$31,000 per month. This will continue until the end of FY 96 when the Aviation Department, City of Austin will assume the operation of the airfield and the ATCALs contract.

(b) Source - 924 OSS/OSA

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.d

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994. The projected airfield operation change to management of the airfield and the ATCALs contract by the City of Austin in FY 96 was not considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.d

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.d (Community responds)

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.e

Base Civil Engineering, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Yellow
- (2) Correct Status - Yellow (Current)/Green (Future)
- (3) Criteria: Green Joint or Civil
 Yellow Tenant or Host
 Red Separate

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) Based on discussions that have already been held with the National Guard (NG) and the City of Austin, it appears that the 924 FW will be providing the NG Aviation Department with fire fighting protection from the 924 SPTG/BCE fire department. This is to comply with DoD fire protection directives.

(b) Source - 924 SPTG/BCE

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.e

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Current Status Yellow, Future Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994, Projected force structure changes such as the move of the Texas National Guard Aviation Department in 1998 were not, and should not have been considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.e

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.e (Community responds)

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1

Overall: Base Operating Support Integration:

<u>Base Operating Support Integration</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants	Yellow	Green
Security	Yellow	Yellow
Base Supply	Yellow	Yellow
Tower/Air Traffic Control	Yellow	Green
Civil Engineering	Yellow	Green
Overall	Yellow	Green

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1

Overall: Base Operating Support Integration:

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Security	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Base Supply	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Tower/Air Traffic Control	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Civil Engineering	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Overall	Yellow	Green	Yellow

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2
Training Effectiveness

Criteria I.1.D.2, ARC Training Effectiveness, is further broken down into Fighter Training, Tanker Training, and Airlift Training. All data in this section was provided by HQ USAF/RT (formerly HQ USAF/SOOR). No rationale is given as to the size requirements for the MOAs. Although Bombers were addressed under Criteria I.1.C Airfield Capabilities, they are conspicuously absent under this criteria. Criteria I.1.D.2.b, Tanker Training and Criteria I.1.D.2.c, Airlift Training appear to be correct as stated in the AF Analysis. The AF Analysis contains a number of errors in its analysis of Fighter Training.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2

Supersonic Air Combat MOAs, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red +
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green <= 150NM
 - Yellow 150 NM and <=200NM
 - Red > 200 NM
 - Size Minimum of 4200 sq. NM (nominal 75 X 56 NM)
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) W-228 is located 140 NM to the southeast of Bergstrom.

(b) Source - Jet Navigational Chart (JNC) 44
1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2

Air Force Analysis - Red +
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Distances to the areas were measured from the base to the centroid of the area in question, not the nearest edge, for standardization/use purposes. In this particular case, the distance to the center of the area is 209 NM, instead of 140 NM as provided by the community.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2

In theory the idea of using the centroid of the area to standardize the data used is good; however, in practice it penalizes you if you have a large area and will result in an erroneous rating as in the case of W-228. It is a very large area and as you can see the change in rating from Red + to Green by simply changing the measurement criteria from centroid to closest edge.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2

The ABSG has refuted AF findings. The ABSG believes it would be an accurate yardstick to measure the distance from the airfield to the "closest edge" of the MOA in question. The ABSG claims the W-228 area to be 140 NM (closest edge) from Bergstrom ARS.

It is entirely unrealistic to measure the usefulness of a MOA by evaluating the distance from the airfield to the "closest edge" of the airspace. No useful training can be accomplished at a pinpoint location. It appears that ABSG has made a futile attempt to alter the grading criteria in order to attain a more desirable rating. The AF grading criteria has been universal in nature and has been applied to all military installations being evaluated. The ABSG claims that W-228 is such a large area, that selecting the center point unfairly penalizes Bergstrom ARS. With this in mind, TEAM FORT WORTH has selected a nominal center point for W-228 training.

<u>Nominal Center Point</u>	<u>Distance From Bergstrom ARS</u>
N 2700.00	211 NM ¹
W 9600.00	

This center point is within two nautical miles of the AF grading criteria. Positioning opposing forces north and south of this point provides suitable distances between players. Orienting a fight around this nominal center point is feasible only if W-228B and W-228C are simultaneously scheduled. If W-228B is unavailable for simultaneous use, the center point would have to be relocated further south.

To validate the AF analysis and rating scale, an analysis was performed on the ability for an F-16C (PW-220E engine equipped) to takeoff from Bergstrom, fly to W-228, perform a training mission, and return to Bergstrom ARS².

App 002 Route Name	Aircraft Cnfg	Area Fuel Flow	BSM Wx	Area Delay	Land Fuel	ASD
BSM1A	2x370	5600 lb/hr	VFR	01+02+00	1002	02+08+06
BSM1B	2x370	5600 lb/hr	IFR	00+50+00	2084	01+56+06
BSM2A	1x300	5000 lb/hr	VFR	00+43+00	1042	01+48+58
BSM2B	1x300	5000 lb/hr	IFR	00+30+00	2094	01+35+59
BSM3A	Clean	4800 lb/hr	VFR	00+23+00	1035	01+28+59
BSM3B	Clean	4800 lb/hr	IFR	00+10+00	2038	01+15+58
BSM4A	ECM	5100 lb/hr	VFR	00+19+00	1027	01+25+00
BSM4B	ECM	5100 lb/hr	IFR	00+07+00	2019	01+13+00

¹ Appendix (001): Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship (From JNC 44).

² Appendix (002): FPLAN V9.3 Flight profile computations.

The "App Route Name" is highlighted on each of the appropriate flight profiles found in Appendix (XX). The "Aircraft Cnfg" column shows the number of external gas tanks carried and the gallons of gas in those tanks. ECM indicates an external jamming pod. The "Area Fuel Flow" shows the fuel consumption rate in pounds per hour. Reference Assumption 4 below as to how this rate was attained. "BSM Wx" indicates the weather status at Bergstrom ARS. When the weather is VFR, a desired land fuel quantity was 1000 lbs. When inclement weather is present, a larger fuel reserve is required to be able to divert to a suitable weather alternate. The "IFR" reflects a required fuel reserve of 2000#³ upon landing at Bergstrom ARS. The "Area Delay" column indicates how long a mission could remain in the area for training purposes given the fuel consumption rates and Bergstrom area weather. The "Land Fuel" shows the exact fuel state at landing following the "Area Delay". "ASD" is Average Sortie Duration. This is nothing more than the amount of time the aircraft are airborne.

Assumptions:

1. 1500 lbs STTO for 2x370 gallon cnfg. 1200 lbs for all others.
2. Takeoff from BSM and cruise to W-228 at 28,000' / 300C.
3. No winds either to or from the area.
4. Loiter in W-228 at 5,000' at 450C (NO AFTERBURNER USE ALLOWED!)
5. RTB at 33,000' / 300C.
6. Straight line vectors to and from the area.

The configuration of air-to-air sorties is desired to be that of what a fighter pilot would expect in a combat engagement. The desired load for the F-16 would be 2 sidewinders and 2 AMRAAMs plus an ECM pod. This is the most realistic configuration, as F-16's can jettison fuel tanks and bombs when the decision is made to engage in the air-to-air arena. The ECM pod on the centerline is a non-jettisonable store.

The "Area Time" shows total playtime available. Any fighter pilot will attest that a fight takes approximately 3-5 minutes to setup. Between fights approximately 5-8 minutes is required to reposition and gather forces. Therefore, there is approximately 8-13 minutes of administrative time required to have one fight and be ready for another. What does all this mean? W-228 is all but unusable to any configuration which provides the approximate aircraft characteristics (routes BSM2A through BSM4B) to be expected in a real world scenario. At best, the any F-16 operating from Bergstrom ARS would have enough gas for one engagement to mature or two abbreviated engagements (route BSM2A). At worst, Bergstrom ARS assets would have enough gas to reach the area, setup an engagement, begin the "fight", and have to terminate 2-4 minutes later (route BSM4B).

³ The 2000 lb figure is a nominal fuel value which would allow an IFR divert to the San Antonio area (San Antonio weather IFR) or the DFW area (DFW weather VFR).

One final concern is that of ASD. On average, BSM could expect ASD to be 1.7 to 1.8 to utilize the W-228 MOA (no AAR). In the days of limited flying hours, this high air-to-air ASD is absolutely unrealistic. Suddenly, W-228 doesn't seem all that attractive.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Criteria I.1.D.2

Perhaps these reasons were the primary factor for the 924 FW / 704 FS utilized the W-228 area only six times beginning in March 1994 to present⁴. In fact, no Letter of Agreement is currently maintained between the 924 FW / 704 FS and the W-228 scheduling authority.

W-228 is another MOA (similar to the Kingsville and Randolph MOAs - addressed shortly) heavily dominated by pilot training requirements. NAS Corpus Christi, TRAWING 2&4, is the primary user of this warning area.

ABSG claims to qualify W-228 as GREEN airspace is inaccurate. TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the AF rating of RED for Bergstrom ARS.

⁴ Source: W-228 Scheduling Authority. Chief Stevens. Radar Section. DSN 861-2503. Comm 512-939-2503.

(ALTERNATIVE TEAM FORT WORTH RESPONSE)

If the criteria is changed to allow distances to be measured to the "nearest edge", then all bases must be measured against that standard. Bergstrom's *relative* standing compared to other bases would remain the same. As a matter of fact, for the criteria to remain a viable filter, it too would need readjustment. For example, Bergstrom argues that W-228 is 140 NM from the base when measured to nearest edge, as opposed to the 209 NM distance when measured to the centroid. This results in a distance reduction of 33%. In contrast, Carswell is 99 NM from the centroid of it's nearest Air Combat Area (Brownwood MOA); it is 62 NM to the nearest edge. This results in a comparable distance reduction of 37%. The point is that when the "new" criteria is used, similar reductions are realized at all other bases. A 35% reduction in the analysis criteria is shown below. It reveals that Bergstrom would *still* be rated RED+ accepting their measurement of 140 NM to the nearest edge.

"Adjusted" Criteria (35% reduction):

- RED: (>130 NM)
- GREEN (≤ 97.5 NM)

It makes more *practical* sense to measure distances from the base in question to the center of the working area, which might not be the area's centroid. For example, A-4s would require significantly less airspace to conduct Air Combat Tactics (ACT) training than would F-16s, due to differences in tactical airspeeds, radar/missile capabilities, etc.

Given that air-to-air engagements begin with adversaries starting at opposite ends of the area, most of the fighting occurs around its midpoint. Therefore, a reasonable measurement to the W-228 area mentioned in ABSG's rebuttal would be approximately 211 NM, arrived at as follows:

(a) According to the W-228 scheduling authority, W-228A is a **sub-sonic** area which is reserved Monday through Friday for near exclusive use by the naval training wing at NAS Corpus Christi. The fact that it is not certified for supersonic flight precludes it from this discussion.

(b) The combining of W-228B and W-228C provides an area size of 60 x 25 NM. While not optimum by AF standards (75 x 56 NM), this area is suitable for F-16 and other fighter operations. As a matter of fact, this combination of the B and C sections of W-228 is how they are ordinarily scheduled.

(c) The geometric center of W-228B/C is shown at attachment 1. The distance to the center of this area is 211 NM. This is the point where most of the training will occur and where the fighters will be returning to base from when the engagements are concluded.

Assuming that Bergstrom jets are configured with external tank(s) sufficient to permit 30 minutes of "playtime" in the area, it would require 28 minutes to fly there, 28 minutes to return to base, and 10 minutes to allow for terminal delays. This adds up to an average mission length of 96 minutes, of which only 31% devoted to actual ACT training.

The efficacy of the AF criteria and their justification of a rating of RED+ for Bergstrom becomes clear when illustrated in real-world terms. Is there any wonder why, in light of Bergstrom's overstated significance of the W-228 area to their ACT requirements, that they utilized this area a grand total of only six times during the last year and a half.

Bottom line: W-228 is no more useful to Bergstrom's everyday ACT requirements than it is to Carswell's. Bergstrom's RED+ rating is valid and fully justified.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2

Other Air Combat MOAs, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green <= 100NM
 - Yellow 100NM and <=150NM
 - Red > 150 NM
 - Size Minimum of 2100 sq. NM (nominal 47 X 45 NM) and 20,000 feet altitude block above 5000 feet AGL.
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - Brownwood Area 96 nm north
 - Chase Area 70 nm south
 - Randolph Areas 70 nm northwest
 - Brady Area 50 nm northwest *
 - (a) Source -
 - Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC) H-23B
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

(5) * Note: Although Brady MOA does not meet the stated criteria (size is 1125 sq. NM, nominal 45 X 25), the 924 FW is able to fulfill approximately 75 % of its air-to-air training requirements, 75 % of its MAVERICK training requirements, and 10% of its air-to-ground training requirements in this MOA located 80 NM northeast of Bergstrom.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2

Air Force Analysis - Red +
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Areas predominantly used for pilot training were not considered useable for air combat training. The Brady area, while useable, does not meet the basic criteria of an Air Combat MOA, i.e. supporting air-to-air requirements.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2

The MOA used in this example is Brownwood MOA. It is not a pilot training MOA since it belongs to units as NAS Dallas and is predominately used by reserve and guard units. In the original document, we stated that Brady does not meet the criteria but that the unit is able to accomplish approximately 75% of its air-to-air training requirements, 75% of its

MAVERICK training requirements, and 10% of its air-to-ground training requirements in this MOA.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2

The current BCEG criteria requires a MOA to possess a 20,000 foot altitude block. This criteria does not recognize additional blocks of Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace (ATCAA's). In the case of Brownwod, the MOA provides an altitude block of 7,000 feet to 17,999 feet MSL. While this is not a realistic evaluation of quality airspace, all other bases being graded were held to this standard. ABSG claims the Brownwood MOA to be 96 NM north of Bergstrom ARS. Once again, the BCEG criteria was altered to arrive at these results. The Brownwood MOA is subdivided into three smaller MOAs, Hornet, Tomcat and Loon. Recent Brownwood usage reflects that the 457 FS has been regularly training against VMFA-112 (USMCR F-18's) utilizing the Hornet and Tomcat MOAs concurrently⁵. The size of the Hornet & Tomcat MOA is 2205 square nm⁶. Picking a nominal center point for the Hornet and Tomcat areas yields the following results⁷:

<u>Nominal Center Point</u>	<u>Distance From Bergstrom ARS</u>
N 3147.00 W 9858.00	116 NM

NAS FW, JRB is the scheduling authority for the Brownwood MOA. As the airspace schedulers, units assigned to NAS FW are afforded higher priority than off-station units. The units receiving first priority for the Brownwood MOA are the 301 FW / 457 FS, VMFA-112, and VF-201. Off station users such as those assigned to Bergstrom ARS receive a lower priority and may have difficulty retaining desired Brownwood airspace⁸. While dissimilar assets may be available for day-to-day training operations in the Brownwood MOA, face-to-face briefs and de-briefs would be cost prohibitive for fighter assets stationed at Bergstrom ARS. This would drastically detract from the quality of training received. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Brownwood MOA to be second hand accessible to fighter assets located at Bergstrom ARS.

The Chase MOA is subdivided into three separate MOAs, Chase 1, 2, and 3. These MOAs have been recently redesignated Kingsville 4,5, and 3 respectively. While Kingsville 1 and 2 are within a reasonable distance from Bergstrom ARS, several limitations result in these MOAs being untenable for fighter aircraft use. The vertical boundaries (including ATCAA's) of Kingsville 4 are 11,000' MSL through FL230. Kingsville 5 is bounded from 9,000' MSL up to FL230. At best, Kingsville MOAs 4 and

⁵ Source: Brownwood MOA Coordinator AC1 Wagner. DSN 739-7689. Comm 817-782-7689.

⁶ Appendix (003): Hornet & Tomcat Airspace Measurement.

⁷ Appendix (001): Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship (From JNC 44).

⁸ Source: Brownwood MOA Coordinator AC1 Wagner. DSN 739-7689. Comm 817-782-7689.

5 allow a vertical gaming area of 14,000'. Kingsville 3 is bounded from 8,000' MSL to FL230⁹. There are no dissimilar assets readily available for day-to-day training operations in the Kingsville MOAs. Finally, the Kingsville MOAs are used primarily by NAS Kingsville. Their mission is very similar to AF AETC training bases. Their usage dramatically reduces the availability for other units to utilize the Kingsville MOAs. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Kingsville MOAs to be of little or no value to a fighter unit located at Bergstrom ARS.

The Randolph MOA, located south of Bergstrom ARS, is under the authority of Randolph AFB. The AETC wing at Randolph AFB heavily uses this MOA Monday through Friday¹⁰. A fighter unit would have very limited availability during the week. The 924 FW / 704 FS utilized the Randolph MOAs only four times int the last two years¹¹. There are no dissimilar assets readily available for day-to-day training operations in the Randolph MOAs. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Randolph MOA to be of little or no value to a fighter unit located at Bergstrom ARS.

ABSG claims the Brady MOA to be 50 NM NW of Bergstrom ARS. The actual distance is 95 NM to the center point of the Brady MOA¹². Brady MOA is acknowledged to be too small to qualify as a suitable MOA for training. ABSG claims the Brady MOA to be 1125 square miles. In actuality, the Brady MOA is only 980 square nautical miles¹³. The vertical limits of the Brady MOA are 500' AGL through FL230. However, when MOAs are used for Air Combat Training (ACT), a 5000' AGL floor is imposed¹⁴. This floor reduces the vertical limits of the Brady MOA to 7000' through FL 230, a mere 16,000'. Other boundary limitations include that the western edge of the MOA is only 10 NM wide¹⁵. The horizontal and vertical boundaries of the Brady MOA render it untenable for modern day Air Combat Training. While dissimilar assets may be available for day-to-day training operations in the Brady MOA, face-to-face briefs and de-briefs would be cost prohibitive for fighter assets stationed at Bergstrom ARS. This would drastically detract from the quality of training received. As stated in the ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995), the 924 FW / 704 FS fulfills 75% of their air-to-air training in the Brady MOA. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the training value received from Brady MOA is sub-standard and inadequate. Subjecting an additional USAF fighter organization to the severe limitations found in the Brady MOA are not in the best interests of that unit or the United States military readiness.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Other Air Combat MOAs.

⁹ Source: Kingsville MOA Coordinator AC1 Hummel. DSN 861-6187. Comm 512-595-6187.

¹⁰ Source: Randolph MOA Coordinator. Captain Alan Schaefer. DSN 487-5580. Comm 210-652-5580.

¹¹ Source: Randolph MOA Coordinator. Captain Alan Schaefer. DSN 487-5580. Comm 210-652-5580.

¹² Appendix (001): Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship.

¹³ Appendix (004): Brady MOA Airspace Measurement / Noise Sensitive Areas.

¹⁴ AFI 11-214 Section 5.2.8.1.3.

¹⁵ Appendix (001): Brady MOA Airspace Measurement / Noise Sensitive Areas.

TEAM FORT WORTH finds that all of the "Southern Texas" MOAs cited in the ABSG report are under the scheduling authority of either USAF or USN training wings. These MOAs are under the constant use of these training wings, and offer little availability to off-station fighter assets. TEAM FORT WORTH acknowledges and understands the BCEG rating of RED for fighter assets located at Bergstrom ARS.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

Low altitude MOAs, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green <= 100NM
 - Yellow 100NM and <=150NM
 - Red > 150 NM
 - Size Minimum of 2100 sq. NM (nominal 47 X 45 NM) and from surface up to at least 2500feet AGL.
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) W-228 is located 140 NM southeast of Bergstrom.
Brady Area 60 nm northwest *
 - (b) Source -
JNC 44
1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
- (5) * Note: Although Brady MOA does not meet the stated criteria (size is 1125 sq. NM, nominal 45 X 25), the 924 FW is able to fulfill all of its low altitude training requirements in this MOA. Brady MOA is located 60 NM northeast of Bergstrom.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

No Response Presented.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

ABSG once again has made invalid claims not in compliance with the universal grading criteria.

1. W-228 is falsely stated as being 140 NM from Bergstrom ARS. As previously discussed, even when shifting the true center point to the north, a fighter aircraft must fly 211 NM from Bergstrom ARS to W-228. The available "Area Delay" times would be further reduced due to increased fuel consumption in the low altitude environment. TEAM FORT WORTH finds W-228 to be unusable for Low Altitude Training to fighter aircraft operating out of Bergstrom ARS.

2. ABSG continues to list the Brady MOA as suitable airspace to complete required training squares. Brady MOA Low (500' AGL up to 6000' MSL) has six noise sensitive measles which further complicate fighter aircraft operating in the small geographical confines of the Brady MOA¹⁶. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Brady MOA to be of limited value for LOWAT training.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

TEAM FORT WORTH finds ABSG quest to obtain a re-evaluation of GREEN to be unsubstantiated and invalid. TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the AF rating of RED for Bergstrom ARS.

¹⁶ Appendix (001): Brady MOA Airspace Measurement / Noise Sensitive Areas.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4

Scoreable Range complexes, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Scoreable Range -
Green Criteria - $1 < 100$ nm and $4 < 250$ nm
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Shoal Creek Range is 70 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A.
 - (b) Yankee Range is 122 NM southeast of Bergstrom inside R-6312.
 - (c) Dixie Range is 128 NM southeast of Bergstrom inside R-6312.
 - (d) Peason Ridge is 225 NM east of Bergstrom inside R-3803A.
 - (e) Ft. Polk is 225 NM east of Bergstrom.
- (5) Source -
TPC H-23B
AFR 50-46
- (6) Note: The 924 FW is able to accomplish 100% of its required air-to-ground weapons delivery requirements on the first three ranges listed.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Distances to the areas were measured from the specific Air Force base to the centroid of the area in question, not the nearest edge for standardization/use purposes. In this particular case, Shoal Creek range lacks conventional target and strafe capabilities, and the distance to the center of the other areas is 209 NM, instead of 140 NM as provided by the community.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4

It appears the Air Force combined responses to Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3 and Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4 in their answer.

- (i) Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3 deals with low altitude MOAs and the Air Force showed W-228 as the closest low altitude MOA. As in 4.A above, the unit shows W-228 as being 140 NM away. The unit report also states that although Brady MOA does not meet the stated requirement for size, the unit is able to fulfill all of its low altitude requirements in this

MOA.

(ii) Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4 deals with scoreable range complexes. The 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire criteria for scoreable range complexes/target arrays (I.2.C.4, page 1.03) states "capable of or having tactical targets, conventional targets, and strafe." Based on this criteria, Shoal Creek meets this criteria since it currently has conventional targets, tactical targets, and high angle strafe can be accomplished on the range. The range currently does not have low angle strafe pits but they could be added if absolutely necessary. Currently, they are not necessary since all the users of Shoal Creek range can accomplish their low angle strafe at other ranges.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response:

ABSG listed five separate ranges to justify their refutation of DOD findings.

1. Shoal Creek Range, located inside the Fort Hood complex (R-6302A), is a USAFR operated range, maintained by the 301 FW¹⁷. Shoal Creek does not possess a range tower, a flank tower, or any means of accurately scoring bombs which are delivered on the complex¹⁸. Furthermore, ordnance is restricted to BDU-33 or MK-106 only. Strafe of any type is *not* authorized on the Shoal Creek facility¹⁹. Live bombs or inert heavyweights are not authorized for use on the Shoal Creek complex.

2. Yankee Range qualifies by AF criteria as a "scoreable range". However, this range has a very small impact area of only 0.429 sq. miles²⁰. Additional range restrictions include no live or heavyweight deliveries and no use of self-protection aids such as chaff and/or flares²¹.

3. Dixie Range is identical in size and capability as Yankee range²². In fact, both of these "scoreable ranges" are encompassed on one range complex, McMullen Range. If the intent of the BCEG criteria is to have geographically separated ranges to allow flexibility to weather and a variety of target complex to enhance training, then the Yankee / Dixie facilities should only be counted as one range.

4. Peason Ridge Range was closed in August of 1992. There is no expected plan to reopen this range to high performance aircraft²³. Units stationed at Bergstrom ARS would *not* have the use of this range.

¹⁷ AFR 50-46/301 FW AFRES, Introduction

¹⁸ AFR 50-46/301 FW Sup 2, Annex A, Page A-2.

¹⁹ AFR 50-46/301 FW Sup 2, Annex A, Chapter 3, Page 3-1 Section 3-4.

²⁰ AFR 50-46, 149 FG Supp-1 (149TFGRegulation 50-46), para 2-3a.

²¹ Ibid, para 3-5.

²² 924 FGR 55-46, Atch-4.

²³ Telecon with Mr. Cal Hodnett. Peason Ridge Range training analyst BDM. DSN 863-9508. Comm 318-531-9508.

5. Fort Polk is an impact area only. No capability exists to accurately score bombs in this area. In comparison to other ranges, no scoreable conventional or tactical targets exist in the impact area²⁴.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary:

Of the five ranges listed by ABSG, only McMullen Range qualifies as a "scoreable range". Although Yankee / Dixie qualifies as "scoreable range(s)", these two complexes are highly incumbered with strict limitations and unrealistically small geographical boundaries. TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the BCEG assigned RED rating.

²⁴ Source: Telecon with Mr. Jerry Hilton. Fort Polk Range Operations. DSN 863-5819. Comm 318-531-5819.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Electronic Combat Range within 250 NM, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green \leq 250 NM
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Ft Hood is 65 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A
 - (b) The U.S. Army has a threat array located on the east side of the impact area that simulate numerous real world threats. They also have personnel assigned to maintain, deploy, and operate the threat system. The capability exists to operate against the threats and to employ ECM pods.
 - (c) Source - TPC H-23B
U.S. Army

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Fort Hood is not a recognized Air Force Electronic Combat Range, and is not listed in the U.S. Army data base as an EC Range for AF use.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

The Air Force listed Claiborne Range as the closest EC range to Bergstrom at 255 NM. Claiborne Range is owned and operated by the 917 FW (AFRES) at Barksdale AFB, LA. The range currently has only one Sentry Dawg, which is a limited threat transmitter only. These same capabilities exist on Yankee Range, 122 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Yankee Range currently has one Sentry Dawg and a Smokey Sam system. Fort Hood, on the other hand, has several actual threat transmitters and the capability to track the target, something Sentry Dawg cannot do. Fort Hood also possesses the capability to detect and evaluate the effectiveness of jamming pods carried on fighter aircraft. The fact that Fort Hood does not show up on someone's list of EC ranges does not alter the fact that this capability exists within 65 NM of Bergstrom and therefore, can justify a Green rating in this area.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Yankee range currently does have a Sentry Dawg system as well as a Smokey Sam system²⁵. The 149 FG, located at Kelly AFB, is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Air National Guard facilities located at the Yankee Target Site²⁶.

(WE NEED TO FIND OUT FROM LTC BENNET WHAT THE AF USES TO QUALIFY A RANGE AS AN EC RANGE. BSMs ARGUEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE SOME FOUNDING. FURTHER RESEARCH PENDING.)

The Fort Hood facility which ABSG refers to, lost funding (US Army) in July of 1994²⁷. There are no U.S. Army personnel assigned to maintain, deploy or operate this system. These facilities were absorbed by Lockheed Corp., a civilian contractor. There are currently no provisions for, or any history of, any AF unit utilizing the system maintained by Lockheed Corp²⁸.

²⁵ AFR 50-46, 149 FG Supp-1 (149TFG Regulation 50-46), Para 2-4.

²⁶ Ibid, Para 1-1.b.

²⁷ Telecon with Major Lingsh. DSN 737-5512.

²⁸ Telecon with Mr. Harley Wills. Comm XXX-287-3079.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.6

Ground Forces/Tactical Aircraft Employment, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

None Required.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7

Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Ranges, shows Bergstrom as Red and that is correct. The closest ACMI range is W-453, 460 NM east of Bergstrom.

(1) Note: Although a lot of emphasis is placed on ACMI ranges, they are extremely costly to build, operate, maintain and technology has made them obsolete.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7

None Required.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7

The world's most highly advanced tactical training range is located in Nevada. The Nellis range complex has been a user of ACMI technology since the mid-1970s. The Red Flag Monitoring Debrief System (RFMDS) is an advanced ACMI range which allows a ground station to track and display a large number of aircraft in near real time. While earlier versions of ACMI are limited to tracking fewer aircraft, the value added to training missions is recognized throughout the Tactical Air Forces²⁹. ABSG claims that ACMI is obsolete is factually incorrect.

²⁹ Telecon with Major Jeff Wish, Nellis AFB Range Control (RFMDS) DSN (682-1110).

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

Full Scale Weapons Drop Ranges, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green <=200 NM
 - Yellow >200NM and <=250NM
 - Red > 250 NM
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Ft Hood is 60 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A and is a Full Scale Weapons Drop Range.
 - (b) Source - TPC H-23B

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training was obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Fort Hood is not a recognized Air Force Full Scale Weapons Drop Range.

Overall Comment: In order to effectively evaluate all bases equally, the Air Staff developed and certified a data base to capture all Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training. To qualify for the data base, the training area had to meet the minimum criteria established for the specific training item. In some cases, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units are able to use areas not specifically designed for the type training required. While this should be considered positive, the BRAC process was designed to identify those bases which best were able to support future force structure, to include those which were in close proximity to training areas meeting Air Force requirements. Again, Fort Hood was not listed in the Army data base as being available for Air Force use.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

Since we have not been provided the Air Force definition of a Full Scale Weapons Drop Range, it is difficult to respond to this criteria. However, it appears that the only ranges used in this category were ranges completely controlled by the Air Force. This makes no allowance for the use of Joint facilities nor acknowledges the fact that other agencies can and do provide facilities used by Air Force units. The Air Force used Claiborne Range, 255 NM east of Bergstrom as the closest range that fits this category. Claiborne Range is essentially a postage stamp range that only has the capability to handle a limited number of

inert munitions and no live munitions at all. Fort Hood can handle any size of inert munition and live MK-82/83/84 weapons. Once again, the fact that Fort Hood does not show up on someone's list of weapons ranges does not alter the fact that this capability exists within 65 NM of Bergstrom and therefore, can justify a Green rating in this area.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

The Fort Hood area consists of the Fort Hood MOA and R-6302³⁰. Inside R-6302 is the Shoal Creek Range and an impact area. As stated earlier, Shoal Creek range is restricted to all but training ordnance only (BDU-33 and MK-106)³¹. The Fort Hood impact area is primarily used by the US Army for ordnance expenditures. This impact area is not readily available to AF fighter units. This impact area is normally restricted to two high performance aircraft³². Scheduling of AF assets to expend heavyweight ordnance (live or inert) are at the discretion of the US Army. Currently, any use of the impact area must be done in conjunction with US Army exercises³³.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

The AF assessment to not qualify the Fort Hood impact area as a Full Scale Weapons Drop Range, and subsequent rating of RED is accurate and fair.

³⁰ Enclosure 6 to Tab F to App 9 Annex C to 12 AF OPOD 1-88.

³¹ AFR 50-46/301 FW Sup 2, Annex A, Chapter 3, Page 3-1 Section 3-4.

³² Enclosure 6 to Tab F to App 9 Annex C to 12 AF OPOD 1-88.

³³ Telecon with LTC Bright. D.O. 3rd ASOG. DSN 737-1909.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9

Visual Routes/Instrument Routes (VIR/IR), shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9

None Required.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a

Overall: ARC Fighter Training Areas

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Supersonic Area	Red	Green
Other Air Combat MOAs	Red	Green
Low Altitude Areas	Red	Green
Scoreable Ranges	Red	Green
Electronic Combat	Red	Green
Ground/Tactical Area	Green	Green
ACMI Ranges	Red	Red
Weapons Drop Areas	Red	Green
Low level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Training Areas	Red +	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Supersonic Area	RED	GREEN	RED
Other Air Combat MOAs	RED	GREEN	YELLOW
Low Altitude Areas	RED	GREEN	RED
Scoreable Ranges	RED	GREEN	RED
Electronic Combat	RED	GREEN	RED
Ground/Tactical Area	GREEN	GREEN	GREEN
ACMI Ranges	RED	RED	RED
Weapons Drop Areas	RED	GREEN	RED
Low Level Routes	GREEN	GREEN	GREEN
Overall Training Areas	RED +	GREEN -	RED +

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2

Overall: ARC Effectiveness

<u>Mission</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Fighter Training	Red +	Green -
Tanker Training	Green -	Green -
Airlift Training	Green	Green
Overall Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Fighter Training	Red +	Green -	Red +
Tanker Training	Green -	Green -	Green -
Airlift Training	Green	Green	Green
Overall Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow -

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.1

Mission Support Facilities

Criteria II.1, Mission Support Facilities, shows Bergstrom as overall Yellow -. Any further information needed on this criteria must come from AFRes.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.C.1

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.1

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.1

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A

Associated Airspace

Criteria II.3.A, Existing Associated Airspace, is further broken down into MOAs and Restricted Airspace, Bombing Ranges, and Low Level Routes. There are no specific corresponding questions in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire. The analysis here appears to be a compilation of all the airspace, range, and low level data originally contained in the unit response to the Questionnaire and appears to be somewhat subjective.

Criteria II.3.A.1, MOAs and Restricted Airspace, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:

Green - Civil and commercial aviation development generally compatible with existing Military Operating Areas and Restricted Airspace.

Yellow - Civil and commercial aviation development impacts access to some (limited) MOAs.

Red - Civil and commercial aviation dominates the development of and access to MOAs or Restricted Airspace.

- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) The two MOAs used the majority of the time by the 924 FW, Brady and Brownwood, are impacted very little by civil and commercial aviation. The only impact is when the Brownwood MOAs are capped because of weather problems around Dallas/Ft Worth Airport and they are seldom capped below FL 230 which allows the 924 FW to complete its mission. The Brady MOA is almost never impacted by civil aviation. The other MOA's often used - Chase, Randolph, Crystal - are seldom effected by civil aviation because of their location in south Texas, a sparsely populated region.

- (b) Source -
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
 - 924 OSS/OSAM

USAF Response: Criteria II.3.A.1

Air Fome Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - Applicable MOAs and Restricted Airspace were evaluated by the Air Force Reserve Functional Expert, using criteria developed in conjunction with the Base Closure Working Group member from Combat Forces. Professional judgment and reference to the following questions in the questionnaire were used to determine Direct Input grades: 1.2.3.B. 1, 1.2.3.B.2, 1.2.3.B.3, 1.2.3.B.4, 1.2.3.B.5, 1.2.3.B.6, 1.2.3.B.7, 1.2.3.B.8, and 1.2.3.B.9.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.A.1

In order to adequately answer this question it is necessary to utilize day-to-day operations and unit expertise. The unit has a very highly experienced and knowledgeable air space manager with previous experience as an FAA Air Traffic Controller. He works very closely with Houston Center and the Southwest Region out of Ft Worth. Using his expertise and daily experiences within the unit, we do not see civil and commercial aviation dominating the development of and access to MOAs or Restricted Airspace. The 704 FS does not experience problems on a daily basis and has an excellent working relationship with both Houston and Ft Worth Centers. The response does not track with data the unit furnished in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire. The closest questions in the Questionnaire are under I.2.E, Airspace Used by Base; they do not reveal any civil or commercial aviation domination or encroachment into MOAs or Restricted airspace used by the base.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.A.1

The 301 FW also has a very highly experienced and knowledgeable air space manager with previous experience as an FAA Air Traffic Controller. He also works very closely with Houston Center and the Southwest Region out of Ft Worth. His expertise and daily experiences within the unit tend to validate the professional judgement of the Air Force Reserve Functional expert. An AOPA survey highlighted that general aviation pilots may be frustrated about not being able to determine if an area is active. The Air Transport Association (ATA) wants air carrier aircraft to be able to fly point-to-point. In January, the FAA began to allow point-to-point operations for aircraft at and above FL390 between selected city pairs. The ceiling will gradually decrease to FL290. This will have a significant impact on high altitude ATCAAs used by the Bergstrom unit.

Source: Southwest Region Airspace Committee Meeting Minutes Memorandum for Record, dated April 10, 1995.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A.2

Bombing Ranges, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - **Green**
- (3) Criteria:

Green - Regional development generally compatible with Air to-Ground ranges.

Yellow - Regional development incompatible in some (limited) areas, creating restrictions on Air-to-Ground ranges

Red - Regional development severely incompatible in many areas, causing major restrictions to Air-to-Ground ranges

- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) There is no data to support a Red rating. The three ranges predominately used by the 924 FW have NO regional development that impacts on them.

(b) Source - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
924 OSS/OSK Interview

USAF Response: Criteria II.3.A.2

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - Applicable MOAs and Restricted Airspace were evaluated by the Air Force Reserve Functional Expert, using criteria developed in conjunction with the Base Closure Working Group member from Combat Forces. Professional judgment and reference to the following questions in the questionnaire were used to determine Direct Input grades: 1.2.3.B.1, 1.2.3.B.2, 1.2.3.B.3, 1.2.3.B.4, 1.2.3.B.5, 1.2.3.B.6, 1.2.3.B.7, 1.2.3.B.8, and 1.2.3.B.9.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.A.2

The response is the same as the previous question. There is no change from the original rebuttal submitted to Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations (Volume V) on 27 March 1995. The Air Force response here does not change any of the factors.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.A.2

A recent ANG-contracted study of real-time airspace documented well the need to improve the overall military and civilian utilization of special use airspace, and suggested areas to explore potential solutions.

Source: Southwest Region Airspace Committee Meeting Minutes Memorandum for Record, dated April 10, 1995.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A.3

Criteria II.3.A.3, Low Level Routes, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria II.3.A.3

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.A.3

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.A.3

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A

Overall: Existing Associated Airspace:

<u>Existing Associated Airspace</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green
Low Level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	Red +	Green

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.A

Overall: Existing Associated Airspace:

<u>CRITERIA REVIEW</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW</u>
MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green	Red
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green	Red
Low Level Routes	Green	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	Red +	Green	Red +

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.B

Criteria II.3.B, Future Associated Airspace, is further broken down into MOAs and Restricted Airspace, Bombing Ranges, and Low Level Routes. The same comments listed above for existing airspace also apply here.

MOAs and Restricted Airspace, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - **Green**
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green- Future civil and commercial aviation development generally expected to remain compatible with existing Military Operating Areas and Restricted Airspace.
 - Yellow - Future civil and commercial aviation development may impact access to some (limited) MOAs. Future development of MOAs and Restricted Airspace may be limited.
 - Red - Future civil and commercial aviation may dominate the area and access MOAs may become severely limited. Future development Restricted Airspace incompatible.
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) No data is presented to substantiate this rating of Red. The FAA, Ft Worth Region and Houston Center over the last several years have publicized their Airspace 2000 plans and their future plans for the Austin Bergstrom International Airport.

These plans indicate the 924 FW should have little conflict in meeting its future airspace needs and requirements. Houston Center at one time proposed a new MOA for the 924 FW due west of the base off the Junction TACAN that would be from surface to FL450 and have the capacity to support 100% of the unit's air-to-air requirements for airspace. Any changes to the Brownwood MOAs would have minimal impact on the 924 FW since they have other quality airspace available in south Texas, a low air traffic region.

(b) Sources - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire,
924 OSS/OSAM

USAF Response: Criteria II.3.B

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - This was a direct input grade resulting from analysis of potential expansion of a base's associated airspace. For a base to be rated green, the functional expert required a current proposal for airspace expansion that had a high likelihood of approval. Past experience with airspace growth attempts indicates that even in sparse activity areas, airspace growth is difficult.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.B.1

Nowhere in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire criteria does it state that a current proposal for airspace expansion is a requirement. This question was adequately answered in the original rebuttal under this Criteria. In the Questionnaire, Bergstrom and Carswell are listed as Red, Homestead is listed as Yellow, and all other AFRES bases (11) are listed as Green under this Criteria. Based on the stated requirement for a current proposal for airspace expansion that had a high likelihood of approval in order to get a green rating, it would appear that all the airlift and tanker bases in AFRES must have such proposals pending. This is doubtful since they do not have the same requirement for MOAs and restricted airspace that fighter units do. Grissom for example utilizes the MOAs owned by the Ft Wayne, IN ANG fighter unit.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.B.1

A: The Air Force's "RANGES 2005" data collection effort has grown to incorporate a study of all airspace.---use projections,extensive list of data elements, and status of environmental documentation.

Source: Southwest Region Airspace Committee Meeting Minutes Memorandum for Record, dated April 10, 1995.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.B.2

Criteria II.3.B.2, Bombing Ranges, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red

(2) Correct Status - Green

(3) Criteria:

Green - Future regional development generally expected to remain compatible with Air-to-Ground ranges.

Yellow - Future regional development may become incompatible in some (limited) areas, creating restrictions on Air-to-Ground ranges.

Red - Future regional development may become severely incompatible in many areas, causing major restrictions to Air-to-Ground ranges.

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) Once again there are no data available to substantiate this rating and it appears to be subjective. There are no known FAA plans, including their Airspace 2000 plan, that will adversely impact 924 FW bombing ranges. Again, south Texas is a low civil air traffic region.

(b) Sources - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
924 OSS/OSAM

USAF Response: Criteria II.3.B.2

Air Force Analysis - Red

Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - Again, this was a direct input grade resulting from analysis of potential expansion of a base's associated airspace. For a base to be rated green, the functional expert required a current proposal for airspace expansion that had a high likelihood of approval. Past experience with airspace growth attempts indicates that even in sparse activity areas, airspace growth is difficult.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.B.2

The rebuttal to this is the same as in the previous Criteria. Once again, it is hard to believe that six tanker/airlift bases have current airspace proposals pending.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.B.2

LTC Arseneau (AF REP Southwest Region FAA) states that within the region there are 30 Military Operations Areas, 7 Restricted Areas, 54 IR, 57 Vr and 76 SR military training routes, and 37 air refueling tracks. The region is fortunate to have a military-friendly population. Current issues in the region include the requirement for expanded airspace to meet the needs of new weapons, tactics and refueling missions.

MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green	Red
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green	Red
Low Level Routes	Green	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	Red +	Green	Red +

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.C

Existing Local/ Regional Airspace Encroachment.

Criteria II.3.C, Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment, shows Bergstrom as Yellow and that is correct. This is based on Houston Intercontinental Airport located 120 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Austin is a low air traffic density area.

USAF Response:

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995):

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response:

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.D

Future Airspace Encroachment.

Criteria II.3.D, Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment, shows Bergstrom as Yellow and that is correct. This is also based on Houston Intercontinental Airport located 120 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Austin is a low air traffic density area.

USAF Response: Criteria II.3.D

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.D

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.D

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4.A

Air Quality.

Criteria II.4.A, Air Quality, is further broken down into Attainment Status, Restrictions, and Future Growth. The data for this is from the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire, Elements VIII.1 and VIII.16.

Criteria II.4.A, Attainment Status, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria II.4.A

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.4.A

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.4.A

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4.B

Criteria II.4.B, Restrictions, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Yellow

(2) Correct Status - **Green**

(3) Criteria:

Green - Not Yellow and not Red

Yellow - 1 block \geq 40 or 2 blocks \geq 30 or 3 blocks \geq 20

Red - 1 block \geq 50 or 2 blocks \geq 40 or 3 blocks \geq 30

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) No mention is made in the 195 Air Force Base Questionnaire of what constitutes a block. It is not possible with the data that we have to determine how a rating of Yellow was derived. On reviewing the Questionnaire Element data, there are only two areas mentioned, VIII.E.8 Monitoring and VIII.E.9 BACT/LAER, and neither of them indicate that Bergstrom is not in complete compliance with Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) rules and regulations. The City of Austin environmental compliance officer has called Bergstrom "pristine" when compared with most airports or military bases.

(b) Source - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire.

Interview with City of Austin environmental compliance officer.

USAF Response: Criteria II.4.B

Air Force Analysis - Yellow

Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - This question refers to a data call briefed to and approved by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group to better quantify Air Quality Restrictions. The data call was sent to each base with instructions to complete each block in order to examine specific air quality restrictions. Weighting was assigned to each block depending on its importance. Once the data call was completed, the points in each block were totaled to determine the type and severity of each specific restriction. Bergstrom specifically exceeded the applicable goalposts for open burning, and regulations prohibiting open burning/open detonation. In addition, they answered yes when questioned whether they have continuous emissions monitoring requirements for sources at the base which exceed the Federal New Source Performance Standards requirements, and whether Bergstrom has BACT/LAER emissions thresholds (excluding lead) that exceed the Federal Clean Air Act requirements.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.4.B

This area is very difficult to determine exactly what is being asked and how it is being weighted. The environmental personnel assigned to the 924 FW do not fully understand how the ratings were arrived at nor exactly what they mean. Without full and complete access to the data used to determine this rating it is impossible to adequately comment on it. It does appear that under Criteria for Monitoring and BACT/LAER, the unit is being penalized because the State of Texas has regulations that are stricter than the Federal Clean Air Act requirement.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.4.B

Without realizing it, the ABSG has hit the nail squarely on the head. In fact, their rating of red is due precisely to the fact that the state of Texas has more stringent regulations than the federal government requires in the area of air quality, making the government's point. Of course the unit is being penalized for it, because it is clearly paying more to deal with those issues. Example: Many states allow open air burning, but the state of Texas does not. Instead, in Texas, a contractor is typically needed to resolve the problem at additional expense to the American taxpayer.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4.C

Criteria II.4.C, Future Growth, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: Criteria II.4.C

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.4.C

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.4.C

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4

Overall: Air Quality:

<u>Air Quality</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Attainment Status	Green	Green
Restrictions	Yellow	Green
Future Growth	Green	Green
Overall	Green	Green

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.4

Overall: Air Quality.

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Attainment Status	Green	Green	Green
Restrictions	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Future Growth	Green	Green	Green
Overall	Green	Green	Green

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.6

Billeting Requirements.

Billeting Requirements is broken down into Installation Billeting and Commercial Billeting. This area relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements IX.3.A and IX.3.B. Bergstrom ARS has 1191 AF reservists assigned as of 23 March 1995. Of these a maximum of 385 require billeting during drill weekends. The 924 FW provides 155 on-base billets and 230 off-base billets during drill weekends. This equates to 32% of reservists requiring billeting, 13% on-base and 19% off-base, with the off-base billeting providing 60% of the total. This does not change the AF Analysis of Yellow but is lower than the figures shown in the Questionnaire.

USAF Response: Criteria II.6

No Response Offered.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.6

No Update Submitted.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.6

The 301 FW has approximately 1200 drilling Reservists assigned, 142 of whom require billeting. This represents less than half the billeting cost absorbed by the 924 FW.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria VI

Economic Impact.

Criteria VI, Economic Impact, shows the Percent Job Loss (All BRACs) for Bergstrom as 0.3%, Carswell as <0.1%, and Homestead as 0.1%.

USAF Response: Criteria VI

No Response Offered.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria VI

No Update Submitted.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria VI (**Community responds**)

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria VII

Community.

Criteria VII, Community, really refers to recruiting data for each community. All the AFRES bases listed are Green - This is because of Criteria VII. 11, Other Local Guard/Reserve Unit, and relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Element IX. 12. All AFRES units are shown as Yellow under this Criteria because they have > 2 units and <= 10 units in their community. It is not understood how the Carswell AFRES location can recruit effectively when competing for almost 12,000 military and reservists in the Ft. Worth area.

USAF Response: Criteria VII

Air Force Response - Recruiting figures were obtained from each unit as part of the Air Reserve Component data call and certified as accurate by Air Force Reserve Headquarters.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria VII

We do not know why this is listed since we did not disagree with the rating shown in the report.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria VII (Community responds)

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria VIII

Environmental Impact.

Criteria VIII, Environmental Impact, shows Bergstrom as overall Green with only one area rated Yellow. That area is Criteria VIII. 5, Installation Restoration Program (IRP). It is shown as Yellow and relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements VIII. 13 A - VIII. 13 F. It is interesting to note that Carswell is the only AFRES base that is shown as Green under Criteria VIII.5. Bergstrom is the only AFRES base shown as Green under Criteria VIII.2, Asbestos.

USAF Response: Criteria VIII

No Response Offered.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria VIII

No Update Submitted.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria VIII

No rebuttal is necessary. ABSG makes no point.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1

Overall: Mission (Flying) Requirements

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -
Overall Mission Requireme	Yellow -	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1

Overall: Mission (Flying Requirements).

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green	Yellow -
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -	Yellow
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow
Overall Mission Requireme	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow -

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment.

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green -	Red +

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure.

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -
Air Quality	Green -	Green
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities	Yellow	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure.

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -	Red +
Air Quality	Green -	Green	Green -
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities	Yellow	Green -	Yellow

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I and II

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission (Flying) Requirements	Yellow -	Green -
Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I and II

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>DOD ANALYSIS</u>	<u>ABSG REBUTTAL</u>	<u>TEAM FW REVIEW</u>
Mission (Flying) Requirements	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow -
Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -	Yellow
<u>ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995):</u>	Cost Comparison		

1. The Air Force cost analysis appears inconsistent and inaccurate.

A. Inputs to the financial model suspect.

The Air Force uses the 'COBRA' computer model to simulate the effects of a proposed realignment or base closure. While the model may work when provided valid data, none of the inputs or assumptions are apparent from the COBRA model. There are however, several areas for concern.

1. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that they only considered Air Force monies. That is, BRACC monies, other service monies, other federal agency monies are not considered. For example, the BRACC monies saved by closing Homestead or the Navy monies saved by moving the 301 FW from Ft. Worth were not considered.

2. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that military force structure is not considered in the COBRA model. However, the Bergstrom model clearly shows the job elimination or realignment of the civilian (ASRT) force for Bergstrom. The civilian ART force is a large part of the "military" presence in the Reserve - in contrast with the normal active duty civilian force.

3. A review shows that the assumptions for Bergstrom are in error or the model is indecipherable. For example, the model submitted to the BRACC shows all costs for Bergstrom doubling after 1997. In fact, the overhead costs will substantially reduce as the City of Austin assumes more control of the base.

4. The Air Force submission to the BRACC shows a model for converting Bergstrom to KC-135's, closing Bergstrom, and moving the unit to MacDill. This move contemplates construction costs at MacDill about the same as Bergstrom - such a move would be a net cost to the government.

B. Personnel costs associated with Force Structure should not be considered

The Austin BRACC Study Group believes it is unreasonable to consider military personnel costs associated with force structure to be considered in determining locations for realignment or closure. The AF Reserve civilian ART force is largely part of the force structure. When comparing AFRES units with similar missions, it is reasonable to assume that military personnel costs are approximately equal. That is, the military personnel costs associated with closing the Bergstrom F-16 unit would be about the same as the unit at Miami or New Orleans, etc.

The Austin BRACC Study Group therefore made a cost comparison between AFRES fighter locations based on two factors. First, an estimate of the overhead associated with the six F-16 fighter locations was made. This estimate was based on the Base Operating Support (BOS) budgets of each unit. Several of the units are based at an Air Force active duty location and their overhead is less than a unit located at a joint use field and substantially lower than an AFRES operated base. However, the Air Force assumes a variable cost associated with its AFRES unit, and this variable overhead needs to be considered.

Second, the Austin BRACC Study Group collected the current construction costs for the services at the six AFRES fighter locations. In our analysis "opportunity cost" is taken as the construction cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer if the listed AFRES location were to close. For example, at Homestead \$88 million in new construction projects are planned and \$15 million has been spent. At Austin/Bergstrom, \$13 million in new construction is authorized and \$2 million has been spent. At Phoenix (Luke AFB), although the value of the AFRES facilities are close to \$50 million, only \$20 million of new construction is planned in the next 2 years.

II. Summary of Cost Savings

	1996 Opportunity Cost	Annual Overhead Value*	Net Present
Miami	-73,000,000	5,000,000	(\$118,642,728)
Fort Worth	-59,000,000	2,500,000	(81,821,364)
Austin	-11,000,000	3,500,000	(42,949,910)
Phoenix	-20,000,000	2,500,000	(42,821,364)
New Orleans	0	3,000,000	(27,385,637)
Salt Lake City	0	2,500,000	(22,821,364)

*Using a discount rate of 9% and a 20 year cost recovery period.

Cost to closure has not been considered, but would make the Austin location look substantially more favorable. The Air Force in their COBRA analysis estimated the cost to close Austin/Bergstrom at \$34 million and the cost to close Miami/Homestead at only \$7.9 million. Obviously, the cost to close Fort Worth, Phoenix, New Orleans, or Salt Lake City would be substantially less than Austin or Miami because they would remain as operating DOD facilities.

It should be noted that if the Air Force's estimate of \$34 million to close Austin/Bergstrom is current, then the savings by closing Bergstrom is about \$9 million over 20 years (again, excluding military force structure).

In its final report to the BRACC the Austin BRACC Study Group intends to compare other AFRES locations to the above listed F-16 locations. It is certainly true, however, based on the above analysis, that Austin/Bergstrom is NOT the most expensive AFRES location and in fact it compares favorably.

USAF Response: Cost Comparison

Air Force Response - It appears that the Bergstrom community has a misunderstanding of the COBRA model and the process of estimating criteria IV/V values.

The COBRA model is directed by OSD for all services to use on BRAC decisions. The model uses two types of data: standard factors, which are used for all AF bases; and base unique data, which is certified for accuracy by the appropriate major command. All three services, the GAO, and the AF Audit Agency have reviewed and validated the model and the process. While there is a certain degree of inaccuracy in the model, it is consistent and thus fairly compares costs and savings among alternatives.

The model includes all major factors which either drive costs or savings. One of the most important input areas is personnel. The cost of eliminating, moving, or other personnel actions is a large part of the costs and personnel elimination is the key factor in determining savings.

The summary of cost savings provided by the community is significantly flawed in two areas. First, COBRA includes all cost and savings elements, not just opportunity costs, when calculating NPV. Second, OSD guidance directs the use of a 2.75 discount rate.

Finally, the community called into question the \$34 million cost to close stated in the Air Force report. Specifically, the \$34 million cost to close noted in the report resulted from the Air Force Reserve's initial level playing field COBRA. In the focused COBRA, these figures reflected a onetime cost as reported to the Commission for Bergstrom of \$13.4 million with a one-time savings due to military construction avoidance of \$13 million. This results in an exceptionally low one-time net cost to close the base of \$345,000.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Cost Comparison

Once again, without complete access to all the data used to define the parameters in the DoD COBRA model, it is impossible to comment on the figures used. They definitely warrant further investigation since they will be a significant factor in any decision to close or keep open a base.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Cost Comparison

1. Summary of Cost Savings:

Fort Worth is shown to have an opportunity cost savings of \$59 million. This figure is based on cancellation of MILCON to accommodate the move of the Texas Air National Guard from NAS Dallas to Ft. Worth. this move was directed by BRAC 93 and the chart does not show all data considered in BRAC 93 that made the one-time expenditure of funds viable by eliminating recurring costs and consolidating the TANG BOS under the new Joint Reserve Base. Obviously, no real MILCON cost savings was available through the Austin proposal to move the 301 FW, so a bogus figure was divined from a separate BRAC action. The \$59 million figure for TANG MILCON is inaccurate. The Navy shows total MILCON of \$27 million for TANG. There are no certified estimates of what it would take to modify 301 FW facilities to accommodate TANG, but could exceed \$27 million. Additionally, the only MILCON scheduled for the 301 FW was an \$18 million figure that was directed as a result of BRAC 91. This was intended to relocate facilities to accommodate a Reserve Cantonment Area. Only approximately \$1 million was spent and that construction is complete. The rest was eliminated as part of the cost savings associated with the consolidation under Fort Worth JRB. The Air Force Reserve at Fort Worth has no MILCON planned, scheduled, or funded.

b. The same paragraph shows an annual overhead of \$2,500,000 for Ft. Worth and run it out 9 years to get a figure of \$22,500,000. This figure is added to the Texas Air National guard MILCON figure to arrive at a total purported savings of \$81,821,364. Note also that the overhead figure at Austin is \$3,500,000 and that translates into 9 million more than Ft. Worth for the same period. This figure does not include the actual costs of overhead at Austin following takeover by the city. At present, the Air Force Reserve has no figures for these additional airport fees. A mandate to remain at Austin without a cost estimate and agreement, amounts to writing a blank check to the City of Austin for whatever support they choose to provide the Air Force Reserve.

2. The notes at the bottom of the same page state that the cost of closure has not been considered and go on to state that closing Bergstrom would cost \$34 million while it only costs \$7.9 million to close Homestead. It does not state what it costs to close the Reserve unit at Ft. Worth. It must be noted that the Reserve unit at Ft. Worth is a part of the NAS Ft. Worth JRB and whatever the costs associated with moving this unit might be, it could not be considered a savings since the host base remains open. That is, you incur the cost of a move without benefit of getting a closure.
3. The last paragraph on the page in question states that based on the analysis on that page, Bergstrom is NOT the most expensive AFRES location and in fact, compares favorably. In truth, the figures are wrong and make just the opposite case. HQ AF Reserve is on record that stand-alone units (i.e., not hosted by active duty) are more expensive to operate. BOS costs at 301 FW (Ft. Worth) and 924 FW (Austin) were \$15.1 million and

\$15.2 million respectively in 1994 when both were stand-alone units. Costs were \$12.2 million and \$16.7 million respectively when 301 FW became a tenant and 924 FW remained a host in 1995. Austin's position ignores the simple economic reality that it is far more cost effective to operate one base rather than two. It also ignores the fact that the BRAC process is designed to close and realign bases, while preserving the capacity needed to fight and win America's wars, not to keep them open when far more efficient options are available.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Alternative Proposal

The Air Force has proposed closing Bergstrom ARS for two stated reasons: eliminate one F-16 unit; and save money. To follow is one suggestion for accomplishing these two goals. There are, of course, many alternatives - this is but one alternative for the BRACC to consider.

1. Move the AFRES flying squadron from NAS Ft. Worth to Bergstrom.

In 1993 the Air Force proposed closing Bergstrom and consolidating 2 F-16 squadrons at Ft Worth (i.e. Carswell). The Air Force estimated that such a consolidation would cost around \$6 million, but save \$20 million per year. Consolidation at Ft. Worth does not make sense for many reasons. For example, the Navy, Air Guard, and Army are moving a large number of aircraft into Ft Worth, creating congested ground and airspace. Carswell was closed as an active duty installation for, inter alia, this ground and airspace congestion and encroachment.

Consolidating at Austin/Bergstrom does make sense both for military value and cost savings. As outlined below, Bergstrom is an ideal location for consolidation and would be cost effective.

2. Close Homestead Air Reserve Base.

In 1993 the BRACC decided to consolidate Air Force Reserve units at Homestead, with the understanding that Dade County would make the Base a joint use facility (but not a commercial air carrier facility). This decision is expensive for the United States - **\$88 million** in new construction required. Dade County argued that a Homestead consolidation made sense because, inter alia: the 301st Rescue Squadron and 302 Fighter Wing would both make use of Homestead; and with MacDill AFB closed, there was no Air Force presence in south central Florida.

1995 has brought substantial changes from the Air Force. The Air Force now proposes leaving the 301st Rescue Squadron at its temporary home of Patrick AFB in Florida. Additionally, the Air Force proposes reopening MacDill AFB in Florida. Little justification can be made for spending \$88 million to reopen Homestead as an Air Reserve Base to support one unit.

3. Section I below explains how such a proposal would not have a negative effect on military value - specifically Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements. Section II below explains how this proposal would save the U.S. taxpayer almost \$200 million in overhead and an additional \$400 million in personnel savings, while eliminating only one F-16 squadron.

I. Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements

A. Operating 150 - 200 aircraft from Ft. Worth NAS's single runway in a high aircraft traffic area degrades operational readiness, increases operating costs, and unnecessarily increases risks.

1. It will be difficult to launch and recover from a single runway on a normal basis the 150 - 200 aircraft proposed for Ft. Worth NAS in a high aircraft traffic area, degrading operational readiness.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

Exhibit IV-A shows the normal operational tempo for Carswell/Ft. Worth. As can be seen from Exhibit IV-A, in normal operation approximately 100 sorties, and 250 takeoffs, approaches, and landings per day can be anticipated. Allocating a takeoff and landing window of three minutes to each aircraft results in a 12 1/2 hour flying day and approximately a 14 hour duty day.

Even with such mitigation practices as staggering duty days of the various squadrons, diverting the 25 rotary sorties, and combining fighters into flights, Carswell/Ft. Worth's single runway is faced with about a 10 hour stream of takeoffs and landings with aircraft assigned several minute windows for takeoffs and recoveries. Scheduling would be dictated by takeoff and recovery allocations instead of mission requirements. Maintenance delays would result in canceled sorties and loss of training; control delays in aircraft in-flight emergencies would have a ripple effect resulting in canceling dozens of sorties. Instrument weather in the Carswell/Ft. Worth area would force cancellation of many additional sorties and the attendant unnecessary loss of training.¹

While Exhibit IV-A illustrates normal operational tempo, an important test of war time training is the ability to surge and exercise under war time conditions. Under the proposal for Carswell/Ft. Worth, any exercise could only be undertaken if other flying units were willing to stand down during the exercise period. Further, a desirable characteristic of a military base is its capacity to expand and surge in times of potential hostilities - Carswell/Ft. Worth would have no excess capacity.

The proposal for Carswell/Ft. Worth would result in one of the most active single runway operations during daylight hours in the world. Truly a remarkable task for a base previously closed because it had "the worst ground and regional airport encroachment in its category."²

¹ The instrument weather could be mild, say 1500 foot ceilings, and yet force instrument approaches. Requiring instrument approaches would force cancellation of many sorties even though the training area weather is adequate.

² Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President 1991, p.53

BERGSTROM

In contract, the Bergstrom/Austin airport is a two runway operation.³ As an operating Air Force Base, Bergstrom sustained 100 takeoffs, approaches, and landings for four squadrons during a normal duty day. With the addition of commercial traffic and another suitable runway, two F-16 squadrons could easily be accommodated without any operational impediment.

2. Operating 150 - 200 aircraft from the single runway at Carswell/Ft. Worth in a high traffic area incurs a substantial hidden operational cost.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

DFW is one of the highest traffic areas in the United States.⁴ As can be seen from Exhibit IV-B, Carswell/Ft. Worth is one of 25 airports in the Dallas-Fort Worth terminal control area. It is readily apparent from Exhibit IV-B that any departure other than to the West is difficult from Carswell/Ft. Worth.

The current plan for Carswell/Ft. Worth launch and recovery in good weather (VMC) is to depart all aircraft to the West below 4,000 ft. for 30 miles prior to permitting turns to the North or South or further climbs to altitude.⁵ Good weather recoveries are similarly restrictive with approach corridors from the Northwest and Southwest to Carswell/Ft. Worth. In most cases, the routing and altitudes are indirect, adding time and cost to operational training.

While the FAA and the military are working to minimize aircraft delays, because of the indirect routing and altitude restrictions, as well as the heavy volume of traffic at Carswell/Ft. Worth and in the DFW area, several minutes of additional flight time per sortie (in good weather) will occur because of cumulative delays.⁶

Departure and approach delays into Carswell/Ft. Worth in inclement weather or at night (IMC) would impose even worse delays compared to good weather (VMC) approaches and recoveries. IMC departures for flights of fighters cannot use the VMC plan of remaining below 4000 feet for 30 miles. Many sorties will be canceled during IMC

³ Bergstrom currently has 1 large and 1 small runway. In 1998 the small runway will be eliminated and another parallel runway will be operational.

⁴ Chicago O'Hare is the first.

⁵ Contact Richard Baugh, Fort Worth Center Airspace Manager, for more details.

⁶ Flights to the West under good conditions would experience little ground clearance or air traffic control delay, although the altitude and routing corridors will result in route delay. Departures to the East would encounter significant handling delays and the routing delay is staggering.

operations, reducing operational training, and the sorties that successfully launch will have significantly increased operational expense.

While estimates of increased operational costs at Carswell/Ft. Worth because of these cumulative delays are difficult to determine, approximate numbers will illustrate the magnitude of the problem.

- An F-16 squadron, such as the 301st FW at Ft. Worth, flies over 3,000 local sorties per year.
- Approximately 75% of the sorties are VMC and 25% of the sorties are IMC/night.
- A conservative estimate of these cumulative delays at Ft. Worth are 3-5 minutes (VMC) and 6-8 minutes (IMC).
- An F-16 costs over \$3000 per hour to operate.
- The added cost of Ft. Worth basing of an F-16 squadron approaches \$1,000,000 annually in operational expense when compared to a Bergstrom consolidation. The AFRES F-16's further add congestion and cost to the other aircraft at Ft. Worth NAS⁷ and civilian aircraft traffic in the DFW Metroplex.

BERGSTROM

In contrast, Austin, Texas has low commercial aviation traffic and Bergstrom/Austin's two runways can handle easily two squadrons with no delay. The routings are direct to all military operating areas without added cost to other users.

3. Operating large numbers of fighter aircraft from the single runway at Carswell/Ft. Worth in a populated area increases risks and diminishes operational training and readiness.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

In the fighter business, operational requirements dictate that the fighters takeoff on time, arrive at their destinations on time, and fighters typically use their available fuel for training (ground attack or air combat) to the maximum extent possible. It is quite common for fighters to return to base with 10 minutes or less of fuel remaining in order to meet their training and operational objectives.⁸

⁷ The operational savings to the Navy by moving the F-16's to Bergstrom is also difficult to estimate with precision, but should approach \$2 million annually. (8000 local sorties, 2-3 minute takeoff, approach, or landing delays eliminated; \$4000-5000 per hour operation cost).

⁸ Because fuel is always limited, 10-15 minutes of fuel reserved for Carswell/Ft. Worth traffic delays typically means 10-15 minutes less training time. Because the tactical portion of a sortie is on the order of 30 minutes, half

Further, it is not uncommon for a fighter aircraft with an emergency to close a runway for a half hour or more, resulting in the diversion of all airborne aircraft to other air fields. Because Carswell/Ft. Worth will be the only military air field in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, military aircraft will be forced to recover at Alliance, Meacham, DFW, or Love in many cases.

Arriving at a single runway over a populated area presents a risk that should, if possible, be avoided. To offset the risk of running out of fuel or forced diversion into a civilian field, pilots will be forced to increase their fuel reserve - significantly reducing their effective training and operational readiness.

BERGSTROM

In contrast, the Bergstrom/Austin airport has two usable runways, practically eliminating the risk of diversion or the necessity to increase fuel reserve. Additionally, Bergstrom/Austin is fortunate to have other military air fields in the immediate area -- Gray Army Air Field 54 miles to the North and Randolph AFB 50 miles to the Southwest. Finally, the approaches to Bergstrom are predominately over unpopulated areas.

II. Carswell/Ft. Worth's training air space is inadequate to support the number of fighter squadrons proposed.

1. The bombing ranges reachable from Carswell/Ft. Worth are Army controlled, permit only limited tactics, and are often unavailable.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

The primary range used by Carswell/Ft. Worth for bombing practice is the Falcon range on the Ft. Sill Army complex. Because the range is small, only limited tactical maneuvers are permitted, limiting the type of training available. The Air Training Command unit from Sheppard AFB unit also uses Falcon. An increasing problem is obtaining range time for Falcon. Because Falcon Range is part of an Army live fire complex, the Army often preempts all other use and sometimes even cancels other users on short notice.

Limited bombing practice can be achieved at Ft. Hood. Ft. Hood is controlled by the Army which is sometimes unable to yield time for Air Force training.

BERGSTROM

the operational training may be lost because of the need to guard against delays in the Carswell/Ft. Worth approach.

As can be seen from Exhibit IV-C and IV-D, Bergstrom has available to it a greater variety of bombing ranges. Most important are the McMullen ranges - actually two ranges. Yankee and Dixie. Yankee is controlled by the Kelly Air National Guard, while the Bergstrom Air Force Reserve controls Dixie. Neither range is in an Army complex, meaning access is unlimited and tactical entries can be made from the multiple low level routes leading to the ranges. Further, because Dixie is controlled by the Air Force Reserve, bombing practice is not preempted by any other user or authority.

Bergstrom has excellent access to Ft. Hood and is 60 miles (10 minutes) closer than Carswell/Ft. Worth.

Access to the Peason Tactical range at Ft. Polk is possible from Bergstrom. Bergstrom is 70 miles closer to Peason than Carswell/Ft. Worth, which means 12 minutes more time available in support of Army exercises. Because of the traffic flow at DFW, Ft. Polk is difficult to reach from Carswell/Ft. Worth.

2. The number of air combat ranges available from Carswell/Ft. Worth is inadequate to support the number of fighter squadrons proposed for Carswell/Ft. Worth.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

The Brownwood MOA has quality training airspace and is easily accessible from Carswell/Ft. Worth. Currently, however, the Navy schedules Brownwood in excess of six hours per day for its own use. With the addition of at least another Navy squadron using Brownwood and increasing traffic into DFW, use becomes difficult for Air Force use during normal duty hours. The result is that Air Force fighter squadrons based at Carswell/Ft. Worth will be forced to use Rivers MOA and Brady MOA a large percentage of the time. The Rivers and Brady MOA's are long distances from Carswell/Ft. Worth, substantially reducing the operational training and increasing operational costs for air combat training.⁹

BERGSTROM

Turning to Exh. IV-C and IV-D, Bergstrom/Austin has a number of MOA's readily available to it for air combat training. The Brady MOA is owned by the Air Force Reserve and is only a short distance away. Equally close to Bergstrom/Austin, are the Randolph and Chase MOA's. With Navy Chase closed, the Chase MOA's are readily available. Even the Brownwood MOA can be easily used from Bergstrom/Austin for joint training with the Navy.

⁹ The 45-50 minute enroute time to the Rivers MOA is 45-50 minutes of valuable air combat training time lost.

II. COST SAVINGS

A. Move the 457th Flying Squadron to Bergstrom

As discussed above, the Air Force in 1993 estimated that consolidating the 704 FS from Bergstrom with the 457 FS at Carswell/Ft. Worth would cost \$6 million and save \$20 million per year. While these estimates may not be correct, they are useful for comparison.

The effects of moving the 457FS from Ft. Worth to Bergstrom would be to eliminate the \$2.5 million per year in overhead incurred by the 301FW in Ft. Worth. Additionally, the \$2.7 cost for military construction to move 10th Air Force to Ft. Worth would be saved, along with the \$300,000 in moving expense.

A significant savings would result from closing the 301 FW at Ft. Worth. First, the Navy would save approximately \$39 million in construction costs and complete their move to Ft. Worth earlier saving additional monies. This \$39 million is based on the estimated value of the 301 FW facilities using Air Force pricing guide and square footage of the facilities. Additionally, the 301 FW was allocated \$18 million in new construction (it is unknown how much of this allocation has been spent).

To accommodate the 457 FS at Bergstrom under \$4.5 million would be spent. This estimate is from the Air Force Reserve and assumes a new operations building would be built and a fuel storage hangar. This estimate is not dependent on the type of airplane used by the 457 FS. The Bergstrom ramp area of 283,000 sq ft is of sufficient size to accommodate 36 F-16's and 8 KC-135's for example. There would be a moving cost estimated as \$1.2 million for moving the 457 FS to Bergstrom.

In Summary, the savings:

- Move the 457 FS Flying Squadron to Austin
 - \$2.5 M Overhead saved per year
 - Opportunity Cost \$59 M
 - Mil Con at Austin Required - (\$4.5M)
- Cost to move single squadron - (\$1.2M)
- Savings from 10th Air Force remaining at Bergstrom
 - \$2.7 Milcon
 - \$.3 moving expense
- Present Value of Overhead and Construction Savings - \$81.5 million

- Personnel Savings additional \$182 million
(Based on Air Force 1993 estimate of \$20 million per year in annual savings.)

Additional considerations:

- Ft Worth is currently scheduled for
11,500 Reservists
140 Aircraft + transients and Lockheed
- 30 T/O, approach, or landing per hour from a single runway in the DFW traffic area
(as shown in Exhibit IV-A)
- With so many reservists it will be difficult to recruit.
- With so many reservists it will be difficult to drill.
- Closure of the 301 FW at Ft. Worth will not only save the Navy substantial military construction monies, but also save perhaps 2 years in their move completion timing.

B. Close Homestead

Homestead ARB has excellent flying airspace. The only negative from an operational training view is that there is no Army units located close enough for joint training.

As previously mentioned, reopening Homestead ARB is expensive for the United States. \$88 million in new construction is required. However, the Air Force now proposes leaving the 301st Rescue Squadron at its temporary home of Patrick AFB in Florida. Additionally, the Air Force proposes reopening MacDill AFB in Florida and establishing an Air Force Reserve unit. Little justification can be made for spending \$88 million to reopen Homestead as an Air Reserve Base to support one unit.

In Summary, the savings from Homestead closure:

1. Construction Savings - \$73 million. This represents \$88 million allocated and the almost \$15 million already spent. See Exhibit IV-D.
2. Overhead Savings - \$5 M/year. As previously indicated, the overhead estimates are based on good faith estimates from a unit's Base Operating support budget, taking into consideration the relative cost of running a unit, savings from joint use, and active duty associated costs.
3. Present Value of Savings - \$118 M
4. Cost to Close - \$7.9 M

This estimate may be low, but is the estimate provided by the Air Force in their COBRA studies.

5. Additional Personnel Savings, same as Bergstrom (--\$220 M). This is the estimated manpower savings resulting from closure. This estimate is believed to be high, but is the estimate provided by the Air Force for Bergstrom. Homestead manpower costs are at least as great as Bergstrom.

C. Summary of Cost Saving.

- Move Carswell to Austin - \$81.5 million.
- Close Homestead - \$110 million.

Present Value of Total Overhead Savings for same combat capability - \$191.5 million.

Additional Personnel Savings -- \$400 million.

USAF Response: Alternative Proposal

Air Force Response - The decision to close Bergstrom Air Reserve Station was the culmination of extensive analysis by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. Carswell NAS ranked higher than Bergstrom in Criterion I, Mission (Flying) Requirements, and Criterion II, Facilities. Specifically, Carswell ranked higher than Bergstrom in both Airfield Capabilities, and Air Reserve Component (ARC) Operational Effectiveness. In addition, Carswell is considered by the AFRES to be much better demographically for recruiting purposes, and ranks better than Bergstrom in Joint Training Opportunities, Training Opportunities (Airspace), and in the cost of bedding down an F-16 squadron.

In its attempt to downsize, the Air Force Reserve found it to be more beneficial from a fiscal standpoint to close Bergstrom. AFRES plans to draw down to four F-16 squadrons and consolidate and reduce its infrastructure and BOS costs. In the case of Bergstrom, the AFRES is totally responsible for the airfield and its operation, versus Carswell, where the costs can be shared jointly with the Navy and the Air National Guard. While the community's proposal did warrant consideration, it is the Air Force Reserve's opinion that closing Bergstrom, and maintaining an AFRES F-16 unit at Carswell is clearly the best option.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Alternative Proposal

1. The USAF position is a restatement of what is contained in the Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendation (Volume V) and the rhetoric used by AFRES as stated by Brig. Gen. Bradley in his testimony before the BRACC to justify their decision to place Bergstrom on the Air Force list.

2. The statement that Carswell is considered by AFRES to be much better

demographically for recruiting purposes does not apparently take into consideration that the Austin MSA supports a much smaller guard/reserve population than does the Dallas/Ft Worth MSA. NAS Ft Worth is scheduled to have 11,500 reservists assigned. Considering the fact that the 924 FW is currently manned at 101% and could be manned at a much higher level, it does not appear the unit has any problems attracting reservists. Bergstrom has traditionally run 8-10 points higher than Carswell (FY 92 BSM-106.4%/FWH-95.6%; FY 93 BSM-98.8%/FWH-91.0%; FY 94 BSM-103.4%/FWH-92.6%). Another point is that the 924 FW is the only AFRES unit located between San Antonio and Ft Worth. Without this unit, there are a lot of people that would not be able to participate in the reserve program without traveling extremely long distances. Another factor is that the 301 FW has a policy that all members of that unit must live within 50 miles of the base. The 924 FW has no such policy and as a result allows participation from a much larger percentage of the population.

3. In response to the statement about Carswell ranking better in Joint Training Opportunities and Training Opportunities (Airspace), that has been shown to be incorrect. The 924 FW has at least as good and in many cases better training airspace and opportunities than does the 301 FW.

4. The statement that AFRES plans to draw down to four F-16 squadrons has already been addressed. The original plan from AFRES was to close the 926 FW at NAS New Orleans and convert the 301 FW to tankers. This left AFRES with four F-16 squadrons. The 926 FW is currently not funded nor programmed for existence beyond FY 96/4.

5. The statement that AFRES is totally responsible for the airfield and its operation shows a basic lack of information. The 924 FW is only responsible for the cantonment area and will operate the runway, tower, and nav aids only until the city takes over in 1996. Once again future changes that impact on our operating costs were not considered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Alternative Proposal

4. Page IV-6, paragraph IIA is full of errors. First, they stated that in 1993, Air Force estimated that consolidating the Austin unit to Ft. Worth would cost \$6 million and save \$20 million per year. Later, it is stated that moving the Ft. Worth flying unit to Austin would cost \$4.5 million. In fact, HQ AFRES has identified a \$10 million MILCON cost to relocate the Ft. Worth unit to Austin. Also, note that this paragraph uses the unsubstantiated figure of \$2.5 million per year overhead at Ft. Worth to suggest a savings if the Ft. Worth unit was moved. It fails to mention that on page III of this document, they show an overhead at Austin of \$3.5 million per year.

• 5. Page IV-7. The fifth point states that personnel savings of \$182 million are available based on the Air Force 1993 estimate of \$20 million per year in annual savings. Again, the reference is so vague that it is not possible to refer to a source document; however assuming that the \$20 million dollar savings refers to the elimination of the support personnel at Bergstrom during the study of cost savings in moving the Austin unit to Ft. Worth, the number is not valid if the direction of unit moves is reversed. Actually, there are 312 support personnel at Austin and 208 at the Air Force Reserve unit in Ft. Worth. Obviously, the \$20 million figure referred to the elimination of the larger personnel package and less savings are accrued if the smaller Ft. Worth package is eliminated.

• Point six is also in error. The latest figures for total reservists is 7800 at Ft. Worth vice 11,500 and 105 aircraft versus 140 plus.(Source?)

• Austin Exhibit IV-A purporting to show 30 T/O, approach, or landing per hour from NAS Fort Worth JRB, is factually incorrect.(Source?)

• Austin's statement that it will be difficult to recruit is factually incorrect. It has been the policy of two 301 Fighter Wing Commanders to intentionally recruit far fewer than our recruiting base would allow, in order to preserve positions for members at other units that were scheduled to deactivate. The policy has given many highly trained and deserving Reservists an opportunity to continue their military careers, while avoiding training costs attendant to recruiting off the street.

• The ABSG assertion that "with so many reservists it will be difficult to drill" is factually incorrect. Drill schedules have and will continue to be deconflicted when appropriate, and co-scheduled when mutually beneficial. There are many advantages to a Joint Reserve Base, not the least of which are Joint Training opportunities not available in Austin.

Austin's assertion that "closure of the 301 FW at Ft. Worth will not only save the Navy substantial military construction monies, but also save perhaps 2 years in their move completion timing is not only factually incorrect, exactly the opposite is true. The Navy was able to construct a very cost effective timetable because of the 301 FW and the capabilities it already has in place. The timetable was planned with that in mind. To take away what the 301 FW brings to the Joint Reserve Base concept would both delay the existing timetable significantly and increase the cost. The obvious reason is that the Navy

would have to tear apart an existing Joint infrastructure and replace it.

7. This paper is not a point by point rebuttal of all inconsistent data found in the subject document. Much of the data presented in the document had no source reference; only glaring errors were identified.

8. Most notably, figures on costs at Bergstrom reimbursable to the city following establishment of the International Airport were missing, probably because they don't exist. The net effect of the Air Force Reserve accepting such an arrangement would be the same as signing a blank check over to the city of Austin with nothing guaranteed in return.

NAS FT. WORTH PROJECTED DAILY OPERATIONAL TEMPO

	<u>LAUNCH AND RECOVERY</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE APPROACHES/ LANDINGS</u>	<u>TOTAL EVENTS</u>
TACTICAL ¹	118	60	1782 178
MULTI-ENGINE	10	10	20
ROTARY	25	5	3 30
TRANSIENT	10	2	12
LOCKHEERD	6	2	8
TOTALS	169	79	248

¹ The Tactical projections are based on a survey of the fighter units involved. The F-16 squadron flies 16 sorties per day on a normal basis. The other projections are Navy estimates contained in its Defense Recommendation for Carswell white paper. Almost 90% of the tactical sorties are daylight sorties, i.e. on 9 out of 10 days these 168+ tactical events will be attempted during normal flying hours 0830-1630, or 21 tactical events per hour. The remaining 70 events would be more evenly spread over the airport hours, or about 6 events per hour. 30 events per hour from a single runway are obviously not possible on a normal basis.

TEAM FT WORTH RESPONSE

NAS FT. WORTH PROJECTED DAILY OPERATIONAL TEMPO¹

	<u>LAUNCH AND RECOVERY</u>		<u>ADD'L MULTIPLE APPROACHES/ LANDINGS</u>		<u>TOTAL EVENTS</u>	
	<u>ABSG</u>	<u>Team FtWorth</u>	<u>ABSG</u>	<u>Team FtWorth</u>	<u>ABSG</u>	<u>Team FtWorth</u>
TACTICAL ²	118	76	60	52	178	128
MULTI-ENGINE	10	10	10	10	20	20
ROTARY	25	24	5	12	30	36
TRANSIENT ³	10	4	2	2	12	6
LOCKHEED	6	8	2	0	8	8
TOTALS	169	122	79	76	248	198

¹ All projections are based on actual contacts with units involved. Reduced numbers are the result of inaccurate ABSG information as to the number of units relocating, possessed aircraft of each unit, and actual ops tempo data. Ref telecons, 25 May 1995, with: VMFA-112 and VMFA-124 (DSN 874-6306), VMFA-201 (874-6195), TANG C-130s (874-6560), Army Reserve (874-6550), TANG CH-47/UH-60s (874-6560), Lockheed (Comm 763-3619), and NAS FW JRB Transient Alert (739-5719)

² Using 90% daylight sortie figure of ABSG, 0830-1630 flying window, yields 14 tactical events per hour (198 x .9)/8. Since two-ship is the average size takeoff movement, this number can be reduced by one third, since ATC treats two-ship takeoff as single event for traffic purposes. This yields 10 events/hr.

³ Monthly average is 198, of which 75% occur during weekend, yielding 1.65 aircraft per week day (rounded up L&R = 4)

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE³⁴

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. TEAM FORT WORTH Review

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
McMullen Range	Actually two ranges - Yankee (north) and Dixie (south). The Navy owns the land, but their use has diminished. The Kelly Guard controls Yankee, while the Bergstrom Reserve controls Dixie. The ranges are good conventional ranges and have a number of tactical targets.	125 NM	Both ranges are fully manned and under-utilized. Could easily support more squadrons. The active duty Air Force at Randolph also used Dixie in cooperation with Bergstrom.
McMullen Range	Two complexes on one range. Yankee and Dixie are extremely small and suffer critical restrictions which impede quality tactical training.	126 nm	Both complexes are readily available for units wishing the limited training opportunities present.
Chase MOA	As the Navy leaves Chase, the entire air space becomes more available. Navy Corpus and Kingsville use the Chase MOA's to a limited extent.	70 nm	Largely available. One Chase MOA is close to Bergstrom, while another Chase MOA overlies McMullen Range.
Kingsville MOA (Formerly Chase)	Limited vertical blocks render this MOA untenable for modern air combat training.	Kingsville 4&5: 94 nm Kingsville 3: 134 nm	Continued use of this MOA by USN training wings stationed at Kingsville NAS will restrict availability for off-station users.

³⁴ ABSG distances to closest edge. TEAM FORT WORTH distances to area centroid.

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. TEAM FORT WORTH Review

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
Peason Range	Good tactical range in western Louisiana. The new Army Medium conflict exercise are. Ft. Polk.	225 nm	Will become major support area for exercises.
Peason Ridge Range	Range closed in August 1992.	241 nm	Range closed in August 1992. No plan to reopen to high performance aircraft.
Ft. Hood	North Ft. Hood has a dedicated AF range - Shoal Creek. South Ft. Hood has a live bombing area. The Army sometimes limits access.	70 nm	Used increasingly to support the Army at Ft. Hood.
Ft. Hood	Shoal Creek, has no ability to score bombs, and is restricted to training ordnance only (no strafe). The impact area in Ft. Hood is useable for heavyweight inerts or live bombs.	65 nm	The US Army owns the Fort Hood MOA. Shoal Creek time must be approved by the army. The impact area is available for joint training opportunities.

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. TEAM FORT WORTH Review

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
Brownwood MOA	Brownwood includes separate air compat areas that can be used individually. Used together, the area can accommodate a big fight.	96 nm	Navy Dallas owns and uses a lot. Also, Carswell and Dyess B1's are users. Additionally, the FAA preempts military use for holding DFW traffic. Little available time left.
Brownwood MOA	MOA vertical limits of 7,000' through 17,999'. ATCAA allows operation up to FL 340. Geographical boundaries well exceed requirements of modern day air combat tactics training.	Center of Hornet & Tomcat 116 nm	Navy Fort Worth owns the Brownwood MOA. Scheduling priority given to units based at the Navy Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base.
Brady MOA	Brady is low (23,000 ft. and below) which is advantageous for Low altitude training, but not as useful for unlimited training.	60 nm	Bergstrom owns and controls. It is close and easy to use.
Brady MOA	Brady MOA is untenable for modern day air combat tactics training. It is useful for LOWAT, although impeded with several noise measles.	95 nm	Readily available for use, as most units utilize more productive airspace.

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. TEAM FORT WORTH Review

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
Randolph MOA	The Randolph 2A MOA is large with a good altitude block for unlimited air combat training.	70 nm	Other Randolph MOA's are closer, but normally unavailable because of heavy use by Randolph.
Randolph MOA	The Randolph 2A MOA is limited from 9,000' MSL to FL 210. This extremely limited vertical block is untenable for modern day air combat training.	Randolph 1A: 64 nm Randolph 1B/C: 74 nm Randolph 2A: 96 nm	All Randolph MOAs are heavily utilized by AETC assets located at Randolph AFB. Off-station users would have limited availability to these MOAs.
Crystal MOA	The Crystal MOA is large, with the biggest altitude block of any MOA in Texas.	130 nm	Crystal is used and controlled by the Kelly Air National Guard, and accordingly is normally available. However, its distance from Bergstrom makes it a second choice.
Crystal MOA	The Crystal MOA is an adequate MOA, with a vertical block from 6,000' MSL to FL 450.	160 nm	TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the ABSG statement regarding Crystal availability.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

ABSG

“Austin Update May 10, 1995”

Point / Counterpoint

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): General Statement

The City of Austin has provided the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC) with detailed information over the last month to support its firmly held position that the Bergstrom Air Reserve Station (BARS) cantonment area should not be shut down. In fact, the City's position is that the BARS should be expanded to further enhance the Department of Defense's financial Return on Investment while providing strong Military Value per the DBCRC's criteria. The following outlines our current evaluation with regard to that criteria:

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: General Statement (**Community responds**)

A. The Law and the Promise.

1. The 1991 BRAC Law: *"The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport. If no decision on a civilian airport is reached by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed. If the Reserve units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be distributed."*
 - a. Citizens of Austin voted May 1, 1993, 63% to .37% to move the municipal airport to Bergstrom site.
 - b. Plans call for City's Aviation Department to move all cargo operations to Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (A-BIA) in October 1996 and to assume majority of operating expenses.
 - c. All air operations will move to A-BIA by end of 1998 and Aviation Department and FAA will assume all operating expenses.
2. The Air Force's 1992 Promise: In a special meeting of the City Council on February 21, 1992, James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Military Installations, USAF, told the citizens of Austin that, *"Our plan is still, and will remain, and our planning efforts will be toward operating that unit at Bergstrom assuming that there is going to be an airport."* and again, *"Certainly, we would like to see an airport there because then we could leave the unit right where it is. But that's your decision, the community's decision, however you decide it we'll make it work for the Department of the Air Force."*
3. The 1993 BRAC Law: *"Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom cantonment area until at least the end of 1996."*
 - a. At April 6, 1995 BRAC visit, Commissioner Cox pointed out that the 1993 law reaffirmed the 1991 law that the unit would remain if Austin met the stated conditions.
4. Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCIF)
 - a. 1991 BRAC law: *"The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for the Air Force to operate it there."*
 1. Most environmentally advanced airplane stripping and painting facility in the Air Force.
 2. Saves Air Force between \$1.5 and \$2.0 million a year over cost of 100 aircraft at depot.

5. In 1993, Commissioner McPherson referred to "*an inherent ninth criteria, which is that the United States doesn't break its word or this Commission ought not to break its word or to cooperate in the breaking of the word.*"
 - a. Citizens of Austin have upheld every aspect of the requirements for keeping the Reserves at Bergstrom Air Reserve Station (BARS).
 - b. The master plan and costs for A-BIA have been greatly affected by the 430 ac. cantonment area and other needs of the Air Force Reserves.
 - c. Construction has begun on south access road for the cantonment area (\$3.7 mil) and utilities rerouting (\$464,897, thus far).
 - d. City has committed \$600,000 directly to the Reserves for the cantonment area (over and above utilities rerouting and other costs).

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: The Law and the Promise.

A. The Law and the Promise.

1.

a.

b.

c.

2.

3.

a.

4.

a.

1.

2.

5.

a.

b.

c.

d.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS' Military Value to Nation.

B. BARS' Military Value to Nation.

1. AFRES's F-16's primary mission of close air support for ground troops is supported by BARS 3 to 4 times more than any other unit because of its close proximity to the "largest army fort in the free world", Ft. Hood. (The only AFRES unit located in such close proximity to an Army fort.)
2. 924th FW accomplishes mission.
 - a. 704th FS part of team which won **first place** in "Long Shot '95" competition just completed at Nellis AFB, Nev. This competition included units from the AF and AFRES.
 - b. 924th FW flew over Bosnia as part of "Deny Flight" for six weeks in March of 1995 without a single sortie canceled due to mechanical or equipment failure.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: BARS' Military Value to Nation.

B. BARS' Military Value to Nation.

1. BARS does *not* support close air support missions 3 to 4 times more than any other unit. The 457 FS supported 65% *more* close air support missions to Ft. Hood than the 704 FS for the time period July 1994 through March 16, 1995³⁵.

There were over 200 total missions scheduled for the Ft. Hood Tactical Range in the time period stated above. The 704 FS flew 20 scheduled close air support missions to Ft. Hood during this time. The 457FS flew 33 scheduled close air support missions to Ft. Hood during this time.

The 457 FS also flew 38 missions to Fort Sill from September 1994 through May 1995³⁶ (a five month period). The 704 FS / 924 FW did not support any CAS missions to Fort Sill. The centralized location of NAS FW, JRB uniquely positions assets so as to achieve maximum on-station and off-station joint training opportunities with Army units at *both* Fort Sill and Fort Hood.

BARS is not the only other unit located in such close proximity to an Army fort. The 704 FS is located approximately 65 miles from Ft. Hood. The 457 FS is 85 miles from Ft Hood. If flown direct at fighter speeds, it would take an extra 2.5 minutes to arrive from Ft. Worth than it would from Austin. Additionally, to get maximum training on

³⁵ Appendix (005): 3 ASOG Close Air Support Summary. Excluding August and September due to lack of data from 3 ASOG.

³⁶ Fort Sill Scheduler (MSgt Taylor) DSN 639-2300.

close air support missions, low level routes are usually flown to tactical ground ranges. There are no military training routes (MTR's) which lead directly from Austin to Ft. Hood³⁷. If the 704 FS were to use an MTR it would drastically increase their distance both going to and departing Ft. Hood range. The 457 FS uses two MTR's which run almost directly to Ft. Hood making 85 miles a realistic number. The 457 FS is the originator of these low levels, specifically designed for use with the Fort Hood MOA. Fighter units stationed at Bergstrom ARS have no advantage for Fort Hood composite training than units positioned at Navy FW, JRB.

2. "924th FW accomplishes mission...."

a. It is an accurate statement that the "704th FS was part of team which won first place in Long Shot '95". However, Part II, Section J (Austin Update May 10, 1995), has greivous and misleading statements concerning the 924 FW / 704 FS. This item will be appropriately addressed.

b. Many other Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces, including the 301 FW / 457 FS, have also contributed to real world contingencies, with equal success rates. TEAM FORT WORTH congratulates all ARC forces for the dedication and sacrifice they have made.

³⁷ Appendix (006): DOD AP/1B Chart, MTR's - Central US

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS', an economical locale for Air Force Reserves.

- C. BARS', an economical locale for Air Force Reserves.
 - 1. Cost to operate declining due to collocation on civilian airport.
 - 2. Collocation of addition units, both AFRES and other DOD, possible on existing cantonment area and in existing facilities.
 - 3. Savings of significant MILCON funds and other DOD costs with collocation of additional AFRES units to BARS.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: BARS', an economical locale...

- C. BARS'. an economic locale for Air Force Reserves.
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Economic Impact on Austin.

D. Economic Impact on Austin

1. Significant cost associated with design of A-BIA around cantonment area.
(Austin will see no return on investment if Reserves leave.)
2. '91 Base Realignment and Closure already cost Austin: 3,870 military and 1,256 civilian jobs, directly, 6,628 military dependents; and approximately \$330,000,000 per year.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Economic Impact on Austin.

D. Economic Impact on Austin.

- 1.
- 2.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS' can support any mission.

E. BARS' can support any mission

1. Bergstrom Air Force Base was built as a SAC base and the current Reserve "wet" ramp and hangers (3) located in the BARS were built for KC-135's to support the B-52s.
2. Local ranges and MOAs provide first class training areas for all type aircraft.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: BARS' can support any mission.

E. BARS' can support any mission.

- 1.
- 2.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS' Environmental Statement.

F. Bergstrom Air Reserve Station is one of only two locations in all of AFRES which is in an environmental attainment area.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: BARS' Environmental Statement. (Community responds)

F.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995) Section II, Paragraph J: An Accurate Assessment...

An accurate assessment of the facilities and training areas available is reflected in the 924 FW first place finish in Long Shot '95. Long Shot is a composite force employment competition between teams of the general purpose Numbered Air Forces. Long Shot is conducted as a low cost/short notice, come as you are war, involving *minimal training preparation for execution*. The objective of Long Shot is bombs on-target-on-time with no losses. The missions involve high speed, low level ingress to a scoreable target for full scale weapons delivery while countering a myriad of surface to air threats utilizing electronic threat emitters and engaging adversary air fighters (LOWAT). After successfully striking the target the participants must egress their way through the threats, thus exercising the skills required in a combat scenario. Based on the 924 FW first place finish the community's assessment of training areas appears accurate.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: An Accurate Assessment...

The statement above is typical of the half truths and distortion of operational factors presented throughout ABSG findings. The description of the Long Shot competition is complete and accurate. The competition was an excellent indicator of combat mission readiness in that it was a "come as you are war". However, the phrase "...924 FW first place finish in Long Shot '95" would lead most readers to believe the 924FW won first place in the Long Shot '95 competition. However...

The 924 FW were *members* of the first place team and contributed to that team's success. The 924 FW, along with other reserve and active duty units comprised the winning team. Although not mentioned in the ABSG statement, the winning team also included the 301FW.

The Long Shot judges individually evaluated units on each team and assigned points based on "bombs on target on time". The total points for each team was the cumulative of each units point total. The 457 FS tallied 800 points out of a possible 800 points, for a 100% combat effectiveness³⁸. The 704 FS tallied 475 points out of 800 points available for a 59% combat effectiveness³⁹. The 704 FS finished 11th out of 27 competing units. The 457 FS scored higher than all USAF reserve, and guard contestants! These results placed the 457 FS among

³⁸ Appendix (007): 12 AF Long Shot '95 Summary.

³⁹ Ibid.

four units with a 100% success rate (other aircraft were two F-117 and one B-1B). The 457 FS unit was the *only* F-16 unit to achieve a 100% success rate.

In ABSG style, an accurate assessment of Long Shot '95 results shows the 924 FW facilities and training areas available to be 59% effective when compared to the 301 FW facilities and training.

The ABSG owes the 301 FW / 457 FS and 924 FW / 704 FS Long Shot competitors an apology for their portrayal of the Long Shot '95 results.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995) Section III: Return on Investment.

A. City of Austin Costs

1. \$600,000 Invested to Date
2. Changes to Accommodate Cantonment Area
 - a. Different terminal location
 - b. More demolition required
 - c. Utilities rerouted to cantonment are - \$465,000
 - d. Greater distance between runways
 - e. Second runway 9,000' vice 7,000'
 - f. New cross taxiway
 - g. South access road for Reserves (under construction)-\$3.25M
 - h. Joint fire fighting facility (under construction)-\$2.3M
 - i. Moving cargo in 1996. Prior to 1998 full airport opening will cost \$1M per year.
 - j. Sunk cost at former proposed Manor site-\$ 10M

B. Costs at Austin-Bergstrom

1. Air Force Analysis

When the Base Closure Commission closed Bergstrom AFB in 1991, the Air Force offered the City of Austin the option of moving its commercial airport to Bergstrom. As previously discussed, Mr. Boatright, Deputy Secretary of the Air Force, Installations, told the City of Austin that the Air Force Reserve unit would remain at Bergstrom if the City of Austin elected to use Bergstrom as its

commercial airport. The 1991 and 1993 BRACC reports and related statutes define the City of Austin and Air Force obligations.

It is reasonable to expect that between the time of closure of Bergstrom in 1993 as an active duty Air Force Base and 1996, when the City of Austin assumes operation, that the costs of running Bergstrom as an Air Reserve Base would be relatively high. It is also reasonable to expect that the cost of maintaining an Air Force Reserve unit as a tenant at Austin-Bergstrom after 1996 would be substantially reduced. The heightened costs associated with the period 1993-1996 are expected costs of defense conversion. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that 1994 and 1995 represent the peak costs of the Air Force Reserve at Austin.

Notwithstanding common sense, the Air Force in its cost analysis of Bergstrom has used 1994 as its benchmark year. Extrapolating 1994 costs over 20 years is not only inappropriate, but potentially misleading.

In its response of April 29, the Air Force implies that the Austin Citizens group is challenging the operation of the financial computer program DOD uses in its BRACC deliberations - the "COBRA" model. However, the quarrel is not with the operation of COBRA, but rather the implementation by Air Force. It is difficult - and unnecessary - to criticize the Air Force implementation, because the Air Force failed to state or provide its assumptions and inputs into the COBRA model.

The analysis below, while simplistic, should be accurate for comparison of alternative locations. Further, the assumptions and inputs are stated so that they can be objectively and critically analyzed.

2. 1994 Costs

The costs associated with the Air Force Reserve can be categorized as: (1) fixed overhead costs, (2) personnel overhead costs; and (3) costs of military operation. The costs associated with military operation, category (3), are not to be considered in BRACC analysis. Category (1) was reviewed in detail in past presentations to the BRACC by Austin Citizens group. Categories (1) and (2) comprise the "overhead" or "Base Operating Support" Costs (BOS) in Air Force jargon.

a. Fixed Overhead Costs

The current fixed overhead costs provided to the Austin Citizens Group was approximately \$3.8 million for 1995. In 1996, these costs are reduced by about \$400,000 when the City of Austin assumes the cost of operating the navigational aids and air traffic control (ATCALS). Further, as the Air Force Reserve cantonment area shrinks from 3500 acres as an active duty base to 300 acres, many of its fixed

costs are reduced. For example, the utility costs are a dominant cost in fixed costs and utility costs are expected to reduce over \$200,000 in 1995 alone compared to 1994. Fixed overhead costs while close to \$4 million in 1994, should be reduced to about \$3 million by 1998 when full commercial operations begin at Austin-Bergstrom.

b Personnel Overhead Costs.

The total civilians, employed in 1994 in nonmilitary positions at Austin-Bergstrom was about 290. Of this amount, about 55 were employed as security police 55 for fire protection, and 100 were part of civil engineering. Between 1993, when the Active Duty Air Force left and 1996, the start of commercial cargo activities at Austin-Bergstrom, a large number of civilians were required. For example, the AF Reserve must provide around the clock fire protection for not only flying activities, but also structural fires for the over 3000 acres and buildings of the former Air Force Base. Similarly, a large number of civil engineers and planners are required to vacate Air Force buildings, assist the City of Austin with construction plans, and oversee construction in the 300 acre Reserve cantonment area.

3. 1998-Joint Use Plan

a. City of Austin Responsibilities

In 1996 the City of Austin begins commercial cargo operations at the Austin-Bergstrom airport. In 1998, full commercial operation at Austin-Bergstrom will begin with the closing, with Austin's current airport Robert Mueller.

Collocation at a joint use facility is a significant financial benefit to the Air Force, although it is difficult to quantify. Examples include the following.

1. Assumption of the cost to operate air traffic control and navigational aids. Currently, the Air Force spends about \$400,000 per year and this number will be reduced to about \$10,000 per, year by 1998.
2. The cost of maintaining a 12,000 foot runway is substantial. By 1998 the City of Austin will not only assume maintenance responsibility, but will have added a 9000 foot parallel runway.
3. The cost of noise abatement and community relations is a substantial cost to the Air Force at its operating locations. The City of Austin will assume responsibility after 1996.
4. Utility provision is expensive infrastructure. The City of Austin is undertaking extensive capital improvements to provide water, waste, electricity, and gas to the Military cantonment area at Austin-Bergstrom.
5. The City of Austin has undertaken the responsibility of providing access roads construction and maintenance into the Military cantonment area.

b. Tenant Units

Currently, there are many tenant U.S. government units either located at Austin-Bergstrom, or with pending written requests to relocate to Austin-Bergstrom. If the Air Force Reserve were to abandon Austin-Bergstrom as the host unit, these tenant units would have to make alternative costly arrangements. For example, the Air Force has proposed moving Tenth Air Force to NAS Ft. Worth at a military construction cost of \$2.5 million and a relocation cost of \$4.4 million, for a total of \$7.1 million. As presented to the BRACC on its site visit to Austin on April 6, the RCCF is a state of the art aircraft strip and paint facility that by Air Combat Command's own estimate save the Air Force about \$2 million per year.

Without the support of the Air Force Reserve for security, fire, administration, ground equipment, etc. the viability of the RCCF would be in doubt.

<u>Tenant</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Military Manning</u>
Headquarters Tenth Air Force, AF Reserve	Command over assigned Reserve Units	140
Army National Guard	Helicopter Unit, located at current Austin airport	450
US Navy NR Seal Delivery Vehicle Teams 1 & 2	Currently in place at Austin-Bergstrom	300
G5 M-Force Up Navy	Request pending *	182
Ground Combat Readiness Center, AF Reserve	Ground combat training and drug interdiction	103
Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF)	ACC state of the art aircraft strip and paint facility	13 (+100 Civ)
NASA	NASA operate 3 ER-2 aircraft for will operate about 170 days per year	41
Texas Headquarters Civil Air Patrol	Assist Air Force and FAA in search and rescue	40
DOD Investigative Services	Security Investigations, Industrial Security, etc.	7
ROTC	Univ. of Texas	6

4. Year 2000 Estimated Costs

a. Fixed Overhead Costs

As previously discussed, the fixed overhead for the Air Force Reserve is estimated to reduce to approximately \$3.2 million per year by 1998. This is primarily due to the assumption of air traffic control, navigational aid, runway maintenance and

other infrastructure expenses and a reduction in utility expenses as the Air Force turns buildings over to the City of Austin and shrinks into its 300 acre cantonment area.

b. Personnel Overhead Costs

Personnel costs are difficult to estimate. The 1994 number of non-military civilians is about 290. This number will reduce gradually over the next five years for several reasons.

- First, the City of Austin will assume responsibility for structural fires. This relieves the Air Force from 24 hour per day fire protection services. Instead the Air Force will provide an augmentation fire protection service during Air Force flying operations.
- Second, Air Force currently maintains a large civil engineering staff to support the transfer of land and facilities to the City of Austin and the construction of the Reserve cantonment area and the approximately \$13 million in military construction.
- Third, the Air Force Reserve currently incurs the total cost for security of the cantonment area. With the addition of tenant units, memorandums of understanding are currently in negotiation for contributions from tenant units for the cost of security. This may be in the form of manpower or direct expense, but will in any event reduce the effective cost of security of the Air Force Reserve.

For these reasons, the effective overhead personnel costs are conservatively estimated at about 225 by the year 2000. Because the Air Force has not provided any of its assumptions or inputs into its COBRA financial model, it is difficult to estimate the approximate costs associated with overhead personnel or the reduction savings. However, in 1993 the Air Force did provide its inputs for its COBRA financial model and used a cost factor of about \$42,000 per head inclusive of salary, benefits, and burden.

	<u>1998 Fixed Overhead</u>	<u>1994 Personnel Overhead</u>	<u>1998 Personnel Overhead</u>	<u>Total 1998+ Overhead Costs</u>
Air Force Estimate	\$8 m	\$12+M	\$12+M	\$21 M
Connect Estimate	\$3.2 M	\$12+M	\$9.4-M	\$12.5 M

*BOS or fixed overhead budgets were obtained from the 924 FW as about \$3.9 M in 1994 with the reductions discussed above for a 1998 estimate of \$3.2 M. The Air Force estimate of \$8 M is difficult to understand because no assumptions or inputs are provided by the Air Force, but appears to include about \$2.5 M in active duty man days for military reservists.

C. Cost Comparison

1. Cost Factors for Reserve Unit

a. Fixed Overhead Costs

Fixed overhead cost appear to be fairly consistent among reserve units. As expected, stand-alone units such as Homestead, Grissom, March, and Willow Grove are the highest, but not significantly. A unit collocated at a Joint use field, such as Bergstrom, are slightly higher than a unit located at an active duty base, such as Luke or Hill.

b. Personnel Overhead Costs

Here again, stand-alone units such as Homestead, Grissom, March, and Willow Grove are the highest, while a unit located at an active duty base, such as Luke or Hill are the lowest. A unit collocated at a Joint use field, such as Bergstrom, are mid-range.

The numbers used in the analysis below are (1) actual numbers from stand alone units; and (2) estimates from units located at active duty bases. The estimates for overhead personnel for a unit at an active duty base are only rough approximations. For example, the Air Force Reserve unit at Luke AFB has only about 30 personnel on its payroll in the "fixed overhead" or BOS category. However, the Air Force uses a planning number of about 8% of total military for overhead personnel planning, plus special categories. For a 1200 military reserve unit, therefore, about 100 overhead personnel are estimated for additional support - e.g. supply, fire protection, security, administration, recreation, billeting, etc. For stand-alone units we estimate about 100 personnel in the overhead category.

c. Construction/Opportunity Costs

The Austin BRACC Study Group collected the current construction costs for the services at the various AFRES locations. In our analysis "opportunity cost" is taken as the construction cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer if the listed AFRES location were to close. For example, at Homestead \$88 million in new construction projects are planned and \$15 million has been spent. At Austin/Bergstrom, \$13 million in new construction is authorized and \$2 million has been spent. At Ft. Worth (Carswell), the Navy saves \$39 million in construction costs and the Air Force saves about \$20 million if the Air Force Reserve at Ft. Worth were to close or relocate. At Phoenix (Luke AFB), although the value of the AFRES facilities are close to \$50 million, only \$20 million of new construction is planned in the next 2 years.

2. Alternative Location Cost Comparison

	Fixed Overhead (\$ millions)	1994 Personnel Overhead	2000 Personnel Overhead	Opportunity Costs
Grissom ARB	\$4	360	360	0

March ARB	\$4	400	450	0
Willow Grove	\$3	300	300	0
Carswell ARB	\$2.8	325	100	60 M
Homestead ARB	\$4.0	300	300	73 M
Bergstrom ARB	\$3.2	290	225	11 M
Luke AR	\$2.8	100	100	20 M
Hill AR	\$2.8	100	160	0

3. Timing of Potential Savings (Criteria 5)

The BRACC procedure correctly recognizes that near term savings are more favorable and less speculative than long term savings. A five year present value analysis on the above comparison reveals that Austin-Bergstrom is a cost effective location.

5 Year Net Present Value

	Annual Overhead	Opportunity Costs	Present Value
Grissom ARB	19,120,000	0	83,936,000
March ARB	20,800,000	0	91,311,000
Willow Grove	15,600,000	0	68,483,000
Carswell ARB	9,300,000	59,000,000	99,826,000
Homestead ARB	16,600,000	73,000,000	145,873,000
Bergstrom ARS	12,650,000	11,000,000	66,533,000
Luke AR	7,200,000	20,000,000	51,607,000
Hill AR	7,200,000	0	31,607,000

*Using a discount rate of 4.5%, as currently set by OSD, and a 5 year cost recovery period. 4.5% discount rate is below the cost of funds of the U.S. government - using a realistic discount rate would be more favorable to Bergstrom.

Cost to closure has not been considered, but would make the Austin location look substantially more favorable. The Air Force in their COBRA analysis estimated the cost to close Austin/Bergstrom at \$13 million and the cost to close Miami/Homestead at \$7.9 million. Obviously, the cost to close Fort Worth, Phoenix, New Orleans, or Salt Lake City would be substantially less than Austin or Miami because they would remain as operating DOD facilities.

4. 20 Year Savings (Criteria 4)


20 Year New Present Value

	Annual Overhead	Opportunity Costs	Present Value
Grissom ARB	19,120,000	0	248,000,000
March ARB	20,800,000	0	270,000,000
Willow Grove	15,600,000	0	203,000,000
Carswell ARB	7,200,000	59,000,000	152,000,000
Homestead ARB	16,600,000	73,000,000	289,000,000
Bergstrom ARS	12,650,000	11,000,000	175,000,000
Luke AR	7,200,000	20,000,000	114,000,000
Hill AR	7,200,000	0	94,000,000

*Using a discount rate of 4.5%, as currently set by OSD, and a 20 year cost recovery period.


Even using a 20 year analysis period, Austin-Bergstrom is a cost effective location.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response Section III: Return on Investment.



Appendix (001)
Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship

(JNC 44)



 CLEARANCE | TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA
 | Clim: 28000 Cruise: 452T
 | temp: -40C wind:
 | FF: 2544

FREQUENCIES

 DEP FIELD DATA | TOT DIST | TOT ETE | TOT FUEL
 |-----|-----|-----
 | 423 | 1+48+58 | 7808

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98				+00+00 00:00:00		1200 7650
	L/O @ 28000		N 2937.82 W09753.97	147 147	24 24	300C 452G	+02+57 00:02:57		437 7213
002	S/D: W-228		N 2700.00 W09600.00	147 147	187 211	300C 452G	+24+51 00:27:48		1054 6159
003	AY 28		N 2700.00 W09600.00	149 149	0 211	450C 480G	+54+30 01:22:18		3867 2292
	L/O @ 31000		N 2729.10 W09542.53	330 330	19 230	300C 474G	+02+16 01:24:34		307 1985
004	KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98	330 330	193 423	300C 474G	+24+24 01:48:58		942 1042

- Starting Configuration:
- 1 Gun (full)
 - 2 Chaff/flares
 - 2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)
 - 1 300 gallon tank with pylon (4/6 empty)

Delay 00+43+00
 5000' / 450C → FF: 5000 1L/1.2

CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T
 temp: -40C wind:
 FF: 2344

FREQUENCIES

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	1+28+59	5865

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98				+00+00 00:00:00		1200 5700
	L/O @ 28000		N 2940.34 W09755.84	147 147	21 21	300C 452G	+02+32 00:02:32		375 5325
002	S/D: W-228		N 2700.00 W09600.00	147 147	190 211	300C 452G	+25+17 00:27:49		988 4337
003	AY 8		N 2700.00 W09600.00	149 149	0 211	450C 480G	+34+30 01:02:19		2110 2227
	L/O @ 31000		N 2728.25 W09541.93	330 330	17 229	300C 474G	+02+07 01:04:26		284 1943
004	KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98	330 330	194 423	300C 474G	+24+33 01:28:59		908 1035

Starting Configuration:

- 1 Gun (full)
- 2 Chaff/flares
- 2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)

DELAY 00+23+00

5000' / 450c → FF: 4300' / HR

CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T
 temp: -40C wind:
 FF: 2344

FREQUENCIES

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	1+15+58	4862

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98				+00+00 00:00:00		1200 5700
	L/O @ 28000		N 2940.34 W09755.84	147 147	21 21	300C 452G	+02+32 00:02:32		375 5325
002	S/D: W-228		N 2700.00 W09600.00	147 147	190 211	300C 452G	+25+17 00:27:49		988 4337
003	AY LB		N 2700.00 W09600.00	149 149	0 211	450C 480G	+21+30 00:49:19		1080 3257
	L/O @ 31000		N 2729.10 W09542.53	330 330	19 230	300C 474G	+02+15 00:51:34		301 2957
004	KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98	330 330	193 423	300C 474G	+24+24 01:15:58		919 2038

Starting Configuration:

- 1 Gun (full)
- 2 Chaff/flares
- 2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)

DELAY 00 + 10 + 00

5000' / 450C → FF: 4800 lb/hr

CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T
 temp: -40C wind:
 FF: 2525

FREQUENCIES

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	1+13+00	4881


TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98				+00+00 00:00:00		1200 5700
	L/O @ 28000		N 2938.66 W09754.59	147 147	23 23	300C 452G	+02+48 00:02:48		422 5278
002	S/D: W-228		N 2700.00 W09600.00	147 147	188 211	300C 452G	+25+01 00:27:49		1053 4225
003	DELAY B		N 2700.00 W09600.00	149 149	0 211	450C 480G	+18+30 00:46:19		884 3342
	L/O @ 31000		N 2730.80 W09543.73	330 330	21 232	300C 474G	+02+34 00:48:53		346 2996
004	KBSM	35	N 3011.85 W09740.98	330 330	191 423	300C 474G	+24+07 01:13:00		977 2019

Starting Configuration:

- 1 Gun (full)
- 2 Chaff/flares
- 2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)
- 1 Centerline pylon
- 1 AN/ALQ-184

DELAY 00+07+00

5000' / 450C → FF: 5100 lb/LR



Area A : 41.45 x 42.80 = 1774
Area B : 41.45 x 2.7 / 2 = 56
Area C : 41.45 x 13.8 / 2 = 286
Area D : 59.30 x 3 / 2 = 89
Total = 2205 Sq. Mi.

APPENDIX (003) HORNET & TOMCAT AREAS MEASUREMENT

3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

as of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT:	AIR. CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	SORT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS	
								UNIT	UNIT	FLOWN				OFF	EML
2P0701N	5	011500Z	1600Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0702N	5	051500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0703N	5	051530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0704N	5	051900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0705N	5	051930Z	2000Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0706N	5	061500Z	1530Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0707N	5	081530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0708N	5	081800Z	1930Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0709N	5	081930Z	2000Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0710N	5	071500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0711N	5	071530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0712N	5	071900Z	1930Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	NO		X	HHQ CNX		
2P0713N	5	071930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0714N	5	081500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0715N	5	111500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0716N	5	111530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0717N	5	111900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0718N	5	111930Z	2000Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0719N	5	121600Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0720N	5	121530Z	1600Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0721N	5	121900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0722N	5	121930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX		
2P0723N	5	131500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0724N	5	131530Z	1500Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0725N	5	131900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0726N	5	131930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0727N	5	141500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0728N	5	141530Z	1800Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0729N	5	141900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0730N	5	141930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0731N	5	161500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0731N	5	181500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0732N	5	181530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								

77

738+5251 P.14

712 ASOS

14:09

MAY-12-1995

3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

as of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONTROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS	
														OFF	ENL
2P0733N	5	181900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0734N	5	181930Z	2000Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0735N	5	191500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0736N	5	191530Z	1600Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0737N	5	191900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0738N	5	191930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	8CAV/3ASOG	YES	X				
2P0739N	5	201500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0740N	5	201530Z	1600Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0741N	5	201900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0742N	5	201930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0743N	5	211500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	NO		X	NO AIRSPACE		
2P0744N	5	211530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0745N	5	211900Z	1930Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0746N	5	211930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0747N	5	221500Z	1530Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	8CAV/3ASOG	NO		X	OPS CNX		
2P0748N	5	251430Z	1515Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0749N	5	251515Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0750N	5	251830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0751N	5	251930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0752N	5	261430Z	1615Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X	X	ONE SHIP		
2P0753N	5	261615Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0754N	5	261830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0755N	5	261930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0756N	5	271430Z	1516Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	8CAV/3ASOG	YES	X				
2P0757N	5	271515Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0758N	5	271830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0759N	5	271930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	8CAV/3ASOG	YES	X				
2P0760N	5	281430Z	1616Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0761N	5	281515Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0762N	5	281830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0763N	5	281930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0764N	5	291500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0765N	1	052230Z	2330Z	2		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10								

2

A-005-2

3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

AS of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

REQ NO.	PM	TOT	TFT	NO.	ARR.	REQ.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	SORT	SUCC	JMSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS
				NO.	ARR.	REQ.		UNIT	UNIT	FLOWN	SUCC	JMSUCC		OFF
2P0766N	1	082230Z	2330Z	2		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10							
2P0767N	1	072230Z	2330Z	2		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10							
2P0768N	1	082230Z	2330Z	2		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10							
2P0769N	5	251400Z	1030	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/3ASG							
ADD ON MISSIONS														
2K0701N	5	122000Z	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0702N	5	122030Z	2100	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0703N	5	192000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0704N	5	192030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0705D	5	272030Z	2100Z	4		LIVE	JAAT/FT RILEY					X	NOTE 1	
2K9795D	5	271900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0701X	6	061500Z	1520Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0702X	5	121500Z	1540Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0703X	5	191500Z	1540Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0704X	5	201500Z	1520Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2K0705X	5	271500Z	1520Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	11D/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1	
2M0701N	5	051800Z	1630Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS							
2M0702N	5	052000Z	2030Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS							
2M0703N	5	061800Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS							
2M0704N	5	062000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	41D/13ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX	
2M0705N	5	071800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	41D/13ASOS	YES		X		
2M0706N	5	072000Z	2000Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	41D/13ASOS	YES		X		
2M0707N	5	121800Z	1830Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	41D/13ASOS	YES		X		
2M0708N	5	122000Z	2030Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS							
2M0709N	5	131600Z	1630Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS							
2M0710N	5	132000Z	2030Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS							
2M0711N	5	191600Z	1630Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS							
2M0712N	5	192000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	41D/13ASOS	YES		X		
2M0713N	5	201800Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	41D/13ASOS	YES		X		
2M0714N	5	202000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	41D/13ASOS	YES		X		

3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

as of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

1025482 P.11

0504 271

11:14 OCT 94

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS	
														OFF	ENL
2M0715N	5	211800Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	NO		X	OPS CNX		
2M0716N	5	212000Z	2000Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0717N	5	221600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0718N	5	222000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0719N	5	251300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0720N	5	281600Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0721N	5	252000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0722N	5	281300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0723N	5	281600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	DRY	DAY CAS	188FG	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0724N	5	262000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	DRY	DAY CAS	188FG	4ID/13ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX		
2M0725N	5	271300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0726N	5	271600Z	1830Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0727N	5	272000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	DRY	DAY CAS	188FG	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0728N	5	281300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0729N	5	281600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0730N	5	282000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0731N	5	291300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0732N	5	291600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0733N	5	292000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0734N	5	301300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0735N	5	301600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0736N	5	302000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0737N	5	311300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0738N	5	311600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0739N	5	312000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
NOTE 1: UNABLE TO GET DATA FROM FT RILEY/10ASOS															

A-005-4

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 8:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR.	REQ.	TASKED	CONTROL	SORT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
				NO.	AIR.	REQ.	FLYING	UNIT	FLOWN			
2P1034N	5	141500	1800	2		DRY						
2P1035N	5	171500	1630	2		DRY						
2P1036N	5	171530	1800	2		DRY						
2P1037N	5	171900	1930	2		DRY						
2P1038N	5	171830	2000	2		DRY						
2P1039N	5	181500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1040N	5	181530	1500	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1041N	5	181900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1042N	5	181930	2000	2		DRY						
2P1043N	5	191500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1044N	5	191530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1045N	5	191900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1046N	5	191930	2000	2		DRY						
2P1047N	5	201500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1048N	5	201530	1800	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1049N	5	201900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1050N	5	201930	2000	2		DRY						
2P1051N1	5	211500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	3 ASOG	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1051N2	5	211530	1800	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	3 ASOG	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1052N	5	241500	1630	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	3 ASOG	YES	X		
2P1053N	5	241530	1800	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	YES	X		
2P1054N	5	241900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1055N	5	241930	2000	2		DRY						
2P1056N	5	251500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1057N	5	251530	1800	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1058N	5	251900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1059N	5	251930	2000	2		DRY						
2P1060N	5	281500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1061N	5	281530	1800	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1062N	5	281900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1063N	5	281930	2000	2	F-18	DRY	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1064N	5	271500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1065N	5	271530	1800	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1066N	5	271900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1067N	5	271930	2000	2	F-18	DRY	184FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	YES	X		

A-005-6

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PR	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR- CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	BORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2P1068N1	5	281600	1630	2	F-16	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1068N2	5	281630	1600	2	F-16	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1068N	1	281900	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1070N	1	291900	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1071N	1	302000	2100	2		BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD						
2P1072N	5	311600	1630	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1073N	5	311630	1700	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1074N	1	312000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD	704FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
ADD ON MISSIONS FOR 3 ASOG													
2P1075N	5	041600	1630	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1076N	5	041630	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1077N	5	041930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1078N	5	042000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1079N	5	051600	1630	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1080N	5	051630	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1081N	5	051930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1082N	5	052000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1083N	5	111600	1630	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1084N	5	111630	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1085N	5	111930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1086N	5	112000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1087N	5	121500	1630	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1088N	5	121630	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1089N	5	121930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1090N	5	122000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1091N	5	181600	1630	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1092N	5	181630	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1093N	5	181930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1094N	5	182000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1095N	5	181600	1630	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1096N	5	181630	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1097N	5	181930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1098N	5	192000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)

A-005-7

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR.	REQ.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	SOBT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
				SOBT.	CRAFT	ORF.		FLYING	UNIT	FLOWN			
2P1099N	5	251500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10100N	5	251530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10101N	5	251930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10102N	5	252000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10103N	5	251500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10104N	5	251530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10105N	5	251930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10106N	5	252000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10107N	5	141530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P10108N	5	171530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	184FS	712 ASOS	NO		X	WX CNX
2K1001N	1	042000	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2K1002N	1	042030	2100	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2K1003N	5	252000	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1004N	5	252030	2300	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1005N	1	182000	2030	2		DRY	FT RILEY CAS						
2K1006N	1	182030	2100	2		DRY	FT RILEY CAS						
2K1007N	1	252030	2100	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1008N	1	252000	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1010D	1	311830	1900	4		BDU	FT RILEY/JAAT						
ADD ON MISSIONS FOR 10 ASOS													
2K1001X	5	171920	1940	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	132FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	WX CNX
2K1002X	5	191940	2000	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	WX CNX
2K1003X	5	251920	1940	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	132FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2K1004X	5	251940	2000	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2L1001V	5	061400	1500	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1002V	5	061400	1500	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1003V	5	121400	1500	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1004V	5	131400	1500	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1005V	5	191400	1500	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						

F.10

1000000

1000000

A-005-8

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

RS.01: 11/4/94 8:32 PM

REQ NO.	PM	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR	REQ.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	SCRT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
				BOBT.	CRAFT	ORD.		FLYING	UNIT	FLOWN			
2M1006V	5	201400	1600	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2M1007V	5	261400	1600	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2M1008V	5	271400	1500	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2M1001N	1	011830	1830	2		HOT	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1002N	5	041600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1003N	5	042000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1004N	1	061600	1700	2		HOT	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1005N	1	052000	2100	2		HOT	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1006N	5	061600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1007N	5	062000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1008N	5	071600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1009N	5	111800	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1010N	5	112000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1011N	5	121600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1012N	5	122000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1013N	5	131600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1014N	5	132000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1015N	5	141600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1016N	5	181600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1017N	5	182000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1018N	5	181800	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1019N	5	192000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/AID	YES	X		
2M1020N	5	201600	1700	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/AID	YES	X		
2M1021N	5	202000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1022N	5	211600	1700	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/AID	YES	X		
2M1023N	5	251800	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1024N	5	252000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/AID	YES	X		
2M1025N	5	261800	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1026N	5	262000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/AID	YES	X		
2M1027N	5	271800	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1028N	5	272000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/AID	YES	X		

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

REQ. NO.	PM	TOT	TFT	NO.	AM.	REQ.	REQ. TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	SOFT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2M1029N	5	281800	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
ADD ON MISSIONS FOR 13 ASOS													
2M1001X	5	070000	2400	4	A-10	DRY	FT CARSON/CAS	REMARKS	13 ASOS/AID	YES	X		WHITEMAN ANG
IA/CI: IN REFERENCE TO AIRCRAFT'S UNIT													

BR. OF: 11/6/94 8:32 PM

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 94

I.	PRF	TGT	TFT	NO.		AIR-		REQ.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	SOFT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
				SOFT.	CRAFT	ORD.	FLYING			PARTY	FLDWN				
1N	5	011800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	011830	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	012000	Z	2030	Z	2	A-1B	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
4N	5	012030	Z	2100	Z	2	A-1B	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
5N	5	021800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
6N	5	021830	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
7N	5	022000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
8N	5	022030	Z	2100	Z	2	A-1B	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
9N	5	031800	Z	1830	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
ON	5	031830	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	032000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	032030	Z	2100	Z	2	A-1B	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
3N	5	041800	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
4N	1	042100	Z	2300	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/B CAV JAAT						
5N	1	060030	Z	230	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/B CAV JAAT						
6N	1	070030	Z	230	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/B CAV JAAT						
7N	5	071800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
8N	5	071830	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
9N	5	072000	Z	2030	Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
ON	5	072030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	47FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
1N	5	081800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	081830	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	082000	Z	2030	Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
4N	5	082030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	47FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
5N	5	081800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	081830	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
7N	5	082000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	3 ASOG	NO			WX CNX
8N	5	092030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
9N	5	101800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
ON	5	101830	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	102000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	102030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	141800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
4N	5	141830	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
5N	5	142000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	142030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
7N	5	151800	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
8N	5	151830	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
9N	5	152030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	712 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
ON	5	152030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
1N	5	161800	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						

RS of: 12/8/94 12:58 PM

A-005-11

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 94

as of: 12/8/94 12:58 PM														
NO.	AIR-REQ.	NO.	TOT	TFT	BORT.	CRAFT	REQ.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	SOFT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
									FLYING	PARTY	FLOWN			
2N	5	161830	Z	1700	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	162000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
4N	5	162030	Z	2100	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
5N	5	171600	Z	1830	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	171630	Z	1700	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
7N	5	172000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
8N	5	172030	Z	2100	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
9N	5	181600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
10N	5	211600	Z	1630	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
11N	5	211630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
12N	5	212000	Z	2030	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	712 ASOS	YES	X		
13N	5	212030	Z	2100	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN						
14N	5	221600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
15N	5	221630	Z	1700	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
16N	5	222000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
17N	5	222030	Z	2100	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	YES	X		
18N	5	231600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
19N	5	231630	Z	1700	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	YES	X		
20N	5	232000	Z	2030	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN						
21N	5	232030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
22N	5	281600	Z	1630	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
23N	5	281630	Z	1700	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN						
24N	5	282000	Z	2030	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN						
25N	5	282030	Z	2100	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN						
26N	5	291600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
27N	5	291630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
28N	5	292000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
29N	5	292030	Z	2100	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
30N	5	301600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
31N	5	301630	Z	1700	Z	2		FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
32N	5	302000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
33N	5	302030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
IN MISSIONS														
34N	5	71630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
35N	5	72030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
36N	5	81600	Z	1830	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
37N	5	82000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
38N	5	91600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
39N	5	92030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
40N	5	101600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
41N	5	102000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		

A-005-12

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 94

as of: 12/8/94 12:58 PM

I.	PM	TOT	Z	TFT	Z	NO.	AIR-	REQ.	TASKED	CONTROL	SORT	SUCC	UNBUCC	REMARKS
01N	5	081800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU						
02N	5	082000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU						
03N	5	091800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU						
04N	5	092000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
05N	5	101800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU						
06N	5	102000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
07N	5	151800	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU						
08N	5	152000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU						
09N	5	161800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
10N	5	162000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		ARMY FTX
11N	5	171800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU						
12N	5	172000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU						
13N	5	281800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU						
14N	5	292000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU						
15N	5	301800	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
16N	5	302000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		ARMY FTX
17N	5							BDU						
18N	5							BDU						
19N	5	182100	Z	2130	Z	2	F-16	DRY						
20N	5	182130	Z	2200	Z	2	F-16	DRY						
21D	1	251930	Z	2000	Z	2		DRY						
IN MISSIONS FOR THE 10 ASOS														
22N	5	161930	Z	2000	Z	2	F-16	DRY					X	A/C MAINT. ABORT
23X	5	162020	Z	2040	Z	2	F-16	DRY						
24X	5	162040	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	DRY	138FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
25X	5	302120	Z	2140	Z	2	F-16	DRY	132FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
26X	5							DRY	141FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
27X	5							DRY	138FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
IN MISSIONS FOR 12 ASOS														
28X	5	071530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE						
29X	5	071900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		
30X	5	081530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
31X	5	081800	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
32X	5	081530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
33X	5	091800	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
34X	5	091800	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
35X	5	101530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
36X	5	101800	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
37X	5	151530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
38X	5	151800	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
39X	5	161530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	DRY	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
40X	5	161800	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	DRY	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
41X	5	161530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	DRY	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
42X	5	161900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	DRY	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
43X	5	171530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	DRY	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL

A-005-13

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER 94

as of: 1/11/95 2:39 PM

REQ NO.	PN	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR.	REQ.	TASKED	CONTROL	SOFT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS	
REQ NO.	PN	TOT	TFT	BORT.	CRAFT	ORD.	FLYING	PARTY	FLOWN				
!P1230N	5	122030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.				
!P1231N	5	131800	Z	1620	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1232N	5	131820	Z	1640	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X
!P1249N	5	131840	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X
!P1233N	5	132000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X
!P1234N	5	132030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.				
!P1250N	5	141530	Z	1550	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X
!P1251N	5	141550	Z	1610	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1235N	5	141600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1236N	5	141630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184FS	11 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1237N	5	142000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1238N	5	142030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1239N	5	151600	Z	1530	Z	2	F-14	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF201	11 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1240N	5	151630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184FS	3 ASOG	NO	WX CNX
!P1241N	5	152000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.				
!P1242N	5	152030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-14	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF201	8 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1243N	5	151800	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149FS	3 ASOG	YES	X
!P1244N	5	151630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184FS	3 ASOG	NO	WX CNX
ADD ON MISSIONS:													
!P1201X	5	091530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1202X	5	091700	Z	1730	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1203X	5	131530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO	WX CNX
!P1204X	5	131700	Z	1730	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1205X	5	151530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	712 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1206X	5	151930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1207X	5	201530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	712 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1208X	5	201930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1209X	5	211530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1210X	5	211930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1211X	5	221530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!P1212X	5	221930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO	A/C UNIT CNX
!K1201A	2	051430	Z	1500	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	303 FS	10 ASOS	NO	WX CNX

F.01

03070201

112 H500

13.00

1117-12-1390

A005-14

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER 94

as of: 1/11/95 2:39 PM

738+5251 P.03

REQ NO.	PRN	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR-	REQ.	TASKED	CONTROL	SORT	UNBUCC	REASON UNBUCCES
REQ NO.	PRN	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR-	REQ.	FLYING	PARTY	FLOWN	SUCC	REASON UNBUCCES
2K1203X	2	131745	Z	2	A-10	BDU	303FS	10 ASOS	YES	X	
2K1204X	2	131815	Z	2	F-16	BDU	185FS	10 ASOS	NO		WX CNX
2K1205X	2	132000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	114FG	10 ASOS	YES	X	
2K1206X	2	141815	Z	2	F-16	BDU	185FS	10 ASOS	NO		WX CNX
2K1207X	2	142000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	114FG	10 ASOS	NO		WX CNX
2L1201V	5	61400	Z	2		BDU					
2L1202V	5	71400	Z	2		BDU					
2L1203V	5	81400	Z	2		BDU					
2L1204V	5	131400	Z	2		BDU					
2L1205V	5	141400	Z	2		BDU					
2L1206V	5	151400	Z	2		BDU					
ADD ON MISSIONS:											
2L2001X	5	201400	Z	2	A-10	BDU	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X	
2L2002X	5	201400	Z	1	OA-10	BDU	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X	
2L2003X	5	201800	Z	2	A-10	BDU	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X	
2L2004X	5	201800	Z	1	OA-10	BDU	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X	
2L2005X	5	211400	Z	2	A-10	BDU	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X	
2M1217N	5	11800	Z	2		BDU					
2M1218N	5	12000	Z	2		BDU					
2M1219N	5	61600	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	NO		WX CNX
2M1220N	5	62000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	NO		WX CNX
2M1221N	5	71600	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X	
2M1222N	5	72000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X	
2M1223N	5	81600	Z	2		BDU					
2M1224N	5	82000	Z	2		BDU					
2M1225N	5	131600	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X	
2M1225N	5	132000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X	
2M1227N	5	141600	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X	
2M1228N	5	142000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X	
2M1229N	5	151600	Z	2		BDU					
2M1230N	5	152000	Z	2		BDU					

712 ASOS

14:00

MAY-12-1995

A-005-16

**3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF JANUARY 95**

738+5251 P.06

712 ASOS

MAY-12-1995 13:45

Q NO.	SPT'D	UNIT	PN	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR-	REQ.	TASKED	CONTROL	SORT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
						SORT.	CRAFT	ORD.	UNIT	PARTY	FLOWN			
'0101N		712 ASOS	5	031600	Z	2		BDU						
'0102N		712 ASOS	5	031830	Z	2		BDU						
'0103N		712 ASOS	5	032000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	457 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
'0104N		712 ASOS	5	032030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	457 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
'0106N		712 ASOS	5	041800	Z	2	F-16	BDU	457 FS	8 ASOS	X	X		
'0108N		712 ASOS	5	041830	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
'0107N		712 ASOS	5	042000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	457 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
'0108N		712 ASOS	5	042030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	457 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
'0109N		712 ASOS	5	042200	Z	2		LIVE						
'0110N		712 ASOS	5	042230	Z	2	F-16	LIVE	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	CANX 8 AF / 457 FS
'0111N		712 ASOS	5	051800	Z	2	F-16	BDU	148 FS	712 ASOS			X	LATE NOTICE TO FS
'0112N		712 ASOS	5	051830	Z	2		BDU						
'0113N		712 ASOS	5	052000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	9 ASOS			X	WX CANX
'0114N		712 ASOS	5	052030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	148 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
'0116N		712 ASOS	5	052200	Z	2		LIVE						
'0116N		712 ASOS	5	052230	Z	2		LIVE						
'0117N		712 ASOS	5	081600	Z	2	F-16	BDU	148 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
'0118N		712 ASOS	5	081830	Z	2		BDU						
'0119N		712 ASOS	5	081800	Z	2		BDU						
'0120N		712 ASOS	5	081830	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184FS	11 ASOS			X	MAINT CANX
'0121N		712 ASOS	5	082000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	704 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
'0122N		712 ASOS	5	082030	Z	2		BDU						
'0123N		712 ASOS	5	101800	Z	2	F-16	BDU	148 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
'0124N		712 ASOS	5	101830	Z	2		BDU						
'0125N		712 ASOS	5	102000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	704 FS	3 ASOG	X	X		
'0126N		712 ASOS	5	102030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	148 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
'0127N		712 ASOS	5	111600	Z	2	F-16	BDU	148FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
'0128N		712 ASOS	5	111630	Z	2		BDU						
'0129N		712 ASOS	5	112000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	704 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
'0130N		712 ASOS	5	112030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	148 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
'0131N		712 ASOS	5	112200	Z	2		LIVE						
'0132N		712 ASOS	5	112230	Z	2		LIVE						
'0133N		712 ASOS	5	121800	Z	2	F-14	BDU	VF 201	3 ASOG			X	WX CANX
'0134N		712 ASOS	5	121830	Z	2		BDU						
'0135N		712 ASOS	5	122000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	704 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
'0136N		712 ASOS	5	122030	Z	2	F-14	BDU	VF 201	9 ASOS			X	WX/MAINT CANX

**3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF JANUARY 95**

738+5251 P.07
712 ASOG
13:46
MAY-12-1995

ED. NO.	SPT'D UNIT	PN	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR	REQ.	TASKED	CONTROL	SORT	BUCC	UNBUCC	REMARKS
					SORT.	CRAFT	ORD.	UNIT	PARTY	FLOWN			
P0137N	712 ASOG	5	122200	Z	2		LIVE						
P0138N	712 ASOG	5	122230	Z	2		LIVE						
P0139N	712 ASOG	5	171600	Z	2		BDU						
P0140N	712 ASOG	5	171630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	9 ASOG	X	X		
P0141N	712 ASOG	5	172000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	704 FS	9 ASOG	X	X		
P0142N	712 ASOG	5	172030	Z	2		BDU						
P0143N	712 ASOG	5	181600	Z	2		BDU						
P0144N	712 ASOG	5	181630	Z	2		BDU						
P0145N	712 ASOG	5	182000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	9 ASOG			X	WX CANX BY A/C
P0146N	712 ASOG	5	182030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	704 FS	9 ASOG			X	WX CANX
P0147N	712 ASOG	5	182200	Z	2		LIVE						
P0148N	712 ASOG	5	182230	Z	2		LIVE						
P0149N	712 ASOG	5	191600	Z	2	F-14	BDU	VF 201	3 ASOG	X	X		
P0150N	712 ASOG	5	191630	Z	2		BDU						
P0151N	712 ASOG	5	192000	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	11 ASOG	X	X		
P0152N	712 ASOG	5	192030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	704 FS	11 ASOG	X	X		
P0153N	712 ASOG	5	192200	Z	2	F-14	LIVE	VF 201	11 ASOG	X	X		
P0154N	712 ASOG	5	192230	Z	2		LIVE						
P0155N	712 ASOG	5	201600	Z	2		BDU						
P0156N	712 ASOG	5	201630	Z	2		BDU						
P0157N	712 ASOG	5	231600	Z	2		BDU						
P0158N	712 ASOG	5	231630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	11 ASOG			X	MAINT CANX
P0159N	712 ASOG	5	232000	Z	2		BDU						
P0160N	712 ASOG	5	232030	Z	2		BDU						
P0161N	712 ASOG	5	241600	Z	2		BDU						
P0162N	712 ASOG	5	241630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	9 ASOG	X	X		
P0163N	712 ASOG	5	242000	Z	2		BDU						
P0164N	712 ASOG	5	242030	Z	2		BDU						
P0165N	712 ASOG	1	251600	Z	2		BDU						
P0166N	712 ASOG	1	251630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	184 FS	9 ASOG			X	WX CANX
P0167N	712 ASOG	5	252000	Z	2		BDU						
P0168N	712 ASOG	5	252030	Z	2		BDU						
P0169N	712 ASOG	5	252200	Z	2		LIVE						
P0170N	712 ASOG	5	252230	Z	2		LIVE						
P0171N	712 ASOG	1	251600	Z	2		LIVE						
P0172N	712 ASOG	1	251630	Z	2	F-16	LIVE	184 FS	9 ASOG			X	WX CANX

A-005-18

**3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF JANUARY 95**

3	2	1	0	NO.	AM.	REQ.	TASKED	CONTROL	SHORT	REMARKS
UNIT	UNIT	UNIT	UNIT	NO.	AM.	REQ.	UNIT	PARTY	SHORT	REMARKS
2173N	712 ASOS	1	262000 Z	2030 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT			
2174N	712 ASOS	5	262000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2175N	712 ASOS	5	262200 Z	2230 Z	2	LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2176N	712 ASOS	5	262230 Z	2300 Z	2	LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2177N	712 ASOS	1	271600 Z	1930 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT			
2178N	712 ASOS	1	271630 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT			
2179N	712 ASOS	1	272000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT			
2180N	712 ASOS	1	281600 Z	1630 Z	2	LIVE	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT			
2181N	712 ASOS	1	281630 Z	1700 Z	2	LIVE	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT			
2182N	712 ASOS	5	301600 Z	1630 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2183N	712 ASOS	5	301630 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2184N	712 ASOS	5	302000 Z	2030 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2185N	712 ASOS	5	302030 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2186N	712 ASOS	5	311900 Z	1830 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2187N	712 ASOS	5	311930 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2188N	712 ASOS	5	312000 Z	2030 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2189N	712 ASOS	5	312030 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2190N	712 ASOS	5	312060 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2191N	712 ASOS	5	311800 Z	1630 Z	2	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.			
2192N	712 ASOS	5	041800 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2193N	712 ASOS	5	042000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2194N	712 ASOS	5	051600 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2195N	712 ASOS	5	052000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2196N	712 ASOS	5	061600 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2197N	712 ASOS	5	062000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2198N	712 ASOS	5	101600 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2199N	712 ASOS	5	102000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2100N	712 ASOS	5	111600 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2101N	712 ASOS	5	112000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2102N	712 ASOS	5	121600 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2103N	712 ASOS	5	122000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2104N	712 ASOS	5	171600 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2105N	712 ASOS	5	172000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2106N	712 ASOS	5	181600 Z	1700 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2107N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2108N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2109N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2110N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2111N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2112N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2113N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2114N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2115N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			
2116N	712 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2	BDU	FT CARBON TACP TRN.			

3AS06 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF FEBRUARY 95

as of: 02066 2:52 PM

REQ NO.	UNIT	PRN	TOT	TFT	NO.	AR.	REC.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	REMARKS/CONTACTS	SHORT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCC
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	282000	Z 2080	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	282080	Z 2100	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	282280	Z 2280	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	282250	Z 2310	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	282810	Z 2380	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0277A	712 ASOS	5	241800	Z 1830	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	241840	Z 1700	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	271600	Z 1630	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	271620	Z 1640	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0281N	712 ASOS	5	272000	Z 2010	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0281A	712 ASOS	5	272010	Z 2020	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0281B	712 ASOS	5	272020	Z 2030	2	F-1A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0282N	712 ASOS	5	281800	Z 2100	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0282N	712 ASOS	5	281820	Z 1830	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0285N	712 ASOS	5	282200	Z 2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	282280	Z 2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160415	Z 0430	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160420	Z 0435	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160435	Z 0450	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160440	Z 0455	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160445	Z 0460	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160450	Z 0465	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160455	Z 0470	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160460	Z 0475	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160465	Z 0480	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160470	Z 0485	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160475	Z 0490	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160480	Z 0495	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160485	Z 0500	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160490	Z 0505	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160495	Z 0510	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160500	Z 0515	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160505	Z 0520	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160510	Z 0525	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160515	Z 0530	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160520	Z 0535	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160525	Z 0540	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160530	Z 0545	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160535	Z 0550	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160540	Z 0555	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160545	Z 0600	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160550	Z 0605	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160555	Z 0610	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160560	Z 0615	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160565	Z 0620	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160570	Z 0625	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160575	Z 0630	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160580	Z 0635	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160585	Z 0640	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160590	Z 0645	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160595	Z 0650	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160600	Z 0655	1	F-117	LGB MK-60	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2A02021N	18 ASOS	5	011800	Z 1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2A02028N	18 ASOS	5	012000	Z 2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2A02028N	18 ASOS	5	021800	Z 1700	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2A02028N	18 ASOS	5	022000	Z 2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2A02025N	18 ASOS	5	031800	Z 1700	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							

3ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF FEBRUARY 95


as of: 3/2/95 2:52 PM

REQ NO.	SPTD	UNIT	PHI	TDI	YFI	NO	ARR	REQ	TYPE MISSION	TASKED	CONTROL	REMARKS/CONTACTS	SORT	UNSLUC	REASON UNSLUC
2A0202N	13 ASOS	5	071600 Z	1700 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0207N	13 ASOS	5	072000 Z	2100 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0208N	13 ASOS	5	081800 Z	1700 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0208N	13 ASOS	5	082000 Z	2100 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0210N	13 ASOS	5	091800 Z	1700 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0211N	13 ASOS	5	092000 Z	2100 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0212N	13 ASOS	5	101800 Z	1700 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0214N	13 ASOS	5	142000 Z	2100 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0215N	13 ASOS	5	151800 Z	1700 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0216N	13 ASOS	5	152000 Z	2100 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0217N	13 ASOS	5	181800 Z	1700 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0218N	13 ASOS	5	182000 Z	2100 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0219N	13 ASOS	5	211800 Z	1700 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0220N	13 ASOS	5	212000 Z	2100 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0221N	13 ASOS	5	221800 Z	1700 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0222N	13 ASOS	5	222000 Z	2100 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0223N	13 ASOS	5	231800 Z	1700 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0224N	13 ASOS	5	232000 Z	2100 Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0225N	13 ASOS	5	242000 Z	2100 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0226N	13 ASOS	5	281800 Z	1700 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0227N	13 ASOS	5	282000 Z	2100 Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN					X		
2A0228N	13 ASOS	5	271800 Z	1900 Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0228N	13 ASOS	5	272000 Z	2300 Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0229N	13 ASOS	5	281800 Z	1900 Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0229N	13 ASOS	5	282000 Z	2300 Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0231N	13 ASOS	5	282200 Z	2300 Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TAQP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS			X		
2A0231V	12 ASOS	1	071400 Z	1500 Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0232V	12 ASOS	1	021400 Z	1500 Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0233V	12 ASOS	1	081400 Z	1900 Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0234V	12 ASOS	1	081600 Z	1900 Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0235V	12 ASOS	1	161400 Z	1600 Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0236V	12 ASOS	1	161400 Z	1900 Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0237V	12 ASOS	1	221400 Z	1800 Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0238V	12 ASOS	1	221400 Z	1800 Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2A0239N	10 ASOS	5	072130 Z	2200 Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY TAQP TRN	138 FS	10 ASOS			X		
2A0239N	10 ASOS	5	072000 Z	2100 Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT RILEY TAQP TRN	303 FS	10 ASOS			X		
2A0239N	10 ASOS	5	262130 Z	2300 Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY TAQP TRN	188 FS	10 ASOS			X		
2A0239N	10 ASOS	5	262130 Z	2300 Z	2		DRY	FT RILEY TAQP TRN					X		
2A0239D	10 ASOS	1	221800 Z	1800 Z	2	A-10	BDU	FT RILEY JAAT	303 FS	10 ASOS			X		
2A0239V	10 ASOS	5	012120 Z	2140 Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY TAQP TRN	138 FS	10 ASOS			X		
TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES: 347															

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF MARCH 95

25 of 4/5/95 2:28 PM

REQ NO.	SPTD	UNT	PR	TOT	TFT	NO.	AIR	REQ.	REQ.	TYPE MISSION	TASKER	CONTROL	SORT	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
2P08 01N	712 ASOS	5	011800Z	1880Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 02N	712 ASOS	5	011830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 03N	712 ASOS	5	012000Z	2080Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 04N	712 ASOS	5	012030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 05N	712 ASOS	5	021800Z	1680Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 06N	712 ASOS	5	022000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 07N	712 ASOS	5	022030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 08N	712 ASOS	5	031800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 09N	712 ASOS	5	031830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 10N	712 ASOS	5	031830Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 11N	712 ASOS	5	031830Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 12N	712 ASOS	5	031830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 13N	712 ASOS	5	032000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 14N	712 ASOS	5	032030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X		WX CANX	
2P08 15N	712 ASOS	5	071600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	3 ASOG		X				
2P08 16N	712 ASOS	5	071630Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 17N	712 ASOS	5	072000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 18N	712 ASOS	5	072030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 19N	712 ASOS	5	081800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	712 ASOS		X				
2P08 20N	712 ASOS	5	081830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 21N	712 ASOS	5	082000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 22N	712 ASOS	5	082030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 23N	712 ASOS	5	081800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	712 ASOS		X				
2P08 24N	712 ASOS	5	081830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 25N	712 ASOS	5	082000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 26N	712 ASOS	5	082030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 27N	712 ASOS	5	101600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS	712 ASOS		X				
2P08 28N	712 ASOS	5	101630Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 29N	712 ASOS	5	181800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 30N	712 ASOS	5	181830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 31N	712 ASOS	5	182000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 32N	712 ASOS	5	182030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 33N	712 ASOS	5	141800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 34N	712 ASOS	5	141830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 35N	712 ASOS	5	142000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 36N	712 ASOS	5	142030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 37N	712 ASOS	5	161800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 38N	712 ASOS	5	161830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 39N	712 ASOS	5	162000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 40N	712 ASOS	5	162030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 41N	712 ASOS	5	161800Z	1830Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 42N	712 ASOS	5	161830Z	1700Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 43N	712 ASOS	5	162000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							
2P08 44N	712 ASOS	5	162030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TAOP TRN	457 FS							



APPENDIX (006) DOD AP/IB Chart, MTRs-Central US

LONG SHOT 1995
RESULTS OF
"DUEL IN THE DESERT"

TOP TEAM WINNER

	POINT TOTALS	POSSIBLE POINTS	
* 8AF TEAM #2	2200	3200	68.750%
9AF TEAM #1	2175	3400	63.971%
9AF TEAM #2	1825	3200	57.031%
8AF TEAM #1	1725	3400	50.735%
12AF TEAM #2	1600	3200	50.000%
12AF TEAM #1	1575	3400	46.324%

TOP NAF WINNER

	POINT TOTALS	POSSIBLE POINTS	
9AF TEAM #1	2175	3400	63.971%
9AF TEAM #2	1825	3200	57.031%
	4000	6600	60.606%
8AF TEAM #1	1725	3400	50.735%
8AF TEAM #2	2200	3200	68.750%
	3925	6600	59.470%
12AF TEAM #1	1575	3400	46.324%
12AF TEAM #2	1600	3200	50.000%
	3175	6600	48.106%

05/12/95 09:43

0602 750 4857

12 COS DN ARB

003/008

LONG SHOT 95 TEAM SCORE SHEET																			
PERIOD : 6		2000 - 2100Z																	
MISSION CMDR: CAPT PURDY										TARGET									
BAF TEAM #1:										HIT		SPLASH		VTR					
				WEST OF		RED		REDAIR		(LGB - 30)		W/IN		FRAG		INVALID		FILM	
				116W		AIR		OR		(FTR - 140)		2MIN		26SEC MIN		A/A		HVA	
				PUSH		KILL		MORT		TOSS		HIT		DECONF		KILL		LOSS	
				POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		SCORE		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		ASSESS	
				(+50)		(+25 / PER)		(-50)		FEET		(+100)		(+50)		(-50)		(0 HIT / -25)	
TOTAL		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS	
AWARDED		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS	
AVAILABLE		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS	
TOTAL		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS	
AWARDED		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS	
AVAILABLE		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS	
BASE		WANG	SOON	SIGN	#s	(+50)	(+25 / PER)	(-50)	FEET	(+100)	(+50)	(-50)	(-75)	(-50)	(0 HIT / -25)	TOTAL	POINTS	POINTS	
BAF TEAM #1:		AIR TO AIR																	
NAS NEW ORLEANS LA		159FG	122 FS	F-15A															
CAPT MEYER				JAZZ	11	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT HOURIN				JAZZ	12	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT RYAN				JAZZ	13	50	0	-50	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	
CAPT MAGUIRE				JAZZ	14	50	0	-50	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	
						200	50	-100			0	0	0	0	0	0	150	200	
																		75.000%	
BARKSDALE AFB LA		AIR TO GROUND																	
917WG		47 FS	A-10A						6xMK82AIR	75-43-08									
1LT BARTLEY				SWINE	21	50	0	0	58	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
MAJ FOY				SWINE	22	50	0	0	38	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT MILLER				SWINE	23	50	0	0	84	0	0	-50	0	0	-25	-25	200	200	
1LT BENSON				SWINE	24	50	0	0	23	100	50	-50	0	0	0	0	150	200	
						200	0	0		300	150	-100	0	0	-25	525	800	65.625%	
FT SMITH MUNI APRT AR		188FG	184 FS	F-16A					6xMK82AIR	75-43-08									
MAJ HASLETT				HAWG	31	50	25	0	144	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	200	
1LT VON GROTE				HAWG	32	50	0	0	16	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT BRYAN				HAWG	33	50	0	-50	202	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
MAJ CUNNINGHAM				HAWG	34	50	0	-50	50	0	0	0	0	0	-25	-25	200	200	
						200	25	-100		100	50	0	0	0	-25	250	800	31.250%	
CANNON AFB NM		27FW	428 FS	F-111E					2xMK84AIR	78-14-03									
CAPT HICKEY				GEMINI	41	50	0	-50	227	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT FITZ				GEMINI	42	50	0	0	802	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT LESS				GEMINI	43	50	0	0	98	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT RICHARD				GEMINI	44	50	0	0	982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
						200	0	-50		100	50	0	0	0	0	300	800	37.500%	
BARKSDALE AFB LA		28W	29 BS	B-52H					6xMK82AIR	78-07-22									
CAPT JAMESON / CAPT PURDY				JAMBO	51	50	0	0	225	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT CONTE				JAMBO	52	50	0	0	291	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT HERREN				JAMBO	53	50	0	0	422	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
						150	0	0		200	100	0	0	0	0	450	600	75.000%	
HOLLOMAN AFB NM		49FW	8 FS	F-117					1xGBU12	76-14-02									
CAPT KOHNTOPP				STELTH	61	50	0	0	63	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
						50	0	0		200	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	25.000%	
GRAND																			
TOTALS:																1725	3400	50.735%	

A-007-2

05/12/95

09:46

0602 750 4857

12 COS DN ARB

006/008

LONG SHOT 95 TEAM SCORE SHEET																
PERIOD : 2																
VJL PERIOD: 1700 - 1800Z																
MISSION CMDR: MAJ TAYLOR																
9AF TEAM #2:																
TARGET																
HIT																
REDAIR (LGB - 30)																
SPLASH																
W/IN																
FRAG INVALID																
VTR																
FILM																
115W AIR SAM (BMR - 300) TARGET 2MIN 26SEC MIN A/A HVA NOT																
PUSH KILL MORT TOSS HIT TOT DECONF KLL LOSS ASSESS TOTAL																
POINTS POINTS POINTS SCORE POINTS																
(+50) (+25 / PER) (-50) FEET (+100) (+50) (-50) (-75) (-50) (0 HIT / -25) AWARDED AVAILABLE																
BASE																
WING SQDN CALL																
SIGN #s																
9AF TEAM #2:																
AIR TO AIR																
EGLIN AFB FL 33FW 58 FS F-15C																
CAPT MANLEY KONG 11 50 25 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 80																
CAPT VACCARO KONG 12 50 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50																
CAPT McDONALD KONG 13 50 25 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 50																
CAPT WISE KONG 14 50 25 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 50																
200 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 275 200 137.500%																
AIR TO GROUND																
SPRINGFIELD ANGB OH 178FG 162 FS F-15C																
6xMK82AIR 75-43-08																
MAJ WILLIAMS BUCKI 21 50 0 0 75 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200																
CAPT SOUDER BUCKI 22 50 0 0 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200																
MAJ JOHNSON BUCKI 23 50 0 0 187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200																
MAJ COGLIN BUCKI 24 50 0 0 152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200																
200 0 0 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 350 800 43.750%																
TOLEDO EXPRESS APRT OH 180FG 112 FS F-15C																
2xMK84AIR 76-14-83																
MAJ TRETAR LOMA 31 50 0 0 187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200																
CAPT NEWELL LOMA 32 50 0 0 82 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200																
CAPT RINKE LOMA 33 50 0 0 88 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200																
MAJ DIEHL LOMA 34 50 0 0 98 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200																
200 0 0 300 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 650 800 81.250%																
MOODY AFB GA 347WG 88 FS F-15C																
1xGBU12 76-14-02																
MAJ TAYLOR LANCR 41 50 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200																
CAPT LAFOND LANCR 42 50 0 0 114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200																
CAPT DIXON LANCR 43 50 0 -50 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200																
CAPT FORN LANCR 44 50 0 -50 166 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200																
200 0 -100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 800 12.500%																
ELLSWORTH AFB SD 288W 37 BS B-1B																
6xMK82AIR 76-07-22																
CAPT MIKESELL TIGER 51 50 0 0 188 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200																
CAPT VANDENBOSSCHE TIGER 52 50 0 0 95 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200																
100 0 0 200 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 400 100.000%																
HOLLOMAN AFB NM 48FW 9 FS F-117																
1xGBU12 76-14-02																
CAPT DAVIDSON 48FW 9 FS STELTH 64 50 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200																
50 0 0 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 200 25.000%																
GRAND																
TOTALS: 1825 3200 57.031%																

A-007-5

05/12/95 09:47

0602 750 4857

12 COS DM AFB

14007/008

LONG SHOT 96 TEAM SCORE SHEET																													
PERIOD : 3																													
VUL PERIOD:	1800 - 1900Z																												
MISSION CMDR: CAPT D BROWN																													
12AF TEAM #1																													
										TARGET																			
										HIT																			
										(LGS - 30)		SPLASH				NO ASSESS													
										(FTR - 140)		W / IN		FRAG		INVALID													
										(SMR - 300)		2MIN		20SEC MIN		A/A		H/A		VTR									
										TOSS		TOT		DECONF		KILL		LDSS		FILM		TOTAL							
										SCORE		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS		POINTS							
										FEET		(+100)		(+50)		(-50)		(-75)		(-50)		Ø HIT / -25		AWARDED		POINTS AVAILABLE			
BASE	WING	SODN	CALL	#a	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	SCORE	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS	POINTS		
12AF TEAM #1																													
AIR TO AIR																													
DOBINS AFB GA	116FW	128 FS	F-15A																										
CAPT O'CONNOR			KAOS	11	80	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	80	
CAPT EAVES			KAOS	12	50	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	
CAPT QUERR			KAOS	13	50	75	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	125	50	
MAJ FEARNEYTHOUGH			KAOS	14	50	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	
					200	100	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	200	150.000%
AIR TO GROUND																													
DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	350WG	357 FS	A-10A					6dMK82AR	75-13-08																				
CAPT O'DAY					50	0	0	76	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	150	200	
MAJ WEAVER			CHLI	22	50	0	0	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	200	
CAPT SANDERS			CHLI	23	50	0	0	57	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	200	
CAPT NACHTMAN			CHLI	24	50	0	0	58	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					200	0	0		200	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400	800	50.000%
HILL AFB UT																													
358FW	421 FS	F-16C						1xGBU12	78-14-02																				
CAPT WARREN			SPDR	31	80	0	-50	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT ALVORD			SPDR	32	80	0	-50	54	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT ROOSA			SPDR	33	50	25	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	200	
CAPT KEATON			SPDR	34	50	0	-50	38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
					200	25	-150		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	800	9.375%
HILL AFB UT																													
358FW	34 FS	F-16C						1xGBU12	78-14-02																				
CAPT BROWN			RACE	41	50	0	0	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT FORD			RACE	42	50	0	0	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT CLAPP			RACE	43	50	0	0	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT FERGUSON			RACE	44	50	0	0	29	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
MAJ CLAYFISH					200	0	0		100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	350	800	43.750%
BARKSDALE AFB LA																													
917WG	93 BS	B-52H						6dMK82AR	78-07-22																				
CAPT CASTELLANI			SCALP	51	50	0	-50	977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT KIRKPATRICK			SCALP	52	50	0	0	281	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT CAIXEIRO			SCALP	53	50	0	0	462	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					150	0	-50		100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	800	41.867%
HOLLOWAN AFB NM																													
48FW	8 FS	F-117						1xGBU12	78-14-02																				
CAPT ENGMAN	48FW	8 FS	STELTH	65	50	0	0	17	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					50	0	0		200	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	200	100.000%
GRAND TOTALS:																	1575	3400	48.324%										

A-00726

Document Separator



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

OWEN PICKETT
2ND DISTRICT
VIRGINIA

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
MERCHANT MARINE & FISHERIES

January 30, 1995

Mr. Chris Goode
Director of Administration
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22207

Dear Mr. Goode:

I am pleased to recommend Lt. Col. Marshall W. Lefavor (Ret.) for a position with the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

I have enclosed for your review correspondence from Lt. Col. Lefavor, and his resume. I hope that you will find Lt. Col. Lefavor a qualified applicant for any positions that may be available with the Commission.

If I can be of further assistance to you on this matter, please be sure and let me know.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Owen Pickett".

Owen Pickett
Member of Congress

OP/ekk
Enclosures

2228 Tanglewood Trail
Virginia Beach, VA 23454
7 December 1994

The Honorable Owen Pickett
U. S. House of Representatives
2710 Virginia Beach Blvd.
Virginia Beach, VA 23454

Dear Congressman Pickett:

I am a retired Marine officer residing in Virginia Beach. I have lived in this area most of my life.

I've recently become informally involved in the current administration's plans for base realignment and closure. I am extremely concerned over the process and the effect this and other defense cutbacks will have on our nation's readiness and military strength in the 90s and beyond. I am also concerned with the immediate impact on our community by the fate of NAS Oceana.

I have spoken with the present Commanding Officer of Oceana on numerous occasions and have expressed my desire to become directly involved in the process. He suggested I contact your office and explore the possibilities of serving directly on or in support of the Base Realignment and Closure Committee in some administrative capacity.

I am aware that I am too junior to be considered in a decision-making or policy-forming role. However, I strongly feel that my wide experience as a career officer and record of performance at several staff support levels as well as my genuine concern as a citizen might be of useful service to the Committee in a journeyman status. I also feel certain that the Committee will generate a prodigious amount of information and data which will require administrative support.

Accordingly, I am enclosing my professional resume in anticipation that your office might explore the possibilities of an *ad hoc* assignment in support of the BRACC or one of its satellite functions.

Very respectfully,



Marshall W. Lefavor
LtCol USMC (ret)

Encl:

Document Separator

Marshall Wade Lefavor
2228 Tanglewood Trail
Virginia Beach, VA 23454
(H) 804-481-7544
~~**(W) 804-496-6689**~~
(w) 804-422-3444

Career Objective

A challenging and dynamic position in the technical support arena where my knowledge, skills, and experience in the Defense-related industry can be effectively applied.

Experience Summary

Over 25 years in positions of increasing responsibility as a Marine officer, Department of the Navy analyst, and defense contractor program support specialist. Extensive operational experience in Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) employment, aviation weapons and tactics, warfighting mission-area studies, and JCS/NATO-level command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I).

Education

AB, English. East Carolina University, 1965.
MA, English. James Madison University, 1974.
Additional postgraduate studies:
University of California, Irvine, 1970.
North Carolina State University, 1972.
Old Dominion University, 1994.

Relevant Experience

10 years' experience as a systems analyst and support program manager.

- Systems Analyst, Department of the Navy: Provided engineering support and documentation for F-14 and A-6 post-maintenance flight check program. Designated flight test engineer for AWG-9 system. Managed Integrated stock control inventory, budget tracking, and aircraft depot-level maintenance and check-flight records.
- Information Systems Manager, NATO-SACLANT: Assisted in the NATO-directed manpower and ADP configuration study of NATO-SACLANT C³I systems including technical support for optimizing the constructive cost model and its implementation within existing NATO information systems. Effected liaison with NATO and US commands for enhancing datalinks, ADP interface, and communications compatibility.
- Systems Analyst, Naval Air Development Center and Navy Space Warfare Command: Assisted the program manager in a multi-million dollar contract for the design, development, and integration of the Navy's High Altitude Long Endurance C³I, over-the-horizon, Aegis battlegroup system including data link and communications subsystems configuration with unattended autonomous vehicle (UAV) remote sensor and target acquisition systems.

Relelvant Experience (cont'd)

- Systems Analyst, Marine Corps Warfighting Center: provided aviation weapons employment expertise for the development of the Marine Corps Mid-Range Objectives and Long Range Plan in conjunction with the Joint Strategic Planning Document and the MAGTF Master Plan. Developed fire support mission areas, weapons mix, real-time weapons availability, and support fire survivability studies. Prepared analyses of the integration of Marine Air Command and Control Systems to UAV remote sensors, FIREFINDER radar, and signal imagery over-the-horizon surveillance. Designed and developed flight simulation programs for Navy and Marine Corps aircrew training.
- Systems Analyst, Naval Sea Systems Command: Assisted the program manager in the development and implementation of the NAVSEA Shock Trial Plan for underway testing of LSD, MCM, and LHA class ships under a multi-million dollar contract with NAVSEA and the Navy Underwater Explosive Research Center. Formulated test-plan SOP, compiled analytical test results, and supervised documentation of the final test reports.

Significant Military Experience

- Designated Aerial Observer, Aviation Staff Officer, Tactical Air Controller Airborne. 1,200 hours as aircrew in tactical aircraft including DACM adversary.
- Marine Amphibious Force Fire Support Coordination and MAGTF planning in three conflicts: Vietnam, Grenada, and Kuwait.
- Atlantic Command Intelligence Officer, Senior Watch Officer.
- Plans and Exercises, Second Marine Aircraft Wing.
- Tactical Warfare Simulation, Second Marine Division.
- Amphibious Warfare School.
- Defense Language Institute.
- Defense Intelligence College.
- Naval War College.
- Navy Fighter Weapons School.
- Retired from the Reserve in 1992 with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Systems

UNIX-based Periphery

Novell LAN

DB4

CAD Graphics Applications

Defense On-Line Intelligence System

MS Windows

Word Processing/Spreadsheet Applications

Cobol Introduction, Basic, DOS Utilities

Achievements

Department of the Navy Superior Service Certificate (2)

Navy Commendation Medal

Published in numerous professional journals

Department of Defense Journalism Award

Personal Data

Excellent Health

Willing to relocate

Willing to travel

Married, empty nest

Top Secret Compartmented Clearance

Excellent References



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

February 3, 1995

The Honorable Owen Pickett
United States House of Representatives
2430 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Pickett:

Thank you for your letter concerning the qualifications of Lt. Col. Marshall W. Lefavor (Ret.). Commission staff members were impressed by Lt. Col. Lefavor's experience and achievements. The Commission has a number of highly qualified candidates seeking a limited number of positions on our staff. We will keep Lt. Col. Lefavor's resume under consideration as we continue to select candidates for these remaining positions.

I appreciate your bringing Lt. Col. Lefavor's interest in serving on the staff of the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to my attention.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "David S. Lyles".

David S. Lyles
Staff Director