DCN 484

# THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

## CONGRESSIONAL HEARING
## WASHINGTON, DC
## TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1995

**ROOM 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING**

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

# CONGRESSIONAL HEARING
# ROOM 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
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# DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
# CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
# JUNE 13, 1995
# 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

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1:12-1:17 Rep. James Greenwood
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1:50-1:55 Rep. Carlos Romero-Barcelo

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**TENNESSEE**
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2:49-2:54 Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison
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3:49-3:54 Rep. Greg Laughlin
Rep. Kika de la Garza

**UTAH**
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4:02-4:07 Sen. Bob Bennett
4:07-4:12 Rep. Jim Hansen
4:12-4:17 Rep. Enid Waldholtz

**VIRGINIA**
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4:30-4:35 Rep. Owen Pickett
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5:03-5:08 Sen. Russ Feingold
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7:11-7:16

# MISSISSIPPI

## I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

*NAVY:*

| | |
|---|---|
| NAS Meridian | Close |
| NTTC Meridian | Close |

## II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

*AIR FORCE:*

| | |
|---|---|
| Columbus Air Force Base | Close |

# MAP NO. 25

# MISSISSIPPI




Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

**Remarks Given by**

**SENATOR THAD COCHRAN**

**Before the**

**Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

**June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for giving me and my colleagues the opportunity to share our thoughts with you on Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian Naval Air Station, the two installations in Mississippi that will be voted on by the Commission within the next few weeks. We appreciate the visits made by many of the commissioners to each of these bases, and hope you find the information gathered useful in your deliberations. We know that each round of base closure has been more difficult than the last, and in this fourth round there are very few clear-cut votes for you to make. We believe, however, that military requirements support keeping both of our bases open.

Columbus Air Force Base is an undergraduate pilot training base. This base, which was not recommended for closure by the Department of Defense, was added for consideration by the Commission. Four commissioners visited the base last week, and many of you heard testimony on the base at the regional hearing in Atlanta last Friday. The Air Force continues to support keeping the base open, a point clearly and strongly made last week by General Boles, the incoming commander of that service's Air Education and Training Command. It would be a nightmare, in large part due to the process for obtaining environmental permits, to try to recreate elsewhere the bombing range that is in use at Columbus Air

Force Base, and this base also has a surge capacity unmatched within the Air Force Air Education and Training Command. The base has excellent airspace and weather, magnificent runways, no encroachment problems, and has the enthusiastic support of the state and local community. I'm sure those of you who were able to go to Columbus last week felt both the pride of the community in the base and the special bond between the base and the community. The Air Force and the Secretary of Defense made the right decision when they chose not to select Columbus Air Force Base for closure. Your examination of the facts can only lead you to conclude that Columbus is not the Air Force undergraduate pilot training base to close.

Mississippi is also home to Meridian Naval Air Station where, unfortunately, the wrong recommendation was made by a Service, in this case the Navy, and the Defense Department. This base has now been scrutinized by three successive Base Closure Commissions. In 1991, Meridian was added by that Commission for consideration and in 1993 it was recommended for closure by the Department of Defense, as it was this year. Talking to base closure commissions every two years about Meridian is a habit that the local community, the State, and Mississippi's congressional delegation would be happy to break. You will find few bases, if any, that have been as thoroughly and repeatedly scrutinized as NAS Meridian. As the facts supported keeping Meridian open in 1991 and 1993, they do so again in 1995.

You should know that I do not lightly criticize a recommendation by the Department of the Navy. Mississippi is, in many ways, a Navy state, and I consider myself fortunate to have served my time on active duty in

the Navy. Mississippians are proud of Naval Station Pascagoula, a base that was reviewed for closure by the Commission in 1993 but was kept open. We are also proud of our SeaBee base in Gulfport. Ingalls Shipbuilding, in Pascagoula, builds destroyers and amphibious assault ships for the Navy and is our State's largest single employer. Other shipbuilders, like Trinity Halter Marine, build oceanographic research vessels for the Navy and special operations craft for our special operations forces. Mississippi's ties to the Navy are strong, and I find myself in the unnatural position of disagreeing with the Navy's analysis and recommendation on NAS Meridian.

As in 1993, the analysis done by the Navy in 1995 to support its recommendation to close NAS Meridian was poorly done. The Navy's recommendation is based upon its conclusion that it can single-site all undergraduate pilot training at one base. The facts do not support this recommendation. Instead, the facts present the "substantial deviation" necessary for the Commission to overturn a recommendation by the Defense Department.

The primary mission of NAS Meridian is to conduct undergraduate pilot training. In performing its analysis the Navy projected that it would need to train 336 pilots per year, otherwise known as the Navy's "pilot training rate" (PTR). Based upon its analysis the Navy concluded that it could close NAS Meridian and conduct all of its UPT training at NAS Kingsville, provided that NAS Corpus Christi is used as an outlying airfield. The Navy concluded that Kingsville and Corpus Christi have sufficient capacity to satisfy the projected PTR. These are fine bases, and

my disagreement with the Navy's recommendation should not be viewed as criticism of either of them. My disagreement with the Navy's recommendation is made solely on the basis of the fact that only so much training can be done at any one facility, no matter how good the facility is.

The PTR provided by the Navy to the Commission is wrong, by the Navy's own admission. If asked when he testifies tomorrow, Admiral Boorda will confirm what I just said. Only last week there was an article in *Defense News*, which I'd like to submit for the record, where senior Navy officials say that the Navy will have to keep six additional squadrons in its force structure that it had planned to decommission by 1997. I'd also like to enter into the record a recent memorandum from Admiral Boorda, dated 10 May 1995, which directs his staff to increase the PTR from 336 -- the number supplied to the Commission by the Navy -- to 360, the result of keeping six additional squadrons in the force structure. As the Navy's numbers are changing, I don't know how anyone can determine if 360 is any more valid as the PTR than 336, or if 360 is only an intermediate stop enroute to a higher number. Indeed, because E-2/C-2 training is built into the strike training PTR, the PTR has actually gone up to 382, as acknowledged in a letter from Admiral Boorda to my esteemed colleague, Sonny Montgomery, on May 25.

In 1993 the Navy published both its strike PTR requirement and the PTR capacity at each of its strike UPT bases. In 1995 the Navy published its PTR requirement but didn't establish the PTR capacity of its strike UPT bases, instead publishing the "operations per hour" each base could perform. You have to wonder why the Navy was willing to compare

apples to apples in 1993, but wants you to compare apples to oranges in 1995. I don't understand why the Navy doesn't want you to have the facts you need.

Analysis conducted by the Meridian Team that has been shared with the Base Closure Commission staff clearly demonstrates that one base cannot conduct all of the strike undergraduate pilot training. Admiral Hayden, the Chief of Naval Air Training, has gone so far as to acknowledge that at a PTR of 360 there is no surge capability. And when the E-2/C-2 training rate is included, as it must be, the PTR comes out to be 382. If you are willing to believe the Navy's numbers, at best there is no surge capability if you single-site strike undergraduate pilot training. Should any of us be willing to accept a situation where the Navy cannot surge its training infrastructure to meet its needs in a crisis?

Furthermore, if you believe the Navy's numbers are correct then you must also accept the idea that effective training can be conducted without any margin for error; that is, without any maintenance problems, weather problems, or personnel problems, day in and day out, every week of the year. Common sense dictates that it is not possible to run any organization at 100% efficiency for sustained periods of time before serious problems occur. Do we want to train our young pilots under these circumstances?

Your charter is to save the Defense Department money by closing or realigning unnecessary infrastructure while at the same time maintaining enough infrastructure for the military to be able to carry out its many

missions. It will not be possible to wring every last bit of excess capacity from the Defense Department's infrastructure, nor should that be the goal unless we think it inconceivable that our military will ever have to be larger than it is today or have to surge its training capacity. Ask the CNO tomorrow if he believes the Navy can meet its mission requirements without NAS Meridian. Ask him if he is comfortable with the idea of depending upon one base for strike undergraduate pilot training, if he thinks that one base is even adequate to fulfill the Navy's mission needs in the coming years.

Back in December, in a speech given before the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Chairman Dixon said, "Base closing...should not be simply a budget-cutting tactic. It should be undertaken to reduce our defense infrastructure in a deliberate way that will improve our long-term military readiness and insure that we are spending taxpayer dollars in the most efficient way possible. We should not make hasty decisions that will eliminate important military assets based on our near-term budget imperatives." The boundaries for the Commission could not have been more clearly stated.

There is a saying in the Army, "The more you train in peace, the less you bleed in war." We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that the training conducted at both Columbus Air Force Base and NAS Meridian is among the most demanding training given to our young men and women in the military. There is no margin for error. As Chairman Dixon said in December, we should conduct our training "...in the most efficient way possible." Efficiency is exactly the right goal; to do less than that would

be to send our forces into combat unprepared, as has happened to our military too many times in this century. While we strive for efficiency in training, we can't ever be sure of exactly what perfect efficiency looks like, and I am worried that some would have you go so close to the edge that we end up passing through "efficiency" and into "inadequacy" in our training. You have the facts to demonstrate that military requirements necessitate keeping both Columbus AFB and NAS Meridian open. I urge you to do so. Thank you.



DEFENSE NEWS FILE PHOTO

**The U.S. Navy will replace two squadrons of A-6s (above) with F/A-18s starting**

*in 1997. The move is part of an effort to meet the service's stated need for 50 strike fighters per aircraft carrier.*

# Navy Plans F-18 Expansion To Counter Strike Shortfall

By ROBERT HOLZER
Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Six squadrons of U.S. Navy A-6 and F-14 aircraft will be replaced with F/A-18 fighters over the next five years under a $1 billion plan to address a looming shortfall in tactical aircraft.

"This is a plan in development," Rear Adm. Brent Bennitt, director of naval aviation, said in a May 24 interview. "We know we have the requirement to fill our carrier decks in 1998 and beyond, and it needs to be addressed. How we actually address it still involves the balance between the Marine Corps and Navy requirements and resources."

Under the Navy's preferred plan, two A-6 squadrons would begin the transition to F/A-18s in 1997, and up to four F-14 squadrons could also be converted to fly F/A-18s during the same period, Navy officials said. It takes on average about two years to fully shift a squadron from one type of aircraft, like the A-6, to fly and maintain a completely new aircraft, Navy officials said.

Since those aircraft, pilots and maintenance personnel already were scheduled to be decomissioned by 1997, it is imperative that the Navy continue to fund those squadrons as they shift to the F/A-18 aircraft to avoid near-term shortfalls and the greater expense of re-forming those needed squadrons from scratch, Bennitt said.

*See SHORTFALL, Page 37*



# U.S. Navy Plans To Re-Equip Six Squadrons With F/A-18

*SHORTFALL, From Page 4*

"If the squadrons are disbanded, it will be more costly to reconstitute that capability at a later date," he said.

The cost could range anywhere from $500 million to more than $1 billion, depending on the needs of the overseas commanders, Navy aviation officials said. The ultimate number of squadrons to be converted also could be reduced if additional Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons are integrated into Navy carrier airwing operations.

In reducing its force structure over the last four years, the Navy cut too deeply into its carrier airwing force and now faces a near-term shortfall of about six F/A-18 squadrons. Not rectifying the shortfall would leave the Navy without enough attack aircraft to meet its stated requirement of maintaining 50 strike-fighter aircraft on each carrier. That mix will be composed of 36 F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and 14 F-14 Tomcats.

To meet that strike-fighter requirement the Navy will need 30 F/A-18 squadrons, Bennitt said, adding that the Marine inventory of 22 F/A-18 squadrons also has proved to be too limited to meet the Corps' needs as well as the Navy's shortfall.

"We overshot in terms of what we had found in 1995 beyond for a number of reasons," Bennitt said, "not the least of which is that the requirement has not decreased at all. We still have tremendous demands on our carriers and the Marine Corps has tremendous demands on their F/A-18 squadrons."

Under a 1993 agreement between the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Marines agreed to integrate up to three F/A-18 squadrons for use aboard Navy carriers, but also has witnessed no decrease in operational requirements, Corps officials said.

At the end of the Cold War, "There was the perception that requirements would logically go down. Now that has proven to not be the case," Bert Cooper, an aircraft analyst with the Congressional Research Service, said May 26. "You can make an argument that Third World threats are difficult to [illegible]"

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1542
Ser N889J6/5U665128
10 May 95

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER AVIATION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, JOINT USN/USAF TRAINING RATES

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889JG/4U661666 of 20 Jul 1994

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 95-00
(2) NFO Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 95-00

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect training requirements to support fleet, Joint USN/USAF, USCG, FMS, and NOAA requirements.

2. USN PTR beginning in FY-98 and NFOTR beginning in FY-97 reflect a phased increase in production to address the outfitting of four(4) EA-6B squadrons to take over the USAF EF-111 mission and the transition of six (6) TACAIR squadrons to F/A-18 squadrons across the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). F/A-18E/F fleet introduction team (FIT) and fleet replacement squadron (FRS) requirements are also included.

3. PTR in FY-96/97 and NFOTR in FY-96 could not be increased over levels published in ref (a) to match an ideal production schedule to meet para. 2 force changes. Compounding this situation, PTR/NFOTR from FY 92-94 was artificially reduced below "fleet requirements" in order to shrink student pools. PTR/NFOTR listed in enclosures (1) and (2) is designed to reestablish production rates to meet and sustain fleet requirements by FY-98 and out.

4. This letter also represents the first publication of joint USAF requirement numbers that will be produced by CNATRA.

5. OPNAV point on contact is CDR Tom Donovan, N889J6, A/V 224-6013, commercial (703) 614-6013 Fax (703) 693-9785.

H. T. RITTENOUR
By direction

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# PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

| | STRIKE | MARITIME | E-6A TAC | E2/C2 | ROTARY | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY-95 | | | | | | |
| USN | 163 | 118 | 22 | 36 | 184 | 523 |
| USMC | 110 | 31 | | 0 | 181 | 322 |
| CG | 0 | 10 | | 0 | 45 | 55 |
| FMS(IMT) | 30 | 45 | | 0 | 65 | 140 |
| NOAA | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| USAF | 0 | 22 | | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| TOTAL | 303 | 228 | 22 | 36 | 475 | 1064 |
| FY-96 | | | | | | |
| USN | 183 | 118 | 22 | 36 | 184 | 543 |
| USMC | 106 | 29 | | 0 | 181 | 316 |
| CG | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| FMS(IMT) | 30 | 45 | | 0 | 65 | 140 |
| NOAA | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| USAF | 0 | 35 | | 0 | 0 | 35 |
| TOTAL | 319 | 229 | 22 | 36 | 480 | 1086 |
| FY-97 | | | | | | |
| USN | 203 | 124 | 22 | 36 | 184 | 569 |
| USMC | 103 | 28 | | 0 | 176 | 307 |
| CG | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| FMS(IMT) | 30 | 45 | | 0 | 65 | 140 |
| NOAA | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| USAF | 0 | 113 | | 0 | 0 | 113 |
| TOTAL | 336 | 312 | 22 | 36 | 475 | 1181 |
| FY-98 | | | | | | |
| USN | 227 | 128 | 22 | 36 | 220 | 633 |
| USMC | 103 | 28 | | 0 | 176 | 307 |
| CG | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| FMS(IMT) | 30 | 45 | | 0 | 65 | 140 |
| NOAA | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| USAF | 0 | 147 | | 0 | 0 | 147 |
| TOTAL | 360 | 350 | 22 | 36 | 511 | 1279 |
| FY-99 | | | | | | |
| USN | 227 | 128 | 22 | 36 | 232 | 645 |
| USMC | 103 | 28 | | 0 | 176 | 307 |
| CG | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| FMS(IMT) | 30 | 45 | | 0 | 65 | 140 |
| NOAA | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| USAF | 0 | 147 | | 0 | 0 | 147 |
| TOTAL | 360 | 350 | 22 | 36 | 523 | 1291 |
| FY-00 | | | | | | |
| USN | 227 | 128 | 22 | 36 | 232 | 645 |
| USMC | 103 | 28 | | 0 | 176 | 307 |
| CG | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| FMS(IMT) | 30 | 45 | | 0 | 65 | 140 |
| NOAA | 0 | 2 | | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| USAF | 0 | 147 | | 0 | 0 | 147 |
| TOTAL | 360 | 350 | 22 | 36 | 523 | 1291 |

# NFO TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

| FY-95 | STRK/FTR | STK | WSO | TN | ATDS | NAV | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | F-14 | S/ES-3 EA-6 | | | E-2 | P/EP-3 E-6 | |
| USN | 39 | 75 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 122 | 271 |
| USMC | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| USAF | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| IMT | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 15 | 35 |
| NOAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 57 | 87 | 19 | 10 | 35 | 138 | 346 |

| FY-96 | STRK/FTR | STK | WSO | TN | ATDS | NAV | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | F-14 | S/ES-3 EA6 | | | E-2 | P/EP-3 E-6 | |
| USN | 39 | 95 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 128 | 297 |
| USMC | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| USAF | 0 | 0 | 29 | 38 | 21 | 0 | 88 |
| IMT | 25 | 0 | 40 | 11 | 0 | 15 | 91 |
| NOAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 82 | 107 | 69 | 49 | 56 | 144 | 507 |

| FY-97 | STRK/FTR | STK | WSO | TN | ATDS | NAV | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | F-14 | S/ES-3 EA-6 | | | E-2 | P/EP-3 E-6 | |
| USN | 48 | 139 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 128 | 355 |
| USMC | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| USAF | 0 | 0 | 37 | 62 | 59 | 189 | 347 |
| IMT | 25 | 0 | 40 | 15 | 0 | 25 | 105 |
| NOAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 91 | 151 | 77 | 77 | 99 | 343 | 838 |

| FY-98 | STRK/FTR | STK | WSO | TN | ATDS | NAV | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | F-14 | S/ES-3 EA-6 | | | E-2 | P/EP-3 E-6 | |
| USN | 48 | 118 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 128 | 329 |
| USMC | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| USAF | 0 | 0 | 37 | 62 | 59 | 189 | 347 |
| IMT | 25 | 0 | 40 | 15 | 0 | 25 | 105 |
| NOAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 91 | 130 | 77 | 77 | 94 | 343 | 812 |

| FY-99 | STRK/FTR | STK | WSO | TN | ATDS | NAV | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | F-14 | S/ES-3 EA-6 | | | E-2 | P/EP-3 E-6 | |
| USN | 48 | 109 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 128 | 320 |
| USMC | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| USAF | 0 | 0 | 37 | 62 | 59 | 191 | 349 |
| IMT | 25 | 0 | 40 | 15 | 0 | 25 | 105 |
| NOAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 91 | 121 | 77 | 77 | 94 | 345 | 805 |

| FY-00 | STRK/FTR | STK | WSO | TN | ATDS | NAV | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | F-14 | S/ES-3 EA-6 | | | E-2 | P/EP-3 E-6 | |
| USN | 48 | 109 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 128 | 320 |
| USMC | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| USAF | 0 | 0 | 37 | 62 | 59 | 191 | 349 |
| IMT | 25 | 0 | 40 | 15 | 0 | 25 | 105 |
| NOAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 91 | 121 | 77 | 77 | 94 | 345 | 805 |

REMARKS OF HON. G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY
BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
JUNE 13, 1995

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS. I HAVE MOVED FROM THE FRONT ROW TO THE PULPIT TODAY. TOMORROW I WILL BE BACK ON THE FRONT ROW.

I AM HERE TODAY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF TWO BASES--MERIDIAN NAVAL AIR STATION AND COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE.

THREE OF YOU HAVE BEEN TO MERIDIAN NAVAL AIR STATION AND GEN. J. B. DAVIS HAS AGREED TO GO THERE ON FRIDAY.

COMMISSIONERS CORNELLA AND STEELE VISITED MERIDIAN ON JUNE 8, BUT THE 90 DEGREE HEAT DIDN'T PREVENT AN ESTIMATED 20,000 PEOPLE FROM COMING OUT IN SUPPORT. WHEN GEN. ROBLES VISITED, WE HAD 12,000 PEOPLE AND ONLY 70 DEGREE WEATHER.

THE NAVY MERIDIAN TEAM MAKES A STRONG CASE THAT THE NAVY WAS ON SHAKY GROUND IN SAYING IT COULD MEET FUTURE PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AT JUST ONE BASE.

SINCE MERIDIAN WAS PUT ON THE CLOSURE LIST, THINGS HAVE CHANGED. THE NAVY SAYS IT NEEDS MORE AIR SQUADRONS AND HAS REVISED THE PILOT TRAINING RATE (PTR) FROM 336 TO 382. AND NOW THE NAVY SAYS IF MERIDIAN IS CLOSED, IT NEEDS TO BE KEPT OPEN FOR TWO MORE YEARS, FROM 1999 TO 2001.

YOU HAVE SEEN THE LETTER TO ME FROM ADMIRAL MIKE BOORDA, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, WHERE HE SAYS THAT OPERATING AT MAXIMUM CAPACITY AT ONE BASE TO MEET THE PROJECTED PTR WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND UNCOMFORTABLE.

THE ADMIRAL ALSO SAYS IT WOULD BE UNSATISFACTORY IF THE NAVY HAD TO INCREASE PTR FOR A SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL SURGE REQUIREMENT.

TO REACH THE REQUIRED PTR AT ONLY ONE BASE, NAS KINGSVILLE WOULD HAVE TO OPERATE AT NEAR CAPACITY, INCLUDING INCREASED WORK DAYS. OPERATING AT THAT LEVEL SIMPLY DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A SURGE IN PTR.

ALSO, WITH ONLY ONE STRIKE BASE, A TORNADO OR HURRICANE HITTING KINGSVILLE PUTS THE NAVY OUT OF BUSINESS IN TRAINING CARRIER PILOTS.

IN VOTING TO KEEP MERIDIAN OPEN, THE 1993 BRAC COMMISSION FOUND THAT TWO FULL STRIKE TRAINING BASES WERE NEEDED WHEN PTR WAS 384. THE PROJECTED PTR IS NOW UP TO 382.

NAS MERIDIAN HAS DIFFERENT MISSIONS. FIRST, THE TRAINING OF AVIATORS TO LAND AND FLY OFF CARRIERS; SECOND, THE NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER, WHICH TRAINS 5,000 SAILORS AND MARINES EACH YEAR; THIRD, THE ANTI-DRUG SCHOOL THAT WAS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE; FOURTH, THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL RESERVE, HAS SAID IF MERIDIAN IS NOT CLOSED, HE WILL MOVE A 200 PERSON RESERVE UNIT FROM JACKSON TO MERIDIAN.

THE CRITERIA GUIDING THIS COMMISSION GIVES PRIORITY TO MILITARY VALUE. THE FACTS ARE CLEAR THAT FOR OPERATIONAL READINESS, THE NAVY NEEDS TWO STRIKE TRAINING BASES.

(PAUSE)

I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT FOUR COMMISSIONERS VISITED COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE JUNE 7 AND 8.

THE KEY WORD WITH COLUMBUS IS FLEXIBILITY. IT CAN SUPPORT ANY OF THE FIVE AIR FORCE FLYING MISSIONS. HAVING ONCE BEEN A STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND BASE, IT HAS THE LONGEST RUNWAY IN THE SOUTHEAST AT 12,000 FEET. IT CAN ACCOMMODATE ANY AIRCRAFT IN THE INVENTORY.

IN ADDITION, COLUMBUS IS THE ONLY UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING BASE WITH THE USE OF A GUNNERY RANGE. THAT IS A BIG PLUS. IT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY TO BUILD ANOTHER RANGE SOMEWHERE ELSE IN THE COUNTRY.

IT HAS AN ABUNDANCE OF AIR SPACE AND NO ENCROACHMENT PROBLEMS OF ANY KIND.

STRONG COMMUNITY SUPPORT BROUGHT THIS BASE TO COLUMBUS IN 1941 AND THAT RELATIONSHIP IS JUST AS STRONG TODAY.

THE AIR FORCE AND THE JOINT CROSS SERVICE STUDY GROUP BOTH RANKED COLUMBUS AS THE NUMBER ONE UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING BASE.

THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO BASES WITH THE ABILITY TO ADAPT TO NEW MISSIONS. COLUMBUS IS IN THAT

CATEGORY.

THAT CAPABILITY, ALONG WITH ITS UPDATED FACILITIES, AIR SPACE AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE TO KEEP COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE OPEN.

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY.

# MISSOURI

## I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

***ARMY:***

| | |
|---|---|
| Aviation-Troop Command | Disestablish |

## II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

# MAP NO. 26

# MISSOURI




Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

Statement in Support of the
Army Aviation and Troop Command
Before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Rep. Jim Talent (2nd - MO)

June 13, 1995

Before I start I'd like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Commissioners and their staff who are working so diligently to assess the merits of each recommendation and argument put before them.

Having said that, I'd like to discuss Army readiness this morning as it relates to the proposed disestablishment of the Army Aviation and Troop Command from St. Louis and its relocation to Natick, Massachusetts; Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Detroit; and also to Huntsville, Alabama.

While the actual cost in terms of new buildings, real estate, leased facilities, infrastructure, and additional overhead can be measured with considerable accuracy and confidence, the issue of readiness as it relates to ATCOM has yet to be fully addressed.

I'd like to focus attention this morning squarely on Army aviation readiness, especially as it relates to the proposed closing of the ATCOM installation in St. Louis, and whether or not the Army will retain the skilled personnel who represent an enormous asset to our services.

By my estimates, we will probably lose between 50 and 80 percent of the roughly 400 engineers and 400 logisticians who presently work at ATCOM. These people represent a collective body of knowledge that the Army will simply lose -- and then have to completely recreate at another installation. Without wanting to exaggerate the point, this relearning process will probably take from between three and five years. In the mean time, this crawl-walk-run scenario will, at the user level, manifest itself in terms of shortcomings in acquisitions, logistics, and in engineering.

For instance, because so many of the more experienced ATCOM employees will remain in the St. Louis area, we can realistically expect greater delays in parts requisitions, which will reflect in greater maintenance backlogs, because parts will be slower in working their way through the "pipeline." This, in turn, means that any given aviation battalion's operational readiness rate will drop considerably. The average Army aviation unit's fully mission capable "O-R" rating today is around 70 to 75 percent; however, if this proposed relocation takes place, we can expect that rating to drop, possibly to as low as 50 percent, and remain below average for as long as it takes to reestablish the Command's expertise.

In addition, we can also expect that response time to Safety of Flight (SOF) decisions will be delayed due to the loss of

experienced engineering personnel. To convey the importance of this matter, when a given fleet of, for instance, CH-47s, is grounded for some reason, ATCOM engineers must issue a Safety of Flight authorization before those helicopters can once again fly. Until then, the fleet is grounded. Over the past year, ATCOM has issued 16 such Safety of Flight authorizations.

Finally, I'd like to illustrate the importance of ATCOM's day-to-day operations. We all recall the tragedy of Desert One. At that time, we put a total of, I believe, 6 SH-53s into the air in support of that rescue mission. And I recall that a day or two later, former President Nixon remarked that we should have had a great many more helicopters involved. But the unfortunate truth was that maintenance problems, amongst other concerns, doomed the mission from the start. The support system that ATCOM maintains today wasn't there when we needed it during the days of the "Hollow Force." Next, contrast that tragedy with the success of last week's rescue mission. Everything worked as it had to work. ATCOM's business, in part, is to keep these birds in the air.

One other consideration warrants discussion. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, led by Mr. John White, has recommended that DOD collocate "all Army, Navy, and Air Force program management offices responsible for development, production, and support of military aircraft and related equipment."

As Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. White will have primary responsibility for implementing this recommendation. Will it actually take place? That remains to be seen. And since implementation of this recommendation will cause ATCOM's aviation functions to be collocated with similar functions at a yet to be determined site, the transfer of ATCOM's aviation functions to Huntsville would be an expense of over $100 million in moving and construction costs that we can ill afford, and this says nothing of the turmoil, degradation in readiness and operational effectiveness that this move plus any follow-on move would have on the Aviation Command's ability to accomplish its missions.

Our long-term objective must be the same as the Army's Stationing Strategy: to "optimize the operational efficiency of the Army's Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation, and material/maintenance management functions." Based on this reasoning, we should set aside this proposal, and instead seek to integrate this Command's responsibilities within a reorganization concept that is more strategic in scope.

In closing, I'd like to repeat a very keen and simple observation that General Shalikashvili made in testimony before the House National Security Committee earlier this spring: That our personnel, especially those with years of leadership experience and specialized knowledge - and I dare say wisdom in a good many instances - are the Army's greatest asset. While it

may take ten years to design and produce a given weapons systems, it usually takes about 18 years to prepare an officer for battalion command, and well over 20 years for division command. The critical investment that we've made in each of these individuals is, in many respects, immeasurable. Much the same can be said of our more experienced ATCOM personnel. They are part of a proven team that will simply go away if this relocation takes place.

**BRAC hearing statement. June 13 1995**

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners... First, I want to thank you for affording all of us , the Senators and Congressmen of Missouri, an opportunity to address you on this issue of not only local but national import; the streamlining of our national defense infrastructure.

There are three specific issues I wish to address, the Army Publications Center in St. Louis, Fort Leonard Wood, and ATCOM.

**The St. Louis Army Publications Office.**

I fully support the Army's plan to consolidate the Army Publications Center"s operations in St. Louis. I understand that construction of an additional loading bay, scheduled to begin this year has been approved by the Secretary of the Army and the funds have been released to accomplish this. So, M. Chairman we are on our way to insuring that this move occur

with minimal if any impact on operations.

**Fort Leonard Wood.**

Mr.Chairman, I know that the move of the Army's Chemical Warfare Training School and Military Police School to new facilities on Fort Leonard Wood has been a contentious issue, though it shouldn't be.

Mr. Chairman, I know that the Commission is well aware of the commitment and support the people of Missouri have for this move.

We have had to face the well financed onslaught of the "friends of Fort McClellan"....and I do believe that we have successfully defended the Army's plan and exposed the subterfuge of those opposed to the move to the light of day. Even TIME magazine in its May 22 issue characterizes these opponents as conducting "guerrilla warfare to sabotage the move... and blackmail." The desperate methods employed by these people have created

much havoc during this process, extending even to the floors of Congress where they have attempted to slip into unrelated legislation during the dark of night, draconian regulatory restrictions upon future Army facilities while exempting the Alabama site from even a modicum of regulation.

We are aware that there is a classified meeting to be held shortly that was requested by the "friends of Fort McClellan" which will address the impact of the move of the Chemical Warfare facility on the United States' ability to fulfill its commitment to the Chemical Warfare Convention. We have spoken with the Department of Defense and have been assured that there is no threat to our National security, nor to our ability to meet our commitments due to the move and that the DoD has fully considered this issue and are anxious to put it to rest, as well.

I would also like to submit to the Commission, here, a summary of a survey conducted by people from Missouri, not some group in the employ of Missouri's opposition, and request

that I be allowed to submit the survey in its entirety for the record.

Commissioners, M. Chairman, I know you are aware of extensive regulatory oversight and permitting requirements this move has required of the Army and the state of Missouri. M. Chairman I am proud to let you know at this time, that Gov. Carnahan has signed the final permit and I have a copy of it here for the Commission. M. Chairman, this oversight and regulation process though to some seems tedious, has been necessary to insure the safety of the personnel at the facilities, the local resident population, the environment and national security overall. These will be the finest, state of the art facilities designed to keep our soldiers superbly trained and ready.

**ATCOM**

On the other hand, M. Chairman the proposal to disperse the Army's Aviation and Troop Command will be found to be unwise

and dated as it does not reflect proposals of theDoD's Roles and Missions Commission.

The Army's Management Control Plan clearly shows that leased facilities were excluded from a military value assessment, a critical factor for all other base closure determinations. The GAO has found no documentation even "supporting an analysis of, or addressing the military value" of leased facilities.

The Army has based its decision to close ATCOM primarily on personnel savings. The 786 positions they anticipate to eliminate does not reflect the 533 positions that must be retained if ATCOM is closed. As a result of this overestimation, the Army's return on investment takes ten times as long and annual savings are cut by over two-thirds.

The Army has also created a new command infrasturcture to include a General Officer and staff at the soldier system command at Natick. To the best of our knowledge, the Army has

(Nay-dick)

not calculated this in its personnel savings assumptions. In our opinion, this expands rather than consolidates the Army's infrastructure, in direct opposition to the BRAC mandate.

Additionally, leaving behind the hundreds of highly trained workers and reestablishing their positions and training their replacements, essentially rebuilding the program from scratch will affect readiness.

We believe that the combined effect of downsizing ATCOM in place and moving the Space and Strategic Defense Command to Redstone will result in an immediate return on investment and save $150 million in military construction costs.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, chaired by Mr. John White, has recommended that DoD collocate "all Army, Navy, and Air Force program management offices responsible for development, production, and support of military aircraft and related equipment." As Deputy Secy of Defense, Mr. White will be responsible for implementing this recommendation. Why then, would we want to spend millions of

dollars to disperse ATCOM to the four corners of the United States only to have it re-consolidated and relocated to a DoD-wide site in a few short years. This, especially when the return on investment for the current proposal won't occur until well after our children will have children, so in all likelihood the savings will never be achieved.

Commissioners, the Army's numbers continue to change and the Army has yet to provide documentation to support their current guess. The delegation's numbers reflect current Army reports. We believe that an objective case has been made that moving ATCOM will increase annual overhead and infrastructure costs, has high one-time costs, and does not achieve any savings that would not occur from downsizing ATCOM in place. In addition with the new revelation from the Roles and Missions Commission, the move would reflect poor headwork when service wide collocation occurs in the next few years. For all these reasons and because better alternatives exist, we believe the Army's recommendation to close ATCOM is ill

advised.

Thank you M. Chairman and Commissioners.

FORT LEONARD WOOD
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY
MAY 18-20, 1995

This 456 person telephone survey was conducted May 18 through May 20, 1995. Survey participants were randomly selected from voter registration polls in the counties of Pulaski, Laclede and Phelps, Missouri. The purpose of this survey was to elicit current public opinion regarding the proposed relocation of the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri from Fort McClellan in Alabama. This proposed relocation has become the focus of recent media attention due to a public relations campaign sponsored by civic groups in the Fort McClellan area attempting to prevent the closure of this Army installation in Alabama and its relocation to Missouri. This survey sought to test the current sentiment of persons in the Fort Leonard Wood region regarding the desirability and perceived safety of the relocation of Chemical and Military Police Training Schools to this area.

Its still the economy! Almost 28% of the survey participants, responding to an open-ended question, stated that the need for economic growth in the local community and jobs/unemployment were the primary issues facing the Fort Leonard Wood region. Crime and the growth of street gangs were cited as the next most important problem in the area at 15.86% (Table 1. Survey Results). Thus, it is understandable that of the 85.24% stating that they believed that Fort Leonard Wood has a positive effect on the area (Table 3. Survey Results), 98.48% said that the employment and local economic impact the military base provides are the primary reasons the base presence is positive. Indeed, only 12.86% (58 people) felt that the base has any negative impact on the region (Table 5. Survey Results). Those reporting a negative impact cited military personal or a personal dislike for the military as their reasons for believing Fort Leonard Wood is negative (Table 6. Survey Results.) A total of 89.14% of those interviewed stated that they believed Fort Leonard Wood was "vital" to the local economy (Table 2. Survey Results.)

Overall, those surveyed had a high degree of awareness (73.63%) of the Fort McClellan base closing and relocation issue (Table 9. Survey Results.) 46.44% of the survey participants had read, seen, or heard that the Fort McClellan base closing and relocation to Fort Leonard Wood was positive since it would further improve the local economy and 36.33% were "aware" that it would provide new jobs in Missouri (Table 10. Survey Results.) Regarding negative opinions seen, read, or heard about the proposed relocation (Table 11. Survey Results); 43.51% had not been exposed to any negative information, 37.79% had heard that the relocation would bring in potentially harmful chemicals, and 12.98% were aware of opinions that the relocation would harm the environment. The most interesting fact is that, despite the exposure to these negative opinions, 83.41% of these persons (217 of 261) continue to favor the relocation of the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood.

The majority of survey respondents, 66.23%, believed that the Chemical and Military Schools will not pose a threat to public health in and around Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. However, 22.30% remain undecided about this issue (Table 12. Survey Results.)

Unsolicited comments during the telephone interviews suggested that the Fort Leonard Wood residents empathized with the Fort McClellan community and felt they could understand the need for those residents to attempt to retain the base in Alabama. This reaction was supported in that less than 17% of the respondents stated that they would be extremely or very angry and upset if they learned that civic groups near Fort McClellan, Alabama are paying for a campaign to convince people in the Fort Leonard Wood area to oppose the transfer of the training schools so that they may remain in Alabama. 18.72% said they would be "somewhat" angry and upset and 38.77% responded they would not be angry or upset "at all" (Table 14. Survey Results.)

However, the residents of Fort Leonard Wood are not easily persuaded; 70.11% stated that they did not believe that those near Fort McClellan would go to such

lengths to keep the military schools if they were a public health hazard (Table 15. Survey Results.) Further, 87.91% stated that they believed that the main reason for the campaign financed by Alabama groups to keep the Chemical and Military Police Schools at Fort McClellan was to save the loss of some 10,600 direct and indirect jobs in Alabama (Table 16. Survey Results.)

67.11% of the survey participants said they favored the relocation of the Chemical and Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood and only 6.40% oppose the relocation. The remaining 26.49% of those surveyed had no opinion or were undecided regarding the proposed move. This is a nonpartisan issue, with Democrats, Republicans and Independents supporting the relocation of the Chemical and Military Police Schools in similar numbers. Those in Pulaski County favor the move most strongly as do those in the higher income categories and those above the age of 34 (Table 18. Survey Results.) Again, its the economy. In response to an open-ended query, the proposed base relocation was supported because it was seen to: provide jobs (37.36%), help the area generally (35.47%), and aid the economy (26.42%) (Table 19. Survey Results). Of the 29 persons providing a reason for not wanting the base relocation, 51.72% said they were concerned about the possible risk from chemicals and 37.93% said they simply felt "it was not necessary" (Table 20. Survey Results.)

STATE OF MISSOURI

# DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

MISSOURI AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION

# PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT

Under the authority of RSMo 643 and the Federal Clean Air Act the applicant is authorized to construct the facility described below, in accordance with the laws, rules, and conditions as set forth herein.

Permit Number: 0695-010 Facility I.D. Number: 3860-0004-015

Owner: U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Owner's Address: Department of Defense

Facility Name: U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Facility Address: ATTN: ATZT-DPW-EE; Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Legal Description: Pulaski County, All or parts of T33, 34, 35N, R10, 11, 12W

Application for Authority to Construct was made for:

**** Permission to construct a static and mobile fog oil smoke training facility. This review was conducted in accordance with Section (8), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Construction Permits Required." ****

---

☐ Special Conditions are not applicable to this permit.

☒ Special Conditions do apply to this permit and are listed as attachments starting on page 2.

June 7 1995 John A. Young

HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADER RICHARD A. GEPHARDT
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION ON THE ARMY'S AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND
TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1995

Senator Dixon and members of the Commission:

For weeks now, you've heard testimony against various base closings, often arguing that the armed services' numbers simply don't add up. While that sort of argument may seem compelling, that's not the argument I intend to make. In the case of the Army's Aviation and Troop Command -- ATCOM -- the numbers do add up. The problem is that they're the wrong numbers. Let me explain.

The Army claims that while the closure of ATCOM will cost 152 million dollars, it will also result in the elimination of 786 jobs -- saving 56 million dollars each year, and yielding a return on the investment in just three years.

Despite requests from your staff, the Army hasn't provided any analysis to support these reductions. At the same time, your staff has received Army data which shows that only 48 civilian positions could be eliminated through the closure of ATCOM. I'd like to summarize this data for you:

-- The Army has included savings from 205 positions that will be eliminated at ATCOM regardless of any base closure. The Army's own base closure plan agrees that these positions should not be counted as savings.

-- The Army claimed savings from 56 positions that must remain in St. Louis to fulfill contractual obligations to other federal agencies, such as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, FEMA, and the Department of Agriculture.

-- The Army claimed savings from 90 positions that must be maintained and transferred to receiving bases to perform base operations functions.

-- The Army claimed savings from 387 positions that must be maintained and transferred to receiving bases, in order to keep performing ATCOM's functions at these other sites.

The bottom line is that if you subtract these positions from the Army's claim of 786 personnel cuts, then only a measly 48 positions can be eliminated by closing ATCOM. Translating this into costs and savings, ATCOM's closure will still cost 152 million dollars, but will achieve no annual savings and no return on investment -- ever.

And you don't have to take from me. Take it from the Army's own officers -- the people

who will have to put this proposal into practice.

-- First, ATCOM's Deputy Commander has confirmed that these personnel must be kept regardless of their location for the Army to continue performing its aviation support functions.

-- Second, the Tank Command in Detroit and the Communications Command in New Jersey have confirmed that additional personnel will have to be transferred from ATCOM to ensure that the Army's operations in these areas continue.

-- Finally, for Redstone Arsenal, the Army Materiel Command has determined that any shortfall in the number of personnel transferred from ATCOM will be filled by excess personnel presently at Redstone.

When I learned this last piece of information, I asked "how many excess personnel does Redstone Arsenal have?" According to the Army's own Stationing and Installation Plan, Redstone Arsenal currently has 900 more personnel than it needs to perform its missions.

This is astounding to me. By the Army's own admission, it is planning to use the closure of ATCOM to solve an overstaffing problem at Redstone Arsenal. As far as I'm concerned, if the Army has too many people at Redstone, it should downsize there. It shouldn't waste over 150 million dollars to move ATCOM functions and kick over 700 people out the door in St. Louis -- people who have dedicated their careers to our nation's defense -- in order to avoid hard choices at Redstone. ATCOM has made these kinds of tough decisions over the past several years, reducing over 3,000 personnel since 1989. Now it's Redstone's turn.

You all know that the BRAC process was not intended to allow DOD to arbitrarily pick winners and losers among its civilian personnel. It was intended to reduce the cost of government to the taxpayer. Closing ATCOM simply wouldn't achieve this goal.

Furthermore, the strength of our Defense Department comes from its people. They are some of the most highly skilled, trained, and dedicated people in our entire nation. This is true for each unit of each branch in the military, and I know that it's particularly true of the individuals that make up ATCOM.

When considering the closure of ATCOM, we have to consider the fate of its employees, because the Army's case for closing the facility rests on the assumption that hundreds can be laid off if ATCOM's functions are transferred somewhere else. As you know, reducing personnel is often a good place to look for savings, but it also can incur even higher costs and disrupt the lives of those who are dedicated to our nation's defense. That's why we must be very careful when deciding to close any facility based on expected personnel cuts.

The Army has presented a straightforward case in which its personnel cuts appear to add up -- provided you consider them in a vacuum and don't ask for any data to back them up.

Therefore, I ask that you not simply accept the Army's claim that ATCOM's closure will

save money. Instead, look at the true number of personnel that can realistically be eliminated by closing ATCOM. Don't let the Army solve a personnel problem at one base by causing pain and hardship in another community hundreds of miles away. This is the very least the employees of ATCOM can ask.

I thank you for this opportunity to discuss ATCOM -- and I hope my testimony is helpful as you make this very difficult decision.

# # #

congressman

# ike skelton



## NEWS RELEASE

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, June 13, 1995

Contact: Amy Blankenship
(202) 225-2876

**TESTIMONY OF U.S. REP. IKE SKELTON (D-MO)**
**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**
**WASHINGTON, DC**
**JUNE 13, 1995**

"Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I support the Department of Defense and Army recommendation to move the Army Chemical and Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood.

"Because of the ending of the Cold War, our country has downsized its military considerably, and continues to do so. The Army, just prior to the Gulf War in 1990, had 764,000 active duty soldiers. Today, there are 532,000 soldiers

river-crossing training, counter-drug operations, operations in rear areas and protection of supply routes training.

"Second, Fort Leonard Wood is a logical location for all these schools. It has 63,000 acres, 17,000 more than Fort McClellan. Fort Leonard Wood has 26 percent more work space, 66 percent more family housing, and 32 percent more barracks. Fort Leonard Wood facilities can easily accommodate contingencies as it is near transportation outlets. Consolidation allows better use of Army manpower, integrating all three branches in one place.

"Concerning return on investment, the Army computes that there will be a return on investment in six years by moving the schools to Fort Leonard Wood. There will be a $45 million per year savings.

"The last Base Closure Commission stated: [illegible]

# MONTANA

## I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

***ARMY:***

| | |
|---|---|
| Ft. Missoula | Close |

***AIR FORCE:***

| | |
|---|---|
| Malmstrom AFB | Realign |

## II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

# MAP NO. 27

# MONTANA




STATE CAPITAL
ARMY INSTALLATION
NAVY INSTALLATION
AF INSTALLATION

Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

STATEMENT BY

SENATOR CONRAD BURNS (R—MT)

JUNE 13, 1995

BEFORE THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman and other Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. I appreciate your taking the time to hear my comments and those of my colleagues from the Montana Congressional Delegation.

I commend you all for the effort you have made in this process, and I look forward to executing your recommendations as the Military Construction Appropriations Chairman.

This morning I am would like to address the costs and savings logic of the various options open to the Commission.

I strongly believe realigning Malmstrom's 12 KC—135's is foolish because:

* it generates a 'suspect' half million dollars in annual savings;

* it generates a 20 year net present value cost of $8.3 million;

* it ignores and would 'mothball' over $100 million in state—of—the—art tanker support facilities.

The cost—savings analysis of the realign Malmstrom scenario is based on:

* the error in Air Force data which counts as a savings in the costs to run McDill Air Force Base's runway (over $4 million);

* the reopening of McDill's runway is a separate recommendation and the costs associated with that independent action (which the Air Force says must occur regardless of Commission recommendations on tankers to McDill) is inappropriate to count in the Malmstrom recommendation;

* the corrected projected savings of less than half a million dollars annually does not take into account the costs to continue missiles operations. These costs include:

1. new commercial airport hot—pad
2. critical parts support
3. medical evacuation flights

4. commercial mobilization support
5. helicopter air traffic control and weather support

* after these changes are in place and paid for, annual net costs will accrue from the realign Malmstrom recommendation.

Closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base makes sense because;

* it maximizes savings with a total closure: it's a clean kill;

* the action pays back in one (1) year;

* it produces recurring annual savings of over $87 million;

* it produces a 20 year net present value of over $1.088 billion (not million, billion);

* it eliminates (and allows DoD to excess) capacity of one large aircraft base.

Mr. Chairman and other Commissioners, Malmstorm is a prime location to keep tankers. And if you look at the facts surrounding costs, you'll see it makes sense financially.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning.

# NEW JERSEY

## I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

*ARMY:*

| | |
|---|---|
| Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal | Close |
| Camp Kilmer | Close |
| Camp Pedricktown | Close |
| Caven Point Army Reserve Center | Close |
| Ft. Dix | Realign |

*NAVY:*

| | |
|---|---|
| NAWC Lakehurst | Close |

## II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

# MAP NO. 31

## NEW JERSEY




Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

# CONSOLIDATION AND COLLOCATION OF ROME LAB MISSIONS TO FT. MONMOUTH

THE HONORABLE DICK ZIMMER
JUNE 13, 1995

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the transformation of modern warfare. It showed that a fully integrated battlefield is increasingly important to our country's military success.

Because of the importance of interoperability of information systems in battle space, U.S. technology supervision must be maximized to fully integrate all elements of the sea-land-air battlefield. This can be done through cross-servicing.

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs agreed with this assessment, recommending

Fort Monmouth as the site for C4I collocation, one of the few interservicing steps taken by the Department of Defense in BRAC 95 and right in line with BRAC 93 guidance for more cross-servicing.

Collocation of the leading Air Force and Army C4I centers will ensure that a coordinated C4I development, procurement, test and implementation plan is pursued. It will promote joint interoperability and create a World Class C4I Center, a National Center of Information Warfare. I believe Fort Monmouth has the expert, experienced staff to lead the DoD effort in C4I. Fort Monmouth is the leader in four mission areas chosen for consolidation at Fort Monmouth: photonics, electromagnetics, radio communication and communications networks.

The Fort has 68 Research and Development Agreements with leading edge academic institutions, including nearby Princeton, Rutgers, New Jersey Institute of Technology and Stevens Institute. It has public/private partnerships with New Jersey leaders in C4I technology, such as AT&T/Bell Labs and ITT and is located in the state that enjoys the highest concentration of scientists and engineers in the nation per capita.

In terms of physical space, Fort Monmouth possesses extensive, low cost expansion capacity. The fort includes more than a thousand acres on the main post and Charles Wood area and has available more than 500 thousand square feet of fully modernized, professional work space.

The fort has state of the art facilities to support the C4I mission, including a variety of unique high technology facilities such as the Digital Integrated Lab. The Myer Center, in particular, includes world class laboratory space and state of the art infrastructure to house the thousands of engineers and scientists who work there today on the cutting edge of information technology.

BRAC and non-BRAC related movements from the post have created significant expansion potential for cross-servicing. This potential is complemented by available housing for military families and the full range of medical, dental, shopping and recreational activities on post to support them.

Fort Monmouth has the ideal integrated commodity command structure, already

predominates the C4I joint arena, and has the physical space and technological and academic environment to make cross-servicing of C4I activities there a success. I strongly support the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations. Thank you.

###

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# Congress of the United States
## House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3004

**CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH**
4TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEES:
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HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE
*COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*
CHAIRMAN

Testimony of Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ)
Base Realignment and Closure Commission Hearing
Washington D.C.
June 13, 1995

The Pentagon's recommendation to radically realign the missions of Lakehurst Naval Air Warfare Center puts carrier aviation at risk, especially in the short term, and may cost two to three times more than the Pentagon suggests.

Navy Lakehurst is a unique, one-of-a-kind, world-class facility whose primary function is to ensure that aircraft safely launch and recover from the deck of a carrier or other platform and that support equipment assist in the service of planes, parts and ordnance at sea.

Navy Lakehurst has a long and distinguished record in technology development, engineering, developmental evaluation and verification, systems integration, prototype manufacturing of Air Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) and Support Equipment (SE).

There is no doubt that the Navy benefits from the synergy of collocating the means of development, manufacturing and testing of aircraft carrier catapult and arresting gear and support equipment.

The burden it seems to me is on the Navy to clearly demonstrate how carrier aviation is improved or at least remains the same by proceeding with realignment. Its a burden they cannot meet.

Research conducted over these past several months by our Save Lakehurst Committee raised serious questions that flight ops may suffer and the fleet may become unnecessarily vulnerable if the Lakehurst mission is torn apart. It is impossible for the Navy to replicate its current 99.999998% success rate of carrier take offs and landings without first experiencing a costly and potentially dangerous period of interruption. Why put the lynchpin of Naval aviation at risk?

Interestingly, our concerns are echoed, to some extend, by BSEC itself. In a May 15, 1995 letter to the Commission, Mr. Charles Nemfakos, Vice Chairman of BSEC stated:

> *Some industrial economic and performance advantages may be lost by separating ALRE manufacturing and prototyping and...support equipment from ALRE testing fleet support functions.*

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One has to ask. If performance advantages may be lost, why break it up?

In almost every instance at sea, our planes now launch as advertised. Our aircraft are recovered without incident. If a glitch is found in design of a flight critical item, they call Lakehurst. There, at Lakehurst, the requisite problem solvers are immediately available in close proximity to one another to design it, manufacture it, to fix it without delay.

The DOD scenario says relocate the prototype manufacturing of ALRE to the Navy Depot in Jacksonville, Florida, and the SE to Patuxent River, Maryland. Artificially separating the testing and evaluation capabilities from the prototype manufacturing function defies logic. Our research shows that in a crisis situation, this could mean delays -- costly delays -- that put a mission in jeopardy.

And here again, Mr. Nemfakos agrees. In his letter Mr. Nemfakos explains that the distance put between functions remaining at Lakehurst and those moved to Jacksonville, Florida will delay the Navy's operational schedule. Industrial parts will have to be shipped by truck back and forth from Florida to New Jersey to test them and ensure that they are ready for deployment. Mr. Nemfakos says it will take:

> *"two additional days to transport between a shop in Jacksonville to a Lakehurst test site vice between a shop in Lakehurst.*

Delays, whether measured in hours or days, during a crisis, could quickly put the lives of our pilots, crews and sailors at risk. Any delays are likely to mean a degradation of mission competence and safety. And I defy anyone to make the case that flight readiness and safety are improved or even remain the same when design and manufacture of flight critical prototyped items are separated from the test and evaluation function.

It should be noted, too, that when a catapult or arresting gear malfunctions on any one of our aircraft carriers, all twelve of our aircraft carriers must shut down until the part is reworked, tested and the problem is fully resolved.

The Nemfakos two day delay and the several month transition period to dismantle and reestablish part of the Lakehurst mission in Florida will leave our Naval carrier operations unsupported, potentially unsafe and vulnerable.

The question we ask the Commission to considers is this: "Should the Navy or our nation be forced to endure these "windows of vulnerability?"

Why should the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, now in the Adriatic, or the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in the Gulf of Oman, or the U.S.S. Independence at Yak., Japan, or any of the other U.S. aircraft carriers shut down and loose capability, power projection and response readiness for extended periods of time because a truck is transporting equipment to or from Florida to complete the rework and testing of flight critical components?

Can tearing apart a textbook case of concurrent engineering which has proven itself, over and over, be justified to save some money?

I think not.

But, incredibly, the DOD scenario doesn't save money, it will actually cost taxpayers more for many decades.

The actual cost of realignment is likely to be between two to three times higher than what the DOD said it would be. That's not a minor miscalculation but a gross error.

Thankfully, the GAO has misgivings about the numbers and specifically asked the Commission to "more thoroughly examine the basis for the cost exclusions" associated with Lakehurst. I feel confident that by now some of you, and some of your staff have looked at the numbers and have misgivings too.

Simply put, the DOD recommendation estimates the one time cost of realignment at just under $97 million. The certified data from Admiral William Bowes, Commander of Naval Air Systems Command, put the cost at $162 million. The SAVE Lakehurst Committee data calculates the cost at $218 million. And, a fourth set of figures calculated by those who will actually implement the scenario puts the price tag closer to $260 million.

If anything is clear, it's that there is a substantial deviation in the savings envisioned by the Navy and the gigantic costs that everyone else agrees truly exist. Thus, the return on investment isn't three years as DOD says but more like a quarter of a century and possibly longer.

What the Pentagon did to arrive at its erroneous $97 million figure was to disallow huge documented costs, drop out entire missions, or as in the case of the SE functions lost on their way to Pax River, say they will contract out the work. But you cannot contract out those who are supposed to be watching, guiding and montinoring the contractors. Unfortunately, through the Navy's process there is a constant pattern of miscalculation, value depreciation and bureaucratic double talk that insults any interested party.

The record shows that as late as February of this year the Navy BSEC and BSAT -- after attempting to close Lakehurst -- came to the undeniable conclusion that catapult and arresting gear engineering and testing could not be performed properly anywhere other than Lakehurst. The subsequent decision to "fence" this critical operation, yet strip and move its inherently interdependent manufacturing and prototype components is a cop-out and crazy. On the one hand the "fencing scenario" underscores the importance of this world class, unique operation at Lakehurst. Yet on the other hand, the "fencing scenario" destroys the synergy, collocation and concurrent engineering which has made the Lakehurst mission indispensable. If its indispensable, as the Navy itself has determined, don't break it apart.

The Commission is in a pivotal position to endorse the Navy's reliance on the catapult and arresting gear functions at Lakehurst but go one critical step further. The success of this mission and the safety of the fleet can be assured by keeping the mission whole, in tact, in one location -- at Navy Lakehurst.

**Bill Bradley**

**U.S. SENATOR**

***Democrat/New Jersey***

*731 Hart Senate Office Building • Washington, D.C. 20510 • 202/224-3224*

Contact: Vicki Streitfeld, Kristen Ludecke (D.C.)
Amy Toth (N.J.)


**Statement by Senator Bill Bradley**
**Before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**
**June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of two very important military assets.

I have already had the opportunity to appear before some of you, at the Commission's Regional Hearing in New York, to demonstrate why closing the Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Lakehurst would undermine the goals of this Commission. Shutting down these installations would *not* reduce unnecessary infrastructu and would *not* save our taxpayers money. What it *would* do is cause a dangerous redu in the level of military readiness that is critical to maintaining our strong national de

I testified then and I maintain today that decisions to close these installati based upon incorrect premises, incomplete analysis, and an insufficient under unique attributes. As you well know, I am certainly not alone in my asses

The director of the largest general cargo port on the East and C illustrated that the premise for closing MOTBY is, at best, misguide informed you on May Fifth that commercial ports are increasingly disruptions that result from military activity -- they have in fact shipments due to the pressures of commercial business. And y

**Testimony of Senator Lautenberg**
**before the BRAC Commission**
**Washington, DC, June 13, 1995**

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, it's a pleasure to come before you again today.

I know how much work you and your staff have done these past few months. On behalf of New Jersey and the nation, thank you.

America's current military strategy depends on **forward deployment, power projection, and rapid reinforcement**. Each of the New Jersey bases on the Pentagon's list -- Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station, Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne, and Fort Dix -- plays an essential role in making our strategy a success.

Lakehurst

As America's permanent military presence overseas is reduced, our **forward deployment depends increasingly on the Navy's aircraft carrier** battle groups. And make no mistake about it, **Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station is the key to America's carrier operations.**

Lakehurst is an **award-winning pioneer in concurrent engineering**. In developing, testing, and -- in the case of some critical components -- manufacturing catapult and arresting gear, Lakehurst brings the **entire research-development-testing-engineering cycle under one roof.**

The result has been an astounding, **near-perfect degree of reliability and safety in American carrier operations**, with over 2 million successful launches and retrievals in the past 5 years alone. Even **reducing the reliability of Lakehurst's mission by 1/2% means that 6 aircraft and their crews would be lost** each day of carrier operations. At that rate, America's strategic choices would be grim: **either shut down carrier operations, or suffer losses** that in less than a year would exceed our entire inventory of carrier-based aircraft.

Yet, the Pentagon's plans are to dismantle Lakehurst and to scatter its mission to the winds. Doing so would not save as much money as the Pentagon would have us believe. For example, in its report on the BRAC, the **GAO noted that the Pentagon's recommendation to close Lakehurst is based on "substantial changes to original estimates"** by the Navy's BRAC team. These changes artificially reduced the cost-of-closing comparisons for Lakehurst from almost $220 million to just under $97 million.

Commissioners, I am absolutely convinced that the **Pentagon's plans to close Lakehurst are short-sighted and unsound. They**

spell disaster for American carrier operations and for our strategy of forward deployment.

Bayonne

Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne is the backbone of America's efforts to project military power from the continental United States overseas in time of crisis. No other port on the East and Gulf coasts -- commercial or military -- can duplicate Bayonne's unique combination of capabilities.

Unlike many commercial ports, moving cargo to Bayonne is fast, economical and unimpeded as Bayonne straddles the huge, highly-developed multimodal transportation network of the American Northeastern corridor. Unlike most commercial ports, once cargo arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast covered and uncovered staging areas. Unlike any commercial ports, these staging areas at Bayonne are fully secure; any military cargo can be accommodated there. Unlike any commercial port, all types of cargo -- from heavy, outsized, non-containerized weapons like the M1A2 Abrams tank, to munitions to provisions -- can be loaded by Bayonne's specially-trained labor force using state-of-the-art, dedicated rail lines. And, Bayonne has the best steaming time to Europe -- a full day's advantage, potentially the difference between life and death in combat -- of any US port, bar none.

Beyond all of these advantages, however, one thing about Bayonne stands out above all else. As our recent operations in the Gulf, Somalia and Haiti have proven beyond doubt, Bayonne's heavy sealift capabilities are always available to us. Unlike commercial ports, which can be commandeered only in times of a declared national emergency, Bayonne has no for-profit impediments, no contracts that need to be broken, no commercial cargo to displace.

Commissioners, you must consider that the Pentagon has recommended closing Bayonne in favor of using commercial ports without first examining whether these ports are both available and able to handle Bayonne's mission. In New York, you heard Lillian Liburdie, Director of the Port of New York and an acknowledged expert in military cargo handling, testify that no commercial port on the East and Gulf coasts could substitute for Bayonne. And we now know that the Pentagon has contracted with the Maritime Administration and Louisiana State University to study this very issue, literally months after recommending that Bayonne be closed.

I am convinced that closing Bayonne would cripple our heavy-lift capabilities and our ability to project American military power from the continental United States overseas.

Dix

Finally, a brief word about Fort Dix, where I and many of my generation trained for the battles of World War II. I support the Pentagon's plan to transfer Dix to the Army's Reserve Command. Especially as we come more and more to rely on citizen-soldiers to augment those on active duty for rapid reinforcement in a crisis, it makes sense to turn Dix into the East coast's premiere Guard and Reserve training facility, handling roughly 1/3 of all mobilization units in the United States. I am concerned, however, that the Pentagon may have inadvertently underestimated the need for support and other staff at Dix, and ask that the Commission consider recommending a closer look at these requirements.

Again, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, let me thank you and your staff for all of your hard work. I continue to hope that you will agree with me and my colleagues that our national security is well-served by New Jersey's bases.

Rep Robert Menendez

The MOTBY closure recommendation is based on the unstudied and untested assumption, that dedicated military port facilities can be eliminated and that commercial capacity will be available to handle all current and future mission requirements. This is a very tenuous assumption because in closing MOTBY you are not reducing excess capacity. You are losing an essential military capability which cannot be re-established.

We believe the Army proposal to close MOTBY substantially deviates from the first four selection criteria.

Criteria 1. The impact on the operational readiness of the DoD's total force.

1: There exists no study or test which examines, evaluates or supports the assumption that sufficient commercial port facilities on the East & Gulf Coasts are

available to support power projection requirements with a minimum loss to operational capacity.

2: On April 14, 1995, MTMC formulated a working group to begin to look at the problem "caused by unforeseen military cargo being sent through a port."

3: On April 19, 1995, MTMC estimated it will take between 2 - 4 years to transition MOTBY's mission to commercial ports because of "several contractual restrictions, which will affect any transfer."

Criteria 2. The availability of facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

Existence of commercial port capacity is not the same as availability. Lillian Liburdi, who is one of the nation's leading experts on both port matters and military traffic concerns, has testified on this matter.

Criteria 3. The ability to accommodate contingency

mobilization and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations.

The operational impacts and risks to rapid mobilization and future force projection needs are incalculable now that both MOTBY and MOTBA could be closed.

Criteria 4 Cost and Manpower implications.

1: There are no cost studies related to the mission - the movement of cargo.

2: Without cost studies, we may never know or be able to control costs for the movement of cargo.

3: The Army TABS study has even been forced to change its COBRA cost and savings estimates. While they are termed refinements, I would consider the initial figures to be drastically wrong.

4: By their own admission, the MOTBY estimates were off:

20% for return on investment;

75% on changes to costs and savings over the implementation period and

77% net present value change

5: The Army has acknowledged gross error in the assembly of its COBRA model. The latest figures from our financial analysts, Coopers & Lybrand, indicate that it will take over 30 years for the Army to recoup the costs necessary to close MOTBY and create a stand-alone enclave for selected tenants. These errors seriously call into question all the assumptions on which this closure recommendation is based.

Finally, the most serious, overarching cost problem is totally unstudied. It is the cost to the military for the mission of moving military cargo and the disruption of commercial

ports.

Military port usage is already the most commercialized activity in the entire DoD and in cooperation with the Maritime Administration has the longest experience with commercial activity. MARAD was never consulted about the proposed closure. Defense Agencies must pay for services on the basis of commercial tariffs and are responsible for all costs arising from the loss of business. Moreover, no labor costs were included in the estimates of the cost of purchasing commercial port services.

There is no legal authority to disrupt commercial port operation in the absence in a declared emergency. By that time, it may be long after the need to mobilize and use the ports. The Kuwaiti invasion was in August, 1990. Congress

authorized the use of force 5 months later.

Even Army documents points out resistance by commercial ports to 48 hour port response time and the request to shift to 7 days. Without MOTBY, there is no guarantee of an immediate logistics response, a 48 hour response or even a 7 day response. We are not reducing capacity, we are eliminating capability and changing operational requirements.

Without MOTBY, there is no absolute legal assurance on timely access to ports for fast power projection. MTMC claims that MOTBY will result in the loss of few capabilities, which we reject. These capabilities are critical and time sensitive. I have talked a lot about cost but this is not about balance sheets. Military value is about things we can't buy.

We cannot buy back time when there is delay in the arrival of equipment. We cannot buy back an American soldier's life when reinforcements come too late. The selection criteria make sense. The MOTBY closure proposal does not. Thank you. (I will be submitting supplemental materials to the Commission which addresses some areas that Commissioners have raised.)

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# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515–3004

Testimony of Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ)
Base Realignment and Closure Commission Hearing
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■ UNITED STATES SENATOR ■

# Frank Lautenberg

NEW JERSEY

For Immediate Release
June 13, 1995

For Further Information
Bill Wise (202) 224-5885

**LAUTENBERG URGES BASE REALIGNMENT COMMISSION TO KEEP NJ MILITARY BASES OPEN**

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**AMERICA'S MILITARY STRATEGY DEPENDS ON LAKEHURST AND BAYONNE**

WASHINGTON, DC - Sen Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) today urged the federal Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) to recognize the contribution made by Lakehurst and Bayonne bases to the nation's military preparedness and to spare the bases from closure.

"America's current military strategy depends on forward deployment, power projectio and rapid reinforcement," Lautenberg said in testimony before the BRAC commissioners. "Each of the New Jersey bases on the Pentagon's list, Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering St Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne and Fort Dix, plays an integral, essential role in makir strategy a success."

Turning first to the Pentagon's plan to close Lakehurst Naval Engineering S Lautenberg said that Lakehurst's integrated engineering has resulted in "an astou perfect degree of reliability and safety in American carrier operations, with ove successful launches and retrievals in the past five years alone."

Lautenberg said that closing Lakehurst, which develops, tests an catapult and arresting gear for aircraft carriers, would endanger our N increasing the likelihood of crashes on aircraft carrier takeoffs or lan

Lautenberg added that the General Accounting Office (C changes to original estimates" by the Navy BRAC team. Thes artificially reduced the cost-of-closing comparisons from cl $97 million.

# NEW YORK

## I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

### *ARMY:*

| | |
|---|---|
| Bellmore Logistics Activity | Close |
| Fort Hamilton | Realign |
| Fort Totten | Close |
| Seneca Army Depot | Close |

### *NAVY:*

| | |
|---|---|
| NRC Staten Island | Close |

### *AIR FORCE:*

| | |
|---|---|
| Griffiss AFB (485th EIG) | Redirect |
| Griffiss AFB (Airfield Support ) | Redirect |
| REDCAP Activity, Buffalo | Disestablish |
| Rome Laboratories | Close |
| Roslyn AGS | Close |

## II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

### *AIR FORCE:*

| | |
|---|---|
| Niagara Falls IAP Air Reserve Station | Close |

# MAP NO. 33

## NEW YORK




Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

# STATEMENT OF
# U.S. SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO
# BEFORE THE BRAC COMMISSION
# JUNE 12, 1995

Good morning Chairman Dixon and Commissioners. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak on behalf of the New York bases which are being considered for closure or realignment.

Mr. Chairman, every elected official comes before this Commission and defends the bases in their state as the best the country has to offer. But Mr. Chairman, I am fortunate in that my state truly falls into that category.

One of the best examples is Rome Lab. Rome Lab is truly a model of excellence and should be the standard by which all Department of Defense labs are judged. Rome Lab received the highest ranking by the Air Force in its 1995 BRAC review -- It is a "Tier One" lab. The Air Force has recognized Rome's importance to the national defense mission

of this country. Rome Lab is the country's preeminent Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence facility.

The decision to close Rome Lab is simply not cost effective. When Congress wrote the legislation to establish the BRAC Commission and begin the difficult process of dismantling our nation's military installations, we were concerned that our decisions would be not only fair, but cost effective and would actually save our country money without sacrificing any military capabilities which would in any way harm our ability to maintain the most powerful and well respected military in the world.

However, the Air Force decision to place Rome Lab on the closure list is simply counterproductive to these goals. The numbers just do not add up. The return on investment by the Air Force would be in excess of 100 years. The one-time costs to the Air Force would be in excess of $100million. And worst of all, Mr. Chairman, the savings that the Air Force would receive under this proposal are less than $1.2 million. That means that no matter what the costs

are, if the savings are that small, the Air Force, and the American taxpayers, will never recoup the costs of closing this one-of-a-kind laboratory.

Mr. Chairman, quite simply, the numbers are so concocted that it is clear that someone made the decision to move the lab, and then the numbers were crafted to justify that decision.

The greatest tragedy of tearing down Rome Lab is the loss of not only some of the best and the brightest that the Department of Defense has to offer, but the fact that the Air Force will lose the extensive technology center that Rome Lab provides not only to the military, but to the State and the entire region. This relationship is integral to an effective research facility and takes years to develop. You can not easily replicate this incredible technology hub without losing some of the military value Rome Lab provides the Air Force.

The Joint Cross-Service Report issued by a special Department of Defense BRAC task force is supposedly one of the reasons to move Rome Lab. Yet, Mr. Chairman, when the proposed move is

completed, there will be no cross-servicing because there is no navy at Hanscom, there is no army at Hanscom. And there is none at Monmouth either. In fact, the Army's Electronic Technology Device Lab, currently at Fort Monmouth, is moving to Maryland as part of a BRAC 1991 decision.

I ask you Mr. Chairman, how can this important lab remain on the BRAC list? It is the right thing to do to remove this lab, and I am confident that this Commission will realize that and remove Rome Lab from the BRAC 95 list.

Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station has been, I believe also placed on the closure list in error. Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station and the 914th Airlift Wing are one of the Air Force Reserve's premier bases. The personnel, training, combat experience and location are ideal to carry out the Air Force mission. Out of all the bases on the current BRAC "Add-list" Niagara Falls is the only base that was activated during the Gulf War.

U.S. Active Duty and Reserve components of

today's military are and will continue to be closely linked well into the future. The current budget environment forces Congress to make tough choices when it comes to our military spending. The evolving nature of America's military doctrine also requires a flexible response and a strong mix of both Reserve and Active Duty soldiers, sailors and airmen. The 914th has operated both independently, and in conjunction with Active Forces in a series of contingency and humanitarian operations.

Any action to close Niagara will sacrifice the cohesion of a unit that has been battle tested, recognized for its performance by the Department of Defense, and terminate the 43 year relationship between the State of New York and the Air Reserve. Niagara and the 914th have drawn the finest Air Reservists from the entire state of New York, and Mr. Chairman, that is quite an accomplishment.

Niagara Falls is the last Air Reserve facility in the State of New York. The economic impact on the state of closing this essential facility will be devastating. Over 40 military facilities in New York

were closed between 1969 and 1993, with a direct loss of over 68,000 jobs. New York State has suffered greatly at the hand of previous BRAC closures, and can not afford another military installation slaughter -- as we were forced to deal with in the last BRAC round.

Next, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to REDCAP. And as you yourself wondered during the May 5th Hearing in New York, Why is REDCAP on the Pentagon closure list?

The Real-time Electromagnetic Digitally Controlled Analyzer & Processor (REDCAP) facility in Buffalo New York also merits a close, second look. REDCAP is contractor owned and operated. Calspan Corporation developed the original REDCAP simulation using independent research and development dollars. Since then, under contract with the Air Force, Calspan has been responsible for the operation and modernization of REDCAP. The F-22 is the most sophisticated, modern and technologically advanced aircraft in our nation's history. To deny the objective testing capability that

REDCAP provides to the Air Force would be an enormous mistake.

Congress and the Department of Defense need REDCAP to remain in place. The objective, thorough testing capability that this facility provides is essential and must be retained.

Additionally, the Army has said that Seneca Army Depot is the smallest and least economical depot to operate. However, all analyses provided by the Army fail to mention that Seneca is the only Army depot east of California with its own airfield, capable of handling C-5 transport planes that fly directly to Europe and Asia.

Further, I understand that the Army has proposed eliminating all the military housing at Fort Hamilton. I join Representative Molinari and the Brooklyn Community in questioning the overall savings of such a move. I also wonder how the United States Army expects its enlisted men and women, as well as officers, to find quality family housing in New York on such a limited military

housing allowance.

Mr. Chairman, I am confident that after close examination of the facts surrounding these important military installations, as well as the skewed numbers that have, in the case of Rome Lab, been presented by the Air Force, this Commission will act fairly and justly. New York must not be allowed to be the victim of those in the Air Force who have concocted numbers and arguments unfairly and without merit. I thank the Chairman and I thank the Commission. I look forward to your decision.

**Statement by Senator Daniel Moynihan**

**Before the 1995 Base Closure Commission**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the bases in New York you are considering for closure. There are flaws in the Pentagon recommendations that you should be aware of, flaws that would affect our nation's defense capability.

I also want you to be aware that only South Carolina lost a greater percentage of its defense employment than New York in the 1993 base closure round. We have only one significant base left, that being Fort Drum. Further closures would mean further economic hardship in areas of a state that has done its share, areas that are particularly unprepared to cope with them.

Rome Laboratory is absolutely vital to the future of the Air Force. We cannot afford to build aircraft after aircraft anymore, so the ones we have must do more and survive longer. The research at Rome Laboratory makes this possible. Rome benefits other services as well. In fact, 29 percent of its budget comes from agencies other than the Air Force. Electronic battlefield maps with up-to-the-second information will allow better coordination and deployment of forces in the future, making the best use of the forces on hand. Intelligence gathering, information processing, communications, photonics, and other fields are being advanced at Rome to the benefit of all three services.

Rome Laboratory is leading the Defense Department into the future, yet today we are considering scattering its functions

into three locations. There is nothing to be gained by this and no private sector CEO would even consider it. The Army's research laboratory is leaving Fort Monmouth. There will be no synergistic blending of minds or resources there. The idea that we will reap the benefits of cross-servicing is a sham. Neither will moving a portion of Rome Laboratory to Hanscom AFB accomplish anything. Hanscom is a products center with nothing to offer to basic research efforts. Neither location has the proper facilities for a world class research lab. This is not, after all, like moving the base laundry.

There is everything to be gained by leaving Rome Laboratory in place. It is an award winning, Tier One laboratory. It has strong ties throughout central New York. That is where you will find synergy. Cornell, RPI, Syracuse, RIT, the University of Rochester, Columbia, Kodak, NYNEX and many others contribute to the laboratory's success. What guarantee is there that this can be replicated, and how long might that take? Experience shows that a majority of the scientists would not make the move to Boston or Fort Monmouth. The disruption in such vital research would be detrimental, far-reaching, perpetual, and totally unnecessary.

The Defense Department has overestimated the savings from relocating the laboratory and underestimated the up-front costs. I hope you will examine these numbers carefully. Even in the latest Air Force estimate there are mistakes and omissions. Operating costs at Rome are overstated. The availability of space at Hanscom and Fort Monmouth is overstated. Personnel

costs are understated because staff reductions are too great. The higher payroll cost due to locality pay has not been included. A true cost analysis shows that the actual return on investment would not begin for over one hundred years. When you see how small the real financial benefit is, this proposal becomes even less supportable.

Finally, I hope you will consider the consequences of relocating the laboratory for Rome, New York. The community is reeling from the loss of Griffiss Air Force Base, for which the only consolation was that it would have the laboratory to build around. The Air Force put that in writing. The community planned accordingly. We owe it to Rome and every other community losing a base to tell them what to expect and then to abide by it. They have too much at stake, too much to overcome, to do otherwise.

I also believe the 914th Airlift Wing should stay right where it is, in Niagara Falls. Niagara is the easternmost base of the six under consideration, and is 200 miles closer to Europe than the next closest. It has on-base assault training, two drop zones, and an aeromedical unit. Niagara's fuel storage capacity is greater than the other five and it has significantly more housing capacity than all the others.

Not only are the existing facilities superior, but the base has the capacity for a great deal of expansion. It could handle up to 57 aircraft. And sharing the base with an Air Guard unit provides numerous opportunities for cost sharing and joint training operations. The 914th is well situated for joint

training around New York, too. In fiscal year 1995 alone it conducted 124 training missions with Fort Drum, and almost as many with units in Schenectady, Buffalo, and at Stewart Airport. This is not a location we should be giving up.

Niagara Falls has the second largest payroll in Niagara County, which has been experiencing hard times for years now. Closing it would eliminate 1.1 percent of the jobs in the area and take $65 million out of the economy. These are factors that you must consider. In addition, the base has extremely close ties to the community. The list of local activities on the base is too long to list here.

Having said all that, military value is the primary criterion, and here is the best argument for keeping Niagara Falls. The 914th is an award winning, combat tested unit that the Reserves needs on hand. In Desert Storm the 914th had 2,900 sorties, 4,800 hours and one hundred percent mission effectiveness. In all it has 32 years of experience and 110,000 hours of accident-free flying. We rely more and more on the Reserves now. In doing so we rely on units such as the 914th. It would not be as good as it is without an outstanding base from which to train.

I hope you will agree that the military value of the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Base is superior, and that you will carefully examine the costs of closing it. You will find that there is next to nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, if you close Niagara.

The other bases on the closure list deserve careful scrutiny

as well, for each plays a role in the Department of Defense and each is important in its local economy. Fort Hamilton has defended New York Harbor since 1826 and trained many thousand troops for the Army. Its family housing would become surplus. Fort Totten has guarded the East River since 1862. It now provides administrative and logistical support for Army Reserve units in New York City. Like Fort Hamilton it would lose its family housing, making the search for affordable housing in New York City even more difficult for service families.

The REDCAP facility in Buffalo provides valuable and cost effective simulation of electronics before we go to the expense of miniaturizing them. Moving REDCAP to Edwards Air Force Base would be a mistake, for Edwards does not now have the capacity to absorb this mission. It is working just fine where it is.

New York has a proud history in the nation's defense dating back to the Revolution. Today it still can and does contribute greatly. You will determine much about the course of that contribution in the future. I appreciate your taking the time to listen and I urge you to examine these arguments diligently in the final days of deliberation.

Molinari

**Talking Points for BRAC Hearing**

**Tuesday, June 13, 1995**

- The Army's first set of data provided to the Commission identified $7.2 million in annual savings. Since then the COBRA model has been revised to indicate the number to be a little over $3 million.

- DOD's position that elimination of Ft. Hamilton's family housing would save money fails to explain why DOD does not dispose of family housing units in bases across the United States for the same purpose. Why is Ft. Hamilton singled out?

- The Pentagon and each of the Base Closure and Realignment Commissions of 1991, 1993 and 1995 have reviewed Fort Hamilton and found that the base provides a vital military function by overseeing the day-to-day duties related to the manning, equipping, recruiting, training, and sustaining of the Army in the New York City region.

- Given the overall military value of Fort Hamilton, it is extremely important that the men and women service members assigned there have adequate and affordable housing. If service members are forced to obtain housing on the local economy, the result will be financial and moral problems among service members to the detriment of the military mission.

- It is also clear that the Department of Defense must begin to improve the quality of its military housing. Secretary Perry recently proposed the Military Family Housing Revitalization Act of 1995, which proposes to solve the military's chronic housing problems through the use of public-private partnerships. Congress is currently conducting hearings and fully reviewing this proposal.

- Contrary to this strategy, the Army has recommended to the 1995 BRAC Commission to divest itself of 442 family housing units at Fort Hamilton and exacerbate the military housing shortage that already exists in the New York City area. This action is even more questionable since the DOD can dispose of this housing at any time without BRAC concurrence.

- Moreover, it is important that the DOD recommendation on Fort Hamilton be considered in the context of other recent reductions of military housing in the New York City area. In front of you is a chart showing that the 442 units at Fort Hamilton are part of a much larger reduction that would eliminate approximately 3,500 military family housing units in the New York area. The net effect of this is make it increasingly difficult and expensive for our military members to find suitable family housing.

- Two options for the 1995 BRAC Commission:

1. Accept the realignment recommendation to close the housing and force 400 military families onto the street.

   - If this option is approved, the Fort Hamilton housing units will no longer be available to military families at anywhere near a cost they can afford. For example, the Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) rates plus basic pay for an E-3 with dependents is $588.00, an E-7 is $813.00 and an O-2 is $905.00. Yet typical housing rent in the New York City area for 3 and 4 bedrooms are significantly higher.

   - Legislation to implement Secretary Perry's recommendation will not yet be in effect and the Army will lose the leverage to provide a public/private solution.

   - Military personnel will likely refuse assignment to Fort Hamilton or will be forced to live in substandard commercial housing. Morale and the military mission will suffer.

2. Reject the realignment recommendation and allow the community the opportunity to work with the Army to "privitize the housing," consistent with Secretary Perry's new pilot housing proposal.

   - Our community has already assembled a team of experienced private developers who have proposed an initiative for Fort Hamilton to improve the physical quality and affordability of military housing at no cost to the Defense Department.

   - Allow military families stationed in New York to continue to live in the units during an orderly transition to private sector involvement.

- <u>Conclusion:</u>

The DOD recommendation on family housing at Fort Hamilton deviated from the base closure criteria by failing to account for the fact that such housing is critical for the military value of the mission performed at the base. The Commission should reject the DOD recommendation and keep the housing under the Army's control. This would give the Army much more leverage and flexibility in working with the private sector to improve the quality of the housing while lowering the Army's costs substantially. This would also be in keeping with the recent housing initiatives proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

# CHARTS SUBMITTED

# BY

# CONGRESSWOMAN SUSAN MOLINARI

# REGARDING THE

# PROPOSED REALIGNMENT OF FORT HAMILTON

Chart #1

"The readiness of our forces depends on retaining the high quality, experienced personnel we now have in the military. One of the most important factors in retention of senior personnel is our ability to provide decent and affordable housing for their families to live in."

-- Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
May 8, 1995

Chart #2

## DOD Military Housing Reductions

| | |
|---|---|
| Fort Hamilton | 442 |
| Fort Totten | 198 |
| Naval Station, NY | 1,444 |
| SUBTOTAL | 2,084 |
| Coast Guard Governor's Island | 1,390 |
| TOTAL | 3,474 |

Chart #3

# Military Housing Allowances for New York City

| Pay Grade | Basic w/Dep. | + | VHA w/Dep. | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| E-3 | $345 | | $243 | **$588** |
| E-7 | $513 | | $300 | **$813** |
| O-2 | $499 | | $406 | **$905** |

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7½ ROOMS
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JAMES R.E. 748-6600

4½ rms + Fin Bsmt, 2 Bdrms, 2 bths, hdwood, parking avail $1,400 + Heat
JAMES R. 748-6600

7 rms, 1st flr, 3 Bdrms, parq train & shops

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SUNSET PK- Lovely 4 mod rm /trans, No

Source: June 9, 1995, HOME REPORTER AND SUNSET NEWS, Page 58

Testimony Before the Defense Base Realignment Commission

The Honorable Jack Quinn (R-NY)

June 13, 1995

Thank you Chairman Dixon and Good Morning.

As you may know, this is my second appearance before the Commission. Since I first testified before you at the New York regional hearings on May 5th, the Niagara Falls Air Force Reserve Base has been added to the list.

Therefore, I will testify in support of both the Niagara Falls Base and the Real-time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processing Facility, or REDCAP, operated by the Calspan Corporation in Buffalo.

Although I do not envy the task that you and your fellow Commissioners share, as a proponent of both reducing wasteful government spending and a strong national defense, I commend all of you for your efforts.

I am here today as a representative of my constituents who work on the Niagara Falls Base but reside in my Congressional district. I have heard from, and met with, several Western New Yorkers who fall into that category.

I would like to take just a moment to thank General Davis for taking the time to visit the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station last month. The entire community remains grateful for his visit.

It is my understanding that the Base has the support of the Defense Department, the Air Force, and the entire Congressional delegation of New York. General McIntosh, the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, has indicated the Air Force's strong support for the retention of the Base.

The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station and the 914th Airlift Wing are valuable, combat proven assets to the Air Force. The 914th Airlift Wing has operated both independently, and in conjunction with Active Forces in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti.

Any action to close the Station will sacrifice the cohesion of a unit that has been battle tested and recognized for their performance by the Department of Defense. It was the only C-130 unit activated for Operation Desert Storm. No other Air Force Reserve C-130 Unit has received a higher ranking during the last 9 years.

In addition, the closure of the Base will not achieve any significant savings over any of the other C-130 reserve bases under study.

Most of all, I want you to know the entire community, not only in Niagara Falls, but throughout Western New York embraces this mission and its people. As the second largest employer in Niagara County, the Base has a bigger impact on the lives and economy of the local community than any of the other C-130 bases under consideration.

I will now turn to my defense of REDCAP.

It is apparent that it is in the best interests of the country to keep REDCAP in Buffalo, NY.

The facility currently is being fully utilized. Any move simply would change the location of the work, without providing for any consolidation or savings. In fact, costs would increase.

The Calspan Corporation is a private company that has enhanced and operated REDCAP for 30 years. Calspan has built up a unique body of knowledge that enables the facility to provide high value to their test customers at a very low cost. The value added by this unique staff will not be retained in a move. Moving the facility, therefore, will destroy a valuable asset that the taxpayers of this county have built.

In addition, moving the facility represents taking jobs out of the private sector and moving them into the government sector.

As far as the economics of a move, the facility costs the government less than $1 million per year to operate. The government does not pay rent for the space occupied by the facility, security, nor utilities to the Calspan Corporation.

REDCAP does not meet the necessary criteria for consideration under the BRACC process. The facility has far less than the required 300 employees and is not even a base. REDCAP is a set of government owned equipment in a contractor's facility. It is providing a significant service as evidenced by its high utilization. If it ceases to provide the service, utilization will fall off dramatically.

Finally, REDCAP is performing its mission efficiently in its present location. Moving the facility to a location that has no capability to support it just doesn't make sense. I believe this country can be best served by keeping REDCAP at its present location.

The facts show that New York has been hit hard by base closures in recent years. Since 1969, New York has lost 40 military facilities and 70,000 jobs. In the 1993 round of closures, we lost a greater percentage of our military and civilian personnel than any other state except South Carolina.

CONGRESSMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT (R-NY)

STATEMENT FOR BRACC WASHINGTON HEARING

June 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission:

Thank you for this opportunity to testify again on behalf of Rome Laboratory. Today I want to focus on just two issues that have arisen since your New York City hearing last month -- the revised Air Force cost estimates, and state funding of the reuse plan for Griffiss Air Force Base.

I'm afraid my discussion of the latest Air Force figures will sound painfully familiar. That's because the Air Force continues to overestimate the annual savings from relocating Rome Lab, while underestimating the costs. Indeed, the Air Force has done exactly what we predicted in our New York testimony: come back with slightly more realistic cost estimates, while further distorting the savings estimates. The May estimate is just a new ruse to obscure one central fact: relocating Rome Lab will cost money -- lots of it -- not save any.

As you well know, the Air Force has costed out the relocation of Rome Laboratory on several occassions with wildly differing results. In the latest figures, as in February, the projected annual saving is the fatal flaw. The Air Force now maintains it would save almost $13 million a year by moving Rome Lab. The actual figure is closer to a mere $1 million a year -- resulting in an impossibly long payback period. Remember, these are not net savings, but rather savings that must be used to offset the costs of moving -- costs in excess of $100 million.

How could such a discrepancy occur? First, the Air Force chose to grossly overestimate the costs of real property maintenance at Rome. For the Air Force's figures to be accurate, Rome would have to be paying $45 per square foot for maintenance, when comparable Air Force facilities pay only 60 cents per square foot.

Here's another problem. Even though the test sites at Rome must remain in operation, the Air Force assumes that every last square foot of space at Rome will be shut down and mothballed. And the Air Force estimate of total square footage at Rome is off by almost an order of magnitude. The Air Force counted 177,000 square feet at a facility that site surveys show has over 1.3 million square feet of space. These kind of glaring, obvious, demonstrable errors hardly build confidence in the Air Force's calculations.

And these are not minor mistakes. If we correct just these errors in maintenance costs and square footage -- and accept absolutely every other Air Force assumption -- the payback period for shutting down Rome jumps to 16 years. That's right -- 16 years.

Let me remind you that the Air Force itself has said that base closures are not economical if the payback period goes into double digits. Indeed, Mr. Boatright and General Blume reiterated that point in a meeting with representatives of the Rome community on June 1. And no BRAC commission has closed an Air Force facility with a payback of more than eight years.

Of course, maintenance costs and square footage are not the only problems with the Air Force's latest estimates. The Air Force now says Rome's support manpower levels will be cut by 93 positions -- almost double the figure in the February estimate. What has happened since February to justify this conclusion? The Air Force has provided no credible answer to that question.

I would like to submit for the record our enumeration of the other faulty assumptions in the Air Force's latest COBRA estimates. When all of them are taken into account, it turns out that the payback period for closing Rome Laboratory is in excess of 100 years -- just as the Air Force itself had concluded in October of last year.

The Air Force's proposal to dismember Rome Laboratory contrasts starkly with the community's effort to strengthen it. So let me turn now to the Griffiss reuse plan in which this Commission has shown so much interest.

Commissioners have repeatedly asked us for evidence that the commitment to the reuse plan is real.

New York State recently concluded its budget process, and the new budget continues to make good on New York State's commitment of $12 million to the New York State Technology Enterprise Corporation (NYSTEC).

In short, the decision to take Rome Lab off the closure list should be an easy one. In New York we demonstrated that the relocation of Rome meets none of the BRAC criteria. The events of the past six weeks have done nothing but strengthen our case.

Closing Rome Lab will cost money and damage a vital military asset. I urge you to remove Rome Lab from the list.

AIR FORCE COBRAS

| | October 94 | February 95 | May 95 |
|---|---|---|---|
| One-Time Cost | $133.6 M | $52.8 M | $79.5 M |
| Annual Savings | $1.5 M | $11.5 M | $12.9 M |
| Manpower Cuts | 5 | 50 | 93 |
| Square Footage (SF) | 615,000 SF | 224,000 SF | 365,000 SF |
| Return On Investment (ROI) | 100+ years | 4 years | 6 years |

FACTS

| May 95 |
|---|
| $103 M |
| $1.2 M |
| 22 |
| 380,000 SF |
| 100+ years |

C

Cong Boehlert

**Discussion of Community Changes to COBRA**

**Return on Investment - Rome Laboratory**

## OVERVIEW

Analysis of the Air Force (AF) COBRA run of 23 May 95 revealed significant errors. These errors varied from erroneous assumptions, incorrect data, unjustified manpower savings, undocumented reductions in one-time expenses, and omissions of significant cost data. The purpose of this paper is to identify the errors, explain the reasons why the AF calculation or data is in error, and present the correction that was used in the COBRA run which the Rome community believes accurately portrays the real costs and savings. The following discussion also takes a conservative position and portrays reasonable, supportable positions.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Community position:** | **Return on Investment:** | **100+ Years** |
| | **One-Time Cost:** | **$103.447 M** |
| | **Recurring Annual Savings:** | **$1.2 M** |
| **AF position:** | **Return on Investment:** | **6 Years** |
| | **One-Time Cost:** | **$79.244 M** |
| | **Recurring Annual Savings:** | **$12.979 M** |

## DISCUSSION:

**1. Discount Rate**. In his testimony before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on March 1, 1995 (Atch 1), Secretary of Defense Perry indicated that the DoD had used a 4.2% discount rate in its calculation of the savings and return on investment. In its COBRA runs, the AF used 2.75% in its calculations based on the previous year's guidance. Both the 4.2% discount rate and the AF 2.75% rate, however, are lower than the rate which should have been applied.

**Community position:** 4.85%

**AF position:** 2.75%

**Discussion:** DoD guidance in Policy Memorandum One, May 31, 1994 (Atch 2) states, "OMB Circular A-94 specifies the discount and inflation rates to be used in ROI calculations Mr Robert Anderson, OMB Office of Economic Policy, and the OMB Circular Point of Contact (POC) who confirmed the DoD use of actual Treasury Bill discount rates in COBRA (Atch 3), confirmed on June 7, 1995, that the Circular discount rates are always updated in January or February of each year. Appendix C of this Circular states, "This appendix is updated annually around the time of the President's budget submission to Congress (Atch 4)."

When asked the source of the 4.2% rate, the OSD Base Closure and Utilization Division, that applied the discount rate to the service calculations, the answer given was that it was obtained by "word of-mouth" in anticipation of the annual circular change since they knew it was going to change and the "calculations would have to be redone anyway."

Although the AF use of a 2.75% discount rate prior to February 1995 was consistent with the 1994 guidance (Atch 4), it was not the correct rate to use after the new guidance was issued on February 7, 1995

(Atch 5). According to the updated guidance, the correct discount rate should have been 4.85%, obtained from linear interpolation to a 20 year rate between the 10 and 30 year rates, as stipulated in the Circular. The correct discount rate for any COBRA after February 7th, 1995 should have been 4.85%.

The AF has continued to use the 2.75% discount rate in its COBRA runs, while the Army has used the 4.2% rate in adjusted runs requested by the Commission.

The use of the correct discount rate is essential to obtain a valid result of cost effectiveness in this case. Use of a lower discount rate is inconsistent with the actual cost of money to the Federal government and therefore reduces the "apparent" cost of the action. Use of the lower rate after the 1995 guidance was issued is clearly inconsistent with the published DoD and OMB guidance. The change in the discount rate, even from 2.75% to 4.2%, is an increase of 52.7% in the cost of money and substantially affects the perceived cost effectiveness of the action.

The community elected to use the correct discount rate of 4.85% to be consistent with the guidance in DoD Policy Memorandum One and the OMB guidance of February 7, 1995.

**2. Real Property Maintenance Activity (RPMA) and Base Operating Support (BOS).** AF RPMA numbers reallocated to the correct categories and utilities expenses reduced to eliminate double counted amounts.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Community position:** | RPMA = $1.0 M | COMM = $0.12 M | BOS = $8.699 M |
| **AF position:** | RPMA = $8.136 M | COMM = $0.12 M | BOS = $3.714 M |

**Discussion:** RPMA non-payroll costs are the expenses associated solely with maintenance and upkeep of the real property--buildings and pavements, etc. These costs are items such as structural repairs, painting, plumbing and electrical maintenance. BOS costs are all the other items, both payroll and non-payroll associated with maintaining and supporting the installation. These include utilities (electricity, heat, water, sewage, etc), logistics support, personnel, general support contracting, comptroller (finance), safety and other support activities needed to operate the base.

The model calculates savings in these categories differently. RPMA is added at receiving locations only if there is new construction. BOS, however, is determined proportionately with the number of people moved. Consequently, if there is no new construction at the receiving site, and the model is told that no facilities remain at the closing/realigning installation, the model takes all of the RPMA as savings. If the costs are properly allocated to both RPMA and BOS, the model takes a much smaller amount of savings to account for the need to provide adequate support in the new location.

The AF included substantial amounts of BOS expense in the RPMA category. This error resulted in significant and inappropriate savings calculations in the COBRA model. The original data used by the Air Force was based on a May 94 Rome Lab estimate of the stand alone RPMA and BOS costs (Atch 6). The estimate included the costs for both the Rome facilities and the remote sites. These costs were not separated into RPMA and BOS categories and showed utilities expenses separately from and in addition to the Civil Engineering expenses. However, additional inquiries of the lab disclosed that the utilities costs were embedded within the civil engineering costs and should not have been added to attain the total. A comparison of the AF RPMA expense of $8.136 million for the 1.3 million square feet of Rome Lab space was also substantially larger than and inconsistent with other RPMA expenses at other installations (Atch 7).

Using a conservative estimate of $1.0 million for RPMA at Rome Lab and reallocating the other support costs to BOS (Atch 8) allows the model to properly calculate the amount of RPMA and BOS to be saved as well as the amount needed at the gaining locations to support the realigning activities.

The correction of the RPMA and BOS allocation, combined with the correction of facilities space remaining after closure eliminates more than half the annual recurring savings claimed in the Air Force calculation.

**3. Existing Facilities and Facilities Shutdown:** The AF calculation uses a significantly understated amount of existing facilities at Rome Lab, retains no facilities space for the remaining functions at the test sites, and assumes no new construction at either Hanscom AFB or Ft Monmouth. Correcting these errors reduces annual savings even further.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Community position:** | Existing Facilities: | 1,341,000 SF | Facilities Shutdown: | 1,068,000 SF |
| **AF position:** | Existing Facilities: | 177,000 SF | Facilities Shutdown: | 177,000 SF |

**Discussion:** The model determines the amount of RPMA to be saved as well the cost of mothballing facilities based on the difference between existing facilities space and the amount of space to be closed or shut down. If the total square footage is eliminated, the model will take all of the RPMA as savings, leaving no dollars to support any remaining functions. If the square footage closed is understated, the one-time closing costs will be understated as well.

The AF understated the total square footage at Rome. The AF COBRAs used 177,000 square feet as the existing amount of facilities at Rome Lab. The actual existing square footage is 1,341,000. The AF figure is inconsistent with the data supplied in the certified questionnaire (Atch 9). When questioned about this discrepancy, AF BRAC officials stated that this was a "typo" but made no effort to correct it.

The AF COBRAs leave no facilities for either the test sites or the modeling/fabrication shop, although both are supposed to remain in existing facilities. Because the AF included the funds for the test sites and modeling/fab shop in its RPMA and BOS expenses, this error causes the COBRA to "take" those expenses as savings and erroneously leaves the test sites with no support dollars.

Using the incorrect figure of 177,000 square feet also understates the one-time cost of mothballing the facilities by approximately one million dollars.

The community used the existing total facilities of 1,341,000 square feet and the actual space to be shutdown of 1,068,000 square feet. This information was obtained from Rome Laboratory civil engineering facilities records. As with the other data, this information also provides a more accurate representation of the real cost of this action. This correction allows the COBRA to calculate RPMA and BOS savings based on accurate data.

**4. Facilities Construction and Renovation:** The Air Force has substantially understated the facilities requirements at both Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth. The Air Force plan depends, in some cases, on using existing facilities that are either unavailable or unusable for the intended purpose to avoid new construction. In addition, some facilities requirements identified during site surveys were inexplicably deleted from the final COBRA. Correcting the facilities omissions and errors is essential to represent accurate cost data and to ensure the laboratory has adequate facilities for the functions.

**Community position:** Add new construction: Hanscom: 69,878 SF - $15.076 M (Adds $8.239 M)
Ft Monmouth: 15,000 SF - $2.39 M
Plus SIO, Contingency, Planning and Design

**AF position:** No new construction. Renovation of existing facilities only.

**Discussion:**

**Hanscom AFB.** The Air Force includes use of Building 1614, which currently houses the base commissary. The use of this building assumes construction of a new commissary. However, investigation with Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) officials disclosed that there are no firm plans for a new commissary. Funds have not been budgeted for a new facility and there is currently no documented justification to build a new facility. Therefore, the commissary is not available, and no other space was identified for the lab's use.

Therefore, at Hanscom AFB, the community believes that the 69,878 square feet shown for building 1614 at a renovation cost of $6,837,000 ($97.84/square foot), must be replaced with new construction at a cost of $215.75 per square foot, which is derived from the Air Force's estimate of new construction cost ($36.0 million / 166,859 SF) for laboratory engineering support facilities in its level play COBRA run (Atch 10). This facility should then cost $15,076,178. The Supervision, Inspection and Overhead (SIO), Contingency, and Planning and Design amounts should also be increased by the appropriate percentages (10, 6, and 8.5 % respectively).

**Ft Monmouth:** The Air Force deleted a project for modeling/fabrication facilities required to support the Reliability and Electromagnetics functions. This deletion was predicated on the existence of a fabrication shop at Ft Monmouth. While a current facility exists, it is approximately 40 miles off station and is sized to meet current requirements. The original construction estimate stated, "Sufficient fabrication shop space does not exist at Fort Monmouth to satisfy [sic] Rome Laboratory mission requirements." (Atch 11) A facility project to provide a fabrication facility on Ft Monmouth is apparently in planning, but it neither exists nor was it sized to include any requirements for the functions moving from Rome Lab. Therefore, funds for a facility for Rome Lab should be included, either as an addition to the Army project or in lieu of it. The original site survey estimate (Atch 11) of $2.39 million for 15,000 square feet should be added to the Ft Monmouth MILCON estimate along with funds for SIO, Contingency and Planning and Design.

**5. Equipment:** The AF reduced the Rome Lab estimate of $10.186 million to $7.429 million. The AF asserted equipment already exists at both Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth (Atch 12). This assertion is invalid and the amount estimated by the lab, based on site survey visits, should be included.

**Community position:** $10.186 M

**AF position:** $7.429 M

**Discussion:** According to Rome Lab supporting documents, the equipment purchases included only those items not already in place at the gaining sites and required to support the relocating activities. Since the modeling/fabrication facility must remain at Rome to support the test sites, none of its equipment can

be moved to either of the gaining sites. Moreover, at Hanscom AFB, the fabrication shop is a contractor owned and operated facility so use of equipment that is available must be reimbursed at the contract price.

The AF assertion that full sets of supporting equipment will not be needed is also incorrect. The Rome Lab equipment is currently dedicated solely to the support of Rome Lab activities. While some equipment may already be available in equipment pools at the gaining sites, the additional equipment is still needed to avoid work delays or stoppages due to conflicts with other users on the base. This is especially true since the needs of acquisition actions to meet near term commitments will always take priority over lab research requirements that generally will appear to be less impacted by delays or scheduling conflicts.

The AF provided no documents to verify the existence or availability of the equipment at the gaining sites. The Rome Lab requirement was based on site survey to the gaining location visits by knowledgeable functional experts. The full cost of the equipment should be included.

**6. Communications:** The Air Force reduced the Rome Lab estimate for communications from $10.135 million to $4.939 million with the rationale that the Rome Lab data included items planned for the future and duplicated capabilities already existing at the gaining sites (Atch 13). The assertion is incorrect, and the funds must be included to provide the proper communications capability for the Lab.

**Community position:** $10.135 M

**AF position:** $4.939 M

**Discussion:** Rome Lab is currently configured in contiguous facilities, interconnected by highly sophisticated telecommunications capabilities. While some of this capability exists at the gaining locations, site visits by Rome Lab communications specialists identified shortfalls in both capacity and compatibility. Contrary to the AF assertion, the costs projected by Rome Lab did not include equipment/capability upgrades. Moreover, the general administrative systems existing at both Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth do not possess the cabling, network and communications compatibility or capacities required to provide comparable capability to that in existence at Rome. In addition, the connectivity costs estimated by the Lab to link the three widely geographically separated sites are realistic.

These costs must be included for the Air Force to replace existing capability. If the capability is not replaced, the lab will not be able to perform its functions to current standards.

**7. Manpower:** The manpower data used by the AF is unsubstantiated and inconsistent with actual data. The 93 positions cited as elimination savings are not justified by any AF documentation and must be retained, except for 22 positions.

**Community position:** Positions Eliminated (Savings) 22

**AF position:** Positions Eliminated (Savings) 93

**Discussion:**

**BOS:**

The AF manpower savings included eliminating 44 BOS positions from a starting baseline of 107 (Atch 14). However, the baseline includes 21 security and 5 BOS positions. The security positions are not BOS and are required only to protect the test sites; their elimination would leave those sites without security (Atch 15). In addition, these positions were, in effect double counted because they were eliminated in one place, but 17 of these positions were also included in the 65 positions remaining behind for the test sites. The disappearance of the other 4 security positions is unexplained. The 5 BOS positions eliminated were also double counted because they are included in the 65 mission/mission support personnel remaining at the test sites.

No valid justification is offered by the AF for eliminating the other 23 BOS positions. It appears that these positions consist of 18 modeling/fabrication positions plus 5 BOS tail positions associated with 49 mission support positions that are arbitrarily eliminated. The 18 modeling/fabrication positions are not BOS and cannot be eliminated. The modeling/fabrication work is not being eliminated and requires all of these positions to provide the requisite variation in skills. The other 5 BOS positions should not be taken because there is no justification for the mission support eliminations which will be disused later.

If excess BOS capacity exists at either Hanscom AFB or Ft Monmouth due to force structure changes, then the excess, associated BOS tail should be eliminated as a non-BRAC savings, in accordance with DoD guidance stated in Policy Memorandum One, "Force Structure Savings The savings associated with force structure drawdowns shall not be included in the return on investment calculation." (DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report, March 1995, page C-22) [Atch 16].

**Mission Support:**

The remaining 49 positions were taken by the AF from support staff. The AF justification for this reduction is not credible. These positions provide specific support to the laboratory and are integral and uniquely authorized to each laboratory for its particular need. Positions to perform these functions do not exist at either Hanscom AFB or Ft Monmouth. If excess capacity exists at either location due to, non-BRAC cuts, such as a reduction in the Geophysics Directorate at Hanscom AFB, the reduction should be taken at Hanscom or Ft Monmouth. Using a non-BRAC action to generate excess capacity that would allow a BRAC reduction would appear to contravene DoD policy guidance.

The AF alleges that "Considering the availability of laboratory support staff at Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth, a savings of this [25%] magnitude is attainable" (Atch 17). However, at Ft Monmouth, no Air Force laboratory or positions currently exist and the Army research functions are programmed by an earlier BRAC round to be moved or eliminated. These positions are not available at Ft Monmouth.

The assumption of consolidation savings, on which the AF bases the elimination of 49 mission support positions, is not realistic. The AF asserts that "The manpower savings occur because of consolidation of stand alone operations onto bases that have "normal" and laboratory specific support functions in place. As a result, some previously required staff operations can be merged into the existing functions at the gaining bases. (Atch 17)" While some laboratory functions exist at Hanscom AFB, the mission support staffs for those functions are sized to the specific need of the function. In the case of functions at Hanscom that belong to Rome Lab, the associated mission manpower is already embedded

within the Rome Lab command and support authorizations, so additional savings from the move is not justified.

The Geophysics Directorate of Phillips Laboratory at Hanscom is, according to the AF (Atch 18), being reduced in size by 164 positions, leaving only 200 positions. Since this activity is also currently only a directorate, it would not have the structure or positions available to assume or consolidate the responsibilities of the Rome Lab mission support structure. If any excess capacity exists as a result of the non-BRAC action, this excess should be eliminated as a non-BRAC savings.

The other "normal" functions at Hanscom AFB, which is largely a product center, are authorized for and support existing functions and authorization levels and are designed to support acquisition and delivery of products that exist. Rome Lab's structure is designed to support research endeavors aimed at products not yet defined or still in concept. These two very different focuses do not lend themselves to a simple merger of workload. Ft Monmouth is also a product center. The Army is moving its laboratory research functions to Maryland, and there is no AF normal or laboratory support structure in place. For all these reasons, the AF assumed manpower savings are unjustified.

In addition, this realignment will separate a single, tightly configured function into what will be three sites that are widely geographically dispersed and to locations where no command or mission support positions currently exist. Programmatically, geographic separation tends to add, not reduce manpower requirements. And, not only will the functions be dispersed to three sites but, at each location the functions will be far more physically dispersed throughout the base than at the Rome site. In reality, this action will produce the exact opposite manpower effects than those expected in a consolidation.

**General:**

It is of interest to note that the AF FY 96 manpower baseline, 916 authorizations, in its recommendation and its revised (May 23) COBRAs for Rome Lab did not change. It is equally interesting to note that the explanation for the manpower reduction in the recommendation COBRA was quite different, although equally unjustified, from the explanation of the May 23 version. The explanation for the recommendation COBRA stated a BOS savings of 28 and a "consolidation savings" of 22 positions (Atch 19). The AF justification for the May 23rd COBRA offers a totally different explanation. While the baseline remained the same, somehow the BOS savings grew 157% and the mission support (consolidation) savings grew 223%. At the same time, force structure before the BRAC action decreased and the number of positions moved also decreased. Consistent logic would dictate that the savings for both categories should have gone down, not up.

The AF also refers to a baseline of 955 positions as the starting point for the May 23 COBRA (Atch 16 ), yet this number appears nowhere in any AF COBRA. It is unclear how the AF used this as the baseline to derive the elimination of 93 positions.

The AF justification for the manpower eliminations is neither supported by the actual manpower numbers, or by the circumstances at the gaining locations. The 44 BOS positions and the 49 mission support positions should be retained and perhaps split in some proportion between Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth to ensure adequate support after the move. However, given that a large portion of the current Rome Lab would move to Hanscom AFB where there is an existing AF structure, some small mission support manpower savings may be attainable. To acknowledge that possibility, albeit remote, the community includes a savings of 10% of the mission support personnel plus the 9% BOS tail, or a total of 22 positions to eliminate.

It appears that the manpower savings projected by the AF were created to generate the cost savings needed to support the action rather than as a savings resulting from the action.

**8. Locality Pay.** The Air Force did not include any amounts for recurring annual locality pay. These costs should have been included.

**Community position:** Add locality pay -- Annual recurring cost $1.23 M

**AF position:** No locality pay

**Discussion:** Locality pay is a civilian pay differential that is paid under statutory requirement since 1994 at specified, high cost locations around the country to partially compensate federal civilian workers for the higher cost of living in these areas. Beginning in 1995, it is applied throughout the contiguous states. It provides a locality adjustment similar to the Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) paid to military personnel.

Both the Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth locales have a locality pay differential substantially higher than the one at Rome. The differential at Hanscom is 6.97% and at Ft Monmouth is 7.3% , while at Rome it s 3.74% (Atch 20). The differential is applied to the average, annual, federal civilian salary which in the COBRA standard factors tables is $46,642. Using the difference between the differential at Rome and each of the two receiving locations yields an approximation of the added annual recurring cost .

At Hanscom the average added salary cost per person would be $1493.55 and at Ft Monmouth the average would be $1646.14 (Atch 21). Using the revised manpower data adds $1.3 million in annual costs to the Rome move and, in any scenario, with or without manpower adjustments, either erodes savings sufficiently that proposed relocations are NOT cost effective.

When queried as to whether or not locality pay was included, the AF answer was evasive at best, but clearly indicated that the use of area cost factor was intended to provide some discrimination between high and low cost areas (Atch 22). However, the area cost factor only applies to limited calculations in the COBRA and does not accommodate salary adjustments.

The VHA is specifically entered in COBRA for each base to reflect any changes in cost, either up or down, that would result from a BRAC action and provides an adjustment to military personnel for living in high cost areas and is comparable in principle to locality pay. Although there is no pre-set location to enter locality pay in the COBRA, it can and should be entered, using a manual calculation and entry procedure, in a Miscellaneous Recurring Costs cell in the model. This cell was specifically added to the model to accommodate costs that apply only to a given installation, or in such variance among installations that attempting to define a standard factor would not be practical.

When asked why locality pay was not considered, a variety of responses were obtained. One response was that DoD, by policy, did not include locality pay in the model. When the OSD Base Closure Utilization Division which oversees the entire BRAC process was asked if such a policy existed, either in writing or verbally, the response was emphatically negative. None of the OSD policy memoranda include a policy prohibiting or denying the use of locality pay. The Defense Base Closure Law requires that the evaluation of bases be conducted using approved criteria which include cost and savings. Locality pay is a statutory obligation and is, therefore, a legitimate and essential cost to consider. Any policy by DoD or a Service that directs exclusion of this cost would seem to contravene statutory requirements.

Locality pay must be included in any COBRA calculations for the Rome move.

**SUMMARY:**

The AF COBRA calculations are based on erroneous data, understate costs and overstate savings by arbitrarily eliminating a variety of costs, including manpower, construction, equipment, communications and salary differentials. While it is true that COBRA is not intended to be a budgetary tool, it can be and is being used in the case of Rome Lab to measure the absolute cost effectiveness of moving the functions to another location. The model is not being used to evaluate differences between two alternate receiving locations. It is being used to determine the costs and savings of moving Rome Lab from where it currently exists.

However, to use the model in this manner requires that the input data be as accurate as possible and that it reflect, to the maximum extent possible, all relevant cost data. To produce a valid return on investment evaluation of the Rome Lab move, the discount rate has to be adjusted upward, BOS and mission support manpower positions must be reinstated to appropriate levels, and costs for construction, equipment, communications, and locality pay must be adjusted to reflect accurate information. With these corrections made, the COBRA model calculations show that the move of Rome Lab is NOT a cost effective action.

22 Attachments

1. Extract, Testimony, SECDEF to DBCRC, 1 Mar 95
   w/BRAC Cost and Savings slide
2. Extract, DoD BRAC Policy Memorandum One, May 31, 1994
3. DoD Paper, Discount Rate for BRAC 95 Return on Investment Analyses
4. OMB Memorandum, M-94-14, February 10, 1994
5. OMB Memorandum, M-95-13, February 7, 1995
6. Extract, SAF/LLP Letter, April 28, 1995
7. Comparison Chart, COBRA RPMA figures
8. RPMA BOS Summary - Rome Lab
9. Extract, AF BRAC 95 Base Questionnaire, Rome Lab
   Facilities Square Footage by Category
10. Extract, MILCON Assets, AF Level Play COBRA, 10/11/94
11. DD Form 1391, Modeling/Fabrication Facility, Ft Monmouth
12. Extract, AF/RT Letter, 6 Jun 1995 (pg 2)
13. Extract, AF/RT Letter, 6 Jun 1995 (pg 3)
14. Extract, AF/RT Letter, 6 Jun 1995 (pg 2)
15. Extract, SAF/LLP Letter, April 28, 1995 - Rome Lab Manpower Projection
    and Extract, AF/RT Letter, 6 Jun 1995 (pg 3)
16. Extract, DoD BRAC Policy Memorandum One, May 31, 1994
17. Extract, AF/RT Letter, 6 Jun 1995 (pg 2)
18. Certification Statement, AFMC/IG, May 23, 1995
19. Extract, SAF/LLP letter, March 24, 1995
20. Presidential Memorandum, Locality-Based Comparability Payments
    November 30, 1994
21. Locality Pay Calculations - Differences at Hanscom and Ft Monmouth
    from Rome
22. Extract, SAF/LLP Letter, March 24, 1995

1 savings which is shown in the third column, that, whereas in
2 BRAC '93, over a six-year period, we had just barely broken
3 even, on this BRAC, we will have $4 billion of savings
4 reflected by the end of the six-year period.
5 Indeed, once we reach a positive savings, from that
6 point on, the annual savings will be $1.8 billion. So, even
7 though this is a smaller BRAC in terms of number of actions,
8 in '93, we have essentially the same annual savings resulting
9 from it.
10 Finally, if I go to the last column, which is
11 called "Total Savings," this is the net present value over a
12 20-year period, including discounting the savings for the
13 cost of money. That shows that this BRAC is the largest BRAC
14 we've ever had in terms of net present savings.
15 We have referred to this BRAC as being somewhat
16 smaller than the previous BRACs in terms of actions and in
17 terms of job losses but, in terms of savings, it's actually
18 the largest BRAC we have ever had.
19 Let me go from there to listing for you some of the
20 major decisions that were made.
21 In the Army, the closing of Fort McClellan;
22 Fitzsimmons Medical Center; Aviation Troop Command in

# BRAC Costs & Savings*

**FY 96 $Billions**

| | | BRAC Actions | Closure Costs | 6 Year Net Savings** | Annual Savings | Total Savings*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BRAC | 88 | 145 | $2.2 | $0.3 | $0.7 | $6.8 |
| | 91 | 82 | 4.0 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 15.8 |
| | 93 | 175 | 6.9 | 0.4 | 1.9 | 15.7 |
| | 95 | 146 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 1.8 | 18.4 |
| Total | | 548 | $16.9 | $7.1 | $6.0 | $56.7 |

* Excluding environmental costs and land sale revenues
** Net savings over the 6 year statutory implementation period
*** Net savings over 20 years, discounted to present value at 4.2%

The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model calculates return on investment. DepSecDef's January 7, 1994, policy memorandum requires the DoD Components to use the most current COBRA version, in order to ensure consistency in methodology. Although the model does not produce budget quality data, it uses standard cost factors and algorithms to estimate costs and savings over time which permit a consistent comparison of bases in a functional or installation category.

We recognize that DoD Component planning and accounting mechanisms are sufficiently different to warrant some Department/Agency specific standard cost factors in the COBRA model. DoD Component documentation must justify the use of such cost factors, particularly when performing cross-service analysis.

Specific instructions follow for the calculation of discount and inflation rates, health care costs, Homeowners Assistance Program, and savings for input to the COBRA model.

o Discount and Inflation Rates OMB Circular A-94 specifies the discount and inflation rates to be used in ROI calculations.

o Health Care Costs

oo CHAMPUS Costs Base closures and realignments can have an impact on CHAMPUS costs DoD-wide. These net cost impacts must be included in analysis of closures or realignments involving Military Treatment Facilities.

o Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) The Secretary of the Army will provide each DoD Component with a list of installations that have a reasonable probability of having a HAP program approved, should the installations be selected for closure or realignment. HAP costs will be included for each of the installations so identified by the Secretary of the Army.

o Land Value Given existing law and practice regarding the disposal of real property, especially public benefit and economic development transfers, proceeds from the sale of land and facilities generally may not be realized. In cases where some proceeds can be expected, DoD Components must estimate the amount to be received for such real property. Estimated land and facility proceeds will generally be based on the anticipated reuse of the land and facilities, assuming appropriate zoning. Also, where an installation has unique contamination problems, a portion of the installation may have to be segregated from disposal so that community reuse may proceed on the balance. Estimated proceeds should be adjusted: for any such parceling, including discounting proceeds when sale of contaminated property is possible only after the cleanup remedy has been installed and

## Discount Rate for BRAC-95 Return on Investment Analyses

**Background.** Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) algorithms incorporate a discount rate to calculate both the number of years required to obtain a return on investment and a 20 year net present value analysis. The source for identifying the appropriate discount rate is OMB Circular A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs". In BRAC-91, a discount rate of 10% was used for COBRA analyses. In BRAC-93, a discount rate of 7% was used, under the assumption that COBRA analyses were "Base-Case" benefit-cost analyses as defined in the Circular.

**Discussion.** The COBRA Joint Process Action Team has reached the conclusion that the previous identification of COBRA as a "Base-Case" analysis was incorrect. "Base-Case" is defined in the current version of the Circular as an analysis of "public investments and regulatory programs that provide benefits and costs to the general public." Public investments and regulations are assumed to "displace both private investment and consumption," therefore a 7% discount rate is used to "account for this displacement and to promote efficient investment and regulatory policies." On the other hand, "Cost-Effectiveness" analyses are defined as an "analysis of internal planning decisions of the Federal Government." This definition is much more consistent with the actual use of COBRA as a part of the formulation of base closure recommendations. Our interpretation has been confirmed by Mr. Robert Anderson, OMB Point of Contact for Circular A-94.

The Circular also includes a discussion of when to use a "real" as opposed to "nominal" discount rate, specifying that for analyses such as COBRA, which deal in constant dollars, a real discount rate should be used, and that "analyses that involve constant-dollar costs should use the real Treasury borrowing rate on marketable securities of comparable maturity to the period of analysis." Discount rates are provided annually as an appendix to the Circular. Current rates are as follows:

| 3-Year | 5-Year | 7-Year | 10-Year | 30-Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1% | 2.3% | 2.5% | 2.7% | 2.8% |

Since COBRA analyses incorporate a 20 Year Net Present Value analysis, a discount rate of 2.75% (average of the 10 and 30 year rates) should be used.

Critics of changing the discount rate may argue that we have lowered the discount rate in an effort to show a more attractive payback period. However, since there is no prescribed "maximum" payback period for base closure decisions, the use of a lower discount rate will not materially affect decisions of whether or not to close/realign an activity. That is, a change in the discount rate will not determine whether or not a decision will result in a net steady-state savings, but, rather, will only affect the number of years required for these net steady-state savings to offset up-front, one-time costs. (As an aside, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has approved recommendations in prior BRAC rounds with payback periods in excess of 100 years, if other factors warranted the closure action.)

**Recommendation.** Use a 2.75% discount rate for BRAC-95 COBRA analyses.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

February 10, 1994

THE DIRECTOR

M-94-14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FROM: Leon E. Panetta
Director

SUBJECT: 1994 Discount Rates for OMB Circular No. A-94

On October 29, 1992, OMB issued a revision to OMB Circular No. A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs." The revision established new discount rate guidelines for use in benefit-cost and other types of economic analysis.

The revised Circular specifies certain discount rates that will be updated annually when the interest rate and inflation assumptions in the budget are changed. These discount rates are found in Appendix C of the revised Circular. The attachment to this memorandum is an update of Appendix C. It provides discount rates that will be in effect for the period March, 1994, through February, 1995.

The rates presented in Appendix C do not apply to regulatory analysis. They are to be used for lease-purchase and cost-effectiveness analysis, as specified in the Circular.

Attachment

# APPENDIX C

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## DISCOUNT RATES FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS, LEASE PURCHASE, AND RELATED ANALYSES

**Effective Dates.** This appendix is updated annually around the time of the President's budget submission to Congress. This version of the appendix is valid through the end of February, 1995. Updates of this appendix will be available upon request from the Office of Economic Policy in OMB (202-395-3381). Copies of the appendix and the Circular may also be obtained from the OMB Publications Office (202-395-7332).

**Nominal Discount Rates.** Nominal interest rates based on the economic assumptions from the budget are presented in the table below. These nominal rates are to be used for discounting nominal flows, as in lease-purchase analysis.

**Nominal Interest Rates on Treasury Notes and Bonds of Specified Maturities (in percent)**

| 3-Year | 5-Year | 7-Year | 10-Year | 30-Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.8 |

Analyses of programs with terms different from those presented above may use a linear interpolation. For example, a four-year project can be evaluated with a rate equal to the average of the three-year and five-year rates. Programs with durations longer than 30 years may use the 30-year interest rate.

**Real Discount Rates.** Real interest rates based on the economic assumptions from the budget are presented below. These real rates are to be used for discounting real (constant-dollar) flows, as in cost-effectiveness analysis.

**Real Interest Rates on Treasury Notes and Bonds of Specified Maturities (in percent)**

| 3-Year | 5-Year | 7-Year | 10-Year | 30-Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.8 |

Analyses of programs with terms different from those presented above may use a linear interpolation. For example, a four-year project can be evaluated with a rate equal to the average of the three-year and five-year rates. Programs with durations longer than 30 years may use the 30-year interest rate.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

THE DIRECTOR

February 7, 1995

M-95-03

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FROM: Alice M. Rivlin

SUBJECT: 1995 Discount Rates for OMB Circular No. A-94

On October 29, 1992, OMB issued a revision to OMB Circular No. A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs." The revision established new discount rate guidelines for use in benefit-cost and other types of economic analysis.

The revised Circular specifies certain discount rates that will be updated annually when the interest rate and inflation assumptions in the budget are changed. These discount rates are found in Appendix C of the revised Circular. The attachment to this memorandum is an update of Appendix C. It provides discount rates that will be in effect for the period March 1995 through February 1996.

The rates presented in Appendix C do not apply to regulatory analysis. They are to be used for lease-purchase and cost-effectiveness analysis, as specified in the Circular.

Attachment

OMB Circular No. A-94
Revised October 29, 1992

APPENDIX C
(Revised January 1995)

**DISCOUNT RATES FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS, LEASE PURCHASE, AND RELATED ANALYSES**

**Effective Dates.** This appendix is updated annually around the time of the President's budget submission to Congress. This version of the appendix is valid through the end of February, 1996. Copies of the updated appendix and the Circular can be obtained from the OMB Publications Office (202-395-7332). Updates of this appendix are also available upon request from the Office of Economic Policy (202-395-3381), as is a table of past years' rates.

**Nominal Discount Rates.** Nominal interest rates based on the economic assumptions from the budget are presented in the table below. These nominal rates are to be used for discounting nominal flows, as in lease-purchase analysis.

**Nominal Interest Rates on Treasury Notes and Bonds of Specified Maturities (in percent)**

| 3-Year | 5-Year | 7-Year | 10-Year | 30-Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.3 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.1 |

Analyses of programs with terms different from those presented above may use a linear interpolation. For example, a four-year project can be evaluated with a rate equal to the average of the three-year and five-year rates. Programs with durations longer than 30 years may use the 30-year interest rate.

**Real Discount Rates.** Real interest rates based on the economic assumptions from the budget are presented below. These real rates are to be used for discounting real (constant-dollar) flows, as in cost-effectiveness analysis.

**Real Interest Rates on Treasury Notes and Bonds of Specified Maturities (in percent)**

| 3-Year | 5-Year | 7-Year | 10-Year | 30-Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.9 |

Analyses of programs with terms different from those presented above may use a linear interpolation. For example, a four-year project can be evaluated with a rate equal to the average of the three-year and five-year rates. Programs with durations longer than 30 years may use the 30-year interest rate.

Annual Est - FY96

| RL RECURRING COSTS | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $$ = thousands | | | | | | |
| | | 4/93 Est | | 2/94 Est | | 5/94 Est |
| Communications | | $814 | | $955 | | $120 |
| Contracting | | $623 | | $709 | | $478 |
| Comptroller | | $216 | | $229 | | $172 |
| Civil Engineering | | $7,842 | | $6,193 | | $5,985 |
| Personnel | | $545 | | $325 | | $0 |
| Logistics | | $4,130 | | $2,027 | | $2,438 |
| PMEL | | $500 | | $500 | | $500 |
| Security Police | | $883 | | $0 | | $0 |
| Safety | | $103 | | $118 | | $90 |
| Judge Advocate | | $94 | | $87 | | $36 |
| | | | | | | |
| Electric Power | | $970 | | $970 | | $970 |
| Heating | | $1,639 | | $1,639 | | $1,135 |
| Water/Sewage | | $46 | | $46 | | $46 |
| | | | | | | |
| SUB-TOTAL | | $18,315 | | $13,798 | | $11,970 |
| | | | | | | |
| Fire Protection | | $1,395 | | $0 | | $0 |
| | | | | | | |
| GRAND TOTAL | | $19,710 | | $13,798 | | $11,970 |

RLSA.XLS



SAF/LLP LTR, 28 APR

# RPMA COMPARISON

| Base | Total SF X 1000 SF | RPMA $ X 1000 | RPMA $ / SF |
|---|---|---|---|
| Minot | 7715 | 2305 | 0.30 |
| Grand Forks | 6664 | 2699 | 0.41 |
| Malmstrom | 4658 | 2778 | 0.60 |
| Dyess | 4148 | 3491 | 0.84 |
| Los Angeles | 9762 | 5600 | 0.57 |
| Ellsworth | 4148 | 3491 | 0.84 |
| Falcon | 1196 | 3404 | 2.85 |
| *Hanscom* | *4425* | *6164* | *1.39* |
| *Ft Monmouth* | *4474* | *10331* | *2.31* |
| Rome Lab (Recommendation) | 177 | 8136 | 45.97 |
| Rome Lab (Level-Play) | 177 | 3227 | 18.23 |
| | | | |
| Rome Lab (Act) | 1300 | ~1000 | 0.77 |

# RPMA BOS SUMMARY - ROME LAB

| RL RECURRING COSTS | | "MAY 94 | RECOMMENDATION | | | ESTIMATED ACTUAL COSTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $$ X 1000 | | Estimate | COBRA | | | IN CORRECT CATEGORIES | | | |
| Input Source | | AFMC | | | | | | | |
| | | RLSA.XLS | COMM | BOS | RPMA | COMM | BOS | RPMA | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Communications | | 120 | 120 | | | 120 | | | |
| Contracting | | 478 | | 478 | | | 478 | | |
| Comptroller | | 172 | | 172 | | | 172 | | |
| Civil Engineering | | 5,985 | | | 5,985 | | 4,985 | 1,000 | |
| Personnel | | 0 | | | | | 0 | | |
| Logistics | | 2,438 | | 2,438 | | | 2,438 | | |
| PMEL | | 500 | | 500 | | | 500 | | |
| Safety | | 90 | | 90 | | | 90 | | |
| Judge Advocate | | 36 | | 36 | | | 36 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Electric Power | | 970 | | | 970 | | 970 | | |
| Heating | | 1,135 | | | 1,135 | | 1,135 | | |
| Water/Sewage | | 46 | | | 46 | | 46 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **SUBTOTAL** | | **11,970** | **120** | **3,714** | **8,136** | **120** | **10,850** | **1,000** | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Fire Protection | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **GRAND TOTAL** | | **11,970** | **120** | **3,714** | **8,136** | **120** | **10,850** | **1,000** | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **WITHOUT DOUBLE COUNTED UTILITIES** | | | | | | **120** | **8,699** | **1,000** | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

# 1995 AIR FORCE BASE QUESTIONNAIRE

## Rome Lab - AFMC

### Section II

### 1. Installation Capacity & Condition

#### A. Land

| | Site | Description | Total Acreage | Acreage Presently Developed | Acreage Suitable for New Development |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| II.1.A.1 | AVA | REMOTE RESEARCH SITE | 297 | 297 | |
| II.1.A.2 | FORESTPORT | REMOTE RESEARCH SITE | 184 | 184 | |
| II.1.A.3 | NEWPORT 1 | REMOTE RESEARCH SITE | 37 | 37 | |
| II.1.A.4 | NEWPORT 2 | REMOTE RESEARCH SITE | 41 | 41 | |
| II.1.A.5 | QUAKER HILL | LEASED THEODOLITE ST | 7 | 7 | |
| II.1.A.6 | ROME LAB | RETAINED ON GRIFFISS | 70 | 70 | |
| II.1.A.7 | STOCKBRIDGE | REMOTE RESEARCH SITE | 295 | 295 | |
| II.1.A.8 | TUMMONDS HILL | LEASED REM RESH SITE | 2 | 2 | |
| II.1.A.9 | VERONA | REMOTE RESEARCH SITE | 493 | 493 | |
| II.1.A.10 | VIENNA | LEASED THEODOLITE ST | 3 | 3 | |
| II.1.A.11 | YOUNGSTOWN | REMOTE RESEARCH SITE | 99 | 99 | |
| | | TOTALS: | 1,528 | 1,528 | |

#### B. Facilities

II.1.B.1 From real property records:

| | Facility Category Code | Category Description | Units of Measure | (A) Required Capacity | (B) Current Capacity | Percentage (%) Cond Code 1 | Percentage (%) Cond Code 2 | Percentage (%) Cond Code 3 | (C) Excess Capacity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| II.1.B.1.a.i | 121-122 | Hydrant Fueling System Pits | EA | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.a.ii | 121-122a | Consolidated Aircraft Support System | EA | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.b | 131 | Communications-Buildings | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.c | 141 | Operations-Buildings | SF | N/A | 7,917 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.c.i | 141-232 | Aerial Delivery Facility | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.c.ii | 141-753 | Squadron Operations | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.c.iii | 141-782 | Air Freight Terminal | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.c.iv | 141-784 | Air Passenger Terminal | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.c.v | 141-785 | Fleet Service Terminal | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.d | 171 | Training Buildings | SF | N/A | 10,197 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.d.i | 171-211 | Flight Training | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.d.ii | 171-211a | Combat Crew Trng Squadron Facility | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |

# 1995 AIR FORCE BASE QUESTIONNAIRE

## Rome Lab - AFMC

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| II.1.B.1.d.iii | 171-212 | Flight Simulator Training (High Bay) | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.d.iv | 171-212a | Companion Trng Program | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.d.v | 171-618 | Field Training Facility | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e | 211 | Maintenance Aircraft | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.e.i | 211-111 | Maintenance Hanger | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.ii | 211-152 | General Purpose Aircraft Maintenance | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.iii | 211-152a | DASH 21 | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.iv | 211-153 | Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) Lab | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.v | 211-154 | Aircraft Maintenance Unit | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.vi | 211-157 | Jet Engine Insection and Maintenance | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.vii | 211-157a | Contractor Operated Main Base Supply | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.viii | 211-159 | Aircraft Corrosion Control Hanger | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.ix | 211-173 | Large Aircraft Maintenance Dock | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.x | 211-175 | Medium Aircraft Maintenance Dock | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.xi | 211-177 | Small Aircraft Maintenance Dock | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.xii | 211-179 | Fuel System Maintenance Dock | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.e.xiii | 211-183 | Test Cell | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.f | 212 | Maint-Guided Missiles | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.f.i | 212-212 | Missile Assembly (Build-Up) Shop | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| II.1.B.1.f.ii | 212-212a | Integrated Maintenance Facility (cruise Missiles) | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| II.1.B.1.f.iii | 212-213 | [illegible] Missile Maintenance Shop | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| II.1.B.1.f.iv | 212-220 | Integrated Maintenance Facility | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| II.1.B.1.g. | 214 | Maintenance Automotive | SF | N/A | 88,272 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | [illegible] |
| II.1.B.1.g.i | 214-425 | Trailer/Equipment Maintenance Facility | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| II.1.B.1.g.ii | 214-467 | Refueling Vehicle Shop | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.h | 215-552 | Weapons and Release Systems (Armament Sho | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.i | 216-642 | Conventional Munitions Shop | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.j | 217 | Maint-Electronics and Communications Equip | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.j.i | 217-712 | Avionics Shop | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.j.ii | 217-712a | LANTIRN | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.j.iii | 217-713 | ECM Pod Shop and Storage | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.k.i | 218-712 | Aircraft Support Equipment Shop/Storage Facility | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.k.ii | 218-852 | Survival Equipment Shop (Parachute) | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.k.iii | 218-868 | Precision Measurement Equipment Lab | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.l | 219 | Maintenance-Installation, Repair, and Ops | SF | N/A | 101,400 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.m | 310 | Science Labs | SF | N/A | 3,865 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |

# 1995 AIR FORCE BASE QUESTIONNAIRE

## Rome Lab - AFMC

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| II.1.B.1.n | 311 | Aircraft RDT&E Facilities | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.o | 312 | Missile and Space RDT&E Facs | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.p | 315 | Weapons and Weapon Syst RDT&E Facilities | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.q | 317 | Elect Comm & Elect Equip RDT&E Facilities | SF | N/A | 497,957 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.r | 318 | Propulsion RDT&E Facilities | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.s.i | 411-135 | Jet Fuel Storage | BL | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.t | 422 | Ammunition Storage Installation & Ready Use | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.t.i | 422-253 | Multi-Cubicle Magazine Storage | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.t.ii | 422-258 | Above Ground Magazine | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.t.iii | 422-264 | Igloo Magazine | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.t.iv | 422-265 | Spare Inert Storage (Alternate Mission Equipmen | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.t.v | 422-275 | Ancillary Explosives Facility (Holding Pad) | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.u | 441 | Storage-Covered Depot & Arsenal | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.v | 442 | Storage-Covered-Installation & Organ | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.v.i | 442-257a | Hydrazine Storage | SF | 3,085 | 3,085 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.v.ii | 442-258 | LOX Storage | GA | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.v.iii | 442-758 | Base Warehousing Supplies and Equipment | SF | 147,954 | 147,954 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.v.iv | 442-758a | Base Warehousing Supplies and Equipment (W | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.v.v | 442-758b | Warehousing Supplies and Equipment (AGS Par | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.w | 510 | Medical Center and/or Hospital | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.x | 530 | Medical Laboratories | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.y | 540 | Dental Clinics | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.z | 550 | Dispensaries and/or Clinics | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.aa | 610 | Administrative Buildings | SF | N/A | 113,981 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.aa.i | 610-144 | Munitions Maintenance Administration | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.aa.ii | 610-144a | Munitions Line Delivery/Storage Section | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.bb | 721 | Unaccompanied Enlisted (UEPH & VAQ) | PN | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.bb.i | 721-312 | Unaccompanied Enlisted Dorm | PN | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.cc | 722 | Dining Hall | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.cc.i | 722-351 | Airman Dining Hall | SF | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| II.1.B.1.dd | 724 | Unaccompanied Officer Housing (OQ & VOQ) | PN | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.ee | 730 | Personnel Support and Services Facilities | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.ff | 740 | Morale, Welfare, and Rec (MWR)-Interior | SF | N/A | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/A |
| II.1.B.1.gg | 852-273 | Acft Support Equipment Storage | SY | 0 | 0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | [illegible] |

II.1.B.2 From in-house survey:

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/4
Data As Of 08:16 10/11/1994, Report Created 16:49 03/22/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Level Play
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\ROM25701.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\PROCTR95.SFF

MilCon for Base: HANSCOM, MA

All Costs in $K

| Description: | MilCon Categ | Using Rehab | Rehab Cost* | New MilCon | New Cost* | Total Cost* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Engineering Support | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 166,859 | n/a | 36,000 |
| Light Lab | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 36,000 | n/a | 8,700 |
| Medium Lab | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 86,000 | n/a | 23,000 |
| Heavy Lab | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 4,600 | n/a | 3,300 |
| Light SCIF | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 26,000 | n/a | 6,600 |
| Heavy Lab | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 29,000 | n/a | 17,500 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Construction Cost: | 95,100 |
| + Info Management Account: | 0 |
| + Land Purchases: | 0 |
| - Construction Cost Avoid: | 0 |
| TOTAL: | 95,100 |

$36,000,000 ÷ 166859 SF
= $215.75/SF

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

97 45984 W REVISION DATE: 12 APR 1995
ARMY BCA (AS OF 04/12/1995 AT 13:10:09) 09 APR 1995
LAF=1.19

Fort Monmouth
New Jersey

R&D Fabrication Shop for Rome Labs

321 10 45984 2,650

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRIMARY FACILITY | | | | 2,079 |
| Rome Labs Fabrication Shop | SF | 15,000 | 138.60 | (2,079) |
| SUPPORTING FACILITIES | | | | 312 |
| Support Fac (15% of Primary Fac) | LS | -- | -- | (312) |

| | |
|---|---|
| ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST | 2,391 |
| CONTINGENCY PERCENT (5.00%) | 120 |
| SUBTOTAL | 2,511 |
| SUPERVISION, INSPECTION & OVERHEAD (6.00%) | 151 |
| TOTAL REQUEST | 2,662 |
| TOTAL REQUEST (ROUNDED) | 2,650 |
| INSTALLED EQUIPMENT-OTHER APPROPRIATIONS | (0) |

Construct a R&D fabrication shop facility. Project includes paving and all utilities and communications. The shop will be heated, ventilated and sprinklered. Install air conditioning to eligible areas. Install fire protection and reporting systems and building communications.

11. REQUIREMENT: 15,000 SF ADEQUATE: NONE SUBSTANDARD: NONE

PROJECT:

Construct a R&D fabrication shop facility.

REQUIREMENT:

This project is required to provide appropriate and complete facilities and other special purpose space to support the Rome Laboratories Electromagnetic Reliability Directorate relocation from Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome, New York. This move is the result of a BRAC 95 initiative, and is required to continue research and development of new technologies and technical management of programs.

Fort Monmouth
New Jersey

R&D Fabrication Shop for Rome Labs 45984

CURRENT SITUATION:
The Rome Laboratory organization is currently located at Griffiss AFB, NY, and is required to relocate to Fort Monmouth, NJ as part of a BRAC 95 recommendation. Sufficient fabrication shop space does not exist at Fort Monmouth to satify Rome Laboratory mission requirements.

IMPACT IF NOT PROVIDED:
If this project is not provided, personnel realigning to Fort Monmouth from Griffiss AFB will be forced into unworkable facilities, since existing space does not fully satisfy Rome Laboratories mission requirements. This will prevent Rome Laboratories from effectively performing its mission of command, control and communications research and development for the U.S. Air Force.

ADDITIONAL:
This project will be coordinated with the Installation Physical Security Plan, and any security improvements and/or combatting terrorism (CBT/T) that are required will be included. This project complies with the scope and design criteria of DOD 4270.1-M, Construction Criteria, that were in effect 1 January 1987, as implemented by the Army's Architectural and Engineering Instructions (AEI), Design Criteria, dated December 1991, with the 8 July 1992 and all subsequent revisions included in the Design Criteria Information System (DCIS).

GERARD P. BROHM
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
Commanding

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ESTIMATED CONSTRUCTION START: | JUL 1997 | INDEX: 2081 |
| ESTIMATED MIDPOINT OF CONSTRUCTION: | DEC 1997 | INDEX: 2110 |
| ESTIMATED CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION: | JUN 1998 | INDEX: 2137 |

personnel reductions throughout DoD, the elimination of 93 positions against a personnel baseline of 955 is a relatively conservative estimate.

The BOS savings were estimated by subtracting the BOS required to be moved to support the Rome Laboratory functions (63) from the stand alone BOS of 107 projected for 97/4 in the Unit Manning Document (UMD). The projected requirement represents a 9% BOS tail for positions being realigned to Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth. This calculation yields a savings of 107-63 or 44 BOS positions eliminated due to the proposed realignment.

The support staff savings due to consolidation efficiencies were estimated based on the number of laboratory support staff (not BOS or mission) positions that will be eliminated (from those slated to go to Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth) to support anticipated civilian personnel reductions. This estimate is currently 49 positions. The estimated number of Rome Laboratory support staff positions projected for 97/4 from the Unit Manning Document (UMD) is well over 200, so this is a reduction of about 25%. Considering the availability of laboratory support staff at Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth, a savings of this magnitude is attainable.

Request 2. The difference and rationale for the reduction of communication and equipment costs as provided by Rome Laboratory and as scrubbed by AFMC ultimately used in the refined COBRA?

Answer 2. The tables below show the differences between the equipment and communications costs initially submitted by Rome Laboratory and the data certified by the ESC Inspector General for use by the Air Force Base Realignment and Closure Office (HQ USAF/RT) to estimate the closure costs.

| Commodity | Initial Cost | Certified Cost | Delta | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equipment | 10.186 | 7.429 | 2.757 | Rome Laboratory identified the requirement to construct a fabrication and modeling shop at both Hanscom AFB and Ft Monmouth including costs for new equipment at each location. Both locations have existing fabrication and modeling shops with capabilities to support the Rome Laboratory requirements. In addition, the Rome Laboratory estimate included purchasing full sets of support equipment rather than supplementing the existing equipment pools at each location. |

| Commodity | Initial Cost | Certified Cost | Delta | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Communications | 10.135 | 4.939 | 5.196 | Rome Laboratory estimates included migration to their five year standard base architecture plan that has not been achieved at Rome, NY. The certified estimate includes the costs to achieve the current capabilities of the existing systems at Rome, NY. Thus, the certified estimate does not include upgrading all computers, hardware, software, network systems (including all new fiber optic cabling), and video capability for all desktop users. It does, however, include connection to the existing Hanscom AFB network backbone (as opposed to a new backbone specifically for Rome Lab). In addition, administrative and R&D LAN requirements were reduced to the projected personnel authorizations relocating rather than the present Rome Laboratory personnel authorizations. Finally, ISDN telephone lines projected at Hanscom AFB are consistent with ESC customer usage and internal access is available at Hanscom AFB at no cost |

Request 3. A detail of the 65 positions remaining at Rome Laboratory after the closure action is completed.

Answer 3. The detailed breakout of the 65 positions remaining at the Rome, NY facility is as follows:

| Personnel Type | Number of Personnel* |
|---|---|
| Mission | 18 |
| Test Sites (5 Sites) | 18 |
| Mission Support Staff | 41 |
| Security | 17 |
| Modeling & Fabrication | 18 |
| Other* | 6 |

* Other includes Supply, Contract Maint, CE Tech Support, etc.

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## ROME LAB MANPOWER PROJECTION

| | OFF | AMN | CIV | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROME LAB | 83 | 26 | 681 | 790 |
| BOS TAIL (from BRAC 93) | 2 | 50 | 34 | 86 |
| direct support (fabrication) | | | 36 | 36 |
| stand alone security | | 21 | | |
| total | 85 | 97 | 751 | 933 |

direct support: identified by AFMC as manpower in ACC providing direct fabrication and material support to Rome Lab that should transfer to Rome Lab

stand alone security: 21 spaces identified by AFMC as cost for Rome Lab to provide its own security

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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Modeling & Fabrication | 18 |
| Other* | 6 |

* Other includes Supply, Contract Maint, CE Tech Support, etc.

approved; for reduced prices where property is likely to be sold for restricted uses; or, when significant public benefit or economic development transfers are anticipated.

o Force Structure Savings The savings associated with force structure drawdowns shall not be included in the return on investment calculations. While declining force structure, as depicted in the required Force Structure Plan, will often be the underlying reason for recommending base closures or realignments, the savings associated with closing bases should generally be founded on the elimination of base operating support (BOS), infrastructure and related costs.

o Military Construction DoD Components will describe anticipated construction requirements (barracks square feet, etc.) to implement a BRAC recommendation and not actual projects. These requirements only become projects during the implementation phase after the 1995 Commission reports to the President and after installation site surveys are conducted and formal project documents (DD 1391s) are prepared.

o Construction Cost Avoidances Closing and realigning bases can result in construction cost avoidances. Cost avoidances should include FY96-01 programmed military and family housing construction that can be avoided at the closing or realigning bases, other than new-mission construction.

COBRA Model Assumptions

The following statements clarify certain cost assumptions written into the COBRA model:

o Local Moves Moves of less than 50 miles will not incur PCS moving costs.

o Priority Placement System Costs. Sixty percent of all employees will be placed in other jobs through the DoD Priority Placement Program. Fifty percent of all employees placed in other jobs through the Program will be relocated at government expense. These percentages are based on historical data.

o Employee Attrition and Turnover. Fifteen Percent of all employees will not need to be placed or severed due to normal attrition and turnover.

o Retirement Factors. Fifteen percent of all employees are eligible for retirement. Five percent of those are eligible for normal retirement and ten percent are eligible for early retirement.

personnel reductions throughout DoD, the elimination of 93 positions against a personnel baseline of 955 is a relatively conservative estimate.

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MAY 23 1995

## CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

Per verbal Air Staff tasking (18 May 95, HQ USAF/RT), Hanscom was directed to cost an option to move Rome Lab to Hanscom, assuming elimination of "non-space related efforts conducted by the Phillips Laboratory (Geophysics)".

We split the Phillips Lab divisions (approximately) along the space/non-space lines, with the management, operations and support staff pro-rated according to the percentage of space/non-space authorizations (Source: Apr 95 UMD).

| Space | Non-Space |
|---|---|
| Space Experiments | Atmospheric Sciences |
| Advanced Weapons and Survivability | Data Analysis |
| Space and Missiles Technology | Optical Environment |
| Space Physics | Earth Sciences |
| Ionospheric Effects | |
| Total Space Personnel: 200 | Total Non-Space Personnel: 164 |

By assuming that physical space would only be required for space-related Phillips Lab/Hanscom authorizations, additional buildings and space became available to accommodate Rome Lab personnel. We reduced the MILCON/minor construction bill for Hanscom from $26.398M to $20.846M.

Also, we added $100K for moving costs to consolidate current Phillips Lab and Rome Lab residents, and thereby make room for Rome Lab directorates to remain together after the proposed move.

I certify that the information contained herein is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Thomas J. Mackey

THOMAS J. MACKEY
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

Attachments
1. New roll-up estimate for proposed RL move
2. Hanscom AFB Maps
3. CE Spreadsheet Roll-Up

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

March 24, 1995

SAF/LLP
1160 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1160

The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3223

Dear Mr. Boehlert

This is in response to your letters of March 17, 1995, to the Secretary of the Air Force requesting additional clarification on data provided concerning Rome Laboratory, New York. Responses to your questions are as follows:

QUESTION 1(a): What causes this discrepancy in numbers?

RESPONSE 1(a): The total number of positions shown as being realigned out of Rome Laboratory and being eliminated reflect total number of Government authorizations being affected by closure of Rome Laboratory. The total number of direct jobs to be lost is a description of economic impact and also includes the man-year equivalents for contractors servicing the installation. In the case of Rome Lab, this equates to 134 contractor man-year equivalents.

QUESTION 1(b): What types of jobs did you assume are going to be lost at the laboratory?

ANSWER 1(b): The total of 50 positions to be eliminated by the closure of Rome Lab can be broken into two types. A total of 22 positions will be eliminated from consolidation savings. Another 28 positions will be eliminated from Base Operating Support (BOS) savings.

QUESTION 2: I'm requesting a copy of the details of these estimates for both Fort Monmouth and Hanscom AFB. I would like to receive copies of any and all worksheets or computer analyses used in developing the construction estimates.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PAY AGENT:

THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Locality-Based Comparability Payments

I have reviewed your report concerning recommended locality-based comparability payments for General Schedule employees, submitted in accordance with section 5304 of title 5, United States Code. I approve the recommended payments as set forth in Table 4 of the report, and I direct the Director of the Office of Personnel Management to implement those payments, effective as of the beginning of the first applicable pay period commencing on or after January 1, 1995. I further authorize and direct the Director of the Office of Personnel Management to ensure that this memorandum and a schedule of the attached comparability payment rates and localities be published in the Federal Register.

William J. Clinton

## Locality-Based Comparability Payments
## Effective January 1995

| Pay Locality | Comparability Payment |
|---|---|
| Atlanta MSA | 4.66% |
| Boston CMSA | 6.97% |
| Chicago CMSA | 6.92% |
| Cincinnati CMSA | 5.33% |
| Cleveland CMSA | 4.23% |
| Columbus, OH, MSA | 5.30% |
| Dallas CMSA | 5.65% |
| Dayton MSA | 5.19% |
| Denver CMSA | 5.75% |
| Detroit CMSA | 6.59% |
| Houston CMSA | 8.53% |
| Huntsville MSA | 4.39% |
| Indianapolis MSA | 4.58% |
| Kansas City MSA | 3.97% |
| Los Angeles CMSA[1] | 7.39% |
| Miami CMSA | 5.39% |
| New York CMSA | 7.30% |
| Philadelphia CMSA | 6.26% |
| Portland, OR, CMSA | 4.71% |
| Richmond MSA | 4.00% |
| Sacramento CMSA | 5.27% |
| St. Louis MSA | 4.28% |
| San Diego MSA | 6.14% |
| San Francisco CMSA | 8.14% |
| Seattle CMSA | 5.84% |
| Washington CMSA[2] | 5.48% |
| Rest of United States[3] | 3.74% |

NOTE: MSA means Metropolitan Statistical Area and CMSA means Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area, both as defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in OMB Bulletin Number 94-07, July 5, 1994.

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[1]Pay locality also includes Santa Barbara County and Edwards Air Force Base, CA.

[2]Pay locality also includes St. Marys County, MD.

[3]Does not include Alaska, Hawaii, or U.S. territories or possessions.

DEC. 5 1994

FAX TRANSMITTAL

To BILL HARVEY
Dept./Agency
Fax #

From GARY HACKER
Phone # (202) 606-4212
Fax #

# of pages ▸ 3

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

## GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY ADJUSTMENTS FOR 1995

| Locality | Cumulative Locality Pay Percentage (1994-1995)[3] | Net Inc. from 1994 Locality Rate (Incl. 2% Increase)[4] |
|---|---|---|
| Albuquerque[1] | 3.74% | 2.64% |
| Atlanta | 4.66% | 2.79% |
| Boston | 6.97% | 3.45% |
| Chicago | 6.92% | 3.53% |
| Cincinnati | 5.33% | 3.09% |
| Cleveland | 4.23% | 2.88% |
| Columbus, OH | 5.30% | 4.19% |
| Dallas | 5.65% | 3.41% |
| Dayton | 5.19% | 3.40% |
| Denver | 5.75% | 3.18% |
| Detroit | 6.59% | 3.70% |
| Houston | 8.53% | 3.92% |
| Huntsville | 4.39% | 2.28% |
| Indianapolis | 4.58% | 2.89% |
| Kansas City | 3.97% | 2.66% |
| Los Angeles CMSA[2] | 7.39% | 2.00% |
| Santa Barbara Co./Edwards AFB | 7.39% | 3.64% |
| Memphis[1] | 3.74% | 2.64% |
| Miami | 5.39% | 4.28% |
| New Orleans[1] | 3.74% | 2.64% |
| New York[2] | 7.30% | 2.00% |
| Norfolk[1] | 3.74% | 2.45% |
| Oklahoma City[1] | 3.74% | 2.39% |
| Philadelphia | 6.26% | 3.26% |
| Portland, OR | 4.71% | 3.60% |
| Richmond | 4.00% | 2.90% |
| Rest of U.S. | 3.74% | 2.64% |
| Sacramento | 5.27% | 3.55% |
| St. Louis | 4.28% | 3.18% |
| Salt Lake City[1] | 3.74% | 2.64% |
| San Antonio[1] | 3.74% | 2.64% |
| San Diego | 6.14% | 4.22% |
| San Francisco | 8.14% | 2.13% |
| Seattle | 5.84% | 3.88% |
| Washington | 5.48% | 3.22% |

[1] These seven locations have measured pay gaps below that for the Rest of U.S. Under the recommendations of the FSC, these seven locations have been combined with RUS in a cost neutral fashion.

[2] GS employees in the Los Angeles and New York CMSA's will continue to receive the 8 percent interim geographic adjustments authorized since 1991, but will also receive the 2 percent general increase.

[3] The 1995 locality pay rates replace the 1994 rates.

[4] The net increase percentages are not used to derive individual employees' 1995 locality rates of pay.

# Locality Pay Calculations - Differences at Hanscom and Ft Monmouth from Rome

| | # Civs moving to | Avg Civ Salary | Area Locality Differential | Rome Locality Differential | Net Locality Pay Diff | $ Diff/ person | Total Annual Pay Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hanscom | 547 | 46240 | 0.0697 | 0.0374 | 0.0323 | 1,493.55 | 816,972.94 |
| | | | | | | | |
| Ft Monmouth | 250 | 46240 | 0.0730 | 0.0374 | 0.0356 | 1,646.14 | 411,536.00 |
| | | | | | | | |
| Total | | | | | | | 1,228,508.94 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | **Total Locality Pay Difference by Year** | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | **FY 97** | **FY 98** | **FY 99** | **FY 2000** | **FY 2001** | |
| | | | | | | | |
| HANSCOM | | **347,997.62** | **507,807.68** | **816,972.94** | **816,972.94** | **816,972.94** | |
| | | | | | | | |
| FT MONMOUTH | | **184,368.13** | **268,321.47** | **411,536.00** | **411,536.00** | **411,536.00** | |
| | | | | | | | |
| Total | | | | 1,228,508.94 | 1,228,508.94 | 1,228,508.94 | |

SAF/LLP Ltr, Mar 24,

ANSWER 2: The requested information is attached and is based on a preliminary site survey conducted in January 1995. We plan to perform a detailed site survey on April 10-14, 1995, at which time we will identify the square footage, building types, and locations of areas where industrial elements now at Rome Lab are to be located at Hanscom AFB and Fort Monmouth. This information will be forwarded to your office upon receipt.

QUESTION 3: Please explain why these MILCON estimates are so small, particularly since site surveys have not been performed by personnel who are familiar with the facilities requirements for these research functions. Please provide any assumptions made or engineering decisions that were relevant in your final MILCON numbers.

ANSWER 3: Rome Lab provided laboratory facility requirements in their data call. These requirements were then given to Hanscom AFB and Fort Monmouth after refinement for space requirements to BRAC target year of Fiscal Year (FY) 97/4 manpower levels. It was also assumed space inefficiencies built into existing Rome Lab facilities would be eliminated when buildings at the receiving location were to house Rome Lab requirements. This resulted in a 20 percent reduction of lab and SCIF space based on the manpower and space reductions. Finally, any SCIF space occupied full time by personnel should have a commensurate reduction in the engineering support space. The preliminary site survey was conducted in January 1995 by Air Force Civil Engineering (AF/CE) and Air Force Realignment and Transition (AF/RT) personnel to validate these responses.

QUESTION 4: Please explain why the civilian locality pay was or was not factored in the calculation; and if so, where; and if not, why not?

ANSWER 4: Screen Four of the COBRA run includes the "area cost factor" for the static base. The factors are 1.10 for Rome, 1.19 for Fort Monmouth, and 1.29 for Hanscom. This factor is used in the calculations for Civilian Housing, Purchase Cost, Family Housing Construction Costs, Homeowners Assistance Program, Information Management Account, Military Construction Costs, Project New Construction Costs, and Project Rehabilitation Cost.

QUESTION 5: Please provide a detailed scenario description which enumerates all assumptions, facts, or other considerations used in this scenario and in the Air Force "level playing field" COBRA run?

ANSWER 5: The level playing field COBRA assumes that Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York, is relocated from the Department of Defense (DoD) retained area to Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. The level playing field COBRA run included $95.1 million in MILCON, $3.3 million in personnel costs, $1.5 million in overhead costs, $31.3 million in moving costs, and $2.4 million in other costs. Total cost was $133.6 million. Manpower eliminations to offset these costs were five spaces.

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1998
ROI Year : 100+ Years

NPV in 2015($K): 86,379
1-Time Cost($K): 103,447

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MilCon | 4,426 | 41,724 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46,151 | 0 |
| Person | 1,096 | 613 | 371 | -990 | -990 | -990 | -890 | -990 |
| Overhd | 2,203 | 1,870 | 1,837 | -217 | -217 | -217 | 5,259 | -217 |
| Moving | 7,060 | 6,818 | 5,462 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19,340 | 0 |
| Missio | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 2,901 | 21,359 | 7,987 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32,248 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 17,687 | 72,385 | 15,657 | -1,207 | -1,207 | -1,207 | 102,109 | -1,207 |

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| POSITIONS ELIMINATED | | | | | | | |
| Off | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| TOT | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| POSITIONS REALIGNED | | | | | | | |
| Off | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Enl | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Stu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ | 345 | 194 | 258 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 797 |
| TOT | 349 | 196 | 262 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 807 |

Summary:
---
1. Closure of Rome lab move C3 and Electro/Rel directorate to Ft Monmouth.
2. Moves other activities to Hanscom
3. Discount rate = 4.85%
4. Puts RPMA and BOS in correct amounts in correct model input cells.
5. Corrrect facilities, manpower, comm, equipment data
6. Adds locality pay

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MilCon | 4,426 | 41,724 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46,151 | 0 |
| Person | 1,127 | 660 | 946 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 3,027 | 98 |
| Overhd | 2,325 | 3,264 | 4,295 | 3,852 | 3,852 | 3,852 | 21,439 | 3,852 |
| Moving | 7,066 | 6,821 | 5,468 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19,356 | 0 |
| Missio | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 2,901 | 21,359 | 7,987 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32,248 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 17,847 | 73,828 | 18,697 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 122,222 | 3,950 |

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MilCon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Person | 31 | 46 | 575 | 1,088 | 1,088 | 1,088 | 3,917 | 1,088 |
| Overhd | 123 | 1,393 | 2,458 | 4,068 | 4,068 | 4,068 | 16,180 | 4,068 |
| Moving | 6 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 |
| Missio | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 160 | 1,443 | 3,040 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 20,113 | 5,157 |

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| Year | Cost($) | Adjusted Cost($) | NPV($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1996 | 17,687,262 | 17,273,342 | 17,273,342 |
| 1997 | 72,384,770 | 67,420,901 | 84,694,243 |
| 1998 | 15,657,449 | 13,909,129 | 98,603,372 |
| 1999 | -1,206,914 | -1,022,555 | 97,580,817 |
| 2000 | -1,206,914 | -975,256 | 96,605,561 |
| 2001 | -1,206,914 | -930,144 | 95,675,417 |
| 2002 | -1,206,914 | -887,118 | 94,788,299 |
| 2003 | -1,206,914 | -846,083 | 93,942,215 |
| 2004 | -1,206,914 | -806,946 | 93,135,269 |
| 2005 | -1,206,914 | -769,620 | 92,365,649 |
| 2006 | -1,206,914 | -734,020 | 91,631,629 |
| 2007 | -1,206,914 | -700,067 | 90,931,562 |
| 2008 | -1,206,914 | -667,684 | 90,263,878 |
| 2009 | -1,206,914 | -636,799 | 89,627,079 |
| 2010 | -1,206,914 | -607,343 | 89,019,736 |
| 2011 | -1,206,914 | -579,249 | 88,440,486 |
| 2012 | -1,206,914 | -552,455 | 87,888,031 |
| 2013 | -1,206,914 | -526,901 | 87,361,130 |
| 2014 | -1,206,914 | -502,528 | 86,858,602 |
| 2015 | -1,206,914 | -479,283 | 86,379,319 |
| 2016 | -1,206,914 | -457,113 | 85,922,206 |
| 2017 | -1,206,914 | -435,968 | 85,486,238 |
| 2018 | -1,206,914 | -415,802 | 85,070,435 |
| 2019 | -1,206,914 | -396,568 | 84,673,867 |
| 2020 | -1,206,914 | -378,225 | 84,295,642 |
| 2021 | -1,206,914 | -360,729 | 83,934,913 |
| 2022 | -1,206,914 | -344,043 | 83,590,870 |
| 2023 | -1,206,914 | -328,129 | 83,262,741 |
| 2024 | -1,206,914 | -312,951 | 82,949,790 |
| 2025 | -1,206,914 | -298,475 | 82,651,316 |
| 2026 | -1,206,914 | -284,668 | 82,366,647 |
| 2027 | -1,206,914 | -271,500 | 82,095,147 |
| 2028 | -1,206,914 | -258,942 | 81,836,205 |
| 2029 | -1,206,914 | -246,964 | 81,589,241 |
| 2030 | -1,206,914 | -235,540 | 81,353,700 |
| 2031 | -1,206,914 | -224,645 | 81,129,055 |
| 2032 | -1,206,914 | -214,254 | 80,914,801 |
| 2033 | -1,206,914 | -204,343 | 80,710,458 |
| 2034 | -1,206,914 | -194,891 | 80,515,567 |
| 2035 | -1,206,914 | -185,876 | 80,329,691 |
| 2036 | -1,206,914 | -177,278 | 80,152,413 |
| 2037 | -1,206,914 | -169,078 | 79,983,335 |
| 2038 | -1,206,914 | -161,257 | 79,822,079 |
| 2039 | -1,206,914 | -153,797 | 79,668,281 |
| 2040 | -1,206,914 | -146,683 | 79,521,598 |
| 2041 | -1,206,914 | -139,898 | 79,381,699 |
| 2042 | -1,206,914 | -133,427 | 79,248,272 |
| 2043 | -1,206,914 | -127,255 | 79,121,017 |
| 2044 | -1,206,914 | -121,369 | 78,999,648 |
| 2045 | -1,206,914 | -115,755 | 78,883,893 |
| 2046 | -1,206,914 | -110,400 | 78,773,493 |
| 2047 | -1,206,914 | -105,294 | 78,668,199 |
| 2048 | -1,206,914 | -100,423 | 78,567,776 |
| 2049 | -1,206,914 | -95,778 | 78,471,998 |
| 2050 | -1,206,914 | -91,347 | 78,380,651 |
| 2051 | -1,206,914 | -87,122 | 78,293,529 |
| 2052 | -1,206,914 | -83,092 | 78,210,436 |
| 2053 | -1,206,914 | -79,248 | 78,131,188 |
| 2054 | -1,206,914 | -75,583 | 78,055,605 |
| 2055 | -1,206,914 | -72,087 | 77,983,518 |
| 2056 | -1,206,914 | -68,752 | 77,914,766 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2057 | -1,206,914 | -65,572 | 77,849,194 |
| 2058 | -1,206,914 | -62,539 | 77,786,656 |
| 2059 | -1,206,914 | -59,646 | 77,727,010 |
| 2060 | -1,206,914 | -56,887 | 77,670,123 |
| 2061 | -1,206,914 | -54,255 | 77,615,867 |
| 2062 | -1,206,914 | -51,746 | 77,564,121 |
| 2063 | -1,206,914 | -49,352 | 77,514,769 |
| 2064 | -1,206,914 | -47,069 | 77,467,700 |
| 2065 | -1,206,914 | -44,892 | 77,422,808 |
| 2066 | -1,206,914 | -42,815 | 77,379,992 |
| 2067 | -1,206,914 | -40,835 | 77,339,157 |
| 2068 | -1,206,914 | -38,946 | 77,300,211 |
| 2069 | -1,206,914 | -37,145 | 77,263,066 |
| 2070 | -1,206,914 | -35,426 | 77,227,640 |
| 2071 | -1,206,914 | -33,788 | 77,193,852 |
| 2072 | -1,206,914 | -32,225 | 77,161,627 |
| 2073 | -1,206,914 | -30,734 | 77,130,893 |
| 2074 | -1,206,914 | -29,312 | 77,101,580 |
| 2075 | -1,206,914 | -27,957 | 77,073,624 |
| 2076 | -1,206,914 | -26,663 | 77,046,960 |
| 2077 | -1,206,914 | -25,430 | 77,021,530 |
| 2078 | -1,206,914 | -24,254 | 76,997,276 |
| 2079 | -1,206,914 | -23,132 | 76,974,144 |
| 2080 | -1,206,914 | -22,062 | 76,952,082 |
| 2081 | -1,206,914 | -21,041 | 76,931,041 |
| 2082 | -1,206,914 | -20,068 | 76,910,973 |
| 2083 | -1,206,914 | -19,140 | 76,891,833 |
| 2084 | -1,206,914 | -18,254 | 76,873,578 |
| 2085 | -1,206,914 | -17,410 | 76,856,168 |
| 2086 | -1,206,914 | -16,605 | 76,839,563 |
| 2087 | -1,206,914 | -15,837 | 76,823,727 |
| 2088 | -1,206,914 | -15,104 | 76,808,622 |
| 2089 | -1,206,914 | -14,405 | 76,794,217 |
| 2090 | -1,206,914 | -13,739 | 76,780,478 |
| 2091 | -1,206,914 | -13,104 | 76,767,374 |
| 2092 | -1,206,914 | -12,497 | 76,754,877 |
| 2093 | -1,206,914 | -11,919 | 76,742,957 |
| 2094 | -1,206,914 | -11,368 | 76,731,589 |
| 2095 | -1,206,914 | -10,842 | 76,720,747 |

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/4
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

| Category | Cost | Sub-Total |
|---|---|---|
| Construction | | |
| Military Construction | 46,151,000 | |
| Family Housing Construction | 0 | |
| Information Management Account | 0 | |
| Land Purchases | 0 | |
| Total - Construction | | 46,151,000 |
| Personnel | | |
| Civilian RIF | 891,329 | |
| Civilian Early Retirement | 344,218 | |
| Civilian New Hires | 1,148,000 | |
| Eliminated Military PCS | 0 | |
| Unemployment | 153,468 | |
| Total - Personnel | | 2,537,014 |
| Overhead | | |
| Program Planning Support | 1,820,581 | |
| Mothball / Shutdown | 1,335,000 | |
| Total - Overhead | | 3,155,581 |
| Moving | | |
| Civilian Moving | 15,974,598 | |
| Civilian PPS | 201,600 | |
| Military Moving | 53,985 | |
| Freight | 139,076 | |
| One-Time Moving Costs | 2,987,000 | |
| Total - Moving | | 19,356,260 |
| Other | | |
| HAP / RSE | 763,660 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Costs | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Costs | 31,484,000 | |
| Total - Other | | 32,247,660 |
| Total One-Time Costs | | 103,447,516 |
| One-Time Savings | | |
| Military Construction Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Family Housing Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Military Moving | 15,700 | |
| Land Sales | 0 | |
| One-Time Moving Savings | 0 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Savings | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Savings | 0 | |
| Total One-Time Savings | | 15,700 |
| Total Net One-Time Costs | | 103,431,816 |

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ
(All values in Dollars)

| Category | Cost | Sub-Total |
|---|---|---|
| Construction | | |
| Military Construction | 14,747,000 | |
| Family Housing Construction | 0 | |
| Information Management Account | 0 | |
| Land Purchases | 0 | |
| Total - Construction | | 14,747,000 |
| Personnel | | |
| Civilian RIF | 0 | |
| Civilian Early Retirement | 0 | |
| Civilian New Hires | 356,000 | |
| Eliminated Military PCS | 0 | |
| Unemployment | 0 | |
| Total - Personnel | | 356,000 |
| Overhead | | |
| Program Planning Support | 0 | |
| Mothball / Shutdown | 0 | |
| Total - Overhead | | 0 |
| Moving | | |
| Civilian Moving | 0 | |
| Civilian PPS | 0 | |
| Military Moving | 0 | |
| Freight | 0 | |
| One-Time Moving Costs | 0 | |
| Total - Moving | | 0 |
| Other | | |
| HAP / RSE | 0 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Costs | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Costs | 0 | |
| Total - Other | | 0 |
| Total One-Time Costs | | 15,103,000 |
| One-Time Savings | | |
| Military Construction Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Family Housing Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Military Moving | 0 | |
| Land Sales | 0 | |
| One-Time Moving Savings | 0 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Savings | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Savings | 0 | |
| Total One-Time Savings | | 0 |
| Total Net One-Time Costs | | 15,103,000 |

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: ROME LAB, NY
(All values in Dollars)

| Category | Cost | Sub-Total |
|---|---|---|
| Construction | | |
| Military Construction | 300,000 | |
| Family Housing Construction | 0 | |
| Information Management Account | 0 | |
| Land Purchases | 0 | |
| Total - Construction | | 300,000 |
| Personnel | | |
| Civilian RIF | 891,329 | |
| Civilian Early Retirement | 344,218 | |
| Civilian New Hires | 0 | |
| Eliminated Military PCS | 0 | |
| Unemployment | 153,468 | |
| Total - Personnel | | 1,389,014 |
| Overhead | | |
| Program Planning Support | 1,820,581 | |
| Mothball / Shutdown | 1,335,000 | |
| Total - Overhead | | 3,155,581 |
| Moving | | |
| Civilian Moving | 15,974,598 | |
| Civilian PPS | 201,600 | |
| Military Moving | 53,985 | |
| Freight | 139,076 | |
| One-Time Moving Costs | 2,987,000 | |
| Total - Moving | | 19,356,260 |
| Other | | |
| HAP / RSE | 763,660 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Costs | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Costs | 31,484,000 | |
| Total - Other | | 32,247,660 |
| Total One-Time Costs | | 56,448,516 |
| One-Time Savings | | |
| Military Construction Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Family Housing Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Military Moving | 15,700 | |
| Land Sales | 0 | |
| One-Time Moving Savings | 0 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Savings | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Savings | 0 | |
| Total One-Time Savings | | 15,700 |
| Total Net One-Time Costs | | 56,432,816 |

ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 4/4
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: HANSCOM, MA
(All values in Dollars)

| Category | Cost | Sub-Total |
|---|---|---|
| Construction | | |
| Military Construction | 31,104,000 | |
| Family Housing Construction | 0 | |
| Information Management Account | 0 | |
| Land Purchases | 0 | |
| Total - Construction | | 31,104,000 |
| Personnel | | |
| Civilian RIF | 0 | |
| Civilian Early Retirement | 0 | |
| Civilian New Hires | 792,000 | |
| Eliminated Military PCS | 0 | |
| Unemployment | 0 | |
| Total - Personnel | | 792,000 |
| Overhead | | |
| Program Planning Support | 0 | |
| Mothball / Shutdown | 0 | |
| Total - Overhead | | 0 |
| Moving | | |
| Civilian Moving | 0 | |
| Civilian PPS | 0 | |
| Military Moving | 0 | |
| Freight | 0 | |
| One-Time Moving Costs | 0 | |
| Total - Moving | | 0 |
| Other | | |
| HAP / RSE | 0 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Costs | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Costs | 0 | |
| Total - Other | | 0 |
| Total One-Time Costs | | 31,896,000 |
| One-Time Savings | | |
| Military Construction Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Family Housing Cost Avoidances | 0 | |
| Military Moving | 0 | |
| Land Sales | 0 | |
| One-Time Moving Savings | 0 | |
| Environmental Mitigation Savings | 0 | |
| One-Time Unique Savings | 0 | |
| Total One-Time Savings | | 0 |
| Total Net One-Time Costs | | 31,896,000 |

TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/4
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

All Costs in $K

| Base Name | Total MilCon | IMA Cost | Land Purch | Cost Avoid | Total Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FT MONMOUTH | 14,747 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14,747 |
| ROME LAB | 300 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 300 |
| HANSCOM | 31,104 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,104 |
| Totals: | 46,151 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46,151 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

MilCon for Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

All Costs in $K

| Description: | MilCon Categ | Using Rehab | Rehab Cost* | New MilCon | New Cost* | Total Cost* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alter Meyer Center AFMC 5/3/95 | OTHER | 124,150 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 9,200 |
| Alter Bld 207 (ER) AFMC 5/3/95 | OTHER | 20,500 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 1,650 |
| Add R&D Fab Shop 8.5% (AFMC) | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 15,000 | n/a | 2,772 |
| Plan & Des Ft Monm 8.5% (AFMC) | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 1,125 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Construction Cost: | 14,747 |
| + Info Management Account: | 0 |
| + Land Purchases: | 0 |
| - Construction Cost Avoid: | 0 |
| TOTAL: | 14,747 |

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/4
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

MilCon for Base: ROME LAB, NY

All Costs in $K

| Description: | MilCon Categ | Using Rehab | Rehab Cost* | New MilCon | New Cost* | Total Cost* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Renovate Bld 101 Adm AFMC 5/3/95 | OTHER | 3,100 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 300 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Construction Cost: | 300 |
| + Info Management Account: | 0 |
| + Land Purchases: | 0 |
| - Construction Cost Avoid: | 0 |
| TOTAL: | 300 |

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

MilCon for Base: HANSCOM, MA

All Costs in $K

| Description: | MilCon Categ | Using Rehab | Rehab Cost* | New MilCon | New Cost* | Total Cost* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Renovate Bld 1105A ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 31,700 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 3,186 |
| Renovate Bld 1102D ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 11,860 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 954 |
| Renovate Bld 1105B ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 60,346 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 2,724 |
| Add Eng Sup (B 1614) Comm Est | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 69,878 | n/a | 15,076 |
| Renovate Bld 1302F ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 28,700 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 1,053 |
| Renovate Bld 1302FA ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 9,256 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 917 |
| Renovate Bld 1508 ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 1,000 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 58 |
| Renovate Bld 1120M ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 4,100 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 435 |
| Renovate Bld 1140 ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 4,100 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 314 |
| Contingency ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 2,472 |
| SIO ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 1,582 |
| Plan & Design 8.5% | OTHER | 0 | n/a | 0 | n/a | 2,333 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Construction Cost: | 31,104 |
| + Info Management Account: | 0 |
| + Land Purchases: | 0 |
| - Construction Cost Avoid: | 0 |
| TOTAL: | 31,104 |

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

| Officers | Enlisted | Students | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| 416 | 505 | 406 | 7,341 |

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
From Base: ROME LAB, NY

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |
| TOTAL | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into FT MONMOUTH, NJ):

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |
| TOTAL | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

| Officers | Enlisted | Students | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| 416 | 505 | 406 | 7,591 |

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: ROME LAB, NY

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

| Officers | Enlisted | Students | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| 84 | 46 | 0 | 786 |

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 0 | -74 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -74 |
| Enlisted | 0 | -46 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -46 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 0 | 98 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 98 |
| TOTAL | 0 | -22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -22 |

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

| Officers | Enlisted | Students | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 0 | 0 | 884 |

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
To Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |
| TOTAL | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

To Base: HANSCOM, MA

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 233 | 136 | 178 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 547 |
| TOTAL | 237 | 138 | 182 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 557 |

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of ROME LAB, NY):

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 345 | 194 | 258 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 797 |
| TOTAL | 349 | 196 | 262 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 807 |

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 0 | 0 | -22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -22 |
| TOTAL | 0 | 0 | -22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -22 |

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

| Officers | Enlisted | Students | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 |

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: HANSCOM, MA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

| Officers | Enlisted | Students | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| 852 | 872 | 0 | 2,354 |

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
From Base: ROME LAB, NY

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 233 | 136 | 178 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 547 |
| TOTAL | 237 | 138 | 182 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 557 |

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into HANSCOM, MA):

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officers | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians | 233 | 136 | 178 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 547 |
| TOTAL | 237 | 138 | 182 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 557 |

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

| Officers | Enlisted | Students | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| 862 | 872 | 0 | 2,901 |

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/4
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| | Rate | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT | | 345 | 194 | 258 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 797 |
| Early Retirement* | 10.00% | 34 | 20 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 |
| Regular Retirement* | 5.00% | 18 | 10 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 |
| Civilian Turnover* | 15.00% | 52 | 29 | 39 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+ | | 21 | 11 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 48 |
| Civilians Moving (the remainder) | | 220 | 124 | 164 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 508 |
| Civilian Positions Available | | 125 | 70 | 94 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 289 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED | | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| Early Retirement | 10.00% | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Regular Retirement | 5.00% | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Civilian Turnover | 15.00% | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+ | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Priority Placement# | 60.00% | 0 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| Civilians Available to Move | | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Civilians Moving | | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Civilian RIFs (the remainder) | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN | | 345 | 194 | 258 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 797 |
| Civilians Moving | | 220 | 124 | 166 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 510 |
| New Civilians Hired | | 125 | 70 | 92 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 287 |
| Other Civilian Additions | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS | | 34 | 20 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 82 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS | | 21 | 11 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS# | | 0 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES | | 125 | 70 | 92 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 287 |

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ | Rate | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Early Retirement* | 10.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Regular Retirement* | 5.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Turnover* | 15.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)* | 6.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians Moving (the remainder) | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Positions Available | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Early Retirement | 10.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Regular Retirement | 5.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Turnover | 15.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)* | 6.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Priority Placement# | 60.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians Available to Move | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians Moving | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian RIFs (the remainder) | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN | | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |
| Civilians Moving | | 71 | 37 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 161 |
| New Civilians Hired | | 41 | 21 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 89 |
| Other Civilian Additions | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS# | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES | | 41 | 21 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 89 |

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| Base: ROME LAB, NY | Rate | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT | | 345 | 194 | 258 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 797 |
| Early Retirement* | 10.00% | 34 | 20 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 |
| Regular Retirement* | 5.00% | 18 | 10 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 |
| Civilian Turnover* | 15.00% | 52 | 29 | 39 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)* | 6.00% | 21 | 11 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 48 |
| Civilians Moving (the remainder) | | 220 | 124 | 164 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 508 |
| Civilian Positions Available | | 125 | 70 | 94 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 289 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED | | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| Early Retirement | 10.00% | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Regular Retirement | 5.00% | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Civilian Turnover | 15.00% | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)* | 6.00% | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Priority Placement# | 60.00% | 0 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| Civilians Available to Move | | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Civilians Moving | | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Civilian RIFs (the remainder) | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians Moving | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| New Civilians Hired | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Civilian Additions | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS | | 34 | 20 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 82 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS | | 21 | 11 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS# | | 0 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| Base: HANSCOM, MA | Rate | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Early Retirement* | 10.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Regular Retirement* | 5.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Turnover* | 15.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)* | 6.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians Moving (the remainder) | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Positions Available | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Early Retirement | 10.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Regular Retirement | 5.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Turnover | 15.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civs Not Moving (RIFs)* | 6.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Priority Placement# | 60.00% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians Available to Move | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilians Moving | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian RIFs (the remainder) | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN | | 233 | 136 | 178 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 547 |
| Civilians Moving | | 149 | 87 | 113 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 349 |
| New Civilians Hired | | 84 | 49 | 65 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 198 |
| Other Civilian Additions | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS# | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES | | 84 | 49 | 65 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 198 |

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| ONE-TIME COSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 4,426 | 41,724 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46,151 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land Purch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| CIV SALARY | | | | | | | |
| Civ RIF | 382 | 200 | 309 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 891 |
| Civ Retire | 143 | 84 | 117 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 344 |
| CIV MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 863 | 490 | 652 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,004 |
| POV Miles | 11 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| Home Purch | 2,701 | 1,523 | 2,038 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6,262 |
| HHG | 1,424 | 803 | 1,075 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,302 |
| Misc | 154 | 87 | 116 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 357 |
| House Hunt | 539 | 306 | 407 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,252 |
| PPS | 0 | 0 | 201 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 201 |
| RITA | 1,195 | 675 | 902 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,772 |
| FREIGHT | | | | | | | |
| Packing | 56 | 31 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 129 |
| Freight | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Vehicles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Driving | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Unemployment | 66 | 34 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 153 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Program Plan | 787 | 590 | 443 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,820 |
| Shutdown | 440 | 440 | 454 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,335 |
| New Hire | 500 | 280 | 368 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,148 |
| 1-Time Move | 100 | 2,887 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,987 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| MIL MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| POV Miles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HHG | 18 | 9 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45 |
| Misc | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Elim PCS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 321 | 181 | 261 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 764 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 2,580 | 21,178 | 7,726 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,484 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 16,713 | 71,534 | 15,201 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 103,447 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| RECURRINGCOSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 491 | 123 |
| BOS | 1,097 | 1,701 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 12,798 | 2,500 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 37 | 61 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 490 | 98 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 532 | 776 | 1,229 | 1,229 | 1,229 | 4,995 | 1,229 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 1,134 | 2,294 | 3,497 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 18,774 | 3,950 |
| TOTAL COST | 17,847 | 73,828 | 18,697 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 122,222 | 3,950 |

| ONE-TIME SAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| 1-Time Move | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 6 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Land Sales | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 6 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 |

| RECURRINGSAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 123 | 372 | 634 | 772 | 772 | 772 | 3,447 | 772 |
| BOS | 0 | 1,021 | 1,824 | 3,296 | 3,296 | 3,296 | 12,733 | 3,296 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 513 | 1,026 | 1,026 | 1,026 | 3,591 | 1,026 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 31 | 46 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 326 | 62 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 154 | 1,440 | 3,033 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 20,097 | 5,157 |
| TOTAL SAVINGS | 160 | 1,443 | 3,040 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 20,113 | 5,157 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| ONE-TIME NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 4,426 | 41,724 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46,151 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| Civ Retir/RIF | 525 | 284 | 427 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,235 |
| Civ Moving | 6,945 | 3,923 | 5,447 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16,315 |
| Other | 1,894 | 4,232 | 1,318 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7,444 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 15 | 8 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 321 | 181 | 261 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 764 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 2,580 | 21,178 | 7,726 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,484 |
| Land | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 16,707 | 71,531 | 15,194 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 103,432 |

| RECURRING NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | -123 | -372 | -512 | -650 | -650 | -650 | -2,956 | -650 |
| BOS | 1,097 | 680 | 676 | -796 | -796 | -796 | 65 | -796 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | -513 | -1,026 | -1,026 | -1,026 | -3,591 | -1,026 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Mil Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 6 | 15 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 164 | 36 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 532 | 776 | 1,229 | 1,229 | 1,229 | 4,995 | 1,229 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 980 | 854 | 463 | -1,207 | -1,207 | -1,207 | -1,323 | -1,207 |
| TOTAL NET COST | 17,687 | 72,385 | 15,657 | -1,207 | -1,207 | -1,207 | 102,109 | -1,207 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| ONE-TIME COSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 1,327 | 13,420 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14,747 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land Purch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| CIV SALARY | | | | | | | |
| Civ RIFs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Retire | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIV MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| POV Miles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Home Purch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HHG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Hunt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| RITA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| FREIGHT | | | | | | | |
| Packing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Freight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Vehicles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Driving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unemployment | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Program Plan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Shutdown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| New Hires | 164 | 84 | 108 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 356 |
| 1-Time Move | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| MIL MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| POV Miles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HHG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Elim PCS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 1,491 | 13,504 | 108 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15,103 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| RECURRINGCOSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 129 | 32 |
| BOS | 420 | 637 | 935 | 935 | 935 | 935 | 4,796 | 935 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 184 | 268 | 412 | 412 | 412 | 1,688 | 412 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 420 | 821 | 1,235 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 6,613 | 1,379 |
| TOTAL COSTS | 1,911 | 14,325 | 1,343 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 21,716 | 1,379 |

| ONE-TIME SAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| 1-Time Move | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Land Sales | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| RECURRINGSAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| BOS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL SAVINGS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| ONE-TIME NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 1,327 | 13,420 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14,747 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| Civ Retir/RIF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Moving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 164 | 84 | 108 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 356 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 1,491 | 13,504 | 108 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15,103 |

| RECURRING NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 129 | 32 |
| BOS | 420 | 637 | 935 | 935 | 935 | 935 | 4,796 | 935 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Mil Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 184 | 268 | 412 | 412 | 412 | 1,688 | 412 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 420 | 821 | 1,235 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 6,613 | 1,379 |
| TOTAL NET COST | 1,911 | 14,325 | 1,343 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 1,379 | 21,716 | 1,379 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: ROME LAB, NY

| ONE-TIME COSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 300 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 300 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land Purch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| CIV SALARY | | | | | | | |
| Civ RIFs | 382 | 200 | 309 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 891 |
| Civ Retire | 143 | 84 | 117 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 344 |
| CIV MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 863 | 490 | 652 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,004 |
| POV Miles | 11 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| Home Purch | 2,701 | 1,523 | 2,038 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6,262 |
| HHG | 1,424 | 803 | 1,075 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,302 |
| Misc | 154 | 87 | 116 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 357 |
| House Hunt | 539 | 306 | 407 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,252 |
| PPS | 0 | 0 | 201 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 201 |
| RITA | 1,195 | 675 | 902 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,772 |
| FREIGHT | | | | | | | |
| Packing | 56 | 31 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 129 |
| Freight | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Vehicles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Driving | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Unemployment | 66 | 34 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 153 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Program Plan | 787 | 590 | 443 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,820 |
| Shutdown | 440 | 440 | 454 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,335 |
| New Hires | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Move | 100 | 2,887 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,987 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| MIL MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| POV Miles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HHG | 18 | 9 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45 |
| Misc | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Elim PCS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 321 | 181 | 261 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 764 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 2,580 | 21,178 | 7,726 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,484 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 12,086 | 29,529 | 14,833 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56,448 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: ROME LAB, NY

| RECURRINGCOSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| BOS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL COSTS | 12,086 | 29,529 | 14,833 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56,448 | 0 |

| ONE-TIME SAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| 1-Time Move | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 6 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Land Sales | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 6 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 |

| RECURRINGSAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 123 | 372 | 634 | 772 | 772 | 772 | 3,447 | 772 |
| BOS | 0 | 1,021 | 1,824 | 3,296 | 3,296 | 3,296 | 12,733 | 3,296 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 513 | 1,026 | 1,026 | 1,026 | 3,591 | 1,026 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 31 | 46 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 326 | 62 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 154 | 1,440 | 3,033 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 20,097 | 5,157 |
| TOTAL SAVINGS | 160 | 1,443 | 3,040 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 5,157 | 20,113 | 5,157 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: ROME LAB, NY

| ONE-TIME NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 300 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 300 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| Civ Retir/RIF | 525 | 284 | 427 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,235 |
| Civ Moving | 6,945 | 3,923 | 5,447 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16,315 |
| Other | 1,394 | 3,952 | 950 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6,296 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 15 | 8 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 321 | 181 | 261 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 764 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 2,580 | 21,178 | 7,726 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,484 |
| Land | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 12,080 | 29,526 | 14,826 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56,433 |

| RECURRING NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | -123 | -372 | -634 | -772 | -772 | -772 | -3,447 | -772 |
| BOS | 0 | -1,021 | -1,824 | -3,296 | -3,296 | -3,296 | -12,733 | -3,296 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | -513 | -1,026 | -1,026 | -1,026 | -3,591 | -1,026 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Mil Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | -31 | -46 | -62 | -62 | -62 | -62 | -326 | -62 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | -154 | -1,440 | -3,033 | -5,157 | -5,157 | -5,157 | -20,097 | -5,157 |
| TOTAL NET COST | 11,926 | 28,086 | 11,793 | -5,157 | -5,157 | -5,157 | 36,336 | -5,157 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: HANSCOM, MA

| ONE-TIME COSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 2,799 | 28,305 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,104 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land Purch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| CIV SALARY | | | | | | | |
| Civ RIFs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Retire | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CIV MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| POV Miles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Home Purch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HHG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Hunt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| RITA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| FREIGHT | | | | | | | |
| Packing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Freight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Vehicles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Driving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unemployment | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Program Plan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Shutdown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| New Hires | 336 | 196 | 260 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 792 |
| 1-Time Move | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| MIL MOVING | | | | | | | |
| Per Diem | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| POV Miles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HHG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Elim PCS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 3,135 | 28,501 | 260 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,896 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: HANSCOM, MA

| RECURRINGCOSTS -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 362 | 90 |
| BOS | 677 | 1,064 | 1,565 | 1,565 | 1,565 | 1,565 | 8,001 | 1,565 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 37 | 61 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 490 | 98 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 348 | 508 | 817 | 817 | 817 | 3,307 | 817 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 677 | 1,412 | 2,164 | 2,473 | 2,473 | 2,473 | 12,161 | 2,571 |
| TOTAL COSTS | 3,849 | 29,974 | 2,522 | 2,571 | 2,571 | 2,571 | 44,057 | 2,571 |

| ONE-TIME SAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| 1-Time Move | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| Land Sales | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| RECURRINGSAVES -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| BOS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Off Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL SAVINGS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

Base: HANSCOM, MA

| ONE-TIME NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONSTRUCTION | | | | | | | |
| MILCON | 2,799 | 28,305 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,104 |
| Fam Housing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | |
| Civ Retir/RIF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Moving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 336 | 196 | 260 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 792 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | |
| Mil Moving | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| HAP / RSE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info Manage | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL ONE-TIME | 3,135 | 28,501 | 260 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31,896 |

| RECURRING NET -----($K)----- | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAM HOUSE OPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| O&M | | | | | | | | |
| RPMA | 0 | 0 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 362 | 90 |
| BOS | 677 | 1,064 | 1,565 | 1,565 | 1,565 | 1,565 | 8,001 | 1,565 |
| Unique Operat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretaker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MIL PERSONNEL | | | | | | | | |
| Mil Salary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| House Allow | 37 | 61 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 490 | 98 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | |
| Procurement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recur | 0 | 348 | 508 | 817 | 817 | 817 | 3,307 | 817 |
| Unique Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL RECUR | 714 | 1,473 | 2,262 | 2,571 | 2,571 | 2,571 | 12,161 | 2,571 |
| TOTAL NET COST | 3,849 | 29,974 | 2,522 | 2,571 | 2,571 | 2,571 | 44,057 | 2,571 |

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| | Personnel | | | SF | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | Change | %Change | | Change | %Change | Chg/Per |
| FT MONMOUTH | 250 | 3% | | 15,000 | 0% | 60 |
| ROME LAB | -829 | -93% | | -1,068,000 | -80% | 1,288 |
| HANSCOM | 557 | 14% | | 69,878 | 2% | 125 |

| | RPMA($) | | | BOS($) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | Change | %Change | Chg/Per | Change | %Change | Chg/Per |
| FT MONMOUTH | 32,208 | 0% | 129 | 934,810 | 2% | 3,739 |
| ROME LAB | -772,426 | -77% | 932 | -3,295,997 | -76% | 3,976 |
| HANSCOM | 90,476 | 1% | 162 | 1,565,138 | 7% | 2,810 |

| | RPMABOS($) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base | Change | %Change | Chg/Per |
| FT MONMOUTH | 967,019 | 1% | 3,868 |
| ROME LAB | -4,068,423 | -76% | 4,908 |
| HANSCOM | 1,655,614 | 6% | 2,972 |

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

| Net Change($K) | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | Total | Beyond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPMA Change | -123 | -372 | -512 | -650 | -650 | -650 | -2,956 | -650 |
| BOS Change | 1,097 | 680 | 676 | -796 | -796 | -796 | 65 | -796 |
| Housing Change | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL CHANGES | 975 | 307 | 164 | -1,446 | -1,446 | -1,446 | -2,891 | -1,446 |

SCENARIO ERROR REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT:
ROME LAB had 65 civilians personnel present after closing.

OVERHEAD/RPMA:
ROME LAB still had 273 KSF of facilities after closing.

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: No

| Base Name | Strategy: |
|---|---|
| FT MONMOUTH, NJ | Realignment |
| ROME LAB, NY | Closes in FY 1998 |
| HANSCOM, MA | Realignment |

Summary:
---
1. Closure of Rome lab move C3 and Electro/Rel directorate to Ft Monmouth.
2. Moves other activities to Hanscom
3. Discount rate = 4.85%
4. Puts RPMA and BOS in correct amounts in correct model input cells.
5. Corrrect facilities, manpower, comm, equipment data
6. Adds locality pay

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

| From Base: | To Base: | Distance: |
|---|---|---|
| FT MONMOUTH, NJ | ROME LAB, NY | 276 mi |
| ROME LAB, NY | HANSCOM, MA | 276 mi |

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from ROME LAB, NY to FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officer Positions: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted Positions: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Positions: | 112 | 58 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Student Positions: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Missn Eqpt (tons): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Suppt Eqpt (tons): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Military Light Vehicles: | 3 | 4 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Heavy/Special Vehicles: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Transfers from ROME LAB, NY to HANSCOM, MA

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officer Positions: | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted Positions: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Positions: | 233 | 136 | 178 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Student Positions: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Missn Eqpt (tons): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Suppt Eqpt (tons): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Military Light Vehicles: | 5 | 9 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Heavy/Special Vehicles: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Data As Of 13:04 05/23/1995, Report Created 20:51 06/12/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Officer Employees: | 416 | RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year): | 10,331 |
| Total Enlisted Employees: | 505 | Communications ($K/Year): | 0 |
| Total Student Employees: | 406 | BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year): | 60,417 |
| Total Civilian Employees: | 7,341 | BOS Payroll ($K/Year): | 39,183 |
| Mil Families Living On Base: | 100.0% | Family Housing ($K/Year): | 3,861 |
| Civilians Not Willing To Move: | 6.0% | Area Cost Factor: | 1.19 |
| Officer Housing Units Avail: | 0 | CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit): | 0 |
| Enlisted Housing Units Avail: | 0 | CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit): | 0 |
| Total Base Facilities(KSF): | 4,474 | CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare: | 20.9% |
| Officer VHA ($/Month): | 441 | Activity Code: | 34555 |
| Enlisted VHA ($/Month): | 261 | | |
| Per Diem Rate ($/Day): | 103 | Homeowner Assistance Program: | No |
| Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile): | 0.07 | Unique Activity Information: | No |

Name: ROME LAB, NY

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Officer Employees: | 84 | RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year): | 1,000 |
| Total Enlisted Employees: | 46 | Communications ($K/Year): | 120 |
| Total Student Employees: | 0 | BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year): | 4,340 |
| Total Civilian Employees: | 786 | BOS Payroll ($K/Year): | 4,359 |
| Mil Families Living On Base: | 0.0% | Family Housing ($K/Year): | 0 |
| Civilians Not Willing To Move: | 6.0% | Area Cost Factor: | 1.10 |
| Officer Housing Units Avail: | 0 | CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit): | 0 |
| Enlisted Housing Units Avail: | 0 | CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit): | 0 |
| Total Base Facilities(KSF): | 1,341 | CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare: | 20.9% |
| Officer VHA ($/Month): | 57 | Activity Code: | 44 |
| Enlisted VHA ($/Month): | 86 | | |
| Per Diem Rate ($/Day): | 66 | Homeowner Assistance Program: | Yes |
| Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile): | 0.07 | Unique Activity Information: | No |

Name: HANSCOM, MA

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Officer Employees: | 852 | RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year): | 6,164 |
| Total Enlisted Employees: | 872 | Communications ($K/Year): | 3,704 |
| Total Student Employees: | 0 | BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year): | 18,161 |
| Total Civilian Employees: | 2,354 | BOS Payroll ($K/Year): | 0 |
| Mil Families Living On Base: | 59.0% | Family Housing ($K/Year): | 8,996 |
| Civilians Not Willing To Move: | 6.0% | Area Cost Factor: | 1.29 |
| Officer Housing Units Avail: | 0 | CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit): | 0 |
| Enlisted Housing Units Avail: | 0 | CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit): | 0 |
| Total Base Facilities(KSF): | 4,425 | CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare: | 20.9% |
| Officer VHA ($/Month): | 432 | Activity Code: | AF036 |
| Enlisted VHA ($/Month): | 303 | | |
| Per Diem Rate ($/Day): | 139 | Homeowner Assistance Program: | Yes |
| Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile): | 0.07 | Unique Activity Information: | No |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\SS-ROMEP.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\DATA\SS-DATA\DEPOTFI3.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1-Time Unique Cost ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Unique Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Moving Cost ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Moving Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Activ Mission Cost ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Activ Mission Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recurring Cost($K): | 0 | 184 | 268 | 412 | 412 | 412 |
| Misc Recurring Save($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Construction Schedule(%): | 9% | 91% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Shutdown Schedule (%): | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fam Housing Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Procurement Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Facil ShutDown(KSF): | 0 | Perc Family Housing ShutDown: | | | | 0.0% |

Name: ROME LAB, NY

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1-Time Unique Cost ($K): | 2,580 | 21,178 | 7,726 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Unique Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Moving Cost ($K): | 100 | 2,887 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Moving Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Activ Mission Cost ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Activ Mission Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recurring Cost($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recurring Save($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Construction Schedule(%): | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Shutdown Schedule (%): | 33% | 33% | 34% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fam Housing Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Procurement Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Facil ShutDown(KSF): | 1,068 | Perc Family Housing ShutDown: | | | | 100.0% |

Name: HANSCOM, MA

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1-Time Unique Cost ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Unique Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Moving Cost ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1-Time Moving Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Activ Mission Cost ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Activ Mission Save ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Misc Recurring Cost($K): | 0 | 348 | 508 | 817 | 817 | 817 |
| Misc Recurring Save($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Construction Schedule(%): | 9% | 91% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Shutdown Schedule (%): | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fam Housing Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Procurement Avoidnc($K): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Facil ShutDown(KSF): | 0 | Perc Family Housing ShutDown: | | | | 0.0% |

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth
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INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: ROME LAB, NY

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Off Force Struc Change: | 0 | -74 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Force Struc Change: | 0 | -46 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Force Struc Change: | 0 | 98 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Stu Force Struc Change: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Off Scenario Change: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Scenario Change: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Scenario Change: | 0 | 0 | -22 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Off Change(No Sal Save): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enl Change(No Sal Save): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civ Change(No Sal Save): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretakers - Military: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Caretakers - Civilian: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

| Description | Categ | New MilCon | Rehab MilCon | Total Cost($K) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alter Meyer Center AFMC 5/3/95 | OTHER | 0 | 124,150 | 9,200 |
| Alter Bld 207 (ER) AFMC 5/3/95 | OTHER | 0 | 20,500 | 1,650 |
| Add R&D Fab Shop 8.5% (AFMC) | OTHER | 15,000 | 0 | 2,772 |
| Plan & Des Ft Monm 8.5% (AFMC) | OTHER | 0 | 0 | 1,125 |

Name: ROME LAB, NY

| Description | Categ | New MilCon | Rehab MilCon | Total Cost($K) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Renovate Bld 101 Adm AFMC 5/3/95 | OTHER | 0 | 3,100 | 300 |

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INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: HANSCOM, MA

| Description | Categ | New MilCon | Rehab MilCon | Total Cost($K) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Renovate Bld 1105A<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 31,700 | 3,186 |
| Renovate Bld 1102D<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 11,860 | 954 |
| Renovate Bld 1105B<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 60,346 | 2,724 |
| Add Eng Sup (B 1614)<br>Comm Est | OTHER | 69,878 | 0 | 15,076 |
| Renovate Bld 1302F<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 28,700 | 1,053 |
| Renovate Bld 1302FA<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 9,256 | 917 |
| Renovate Bld 1508<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 1,000 | 58 |
| Renovate Bld 1120M<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 4,100 | 435 |
| Renovate Bld 1140<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 4,100 | 314 |
| Contingency<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 0 | 2,472 |
| SIO<br>ESC 5/23/95 | OTHER | 0 | 0 | 1,582 |
| Plan & Design<br>8.5% | OTHER | 0 | 0 | 2,333 |

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Percent Officers Married: | 76.80% | Civ Early Retire Pay Factor: | 9.00% |
| Percent Enlisted Married: | 66.90% | Priority Placement Service: | 60.00% |
| Enlisted Housing MilCon: | 80.00% | PPS Actions Involving PCS: | 50.00% |
| Officer Salary($/Year): | 78,668.00 | Civilian PCS Costs ($): | 28,800.00 |
| Off BAQ with Dependents($): | 7,073.00 | Civilian New Hire Cost($): | 4,000.00 |
| Enlisted Salary($/Year): | 36,148.00 | Nat Median Home Price($): | 114,600.00 |
| Enl BAQ with Dependents($): | 5,162.00 | Home Sale Reimburse Rate: | 10.00% |
| Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week): | 174.00 | Max Home Sale Reimburs($): | 22,385.00 |
| Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks): | 18 | Home Purch Reimburse Rate: | 5.00% |
| Civilian Salary($/Year): | 46,642.00 | Max Home Purch Reimburs($): | 11,191.00 |
| Civilian Turnover Rate: | 15.00% | Civilian Homeowning Rate: | 64.00% |
| Civilian Early Retire Rate: | 10.00% | HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate: | 22.90% |
| Civilian Regular Retire Rate: | 5.00% | HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate: | 5.00% |
| Civilian RIF Pay Factor: | 39.00% | RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate: | 0.00% |
| SF File Desc: | Final Factors | RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate: | 0.00% |

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| RPMA Building SF Cost Index: | 0.93 | Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost: | 0.00% |
| BOS Index (RPMA vs population): | 0.54 | Info Management Account: | 0.00% |
| (Indices are used as exponents) | | MilCon Design Rate: | 0.00% |
| Program Management Factor: | 10.00% | MilCon SIOH Rate: | 0.00% |
| Caretaker Admin(SF/Care): | 162.00 | MilCon Contingency Plan Rate: | 0.00% |
| Mothball Cost ($/SF): | 1.25 | MilCon Site Preparation Rate: | 0.00% |
| Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF): | 256.00 | Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: | 4.85% |
| Avg Family Quarters(SF): | 1,320.00 | Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: | 0.00% |

APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00% 1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

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STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Material/Assigned Person(Lb): | 710 | Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton): | 284.00 |
| HHG Per Off Family (Lb): | 14,500.00 | Mil Light Vehicle($/Mile): | 0.43 |
| HHG Per Enl Family (Lb): | 9,000.00 | Heavy/Spec Vehicle($/Mile): | 1.40 |
| HHG Per Mil Single (Lb): | 6,400.00 | POV Reimbursement($/Mile): | 0.18 |
| HHG Per Civilian (Lb): | 18,000.00 | Avg Mil Tour Length (Years): | 4.10 |
| Total HHG Cost ($/100Lb): | 35.00 | Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour): | 6,437.00 |
| Air Transport ($/Pass Mile): | 0.20 | One-Time Off PCS Cost($): | 9,142.00 |
| Misc Exp ($/Direct Employ): | 700.00 | One-Time Enl PCS Cost($): | 5,761.00 |

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

| Category | UM | $/UM | Category | UM | $/UM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Horizontal | (SY) | 0 | other | (SF) | 0 |
| Waterfront | (LF) | 0 | Optional Category B | ( ) | 0 |
| Air Operations | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category C | ( ) | 0 |
| Operational | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category D | ( ) | 0 |
| Administrative | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category E | ( ) | 0 |
| School Buildings | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category F | ( ) | 0 |
| Maintenance Shops | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category G | ( ) | 0 |
| Bachelor Quarters | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category H | ( ) | 0 |
| Family Quarters | (EA) | 0 | Optional Category I | ( ) | 0 |
| Covered Storage | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category J | ( ) | 0 |
| Dining Facilities | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category K | ( ) | 0 |
| Recreation Facilities | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category L | ( ) | 0 |
| Communications Facil | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category M | ( ) | 0 |
| Shipyard Maintenance | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category N | ( ) | 0 |
| RDT & E Facilities | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category O | ( ) | 0 |
| POL Storage | (BL) | 0 | Optional Category P | ( ) | 0 |
| Ammunition Storage | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category Q | ( ) | 0 |
| Medical Facilities | (SF) | 0 | Optional Category R | ( ) | 0 |
| Environmental | ( ) | 0 | | | |

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

1. Discount factor = 4.85%

2. Facilities shutdown changed to reflect current actual space less vacated.

3. RPMA and BOS corrected to put right amounts in correct input cells.

4. Locality pay adjusted. Hanscom - 3.23%; Ft Monmouth 3.56%.

# NORTH CAROLINA

## I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

***ARMY***

| | |
|---|---|
| Recreation Center #2 Fayetteville | Close |

## II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

# MAP NO. 34

# NORTH CAROLINA




STATE CAPITAL
ARMY INSTALLATION
NAVY INSTALLATION
AF INSTALLATION

Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

CHARLIE ROSE
7TH DISTRICT, NORTH CAROLINA

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
SUBCOMMITTEES:
RISK MANAGEMENT AND SPECIALTY CROPS
RANKING MEMBER
GENERAL FARM COMMODITIES

# Congress of the United States
## House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515–3307

PLEASE RESPOND TO:

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
242 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515–3307
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FAX: AREA CODE (910) 323–0069

208 POST OFFICE BUILDING
WILMINGTON, NC 28401–3957
PHONE: AREA CODE (910) 343–4959
FAX: AREA CODE (910) 763–7790

June 13, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, The Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am enclosing testimony that I would like to have included in the transcript from Monday's hearings on the Department of Defense's base closure recommendations.

Thank you for your assistance with this matter and please feel free to contact me if you have any questions regarding my statement.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Charlie Rose

CR:wm

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

**Statement of Congressman Charlie Rose before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

I thank the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) for giving me this opportunity to speak on a matter of critical importance to the people of Southeastern North Carolina.

As you are all aware, in 1993 the Department of Defense (DoD) recommended that the Navy transfer 12 aircraft operational F/A-18 squadrons and one 48 aircraft training squadron from the Naval Air Station Cecil Field in Florida to the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point. Before arriving at this decision, the DoD also considered transferring the aircraft to the Naval Air Station in Oceana Virginia. After a careful review of the merits of redirecting the aircraft to each base, DoD determined that the aircraft should be transferred to MCAS Cherry Point.

In initially recommending the transfer to MCAS Cherry Point, DoD determined that this was consistent with the objective of facilitating Joint Use Training between the Navy and Marine Corps. To quote the recommendation, "movement of NAS Cecil Field F/A-18 aircraft and personnel to NAS Oceana defeats the increase in military value achieved by the integration of Navy carrier-based aviation with the Marine Corps carrier aviation at MCAS's Cherry Point and Beufort." Additionally, DoD found that the transfer to Cherry Point, "alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems." Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, the DoD analysis found that the cost of transferring the Air Wing to MCAS Cherry Point would be considerably cheaper than transfer to NAS Oceana. This analysis was thorough and the reasoning for relocating the aircraft to MCAS Cherry Point was compelling.

However, in 1995 BRAC reversed itself and recommended that eight 10 Aircraft Squadrons and one 48 Aircraft FRS be redirected to NAS Oceana. In doing so, the BRAC manipulated the criteria for redirection by stipulating that, "The introduction of aircraft types not currently aboard a station is not allowed." NAS Oceana prevailed under this new standard by virtue of the fact that a single Reserve squadron of F/A 18s are stationed at the base. This change is in direct contradiction to the 1993, "determination for joint military operations of Navy and Marine aircraft."

The second major motivation for the reversal was the, "application of cost avoidance...through cancellation of budgeted military construction and fuller utilization of existing capacity at other receiving sites." However, this finding is not supported by the facts. The 1995 cost figures for Cherry Point were inflated by $43 million dollars for unneeded family housing. In fact, MCAS Cherry Point has more than 1600 family housing units than does NAS Oceana, and ample off-base private housing.

In addition, Cherry Point has benefited from a $400 million Military Construction budget over the last decade. This budget has created 16 new BEQ's with additional capacity, a new full service Naval Hospital, a new water treatment facility with additional capacity and new sewage treatment facility with additional capacity.

There are several other reasons why MCAS Cherry Point is the preferred sight for redirection. For instance, NAS Oceana has had a long history of water supply problems that could affect operational readiness. As you are well aware, NAS Oceana is dependent on Virginia Beach for its water needs. During the drought of 1980 NAS Oceana was forced to build emergency wells to meet operational needs. In the December 1980 Navy Oceana Environmental Assessment, officials stated, "efforts to curtail consumption were successful, but these measures were at the expense of operational readiness." In 1991, Virginia Beach imposed mandatory, long-term water use restrictions and placed a moratorium on all new water system connections. These restrictions remain in place today. In 1994, the Corps of Engineers concluded that the area is vulnerable to drought and without additional water supply, faces water problems of extreme proportions. What more, The Lake Gaston Pipeline project, which may take up to 95 million gallons of water a day from the Roanoke River Basin, will not solve the long term water shortages in the Virginia Beach area. Recently, Virginia Beach Officials stated, "The Lake Gaston Project will not eliminate the need for Virginia Beach or Chesapeake to restrict water use."

Additionally, the NAS Oceana area is out of compliance for ozone pollution and EPA officials recently informed the State of Virginia that ozone pollution problems in that area may be getting worse. Under federal law, any new sources of air pollution, including F/A-18s, require a detailed conformity analysis to show that air quality will not be further degraded.

The decision to ignore the 1993 recommendations to redirect the aircraft to MCAS Cherry Point threatens the integrity of the BRAC process. I am convinced that an objective review of the facts surrounding this matter leads one to the overwhelming conclusion that the 1993 recommendations were proper and sound. I strongly urge the commission to reject the 1995 recommendations and implement the recommendations made in 1993 to transfer the aircraft to MCAS Cherry Point.

Once again, thank you for your time and consideration of these remarks.



# *North Carolina Senate and Congressional Speaking Points*

## Merits of Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC vs. Naval Air Station Oceana, Va

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# Aerial View of Cherry Point



OPERATION HORNETS' NEST
MCAS CHERRY POINT

# Aerial View of Oceana



OPERATION HORNETS' NEST
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# Aerial View of Oceana



Residential Neighborhoods

One of largest malls in Va.

Residential Neighborhoods

Extremely Dense Commercial

Residential Neighborhoods

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WICHITA FALLS, Texas (AP) -- An Air Force training jet that smashed into an apartment complex and killed two people developed mechanical problems minutes after takeoff, the military said.

About 20 others were hurt Wednesday in the crash, which engulfed a building and several cars in flames and shook schools and homes. Investigators were searching Thursday through chunks of green metal that littered the complex parking lot to try to determine the cause.

Two or three minutes after the T-38 took off from Sheppard Air Force Base, the plane was trailing smoke and dropping off pieces, witnesses said. The two pilots ejected and parachuted onto a softball field just before the plane went down. They suffered minor scrapes.

"The pilots are extremely distressed about what happened," said Air Force Col. Bill Orcutt, the crash investigation commander. "But from what we know, it was a mechanical problem. There was nothing they could do."

The pilots names were not released. They were assigned to the 80th Flying Training Wing at Sheppard, which is about four miles from the complex.

The pilots were part of Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot training program. One, an instructor, was from the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The other, a student, was American, a base spokesman said. No further information was provided.

The plane just missed two schools that were out for the summer and a day-care center before smashing into the 120-unit Amber Falls Crossing apartment complex. One of the 11 buildings in the complex was hit; four apartments in that building were destroyed.

"It looked like a bomb dropped," said tenant Linda Thornton. "There was so much smoke you couldn't see the building."

The dead were identified as Joseph Robert Wolfe, 77, and his wife, Edelmira Corbett Wolfe, 83. They were outside the apartment complex, knocking on doors for a local Jehovah's Witness church.

Wolfe died on the sidewalk when three cars in front of him exploded. His wife burned to death near the couple's car, police said.

Most of the injured suffered smoke inhalation and bruises.

Debris was scattered over about two blocks, and a large hunk of fuselage rested among the hulls of several burned-out vehicles. The charred, splintered apartment building stood directly in front of a grassy playground.

Barbara Harrell said the fire burned everything in her mother's apartment. Her mother wasn't home at the time.

"She would've been in bed or up drinking coffee," Ms. Harrell said. "It makes you feel relief."