Mr. Chairman, members, and staff of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the task you have before you is a difficult one, but essential to allow the Department of Defense to reduce their investment on unneeded facilities, thus freeing up resources for critical readiness requirements. You, and your colleagues who are not here today, are to be commended for the formidable challenge that you have assumed for the benefit of the American people and the men and women in uniform, the finest military in the world.

I use those two groups deliberately because in the end, that is for whom you perform this duty, and to whom you are answerable. When my colleagues and I wrote the legislation that authorized the defense base realignment and closure round for 2005, we specifically addressed issues of openness, transparency, and an independent review of critical decisions in order to preserve the integrity of, and public trust in, the process. We added language to exclude--to the maximum extent possible--political influence in the process, and preconceived notions of what should be closed, what should be realigned, and what should remain open. We put specific criteria into law to ensure that the military value of our installations and infrastructure were given priority, and directed the Secretary of Defense to make

recommendations based on those criteria—and those criteria alone. Section 2913(f) of title 10, United States Code states,

> *"(f) Relation to Other Materials—The final selection criteria specified in this section shall be the only criteria to be used, along with the force structure plan and infrastructure inventory referred to in section 2912, in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005."*

We established this BRAC commission--an independent commission--and tasked it with the responsibility of objectively, and independently, reviewing the Secretary's recommendations. The Commission was specifically empowered to amend the Secretary's recommendations, if their analysis revealed "that the Secretary deviated substantially" from the BRAC criteria and/or the force structure plan submitted as part of the BRAC process. Finally, we charged the commission with the sole responsibility of submitting a final list of recommendations to the President.

While we in Congress retain a right to review and reject the final recommendations in total, the commission is charged with reviewing and amending each recommendation to ensure the use of correct data, an accurate and substantiated assessment of cost savings, and---most importantly—recommendations that advance the tenets of "military value" as clearly prescribed in law. While many have criticized the BRAC process over the

years, no one has come up with a better, fairer, more objective way to address the unpleasant task of closing military bases.. Thank you for your commitment and willingness to participate in this process essential to maintaining America's modern and strong national defense.

The Commonwealth of Virginia has enjoyed a close relationship with our men and women in uniform since the founding of our Republic. Virginia is home to some of the most diverse and capable military personnel and installations, including leased facilities, effectively supporting the full range of U.S. military missions and special operations.

The Hampton Roads region serves as the homeport for the U.S. Naval Atlantic Fleet with critical installations including Naval Air Station Oceana, Norfolk Naval Station, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and Naval Base Little Creek. Langley Air Force Base has the honor of being the first air base in the world to support the operations of the best fighter jet in the world, the F/A-22 Raptor. Located near these installations are the traditional Army bulwarks at Fort Story, Fort Monroe, Fort Eustis, and Fort Lee in nearby Petersburg..This compact and critical collection of military activities has enabled our military forces to work and train together ever since the joint siege at Yorktown became the stepping stone for the beginning of our nation. The region continues to serve as the center of joint war-fighting as the home of Joint

Forces Command and the only headquarters in the United States for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We cannot underestimate the importance of the Hampton Roads region to our nation's security.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, before I go any further, I would like to state for the record my thoughts on your request to the Secretary of Defense dated July 1, 2005 for additional information on the Navy's recommendation to preserve its presence at Naval Air Station Oceana. I realize that if, by some unfortunate turn of events, NAS Oceana is added by the Commission for consideration for further action on July 19, 2005, I will have an additional opportunity to testify before you with the facts about why this fine installation must be maintained. NAS Oceana is a superb base with access to unlimited ranges and training airspace. Like many other installations in a suburban setting supporting rigorous military operations, NAS Oceana has been proactively and aggressively cooperating with local communities to address issues related to the encroachment of local development. I point out that problems with encroachment are not unique to Oceana. A Joint Use Land Study was recently completed for NAS Oceana by the Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in cooperation with numerous local communities. The study resulted in the establishment of a long-term plan to manage the growth of surrounding

development while allowing certain types of construction and maintaining safe decibel levels for residential areas. Luckily, NAS Oceana has not had to restrict flying operations to curtail the take-off of combat loaded aircraft to one end of the runway like other air bases in the DOD inventory which have more severe encroachment problems. Given that the Commission has taken an interest in the threat of encroachment on our bases, I have to question why the Commission did not develop questions and scenarios for the Department of Defense to further explore options to alleviate encroachment issues at the air bases with more severe problems.

Naval Air Station Oceana is the United States Navy's Master Jet Base on the East Coast, with the primary mission of training and deploying strike-fighter squadrons. NAS Oceana has one 12,000 foot runway and three 8,000 foot runways. An outlying landing field under construction in North Carolina will be shared with the two squadrons of F/A-18's at NAS Cherry Point, North Carolina, allowing for more efficient use of training resources. NAS Oceana's proximity to Norfolk Naval Station allows quick surface transport of men and material necessary to load aboard the aircraft carriers to which the airwings are assigned, supporting the Navy's ability to surge forces forward quickly under its Fleet Response Plan. The aircraft are then

launched from nearby NAS Oceana and can recover aboard the aircraft carrier as soon as it clears the Chesapeake Bay.

From a more distant base, this process would require airlift, and long flights for the airwing aircraft that would then need a divert base on which to land should the carrier be unable to land aircraft. Presently NAS Oceana serves the function of both home base and divert base, and is able to quickly turn aircraft around if any maintenance is required. During the period when a carrier is in ready-surge status prior to extended deployment, and during the sustainment period following deployment, carrier pilots are required to maintain carrier qualification through periodic day and night refresher landings. From a more distant base, such operations would entail movement of men and material for longer periods of time, with a detachment both onboard the carrier and at the divert base. These operations would also require more family separation for airwing flight and maintenance personnel, even during those times when the ship is not deployed.

NAS Oceana also provides a realistic climate and altitude to train pilots for the demanding landings aboard aircraft carriers. Controlling jet engine response is critical and this response varies greatly with elevation. Therefore, training should be accomplished as close to sea-level as possible. It would be counterproductive to do field-carrier-landing-practice at too high

an altitude (e.g. Cannon AFB is 4,330 above sea-level). Such training could actually result in dangerous habits for our pilots.

To summarize, the combination of close proximity to the fleet, access to superb training ranges, and an encroachment problem that is being managed, resulted in the Navy's decision to remain at NAS Oceana. I hope the BRAC Commission will objectively review the facts and will support the Department's decision.

The Fredericksburg region, though smaller than Hampton Roads, also serves as host to three important military reservations. Marine Corps Base Quantico, the Naval District of Washington, West Area with its 4 tenant activities including Naval Surface Warfare, Dahlgren, and Fort AP Hill which, though less than two hours from the Pentagon, has more training and maneuver area than the area within the Capitol Beltway. Each of these installations has the ability to accommodate significant additional military activities as the needs of the future warfighter require.

Down past the Shenandoah, in the southwestern part of Virginia, the proud people of Radford support the manufacturing of the munitions and explosives that our military forces require in this global war on terrorism. Finally, here in Northern Virginia you will find Fort Belvoir, Fort Myer,

Henderson Hall, Arlington Hall, the Pentagon and many other federal enclaves established to support military operations, headquarters activities, and the National Command Authority, as well as new requirements emerging for homeland defense and the protection of the National Capital Region.

In all, the Commonwealth has a long and storied tradition of answering the call of our nation to provide the unique resources, the finest men and women, and the spirit of our founding fathers to all endeavors up to and including this round of defense base realignment and closures.

I have long been a supporter of the BRAC process and have led, in the face of considerable opposition, the efforts of Congress to establish and to preserve this 2005 BRAC round. Having invested so much of my time and effort over the past several years to safeguarding this process, I have a vested interest in ensuring that this round is conducted fairly and with complete objectivity and integrity. This is why I feel compelled to appear before you today to raise important issues that, in my mind, demonstrate that certain recommendations by the Secretary of Defense have not been made in accordance with BRAC law. My concerns cut to the heart of the BRAC process and I trust the commission will take the time to explore them in further detail subsequent to our presentations this afternoon. Both the

commission and the representatives of affected communities must continue to work together to ensure that final decisions about base closure and realignment are made in accordance with the criteria and procedures established by law. We must preserve the integrity of the BRAC process so that the Department of Defense may, in the future if the need arises, return to this tried and tested process for making very difficult and challenging decisions.

It has been ten years since the last round of defense base closure and realignments. There is no doubt that the Department has excess capacity on its military installations and many of the Department's recommendations, in accordance with Congressional intent on the use of military value and other criteria, will effectively improve the efficiency of installation operations and infrastructure support. For the current round though, the Secretary of Defense, in his first policy memorandum on the 2005 BRAC process on November 15, 2002 directed the goal to "*produce BRAC recommendations that will advance transformation, combat effectiveness, and the efficient use of the taxpayer's money.*" Congress provided further direction to the Department of Defense by including in the 2005 Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act an amendment to the BRAC statute that directed the criteria to be used by the Secretary to make BRAC recommendations,

along with the clarification as written in section 2913(f) of title 10, United States Code that:

> "*the final selection criteria specified in this section shall be the only criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory referred to in section 2912, in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005.*"

On October 14, 2004, a second DOD policy memorandum entitled "BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles" stated that

> "*the Department has determined that the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation.*"

This policy was published over a year after the military departments and defense agencies established their own analytical foundation consisting of a military capacity assessment based on certified data and an objective military value scoring system based on a series of weighted factors. It is at this juncture in the BRAC process that I believe the BRAC process began to deviate substantially from the criteria established by Congress.

Based on an extensive review of supporting documents, along with the experience I have had in the drafting of legislation and participation in 5 successive rounds of BRAC, I must respectively call to the attention of the

Commission to a number of the Department's BRAC recommendations which–in my view—"deviate substantially" from the BRAC legislative requirements. The BRAC law simply does not provide the legal basis, or otherwise allow for the Department to take action or implement decisions that are not in accordance with BRAC criteria.

My research has found a number of documents that raise concerns regarding three substantial and persistent deviations from the BRAC law that the Department of Defense made during the BRAC process:

1. Certain recommendations were justified by factors and priorities other than the selection criteria in violation of section 2914 (f) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 as amended;
2. Certain recommendations were based on data that was not certified as required by Section 2903(c)(5)(A) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 as amended; and
3. Certain recommendations did not contain accurate assessments of the cost and savings to be incurred by the Department of Defense and other federal agencies as required by section 2913(c)(1) and section 2914(e) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 as amended.

To support my decision, I have attached 5 legal analyses that address these issues in greater detail.

The commission must determine if the Department simply disregarded the selection criteria—and used subjective military judgment in place of the criteria in law, to justify certain BRAC recommendations when the analysis process established to provide an objective review of data did not support the recommendation.

On October 14, 2004 Michael Wynne, the Acting Undersecretary of Defense responsible for managing the internal BRAC process in the Department, issued a memo to the Secretaries of the military departments and the chairmen of the Joint Cross-Service Groups which stated that the Department would use a specific set of principles when applying military judgment in their deliberative process. These principles include references to the Department's ability to recruit and train, to provide quality of life, to organize, to equip, and other elements that are important to the Armed Forces ability to execute its missions. Nowhere in these principles, nor the July 2, 2004 memorandum, which provides greater detail, from Secretary Wynne to the chairmen of the Joint Cross-Service Groups, will you find any mention of leased office space or any indication that it would serve national security to reduce military presence in the National Capitol Region (NCR).

Further, Secretary Wynne's published guidance on the interpretation of military value criteria does not have any discernable correlation between military value and the goal of reducing leased office space in the NCR or reducing DOD's presence in the NCR.

Use of Alternate Criteria

The law directs the Secretary of Defense to use 4 primary selection criteria related to military value in making recommendations. These criteria outlined in section 2913 of title 10, United States Code state:

> *"1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness to the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint war-fighting, training, and readiness.*
> *2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.*
> *3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.*
> *4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications."*

Section 2913 also provided other criteria to the Secretary of Defense as follows:

> *"1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.*
> *2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations*

3) The ability of infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving locations in existing and receiving locations to support the forces, missions and personnel; and
4) The environmental impact on communities"

With one exception, these criteria were identical to those proposed by the Department in December 2003 and adopted in February 2004. They were intended by Congress to serve as the framework for the Department's BRAC analysis. Yet, on September 8, 2004, Acting Undersecretary of Defense Wynne announced that a series of 77 transformation options would "*constitute a minimal analytical framework upon which the Military Departments and Joint Cross Service Groups will conduct their respective BRAC analyses.*" There is no record that these options were ever formally approved. The GAO noted in its July 1, 2005 report that "*while furthering transformation was one of the BRAC goals, there was no agreement between DOD and its components on what should be considered a transformational option.*" However, the record will show that these options were extensively used by the military departments and Joint Cross Service Groups.

Concerns about the use of the BRAC process to implement transformational options were raised by the Department's BRAC Red Team in the March 22, 2005 briefing notes: "s*ince transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis*

and should be removed.." However, as late as July 1, 2005, the Executive Director of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group informed my office that "*Transformation options guided TJCSG recommendations.*"

These transformation options or "imperatives" were clearly emphasized by senior officials of the Department of Defense in their communications to subordinates who were tasked with the day-to-day work associated with putting together the BRAC recommendations. Many of the decisions were based on two OSD imperatives as quoted in the internal minutes of the Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA) Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG): "*(1) significant reduction of leased space in the NCR; (2) reduce DOD presence in the NCR in terms of activities and employees"*

The goal to vacate leased office space was the guiding principle for many of these recommendations--not military value, cost savings or any other legislated criteria. This is not permitted by law.

On February 17, 2005, the H&SA activities JCSG, acknowledged DOD's guidance to vacate leased office space, particularly in the NCR. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:

> *"Was it DOD guidance to get out of leased space? Yes, but there is no supporting documentation -- there was the general sense that being in*

the NCR is not good -- most space in the NCR is leased, so the connection was made that vacating leased space is favorable."

This was even more clearly conveyed to the OSD member of the H&SA Joint Cross-Service Group by an OSD official involved in the BRAC process. The minutes of the January 5, 2005, meeting of the H&SA group state:

> *"The OSD Member met with Mr. DuBois and gave him an NCR update. Mr. DuBois stated the leadership expectations include four items: (1) significant reduction of leased space in the NCR; (2) reduce DOD presence in the NCR in terms of activties and employees; (3) MDA, DISA, and the NGA are especially strong candidates to move out of the NCR; and (4) HSA JCSG should propose bold candidate recommendations and let the ISG and IEC temper those recommendations if necessary."*

Note that the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Information Services Agency, and the National Geospatial Agency were specifically identified as likely candidates. I cannot recall in my 17 years of association with the BRAC process when installations within a specific region were targeted by the Department of Defense for specific scrutiny and recommendations for realignment or closure. Congress intended the legislative criteria and force structure requirements to be evenly applied to all military installations. OSD imperatives targeting a certain region should not be used to guide the BRAC recommendations. In fact, these imperatives

violate section 2903(c)(3)(A) of the BRAC law which requires all installations within the United States to be treated equally.

These "expectations" are further reinforced by the March 24, 2003, minutes of the H&SA Joint Cross-Service Group which state, *"Thinning of headquarters in the National Capitol Region (NCR) remains a DOD objective."* And the justification accompanying the recommendation to move the Missile Defense Agency to Huntsville stated: *"this recommendation meets several important Department of Defense objectives with regard to the future of leased space, rationalization of the Department's presence within 100 miles of the Pentagon, and enhanced security for DOD activities."*

In the minutes of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group of January 19, 2005, relating to the recommendation to move the extramural research elements (DARPA, ONR, AFOSR, ARO, DTRA) to Bethesda is the statement that *"the military value analysis is irrelevant as this scenario strives to get out of leased space per the OSD imperative and there is currently no military value for research at Anacostia..(emphasis added)"* This statement clearly demonstrates that military value was not applied to the decision to vacate leased space in the NCR. The OSD imperative on leased space was the driving factor in this decision, as opposed to military value, which by law, is the criteria that should have been applied .

This goal to move out of leased office space in Northern Virginia was further reinforced by a seemingly inequitable change to a metric used to assess DOD owned space. This metric was adopted by the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group in a memorandum on February 15, 2005. The metric associated with DOD's new antiterrorist standards allowed activities that are in DOD owned space to receive a score of 1, while activities located in leased locations where DOD represents 25% or more of the occupancy would receive a score of 0. The memorandum stated that:

> *"the implication of this metric change is that all leased space will now be largely scored poorly. The formalization of this methodology has a minimal impact on the military value results. The results of this change are consistent with the strategy used by HSA JCSG to pursue leased space".*

It is difficult for me to understand why an activity in DOD owned space would arbitrarily score higher for force protection than an activity in leased space simply because of title ownership However, DOD changed the metrics late in the process to treat these spaces differently. One can only conclude, as their own statements demonstrate, their goal was simply to get out of leased space per the OSD imperative. If force protection /antiterrorism measures had been consistently assessed, the effects of installation deficiencies most likely would have dramatically altered the military value of the Washington Navy Yard and the US Marine Corps Barracks at 8th & I in the District of Columbia, Los Angeles Air Force Base,

California, and leased facilities at Headquarters, Southern Command in Miami, Florida, to name a few.

The minutes from the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group of February 22, 2005 clearly state that DARPA and ONR had higher quantitative military values than the Anacostia Annex in the District of Columbia, or at the Naval Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, but the decision was made to move them to the lowest military value location of the three based on the justification to *"Vacate leased space in the National Capital Region."* The BRAC Red Team also stated in the March 22, 2005 briefing notes that *"since ONR and DARPA are in leased office space currently, there is no need to justify military value decisions as compared to Anacostia."* (The site originally slated to receive these functions). Once again leased office space is mentioned as the driver and military value is deemed irrelevant.

Military value was given priority in the legislation because this process was designed to improve capability and free up resources for other military activities. However, the arbitrary mandate to vacate leased office space in the NCR will have the effect of reducing military value. You may remember the statement by a representative from the Missile Defense Agency before the commission on May 27, 2005. That individual, and representatives of the other technical commands (DARPA, ONR, DISA, HRC, NGB, WHS, AF, and DTRA) stated their concerns

with the risk of losing people and detrimentally impacting the **mission**. In the case of the activities in these leased office spaces, whether it is DARPA, ONR, DISA, MDA or many of the others, the military value is provided by the people. As you have all heard, many of these people have no intention of moving and will simply seek other jobs. Some may not believe this to be the case, but you will soon here from one senior DOD science and technology official who believes he will lose many of his employees and his ability to serve the war-fighter will be severely diminished if his activities are moved from the area. He is taking a great personal risk by testifying today and I commend him for his sense of duty. Furthermore, DOD, in its savings analysis, acknowledges that it will lose people. You must consider that these people cannot be easily replaced. They have advanced degrees and as you know, it is difficult to hire people of that caliber and even harder to hire those who can get a clearance. Even if they can get a clearance, the current backlog is 328,913 people awaiting clearance. It will take years to work through this backlog. Rather than advance military value, the recommendation to move these activities from this area would dramatically hinder it.

The problems identified above are not isolated. I would like to draw your attention to the minutes of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group of November 18, 2004. According to one participant in that meeting:

"The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) has registered 29 closure/realignment scenarios on the Department's Scenario Tracking Tool. But 20 months after the TJCSG's first deliberations in March 2003, and with the Cost of Base Closure and Realignment (COBRA) data calls set to launch in a matter of days – not one scenario is the output of the Linear Optimization Model (LOM), not one is driven by data on excess capacity, and not one reflects data-derived military value. In short, not one is the result of quantitative analysis. All are instead the product of military judgment. Military judgment is a critical part of our process, but it is subjective by nature and strongly dependent on the mix of individuals within the TJCSG. The process was designed to be data driven for those very reasons, but it has drifted into one that will be, at best, data-validated, and at worst, data-rationalized. Without proactive measures, the scenarios will be difficult to defend before the BRAC Commission."

My observations are consistent with the testimony of witnesses and Congressional delegations around the country to date who have presented the Commission firm evidence supporting similar observations of questionable data and an internal collapse of the quantitative analytical foundation in lieu of other guidance provided by senior defense officials. These observations are also consistent with issues raised by the Government Accountability Office in its July 1, 2005 report to the Commission and to Congress .

The issue of force protection is important and can and should be addressed outside the BRAC process so that other options, all options, can be considered. Leased space should also be addressed outside of the BRAC process since it does not require a BRAC to move from leased space. The Department elected to work outside the BRAC process with the State of

Florida in finding a suitable replacement for the leased building in which US SOUTHCOM HQ currently resides. The Department can and should do the same with respect to the activities in leased space in the National Capitol Region. According to the law, all installations must be treated equally.

Inaccurate and Incomplete Data

In the case of leased office space in northern Virginia, the Department of Defense did not ensure—as required by law--that the recommendations submitted concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation were based on data certified by designated officials to be accurate and complete information. The H&SA JCSG initially relied on capacity data for administrative functions provided and certified by the military services and defense agencies. Upon review of the capacity data received by H&SA, the group realized that less than 20% of the leased locations (coded as administrative functions in the installation inventory provided in appendix B "inventory of Installations" of the force structure report required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base closure and Realignment Act of 1990), had certified data available, severely limiting the groups ability to perform an accurate and complete capacity assessment. Furthermore, the certified data received in response to specific questions pertaining to an assessment of leased locations and force protection was inconsistent or contained obvious errors. In an October 2004

memorandum to the Infrastructure Steering Group describing military value scoring changes, the H&SA JCSG concluded that "*based on an analysis of the effect of the missing, wrong, and incomplete data on the proposals, there were some data issues that could affect the generation and comparison of proposals by group members.*" The incompleteness of data pertaining to leased space finally resulted in the adoption of questionable assumptions in January 2005 pertaining to the cost of leased space, status of leases, and compliance with antiterrorism/force protection standards, which were then inconsistently applied to proposals under consideration at that time.

The Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) coined the phrase "derived data" in its draft report to refer to information that was established by means other than a data collection from the military department or defense agency and could not be certified. This derived data included critical information related to lease costs, costs to implement force protection measure, and space requirements for new construction. The DOD IG also counted over 150 data discrepancies in certain recommendations proposed by the H&SA JCSG that did not use certified data in the OSD database. Although these discrepancies were raised before the submission of the final report to the Commission, the H&SA JCSG made no attempt to correct their final military value report.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated in a July 1, 2005 report that:

> "*Using* ***mostly*** *certified data, the headquarters group examined capabilities of each function from questions developed to rank activities from most valued to least valued. Exceptions occurred where military responses were slow in arriving, contained obvious errors, or were incomplete, and in these cases, judgement-based data were used (emphasis added).*"

MOSTLY certified data is not in compliance with section 2903(3)(C)(5)(A), which states that:

> "*Each person referred to in subparagraph (B), when submitting information to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation, shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief.*"

How can a person certify "judgment-based, derived data"?

Inaccurate Costs and Savings Estimates

As identified by the Government Accountability Office, the H&SA JCSG assumed savings for reductions in military personnel as a result of recommendations to collocate leased space onto military installations that were not certified by the affected military department. For example, according to the transcripts from the June 15, 2005 hearing in Fairbanks, Alaska, DOD counted as savings the salaries of personnel who will remain in the military and perform the

same mission--just in a different location. This is not a net "savings." These personnel remain in the military.

Since 32% of BRAC savings come from personnel reductions, this calls into question the entire savings estimate–particularly since we are not reducing any meaningful force structure.

My staff also discovered peculiarities associated with the savings estimated for the movement of miscellaneous Air Force activities from leased space to Andrews Air Force Base. The report outlining the Secretary's recommendations states that there is a one year payback and a $30.8 million annual savings after implementation of the move. However, the minutes of the meeting on this subject that was held on January 13, 2005, state that there is a 100 + year payback and an annual savings of only $0.7 million thereafter. What happened to dramatically change the numbers? The Department packaged this recommendation with an unrelated recommendation to relocate miscellaneous National Guard Bureau functions in leased locations that did achieve savings. Would it not have been a wiser course of action, one that would save more money for the US military, to just move the National Guard function and leave the Air Force activities where they are? If saving money was the imperative that would have happened. Unfortunately, it appears that vacating leased office space was the imperative, therefore the numbers were made to fit.

In the five recommendations focused on leased space, the H&SA JCSG also derived substantial "savings" from a questionable assumption of the amount of square footage of new military construction required to compensate for vacating leased office space. For example, the recommendation to relocate miscellaneous Air Force and National Guard Bureau leased space to Andrews Air Force Base and Arlington Hall would result in the reduction of 532,000 leased gross square feet. Yet, the costs of new construction in the recommendation proposes to construct 358,485 of gross square feet. The capacity analysis for Arlington Hall reveals an existing deficit of 61,815 square feet, while Andrews AFB has a surplus of 42,019 square feet. Neither the COBRA footnotes nor the proposed reduction in military personnel and contractors can justify the reduced square footage required to support the recommendation.

Also, the H&SA JCSG did not use certified data to estimate the savings to be gained by vacating leased office space in northern Virginia. Although initial data calls attempted to gather the costs associated with leased space, this information was eventually abandoned and replaced with an arbitrary cost per square foot "expected" to be incurred in future leases. No attempts were made to determine the conditions of the leases to be affected, expiration dates, and current usage, in contrast with other military departments and JCSG's which incorporated actual lease costs and supporting costs into their analysis. In certain cases, savings were

taken as part of the BRAC recommendation for personnel previously scheduled to return to the Pentagon upon completion of renovations.

There is also evidence that individuals within the BRAC process were trying to make the numbers fit their desired scenarios. The minutes of the H&SA meeting on February 24, 2005, state that, as a result of the decision by the Chief of the Army Reserve to approve an increase from 7% to 20% personnel savings associated with moving the Army Reserve Command to Fort Detrick, "*members express concern that people are beginning to do some gaming with the numbers now and they intend to make the ISG (Infrastructure Steering Group) aware.*"

Another dramatic problem associated with assumed, not actual, savings is demonstrated in the movement of the Extramural Research Program Managers from their current location to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda. According to the data they used in their analysis, it will cost approximately $1.5 million to build a new parking structure. Upon further investigation with the Department of the Navy, we found that this number was an error and that it will actually cost $17.835 million for the parking structure. We also found that the rents that were cited in the Technical Joint Cross Service Group's (TJCSG) analysis of the leased space that the Extramural Research Program Managers currently occupy was dramatically different from what the Department is actually paying for rent. This was most notable in the case of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

which is listed as having $38.5 million in recurring savings associated with the relocation. However, this is based on data which includes a number of errors. DARPA itself has acknowledged to the Senate Armed Services Committee that their lease costs are only $8.9 million per year (the buildings landlords state that it is $6.2 million) and that the remaining $29.6 million is associated with such things as Information Technology requirements, mailing, supplies, equipment, and telephone service, The costs associated with these items would not be saved on a recurring basis. Furthermore, the TJCSG's analysis does not include the cost of the lease payments that the General Services Administration will continue to incur, or the $7.1 million contract termination cost to restore the facilities, even though section 2913 of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act requires that such costs be accounted for. Section 2913(e) states:

> *"the selection criteria relating to the cost savings or return on investment from the proposed closure or realignment of military installation shall take into account the effect of the proposed closure or realignment on the costs of any other activity of the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency that may be required to assume responsibility for activities at the military installations."*

In the case of leased office space, that means that lease payments for which GSA or any other entity will be responsible must be deducted from the calculation of "savings".

Furthermore, the recommendation associated with the movement of the Extramural Research Program managers significantly understates the cost of sustainment and recapitalization for the proposed building at Bethesda--despite DOD standards in these two areas. The inclusion of the true costs associated with these two areas would add several million dollars to the recurring cost of moving to Bethesda or any other installation.

The Government Accountability Office found a number of problems in the way that the Technical Joint Cross Service Group accounted for personnel and leased office space savings. For example, the GAO found that:

> *"the recommendation to co-locate the extramural research program managers also includes $2.7 million in annual recurring savings for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency vacating leased space; however, the agency is already scheduled to move to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in January 2006."*

Taken together, these corrections increase the one time costs to the Department from $153.5 million to $176.9 million, and reduce the net present value of the savings over 20 years from $572.7 million to $143.2 million—a $430 million difference.

Mistakes of this magnitude in these areas, and others we have heard of, call into question whether or not there will be any savings associated with BRAC recommendations on leased office space if the Commission were to approve them.

Options

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I understand the intent of the Department to reduce leased office space as part of the process to identify excess facilities on military installations. Vacating leased space is a smart move when you have identified excess capacity and underutilized facilities on military installations. The first goal should be to minimize leases and to maximize the effective use of all facilities on military bases. But leases have served and continue to serve a vital purpose for all federal agencies--that is, to position manpower and resources efficiently near established functions where and when capital investment may not be required. As in private industry, the government uses leased space for flexibility and reduced operations and maintenance costs. It makes no sense to take on the substantial cost of new construction and a perpetual operations and maintenance tail for functions that do not need, and actually may suffer from isolation on a military installation, detached from supporting private sector interests. Secure leased space serves as an enabler and should not be dismissed without a full assessment of the costs and benefits.

Other options exist outside of the BRAC process to address leased space, one of which the Governor will raise shortly. The commission will have to assess whether decisions to vacate leased space are best handled as a mandate through the BRAC process. In my opinion, the Department got it right when they decided that

the same lease and force protection issues at the Headquarters complex for the United States Southern Command in Miami Florida would best be handled outside the BRAC process. The Department got it right when they decided that the same lease and force protection issues at the Headquarters, Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia would best be handled outside the BRAC process. We should insist on consistency.

As to the issue of security, it is imperative that protect our most precious national resource, the men and women serving our nation. Prudently and consistently imposing force protection and anti-terrorism standards for all federal employees is the right thing to do. Whether it be at the Capitol, the Internal Revenue Service, the new Department of Transportation Complex, or the Army Human Resources center, all American citizens deserve the highest measure of protection in their workplace. I have been working with the Department of Defense for over two years now, well before the BRAC recommendations were announced, to push them for an investment plan on what resources would be needed to meet DOD's unique standards and goals for force protection and anti-terrorism. I am still not aware of any Department assessment on the true costs required to meet their force protection standards. The BRAC recommendations for force protection will not resolve DOD's challenge to secure all facilities not located on military installations. What the BRAC recommendations will do is to severely curtail the

innovation and cooperation currently underway between the private sector and the government to provide more secure leased space, while maintaining the current benefits of flexibility and reduced costs. Trying to solve force protection concerns in leased space in the BRAC round at the sacrifice of military value and at a prohibitively high cost was a mistake that needs to be corrected

The Commission should allow the Department to complete force protection assessments for leased office space in order to make decisions based on actual facts, a true assessment of costs, and prudent judgment, as opposed to derived data, and arbitrary assumptions of savings. The Department should continue to work with local communities, the private sector, and installation commanders to identify and provide appropriate alternatives to any existing locations that do not have adequate force protection, or are otherwise too expensive, upon expiration of existing leases.

Other Concerns

Mr Chairman, I would also like to take a few minutes to outline my concerns regarding the recommendation to close Fort Monroe and move significant activities from Fort Eustis. Everyone recognizes the historic nature of Fort Monroe and its unique physical characteristics, which provide excellent force protection. The decision to close Fort Monroe could not have been an easy one. It also may not have been wise. By excluding the extensive costs to cleanup the facility, and

ignoring the legal confusion surrounding the ownership of the property, the Department may well have put forward a recommendation which will cost the people of the United States far more than it will ever save. I ask you to look closely at the Department's rationale and the true costs to the Department, and explore other options, such as that put forward by Mayor Kearney, before you make any final decision.

I also believe that the recommendations surrounding Fort Eustis may not result in the best solution for the US military and the American taxpayers. The cost to move the Aviation Logistics School in particular will cost $492 million to implement and only save $77 million over the course of 20 years—if the estimates are correct. The Department should have examined this wonderful facility more closely in its decision to relocate the Missile Defense Agency and the Army Materiel Command. The proximity to the Pentagon and the collection of highly skilled researchers, engineers, and technicians resulting from the presence of NASA Langley and Jefferson Labs would make this an ideal location for these activities if more suitable locations cannot be found in Northern Virginia. I ask that the Commission speak with Mayor Frank regarding his efforts to partner with the Department of Defense to provide them with the facilities they require.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, given the quantity and the quality of the data that has been provided, I understand the challenge you have before you. In turn the Congress will take up these recommendations. My staff, like yours, has been working through the unprecedented volumes of data and documents. We will continue to send information to you and your staff that will be important to your deliberations. This is a challenging BRAC round. The recommendations are not simple and the supporting documents have a number of errors that must be assessed. Ultimately, in order to protect the integrity of the process, and in fairness to all those impacted by BRAC decisions, the commission should follow the norms of law. The Department of Defense must prove its case beyond a **beyond a reasonable doubt**. You have a responsibility to ensure that final BRAC recommendations are grounded in accurate information and guided by the criteria established in law, particularly military value. I commend you for your efforts and wish you luck.

Co-Locate Extramural Research Program Managers Incorrect Costs and Savings

DOD Recommendation: Close the Office of Naval Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Air Force Office of Scientific Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Army Research Office facilities, Durham, NC, and Arlington, VA; and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency facility, Arlington, VA. Relocate all functions to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating the Army Research Office to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. Realign the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Telegraph Road facility, Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Extramural Research Program Management function (except conventional armaments and chemical biological defense research) to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD.

Justification: This recommendation co-locates the managers of externally funded research in one campus. Currently, these program managers are at seven separate locations. The relocation allows technical synergy by bringing research managers from disparate locations together to one place. The end state will be co-location of the named organizations at a single location in a single facility, or a cluster of facilities. This "Co-Located Center of Excellence" will foster additional coordination among the extramural research activities of OSD and the Military Departments. Further it will enhance the Force Protection posture of the organizations by relocating them from leased space onto a traditional military installation.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $153.5M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $107.1M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $49.4M with a payback expected in 2 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $572.7M.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 193 jobs (122 direct jobs and 71 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Durham, NC, Metropolitan 30 Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: An Air Conformity determination may be required at National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. This recommendation has no impact on cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This

recommendation will require spending approximately $0.5M for environmental compliance activities. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Substantial Deviation: Incorrect Costs and Savings

Another dramatic problem associated with this recommendation is the assumed savings in moving the Extramural Research Program Managers from their current location to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda. According to the data they used in their analysis it will cost approximately $1.5 million to build a new parking structure. Upon further investigation with the Department of Defense, we found that this number was an error and that it will actually cost $17.835 million.

We also found the rents that were cited in their analysis of the leased space that the Extramural Research Program Managers currently occupy were dramatically different than what the Department is actually paying. This was most notable in the case of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency which is listed as having $38.5 million in recurring savings associated with the relocation. However, this is based on data that was not certified, as required by law, and includes a number of errors. DARPA itself has acknowledged to the Senate Armed Services Committee that their lease costs are only $8.9 million per year (the buildings landlords state that it is $6.2 million) and that the remaining $29.6 million which is associated with such things as Information Technology requirements, mailing, supplies, equipment, and telephone service, would not be saved on a recurring basis.

Furthermore, the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group either intentionally or unintentionally understated the annual maintenance costs of the new building it proposed for Bethesda. DOD standards require a recapitalization rate of 67 years in order to prevent a building from deteriorating and becoming inadequate. According to the $1,026,902 allocated in the COBRA report for this recommendation, this building would have a 114 year recapitalization rate. If the group had used the appropriate rate of 67 years, their costs would have increased by $720,364 each year—which is what DOD will have to pay.

The Technical Joint Cross-Service Group also used the insufficient sustainment funding. According to the DOD Facilities Cost Factor Handbook, the sustainment cost factor is $3.47 per square feet. However, the COBRA report indicates that they used $1.80 to estimate sustainment costs. This means that they have underestimated the annual sustainment costs by $819,705.

The Government Accountability Office found a number of problems in the way that the Technical Joint Cross Service Group accounted for personnel and leased office space savings. For example, the GAO found that *"the recommendation to co-locate the extramural research program managers also includes $2.7 million in annual recurring savings for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency*

vacating leased space; however, the agency is already scheduled to move to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in January 2006."

Furthermore, their analysis does not include the lease payments that the General Services Administration will continue to incur after the Defense entities move out in 2008. The United States Government will continue to pay approximately $10.5 million per year until 2012 for this building, or $42.0 million. The Department also failed to account for the $7.1 million contract termination cost to restore the DARPA facilities. Section 2913 of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act requires them to account for such costs. That law states "the selection criteria relating to the cost savings or return on investment from the proposed closure or realignment of military installation shall take into account the effect of the proposed closure or realignment on the costs of any other activity of the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency that may be required to assume responsibility for activities at the military installations." In the case of leased office space, that means lease payments and contract termination costs.

Taken together, these corrections increase the one time costs to the Department from $153.5 million to $176.9 million, and reduce the net present value of the savings over 20 years from $572.7 million to $143.2 million—a $430 million difference.

Failure to account for the costs for which another Federal Agency would be required to assume responsibility was a substantial deviation from the legislated BRAC criteria for making decisions. Failure to use accurate and certified data is a substantial deviation and has resulted in significant errors.

Co-Locate Extramural Research Program Managers
Military Value Not Priority

DOD Recommendation: Close the Office of Naval Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Air Force Office of Scientific Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Army Research Office facilities, Durham, NC, and Arlington, VA; and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency facility, Arlington, VA. Relocate all functions to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating the Army Research Office to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. Realign the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Telegraph Road facility, Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Extramural Research Program Management function (except conventional armaments and chemical biological defense research) to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD.

Justification: This recommendation co-locates the managers of externally funded research in one campus. Currently, these program managers are at seven separate locations. The relocation allows technical synergy by bringing research managers from disparate locations together to one place. The end state will be co-location of the named organizations at a single location in a single facility, or a cluster of facilities. This "Co-Located Center of Excellence" will foster additional coordination among the extramural research activities of OSD and the Military Departments. Further it will enhance the Force Protection posture of the organizations by relocating them from leased space onto a traditional military installation.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $153.5M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $107.1M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $49.4M with a payback expected in 2 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $572.7M.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 193 jobs (122 direct jobs and 71 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Durham, NC, Metropolitan 30 Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: An Air Conformity determination may be required at National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. This recommendation has no impact on cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This

recommendation will require spending approximately $0.5M for environmental compliance activities. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Substantial Deviation: Military Value Not Priority

The justification recommendation states that this will co-locate the managers of externally funded research in one campus. Currently, these program managers are at seven separate locations. It further states that the relocation allows technical synergy by bringing research managers from disparate locations together to one place. The end state will be co-location of the named organizations at a single location in a single facility, or a cluster of facilities. This "Co-Located Center of Excellence" will foster additional coordination among the extramural research activities of OSD and the Military Departments.

This justification completely ignores the fact that almost all of these activities are currently clustered in a two square block area of Arlington that is also near the National Science Foundation, university offices, and leading research and development companies. These agencies are by their very mission charged with intense interaction with non-DOD research institutions, and as stated in the briefing that Dr. Tether, Director of DARPA, provided to the Infrastructure Executive Council on April 25th, 2005, "mission success depends on an open environment where people with innovative ideas and who have not dealt with DOD can easily access DARPA." He further stated that "effective operations require a closely located and immediately available large cadre of high-quality, non-Government technical support staff experts and facilities."

Technical synergy is important but this recommendation removes this synergy by isolating defense research agencies from not only the National Science Foundation but an entire area that has been built over the past 50 years to be a high-tech concentration

The justification for this recommendation further states that it will enhance the Force Protection posture of the organizations by relocating them from leased space onto a traditional military installation. Force protection is important. That is the reason that the Office of Naval Research, elements of Army Scientific Research, Air Force Research, and others recently moved into a building that was specifically designed to provide force protection. However, force protection was not the reason for this recommendation, vacating leased office space was the reason. Among the minutes of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group of January 19, 2005, as it relates to the recommendation to move these activities to either Bethesda or Anacostia, is the statement that *"the military value analysis is irrelevant as this scenario strives to get out of leased space per the OSD imperative."* Furthermore, the minutes from the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group of February 22, 2005, clearly state that DARPA and ONR had higher quantitative military values than Anacostia, which has a higher military value than Bethesda, but the decision was made to move them to the lowest military value of the three. Among the justifications given: *"Vacate leased space in the*

National Capital Region." The existing locations had a higher military value, the highest priority according to the law, than both Anacostia and Bethesda but they still chose to move as a result of this OSD imperative.

In looking at this recommendation, and all of the recommendations from the Technical Joint Cross Service Group, it is important to note the deliberations of their meetings and the thoughts of some of their members. According to the minutes of their November 18, 2004, meeting, Don DeYoung, the Navy CIT alternate had this to say: *"The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) has registered 29 closure/realignment scenarios on the Department's Scenario Tracking Tool. But 20 months after the TJCSG's first deliberations in March 2003, and with the Cost of Base Closure and Realignment (COBRA) data calls set to launch in a matter of days – not one scenario is the output of the Linear Optimization Model (LOM), not one is driven by data on excess capacity, and not one reflects data-derived military value. In short, not one is the result of quantitative analysis. All are instead the product of military judgment. Military judgement is a critical part of our process, but it is subjective by nature and strongly dependent on the mix of individuals within the TJCSG. The process was designed to be data driven for those very reasons, but it has drifted into one that will be, at best, data-validated, and at worst, data-rationalized. Without proactive measures, the scenarios will be difficult to defend before the BRAC Commission."* Furthermore, according to the October 14, 2004 memo that Michael Wynne, the Acting Undersecretary of Defense responsible for managing the internal BRAC process in DOD, issued to the Secretaries of the military departments and the chairmen of the Joint Cross-Service Groups the Department would used a specific set of principles when applying military judgement in their deliberative process. These principles include references to the Department's ability to recruit and train, provide quality of life, organize, equip, and other elements that are important to the Armed Forces ability to execute its missions. Nowhere in these principles, or the July 2, 2004 memorandum from Secretary Wynne to the chairmen of the Joint Cross-Service Groups which spell them out in greater detail, will you find any mention of leased office space or any reference to force protection standards.

Some have argued that vacating leased space and co-locating in a single building is transformational but the Department's own BRAC Red Team noted its March 22, 2005 briefing notes: *"since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed.."*

Decisions were made and scenarios were developed, all without consideration of cost, excess capacity, or military value. Military judgment is cited but the Departments own documented guidance does not include vacating leased office space as a valid military judgement. Throughout the BRAC process the Pentagon leadership decided that they would vacate leased office space despite any quantitative analysis on cost, excess capacity (MilCon is required), or military value (it was considered "irrelevant"). This is demonstrated by the minutes of the January 5, 2005, meeting of the H&SA Cross Service Group which state: *"The OSD Member met with Mr. DuBois and gave him an NCR update. Mr. DuBois stated the leadership expectations include four items: (1) significant reduction of leased space in the NCR; (2) reduce DOD presence in the NCR in terms of activties and employees; (3) MDA, DISA, and the NGA are especially strong candidates to move out of the NCR; and (4) HSA JCSG should propose bold candidate recommendations and let the ISG*

and IEC temper those recommendations if necessary."

Giving OSD imperatives and expectations greater priority than military value is a substantial deviation from the BRAC criteria.

Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA)
Data Inaccurate and Incomplete

DOD Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency and Establish Joint C4ISR D&A Capability, Relocate Army Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies, Collocate Missile and Space Defense Agencies, Consolidate Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Headquarters, Collocate Miscellaneous Army Leased Locations, Relocate Miscellaneous Department of Navy Leased Locations, Collocate Defense/Military Department Adjudication Activities, Collocate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations and National Guard, Headquarters Leased Locations, etc...
Justification: Various including vacate leased office space and reduce DOD presence in the NCR.
Payback: Various
Economic Impact: Various
Community Infrastructure Assessment: Various
Environmental Impact: Various

Substantial Deviation: Inaccurate and Incomplete Data
The Department of Defense did not ensure that the recommendations submitted concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation were based on data certified by designated officials to be accurate and complete information. The H&SA JCSG was developed to analyze common headquarters, administration, and business-related functions across DOD. The group established the following objectives: improve jointness; eliminate redundancy, duplication, and excess capacity; enhance force protection; utilize best business practices; increase effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability; and reduce costs. The group initially relied on capacity data for administrative functions provided and certified by the military services and defense agencies. Upon review of the capacity data received by H&SA, the group realized that less than 20% of the leased locations coded as administrative functions in the installation inventory provided in appendix B "inventory of Installations" of the force structure report required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base closure and Realignment Act of 1990, had certified data available, severely limiting the groups ability to perform an accurate and complete capacity assessment. Furthermore, the certified data received in response to specific questions pertaining to an assessment of leased locations and force protection was inconsistent or contained obvious errors. In an October 2004 memorandum to the Infrastructure Steering Group describing military value scoring changes, the H&SA JCSG concluded that based on an analysis of the effect of the missing, wrong, and incomplete data on the proposals, there were some data issues that could affect the generation and comparison of proposals by group members. The H&SA raised this issue with OSD officials in a meeting on December 22-23, 2004 (minutes are not available per unsigned memo from H&SA JCSG received by the SASC on June 30, 2005) and the decision was made to remove certain data collected by the military departments from the final database. The incompleteness of data pertaining to leased space finally resulted in the adoption of arbitrary assumptions in January 2005 pertaining to the cost of leased space, status of leases, and compliance with antiterrorism/force protection standards, which were then inconsistently applied to proposals under consideration at that time (see package on SOUTHCOM lease).

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated in a July 1, 2005 report that "*Using mostly certified data, the headquarters group examined capabilities of each function from questions developed to rank activities from most valued to least valued. Exceptions occurred where military responses were slow in arriving, contained obvious errors, or were incomplete, and in these cases, judgement-based data were used.*" MOSTLY certified data is not in compliance with section 2903(3)(C)(5)(A), which states that "Each person referred to in subparagraph (B), when submitting information to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation, shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief." How can a person certify "judgement-based data"?

Failure to use accurate certified data is a substantial deviation from the law and has resulted in significant errors.

Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA)
Military Value Not Priority
NCR and Leased Properties Targeted

DOD Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency and Establish Joint C4ISR D&A Capability, Relocate Army Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies, Collocate Missile and Space Defense Agencies, Consolidate Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Headquarters, Collocate Miscellaneous Army Leased Locations, Relocate Miscellaneous Department of Navy Leased Locations, Collocate Defense/Military Department Adjudication Activities, Collocate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations and National Guard, Headquarters Leased Locations, etc...
Justification: Vacate leased office space and reduce DOD presence in the NCR.
Payback: Various
Economic Impact: Various
Community Infrastructure Assessment: Various
Environmental Impact: Various

Substantial Deviation: Military Value Not Priority
The Secretary of Defense did not comply with the BRAC stature to use the force structure, and the BRAC criteria established in law to develop recommendations. Instead, The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group (H&SA JCSG) relied on guidance not related to military value provided by representatives of the Secretary of Defense to focus on moving headquarters functions and vacating leased office space out of the National Capitol Region. The minutes of a February 17, 2005 meeting of the H&SA JCSG, record the acknowledgement that DOD's guidance to get out of leased office space, particularly in the NCR, could not be supported by the capacity assessment or military value analysis -- "*Was it DOD guidance to get out of leased space? Yes, but there is no supporting documentation--there was the general sense that being in the NCR is not good--most space in the NCR is leased, so the connection was made that vacating leased space is favorable.*" Rather than placing the guidance within the framework of a military value assessment to allow for adequate data collection, due consideration, and some sort of auditable scoring, it was conveyed to the members of the group by senior OSD officials outside the formal analysis process adopted by the H&SA JCSG. This guidance was clearly conveyed to the OSD member of the H&SA Joint Cross-Service Group by Ray Dubois in the minutes of the January 5, 2005, meeting of the H&SA group --"*The OSD Member met with Mr. DuBois and gave him an NCR update. Mr. DuBois stated the leadership expectations include four items: (1) significant reduction of leased space in the NCR; (2) reduce DOD presence in the NCR in terms of activities and employees; (3) MDA, DISA, and the NGA are especially strong candidates to move out of the NCR; and (4) HSA JCSG should propose bold candidate recommendations and let the ISG and IEC temper those recommendations if necessary.*" These "expectations are further reinforced by the March 24, 2003, minutes of the H&SA Joint Cross-Service Group which state "*Thinning of headquarters in the National Capitol Region (NCR) remains a DOD objective.*" According to the justification accompanying the recommendation to move the Missile Defense Agency to Huntsville stated: "*this recommendation meets several important Department of Defense objectives with regard to the future of leased space,*

rationalization of the Department's presence within 100 miles of the Pentagon, and enhanced security for DOD activities." Note the absence of any connection to a BRAC criteria or to the military value principles established on Oct 14, 2004 by the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group.

There is no substantive military value to locations outside the NCR as demonstrated by the continued presence of the Pentagon. For Major Headquarters activities, which require constant interaction with Pentagon leadership and the US Congress, the National Capitol Region should have a higher military value.

Since the headquarters activities identified by Mr. Dubois as *"especially strong candidates to move out of the NCR"* were in leased locations, and since the leadership wanted to vacate leased space in the NCR as a whole, the H&SA group developed a mechanism to score leased activities at a lower military value. Three weeks after the meeting in which the OSD representative to the H&SA JCSG conveyed Mr. Dubois expectations, a February 15, 2005 memorandum for the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group directed a change in the metric associated with measuring military value and meeting DOD's new antiterrorist standards. According to that memorandum activities that are in DOD owned space would receive a score of 1 while activities located in leased locations where DOD represents 25% or more of the occupancy would receive a score of 0. The memorandum goes on to state that *"the implication of this metric change is that all leased space will now be largely scored poorly. The formalization of this methodology has a minimal impact on the military value results. The results of this change are consistent with the strategy used by HSA JCSG to pursue leased space".*

Why would an activity in a DOD owned activity score higher for force protection than an activity that is in leased space simply because of who owns the title? How does the ownership of the facility affect standoff distances, blast resistant windows, or reinforced support beams–true measures of force protection? Is the new Office of Naval Research leased facility, built with force protection standards in mind, less secure than the Washington Navy Yard, 8th and I, or Los Angeles Air Force Base? The GAO stated in its report on July 1, 2005 that *"Initially, the group prepared military value data call questions that could determine whether a leased location met the force protection requirements. However, group officials stated that most of these questions were discarded because of inconsistencies in how the questions were answered."* Even with this admission, DOD changed the metrics late in the process to treat leased buildings different because, as their own statements demonstrate, their goal was to get out of leased space per the OSD imperative. Force protection was used as a justification and the military value metric was changed late in the process to achieve the desired end. The GAO stated in its July 1, 2005 report that "the (DOD) official also stated that application of the standards in BRAC was not the result of a threat or vulnerability assessment of the affected facilities.

This problem also existed in other Cross Service Groups as demonstrated by the minutes from the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group of February 22, 2005, which clearly state that DARPA and ONR had higher quantitative military values than Anacostia, which has a higher military value than Bethesda, but the decision was made to move them to the lowest military value of the

three. Among the justifications given: *"Vacate leased space in the National Capital Region."*

The minutes of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group of January 19, 2005, as it relates to the recommendation to move the extramural research elements (DARPA, ONR, etc.....) to Bethesda includes the statement that *"the military value analysis is irrelevant as this scenario strives to get out of leased space per the OSD imperative and there is currently no military value for research at Anacostia."* This statement clearly demonstrates that military value and the OSD leased space imperative are separate issues and that, despite the law, the leased space imperative was given greater priority than military value and was the driving factor in this decision.

The GAO found that the H&SA JCSG developed proposal without receiving all the data and therefore relied on transformational goals and military judgement rather than the legislated criteria.

As noted throughout the minutes of the H&SA, vacating leased space was treated differently and installations inside the NCR were treated differently simply because they were leased facilities and/or inside the NCR. Direction to do so was provided by senior Pentagon officials as "imperatives" and "expectations". The Missile Defense Agency and the Defense Information Services Agency were specifically identified as likely candidates. This is in direct contradiction to section 2903(c)(3)(A) of the BRAC law which requires all installations within the United States to be treated equally. Never before have installations within a specific region been targeted by the Department of Defense for closure.

Vacating leased office space was identified as one of the draft transformational options in a June 19, 2003, memorandum for the Undersecretary of Defense from the acting chair of the HSA JCSG and cited in many H&SA JCSG meetings as the rationale for numerous recommendation. However, as stated in the March 22, 2005 briefing notes of the BRAC Red Team *"since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed."*

The only selection criteria which were permitted to be used were those spelled out in section 2913 of title 10, United States Code. Section 2913(f) specifically states: *"(f) Relation to Other Materials—The final selection criteria specified in this section shall be the only criteria to be used, along with the force structure plan and infrastructure inventory referred to in section 2912, in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005."*

Giving priority to OSD imperatives and Transformational Options, rather than military value is a substantial deviation from section 2913. Treating leased facilities and installations within the NCR is a substantial deviation from section 2903(c)(3)(A) that requires all installations to be treated equally.

Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA)
Incorrect Costs and Savings

DOD Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency and Establish Joint C4ISR D&A Capability, Relocate Army Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies, Collocate Missile and Space Defense Agencies, Consolidate Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Headquarters, Collocate Miscellaneous Army Leased Locations, Relocate Miscellaneous Department of Navy Leased Locations, Collocate Defense/Military Department Adjudication Activities, Collocate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations and National Guard, Headquarters Leased Locations, etc…
Justification: Vacate leased office space and reduce DOD presence in the NCR.
Payback: Various
Economic Impact: Various
Community Infrastructure Assessment: Various
Environmental Impact: Various

Substantial Deviation: Incorrect Costs and Savings
In their report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office identified a number of concerns with the costs and savings that the H&SA JCSG used in estimating savings associated with BRAC recommendations. The GAO and the DOD Inspector General identified two particular areas of concern, one time savings associated with vacating leased office space and consistency in rounding to estimate personnel savings. According to the GAO, corrections made in this data would reduce the net present value savings would be reduced by $268 million as a whole, and for one recommendation, it would result in a net cost over the 20 years.

The Government Accountability Office also determined that 92 percent of the annual recurring savings would result from personnel reductions and the elimination of lease payments.
The GAO suggested that the Commission more carefully review these recommendations and the analysis that accompanied them since they are so dependent upon personnel savings and lease costs that have been called into question.

For example, contrary to the service a the certifying authority, the leadership of the H&SA group decided to impose a 7 percent personnel elimination based on expected economies of scale from co-locating the command with one of its major subordinate activities. Since the Army and not the group leadership will ultimately have to staff and operate the Army Materiel Command, their assessment is probably more accurate and the 7 percent personnel reduction should not have been imposed.

The GAO also questioned the assumed AT/FP costs associated with all leased buildings since these were not based on actual data that could have been collected. The H&SA JCSG applied a one-time arbitrary savings of over $28 per square foot of leased space as a future cost avoidance, ignoring the Department's criteria that force protection/antiterrorism measure would not need to be implemented for leased where DOD personnel occupy less than 25% of the total building. In some cases, such as the Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia, or the Navy human resource

service center at the Stennis Space Center, would be minimal at best since they are already located in secure facilities.

In the five recommendations focusing on leased space the H&SA JCSG also derived substantial savings from a questionable assumption of the amount of square footage of new military construction required to compensate for vacating leased office space. For example, the recommendation to relocate miscellaneous Air Force and National Guard Bureau leased space to Andrews Air Force Base and the Arlington Hall would result in the reduction of 532,000 leased gross square feet. Yet, the costs of new construction in the recommendation proposes to construct 358,485 of gross square feet. The capacity analysis for Arlington Hall reveals an existing deficit of 61,815 square feet, while Andrews AFB has a surplus of 42,019 square feet. Neither the COBRA footnotes nor the proposed reduction in military personnel and contractors can justify the reduced square footage required to support the recommendation

Also, the H&SA JCSG did not use certified data to estimate the savings to be gained by vacating leased office space. Although initial data calls attempted to gather the costs associated with leased space, this information was eventually abandoned and replaced with an arbitrary cost per square foot expected to be incurred in future leases. No attempts were made to determine the conditions of the leases to be affected, expiration dates, and current useage, in contrast with other military departments and JCSG's which incorporated actual lease costs and supporting costs into their analysis. In certain cases, savings were taken as part of the BRAC recommendation for personnel previously planned to return to the Pentagon upon completion of renovations.

Furthermore, contrary to the BRAC law, the H&SA also failed to include the costs associated with lease payments that the General Services Administration will be responsible for after DOD entities vacate the space.

According to the GAO, *"after the final recommendations were released to the BRAC Commission, the group found errors in some recommendations, affecting one-time estimated savings and other costs and savings, which were still in the process of being corrected"* at the time that GAO issued its report.

There is also a problem associated with the savings that are assumed by the movement of miscellaneous Air Force activities from leased space to Andrews Air Force Base. The report outlining the Secretary's recommendations state that there is a one year payback and a $30.8 million annual savings after implementation. However, the minutes of the meeting on this subject that was held January 13, 2005, state that there is a 100 + year payback and an annual savings of only $0.7 million. What happened to dramatically change the numbers. The Department packaged this recommendation with an unrelated National Guard recommendation that did achieve savings. Would it not have been a wiser course of action, one that would save more money for the American taxpayer, to just move the National Guard function and leave the Air Force activities where they are? This would have been the prudent course of action if the legislated criteria to achieve savings were used in making the decision. However, since it was the OSD "imperative" to vacate leased office that was driving the decision, the DOD officials

sought to manipulate the data by packaging them together in a way to achieve savings, but of a smaller scale.

Was this the result of "gaming" the numbers as is asserted in the minutes of the H&SA meeting on February 24, 2005 where, as a result of the decision by the Chief of the Army Reserve to approve an increase from 7% to 20% personnel savings associated with moving the Army Reserve Command to Fort Detrick, "*members express concern that people are beginning to do some gaming with the numbers now and they intend to make the ISG aware.*" Perhaps. Since 32% of BRAC savings are to be achieved through personnel reductions, and since it is difficult to demonstrate that the assumed savings from personnel will ever be achieved. The proposed savings must be called into question.

It must also be remembered that in the case where military value is associated with the people, any savings from the loss of people would also result in a lower military value. You may remember the comments that the representative from the Missile Defense Agency made at the briefing to Secretary Principi in the Commission offices. He and the other technical commands (DARPA, ONR, DISA, etc...) stated that they would lose people and risk mission. Military value was given the highest priority in law. In the case of the activities in these leased office spaces, whether it is DARPA, ONR, DISA, MDA or many of the others, the military value is provided by the people. As you and I have all heard, many of these people have no intention of moving and will simply seek other jobs. DOD itself acknowledges this in their savings analysis. However, these people cannot be easily replaced. They have advanced degrees and as you know, it is difficult to hire people of that caliber and even harder to hire those who can get a clearance. Even if they can get a clearance, the current backlog is 328,913 people awaiting clearance that will take years. Rather than advance military value, these savings would dramatically hinder it.

The failure to use accurate, certified data, and the failure to include costs that would be incurred by other federal agencies as a result of the recommendations was a substantial deviation and calls into question all of the assumed savings resulting from the H&SA groups recommendations to vacate leased space.

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Senator George Allen's Testimony
Before the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission
July 7, 2005

Chairman Principi and members of the Commission:

Thank you for your dedicated service on this important issue. It is a pleasure for me to appear before you today on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, its citizens and the thousands of uniformed and civilian military personnel who reside and utilize the Commonwealth as their "base" from which to protect our nation.

As a State, being the substantial home of the Navy, Marines, Army, and Air Force, Virginia has historically operated as an integrated military installation, focusing its sovereign efforts on attending to the diverse, but interconnected, needs of the military – including the essential partnership between government and contractor personnel. Virginia's military contributions ranges from Northern Virginia down to Fredericksburg through Central Virginia to Tidewater Virginia and across to Southwest Virginia, hosting and supporting the key military functions of policy, research and development and procurement, joint military-industry operations, and implementation and training by all military services. Among these functions are the policy, procurement and research infrastructure in Northern Virginia; the tactical maneuver training in the Fredericksburg region at Quantico and Dahlgren; the production of propellants, ammunition and explosives at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant in Southwest Virginia; the military training facilities at Forts A.P. Hill and Lee and in Central Virginia; the diverse, joint military network in Tidewater Virginia, including such public-private collaborations as the shipbuilding operations at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard and the nearby Northrop Grumman shipyard in Newport News; and the national military policy-making functions at Forts Eustis and Monroe. By virtue of the close proximity of these interrelated military installations and functions, Virginia has proven to be the singular model of joint operations and business efficiency for the Department of Defense (DOD), the military services and their civilian contractors.

We are here today to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a number of the recommendations provided by the Secretary of Defense, especially for the leased office space in Northern Virginia and Fort Monroe in Hampton, deviate substantially from the legislative mandates in the BRAC statutes. I do not believe that full or accurate consideration was given to many of these closures and realignments to see if they were honestly a viable option. I am convinced that in many cases military value was ignored and then unsubstantiated arguments were concocted to justify an agenda which had little to do with the proper BRAC criteria.

I want to first speak to the Secretary's recommendation for the Tidewater Region of Virginia.

Chairman Principi, as I am sure you heard when you visited Fort Monroe on May 25 of this year, Monroe is one of the oldest military bases in the country and to that end, it is safe to say that the base with a fort and a moat is one of the most unique and secure in the nation. Its military value is proven throughout history and it remains a premier location for TRADOC. Because the Secretary's recommendation does not contain a cost estimate for environmental remediation, I am truly concerned that this criterion was quickly glanced over or even completely ignored. Early estimates for cleanup came back around $300 million. But I would like to note for the record that the 1995 BRAC Commission cited an analysis conducted by the 1993 BRAC Commission which reported:

> According to a study conducted by the Naval Explosive Ordnance Facility in 1980, the cost of cleaning up the base would be approximately $635 million. The Navy survey covered only one fourth of the installation, and the uninhabited portion at that. Factoring for inflation from 1980 to the present, it is clear that a comprehensive remediation for the entire facility would easily exceed one billion dollars.

Considering these costs, one can confidently assert that any potential saving from closing Fort Monroe will be so far into the future that they cannot be accurately determined. The bottom line is that the possible closure of Fort Monroe will lead to arguably one of the convoluted, complicated, costly, and controversial closings in our nation's history with reuse by the private sector being made impossible as you will hear from the Mayor of Hampton with his cogent presentation.

With respect to Fort Eustis, please look specifically at weak economic basis for the proposed move of the Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker, Alabama. The cost to move this component is estimated at $492 million while the 20 year savings is estimated at $77 million. This does not seem to be in the best interest of taxpayers as well as DOD's pocketbook.

With that in mind, I respectfully request that you carefully listen and give careful consideration to the innovative and clearly thought out proposals that Mayor Ross Kearney of Hampton and Mayor Joe Franks of Newport News will lay out before the Commission shortly. I support these proposals and believe they will clearly and logically demonstrate the unique value of Fort Monroe and Fort Eustis.

Finally, I received notice just this past Friday on further investigation of possibly realigning the Master Jet Base at Oceana to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. The justification or reasoning behind this inquiry stems from the encroachment problem associated with Oceana. That is not unusual as a number of other bases have the same experience, notably Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. I do know in Virginia Beach that every time a jet flies over – the remark is, "that is the sound of freedom." The point is Virginia Beach greatly appreciates and supports Oceana and is a longtime wonderful home for Navy families.

Now, with respect to Northern Virginia.

Mr. Chairman, as you are clearly aware, the military is very different today than it was ten years ago and that is why I want to focus on a few vital issues: (a) the changing nature of the military, (b) the essential teamwork between civilian and military, (c) and the fundamental importance of preserving the synergy of our country's foremost scientists and researchers. To achieve these goals, we must avoid any substantial disruption in the effectiveness of our essential efforts or loss of indispensable personnel. These highly skilled, well-educated men and women are most valuable assets in these varied high-tech military functions.

My experiences as Governor and now as a member of the Senate Technology, Innovation, and Competitiveness Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee allows me to understand how important technology and innovation are to our future—and how we should actually tear down detrimental barriers between military, academic, and civilian scientists. We need to enhance the synergy that can produce the kinds of cutting edge communications, technology, and software systems necessary to prevail.

It is for that reason that I am deeply concerned about the adverse consequences that will flow from the current Department of Defense recommendations for the military science and technology command agencies: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the Army Office of Research (AOR) in the Ballston area of Northern Virginia. Rather than strengthening national security, if adopted, they would lead to mission degradation and increased cost. DOD understands that the close location of the research agencies to other research organizations such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) contributed to their resounding success.

As you know, criterion 1 of the BRAC Selection Criteria is "current and future mission capabilities." It is, appropriately, the number one criteria by which the law asks you to evaluate options. It is also the paramount consideration for the Congress.

Military research agencies such as ONR received favorable military value scores from the Technical Joint Cross Services Group (JCSG) in part because of the unique atmosphere that Northern Virginia provides. The ability to collaborate with both military and non-military research facilities provides for innovation that contributes greatly to the military value of these facilities. Specifically, collaboration with the National Science Foundation, accessibility to the Pentagon, and the close physical location to various skilled and expert defense contractors are some of the many benefits of the current setting. For example, contractor experts make up approximately 75 percent of DARPA's "internal" staff and over 85 percent of DARPA's internal/external combined team.

As you can clearly see, Northern Virginia has an extraordinary synergy of universities, contractors, and civilian and military research agencies that represent a creative collaboration for productive ideas and knowledge that enables new capacities – in close proximity to the Pentagon. Your commission should not render asunder this convergence of national defense foresight that enhances the kind of military effectiveness we need for the future.

It makes no sense whatsoever to risk such disruption at such a vital time for the nation when any fair or balanced review of the data demonstrates our mutual obligation to ensure the continuity of this exceptional synergy.

As Arlington County will point out in their recommendation to the Commission, Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross Services Group (HSA JCSG) did not properly evaluate elements of the criteria required to ensure mission effectiveness of the extramural research agencies, which include the proximity to the contractor base and non-DOD research program managers; as well as the access to non-defense private sector researchers.

The research agencies are dependent upon ready access to the large pool of highly educated contractors who surround them in the Ballston area of Arlington, Virginia. In the case of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, nearly three-quarters of the agency's internal 828-person staff are contractors who work in DARPA's offices. Another 900 DARPA contractors are within walking distance of the DARPA offices. As you heard at your earlier hearing in Arlington in may, DARPA has very serious concerns about the willingness and ability of these contractors to move to either the National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) Bethesda or the Anacostia Annex sites, particularly given the requirement for most of them to add a Potomac River crossing on a few already highly congested bridges. For all the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ron Kurjanowicz, a Program Manager

with DARPA clearly stated that this was a very harmful proposal which would result in the loss of creative scientists, engineers and technologists.

In that May meeting, representatives from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), ONR and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) also stated that under the proposed recommendations they would lose people and risk mission. These are among the most highly trained and sought after technical experts in the nation. They are resources who can and will find alternative employment that will not require them to move from their home or to substantially increase their daily commutes. Even the Department of Defense recognized this fact in their savings analysis. For example, it was said that the Missile Defense Agency would only be able to move 20 to 30 percent of their personnel to Huntsville. Lieutenant General Harry D. Raduege, Jr., Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and Commander, Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), said that the proposed move had implications of a 50 percent loss of personnel; plus the difficulty reconstituting security cleared personnel who are so valuable in the private sector.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) is also within walking distance of the defense extramural research agencies. Since the operations of the NSF and the research agencies are so closely intertwined, the proposed recommendations from the Secretary of Defense will rupture the close working relationship between the two and render useless the mission of the extramural research agencies.

Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed a letter sent to your attention from Hans Binnendijk, Director for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University regarding their views on the impact of BRAC recommendations on the Defense Labs. This is also the sentiment of the Senior Scientists at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Center employs a number of former directors of each Service Defense Lab, which include: Dr. Timothy Coffey, Former Director of the Naval Research Laboratory; Dr. Elihu Zimet, Former Head of the Expeditionary Warfare Science and Technology Department at the Office of Naval Research; Dr. John Lyons, Former Director of the National Bureau of Standards and former Director of the Army Research Laboratory; and Dr. Richard Chait, Former Director of Army Research and Laboratory Management.

The Center is concerned about the co-location of DOD science and technology funding organizations at Bethesda. Director Binnendijk writes:

> The future will be characterized increasingly by the globalization of science and technology. While the United States will continue to be a major force in science and technology, its share of the world's program will decline. In

> such a world the DOD would be wise to move toward greater engagement and diversity regarding science and technology. The BRAC recommendations indicate some worrisome trends in this regard. For example, the co-location of DOD science and technology funding organizations at Bethesda and the removal of DOD contingents from other government locations could reduce diversity of DOD science and technology efforts and hamper the coordination of DOD science and technology with efforts funded by other government agencies. Such an outcome would not be in the best long-term interests of DOD.

Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree more with that analysis.

Moreover, Director Binnendijk raises the same exact concerns that are shared with the folks at MDA and DISA – that people are unwilling to move should these recommendations be enacted. Director Binnendijk states, "Though figures vary from location to location, data from the last BRAC round indicate that on average only about 25-30 percent of scientists and engineers assigned to relocate actually do so and many of those who do relocate subsequently leave the government. If this BRAC round results in a similar proportion of resignations, it would mean a very serious loss of technical talent." Mr. Chairman, these proposals have the potential of being disastrous to the Science and Technology (S&T) function of our nation's military.

I know that with Northern Virginia's hot high-tech economy these skilled men and women, most with security clearances, are in great demand and will not have to uproot their families or ruin their quality of life with longer commutes because they will land good paying jobs.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. Virginia is prepared to work with you and the Department of Defense so that we can provide the best military value for our nation's defense. When you closely scrutinize the data and hear from our local officials and their proposals; it will be self evident that the recommendations from the Secretary are not based on sound principle and that Virginia undoubtedly offers the best environment for our military to achieve top mission effectiveness and with the best bang for the buck for our taxpayers.

I'm fully aware that you are being asked to correct illogical and undesirable DOD proposals from Alaska to South Dakota to here in Virginia. But, I respectfully ask you all to exercise your own best judgment based upon the facts. If you do so, Virginia and most importantly all America's national defense will be stronger, more efficient and leaders in innovation. We're counting on you. Thank you for your vitally important service to our country.

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Oral Testimony To

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

By

The Honorable Mark R. Warner
Governor
Commonwealth of Virginia

July 7, 2005

Regional Hearing
Sheraton National Airport Hotel
Arlington, VA

National BRAC Commission
July 7, 2005
Sheraton National Airport Hotel
Arlington, VA

- Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, my name is Mark Warner and I am the [69th] Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Thank you for holding this hearing today. It is critical that the Commonwealth address the Department of Defense's recommendations on Base Realignment and Closure given the potential impact of those recommendations on our citizens. It is also critical because, as was true for my 68 predecessors as Governor of Virginia. Virginia has a central role to play in America's military force structure.

- Virginians are united in our recognition of the tremendous responsibility entrusted to each of you and to the Commission as a whole.

- Your work is important to the future of America's defense activities at a time when our military is actively engaged in war abroad and in

protecting our security at home. You are helping to shape the future of our national defense apparatus. Virginia thanks you for your service.

- We also appreciate the tremendous amount of data you must review and analyze within a very short amount of time.

- We have added to this challenge with the analytical and written material we have submitted for the record. I believe you will find our information and data accurate and critical to your deliberations. It more fully supports oral testimony today. This data represents facts -- not perceptions or emotions.

(Pause)

Let me briefly describe to you the agenda for our oral presentations today. In my remarks, I will provide an overview of BRAC issues that affect various parts of Virginia. Senator Warner will then address the BRAC process and specific issues associated with the legislation creating and implementing BRAC. Senator Allen will follow him and will speak to the unique benefits and synergies of Virginia to the military and its missions. Following Senator Allen, we will have a panel of speakers on issues of concern

to Hampton Roads, followed by a panel addressing issues of concern to Northern Virginia and finally the Fredericksburg region

- In our remarks today, we want to emphasize to you [4] key points:

  - First, Virginia remains committed to its centuries long tradition of supporting the needs of America's military. Because of the concentration of military bases in Virginia from all branches of service, we are uniquely positioned to provide common security, to support the transformation to joint military activities, and to be accessible both to the Pentagon and to other national capital region agencies. We have the Virgnia Military Advantage

  - Second, Virginia and its communities are well-equipped to handle the proposed expansions of Ft. Belvoir, Quantico, Ft. Lee and the Norfolk Naval Base and Shipyard.

  - Third, we believe that the recommendation to close Ft. Monroe and to shift missions and personnel from Ft. Eustis and Dahlgren are not supported by sound factual or strategic analysis.

- And fourth, the recommendation to move out of over 8 million square feet of leased space in Northern Virginia is unnecesary for the security of our military forces, inordinately expensive, inconsistent with the BRAC legislation and inconsistent with the treatment afforded leased space in other areas of the county. In particular, the DoD's recommendation to move 5 Extramural Research Commands from Arlington to Ft. Meade, Maryland is flawed because it failed to consider reasonable lower cost alternatives available in close proximity to the current locations for those agencies – close-by alternatives that provide a greater military advantage, maintain and enhance our existing research Center of Excellence and do so at a lower cost than the moves proposed by DoD.

- These points will also be elaborated upon by subsequent speakers.

The Virginia Military Advantage

- The Commonwealth of Virginia, our communities, our Congressional Delegation and our local elected officials consider the needs of the military in Virginia to be the highest of priorities.

- This has been true since the early days of our nation and remains true today. If there was ever any doubt about that, consider the origins of Ft. Monroe. In 1821, over 116 years ago, Virginia donated the land to the United States for the construction of Fort Monroe.

- Virginia continues today to provide unique location, strategic and quality of life advantages for America's military forces. Senator Allen will address these issues in more detail in his remarks. Suffice it to say, there is a distinct Virginia Military Advantage that is alive and well today.

Support for Base Expansions

- Let me turn now to my second point -- our ability to support the recommendations for base expansions in Virginia.
- Virginia and its communities are ready, willing and able to support the proposed expansions at

installations throughout Hampton Roads, Central Virginia and Northern Virginia.

- More than 220,000 defense related workers already live in Virginia. As a result, we know well what our military needs and wants in terms of community support, public infrastructure and quality of life.

- The state and our communities are prepared to work closely with the military to ensure the sites they choose for new facilities take maximum advantage of already planned transportation, residential and commercial development outside of the installations. This can substantially enhance the quality of the expansions and save money.

- Virginia's mature and effective mechanisms that exist to support collaborative public-public capital improvement projects between installations and adjacent communities. DOD's success in its private housing ventures can be translated into office and other non-housing building needs. This will be evident in the

presentations and proposals you will hear from our local officials today. The state and our local communities remain committed to work with the military to build modern facilities on installations.

- Simply put – Virginia is a state where this BRAC recommended growth – and future non-BRAC growth can be solidly planned for and accommodated. For instance:

  - We already actively solicit and consider the needs of all Virginia military installations in our Six Year transportation plan. I have recently directed the Commissioner of Transportation to ensure update of the Six Year plan to addresses new military needs as BRAC recommendations are finalized. This action will help address:

    - Widening and mass transit needs on Route 1 around Fort Belvoir;
    - Integration of planned improvements around the main gate at Quantico and the Marine Corps Heritage Museum;
    - Enhancements to Route 36 at Fort Lee;

- Needs associated with the I-564 inter-modal connector and Chambers Field interchange at Norfolk Naval Station;
- And improved bus service throughout Hampton Roads to support the Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
- These are only a few examples of how we are already engaged in the process of planning for the transportation improvements that will be needed if and when the BRAC recommendations are implemented.

o I have also asked our Department of Education to work with those local school divisions that may be affected by the impact of the BRAC recommendations. Those school systems must be, and will be, ready for expected growth. Virginia's highly regarded public school system stands ready to serve the military families slated to move here as part of BRAC, just as it has served many previous generations of military families

- Military families that transfer to Virginia will be greeted with the highest quality of life. They

will quickly discover why more than 100,000 military retirees choose to stay in Virginia when their service is complete.

- Virginia was selected the Best Managed State in the Nation this year and we will apply those talents to assisting our local and military partners with achieving their mission for growth.

- Let me turn now to some specific observations about the expected significant growth at Norfolk Naval Station, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Fort Lee, Quantico Marine Corps Base and Fort Belvoir as well as lesser growth at some other installations including Naval Air Station Oceana.

- Norfolk Naval Station and Norfolk Naval Shipyard enjoy phenomenal access to well-trained workforces and superb military resources for Naval personnel and their dependents. In addition, these facilities have plenty of available space for expansion and surge capacity in the Port of Hampton Roads.

- The movement of submarines and other maintenance activities can be easily accommodated within the military facilities and

the Port. The infrastructure inside and outside the fences of these installations is more than adequate to absorb 6,000 plus new workers, the related ships and other equipment and expanded missions.

- There is total docking capacity of more than 97 cruiser equivalents at Norfolk Naval Station and with post Cold War fleet reductions this leaves ample space – more than 25 % available capacity.

- To give you an idea of the space available at the Naval Station, if the 16 home ported subs at New London Connecticut were not sent to Kings Bay as recommended, Norfolk could easily accept all of them…space is not an issue. I note, however, that we are not recommending this action.

- Moreover, the Norfolk Naval Station and the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, as well as the other many defense facilities throughout Hampton Roads, are in a particularly secure environment. The Commonwealth and the localities throughout the Hampton Roads region have developed aggressive and innovative homeland security and emergency preparedness initiatives.

Those civilian initiatives are fully integrated with military force protection and with other military readiness activities across the Port and throughout the region.

- The DOD BRAC recommendations to move activities to Hampton Roads make great sense for security reasons: it is easier to protect forces when they are consolidated in a distinct geographic area. It makes better sense to invest in higher security in a single geographic area rather than in multiple sites across the nation.

- If the initial BRAC recommendations are carried out, Fort Lee, Quantico and Fort Belvoir will significantly increase their size and mission. We have no concerns about the availability of housing and related infrastructure to support these new personnel and missions. . In fact, through close coordination between local and military land use planners, the jurisdictions that house those bases will provide military cost savings far beyond that already calculated by the military.

- In the immediate aftermath of DOD release of its recommendations some local officials expressed concern about DOD movement plans simply because of the absence of publicly available information. As more data becomes available, our communities grow more excited about their ability to assist the military with the proposed expansions. We are confident that implementing these changes, such as relocation of the National Geospatial Agency to Fort Belvoir, will produce the outcomes beyond those expected by the Department of Defense.

- Virginia is ready to deliver. We recognize that the expansion of bases in Virginia is is important to the security of America and to the safety and prosperity of our state and its communities.

- As Virginia and its communities have for so many years in the past, we will work side by side with our military partners to make sure that the growth recommended for Virginia bases is smoothly and effectively accommodated.

Base Closures

- Let me turn my attention now to proposed closures and reductions. Guiding our comments is a detailed review of as much supporting data as we could secure from the Department of Defense. We have also engaged in on-going conversations with community officials and members of Congress. You will hear their comments in detail shortly.

- Our analysis shows that implementing the recommended closures and other reductions across Virginia will not produce real cost-savings, will degrade efficiency and military value of affected activities and most notably -- are based on incomplete or inaccurate information. The following examples simply highlight our findings that are contained in more detail in our written submittal.

- The recommended closure of Fort Monroe is not based on an accurate analysis of data. The recommendation fails to recognize Fort Monroe's security attributes, modern infrastructure and ability to receive new missions. . Its location provides the military value that can be achieved by geographically co-locating similar military command activities with

rapid access to other like defense activities and national command activities in Washington D.C.

- We believe that DoD has grossly under-estimated the environmental clean-up costs for Fort Monroe. In that environmental data– among others -- you will discover the facts do not support DoD's recommendation. Actual environmental remediation numbers may be more than four times what DOD used in their BRAC calculations…or potentially nearly 200 million dollars according to military estimates. We encourage a close re-examination of this closure recommendation.

- Recommendations concerning some activities at Fort Eustis are based on incomplete or flawed data. For example, those recommendations fail to take into account the cost-savings that would be available to the Army under a proposal made by the City of Newport News last year to construct at the City's expense a new facility to house the Surface Deployment and Systems Command. This causes the DOD cost savings analysis to be inaccurate.

- Dahlgren offers phenomenal advantages given its size, location and wide-ranging capacity. Keeping the Navy large gun weapon and ammo testing at Dahlgren instead of the Army's facility in Picatinny, New Jersey is critical given the significant differences and needs between the Army and Navy in how they test and evaluate large guns and ammunition.

- Also keeping the Chemical and Biological activities at Dahlgren as an adjunct to Aberdeen is prudent because of just completed capital improvements and existing synergies with other like activities on the Dahlgren installation.

- Dahlgren has additional capacity for research activities that should be utilized given its proximity to the National Capital Region.

- I know that this Commission has asked some specific questions related to Oceana. I would like to briefly address this facility.

- Oceana Naval Air Station is a first class Master Jet Base. There has been much misinformation and many urban myths about Oceana. I urge this Commission to deal with facts. not the myths.

For example, in our written material I think you will find compelling data that refutes perceptions of encroachment.

- Oceana and its surrounding area continue to co-exist well. More than 3,600 acres of restricted easements outside the fence of the main base and another 8,700 acres of restricted easements near the Fentress Auxiliary landing Field, provide needed buffer for operations.

- The City of Virginia Beach has committed more than 200 million dollars during the past decade to improve transportation around the base. And on-going regional land use studies and planning efforts underscore the region's support of the Oceana mission.

- In a scientifically conducted survey last year, more than 86% of Virginia Beach residents surveyed said they oppose closing Oceana and 90% of those surveyed believe the facility is good for Virginia Beach. The opponents may be loud but, more importantly, they are few in number.

- Maintaining the air wings in close proximity to the air-craft carriers where they are assigned and other existing military support activities – command activities, personnel and medical support facilities - ensures the highest levels of readiness for personnel and equipment. This makes possible extremely rapid deployments.

- The Commonwealth has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to assisting the Navy with fulfilling its need for an Outlying Landing Field for Oceana. We fully support the North Carolina site in Washington County NC. If that site does not proceed, and we hope it will, we will be responsible in helping the Navy explore alternatives already suggested by Virginia.

- The Virginia installations slated for closure or realignment possess multiple missions and unique capabilities that cannot be easily replicated and certainly not for the same cost as when developed over the past 20 years. Close scrutiny by your Commission is needed.

Northern Virginia Leased Space

- Among the most troublesome of DoD's BRAC recommendations, are those that call for DoD to move out of over [8 million] square feet of leased space in Northern Virginia. DoD recommendations on activities in leased space in Northern Virginia clearly deviate from the criteria established by law. Furthermore the recommendations affecting nearly 8.4 million square feet of office space are not supported by facts. There are serious flawed assumptions, erroneous data and questionable judgments that were used to create these. These actions will, in our opinion, severely degrade military effectiveness and strategic value. In particular Arlington County and the City of Alexandria, long-term partners with DOD, will be severely and unnecessarily damaged.

- The National Capital Region is one of the best-protected places on earth. As a nation, we will never be 100% risk free. Achieving appropriate levels of security for DOD and every American requires a reasonable approach and one that reassures our citizens. The state and our communities have long worked with DOD on security issues can offer the right level of security in a manner consistent with national goals. Moving every military mission or

operation behind the fence lines of installations is not the answer. The opportunities presented by Arlington and Alexandria send the right message to the American public while addressing security concerns.

- My colleagues – Senator Warner and Senator Allen will discuss these as a precursor to follow-up comments from me specific to leased space in Arlington County and the City of Alexandria.

- Senator Warner Speaks

- Senator Allen Speaks

- Senator Allen Transitions Back To You

- Both Senators have provided additional views of our concerns about leased space. Like the Senators I would like to highlight for the Commission the issue of the extramural scientific research agencies and other functions in leased space that illustrates these issues in very practical dollar terms.

- First in Alexandria. The buildings previously occupied by the Army Material Command have

been purchased by a developer who plans to renovate the property and turn them into a 1 million square foot facility that meets all 22 of the DOD security standards. This site could accommodate about 90% of the DOD activities from the City of Alexandria slated for movement elsewhere. This option was not considered because it was either not known or for some other reason.

- This example underscores what has been stated earlier. The DOD security focus after the September 11th events coincided with internal guidance by DOD on the BRAC process. The end result is that military officials have been reluctant to work with private sector and local officials to fully explore lease and security options for fear that they would be perceived to be in violation of BRAC confidentiality guidance.

- The case in Arlington County relative to the Extramural Research Programs applies to the following entities;

    - Defense Applied Research Projects Agency
    - Defense Threat Reduction Agency

- Office of Naval Research
- Army Research Office and
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research

- We are providing the Commission with documentation that supports options for retention of these activities in Arlington – two different options – but both actions that maximize military value because there will be no disruption of highly skilled workforces and loss of strategic alliances with similar activities located nearby. Firm options allow you to compare to see if the DOD recommendation is accurate. The options provide better strategic military value than the presented options because:

  - They both would cost less than recommended movement to Bethesda in the short and long term.
  - They both would comply with DOD force protection criteria.
  - They both represent actual buildable, quantified proposals and not theoretical options.

- Let me briefly summarize the two alternatives that are critical to assessing whether the DOD recommendation is based in accurate analysis.

- First movement of the noted functions nearby to a new site in the Ballston area of the County on property that now houses a METRO bus yard.

- The proposal provides a 458,000 square foot facility that meets all of the needed DOD security standards.

- Based on a recent COBRA analysis of the alternative there would be a net savings of $52 million over 2006-2011 period as compared with the DOD projections of moving to Bethesda. This could be either a lease or ownership option and could be funded with low interest funds through the Virginia Resources Authority that possesses a triple A financing rating. Cost savings assume local and state investment and this option represents a significant savings ($20 million) over the DOD Bethesda option irrespective of the local/state contributions.

- The second alternative is a secure Arlington Hall site less than 1.5 miles from the current location of these functions. This site currently houses both National Guard and State Department

activities and is on land that was given to the federal government by Arlington County.

- This site would provide for 485,000 square feet of campus style space without intrusion on existing activities, and in-fact could enhance the functions currently there. This alternative beats the Bethesda recommendation by $122 million in one time costs, $158 million over the 6 year implementation period and $25 million over 20 years. This would be a lease with eventual federal ownership option.

- In both of these proposals the tight existing relationships with the National Science Foundation, other federal civilian agencies and private sector supporting organizations are retained and uninterrupted.

- Also, there would likely be no loss of the existing specialized workforce that is a real possibility with the Bethesda option. Maintaining workforce and opportunities for synergy between like private sector, civilian and military functions are imperatives to retaining the strategic military value of these extramural research programs. These represent firm proposals that had DOD

taken the initiative to acquire early in the BRAC process could have ensured an accurately informed BRAC analysis, met security needs and accomplished their desires to save money while retaining strategic military value.

- You will hear additional discussions on leased space issues in the subsequent panel discussions. Rest assured that the communities in Northern Virginia and the Commonwealth of Virginia stand ready to deliver to meet DOD's needs.

- In closing let me reiterate Virginia's and our local community's commitment to working with you and members of your staff in the coming days and weeks to more fully outline our findings. These findings are critical to informing your analysis of the DOD recommendations and addressing what we firmly believe are in-accuracies.

- Thank you.

DCN: 4858

Congressman James P. Moran
Testimony before BRAC Commission
July 7, 2005

Chairman Principi, Members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. Congressman Davis and I appear before you jointly to raise issues regarding the accuracy and analytical sufficiency of the Department of Defense's BRAC recommendations.

We will address the issue of leased space in the context of cost and military value as well as elaborate on anti-terrorism / force protection issues and implications for a brain drain in critical military activities.

As you know, the proposed BRAC recommendations call for a total of 23,000 DOD employees to be moved out of leased office space in Northern Virginia and 18,000 employees to be moved to Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Localities such as Arlington, Alexandria, Falls Church, and Fairfax County are severely impacted by these relocations.

(00:00:30 elapsed)

The BRAC law contemplates a process that is neutral on its face and determines the outcome through the analysis of the inputs into that process. In the case of leased space, the process itself was biased against leased space.

On page 16 of Volume VII of the Final BRAC 2005 Report, it specifically states that eliminating leased space was part of the strategy.

In the description of the various recommendations such as "Collocate Miscellaneous OSC, Defense Agency, and Field Activity Leased Locations", the justification states:

> Implementation will reduce the Department's reliance on leased space which has **historically** higher overall costs than government-owned space and **generally** does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection Standards in UFC 04-010-01. [Emphasis added]

(00:01:00 elapsed)

This justification appears throughout the recommendations.

The BRAC process was not supposed to determine its outcomes on generalizations or assumptions of what things may have historically cost. There was no effort made to determine the actual costs of leased space.

In a report we are submitting to the Commission, we document a number of factual errors in the cost analysis, including errors in calculating the cost of new facilities and errors in cost of leases – basic data inputs that are essential to accurate analysis.

In fact, the GAO's recent report analyzing the DOD BRAC recommendations states, "While we believe [the Defense Department's] overall recommendations, if approved and implemented, would produce savings, there are clear limitations associated with the projected savings."

(00:01:30 elapsed)

DoD also failed to account accurately for military value in assessing leased space.

This is demonstrated in a review of the Military Value Analysis Results Report by the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross Service Group, which reveals the same built-in bias that determines the outcome before any analysis. On page I-2 it specifically states:

- Leased space is less desirable than government owned space on DoD installations, and is **devalued** in scoring plans. [emphasis added]

For example, leased space was automatically and arbitrarily assigned a score equal to the worst military installation for such metrics as "Percent of Bachelor's degree or higher" and "Distance to Major Airport" even though, in reality, no military installation could score higher than Arlington County on those two points.

(00:02:00 elapsed)

Leased space in Crystal City, literally minutes from Reagan National Airport, was assigned a rating as low as any base in the U.S., while its score should be at least comparable to nearby Ft. Myer and Henderson Hall.

We believe the Secretary of Defense's selection process set out to eliminate leased space in Northern Virginia, failed to collect and compare actual data, and as a result is neither accurate nor sufficient to meet the requirements of the law.

Now I turn to my colleague, Congressman Davis to further elaborate on DoD's failure to abide by Congressional mandates in the BRAC process.

DCN: 4858

Testimony of Jay Fisette
Chairman, Arlington County Board

Chairman Principi and other Members of the Commission, thank you for holding the Virginia hearing here in the Commonwealth. It is certainly our honor to host you in Arlington.

I also must begin by thanking all of the elected leaders from whom you have heard today. It is too rare that people from so many different political perspectives can come together in such unity – for which a special debt is owned to Sen. Warner.

Sen. Warner's commitment to the integrity of the BRAC process and his tone of statesmanship has mentored all of us through this review. The Senator's own conclusion about substantial deviation from the Congressionally-approved BRAC criteria is the foundation for all that we have done.

Earlier in the presentation, you were reminded that 23,000 jobs are impacted by recommendations on leased space in Northern Virginia.

Mr. Chairman, 20,000 of the jobs come from Arlington alone. Arlington is the single most impacted community from this round of BRAC. The ultimate impact is expected to be twice the number of direct DOD positions – an impact on 20 percent of our workforce when contractors and other support staff are taken into account.

By comparison, the largest closing of an actual military base impacts 8,500 direct positions.

The difference for Arlington is that the Department of Defense is not vacating a single-purpose military base; it is leaving commercial office space that is readily adaptable to alternative governmental and civilian use.

Make no mistake, a change of this magnitude will be felt by Arlington's thriving commercial market; it will delay new development; and it will have a detrimental ripple affect across the commercial office markets in the District of Columbia and across all of Northern Virginia.

The preceding notwithstanding, the first decision that we made when we began our BRAC review is that we would **not** challenge the results based on local economic impacts.

As home to the Pentagon, Ft. Myer, Henderson Hall, the Arlington Service Center, and Arlington Hall – as well as the numerous DOD activities in leased space – Arlington is deeply linked to the military and the national defense of this country. As much as we

may want to keep every DOD function we can in Arlington, we want to do so only when it is in the best interest of the nation.

Thus, the second decision we made was that we would only make BRAC challenges if we could demonstrate with objective analysis that any Arlington alternative would provide greater military value and cost savings to the nation than the DOD recommendations.

As we immersed ourselves into the DOD recommendations we were shocked and disillusioned to find that **military value was <u>not</u> the primary basis on which the Department of Defense itself had made its recommendations.**

Finding the explicit statement in DOD's proceedings that, quote, ***"military value was irrelevant,"*** removed a very small fig leaf to reveal that the recommendations truly had no clothes.

On May 20, 2005, the leadership of several of the military activities currently located in leased space presented their concerns to Chairman Principi. Among these were representatives of the Defense Advanced Research Program Administration (DARPA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR), both of which have a long history of successful administration in Arlington. In DOD's BRAC recommendation, they are proposed to relocate to the National Navel Medical Center (NNMC).

Mr. Chairman, the leadership of Arlington does not presume to know what is in the best interest of military value for the defense of the nation:

- If the leadership of these agencies had indicated a need to relocate from Arlington for purposes of national defense, we would not be here today making this testimony.
- If Sen. Warner had called and said, "Mr. Fisette, Arlington needs to do this for the nation," we would not be here.
- If Gen. Kern, had said, "Wait, this is important for military effectiveness," we would have simply moved on.

What we have confirmed, however, is that there is <u>no military reason</u> to make this move.

And, you will soon here directly from military experts themselves.

The primary motivation for the relocation of the extramural research activities (and a number of other activities) is the DOD, quote, "imperative" to get out of leased space, ostensibly for reasons of cost and anti-terrorism.

Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection

At every step in our review of the BRAC recommendations, people have encouraged us not to challenge DOD on anti-terrorism and force protection. It has been described as everything from the "third-rail" to "apple pie and motherhood."

As one of the two communities in the United States that was actually attacked on September 11th, Arlington is as concerned about terrorism as any place in the nation.

People forget that Arlington provides the fire and rescue services for the Pentagon and had the command responsibility for the response to the 9/11 attack. Arlington Police secured the streets leading into the Pentagon and deployed counter-snipers to nearby rooftops. Literally every agency of Arlington was re-directed to support the response to the Pentagon.

Terrorism is more than a theoretical notion in Arlington

As Chairman of the County Board in 2001, and as Chairman today, I am as concerned about force protection for the 20,000 DOD workers in leased space as anyone.

I am also equally concerned about the safety and protection of the other 180,000 workers in Arlington, the 200,000 people who live here, and the literally millions of people who visit this community annually.

We cannot simply lift Arlington and place it behind a fence line.
And, even if we could, it would be the ultimate win for terrorists.

For these reasons, we have worked tirelessly since 9/11 to further enhance our proven response capabilities.

We have focused considerable attention on urban design and anti-terrorism measures that can make buildings safer without sacrificing the amenities and activities that create the quality of life so key to urban environments. We are supportive of the graduated, performance-based, anti-terrorism building standards adopted by GSA and the ISC.

In the alternatives we have developed for the military research activities, we show conclusively that anti-terrorism standards – even to the highly prescriptive levels of DOD -- can be met by Arlington locations and at a lower cost than a move to the National Naval
Medical Center.

For how many other DOD activities in leased space might this be the case?

Preserving Military Value through Partnerships

The Arlington Alternatives, most importantly, preserve and enhance military value by retaining synergistic relationships – not only among the DOD researchers -- but also with the National Science Foundation and the vast array of contractor, consultants, and academics in their immediate proximity.

Working with the Commonwealth of Virginia, with the strong commitment of Gov. Warner, and with the private sector – we offer alternatives that meet anti-terrorism concerns in a manner that is better and cheaper.

Please note, we have developed alternatives only for the extramural research activities because their leadership made such a compelling case on the need to stay in Arlington. Thus, our alternatives address considerably less than 10 percent of the DOD workforce proposed to leave Arlington.

However, the Arlington Alternatives are **prototypes** of better solutions that can be found for DOD leased space needs in other locations if given an opportunity.

We ask to Commission to take no action in its recommendations that would preclude such opportunities.

This federal-state-local-private partnership is a truly "transformational" approach that can enhance military effectiveness for the future.

The Arlington Alternatives

The two alternatives that we have developed are fairly straightforward. We developed these two options from approximately a dozen ideas that emerged since May 15th. Other, even better ideas, may be possible if given an opportunity to bring all the parties together to problem-solve jointly. These two alternatives, however, show how quickly better solutions can be achieved when the process is opened to others.

The Ballston Site. The first Arlington Alternative is a public-private partnership in a re-development site in the heart of Ballston, located one-block from the existing site of ONR (and the Air Force and Army research offices co-located with the Navy). We were already deep into planning redevelopment of this site when the BRAC challenges emerged. Making the military research activities the tenants in one of the buildings enables us to achieve our urban objectives and fully achieve DOD's highly prescriptive anti-terrorism standards.

Bringing assets of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Arlington County to the table, we can provide this alternative at a lower cost than the DOD recommendation at NNMC. The most dramatic savings above NNMC are $122 million in upfront costs. Our

alternative also retains its cost advantage at the end of the BRAC implementation period and at the end of 20 years.

The Arlington Hall Site. The second Arlington Alternative is another public-private partnership that would put the research operations behind a federal fence line – but one that is only 1.5 miles away at Arlington Hall. This alternative preserves the military value and synergy of the existing location.

By using federally owned land, this is also the lowest cost alternative, substantially beating the NNMC recommendation at every time point.

Clearly the Department of State would need to be a partner in this alternative. Pursuit of this plan would require working collaboratively with the existing operations at the site to ensure that the needs and interests of all users are not compromised, but enhanced. We only seek to ensure that the BRAC process and the recommendations of this Commission do not preclude such discussions, which could be in everyone's best interest.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the Commission has received from us a comprehensive report on the "substantial deviation" that occurred in this process.

It includes the details on the alternatives we have been able to develop in this tight timeframe, including detailed cost estimates and COBRA runs; however, we are not asking the Commission to actually select one of these alternatives.

We are merely asking for the opportunity to work with DOD and other parties to explore which alternative or combination of alternatives can best meet the needs of DOD.

As currently written, the leased space recommendations by DOD, will, at best, result in sub-optimal solutions – at worst, they degrade military effectiveness and cost more. Working together, we can do better for the nation.

Mr. Chairman, to you and each Commission Member, we extend our thanks for listening to our presentation and for your service to the country.

DCN: 4858

DRAFT

Testimony by GEN Paul J. Kern, USA (ret.)

Before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission

July 7, 2005

I would like to thank the Commission for your dedication in reviewing the recent DOD recommendations on Base Realignment and Closure.

In general, I support BRAC as a necessary part of the process of making our Defense Establishment more effective for the 21st Century.

But I would like to testify here today on an issue about which I believe is essential to the national security of the United States, sustaining our Nation's science and technology (S&T) leadership in defense; leadership which I believe would be damaged by a recommendation in the current BRAC process.

I am here at the request of Arlington County as someone who has experience with bringing S&T to the service of defending our Nation. I am a member of The Cohen Group Team retained by Arlington, but am speaking based on more than 37 years of commissioned service in the US Army.

I retired this January after commanding the Army Materiel Command which was responsible for the Army's Research facilities and interfaces with the Department of Defense and other Services. Previously, I worked in the Pentagon as the Military Deputy in Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. I taught in the Weapons Systems Department at the United States Military Academy. I led troops in combat in Vietnam as a lieutenant and captain and as a colonel in Desert Storm when I commanded the Second Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division. I have been in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan meeting with our commanders and soldiers to assess the improvements in equipment we need as well as our overall support.

As Division Commander of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), I was responsible for training, developing, and evaluating the technologies which led to the digitized network for ground forces which is in use today.

In each job I directly interfaced with the Defense Director of Research and Engineering, the DARPA Directors, the Navy and Air Force Research Labs, as well as the Soldiers we supported.

I have also worked closely with many university researchers across the United States who funded grants from these organizations in DoD. This is an alliance the military needs, and this research to meet that need, which has been built over more than 60 years of study and practice.

I believe strongly, as a result of this experience, that close ties between the military and research are essential-and very difficult to achieve. It requires continuous work to improve communications between two dedicated groups who live in very different cultures. We have made great strides in achieving the synergy by the hard work of many DDRE's, DARPA Directors, and Research Lab Directors working closely with the combat veterans of all the services.

Tom Friedman's "The World is Flat" lays out the dangers of the loss of scientists, engineers, and mathematicians to the USA. The world produces talent outside US Universities which is quickly outnumbering our University graduates. We should work together to address this issue for economic and military security. We should not undermine it further by destroying the synergy we have achieved.

Technology by itself cannot solve military problems. It is the careful integration of technology with operational methods, training to achieve the desired results, and a clear understanding of the people and environment where the technology will be used which makes a difference.

I would like to strongly support Arlington's recommendation that you challenge the recommendation of the Department of Defense concerning the re-location of the extramural research programs—DARPA, ONR, AOR and AFOSR. These organizations manage and direct basic and applied research and development projects for DOD where risks are higher and payoffs for any military capabilities could be dramatic.

- The DoD recommendation would harm national security by significantly degrading the military value of these organizations and their ability to bring the immense strength of our Nation's civilian S&T intellect and expertise to the service of our warfighters.
- The DoD recommendation would erect significant barriers to regular, open and sustained interaction between the civilian S&T community and the defense extramural research programs.
- The DoD recommendation would break the delicate and essential synergy these defense organizations have developed over many years with their civilian counterparts at the National Science Foundation, located currently within walking distance in Arlington.

Arlington has developed two alternatives for consideration by the Commission and the Department of Defense that have greater military value, cost less, provide greater savings than the DoD recommendation for re-location and also fully comply with DoD anti-terrorism and force protection standards.

The singular importance of technology leadership to the success of the United States armed forces is impossible to overestimate nor is it a new issue.

The debacle of Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War, when our troops were outgunned and their rockets bounced off the attacking tanks, taught us again to never fall behind the technology curve.

We as a nation owe it to our men and women in uniform to ensure that they are not only the best trained and best equipped, but that they also have the technology edge over any adversary---better eyes with sensors, better ears with communications and longer, more accurate reach with weapons.

I am glad to say that our S&T leadership for defense has had strong, unwavering support from successive Secretaries of Defense.

Secretary Rumsfeld in his first Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001 explained the importance of S&T to defense very well.

> "A robust research and development effort is imperative to achieving the Department's transformation objectives. DoD must maintain a strong science and technology (S&T) program that supports evolving military needs and ensures technological superiority over potential adversaries. Meeting transformation objectives also will require new information systems. These must be married with technological advances in other key areas, including stealth platforms, unmanned vehicles, and smart submunitions. To provide the basic research for these capabilities, the QDR calls for a significant increase in funding for S&T programs to a level of three percent of DoD spending per year." QDR 2001, p. 41.

The Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force have all benefited by the phenomenal success of our science and technology community—stealth technology, fire and forget missiles, low cost training simulations, unmanned aircraft, the internet and numerous concepts adding to military value have resulted from our nation's civilian science and technology community.

We all know that many nations have achieved technical breakthroughs in defense capabilities, including the British with RADAR and the Germans with rockets in World War II. What is so important in the case of the United States is that we have achieved breakthrough after breakthrough for decades.

This is not pure luck, although luck always plays its part.

This is not only skill, although our researchers and industrialists are the best in the world.

This is the result of a sustained, institutionalized effort lead by a unique set of organizations—the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), The Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the Army Research Office (ARO), the so-called defense extramural research organizations.

Allow me to quote from the mission statements of each of these organizations to provide a sense of their unique and vital mission for our national security:

DARPA, "manages and directs selected basic and applied research and development projects for DoD, and pursues research and technology where risk and payoff are both very high and where success may provide dramatic advances for traditional military roles and missions."

ONR, "coordinates, executes, and promotes the science and technology programs of the United States Navy and Marine Corps through schools, universities, government laboratories, and nonprofit and for-profit organizations."

AFOSR's mission is to, "manage the discovery and initial development of the leading edge of research while identifying potential new concepts and opportunities that will serve the Air Force in the future. To accomplish this role, AFOSR focuses the basic research community (government, academia and industry), including numerous Nobel Laureates, on the vital task of supporting Air Force warfighter requirements. Basic research provides the essential foundation for technology development and systems acquisition."

AOR's mission is, "to seed scientific and far reaching technological discoveries that enhance Army capabilities. Basic research proposals from educational institutions, nonprofit organizations, and private industry are competitively selected and funded. ARO's research mission represents the most long-range Army view for changes in its technology."

The key points are clear:

- Their common mission is advanced defense capabilities
- Their common strategy is to leverage civilian science and technology breakthroughs
- Their common task is to work with leading civilian researchers in educational institutions, non-profit organizations, private industry and government laboratories.

And their common requirement is a location with an open environment where, from all over the nation, civilians with innovative ideas and who have not previously dealt with the Department of Defense can easily access their offices.

It is no accident that DARPA, ONR, AFOSR have co-located themselves within easy walking distance of the National Science Foundation in Northern Virginia, with the ARO having a liaison office there as well.

The NSF was founded in 1950 to leverage the nation's S&T resources for the civilian economy just as the military had leveraged those resources for the war effort in World War II. As such, the target clientele of both the NSF and the defense research organizations are the same leading edge civilian S&T researchers.

This co-location with NSF in Northern Virginia has enabled unique synergies of effort and expertise for these defense organizations. Together they have become this Nation's Center of Excellence. The DOD organizations benefit significantly from the strong "gravitational pull" that NSF exerts on the civilian research community in the United States, the same community that the DOD organizations is trying to recruit to support DOD missions.

Re-location of the DoD organizations away from NSF's orbit would decrease the ability of the DOD organizations to recruit researchers, lower the "foot traffic" of the civilian research community for the DoD organizations, and severely damage the synergy of effort that currently exists among these civilian and military organizations with a common purpose and clientele.

Again, Secretary Rumsfeld understands well the fundamental importance of DoD's access to and reliance on non-government civilian S&T research. In-house government research alone cannot maintain the nation's technology edge in defense. His QDR 2001 report is quite clear:

> "During the Cold War, U.S. government programs were a primary impetus for research into new technologies, particularly in areas such as computers and materials. Today and well into the foreseeable future, however, DoD will rely on the <u>private sector</u> to provide much of the leadership in developing new technologies. Thus, the Department has embarked on an effort (a) to turn to private enterprise for new ways to move ideas from the laboratory to the operating forces, (b) to tap the results of innovations developed in the private sector, and (c) to blend government and private research where appropriate. This "quiet revolution" will take advantage of science and technology and continue to provide U.S. forces with technological superiority." QDR 2001, p.41. (Underline added.)

These organizations rely on their ability to recruit S&T talent to the needs of the Defense Department. This is not always easy.

The military culture and community and the civil academic S&T culture and community are not, shall we say, natural overlaps. All—military and civilian alike--love our nation and want to give it their best, but the gaps between the two communities are often large.

And therefore, like recruitment centers for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, these research organizations need to be open, easily accessible and within the civilian community—while at the same time having ready, easy access to Defense leaders at the Pentagon.

The institutional model for the solution to this delicate task was first developed on the eve of America's entry into World War II and has been carefully nurtured and developed for over 60 years.

In 1940, as Europe was engaged in war, it became clear that US defense technology was lagging. In response, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Dr. Vannevar Bush, then President of the Carnegie Institution in Washington, as Chairman of the Defense Research Committee, a new organization tasked with bringing the insights and expertise of the nation's civilian science and technology community to the service of the War and Navy Departments.

He built a marriage between our nation's Universities, today represented by the National Science Foundation with its headquarters in Arlington, and our military represented by DARPA, ONR, AFOSR, AOR and the Pentagon.

Northern Virginia has been home to the War Department since WWII and now the Department of Defense. Arlington has grown from a rural suburb of DC to a thriving urban community. I have had the opportunity to observe and participate in this growth since the mid 1960's. I have watched the synergy develop around the civilian science community and the Department of Defense which began with the efforts of Vannevar Bush.

These organizations have been developed in an urban environment along a speedy and modern transportation network. This is key to access for multiple organizations worldwide inside and out of government.

The core Military Value of these organizations to the Nation and the Defense Department is clear. It is also clear that these organizations rely on two mission-essential conditions to deliver their Military Value:

- A location with an open environment where, from all over the nation, civilians with innovative ideas and who have not previously dealt with the Department of Defense can easily access their offices, and
- A synergy maintained through daily collaborative efforts with the National Science Foundation and each other.

Re-location of the DoD research organizations from Arlington to a military installation would remove them from their current open environment and significantly increase the barriers to access—both physical and cultural—for the civilian researchers that these organizations are supposed to recruit. As mentioned above, the Services don't put recruiting stations on military installations—they put them in open, easily accessible locations with lots of foot traffic. Similarly, these defense organizations rely on scheduled and unscheduled "drop-in" visits to achieve their missions.

It has been argued in the BRAC recommendations that re-location is necessary to enhance synergy among these organizations. In fact, these organizations have already

developed a high degree of synergy at their current locations, all within easy walking distance of each other. Moving these organizations, even again to the same locations, would result in inevitable disruptions in their joint projects.

Moreover, the DoD recommendation seems to have overlooked the essential synergy of effort that these defense organizations have at their current location with the National Science Foundation, also within an easy walk. NSF, as the leading civilian research counterpart to the DOD organizations, is an invaluable resource and source of regular collaboration opportunities for the DOD research community.

There are vulnerabilities, however, which have been felt in Arlington with the attack on the Pentagon on 9-11. We must work to reduce those vulnerabilities while building upon the Center of Excellence synergy represented by the NSF, DARPA, ONR, AFOSR, ARO and others. The people who work in and support these organizations are unique and a national treasure

The Commonwealth of Virginia and Arlington County have been working to find alternatives that preserve the synergy, which has taken 60+ years to develop and reduce the vulnerabilities. You have heard new ideas, not previously considered by DoD, presented by the community. In just two months, they have found new ways to achieve the goals of BRAC -- increase military value, reduce cost, while meeting DoD's anti-terrorism and force protection standards and not disrupting military functions. They should be given the opportunity to implement these alternatives and find other new ways to continue the transformation of DoD while improving security and military value.

As I mentioned earlier, The Internet, Stealth Technology, fire and forget missiles, low cost training simulations, unmanned aircraft, and numerous concepts adding to military value have grown from this incubator of science and defense. This is a unique place in our nation and we should study it carefully before we destroy its attributes. DoD developed alternatives over 2 years for this BRAC, building on almost 15 years of gathering data and developing options. Virginia has had two months to study 60 years of building a capability around urban leased space and has already found alternatives which warrant further development and implementation.

I have discussed this issue with former Secretaries of Defense, former Undersecretaries, former DDRE's, University Professors, and former senior military leaders. All concur that we should not rush into taking this capability apart. Military value is difficult to tie directly to Science, but it is unquestionable that we won the Cold War and continue to surpass our enemies through men and women of our Armed forces who have had the benefit of the best minds in our country. No one doubts the value of bringing the academic cultures and military cultures together to solve the toughest problems we must confront. We should strengthen this fragile marriage, not add stress to making it work. We should accept the imperative of improving physical security, but not at the expense of tearing apart the synergy that has been achieved, especially when it seems very possible to do both. This is the message I heard from previous leaders and one which I support wholeheartedly.

Military value will only be created by moving ahead faster and not by slowing and damaging that process as a result of re-locating the DOD research organizations as recommended by the DoD BRAC process. The Commission should direct that the criteria be applied to leased space on an equal basis as they have for military installations. Generalities should not destroy 60 years of effort in the service of national security.

Virginia has shown that DoD did not follow its own criteria with respect to leased space. Northern Virginia is unique in the development of leased space for DoD and in the nurturing of the National Science Foundation. Together they create a synergy that is unmatched in the world. We should develop the alternatives proposed and execute whichever one enhances the military value desired with full force protection and least cost.

DCN: 4858

Congressman Robert C. Scott
BRAC Commission Hearings
July 6, 2005
1:30 - 3:30

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Distinguished commissioners (will not know who is attending until we get there), Senator Warner, Gov. Warner, and other guests.
Now that the DOD has issued their recommendations for base closures, it is our responsibility to look at the data and ensure that all factors are taken into account. The first recommendation I will address is the proposal to relocate the Transportation School at Fort Eustis to Fort Lee, Virginia. On paper this appears to be a good move that will develop a campus atmosphere where similar studies can be grouped. However, in reality the moves are not logistically possible. The Transportation School at Fort Eustis is unique. Over 1/3 of the Center uses functions that are not located at Fort Lee. This includes a port facility and 23 miles of rail specifically engineered to support training. They cannot be moved to Fort Lee without extensive renovations and actually dredging a new port. When the Army Basing Study Group (TABS) was asked about the recommendation they answered that it was not their intent for the whole school to move. However, the recommendation was for the entire school and the "intent" to not move certain aspects was not documented in the report.

In addition the TABS Group did not consider rail training and the relationship of inter-modal training resources to other courses such as cargo specialists. The Transportation School cannot train without the 7th Transportation Group vessels which will not be moved to Fort Lee. Finally, Fort Lee does not offer the following training supplies which will have to be rebuilt: the Landship, the Rail infrastructure and assets, the inter-modal exercise capability which includes the JLOTS site, air mockups, watercraft, an exercise radio frequency/ automated information technology network, simulators, etc. With $33 million worth of tracks, a $31 million landship, and a port which would need to be recreated at Fort Lee at an unknown expense, it is not feasible to move the Transportation School.

The synergy between Fort Eustis and the additional training at Fort Story and the ability to walk off of a virtual ship and directly onto the real ship has not been assigned a value by DOD. It is my contention that the real world value far outweighs any savings that the DOD believes they will see in the future.

The second issue from Fort Eustis that I believe looks good on paper but in reality does not work is the relocation of the Aviation Logistics School to Ft. Rucker, Al. This move was made to consolidate the Aviation Logistics School with the Aviation Center and School at Fort Rucker. There is no jointness in locating both facilities at Fort Rucker.

The Aviation Center and School is responsible for training helicopter pilots while the Aviation Logistics School is responsible for training mechanics. This move brings with it many questions: what effect will training degradation during the move have on soldiers?

Does Rucker have the infrastructure, power requirements, and the necessary fiber optic backbone to handle the additional workstations?

Can the training devices actually be moved safely? Recently a training device was moved by the Aviation Logistics School. In the 18 months since it was moved it has still not worked. In order to train on the device each one has been bolted to the ground. Then parts are changed out for cheaper plastic pieces making it easier to train on and less expensive to replace if broken . During the move many of these plastic parts break. If it takes an average of 18 months to get each device working again what is the time frame and cost of moving an entire facility. The DOD estimates the cost of moving the facility to be $492 million with a recoupment time of 13 years. This cost does not include any breakage. If it takes 13 years to recoup the cost of moving the command under perfect conditions, what would the cost balloon to considering the Army has to drive each training helicopter to Alabama, breaking the plastic pieces along the way? Lastly, many of the instructors are civilians living in Hampton Roads. By moving to Fort Rucker the DOD loses the expertise of these men and women. No cost has been associated with the loss of knowledge and experience. What positive experience has anyone in the Army had with moving these training devices?

Who is working on the estimated cost to fix the broken helicopters? What value is placed on the experience of retired instructors and adjuncts teaching at the facility who will not move? These are questions which must be addressed by the Department of Defense in order to get a true picture of the total cost of relocating to Fort Rucker for no other reason then having an "Aviation Campus."

The last point regarding Ft. Eustis that I would like to touch on is the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). Mayor Joe Frank from the City of Newport News will be speaking on this topic in greater detail but I will point out that in 1995 the BRAC Commission recommended consolidating MTMC, now called SDDC, into one site.

Through careful studies the Army chose Ft. Eustis as the site. I now ask, what has changed? In addition to being the best location for synergy the City of Newport News has offered, prior to BRAC 2005, a plan to help finance any needed facilities SDDC will need. What is the logic behind changing the 1995 recommendation and the recommendation of further in-depth studies?

In the last minute I would like to add my support to Fort Monroe. Every round of base closures has included Fort Monroe. And every round the Commissions have found that the figures just do not add up to close this base.

Keep in mind the reversionary clause on the Fort states that the Federal Government must clean it to pristine condition before you close it, a cost that in every round of closures has proven too costly to make feasible. I will also point out that eight commands at Ft. Monroe have not been assigned to new homes. No true figure for cleanup, no home for

eight separate commands, no merging or cutting of services. What is the overall benefit of closing this historic base?

Throughout the BRAC process the Department of Defense has listed Joint Centers of Excellence as a main reason for closing or reorganizing bases. I will end today by saying the synergy among all three services that exist now in Hampton Roads has already created a Joint Center for Excellence.
Thank you

DCN: 4858

Congresswoman Thelma Drake
Opening Remarks
July 7, 2005

Let me begin by thanking the Commission for holding this very important hearing. I will only take a couple of minutes, deferring most of my time to the local officials who are the real experts on how the decisions made here will affect our communities.

Commissioners, I want to be very clear on one point. Although I am the only Member of Congress from Virginia with a military base slated for closure, I fully support the BRAC process as a cost-saving measure intended to save the American tax-payer money. However, as the commission may be aware, Fort Monroe has been targeted for closure in previous BRAC rounds, yet it was subsequently removed due to the costs and ramifications of the necessary environmental clean-up.

Throughout this process, I have voiced concerns regarding the Pentagon's failure to factor in clean-up costs to the cost-benefit analysis of this environmentally sensitive area. The commission needs to understand that once these costs are realized, the short-term savings to the American people will disappear.

I have also voiced concerns regarding four commands – namely the Army Audit Agency Field Office, the Joint Task Force—Civil Support, the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Naval Surface Warfare Center—Carderock Division that have not been reassigned. These four commands represent 259 jobs that as of today are unaccounted for. I strongly urge to Commission to review this issue and request this information from the Army.

Even with the closure of Fort Monroe, the Hampton Roads region stands to gain a net increase of jobs, primarily due to the expected growth of Naval Station Norfolk. I am very pleased that the

Defense Department understands the potential of Naval Station Norfolk to handle a larger segment of U.S. projection forces. I am concerned, however, with recent statements in the press likening this naval base to Pearl Harbor and misstating their ability to harbor additional naval surface ships or submarines.

It is important to remember that at one point when our naval force numbered close to 600 ships, there were over 20 submarines home ported at Naval Station Norfolk. Today there are nine. Clearly, these figures indicate there is no danger of Naval Station Norfolk becoming congested.

Again, I thank all of you for taking the time to hold this hearing and will now defer to my friend, Mayor Ross Kearney of Hampton Virginia.

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DRAFT

Comments to BRAC Commission

Hampton Mayor Ross A. Kearney, II

July 7, 2005

Hello, I'm Ross Kearney, mayor of Hampton, Virginia. With me today are

- One of my fellow Council members, Charles Sapp
- City Manager Jesse Wallace
- Assistant to the City Manager Brian Deprofio

We are pleased to have this opportunity to address you today and we would like to thank the BRAC Commission for giving us this opportunity.

Regarding the Base Realignment and Closure process, we know that the Department of Defense is making decisions in the best interests of national defense. And we respect the fact that the BRAC Commission has said that its principal role is to assure that the recommendations made by DoD are, in fact, aligned with the Base Realignment and Closure criteria that were established at the beginning of this important process.

In that context, as a taxpayer I feel obligated to point out some areas where the DoD recommendations in regards to Fort Monroe do not align

themselves with two important criteria: Military Readiness and Cost Considerations.

I won't even talk about the fact that Fort Monroe's history makes it one of the most significant and revered Army facilities in the Country – putting it on par with West Point in its significance.

Or the fact that the $90 million invested in Fort Monroe two years ago resulted in a completely renovated and upgraded facility.

Or the fact that Fort Monroe ranked #10 in the 2005-BRAC Report in Well-Being.

I also won't talk about the fact that the closure of Fort Monroe could have a negative 7% impact on the Hampton economy because, if the military cleans Fort Monroe it is viewed as one of the most attractive properties on the east coast and could be converted into an economic asset for the City. As I said earlier, I am most interested in dealing with the issues that are most important to the national defense of our country and the cost impacts on the U.S. taxpayers.

MILITARY VALUE

Fort Monroe is one of the most secure military installation in the country and is strategically located in the Center of the joint environment of Hampton roads -- in the middle of a hub of joint force commands (Air Combat Command, Fleet Forces Command, Joint Forces Command, NATO Allied Command, Marine Command, Reserve Command) – making it an ideal site for TRADOC, FORSCOM (the only service element of Joint Forces Command not located in Hampton Roads) and other Commands focussed on joint warfare. Fort Monroe must be viewed in the context of its relationship to Langley Air Force Base, Norfolk Naval Station and the other military installation in Hampton Roads.

Fort Monroe is also connected to the Norfolk HUB joint forces communications infrastructure making Fort Monroe one of the most wired military installations in the Country. Fort Monroe also has over 90 acres of developable property that could accommodate over 1 million square feet of additional office space. The City of Hampton has offered to assist the military in building out this space to house additional

operations at Fort Monroe for costs well below market rents around the country.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center presently operates a facility at Fort Monroe that the Navy identifies as a critical operation that supports the Atlantic Fleet by measuring signatures of minesweepers. Their location at Fort Monroe is ideal due to the Naval ships traveling the thimble shoals channel and due to the varying depth conditions along the banks of Fort Monroe. But now, with the proposed closure of the Fort, this ideal location would no longer be available to the Navy during the war on terrorism. The BRAC analysis did not provide a solution to the loss of this critical operation.

The Joint Task Force Civil Support has identified Fort Monroe as the ideal location for their operation due to its central location on the East Coast and close proximity to Langley Air Force Base and Norfolk Naval Station. The BRAC analysis also did not provide a solution for JTF-CS.

Further I can only question the wisdom of disrupting the operations presently located on Fort Monroe that plan for the future of the Army and work to recruit new army soldiers during the war on terrorism –

particularly at a time when Army recruiting efforts are lagging and as the Army is trying to expand.

COST CONSIDERATIONS

However, as Mayor and taxpayer I must concentrate the bulk of my remarks on the lessons learned from past BRACs. What past BRACs have taught us is that the issues present at Fort Monroe do not fit into the standard BRAC analyses. There are three key issues that complicate the situation at Fort Monroe:

1. Unexploded ordinance;
2. Historic protections; and
3. Deed reversion.

These three issues create a complex web of legal entanglements that have significant cost implications that could range upwards of a billion dollars to resolve.

There is a large amount of unexploded ordinance buried throughout Fort Monroe and much of it pre-dates the Civil War ~ and, as a Southerner, I must point out that it was put there by the Union Army. There are

documented finding of ordinance buried as far down as ten feet on Fort Monroe and under structures that are on the National Register of Historic Places ~ possibly including the Catholic Church on the Post. How do you clean buried ordinance under historically significant structures?

The entire Fort Monroe garrison is a National Landmark and local historians believe that Indian and contraband slave cemeteries are present on Fort Monroe. These complicated issues only add to the uncertainty about the cost of cleaning Fort Monroe. Any attempt to clean Fort Monroe will not only include experts in cleaning hazardous materials but also archeologists who will be present to insure that any historic artifacts are protected. No complete study of the costs to clean up the buried ordinance has ever been conducted. Over the course of time, because of the complications involved, estimates have ranged from the hundreds of millions of dollars to a billion dollars.

Further complicating Fort Monroe is the fact that much of the property at the Fort was deeded to the Federal Government by the Commonwealth of Virginia and included reverter clauses where the property would revert to the Commonwealth if it ever ceased to be used for national defense. However, there is disagreement about whether all

of the property reverts and who it reverts to, but that is a discussion that will be resolved after years of costly legal negotiations or litigation.

One of the real interesting issues about the reverter clause is that there are a series of long term leases on other properties ~ one to a company that plans to convert a historic Chamberlain hotel into a retirement home for retired military and another is with the Catholic Church. The Chamberlain hotel project is on property where there is a question whether it reverts and the 107 year old Saint Mary's Star of the Sea Catholic Church (like many other buildings) straddles properties that clearly revert and properties where there is a question about whether it reverts. Someone will need to remain in contact the Catholic Church as the lawyers debate that issue.

Further, it is clear that the Department of Defense is responsible for the enormous costs associated with environmental clean up but what about the cost of maintaining the historic structures? These facilities can not be left to decay and must, by law – and emphasized further by executive order of President Bush, be maintained. This is another costly issue for the lawyers to work out. I think the general rule of thumb on such issues is that if the Federal Government put it there it is their responsibility.

CONCLUSION

As I said earlier, Fort Monroe does not easily fit into the standard BRAC models. Perhaps this is the reason the numbers associated with Monroe in BRAC 2005 are so different than those in BRAC 1993. In 1993, it was estimated (after Congressman Herb Bateman questioned the original figures released by BRAC) it would cost $127 million to close Fort Monroe and relocate the operations to Fort Eustis and the move would not pay for itself for 17 years – of course, these figures, like the 2005 figures did not factor in clean up costs. Today, that $127 million would be $160 million which is more than twice the 2005 estimate of $72 million.

Another curious cost item for Fort Monroe is the per year savings. Fort Monroe estimates that it costs $30 million to run the Fort. BRAC estimates that it will save $54 million per year – where does the other $24 million come from?

Another issue that just defies logic is that the BRAC analysis proposes moving an operation from Fort Monroe that fits neatly on a 500 acre facility to a facility that is over 8,000 acres. No one has been able to

determine how BRAC concluded that this would be a cost effective proposal.

Finally, back in 1993, after the Gulf War, TRADOC Commander General Frederick M. Franks told the BRAC Commission that moving TRADOC – the Army's "architect to the future" – a mission best done in close proximity to its Navy and Air Force counterparts – away from Fort Monroe at a time of "unprecedented change and unpredictability," would be like moving a command post in the middle of the night during an attack against the enemy.

Further, in making his point to the BRAC Commission, he said this: "A 17-year return on investment at a cost to the U.S. government of $100 million, for a 20-mile move resulting in a complex tangle of costs and legal issues involving disposition of a unique National Historic Landmark – it would not seem worth the effort."

The BRAC Commission at that time agreed with General Franks and removed Fort Monroe from the closure list.

Today the situation is no different. The bottom line of Fort Monroe is that the closure is so complicated that the standard BRAC analyses are

insufficient to capture all of the costs and complications involved. Also, Fort Monroe offers its tenants a strategic location in the middle of the Hampton Roads region and some unparalleled military advantages for the operations located on the Fort.

Again, I thank you for your time today.

DCN: 4858

STATEMENT OF

MAYOR JOE S. FRANK
CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA

FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA

BRAC 2005 COMMISSION HEARING

Sheraton National Hotel
Commonwealth Ballroom
900 South Orme Street
Arlington, VA 22204

July 7, 2005

Presented by: The Honorable Joe S. Frank
Mayor, City of Newport News, Virginia

Chairman Principi, Members of the Commission, we are pleased to be able to provide you our comments here today. I am Joe Frank, the Mayor of Newport News, Virginia. We have looked forward to the opportunity to present enhancement alternatives to DoD's recommendations for realignments at Fort Eustis, Virginia. This statement is provided for the record and is in addition to my oral testimony presented to you on July 7, 2005. Should additional issues or facts develop, I would like with your permission to supplement our submittals.

First and foremost, we understand and support the necessity to reduce and align our military's infrastructure in support of our nation's operational forces. We understand the need to transform the military to meet today's changing global and homeland security requirements. We want to do everything to support jointness within the military, increase the military value of our bases and units around the nation and throughout the world, and reduce overhead costs. However, we believe that three of DoD's recommended realignment actions at Fort Eustis should be reversed in order to preserve military value and enhance efficiencies.

Within my allotted time, I would like to focus on our support for important pieces of the recommendation and also on those three realignment recommendations which we believe deviate from the BRAC criteria of providing increased military value and cost efficiencies. I will also describe to you alternative proposals that we feel would enhance our military readiness and meet the goals of the BRAC criteria.

First, let me take the opportunity to ensure your understanding of our support for the Department's decision to recommend the movement of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to Fort Eustis. TRADOC is slated to move from Fort Monroe after its closure. We fully and strongly support efforts to keep Fort Monroe open. I am confident that the Mayor of Hampton will make a strong and compelling case for doing so. However, should you determine to follow the Secretary of Defense's recommendation, and should it become necessary to close the installation, military value can be maintained by keeping TRADOC on the Peninsula as recommended by the Department of Defense. TRADOC will remain in close proximity to Joint Forces Command and other military commands in the region. Additionally, this move will not create a disruption in the TRADOC workforce and therefore, recruiting new skilled employees will not be an issue. Military construction costs are not excessive and the overall costs associated with this move will be recouped within one year.

The City feels that a move of TRADOC to Fort Eustis correctly accomplishes the military value and cost efficiency goals of the BRAC criteria, limits adverse impact to the workforce, and therefore we support the recommendation. The

recommendation to realign to Fort Eustis will not create a disruption in the TRADOC workforce and therefore, recruiting new skilled employees will not be an issue. Moving TRADOC to any location other than Fort Eustis would generate costs in three areas: personnel relocation, recruitment, and training and loss of intellectual capital. Personnel transfers average $50,000 to $75,000 for U.S. military personnel and $50,000 to $85,000 for civilian employees. Assuming a high retention, the cost of relocating TRADOC outside of the Fort Monroe commuting area could be over $100 million. Those costs could increase even more significantly if the percentage of retained positions decreased.

I should also state early on that in terms of TRADOC or any other mission brought to Fort Eustis, the City of Newport News stands prepared to do all that it can to make the transition as smooth as possible both for the military and for those who will be working at Fort Eustis. We can provide information on housing, the school system and any other information a new resident of the city would need to make the move easier. We expect that most TRADOC employees will not need to relocate because of Fort Eustis' close proximity to Fort Monroe, but it is important to let you know that we want to help eliminate any issues regarding any mission transition to Fort Eustis.

Our community has had recent experience in transitioning a large workforce to the region. As a result of BRAC 1995, the Army was directed to consolidate its Oakland, California and Bayonne, New Jersey elements of Military Traffic Management Command at an undetermined location to be picked by the Army. After significant study and analysis, Fort Eustis was selected over a number of locations. Our community and business leaders went to both Oakland and Bayonne and met with the transferring workforce in an effort to ease the transition. We know how to work with these individuals to ensure that these transitions are seamless and we know the information that incoming personnel are looking for to make their respective moves uneventful.

And finally, with regard to the TRADOC move to Fort Eustis or for that matter the movement of any organization into the region, the City of Newport News is prepared to enter into agreements with the Department of Defense to ensure that buildings are constructed to the military's specifications (Attachment 1). We have put together these build/lease agreements in the past and are very capable of providing the military state of the art construction. The military would simply carry our debt service on the building(s) and at the end of the payback period title to the facilities would be transferred to the Department.

In summary, the City of Newport News feels that if the Commission supports the closure of Fort Monroe, the decision to move TRADOC to Fort Eustis

correctly accomplishes the military value and cost efficiency goals of the BRAC criteria and limits adverse impact to the workforce.

The three realignments out of Fort Eustis, Virginia that I would like to call your attention to are:

1. The movement of the Surface Deployment Distribution Command, known as SDDC, to Scott Air Force, Base, Illinois.
2. The realignment of the Army Transportation Center and School to Fort Lee, Virginia.
3. The movement of the Aviation Logistics School, or USAALS, to Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)

First, the recommendation to relocate SDDC operations including the Transportation Engineering Activity or TEA is not only shocking but also illogical in terms of the goals of this BRAC round. SDDC, formerly known as the Military Transportation Management Command is responsible for DOD surface transportation and logistics. These facilities were consolidated at Fort Eustis as a result of BRAC 1995 at substantial expense and work force disruption. BRAC 1995 recommended the consolidation of SDDC operations from California and New Jersey and directed the Army to select a consolidated site. After careful consideration and an intense study, the Army selected Fort Eustis. The SDDC Operations Center, located at Fort Eustis, routinely coordinates the work of joint service activities whose commands are already concentrated within Hampton Roads, Virginia.

Recognizing the advantages of Fort Eustis' SDDC operations location, the highest levels of the Army had previously authorized consolidating SDDC headquarters from Northern Virginia to Fort Eustis. In fact, in 2004 Major General Ann E. Dunwoody the former Commander of SDDC and currently the Commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) at Fort Lee, both in official meetings and at public events stated that it was the intent of SDDC to consolidate its headquarters at Fort Eustis.[1] In fact, as part of the intended relocation of SDDC to Fort Eustis the City of Newport News agreed to construct, at their actual cost, the needed facilities to accommodate all elements of SDDC on Fort Eustis. The City of Newport News had offered to build and maintain a Headquarters Complex to Army specifications either on base or contiguous to Fort Eustis. For its part, the Army would pay to the City the actual debt service and upon completion of the payments the facilities would be transferred to the

[1] Major General Ann E. Dunwoody, Public Speech Given at Change of Command Ceremony

Army at no additional cost. However, we were informally lead to believe that the Army elected to wait for BRAC 2005 in lieu of proceeding on since the cost of this realignment could be absorbed within the BRAC account rather than in their annual appropriations accounts. Our original proposal to the Office of the Secretary of the Army is found at Attachment 2.

The package of recommendations related to SDDC should be carefully examined and overturned. Moving SDDC to Scott Air Force Base, Illinois can be accomplished but the inherently better choice in terms of military value, cost, military construction, and lack of disruption to the workforce is Fort Eustis.

The consolidation at Fort Eustis of SDDC Headquarters with the Operations Center meets the operational needs of the Army and USTRANSCOM by locating the mission within a region well known for joint military activities and command centers. Consolidating SDDC at Fort Eustis would create minimal workforce disruption, as a large portion of SDDC is already located at the Fort. Additionally, for the skilled workforce being moved out of Northern Virginia, Fort Eustis presents a much more feasible relocation option. Historic evidence shows us that only about 40% of the current SDDC workforce would be willing to move to Scott AFB, a substantial workforce disruption. Recruiting and retraining for these positions is costly and it would be difficult to replace the operations research and engineering positions currently located at Fort Eustis as part of SDDC.

Additionally, consolidating SDDC at Fort Eustis, as was originally planned, creates an important synergy by maintaining the organization in close proximity to the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Distribution Center, and the Military Sealift Command. While the larger concern is the disruption of a highly skilled workforce, this synergy cannot be overlooked. From a communication standpoint, if the desire were to create a synergistic environment for all three-service elements of USTRANSCOM, then why would only two of those elements (Air Mobility Command and SDDC) locate at Scott AFB, an installation with a lower military value score than Fort Eustis.[2] If this logic were to continue, would not the Secretary of Defense insist that Military Sealift Command be relocated to Scott AFB as well? The Secretary did not recommend the movement of Military Sealift Command from Washington, D.C. to Scott AFB, so the claims of relocating all of SDDC to gain organizational synergy is brought into question. In fact, the Secretary's Joint Cross Service Group recommended that MSC be dropped from the scenario. Was it dropped to reduce the costs associated with the

[2] Cobra Analysis, Fort Eustis Military Value Score: 0.875799221; Scott AFB Military Value Score: 0.846726271

recommendation so as to make the recommendation more acceptable? We do not know, but are continuing to study the issue.

The consolidation of SDDC at Fort Eustis also is the least costly alternative. Consolidating the SDDC (Ops Center, TEA, and the HQ) at Ft. Eustis would eliminate the need for $40 million[3] in new construction at Scott AFB, which is an installation with zero available capacity.[4] Fort Eustis has available capacity approaching 39 percent. Some renovations (less than $5 million) would need to be accomplished at Fort Eustis to provide for consolidation but not to the degree of new construction needed at Scott Air Force Base. The consolidation at Fort Eustis would achieve the reduction of leased space (183,553 GSF[5]) that the DoD and the Joint Cross Service Group were looking to accomplish but it would only impact those personnel in Alexandria, Virginia (SDDC HQ) and not those located in Newport News (TEA and Operations Center). As mentioned above, the disruption to the workforce and the costs associated with that disruption would be minimal as TEA and Operations Center personnel would not be relocated and new personnel would not have to be recruited.

In summary, locating the entire SDDC operation at Fort Eustis would eliminate concerns of force protection, enhance military synergy, eliminate costly leases in Alexandria and Newport News, Virginia, reduce military construction costs significantly, and still provide the ability to institute personnel reductions, thus saving the Department resources it was seeking in the consolidation at Scott AFB.

Therefore, we believe that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the BRAC Criteria by reducing readiness as well as in not properly valuing the costs associated with this recommendation. Additionally, the Department used as a main reason for this realignment the need to vacate leased office space and to apply Anti-Terrorists Force Protection (ATFP) criteria to the analysis. While these two criteria are important agendas to pursue, they are not part of the BRAC 2005 Criteria as recommended by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress.

U.S. Army Transportation School

Next, the decision to relocate the Transportation School to Fort Lee also requires careful review. As was objectively described to Chairman Principi and General Newton during their May 25, 2005 Fort Eustis site visit, the calculations resulting

[3] HSA 0114RV4 Report
[4] DoD Cobra Analysis, Fort Eustis Available Capacity: 39%; Scott AFB Available Capacity: -3%
[5] BRAC Report, Volume 1, Part 2 of 2, May 2005, H & SA, Page 32

in the realignment recommendation regarding the Transportation School are clearly flawed. Because of the unique multi-modal facilities located at Fort Eustis, including an airfield, a deep-water port, and an active Army railroad network, approximately 1/3 of the current Transportation School training (watercraft, cargo specialists and rail training) must stay at Fort Eustis even if this recommendation is instituted. Otherwise, the Department of Defense would need to invest approximately $70 to $100 million in new facilities at Fort Lee, which have not been calculated in the BRAC Recommendations or the COBRA analysis.[6] These investments, in addition to being costly, are highly infeasible. They would include having to construct a man-made river and multi-million dollar rail line at the new location. Again, these costs were not calculated in the BRAC recommendation or the COBRA.

It is the City's understanding that the Department of the Army has already been made aware of these oversights in the initial recommendation and is preparing to send a supplemental letter of intent to the BRAC Commission. If one accepts the premise that a major portion of the training school must stay at Fort Eustis, a legitimate question for the Commission is what savings or efficiencies are achieved by moving elements of the school to Fort Lee while leaving significant training facilities and missions at Fort Eustis? In other words, doesn't it make more sense to maintain the entire Transportation School mission at Fort Eustis, instead of busing personnel 90 minutes from Fort Lee, based on this new information that at least 1/3 of the functions and almost all the actual "hands-on" training will need to remain at Fort Eustis? From a force protection standpoint Fort Lee also poses challenges as a major highway separates the installation. At 9,000 acres with no similar encroachment, Fort Eustis does not face the same concerns.

We believe that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the BRAC Criteria by adversely impacting training and readiness with this recommendation. Additionally, the realignment recommendation does not meet the cost and manpower implications criterion.

U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School (USAALS)

The final realignment recommendation that should be carefully re-evaluated involves the U.S Army Aviation Logistics School (USAALS). On the surface, the idea of consolidating helicopter repair training with other Army aviation assets at Fort Rucker seems rational. However, thoughtful analysis of this proposal raises serious cost and operational questions.

[6] Fort Eustis Base Visit Briefing to Chairman Principi and General Newton

Operationally, moving helicopter repair training to Fort Rucker provides no additional synergy for the Army's aviation programs. Those who have served in the military understand that those who learn to repair aircraft and those who learn to fly aircraft are learning two different missions and that collocation does not create jointness. Secondly, as a training activity of high importance, helicopter maintenance requires the availability of a skilled civilian and uniform work force. Fort Eustis is optimally located to tap into a retiring military labor market that includes approximately 15,000 skilled Army, Navy and Air Force personnel who muster out and stay in the Hampton Roads area every year.[7] USAALS is ideally located for joint service helicopter repair training as part of one of the largest concentrations of national military assets in America. The joint training that already occurs there has great potential for inter-service expansion. The Dothan, Alabama community will tell you they are joint because they train other government agencies and aviators from allied nations and those two facts are true. They also claim that Air Force helicopter pilots are trained at Fort Rucker and that is true, but they are not trained in a joint environment. The Air Force is co-located at Fort Rucker and their training is not integrated into the Army training syllabus. Collocation, in and of itself is not jointness. We understand and endorse the concept of "train like we fight" but as I mentioned having the Army helicopter enlisted maintenance and logistics training school on the same base with the training of Warrant Officer and Officer helicopter pilots does not constitute joint training. This realignment proposal does very little if anything to enhance the goals of jointness as outlined by the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the BRAC Criteria.

If the argument could be substantiated that invaluable jointness and synergy would be created by this move, it might make this high cost decision feasible. However, after reviewing the enormous cost of this move, the decision becomes even more irrational. USAALS is housed in expensive and renovated facilities at Fort Eustis. The cost of relocation of this mission to Fort Rucker is estimated to be $492.3 million.[8] In fact, the SECDEF's own recommendation states that the Return on Investment (ROI) has a payback of 13 years.[9] Moreover, the net present value over 20 years is only $77 million.[10] A thirteen-year payback and such little long-term savings on an investment such as this is not financially sound.

Finally, the Army has examined realignment of USAALS to Fort Rucker on a number of occasions and found it far too expensive to undertake within their normal budget and military construction programs. Only through BRAC can

[7] Defense Manpower Data Center
[8] BRAC Report, Volume 1, Part 2 of 2, May 2005, E & T, Page 5
[9] BRAC Report, Volume 1, Part 2 of 2, May 2005, E & T, Page 5
[10] BRAC Report, Volume 1, Part 2 of 2, May 2005, E & T, Page 5

they recommend such an action since the high military construction costs (ROI of 13 years) can be absorbed within the BRAC account. I am of the opinion that the Army's Aviation Branch and the communities of the region have always sought to consolidate at Fort Rucker aviation assets regardless of the cost and irrespective of whether it enhances military value. I say this because I understand that the Army has sought for over two decades the realignment to Fort Rucker of the Navy's helicopter training located at NAS Whiting Field, Florida.

We believe that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the BRAC Criteria by adversely impacting training and readiness with this recommendation. Additionally, the realignment recommendation does not meet the cost and manpower implications criterion, especially with a one-time cost approaching $500 million and a ROI of 13 years. This realignment does nothing to enhance jointness; in fact it degrades jointness, and does nothing to increase military value.

I've outlined the reasons we feel the three realignments deviate from the BRAC criteria. However, we understand that you may not be able to take actions on all of these issues. Therefore, since the BRAC recommendation specifically stated that freeing up space at Fort Eustis would allow for other missions to be transferred to the base[11], I also would like to mention two missions that are slated to move outside of the Commonwealth of Virginia that the City of Newport News believes could be accommodated at Fort Eustis. As I mentioned, the Hampton Roads area maintains the largest concentration of military personnel and installations in the country outside of Washington. As a result, the ability to work jointly with other Services and Commands makes it attractive to numerous military missions. Therefore, we believe it is worthwhile for the Commission to reconsider the recommendation to relocate Army Material Command (AMC) and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) from Northern Virginia to Alabama.

While we understand and appreciate the Department's necessity to move its assets out of leased space and/or into more secure locations from an ATFP standpoint, we believe that a case can be made to maintain these two missions in the Commonwealth of Virginia and within relative close proximity to the National Capital Region (NCR).

[11] DoD Cobra Analysis of Fort Eustis

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)

First, AMC is currently under consideration to be relocated to Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. While Redstone could accommodate AMC and provide some cost savings, these goals could also be achieved by moving AMC to Fort Eustis. With transportation training facilities, available capacity and a relative close proximity to Service and Joint Commands within the National Capital Region and Hampton Roads (TRADOC, JFCOM, ACC), the mission of AMC could be sustained in Virginia at an acceptable cost while also ensuring a sustainment of military value. For example, having AMC and TRADOC in close proximity will allow for the Army acquisition and logistics command to be directly linked to the training and requirements command. That type of synergy should be beneficial to the warfighter and will enhance the military value of both operations.

In a similar situation to the TRADOC move, there would be less workforce disruption associated with moving AMC to Fort Eustis. We do not believe the same can be said for moving AMC to Redstone, Alabama. As we all know, the costs of recruiting and retraining a new workforce can be quite costly and will impact operational readiness.

The recommendation cites that the realignment will be consistent in meeting DoD objects by cutting down on the amount of leased space and consolidating missions that regularly interact with one another onto a more secure facility. Please recognize that the AMC move to Redstone is but one of nine recommendations within this realignment scenario and that the COBRA analysis accumulates all nine recommendations into the model as if they were one move. Furthermore, the Army Materiel Command is located on Fort Belvoir and not in leased space. It is on a major Army installation and the ATFP requirements that the Department so urgently seeks are being met today at Fort Belvoir just as they would be met at Fort Eustis.

As mentioned above, the savings of this move are difficult to isolate because the recommendation to move AMC is only one of nine recommendations under the relocation of Army Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies. In moving a host of Army activities to Redstone Arsenal, Fort Sam Houston, and Fort Knox, the DoD expects an initial cost of almost $200 million with a payback expected in 10 years. The Headquarters and Support Agency Joint Cross Service Group claims that AMC is in "temporary facilities," I hope that the Commission has looked at those "temporary facilities". If you have, you will come away with the same conclusion that we have, those facilities are about as temporary as the Washington Navy Annex across from the Pentagon, which was built as temporary administrative space over 50 years ago.

Additionally, it appears that the Department of Defense is more interested in moving missions and commands from the NCR, from leased office space (both of which are not one of the eight BRAC 2005 Criteria), and using ATFP as a justification for such moves. For example, in H&SA JCSG D-05-326 of the BRAC report, the enhancement of military value seems at times to almost be an afterthought.

We believe that if the Commission believes that AMC should relocate, that Fort Eustis is the better realignment candidate than Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the BRAC 2005 Criteria since he utilized non-BRAC criteria as his primary criteria and therefore did not properly justify the realignment recommendation relative to AMC.

Missile Defense Agency

And finally, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), with the exception of a Headquarters Command element, has been recommended by the Secretary to be relocated to Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. Additionally, other missile and space related commands at other installations outside of the NCR that work closely with MDA are being moved to locations throughout the United States. I am not fully aware of all the military value and operational implications, but it appears that the relocations and realignments are affecting more than just the MDA located in the NCR.

The Secretary of Defense states that the MDA realignment from the NCR will cost $180 million, save $359 million over 20 years, and have a ROI of only one year.[12] From a business case perspective this move appears to make sense. But does it from a national security perspective when all the movements associated with space and missile defense will turn organizations upside down and inside out?

As with the Army Materiel Command move, the recommendation cites that the realignment will be consistent in meeting DoD objects by cutting down on the amount of leased space and meeting the requirements of Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP). The movement out of leased space and the requirements of ATFP can be met at a number of military installations in close proximity to the NCR. For example, both Fort Eustis and Dahlgren in King George County, Virginia can provide for the needs of MDA if the concern is costly leased space and space that does not meet ATFP standards. The Department of Defense seems to be placing a higher priority on moving missions and commands from

[12] BRAC Report, Volume 1, Part 2 of 2, May 2005, H & SA, Page 16

the NCR, than on ensuring the efficient functioning of space and missile defense organizations.

I would like to quote extensively from Robert Snyder, former Executive Director of MDA from 1998 to 2004, from a recent article for Defense News.com[13] relative to the relocation of MDA and other space and missile organizations contained in the BRAC 2005 recommendations. He states,

> "The supposed economic efficiencies are penny-wise and pound-foolish. New buildings will need to be built to house the agency in six different states. The lack of a central location will require more travel. Add to this the cost of building and operating an elaborate enterprise information management system to foster a collaborative work environment across the multiple facilities.
>
> The $359 million in projected savings over 20 years amounts to about $18 million a year. An agency with an annual budget of about $8 billion could certainly deliver similar efficiencies without such a disruptive move."
>
> But beyond the cost issue, consider the near-term priorities. The MDA must complete the development and fielding of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and; Aegis ballistic missile defense systems. The MDA also needs to demonstrate the technical capabilities of the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense system and the Air Force's Airborne Laser, and initiate the development of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and other advanced systems, all while integrating them into the planned ballistic missile defense system. No single location outside the Washington metropolitan area can offer this level of jointness.
>
> The MDA needs to focus on these priorities now, while North Korea continues to threaten its neighbors as well as the United States. The MDA needs to field these systems reliably before other nations, such as Iran and others, can threaten our forces, our friends and our homeland.
>
> The department's proposed BRAC-inspired moves are wrong both in timing and effect. Even if the agency does not move until the 2008-2009 time frame, the effect on people will be immediate. During the next three years, when the integrated missile defense system should be deployed in its initial spirals using ground- and sea-based defenses, MDA leaders and work force will be distracted by the prospect of uprooting itself and moving.
>
> The ability to coordinate, communicate and focus on executing critical missile defense programs will be undermined as people focus on their own "here-and-now" issues of whether or not they move or take new jobs. Typically, only a small fraction of the work force moves following a BRAC decision. The MDA's

[13] *BRAC Threatens MDA*, Defense News.com, June 20, 2005

leaders will discover that the best and brightest will quickly find other jobs in the Northern Virginia area.

Rear Adm. Wayne Meyer, the architect of the U.S. Navy's Aegis weapon system, has often noted that, "The system reflects the organization that built it." An organization that is effectively led, coherently organized, populated with quality people and strongly focused on execution is more likely to develop and field effective weapon systems. The converse is true as well.

If the Admiral's sage advice rings true, what would a missile defense system built by such a perversely organized and managed agency look like? How could such a structure execute the program and build the world's most complex system in an effective and integrated manner?

In any organization or endeavor, success comes down to the people who do the work. I have had the privilege to occupy missile defense leadership positions dating back to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. I know the quality, dedication, technical competence and tireless sacrifice of these wonderful people. Their dedication to service deserves that we reciprocate;, that our leaders lead.

As the BRAC Commission considers myriad facilities and bases recommended for realignment or closure, it must pay special attention to the disposition of the MDA. The commission must weigh the physical security and economic issues against the national security challenge, and the likely impact this will have on the MDA's ability to field those systems needed in times of national emergency.

Failure to do what is right, right now, may leave the United States largely defenseless for the foreseeable future against existing and emerging threats from missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction."

Mr. Chairman, these are words of a knowledgeable insider and former MDA Executive Director. He is concerned not just about the affect that this move will have on the Washington DC area and the MDA organization, but the affect that the complete realignment with have on the entire missile and space defense initiative. This concern of the loss of intellectual capital is a theme that you have heard from a number of communities. It is not just a defense or a tactic devised by community leaders to overturn or reverse a BRAC recommendation. The loss of intellectual capital is a legitimate concern and I believe that this Commission will recognize the impact that it will have on the operational readiness of our forces, both offense and defensive.

As I mentioned, there are several military installations in Virginia that can accept the MDA if the Commission believes that they should be relocated. We believe that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the BRAC 2005 Criteria since he utilized non-BRAC criteria as his primary criterion and therefore did not

properly justify the realignment recommendation relative to MDA. Additionally, the Secretary deviated substantially from Criteria 1 and 4 since the loss of agency personnel, which is significantly under-estimated, will result in a degradation of operational readiness. Additionally, the loss of personnel will have a direct adverse affect on the cost of operations.

In closing Mr. Chairman and BRAC Commissioners, we believe the enhancements and alternatives shown represent a sound business plan while also ensuring a transformation of America's military forces into a more joint, capable and cost effective force with priority given to increasing military value.

Thank you for your time and attention and I am prepared to answer any questions that you might have.

3 Attachments:

1. TRADOC Proposal
2. SDDC Proposal
3. Regional Hearing – Oral Presentation Slides

DCN: 4858

DCN: 4858

Written Testimony To

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

By

The Honorable Mark R. Warner
Governor
Commonwealth of Virginia

July 7, 2005

Regional Hearing
Sheraton National Airport Hotel
Arlington, Virginia

Introduction

Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission and staff for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense recommendations as they pertain to the Commonwealth of Virginia for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process. I am pleased to be joined today by distinguished members of Virginia's Congressional Delegation including Senate Armed Services Chairman John Warner and Senator George Allen. I am also joined by a number of local officials and experts, all firmly committed to sustaining Virginia's centuries long commitment to the United States military.

Your task, to provide an objective, non-partisan and independent review and analysis of these extremely complex recommendations, is daunting. You are to be commended for your considerable efforts on behalf of our nation's defense and your commitment to maintaining a fair, open and equitable process. We share your commitment to America's Armed Forces and know of the benefits of a more cost-effective operation of our national defense. We believe it will result in armed forces that are better prepared to meet present and future challenges both at home and abroad. We, as Virginians, welcome the opportunity to continue our supporting role in the transformation of the Department of Defense.

The Virginia Military Advantage

Virginia is proud of its historic responsibility as the foundation of key national defense activities. The range of defense commands, installations and businesses located in Virginia are clearly a testament to the Commonwealth's strategic military advantages. Virginia remains firmly committed to assisting the Department of Defense with the successful achievement of its objectives.

Virginia's strategic military advantage has evolved throughout the creation of the nation and its rise as a world power. Since the earliest Colonial days, America's military has transformed from simply being capable of defending the home-land to projecting its strength across the globe. Because of the inextricable linkages between the two, as the military has transformed, so has Virginia. Today, Virginia is both the center of military thought and the gateway for people, equipment and technology to defend the homeland and project military strength overseas.

This preeminent role has evolved because of the state's many natural attributes, including its geographic location as a gateway to the United States and the world, variant terrain and climate, in addition to an outstanding economy and quality of life. These attributes are underscored by the Commonwealth's consistent attention to the needs of the military installations, defense-related businesses and the thousands of men and women in both the military and private sectors who work to protect America and its interests.

Situated mid-point along the U.S. East Coast, Virginia offers unparalleled strategic and tactical military advantages, including one of the finest natural ports in the world. Positioned strategically at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay and protected from coastal weather elements, the Hampton Roads region exemplifies one concept of Virginia's military value. It epitomizes

the concept of "jointness" with key components of all military services geographically co-located. This proximity achieves synergy that is not replicated elsewhere.

With the increasingly important role of private industry in military strategic planning and operations, transformation of the military demands efficient access to military suppliers who can respond in the compressed 21st century time cycles. More than 35 percent of the nation's manufacturers are within a day's drive to the Port of Virginia enhancing coordination and enabling more efficient interaction opportunities.

The region is critical to the support of the nation's evolving military force structure. Virginia serves as a point of synergy for personnel and material moving from the Northeast, Midwest and Southeast United States. This natural movement and flow of material and personnel identifies Virginia installations as natural locations for "surge" capabilities. As such, joint operations and supportive industries have naturally developed or relocated here. Joint operation concepts and architectures thrive in Virginia's Military Crescent, which carves a wide swath from Northern Virginia to Tidewater where the Air Combat, Atlantic Fleet, Training and Doctrine, Joint Forces and NATO Supreme Allied commands are located, as is the Virginia Modeling Analysis and Simulation Center (VMASC) which offers the largest battle laboratory in the world for critical joint training. The VMASC exists to foster the innovative concept development and experimentation through war gaming and simulations identified as one of the four pillars of force transformation.

At its center, Virginia's Capital fosters an environment supportive of these innovative processes is key to successful military transformation. Virginia has a rich tradition of sound governing practices sensitive to the needs of those entities either conducting or seeking to do business here. Virginia offers streamlined regulations, coordinated state-supported workforce training and export assistance which combined create an innovative economic strategy for the Commonwealth and one of the most prosperous business environments in the world. Virginia's prowess has been recognized with its designation this year as America's best managed state.

Virginia's rich and diverse economy has strong roots in manufacturing and service industries. As the birthplace of the Internet, originally designed to support the Department of Defense, and one of the leading centers of software development, Virginia's high-technology economy continues to excel. It is one of the four U.S. states currently licensed and capable of launching communications satellites and other commercial payloads into Space. Virginia is a leader of the information age. More than 10,400 high-tech companies operate in Virginia. To support this rapidly expanding segment of its economy, Virginia develops and attracts a highly trained, skilled and technologically proficient work force. Nowhere is this more evident than in Northern Virginia where technological synergies offer unparalleled operational advantages in close proximity to the National Capital Region – the seat of our federal government and national leadership.

Virginia has the highest concentration of engineers and doctoral scientists in the Southeast. Virginia's colleges, universities and community colleges annually produce more than 57,000 degreed students a year and are key assets in training and developing this high technology work force. More than 20,000 engineers and scientists live and work in Virginia. Its nationally

recognized research and development facilities that have clustered around defense operations in Northern Virginia, as well as Hampton Roads, provide the means necessary for the U.S. military to ensure the nation's strategic advantage on the land and sea, as well as in aerospace and cyberspace.

The Commonwealth's diverse climate provides significant advantages. Four distinct seasons enable the U.S. Military unrestricted training opportunities, while also providing natural protection from the destructive effects of severe weather experienced in other southeastern coastal states.The military's critical training venues in Virginia benefit from the rapid recovery rate of the natural environment and significant uninterrupted training days that results from the state's moderate and supportive weather conditions. These same moderate weather conditions create ongoing routine replacement cost savings for installation roads and facilities as well natural disasters. This keeps installation operational costs low and training day opportunities high.

In addition to the state's beneficial weather conditions, other circumstantial factors benefit Virginia's military presence. With the increasing demands on the U.S. soldier, sailor, airman and marine who must meet the escalating service challenges at home and abroad, quality of life issues can play a pivotal role in mitigating the resulting stress on military personnel and their families. Virginia offers excellent primary and secondary schools. Its 39 public and 35 private institutions of higher education are recognized globally as models of excellence in learning, leadership and research. The state is committed to affordable, quality higher education, last year by increasing funding by $278 million to higher public education in 2004-06.

Virginia also offers the highest quality health care, affordable housing, transportation choices, award-winning statewide recreational areas and a rich historic setting to explore our nation's past. These quality of life attributes are routinely enjoyed by military families who welcome Virginia assignments.

Virginia also offers a significant advantage in terms of its programs to ensure the safety and security of its citizens, communities and military installations for emergencies and disasters of all kinds, including terrorism. Today the Commonwealth is one of eight states nationally that possesses accreditation of its emergency management programs. This underscores the professionalism of state government to partner with local agencies, military installations and citizens in effectively managing the full range of risks that confront the state.

Virginia's specific focus on homeland security activities is grounded in more than 30 years of planning and preparation that has at its foundation "nuclear attack preparedness", including supporting federal Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government activities. Following the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Murrah Federal Building in 1995 specific focus has been placed on terrorism readiness. These efforts have been buoyed by the substantial national focus and resources in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks targeting the Commonwealth, New York and Pennsylvania.

Today, Virginia is one of the most advanced states when it comes to homeland security. The National Capital Region (NCR) comprised of Washington, D.C. and the surrounding

suburbs of Virginia and Maryland is afforded the highest level of security of anywhere in the world. Military installation leaders are fully integrated with local and state officials in the assessment and analysis of intelligence targeting prevention, engaged in the development of plans and protocols to communicate, coordinate and cooperate on response and recovery issues, as well as daily training and exercise activities. This provides a seamless security blanket for the NCR. In addition, the NCR is one of the few places in America that benefits from an immediately available air interdiction capability and standing roving remote sensing detection activities. Key personnel and monitoring activities at all levels of government and in the private sector maintain a higher level of vigilance than those in other areas. This level of vigilance combined with "on the ground" capability to react makes the region among the safest places in America given that no one area can be 100 percent risk free. The nation's first Secretary of Homeland Security consistently heralded the National Capital Region as the national model for cooperation and coordination among government and the private sector for regional cooperation – a distinction that continues.

The Hampton Roads region benefits from one of the most active port security activities found anywhere. Combined port security activities enjoy full planning and operational inter-relationships made possible by the joint civilian and military port monitoring centers. The geographic size of the Port presents unique opportunities to house many activities under a single security focus supported by committed assets – achieving greater unity of efforts. Co-location of assets in this single geographic region does not present a hazard because of phenomenal advances made in air defenses in the past 50 years, limited capability of most likely terrorist weapons of choice and most notably current security techniques. Given limited resources available nationally to support security it is wise to house key activities in a single geographic region like Hampton Roads with the access options, existing infrastructure and security focus as found in the Port.

Supporting security objectives of DOD is not a new mission for the Commonwealth and its communities where the importance of Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government and Force Protection in the context of DOD are well known, understood and the values are shared. DOD installations and activities are treated as equal partners with cities and counties in all aspects of prevention and preparedness as evidenced by high levels of coordination, joint training and exercising and most importantly past cooperation that limit the impact of past incidents. We will be pleased to discuss specific initiatives in greater detail with BRAC staff that, for obvious reasons, local communities and the state cannot include in a publicly available document.

Virginia is uniquely poised to provide for the future of the U.S. military. As the Department of Defense seeks ever more creative and innovative approaches to the evolving national security challenges at home and abroad, Virginia already possesses the needed resources to contribute to the successful transformation of our nation's military.

The Department of Defense recommendations for this round of the Base Realignment and Closure process encompass 140 actions involving military installations and personnel in Virginia. (Summarization Map Attached) Some of these recommendations involve multiple sub-actions. Given the complexity and magnitude of these recommendations, it is not feasible to

address all aspects of these actions in this hearing. We will continue to inform your efforts to analyze the Department of Defense recommendations that impact Virginia over the next few weeks in order to ensure you have comprehensive and accurate data necessary to meet our shared objectives.

Northern Virginia – DoD "Leased Space"

One of the largest and most complex recommendations made by the Department of Defense involves the whole of Northern Virginia. The Department of Defense proposes to relocate approximately 23,000 employees and vacate 8.4 million square feet of commercial office space to satisfy the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) imperative to eliminate leased space, and to comply with its Minimum Anti-Terrorism Standards for Buildings. Virginia remains committed to Department of Defense's objective, and agrees that this must be a priority. However, the consideration of the Minimum Anti-Terrorism Standards for Buildings to guide BRAC decisions is misplaced and is a substantial deviation from the original Selection Criteria provided to guide the Department of Defense's development of recommendations.

It is inappropriate for the Department of Defense to arbitrarily assign all leased space a military value of zero simply on the basis of being leased space. This Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) imperative is documented by the Technical Joint Cross Service Group meeting minutes of 19 January 2005 that state, "the Military Value analysis is irrelevant as this scenario strives to get out of leased space per the OSD imperative." The substitution of OSD imperatives for the statutory BRAC Selection Criteria constitutes a significant deviation from the Selection Criteria and undermines the overall credibility of the BRAC process and, in our opinion, exceeds Congressional checks and balances placed on the entire process

Both Arlington County and the City of Alexandria have been and can continue to be able hosts for major administrative, research and headquarters activities of the Department of Defense. With a highly educated population and in-place varied housing stock; a private sector with substantial military knowledge, experience and technological capabilities; a transportation infrastructure that is already in place; and a quality of life which independent surveys rank high, these communities should remain the preferred location of these current Department of Defense activities. Instead, the Department of Defense is missing an important opportunity to consistently re-define its relationship with communities in today's environment and truly modernize.

Arlington County and the City of Alexandria are hit particularly hard by the Department of Defense recommendations to leave leased space but are also communities where local officials are ready to help the Department of Defense achieve its security objectives. Rather than collaborating with these local communities to address security concerns, the Department of Defense has arbitrarily used the BRAC process to this end. It is disingenuous to promote a Department of Defense transformation process that fails in its ability to modernize how the Department works with local communities. Relationships with local communities and states built on the premise of modern economic development practices will allow the Department to truly achieve better efficiency of mission and cost effectiveness of its activities domestically.

An analysis of the recommendations as they impact these areas reveals additional concerns to those raised above, among them the costing of factors used in the COBRA model

resulted in a cost and savings bias against non-military base office buildings. The DoD minimum anti-terrorism standards for new and existing buildings are overly prescriptive and not performance based as they should be. Performance based standards encourage private sector innovation and can achieve a better security end result for DoD. An open discussion in favor of performance based standards may well prove to be a win-win solution for all concerned. External costs to the DoD are not reflected in the COBRA analysis. For example, stranded lease costs for large blocks of leased space would fall back onto the Federal Government. Also, the definition of community used in the COBRA analysis to determine economic impact was the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) for Washington, D.C., which is overly broad as it includes population from both Maryland and West Virginia which are unaffected by these recommendations.

Further, by comparing only the existing leased space with existing military installations, the process leaves no room for the possibility of potentially better options for locating administrative, research and headquarters functions. For example, in Alexandria the former Army Material Command building property has been purchased by a major developer who plans to develop and expand the building into a 1 million square foot complex, which can fully meet all twenty-two of the DoD required building standards including the required standoff distances, parking and progressive collapse avoidance standards. A second alternative in Alexandria is to consider the Hoffman Town Center buildings that could accommodate nearly all of the 1.2 million square feet of DoD offices recommended to be moved from the City.

The federal presence in Northern Virginia has created a critical Center of Excellence for the Department of Defense, one that is not limited to its own operations. In fact, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Army Research Office (ARO) and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), which are clustered within a five-block radius in Arlington County, benefit greatly from proximity to the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Homeland Security Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), the White House, Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, a host of other non-DoD agencies and by being in the "heart" of the region's public sector intellectual resources. From a private sector perspective organizations established across the area that support these activities provide the DoD with a better product cost because of the synergy gained when experienced personnel support more than a single federal contract.

To remove these agencies from this established Center of Excellence and this robust intellectual environment would be detrimental to their missions and contrary to the Department of Defense BRAC Principles concerning highly skilled personnel and "jointness" as well as strategic Military Value.

Arlington County will present location options to the BRAC Commission that were not considered by the Department of Defense. These are innovative alternatives that meet the Department of Defense's security requirements. They merit serious consideration by the Commission in the context of evaluating if the Department of Defense recommendations were fully informed and by the Department if is truly is committed to efficiency and the whole concept of transformation. Additionally these alternatives preserve the existing Center of

Excellence for these key defense operations. This will be good for the Department and the nation as a whole.

We submit that for the Extramural Research Program Managers (#TECH 0040Rv2: Co-locate Extramural Research Program Managers to Bethesda), there are viable options, each of which delivers force protection, mission effectiveness and savings better than relocation to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. Our proposals include creating a campus-styled environment for DARPA, ONR, ARO and AFOSR and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Arlington has prepared options for the Commission's consideration that will be fully detailed in their written testimony which will include all documented evidence and relative COBRA model runs. This written testimony reinforces Arlington's well researched and presented alternatives.

The Arlington alternatives achieve the following:

Maximize military value by maintaining the current synergies and inter-relationships with each other, NSF and DHS, and the private contractor community, which is heavily concentrated in the Ballston area of Arlington:

- **Cost less, both short-term and long term, than the NNMC alternative.**
- **Comply with DoD anti-terrorism / force protection criteria** (UFC 4-010-01); and
- **Represent very realistic, researched, cost effective options that had not been considered during the DoD analysis in the BRAC process.**

The Arlington Alternatives: Ballston & Arlington Hall

Arlington offers two specific alternatives that were not considered, nor were not fairly evaluated, in the preparation of the DOD BRAC recommendation process. The first alternative is to construct a new joint, secure, leased facility in Ballston, in immediate proximity to the current locations of the scientific research agencies. A second alternative is to co-locate the extramural research agencies on a secure federal facility at Arlington Hall, approximately 1.5 miles away from their current location, in new, leased buildings. The Arlington alternatives have been developed in conjunction with the private sector and the Commonwealth of Virginia and are meant to provide maximum flexibility for DOD. These are clear examples of the benefit of DoD's collaborating with local and state officials. While they are presented as leased options, built with private capital, they could be converted to ownership. They could also be built with DOD funds. **There is no Military Value justification for relocation from Arlington.** As will be shown below, there are also no force protection reasons to relocate and cost comparisons compel retention in Arlington.

Alternative 1: The Ballston Site

The first alternative is the construction of a new facility for the co-location of the extramural research agencies in the immediate proximity of their current location in the Ballston area of Arlington. It would also **maximize military value by allowing the research functions to remain in proximity to NSF and HSARPA** as well as the private contractor community. It would require **minimal disruption of the agencies** and meet the desires of existing staff by remaining in an urban environment. The new facility would **comply with DOD force protection and security standards for new construction.** The Ballston alternative **results in savings of $52 million** in the 2006-2011 period over the DOD NNMC recommendation, based on a COBRA analysis.

Description: This alternative would locate the agencies on the current Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Bus Yard Site. The WMATA block is located in Ballston along Wilson Boulevard between North Randolph Street and North Quincy Street. It is approximately one block from Liberty Center I, the current home of ONR, AFOSR, and AOR and about five blocks from DARPA's current location. The National Science Foundation is two blocks away and HSARPA is three blocks further west. The site is an easy three block walk to Metro.

This re-development of this site has been in active planning that was scheduled to bring forward specific proposals this calendar year. A development agreement is in negotiation with WMATA, Arlington County and a private developer who currently has the option on the site. Supplemental parcels are actually owned by Arlington County. Arlington can provide assurances that this proposal meets local development plans and zoning criteria. A site plan submission is expected by the end of 2005 with development scheduled to begin in 2007. The existing bus garage will be relocated in 2007, allowing for occupancy in new construction in late 2009, well within the current window for completion of BRAC moves. Bringing the extramural research functions into the project actually accelerates the development through the identification of the tenant for the major office structure. The extramural research activities would be in a 485,000 square foot building of 17 stories with a floor plate of 28,500 square feet. The building would be for the sole use of the DOD research agencies.

The Ballston alternative is scaled to accommodate all of the research functions recommended for NNMC; however, it could be scaled in either direction to best meet DOD's needs. For example, a smaller building could be constructed for DARPA on the WMATA site and allow the other extramural research agencies to remain at Liberty Center I. This would result in a new building of approximately 285,000 square feet and 10 stories tall.

The Ballston alternative is presented as a leased proposal, but could be converted to an ownership option.

Anti-terrorism / Force Protection: The Ballston alternative is in full compliance with anti-terrorism / force protection standards. The new building would be set back from the sidewalk by a minimum distance of 82 feet. The main entrance would be from a pedestrian

walkway extending between Randolph and Quincy Streets. Access to the loading dock would be from Randolph Street and could be fully secured.

A secure parking garage would be constructed off-site on the east side of Quincy Street in a structure separate from the main building itself. This parking facility will be underground and would incorporate a vehicle screening function. A secure underground walkway could extend from the garage to the building.

Cost Savings: Compared to the DOD recommendation, the Ballston alternative lowers the one time cost to DOD by $122 million. Over the implementation period, it saves $52 million over six years and a NPV of $4 million over a 20 year period. The COBRA model also indicates that this option represents a cost savings of $158 million over the initial six year BRAC period and a long term (20 year) savings of $576 million. The complete COBRA analysis is included in Arlington County's written submission.

The cost estimates for Ballston have been prepared by a developer and contractor (John Shooshan Company) currently constructing similar buildings in the Arlington market. This alternative assumes that the developer would build and lease back the new building to DOD. Significant state and local contributions would be used to defray a portion of the cost of the project. It should be noted that without this state and local support, there would still be a minimum of $20 million in direct cost savings with the Ballston site beyond the DOD NNMC recommendation. Clearly, savings would be even greater when one considers the loss of experienced workers under a relocation scenario and the added cost of recruiting, training and loss of research momentum.

The construction of the Ballston alternative could be financed by the Virginia Resources Authority which would provide both construction and long term financing. VRA is rated as an AAA lender, and their cost of capital is among the lowest in the market.

A further option associated with this alternative would permit DOD to own the building after the lease period. The cost of this option is not included in the COBRA analysis, but would be an approach the developer and County would consider.

Community Infrastructure and Environmental Considerations: The site can meet all local planning and zoning provisions in terms of use and density. It is currently shown on the General Land Use Plan for Medium Office-Apartment-Hotel with 2.5 FAR allowable office density. The 2.5 FAR of allowable office development would support the development of a 485,000 office project based on the overall consolidated site area of 218,652 square feet. A local development company has control of the entire site. Project approval is fully within the control of the County Board. The costs of the environmental remediation from the WMATA use and the removal of the existing gas station are included in the site development costs.

Alternative 2: The Arlington Hall Site

The second alternative site is Arlington Hall, a secured federal facility only 1.5 miles from the current location of the extramural research functions. This option also preserves the existing "Center of Excellence" and is the only secured federal facility that could do so. It meets the most rigorous anti-terrorism / force protection standards. This alternative beats the NNMC recommendation by $122 million in one-time costs, $158 million over the implementation period, and $25 million over 20 years.

Description: Arlington Hall is the current location of the Army National Guard (ANG) and the State Department's National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC). This 78 acre campus is behind a secure federal gate, but has an atmosphere more representative of a campus than a military base or compound. The NFATC accommodates an ever-changing cadre of visitors who access the center for training for a few days or weeks at a time. Like the extramural research agencies, the NFATC requires a level of security that not only permits, but welcomes pre-cleared visitors. There are extramural research personnel located in most U.S. embassies, and the NFATC is operated by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

The 485,000 square feet of development needed to house the extramural research agencies could be accommodated on this site in a campus environment. Co-location is not only possible on this site, but several optional approaches of clustering the agencies is also feasible. **Agencies could be co-located in a single building or could have a separate but adjacent facility. All of the benefits of creating an extramural research Center of Excellence can be gained without any loss of synergy with NSF and the consultants and contractors that support the functions in Ballston, which is literally down the street.**

Force Protection and Anti-terrorism: The proposals for new office development on this site would fully meet the more rigorous DOD UFC Standards. Not only would the operations be behind a federal fence line, but would achieve setbacks exceeding 148 feet around the perimeter – something not achieved on a number of federal installations.

Cost Savings: This alternative is structured similarly to the Ballston alternative as a privately constructed lease-back on public land. The lack of land cost, coupled with state and local contributions, results in reduced construction costs of $95 million, making the Arlington Hall alternative the lowest cost option.

The Arlington Hall alternative can also be structured as a lease purchase, with the building reverting to federal ownership after the lease period. Additionally, DOD could develop at Arlington Hall the same way proposed at NNMC, using MILCON funding to construct the facility.

The COBRA analysis indicates that the Arlington Hall site developed privately and leased back to DOD represents the most cost effective option, saving some $165 million during the six year BRAC period and $598 million over the 20 year cycle. This alternative beats the NNMC proposal by $58 million over six years and $25 million over the 20 year period. The complete COBRA analysis is included in Arlington County's written submission. Again, clearly savings would be even greater when one considers the loss of experienced workers under a relocation scenario and the added cost of recruiting, training and loss of research momentum.

Community Infrastructure and Environmental Considerations: The Arlington Hall site is located along Arlington Boulevard between George Mason Drive and South Oakland Street. It is currently designated on the General Land Use Plan as "Public" and is zoned "S-3A" consistent with current and proposed uses. The height limit in the zoning category of "S-3A" is 45 feet, which would accommodate 4 story structures as a matter of right. There are no known regulatory, environmental, or infrastructure restrictions that would prevent the development proposed.

These options meet the Defense Department's security objectives and provide increased cost savings, as well as preserving proximity to the Pentagon and key agencies and the intellectual capital so vital to the nation's security. In short, the Arlington County location provides a higher Military Value which is the dominant consideration for BRAC related decisions. The proposed Bethesda location measures poorly in Military Value against Arlington locations in that there is no synergy between the research agencies and a hospital use. The same is true at Anacostia.

Military Value

The Department of Defense recommendation to move the existing cluster of "high end" scientific activities to Bethesda, Maryland offers no Military Value advantage; indeed, it is simply a real-estate relocation grounded in faulty assumptions and lack of innovation. An Arlington County location, offering the required force protection measures, provides the two key Military Value advantages which the Department of Defense seeks as outlined in #TECH 0040Rv2: Co-locate Extramural Research Program Managers to Bethesda. (Copy attached for reference) Those advantages are far better access to the Pentagon via Metro, which is a great time savings over Bethesda, and the retention of the functions' highly skilled workforce. These are the two targeted Military Value measures for this recommendation. Furthermore, the Department of Defense Memorandum Two – BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles -- details the importance of skilled employees. "The Department must attract, develop and retain active, reserve, civilian and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated...to support advances in technology..." Maintaining this Center of Excellence meets the number one listed BRAC Principle as stated by the Department of Defense on October 14, 2004. (Copy attached for reference) The Virginia Council of (University) Presidents also have weighed in on this matter in their letter addressed to the BRAC Commission dated 28 June 05. In part they add, "We feel strongly that moving the agencies away from the complex, thriving research and development environment that has emerged inside the Beltway would have a deleterious effect on the overall defense related research environment for the nation." (Copy attached for reference)

We respectfully ask that the BRAC 2005 Commission review the recommendation concerning "Extramural Research Program Managers" and direct the Department of Defense to explore all available options. We have proposed very attractive alternatives that offer required force protection; a superior operating location; a much lower cost solution and the critical retention of the current, highly skilled and talented workforce. Additionally, no operational disruption would occur with these functions that are critical to our nation's security. The BRAC

Commission must perform an independent analysis of the calculations of military value and costs savings in a fair and unbiased review of the DoD recommendations. The resulting Commission recommendation should require DoD to thoroughly investigate and negotiate the feasibility and cost of the alternatives presented by Arlington County before any BRAC relocations or realignment of leased space becomes final.

Fort Monroe

Virginia has made supporting the military a core value dating back to the early 1800's when the state loaned the land to the Federal Government for construction of Fort Monroe.

Fort Monroe is one of three U.S. Army installations designated as a National Historic Landmark. The property's history began as Fort Algernourne in 1609, and its construction as Fort Monroe dates to 1819. Due to the peninsula shape of the installation and its water surroundings, this property offers tenants exceptional force protection. Additionally, the installation's configuration has the effect of mitigating all civilian encroachment issues. Both force protection and encroachment are key concepts for consideration during development of Department of Defense BRAC recommendation.

When all factors are taken into consideration, the age of the installation does not preclude the opportunity to operate the facility as efficiently as a newer one. In fact, Ft. Monroe has a modernized, well-maintained infrastructure to accommodate headquarters operations. Monroe is on the leading edge of technology having an extensive installation-wide fiber optic network providing unclassified and classified data transfer. This installation is fully engaged with the Army's "Installation Information Infrastructure Program." Additionally, the recent $88.4 million upgrade for housing, administrative buildings and utility systems make the historic fort complex extremely usable for modern technology. The military value principles embodied by Ft. Monroe include: retaining highly skilled and educated personnel, providing a high quality of life, and jointness and synergies realized through its Hampton Roads location among a cluster of four and three-star commands. Furthermore, this property offers exceptional force protection and can be utilized as a keystone property for homeland defense.

Fort Monroe also provides a unique natural configuration unequaled along the East Coast due to the varying depth conditions along its shore, which allows the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) to operate a Range House on the Chesapeake Bay. The NSWC has measurement systems that measure signatures of minesweepers looking at the phenomena of acoustic, magnetic, electric, and pressure data considered critical to the Navy. The location at Fort Monroe is also ideal due to the naval ships traveling the nearby channel. The Department of Defense recommendation to close Fort Monroe did not provide an alternative location for this activity.

At Fort Monroe, the City of Hampton has presented an option that can enhance the operational efficiency of Fort Monroe given its strategic importance to the Department of Defense. City leaders have identified more than 90 acres of developable land on the site. With the consent of the Defense Department, the land could be leased to the Hampton Industrial Development Authority. The city agency would then issue bonds and construct new buildings,

leasing them back to the Department or private firms to cover debt payments. The Virginia General Assembly has already approved this as an option.

Major portions of the property, under the original loan agreement by the Commonwealth of Virginia, would revert to the state if the property is not used for national defense. Since the Commonwealth has a significant vested interest in the property it is important that we note the Commonwealth's preference as well. The Commonwealth fully supports the City of Hampton's proposal and is committed to the 200 year old state commitment to this site being integral to national defense.

The City of Hampton's plan to have the City's Industrial Development Authority partner with Fort Monroe and the Department of Defense in further strengthening operational efficiencies at the installation reflects Virginia's ability to transform along with the military. There is a good case for growing Fort Monroe – its strategic location on the East Coast, as well as its ability to partner with key elements of all of the Services and its ability to accept overseas units being re-stationed at home. Further, its position at the mouth of the James River and the Chesapeake Bay suggest an opportunity to locate homeland defense operations at this natural guard station.

If the recommendation to close Fort Monroe is approved, resolution of all of the issues surrounding the closure will likely take many years – and the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars - to resolve. Resolution of the myriad issues created by closing this 400-year-old military site will entail solving complex real estate, environmental and historic resources issues, including:

- The Fort sits on land accumulated at different times, involving different legal instruments, some involving reverter clauses and one the subject of a Virginia statute. What happens to buildings straddling two parcels of land, one subject to reverter and one that is not? Who owns accreted lands? How are structures on the land handled if the land is transferred back to the State?
- Several parcels of land at the Fort are subject to current leases. The Chamberlin Hotel lease began December 1, 2004 and ends November 30, 2054. The Catholic Chapel & Rectory is leased to the Bishop of Richmond; the lease began June 8, 1860 and is of indefinite duration. The U.S. Coast Guard Air Rights is leased land upon which a lighthouse sits. The lease began May 1984 and ends May 31, 2009.
- A 1994 geophysical survey of unpaved, accessible areas detected 73,331 magnetic anomalies (an additional 80,000 are estimated to be in the moat). The survey did not include main roads, under buildings, wetlands, or any associated archeological investigations. How will the Department of Defense clean up unexploded ordnance under buildings? The estimate to remediate to a depth of 10 feet was approximately $21.7 million in 1995 dollars; the City of Hampton estimates that the cost will be closer to $200 million.
- A 2003 Closed, Transferred and Transferring (CTT) Range/Site Inventory Report covering unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions or munitions constituents based upon available records and historical research found that the estimated remediation cost for sites within the installation is $11.1 million. Remediation for sites outside installation boundaries (transferred sites) was estimated at $180.9 million.

- The cost to complete all sites eligible for the Military Munitions Response Program is $192 million (35 percent of acreage to a depth of four feet).
- Complete remediation costs cannot be estimated at this time because there is no complete lead and asbestos survey, and there has been no complete field sampling of groundwater, surface water and soils for other possible environmental contaminants.
- Most of Fort Monroe is a National Historic Landmark. Fifty-six percent of the permanent buildings contribute to the National Historic Landmark designation and 16 archaeological sites are eligible or potentially eligible for listing in the National Register. There are thought to be several historic cemeteries (African American and Native American) on the installation that have not yet been discovered.
- The National Historic Landmark designation includes 83 housing buildings, 2 buildings to support housing, 55 administrative buildings, 3 structures, 6 landscape features, 1 stone fort with 11 named/numbered segments, and 11 archaeological sites eligible for the register and 5 additional sites that are potentially eligible.

The issues briefly outlined above represent a sample of the situations that will need to be addressed in the event of closure. The potential closure of Fort Monroe is more problematic than the Department of Defense BRAC analysis thus far would seem to indicate. The Commonwealth is also concerned that environmental remediation numbers used by the Department of Defense for the purposes of cost-benefit calculations appear to be significantly lower than actual estimates. Thus there are not likely to be cost savings. While maintaining the installation as a military operation is the preferred alternative, it should be noted that the Army has been very diligent in managing the property and the environmental issues. It is feasible that continued high-level DOD occupancy at Fort Monroe would allow greater flexibility and time in completing some aspects of these activities

Fort Eustis

The presence of Defense activities and military installations in the Hampton Roads area make it a centerpiece in the region and on the East Coast with robust joint service mission activities. A review of a listing of military installations and commands in the Hampton Roads area quickly underscores the significant level of "jointness" the Department of Defense enjoys in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth provides tremendous resources for diverse training of all the Services and venues to support their requirements, both individually and jointly, for a significant portion of the nation's military functions.

The regional compatibility and infrastructure capacity for military missions make Fort Eustis an excellent fit as the new home for the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Installation Management Agency Southeast and Northeast Region Headquarters, Network Command, and the Northeast Region Army Contract Agency should Fort Monroe close. We support the decision by the Defense Department to retain this installation and to leave the important four-star TRADOC command on the Virginia Peninsula.

Fort Eustis provides proximity to commands including Air Force Air Combat Command, the Navy's Fleet Forces Command, Naval Network Warfare Command, Naval Submarine

Forces, Atlantic Fleet and the Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, as well as the Joint Forces Command encouraging the continued enhancement of joint operations critical to these particular missions. The military synergy of the Hampton Roads area is unparalleled by any other area of the nation with the exception of the National Capital Region.

Fort Eustis has land for new facilities in any imaginable configuration. With a total of 8,300 acres, 475 of which are buildable, the installation is more than sufficient in size to offer a very secure environment from a force protection perspective. It also has the infrastructure, including fiber optic capabilities necessary for a modern office environment. The nearby Oakland Industrial Park, home of the East Coast's Army and Air Force Exchange Service Distribution Center, has an outstanding record of utility reliability.

As with all military operations in the area, Fort Eustis offers military personnel a concentration of medical, educational and recreational facilities. A network of exchange facilities throughout the region also contributes to the high quality of life through excellent service to both active duty and retired military personnel.

Given Fort Eustis's high military value, however we would vigorously question the recommendation to relocate the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) Operations Center and its related Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA), as well as the SDDC Command Headquarters in Alexandria to Scott Air Force Base in Illinois. All but one of these was consolidated at Fort Eustis and in Newport News at substantial expense and work force disruption as a result of the 1995 BRAC process. The SDDC Operations Center routinely coordinates the work of joint service activities whose commands are already concentrated within the Hampton Roads region.

Just as the Department of Defense has recognized that the Military Sealift Command should remain at the Washington Navy Yard on the East Coast, consolidation of the SDDC should occur in the Hampton Roads region to achieve complete regional command consolidation.

The City of Newport News has offered to construct, at favorable financial terms to the government, the needed facilities to accommodate all elements of SDDC at Fort Eustis. The city's proposal was offered in tandem with an Army decision in early 2004 to consolidate SDDC headquarters at the installation. The reversal of this decision by the Headquarters and Support Activity Joint Cross Service Group was based on force protection and mission consolidation considerations. However, this decision seems to focus primarily on consolidation of headquarters personnel at Scott Air Force Base rather than the military mission interests or operational cost considerations.

The consolidation of these mission commands and operations at Fort Eustis would meet the operational needs of the Army and USTRANSCOM and is the least costly alternative. Consolidating SDDC at Fort Eustis would eliminate the need for $40 million in new construction at Scott Air Force Base, an installation with limited available capacity. The military value advantage is that Fort Eustis is "optimally located for mission accomplishment that supports

power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge."

The package of recommendations related to SDDC should be carefully examined and overturned.

The Department of Defense realignment recommendation to relocate the Transportation School at Fort Eustis to Fort Lee also demands critical analysis. As it was objectively described to Chairman Anthony J. Principi and Commissioner Lloyd W. Newton during the May 25, 2005 Fort Eustis site visit, the calculations that resulted in this recommendation did not include important pertinent data. Fort Eustis offers unique multi-modal facilities including an airfield, a deep-water port and an active Army railroad network. These facilities are not present at Fort Lee. Realigning watercraft, cargo specialist and rail training activities for the Transportation School would require an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in new facilities at Fort Lee – a cost not included in the BRAC analysis or the COBRA analysis.

Fort Lee supported this position during a BRAC Commission site visit to Fort Lee on June 27, 2005. The installation has recommended that the Maritime Training, Cargo Training, and Rail Training activities of the Transportation School remain in place at Fort Eustis given its ability to provide necessary facilities.

Naval Station Norfolk

Hampton Roads is the fourth largest metropolitan area in the Southeast and has a significant military population and numerous military installations. It offers significant infrastructure advantages including world class port facilities, extensive road and rail networks, as well as two major military airfields and two major commercial airports. Most notably, Hampton Roads is second only to the Pentagon for its concentration of military decision-makers in the U.S.

The Naval Station Norfolk is part of the extremely large Hampton Roads Naval Complex which includes approximately 83,000 active duty personnel and 27,500 federal civilian employees on approximately 4,600 acres. The Naval Station has 75 ships and 13 afloat staffs home ported with 13 piers. It is the home of the Atlantic Fleet Headquarters and homeport to five nuclear aircraft carriers and a large number of cruisers, destroyers, large amphibious ships, submarines and a variety of supply and logistics ships. Naval Station Norfolk is the largest navy base in the world. Among the 29 U.S. Navy bases that homeport surface ships and submarines, the Naval Station Norfolk ranks number two in military value, second only to strategically located Pearl Harbor.

With a total docking capacity of over 97 cruiser equivalents, Norfolk is the Navy's largest homeport in terms of capacity to base ships. More than 100 surface ships and submarines called Norfolk home during the height of the Cold War. Over the past 15 years, the number of ships homeported in Norfolk has dwindled, leaving ample pier space and support infrastructure to support mission expansions. The BRAC data calls clearly show that Naval Station Norfolk

has sufficient excess basing capacity to fully accommodate the additional forces and missions proposed for realignment to Norfolk.

Over the years, the Norfolk Naval Complex has evolved into a unique region of the U.S. and serves as the Navy's only major combatant fleet staging and training area on the East Coast. These key capabilities more than meet the Department of Defense BRAC principle which calls for "secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy."

Norfolk Naval Station is located at a point in the Chesapeake Bay where three rivers enter the Bay, which connects with the Atlantic Ocean. This configuration provides maximum flushing potential – from both river movements and tidal action – to move suspended solids in the water out to deeper ocean depths and minimize the amount of dredging required to maintain necessary water depths of up to 50 feet.

We support the Department of Defense recommendations to expand missions at Norfolk Naval Station. The base offers 25 percent excess capacity for ships. The Department of Defense BRAC recommendations place a high Military Value on the capability of a base to expand and handle multiple missions.

Submarines continue to play a vital role in the post-Cold War era. The Navy's Vice Admiral Charles Munns on June 13, 2005 reported to the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces that the Navy's combatant commanders already ask for about 50 percent more daily submarine missions than he can provide. Further, it was reported that the Navy's submarine fleet is assuming increasing importance as the Defense Department recognizes its ability to do things that cannot be accomplished any other way. Norfolk Naval Station is well-prepared to support additional submarines from the New London, CT, base that is recommended for closure.

New London, CT homeports 16 nuclear submarines. Because they are in port 75 percent of the time, the closure of the New London submarine base would necessitate the ability of Norfolk Naval Station and the Navy's submarine facilities in Kings Bay, GA to bed down 12 at a time – the number of submarines to each has yet to be announced. A nuclear submarine is three-fourths of a cruiser equivalent (CGE), so measured in CGEs , the question becomes the base's capability to bed down 8.4 CGEs divided between bases in Norfolk and Kings Bay. Norfolk has excess capacity of almost 19 CGEs and Kings Bay has excess capacity of 9.5 CGEs. So from a capacity analysis perspective, there is more than enough capacity at the bases in Norfolk and Kings Bay to bed down the 16 New London submarines. In fact, Norfolk has enough excess pier space to homeport all 16 New London submarines even if they never went to sea (12 CGE required, 19 CGE available).

Virginia and her local governments are proud of both their historic role in housing national defense activities and in their strong commitment to supporting and assisting the Department of Defense in successfully achieving its objectives. Both Virginia and her local

governments stand ready, willing and able to handle growth to Virginia military installations - additional operations, personnel and families will be wholeheartedly supported and housed:

- Virginia is served by a strong transportation infrastructure including interstate highways, major rail lines and international airports. The Virginia Department of Transportation will work with the Naval Station Norfolk as planned improvements are funded such as the reconstruction of Route 337 from Rogers Avenue to "B" Avenue; the interchange at Route 337 and Route 406; the I-564 Intermodal Connector and Chambers Field interchange. The Virginia Department of Transportation will also continue seeking aggressive demand management strategies, such as ridesharing, flextime and telecommuting.
- Virginia has a highly regarded public educational system and many of the leading public universities and colleges in the country are located here. The Virginia Department of Education will work with localities to ensure that local schools can provide a quality education to the children of military families;
- The quality of life enjoyed in Virginia by military families is high – a Virginia "posting" is welcomed by families, especially those with school aged children. Virginia has 120 recreation and natural areas including 35 state parks that were voted "America's Best" and many historical and cultural attractions;
- The quality and availability of civilian health care services is critical to successful military operations and essential to an acceptable quality of life. Premium health care services are readily available in Virginia, which ranks in the top ten states in the nation in access to health care services, according to a 2003 study by the Morgan Quitno Corporation. The Virginia Department of Health offers a complete array of health services including Child Health Services, Family Planning Services, Maternal health Services and Communicable Disease Services to those who qualify based on annual income levels;
- Virginia was recently rated by Governing magazine as the best managed state in the U.S. and is one of only seven states having an AAA bond rating from all three rating agencies;

The impacts of military installation mission growth or expansion off the installation, such as housing, utility enhancements, transportation, education, and recreation, are managed by local communities or regional alliances in Virginia, with the strong support of the Commonwealth and its state agencies.

Norfolk Naval Shipyard

Norfolk Naval Shipyard is the East Coast's largest Federal facility for ship, aircraft carrier, and submarine overhauls, maintenance and modernization. The Shipyard provides logistic support for assigned ships and service craft; performs work in connection with conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, dry-docking and outfitting of ships and craft; performs manufacturing, research, development and test work; and provides services and material to other activities and units. The shipyard can accommodate any ship in the fleet. State-of-the-art

technology provides capability to service nuclear, as well as conventional ships of all sizes and types, from tugboats to submarines to aircraft carriers.

The Navy ranks Norfolk number one in Military Value among its shipyards and number three overall among the Navy's 29 major surface ship and submarine facilities.

A former colonial shipyard, it was established in 1767 under the British flag and actually predates the U.S. Navy. It became the Navy's nucleus in the Hampton Roads area with the evolution of the Norfolk Naval Station.

Strategically situated on the southern branch of the Elizabeth River, the Shipyard secures a key Center of Excellence for U.S. Naval operations in the South Hampton Roads region with its proximity to the Norfolk Naval Station and Naval Air Station Oceana in neighboring Virginia Beach.

Norfolk Naval Shipyard sits on approximately 800 acres with almost four million square feet of production space, houses eight dry docks, 400 cranes, four miles of waterfront and an outstanding infrastructure of roads and rail service. On a typical day, the Shipyard is servicing about 15 percent of the Navy's active fleet.

Of the four public Navy shipyards located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Portsmouth, Virginia; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and Bremerton, Washington, only Norfolk Naval Shipyard has the capability and capacity to work on all classes of military ships including nuclear-fueled ones.

In addition to the public shipyard, the Hampton Roads includes a number of private shipyards which greatly augment the public yard's capabilities. Such shipyards include; Northrop Grumman Newport News, Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock, Moon Engineering, Metro Machine, Norshipco, and Marine Hydraulics to name a few. The Hampton Roads area currently offers a robust Center of Excellence which can handle any and all ship repair and maintenance issues. This maritime industry complex embraces the Military Value BRAC principle that "the Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces." Another routine capability of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard is to dispatch work teams around the world to work on ships. In fact, in the spirit of "jointness," Navy welders, electricians, boilermakers and steelworkers from the shipyard are "up-armoring" Army trucks in Kuwait. They are wrapping soldiers in heavy metal to protect them as they drive ammunition and supplies through Iraq. This Hampton Roads complex provides the complete maritime package that can rightfully be called a Maritime Center of Excellence.

The Norfolk Naval Shipyard workforce has varied from a high point of over 40,000 during World War II, to 14,500 at the close of the Cold War in 1990 to the current level of 7,500. The shipyard has an excellent four-year apprentice program covering all required trades and skill sets. The apprentice program has 550 students in training at any given time and expects to graduate approximately 175 fully qualified tradesmen annually over the next several years. The Norfolk Naval Shipyard also has a sizeable pool of trained personnel available in the civilian

community due to the concentration of private sector shipbuilding and repair facilities located in Hampton Roads. The BRAC capacity analyses and workload projections prove that Norfolk Naval Shipyard has ample capacity to absorb the nuclear work being proposed for realignment to Norfolk beginning in Fiscal Year 2008, which is the year during which the workload associated with refueling 688 Class SSNs falls off significantly.

The impacts of military installation mission growth or expansion, such as housing, utility enhancements, transportation, education, and recreation, are managed by local communities or regional alliances in Virginia, with the strong support of the Commonwealth and its agencies. For example, the Virginia Department of Transportation is confident that NNSY can easily accommodate their projected growth through the completion of the Pinners Point interchange in Portsmouth.

Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana

The third side of the Naval Center of Excellence in South Hampton Roads is NAS Oceana, which actually was established as an "auxiliary airfield" to the Norfolk Naval Complex. The original 328-acre airfield was located in an isolated, swampy area close enough to the Atlantic Coast to serve the needs of naval aviation in the World War II era. The airfield grew significantly and was designated as "Naval Auxiliary Station Oceana," an auxiliary field to the Naval Air Center in Hampton Roads in 1943. As it expanded, it earned the designation of Naval Air Station in 1952. As jet aircraft were introduced into naval aviation, Oceana became a valuable training installation.

Oceana has grown 16 times larger – to more than 5,331 acres within the fence and an additional 3,680 acres in restrictive easements outside the main fence – and is now comprised of several installations/activities: the "Main Base," the 2,560-acre Naval Auxiliary Landing Field (NALF) Fentress with an additional 8,780 acres of restricted easements, Dam Neck-Combat Direction Systems and Fleet Combat Training Center and Chambers Field at Naval Station Norfolk.

We applaud the Department of Defense for recognizing the value of retaining Oceana in its BRAC recommendations. Oceana is the Navy's Master Jet Base on the East Coast. It is home to 19 fighter/attack squadrons flying F-14 and F-18 aircraft and a Search and Rescue unit – flying the SH-3 Sea King helicopter – that provides rescue services for both military and civilian communities. Oceana's primary mission is to train and deploy Navy fighter/attack squadrons to "support the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific Fleet force of Strike-Fighter Aircraft and Joint Operations." Its daytime onboard strength is approximately 12,300.

The main base is located about three and a half miles from the Atlantic Ocean. Although the main base has approximately 317 buildings, it has a reported 1,000 build-able acres that could potentially be used for other facilities.

Oceana has been evaluated in the Operational Air Station subcategory, along with 19 other air-facilities and stations operated for Navy and Marine Corps active and reserve units. The subcategory included activities that had a "principal mission to home port, support, provide

training facilities and operate a base from which operational and training missions can be flown by Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons."

A series of data calls were performed by the Navy to obtain required information to fairly assess the relative merits of the 20 installations included in the subcategory. Capacity data calls measured the ability to house, maintain and operate aviation units. The available training infrastructure and sufficient support facilities were of particular importance.

The finding that a 22 percent excess capacity existed in this subcategory prompted a military value analysis of operational assets needed to support flying units such as training ranges, special use airspace outlying/auxiliary airfields and encroachment/environmental factors that were or could reduce future mission capabilities. This analysis indicated the Navy could achieve its goals by closing 7 and retaining 13 air stations. Scenarios were then developed to test alternate solutions – in all scenarios, Oceana was retained.

The City of Virginia Beach and surrounding region have a long and successful history of supporting growth of the area's military activities.

Most recently, the City Council has acted to address the new Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) instruction which expanded the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) to deem residences within the 65 to 74 decibel noise level to be "incompatible and encroaching on Oceana. The Virginia Beach City Council, in concert with the cities of Norfolk and Chesapeake, and the Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment, recently completed a Joint Land Use Study (JLUS). Designed to identify how the adjacent cities can grow without jeopardizing the military mission, the study was endorsed by all communities involved and prompted the creation of a permanent regional committee to address ongoing concerns about jet noise and other issues that affect residents and local military bases.

Cited by participants as one of the most positive steps ever taken in the region to build partnerships between military leaders and local communities, the study includes proposals to amend Virginia Beach's Comprehensive Plan and outlines the creation of a new zoning overlay district aligned with the Navy's noise and accident potential zones. A key result of this proposal is that Virginia Beach has agreed to retain agricultural zoning of one residential lot per 15 acres in the inter-facility zone between Oceana Naval Air Station and Fentress Auxiliary Field at or above 75 dB Day and Night Level (DNL) and amend the Comprehensive Plan to retain agricultural zoning with residential density not to exceed one dwelling per five acres in the 70 to 75 dB Day and Night Level (DNL) noise zone. The City agreed to limit density to one dwelling per acre in the 65-70 dB DNL noise zone. The City also agreed to consider ways to substantially reduce the number of residential units allowed by current zoning in the Resort Area.

Based on legislation recently passed by the Virginia General Assembly, sound attenuation laws would be expanded to certain non-residential uses and disclosures of noise and/or accident potential zones would be improved for the sale or lease of residential units.

In 1995, the City of Virginia Beach demonstrated its support for Oceana by obtaining authority from the Virginia General Assembly for the creation of an Airport Zoning Ordinance,

which allows the City to better plan for development around Oceana and to require noise attenuation where appropriate.

Furthermore, the City of Virginia Beach has invested many millions of dollars to accommodate the Navy's needs at Oceana. The City of Virginia Beach has invested $202 million in transportation improvements around Oceana during the last decade. This includes Dam Neck Road, the intersection of London Bridge Road and Great Neck Road, Oceana Boulevard, and the currently approved Birdneck Road project. The southeastern Parkway and Greenbelt (SEPG) will hopefully be constructed within the next eight years, which will provide interstate access from Oceana to I-64 in Chesapeake. Oceana already has excellent access to I-264.

The City of Virginia Beach has also invested in other community improvements including relocating schools at the request of previous BRAC rounds, providing a world-class education system and a quality living environment for the service men and women and their families who enjoy tremendous job opportunities for spousal and family employment, higher education opportunities, a tremendous support network for military families with special needs children, miles of beaches, public parks and other attributes too numerous to mention. Service men and women and their families love Virginia Beach and love being stationed at the installation.

A survey conducted in early 2004 by the firm of Bennett, Petts and Blumenthal found that an overwhelming majority (86 %) of Virginia Beach residents are opposed to closing Oceana. Ninety percent of those surveyed believe Oceana is "good for the people of Virginia Beach." More than half of all Virginia Beach residents surveyed do not believe the jet noise from Oceana is particularly loud. (Survey summary attached)

Oceana enjoys inherent strength from its high replacement value of over $1.5 billion and the region is blanketed with high-quality training venues. Military air crew training requires dedicated and specialized airspace to achieve and remain combat-ready. The Military Training Routes, Restricted Areas, Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas and other Special Use Airspace available over the area and just off the mid-Atlantic Coast support the full spectrum of training requirements for naval aviators. Additionally, the ability to train in a "joint environment" within the region is an important attribute of the installation and jointness is a Department of Defense emphasis item for the BRAC 2005 round.

Oceana's location adjacent to the city of Norfolk, where the majority of the East Coast aircraft carriers are stationed, is also very advantageous for military families. Personnel, before and after deployments, can stay with their family, even as they load and unload the carriers and other ships during the day and stay with them up until the morning of their departure and immediately upon their return from deployment. Locating tactical air and other assets away from Oceana would mean military personnel would – a week before and a week after every deployment – be forced to leave their families to move support gear and other assets to the carriers, in essence adding two weeks or so to every deployment. This can only have a deleterious effect on retention.

Of particular importance to any decision regarding Oceana is the National Command Authority activity supported by Oceana Naval Air Station. The support of those operators has historically and must now also be given a high priority in any discussion you have on the future of Oceana.

Naval Medical Center Portsmouth

Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth occupies a 112-acre site along the Elizabeth River in downtown Portsmouth, Virginia. It is located on the original site of Fort Nelson which was built in 1776 to provide harbor defense for Norfolk and Portsmouth. In 1826, a Naval Hospital Fund was established by taxing every Officer, Seaman and Marine in the Navy. In 1827 construction began on the Naval Hospital, and by July 1830 a portion of Building One was occupied. Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth has provided continuous care since that time and remains the oldest hospital in the U.S. Navy.

In 1960 Building 215 was constructed to accommodate the ever-increasing demands of the Naval Medical Center. As the military establishment grew, Naval Medical Center Portsmouth became the major military medical facility serving active duty Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard, their families, retired personnel, their dependents and other beneficiaries authorized treatment in uniformed services clinics and hospitals.

Through its extensive graduate Medical Education Programs, the Naval Medical Center conducts internships and residency training in medicine, dentistry, psychology, and pastoral care. As one of three major teaching hospitals in the Navy, Naval Medical Center Portsmouth offers residency programs in 13 specialty areas. Each year, approximately 75 officers complete internships at the Naval Medical Center.

In June 1990, the Naval Medical Center broke ground on a major construction project designed to build a modern replacement hospital with extensive support structures and services over the next 10 years. The project was completed in 1998 and began operations in 1999. The Charette Health Care center is a 1.02 million square foot facility and the most modern available in the Naval inventory. The center contains over 300 clinical exam rooms, 140 specialty exam rooms and 17 operating rooms. In its first year there were over 392,000 outpatient visits, 859,115 pharmacy visits and over 5,500 inpatient surgeries. In addition to the eight clinics in Hampton roads the Charette Health Care Center is well poised to serve the medical needs of the half-million military beneficiaries well into the next century.

We urge the Commission to reconsider the realignment of the Naval Medical Center in Portsmouth to relocate basic and specialty enlisted medical training to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

We share the goal of streamlining the military base structure, but the streamlining must not degrade war fighting capabilities and support. In this case, the issue is not whether – but how and where – to best consolidate the military's medical training and research capabilities.

We believe that the Department of Defense recommendation goes too far in over-centralizing these critical activities at one location, in this case Fort Sam Houston in Texas.

While consolidation has benefits, we believe that the Pentagon's recommendation swings the pendulum too far. Instead of locating the training and research at several bases around the country, these functions would best be performed as they currently are at Portsmouth Naval Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston and Great Lakes in Illinois.

The presence of Defense, in particular U.S. Navy, activities and military installations in the Hampton Roads area – second only in the nation to the National Capital Region would suggest that a medical training facility such as that at the Naval Medical Center Portsmouth should remain in proximity to the largest navy base in the world.

The current arrangement is a stronger, more secure platform for the future and avoids the syndrome of "putting all your eggs in one basket," or in this case, one base. This more balanced approach would provide needed savings, operational flexibility and a level of healthy redundancy.

It appears that the Pentagon's recommendation for the Medical Center was made without adequate consideration of either the military value advantages of keeping this program at current facilities such as the highly regarded Portsmouth Naval Medical Center or the financial risks of implementing the recommended action. The recommended action to consolidate training at Fort Sam Houston Texas, as demonstrated by the Department of Defense's own calculations is a risky venture. The entire recommended action is estimated to cost more than one billion dollars, approximately 4 percent of the entire cost of this BRAC round, which is more than double the cost of the four BRAC rounds of the late 1980s and 1990s. The Department of Defense predicts that it will take 10 years to get a pay back on this investment which is about fifteen years from now. Very few businesses would take on an investment of this magnitude and lengthy payback period because of conditions that will certainly change several times over the next fifteen years. Please compare this lengthy payback period with actions recommended by the Department in previous rounds where the average payback periods appear to be considerably shorter, particularly since no investment needs to be made to maintain the status quo that has provided more than adequate service for many years.

For military value, financial risks and local economic concerns, we urge the BRAC Commission to reverse the contemplated downsizing of Portsmouth Naval Medical Center.

Based on the record, excellence of training capability and capacity, and training redundancy, we would hope that the Commission will concur that Portsmouth Naval Medical Center is a base that should be expanded, not downsized.

Fort Belvoir

As a strategic sustaining U.S. Army base, Fort Belvoir is vital to meeting the goals and objectives of the nation's defense strategy. Fort Belvoir is home to more than 112 tenant organizations including one Army major command headquarters and elements of 10 others; 19

different agencies and direct reporting units of the Department of Army; eight elements of the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard; and 26 Department of Defense agencies. Also found at Fort Belvoir is a Marine Corps detachment, a U.S. Air Force activity, and an agency from the Department of the Treasury.

Fort Belvoir is recommended for realignment, both gaining and losing agencies, and stands to gain a net of up to 18,000 people. The base, the local community and the Commonwealth are prepared to aggressively facilitate this significant growth in the BRAC 2005 process.

The installation has been preparing for substantial growth prior to the BRAC 2005 recommendations. The planning process is firmly in place to continue that growth to accommodate for the addition of the realigned activities/functions. By 2011, Fort Belvoir had planned for 1,630 new houses for military families to replace existing houses scheduled to be demolished in phases. Additionally, 170 historic Colonial brick houses are scheduled for renovation for the families of senior officers.

A privatization of the installation housing has streamlined the process and greatly improved its management. Under a partnership with the military, Clark Pinnacle Residential Communities has taken over management of the existing installation housing and has constructed the first cluster of homes for enlisted personnel, called Herryford Village.

Installation commanders, including Major General Galen B. Jackman, MDW commanding general, have recognized the importance of working in tandem with the local and state officials, and all involved are optimistic about preparing for the installation's growth given its potential impact on the infrastructure of schools and roads, among other things. Local leaders and representatives from Fort Belvoir have already participated in a series of meetings to prepare for the BRAC changes.

Fort Belvoir Installation Commander Col. Thomas W. Williams has pledged to maintain constant communication with community leaders as the results of the BRAC process unfold in the coming months and years. Officials from Prince William and Fairfax counties and Fort Belvoir have been very supportive of the installation and its efforts to work together in planning for the anticipated growth.

Fairfax County has formed a Fort Belvoir Committee chaired by the county's Lee District supervisor, Dana Kauffman. The Committee will be an important resource as the installation continues to plan for BRAC changes. The Committee will also work closely with Fort Belvoir's BRAC Implementation team, which is currently at work examining potential scenarios and locations for new functions.

The Fairfax County Executive, Anthony H. Griffin, has confirmed the County's commitment to support the proposed transfers to Fort Belvoir. The County's top-rated school system, which currently serves approximately 166,000 students in grades K through 12, will work to accommodate any additional students from families moving to the County as a result of the recommended realignment at Fort Belvoir.

Of the approximately 18,000 additional civilian and military employees slated to move to Fort Belvoir, the largest percentage of those – nearly 9,000 people – would be employees of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), a combat support agency with offices currently in Virginia, Washington, D.C. and Maryland. The synergistic value of bringing together all of the NGA's East Coast employees into one facility supports the proposed realignment as it fulfills the BRAC Principle of Organization: "force structure sized, composed and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other Department of Defense organizations and that takes advantage of opportunities for joint basing."

According to NGA officials, the agency would require approximately 150 acres of land and 2.2 million square feet of office space to accommodate its employees. The Engineer Proving Grounds (EPG) at Fort Belvoir has been identified as an ideal future home for the NGA. It has approximately 540 acres available for development at the installation.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment has jurisdiction over any redevelopment at the EPG. However, installation leaders have pointed out that there is adequate space on Fort Belvoir to build a complex to accommodate the NGA without using the EPG. Installation capacity will be significantly increased with the proposed realignment of the Army Materiel Command and the Security Assistance Command to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

Fairfax County elected officials have reported that the addition of the NGA personnel to Fort Belvoir would have a minimal impact on traffic because of non-traditional work schedules. NGA employees work on a 24-hour clock.

Virginia, together with county planners, is preparing for the impact on transportation from all of the recommended realignments to Fort Belvoir. While numerous options to facilitate people and vehicle movement are being considered, Virginia is focused on three primary areas. The Virginia Department of Transportation is investigating ways to improve traffic flow on the Route 1 corridor. This includes the expansion of Route 1 itself and the development of other roads which could redirect some of the current traffic in the area. The Fairfax Parkway is also slated for completion to four lanes. We are currently waiting for access to the property to begin construction. The Commonwealth of Virginia and Fairfax County stand ready to begin on Fairfax Parkway as soon as possible. This should significantly improve traffic flow. VDOT also suggests maximizing use of the Engineer Proving Grounds on the west side of I-95. Fort Belvoir and the associated Engineer Proving Grounds will be better positioned to accommodate the projected growth if the following planned improvements are completed as scheduled; Route1 widened from Lorton to Telegraph Road, widen I-95 from Newington to Occoquan, and expand bus service in the Route 1 Corridor. Once the Ft. Belvoir and Engineer Proving Ground land uses have been established, VDOT, working with Fairfax County, has already identified other projects and programs to address growth concerns.

One of the major gains for the post is the relocation of primary and specialty patient care from Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Maryland to Fort Belvoir, where a new, expanded

hospital would be built. Under Walter Reed's realignment, its patient care would be joined with the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, MD. By combining the two medical care facilities' capabilities, a Walter Reed National Military Medical Center would be established at Fort Belvoir.

Fort Belvoir had planned to break ground in 2006 for a 26-bed inpatient hospital near the North Post's Commissary and Post Exchange. With the BRAC realignment recommendations for Walter Reed, those plans have been put on hold. Now plans are underway to build a 165-bed Defense joint service facility which would add 2,069 additional military and civilian slots and would be slated to open in 2011.

The installation's DeWitt Army Community Hospital currently serves beneficiaries of all the Armed Forces. Half of the beneficiaries are Army and the remainder is comprised of Air Force, Navy and Marine forces.

One particular tenant of note recommended for movement from Fort Belvoir is the Army's Night Vision Lab (NVL). The Night Vision Lab is the recognized world leader for night vision sensor and countermine research and development. NVL's products revolutionized the way the U.S. forces fight and give us a well-documented advantage in combat. NVL employs more than 500 people along with 200 civilian support contractors. About 340 of these personnel are scientists and engineers having specialties in numerous advanced and unique sensor areas such as molecular beam epitaxy, laser design, sensor design/testing, infrared sensor optical design/testing, focal plane arrays and numerous others. These specialties are learned over time on the job through mentoring and experience. They are not taught at colleges and universities. Thus the personnel supply for these critical skills are limited. It is expected that a critical number (some estimate 75 percent to 80 percent) of these scientists and engineers will not relocate to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland. The reconstitution of this workforce loss will take up to 5 to10 years as these specialists require security clearances and on the job mentoring. Both quick reaction capabilities and carefully planned research and development programs will undoubtedly be disrupted. This disruption could cause a sensor advantage loss to nations such as China and France. The key military value principle this movement violates is that "the Department (DoD) must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated ... to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and Service doctrine and tactics." Damaging a rapid response capability, disrupting new development, and risking our advantage in sensor technology are not ways to maintain or improve mission capabilities. The second BRAC military value principle involves equipping: "... effectively place superior technology in the hands of the war fighter to meet the current and future threats." The bottom line is that the Army will lose uniquely skilled personnel which will disrupt the continued development of the superior technology that enables the U.S. to overmatch our combatant foes on the battlefields of today.

We would appreciate the opportunity to meet with staff on the question of the military value of this recommendation.

Fort Lee

U.S. Army Garrison Fort Lee is situated on 5,849 acres east of Petersburg. It is the home to 19 U.S. Army tenant operations including the Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster Center and School and the Army Logistics Management College. It currently employs 2,500 civilians, 434 NAF employees and 565 contractor personnel, in addition to its 2,800 military personnel. Approximately 3,000 families live on the installation and the average daily student load is approximately 4,000.

We support the recommendation to consolidate and expand missions at Fort Lee. The installation offers a high degree of military value, and we are pleased the Department of Defense has recognized Fort Lee for consolidation of its joint services missions including the Combat Service Support (CSS) Center, Defense Commissary Agency and the Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Arts Training.

In addition to its 1,800 buildable acres, Fort Lee has recently accumulated 333 acres from the Commonwealth of Virginia and the federal government. This acreage is available for additional training area. Also, the Commonwealth welcomes the opportunity to work with Fort Lee to share training facilities at Fort Pickett through an Interservice Support Agreement.

With over 35,000 acres of available maneuver training area at Fort Pickett, its training area consists of diverse terrain with few environmental constraints. It offers the best in both mounted and dismounted infantry training. Open upland savannas, with rolling contours and patches of cover, lend themselves effectively to both mounted and dismounted operations. Three platoon-sized lanes have been developed offering "open/broken" terrain, typically intermixed with patches of forest. The installation offers 2,924 acres of training land unconstrained by environmental issues and has unrestricted airspace. Terrain is being managed to closely resemble the eastern European theater. The prescribed burn program in use at Fort Pickett has opened the understory significantly to facilitate maneuvering. The ultimate goal is to provide "GO" terrain for all types of combat arms, combat support, and CSS units.

Virginia looks forward to continuing to work closely with Fort Lee along with the six jurisdictions surrounding the installation including the cities of Colonial Heights, Hopewell and Petersburg and the counties of Chesterfield, Dinwiddie and Prince George to provide infrastructure support including transportation improvements, education facilities and housing options. The Virginia Department of Transportation has reviewed the transportation issues and believes that Fort Lee can easily accommodate its projected growth. The key improvements to be made are on Route 36 and the I-95/Rives Road interchange. In addition, VDOT recommends that Fort Lee should consider expanded bus service from Richmond and Petersburg; look at demand management strategies such as ridesharing, flex time and telecommuting; and security check and facility entrances designed to avoid queing onto public highways. The area cost of living compares quite favorably with the rest of Virginia and the nation with higher than average annual incomes and lower than average housing costs.

State and local efforts to work in tandem with installation leadership to provide for the needs of Fort Lee and its personnel are ongoing. Three years ago, representatives from the surrounding jurisdictions formed the Tri-Cities Area BRAC Policy Initiative to ensure that the region would speak with one voice and address installation needs effectively and cohesively.

The communities provide further support through the Crater Planning District Commission, which is comprised of 10 local governments in south central Virginia. Established in 1970, the Commission includes the cities of Colonial Heights, Emporia, Hopewell and Petersburg and the counties of Chesterfield, Dinwiddie, Greensville, Prince George, Surry and Sussex. Commission representatives include local elected officials and community leaders. The Commission has fully endorsed the proposed growth at Fort Lee and is confident that the area infrastructure will be able to support full implementation of the Department of Defense recommendations for growth at Fort Lee. The Commonwealth and local communities welcome the additions to the installation and are committed to assisting in the transition for Fort Lee.

From a regional standpoint, Fort Lee also benefits from being part of the Richmond-Petersburg MSA, which offers military families a great quality of life and numerous choices for housing and education.

Marine Corps Base Quantico

The Fredericksburg Regional Chamber of Commerce, localities, and the Commonwealth of Virginia realize the important role of the defense industry in the Fredericksburg Region. Community leaders actively support the defense industry and the installations in the region and regularly interact with the state and congressional delegations. This ongoing support and energy has led to the funding of several high priority military construction projects to ensure future warfighting capabilities. These include the Electromagnetic Launch RDT&E Facility at Dahlgren, the Combined Arms Collective Training Facility (CACTF) at Fort A. P. Hill, and the Network Operations Center (NOC) at Marine Corps Base Quantico. The Fredericksburg Chamber and localities have begun the planning dialogue to accommodate growth for the Fredericksburg Region and its military installations. We will encourage planning efforts with Stafford and Prince William counties which examine development of the underutilized northwest portion of the base.

The Region offers:

- An excellent multi-modal transportation network.
- Modern utility systems with excess capacity.
- Extensive fiber-optic network.
- A highly skilled labor force of over 909,000 individuals within commuting distance.
- Access to extensive, quality health care.
- Access to abundant historic, cultural and recreational amenities.

Marine Corps Base Quantico is situated on approximately 60,000 acres about 35 miles south of Washington, D.C. Known as the "Crossroads of the Marine Corps," the base has approximately 54,000 acres of range and training areas and is home to approximately 18 tenant commands and interagency organizations such as the FBI Academy and Crime Laboratory.

Quantico's secure western campus and training area has been recommended as a receiver site for the Military Department Investigation Agencies with the Department of Defense

Counterintelligence and Security Agency to include all components of the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and Defense Security Service (DSS), which includes about 3,000 people.

The proposed realignment produces operational synergies by locating entities with similar or related missions and meets the BRAC principle which espouses secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment, that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge and that ensure strategic redundancy.

The recommended realignment also supports a primary Department of Defense objective to rationalize the presence of Department of Defense activities within the National Capital Region – resulting in a significant improvement in military value.

Base infrastructure upgrades, available developmental areas on base at approximately two million square feet, and force protection capability make Quantico an excellent location for additional missions offering the required force protection.

From Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) standpoint, MCB Quantico is well-positioned to accommodate the projected increase of personnel. Planning and coordination must take place between Prince William County, Stafford County, and VDOT to maximize the underutilized base areas on the west side of I-95; design security check and facility entrances to avoid queing onto public highways, and design facility access points to maximize the use of bus, HOV and HOT lane facilities in the I-95 and Route 1 corridors. VDOT has identified other projects to further position MCB Quantico for anticipated growth which include; main gate security improvements, expansion of I-95 interchange to provide direct access to underutilized base areas on the west side of I-95; and extend HOV/HOT lanes on I-95 from Stafford County to Dumfries.

Naval District Washington, West Area, Dahlgren

Naval District Washington, West Area, Dahlgren, known as the Dahlgren Military Complex, is located approximately 50 miles southeast of Washington, D.C. It is home to four major tenant commands including one of the Navy's lead research and development laboratories (NSWCDD), a joint operations command (JWAC), a space operations command (NNSOC), and a training command (CSCS/ATRC). Situated on approximately 4,300 acres, Dahlgren provides an integrated, high tech and intellectual excellence environment with a scientific edge and systems engineering competency. Jointness between services and missions that have been identified as the keys to the transformation of the nation's Defense are already well-established at Dahlgren. Further supporting the military value of this installation is the fact that Dahlgren is the location of the only over-the-water instrumented testing range critical for regularly testing naval gunnery, future military weaponry, and joint homeland defense programs (such as Chemical and Biological Defense).

The installation is equipped to provide force protection with sensor systems and secure building access, updated and modern self-sufficient on-base utility sources. Dahlgren's unique and modern facilities include approximately one million square feet built in the last 15 years and approximately 162,000 square feet now under construction. The installation also has state-of-the-art information technology infrastructure with a fiber optic network available and designated areas available for development to accommodate 1.7 million square feet of space and more than 8,000 additional personnel.

We want to highlight what appear to be inconsistencies in the BRAC report regarding two items of realignment at Dahlgren.

The recommended realignment to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ would relocate the gun and ammunition research and development and acquisition at Dahlgren to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. We believe this consolidation does not enhance military value given the following situations:

1. **The application of large guns is different for the Army and the Navy.** Other than tanks, Army artillery guns/howitzers are not stabilized or integrated onto a platform as are Navy guns. Furthermore the expected need for range of Army guns is 40 kilometers or 21.6 nautical miles. The Navy needs to stand offshore 25 nautical miles in order to fire 25 to 200 nautical miles deep on shore to support U. S. Marine Corps requirements and to provide a "hit" without risking expensive armaments such as a tomahawk missile.
2. **In the case of smaller size guns, the Army and Navy target sets are very different and significantly impact weapon design.** For the Navy, the degree of integration on a moving platform with sensors that are not on a gun mount and fire control systems require a great deal of integration not required by the Army. The Navy uses systems in automatic and semi-automatic modes because the firing engagement sequence requires decisions quicker than the human can effectively perform.
3. **Packaging, handling shipping and transportation of armaments are different for the Army and the Navy**. The Army prefers to ship in wooden boxes. The Navy does not allow wood on ships because of fire hazards. The Army also ships fuses and projectile separately and assembles them on the battlefield, whereas the Navy assembles them before shipping to reduce the hazard shipboard of having exposed explosive material in its magazines.

We would like to offer an alternative proposal that would consolidate small arms work at Picatinny, NJ, and consolidate Maritime Guns and Ammunition Work and Life Cycle Management of Navy Ammunition at Dahlgren.

This proposed realignment provides higher military value than the Department of Defense's recommendation for realignment. It also offers a greater degree of jointness and synergy for the missions. It provides design, in-service maintenance and surveillance people at one location and eliminates functional overlap that exists in separate locations. Dahlgren is currently doing this type of work and therefore facilities and space already exist, which would reduce the cost of operations. In addition, a skilled workforce already exists, which would ensure military capability and enhance military value, and meets the BRAC principle to "retain active,

reserve, civilian and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated..." Further, the Navy requires an over-water gunnery range which currently exists at Dahlgren.

The plan to consolidate all of Dahlgren's gun and ammunition work at Picatinny is in conflict with the recommendation to establish Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare. This is unique to the services and a centroid for Navy surface ship developments to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control system developments and the weapon system developments themselves (Tech-16). Full consolidation at Picatinny will result in the reduction of the Navy's ability to engineer and integrate its shipboard combat systems. System integration is best done, for both engineering and cost purposes, when those elements being integrated are co-located. The Department of Defense recommendation will result in a reduction in military value and potentially negatively impact the warfighting capability of the Navy unless additional systems integration funds are provided. We do not believe that these costs were considered during the Department of Defense BRAC analysis.

The Department of Defense recommendation to consolidate the Chemical-Biological warfare organization with the Army's at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD is similarly flawed. We support the concept of creating a National Center of Excellence for chemical-biological defense to maximize the efficacy of Department of Defense missions in Homeland Defense, Global Presence and the Global War on Terrorism.

We endorse the designation of the Navy's Chemical-Biological Defense Team at Dahlgren as a remote detachment of the National Center that would be located at Aberdeen. The Commonwealth has well-established Homeland Defense roles including direct support of State First Responders to any chemical-biological incident. Dahlgren also has newly completed facilities, the Honorable Herbert A. H. Bateman Chem-Bio Defense Building, with an existing, highly effective team of dedicated scientists and engineers already in place. Movement of this capability to Aberdeen would require construction of new facilities there and the predicted loss of team members which would destroy a national capability at the very time it is most necessary. It is also contrary to the BRAC principle which calls for the Department of Defense to "retain active, reserve, civilian and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated and have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness."

We believe maintaining a Chemical-Biological Defense entity at Dahlgren better supports the system engineered integration of chemical-biological defense into Navy ships, submarines, aircraft and ashore facilities.

In both of the recommendations for Dahlgren outlined above, we believe a solution may be to retain Navy Chemical - Biological and gunnery physically as detachments at Dahlgren while organizationally realigning them under a joint structure with Aberdeen and Picatinny respectively.

Fort A.P. Hill

Fort A. P. Hill is located approximately 65 miles southeast of Washington, D.C. The installation is an all-purpose, year-round, military training center with 76,000 acres of land, including a 28,000-acre live-fire range complex and training unencumbered by environmental or encroachment constraints. It is one of the largest East Coast military installations and is the range and training center nearest the National Capital Region. It is one of only two installations in the Northeastern section of the United States capable of training a large maneuverable force.

Fort A. P. Hill provides opportunities for growth for additional and complimentary training and maneuvering missions. This facility is geographically located between the National Capital Region and the military complex located in the Hampton Roads. Fort A.P. Hill is an optimal location for growth for both training as well as those missions which require proximity to the NCR or the Hampton Roads as well as a venue to consider for overseas locations.

Conclusion

Virginia is proud of its long history in support of our nation's defense. We continue that support today for the BRAC mission to create cost-effective operation of our armed forces and to ensure that those forces are prepared to meet present and future challenges both at home and abroad. It is clear that our nation's military must become more agile and flexible to accomplish this. Situated mid-point along the U.S. East Coast, Virginia offers unparalleled strategic and tactical military advantages towards that goal, including one of the finest natural ports in the world with ready access to vital ocean training and weapons systems testing areas coupled with similar land-based activities which allow military activities to achieve maximum readiness and response.

Certainly the process of building efficiencies that contribute to military readiness and ensure a well-utilized infrastructure include disposal of surplus assets and realignments of operations. It is a formidable task which demands a careful assessment of existing strengths and weaknesses, as well as creativity and innovation.

We believe that in considering the efficiency and operational necessity of military bases and missions in Virginia, the Department of Defense has endeavored to apply sound military judgment to achieve its goals for a transformed, more effective national defense; however it has overlooked some opportunities to realize increased savings and create synergies that would maximize military value.

We respectfully request your review of the proposals outlined in this testimony and the data presented in their defense. Over the coming weeks, as we continue to provide you and your staff with information about affected installations, we look forward to working with the BRAC Commission staff further on the numerous recommended actions.

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this critical process for our Commonwealth and our nation. Over the course of history, the military has become an integral part of our Commonwealth to include our security, our economy and our civic life. Given the critical mission of Virginia's military installations, and their proximity to the Nation's Capital at

this unique juncture in history, and our homeland security imperative, the importance of Virginia to the nation's security has never been greater.

Virginia stands ready to deliver.

ATTACHMENTS

A. Department of Defense Recommended BRAC Actions for Virginia Announced on May 13, 2005

B. BRAC 2005 Military Principles – October 14, 2004

C. TECH 0040 Rv2: Co-located Extramural Research Program Managers to Bethesda – May 4, 2005

D. Virginia Beach Survey on NAS Oceana
Conducted January 19-21, 2004

E. Virginia Council of Presidents Memorandum, June 28, 2005

F. Retired U.S. Navy Admirals' letter to the BRAC Commission as regards to NAS Oceana, Dated July 5, 2005

Attachment A



DoD Recommended BRAC 2005 Closure and Realignment Impact

VIRGINIA

Net Gain/(Loss)	Department of Defense Installation
(3,564)	Fort Monroe
(22,925)	Leased Space - VA
6	Defense Supply Center Richmond
11,858	Fort Belvoir
7,344	Fort Lee
666	Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall
749	Langley Air Force Base
3,013	Marine Corps Base Quantico
37	Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek
2,036	Naval Shipyard Norfolk
2,807	Naval Station Norfolk
788	Naval Support Activity Norfolk
(282)	Arlington Service Center
(338)	Center for Naval Research
(408)	Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Arlington
(2,152)	Fort Eustis
(60)	Naval Air Station Oceana
(461)	Naval Medical Center Portsmouth
(351)	Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren
(179)	Naval Weapons Station Yorktown
(126)	Richmond International Airport Air Guard Station
(32)	U.S. Marine Corps Direct Reporting Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault
(1,574)	**Virginia Total**

Military Installation Gain (size based on number gain)

Military Installation (Loss) (size based on number Loss)

US Highway

Interstate Highway

Source: United States Department of Defense, 2005
Virginia Economic Development Partnership, 2005
Environmental Systems Research Institute, 2005

VIRGINIA Is For Business

Project BRAC

05/19/2005

Attachment B

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

OCT 14 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMEN, JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS

SUBJECT: Policy Memorandum Two--BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles

The Department has determined that the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation. The quantitative analytical foundation is built by the Joint Cross-Service Groups and Military Departments applying the BRAC selection criteria to rank the facilities for which they have responsibility. The exercise of military judgment occurs through the application of principles. Limited in number and written broadly, the principles enumerate the essential elements of military judgment. The Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups shall use the attached principles when applying military judgment in their deliberative processes.

Michael W. Wynne
Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Attachment:
As Stated

BRAC Principles

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated and have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, including quality of work place that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.

Organize: The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that takes advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

Attachment C

BRAC 2005

Briefing to the
Infrastructure Executive Council

May 4, 2005

DCN: 4858

#TECH 0040Rv2: Co-locate Extramural Research Program Managers to Bethesda

Candidate Recommendation (summary): Close the Office of Naval Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Air Force Office of Scientific Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Army Research Office facilities, Durham, NC, Fort Belvoir, VA, and Arlington, VA; and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency facility, Arlington, VA. Relocate all functions to Bethesda, MD. Realign the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Telegraph Road facility, Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Extramural Research Program Management function (except conventional armaments and chemical biological defense research) to Bethesda, MD.

Justification

- Foster coordination among extramural research activities
- Enhance force protection

Military Value

- DARPA and ONR had higher quantitative MV scores than Bethesda.
- Military judgment said quantitative scores high because of research managers, not location. Bethesda provides highest overall MV because of enhanced force protection, accessibility to Pentagon and Capital Hill by metro.

Payback

One-time cost:	$154M
Net implementation savings:	$108M
Annual recurring savings:	$49M
Payback time:	2 years
NPV (savings):	$574M

Impacts

- Criteria 6: -193 jobs (122 direct, 71 indirect); <0.1%
- Criteria 7: No issues
- Criteria 8: No impediments

Attachment D

DCN: 4858

Confidential

Survey of Virginia Beach, Virginia

Conducted January 19-21, 2004

Bennett, Petts & Blumenthal

Methodology

- 500 interviews conducted among residents of Virginia Beach, Virginia who are 18 years of age or older.
- Survey conducted from **January 19-21**, 2004.
- In 95 cases out of 100, the responses to this survey should fall within **± 4.4%** of those that would have been obtained from interviewing the entire population of likely general election voters in the Virginia Beach, Virginia.

DCN: 4858

Q6. Would you STRONGLY FAVOR, SOMEWHAT FAVOR, SOMEWHAT OPPOSE, or STRONGLY OPPOSE closing down the Oceana Naval Air Station and moving the planes to bases outside of Virginia?

	Strong Favor	Smwt Favor	Smwt Oppose	Strong Oppose	Total Favor	Total Oppose
Men	6%	4%	13%	72%	10%	85%
Women	4%	4%	12%	75%	8%	87%
18-29	9%	7%	20%	60%	16%	80%
30-39	3%	4%	14%	71%	7%	85%
40-49	4%	4%	11%	79%	8%	90%
50-59	4%	4%	10%	81%	8%	91%
60+	6%	2%	6%	80%	9%	86%



■ Strongly Favor □ Somewhat Favor ▣ Strongly Oppose □ Somewhat Oppose

An impressive 86% of those surveyed are opposed to closing down Oceana (74% said they are strongly opposed to closing Oceana). Just 9% favor closing down Oceana.

BENNETT, PETTS & BLUMENTHAL

DCN: 4858

Q7. Which of the following statements is closer to your opinion: **[ROTATE ORDER OF STATETMENTS]**

The Oceana Naval Air Station is good for the people of Virginia Beach. It provides jobs for the local economy, tax revenue for the city, and is important to our national defense.

The Oceana Naval Air Station is bad for the people of Virginia Beach. It creates terrible jet noise, air pollution, and poses a safety risk to thousands of people



	Good for VA Beach	Bad for VA Beach
Men	89%	6%
Women	90%	8%
18-29	87%	10%
30-39	92%	5%
40-49	92%	6%
50-59	90%	8%
60+	87%	9%

Ninety percent (90%) believe that "The Oceana Naval Air Station is good for the people of Virginia Beach. It provides job for the local economy, tax revenue for the city, and is important to our national defense." Only 7% chose the alternative statement that "The Oceana Naval Air Station is bad for the people of Virginia Beach. It creates terrible jet noise, air pollution, and poses a safety risk to thousands of people."

DCN: 4858

BENNETT, PETTS & BLUMENTHAL

Q9. Recently there has been a lot of talk about the issue of noise created by jets taking off and landing at the Oceana Naval air station. Thinking about your own home, how would you rate the noise created by these jets where you currently live? Would you call it VERY LOUD where you live, SOMEWHAT LOUD, NOT VERY LOUD, or NOT LOUD AT ALL where you live?

	Very Loud	Smwt Loud	Not Very	Not At All	Total Loud	Total Not Loud
Men	13%	17%	18%	51%	30%	69%
Women	16%	21%	18%	44%	36%	62%
18-29	18%	21%	13%	47%	39%	60%
30-39	16%	20%	18%	46%	36%	60%
40-49	13%	18%	18%	50%	30%	68%
50-59	13%	10%	26%	50%	23%	76%
60+	11%	22%	19%	47%	33%	66%



When asked to evaluate the level of jet noise where they currently live, 69% said it was either not very loud or not loud at all. Just 14% said it was very loud, and an additional 19% said it was somewhat loud.

BENNETT, PETTS & BLUMENTHAL

DCN: 4858

Q8. I'm going to read you some issues the U.S. Navy is responsible for dealing with when it comes to managing the Oceana Naval Air Station and I'd like you to rate the job the Navy is doing on each one using a scale of EXCELLENT, GOOD, NOT SO GOOD, or POOR.



DCN: 4858

Attachment E

Virginia Council of Presidents

MEMORANDUM

To: 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
From: Council of Presidents
Date: June 28, 2005

We write to express our grave concern over the BRAC Commission's recommendation to move major defense research-related agencies out of Arlington and Alexandria. We feel strongly that moving the agencies away from the complex, thriving research and development environment that has emerged inside the Beltway would have a deleterious effect on the overall defense related research environment for the nation.

These agencies include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); the Office of Naval Research; the Army Research Institute; and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The success of these agencies depends on their ability to partner with both the academic research community, including the National Science Foundation in Arlington, and a large number of high technology research and development firms that have emerged in the region over the past three decades. The close proximity of these organizations to each other, and their mutual research interests, have led to the creation of a highly complex, synergistic, and productive cluster. Removing the defense research agencies would break up this synergy and impede —even disrupt—this critical defense research environment.

The National Science Foundation reports that in FY 2002, the Department of Defense funded more than $6.2 billion of research activity, a major portion of which was dispersed through these agencies. Virginia's universities perform in excess of $50 million in defense-sponsored research, so we are well aware of the importance of ready access to both the agencies and their private sector partners.

It is essential that the United States stay on the leading edge of scientific discovery in order to guarantee our collective security against our adversaries both on the home front and abroad. The success and growth of our national security research will be dependent on the availability of ample opportunities for continued interaction and collaboration between academic, private, and governmental partners. We feel strongly that this goal will be best accomplished through preserving the existing synergistic research environment in Northern Virginia. While we

appreciate the need for defense agencies to be in secure facilities, it is not necessary and possibly counterproductive for them to be located on a military installation.

We understand that Arlington County is prepared to work with the Department of Defense to create appropriately secure space for these agencies. It is our understanding that this can be done without disrupting the complex and thriving research culture that is currently providing critical support for the nation's defense efforts.

Our institutions are key partners in the nation's security efforts and we therefore have a great and collective interest in the Commission's actions. We respectfully request that the Commission work with local government and the Commonwealth of Virginia to preserve the existing research environment, which has been established over many years at great effort and expense. We believe that ultimately, the continued progress of our national defense research efforts may be at stake.

Thank you for your consideration.

Cc: The Honorable Mark R. Warner
The Honorable John W. Warner
The Honorable George Allen
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
The Honorable James P. Moran
The Honorable Thomas M. Davis, III

William M. Anderson, Jr., President
University of Mary Washington

Ernest H. Ern, Chancellor
The University of Virginia's College at Wise

General J. H. Binford Peay, III, Superintendent
Virginia Military Institute

Frank Friedman, President
Piedmont Virginia Community College

John T. Casteen, III, President
University of Virginia

Penelope W. Kyle, President
Radford University

Patricia P. Cormier, President
Longwood University

Jack M. Lewis, President
New River Community College

Elizabeth H. Crowther, President
Rappahannock Community College

Alan G. Merten, President
George Mason University

Glenn DuBois, Chancellor
Virginia Community College System

Eddie N. Moore, President
Virginia State University

James B. McNeer, President
Richard Bland College

Alvin J. Schexnider, Acting President
Norfolk State University

James R. Perkins, President
Blue Ridge Community College

Charles W. Steger, President
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Gary L. Rhodes, President
J. Sargeant Reynolds Community College

Timothy J. Sullivan, President
College of William and Mary

Linwood H. Rose, President
James Madison University

Eugene P. Trani, President
Virginia Commonwealth University

Roseann Runte, President
Old Dominion University

Paul S. Trible, Jr., President
Christopher Newport University

DCN: 4858

Attachment F

July 5, 2005

Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street
Suite 600
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Commissioner:

We, the undersigned (Enclosure 1), heartily agree with the Secretary of Defense's decision to not include Naval Air Station Oceana (NASO) as a candidate for closure in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. We have flown every tactical aircraft in the inventory of the United States Navy for more than 40 years; have flown off of every aircraft carrier in that inventory, and have fought every war that this nation has been involved in since World War II. We have been stationed at virtually every one of our Navy's bases both in CONUS and abroad. We have lead innumerable major commands, ships and battlegroups. We have dealt with the needs of hundreds of thousands of sailors over our collective careers and know the services' needs for recruitment and, more importantly, retention. Our experience also gives us great insight into the military value of bases, threats of encroachment and interaction with elected officials at the local level.

Because of the above listed experience, we believe very strongly that NASO is and will continue long into the future to be the best site for the Navy's East Coast Master Jet Base. We have provided (Enclosure 2) a Point Paper that will support our argument; however, we believe that the strongest reasons for keeping NASO as the Master Jet Base for the East Coast for the Navy come down to three central issues:

- Opposition to NASO
- Encroachment
- Support for NASO

The opposition to continuation of NASO as a Master Jet Base is confined to a very small, we repeat, very small number of individuals. The one organized group who say they do not favor closing NASO, but merely realigning the assets is the Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise (CCAJN). Although they claim to have membership of over 5,000, the truth is that their "membership" is likely a fraction of that. This means that in the City of Virginia Beach, with its approximately 441,000 residents and the City of Chesapeake, where Fentress Auxiliary Landing Field is located, with its 210,000 residents, less than one tenth of one percent of the citizenry is actively opposed to NASO operations.

Even more telling is the scientifically valid survey done by the City of Virginia Beach, using an independent contractor (Continental Research), of not just citizens living throughout the city, but in a statistically representative number of households within various noise zones covered under the Aircraft Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) map. Of those who were asked whether jet noise was a reason they were unhappy with their decision to select where they live, a total of only

1.5% responded yes. This included zero responses from those in the 65db or lower zone, 1.6% in the 65 to 70db zone, and 2.9% in the 70 to 75db zone. Also, the average rating on a scale of 1 to 10 of whether jet noise was bothersome between 10:00 PM at night and 7:00 AM was 3.57. This compares to, on the same scale, a 2.76 response for traffic noise. The entire survey is included as Enclosure 3.

With respect to the issue of encroachment we take particular exception to the response provided by the Secretary of the Navy in a letter from Anne Rathmell Davis to the Chairman of the BRAC Commission in response to questions asked at the May 17, 2005 hearing that read, *"Under the assumption that future growth in the vicinity of Virginia Beach could impact NAS Oceana's mission as the East Coast's Master Jet Base . . ."* – a bit of history is in order.

NASO began as a several hundred-acre landing field in the World War II era and has now grown to over 5,331 acres within the fence and an additional 3,680 acres in restrictive easements outside the main fence. It also includes the 2,560 acres Fentress Auxiliary Landing Field in Chesapeake, Virginia, and an additional 8,780 acres of restricted easements. This landing field is located approximately 7 miles from NASO. Over this time, the City of Virginia Beach has grown from a small town and surrounding county, which merged in 1963, and now is home to a population of approximately 441,000 people. Most of the land around Oceana was zoned for residential and other uses in the sixties, seventies and early eighties. There have been very few major rezonings in and around NASO since then, even in the important Interfacility Traffic Area between NASO and Fentress.

The City, in an effort to support NASO, went to the Virginia General Assembly in 1994 to receive enabling authority. They City then adopted an Airport Zoning Ordinance in August of 1994 and promptly instituted its provisions. This allows the City to better plan for development around NASO and to require noise attenuation where appropriate.

Since the Airport Zoning Ordinance was put in place, there have been very few upzonings in the area adjacent to NASO. In fact, there were several downzonings of allowed density. One must put in perspective that Virginia is a very strong property rights state and once property is vested with zoning, regardless of how many years the zoning has been in place, the City must either allow development to go forward or buy the property rights. One must also keep in mind, when the City adopted its Airport Zoning Ordinance residential development was allowed by the OPNAV Instruction 11010.36A in the 65-75 db range as long as appropriate noise attenuation was included in the construction. This includes approximately 12,000 developed acres around NASO on which approximately 92,000 people currently live along with 8,000 undeveloped acres. This was based on the 1999 AICUZ (Air Installation Compatible Use Zone) map that was adopted by the City at the request of the Navy.

When the Navy revised the OPNAV Instruction, on 19 December 2002, the residences within the area between 65-74 db became incompatible and are now considered to be encroaching on NASO. The Navy's alteration of the noise contours in the revised OPNAV Instruction did not change the noise generated or the number of people adversely affected. It is a definitional change, not an alteration of the physical reality.

In order to address the revised OPNAV Instruction, the City Council has, in concert with the cities of Norfolk and Chesapeake, the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission, and the Office of Economic Adjustment, recently completed an extensive Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) to address the revised OPNAV Instruction. The specifics of the JLUS recommendations and how they will be incorporated into the City's zoning ordinance and other development ordinances are included in Enclosure 4. The City of Chesapeake has also adopted similar changes to its zoning and other development ordinances to incorporate the recommendations of the JLUS.

The Interfacility Traffic Area that is a defined area between NASO and Fentress Auxiliary Field in Chesapeake caused specific concerns for the Navy. These concerns are covered at length in the Joint Land Use Study and the recommendations were adopted by both City Councils. City Council in Virginia Beach is aggressively and forthrightly addressing the encroachment issues created by the revised OPNAV Instruction as they addressed encroachment under the previous OPNAV Instruction. Options to acquire and reserve significant areas of the Interfacility Traffic Area are underway in cooperation with the Navy and other agencies.

We also want to bring to the Commission's attention the great support that Virginia Beach has provided to NASO. That support is best itemized through the aforementioned Point Paper, which outlines the many millions of dollars the City has spent on relocating schools identified in the previous BRAC rounds; building a first class highway network around NASO in just the last 10 years; providing a world class education system and a high quality living environment for the service men and women and their families. Virginia Beach has the lowest crime rate of any city its size in the nation, the lowest residential tax rate, by far, of any city in the Hampton Roads region of 1.5 million people, and also has the best performing school system in the region.

It is pointed out repeatedly in the Point Paper that the quality of life for service men and women and their families in Virginia Beach is unexcelled. Tremendous job opportunities for spousal and family employment, higher education opportunities, great medical care, including the half billion dollar Portsmouth Naval Medical Center, a tremendous support network for military families with children with special needs, miles of beaches, public parks and other attributes too numerous to mention all contribute to the unequaled quality of life to service members and their families. Because of the extensive Hampton Roads military establishments, our military members enjoy the opportunity to rotate, sea-to-shore and shore-to-sea duty, providing family stability and conserving Navy PCS funds.

Service men and women and their families love Virginia Beach and love being stationed here, and as the BRAC Commission is well aware, the Navy recruits sailors and retains families.

In closing we would also like to state that Virginia Beach's and NASO location adjacent to the city of Norfolk, where the majority of the east coast aircraft carriers are stationed, is also very advantageous for military families. Personnel, before deployments, can stay with their family, even as they load the carriers and other ships during the day and stay with their loved ones up until the morning of departure. Returning from cruise, they can immediately be home and spend time with their family and then worry about unloading the ship and returning assets to the tremendous infrastructure at Naval Air Station Oceana. Locating tactical air and other assets away from Naval Air Station Oceana would mean military personnel would - a week before and a week after every deployment - be forced to leave their families to move support gear and other assets to the carriers, in essence adding two weeks or so to every deployment. This can only have a deleterious effect on retention.

We are sure you are also aware of the National Command Authority activity supported by Naval Air Station Oceana. The support of those operators must be given a high priority in any discussion the Commission may have on the future of Naval Air Station Oceana.

We believe Naval Air Station Oceana is, and should continue in the long term to be, the heart of Naval Aviation on the east coast. This is the position that the Secretary of Defense has taken and we strongly endorse his decision for the above-mentioned reasons as well as the multiple other reasons that we have included.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/

RRM/clb

Enclosures (4)
- Signature Page
- Point Paper
- AICUZ Zone Household Survey
- Joint Land Use Study Timeline

c: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations
The Honorable John W. Warner
The Honorable George Allen
The Honorable Thelma D. Drake
The Honorable Governor Mark R. Warner
The Honorable Mayor and Members of City Council
Mr. James K. Spore, City Manager, City of Virginia Beach

Base Realignment and Closure Commission
July 5, 2005
Enclosure 1

Signature Page

/s/
Vice Admiral Richard Allen, Retired

Admiral Roy F. Hoffmann, Retired

Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, Retired

Rear Admiral George Jessen, Retired

/s/
Rear Admiral Martin Carmody, Retired

Admiral Frederick J. Metz, Retired

/s/
Admiral Edward W. Clexton, Retired

/s/
Rear Admiral Lafayette F. Norton, Retired

/s/
Admiral Ralph Cousins, Retired

/s/
Vice Admiral Jimmy Pappas, Retired

Admiral Joseph Dantone, Retired

Admiral Gerald L. Riendeau, Retired

Admiral Richard Dunleavy, Retired

/s/
Admiral David R. Ruble, Retired

Admiral Francis L. Filipiak, Retired

Rear Admiral Lindell Rutherford, Retired

Admiral William R. Flanagan, Retired

Admiral James R. Sanderson, Retired

/s/
Admiral Mark Gemmill, Retired

Admiral Rodney K. Squibb, Retired

/s/
Rear Admiral Karen A. Harmeyer, Retired

Rear Admiral James Taylor, Retired

Base Realignment and Closure Commission
July 5, 2005
Enclosure 1

Admiral Raynor A. K. Taylor, Retired

Signature

Admiral Richard Ustick, Retired

Print Name

Admiral Thomas M. Ward, Retired

Signature

Signature

Print Name

Print Name

Signature

HENRY C. GIFFIN III

Print Name

Signature

Print Name

Signature

LARRY C. BAUCOM

Print Name

Signature

Print Name

/s/

Signature

Rear Admiral Earl P. Yates, Retired

Print Name

Signature

Print Name

/s/

Signature

Rear Admiral Paul Sutherland, Retired

Print Name

Signature

Print Name

Point Paper
Regarding Naval Air Station Oceana

- The City of Virginia Beach has invested $202 million in transportation improvements around NAS Oceana during the last 10 years. This includes: Dam Neck Road, the intersection of London Bridge Road and Great Neck Road, Oceana Boulevard, and the currently approved Birdneck Road project. The Southeastern Parkway and Greenbelt (SEPG) will hopefully be constructed within the next eight years, which will provide interstate access from NAS Oceana to I-64 in Chesapeake. NAS Oceana already has excellent access to I-264.

- The City relocated two elementary schools from the APZ following the 1993 BRAC round. The City currently has 87 schools serving the citizens of Virginia Beach. This includes 56 elementary schools, 14 middle schools, and 11 high schools. Ninety-nine percent of our schools required to participate in the Standards of Learning met the accreditation requirements and eighty-three percent met the requirements of the No Child Left Behind program.

- The cities of Virginia Beach, Norfolk, and Chesapeake along with the Navy and the U. S. Office of Economic Adjustment completed a Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) to accommodate the realities of the OPNAV Instruction 11010.36B issued in December 2002. This instruction changed the status of 92,162 people living around NAS Oceana from compatible to non-compatible.

- The City of Virginia Beach has joint service agreements with NAS Oceana for fire, police, EMS and other services.

- The City of Virginia Beach has recently made accommodations for greater U.S. Navy participation in the city's capital improvement roadway program and related project planning meetings. In addition to reviewing discretionary development proposals, a process that has been on-going for many years, arrangements have recently been made to enable the Navy to review all "by-right" development applications"

- The City of Virginia Beach is "Navy friendly." For example, the Mayor traveled to San Diego when the F/14 aircraft was directed to be single sited at NAS Oceana. The Base Commander stated that the current Mayor of San Diego had never been on his base, let alone a Mayor from 2,800 miles away. She also traveled to Bayonne, New Jersey, when the Military Sea Lift Command was relocated to Virginia Beach and to Cecil Field when those assets were realigned to NAS Oceana after the 1995 BRAC.

- The City has a long history of assisting the Navy in security issues - a relationship that has only become stronger since 9/11.

- Oceana has the unrestricted use of a massive training area off the coast of Virginia/North Carolina that they solely control. This is a fully instrumented course for air combat and other maneuvers. There are also many bombing and other training areas available close by.

- During the F/A-18 E/F (Superhornet) Environmental Impact Statement process, the Navy asserted that no Air Force or Navy Air Base east of the Mississippi met the training or aircraft requirements.

- During the 1995 BRAC, NAS Oceana was ranked the #1 Navy/Marine Corps air station in military value.

- The population of Virginia Beach has only increased by approximately 30,000 residents spread over the City's 310 square miles since 1995.

- The City of Virginia Beach is close to complete build-out. The area around Oceana is technically completely built-out. The City's population increased by .8 percent a year in the 90's and .4 percent a year since 2000 (Weldon Cooper Center statistics).

- The City has a long history of working with the Navy on issues of encroachment, transportation, etc.

- Virginia Beach is served by two full service hospitals located within the city limits, as well as three full service hospitals in the adjoining city of Norfolk and one in neighboring Chesapeake. There are also numerous surgical centers and drop-in general practitioners offices. The region has a teaching hospital at Sentara Norfolk General which partners with the Eastern Virginia Medical School to provide world-class medical care. The Naval Hospital Center, Portsmouth, has recently completed a several hundred million dollar expansion and modernization program to support the region's military installation clinics.

- In addition to NAS Oceana, Dam Neck Annex, Fort Story Army installation, and Little Creek Amphibious Base are also located in Virginia Beach. Virginia Beach is adjacent to the City of Norfolk, which is the home of the largest naval sea power port in the world. This co-location allows sailors to load and unload before and after deployments and still remain at home.

- The City of Virginia Beach has the lowest real estate tax rate of any large city in Virginia.

- Personnel stationed at NAS Oceana volunteer in our civic leagues, emergency medical services program, in our schools, scout troops, etc.

- The Mayors of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake have asked our congressional delegation for appropriations to help purchase land rights in the interfacility area.

- Virginia Beach supports many families with exceptional family members and works to meet the needs of these families through the Community Services Board and our school system.

- Virginia Beach and the surrounding communities provide an excellent quality of life for military families and, as a result, retention is high for military personnel based in the region. This saves the Navy money by keeping highly (and expensively trained) personnel.

- The proximity of NASO to the training ranges and carriers provides a great savings in fuel costs over all other alternates.

Timeline

Joint Land Use Study

April 25, 2005

08/23/94	City amends Zoning Ordinance to include AICUZ provisions
12/19/02	Operational Navigation Instructions (OPNAV) released by Department of Defense
02/25/03	City Council Adopts TATAC Recommendations
04/2003	OPNAV Instructions Briefing to City Council
12/02/03	Virginia Beach Comprehensive Plan Adopted
12/09/03	City Council Establishes AICUZ Task Force
01/06/04	City Commits to participate on Joint Land Use Study (JLUS)
06/04 - 12/04	JLUS Meetings, Workshops and Open Houses held
01/03/05	AICUZ Task Force Public Meeting (24 points presented and recommended to City Council)
01/04/05	City Council receives briefing- recommendations from AICUZ Task Force
01/18/05	City Council Public Hearing on JLUS
01/25/05	Eminent Domain in Accident Potential Zones removed from JLUS study
02/08/05	Voluntary Purchase of Property in Accident Potential Zones removed from JLUS study
01/31/05	Public Town Hall meeting (Advanced Technology Center)
02/02/05	Public Town Hall meeting (VB Fire Training Academy)
02/10/05	JLUS Regional Policy Committee meeting creates Virginia Beach and U.S. Navy Subcommittee
03/10/05	Regional JLUS Policy Committee Meeting agreement on revised timeline through April 7

03/15/05	City Council - JLUS Workshop Briefing
03/17/05	Public Information Forum – 6:30 p.m. at Advanced Technology Center
03/22/05	City Council Public Hearing on JLUS
04/05/05	Council provides direction to the JLUS Policy Committee liaisons
04/07/05	Regional JLUS Policy Committee meeting Provide direction to EDAW to prepare final draft JLUS
04/18/05	Receive final draft JLUS from EDAW
04/21/05	Regional JLUS Policy Committee meeting Vote on JLUS
04/26/05	City Council briefing on JLUS
05/03/05	City Council Public Hearing on JLUS
05/10/05	City Council vote on JLUS
05/24/05	Begin city process affecting Comp Plan and AICUZ overlay ordinance