

**DRAFT**

**INDIANA**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**NAVY:**

NAWC Indianapolis

Close


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 15

## INDIANA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

NOTES

LEE H. HAMILTON  
9TH DISTRICT, INDIANA

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

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THE HONORABLE LEE H. HAMILTON

Statement before the

Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Washington, DC

June 12, 1995

Senator Dixon. Members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Thank you for providing me with this opportunity to comment on the Defense Department's decision to include the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville (NOSL) on its 1995 base closure list.

Before I begin my formal testimony, I want to thank Senator Dixon and Commissioner Kling for taking the time to visit Naval Ordnance on April 6. I am pleased that you could meet with Captain Cummings and the employees and managers at the Ordnance Station, and see first hand the outstanding work done at the installation.

I oppose the Defense Department's decision to close the Ordnance Station. My preference would be to remove the Naval Ordnance Station from the closure list. In the alternative, I would urge the Commission to endorse the establishment of a Naval Gun Center of Excellence at Louisville.

Keep Louisville Open

I would initially like to express my support for keeping the Naval Ordnance Station off the closure list.

First, the Naval Ordnance Station is the last Navy owned facility capable of gun system design, prototyping, manufacturing and remanufacturing. Were Louisville to be closed, the Navy would lose that capability as well as the ability to reconstitute a full industrial base capacity in time of emergency.

Second, the Ordnance Station has had a superb record of service to the Navy and the country. Its engineering capability -- in design engineering, in-service engineering and advanced gun system management and development -- is a tremendous asset to the Navy. It can perform its work in a cost-effective manner, and has an outstanding workforce.

Third, closing the Ordnance Station would have an adverse impact on communities in my congressional district in Indiana. 320 of the 1,836 employees at the installation reside in Indiana, and putting them out of work would cause them hardship and cost the State millions of dollars in lost income.

Fourth, Indiana should not have to sustain additional cutbacks in the base closure process. Indiana has taken the brunt of the base closing process over the last seven years. Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, and Grissom Air Force have all been listed for closure or inactivation. Thousands of jobs are being lost.

I understand that the Base Closure Commission has explored the possibility of establishing

inter-service depots. I believe Naval Ordnance has the capabilities to provide depot work for the Navy as well as the other services. I ask that you give this option every consideration.

Naval Gun Center of Excellence

If the Commission decides to support the recommendation of the Defense Department, I urge that it then consider endorsing the creation of a Naval Gun Center of Excellence at Louisville.

As Senators Ford and McConnell and Congressman Ward will discuss in more detail in their testimony, the City of Louisville and Jefferson County have proposed establishing a Naval Gun Center of Excellence at NOSL. The proposal includes the following elements:

- The Navy would close the Naval Ordnance Station, with language in the BRAC report to assure that the Navy will work to privatize in place the majority of the work performed at the Station.
- The City of Louisville and/or Jefferson County would assume ownership of the facility.
- One contractor (United Defense) would lease part of the facility to perform the 5-inch gun work and other activities.
- Another contractor (Hughes) would lease part of the facility to perform work on the Phalanx system.
- The Navy would lease part of the facility to maintain an engineering presence.
- The contractors would hire NOSL employees displaced by the closure.

I understand that the City of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky recently signed agreements with United Defense and Hughes to operate portions of the proposed Center.

This proposal has several benefits.

It would allow the Navy to centralize Navy gun system capability at a single location; lower overhead costs; and save the Navy the cost of relocating NOSL activities to other installations around the country.

Most importantly, the proposal would keep jobs at Naval Ordnance. Ideally, I would like to see the facility stay a government facility and the workforce remain a government workforce. But, if the Commission decides to close NOSL, I want to do all I can to keep good-paying jobs in the Louisville area. The "Center of Excellence" concept would offer such an opportunity.

I ask that the Commission give every consideration to this proposal.

I appreciate having this opportunity to testify. I commend you for your efforts. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

## **Statement of Representative John N. Hostettler**

### **Base Realignment and Closure Commission**

**June 12, 1995**

#### **Introduction:**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I appreciate your attention to today's testimony. Having sat through a number of hearings in recent months, I know how hard it can be to remain focused in long hearings even when the issues being presented are exceedingly important, as they are today.

I represent the 8th Congressional District of Indiana, located in the Southwestern part of the state. Its two largest cities are Evansville, a leading industrial city along the Ohio River, and Bloomington, a city located 45 miles South of Indianapolis and the home of Indiana University. The District covers a large rural area of Indiana, composed of rolling forested countryside in the East and large tracts of fertile farmland in the West. It also contains a number of wholesome Indiana towns like historic Vincennes, founded in 1732, Bedford, the "limestone capital of the world", and French Lick, the hometown of basketball legend Larry Bird. Finally, and the reason for my being here today, the District is also the home of the Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center's Crane Indiana Site - located in Martin County, Indiana.

#### **Purpose of Testimony:**

As you know, the Secretary of Defense has recommended that several activities at the Indianapolis Naval Air Warfare Center and the Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center's Louisville Kentucky site be transferred to the Martin County facility. My purpose today is not to enter into the privatization debate which my colleagues and friends are bringing to your attention. I will only say that I, like my constituents, want the very best decisions to be made for America. As a member of the House National Security Committee, I fully appreciate that decisions regarding our military force structure must be made as free of politics as possible.

My testimony is, however, to help assure you that if you should decide to follow the Secretary of Defense's recommendations, the Martin County site of the Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center is ready, available, and in good condition, to be the receiving location. I also want to assure you that the local communities are fully capable of implementing the Secretary's recommendations, and that the facility has ample capacity to absorb the consolidated missions.

#### **Crane Site Physical Dimensions:**

The Crane site in Martin County, Indiana, is a unique national asset. To truly appreciate this base a person really needs to visit there. The base's physical statistics are amazing and sound more like the description of a National Park than a military base. It contains over 62,000 rolling acres, which translates to 97 square miles and includes over 50,000 acres of beautiful

forest. In fact, the United States Navy has recently informed me that its Crane, Indiana, site is among its ten largest facilities in the world.

The size of the base has proved to be an ideal location for the storage of munitions. For that reason, the Martin County site is also home to the United States Army's Crane Army Ammunition Activity, a tenant of the Navy. Because of the facility's size, munitions can be safely stored and all security needs easily met.

### **Crane Site Infrastructure:**

The base's infrastructure reflects its physical dimensions. It has approximately 75 miles of perimeter fence, 185 miles of paved streets and highways, 226 miles of unpaved roads, and 170 miles of railway. It also has a large variety of facilities, ranging from ammunition storage bunkers to state of the art technology centers supporting the well over 2500 current Crane engineers, scientists, and technicians.

Since 1987, there has been approximately \$34.4 million in new construction completed at the site, resulting in state of the art product support facilities. Approximately \$12.06 million in new construction is currently underway, including a \$7.9 million Electro-optics Center.

Given its physical size and up-to-date infrastructure, it is my view that the Crane, Indiana Site would, if called upon, meet the needs of the Navy for the foreseeable future as a premier product engineering and industrial activity.

### **The Southwestern Indiana Community:**

The people of Southwestern Indiana are by nature patriotic Midwesterners. We wholeheartedly support the work of Navy at Crane and, if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are followed, we are ready to do our part.

According to an Indiana University study requested by the South Central Indiana Coalition immediately prior to the last BRAC round, the local communities surrounding Crane are fully capable of absorbing even a 100% expansion in the Crane workforce. There exists ample housing, schools, transportation, and utilities to handle the projected influx. I believe that this conclusion continues to be valid. I also believe that this area has a trained workforce with an excellent work ethic.

I would be remiss if I did not add that Southwestern Indiana is a great place to live. The cost of living in the area is low, as is crime. In addition, there exists a choice between living in a relatively remote rural area or in a sophisticated urban environment.

**Conclusion:**

I fully support the concept of the Midwest Navy. I think that the history of the Indianapolis, Louisville, and Crane, Indiana, sites have shown the value of these Midwest facilities. I thank you for your work on the difficult task you face in determining the region's future force structure.

**Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar**  
**Submitted for the Record to the**  
**Base Realignment and Closure Commission**  
**on Behalf of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis, Indiana**  
**Washington, D.C.**  
**June 12, 1995**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I am pleased to submit testimony today to share with you my continued interest in the Department of Defense's (DoD) recommendation to the Base Closure Commission to close the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) in Indianapolis, Indiana.

As you recall, I testified before the Commission's regional hearing in Chicago on April 12th. At that time, I highlighted the important work performed at NAWC - Indianapolis, and expressed my support for an alternative partnership proposal prepared by Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith. To re-emphasize my main points made at the April 12 hearing, I have included a copy of my original testimony to be included with this statement in today's record.

I strongly support Mayor Goldsmith's plan because I believe it achieves real cost savings for DoD, reduces the economic impact on the local economy, and provides growth opportunities for Indiana's technology and manufacturing industries. It is my hope the Commission will carefully examine the merits of this partnership proposal and consider recommending the Mayor's plan as the preferred closure option in the Commission's final base closure recommendations to the President. I hope also the Commission will establish a period of time for negotiations between the City of Indianapolis and the Navy to structure an agreement that will serve as the basis for implementation of the partnership plan

The Naval Air Warfare Center has a long and distinguished record of service to our nation's military forces. As a former mayor of Indianapolis, I am familiar with NAWC and have visited the facility many times. I have met with many of the skilled, dedicated professionals whose hard work and career service contributed to NAWC's special role in maintaining U.S. military readiness. I understand the valuable role they play in preserving a core technology research and knowledge base for our national defense.

I support the Base Realignment and Closure process as a careful and systematic evaluation of our nation's military requirements and assets. Within this process, however, I believe creative solutions can be found to reduce defense spending, protect our nation's technology base and lessen the economic impacts on communities affected by a facility closure.

I understand the Mayor's partnership proposal reduces DoD's overall facility closure costs from a recently revised figure of \$226 million down to \$20 million, and eliminates all military

construction costs, saving at least an additional \$20 million in costs to house workers slated for transfer.

The Mayor's partnership proposal complements the President's National Performance Review goals and current DoD policy objectives that include development of a lower cost, higher value national defense for the 21st Century through a variety of means, including privatization and acquisition reform initiatives. The Mayor's plan combines these elements into an innovative closure alternative developed outside the traditional, outright-closure-oriented planning model used by DoD to determine base closure recommendations.

Throughout its history, NAWC - Indianapolis performed a unique mission for the Navy. Whether in peacetime or in crisis, dedicated NAWC professionals have met the Fleet's readiness requirements and served as an engineering and product development resource for the Defense Department. I believe Mayor Goldsmith's future growth plan is a viable proposal that addresses the community economic hardship and industrial base issues common with today's defense closures. I believe this alternative partnership proposal will promote cooperative public/private sector initiatives to ensure our national defense, protect the U.S. technology base, and encourage investment in dual use technologies. I also believe this proposal will help the U.S. maintain its leadership position in engineering and technology development for the defense and commercial sectors.

During my April testimony before the Commission, I asked that every consideration be given to the merits of this partnership proposal for the future of the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis. I am hopeful now the Commission has reviewed the details of the plan and will exercise its authority to act in the long term interest of our nation's defense by including the City's plan as the preferred closure option, and by recommending a negotiation period between the City and the Navy to occur as part of its final base closure recommendations to the President.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony before the Commission today.

**Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar  
Before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission  
on Behalf of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis, Indiana  
Chicago, Illinois  
April 12, 1995**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I am pleased to testify before you today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DoD) recommendation to the Base Closure Commission to close the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) in Indianapolis, Indiana.

I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts on the important work performed at NAWC - Indianapolis, and to express my support for an alternative partnership proposal prepared by Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith. I strongly support Mayor Goldsmith's plan because I believe it achieves real cost savings for DoD, reduces the economic impact on the local economy, and provides growth opportunities for Indiana's technology and manufacturing industries. I hope the Commission will carefully examine the merits of this partnership proposal as the Commission prepares to make its final base closure recommendations to the President later this year.

The Naval Air Warfare Center has a long and distinguished record of service to our nation's military forces. With its beginnings in 1942 as a naval ordnance plant producing the Norden Bombsight, NAWC over the years has changed, functions, missions and even its name to meet the evolving requirements of the U.S. Navy.

As a former mayor of Indianapolis, I am familiar with NAWC and have visited the facility many times. I have met with many of the skilled, dedicated professionals whose hard work and career service contributed to NAWC's special role in maintaining U.S. military readiness. I understand the valuable role they play in preserving a core technology research and knowledge base for our national defense.

NAWC can and should play a significant role in the development and maintenance of our nation's defense for the 21st Century. NAWC - Indianapolis is a leader in the design, development and limited manufacturing of high technology airborne electronic systems for the Navy.

As a "knowledge factory," NAWC is a unique and dynamic engineering and technology center that provides today's downsized Navy the opportunity to outsource and develop dual use technologies critical to our nation's industrial base. As a "smart buyer" for the Navy, NAWC provides acquisition support and rapid prototyping of new equipment to assure the Defense Department buys the right equipment at the lowest possible cost.

To maintain core capabilities and specialized workforce in an era of diminished defense spending, NAWC streamlined its management structure, expanded its customer base, and forged partnerships with the private sector and academia. Recently designated a "Reinvention Laboratory" by the Defense Department, NAWC strives to maintain the defense technology base by leveraging investment for dual use initiatives through entrepreneurial partnerships with private industry. NAWC and Crane have also developed a working relationship with Purdue University, a premier engineering school in Lafayette, Indiana.

As a result, NAWC benefits from Indiana's strong manufacturing industrial base and academic resources, finding new and better ways to serve its customers while reducing overhead costs.

As a Defense Base Operating Fund activity, NAWC is a cost contained, pay as you go, facility generating most of its revenue from its government customers. NAWC- Indianapolis is the most productive of all the Navy's warfare centers. Reimbursable revenues have remained steady since FY 1992, with inflows projected to average over \$335 million per year through FY 1996. Despite its steady workload, NAWC - Indianapolis managed to reduce overhead costs by 28% since 1992.

NAWC - Indianapolis has proven its ability to adjust to the changing demands of the Department of Defense while delivering essential engineering and technology services to the Fleet. While defense spending continues to decline, the core capabilities, facilities and institutional knowledge found at NAWC continue to be vital to the increasing demands of the 21st Century Navy.

Prior to the Defense Department's February 28th announcement to recommend closure of NAWC - Indianapolis, I worked with the Indiana Congressional Delegation to demonstrate to the Navy the value of maintaining a strong "Midwest Navy" presence in Indiana through the combined functions of NAWC, the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Crane, Indiana, and NSWC Crane, Louisville, Kentucky. I believed it was important to highlight the complementary equipment development, maintenance and testing work performed by these three sites, and to urge the Navy to review carefully the vital integrated role these facilities can play in meeting the Navy's air and surface warfare requirements for the next Century.

I support the Base Realignment and Closure process as a careful and systematic evaluation of our nation's military requirements and assets. Within this process, however, I believe creative solutions can be found to reduce defense spending, protect our nation's technology base and lessen the economic impacts on communities affected by a facility closure.

Anticipating the Defense Department's 1995 closure recommendations, Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith proposed his alternative partnership plan using privatization and administrative consolidation to meet Defense Department spending targets and to address local community concerns. Mayor Goldsmith has been a leader in the effort to downsize government and improve service efficiency through privatization.

On February 28, the Defense Department recommended closure of the NAWC facility and called for elimination of 1,300 positions and relocation of 1,600 additional jobs to bases in California, Maryland and southern Indiana. Under the Mayor's partnership proposal, the NAWC facility building would be transferred to the City of Indianapolis or to the General Services Administration at no cost. The positions slated for elimination would be transferred to private sector defense organizations but would remain located in the NAWC facility. This approach permits DoD to reduce overhead costs but retain the vital knowledge and capabilities base to meet future technology development needs and crisis response requirements.

After learning of the Mayor's partnership alternative, I met with Defense Secretary William Perry to express my support for the plan and request a Defense Department review of the proposal. I also arranged for Mayor Goldsmith to present his plan to Deputy Secretary John Deutch on March 8, 1995. Secretary Deutch expressed interest in privatization as a worthy alternative to outright closure and gave assurances that the Defense Department and the Navy would fully evaluate the Mayor's plan.

The Mayor's innovative proposal features several components I believe are attractive to the Defense Department as it seeks ways to do more with less. In addition to assuming closure of the NAWC facility as a DoD site, the Mayor's partnership plan also provides significant cost savings by: 1) removing 1,300 employees from the federal payroll; 2) avoiding relocation expenses for 1,600 employees currently slated for transfer to NSWC Crane, California, and Maryland; and 3) consolidating certain NAWC administrative and personnel records functions to Crane.

In addition, the Mayor's partnership proposal reduces DoD's overall facility closure costs from at least \$78 million to \$20 million, and eliminates all military construction costs, saving at least an additional \$20 million in costs to house workers slated for transfer.

Throughout its history, NAWC - Indianapolis performed a unique mission for the Navy. Whether in peacetime or in crisis, dedicated NAWC professionals have met the Fleet's readiness requirements and served as an engineering and product development resource for the Defense Department. With a changing national security environment and fewer dollars for defense programs, I believe Mayor Goldsmith's future growth plan is a viable proposal that addresses the community economic hardship and industrial base issues common with today's defense closures. I believe this alternative partnership proposal will promote cooperative public/private sector initiatives to ensure our national defense, protect the U.S. technology base, and encourage investment in dual use technologies. I also believe this proposal will help the U.S. maintain its leadership position in engineering and technology development for the defense and commercial sectors.

Despite reduced defense budgets, I believe we can still put our best minds to work in addressing the engineering challenges of today and tomorrow, and do so at less cost to the taxpayers.

I urge the Commission to give every consideration to the merits of this partnership proposal for the future of the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis as the Commission makes its final recommendations to the President later this year.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and your committee today.

# TESTIMONY OF REP. DAN BURTON (R-IN) TO THE BRAC COMMISSION 6/13/95

CHAIRMAN DIXON AND BRAC COMMISSIONERS:

THANK YOU FOR PERMITTING ME TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU THIS EVENING. I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT A VERY INNOVATIVE AND UNIQUE PRIVATIZATION PROPOSAL FOR THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER IN INDIANAPOLIS.

THIS PROPOSAL WAS DEVELOPED BY AN INDIANAPOLIS TASK FORCE WHICH INCLUDED MAYOR GOLDSMITH, AND HAS RECEIVED POSITIVE REACTION FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE PENTAGON, AND I BELIEVE FROM BRAC COMMISSIONER LEE KLING. IN FACT, I HAVE IN FRONT OF ME, A LETTER FROM RICHARD DANZIG, THE UNDERSECRETARY OF THE NAVY, THAT HE HAS FORWARDED TO CHAIRMAN DIXON, WHICH EXPRESSES THE NAVY'S INTEREST IN WORKING WITH THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS ON THIS PLAN.

AS SOME OF YOU MAY KNOW, I HAVE BEEN A FISCALLY CONSERVATIVE MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AND I CONSISTENTLY LOOK FOR WAYS TO ELIMINATE THE WASTEFUL USE OF TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS. THE PARTNERSHIP PLAN FOR THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, I BELIEVE, DOES EXACTLY THAT. IT ACTUALLY SAVES MORE MONEY THAN THE D.O.D.'S RECOMMENDATION TO COMPLETELY CLOSE THE FACILITY.

• THE ACTUAL COST FOR CLOSING THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER IN INDIANAPOLIS, IS \$226 MILLION. OR ALMOST THREE TIMES WHAT THE D.O.D. ESTIMATED IN ITS MOST COSTLY COBRA ANALYSIS. WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT SMALL CHANGE HERE...WE ARE TALKING ABOUT AN UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURE OF \$184 MILLION TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS IF THE D.O.D.'S PLAN IS USED!!!

• ON THE OTHER HAND, BY IMPLEMENTING THE PARTNERSHIP PLAN THE COSTS OF CLOSURE ARE REDUCED BY THAT \$184 MILLION. UNDER THE PARTNERSHIP PLAN, THE IMPLEMENTATION TIME IS ALSO MUCH SHORTER.

IT IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND IMPLEMENTING A PLAN WHICH WILL COST TAXPAYERS AN UNNECESSARY \$150 MILLION WHEN THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN WHICH WILL SAVE \$184 MILLION.

I HAVE TWO REQUESTS FOR THE BRAC COMMISSION TODAY:

• FIRST, I REQUEST THAT THE COMMISSION ALTER THE PRESENT D.O.D. RECOMMENDATION BY INSERTING THE PARTNERSHIP PLAN IN ITS PLACE. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE COMMISSION MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE PARTNERSHIP PROPOSAL IS THE PREFERRED CLOSURE OPTION. THE COMMISSION HAS NOTHING TO LOSE BY DOING THIS. THE PLAN SAVES TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS; TECHNICALLY A CLOSURE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED; AND THE PLAN WILL PROTECT AND PRESERVE A VERY VITAL PART OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE JOBS OF NEARLY 2,500 OF MY CONSTITUENTS!!

• SECOND, I REQUEST THE COMMISSION ESTABLISH A TIME FRAME IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE NAVY MUST OCCUR...PERHAPS A YEAR. THIS WOULD SET A TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE NAVY AND THE CITY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO STRUCTURE THE AGREEMENT UPON WHICH THE PARTNERSHIP MUST BE BASED.

THESE ARE TWO SIGNIFICANT REQUESTS, BUT ARE BOTH WITHIN THE SCOPE AND JURISDICTION OF THE BRAC COMMISSION. I HOPE YOU AGREE THIS ALTERNATIVE MAKES GOOD SENSE AND THAT YOU WILL LOOK WITH FAVOR ON THIS PROPOSAL.

THANK YOU AND GOOD NIGHT.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

22 May 1995

The Honorable Dan Burton  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Steve Goldsmith  
Mayor of Indianapolis  
Suite 2501, City-County Building  
200 East Washington Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46204-3372

Dear Mr. Burton and Mayor Goldsmith,

I am glad that the three of us have had the opportunity to talk about the future of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) if it is closed as a military facility, as this Department has recommended. Thank you, particularly, Mr. Burton for arranging the airport meeting between the Mayor and me, and thank you, Mr. Goldsmith, for your clarity, candor, and sensitivity to the public interest in our discussions at that meeting.

I am persuaded that the two of you are correct in urging that we should seriously consider an option of privatizing work now done at NAWC, Indianapolis in the event that the BRAC commission supports the Defense Department's recommendation that NAWC should be closed as a military facility.

I believe that, if adopted by the BRAC, the language recommended by this Department will preserve that option as well as the more traditional option of a transfer of assets and personnel in the wake of a closure decision. You are welcome to enter this letter in the record before the BRAC commission to convey this view. To assist that, I am also taking the liberty of providing a copy of this letter directly to Mr. Dixon, the Chairman of the BRAC. Beyond this, though we do not think it is necessary, we will be supportive should the BRAC Commission desire to record that privatization is one of the post-closure alternatives.


In saying this, it is important to recognize, as we have discussed, that any such resulting entity would compete for Navy business and not be assured it on a non-competitive basis.

We all agree that the city should have some time to develop its proposal. At the same time, I am concerned that the question of how we proceed promptly be resolved so that the government can secure the efficiencies of closure and the employees of NAWC can make long-term plans. Balancing these considerations if the Base Closure and Realignment

Commission approves our recommendations, I will ask the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment, Robin Pirie, to take responsibility for evaluating alternatives in the Fall, and reaching a decision by the New Year.

With appreciation for your energy and thoughtfulness on this matter,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Richard Danzig". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping tail on the final letter.

Richard Danzig

Copy to:  
Honorable Alan Dixon

6/13 Revised  
replace earlier version ✓

**Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar  
Submitted for the Record to the  
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on Behalf of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis, Indiana  
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★  
replace version  
submitted 6/12

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**Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar**  
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I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts on the important work performed at NAWC - Indianapolis, and to express my support for an alternative partnership proposal prepared by Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith. I strongly support Mayor Goldsmith's plan because I believe it achieves real cost savings for DoD, reduces the economic impact on the local economy, and provides growth opportunities for Indiana's technology and manufacturing industries. I hope the Commission will carefully examine the merits of this partnership proposal as the Commission prepares to make its final base closure recommendations to the President later this year.

The Naval Air Warfare Center has a long and distinguished record of service to our nation's military forces. With its beginnings in 1942 as a naval ordnance plant producing the Norden Bombsight, NAWC over the years has changed, functions, missions and even its name to meet the evolving requirements of the U.S. Navy.

As a former mayor of Indianapolis, I am familiar with NAWC and have visited the facility many times. I have met with many of the skilled, dedicated professionals whose hard work and career service contributed to NAWC's special role in maintaining U.S. military readiness. I understand the valuable role they play in preserving a core technology research and knowledge base for our national defense.

NAWC can and should play a significant role in the development and maintenance of our nation's defense for the 21st Century. NAWC - Indianapolis is a leader in the design, development and limited manufacturing of high technology airborne electronic systems for the Navy.

As a "knowledge factory," NAWC is a unique and dynamic engineering and technology center that provides today's downsized Navy the opportunity to outsource and develop dual use technologies critical to our nation's industrial base. As a "smart buyer" for the Navy, NAWC provides acquisition support and rapid prototyping of new equipment to assure the Defense Department buys the right equipment at the lowest possible cost.

To maintain core capabilities and specialized workforce in an era of diminished defense spending, NAWC streamlined its management structure, expanded its customer base, and forged partnerships with the private sector and academia. Recently designated a "Reinvention Laboratory" by the Defense Department, NAWC strives to maintain the defense technology base by leveraging investment for dual use initiatives through entrepreneurial partnerships with private industry. NAWC and Crane have also developed a working relationship with Purdue University, a premier engineering school in Lafayette, Indiana.

As a result, NAWC benefits from Indiana's strong manufacturing industrial base and academic resources, finding new and better ways to serve its customers while reducing overhead costs.

As a Defense Base Operating Fund activity, NAWC is a cost contained, pay as you go, facility generating most of its revenue from its government customers. NAWC- Indianapolis is the most productive of all the Navy's warfare centers. Reimbursable revenues have remained steady since FY 1992, with inflows projected to average over \$335 million per year through FY 1996. Despite its steady workload, NAWC - Indianapolis managed to reduce overhead costs by 28% since 1992.

NAWC - Indianapolis has proven its ability to adjust to the changing demands of the Department of Defense while delivering essential engineering and technology services to the Fleet. While defense spending continues to decline, the core capabilities, facilities and institutional knowledge found at NAWC continue to be vital to the increasing demands of the 21st Century Navy.

Prior to the Defense Department's February 28th announcement to recommend closure of NAWC - Indianapolis, I worked with the Indiana Congressional Delegation to demonstrate to the Navy the value of maintaining a strong "Midwest Navy" presence in Indiana through the combined functions of NAWC, the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Crane, Indiana, and NSWC Crane, Louisville, Kentucky. I believed it was important to highlight the complementary equipment development, maintenance and testing work performed by these three sites, and to urge the Navy to review carefully the vital integrated role these facilities can play in meeting the Navy's air and surface warfare requirements for the next Century.

I support the Base Realignment and Closure process as a careful and systematic evaluation of our nation's military requirements and assets. Within this process, however, I believe creative solutions can be found to reduce defense spending, protect our nation's technology base and lessen the economic impacts on communities affected by a facility closure.

Anticipating the Defense Department's 1995 closure recommendations, Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith proposed his alternative partnership plan using privatization and administrative consolidation to meet Defense Department spending targets and to address local community concerns. Mayor Goldsmith has been a leader in the effort to downsize government and improve service efficiency through privatization.

On February 28, the Defense Department recommended closure of the NAWC facility and called for elimination of 1,300 positions and relocation of 1,600 additional jobs to bases in California, Maryland and southern Indiana. Under the Mayor's partnership proposal, the NAWC facility building would be transferred to the City of Indianapolis or to the General Services Administration at no cost. The positions slated for elimination would be transferred to private sector defense organizations but would remain located in the NAWC facility. This approach permits DoD to reduce overhead costs but retain the vital knowledge and capabilities base to meet future technology development needs and crisis response requirements.

After learning of the Mayor's partnership alternative, I met with Defense Secretary William Perry to express my support for the plan and request a Defense Department review of the proposal. I also arranged for Mayor Goldsmith to present his plan to Deputy Secretary John Deutch on March 8, 1995. Secretary Deutch expressed interest in privatization as a worthy alternative to outright closure and gave assurances that the Defense Department and the Navy would fully evaluate the Mayor's plan.

The Mayor's innovative proposal features several components I believe are attractive to the Defense Department as it seeks ways to do more with less. In addition to assuming closure of the NAWC facility as a DoD site, the Mayor's partnership plan also provides significant cost savings by: 1) removing 1,300 employees from the federal payroll; 2) avoiding relocation expenses for 1,600 employees currently slated for transfer to NSWC Crane, California, and Maryland; and 3) consolidating certain NAWC administrative and personnel records functions to Crane.

In addition, the Mayor's partnership proposal reduces DoD's overall facility closure costs from at least \$78 million to \$20 million, and eliminates all military construction costs, saving at least an additional \$20 million in costs to house workers slated for transfer.

Throughout its history, NAWC - Indianapolis performed a unique mission for the Navy. Whether in peacetime or in crisis, dedicated NAWC professionals have met the Fleet's readiness requirements and served as an engineering and product development resource for the Defense Department. With a changing national security environment and fewer dollars for defense programs, I believe Mayor Goldsmith's future growth plan is a viable proposal that addresses the community economic hardship and industrial base issues common with today's defense closures. I believe this alternative partnership proposal will promote cooperative public/private sector initiatives to ensure our national defense, protect the U.S. technology base, and encourage investment in dual use technologies. I also believe this proposal will help the U.S. maintain its leadership position in engineering and technology development for the defense and commercial sectors.

Despite reduced defense budgets, I believe we can still put our best minds to work in addressing the engineering challenges of today and tomorrow, and do so at less cost to the taxpayers.

I urge the Commission to give every consideration to the merits of this partnership proposal for the future of the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis as the Commission makes its final recommendations to the President later this year.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and your committee today.

**DRAFT**

**KENTUCKY**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**NAVY:**

NSWC Louisville

Close


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 18

## KENTUCKY




Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

Statement of Senator Wendell Ford  
Before the Base Closure Commission  
June 12, 1995



Chairman Dixon and members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to share my views on the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville.

I know that you've got some tough decisions to make in the next few weeks, but I hope that the homework your staff has already done on Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, and the testimony that you hear today, convince you that Louisville should be taken off the base closure list.

The Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville is considered an outstanding facility because of its quality work and its cost effectiveness. This was never more evident than during the Gulf War, when Louisville employees literally made house calls to the Persian Gulf war zone, providing critical, on-site assistance when the USS Princeton hit a mine.

Louisville is a full service organization, and as the only remaining Major Caliber Gun Barrel manufacturing facility in the Navy and the only Close-In Weapon System Depot public or private, Louisville is the lead activity for the development of the latest improvements to naval gunnery and the Congressionally mandated Naval fire support program. This activity does research and development to include design,

production, in service support and depot functions.

And as all the Commission members who visited Louisville know first hand, the state-of-the-art and environmentally compliant -- exceeding all EPA and state regulations -- plating facility is the most modern and effective in the entire Defense Department.

In fact, in 1993, Former Base Closure and Realignment Commission Chairman James Courter called the station a modernized operation that does a range of overhaul, engineering and research work on Navy gun systems, and said he was "convinced that it is certainly not a facility we should close." He was supported by all of his fellow Commission members.

They understood that the central location of Naval Ordnance, Louisville provides critical rapid deployment capabilities for the Navy of systems, equipment, material and technical personnel to the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf Coasts.

Furthermore, your own staff has discovered that Navy numbers on the cost savings that would occur because of closure and moving equipment from Louisville were over enthusiastic. In fact, in terms of both military construction and labor rates, the costs of shutting down Naval Ordnance, Louisville will be much higher than the original Navy estimates.

I understand that these tight fiscal times demand tough decisions. But, these numbers alone should be a clear indication that even if the Commission makes what we consider an adverse decision, there should be no question that BRAC needs to direct the Navy in no uncertain terms to retain the equipment and current missions at Naval Ordnance, and negotiate with local officials to privatize the facility. In particular, I request that your Commission provide enabling language allowing the Navy work to continue at Louisville for two years until the privatization process is complete.

Two companies -- Hughes and United Defense -- have each signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the City of Louisville and Jefferson County, committing to do the work at Louisville. They have also met with your staff to outline in detail their plans. So this is clearly no "pie-in-the-sky" proposal.

As Louisville representatives testified back in April at your Chicago hearings, this plan to create the Naval Gun Center of Excellence would save the Navy in excess of \$300 million -- **more than they would save by moving operations to another location**, reduce the Navy's infrastructure in Louisville to nearly zero, while maintaining the world-class gun operations the Navy has come to depend on.

Let me reiterate that every person who will testify today believes without question that Naval Ordnance, Louisville is a unique, integral part of our nation's

defense and should be removed from the Base Closure list. However, faced with the fact that the Pentagon has put Louisville on the list, we have worked diligently to produce a plan to meet the overall downsizing BRAC is attempting to address.

More important, the privatization plan will put Louisville on the forefront of recent recommendations by Dr. White, head of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, a former chairman of BRAC, and now the man chosen by the President and Secretary of Defense to be number two in the Defense Department. In that document, Dr. White called for privatizing-in-place those depots with a highly-skilled workforce and significant expertise that could be capitalized in the commercial market place. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the Record the relevant portions of the Commission on Roles and Missions recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, it has been brought to my attention that there are those who are wrongly questioning the legal authority of this Commission to direct the Department of Defense to privatize an installation. As the author of the original Base Closure legislation, you do not need reminding about the authority and reach of this Commission. I hope you will exercise that authority in the best interests of the Naval Ordnance, Louisville.

Let me close by saying again, that I firmly believe all evidence points to taking Louisville off the Base Closure list. However, I think we have presented you with a viable alternative to the total loss of this highly skilled workforce and its long history of patriotic service to the Department of Defense.

## Fielded Systems

When DOD owns sufficient technical data to permit private/private competition, a time-phased plan should be established to shift ongoing DOD depot support to the private sector for systems already in use. For some systems that are in or past the production phase, data rights issues or the cost of needed tooling may prohibit the full benefits of competition. In these cases, DOD should attempt to acquire the needed technical data rights, including taking appropriate legal action.

In those few cases where establishing competition between private facilities would be too costly, the alternatives are either to establish competition between the government depot and the OEM, or to compete the private management and operation (or ownership) of the non-proprietary portions of the existing government depot, as discussed below.

Recommendation: Establish a time-phased plan to privatize essentially all existing depot-level maintenance.

Public-private competitions, however imperfect, are generally preferable to non-competitive sole source contracts, public or private, for long-term support. To permit more equitable competition between public and private sectors for those few cases where private/private competition cannot be established (and to improve cost management), DOD must develop a financial accounting system that permits accurate comparisons of total costs between existing depots and OEMs and must recognize that the fundamental disparity between public and private profit/loss mechanisms precludes a fully level playing field.

FOR THE RECORD  
v

## Depot Facilities

*Donald J. ...*

The privatization-in-place concept recognizes the value of a highly skilled work force at heavily capitalized military depot facilities as assets in the commercial market place. Effective transitions will be difficult, but the benefits will be worthwhile. These transitions could involve an outright sale to a private buyer or could include an interim fixed period of government ownership and contractor operation (GOCO), or possibly some form of employee ownership. Because these "privatized" depots would have significant expertise, they may compete successfully for other types of work and become successful businesses.

DOD is experienced at closing facilities through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, but it has little experience with privatizing facilities and moving federal employees to the private sector on the scale envisioned here.

Recommendation: Create an office under the ASD (Economic Security) to oversee privatization of depots.

## FOR THE RECORD (CONT)

Therefore, we recommend establishing an office under the Assistant Secretary for Economic Security to ensure that appropriate legislation is prepared and that policies and procedures are established, and to oversee the DOD-wide facility privatization effort.

## MATERIEL SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

The materiel supply segment of the overall DOD logistics support infrastructure includes the processes required to acquire and deliver supplies to the operating forces. This major industrial support enterprise involves the wholesale-level management of inventories in excess of \$77 billion and annual direct spending of more than \$22 billion (\$4 billion for operations, \$18 billion for inventory purchases). Major activities include estimating required quantities, purchasing and storing inventories, processing orders, distribution, and disposing of excess materiel.

In the commercial world, competitive pressures and customer demand are causing private companies to optimize logistics support processes. This routinely results in shorter cycle times, as shown in Figure 3-1, and inventory reductions of 25 percent.<sup>11</sup> This is much better than DOD has done. Currently only about a quarter of DOD's operating expenses in this area go to the private sector, and most of that pays for transportation. There is significant opportunity to take greater advantage of private-sector efficiencies, including the provision of any needed "surge" capacity.




Figure 3-1. Wholesale Supply System Performance for High Priority, In-Stock Repair Parts

<sup>11</sup> Delaney, R., Cass Logistics Inc., "It's All About Time," Fifth Annual Conference, National Press Club, 6 June 1994.

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## **Statement of Representative John N. Hostettler**

### **Base Realignment and Closure Commission**

**June 12, 1995**

#### **Introduction:**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I appreciate your attention to today's testimony. Having sat through a number of hearings in recent months, I know how hard it can be to remain focused in long hearings even when the issues being presented are exceedingly important, as they are today.

I represent the 8th Congressional District of Indiana, located in the Southwestern part of the state. Its two largest cities are Evansville, a leading industrial city along the Ohio River, and Bloomington, a city located 45 miles South of Indianapolis and the home of Indiana University. The District covers a large rural area of Indiana, composed of rolling forested countryside in the East and large tracts of fertile farmland in the West. It also contains a number of wholesome Indiana towns like historic Vincennes, founded in 1732. Bedford, the "limestone capital of the world", and French Lick, the hometown of basketball legend Larry Bird. Finally, and the reason for my being here today, the District is also the home of the Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center's Crane Indiana Site - located in Martin County, Indiana.

#### **Purpose of Testimony:**

As you know, the Secretary of Defense has recommended that several activities at the Indianapolis Naval Air Warfare Center and the Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center's Louisville Kentucky site be transferred to the Martin County facility. My purpose today is not to enter into the privatization debate which my colleagues and friends are bringing to your attention. I will only say that I, like my constituents, want the very best decisions to be made for America. As a member of the House National Security Committee, I fully appreciate that decisions regarding our military force structure must be made as free of politics as possible.

My testimony is, however, to help assure you that if you should decide to follow the Secretary of Defense's recommendations, the Martin County site of the Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center is ready, available, and in good condition, to be the receiving location. I also want to assure you that the local communities are fully capable of implementing the Secretary's recommendations, and that the facility has ample capacity to absorb the consolidated missions.

#### **Crane Site Physical Dimensions:**

The Crane site in Martin County, Indiana, is a unique national asset. To truly appreciate this base a person really needs to visit there. The base's physical statistics are amazing and sound more like the description of a National Park than a military base. It contains over 62,000 rolling acres, which translates to 97 square miles and includes over 50,000 acres of beautiful

forest. In fact, the United States Navy has recently informed me that its Crane, Indiana, site is among its ten largest facilities in the world.

The size of the base has proved to be an ideal location for the storage of munitions. For that reason, the Martin County site is also home to the United States Army's Crane Army Ammunition Activity, a tenant of the Navy. Because of the facility's size, munitions can be safely stored and all security needs easily met.

### **Crane Site Infrastructure:**

The base's infrastructure reflects its physical dimensions. It has approximately 75 miles of perimeter fence, 185 miles of paved streets and highways, 226 miles of unpaved roads, and 170 miles of railway. It also has a large variety of facilities, ranging from ammunition storage bunkers to state of the art technology centers supporting the well over 2500 current Crane engineers, scientists, and technicians.

Since 1987, there has been approximately \$34.4 million in new construction completed at the site, resulting in state of the art product support facilities. Approximately \$12.06 million in new construction is currently underway, including a \$7.9 million Electro-optics Center.

Given its physical size and up-to-date infrastructure, it is my view that the Crane, Indiana Site would, if called upon, meet the needs of the Navy for the foreseeable future as a premier product engineering and industrial activity.

### **The Southwestern Indiana Community:**

The people of Southwestern Indiana are by nature patriotic Midwesterners. We wholeheartedly support the work of Navy at Crane and, if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are followed, we are ready to do our part.

According to an Indiana University study requested by the South Central Indiana Coalition immediately prior to the last BRAC round, the local communities surrounding Crane are fully capable of absorbing even a 100% expansion in the Crane workforce. There exists ample housing, schools, transportation, and utilities to handle the projected influx. I believe that this conclusion continues to be valid. I also believe that this area has a trained workforce with an excellent work ethic.

I would be remiss if I did not add that Southwestern Indiana is a great place to live. The cost of living in the area is low, as is crime. In addition, there exists a choice between living in a relatively remote rural area or in a sophisticated urban environment.

**Conclusion:**

I fully support the concept of the Midwest Navy. I think that the history of the Indianapolis, Louisville, and Crane, Indiana, sites have shown the value of these Midwest facilities. I thank you for your work on the difficult task you face in determining the region's future force structure.

**Statement by  
Congressman Ron Lewis  
BRACC Congressional Hearings  
June 12, 1995**

I want to thank you Chairman Dixon and the other members of the commission for this opportunity to testify today and to express my strong support for the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Louisville, Kentucky.

Mr. Chairman, my first priority here today is to support the Naval Surface Warfare Center as a viable, important part of our Navy's success.

Although the station is not in my district directly, I do represent the southern portion of Louisville. I represent over 400 of the engineers, planners and technicians at the Station. These are hard working, dedicated folks. These people are the heart and sole of that facility and they know its true capabilities. They are the reason that Naval Ordnance has achieved a reputation of excellence in the quality of its work. They are the reason for the Center's innovative success over the years.

The record clearly shows the unique capabilities and vital importance of Naval Ordnance to our national defense. I am sure that we all can agree that our nation's commitment to readiness is the driving force that keeps our military forces the best in the world. The support services of our military have proven their worth time after time when the security of our nation and its

future were in jeopardy. Naval Ordnance is an important link in maintaining that readiness edge.

As you know, Naval Ordnance has been there when called to duty. It responded swiftly and accurately during The Gulf War to develop solutions and execute swift repairs of equipment. It is the only Close-in Weapon System Depot available to the Navy. It is also the only remaining Major Caliber Gun Barrel manufacturing facility of its kind. Naval Ordnance possesses a full spectrum of capability, from development and design, to production, to maintenance of technology and equipment for the Navy. It clearly has unique and vital capabilities.

Of course in these times of growing federal budget deficits, we must find ways to curb spending in all sectors of the federal budget. The Base Closure Commission has an important job to do in finding ways to reduce excess military facilities while at the same time, maintaining our military excellence. I commend you and the other Commissioners for the task you are undertaking.

In that light, the idea of moving towards cross servicing has been discussed as the possible direction for military readiness efforts in the future. It certainly has merits from a budgetary point of view and is an idea that previous BRAC Commissions have supported. Mr. Chairman, Naval Ordnance can be a key player in this effort. Naval Ordnance has joint service capabilities in

place that are operating today. But if we dismantle that capability, that opportunity will be lost.

As I stated before, my priority in this effort to keep Naval Ordnance open and continue its unique, qualified role in the readiness efforts of our military machine. Some have suggested that privatization is the direction that we should go; as this is an idea that has some merit. But I am not ready to give up on maintaining the status quo at Naval Ordnance. And this Commission shouldn't give up on that goal either. In my judgement, maintaining the Naval Surface Warfare Center is the best thing for our national defense.

Again, I commend you and the members of the Commission for the fine job you are doing and the important task before you. The Navy has been well served by the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Louisville. It is the last operation of its kind due to its complete services ability and its workforce who's dedication can't be matched. It is a key ingredient for the continued, superiority of our Nation's military readiness.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.

**Statement of Congressman Mike Ward  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Congressional Hearing, 345 Cannon House Office Building  
Monday, June 12, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

First, let me thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Louisville, Kentucky -- the facility which we know as the Naval Ordnance Station.

Thank you, too, for the site visit in Louisville on April 6 by Senator Dixon, Commissioner Kling and Commissioner Cornella, and for the Commission's attention to our community presentation in Chicago on April 12. In addition, the BRAC staff has diligently responded to our serious concerns about the handling of "data call" information regarding Naval Ordnance.

I am here today, along with my colleagues, to talk with you about two approaches which might be used to preserve the core gun system capabilities at Naval Ordnance, capabilities essential for defense readiness.

As I sketch these two alternatives, I want to emphasize that the process of developing these proposals began immediately after the BRAC '93 process concluded. We come to you as a *community*. Every level of government -- represented by the Kentucky/Indiana Congressional delegation, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky, the Mayor of Louisville and the County Judge/Executive of Jefferson County -- worked together, in a bipartisan manner, to develop our proposals. Here with us today is my predecessor, Congressman Ron Mazzoli, a veteran of these wars who has stayed in the field and chairs our Community Naval Ordnance Task Force.

**THE BEST AND PREFERRED OPTION: A GUN SYSTEMS DEPOT OF EXCELLENCE**

Mr. Chairman, I urge the Commission to seriously examine providing future gun systems capability by keeping Naval Ordnance Station open as a Department of the Navy facility, performing Navy work and cross-services work presently being evaluated by the Commission. Frankly, I believe this would be the best option for the taxpayers and for our national defense.

As the Commissioners who visited Louisville saw firsthand, Naval Ordnance is a *unique repository of engineering, mechanical, electronics and industrial knowledge of gun systems*. No other facility provides the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense with the *full spectrum of gun systems expertise* -- research, development, design, manufacture, upgrade, and overhaul -- provided at Naval Ordnance.

The important and unique assets at Naval Ordnance Station include:

- o a state-of-the-art, environmentally compliant plating shop, with the only vertical gun barrel plating capability within the Department of Defense;
- o the only remaining Major Caliber Gun Barrel manufacturing facility within the Department of the Navy;
- o the only Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) depot, public or private;

The real "gold mine" at Naval Ordnance are the synergies created by the co-location of engineers and ordnance workers. This co-location of engineers and workers has made invaluable contributions to gun systems technology and must not be lost.

Closure of the Naval Ordnance Station, the last remaining facility, public or private, providing full-spectrum engineering and industrial life cycle support for Naval gun weapons systems, would be analogous to closure of the last public-sector shipyard, and would clearly be "eating our seed corn," as Commissioner Davis put it, in reference to another facility, at your hearing on May 10. For this reason, I urge the Commission to remove the Naval Ordnance Station from the list of facilities to be closed.

**A CREATIVE OPTION TO SAVE MONEY AND PRESERVE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES:  
TURN NAVAL ORDNANCE INTO A PRIVATE GUN CENTER OF EXCELLENCE:**

If the Commission does not overturn the Department of Defense recommendation to close the Naval Ordnance Station, the Commission can retain the critical skills at Louisville by altering the Navy recommendation language to assure implementation of the community proposal to privatize the work at Louisville under Department of the Navy supervision.

The Department of the Navy strongly supports the community's privatization initiative, which would maintain at Naval Ordnance -- and potentially expand -- the gun systems capabilities which reside at Louisville.

The community's privatization initiative offers the best alternative to outright closure. The "Louisville Plan" would serve the best interests of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, the Louisville, Kentucky and Southern Indiana communities, and two important defense contractors who have signed memorandums of understanding with the City of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky.

The privatization plan would:

- . allow the Navy to reduce its infrastructure by removing

a large facility from its ownership;

- . *support maintaining the private defense industrial base* by enabling two defense contractors to gain access to overhaul and upgrade work;
- . *facilitate dual use of technologies and facilities which have military and commercial applications, such as our state-of-the-art plating shop;*
- . *avoid unnecessary, wasteful costs to relocate equipment and capabilities* at Naval Ordnance that are provided in a cost-effective and efficient manner by experienced Naval Ordnance employees;
- . *assure uninterrupted ability to meet Fleet readiness requirements by retaining the experienced, highly-skilled employees at Naval Ordnance* for Phalanx overhaul and Naval gun systems work.

Mr. Chairman, I want to take just a moment to respond to a memorandum which the Commission received from consultants hired by supporters of the Norfolk Navy Shipyard. That memorandum states, correctly, that the Commission may not consider "advance conversion planning" in closure recommendations. However, the consultants' conclusion that this prevents the Commission from recommending privatization of NSWC Louisville is incorrect and unjustified.

I urge you to recommend that the Naval Ordnance Station remain open as a Department of the Navy facility. If that is not possible, your recommendation should, at least, assure that the core gun systems work at Louisville is privatized in place and that the nation retains the co-location of Department of the Navy engineering capability alongside the depot overhaul capabilities at the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville.

Finally, let me express my gratitude for the continuing work which you, and the BRAC staff, are doing to make the difficult judgements necessary to reduce our defense infrastructure while preserving a strong national defense.

**DRAFT**

**MAINE**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

None

**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

**NAVY:**


Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

Close

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 20

## MAINE



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1903

**STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR OLYMPIA J. SNOWE (MAINE)  
BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING  
OF THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
345 Cannon House Building, Washington, DC  
Monday, June 12, 1995, 3:17 p.m.**

On behalf of the Maine and New Hampshire Delegations, let me first thank all eight Commissioners for visiting Portsmouth Naval Shipyard ten days ago.

We are confident that what you saw and heard confirms what we and the Navy already know to be the case: that America's submarine future and America's Naval strength truly "runs deep", and its home base IS Portsmouth. That's the bottom line.

Those responsible for our national security made a military judgement in recommending the retention of Portsmouth.

And it was based on their professional assessment of the threats confronting this nation in the next century and the force structure required to deal with them.

And, furthermore, in a report required by law, the GAO supported the Navy's view that "Portsmouth should not be closed because of uncertainties in the future of the SSN-21 program (the Seawolf) and the nature of the evolving (Russian) submarine threat." Clearly, this was a military decision - no more, and no less.

Admiral Boorda, Admiral DeMars, and Vice Admiral Sterner - all emphatically spoke on behalf of Portsmouth's military value. They said closing Portsmouth was "an unacceptable risk" and that they "needed Portsmouth on the Navy team". They said Portsmouth "is a critical asset for the future" and that America has an "obligation to retain the shipyards needed to support the fleet". They said closing Portsmouth would put us in an "unacceptable margin for performing nuclear submarine work."

As you can tell, they don't exactly mince words when it comes to Portsmouth. And for good reason.

So why is Portsmouth so vital to the Navy? Because when it comes to submarines, they know from experience that there is no more modern shipyard than Portsmouth -- the only shipyard in the nation, public or private, that can perform the full range of repair and maintenance functions on the 688-class submarine.

AUBURN  
GREAT FALLS PLAZA  
7B  
AUBURN, ME 04210  
(207) 786-2451

AUGUSTA  
68 SEWALL STREET, SUITE 101C  
AUGUSTA, ME 04330  
(207) 622-8292

BANGOR  
ONE CUMBERLAND PLACE, SUITE 306  
BANGOR, ME 04401  
(207) 945-0432

BIDDEFORD  
231 MAIN STREET, SUITE 2  
P.O. BOX 215  
BIDDEFORD, ME 04005  
(207) 282-4144

PORTLAND  
3 CANAL PLAZA, SUITE 601  
P.O. BOX 188  
PORTLAND, ME 04112  
(207) 874-0883  
TDD (207) 775-5196

PRESQUE ISLE  
169 ACADEMY STREET, SUITE 3  
PRESQUE ISLE, ME 04769  
(207) 764-5124

And it is the 688 that will make-up virtually 98% of the attack submarine force by the end of the decade. It will be the backbone of our submarine fleet well into the 21st century, at least until the year 2020.

Because only one shipyard -- Portsmouth -- currently supports ALL 688 requirements, the Navy determined that it should be removed from consideration for closure because of - and I quote - "its unique role as the center of excellence for the SSN 688-class submarines." Again, the Navy's words.

In arriving at its determination to retain Portsmouth, the Navy had to consider not just the *amount* of nuclear shipyard work it had to perform, but the *type* as well.

The Navy knows that 58% of its nuclear workload will be on submarines in 2001.

The Navy knows that, even more significantly, it already has complex shipyard work planned for the 688 through the year 2018.

In addition, a NAVSEA report stated that over the next ten years, the Navy's submarine refueling complexes will be 93% utilized. And NAVSEA stated that the loss of just one of the nation's nuclear shipyards would render its depot maintenance program - quote - "inexecutable without creating additional facilities at another location."

And that's why, at the Boston hearing, Admiral Sterner told the Commission that the loss of Portsmouth would pose an "unacceptable risk" to his ability to support the fleet, as well as to our national security. Those aren't idle words...that's our nation's military leadership, our armed forces, speaking out for Portsmouth.

To put this in context, the Navy has aggressively used the base closure process to reduce its shore-based infrastructure. Since the '91 round, the Navy has recommended closure of four of eight shipyards...a 50% reduction. Admiral Sterner said - and I quote - "the difference is that we no longer have any surplus", and he added, "I don't have a Mare Island to go to".

You see, the Navy knows Portsmouth's experience with the 688 is unrivalled.

The Navy knows Portsmouth was the first Naval shipyard to overhaul a 688.

The Navy knows Portsmouth was also the first Naval shipyard to perform a 688 refueling overhaul.

The Navy knows Portsmouth is also the first in overall nuclear submarine overhaul experience - it has completed more major submarine overhauls than any other shipyard.

Furthermore, Admiral Sterner described a submarine refueling overhaul as "probably the most complex industrial undertaking known to man". But this is what Portsmouth does best, and they are getting even more efficient: its first refueling took 141 work days; the second, 133 work days; and the third is projected to take just 102 work days.

The Navy knows that its crown jewel for submarine overhauls is Portsmouth's covered Dry Dock #2 - the only dry dock *in the entire country* currently configured to perform the complex nuclear refueling of a 688.

Its unique, singular features are a permanent part of that Dry Dock. They are not portable. They are not interchangeable with any other dry dock - anywhere.

So, knowing just these facts, why would anyone want to attempt to replicate a facility that has always been the first and the best at what it does?


The point is, the goal here should not be to close one base the Navy requires for the sake of moving it somewhere else. In the case of Portsmouth, it simply cannot be done. We just can't afford to play a military "shell-game" with a superlative, one-of-a-kind shipyard like Portsmouth.

In conclusion, I must point out that, never before in this process have so many in the Navy said so much in defense of a base that is so critical to the defense of our country. Never. And if I could just recall just one moment in this process that said it all, it is this: when the Chief of Naval Operations - Admiral Boorda, in his only site visit to a base in this round - stood before all of you at the Portsmouth yard and said the Navy not only wants Portsmouth...they need Portsmouth.

And - I would add - so does America.

Thank you.

# Naval Shipyard FY2001 Nuclear Workload



## Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

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# FUTURE SSN 688 CLASS MAINTENANCE AND MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS

- Complex Depot Work
  - ✓ 14 Engineered Refueling Overhauls Through 2005
  - ✓ 28 Depot Modernization Periods Through 2007
  - ✓ 31 Engineered Non-Refueling Overhauls 2004 Through 2018

CONGRESSMAN JOHN E. BALDACCI

EXTENDED REMARKS BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND  
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION, JUNE 12, 1995

MR. CHAIRMAN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION,  
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. I AM HONORED TO BE BEFORE YOU  
TODAY TO SPEAK ABOUT THE PEOPLE OF PORTSMOUTH AND THE  
VALUABLE EXPERIENCE THEY BRING TO THE NAVY. PORTSMOUTH  
NAVAL SHIPYARD'S MISSION IS TO PROVIDE QUALITY  
OVERHAUL, REPAIR, REFUELING AND MODERNIZATION OF  
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES AND RELATED SERVICES IN A SAFE,  
TIMELY, AND COST-EFFECTIVE MANNER.

THE EXPERIENCE AND SKILLS ACQUIRED AND HANDED DOWN  
SINCE 1914 HAVE MADE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD THE LEAD  
NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FACILITY IN THE COUNTRY. THESE  
EXPERIENCED MEN AND WOMEN HAVE BECOME EXPERTS IN THEIR  
FIELD AND HAVE DEVELOPED EFFICIENT TECHNIQUES OVER THE  
YEARS. MR. CHAIRMAN, PORTSMOUTH IS SECOND TO NONE.

PORTSMOUTH IS THE NAVY'S FOREMOST NUCLEAR SUBMARINE  
SHIPYARD, SUCCESSFULLY AND EFFICIENTLY DOING ITS JOB

FOR OVER 80 YEARS. THIS EXPERTISE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUED STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES' NAVAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR NATION. THE WORKING MEN AND WOMEN OF THE SHIPYARD ARE PROUD OF THIS TRADITION AND THEIR "YANKEE WORK-ETHIC" WILL SEE THAT THE NAVY AND THE COUNTRY ARE NOT DISAPPOINTED. THIS EXPERTISE CANNOT BE RECALLED OVERNIGHT. IN FACT, IT CANNOT EVER.

PORTSMOUTH HAS COMPLETED MORE SUBMARINE MAJOR AVAILABILITIES THAN ANY OTHER SHIPYARD. THIS INCLUDES 8 DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERIODS, 32 NON-REFUELING OVERHAULS, AND 24 OF THE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND COMPLEX REFUELING OVERHAULS TO DATE. THIS INCLUDES A SSN 688 REFUELING OVERHAUL. A SECOND ONE IS UNDERWAY.

PORTSMOUTH CONTINUES WITH ITS PROUD TRADITION OF BEING ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF SUBMARINE TECHNOLOGY. IT HAS PRODUCED AND WORKED ON UNIQUE SUBMARINES LIKE THE SSN "NAUTILUS," "SEAWOLF," "TULLIBEE," "JACK," AND THE SS "ALBACORE." IN ADDITION, PORTSMOUTH IS DEVELOPING THE ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH IS THE NAVY'S

NEWEST SUBMERSIBLE SUPPORTING THE SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES.

FURTHERMORE, PORTSMOUTH IS THE IS THE PLANNING YARD AND NAVSEA PROGRAM MANAGER REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE NAVY'S DEEP SUBMERGENCE SYSTEMS. THESE ARE SPECIAL DEEP-DIVING SUBMERSIBLES INVOLVED IN NAVAL RESEARCH. THIS PROGRAM INCLUDES DEEP SUBMERGENCE VEHICLES (DSVs); THE DOLPHIN, THE NAVY'S DEEPEST DIVING SUBMARINE AND RESEARCH PLATFORM WHICH WAS DESIGNED AND BUILT AT PORTSMOUTH; AND SUBMARINE RESCUE CHAMBERS, WHICH HAVE EMERGENCY FLY-AWAY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AS WELL AS AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

***SOME EARLY PORTSMOUTH FIRSTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:***

FY 56 FIRST NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE BUILT IN A YARD.

FY 58 FIRST AND ONLY SHIPYARD TO DESIGN AND BUILD DEEP SUBMERGENCE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES.

FY 59 FIRST SHIPYARD TO PERFORM A REFUELING OVERHAUL OF A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE.

FY 62 FIRST SHIPYARD TO PERFORM A NON-REFUELING OVERHAUL OF A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE.

FY 63 DELIVERED THE ONLY NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE WITH COAXIAL COUNTER-ROTATING PROPELLERS.

FY 73 FIRST SHIPYARD TO PERFORM A STURGEON CLASS NON-REFUELING OVERHAUL IN LESS THAN 12 MONTHS.

FY 76 RECORD FOR COMPLETING SEVEN STURGEON CLASS NON-REFUELING OVERHAULS IN LESS THAN 26 MONTHS.

FY. 81 FIRST SHIPYARD TO CONVERT A NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE (DURING OVERHAUL) TO CARRY TRIDENT C-4 MISSILES.

PORTSMOUTH IS THE ONLY REMAINING SHIPYARD WITH SSN 688 CLASS SUBMARINE REFUELING EXPERIENCE. THESE SUBMARINES ARE THE BACKBONE OF OUR FLEET. IN ADDITION TO PERFORMING THIS CRUCIAL TASK, PORTSMOUTH HAS THE BREADTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE TO PERFORM WORK ON SURFACE SHIPS AS WELL, INCLUDING WORK ON DESTROYERS, FRIGATES, CRUISERS, AND COAST GUARD CUTTERS. THE WORKERS AT PORTSMOUTH HAVE BECOME THE NAVY'S EXPERTS IN PERFORMING COMPONENT REPAIRS SUCH AS PROPULSION SHAFTS AND MOTOR GENERATOR SETS. PORTSMOUTH HAS CONTINUALLY PROVEN THAT IT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR YARD IN

THE COUNTRY, BY NOT ONLY PROVIDING THIS ESSENTIAL SERVICE TO THE NAVY'S NUCLEAR SUBMARINES BUT ALSO BY PROVIDING A WIDE ARRAY OF FLEET SUPPORT. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE NAVAL FLEET IS NUCLEAR SUBMARINES, ESPECIALLY SSN 688 LOS ANGELES CLASS SUBS.

ON AVERAGE, PORTSMOUTH IS THE MOST RELIABLE, EFFICIENT AND COST-EFFECTIVE YARD IN THE COUNTRY FOR OVERHAULS, DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERIODS AND REFUELINGS OF SSN 688 CLASS SUBMARINES. THIS RECORD SERVES AS A BENCHMARK FOR OTHER SHIPYARDS.

THE WORK PERFORMED AT PORTSMOUTH IS THE RESULT OF THE HARD WORK AND BREADTH OF EXPERIENCE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE OF MAINE AND NEW HAMPSHIRE. I AM PROUD TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY ABOUT THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE MADE PORTSMOUTH A FACILITY THAT IS INDISPENSABLE TO THE NAVY. THEIRS IS A TRADITION OF QUALITY WORK, "YANKEE INGENUITY," AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, NATIONAL SECURITY. THESE PEOPLE HAVE PROVEN THEIR WORTH THROUGH THEIR UNPARALLELED SKILL AND EXPERIENCE. THE NAVY HAS CONTINUALLY STRESSED THE ABSOLUTE IMPORTANCE OF

PORTSMOUTH'S UNIQUE EXPERIENCE TO THE UNITED STATE'S NAVAL FLEET. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND TOP NAVAL OFFICIALS ALL REALIZE THE UNEQUIVOCAL NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THIS YARD AND THE EXPERIENCE AND PROFICIENCY THAT HAS BEEN ACQUIRED OVER THE LAST 80 YEARS. THERE IS NO OTHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE YARD IN THE COUNTRY THAT IS BETTER PREPARED, EQUIPPED OR TRAINED THAN PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD TO OVERHAUL THESE SUBMARINES. I URGE YOU TO KEEP THIS NATIONAL ASSET OPEN.

**DRAFT**

**NEW HAMPSHIRE**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

None


**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 30

## NEW HAMPSHIRE



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

# NOTES

**STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR JUDD GREGG  
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT  
COMMISSION**

**JUNE 12, 1995**

Just over a week ago, you visited Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and conducted a hearing in Boston, Massachusetts. During your visit and at the regional hearing, you had the opportunity to hear the case for retaining the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and to meet the workers who make it the outstanding facility it is today. Between the Shipyard community and workers, the Navy, our State officials and the joint effort of our Congressional delegation, this Commission has heard the best case that can be made to keep our yard open. By now you should know the facts. You should be keenly aware of Portsmouth's inherent military value, the cumulative economic impact closing would have on the community, and the strong support for keeping it open from the Navy and from the citizens of New Hampshire.

Therefore, today I want to stress just one last point which I believe may be the most important message you will consider: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is an irreplaceable asset. It is highly doubtful, if not impossible, to overcome the seemingly insurmountable obstacles of cost, time, environmental regulations, and nuclear licensing to build another facility someday to replicate Portsmouth's known capabilities. It is uncertain whether this highly efficient yard and its top notch workforce could ever be reconstituted to fulfill the mission and needs of our national defense as flawlessly as it already operates.

Since 1991, the Navy has closed three of its eight shipyards. A fourth, Long Beach, is on the current DoD list. Of the four, Long Beach and Philadelphia were conventional yards, while Mare Island and Charleston were nuclear-certified. The four remaining shipyards: Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, Norfolk, and Portsmouth are all nuclear-certified. By the end of BRAC 95, if the Department's recommendations are accepted, the Navy will have closed half of its public shipyards.

Shipyards are not like any other kind of military installation in that they are not easily replaceable. Building an industrial facility on the water similar to Portsmouth would be next to impossible. Among the issues that would have to be overcome are:

\* Cost - Acquiring the land to build such an industrial facility like Portsmouth would be prohibitive.

\* Time - Building such a facility would not only be costly, but time-consuming. As the Commission saw during its base visit, much of the equipment at Portsmouth is custom built and could not be easily re-created or moved.

\* Environment - Current laws which severely limit any kind of development on or near water. The last naval shipyard was built more than 75 years ago prior to the stringent environmental regulations that now exist. Attempting to locate a nuclear shipyard, or any type of nuclear facility, along the water would be next to impossible.

\* Nuclear License - Reconstituting a nuclear shipyard such as Portsmouth would be made even more difficult by the fact that acquiring a nuclear license would present many difficulties. The Seabrook nuclear power plant and the years it took to come on-line present a vivid example of the difficulties inherent in building a nuclear facility.

\* Workforce - An aspect that often goes overlooked is the well-trained workforce. Like other shipyards, Portsmouth has a long tradition of expertise in complex nuclear work. Close the yard and those workers will either leave the area or go to other jobs and that expertise is lost. Even if the Navy were able to overcome all the other hurdles in reconstituting Portsmouth or another yard, finding nuclear-certified welders and other highly specialized skilled workers is not like finding someone to flip burgers at your local McDonalds.

\* Private Sector - As you heard during the base visit and the regional hearing, some observers have suggested that Portsmouth's workload simply be shifted to the private sector. As ADM DeMars pointed out, facilitating a private yard costs money up front for construction and the high cost to train workers cannot be accurately calculated. Plus, why would you want to go to the expense of trying to recreate a capability that you already have, and that performs in a highly efficient manner?

\* Regional Maintenance - Retention of Portsmouth would not have a high cost to the American taxpayer. Consolidation of industrial functions through initiatives such as Regional Maintenance eliminate redundancy and save money. This also represents affordable insurance against future needs and allows for the retention of shipyards that cannot be reconstituted.

It makes good military and economic sense to base critical industrial facility decisions on the ability to reconstitute them when the need arises. Shipyards are unique industrial facilities and once they are gone, they are gone forever. The world is a very uncertain and dangerous place, closure decisions must be based on today's needs as well as those in the future.

Portsmouth is highly efficient, its workers are top notch, and it has a mission and workload which the Navy plans to continue for the foreseeable future. Portsmouth provides the Navy with the flexibility needed to meet today's and future requirements. Closing this facility would certainly be a severe blow for the Seacoast region of both New Hampshire and Maine, but more importantly, it would negatively impact the Navy's ability to provide for the national defense.

REMARKS OF SENATOR BOB SMITH  
BEFORE THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
June 12, 1995

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, GOOD AFTERNOON. I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR LISTENING TO OUR INPUT TODAY ON PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD. I ALSO WANT TO THANK EACH OF YOU FOR YOUR VISIT TO THE SHIPYARD ON JUNE 2. YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SITE VISIT DEMONSTRATED BEYOND A SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT YOU ARE COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS, AND TO MAKING A FAIR, INFORMED DECISION.

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE ROLE OF SUBMARINES IN OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. AS A MEMBER OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, I HAVE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, AND I CAN TELL YOU WITHOUT HESITATION THAT SUBMARINE THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES ARE REAL AND THEY ARE GROWING.

FOR INSTANCE, RUSSIA IS CONTINUING TO AGGRESSIVELY MODERNIZE ITS NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE AND IS PLACING ENORMOUS EMPHASIS ON ACOUSTIC AND MAGNETIC QUIETING PROGRAMS. TODAY, RUSSIA'S FRONT-LINE SUBMARINES ARE AS QUIET OR QUIETER IN SOME RESPECTS THAN AMERICA'S BEST. BY THE YEAR 2000, THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES THAT 20 PERCENT OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES WILL BE QUIETER THAN THE U.S. NAVY'S FRONTLINE IMPROVED LOS ANGELES CLASS SUBMARINES.

IN ADDITION, RUSSIA IS EXPORTING HIGHLY CAPABLE KILO CLASS SUBMARINES TO IRAN AND CHINA. THESE DIESEL SUBMARINES WILL FUNDAMENTALLY SHIFT THE BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, AND ALLOW IRAN TO THREATEN THE SEALANES WITHIN, AND SURROUNDING, THE PERSIAN GULF. IN CHINA, THESE SUBMARINES WILL SUBSTANTIALLY ENHANCE CHINESE POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES, AND PROVIDE THE MUSCLE TO BACK CHINA'S RECENTLY ASSERTED EXPANSION OF ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE HAS RELEASED AN ANALYSTS OF WORLDWIDE SUBMARINE PROLIFERATION THAT IS CONCISE AND COMPELLING. FOR YOUR REVIEW, I HAVE PROVIDED EACH OF YOU WITH A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT. IN PARTICULAR, I WANT TO HIGHLIGHT A QUOTE FROM RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER PAVEL GRACHEV FROM JUNE 8, 1993 IN WHICH GENERAL GRACHEV STATES, AND I QUOTE, "A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FLEET IS THE FUTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE NUMBER OF TANKS AND GUNS WILL BE REDUCED, AS WELL AS THE INFANTRY, BUT A MODERN NAVY IS A TOTALLY DIFFERENT THING. THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL DEVELOPED COUNTRIES UNDERSTAND THIS VERY WELL." UNQUOTE.

-MORE-

SMITH TESTIMONY BEFORE BRAC  
JUNE 12, 1995  
PAGE 2

THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE STUDIED THIS THREAT VERY CAREFULLY. THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST MAINTAIN A ROBUST, MODERN SUBMARINE FLEET TO COUNTER THE GLOBAL SUBMARINE THREAT, AS WELL AS THE NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE INFRASTRUCTURE TO SERVICE AND MAINTAIN OUR SUBMARINE FLEET. THIS IS PRECISELY WHERE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD FITS IN.

BEFORE I ADDRESS THE MILITARY VALUE OF PORTSMOUTH, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE FLUID STATE OF OUR SUBMARINE PROGRAM. NUMEROUS FLAG OFFICERS HAVE ADVISED ME THAT WE NEED MORE SUBMARINES THAN ARE CURRENTLY PROGRAMMED IN THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW. IN FACT, I HAVE BEEN TOLD WE WILL NEED TO RETAIN SOME 60-65 ATTACK SUBMARINES VERSUS THE 45-55 THAT ARE FUNDED IN THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM.

THE ONLY WAY WE CAN REACH THESE LEVELS IS TO REFUEL ADDITIONAL LOS ANGELES CLASS SUBMARINES. AGAIN, THIS IS PRECISELY WHERE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD FITS IN. PORTSMOUTH IS THE ONLY SHIPYARD THAT HAS PERFORMED AND IS CURRENTLY PERFORMING REFUELING OVERHAULS ON THESE SUBMARINES. IT IS A TRUE NATIONAL ASSET.

I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THERE IS A BIG, BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A DE-FUELING OR INACTIVATION OF A SUBMARINE, AND A REFUELING OVERHAUL WHICH EXTENDS ITS SERVICE LIFE. DE-FUELINGS ARE RELATIVELY SMALL, RELATIVELY UNCOMPLICATED WORK PACKAGES. REFUELING OVERHAULS ENTAIL ROUGHLY 7 TIMES AS MANY MANDAYS AS A DE-FUELING, AND ARE EXTREMELY COMPLEX. THEY ARE SPECIALIZED PROJECTS THAT REQUIRE STATE OF THE ART FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND SYNERGY WITHIN THE WORKFORCE. NO ONE DOES IT BETTER THAN PORTSMOUTH. NO ONE HAS MORE EXPERIENCE.

LET ME SUMMARIZE AND CONCLUDE MY PRESENTATION TO YOU WITH SOME BRIEF OBSERVATIONS.

\*\*SUBMARINE THREATS TO OUR NATION ARE REAL AND THEY ARE GROWING.

\*\*THE SIZE AND NATURE OF OUR FUTURE SUBMARINE FLEET IS INDEFINITE, AND IS VERY LIKELY TO INCREASE ABOVE THE LEVELS FUNDED IN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION BUDGET.

\*\*PORTSMOUTH IS THE ONLY NAVAL SHIPYARD THAT PERFORMS ALL LOS ANGELES CLASS REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING LEAD ENGINEERING.

\*\*THE CLOSURE OF PORTSMOUTH WOULD RESULT IN THE CUMULATIVE LOSS OF 50 PERCENT OF NAVY'S NUCLEAR CAPABLE SHIPYARDS, 73

-MORE-

SMITH TESTIMONY BEFORE BRAC  
JUNE 12, 1995  
PAGE 3

PERCENT OF NAVAL SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, AND REDUCE TOTAL SHIPYARD EXCESS CAPACITY TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF ONLY 1 PERCENT. IT WOULD LEAVE THE ATLANTIC FLEET WITH ONLY A SINGLE NAVAL SHIPYARD PROVIDING DEDICATED SUPPORT TO ITS ASSETS.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, IN TODAY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, UNCERTAINTY TRANSLATES INTO RISK. THE NAVY HAS DETERMINED THAT THE CLOSURE OF PORTSMOUTH WOULD POSE UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THEY WANT TO RETAIN PORTSMOUTH. THEY NEED TO RETAIN PORTSMOUTH. I URGE YOU TO CONSIDER THEIR INPUT VERY CAREFULLY.

IF DOWN THE ROAD WE DETERMINE THAT PORTSMOUTH IS NO LONGER NECESSARY, FUTURE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSIONS CAN REVISIT THE ISSUE. BUT IF YOU VOTE TO CLOSE PORTSMOUTH NOW, AND WE FIND IN THE COMING WEEKS, OR MONTHS, OR YEARS, THAT WE REALLY NEED THIS BASE, IT WILL BE TOO LATE. THE SHIPYARD WILL BE GONE; ITS FACILITIES, ITS WORKERS, AND ITS NUCLEAR LICENSE WILL BE LOST. THAT IS A RISK THE NAVY IS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE. THAT IS A RISK OUR NATION MUST NOT ASSUME.

I URGE YOU TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF RETAINING PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD. THANK YOU.

# DRAFT

## MARYLAND

### I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

#### ARMY:

Army Bio-Medical Research Lab, Ft. Detrick	Redirect
Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore	Close
Concepts Analysis Agency	Close
Ft. Meade (Kimbrough Hospital)	Realign
Ft. Ritchie	Close

#### NAVY:

Naval Medical Resarch Inst. Bethesda	Close
NSWC Det Annapolis	Close
NSWC Det White Oak	Close

#### DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE:

IC&AD, Ft. Holabird	Relocate
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
### II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

#### ARMY:

Ft. Holabird	Close
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# MAP NO. 21


## MARYLAND



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# MAP NO. 21a

## SUBURBAN MARYLAND



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**NOTES**

**NOTES**

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**Closing Fort Ritchie Would Make a Mockery of the BRAC Process**

**Statement by Representative Roscoe Bartlett**

Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Washington, D.C.

June 12, 1995

The Army and the Department of Defense (DoD) have substantially deviated from compliance with a number of the base closure selection criteria, in all three of BRAC's major categories: (1) military value, (2) return on investment, and (3) impacts.

The Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee (FORMAC), the community-based group reviewing the Fort Ritchie issue, has uncovered a multitude of data errors, omissions and faulty rationale in the Army/DoD BRAC submissions. To make a decision to close Fort Ritchie, Maryland based on those errors would make a mockery of the BRAC process. Notwithstanding the fact they have been shown the specific errors and omissions by FORMAC, the Army continues to submit completely invalid data.

I will provide the BRAC Commission with some major examples in a few moments and submit a statement for the record.

FORMAC has documented all of their findings and has shared those findings along with detailed back-up data, with representatives from the Army, the BRAC Commission staff and five of the BRAC Commissioners (both at Fort Ritchie on March 24 and in Baltimore on May 4).

In every meeting with the Army, FORMAC has reiterated errors and omissions which continue to refute the Army's claim that Fort Ritchie should close and its tenants be disbursed. **There are 18 specific areas in the Cost Of Base Realignment Action Model (COBRA) which the Army/DoD failed to address or for which they submitted completely erroneous data.**

For example:

- (1) Claiming credit for Fort Ritchie support personnel savings a full two years before the people receiving that support would vacate Fort Ritchie. This is completely premature, and thereby, unsubstantiated.
- (2) Stating in their original submission to the BRAC Commission that there are (quote) "No known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installation" (unquote), and then refusing to pursue the issue after FORMAC demonstrated unequivocally that there was potentially a **very serious** environmental issue at the receiving site, Fort Huachuca, Arizona concerning the San Pedro Basin water supply.
- (3) Including a Fiscal Year 1993 \$2 million one-time family housing capital investment as a continuing recurring expenditure. This error alone translates into approximately a \$12 million overstatement by the Army of the "net present value" and approximately \$28 million in constant dollars relative to Fort Ritchie for the 20-year period.
- (4) Changing the number of family housing units required at Fort Detrick, Maryland from 354 units in their original submission to 57 units in their most recent proposal. There is no explanation given by the Army/DoD for this change in strategy. **It certainly smacks of data manipulation simply to reflect the lowest initial investment cost.** There is no rationale from Army/DoD to support the shift from military family housing to "variable housing allowance" (off-post subsidized housing). **This capricious action results in a comparative advantage in the Army/DoD analysis by deferring expenditures into out-years with reduced net present value.**

**FORMAC has also identified a "lost opportunity."** There is approximately \$9 million that can be saved simply by consolidating geographically dispersed staff elements of Headquarters, Defense Information Systems Agency - Western Hemisphere (DISA-WESTHEM) at Fort Ritchie. The up-front cost of relocating the DISA-WESTHEM Denver staff is approximately \$2.3 million, which would be amortized over only three years. There would also be an additional intangible benefit through improved operational efficiency.

**A careful review of General Shalikashvili's April 17, 1995 to Chairman Dixon reveals serious shortfalls.** For instance, General Shalikashvili's letter says that Site R is serviced by a fire suppression system. In fact, the Halon fire protection system covers only 10% of the Site R operating space. FORMAC will raise this and several other operational issues raised in General Shalikashvili's letter with senior members of the BRAC staff on June 16, 1995.

**In summary, it is imperative that the BRAC Commission reject the Army/DOD recommendations to close Fort Ritchie due to deviation from final selection criteria 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.** Furthermore, it is my recommendation that DoD be directed as soon as possible to relocate the DISA-WESTHEM Denver staff from leased space to Fort Ritchie.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL S. SARBANES  
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**JUNE 12, 1995  
CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 345**

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, thank you for this opportunity to testify once again on behalf of the military installations in Maryland.

As you know, Maryland was impacted heavily by the DoD's 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Recommendations. Over the past three months, our Congressional Delegation has worked closely together and with the affected communities to analyze the Department's justifications and, in our judgment, these justifications contain some serious flaws. We outlined many of our concerns to you at the May 4th Regional Hearing in Baltimore, and you will be hearing shortly from each member of our Delegation who will provide more detailed arguments for the facilities in their congressional districts. I want to use my time to highlight, with respect to each installation, some of the principal areas where we believe the Department deviated substantially from the Commission's Base Closure and Realignment Criteria.

NSWC - Annapolis

Two years ago the 1993 BRAC unanimously rejected the Department's recommendation to disestablish the Annapolis Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center. In our view, nothing has changed to warrant reconsidering this decision. In fact, in light of the Detachment's growing workload in such critical and time-sensitive areas as non-CFC Research and Development, the rationale for keeping it open is even stronger. There is simply no excess capacity at Annapolis! I want to underscore the following points:

First, the Navy cannot move over \$300 million worth of machinery and personnel for the same \$25 million cost that it planned to move just personnel in 1993. Even the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) has acknowledged that its estimates are faulty and that it was using the wrong base operating data. Our own review of the certified data, which we provided to the Commission in April, indicates that the figure is at least \$58 million too low.

Second, by closing NSWC Annapolis we would lose not only critical military facilities such as the Deep Ocean Pressure and Submarine Fluid Dynamics facilities -- considered in just the past two years to be vital to the Navy's future mission -- but perhaps more importantly, a dedicated team of scientists, engineers and technicians, and their corporate memory which would reduce the Navy's Machinery R & D capability to an unacceptable level and take many years to reconstitute. Even though Annapolis accounts for less than 10% of the personnel within the Carderock Division of NSWC, it consistently generates more than 50% of the patents.

Third, we have a real opportunity to achieve some savings and efficiencies by consolidating Joint Spectrum Center activities currently in leased space in the area to NSWC Annapolis.

We urge the Commission to, once again, reject DoD's proposal and maintain the highly integrated, proven team and research facilities at Annapolis.

#### NSWC - White Oak

The 1993 BRAC also recommended that the Headquarters of the Naval Sea Systems Command move from high-cost leased space in Crystal City to the Navy's White Oak facility. Here again, we see no reason that this decision should be reopened and NAVSEA redirected to the Navy Yard.

No less an official than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified that White Oak's hypervelocity wind tunnel is a "unique national capability" which must be retained. Similarly, the Defense Nuclear Agency has identified a critical need to retain the phoenix-casino nuclear effects simulators at White Oak. The fact that DoD failed to adequately consider the military value of these critical facilities is beyond dispute and the cost of moving or replication the facilities -- valued at over \$185 million -- is clearly prohibitive.

The Navy concedes that it will cost \$3 million more to relocate NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard versus moving to White Oak, but even these figures are flawed. Based on a detailed engineering study and new information provided by the Department of the Navy, over \$60 million in savings can be achieved by moving NAVSEA to White Oak.

I strongly urge you to uphold the BRAC 93 decision to relocate NAVSEA to White Oak, where the 4,000 NAVSEA employees can easily be accommodated and are welcomed by the community. This decision would also provide a receiving site for SPAWAR Headquarters in the National Capital Region.

#### Fort Ritchie

Fort Ritchie's critical support of Site R and the proximity of its tenants namely the Information Systems Engineering Command-Continental U.S., the Technology Applications Office, and Defense Information Systems Agency-Western Hemisphere (DISA-WESTHEM) to its predominantly East coast-based customers are essential to the Army's readiness and responsiveness.

Fort Ritchie's synergies, including a link which allows for Information Services designed by Disa-Western Hemisphere to be largely engineered by the Information Systems Engineering Command-Continental U.S., Not only upgrade efficiency, but also significantly cut costs.

DoD originally identified \$712 million in savings over 20 years for closing the Fort. As you know from our regional hearing, the Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee identified significant errors in the Army's COBRA analysis of Fort Ritchie. The Army's new cost savings

estimate for closing Fort Ritchie is 60% lower than the cost savings stated in DoD's original recommendation.

The fact that the Army's cost savings analysis has been so severely flawed to this point should not only cast doubt on its assessment of Ritchie's military value and critical synergies, but also on its entire rationale for closing Fort Ritchie.

#### Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore

The proposal to close PDC-Baltimore is flawed in a number of areas, namely because it fails to recognize the opportunity for significantly higher savings and increased efficiencies that could be achieved if PDC-Baltimore and its fully automated capabilities were to be utilized to carry out part of a consolidated DoD-wide PDC mission.

It is clear that in making this recommendation DoD failed to fully explore PDC-Baltimore's remarkable track record of quick response, its demonstrated flexibility in handling a wide variety of publications and forms, and the superior efficiency of its fully-automated warehouse capabilities.

Contrary to DoD's assertions, PDC-Baltimore is not a manual operation, but a highly automated warehouse with a high tech warehouse computer control system as your staff who visited and toured the center can attest.

PDC-Baltimore is an award-winning installation -- it recently won Vice President Al Gore's 1994 National Performance Hammer Award. When compared to the other services this facility is truly second to none. During Desert Shield Desert Storm, Baltimore distributed 1581 of the Army's 1873 total tons shipped for 75% of the Army's total cost. During this period, the Baltimore Center filled the majority of its orders in two days time.

With its broad authority, the Commission has the opportunity to request that Baltimore be removed from the list so that a fair and independent study of DoD-wide consolidation can be conducted.

#### Fort Meade - Kimbrough Hospital

Maintaining Kimbrough at full hospital status is essential to providing adequate medical services to the National Capital Region. Kimbrough provides both cost-effective and top quality patient care to the Fort Meade area which continues to grow. Downsizing Kimbrough will not save money as the Army originally asserted, but according to a recent cost analysis performed by the Army Medical Command will actually cost approximately \$3 million per year.

We contend that maintaining Kimbrough at full hospital status is the most expeditious way to provide timely and quality service to the active duty and retired military personnel and their families in the National Capital Region.

Naval Medical Research Institute - Bethesda

Finally, we fully support the relocation of the Infectious Diseases, Combat Casualty Care and Operational Medicine Programs to the new Walter Reed Army Institute for Research in Forest Glen, Maryland. However, we disagree with the proposed relocation of the "manned diving" research component to Panama City, Florida.

This would disrupt a highly integrated research program and abandon unique research facilities such as the Hydrogen Gas Research and Diving Tanks. This view is also supported by the Head of the Deep Submergence Branch for the Navy, who raises concerns regarding the adequacy of existing facilities, staffing, and operation and maintenance funding at Panama City to support the additional requirements of the "manned diving" research.

In conclusion, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and hope that you will not hesitate to let me know if I can provide any further information to you on any of these issues.

STATEMENT FROM CONGRESSMAN WAYNE T. GILCHREST  
BEFORE THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION  
JUNE 12, 1995

CHAIRMAN DIXON AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY IN OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSAL TO CLOSE THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, CARDEROCK DIVISION, ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT. AS YOU WILL RECALL, I WAS HERE UNDER VERY SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES JUST TWO YEARS AGO WHEN THE COMMISSION, IN ITS WISDOM, DETERMINED THAT A SIMILAR PROPOSAL WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE SAVINGS BENEFITS ORIGINALLY PROJECTED. IN 1993 THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT \$25 MILLION WAS NOT ENOUGH MONEY TO MOVE THE PERSONNEL OF THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT TO THE PHILADELPHIA SHIPYARD. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COMPREHEND HOW THE NAVY WOULD NOW HOPE TO MOVE BOTH THE PERSONNEL AND EIGHT FACILITIES FROM ANNAPOLIS TO PHILADELPHIA WITH ONLY \$25 MILLION. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THESE COST ESTIMATES ARE UNREALISTIC. EXHIBIT A OUTLINES THE DISCREPENCY BETWEEN THE COBRA RESULTS BASED ON BSEC DATA AND THOSE BASED ON ALL CERTIFIED NAVY DATA NOT USED BY BSEC. USING CERTIFIED NAVY DATA THE TOTAL COST OF THE BSEC RECOMMENDATION IS OVER \$83 MILLION, MORE THAN THREE TIMES THE BSEC'S ESTIMATE. SIMILAR DISCREPANCIES EXIST BETWEEN THE ESTIMATES FOR ANNUAL SAVINGS. THE COBRA RESULTS USING NAVY DATA SHOW AN ANNUAL SAVINGS WHICH IS JUST OVER A THIRD OF THOSE FIGURES CALCULATED USING THE BSEC DATA. PLEASE REVIEW CAREFULLY

THESE FIGURES PRESENTED TO YOU IN WRITING WHEN MAKING YOUR DECISION.

AS YOU KNOW, THE WORK CONDUCTED AT THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT IS EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON MACHINERY R&D. THE COMMISSION HAS RECOGNIZED THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE TESTING CONDUCTED IN MANY OF THE CENTER'S UNIQUE LABORATORIES AND HAS PROPOSED THAT THIS EXPERIMENTATION CONTINUE IN EIGHT RELOCATED FACILITIES IN PHILADELPHIA AND IN A REPLICATED MAGNETICS FACILITY AT CARDEROCK. HOWEVER, THE BSEC HAS RECOMMENDED THAT TWO IRREPLACABLE FACILITIES COMPLETELY CLOSE WITHOUT PROPOSING HOW OR WHERE THEIR FUNCTIONS WILL BE FULFILLED IN THE FUTURE. BY ABANDONING THE DEEP OCEAN SIMULATION FACILITY AND THE SUBMARINE FLUID DYNAMICS FACILITY THE NAVY LOSES THESE CAPABILITIES ALTOGETHER. THESE TWO FACILITIES ARE PRESENTLY BUSY AND SELF-SUSTAINING. TO CLOSE THEM WOULD COMPROMISE THE RELIABILITY OF EQUIPMENT AND THE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL ON THE NAVAL FLEET. SMALL SHORT TERM SAVINGS WILL RESULT FROM THE INITIAL ELIMINATION OF THESE LABORATORIES. HOWEVER, THE NEED FOR THESE TESTS WILL NOT DISAPPEAR AND THE BSEC HAS NOT INCLUDED IN ITS COST PROJECTIONS THE EXPENSE OF REPLACING THESE FUNCTIONS ELSEWHERE. TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THIS COMPARISON: THE TESTS RUN ON THE LAST 24 ITEMS TESTED IN THE DEEP OCEAN PRESSURE SIMULATION FACILITY COST \$600,000 IF THE FACILITY WERE CLOSED AND THE TESTS WERE TO BE CONDUCTED AT SEA, HUMAN LIVES WOULD BE RISKED, AND THE TESTS WOULD COST MORE THAN \$5 MILLION. I DON'T THINK ANYONE PRESENT WOULD CONCLUDE THAT

THESE FIGURES REFLECT ANY REAL SAVINGS.

THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT PRESENTLY CONDUCTS A UNIQUE RESEARCH PROGRAM DEDICATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-CFC REFRIGERATION AND COOLING. BSEC'S PROPOSAL TO MOVE THE PROGRAM TO PHILADELPHIA DOES NOT INCLUDE THE RELOCATION OF THE EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM -- PERSONNEL WHO HAVE COLLECTED 13 PATENTS IN THIS AREA, MORE THAN SIX TIMES THE NUMBER FOR THE ENTIRE PHILADELPHIA FACILITY. THE TIME AND COST OF TRAINING REPLACEMENTS IN PHILADELPHIA WILL INEVITABLY INTERRUPT THE PROGRESS OF THE CFC PROGRAM AND THUS DELAY THE DEPLOYMENT OF SHIPS WITH NON-CFC COOLING SYSTEMS. SUCH A DELAY IS BENEFICIAL TO NO ONE AND THE IMPACT OF IT CANCELS OUT ANY POTENTIAL SAVINGS PROJECTED IN BSEC'S PROPOSAL.

THE TALENTED PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN NON-CFC RESEARCH ARE NOT THE ONLY ONES WHOSE JOBS ARE AT STAKE. MANY MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE DEDICATED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE FIELDS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FOLLOW THEIR FORMER POSITIONS TO PHILADELPHIA. AS A RESULT THE NAVY RISKS LOSING MANY OF ITS MOST EXPERIENCED SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS. OF THE OVER 300 SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS WHO MAKE UP THE MACHINERY R&D IN ANNAPOLIS, 43% HAVE MORE THAN 20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS THESE MEN AND WOMEN HAVE ACHIEVED ARE REMARKABLE. IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT HAS RECEIVED 71 PATENTS, WHILE PHILADELPHIA RECEIVED ONLY ONE. THE KIND OF SUCCESS, KNOWLEDGE, AND EXPERIENCE EMBODIED BY THE

ANNAPOLIS PERSONNEL CANNOT BE ISSUED A PRICE TAG AND CAN NOT BE COMPENSATED FOR BY TRAINING REPLACEMENTS IN A FEW MONTHS TIME.

THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN YOUR DECISION. IT IS LOCATED ON 80 ACRES ON THE SEVERN RIVER ACROSS FROM THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY AND IS COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY THE ANNAPOLIS NAVAL STATION. FOR THESE REASONS IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE LAND AND THE ABANDONED FACILITIES WILL BE CONVERTED TO PRIVATE USE. CURRENTLY THE PERSONNEL OF THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT TAKES ADVANTAGE OF ITS LOCATION AND ENJOY HIGH VALUE INTERACTION WITH THE STAFF AND STUDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY. TO CLOSE THE FACILITIES WILL ELIMINATE THIS BENEFICIAL EXCHANGE OF IDEAS.

COMMISSIONERS, I ASK YOU TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED TO YOU AND TO ASK YOURSELVES IF THE NAVY CAN AFFORD TO SACRIFICE THE UNIQUE AND SELF-SUSTAINING R&D CAPABILITIES CURRENTLY FUNCTIONING SUCCESSFULLY AT ANNAPOLIS. THE TALENT, EXPERIENCE, AND SYNERGY OF THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT CANNOT BE REPLICATED ELSEWHERE. THE COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY REJECTED A PROPOSAL TO MOVE ONLY THE PERSONNEL FROM ANNAPOLIS AT A COST OF \$25 MILLION. I URGE YOU TO CONSIDER HOW THE FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL CAN BE RELOCATED AT THE SAME ESTIMATE OF \$25 MILLION. AS IN 1993, THE COSTS OF THE BSEC'S PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN UNDERESTIMATED AND THE SAVINGS OVERESTIMATED. I ASK YOU TO ONCE AGAIN REJECT A PROPOSAL WHICH JEOPARDIZES THE FUTURE OF NAVAL

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND AS A RESULT JEOPARDIZES THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EQUIPMENT AND THE SAFETY OF THE LIVES WE  
SEND OUT TO SEA.

CONTENTS OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ACCOMPANYING THE TESTIMONY  
OF CONGRESSMAN WAYNE T. GILCHREST BEFORE THE BRAC COMMISSION  
JUNE 12, 1995

- EXHIBIT A: Economic Analysis of BRAC'95 Impact on  
NSWC/Annapolis (Table)
- EXHIBIT B: Economic Analysis of BRAC'95 Impact on  
NSWC/Annapolis
- EXHIBIT C: Point Paper: Overstatement of claimed recurring  
savings through "elimination" of personnel at  
Annapolis
- EXHIBIT D: Letter to Commissioner Rebecca Cox from  
Congressman Gilchrest
- EXHIBIT E: Point Paper: Commercial Capabilities of NSWC  
Annapolis
- EXHIBIT F: Issue Paper: Privatization of NSWC/Carderock,  
Annapolis Detachment

# Exhibit A

## Economic Analysis of BRAC'95 Impact on NSWC\Annapolis

The Navy, as part of DOD's BRAC'95 recommendations, has recommended the closure of NSWC\Annapolis. The following is a compilation of the cost data used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) and certified Navy cost data not used by the BSEC.

### Cost Data Summary

Item	Data Used by the BSEC (\$)	Certified Navy Data Not Used by the BSEC (\$)
<b>One-time costs</b>		
- Unique	6513K	23232K
- Military Construction	8000K	8000K
- Moving	6854K	49015K
- Overhead	2905K	2487K
- Personnel	764K	760K
<b>Total</b>	<b>25036K</b>	<b>83494K</b>
<b>Recurring Savings</b>		
- Personnel	7623K	3630K
- Overhead	6904K	2047K
<b>Total</b>	<b>14527K</b>	<b>5677K</b>
<b>Personnel</b>		
- Relocated	280	320
- Eliminated	138	65
- Retained	0	5
- New hires	0	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>418</b>
<b>COBRA Results</b>		
- One-time Costs	25M	83.5M
- Annual Savings	14.5M	5.7M
- Breakeven	1 year	19 years
- Net Present Value (20 years)	175M	-5.6M

## Exhibit B

### Economic Analysis of BRAC'95 Impact on NSWC\Annapolis

The Navy has recommended the closure of NSWC\Annapolis in accordance with Navy Scenario 3-20-0198-35A, as modified. Scenario 35A specifies the following capability disposition:

#### To NSWC\Philadelphia

- Advanced Shipboard Auxiliary Machinery Facility
- Electric Power Technology Facility
- Advanced Electric Propulsion Development Facility
- Pulsed Power Facility
- Advanced Propulsion Machinery Facility
- Machinery Acoustics Silencing Facility
- 261 civilian personnel

#### To NSWC\White Oak

- Magnetism Fields Laboratory
- 17 civilian personnel

#### To NSWC\Carderock

- 2 civilian personnel

#### Abandon at NSWC\Annapolis

- Deep Ocean Pressure Facility
- Submarine Fluid Dynamics Facility
- 138 civilian personnel eliminated

Scenario 35A was modified by direction of the Navy as follows:

- add the CFC Elimination capability to the NSWC\Philadelphia migration
- build a new magnetism capability at NSWC\Carderock, abandon the NSWC\White Oak facility
- transfer 5 civilians to Naval Station\Annapolis to operate the water treatment plant

The following analysis lists costs used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) and certified Navy costs not used by the BSEC.

#### Cost Data Used by the BSEC

• One-time costs	
- Unique	6513K
- Military Construction	8000K
- Moving	6854K
- Overhead	2905K
- Personnel	<u>764K</u>
Total	25036K

- **Recurring Savings**
- Personnel 7623K
- Overhead 6904K
- Total 14527K**

- **Personnel**
- Transferred 280
- Eliminated 138
- Total 418**

DOD's COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions) model is used to then calculate the economic benefits of the closure:

<b>BSEC COBRA Results</b>	
● <b>Total one-time costs</b>	- \$25M
● <b>Recurring Savings</b>	- \$14.5M
● <b>Breakeven</b>	- 1 year
● <b>Net Present Value</b>	- \$175M

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**Additional Certified Navy Cost Data Not Used by the BSEC**

- **One-time costs**
- Unique 16719K (Contract termination costs)
- Military Construction 0K
- Moving 42161K (Movement of facilities)
- Overhead -418K
- Personnel -4K
- Total 58458K**

- **Recurring Costs**
- Personnel 3993K (More personnel being retained/relocated)
- Overhead 4857K (Increased travel costs, lease costs, higher operating costs at Philadelphia, lower operating savings at Annapolis)

**Total 8850K**

● **Personnel**

- Transferred 320 (includes the addition of 40 for the CFC work)
- Eliminated 65 (includes the subtraction of 40 for the CFC work, 5 for the water treatment plant operation and 28 required new hires from Philadelphia excess personnel)
- Retained at Annapolis 5 (water treatment plant operators)
- New hires at Philadelphia 28 (from excess at Philadelphia)
- Total 418**

<b>COBRA Results Using All Certified Data</b>	
● <b>Total one-time costs</b>	- \$83.5M
● <b>Recurring Savings</b>	- \$ 5.7M
● <b>Breakeven</b>	- 19 years
● <b>Net Present Value</b>	- (minus (-)) \$5.5M

# Exhibit C

## Point Paper

**Subject:** Overstatement of claimed recurring savings through "elimination" of personnel at Annapolis.

**Point:** The elimination of Annapolis people whose work will continue after relocation by substituting people at Philadelphia does not represent a recurring "savings" in the BRAC process. If the substituted people at Philadelphia are without other work, then these positions could (should) be eliminated independent of BRAC action. If no excess people are available in Philadelphia, then new hires must be secured resulting in no net recurring savings attributable to BRAC action.

This point is specifically applicable to the 28 excess Philadelphia personnel to be substituted for Annapolis people as stated in Scenario 3-20-198-035A, the 40 Annapolis personnel noted in DJD-021 as working in the non-CFC program which was specifically designated to be moved to Philadelphia without those personnel by the BSEC, and the 5 water plant operators designated to move to the Annapolis Naval Station.

"Efficiency" issues are not applicable in these cases since all these positions require full-time, dedicated personnel with the requisite R&D training and experience (or, in the case of the water plant, mandated to move).

**Specifics:**

A total of 138 positions are claimed to be eliminated at Annapolis if the DoD BRAC 95 closure recommendation is sustained by the Commission. Of these, 5 (as stated in DJD 011, page 2): have been designated to move to the Annapolis Naval Station to continue water plant operations, per BSAT memo PR 0492-F9, page 4. Another 28 positions were specifically designated to be substituted for at Philadelphia by "excess capacity" at that site as certified in Scenario 3-20-198-035A, page 1-2R. Another 40 were identified as required for conduct of the non-CFC work as certified in response DJD-021. This capability was specifically designated by the BSEC to be relocated to Philadelphia but without the personnel per BSAT memo RP 0492-F9, page 4.

In the case of the 5 water plant operators, the annual savings should clearly be reduced by the appropriate amount.

Consider the case of the 28 personnel eliminated at Annapolis to be replaced by 28 excess people at Philadelphia. Clearly, the programs now funding those people in Annapolis will continue to fund the "substitutes" in

Philadelphia. It is also clear that the eliminated Annapolis researchers, by virtue of education, experience and background would be the preferred ones to accomplish the R&D work being moved. If the Philadelphia personnel are "excess" there is no justification to retain them in lieu of those in Annapolis. The one time moving costs avoided by this substitution would be more than balanced by costs of training, program delays, and the costs of eliminating Annapolis people. The claimed recurring savings in this case could be achieved with no relocation of personnel by eliminating excess capacity at Philadelphia and therefore are not fairly attributable to the proposed BRAC action.

In a similar vein, the BSEC and DoD recognized the importance and schedule criticality of the non-CFC R&D program and related facilities capabilities at Annapolis, and directed that this facility be moved. However, this direction specifically excluded the moving of the 40 experienced Annapolis R&D personnel associated with this capability. One must conclude that either there are or will be 40 additional excess personnel at Philadelphia to be trained and substituted for those eliminated at Annapolis, or that the Navy must hire 40 additional personnel at Philadelphia to do the non-CFC work. Due to its importance to the Navy, the program funding will continue to accomplish the non-CFC work. In either case, the claimed savings due to the "elimination" of 40 Annapolis people associated with the non-CFC work is not attributable to BRAC action. In the first case, the Annapolis eliminations are substituted for what would have been necessary downsizing at Philadelphia. In the second, new hires at Philadelphia negate the recurring savings claimed by eliminating people in Annapolis.

#### Addenda:

Claims of savings associated with the elimination of the remaining 65 technical and support positions at Annapolis may be similarly overstated. The technical R&D programs themselves are expected to continue as evidenced by anticipated funding increases in the future by Annapolis. Someone will have to accomplish this work. In the absence of the experienced Annapolis people, the cost of doing so will very likely increase, and at any rate, result in simply substituting personnel in Philadelphia or elsewhere for the Annapolis people.

Likewise, a significant fraction of the eliminated support personnel provide direct (non-overhead) services to the technical programs such as contracting support, industrial shop support and test operating mechanics. While one can argue that some efficiencies may accrue in combining base operating support from two sites to one, the direct technical support is linearly related to workload and not amenable to efficiencies due to

combining work forces. In addition, the BRAC 91 action at Annapolis specifically targeted the majority of support functions to be moved to Carderock and/or Philadelphia, and thus most of the efficiencies due to such action have been already taken.

WAYNE T. GILCHREST  
1ST DISTRICT, MARYLAND



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AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
TRANSFORMING PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE  
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
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**Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives**

April 19, 1995

Commissioner Rebecca Cox  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Commissioner Cox:

It was good to be part of your visit to the Naval Surface Center's Annapolis Detachment on March 27, 1995. I hope you got an appreciation for the importance and complexity of the Machinery R&D facilities at this site and the dedication and competence of the staff.

As a member of the BRAC 1993 Commission, you were a party to the unanimous rejection of the Navy's 1993 proposal to disestablish the Annapolis Detachment. There were several reasons for the rejection: the Detachment is an enclave within the Annapolis Naval Station - Naval Academy Complex, and much inefficient travel would be required in implementing the recommendation. The most significant BRAC conclusion, however was that costs were greatly understated and savings exaggerated.

Although the 1995 recommendation is different in some respects from that of 1993, the same flaws are increasingly evident. To illustrate, the Navy proposed to move people only in 1993, principally to Philadelphia, and retain facilities operational in Annapolis, all for a one-time cost of \$24.7M. For 1995, they are recommending moving people and the preponderance of these large and complex facilities, yet the costs are still claimed at only \$25M.

The errors in the Navy's economic reasoning are easier to uncover and evaluate this year because of the "openness" policy established by BRAC 1995 Commission. As summarized in the attached, real costs associated with the recommended closure and relocation exceed \$80M using the Navy's own "certified" data. Similarly, the real savings are less than \$6M per year, again using only Navy certified data. When these costs and savings are evaluated by the COBRA model, the time to break even is almost 20 years rather than the advertised one year.

Additional costs beyond these already certified will assuredly be identified as the planning process proceeds, further increasing the costs and reducing the savings - significant new military construction requirements at the Philadelphia and Carderock

receiving sites, and costs to transfer support functions to the USNA, to name a few.

Clearly the 1995 proposal for Annapolis deserves rejection as a significantly bad investment for the taxpayers. It's a bad deal for the Navy too, when we further consider the inevitable talent loss, the disruption to vital research, crucial programs, and the total loss of Deep Submergence and Submarine Fluid Dynamics Capabilities. A closure would also preclude consolidation of the cross-service Joint Spectrum Center at this site, and eliminate a long-standing synergistic relationship between the U.S. Naval Academy and the laboratory R&D community.

As the current Commission expert on the Annapolis Detachment, and the only one with the 1993 perspective, please help us again avoid a decision which would be both costly and damaging to an essential capability.

Sincerely,

Wayne T. Gilchrest  
Member of Congress

Enclosure

# Exhibit E

## Point Paper on Commercial Capabilities of NSWC Annapolis

The purpose of this paper is to provide additional information with regard to the proposed closure of the Annapolis site of the Carderock Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center.

While the Annapolis site has historically been well funded by Navy customers, and future Program Element budgets are rising, it is important to point out that they also have a history of working for, and being paid by, industrial sources as well. While in the past the significant dual use potential associated with Machinery R&D has been pointed out, it has not been sufficiently demonstrated that Annapolis has a history of doing work for industry, that they know the process, and that there is potential to expand such efforts in the future which can help to reduce the cost of ownership of the Annapolis facilities, should the Navy R&D decline in future years.

Over the past five years, Annapolis has been paid by industry to perform over 80 tasks for a total value of over \$3M. The Annapolis policy has been to focus efforts first on Navy customer needs, and to do commercial work only when Navy workload permits. If future Navy budgets were to decline in the area of Machinery R&D, an effort to expand the commercial business base in areas where the unique Annapolis capabilities are useful, in conjunction with their significant dual use potential, could increase income substantially.

The nature of the work done for industry includes design support and full scale hardware evaluations for:

(1) acoustic performance of machinery components; (2) system performance of undersea vehicles and components; (3) composite machinery; (4) waterjet propulsion; (5) electroset technology; (6) Marine Spill Response; (7) hydraulics; (8) electrical power systems; (9) cryogenics; and (10) magnetic signature reduction.

The majority of these examples are direct work in which Annapolis performs the work and is paid for their services through a formal agreement and statement of work. Their value ranges from \$5000 for evaluation of machinery components in the Annapolis facilities, to \$1,400,000 from S.R.I. International for design and development of an electrical power system for an active sonar system.

The above facts demonstrate that the Annapolis site is fully capable of doing work for industry, that there is a market for their services, and that the potential exists to increase that market should Navy funded work decline in future years.

Arguments have been presented over the past several months against closing the Annapolis site. These arguments center on the real costs to move Annapolis, loss of critical capabilities, the lack of excess capacity, as well as many deviations from the Commission's criteria. The facts presented here add to those arguments by allowing for reducing the cost of ownership of the Annapolis facilities should that be necessary.

# Exhibit F

## Issue Paper

**Issue:** Privatization of NSWC/Carderock, Annapolis Detachment

**Background:** At BRAC hearings, the issue of "privatization" of some Navy facilities was discussed. An inquiry was made, during a commission visit to Annapolis, as to whether privatization had been considered for this site.

**Analysis:** In the case of some Navy installations which are industrially oriented, e.g., providing short run manufacturing, repair, warehousing, maintenance, etc.; privatization as a GOCO or other arrangements may be appropriate. Their basic products do not necessarily involve decision making, selection of alternatives, or other inherently governmental activities which must be approached in a completely unbiased manner with no parochial self interests and complete objectivity. Conversely, Navy laboratories, such as that at Annapolis, are a key element in the overall organization in providing the inherently governmental functions as follows:

(1) A "Smart Buyer" capability by providing the RDT&E necessary to transform Navy requirements into technical/procurement specifications (military and commercial), certification criteria and validation of designs for integrated naval machinery systems and components for the fleet; (2) Rapid response to operational problems including in times of military crisis (technical analysis and fitness for purpose of assessment of vital/critical ship systems); (3) Ensure technological superiority and avoid technological surprise by translating new technologies and rapidly changing threat to system change; and (4) Objective/unbiased direction, evaluation, and monitoring of contractors.

The 1991 Federal Advisory Commission on DoD Laboratory Mission and Functions defined the mission as "Provide the technical expertise to enable the services to be smart buyers and users" and as "an essential part of the acquisition process." It also listed the following functions:

- (1) Infuse the art of the possible into military planning.
- (2) Act as principal agents in maintaining the technical base.
- (3) Avoid technological surprise, ensure technical innovation.
- (4) Support the acquisition process.
- (5) Provide special purpose facilities impractical for private sector.
- (6) Respond rapidly in time of urgent need or national crisis.

- (7) Be a constructive advisor for department directions and programs based on technical expertise.
- (8) Support the user in application of emerging technology and introduction of new systems.
- (9) Translate user needs into technical requirements for industry.
- (10) Serve as Science and Technology training ground for civilian and military acquisition personnel.

The Annapolis Detachment, in the area of shipboard machinery and electrical systems, including acoustic and magnetic signature control and environmental compliance R&D, fulfills all these needs for the U.S. Navy.

**Conclusion:** Based on accepted criteria as to the role of Navy laboratories providing inherently governmental functions, "privatization" of the Annapolis Laboratory would be inadvisable, and contrary to the purpose for the existence of such laboratories. One possible alternative would be to convert this laboratory to a Federally Funded Research and Development Center, which might allow the retention of its mission as well as the unbiased objectivity required. However, no immediate payoff to such a conversion is apparent, except for the additional flexibility allowed by the absence or decrease in the regulations which limit personnel and management practices in government labs.

**DRAFT**

**MASSACHUSETTS**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**ARMY:**

Hingham Cohasset	Close
Sudbury Training Annex	Close

**NAVY:**


NAS South Weymouth	Close
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**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

# MAP NO. 22

## MASSACHUSETTS



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

**NOTES**

**NOTES**

TESTIMONY OF  
CONGRESSMAN GERRY E. STUDDS  
BEFORE THE  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, DC  
JUNE 12, 1995

I want to thank the Commission for this opportunity to discuss the Navy's decision to recommend NAS South Weymouth for closure. I also want to thank Commissioners Kling and Davis for their recent visit to South Weymouth and Commissioner Robles for his visit in April. As you know, I have been working closely with the local community to evaluate the merits of the Navy's recommendations and I believe that we have a very compelling case for keeping the Weymouth facility open. We applaud the Commission's decision to consider NAS Atlanta as an alternative to the closure of NAS South Weymouth.

Two years ago, this panel unanimously rejected a similar Navy proposal to close the Weymouth facility. In doing so, the Commission found that the Navy had inaccurately -- and misleadingly -- portrayed South Weymouth's capacity and capabilities. We strongly believe that the Navy has done so again. As far as we can determine, the Navy's case to close NAS South Weymouth is based on anecdotal information that is not supported by its own empirical analysis and data.

Furthermore, we are deeply disturbed that the Navy has not presented the Commission with COBRA (cost of base realignment) scenarios which would keep NAS South Weymouth open and take advantage of the facility's operational potential. In response to a Commission request to develop alternatives which would result in the closure of NAS Atlanta, the Navy chose not to consider South Weymouth as a receiver site for Atlanta's units. In fact, the Navy's COBRA analysis assumed the closure of both Atlanta and South Weymouth. While the Commission may be exploring this as an option, it was our understanding that Atlanta is also under consideration by the Commission as an alternative to the closure of South Weymouth.

We submitted detailed proposals to the Commission several weeks ago (a copy of which is attached) in which NAS South Weymouth would remain open and receive new aviation squadrons. Units of the same variety have successfully been stationed at Weymouth as recently as two years ago. We believe that these alternatives will reflect a cost savings and increased efficiency for the Navy and will also preserve a Naval Air Reserve capability at Atlanta by moving some of its existing units over to Dobbins ARB. To our knowledge, the Navy has not provided Commission with these COBRAs. I strongly urge the Commission to fully examine all potential scenarios with regard to South Weymouth.

We are extremely concerned with the process that the Navy used to recommend NAS South Weymouth for closure. In fact, we have found much of the Navy's rationale undocumented and in direct contradiction with its own analysis.

Specifically, the Navy ignored its own evaluation which ranks NAS South Weymouth higher in military value than two other Air Reserve facilities -- NAS Fort Worth and NAS Atlanta. In fact, we have identified errors in the Navy's military value calculations which -- if corrected -- would rank NAS South Weymouth even higher. We submitted this information more than a month ago and to our knowledge the Navy has not responded. I would urge the Commission to give full consideration to these modifications.

Additionally, NAS South Weymouth is ranked first in demographics and NAS Atlanta is ranked last. However, after all its empirical data pointed to Atlanta as the overwhelmingly logical candidate for closure, the Navy decided to spare the facility, claiming that the area was "demographically rich." This conclusion is also unsupported by its own analysis. While the Navy claims that Atlanta's low score is an "aberration," evidence seems to indicate that the facility's demographic problems are historic, not temporary.

The Navy also decided to give greater weight to the unrecorded "operational recommendations" of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT) than the rest of its certified data. The CINCLANT's request to retain the most capable base north of Norfolk resulted in a "trade-off" between NAS South Weymouth and NAS Brunswick -- an operational facility. These recommendations were made during deliberations between the Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) and CINCLANT. I have requested the records of these discussions so that we -- and the Commission -- can examine the assumptions, justifications, and merits of the "policy imperatives" developed during these meetings. I have not received this information and -- after this and numerous other attempts -- can now only assume that it does not exist.

This obviously raises serious concerns about the integrity of the Navy's recommendations. The complete documentation of all information used in formulating recommendations, including relevant deliberations, is one of the foundations of the base closure process. However, it would appear that the only factor which led to the Navy's decision to close NAS South Weymouth is both uncertified and undocumented.

The CINCLANT's recommendation resulted in a comparison between an operational and a reserve base. This decision -- which may violate Defense Department directives -- suggests that the Navy disregarded its own analysis that distinguishes between reserve and active duty missions and capabilities. The data calls for reserve and operational facilities are not compatible. Similar questions are weighted differently and, in some cases, entire subcategories are omitted. In fact, following the Navy's logic, a comparison of the military value scores for the four Naval Air facilities north of Norfolk (NAS South Weymouth, NAS Washington, NAS Willow Grove, and NAS Brunswick) would reveal that NAS Brunswick ranks last. In short, the Navy has compared apples with oranges.

In its report to the Commission, the Navy indicates that it will move Naval Air

Reserve units from Weymouth to NAS Brunswick. I asked the Navy to provide me with information which supports its claim that NAS Brunswick could demographically accommodate these units. Assistant Secretary Pirie responded that the Navy has "no demographic information (certified or otherwise) concerning this move." Instead, the Navy Base Structure Analysis Committee (BSEC) staff was "advised" by the Commander of the Naval Air Reserve (COMNAVAIRRESFOR) that there were sufficient demographics available at Brunswick.

Not only has the Navy given insufficient consideration to the demographic ramifications of this decision, it has downplayed the attrition that these units will suffer as a result of this move. We believe that the Navy is making a tremendous "leap of faith" in assuming that reservists from southern New England will travel great distances in harsh winter weather conditions to drill in Maine. Evidence indicates that many of these reservists will not move with their units -- in fact by the Navy's own admission these units may lose over a third of their personnel. Replacements will have to be drawn from a smaller, less qualified pool of potential reservists in northern New England. As a result, many of these units may have to be decommissioned.

In closing, I want to address an issue that was raised at the regional hearing last week in Georgia with regard to NAS Atlanta's ability to accommodate an F-18 squadron from Florida. It is my understanding that in response to a question from Commissioner Robles, the Commander at NAS Atlanta stated that his facility did not have an encroachment problem. However, the Air Force -- which owns and operates the airfield at Atlanta -- has declared the facility's infrastructure unsuitable for fighter missions of any kind. Dobbins ARB has scored extremely low in the categories of airfield capabilities, fighter training effectiveness, and fighter training areas. Its runway, taxiway, and aprons were rated as poor and incapable of accommodating fighter missions. The base was also given the lowest rating for tactical aircraft employment and air combat maneuvering instrumentation. Furthermore, the Navy's own data identifies severe encroachment problems at Atlanta. I have attached copies of this information.

This unit could readily be accommodated at South Weymouth, which does not have a significant encroachment problem, is close to training ranges, and has effectively stationed tactical aircraft in the past.

I have tremendous confidence in the Commission's ability to thoroughly and fairly review the merits of the Pentagon's recommendations. We believe that the Navy substantially deviated from its selection criteria in recommending NAS South Weymouth for closure. We look forward to working with you to rectify this oversight.

Thank you.

## MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
**FROM:** Committee to Save NAS South Weymouth  
**DATE:** June 6, 1995  
**SUBJECT:** Scenario for COBRA Analysis

---

During the recent visit of Commissioners Kling and Davis to NAS South Weymouth, members of this Committee expressed their disappointment with the three recent COBRA scenarios produced following the addition of NAS Atlanta to the potential closure list. The disappointment resulted from the fact that NAS South Weymouth was not considered in any of the three scenarios as a receiving site for Atlanta's aircraft. At this time, the Committee would like to propose the following scenario for BRAC consideration:

### Lead Major Claimant - RESFOR

- Close NAS Atlanta

Relocate C-9 squadron (VR-46) and E-2 squadron (VAW-77) to Dobbins ARB. Alternatively, the E-2 squadron could be relocated to NAS Jacksonville.

Relocate H-1 squadron (HMLA-773) to NAS South Weymouth.

Change proposed BRAC-95 redirect so as to locate two reserve F/A-18 squadrons (VFA-203 and VMFA-142) at NAS South Weymouth rather than at NAS Atlanta.

Relocate VP-92 from NAS South Weymouth to NAS Brunswick.

- NAS South Weymouth remains open with current C-130 squadron (VR-62) remaining there, to be joined by the three squadrons (HMLA-773, VFA-203, and VMFA-142) relocated/redirected from Atlanta.

The scenario proposed above offers numerous advantages:

- Substantial cost savings can be achieved by closing NAS Atlanta, the reserve base with the lowest military value, by far.
- The Naval Reserve presence can be maintained in the Atlanta area by relocating up to two of Atlanta's aviation squadrons (VR-46 and VAW-77) across to the other side

South Weymouth while keeping VR-62 in place will eliminate any excess capacity at South Weymouth.

- (3) Relocating VP-92 from South Weymouth to Brunswick will address the excess capacity situation at Brunswick.
- (4) Milcon required for all of these proposals will be minimal. South Weymouth can accommodate the three new squadrons in existing facilities as can Brunswick accommodate VP-92 in existing facilities there. It is known that VR-46 can be accommodated in existing facilities at Dobbins. It is likely that VAW-77 can also be accommodated.

JCY/jb

of the airfield at Dobbins ARB. (It is assumed that the Naval Air Reserve Center will also relocate to Dobbins.)

- Keeping VR-46 and its C-9s at Dobbins will allow other Atlanta-area Naval and Marine Air Reservists to be airlifted to other drilling units located at such bases as NAS South Weymouth, NAS Fort Worth, and NAS New Orleans.
- Redirecting the two F/A-18 squadrons to NAS South Weymouth rather than to NAS Atlanta will allow these two units easy access to numerous over-the-ocean warning/training areas. Similar over-the-ocean areas, which are essential for the proper training of Naval and Marine aviators and which are most representative of the environment in which these aviators will most likely be required to operate in times of crisis, require a flight of over 250 miles in each direction from Atlanta. The relocation of HMLA-773 from Atlanta to South Weymouth will provide similar benefits to that squadron. NAS South Weymouth is the owner of a unique 640-acre island located off the Massachusetts coast which would be available for use as a target range by all three of these squadrons.
- Keeping VAW-77 and its E-2s at Dobbins (or, alternatively, relocating this unit to Jacksonville) permits these aircraft to be used in the southeastern United States for drug interdiction purposes. (Note: If VAW-77 is relocated to NAS Jacksonville, it might be possible to then relocate one of Jacksonville's active-duty P-3 squadrons to NAS Brunswick, thus helping to alleviate the excess capacity situation at the latter base.)
- Relocating the two F/A-18 squadrons to NAS South Weymouth will also permit these units to work directly with VMGR-452, a Marine Air Reserve KC-130 squadron stationed at Stewart International Airport in eastern New York. This unit can supply refueling practice to these F/A-18 squadrons.
- Relocating the P-3Cs of VP-92 from NAS South Weymouth to NAS Brunswick will satisfy the Navy's desire to co-locate this reserve unit with its active-duty counterparts at Brunswick. It also serves to alleviate the excess capacity situation at Brunswick. (Note: This suggested relocation is being proposed reluctantly by this Committee due to our continuing concern with the recruiting/manning demographics for reserve units at Brunswick.)

In summary, the Committee to Save NAS South Weymouth believes this proposed scenario has considerable merit, since it:

- (1) Closes the reserve base with the lowest military value while still maintaining a smaller reserve presence in the Atlanta area through the use of facilities at Dobbins ARB, all resulting in substantial cost savings to the Navy.
- (2) Permits NAS South Weymouth, a reserve base with a considerably higher military value than NAS Atlanta, to remain open. Relocating up to three new squadrons to

**GUIDELINES FOR ACHIEVING LAND USE COMPATIBILITY  
IN THE DOBBINS AIR RESERVE BASE ENVIRONS  
AIR INSTALLATION COMPATIBLE USE ZONE (AICUZ) REPORT**

**AUGUST 1992**

**AN AMENDMENT TO THE JANUARY 1984  
AICUZ REPORT**

**SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND CITIZENS  
CONSTITUTING THE DOBBINS AIR RESERVE BASE COMMUNITY**

**SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO ITEM 34.a.**

**PAGE 1 OF 30**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### INTRODUCTION

This study is an amendment to the Dobbins ARB Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) Study. The amendment presents and documents the changes to the AICUZ for the period of 1984 to 1991. It reaffirms Air Force policy of promoting public health, safety and general welfare in areas surrounding Dobbins ARB. The amendment presents changes in flight operations since the last study and provides current noise contours and compatible use guidelines for land areas surrounding the base. It is hoped this information will assist the local communities and serve as a tool for future planning and zoning activities.

The changes in the AICUZ are attributed to: The conversion of the 116th Tactical Fighter Wing, Georgia Air National Guard, from F-4 aircraft to F-15 aircraft in 1986, and transition of the VA-205 Squadron, Naval Air Station Atlanta, from A-7 aircraft to A-6 aircraft in 1990.

### PURPOSE AND NEED

As stated in the previous Dobbins ARB AICUZ study, the purpose of the AICUZ program is to promote compatible land development in areas subject to aircraft noise and accident potential. Community cooperation regarding recommendations made in the earlier AICUZ Study have been outstanding. Cobb County and the City of Marietta have recently published comprehensive plans which include policy statements encouraging airport compatible land uses in the vicinity of Dobbins ARB.

Air Force AICUZ Land Use Guidelines reflect land use recommendations for clear zones, accident potential zones I and II and four noise zones. These guidelines have been established on the basis of studies prepared and sponsored by several federal agencies, including the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Air Force, and state and local agencies. The guidelines recommend land uses which are compatible with airfield operations while allowing maximum beneficial use of adjacent properties. The Air Force has no desire to recommend land use regulations which render property economically useless. It does, however, have an obligation to the inhabitants in the Dobbins ARB environs and the citizens of the United States to point out ways to protect the people in adjacent areas as well as the public investment in the installation itself.

The AICUZ program uses the latest technology to define noise levels in areas near Air Force installations. An analysis of Dobbins ARB's flying operations was performed, including types of aircraft, flight patterns utilized, variations in altitude, power settings, number of operations, and hours of operation. This information was used to develop the noise zones contained in this AICUZ amendment. The Day-night average sound level (LDN) methodology was used to define the noise zones for Dobbins ARB.

#### **PROCESS AND PROCEDURE**

Preparation and presentation of this amendment to Dobbins ARB's AICUZ report is part of the continuing Air Force participation in the local planning process. It is recognized that, as local communities prepare land use plans and zoning ordinances, the Air Force has the responsibility to provide inputs on their activities relating to the community. This AICUZ amendment is presented in the spirit of mutual cooperation and assistance by Dobbins ARB to aid in the local land use planning process. It updates information on base flying activities since 1984. Noise contours and AICUZ maps in this amendment are based on current flying operations.

Aircraft operational and maintenance data was obtained to derive average daily operations, by runway and type of aircraft. Data is supplemented by flight track information (where they fly), flight profile information (how they fly), and ground runup information. After verification for accuracy, data was input into the NOICEMAP software program at the Air Force Engineering and Services Center, where it was converted to average day-night (LDN) noise contours. Contours were plotted on an area map and overlaid with clear zones and accident potential zone areas. The appendix of the AICUZ study which this amendment updates contains detailed information on the development of the AICUZ program.

## **DOBBINS AIR RESERVE BASE**

### **THE BASE**


Dobbins ARB is located between the cities of Marietta and Smyrna approximately 15 miles northwest of the population center of Atlanta, Georgia, and is completely within the bounds of Cobb County (Figure 1).

The Base incorporates an area of approximately 1675 acres which includes an airfield, industrial areas, housing, and recreational facilities. Base facilities include approximately 100 buildings constructed since 1943. The 10,000' single runway is shared with Lockheed-Aeronautical Systems Company, which has facilities on the north and south sides of the airfield, and the Naval Air Station south of the airfield.

Today, the Dobbins ARB complex is a closely integrated component of the Atlanta and Cobb County metropolitan area. The Base has a working population of about 2,000 military and civilian personnel. The total Base population, including civilian employees, Reservists and Guardsmen, is over 8,500 people.

### **THE MISSION**

The Dobbins Air Reserve Base complex is a unique Total Force installation supporting flying components of the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Naval Air Reserve, Marine Air Reserve, Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The installation also provides aerial access to Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, one of the nation's largest military aircraft contractors. The primary mission of the military units is to recruit, organize and train Department of Defense Reservists to be prepared for active duty in time of war, national emergency or when otherwise required to maintain national security.



## ECONOMIC IMPACT

Financially, the Dobbins ARB complex contributes significantly to the local economy.

### EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL (as of 30 Sep 91)

<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>PAYROLL</u>
Active Duty (Military)	255	\$ 7,466,118
Reservists (Military)	4322	24,088,089
Civilians*	1750	52,834,915
Other Civilians**	222	<u>2,384,915</u>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>6549</b>	<b>\$86,773,869</b>

- \* includes Air Reserve Technicians and civilian government employees
- \*\* includes Nonappropriated fund, contract civilians, and private business

Other economic contributions occur in the purchase of goods and services in the local area. Over 2,000 local business firms are used by Dobbins ARB organizations to provide the required operations and maintenance items. Annual expenditures for FY91 were \$10,554,861.

Annual expenditures for construction projects in FY91 were \$3,020,900. Total annual expenditures in FY 91 were \$66,144,548.

Local school districts also receive significant amounts of Federal Impact Funds. Approximately \$37,657. of Public Law 874 money was distributed to the Cobb County and Marietta public school system in 1990-91 to help defray the cost of educating government employee children concentrated in those school districts.

In addition to these direct inputs to the area economy, there are several spin-off benefits. The most significant of these is the creation of off-base jobs. It is estimated that approximately 1,341 additional jobs in the local area are attributable to the economic activity generated by Dobbins ARB-related organizations."

In summary, it can be seen that the Dobbins Air Reserve Base complex plays a significant role in regional and local economics—primarily through the jobs, payroll, retail sales, and tax revenues it generates.

## DOBBINS ARB FLYING ACTIVITY

### AIRCRAFT OPERATING AT DOBBINS ARB

The conversion of the 116th Tactical Fighter Wing, Georgia Air National Guard, from F-4 aircraft to F-15 aircraft in 1986 and the subsequent transition of the VA-205 Naval Reserve Squadron, Naval Air Station Atlanta, from A-7 aircraft to A-6 aircraft in 1990, resulted in a slight reduction in aircraft-generated noise from Dobbins ARB.

The following aircraft are assigned to flying organizations at Dobbins ARB: C-130H, C-9, F-15, A-6E, OV-10, OV-10, UH-1, C-12.

Transients and other aircraft using Dobbins AFB include:

C-21	T-43	F-14	CH-46
C-20	T-34	F-18	BE-55
C-5	T-37	F-111	S-3
C-135	T-38	A-4	U-8
C-141	T-2	A-7	
C-550	F-4	CH-53	
P-3	F-16	CH-54	

### AIR OPERATIONS

Recognizing its responsibilities to the quality of life and the protection of property in the surrounding communities, Dobbins Air Reserve Base has established procedures for minimizing the environmental impact of its flying operations while still accomplishing the mission requirements of its flying organizations. Dobbins Air Reserve Base regulations clearly spell out the precautions and procedures to be incorporated into normal flying operations taking into consideration both noise abatement and safety.

Aircraft traffic patterns for Dobbins Air Reserve Base are especially designed to comply with DOD Flight Safety and Noise Abatement directives. For flights over populated areas which cannot be avoided, established procedures are used to minimize the inconvenience to those living in the affected areas. Control of traffic by the Federal Aviation Administration and Dobbins Air Reserve Base Air Traffic Control is designed to avoid the most heavily populated areas. Flight patterns established at Dobbins Air Reserve Base are predicated on flight safety. Night time "quiet hours" are established to further minimize noise impact.

Approaches to Dobbins ARB's Runways 29 and 11 are over relatively flat terrain affording generally safe and uncomplicated access for aircraft landing at Dobbins ARB, a necessary attribute for the high traffic volumes experienced. Dobbins ARB flight tracks are illustrated in Figure 2.



DEPARTMENT of the AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS of COMMANDING & CONTROL-OPS AND CONTROL PLANES

**AFRES**  
BATTLE PLAN

FLIGHT TRACKS

DOBBINS AFB  
MARIETTA, GA

SCALE: 1" = 0.31133"

## **GROUNDED OPERATIONS**

Operation of aircraft engines on the ground during maintenance is conducted in special sound suppression and deflector facilities designed to minimize the release of undesirable noise. Routine ground operations of aircraft also require engine "run ups" to adjust or verify proper thrust, temperature and fuel consumption. This type of operation is usually conducted at specific "run-up" locations. Attendant noise will vary according to the direction of wind and to other weather conditions. "Quiet Hours" periods are observed in planning these activities.

## LAND USE COMPATIBILITY GUIDELINES

The three major operational factors that influence AICUZ land use recommendations are height restrictions, noise contours and aircraft accident potential zones. Thoughtful planning in these three areas, reflected in land use policies and regulations, will minimize the exposure of the public to noise and safety hazards; will provide safer aircraft operations; and will help protect the airfield and the public resource it represents from encroachment by incompatible land development. Land use compatibility is determined by comparing proposed land uses against height, noise and accident potential guidelines. Proposed land uses must be consistent with each factor to ensure land use compatibility. Land use compatibility guidelines for standard land uses are provided in Table 1. These guidelines have been established on the basis of studies prepared or sponsored by various Federal agencies. They replace the guidelines provided in the 1984 AICUZ Report.

### HEIGHT COMPONENT

Height restrictions are necessary to ensure that buildings and structures will not impair flight safety or decrease the operational capability of the airfield. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 77, "Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace," is the basis for defining a series of imaginary surfaces surrounding civilian and military airfields. Any object or structure which would penetrate any of these imaginary surfaces is considered by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to be an obstruction to air navigation. Refer to Appendix C of the 1984 AICUZ Report for detailed height and obstruction criteria.

Height regulations are currently established locally by Cobb County and the City of Marietta.

The Cobb County Zoning Ordinance establishes an Airport Hazard District regulating the use of property in the vicinity of Dobbins Airfield, McCollum Airport and other airfields in Cobb County by creating compatible use zones and establishing the boundaries thereof. The boundaries of the compatible use zones are indicated on the Cobb County Zoning Map.

The City of Marietta Comprehensive Development Code requires Marietta Fire Department approval for buildings in excess of three stories.

A comprehensive review of aviation easements and FAA airfield clearance criteria has revealed numerous instances of height-restriction violations in the clear zones and accident potential zones at both ends of the Dobbins AFB runway. The obstructions include trees and man-made objects, such as signs, poles and buildings.

LAND USE COMPATIBILITY

SLUCH NO.	LAND USE	MADE	ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES		NOISE ZONES			
			CLEAR ZONE I	APZ II	65-70	70-75	75-80	80+
10	Residential							
11	Household units		N	R <sup>1</sup>	2511	3011	M	M
11.11	Single units; detached		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
11.12	Single units; semidetached		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
11.13	Single units; attached row		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
11.21	Two units; side-by-side		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
11.22	Two units; one above the other		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
11.31	Apartments; walk up		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
11.32	Apartments; elevator		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
12	Group quarters		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
13	Residential hotels		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
14	Mobile home parks or courts		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
15	Transient lodgings		N	N	2511	3011	M	M
16	Other residential		N	N <sup>1</sup>	2511	3011	M	M
20	Manufacturing							
21	Food & kindred products; manufacturing		N	N <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y <sup>12</sup>	Y <sup>13</sup>	Y <sup>14</sup>
22	Textile mill products; manufacturing		N	N <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y <sup>12</sup>	Y <sup>13</sup>	Y <sup>14</sup>
23	Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics, leather, and similar materials; manufacturing		N	N <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y <sup>12</sup>	Y <sup>13</sup>	Y <sup>14</sup>
24	Lumber and wood products (except furniture); manufacturing		N	Y <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y <sup>12</sup>	Y <sup>13</sup>	Y <sup>14</sup>
25	Furniture and fixtures; manufacturing		N	Y <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y <sup>12</sup>	Y <sup>13</sup>	Y <sup>14</sup>
26	Paper & allied products; manufacturing		N	Y <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y <sup>12</sup>	Y <sup>13</sup>	Y <sup>14</sup>

Table 1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO ITEM 34.a.

SLACK NO.	LAND USE	ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES				MOUSE ZONES			
		MAKE	CLEAR ZONE	APZ I	APZ II	65-70	70-75	75-80	80+
27	Printing, publishing, and allied industries	M	Y2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
28	Chemicals and allied products; manufacturing.	M	N	N2	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
29	Petroleum refining and related industries	M	N	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
30	Manufacturing	M	N2	N2	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
31	Rubber and misc. plastic products, manufacturing	M	N2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
32	Stones, clay and glass products manufacturing	M	N2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
33	Primary metal industries	M	N2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
34	Fabricated metal products; manufacturing	M	N2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
35	Professional, scientific, and controlling instruments; photographic and optical goods; watches and clocks manufacturing	M	N2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
39	Miscellaneous manufacturing	M	N	N2	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
40	Transportation, communications and utilities	M	Y2	Y2	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
41	Railroad, rapid rail transit and street railroad transportation	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
42	Motor vehicle transportation	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
43	Aircraft transportation	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
44	Marine craft transportation	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
45	Highway & street right-of-way	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
46	Automobile parking	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
47	Communication	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
48	Utilities	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
49	Other transportation communication and utilities	M3	Y4	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	

SLURCH NO.	LAND USE NAME	ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES				NOISE ZONES			
		CLEAR ZONE	APZ I	APZ II	APZ III	65-70	70-75	75-80	80+
50	Trade								
51	Wholesale trade	N	Y2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
52	Retail trade-building materials, hardware and farm equipment	N	Y2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
53	Retail trade-general merchandise	N	N2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	
54	Retail trade-food	N	N2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	
55	Retail trade-automotive, marine craft, aircraft and accessories	N	Y2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	
56	Retail trade-apparel and accessories	N	N2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	
57	Retail trade-furniture, home furnishings and equipment	N	N2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	
57	Retail trade-eating and drinking establishments	N	N2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	
59	Other retail trade	N	N2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	
60	Services								
61	Finance, insurance and real estate services	N	N	Y6	Y	25	30	N	
62	Personal services	N	N	Y6	Y	25	30	N	
62.4	Cemeteries	N	Y7	Y7	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14,21	
63	Business Services	N	Y8	Y8	Y	25	30	N	
64	Repair Services	N	Y2	Y	Y	Y12	Y13	Y14	
65	Professional services	N	N	Y6	Y	25	30	N	
65.1	Hospitals, nursing homes	N	N	N	25a	30a	N	N	
65.1	Other medical facilities	N	N	N	Y	25	30	N	
66	Contract construction services	N	Y6	Y	Y	25	30	N	
67	Governmental services	N	N	Y6	Y	25	30	N	
68	Educational services	N	N	N	Y6	25a	30a	N	
69	Miscellaneous services	N	N2	Y2	Y	25	30	N	

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO ITEM 34.a.

ACCIDENT POTENTIAL  
ZONES

LAND USE

BLUCH NO.	NAME	ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONES				NOISE ZONES
		CLEAR ZONE	APZ I	APZ II		
				65-70	70-75	75-80 80+
70	Cultural, entertainment and recreational					
71	Cultural activities (including churches)	N	N <sup>2</sup>	25 <sup>a</sup>	30 <sup>a</sup>	N
71.2	Nature exhibits	N	Y <sup>2</sup>	Y <sup>a</sup>	N	N
72	Public assembly	N	N	Y	N	N
72.1	Auditoriums, concert halls	N	N	25	30	N
72.11	Outdoor music shells, amphitheaters	N	N	N	N	N
72.2	Outdoor sports arenas, spectator sports	N	N	Y <sup>17</sup>	Y <sup>17</sup>	N
73	Amusements	N	N	Y	Y	N
74	Recreational activities (incl golf courses, riding stables, water recreation)	N	Y <sup>9,9,10</sup>	Y <sup>a</sup>	25 <sup>a</sup>	30 <sup>a</sup>
75	Resorts and group camps	N	N	Y <sup>a</sup>	Y <sup>a</sup>	N
76	Parks	N	Y <sup>9</sup>	Y <sup>a</sup>	Y <sup>a</sup>	N
79	Other cultural, entertainment and recreation	N	Y <sup>9</sup>	Y <sup>a</sup>	Y <sup>a</sup>	N
80	Resource production and extraction					
81	Agriculture (except livestock)	Y	Y	Y <sup>18</sup>	Y <sup>19</sup>	Y <sup>20</sup> Y <sup>20,21</sup>
81.5 to 81.7	Livestock farming and animal breeding	N	Y	Y <sup>18</sup>	Y <sup>19</sup>	Y <sup>20</sup> Y <sup>20,21</sup>
82	Agricultural related activities	N	Y <sup>5</sup>	Y <sup>18</sup>	Y <sup>19</sup>	N
83	Forestry activities and related services	N <sup>5</sup>	Y	Y <sup>18</sup>	Y <sup>19</sup>	Y <sup>20</sup> Y <sup>20,21</sup>
84	Fishing activities and related services	N <sup>5</sup>	Y <sup>5</sup>	Y	Y	Y
85	Mining activities and related services	N	Y <sup>5</sup>	Y	Y	Y
69	Other resource production and extraction	N	Y <sup>5</sup>	Y	Y	Y

"The designation of these uses as "compatible" in this zone reflects individual Federal agencies, and program consideration of general cost and feasibility factors as well as past community experience and program objectives. Localities, when evaluating the application of these guidelines to specific situations, may have different concerns of goals to consider."

## NOTES

1. Suggested maximum density 1-2 dwelling units per acre, possibly increased under a Planned Unit Development (PUD) where maximum lot coverage is less than 20 percent.
2. Within each land use category, uses exist where further definition may be needed due to the variation of densities in people and structures. (See Appendix F)
3. The placing of structures, buildings, or above-ground utility lines in the clear zone is subject to severe restrictions. In a majority of the clear zones, these items are prohibited. See AFR 19-9 for specific guidance.
4. No passenger terminals and no major above-ground transmission lines in APZ I.
5. Factors to be considered: labor intensity, structural coverage, explosive characteristics, air pollution.
6. Low-intensity office uses only. Meeting places, auditoriums, etc., not recommended.
7. Excludes chapels.
8. Facilities must be low intensity.
9. Clubhouse not recommended.
10. Small areas for people gathering places are not recommended.
11. a. Although local conditions may require residential use, it is discouraged in Ldn 65-70 and strongly discouraged in Ldn 70-75. The absence of viable alternative development options should be determined and an evaluation indicating that a demonstrated community need for residential use would not be met if development were prohibited in these zones should be conducted prior to approvals.  
  
b. Where the community determines the residential uses must be allowed, measures to achieve outdoor to indoor Noise Level Reduction (NLR) of at least 25 dB (Ldn 65-70) and 30 dB (Ldn 70-75) should be incorporated into building codes and be considered in individual approvals. Normal construction can be expected to provide a NLR of 20 dB, thus the reduction requirements are often stated as 5, 10, or 15 dB over standard construction and normally assume mechanical ventilation and closed windows year round. Additional consideration should be given to modifying NLR levels based on peak noise levels.

NOTES - continued

c. NLR criteria will not eliminate outdoor noise problems. However, building location and site planning, design and use of berms and barriers can help mitigate outdoor exposure particularly from level sources. Measures that reduce noise at a site should be used whenever practical in preference to measures which only protect interior spaces.

12. Measures to achieve NLR of 25 must be incorporated into the design and construction of portions of these buildings where the public is received, office areas, noise sensitive areas or where the normal noise level is low.

13. Measures to achieve NLR of 30 must be incorporated into the design and construction of portions of these buildings where the public is received, office areas, noise sensitive areas or where the normal noise level is low.

14. Measures to achieve NLR of 35 must be incorporated into the design and construction of portions of these buildings where the public is received, office areas, noise sensitive areas or where the normal noise level is low.

15. If noise sensitive, use indicated NLR; if not, use is compatible.

16. No buildings.

17. Land use compatible, provided special sound reinforcement systems are installed.

18. Residential buildings require a NLR of 25.

19. Residential buildings require a NLR of 30.

20. Residential buildings not permitted.

21. Land use not recommended, built if community decides use is necessary, hearing protection devices should be worn by personnel.

#### **NOISE COMPONENT**

Noise contours are produced by a computerized Day-Night Average Sound Level (DNL) Methodology called NoiseMap. Refer to Appendix B of the 1984 AICUZ Report for a detailed description of this methodology. The AICUZ Report contains noise contours plotted at increments of 5 dB ranging from Ldn 65 to Ldn 80. Dobbins AFB noise contours are illustrated in Figure 3.

#### **ACCIDENT POTENTIAL COMPONENT**

Accident potential zones are determined by historical aircraft accident data at Air Force bases. Refer to Appendix A of the 1984 AICUZ Report for the Air Force accident potential study. Dobbins ARB Clear Zones and Accident Potential Zones are illustrated in Figure 4.

#### **OTHER COMPONENTS**


The Air Force recommends certain types of land uses be prohibited in areas of aircraft overflight, such as:

- uses that would impair visibility (e.g. steam, dust, smoke, etc).
- uses that produce direct or indirect light sources or beams that would affect pilot vision.
- uses that produce electronic emissions that could interfere with aircraft communication systems or navigational equipment.
- uses that would attract birds (e.g. sanitary landfills, sanitary treatment plants, ponds, etc).

The Cobb County Zoning Ordinance restricts these land uses in the compatible use zones established within the Airport Hazard District.

#### **AIR INSTALLATION COMPATIBLE USE ZONE MAP**

The Dobbins ARB AICUZ map is illustrated in Figure 5.




DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, OHIO 45433-6000

**AFRES**  
MASTER PLAN

NOISE CONTOURS

DOBBINS AFB  
MARIETTA, GA

SCALE: 1" = 0.33333"



## LAND USE ANALYSIS

The noise contour footprint for Dobbins ARB impacts approximately 5% less land area than the 1984 contours. This reduction is the result of the conversion of the 116th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Georgia Air National Guard, from F-4 aircraft to F-15 aircraft in 1986, and the transition of the VA-205 Squadron, Naval Air Station Atlanta, from A-7 aircraft to A-6 aircraft in 1990.

Areas of extensive development exist on all sides of Dobbins ARB, with new construction or redevelopment occurring at all times. Privately owned land within the Dobbins ARB AICUZ contains a mix of uses, including low, medium and high density residential development, industrial development, commercial/retail trade activity, and office parks. Development on the east end of the AICUZ is nearing saturation. Predominant uses are commercial/retail trade along US Highway 41 (Cobb Parkway), industrial distribution between Franklin and Delk Roads, high density residential along Cobb Parkway, Terrell Mill Road and Windy Hill Road, and office parks along all major thoroughfares in the east approach. Development on the west end of the AICUZ includes low, medium and high density residential, including mobile home parks, commercial/retail trade along Atlanta Road, South Cobb Drive, Austell Road and Powder Springs Road, with some vacant land remaining.

The Dobbins ARB AICUZ impacts the cities of Marietta and Smyrna, and unincorporated portions of Cobb County. The current noise contour footprint is within the East Central and Central Cobb County planning areas. Between 1980 and 1987, East Central Cobb's population increased 54 percent, with an additional 50 percent increase forecast by the year 2000. Employment is forecast to increase 42 percent between 1990 and 2000. Central Cobb's population is forecast to increase 35 percent by the year 2000, while employment is forecast to increase 33 percent.

The Cobb County and City of Marietta Comprehensive Plans have identified noise and safety in the vicinity of Dobbins AFB as significant planning issues. The documents recommend that local governments develop land use programs for areas impacted by air bases, and encourage programs to reduce the effects of noise. A detailed land use study is recommended for the area generally defined by the 65 ldn noise contour. Changes in land use to low density nonresidential uses are encouraged. Specifically, the plans recommend that areas impacted by the Dobbins AFB AICUZ be redesignated as "Industrial Compatible" areas to serve as transitional areas between more intense industrial uses (Dobbins AFB/Air Force Plant No. 6/NAS Atlanta complex) and less intense uses. Regional-serving employment areas consisting of light industrial, office/warehouse, distribution and support commercial service uses are encouraged in Industrial Compatible areas.

The plans further recommend rewriting the Airport Hazard District Zoning Ordinance using FAA standard model guidelines and AICUZ recommendations in order to prevent land use incompatibilities in the future.

The Dobbins AICUZ overlay on the Land Use Map of Cobb County is illustrated in Figure 6.

**A Policy Guide**


*City of Columbus Comprehensive Plan*

**LEGEND**

- OPEN SPACE / RECREATION
- VERY LOW DENSITY RES. (1-5 UNITS)
- LOW DENSITY RES. (6-14 UNITS)
- MEDIUM DENSITY RES. (15-34 UNITS)
- HIGH DENSITY RES. (35-64 UNITS)
- COMMUNITY ACTIVITY CEN.
- REGIONAL ACTIVITY CEN.
- REGIONAL COMMERCIAL AREA
- REGIONAL AREA
- MANUFACTURING & INDUSTRIAL
- COMM. SERVICE / DISTRIBUTION
- CITY CENTER

This is not a zoning map. It is intended to show the general character of the land use plan and the location of the various zones. It is not intended to be used as a legal document. For more information on the various zones, please refer to the City of Columbus Comprehensive Plan.

**COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN**  
 COBB COUNTY, GEORGIA  
 1992



DOBBINS AIR FORCE BASE  
 AICUZ  
 1992

## **IMPLEMENTATION**

### **GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

The realization of providing land use compatibility between Dobbins AFB and the neighboring community will be the result of cooperative efforts on the part of both parties. The role of the Air Force is to minimize the impact of airfield operations. The role of the community is to protect its members from the negative impacts of incompatible development. Together Dobbins AFB and its neighbors must continue to strive for the harmony that provides the greatest mutual benefit to both. It is strongly recommended that this effort be sustained and approached with renewed dedication to achievement.

### **AIR FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES**

The Air Force views its responsibilities in the AICUZ process as being twofold. The first of these responsibilities is to insure that all possible steps have been taken to reduce the noise and accident impact generated by aircraft operations. The second is to be an active and willing participant in an ongoing cooperative planning process through which compatible development plans are generated by the local community. In fulfillment of the first responsibility, Dobbins Air Reserve Base participates in the noise abatement program and the Air Force Safety program by continually evaluating its operational procedures to determine if all feasible steps have been taken to reduce the impact of Dobbins Air Reserve Base operations in adjacent land areas. In fulfillment of the second responsibility, Base officials confer with community officials on land use matters affecting the Dobbins AFB environs.

#### **1. Flying Safety**

Throughout the world, the Air Force conducts an extremely comprehensive flying safety program. Every aspect of flying and aircraft maintenance is governed by safety considerations to avoid the loss of life and property. Every precaution is taken to insure the airworthiness of each aircraft, the flying proficiency of the aircrews, and safe airborne operations.

Well-maintained aircraft and well-trained aircrews do much to assure that aircraft accidents are avoided. However, despite the best training of aircrews and maintenance of aircraft, history makes it clear that accidents do occur. It is imperative that flights be routed over sparsely populated areas as much as possible to reduce the exposure of lives and property to a potential accident. As civilian flight operations increase, and airspace becomes more limited, the flight tracks for aircraft arriving and departing Dobbins AFB become less flexible. It has become increasingly difficult to change aircraft routing or altitudes to entirely avoid urbanized areas.

Thus the need for compatible land use planning becomes readily apparent.

### 2. Noise Abatement

Noise is generated from aircraft both in the air and on the ground. At Dobbins ARB operations are evaluated continuously to ensure noise levels are minimized, both on and off base, in areas such as those developed for housing and education.

Practice take-offs/landings and instrument approaches are conducted at times when individuals are normally awake. These activities are generally not scheduled between 11:00 PM and 7:00 AM.

65% of all run-ups for F-15 aircraft are conducted in a sound suppressor (hush house) which muffles and directs noise away from sensitive areas.

The touchdown point for A-6 aircraft field carrier landing practices (FCLPs) is at the center of the runway to draw in flight paths and their associated noise contours.

Notice of intensive FCLPs or other uncommon aircraft activity is provided to the local media for public dissemination.

### 3. Participation in the Planning Process

The preparation and presentation of this amendment to the Dobbins Air Reserve Base AICUZ Report reflects the continuing interest of the Air Force in local planning processes. It is recognized that as local communities prepare their land use plans, the Air Force must be ready to provide pertinent inputs.

The Air Force is prepared to participate in any meeting involving AICUZ related land use plans. As the AICUZ program will be an ongoing activity even after compatible development plans are adopted and implemented, the Air Force is prepared to participate in the continuing discussion of zoning refinements, comprehensive plans, and other land use matters as they may affect Dobbins Air Reserve Base.

### COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITIES

The following recommendations are addressed to the citizens of Cobb County and are based on the need to reinforce the goals and objectives set forth in the 1984 AICUZ Report. These recommendations are particularly cogent at this time because of improved prospects for AICUZ implementation in conjunction with the recommendations of the Cobb County and City of Marietta Comprehensive Plans.

1. Land Use.

Land in the Dobbins ARB environs should be used for activities which (1) do not involve residential or transient-housing use, (2) do not provide extended health care domiciling, such as hospitals, (3) are not school-related or of a comparable educational nature, (4) do not involve public assembly, and (5) are not otherwise based on concentrations of people for residential, educational, institutional, recreational, commercial or industrial purposes.

2. Building Codes.

Municipal and county building codes should be amended to incorporate sound attenuation provisions as mandatory design and construction features for all human-habitation enclosures proposed for construction or modification within particular portions of the Airport Hazard District as set forth in municipal and county comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances. Affected areas should be delineated in conjunction with changes to the comprehensive plans and revisions of the Airport Hazard Districts.

3. Revising Municipal and County Comprehensive Plans.

Dobbins ARB should be involved in the deliberations and decision processes preparatory to revisions to municipal comprehensive plans for those areas of Marietta, Smyrna and Cobb County in the vicinity of the installation.

4. Updating and Amending Municipal and County Zoning Ordinances.

The Cobb County Planning Commission and the Cities of Marietta and Smyrna should avail themselves of the support and assistance of Dobbins ARB in the development, preparation and promulgation of amended Airport Hazard Districts contained in local zoning ordinances. Height-restriction violations in the areas immediately adjoining the ends of the Dobbins ARB runway constitutes a major threat to safety-of-flight operations at the airfield. Dobbins ARB should assist in the preparation of the draft text and maps for the Airport Hazard Districts surrounding Dobbins ARB and provide any other support requested by city and county officials.

**5. Formal Notification Procedures.**

The Cobb County Planning Commission and the Cities of Marietta and Smyrna should notify Dobbins ARB of all proposed actions which may impact the installation or its interaction with the surrounding community. Notification should include items on the agendas of regularly scheduled and specially called formal commission meetings, city council meetings, public hearings and committee/sub-committee meetings. Dobbins ARB should establish and observe formal response procedures arranged to accommodate municipal and county calendars.

CONCLUSION

Land use planning and control is a dynamic, rather than a "static" process. The specific characteristics of land use determinants will always reflect, to some degree, the changing conditions of the economic, social, and physical environment of a community, as well as changing public concern. The planning process accommodates this fluidity in that decisions are normally not based on boundary lines but rather on more generalized area designations.

AICUZ boundaries and noise contours describe the impact of a specific operational environment, and as such, are subject to change when a significant change in flying operations occurs (i.e., mission and/or aircraft changes, force structure changes, etc.). Consequently, if the local communities that make up the Dobbins AFB environs attempt to use these AICUZ boundaries as boundary lines for zoning districts, problems may result.

The Air Force recommends that AICUZ data be utilized with all other community planning criteria. Specific land use control decisions should never be based solely on AICUZ boundaries. With these thoughts in mind, Dobbins AFB hereby amends the 1983 AICUZ Study and provides flight track and noise contour maps in this amendment which reflect current aircraft operations.

## Encroachment

34.a. Do current estimates of population growth and development or environmental constraints pose problems for existing or planned AICUZ restrictions (i.e., safety of flight, noise)? Attach a copy of any applicable sections of the air station AICUZ plan and note any recent modifications.

Yes, population growth and development does pose potential problems. NAS Atlanta operates on the Dobbins ARB. Dobbins ARB manages the AICUZ program. As most of the clear zone is already saturated with development, accident potential zones (APZ) will remain out of compliance with AICUZ guidelines over the next twenty years. The cost to purchase the expanded clear zone is estimated to cost \$50 million. Efforts to control redevelopment will be very slow. (See attached AICUZ report for Dobbins Air Reserve Base dated August 1992.)

34.b. Are there any known plans for a significant increase of commercial airline traffic in your area? If so, describe.

There are no known plans for increase of commercial airline traffic.

35.a. Have there been any ATC delays (15 minutes or greater) between initial take-off request and actual take-off during the past three years as a result of civilian traffic? If so, please complete the following table.

Table 35.1 Delays

Fiscal Year	Average Delay (minutes)	Number of Delays	% of Total Flight Operations Scheduled
1991	NONE		
1992	NONE		
1993	NONE		

**DRAFT**

**MICHIGAN**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**ARMY:**

Detroit Arsenal  
Selfridge Army Garrison

Realign  
Close

**NAVY:**

NAF Detroit  
NRC Cadillac

Redirect  
Close

**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**

None

# MAP NO. 23

## MICHIGAN



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

**NOTES**

**NOTES**

Statement of Representative Sander M. Levin  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Hearing  
June 12, 1995

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Base Closure Commission:

I appreciate having the opportunity to address the Commission today about the Army's recommendation to close the Detroit Tank Plant.

The Army announced its recommendation to close the Tank Plant on February 28. Since that time, I have been working to get the Army to answer three basic, threshold questions: Who's affected by this recommendation? How much will it cost? What are the implications for the tank program? I am here today because the Army's answers are unconvincing.

Even at this late date -- with less than three weeks remaining before the Base Closure Commission must submit a final list of closures to the President -- the Commission still lacks the information necessary to make an informed judgement on the Detroit Tank Plant.

From day one, it was clear that the recommendation to close the Tank Plant contained obvious flaws. For example, the Army claimed that closing the Tank Plant would "not affect any jobs" in the Detroit area. I asked the Army how this could possibly be true when over 250 workers are employed at the plant.

The Army's reply to me was that the affected workers represent only ".0067 per cent of the labor force in the area." When even one worker loses his job, then, by definition, jobs have been affected. If the tank plant closes, real people will lose their jobs.

All other issues aside, the most fundamental shortcoming of the Army's recommendation is the lack of a credible estimate of the cost of closing the Tank Plant.

The Army's original claim was that closing the Tank Plant would result in a one-time cost of only \$1.4 million. When I asked the Army how it arrived at this figure, the Army told me the estimate was based on a standard formula that sets building closing costs at \$1.25 per square foot.

A buck and a quarter per square foot isn't going to do the job. Unlike most Army installations, the Detroit Tank Plant is not a base that houses and trains troops. Neither is it an administrative office building. The Detroit Tank Plant is an industrial facility that has been manufacturing tanks for nearly 50 years. I sincerely doubt \$1.4 million will be enough to close the facility and move the work to other locations.

During her site visit to the Tank Plant last April, Commissioner Steele heard a broad range of testimony from myself and others that raised serious problems with the Army's original closing cost estimate. After hearing the evidence, Commissioner Steele asked the Army to prepare a revised cost estimate by mid-May.

Well, here we are. It's mid-June and the Army still hasn't submitted a revised closing cost estimate for the Detroit Tank Plant. We do know that the Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) in Warren, Michigan, requested and received detailed closing cost data from the contractor at the plant. This information was provided weeks ago.

We also know that, using this data, TACOM prepared a revised closing cost estimate. This estimate was forwarded to Washington several weeks ago. I am informed that the Army rejected the new cost study and is sticking with its original estimate of \$1.4 million.

While the Army is unwilling to accept new cost data from the people who actually run the plant, my office has received reports that the true closing costs are at least 25 times higher than the Army's original calculations.

We simply cannot legislate in the dark like this. Members of Congress and the Base Closure Commission should have timely access to the reliable information necessary to make informed judgements.

Mr. Chairman, I would like the assurance of the Commission that it will take no action to close the Detroit Tank Plant without first reviewing the closing cost data prepared by General Dynamics Lands Systems and TACOM.

**DRAFT**

**MINNESOTA**

**I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

None

**II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:**


**AIR FORCE:**

Minneapolis-St. Paul IAP Air Reserve Station      Close

**DRAFT**

# MAP NO. 24

## MINNESOTA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Information  
Operations and Reports

# NOTES

**NOTES**

June 9, 1995

TO: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
FROM: Gina Bacigalupo L.A. for Rep. Bruce F. Vento  
(202) 225-6631  
RE: Mr. Vento's statement on the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air  
Reserve Station

\*\*\*\*\*

As I informed the BRAC liaison staff on Thursday, June 8, Congressman Vento will be unable to testify at his scheduled time on Monday. Attached please find his written statement in support of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air Reserve Station and a letter of support from St. Paul Mayor Norm Coleman. Mr. Vento would like this letter to follow his statement in the record.

I can be reached at the telephone number listed above. Thank you for your assistance.

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN BRUCE F. VENTO  
TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
REGARDING THE MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL AIR RESERVE STATION

JUNE 12, 1995

I am pleased to express my support for the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air Reserve Station and the work of the 934th Airlift Wing, the Air Reserve unit that calls this base located on the north side of the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport home. The 934th is both an effective and efficient military unit and a valuable community partner in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. I strongly support the continued operation of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air Reserve Station.

The members of the 934th Airlift Wing have an excellent record of service to the Twin Cities and the United States. This combat-ready Air Reserve flying unit uses C-130 cargo aircraft to perform essential airlift services within the United States and throughout the world. The 934th participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq, Operation Provide Promise in Bosnia, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and Operation Safe Haven in Cuba. The members of the 934th have served with distinction during these humanitarian missions.

The 934th also provides the residents of the 4th Congressional District and the rest of Minnesota with unique opportunities for

service in our armed forces. There are no active duty Air Force bases in the state of Minnesota and the installation at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport is the only base in Minnesota out of which the Air Force flies aircraft. The nearest Air Reserve base is more than 300 miles away in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It is unlikely that members of the 934th, many of whom are natives of the Twin Cities area and hold full time jobs there, would be able to transfer to the Wisconsin unit.

The 934th is not only an effective Air Reserve unit, it is also a highly efficient one. The 934th Air Reserve unit performs the same mission as an active duty unit of the same size at about half the cost. Today, when downsizing and streamlining of all government functions, including defense operations, is crucial, retaining cost-effective military units like the 934th makes a great deal of sense. Moreover, the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air Reserve Base has the lowest annual operating budget of the six Air Reserve bases recently added to the BRAC list. Far from deserving closure, the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air Reserve station's exemplary performance could be held up as a model base that successfully meets our nation's current needs.

Beyond its military contributions, the 934th Airlift Wing makes significant economic and social contributions to the Twin Cities community. The economic impact of the 934th in the Twin Cities is \$70 million per year and 670 area vendors have conducted business with the 934th. The base provides jobs for over 1700 reservists and Department of Defense personnel. About 260 of these people live in Ramsey, Dakota, and Washington Counties, areas I

have represented in Congress.

The 934th has taken advantage of its location at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport by forming partnerships with the Metropolitan Airports Commission. These partnerships save Minnesota taxpayers millions of dollars and improve the quality of life in our community. Currently, the 934th shares fire-fighting capabilities, runway access, and a control tower with the Metropolitan Airports Commission--all of which make maximum use of our airport facilities and save Federal and state taxpayer resources. These successful joint ventures are expected to continue as the airport expands.

Finally, as residents of the Twin Cities, 934th Airlift Wing personnel have a stake in the community and have been active in educational and social programs that improve the lives of Minnesotans. I have learned first hand the role of the 934th, which has assisted the Minnesota Air National Guard's 133rd Airlift Wing with its STARBASE programs. These successful programs for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds promote careers in mathematics and the sciences, goal setting, drug abuse prevention, and character development. The 934th provides speakers and tours of the Air Reserve Station for children and teenagers participating in STARBASE. The participation of members of the 934th in positive programs like STARBASE is good for the Air Reserve and it is good for Minnesota.

If the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air Reserve Station were to be closed, the Twin Cities would lose jobs and a valued community partner, the Department of Defense would lose an extremely

effective, experienced and efficient reserve unit, and the people of the United States and the world would lose the humanitarian services of the dedicated men and women who serve as members of the 934th Airlift Wing. I hope the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will recognize the outstanding qualities and merits of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Air Reserve Base and permit the 934th Airlift Wing to continue its excellent work in Minnesota.

**Remarks of Congresswoman Eva M. Clayton**  
**Congressional Testimony Before The**  
**Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**  
**Cannon Caucus Room - Washington, D.C.**

**Monday, June 12, 1995**

**Mr. Chairman, and members of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, I want to again thank you for this further opportunity to present the case for relocating the Navy Wing from Cecil Field, Florida, to the Cherry Point Marine Air Station in Havelock, North Carolina.**

**When my colleagues in the Congress, our Governor and I appeared before you on May 4th, in Maryland, I said at that time that I believe our case is compelling.**

**Now that the facts are unfolding, the case is even more compelling.....and the reasons are many.**

**First, the very integrity of the base closure and realignment process is at issue.**

**In 1993, a decision was made based upon sound factors --- cost savings, military value, land use, safety, environmental impacts and joint service training --- Cherry Point was selected.**

**This decision was careful, thoughtful, dispassionate, disinterested, impartial and calculated on where best to relocate the F/A 18 jets.**

**Less than 18 months later, that decision has changed.**

**Second, the cost figures upon which the Navy relied in 1993 differ by close to a half billion dollars in 1995.**

**One must seriously question the accuracy of these figures.**

**How can the Navy make a \$385 million mistake?**

**Faulty information and inflated figures seems to be driving the decision to switch from Cherry Point to the Oceana Naval Air Station.**

**Third, there are serious problems at the Oceana location that could affect operational readiness.**

**For more than two decades, it has been documented that Oceana --- which depends upon Virginia Beach for its water supply --- does not have sufficient water yields.**

**This is particularly true during periods of dry weather or drought.**

**And, this will remain true, even if the Lake Gaston Pipeline Project is finally approved by Virginia and my state.**

**The Virginia Beach area is counting on ninety-five million gallons of water a day from Lake Gaston.**

**I live on Lake Gaston, on the North Carolina side.**

**This matter has been at issue for more than ten years, and I can tell you that a resolution in favor of this additional water flowing into the Virginia Beach area is by no means certain.....It is, in fact, in grave doubt.**

**I am most disturbed, however, Mr. Chairman because the exaggerated estimates upon which the Navy has relied first surfaced in three letters to the Secretary of the Navy from Senator John Warner of Virginia --- himself, a former Secretary of the Navy --- and, our competitor!**

**Surely, some reservations must be raised about estimates generated by those who have a direct interest in the outcome of the Commission's decision.**

**Finally, it should not be overlooked that in reliance upon the first decision and in anticipation of the relocation to Cherry Point, the people of North Carolina, have expended considerable resources, money and energy in preparation for the move of the Navy Wing --- \$40 million on housing and other upgrades alone has been spent.**

**Millions more has been expended for extensive planning, infrastructure improvements, bond issues, planned new schools, housing development, comprehensive water and sewer planning and transportation needs.**

**Based upon the first decision to relocate to Cherry Point, the state of North Carolina has been looking forward to the move and making plans to insure that the Navy Wing was well accommodated.....We have done our part.**

**We have been making arrangements and getting ready for the nearly five thousand military and civilian personnel who will come with this move.**

**To say that we have relied to our detriment on the 1993 decision, puts the situation in the mildest of terms.**

**This change, if it prevails, will be felt throughout the state, will have a long term impact and will not soon be forgotten.**

**One final point, Mr. Chairman. I would urge the Commission to make sure it takes a close look at the environmental impact that a move of the Navy Wing would have on the state of Virginia.**

**Indications that I am aware of suggest that there are significant, sensitive environmental concerns in the area of Virginia to which the change is proposed.**

**I urge the Commission to reconsider the decision to relocate to Cherry Point, once again.**

**Cherry Point was and remains a sound selection.....the rationale for changing appears to be rather shallow and based upon inaccurate information --- critical water supply issues are swerving around the Oceana location --- and, the people of North Carolina relied, in good faith, on the original decision.**

**Moreover, the environmental concerns would seem to be paramount in Virginia, as opposed to Cherry Point.**

**The case continues to be compelling, Mr. Chairman.**

**I believe reconsideration is obliged. At the very least, a fresh and closer look is warranted. Thank you.**

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL D. WELLSTONE**  
**BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
**ON THE FUTURE OF THE 934TH AIRLIFT WING**

JUNE 12, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to join Congressmen Sabo and Vento to briefly express our views on the Commission's decision to review the 934th Airlift Wing, located at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport, for possible realignment or closure. I know you have been here for many hours today, hearing from many members of Congress, and so I will keep my comments short and submit my full statement for the record.

I am proud to represent those who work at this base, and all Minnesotans who have an interest in its future, at this hearing. I believe that as you move forward with your deliberations and review, the extraordinary quality of this unit, its people, and the reasons for its retention will become clear to the Commission.

Let me say at the outset that I come before you today as a firm proponent of post-Cold War defense downsizing. I have argued throughout my tenure in the Senate that as a nation we continue to spend too much on breathtakingly sophisticated, expensive and sometimes redundant weapons systems, on maintaining large and expensive active duty forces scattered over the globe, and on the maintenance of a Cold War defense infrastructure that is in some ways obsolete, and in need of thorough restructuring.

There are a number of places where I believe we can save billions in excessive defense spending, while preserving military readiness and improving the quality of life of Americans who serve in our Armed Forces. They include limiting procurement of C-17 cargo aircraft, delaying production of the F-22, terminating the Trident II backfit program, limiting procurement of Milstar II satellites, and many others. These four items alone would save taxpayers over \$15 billion dollars over the next five years.

In addition, I recognize that Reserve and Guard forces must bear their share of the burden of defense downsizing. And they have done so, throughout the current force restructuring of the last couple of years, including the changes made by last year's off-site agreement.

But having said that, I believe it would be a penny-wise and pound-foolish mistake to close the 934th, and thus lose the substantial investment which the U.S. military has made there over the last 45 years or so.

Minnesota has no active duty military bases, and only a few major regional Guard or Reserve bases, including the National Guard training center at Camp Ripley, the 148th Tactical Fighter Squadron in Duluth, the 133rd Airlift Air National Guard unit, and the 934th Airlift Wing. A member of the Twin Cities community since 1949, the 934th Airlift Wing is consistently ranked as one of the finest flying units in the nation, and one of the most cost-effective Air Reserve units in the system.

There are a number of factors which argue for a decision by the Commission to retain this unit, even when compared to other C-130 Air Reserve bases across the country. The unit's distinguished flying record; its prime location at a major aviation hub (the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport); its significant economic contributions to our state; its relationship to other key military tenants of the base, including the Navy Reserve and a National Guard unit which shares some inventory, maintenance and other resources and facilities; and its ability to draw on skilled Minnesotans who work in our large and growing technical, aviation, and medical sectors to operate efficiently and cost-effectively all argue for its retention.

I understand that originally only one Air Force Reserve C-130 airbase was slated nationally for review and possible closure, and that the decision of the Commission to add the other C-130 airbases to the review list was in part to enable you to validate large amounts of complicated data on these bases that was provided by the Air Force. I am hopeful that once that review is completed, you will decide to remove the 934th Airlift Wing from the list altogether.

The basic mission of this Air Reserve unit is to support the active duty Air Force by providing seasoned, professional air crews and planes ready to perform tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation worldwide as the need arises. The unit augments the active duty forces with over 1000 well-trained support personnel. In recent years, because of their excellent record, reputation, and training, they have been called on to undertake humanitarian airlift or medical evacuation missions in Bosnia, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, Haiti, and elsewhere, where they have performed in award-winning fashion. They can either airdrop or actually land cargo and personnel into the midst of combat or other critical situations, or evacuate people out who are in need of medical attention, and have done so with extraordinary courage and skill over the years.

While I know that active duty units are indispensable for certain roles and missions, I believe that a smaller active duty force, coupled with an increased reliance on usually much more cost-effective Reserve units would better meet our defense needs in the long run. The genius of this general approach is embodied by this unit; it reportedly costs only about 40 cents for this unit to do what it would cost a dollar for a similar active duty Air Force unit to do.

In addition to the general cost advantages of Reserve forces, this station is particularly well-managed and is, I understand, among the least costly Air Reserve bases in the country, in terms of operations and maintenance costs. Its location in a large metropolitan area and its close connections with a major hub airport in the Twin Cities provide substantial economic and military advantages.

For example, the 934th has an excellent working relationship with the Metropolitan Airports Commission. This unusual arrangement allows the sharing of fire-fighting capabilities, snow removal equipment, and runways, saving taxpayers well over \$2 million annually. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates the control tower for both civilian and military flights, thus producing further substantial savings. The station also owns 21 joint-use facilities that are shared with other military customers at a large overall savings.

There are other benefits to retaining this unit in Minnesota as well. Drawing on the vast technical, engineering and other skills of Minnesotans who work in large Twin-Cities-based firms like Honeywell, Tonka, 3-M, Cray Computers, Ceridian, and others, over the years the unit has been staffed with technicians who are tops in their fields. In addition, Minnesota's position as international headquarters and a major hub for Northwest Airlines provides a large pool of skilled pilots, ground and maintenance crews from which recruiters can draw. Similarly, relying on Minnesota's vast network of excellent health-care facilities for highly-skilled personnel, the unit has consistently set a standard for readiness and performance of aeromedical evacuation for Air Reserve units nationally.

As I'm sure your site visit and regional hearing in Chicago earlier this month revealed, the 934th is important to the economies of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and the surrounding region. It is estimated that the 934th had an economic impact of around \$70 million in the last fiscal year alone. About 500 full-time, and 1100 part-time active and reserve workers could lose their jobs if this base closed. In addition, the station provides base support for around 5,000 National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel.

The base employs a substantial number of Department of Defense civilian employees, and provides exchange and other ancillary services for over 12,000 military retirees and their families. In recent years, the unit has conducted business with over 670 small and medium-sized businesses as vendors in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Thus the direct and indirect employment and other economic losses from closing this base would be substantial to the Twin Cities region, to the state of Minnesota, and to the Upper Midwest.

In addition to the economic issues which the Commission must consider, the unit's military record is exemplary. Members of

the unit have repeatedly shown their dedication to the nation and their ability to effectively carry out their missions. The retention rate for this unit is among the highest in the entire Air Force Reserve system.

On top of their military accomplishments, unit members are active in the community, volunteering their time and energies for a variety of local programs and projects, including tours and visits for over 10,000 children and youth since 1988, helping to build a new shelter at the metropolitan zoo, painting houses for low-income persons in the Twin Cities area, and contributing a great deal of time and money to various other charity efforts. Thus the intangible benefits from having this base located in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area are many.

Finally, closing the 934th would pose serious geographic problems for those personnel currently working there. With the next closest unit currently located in Madison, Wisconsin, closing this station would make it very difficult for members of the unit to continue to serve in the Air Force Reserves.

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that when you and other members of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission examine all the facts, you will conclude that the 934th Air Force Reserve Station located at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport should remain open. I appreciate your taking the time to hear from me and other members of our delegation on this matter so important to Minnesotans.

# **Congressman Martin Olav Sabo (5th-MN)**

## **Remarks before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

**on the 934th Air Force Reserve Airlift Wing  
based at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport**

**June 12, 1995**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify in support of the 934th Air Force Reserve Airlift Wing. We in Minnesota are rightfully proud of the 934th. And, I am confident that the Base Closure and Realignment Commission in reviewing this installation will recognize that the 934th Air Wing serves vital military and humanitarian roles that are particularly important to maintain in this time of restructuring our national defense operations.

Commissioner Cornella, who visited the base just two weeks ago, observed first-hand some of the major assets of the 934th Air Wing. The 934th has proven itself as a consistent, capable, and efficient combat-ready support force for our ever-changing national defense needs.

By providing vital airlift assistance, the 934th served effectively in the Persian Gulf War, and more recently in Haiti, Panama, and Somalia. In Bosnia alone, they have deployed 500 personnel during three rotations in 1992, 1993, and 1994. The 934th delivered over 2,000 tons of critical humanitarian

assistance to the troubled area.

While its military record is solid, the 934th is also known for its cost-effectiveness. Of the six Air Force Reserve bases now under consideration by the commission, the 934th has the lowest operating budget, and ranks in the top third of all Air Force Reserve host bases for cost efficiency in operating and maintenance costs.

The 934th is a model of cooperation, working with other military and civilian air services. The unit shares 21 joint-use facilities on base with the Army, Navy, Marines and Air National Guard. Furthermore, the 934th cooperates and shares services with the Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport. The 934th and the airport share runways, air traffic control and fire and emergency support services -- resulting in substantial savings to the American taxpayer. The shared fire fighting capabilities alone save taxpayers an estimated \$2 million annually.

Clearly, this base is important to the Twin Cities economy. The 934th directly employs 500 full-time Defense Department personnel and more than 1100 reservists. Experts estimate that the base, with an operating budget of \$34.7 million, has a total economic impact of \$70 million annually for the state of Minnesota.

However, the base is more than just a source of defense dollars for Minnesota; it serves as a strong military presence that attracts quality recruits.

The nearest Air Force Reserve base is in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 337 miles from Minneapolis. The 934th puts forth a powerful image in the Twin Cities metropolitan area that brings recruits into the reserve service and keeps them at higher rates than the Reserve targets. The unit has re-enlistment rates hovering around 99%, well above the target 90% set for Air Force Reserve units.

The 934th Airwing serves vital military and domestic missions, and does so in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The 934th is in high demand, and its mission performance is a credit to the Air Force. It should also be noted that the 934th Airlift Wing has flown over 142,000 flying hours without a single major mishap, giving it the second-best flying safety record in the entire Air Force.

Commissioner Cornella's fact-finding visit to the base, and your willingness to hear from those in Minnesota show the Commission's commitment to making well-informed decisions. I believe the 934th should continue its current mission, and I would be happy to provide further information as the Commission proceeds with its review.

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Post-It® Fax Note	7871	Date	6-15	# of pages	1
To	Gina Bacigalupo	From	Tim ROGERS		
Co./Dept.		Co.			
Phone #		Phone #	612 223 5022		
Fax #	612-225-1968	Fax #			

May 23, 1995

TO: BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSING COMMISSION MEMBERS

On behalf of the members of the Saint Paul Area Chamber of Commerce, I want to go on record in support of maintaining the 934th Airlift Wing at the Minneapolis/Saint Paul International Airport.

The base, its reservists and civilian staff have a significant positive impact on the economy of the Twin Cities metropolitan area. The full and part time jobs represented on the base account for more than \$31 million in annual payroll. Over 200 of the reservists live and work in the metro east area. In addition to the base's impact on the local economy, the 934th has assumed key roles in such missions as Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and the humanitarian airlifts to Bosnia and Somalia.

I am sure your charge and the related decisions are difficult, however, the positive impacts this base has had on our economy and events around the world warrant your vote of continued support.

Sincerely,

Tim Rogers  
President

TGR/sue

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