

DRAFT

NORTH DAKOTA

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

AIR FORCE:

Grand Forks AFB

Realign

II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

AIR FORCE:

Grand Forks AFB


Close

Minot AFB

Realign

MAP NO. 35

NORTH DAKOTA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

TESTIMONY OF
U.S. SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN
before the
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
June 13, 1995
Washington, D.C.

Similarly, Admiral Henry Chiles, Jr., Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, stated in a letter to you that **"the core refueling wing at Grand Forks AFB provides critical support to strategic and contingency operations"**.

General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief of U.S.

Transportation Command, also made clear to you that:

The wisdom of establishing a refueling wing at Grand Forks was validated during the recent high priority operations including VIGILANT WARRIOR in Iraq and SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda.

Vigilant Warrior provides one of the most dramatic examples of the use of Grand Forks' tankers. In response to provocative troop movements by Saddam Hussein in 1994, the President dispatched U.S. fighters to warn Iraq that it was playing with fire. Grand Forks took the lead in supplying (23) KC-135 tankers to prevent the outbreak of new hostilities.

Let me also mention the Persian Gulf War to illustrate how KC-135s serve as gas stations in the sky -- the very lifeline of military operations. During this conflict KC-135s and other tankers completed 85,000 aerial refuelings and pumped 190 million gallons of fuel.

parking space, a new state-of-the-art Type III hydrant refueling system,
extensive hangars, and unimpeded air space.

As Gen. Fogleman told you, "... Grand Forks has some of the best
infrastructure in AMC, with both the ramp and hydrant system required to
support a large tanker fleet".

Admiral Chiles also pointed out the unique value of Grand Forks'
infrastructure as its "ability to sustain a large tanker fleet and provide
important operational flexibility to our strategic air refueling assets in
support of global missions."


In conclusion, I hope that you will agree with General Fogleman's
assessment of the military value of Grand Forks:

**I cannot overstate my support for retention of a core refueling wing
at Grand Forks Air Force Base. I believe it is essential to our
nation's ability to respond in a timely manner to challenges across the
entire spectrum of conflict.**

Thank you for your thoughtful consideration.

MAP NO. 36

OHIO



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

DAVID L. HOBSON
7TH DISTRICT, OHIO



APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
NATIONAL SECURITY
VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
BUDGET COMMITTEE
SPEAKER'S DESIGNEE
STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT
REPUBLICAN WHIP ORGANIZATION

WASHINGTON OFFICE

1514 Longworth HOB
Washington, D.C. 20515

(202) 225-4324

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 13, 1995

Testimony of Representative David L. Hobson
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Close Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 178th Fighter Group (ANG), the 251st Combat Communications Group (ANG), and the 269th Combat Communications Squadron (ANG) to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

- Mr. Chairman. Members of the Commission. I have five minutes to convince you not to waste \$30 plus million dollars.

- My arguments are based solely on the numbers. Although the community will survive, the numbers are flawed and this is not fair. This decision results from a desire on the part of the Air Force to fill a hole at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base with pointed nosed airplanes. The numbers were backed into in an attempt to prove this is a cost effective move.

- Just as in 1993, the numbers are flawed. They are based on improper assumptions. Had the right assumptions been used in the COBRA model, the base would not be on the list in the first place. Even using the current flawed COBRA run--which just arrived Friday afternoon, June 9, 1995--there is an 11 year ROI, \$24.6 million one-time costs, and \$2.8 million annual savings, the base should not be on the list. As you see from the chart in your packet and on display.

- Let me show you a few problems about the numbers and why this should be investigated further.

1. A major dispute is manpower savings. AFMC and the Guard say 31 people are needed and authorized at Wright-Patterson to accommodate a move. Air Force headquarters says only 13 will be allowed because they assume that a current regulation may be changed some time in the future. Although no one knows when. Annual recurring savings at Wright-Patterson are reduced by \$1 million. This blows the Air Force's whole position on the move.

In 1993 this was not an issue. However, in order to make the numbers look bad for Springfield, the Air Force makes this assumption and in my opinion cooks the books.

SPRINGFIELD OFFICE

Room 220 Post Office
150 N. Limestone St.
Springfield, OH 45501-1121

(513) 325-0474

LANCASTER OFFICE

212 S. Broad St.
Room 55
Lancaster, OH 43130-4389

2. There are asbestos and lead paint in the buildings to be provided at Wright-Patterson. No contractor is going to go in and renovate around asbestos; the liability is too great. Yet, AF assumes this will happen. This is a substantial increase, estimated to increase military construction costs by \$5 million.

3. The telephone bill is \$13,000 at Springfield but is assumed to be \$82,020 at Wright-Patterson. This is ridiculously stupid and part of why I question the numbers!

4. AF refuses to admit that an expanded Dining Hall is needed. Just wait, a military construction request for more capacity will come down the pike a year or two after a move. This is another \$1 million in milcon costs.

5. In questioning these and other open or disputed areas, AF says "Don't worry. We'll take care of it after the move." If you want to see how these things are taken care of, go back and look at the General Accounting Office study and, specifically, the move of the 445th Air Force Reserve unit. Compare the lower assumed costs vs. the higher actual ones.

- Springfield has always received more than a fair hearing from the BRAC staff. I believe your analysts understand the problem and how the numbers are being cooked to put pointed nose airplanes at Wright-Patterson.

- Why waste \$30 plus million and take--even by AF flawed assumptions and we think it will be much higher--11 years to get to where we are already in Springfield. We should not fill a hole at Wright-Patt in this costly matter and waste tax dollars just because they are available through the BRAC process.

- The Air Force should bring back on Wright-Patt, the tenants for whom they are leasing space off base, and use this space for that purpose.

- Springfield should not be abandoned. It is a well functioning facility which needs nothing and has a new engine shop for F-16s already completed. Springfield should be allowed to continue to do the cost effective job it has been doing.

- Do this by the numbers and I am confident, just as in 1993, it will be reversed.

- I implore you to look at the numbers. It is irresponsible to put a base on the list with false numbers and continue to use false assumptions.

- Think about the taxpayer and what is cost effective. Not what some General would like to see on the flight line.

- I have been requested to submit testimony on certain other moves to W-P and it is attached.

Springfield Air Guard Base COBRA Adjustment Summary

	<u>Decision COBRA</u>	<u>COBRA 8 May 95</u>	<u>COBRA 11May 95</u>	<u>COBRA Adjusted * 9 June 95</u>
ROI Years	6	7	8	11
NPV in 2015 (\$K)	-35,122	-29,703	-25,747	- 14,000
One Time Cost (\$K)	23,378	25,494	24,814	- 24,600
Annual Recurring Savings (\$K)	-4,208	-3,959	-3,626	- 2,800

* This is still flawed.

**Springfield Air Guard Base
ANG BRAC 95
Springfield Recurring Costs**

	Springfield	WPAFB	Delta
Utilities	459,246	570,844	111,598
Phones	13,347	82,080	68,733
Recurring Cost Difference			<hr/> 180,331

Springfield numbers are FY94 actuals.
WPAFB numbers based on formula provided by 88ABW/XPP.

BOS	ANG	AFMC	AIRSTAFF
Initial	-35	+39**	+13*
Current	-22	+13	

*7 BOS positions, plus 6 Security Police positions.
**39 personnel required by AFI 38-204 & AFI 65-503.

**Springfield Air Guard Base
Community Partnership Savings Estimates
15 May 95**

Recurring Cost Item	Community Approach	Estimated Savings	COBRA References
1. Crash, Fire & Rescue (CFR) Operations	Cover non-flying hours with mutual aid agreements with communities.	\$400K/Yr.	CFR Total: \$1,281,834
2. Air Traffic Control (ATC)	Include in joint use agreement with state & local operation.	\$370K/Yr.	ATC: \$480K

**Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport/Airpark
Springfield, Ohio**

Shared Investment Summary (1982-1994)

Year	Project	Local	State	Federal	Military	Total
1982*	Installation of Arresting Gear (Barriers)	-	-	-	535,140	535,140
1982	Installation of Instrument Landing System for Runway 24 (Navigational Aid)	-	-	-	350,000	350,000
1983*	Construct TACAN Electric Service	-	-	-	59,250	59,250
1983	Runway 6/24 Crack Filling Project	9,000	-	-	-	9,000
1984	Rehabilitate Taxiway "A"	-	-	-	840,680	840,680
1985	Sealcoat Terminal Building Apron	11,000	-	-	-	11,000
1985	Reconstruct Approx. 1,000' of each end of Runway 6/24 with concrete; re-replace drainage	-	-	-	1,484,500	1,484,500
1986	Taxiways & T-Hangar Resurfacing Project; Land Reimbursement	31,260	-	281,337	-	312,597
1986	Runway 15/33 Slurry Seal Project	18,656	74,624	-	-	93,280
1986	Construct Runway 24 Approach Lighting System	-	-	-	846,400	846,400
1987	Construct Water/Sewer Facilities	740,562	1,650,000	-	1,191,888	3,582,450
1989	Utility Installation to AirparkOhio	748,000	-	-	-	748,000
1990*	Construct TACAN Building	-	-	-	58,520	58,520
1992	Rehabilitate Runway 6/24; Install Guidance Signs; Upgrade Lighting Control Building	32,950	32,950	392,500	1,141,600	1,800,000
1992	Terminal Building Apron Expansion	10,500	10,500	192,000	-	213,000
1990**	Airport Master Plan Update	10,000	-	90,000	-	100,000
1993	Secondary Runway	7,421	7,421	133,587	-	148,429
1993	Main Runway Rehab	11,535	1,391	221,337	-	234,263
1993	Apron Expansion	1,905	1,905	34,295	-	38,105
1994	Noise Study	9,064	-	81,579	-	90,643
1994	AirparkOhio Entrance	-	111,254	-	-	111,254
1994	AirparkOhio Roadways	-	733,353	-	-	733,353
GRAND TOTAL:		\$1,641,853	\$2,623,398	\$1,626,635	\$6,507,978	\$12,399,864

**Springfield Air Guard Base
Springfield, Ohio**

Major Military Construction (since 1980)

Year Completed	Project Descriptions	Cost
1981	Fuel Systems Maintenance Dock	\$1,014,000
1982	Aircraft Arresting System	565,000
1982	Munitions Maintenance	640,000
1982	Civil Engineering	585,000
1984	Taxiway "A" Overlay	901,000
1985	Add/Alter Vehicle Maintenance	1,069,000
1985	Add/Alter Comm. Electronics	958,000
1985	Petroleum Operations	229,000
1985	Water and Sewer Lines	1,192,000
1985	Construct Concrete Runway Ends	1,486,000
1986	Instrument Landing System	856,000
1987	Construct Hush House Pad	493,000
1991	Runway Repair	1,000,000
1994	ECM Pods	553,000
1995	Engine Shop	1,118,000

(note: Natural Gas Service was recently extended to the base at an approximate cost of \$486,000.)

**Springfield Air Guard Base
Realignment Cost Comparisons
1993 vs. 1995**

	<u>Initial Estimate 12 May 93</u>	<u>Site Survey 10 April 93</u>	<u>BRAC Report June 93</u>	<u>Decision COBRA 1995</u>
One Time Cost (\$K)	3.0	45.1	35M	23.3
Annual Recurring Savings (\$K)	-1.1	-1.1	-1.1	-4.2

POINT PAPER ON SAVINGS OFFERED BY SPRINGFIELD

Two Key Features of Operating the ANG at Springfield ANG Base, Ohio are
Fire Crash Rescue Services and the Control Tower

- Fire Crash Rescue - currently 24 state employees
 - 100% federally paid
 - City would cover all non-flying hours by Mutual Aid Agreement
 - Would eliminate 10 full time state employee positions
 - Cost savings annually: \$480,000 actual
 - Agreement being proposed through Adjutant General's Office from City of Springfield to NGB
 - Start FY 97 to allow transition for employees - cost savings - \$480,000 annually

- Control Tower operated by ANG with Title 5 employees
 - Currently two weather observes assigned
 - Controllers are already certified observers
 - Obstruction charts were developed for Springfield
 - Two positions can be eliminated
 - Savings: \$65,730.86 annually
 - Start FY 97 to allow transition for employees

TOTAL PROPOSED ANNUAL SAVINGS: \$545,730.00

**Testimony for Congressman David Hobson Before BRAC In Support
Of Consolidation of Certain Brooks Air Force Base Function at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base**

An issue that is of serious concern to my district is the recommendation before the Commission made by the Air Force to close Brooks Air Force Base and move certain of those functions to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The Air Force recommendation would result in the consolidation of the ARMSTRONG LABORATORY, HUMAN SYSTEMS CENTER, THE SCHOOL OF AEROSPACE MEDICINE, and the SYSTEMS ACQUISITION SCHOOL with Wright-Patterson's premier research and development activities.

The BRAC process was established by Congress to enable the reduction of infrastructure in an organized responsible manner. The BRAC criteria are clearly met with this recommended consolidation:

- Moving these functions to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base would maximize military value by providing the enhanced man-machine integration required for new and evolving weapon systems.
- The economic pay back would make the best business sense in terms of annualized and long term savings.
- Excess capacity would be reduced in that it offers the only option under consideration that reduces excess Air Force

Laboratory capacity at the same time providing the best long term value for DoD.

It has also come to my attention that there may be some concern about moving the medical capabilities from Brooks Air Force Base. I want to bring to the Commission's attention that the Dayton region is a biomedical center of excellence. Wright State University is the only civilian school of aerospace medicine. Ohio State University and the University of Cincinnati have very strong medical programs. The Dayton Area of Graduate Studies Institute (DAGSI) has recently been established and will enable graduate studies in among other things biomedical technology.

The private sector also provides capabilities in the biomedical area. The Kettering Heart Institute, Hipple Cancer Institute, and numerous commercial laboratories specializing in R&D medical and environmental testing and biomedical research are also located in the Dayton region.

There are some federal government capabilities that are located in the Dayton area. The Triservice Regional Medical Center covers ten surrounding states. The Wright Technology Network, Fitts Human Engineering Division at Armstrong Laboratories, and the Regional Veterans Administration Medical Center are located in the Dayton region.

I have been assured in conversations with well respected experts in the biomedical field that certainly the Dayton area will enable those functions which took place at Brooks to continue to be performed in the superior matter thus meeting the Air Force needs.

In conclusion, it is imperative for all of us to look to the future. This consolidation would enable the combination of two inextricably linked facets of military capability - - the weapons and the humans which fly them. The future of human flight and high performance aircraft will require a shortened acquisition process, an increased need for cross servicing capability, and a total innovative focus on the human and machine interface. The Air Force position which is being considered by you will lead to meeting these future needs. The Air Force is right and should be supported by the commission.

**Why Armstrong Laboratory, Human Systems Center, School of Aerospace
Medicine, and the Systems Acquisition School
Should be Consolidated
at Wright-Patterson AFB**

INTRODUCTION

The future of human flight in high performance aircraft will require a shortened acquisition process, an increased need for cross servicing capability and a total integrated focus on the human and machine interface.

Consolidating the Armstrong Laboratory, Human Systems Center, the School of Aerospace Medicine, and the Systems Acquisition School with Wright-Patterson's premier research and development activities makes good economic sense. This BRAC action will also maximize military value and reduce excess laboratory capacity within the Department of Defense.

- **Military Value** - Provides the enhanced man-machine integration required for new and evolving weapon systems.
- **Economics** - Makes the best business case in terms of annualized savings and long term payback.
- **Reduces Excess Capacity** - It offers the only option under consideration that reduces excess AF laboratory capacity while providing the best long term value for the DoD.

MILITARY VALUE

Realignment and consolidation at WPAFB maximizes military value by enhancing man-machine integration.

The Human Systems Center currently at Brooks AFB is composed of three key elements:

- **Human Systems Program Office (HSPO)** - an acquisition management and sustainment organization with projects centered on the health, safety and efficiency of the human weapon system operator.
- **Armstrong Laboratory (AL)** - a research and development laboratory focused on the basic and applied core technologies associated with human aspects of weapon system performance.
- **Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (AFSAM)** - a medical education institution providing a flight surgeon residency program and training programs for medical technicians.

Consolidation of these elements at Wright-Patterson AFB would provide military benefit through the synergy resulting from having both the basic research and the development/acquisition of human centered technologies/equipment and the aeronautical weapon systems at one location.

- Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson has the mission of acquiring all aeronautical weapon systems (i.e., F-16, F-15, F-22, B-2, C-17, F-117, etc.) and associated training and support equipment. Human centered considerations are inextricable from the design and development of such systems. Additionally, man-machine interface issues are more efficiently resolved during the early stages (i.e. research, development, acquisition) of weapon systems management life cycle. Until 1989, the HSPO was located at Wright-Patterson with the weapon system program offices it served.
- Wright Laboratory (WL), the Air Forces largest 'super lab', is located at WPAFB. Its core technologies are flight dynamics, avionics, propulsion, and materials which are the leading edge technologies upon which advanced weapon systems are based. WL works closely with the AL divisions currently located at WPAFB in the joint cockpit office. It would forge stronger bonds with the remaining AL divisions, once collocated. There is a 50 year tradition of physiological research at WPAFB which started with the Aeromedical Research Lab which is the genesis of the current AL and the roots of the divisions of AL currently at WPAFB.
- The AFSAM would be sustained and enhanced within the WPAFB community. The local universities provide a wealth of education in the field of medicine. The region has a total of over 1600 full-time faculty, 1100 part-time faculty and 1800 full-time medical students. Wright State University School of Medicine, which is contiguous to WPAFB, has the only civilian school of aerospace medicine in the United States. Additionally, the AF's second largest medical center is located at WPAFB and currently services tri-service medical needs across a 10 state region. It provides direct access to clinical resources to complement the AFSAM curriculum. Moreover, there is a full complement of private medical facilities and biomedical research institutions in proximity of WPAFB.
- Brooks AFB has no ability to "accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements." However, WPAFB continues to be a principal part of these AF activities with considerable demonstrated potential to expand (i.e. every major class of AF aircraft has been operated from WPAFB at some time in the last 20 years--fighters, bombers, transports, tankers).

The military value of locating the HSC elements currently at Brooks AFB at WPAFB are derived from the synergistic benefit of co-locating the basic and applied research, as well as the development and acquisition, of both the weapon systems and the human centered technologies, upon which they rely. The AF can no longer afford the inefficiencies of maintaining separate infrastructures for these two inextricable facets of military capability -- the weapon systems and the humans which fly them.

ECONOMICS

Cost of relocation of Brooks AFB activities would save money with payback in six years.

- This is driven by the lower cost of operations at Wright-Patterson AFB. All COBRA analysis studies run by the Air Force and the San Antonio community agree that more efficient operations of facilities would be at Wright-Patterson AFB.
- The one time cost of closure of Brooks AFB is \$211.5M vs \$42.4M for cantonment. However, the cantonment should not be viewed as a true closure since most missions and facilities will remain. The one time costs of closure is offset by the higher annual savings of \$32.3M vs \$10.5M for cantonment. The site survey process has now refined the Air Force estimate for return on investment to 6 years (very desirable in BRAC terms). Note: It will take at least two years for the cantonment (with its lower military value) to "pay back" vs the immediate payback asserted in the San Antonio proposal.
- Consolation at WPAFB will save significant dollars by reducing base support management, oversight and Headquarters support functions now duplicated between Brooks and Wright-Patterson Air Force Bases.

The cantonment alternative proposed by the San Antonio community understates the true cost of that option.

- The proposed cost of other cantonment operations across DoD have been historically understated (Kirkland AFB and Rome AFB are examples).
- The Brooks cantonment plan closes no facilities or infrastructure as represented by that option (it sells land, but does not close physical plant).
- The city of San Antonio has provided estimated "cost and manpower implications" for the cantonment. This data as well as the data for the proposed closure has been updated. This data shows that closure eliminates almost twice as many people -- 506 vs 266 and moves four times as many, 2876 vs 689. From a cost standpoint, it is the elimination of positions which produce significant savings which more than offset one time moving costs.
- The updated Air Force COBRA analysis of the Brooks closure delineates "the extent and timing of potential costs and savings." Closure has a 43% greater net present value (\$172.1M vs \$119.7M) than cantonment. Thus, cantonment would cost the Air Force at least \$52M more than closure in constant dollars.
- The cantonment option does not result in like consolidations of laboratory functions. The cantonment option also fails to reduce DoD infrastructure which is a primary consideration of the BRAC process.

CONSOLIDATION

Realignment of Brooks AFB activities to Wright-Patterson AFB significantly contributes to accomplishment of DoD/Air Force goals for *laboratory consolidation*.

- **Wright-Patterson has the highest concentration and diversity of research and development activities and is ranked as a Category one (1) Air Force Product Center (Best) by the DoD Joint Cross Service Group and the Air Force.**
- **Brooks AFB ranked lowest of nine (9) Air Force Product Centers/Laboratories by the DoD Joint Cross Service Group and has no excess capacity to accomplish additional future taskings.**


Consolidation also supports joint facility use, reduces infrastructure and overhead.

- **There are highly effective and efficient support activities at Wright-Patterson AFB, i.e. a regional military housing and other necessary base operating support infrastructure.**
- **Collocation reduces infrastructure for base and headquarters support with 506 positions eliminated.**
- **Availability, affordability and quality of housing and educational opportunities, both on an off base are available at Wright-Patterson AFB and Dayton, Ohio.**
- **Movement of Brooks AFB activities to Wright-Patterson AFB provides synergistic effects with the collocation of similar and mutually dependent activities.**
- **WPAFB has available laboratory and office space capacity to support a critical mass of the transferring activities' needs.**
- **Complements research, development, education, and acquisition skill base readily available at Wright-Patterson AFB.**
- **A significant skill base for aerospace medicine and human factors engineering is also resident at Wright-Patterson AFB and the surrounding area.**

SUMMARY

Cantonment

**Consolidation of Laboratories
to WPAFB**



Consolidation of Brooks activities to Wright-Patterson is the right answer. It meets all relevant BRAC criteria.

Relocation to Wright-Patterson is the right answer when viewed from three perspectives:

- **Military Value - Provides total man-machine integration for all USAF weapon system management.**
- **Economics - Provides for best business case. The up front cost pays back in only six years.**
- **Reduction of Excess Capacity - Provides for reduction of excess capacities and promotes cross - servicing in weapon system man-machine endeavors.**

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN
BEFORE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995**

**Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of
the Commission.**

**While I have only five minutes to cover
four different proposed base closure actions, I
would like to highlight for you some of the key
issues associated with these proposed closure
actions.**

**The first issue relates to a 1993
recommendation I have always questioned --
the recommendation to privatize the Aerospace
Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark Air**

Force Base in Heath, Ohio.

The Commission approved the recommendation to close Newark in 1993. But, as privatization has proceeded, cost data has become available which indicates that closing and privatizing Newark may actually cost the taxpayer money, perhaps as much as \$456 million over the next five years. Moreover, the potential cost increase and difficulties associated with privatizing Newark led GAO to recommend that the closure of Newark be reconsidered. This is the only time that GAO has recommended that a previous decision be re-examined.

As it currently stands, the Air Force will receive privatization proposals on June 17 and the Air Force has alerted the Commission that it may need to reevaluate what happens to Newark.

I urge the Commission to consider revisiting the 1993 closure decision, particularly if the proposals the Air Force receives on June 17 demonstrate that privatization will cost more than current operations.

A second closure issue is the proposed closure of Brooks Air Force Base and the realignment of its Armstrong Laboratory, Human Systems Center, School of Aerospace Medicine and the Systems Acquisition School to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. As I understand it, the Commission is considering an alternative proposal under which these activities would be cantoned at Brooks.

In terms of military value, consolidation of these activities at Wright-Patt takes advantage of the outstanding aerospace research and

development work already located there, while reducing overall Air Force infrastructure.

Furthermore, the Air Force provided the Commission with its cost analysis on the cantonment proposal and found that while the up-front cost of base closure could be avoided through cantonment, movement of these activities to Wright-Patterson is more cost effective than cantonment because after a 6 year pay back period it produces annual recurring savings in excess of \$20 million. Disapproving a recommendation merely to avoid the up-front costs of base closure seems at odds with the entire base closure process.

A third issue involves the proposed closure of the Springfield Air National Guard Base and the realignment of the 178th Fighter Group, as well as the 251st and 269th Combat

Communications units. Let me first say that a similar recommendation was made in 1993, but the Air Force reversed its position before the Commission when the costs of the move were questioned.

The costs and savings again have been questioned by the local community. According to the local community's cost data, it would take 23 years before the Air Force would obtain a return on its \$30 million investment. Mr. Chairman, that would be a \$30 million investment essentially to walk away from the fully modern taxpayer-purchased facilities at Springfield.

Given the past record on Springfield and the issues that have been raised this year by the local community, I urge the Commission to carefully examine the Air Force's

recommendation.

Finally, I urge the Commission to reconsider its actions with respect to the Youngstown Air Reserve Station. The Commission added this facility to the closure list along with several other C-130 reserve bases. Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of the Air Force recommended closing Youngstown.

Rather, the Air Force recognizes Youngstown's military value and plans to expand the number of C-130 aircraft at Youngstown, making the 910th Airlift Wing the largest C-130 wing in the Air Force Reserve. The 910th also performs the aerial spray mission, the only unit in our military that performs that technically demanding mission and for which unique maintenance facilities

have been constructed.

Youngstown is an extremely modern facility with 86% of its buildings having been constructed or upgraded in the last ten years.

I'll conclude my remarks by noting that the costs associated with closure argue against it. Youngstown has the lowest operating costs of the bases under consideration, but would have among the highest closure costs because more aircraft would have to be relocated and the facilities and training associated with the aerial spray mission would have to be reproduced elsewhere.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Commission and thank you for taking on the difficult task of base closure.

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN ROB PORTMAN
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995

First, I would like to thank the Commission for giving me the opportunity to testify here today with regard to the proposed consolidation of certain activities at Brooks Air Force Base (AFB) in San Antonio and Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio.

Having served in the White House when the first Base Closure and Realignment activities were initiated, I understand how important it is to have a non-political entity like the Commission involved in the closure process. As you all know, the 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act provided for an independent commission to review the closure recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense. I fully support this approach and applaud the Commission for its role in performing the difficult task of downsizing the armed services to meet budgetary requirements while maintaining the readiness and modernization capabilities that make our military force the best in the world. I am here today not to advocate a parochial view, but to urge you to act based on the merits. That, as I see it, is what this Commission is all about. The more your recommendations reflect good decisions on the merits alone, the better the results for our country.

In accordance with BRAC, the Air Force has determined that

it is necessary to reduce its laboratory research facilities in order to carry out its mission in the most thorough and cost-effective manner. To do this, the Secretary of Defense has recommended consolidating the Brooks Air Force Base (AFB) in Texas with the Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio. This decision appears to be consistent with both the long-term force structure plan as well as the selection criteria under the Base Closure and Realignment Act. Indeed, the Air Force has rated Wright-Patterson as a Tier I base, while Brooks was rated as a Tier III base.

Furthermore, the Air Force has indicated that Wright-Patterson and the surrounding area have a sufficient level of qualified personnel, support, and technical facilities to incorporate the activities from Brooks at Wright-Patterson efficiently and effectively. The one-time cost of closure and consolidation should be more than offset by the long-term savings associated with reducing personnel and infrastructure. The Air Force has determined that consolidation will eliminate almost twice as many positions as the cantonment policy suggested by supporters of Brooks. This fact, in addition to the reduction in overhead and other costs, is expected to result in an annual savings of about \$32 million, compared to only \$10.5 million in annual savings associated with cantonment. All of these are Air Force data -- not mine.

The services -- including the Air Force -- have correctly

been given the discretion to determine how to best restructure forces into a more efficient organization while preserving the ability to protect the nation. In this case, they have decided that consolidation will result in the "best" military value for the Air Force. I urge you to consider the merits of the cost-effectiveness of this measure as you review the Air Force recommendation in accordance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act. Sound decisions based on sound policies -- divorced from politics -- will help make your recommendations and the work of this Commission credible and persuasive.

Thank you for letting me say a few words today.

JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.
17TH DISTRICT, OHIO

COMMITTEE:
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE

SUBCOMMITTEES:
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME
TRANSPORTATION,
RANKING DEMOCRAT
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT

COMMITTEE:
SCIENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE:
SPACE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3517

2446 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-5261

125 MARKET STREET
YOUNGSTOWN, OH 44503
(216) 743-1914

5555 YOUNGSTOWN-WARREN ROAD
SUITE 503
NILES, OH 44446
(216) 652-5649

109 WEST 3RD STREET
EAST LIVERPOOL, OH 43920
(216) 385-5921

**TESTIMONY OF THE
HONORABLE JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.
BEFORE THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION'S
CONGRESSIONAL HEARING IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
JUNE 13, 1995**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I want to thank you again for the opportunity you have given me to testify before you on behalf of the Air Force Reserve's 910th Airlift Wing at the Youngstown, Ohio, Municipal Airport. It is my hope that after having heard my testimony and the testimony of others on behalf of the 910th that your panel will find the 910th to be one of the most efficient, cost-effective, and vital Air Force Reserve facilities in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I believe is the intention of the BRAC Commission to close or realign those bases that are deemed to have diminishing military value, low return on investment, and negligible community impact. If that is truly the mission of this panel, then the 910th should be lauded for its success and should not be considered a candidate for closure or realignment. The 910th Airlift Wing has grown and expanded into one of the premier Air Force Reserve units in the United States. In fact, its recent growth and mission has put it on the level of many of the finest active-duty bases in the country.

I have worked diligently during my tenure in Congress to ensure that the 910th continues to grow to meet the requirements that the Department of Defense has

Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.

page 2

asked of it. As a matter of fact, last November I was honored to be present at a commanders call to announce to approximately 500 Reservists in attendance that the 910th had the distinction of being designated a full wing. With the delivery of its sixteenth C-130H aircraft later this year, the 910th will meet that designation.

The 910th also enjoys the continued strong support of the White House and the Air Force because of the vital missions the 910th performs and the Wing's cost-effectiveness. To demonstrate this point, the fiscal year 1996 budget submitted to Congress by the President includes almost \$8 million for additional improvements to be made at the Youngstown Municipal Airport for the 910th. Last May, former Under Secretary of Defense John Deutch even reiterated the Air Force's strong commitment to making the 910th a regional C-130 maintenance facility. Clearly, these improvements are needed to continue the on-going build-up of the mission and infrastructure of the 910th Air Wing.

The mission of the 910th is two-fold: in wartime, it deploys the C-130H in the combat operations of tactical airlift. These operations include low-level infiltration into combat environments, where the aircraft can deliver personnel and materials by airdrop and air-land techniques. In peacetime, the Wing's mission is to direct the organizing, equipping and training of Air Force Reserve aircrews in tactical airlift tactics and techniques. And, as required, the unit will also be available to provide non-military humanitarian assistance. In this capacity, since February of 1993, the 910th Air Wing has provided airlift and personnel for humanitarian flights to war-torn Bosnia.

Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.

Page 3

In January of 1992, the 910th also assumed the responsibility of Aerial Spray Mission for the Department of Defense. This is the Department of Defense's only dedicated aerial spray facility. The mission of the spray facility is to maintain the ability to aeriually dispense liquid pesticides. In this capacity, the 910th has carried out its mission to control insects at military bases around the country and also, at the request of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, conducted spray operations around South Florida in September of 1992 to control mosquitos following Hurricane Andrew.

Since coming to Congress in 1985, I have worked closely with appropriate House committees to ensure that the 910th's needs for fulfilling its missions have been met. I think that by assisting the 910th at the legislative level, the Wing can concentrate on carrying out its mission instead of worrying about whether it has the tools and infrastructure to carry that mission out. In 1991, the 910th received eight new C-130H aircraft to replace aging C-130B aircraft. In that same year, I secured \$1.45 million for a much-needed avionics shop for the 910th. In fiscal years 1992 and 1993, I was able to secure \$240 million for the additional eight aircraft that brought the 910th to full wing status. Also, five new construction and expansion projects were included in the fiscal year 1994 House authorization bill for the Department of Defense.

Most importantly, the 910th has an impressive record of efficiency and fiscal responsibility. The 910 Airlift Group, dollar for dollar, is the best value that the Department of Defense can find. The 910th has always proven itself to be one

Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.

page 4

of the most cost efficient units in the country, and continues to be. However, the 910th's cost efficiency has recently been brought into question for the wrong reasons. To compare an Air Force Reserve unit that has eight planes with one that will have 16 planes and a unique mission is unacceptable. The costs associated with the closing and reassignment of any other C-130 unit in the country is minimal compared to what it would be if the 910th were to be closed. No other unit has an aerial spray unit or short field runway that can be easily shut down and relocated. Simply put, the taxpayers are getting maximum bang for their buck with the 910th.

I again want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before you and the members of the Commission. The Department of Defense and the White House have stated their unequivocal support for the 910th. For this and the reasons I've stated above, I truly believe that it is in the best interests of this nation to keep the 910th Air Wing fully operational.

I will be more than happy to respond to any questions you might have.

DRAFT

OKLAHOMA

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

AIR FORCE:

Oklahoma City ALC (Tinker AFB) Realign

II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

AIR FORCE:


Vance AFB Close
Tinker AFB Close

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City Close

MAP NO. 37

OKLAHOMA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

BILL K. BREWSTER

3D DISTRICT
OKLAHOMA

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3603
(202) 225-4565



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3603

DISTRICT OFFICES:
201 POST OFFICE BUILDING
P.O. BOX 1607
ADA, OK 74820
(405) 436-1980

101 WEST MAIN STREET
ARDMORE, OK 73401
(405) 226-6300

118 CARL ALBERT FEDERAL BUILDING
MCALISTER, OK 74501
(918) 423-5951

123 W. 7TH AVENUE, SUITE 206
STILLWATER, OK 74074
(405) 743-1400

STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE BILL K. BREWSTER
BEFORE THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I appreciate the time and effort each of you have spent to bring this round of the BRAC process to a close. I certainly do not envy your task.

I am here with my Oklahoma colleagues to testify in support of the role Tinker Air Force Base plays in the defense of our country, as well as the important role Tinker plays in the economy of Oklahoma.

Tinker's past record speaks for itself. Tinker has consistently been ranked as one of the Air Force's superior depots. This record has been achieved while working on some of the Air Force's most complex planes, such as the B-52, B-1 and the KC-135. Furthermore, maintenance of the B-2 bomber will soon be under way at Tinker. We in Oklahoma do not understand why a base like Tinker, with its excellent record of performance, could be a target for downsizing. In fact, every entity which has reviewed the situation, except the Pentagon, has recommended the closure of one or more bases less efficient than Tinker. Moreover, I am confident Tinker's capabilities will keep it off any list the commission may propose.

We have now reached a point where the optimal operating levels may be sacrificed if we continue personnel reductions. However, increased savings could be achieved by efficiently utilizing the facility, thereby reducing the overhead expenses per person. By downsizing personnel levels below efficient levels, more overhead costs are born by the remaining workforce. Currently, it costs \$60 per man-hour to operate Tinker. However, if the base were operating at capacity, the cost would be reduced to \$50 per man-hour. The increased operating capacity could be achieved by reassigning work currently being done at other facilities.

Tinker has the excess capacity available to absorb a significant increase in duties. Its potential for sizable growth will allow Tinker to absorb new missions with minimal construction. For example, Tinker once maintained approximately 350 B-52 bombers. The number has now dropped to around 100. As a result of the lower number of B-52s, Tinker has sufficient excess ramp space to absorb up to 5 million man-hours of additional duties without additional construction. The C-5 mission is representative of a mission which Tinker could absorb with minimal additional construction.

The support for Tinker does not end at the base gates. Oklahoma community leaders have long made it a point to work closely with military installation commanders. Likewise, our bases are quick to respond when appropriate. Countless examples may be drawn from situations arising from the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

With exception to the state government, Tinker Air Force Base is the single largest employer in the State of Oklahoma. Employees live in 37 of our state's 77 counties. The positive economic impact on the State of Oklahoma by the base is tremendous. Likewise, the loss of this employment source would be devastating. Tinker's positive impact is not restricted to the Oklahoma City metro area or the state of Oklahoma, but to the Nation as a whole.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NOTES

NOTES

Testimony by
the Honorable Phil English
before
the Base Closure and Realignment Commission
for June 13, 1995

I want to thank the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) for allowing me the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Youngstown/Warren Air Reserve Station that serves the Pennsylvania- Ohio Shenango Valley. I believe that this facility is a significant resource for our national defense.

I cannot claim to be an expert on all aspects of military preparedness, but what I can do is relay to the commission the significance of the air reserve base to the Mercer County community. Over 400 reservists as well as nearly 150 civilian employees from Pennsylvania, work at or otherwise utilize the 910th. The Youngstown Air Reserve Station has become one of the area's largest single employers, and its loss would have serious consequences upon the local community and the regional economy. I believe that one can compare the beneficial impacts of such a base on a local economy to that of a major industry. Individuals' livelihoods are tied to the base's operation and its closure would be a blow to a region that has suffered much recent economic hardship.

But I do not want to speak only on the extent of such a loss. I also want to emphasize the support and initiative of the 910th personnel given to their Air

Reserve Station -- an exceptional operational record recognized regularly by the Department of Defense. I firmly believe that after reviewing the Youngstown Air Reserve Station's military value, its capabilities, and its strong community support, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission will see the merits of its continued service.

Presently, the 910th Airlift Wing consists of two tactical unit's, the 757th Airlift Squadron, the 773rd Airlift Squadron, as well as the Aerial Spray Branch and its supporting units covering all facets of Air Force requirements. It is under the command of the 10th Air Force at the Bergstrom Air Force Base in Texas and the Air Force Reserve Headquarters at the Robins Air Force Base in GA. To briefly describe its size, the Youngstown Air Reserve Station employs nearly 500 people, is utilized by 1100 reservists, sits on 230 acres on the north side of Youngstown- Warren Regional Airport while using a total of 1,303 acres when counting all the facilities used.

The mission of the 910th is two-fold: in wartime, it deploys the C-130H in the combat operations of tactical airlift. These operations include low-level infiltration into combat environments, where the aircraft can deliver personnel and materials by airdrop and air-land techniques. In peacetime, the Wing's mission is to direct the organizing, equipping, and training of Air Force Reserve aircrews in

tactical airlift tactics and techniques. And, as required, the unit will also be available to provide non-military humanitarian assistance. In this capacity, since February of 1993, the 910th Air Wing has provided airlift and personnel for humanitarian flights to wartorn Bosnia.

In January of 1992, the 910th also assumed the responsibility of Aerial Spray Mission for the Department of Defense. This is the Department of Defense's only dedicated aerial spray facility. The mission of the spray facility is to maintain the ability to aerially dispense liquid pesticides. In this capacity, the 910th has carried out its mission to control insects at military bases around the country and also, at the request of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, conducted spray operations around South Florida in September of 1992 to control mosquitos following Hurricane Andrew.

I want to note that as a measure of the base's ambition in fulfilling its mission, just eight months ago, the 910th received the authorization for enough C-130 aircraft to earn it "wing" status. Its complement of C-130 cargo planes was raised to 16, making the 910th the largest C-130 base in the nation. The delivery of the 16th C-130H aircraft later this year will complete its designation as a "wing" and will signify yet another important step forward in the expansion of the 910th.

But this depiction of the military preparedness is only part of the 910th's portrait. The 910th Air Reserve Base is a pillar of support in the Shenango valley. In a region that regularly experiences unemployment rates well above the national average (Mercer county began the year with a 6.2% unemployment figure while the nation averaged 5.7%), the operation of the 910th substantially effects the region's economy. The 910th is the county's largest employer and its operation has a local financial impact of \$30.1 million. When viewed in relation to the recent loss of many large employers and facilities, the placement of the 910th on the BRAC list has brought much distress to the Mercer community. Its closure would be another burden in a region fighting to revive its economy.

Besides the air base's economic strength, the Mercer community has also come to depend heavily on several key capabilities of the Reserve Station. The station provides full time fire/crash rescue capabilities for the Regional Airport and has numerous mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities. Over the past several years, the station has responded with assistance during tornado damage, recovery fuel fires, and numerous automobile accidents. The station also successfully responded to local aircraft crashes in 1981 and more recently in 1995.

I want to finish with what I believe are the 910th Air Wing greatest asset -- the individuals who make the base function so successfully. Besides the

dedication needed to achieve high air force reviews, base personnel actively promote volunteerism and public service. Yearly, the base is open to a 1000 visitors as well as hosts charity events. This demonstration of generosity also extends to such recent humanitarian projects as assisting Mother Teresa and her cause while en-route to Thailand to participate in an exercise. This is but one small facet of an organization depicting the spirit of the men and women who comprise the 910th Ohio-Pennsylvania military community.

Again, I want to thank the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission for the opportunity to testify. The Department of Defense, the White House, Congressional Members from both parties have all come forth to demonstrate their support for the 910th. For this and the reasons I have already stated, I want to urge the commission to reconsider the base's placement on the closure list and to allow the 910th to continue its fine work. I believe that it is in the best interests of this nation to keep the 910th Air Wing fully operational.

**Statement of Congressman George W. Gekas (PA-17)
to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Tuesday, June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

Thank you for the opportunity to present final arguments on behalf of Fort Indiantown Gap. I want to urge each of you to seriously reconsider inclusion of the Gap on the Department of Defense base closure list.

It is not my intention to bore you with the technical specifics and crunched numbers that represent the foundation of my support for Fort Indiantown Gap. These figures are already familiar to you and your staff. Instead, I am including a detailed fact sheet along with my testimony for your review in a more suitable moment.

The argument of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation is a simple one: The Army's analysis of Fort Indiantown Gap is flawed and a corrected analysis requires the Gap be removed from the closure list. The Army has already admitted that their own financial analysis of the dollar savings by closing Fort Indiantown Gap was very flawed and based on very incorrect data. Their latest analysis has required a 75% correction in their figures. I repeat, a 75% correction. And there are still more data errors that they must address. For example, the additional transportation costs for moving training to other posts has not been considered. For the Pennsylvania National Guard alone, it is estimated at \$1.6 million per year. This additional funding will have to come from operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts which will undermine readiness and training.

Another example is the projected \$8 million cost of moving the Army Reserve Equipment Concentration Site to Fort Dix. Also not included is the cost to move the Pennsylvania Guard's equipment site, currently located at Fort Pickett, VA--which is also on the closure list--to another site. This cost will be in excess of \$8 million.

Based solely on the newly configured financial data presented by the Army, it is NOT cost-effective to close the Gap. The Cost Savings argument falls strongly on the side of keeping Fort Indiantown Gap open.

In addition, I want to address the other component in determining Fort Indiantown Gap's status, its military value. I submit to you that the Department of Defense and the Army have failed to consider the following key military aspects of the Gap:

- An air-to-ground bombing and strafing range which is part of a system of low-level flight routes and sits in a large Military Operations Area (MOA), airspace dedicated to military aircraft training and used by all services, Active, Guard and Reserve from thirteen states;

- A 710 square mile maneuver rights area used for Army Aviation Training. The land used for this training was not considered in the analysis of military value since ground maneuver is restricted within most of this area. Unfortunately, this ignores the importance of Army aviation as a component of the modern Army. To not recognize the

(MORE)

June 13, 1995

Page Two

value of this aviation maneuver area flies in the face of current Army maneuver doctrine. When this maneuver area is considered, the military ranking of the Gap in the Major Training Area category increases from ninth out of ten to third out of ten, a huge increase in military value;

- The local needs of reserve component troops;
- The tank crew qualification ranges, unique and non-replicated at any other location; and other aspects of military value detailed in my attachment.

In addition, to further support the case of Fort Indiantown Gap, I present this proven formula of military value and success:

ARMY GUARD/RESERVES + FORT INDIANTOWN GAP + PERSIAN GULF WAR = SUCCESS. I repeat: ARMY GUARD/RESERVES + FORT INDIANTOWN GAP + PERSIAN GULF WAR = SUCCESS. To this proven formula, I offer the Gekas Corollary: MILITARY SUCCESS = MILITARY VALUE. I repeat: MILITARY SUCCESS = MILITARY VALUE.

Fort Indiantown Gap has consistently proven its military value, most notably in one of the larger troop activities of this century, the Persian Gulf War. In this short but intense conflict, Fort Indiantown Gap displayed the high level of military value needed to make Desert Storm a success.

Prior to, and in preparation for the Persian Gulf War, over 2,700 troops were trained at Fort Indiantown Gap. And when those troops got to the field of Desert Storm they "played a key role in our success." My quote? No. Those are the words of General Gus Pagonis, the Chief Logistician during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, who has told me that, "During the Persian Gulf War, 75% of my 22nd Support Command units came from the Guard and Reserve. Fort Indiantown Gap and other mobilization sites were critical to our ability to effectuate their transition from peace to war."

May I also remind the Commission that Fort Indiantown Gap was put on the Base Closure List during the 1991 BRAC round and was taken off that list at the request of DOD! What has changed since then? A huge infusion of money and resources into the Gap has made it a better, more cost efficient and more militarily valuable training facility.

There is no logic, no consistency, no accuracy to the conclusion to close Fort Indiantown Gap. Readiness will not be enhanced and costs savings will never materialize. Keep the Gap open and keep our military in a better, not worse, state of readiness.

(END)

Remove Fort Indiantown Gap from the base closure list!

BRAC 95

Fort Indiantown Gap

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP HAS HIGH VALUE TO ALL OF DOD

DoD Under Estimates The Gap's Value

The data used in the Army's military value analysis does not include some significant training facilities such as tank crew qualification ranges, automated air-to-ground bombing and strafing ranges, and the value of low-level flight routes which lead into a Military Operations Area (MOA) - airspace which is dedicated to military aircraft operations. These facilities all exist at the Gap and significantly contribute to its military value to the DOD, not just the Army.

The Army clearly did not fully understand the complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to the Air Force, Navy, and Marines Corps. In addition, the Army's analysis of military value did not include training conducted by the other services. In fact, the other services were not queried as to their training requirements at the Gap. The Marine Corps Reserves, the Air Force (both active and reserve), the Navy (both active and reserve) all train at the installation and on the bombing and strafing range.

The bombing range is part of an integrated series of ranges in the eastern U.S. The loss of any of them would overload the other ranges and severely degrade the training of the aviation units in the other services, all of which use these ranges.

In addition, international students are trained at the flight simulator complex as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program.

The Army did not consider the Northern Training Area at Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square miles used for Army Aviation training. The Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS), located at the Gap, is the second largest Army aviation training facility in the country. It is a critical part of the Army's overall aviation training program. The land used for this training



THE GAP - AN IMPORTANT DOD POWER PROJECTION PLATFORM

was not considered in the analysis of military value since ground maneuver is restricted within most of this area.

Army aviation is a key component of the three-dimensional maneuver of the modern Army. To not recognize the value of this aviation maneuver area flies in the face of current Army maneuver doctrine. When this maneuver area is considered, the military ranking of the Gap in the Major Training Area category increases from ninth out of ten to third out of ten in the DOD Major Training Area category.

FLAWED AND MISSING DATA MEAN FAULTY CONCLUSIONS

Important Military Data Was Missed

The Army's military value analysis was based on data elements which were specified by the Army and received from all installations. However, the data does include several primary factors relevant to reserve component units: the accessibility to a given training site, the suitability of proposed alternate training sites for specific units and training, and the affordability (additional transportation costs) of moving training to more distant locations.

The Army used an analytical model called TRAINLOAD to determine to which installations reserve component annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in that its results are based on a 12 month availability of reserve component units for annual training. In reality, these units are limited to the May to September time frame due to the 15-20 percent of their soldiers who are in school during the September - May time period. When the annual training period is thus compressed, the proposed alternate training sites (Fort Drum, Fort Dix, and Fort AP Hill) are not able to take the additional training load.

Summary

- 1 Gap's Military Value Under Estimated
- 2 DoD Missed Important Military Data
- 3 Governor To Train Federal Troops?
- 4 Army Overstated Savings and Understated Costs

William J. Coyne

**THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. COYNE
TESTIMONY FOR THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995**

Chairman Dixon, Members of the Commission, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify in support of ensuring that the 911th Airlift Wing is retained as an integral part of our Nation's defense structure. / I am pleased to join with my colleagues from Pennsylvania in setting forth our views on the real and significant benefits the 911th brings to the U.S. Air Force and overall U.S. defense capabilities. /

Today we have sought to provide compelling evidence on the merits of the 911th and have also attempted to provide convincing information on why the original recommendation to close the 911th was unwarranted and ill-considered. / Quite simply, we believe that the original Cost Of Base Realignment

Actions (COBRA) report prepared by the U.S. Air Force was flawed in several key aspects. /

As someone who has been deeply involved with regional efforts to create and retain jobs in the Greater Pittsburgh area, I want to provide in particular some detailed information regarding some of the regional economic issues which were not correctly reflected in the original COBRA report. / I also want to request permission to submit along with my written testimony an economic impact statement prepared by Carnegie Mellon University.

I believe strongly that the Air Force's COBRA report fails to adequately reflect the conditions of the Pittsburgh economy and thus, the cumulative impact of the closing. / Based upon the

economic changes of the last two decades, the Greater Pittsburgh economy is far less capable of absorbing the loss of the 911th Airlift Wing than any other major economic region. This is particularly true in light of the nature of the 701 jobs put at risk by the proposed closure of the 911th. Losing these quality jobs and the \$20,370,255 that the 911th's operations contribute to our economy would bring about a significant economic loss that must be put in context.

The 911th Airlift Wing has played a critical role in stabilizing the Pittsburgh economy in the wake of ongoing economic restructuring. The closure of the base would contribute significantly to the cumulative impact of the continued decline of manufacturing and emerging job losses in the health care industry. Moreover, closure of the base would

weaken business vitality and development in the area surrounding Greater Pittsburgh International Airport. /

The 911th Airlift Wing is an economic asset for the entire Pittsburgh metropolitan statistical area (MSA) The 911th employers workers and procures products in each of the six counties which constitute the Pittsburgh MSA (Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Washington, and Westmoreland). / The COBRA report on employment and income in four of the six counties in the MSA suggested that the Pittsburgh economy has performed better on average than the other base economies. / However a deeper assessment of the performance of the Pittsburgh MSA reveals the importance of the 911th to the region's economic future. /

Between 1970 and 1990, the Pittsburgh region experienced the steepest decline in jobs and population of the top 25 metropolitan regions. The region also experienced a decline in average wages in the same period. The decline of area steel mills was a central factor in both general job loss and the decline of wages as an international restructuring of the steel industry deprived the Pittsburgh region of many above-average wage jobs.

These conditions have only moderately stabilized in the 1990's. For example, in 1993, the region's unemployment rate was .9 percent higher than the average U.S. metropolitan region. This means that the Pittsburgh region had on average 10,000 more unemployed workers than other metropolitan areas.

A critical challenge for the Pittsburgh regional economy is to maintain and expand the number of jobs paying above-average wages -- jobs with salaries above \$27,000 per year. Retaining a strong wage base is essential to the overall health of the region's economy and the maintenance of region's quality of life.

In the 1990's, only one industry with above average wages, the health care industry, has added jobs. The health care industry now faces many of the same pressures for restructuring which the region's manufacturing base faced in earlier decades. Within the last month, one of the region's largest health care employers, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, announced the elimination of 800 jobs.

It is in this context that the 911th is so important. Between 1990 and 1993, the Pittsburgh region had a net job loss of 1,416 jobs with above average wages. The average salary of employees of the 911th is \$34,000. Thus, closing the 911th represents a 16 percent increase in the net above average wage jobs lost in the region in the 1990's. This increased pressure on the region's above average wage job base cannot fail to have a significant impact on general level of economic activity in the Pittsburgh area.

The loss of the 911th would also hinder efforts to establish the area around the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport as one of the region's job growth centers. The 911th represents an important anchor for the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport. Currently, the pace of commercial development

surrounding the airport has not proceeded quickly enough to ensure the economic reuse of the old airport terminal. / Given these development trends, it is highly unlikely that commercial reuse of the 911th base site would occur in the short term. /

Moreover, indirect job loss could be greater than estimated considering the fact that employees at the 911th provide an important market for the cluster of restaurant and entertainment enterprises located in the airport area. /

In summary, the closure of the 911th Airlift Wing will add significantly to the cumulative impact of job and population loss in the Greater Pittsburgh region. / The closure will particularly exacerbate the loss of above average jobs in the Greater Pittsburgh region. / Closure would also deprive the Air Force

Reserve and the Department of Defense a recruiting pool that is without question among the very best in the Nation.

I join with my colleagues from the Pennsylvania Congressional Delegation in requesting the Commission to consider these facts which we believe demonstrate why the 911th should retain its position as one of our Nation's essential military facilities. Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify.

####

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN MIKE DOYLE
BEFORE THE BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995

I want to begin by thanking the Commissioners for holding this hearing, and for offering to myself and others the opportunity to testify before you today. I want to use this opportunity to speak about the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and why it should not be selected for closure and, in fact, should never have been considered for closure.

The Western Pennsylvania Coalition, after identifying multiple errors throughout the data supplied by the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve, determined that a closer look at the grading of the criteria was necessary.

After analyzing these individual errors, it became clear that final rankings of the C-130 bases were affected by these mistakes.

The Coalition then proceeded to evaluate the standings through the Grading and Weighting process used by the Air Force.

Criteria 4 and 5 were evaluated through use of the COBRA program and the results of that analysis will be described in detail by Congressman Mascara in a few minutes.

I am going to focus on Criteria 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8, which were evaluated using raw Air Force scores from their Analysis and Recommendations, Volume 5. The results of our study differed significantly from the Air Force's findings.

Many of the identified errors negatively affected these raw scores. We have focused on three of these errors within this study, which I would like to submit for the record at this time.

First, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station received a low rating for the condition of its airfield pavement. This rating was based upon data that is fourteen years old. A 1994 study, however, rates the pavement's ability as being capable of handling any aircraft in the Air Force inventory.

The second error addressed was the Future Growth ability and the Attainment Status of our air quality. Our installation was graded "Red" for its future growth ability and "Yellow" for attainment status.

The EPA has reviewed Allegheny County's air quality and reached the conclusion contained in the following quote, "... the area attained the ozone standard at this time." Thus, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station has no restrictions on its air quality.

The third error I wish to highlight pertains to the Environmental Impact of this facility. Despite the 911th Airlift Wing's answer to the BRAC questionnaire, it was graded "Red" for wetlands. A 1994 study by GEONEX reports, "...there are no wetlands apparent at your installation."

Underscoring the credibility of our points is the fact that each of these studies was either in progress or were under contract prior to the Air Force BRAC questionnaire process which occurred during the spring of 1994. Supporting data can be found in the appendices of the study that I have submitted for the record.

By eliminating these errors and using the same analysis, Pittsburgh qualifies for the top ranking for Criteria 1, 2, and 8. As you can see, the net effect of these clarifications is quite substantial.

Furthermore, the Coalition recognizes the importance of correct data and accurate assessment of that data for your deliberations. Thus, we also have taken the Air Force's grading system one step further in order to evaluate the criterion's rankings fairly and objectively.

Although there are many ways to accomplish this task, we chose a method that weights each criteria equally and produces a numeric value based upon each of the rankings within each criteria. We believe that this weighted method would yield better results in general, and, using the corrected data, bodes well for Pittsburgh because of its consistent high rankings across the full range of the criteria used by the BRAC.

Commissioners, as you already know, and as this study and the corrected COBRA data clearly show, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should not have been on the Department of Defense's closure list, and certainly should not be selected for closure. I want to conclude my testimony by reiterating my thanks for the opportunity to testify before you today, and by respectfully requesting that you closely examine the empirical data we have supplied. Finally, I want to introduce my friend and colleague, Frank Mascara, who will detail the corrected COBRA data and its positive impact on the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station.

**TESTIMONY OF
CONGRESSMAN FRANK MASCARA
PENNSYLVANIA 20TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT**

**CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995**

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDL LOUISE STEELE

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS:

**I AM HERE TO ADDRESS THE COMMISSION
ON TWO ISSUES.**

**FIRST IS REGARDING THE KELLY SUPPORT
FACILITY IN OAKDALE, PENNSYLVANIA,
AND SECOND THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING.**

**REGARDING THE KELLY FACILITY, THE
ARMY AND THE DOD WERE
RECOMMENDING A SIGNIFICANT
REALIGNMENT. IT IS MY
UNDERSTANDING THAT BECAUSE OF
QUESTIONS FROM THE LOCAL**

COMMUNITY AND FROM THIS COMMISSION, THE ARMY HAS REVIEWED ITS POSITION AND IS SEEKING TO MODIFY ITS ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION.

NOW, THE ARMY IS RECOMMENDING A FAR LESS DRASTIC REALIGNMENT AND IS NOT RECOMMENDING THE CLOSURE OF THE EXCHANGE OR THE COMMISSARY.

IF THE ARMY AND THE DOD HAVE MODIFIED THEIR RECOMMENDATION IN THIS FASHION, THEN I WOULD URGE THE COMMISSION TO APPROVE IT. I BELIEVE THE ARMY REVIEW HAS PROVEN THE WORTH OF THE KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY. IT'S A GREAT FACILITY WITH

**GREAT PEOPLE. IT DOES THE ESSENTIAL
WORK OF LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE
AND IT GETS THE JOB DONE.**

NOW, THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING.

**THE COBRA COST DATA USED TO ARRIVE
AT THE DECISION TO CLOSE THE
PITTSBURGH AIR RESERVE STATION WAS,
QUITE SIMPLY, INCORRECT.**

**SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATIONS EXISTED ON
THREE COUNTS--INCORRECT COST DATA,
PARTIAL-YEAR COST DATA, AND TOTALLY
MISSING COST DATA. SUBSEQUENT
CORRECTED COBRA RUNS BY THE AIR**

**FORCE AND YOUR OWN BRAC ANALYSTS
HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED
THAT PITTSBURGH IS THE MOST COST
EFFECTIVE BASE AMONG C-130
INSTALLATIONS ON CIVILIAN AIRFIELDS.**

**THE ORIGINAL COBRA ANALYSES ALSO
FAILED TO CONSIDER SAVINGS BENEFITS
FROM MILCON COST AVOIDANCE. OF THE
6 INSTALLATIONS AT CIVILIAN AIRFIELDS,
PITTSBURGH HAS THE LOWEST
PROJECTED MILCON OVER THE COBRA
ANALYSIS PERIOD. BY CONTRAST,
ANOTHER CONSIDERED BASE HAS
PROJECTED MILCON 775% GREATER THAN**

**PITTSBURGH--MONEY THAT WOULD
LARGELY BE SPENT TO NEEDLESSLY
DUPLICATE CAPABILITIES ALREADY**

**2 AVAILABLE AT PITTSBURGH. WE BELIEVE
THAT AIR FORCE-GENERATED COBRA
DATA CONTINUES TO SERIOUSLY
UNDERSTATE MILCON COST AVOIDANCE
AT SOME BASES. I AM PRESENTING
CORRECTED WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA
COALITION COBRA SCENARIOS RESULTS
WHICH MOST ACCURATELY REFLECT THE
TIME COMPARISON FIGURES (DATA
WHICH BY THE WAY IS AGREED WITH BY
YOUR OWN BRAC STAFF.)**

AS YOU HEARD CONGRESSMAN KLINK SO CORRECTLY EXPLAIN, THE AIR FORCE RESERVE PRESENTLY ENJOYS MILITARY BENEFITS AND SPECIAL FACILITIES AT THE PITTSBURGH AIR RESERVE STATION THAT DO NOT NOW EXIST AND CANNOT BE DUPLICATED ELSEWHERE WITHOUT ENORMOUS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COST. PITTSBURGH ALREADY HAS THE ASSETS NEEDED TO EXPAND ITS MISSION AT NO COST TO THE UNITED STATES.

THESE EXPANSION CAPABILITIES INCLUDE ADDITIONAL EXISTING CONCRETE RAMP SPACE AND ACREAGE ON THE INSTALLATION, HIGH CAPACITY TARMAC

3 AT THE ADJACENT AND ABANDONED PASSENGER TERMINAL. IN ALL, AIR FORCE ASSESSMENTS OF MILITARY VALUE, PITTSBURGH RATES AT OR NEAR THE TOP.

IN SUMMARY, COMMISSIONERS, WHEN CORRECTED COBRA RESULTS, MILITARY VALUE, EXPANSION CAPABILITY, RECRUITING, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT ARE CONSIDERED, PITTSBURGH IS, WITHOUT QUESTION, THE LEAST FAVORABLE CLOSURE CANDIDATE AMONG C-130 BASES. THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE

**COMMISSION'S HYPOTHESIS AT THE ADD
ON HEARINGS--FURTHER DISCOVERY,
INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS SINCE
THEN HAS CONVINCINGLY VALIDATED
THIS CONCLUSION. MOST RECENTLY, THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, SHEILA
WIDNALL, ANNOUNCED IN A LETTER TO
CHAIRMAN DIXON THAT "INACTIVATION
OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE C-130 UNIT
AT O'HARE INSTEAD OF THE C-130 UNIT
AT PITTSBURGH IS A REASONALBE
ALTERNATIVE." CONSIDERING THE FACTS
IN PITTSBURGH'S FAVOR AND THE
CHANGE IN THE AIR FORCE'S POSITION
REGARDING THE CLOSURE OF THE 911TH,**

**THE PITTSBURGH AIR RESERVE STATION
SHOULD REMAIN OPEN!**

ACRONYMS

COBRA-Cost of Base Realignment Action

BOS-Base Operating Support

COMM-Communications

RPMA-Real Property Maintenance Account

DBRAC-Defense Base Realignment and Closure

HQ USAF/RT-Headquarters United States Air Force

NPV-Net Present Value

ROI-Return On Investment

MILCON-Military Construction Budget

**AIR FORCE COBRAS WITH FY91-94 AVERAGE NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD COSTS
ERRONEOUSLY OMITTED FY91-94 RPMA FROM PEC 55394**

AIR FORCE COBRA SCENARIOS			
[XXX14301.CBR]			
Averaging FY91-94 Non-Payroll Overhead Costs (BOS,COMM,RPMA)			
per DBRAC Request 950517-2 and HQ USAF/RT Response dated 25 May 1995			
BASE	NPV thru 2015 (\$K)	ROI Years	Steady-State (\$K)
MINI-ST. PAUL	(180,049)	1999	(14,477)
NIAGARA	(196,419)	1998	(15,157)
PITTSBURGH	(196,889)	1998	(14,871)
O'HARE	(204,271)	1999	(16,273)
YOUNGSTOWN	(211,301)	1998	(15,791)
MILWAUKEE	(223,379)	1998	(16,831)
W. PA COALITION COBRA SCENARIOS			
[XXX-RPMA.CBR]			
CORRECTED to Include FY 91 & 92 Non-Payroll RPMA costs from PEC 55394:			
[Erroneously omitted from Air Force RPMA Averages]			
BASE	NPV thru 2015 (\$K)	ROI Years	Steady-State (\$K)
MINI-ST. PAUL	(183,684)	1999	(14,666)
	Rank: 1		Rank: 1
PITTSBURGH	(198,673)	1998	(14,998)
	Rank: 2		Rank: 2
O'HARE	(215,217)	1998	(17,058)
	Rank: 3		Rank: 5
NIAGARA	(216,974)	1998	(16,631)
	Rank: 4		Rank: 4
YOUNGSTOWN	(219,012)	1998	(16,344)
	Rank: 5		Rank: 3
MILWAUKEE	(238,769)	1998	(17,935)
	Rank: 6		Rank: 6
fix91-94.xls			
6/5/95			

FY91-94 NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD COSTS							
PEC Codes	PITT	O'HARE	MILW	MINI-ST.P	NIAG	Y-TOWN	
FY 1991:							
RPMA PEC 55394	2,607.0	3,388.9	4,028.6	2,281.0	4,510.8	3,114.9	
Minor Const PEC 55376	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
RPM&R PEC 55378	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
RPMA Subtotal	2,607.0	3,388.9	4,028.6	2,281.0	4,510.8	3,114.9	
Comm 55395	1,048.3	139.0	2,292.5	810.9	390.6	252.4	
BOS 55396	979.6	1,122.9	2,886.6	786.9	2,625.0	886.4	
FY 1991 Total	4,634.9	4,650.8	9,207.7	3,878.8	7,526.4	4,253.7	
FY 1992:							
RPMA PEC 55394	2,582.8	3,143.0	2,493.4	3,396.4	4,920.6	2,968.6	
Minor Const PEC 55376	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
RPM&R PEC 55378	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
RPMA Subtotal	2,582.8	3,143.0	2,493.4	3,396.4	4,920.6	2,968.6	
Comm 55395	299.2	502.9	296.0	1,337.4	346.6	257.4	
BOS 55396	768.5	693.8	822.6	711.1	1,993.3	644.6	
FY 1992 Total	3,650.5	4,339.7	3,612.0	5,444.9	7,260.5	3,870.6	
FY 1993:							
RPMA PEC 55394	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	
Minor Const PEC 55376	596.7	0.0	338.7	479.3	376.1	758.2	
RPM&R PEC 55378	1,733.5	1,259.6	556.7	2,590.7	1,244.4	1,405.7	
RPMA Subtotal	2,330.2	1,259.6	895.4	3,070.0	1,620.5	2,164.0	
Comm 55395	385.7	407.5	2,013.0	1,337.6	567.0	221.4	
BOS 55396	1,817.3	4,279.0	2,022.1	1,624.5	5,486.7	1,974.0	
FY 1993 Total	4,533.2	5,946.1	4,930.5	6,032.1	7,674.2	4,359.4	
FY 1994:							
RPMA PEC 55394	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Minor Const PEC 55376	1,319.3	461.0	647.6	744.8	258.8	780.4	
RPM&R PEC 55378	1,024.9	1,672.3	563.9	1,103.1	1,653.7	926.1	
RPMA Subtotal	2,344.2	2,133.3	1,211.5	1,847.9	1,912.5	1,706.5	
Comm 55395	478.8	303.7	1,415.9	1,467.6	765.1	193.9	
BOS 55396	1,803.7	3,184.9	2,008.9	2,050.1	5,773.4	1,637.2	
FY 1994 Total	4,626.7	5,621.9	4,636.3	5,365.6	8,451.0	3,537.6	
4-Year Avg:							
RPMA PEC 55394	1,297.5	1,633.0	1,630.5	1,419.4	2,357.9	1,520.9	
Minor Const PEC 55376	479.0	115.3	246.6	306.0	158.7	384.7	
RPM&R PEC 55378	689.6	733.0	280.2	923.5	724.5	583.0	
RPMA Subtotal	2,466.1	2,481.2	2,157.2	2,648.8	3,241.1	2,488.5	
RPMA 4-Year Average	2,466.1	2,481.2	2,157.2	2,648.8	3,241.1	2,488.5	
Comm 4-Year Avg 55395	553.0	338.3	1,504.4	1,238.4	517.3	231.3	
BOS 4-Year Avg 55396	1,342.3	2,320.2	1,935.1	1,293.2	3,969.6	1,285.6	
4-Yr Avg Total	4,361.3	5,139.6	5,596.6	5,180.4	7,728.0	4,005.3	
PECs 76 + 76 Only	2,337.2	1,696.5	1,053.5	2,459.0	1,766.5	1,935.2	
Air Force COBRA Inputs:							
RPMA Subtotal	2,337.0	1,696.0	1,053.0	2,459.0	1,767.0	1,935.0	
Comm 55395	553.0	338.0	1,604.0	1,238.0	517.0	231.0	
BOS 55396	1342	2320	1935	1293	3970	1286	
COBRA Total	4,232.0	4,354.0	4,592.0	4,990.0	6,254.0	3,452.0	
Actual/COBRA RPMA (%)	105.5%	146.3%	204.9%	107.7%	183.4%	128.6%	
NOTES:							
[1] All figures are from Air Force-generated spreadsheet and COBRA Runs transmitted via HQ USAF/RT letter dated 25 May 1995 in response to DBRAC (Cirillo) letter dated May 16, 1995 (#950517-2).							
[2] COMM and BOS COBRA Figures Agree with 4-Year Average; however RPMA Figures do not agree.							
[3] RPMA PEC Code changed from 55394 for FY91 and FY92 to 55376/55378 for FY93 and FY94.							
[4] Air Force Failed to include FY91 and 92 RPMA (PEC 55394) in their 4-year Average RPMA calculations.							

**Senator Abraham's Testimony before the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
12 June 1995**

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,

Thank you for the opportunity to once again discuss the impact of the Base Realignment and Closure process on the State of Michigan. In my testimony before this Commission in Chicago, I raised serious concerns over the methodology and data used by the Department of the Army in proposing to close the Selfridge Army Garrison and the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant. Since that time, the Army has done little to alleviate those concerns. I still believe the Army's proposals are poorly developed and unwarranted. Therefore, I strongly recommend you reject the Army's proposals to close the Selfridge Army Garrison and the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant.

On 21 May, the Army attempted to respond to our original concerns by completing a second run of its closure cost computer model. As a result, they claimed the Department of Defense would still save almost \$7.3 million per year, and that there would be an immediate return on the investment. I believe both assumptions are wrong.

First, I believe the Department of Defense will not save any money by closing the Selfridge Army Garrison. The Army claims the recurring Base Operations Support and miscellaneous costs will be only \$3.2 million per year. However, non-housing base operations expenses for the Garrison were over \$10.1 million in fiscal year 1994, a difference of \$6.9 million. The only way the Army could realize such significant reductions is by a wholesale elimination of the support it provided. This, however, will not happen.

The Army cannot assume that the need for such support services will miraculously disappear. The military personnel at the Garrison make up less than 1/10th of 1% of the total Selfridge base military population, but provide almost all of the base operation, housing and morale support services. If the Garrison closes, the other units at the base will have to pick up the tab for the support the Garrison previously provided.

A 16 May Base Realignment and Closure Cost Estimate Validation Study, conducted by the Michigan Air National Guard's 127th Fighter Wing, and validated by every Commander at Selfridge save the Garrison, concluded that the other units will still have to fund over \$10.8 million in operation and maintenance costs after the Garrison leaves.

Now do not think that the remaining units at Selfridge can move elsewhere. Nowhere has the Department of Defense proposed moving or eliminating any units at Selfridge besides the Garrison. In fact, it proposed adding additional units to the base, namely the Marine Wing Support Group 47. Your Commission is charged with ensuring the current military base structure supports the total military force structure. I believe it is clear the planned military force structure is based upon the continued existence of Selfridge Air National Guard Base and all its tenant units. The current force level requirements assume the continuation of all Selfridge activities at Selfridge. These forces will require the infrastructure services provided by the Army Garrison.

The Army's most recent analysis is also lacking in its consideration of off-base housing costs. Although the Army now recognizes that the closing of the Selfridge housing will evict the current tenants, they continue to grossly underestimate off-base housing costs at \$1.286 million per year. 692 families currently reside in the Selfridge housing. Given these current Department of Defense residents and the amount they would be provided in Basic Allowance for Quarters and Variable Housing Allowance, the total annual costs would be almost \$4.8 million, a difference of just under \$3.5 million per year.

Last, the Army's calculations for salary savings are not correct. The Army has not changed its data since I pointed out in Chicago that the more than \$3.5 million in annual civilian and military salary savings are based on average salaries that are 50-100% above the actual averages. The fact remains that the Army is claiming \$2.3 million more in salary savings than would otherwise be indicated.

The bottom line is that the Army continues to consistently overstate the prospective savings, consistently understate the prospective costs, and grossly overlook vital economic impact data. The Army expects to realize a net annual savings of \$7.291 million by 1998. However, with the information I have presented here, the Army has underestimated continuing annual base operation and support expenses by \$7.2 million, underestimated housing costs by \$3.5 million per year, and overestimated salary savings by \$2.3 million per year. Given these costs, I estimate the Department of Defense will actually spend \$5.7 million a year more with the Garrison closed than if it were to continue to rely on the Garrison to provide these vital services, and never realize a return on its investment.

Because much of this information has not changed since my testimony in Chicago, I have enclosed an annotated copy of that statement with my remarks today. Furthermore, I commend to you the study by the 127th Fighter Wing on this proposal, and recommend you study it closely. I understand Commissioner Cox and your staff have already been provided copies of this cogent study.

I would like to close today by commenting on the Army's other proposal to close the Detroit Army Tank Plant. Not much has changed since the Chicago hearings, but I think it is important to reemphasize two salient points. First, the Army claims no jobs will be lost by this proposal. However, the Tank-Automotive Command wrote to me on 27 March, "If the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant closed, 149 General Dynamics Land Systems employees will be laid off." Furthermore, the Tank-Automotive Command staff informed me that 41 Defense Logistic Agency personnel support the production at the Plant, and their positions would likewise be eliminated.

Second, there appears to be a wide disparity between the analysis and the actual impact of such a move. Given that the cost of moving the Tank Plant's equipment in the BRAC 91 process was around \$135-\$150 million, I do not believe the full cost of this proposal has been considered.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I believe the analysis used to justify these proposals is still insufficient. I repeat my belief that the savings expected have been consistently overstated, the costs incurred consistently understated, and vital economic impact data grossly overlooked. I do not believe these proposals have been fully developed, and are not in the best interests of the US Army or the Department of Defense. I therefore make my strongest petition that you not accept these proposals by the Department of Defense.

Thank you.

Statement of Senator Spencer Abraham
to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
Regional Hearings, Chicago, Illinois

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,

I thank you for this opportunity to discuss the impact of the Base Realignment and Closure process on the State of Michigan. I have serious concerns about the process by which these proposals were developed, and I do not believe the interests of the taxpayer, the Department of Defense, nor the State of Michigan are served by their execution. I recommend you not adopt these recommendations and preserve these installations for the militarily necessary purpose they serve.

Let me first address the proposal to close the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Support Activity (TACOMSA) at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. In my view, Selfridge is unique to the US military as a facility that supports all five uniformed services in addition to the National Guard. Although I could expound on the military utility of Selfridge, the base as a whole is not slated for closure, only TACOMSA. To that end, I wish to focus attention on the issues I believe have not been fully addressed by this proposal.

First, the Army suggests the closure is justified because TACOMSA "exists primarily to provide housing activities (predominately Detroit Arsenal) located in the immediate area although such support can be provided through a less costly alternative." Specifically, "commercial housing . . . on the local economy for military personnel using Variable Housing Allowance/Basic Allowance for Quarters" and that "closure avoids the cost of continued operation and maintenance of unnecessary support facilities."¹ Mr. Chairman, I disagree with both of those findings.

The proposal notes that TACOMSA housing is only 35% occupied², and that moving the service families into the local economy will save over \$4.8 million per year.³ However, I believe absent is an accounting for the other service families living in TACOMSA housing. It is true Army personnel only occupy 35% of the total housing available. But due to Selfridge's joint nature, Navy, Marine Corps, Air

¹ Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. III, Department of the Army, Analyses and Recommendations (March 1995), p. 153.

² Calculation derived from 965 housing units (Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. I, Department of the Army, Installation Narrative (March 1995), p. 153), and 357 Army families and unaccompanied (from Colonel King, Civil Engineer, 127th Fighter Wing, Memo of 14 March, p. 1), for a 36.99% occupancy rate. Also, The US Army Tank-Automotive Command Support Activity (TACOMSA): Fact Sheets and Items of Interest, p. 2, states Army occupancy is 35%.

³ Calculation from COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 112. Calculation was line item "RECURRING NET--FAM HOUSE OPS" of -\$6.063 million, minus "RECURRING NET--MIL PERSONNEL--House Allow" of \$1.282 million, plus "RECURRING NET--OTHER--Misc Recur" of \$.056 million for a total of \$4.837 million.

Force and National Guard service families bring the total occupancy above 95%.⁴ Furthermore, because of the housing appropriation process, the Army is not reimbursed by the other military services for their personnel occupying Army housing. So although such a move may reduce Army expenditures, total Department of Defense expenditures will not be considerably less. Let me focus attention on these specific numbers.

The suggested savings to the Army is over \$6.063 million per year in family housing operations costs.⁵ However, TACOMSA Army Family Housing costs as provided by the TACOMSA staff, are \$5.4557 million per year.⁶ 692 families currently occupy TACOMSA housing units. With the elimination of the two TACOMSA military billets, moving the 690 military families into the local economy will cost \$5.575 million per year, an increase of almost \$120,000 per year.⁷ What is less consistent in these calculations is that the annual operating costs have apparently been overstated by over a half a million dollars⁸, while the annual costs of housing the service families on the economy were understated by \$4.293 million.⁹ In short, I believe the Federal Government may spend more money by moving the service families at Selfridge onto the economy.

TACOMSA provides much more, however, than just on-base housing. Because the National Guard does not usually provide morale, welfare, and recreation or family support services unless specifically authorized by Congress, TACOMSA, as the tenant regular military command, has provided these functions at Selfridge. TACOMSA is singularly responsible for the operation and administration of all morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities and facilities, while it also provides the maintenance and base support for all non-operational facilities on base. To my knowledge, 60-65% of all TACOMSA work is to support

⁴ Calculation derived from 720 habitable housing units (Commanding Officer, TACOMSA, conversation with Richard Fieldhouse, Legislative Assistant to Senator Carl Levin, 6 April 1995) and 692 total housing military sponsors (Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.). Actual rate is 95.83%.

⁵ COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 112. Actual figure is line item "RECURRING NET--FAM HOUSE OPS" on page 3 of 3 of the Total Appropriations Detail Report.

⁶ FY 94 Army Family Housing (AFH) obligations provided by Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.

⁷ Based upon a monthly BAQ/VHA expenditure of \$464,603 given current occupants, this equates to an annual BAQ/VHA expenditure of \$5,575,236. Data provided by Mr. Jerry Porpour, Housing Manager, TACOMSA.

⁸ Calculation derived from COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, page 2 of 3, line item "RECURRINGSAVES--FAM HOUSE OPS" of \$6.063 million minus the TACOMSA FY 94 obligations of \$5.4557 million (Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994), equals \$.6073 million.

⁹ Total DoD and Coast Guard BAQ/VHA payments for evicted service families of \$5.575 million (footnote 7) minus the COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, page 2 of 3, line item "RECURRINGCOSTS--MIL PERSONNEL--House Allow" of \$1.282 million, equals \$4.293 million.

these non-housing facilities such as the Exchange, the Commissary, and the clubs.¹⁰

But the closing of TACOMSA would not necessarily mean the closing of these facilities. Although the military families would move off-base, they would still be assigned in and around Selfridge. Correspondingly, the need for the support services TACOMSA has supported and maintained may still be needed. It does not matter if TACOMSA provides that support, the fact of the matter is, some Department, Agency or organization will be needed to provide that support. Therefore, the proposed savings of almost \$1.4 million dollars annually in operations and maintenance and \$2.806 million annually in civilian salaries, would evaporate. Such functions as the woodcraft shop or the Boy Scouts may cease, but the need for maintenance on the exchange and commissary, or the administration of such core MWR functions as the fitness center and the clubs will continue.

This highlights the inconsistency of the COBRA cost model data with the savings claims. The proposal narrative states 57 military¹¹ and 555¹² civilian/contractor positions will be eliminated. The COBRA Realignment Summary, however, states 19 military and 61 civilian positions will be eliminated, while 268 military and 81 civilian positions are realigned.¹³ From these reductions, over \$2.8 million in civilian salaries will be saved annually, while \$735,000 will be saved annually in military salaries.¹⁴ This equates to an average civilian salary of \$46,000¹⁵, and an average enlisted military salary of \$31,000¹⁶, both 50-100% above

¹⁰ CO, TACOMSA conversation with Richard Fieldhouse, 6 April 1994.

¹¹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense News Release No. 095-95, 28 February, 1995, cites losing 54 military personnel, while subsequent conversation between LCOL Dave Reed of US Army Legislative Liaison and Robert Carey of the Office of Senator Abraham cited 57 military personnel. Furthermore, The Army Basing Study, BRAC 95 Alternative Documentation Set (Alternative No. CA15-1Q): Section II, Personnel Organization and Data, Active Army Base Military Grade Distribution, US Army Garrison, Selfridge, SAMAS data as of 16 May 1994, printed 15 August 1994, states TACOMSA has 58 officers as FY 94, and will have 60 as of FY 2000.

¹² Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense News Release No. 095-95, 28 February, 1995.

¹³ COBRA Realignment Summary, p. 1 of 2, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 109. Actual figure from line items "POSITIONS ELIMINATED--Off" [4 personnel], and "POSITIONS ELIMINATED--Enl" [15 personnel].

¹⁴ COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report, p. 2 of 3, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Vol. IV, Department of the Army, COBRA Reports (March 1995), p. 111. Line items are "RECURRINGSAVES--MIL PERSONNEL--Off Salary" [\$272 thousand] and ". . .--Enl Salary" [\$463 thousand]. Also, "RECURRINGSAVES--O&M--Civ Salary" [\$2.806 million].

¹⁵ \$2.806 million divided by 61 personnel.

¹⁶ \$463 thousand divided by 15 enlisted is \$30.87 thousand annual salary.

the average.¹⁷ This also overlooks the fact that TACOMSA only has 20 military personnel assigned.¹⁸

The aforementioned illustrates how the TACOMSA proposal appears incomplete. In my investigations, I have not found any indication that the other services were advised of this proposal, nor was their opinion considered. Furthermore, the claims in the proposal narrative do not follow through in the COBRA cost accounting, while the COBRA cost assumptions do not match the actual costs experienced at Selfridge. By my estimation, the Federal Government would not save any money in housing costs¹⁹, but would continue to spend upwards of \$7 million per year for base operations and maintenance and \$2.5 million per year for MWR activities.²⁰ I further believe that the Federal Government would only save these expenditures by the elimination of Selfridge, a proposal that has not been put forth by the National Guard.

I understand these figures I've presented today, calculated from actual TACOMSA data, do not correspond to the COBRA Total Appropriations Detail Report by either line item or amount. My staff, in close coordination with the staffs of my Michigan delegation colleagues, have found these inconsistencies throughout the proposal's analysis. I therefore request that your staff fully analyze the source for the proposal's data, the process by which it was calculated, and the conclusions to which it came. I believe that you will find TACOMSA to be cost-effective and militarily justified.

I also wish to discuss the Army's proposal to close the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant. The proposal narrative asserts there would be no impact as no military or civilian personnel currently work at the facility. However, the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, the Tank Plant's parent command, states 41 Defense Logistic Agency personnel, two Army military, and 149 General Dynamics Land System contractor personnel work in the facility producing gun mounts and related

¹⁷ Given the enlisted breakdown provided by The Army Basing Study, BRAC 95 Alternative Documentation Set (Alternative No. CA15-1Q): Section II, Personnel Organization and Data, Active Army Base Military Grade Distribution, US Army Garrison, Selfridge, SAMAS data as of 16 May 1994, printed 15 August 1994, 2% E-9 (assumed averaging over 20 years of service), 9% E-8 (over 18), 14.3% E-7 (over 12), 21% E-6 (over 8), 24% E-5 (over 6), 21% E-4 (over 4), and 7% E-3 (over 2), an average enlisted salary was calculated to be \$21,528 vice the \$31,000 used in the COBRA model.

The average civilian salary at TACOMSA, as provided by Mark Opatik of the Resource Management Division of TACOMSA is \$33,000 for 69 civilian positions. The average non-appropriated fund activity personnel salary at TACOMSA, as provided by Al Bird, Director of Community and Family Activities at TACOMSA, is \$10,790 for approximately 140 positions. From over \$3.81 million in total civilian expenditures for 209 personnel, this averages to about \$18,200 per year, vice the \$46,000 used in the COBRA model.

¹⁸ Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.

¹⁹ Footnote 7.

²⁰ Total TACOMSA operating costs (as provided by Resource Management Office, TACOMSA, TACOMSA FY 94 Roll-Up Budget Data, ca. 4 November 1994.) of \$16.015 million, minus \$5.4557 million in Army Family Housing, \$1.2216 million from the Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) spent on Army Family Housing (35%), and \$1.6808 million in SERV AIR labor cost reductions (again, assuming 40% on housing), for a net operating cost of \$7.6569. Additionally, FY 94 Appropriated MWR Facility costs are \$2.4769 million per year.

parts for the M1 tank²¹. Furthermore, the Tank-Automotive Command declared to me on 27 March, "If the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant (DATP) closes, 100% of the gun mounts would be produced by Rock Island Arsenal (RIA). It would not be cost effective to move the equipment when the capability to produce the required 10 per month (or less) currently exists at RIA. If DATP closed, 149 General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) employees will be laid off."²²

There appears to be a wide disparity between the analysis and the actual impact of such a move. Given that the cost of moving the Tank Plant's equipment in the BRAC 91 process was around \$135-\$150 million²³, I do not believe the efficacy or the full cost of this proposal has been fully considered. What is also of concern is the apparent resignation to accept Rock Island Arsenal as the sole source supplier of these tank parts, when Department of Defense policy is clearly to encourage private sector production over public agency production²⁴.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I believe the analysis used to justify these proposals is insufficient. I believe the savings expected have been consistently overstated, the costs incurred consistently understated, and vital economic impact data grossly overlooked. I do not believe these proposals have been fully developed, and are not in the best interests of the US Army or the Department of Defense. I therefore make my strongest petition that you not accept these proposals by the Department of Defense.

Thank you.

²¹ Bob Kaspari, Comptroller, Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 1995, Brief to Robert Carey of the Office of Senator Abraham (10 March 1995), p. 3.

²² D. R. Newbury, Acting Deputy to the Commander, Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, letter to Robert H. Carey, Jr., Office of Senator Abraham (27 March 1995).

²³ Defense Week, 30 May 1989, p. 9; Chad Selweski, The Macomb Daily, 12 August 1989; and Bill King, The Source Newspaper, 22 January 1990, pp. C-1, C-8.

²⁴ OMB Circular A-76 (Revised).

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM HOLDEN
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995

GOOD AFTERNOON, COMMISSIONER'S. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU ON MATTERS RELATING TO FORT INDIANTOWN GAP AND TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT. FIRST, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, THE ARMY'S FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SAVINGS WAS BASED ON BAD DATA AND FLAWED ANALYSIS RESULTING IN A SERIOUS OVER-ESTIMATION OF THE PROJECTED SAVINGS. THE ARMY, USING MORE ACCURATE DATA FROM THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION, REVISED ITS ANNUAL PROJECTED SAVINGS DOWN FROM \$23 MILLION TO \$6.7 MILLION- ADMITTEDLY A 75% ERROR AND CORRECTION. USING ACTUAL EXPENDITURE FIGURES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ON-HAND CIVILIANS, AS OPPOSED TO THOSE AUTHORIZED BUT NOT FUNDED, AND ACTUAL REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE DATA, THE ANNUAL COST SAVINGS IS ONLY \$2.3 MILLION.

THE ARMY'S FINAL \$6.7 MILLION ANNUAL SAVINGS IS FURTHER UNDERMINED IN THAT THEY DID NOT INCLUDE ALL THE COSTS IN THEIR ANALYSIS AND ONLY THE COSTS OF MOVING ACTIVE COMPONENTS UNITS AND FUNCTIONS WERE CONSIDERED. THEIR IGNORING THE COST OF MOVING THE US ARMY RESERVE EQUIPMENT CONCENTRATION SITE TO FT DIX AND THE COST TO MOVE THE PENNSYLVANIA GUARD'S EQUIPMENT SITE CURRENTLY LOCATED AT FT PICKETT, VIRGINIA TO ANOTHER SITE IS A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

SIGNIFICANTLY, THE ARMY HAS SERIOUSLY UNDER-ESTIMATED THE GAP'S MILITARY VALUE IN A NUMBER OF OTHER WAYS.

THE ARMY CLEARLY DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITY AND VALUE OF THE AVIATION ASPECTS OF THE GAP TO THE AIR FORCE, NAVY AND MARINES CORPS. IN FACT, THE OTHER SERVICES WERE NOT EVEN QUESTIONED AS TO THEIR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AT THE GAP. THE MARINE CORPS RESERVES, THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY ALL TRAIN AT THE INSTALLATION AND ON THE BOMBING AND STRAFING RANGE, A NATIONAL ASSET WHICH IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO REPLACE.

NOT INCLUDED WAS THE NORTHERN TRAINING AREA AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, A MANEUVER RIGHTS AREA OF 710 SQUARE MILES USED FOR ARMY AVIATION TRAINING.

TANK QUALIFICATION RANGES (TANK TABLE VIII) WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN THE ARMY'S ANALYSIS OF MILITARY VALUE. THE ARMY WANTS TO SHIFT TRAINING TO FORT DIX AND AP HILL, NEITHER OF WHICH CAN SUPPORT TANK QUALIFICATION GUNNERY.

THE ARMY DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF RESERVE COMPONENT SCHOOLS, THE RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS, AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE ASSIGNED TO THE GAP. NONE OF THE SEVEN SCHOOLS, THE ASSIGNED RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS, AND THE AVIATION AND GROUND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ARE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THE GAP UPON CLOSURE. THE ACTIVE ARMY IS ATTEMPTING TO PASS THE COSTS OF RUNNING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE POST TO THE STATE. THEREBY, THE STATE WOULD BE IN THE BUSINESS OF SUBSIDIZING THE TRAINING OF FEDERAL TROOPS, A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH CLEARLY SHOULD REMAIN WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

THE ARMY ANALYSIS DETERMINED RESERVE COMPONENT ANNUAL TRAINING COULD BE MOVED. THIS ANALYSIS IS FLAWED IN THAT ITS RESULTS ARE BASED ON A 12 MONTH AVAILABILITY OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS AND THAT THE PROPOSED ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES ARE NOT ABLE TO ACCOMODATE THE ADDITIONAL TRAINING LOAD.

THIS IMPACT OF AN INCREASED TRAINING LOAD ON THE ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES WAS NOT PART OF THE ARMY'S ANALYSIS. THE AFFECTED INSTALLATIONS WERE NOT CONSULTED. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FORT DRUM HAVE TOLD THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION: (1) THEY ARE ALREADY SATURATED FOR ANNUAL TRAINING, AND (2) THE INCREASED TRAINING LOAD WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT RANGE AND TRAINING FACILITY MAINTENANCE AND INCREASE EXISTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN TRAINING AREAS.

TWO OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES ARE UNSUITABLE FOR THE REQUIRED KIND OF TRAINING. THE ARMY ERRED IN THAT THE PROPOSED SITES CANNOT MEET ALL EXISTING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITS WHICH CURRENTLY TRAIN AT THE GAP.

GIVEN THE TOTALITY OF THESE ERRORS AND OMISSIONS IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARMY SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM THE DOD SELECTION CRITERIA AND AS A RESULT OF ITS HIGHER THAN ESTIMATED MILITARY VALUE TO ALL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE CLOSURE LIST.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly turn your attention to the Tobyhanna Army Depot.

I urge you and the Commission members to accept the recommendation of the

Secretary of Defense and keep Tobyhanna open because it is an outstanding facility.

Tobyhanna offers the highest military value and is very cost effective.

Tobyhanna is a truly valuable military asset to the Department of Defense which should be retained.

Tobyhanna is a great bargain for the taxpayers and its modern facilities provide great potential for interservicing agreements. The state-of-the art facilities and highly skilled workforce at Tobyhanna provide an outstanding opportunity for the communications and electronics work from the other services to be consolidated as part of interservicing agreements. In today's modern digitized battlefield, the high-tech facilities at Tobyhanna are critical to our national security.

Pennsylvanians have always answered the call to duty, but the proposed cuts in BRAC '95 would have an unfair and drastic effect on the Commonwealth.

I deeply appreciate your consideration in this matter and ask that you remove Fort Indiantown Gap and Tobyhanna from the BRAC list. Thank you very much.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT
CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17201 - 4150

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

9 May 1994

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, U.S. Army Depot System Command,
ATTN: COL Joseph A. Fields, AMSDS-MN,
Chambersburg, PA 17201-4170

FOR Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical
Command, ATTN: AMSMC-ST, Rock Island, IL 61299-6000

SUBJECT: BRAC 95 Installation Assessment (IA) Data Call

1. Enclosed is the Letterkenny Army Depot submission to subject data call. As a result of updated guidance via E-mail and numerous telephonic discussions with identified points of contact, we have included the diskette requested and narrative clarification as appropriate.

2. For ease of reference, we display a copy of the diskette screen data and/or the attribute definition followed by elaborated information, clarification, or source references. Where this is the case, we have not, in many cases, made an entry to the data field on the diskette. If data is subsequently inserted, please inform us so that we can adjust our auditable files accordingly.

3. Finally, because Letterkenny has considerable ammunition maintenance and storage capabilities, we have included information for your use in completing segments of the "Ammunition Storage Installation" matrix as well.

4. With the foregoing identified, the information contained in this report is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. My point of contact in this regard is Ms. Hallie Bunk, DSN 570-9585.

5. I have serious concerns with this model as expressed in the point paper enclosure 3.

3.2 Encls
as

Joe Arbutch
JOSEPH W. ARBUCKLE
Colonel, OD
Commanding

POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Military Worth Analysis for BRAC 95

1. PURPOSE. To provide the Department of Army (DA) Total Army Basing Study (TABS) Office with concerns relative to the Military Worth Analysis for Maintenance Facilities in support of BRAC 95.

2. FACTS.

a. Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) has recently completed the first Military Worth analysis data call in support of BRAC 95. The process involved a review of the data definitions, the collection of the information as prescribed by various data source documents, and finally the computation of data elements when required.

b. A thorough review of the proposed data submission revealed that in some cases where attributes had to be computed the definition of the primary attribute had direct influence over the outcome of the computed attribute. Of major concern is the maintenance capacity data element.

c. The data call requested capacity be reported in direct labor hours in accordance with DOD 4151.15H, "Depot Maintenance Capacity/Utilization Index Measurement Handbook" dated Nov 90. This DOD-mandated capacity reporting requirement does not include an assessment of the available industrial square footage of an installation. LEAD, because of its workload mix, reports the lowest direct labor manhours of available capacity for the remaining Army depots. However, LEAD is the second largest Army depot in actual available industrial square footage. The maintenance capacity attribute on its own is worth 150 of the total 1000 points associated with the military worth analysis.

d. The maintenance capacity attribute directly influences two other important attributes in the data call. The IBOE rate and the Mission Overhead rate worth 100 and 50 points respectively. The data call computation directs the division of the total maintenance base operations costs by 85 percent of the direct labor hours of capacity for the IBOE rate, and the same computation for the mission overhead rate. It is intuitively obvious that the higher the capacity data, the lower both the IBOE and mission overhead rates become. Based on this approach, LEAD will again be shown negatively as having the highest costs per hour.

SDSLE-I

SUBJECT: Military Worth Analysis for BRAC 95

e. The maintenance capacity computation in the military worth analysis therefore influences 300 of the total 1000 points or 30% of the outcome. As currently defined, it does not measure what is intended.

f. Another concern discovered during the analysis of the data submission is maintenance excess capacity. The data call required the installation report excess maintenance capacity in square footage. The attribute has a value of 40 points. The concern is two fold; first, there appears to be an inconsistency when available capacity is reported in manhours and excess capacity in square feet and secondly, the data call states that the more excess available the better.

g. LEAD is in the process of consolidating 23 DOD Tactical Missile systems into the depot, as directed by BRAC 93. Rather than new construction, LEAD is renovating existing space, or previously excess square footage to accommodate the consolidation. This was done to keep BRAC 93 costs down. Therefore, again because of the execution of the BRAC 93 recommendation, LEAD will be reported as the lowest on comparison with the other Army Depots for this attribute.

3. CONCLUSION.

a. It is very clear by analyzing this data call that LEAD will be viewed as the least valuable of all the Army depots in this military worth assessment. The reason is that the model simply rewards and reinforces what is already being done at a location defined by past workloading decisions. Those past decisions are not based on military worth. In fact, the effects of politics weigh heavily in this, though Congressionally-mandated workload actions.

b. A better assessment of military worth would be to evaluate the actual maintenance missions currently performed, and those slated to be performed, at each of the installations, and their overall value to DOD. This would include interservicing worth.

Hallie Bunk/DSN 570-9585

PAUL WOLF
Senspector H830



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200



May 8 1995

Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
ATTN: Mr Brown
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Brown,

As requested in 26 April 1995 letter, attached are the COBRA analyses associated with the following depot scenarios:

- 1) Realignment of Anniston Army Depot
- 2) Closure of Tobyhanna Army Depot
- 3) Realignment of Letterkenny Army Depot with tactical missile to Hill AFB
- 4) Closure of Letterkenny Army Depot with tactical missiles to Hill AFB

These options are neither supportable nor preferable to the current DoD recommendations, as indicated in the attached briefing presented to the Commission staff on 9 May 1995. All of the COBRA analyses presented in this package are quick turn around efforts and may cost more than is indicated. If any of these commission alternatives are added to the BRAC 95 list on 10 May 1995, we will study them further.

Depots- General: A review of our depot requirements into the 21st Century (Army Stationing Strategy) supports a reduction from five Army depots to three commodity oriented depots. An independent analysis by DoD through the Joint Cross-Service Group- Depot Maintenance fully supported the Army's recommendation to consolidate all ground combat workload at a single depot - Anniston Army Depot. All analysis clearly confirms that the best alternative, from both an operational and financial aspect, is to realign Letterkenny to a storage activity under Tobyhanna Depot and close Red River Army Depot.

Anniston: Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair and is the only depot capable of performing maintenance on the M1 series main battle tank. Because it was ranked high on the Installation Assessment and Military Value Assessments, Anniston was not considered for closure. The realignment of Anniston and relocation of heavy combat workload to Red River would cost \$128 M and have a return on investment in 4 years. A complicating factor with the realignment of Anniston is the chemical storage and chemical demilitarization mission. This mission would preclude any significant reduction base support at Anniston; furthermore,

technology maintenance skills required to work on tanks is more complicated than tactical vehicles at Red River. Consequently, a substantial portion of the installation would remain open and a large number of personnel would have to transfer to Red River.

Tobyhanna: Tobyhanna is our newest depot and is the repair site for ground communications and electronic systems. It has the highest Installation Value among all the depots and has a high Military Value. Moving this high tech workload with its requirement for clean rooms to a low tech ground depot does not make sense. Closing of Tobyhanna is over twice as costly and saves half as much in annual savings. This is due to the high renovation and personnel relocation costs.

Letterkenny BRAC 93 Re-Direct: These scenarios are variations of the same concept. Neither is cost effective for two principle reasons - ammunition storage construction and personnel relocations. Hill AFB only has approximately 100,000 SQFT of ammunition storage available at both Hill AFB and Oasis (20 air miles away). DoD has a requirement for 1 Million SQFT for missile storage. The personnel issue is based on the Air Force BRAC 95 recommendation and their current and projected workload. These workload figures require 922 personnel to transfer to Hill AFB to meet the requirements. These two factors drive the one time cost to \$220 for the realignment scenario and \$471 M for the closure scenario. In addition, closure requires the total redesign of the DoD ammunition tiering concept and forces reconsideration of three to five Army BRAC 95 recommendations. The net present value of both hill AFB scenarios do not meet our expectations. Neither are better options than the current DoD recommendation.

The bottom line is all of these alternatives are neither supportable nor preferable to current DoD recommendations.

Enclosure


Michael G. Jones
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, The Army Basing Study



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

PAUL WOLF
Senspector H&S



May 8 1995

Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
ATTN: Mr Brown
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Brown,

As requested in 26 April 1995 letter, attached are the COBRA analyses associated with the following depot scenarios:

- 1) Realignment of Anniston Army Depot
- 2) Closure of Tobyhanna Army Depot
- 3) Realignment of Letterkenny Army Depot with tactical missile to Hill AFB
- 4) Closure of Letterkenny Army Depot with tactical missiles to Hill AFB

These options are neither supportable nor preferable to the current DoD recommendations, as indicated in the attached briefing presented to the Commission staff on 9 May 1995. All of the COBRA analyses presented in this package are quick turn around efforts and may cost more than is indicated. If any of these commission alternatives are added to the BRAC 95 list on 10 May 1995, we will study them further.

Depots- General: A review of our depot requirements into the 21st Century (Army Stationing Strategy) supports a reduction from five Army depots to three commodity oriented depots. An independent analysis by DoD through the Joint Cross-Service Group- Depot Maintenance fully supported the Army's recommendation to consolidate all ground combat workload at a single depot - Anniston Army Depot. All analysis clearly confirms that the best alternative, from both an operational and financial aspect, is to realign Letterkenny to a storage activity under Tobyhanna Depot and close Red River Army Depot.

Anniston: Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair and is the only depot capable of performing maintenance on the M1 series main battle tank. Because it was ranked high on the Installation Assessment and Military Value Assessments, Anniston was not considered for closure. The realignment of Anniston and relocation of heavy combat workload to Red River would cost \$128 M and have a return on investment in 4 years. A complicating factor with the realignment of Anniston is the chemical storage and chemical demilitarization mission. This mission would preclude any significant reduction base support at Anniston; furthermore,

technology maintenance skills required to work on tanks is more complicated than tactical vehicles at Red River. Consequently, a substantial portion of the installation would remain open and a large number of personnel would have to transfer to Red River.

Tobyhanna: Tobyhanna is our newest depot and is the repair site for ground communications and electronic systems. It has the highest Installation Value among all the depots and has a high Military Value. Moving this high tech workload with its requirement for clean rooms to a low tech ground depot does not make sense. Closing of Tobyhanna is over twice as costly and saves half as much in annual savings. This is due to the high renovation and personnel relocation costs.

Letterkenny BRAC 93 Re-Direct: These scenarios are variations of the same concept. Neither is cost effective for two principle reasons - ammunition storage construction and personnel relocations. Hill AFB only has approximately 100,000 SQFT of ammunition storage available at both Hill AFB and Oasis (20 air miles away). DoD has a requirement for 1 Million SQFT for missile storage. The personnel issue is based on the Air Force BRAC 95 recommendation and their current and projected workload. These workload figures require 922 personnel to transfer to Hill AFB to meet the requirements. These two factors drive the one time cost to \$220 for the realignment scenario and \$471 M for the closure scenario. In addition, closure requires the total redesign of the DoD ammunition tiering concept and forces reconsideration of three to five Army BRAC 95 recommendations. The net present value of both hill AFB scenarios do not meet our expectations. Neither are better options than the current DoD recommendation.

The bottom line is all of these alternatives are neither supportable nor preferable to current DoD recommendations.

Enclosure


Michael G. Jones
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, The Army Basing Study



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT
CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17201 - 4150

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

9 May 1994

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, U.S. Army Depot System Command,
ATTN: COL Joseph A. Fields, AMSDS-MN,
Chambersburg, PA 17201-4170

FOR Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical
Command, ATTN: AMSMC-ST, Rock Island, IL 61299-6000

SUBJECT: BRAC 95 Installation Assessment (IA) Data Call

1. Enclosed is the Letterkenny Army Depot submission to subject data call. As a result of updated guidance via E-mail and numerous telephonic discussions with identified points of contact, we have included the diskette requested and narrative clarification as appropriate.

2. For ease of reference, we display a copy of the diskette screen data and/or the attribute definition followed by elaborated information, clarification, or source references. Where this is the case, we have not, in many cases, made an entry to the data field on the diskette. If data is subsequently inserted, please inform us so that we can adjust our auditable files accordingly.

3. Finally, because Letterkenny has considerable ammunition maintenance and storage capabilities, we have included information for your use in completing segments of the "Ammunition Storage Installation" matrix as well.

4. With the foregoing identified, the information contained in this report is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. My point of contact in this regard is Ms. Hallie Bunk, DSN 570-9585.

5. I have serious concerns with this model as expressed in the point paper enclosure 3.

32 Encls
as

Joe Arbuckle
JOSEPH W. ARBUCKLE
Colonel, OD
Commanding

POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Military Worth Analysis for BRAC 95

1. PURPOSE. To provide the Department of Army (DA) Total Army Basing Study (TABS) Office with concerns relative to the Military Worth Analysis for Maintenance Facilities in support of BRAC 95.

2. FACTS.

a. Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) has recently completed the first Military Worth analysis data call in support of BRAC 95. The process involved a review of the data definitions, the collection of the information as prescribed by various data source documents, and finally the computation of data elements when required.

b. A thorough review of the proposed data submission revealed that in some cases where attributes had to be computed the definition of the primary attribute had direct influence over the outcome of the computed attribute. Of major concern is the maintenance capacity data element.

c. The data call requested capacity be reported in direct labor hours in accordance with DOD 4151.15H, "Depot Maintenance Capacity/Utilization Index Measurement Handbook" dated Nov 90. This DOD-mandated capacity reporting requirement does not include an assessment of the available industrial square footage of an installation. LEAD, because of its workload mix, reports the lowest direct labor manhours of available capacity for the remaining Army depots. However, LEAD is the second largest Army depot in actual available industrial square footage. The maintenance capacity attribute on its own is worth 150 of the total 1000 points associated with the military worth analysis.

d. The maintenance capacity attribute directly influences two other important attributes in the data call. The IBOE rate and the Mission Overhead rate worth 100 and 50 points respectively. The data call computation directs the division of the total maintenance base operations costs by 85 percent of the direct labor hours of capacity for the IBOE rate, and the same computation for the mission overhead rate. It is intuitively obvious that the higher the capacity data, the lower both the IBOE and mission overhead rates become. Based on this approach, LEAD will again be shown negatively as having the highest costs per hour.

SDSLE-I

SUBJECT: Military Worth Analysis for BRAC 95

e. The maintenance capacity computation in the military worth analysis therefore influences 300 of the total 1000 points or 30% of the outcome. As currently defined, it does not measure what is intended.

f. Another concern discovered during the analysis of the data submission is maintenance excess capacity. The data call required the installation report excess maintenance capacity in square footage. The attribute has a value of 40 points. The concern is two fold; first, there appears to be an inconsistency when available capacity is reported in manhours and excess capacity in square feet and secondly, the data call states that the more excess available the better.

g. LEAD is in the process of consolidating 23 DOD Tactical Missile systems into the depot, as directed by BRAC 93. Rather than new construction, LEAD is renovating existing space, or previously excess square footage to accommodate the consolidation. This was done to keep BRAC 93 costs down. Therefore, again because of the execution of the BRAC 93 recommendation, LEAD will be reported as the lowest on comparison with the other Army Depots for this attribute.

3. CONCLUSION.

a. It is very clear by analyzing this data call that LEAD will be viewed as the least valuable of all the Army depots in this military worth assessment. The reason is that the model simply rewards and reinforces what is already being done at a location defined by past workloading decisions. Those past decisions are not based on military worth. In fact, the effects of politics weigh heavily in this, though Congressionally-mandated workload actions.

b. A better assessment of military worth would be to evaluate the actual maintenance missions currently performed, and those slated to be performed, at each of the installations, and their overall value to DOD. This would include interservicing worth.

Hallie Bunk/DSN 570-9585

**STATEMENT TO
THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
OF THE HONORABLE FRANK PALLONE, JR.
JUNE 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I appreciate having the opportunity to testify before you today.

The Base Realignment and Closure Commission has an historic opportunity to begin the process of consolidation and collocation of C4I capabilities, especially when the individual military services have traditionally been parochial in nature. The opportunity for cross-servicing, a goal so often sought and so consistently eluded, will not soon arise again.

The concept of cross-servicing is not new. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's 1993 Report to the President noted that "The Department of Defense has been attempting for approximately 20 years without significant success to interservice...." As a result, the 1993 Commission recommended exhaustive review on the issue of cross-servicing for the BRAC 1995 deliberations. During the 1995 process, the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group (LJCSG) recommended Fort Monmouth as the site for C4I collocation. Unfortunately, as the U.S. General Accounting Office noted, "... agreements for consolidating similar work done by two or more of the services were limited, and opportunities to achieve additional reductions in excess capacity and infrastructure were missed. In particular, this was the case at...laboratory facilities." It is evident that the only forum to achieve the desired end of cross-servicing lies within your final recommendations to the President.

Supporters of Rome have argued that it is too expensive to close the Rome Labs and cite various Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses in support. After closer examination, it is apparent that dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom does produce annual savings and a return on investment within four to six years. The first COBRA, dated October 13, 1994, indicated an estimated one-time cost of \$133.8 million and estimated that it would take more than 100 years to recoup costs. This COBRA analysis was completed before the Joint Cross-Servicing Group on Labs suggested the relocation of Rome Labs to Fort Monmouth and Hanscom. Once this alternative was calculated, the February 23, 1995, COBRA illustrated the one-time cost

at \$52.8 million with a four year return on investment. Another COBRA was conducted on May 23, 1995. Although the one-time cost increased to \$79.2 million, the return on investment would be in only six years. In addition the latest COBRA analysis found the most cost-savings -- \$13 million per year. Over a twenty year period an excess of \$180 million will be saved by this closure.

Fort Monmouth provides an excellent environment for the collocation of C4I capabilities for various reasons, including: an ideal integrated command structure, an already predominant C4I joint arena, the physical space to accommodate the Rome Labs, and the technological/academic base to make cross-servicing of C4I activities a success.

Fort Monmouth has been the center of gravity for C4I innovation for many years, and is postured to achieve the cross-servicing vision of the 1993 Commission and the 1995 LJCSG. The 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission can make this goal a reality with C4I consolidation at Fort Monmouth.

ATCOM REALIGNMENT

This realignment to Fort Monmouth is a logical out-growth of BRAC 93, which realigned the research and development portion of the life cycle of six ATCOM business areas to CECOM, Fort Monmouth. By realigning the rest of the life cycle to CECOM, BRAC 95 eliminates duplication of effort and achieves the efficiencies and mission enhancement of one command managing the entire life cycle.

MTMC RELOCATION

Another BRAC 95 recommendation closes the Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal and relocates the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Eastern Area Command Headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 1301st Major Port Command to Fort Monmouth. The fort has ample, quality facilities to house MTMC and the 1301st together. In addition, the proximity of Fort Monmouth to Bayonne facilitates coordination with the ports of NY and NJ, and lessens the personal impact of this BRAC recommendation on the MTMC/1301st employees.

DRAFT

PENNSYLVANIA

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

ARMY:

Fort Indiantown Gap	Close
Kelly Support Center	Realign
Letterkenny Army Depot	Realign

NAVY:

NAESU Philadelphia	Close
NATSF Philadelphia	Close
NAWC-AD Open Water Test Facility Oreland	Close
NAWC-AD Warminster	Close
NCCOSC R&D Det Warminster	Close
NSY Philadelphia-Norfolk Det	Redirect

AIR FORCE:

Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS	Close
----------------------------	-------

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny	Disestablish
Defense Industrial Supply Center	Disestablish

II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

ARMY:

Tobyhanna Army Depot	Close
Letterkenny Army Depot	Close


DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:

Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna	Close
--------------------------------------	-------

DRAFT

MAP NO. 39

PENNSYLVANIA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

Testimony to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission
by U.S. Rep. James C. Greenwood (R-Pa.)
June 13, 1995

I would like to preface my remarks today by voicing my support for the challenging mission of the BRAC. In this post-Cold War era, the United States must react to a changing world order that demands a new global strategy, while incorporating major technological advances necessary to strengthen our national defense. To this end, we must restructure our fighting force, and thus close, consolidate and realign a major portion of our state-side military installations. Among the many solutions, placing a greater emphasis on the reserve components of each branch of the armed services and encouraging their readiness and effectiveness allow us to scale back on large active duty bases. I agree that the Department of Defense, like the rest of our government, must continue the process of rightsizing.

From my own experiences at Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC)-Warminster, I understand the cost of closing a military installation from the point of view of both the military and, equally important, the impacted communities. At Warminster, these up-front expenses are running well over the original 1991 estimates from the Navy and virtually eliminate the intended savings to the American taxpayer. Furthermore, I have witnessed firsthand the difficulties of enlisting the Department of Defense as a cooperative partner in the realignment and conversion process, especially as it relates to environmental clean-up and general reuse issues. The absence of any specific and clear direction in the BRAC undertaking on the obligation of the federal government to rapidly clean-up serious environmental hazards and to aggressively promote and support new uses for former bases are criticisms of the on-going base closing process. These are areas where the BRAC must look for solutions. Moreover, I see and understand the uncertainty and frustration of the Navy's civilian employees and the concerns of the local business community -- from the small contractor to the restaurant owner to the retailer. Each base is confronted with these problems as the military eliminates its presence, but they are greatly magnified in the five county area, in and around Philadelphia, where facility after facility prepares for closure or realignment.

I urge you to consider the impact of your actions on Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia region. **The facts are clear: (1) The Philadelphia-area is the only region in the country to have installations closed in all three previous BRAC rounds; (2) Philadelphia closures account for more than 75-percent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's total job losses from the BRAC process; (3) Pennsylvania has suffered the highest percentage of DoD job losses in the nation as a result of the BRAC process; and (4) Pennsylvania has already lost more than 15,000 jobs to previous BRACs and faces the loss of more than 4,000 in 1995.**

Given this background, as the BRAC 95 process unfolds, I am increasingly concerned with its impact on my district in particular and on the Philadelphia region in general. I believe we can rightsize DoD without further weakening the regional economy or leaving large numbers of civilian employees without alternative employment opportunities. However, recent actions from the Defense Department have begun to erode my confidence that we can accomplish both goals simultaneously. The Department of the Army has recommended closing the 79th Army Reserve Headquarters in my district and, through the Off-Site Agreement, has disestablished a Reserve brigade headquartered there. Earlier rounds of the BRAC commission have closed the Naval Air Warfare Center in Warminster and the Naval Base and Shipyard in Philadelphia for a large total job loss.

Now the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) wants to remove another 1,200 jobs from the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) facility in northeast Philadelphia. From a regional economic standpoint this would exacerbate the process of economic dislocation -- which has seen the elimination of 40,000 direct and indirect local jobs due to the BRAC

process -- occurring over the past few years. And from a military value perspective, the plan appears to lack merit.

I know that you have heard testimony to that effect from Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell, retired officers from the Philadelphia region and other concerned citizens and business leaders. Among the testimony you heard in Baltimore last month, David Thornburgh, the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Economy League, testified to the military importance of keeping DISC in Philadelphia. Besides the synergy already established with the Navy's Aviation Supply Office, Mr. Thornburgh testified to the inaccuracies contained in the DLA's cost-benefit analysis. He pointed out that the one-time costs would add at least \$118 million to the proposed move; and that the planned reduction in manpower would not necessarily be a substantial cost savings when management changes and disruptions are taken into account.

A number of my colleagues and I traveled to Russia last year in an effort to secure a proposal that would allow warships of the former Soviet Union to be dismantled in Philadelphia. Currently, negotiations are proceeding with a commercial German ship-builder to use the superb facilities at the Shipyard located along the Delaware River. The community and its elected officials are continuing to work hard to find solutions for the men and women who will lose their jobs because of prior BRAC decisions.

Our efforts will be aided by the realignment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Annapolis with the detachment in Philadelphia. This would create a significant return on investment and make good military sense. By consolidating the operation in Philadelphia, the Navy would be establishing in one location the engineering lifecycle, from Research and Development to immediate feedback from fleet operations, which will lower acquisition and development costs and increase operational readiness. This action would mean the immediate return of jobs to the Philadelphia community. Also, NSWC-Philadelphia will prove valuable in attracting new technology-oriented businesses to the Naval Shipyard area. By supporting such a measure, you will be helping the Philadelphia region in beginning to recover from the Navy's withdrawal from the other facilities in the area.

Furthermore, I would urge you to review the proposals affecting Philadelphia contained in BRAC '93. The movement of the DPSC facility to the Northeast and the strong working relationship between the Navy's ASO and DLA's DISC remain strong arguments for maintaining the military relationships stressed in the previous BRAC round.

I maintain that Pennsylvania -- and especially the Philadelphia community -- has already done its part to ensure the Department of Defense is not operating at excess capacity. I urge you to reward the dedicated service of the DISC employees by adding to, not taking away, from their mission. And remember that Philadelphia, the home of the Navy and Marine Corps, remains a strong and vital region, willing and able to contribute to the defense of our nation.

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN JON FOX
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995

\

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As a new Member of Congress, I certainly appreciate the importance of your mission of cost-cutting and consolidation. I was proud to support and vote for a balanced budget, and I salute you for your efforts to preserve our national defense by streamlining and reducing inefficiencies.

While I do believe that we all must share in the burden of reducing the size and cost of federal government, I must emphasize the tremendous impact of base closures and realignments on the Philadelphia region and on Pennsylvania as a whole. Pennsylvania had 45,435 total defense personnel as of September 30, 1994. As a result of action by the 1988, 1991, and 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions, Pennsylvania lost 13,305 of those jobs. Including the 1995 Department of Defense recommendations, Pennsylvania will have lost a total of 16,635 jobs. This is a 36.6% cut in defense personnel, **higher than any other state in the nation**. Moreover, Philadelphia closures account for more than 75% of Pennsylvania job losses. Mr. Chairman, Pennsylvania has given its share towards accomplishing our goal.

I would like to take this opportunity to share my thoughts with you concerning four specific issues before the Commission - the Navy facilities in Warminster, Pennsylvania; the Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, PA; realignment and consolidation affecting Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. These issues are of great importance to me and the citizens of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, whom I am privileged to represent.

First, I would like to urge the Commission to closely examine the options for the Naval Air Warfare Center, Warminster, PA. I believe that we must do everything possible to ensure the success of reuse efforts and to protect the regional economy. Moreover, I would like to bring to your attention the value of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania.

As you know, the Navy has proposed that the functions of this detachment be relocated to the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, San Diego, California, and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.

The Philadelphia Detachment is of great military value to both Navy and joint forces programs. The proposed transfer would have an extremely negative effect on the Detachment's core capability to continue to support these programs. Moreover, the costs assumptions for the move do not include personnel and equipment transfer costs, and do not consider the Detachment's locally employed out-sourced technical support. I am concerned that the Department did not investigate the possibility of relocating this

Detachment to an alternate, local site.

Second, as I emphasized in my letter to you of April 14, 1995, I strongly support the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) in Philadelphia, PA.

As you know, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has recommended that the DISC be "disestablished." Although DLA claims that this action will eliminate 385 direct jobs, I understand that the jobs of all of the more than 1800 employees at DISC would be at risk because the current employees would have no right of placement or transfer of function entitlement in any job within the DLA's Inventory Control Point (ICP).

In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned the Department of Defense's recommendation to close DISC. This facility is still crucial to military readiness, and I urge you to uphold the decision of the 1993 Commission.

The workforce at DISC has been recognized as a model of efficiency. DISC has the highest proportion of military requisitions and still maintains the highest level of support of all hardware centers. In addition, DISC has the lowest number of below goal systems and consistently provides better availability to weapons systems items than the other ICP's. Because DISC is housed along with a Navy weapons management ICP and a weapons engineering facility, a talented pool of experienced logistics personnel has developed. As a result, DISC and the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) have developed a strong working relationship that promotes cooperation and productivity.

There is no rationale for choosing to eliminate DISC among the

four Defense Logistics Agency ICP's. Of all four ICP's, DISC manages 34.5 percent of all weapons systems hardware and processes 40 percent of all military customer requisitions.

Despite these facts, DLA recommended moving DISC's weapons-coded workload to the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), which currently manages the least amount of weapons-coded workload of the ICP's.

It is essential that we preserve DISC in order to maintain our defense logistics at the highest level of readiness, promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and save the jobs of dedicated DISC employees. Therefore, I would respectfully request your consideration of an alternative which preserves DISC.

Third, I would like to speak in support of the DOD recommendation to realign Naval Surface Warfare Center-Annapolis with Naval Surface Warfare Center-Philadelphia as well as the City of Philadelphia's recommendation to consolidate NAVSEA 03 with the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Philadelphia.

As former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman noted, realigning NSWC-Annapolis with the NSWC-Philadelphia "center of excellence" is of critical importance to the Navy. Consolidation of the machinery engineering lifecycle will improve the operational readiness of the fleet and save \$14.5 million a year for a total 20-year savings of \$175.1 million.

I would also like to strongly urge the Commission to approve the City of Philadelphia's proposal to consolidate NAVSEA 03's 650 employees with NSWC-Philadelphia's 1600 employees and tremendous facility infrastructure. This consolidation will eliminate

unnecessary duplication, saving \$165.88 million over 20 years. In contrast, moving NAVSEA 03 to the Washington Navy Yard saves only \$10 million over 20 years. Moreover, this proposal will improve the operational readiness of the fleet.

Finally, I am pleased to offer my support for Fort Indiantown Gap. I am concerned about the harm that a closure of this Fort would cause to our national security and to our local economy.

I believe that Fort Indiantown Gap is essential for military readiness. In addition, as I stated in my letter to the Commission of May 12, 1995, Fort Indiantown Gap is the only convenient training site for reserve and National Guard units in our area.

Elimination of Fort Indiantown Gap would be a grave error and I urge you to examine this proposal very carefully.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, thank you for your consideration of my thoughts. With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

JUNE 13, 1995

TESTIMONY BY

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT A. BORSKI

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, FOR GIVING ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY TODAY. TWO YEARS AGO, I CAME BEFORE YOU TO ARGUE AGAINST THE PENTAGON'S PROPOSAL TO CLOSE AND RELOCATE NEARLY EVERY DEFENSE FACILITY IN PHILADELPHIA. RECOGNIZING THAT THE TRUE MILITARY VALUE OF THESE FACILITIES IS ITS SKILLED WORKFORCES, THE COMMISSION WISELY REJECTED THE PENTAGON'S PROPOSAL AND INSTEAD APPROVED A MORE COST-EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE THAT CONSOLIDATED THESE FACILITIES AT THE AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE (ASO) COMPOUND IN PHILADELPHIA.

REGRETTABLY, IN BRAC 95, THE PENTAGON HAS CHOSEN TO IGNORE THE WISDOM OF YOUR DECISION. THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA) HAS PROPOSED TO "DISESTABLISH" THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER (DISC) ON THE ASO COMPOUND. THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT CLOSE A BASE -- 80 PERCENT OF ITS CLAIMED SAVINGS COME FROM ELIMINATING PERSONNEL POSITIONS. I WILL NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE FLAWS BEHIND DLA'S STATED SAVINGS -- THE EMPLOYEES AT DISC HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED YOU WITH DETAILED INFORMATION. INSTEAD, AS YOU EXAMINE WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL WILL SAVE ANY MONEY, I ASK THAT YOU KEEP IN MIND THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL'S IMPACT ON MILITARY READINESS:

- * DLA IS DISESTABLISHING DISC, WHICH BY EVERY MEASURE IS DLA'S MOST EFFICIENT WEAPONS SUPPLY CENTER. DISC MANAGES THE MOST WEAPONS SYSTEMS ITEMS AND HAS THE HIGHEST CUSTOMER SUPPORT RATE, YET HAS THE LOWEST RATE OF ERROR.

- * BECAUSE DISC IS DLA'S BEST SUPPLY CENTER, IT HAS SERVED AS A PROTOTYPE FOR DLA'S FUTURE MISSION REQUIREMENTS. THE EMPLOYEES AT DISC HAVE BEEN REINVENTING GOVERNMENT LONG BEFORE VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S INITIATIVES.

- * DISESTABLISHING DISC WILL ALSO RESULT IN THE PERMANENT LOSS OF A UNIQUE JOINT-SERVICE SYNERGY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN DISC AND ASO. IN BRAC 93, THE COMMISSION POINTED TO THIS SYNERGY AS A REASON FOR KEEPING BOTH ON THE SAME COMPOUND.

- * DLA'S PROPOSAL WILL THROW THE ITEMS IT MANAGES INTO A WHIRLWIND BEYOND ITS CONTROL. IF THIS PROPOSAL IS APPROVED, MORE THAN 66 PERCENT OF DLA'S WORKLOAD WILL MOVE FROM ONE FACILITY TO ANOTHER IN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS. NO ITEM TRANSFER OF THIS MAGNITUDE HAS EVER BEEN ACCOMPLISHED!

- * DISESTABLISHING DISC WILL NOT CLOSE ANY BASES. IT WILL ONLY RESHUFFLE WORKLOAD. DLA IS ESSENTIALLY ASKING A COMMISSION ESTABLISHED TO CLOSE BASES TO ENDORSE ITS AGENCY REORGANIZATION PLAN.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS, EACH OF THESE POINTS BEGS A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION: "IS THIS REALLY WORTH THE RISK?" DISC'S MISSION IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO THE RELIABILITY OF OUR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN MILITARY MISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

FOR EXAMPLE, DISC MANAGES 41 PERCENT OF THE CONSUMABLE ITEMS ON THE CH-53 SUPER STALLION HELICOPTERS THAT RESCUED CAPTAIN SCOTT O'GRADY IN BOSNIA. WE OFTEN TAKE FOR GRANTED THE ROLE THAT SUPPLY PLAYS IN THESE MISSIONS. IF THESE HELICOPTERS ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH THE PROPER PARTS, THEY RISK MALFUNCTION, OR WORSE. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TRAGIC IF THIS MISSION HAD NOT SUCCEEDED BECAUSE OF A MALFUNCTION CAUSED BY INEXPERIENCED SUPPLY MANAGEMENT.

AS YOU EXAMINE DLA'S PROPOSAL AND LOOK AT THE DISRUPTION IT WILL CAUSE, ASK YOURSELVES WHETHER ITS WORTH THE RISK OF JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF MISSIONS SUCH AS THIS -- ALL FOR SAVINGS WHICH ARE QUESTIONABLE AT BEST, AND DO NOT EVEN INVOLVE A BASE CLOSURE?

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS, I SUPPORT THE GOALS OF DLA'S REORGANIZATION, WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY CONSOLIDATE DLA'S WEAPONS WORKLOAD INTO TWO SUPPLY CENTERS. BUT, CLEARLY, DISC DESERVES TO BE ONE OF THESE WEAPONS CENTERS.

THE COMMISSION SHOULD REJECT THIS MISGUIDED PROPOSAL SO THAT DLA CAN REORGANIZE IN A MORE SENSIBLE MANNER AND TIMEFRAME -- OUTSIDE OF THE BRAC PROCESS. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD PLACE AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE READINESS OF OUR ARMED SERVICES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO BRIEFLY DISCUSS THE NAVY'S PROPOSED RELOCATIONS OF THE NAVAL AIR TECHNICAL SERVICES FACILITY (NATSF) AND THE NAVAL AVIATION ENGINEERING SERVICE UNIT (NAESU) TO CALIFORNIA. LIKE THE DISC PROPOSAL, THE NAVY PROPOSALS DO NOT CLOSE BASES: THEY MERELY MOVE THESE FACILITIES FROM PHILADELPHIA TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COUNTRY. SUCH A MOVE WOULD COMPLETELY DISMANTLE TWO SKILLED WORKFORCES THAT ARE STILL ESSENTIAL TO THE READINESS OF OUR ARMED SERVICES.

IN RESPONSE TO THE NAVY'S PROPOSALS, THE EMPLOYEES OF NATSF AND NAESU HAVE DEVELOPED COUNTER-PROPOSALS THAT PRESERVE THEIR WORKFORCES AND ACHIEVE EVEN BETTER SAVINGS BY CONSOLIDATING THEIR FUNCTIONS WITH ASO. THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE THE COMMISSION WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSOLIDATE WITHOUT SACRIFICING MILITARY VALUE.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR DOD'S PROPOSED REALIGNMENT OF NSWC-ANNAPOLIS TO NSWC-PHILADELPHIA, AND THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA'S PROPOSAL TO CONSOLIDATE THE NAVSEA HEADQUARTERS ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE WITH NSWC-PHILADELPHIA. THESE PROPOSALS WILL RESULT IN A COMBINED SAVINGS OF NEARLY \$340 MILLION OVER SEVEN YEARS, AND ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY FORMER NAVY SECRETARY JOHN LEHMAN.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, THE EMPLOYEES OF PHILADELPHIA'S DEFENSE FACILITIES ARE THE TRUE MILITARY VALUE OF THESE FACILITIES. SINCE BRAC 93, THEY HAVE RISEN TO THE CHALLENGE OF "DOING MORE AND BETTER WITH LESS." I HOPE THE COMMISSION RECOGNIZES THIS VALUABLE ASSET TO OUR COUNTRY AND BUILDS ON THE CORRECT RULING IT MADE IN 1993.

**Statement by Senator Arlen Specter
Before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Congressional Hearing
Washington, D.C.
June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, I welcome this opportunity to testify before you today regarding the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment process and its importance to the state of Pennsylvania. The needs of our nation's military, as well as those of communities and citizens throughout Pennsylvania, are very much at stake in these proceedings.

This is the third time in recent weeks that I have appeared before this Commission. During that time and throughout the months leading up to these hearings, I have had numerous opportunities to visit military installations in Pennsylvania that have been included on this year's closure and realignment list. These visits have given me a keener sense of the important work that is being carried out at these facilities, of the commitment and expertise with which the men and women of Pennsylvania are fulfilling their responsibilities, and of the enormous economic importance of these installations to their local communities. In short, I have seen that these bases are important to Pennsylvania and important to our national defense.

Pennsylvania has already suffered inequitably in the base closure rounds of 1988, 1991 and 1993, taking on nearly 11 percent of nationwide Defense personnel reductions (military and civilian) in those three base closure rounds in spite of possessing only 2.6 percent of that same category in 1988. Now, in 1995, this Commission must decide if that inequitable trend is to continue -- which will surely be the case if these proposals are followed -- or if it is finally to be reversed and Pennsylvania's facilities finally recognized for their longstanding military and

economic importance.

The criteria by which you are to make that decision have been plainly set forth. They include, most importantly, the military value of the facilities under review, their economic importance to their local economies, and the cost savings associated with their potential closure or realignment. A brief survey Pennsylvania's military bases according to these criteria makes it clear that they ought not to be closed or realigned.

The 911th Airlift Wing

The 911th Airlift Wing, located at the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), is a shining example of a Pennsylvania unit that has made invaluable contributions to our nation's defense. The 911th, made up of nearly 1,300 area Reservists, 350 civilian employees, and eight C-130 cargo aircraft, has played a critical role in the area of airlift support during numerous military and humanitarian operations. Its operations tempo has increased significantly in recent years as it has served with distinction in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, in humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia and Somalia, in domestic relief operations in the wake of Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, and in recent non-combat operations in Turkey and Haiti. The 911th has played an important role in the local Pittsburgh area as well, serving as an arrival point for the President and other senior government officials, and lending critical assistance last summer in the wake of the crash of USAir Flight 427. It has also played an important part in the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a cooperative public-private initiative designed to care for large numbers of casualties in overseas conflicts and domestic disasters. Its outstanding performance in these many capacities has been widely recognized, earning the 911th two Outstanding Unit Awards and numerous other Air Force awards for the

quality of its service and personnel.

Its outstanding performance in recent operations and its service to the community are only two of many reasons that the 911th ought to remain operational. An offer by the County of Allegheny to add an additional 77 acres to the unit's existing lease -- at no additional federal taxpayer cost -- would significantly expand its current capacity. These 77 acres are not undeveloped land requiring an investment of time and money for clearing and construction, but consist of concrete aircraft parking ramps and taxiways adjacent to the current 911th ramp which are ready to use. No new military construction costs would be necessary for the 911th to take advantage of this expanded capability. On its current 115 acres, the 911th has room for 13 C-130s (five more than it already has); with an additional 77 acres, its C-130 capacity would be enormous -- and all of this at no additional cost.

The 911th's \$15.1 million communications center is yet another reason for the unit's retention. Its communications facility is, in fact, one of the most advanced in the country and the only operational fiber optic network in the Air Force Reserve; it has contributed greatly to the 911th's overall efficiency and readiness. In the event that the 911th is closed, this facility will be lost and its \$15.1 million dollar investment essentially wasted. The Air National Guard and other federal agencies that currently make use of its services will be forced to replace it with their own costly systems.

It is particularly troubling, in view of all these considerations, that the Defense Department has recommended the closure of the 911th and has done so on the basis of incorrect information. The Department claims that the 911th's annual Base Operating Support (BOS) costs are \$22.2 million for 243 BOS positions; the actual figures are \$10.1 million in BOS costs

for 121 positions. The Department claims that the closure of the 911th would save over \$33.5 million in planned military construction costs through the year 2000; the actual number is \$4.4 million. It is of paramount importance that this Commission rely on accurate information, and the facts in this case are squarely on the side of the 911th: the 911th is a critical airlift unit to our nation's military, and its closure simply does not make sense.

Charles E. Kelly Support Facility

The case of the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility in Oakdale, Pennsylvania is another unfortunate example of how the Defense Department has unfairly treated Pennsylvania military installations. The Kelly Support Facility provides logistical and engineering support to its various tenant activities and to Army Reserve Units throughout western Pennsylvania. The Army originally recommended to this Commission the substantial realignment of the Kelly Facility, including the elimination of 83 of its 113 positions and the use of resulting cost savings to finance the construction of a new headquarters building for the 99th Army Reserve Command at the base. In the executive summary of its more detailed implementation plan, however, the Army claimed that as many as 79 of Kelly's positions would eventually be retained -- suggesting that the Army had merely shuffled its job loss figures in an effort to produce the necessary cost savings on paper to finance its construction initiative. I am concerned by the Army's conduct in this matter, and I am appreciative that the efforts of this Commission to clarify these discrepancies have led to the reversal of the original recommendation. I am advised that in its most recent submission to this Commission the Army has now proposed a much smaller realignment of the Kelly facility consisting of the elimination of two parcels of land and 13 positions -- only five of which are currently filled and which the facility will be able to handle

through attrition. It is just this sort of diligence in evaluating the Defense Department's numbers that this Commission must apply to each and every one of these facilities.

The Letterkenny Army Depot

The Letterkenny Army Depot, located in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, is also doing outstanding work for our nation's armed forces. This Depot's 3,550 employees have made the installation a model of efficiency and excellence. Two particular areas should be recognized. First, Letterkenny and its personnel have distinguished themselves in the maintenance and repair of a dozen different types of tracked vehicles -- and in so doing have earned the Department of the Army's designation as a Center of Technical Excellence with respect to self-propelled tracked artillery.

In a proactive effort to take advantage to the greatest extent possible of the capabilities of the private sector, Letterkenny has formed a partnership with a Pennsylvania contractor, United Defense. This innovative public-private partnership -- the first ever initiated by a Defense depot -- has produced the Paladin self-propelled howitzer at great savings to the taxpayer; the system's program manager has returned \$64 million to the Department of the Army. As the Army's top acquisition official, Assistant Secretary Gilbert F. Decker, said about the partnership last year, it is "a hallmark of something we should try to replicate . . . [I] take my hat off to this." Indeed, such innovation can help strengthen the entire defense industrial base and serve as a model for partnerships to acquire other military systems.

Letterkenny also has an outstanding record of achievement in the area of tactical missiles. In 1993, this Commission charged Letterkenny to become the Defense Department's sole center for the repair and maintenance of these weapons. Since that time, the Depot's highly skilled

electronic repair technicians have been certified by the Army Navy, Air Force and Marines to perform missile work on 14 systems, including the Patriot, Sidewinder and Hawk. Such achievements suggest that Letterkenny has clearly lived up to the expectations generated by the 1993 Commission's decision to consolidate missile work at the Depot. Realigning this crucial installation would reduce significantly the efficiencies generated by Letterkenny's position as the Pentagon-wide tactical missile repair facility. Consequently, the readiness of our armed forces may well suffer.

The Defense Department has relied on faulty data and outdated assumptions to arrive at the conclusion that Letterkenny should be substantially realigned. This was demonstrated in Letterkenny's May 9, 1994 response to the Army's data request for its Military Worth Analysis. In that response, Colonel Joseph W. Arbuckle pointed out that several of Letterkenny's capacities would not be accurately reflected in the data submission because the Army had defined its data categories in such a way as to skew the final outcome. I ask that a copy of this letter also be entered into the record of these proceedings. Unfortunately, this is not the first time that questionable methodology has been used against a Pennsylvania facility. In 1991, the Navy's fraudulent concealment of key information helped place the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard on the base closure list.

As you will recall, the Defense Department recommended Letterkenny's realignment in 1993, and the 1993 Commission found that that recommendation "deviated substantially" from the Commission's final selection criteria, which criteria are identical to that of this Commission. I believe that Letterkenny remains the important and efficient operation that our military needs -- and that this Commission is well-advised to retain.

It must also be noted that the economic impact of the proposed Letterkenny realignment would be devastating to its local economy. The Depot is the largest employer in Franklin County, employing 3,550. The original Defense Department realignment proposal would eliminate nearly 2,500 of these jobs; the May 10 BRAC realignment proposal is worse, eliminating over 3,000. Nearly 10 percent of the economy in the area surrounding Letterkenny is directly dependent on the installation. The average annual earnings of a Letterkenny employee is \$32,000, and Letterkenny employees pay approximately \$4.1 million annually in state and local taxes. If Letterkenny were to undergo realignment, the Chambersburg area would suffer a crippling \$300 million annual economic loss, and unemployment, currently at 5 percent, could nearly double.

Fort Indiantown Gap

Fort Indiantown Gap is yet another Pennsylvania facility that contributes greatly to the readiness of our nation's armed forces. The Fort has served as one of our military's most important training and mobilization sites since World War II. Over 177,000 soldiers took advantage last year of its unique modernized training facilities, including a vast array of artillery ranges, flight training airfields, and planning and briefing facilities. Other important assets at the Fort include its ammunition storage facility, its state-of-the-art flight simulators, and its two equipment concentration/training sites. In short, Fort Indiantown Gap is exceptionally equipped for the various training needs of our nation's soldiers. Its proximity to Interstates 78, 81 and 76 (the Pennsylvania Turnpike) and the Harrisburg International Airport enhances its value as a training and mobilization site. It is no surprise that Fort Indiantown Gap has been used for the mobilization of U.S. troops in every armed conflict in which the United States has been involved

since World War II. Nor is it surprising that the Fort has hosted the training of National Guard and Reserve units from Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, Washington, D.C., Delaware, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and North Carolina -- in fiscal year 1994 alone.

Recent testimony before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, of which I am a member, has underscored the fact that the recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap would hamper the ability of our military to train its soldiers. As stated in a May 19 letter to this Commission from myself and several other Senators, the Director of the Army National Guard testified before our Subcommittee that the "enclaves" the Army plans to leave behind at five major maneuver areas recommended for closure or realignment, including Fort Indiantown Gap, would be inadequate to meet the Guard's minimum training needs. Also, the Directors of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard testified that the savings that would result from the closure or realignment of these facilities would be offset by the increased costs the National Guard will have to pay to send units longer distances for fewer days of annual training.

It is also of concern to me, as I outlined in my May 25 letter to this Commission, that the Army's original recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap appears to have been based upon faulty data. As I stated in that letter, I am advised that the Army Basing Study has now conceded that the annual cost savings that would result from the closure of Fort Indiantown Gap are not \$23 million, as originally claimed, but rather \$6.7 million -- a difference of almost 75 percent. Community officials involved in this issue have gone on to cite other errors in the Army's original cost savings estimates which suggest that annual savings might amount only to \$2.1 million. It is all the more difficult to believe, in view of these revised numbers, that the

closure of Fort Indiantown Gap would actually be of any benefit for our nation's armed forces.

The economic hardship that would result from the closure of the Fort is yet another argument in favor of its retention. This move would result in the loss of nearly 800 of the Fort's 2280 jobs, the remaining jobs associated with the continued operation of the Headquarters of the Pennsylvania National Guard. The loss of these 800 jobs translates into the loss of \$20.6 million in annual payroll, combined with the loss of \$20.1 million in fiscal year 1994 Operations and Maintenance funds and \$6 million in fiscal year 1994 Military Construction funds.

Tobyhanna Army Depot

The Tobyhanna Army Depot in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is also serving the U.S. Army with excellence, specifically in the area of communications and electronics maintenance. As the Director of the Army Basing Study, Colonel Michael G. Jones, said in a May 8, 1995 letter to this Commission, Tobyhanna "has a high military value" and the relocation of its workload "does not make sense." I ask that a copy of this letter be entered into the record of these proceedings.

Tobyhanna's importance to the U.S. military is based upon a number of factors. First, it has been the subject of an ongoing modernization effort begun in 1975 -- including the investment of over \$110 million since 1990 -- that has made it into one of the most up-to-date operations in the whole of the Department of Defense today. Today, 53 percent of its facilities are less than 5 years old, and 86 percent are less than 15 years old. Second, Tobyhanna's facilities have been specially designed and consolidated to maximize the efficiency of their electronics workload, with a 15 percent increase in their production efficiency resulting from recent industrial engineering initiatives. Third, Tobyhanna possesses one of the Defense

Department's most highly-trained and well-educated workforces, with the largest concentration of electronic mechanics and professional electronic support staff in the Department.

All of these factors have led to Tobyhanna's well-established reputation for efficiency and excellence. Studies by numerous organizations within the Defense Department over the last several years, as well as a recent study by the Coopers and Lybrand accounting firm, have recognized Tobyhanna as an outstanding installation. This is the second consecutive base closure round in which Tobyhanna has received the Army's highest military value rating, and it has been rewarded for its excellence in each of the three prior base closure rounds with the transfer of additional workloads. Tobyhanna is clearly a model installation within the Defense Department; it deserves to be commended -- not closed.

The recommendation to close Tobyhanna is all the more inexplicable in light of its economic importance to Northeastern Pennsylvania. With an employment of almost 3,600 area residents who earn an average of \$31,000 annually, Tobyhanna is the largest employer in the region. It contributes \$644 million annually to the local economy according to the Economic Development Council of Northeast Pennsylvania, and Tobyhanna personnel pay \$4.3 million annually in state and local taxes. An additional 9,500 jobs throughout the surrounding region depend indirectly upon the Depot's presence, totalling \$289 million in additional wages and salaries. The closure of Tobyhanna would be devastating to an economy whose unemployment rate of over 6 percent already exceeds the state and national averages and which has seen extensive job loss already throughout the last several years -- including at Tobyhanna itself.

Defense Industrial Supply Center

Finally, several military facilities in the city of Philadelphia stand to be affected by this

year's base closure round. The Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) is currently one of five Inventory Control Points (ICPs) in the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) system. DISC, with 1800 employees, is one of three ICPs that specialize in critical weapons systems, including hardware for aircraft and tanks. In fact, DISC handles more weapons items than any other ICP in the Department of Defense. DISC has a well-established a record of excellence: it has achieved the lowest proportion of "wrong parts issued" in the DLA system and the highest DLA weapons support rate of over 89 percent, meaning that 9 out of 10 of its customer requirements are filled immediately.

The Defense Department has recommended the disestablishment of the DISC and the transfer of most of its positions to the Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC), also in Philadelphia. This recommendation is troubling for many reasons. First, the Department of Defense did not include in its calculations the additional costs to operate the DPSC at its current location for two more years, as required under the Department's proposal (costs that would approach \$52 million for those two years), nor did the Department fully gauge the costs associated with the requisite transfer of items within the DLA system (a figure that DISC has estimated to be \$66 million higher than the Department's estimate.) Second, in its recommendation to disestablish DISC, the Department of Defense has estimated that only 385 jobs would be lost since the majority of the DISC's 1800 positions would be transferred to the DPSC in Philadelphia. By the use of the designation "disestablishment," however, all 1800 jobs currently at the DISC would be lost and the DISC employees given no guarantees of being rehired at the DPSC site. This recommendation, finally, is contrary to the 1993 Commission's recommendation to consolidate DISC, DPSC and the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) all at one

site. The 1993 recommendation, in fact, is a preferable move that would result in the savings of \$116 million in 20 years by consolidating DISC and DPSC under one command and maximizing DISC/ASO synergy.

**Naval Air Technical Services Facility
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit**

In its March 1 list of recommendations to this Commission, the Defense Department has also proposed the closure of the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) and Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit (NAESU) and their relocation from Philadelphia to North Island in San Diego. The closure of the NATSF, responsible for the management of technical manuals for the Defense Department, is expected to result in the loss of 227 jobs; the closure of NAESU, responsible for a variety of engineering and technical services including training and maintenance to fleet activities, is expected to result in the loss of 90 jobs.

The recommendation to relocate these facilities to San Diego is troublesome in several respects. First of all, it disrupts the relationship between NATSF and its parent command, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) located in Arlington, Virginia. The close working relationship of these two organizations required over 600 trips by NATSF personnel to NAVAIRSYSCOM in Arlington in fiscal year 1994 alone; the relocation of NATSF to San Diego would greatly complicate their coordinated efforts. Second, the Department's relocation scenario does not reflect any costs associated with the cross-country communications links that would have to be established between NATSF and the ASO -- now only minutes away in Philadelphia. Third, it would disrupt the longstanding management and staff relationship that has emerged between NAESU and the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Philadelphia, NAESU's contract partner for over 27 years. City officials and NATSF and NAESU

representatives have estimated, in fact, that improved coordination and cost efficiency would result from the combination of these two facilities at the current ASO site in Philadelphia and not from their relocation to San Diego. The consolidation of all of these facilities at the same site would result in greater cost efficiency and would provide that face-to-face coordination that is so crucial to their related engineering and technical responsibilities.

Naval Surface Warfare Center

It is important to consider these closure and disestablishment recommendations in light of the City of Philadelphia's history in past base closure rounds, which, unfortunately, serves as an example of the disproportionate burden that the entire state of Pennsylvania has had to bear. As outlined in an April 5 letter to this Commission from several members of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation, the Philadelphia region is the only region in the country to have military installations closed in all three of the previous base closure rounds. The impact of these closures is enormous: the loss of 40,000 jobs (direct and indirect) in the Philadelphia region and the loss of \$50 million in tax revenue for the city. The 10,000 direct civilian jobs lost in the 1991 base closure round, including the recommendation to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, accounted for more than one third of the national total for this round.

In light of this grim history, the Defense Department's recommendation to realign functions of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division to the Philadelphia site is a particularly welcome proposal. As stated in the aforementioned April 5 letter, the NSWC/CD-Philadelphia site is the Defense Department's only source for in-service engineering and for the testing and evaluation (T&E) of ship machinery systems. The Navy devotes 20 percent of its annual budget to the lifecycle costs associated with its 10,000 machinery systems and 200,000

component models in its ships and submarines; the 1600 employees of the NSVC/CD-Philadelphia have played a significant role in that crucial process of upkeep, evaluation and repair. As the Navy has argued, there are significant "synergistic efficiencies" to be enjoyed as a result of the consolidation of NSWC/CD activities in Philadelphia, providing increased cost efficiency in acquisition and development, decreased overhead costs, and an increased capacity to respond rapidly to immediate problems. These efficiencies, combined with the resulting cost savings (\$175.1 million over 20 years) and the already devastating impact that Philadelphia has borne in past base closure rounds, make this proposal a reasonable one that this Commission would be wise to approve.

In an effort to further capitalize on just these sorts of "synergistic efficiencies," Philadelphia has offered this Commission a complementary proposal involving the NSWC/CD-Philadelphia. Under this additional proposal, the NSWC/CD-Philadelphia would also receive the Engineering Directorate of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), currently located in Crystal City, Virginia, a move of 600 jobs to the Philadelphia site. City officials estimate that this proposal, like the Defense Department proposal discussed above, would result in significant cost savings for the Department -- as much as \$187 million over 20 years -- as well as increased efficiency in the process of ship repair and development. NAVSEA itself, along with a wide range of Defense Department and private sector experts, has stressed the importance of achieving a smaller command structure in Washington, D.C. by moving its engineering activities into the field.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, this brief survey of military facilities in

Pennsylvania demonstrates their proven importance to our nation's defense and to the communities in which they reside -- as well as the fact that, in many cases, misguided figures and assumptions have led to the recommendation that they be closed or realigned. I have represented the state of Pennsylvania for over fourteen years; having witnessed the tremendous burden that Pennsylvania has borne in the base closure rounds of 1988, 1991 and 1993, having visited Pennsylvania's military facilities personally on many occasions in recent months and having reviewed their military and economic importance, and having served as a member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I am convinced that the interests of our national defense and of the people of Pennsylvania will be harmed by the additional closure or realignment of military bases in our state. In the end, it is your responsibility to submit to the Administration a final list of base closure and realignment recommendations. I urge you to ensure that this final list does justice to the tremendous importance of Pennsylvania's military installations to the defense of our country and to the communities that are their homes.

Thank you.

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK CHAIRMAN DIXON
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE BASE
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION FOR
CONVENING TODAY'S HEARING.

341 CH6B
MY APPEARANCE TODAY IS MUCH DIFFERENT
THAN THE LAST TIME I SPOKE BEFORE THE
COMMISSION IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY. IN
1991, THE COMMISSION WAS REVIEWING THE
NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE THE
PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD. THIS
SEPTEMBER WHEN THE OVERHAUL IS COMPLETE ON
THE USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, ON TIME AND ON
BUDGET, SHE WILL STEAM OUT THE NAVY YARD
AND THE YARD WILL CLOSE.

BASED ON THAT DECISION AND OTHERS,
PHILADELPHIA HAS THE UNFORTUNATE
DISTINCTION OF BEING THE ONLY CITY TO BE
IMPACTED IN EVERY BASE CLOSURE ROUND. ALL
TOTAL THE PHILADELPHIA REGION WILL LOSE
38,000 JOBS AS A RESULT OF THESE THREE
BRAC ROUNDS.

I AM HERE TODAY TO URGE YOUR SUPPORT OF THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION TO CONSOLIDATE NAVY ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS AT THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, CARDEROCK DIVISION, PHILADELPHIA. ADDITIONALLY, I STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION BY THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. IT BUILDS ON THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION BY FURTHER CONSOLIDATING NAVY ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS BY REALIGNING THE ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE AT NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS IN PHILADELPHIA.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL PROMOTE THE READINESS OF OUR ARMED FORCES, LOWER NAVY MACHINERY LIFE-CYCLE COSTS AND IMPROVE EFFICIENCY WHILE ASSISTING IN THE CONVERSION OF THE PHILADELPHIA NAVY YARD.

I ALSO STRONGLY URGE THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION TO MAINTAIN THE 1993

COMMISSION'S DECISION TO MOVE THE DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER FROM ITS PRESENT LOCATION TO THE SITE OF THE NAVY AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE COMPOUND IN NORTHEAST PHILADELPHIA. DPSC PERFORMS THE CRITICAL TASK OF BUYING AND MOVING FOOD, CLOTHING, MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND OTHER SUPPORT PRODUCTS FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES. IN THIS CAPACITY, DPSC HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN RESTORING CREDIBILITY TO MILITARY PROCUREMENT, PUTTING TO REST THE IMAGES OF GOLD PLATED TOILET SEATS, HAMMERS AND ASH TRAYS. FURTHERMORE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE COMMISSION GIVE CERTAINTY TO PAST COMMISSION ORDERS, RATHER THAN EXPOSING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TO A REVOLVING DOOR OF INCONSISTENT DECISIONS.

THE COMMISSION CAN BUILD ON THE SUCCESS OF DPSC'S IMPOSING TRACK RECORD BY MERGING IT WITH THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER IN PHILADELPHIA. THESE IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES COULD BE CONSOLIDATED UNDER ONE BASE OPERATING SUPPORT STRUCTURE. THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD ENHANCE MILITARY READINESS, BETTER UTILIZE A VALUED WORKFORCE, AND ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT COST SAVINGS.

THE NSWC, PHILADELPHIA IS THE NAVY'S ONLY SOURCE FOR IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING AND FOR TESTING AND EVALUATING SHIP MACHINERY SYSTEMS. A FULL TWENTY PERCENT OF THE NAVY'S ANNUAL BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO LIFE-CYCLE COSTS FOR THESE VITAL SYSTEMS.

BY CONTINUING THE CONSOLIDATION OF
ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS IN PHILADELPHIA--A
PROCESS WHICH BEGAN AS A RESULT OF A 1991
BRAC DECISION--THE NAVY ESTIMATES THAT
THEY WILL SAVE \$175.1 MILLION OVER TWENTY
YEARS. FURTHERMORE, THIS REALIGNMENT CAN
BE COMPLETED IN A COST EFFECTIVE MANNER.
THE NAVY CALCULATES THAT THE REALIGNMENT
WILL COST \$25 MILLION.

THIS RECOMMENDATION WILL ALSO GREATLY
IMPROVE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND
MILITARY READINESS BY CONSOLIDATING LIFE-
CYCLE SUPPORT FOR MACHINERY SYSTEMS IN ONE
CENTRAL LOCATION. THIS WOULD STREAMLINE
THE NAVY'S ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS AND ENABLE THE PURCHASE OF MORE
CAPABLE SYSTEMS AT LOWER COSTS.

THE SECOND PROPOSAL WHICH I MENTIONED EARLIER WOULD BUILD ON THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATION BY MOVING NAVSEA'S ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE TO PHILADELPHIA.

THIS CONSOLIDATION WOULD PROVIDE A MAJOR RETURN ON INVESTMENT BY REDUCING DUPLICATION OF ACTIVITIES BETWEEN THE 650 EMPLOYEES AT NAVSEA AND THE 1600 WORKERS AT NSWC, PHILADELPHIA. THE NAVY'S OWN INTERNAL STUDIES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS DUPLICATION AND THAT NAVSEA'S ENGINEERS SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM HEADQUARTERS AND MOVED TO THE FIELD. FURTHERMORE, IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD SAVE THE NAVY \$13.4 MILLION PER YEAR AND A TOTAL SAVINGS OVER TWENTY YEARS OF \$165.88 MILLION.

AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, PHILADELPHIA HAS BEEN BATTERED BY THE BASE CLOSURE PROCESS.

HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO CONVERT THE PHILADELPHIA NAVY YARD AND DEVELOP COMMERCIAL SHIPBUILDING IN PLACE OF NAVY WORK ARE SUCCEEDING.

EVEN BEFORE THE KENNEDY LEAVES, WE HAVE TWO ESTABLISHED COMMERCIAL MARITIME OPERATIONS WHICH ARE INTERESTED IN BUILDING SHIPS AT THE YARD. THIS COULD MEAN 3,800 JOBS FOR NAVY YARD WORKERS. ADDITIONALLY, THE WESTINGHOUSE CORPORATION AND GARVEY PRECISION MACHINE HAVE COMMITTED TO MOVING TO THE YARD AND CREATING OVER 150 JOBS. ALL OF THESE BUSINESSES HAVE CITED NSWC'S LOCATION AT THE NAVY YARD AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THEIR DECISION TO COME TO PHILADELPHIA.

THESE ARE EXCELLENT RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL BOOST MILITARY READINESS, SAVE MONEY, AND GREATLY ASSIST OUR WORK TO REVITALIZE THE COMMERCIAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AT THE NAVY YARD. THE EXPERTS AGREE. FORMER NAVY SECRETARIES JOHN LEHMAN AND SEAN O'KEEFE HAVE STRONGLY ENDORSED THESE PROPOSALS.

IN FACT, SECRETARY LEHMAN TESTIFIED BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT THE REGIONAL HEARING IN BALTIMORE IN SUPPORT OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.

WITH THESE OUTSTANDING BENEFITS IN MIND--SAVING MONEY, ENHANCING READINESS AND BOOSTING DEFENSE CONVERSION IN PHILADELPHIA--I URGE THE COMMISSION TO ADOPT THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.

THANK YOU.

BRAC 95

Fort Indiantown Gap

FEDERAL AND NATIONAL GUARD FUNDING OF BASE OPERATIONS

States Should Not Pay for Base Operations

The funding for base operations, those funds used to operate and maintain a military installation, come strictly from the Federal government. A popular misconception is that the states provide 25 percent of the funds for the operation of their respective National Guard. The 75-25 split in funding applies only to the construction of new facilities to "house" units in the state -the armories.

When a new armory is to be built, the Federal government supplies 75 percent of the funds and the state must provide the other 25 percent. This is the case, for example, for the 28th Division's new Aviation Brigade armory currently under construction at Fort Indiantown Gap.

The National Guard Bureau operates 59 training sites in the United States on an annual budget of \$157 million. The BRAC 95 recommendations would add four additional training sites to those already operated by the states, but with BASOPS funding provided by the National Guard Bureau. The current budget would be divided between 61 not 57 sites thereby spreading already limited BASOPS funds even further.

Tank Crew Qualification: Key to Readiness

Tank Table VIII is the table which must be completed in order to qualify tank crews. This table must be fired on a certified range which allows for required distances and target arrays. Currently, the only available Tank Table VIII ranges in the eastern U.S. are located at Fort Stewart GA., Fort Pickett, VA, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA, and Fort Drum, NY. Fort Dix, NJ is scheduled to complete a Table VIII range but it will not be suitable for firing the 105mm main guns of the M-1 and M-1IP tanks of the National Guard. Fort A.P. Hill does not have a Table VII range nor an equipment site at which armored vehicles can be stored and issued for training.

Tank crews must continually fire Tank Table VII throughout the year in order to maintain their crew qualification. It is a key component of readiness ratings for an armor unit. In order to maintain their qualification, crews must be able to fire sustainment gunnery at certified tank ranges which are available during weekend training. They cannot wait to fire only during their two-week Annual Training period.

The Gap: An Impractical Enclave

Tank Table VIII is the table which must be completed in order to qualify tank crews. This table must be fired on a certified range which allows for required distances and target arrays. Currently, the only available Tank Table VIII ranges in the eastern U.S. are located at Fort Stewart GA., Fort Pickett, VA, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA, and Fort Drum, NY. Fort Dix, NJ is scheduled to complete a Table VIII range but it will not be suitable for firing the 105mm main guns of the M-1 and M-1IP tanks of the National Guard. Fort A.P. Hill does not have a Table VII range nor an equipment site at which armored vehicles can be stored and issued for training.

Tank crews must continually fire Tank Table VII throughout the year in order to maintain their crew qualification. It is a key component of readiness ratings for an armor unit. In order to maintain their qualification, crews must be able to fire sustainment gunnery at certified tank ranges which are available during weekend training. They cannot wait to fire only during their two-week Annual Training period.

Tank Table VIII is the table which must be completed in order to qualify tank crews. This table must be fired on a certified range which allows for required distances and target arrays. Currently, the only available Tank Table VIII

Summary

- ① A misconception: BASOPS funding
- ② Tank Table VIII Ranges
- ③ Why the Gap cannot be "enclaved"
- ④ The Gap: Most cost effective & 2nd most used Major Training Area

BRAC 95

Fort Indiantown Gap

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP HAS HIGH VALUE TO ALL OF DOD

DoD Under Estimates The Gap's Value

The data used in the Army's military value analysis does not include some significant training facilities such as tank crew qualification ranges, automated air-to-ground bombing and strafing ranges, and the value of low-level flight routes which lead into a Military Operations Area (MOA) - airspace which is dedicated to military aircraft operations. These facilities all exist at the Gap and significantly contribute to its military value to the DOD, not just the Army.

The Army clearly did not fully understand the complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to the Air Force, Navy, and Marines Corps. In addition, the Army's analysis of military value did not include training conducted by the other services. In fact, the other services were not queried as to their training requirements at the Gap. The Marine Corps Reserves, the Air Force (both active and reserve), the Navy (both active and reserve) all train at the installation and on the bombing and strafing range.

The bombing range is part of an integrated series of ranges in the eastern U.S. The loss of any of them would overload the other ranges and severely degrade the training of the aviation units in the other services, all of which use these ranges.

In addition, international students are trained at the flight simulator complex as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program.

The Army did not consider the Northern Training Area at Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square miles used for Army Aviation training. The Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS), located at the Gap, is the second largest Army aviation training facility in the country. It is a critical part of the Army's overall aviation training program. The land used for this training



THE GAP - AN IMPORTANT DOD POWER PROJECTION PLATFORM

was not considered in the analysis of military value since ground maneuver is restricted within most of this area.

Army aviation is a key component of the three-dimensional maneuver of the modern Army. To not recognize the value of this aviation maneuver area flies in the face of current Army maneuver doctrine. When this maneuver area is considered, the military ranking of the Gap in the Major Training Area category increases from ninth out of ten to third out of ten in the DOD Major Training Area category.

FLAWED AND MISSING DATA MEAN FAULTY CONCLUSIONS

Important Military Data Was Missed

The Army's military value analysis was based on data elements which were specified by the Army and received from all installations. However, the data does include several primary factors relevant to reserve component units: the accessibility to a given training site, the suitability of proposed alternate training sites for specific units and training, and the affordability (additional transportation costs) of moving training to more distant locations.

The Army used an analytical model called TRAINLOAD to determine to which installations reserve component annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in that its results are based on a 12 month availability of reserve component units for annual training. In reality, these units are limited to the May to September time frame due to the 15-20 percent of their soldiers who are in school during the September - May time period. When the annual training period is thus compressed, the proposed alternate training sites (Fort Drum, Fort Dix, and Fort AP Hill) are not able to take the additional training load.

Summary

- 1 Gap's Military Value Under Estimated
- 2 DoD Missed Important Military Data
- 3 Governor To Train Federal Troops?
- 4 Army Overstated Savings and Understated Costs

Remove Fort Indiantown Gap from the base closure list!

BRAC 95 Fort Indiantown Gap

**FORT INDIANTOWN GAP HAS
HIGH VALUE TO ALL OF DOD**

DoD Under Estimates The Gap's Value


The data used in the Army's military value analysis does not include some significant training facilities such as tank crew qualification ranges, automated air-to-ground bombing and strafing ranges, and the value of low-level flight routes which lead into a Military Operations Area (MOA) - airspace which is dedicated to military aircraft operations. These facilities all exist at the Gap and significantly contribute to its military value to the DOD, not just the Army.

The Army clearly did not fully understand the complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition, the Army's analysis of military value did not include training conducted by the other services. In fact, the other services were not queried as to their training requirements at the Gap. The Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force (both active and reserve), the Navy (both active and reserve) all train at the installation and on the bombing and strafing range.

The bombing range is part of an integrated series of ranges in the eastern U.S. The loss of any of them would overload the other ranges and severely degrade the training of the aviation units in the other services all of which use these ranges.

In addition, international students are trained at the flight simulator complex as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program.

The Army did not consider the Northern Training Area at Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square miles, which is used for Army Aviation training. The Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS), located at the Gap, is the second largest Army aviation training facility in the country. It is a critical part of the Army's overall aviation training program. The land used for this training



**THE GAP - AN IMPORTANT DOD
POWER PROJECTION PLATFORM**

was not considered in the analysis of military value since ground maneuver is restricted within most of this area.

Army aviation is a key component of the three-dimensional maneuver of the modern Army. To not recognize the value of this aviation maneuver area flies in the face of current Army maneuver doctrine. When this maneuver area is considered, the military ranking of the Gap in the Major Training Area category increases from ninth out of ten to third out of ten in the DOD Major Training Area category.

**FLAWED AND MISSING DATA
LEAD TO FAULTY CONCLUSIONS**

Important Military Data Was Missed

The Army's military value analysis was based on data elements which were specified by the Army and received from all installations. However, the data does include several primary factors relevant to reserve component units: the accessibility to a given training site, the suitability of proposed alternate training sites for specific units and training, and the affordability (additional transportation costs) of moving training to more distant locations.

The Army used an analytical model called TRAIN/OAD to determine to which installations reserve component annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in that its results are based on a 12 month availability of reserve component units for annual training. In reality, these units are limited to the May to September time frame due to the 15-20 percent of their soldiers who are in school during the September - May time period. When the annual training period is thus compressed, the proposed alternate training sites (Fort Drum, Fort Dix, and Fort AP Hill) are not able to take the additional training load.

Summary

Gap's Military Value Under Estimated
DoD Missed Important Military Data
Governor To Train Federal Troops
Army Overstated Savings and Understated Costs

Two of the proposed alternate training sites have limitations on the kind of training which can be conducted. Neither Fort Dix or Fort AP Hill have tank crew qualification ranges, only one mechanized installation can maneuver at Fort Dix at one time, AP Hill is unsuitable for mechanized training due to the density of the vegetation and limited number of tank trails, there are limitations on artillery firing at Dix and AP Hill, and AP Hill does not have a National Guard equipment site with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery. To create an equipment site would require extensive environmental studies and the costs of the new construction were not considered in the Army's COBRA analysis. Thus, the Army erred in that the proposed sites cannot meet all existing training requirements of the units which currently train at the Gap.

The additional transportation costs of moving training to these sites was not considered in the Army's COBRA analysis. The cost is estimated at \$1.6 million annually for just the Army National Guard.

The impact of an increased training load on the alternate training sites also was not a part of the Army's analysis. The affected installations were not consulted. The increased training load will adversely affect range and training facility maintenance and increase existing environmental problems in training areas.

Under the DOD recommendation, training and readiness of all affected reserve component units would suffer. For many units the Annual Training period would be reduced by two days as additional travel days would be required to get to the proposed training sites.

DOD'S UNFUNDED MANDATE - TRANSFERRING A FUNCTION WITHOUT TRANSFERRING FUNDS

Governor To Train Federal Soldiers

If the DOD recommendation were implemented, the Commonwealth would be responsible for environmental issues and safety on the ranges, in the training areas, and in the air space. There are clearly a Federal responsibility as the troops and units training there are Federal forces. In addition, the responsibility for the training of international military personnel would also fall on the Governor as the operator of the installation. This is clearly a DOD responsibility.

The BRAC recommendation for the Gap would have the Commonwealth pick up the responsibility for running the infrastructure of the installation for the Reserve and National Guard

units as well as the Reserve Component Training Institutions which will remain as part of the "reserve component enclave". The Army has concluded it will cost too much to move these units and activities to other installations. The current charges for these activities are at a rate which the Commonwealth could not afford to charge to completely cover their costs. As a result, the rates charged for services would drastically increase as the Commonwealth would have to operate the installation on a break-even basis. These additional costs were not included in the COBRA analysis.

BRAC 95 DOD COBRA ANALYSIS

Understated Costs - Overstated Savings

The Army seriously overestimated the savings derived from its recommended closure action. The fact is that there will be zero savings. The original COBRA analysis estimated a \$23 million annual savings. This analysis double counted some cost data submitted by the installation in its data call. This was not caught by Army Audit Agency auditors who were a part of the Total Army Basing Study (TAHS) team.

The analysis used incorrect and flawed Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP) data. The COBRA analysis incorrectly assumed a 43% increase in the installation's population from FY93 to FY96 resulting in an overestimation of the cost savings.

The COBRA analysis used a standard Department of the Army annual civilian pay figure of \$47,000 to generate estimated savings. While a standard factor is useful when comparing one installation to another, site specific data should be used to generate the estimated savings. The use of site specific data was recommended by the Joint Process Action Team which examined the 1993 BRAC. The actual annual civilian pay average at the Gap is \$27,000. The use of the standard DA figure resulted in an overestimation of cost savings.

The original COBRA data was challenged by the Ft. Indiantown Gap Coalition. The Army ran a second analysis using some of the corrections recommended by the Coalition. This resulted in a decrease of the estimated annual savings from \$23 million to \$11.6 million.

When the data and second COBRA analysis was challenged by the Coalition, the Army again admitted it had erred, adjusted its data, and ran a

third COBRA analysis which was given to the BRAC Commission on 23 May. This analysis estimates an annual savings of only \$6.7 million - a 75 percent reduction in savings from the original analysis upon which the decision to close the Gap was made.

The \$6.7 million annual savings is still inaccurate since it overestimates the repair and maintenance funding actually spent by the installation and the cost of reducing the number of civilian personnel. When actual figures are used the annual savings is only \$2.5 million.

The Army's estimated annual savings do not include two important factors. First is the additional cost of transportation for units to conduct annual training at other installations. The cost is estimated at \$1.6 million annually for just the Army National Guard. The Army Basing Study's position is that they assume these costs will be funded by the Army.

The reality is that the Army National Guard transportation accounts have been decreasing steadily for a number of years. Only by transferring money from other accounts (such as operations and maintenance) will the additional transportation costs be covered. This will lead to a decrease in readiness.

Second, only the costs involved in moving active Army units and functions were included in the COBRA analysis. Thus, the costs of moving the USAR Equipment Concentration Site (ECS) from the Gap to Fort Dix, NJ, estimated at \$8 million were not included in the estimate of overall savings.

THE BOTTOM LINE

The Gap Has A High Military Value to DoD

The DOD recommendation is based on inaccurate and incomplete data which seriously underestimates the military value of the Gap, not only for the Army but for the other services.

If implemented, the recommendation would result in the needless loss of a valuable training facility, a degradation in the training and readiness of many reserve component units, increased transportation costs to units with the funds coming from existing operations and maintenance accounts, and the shift of what should clearly be a Federal responsibility for the training of Federal troops to the Governor and Commonwealth.

DRAFT

PUERTO RICO

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

ARMY:

Fort Buchanan

Realign


II. COMMISSION ADD-ON FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

DRAFT

MAP NO. 53

PUERTO RICO



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

First of all, I wish to extend my appreciation to the Commission for allowing me the opportunity to express in person my deep concern over the proposed closure of Fort Buchanan, the only Active Army installation in the whole Caribbean region. And I say closure in a deliberate way as the term realignment is a misnomer under the circumstances facing the Fort.

Although the former Camp Buchanan was originally established as a training site for the 65th United States Infantry Regiment in 1923, its role has changed dramatically over the years. The main mission of Fort Buchanan at present is to prepare and assume responsibility for the mobilization of reserve component forces in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Further, the Fort provides administrative and logistical support to active and reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces in Puerto Rico and the U.S.

Virgin Islands, including Puerto Rico's Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). This includes recruiting services for the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as providing mobilization support for all reserve components in case of war. In addition, Fort Buchanan plans, coordinates and executes all Army-related counter-terrorism actions on the Island.

In recent military operations such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Uphold Democracy where Reserve Forces and National Guard units have been mobilized, Fort Buchanan, as a lead mobilization station, has played a key role serving as a support hub to bring together all elements of support assuring the quick validation and deployment of the mobilized units. Also proven during these operations was the fact that the "Total Army" concept really works, thereby firmly establishing the trend that Reserve Component Units will continue to be mobilized along with the Active Component. If Fort Buchanan is closed, who will

support future mobilizations in Puerto Rico?

Fort Buchanan is a mobilization station while its parent installation, Fort McPherson in Georgia, is solely an administrative support headquarters which has remained untouched by BRAC. To close the Fort Buchanan garrison while maintaining Fort MacPherson does not meet the test to consolidate and economize on military spending.

Although the Department of Defense Proposal asks for a "realignment" of Fort Buchanan, this move would constitute, for all practical purposes, a closure. In effect, the Fort will cease operations as an active army enclave. All active Army personnel (military and civilian) will leave; all active Army functions will cease; all family housing must be abandoned and all morale support activities stopped.

If this "realignment" were to take place, it would result in a potential reduction of at least 500 jobs. The Commission is definitely being misled by the figures presented in the Department of Defense's Base Closure and Realignment Report stating that only 128 jobs would be lost.

At this time, Fort Buchanan services 2,486 Active Duty and civilian personnel. It also serves five other sizeable groups comprising some 73,170 persons who would also be negatively impacted. These five groups include 175 Active Guard/Reserve personnel and their families; 15,410 Reserve Component soldiers; 19,835 family members of Reserve Component soldiers; 13,260 retirees; and 34,890 family members of retirees.

Fort Buchanan is a symbol of the Army's interest in the Caribbean Basin and its presence brings stability to the region. To

"realign" or close this installation will not only negatively impact on the critical support to the Active and Reserve Component Forces, but will also add to the unemployment problem on the Island.

But perhaps the strongest argument in favor of keeping Fort Buchanan on the active list is that the supposed monetary savings to be achieved by closing the Post are highly questionable. The efficiency and combat readiness of Reserve Component organizations will certainly suffer and mobilization of these organizations will eventually take place at a much higher cost to taxpayers than if Fort Buchanan were to be maintained on the active list. Is it worth risking part of our national security to allegedly save a few dollars here and there? Will the Army be able to rapidly and efficiently mobilize our Reserve Component units for a future conflict without Fort Buchanan?

I believe it is in our best national security interests that the Active Army facilities at Fort Buchanan remain open, particularly

now with the upcoming termination of the U.S. military presence in
Panamá under the terms of the Panamá Canal Treaty of 1977.

Puerto Rico has a proud and long tradition of supporting national defense. This has been shown time and time again as hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans, in spite of their obvious second-class citizenship, have consistently and promptly answered the Nation's call to arms without hesitation. From the vital defenses of Panama during the First World War and practically every theater of operations during the Second World War, to the frozen plains of Korea, the hardships of Vietnam, the interventions in Grenada and Panama and the sands of the Middle East... Puerto Ricans have been there and have shed their blood. Throughout all of these operations, Fort Buchanan has always stood ready to support us.

Today, more than ever, we in Puerto Rico stand ready to assume an even greater role in the Army of the 21st century. Closing Fort Buchanan, the only Active Army installation in Puerto Rico and the

whole Caribbean region, is certain to lead us in the wrong direction.

strongly urge you to remove Fort Buchanan from any proposed base closure list.

DRAFT

RHODE ISLAND

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

None


II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

DRAFT

MAP NO. 40

RHODE ISLAND



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

Statement of the Honorable Jack Reed
before the
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Washington, D.C.
June 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I am pleased to join my colleagues in support of the further realignment of Navy underwater research, development, testing, and evaluation functions to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, Rhode Island.

While this consolidation proposal would generate over 1,000 new jobs in my state, it is more important to note that this consolidation builds upon past BRAC recommendations approved by this Commission's predecessors. Failure to endorse further rationalization of the Navy's undersea R,D,T, and E capabilities would upset the sensible path recommended by the Defense Department and conceivably jeopardize future submarine research.

I am pleased that the Defense Department has once again identified Newport as the most logical and cost effective location for the consolidation of Navy submarine warfare related research.

The proposed realignment in Newport will also capitalize on and expand the existing synergy between NUWC and the multitude of private submarine oriented engineering and software firms located on Acquidneck Island. Many companies that have done business with NUWC New London are establishing Newport offices in the wake of the Defense Department's recommendation.

As you know, the Defense Department developed this proposal after intense scrutiny and in-depth data analysis. Indeed, the cost estimates for this proposal were developed jointly by personnel from both the Newport and New London NUWC facilities and comply with standard methodologies used in past BRAC's.

While some may argue that the Navy's proposal to consolidate undersea research, development, test, and evaluation in Newport will inconvenience the family life of some NUWC New London personnel, it is my understanding that many New London employees have expressed to the Navy an interest in employment at the Newport facility. Unlike many proposed realignments, the close proximity of these facilities will ease family adjustments.



The Commission should also uphold the DoD's recommendation on realigning submarine R,D,T, and E functions at NUWC Newport because it requires no new military construction or lease space and can accommodate new missions within the DoD's cost estimates.

I would also urge the Commission to carefully review and support the recommended relocation of certain Navy Air training activities to the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) in Newport. This is a straight forward proposal that would yield an estimated net savings of \$158.8 million during implementation and approximately \$471 million in savings over 20 years.



Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I urge you to endorse the Defense Department's recommendation to continue the consolidation of Navy undersea research and development at NUWC Newport and to move certain training functions to NETC Newport.

Thank you.



STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN H. CHAFEE
TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of defense base closures. I recognize the extremely difficult job the Commission faces in deciding on how best to accomplish the continued painful down-sizing of our defense infrastructure, and I commend the efforts of the Commissioners in meeting this challenge.

I would like to address three Department of Defense (DoD) recommendations affecting the Navy's presence in Newport, Rhode Island: the proposed consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's (NUWC) New London, CT detachment into NUWC's Newport, Rhode Island headquarters; the proposed transfer of the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), Meridian, MS into Newport's Naval Education and Training Center (NETC); and the proposed relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL UWSRD), Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. I believe the Navy has done well in proposing three recommendations which will streamline its operations, thereby saving resources and enhancing national security. I am further convinced that these three proposals will survive careful scrutiny and fully meet the exacting criteria established by the base closure law.

In 1991, the Navy, through the BRAC process, consolidated all of its research and development (R&D) laboratories into four "superlabs," one each for air, surface, subsurface and C³I activities. The undersea component created by this consolidation is the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, headquartered in Newport, Rhode Island with several outlying detachments. During my three and one-half years of working with officials of NUWC/Newport, and having visited the lab on many occasions, I can surely attest that NUWC is an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art facility. NUWC's superlab designation enhanced the reputation it had already earned as a center of excellence for submarine research and development. The work of NUWC's dedicated, hard-working employees has allowed the U.S. Navy to maintain its technological superiority in all aspects of undersea warfare, a priority that has become increasingly urgent with the global proliferation of modern submarines.

But NUWC's position within the Navy force structure is not static. The Center is well-prepared with a most willing workforce and a growing infrastructure to increase its contribution to our national security. In fact, a \$12 million building was just opened in January, and two more worth \$11.2 million and \$21.7 million are under construction and scheduled to open in January and June of 1996 respectively. These last two facilities are being built specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and BRAC '95 influx of personnel and their activities from New London, CT.

Further consolidation of NUWC at Newport will save DoD scarce resources by eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies. The 1991 action appears well on its way to reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will result in further savings of \$91.2 million over 20 years. These savings will ultimately allow the Navy to invest more resources into our irreplaceable submarine technical base, rather than needlessly squander them on overhead and excess capacity.

Those seeking to thwart the Navy's plans for NUWC have argued to the Commission that the transfer to Newport will result in adverse impact on personnel retention and geographic technical synergies. This contention is seriously flawed, as any such negative impact is offset by at least two factors. First, the close geographic proximity of New London personnel to the Newport site will encourage commuting and continued employment at NUWC. Second, a large percentage of NUWC/New London technical work is performed by private contractors. If these employees choose not to move to Newport, either of two remedies are available: the contractor could utilize employees of its Newport office, or the Navy could easily hire another contractor.

Opponents of the NUWC plan also wrongly argue that the cost of transferring the 700+ NUWC/New London personnel to NUWC/Newport under BRAC '91 has more than doubled from the Navy's original estimates. Proponents of this point of view argue that transferring the remaining 417 NUWC/New London employees to

Newport under BRAC '95 would lead to further cost discrepancies. However, a more responsible analysis of these costs shows quite a different story. Earlier this year I shared with the Commission the Navy's yearly documentation of the cost of the 1991 realignment of NUWC. I was pleased to note that the Navy's original cost estimate of the transfer has actually decreased by \$7.9 million. As I understand it, proponents of retaining NUWC's New London detachment used different economic models which produced a higher current cost, thus making an unfavorable comparison to the Navy's original estimate.

For all of the reasons cited above, I urge this Commission to approve the Navy's proposal to consolidate NUWC's New London detachment into its Newport headquarters. There is clearly no logical alternative for location of the Navy's principal undersea research and development laboratory.

The Navy has also recommended the relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. This proposal will achieve savings of \$30.1 million over 20 years, and will complement the New London transfer, further bolstering our nation's undersea R&D effort. I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal, and urge the Commission to do so as well.

Finally, I would like to address the Navy's recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS to

Athens, GA and NETC/Newport. This proposal seeks to co-locate NTTC's enlisted schools at bases that largely consist of officer schools. Specifically, the Navy seeks to streamline its operations and achieve savings by transferring several Administrative Schools from NTTC/Meridian to Newport.

NETC/Newport has long maintained a sterling reputation as a superior learning center. Institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface Warfare Officers School, the Officer Indoctrination School, and many others have provided the fleet with the best-educated, highest quality personnel. I have long argued that in these times of continued shrinking of our force structure, we must ensure that our men and women in uniform continue to be educated and trained at the highest standards. An increasingly complex and unpredictable world requires military personnel who are well-prepared to meet a number of new challenges.

The learning environment of NETC is ideal for incorporation of the Administrative schools of NTTC/Meridian. Its classroom facilities are modern, housing is plentiful, and the surrounding community is prepared to welcome the influx of students with open arms. Simply put, Newport's quality of life is difficult to match within the Navy. And it is quality of life that remains such an important factor in recruiting and retaining our military's most important resource, its people.

I have previously shared with this Commission information on a recent effort conducted by NETC that merits reiteration. NETC's livability is illustrated by its successful implementation of the Navy's Family Housing Neighborhoods of Excellence (NOE) program, begun in 1992 by then-Commander of the Naval Facilities and Engineering Command, Admiral Jack Buffington. This innovative, wide-ranging program involves modernization and beautification of Navy housing, in addition to improved housing maintenance services. It is fair to say that NETC has performed as well as any other Navy base in the nation in implementing the NOE program.

Finally, the move of NTTC to Newport will achieve needed cost savings during these times of a shrinking military. The Navy's responsible research has concluded that annual recurring savings after implementation of the NAS/Meridian closure is \$26.9 million, with net savings over 20 years of \$345.6 million. These figures have yet to be adequately disproved with respect to NTTC. For all of these reasons, I urge the Commission to approve the Navy's proposed transfer of NTTC/Meridian to Athens and Newport.

Again, I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to appear today to present my testimony.

Sen. Chafee

Statement Of Senator John H. Chafee -- June 13, 1995
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of defense base closures. I recognize the extremely difficult job the Commission faces in deciding on how best to accomplish the continued painful down-sizing of our defense infrastructure, and I commend the efforts of the Commissioners in meeting this challenge.

I would like to address three Department of Defense (DoD) recommendations affecting the Navy's presence in Newport, Rhode Island: the proposed consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's (NUWC) New London, CT detachment into NUWC's Newport, Rhode Island headquarters; the proposed transfer of the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), Meridian, MS into Newport's Naval Education and Training Center (NETC); and the proposed relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL UWSRD), Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. I believe the Navy has done well in proposing three recommendations which will streamline its operations, thereby saving resources and enhancing national security. I am further convinced that these three proposals will survive careful scrutiny and fully meet the exacting criteria established by the base closure law.

In 1991, the Navy, through the BRAC process, consolidated all of its research and development (R&D) laboratories into four "superlabs," one each for air, surface, subsurface and C3I activities. The undersea component created by this consolidation is the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, headquartered in Newport, Rhode Island with several outlying detachments. During my three and one-half years of working with officials of NUWC/Newport, and having visited the lab on many occasions, I can surely attest that NUWC is an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art facility. NUWC's superlab designation enhanced the reputation it had already earned as a center of excellence for submarine research and development. The work of NUWC's dedicated, hard-working employees has allowed the U.S. Navy to maintain its technological superiority in all aspects of undersea warfare, a priority that has become increasingly urgent with the global proliferation of modern submarines.

But NUWC's position within the Navy force structure is not static. The Center is well-prepared with a most willing workforce and a growing infrastructure to increase its contribution to our national security. In fact, a \$12 million building was just opened in January, and two more worth \$11.2 million and \$21.7 million are under construction and scheduled to open in January and June of 1996 respectively. These last two facilities are being built specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and BRAC '95 influx of personnel and their activities from New London, CT.

Further consolidation of NUWC at Newport will save DoD scarce resources by eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies. The 1991 action appears well on its way to reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will result in further savings of \$91.2 million over 20 years. These savings will ultimately allow the Navy to invest more resources into our irreplaceable submarine technical base, rather than needlessly squander them on overhead and excess capacity.

Those seeking to thwart the Navy's plans for NUWC have argued to the Commission that the transfer to Newport will result in adverse impact on personnel retention and geographic technical synergies. This contention is seriously flawed, as any such negative impact is offset by at least two factors. First, the close geographic proximity of New London personnel to the Newport site will encourage commuting and continued employment at NUWC. Second, a large percentage of NUWC/New London technical work is performed by private contractors. If these employees choose not to move to Newport, either of two remedies are available: the contractor could utilize employees of its Newport office, or the Navy could easily hire another contractor.

Opponents of the NUWC plan also wrongly argue that the cost of transferring the 700+ NUWC/New London personnel to NUWC/Newport under BRAC '91 has more than doubled from the Navy's original estimates. Proponents of this point of view argue that transferring the remaining 417 NUWC/New London employees to Newport under BRAC '95 would lead to further cost discrepancies. However, a more responsible analysis of these costs shows quite a different story. Earlier this year I shared with the Commission the Navy's yearly documentation of the cost of the 1991 realignment of NUWC. I was pleased to note that the Navy's original cost estimate of the transfer has actually decreased by \$7.9 million. As I understand it, proponents of retaining NUWC's New London detachment used different economic models which produced a higher current cost, thus making an unfavorable comparison to the Navy's original estimate.

For all of the reasons cited above, I urge this Commission to approve the Navy's proposal to consolidate NUWC's New London detachment into its Newport headquarters. There is clearly no logical alternative for location of the Navy's principal undersea research and development laboratory.

The Navy has also recommended the relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL to NUWC/Newport. This proposal will achieve savings of \$30.1 million over 20 years, and will complement the New London transfer, further bolstering our nation's undersea R&D effort. I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal, and urge the Commission to do so as well.

Finally, I would like to address the Navy's recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS to Athens, GA and NETC/Newport. This proposal seeks to co-locate NTTC's enlisted schools at bases that largely consist of officer schools. Specifically, the Navy seeks to streamline its operations and achieve savings by transferring several Administrative Schools from NTTC/Meridian to Newport.

NETC/Newport has long maintained a sterling reputation as a superior learning center. Institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface Warfare Officers School, the Officer Indoctrination School, and many others have provided the fleet with the best-educated, highest quality personnel. I have long argued that in these times of continued shrinking of our force structure, we must ensure that our men and women in uniform continue to be educated and trained at the highest standards. An increasingly complex and unpredictable world requires military personnel who are well-prepared to meet a number of new challenges.

The learning environment of NETC is ideal for incorporation of the Administrative schools of NTTC/Meridian. Its classroom facilities are modern, housing is plentiful, and the surrounding community is prepared to welcome the influx of students with open arms. Simply put, Newport's quality of life is difficult to match within the Navy. And it is quality of life that remains such an important factor in recruiting and retaining our military's most important resource, its people.

I have previously shared with this Commission information on a recent effort conducted by NETC that merits reiteration. NETC's livability is illustrated by its successful implementation of the Navy's Family Housing Neighborhoods of Excellence (NOE) program, begun in 1992 by then-Commander of the Naval Facilities and Engineering Command, Admiral Jack Buffington. This innovative, wide-ranging program involves modernization and beautification of Navy housing, in addition to improved housing maintenance services. It is fair to say that NETC has performed as well as any other Navy base in the nation in implementing the NOE program.

Finally, the move of NTTC to Newport will achieve needed cost savings during these times of a shrinking military. The Navy's responsible research has concluded that annual recurring savings after implementation of the NAS/Meridian closure is \$26.9 million, with net savings over 20 years of \$345.6 million. These figures have yet to be adequately disproved with respect to NTTC. For all of these reasons, I urge the Commission to approve the Navy's proposed transfer of NTTC/Meridian to Athens and Newport.

Again, I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to appear today to present my testimony.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of defense base closures. I will summarize my full statement, which I would like to place in the record.

My testimony will be somewhat different from what you usually hear. I support each of the three Department of Defense recommendations affecting the Navy's presence in Newport, Rhode Island.

First is the proposed consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's New London, Connecticut detachment into the Center's Newport, headquarters. I am convinced that the Newport laboratories constitute an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art facility. Its upgrading in 1991 to a "superlab" enhanced the reputation it had already earned as a center of excellence in submarine research and development.

The Center is well-prepared to increase its contribution to

our national security. In fact, a \$12 million laboratory was just opened in January, and two more costing \$11.2 million and \$21.7 million apiece are under construction and scheduled to open in 1996. These last two facilities are being built specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and BRAC '95 influx of personnel and their activities from New London, CT.

Consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Newport will save DoD scarce resources by eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies. The 1991 action already appears well on its way to reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will result in further savings of \$91.2 million over 20 years. These savings will ultimately allow the Navy to invest more resources into our irreplaceable undersea technical base, rather than squander them on needless overhead and excess capacity.

For all of the reasons cited above, I urge you to approve the Navy's proposal to consolidate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's New London detachment into its Newport headquarters.

Second, the Navy has recommended the relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL to Newport. This proposal will achieve savings of \$30.1 million over 20 years, and will further strengthen the Navy's undersea research and development effort. I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal, and urge the Commission to do so as well.

Third and last, I would like to address the Navy's recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi to Athens, Georgia and Newport's Naval Education and Training Center. In advancing this proposal, the Navy seeks to streamline its operations and achieve savings by moving several Administrative Schools from Meridian to Newport.

The Naval Education and Training Center at Newport has long maintained a sterling reputation as a superior learning center. It consists of institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface Warfare Officers School, and many others which

have provided the fleet with the best-educated, highest quality personnel. The learning environment of the Naval Education and Training Center is ideal for incorporation of the Administrative schools at Meridian. Its classroom facilities are modern, housing is plentiful, and the surrounding community is prepared to welcome the influx of students with open arms. Simply put, Newport's quality of life is difficult to match within the Navy. And as we all know, it is quality of life that is such an important factor in recruiting and retaining our military's most important resource, its people.

The move of the Naval Technical Training Center to Newport will also achieve needed cost savings. Annual recurring savings after implementation of the Naval Air Station/Meridian closure is \$26.9 million, with net savings over 20 years of \$345.6 million. For all of these reasons, I urge the Commission to approve the Navy's proposed transfer of the Naval Technical Training Center in Meridian to Athens and Newport.

Again, I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to appear today to present my testimony.

DRAFT

TENNESSEE

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY:

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis

Close


II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

DRAFT

MAP NO. 43

TENNESSEE



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES SENATOR FRED THOMPSON
TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission:

First, let me say that I applaud the efforts of the Department of Defense and the Base Closure and Realignment Commission to streamline our nation's defense system.

However, the closure of Defense Distribution Depot Memphis -- DDMT -- would hurt, not help our country's defense structure.

As my colleagues will tell you, Memphis and DDMT have the things that are needed when it comes to serving our troops and emergency operations in the field and at home.

From World War II to Desert Storm, the Memphis Depot has a proven record of service and continues to provide top support to our men and women in uniform. It has accomplished this through DDMT's highly automated and functional facility. The goods are delivered efficiently because, as many national and international companies know, Memphis' excellent transportation system and central location have helped make it America's distribution center.

At a time when the private sector finds Memphis such an appealing place to set up business, why is the Defense Department recommending that one of its prime logistics centers be closed in the very same city?

Part of DOD's recommendations entail lessening the amount of capacity in its storage system. As its current closure list stands, there would be a 22 million cubic foot shortfall in storage requirements. The Defense Logistics Agency has stated that the Air Force logistic centers -- ALCs -- coupled with direct vendor deliver, would make up that shortfall.

As you know, the Air Force never addressed the need to close any of its maintenance depots, or ALCs and the commission is presently examining their role in future military operations. This calls into question DLA's reliance on this space, especially if any of the air logistic centers are closed.

We, the members of the Tennessee delegation, are convinced that if any of the ALCs are closed that DLA will need more storage capacity. The closure of even the smallest ALC will result in a 17.8 million cubic foot shortfall in the Defense Department's storage and material handling capacity.

Only a depot like DDMT can fulfill the requirement for storage space and material handling facilities DOD will need. The Memphis depot's transportation assets and central location are exceptional in comparison to any other DLA facility.

Even though DLA claims that its movement towards a direct vendor delivery system will help facilitate many of its future capacity needs, this system has never been proven in war time.

In fact, most vendors are small to medium sized businesses which do not have a wide range of transportation capabilities. Most vendors also do not have the warehousing abilities that the depot system provides.

Distribution Depot Memphis is a vital link between contractor and soldier for those vendors who cannot ship directly to the troops. While direct vendor delivery is an option for distributing goods to our military men and women, the customers -- our American troops -- could be placed in jeopardy if a direct vendor system were fully in place. DLA has observed that this could be a problem and that an intermediary depot would be required to meet military needs.

In summary, I ask the commission to reconsider fully the Air Force and DLA's base closing procedures. There appear to be many shortcomings and the timely delivery of military supplies could be threatened.

It must be made clear that the Memphis depot is the only DLA depot that has the combination of a central location, automated facility, and exceptional transportation assets to meet the needs of our military and other emergency operations.


It was Defense Depot Memphis and its 1,300 employees that helped ship supplies to relief workers in Oklahoma City the day of federal building bombing disaster. During Operation Desert Storm, it was DDMT that was the number one shipper of supplies to our troops in the Persian Gulf.

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee must be retained. It has a proven record of service to our men and women in the military and to the people of this country. Closing the Memphis Depot will mean the loss of a valuable resource to our nation's military.

Thank you for this opportunity to present our case, and I ask that you please consider these points in the weeks ahead as the Commission formulates its final list for the President.

Bill Frist

UNITED STATES SENATOR • TENNESSEE



TESTIMONY OF U.S. SENATOR BILL FRIST
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
June 13, 1995

MR. CHAIRMAN, Commissioners, thank you for this opportunity to testify in support of the Defense Depot in Memphis, Tennessee.

Mr. Chairman, as I hope the testimony given today by myself and my colleagues will demonstrate, the Memphis Depot is critical to the efficient and effective distribution of matériel to our Nation's Armed Forces. So critical, in fact, that I believe the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will not be able to meet its distribution requirements in times of war or contingency operations if the current plan to disestablish the Memphis Depot is upheld.

Mr. Chairman, under the current plan, the DLA will distribute and store military supplies through two primary distribution sites on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. However, such a plan leaves a vast and disturbing gap in coverage and service for the central United States.

Moreover, as was dramatically demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War, coastal PDS sites cannot support CONUS (continental U.S.) facilities as efficiently as can a centrally located distribution site.

During both Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, goods shipped from the coasts were backed up almost to the point of "gridlock" -- to use Admiral Straw's word -- while DDMT experienced no difficulty at all in getting its goods shipped to military users.

In fact, not only was the Memphis Depot ranked number one in matériel support for our Nation's fighting forces in the Gulf, but it has subsequently participated in every major military and humanitarian mission undertaken by the Department of Defense.

DDMT is the closest depot to the largest concentration of our military forces, and ten of the top fifteen U.S. water ports are located on the Gulf of Mexico, in close proximity to DDMT.

Not only does it have the ability to support the Southern Hemisphere and the rest of the Western World, but is a primary distribution site and third partner to the coastal DLA depots which service the European and Pacific Rim outpost requirements.

-more-

Mr. Chairman, by both quantitative and qualitative measures, DDMT is superior to other depots.

- Thanks to its centralized location and Depot capabilities, DDMT provides truck services to 115 U.S. installations of 100 persons or more.

It has the ability to outreach and service by truck 66 percent of active duty CONUS military personnel within 48 hours. And 700,000 troops, or 42 percent of all CONUS-based military personnel can be supported within a 24-hour period.

In terms of transportation infrastructure, the Memphis Depot is also unparalleled, as demonstrated by the fact that many major national and international corporations have moved their distribution centers to Memphis in recent years.

- Not only is it located on both East-West and North-South interstates, it is home to 200 trucking companies;
- It sits at the crossroads of six Class 1 railroads with 96 freight trains arriving and departing daily, and has unrivaled intermodal capability;
- It boasts the world's second largest cargo airport with nine airlines, 44 carriers and, unlike other facilities which often close due to inclement weather, -- it has minimal constraints imposed by weather conditions.

It also has two military air terminals.

- As America's second largest inland port, with three harbors that handle 11 million tons of cargo annually, Memphis is home to six commercial barge lines and can accommodate ocean-going ships ten months out of every year.

Mr. Chairman, the Defense Logistics Agency's "Coastal PDS Strategy" has the advantage of simplicity. This approach might even be adequate were the DLA a commercial entity that only has to meet the usual demands and deadlines of commercial traffic.

However, the DLA is not a commercial entity but rather the one agency responsible for supplying America's fighting forces in times of peace as well as war. At such times the movement of matériel -- both within the U.S. and across the globe -- is critical, and missteps or miscalculations can and do mean lives.

We must be absolutely certain that the Depot that is chosen can support our military forces, and Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, that is why I ask you to reconsider the decision to disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot in Memphis, Tennessee.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time, and yield to Senator Thompson.

**Testimony of the Honorable Harold Ford
before the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Defense Distribution Depot Memphis**

Tuesday - June 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to make the case for the Defense Distribution Depot Memphis. I want to express my appreciation to the Commissioners and staff who have been professional, courteous and accommodating throughout this process. I particularly would like to thank Commissioner Kling who visited the depot, Chairman Dixon and Commissioners Cox, Cornella and Steele who have given generously of their time.

Our two Senators make compelling arguments about the Depot's strategic geographic location, unmatched transportation infrastructure and the importance of maintaining the Depot to fill an anticipated shortfall in

storage capacity in the DOD distribution system. Senator Thompson and Senator Frist have explained in the clearest terms the potential negative impact closure of the Depot will have on the Department of Defense distribution system. I would like to cover another important area: that is rationale behind the DLA's closure recommendation.

Before I do that, let me say that as the Congressman who represents the Depot and the majority of its employees, I am extremely concerned about the economic impact on the community. I urge the Commission to be sensitive to the adverse impact of the closure on the work force.

The primary issue I would like to address today is the rationale behind the closure recommendation. The Defense Logistics Agency has taken great pains to point out that its

decision to close DDMT was the result of an evaluation of a combination of factors called BRAC evaluation tools. I believe a fresh look at DLA's own BRAC evaluation tools will reveal that Defense Depot should remain open. These tools include: Military Value, DOD Force Structure Plan, Concept of Operations, Joint/Service Decisions, Excess Capacity, and ~~"showstoppers."~~

The first factor is military value. By DLA's own analysis, Memphis was ranked third in military value among stand-alone depots. However, DLA chose to disregard DDMT's high military value ranking in favor of an installation analysis which is of questionable merit.

The DOD Logistics Strategic Plan states that transportation, not storage is the critical military value factor. As you have heard, DDMT is located in the industry

accepted transportation capital of the U.S. Why, therefore, was the DLA military analysis structured to ensure that DDMT received only 20 out of 2000 possible points for transportation resources?

The DLA's Concept of Operations requires that it be able to support two Major Regional Conflicts by using both coasts. Prior to BRAC 95, Defense Depot Memphis was the primary warfighting depot during the only major regional conflict since Vietnam - Operation Desert Storm. To date, DLA has not included a mobilization plan to determine how it would provide support without the capabilities provided by Defense Depot Memphis.


With respect to Joint-Service decisions and Excess Capacity, even though the DLA negotiated with the Air Force and Navy for extra storage space, the DLA has

admitted there will be a shortfall as the result of the closure of a maintenance depot. I believe this shortfall requires requires DLA to reassess its future capacity requirements and whether or not it can afford the closure of a stand-alone depot like Memphis.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I ask you to go beyond mere cost considerations in your decisions on our defense distribution system. I ask that you consider the human and economic consequences of displacing a community with disproportionately high unemployment rates. As important, I ask the Commission to fully consider the unmatched military value of DDMT. Thank you.

MAP NO. 44

TEXAS



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

STATEMENT BEFORE THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Senator Russell D. Feingold

June 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon, Commissioners, thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to you today about the 440th Air Reserve Unit at Mitchell Airport.

I have always been a strong supporter of the base closure process. Since 1993 I have worked to close Wisconsin's only Naval installation in the state, Project ELF, the Extremely Low Frequency communications system. I have introduced legislation, and I wrote to you, advocating that it be placed on the list for consideration for closure. In my view, ELF exemplifies an installation whose mission is of little -- if any -- military strategic value, and therefore should be closed.

The 440th Airlift wing, on the other hand, has time and time again demonstrated its strategic value as a part of our nation's overall defense forces. Be it during the Persian Gulf War, Haiti, Somalia, or recent and future missions in Bosnia, the men and women of the 440th have consistently served our nation with honor, distinction, and excellence.

You have heard from Senator Kohl about the unprecedented number of military honors the 440th has received in recognition of its training levels and preparedness. I believe that a primary reason the 440th has met with such incredible success is the

quality of the reservists who serve there.

I want to review for the Commission some of the notable achievements of the 440th's recruiting operation.

First, the 440th is a recognized leader for excellence in Air Force Reserve recruiting. As you all know, it is important that reserve units be staffed at over 100 percent to ensure that they can be relied upon to do their job, which is to back up the active duty in any case. Few bases can do that consistently. But the staffing levels of the 440th have been over 100 percent 9 of the last 10 years. For the reserves, this is not excess staffing: it is assurance that the 440th has the personnel strength to activate for any mission, anywhere at anytime.

Second, as Wisconsin's federal Air Force installation, the 440th draws reservists from every one of the nine congressional districts in the state, ensuring full support for its mission.

Third, with the regional hubs of both the United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express located at Mitchell Field, the 440th has a large pool of trained pilots, loadmasters and mechanics from which they successfully recruit.

Recruiting is a critical element to the readiness of any reserve

unit. The 440th has demonstrated that their recruiting efforts far outdistance those of any other C-130 reserve unit. I know some of you heard this fact repeatedly during the site visit to the 440th and at the regional hearing last week in Chicago.

The 440th airlift wing also provides essential support for other federal agencies in the Midwest. As you consider its future, I want to point out the concurrent negative impact closing the 440th would have on other government agencies.

First, the 440th is the headquarters of the regional personnel office that currently services a seven state region -- including Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Colorado, and Oregon. If the 440th closed, this function, and the related personnel, would have to be duplicated at another site, so there would not be a net savings to closure.

Second, the 440th is a regional Federal Communications Center, and is the only authorized provider of satellite and classified messages to other military and law enforcement agencies including DOD, FBI, DOT, DOE, Secret Service, and FEMA. It would be problematic for those agencies were the 440th's communications center to be terminated.

Third, the 440th is a Regional National Disaster Medical System site, tasked with providing emergency airlift services,

casualty triage processing, and as a medical disaster communications hub in times of national crisis.

It is clear that our nation cannot afford to lose the many functions that the 440th now provides for our national security. There can be no doubt this unit plays a serious strategic role in our nation's defense. The Air Force has time and time again recognized the military value of the 440th.

For these reasons, the Air Force has indicated that it does not want to close the 440th. Further, as you all know, the Department of Defense did not even recommend this unit for consideration for closure.

The State of Wisconsin is proud of the accomplishments of the members of the 440th Airlift wing and remains wholly committed to keeping this unit in Milwaukee. It has demonstrated quality, superiority, and strategic value that should not be lost. I hope the Commission will concur.

CONGRESSMAN COMBEST TESTIMONY
FOR
BRAC CONGRESSIONAL HEARING
(3:19-3:24 p.m., 13 June 1995)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, I know how seriously you take your role on this Commission. That is why I know that you appreciate the serious impact of closing any Undergraduate Pilot Training base because pilot training is at the very core of our military readiness. Closing Reese Air Force Base would be a serious, costly mistake.

You are being asked to make a close call here.

Your inclination might well be to follow the Air Force recommendations. However, as your own BRACC staff have confirmed, the Air Force data was flawed and the wrong recommendation was made: Reese does NOT belong at the bottom of the list. Had the Air Force data been correct, then another base would be on the bottom and your decision might be made amid less murky circumstances.

I recall very clearly that Commissioner Davis expressed a concern at the May 10th hearing that the Commission not cut back too far in

the area of pilot training.



Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is going to need all its pilot training capacity to fulfill the Pilot Training Requirements of the Air Force into the 21st Century. If in the future the Air Force needs to re-open a base you recommend for closure, re-opening it will cost 8 times more than the estimated savings of closing.

The initial perception was that the Air Force had excess capacity in Pilot Training Requirements and one Undergraduate Pilot

Training base could be closed. However,

both the Navy and the Air Force have begun
to revise their future training projections ---
their pilot training requirements are going up.

One reason is the forecast demand for 51,000
pilots in civilian aviation in just 9 years as
massive numbers of pilots begin to retire.

Also, retention rates in all the services are
going down. With a big hiring binge by the
airlines, the Air Force and the Navy will lose
pilots by the hundreds. Additionally, the
needs of the Air National Guard will increase
demand on Air Force training.

There is no margin for error if Reese AFB is closed.

If Pilot Training Requirements turn out to be higher than were projected a year or more ago, then the Air Force will be in the very dilemma that General Davis described.

I urge the Commission to press the Air Force on this question and projected requirements.

It is my understanding that there may be a much larger requirement for pilots than originally projected.

There are five clear reasons you should reject
the recommendation to close Reese AFB:

* **FIRST:** Reese has a higher Military value than other UPT bases which will be retained. Your own staff revealed this fact in their analysis that ranked Reese ahead of two other UPT bases (Vance and Randolph). Their analysis proved that there were substantial errors in the Air Force/DoD analysis.

* **SECOND:** Quality of Life is the key to retaining quality professional military personnel, and retention is one of the keys to

readiness.

Any successful business that prides itself on attracting and retaining quality people looks for a location that provides a quality lifestyle: plentiful housing, excellent medical facilities, jobs for spouses, easy access with an international airport, and outstanding educational opportunities.

Reese Air Force Base had the highest rating of any base in the Air Force in regards to quality of life.

THIRD: DoD tells Congress that Housing

is one of the most important elements of Quality of Life. Their military doctrine is that "We enlist soldiers, but we RE-enlist families." Retention is 15% higher at bases with good housing. Reese has spent millions of dollars to ensure they have the finest housing of any UPT base. This is an asset that cannot be ignored and cannot be matched without considerable cost.

* **FOURTH:** It is a sad but indisputable fact, proven again just recently at Sheppard AFB, that flying/training is a dangerous business, but it need not be a hazard for innocent

civilians if we pay special attention to encroachment. Both of the bases with less military value than Reese, have encroachment problems that place homes, businesses, and public places in the direct path of daily training operations. By contrast, Reese does not have an encroachment problem.

FIFTH and LAST ((I promise)): Reese is the Air Force's premier Undergraduate Pilot Training Base:

- First to receive the T-1 trainer
- first and only with joint Navy training
- first to receive the new JPATS aircraft.

Reese is also the number one base of

reference of Student and Instructor Pilots in the Air Education and Training Command.

Our young men and women in the Air Force vote to keep Reese every day by choosing to serve at Reese.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, as I said this is a close call.

Reese should not be closed:

The data is flawed and the planning assumption is clearly wrong.

Thank you for your time and attention.

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON

UNITED STATES SENATOR • TEXAS



For immediate release

June 13, 1995

Contact: Missi Tessier 202 224-9782

SENATOR HUTCHISON MAKES CASE FOR TEXAS BASES

Saying that "Texans support the military because we believe a strong national defense will preserve our freedom," U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison today led the Texas congressional delegation in making the case for keeping its military installations open to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC).

Citing recent analyses of U.S. readiness by top military officials, Senator Hutchison urged the Commission to review its initial recommendations to close Brooks AFB, Kelly AFB, Reese AFB and Laughlin AFB and the Red River Army Depot.

Senator Hutchison argued that in its haste to eliminate "excess capacity" at the Air Force installations, the Commission may harm the readiness of U.S. forces.

"If we err, our national security demands that we err on the side of excess capacity, for it is excess capacity that provides the margin of error to prevail and with fewer casualties," the Senator said. "To err on the side of cutting it too close will prove costly both in terms of lives and dollars because we cannot prevail in combat with few casualties if the force is too small. And we will hardly be able to afford to re-open infrastructure once it is closed."

The Senator cited specific key characteristics of the Texas bases to urge their retention, including:

- Laughlin AFB is "the Air Force's premier undergraduate pilot training base";

- Brooks AFB's new cantonment proposal is "the most innovative proposal on the table before the Commission and should be rewarded for innovation, excellence and efficiency";

- Reese AFB is "the clear first choice of pilots and instructors and its quality of life is superior to any";

###MORE###

- Kelly AFB's role as a depot cannot be replaced without prohibitive cost. Moving C-5 maintenance and replicating C-5 hangars would cost an additional \$275 million; and

- Red River Army Depot must be looked at in terms of capacity and readiness. If Red River is closed, "there will be no surge capacity in the event of an emergency."

"We come to you to say that our bases in Texas are the best," the Senator concluded. "Our communities adopt and support them to keep them the best. And our Members of Congress support the funding to make them what they are."

#####

GREG LAUGHLIN
TESTIMONY BEFORE BRAC
JUNE 13, 1995

The 1986 Goldwater/Nichols Act mandates combined commands and joint operations between the various branches of the armed forces.

These joint operations are not only required during times of war but also for joint training exercises in times of peace.

This training can best be accomplished at either joint use bases or at bases which are located in close proximity to one another.

If we continue to close Air Force Bases which are close to Army Posts, we decrease the training time and joint opportunities and increase the cost of joint exercises.

This can cost us dramatically more in the long run by an ill-prepared military, than any short term cost savings we might achieve by ill-conceived base closings.

With Ft. Hood, the army's largest installation, only 50 miles away, Bergstrom Air Reserve Station is ideally suited for joint operations.

The Air Force Reserve's 924th Fighter Wing currently flies in a quarter of all joint training exercises at Ft. Hood each year.

In addition, these two organizations have twice deployed together to the National Training Center for "Air Warrior" exercises.

These Close Air Support (CAS) and Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) operations provide both services with the live training necessary for top combat preparedness.

Without Bergstrom Air Reserve Station, Ft. Hood's actual training time will be greatly curtailed and the Army's training costs will be greatly increased.

In addition to these joint training opportunities, the 924th trains in numerous Military Operating Areas, air refueling tracks, Military Training Routes and bombing ranges in the area.

These provide the 924th with invaluable training in aerial refueling, surface attack tactics, Low Altitude Awareness Training and aerial combat.

Few organizations in the Air Force have access to such an array of excellent training areas as does the 924th.

The unit thus is able to plan and execute missions encompassing the elements and skills required in realistic combat scenarios.

The excellent training opportunities in central Texas are only surpassed by the facilities and opportunities found on Bergstrom Air Reserve Station itself.

The 302 acre cantonment area has an existing wet ramp and hangers originally built for KC-135 aircraft.

Nowadays, these facilities are used to accommodate several squadrons of fighter, tanker, or transport aircraft.

Existing buildings can accommodate the support personnel and equipment of additional units.

In addition, there is adequate open space for growth of support facilities or ramp space.

Currently, there are only two Air Force Reserve facilities located in air quality attainment areas.

Bergstrom Air Reserve Station is one of those.

Flight and training operations and unit growth, long taken for granted at Bergstrom, can be hampered or even curtailed at other facilities which are located in non-attainment areas.

Austin is proud of its environmental quality and works hard to maintain it.

For the past three years, the 924th consistently has led other Air Force Reserve units in recruiting.

The latest data available showed nearly 100% manning for two years in a row.

Central Texas is an ideal location for recruiting with a highly educated population, over 200,000 students, numerous AFROTC and AFJROTC units, many high tech and defense manufacturers, and thousands of military retirees, families and support organizations.

At a time when we face base closures such as this, we must question the larger issue of priorities.

It is ironic that at the same time we discuss closing vital bases such as Bergstrom ARS, the American taxpayer pays billions of dollars to subsidize our allies' defense by keeping overseas bases open.

Instead of closing Bergstrom ARS, we should close bases overseas which originally were built, and are still being kept, to counter a Soviet threat which no longer exists.

Finally, it seems incredible that so many Air Force Reserve bases and units have been added to the closure consideration list while not a single Air National Guard unit was also added.

Is this oddity the result of sober deliberation, or is it rather the product of naked political maneuvering?

This appears to run directly counter to the very reason the BRAC procedure was developed in the first place.

The citizens of the 14th Congressional District join those of the 10th District in urging the Commission to keep the 924th Fighter Wing, 10th Air Force headquarters and other ancillary units operating at Bergstrom Air Reserve Station.

TUESDAY, JUNE 13

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK BEFORE YOU TODAY REGARDING THE 301ST FW AT JRB FORT WORTH. I ALSO A COMPREHENSIVE REBUTTAL OF AUSTIN'S ATTACKS ON JRB FORT WORTH I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT FOR THE RECORD TODAY.

BUT FIRST, REGARDING THE AFEWES FACILITY IN FORT WORTH TEXAS RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT TO EDWARDS AFB. I HAVE SOME QUESTIONS AND ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT REGARDING SOME OF THE DATA USED. ANY DECISION WE MAKE REGARDING AFEWES, THAT DEVELOPS AND TESTS ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY -- A NEED DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE SHOOTING DOWN OF OUR F-16 PILOT OVER BOSNIA -- IS VERY IMPORTANT AND I URGE THE COMMISSION TO REVIEW THIS CAREFULLY.

REGARDING JRB FORT WORTH'S MILITARY VALUE, NO LESS OF AN AUTHORITY THAN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GEN. SHALI HAS INTERCEDED ON OUR BEHALF, STATING IN PART THAT "THE JRB...AT FORT WORTH...OFFERS A PRIME OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THE VIABILITY OF JOINT BASING...[AND]...HOLDS GREAT PROMISE FOR STREAMLINING OUR INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENHANCING JOINT OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS." REGARDING BERGRSTROM, GEN. SHALI ALSO WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE "CINCS, CHIEFS OF THE SERVICES AND I REVIEWED THE AF PROPOSAL TO CLOSE..[BERGSTROM].. AND DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD NOT IMPAIR OUR ABILITY TO EXECUTE THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEBBIE LEE ALSO SENT YOU A LETTER STATING IN PART THAT IT WAS "IMPERATIVE" THAT THE 301ST REMAIN A PART OF JRB FTW.

I WOULD LIKE TO DIGRESS BECAUSE CONCERN HAS BEEN RAISED THAT THERE WAS SOME KIND OF A "COMMITMENT" OR "PROMISE" MADE TO AUSTIN THAT GOES BEYOND THAT STIPULATED IN THE 93 BRAC REPORT.

ALTHOUGH COMMISSIONER COX SAID DURING HER RECENT SITE VISIT THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER AN ISSUE, I WANTED TO ADDRESS IT BECAUSE SOME MISPERCEPTIONS STILL MAY EXIST.

WE HAVE PROVIDED ALL OF THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL TO THOSE STAFF AND COMMISSIONERS PRESENT IN FORT WORTH LAST SATURDAY. BUT, I WOULD LIKE TO REFERENCE A FEW KEY POINTS:

FIRST, AUSTIN'S PLAN TO MOVE OUT OF ITS CENTER CITY CONGESTED AIRPORT DID NOT COMMENCE WITH BRAC AND NOR WAS IT BASED ON BRAC 91 OR 93. THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO MOVE THEIR AIRPORT FOR 20 YEARS:

SECOND, BACK TO THE "ALLEGED COMMITMENT." IN SPITE OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF BRAC 93, THERE IS CONCERN THAT SOME IN AUSTIN UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AIR FORCE PLANNED TO REMAIN AT BERGSTROM BEYOND 1996 AND HAD RELIED TO THEIR DETRIMENT ON THIS UNDERSTANDING. WHO MIGHT THAT BE?

IN FEBRUARY 1995, BRUCE TODD, MAYOR OF AUSTIN SENT A LETTER TO THE DOD COMPLAINING ABOUT THE IMPENDING CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION. YET, IN THAT VERY LETTER HE ALSO STATES:

"THE CITY HAS BEEN ABIDING BY THE
DECISION OF BRAC II AND II WHICH COMMITTED
THE 924TH TO AUSTIN AT THE SITE OF OUR NEW
AIRPORT AT LEAST UNTIL SEPTEMBER 30, 1996."

SO, IF SOME IN AUSTIN SO MISUNDERSTOOD, AT LEAST IT WASN'T MAYOR TODD. OUR FORMER COLLEAGUE CONGRESSMAN JAKE PICKLE, WHO LED THE SUCCESSFUL AUSTIN EFFORT IN BRAC 93 ALSO UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE THE CASE, SAYING IN THE APRIL 29TH 1994 AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN:

"THE PENTAGON IS COMMITTED TO KEEPING THE UNIT
HERE AT LEAST THROUGH 1996."

SO NOW WE KNOW THAT NEITHER THE MAYOR NOR THE CONGRESSMAN MISUNDERSTOOD. WHAT ABOUT THE CITY COUNCIL?

THE CITY COUNCIL PASSED A RESOLUTION ON AUGUST 1ST 1991 THAT SETS OUT THE COUNCIL'S CONDITIONS FOR THE MOVE AND THEY ARE VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD, WHICH I PARAPHRASE:

- 1: THE TRANSFER OF LAND & FACILITIES FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO AUSTIN;
- 2: APPROVAL OF A MASTERPLAN BY THE FAA AND;
- 3: THAT THE PROJECT BE AFFORDABLE, SUITABLE, ETC.

THREE THINGS HAPPEN AND AUSTIN GOES TO BERGSTROM. PERIOD.
THAT'S IT. NO MENTION OF THE RESERVES. ALSO, THE OMISSION OF
THE RESERVES WASN'T AN OVERSIGHT BECAUSE ON THE VERY SAME DAY,
THE COUNCIL PASSED ANOTHER RESOLUTION, URGING THE RESERVES TO
STAY. THEIR CONDITIONS FOR THE MOVE WERE IN THE FIRST
RESOLUTION, THEIR HOPES WERE IN THE SECOND.

THE PUBLIC RECORD IS CLEAR THAT NEITHER THE MAYOR NOR THE COUNCIL
RELIED ON THE RESERVES WHEN IT MADE THE DECISION TO MOVE. SO
THEY'RE OK. ANY OTHERS?

THE CITY OF AUSTIN COMMISSIONED A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR MASTER
PLAN BY THE CONSULTING FIRM OF PEAT MARWICK TO STUDY THE
BERGSTROM MOVE.

THE PLAN WAS COMPLETED IN MAY 1993, AND, IN DESCRIBING THE ROLE
THAT THE RESERVES PLAYED, THE PROJECT DIRECTOR TOLD THE AUSTIN
AMERICAN STATESMAN ON MARCH 12TH 1993 -- DIRECTLY CONTRADICTING
MAYOR TODD'S OWN SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON APRIL
19 OF THIS YEAR -- THE FOLLOWING:

"HAVING THE RESERVES DID NOT INFLUENCE ANY MAJOR DECISIONS
DURING THE MASTER PLAN PROCESS...THE RESERVES SHOULDN'T BE
THE GOVERNING FACTOR...[AND THAT] ANY EFFECT ON WORK ALREADY
DONE ON THE PROPOSED NEW AIRPORT WOULD BE MINOR"

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, THE MAY 1993 STUDY ALSO SHOWS THAT AUSTIN
PLANS TO EXPAND A NEW PASSENGER TERMINAL RIGHT INTO THE HEART OF

THE PROPOSED RESERVES CANTONMENT THEY CLAIM TO BE PLANNING THEIR ENTIRE AIRPORT AROUND.

ANOTHER POINT: SOME HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT AUSTIN HAS SOLD \$400 MILLION IN BONDS IN RELIANCE ON AN ALLEGED "PROMISE" AND DESPITE WHAT THE MAYOR, THE CONGRESSMAN, THE COUNCIL AND THE MILLION DOLLAR CONSULTANT KNEW OTHERWISE, A REFERENDUM WENT FORWARD. WELL, REGARDING THOSE BONDS, ACCORDING TO THE TEXAS STATE COMPTROLLER, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED.

NOT ONE PENNY!

NOW ON TO THE FAMOUS BOATRIGHT "PROMISE."

THE CITY OF AUSTIN HAS ASSERTED REPEATEDLY THAT ON FEBRUARY 21 1992 BEFORE THE AUSTIN CITY COUNCIL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES BOATRIGHT MADE A PROMISE TO LEAVE THE RESERVES AT BERGSTROM AND THAT AS A RESULT, A \$400 MILLION REFERENDUM WAS AUTHORIZED.

AUSTIN'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE "PROMISE" WEIGHED HEAVILY IN THE FINAL DELIBERATIONS FOR BRAC 93. IN FACT, THIS BOATRIGHT "PROMISE" IS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE AUSTIN ARGUMENT, REPEATED OVER AND OVER IN BRAC 93 AND AGAIN ON APRIL 19TH AND MAY 10TH 1995 WHEN THEY QUOTE THIS BOATRIGHT "STATEMENT" AS EVIDENCE OF THIS PROMISE.

BUT MR. BOATRIGHT DID NOT STOP THERE -- AS SOME MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED BY THE WAY IT WAS PRESENTED BY AUSTIN. BUT WE CAN TAKE COMFORT IN KNOWING THAT THE MAYOR, THE COUNCIL, AND THEIR MILLION

DOLLAR CONSULTANT WERE AT THAT COUNCIL MEETING AND DID HEAR THE REST OF THE STORY. AND WHAT IS THE REST OF THE STORY? HE WAS VERY CAREFUL TO QUALIFY THE DISCUSSION SAYING:

"I NEED TO ADD ADDITIONAL COMMENT....WE CANNOT MAKE A LONG TERM COMMITMENT ON THAT RESERVE UNIT. I CAN EVER SIT HERE AND TELL YOU THAT THAT RESERVE UNIT WILL STAY HERE FOREVER."

HE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE CLEAR.

THERE WAS NO "PROMISE."

NOW, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, AS I NOTED AT THE BEGINNING, AUSTIN HAS BEEN TRYING TO MOVE ITS AIRPORT OUT OF ITS CONGESTED CENTRAL CITY LOCATION FOR 20 YEARS. THE FIRST STUDY WE FOUND WAS DATED 1975. IN 1987, AUSTIN VOTERS APPROVED A MOVE TO NEARBY MANOR, TEXAS AND IN 1989 AUSTIN APPROVED A \$30 MILLION BOND SALE FOR THIS PURPOSE. BUT, THE MOVE TO BERGSTROM HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE RESERVES.

WHEN SECRETARY CHENEY PUT BERGSTROM ON THE ABORTIVE 1990 CLOSURE LIST, IT WAS MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE THE BRAC 91 DECISION AND SOME 21 MONTHS BEFORE THE FAMOUS BOATRIGHT "PROMISE." THE CITY HALTED WORK ON THE MANOR SITE IN APRIL 1990 AND SHIFTED TOWARD BERGSTROM. WHY? SIMPLE. IT SAVED \$108 MILLION. THE DECISION WAS BASED ON A GOOD OLD FASHIONED PRINCIPLE: IT WAS CHEAPER.

IN SUMMARY, WAS A "PROMISE" MADE THAT REQUIRES SPECIAL
CONSIDERATION OF BERGSTROM AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE NORMAL BRAC
PROCESS? NO! AND, THE MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL KNOW OTHERWISE.

THE PUBLIC RECORD IS CLEAR.

THERE WAS NO "PROMISE," OR A "COMMITMENT" BEYOND 1996.

AND THERE WAS NO RELIANCE.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION: BRAC 93 CREATED JOINT RESERVE BASE
FORT WORTH AND GAVE US, AS TAXPAYERS, AND THE MILITARY A GOLDEN
OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP THE FIRST TRULY JOINT RESERVE BASE AND
SAVE MONEY AT THE SAME TIME. IT IS THE MODEL FOR THE FUTURE. I
URGE YOU TO CONTINUE WHAT BRAC 93 STARTED AND RETAIN THE 301ST
FIGHTER WING HERE AT NAS FORT WORTH JRB. LET THIS SUCCESS, A
BRAC SUCCESS, CONTINUE.

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN JOE BARTON
BEFORE THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

June 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman and Commission members, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding the recommendations of the 1995 Base Closure Commission. I would like to address the proposed deactivation of the 301st Air Force Reserve unit at NAS Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base (NAS FW JRB).

The problem with the idea of the Base Closure Commission moving the 301st is that it will not close a base it actually keeps one open. It won't save money, it will cost 16 and a half million dollars more. Deactivating the 301st would result in NO base closure, NO base closure savings and would cost the American Taxpayer millions each and every year for as far as the eye can see.

Base operations and overhead at the NAS FW JRB must continue with or without the 301st. In fact, other units at the JRB must pick up support contributions that are now the responsibility of the 301st. For example, over \$1.2 million has been identified as potential costs that the Navy must pick up. Deactivating the 301st is a force structure issue. DOD analysis correctly shows that such an action would **never** result in a pay back.

On the contrary, closing Bergstrom and moving the 10th Air Force Headquarters to the NAS FW JRB results in **complete closure of a DOD installation**. The action would have an immediate, or one year pay back. Annual recurring savings would continue in the amount of approximately \$4.5 million. This \$4.5 million is understated due to substantial annual savings associated with joint training and operations at the Joint Reserve Base.

At the request of the BRAC, COBRA models were run on May 5, 1995 and May 10, 1995, that compared 1) deactivating the 301st at NAS FW JRB, and 2) closing Bergstrom and moving the 10th Air Force Headquarters to NAS FW JRB. This focus is based on comparison with Bergstrom, since Bergstrom is the DOD recommendation for closure. The DOD analysis shows closing Bergstrom to clearly be the most cost-effective. The COBRA models confirm that closing a base saves more money than not closing a base. It's not even a close call.

The first item the COBRA models looked at was the net one time cost. The net total one time cost to deactivate the 301st at NAS FW JRB would be \$20,946,000. The total one time cost to close Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force Headquarters to NAS FW JRB would be \$4,362,000. Therefore, the net total savings to close Bergstrom versus deactivating the 301st would be \$16,584,000. This is a substantial savings, especially in light of the current restraints on the federal budget.

The second big area the COBRA models evaluated was the annual recurring steady state savings. The steady state savings to close Bergstrom and move the 10th AF would be \$17,666,000. The steady state savings to deactivate the 301st at NAS FW JRB would be \$13,195,000. Therefore, the annual recurring savings to close Bergstrom is the net difference of the two steady state savings or \$4,471,000. In addition, there will be substantial savings due to joint training and operations that are not reflected in the \$4,471,000 figure. Areas where additional savings could occur include deployment savings, billeting savings and on-going fine tuning of cost sharing.

Deactivating the 301st at NAS Fort Worth JRB results in NO base closure, NO base closure savings and NEVER pays back. Instead there will be recurring costs to DOD in that the remaining NAS FW JRB units will pick up the fixed overhead costs and there will be redundant overhead at another stand alone base. This action will jeopardize the model Joint Reserve Base established by BRAC 93.

Another issue I would like to address concerns the supposed "promise" to Austin and reliance on that promise. Austin Mayor Todd and the Austin delegation represented that somehow the Air Force made a promise about locating the Air Force Reserve unit at the Bergstrom site. Congressman Geren and others have clearly shown that there was no promise or commitment

beyond 1996. Additionally, during her site visit to NAS FW JRB, Commissioner Cox assured me that the "promise" was no longer an issue for BRAC 95.

Another claim of the Austin group is that there was reliance on the promise. They would have you believe that Austin adjusted the planning of their airport around the presence of the Air Force Reserves. The fact is that Austin designed the optimum airport and then fit the reserves within that optimum airport.

Austin wants only one thing, the economic advantages of a Bergstrom location for a civilian airport, which they have wanted since at least 1975. I commend Austin for making good business decisions and putting their airport at the best and least costly location. However, I am concerned that Austin may have misrepresented how much of a factor the Air Force Reserves were in making that decision.

Some of you may know I am an engineer by training, so I am somewhat familiar with airport layouts and planning. There are about three or four major elements that go into configuring an airport: 1) runway location and spacings, 2) passenger terminal locations, 3) air cargo and freight operations, and 4) general aviation and FBO operations.

In reviewing the Austin Airport layout plan, it is clear that the Airport planners selected the best locations for all of the above elements and then the other Airport elements, including the Reserve component, were located to fit within the resulting framework. In fact, on March 12, 1993, the City's consultant stated that, "The City's instructions to us were to plan the best airport we could and that the reserves shouldn't be the governing factor."

Austin would have you believe that the runway spacing was affected by the Reserves. According to the Final Master Plan Report for the Austin Airport at Bergstrom, the runways are spaced 6,700 feet apart to 1) allow for dual instrument operations in poor weather conditions which gives the best overall operational flexibility, and 2) allow the "greatest flexibility for development of the central terminal facility." The location of the Reserves was made to fit within the Airport layout dictated by the above mentioned functions.

Additionally, the report clearly states that the north alternative was selected because it is less expensive, has much more convenient access to the traveling public, and can take advantage of existing aircraft parking areas, not because it would best suit the Reserves. In fact, the Reserves are not even mentioned in the location analysis.

In conclusion, Austin had no promise and there is no reliance on an

alleged promise. Austin elected to pursue Bergstrom as a civilian airport not because of any promise made by the Air Force, but because it saves them \$108 million to do so. Based on this same reasoning, NAS FW JRB is the best and least costly location for the Air Force Reserves.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to address this Commission today.

**STATEMENT OF
Charles W. Stenholm
BEFORE THE
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
June 13, 1995**

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. I want to express my strong support for the excellent military facilities that we have in Texas. Also, I want to make you aware of the primary Defense Department facility in my district, Dyess Air Force Base and the options it makes available to you as you go through the BRAC decision process.

First, I want to express my strong support for Goodfellow Air Force Base located in San Angelo which I represent together with Lamar Smith. Although Goodfellow is in Lamar's district, it is literally across the street from my district line. Therefore, I do represent many of the men and women who work and serve at Goodfellow so I feel it is part of my district.

To call Goodfellow an Air Force Base is a little misleading because it has a proven track record as a joint service training facility. At times, in fact, there may be more Army personnel at Goodfellow than Air Force. I bring this to your attention because of my concerns and efforts to find cost savings in the Federal Budget and my belief that joint missions whenever possible could be helpful

in finding cost savings in the Defense Budget.

In that regard, I would like to see more training missions go to Goodfellow. The City of San Angelo is a good partner to the military and I know they would welcome growth at the base and would actively help accommodate any new needs caused by new missions at the base.

As a whole, the people of Texas have proven themselves to be very supportive of our bases and the men and women who serve there. While I am supportive of all Texas facilities, there are two, Reese Air Force Base and Naval Air Station, Joint Reserve Base Ft. Worth (formerly Carswell) currently being considered for closure which I would like to speak to you about. Although these bases are not in my district, I know that they are exceptional bases and encourage the commission to reconsider the decision to close them.

Secretary Widnall has stressed the importance of Air Force training and quality of life issues. The decision to close Reese which was ranked the number one base by the Air Force for quality life and which has an excellent training record contradicts previously stated Air Force goals. If Reese does close, I believe the Air Force will regret the decision because it could result in a lack of well trained pilots in the future. Moreover, it is my understanding that mistakes were made in the Air Force/Department of Defense analysis of Reese

and I believe that it deserves another look and should remain open.

J.R.B. Ft. Worth is another facility that does not warrant closure. The 301st Fighter Wing is not a base closure issue and it will not result in long term cost savings. J.R.B. Ft. Worth is supported by senior Pentagon officials and should be taken off the closure list.

Turning to Dyess Air Force Base, it is the training base for the B-1 bomber and is also the home for two squadrons of C-130s. Until last year, Dyess also handled KC-135 tankers. The Air Force has consistently rated Dyess in Tier 1, one of its best bases. It has excellent infrastructure, almost all of which is in virtually new condition. Dyess has extra capacity available to handle additional aircraft; it has near-perfect flying conditions; and its airfield has no encroachment problems. The base presently has a Primary Aircraft inventory of 60 and could handle about 40 more. I would also like to mention that Dyess is in an attainment area under the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, additional aircraft could be relocated there without raising any air pollution concerns.

I understand that the Commission is considering several scenarios which would relocate KC-135 tankers or C-130s. Dyess could handle either plane with little or no MILCON cost and would be an excellent location for both assets.

I am aware that the proposal to move tankers to Dyess may not

be consistent with the Air Force's stated "one base, one boss" policy.

In fact, the Air Force moved 17 tankers out of Dyess in 1994 solely because of this policy, even though the base has and is capable of handling KC-135 tankers. The combination of B-1s, C-130s and KC-135 tankers at Dyess worked very well there for over 10 years.

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, the need to save money due to budgetary constraints require much greater flexibility in locating different types of aircraft, such as bombers and tankers, at the same base. This "one base, one boss" policy should not be the driving factor in matters involving sound fiscal decisions and operational logic.

In closing ladies and gentlemen, take a good hard look at the Texas installations such as Dyess and Goodfellow Air Force Bases and others. The one common thread is that the people of my State are staunch supporters of defense and have prepared their installations to perform the mission of defense in the United States for the next century. Texas has always trained our troops for conflicts such as World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam and that was a conscientious decision made by our government due to its citizens and location. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY BONILLA
JUNE 13, 1995

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you on behalf of Laughlin, Kelly and Brooks Air Force bases, three of the finest military facilities in the world. I feel like some of us are old friends already after our earlier visits. Let me take this opportunity to share with you my perspective as a member of the National Security Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.

As a member of that committee I am constantly reminded of the very real constraints we are experiencing in the defense budget. We are having increasing difficulty insuring that our military is provided with an adequate quality of life and the tools and training to remain the number one fighting force in the world. I personally welcome your assistance in this effort to cut costs and make our military more economically efficient.

Laughlin and Kelly Air Force ^{bases} are the low cost providers for the United States Air Force. Closing either one of these bases will not be cost effective and will not serve the taxpayer's best interest. We should not close facilities unless it saves money.

A few short days ago, a few of you were our guests down in Del Rio. You saw with your own eyes the strong case for Laughlin. No other UPT base matches it. Its weather and airspace remain unsurpassed by any other facility and what this

means is dollars saved. Dollars saved by fewer cancelled missions. Dollars saved by less time travelling to usable airspace. Dollars saved by a low cost and efficient work force.

Laughlin trains the best pilots in the United States Air Force. That is Laughlin's first contribution to our national defense. Laughlin's cost effectiveness is its second contribution to our national defense. These savings free up additional dollars to be spent on quality of life, on procurement and training. These savings are vital for our national defense. Without Laughlin, America would be weaker. I am proud to be Laughlin's representative and the people of Del Rio are very proud to be the home of the best little base in the Air Force.

I grew up in the shadows of Kelly Air Force Base. My father worked at Kelly for about 30 years. I probably would not be here today were it not for Kelly Air Force Base and the opportunities it has provided me and thousands of other San Antonians.

Kelly is the lowest cost depot. Kelly has the lowest labor costs and the highest quality. This is nothing new. This has been the Kelly story for decades. As a member of the Appropriations Committee it would trouble me if we did not make cost effective choices. I am working hard to stretch federal dollars, assets like Kelly make my job much easier.

Our government must learn to deliver services as lower

costs. The BRACC can make that task easier. I urge you to make cost efficiency a goal in your decision making process. We gain little and in fact hurt ourselves if closures cost money. Our goal must always be saving money, not just closing bases. In simple terms we are closing bases to save money. If it costs us money to close we are defeating the purpose of the base closure process.

Kelly is a tool we need in the battle to control government spending. We should be looking at transferring workload to Kelly to control costs. Low costs benefit the taxpayer and make dollars available for other vital Department of Defense missions. In fact, the issue of excess capacity is ONLY relevant in terms of its cost impact. If we can maintain an additional surge capacity at no cost, or even better at a savings, the nation benefits.

San Antonio's cantonment proposal maximizes the return for taxpayers from closing Brooks AFB. This proposal results in considerable savings with few closure costs. In addition, it keeps intact the work force which has made Brooks a world class facility. I know you will give this proposal the serious consideration it deserves.

I don't have to tell you how strongly the people of Del Rio and San Antonio support their bases. You have personally seen the tens of thousands standing up to be counted in support of

their base. I sincerely doubt there are any communities in this great nation with such strong and long standing support for our military.

Thank you for providing me this opportunity to speak before you today. I appreciate your help in the effort to save taxpayer dollars. I know when you review the facts, the decision will be crystal clear. Laughlin and Kelly must continue to lead the way in quality and savings.

CONGRESSMAN DICK ARMEY
26TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEES:
EDUCATION AND LABOR
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
CHAIRMAN



WASHINGTON OFFICE:
301 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4326
(202) 225-7772

DISTRICT OFFICE:
9901 VALLEY RANCH PKWY. EAST
SUITE 3050
IRVING, TX 75063
(214) 556-2500

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-4326

June 10, 1995

Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission,

I appreciate the time and effort you will take today in hearing from the various communities regarding the next round of base closure and realignment now being considered.

As you go through this process and give deliberation to this important decision, I wanted to take this opportunity for reviewing the intent of the legislation that created the process. It is critical that we provide a system of national defense that maximizes the use of our scarce resources dedicated to this task.

If an opportunity exists to realign a unit to another facility and this allows for more efficient use of the facility, then we should seize the opportunity. On the other hand, realigning a unit to an area that would otherwise be closed should be a secondary option to leaving that unit in its existing location if the current facility will continue to exist after the Commission completes all other actions.

All of these decisions are to be made irrespective of any considerations other than the efficient, effective deployment capability of our national defense. This is the charge that has been extended to every Commission that has sat where you sit today, and is still the charge before you.

Again, I appreciate the time and effort you have put into this effort and encourage you to continue the tradition set before you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dick Arme".

DICK ARMEY
Member of Congress

DA/jlc

Copy

Statement of

Congressman Jim Chapman (D-TX)

Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Congressional Hearing

June 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon and BRAC Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of Red River Army Depot and the Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas in my Congressional District. The Red River Defense Complex is a unique installation combining the missions of tracked vehicle maintenance, supply distribution, depot-level maintenance and storage of ammunition and ammo production at the co-located Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant.

By the end of this week, all eight Commissioners will have traveled to Northeast Texas to witness this world-class installation in action. On behalf of the people of the Four States Region -- Arkansans, Oklahomans, Louisianans, and Texans - - I want to thank you for taking the time to see for yourselves the best of the best. The Commission's April 19th regional hearing in Dallas demonstrated conclusively the strong community support the Red River family enjoys. In a few days, you will decide the fate of the people you met in my district. I trust you will keep them -- and their tireless commitment to quality service to the American taxpayer -- very much in mind as you consider alternatives to the Defense Department's recommendations.

CAPACITY. The central issue of Army depots is the issue of excess capacity. Our nation's military force structure has been reduced substantially from its Cold War levels, and appropriate cuts in infrastructure must be made to ensure that defense spending is distributed so that our readiness is not jeopardized by misplaced priorities.

But the flip side to this rule is that we must make sure we retain sufficient military infrastructure to meet our warfighting needs. To paraphrase one of my constituent's statement's from the Dallas hearing: Do we really want to put all our vehicle maintenance "eggs" in one depot "basket"? I think the answer to that question is a resounding NO!

The Army has proposed closing Red River Army Depot, significantly realigning Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania and consolidating all ground vehicle maintenance work at Anniston Army Depot in Alabama. I have contended from the beginning of this process that this plan would overload Anniston and severely impede the ability of the depot system to surge to meet a wartime mobilization. New figures submitted by the Army confirms that assessment.

The Army's TABS Office recently submitted to the Commission its estimated peacetime and wartime vehicle maintenance workload requirements. The Fiscal Year 1999 peacetime workload of 3.2 million manhours exceeds Anniston's capacity of 2.8 million manhours. Also, the wartime workload of 12.9 million manhours

greatly exceeds Anniston's maximum capacity of 4 million manhours. These numbers, which come directly from the Army, strongly support my contention that we must retain two maintenance depots.

RRAD vs. LEAD. I wish no ill will toward the supporters of Letterkenny Army Depot. I know first-hand the terrible burden of trying to prevent a proposed base closure action. But the Commission must make these tough calls. I strongly believe the right call is to retain Red River and realign Letterkenny to Red River and Anniston.

My position is based on two simple factors: military value and cost. Red River's score in the Army's military value assessment is more than double that of Letterkenny. Military value comprises half of the base closure selection criteria, and any closure action must have this factor as its basis.

The other factor is cost. On May 26, the Army submitted to the BRAC revised COBRA numbers that show it would save more money (\$1.262 billion) to realign Letterkenny than it would to close Red River.

You have heard over and over that the Army's numbers are wrong. You've heard from me. In this case, the Army's right: the Army's evaluation that Red River's military value is more than twice that of Letterkenny, and the Army would realize a greater cost savings to close Letterkenny is correct. The Commission should opt to keep Red River open and move Letterkenny's work to Red River and Anniston.

Win-Win. The Red River community has devised a plan to deal with the problem of excess capacity without jeopardizing the knowledge base and expertise that are required to meet wartime needs. This Win-Win proposal follows the concepts recommended by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance Management in April, 1994. We should retain the Army's two most efficient depots (Red River and Anniston), realign Letterkenny's vehicle and missile workload to Red River and Anniston, downsize workload to core warfighting systems while teaming with industry for non-core work and maintaining the distribution mission at Red River. This arrangement will reduce excess capacity while ensuring our ability to meet readiness requirements and preserve the industrial base. Everybody wins with this plan: the Army, private industry and the American taxpayer.


I call on the Commission to focus for a moment on the impact of the Pentagon's recommendation on our local economy. The projected local unemployment of 21.7% that would result from Red River's closure would be a brutal blow from which we may never recover. This is an award-winning installation, the nation's recognized quality leader. The people of Red River, with their

demonstrated commitment to quality and efficiency, have earned the chance to continue to play a vital role in defense of America's national security. I strongly urge you to reject the Army's mistaken recommendation, and take Red River Army Depot and the Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas, off the closure list before you send that list to the President on July 1.

Thank you for your time, and I wish you best regards as you complete the difficult task before you.

MAP NO. 45

UTAH



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES



June 13, 1995

NEWS RELEASE

ORRIN HATCH

United States Senator for Utah

Contact: Paul Smith (202)224-9854

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ORRIN HATCH OF THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman, other BRAC Commissioners, let me try to be brief: Hill Air Force Base is simply the best of the best.

* It is the best operational base, and it is the best depot. Two rating groups came to this conclusion. Their findings have been twice verified by Air Force Under Secretary Rudy DeLeon.

First in evaluating the Hill Air Force Base

* Hill spills over with excellence - and its vast capacity offers savings and successes with each potential expansion of the base mission. Let me give you just four reasons why Hill is already part of the strength of our future airpower.

- First, Hill is now the logistics manager and depot for the world's largest aircraft fleet, the F-16, used by 21 nations which share our regional and global security objectives.

- Second, as proven in its successful cross-service competition, Hill Air Force Base, perhaps more than any other installation in the entire DOD inventory, has the potential to expand into the Defense Department's most cost-efficient tactical fighter depot.

- Third, it is the world's largest overhaul facility for landing gear, struts, wheels, and brakes - accommodating 70 percent of DOD's work and with the capacity to do it all, and do it well.

SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT
BRAC HEARINGS - JUNE 12, 1995

IF I COULD GIVE SOME ADVISE: **LOOK AT THE NUMBERS.**

I. [**IT MAKES GOOD BUSINESS SENSE TO KEEP HILL.**]

WHAT DO THE NUMBERS SAY?

I BELIEVE THE NUMBERS OVERWHELMINGLY SAY THAT HILL SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN. YOU HAVE SOPHISTICATED ANALYSIS, AND YOUR STAFF HAS BEEN SWIMMING IN NUMBERS, BUT I DO WANT TO MENTION A FEW:

- THE AIR FORCE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP RANKED HILL THE HIGHEST OF THE FIVE IN MILITARY VALUE.
- THE RETURN ON INVESTMENT IF HILL WERE CLOSED IS 29 YEARS.
- IN THE AIR FORCE'S ORIGINAL SUBMISSION, THE ONE TIME COST OF CLOSING HILL IS THE HIGHEST AMONG ALC'S AT \$1.418 BILLION.

KEEPING HILL OPEN MAKES GOOD BUSINESS SENSE. THE NUMBERS BACK UP THAT CONTENTION.

II. [IT NOT ONLY MAKES SENSE TO KEEP HILL OPEN, IT MAKES GOOD BUSINESS SENSE TO CONSOLIDATE TACTICAL MISSILE WORKLOAD TO HILL.]

- HILL IS MORE THAN A DEPOT
 - OPERATIONAL WINGS
 - UTAH TEST AND TRAINING RANGE
 - TEST AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
 - MAJOR CORE WORK INCLUDES:
 - ICBM'S & TAC MISSILES AND MUNITIONS
(HILL HAS 35 YEARS IN MISSILE WORK)
 - LANDING GEAR
 - FIGHTER AND TAC AIR LIFT AIRCRAFT
 - ELECTRONICS AND SIMULATORS
- WORKBASE IS 5.2 MILLION HOURS. THIS GIVES A BROAD BASE TO SPREAD OVERHEAD. MOVING THE MISSILES THERE PROVIDES SAVINGS REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT OF WORK
- COST TO DO WORK IS LESS AT HILL

THERE A MANY WAYS TO ACCOUNT FOR COST. IN TWO DIFFERENT COMPARISONS, DEPOT HOURLY RATES AT HILL ARE CHEAPER IN COMPARISON TO OTHER DEPOTS.

- IN THE DEPOT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS INDICATOR REPORT, HILL IS \$69 COMPARED TO \$101 AT LETTER-KENNEY.
- BASED ON THE COST COMPARABILITY HANDBOOKS AND THE ARMY REPORTED DEPOT HOURLY RATES, HILL WAS \$49, COMPARED TO \$65 AT LETTERKENNY.
- BASED ON THE LATTER FIGURES, THERE WILL BE A MINIMUM COST SAVINGS OF \$15 MILLION PER YEAR

■ COST TO MOVE:

MOVING CURRENT WORK LOAD FROM HILL WILL COST \$12-15 MILLION. **THERE ARE NO REAL SAVINGS** SINCE FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE REMAIN AT HILL WITH OTHER WORK BEING DONE.

■ FACILITIES:

- HILL SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IS IN PLACE;
- HILL STORAGE REQUIRES NO MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.
- STORAGE, TEST, ANALYSIS, REPAIR, AND DISPOSAL OF MISSILES CAN BE DONE IN ONE PLACE.

NOT MAXIMIZING THE MOST CAPABLE FACILITIES WILL DRIVE UP END ITEM SALES PRICE.

III. [DDOU: ASK BRAC TO LOOK AT DLA'S ANALYSIS VERY CAREFULLY.]

THERE IS STILL DOUBT THAT DLA HAS AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM TO DETERMINE WHAT DEPOTS SHOULD BE CLOSED.

- DLA HAS STATED THAT DEPOT EFFICIENCIES CANNOT BE COMPARED, EFFICIENCY IS DETERMINED ENTIRELY BY WORKLOAD, AND SHOULD NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATION.

I QUESTION THAT ASSERTION.

FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995, DDOU HAS TURNED BACK OVER \$7 MILLION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED A PROFIT. DOES THIS OCCUR AT OTHER DEPOTS?

- IN ADDITION, I UNDERSTAND DLA FAILED TO INCLUDE THE DEPMEDS IN THEIR COBRA ANALYSIS. OMITTING THE LARGEST COST OF CLOSURE HAS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE NUMBRS.

IN THE LATEST COBRA RUN, COST TO CLOSE DDOU WENT FROM \$101.8 M TO \$409.6 MILLION IF DEPMEDS WERE INCLUDED.

THIS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION FROM THE BRAC SELECTION CRITERION.

- HAVING SAID THAT, I BELIEVE WE CAN AND MUST CONTINUE TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH DLA, AND SEEK ANSWERS, SO THAT SOLUTIONS ARE FOUND THAT WILL BENEFIT BOTH THE COMMUNITY AND THE DLA.

IV. [CONCLUDE]

DRAFT

VIRGINIA

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

ARMY:

Fort Lee (Kenner Hospital)	Realign
Fort Pickett	Close
Information Systems Software Command	Close

NAVY:

Information Systems Mgmt Center Arlington	Relocate
Naval Mgmt Systems Support Office Chesapeake	Disestablish
NAVSEA Crystal City	Redirect
NISE Det Norfolk	Close
Office of Naval Research Arlington	Redirect
SPAWAR Arlington	Redirect


II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

None

DRAFT

MAP NO. 47

VIRGINIA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

PROPOSED COMMENTS FOR
SENATOR JOHN WARNER
AT BRAC CONGRESSIONAL HEARING
JUNE 13, 1995

Appropriate greeting to Chairman
Dixon and Commissioners

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
opportunity to briefly summarize some key
points I believe the Commission should
consider, with regard to Virginia
military installations, before you vote
next week on the final BRAC list.

We all agree that the most important of the BRAC criteria is military value, or how a particular base contributes to the continued readiness of our Armed Forces. It is from the perspective of readiness that I applaud the Navy's recommendation to redirect 8 F/A-18 squadrons from Cecil Field, Florida to Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia. Placement of those squadrons at Oceana will allow them to maximize the synergistic effect of being part of the Nation's largest military complex, the Hampton Roads Megabase. Morale, training

and logistical sustainment, hence readiness, will all be enhanced. The move will also be more cost effective for the Navy than other options previously considered. I urge you to uphold this recommendation.

I also support the Navy's recommendation to redirect its Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to the Washington Navy Yard. Although for the past 2 years I have joined Senator Robb and Congressman Moran in arguing for NAVSEA to remain in its current location

in Arlington's Crystal City, I believe that the proposed move to government-owned space at the Navy Yard is sound, both in terms of efficiency and quality of life for the people who work for NAVSEA.

The Navy's 1995 recommendation would keep NAVSEA close to the Navy's decision-makers in the Pentagon, thereby enhancing efficiency, and would be much more cost-effective than the previous recommendation to move it to White Oak, Maryland since it would consume

considerably less military construction monies. Additionally, the Navy Yard is much closer than White Oak to where most of NAVSEA's employees live, thereby making their daily commutes that much easier. Finally, by upholding the Navy's recommendation to quarter NAVSEA at the Navy Yard, the Commission will be contributing to the revitalization of the Navy Yard and Southeast Washington and thereby improving the economic health of the District of Columbia.

While I agree with the Navy regarding Naval Air Station, Oceana and NAVSEA, I cannot see how their recommendation to move the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) from Arlington to San Diego, California, would enhance readiness in any way. In fact, a move to San Diego would adversely affect how SPAWAR accomplishes its mission. As is the case with NAVSEA, most of SPAWAR's business is conducted with other government and civilian agencies in and around Washington. Putting the efficient accomplishment of SPAWAR's mission, hence

readiness, in jeopardy just so SPAWAR can be housed in government-owned space on the other side of the country, seems to me to be short-sighted. I believe this recommendation should be overturned.

Now I turn to Army installations.

The Army's recommendation to realign Fort Lee's Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic would degrade readiness at a key power projection and personnel training site.

Among other things, Fort Lee is an important training installation that supports, on the average, nearly 4,000 military students each day. For purposes of efficiency and morale, sick and injured trainees who require in-patient care should be hospitalized in a facility which is as close as possible to their units. Perhaps the Army's medical infrastructure needs to be reduced; but those reductions should not be made at facilities with a high density of military students who often engage in risky training. I urge you to maintain

Kenner Army Community Hospital as a full service facility.

Finally, I want to address the Army's proposed closure of Fort Pickett, one of the most cost-effective bases in America. On May 4th, some of you heard me express my strong belief that the true facts about Fort Pickett seriously deviate from what the Army has reported to you. You also heard former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, testify to the significant military value of Fort Pickett. Additionally, this Friday

Commissioner Cornella will have the opportunity to view, first hand, Fort Pickett's many attributes and receive a briefing on, among other things, the importance of the fort to Army and Marine Corps tank gunnery on the East Coast.

I want to emphasize to you again today that the Army's plan is not to close Fort Pickett, but rather to keep its ranges and maneuver areas open, while drastically cutting jobs, through the use of an "enclave". In addition to being a detriment to readiness, which I will

explain in a moment, this "enclave" concept would negate community reuse of Fort Pickett and make it nearly impossible to create jobs to offset those eliminated by the closure. That fact alone makes it an unfair recommendation.

The Army says that the "enclave" will save the Government money. But careful analysis shows that the savings they have announced are greatly exaggerated. By all indications, the Army plan is to keep Fort Pickett running by "licensing necessary ranges and maneuver areas to

the National Guard." In their COBRA runs, however, the Army has not factored in the resultant costs to the Federal Government caused by the licensing.

According to National Guard Bureau estimates, those costs would be over \$7.5 million dollars a year, an amount that is nearly half of the present annual operating budget of Fort Pickett.

Therefore, the Army's actual steady state savings from closing Fort Pickett would be significantly less than what they have projected.

Most significantly, in addition to being unfair and uneconomical, the "enclave" concept represents a half-hearted and potentially dangerous approach to readiness. The "enclave" and the "licensing action" combined would still leave Fort Pickett seriously undermanned. As a result, there would be poorly planned, poorly supported and unsafe training. Readiness would ultimately suffer.

Fort Pickett is crucial to the continued readiness of our Armed Forces.

The Army agrees that it should remain open. But their proposed means to do so--the "enclave"--is flawed from both the readiness and the fiscal standpoints. I strongly urge the Commission to overturn the recommendation to close Fort Pickett.

In closing, I thank you all for your attention this afternoon and for your service to the Nation in this critical yet thankless task.

####



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

RANKING MEMBER:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY READINESS

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

OWEN PICKETT
2ND DISTRICT
VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2430 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4215

May 31, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

At the regional hearing in Baltimore conducted by the Commission, the Virginia Congressional Delegation expressed its general agreement with the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. We applaud the efforts of you, your fellow commissioners, and your dedicated staff in sorting out the many issues being thrust upon you.

Unfortunately, some inaccurate data was presented to the Commission by representatives of North Carolina at this hearing that needs to be corrected. For this purpose there is attached a point-by-point analysis of the major items presented by North Carolina in opposition to the BRAC-95 recommendation by the Secretary of Defense to move the F/A-18's from Cecil Field, Florida to NAS Oceana, Virginia.

It must be remembered that when BRAC-93 recommendations and decisions were made, the A-6 aircraft program was scheduled to remain in the US Navy's active aircraft inventory until early in the 21st century. With the projected force structure of F-14's, A-6's and other aircraft scheduled at NAS Oceana when the BRAC-93 decisions were made, there was not adequate capacity to re-direct the F/A-18's from Cecil Field to Oceana.

Since BRAC-93, however, the A-6 aircraft program has been zeroed out. Of the nine A-6 squadrons formerly based at NAS Oceana, all but two have been disestablished. The remaining two A-6 squadrons will either transition to F/A-18's or be disestablished in the next two years. With this dramatic change in Navy aircraft force structure, NAS Oceana will have more than ample room to handle the single-siting of the Navy's entire F-14 aircraft inventory and the Navy's east coast F/A-18 aircraft inventory, including the F/A-18 "E/F" versions to be purchased in the future.

The BRAC-95 decision to move the F/A-18's from Cecil Field, Florida to NAS Oceana, VA can be accommodated with a relatively small expenditure of scarce MILCON dollars compared with the extensive cost of other options. Having these F/A-18's at NAS Oceana is a "Win-Win-Win Situation" for operational readiness, for "quality of life" for military families, and for savings of taxpayer dollars.

VIRGINIA BEACH OFFICE:
2710 VIRGINIA BEACH BOULEVARD
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA 23452
(804) 486-3710

NORFOLK OFFICE:
WARD'S CORNER
112 EAST LITTLE CREEK ROAD
NORFOLK, VA 23505
(804) 583-5892


The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
May 31, 1995
Page 2

We hope the above information and the enclosed materials will be helpful to you and your staff in your decision making process. If we can be of further help, please let us know.

Respectfully,



Owen B. Pickett




John W. Warner



Robert C. Scott



Charles S. Robb



Norman Sisisky



Herbert H. Bateman

TESTIMONY BY
HON. OWEN PICKETT

BEFORE THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1995

THANK YOU CHAIRMAN DIXON AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION. I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH AND ITS SISTER COMMUNITIES IN GREATER HAMPTON ROADS. WE SPEAK AS ONE IN OUR ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT OF THE RECOMMENDATION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO REALIGN ALL NAVY F-14 "TOMCAT" SQUADRONS, AND TO REDIRECT THE BULK OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET FA-18 "HORNET" AIR ASSETS TO NAVAL AIR STATION OCEANA.

AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, BRAC '93 RECOMMENDED CHERRY POINT AS THE PRIMARY RECEIVING SITE FOR CECIL FIELD FA-18'S. MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES IN NORTH CAROLINA QUESTION THE SEC/DEF'S 1995 DIRECTIVE AND ASK "WHAT HAS CHANGED?" TO JUSTIFY MODIFICATION OF

THE BRAC '93 DECISION. THE OBVIOUS ANSWER IS FORCE STRUCTURE. BRAC '93 DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE IMMEDIATE RETIREMENT OF THE ENTIRE A-6 COMMUNITY NOR DID IT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF F-14 SQUADRONS THAT HAS OCCURRED. THIS WILL LEAVE AMPLE CAPACITY AT OCEANA TO ACCOMMODATE BOTH THE SINGLE-SITING OF ALL F-14'S AND THE CECIL FIELD FA-18 SQUADRONS. THE NAVY AND DOD WISELY CHOSE TO CAPITALIZE ON OCEANA'S AVAILABLE CAPACITY AND AVOID THE HIGH COST OF CONSTRUCTING ENTIRELY NEW FACILITIES AT CHERRY POINT. THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION MONEY SAVED BY THIS DECISION IS EQUAL TO THE COST OF CONSTRUCTING AN ENTIRELY NEW AIR STATION. WHILE THERE MAY NOT BE AGREEMENT ON EXACT DOLLAR VALUES, IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS TO ANYONE THAT IT IS CHEAPER TO BED DOWN THESE SQUADRONS AT A HALF EMPTY MASTER JET BASE THAN AT AN AIR STATION ALREADY LOADED AND OPERATING AT OR NEAR ITS MAXIMUM CAPACITY.

THE COST ISSUE AND OTHER MATTERS RAISED BY NORTH CAROLINA AT THE BALTIMORE PUBLIC HEARING ARE DEALT WITH MORE FULLY IN THIS WRITTEN REBUTTAL PREPARED BY OUR OCEANA COMMUNITY SUPPORT GROUP. WITH YOUR KIND PERMISSION, I SUBMIT THIS DOCUMENT FOR THE RECORD AND WILL RESTRICT MY REMAINING COMMENTS TO A FEW KEY POINTS.

THE SEC/DEF's 1995 RECOMMENDATIONS CLEARLY PROVIDE THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE BASING PLAN FOR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT BUT THEY ALSO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES. TOMCAT AND HORNET SQUADRONS FLY INTO COMBAT TOGETHER FROM NAVY CARRIER DECKS -- NOW THEY WILL TRAIN TOGETHER FROM A COMMON BASE LOCATED ONLY A FEW MILES FROM THEIR AIRCRAFT CARRIER HOME PORT, A MAJOR CONCENTRATION OF NAVY SCHOOLS AND TRAINING FACILITIES, AND THE PRIMARY NAVY AND JOINT HEADQUARTERS FOR THE ATLANTIC THEATER.

IT IS LITTLE WONDER OCEANA RANKS FIRST IN MILITARY

VALUE AMONG THE 20 NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OPERATIONAL AIR STATIONS. OCEANA HAS A LONG AND PROUD HISTORY AS A MASTER JET BASE FOR CARRIER-BASED "FIGHTER" AND "ATTACK" AIRCRAFT. THIS EXCELLENT BASE OFFERS A WELL DESIGNED AIRFIELD CAPABLE OF HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS, DIRECT NAVY-CONTROLLED ACCESS TO EXTENSIVE OFFSHORE TRAINING AREAS, COMPREHENSIVE SUPPORT FACILITIES, A MODERN INFRASTRUCTURE, AND ALL NECESSARY AMENITIES TO ENHANCE THE "QUALITY OF LIFE" OF OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILIES.

LAND ENCROACHMENT AT OCEANA IMPOSES NO SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS ON AIRCRAFT LANDING, APPROACHES OR DEPARTURES. UNLIKE CHERRY POINT, THE STANDARD LEFT-HAND PATTERN REQUIRED BY CARRIER PILOTS IS AVAILABLE ON ALL RUNWAYS. TO PROTECT OCEANA'S FUTURE, THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH HAS ENACTED A NEW, COMPREHENSIVE AIRPORT ZONING ORDINANCE AND RECENTLY ACQUIRED THE LAND AND BUDGETED \$25 MILLION DOLLARS TO RELOCATE TWO 40-

YEAR OLD ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS THAT NOW marginally infringe a runway approach. Oceana's unencroached outlying field at Fentress provides intensive day and night carrier landing practice on a full length, 8000 foot runway fully equipped to handle emergency landings.

Water-supply and water quality at NAS Oceana is an absolute non-issue. Along with all other Navy bases in South Hampton Roads, NAS Oceana gets its water supply directly from the City of Norfolk under a blanket contract dating back to 1947. Norfolk and the Navy enjoy a long-standing partnership in responsible water supply management, including a 1981 joint venture for deep wells at Driver, Virginia to guarantee the Navy's water supply in an emergency.

In response to the Air Quality Conformity Statement requirement noted in DOD's recommendation for Oceana, the appropriate

VIRGINIA AUTHORITIES HAVE COMPLETED THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED BASE LOADING AND ISSUED DOCUMENTATION ATTESTING TO "NO IMPACT ON CONFORMITY DETERMINATIONS" FOR THE HAMPTON ROADS AREA.

LET ME CLEARLY AND FORCEFULLY STRESS THE FACT THAT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEC/DEF'S BRAC '95 RECOMMENDATIONS, OCEANA WILL STILL HAVE FEWER AIRCRAFT AND FEWER MILITARY PERSONNEL THAN IT SUCCESSFULLY HOSTED AND SUPPORTED DURING THE LATE 1980'S. BY CONTRAST, FA-18 BASING AT CHERRY POINT WOULD REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT NEW GROWTH FOR AN AIR STATION AND SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES THAT ARE ALREADY PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THEIR SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS.

FINALLY, LET ME EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THE SEC/DEF'S BRAC '95 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OCEANA ARE STRONGLY AND WIDELY SUPPORTED BY OUR ELECTED OFFICIALS, BY OUR CIVIC GROUPS, AND BY THE COMMUNITY

AT LARGE. AS MAYOR OBERNDORF TOLD YOU IN
BALTIMORE, THE CITIZENS OF VIRGINIA BEACH ARE EAGER
TO ROLL OUT THE RED CARPET AND WELCOME THE NAVY'S
BEST AND BRIGHTEST TO NAS OCEANA, THE NAVY'S
"FIGHTER TOWN EAST."

Testimony before the BRAC Commission

Senator Charles S. Robb

June 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to present the legislative perspective on this last round of base closings. Yours is not an easy task and we appreciate the fair and open manner in which the BRAC proceedings have been conducted. Our differences with the DoD's recommendations are few, but significant.

Let me begin by joining Virginia's senior senator in strongly urging you to reverse the DoD recommendation to withdraw any support for Fort Pickett. Clearly, the Army did not take into account the utilization of this key facility by the other services and the impact upon East Coast armor training readiness if this facility is closed. Transferring control of Fort Pickett to the National Guard under a so-called "enclave" may decrease the Army's budget very slightly, but the cost to the taxpayer will remain unchanged. The need for this strategically located training facility has not been challenged. We believe the Army should share the costs of operating it with the other services who are presently using the ranges.

Secondly, and critically important, Mr. Chairman, the Navy's planning process surrounding the proposal to move SPAWAR to San Diego was seriously flawed and the decision ought to be reversed. In 1993 the BRAC directed that SPAWAR relocate in government owned space within the National Capitol Region. Under Secretary Danzig reinforced this policy by issuing a policy imperative in April 94 that quote, "The Department of the Navy must collocate the acquisition work force with the Service Acquisition Executive -- the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RD&A -- to ensure efficiency, timeliness and effectiveness of the acquisition work force." End quote. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Service Acquisition Executive is located in the Pentagon, not in San Diego.

SPAWAR is the major acquisition command for hardware and software for electronic systems in the world. In this capacity it works with commands and activities in the National Capital Region and on the East Coast. Over the years

they have been extraordinarily successful in carrying out this role. As the nation watched the events unfold in Bosnia last week, it struck me that the electronics aboard the ships which guided the successful mission to rescue Captain O'Grady, was due, in large part, to SPAWAR's ability to work closely with both the contractors and their ultimate fleet customers. It makes no sense at all to move this critical command with its unique work force over 3000 miles away from the Assistant Secretary and their primary customers.

In doing the BRAC analysis for the move to San Diego, the Navy conducted COBRA models for a move to Ft. Monmouth and Hanscom AFB. But despite the obvious practical reasons to stay within the NCR, inexplicably, the Navy did not even conduct COBRA runs on alternatives within the National Capital Region. In addition, the Navy did not calculate in its analysis for the San Diego move any construction costs associated with a transcontinental move, despite the fact that four years ago it spent over \$10 million to relocate just two blocks to its present location.

An independent analysis which did conduct COBRA runs for alternatives in the NCR show savings values in the NCR to be three to four times greater than the amount of projected savings from a move to San Diego. This data has been made available to your staff for their review.

It has also come to our attention recently, Mr. Chairman, that the Navy is now preparing plans to consolidate the systems commands. The object is to merge redundant staffs and restructure the planning, budgeting and acquisition roles of the systems commands. We applaud this move which has been recommended by cross service groups for years - most recently by the White Commission on Roles and Missions in the armed forces. But we would argue, Mr. Chairman, that it simply does not make sense to be scattering key elements of these commands all across the country even while we work to rationally and efficiently consolidate our efforts.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Nearly 40 percent of the personnel in SPAWAR are in support or overhead positions -- not the line positions performing the critical functions of this command. Elimination of this overhead and combining redundant functions with the other systems commands could achieve the hoped for savings without a major move and will enable this command to continue its service to its primary customers which are co-located with them in this part of the

country.

To quickly summarize my points, Mr. Chairman, I believe the DoD recommendation to move SPAWAR to San Diego should be overturned for the following reasons:

(1) The COBRA analysis and cost estimates were seriously flawed in that they understate realistic construction costs and fail to consider more practical and efficient alternative sites in the NCR.

(2) Moving this command, at this time, complicates efforts to consolidate the Navy's systems commands. The force structure of SPAWAR suggests that the planned savings can be achieved by staying in their present location and reducing unnecessary and redundant functions. And

(3) Keeping SPAWAR in the NCR keeps them collocated with their customers and with the ASN (RD&A) as required by Navy policy imperatives.

Mr. Chairman, the Navy's own data call specified that -- and I quote -- "If SPAWAR were relocated outside the NCR, the mission would be performed slower, with greater technical risk, and at greater expense ..." Close quote.

Decreasing the efficiency of our critical commands and increasing their costs Mr. Chairman, was not the intent of the BRAC process. Our mission is to increase our efficiency and reduce our costs. For SPAWAR, this can really only be done by keeping it in the National Capitol Region.

Mr. Chairman, Thank you.

Statement of Congressman Tom Davis
before the
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Hearing
June 13, 1995

Chairman and commissioners. The Army has proposed moving the Information Systems Software Development Center (ISSC) from leased space in Fairfax County to government space at Fort Meade, Maryland. This move from leased space to government-owned space looks good -- it should save the government money, none of the 400 military and civilian personnel will be laid off, and the move is from Virginia to just across town in Maryland. But, this is a bad decision for the Army and the Government, and I urge you to have the Army reconsider this move.

The Army ISSC has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. When the Army looked to move ISSC from outdated facilities in Fairfax, Virginia, the Army asked the General

Services Administration (GSA) to find space for ISSC in Northern Virginia. They even specified the boundaries. The Army sought a location close to its Fort Belvoir and Pentagon customers and close to where most of its employees had settled during the past 20 years. This was the Crown Ridge building located at the junction of I-66 and Route 50.

GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease with Crown Ridge Associates for 6 years, at a cost of \$3 million a year. That lease started a little over a year ago and runs through **May 28, 2000**. A total of \$7.2 million was spent by Crown Ridge, GSA, and the Army to upgrade the building to meet the unique requirements of Army ISSC. Crown Ridge spent \$1.3 million, GSA \$2.9 million, and DoD spent \$3.0 million to get this building ready. And in fact, they are still in the process of upgrading and moving into the space. The agreement with GSA allows the Army to move out of the current space without penalty if appropriate notice is given.

Now, after spending all this money the Army is proposing

moving the ISSC to Fort Meade, Maryland. The Army believes that it will save \$8 million over 20 years.

Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer, GSA is still obligated for the six-year term of the lease. If the Army moves out, GSA is stuck with an empty building. This will not be easy space to fill considering it was built to suit ISSC and is not in reasonable proximity to mass transit. **To quote GSA regarding the Army's plans to move out of this building, "... the building was leased specifically for the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the location, and the building might be difficult to market."**

In addition, the Army is going to have to convert or build facilities at Fort Meade. The Cobra model figures used by the Army indicate that it will have to spend roughly \$5 million to renovate space at Fort Meade and move ISSC. So, at a minimum, the government spends \$11 million in renovation and moving costs and ISSC has to go through two moves in

three years. But, the government also will be stuck with a \$3 million per year lease for a building which may sit empty for three years -- another \$9 million.

This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process to work -- the objective is to reduce costs for the government, not just the military services. All this move would accomplish is a cost-shift from the Army to GSA -- a tactic Congress has discouraged BRAC from endorsing.

But more importantly, while this is listed as an in-area move, one only has to try the Washington rush hour commute from western Fairfax County to Ft. Meade, Maryland to know that it will require people to move or spend hours commuting. ISSC civilian personnel, roughly 2/3rds of the command's personnel, have built their lives in Fairfax County over the past 20 years. With the signing of a new six-year lease, personnel felt comfortable making plans to stay in this area. Now the command will be moved again -- and, literally to the other side of the Washington Metropolitan area.

Those working at ISSC are software experts with very specialized and valuable skills. Certainly, some will move to Maryland and some will commute from Northern Virginia, but it is likely that significant numbers will choose to find other jobs. The Army will lose talented people, and there will be a real and operational impact on ISSC.

I think if you look at the big picture, this decision never made sense for the government. It may save the Army some money, if you do not count the disruption to operations caused by another move and the potential loss of skilled people. Ultimately, however this move will cost the government millions in renovation and moving costs and leave the GSA with a \$3 million annual lease obligation on a building without tenants.

In closing, I repeat. With this move, we are shifting the cost of this operation from the Army to GSA. We are not saving any money. This is not what Congress intended when the Base Closure process was set up.

June 13, 1995

Base Closure and Realignment
Commission Congressional Hearing

the proposed transfer of the

U.S. Army Information Systems
Software Development Center -

Washington

to Fort Meade, Maryland

BRAC Congressional Hearing 95 - ISSC

- The Army was very specific in its request to GSA - the new ISSC building would be located in Northern Virginia within a specifically designated "area of consideration."
- The Army agreement with GSA allows it to move out of the space without penalty if appropriate notice is given.
- GSA is still obligated for the six-year term of the lease. GSA has stated that this building may be hard to fill because it is not close to the subway or mass transit.

BRAC 95 Congressional Hearing - ISSC

- A total of \$7.2 million was spent by Crown Ridge, GSA, and the Army to upgrade the current building to meet the unique requirements of Army ISSC. This breaks down as follows:
 - Crown spent \$1.3 million,
 - GSA \$2.9 million, and
 - DoD spent \$3.0 million.
- ISSC is still in the process of upgrading and moving into the Crown Ridge building.

BRAC Congressional Hearing 95 - ISSC

- If the Army moves out in 1997, GSA is still obligated for the remainder of the six-year term of the lease - \$9 million.
- This building does not meet the usual GSA criteria for federal buildings in the Washington area, it has no easy access to the subway or mass transit.
- When asked about the Army's plan to move out, GSA stated, "*... the building was leased specifically for the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the location, and the building might be difficult to market.*"

BRAC Congressional Hearing 95 - ISSC

- There is a human and operational impact here. ISSC's move to Fort Meade will be the second move in three years and the cause of substantial work disruption.
- But more importantly, while this is listed as an in-area move, one only has to try the Washington rush hour commute from western Fairfax County to Laurel, Maryland to know that it will require people to move or spend hours commuting by car -- roughly a 1 1/2 to 2 hour commute, one way.
- These are software experts with highly valuable skills. Certainly, some will move to Maryland and some will commute, but significant numbers of ISSC personnel will choose to find other jobs. The Army will lose talented people, and there will be a real operational impact on ISSC.

CONCLUSION

- This is a building that the Army specifically asked for.
- It has been modified at a government cost of \$5.9 million to meet Army requirements; renovating space at Fort Meade will cost an additional \$5 million.
- If the Army vacates the building, at whatever cost savings, GSA still has to honor the \$3 million per year lease that runs through the year 2000.
- There are hidden costs in loss of qualified people and in the disruption caused by two moves in three years.

P R E S S R E L E A S E

JOHN WARNER

UNITED STATES SENATOR • VIRGINIA



United States Senate • Washington, D.C. 20510-4601 • (202) 224-2023 FAX (202) 224-6295

June 13, 1995

CONTACT: Tracey E. Smith
202/224-6290-O
703/998-5627-H

tracey_smith@warner.senate.gov

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

WARNER TESTIFIES ON BEHALF OF VIRGINIA BASES

Senator John Warner testified today before the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission on behalf of Virginia military installations affected by 1995 Department of Defense (DoD) BRAC recommendations. Warner previously testified at the May 4, 1995 BRAC Regional Hearing in Baltimore.

"The most important of the BRAC criteria is military value, or how a particular base contributes to the continued readiness of the Armed Forces," said Warner. In his five minute presentation, Warner outlined how military readiness would be affected if the Commission were to uphold DoD recommendations regarding four Virginia bases.

Warner applauded the Navy's recommendation to redirect 8 F/A-18 squadrons from Cecil Field, Florida to Naval Air Station, Oceana, near Virginia Beach, and urged the commission to uphold it. "Placement of those squadrons at Oceana will allow them to maximize the synergistic effect of being part of the Nation's largest military complex, the Hampton Roads Megabase," he said. "Morale, training and logistical sustainment, hence readiness, will all be enhanced."

Warner expressed doubt that the Navy's recommendation to move its Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) from Arlington to San Diego, California would enhance readiness. "In fact," he said, "a move to San Diego would adversely affect how

- more -

Senator Warner, Page 2

SPAWAR accomplishes its mission, because most of SPAWAR's business is conducted with other government and civilian agencies in and around Washington, D.C." In urging the Commission to overturn the recommendation, Warner concluded, "Moving SPAWAR across the country, just so it can be quartered in government-owned buildings, is short-sighted."

Warner also expressed strong opposition to two Department of Defense recommendations regarding Army facilities in Southern Virginia.

He said that the Army's recommendation to realign Fort Lee's Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic, "would degrade readiness at a key power projection and personnel training site." Warner stressed that Fort Lee's nearly 4000 military students have unique needs as a result of their time-constrained and often risky curriculum. "Sick and injured trainees requiring in-patient care should be hospitalized in a facility which is as close as possible to their units," he said. "Perhaps the Army's medical infrastructure needs to be reduced; but those reductions should not be made at facilities with a high density of trainees who often engage in risky training."

With regard to Fort Pickett, near Blackstone, Virginia, Warner underscored the points he had made in his May 4th testimony in Baltimore. "The true facts about Fort Pickett seriously deviate from what the Army has reported to you," he said.

Warner took particular exception to the Army's closure language: "I want to emphasize to you again today that the Army's plan is not to close Fort Pickett, but rather to keep its ranges and maneuver areas open, while drastically cutting jobs, through the use of an 'enclave'". Warner called the concept unfair pointing out that, "in addition to being a detriment to readiness, the 'enclave' would negate community reuse of Fort Pickett and make it nearly impossible to create jobs to offset those eliminated by the closure."

Warner also claimed that the Army's projected cost savings from "closing" Fort Pickett are greatly exaggerated. "By all indications, the Army plan is to keep Fort Pickett running by 'licensing necessary ranges and maneuver areas to the National Guard,'" he said. "In their COBRA runs, however, the Army has not factored in the resultant costs to the Federal Government caused by the licensing." Warner pointed out that, according to National Guard Bureau estimates, those costs would be over \$7.5 million a year, an amount that is nearly half of the present annual operating budget of Fort Pickett. "Therefore, the Army's

Senator Warner, Page 3

actual steady state savings from closing Fort Pickett would be significantly less than what they have projected," he said.

"In addition to being unfair and uneconomical," Warner continued, "the enclave concept represents a half-hearted and potentially dangerous approach to readiness. The 'enclave' and the 'licensing action' combined would still leave Fort Pickett seriously undermanned. As a result, there would be poorly planned, poorly supported and unsafe training."

In strongly urging the BRAC Commission to overturn the recommendation to close Fort Pickett, Warner noted that the post "is crucial to the continued readiness of our Armed Forces," and concluded that the Army's "enclave" plan for the post "is flawed from both the readiness and fiscal standpoints".

The BRAC Commission is scheduled to vote on the Department of Defense's closure and realignment recommendations between June 22nd and June 26th. The site for those meetings, which are open to the public, is expected to be announced later this week.

#####

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STENY H. HOYER
BEFORE THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION**

JUNE 12, 1995

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM PLEASED TO BE HERE WITH SENATOR SARBANES AND THE REST OF THE MARYLAND CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN ABOUT A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAT WOULD ADVERSELY IMPACT OUR STATE.

OUR STATE HAS LONG PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE, ESPECIALLY IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS THAT ARE SO CRITICAL TO READINESS.

OUR CITIZENS HAVE LONG SUPPORTED THE STATE'S ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN MARYLAND AND I KNOW THAT AT THE MAY 4TH REGIONAL HEARING MANY OF YOU SAW FIRST HAND THE TREMENDOUS RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS WITH THE FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN TARGETED IN THE STATE.

I FIRST WANT TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL TO MOVE MUCH OF THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER'S AIRCRAFT DIVISION AT LAKEHURST, NEW JERSEY TO THE PATUXENT RIVER NAVAL AIR STATION. PREVIOUS COMMISSIONS HAVE MOVED PERSONNEL FROM TWO ELEMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT DIVISION, WARMINSTER AND TRENTON, AS WELL AS THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND TO THE STATION. WE HAVE CREATED A UNPARALLELED FACILITY FOR TEST AND EVALUATION OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT.

THE 700 JOBS THAT WOULD TRANSFER FROM LAKEHURST WOULD FURTHER ENHANCE THE SYNERGISM AT THE BASE. CLEARLY, PATUXENT RIVER WILL BE AN ENORMOUS ASSET TO THE NAVY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS WE ENTER THE NEXT CENTURY.

THE SOUTHERN MARYLAND COMMUNITY HAS WELCOMED THE OTHER RELOCATIONS WITH OPEN ARMS AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THEY WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE NAVY TO ENSURE A SMOOTH TRANSFER FOR THE MEN AND WOMEN FROM LAKEHURST. SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY TO ASSIST WITH HOUSING, EDUCATION, TRANSPORTATION, AND SPOUSAL EMPLOYMENT ISSUES -- MANY OF THE WORRIES OF ANYONE WHO MOVES TO A NEW COMMUNITY.

WHILE I URGE YOU TO APPROVE THIS RECOMMENDATION, I JOIN WITH THE DELEGATION IN ASKING YOU TO REJECT SEVERAL OTHERS. AS I SAID WHEN I TESTIFIED BEFORE YOU AT YOUR REGIONAL HEARING IN BALTIMORE, I BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THE DEPARTMENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BASED ON INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY VALUE.

KIMBROUGH ARMY HOSPITAL AT FORT MEADE HAS LONG BEEN A VITAL PART OF THE SERVICE WE OFFER TO SOLDIERS STATIONED AT FORT MEADE AND TO THE MANY MILITARY RETIREES IN THE REGION. IT ALSO FULFILLS UNIQUE ROUND-THE-CLOCK NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. THE COMMUNITY IS PREPARING COST DATA FOR THE COMMISSION WHICH I HOPE YOU WILL REVIEW CAREFULLY.

I ALSO WANT TO ENCOURAGE YOU TO TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER'S ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT. THE CENTER'S MACHINERY WORK REQUIRES SPECIALIZED FACILITIES THAT THE NAVY CANNOT AFFORD TO DUPLICATE ELSEWHERE DESPITE OUR NEED TO ACCELERATE SUBMARINE RESEARCH. WE CAN'T AFFORD TO LOSE OUR SUBMARINE SILENCING CAPABILITY OR THE PEOPLE WHO MAKE IT WORK. I ASK YOU TO DUPLICATE THE 1993 COMMISSION'S UNANIMOUS VOTE AGAINST THIS PROPOSAL.

THE MOVE OF THE NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND TO WHITE OAK CONTINUES TO MAKE SENSE FROM A COST STANDPOINT AND FROM THE MILITARY VALUE VIEWPOINT. YOU HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WITH A PROPOSAL TO LOCATE THE SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND WITH NAVSEA AT WHITE OAK. LIKE THE COLLOCATIONS AT PATUXENT RIVER, THIS PROPOSAL HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CREATE ENORMOUS SYNERGISM AND I HOPE YOU WILL APPROVE IT.

YOU WILL BE HEARING FROM MY COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE EQUALLY STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR THE ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTER IN BALTIMORE AND FORT RITCHIE IN CASCADE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I TRUST THAT EACH OF YOU WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER ALL OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU ON MARYLAND INSTALLATIONS. I THANK EACH OF YOU AND ALL OF YOUR STAFF FOR THE ENORMOUS INVESTMENT OF TIME AND ENERGY THAT YOU HAVE SPENT REVIEWING AND VISITING MARYLAND BASES. A FAIR CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS IS ALL WE ASK OF YOU.

THANK YOU.

JAMES P. MORAN
8TH DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

DISTRICT OFFICE:
5115 FRANCONIA ROAD
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22310
(703) 971-4700

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4608

F. 1
COMMITTEE
ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
COMMITTEE
ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Testimony of Representative James P. Moran
at the Congressional BRAC Hearing, 216 Hart SOB
June 13, 1995

Mister Chairman and Members of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, I appear before you to address the relocation of the Space and Naval Warfare Command from Crystal City, Virginia to San Diego, California. As you wind down from two days of grueling testimony, I trust my argument to retain SPAWAR in Crystal City will be cogent and offer compelling reasons to halt this proposed relocation.

There are four reasons why this move is not in the best interest of the mission requirements for the Department of Defense. First, in previous testimony before this Commission, I addressed the matter of a military unit's effectiveness, and the ability to perform the assigned mission. As a United States Navy technical command, SPAWAR is responsible for developing, acquiring and supporting effective, integrated and responsive: undersea, terrestrial and space sensors; communications systems; command, control and intelligence systems; and systems for selective denial of these capabilities to opposing forces. This is a significant mission statement. Relocating SPAWAR from the National Capitol Region to San Diego would degrade and compromise the mission this command is tasked with performing.

The Navy in SPAWAR Certified 1995 BRAC Data Call 31, page 2 states "If SPAWAR were relocated outside the NCR (National Capitol Region), the mission would be performed slower, with greater technical risk, and greater expense due to a different, less experienced work force." I cannot find a more relevant argument, coming from the affected command, to support a redirection that SPAWAR remain in Crystal City.

Second, this move would inhibit international cooperation with military allies in the area of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) activities. A current Memorandum Of Understanding with allied governments requires coordination and development of C4I projects to take place in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. Presently, SPAWAR works closely with these allies who need ready and secure access to their Embassies in order to facilitate information exchanges and C4I interoperability. A move to the West Coast would provide a hinderance to this technical and production

progress.

The third point is the effect this move would have on the contractor support and its associated network. Currently, these contractors also provide services to NAVSEA, NAVAIR, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Science Foundation and an International Program Office. There are approximately 4,000 experts who will be affected by this move; a significant loss to corporate knowledge and expertise in the field of C4I. Many of these individuals have established ties in this area and are unwilling to transfer. Others are concerned about the high cost of living in Southern California.

Finally, potential savings were overstated and construction costs were understated. Personnel cost savings need not be realized solely by relocating to San Diego. Rather, streamlining the staff can be accommodated at the present location using sound management practices. Savings could also be achieved by pursuing other opportunities for consolidation; suggestions which the Navy has recently offered. The Navy is discussing the option of consolidating the Systems Commands or to consolidate common support functions across technical commands. By spinning off these commands prior to an objective attempt by the Navy to consolidate these functions may cause future unnecessary moves and defeats the purpose of closures and realignments.

Additionally, construction costs were not addressed or allocated. It is difficult to assume the relocation of 1160 personnel, and associated equipment would not require the buildout of workspaces, installation of computer equipment and networks, and improvements to the Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). As recent as three years ago, SPAWAR moved a short distance within Crystal City. It cost \$10 million to build out a SCIF, install a Local Area Network, and construct a communications laboratory. Similar construction efforts, with associated costs, will need to be addressed if this relocation were to take place. The COBRA analysis did not take these costs into account.

I urge this Commission to consider the statements offered by SPAWAR in their data call, to look at the potential for loss of corporate memory, to weigh the impact that distance will have on our allied agreements, and to review the unstated personnel and construction costs this move will incur. These arguments provide substantive support for keeping SPAWAR in its present location.

DRAFT

WISCONSIN

I. DoD RECOMMENDATIONS:

NAVY:

NRC Sheboygan

Close

II. COMMISSION ADDS FOR CONSIDERATION:

AIR FORCE:


General Mitchell Air Reserve Station

Close

DRAFT

MAP NO. 50

WISCONSIN



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NOTES

NOTES

news from

HERB KOHL

United States Senator
Democrat of Wisconsin

330 Hart Senate Office Building • Washington, D.C. 20510 • (202) 224-5653

Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI)
Testimony to Base Closure and Realignment Commission
on the
440th Airlift Wing at General Mitchell Air Reserve Station
Milwaukee, WI
June 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, it is my pleasure to testify before you today on behalf of the 440th Airlift Wing, an Air Reserve unit based at General Mitchell International Airport Air Reserve Station in Milwaukee.

When you close an Air Reserve station you are not just closing an installation, you are making the decision to dismantle a unit. In the case of the 440th Airlift Wing, the Air Force would be losing some of the best highly trained C-130 pilots and maintenance crews.

From D-Day to the Cuban Missile Crisis, from Desert Shield/Desert Storm to Haiti, the 440th has demonstrated its importance to our Nation. Even now, as we consider the future of this historic unit, the 440th is ready as the lead wing in the event of an evacuation of United Nations forces from Bosnia.

In 1993, the 440th accomplished what no other C-130 airlift wing has ever accomplished -- and that includes active duty, Air National Guard and reserve units -- an unprecedented performance in the Air Mobility Command's Rodeo, known as the "Olympics of Airlifters." The 440th won the competition for:

- The best C-130 airdrop crew
- The best C-130 crew
- The best C-130 airdrop wing
- The best C-130 wing, and
- The best U.S. Air Force Mobility Wing


- more -

Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI)
Testimony to Base Closure and Realignment Commission
on the
440th Airlift Wing at General Mitchell Air Reserve Station
Milwaukee, WI
June 13, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, it is my pleasure to testify before you today on behalf of the 440th Airlift Wing, an Air Reserve unit based at General Mitchell International Airport Air Reserve Station in Milwaukee.

I have a statement from Congressman Kleczka I would like to insert for the record.

When you close an Air Reserve station you are not just closing an installation, you are making the decision to dismantle a unit. In the case of the 440th Airlift Wing, the Air Force would be losing some of the best highly trained C-130 pilots and maintenance crews.



News From: _____

U.S. Senator Russ Feingold

8383 Greenway Blvd.
Middleton, WI 53562
(608) 828-1200

517 E. Wisconsin Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53202
(414) 276-7282

317 First St., Room 107
Wausau, WI 54403
(715) 848-5660

425 State St., Room 232
La Crosse, WI 54603
(608) 782-5585

502 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-4904
(202) 224-5323

Contact: Matt Nikolay
(202) 224-5323 office
(202) 588-9377 home

For Immediate Release:
June 13, 1995

FEINGOLD URGES BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION TO SPARE 440TH AIR RESERVE UNIT FROM CUTS

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- U.S. Senator Russ Feingold urged members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission today to consider keeping the 440th Air Reserve Unit open and closing the Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications system instead.

"In my view, ELF exemplifies an installation whose mission is of little, if any, military strategic value, and therefore should be closed. In contrast, the 440th Airlift wing has time and time again demonstrated its strategic value as part of our nation's overall defense forces," Feingold said.

Feingold praised members of the 440th for their "honor, distinction, and excellence" in serving this country in the Persian Gulf War, Haiti, Somalia, and most recently in Bosnia.

Feingold offered several notable achievements of the 440th's recruiting operation.

-- Staffing levels of the 440th have been over 100 percent in 9 of the last 10 years, thereby ensuring personnel are ready immediately for active duty.

-- The 440th draws reservists from every one of the nine congressional districts in the state, ensuring full support for its mission.

-- With the regional hubs of both the United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express located at Mitchell Field, the 440th has a large pool of trained pilots, loadmasters and mechanics from which they can successfully recruit.

-- more --

B.R.A.C. Commission
Congressional Hearings, Washington, D.C.
June 12, 1995

Statement by The Honorable Wally Herger

(641 words, 5 min. 2 sec.)

Thank you, Chairman Dixon, and members of the Commission, for this opportunity to testify on behalf of Sierra Army Depot.

I wish to acknowledge the tremendous effort each member of the Commission has devoted to the BRAC process. I wish to especially thank Commissioner Steele who spent a full day at Sierra Army Depot viewing the facility and gathering data about its mission. In the final analysis, it is first-hand observations like this which will enable this Commission to reach an intelligent and informed conclusion regarding the future of Sierra Army Depot.

Today I would like to again draw the Commission's attention to a few specific points which are crucial to a fair evaluation of Sierra. These factors are critical to both the efficient operation of the Department of the Defense and the overall military readiness of our country.

The facts about Sierra speak for themselves. The facility is ideally located. It is cost-effective. It has unmatched transportation capabilities. It has storage conditions that rate fourth overall in the Army system. It has unparalleled demilitarization capability. It stores and services three of the Army's largest operational stocks. Significant realignment would be costly to taxpayers. Combined, these factors alone present a compelling case against realignment of the facility.

Unfortunately, however, these facts have been consistently understated and manipulated in the data which has been provided to this Commission. I wish to cite a few examples.

First, Sierra's demilitarization capability has been grossly understated by the Army and misconstrued in both Navy and Air Force reports. The fact is that Sierra has the largest and most cost effective demil capacity in the country. Furthermore, it has the flexibility to decommission Start I and Start II, thereby enabling the United States to expeditiously fulfill its military-related treaty obligations.

Second, Sierra has been repeatedly evaluated strictly as an ammunition depot when, in fact, fifty-five percent of its mission is to store and maintain three of the Army's largest operational stocks. These operational stocks are critical to Army force projection and were used extensively during the Gulf War.

Third, Army reports have frequently underestimated Sierra's ideal location and transportation facilities. Sierra is the most proximate of any depot to west coast military seaports. It is traversed by two major rail lines and is the only depot with an airfield capable of supporting C-5 aircraft. Closure or realignment would dramatically increase transportation costs for shipping munitions to port. Furthermore, closure of the facility would eliminate a source of virtually unlimited munitions storage and training space.

Fourth, although Army data suggests that realignment of Sierra would save taxpayer dollars, the opposite, in fact, is true. The initial cost of transporting Sierra's ammunition to other bases combined with subsequent increases in the costs of redeployment and demilitarization will negate any one-time savings and, in the long run, cost taxpayers more money.

These four examples suggest that this Commission should carefully re-examine all of the data regarding Sierra Army Depot. As it does so, I urge the Commissioners to give particular credence to the information gathered by Commissioner Steele. With national security and a growing deficit hanging in the balance, it is imperative that any final determination regarding Sierra be predicated upon unimpeachable information. I am confident that such information is now available to the Commission, and I ask that it be given the weight it deserves.

In closing, I again thank you, Chairman Dixon, and your associates for your dedicated efforts. Your decisions over the next few weeks will affect our country's military capabilities for decades. I urge you to consider all the facts - particularly your first-hand knowledge - and predicate your decisions on what is best for our country. I am confident that, as you do so, you will elect to retain Sierra Army Depot as a fully operational facility. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF REP. JAY DICKEY BEFORE THE DEFENSE
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
Monday, June 12, 1995, 10:12 a.m., 345 Cannon HOB

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you about the Red River Army Depot (RRAD) and the Defense Distribution Depot Red River (DDRT) (sometimes collectively referred to as "Red River"). Red River is a true military complex that needs to be considered as a whole rather than as separate parts.

Red River employs 3,700 persons directly, including around 1,200 persons from my district. The mission of Red River is one that is very important to the Army. Red River performs 77% of the Army's maintenance support for mechanized division tracked vehicles. Red River is the Army's most profitable depot. It performs its mission in a highly efficient manner.

Eighty percent (80%) of Red River's distribution mission is for external customers including the following major Army installations: Fort Hood (Texas), Fort Sill (Oklahoma), Fort Carson (Colorado) and Fort Riley (Kansas).

Over 50% of all stateside military posts, camps and stations are located in the Red River central distribution area. It is a modernized, responsive depot that has ample and immediate expansion capacity, including 2,139 acres of land available for unrestricted development.

We believe that the Army needs two (2) combat vehicle maintenance depots. We further believe that the 1995 BRAC Commission should recommend closure of Letterkenny Army Depot rather than Red River. Army COBRA shows that the largest net present value savings will occur if Letterkenny is closed. The figure is \$144 million greater from closure of Letterkenny.

Department of Defense (DoD) has recommended that the combat vehicle maintenance mission at Red River be moved to Anniston Army Depot. We think that this is a mistake because it will overload Anniston, limit surge capacity and jeopardize readiness. In 1995,

information collected during the BRAC data call ranked Red River higher in military value than Letterkenny. In fact, Letterkenny ranks dead last in military value and Red River's score is more than double that of Letterkenny.

DoD has substantially understated the costs to close Red River by \$382 million as well as the recurring savings by \$116 million. The Return on Investment for closing Red River is in the range of 60 years rather than immediately as claimed by the Army. The Army also completely overlooked the missile recertification mission that is performed at Red River.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me take a moment to emphasize the devastating effects that closure of Red River would produce in the Texarkana area. According to the March 1995 DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report, closing Red River would result in the loss of 7,256 direct and indirect jobs. Unemployment in the Texarkana area is already well above the nation's average at 8.1%. If BRAC proceeds to close Red River, unemployment is expected to swell to over 21%. That is a disproportionately harsh result for this economically depressed part of the country.

In fact, under DoD's plan, Red River sustains the largest job loss in the entire country. My colleague, Congressman Jim Chapman of the First District of Texas has previously provided the Commission with a detailed analysis of the cost, in terms of unemployment compensation, that would be associated with closing Red River—a staggering \$52 million. The chances of these displaced workers being able to find comparable permanent employment is slim indeed and the cost to the government is unbelievable.

I hope that the Commission will take a close look at the actual ability of Anniston to accept the massive work requirements that are performed at Red River. I am confident that a fair review will result in a recommendation that will close Letterkenny and retain two combat vehicle maintenance depots for the Army, Anniston and Red River. This would keep military readiness at the needed level.

Mr. Chairman and members of the 1995 BRAC Commission, thank you for your time and consideration of this matter.

STATEMENT OF REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
JUNE 13, 1995

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE PROPOSED CLOSURE OF FORT TOTTEN.

AS I NOTED IN MY TESTIMONY LAST MONTH, THE CURRENT PROPOSAL REGARDING FORT TOTTEN IS TO CLOSE THE FORT EXCEPT FOR AN ENCLAVE RESERVED FOR THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 77TH ARMY RESERVE COMMAND. THAT COMMAND WILL INCREASE AT THE END OF THIS FISCAL YEAR BY 2,000. THIS INCREASE WILL ALSO BRING ADDITIONAL FULL-TIME MILITARY PERSONNEL, WHICH LEAVES US WITH THE QUESTION OF WHERE TO HOUSE SERVICE MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

THE ARMY'S ANSWER CONTINUES TO BE THAT FORT TOTTEN BE CLOSED AND THAT THE ARMY PAY \$3.1 MILLION TO THE NAVY TO HOUSE SERVICE MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES AT MITCHELL FIELD. THE ARMY WILL PAY THE NAVY TO UPGRADE THAT HOUSING BUT THE NAVY WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE A "RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL" TO NAVY AND MARINE PERSONNEL. THIS MAY FORCE ARMY PERSONNEL TO LOOK FOR HOUSING ON THE OPEN MARKET IN ONE OF THE MOST EXPENSIVE MARKETS IN THE COUNTRY. I BELIEVE THIS PROPOSAL IS BOTH UNFAIR AND UNWISE.

THE PROPOSAL IS UNFAIR TO SERVICE MEMBERS WHO WOULD PREFER TO LIVE IN BAYSIDE WHERE EASY ACCESS TO MAJOR TRANSPORTATION

ARTERIES PLACES THE ENTIRE TRI-STATE AREA AND ITS MILITARY FACILITIES WELL WITHIN REACH OF THE BASE.

CLOSING FORT TOTTEN WOULD ALSO DEPRIVE SERVICE MEMBERS OF THE ABILITY TO ENROLL THEIR CHILDREN IN TWO OF NEW YORK CITY'S TOP-RATED SCHOOL DISTRICTS -- DISTRICTS 25 AND 26.

IT IS ALSO UNFAIR TO FORCE SERVICE MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES TO SEARCH FOR HOUSING IN SUCH AN EXPENSIVE MARKET. THE ARMY LISTS NEW YORK CITY AND LONG ISLAND AMONG THE TOP FIVE MOST EXPENSIVE AREAS IN THE COUNTRY. ARMY PERSONNEL IN NEW YORK WILL RECEIVE A 6 PERCENT COLA FOR A MAXIMUM ADDITIONAL PAYMENT OF \$270 PER MONTH. EVEN WITH THIS ADDITIONAL PAYMENT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MILITARY FAMILIES WILL BE ABLE TO FIND ADEQUATE HOUSING NEAR HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOLS AND WITH EASY ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION.

IT IS UNWISE FOR THE ARMY TO PAY THE NAVY TO UPGRADE NAVY HOUSING WHEN THE ARMY COULD SPEND THAT \$3 MILLION TO UPGRADE HOUSING AT FORT TOTTEN AND PERMIT THE CONTINUATION OF RESIDENCES WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THE EXPANDING RESERVE FACILITY AND IN A SUPERIOR LOCATION.

CLOSING FORT TOTTEN WOULD ALSO BE UNWISE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MORALE. SECRETARY PERRY AND PRESIDENT CLINTON HAVE BOTH COMMITTED TO UPHOLDING THE MORALE AND WELFARE OF SERVICE MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. THE COMBINATION OF AMENITIES AND SUPERIOR QUALITY OF LIFE IN BAYSIDE MAKE FORT TOTTEN AN ATTRACTIVE HOUSING

OPTION FOR SERVICE MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. IN FACT, THE CITIZENS COMMITTEE OF NEW YORK RATED THE BAYSIDE AREA ONE OF THE TOP COMMUNITIES IN WHICH TO RAISE A CHILD IN NEW YORK CITY. CLEARLY, LIVING AT FORT TOTTEN WOULD BE GOOD FOR MORALE.

IN SHORT, FORT TOTTEN SHOULD REMAIN OPEN BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING MILITARY HOUSING NEEDS IN NEW YORK CITY, THE HIGH-COST OF HOUSING IN THE NEW YORK AREA, AND BECAUSE IT WILL IMPROVE THE MORALE AND WELFARE OF SERVICE MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

I URGE THE COMMISSION TO REMOVE FORT TOTTEN FROM THE LIST OF FACILITIES TO BE CLOSED.

Statement of

Congressman Jim Chapman (D-TX)

Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Congressional Hearing

June 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon and BRAC Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of Red River Army Depot and the Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas in my Congressional District. The Red River Defense Complex is a unique installation combining the missions of tracked vehicle maintenance, supply distribution, depot-level maintenance and storage of ammunition and ammo production at the co-located Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant.

By the end of this week, all eight Commissioners will have traveled to Northeast Texas to witness this world-class installation in action. On behalf of the people of the Four States Region -- Arkansans, Oklahomans, Louisianans, and Texans -- I want to thank you for taking the time to see for yourselves the best of the best. The Commission's April 19th regional hearing in Dallas demonstrated conclusively the strong community support the Red River family enjoys. In a few days, you will decide the fate of the people you met in my district. I trust you will keep them -- and their tireless commitment to quality service to the American taxpayer -- very much in mind as you consider alternatives to the Defense Department's recommendations.

CAPACITY. The central issue of Army depots is the issue of excess capacity. Our nation's military force structure has been reduced substantially from its Cold War levels, and appropriate cuts in infrastructure must be made to ensure that defense spending is distributed so that our readiness is not jeopardized by misplaced priorities.

But the flip side to this rule is that we must make sure we retain sufficient military infrastructure to meet our warfighting needs. To paraphrase one of my constituent's statement's from the Dallas hearing: Do we really want to put all our vehicle maintenance "eggs" in one depot "basket"? I think the answer to that question is a resounding NO!

The Army has proposed closing Red River Army Depot, significantly realigning Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania and consolidating all ground vehicle maintenance work at Anniston Army Depot in Alabama. I have contended from the beginning of this process that this plan would overload Anniston and severely impede the ability of the depot system to surge to meet a wartime mobilization. New figures submitted by the Army confirms that assessment.

The Army's TABS Office recently submitted to the Commission its estimated peacetime and wartime vehicle maintenance workload requirements. The Fiscal Year 1999 peacetime workload of 3.2 million manhours exceeds Anniston's capacity of 2.8 million manhours. Also, the wartime workload of 12.9 million manhours

greatly exceeds Anniston's maximum capacity of 4 million manhours. These numbers, which come directly from the Army, strongly support my contention that we must retain two maintenance depots.

RRAD vs. LEAD. I wish no ill will toward the supporters of Letterkenny Army Depot. I know first-hand the terrible burden of trying to prevent a proposed base closure action. But the Commission must make these tough calls. I strongly believe the right call is to retain Red River and realign Letterkenny to Red River and Anniston.

My position is based on two simple factors: military value and cost. Red River's score in the Army's military value assessment is more than double that of Letterkenny. Military value comprises half of the base closure selection criteria, and any closure action must have this factor as its basis.

The other factor is cost. On May 26, the Army submitted to the BRAC revised COBRA numbers that show it would save more money (\$1.262 billion) to realign Letterkenny than it would to close Red River.

You have heard over and over that the Army's numbers are wrong. You've heard from me. In this case, the Army's right: the Army's evaluation that Red River's military value is more than twice that of Letterkenny, and the Army would realize a greater cost savings to close Letterkenny is correct. The Commission should opt to keep Red River open and move Letterkenny's work to Red River and Anniston.

Win-Win. The Red River community has devised a plan to deal with the problem of excess capacity without jeopardizing the knowledge base and expertise that are required to meet wartime needs. This Win-Win proposal follows the concepts recommended by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance Management in April, 1994. We should retain the Army's two most efficient depots (Red River and Anniston), realign Letterkenny's vehicle and missile workload to Red River and Anniston, downsize workload to core warfighting systems while teaming with industry for non-core work and maintaining the distribution mission at Red River. This arrangement will reduce excess capacity while ensuring our ability to meet readiness requirements and preserve the industrial base. Everybody wins with this plan: the Army, private industry and the American taxpayer.

I call on the Commission to focus for a moment on the impact of the Pentagon's recommendation on our local economy. The projected local unemployment of 21.7% that would result from Red River's closure would be a brutal blow from which we may never recover. This is an award-winning installation, the nation's recognized quality leader. The people of Red River, with their

demonstrated commitment to quality and efficiency, have earned the chance to continue to play a vital role in defense of America's national security. I strongly urge you to reject the Army's mistaken recommendation, and take Red River Army Depot and the Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas, off the closure list before you send that list to the President on July 1.

Thank you for your time, and I wish you best regards as you complete the difficult task before you.

*The Unique Military Value
of Military Ocean Terminals:*

A Consolidated Summary of
Expert Witness Testimony
Before the Commissioners

Submitted by: Senator Bill Bradley,
Senator Frank Lautenberg, &
Congressman Robert Menendez
June 13, 1995

Introduction

"This is a different category of BRAC. We are not just relocating, we are not just realigning, but in fact we are eliminating a capability"^{1/}

The BRAC Commissioners receive thousands of pages of testimony from hundreds of witnesses in numerous settings making countless valuable points. To aid the Commissioners, this paper briefly presents in a thematic manner the points made on the military value of military ocean terminals by the three expert witnesses who have appeared before the Commission:

- (1) **General Dick Larson**, former MTMC Commander [hereafter, General Larson];
- (2) **Lillian Liburdi**, Executive Director, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey [hereafter, Director Liburdi]; and,
- (3) **Captain Ensminger**, Deputy Commander, Western Area Command, MTMC [hereafter, Captain Ensminger].

Although these expert witnesses gave independent testimony before the Commission on two different dates in two different cities in support of two different bases, the points they make and the conclusions they reach are remarkably similar. In essence, their testimony points out several significant differences between military ocean terminals and commercial ports, points that are described within. Ultimately, these expert witnesses conclude that **the capabilities of military ocean terminals have unique military value that cannot be duplicated by commercial ports.** This testimony is not mere conjecture (like the unproven assumption that commercial ports can meet all the nation's national security needs); their testimony is rooted in real world experience. The points raised in their expert testimony demand that the Commission retain **both** the Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne, New Jersey (hereafter, "MOTBY") and the Military Ocean Terminal at Oakland, California (hereafter, "MOTOA").

^{1/} General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 238.

Differences in Capabilities Between Commercial Ports and Military Ocean Terminals

Military Ocean Terminals were designed to support our national security. Serving our military is their sole purpose, and every aspect of their operation is planned with that unique function in mind. Commercial ports are different in design and operation in manners that make it impossible for them to compete with the military value provided by MOTBY and MOTOA. This paper briefly summarizes some of the critical differences between the two types of ports.

1. Guaranteed Port Availability

A. MOTs Guarantee Instant Access in a Contingency Situation.

It is a fact of military history that contingencies arise which demand instant action on short notice.^{2/} Military officials understand the nature of contingency operations and plan for the day when our nation's military forces must be deployed for immediate action. Military preparedness guides the planning and operations of military ocean terminals.^{3/} As a result, MOTs constantly focus on how to expedite military vehicles and cargo in a crisis, how their physical facilities can be arranged to facilitate responding to such a scenario, and how their personnel should be prepared to handle the potential tumult of a national security emergency.

^{2/} *"Characteristics of contingencies are short notice, quick movement response, secure requirements."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 141-42.

^{3/} *"When I was Commander of MTMC I was preoccupied with the ability of our ports to handle on a short term, 24 hours or less, to garner the availability of the port facilities, be that diverse staging areas, marshalling areas, and many of the attributes that I think are absolutely necessary for the defense of this country and . . . to deploy forces anywhere in the world from the United States in the force projection scenario today."*

General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 239-240.

B. Commercial Ports Do Not and Will Not Guarantee Port Availability Necessary for Effective Military Operations.

Our nation's commercial ports are congested with commercial shipments that delay prompt action.^{4/} These commercial ports do not allocate money to maintain extra capacity that is needed only in times of a surge in military need.^{5/} Further, the availability of commercial ports for military shipping is worsening rather than improving.^{6/}

In addition, General Larson recounted real-life situations where a commercial ports did not guarantee access to military shipping during ongoing military operations.^{7/} The Commission cannot depend upon the wishful thinking of some analysts that, in time of military action, the normal commercial port congestion created by limited facilities will melt away. All three experts agreed: commercial ports are unwilling to guarantee access in the required time frame to assure readiness.

4/ *"Commercial ports, like the commercial port of Oakland, are busy. That means limited availability, congestion in their ports, and very little access capacity."*
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 139.

5/ *"Commercial ports are profit-making organizations, and there aren't too many profit-making organizations that can afford to maintain excess capacity. That limits their availability, especially when we need them on short notice."*
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 139-140.

6/ *"[C]ommercial ports are becoming increasingly unable to deal with disruption resulting from military activity. Without a declaration of a nation's emergency, many ports are requiring lead time well beyond those that are currently assumed in joint planning orders."*
Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 229.

"Traffic at all major ports, with the exception of Baltimore, has increased significantly each year."
Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 227.

7/ *See generally* General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 236-237 (one commercial port did not provide the military with the staging areas and berths to accommodate full deployment of a Gulf War force, and another commercial port refused to guarantee the availability of continued berthing for a military ship during a military action in Somalia).

2. Secure Port Operations

A. MOTs Guarantee Secure Operating Environments That Are Necessary for Military Operations.

It is critical that all movements of essential war-fighting support equipment have the best security we can provide. Terrorists and the governments that support them will do their utmost to disrupt the transportation of military hardware. In addition, certain domestic forces would like to acquire weapons of destruction for their own dark purposes. In short, military equipment and operations must have a high level of security.^{8/} Both MOTs have security unrivaled by any commercial ports.^{9/}

B. Commercial Ports Simply Do Not Have Equivalent Security.

Commercial ports cannot afford to duplicate and are not equipped to manage security operations on a par with either MOT.^{10/} The commercial port security is not designed to safeguard classified military goods, to protect lethal military weapons, and to prevent terrorist actions that could choke a military deployment in a time of national emergency.

^{8/} *"The military security aspect . . . was of utmost importance. It is not that only certain aspects on an M-1 tank are classified and have to be secured, it is also because the military equipment by nature has to be secure. They are lethal weapons, they are cannons and tanks and artillery and aircraft that have to be secured and have to be protected."*

General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 240.

^{9/} For example,
"MOTBY is located on a peninsula and has a perimeter security line and another, more fortified security arrangement around the cargo handling facility. This level of security, which includes CCTV surveillance around the compound, is essential to a military deployment."

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 232.

^{10/} *"[O]ur cargoes are secured to prevent theft . . . but not to the degree of sophistication and control that MOTBY provides.*

*. . . .
Neither the Port of New York and New Jersey nor alternate ports which may be considered -- Norfolk, Baltimore, Savannah, Charleston or Wilmington -- have a similar [security] capability."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, pp. 233-234.

3. Ability to Handle Specialized Military Cargo

A. MOTs Are Designed to Handle Large, Non-Containerized Pieces of Military Cargo.

Military cargo has unique characteristics. One of the most important of those characteristics is the fact that most military cargo is not containerized,^{11/} unlike most commercial cargo. Further, it is often better to ship even that portion of military cargo that could be containerized (and made easier for commercial port shipping here) in a non-containerized manner because many ports cannot receive such heavy containers.^{12/}

B. Commercial Ports Have a Limited Ability to Provide Adequate Staging and Operating Areas Needed for Large Deployments.

Commercial ports were not designed to handle military cargo.^{13/} Most commercial ports are designed to handle containerized cargo, not large uncontainerized military equipment.^{14/}

^{11/} "[D]uring contingencies and unit moves, most military equipment is not containerizable. Well, one reason it's not containerizable is size. Picture the M-1 tank. that should make that obvious. You can't fit an M-1 tank into an eight foot wide opening of a container."

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 138.

^{12/} "Another reason not so obvious is the inability to off-load and move containers in underdeveloped ports or countries. Mogadishu and Somalia and Haiti is an example of that lesson relearned. Because military cargo is heavy and overweight, it often requires special heavy lift cranes, a unique problem for most ports."

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 138-139.

^{13/} "Commercial ports have not been designed to accommodate the special requirements of military cargo. Non-containerized military equipment armaments combat vehicles and sustaining cargoes require specialized staging, restaging, security, intermodal access and a trained labor force dedicated solely to this activity if we are going to assure safety and timeliness."

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 230.

^{14/} "[M]ost commercial ports are optimized to handle commercial cargo in containers. Large amounts of military cargo can't be containerized

.....

(continued...)

4. Adequate Staging and Operating Areas

A. MOTs Guarantee Secure Operating Environments That Are Necessary for Military Operations.

The size and nature of military cargo require larger staging areas than those found in commercial ports.^{15/} The need to marshall mixed cargo loads that might have arrived separately into a comprehensive shipment needed to support a fighting force also necessitates large and convenient staging areas.^{16/} These staging areas must be designed for military cargo. ^{17/}Further, the difficulties involved in moving military goods make it essential that such staging areas are convenient to transportation and loading facilities.^{18/}

^{14/}(...continued)

"Commercial ports are optimized for containerized cargo, which makes it a limited capability for non-containerized cargo."

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 139, 140.

^{15/} *"The size and nature of military vehicles means you can't stack them one on top of another like you can containers. That means military cargo typically requires large amounts of staging area, more so than typical commercial cargo. Military cargo also frequently has security requirements, has hazardous waste consideration."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 139.

^{16/} *"The staging area that is provided at MOTBY . . . not only provide[s] the ability to bring in a great deal of equipment and provide[s] a number of ships to be loaded concurrently, but it also ensures the ability to manifest and marshall the equipment in the priority order that is wanted overseas."*

General Dick Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 240-241.

^{17/} *"For military purposes the staging area must be designed to accommodate irregular shapes, sizes and other requirements of specialized military cargo. The weight and overall dimensions of this military cargo also dictate that the staging area be designed to support the loads placed by M-1 tanks and Bradleys."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 231.

^{18/} *"[MOTBY] has a concrete staging area along its operational berths which allows unique staging configurations. This staging area is integrated with on-dock rail leading directly to the berths, thereby allowing for immediate transfer to shipside -- features that no commercial port can match today."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 231.

Both MOTBY^{19/} and MOTOA have outstanding staging areas. Their abundant, contiguous, and open staging to the shipping berths ensure that military cargo will be handled in both orderly and rapid fashion.

B. Commercial ports have a limited ability to provide adequate staging and operating areas needed for large deployments.

In contrast, commercial ports have a concern for maximizing the value of their real estate. They have not reserved large amounts of space for open staging areas that are needed only for military shipping needs. Their staging areas are not as convenient to points of transportation and loading.^{20/} As a result, commercial ports do not have the capability to replace MOTs due to the lack of sufficient staging areas.^{21/}

That last point needs to be reiterated. Commercial ports do support certain military operations and are capable of shipping some military cargo. What commercial ports cannot do, however, is take over entirely **all** of the military sea lift shipping mission.^{22/} No detailed study has yet analyzed the capability of commercial ports to completely usurp the role of our nation's two Military Ocean Terminals, and no objective study could reach such a conclusion.

^{19/} "MOTBY has almost a million and a half square feet of storage under cover and several million square feet that are available in the open."
General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 240.

See also footnote 18, *supra*, regarding the convenience of MOTBY's staging areas.

^{20/} "[W]e have Gantry cranes and stacked boxes which preclude helicopter landings at berthside."
Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 232.

^{21/} "[Commercial ports] are limited in suitability because of inadequate staging"
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 140.

^{22/} "That doesn't mean we don't need the commercial ports. On the contrary. In both peacetime and during contingencies, there still is a lot of militarized cargo moving in containers. The commercial ports **complement** the military ports. We need them **both**."
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 140-141 (emphasis added).

5. Trained Port Personnel

A. MOTs Have the Specially Trained Port Personnel Needed for Moving Military Vehicles and Cargo.

Both MOTs have the dedicated and experienced stevedores that are necessary to deal with whatever diverse cargo arrives at the port. MOT professional longshoremen are trained to stage, marshal and move all types of military cargo, and are licensed to operate and load the over sixty DoD oversized vehicles port personnel must handle every day.^{23/} This cadre of highly trained professionals is integral to a successful mobilization.

B. No Other Workforce Should Handle Military Mobilization.

Workers at commercial ports simply do not have the training and expertise to handle the full range of military vehicles and cargo, and certainly not as efficiently as the MOT longshoremen.^{24/} Commercial port workers cannot take over the task of moving military vehicles and cargo, nor should we use scarce military manpower in that mission.^{25/}

^{23/} "Given that military cargo is different from the type of vehicles and equipment normally handled at a commercial port, a trained labor force to move these pieces in an efficient manner is essential. International Longshoreman Association drivers at MOTBY have military drivers licenses, permitting them to operate all military equipment, including M-1 tanks."

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 234.

^{24/} "[M]y experience was, in dealing with the commercial ports, they have a wonderful force for loading containers and cars and fastening them down, but when it comes to dragging heavy chain to tie down M-1 tanks and outsized heavy equipment, most commercial ports do not have that experience and training which exists today and every day at MOTBY."

General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 242.

^{25/} "It is not possible during times of military mobilization to first train workers at commercial ports to do the specialized tasks associate with military cargoes. In past mobilization efforts, troops were required to be at commercial ports to move these vehicles, shrink-wrap helicopters prior to loading, and so on. In some case staging had to take place at the home base. This deprived MTMC of its flexibility in its use of ships. In cases where alternate ships were used, restaging was required. Restaging, of course, costs time, money, and coordination effort."

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 235.

6. Special Transportation Advantages

A. Both MOTs Are Located Near Major Transportation Modes.

The military value of the two Military Ocean Terminals cannot be appreciated without considering our nation's geography.^{26/} If the military were to choose anew the location for one East Coast MOT and one West Coast MOT, it could not choose better locations than Bayonne and Oakland. MOTBY has access to two of the nation's major interstate routes.^{27/} In addition, MOTBY is near major ports, railroads, and airports.^{28/} Similarly, MOTOA is situated near major transportation systems.^{29/}

The strategic locations of our nation's two Military Ocean Terminals near the premier ports of New York and San Francisco equips them for power projection into all parts of the world. Their indispensable military is augmented by complete access to the best intermodal transportation networks in our country.

^{26/} *"The model [for military value], as good as it was, was deficient. It was deficient because it was missing a crucial attribute. What the missing attribute is, in a word, was geography. . . . Military value must consider the strategic importance of Oakland's geographic location"*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 135.

^{27/} *"MOTBY enjoys unparalleled highway access, being located adjacent to the major north-south motor carrier roadway in the United States -- I-95 -- and near the nation's major east-west roadway -- I-80. This is important because a significant percentage of military cargo is delivered over the road."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 234.

^{28/} *"The transportation center that we have in the Port of New York and New Jersey is one of the best in the country. You not only use the rails to bring in the equipment, but you have a wonderful road system. Also, Newark Airport and the other airports are within close proximity to MOTBY."*

General Larson, May 5, 1995, p. 241.

^{29/} *"Part of the reason for Oakland being the CONUS focus for west deployment is the excellent highways and railroads. . . . Oakland also has excellent railroad infrastructure. . . . Oakland is serviced by three full service railroads, the Santa Fe, Union Pacific, and Southern Pacific. By the way, rail is the preferred mode of transportation for moving containerized military cargo."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, pp. 137-138.

**B. Both MOTs Have Special Facilities and Capabilities
That Aid in the Expedited Transport of Military Cargo.**

Military Ocean Terminals were designed with one key concept foremost in the minds of planners--namely, that in a mobilization situation, large amounts of military vehicles and cargo must be moved in an expedited manner.^{30/} In many ways, large and small, the need for speed is built into their mission. First, just by being immediately available (unlike commercial ports), MOTs can respond quickly.^{31/} That availability comes at a price, but its is a small price for the military capability our nation needs.

Second, the MOTs' physical plant is designed for even quicker transportation of cargo than commercial ports (given the difficult nature of the military cargo handled). In addition to the staging areas discussed earlier, another example of superior physical facilities designed for speedy transport is MOTBY's rail system. The MOTBY rail system is designed to allow mostly direct shipments and easy access for large military cargo shipments.^{32/} No other East Coast Port has a similar facility, and use of other ports would result in critical delays.^{33/}

^{30/} *"What distinguishes military port capacity from commercial port capacity? The unique characteristics of military cargo. For example, crises occur with little or no notice, and that means huge amounts of military cargo must move quickly."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 138.

^{31/} *"[MOTOA] is designed for rapid movement of military cargo in a crisis. Its facilities are immediately available and suitable for handling non-containerized cargo. . . ."*

Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 137.

^{32/} *"The rail installation at MOTBY is first rate, having been totally rehabilitated as a result of the lessons learned during the Gulf War. This \$15 million upgrade, designed by the [DOT], produced facilities which provide an efficient time saving transportation link to berthing facilities. Most of the rail shipments received at MOTBY are direct runs, eliminating time-consuming rail interchanges which could add days when taken to ports elsewhere, Norfolk and others."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 233.

^{33/} *"In contrast to [MOTBY's] capability, rail access to the Port of New York and New Jersey's commercial facilities was not designed with the specific needs of the military in mind. The same is true in Baltimore and Norfolk and Charleston and Savannah."*

Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, pp. 233-234.

Conclusion

"I believe that I cannot at my port provide the space, security, access, and trained labor in the efficient, timely manner needed to support the MTMC mission, to service troops to the support scenario areas. I also sincerely doubt whether my colleagues at other ports could do so. On the other hand, MOTBY stands ready to performs these services with a proven, and unparalleled, record."^{34/}

Even the Executive Director of one of the nation's largest general cargo port on the East and Gulf coasts agrees that commercial ports cannot replace our Military Ocean Terminals at Bayonne and Oakland. All of the expert testimony consistently agrees that MOTs are uniquely capable of handling military missions on short notice in a secure and efficient manner.^{35/} MOTs have singular capabilities that render them invaluable, even aside from questions of port capacity generally. In short, **Military Ocean Terminals cannot be replicated by commercial ports.**^{36/}

The Military Ocean Terminals at Bayonne and Oakland are designed solely for rapid movement of military cargo in a crisis. Because of their unique military value, the Commission **must** retain these capabilities in order to preserve our nation's security.

^{34/} Director Liburdi, May 5, 1995, p. 237.

^{35/} *"Knowing the unique characteristics of military cargo, and knowing that military ports like Oakland Army Base are designed and built for military cargo, it is not surprising that military cargo works best in military ports."*
Captain Ensminger, May 25, 1995, p. 139.

^{36/} *"It simply cannot be replicated, the capabilities, the accessibility, of MOTBY, any place in the United States other than Oakland Army Base on the West Coast. And the studies that were done for Oakland show that in fact the other commercial ports on the West Coast cannot take the full capabilities and necessities of the military equipment through that far in the world."*
General Larson, May 5, 1995, pp. 242-243.

**BASING OF ATLANTIC FLEET FA-18
SQUADRONS**

* * * * *

VIRGINIA BEACH, VA COMMUNITY RESPONSE

TO

**TESTIMONY OF
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
BEFORE THE
1995 BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**DURING THE
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
REGIONAL HEARING
MAY 4, 1995**

Compiled by the
Hampton Roads Planning District Commission Staff
June 8, 1995

**BASING OF ATLANTIC FLEET FA-18
SQUADRONS**

* * * * *


VIRGINIA BEACH, VA COMMUNITY RESPONSE

TO

**TESTIMONY OF
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
BEFORE THE
1995 BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**DURING THE
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
REGIONAL HEARING
MAY 4, 1995**

Compiled by the
Hampton Roads Planning District Commission Staff
June 8, 1995



INTRODUCTION

BRAC '93 directed the closure of NAS Cecil Field, Florida and movement of its fleet FA-18 Hornet community to MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina. Cecil Field's two FA-18 Naval Reserve squadrons were directed to MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, while the S-3 community was slated for transfer to NAS Oceana, Virginia. During BRAC '95, the Navy and DoD reconsidered the distribution of Cecil Field squadrons and recommended placing the bulk of the FA-18 community at NAS Oceana, two fleet FA-18 squadrons at MCAS Beaufort, the S-3 community at NAS Jacksonville, and the two Reserve FA-18 squadrons at NAS Atlanta.

North Carolina officials vigorously oppose the redirect of Navy FA-18 squadrons to NAS Oceana and argue that the BRAC Commission should hold the Navy to its 1993 recommendation. Asking "what has changed?" since 1993, North Carolinians question the "flip flop" in cost estimates that favor Oceana by a wide margin and contend the Navy arbitrarily rigged its analysis process to exclude Cherry Point as an FA-18 site. North Carolina also argues that Cherry Point is a superior FA-18 site due to operational, environmental and "quality of life" considerations. So why should the Navy ignore such compelling logic and choose Oceana? The answer, according to Cherry Point advocates, is that the Navy "refuses to implement joint-servicing" and has decided to "save Oceana at all costs."

Of the diverse points raised by North Carolina, one central issue deserves special emphasis: the question of "what has changed" since 1993? The obvious answer, which North Carolinians choose to ignore, is **force structure**. The Navy did not seriously consider NAS Oceana as an FA-18 site in 1993 because force planning assumptions at the time indicated little reduction in Ocean's base load of A-6 and F-14 squadrons for the next decade. The subsequent decisions to retire the A-6 and reduce F-14 squadrons by half opened up enough capacity at Oceana to accommodate the FA-18 community at a fraction of the cost required to build what amounts to a new air station at Cherry Point. While North Carolinians understandably press their desires for new growth and economic windfalls from the BRAC process, it must be emphasized that the net result of BRAC '95 recommendations will still leave NAS Oceana with fewer aircraft and personnel than it had during the late 1980's.

Elected officials of North Carolina presented their case during testimony before the Commission in Baltimore on May 4, 1995. This presentation was marked by misleading statements, out of context quotations, creative accounting and unsubstantiated conclusions. The following pages offer a point by point rebuttal based on North Carolina's briefing slides and recorded testimony during the Baltimore hearing.

1993 Rationale

- "...dovetail with the recent *determination for joint military operation of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft...*"
- "...Alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems..."
- Oceana considered as receiver but *rejected*:
 - "...Movement of NAS Cecil Field F/A-18 aircraft and personnel to NAS Oceana defeats the increase in military value achieved by the integration of Navy carrier-based aviation with the Marine Corps carrier aviation at MCAS's Cherry Point and Beaufort..."
- 1993 COBRA analysis found that movement of Cecil Field:
 - F/A-18 and S-3 aircraft to Oceana would cost \$228,084,877
 - F/A-18 aircraft to Cherry Point would cost \$147,453,000
 - S-3 aircraft to Oceana would cost \$42,871,751
- Navy rationale made sense



1993 RATIONALE (NC Slide 4)

- "...DOVETAIL WITH THE RECENT DETERMINATION FOR JOINT MILITARY OPERATION OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT..."

Comment: This quote of the Navy's rationale for choosing Cherry Point and Beaufort as receivers of Navy FA-18 squadrons is incomplete and misleading. The quoted sentence from the Navy's recommendation actually reads "...dovetail with the recent determination for joint military operation of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft from carrier decks." (underline added.)¹ The Navy's BRAC '95 recommendation accomplishes this joint integration goal more fully by pairing two fleet carrier-based (vice Reserve) FA-18 squadrons with Marine carrier-based FA-18 squadrons at MCAS Beaufort. The Navy's cross-service basing rationale makes little sense at Cherry Point, which has only AV-8 Harrier, EA-6B and C-130 squadrons. Except for one EA-6B unit, these Marine squadrons are not routinely carrier-based and have little maintenance or mission commonality with Navy FA-18 squadrons. No significant cost, training or operational advantage would be achieved by co-basing these diverse aircraft types.

- "...ALLEVIATED CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE PROBLEMS..."

Comment: This out of context quote from the 1993 Navy recommendation was presented to imply Navy concerns about NAS Oceana when, in fact, the comment refers to NAS Cecil Field.

- "OCEANA CONSIDERED AS RECEIVER BUT REJECTED:"

- "...Movement of NAS Cecil Field FA-18 aircraft and personnel to NAS Oceana defeats the increase in military value achieved by the integration of Navy carrier-based aviation with the Marine Corps carrier aviation at MCAS's Cherry Point and Beaufort..."

Comment: As noted above, the Navy's 1993 rationale for collocating Navy and Marine carrier-based squadrons has little application to Cherry Point. Moreover, the Navy did not seriously consider Oceana as an FA-18 site during BRAC '93 because Oceana's F-14 and A-6 squadrons were projected to remain at or near 1993 levels well into the next decade. It was the Navy's subsequent decision to retire the A-6 and reduce the total number of F-14 squadrons by half that created excess capacity at Oceana and the opportunity to accommodate Cecil Field's FA-18's at greatly reduced cost.

¹ DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, DoN Analysis and Recommendations (Vol. IV), March 1993. p. I-7.

1995 Navy Rationale totally changed!

- "The rules built into the configuration model are:
 - Rule 1: that average military value of air stations left open must be at least equal to the average military value of all air stations considered and that *the introduction of aircraft types not currently aboard a station is not allowed*"
- This rule:
 - Eliminates Cherry Point as an F/A-18 base
 - Qualifies Oceana for active component F/A-18s by virtue of its ONE F/A-18s Reserve squadron
 - Destroys the inter-Service synergy sought in the BRAC '93 recommendations and confirmed by the BRAC '93 decision
 - Violated by redirecting S-3s from NAS Oceana to NAS Jacksonville

Substantial Deviation



1995 NAVY RATIONALE TOTALLY CHANGED! (NC Slide 6)


North Carolina officials claim the Navy changed the "rules" in their configuration analysis process to arbitrarily eliminate Cherry Point as a potential FA-18 base while qualifying Oceana by virtue of its existing FA-18 Reserve squadron.

Comments: THIS ALLEGATION IS SIMPLY UNTRUE. Moreover, North Carolina's argument reflects a serious misunderstanding--or misrepresentation--of the Navy's decision process and the true basis for the BSEC's recommendations on aircraft squadron redirects.

- The Navy's configuration analysis process is described in Volume IV of the DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission (DoN Analyses and Recommendations, March 1995).² The configuration model combines results of capacity and military value analyses to yield optimum sets of bases that minimize excess capacity while achieving an average military value equal to or greater than the average military value of all bases in the subcategory. "Rules" applicable to each base subcategory were applied "so that the configuration model would not select an operationally infeasible solution."³ In the case of Air Stations, analyses were based on FY 2001 force structure requirements and assumptions, including the BRAC '93 decision that FA-18's would go to Cherry Point. In short, the analysis "rules" **did not eliminate or in any way prejudice Cherry Point as an FA-18 receiving site.**
- It is also important to note that **the Navy's final recommendations for FA-18 basing were *not* based on the results of configuration modeling**, which is only an intermediate step in the Navy's overall process. Configuration model output is limited to "optimum" combinations of bases to retain or close based solely on physical capacity and military value considerations. Cost and operational priorities do not come into full play until the scenario development and analysis phase of the evaluation process. The Navy's configuration analyses suggested closing four air stations including the jet bases at Key West and Beaufort. The BSEC rejected these choices for operational reasons and turned to an alternative capacity reduction approach that focused on redirecting BRAC '93 laydowns rather than closing additional bases. Subsequent data call and COBRA analyses proved it was far more cost effective and operationally sound to take advantage of existing capacity at Oceana rather than build new capacity to accommodate Navy FA-18 squadrons at Cherry Point. Combined with F-14 community single

² DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, DoN Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), March 1995, p. 25 and pp. C3-C5.

³ *ibid.*, p. 25.



siting, the total cost avoidance associated with aircraft squadron redirects to Oceana was judged to be "equivalent to the infrastructure cost of a major new tactical aviation base."⁴

To summarize:

- Navy "rules" did *NOT* prejudice consideration of Cherry Point as a potential FA-18 receiving site during configuration analyses.
- Even if allegations of rigged configuration analyses were factual, there would have been no ill-effect on Cherry Point because the Navy did not base its 1995 FA-18 recommendation on configuration model results.
- The Navy's FA-18 recommendation is based on thorough analyses including comprehensive data calls, operational commander inputs, alternative scenario development and extensive COBRA runs.⁵ This recommendation fully satisfies the letter and spirit of BRAC selection criteria.

⁴ DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, DoN Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), March 1995, pp. C4-C5.

⁵ Ibid., p. C-4.

Return on Investment - COBRA Analysis

Rule 2: The application of "significant cost avoidance...through cancellation of budgeted military construction (MILCON) and fuller utilization of existing capacity at other receiving sites..."

▪ **Cherry Point Costs Overstated:**

- Cost avoidance for Cherry Point calculated at \$332,342,000
- Including:
 - \$42,800,000 for 447 *MORE* family housing units at Cherry Point that are NOT required
 - \$39,500,000 for 6 additional BEQs which are NOT required
 - \$25,000,000 for unnecessary and counterproductive parallel taxiway
- Unlike Oceana costs, Cherry Point savings are based on original plan to house 204 aircraft
- *SHOULD be consistent based on eight operational squadrons plus an FRS of 48 aircraft (as was Oceana Cobra)*



Return on Investment - COBRA Analysis

▪ **Oceana Costs Understated:**

- Move of F/A-18s to Oceana costed at \$28,370,000, rather than the 1993 figure of \$228,084,877
- No calculation for additional family / bachelor housing

Personnel	8713	8730
Housing	2840 units	1225 units
BEQ	3750 beds	2640 beds



RETURN ON INVESTMENT- COBRA Analysis (NC Slides 7 & 8)

- *North Carolina briefing contends cost avoidance of \$332,342,000 for Cherry Point MILCON is overstated.*

Comments: In fact, \$332M may *understate* the cost involved in BRAC '93-related expansion at Cherry Point. Marine Corps certified data specifies ten numbered MILCON projects totaling \$419,880,000 that are planned or programmed for 1995-1999 in order to accommodate Navy FA-18 squadrons at Cherry Point⁶. This USMC estimate does not include the one time local impact remediation cost of \$36,560,000 for public school classroom additions in Carteret and Craven Counties included in the Navy's BRAC '93 COBRA cost estimates.⁷ Whether or not these classroom additions are federally funded, they would be sorely needed judging from the crowded classroom conditions described in MCAS Cherry Point's data calls.⁸ The Navy's current cost avoidance estimate of \$332M eliminates several MILCON projects requested by the Marine Corps and represents the bare minimum requirements for accommodating Cecil Field aircraft at Cherry Point.

- *North Carolina argues Cherry Point needs no new family housing and BEQ since it already has more units than Oceana.*


Comment: This argument ignores three vital facts about Oceana. First, military personnel based at Oceana are not restricted to the 1225 units of on-base housing, but enjoy a choice of 5309 family housing units in various off base Navy housing complexes in Virginia Beach and Norfolk. Assignment of these 5309 units is coordinated by a centralized housing office with branches at major South Hampton Roads bases.

Second, Virginia Beach and adjacent cities offer a wide variety of affordable civilian housing capable of absorbing surges in housing demand. By contrast, military personnel at Cherry Point face a rural, small town environment and are far more dependent on government housing which is already fully utilized and includes

⁶ MCAS Cherry Point BRAC '95 Military Value Analysis Data Call, question 20.b, Table 20.b, p. 27.

⁷ DoN Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), March 1993, pp. I-8 & I-9.

⁸ Craven County schools are within 300 students of maximum capacity and have a pupil-to-teacher ratio of 26:1 (Cherry Point BRAC '95 Data Call 65, p. 20.). By Contrast, Virginia Beach schools enjoy a pupil-to-teacher ratio of only 20:1 (Oceana BRAC '95 Data Call 65, p. 20.)



significant percentages of units classified as "substandard" or "inadequate."⁹ Contrary to North Carolina's current allegations, the Navy's BRAC '95 estimated requirement of 447 new family housing units is far below previous Marine Corps and Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) recommendations which ranged from 670 units to 1383 units.¹⁰

Finally, the housing resources and public service infrastructures of NAS Oceana and Virginia Beach successfully supported a larger base population in the late 1980's than will exist following full implementation of BRAC '95 recommendations.

- *North Carolina says building parallel taxiways for Cherry Point runways is "unnecessary and counterproductive."*

Comment: Taxiways paralleling the full length of primary runways are an important operational factor given high weight in military value calculations (weighted value 1.78 in BRAC '95 military value matrix). While Cherry Point's unique runway configuration is adequate for its current base loading and aircraft mix, it is not compatible with the high intensity operations required at a Master Jet Base. Without parallel taxiways, Cherry Point's four runways are essentially reduced to only two since for any given pair of runways, e.g., runways 32 Left and 32 Right, only 32 Right is available for takeoffs and 32 Left for landings. Parallel taxiways would allow either runway to be used for both takeoffs and landings when necessary. Parallel taxiways will not, however, solve other operational problems such as the necessity to use a "non standard," right hand landing pattern on the primary landing runway (32 Left) to avoid overflying two elementary schools, a middle school, a high school, Annunciation Catholic School and most of the City of Havelock. This restriction precludes the use the Cherry Point's primary landing runway for carrier landing practice (FCLP), a critical training requirement for FA-18 pilots.

The cumulative effect of Cherry Point's airport configuration significantly reduces the maximum "operations per hour" at Cherry Point in comparison to other major air stations.

⁹ Cherry Point's BRAC '95 Military Value Data Call cites the following occupancy rates: Family housing units -- 97.9% (Question 41.a.[8]); Adequate BEQ units -- 95%; Substandard BEQ units -- 100%; Inadequate BEQ units -- 63% (Question 41.b.[1]).

¹⁰ BRAC '93 Scenario Development Data Calls included three "housing scenarios" for Cherry Point. Scenario 1, the "Marine Position," recommended 1383 housing units. Scenario 2, NAVFAC's estimate of consolidated "Cherry Point/Lejuene Average" requirements, recommended 1005 units. Scenario 3, based on the "Navy-wide Average" for housing units given Cherry Point's projected population recommended 670 additional units.

Return on Investment - COBRA Analysis

1993

1995

?

Oceana	\$228,084,877	\$28,370,000
Cherry Point	\$147,453,000	\$332,342,000



RETURN ON INVESTMENT -- COBRA ANALYSIS (Slide 9)

Slide 9 questions the apparent disparity between the Navy's 1993 and 1995 cost estimates for basing Cecil Field FA-18 squadrons at Cherry Point and Oceana.

Comments:

- **The cost figures displayed on this slide blatantly misrepresent the Navy's analysis and cannot be directly compared.** The quoted 1993 cost of \$147.453M for Cherry Point is, in fact, only the "MILCON without Avoidances" line item from a "Base One-Time Cost Report," whereas Oceana costs for both years and the Cherry Point cost for 1995 are the bottom line "Total Net One-Time Cost." The correct 1993 "Total Net One-Time Cost" for Cherry Point was \$201.031M.
- While misrepresenting the 1993 "total net one-time cost" for Cherry Point FA-18 basing as \$147M rather than \$201M, this slide erroneously compares it with a \$228M total cost for Oceana--a figure which North Carolina quotes on Slide 4 as being the cumulative cost for both FA-18 *and* S-3 squadron movements to Oceana. Subtracting out the \$43M cost attributed to S-3 squadrons (also quoted by North Carolina on Slide 4), the correct cost for FA-18 laydown at Ocean in 1993--using North Carolina's own data--was only \$185M, or \$16M less than the \$201M estimate for Cherry Point.
- Contrary to North Carolina's allegations, the Navy did not seriously consider NAS Oceana as an FA-18 receiving site during BRAC '93--primarily because the force structure assumptions for BRAC '93 included only minor reductions in the A-6 Intruder and F-14 Tomcat communities at Oceana well into the next Century. The quoted 1993 cost of \$228M for basing Cecil Field FA-18 and S-3 squadrons at Oceana assumed little excess capacity existed and that virtually all the added squadrons and support organizations would be accommodated in new MILCON -- not unlike the situation which still exists at Cherry Point.
- **BOTTOM LINE:** While Cherry Point was a slightly more expensive option for FA-18 basing than Oceana in 1993--today, it is *no contest*. The early retirement of the A-6 community and downsizing of the Navy's F-14 force open up capacity at Oceana which will allow F-14 single-siting and laydown of Cecil Field FA-18's at minimal cost.

Cherry Point - Overview

Infrastructure

- \$400M MILCON expenditure in last decade
 - 16 *New* BEQ's with additional capacity
 - *New* Full Service Naval Hospital
 - *New* Water Treatment Facility with additional capacity
 - *New* Sewage Treatment Facility with additional capacity



CHERRY POINT -- OVERVIEW (Slide 11)

Infrastructure


Slide 11 cites Cherry Point's \$400M MILCON expenditure in last decade, including new BEQs, hospital, water treatment facility and sewage treatment facility. North Carolina briefers implied these projects were associated with the BRAC '93 decision to base FA-18's at Cherry Point.

Comments:

- **All cited MILCON projects predate BRAC '93 and were designed to correct long standing deficiencies in supporting Cherry Point's current base load of tenant commands and AV-8, EA-6 and C-130 squadrons. Cognizant Navy and Marine Corps officials attest that no funds have been or will be committed for FA-18 facilities at Cherry Point pending the outcome of BRAC '95.**
- The 16 *new* BEQs are already fully utilized by existing personnel, leaving no room for personnel from the Navy FA-18 community.
- The *new full service hospital* is a **22 bed facility** that replaces an inadequate structure built in 1942.
- The *new water treatment facility* was completed in 1993. This facility was designed to meet the projected needs of NADEP and existing squadrons, but did not consider the impact of an additional 5000 or more personnel associated with the BRAC '93 FA-18 basing decision.
- The *new sewage treatment facility with additional capacity* at MCAS Cherry Point replaces an outmoded facility plagued by operating permit violations and unable to meet current State of North Carolina operating standards. The Marine Corps also obtained a permit to move its waste water discharge line to the Neuse River from Slocum Creek, which the State of North Carolina describes as a "nutrient-sensitive swamp"¹¹

A Neuse River discharge helps solve MCAS Cherry Point's immediate waste water problem, but does nothing for the town of Havelock which is limited to its current 1.9MGD waste water discharge volume into Slocum Creek. In rejecting Havelock's recent requests for expanding discharge volume to the maximum treatment plant capacity of 2.25 MGD, the State cites serious water

¹¹ Environmental Assessment for North Carolina Dept. of Environment, Health and Natural Resources 201 Facilities Plan, Havelock Project No. CS370429-04.



quality problems in Slocum Creek including "low dissolved oxygen, stratification, algae blooms and metals accumulation in fish... including fish kills...(These) problems are exacerbated by the tidal nature of Slocum Creek, which receives zero fresh water inflow and limited tidal exchange with the Neuse River."¹² **At present, State permit restrictions on discharges to Slocum Creek severely impair Havelock's ability to accommodate residential and industrial growth--even at the modest levels projected prior to BRAC '93. The programmed expansion of NADEP Cherry Point will place additional pressure on Havelock's limited waste water disposal capabilities. (See additional comments in discussion of Slide 20.)**

¹² North Carolina Dept. of Environment, Health and Natural Resources (Rob Brown) ltr of September 8, 1994 to Mayor of Havelock revised 201 Facilities Plan.



Cherry Point - Overview

Proximity to Training Areas

- Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune
- Electronic Warfare Range, Cherry Point
- Air-to-Air ranges off coast of North Carolina

Note:

Overwhelming *majority* of Air-to-ground training done in North Carolina

Greater productivity for each hour of flying time





CHERRY POINT -- OVERVIEW (Slide 12)

Proximity to Training Areas

Comments:

- When comparing Oceana and Cherry Point, access to training areas is essentially a draw. Cherry Point is somewhat closer to the Dare County bombing targets and electronics warfare range, while Oceana has the advantage of direct, Navy controlled access to offshore operating areas where the majority of FA-18 training will occur. These adjacent training areas off the Virginia and North Carolina coasts are controlled by the Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility (FACSFAC VACAPES) located at Oceana.
- Cherry Point acknowledged a problem with inshore training and coastal transition areas several years ago by petitioning the FAA for two new operating areas: the Cherry One MOA and the Core MOA, both in the immediate vicinity of the MCAS. These MOA proposals are still pending.

Community Crime Rates 1992-1994



COMMUNITY CRIME RATES 1992-1994 (Slide 13)

Comment: This slide is mislabeled and misleading.

- The bar graph and numbers shown are *not* the crime rate, but the total number of crimes reported in Virginia Beach and Craven County, NC with no regard for the seriousness of the offense or huge difference in population. Not surprisingly, Virginia Beach with a population of over 419,000 reports a higher number of crimes than Craven County with a population of only 82,000.
- Nationwide, the most commonly used measure of criminal activity is the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) crime rate, which is the number of Class I felonies¹³ per 100,000 population. The 1993 crime rate in Virginia Beach was 5013 and is on the decline.¹⁴

¹³ Under the UCR standard, Class I crimes include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and arson.

¹⁴ Dept. of State Police, Uniform Crime Reporting Section, Crime in Virginia--1993, p. 102.

How is proximity to the fleet an issue?



HOW IS PROXIMITY TO THE FLEET AN ISSUE? (Slide 16)

Slide 16 depicts transfer of West Coast F-14's to single-site with East Coast F-14's at Oceana, implying that basing Navy fleet aircraft in close proximity to their host aircraft carriers is not a valid concern.

Comments:

- The rationale for single-siting all Navy F-14 squadrons and for locating fleet squadrons near their carrier home port is based on the same key factor: COST.
- Basing fleet squadrons in close proximity to carrier ports reduces the cost of moving personnel and squadron equipment off and on the ship several times each year. Single-siting creates even larger savings by reducing the number of intermediate level maintenance sites, FRS training squadrons and other support activities unique to a given aircraft. Single-siting has long been the practice for Navy EA-6B aircraft, and became a logical cost cutting option for the F-14 once the Navy decided to reduce the number of F-14 squadrons by half. The resulting savings more than offset the added cost of moving squadrons between Oceana and their West Coast aircraft carriers.

Environmental Issues

- 1980-81:SE Virginia drought - Oceana builds emergency wells. "Efforts to curtail consumption were successful, but these measures were at the expense of operational readiness." ,
- 1985-88:Variety of voluntary and mandatory water use restrictions imposed.
- 1991-92:Virginia Beach imposes mandatory, long-term water use restrictions and places a moratorium on all new water system connections. These restrictions remain in place.
- 1994:Corps of Engineers concludes the area is very vulnerable to drought and, without an additional water supply, faces water problems of extreme proportions..
- 1995:In comments to FERC regarding the January 1995 DEIS, Virginia Beach comments that "the Lake Gaston Project will not eliminate the need for Virginia Beach or Chesapeake to restrict water use..." ,



* 1 December 1980 Navy Oceana Environmental Assessment, page 1.
2 Quoted in January 1995 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) at page 1-5.
3 January 1995 FERC DEIS, pages 1-8 to 1-10

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Slide 19)

Slide 19 displays an array of out of context quotes concerning alleged water supply problems in Virginia Beach, implying these issues pose a operational readiness problem for NAS Oceana.


Comments:

- For many years, the State of North Carolina has attempted to dictate how the Hampton Roads area should manage its potable water supply. It is obvious North Carolina officials still do not understand our area's source of supply and distribution system and how these factors relate to Navy installations.
- **NAS Oceana's potable water is supplied by Norfolk, not Virginia Beach.** The City of Norfolk has a master contract with the U.S. Government to provide water to 43 separate military activities in the Hampton Roads area including all Navy bases and off base Navy housing areas. This contract includes provisions to guarantee that Navy activities are provided with enough water to maintain full operational readiness.
- The "emergency wells" cited in the first bullet on Slide 19 were not built by or specifically for NAS Oceana. Oceana does have on-base wells, but Virginia Department of Environmental Quality Records show no new wells have been constructed since 1966.
- During the unprecedented drought of 1980-81, the U.S. Government paid the City of Norfolk to augment its water supply with two 1000 foot-deep wells on federal property near Driver, Virginia, some 32 miles west of NAS Oceana. These wells were intended to assure adequate water supplies to all military installations in South Hampton Roads in the event of future droughts or other natural disasters. The purpose and operation of these wells is contractually specified as follows:¹⁵

1. The Government will pursue all possible water conservation measures short of impacting adversely on the operational readiness of the Government, and the Contractor (i.e., City of Norfolk) shall continue water service to the Government, endeavoring to make available such quantity of water as will meet the Government's operational readiness needs.

2. Water from the Driver wells shall be pumped only during water emergencies when the Government in good faith determines that, despite the use of all

¹⁵ City of Norfolk--U.S. Government Contract N62470-80-C-3918 dated July 1, 1947 as amended. Para. 28, p. 23.



reasonable voluntary water conservation measures and the use of all water available to the Government from the Contractor without surcharge under consumption averaging or otherwise, such mandatory water conservation measures would adversely impact on the operational readiness of the Government.

The Government shall determine when and how much water shall be pumped from the wells and agrees the Driver wells will be pumped only for the difference between the allocation...available without surcharge...and the amount of water the Government in good faith determines it needs to meet the operational readiness of the Government.

- No locale in the U.S. is totally assured of an adequate water supply under all environmental conditions. Any city, county, state or federal government that is not practicing strict water conservation is not operating in a responsible manner.
- The City of Virginia Beach and the State of North Carolina recently signed an agreement that will clear the way for the timely construction of the Lake Gaston Water Supply Project. This project will bring 60M gallons/day into South Hampton Roads. Final federal approval is expected by mid-July, 1995.

Environmental Issues

Installation Quality of Life

- **Safety**
 - Oceana aircraft approaches are over dense population
 - Oceana aircraft approaches are over dense commercial development
- **Underground contamination**
 - Plume of fuel under Oceana
 - 10 gal / day
 - Reports of hospitalizations due to fuel in water system ("We don't drink the water" - Navy Families report - Navy Times - 7/4/94)




ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES --QUALITY OF LIFE (Slide 20)

- *Oceana aircraft landing approaches over "dense population" and "dense commercial development."*

Comments:

- In fact, ground encroachment at NAS Oceana imposes no operational impediments on NAS Oceana approach, departure or landing patterns. By contrast, aircraft landing on Cherry Point's primary runway (32 Left) must use a non-standard, right hand landing pattern to avoid overflying the City of Havelock¹⁶--including one Catholic school, two elementary schools, a middle school and a high school which would lie under a left hand landing pattern. This runway is used for 60% of Cherry Point's annual operations. The required right hand pattern precludes use of Runway 32 for field carrier landing practice (FCLP).
- The City of Virginia Beach and NAS Oceana have actively addressed the problems of ground encroachment through a comprehensive and cooperative program of property and AICUZ easement acquisition and zoning restrictions. The most recent airport zoning ordinance was addressed by Mayor Oberndorf in her testimony to the Commission on May 4, 1995. Moreover, the City has already funded the relocation of two elementary schools currently sited within APZ 2.
- North Carolina officials repeatedly characterize Virginia Beach as a densely populated urban area and Havelock, NC as a sparsely populated rural area. In fact, population densities of the two communities are not significantly different. Virginia Beach has a population density of 2.47 persons per acre, while Havelock has a population density of 2.13 persons per acre.
- *Underground fuel contamination at Oceana*
 - Localized ground water contamination from fuel storage tank leaks has occurred at one time or another on virtually all military air bases, including Oceana and Cherry Point. Both bases have taken proper remedial action and neither has reported any ground water contamination beyond base boundaries. Ground water contamination is a more serious potential threat at Cherry Point because all water comes from local wells, whereas Oceana's potable water comes from reservoirs located several

¹⁶ BRAC '95 Operational Air Station Capacity Analysis, Question 1.e.




miles from the base. Neither Oceana nor the City of Virginia Beach use ground water as a primary supply source.

- The cited "reports of hospitalizations due to fuel in the water system" at Oceana are largely attributed to a single family. Thorough investigation of these reports and subsequent water quality monitoring by the Navy, the City of Virginia Beach and the Commonwealth of Virginia found no contamination of the water supply.
- Cherry Point's BRAC environmental data calls report on-base ground water contamination not only from fuel lines, but also from barrow pits and landfills, the old incinerator area, fly ash ponds, old sanitary landfill, the Industrial Waste Treatment Plant (IWTP), Industrial Drainage System, and a ditch behind NADEP.
- In 1989-90, the U.S. Geological Survey monitored several unlined hazardous waste sites located near MCAS Cherry Point's potable water supply wells. The USGS notes that "Differences in hydraulic head indicate a potential for migration of contaminates downward" creating a potential threat to Cherry Point's water supply.¹⁷
- *Growth limitations imposed by Havelock's infrastructure*
 - The water and sewage limitations of Havelock are well documented in the *CAMA Land Use Plan Update 1993 for the City of Havelock, NC*, which is included in Cherry Point's BRAC '95 Military Value Analysis Data Call as attachment (4). The Land Use Plan states that:

"The current (water treatment) system has sufficient capacity to accept the projected modest growth of 500 housing units during the next ten years plus 136 new customers from projected annexations, approximately 650,000 gallons per day total increase."

The Environmental Assessment for the BRAC '93 Cherry Point NADEP realignment forecast a housing unit demand by 1996 of 536 units in Craven County and a population increase of 2,950 persons. NADEP growth alone represents 83% of the total population increased assumed by the CAMA Land Use Plan for the period 1990-2000. **The additional**

¹⁷ U.S. Geological Survey, *Water-Resources Investigation Report 89-4200 (1990)--Hydrogeologic, Water-Level, and Water Quality Data from Monitoring Wells at the USMC Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina.* pp 1-2.



8000+ service personal and family members associated with the Cecil Field FA-18 community would place a severe strain on Havelock's water treatment capacity.

- The future capabilities of Havelock's Waste Water Treatment Plant are somewhat in doubt. Plant capacity is reportedly 2.25 MGD,¹⁸ but operation is limited to 1.9 MGD due to State-imposed limitations on discharges to Slocum Creek.¹⁹ Prior to June 30, 1993, Havelock was limited to a discharge of 1.5 MGD and was granted an increase only after the City was unsuccessful in its repeated efforts to reach an agreement with the Marine Corps allowing the City to share the Cherry Point's waste water discharge line to the Neuse River. Without discharge access to the Neuse, it is doubtful Havelock's system will ever be permitted to discharge more than the current 1.9 MGD regardless of the capacity of the treatment plant.
- **BOTTOM LINE:** The City of Havelock's ability to accommodate even modest growth is severely limited.

¹⁸ CAMA Land Use Plan for the City of Havelock, NC. p. 6-1.

¹⁹ CAMA Land Use Plan for the City of Havelock, NC. p. 7-1 and North Carolina Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources letter of August 27, 1994 to State Senator Beverly N. Perdue.

Conclusions

Substantial Deviation

- The 1995 Navy recommendation is inconsistent with its 1993 recommendation --- without any material justification.
- The 1995 Navy return on investment analysis calculates grossly inaccurate costs and savings
- With its 1995 recommendation, the Navy refuses to implement joint-servicing



CONCLUSIONS (Slide 22)

- *"The 1995 Navy recommendation is inconsistent with its 1993 recommendation -- without any material justification."*

Comment: To the contrary, the Navy's 1993 and 1995 recommendations are entirely consistent given the major changes in force structure occurring since BRAC '93. In 1993, force structure assumptions indicated that any potential East Coast FA-18 site would require major MILCON investment to accommodate Cecil Field's squadrons. Given no low cost solution, Cherry Point was a reasonable choice which also gave the appearance of furthering DoD joint-servicing objectives. Subsequent force structure reductions created significant excess capacity at Oceana, offering a golden opportunity to avoid the cost of building the equivalent of an entirely new air station at Cherry Point. This sounds like compelling "material justification" to us!

- *"The 1995 Navy return on investment analysis calculates grossly inaccurate costs and savings."*

Comment: North Carolina's solution to correct the Navy's alleged inaccuracies is to ignore P-80 standards and eliminate much of a MILCON package already trimmed far below requirements requested by the Marine Corps.²⁰ For the sake of anticipated economic gains, North Carolina politicians would shoehorn Navy and Marine squadrons into inadequate hanger space, choke air operations by eliminating parallel taxiways, and create hardships for Marines and sailors by failing to provide adequate housing and BEQ capacity. This "solution" would be highly detrimental to military operations and personnel at Cherry Point--and, in the long run, is not in the best interests of the local community and its citizens.

- *"With its 1995 recommendation, the Navy refuses to implement joint-servicing."*

Comment: The rationale behind joint-servicing is two-fold: (1) it can save money, and (2) it can enhance interoperability and coordination between the services. Neither goal is well served by the 1993 decision to base Navy FA-18's at Cherry Point. No operational or training synergies would result--and the cost is prohibitive. In consideration of these facts, the Navy wisely reconsidered its 1993 recommendation and found a better way to implement joint-servicing by stationing two FA-18 fleet squadrons with their Marine sister squadrons in Beaufort. This action provides a productive interface between Marine and Navy carrier-based FA-18 squadrons while saving money through use of existing capacity at MCAS Beaufort.

²⁰ For example, see Senator Lauch Faircloth letter to BRAC Commission dated April 21, 1995 (ECTS # 950425-10)

Recommendations

- Perform competent and careful COBRA analysis using consistent numbers for Oceana and Cherry Point
- Question the application of rules that were deliberately designed to inhibit the integration of Navy and Marine aviation assets



RECOMMENDATIONS (Slide 24)

- *"Perform competent and careful COBRA analysis using consistent numbers for Oceana and Cherry Point."*

Comment: Use any input numbers within reason and the conclusion will be the same. It doesn't require a sophisticated analysis to determine that it is much less expensive to move squadrons to a Master Jet Base that is half empty than to an air station with an infrastructure essentially saturated by its existing base load--particularly when that air station is poorly designed to support tactical aircraft requiring high intensity flight operations and frequent day/night carrier landing practice.

- *"Question the application of rules that were deliberately designed to inhibit the integration of Navy and Marine aviation assets."*

Comment: As previously stated, this allegation is totally unfounded and indicates a serious misunderstanding--or misrepresentation--of the BSEC/BSAT evaluation process.

