





DCN: 4979

Airfield Pavements

Ellsworth AFB



SCORE CONDITION RATING



CONDITION RATINGS SHOWN ARE TAKEN FROM THE ENGINEERING CONDITION ASSESSMENT GIVEN IN 2004 BY THE ACC SUSTAIN TEAM MODIFIED TO REFLECT WORK FUNDED OR COMPLETED SINCE 2004

IMPROVEMENTS FOR 2004


- | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------|
| 1) RUNWAY 13 | RESEAL CENTERLINE JOINT |
| 2) TAXIWAY D-WEST | RECONSTRUCT |
| 3) TAXIWAY A-NORTH | RECONSTRUCT KEEL |
| 4) TAXIWAY A-NORTH | OVERLAY EDGE & SHOULDERS |
| 5) 90-ROW APRON | REPAIR B-1 PARKING SPOTS |

IMPROVEMENTS FOR 2005

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------------------|
| 6) 60 ROW APRON | OVERLAY APRON & SHOULDERS |
| 7) TAXIWAY D-EAST | OVERLAY EDGES & SHOULDERS |
| 8) 90-ROW APRON | REPLACE SLABS, REPAIR SPALLS |

AFCEA TO CONDUCT STRUCTURAL EVALUATION AND FRICTION CHARACTERISTICS TESTING IN AUGUST 2005

LAST AIRFIELD PAVEMENT CONDITION SURVEY IN 2003



John Michael Loh
General USAF Retired
125 Captaine Graves
Williamsburg, Virginia
June 15, 2005

To the Chairman and Commissioners of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC),

Whereas, I desire to submit a Statement and Videotape to the BRAC Commissioners meeting in public session at Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005, and

Whereas, due to a medical condition preventing extensive travel, I am unable to appear in person at the public hearing in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005, and

Whereas, I am providing this Statement voluntarily, at my own request, and without any compensation whatsoever for this testimony, and

Whereas, I am attaching as enclosures to this document the Statement and Videotape for presentation as testimony at the public hearing in Rapid City, South Dakota, therefore,

I do solemnly swear that the testimony I so provide is the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth, and is accurate to the best of my knowledge, so help me God.


John Michael Loh


2 Enclosures:

- 1. Statement of John Michael Loh, General, USAF Retired, to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) for the Public Hearing of the Commission in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005.**
- 2. Videotape containing the Statement in Attachment 1.**

Sworn at Williamsburg, Virginia on the 15th day of June, 2005, by John Michael Loh, 125 Captaine Graves, Williamsburg, Virginia.

In the presence of, and notarized by Deborah M. Scott, on the 15th day of June, 2005.

My commission expires April 30, 2008



Statement of John Michael Loh, General, USAF Retired, to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) for the public hearing of the Commission in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005.

I thank the Commission for this opportunity to present this statement to the BRAC Commissioners in Rapid City, South Dakota, supporting Ellsworth Air Force Base.

Please allow me to introduce myself.

I am John Michael Loh, a retired Air Force four-star general. I served as commander of Air Combat Command from its inception in June 1992 until my retirement from the Air Force in July 1995. Prior to that, I was the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff during the first Gulf War, and commander of Tactical Air Command from March 1991 until June 1992.

As commander of Air Combat Command I controlled all of the Air Force's bombers and bomber bases including Ellsworth Air Force Base. I was responsible for training, equipping, and maintaining combat readiness for our bomber aircraft and crews for combat operations worldwide. This included all of the B-1 bombers and B-1 bases.

I speak today to urge the Commissioners to retain Ellsworth Air Force Base as a B-1 operational base vital to our nation's security and defense preparedness.

(By the way, and just for the record, I submit this statement voluntarily, at my own request, and I am not being compensated in any way for this testimony.)

I believe the Pentagon deviated significantly from six of the eight BRAC criteria in its recommendation to close Ellsworth and move all of its B-1 bombers to another B-1 base. I will explain why in a minute.

First, we must understand how valuable our fleet of 67 B-1s is to our current warfighting needs. The B-1 bomber is the backbone of the bomber force. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the B-1s delivered more weapons, and struck more targets, than any other bomber or fighter, by far.

In Afghanistan, the B-1 accounted for 40%, by weight, of the weapons delivered. In Iraq, 34%. No other weapon system came close.

So, whatever decisions you make regarding B-1s, please do so carefully because you are dealing with the Air Force's number one offensive weapon system in terms of its impact on the global war on terror.

Enclosure 1

Now, when the Air Force created Air Combat Command in 1992 it had four large B-1 bases each with about 24 B-1s. These bases were Ellsworth AFB South Dakota, Grand Forks AFB North Dakota, McConnell AFB Kansas, and Dyess AFB Texas. Subsequent BRACs and Air Force decisions reduced the number of B-1s to its current number, 67, and the number of B-1 bases to two bases, Ellsworth and Dyess.

I mention this brief history because when the Air Force consolidated to two bases in 2001, it violated one of the guiding principles I consistently and scrupulously followed for long range bomber operations; that is, do not operate more than 36 heavy, long range bombers from a single base.

This long-standing principle has a sound basis. In the case of the B-1, putting more than 36 bombers at one base results in a very inefficient operation.

Operational readiness suffers because too many crews must share too few training ranges and training airspace.

Logistics suffers because there is too little support infrastructure to handle greatly expanded maintenance, supply and transportation needs.

Quality of life suffers because one base cannot provide adequately for all the medical, housing and other needs of our people.

Now, putting all 67 B-1s at one base, the current plan under BRAC, almost doubles the maximum size for a bomber base and will greatly aggravate these adverse operational, logistical, and security problems. It's a recipe for unmanageable congestion, and never-ending chaos that spells inefficiency, waste and degraded operational readiness for the B-1s.

~~Moreover, having the entire B-1 fleet at one base with only a single runway presents an unacceptable security risk. This situation provides an inviting target to an enemy that could render the entire B-1 fleet inoperable with a single weapon.~~

In addition, having two B-1 bases allows the Air Force the option of adding back more B-1s from inactive status as it did just recently, and allows for the introduction of additional missions at both bases, an important BRAC criterion not available if Ellsworth is closed.

So, as I read the eight BRAC criteria, I find that the Pentagon deviated significantly from six of them in its recommendation on Ellsworth.

Criteria one concerns the impact on operational readiness. Closing Ellsworth will decrease the operational readiness of the B-1 fleet as I explained earlier.

Enclosure 1

Criteria two concerns facilities and airspace at receiving and existing bases. Closing Ellsworth shuts down forever valuable training airspace in the northwest U.S. and aggravates the available training ranges and airspace at the receiving base.

Criteria three concerns the ability to accommodate future requirements. Closing Ellsworth will deny the Pentagon a valuable base for future missions in an area that will offer ideal, unencroached land and airspace for generations to come.

Criteria four concerns cost and manpower. Closing Ellsworth will not reduce cost or manpower. In the long run, trying to operate 67 B-1s from a single base will cost more than operating two B-1 bases at peak efficiency for each.

Criteria six concerns the economic impact on the community. Closing Ellsworth will be devastating to the regional economy. Others can speak to this impact better than I.

Criteria seven concerns the ability of the receiving infrastructure to support the mission. Closing Ellsworth will cause enormous, long-term infrastructure problems at the receiving base that will adversely impact operational readiness of the B-1 fleet.

So, in my opinion, the Pentagon, in its zeal to consolidate and reach some perceived quota for base closures, picked the wrong base by putting Ellsworth on the list. There are many other options that do not involve this questionable move of all B-1s to a single operating location while closing the one base, Ellsworth, that is located in a region of the country having the capacity for unencroached military operations as far as the eye can see.

Mr. Chairman, I have served as the senior commander of bomber operations for our nation. I sincerely feel that tinkering with our most productive bomber fleet in this way is a misguided and risky application of the BRAC process.

I urge you to retain Ellsworth Air Force Base as an urgently needed B-1 base, and remove it from the closure list.

Thank you.



John Michael Loh
General, USAF Retired
125 Captaine Graves
Williamsburg, Virginia

June 21, 2005

Enclosure 1

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John Michael Loh
General, USAF Retired
125 Captaine Graves
Williamsburg, Virginia

June 21, 2005

Enclosure 1

Issues for BRAC Staff Consideration

Issue #1: Closing Ellsworth will not create the savings the Air Force estimates.

1. GAO Analysis of Air Force Selection Process and Recommendation for Base Closures and Realignment (GAO-05-785, July 2005) specifically noted:

- **In *Issues Identified with Approved Recommendations* (p. 124), the “BRAC Commission may wish to consider ... the closure of Ellsworth AFB, SD.”**
- **Over 60% of the Air Force’s net annual recurring savings are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations; however, eliminations are not expected to result in end strength reduction (p. 123). *Will closing Ellsworth actually save \$1.853.3 billion?***
- **Claiming BRAC associated personnel savings without end strength reductions does not provide dollar savings that can be applied outside of personnel accounts and could require other sources for up-front investment costs (p. 124). *How will the cost (\$299.1 million) to close Ellsworth be funded?***
- **The estimated savings from closing Grand Forks AFB, ND (\$2.656.3 billion) was reduced to \$1.982 billion by a realignment versus closure decision in the week prior to the approval of the final recommendations (p. 129). Ellsworth is rated as a higher valued base in 7 of 8 Air Force functions; *why not close Grand Forks?***
- **The Air Force did not develop one composite score for each base across all eight mission areas rather they established index scores in each mission area and were not able to clearly delineate between lower and higher military value rankings (p. 117). *If composite scores were used, would Ellsworth’s rating as higher valued in 7 of 8 mission areas have clearly defined it as a base to be retained?***

2. The consolidation of the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and the closure of Ellsworth may not realize:

- **The reported savings of \$1.853 billion as it includes a significant percentage of personnel savings which can not be applied outside of personnel accounts;**
- **Any cost associated with consolidated B-1B flying operations in the Dyess area will be increased by \$14,000 per mission due to an increase of 0.7 hrs of flight time when compared to similar missions flown at Ellsworth (estimated twenty year cost could range as high as \$280 million.**

- **The estimated savings of consolidated flying operations due to limited or inaccessible aerial training areas/altitudes in the Dyess area and/or the continued use of the Powder River Military Operating Area, specifically,**
 - **Powder River MOA missions flown from Dyess AFB will require an added five hours of flight time at a cost of \$100,000.00 per mission or \$100 million per 1,000 missions flown --- twenty year cost for such missions could range from \$1 to 2 billion.**

3. The cost to close Ellsworth AFB (\$299 million) is the most expensive of all Air Force recommended actions and provides the least rate of return over the 20 years of calculated savings. Other major closures and realignments provide returns on investment in a range two to five times greater.

4. The \$124 million MilCon cost to prepare Dyess for a consolidate B-1B mission will still position Dyess with less facility space than a closed Ellsworth.

Issue #2: Retaining Ellsworth will create savings the Air Force has not considered.

1. As there may be no cost savings realized by consolidating the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and closing Ellsworth, two alternative initiatives are available for consideration:

- **Retain Ellsworth's current B-1B mission; close Grand Forks AFB, ND and realize the estimated savings of \$2.656 billion (or such an amount as allowed) and designate Ellsworth AFB as the base for continued strategic presence in the north central U.S.**
 - **Ellsworth was the only base in the north central U.S. judged suitable for the bed down of the Global Hawk mission (ACC Environmental Impact Statement, March 2001); Ellsworth should be designated for the emerging UAV mission;**
 - **In terms of other future missions, Ellsworth ranked first in six of eight Air Force categories (Bomber, Airlift, Tanker, Fighter, SOF, C2ISR and Space) when compared to Grand Forks and Minot (other two north central bases).**
- **If it is the judgment of the commission that the B-1Bs should be consolidated at one base, retain Ellsworth as the principal base to house the B-1 mission. Ellsworth is better suited to maintain and operate all B-1B's than Dyess for the following reasons:**


- **The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Dyess AFB are under control of the federal courts; do not currently provide a suitable B-1B crew training area and are subject to one or possibly two Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements and probable future flight operating restrictions;**
- **The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Ellsworth AFB is better suited for all B-1B training and qualification missions; is more readily accessible to Ellsworth; requires fewer total flying hours to accomplish similar missions; and is not subject to the controversy of the Dyess ranges.**
- **As Ellsworth can handle 71 large aircraft, it requires only \$63.9 million in construction cost to bed down two additional squadrons. A third additional squadron can be housed in an existing facility recently made available by the construction of a new B-1B squadron operations facility.**

2. Ellsworth is also the most logical choice as a bed down base for the Airborne Laser platform (ABL), having both unencumbered airspace and a hanger capable of housing two B-747 aircraft.

The Bottom Line is Ellsworth should be retained. Ellsworth provides more current and future value to the Air Force than competing large aircraft bases; maintains a base for high tempo B-1B operations; immediate access to an unrestricted MOA; strategic presence in the north central U.S. and can either bed down emerging missions or all B-1B aircraft.

Comparative Military Value Rankings Between Ellsworth AFB, Grand Forks AFB, & Minot AFB

Air Force Function	1 st in Rankings		2 nd in Rankings		3 rd in Rankings	
Bomber	Ellsworth	50.81	Minot	45.72	Grand Forks	38.48
Lift	Ellsworth	59.40	Minot	54.34	Grand Forks	50.53
Tanker	Ellsworth	83.73	Grand Forks	63.52	Minot	62.74
Fighter	Ellsworth	58.06	Minot	56.64	Grand Forks	55.88
SOF	Minot	45.12	Ellsworth	43.91	Grand Forks	43.75
C2ISR	Ellsworth	87.72	Minot	77.04	Grand Forks	76.33
UAV	Grand Forks	70.93	Ellsworth	69.73	Minot	67.53
Space	Ellsworth	84.12	Minot	83.93	Grand Forks	82.64



Candidate # USAF - 0018V3/ S200.3
#USAF - 0117V2/ S420c3

DCN: 4979

	Ellsworth Air force Base	Grand Forks Air force Base
One-time Cost:	\$229 M	\$129 M
Payback period:	1yr / 2009	Immediate
NPV Savings:	\$1,853 M	\$2,656 M



DCN: 4979

“As we transform our posture, we are guided by the following goals:

...Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations;...”

Source: DoD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, page 22.




Principles and Corresponding Imperatives

Deploy & Employ (Operational):


- The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense)... and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Major Active Duty U.S. Air Force Bases (Northern Region, Flying Mission) 1958



Source: AIR FORCE Magazine

Major Active Duty U.S. Air Force Bases (Northern Region, Flying Mission) 2005



Source: AIR FORCE Magazine