

NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, MAINE

BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL
FIELD HEARING
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
JULY 6, 2005




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7. Representative Allen's remarks on the economic impact to the Maine Midcoast Region (*with supporting slides*)
8. Senator Snowe's closing remarks on the realignment of NAS Brunswick (*with supporting slides*)

AGENDA

**BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION
BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING, JULY 6, 2005**

Boston Convention and Exhibition Center
415 Summer Street, Boston, MA

1. **OPENING STATEMENT/CASE OVERVIEW** - Senator Olympia J. Snowe

2. **MILITARY VALUE/MISSION**
 - A. RADM Harry Rich, United States Navy, Retired
Former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic

 - B. Senator Susan M. Collins

3. **COSTS AND COST SAVINGS** - Sen. Olympia J. Snowe

4. **ECONOMIC IMPACT** - Rep. Thomas H. Allen

5. **CLOSING ARGUMENTS** - Sen. Olympia J. Snowe

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense recommendation to realign elements at Naval Air Station Brunswick, specifically to remove the P-3 and C-130 aircraft squadrons and their supporting personnel, results from a failure to properly apply the Base Closure and Realignment Criteria. *Substantial Deviations from the Selection Criteria are listed below:*

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 1: Current/Future Missions & Operational Readiness

- Ignored Homeland Defense missions such as maritime domain awareness, maritime interdiction and proliferation security.
- Degrades readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from NAS Brunswick.
- Ignored introduction of Multi-Mission Aircraft.
- No data calls to evaluate joint war fighting capabilities.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 2: Availability of Facilities

- Inadequately considers the only infrastructure available to support MMA: NAS Brunswick has only hangar capable of receiving the Boeing 737 MMA aircraft.
- Excess capacity would actually be exacerbated as the realignment of NAS Brunswick will increase hangar excess capacity due to the requirement to build additional MMA-capable hangars at NAS Jacksonville.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 3: Contingency, Mobilization & Surge Capacity

- No data calls or scenarios conducted to evaluate ability to accommodate contingency or surge operations or training.
- Did not consider role of maritime patrol for Homeland Defense under NORTHCOM in seamless conjunction for operations and training with Guard and Reserve forces for Homeland Security (at NAS Brunswick's future Armed Forces Reserve Center).

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 4: Costs and Manpower Implications

- Failed to consider cost savings impact of MMA on personnel and facilities costs – result is inflated savings and shorter than achievable payback.
- Failed to account for higher mission costs due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.
- Failed to consider impact of fatigue life expenditure on P-3 aircraft due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.
- Failed to consider impacts of detachment and surge operations on personnel tempo.
- Failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, e.g., VP-92 (reserve squadron) may be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve patrol and reconnaissance units.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 5: Extent and Timing of Savings

- Failed to properly account for introduction of MMA impact on personnel and facilities costs. For example, over-estimated number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment scenario as MMA contractor will provide maintenance personnel - not Navy.
- Failed to analyze any scenario considering initial fleet introduction of MMA at NAS Brunswick instead of NAS Jacksonville thereby eliminating (and postponing other) MILCON and other requirements at Jacksonville.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 6: Economic Impact

- Incorrectly placed NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, claiming an adverse economic impact of only 1.3% – grossly underestimating actual impact by a factor of eight.
- Calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 4,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Only 2,718 military positions at BNAS are active duty.
- Reduces total current active duty military in the region by 85%.

Testimony of
Senator Olympia J. Snowe
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Opening Statement and Case Overview
July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman and esteemed Members of the Commission, on behalf of the State of Maine, the Governor and its congressional delegation, I will now proceed to the case of Brunswick Naval Air Station.

As you know, Brunswick is the only fully operational, active-duty airfield in the Northeast United States. And yet, DoD proposes to move its mission – and the crucial protection it provides – over 1,200 miles away.

Single-siting of maritime patrol aircraft in this instance doesn't make sense – because geography matters, and strategic location is the primary attribute for operational bases such as Brunswick.

Over the next hour, we will address DoD's realignment recommendation, providing data and analysis that will lead to one inescapable conclusion – that realignment is no more the answer for Brunswick than full closure. Moreover, we will present evidence today that both refutes the Department's official realignment recommendation, and also demonstrates how and *why* DoD definitively took the issue of closure *off the table*.

SLIDE ONE

You will hear that, on *ten separate occasions*, officials including the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Commanders of Fleet Forces Command, and the

Northern Command spoke to Brunswick's military value...that, as the OSD's Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) concluded, "the total closure of NAS Brunswick would adversely impact Department of the Navy aviation operations in the Northeast United States."

In the end, it was NORTHCOM's recognition of Brunswick's strategic military value that persuaded the IEC to keep Brunswick open. That same rationale should have been a repudiation of single-siting of maritime patrol forces on the East Coast – and underscores the vital necessity of maintaining Brunswick as a fully active and operational Naval Air Station.

Indeed, the case we will present today will demonstrate that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign NAS Brunswick by removing the P-3 and C-130 aircraft squadrons and their supporting personnel, and relocating them to Jacksonville, Florida, results from a failure to properly apply the selection criteria.

Criterion 1

With regard to Criterion # 1 that speaks to capacity and readiness we will show at least four deviations.

SLIDE TWO

First, the recommendation ignores Brunswick's advantages for operations and training by the current Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft force, and will actually degrade our nation's readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from Brunswick.

Second, no data calls were made to evaluate the new criteria of joint war fighting capabilities. Indeed, the only gaining scenarios run were for aviation assets from Reserve Air Bases before Brunswick was considered for closure – and even *these* weren't revisited after the final decision to instead realign.

Third, as mentioned, in reviewing Navy meeting minutes, we find the strategic location of Brunswick was raised as a concern on at least *10 separate occasions*.

In fact, the Commander of the Northern Command concluded that closing Brunswick would negatively affect the Navy's ability to support Northern Command's homeland defense missions...and the Commander of the Navy's Fleet Forces Command has requested an operational airfield in the northeast under Navy control.

And finally, the Navy failed to assign Brunswick a Military Value score for its Strategic Location *despite* the fact that geography is a primary attribute of strategic value, *despite* DoD's recognition of Brunswick's strategic value, and *despite* the fact that, in August of 2004, the Navy Analysis Group was presented a list of recommended airfields that should be *assigned* military value scores for strategic location – *and Brunswick was on that list.*

Together, these and other facts we will cite demonstrate that the recommendation to realign Brunswick substantially deviates from Criterion One.

Criterion 2

With regard to Criterion # 2 -- the availability of facilities – we will show three primary deviations.

SLIDE THREE

First, DoD clearly ignored Brunswick's value as a base for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions, including those necessary to support maritime domain awareness, protect against the greatest threat against this country -- WMD attack -- and respond to other threats to the Northeast.

Second, the DoD failed to recognize that Brunswick is the only base with the infrastructure in place today to support the aircraft of the future – the Multi-Mission Maritime, or MMA, Aircraft. *Only* Brunswick has a hangar capable of receiving these aircraft.

And third, DoD overlooked the fact that realignment will only increase, not decrease, excess hangar capacity – with Jacksonville required to build the special MMA-capable hanger the Navy already built at Brunswick with an investment of \$34 million. And let me just note that, under a full *closure*, the Navy would still, of course, be required to duplicate existing infrastructure – *and* operate detachments for homeland defense from limited East Coast facilities.

Criterion 3

With regard to Criterion # 3 -

SLIDE FOUR

- ability to accommodate surge, we will show DoD conducted *no* data calls...ran *no* scenarios...to evaluate the total force requirements necessary to sustain that capability.

Moreover, DoD failed to recognize the potential advantages of joining MARITIME PATROL forces under NORTHCOM for homeland defense, with National Guard and Reserve forces at a future Armed Forces Reserve Center at Brunswick -- for the purposes of bolstering Homeland Security.

Criterion 4

With regard to Criterion # 4 -- the cost of operations and manpower implications -- we will demonstrate three primary deviations --

SLIDE FIVE

First, DoD failed to account for the higher mission costs attributable to the additional distances aircraft must fly to perform missions or transits which could be done more economically from NASB.

Second, DoD failed to consider the adverse personnel impact of this realignment on those performing detachment and surge operations from Brunswick.

And third, DoD failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, which indicate that VP-92 will be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve Patrol and Reconnaissance squadrons.

Criterion 5

And on the related subject of Criterion # 5 -- the extent and timing of cost savings -- you will see at least three deviations.

SLIDE SIX

First, you will see DoD simply ignored the impending introduction of the MMA.

The DOD's recommendation to relocate Brunswick's aircraft and support personnel to Jacksonville completely overlooks the costs of transitioning from the P-3 aircraft to the MMA during the payback period.

As a result of these erroneous calculations, the Navy's net present savings claim of \$239 million is inflated – while the actual figure is \$56 million. Likewise, the Navy wrongly asserts a payback period of 4 years, when the reality is actually *9 years*.

Second, DoD seriously over-estimated the number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment. In fact, about 40% of those positions are already slated for elimination by the MMA program, and therefore cannot be counted as cost savings over the 20-year payback period.

And third, DoD failed to consider any scenario that would have assigned the MMA or other aviation assets to Brunswick. Such scenarios had the potential to eliminate the substantial MILCON that will be required at Jacksonville if this recommendation for realignment is approved.

Criterion 6

Finally, as regards Criterion # 6 —

SLIDE SEVEN

Economic impact -- you will hear how the Navy inaccurately placed Brunswick in the Portland Metropolitan Statistical Area versus an independent labor market of its own.

As a result, the economic impact from Brunswick's realignment is actually eight times greater than claimed by the Department for this rural region and the State of Maine – all the more stunning given that *two* Maine facilities on the recommendation list are merely 80 miles apart.

Conclusion

Chairman Principi, Commissioners, this will be the case you will hear over the next hour. We appreciate your kind attention and, with that, Rear Admiral Harry Rich, U.S. Navy retired, former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic, will speak in greater depth with regard to the issue of military value.

NAS Brunswick

Essential Strategic Asset - Valued by Senior Leadership

Secretary of the Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Commander, Northern Command

Commander, Fleet Forces Command

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

"This is a military value question more than anything else . . . we're really keeping a strategic capability in the Northeast. That's what it boils down to."

**- ADM Vern Clark
Testimony to BRAC Commission
May 17, 2005**

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 1: Current/Future Missions & Operational Readiness

- Ignores Brunswick advantages -- degrades readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from NASB.
- No data calls to evaluate joint war fighting capabilities.
- Ignores Brunswick's strategic location -- Homeland Defense missions such as maritime domain awareness, maritime interdiction and proliferation security suffer through realignment.
- No military value score for strategic location.

Ignores introduction of Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 2: Availability of Facilities

- Ignores Brunswick's military value for Homeland Defense.
- Inadequately considers the only infrastructure available to support MMA: NAS Brunswick has only hangar capable of receiving the Boeing 737 MMA aircraft.
- Excess capacity would actually be exacerbated as the realignment of NAS Brunswick will increase hangar excess capacity due to the requirement to build additional MMA-capable hangars at NAS Jacksonville.

Gaining scenarios were not revisited after DoD overturned closure scenario

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 3: Contingency, Mobilization & Surge Capacity

- No data calls or scenarios conducted to evaluate ability to accommodate contingency or surge operations or training.
- Did not consider role of maritime patrol for Homeland Defense under NORTHCOM in seamless conjunction for operations and training with Guard and Reserve forces for Homeland Security (at NASB's future Armed Forces Reserve Center).

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 4: Costs and Manpower Implications

- Failed to account for higher mission costs due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.
- Failed to consider impacts of detachment and surge operations on personnel tempo.
- Failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, e.g., VP-92 (reserve squadron) may be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve patrol and reconnaissance units.

No consideration of cost savings impact of MMA on personnel and facilities costs – result is inflated savings and shorter than achievable payback.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 5: Extent and Timing of Savings

- Failed to properly account for introduction of MMA impact on personnel and facilities costs.
- Failed to correctly estimate the number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment scenario; MMA contractor will provide maintenance personnel - not Navy.
- Failed to analyze any scenario considering initial fleet introduction of MMA at NAS Brunswick instead of NAS Jacksonville thereby eliminating (and postponing other) MILCON and other requirements at Jacksonville.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 6: Economic Impact

- Incorrectly placed NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, claiming an adverse economic impact of only 1.3% – grossly underestimating actual impact by a factor of eight.

Incorrectly calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 4,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Only 2,718 military positions at BNAS are active duty.

Reduces total current active duty military in the region by 85%

Testimony of

**Rear Admiral Harry Rich
United States Navy, Retired
Former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic Fleet**

**Before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
On**

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Military Judgment and Operational Issues

July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, ladies and gentlemen,

My role in today's hearing is to address the operational issues that are of concern if NAS Brunswick is realigned as proposed by DOD.

I have selected four issues that would be of great concern to me if I were the operational commander. I will briefly discuss each of them.

I have assumed that the role of the Atlantic Fleet long range Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, as part of DOD's Homeland Defense mission, will be to defend our Atlantic coast, all 32 thousand miles of it, in concert with the U.S. Coast Guard, against terrorist's attempts to deliver weapons of mass destruction into our highly vulnerable ports. As we are all painfully aware, that mission came into sharp focus on 9-11.

To execute that mission will require ocean surveillance around the clock out to 1000 miles. It can be expected that the concentration of targets will be in the North Atlantic shipping lanes.

In mission planning enroute time to the target area is a critical factor. Enroute time from Brunswick, for the P-3, to the shipping lanes is less than 30 minutes. From Jacksonville it's

three hours. To me as the operational commander that would be unacceptable if there is a viable alternative. And there is! I would immediately move the planes back to Brunswick. Which begs the question: "Why move them in the first place?"

Operational commanders can be expected to require 24-hour manned aircraft coverage on targets of special interest. Using a mission profile of 12 hours, which is generally accepted as maximum for the P-3, the crew can go out 1000 miles in about 3 hours, stay on station six hours and return to base. Total flight time 12 hours. From Jacksonville that profile fits; three hours to the shipping lanes, six hours on station and three hours home. That requires 4 flights per day to provide 24-hour coverage. That's 48 flight hours at a cost of just under \$8000 per flight hour (\$7,876). From Brunswick that same coverage would be achieved with just over two sorties per day, about 25 flight hours, or roughly half the cost of staging from Jacksonville.

Rapid response has been the hallmark of VP squadrons for more than 50 years. Urgent deployments to the Mediterranean or Middle East are not uncommon and it would take at least three hours longer from Jacksonville than from Brunswick. The added cost would be 25-30 thousand dollars per aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, it's somewhat ironic that during your recent visit to NAS Brunswick there were two Jacksonville based P-3s sitting on the ramp. They were enroute home from Sigonella in the Mediterranean and were forced to stop at Brunswick to refuel.

Having dual runways available may seem like a minor factor, but let me assure you it's not if you are forced to land on a taxiway because of a crash on the active runway; or even repaving as happened at Sigonella. NAS Brunswick has parallel 8000 ft. Runways that have recently been resurfaced. If one becomes unusable for any reason, operations can continue uninterrupted.

Finally, I would be very concerned about unnecessarily using up the precious service life remaining in our fleet of P-3s. As the CNO, Admiral Clark, recently stated at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, "... because of high demand, we are flying the wings off the P-3s. Two years ago we had 220 P-3s in the navy inventory. We've been forced to retire 70 in the last 18 months. They reached the end of their service life and were no longer considered safe to fly. The 150 remaining must be made to last until the MMA, the follow-on aircraft, becomes operational in 2012 at the earliest. Unless we restrict flying in non-wartime environments and eliminate every transit and enroute hour possible, the P-3 may not make it to the transition window. Because of the increased flight hours inherent in DOD's plan for NAS Brunswick, realignment will only exacerbate this problem.

Mr. Chairman, as you've heard me say before, a strategy to protect our extensive coastal borders is key to homeland defense, and, as you know, that strategy is just evolving. If the role of the Atlantic Fleet Maritime Patrol Force is as I have postulated, then a fully capable, operational air station strategically located in the Northeast with permanently assigned long range Maritime Patrol Aircraft is absolutely critical to success.

There is only one left and DOD proposes to essentially put NAS Brunswick in mothballs and single site all six Atlantic Fleet VP squadrons 1000 miles to the south.

Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, it's probably a gross understatement, but I have great difficulty understanding the logic in such a move.

Thank you.

RADM Harry Rich USN (Ret)

Former Commander Patrol Wings

Atlantic Fleet

Testimony of
Senator Susan M. Collins
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Military Value and Mission
July 6, 2005

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. I am Senator Susan Collins.

DoD's first BRAC criterion focuses on current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force. This includes the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness.

(show disappearing bases slide)

Brunswick is the only fully capable operational DoD airfield remaining north of New Jersey. Previous BRAC rounds closed all other active duty air bases in the Northeast, as this slide demonstrates.

(pause for slide)

Brunswick is strategically located adjacent to the great circle routes for ships and aircraft crossing the North Atlantic. This location makes Brunswick a vital link in our national defense posture and critical for surveillance of ships coming from Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

(show slide)

Indeed, its proximity to major population centers, combined with its ability to support every aircraft in the DoD inventory, makes BNAS essential across the full range of homeland defense operations and contingencies.

Brunswick's unique location provides it with *correspondingly unique capabilities* for current and future operations in the defense of our homeland. Brunswick was a key base for homeland defense during the months following September 11th, providing P-3 surveillance missions under Operation Vigilant Shield, and land-based combat air patrol for Navy ships at sea.

And only Brunswick Naval Air Station can perform such missions efficiently in the future. Maritime patrol assets from Brunswick will continue to be needed to locate and monitor ships in the North Atlantic, including those potentially carrying weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles, or other threats to our shores.

(show MPA coverage area slide)

Maritime Domain Awareness is a key component of homeland defense. Properly based Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft, or "MPRA," is essential to this increasingly important mission.

As Rear Admiral Rich has pointed out, response time and endurance on-station are critical in MPRA operations, and the location of a maritime patrol aircraft base is critical to those capabilities. The removal of full-time, operationally ready maritime patrol assets from the northeast is contrary to the very concept of Maritime Domain Awareness and would leave our nation vulnerable.

Removal of these aircraft would *degrade readiness* by requiring detachments from Jacksonville, Florida, to perform missions that can be performed much more efficiently and effectively from Brunswick. It is a move that would increase the risk of failure in the defense of our homeland, a mission in which even a single failure could be catastrophic.

A review of the Navy's analysis group minutes proves that the strategic location of Brunswick was confirmed by warfighting commands no fewer than ten separate times during the deliberations. The Commander of Fleet Forces and the Commander of Northern Command repeatedly voiced grave concerns to the Navy about the potential loss of Brunswick to their warfighting readiness.

These commanders also said that the closure of Brunswick would damage the Navy's ability to support Northern Command's homeland defense missions. Removal of Brunswick's air assets would have the same negative effects on this mission as would closure.

The minutes show that the military value of individual facilities was determined early in the BRAC review process. In August 2004, the Navy's infrastructure team presented the Navy analysis group with a list of 33 airfields that should be assigned military value scores for strategic location. Brunswick Naval Air Station was on that list.

(show slide)

Yet, the Navy determined that only two airfields would receive scores for strategic location. The fact that Brunswick was not given any credit for its strategic location after two commanders weighed in no fewer than ten times about the strategic value of Brunswick's location is inexplicable.

(show slide) The minutes of a January 2005 Navy analysis group meeting show that discussions were held on whether a scenario to close Brunswick was desirable, quote,

“in light of the fact that Brunswick is the last active-duty DoD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent.”

Despite these concerns and those of our operational commanders, the Navy still forwarded to the Infrastructure Executive Council a recommendation to close Brunswick. As far as we can determine from a review of the minutes, the overriding factor that led the Navy to ignore the many advantages of Brunswick was a goal to locate maritime patrol aircraft at a single site on the East Coast. Yet, the Commander of Fleet Forces warned that: (show slide)

“Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of *closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities.*”¹

The IEC subsequently rejected the recommendation to close Brunswick because, and I quote again, “Department of Navy leadership expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding Northern Command’s homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England.”²

¹ Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP, 7 Feb 2005 (N-RP-0432), Enclosure 8, Slide 11

² Report of DAG Deliberations of 8 February 2005 (N-RP-501), Page 11.

Commissioners, this statement recognizes that Brunswick is not just a training site or staging area. It is an operational airfield in the defense of our nation.

The Navy's recommendation to close Brunswick was overturned by the Council due to the base's overwhelming strategic military value. This determination should have triggered the reconsideration of single-siting maritime patrol forces on the East Coast. Yet, we can find no evidence that this occurred. The first measure of military value – the impact on mission capabilities and operational readiness --was ignored.

The second BRAC criterion measures military value by considering the availability and condition of a base's land, facilities, and associated airspace. This is what the Navy's Infrastructure Analysis Team stated on January 11, 2005, concerning the infrastructure at Brunswick (show slide):

- "NASB, the last active duty DOD airfield in New England, is available 24/7, 365, and offers unique Joint /NATO strategic, physical, and training assets.
- NASB is strategically located to base maritime homeland defense missions.
- Of note, NASB has no encroachment issues, nearly 1,000 acres available for expansion, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and nearly 12,000 Navy-owned mountainous acres capable of accommodating joint exercises and meeting all Navy / Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training requirements at a single site.
- Armed aircraft can depart NASB and enter offshore operating areas without over-flying populated areas."

Brunswick Naval Air Station is in first-class condition, with more than \$120 million in recapitalization and military construction during the past five years. As a result of this investment, DoD has, in effect, an all-new airfield at Brunswick.

(show slide)

With its side-by-side 8,000-foot runways, there are literally no aircraft in the DoD's current or future inventory that Brunswick cannot support either in a transient role or permanent assignment.

(show slide)

Other investments included: (show slide)

- Hangar 6 - Six Bays
- Runway Recapitalization
- Ramp & Taxiway Repairs
- Aircraft Control Tower
- Family Housing, Phases I, II & III
- Transient Quarters
- Relocated Base Entrance

NATO has recognized the importance of Brunswick to its operational capability, and backed up that recognition with significant investment in the base's facilities. The station's NATO-built fuel farm regularly supports all types of foreign aircraft. Its state-of-the-art Tactical Support Center, also NATO-funded, provides essential command and control for operational and exercise flights by U.S. and NATO maritime patrol aircraft. (show slide)

Of great significance, as has been mentioned, is the fact that Brunswick has the only hangar capable of hosting the MMA aircraft, which is scheduled to replace the P-3 starting in 2012. This hangar was specifically designed to support the MMA and its related unmanned aerial vehicles.

The recommendation to realign Brunswick significantly deviated from BRAC selection criterion two by inadequately considering the value of this brand-new infrastructure. Under realignment, additional MMA-capable hangars would need to be constructed in Jacksonville. Rather than reduce excess capacity, this realignment would increase it and require significant military construction costs.

As home to the four active duty squadrons, Brunswick provides basing and support essential to the entire Maritime Patrol Aircraft force under the Navy's new Fleet Response / Flexible Deployment concept.

This concept increases the proportion of MPRA aircraft and crews at bases in the United States, and requires them to maintain a high state of readiness for immediate surge deployments to overseas bases. The Station's simulator capacity is essential to meet the training needs of the fleet's P-3 crews. I would note that the simulators at Jacksonville are already at maximum utilization now.

Brunswick's facilities, unencumbered airspace, and location at the nearest point in the United States to Europe and the Middle East provide the capabilities to support the Fleet Response concept. The conditions of criterion two are fully met by Brunswick Naval Air Station, but not properly recognized by this realignment proposal.

The third BRAC criterion is the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future force requirements.

(show slide)

Brunswick's role during *Operation Iraqi Freedom* clearly demonstrates its ability to accommodate mobilization and surge requirements. Brunswick is the preferred refueling stop for tactical jet and turboprop aircraft crossing the Atlantic Ocean. The base hosted or provided logistical support for more than 120 aircraft returning from Middle East operations.

Brunswick also provided berthing for more than 850 DoD personnel returning from Iraq to the U.S. through Brunswick. The base's ramp space is sufficient to park more than 250 maritime patrol or other large aircraft under maximum surge conditions.

Additionally, as the northeasternmost base in the United States, Brunswick supports mobilization efforts every day. Naval Air Station Brunswick is the closest U.S military airfield to the current theater of operations.

Despite all the talk of transformation and jointness during this BRAC round, it is remarkable that the Navy did not ask in even one data call whether Brunswick could expand its current missions to more fully utilize the Air Station's capacity. The only gaining scenarios run were for aviation assets from reserve air bases before Brunswick was considered for closure. This option was not even revisited after the final decision was made to realign, rather than close, Brunswick.

Clearly, the Navy and the OSD missed a tremendous opportunity to strengthen U.S. military capabilities by not placing other operational forces at Brunswick to fulfill current and

future total force requirements that meet contingency, mobilization, surge operations, and training missions.

A realignment of Brunswick Naval Air Station to a Naval Air Facility eviscerates the military value of Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance assets by removing them from *a superb facility in a critical theater of operations*. It would require future detachments – from one U.S. base to another – to meet mission requirements.

The removal of Brunswick's aircraft would significantly and dangerously degrade operational readiness. It would reduce response time in times of crisis. This proposed realignment would not meet the needs of Northern Command's homeland defense missions. It would result in a Navy and a Department of Defense that will operate less effectively and efficiently, and with many hidden costs.

Taken together, the first three criteria I have discussed are a measure of the most crucial elements of military value, now and in the future. By any fair and complete assessment, Brunswick Naval Air Station measures up. It must remain fully operational.

Senator Snowe is our next speaker.



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
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
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NAS Brunswick's Strategic Importance





KEFLAVIK

SHIPPING LANES

BRUNSWICK

JACKSONVILLE

CURRENT MPA COVERAGE AREA

Mercator Projection
Radius of all circles = 1000 NM

Brunswick: Homeland Defense Requirement


19. The DAG further discussed whether this scenario is desirable in light of the fact that NAS Brunswick is the last active-duty DOD air base in New England and is relatively unencroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent. Defense mission could most likely be performed at other DOD airfields in the Northeast. IAT to collect information from CFF. SERE school, research alternative rec.

Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not
8

"Brunswick is the last active-duty DoD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent."

*Report of DAG Decisions of 11 January
2005 (N-RP-0432), Page 8.*

Brunswick: Unacceptable Expense if Closed



"Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities. This scenario also removes any future transformational flexibility options at NAS Jacksonville as all remaining build-able acres are now being committed."

Brunswick: Only Naval Aviation Footprint in New England

25. CDR Deputy presented updated COBRA results for scenario DON-0139, which would close NAS Brunswick, ME, and relocate naval aviation and non-naval aviation assets to numerous receiver sites. Enclosure (6) pertains. Ms. Davis informed the DAG that DON senior leadership has expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England. She stated that the IAT Operations Group is currently examining BPAC 2005 options other than Brunswick, ME, and alternative scenarios to realign operations. She explained that a realignment scenario would relocate Brunswick into a Naval Air Facility (NAF) in the United States. Naval aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville, FL, and necessary BOS personnel and maintaining the operational capability of the fleet. She further explained that deactivation of the fleet would relocate all aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville, FL, and caretaker workforce. Ms. Davis also reminded the DAG that the IEG, at its 27 January 2005 deliberative session, directed the DAG to consult with the Air Force concerning possible relocation of the Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group

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- 11 -

Department of Navy leadership expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England

Report of DAG Decisions of 8 February 2005 (NRP-0501), Page 11.


Brunswick: Navy Highlights Military Value

"NASB, the last active duty DOD airfield in New England, is available 24/7, 365 and offers unique Joint/NATO strategic, physical, and training assets"

"NASB is strategically located to base maritime homeland defense missions"

"Of note, NASB has no encroachment issues, nearly 1,000 acres available for expansion, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and nearly 12,000 Navy-owned mountainous acres capable of accommodating joint exercises and meeting all Navy/Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet SERE training requirements at a single site."

"Armed aircraft can depart NASB and enter offshore operating areas without over-flying inhabited areas."



Dual Runways



Recent Recapitalization

- Hangar 6 - Six bays (\$33.9M, completed FY 05)
- Runway Recapitalization (\$10.7M, FY 01-05)
- Ramp & Taxiway Repairs (\$8.7M, FY 03)
- Aircraft Control Tower (\$8.2M, FY 05)
- Family Housing - Phases I, II & III - 220 Homes (\$33.4M, FY 01-05)
 - Transient Quarters (\$17.7M, FY 04)
 - Re-located Base Entrance (\$1.65M, FY 04)
- Separate Truck & Vendor Entrance (\$1.3 M, FY 04)
 - Small Arms Range (\$940K, FY 05)
 - MWD Kennel (\$346K, FY 05)
- 40 Natural Gas Boilers (\$7.0M, FY 05)

NATO Fuel Farm



Hangar 6



**Brunswick Hosts 123 Aircraft
Returning from Middle East
Operations**

66 F/A-18

6 C-40

32 A/V-8

2 C-9

17 C-130

Testimony of
Sen. Olympia J. Snowe
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Costs and Cost Savings
July 6, 2005

Good afternoon.

As I said earlier, the Navy's justification for the realignment of Naval Air Station, Brunswick is based solely on reducing operating costs while single-siting the **East Coast Maritime Patrol community** at Naval Air Station Jacksonville.

The Navy proposes to accomplish these cost savings primarily by merging depot and intermediate maintenance activities thus **"reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions."**

Today we intend to demonstrate that the cost savings put forward by the Navy are erroneous and built upon assumptions that can not withstand even rudimentary scrutiny.

We will highlight how the Navy's analysis process led to overstated personnel savings, ignored mission costs and understated military construction which led to a flawed conclusion - that realignment of NAS Brunswick was fiscally viable.

While the Navy's recommendation postulates that a one-time investment of \$147.6 million will result in a 20-year savings of \$239 million with an expected 4-year payback, we will show a significantly different outcome: a 9-year payback and a 20-year savings of only \$56 million.

Are we willing to sacrifice the unique strategic advantage that NAS Brunswick offers in securing our homeland in order to save a theoretical \$2.8 million annually? This is an extremely small margin to support a decision with such far-reaching national security implications.

Our analysis is based on the work of **Mr. Ed Anderson** whom many of you met during your visit to Brunswick.

He is a senior aviation economics consultant and former P-3 pilot who works for one of America's foremost aviation industry analysis firms who has setup and run the COBRA model to measure the cost impact of identified errors in the data and methodology.

In deconstructing the COBRA scenario report and data calls, he identified errors that raise serious concerns about the validity of the DOD case for realigning NAS Brunswick.

The errors were primarily due to basing the cost analysis solely on the P-3 without accounting for planned reduction in support requirements due to the MMA program...

Failure to account for increased mission costs; military construction cost avoidances at NAS Brunswick...

And unrealistic assumptions concerning the timing of military construction at NAS Jacksonville and ability to accommodate Brunswick squadrons according to the proposed schedule.

First, the Navy's most significant error was to base their 20-year cost analysis solely on the P-3C aircraft, while ignoring the fact that the Navy plans to begin phasing out the P-3 in 2012, replacing them with a smaller fleet of contractor-maintained Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft or MMA, a key element in the Navy's 20-year Force Structure Plan.

This is precisely where the Navy's cost savings argument begins to unravel because the entire financial case for single-siting East Coast P-3s rests on the hypothetical elimination of 403 personnel by 2011 and continuing through the remaining 20 years of the projection.

SLIDE ONE

This "straight-line projection" of personnel savings is fundamentally flawed because 157 of those personnel will be replaced by Boeing as part of the **Contractor Logistic Support or CLS program** that was part of the justification for replacing the P-3 with the MMA. The CLS program will also result in the reduction of facilities for which the Navy has claimed savings under BRAC.

These errors alone result in an understatement of recurring costs by \$14.2 million annually.

SLIDE TWO

Second, the Navy's analysis completely ignores the substantial increase in mission costs that will result from basing Maritime Patrol Aircraft at Jacksonville rather than Brunswick.

Given that it is 1200 miles from NAS Jacksonville to NAS Brunswick and, by extension, that much further to P-3 deployment sites, operational areas and exercise areas, the increased flying time for every sortie is 4 to 7 hours per round trip at a cost of about \$8,000 per flight hour.

For example, a single round trip to **Signonella, Italy** or the **Mideast** will cost an additional \$55,000 in the P-3 and an estimated \$37,000 for the MMA. This error alone results in an understatement of Mission Costs by \$2.5 million annually.

Also closely tied to the increased mission costs of flying from NAS Jacksonville rather than NAS Brunswick are the simple fact of life costs of moving the squadrons to NAS Jacksonville. As we conducted our analysis, again, we found the Navy, while meticulous in some details, missed the big picture in others.

For example, their analysis calculates the costs of moving people, vehicles, household goods, and so forth to Florida.

However, it makes no allowance for the cost of relocating the aircraft, nor does it make any allowance for the numerous liaison flights that will take place between Brunswick and Jacksonville before and after the move.

Since it costs over \$27,500 to fly each P 3 the 1200 miles from Brunswick to Jacksonville, even if the squadrons move during deployment, they will have to fly an additional three hours or so to reach NAS Jacksonville. This oversight results in an understatement of one-time moving costs by \$2.6 million.

The **third** area in which we found the Navy's analysis faulty was in their overstatement of military construction cost avoidances at NAS Brunswick. Navy analysts claimed \$6.7 million in savings due to the cancellation of Hangar 1 demolition efforts and the cancellation of the weapons magazine replacement project.

These credits are incorrectly applied to the realignment scenario because should NAS Brunswick be converted to an active Naval Air Facility, it would still be necessary to demolish Hangar 1 and it would still be necessary to complete the **Weapons Magazine Replacement** in order to support future detachments of operational aircraft.

Under the realignment scenario, the Navy should not claim these savings and therefore understated military construction costs by \$6.7 million.

Finally, the Navy also failed to properly consider the timing and phasing of military construction projects at NAS Jacksonville.

We found a note in the **Patrol Wing Five realignment scenario data call** that indicated the first NAS Brunswick based squadron would relocate in 2009 upon completion of hangar military construction.

But the same scenario shows that military construction in Jacksonville could not possibly be completed by then because the space for hangars and ramps will still be occupied by active duty S-3 squadrons.

The Navy's analysis also wrongly assumes that NAS Jacksonville would be able to accommodate 50% of Brunswick's squadrons when military construction is half complete. It just doesn't work that way – you can't put aircraft, or people, into a half-finished hangar. No squadron relocation can take place until all military construction is complete.

This argument is supported by language submitted by NAS Jacksonville in response to the realignment scenario data call:

SLIDE THREE

“NAS Jacksonville has no available hangar space suitable to house the types of aircraft that are relocating. Per latest Naval Facilities Command planning criteria, each relocating squadron is entitled to one Type II hangar module. Quantity is based on a total of five modules.”

SLIDE FOUR

“The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation.”

SLIDE FIVE

“Child Street, a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville, must be relocated. Unless Child Street is relocated, there is insufficient area available to construct the required hangar and parking apron.”

Given that the Navy proposes to spend \$119 million to build *additional* hangar modules for the Brunswick squadrons, the realignment of NAS Brunswick actually increases naval aviation excess capacity.

Relocating NAS Brunswick aircraft squadrons and personnel requires military construction of hangars and ramp space to accommodate not only the near-term arrival of the MMA, but also to meet shortfalls in hangar space for the additional NAS Brunswick P-3 squadrons thereby increasing the number of overall hangar modules.

But the Navy also failed to account for the “Type III” MMA-capable hangars in the Navy's capacity analysis.

Although the Navy recognized that the MMA would enter the Fleet during the 20-year BRAC implementation period, the evaluation process did not allow for **“the introduction of aircraft types not currently on board an activity...”**

This restriction, therefore, prohibited the consideration of the MMA's introduction even though the Navy was well aware that it would occur one year later in 2012. Not considering the new MMA-capable hangar – already constructed at Brunswick with an investment of \$34 million -- *ignores* this valuable infrastructure and illustrates that the Navy's methodology for calculating excess capacity is fundamentally flawed.

Even the **Department of the Navy's Analysis Group** realized that realignment is not the right decision.

SLIDE SIX

A review of the meeting minutes for 24 January 2005 reveals that the group **“determined the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate the aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and would provide reduced savings since fewer billets would be eliminated.”**

It is clear that the Navy failed to think through the costs of realignment. After the recommendation for closure was overturned because of Brunswick's acknowledged strategic value, the Navy scrambled to develop a rationale and cost savings to justify realignment, but failed to conduct a rigorous analysis that would account for the future MMA role at Brunswick, the increased mission costs and the hidden costs underlying the realignment decision. We can only conclude that the drive for false savings was overwhelming.

SLIDE SEVEN

When the Navy's cost analysis is corrected to reflect the above additional considerations, the financial justification for realignment fails. The payback period becomes a more realistic 9 years versus 4 years and the purported 20-year net present value savings of \$238.8 million is closer to \$56.5 million.

It is clear that the Navy's sole reason for recommending the realignment of NAS Brunswick – cost savings – is not supportable by the facts.

The Navy's analysis does not comply with the expressed requirement of military value criteria number four to consider the cost of operation and manpower implications or selection criteria number five to consider the extent and timing of saving and therefore is a substantial deviation.

Projection of Personnel Savings Fundamentally Flawed

Of projected elimination of 403 personnel by 2011:

- 157 to be replaced by Boeing as part of Contractor Logistic Support program with introduction of MMA
- In reality, 246 positions eliminated as a result of realignment.

Personnel cost savings greatly overstated

**GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE FROM NAS JACKSONVILLE
TO
BAGHDAD, IRELAND, SIGONELLA, & ICELAND**



All routes lead past NAS Brunswick

NAS Jacksonville's Inability to Accommodate Brunswick Squadrons

Chief Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA.
 Draft Civil Engineer COA-4-108, COA-4-108B, Planning and Design to Ref. B. 4 February
 Control By: ams, submitters Engineering Activity, Mail: JLN/SCM/LJ/F, Bldg: 204 2076 Twp: 1974, Changing Activity: COE, WASHINGTON, DC, NA

	<p>Is the ST necessary to reconstruct the apron space beneath the footprint of the hangars. This explains the difference between the total amount of apron space required and the amount of new apron space proposed for construction.</p>	
	<p>As noted previously, demolition of these old hangars is required to provide parking apron space to accommodate the incoming aircraft. Hangars 113-115 are being demolished. The 5-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation. There is no current plan to backfill these hangars with other aircraft. The estimated cost to demolish these hangars is based on estimated demolition costs for similar type hangars in a programed list (DCN, Project P-312, FAC).</p>	14764

Page 6

The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation.

Brunswick: Realignment Does Not Provide Good Return on Investment

"determined that the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate the aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and would provide reduced savings since fewer billets would be eliminated."

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Subj: REPORT OF DAG DELIBERATIONS OF 24 JANUARY 2005

continuing to consult with the Marine Corps and 1st Naval Construction Division concerning alternate receiving sites. See slide 11 of enclosure (7). CDR Deputy indicated that 1st Naval Construction Division was considering Westover AFB, VA, as a possible receiving site. CDR Deputy also indicated that recurring costs and savings for Westover AFB were not the most significant recurring savings that would result from the elimination of billets. See slides 12 through 14 of enclosure (7).

23. The DAG determined that the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville. The DAG also determined that relocation of FASOTRAC assets to NAS Cherry Point was preferable since MILCON costs would provide a 50% savings (there is a 50% reduction in San Diego). According to the analysis and CPA for the scenario, which relocates FASOTRAC assets to NAS Cherry Point for the DAG's review.


24. CDR Deputy, LtCol Terri E. Erdag, USMC, and Mr. L. presented updated CPA results for three scenarios that realign NAS Oceana, VA, and relocate aviation assets to NAS Whiting Field, FL (scenario DOR-0107), NAS Beaufort, DC (scenario DOR-0151), and Moody AFB, GA (scenario DOR-0153). Enclosure (8) pertains. CDR Deputy indicated that the DAG decided to remove scenario DOR-0133, which would realign assets and relocate assets to NAS Pensacola, FL, from further consideration at its 17 January 2005 deliberative session. CDR Deputy informed the DAG that the updated CPA results contained the same assumptions as the previous CPA results reviewed by the DAG at its 17 January 2005 deliberative session. See slide 2 of enclosure (8). Mr. Leather requested the updated CPA results, noting that an evaluation of the cost savings and ready state savings indicates the following: Payback for 20-year NPV costs for the three scenarios, Scenario DOR-0140 - Payback approximately 14 years and 20-year NPV costs approximately \$193.2M; Scenario DOR-0151 - Payback approximately 14 years and 20-year NPV costs approximately \$54.1M; Scenario DOR-0153 - Payback in 14 years and 20-year NPV savings approximately \$16.9M. See slide 3 of enclosure (8).

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NET SAVINGS DUE TO BNAS REALIGNMENT

(Net Present Value)



Realignment results in a payback period of 9 years (not 4) and 20 year savings of only \$56 million (not \$238 million)

**Testimony of
Representative Tom Allen
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station Brunswick
Economic Impact
July 6, 2005**

Good afternoon, Chairman Principi and Members of the Commission.

At the end of the Maine portion of the hearing, Governor Baldacci will testify to the overall economic impact on Maine of the three recommendations that affect us.

I will speak now to the Department of Defense's economic analysis for Brunswick. By using the wrong labor market in its analysis, the Department grossly underestimated the negative impact of the realignment recommendation. This constitutes a deviation from Criteria 6.

The Department calculated the impact of the NAS Brunswick realignment within the Portland-South Portland-Biddeford Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). But Brunswick isn't in the Portland MSA. Brunswick has its own, separate Labor Market Area called the Bath-Brunswick LMA.

[insert ALLEN slide 1 – map]

This map of Southern Maine shows these two separate labor markets.

According to the DOD figures, the realignment of Brunswick would result in the loss of 2,317 military jobs, 42 military contractor jobs, 61 direct civilian jobs, and 1,846 indirect civilian jobs, for a total of 4,266 net jobs lost. By incorrectly placing NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, DOD claimed an adverse economic impact of only **1.3 percent**. The reality is many orders of magnitude higher.

NAS Brunswick accounts for one-third of all jobs in the Town of Brunswick. Looking just at the net direct job loss (2,420), the realignment would result an adverse economic impact of **15.2 percent** on the Town.

Expanding the scale a bit, NAS Brunswick accounts for 13 percent of all jobs in the Bath-Brunswick LMA. Looking just at both the direct and indirect job lost (4,266), the realignment would cause a loss of **10.4 percent** in this labor market. That 10.4 percent is the figure that DOD should have used for its economic impact analysis.

[insert ALLEN slide 2 – bar chart]

Thus, the negative effect on the local economy is **8 times** greater than what DOD claims.

A corrected adverse economic impact figure of 10.4 percent would leave Brunswick with the third highest economic hit, on a percentage basis, of any community on the list, after Cannon Air Force Base, NM, and the Crane Naval Support Activity, IN.

We also believe that the DOD projection for number of civilian jobs lost (61) is low. The civilians are there to support the uniformed personnel. Since the realignment removes all active duty presence at the base, it is reasonable to expect a higher proportion of civilian jobs would vanish. If the present ratio of military to civilian jobs remains after realignment, the number of civilian jobs lost could exceed 600, or 10 times the DOD forecast. This prospect would increase the economic impact to **11.8 percent** in the Labor Market Area.

Given the flawed analysis, we believe that DOD has substantially deviated from Criteria 6, consideration of economic impact.

As three of you saw during your site visit, Brunswick is a small town, with a population of just over 21,000. There are only 79,000 people in the LMA. According to an economic analysis by the State, the downsizing would cause a payroll reduction of \$136 million, retail sales losses of \$16 million, rental losses of \$13 million, financial and


insurance sector losses of \$12 million, and construction industry losses of \$10 million.

All are annual figures.

Just 10 miles down the road from Brunswick is Bath Iron Works. With 6,000 jobs, it is the largest single-site employer in the State of Maine. Bath Iron Works is facing potentially dramatic reductions in its workforce, due to a widening production gap between the end of the DDG-51 destroyer program and the start of the DD-X destroyer. We know that this private company is outside the purview of the Commission, but the downsizing of both the air station and the shipyard, at the same time, would deliver a double blow to the community. We appreciate that the Commission is willing to consider additional information about economic impact, and urge you to consider the consequences of the potential evaporation of military-related jobs and industry in the State.

Thank you. Senator Snowe will now make closing comments.

NAS Brunswick Economic Impact Evaluated in Wrong Labor Market




Source: Maine Department of Labor, Labor Market Information Services

Economic Impact on Brunswick

Corrected effect is 8 times larger

10.4%



1.3%



DOD estimate
(wrong labor market)

Actual impact
(correct labor market)

**Testimony of
Senator Olympia J. Snowe**

**before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on**

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Closing Arguments

July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman and esteemed Members of the Commission, thank you for your time and attention in this hour.

In the end, the facts show that DoD's recommendation to realign Brunswick is based on an *overvaluation* of cost savings and a gross *undervaluation* of strategic importance. This equation adds up to a grave risk for America's maritime security and our national homeland defense.

It is a litany of failures that undermines DoD's sole justification for realignment on the basis of cost savings --

A failure to account for cost savings from the airplanes of the future...

A failure to account for the new \$34 million hanger at Brunswick to *house* those aircraft...

A failure to consider the full cost of moving squadrons to Jacksonville...

A failure to recognize the accompanying increased mission costs.

In other words, the Navy's claim of cost savings is a mirage. What is *real*, however, is the new, post- 9-11 threat environment in which we live – and Brunswick's indispensable strategic value *within* that new environment.

SLIDE ONE

The Secretary of the Navy...the Chief of Naval Operations...the Commanders of Fleet Forces Command...and the Northern Command on *ten separate occasions* have stated that Brunswick is *vital* to the maritime defense of the nation -- leaving us with only one question --

Why, then, has the Department of Defense deserted the Northeastern United States, leaving us devoid of any active military aviation assets?

SLIDE TWO

Given DoD does not even attempt to justify this proposed realignment on the basis that it enhances homeland security..or bolsters readiness...or increases our mission capabilities...

And *given* we have shown that their cost savings calculation -- DoD's *sole justification* for realignment -- *fails*...

The *overwhelming strategic military value* of NAS Brunswick should trump any decision to close or realign this vital national asset. Because without a fully functional base, ready to respond at a moment's notice, our nation's maritime security will be at risk -- and therefore, Brunswick should remain an active, fully-operational Naval Air Station.

Thank you, and we would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

NAS Brunswick

Essential Strategic Asset - Valued by Senior Leadership

Secretary of the Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Commander, Northern Command

Commander, Fleet Forces Command

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

"This is a military value question more than anything else . . . we're really keeping a strategic capability in the Northeast. That's what it boils down to."

**- ADM Vern Clark
Testimony to BRAC Commission
May 17, 2005**



Loring AFB

NAS Brunswick

Pease AFB

Hanscom AFB

S. Weymouth

New Bedford AFB

Plattsburg AFB

Griffiss AFB

Westover AFB

New York

McGuire AFB

1988



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2005

NAS Brunswick

McGuire AFB

New York

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