

Testimony Before the Base Relocation and Closure Commission Regional Hearing

July 14, 2005

1. Slide Presentation

2. Testimonies


3. Community Report to the
BRAC Commission
Relevant to Naval Base
Ventura County

4. Letters of Support

5. Pt. Mugu Greenbelt

6. CD: Presentation
documents

DVD: Association of Old
Grows' "EW Warfare"





Testimony Before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission Regional Hearing

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Los Angeles, California
July 14, 2005

Presented by
Dana McKinney, RDML (Ret), USN
Jack Dodd, CAPT (Ret), USN
George Strohsahl, RADM (Ret), USN



+ Relevant Experience

- 3000+ hours in EA-6B/Squadron CO
 - Close ties to Navy Electronic Attack (EA) Community
- EA-6B Program Manager
 - Depended on EA-6B team at Pt. Mugu WSSA
- COMNAWC/WD—Lived at China Lake
 - Commanded SINGLE Command
 - Managed an INTEGRATED business unit
 - Testified against BRAC 95 closure of Pt. Mugu *
- COMNAWC/AD
 - Warminster move to Pax (96/97)

* BRAC 95 testimony submitted for the record

Report to the BRAC Commission

July 14, 2005

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Four Major Points

- Airborne Electronic Attack is a vital DoD capability now and in the future
- AEA depends on expert technical support
- Realignment will decimate AEA tech base
- Projected savings are unfounded

***Savings Not Justified—Realignment Puts
Our Forces at Greater Risk***

Report to the BRAC Commission

July 14, 2005

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+ Importance of AEA and EA-6B



- AEA support a go/no-go criterion for coalition air forces since Desert Storm
- AEA direct support to ground troops is saving lives TODAY in CENTCOM AOR
- EA-6B is the only AEA capability in DoD
 - Provides AEA for Navy/USMC/USAF/Allies

***Electronic Attack Saves Lives—
Only EA-6B Provides It***

Report to the BRAC Commission

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Value of Pt. Mugu to AEA Mission



- Nature of AEA demands rapid response
- Mugu EA-6B WSSA: A Critical AEA Asset
 - 30+ years of dedicated AEA experience
 - Not duplicated anywhere in DoD
 - Ongoing technical support/block upgrades
 - Quick response for rapidly changing threat
 - Close working relation with fleet user
- Integral part of EA-18G development team

***Pt. Mugu Is The Only Source Of
AEA Tech Support in DoD***

Probable Realignment Outcome



- Experience: Warminster move to PAX
 - Highly-skilled, marketable technical workforce
 - Move from urban to rural/remote-location
 - Result: Lost 80% of workforce
- Similar situation here, but aggravated by remoteness, desert climate of China Lake
- Realignment means Navy DoD will lose most of its tech base for AEA in the next two years

***Realignment Will Decimate Tech Base For
A Critical DoD Warfighting Capability***

Report to the BRAC Commission

July 14, 2005

Realignment Savings Not Justified



- NAWC/WDC is a single, integrated unit
 - 1992 NAWC consolidation
 - Redundant functions eliminated to lower costs
 - Establishment of NBVC in 2000 reduced BOS costs
- Multiple flaws in Tech TJCSG analysis

**Efficiencies Already Gained—
Savings Already Taken**

Report to the BRAC Commission

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Conclusion

- Proposed realignment of AEA support jobs from Ft. Mugu to China Lake will.
 - Decimate a highly skilled workforce
 - Weaken a critical DoD warfighting capability
 - Not result in claimed savings

Commission Should Reject This Proposal




Detailed Rebuttal of TJCSG Analysis and Recommendations



CAPT (Ret) Jack Dodd



Executive Summary



- DoD significantly deviated from BRAC law
 - Military Value (Criteria # 1 and # 2)
 - Costs and Savings (Criteria # 5)
- DoD did an extremely poor job of data analysis and management
- DoD significantly deviated from its own Departmental guidance
 - Jointness
 - Transformation

DoD's Current Recommendations

- Realign Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) Weapons & Armaments (W&A) functions to a W&A RDAT&E Center at China Lake, CA
- Realign NBVC Maritime C⁴ISR functions to a new Space Warfare Systems Command at Point Loma, CA
- Realign NBVC Electronic Warfare (EW) functions to China Lake, CA

Report to the BRAC Commission

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+ Military Value (Criteria # 1)

“The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.”

- BRAC actions should enhance, not degrade, our warfighters’ ability to carry out their missions.

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Electronic Warfare

- The TJCSG recommendation to move EW from Pt. Mugu to China Lake was made in spite of:
 - Pt. Mugu is the current, recognized EW COE.
 - The proposed realignment would not result in increased synergy with China Lake activities.
 - The realignment would result in significant disruption to our warfighting capabilities.

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Surface Ship Combat Systems

- The TJCSG recommendations to move Port Hueneme Combat Systems Integration functions to China Lake and CEC functions to Point Loma were made in spite of:
 - These realignments would destroy the ability to integrate and support the Detect-Control-Engage combat systems currently deployed in every Navy warship.
 - Navy ships would deploy with degraded combat system integration and less than optimum warfighting capability, and Navy warfighters would be placed in harm's way.
 - The VLS, NSSM, and RAM launching systems are essential components of the 'Engage' elements of ships' combat systems, and are separate from Weapons and Armament elements.
 - CEC and the IC Switchboards are integrated components of the entire Detect-Control-Engage sequence performed with integrated combat systems and are not Navy/Joint C⁴ISR systems.

Summary: Military Value (Criteria # 1)



- The DoD proposed realignments decrease Military value. They would negatively affect warfighter capabilities; they would unnecessarily cost taxpayers millions of dollars; and they would not result in any increased synergy at either China Lake or Pt. Loma.
- DoD's recommendations should be rejected.
 - Do not realign Electronic Warfare to China Lake.
 - Do not realign Combat Systems Integration functions to China Lake.
 - Do not realign CEC and IC Switchboard functions to Pt. Loma.

Military Value (Criteria # 2)

“The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.”

- DEPSECDEF Guidance on “Military Value Principles”: “The Department needs research development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.”
- In other words, no BRAC recommendations should degrade the efficiency or effectiveness of DoD’s test and training ranges or their supporting functions.

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Sea Range

- The TJCSG recommendation to move Sea Range functions from Pt. Mugu to China Lake was made in spite of the following facts:
 - The Sea Range supports a large number of non-W&A customers.
 - Sea Range personnel are not separable into distinct Defense Technical Areas.
 - There is no synergy to be gained.
 - Sea Range efficiency and effectiveness would be decreased.
 - Significant intellectual capital would be lost.
 - Sea Range operations are inextricably linked to the coastal geography.
 - Significant unnecessary upfront and recurring costs would be incurred.
 - Open Air Ranges were under the purview of the E&T JCSG, not the TJCSG.

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Targets

- The TJCSG recommendation to move Targets functions from Pt. Mugu to China Lake was made in spite of the following facts:

- 92% of aerial target operations are conducted at the Sea Range.
- 8% of aerial target operations are conducted at China Lake.
- 100% of seaborne target operations are conducted on the Sea Range.
- There is no synergy to be gained.
- By operating from 150 miles away, significant target operational efficiency would be lost.
- Significant intellectual capital would be lost.
- Significant unnecessary upfront and recurring costs would be incurred.

+ Range Support Aircraft

- The TJCSG recommendation to move VX-30 (P-3 & C-130) RSA functions from Pt. Mugu to China Lake was made in spite of the following facts:

- VX-30 RSA perform an average of 86% of their sorties on the Sea Range.
- VX-30 RSA perform an average of 1% of their sorties at China Lake.
- VX-30 RSA support Sea Range operations; they do not test Weapons & Armaments.
- Relocation to China Lake would result in significant unnecessary MILCON and recurring operational and maintenance costs.
- Realignment would not result in military personnel savings.

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Summary: Military Value (Criteria # 2)



- The proposed realignments decrease Military Value.
- They would not result in any increased synergy with China Lake W&A programs.
- They would negatively impact cost, safety and operational efficiency of Sea Range operations and thereby negatively affect military operational readiness.
- DoD's recommendations should be rejected.
 - Do not realign the Sea Range, Targets and Range Support Aircraft from Pt. Mugu to China Lake.

Cost and Savings (Criteria # 5)

“The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.”

- The TJCSG did not perform a proper analysis of the costs and savings associated with their recommended realignments. Specifically, extremely poor analyses were performed on the TECH 18 (Weapons and Armaments) and TECH 54 (Electronic Warfare) scenarios.

+ DoD TECH 18 (W&A) Costs



- As proposed by DoD, TECH-0018 :
 - Realigns all personnel at NBVC (and other installations) engaged in Weapon and Armaments RDT&E to China Lake.
 - Including all personnel supporting Pt. Mugu Sea Range and Target Operations, and Port Hueneme Weapon Systems Integration functions.
 - Does not include the costs to move these functions, the costs of the required MILCONS, and annual recurring costs of conducting Sea Range and Target operations remotely from China Lake.
 - Included an arbitrary across-the-board 15% reduction in military, civilian, and contractor positions being realigned.
- Summary of DoD COBRA results:
 - Payback Year 2015 (7 years)
 - NPV in 2025 (\$K) -433,404 (savings)
 - 1-Time Cost (\$K) 358,142

+ True TECH 18 (W&A) Costs



- The true cost of TECH 18 must include the costs for moving the Range and Target functions, the MILCON expense, and the recurring annual costs for remote Sea Range and Target operations.
- Due to over 12 years of consolidation of technical, administrative, and management functions between NAWCWD Pt. Mugu and China Lake, the assumed 15% savings for NBVC personnel would not occur.
- Adding the cost data from Navy certified responses to scenario DON-0162 dated January 11, 2005, and subtracting the 15% savings, yields the following:
- Summary of DoD COBRA results:
 - Payback Year 100+ years
 - NPV in 2025 (\$K) 249,094 (loss)
 - 1-Time Cost (\$K) 440,497

Modified TECH 18 (W&A) Costs



- Assume that Sea Range, Targets, VX-30 Range Support Aircraft, and NSWC PHD Weapon System Integration functions do not move to China Lake.
- Delete the associated recurring and nonrecurring costs and savings.
- Remove the 15% savings for the remaining NBVC personnel realigned to China Lake.
- Summary of DoD COBRA results:
 - Payback Year 2037 (29 years)
 - NPV in 2025 (\$K) 77,811 (loss)
 - 1-Time Cost (\$K) 269,727

+ DoD TECH 54 (EW) Costs



- As proposed by DoD, TECH 54:
 - Relocates the Pt. Mugu EW COE from Pt. Mugu to China Lake
 - Realigns 11 military, 368 civilian, and 100 contractor EW personnel to China Lake
 - Claims an un-itemized and unjustified “payroll savings” of \$3M/year
- Summary of DoD COBRA results:
 - Payback Year 2021 (12 years)
 - NPV in 2025 (\$K) -16,888 (savings)
 - 1-Time Cost (\$K) 72,799

+ Modified TECH 54 (EW) Costs



- Subtract the unjustified \$3M/year savings
- No other changes
- Summary of DoD COBRA results:
 - Payback Year 2040 (31 years)
 - NPV in 2025 (\$K) 24,961 (loss)
 - 1-Time Cost (\$K) 72,799

Summary: Cost and Savings (Criteria # 5)

- Both the Weapons and Armaments (TECH 18) and the Electronic Warfare (TECH 54) scenarios recommended by the TJCSG will result in high one-time costs and unacceptable long-term costs to the taxpayer.
- By not considering these costs in its analysis, DoD significantly deviated from BRAC law.

Poor Data Analysis & Management



- The Technical Joint Cross Service Group did an extremely poor job of analyzing and managing the data which was submitted by both NAWC WD and NSWC PHD.
- The most egregious example of this poor execution was in the TJCSG handling of what has become known as the "Question 47" data.
- In response to Data Calls TECH 2B and TECH 18B, NBVC personnel identified inconsistencies and confusion that would result if they were to arbitrarily lump personnel into "W&A" or "C⁴ISR" categories.

Poor Data Analysis & Management



- NBVC personnel were directed to include all of the personnel, but to identify areas of conflict for those personnel considered to be inextricable parts of their activities' missions in their Question 47 inputs.
- NBVC operated in good faith :
 - Identified all positions in each category
 - Identified those positions considered inextricable in their Question 47 responses.
 - Pt. Mugu Sea Range and Targets
 - Port Hueneme CSI and CEC
- TJCSG:
 - Did not ask NBVC personnel for clarification
 - Ignored the certified inputs

Poor Data Analysis & Management



- DoD rolled up all of the realignment numbers, including those from the TJCSG, and published a recommendation to realign 2,250 NBVC personnel, when the correct number, subtracting the Question 47 exclusions, should have been 803.
- From the July 2005 GAO inquiry:
 - “A Navy official said that most Navy activities asked to exclude large numbers of personnel from consideration in recommendations and the technical group was consistent in disregarding these exclusions.”
- Improperly realigning the 1,447 inextricable NBVC personnel due to TJCSG staff incompetence and/or inattention to detail is an egregious error which should be corrected by the Commission.



Jointness & Transformation Conclusions Recommendations



RADM (Ret) George Strohsahl

+ Background

- NAWCWD and NSWCWD created by BRAC 91
- NAWCWD (not China Lake nor Pt. Mugu) embodies several COEs)
- NAWCWD totally integrated, technical leadership distributed, and management overhead eliminated
- NBVC greatly reduced base support overhead
- BRAC 95 considered closing Pt. Mugu. Rejected even with the infrastructure savings.



BRAC 2005



- Retains Pt. Mugu base for fleet, Air Guard, and Homeland Defense purposes. No closure savings.
- Assumes 15% savings through technical work realignment, which has already been taken.
- Huge loss of intellectual capital.
- Retains Sea Range but—
 - Relocates most supporting jobs to China Lake. Raises unavoidable customer cost and safety issues. A grave error.
 - Relocates the supporting aerial and sea targets functions to China Lake. Dramatic decline in range capability will result.
 - Relocates the Range Support Aircraft to China Lake. Increases cost and reduces efficiency.

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Jointness and Transformation

- Disregards SECDEF guidance
- Range, EW, HIL lab, Radar reflectivity lab and others all have extensive joint use, but realignment moves them to Navy-centric organization.
- Transformation occurred with BRAC 91 and in subsequent management initiatives. BRAC 2005 returns to “cold war” type arrangement – anti-transformational





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Conclusions

- TJSCG did a terrible job. They:
 - Deviated from BRAC law
 - Deviated from DOD guidance
 - Failed to do proper data analysis and management
 - Substituted flawed “expert military judgment” for common sense.
- Existing work synergies ignored. New centers not well conceived as proposed.
- Loss of intellectual capital will be devastating.
- Adverse impact on the warfighters and other customers.
- Costs are not recoverable.

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Recommendations



- Totally remove NBVC from BRAC 2005 realignment
- If Commission decides to retain portions of the proposed realignment:
 - Use the Question 47 inextricable work data submitted by Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme to calculate more reasonable realignment numbers.
 - **Do not realign Range, Targets, EW, and Range Support Aircraft**

+ A Workable Alternative

- Retain NAWCWD two-site concept.
- Retain proposed concept of Weapons and Electronic Warfare Centers, but with distributed positions at two sites.
- Do not move any NAWCWD Pt. Mugu positions.
- Realign NSWC PHD weapons positions to NAWCWD.
- Realign NSWC PHD C⁴ISR positions to Pt. Loma after decreased by Question 47 data.

Report to the BRAC Commission

July 14, 2005

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Statement of Congressman Elton Gallegly (R-CA)
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission
California Regional Hearing
July 14, 2005

Good afternoon. On behalf of our panel, I first want to thank the distinguished gentlemen and gentlewoman for serving on the BRAC commission and for your continued service to our country.

I would like to specifically thank my former colleague, Commissioner James Bilbray, and Commissioner Philip Coyle, who toured Naval Base Ventura County yesterday.

I am joined today by Congresswoman Lois Capps, retired Rear Admiral George Strohsahl, retired Rear Admiral Dana McKinney and retired Captain Jack Dodd.

I have had the privilege of representing some or all of Naval Base Ventura County for the past 19 years in the U.S. Congress.

I support streamlining our military, but the Technical Joint Cross Service Group's recommendations to realign many functions from Point Mugu to China Lake – functions that are essential to the core mission of Point Mugu or have been identified as "Center of Excellence" areas – will raise the costs to taxpayers by millions of dollars, decrease military effectiveness and harm our military personnel – exactly the opposite of what BRAC is supposed to do.

We can only assume that the decision to eliminate 2,400 jobs – and up to 6,300 if you include indirect – from Naval Base Ventura County and transfer them to China Lake was based on an initial assumption that NAS Point Mugu would close. No other scenario makes sense because the enormity of the proposed realignment will devastate NBVC's ability to execute its remaining missions and support our deployed troops.

For the sake of time, I will provide just two examples.

- China Lake is 150 miles from the primary Sea Range operating area. Relocating range operations, aerial targets and aircraft to China Lake will increase response times to the range, reduce on-range time, increase safety risk factors and significantly increase operating costs. It's important to note that the range and target costs were not included in the COBRA model. And, what sense does it make to move the Range Support Aircraft to China Lake when they fly 86 percent of their sorties at Point Mugu and only 1 percent at China Lake?
- Point Mugu has been the Navy's Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence for more than 50 years. Its civilian and military personnel possess more than 4,500 collective years of EW experience. Many of those scientists and engineers have told me they won't move from the ocean's shore to the desert, which will result in a tremendous loss of intellectual capital.

I believe that when the investment costs, safety and support of our troops are considered, you will agree that the DOD recommendations simply do not make sense and will reject them in the best interest of military efficiency, preparedness and support.

Thank you again for your time and your dedication to our military and the nation.

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COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Congresswoman Lois Capps
2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Regional Hearing
Los Angeles, California
July 14, 2005

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Good afternoon and welcome to California.

Thank you Chairman Principi and Commissioners Bilbray and Coyle for being here today. I want to convey my gratitude and thanks for your service on the BRAC Commission.

I have represented Naval Base Ventura County for the last three years and have become intimately familiar with the critical role that this base, and the brave men and women who serve there, play in ensuring the continued security of our nation. The base is an important asset to our local community and a very good neighbor. More importantly, it's a key component of our national defense strategy.

As you know, Naval Base Ventura County has two physically separate operating facilities – Point Mugu and Port Hueneme – that were integrated to serve as the home to six major tenant commands. The base oversees an airfield, activities in a 36,000-square mile instrumented sea test range, and the only military-controlled deep water harbor and port facility between San Diego and Seattle.

Together, these facilities contribute substantially to the operational readiness of the Defense Department's total force, including development and testing of new weapons systems, joint war fighting experimentation, training and readiness, and Homeland Defense.

I have reviewed the Pentagon's recommendations and it's clear that the Defense Department erred when measuring the military value of these facilities. These recommendations don't make sense. Here's why:

First, relocating the vital functions performed by the personnel at NBVC would likely have lasting consequences for our national security.

The activities conducted at this site for the Navy, Air Force, Missile Defense Agency, and others cannot be replicated anywhere else in the nation. Moreover, the base's sea range is linked with other inland ranges in California – providing an unmatched capability to the Defense Department.

The proposed realignments could diminish these existing operational efficiencies and negatively impact the ability of our war fighter to get her or his job done.



Second, realigning the base's sea range and targets, and moving the test squadron and electronic warfare personnel and facilities will waste, not save, taxpayer dollars. I serve on the House Budget Committee and let me tell you – we can't afford to spend a lot of money to move missions and personnel when there's no long-term savings involved.

Other speakers will be addressing these issues in more detail, so I won't dwell on them.

But I wanted to conclude by saying that at the end of the day, this is not just about numbers, missions or dollars – it's about people. It's about the fine example of sacrifice and patriotism that is on view every day at the base by military and civilian personnel alike. The commitment to serving our country and its citizens by the people of this base should not be forgotten, especially these days.

I strongly encourage you to reject the Pentagon's recommendations and instead consider the Naval Base's valuable role in enhancing our nation's military and homeland security.

Again, thank you for being with us here today and thank you for your service to our country.



TESTIMONY BEFORE THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING,
JULY 14, 2005
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL (Ret) DANA MCKINNEY, USN

Chairman Principi, Commissioners:

Good afternoon. My name is Dana McKinney. I came here today to express my concern that, in return for a questionable level of future savings, the proposed realignment of jobs from Pt. Mugu to China Lake will adversely impact the Department of Defense's future electronic attack capability.

Let me provide you some background as to why my concern may be worth considering. I am, by training, an electronic attack pilot with over 3000 hours experience operating the EA-6B Prowler aircraft, including operational squadron command. From 1990 through 1993 I was the Navy's Program Manager for the Prowler, directing all RDT&E, acquisition, and operational support for the EA-6B fleet. From 1994 to 1996 I was stationed at China Lake, commanding the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, a single command—a SINGLE command—with major sites at Pt. Mugu and China Lake. My last job in the Navy was head of Research and Engineering for the Naval Air Systems Command, a position that included oversight of all of the Weapon System Support Activities, including those at China Lake and Pt. Mugu. During that period I also commanded the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division during the final implementation of the BRAC realignments of Warminster, Trenton, and NAVAIR HQ down to Pax River, so I have some history with the practical effects of such realignments. I hope that my experience as a warfighter, technical manager, and commander of both Air Warfare Center Divisions will lend credence to my remarks.

In May 1995 I testified before the BRAC commission, strongly opposing a similar proposed movement of jobs from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, so I have a sense of deja vu. The 1995 BRAC Commission unanimously rejected that proposal. I respectfully request that my 1995 testimony be placed in the record for your review. It is only four and a half pages long, but I believe it provides some necessary background for the Commission's deliberations, particularly regarding the realism of obtaining projected efficiencies through consolidating separate DoD activities. Some of the specifics, for example the weapon systems mentioned, may be out of date. However, the core argument made then is still valid. Significant efficiencies and savings can certainly be gained by consolidating separate organizations, particularly where redundant overhead infrastructure exists. We know this--because Admiral George Strohsahl, who will speak later, did it in 1992 when he consolidated a number of separate commands into the Naval Air Warfare Center or NAWC. During my three years as the NAWC Weapons Division commander we continued to search for, and find, additional efficiencies. All six of my successors have

devoted considerable attention to making the Weapons Division as efficient as possible because the NAWC divisions operate like businesses and excess overhead makes a business too expensive to compete. So, we've all continuously sought to eliminate redundancies between Pt. Mugu and China Lake as a matter of competitive advantage and long term fiscal health. In addition to business streamlining actions taken within the Weapons Division, further efficiencies were realized in 2000 by the establishment of the Naval Base Ventura County, a Navy regionalization initiative that reduced redundant base operating support personnel by 11% at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme during the first year. I know that the BRAC COBRA analysis assumed a 15% efficiency savings as a result of realigning most of the jobs in this scenario. Realignment of the remaining jobs, those associated with Electronic Warfare, was assumed to save about \$3 million per year due to "payroll savings for reduced Technical and Admin personnel", the basis for which was described as "an un-itemized value". Applying arbitrary or unjustified efficiency figures to the movement of jobs from one site to another within a single command is inappropriate and should be rejected by the Commission. The bottom line is that the business case for this realignment is a fiction. The savings that this BRAC realignment seeks to realize have already largely been taken as a result of the 1992 NAWC consolidations and the subsequent implementation of sound business decisions and Navy regionalization initiatives.

I don't have time to enumerate the deficiencies in the analysis used to justify this proposed realignment so I'll let Jack Dodd, who was my Vice Commander, give you those details in a few minutes. I want to use my remaining time addressing the movement of the electronic attack technical support jobs from Pt. Mugu to China Lake

As a former warfighter and weapons developer, I strongly oppose the movement of the electronic attack jobs from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. The Navy's electronic attack intellectual capital, particularly for dedicated jamming platforms such as the EA-6B, has been concentrated at Pt. Mugu for more than 30 years. Looking forward to replacing the EA-6B with the EA-18G, the Navy decided to establish the electronic attack weapon system development laboratory for this aircraft not at China Lake, where the strike version F/A-18E/F development laboratory is located, but rather at Pt. Mugu. The Navy recognized that the profound system and mission knowledge for the electronic attack mission resides at Pt. Mugu. In addition, the EA-18G tactical jamming system is essentially a repackaged version of the newest EA-6B system and the engineers having the most intimate familiarity with that system are located at Pt. Mugu. When completed, the EA-18G electronic attack laboratory will communicate via fiber optic lines to the F-18 E/F laboratory at China Lake, providing a virtually combined laboratory capability. I can't see any value whatsoever in physically moving the EA-6B and EA-18G electronic attack development laboratory from Pt. Mugu to China Lake at great expense when essentially the same connectivity exists today. In an era of reliable, cheap, high speed data transfer, the need for physical collocation of lab assets is frankly an antiquated notion.

Setting aside the economic argument, these labs cannot function without the expertise of the dedicated scientists and engineers currently assigned to Pt. Mugu. I mentioned that I have some practical experience in dealing with the effects of BRAC realignment decisions. My experience tells me that reassigning marketable engineers from a well developed, urban center to a rural or remote site is a guaranteed way to lose about 80% of them. It happened to us when we tried to move the Warminster folks from the suburbs of Philadelphia to rural southern Maryland and it will happen in spades if you try to move these people from the seaside suburbs of Ventura County to the remote high desert. Now, I personally loved China Lake and regretted having to leave. However, it's not for everyone and anyone in the Weapons Division who wanted to move to China Lake could have easily done so long ago. Any of you who have visited China Lake understand this simple truth--and those who haven't been there need to go: if the Commission approves this move you can expect to lose most of the Navy's technical base for airborne electronic attack in the next two years.

As a former Prowler pilot, I stay connected to the Navy's electronic attack community and I can tell you that there is widespread dismay at the prospect of losing the expertise that Pt. Mugu represents. I hear this from the NAVAIR program offices, the OPNAV offices, and most importantly from the fleet operators at Whidbey Island--the young men and women who rely on the scientists, engineers, technicians and testers to make sure that they have the most effective and reliable weapons possible as they prosecute an ongoing war. They can't speak here today, but you should know that they share my concern.

Finally, the timing of this proposal could not be worse. The Navy is preparing to transition the electronic attack mission from the EA-6B to the EA-18G. The EA-6B weapon system must be kept viable until the EA-18G development is completed and the aircraft is introduced to the fleet beginning in 2009. Expert and responsive EA-18G technical support will certainly be required during the introduction of the aircraft to the fleet over the next several years as we incorporate lessons learned from operational experience and respond to the constantly changing electronic threat environment. Unfortunately, the announcement of the proposed realignment is already taking a toll and the actual moves take place in 2008 and 2009, precisely when program stability is most needed. In addition, while the Air Force is attempting to resurrect its own electronic attack mission capability sometime in the next decade, the Navy's current EA-6B and future EA-18G fleet is the only tactical airborne electronic attack capability in the entire Department of Defense. We are a nation at war. EA-6B crews are providing direct support to our soldiers and Marines on the ground today in Iraq and Afghanistan and the demand for their capability continues to remain high. So the potential disruption of the developmental activities at Pt. Mugu will jeopardize not only the Navy's mission, but that of the entire joint force as well.

In summary, while I'm sure the Technical Joint Cross Service Group's recommended realignment was well intentioned, I believe it to be fatally flawed with respect to the movement of electronic attack related jobs at Pt. Mugu. The rationale for the savings

claimed don't apply in the case of Pt. Mugu and China Lake because these savings have already been taken. The transfer of electronic attack-related billets from Pt. Mugu to China Lake will result in more than an 80% attrition rate among these employees and will damage not only the Navy's but the entire joint forces' operational capability during a period when we can least afford such an impact. I strongly urge the Commission to weigh these factors and reject this proposed realignment.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE BASE REALIGNMENT
AND CLOSURE COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING,
MAY 25, 1995
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DANA MCKINNEY USN,
COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, WEAPONS DIVISION

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners:

Good morning. My name is Dana McKinney, and I command the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division. My purpose in being here today is to make clear the position of the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense in regard to the realignment of functions at the Naval Air Weapons Station Pt. Mugu.

We oppose this realignment strongly. It fails to accomplish the primary intent of the Joint Cross Service Group for Test and Evaluation, fails to meet reasonable goals for return on investment, and jeopardizes the future of an extremely valuable test and training range which supports a significant West Coast Fleet concentration.

The fact that the Division includes the bases at Pt. Mugu and China Lake puts me in the unique position of being both the losing command and the primary gaining command in the scenario that we are discussing today. As you can imagine, I've been having an interesting time with the community relations in the past two weeks.

Let me just touch briefly on a little background. The Naval Air Warfare Center was established in 1992 as a result of a consolidation of 38 Navy Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation sites into four warfare centers. The 1991 BRAC Commission endorsed this consolidation. The Weapons Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center brought together four of these sites with the primary mission of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and in-service engineering (ISE) support of naval aviation weapons and ship-launched surface to air missiles. As a result of this consolidation, the subordinate sites fell under a unified command structure. In addition, overhead functions such as Human Resources, Information Management, Comptroller, Procurement, Public Affairs, etc. were consolidated at the Division level with management at a single site. Technical management was also consolidated, with the Deputy Commander for Test and Evaluation located at Pt. Mugu and the Deputy Commander for Research and Development located at China Lake. The focus in the last three years has been on elimination of duplicate functions at the two major bases, and as a result, today there are virtually no redundant functions performed at Pt. Mugu and China Lake.

The Pt. Mugu site's primary focus is on operation of the Sea Test Range, development, maintenance and operation of target aircraft and ships, development and maintenance of software upgrades and integration of new weapons for the F-14 and EA-6B aircraft, electronic warfare avionics integration, and support of naval strike missiles such as the Tomahawk, Harpoon and SLAM. In addition, the site includes unique indoor facilities for bi-static radar cross section measurements and air-to-air missile seeker simulation labs used to reduce actual flight testing.

The China Lake site's primary focus is on operation of the Navy's largest air-to-ground weapons test range and electronic warfare test complex, development and maintenance of software upgrades and weapons integration for the F/A-18, AV-8B, AH-1W, and A-6E aircraft, development and test of new and modified air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, and aircraft survivability development and test. In addition, the site performs sophisticated outdoor radar cross section measurements, large scale explosive effects testing, prototype explosive and warhead development, and basic research in a number of weapons related areas.

The two sites operate as a single organization with two campuses. Their facilities and personnel skills are complementary rather than overlapping.

I'd like to emphasize the fact that the Navy made a determination to retain Pt. Mugu in its current configuration following an extremely rigorous analysis process. As a result of the process Pt. Mugu was ranked #2 of 64 Navy technical centers. The primary value of Pt. Mugu is obviously the Sea Test Range with its 36,000 square miles of highly instrumented and controlled air and sea space. The range is unique in DoD due to the use of 1500-foot Laguna Peak adjacent to the main base and San Nicolas Island, sixty miles offshore, both of which are heavily instrumented and provide extended coverage far out to sea. In addition to San Nicolas' geographic position, its remote nature provides a base unmatched in its ability to provide absolute security for highly classified projects and a 10,000 foot runway for launching full-scale unmanned aircraft targets without major concern for public safety caused by encroachment from local communities. Pt. Mugu is located adjacent to the deep water port of Port Hueneme, providing an ideal base for our fleet of target ships.

The airfield at Pt. Mugu supports a variety of users. It is the deployment airhead for the SEABEES located at Port Hueneme, and the base for two Naval Air Reserve squadrons and a Naval Air Reserve Center. The airfield is shared with the California Air National Guard as the home of the largest C-130 Guard Wing in the nation. The airfield provides logistical support for Division operations, ferrying equipment and personnel from Pt. Mugu to China Lake and San Nicolas Island. This capability is extremely important to the day-to-day management of the Division because it provides a means to rapidly and routinely commute between the two major bases as required. All full-scale and sub-scale target operations and maintenance originate from the field at Pt. Mugu, as well as the surveillance, control, and range clearance aircraft which are vital to the operation of the Sea Test Range. Finally, the Navy maintains a squadron sized detachment at Pt. Mugu exclusively for operational testing of the F-14 weapon system, as well as the F-14 aircraft which are used by the Weapons Division's Test Squadron for developmental test.

I mentioned the F-14 aircraft last because I want to use them as an example of the synergy between the Research and Development and Test and Evaluation elements which are co-located at Pt. Mugu.

The Navy has embraced the concept of full spectrum Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation centers located at two hubs, one on either coast. The West Coast hub is the Pt. Mugu-China Lake complex. We have consciously placed the full spectrum of technical support for air munitions Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and ISE at this hub. In this manner we can provide a single site for expertise for all Navy air-launched weapons throughout their entire life cycle, from concept to deployment and ultimately disposal. We believe strongly that we have achieved large efficiencies by pursuing this approach. Co-location provides efficient use of personnel and facilities in laboratory and

aircraft avionics support, shared use of flight test engineers, on-site coordination between customers and range operations, near real time analysis and correction of deficiencies encountered in tests, and the sharing of lessons learned amongst design, flight test, and in-service engineers. For instance, the F-14 Weapon System Support Activity, or WSSA, is involved in development of future capabilities for the F-14. It is supporting three deployed configurations of the aircraft, and participates daily in the developmental test and evaluation of the changes that they initiate. Flight test engineers who work with the co-located Weapons Test Squadron routinely interface with both the WSSA engineers and with the Range operators. In addition, co-location of the operational testers of the F-14 at Pt. Mugu provides a vital fleet input to the kinds of software changes being incorporated into the aircraft. Spare parts, as well as systems expertise, are shared between the Test Squadron and the WSSA. Over the past several months we have been forced to cost out the impacts of establishing separate facilities for software support, development, and test and evaluation, and have been impressed at the magnitude of the inefficiencies caused by such an arrangement.

I'd like to talk a little bit about the things required to perform the kinds of Test and Evaluation that we do at Pt. Mugu. We need a highly instrumented test arena (the Sea Test Range), a range control/operations center, a data gathering and analysis capability, Modeling and Simulation augmentation (Hardware-in-the-Loop and Weapon System Laboratories for component stimulation), targets at which to shoot (full-scale, sub-scale, air, and ship), and finally shooters (F-14, F-18, surface combatants, subs [TLAM], or Foreign Military customer assets). The combination of these elements and the extent to which they are needed vary from program to program, and within each program depending on where it is in its life cycle. At the beginning of a weapon's life you may depend more on Modeling and Simulation and controlled stimulation of components in laboratories. As the program matures, more use is made of integrated system stimulation and actual flight testing. In production and deployment, operational testing and full scale fleet exercises require the most complex open-air test scenarios available, often augmented by simulation. At Pt. Mugu, these components are all available at a single location. The proposed scenario would leave the Sea Test Range operations at Mugu, retain sub-scale aircraft and ship targets on the coast, move supersonic high altitude and sea skimming targets and full-scale aircraft targets to China Lake, locate the range customers and their test assets 160 miles from the range, and eliminate the ability to easily get by air from where the products are developed to where they are tested. This scenario will generate significant inefficiencies in operating the Weapons Division's aircraft on the range, and will require additional infrastructure to be built on San Nicolas Island in order to provide a staging base for range target presentation.

In short, the proposed scenario will destroy the synergy which currently exists between Research and Development and Test and Evaluation at Pt. Mugu and will lead to a less, rather than more, efficient organization. This will have an adverse effect on the cost of operation of the range which will be reflected in increased costs to our customers. These customers are not only within the developmental community. The Sea Test Range also performs a significant Fleet training role, due to its close proximity to the San Diego operational Fleet bases, and its demonstrated ability to generate complex and challenging scenarios for our operators.

At this point, I'd like to show you a short video which emphasizes these points.

Let me now turn to some significant issues associated with the scenario itself. As I understand it, this scenario was derived from the report of the Joint Cross Service Group for Test and Evaluation. In its report the Joint Cross Service for Test and Evaluation identified significant Test and Evaluation capacity roughly equal to twice the projected workload. Yet, this scenario preserves all of the Test and Evaluation capacity at Pt. Mugu by retaining the Sea Test Range. It results in no reduction of excess DoD Test and Evaluation capacity. It therefore does not accomplish the goals of the Joint Cross Service Group for Test and Evaluation.

In my opinion, this scenario will not accomplish the goals of the Commission. Previous recommendations for closure or realignment have focused rightly on scenarios which target bases with lower military value, which afford an acceptable return on investment, and which involve lower impacts to the community.

As previously stated, Pt. Mugu has an exceptionally high military value and is located in close proximity to a major fleet concentration. Implementation of this scenario will jeopardize the continued viability of the range by driving up operating costs.

Based on my review of the scenario and the Division's response, I believe that the return on investment will be unacceptable due to significant initial costs and low recurring savings. Our data show an initial investment cost of approximately \$735M, not counting the COBRA costs to move over 2800 personnel and 13,700 tons of equipment. Due to the requirement to locate a large number of range customers and all test assets 160 miles away from the range, we believe there will be a recurring net loss of \$4.6M per year in operations. While the personnel reductions associated with shutting down the airfield and base infrastructure generate recurring savings, we believe the net recurring savings will not exceed \$30M per year. If these savings are applied only to the initial investment cost, not including COBRA moving costs and zero annual inflation, it will result in a break-even period of 24 years. When standard inflation indices are applied and the COBRA moving costs are added, I am not confident that there will ever be a break-even point. Of course, I do expect that the Commission staff will discount some of our initial cost estimates and perhaps find additional recurring savings. However, I am convinced that the magnitude of the final costs and savings involved will still yield an unacceptable return on investment.

I won't dwell on the IG report, but the Commission was briefed that there were approximately \$1.7B in savings to be derived from that proposal, which was very similar to the one before the Commission. I want to reiterate that the Navy does not agree with this position. Those savings were a direct result of proposed elimination of 1049 jobs at Pt. Mugu, and the use of 937 personnel at China Lake to perform work to be shifted from Pt. Mugu. Essentially the report concluded that 20% of the Weapons Division's workforce (1984 people) was redundant. This is not the case. The Division is largely a DBOF organization, which means that we operate like a business, except that we attempt to set our rates each year to achieve a zero profit. Because we must generate revenues to pay for our cost of labor and other production overhead, we attempt to size our workforce to meet demand. For example from 1991, the year of the initial decision to consolidate Pt. Mugu and China Lake, through this fiscal year, the Division's government-only workload has decreased approximately 15%. During the same period, the government workforce available to accomplish the work has been reduced by a little over 1700 people or

approximately 19%. Due to Federal hiring constraints, we have actually not been able to retain adequate government employees to match the workload, and have had to increase our use of commercial contractors to make up the difference in workyears. So, the excess workforce assumed in the IG report does not exist. Without those excess jobs to eliminate, the savings just aren't there.

As to community impact, other speakers are addressing these issues.

In summary, the consolidation of four independent sites into the Weapons Division has, over the past three years, resulted in the virtual elimination of redundant capabilities. The sites perform complementary, vice overlapping functions. Because of this and because of the nature of DBOF business operations, the workforce levels are driven by available workload. The Weapons Division workforce has actually been declining at a higher rate than the available customer demand, resulting in a scarcity, rather than a surplus, of government employees. The redundant facilities and idle workers envisioned in the DoD IG report do not exist, nor do the savings claimed in that report. The proposed scenario will not reduce the excess capacity in DoD Test and Evaluation, and, in my opinion, will not result in an acceptable return on investment. If executed, it will result in the fragmentation of an efficiently integrated Research, Development, Test and Evaluation center resulting in cost inefficiencies. It will jeopardize a national Test and Evaluation asset which supports a significant fleet concentration.

The retention of Pt. Mugu in its current configuration is supported by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. I urge the Commission to reject this proposal and remove Pt. Mugu from further consideration for closure or realignment.

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners:

Good afternoon. I am George Strohsahl. I lead the team which planned the creation of the Naval Air Warfare Center under BRAC 91 and subsequently I was its first Commander. We planned the NAWC Weapon Division to be a Center of Excellence for all Naval Aviation Weapons, electronic warfare RDT&E, open air test ranges and targets, and weapons systems support for fighter and attack aircraft. At that time, recognizing the unique and robust infrastructure and quality of scientific and engineering personnel at both China Lake and Pt. Mugu we crafted an organization that functioned as a single entity with two coequal geographical locations about 150 miles apart. Subsequent termination of outdated programs, refinement of technical management structure, advances in high speed communications, and base regionalization have further honed NAWCWD into a very lean highly productive organization. Today, command leadership of NAWCWD is at China Lake while technical leadership of Ranges, EW, and Targets/Treat Simulation is at Pt. Mugu. The people at both sites have long since learned to work effectively together in a distributed workplace environment as a totally integrated team without regard to site. Site oriented management, other than the base command structure under the fleet, is almost not existent. There was serious consideration given in BRAC 95 to closing Pt. Mugu and moving all the technical work to China Lake. Then, even with the infrastructure savings to be gained through base closure, the BRAC commission found the proposed action without merit and rejected the closure admitting it was an error to even have considered it.

Today in BRAC 2005, we are fortunately not reinventing that prior error of base closure for we know the fleet, the Air National Guard, and soon the Coast Guard will be using this base for a long time to come. Additionally, the existence of the sea range, a unique national asset and the most capable range for both testing and training in the DOD inventory will continue. Incredibly, however we are proceeding down the same technical path proposed in BRAC 95, this time, however, without the infrastructure savings envisioned then. If this realignment is allowed to proceed, when all is said and done, we will have lost over 80% of our NBVC technical workforce, we will have spent a small fortune in unrecoverable cost, and largely the same number of people will be doing the same work supported by about the same number of contractors, at a new location. The NAWCWD technical centers created in the proposed BRAC realignments already exist and are functioning extremely effectively, and the savings envisioned in the case of Pt. Mugu realignment have already been taken. Sadly with this BRAC 2005 realignment, the sea range will be significantly more expensive to operate and less responsive to customer needs because almost all the essential elements of managing, operating, supporting, equipping, and maintaining that range will have been arbitrarily moved 150 miles away from the range. One occasionally hears of highly undesirable occurrences termed as a nightmare scenario. Separating the range from almost all its people, its

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targets and treat simulations, and its support aircraft is one of the worse nightmare scenarios I could imagine.

I would like to dwell briefly on one more subjective aspect of this BRAC before giving you our conclusions and recommendations. As early as 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld stressed in his BRAC 2005 guidance that weight be given to jointness. Later Secretary Wynne further stressed the need to ensure the BRAC process enhanced the transformational goals of DOD. Yet as the DOD process progressed there are memoranda in the public record that clearly show that despite the guidance and the use of Joint Service Coordinating Groups that service-centric solutions were evolving. GAO has recently reported only limited progress in fostering greater jointness and transformation. The realignment of NBVC is a classic example of a navy-centric solution and step back from transformation. The busy sea range last year was utilized about one quarter of the time by the Navy and the rest by the Air Force, other DOD and federal users, and allies. This realignment moves almost all the people running this joint range to a navy-centric Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E center at China Lake, seriously degrading the capability of the range to support joint usage. The movement of the EA-6B and other EW equipment software support to a navy-centric Navy Sensors, EW, and Electronic RDAT&E center at China Lake runs counter to the totally integrated joint use by all our military forces of the supported equipment. Similarly the movement of the AMRAAM hardware-in-the-loop lab supporting that joint service missile system managed by the Air Force and the closure of the world unique radar reflectivity lab at Pt. Mugu which serves a large variety of joint customers to navy-centric centers at China Lake are counter to the jointness guidance from Sec. Rumsfeld. Lastly, it appears that geographic collocation equates to transformation in the eyes of the creators of this proposed realignment. I define transformation as achieving desired results in newer more efficient and effective ways. That paradigm was captured in the current NAWCWD alignment and was enabled by modern communications technology. This proposed realignment is a giant step backward and ignores a highly successful transformation already in place and not in need of fixing.

Our conclusion is not very complimentary of the DOD Technical Joint Cross Service Group work in preparing for BRAC 2005. They deviated from BRAC law, they deviated from internal DoD guidance, they did a very poor job of basic data analysis and management, and a terrible job in judging military value. A majority of their recommendations simply do not make sense. Most of the affected positions are not synergistic with the weapons and armaments and electronic warfare work at China Lake, nor with the C4ISR work at Pt. Loma. These jobs are integral to the existing NAWC WD Sea Range and EW Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu and the NSWC PHD shipboard combat systems integration laboratory. Realigning these positions would result in unacceptably large losses of intellectual capital, adversely affect our war fighting capabilities and would waste hundreds of millions of dollars with scant, if any, payback.

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Based on those conclusions our most basic recommendation is to totally remove the entire NBVC realignment from the BRAC list. Should the commission decide to retain the essence of the proposed realignment, then we urge the incorporation of the base responses to Question 47 in recalculating the proper number of positions to be realigned. In any event, we most strongly recommend that all of the range, targets and EW work remain at Pt. Mugu along with the Range Support Aircraft.

As an old retired warrior and test pilot who lives in another state without an axe to grind in the outcome of this BRAC and not being paid to express my opinions, I would like to offer a sensible alternative philosophical approach to resolving the dilemma of dealing with this BRAC issue. This alternative preserves the Center of Excellence concept in Weapons and Electronic Warfare of the BRAC proposal, eliminates the extremely painful loss of intellectual capital the proposal will cause, enhances jointness, and reinforces the transformational management concept enabled by BRAC 91. In this alternative you would acknowledge the continued viability of the two-site concept for NAWCWD as established through BRAC 91 and the concept of the BRAC 2005 proposed centers of excellence. All NAWCWD positions at Pt. Mugu would remain in place at Pt. Mugu as a continuing part of NAWCWD with many positions integrating into the proposed COEs. The weapons positions, at NSWC PHD, corrected to an accurate number, would realign under NAWCWD and remain in place at Pt. Hueneme, or move 5 miles to Pt. Mugu if management prefers. The C4ISR positions at NSWC PHD, decreased by the inextricable positions identified in the Question 47 response, would realign to Submarine Base, Pt. Loma as proposed. This alternative also has no impact on other proposed realignments to the COEs at China Lake.

We thank you for your time. Are there any questions?

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July 1, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

As several members of your commission and staff prepare for a site visit to Naval Base Ventura County as well as convening the regional hearing in Los Angeles on July 14, I would like to share a few concerns I have over the original Department of Defense recommendations for Naval Base Ventura County.

Specifically I am concerned with the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) recommendation to: *"Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA and Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA."*

While I understand the concept of creating a Naval Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center, I am troubled that the TJCSG did not take Question #47 into consideration that would have allowed for personnel, equipment and facilities that were within the "Weapons and Armaments" category, but were an inextricable part of the remaining core mission, to be retained. In an attempt to understand the rationale of this decision, I sent an inquiry to Alan Shaffer, Executive Director of the TJCSG and I was even more troubled by his response which read in part, *"Naval Base Ventura County information was reviewed but not included in the final analyses due to expert military judgment."*

If the intended BRAC selection criterion is military value, the decision to ignore the issue of inextricable work in Naval Base Ventura County's case, will have a tremendous impact on operational readiness as well as increase the cost of doing business to the taxpayer. This point is illustrated in two areas, targets and range operations. First, since the airfield at NAS Point Mugu will stay open, why relocate aerial targets and aircraft to China Lake which is 150 miles away from their primary Sea Range operating area? This will surely increase response times to the range and ultimately increase their operating costs. Additionally, operational inefficiencies and operating costs will surely increase for VX-30. This Wing operates P-3, C-130 and F/A 18 Aircraft to provide surveillance, clearance, telemetry and other services to the sea-test range. Recurring costs of flying these aircraft from China Lake to Point Mugu are estimated to be over \$6.9 million per year as well as the wear and tear the additional flight hours will put on these aging airframes.

Second, Point Mugu just upgraded their Range Operations facilities with state of the art equipment at a cost of over \$20 million just a few years ago. Why duplicate this infrastructure at

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Mr. Anthony Principi, Chairman
July 1, 2005
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another location, and how safe and efficient will operating a 36,000 square mile sea test range be from a remote location?

The second DoD recommendation I have a concern with is the TJCSG recommendation to:
"Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA."


This recommendation simply does not make sense. Point Mugu is the existing recognized Center of Excellence for Electronic Warfare and is currently doing work not only for the Navy but the Air Force as well. The Electronic Warfare community at Point Mugu directly supports the war-fighter in Afghanistan and Iraq on an around the clock basis. Additionally, the Electronic Warfare community is very specialized and while they do work with their aircraft software development counterparts in China Lake, they possess very different skills and expertise.

Since the BRAC list was released over a month ago, numerous individuals who work in this area have contacted my office. Many indicated they would not re-locate to China Lake. Unfortunately, their intellectual capital would be lost and the program would suffer for many years if not decades. Furthermore, the costs and time of reconstituting the laboratories at China Lake would take a tremendous toll on our operational readiness.

Point Mugu is the only un-encroached oceanfront Navy airfield on the West Coast and is contiguous to the largest instrumented Sea Test Range in the world. It is home to the West Coast operational E-2 Wing, Channel Islands Air National Guard and is the optimum location for testing and basing future military weapons systems and unmanned aerial vehicles such as in the Coast Guard's Deep Water Program. With this invaluable DoD asset in place, it does not make operational or economical sense to move programs like targets, range operations and electronic warfare hundreds of miles from the area they primarily serve.

Finally, the Commander of Naval Aviation, Admiral Massenburg has contacted my office in support of keeping these critical activities at Point Mugu. As your Commission reviews the final recommendations submitted by DoD, please reconsider the movement of targets, range operations and electronic warfare out of Point Mugu. It is currently located at a facility that provides the greatest current and future mission capabilities to our nation's operational readiness.

Sincerely,



ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

June 28, 2005

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The Honorable Anthony Principi
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
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Dear Chairman Principi:

As members of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission prepare for the site visit to Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) located in Ventura County, California, I wanted to thank you for your steadfast work in making the tough decisions required in implementing the 2005 round.

As you know, the Pentagon has recommended realigning important missions away from NBVC that will result in the largest job loss in California – over 2,800 military and civilian positions. While I am relieved that NBVC was not recommended for complete closure, the impact of the BRAC recommendation is nevertheless quite significant to my constituents and to our nation. The community and I believe the recommendation was based on inaccurate information and failed to recognize the installation's important military value.

Your upcoming site visit will allow base personnel, as well as local business and community leaders, to inform the Commission on evaluation inaccuracies and reasons why the potential realignments should not occur. The base and community are well prepared and organized, having made essentially the same argument in 1995. The case then was convincing and persuasive to the Commission and I trust it will be so again.

Like you, I strongly support efforts to make our military stronger and more efficient. However, any changes made to our military installations should be focused on protecting local communities and strengthening our national defense capabilities. Relocating the vital functions performed by the personnel at NBVC will have serious disruptions to the lives of the military and civilian personnel on the base and their families. The base supports about 17,000 military, civilian and contractor jobs with an estimated impact of \$1.2 billion annually. In addition, the base generates 30,000 jobs in Ventura County, which translates to another \$750 million in economic activity.

The relocations will also have severe and lasting consequences to our nation's security. NBVC is an important element in our national security system, especially in the war against terrorism and protecting our homeland. The entire base, which includes Port Hueneme and Pt. Mugu, supports more than 70 military units and numerous missions, including support for

research and development, and test and evaluation of weapons systems, a deep-water port, an airfield, and missile seat-test range. Many of the functions conducted at the base cannot be performed anywhere else.

As an example, the weapons division at NBVC operates the largest instrumented sea test range in the world, providing a testing and training facility for the Navy, Air Force, Missile Defense Agency, and allied nations. The region's geography enhances the value of the sea test range, permitting a large operating area with no traffic conflicts. The range is also linked with the inland ranges of California and the western United States in an irreplaceable relationship.


Again, thank you for all of the work you are doing. I know the Commission is busy and under tremendous time pressure. I admire your efforts, and look forward to working with you as the BRAC process progresses.

Sincerely,



LOIS CAPPS
Member of Congress

- cc: The Honorable James H. Bilbray
The Honorable Philip Coyle
Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., (USN, Retired)
The Honorable James V. Hansen
General James T. Hill (USA, Retired)
General Lloyd W. "Fig" Newton (USAF, Retired)
The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner
Brigadier General Sue E. Turner (USAF, Retired)



Congressman Brad Sherman

27th District, California

SERVING THE SAN FERNANDO VALLEY

July 14, 2005

COMMITTEE ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

I am extremely pleased that the Department of Defense has not proposed closing Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC). In my letter written to Secretary Rumsfeld dated March 25, 2005, I mentioned that such a closure could only be justified by cost savings and not based on an adequate assessment of the total military and national security value of this multi-mission base. I am, however, concerned about the Department's recommendations to move weapons with range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

An analysis of the BRAC recommendations has indicated a potential reduction of 6,373 jobs, which would include 2,856 direct jobs (military and civil service) and 3,517 indirect jobs (including contractors) in the Oxnard, Thousand Oaks, and Ventura metropolitan statistical area.

Relocating the missions associated with the range and aerial target functions and their supporting aircraft, which is 150 miles away from the primary operating station, seems anything but practical. The loss of technical specialties and the resulting impact on timed phased mission performance schedules appear to have been insufficiently assessed.

These considerations are something the nation can ill afford in this era of global war on terrorism.

I call upon the Commission to carefully review all of these concerns in your careful deliberations and reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,

BRAD SHERMAN
Member of Congress

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SAN FERNANDO VALLEY OFFICE

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SHERMAN OAKS, CA 91403
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CONGRESSMAN BRAD SHERMAN
SERVING THE SAN FERNANDO VALLEY

Statement of Congressman Brad Sherman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) Regional Hearing
July 14, 2005

I want to thank the BRAC Commission for holding this important hearing today. The defense of this country is a primary responsibility for all levels of government. As a Member of Congress serving the San Fernando Valley and Ranking Member of the International Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation, I am keenly aware that the protection of Southern California and the Greater Los Angeles area is directly linked to our military preparedness.

Although I am pleased with the Department of Defense's decision not to close the Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC), I am, however, concerned about the Department's recommendations to move weapons with range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

An analysis of the BRAC recommendations has indicated a potential reduction of 6,373 jobs, which would include 2,856 direct jobs (military and civil service) and 3,517 indirect jobs (including contractors) in the Oxnard, Thousand Oaks, and Ventura metropolitan statistical area.

Relocating the missions associated with the range and aerial target functions and their supporting aircraft, which is 150 miles away from the primary operating station, is impractical. NBVC uniquely combines a military-controlled airfield complex, a military-controlled deepwater seaport, the military-controlled San Nicholas Island, and the largest instrumented Sea Test range in the world. While the Department of Defense has wisely recognized the vital importance of NBVC, it does not make logistical or economic sense to relocate range and support operations to a location 150 miles away. Relocating personnel from their primary operating area to China Lake will increase response time to range tasking, reduce on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

Moreover, the Department of Defense is assuming that a large portion of NBVC's civil service and contractor employees would be willing to move to China Lake. That assumption is highly questionable. The likely loss of experience, expertise and intellectual capital from employees unwilling to relocate would take the Navy years to reconstitute.

It appears the Department's decision was predicated on the similarity of work between Pt. Mugu and China Lake. While there are people at both places who work in the general fields of electronic warfare, missile, and target systems, the Pt. Mugu specialty areas do not exist at other sites. Some of the work could be done elsewhere but not until the intellectual capability in certain areas is moved or recreated. Thus, this proposed costly relocation would be a step back without meaningful tangible benefit.

I call on the Commission to carefully review these concerns in your deliberations and reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

California State Senate



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SENATOR GEORGE RUNNER
REPUBLICAN CAUCUS CHAIR
SEVENTEENTH SENATE DISTRICT

COMMITTEES
HEALTH
VICE CHAIR
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
VICE CHAIR
BUDGET & FISCAL REVIEW
BUDGET SUBCOMMITTEE 3
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
REVENUE AND TAXATION
TRANSPORTATION AND
HOUSING

June 30, 2005

Anthony Principi
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

I want to lend my voice to the chorus of Ventura County cities and officials asking that you reconsider the proposed move of Naval Base Ventura County electronic warfare functions, weapons and range support operations 150 miles away to China Lake.


Moving the Sea Test Range from Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme does not make sense in that the supporting functions at this location cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the world. To relocate the range and aerial target functions, along with the supporting aircraft, 150 miles from the operating Range does not appear to be a sound economic or logical arrangement.

The possibility of civil service and contractor employees not following the move to this fairly remote area means that the Navy will spend years reconstituting this loss of expertise, a set-back to the continuation of programs already in place for the protection of our nation in its Global War on Terrorism.

The move will increase the employees' response time to range tasking, reduce their on-range time, increase operating costs and reduce safety, all of which seem counterproductive to the DOD's quest for cost reduction in consolidation.

I remain hopeful that you will join with us in rejecting the recommendation to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,


George Runner
17th District

California State Senate

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STATE CAPITOL, ROOM 4032
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
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FAX (916) 324-4833

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10951 WEST PICO BLVD., SUITE 202
LOS ANGELES, CA 90064
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FAX (310) 441-0724

SENATOR
SHEILA JAMES KUEHL
TWENTY-THIRD SENATORIAL DISTRICT

CHAIR
NATURAL RESOURCES AND WILDLIFE COMMITTEE

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE AND WATER
RESOURCES
BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
JUDICIARY
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS



July 7, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

I am proud to represent the 23rd State Senate District, which includes Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) and many of the base's military and civilian employees. I would like to take this opportunity to request that you reject the Department of Defense's (DOD) recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

NBVC uniquely combines a military-controlled airfield complex, a military-controlled deepwater seaport, military-controlled San Nicholas Island, and the largest instrumented sea test range in the world. While the DOD has wisely recognized the vital importance of NBVC, it does not make logistical or economic sense to relocate range and support operations to a location 150 miles away. Relocating personnel from their primary operating area to China Lake will increase response time to range tasking, reduce on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

In addition, the DOD assumes that a large portion of NBVC's civil service and contractor employees would be willing to move to Ridgecrest or China Lake. That assumption is highly questionable. The likely loss of expertise and intellectual capital from employees unwilling to relocate would take the Navy years to reconstitute.

I hope that you will recognize the overwhelming benefits to allowing weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions to remain at NBVC. Thank you for considering my views.

Sincerely,

Sheila James Kuehl
California State Senate
23rd District

CHAIR, BUDGET SUBCOMMITTEE
ON RESOURCES (NO. 3)

COMMITTEE MEMBER:

BUDGET

EDUCATION

TRANSPORTATION

WATER, PARKS AND WILDLIFE



DCN: 5032

Assembly
California Legislature

FRAN PAVLEY
ASSEMBLYMEMBER, FORTY-FIRST DISTRICT

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FAX (818) 596-4150

July 5, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

I am proud to represent the 41st Assembly District, which includes Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) and many of the base's military and civilian employees. I would like to take this opportunity to request that you reject the Department of Defense's (DOD) recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

NBVC uniquely combines a military-controlled airfield complex, a military-controlled deepwater seaport, military-controlled San Nicholas Island, and the largest instrumented sea test range in the world. While the DOD has wisely recognized the vital importance of NBVC, it does not make logistical or economic sense to relocate range and support operations to a location 150 miles away. Relocating personnel from their primary operating area to China Lake will increase response time to range tasking, reduce on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

In addition, the DOD assumes that a large portion of NBVC's civil service and contractor employees would be willing to move to Ridgecrest or China Lake. That assumption is highly questionable. The likely loss of expertise and intellectual capital from employees unwilling to relocate would take the Navy years to reconstitute. As a result, the projects they work on will suffer and programs critical to our nation's Global War on Terrorism would be hindered.

I hope that you will recognize the overwhelming benefits to allowing weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions to remain at NBVC. Thank you for your outstanding service to our country.

Sincerely,

FRAN PAVLEY
Assemblymember, 41st District

FP:rs



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Assembly
California Legislature



KEITH S. RICHMAN, M.D.
ASSISTANT REPUBLICAN LEADER
ASSEMBLYMEMBER, THIRTY-EIGHTH DISTRICT

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

- HEALTH
- INSURANCE

July 8, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Principi:

As a representative of portions of Ventura County in the California legislature, I wanted to share my concern with the proposed closure of the Sea Range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme.

I would appreciate your consideration of the following facts:

- 1) The Sea Range is unparalleled and cannot be duplicated elsewhere in the United States;
- 2) It is not logical to relocate the range support operations to a location 150 miles from Pt. Mugu while keeping the test range and facilities open;
- 3) I have been advised that many civil service and contractor employees have stated that they will retire or not relocate to Ridgecrest of China Lake, 100 miles east of Bakersfield;
- 4) It is my understanding that it would take the Navy years to reconstitute the lost expertise with a resulting loss in the quality of the projects.
- 5) Relocating the sea range and target personnel to a location 150 miles from their primary operating area will increase the employees' response time to range Safety.

I trust that you will reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from the Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.

Sincerely yours,

Keith S. Richman, M.D.
Member of the Assembly

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Assembly
California Legislature

PEDRO NAVA

ASSEMBLY MEMBER, THIRTY-FIFTH DISTRICT



July 13, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
Chairman, Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and Commissioners:

Thank you for holding a Regional Hearing to hear from our community regarding the Department of Defense's (DOD) Base Realignment and Closure recommendations (BRAC).

I respectfully ask that you reject the DOD's recommendation to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake. This proposed realignment would increase the risks to our crews, decrease the combat effectiveness of our fleet, and could result in increased costs that are non-recoverable.

The technical work that takes place at Point Mugu in support of fleet operations is vital to the safety of air crews in pursuing their missions and critical to their combat-effectiveness. It does not make logical or economic sense to move the NBVC range support operations to a location 150 miles away, while keeping the test range and facilities open. This would result in an increase in response time to range tasking, reduction of on-range time, reduced safety, as well as increased operations costs.

The around-the-clock responsiveness of the technical team at Point Mugu could be detrimentally affected by the risk of decreased productivity as a result of the proposed realignment relocation, new hiring, and training. Furthermore, the history of past BRAC realignments have shown that relatively few civilian workers personally relocate when offered the opportunity, and many of our local civil service and contractor employees have stated that they will retire or not move to Kern County. This loss of knowledge, skill, and experience would take the Navy years to reconstitute, further denigrating critical response time that is so necessary to the safety and effectiveness of our crews in battle.

The Honorable Anthony Principi
July 13, 2005
Page 2

Thank you for your consideration in this matter. I respectfully urge you to reject the proposed NBVC realignment.

Sincerely,



Pedro Nava
Assemblymember, 35th Assembly District

PN: ag

cc: Senator Dianne Feinstein
Senator Barbara Boxer
Congresswoman Lois Capps
Ventura County Board of Supervisors
Oxnard City Council
Port Hueneme City Council
Camarillo City Council
Ventura City Council
Military Base and Economic Committee
BRAC Ventura County Taskforce

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Assembly
California Legislature



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AUDRA STRICKLAND
ASSEMBLYWOMAN, THIRTY-SEVENTH DISTRICT

July 1, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

For the following reasons I am hopeful that you will reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.

First, the Sea Range and its supporting functions at Point Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. It would appear that relocating the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft, to China Lake - 150 miles away from the primary operating range - would only increase their response time to range tasking, reduce their on-range time, increase operating costs and reduce safety.

Additionally, most of the people who have worked on these projects for many years and are detailed to move, simply will not move to China Lake/Ridgecrest. As a result, it will take years to reconstitute that expertise. In the meantime the projects they are working on will suffer greatly. Many of these people live in Ventura County, are respected and integral parts of our community, and have indicated that they will not leave here for the desert.

Finally, this loss of intellectual capital and interruption of work will be detrimental to our nation's Global War on Terrorism, and moving essential technology from its proximity to the Sea Range will be detrimental, as well.

Again, I am hopeful that you will reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Thank you for taking the time to consider my comments.

Sincerely,

Audra Strickland
Assemblywoman, 37th District



**BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
COUNTY OF VENTURA**

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800 SOUTH VICTORIA AVENUE, VENTURA, CALIFORNIA 93009

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July 12, 2005

Mr. Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

The Ventura County Board of Supervisors is requesting that you reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.


Naval Base Ventura County provides the Southern and Central California Coast with highly concentrated military value and homeland security protection. The historic location of the Sea Range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. Relocating the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft, to China Lake, 150 miles away from the primary operating range, will increase the response time to range tasking, reduce the on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.


In addition, most of the people who have worked on these projects and have numerous years of institutional knowledge will be challenged to move to China Lake/Ridgecrest. Many of the personnel will select not to move. Loss of this valuable human resource will take years to rebuild and their expertise may never be adequately replaced. During this proposed transition the projects they are working on may face delays that will certainly be costly to taxpayers.

Rejection of DOD recommendation to move
various functions from NBVC to China Lake.
July 12, 2005
Page 2


Finally, the recommended shift of personnel and technology will be damaging to our nation's Global War on Terrorism. The proposed realignment will virtually destroy our national electronic warfare capability. The total operations at the base are integrally supported through the mutual cooperation of personnel, missions and leadership. This cooperation has proven to be efficient and cost effective. To realign the weapons, range and electronic warfare functions would be a great disservice to our community, the taxpayers and the nation. We ask that you solidly reject the recommendations.


Sincerely,


Kathy I. Long, Chair
Supervisor Third District


Steve Bennett
Supervisor First District


Linda Parks
Supervisor Second District


Judy Mikels
Supervisor Fourth District


John Flynn
Supervisor Fifth District

C: The Honorable Lois Capps, U.S. Congresswoman
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, U.S. Congressman
The Honorable Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator



City Of Camarillo

601 Carmen Drive • P.O. Box 248 • Camarillo, CA 93011-0248

Office Of the Mayor
(805) 388-5307
Fax (805) 388-5310

July 1, 2005

Mr. Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

The City of Camarillo is hopeful that you will agree with us and reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake for the following reasons:

First, the sea range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled, and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. Why would you want to relocate the range and aerial target functions and supporting aircraft to China Lake, which is 150 miles away from the primary operating range? This relocation would increase response time to range tasking, increase operating costs, while at the same time reduce on-range time and safety.

Additionally, most of the people who have worked on these projects for many years, and who are detailed to move, simply *will not* move to the China Lake/Ridgecrest area. As a result, it would take years to reconstitute that expertise, and, in the meantime, the projects they are working on will suffer greatly. Many of these people live in Camarillo. They are well respected, and an integral part of our community. They do not want to leave this area to live in the desert.

Finally, this loss of intellectual capital and interruption of work will be detrimental to our nation's global war on terrorism. Moving essential technology from its proximity to the sea range will be detrimental, as well.

Again, I am hopeful that you will agree with us and reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,

Kevin Kildee
Mayor



CITY OF FILLMORE

CENTRAL PARK PLAZA
250 Central Avenue
Fillmore, California 93015-1907
(805) 524-5701 • FAX (805) 524-5707

June 29, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

For the following reasons the City of Fillmore is hopeful that the BRAC Commission will agree with us and reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.


First, the Sea Range and its supporting functions at Point Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. Why would the Commission want to relocate the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft, to China Lake, 150 miles away from the primary operating Range, only to increase their response time to range tasking, reduce their on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety?


Additionally, most of the people who have worked on these projects for many years and are detailed to move simply will not move to China Lake/Ridgecrest. Many of these people live in Ventura County and have indicated that they will not leave here for the desert. As a result, it will take years to reconstitute that expertise. In the meantime the projects they are working on will suffer greatly.

Finally, this loss of intellectual capital and interruption of work will be detrimental to our nation's Global War on Terrorism, and moving essential technology from its proximity to the Sea Range will be detrimental, as well.

Again, I am hopeful Mr. Chairman that you and the BRAC Commission will agree with us and reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,


Ernie Villegas, Mayor
City of Fillmore, CA



MOORPARK

799 Moorpark Avenue Moorpark, California 93021 (805) 517-6200

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

July 6, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:


The City of Moorpark urges you to reject the Department of Defense's recommendation to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County to China Lake.

The sea test range and its supporting functions at Point Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated elsewhere. Moving the range and aerial target functions, including its supporting aircraft, to China Lake, 150 miles from the primary range, would increase response time to range tasking, reduce range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

Moreover, many veteran civil service and contract employees are unable to relocate to China Lake, choosing retirement or other employment. It would take years to reconstitute this lost expertise and significant projects would suffer.

This loss of intellectual capital and productivity could weaken America's global war on terrorism. For these reasons, the City of Moorpark urges you to reject the Department of Defense's recommendation to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County to China Lake.

Sincerely,


Patrick Hunter
Mayor

PH:KC

cc: Honorable City Council
Steven Kueny, City Manager

PATRICK HUNTER
Mayor

CLINT D. HARPER
Mayor Pro Tem

ROSEANN MIKOS
Councilmember

KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
Councilmember

JANICE S. PARVIN
Councilmember



CITY OF OJAI

401 SOUTH VENTURA STREET
P.O. BOX 1570 / OJAI, CA 93024
TELEPHONE (805) 646-5581
FAX (805) 646-1980

July 5, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

The City of Ojai is a community that is highly educated and expresses considerable interest in the well-being in the State of California and the nation. As such, we have a number of concerns with the proposed movement of weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake. This base represents the best in terms of location for these functions for a variety of reasons.

The Sea Range and the support functions attendant to its operation are unmatched and not subject to duplication anywhere else in the country. Placing these functions approximately 150 miles distant from the actual operating Range does not prove for an efficient use of the resources that need to be available for proper testing. The distance will ultimately result in increased response time to range tasking, reduce on-range time, increase operating cost and reduce safety.

Probably of greater concern to the nation's defenses will be the unavailability of highly trained personnel from NBVC who will not be willing to make the move to China Lake for a variety of reasons. The change in lifestyle from a coastal environment to the desert is a primary deterrent for these highly qualified and experienced workers. The result will be a long time lag before the China Lake facility will be able to operate as will be necessary for an effective defense system. The nation is not in a position to wait the period of time that will be necessary.

As you proceed with your deliberations regarding base closures, I ask that you take into account the impacts a movement of the weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake will have on the nations overall state of readiness and protection of its citizens. I hope you will find that an analysis will result in an agreement with our position.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Rae Hanstad".

Rae Hanstad, Mayor
City of Ojai, CA



CITY COUNCIL OFFICE
305 West Third Street • Oxnard, CA 93030 • (805) 385-7428 • Fax (805) 385-7595

July 12, 2005

Mr. Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Principi:

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Recommendations for Base Realignment and Closures at
Naval Base Ventura County, California

The City Council of the City of Oxnard requests that you do not support the Pentagon's recommendations for the realignments at Naval Base Ventura County (NVBC) that result in transfer of war-fighting abilities to other bases. We oppose the realignments for the following reasons:

1. The Sea Test Range is unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the country. (Or in the world, for that matter.)
2. It does not make logical or economic sense to relocate the range support operations to a location 150 miles away, while keeping the test range and facilities open.
3. Many civil service and contractor employees have said they will retire or not move to Ridgecrest or China Lake, which is in Kern County, about 100 miles east of Bakersfield.
4. It would take the Navy years to reconstitute the above lost expertise, which means that the projects their personnel work on will suffer. That could create a problem with the continuation of programs and be detrimental to the nation's global war on terrorism.
5. Relocating the sea range and target personnel to a location 150 miles away from their primary operating area will increase the employees' response time to range tasking, reduce their on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

Mr. Anthony Principi, Chairman
July 7, 2005
Page 2

DCN: 5032

We are hopeful that you will agree with us and reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake. Please feel free to call us at (805) 385-7430 if you have any questions.

Cordially,




Dr. Thomas E. Holden
Mayor




Andres Herrera
Mayor Pro Tem



Dean Maulhardt
Councilmember




Timothy B. Flynn
Councilman



John C. Zaragoza
Councilmember

TEH:CD

c: Edmund F. Sotelo, City Manager
Karen Burnham, Assistant City Manager
Cynthia Daniels, Public Works Department



City of Port Hueneme

CITY COUNCIL

June 30, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chair
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

**REF: REJECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S BRAC
RECOMMENDATION REGARDING NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY**

Dear Chair Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

For the following reasons, I am hopeful that you will agree with me and reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.

First, the Sea Range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. It is illogical to relocate the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft, to China Lake, 150 miles away from the primary operating range, only to increase response time to range tasking, reduce on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

Additionally, most of the people having worked on these projects for many years and detailed to move simply will not move to China Lake/Ridgecrest. As a result, it will take years to reconstitute that expertise. In the meantime the projects will suffer greatly. Many of these people live in Port Hueneme, are respected, are integral parts of the community, and have indicated they will not leave this community for the desert.

Finally, this loss of intellectual capital and interruption of work will be detrimental to our nation's global war on terrorism. Moving essential technology from its proximity to the sea range will be detrimental as well.

250 North Ventura Road • Port Hueneme, California 93041 • Phone (805) 986-6500
<http://www.ci.port-hueneme.ca.us>

REJECTION OF DOD'S BRAC RECOMMENDATION
JUNE 30, 2005
PAGE 2

I am hopeful you will reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,


ANTHONY C. VOLANTE
MAYOR PRO TEM

c: City Council
City Manager



"Civus Capital of the World"

City of Santa Paula

970 Ventura Street • Santa Paula, California • Mailing Address: P.O. Box 569 • 93061 • Phone: (805) 525-4478 • Fax: (805) 525-8278

July 8, 2005

Mr. Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

The City of Santa Paula urges the Commission to reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.

The Sea Range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. We believe it is not appropriate to relocate the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft, to China Lake, 150 miles away from the primary operating Range, only to increase their response time to range tasking, reduce their on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety,

Additionally, most of the people who have worked on these projects for many years and are detailed to move, simply will not move to China Lake/Ridgecrest. As a result, it will take years to reconstitute that expertise. In the meantime the projects they are working on will suffer greatly. Many of these people live throughout Ventura County, are respected and integral parts of our community, and have indicated that they will not leave here for the desert.

On behalf of the Santa Paula City Council, I am hopeful that you will agree with us and reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,


Mary Ann Krause, AICP
Mayor

c: City Council



CITY OF SIMI VALLEY
Home of The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

July 1, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
and BRAC Commissioners
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

On behalf of the City of Simi Valley, I am writing to respectfully request you reject the Department of Defense's (DOD) recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.

The Sea Test Range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. Relocating the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft to China Lake, 150 miles away from the primary operating range, would only increase response time to range tasking, reduce on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

It is unrealistic to expect that many of the civil service and contractor employees who have worked on these projects would move to the China Lake/Ridgecrest area. Consequently, years of valuable expertise will be lost and will take years to reconstitute. In the meantime, the projects that they have worked on will suffer greatly.

Moreover, this loss of intellectual capital, work interruption, and the distancing of essential technology from the Sea Test Range will be detrimental to our nation's Global War on Terrorism.

Thank you for considering these comments; I am hopeful that you will agree with us and reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,


Paul Miller
Mayor

cc: City Council
City Manager



City of Thousand Oaks

MAYOR CLAUDIA BILL-DE LA PEÑA

July 5, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Re: Naval Base Ventura County

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

The City of Thousand Oaks is pleased to provide input and requests that you reject the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake.

First and foremost, the Sea Range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme are unparalleled and cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the nation. It is not logical to relocate the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft, to China Lake, 150 miles away from the primary operating Range, only to increase their response time to range tasking, reduce their on-range time, increase operating costs, and reduce safety.

From a practical point of view, most of the people who have worked on projects at Pt. Mugu for many years and are detailed to move, simply will not move to China Lake/Ridgecrest. As a result, years of expertise will be lost and the projects that those talented individuals are working on will suffer greatly. Many of these people live in Ventura County, are respected and integral parts of our community, and have indicated that they will not leave here for the desert.

Finally, this loss of intellectual capital and interruption of work will be detrimental to our nation's Global War on Terrorism, and moving essential technology from its proximity to the Sea Range will be detrimental, as well.

Again, I am hopeful that you will agree with the City of Thousand Oaks and reject the DOD's recommendations to move weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake.

Sincerely,

Claudia Bill-de la Peña
Mayor

c: City Council

cmo:470-80/cdbp/dmg/navalbaseventuracounty

CITY OF SAN BUENAVENTURA

July 8, 2005

CITY COUNCIL

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

Brian Brennan, Mayor
Carl E. Morehouse, Deputy Mayor
Neal Andrews, Councilmember
Bill Fulton, Councilmember
James L. Monahan, Councilmember
Sandy E. Smith, Councilmember
Christy Weir, Councilmember

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

I am writing on behalf of the City of Ventura to express our concern regarding the Department of Defense's recommendations to move weapons, range, and electronic warfare functions from Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) to China Lake. We believe that there are several compelling reasons related to the relocation of the Sea Range support operations that do not make logistical or economic sense.

The Sea Range and its supporting functions at Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme are unique and not readily duplicated anywhere else in the nation. Most of the contractors and civil service employees involved in this program have worked on these projects for many years. They are detailed to move as a part of the relocation, and the preliminary indication is that many of them are not likely to relocate to China Lake/Ridgecrest. As a result, it will take many years to replace the collective knowledge that will be lost. This will more than likely have a detrimental effect on the continuation of the program.


Relocating the range and aerial target functions, plus supporting aircraft, to China Lake, 150 miles away from the primary operating Range, would result in an increased response time to range tasking, a reduction in on-range time, increased operating costs, and reduced safety.

We at the City of Ventura are hopeful that after consideration of these specifics, you will agree with us that the DOD's recommendation to move the weapons, range and electronic warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake is not in Country's best interest. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Brian Brennan
Mayor



Data Source: Ventura County
Resource Management Agency
July 12, 2005

Restricted Space Around NBVC-Point Mugu

The mapped data is created and designed by the City of Oxnard GIS Program, which is developed and operated solely for the convenience of the City. The map is for illustrative purposes only. The City does not warrant the accuracy of this map, and no decision involving a risk of injury or economic loss should be made in reliance thereon.



