


Pre-Sept 11th Alert Forces



Portland

Otis

Riverside

Langley

Homestead

Home Station

Alert Detachment




Ellington


Tyndall

Operation NOBLE EAGLE

Post-BRAC Alert Forces



Post-BRACUSAF Fighter Forces



- Training/Non Air Defense Dedicated
- 250 mile radius around population centers = 2 hrs on-station without tanker

“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks”

-President George W. Bush



Pre-BRAC USAF Fighter Aircraft Dedicated to Air Defense of the Northwest:


15


Post-BRAC USAF Fighter Forces Dedicated to Air Defense of the Northwest:

2

USAF Fighter Aircraft in Europe:

146







DEFENDING THE NORTHWEST


142d Fighter Wing Mission

- Federal
 - 24 / 7 NORAD Alert
 - Worldwide Deployable
 - 72 Hour Notice
- State
 - Protect Life & Property
 - Peace & Order (Public Safety)
 - Support to Civil Agencies
 - Wildfires, Floods, Mt. St. Helens



Portland ANG Base (*Joint*)

- Guard Base with AF Reserve Tenant
- 246 Acres (ANG / AFRES / Army NG)
 - 500K SF Facilities ANG
 - 225K SF Facilities AFRES
 - Plant Replacement Value \$217M
- \$42M Current Reserve Construction Programmed



Current as of 04 January 2005

Corp of Engineers
Trailer #00086

PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

F-15 Unit Comparison FY 03

Unit	MC*	HOURS
142 FW Portland	81.3%	4390.7
125 FW Jacksonville	72.3%	4085.6
102 FW Otis	72.2%	3870.9
131 FW St-Louis	71.7%	3529.1
173 FW Kingsley Field	69.7%	3880.0
154 FW Hickam	69.3%	3779.2
159 FW New Orleans	65.6%	3651.2

*MC = Mission Capable

Air National Guard MC Goal: 66%

F-15 Unit Comparison FY 04


Unit	MC*	HOURS
142 FW Portland	78.2%	4200.6
102 FW Otis	75.5%	4080.6
173 FW Kingsley Field	75.5%	3963.0
154 FW Hickam	75.2%	3364.1
125 FW Jacksonville	72.4%	4044.7
159 FW New Orleans	69.2%	3342.5
131 FW St Louis	68.8%	3383.1

*MC = Mission Capable

Air National Guard MC Goal: 70%

Retention Remains High

142 FW Strength





DoD Recommendation For Portland ANG Base

- Homeland Defense Aircraft
 - ANG F-15's sent to Louisiana and New Jersey
- Personnel
 - Loss of 249 Full Time and 398 and Guardsmen
- A NORAD Fighter Alert Detachment will remain
 - A typical Alert Detachment is equipped with two aircraft and a skeleton maintenance crew

Northwest Security Environment




- What's at Risk
- Population Centers
- Airline Traffic
- Maritime Routes
- Threats to the Northwest

What's At Risk...




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SAFECO FIELD




Northwest Population Growth

- By 2030 there will be a increase in population growth within the Pacific Northwest.
- NW states rank 6th, 9th, and 10th for population growth within all 50 states.



Incoming International Flights



Portland International Airport:

- Monthly:


Seattle-Tacoma International Airport:

- Monthly:



Vancouver BC International Airport:

- Monthly:

Hundreds of international flights
transit through the Northwest





Pacific Maritime Routes




Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

- Commercial Aviation
 - Charter flights
 - Passenger & Cargo
- Cruise Missiles
 - Widely proliferated







Cruise Missile Threats to the NW



Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

- General Aviation
- Crop Dusters
- Drug trafficking
 - Smuggling routes from Canada, Mexico, SE Asia
- UAVs
 - Military & Civilian
 - Minimal training required




Pacific NW Terrorist Activity

James Ujaama indicted for aiding the Taliban. Also tried to team with Al Qa'ida recruiter Abu Hamza to set up terror camp in southern Oregon.




Abu Hamza

Indicted for plotting to aid Al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces fighting U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.



Portland Six

Linked to Al-Qa'ida organization through non profit organization.



Peta Seda

Millennium bomber arrested at border crossing in Washington.







Ahmed Ressam



James Ujaama

Pacific Rim Nation States

- Force Projection Improvements
 - Naval Force Improvements
 - Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Surface Combatants
 - Cruise Missile Development
 - Ground, Air, Submarine launched
- Advanced Aircraft
 - Fighters, Bombers, A/A Refueling



Pre-Sept 11th Alert Forces



Portland

Otis

Riverside

Langley

Homestead


Home Station
Alert Detachment

Ellington


Tyndall

September 11th, 2001

- Timeline
 - 6 aircraft on alert status within 4.5 hours
 - Entire fleet on status within 12 hours
- 12-30 September, 2001 Operations
 - Continuous airborne coverage for 48 hours
 - Deployed Alert Operations at McChord AFB
- FY 2002 Wartime Readiness
 - Maintained 100% Mission Ready




Today's Operation NOBLE EAGLE Alert Forces



Operation NOBLE EAGLE

Post-BRAC Alert Forces



No Change

Increased Capability



Alert Detachment



New Orleans

Ellington

New Orleans

Bradley

Selfridge

Madison

Duluth

Buckley

Atlantic City

Andrews

Langley

Shaw

Homestead

Portland

Fresno

Riverside

Tucson

New Orleans

Ellington

New Orleans

Bradley

Selfridge

Madison

Duluth

Buckley

Atlantic City

Andrews

Langley

Shaw

Homestead

New Orleans

Ellington

New Orleans

Bradley

Selfridge

Madison

Duluth

Buckley

Atlantic City

Andrews

Langley

Shaw

Homestead

Portland

Fresno

Riverside

Tucson

New Orleans

Ellington

New Orleans

Bradley

Selfridge

Madison

Duluth

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Atlantic City

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Homestead

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New Orleans

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Selfridge

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Duluth

Buckley

Atlantic City

Andrews

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Shaw

Homestead

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Fresno

Riverside

Tucson

New Orleans

Ellington

New Orleans

Bradley

Selfridge

Madison

Duluth

Buckley

Atlantic City

Andrews

Langley

Shaw

Homestead

Portland

Fresno

Riverside

Tucson

New Orleans

Ellington

New Orleans

Bradley

Selfridge

Madison

Duluth

Buckley

Atlantic City

Andrews

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Shaw

Homestead

Portland

Fresno

Riverside

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New Orleans

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Riverside

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Atlantic City

Andrews


Langley

Shaw


Homestead

Portland

Post-BRAC USAF Fighter Forces



- Training/Non Air Defense Dedicated
- 250 mile radius around population centers = 2 hrs on-station without tanker



**Pre-BRAC USAF Fighter Aircraft Dedicated to
Air Defense of the Northwest:**

15

**Post-BRAC USAF Fighter Forces Dedicated to
Air Defense of the Northwest:**


2

USAF Fighter Aircraft in Europe:

146

**“The US Government has no more
important mission than protecting the
homeland from future terrorist attacks”**

-President George W. Bush



DCN- 01113

Northwest Security

Before and After BRAC

- Pre-BRAC
 - 15 (+) Aircraft available on station
 - 15 (+) Pilots available within 4 hours
 - Full Maintenance, Weapons, and Intelligence Support
- Post-BRAC
 - 2 Aircraft available
 - 4 Pilots, 25 Maintenance and Weapons Troops, no Intelligence Support
 - Closest additional support over a 6 hour drive away

Seattle Combat Air Patrol Comparison

(No Tanker / No Alternate Required)

- Home Station vs. Nearest Fighter Base
 - Twice the "On Station" Time
 - Half the Aircraft Required
 - One-Third Fewer Sorties Required
 - One-Third Fewer Pilots Required

Homeland Defense and Security

“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks.” *President George W. Bush*

**National Security
Strategy - 2002**



“Establishes homeland security as the first priority of the nation”

Highlights the need to retain and improve capabilities to prevent attacks against the United States”

Homeland Defense and Security

National Security
Strategy

National Defense
Strategy - 2005

FIRST DEFENSE OBJECTIVE - Secure the US from direct attack.

DIRECTS "1-4-2-1" concept

"1" - Force size will be able to defend the homeland

AND

"4" - Deter forward in and from four regions

AND

"2" - Conduct two overlapping "swift defeat" campaigns.

AND

"1" - Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to win decisively in one of two campaigns.

Homeland Defense and Security

National Security
Strategy

National Defense
Strategy

National Military
Strategy - 2004



“First, while protecting the United States we must win the War on Terrorism.”

Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Establishes Three Military Objectives

#1 Objective - Protect the United States against External Attacks and Aggression

Homeland Defense and Security

National Security
Strategy

National Defense
Strategy

National Military
Strategy

National Strategy
For Homeland
Security - 2002



“One fact dominates all homeland security threat assessments:

Terrorists are strategic actors.


They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and our preparedness.”

September 11th Commission Report

Realignment runs counter to the
Commission's recommendations:

*“Do not give terrorists the impression that
potential targets are not defended.”*

*“Beware the failure of imagination, the
enemies of the United States are resolute and
creative.”*



FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES



AUTHORIZED EDITION

DoD Recommendation Compromises the Top Defense
Priority of Homeland Security for the Northwest

DoD Recommendations:

- Drop Alert Force structure BELOW 9/11 posture for the Pacific Northwest
- Leave the region vulnerable to current and future threats
 - Can not defend against multi-axis attacks
 - Unable to handle increased alert requirements
 - Unable to support war plans

History of Portland BRAC Scenario

- 14 Feb 05, Recommendation S432, Close Portland AGS
 - “tabled pending further financial analysis”
 - 1 time costs = \$69M
 - Net Savings = \$.2M/year
 - Payback Period = 345 Years simple math
- 24 Feb 05, Recommendation S432.1, Close Portland AGS
 - “agreed by consensus, to forward S432.1 as a Candidate Recommendation
 - 1 time costs = \$47M
 - Net Savings = \$.5M/year
 - Payback Period = 94 Years simple math
- 19 Apr 05, Recommendation S432.1C2, Close Portland AGS
 - “determined by consensus should be moved forward to ISG”
 - 1 time costs = \$86M
 - Net Savings = \$14M/year
 - Payback Period = 6 years

BRAC -- At What Cost?

Portland Personnel Reductions:	\$ 19.1 M
Atlantic City Payroll Increase:	\$ () M
New Orleans Payroll Increase:	\$ () M
Base X Manpower Savings:	\$ 3.8 M

Alert Detachment at Portland: \$5.4 M

Net COST to taxpayer: \$ (1.6) M

Homeland Defense and Security

“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks.” *President George W. Bush*

National Security
Strategy

National Defense
Strategy

Homeland Defense Was Not Factored Into BRAC Military Value


National Military
Strategy

National Strategy
For Homeland
Security

BRAC Military Value Issues

- SAF/IEB Included all CONOPS Champions EXCEPT Homeland Defense (9 Oct 2003)
- DoD Military Value Final Selection Criteria Ignored “proximity to and ability to protect vital national assets” etc. (2 Feb 2004)
- Public comments ignored (Sen Hutchison) (21 Jan 04)
- BCEG Deleted the Air Sovereignty/Air Defense Scenario (18 Mar 2005)
 - Imperative: Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and air defense response criteria stipulated by COM/NORTHCOM and COM/PACOM
- Fighter Index did NOT measure Homeland Defense
- Air Force Analysis ranked all bases in eight key mission areas:
 - Homeland Defense WAS NOT one of these missions even though it is an Air Force imperative and the DoD’s #1 priority

Recommendation



No Change


Increased Capability

ACC Alert Detachment

Maintain, at a minimum, the existing F-15 force structure at the Portland ANG base

MIL VALUE

Unparalleled Training Airspace



Military Value

- Homeland Defense, the DoD's #1 priority, was not adequately considered in BRAC's military value analysis
 - Congressional and public calls for developing base selection criteria, as well as national military strategy were ignored
 - Air Sovereignty / Air Defense scenario specifically addressing command established air defense response criteria inexplicably deleted by the Base Closure Executive Group
 - Base final selection quantitative analysis did not include Homeland Defense factors

2005 BRAC MILITARY VALUE

“In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below) will consider:

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Force3s in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and manpower implications.

-- Final Selection Criteria, Military Value, 12 Feb 2004 (Ref. Tab 1)

Homeland Defense, the DoD's #1 priority, *was not* considered in BRAC's military value analysis.

- Congressional and public calls for developing base selection criteria, as well as national military strategy were ignored
 - Senator Hutchison's "Comments on BRAC Selection Criteria", 21 Jan 2004
 - "The DoD should also consider homeland security issues and how closing or realigning installations affects our national security. The current draft criteria, very similar to the criteria proposed in three previous BRAC rounds, do not fully reflect the national security issues our country faces in the wake of September 11, 2001." (Ref. Tab 2)
 - Supplemental Information, DoD memo on Final Selection Criteria, Analysis of Public Comments, 12 Feb 2004
- Air Sovereignty/Air Defense scenario *specifically addressing command established air defense response criteria* inexplicably deleted by the Base Closure Executive Council
 - Scenario #3 of 127 registered USAF scenarios
 - Description: Determine airfields and installations sufficient to support air sovereignty/air defense mission
 - Imperative: Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and air defense response criteria stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM (Ref. Tab 3)
- Base final selection quantitative analysis did not include Homeland Defense factors
 - Slides accompanying SAF/IEB memo on Military Value, 9 Oct 03: Focus areas only included Space and C4ISR CONOPS, Global Response/Strike CONOPS and Global Mobility CONOPS (Ref. Tab 4)
 - Emphasis clearly shifted to global operations

Final Selection Criteria
Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

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COORDINATION DRAFT

Page 6 of 10

criteria that were applied to operations, training and maintenance facilities serving very different functions. DoD highly values its research, development, test and evaluation, engineering, procurement, and technical facilities. The Department believes that research, development, engineering, procurement and other technical capabilities are elements of military captured within criteria one through four. The Department will consider military value in a way that incorporates these elements.

(f) Several commentors also raised concerns that the criteria did not take into account the availability of intellectual capital, critical trade skills, a highly trained work force, allied presence, and the synergy among nearby installations and between DoD facilities and nearby industrial clusters and academic institutions. DoD appreciates the importance of having an available pool of intellectual capital and critical trade skills that make up, and allow us to recruit and retain, a highly trained and experienced work force, as well as the synergy provided by nearby facilities. DoD believes that, to the extent that the availability of highly skilled civilian or contractor work forces and relationships with local institutions and other installations influence our ability to accomplish the mission, they are captured in criteria one, three and seven.

(g) Some commentors urged DoD to consider strategic location and irreplaceable properties and facilities as part of military value. DoD agrees that the availability and condition of land and facilities are an integral part of military value and believes these issues are covered under criterion two. Furthermore, the strategic location of DoD facilities informs criteria one and three.

(h) Some commentors said that an installation's demonstrated ability to transform, streamline business operations, and manage successful programs should be considered as part of military value. In some instances commentors praised the outstanding work of a particular installation or group of installations. DoD recognizes and appreciates the outstanding work done by its installations. We believe that criteria one and three capture both the ability to perform a mission and the quality of that work – both of which, in turn, capture the willingness to transform and streamline.

(i) Some commentors recommended that DoD consider an installation's role in homeland defense, security, domestic preparedness, and the war on terrorism as a part of military value. Some suggested that an installation's proximity to and ability to protect vital national assets, transportation facilities, major urban centers and international borders was a key consideration, while others indicated that geographic diversity or complete isolation should be the real objective in order to enhance security. The security of our nation, whether expressed as homeland defense, domestic preparedness, or fighting the war on terrorism, is an important DoD mission. Both the BRAC legislation and DoD's implementation of it ensure that homeland defense and security are considered in the BRAC process. Specifically, criterion two requires DoD Components to consider "[t]he availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace . . . as staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions." Additionally, as a mission of DoD, all of these issues are captured by the requirements of criteria one and three.

(j) Some commentors noted that, in some areas of the country, expanding civilian use of adjacent lands is encroaching upon military properties and has impacted critical training



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

9 Oct 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR AF/XPP, AF/XOR, SAF/AQQ, SAF/AQP, SAF/USA

FROM: SAF/IEB

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Analysis: Military Value

The Air Force BRAC 2005 office is developing data collection tools and processes for use during the next round of base closures and unit realignments. The first of our two data calls (focused on installation capacity) is nearly complete. We are beginning work on the second data call, which will focus on military value. As functional experts, I need your organization's support and active participation in this process to ensure our success.

The law authorizing the Department of Defense to conduct a round of closures and realignments in 2005 specifically directs that decisions be made primarily on the basis of military value. Our military value assessment must be based on our planned force structure, the approved BRAC 2005 selection criteria, the attributes of major weapons systems involved and our future concept of operations (CONOPS). The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), through its working group, needs assistance from the Air Staff experts--the force programmers, CONOPS Champions, and acquisition professionals closest to these issues.

I've asked my staff to create several groups of AO-level experts from your organizations (see attach.1). Assisted by my staff, these groups will help develop questions based on attributes associated with the weapons systems in the Air Force's future force structure plan. Answers to these questions will be used by the BCEG to analyze basing alternatives.

Your support of this effort will ensure the Air Force makes the right decisions for our future base structure. Col Tom Fleming, Chief, BRAC Division (SAF/IEBB), and his team will work through your BCEG Working Group representatives to select and train these individuals. Col Fleming can be reached at 692-9515.

//signed//

MICHAEL A. AIMONE, P.E.
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Basing & Infrastructure Analysis)

USAF BRAC 2005 - WIDGET User:94.7409 - System:safiebq02-oaprod.hq.af.mil
Deliberative Draft Document. Not Releasable under FOIA

Assigned To:94.11492

Base:94

Level: Base

Status:Approved

You are here: [Home](#) > [4 CE Programming](#) > [4.1206 Air Operations - Homeland Defense \(HLD\)](#)
[Alert Facilities](#) > Question 3 of 6

4.1206 : For installations with an active runway, does the installation have existing infrastructure that can support full service alert facilities? Amplification (Last Update:18-Jun-04)

Recommended Source: Real Property Records; Record Drawings

1. Does the Installation Have an Active Alert Hangar (1) (Yes/No)	2. Does the Installation have an Active High Speed Taxiway (Yes/No)	3. Does the Installation Have an Active Ready Crew Facility (Yes/No)	4. Are Facilities Located to permit take off in required time (2) (Yes/No)
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Answer Seq: #517682	18-JUN-04	94.7409	CE
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Approved by Base POC.

Answer Seq: #504821	17-JUN-04	94.11492	CEC
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Base Answer.

Source Name: Real Property Records	Source Date: 03 Oct 2003
Source Location: 7115 Report	
Source Method: 7115 Report	

Functional Point of Contact Certification

In accordance with Section 2903(c)(5) of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-510 as amended, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief the information provided herein is accurate and complete.

Tab 5

**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTIVE
for
FISCAL YEARS 2006 - 2011**



March 2003

**Headquarters, United States Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans & Programs**

Tab 7.1



Deploy & Employ (Operational)

- Air Force Imperatives

- Air mobility basing which supports rapid mobilization and deployment of U.S. forces and equipment
- Unimpeded access to space
- US-administered Pacific mobility infrastructure
- Sufficient surge capacity to meet war plans, accommodate airfield repairs, and accomplish evacuation for natural disasters
- Long range strike assets sited to maximize strategic force protection
- Air refueler basing that maximizes proximity to mission
- Ability to provide missile warning and defense
- Basing to fulfill homeland defense and consequence management missions

DCN: 5113

COST DATA

Cost Analysis

- Air Sovereignty Alert Detachment unfunded \$5.4M
- “The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions”
- Personnel Issues
 - Civilian Employees (Net Loss = 173) \$10.3M
 - Drill Status Guardsmen (Net Loss = 201) \$ 2.8M
 - Military Early Retirements \$9.0M
- Unrelated Savings \$153K

BRAC1094

SCENARIO # 6422102

BASE NAME: Portland

Standard COBRA Costing Models:

\$124,971.93 Officer
 \$ 82,399.09 Enlisted
 \$ 59959.18 Civilian

Reference COBRA Manpower Calculations Memorandum for:
 AF/DPM
 AFCAA/TD
 Dated APR 15 2005
 For BASE X Accounting

Source MAJCOM-Current/Projected 30 Sep 04	FY08				Annual Personnel Cost
	Off	Enl	Civ	Total	
Moves from Portland					
(432.1c2) Minus 9 F-15C Ops and Mx to New Orleans	-4	-13	-70	-87	(\$9,016,218)
(432.1c2) Minus 9 F-15C BOS to Base X (ANG)	0	-5	-5	-10	(\$711,791)
(432.1c2) Minus 6 F-15C Ops and Mx to Atlantic City	-5	-10	-41	-56	(\$5,825,177)
(432.1c2) Minus 6 F-15C BOS to Atlantic City (ANG)	-1	-3	-2	-6	(\$492,088)
(432.1c2) Minus 6 F-15C to Atlantic City, residual Ops and Maint to ANG Base X (ANG)	0	0	-45	-45	(\$3,104,163)
					(\$19,149,437)
Moves to New Orleans					
(432.1c2) Plus 9 F-15C Ops and Mx to New Orleans	4	13	70	87	\$9,016,218
					\$9,016,218
Moves to Atlantic City					
(432.1c2) Plus 6 F-15C Ops and Mx to Atlantic City	5	10	41	56	\$5,825,177
(432.1c2) Plus 6 F-15C BOS to Atlantic City (ANG)	1	3	2	6	\$492,088
					\$6,317,264
Moves to Base X (ANG)					
Unmanned Employment Authorization					
(432.1c2) Plus 6 F-15C, residual Ops and Maint to ANG Base X (ANG)	0	0	45	45	\$3,104,163
(432.1c2) Plus 9 F-15C BOS to Base X (ANG)	0	5	5	10	\$711,791
					\$3,815,954
Total recurring saving:					\$0
Air Sovereignty/Alert at Portland					
(432.1c2) Plus 2 F-15C Ops and Mx to PDX	10	38	0	48	(\$4,380,885)
(432.1c2) Plus 2 F-15C BOS at PDX	1	11	0	12	(\$1,064,322)
					(\$5,445,206)
Total recurring cost:					(\$5,445,206)
Total annual net savings:					(\$5,445,206)

Alert Detachment Manning

		Alert Detachment Manning		Standard Det	
Civ	Portland Stand Alone DET	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
		1		1	
	Remarks				
	Detachment CC				
	Detachment DO				
	F-16 Pilot	8		1	
	Aircraft Maintenance SUPT				1
	Information Craftsman				1
	Command and Control JYMN		6		6
	Aircraft LS CRFT				
	Airfield Mgmt CRFT				
	Intelligence CRFT				
	Tactical Act Support				1
	Tactical Act MAI JYMN		8		8
	Munitions System CRFT		6		6
	Flightline Avionics		2		2
	Aircraft Egress System JYMN		1		1
	Aerospace Populsion CRFT		2		2
	Aerospace Ground Equip JYMN				1
	Nondestruct Inspect JYMN		1		1
	Aircraft Hydraulic Sys JYMN		1		1
	Aircraft EI/Env System JYMN		1		1
	Aircraft Maintenance Tech F-15		1		1
	Fuel Shop		1		1
	Structural Repair		1		1
0		10	38	2	33
NON ENCLAVED PERSONNEL					
19			22		
	Security Forces CRFT		1		
	Fire Protection JYMN		2		
	Power Production CRFT		3		
	Fuels CRFT		5		
	Munitions CRFT				
	Supply Management CRFT				
	Ground/Hight Safety Super				
19		0	33		
ECS ENCLAVE					

Financial Analysis Point Paper

The DoD BRAC recommendation does not account for multiple costs associated with the deactivation of the 142nd Fighter Wing. We believe these costs are substantial and should be included in the overall cost-benefit analysis. The initial assessment of the Cost Analysis produced by the COBRA model for the Portland Realignment overlooked significant costs. This initial assessment contributed to the recommendation of the Department of Defense recommendation to Realign the Portland Air Guard Station.

1. The recurring costs of an Alert Detachment at Portland were not incorporated into the COBRA cost analysis. Annual recurring cost of \$5.4 million disregarded.
2. The recurring savings of \$153,000¹ per year tied to moving a Geographically Separated Unit attached to the 159th Fighter Wing, New Orleans NAS, onto the New Orleans NAS will be achieved independently of any Portland Realignment and should not be used in the Portland Realignment Savings.
3. Only Civilian Personnel were considered for a Reduction in Force (RIF) using the COBRA model. If a Reduction in Force is authorized, over 100 personnel of the 142nd Fighter Wing (Drill Status Guardsmen and Active Guard/Reserve) will be eligible for an early federal retirement.

Cost Analysis of Early Retirement

<u>Avg. annual compensation</u>	<u>Est. # of personnel</u>	<u>Annual cost</u>
Officer (O-4): \$29,595	17	\$498,885
Enlisted (E-7): \$19,793	101	<u>\$1,698,520</u>

Additional annual cost for 142nd FW deactivation: \$2.2M

An additional \$9.0 million (present value of \$2.2 million for 4.1 years) one time cost may need to be included in the COBRA analysis.

4. If the statement: "The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions"², means there will be no net loss of personnel in the reserve components, then the recurring costs reflected in the COBRA analysis are overstated.
 - a. Misc \$2.8 million Recurring Savings 201 drill positions x14k³
 - b. The net loss of 173 Civilian Employees⁴ from the Portland Realignment Scenario will not produce a Net Savings to the Air Force and cannot be traced to a recurring

¹ COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2) data as of 5/22/2005, Footnotes for Screen Five

² Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 9 May 2005, Subject: Air Force 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Recommendations

³ COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2), Footnotes for Screen Five, Portland

expense of any other scenario, therefore the Annual Recurring Savings of \$11.894 Million⁵ personnel is suspect. If there are no charges for these personnel against another scenario, the annual recurring costs associated with these 173 Civilian Positions should not be charged against the Portland Realignment Scenario⁶.

5. Although the costs of a unit conversion cannot be expressed in the COBRA model as a cost of conversion⁷ because this cost is viewed as an "Overhead Operational Cost"; it is certain that the cost of training the 177th Fighter Wing, Atlantic City NJ, personnel will not be incurred if the unit isn't converted. If the 177th Fighter Wing is not converted it will allow other personnel to be trained, and does not impact the currently projected Training Cycle(s) of the Air Education and Training Command.

- a. F-15 Pilot TX Course, 5 months, \$2.0 Million. There are approximately 30 177th F-16 Fighter Wing Pilots who will require cross training (\$60 Million).
- b. F-15 Maintenance Schools, average cost is \$25,870⁸. There are approximately 250 Atlantic City Maintenance Personnel who will require cross training (\$6.4 Million).

6. There may be other discrepancies in the numbers unique to the 939th Air Refueling Wing and the 304th Rescue Squadron, but this analysis did not incorporate a study of the 939th or 304th costs unique to them.

7. Attached is an Adjusted Cost Analysis of the Portland Air Guard Station .

⁴ COBRA PERSONNEL (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2) data as of 5/22/2005, COBRA Total Personnel Summary Report

⁵ COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10), Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars, Person

⁶ COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10), Footnotes for Screen Six

⁷ COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2), Footnotes for Screen Five, Atlantic City

⁸ COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2), Footnotes for Screen Five, New Orleans

**ADJUSTED FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)**

Description:	Potentially Overlooked Costs:	Adjustments:	Adjusted Values:
COBRA "Total Net One Time Costs"⁹			\$(85,358,751)
Early Military Retirements	\$ (9,009,362)		
Total Adjusted One Time Costs:	\$(99,813,319)		
F-16 Conversion	\$ (6,467,500)		
Maintenance Pilots	\$ (60,000,000)		
Total Costs with Conversion	\$(166,280,819)		
 Total Recurring Savings:			
COBRA "Total Recurring Savings"			\$13,986,000
New Orleans GSU Move onto Base		\$ (153,000)	
Annual savings not related to the Portland Realignment			
Air Sovereignty Alert Detachment		\$ (5,445,206) ¹⁰	
Annual recurring cost			
Total Recurring Savings:			\$8,387,794
Misc Recurring Savings:	\$ (2,814,000)		
(201 drill positions x \$14k ³)			
Personnel: (173 civilian positions ¹¹)	\$ (10,372,938)		
(173 x \$59,959.18 ¹²)			
Annual recurring cost			
Total Annual Cost With Pay:	\$(4,799,144)		

³ COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2), Footnotes for Screen Five, Portland

⁹ TOTAL COBRA ONE TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)

¹⁰ Alert Manning Spreadsheet

¹¹ COBRA PERSONNEL/SF/SUSTAINMENT/RECAP/BOS DELTAS REPORT, Personnel

¹² COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10) COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2), Standard Factors Screen One, Personnel

	<u>COBRA Figures</u>	<u>Adjusted Figures</u>
COBRA Net One Time Cost	\$85,358,751	\$85,358,751
Adjusted Annual Recurring Savings	<u>\$13,986,000</u>	<u>\$8,387,794</u>
Net Present Value	\$100,233,049	\$13,544,100
Repayment	7 Years	16.6 Years
Repayment (simple math)	6 Years	15.3 Years

Net Present Value Calculated at 4%

Year	Cost	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	\$4,956,847	\$4,888,875	\$4,888,875
2007	\$47,350,814	\$45,429,481	\$50,318,356
2008	\$27,269,000	\$25,449,920	\$75,768,276
2009	(\$6,745,794)	(\$5,766,333)	\$70,001,943
2010	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,894,155)	\$63,107,788
2011	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,628,995)	\$56,478,793
2012	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,374,034)	\$50,104,759
2013	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,128,879)	\$43,975,880
2014	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,893,153)	\$38,082,727
2015	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,666,493)	\$32,416,234
2016	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,448,551)	\$26,967,683
2017	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,238,991)	\$21,728,692
2018	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,037,492)	\$16,691,200
2019	(\$8,387,794)	(\$4,843,742)	\$11,847,458
2020	(\$8,387,794)	(\$4,657,444)	\$7,190,014
2021	(\$8,387,794)	(\$4,478,312)	\$2,711,702
2022	(\$8,387,794)	(\$4,306,069)	(\$1,594,367)
2023	(\$8,387,794)	(\$4,140,451)	(\$5,734,818)
2024	(\$8,387,794)	(\$3,981,203)	(\$9,716,021)
2025	(\$8,387,794)	(\$3,828,079)	(\$13,544,100)

COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10)
Data As Of 5/22/2005 10:50:40 AM, Report Created 6/9/2005 2:13:28 PM

Department : USAF
Scenario File : COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2).CBR
Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
Std Fctrs File :BRAC2005.SFF

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN FIVE

New Orleans:
\$3,079 = One-time Unique for training 119 F-15 Reservists @ 25,870 = \$3,078,530
(no training for Jackson Barracks GSU move)
\$153 Misc Recurring Savings is FSM from Jefferson Barracks GSU consolidation



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

09 MAY 2005


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Air Force 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Recommendations

Attached please find the Air Force recommendations for installations to be closed or realigned under the 2005 BRAC process. As required by Section 2903 (c) (5) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, I certify that the information contained in the Air Force report and the supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The Air Force has taken bold steps to re-shape the force and institutionalize the changes needed to transform the Air Force, including adjusting to substantial force structure changes and leveraging the inherent strengths and advantages of our National Guard and Reserve forces. The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions, including emerging missions. Replacing older missions with emerging missions required by the new defense strategy helps ensure our reserve components remain relevant and engaged parts of the Total Force while providing the Air Force with an efficient and effective means to meet these new challenges.

The Air Force BRAC recommendations take a comprehensive, 20-year view, giving us the ability to reset our forces in a strategic way and create innovative organizational and basing solutions, capitalizing on joint opportunities where it makes sense, reducing inefficiencies, and freeing valuable resources. I look forward to working closely with you as our recommendations proceed through the BRAC process.


Michael L. Dominguez
Acting Secretary of the Air Force

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Department : USAF
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Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN FIVE

Portland:

\$2,809=One-time Moving To: NO 4k warehouse, 171k munitions; to BAI 6k trans, 8k munitions; to Tinker 20k trans, 2k warehouse, 64k munitions; to W-R 2500k hush house; to Forbes 16k trans, 1k warehouse, 17k munitions

\$2,814=Misc Recurring Savings 201 drill positions x \$14k

COBRA TOTAL PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10)
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Department : USAF
 Scenario File : COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
 Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

TOTAL SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES, ENTIRE SCENARIO:

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Officers	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Enlisted	0	0	-3	0	0	0	-3
Civilians	0	0	-173	0	0	0	-173
TOTAL	0	0	-173	0	0	0	-173

TOTAL SCENARIO POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
2,730	13,158	325	20,218

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/2
 Data As Of 5/22/2005 10:50:40 AM, Report Created 6/9/2005 2:13:28 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
 Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

Starting Year : 2006
 Final Year : 2008
 Payback Year : 2015 (7 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -100,233
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 85,521

Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MilCon	4,036	44,846	0	0	0	0	48,882	0
Person	0	0	-3,040	-11,894	-11,894	-11,894	-38,721	-11,894
Overhd	790	1,498	-1,523	-2,092	-2,092	-2,092	-5,511	-2,092
Moving	0	823	17,608	21	0	0	18,452	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	131	184	11,184	1,621	0	0	13,120	0
TOTAL	4,957	47,351	24,229	-12,344	-13,986	-13,986	36,222	-13,986

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Enl	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Civ	0	0	201	0	0	0	201
TOT	0	0	239	0	0	0	239
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	17	0	0	0	17
Enl	0	0	57	0	0	0	57
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	251	0	0	0	251
TOT	0	0	325	0	0	0	325

COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10)

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Department : USAF
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 Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: Portland IAP AGS, OR (TQKD)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	-7	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-31	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-201	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	4	0	-1	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	10	6	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	-30	2	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: Tinker AFB, OK (WWYK)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	3	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	-6	-1	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	9	-4	-4	-3	-3	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	688	0	-2	-4	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: Forbes Field AGS, KS (GUQE)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	9	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	17	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	19	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	-1	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	1	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	-2	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: NAS New Orleans ARS, LA (RQLB)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	-1	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	4	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	-1	25	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: Atlantic City IAP AG, NJ (AQRC)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	3	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	1	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: McChord AFB, WA (PQWY)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	-7	-24	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	19	-43	11	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	18	-4	2	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN SIX

Manpower moving to/from Base X is entered as additions/eliminations on Screen 6.

COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10)

Data As Of 5/22/2005 10:50:40 AM, Report Created 6/9/2005 2:13:28 PM

Department : USAF
Scenario File : COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2).CBR
Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN FIVE

Atlantic City:

Env Non-MILCON \$89k NEPA,; \$111 = 16k conformity analysis, 63k air permits, 32k waste program

One-time It \$61k conection, \$144k phones, STEs, PCs, etc. for a 383 person gain

No ANG training due to aircraft model conversion

COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10)
Data As Of 5/22/2005 10:50:40 AM, Report Created 6/9/2005 2:13:28 PM

Department : USAF
Scenario File : C:\Documents and Settings\jonesp\Desktop\COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2).CBR
Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
Std Fctrs File : H:\BRAC2005.SFF

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN FIVE

New Orleans:
\$3,079 = One-time Unique for training 119 F-15 Reservists @ 25,870 = \$3,078,530
(no training for Jackson Barracks GSU move)
\$153 Misc Recurring Savings is FSM from Jefferson Barracks GSU consolidation

TOTAL COBRA ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/9
 Data As Of 5/22/2005 10:50:40 AM, Report Created 6/9/2005 2:13:28 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
 Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

(All values in 2005 Constant Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	48,882,000	
Total - Construction	48,882,000	
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	2,137,140	
Civilian Early Retirement	458,793	
Eliminated Military PCS	197,297	
Unemployment	160,236	
Total - Personnel		2,953,466
Overhead		
Program Management Cost	1,826,223	
Support Contract Termination	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	124,650	
Total - Overhead		1,950,873
Moving		
Civilian Moving	10,777,835	
Civilian PPP	1,455,336	
Military Moving	396,650	
Freight	1,273,896	
Information Technologies	1,902,000	
One-Time Moving Costs	2,809,000	
Total - Moving		18,614,717
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	283,000	
Mission Contract Startup and Termination	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	12,837,000	
Total - Other		13,120,000

Total One-Time Costs		85,521,056

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	162,305	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		162,305

Total Net One-Time Costs		85,358,751

Alert Detachment Manning

	Portland Stand Alone DET		Remarks	Standard DET	
	Civ	Off		Off	Enl
NON ENCLAVED PERSONNEL		1	Detachment CC	1	
		1	Detachment DO	1	
		8	F-15 Pilot		
			Aircraft Maintenance SUPT		1
			Information Craftsman		1
			Command and Control JYMN		6
			Aircrew LS CRFT		
			Airfield Mgmt CRFT		
			Intelligence CRFT		
			Tactical Acft Support		1
			Tactical Acft MAI JYMN		6
			Munitions System CRFT		6
			Flightline Avionics		2
			Aircrew Egress System JYMN		
			Aerospace Propulsion CRFT		1
			Aerospace Ground Equip JYMN		1
			Nondestruct Inspect JYMN		1
			Aircraft Hydraulic Sys JYMN		1
			Aircraft EI/Env System JYMN		1
			Aircraft Maintenance Tech F-15		1
			Fuel Shop		1
			Structural Repair		1
	0	10		2	33
ECS ENCLAVE			Security Forces CRFT		
	19		Fire Protection JYMN		
			Power Production CRFT		
			Fuels CRFT		
			Munitions CRFT		
			Supply Management CRFT		
			Ground/Flight Safety Super		
	19	0			33

PDX Alert DET Cost Analysis

2 Ship Alert DET

Non Enclave	Civilian	0	\$0.00	
	Enlisted	38	\$3,131,165.42	
	Officer	10	\$1,249,719.30	
	COS		\$1,064,322.00	
			\$5,445,206.72	Non Enclave Personnel Costs
		\$63,700.00	Transportation Costs	182
		\$5,508,906.72		
ECS Enclave	Civilian	0	\$1,139,224.42	
	Enlisted	0	\$2,719,169.97	
	Officer	0	\$0.00	
			\$3,858,394.39	Enclave Personnel Costs
		\$8,302,979.11	2 Ship Total Costs	

COBRA PERSONNEL/SF/SUSTAINMENT/RECAP/BOS DELTAS REPORT (COBRA v6.10)
 Data As Of 5/22/2005 10:50:40 AM, Report Created 6/9/2005 2:13:28 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
 Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

Base	Personnel		Change	%Change
	Start*	Finish*		
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Portland IAP AGS	738	174	-564	-76%
Tinker AFB	22,467	22,530	63	0%
Forbes Field AGS	369	414	45	12%
NAS New Orleans ARS	313	400	87	28%
Atlantic City IAP AG	290	352	62	21%
McChord AFB	5,358	5,405	47	1%
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	2,940	2,940	0	0%
Vandenberg AFB	4,129	4,216	87	2%
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	36,604	36,431	-173	0%

* "Start" and "Finish" values for Personnel and BOS both include the Programmed Installation Population (non-BRAC) Changes, so that only changes attributable to the BRAC action are reflected in the "Change" columns of this report.

COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.10)
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Department : USAF
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 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)
 Std Fctrs File : BRAC2005.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

SF File Descrip:

Perc Officers Accompanied:	72.00%	Priority Placement Program:	39.97%
Perc Enlisted Accompanied:	55.00%	PPP Actions Involving PCS:	50.70%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	124,971.93	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	35,496.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	82,399.09	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	59,959.18	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	50,000.00
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	272.90	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	16	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	25,000.00
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	68.40%
Civilian Turnover Rate:	9.16%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	13.46%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	8.10%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	18.44%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	1.67%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	86.32%	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%
Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	18.03%		



Mission Compatibility Index

(Methodology, Comparison, and Analysis)

- Homeland Defense was ignored in the BRAC data call, and not used in computing the MCI
- Airspace (40% of the MCI score) was not evaluated appropriately
- Munitions storage capability scoring was biased to large conventional munitions
 - Air-to-Air only munitions storage facilities received no credit

Point Paper on Mission Compatibility Index (MCI)

1. The "Fighter MCI" values were determined by extracting and calculating information collected during the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) "Data Call" process. These MCI values were assigned specific weights / percentages to provide an overall ranking for every USAF fighter base. The resultant information (value) was integral to the Department of Defense's recent BRAC recommendations. Reference attachment 1 for a cross-section of these MCI values and their associated installations.
2. Numerous discrepancies, in both the methodology of the BRAC data collection process and the subsequent calculations, are apparent.
 - a. The "Current / Future Mission" category of the MCI, which accounted for 46% of the total weight, focused primarily on the installations proximity to Special Use Airspace and Low-Level routes supporting the mission.
 - i. While "proximity" to adequate airspace is important, "availability" to use that airspace is paramount (see attachment 2).
 - ii. Also, while this category/metric captures "Current/Future 'Training' Mission" data, it ignores "Current/Future 'Real-world' Mission" data (i.e. those installations with Air Defense and Air Sovereignty Alert responsibilities.
 1. A grand total of two questions remotely addressed installation alert capabilities, neither of which were utilized in the MCI calculations.
 - a. BRAC question 4.1206: "For installations with an active Runway, does the installation have an existing infrastructure that can support full-service alert facilities - does the facility have: an active alert hanger, active high-speed taxiway, active ready-crew facility, and are facilities located to permit takeoff in required time?" Not evaluated in the MCI values.
 - b. BRAC question 21.1013: "List and describe any specialized (not unique) capabilities or missions performed by your activity. Capability/Mission: Homeland Defense, and Description: NORAD fighter alert site. Also, not addressed in MCI values.
 2. Proximity of an installation's current location to it's Areas of Responsibility (AOR), or the ability to respond to other critical areas (i.e. military/industrial complexes, crucial infrastructure, and population centers), was NOT considered in the data collection process, despite the fact that this is a "Current AND Future Mission".
 3. While "training" airspace received a considerable amount of attention and consideration, real-world airspace, and the unit's tasked with "Current Missions", received no credit.
3. The following pages examine the MCI areas of greatest concern, and identify several discrepancies discovered therein. The MCI does not accurately reflect the true compatibility of the Portland Air National Guard to it's on-going mission.

Mission Compatibility Index

Section II Condition of Infrastructure

1. Section II was the second most heavily weighted counting for 41.5% of the total score.
2. Within this section, "Range Complex Supports Mission" counted for 11.95% of the total MCI, "Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace" counted for 6.72% of the total MCI, and "Sufficient Munitions Storage" counted for 4.79% of the total MCI.
3. The formula used to compute the value assigned to "Range Complex Supports Mission" weights air-to-ground capability heavily. If an airspace does not have air-to-ground capability, 30% of the "Range Complex Supports Mission" score is lost. F-15's do not require ranges with air-to-ground capability. The training ranges near Portland support the Homeland Defense Mission very well, but do not have air-to ground capability.
weight to air-to-ground capable ranges. There is a 30% penalty in this formula for not having air-to-ground capability.
4. It is unclear if the formula used to compute the value assigned to "Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace" gives credit to a base if it doesn't own and schedule its airspace. A base may still have very good access to supersonic airspace and not actually own and schedule it. Further, a base may actually have very poor access to supersonic airspace which they own due to sharing it with multiple users. Portland does not own or schedule its airspace, but has unfettered access to it.
5. The formula used to compute the value assigned to "Sufficient Munitions Storage" gives no credit to a base if it cannot store enough bombs to support a full squadron of F-117 or F-22 strike aircraft. The formula gives no credit to a base for being able to perfectly support its air-to-air Homeland Defense Mission.
6. Portland ANGB has adequate munitions storage to support the Air Defense of the Northwestern United States, but received no credit for this capability.

Mission Compatibilty Index

Section IV Cost of Ops / Manpower

1. Section IV counted for 2.5% of the total MCI score.

AIRSPACE COMPARISON CHART

"Access" to Airspace does not convey "Availability"

Langley

Primary Airspace	<u>USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)</u>
-------------------------	---

W386

Langley
 Atlantic City
 Richmond
 Andrews
 Willow Grove
 Seymour Johnson
 Pope
 *Navy: NAS Oceana, NAS Norfolk, NAS Patuxent River Also Primary Users

W50

Langley
 Richmond
 Andrews
 Seymour Johnson
 Atlantic City
 Pope
 *Navy: NAS Oceana, NAS Norfolk, NAS Patuxent River Also Primary Users

Atlantic City

Primary Airspace	<u>USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)</u>
-------------------------	---

W107

Atlantic City
 Langley
 Shaw
 Willow Grove
 Andrews
 Bradley
 Richmond
 Otis
 *Navy: NAS Oceana, NAS Norfolk, NAS Patuxent River Also Primary Users

New Orleans

Primary Airspace	<u>USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)</u>
-------------------------	---

W453

New Orleans
 Eglin
 Tyndall
 Dannelly
 Navy: NAS New Orleans, NAS Pensacola are also Primary Users

W59B

New Orleans
 Ellington
 Navy: NAS New Orleans, NAS Pensacola are also Primary Users

Portland

Primary Airspace	<u>USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)</u>
-------------------------	---

W570

Portland
 Klamath Falls
 Navy: None