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**COMMUNITY
RESPONSE**



ASSERTIONS MADE BY OTHERS

1. The Alabama memo asserts: **Red River Army Depot (RRAD) argues that the Army must retain all depots.**
 - a.) RRAD quotes Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey from *National Defense* article.
 - a.) As a counter point, the Alabama memo supplies quotes from BRAC testimony of SEC Army Harvey.

Community Response: In *National Defense* Mr. Harvey states that “This year, the service’s eight depots and arsenals will generate 19 Million direct labor hours. Next year, the number is going up to 25 Million direct labor hours.” He quotes the same numbers in his BRAC hearing testimony. While the 25M DLH is probably a fair representation of the workload anticipated in FY2006, it is not representative of the workload considered by the IJCSG for the RRAD closure recommendation. The four remaining depots and the three arsenals cannot accomplish 25M DLH in the specific commodities required by the Army and the other services in FY2006 and beyond should a major conflict arise. RRAD’s planned workload of 6.4M DLH is not applicable to the arsenals or the rotary and aircraft work in Corpus Christi. Other depots lack the capacity to assume work of this magnitude in conjunction with their current FY2006 work without undue risk, if at all.

- b.) The Alabama memo asserts: December 2004 DA told IJCSG not to close RRAD.
- b.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation says “this was simple (*sic*) a discussion point in the deliberative process, not a binding recommendation...”

Community Response: Dr. College considered it a binding recommendation rather than a discussion point by posting his signature to a memo dated 10 December 2004. It was addressed to the Senior Army representative on the IJCSG, Mr. Motsek, stating “Request you delete scenarios for Closure of Red River Army Depot and Letterkenny Army Depot. Both installations are in the Army’s Military Value Portfolio. The GWOT induced workload is expected to remain high and these Depots are needed to support this workload.”

- c.) The Alabama memo asserts: Army analysis shows no excess capacity.
- c.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation references a 2003 GAO report they purport to show excess capacity.

Community Response: The 2003 GAO report was to study the trends and reliability of depot workload projections and the identification of depot core capabilities; not excess capacity. The excerpted report stated “Army component and recapitalization work is projected to be the majority of depot work in the future”. RRAD has HMMWV Recapitalization workload and, according to HQ-Army Materiel Command today, could exceed 9800 vehicles in FY2006. The report also states “potential increases in depot work resulting from the Iraq war are not yet clear.” GAO’s intuition about an increase in work from Iraq was correct. The capacity to meet wartime requirements is critical, or as the report states “to preserve surge capability”, and is a basic CORE tenet for the depots. It is not something to be trusted to outsourcing and could violate 10 USC 2464. Table 1 of the report shows a small number of hours for FY2002, but these are no more representative of today’s realities than the 2003 averages used by the analysts for the IJCSG. All depots are experiencing a significant increase in workload to support war efforts.

2. The Alabama memo asserts: **Red River maintains that the IJCSG “created” excess capacity through calculations.**

- a.) “They” (IJCSG) used 1.5 shifts as opposed to a single shift basis for calculation of capacity.
- a.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation says GAO analysis acknowledges that ANAD can accommodate workload under a one-shift basis.

Community Response: The SRG meeting chart, page 14, of 15 March 2005 states “the ILCSG must submit a CR that *creates* 2.6M DLHs capacity at other depots.” GAO only acknowledges they were “told” of not working the expanded shift concept, but that “with additional construction to *increase* capacity” they would be able to accommodate the additional workload. This “creates” capacity through construction where it does not exist today.

4. The Alabama memo asserts: **RRAD notes that DOD rated it higher than military value in fleet and field support.**

Community Response:

- a.) The DA justification to close RRAD stated the commodities were being transferred to facilities with higher military value in those commodities. That rationale is not plausible for Construction Equipment, Starters/Alternators/Generators, and Armament and Structure Components where RRAD is the highest rated installation. Only Armament and Structure Components are going to Anniston, but they do not presently have that capability and have no military value rating. In the Fleet and Field Support category, RRAD is rated at 31.56 while ANAD is rated at 15.81.
- b.) So does Red River.
- c.) RRAD continues to deploy civilian employees to support light combat and tactical vehicle workload in SWA to work alongside ANAD and contractor personnel. We have deployed to over 100 mission sites with over 500 personnel to support the warfighter at home and abroad.
- d.) The depot has employees currently deployed and the Commander has been deployed for two tours in Kuwait at Camp Arifjan as the commander of the Forward Repair Activity for the Anniston and Red River teams.

5. The Alabama memo asserts: **RRAD claims that it is the only site with a maintenance, ammunition, and distribution mission.**

Community Response: Red River is the ONLY site with a maintenance, ammunition, and MAJOR distribution mission. DDRT ships more than 80% of its supplies to installations other than RRAD. It was rated number one in military value for the central region and chosen as the Strategic Distribution Platform (SDP) for Central Region. The SDP for the Southeast Region is Warner-Robins and will provide service to Anniston.

6. The Alabama memo asserts: **RRAD claims in its Mission Statement that it “is responsible for the Army’s light combat tracked vehicle fleet.”**
a.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation says “They do Bradley’s Multiple Launch missile systems only.”

Community Response: Red River is the Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) for two separate systems--the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The rockets for the MLRS are under the control of the Munitions center. The CITE for missile systems are the PATRIOT and the HAWK.

- b.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation says “Anniston does M-113’s, FAASV’s, Stryker’s, M-577’s, M9ACE, Fox’s and all components.”

Community Response: The M113 FOV and the M9ACE were accomplished at RRAD prior to the 1995 BRAC decision to balance workload between ANAD and RRAD. The M113 FOV was organic production for Red River and was not outsourced.

7. The Alabama memo asserts: **Red River Officials expressed concern to GAO auditors that McAlester lacked the Category I and Category II storage capacity.**
a.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation states “McAlester was not the only location to receive the CAT I and CAT II storage mission. Blue Grass/ANAD Munitions Center has 198 igloos for CAT I and II storage.”

Community Response: The language in the Army closure recommendation is: “Relocate the *storage and demilitarization* functions of the Munitions Center to *McAlester Army Ammunition Plant*, OK. Relocate the *munitions maintenance functions* of the Munitions Center to *McAlester Army Ammunition Plant*, OK, and *Blue Grass Army Depot*, KY.”

Nothing in the recommendation is slated to go to the Anniston Munitions Center and only munitions maintenance functions are scheduled for Blue Grass. However, even if it were slated to go to Anniston Munitions Center, the available space claimed to be available would be insufficient to accommodate the CAT I and II items presently stored at Red River Munitions Center. And potential retrograde items returning from the war effort in Iraq are not included in the current numbers for storage.

8. The Alabama memo asserts: **There is concern over the transfer of workload, specifically the transfer of the Bradley mission which is partnered with BAE, formerly United Defense.**
a.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation says “This is the same situation that occurred in the 95 BRAC with two depots. The M113A3 conversion came from RRAD and the Paladin came from LEAD—both under partnership with United Defense.”

Community Response: Not exactly the same. United Defense was the Original Equipment Manufacturer for the M113 FOV, but vehicle rebuild and overhaul was accomplished organically by RRAD. Upon transfer to Anniston, a significant amount of the work was outsourced to UD. For current partnerships with BAE/UD on the Bradley system, RRAD possesses skills and abilities needed to complement the UD production line at York. These processes have been certified by UD and they are investing in the depot infrastructure. ANAD currently possesses none of the expertise, equipment, or proven performance to warrant BAE’s confidence in successful achievement of the Bradley partnership requirements.

9. The Alabama memo asserts: **Red River officials voiced concern over ANAD's Rubber production capability.**

- a.) As a counter point, the Alabama delegation says "ANAD engineers are continuing to review options, including the ones to enclave in place or build a facility at ANAD. Complete Economic Analysis to be furnished on this."

Community Response: Not only did the depot voice concern over the proposed transfer, but so did GAO. This same problem arose and was settled with the 1995 Commission decision. RRAD has exhibited proven performance for rubber production, including the M1 Abrams roadwheel that we provide to the ANAD Abrams production line and the Lima Tank Plant production line. These roadwheels have surpassed the mileage requirements at Army proving grounds required to become a qualified supplier where commercial firms have failed. The depot remains the sole source for new or remanufactured M1 roadwheels to support the Army or Marine Corps. The uncertainty in how BRAC cope's with the rubber production process and its critical mission is demonstrated in the tenor of Alabama's response. Its direction is unclear, muddled, and rampant with risk. It is grappling with the proper method of sustaining the operation without Red River's trained and experienced workforce that will not relocate. It is a craft that cannot be replicated with workers from commercial firms who exhibit unsuccessful performance in producing roadwheels such as the M1.

But following the DOD BRAC announcement of 13 May is the inappropriate time to conduct studies to move or enclave this mission. And it is further proof that the recommendation to close Red River was not analyzed fully nor supported by sound business judgment. Support to our soldiers during war is not a time for uncertainty.



DCN: 4032

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510



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July 8, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
Chairman
2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street
Suite 600
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

Thank you for your service and the service of your fellow Commissioners to our country as demonstrated by your willingness to take on the vitally important BRAC task. Alabama is in a unique situation as we have installations which are both gaining and losing missions. These changes allow us to experience firsthand how emotionally-charged the process can be. Having been through the closing of Fort McClellan in 1995, we understand why communities, feeling fear and anger, fight closure by engaging in tactics that they otherwise would not.

Anniston Army Depot has taken the high road to date throughout this process as a gaining community. It is also a community that can truly empathize with those communities losing current missions since Anniston was the home of Ft. McClellan. However, we and our community feel that there is misleading information being dispensed regarding the Anniston Army Depot, and we want to set the record straight.

We recall Admiral Gehman's remarks at the Regional Hearing in Atlanta recently that information provided by local communities broadens the reach of the BRAC Commission by maximizing limited staff time and resources. We therefore offer the following response and clarification to statements made about Anniston Army Depot. Our desire is this concise rebuttal will quell any lingering questions the Commission may have, allowing the Commission to move forward to reduce excess infrastructure and capacity.

Again, having observed the work of the BRAC Commission in Atlanta, we applaud you and your fellow Commissioners on the deliberate and professional way you are approaching this important endeavor. The nation owes you a debt of gratitude.

Very truly yours,

Richard Shelby
United States Senator

Jeff Sessions
United States Senator

Mike Rogers
Member of Congress

JS:rap

ASSERTIONS MADE BY OTHERS

1. Red River Army Depot argues that the Army must retain all depots
 - a.) They quote Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey with their reference as a May, 2005 *National Defense* article.

FACTS

- a.) The Secretary of the Army testified before the BRAC Commission.

MR. HARVEY: Let me address that, General Turner. We looked at our industrial base, which includes five depots and three arsenals. And determined that we had greatly excess capacity in that complex. And we looked at that analysis from both in terms of what we could surge to in the number of direct labor hours we need to generate across that complex in any given year.

In the last 50 years, the highest number of direct labor hours that have to be generated in these eight – these eight sites is 25 million direct labor hours. By closing Red River and then reconfiguring it into centers of excellence, and I'll get into that in a second, we have the ability to --still to surge to 50 million direct labor hours. So we can double the capacity with one less depot.

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial deviation.

Results in Brief

Work performed in Army depots declined by 36 percent from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 2002, while the total depot maintenance program grew. With the exception of fiscal year 2003—which has seen increased work, some of which is resulting from the Iraqi conflict—future workload projections indicate further decline in the work to be performed in military depots, but the full impact of the Iraq conflict on future depot workload is not yet known. Although future workload projections are important tools for managing depot operations, they have limitations because some inputs are not reliable and because operational and budget conditions change. However, opportunities exist for improving future estimates.

A number of factors, including the decline in workload performed in Army depots and changes in the type of work, have led to inefficient operations. Initiatives have been implemented to improve depot efficiency and productivity, and trends in two metrics—capacity utilization and employee productivity—show that improvements have been made. Additional workloads could play a key role in further improving the cost-effectiveness of the Army depots, but other issues must also be addressed. Nonetheless, without new work, the depots cannot continue to be viable. While some new work is being explored, little work for new or upgraded systems is going to the depots.

Table 1: Army Depot Workload, Workload Value, and Civilian Employees in Fiscal Year 2002

Depot	Principal work	FY 2002 workload ^a	FY 2002 value of workload executed ^d	FY 2002 number of civilian depot employees
Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama	This depot performs maintenance on heavy- and light-tracked combat vehicles and components and is the designated center of technical excellence for the M1 Abrams tank.	2.5	\$421.6	2,429
Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas	As the Army's only aviation facility, the depot overhauls and repairs DOD rotary wing aircraft and components, such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinook, and UH-60 Blackhawk.	2.9	\$500.2	2,969
Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania	This depot provides repair and overhaul support for air defense and tactical missiles such as the Patriot, Hawk, Avenger, Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Sidewinder.	0.9	\$108.0	1,982
Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas	For combat and tactical systems, the depot supports systems such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Multiple Launch Rocket System, and vehicles for the Patriot and Hawk missiles.	1.2	\$236.7	1,478
Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania	From handheld radios to satellite communication, the depot provides repair of or overhaul support for hundreds of communications and electronic systems.	2.8	\$251.3	2,237

Source: U.S. Army data (data); BAO (presentation).

^a Maintenance mission direct labor hours not including overtime.

^b Hours in millions.

^c Value of the workload executed for all customers, or total revenue.

^d Dollars in millions.

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial deviation

c-1) Testimony from BRAC hearing gives further support:
MR. HARVEY: Let me address that, General Turner. We looked at our industrial base, which includes five depots and three arsenals. And

b.) Dec. '04 DA told IJCSG not to close
RRAD

c.) Army analysis shows no excess capacity.

b.) This was simple a discussion point in the deliberative process, not a binding recommendation, occurring well before completion of data submission, scenario development and analysis.

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial deviation.

c.) A 2003 Governmental Accountability Office Study shows excess capacity (Summary follows)

Why GAO Did This Study

The Army's five maintenance depots produced work valued at \$1.5 billion in fiscal year 2002, with the remaining 49 percent of the Army's depot work performed by contractors. GAO was asked to assess: (1) the trends in and the reliability of depot workload projections, (2) whether workloads are sufficient for efficient depot operations, initiatives are under way to improve efficiency, and additional workloads are possible; (3) whether the Army has identified depots' core capability and provided workload to support that capability; and (4) whether the Army has a long-range plan for a viable, efficient depot system.

What GAO Recommends

GAO makes two recommendations to improve the reliability of workload projections from Army and other service acquisition communities and from inter-service customers. GAO previously reported on the need for improving the process for identifying core capabilities and improving strategic and workforce planning. Without improvements in these areas, the future viability of Army depots is questionable. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred in part with our recommendations to improve workload projections for Army depots, but stated that needed actions involved more than the Army. GAO revised the two draft report recommendations to address the broader need of improving projections of inter-service work for all the services.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/gettr?GAO-03-332

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 512-5412 or

What GAO Found

The work assigned to Army maintenance depots has declined by 36 percent, although the cost of the Army's total maintenance program has increased since fiscal year 1997. Except for fiscal year 2003, projections for future work in the depots through fiscal 2008 show further decline. Depot work also changed from predominately overhauling Army end items to the increased repair of components. In addition, work from non-Army customers has increased from 6 to 26 percent. Army component and recapitalization work is projected to be the majority of depot work in the future. Depot planners generally do not have reliable projections of work requirements for non-Army customers. Because of this and other factors, including changing conditions, future projections have limitations. Potential increases in depot work resulting from the Iraq war are not yet clear.

Various factors, including workload reductions and workload performance issues, have resulted in efficiency and productivity problems in Army depots. Such initiatives as facility and equipment rightizing, depot maintenance partnerships, and "lean manufacturing" have been implemented. Trends in two metrics—capacity utilization and employee productivity—show that, while more needs to be done, efficiency and productivity improvements have been made. Additional workloads, particularly for new and upgraded systems, are essential for future depot viability. However, in the past most new work has gone to private contractors. Some new-systems work is being explored for depots, and depot managers believe that partnering with the private sector may be the best chance for getting such work.

The Army has not identified its depots' core capability requirements using a revised DOD methodology meant to overcome weaknesses in the core process. At the same time, it is unclear whether the revised methodology, which is undergoing further changes, will correct weaknesses in the core process. Moreover, no one in the Army assesses the extent to which depot work compares with identified core capability requirements. Depot managers are concerned about the loss of work and the failure to obtain work necessary to support core capabilities.

The Army does not have a comprehensive and current strategic plan for the depots and has not implemented the limited plan it developed. GAO concluded in a 1998 report that the Army had inadequate long-range plans for its depots and that such planning is essential if significant progress is to be made in addressing the complex, systemic problems facing the depots. Despite the time that has passed, the same issues remain. DOD has not implemented a comprehensive and current plan for resolving continuing issues about (1) reduced workloads being assigned to Army maintenance depots and (2) deficiencies in the process of quantifying both core depot maintenance capabilities and the workload needed to ensure cost efficiency and technical competence and to preserve surge capability. Without such a plan, the long-term viability of Army depots is uncertain.

determined that we had greatly excess capacity in that complex. And we looked at that analysis from both in terms of what we could surge to in the number of direct labor hours we need to generate across that complex in any given year.

In the last 50 years, the highest number of direct labor hours that have to be generated in these eight – these eight sites is 25 million direct labor hours. By closing Red River and then reconfiguring it into centers of excellence, and I'll get into that in a second, we have the ability to --still to surge to 50 million direct labor hours. So we can double the capacity with one less depot.

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial deviation.

2. Red River maintains that the IJCSG “created” excess capacity through calculations.

a.) “They” (IJCSG) use 1.5 shifts as opposed to a single-shift basis for calculation of capacity.

a.) GAO analysis acknowledges that ANAD can accommodate workload under a one-shift basis. (Copy p. 89)

**Potential Transformation
Opportunity for Depot
Maintenance**

As discussed in appendix VIII, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group, when developing its maintenance proposals, completed its depot workload analysis on the basis of one and a half shifts per workday (60 hour workweek) rather than the one shift per day (40 hour workweek) under the current system, thus increasing available capacity and allowing it to consider depot closures. Industrial group officials told us that use of more than one shift, which is a common private industrial better business practice, would enhance transformational opportunities in that it would provide for more efficient use of facilities and equipment. Industrial group officials stated that the expanded shift concept, although transformational, was only a "sizing or planning tool" to examine ways to increase depot capacity and that it would be left up to each depot to decide whether or not to employ the expanded shift concept. In other words, it was a way to see if a depot could accommodate the incoming transfer of additional workload. We were also told that no policy changes were envisioned to actually implement the expanded shift concept. Available information indicates that the closure recommendation may not be implemented based on the concept of a one and a half shift operation at the Anniston Army Depot, which is to receive the combat vehicle workload from Red River. In our visit to Anniston Army Depot, officials told us that, with additional construction to increase capacity as provided for in the supporting documentation for the recommendation, they would be able to accommodate this additional workload without much difficulty and without working under the expanded shift concept. Industrial group officials acknowledged that, while some one and a half shift operations may be implemented at other activities, only a one shift operation was envisioned at Anniston, given the uncertainty associated with future requirements and the need to minimize risk by providing for additional capacity if a contingency arises. As such, it appears that there is essentially

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial deviation.

3. Red River alleges that the DoD recommendation ignored Military Value for the following reasons:

a.) RRAD has collocated vehicle storage and maintenance services.

a.) So does Anniston.

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial deviation.

b.) Vehicles from Anniston will be sent to Oklahoma for storage.

b.) There is no documentation indicating a policy change to store vehicles at a place other than where maintenance is performed.

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial Deviation..

4. RRAD notes that DoD rated it higher than military value in fleet and field support.

a.) Anniston Army Depot ranked highest Depot in Total Military Value – the only Depot in upper 25 percentile.

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial Deviation.

b.) Anniston continues to demonstrate its support for the Warfighter and its commitment to the combatant commanders.
There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial Deviation.

c.) Anniston is organized for deployment.
There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial Deviation.

d.) Anniston's Depot Commander is currently in Afghanistan and civilian employees are deployed.
There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial Deviation.

AMSTA-AN-BR

Memorandum for Record

Subject: Depot Level Field Support

In addition to depot maintenance operations on the installation, Anniston is designated for deployment support missions to anywhere in the world and can deploy on short notice.

In support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm 476 ANAD employees performed 36 percent of all civilians deployed. ANAD employees in country formed ANAD employees formed "mini depots" in country to perform improvements, and CARC painting of equipment. 1243 total employees installed appliqué armor on 75 USMC M60A1 tanks, supply, and field support of armored vehicles and new procure-

(ANAD) has an organization in place specifically designed to support the war efforts in SWA, which accounted for 36 percent of all combat vehicle maintenance missions.

Operations on Armor packages, optical improvements, survivability improvements, and inter-service support. ANAD support included DESCOMUSA support group, maintenance and support of M1A1 tanks for the USMC.

At the conclusion of Desert Storm, the heavy-tracked combat vehicle fleet in SWA was evaluated to determine the degree of repair necessary ensuring uncompromised readiness. Listed below is a recap of quantities and series of vehicles work loaded at ANAD. Reconstitution as of June 95:

SERIES	QUANTITY
1PM1	236
M1A1	365
M1	300
M728 CEV	46
M88A1	371
AVLB	70
Total Vehicles	1,388

Anniston Army Depot has deployed in excess of 250 employees in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom and another 100 employees to various locations around the globe since January 2003.

ANAD's first mission was to deploy two employees to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, to establish a Forward Repair Activity (FRA). These employees were tasked with establishing all logistical requirements including lodging, housing, clothing, etc. for ANAD employees. We deployed approximately 20 additional employees two weeks later to begin transformation of an empty warehouse into a Rebuild Facility. Within 45 days of arrival in country, we were making repairs to secondary items. Four employees were deployed to the Netherlands Feb 03 for a period of 30 days to support M1A1 mission requirements. Three employees were also deployed to Germany to inspect 45 M1A1 Vehicles prior to vehicles being turned in. We have maintained a cadre of approximately 22 employees since being at Camp Arifjan. These individuals also possess the skills necessary to make needed repairs on combat vehicles such as the M1A1, M88A1, M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE), M60 AVLB (Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge), and M113 Family of Vehicles. Missions in Kuwait have ranged from Add-on-Armor, repair of 1790 engines, repair of other secondary items, and the inspection/categorization of assets to determine disposition.

Anniston deployed 10 employees to Camp Anaconda, Balad, Iraq, to staff the HMMWV Service Center for approximately 18 months. These employees performed numerous services in support of our soldiers in country. These included repairs of tires, application of Add-on Armor, changing oil in vehicles, changing transmissions, repairing brakes, etc.

During the past two years, Anniston Army Depot has deployed in excess of 350 employees to posts, camps, and stations in 34 states and 7 different countries. Our employees have been involved with supporting our war fighters in many different missions. Some of these include: Inspection/Repair of AVLB's; Inspection of M1A1's; Repair of Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU); Welding of Tracked Vehicles; Towed Artillery Repair; and Inspection/Repair of Small Arms. Our employees continue to support any mission requiring our support. We have the capability and have demonstrated our commitment to our Warfighters by deploying employees to posts, camps, and stations, within hours when necessary.

o/s/b

Phillip Dean
Installation Administrator
Transformation (BRAC) Office
Anniston Army Depot

5. RRAD claims that it is the only site with a maintenance, ammunition, and distribution mission.

a.) Anniston has all three of those missions as well as small arms repair and storage, chemical weapons storage, missile recycling, and chemical demilitarization.

◆ **Anniston is the home to 20 Tenant Organizations and Private Companies**

◆ **Major Government Tenants**

- Defense Logistics Agency
- Anniston Munitions Center
- Anniston Chemical Activity & Program Manager for Chemical Demil
- Center of Military History Clearinghouse
- US Army TMDE Activity
- Defense Reutilization & Marketing Organization
- 722nd Ordnance Company (EOD)

◆ **Corporate Tenants**

- General Dynamics (Stryker, Fox & M1A2 GPS Manufacturing)
- Honeywell (AGT-1500 Recuperator Manufacturing Facility)
- Westinghouse (Chemical Disposal Facility)
- United Defense (M113A3 Conversion)

There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial Deviation.

6. RRAD claims in its Mission Statement that it "is responsible for the Army's light combat tracked vehicle fleet."

a.) They do Bradley's Multiple Launch missile systems only.
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b.) Anniston does M-113's, FAASV's, Stryker's, M-577's, M9ACE, Fox's and all components.
There is no change in Military Value. There is no substantial Deviation.

7. Red River officials expressed concern to GAO auditors that McAlester lacked the Category I and Category II storage capacity.

- a.) McAlester was not the only location to receive the CAT I and CAT II storage mission. Blue Grass/ANAD Munitions Center has 198 igloos for CAT I and II storage. As of 6 Jul 05, there is:

50,000 SF CAT I

*60,000 SF CAT II

storage available at Anniston Munitions Center.

*All ANAD CAT II's already have Intrusion Detection Systems and can be easily upgraded to CAT I with the installation of double locks.

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8. There is concern over the transfer of workload, specifically the transfer of the Bradley mission which is partnered with BAE, formerly United Defense

This is the exact same situation that occurred in the 95 BRAC with two

depots. The M113A3 conversion came from RRAD and the Paladin came from LEAD—both under partnership with United Defense.

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9. Red River officials voiced concern over ANAD's Rubber production capability.

ANAD engineers are continuing to Review options, including the ones to Enclave in place or build a facility at ANAD. Complete Economic Analysis to be furnished on this.

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**RUBBER
PRODUCTS**

Red River Army Depot & Rubber Products

Red River Army Depot's Unique Capabilities for Rubber Products

Red River Army Depot is a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) for many capabilities, including **Rubber Products**.

In fact, Red River Army Depot is the **only Department of Defense facility** with Rubber Product capabilities.

The scope of Rubber Products includes both rubber road wheels, track shoes, and track pads; in other words, **Red River Army Depot is a major source of products essential to DoD ground vehicles**.

In fact, Rubber Products were included in a list of "critical industrial capabilities" that initially would have been removed from BRAC consideration pursuant to draft imperatives. Instead, the decision was made to describe all of these essential capabilities as "important areas for consideration" for BRAC evaluation.

Red River Army Depot is the **only source of Abrams M1 tank road wheels** and the only source certified to technical data drawing specifications for the M1 road wheel. No commercial sources are approved.

In addition, Red River Army Depot is **QPL certified for the following products:**

- M60 FOV track and pads
- BFVS track
- M113 track and pads
- M109 track and pads
- M88 track.

The Difficulty of Recreating Red River Army Depot's Rubber Product Division

The DoD Rubber Products Division at Red River cannot be easily "disestablished" and replicated elsewhere. Nowhere in the DoD BRAC documents is there evidence of a detailed study on how to replicate this unique and critically important facility. There are many problems with the DoD recommendation that do not appear to have received adequate consideration.

First, the production of Rubber Products is an artisan process. Red River Army Depot alone creates the unique rubber compound. Even when three commercial vendors obtained the compound formula and attempted to replicate Red River Army Depot products, not one was able to achieve certification for the M1 Abrams road wheel. The DoD cannot assume that Red River's state-of-the-art processes can be recreated elsewhere.

Second, replicating the Red River Army Depot's Rubber Products Division elsewhere would not only be difficult, but also expensive. The cost to replicate the rubber products capability alone, including facilities and equipment, would cost more than **\$49 million** and not guarantee certification. Moreover, it would take **more than three years** to do so, assuming the proper environmental permits could even be obtained.

Third, the process for obtaining the necessary environmental permits is complicated and success in gaining environmental approval at a new site cannot be assured.

RRAD's Rubber Products Division Permit Requirements, State and Federal

State Air Permit and Federal Operating Permit, or Title V Permit

One state air permit, Air Permit #17973, pertains to Bldg. 493, Rubber Products Division. The fluidized bed, one paint booth, and three adhesive booths, and a number of abrasive cleaning units, dust collectors and vats are on that permit. These emissions points are also enforceable under our Title V Operating Permit, # O-01646, which encompasses this state permit by reference. This Permit, including all special conditions of the permit, allows RRAD to emit limited specific quantities of air emissions. Examples of those emissions are: volatile organic compounds (VOC), particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), oxides of sulfur (SO_x), and oxides of nitrogen (NO_x). Also, there are some emissions from the vapors from the metal finishing ventilation exhaust stack.

EPA Identification number required: Any waste generator who produces a hazardous waste that is not excluded from regulations (40 CFR 261.4), and who is not a conditionally exempt small-quantity generator (less than or equal to 100 kg/220 lbs) must notify EPA of onsite activities and obtain an EPA identification number. The generator cannot treat, store, dispose, or offer for transport any hazardous waste without first receiving this certification or ID Number.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA): RCRA C permit will be required if waste volume is 2,205 lbs or more per month and waste is stored onsite for more than 90 days. Large quantity generators (equal to or more than 2,205 lbs per month) who accumulate waste onsite for more than 90 days are classified as operators of hazardous waste storage facilities; they must comply with Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) obtain a RCRA storage permit.

Even generators who accumulate wastes for less than 90 days must comply with storage standards for containers and tanks, and conduct proper operating, maintenance, and inspection procedures. Large quantity generators must prepare a written contingency plan to be implemented in the event of an emergency.

Waste Water Discharge Permits: Point source discharges from industrial activities (chemical vats, quench tanks) must be permitted in accordance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) or state equivalent. In RRAD case these waters are sent to a permitted Industrial Waste Water Treatment Plant (IWTP). ANAD does not currently have the capacity in their waste water treatment facility to handle the additional requirements and will require a military construction project to add capacity.

*****New Development: Army Picks Rubber Tracks for FCS Vehicles*****

The Army has just announced its decision to equip Future Combat Systems' manned ground vehicles with tracks made from bands of molded rubber. [See *Army Times*, August 1, 2005, p. 10] This choice was made due to the weight savings, increased service life, and better operational performance characteristics.

This choice increases both the demand for rubber products and the serious risks to transformation resulting from a recommendation to move the Rubber Products Division.



Army picks rubber tracks for FCS vehicles

Design distributes weight more evenly, proponents say

By Greg Grant
TIMES STAFF WRITER

The Army has decided to equip its Future Combat Systems' manned ground vehicles with tracks that are bands of molded rubber.

The band track resembles a giant steel-belted radial tire and weighs significantly less than metal tracks, a key design consideration in the FCS ground vehicles. Those vehicles are intended to be lightweight and transportable by air.

Proponents of both tracked and wheeled designs within the Army have argued vehemently for those versions.

For vehicles heavier than 30 tons, particularly when driven over loose terrain, tracks are a better choice because they distribute the tonnage over a greater surface area, thus reducing the all-important vehicle ground pressure. A heavy wheeled vehicle will just dig into soft or sandy ground and has poor mobility over wet ground or snow. But at weights below 10 tons and on vehicles driven primarily on roads, wheels make more sense. They're quicker and considerably

cheaper than tracks.

"The problem with FCS is that its weight is in the 25-ton range, which is a gray area where it could go either way," said Michael Blain, a track and suspension specialist with the Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command.

Blain said heavy tracked vehicles are more compact than wheeled ones, which require multiple axles, transfer cases, drive shafts, and space to turn — all of which adds up to a bulkier, taller vehicle.

Tracked vehicles turn by "skid steering," and so do not require a steering arm or under-vehicle suspension. This allows those vehicles' profiles to be significantly lower, increasing survivability and also making it easier to fit a tracked vehicle inside a cargo aircraft.

Wheel proponents argue that multiple-wheeled vehicles can keep running if a wheel is knocked out by a mine. But the tires and suspension system are vulnerable to small-arms fire and artillery fragments.

The greatest argument in favor of wheels had always been weight.

Weight-saving technology

However, Blain's team at the development center has come up with a new technology, the band

track, that should save around one ton per vehicle. He said that technology creates a nearly tailor-made solution for the weight-sensitive FCS program.

The band track combines the aggressive cross-country, wet or soft ground and snow performance of tracks with the road-friendly ride of wheels. Tests show the service life of the hard rubber track should be nearly double that of traditional metal tracks. In Iraq, the Army has been replacing the metal tracks on its heavily used Bradley Fighting Vehicles every two weeks.

The band track offers much less rolling resistance than metal track links, which means less inertia to overcome to get the vehicle rolling; this results in significant fuel savings. And the troops like the band track because the rubber track and rubber road wheels result in a much smoother ride without the severe vibration characteristic of steel tracks.

Another benefit: Band tracks made of rubber are much quieter than metal ones, particularly on a hard surface, as there's no metal-to-metal contact, explained Herb Mukhtarian, of BAE Systems, the fourth-largest defense company in the world, who is involved in FCS ground-vehicle development.

"When combined with the FCS vehicle's hybrid electric system, the band track helps provide a touch of stealth" to even a 25-ton vehicle, he said.

There are a few drawbacks. The band track's light weight makes it more vulnerable to mine blasts than are steel links.

Conversely, the band track has proven more resistant to small-arms fire than metal track.

Repairs are another concern. TACOM's band tracks are made in one continuous piece, like a giant rubber band.

To replace the track, soldiers need to haul along another continuous band, which is not entirely feasible.

Individual metal track links can be removed and replaced much like the links in a bike chain.

"Commanders of the FCS program said, 'This stuff is great, but if you could chop it into little segments, then we could maintain it in the field a lot easier,'" Blain said.


Blain's group is now working on developing a segmented track with a joint similar to that found on existing metal tank and Bradley tracks, so it's nothing the troops in the field haven't seen before. □

Greg Grant covers the Army for Defense News.

DEPOT
CAPACITY




Red River Army Depot Closure Scenario (#0093)



* Other = Pwrtrain Comp, Start/Alt/Gen, Armt & Struct Comp, Depot Fleet/Fld Spt, Fire Cntrl & Other





CAPACITY ISSUES

- Conflicts with DOD 4151.18H peacetime capacity guidance
- Assumes people are only constraint and that all shops have capacity for expansion
 - Equipment, tooling and facility constraints ignored
 - Existing multi-shift operations not considered
 - Assumes no artisan/skills constraint
- Navy analysis indicates
 - 1.5 shift operation with 50% increase in work will only yield 30% increased throughput with corresponding 20% increase in WIP

