

BEFORE THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

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FIRST REGIONAL HEARING)
OF THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE)
AND REALIGNMENT)
COMMISSION FOR THE)
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT)
OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS)
IN THE UNITED STATES AND)
ITS TERRITORIES.)
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G U A M R E G I O N A L H E A R I N G

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Wednesday, March 29, 1995

Session Hall
Guam Legislature Temporary Building
Agana, Guam

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REPORTED BY: FRANCES U. TAITANO

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1 BE IT REMEMBERED that, pursuant to Notice
2 of Regional Hearing and on Wednesday, the 29th day
3 of March, 1995, commencing at the hour of 2:30
4 o'clock p.m. thereof, at the Session Hall, Guam
5 Legislature Temporary Building, Agana, Guam, before
6 me, FRANCES U. TAITANO, a Notary Public in and for
7 the Territory of Guam, said regional hearing took
8 place as hereinafter set forth.

9 ---o0o---

10 APPEARANCES

11 Presiding Official

12 DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
13 1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
14 Arlington, VA 22209
15 By: WENDI STEELE, Commissioner
AL CORNELLA, Commissioner

16 Charles Smith, Executive Director
17 Eric Lindenbaum, Navy DoD Analyst
18 Elizabeth King, Counsel
John Earnhardt, Communications Assistant
Ziba Ayeen, Travel Assistant

19 For Guam

20 The Honorable Carl T.C. Gutierrez, Governor
of Guam
21 Senator Don Parkinson, Speaker of the
Twenty-third Guam Legislature
22 Congressman Robert A. Underwood, U.S. Congress
Guam Delegate
23 Senator Hope A. Cristobal, Twenty-third Guam
Legislature
24 Senator Mark Forbes, Twenty-third Guam
Legislature
25 Most Rev. Anthony S. Apuron, Archbishop of
Agana

1 Mr. Manny Q. Cruz, President of the American
2 Federation of Government Employees

3 Messrs. Ovidio R.A. Calvo, Jr. and Simon Sanchez
4 II, Guam Chamber of Commerce

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1 OPENING REMARKS BY COMMISSIONER STEELE

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Good afternoon. Governor
3 Gutierrez, Lieutenant Governor Bordallo, Congressman
4 Underwood, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to this,
5 the first regional hearing of the 1995 Defense Base
6 Closure and Realignment Commission.

7 My name is Wendi Steele and I'm one of the
8 eight members of the BRAC Commission, which, as you
9 know, is charged with the task of evaluating the
10 recommendations of the Secretary of Defense
11 regarding the closure and realignment of military
12 installations in the United States and its
13 territories.

14 Also here with us today, I'm delighted to
15 add, is my colleague, Mr. Al Cornella, of Rapid
16 City, South Dakota.

17 Governor, we'd like to thank you for the
18 hospitality and the many kindnesses which have been
19 extended to us during our short visit to your
20 beautiful island.

21 Also, let me thank Admiral Brewer and all
22 of the military and civilian personnel, you have
23 assisted us so capably during our site visits. We
24 spent yesterday and today looking at the
25 installations that are impacted by the Secretary of

1 Defense's recommendations. We've engaged in
2 extensive briefings that will help us tremendously
3 in our independent review. The cooperation we've
4 received has been exemplary.

5 The Defense Base Closure commissioners are
6 conducting 54 base visits including sites on Guam,
7 the main purpose of which is to allow us to see the
8 installations first hand and to address with the
9 military personnel the all important question of the
10 military value of each base.

11 In addition to the base visits, the
12 Commission is conducting a total of 11 -- excuse me --
13 regional hearings to allow members of the local
14 communities affected by the secretary's
15 recommendation -- recommendations a chance to
16 express their views and insights. We've seriously
17 considered this interaction with the community to be
18 one of the most important and valuable parts of our
19 independent analysis.

20 Commissioner Cornella and I would like to
21 thank you in advance for participation this
22 afternoon and your contributions to the process.
23 Let me assure you all -- Let me assure you that all
24 of our commissioners and staff are well aware of the
25 huge implications of base closure on local

1 communities around the nation. We are committed to
2 openness in this process. And we are committed to
3 fairness and impartiality. All of the material we
4 gather, all of the information we receive from the
5 Department of Defense, and all of our correspondence
6 is open to the public.

7 We are faced with an unpleasant and painful
8 task. None of the decisions -- excuse me -- none of
9 the decisions to be made by this commission will be
10 easy. Due to previous defense installation
11 closures, the 1995 round leaves us with a
12 challenging task of comparing the best with the
13 best. What we have seen in Guam further confirms
14 that reality. But to our men and women who serve,
15 those whom you have hosted so warmly and openly over
16 the years, we must ensure that the Department of
17 Defense has sufficient resources for their training
18 and readiness. It is necessary for our base
19 structure to efficiently support our fore structure.

20 So now let me tell you how we will proceed
21 here today and in all of our regional hearings.

22 The commission has assigned a block of time
23 to each state or territory affected by the
24 Secretary's recommendations. The overall amount of
25 time was determined by the number of installations

1 on the list and the amount of job loss. Guam has
2 been given a hundred and 40 minutes to make its
3 presentation. We notified the appropriate elected
4 officials of this procedure and left it up to them,
5 working with the local communities, to determine how
6 to fill the block of time. Today, it is our
7 intention to listen to testimony for about 55
8 minutes and then take a short break and finish the
9 remaining 55 minutes. We had originally been
10 scheduled to listen to 70 minutes on each side of
11 the break. But Governor Gutierrez and Congressman
12 Underwood decided that they would like to donate 30
13 minutes of Guam's testimony time to the people of
14 Guam.

15 At the end of the presentations, the people
16 of Guam will have 30 minutes in addition to their
17 original 15 for public comments. We have provided a
18 sign-up sheet for this portion of the hearing. And
19 those of you speaking will have two minutes apiece.

20 Let me also say that the Base Closure law
21 has been amended since 1993 to require that anyone
22 giving testimony before the commission do so under
23 oath. And so I will begin -- excuse me -- by
24 swearing in witnesses, and that will include
25 individuals who will speak during the public portion

1 of the hearing.

2 With that, I believe, we are ready to begin
3 our hearing. And we can swear all three of you
4 gentlemen at the same time, to be efficient.

5 If you will please rise and raise your
6 right hands.

7 Extra help, there.

8 (Laughter).

9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Do you solemnly swear or
10 affirm that the testimony you are about to give to
11 the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
12 shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
13 the truth?

14 GOVERNOR GUTIERREZ: I do.

15 CONGRESSMAN UNDERWOOD: I do.

16 SPEAKER PARKINSON: I do.

17 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

18 We will begin with the Governor.

19 TESTIMONY BY GOVERNOR CARL T.C. GUTIERREZ

20 GOVERNOR GUTIERREZ: Thank you very much.

21 Honorable Commissioners Wendi Steele and Al
22 Cornella, and the BRAC staff, allow me to publicly
23 welcome you to Guam. In the past day and a half, we
24 know that you have been busy gathering information
25 about military activities on Guam. We have done our

1 best to make sure that you have had the opportunity
2 to look at our island from the air, to speak to the
3 base commanding officers, talk with some of our
4 people and review the situation on the ground in
5 Guam. We trust that you leave our homeland with a
6 better understanding of our plight as people.

7 You are here for some very serious business
8 as far as Guam is concerned. You will weigh the
9 recommendations of the Secretary of Defense to close
10 military activities and dispose of the assets of
11 some of the most economically important property on
12 Guam. We appreciate the heavy burden this places on
13 you and the prayers of our people are with you to
14 arrive at the best decision for Guam and America.

15 Today you will hear from the heads of
16 Guam's Executive branch and Legislative branch, our
17 island's delegate to the U.S., Congressman
18 Underwood, the Archbishop of Guam, the president of
19 the American Federation of Government Employees, the
20 chairman of the board of the Guam Chamber of
21 Commerce, and legislators of both political parties,
22 and members of the general public. We appreciate
23 the fact that you have accepted our offer to take
24 some of our time to allocate to the public and we
25 thank you for that.

1 The Defense Department's recommendation to
2 effectively close Inner Apra Harbor, lay off over
3 2,000 civilian employees, and then keep the lands
4 and assets idle is unacceptable. It leaves little
5 or no room for us to provide for employment and our
6 own economic revitalization.

7 Today, Guam is desperately in need of port
8 facilities. We are bursting at the seams in our
9 small portion of the harbor. As you can see, over
10 80 percent of the land surrounding Inner Apra,
11 within the two-mile radius, is held by the Navy.
12 This is the best port in this strategic part of the
13 Pacific and we can't use it. Our 15 percent of the
14 wharf space handles about 95 percent of vessel
15 traffic.

16 At the same time, this decision would
17 affect 10 percent of our total work force. It would
18 bring a tremendous shock to our economy that will be
19 even more devastating if we do not have the
20 resources to provide for own economic
21 revitalization. As an aside, it is unfortunate in
22 your briefing by the military yesterday that no
23 information was given as to the civilian job loss
24 proposed under the Pentagon's plan. It is clear to
25 us that from the military view, the civilian

1 employees would be left behind on a sinking ship.
2 We cannot allow this to happen.

3 We all understand the need of the
4 U.S. government to reduce military spending. Deep
5 down inside we know that technology is changing
6 Guam's military role. We know that cuts must be
7 made and that Guam may be less important to the
8 military in light of the post cold war military
9 posture. The DoD recommendations are simply
10 untenable. The facilities get closed, the jobs are
11 gone. It locks the gate without giving us the key.

12 We are willing to accept change, but we
13 believe that we should have a transition which
14 respects our long-standing loyalty to the United
15 States. The citizens of Guam have a century of
16 personal sacrifice to the requirements of
17 U.S. national defense and the sacrifice is unmatched
18 in the United States. To retain the skilled labor
19 and to minimize the shock to our economy with the
20 prospective 10 percent cut in the work force, we
21 require three- to six-year transition period.

22 We are optimistic about our long-term
23 future, provided we are given the tools. On the
24 other hand, there is nothing to prevent a
25 cooperative arrangement between the military and the

1 private sector that satisfies the needs of both
2 military readiness and the civilian economic growth.
3 There are no show-stoppers to this win-win
4 situation.

5 In the COBRA computer analysis, the final
6 data scenario is called "Close Guam Piers." I know
7 that's only a title for a data scenario, but it has
8 an ominous ring to it. It doesn't help you and it
9 doesn't help us. This scenario could not possibly
10 be accepted by the people of Guam if that were a
11 final recommendation.

12 Honorable Commissioners, for years we have
13 worked closely with the military, often to the point
14 of our discomfort. During the height of the Vietnam
15 War and up until 1973, our commercial port shared
16 the Inner Harbor jointly with the Navy. If the
17 civilian government could operate jointly out of the
18 Inner Apra area when Navy activities were so hectic,
19 there is no reason why we cannot share facilities
20 today to accommodate military readiness and our
21 economic revitalization. We should expand upon our
22 cooperative ventures of the past before we allow the
23 Pentagon to "close Guam's piers."

24 The civilian community is not the only
25 loser in the Pentagon's recommendations. Those

1 recommendations appear to hamper military readiness
2 severely. Closing Guam means the end of a forward
3 deployed logistic and support replenishment center
4 for the Seventh Fleet. With the Military Sealift
5 Command vessels moved to Hawaii, this crucial
6 support will be ten days further from Asia and the
7 Indian Ocean. The plan would eliminate 25 percent
8 of the annual support voyages, from eight to six,
9 for our sailors in Southeast Asia and the Indian
10 Ocean.

11 The continued presence of the MSC vessels
12 would also provide a minimum workload for Guam's SRF
13 and the Fleet Industrial and Supply Center. A
14 cooperative arrangement allows us to more easily
15 develop private sector work to augment the federal
16 work levels represented by the MSC ships. This will
17 bring jobs, profits, and readiness.

18 DoD's proposal also reduces military
19 readiness by mothballing Inner Apra Harbor and the
20 Sasa and Tenjo storage tanks. But we are not sure
21 from the data what the true cost savings would be.
22 We do not know what it would cost to mothball these
23 facilities. Remember this is the tropics and things
24 are hard and expensive to mothball. And the COBRA
25 is unclear on this. We have no idea how quickly,

1 and at what cost, mothballed areas in Guam can be
2 transformed into a meaningful support operation, and
3 apparently neither does the military.

4 We believe that the answer is an agreement
5 for civilian use of the facilities in partnership
6 with an appropriate financial commitment by the
7 military. This would render the harbor and its
8 assets a ready port and less taxes to -- to the U.S.
9 taxpayer.

10 We understand that the nation needs to cut
11 back. We have borne the difficulties of change
12 before, often in dramatic ways. We have been
13 occupied and exploited for the last 350 years. We
14 here remember vividly the bomb trucks running up and
15 down our main road during the Korean Conflict, the
16 Vietnam Conflict, and the Gulf War.

17 Please understand what we need in this time
18 when the military is cutting costs. If we are to
19 keep our people employed, develop our potential as a
20 maritime center, and continue to provide the basis
21 for military readiness, we need access to these
22 assets. I will not speak in detail about all the
23 assets at this time, but clearly we need the
24 following.

25 One, we need the waterfront and attendant

1 properties proposed for mothball;

2 we need fuel storage facilities proposed
3 for mothball;

4 the housing, administrative, warehousing
5 and command areas not required as a result of the
6 lower force levels, we need those;

7 the Fena watershed area and the separate
8 Navy water system. Why should the Navy operate a
9 separate and overlapping water supply system?

10 Additionally, the BRAC 93 process is not
11 complete. The officer's housing at NAS is the only
12 part of the Air Station not scheduled for return.
13 The squadrons are gone. The BRAC, in its redirect
14 of NAS Agana, should finish the NAS closure process,
15 and we ask you for that.

16 The land and assets that are currently
17 underutilized by the military should be returned to
18 be more productively utilized by Guam's private
19 sector. This will lower military budget outlays
20 while maintaining a profound level of readiness
21 capacity. Currently, Guam's private sector faces
22 unnatural barriers to growth created by
23 military-exclusive retention of some of Guam's most
24 economically valuable property and assets. To
25 expand, we need to remove these barriers.

1 If we seize upon this new vision of
2 strategic Guam, we can provide opportunities to both
3 the military and the people of Guam. We can create
4 new jobs and improve military readiness. We can run
5 facilities and manage assets to further develop our
6 economy and provide a ready capacity for emergent or
7 contingency military requirements with less strain
8 on the U.S. budget.

9 We would be pleased to work with the BRAC
10 in examining alternative COBRA scenarios which
11 reflect this approach. We would be pleased to
12 examine in detail the cost effectiveness, the
13 strategic readiness, and the economic recovery
14 potential of this vision of strategic Guam.

15 Speaking of COBRA analysis brings me to a
16 final issue, the inefficiencies of the existing
17 process. Please allow me to bring to your attention
18 some of our difficulties in assessing the exact
19 nature of DoD's recommendations.

20 No one seems to know what the actual impact
21 of the closure will be, not in Washington D.C. at
22 high administrative levels, not at the local command
23 level, and certainly not by us.

24 We cannot determine if any land is proposed
25 for return to the people of Guam in the close-out

1 scenario, and if so, what is it?

2 The COBRA runs themselves do not reflect
3 the true expenses and cost savings to the military
4 nor the economic impact on Guam.

5 Mothball costs are not fully reflected, and
6 the costs of preparation for readiness of mothballed
7 assets is not included in the cost-savings analysis.

8 The loss of jobs amongst those who work in
9 non-appropriated funds instrumentalities has not
10 been considered. In Guam, there are 1200 of these
11 employees.

12 The COBRA scenario does not appear to have
13 included Guam's so-called Section 30 funds. We
14 urgently need your help in determining the details
15 of the Department of Defense's proposals.

16 It is less -- It is less than a month until
17 the hearing in San Francisco. We seek your
18 immediate assistance in helping us acquire the
19 necessary information so that we can best present
20 the financial impact of our vision of strategic
21 Guam.

22 In closing, let me remind you of where you
23 are today. You are in Guam, an unincorporated
24 territory, whatever that may mean. Guam is really a
25 colony by any definition. We are minuscule. We

1 understand that. We don't have any political clout
2 in Washington D.C. And although we are a useful
3 military location, very few in Washington even know
4 we exist. As an example, go to the Internet and try
5 to find information about base closing in Guam, or
6 economic information -- or economic information
7 about the military in Guam under the Economic
8 Conversion Information Exchange called "gopher."
9 Every other base the BRAC deals with is on the
10 Internet, but not those in Guam.

11 For 100 years, the lives of our people have
12 been shaped by the military. For over 50 years, we
13 had a Naval government. And even without direct
14 control, the impact of the military on the economy
15 and its control of resources have affected
16 dramatically the development of our private sector.
17 Although there are many individual exceptions, the
18 men and women in uniform, transient and just doing
19 their job, have not always promoted or even
20 understood our interests.

21 Despite the inherent injustices of the
22 Guam/U.S. relationship, both on an individual and
23 collective basis, we could always be counted on to
24 pull our weight. Please consider this when you
25 think about our vision of the future of Guam versus

1 the Pentagon's "close Guam's piers" scenario.

2 The Pentagon's recommendation is
3 short-sighted. It places little emphasis on
4 readiness. It does not reflect the true costs of
5 mothballing Guam and ignores our interest in
6 economic self-sufficiency. In this time when the
7 military needs to cut costs and we need to promote
8 continuing employment and economic development,
9 allow for our interests to be realized while
10 continuing military readiness.

11 For 100 years we have thought of Guam's
12 strategic importance in relation to the military.
13 Now is the time to think of Guam's true strategic
14 importance, as a regional hub of economic
15 development.

16 We will find our place in the Asia/Pacific
17 region. We will not only prevail through these
18 troubling times, but we shall thrive, prosper, and
19 enjoy a bright future for our children.

20 The United States of America is a
21 representative democracy. We are U.S. citizens but
22 we are not represented in that democracy. Decisions
23 for Guam are made by bureaucrats in the
24 administration who have no stake in our future.
25 Decisions for Guam are made by officials elected by

1 other constituencies. We have unequal status.

2 As so often in the past, we now look to
3 others who are making decisions for us. What we are
4 looking for is someone who will do what is right.
5 We need someone to do what is right for once in
6 Guam's history. Today, we look to you to represent
7 our interests which have been ignored too often.

8 Thank you very much.

9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Governor.

10 (Applause.)

11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We look forward very to
12 working with you, and please be assured that as
13 commissioners and both the entire commission staff
14 plan to entertain various scenarios with COBRA
15 models for different opportunities that can be
16 mutually beneficial. So any help you can provide us
17 makes our job easier, we will do our very best to be
18 responsive. Please know that our doors are open,
19 our library is your library, and we -- I don't know
20 what else I can say. We really look forward to
21 finding the best solution that we can, keeping
22 military values our primary concern and what our
23 mandate is by the statute. Thank you very much,
24 your words were heard.

25 GOVERNOR GUTIERREZ: Thank you for the

1 offer.

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And next this afternoon
3 is Mr. Speaker.

4 TESTIMONY BY SPEAKER DON PARKINSON

5 SPEAKER PARKINSON: Thank you, Commissioner
6 Steele, Commissioner Cornella -- Cornella.

7 Allow me to begin by welcoming you on
8 behalf of the Twenty-third Guam Legislature and the
9 people of Guam to our beautiful island.

10 I'm going to ad lib slightly here.

11 There's been a feeling by some that the
12 hearings were a meaning exercise -- meaningless
13 exercise, and I hope that's not true.

14 COMMISSIONER STEELE: That is not true.

15 SPEAKER PARKINSON: There is perception here,
16 not by the BRAC commission now, but we are being
17 maneuvered and the BRAC commission is being
18 maneuvered to punish Guam because of some of the
19 positions we've taken on land issues. And it is my
20 feeling that the BRAC commission is not a part of
21 this scenario. However, the military has for the
22 last 50 years since World War II, apparently done
23 everything it can to thwart the development of the
24 Territory of Guam, to keep Guam a safe preserve for
25 the military. We have the military attempting to

1 convert large portions of the island that -- the
2 military reserves that are no longer needed for
3 military reserve, and the bird preserves with the
4 Department of Defense having the right to
5 unilaterally move at any time it wants these lands
6 for national defense. The national -- The
7 Department of Defense has always wanted to keep a
8 good share of Guam as a reserve in case they ever
9 need a massive buildup in this part of the world.
10 And I think we see this scenario continuing here.
11 They want their cake and eat it too, so to speak.
12 They want to keep the land and not use it for
13 apparently another 50 years.

14 Also, and I will mention this later in my
15 formal testimony, the fact that there is a
16 misperception, and I think this has to be brought
17 out at the start, because last night coming into
18 Guam, I was talking to a stewardess who had been on
19 Guam for eight years and she had this misperception.
20 That the -- the activists, if you want to call them
21 that, the radicals, which I'm rapidly becoming one,
22 I'm afraid, if I'm not already, but in any event,
23 they want the military out. And this has not been
24 the perception that I have had on most of the --
25 even the most radical of the radicals. What they've

1 been saying is that -- we understand that you need
2 some lands for national defense and Guam is
3 strategic, and if you need the land, use it. But if
4 you don't need the land, give it back. And I think
5 the whole issue at NAS was it seems sort of foolish
6 to have an air base sitting 90 percent underutilized
7 up at Andersen and yet retain valuable assets in the
8 middle of Agana for a Naval Air Station, which is
9 redundant. But nobody wants the Naval Air Station
10 functions to leave the island. Nobody wants the
11 Andersen Air Force Base to close. When I say
12 "nobody," I'm speaking now of 95 percent of the --
13 of the people, including the people who you would
14 call radicals or activists. Nobody is saying close
15 the Naval base. What we're saying is, if you don't
16 need this land, give it back. If you're going to
17 use it, use it; if you're not going to use it, give
18 it to the people who can use it. Don't let it sit
19 idle and hold back the economy of the territory.

20 We've got -- We've got roughly 210, 215
21 square miles of land on the island, and the military
22 holds a third of it. Of what's left, probably
23 another 40 percent of that, at least, is unusable
24 because it's straight up and down, it's hillside,
25 it's land that's not really useable. So, really,

1 we're talking about -- for the civilian population
2 of Guam probably not much more than a hundred square
3 miles of useable land, at the most for a
4 hundred-and-forty-thousand people. And I think the
5 point is -- I don't think -- with a few exceptions,
6 I don't think anybody wants to kick the military
7 out. We simply want them to use the land
8 efficiently that they need and give back all of this
9 land that we're holding in reserve.

10 I'm going -- I'd like to go into a
11 historical perspective now.

12 As you know, Guam became a territory of the
13 United States as a result of the Treaty of Paris
14 when Guam was ceded to the United States by Spain.
15 Since that time, Guam was used primarily as a
16 military base, governed first by a Naval governor
17 and then by a civilian-appointed governor appointed
18 by the president, and since 1970, by an elected
19 governor.

20 During the initial years of the
21 administration of the Naval government, people were
22 moved out of their homes in many locations using the
23 excuse -- and primarily, this is primarily,
24 actually, after World War II -- people were moved
25 out of their homes in many locations using the

1 excuse that their ancestral homelands were necessary
2 so that the U.S. military could build its bases.
3 These are loyal Americans. They didn't object,
4 they've just been -- look at the scenario after the
5 World War II. These people have just gone through
6 four years of Japanese occupation and they had been
7 rescued by the Americans. And the Americans say,
8 "We need your help now." And the people of Guam
9 responded many times without hesitation. They were
10 willing to sacrifice for the country that had laid
11 down the lives of its children to rescue Guam from
12 the occupation. But they were misled. A lot of
13 this land wasn't necessary. A lot of this land was
14 not going to be used for 50 years. And then the
15 federal government still doesn't want to give it
16 back.

17 Right now, approximately one-third of the
18 total land area of Guam is being held. To make
19 matters worse, in many cases, little or no
20 compensation was given to those whose land were
21 taken. In addition, for a time in the 1940's after
22 the war, the Naval government actually prohibited
23 the sale or transfer of land between private parties
24 in order to keep the prices stable at rock bottom
25 prices, so that the market was frozen. This is the

1 type of administration we've had from the military.

2 The land takings are not isolated to one
3 area but it encompassed the entire island, as you're
4 aware. Most of the land taken was prime land. As a
5 result, this has thwarted agricultural and economic
6 development of the island.

7 Guam was put in a time capsule and let out
8 in 1962 by President Kennedy. While the rest of the
9 country was progressing, Guam stood still. Prior to
10 World War II, the economy of Guam was primarily a
11 subsistence economy based on agriculture and
12 ocean-related activities. When the federal
13 government took the land, this changed. Ernest
14 Hopkins, one of the architects of Guam's 1950
15 Organic Act, accurately describes this when he said:

16 "A prewar economy that was primarily
17 agricultural has been ... reduced to a status
18 comparable to our mythical American city's victory
19 gardens. At present, it is no exaggeration to state
20 that the native inhabitants are as dependent on
21 off-island sources for food and other necessities of
22 life as our comparable American city would be
23 dependent upon sources beyond its corporate limits."

24 In their zeal and under the guise of
25 national security, the military completely sealed

1 Guam off to the outside world. Unlike other United
2 States communities which has strong military
3 presence and were allowed to develop their civilian
4 economy, the military became the only industry on
5 Guam because the military will not allow anything
6 else to flourish. Under the security clearance
7 requirements of the U.S. military, economic
8 development could be pursued only in -- only be
9 pursued in Guam if the military gave it its
10 blessing. This obviously had a negative impact on
11 the economy. People say why do you have a public
12 power system? Why do you have public water? Why do
13 Why is it -- the telephone company publicly owned?
14 Because when the rest of the country was developed
15 into a private infrastructure, private industry was
16 not allowed into Guam to develop it. So out of
17 necessity, the government of Guam and the federal
18 government had to develop these resources.

19 The result was that the military forced the
20 people of Guam to be dependent on the military at
21 the exclusion of military -- or exclusion of private
22 sector development. The military attempted to
23 justify their actions in relation to Guam's
24 perceived prosperity and security clearance posture
25 by stating that Guam constitutes -- and I quote now --

1 "Guam constitutes a defense base of immeasurable
2 value and has manifest advantages over other areas
3 overseas where the United States does not enjoy
4 sovereignty. The continued security of Guam, is in
5 fact, a vital prerequisite to its continuance as a
6 strategic military base. This then is also of
7 extreme interest to the civilian population of the
8 island since the economic development of Guam is
9 almost entirely dependent on national defense
10 activities."

11 The control of Guam and its people was
12 complete. Everybody that came or went from Guam had
13 to have a Naval clearance until 1962, including
14 people who joined the military during this period.
15 They had to get permission from the Navy to go
16 off-island to bring their dependents on-island, et
17 cetera.

18 Despite the lack of respect shown to the
19 people of Guam during this post war period and
20 despite the absolutely unbelievable abusive use of
21 power by the military government and the appointed
22 civilian government perpetrated upon the people of
23 Guam, the people of Guam have remained loyal to the
24 United States. The record speaks for itself. We've
25 got one of the highest per capita ratios of people

1 going into the service -- on a per capita basis,
2 we've had more deaths in every conflict of any
3 significance since World War I. I don't believe we
4 participated much in World War I, but World War II
5 went on, we -- we had losses in World War II. Many
6 Chamorros were in the military when the war started,
7 and, of course, in the Korean and Vietnam wars, our
8 losses exceeded that of any other American community
9 on a per capita basis.

10 The people of Guam have always supported
11 the United States in matters of national security.
12 The military made Guam dependent on national
13 defense. And anything that did not directly or
14 indirectly benefit the military before 1962 was
15 simply not permitted. Even after 1962, the federal
16 government continued bullying the people of Guam as
17 far as retaining unneeded lands.

18 It has only been 33 years since the
19 isolation bubble was lifted and Guam was opened up
20 to the outside world. It has only been 33 years
21 that Guam has been allowed to develop an economy
22 that was not related to the military. This is a
23 short time in comparison with other -- other similar
24 jurisdictions.

25 I do not think that we can ignore in this

1 BRAC Commission hearing the historical perspective
2 of what happened in Guam. The fact that Guam was
3 made totally economically dependent on the military,
4 a dependence which has continued to this day,
5 somewhat ameliorated by the tourism industry, which
6 is the only other viable industry Guam has. We're
7 isolated, we're out in the middle of the Pacific
8 Ocean. When you look at the other communities in
9 the United States which are having bases closed,
10 they were not under a security bubble until 1962.
11 When -- Whatever other bases are being closed, and
12 Mountain Home Air Force Base is being closed in
13 Idaho. And I'm familiar with Mountain Home because
14 I used to live in Boise. There was no security
15 bubble prior to 1962. I didn't have -- When I was
16 in high school, I didn't have to get permission from
17 the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy to drive up to
18 Mountain Home to see a friend. I didn't have to get
19 permission from the U.S. military if I wanted to
20 open a business there. I didn't have to get
21 permission from the U.S. military if I wanted to
22 practice law there. They kept out lawyers so that
23 the people couldn't litigate these land claims, for
24 God's sake.

25 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Keeping out lawyers.

1 SPEAKER PARKINSON: What?

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Keeping out lawyers,
3 interesting concept.

4 (Laughter.)

5 SPEAKER PARKINSON: Well, I think Shakespeare
6 had the best theory.

7 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Sorry, Lis.

8 SPEAKER PARKINSON: You must be a lawyer, too.
9 Okay.

10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: No, it --

11 SPEAKER PARKINSON: Okay.

12 Guam is an island community. Every
13 resource is needed in order for the people to
14 survive. The federal government recognized the
15 importance and the value of Apra Harbor when it
16 forcibly moved the original inhabitants of Sumay at
17 Apra Harbor to the hills of Santa Rita in about the
18 same manner that the American Indians were forced to
19 move from their land onto reservations when the
20 settlers wanted that land. If Apra Harbor was
21 important to the people of Guam then, it is a
22 thousand fold more important now. That's one of the
23 few natural harbors available to the military in
24 this part of the world of that quality.

25 My preference would be to keep the Ship

1 Repair Facility and Fleet Industrial Supply Center
2 in operation and the other facilities that are
3 proposed to be closed open. If not, I agree with
4 the governor, some sort of a joint-use program.
5 Realistically, though, we are being buffeted by
6 forces over which we have no control. The wind down
7 of the cold war. We have the cutbacks mandated by
8 the politicians in Washington which may or may not
9 be justified. But that's beyond our control.
10 That's beyond your control and you've been mandated
11 to make cuts.

12 Okay, in closing, I haven't had time to
13 finish, but what I would like to say is this: The
14 federal government must treat the people of Guam
15 fairly.

16 I'd like to make other point as an
17 American. The Navy is using Guam as a pawn for
18 political purposes in closing these bases. It is
19 imperative that we maintain bases for America's
20 national security in the Pacific on American
21 territory. And to close these facilities, in my
22 opinion, because the Navy is mad at Guam would be
23 foolish. We must keep these bases open not only for
24 the economy of Guam but for the national security
25 interest involved in the United States.

1 Thank you, commissioners, I appreciate the
2 opportunity to speak.

3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much for
4 your testimony, Mr. Speaker.

5 (Applause.)

6 SPEAKER PARKINSON: I would be submitting my
7 written testimony along with a copy of the
8 resolution from the Guam Legislature, which is
9 attached to my written testimony, which is
10 self-explanatory. Thank you.

11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And we'd be delighted to
12 include it in our records.

13 SPEAKER PARKINSON: Thank you.

14 COMMISSIONER STEELE: You're welcome.

15 And now we will turn to your fine and able
16 representative in Washington, Congressman Underwood.

17 TESTIMONY BY CONGRESSMAN ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD

18 CONGRESSMAN UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much,
19 Commissioner Steele and Commissioner Cornella.

20 I join Team Guam in welcoming both of you
21 to -- both you and your staff to Guam, and I hope
22 you have an opportunity to experience our the
23 hospitality.

24 Governor Gutierrez has spoken to the Team
25 Guam's response. Speaker Parkinson has spoken to

1 the historical background that the island has
2 experienced. And now I will speak to the final
3 selection criteria which you will using in analyzing
4 DoD's recommendation.

5 First, I would like to scrutinize DoD's
6 current recommendation with the eight selection
7 criteria as the yardstick of measurement and
8 analysis. Then I would like to review Team Guam's
9 recommendation under the light of that criteria.

10 The DoD recommendations for Guam raise a
11 number of concerns about the first four final
12 selection criteria which deal with the military
13 value. If the current recommendations are
14 implemented, they will seriously affect the ability
15 of our military commanders to respond to their
16 current and future mission requirements and
17 adversely impact on operational readiness. You may
18 not hear any clear statements regarding the adverse
19 impact on operational readiness on our Team Guam
20 Proposal from your military briefings and contacts
21 because all uniformed personnel are constrained to
22 support the Department of Defense's position, one
23 borne more of accounting computer models than the
24 realities of the Western Pacific and the historic
25 and potential use of Guam.

1 First, relocating the Military Sealift
2 Command ships to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, seven to ten
3 sailing days from Guam, will require the Navy to
4 place these ships on a permanent cruise. They will
5 be less capable of responding to an emergent
6 contingency since they are not constantly forward
7 deployed.

8 Secondly, current and future mission
9 requirements are jeopardized by the DoD's mission to
10 rely on foreign military facilities instead of those
11 on U.S. soil. The recent rejection of the CINCPAC's
12 request for stationing pre-position ships on foreign
13 countries in Southeast Asia demonstrates why Guam is
14 so important and why DoD cannot rely on these
15 facilities for future mission requirements. In this
16 regard, DoD's recommendation is incredibly
17 shortsighted, considering only the current political
18 climate and not factoring in the possible political
19 hurdles which may emerge on bases that DoD relies on
20 in Asia. Guam apparently did not score points for
21 reliability in the DoD computer models.

22 Thirdly, DoD's recommendations assumes that
23 by mothballing the assets, they will be able to
24 return to Guam and simply open shop once again.
25 This is based on a false assumption that a skilled

1 force will be available to immediately respond to
2 their needs and that they would be welcomed back.
3 If the current recommendation is implemented, then
4 it is unlikely that a skilled workforce would be
5 ready to respond to DoD's needs, and it is even more
6 unlikely that DoD would be welcomed back with the
7 same enthusiasm as before. Moreover, many Naval
8 officials have already admitted that mothballing is
9 the least cost-effective approach to maintaining the
10 assets at SRF.

11 Military commanders will also have less
12 flexibility to respond to contingency, mobilization,
13 and future total force requirements, the third
14 criteria, under the DoD recommendation. DoD will
15 have less flexibility to response should a crisis
16 emerge in Korea or in Southeast Asia. In addition
17 to coordinating the deployment of troops, military
18 commanders will have to coordinate the MSC locations
19 on their cruises to meet up with the carrier battle
20 groups. Consequently, the Navy will have less
21 ability to effectively forward deploy and less
22 flexibility to respond to a crisis.

23 DoD's recommendations do not make sense
24 when we examine some of their initial cost
25 implications, the fifth criteria. First, the cost

1 of relocating the MSC ships in Hawaii is more
2 expensive than keeping them forward deployed in
3 Guam. This additional cost is borne because the MSC
4 ships should be on constant cruises to Guam and back
5 to Hawaii, which takes 14 to 20 days to complete
6 this circuit. DoD did not input the added cost of
7 these ship deployments into their calculation of
8 savings. By not figuring added costs for these ship
9 movements, the DoD planners seemed to assume that
10 Hawaii and Guam were in fact in the same place.

11 The economic impact of DoD's
12 recommendations on our island community is
13 devastating, representing the sixth selection
14 criteria. Up to 10 percent of our workforce and 25
15 percent of our economy will be affected making Guam
16 the hardest hit U.S. community. If this magnitude
17 of reductions were undertaken in California, then
18 about one-and-a-half million people would lose their
19 jobs.

20 In fact, the economic impact is greater
21 than what DoD's model indicates. Section
22 30 tax payments to Guam for military personnel
23 stationed here are not included in their
24 calculations. This represents up to \$19 million in
25 lost income to the people of Guam.

1 DoD's recommendation also seems to argue
2 that these closures and realignments will somehow
3 contribute positively to the environment, the final
4 criteria. However, it is more likely that
5 industrial sites such as SRF, FISC, and the fuel
6 tank farm will pose greater dangers in a mothballed
7 state through neglect. We on Guam are more
8 cognizant of the dangers of corrosion to plant
9 equipment in this tropical environment. Without
10 constant use and maintenance, environmental problems
11 are more likely to materialize at these facilities.

12 Guam's recommendation addresses the
13 concerns of military commanders in the Pacific
14 regarding the strategic military value of Guam,
15 DoD's need to save money, and Guam's effort to
16 adjust to the economic impact. Team Guam's
17 recommendation accomplishes this by responding to
18 the selection criteria.

19 Team Guam's approach would enable the
20 military commanders in the Pacific to respond to the
21 current and future mission requirements and improve
22 on operational readiness, the first criteria. By
23 keeping a core number of MSC ships forward deployed
24 in Guam, military commanders would maintain their
25 forward deployment in the Pacific and flexibly

1 respond to any contingency.

2 Moreover, maintaining facilities at a
3 downsized but operational state in Guam will provide
4 for DoD's need for reliable bases in the future. As
5 noted, it is problematic to rely on facilities on
6 foreign soil in Asia.

7 The second criteria, availability and
8 condition of land and facilities, is not of
9 concern -- excuse me -- since current facilities on
10 Guam are already performing the proposed missions.

11 Team Guam's recommendation is more
12 responsive to the third criteria, regarding the
13 availability to accommodate contingency,
14 mobilization, and future total force requirements
15 than DoD's own recommendations to mothball Guam. It
16 will enhance the ability of military commanders to
17 respond to a contingency quicker and more
18 efficiently with Guam's seven-day advantage over
19 Hawaii. Guam proved its military value in Desert
20 Storm, and Guam was instrumental in supporting the
21 logistic needs of this massive operation. In
22 attempting to answer your questions about their
23 ability to support a future contingency on the scale
24 of Desert Storm, military officials were evasive and
25 unclear in their responses.

1 The downsized presence on Guam, a
2 collaborative effort at SRF, and privatization
3 opportunities will save DoD money, the fourth
4 selection criteria.

5 Most importantly, from the perspective of
6 our local community, Team Guam's recommendation
7 would ease the economic impact on our community. A
8 certain core job base would be maintained and we
9 would be able to augment the SRF operation with
10 commercial work at our harbor facilities. Federal
11 civil service jobs would be maintained at a higher
12 level than the DoD proposal. This arrangement would
13 give us important economic tools from which to build
14 and grow our economy.

15 The Team Guam presented -- Proposal
16 presented to you today would preserve the Navy's
17 ability to support fleet operations in Southeast
18 Asia. It would also create long-term savings that
19 offset the savings projected from the DoD
20 recommendations to BRAC. This proposal is a win-win
21 situation, the Navy wins, but more importantly to
22 us, Guam wins.

23 Guam brings to the table three things that
24 no other domestic base has: location, location, and
25 location. Your jet lag --

1 (Applause.)

2 CONGRESSMAN UNDERWOOD: Your jet lag is a
3 reminder not that Guam is far from Washington, but
4 rather that Guam is closer to the action in Asia.
5 While we would not argue with the DoD determination
6 that its forward deployment in Southeast Asia is not
7 harmed, or its ability to conduct operations is not
8 diminished by the pullout on Guam, we would remind
9 the BRAC Commission that Guam can make these same
10 operations much easier to conduct. I do not know
11 whether you can translate increased operational
12 readiness into dollar savings.

13 The Team Guam proposal has at its
14 centerpiece the forward deployment on Guam of the
15 MSC supply ships and the helicopter squadron which
16 supports these ships. This forward deployment would
17 put the supply ships where they can be best
18 utilized, seven days ahead of fleet operations
19 coming from Hawaii, and just behind the lines of
20 potential trouble spots in the South China Sea.

21 To save money, the DoD recommendation
22 proposes mothballing SRF and FISC. The Team Guam
23 proposal addresses these issues so that savings can
24 still be realized. SRF would be operated in a
25 collaborative venture. FISC would continue to

1 support the fleet logistic needs. It was reported
2 yesterday that FISC's customer base is anchored in
3 the 42 percent of the sales that are attributed to
4 MSC supply ships.

5 The core customer base for the SRF would be
6 the MSC supply ships. The supply ships provided 70
7 percent of the work at SRF last year, and the work
8 base for the supply ships at SRF far exceeds 70
9 percent in a typical year.

10 Team Guam has proposed an innovative and
11 attractive solution to meet our mutual needs. We
12 hope that BRAC would look favorably at these
13 proposals, but we must be unequivocal in our
14 opposition to the current DoD recommendations.

15 If the commission decides not to implement
16 the Team Guam proposal, then the least it should do
17 is ensure Guam's economic future by turning over the
18 assets that GovGuam has requested. This includes
19 the SRF dry dock and infrastructure, the waterfront
20 assets, land not needed anymore, warehouses and
21 structures not being utilized for fleet operations
22 anymore.

23 Guam could use these assets for its own
24 economic recovery. The DoD's plan would simply
25 allow these assets to deteriorate over time. In

1 fact, the DoD's recommendation makes a strange
2 point. While scaling back on Guam, DoD hedges its
3 bets by retaining assets in case of some unspecified
4 future contingency. Guam has a message to DoD: you
5 can't have it both ways. If we are left to fend for
6 ourselves, we will. But DoD would have to seriously
7 reconsider whether Guam would be as hospitable to
8 DoD's needs in the future. This is a serious flaw
9 in the DoD thinking that we would ask the commission
10 to consider. This is the kind of thinking that
11 takes the people of Guam for granted, the kind that
12 sees Guam as little more than property made valuable
13 by its potential to conduct war and that sees the
14 benefits of forward deployment accrue to foreigners
15 over the U.S. citizens of Guam.

16 And I want to emphasize that we're talking
17 about people. I want to emphasize the human
18 dimension of the DoD recommendation so that we can
19 put these closures in perspective. I was stopped
20 while at the post office the other morning by one
21 Chamorro who transferred back to his homeland last
22 year and had just gotten a position at FISC. Now
23 facing the prospect of a layoff, he is at a loss as
24 to what he can do, how will he provide for his
25 family, where will he find a job. He can't just

1 drive into the next county and find a job.

2 You met Junior Parcon on your tour of the
3 FISC fuel farm yesterday. He has saved -- served
4 the Navy for 25 years and has been at FISC for 13
5 years. He is now the deputy director of the fuel
6 department and is the expert on fuel matters. He
7 has been told by DoD that his expertise will be
8 mothballed even though the Navy has not yet figured
9 out how it will provide for the ships and planes if
10 we have to fight another Desert Storm.

11 You might also recall Captain Bermudes'
12 justifiable pride in the local workforce at SRF. In
13 his words, they can do anything. The welders, the
14 pipefitters, and sheet metal workers and every
15 category of skilled worker at SRF is among the best
16 in the trade. In response to your question about
17 mothballing SRF and then returning to SRF in a
18 surge, Captain Bermudes expressed his concern about
19 the problems of finding new workers and the
20 tremendous loss of an indigenous skilled workforce.
21 Maybe the surge you referred to is similar to 1945.
22 Back then SRF had at its peak over 166 ships under
23 repair at the same time. Back then the Chamorros
24 did not have these skills that took years to
25 accumulate. The Chamorros cooked, cleaned the base,

1 and emptied the garbage. And the base was built on
2 their land, the village of Sumay, expropriated for
3 defense needs in order to prosecute the war against
4 Japan.

5 So today SRF must compete for work on U.S.
6 Navy ships with a Japanese shipyard. And to further
7 compound the irony, not only is SRF, like FISC and
8 PWC, completely manned by an indigenous skilled
9 workforce, but SRF is also commanded by Captain Eloy
10 Bermudes, a native son of Guam. And if the Navy
11 leaves SRF, if the Navy mothballs its facilities,
12 will Sumay then be returned and will the people of
13 Guam ever be made whole?

14 Team Guam has given DoD a way to stay, a
15 way to save money, and a way to prepare this
16 community for the challenges that we face as a
17 people in the next decade. This is not exactly give
18 us liberty or give us death, but it is certainly
19 give us a chance to work together or give us back
20 the assets.

21 Thank you.

22 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much,
23 Congressman Underwood.

24 (Applause.)

25 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Now I'd like to turn to

1 Commissioner Cornella who, I believe, has some
2 questions and comments to address to you three
3 gentlemen.

4 REMARKS BY COMMISSIONER AL CORNELLA

5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Governor, Mr.
6 Underwood, Mr. Speaker, I'd like to thank all three
7 of you for your eloquent testimony and to make a few
8 remarks regarding to some of the Speaker's comments.

9 This commission is an independent
10 commission, independent of the Department of
11 Defense. If your voices are unimportant, then this
12 hearing is a charade. But we do not believe that
13 your voices are unimportant. They are a very
14 important part of this process. We will take them
15 into consideration, transcripts will be made of this
16 hearing, and it will be provided to all the
17 commissioners. I understand your passion. And I
18 can understand why you are the speaker.

19 Thank you, Madame Chair.

20 (Applause.)

21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Who wants to follow that
22 comment. So with that, we will break for ten
23 minutes and return. Thank you very much.

24 (Brief recess.)

25 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome back.

1 I thought before we have the gentlemen
2 before us testify, I would show a few of the
3 wonderful posters that we've been given by some of
4 the local children. For a couple of different
5 reasons: I -- We were so well aware of how these
6 recommendations impact communities. And, secondly,
7 defense and national defense, it's for the kids in
8 the long haul, so that these children are involved
9 in the process and concerned about it, it just
10 really tickles us that they took the time to do
11 this.

12 So we will show Clifford's wonderful olive
13 green ship welcome to the -- "Welcome to Guam BRAC
14 team."

15 "Working together for a brighter future,
16 it's a good start," Joseph.

17 And "Keep us working together." We look
18 forward to trying to come on to some common ground
19 here with the recommendations on what our the final
20 product will be.

21 Thank you, kids.

22 Alrighty, down to business. Will those at
23 the dais please stand and raise your right hands?

24 SENATOR FORBES: Oh, right hand.

25 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Got it?

1 SENATOR FORBES: Okay.

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay.

3 Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the
4 testimony you are about to give to the Defense Base
5 Closure and Realignment Commission shall be truth,
6 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

7 MR. CRUZ: I do.

8 MR. CALVO: I do.

9 MR. SANCHEZ: I do.

10 ARCHBISHOP APURON: I do.

11 SENATOR CRISTOBAL: I do.

12 SENATOR FORBES: I do.

13 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you. You may be
14 seated.

15 We will begin with Mr. Manny Cruz, who will
16 have ten minutes.

17 TESTIMONY BY MR. MANUEL Q. CRUZ

18 MR. CRUZ: Honorable Commissioners, my name is
19 Manuel Q. Cruz. I am the president of the American
20 Federation of Government Employees, Local 1689, Inc.

21 AFGE is the exclusive representative for
22 about 4,000 bargaining unit members in 12 Navy
23 commands and activities, the Air Force at Andersen
24 Air Force Base, the Navy Exchange, the Army and Air
25 Force Exchange Service, the Defense Commissary

1 Agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service,
2 the Defense Printing Office, the Defense Information
3 Systems Agency, and the Defense Reutilization and
4 Marketing Office.

5 On behalf of the -- of all the federal
6 employees, I come before you to express our serious
7 concerns with the latest Defense Department's BRAC
8 recommendations, namely, to close the Naval Ship
9 Repair Facility, to disestablish the Fleet and
10 Industrial Supply Center, to realign the Naval
11 Activities, and to redirect the Naval Air Station.

12 Given these recommendations, I believe that
13 the Department of the Navy, for its part, has
14 deliberately lied, misled, and betrayed the faith
15 and trust of the employees of Guam. Note that I
16 refer to the Department of the Navy because I know
17 for a fact that the local military leaders are only
18 following marching orders as required.

19 Now let me just explain what I have just
20 stated.

21 The proposed closure of SRF is just one
22 example of a broken promise. For some time after
23 BRAC 93, the CINCPACFLT Efficiency Review (ER) Team
24 has been working very closely with the SRF to cut
25 costs and to cut personnel because of budget

1 constraints and budget shortfalls. In the interest
2 of partnership, both union and management agreed to
3 embrace the concept of becoming a lean,
4 cost-efficient service provider. It could be said
5 that the SRF had reinvented itself long before the
6 reinvention of government initiative had been
7 invented. Since early 1994, the SRF has been
8 leading the way in doing more with less, reducing
9 its budget and personnel through downsizing and
10 rightsizing. Many good workers have since left the
11 SRF through optional retirement, voluntary early
12 retirement (VERA), and voluntary resignation in
13 order to make room for the younger workers. And I
14 present you exhibits. Many of these workers
15 actually believed that the downsizing and the
16 budget-cutting efforts of the SRF will ultimately
17 save the SRF from any planned closure in the future.

18 Also, the past two years, the Navy has
19 allowed the SRF to undergo substantial reductions in --
20 in depot maintenance capability because of the
21 conversion and transfer of the Navy supply ships to
22 the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Under the MSC,
23 the supply ships were doomed to long-term
24 deployments on the high seas. It is a well-known
25 fact that planned maintenance and repair are going

1 to be infrequent. Thus, it is not a big surprise
2 that the MSC will opt to be homeported in Hawaii
3 rather than in Guam for very obvious reasons. Guam
4 is not as attractive as Hawaii for the many single
5 and unaccompanied sailors and mariners assigned to
6 the ships.

7 Another sad story was FISC. With the
8 drawdown and eventual closure of Subic Bay in the
9 Philippines, there were high hopes among the
10 employees that Guam will be the recipient of
11 additional manpower, equipment, and material. Guam
12 will be become the supermarket of the Pacific. With
13 the MSC and supply ships homeported here, it
14 appeared that Guam has a bright future. However,
15 the recommendation to transfer MSC and the supply
16 ships, including the ammunition ships, to Hawaii is
17 the nail driven into the coffin of FISC. You cut
18 off the customer base and your future is gone.

19 When the -- When the Naval Magazine
20 (NAVMAG) and the Naval Station (NAVSTA) merged in
21 October 1994 to become the Naval Activities
22 (NAVACTS), it was primarily intended to solidify and
23 maximize the operational infrastructure of both
24 commands. And I've presented you exhibits. You
25 will note that the merger was to have little effect

1 on the tenant commands, such as SRF and FISC.
2 However, the recommendation to realign NAVACTS
3 appears to be utterly contradictory to the intent of
4 the merger. In hindsight, it all fits in now like a
5 glove. But why lie about it.

6 The most serious case scenario is the
7 pending closure of the Naval Air Station (NAS).
8 From the very beginning in June 1994, the Navy
9 failed to comply with the BRAC 93 recommendations.
10 The civilian workers supported the closure based on
11 the relocation of the operation to Andersen Air
12 Force Base. However, this did not happen for the
13 reason given: lack of proper infrastructure at
14 Andersen Air Force Base. The aircraft squadrons
15 ultimately moved to the Continental United States.
16 However, note that none of the civilian workers who
17 worked in support of the squadrons ever moved with
18 them. When it was revealed that the Navy did not
19 comply with the BRAC 93 recommendations to relocate
20 to Andersen Air Force Base, the union filed an
21 unfair labor practice complaint for bad faith
22 bargaining on the part of the Navy. Even though a
23 response was made, the issue was not thoroughly
24 addressed. More so, when Congressman Underwood had
25 pursued the matter at the Congressional level.

1 Unfortunately, the latest recommendation has now
2 rendered this issue moot.

3 Honorable commissioners, you can see how
4 far the Department of the Navy has dared to treat
5 Guam and the civilian employees. I believe that we
6 have been treated poorly and unfairly. In short, we
7 have been forced to fail. We really do not want to
8 lose the bases. Please help us keep the bases. We
9 want to continue as federal employees long into the
10 21st century. However, in the event that the bases
11 in question do have budgetary problems, we want to
12 go on record in support of a joint use between the
13 Navy and any commercial organization with the
14 government of Guam in the brokerage role. We do not
15 want to see this -- these bases mothballed and
16 inactive. Keeping them operating and keeping us
17 working for the Navy and for the American people.

18 Thank you and Si Yu'os Ma'ase.

19 (Applause.)

20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.

21 Let's see. With the Chamber of Commerce,
22 follows, I -- I note that I have ten minutes here
23 for both of you gentlemen. Are you speaking
24 together or ...?

25 MR. CALVO: That's correct.

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Do it however you
2 choose. You may proceed, thank you.

3 TESTIMONY BY MR. OVIDIO R.A. CALVO, JR.

4 AND SIMON A. SANCHEZ II

5 MR. CALVO: Good morning, Commissioners Steele
6 and Cornella. Welcome to Guam.

7 I am Ovidio Calvo, Jr., Chairman of the
8 Board of the Guam Chamber of Commerce. I am joined
9 by Simon A. Sanchez II, business representative to
10 the Guam BRAC ad hoc task force.

11 Mr. Sanchez and I appreciate this
12 opportunity to submit the Guam business community's
13 position statement regarding the Department of
14 Defense's recommendations to the Base Realignment
15 and Closure Commission.

16 The position presented in this statement
17 represents views of a consortium of Guam's major
18 private sector organizations. Collectively, our
19 organizations generate over 75 percent of Guam's
20 \$3.1 billion Gross Island Product and employ a
21 private sector workforce of over 46,000 employees.

22 The business community of Guam opposes
23 DoD's recommendations to the BRAC to reduce the Navy
24 presence and retain the assets for possible
25 contingencies.

1 We believe Guam remains a strategically
2 vital area for supporting our defense interests in
3 this region. The proposed realignment misses the
4 opportunity to combine the need to save defense
5 dollars with Guam's ability to share the costs by
6 jointly operating and marketing realigned facilities
7 as public private ventures. Rather than simply
8 reducing DoD's presence on Guam, BRAC should require
9 DoD to pursue collaborative arrangements for
10 community reuse of productive assets that will no
11 longer be utilized to their fullest capacity.
12 Contingency needs of the military can be met even
13 with the realigned assets under a joint-use
14 arrangement. The cost of maintaining or mothballing
15 underutilized assets can be saved by the Navy.

16 However, if such a collaborative approach
17 is not a viable option, then the DoD must relinquish
18 unilateral control over the productive assets it
19 intends to close and allow these assets to be
20 managed and developed by the people of Guam. The
21 productive reuse of realigned assets by the people
22 of Guam will offset the adverse impact of these
23 recommendations by providing the basis for expanding
24 and diversifying our economy.

25 The challenge for all of us is to forge an

1 approach which meets the needs of Guam and the DoD
2 as partners in Guam's future. A realigned and
3 efficient military presence on Guam and the
4 expansion of economic opportunity for island
5 residents can be realized without compromising the
6 military's needs or crippling Guam's economic
7 future.

8 There is an opportunity to build a new
9 future for Guam upon the foundations of change,
10 which are occurring now. We are ready to roll up
11 our sleeves and work to take advantage of this
12 moment in history. We will all be the better for
13 it.

14 The DoD recommendations will significantly
15 reduce the military's contribution to the island's
16 economy. We estimate as much as 15 to 20 percent of
17 Guam's total economic activity, or half a billion
18 dollars annually could be lost. Based on DoD
19 estimates, almost 5,000 local residents could lose
20 their jobs, producing an estimated annual loss of
21 150- to \$200 million in wages. The 2100 military
22 jobs being eliminated represent almost 30 percent of
23 the 7,000 active duty enlisted serving on Guam.

24 Island businesses will lose sales and
25 profits. Local tax revenues will plummet. The

1 adverse multiplier effect on our economy will be
2 significant, far exceeding the figures calculated by
3 DoD. Time does not allow for detailed projections
4 of the adverse economic impact but some preliminary
5 assessments can be made.

6 During the last three years, military
7 construction projects totaled over \$300 million.
8 There is great concern that ongoing projects at SRF,
9 FISC, and Naval station slated for completion in
10 early 1996 could be subject to termination for
11 convenience of the federal government.

12 Construction projects already contracted
13 should be completed. Unfinished projects would be
14 of no use to either the Navy or us.

15 Retailers estimate that 30 percent of
16 military and dependent personnel shop outside the
17 base, an amount sure to decrease with the proposed
18 realignment.

19 Military cargo volumes lower shipping costs
20 to and from Guam. Less military cargo being shipped
21 to Guam will result in higher prices for consumers.

22 Auto sales are expected to drop 10 to \$15
23 million annually.

24 Food and beverage businesses and suppliers,
25 recreation and the entertainment industry will see

1 an estimated 10 to 20 percent drop in businesses.

2 Credit which has been extended by financial
3 institutions for housing and personal loans risk
4 default. No sector of our economy will be
5 unaffected by the downsizing of the Navy activities
6 on Guam. The impact will be felt by every citizen
7 of Guam, including the remaining military personnel.

8 Given the magnitude of the impacts, any
9 realignment must allow sufficient amount of
10 transition time for Guam to attract the investment
11 and create the industries that can replace the
12 economic losses created.

13 We will recover but we need time, and we
14 need access to the assets.

15 MR. SANCHEZ: In 1962, President Kennedy lifted
16 the security restrictions on access to Guam. Prior
17 to this time, the DoD controlled access to Guam
18 which produced only minimal economic activity. If
19 we can learn one thing from Guam's history, we
20 should know that military controlled access to
21 valuable property is not good for business.

22 In the 60's, the largest employers were the
23 Navy and the government of Guam, employing over 80
24 percent of the civilian workforce which numbered
25 less than 10,000 jobs.

1 In 1969, airline flights to Japan were
2 inaugurated. In 1972, the first hotels opened.
3 Guam's tourism industry began to grow. One
4 generation later, Guam employs over 65,000 people,
5 and two out of the every three employees work for a
6 privately-owned company. Since 1984, over 25,000
7 new jobs have been added, an increase of 125 percent
8 in ten years. Today, there are over 8,000 hotel
9 rooms. In 1994, almost 1.1 million tourists visited
10 Guam, nearly double the amount of visitors since
11 1988.

12 The Gross Island Product has increased 75
13 percent in the last six years, making Guam one of
14 the fastest growing economies in the world.
15 Personal income exceeds 2.3 billion and has grown at
16 an annual rate of 11 percent since 1988.

17 It is amazing what the people of Guam can
18 do when given access to assets. See all those
19 graphs, they start to go up when we get to profit.

20 (Laughter.)

21 MR. SANCHEZ: We have a demonstrated ability to
22 attract investment, create jobs, and generate
23 profits. We have business links with Asia, the
24 Pacific, and America and we are ideally located to
25 capitalizing on these relationships. The shared use

1 of Navy dock-side land, wharves, and facilities will
2 spur Guam's next growth phase.

3 A new Apra Harbor can be developed to
4 expand transshipment, warehousing, fueling,
5 industrial repair, fishing, and light manufacturing
6 uses.

7 SRF facilities can be operated by private
8 companies to continue ship and other complementary
9 types of industrial repair, serving both Navy and
10 civilian markets.

11 The warehousing at FISC could -- excuse me --
12 The warehousing at FISC could provide the anchor
13 facility for a Free Trade Zone. Light assembly
14 industries could be attracted to Guam for duty-free
15 access to U.S. and Asian markets.

16 Guam can continue to serve as a
17 redistribution and transshipment center to markets
18 throughout the entire Pacific while giving Navy
19 supply ships priority access to dock-side
20 facilities.

21 Guam's tuna industry, which currently
22 transships 9 million metric tons annually, could
23 grow with increased berthing capacity.

24 Passenger cruise ships from Asia could
25 bring additional tourists to Guam. Unfortunately,

1 our Commercial Port lacks wharf space and there is
2 no room to build a passenger terminal.

3 Industries investing in ocean systems
4 technology could utilize the University of Guam's
5 world-class marine biology program for research and
6 development. The oceans represent the last
7 unexplored frontier on the planet and Guam can play
8 an integral part in ocean research in the next
9 century.

10 Economic expansion and a realigned Navy are
11 not mutually exclusive. All that is needed is the
12 vision, political will, and the good faith in each
13 other to accomplish the goals of the DoD and the
14 people of Guam. It is our hope that the BRAC will
15 provide the impetus to forge a new partnership
16 between Guam and the U.S. military.

17 We gather today at a historical crossroad.
18 By 1998, Guam will have spent nearly 100 years as a
19 colony of the United States.

20 Military interests have dominated the
21 decision matrix for most of Guam's history. Since
22 1945, one-third of Guam's land has been controlled
23 by the military for active and contingent needs.

24 But at the end of this week, the BRAC
25 process will force the release of NAS Agana because,

1 with the new world order, we have all come to
2 realize that keeping thousands of acres of valuable
3 Guam land idle for military contingencies doesn't
4 make sense any more.

5 We need to provide a future for the people
6 of Guam. Thousands of our people have fought and
7 died and worked to make America strong and to make
8 Guam better. We cannot and we must not forget their
9 sacrifices or throw away their hard earned skills
10 and talent. We must give the people of Guam a new
11 opportunity. We must give them hope. That is our
12 duty and moral obligation as shapers of public
13 policy and defenders of our country.

14 None of this rhetoric is supposed to be
15 listened to in your job description. Frankly
16 speaking, we don't have a lot of leverage on this.
17 But all we can do is ask you and appeal to your
18 sense of doing the right thing: Sustain the
19 strategic presence, save the money by sharing the
20 use, provide the opportunity for our future.

21 Thank you, God bless you and good luck.

22 (Applause.)

23 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

24 And God bless you, too, as we move to the
25 Archbishop.

1 (Laughter.)

2 TESTIMONY BY ARCHBISHOP ANTHONY S. APURON, OFM CAP.

3 ARCHBISHOP APURON: Good afternoon, ladies and
4 gentlemen, distinguished commissioners of the
5 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission,
6 honored local dignitaries, yan i manaotao-hu Guahan
7 (My people of Guam).

8 I am pleased to be given this opportunity
9 to address this panel of commissioners with respect
10 to the recommendations made by the Department of the
11 Defense for the closure of certain Naval facilities
12 on Guam.

13 I would like to begin by recognizing the
14 difficult job that the commissioners of BRAC are
15 tasked to do. You are mandated by Congress to
16 reduce military costs. This is the job that has
17 been handed on to you. And in order to meet the
18 demands of Congress, it has been necessary for you
19 to make some difficult decisions in the past. The
20 actions of BRAC have already closed many military
21 bases throughout the world and throughout the United
22 States, and certainly more closures will occur in
23 the fullness of time.

24 Each of these actions, whether they have
25 occurred in California or Pennsylvania or Texas, no

1 matter where, each of these actions has been
2 accompanied by a degree of pain. Many BRAC actions,
3 throughout the United States, have caused the loss
4 of jobs, of livelihoods. In most cases, human lives
5 have been affected.

6 You are intelligent and compassionate men
7 and women, and I am certain that this human element
8 has weighed upon you with every action. None of you
9 wishes to cause human suffering; none of us wishes
10 to do that. Yet, the very nature of the mandate you
11 have means that your actions have to some degree
12 must this -- this -- have this effect.

13 As I have said, you have a most difficult
14 task, indeed. In previous years, you have been
15 petitioned by many communities who have struggled
16 with the condition of having military installations
17 closed which affected the livelihoods of their
18 people. Many have asked that you spare them this
19 fate. You cannot be immune to these pleas, I know.
20 They must affect you even when you rule otherwise.

21 Of course, we on Guam would like to see our
22 people who will be affected by these closures
23 spared. We, as others before us, would like to see
24 them continue with their careers. We would like to
25 see our people spared this fear, this uncertainty,

1 this pain.

2 If you do decide to close these bases, as
3 you have so many others, that will be a painful
4 decision. But if you decide to close these bases,
5 and at the same time, not also decide to return the
6 assets and the land associated with them to the
7 people of Guam in order that we can do whatever is
8 possible to provide for our people, then that will
9 be a more than just a painful decision. It will be
10 an immoral decision.

11 I must tell you that when I first read of
12 the Department of Defense's decision to close these
13 bases, I was saddened deeply. My thoughts and
14 prayers went out to those families who would be
15 harmed by such a decision. But when I read of the
16 military's desire to retain these bases and assets
17 after they were closed, I was angered. How could
18 anyone, especially our United States government and
19 especially our Department of Defense, morally
20 justify taking these jobs away from our people, and
21 at the same time, refuse to return the properties
22 associated with them to Guam and its people? That
23 is surely one of the most blatant cases I have ever
24 seen of adding insult to injury.

25 If you decide to close these Naval

1 facilities, it will be a painful enough reality for
2 all of us to deal with, and I sincerely hope that
3 you would spare our people. But if that is not
4 done, I assure you that in the end, Siempre
5 manmanganna' ham (we will overcome) for we are a
6 resilient people, as we have shown time and time
7 again.

8 In the book of Ecclesiastes, Chapter 3,
9 Verses 1 through 8, we read:

10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Here comes pressure.

11 ARCHBISHOP APURON: "There is a season --

12 (Laughter.)

13 ARCHBISHOP APURON: -- for everything, a time
14 for every occupation under heaven; a time for giving
15 birth, a time for dying; a time for planting, a time
16 for uprooting what has been planted. A time for
17 killing, a time for healing; a time for knocking
18 down, a time for building. A time for tears, a time
19 for laughter; a time for mourning, a time for
20 dancing. A time for throwing stones away and a time
21 for gathering them up; a time for embracing, a time
22 to refrain from embracing. A time for searching, a
23 time for losing; a time for keeping, a time for
24 throwing away. A time for tearing and a time for
25 sewing; a time for keeping silent, and a time for

1 speaking. A time for loving, a time for hating; a
2 time for war, and a time for peace."

3 As is obvious in life, in the end, change
4 is a necessary condition of our human existence, and
5 pain is frequently an unavoidable consequence of
6 change as in life itself. As christians, we believe
7 that everything serves in some manner the will of
8 God, and that there are limits to what we, as mortal
9 human beings, can do to control this world, which in
10 the end, like humanity, is God's creation.

11 But although we recognize in deep humility
12 that we are creatures of our creator and subject to
13 his will, this does not remove us from all the
14 obligation to treat our fellow human beings with
15 decency, respect, and compassion. On the contrary,
16 as we are all children of God, and as it is morally
17 incumbent that each one of us demonstrate compassion
18 to our brothers and sisters at all times, for as
19 Christ himself said in Matthew, 24, Verse 40:
20 "Insofar as you did this to one of the least
21 brothers (and sisters) of mine, you did it to me."

22 As you wrestle with this, only the latest
23 in so many difficult decisions you have had to make,
24 I call -- I call upon you that compassion in you. I
25 am no military expert and can make no military

1 arguments. But like David in front of Goliath, I
2 can only appeal to that which lives in all of us,
3 that which guides us and tells us what is right and
4 what is wrong, what is just and what is unjust.

5 Do not allow insult to be added to this
6 injury that is being done to us. If the decision is
7 for these bases to be closed, then, gi na'an Yu'os
8 (in God's name), na'i ham tatte ni guinahan-mami
9 lokkue (give us back our resources as well), kosaki
10 sina in che'gue hafa debi di in che'gue (so that we
11 can do what we must do) para in pribiniyi i
12 mane'lun-mami ni ipara u faninnafekta ni este na
13 matdesidun desision (to provide our brothers and
14 sisters who will be affected by this malicious
15 decision).

16 Este ha, in fin, i it mas sentidu debi di
17 umacho'gue!

18 This, finally, is the moral thing to do.

19 Si Yu'os ma'ase. Thank you.

20 (Applause.)

21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.
22 Humbling.

23 Senator Cristobal, I believe you have eight
24 minutes.

25 TESTIMONY BY SENATOR HOPE A. CRISTOBAL

1 SENATOR CRISTOBAL: Thank you.

2 Amanu na guaha minalagu', guaha nina'sina.
3 Yangin un hongge na sina un aligao ya un na'magahet!
4 Sa'yangin fine'ne'na ti un tanga ya un chagi, taya'u
5 faloffan magahet.

6 Simply put, where there is a will, there is
7 a way.

8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I thought my jet lag
9 kicked in.

10 (Laughter and applause.)

11 SENATOR CRISTOBAL: Buenas yan hafa adai,
12 Commissioner Steele and Commissioner Cornella.

13 We recognize the legal mandate of the Base
14 Realignment and Closure Commission and we are aware
15 of the criteria that you must follow.

16 The current Department of Defense
17 recommendations propose to close Ship Repair
18 Facility Guam and transfer and retain appropriate
19 assets at Naval Activities Guam. Additionally, the
20 Department of Defense recommends the realignment of
21 Naval Activities Guam, the trans -- the transfer of
22 various activities to Hawaii, and the retention of
23 waterfront assets for support mobilization and
24 contingencies. Finally, Fleet Industrial Supply
25 Center Guam (FISC) is slated for disestablishment.

1 The BRAC process, we are told, is a reality
2 we must face. We reiterate that we are aware of
3 this commission's legal mandate. If the BRAC
4 process is a reality we must deal with, then we, the
5 leaders of the Guam, have an obligation to express
6 the Guam reality. The Guam reality should serve to
7 develop a conscience to the BRAC process as it is
8 applied to Guam, while still allowing your
9 commission to fulfill its mandate.

10 The Guam reality is that we are a
11 possession of the United States.

12 The Guam reality is that the United States
13 military proudly defended our dependent status as a,
14 quote, "National Security Asset," unquote.

15 The Guam reality is that no family on Guam
16 has escaped the impact of the United States military
17 presence here.

18 The Guam reality comes from the framework
19 of the military, its command and control
20 personality, its bureaucratic machinations, its
21 massive expenditure of money, and, of course, its
22 concerns for security.

23 The Guam reality is that the United States
24 decisions affecting Guam continue to be made within
25 a colonial framework.

1 The Guam reality is that this island
2 developed economically, socially, and politically
3 around the military who unilaterally established the
4 bases here.

5 The Guam reality is that strategic bases
6 were built on prime land taken by the military.
7 Land that otherwise would have been instrumental in
8 developing a vibrant local economy.

9 The Guam reality is that there is no
10 consensus and much disagreement among military
11 leaders about Guam's current strategic value in
12 relation to U.S. interests in the region.

13 The Guam reality, my dear commissioners, is
14 that now you want to close the bases and keep the
15 property.

16 The Guam reality is that by doing so,
17 thousands of special-skill workers are released to a
18 community that cannot, cannot readily employ them in
19 those areas.

20 The Guam reality is that at least ten
21 percent of the jobs on Guam will be lost.

22 The Guam reality is that approximately 30
23 percent of the total income earned on Guam will
24 disappear.

25 The Guam reality is that the historical

1 connection between the U.S. military and the people
2 of Guam cannot be overstated and must be expressed.

3 We understand the BRAC 95 mandate. We
4 realize that a reduction from a 600-ship Navy to
5 just over 300 ships requires significant military
6 budget cuts. We do not argue with the concomitant
7 cost savings that will result from these cuts.

8 However, Department of Defense
9 recommendations to close, realign, and disestablish
10 activities, while at the same time retaining assets
11 and facilities, are unacceptable and untenable. The
12 people of Guam cannot be reasonably expected to
13 survive the economic impact of these closures and
14 realignments without the means for economic
15 recovery.

16 In light of the BRAC 95 reality, give us
17 the opportunity to determine our reality by giving
18 us the assets which provide a basis for economic
19 revitalization. Do not deny us the means to chart
20 our future course.

21 A key component of President Clinton's
22 policy on base closures is, quote, "economic
23 revitalization," unquote, for communities that are
24 affected by base closures. This is echoed as well
25 in statements made by the Secretary of Defense and

1 the Secretary of the Navy. BRAC, in its
2 deliberations, must in good conscience take in full
3 account the historical connections between the U.S.
4 military and the people of Guam. And BRAC must
5 understand the devastating impact these closures
6 will have on Guam.

7 In the Department of Defense's base closure
8 and realignment report, the sections describing the,
9 quote, "Economic Impact on Communities," unquote,
10 begin with the same phrase, quote, "Assuming no
11 economic recovery ..." continuing quote, "if the
12 recommended base closures are implemented as now
13 stated, no economic recovery will become a Guam
14 reality."

15 Our geographic location has been and
16 continues to be both a boon and a bane. A boon,
17 when we are able to use our geographic location to
18 our benefit, and, a bane, when it is used to serve
19 the interest of others at our expense. A boon when
20 we are able to chart our course; a bane when its
21 strategic value overrides our community needs. A
22 boon when we can effectively change our quality of
23 life; a bane when we become a pawn in a bigger game.

24 Today, we are faced with another unilateral
25 act involving the closure and realignment of

1 significant U.S. military activities in Guam. The
2 bean counters will get together, create information
3 and financial databases, look at the world as a
4 spreadsheet, create little scenarios, and then
5 unilaterally change the Guam reality.

6 The Pentagon has offered you its option
7 without benefit of our input. This Pentagon option
8 meets all of the Pentagon's needs. Costs cut,
9 assets are retained so that just in case the Navy
10 can come back again to use Guam.

11 The Pentagon offer, however, sacrifices the
12 legitimate needs of the people of Guam. These needs
13 are embodied in our right to self-determination and
14 our right to be self-sufficient.

15 Commissioners, we know the U.S. military
16 interests will be paramount in making your final
17 decisions, and these decisions may mean closure,
18 realignment, and disestablishment of military
19 activities. If so, allow for collaborative
20 arrangements between the U.S. military and the
21 government of Guam, and where appropriate, turn over
22 the assets and facilities necessary for this
23 community, our community, to economically
24 revitalize. To do otherwise would be to unjustly
25 shape the future Guam reality.

1 Si Yu'os ma'ase.

2 (Applause.)

3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator.

4 Senator Forbes.

5 TESTIMONY BY SENATOR MARK FORBES

6 SENATOR FORBES: Thank you.

7 Honorable Commissioners, I am here today to
8 testify against the Department of Defense
9 recommendations with respect to the essential
10 closure of the Fleet Industrial Supply Center and
11 Ship Repair Facility in Guam, and in support of
12 testimony provided previously by our Team Guam
13 leaders, the Governor, our Congressman, and the
14 Speaker.

15 The one thing we have learned, as a result
16 of these recommendations by DoD, as well as the
17 events in the past 15 years, is that in 97 years, in
18 spite of uneven and inequitable treatment, despite
19 outright discrimination, in spite of times that have
20 been occasionally contentious and troubled, Guam has
21 always been there for the Department of Defense.
22 But apparently, the Department of Defense does not
23 plan to always be there for Guam.

24 As has been testified previously, the
25 Department of Defense recommendations will have a

1 terrible impact upon literally thousands of our
2 people here in Guam who are employed directly by SRF
3 and FISC, as well as other activities. This impact
4 has yet to be quantified; yet it is clear that
5 regardless of the specifics, the effect will be
6 severe. It's going to affect my immediately family
7 and many immediate families in the Territory of
8 Guam. People who have worked hard for many years
9 contributing to America's defense are going to see
10 those careers cut short. They will see the
11 investment of many years come to a premature end.
12 If these recommendations go into effect, there is no
13 doubt that there will be anxiety, there will be
14 suffering. Others have already testified that the
15 closure of these bases will result in economic
16 distress for Guam for at least the short term.

17 Naturally, we would like to see our people
18 spared, but that decision is not ours to make, it is
19 yours. As Senator Cristobal said in so many words,
20 when the military came to Guam and established such
21 a huge presence here almost half a century ago, it
22 was of the military's own volition. When the
23 military condemned so much of our island for their
24 use depriving thousands of our people from the use
25 of their property, it was of the military's own

1 volition. And now, if the military chooses to leave
2 Guam and abandon thousands of people who have come
3 to rely upon them for their daily sustenance, it
4 will be of the military's own volition. We can ask
5 that you spare our people this trauma as so many
6 other communities before us have asked. But in the
7 end, if the military stays or goes to whatever
8 degree, it will be, as always, of their own
9 volition.

10 We ask that you spare our people. But if
11 the decision is that SRF and FISC are to be
12 essentially closed, it is vital that you give Guam
13 the assets and the resources we will need to do as
14 much as we can for the benefit of the people of
15 Guam.

16 The Department of Defense, in making its
17 recommendations, says that SRF and FISC are no
18 longer necessary for the national defense and,
19 consequently, should be closed. But they also say,
20 in effect, that someday they may be needed once
21 again and, therefore, propose that the Navy keep
22 these assets and maintain them in a mothballed
23 condition. If, indeed, the military believes that
24 these assets are valuable, then they should remain
25 open as facilities. If they believe that they may

1 be valuable at some point in the future, then our
2 position is that mothballing is neither cost
3 effective nor humane fashion in which to maintain
4 these facilities.

5 As has been testified earlier, Guam
6 believes that if BRAC decides to close these
7 facilities, it must allow for the return of these
8 assets so that they may be used and remain
9 productive, which, in our view, will not only help
10 us expand our local economy and ameliorate the
11 distress that will be caused by these actions, but
12 will also insure that the facilities are maintained
13 far more effectively than they would be under a
14 mothballing scenario, as well as provide further
15 cost savings to the federal government, since that
16 is BRAC's primary purpose. And since we all know
17 that mothballing costs money.

18 It has been suggested that facilities at
19 SRF could be maintained in some sort of joint-use
20 capacity, involving private capital and investment,
21 that would not only maintain a degree of military
22 use and reduce costs to the federal government, but
23 also bring new and commercial business to the
24 facility. Waterfront assets at Apra Harbor could be
25 converted to commercial use not only for cargo but

1 to provide for such services as do not exist in Guam
2 at this time, such as a true ocean terminal that
3 could expand our marine tourism industry. Assets
4 such as the fuel tanks at Sasa Valley could be
5 privatized and used for commercial fuel storage,
6 again reducing costs to the federal government while
7 providing a consistent source of fuel that could be
8 used by the military on a contingency or even an
9 on-going basis.

10 There are other areas BRAC should look at
11 as well, areas where the federal government can save
12 money without necessarily costing our people their
13 jobs. For example, maybe this is the time to turn
14 over the Fena Reservoir, and the attendant water --
15 water production facilities there, which would, of
16 course, save the military money with respect to
17 maintenance. What about the Admiral Nimitz Golf
18 Course which would again reduce costs to the federal
19 government for maintenance while providing a
20 facility that can be used by civilians and such
21 military community that will remain in Guam? What
22 about Tarague Beach? Why not relieve the federal
23 government of the burden of having to maintain that
24 beautiful and pristine beach? Or, the miles of
25 beach that stretch northward between Tanguisson and

1 Falcona? What about Nimitz Hill? Is all that
2 property necessary now? What about the thousands of
3 acres of land in Guam that have never been used by
4 the military for any purpose whatsoever?

5 The point is that by allowing Guam to
6 regain these assets, the federal government loses
7 nothing except for the costs of maintaining them.

8 Guam is part of the United States and as
9 such should these areas ever require use by the
10 military, although I have always been mystified by
11 how a golf course is critical to the defense of the
12 nation, they will always be there. The difference
13 is that in the meantime, they'll be productive.
14 They will be providing for the welfare and benefit
15 of those we must be most concerned about here, the
16 people of Guam.

17 The one thing that must not happen, the one
18 thing that would be adding supreme insult to
19 terrible injury would be to follow these Department
20 of Defense recommendations and close these bases,
21 harm our people and allow the military to keep all
22 the assets and deny us even the opportunity to try
23 and take care of our own. This you must not allow
24 to happen.

25 To misquote William Jennings Bryan, you

1 cannot allow the people of Guam to be crucified upon
2 a cross of contingencies.

3 For the balance of the afternoon, you're
4 going to be listening to testimony from our people.
5 We realize that since 1988, BRAC has already closed
6 hundreds of military activities, large and small,
7 and that you have heard the pleas of similar
8 communities throughout the United States, but we beg
9 you to understand that although this experience may
10 be something that you are used to, it is for us
11 unique. Our frustration is unique to us, our fear
12 and our anxiety are unique for us. And if some of
13 the testimony gives evidence to that fear, that
14 frustration, that anxiety, or even that anger, that
15 you hear it with compassion and understanding. And,
16 hopefully, the voices of our people will move you to
17 do that which is right, because in the end, that is
18 all that we can expect from you, to do that which is
19 right.

20 Thank you.

21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.

22 (Applause.)

23 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Commissioner Cornella.

24 QUESTION BY COMMISSIONER CORNELLA

25 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Madame

1 Chair.

2 I thank you all for your testimony. I do
3 have a question for the Chamber of Commerce.

4 Q. If you could tell me, on the economic
5 impact you said that was somewhat understated, can
6 you tell me what you used as a multiplier in
7 determining what that economic impact is?

8 MR. SANCHEZ: A. We don't have the specific
9 econometric multiplier, given the short time that we
10 were given, but what we looked at were some of the
11 macro-impacts. When we looked at the DoD figures
12 that are in the BRAC recommendations, we primarily
13 looked at the job impact, the indirect or direct job
14 losses that would occur. We then tried to
15 extrapolate the purchasing power that gets lost and
16 the impacts and the multiplier effects that affects
17 our -- our businesses. We've never had an
18 econometric model that, you know, I can show to you
19 and say it's a .743. But clearly in doing some
20 random -- some quick surveys of the auto industry,
21 of the shipping industry, some of the dynamics that
22 were there, we tried to give you a feel for some of
23 those dynamics. We'll try to document more fully
24 for you for the April 29th hearing some of those
25 impacts. But, in a quick search amongst our

1 membership, you know, we got a feel for -- I can't
2 tell you -- the bank -- the financial institution, I
3 can't tell you how many loans might go into default,
4 but I can tell you that they're very concerned that
5 they make a lot of loans to 5,000 people that aren't
6 going to be able to pay those back. And to the
7 degree we can document those, we'll give those to
8 you, but our point was the -- the DoD
9 recommendations really don't -- don't look at those
10 elements. They just kind of look at the job loss --
11 direct job loss.

12 MR. CALVO: A. And I would add that an
13 additional point is that there is an ongoing effort
14 between this consortium of business sector
15 organizations to compile as much information as
16 possible for any future efforts or hearings that may
17 be possible and we're more than willing to provide
18 you with whatever we can.

19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I believe a lot of
20 times the -- the impact numbers are understated
21 somewhat, having been on that side of the table.
22 The standard factor, I believe, was somewhere around
23 2.1, 2.3, as far as what's used by the military.
24 You know, I found that -- that four is probably
25 closer to the numbers. So I'm not sure what -- what

1 will be used, but I think it would be important to
2 try to document as much of that as you can, as you
3 stated, for the next hearing. Thank you.

4 MR. CALVO: We intend to, thank you.

5 MR. SANCHEZ: Thank you.

6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I just have a comment,
7 and I'm very encouraged by the unified support of
8 the community leaders that we've heard today. I
9 want to encourage you to act in unity both when you
10 look at the Naval Air Station for reuse plans and as
11 you consider possibly -- or proposals for the Navy
12 or maybe for the BRAC Commission, if you have them
13 prepared in time, for the waterfront. Particularly
14 regarding the commission, maybe in California,
15 obviously you can't have firm ideas all organized in
16 that period of time, but to the degree that you can
17 come up with concepts for this community and the
18 directions you would like to go, and bring them to
19 us and to the Navy and we can bounce them off the
20 Navy and -- maybe all that good stuff. Why, we have
21 an able staff to help facilitate those kinds of
22 things.

23 I think Guam is best served if -- if those
24 things go forward and I -- I said that second part
25 with the presumption (indicating) and that -- this

1 is in quotes which doesn't show on there -- but if
2 the secretary's recommendations would go forward, we
3 have no idea at this point where we'll be at the end
4 of this process. But I have you all in front of me
5 today as I say that, having watched communities go
6 through this the last couple of rounds, and a lot of
7 you might not have had the opportunity to see or to
8 learn from the experiences they've gone through.
9 But the more you can come together, the easier it is
10 for everybody to benefit and not suffer and have all
11 those curves shoot up high quickly.

12 At this point, we'd like to take a
13 five-minute break. And those that are testifying
14 this afternoon, I'd like to ask you to please come
15 to the center aisle, the staff will meet you there.
16 And then when we all come back, I'll swear you in.

17 Thank you very much. Five minutes.

18 (Brief recess.)

19 COMMISSIONER STEELE: As always at a first
20 hearing, we have run into a few little dents --
21 unanticipated bumps in the road, one of which is on
22 the sign-up sheet for this afternoon, there were
23 some instances of double name signup or people
24 signing up for someone other than themselves, which
25 really wasn't the intent of a public comment period

1 with first-come, first-serve right to speak. So
2 what we've decided to do is those who signed up who
3 do wish to speak for their two minutes, we'll
4 proceed with that group. Then with the time
5 remaining, folks who didn't sign up but others did
6 on their behalf, we will swear in that group. We're
7 still under the 45 minutes, so we should be fine.
8 And then we'll proceed with the additional speakers
9 at that time.

10 Would the first group of individuals who
11 did sign up and do plan to speak all rise?

12 Or how are we going to do this? Are they
13 going to come to the center? Or -- They're
14 scattered around.

15 You all don't have to come to the center,
16 that's okay, no problem.

17 Raise your right hands, please.

18 Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the
19 testimony you are about to give to the Defense Base
20 Closure and Realignment Commission shall be the
21 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

22 (All respond "I do.")

23 COMMISSIONER STEELE: When you proceed to the
24 microphone, if you could clearly state your name.

25 TESTIMONY BY SENATOR VICENTE C. PANGELINAN

1 SENATOR PANGELINAN: Two minutes.

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: You have two minutes.

3 SENATOR PANGELINAN: Let me just say that my
4 name is Vicente C. Pangelinan, I'm a senator in the
5 Twenty-third Guam Legislature and I'm a member of
6 Guam's second team of Team Guam, I guess. But I'm
7 glad to be in the game here.

8 On the issue of military importance, you
9 have the turnover of Hong Kong occurring in 1997.
10 The Korean Peninsular wars and problem continue to
11 exist. The brewing fight over the Spratly Island
12 between the different nations claiming that island.
13 The instability of the Middle East, the
14 renegotiation of the defense burden-sharing contract
15 with Japan that's up for renegotiation next year in
16 1996, are all issues that require military attention
17 with regards to the military's ability to respond in
18 the Asian Pacific Rim area should any kind of -- of
19 problem occur. And who else is closest situated to
20 this area? Guam, the island of Guam. Nobody can
21 tell me that for strategic purposes, Hawaii is
22 better able to serve the strategic needs of the
23 military with regards to that respect.

24 On tourism, let me just give you some
25 numbers. Under the QC program on Guam, we have

1 3,900 employees employed by that. The military in
2 its -- in its program says that they'll eliminate
3 over 6,900 jobs. The income tax payroll is \$49
4 million for a core industry. The military's payroll
5 that will be cut of these 6,000 employees is \$219
6 million. We will need to generate over 4,000 new --
7 over 12,000 new hotel rooms in order to be able to
8 sustain and meet the cuts that's going to occur.

9 Before World War II, the military evacuated
10 American citizens when intelligent sources indicated
11 an -- that an invasion was in danger. The people --
12 The people, after invasion came, felt the United
13 States abandoned them. They came back and liberated
14 the island and the people welcomed the Americans
15 back with open arms and willingly gave up their
16 land. As BRAC 94 recommendations instituted as is,
17 it will not be -- we will not have a -- what we will
18 have is a second abandonment. And if the U.S.
19 military returns after this due to a conflict in our
20 region, it won't be considered a second liberation,
21 ladies and gentlemen, but maybe a second occupation.
22 And instead, you may face confrontation instead of
23 cooperation.

24 Thank you.

25 (Applause.)

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you for your
2 testimony.

3 TESTIMONY BY MS. MARIANNE RIOS

4 MS. RIOS: Good afternoon, commissioners. My
5 name is Marianne --

6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I'm sorry, may I
7 interrupt for one second?

8 I have a suggestion. Would those who rose
9 as they were going to testify go to the back of the
10 room with John and he'll get you in order, so we'll
11 be able to expedite the process to have enough time
12 for everybody.

13 Sorry for the disruption.

14 MS. RIOS: No problem.

15 Good afternoon, Ms. Steele, Mr. Cornella.
16 Hafa adai to you and your staff.

17 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And your name, please.

18 MS. RIOS: My name is Marianne Rios. I'm
19 representing Guahan Landowners United.

20 This is an organization of members about 35
21 clans of Guahan landowners and you can roughly say
22 that they represent approximately 1500 heirs, and
23 they call themselves "original landowners."

24 Members of Guahan landowners want to be
25 known as members of an organization that stands for

1 private property rights. Their organization is
2 pro-constitution, not anti-military. We have among
3 our members ardent military supporters and American
4 patriots and veterans who have fought for the
5 American flag and who get their retirement
6 subsistence from that very federal government.
7 Guahan Landowners United's mission is to assure that
8 lands declared excess by the military and returned
9 to the government of Guam be returned to the
10 original landowners by their government. We don't
11 see anti-militarism in receiving back something we
12 gladly lent to the war effort for lots of personal
13 and economic sacrifice, and for very little rent
14 money, namely, lands which have been declared as
15 excess, not needed anymore for military strategies.
16 No, we don't see that as anti-military at all.

17 Anti-militarism is not the question here,
18 we hope, and the reason for the decision of closing
19 these facilities here on Guam. We doubt very much
20 that the livelihood of many thousands of people
21 working at SRF and FISC would be negligently
22 determined upon the -- because of a military or even
23 federal disdain on the exercise of inalienable
24 rights of the original landowners, namely, their
25 right to freedom of speech. This organization, as

1 an organization, has never jumped fences, at least
2 not yet, and hopes it will never have to. We
3 believe in exercising our right to speech and
4 participation within the conventional channels of
5 government. We don't know, however, if we can place
6 constraints upon our members who seem to be totally
7 fed up seeking results through the conventional
8 process.

9 I have given you my -- our written --

10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Statement for the rest of
11 the testimony.

12 MS. RIOS: -- testimony, and please study it
13 carefully.

14 Thank you very much for coming to Guam.

15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We will include it in the
16 record, and thank you very much. Sorry we --

17 MS. RIOS: Thank you.

18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- ran short on time
19 there.

20 (Applause.)

21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome.

22 TESTIMONY BY MS. MILLIE ARTERO

23 MS. ARTERO: Hafa adai, commissioners. Millie
24 Artero.

25 For every action, there's equal but

1 opposite reaction. In order to have a win-win
2 situation among the BRAC, the military, and the
3 community, policies must not stand in the way. I
4 view the base closures here on Guam, should it come
5 to fruition, as a threshold of righting the historic
6 wrong in the acquisition of our land by the
7 military. Twice the issue of compensation was
8 addressed but failed to deliver just compensation.
9 And after nearly 50 years, the meager sum received
10 is considered bad rent.

11 In order to promote the general welfare of
12 the people of Guam, we must do major reform by
13 restoring our fundamental principles. Perhaps
14 through this BRAC 95 process, we will be able to
15 right the wrong.

16 Regulations should not prevent the return
17 of land to the original owners or their heirs. The
18 people of Guam must come up with an economic plan
19 but should not preclude the return of land to the
20 original landowners. The original landowners will
21 gladly conform with such a plan.

22 To truly restore the island's economic
23 self-sufficiency and maintain the peace, government
24 of Guam must take the leadership and moral
25 responsibility of righting the injustices in the

1 violations of private property rights. Make no
2 mistake, this will create revenues for the people of
3 Guam thereby addressing public benefit and savings
4 to the federal government.

5 At the present, the federal and local
6 governments hold two-thirds of our -- of our land,
7 mostly in a counterproductive manner. This is
8 asinine, unconscionable, and immoral. In a free
9 society, this is a crime.

10 The U.S. has come to the realization that
11 it has placed Guam in a welfare state unnecessarily
12 by their land-grabbing frenzy and paying dearly for
13 it. To allow the government of Guam to be the
14 steward of the lands coming back is to pump money
15 into a fail system and would not deliver the intent
16 of the president. The president's base closures
17 plan is supposed to overhaul the status quo and
18 restore the power of decision making to the
19 community.

20 If the military pulls out, it has a moral
21 obligation to leave behind its assets necessary to
22 wean the people out of government dependency in this
23 new partnership arrangement. Short of returning the
24 land to the original owners and the assets thereon,
25 I construe the government action to be a cruel

1 attack on the people of Guam once more. That is
2 exactly what took place 50 years ago.

3 America must ask, what will happen to the
4 people of Guam?

5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.

6 (Applause.)

7 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome.

8 TESTIMONY BY MR. VICENTE P. PEREZ

9 MR. PEREZ: Welcome to Guam.

10 First of all, my name is Vicente P. Perez,
11 a retired senior manager at SRF.

12 I want to extend our heartfelt gratitude to
13 our leaders who eloquently put out the position of
14 Guam, what it should be. Governor Gutierrez really
15 came out and covered every aspects. Our Delegate
16 Underwood did wise -- likewise. And our spiritual
17 leader even invoked on the spiritual to come down
18 and guide us.

19 History repeats itself. Twenty years ago,
20 and looking at my number 10 to testify, it looks
21 like every 10 and 20 years, history repeats itself.
22 Twenty years ago, we had to invoke the help of the
23 late Governor Camacho, Governor Bordallo, our then
24 spiritual leader, Felixberto C. Flores, and we were
25 able to successfully convince our federal leaders in

1 staying the downsizing of SRF to a caretaker's
2 status.

3
4 Your question about the multiplying
5 effects, back then in 1974, '75, we used the
6 multiplier times eight. If you use \$320 million,
7 the impact on the local economy is times eight.
8 It's a direct impact on the local vendors and major
9 contractors. The most devastating is the technical
10 college called the Ship Repair Facility. SRF is the
11 only facility that is industrially complex that our
12 kids could look forward to be trained in the
13 machinery, welding, and electronics. We work
14 hand-in-hand with our University of Guam and GCC.

15 The DoD think tanker frequently stress that
16 Guam has a strategic location. The 8.2 earthquake
17 did not move Guam at all. We're still strategically
18 important.

19 Rapid deployment should be taken into
20 consideration. The nerve gas incident in Yoko --

21 Thank you. Sorry.

22 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Sorry. Sir, if you would
23 like to --

24 (Applause.)

25 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Excuse me, you don't have

1 to if you don't want to, but if you would like to
2 submit that written statement for the record --

3 MR. PEREZ: I will.

4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- we'd be delighted to
5 read it.

6 MR. PEREZ: I will.

7 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay, terrific. Thanks.

8 TESTIMONY BY MR. JOSEPH C. QUINATA

9 MR. QUINATA: Good afternoon, commission
10 members. Again, as everybody had mentioned, we
11 welcome you to Guam.

12 My name is Joe Quinata, and I come here as
13 a private citizen, although I've worked for the
14 military 27 years of my life. I come here not to
15 beg for my particular job but also in support of the
16 people that will be affected and the families that
17 will be affected by this base closure.

18 I am also against the BRAC commission or
19 DoD recommendation to close Guam. As far as in
20 closing, views have been expressed that indicated
21 that the decision will be a miracle to reverse. I
22 hope that you commission members are the miracles.

23 Thank you and Si Yu'os ma'ase.

24 (Applause.)

25 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

1 TESTIMONY BY MR. ALBERT S. TOPASNA

2 MR. TOPASNA: My name is Albert Topasna.

3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome.

4 MR. TOPASNA: Thanks --

5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I said welcome. Sorry.

6 MR. TOPASNA: Thank you.

7 I am here on the -- as a private citizen
8 and also a private investigator. Thanks to the
9 bishop, I found the theme for my speech today. And
10 that is our Guam and our democracy. The three most
11 important resources that Guam, our island territory,
12 depend upon for survival are shipping industry, our
13 airline industry, and our American democracy.

14 My dear friends, you must give up the
15 memories at this point in time because you cannot
16 forget the sacrifices the people and the Guamanian
17 soldiers have given to preserve democracy. Our
18 people have given so much because we all believe on
19 the American dream.

20 Guam cannot depend on its island neighbors,
21 set aside its principles and distance from the
22 American coastline. And we were taught when were in
23 school, American history. We understood social and
24 cultural beliefs, we demonstrate democracy and
25 respect our American Constitution. Our Guam, or

1 Guamanian blood was shed in Korea, Vietnam, and
2 Desert Storm. Our -- We honor our war victims. We
3 pray the American way, the honorable way. We will
4 suffer when the solution comes to a reality by
5 closing SRF.

6 You will hear of crisis in America, the
7 will to obey the order to close out SRF and the
8 predicament of chaos and trauma. We are on the road
9 to isolationism, abandonment, and neglect. Our
10 right to be part of America, to defend America only --
11 not only in war but sustain in maintaining
12 democracy, protecting society from crime and justly
13 caring for all Americans.

14 Is money important? Judging money and
15 people against ideals and life -- and their
16 livelihood, please, Uncle Sam, must you choose
17 between a true American or a part of America?
18 Again, American history was correct. And American
19 history is unchallenged and highly respected.
20 American history will be measured differently by me
21 as I've learned that I am an American.

22 Save this little island, Guam is truly
23 where America's day begins.

24 Thank you.

25 (Applause.)

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.

2 TESTIMONY BY SENATOR ANGEL LEON GUERRERO SANTOS

3 SENATOR SANTOS: Hafa adai, my name is Angel
4 Leon Guerrero Santos and I am a member of the
5 Twenty-third Guam Legislature.

6 Is it not enough for the federal government
7 to punish our people for practicing the culture in
8 the 1900's? Is it not enough for the federal
9 government to punish our people for speaking the
10 language from 1900 to 1975? And is it not enough
11 for the federal government to condemn two-thirds of
12 all the lands on Guam, the most rich, fertile
13 agricultural lands that our people depended on for
14 survival? And then today, in 1995, sets aside over
15 20,000 acres of that for a wildlife refuge to
16 protect the endangered species. Is it not enough
17 that we only have two minutes to fight for our
18 rights to survive in our own homeland? We --

19 (Applause.)

20 SENATOR SANTOS: We almost lost our language
21 and culture, we lost our lands, now you want to take
22 our jobs. The greatest mistake that the federal
23 government will make is to take away our jobs
24 without giving us the resources to rebuild our
25 lives. The greatest sin that the federal government

1 can commit on the people of Guam is to take away our
2 bread and butter and not give us the kitchen that we
3 need to prepare the food so that our people can
4 survive.

5 Generations will come and generations will
6 pass. But if no generation has the conscience, the
7 courage, and the conviction to rights the wrongdoing
8 of the past, then the next generation will have to
9 live with the same injustices in the future. I will
10 fight for our rights to survive in our own homeland.

11 Thank you.

12 (Applause.)

13 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

14 TESTIMONY BY MS. JULIE NORMAN

15 MS. NORMAN: Good afternoon, commissioners.

16 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome.

17 MS. NORMAN: And all my friends of the United
18 States of America. I'm Julie Norman and I'm from
19 Guam. I'm a U.S citizen.

20 There's only one thing that I'd like to ask
21 you. I'd like to ask you to go back and remind the
22 Department of Defense that Guam is a U.S. territory
23 and it was the United States of America that stepped
24 in here to gain and maintain the island of Guam from
25 the enemies. And if they pull out all the military

1 forces out of Guam, they have just weakened their
2 position as the most powerful country in the world.
3 And we want to remain the territory of the United
4 States of America.

5 Thank you very much.

6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

7 (Applause.)

8 TESTIMONY BY MR. TONY ARTERO

9 MR. ARTERO: Honorable commissioners, my name
10 is Tony Artero, I'm the principle broker of Artero
11 Realty. I'm also a retired Navy submariner.

12 And I'll start by saying that the people of
13 Guam have fought in all of America's wars since
14 American invokes on the use of our very limited but
15 preciously located real estate, as our congressman
16 has said, "location, location, location."

17 Although Guam has been living -- has been
18 flying the American flag for nearly 100 years, many
19 people have gone before us without ever seeing the
20 reality of their belief in what America is all
21 about. Generations come and generations go, yes,
22 and the problem, that of economic freedom, has yet
23 to be addressed and corrected. Over the years, only
24 the symptom of the problem is addressed, never the
25 problem. Instead, the government grew in leaps and

1 bounds and has evolved into a -- into a unrestraint,
2 ruthless, and insatiable giant and spending
3 skyrocketed like there is no tomorrow.

4 Consequently, the federal government's financial
5 position is near \$5 trillion in deficit spending.

6 Similarly, Guam's financial position is now near the
7 bottom of the Marianas Trench. I hope -- I hope
8 that this hearing with BRAC 95 will cause a solution
9 to the cancerous dilemma we find ourselves in. I
10 will offer some examples.

11 Before World War II, everyone had
12 uninhibited access to their property. The people
13 and their lands were productive. Now, there are
14 people who are paying taxes on properties for
15 decades that the government restrict their access to
16 and the economic use of for no reason at all.

17 The dawning of history, however, should
18 teach us that Guam, in the middle of the Pacific,
19 has been the financial sinkhole of the American
20 taxpayer since World War II. No doubt the condition
21 of -- that condition is the result of a -- of the
22 mid-19th century policy of imperialistic expansion
23 to the Pacific regarded as the manifest destiny of
24 the United States.

25 Ladies and gentlemen, please let's work

1 together and clean up the mess. It's the
2 responsibility of the government to do so since they
3 caused the problem.

4 Thank you.

5 (Applause.)

6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

7 Good afternoon.

8 TESTIMONY BY MR. JOE TOPASNA

9 MR. TOPASNA: Good afternoon, honorable
10 commissioners. Good afternoon and welcome to Guam.

11 My name is Joe Topasna. I work for the
12 Fleet and Industrial Supply Center for a good 31
13 years. I spent more than half of my lifetime
14 working for this command. I have no regrets.

15 The many in our workforce that have chosen
16 a career at FISC because of the opportunities of
17 good pay, a security of jobs, future retirement.
18 Now the hope is faced with uncertainty.

19 What is FISC's mission? May I elaborate.
20 I'll make it simple: Support the fleet across the
21 Pacific Ocean to the Arabian Gulf and to the Indian
22 Ocean. Seventy-five to 80 percent of our workload
23 is supporting the fleet. The MSC's, the AFS's, from --
24 from Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Other
25 customers in the area are DGAR, Bahrain, Singapore,

1 and Jebel Ali.

2 FISC spent millions of dollars in the local
3 market annually for consumable items and provisions
4 to support the men and woman in the Navy in
5 preserving peace and security around the world. Our
6 workforce is the finest in the Pacific. Yet, we are
7 victims of our governments, local and federal
8 government. Our local government is not -- Our
9 local government, in not so many words, said,
10 "Relocate by base."

11 And federal government said, "I'll do
12 better than that. I'll close it."

13 The working people at FISC and SRF, these
14 are the people that are assets to the government,
15 pay their taxes, and do not wait for handouts. Our
16 government claims that there will be more jobs in
17 the future by building the private sectors and
18 tourism industry. These are 10, 15, 20 years from
19 now, which is fine. But what about the employees
20 that are affected today? They still have to feed
21 their loved ones, pay mortgages, and other bank
22 payments.

23 Guam is logistically in a much better
24 location to support the fleet across the Indian
25 Ocean, Arabian Gulf, the Korean Peninsula, than FISC

1 Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and FISC Yokosuka, Japan. I
2 beg of you to reconsider disestablishment of FISC,
3 but rather realignment. But whatever your
4 recommendation is, I understand.

5 Thank you.

6 (Applause.)

7 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

8 That sure beat an ending that said I was
9 going to be immoral or something.

10 TESTIMONY BY ATTORNEY PETER R. SGRO, JR.

11 MR. SGRO: My name is Attorney Peter Sgro.

12 Because of the time limitation, I'd just
13 like to read some quotes from Supreme Court
14 decisions. Although just in the three hours worth
15 of research, similar quotes are incorporated by
16 reference, and at least a hundred and seventy
17 different federal authorities by various federal
18 courts throughout the nation.

19 Under the war powers of Congress, Congress
20 may authorize the summary requisition of property
21 immediately needed for prosecution of the war. The
22 Supreme Court said in 1948: Congress, in time of
23 war, unquestionably has the fundamental power ... to
24 the requisition of properties necessary and proper
25 to enable it to raise and support its Armies."

1 I would like to use that supporting
2 position with the -- and I will incorporate written
3 testimony with all the citations necessary of
4 federal decisions, not decisions by the Superior
5 Court of Guam, that meets every single one of the
6 four top criteria by BRAC for not mothballing the
7 facility. You already have the power of Congress to
8 take back private property, to take any property.
9 They can take over this legislative building, if
10 they wanted to, in the event of a threat of war. To
11 mothball the assets that we're talking about with
12 respect to the people of the territory, puts the
13 people in a bad precarious situation.

14 Now that I -- I would like visit one
15 subject that is totally related to this, which
16 you'll never find in any other community. The
17 chamber touched upon, and I was past chairman of the
18 Chamber of Commerce, on the issue called "security
19 clearances." That was an -- intentional, based on
20 recently declassified information, an intentional
21 act by the federal government to prevent people like
22 my family that as been doing business on Guam since
23 1940, from economically becoming independent. It
24 prevented injection of capital into Guam, and I
25 think that we're now trying to do mothball assets in

1 the disguise of what we're seeing now as another
2 security clearance, which I don't think that's in
3 the best interest of BRAC or the military, or for
4 that people -- or purpose, the people of the
5 Territory of Guam.

6 Thank you.

7 (Applause.)

8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.

9 TESTIMONY BY MR. BILL PAYNE

10 MR. PAYNE: Good afternoon, commissioners.

11 I'm Bill Payne. I've spent 30 years of my
12 life down at SRF. I'm here as a private citizen,
13 though.

14 I've been asked to make a brief statement
15 concerning the necessity of maintaining a strong
16 military presence on Guam and its benefits to the
17 United States. Guam is the western-most territory
18 of the U.S. Guam is where America's day begins.

19 From a strategic point of view, it means
20 having a base near the heart of Asia. It means
21 having a staging point from which the U.S. can
22 project Naval and Air Force power, provide aid and
23 humanitarian services to Asian allies in the spirit
24 of peace and cooperation. It's a place that's
25 populated by U.S. citizens. No U.S. ship or

1 airplane has ever turned away from Guam. It is the
2 only place in this part of the world that the U.S.
3 can depend on with absolute certainty. This is
4 Guam, U.S.A.

5 It has been pointed out that the bases in
6 Japan and Singapore have made Guam unnecessary from
7 a strategic view. It is true Singapore is closer to
8 the Middle East and a major transit place for U.S.
9 ships. Also, the industrial facilities the Japanese
10 offer are more than what Guam has and the Japanese
11 government absorbs most of the cost to the U.S.
12 military is an important item. But the current
13 economic conditions in Japan will not warrant that.
14 Sooner or later, they'll charge the United States
15 for it. The old adage "Charity begins at home" is
16 as good for Japan as it is for the United States.

17 Guam legitimizes U.S. military interests in
18 Asia because the military is there to protect U.S.
19 citizens and property. There is no greater
20 justification for a military presence here.
21 Countries have criticized the U.S. as being
22 imperialistic for having bases in Japan or
23 Singapore, but no one can criticize the U.S. for
24 having its own citizens, its bases here.

25 Guam have always been the focal point of

1 blood, sweat, and tears for the U.S. government.
2 Please let's have a joint-use agreement for the
3 bases, do not close it or mothball it.

4 Thank you.

5 (Applause.)

6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

7 TESTIMONY BY MR. HOWARD A. HEMSING

8 MR. HEMSING: My name is Howard Hemsing.

9 First of all, I'd like to thank you for the
10 base closure. It has been long in coming.

11 Now, allow me to comment on how to rectify
12 the problems for Guam's economy to benefit from this
13 closures.

14 The military administration has -- no. The
15 United States of America first established
16 themselves on Guam in 1899 after gaining possession
17 of Guam from Spain through the Treaty of Paris.
18 After arriving on Guam until the beginning of World
19 War II, the military administration enacted laws to
20 make the indigenous people here feel inferior. Laws
21 restricting language and culture have worked, for
22 today the Chamorros are confused with their own
23 identity. Also, years before, our language was
24 spoken at home but today one rarely hear parents
25 speak to their children in their native tongue.

1 The military administration has also
2 condemned valuable -- land valuable to the
3 Chamorros' well being. In basic facts, your
4 government have intentionally made the Chamorros
5 dependent instead of independent. You have turned
6 Guam into a welfare island, dependent on your
7 government with welfare and food stamps. People are
8 trying to find jobs instead of creating their own
9 businesses. Attitudes concerning self-pride --
10 self-pride, self-reliance are missing in a lot of
11 Chamorros because your government strategically
12 planned this. How do I know this? You have brought
13 in your educational system and it has all -- you
14 have also have people here that have retired right
15 out of the Pentagon's strategic intelligence unit.

16 Now let's correct your wrong doings. How?
17 First of all, return the land, not to the government
18 but the to the original landowners. Let them
19 consolidate the business. That way, the landowner
20 and the people can be making money. Give them the
21 200 mile EEZ zone and give -- and remove the Jones
22 Act. And you give them the money to start this.
23 And you contract the base cleaning of all toxic
24 wastes on this island. That way your money can be
25 returned to you at a 4 percent interest as a small --

1 small business administration style. Four percent
2 interest, that's all right.

3 I wish I had more time, I still got some
4 more.

5 (Applause.)

6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: You can submit that for
7 the record. Feel free to submit your additional
8 comments for the record. We'd be delighted to read
9 them.

10 TESTIMONY BY MR. ANTHONY M. QUITUGUA

11 MR. QUITUGUA: May I ask a few -- few moments
12 of indulgence?

13 COMMISSIONER STEELE: This will be a prop.

14 Is that Lysol a hint?

15 MR. QUITUGUA: It's Listerine.

16 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Oh, Listerine.

17 MR. QUITUGUA: What you have before you -- Oh,
18 my name is Anthony M. Quitugua and I'm a private
19 citizen.

20 What you have before you is something
21 symbolic. It's American products from the Cracker
22 Jack, Columbus, Ohio, maybe a lot of you know that;
23 a box of cereal from Minneapolis, Minnesota; cans of
24 Campbell's soup from Camden, New Jersey; a bottle of
25 Listerine, Morris Plains, New Jersey; a can of

1 chili, Tacoma, Washington; and a can of vegetables
2 from Los Angeles, California.

3 We share, like the 48 states, as Americans.
4 Americans who hold U.S. passports. And let me read
5 something, if you have it. You probably have one
6 because if you didn't, you wouldn't -- it'd be very
7 hard for you to go through immigrant -- through U.S.
8 Immigration.

9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay, that's fine.

10 MR. QUITUGUA: Please.

11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: No problem.

12 MR. QUITUGUA: Anyway, it says: The Secretary
13 of State of the United States of America hereby
14 request that all -- all to whom concerned to permit
15 the citizen/national of the United States named
16 herein to pass without delay or hinderance, and in
17 case of need, to give all lawful aid and protection.

18 I'm nervous here now.

19 In God we trust is what the money -- in the
20 back of every money -- it's \$10 because a dollar is
21 no good anymore. The economy, you know what I mean?

22 Ladies and gentlemen, I know that the --
23 America has been bashed here, American has been --
24 there's a kind of animosity in the air. I'm
25 speaking from the heart here. Two points:

1 Number one, we have your American flag
2 waving 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

3 Number two, we have passports that we have
4 not renounced. We're still Americans. And that --
5 that's very important. World War II, World War II --
6 or Korean War and all the wars we've participated
7 and our sons have died for the cause of liberty.

8 America -- The American negative impact
9 here would be if you close these bases and you put
10 these people out of jobs and you do what you have to
11 do, and say, "Oh, Guam is no longer important
12 strategically," we're repeating Pearl Harbor again.
13 If you think Hawaii -- Hawaii was the first hit,
14 then Guam and then the other islands. Ladies and
15 gentlemen, if you do this, if you really do this,
16 you're going to hurt the people of Guam who are
17 Chamorro/Guamanian/Americans. That's what we are.
18 Just like the Indian/Americans.

19 So, I ask you, please go to Washington,
20 don't let this just stay here and then we forget it
21 in the 15-hour flight, go to Washington and tell
22 them, there are people that are living with children
23 and if you take that food off their table, then
24 that's exactly what you're going to do.

25 Thank you.

1 (Applause.)

2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.

3 (Brief pause.)

4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Were you sworn in?

5 MR. UNPINGCO: Yes.

6 TESTIMONY BY MR. STEVEN SABLAN UNPINGCO

7 MR. UNPINGCO: My name is Steven Sablan
8 Unpingco and I'm here on behalf of many students
9 from the University of Guam.

10 As a concerned citizen, I am here to
11 testify in opposition of -- to the DoD
12 recommendation to close SRF and disc -- FISC, excuse
13 me.

14 At the outset, it is my opinion that the
15 U.S. military depends too much on bases located in
16 foreign countries such as bases in Korea, Japan, and
17 Singapore.

18 The permanence and viability of such bases
19 may be questionable. Despite the existence of
20 international agreements like the Status of Forces
21 Agreement being in force and effect, these
22 agreements are written in language ambiguous enough
23 for a foreign nation to easily abrogate such
24 agreements. In ensuring national security, nothing
25 beats having your own forces in your own soil,

1 especially with a politically volatile climate in
2 the far reaches of the Pacific.

3 In committing bases in foreign soil, one
4 must ask, how much are these nations contributing to
5 our joint effort to defend their interests? Is
6 Korea, one of the newly emerging economic Asian
7 nations, really contributing that much to its
8 defense? Is the military presence in Korea designed
9 to protect the Koreans than to the protect the
10 United States citizens? Given the ability of the
11 United States to rapidly deploy, is the U.S.
12 presence in Korea still necessary or critical?

13 What about Japan? Is she contributing a
14 fair share to her defense? Viewed in terms of
15 annual Gross Domestic Product, the Japanese defense
16 budget is really minuscule. If Japan is reluctant
17 to rearm herself because of fear of repercussions
18 from her neighbors or because of her constitution,
19 shouldn't she contribute more monetary to offset the
20 cost of her defense?

21 I believe it is time to revisit our
22 national defense strategic thinking and analyze the
23 changed circumstances affecting foreign policy. Let
24 us fortify bases in U.S. soil and engage in policy
25 favoring United States citizens and not foreign

1 citizens.

2 The end of the cold war crisis, with the
3 downfall of the Soviet Union, leaves no present
4 threat of superpower enemy. Accordingly, military
5 actions will now probably be police actions for
6 humanitarian reasons, as in the case of Somalia, or
7 to deter aggression as in Iraq/Kuwait. Rapid
8 development aided by the mid-air refueling appears
9 to be the logical alternative to pre-positioning of
10 troops and supplies in places such as Guam. But you
11 know something, there are two critical weaknesses to
12 this analysis. Okay? That you all ought to
13 consider.

14 First, rapid deployment by air requires
15 weather conditions that will allow planes to fly and
16 be refueled in mid air. If inclement weather
17 conditions prevail, refueling is not possible. The
18 importance of weather should not be overlooked or
19 downplayed especially in the Pacific Ocean region.
20 The weather over a large ocean, as large as the
21 Pacific, can be subject to rapid and erratic change.

22 Second, small scale wars or police actions
23 are dependent on troops being deployed followed by
24 supplies being flown in later. The ability of
25 troops to fight a small war or police action that is

1 prolonged is severely limited if there is a total
2 dependency on airlift providing all needed supplies.
3 Even with the presence of huge aircrafts to support
4 deployment, the supplies such carriers can furnish
5 will be limited. Not only is weather a problem, but
6 the costs of continuous airlift is astronomical.

7 In addition, planes do break down often, as
8 the older planes, the more the wear, tear, and other
9 breakdown components occur. Is there enough of a
10 fleet of cargo planes that exist that can adequately
11 service a prolonged airlift? Remember, the Air
12 Force also has been downsizing. Therefore, looking
13 at Guam's strategic location in the middle of the
14 Pacific Ocean next to the potential trouble spots
15 like Korea, Pakistan, and the Philippines, it makes
16 a lot of sense to keep military facilities on Guam,
17 which is American soil. To do otherwise would
18 ultimately be necessarily endangering the lives of
19 American military personnel and the national and
20 international security of the United States.

21 Strategically speaking, we should not
22 undermine the immense importance of Naval ships as a
23 projection of U.S. power offshore. The presence of
24 a battle group or task force over a troubled spot
25 has a lot of peacekeeping dividends, as in the case

1 of the Persian Gulf. But, the Navy's ability to
2 project such power and to participate in hostilities
3 and therefore take away some dependence on rapid
4 deployment has been severely curtailed by SRF and
5 FISC disestablishments on Guam. Navy ships must
6 replenish supplies and must have repair and
7 maintenance work performed on them to ensure maximum
8 battle readiness. One Navy ship can carry the
9 equivalent of 20 Air Force C-5's in terms of cargo.
10 These military can testify to that (indicating).
11 Hawaii's remote location away from South and
12 Southeast Asia cannot meet the Navy's demands.
13 Guam's mid-ocean location and logical support
14 capabilities can.

15 Aside from Guam's strategic location, we
16 must stay focused on the real objectives of proposed
17 closures, that is cost and savings benefits. The
18 goal and mission of BRAC is to minimize cost of
19 implementation and expect substantial savings in due
20 period of time. In regards to costs implementation
21 of disestablishment recommendations, has the
22 committee engaged in costs analysis regarding
23 environmental clean-up costs and disposition of
24 chemical, hazardous or toxic wastes? Environmental
25 clean-up needs should be quickly ascertained and the

1 costs of waste disposal consistent with
2 environmental protection standards must be quickly
3 estimated and forecasted.

4 In view of the plummeting exchange rate of
5 the dollar to the yen, it may perhaps be most -- be
6 more cost-savings effective to eliminate or
7 consolidate some of the air bases in Korea or Japan.
8 The air bases in Kunsan and Osan in Korea, for
9 example, which have fighter planes could be
10 consolidated. The fighters at Kadena Air Base in
11 Okinawa could be relocated to Yokota or Misawa. Has
12 anyone analyzed the cost savings measures that these
13 moves would bring? If these consolidations or
14 realignments can be made, the cost-savings component
15 will inevitably show substantial savings over and
16 beyond amount of savings Guam proposed closures --
17 amount of savings Guam's proposed closures will
18 yield.

19 You know, the -- this gentleman has been
20 telling me it's time.

21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I know --

22 MR. UNPINGCO: We are in an undue --

23 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- I was just about to
24 second --

25 MR. UNPINGCO: -- burden, we are college

1 students here. We're all here after two-and-a-half
2 weeks of legal research. We don't enjoy the luxury
3 of government subsidized travel to go and meet with
4 you people. The least you guys can do is sit down
5 for a couple more minutes and see what these young
6 leaders of tomorrow have to say.

7 (Applause.)

8 MR. UNPINGCO: Now I ask you, okay?

9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Mr. --

10 MR. UNPINGCO: Secondly --

11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Mr. --

12 MR. UNPINGCO: -- you are not treating us
13 correctly.

14 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Excuse me --

15 MR. UNPINGCO: You are violating our equal
16 protection rights.

17 MR. SMITH: Could you please respect the
18 commissioners for a second?

19 MR. UNPINGCO: Sure.

20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Sir, the respect goes
21 both ways in the sense that there are many people in
22 the community that would like to speak. And that --
23 that opportunity needs to be shared and it's
24 important to us --

25 MR. UNPINGCO: I understand.

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- that we share that
2 opportunity. Mr. Cornella -- or Commissioner
3 Cornella has comment as well.

4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, you basically
5 said what I was going to say, but I would add that
6 there -- there will be a press conference. While
7 Commissioner Steele is in that conference, I will
8 give you my undivided attention for the length of
9 that conference, which is, I believe, is 15 minutes.

10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: You'll make me do it by
11 myself?

12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: That was the idea.

13 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Gentlemen, thank you --

14 MR. UNPINGCO: I thank you for your benevolence --

15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- very much. We look
16 forward to reading your statement if you would like
17 to submit it for the record.

18 MR. UNPINGCO: I would like to, but I also I
19 would like to have just a minute --

20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Sorry.

21 MR. UNPINGCO: -- to summarize.

22 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Sorry.

23 MR. UNPINGCO: Well, let me just say, may God
24 bless the island of Guam, its family and its future,
25 and may He bestow goodwill to all of you commission

1 members.

2 Thank you.

3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much, and
4 to you as well.

5 (Applause.)

6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Excuse me just a half a
7 second, please.

8 (Brief pause.)

9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Our chief analyst here
10 has asked me to request those of you that had
11 statements but may not have turned them in yet,
12 please do so, because he needs to analyze them. We
13 need to read them and share them with our fellow
14 commissioners when we return to the states. So
15 please do do that. If you don't have an opportunity
16 to give it to us today, don't worry, we keep
17 receiving information the whole way through the
18 process. This is not the end of your hearing, and
19 this is not your only hearing, by the way. As many
20 of you know, you have an additional hearing in
21 California. This is the only group of installations
22 that gets that second opportunity, in addition to
23 the hearings in Washington where Congressman
24 Underwood will testify.

25 It's my understanding that we have used up

1 those 45 minutes of testimony. We thank you very
2 much for your participation.

3 If Al has any comments at the moment, but --

4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I do.

5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Commissioner
6 Cornella.

7 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, we've heard a lot
8 of concern expressed today and I just want to assure
9 everyone that -- that those concerns will be
10 recognized when we go into our deliberations, and
11 all those items will be addressed. And I also will
12 say and promise to you that you will give -- be
13 given the same respect that all U.S. citizens will
14 receive as we under -- as we go through this
15 process. I'll treat this situation and -- and the
16 island like this island and all the citizens were in
17 the middle of my home state, and I promise you that,
18 that we will do that.

19 Thank you.

20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.
21 This hearing is adjourned.

22 (Applause.)

23 (Whereupon, the regional hearing concluded
24 at 5:40 o'clock p.m.)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Frances U. Taitano, stenographic court reporter, do hereby certify the foregoing 123 pages to be a true and correct transcript of the stenographic shorthand notes taken by me in the within-entitled hearing at the time and place as set forth herein.

Dated at Agana, Guam, this 7th day of April, 1995.



Frances U. Taitano

Document Separator

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**



**REGIONAL HEARING
GRAND FORKS, ND**

MARCH 30, 1995

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Document Separator

**GRAND FORKS, ND REGIONAL
HEARING AND BASE VISITS
MARCH 28-30, 1995**



INFORMATION PACKET

ITINERARY

POINTS OF CONTACT

FACT SHEET

STAFF ASSIGNMENT SHEET

HOTEL ACCOMODATIONS

**REGIONAL HEARING
GRAND FORKS, ND
Thursday, March 30, 1995**

COMMISSIONERS ATTENDING:

**J.B. Davis
Rebecca Cox
Lee Kling**

STAFF MEMBERS ATTENDING:

**David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson
Ralph Kaiser
Rick DiCamillo
Frank Cantwell
Dave Olson
James Phillips
Chris Goode
J. Kent Eckles**

ITINERARY

Tuesday, March 28

9:00AM ET: Rick DiCamillo departs DC National en route Grand Forks, ND via
Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 355.

1:05PM CT: Rick DiCamillo arrives Grand Forks, ND from DC National via Mpls/
St. Paul:
NW flight 3250.
*Rental Car (Rick) National Confirmation #1044576013

3:30PM ET: David Olson departs DC National en route Grand Forks, ND via Mpls/
St. Paul:
NW flight 323.

8:50PM CT: David Olson arrives Grand Forks, ND from DC National via Mpls/St. NW flight 590.
*Rental Car (David) National Confirmation #Flight No. 590.

RON: **Holiday Inn Grand Forks**
1210 North 43rd Street
Grand Forks, ND 58203
Phone-(701) 772-7131
Confirmation Numbers: **Olson #661757000**
DiCamillo #60308248

Wednesday, March 29

6:45AM ET: Frank Cantwell departs DC National en route Minot, ND via Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 315.

10:33AM CT: Frank Cantwell arrives Minot, ND from DC National via Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 1125.

11:30AM CT: David Olson departs Grand Forks AFB en route Minot AFB via military
helicopter.

12:30PM CT: David Olson arrives Minot AFB from Grand Forks, AFB aboard military
helicopter.

1:15PM CT: Ralph Kaiser departs St. Louis, MO en route Minot, ND:
NW flight 129.

2:43PM CT: Ralph Kaiser arrives Minot, ND from St. Louis, MO:
NW flight 129.

4:15PM CT: Rick DiCamillo departs Grand Forks, ND en route Great Falls, MT via
Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 962.

4:20PM ET: J.B. Davis departs Tampa, FL en route St. Louis, MO:
TWA flight 205.

- 4:40PM ET: Commissioner and staff depart DC National en route St. Louis, MO:
TWA flight 439.
Rebecca Cox
David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson
- 5:00PM ET: Advance Commission staff departs DC National en route Grand Forks,
ND via Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 107.
Chris Goode
J. Kent Eckles
- 5:50PM CT: J.B. Davis arrives St. Louis, MO from Tampa, FL:
TWA flight 205.
- 6:10PM CT: Commissioner and staff arrive St. Louis, MO from DC National:
TWA flight 439.
- 6:20PM CT: Commissioners and staff proceed to Mid-Coast Ramp to board C-21 (Call
Sign is Swift 51).
Phone-(314) 731-7111.
- 6:30PM CT: Commissioners and staff depart St. Louis, MO en route Minot AFB via
C-21.
J.B. Davis
Rebecca Cox
S. Lee Kling
David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson
- 8:30PM CT: Commissioners and staff arrive Minot AFB from St. Louis, MO aboard
C-21.
- 8:50PM CT: Advance Commission staff arrives Grand Forks, ND from DC National
via Mpls/St. Paul
J. Kent Eckles
Chris Goode
*Rental Car (Kent) National Confirmation #1041138551

**RON: Holiday Inn-Grand Forks
1210 North 43rd Street
Grand Forks, ND 58203
Phone-(701) 772-7131**

**Confirmation Numbers: Chris Goode #66119294
 J. Kent Eckles #66090256**

9:00PM CT: Dinner for Commissioners and staff at Minot AFB Officer's Club.
 J.B. Davis
 Rebecca Cox
 S. Lee Kling
 David Lyles
 Frank Cirillo
 Wade Nelson
 Frank Cantwell
 Ralph Kaiser
 David Olson

**RON: Minot AFB Officer's Quarters
(701) 723-2184**

Thursday, March 30

7:00AM CT: Commissioners and staff depart Officer's Quarters en route Minot AFB
 Conference Room via military transportation.

7:10AM to
11:00AM CT: Commissioner and staff attend working breakfast and Minot AFB base
 visit.

9:00AM ET: Commission staff departs DC National en route Grand Forks, ND via
 Mpls/St. Paul:
 NW flight 355.
 CeCe Carmen
 Jim Phillips
 *Will be picked up by J. Kent Eckles.

- 11:00AM to 2:00 PM:** **Commissioners and staff depart Minot AFB aboard military helicopters, tour Minot AFB missile fields, attend working lunch and continue to Grand Forks AFB.**
 J.B. Davis
 Rebecca Cox
 S. Lee Kling
 David Lyles
 Frank Cirillo
 Wade Nelson
 Frank Cantwell
 Ralph Kaiser
 David Olson
- 1:05PM CT: Commission staff arrives Grand Forks, ND from DC National via Mpls/St. Paul:
 NW flight 355.
 CeCe Carmen
 Jim Phillips
- 2:00PM CT: Commissioners and staff arrive Grand Forks, AFB aboard helicopter.
- 2:00PM to 5:00PM:** **Grand Forks AFB Base Visit.**
- 5:00PM CT: Grand Forks AFB visit completed. Commissioners and staff depart Grand Forks AFB en route hotel via state of North Dakota transportation.
- 5:20PM CT: Arrive hotel. Holiday Inn-Grand Forks
 1210 North 43rd Street
 Grand Forks, ND 58203
 Phone (701) 772-7131
- 6:00PM CT: Depart hotel en route dinner at the house of Kendall Baker, President of the University of North Dakota.
- 6:15PM CT: Arrive at the house of the President of the University of North Dakota.
- 7:15PM CT: Complete dinner and walk to Regional Hearing on campus:
 Chester Fritz Auditorium
 University of North Dakota
- 7:30PM to 9:30PM CT:** **Regional Hearing**

9:30PM CT: Depart for hotel via state of North Dakota transportation.

RON: **Holiday Inn-Grand Forks.**
1210 North 43rd Street
Grand Forks, ND 58203
Phone (701) 772-7131

Confirmation Numbers:	Davis	#60563162
	Cox	#66127082
	Kling	#60570029
	Lyles	#66169440
	Cirillo	#66133364
	Nelson	#66155683
	Kaiser	#64426681
	Cantwell	#66189867
	Phillips	#60580955
	Carman	#66015084

Friday, March 31

6:30AM CT: Continental Breakfast available in the Holiday Inn with John Marshall, Head of Community Base Support Group and Ken Baker, President of the University of North Dakota.

6:45AM CT: Commissioner and staff depart Holiday Inn en route Grand Forks AFB via state of North Dakota transportation.

7:10AM CT: Commission staff depart Grand Forks, ND en route Great Falls, MT via Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 124.
Chris Goode
CeCe Carmen
Ralph Kaiser
Jim Phillips

7:10AM CT: Dave Olson departs Grand Forks, ND en route DC National via Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 124.

7:10AM CT: Frank Cantwell departs Grand Forks, ND en route DC National via Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 124.

7:30AM CT: Commissioners and staff depart Grand Forks AFB, ND en route Malmstrom AFB, MT via C-21.

J.B. Davis
Rebecca Cox
S. Lee Kling
David Lyles
Wade Nelson
Frank Cirillo

8:00AM MT: Commissioners and staff arrive Malmstrom AFB, MT via C-21.

2:25PM CT: J. Kent Eckles departs Grand Forks, ND en route DC National via Mpls/St. Paul:
NW flight 3253.

**GRAND FORKS REGIONAL HEARING
POINT OF CONTACT LIST
Thursday, March 30, 1995**

- 1) Minot AFB
 Points of contact: Officer's Quarters-(701) 723-2184
 Col. Charlie Phillips
 Col. Frank Klotz
 Phone-(701)723-3215/9

- 2) Ms. Lorna Jacobson
 Administrative Officer
 Office of Kendall Baker
 President
 University of North Dakota
 P.O. Box 8193
 Grand Forks, ND 58202
 Phone-(701) 777-2122
 Fax-(701) 777-3866

- 3) Ms. Debbie Steding
 Manager
 Holiday Inn-Grand Forks
 1210 North 43rd Street
 Grand Forks, ND 58203
 Phone-(701) 772-7131
 Fax-(701) 780-9112

- 4) Grand Forks AFB
 Point of contact: Officer's Quarters-(701) 594-8531
 Col. Engstrom
 Phone-(701) 747-5120
 Fax-747-3916

- 5) Office of John Marshall
 Pat(Personal Asst.)
 Head of Community Base Support Group
 Phone-(701) 772-3407
 Fax-(701) 772-3833

6) Stenographer
Doug Ketcham and Associates
123 1/2 Broadway
Fargo, ND 58102
Phone-(701) 237-0275
Fax-(701) 237-0298

7) Chester Fritz Auditorium
University of North Dakota
Truman Reed
Phone-(701) 777-3077

Lyle Siedschlaw-Technical Director
Phone-(701) 777-2194
Vione Jordheim-Lyle's asst.
Phone-(701) 777-3705

8) Bob Gustafson
President
Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce
Phone-(701) 777-7271

9) Mayor Michael Polovitz
Phone-(701) 746-2607

10) Craig May
Office of Senator Kent Conrad
Washington, D.C. 20515
Phone-(202)224-2993
Fax-(202)224-7776

**GRAND FORKS, ND REGIONAL HEARING
MARCH 30, 1995**

FACT SHEET

LOCATION:

Chester Fritz Auditorium
The University of North Dakota
University Avenue and Yale Drive
On stage phone line (701) 777-2173
Holding Room (701) 777-2173
Green Room (701) 777-6012
(Commissioners) (701) 777-5012
Rehearsal Room (701) 777-5306
(Staff) (701) 777-5307
(701) 777-5309
(710) 777-5310
(710) 777-5312

CAPACITY:

2406

STENOGRAPHER:

Doug Ketcham and Associates
123 1/2 Broadway
P.O. Box 3165
Fargo, ND 58108
Phone (701) 237-0275
(800) 782-9227
Fax (701) 237-0298

TRANSPORTATION:

Commissioners and staff will be transported to the hearing site by the state of North Dakota transportation.

DINNER:

6:15-7:15PM
Home of Kendall Baker
President
The University of North Dakota
Phone (701) 777-2122
Fax (701) 777-3866

**GRAND FORKS, ND REGIONAL HEARING
MARCH 30, 1995**

STAFF ASSIGNMENT SHEET

Signage.....Kent
 reserved seating (vip, witness, press)
 public telephones
 staff only
 base closure hearing

Commissioner and staff dais seating.....Kent

Advance on site check.....Kent
 lights
 microphones
 water
 stenographer

Testimony collection.....Kent

Timekeeper.....Chris

VIP Greeter.....CeCe

Computer and fax set up.....Jim
 Transporter (nameplates, gavel, laptop)

Dinner arrangements.....Kent

General Runner.....Kent, Chris

Final site sweep.....Kent, Chris

**GRAND FORKS, ND REGIONAL HEARING
MARCH 30, 1995**

HOTEL ACCOMODATIONS

**Holiday Inn-Grand Forks
1210 North 43rd Street
Grand Forks, ND 58203
Phone-(701) 772-7131**

Tuesday, March 28:

David Olson Confirmation #66175700
Rick DiCamillo Confirmation #60608248

Wednesday, March 29:

Chris Goode Confirmation #66119294
J. Kent Eckles Confirmation #66090256

Thursday, March 30:

Commissioner Davis Confirmation #60563162
Commissioner Cox Confirmation #66127082
Commissioner Kling Confirmation #60570029
David Lyles Confirmation #66169440
Frank Cirillo Confirmation #66133364
Wade Nelson Confirmation #66155683
Ralph Kaiser Confirmation #64426681
Frank Cantwell Confirmation #66189867
James Phillips Confirmation #60580955
CeCe Carman Confirmation #66015084

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FINAL ITINERARY 03/27/95 3:32 PM
PROTOCOL OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH BOMB WING
MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA 58705-5049
OPR: 5 BW/CCP, 1st Lt Young, DSN 453-3474

Itinerary For: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Visit

Commission Members (DV-4)

Gen (Ret) James B. Davis
 Ms Rebecca G. Cox
 Mr S Lee Kling

Staff Members

Mr David Lyles (DV-4)
 Mr Francis A Cirillo
 Mr E Wade Nelson
 Mr Francis A Cantwell
 Mr Ralph A Kaiser
 Mr David L Olson

ACC Liaison

Capt Bierbaum

Purpose: Base Closure and Realignment Visit

Accommodations: Gen (Ret) Davis	Ms Cox
Roughrider Suite (Rm 1711/1712)	Magic City Suite (Rm 1715)
Minot AFB ND	Minot AFB ND
Comm: 701-727-6161 ext 1711/1712	Comm: 701-727-6161 ext 1715
DSN: 453-6161 ext 1711/1712	DSN: 453-6161 ext 1715
ALT: 453-4653 FAX: 453-1844	ALT: 453-4653 FAX: 453-1844
STU III: 453-2640	
Mr Kling	Mr Lyles
DV Suite # 1101	DV Suite # 1102
Minot AFB ND	Minot AFB ND
Comm: 701-727-6161 ext 1101	Comm: 701-727-6161 ext 1102
DSN: 453-6161 ext 1101	DSN: 453-6161 ext 1102
ALT: 453-4653 FAX: 453-1844	ALT: 453-4653 FAX: 453-1844
Mr Nelson & Mr Kaiser	
Missouri Suite (Rm 1691/93)	
Minot AFB ND	
Comm: 701-727-6161 ext 1691/93	
DSN: 453-6161 ext 1691/93	
ALT: 453-4653 FAX: 453-1844	
Mr Cirillo & Mr Olson	Mr Cantwell
DV Suite #	DV Suite #
Capt Bierbaum	
TBD	

2100 Dinner is served

Attendees: Governor
Governor Ed Schaefer

Congressional Delegation (Arrive approx 2130)

Senator Byron Dorgan
Senator Kent Conrad
Representative Pomeroy

Commission Members and Staff

Gen (Ret) James B. Davis
Ms Rebecca G Cox
Mr S Lee Kling
Mr David Lyles
Mr E Wade Nelson, Jr
Mr Ralph A Kaiser
Mr Francis A Cirillo, Jr
Mr David L Olson
Mr Francis Cantwell

Minot Area Representatives

Mayor Backes, Mayor of Minot (Orlin)
Mr Christianson, Co-Chairman "Task Force 96" (Bruce)
Mrs Emerson, Former Chairperson Minot Chamber of Commerce (Gloria)
Mr Jantzer, Chairman Military Affairs Committee (Mark)
Mr Larson, President, Minot Chamber of Commerce (Mark)
Mr Syria, Co-Chairman "Task Force 96" (Buzz)
Mr Giesinger, Former Chairman Military Affairs Committee (Jerry)

Minot AFB Representatives

Col Pasini, 5th Bomb Wing Commander (Ralph)
Col Klotz, 91st Missile Group Commander (Frank)
Col Phillips, 91st Missile Group Deputy Commander (Charlie)
Col Lay, 5th Bomb Wing Director of Staff (Dave)
Col Bedke, 5th Operations Group Commander (Curt)
Col Luina, 5th Logistics Group Commander (Joe)
Col (Sel) Chesney, 5th Medical Group Commander (Sandy)

Congressional Aides

Mr Norell, Congressional Aide (Doug)
Mr May, Congressional Aide (Craig)

ACC Representative

Capt Bierbaum, HQ ACC ()

Menu: Buffalo Medallion, Spinach and Mandarin Orange Salad w/Curry
Orange Dressing, Fresh Green Beans, Wild Rice, Fresh Baked Rolls
w/butter, Coffee or Tea, Creme Puff Ventienne

Cost: \$20.00

- 2120** Congressional Delegation Arrival Minot AFB Front Gate; proceed to Officers' Open Mess under 5th Security Police Squadron escort
- 2125** Congressional Delegation arrival at Officers' Open Mess; proceed to Gold Room; join dinner
- 2300** (Approx) Return to quarters; at leisure

Thursday 30 March

Weather forecast: Hi: Upper 30's Lo: Mid 20's Winds: NW 15-20 Partly cloudy, Dry

Military: Service Dress

Civilian: (Dress for warmth; slacks and flat shoes recommended for all personnel)

0700 Working Breakfast Officers' Open Mess (Gold Room)

Attendees:

- Gov Schaefer, Governor, State of North Dakota (Ed)
- Sen Conrad, US Senator from North Dakota (Kent)
- Sen Dorgan, US Senator from North Dakota (Byron)
- Rep Pomeroy, US Congressional Representative (Earl)
- Gen (Ret) James B Davis, Commissioner
- Ms Rebecca G Cox, Commissioner
- Mr S Lee Kling, Commissioner
- Mr David S Lyles, Commission Director of Staff
- Mayor Backes, Mayor of Minot (Orlin)
- Mr Larson, President, Minot Chamber of Commerce (Mark)
- Col Pasini, 5th Bomb Wing Commander (Ralph)
- Col Klotz, 91st Missile Group Commander (Frank)
- Col Phillips, 91st Missile Group Deputy Commander (Charlie)
- Col Lay, 5th Bomb Wing Director of Staff (Dave)
- Col Bedke, 5th Operations Group Commander (Curt)
- Col Luina, 5th Logistics Group Commander (Joe)
- Col (Sel) Chesney, 5th Medical Group Commander (Sandy)
- Mr E Wade Nelson, Director of Commission
- Mr Ralph A Kaiser, General Counsel
- Mr Francis A Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
- Mr David L. Olson, Air Force Analyst
- Mr Francis Cantwell, Air Force Analyst
- Mrs Emerson, Former Chairperson Minot Chamber of Commerce (Gloria)
- Mr Jantzer, Chairman Military Affairs Committee (Mark)
- Mr Giesinger, Former Chairman Military Affairs Committee (Jerry)
- Mr Syria, Co-Chairman "Task Force 96" (Buzz)
- Mr Christianson, Co-Chairman "Task Force 96" (Bruce)
- Mr Allen, Consultant "Task Force 96" (John)
- Mr Massey, Consultant "Task Force 96" (Don)
- Mr May, Congressional Aide (Craig)
- Mr Norell, Congressional Aide (Doug)
- Capt Bierbaum, HQ ACC

Menu: Eggs Benedict, Tomato Parmesan, Fresh Fruit, Juice, Coffee

Cost: \$ 5.00

0700 Governor's Welcome - Governor Schaefer (Ed)

0705 Congressional Delegation - Senator Dorgan (Byron), Senator Conrad (Kent), Representative Pomeroy (Earl)

0715 5th Bomb Wing Unit Mission Briefing - Col Bedke, 5th Operations Group Commander (Curt)

0725 91st Missile Group Unit Mission Briefing - Col Klotz, 91st Missile Group Commander (Frank)

0735 Facilities Briefing - Mr Nelson, 5th Civil Engineering Squadron Deputy Commander (Kevin)

0745 Depart breakfast, proceed to media interviews (Daedalion Room)

Planned media attendees: TBD

Note: Media holding area will be Fireside Room: with coffee, tea and pastries

- 0800** Depart media interview, proceed to "Task Force 96" briefing (Ballroom)
- 0805** "Task Force 96" briefing
Briefer: Mr Christianson, Co-Chairman "Task Force 96" (Bruce)
- 0830** Depart Officers' Open Mess; Proceed on windshield tour of Minot AFB to include
Child Development Center
Education Center
Commissary
91st Missile Group Headquarters
- NOTE 1:** All civilians attending the working breakfast are welcome to accompany the commission party throughout the base tour until their departure at 0955
- 0845** Arrive Missile Maintenance Shop; Proceed on drive through tour
Met by Lt Col Fancher, 91st Maintenance Squadron Commander (Sam)
- 0855** Depart Missile Maintenance by roll transfer; Continue tour to include
Nose Dock 7 (drive-in)
B-52 ramp
(Taxiway to Runway 11)
Down Runway 11
ALCM road
Past WSA exiting via South gate
HWY 83 to Hospital
- 0925** Arrive hospital; Proceed on tour
Escorted by: Colonel (Sel) Chesney, 5th Medical Group Commander (Sandy)
- 0935** Depart Hospital; Proceed to Helicopter Operations
Note: 5th Security Police Squadron provide escort vehicle and traffic control
- 0945** Arrive Helicopter Operations; receive safety briefing
- 0955** Depart Minot AFB via helicopter for N-01

Helicopter A

Gov Schaefer
Gen Davis
Ms Cox
Sen Dorgan
Mr Norell
Col Klotz

Helicopter B

Mr Kling
Sen Conrad
Mr Lyles
Rep Pomeroy
Mr May
Col Phillips

Helicopter C

Mr Kaiser
Mr Cantwell
Mr Cirillo
Mr Nelson
Mr Olson
Lt Col Wright

- 1015** Arrive N-01, walk into Missile Alert Facility (MAF)
Note: (van will be available for inclement weather)
- 1025** Elevator down to Launch Control Center (LCC) for tour
- 1030** LCC briefing and Q & A
- 1045** Depart LCC, elevator to topside MAF
- 1050** Walk through MAF
- 1100** Depart N-01 for Grand Forks via 321st Missile Group helicopters

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GRAND FORKS, ND REGIONAL HEARING TABLE OF CONTENTS

Thursday, March 30, 1995

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- 1. AGENDA**
- 2. OPENING STATEMENT: COMMISSIONER DAVIS**
- 3. SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES**
- 4. REMARKS BY THE CHAIR PRECEDING THE PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD**
- 5. NORTH DAKOTA FACILITIES SUMMARY SHEET**
- 6. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**
- 7. AIR FORCE INSTALLATION LIST: BRAC 95**
- 8. USAF FACT SHEETS**
- 9. STATE MAP-STATISTICAL DATA-STATE CLOSURE HISTORY**
- 10. PRESS ARTICLES & CORRESPONDENCE**
- 11. COMMISSION LETTERS TO NORTH DAKOTA LEADERS**
- 12. LIST OF 1995 DOD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT**



**GRAND FORKS, ND
REGIONAL HEARING AND BASE VISITS
Thursday, March 30, 1995**

COMMISSIONERS ATTENDING:

**J.B. Davis
Rebecca Cox
Lee Kling**

STAFF MEMBERS ATTENDING:

**David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson
Ralph Kaiser
Rick DiCamillo
Frank Cantwell
Dave Olson
James Phillips
Chris Goode
J. Kent Eckles**

AGENDA

Wednesday, March 29

- 4:20PM ET: J.B. Davis departs Tampa, FL en route St. Louis, MO:
TWA flight 205.
- 4:40PM ET: Commissioner and staff depart DC National en route St. Louis, MO:
TWA flight 439.
Rebecca Cox
David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson
- 5:50PM CT: J.B. Davis arrives St. Louis, MO from Tampa, FL:
TWA flight 205.
- 6:10PM CT: Commissioner and staff arrive St. Louis, MO from DC National:
TWA flight 439.

6:20PM CT: Commissioners and staff proceed to Mid-Coast Ramp to board C-21 (Call Sign is Swift 51).
Phone-(314) 731-7111.

6:30PM CT: Commissioners and staff depart St. Louis, MO en route Minot AFB via C-21.

J.B. Davis
Rebecca Cox
S. Lee Kling
David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson

8:30PM CT: Commissioners and staff arrive Minot AFB from St. Louis, MO aboard C-21.

9:00PM CT: Dinner for Commissioners and staff at Minot AFB Officer's Club.

J.B. Davis
Rebecca Cox
S. Lee Kling
David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson
Frank Cantwell
Ralph Kaiser
David Olson

**RON: Minot AFB Officer's Quarters
(701) 723-2184**

Thursday, March 30

7:00AM CT: Commissioners and staff depart Officer's Quarters en route Minot AFB Conference Room via military transportation.

7:10AM to
11:00AM CT: Commissioner and staff attend working breakfast and Minot AFB base visit.

11:00AM to
2:00 PM:

Commissioners and staff depart Minot AFB aboard military helicopters, tour Minot AFB missile fields, attend working lunch and continue to Grand Forks AFB.

J.B. Davis
Rebecca Cox
S. Lee Kling
David Lyles
Frank Cirillo
Wade Nelson
Frank Cantwell
Ralph Kaiser
David Olson

2:00PM CT:

Commissioners and staff arrive Grand Forks, AFB aboard helicopter.

2:00PM to
5:00PM:

Grand Forks AFB Base Visit.

5:00PM CT:

Grand Forks AFB visit completed. Commissioners and staff depart Grand Forks AFB en route hotel via State of North Dakota transportation.

5:20PM CT:

Arrive hotel. Holiday Inn-Grand Forks
1210 North 43rd Street
Grand Forks, ND 58203
Phone (701) 772-7131

6:00PM CT:

Depart hotel en route dinner at the house of Kendall Baker, President of the University of North Dakota.

6:15PM CT:

Arrive at the house of the President of the University of North Dakota.

7:15PM CT:

Complete dinner and walk to Regional Hearing on campus:

Chester Fritz Auditorium
University of North Dakota

7:30PM to
9:30PM CT:

Regional Hearing

9:30PM CT:

Depart for hotel via State of North Dakota transportation.

RON: **Holiday Inn-Grand Forks.**
1210 North 43rd Street
Grand Forks, ND 58203
Phone (701) 772-7131

Confirmation Numbers:	Davis	#60563162
	Cox	#66127082
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	Cantwell	#66189867
	Phillips	#60580955
	Carman	#66015084

Friday, March 31

6:30AM CT: Continental Breakfast available in the Holiday Inn with John Marshall,
Head of Community Base Support Group and Ken Baker, President of the
University of North Dakota.

6:45AM CT: Commissioner and staff depart Holiday Inn en route Grand Forks AFB via
State of North Dakota transportation.

7:30AM CT: Commissioners and staff depart Grand Forks, ND en route Malmstrom
AFB via C-21:
 J.B. Davis
 Rebecca Cox
 S. Lee Kling
 David Lyles
 Wade Nelson
 Frank Cirillo

8:00AM MT: Commissioners and staff arrive Malmstrom AFB, MT via C-21.





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

OPENING STATEMENT

COMMISSIONER J.B. DAVIS

REGIONAL HEARING

Grand Forks, North Dakota

March 30, 1995

GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO THIS REGIONAL HEARING OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION.

MY NAME IS J.B. DAVIS AND I AM ONE OF EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION CHARGED WITH THE TASK OF EVALUATING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REGARDING THE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

ALSO HERE WITH US TODAY ARE MY COLLEAGUES, COMMISSIONER REBECCA COX AND COMMISSIONER LEE KLING.

FIRST LET ME THANK ALL THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO HAVE ASSISTED US SO CAPABLY DURING OUR VISIT TO MINOT AIR FORCE BASE AND TO GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE. WE HAVE SPENT ALL DAY TODAY LOOKING AT THE INSTALLATIONS AND ASKING QUESTIONS THAT WILL HELP US MAKE OUR DECISIONS. THE COOPERATION WE'VE RECEIVED HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY. THANKS VERY MUCH.

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE BASE VISIT WE CONDUCTED HERE -- IT IS ONE OF 54 BASE VISITS COMMISSIONERS ARE MAKING, BY THE WAY -- IS TO ALLOW US TO SEE THE INSTALLATION FIRST-HAND AND TO ADDRESS WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL THE ALL-IMPORTANT QUESTION OF THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE BASE.

IN ADDITION TO THE BASE VISITS, THE COMMISSION IS CONDUCTING A TOTAL OF ELEVEN REGIONAL HEARINGS, OF WHICH THIS IS THE SECOND. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE REGIONAL HEARINGS IS TO GIVE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY THESE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS A CHANCE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. WE CONSIDER THIS INTERACTION WITH THE COMMUNITY TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND VALUABLE PARTS OF OUR REVIEW OF THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT ALL OF OUR COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF ARE WELL AWARE OF THE HUGE IMPLICATIONS OF BASE CLOSURE ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES. WE ARE COMMITTED TO OPENNESS IN THIS PROCESS, AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO FAIRNESS. ALL THE MATERIAL WE GATHER, ALL THE INFORMATION WE GET FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ALL OF OUR CORRESPONDENCE IS OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.

WE ARE FACED WITH AN UNPLEASANT AND PAINFUL TASK, WHICH WE INTEND TO CARRY OUT AS SENSITIVELY AS WE CAN. AGAIN, THE KIND OF ASSISTANCE WE'VE RECEIVED HERE IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

NOW LET ME TELL YOU HOW WE WILL PROCEED HERE TODAY, AND AT ALL OUR REGIONAL HEARINGS.

THE COMMISSION HAS ASSIGNED A BLOCK OF TIME TO EACH STATE AFFECTED BY THE BASE CLOSURE LIST. THE OVERALL AMOUNT OF TIME WAS DETERMINED BY THE NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS ON THE LIST AND THE AMOUNT OF JOB LOSS. NORTH DAKOTA HAS BEEN GIVEN 90 MINUTES TO MAKE ITS PRESENTATION.

WE NOTIFIED THE APPROPRIATE ELECTED OFFICIALS OF THIS PROCEDURE AND LEFT IT UP TO THEM, WORKING WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES, TO DETERMINE HOW TO FILL THE BLOCK OF TIME.

TODAY, IT IS OUR INTENTION TO LISTEN TO 90 MINUTES OF TESTIMONY, THEN TAKE A SHORT BREAK.

WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN A LIST OF PERSONS WHO WILL SPEAK DURING THE NORTH DAKOTA PRESENTATION, AS WELL AS HOW LONG THEY WILL SPEAK. WE WILL ENFORCE THOSE LIMITS STRICTLY, AND WE WILL LET THE SPEAKER KNOW WHEN HE OR SHE HAS ONE MINUTE, AND THEN 30 SECONDS LEFT. WE WILL RING A BELL WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL'S TIME IS UP.

AFTER THE 90 MINUTE PRESENTATION, WE WILL TAKE A SHORT BREAK, AFTER WHICH WE HAVE SET ASIDE A PERIOD OF 15 MINUTES FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC MAY SPEAK. WE HAVE PROVIDED A SIGN-UP SHEET FOR THIS PORTION OF THE HEARING AND HOPE THAT ANYONE WHO WISHES TO SPEAK HAS ALREADY SIGNED UP. WE WOULD ASK THOSE OF YOU SPEAKING AT THAT TIME TO LIMIT YOURSELVES TO ONE MINUTE.

LET ME ALSO SAY THAT THE BASE CLOSURE LAW HAS BEEN AMENDED SINCE 1993 TO REQUIRE THAT ANYONE GIVING TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION DO SO UNDER OATH, AND SO I WILL BE SWEARING IN WITNESSES, AND THAT WILL INCLUDE INDIVIDUALS WHO SPEAK IN THE PUBLIC COMMENT PORTION OF THE HEARING.

WITH THAT, I BELIEVE WE ARE READY TO BEGIN.


(FIRST WITNESS...ADMINISTER OATH)



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

WITNESSES' OATH

DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT
TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?



**GRAND FORKS, ND REGIONAL HEARING
SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES**

Thursday, March 30

7:30PM - 7:40PM	10 minutes	Opening Statement: Commissioner J.B. Davis
7:40PM - 7:44PM	4 minutes	Senator Kent Conrad
7:44PM - 7:48PM	4 minutes	Senator Byron Dorgan
7:48PM - 7:52PM	4 minutes	Governor Edward Schafer
7:52PM - 8:29PM	37 minutes	Grand Forks Community Mr. John Marshall, Head of Community Base Support Ambassador Edward Rowney, LGEN, USA, (Ret.), (former chief negotiator, START) Lt. Gen. Beckel, USAF (Ret.) Colonel Gerald Goff, USAF (Ret.)
8:29PM - 8:35PM	6 minutes	Break
8:35PM - 9:12PM	37 minutes	Minot Community Mr. Bruce Christianson, City Councilman and Co- Chair of Task Force '96 Mrs. Gloria Emerson, Former Chairwoman-Minot Chamber of Commerce Dan Lester, USAF (Ret.)
9:12PM - 9:16PM	4 minutes	Congressman Earl Pomeroy
9:16PM - 9:20PM	4 minutes	Administer oath to those providing public comments
9:20PM - 9:35PM	15 minutes	Public Comment
9:35PM - 9:50PM	15 minutes	Press Availability





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

**REMARKS BY CHAIR AT BEGINNING OF PUBLIC COMMENT PORTION
OF THE GRAND FORKS REGIONAL HEARING**

WE ARE NOW READY TO BEGIN A PERIOD SET ASIDE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT. OUR INTENT IS TO TRY INSURE THAT ALL OPINIONS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY AFFECTING THIS COMMUNITY ARE HEARD.

WE HAVE ASSIGNED 15 MINUTES FOR THIS COMMENT. WE HAVE ASKED PERSONS WISHING TO SPEAK TO SIGN UP BEFORE THE HEARING BEGAN, AND WE HAVE ASKED THEM TO LIMIT THEIR COMMENTS TO ONE MINUTE, AND WE WILL KEEP TRACK OF THE TIME.

OF COURSE, WRITTEN COMMENT OR TESTIMONY OF ANY LENGTH IS WELCOMED BY THE COMMISSION AT ANY TIME DURING THE PROCESS.

IF ALL THOSE SIGNED UP TO SPEAK WOULD PLEASE RISE AND RAISE YOUR RIGHTS HANDS, I WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH.


THANK YOU. WE ARE READY FOR THE FIRST SPEAKER.



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

WITNESSES' OATH

DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT
TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?



DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

MINOT AIR FORCE BASE

Minot, North Dakota

INSTALLATION MISSION: Air Combat Command base. Home of the 5th Bombardment Wing (26 B-52H). Major tenant is the 91st Missile Group (150 Minuteman III).

DOD RECOMMENDATION: None from DoD - Commission Add for Realignment.

- The 321st Missile Group at Grand Forks AFB will inactivate unless prior to December 1996, the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain ballistic missile defense (BMD) options effectively precludes this action. If the Secretary of Defense makes such a determination, Minot AFB, North Dakota, will realign and the 91st Missile Group will inactivate.
- A portion of the Minuteman III missiles from the group which is inactivated will be relocated to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, to support ongoing conversion from Minuteman II to Minuteman III.
- All activities and facilities at Minot AFB associated with the 5th Bomb Wing, including family housing, hospital, commissary, and base exchange, will remain open.

• **DOD JUSTIFICATION**

- The Nuclear Posture Review recommended an ICBM force structure consisting of “three wings of Minuteman III missiles carrying single warheads (500-450).” This requires inactivation of one missile group within the Air Force.
- The missile field at Grand Forks ranked lower than either Minot or Malmstrom, but may be precluded from inactivation.
- The missile field at Minot ranked lower than Malmstrom due to operational concerns.
- The missile field at FE Warren AFB, Wyoming, was excluded from consideration because it is the only Peacekeeper missile base. The DoD force structure plan requires Peacekeeper missiles through the period during which BRAC actions must be taken, and inactivation of Peacekeeper missiles could have adverse START implications.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

• One-Time Costs:	\$12.0 million
• Net Costs (Savings) During Implementation	\$114.8 million
• Annual Recurring Savings	\$36.1 million
• Return on Investment Year	Immediate
• Net Present Value Over 20 Years	\$458.6 million

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MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline	4,595	525	0
Reductions	809	46	0
Realignments	0	0	0
Total	809	46	0

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
1506	160	0	0	(1506)	(160)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Environmental impact is minimal and ongoing restoration will continue.

REPRESENTATION

Senators:	Kent Conrad Byron Dorgan
Representative:	Earl Pomeroy
Governor:	Edward Schafer

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 2,172 Jobs (1,666 Direct, 506 Indirect)
- Ward County Economic Area: 35,475 Jobs
- Percentage: 6.1 percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1996-2001):

MILITARY ISSUES

- The Air Force analysis of missile field operational effectiveness ranked Minot AFB higher than Grand forks AFB but lower than Malmstrom AFB based on target coverage, availability for launch, survivability, operations and maintenance accessibility, and logistics supportability.

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- The 1974 Protocol to the 1972 ABM Treaty restricts each side to deployment of one ABM site located at either an ICBM field or the nation's capital. The United States agreed that its ABM system "will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area."

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- Retaining Minot AFB as a multi-mission base (bombers and missiles) is more efficient than the current DoD proposal that creates single mission bases at Minot AFB (bombers) and Malmstrom AFB (Missiles).
- Air Force rationale for excluding the FE Warren AFB, WY missile field should be reviewed--Peacekeeper missiles are already scheduled for retirement in 2003.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- None.

David Olson/AF Team/Mar 21, 1995/12:00

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE

Grand Forks, North Dakota

INSTALLATION MISSION: Air Mobility Command base. Home of the 319th Air Refueling Wing (48 KC-135R). Major tenant is the 321st Missile Group (150 Minuteman III).

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Realignment.

- The 321st Missile Group will inactivate unless prior to December 1996, the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain ballistic missile defense (BMD) options effectively precludes this action. If the Secretary of Defense makes such a determination, Minot AFB, North Dakota, will realign and the 91st Missile Group will inactivate.
- A portion of the Minuteman III missiles from the group which is inactivated will be relocated to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, to support ongoing conversion from Minuteman II to Minuteman III.
- All activities and facilities at Grand Forks AFB associated with the 319th Air Refueling Wing, including family housing, hospital, commissary, and base exchange, will remain open.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The Nuclear Posture Review recommended an ICBM force structure consisting of “three wings of Minuteman III missiles carrying single warheads (500-450).” This requires inactivation of one missile group within the Air Force.
- The missile field at Grand Forks ranked lower than Minot AFB or Malmstrom AFB due to operational concerns.
- The missile field at FE Warren AFB, Wyoming, was excluded from consideration because it is the only Peacekeeper missile base. The DoD force structure plan requires Peacekeeper missiles through the period during which BRAC actions must be taken. and inactivation of Peacekeeper missiles could have adverse START implications.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

• One-Time Costs:	\$11.9 million
• Net Costs (Savings) During Implementation	\$111.8 million
• Annual Recurring Savings	\$35.2 million
• Return on Investment Year	Immediate
• Net Present Value Over 20 Years	\$447.0 million

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MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline	4,607	557	0
Reductions	802	35	0
Realignments	0	0	0
Total	802	35	0

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
1,506	119	0	0	(1,506)	(119)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Environmental impact is minimal and ongoing restoration will continue.

REPRESENTATION

Senators: Kent Conrad
Byron Dorgan
Representative: Earl Pomeroy
Governor: Edward Schafer

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 2,113 Jobs (1,625 Direct, 488 Indirect)
- Grand Forks County Economic Area: 45,092 Jobs
- Percentage: 4.7 percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1996-2001):

MILITARY ISSUES

- The Air Force analysis of missile field operational effectiveness ranked Grand Forks AFB lower than Malmstrom AFB or Minot AFB based on target coverage, availability for launch, survivability, operations and maintenance accessibility, and logistics supportability.

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- The 1974 Protocol to the 1972 ABM Treaty restricts each side to deployment of one ABM site located at either an ICBM field or the nation's capital. The United States agreed that its ABM system "will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area."

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES


- Closing the Grand Forks missile field could send a misleading signal to the former Soviet Union regarding our intent to "unilaterally change the treaty," and could jeopardize any future ballistic missile defense deployments.
- Retaining Grand Forks AFB as a multi-mission base (tankers and missiles) is more efficient than the current DoD proposal that creates single mission bases at Grand Forks AFB (tankers) and Malmstrom AFB (Missiles).
- Costs associated with relocating the ABM site should be included in the analysis, if it is determined that relocation is necessary.
- Air Force rationale for excluding the FE Warren AFB, WY missile field should be reviewed--Peacekeeper missiles are already scheduled for retirement in 2003.
- Complete closure of Grand Forks should not be considered because of the Air Force's "core base" concept for tankers.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- None.

David Olson/AF Team/Mar 21, 1995/12:00

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UNCLASSIFIED

DoD Base Closure and Realignment
Report to the Commission



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Volume V)

February 1995

UNCLASSIFIED

GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA

Recommendation: Realign Grand Forks AFB. The 321st Missile Group will inactivate unless prior to December 1996, the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain ballistic missile defense (BMD) options effectively precludes this action. If the Secretary of Defense makes such determination, Minot AFB, North Dakota, will be realigned and the 91st Missile Group will inactivate.

If Grand Forks AFB is realigned, the 321st Missile Group will inactivate. Minuteman III missiles will relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot facilities, or be retired. A small number of silo launchers at Grand Forks may be retained if required. The 319th Air Refueling Wing will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the base associated with the 319th Air Refueling Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open.

If Minot AFB is realigned, the 91st Missile Group will inactivate. Minuteman III missiles will relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot facilities, or be retired. The 5th Bomb Wing will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the base associated with the 5th Bomb Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open.

Justification: A reduction in ICBM force structure requires the inactivation of one missile group within the Air Force. The missile field at Grand Forks AFB ranked lowest due to operational concerns resulting from local geographic, geologic, and facility characteristics. Grand Forks AFB also ranked low when all eight criteria are applied to bases in the large aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained to satisfy operational requirements and maintain consolidated tanker resources.

If the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain BMD options effectively precludes realigning Grand Forks, then Minot AFB will be realigned. The missile field at Minot AFB ranked next lowest due to operational concerns resulting from spacing, ranging and geological characteristics. Minot AFB ranked in the middle tier when all eight criteria were applied to bases in the large aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained to satisfy operational requirements.

Return on Investment: For Grand Forks, the total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$11.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$111.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$35.2 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$447.0 million. Savings associated with the inactivation of a missile group were previously programmed in the Air Force budget.

If Minot AFB is selected, the total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$12.0 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$114.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$36.1

million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$458.6 million. Savings associated with the inactivation of a missile group were previously programmed in the Air Force budget.

Impact: For Grand Forks AFB, assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,113 jobs (1,625 direct jobs and 488 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Grand Forks County, North Dakota economic area, which is 4.7 percent of the economic area's employment. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration at Grand Forks AFB will continue.

If Minot AFB is selected, assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,172 jobs (1,666 direct jobs and 506 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Minot County, North Dakota economic area, which is 6.1 percent of the economic area's employment. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration at Minot AFB will continue.



OPERATIONS - LARGE AIRCRAFT and MISSILES Subcategories

OVERVIEW: The Large Aircraft Subcategory consists of bases which support the bomber, tanker, and airlift missions. Bases in the Large Aircraft Subcategory are:

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Alus AFB, Oklahoma | Barksdale AFB, Louisiana | Beale AFB, California |
| Charleston AFB, South Carolina | Dover AFB, Delaware | Dyess AFB, Texas |
| Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota | Fairchild AFB, Washington | Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota |
| Little Rock AFB, Arkansas | Malmstrom AFB, Montana | McConnell AFB, Kansas |
| McGuire AFB, New Jersey | Minot AFB, North Dakota | Offutt AFB, Nebraska |
| Scott AFB, Illinois | Travis AFB, California | Whiteman AFB, Missouri |

ATTRIBUTES: Important attributes of large aircraft bases depend on the type mission of the primary assigned aircraft.

ATTRIBUTE:	BOMBER MISSION	TANKER MISSION	AIRLIFT MISSION
Survivability	✓		
Adequate weapons storage	✓		
Geographically located with adequate tanker support	✓		
Proximity to receiver units		✓	
High capacity refueling systems		✓	✓
Minimum traffic congestion/ATC delays	✓	✓	
Access to low level routes	✓		
Access to bombing ranges	✓		
Proximity to major airlift customers			✓
Proximity to drop/landing zones			✓
Proximity to east or west coast			✓
Large passenger handling facilities			✓
Runway and flight line facilities which support large aircraft	✓	✓	✓
Low encroachment ground/airspace	✓	✓	✓

Important attributes of missile bases are detailed in Appendix 12 (classified).

SPECIAL ANALYSIS METHOD: The Large Aircraft Subcategory analysis reflected the same method for Criteria II - VIII as the overall Air Force process, a mission dependent Criterion I analysis was developed for this subcategory. Additionally, the two primary elements of Criterion I, Flying Operations and Missile Operations, were not combined into a single Criterion I grade.



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USAF BASE FACT SHEET
MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA

MAJCOM/LOCATION/SIZE: ACC base thirteen miles north of Minot with 5,383 acres

MAJOR UNITS/FORCE STRUCTURE:

- 5th Bomb Wing
 - 26 B-52H and 5 T-38A
- 91st Missile Group (AFSPC)
 - 150 Minuteman III and 4 HH-1H

USAF MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS: (As of FY 95/2)

MILITARY--ACTIVE	4,629
CIVILIAN	<u>532</u>
TOTAL	5,161

ANNOUNCED ACTIONS:

- As a result of the DOD Bottom-Up Review, the Air Force deleted funding for 150 Minuteman launch facilities. Additional actions concerning missile launch facilities will be determined by the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
- The Air Force will reduce approximately 11,700 civilian authorizations in fiscal year 1995. These reductions are a result of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, the National Performance Review, and depot workload reductions. This action helps bring Department of Defense civilian employment levels in line with overall force reductions and results in a decrease of 42 civilian manpower authorizations at Minot AFB.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (\$000):

FISCAL YEAR 94

Underground Fuel Storage Tanks	2,000
Repair Runway/Taxiway (Congress Insert)	8,500
Alter ECM/Bomb Navigation/AMU Facilities (Base Closure)*	1,240
Alter Base Supply Warehouse (Base Closure)*	<u>140</u>
TOTAL	11,880

Basing Manager: Major Ridley/XOOB/42123
Editor: Ms Wright/XOOBD/46675/16 Feb 95

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MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA (Cont'd)

FISCAL YEAR 95:

Upgrade Storm Drainage Facilities	1,500
Underground Fuel Storage Tanks	1,400
Underground Fuel Storage Tanks (Missile Facilities)	2,950
Repair Parking Apron (Congress Insert)**	4,500
B-52 Pylon/Launcher Storage Facility (Base Closure)*	2,670
Corrosion Control Facility (Base Closure)*	<u>600</u>
TOTAL	13,620

* Projects forecast for funding by the Base Closure Account. Associated with the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommendation to realign Griffiss AFB, NY.

** Congress directed Air Force to use O&M funds for this project.

SIGNIFICANT INSTALLATION ISSUES/PROBLEMS: None



USAF BASE FACT SHEET
GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA

MAJCOM/LOCATION/SIZE: AMC base sixteen miles west of Grand Forks with 5,422 acres

MAJOR UNITS/FORCE STRUCTURE:

- 319th Air Refueling Wing
– 48 KC-135R/T and 6 C-12F
- 321st Missile Group (AFSPC)
– 150 Minuteman III and 4 HH-1H

USAF MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS: (As of FY 95/2)

MILITARY--ACTIVE	4,772
CIVILIAN	<u>462</u>
TOTAL	5,234

ANNOUNCED ACTIONS:

- As a result of the DOD Bottom Up Review, the Air Force has deleted funding for 150 Minuteman launch facilities. Additional actions concerning missile launch facilities will be determined by the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
- The Air Force will reduce approximately 11,700 civilian authorizations in fiscal year 1995. These reductions are a result of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, the National Performance Review, and depot workload reductions. This action helps bring Department of Defense civilian employment levels in line with overall force reductions and results in a decrease of 50 civilian manpower authorizations at Grand Forks AFB.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (\$000):

FISCAL YEAR 94:

Upgrade Hydrant Fueling System (Congress Insert)	3,250
Underground Fuel Storage Tanks	2,600
Life Safety Upgrade [DMFO]	860
Alter Squadron Operations Facility (Base Closure)*	<u>460</u>
TOTAL	7,170

Basing Manager: Maj Pray/XOOB/77356
Basing Editor: Ms Wright/XOOBD/46675/12 Jan 95

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
GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA (Cont'd)

FISCAL YEAR 95:

Underground Fuel Storage Tanks-Missile Facilities	5,200
Housing Office [MFH 711]	709
Alter Corrosion Control Facility (Base Closure)*	3,801
Add to Fabrication Shop (Base Closure)*	<u>384</u>
TOTAL	10,094


*Projects forecast for funding by the Base Closure Account. Associated with the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommendation to realign Griffiss AFB, NY.

SIGNIFICANT INSTALLATION ISSUES/PROBLEMS: None



MAP NO. 35

NORTH DAKOTA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

NORTH DAKOTA

FISCAL YEAR 1994

(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

Personnel/Expenditures	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities		
1. Personnel - Total	19,295	5,795	683	12,662	155		
Active Duty Military	9,786	26	10	9,750	0		
Civilian	1,702	273	1	1,273	155		
Reserve & National Guard	7,807	5,496	672	1,639	0		
<hr/>							
II. Expenditures - Total	\$460,379	\$95,410	\$9,495	\$347,122	\$8,352		
A. Payroll Outlays - Total	340,399	45,038	6,108	285,254	3,999		
Active Duty Military Pay	214,314	806	285	213,223	0		
Civilian Pay	53,545	6,303	48	41,195	3,999		
Reserve & National Guard Pay	34,148	26,689	801	6,658	0		
Retired Military Pay	38,392	9,240	4,974	24,178	0		
B. Prime Contracts Over \$25,000 Total	119,980	50,372	3,387	61,368	4,353		
Supply and Equipment Contracts	7,851	626	3,387	1,422	2,416		
RDT&E Contracts	841	841	0	0	0		
Service Contracts	65,891	3,944	0	60,010	1,937		
Construction Contracts	27,244	26,808	0	436	0		
Civil Function Contracts	18,153	18,153	0	0	0		
<hr/>							
Major Locations of Expenditures	Expenditures			Major Locations of Personnel	Military and Civilian Personnel		
	Total	Payroll Outlays	Prime Contracts		Total	Active Duty Military	Civilian
Grand Forks AFB	\$153,542	\$106,952	\$48,590	Minot AFB	5,452	4,869	533
Minot AFB	145,158	123,122	22,036	Grand Forks AFB	5,295	4,753	542
Grand Forks	41,461	23,794	17,577	Fargo	397	106	291
Fargo	31,134	27,604	2,530	Bismarck	159	0	159
Minot	26,174	10,691	15,483	Devils Lake	58	0	58
Bismarck	18,618	16,534	84	New England	32	32	0
Cavalier	7,153	1,034	6,059	Cavalier	30	25	5
Devils Lake	6,255	6,144	111	Minot	24	1	23
Janestown	4,927	1,635	1,292	Valley City	18	0	18
Valley City	2,134	2,102	32	Dickinson	6	0	6
<hr/>							
Prime Contracts Over \$25,000 (Prior Three Years)	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities		
Fiscal Year 1993	\$172,044	\$72,962	\$6,550	\$71,736	\$20,794		
Fiscal Year 1992	146,270	69,567	6,475	56,472	13,756		
Fiscal Year 1991	148,656	85,536	3,259	49,876	9,955		
<hr/>							
Top Five Contractors Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards in this State	Total Amount	Major Area of Work					
		FSC or Service Code Description	Amount				
1. INDUSTRIAL BUILDERS, INC	\$14,968	All Other Non-Building Facilities	\$15,100				
2. STRATA CORPORATION	8,340	Airport Runways	7,357				
3. MEINCKE-JOHNSON COMPANY	6,975	Other Administrative & Service Buildings	6,975				
4. EUBOIS & SONS MASONRY INC	6,838	Maint/Other Residential Buildings	3,770				
5. CAPE, JAMES & SONS COMPANY	5,790	Airport Runways	5,790				
Total of Above	\$42,911	(35.5% of total awards over \$25,000)					

Prepared by: Washington Headquarters Services
 Directorate for Information Operations and Reports

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN NORTH DAKOTA

15-Mar-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
AF						
	CAVALIER AFS					
	GRAND FORKS AFB	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNUP	1993 DBCRC: Closure recommendation of Griffiss AFB, NY directs movement of KC-135 aircraft into Grand Forks AFB, ND. Also, B-1Bs move to Ellsworth AFB, SD. Personnel movement in arc: 320 MII and 10 Civ.
	HECTOR FIELD IAP AGS					
	MINOT AFB	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNUP	1993 DBCRC: Griffiss AFB, NY closure recommends relocation of B-521Is to Minot AFB, ND. Movement of personnel into Minot: 315 MII and 3 Civ

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POINT PAPER

ON

MINOT AND GRAND FORKS ICBM SYSTEMS

PURPOSE: Provide information on major differences between the two weapon systems

DISCUSSION:

Both Grand Forks and Minot came into the inventory in the late '60s

	Weapon System	LCCs / LFs	IOC	Converted to MM III	System Design
Minot	WS133A-M/CDB	15 / 150	64	71	Boeing
Grand Forks	WS133B/CDB	15 / 150	66	73	Sylvania (now GTE)

LCCs = Launch Control Centers LFs = Launch Facilities

* Currently converting 150 MM IIs to IIIs--30 completed to date

Although they use the same missile, the ground systems are significantly different (atch 1)

- Hardware design (pre-REACT--Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting, an upgrade combining both LCC consoles into a single unit, improving C3 and rapid emergency action message processing and retargeting):

-- "A-M": Smaller LCC with equipment racks on capsule perimeter. Commander's console provides majority of visual LF status indicators, Deputy monitors hardcopy status. At LF, the launch facility support building (LFSB) is a "soft" building at ground level

-- "B": Larger LCC, with an "island" of additional equipment. Deputy monitors majority of visual LF status indicators, as well as some hardcopy status. At LF, the launcher equipment building (LEB) is below ground level

- Command and control:

-- "A-M": Designed with a redundant network of buried, intersite cables connecting all 5 LCCs and 50 LFs. Allows command and control to be maintained in the event of multiple point failures in the cable network, such as cable breaks or LCC computer failure

-- "B": Designed with a single thread non-redundant cable system and a redundant medium frequency (MF) radio system.

afd: dc:hceg/pp-gf

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--- The cable system provides a single line connection from the parent LCC to assigned LFs and other LCCs within the same squadron, but no cable interconnectivity to other LFs in the same squadron

--- The MF radio system provides a redundant, separate (from the cable network) path connectivity from the parent LCC to all LFs / LCCs in the same squadron

- Targeting Operations: (Assuming both systems receive the REACT modification):


-- "A-M": As many as five LCCs can simultaneously conduct squadron retargeting operations to meet national military timelines. This process allows combat crews to input new target data from LCCs into the required LF computer as directed by higher headquarters

-- "B": A maximum of two LCCs can conduct retargeting operations at the same time.


RECOMMENDATION: None--for information only

1 Atch
C2 system depiction (2 pgs)

minot afb




Redundant intersite cables



Command & Control System

- WING III MINOT AFB ND 150 MM III LAUNCH FACILITIES (15 LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES)
- WING IV WHITEMAN AFB MO 150 MM II LAUNCH FACILITIES (15 LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES)
- WING V F.E. WARREN AFB WY 200 MM III LAUNCH FACILITIES (20 LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES)




Launch Support Facilities

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
**FOR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY**

Single cable with radio




Command & Control System

WING VI GRAND FORKS AFB ND 150 MM III LAUNCH FACILITIES (15 LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES)
 SQUADRON 20th MALMSTROM AFB MT 50 MM III LAUNCH FACILITIES (5 LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES)



Launch Support Facilities



GRAND FORKS AFB

DRAFT
BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
GRAND FORKS AFB - ABM ISSUE

BACKGROUND

- The DoD recommendation to realign Grand Forks AFB says that "the 321st Missile Group will inactivate unless prior to December 1996 the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain ballistic missile defense options effectively precludes this action."
- During the March 1, 1995 hearing, Secretary Perry indicated that he could not promise a recommendation by late June, because the ABM determination requires an interagency process.
- On March 7, 1995 the Commission voted to add Minot AFB for realignment and inactivation of the 91st Missile Group if ABM considerations preclude the proposed realignment of Grand Forks AFB.

ABM AGREEMENT

- ABM Treaty--Signed May 23, 1972, ratified October 3, 1972
 - Restricts the number of ABM deployment areas by permitting each nation to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. (Treaty, Article III (a), (b))
- Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, Unilateral Statements--Signed May 26, 1972
 - Stipulates that the US ABM deployment area for defense of ICBM silos "will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area." (Agreed Statement, Paragraph A)
 - Permits second site to be located in Washington DC area.
- Protocol to the ABM Treaty--Signed July 3, 1974, ratified March 19, 1976
 - Further restricts ABM deployments by requiring that "each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for the deployment of ABM systems." (Protocol, Article I)
 - Permits each side to reverse its original choice of an ABM site, and states that the right to change from the original deployment site to the alternate site may be exercised only once. (Protocol, Article II) Thus, the US could dismantle its ABM site near Grand Forks AFB and deploy an ABM system in the Washington DC area, but not elsewhere.
 - Requires advance notice be given prior to changing from the original deployment site to the alternate site, and stipulates that this can only be done during a year in which the ABM Treaty is scheduled for review by the Standing Consultative Committee. (Protocol, Article II) Accordingly, this could be done during the next five year review in 1997.

DRAFT

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AIR FORCE POSITION - 1993

- During June 17, 1993 hearing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations (Mr. Boatwright) was asked if the ABM site would "preclude closure of Grand Forks AFB or its attached ICBM missile field now or during the 1995 round of the base closure process. He provided the following insert for the record:

"The ABM Treaty would not preclude closure of Grand Forks AFB. A major provision of the treaty limits deployment of ABM systems to one site located either around the nation's capital or centered within a group of ICBM silo launchers. If the base is closed and all silo launchers are eliminated, the US would have the right to relocate the US ABM system to the nation's capital, not to another ICBM base or some other location. If we eliminate all the ICBM silo launchers in the deployment area and choose not to relocate the ABM system, the Treaty is unclear whether the US may leave the ABM system in place without dismantling it or reactivate it someday. The existence of the ICBM launchers was a sine qua non for the initial deployment of the ABM system there pursuant to Article III. But a review of the negotiating record would be required to determine whether the US would still have a right to an ABM system there. In any case, the US could seek explicit agreement of the Treaty Parties to have an ABM system there." (Emphasis added.)

DOD POSITION - 1995

- During March 1, 1995 hearing, The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Mr. Deutch) was asked about ABM implications and responded as follows:

"In order to come to a proper judgment on it, it's not just a Department of Defense matter. We have to get interagency views from others about the treaty implications. That's going to take some period of time. I believe the material transmitted to the Commission contains a view from our General Counsel and our Undersecretary for Policy that we think it's clean from the point of view of the Treaty. But we do need to have interagency confirmation of that ..." (No separate views have been received from the General Consul or Undersecretary for Policy, but their views may be implicit in the DoD recommendation.) (Emphasis added.)

GRAND FORKS COMMUNITY POSITION

- In a December 9, 1994 letter, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny argued that closing Grand Forks AFB "would be prejudicial to the national security interest of the United States."

-- Closing the missile field at Grand Forks AFB without working out the details with the former Soviet Union could signal that the US is working unilaterally to change the ABM Treaty.

-- Moving the ABM site from Grand Forks will require negotiations that could complicate plans for eventually establishing a multiple site strategic defense of the US.

David Olson/AF Team/Mar 20, 1995/12:00

DRAFT

prohibits this. While further deployment of radars intended to give early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, they must be located along the territorial boundaries of each country and oriented outward, so that they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the treaty's provisions for consultation and amendment.

The treaty also provides for a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The commission was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II, by a Memorandum of Understanding dated December 21, 1972. Since then both the United States and the Soviet Union have raised a number of questions in the Commission relating to each side's compliance with the SALT I agreements. In each case raised by the United States, the Soviet activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern.

Article XIV of the treaty calls for review of the treaty 5 years after its entry into force, and at 5-year intervals thereafter. The first such review was conducted by the Standing Consultative Commission at its special session in the fall of 1977. At this session, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the treaty had operated effectively during its first 5 years, that it had continued to serve national security interests, and that it did not need to be amended at that time.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972

Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972

Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972

Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972

Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
- (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
- (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes.

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA**

**FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

RICHARD NIXON

L.I. BREZHNEV

*President of the United States of
America*

*General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU*

Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles

1. Agreed Statements

The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added):

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[E]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[F]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

2. Common Understandings

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Articles III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: "The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers." In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)

B. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges." We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test

ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed test ranges" to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Government that there will be such additional ABM test ranges.

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

C. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

D. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultative Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,¹ agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

E. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.

¹ See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept. 30, 1971.

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of ratification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements

The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

B. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode," in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes; not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975

Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976

Instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976

Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976

Entered into force May 24, 1976

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security,

Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol.

2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article III of the

Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years of periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article III

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L.I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

March 24, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950324-16

The Honorable John M. Deutch
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

Dear Secretary Deutch:

During your recent testimony before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on March 1, 1995, you indicated that interagency coordination would be required to determine whether the proposed inactivation of the missile field at Grand Forks Air Force Base would jeopardize future deployment options under the ABM Treaty.

As you know, the Commission must make its recommendations to the President on the Defense Department's base closure and realignment recommendations by July 1. I hope you will make every effort to complete the interagency review of the issues surrounding the proposed deactivation of the 321st Missile Group at Grand Forks Air Force Base by early June in order that the results of this review will be available to the Commission before we make our recommendation to the President on this proposal.

Thank you for your assistance in this important matter.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman



4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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GANNETT NEWS SERVICE

March 7, 1995, Tuesday

LENGTH: 257 words

HEADLINE: MINOT, N.D., BASE ADDED TO COMMISSION'S LIST

BYLINE: KIRK SPITZER; Gannett News Service

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

It's official: Minot Air Force Base, N.D., is on the list of military bases being considered for closure or realignment.

In a largely technical move, the federal Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission voted Tuesday to add Minot to the list of bases the commission will consider during the 1995 base deliberations.

The Pentagon has recommended inactivating the 321st Missile Group at Grand Forks Air Force Base as part of a plan to close or realign 59 major domestic bases nationwide.

The Grand Forks recommendation is contingent, however, on a determination by various government agencies that it conforms with U.S. nuclear weapons treaties; if not, Minot's 91st Missile Group would be inactivated in its place.

Commission Chairman Alan Dixon said that without the formal designation by the commission, Minot could not have been substituted for Grand Forks, if it proved necessary. He said addition to the list allows the Minot community time to prepare for public hearings and a base visit by members of the commission.

Under commission rules, no base can be considered for closure if it is not formally added to the list of recommendations by May 17.

"We had to make it clear that Minot is on the list and is at risk, so that Minot could do whatever it needed to do to prepare," Dixon said.

Commissioner Al Cornella, a Rapid City, N.D., businessman, who lobbied on behalf of Ellsworth Air Force Base during previous base closing rounds, recused himself from voting on or discussing the Minot recommendation. ---

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 9, 1995

Document Separator

80TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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Star Tribune

March 1, 1995, Metro Edition

SECTION: News; Pg. 1B

LENGTH: 970 words

HEADLINE: One of two N.D. bases faces loss of missiles;
Grand Forks likely to lose 2,100 jobs

BYLINE: Kevin Duchscher; Staff Writer

BODY:

The Air Force bases at Grand Forks and Minot long have been a source of pride for ornery North Dakotans, who often bragged that their firepower made their state the world's third biggest nuclear power.

But they didn't joke about the jobs and economic benefits both bases brought to their respective regions. That's why state officials greeted with relief the news Tuesday that neither was on the Pentagon's latest list of base closings.

There is one problem. Defense Secretary William Perry has recommended that the Grand Forks base be "realigned." That's a nice way of saying that, if Congress and President Clinton approve, starting in 1997 the base will lose its missiles and about a third of its military employees and their families.

But an obsolete Cold War treaty that once made Grand Forks one of the country's primary defense centers may prevent that from happening. If government lawyers decide that the treaty requires Grand Forks to keep its missile group, the Pentagon says will take the missiles from Minot instead.

F. John Marshall, a Grand Forks attorney who has led community efforts to keep the base, said he knows what he has to do to salvage the missiles. But he said he doesn't like it.

"It puts us all in an awkward position," he said. "I have to go forward and speak about the ABM treaty, knowing full well that every time I bring up the ABM treaty, they'll know I'm talking about Minot. . . ."

"I don't want to start a war."

Marshall's counterpart in Minot, businessman Buzz Syria, coolly said he didn't think that was going to be necessary. With 37 B-52 bombers stationed in Minot, the Pentagon had good reason to hang onto the missile sites nearby, he said.

"We're not going to shoot any bullets at Grand Forks or Malmstrom [an Air Force base in Montana] or anybody," he said. "Frankly, that's stupid. We're going to do what we can. As far as I'm concerned, the missiles should all stay in North Dakota and that's where they belong."

The demise of the 321st Missile Group in Grant Forks would mean the loss of 1,600 jobs on the base and 500 base-related support positions, nearly 5

Star Tribune, March 1, 1995

percent of local jobs. That works out to a loss to the region of more than \$ 70 million a year, Marshall said.

"It has the potential to be a devastating blow," he said.

If Minot loses its 150 missiles, the Air Force estimates that the economic impact would be just about the same: about 2,200 lost jobs, or 6 percent of the area's employment.

Whatever else happens, Minot will keep its bombers and Grand Forks will keep its 48 Stratotankers, which refuel planes in the air.

The treaty at issue was one that Richard Nixon signed with the Soviet Union in 1972.. It resulted in the placement of the nation's only antiballistic missile (ABM) site north of Grand Forks, guarded by the Minuteman III missiles that dot the North Dakota prairie. But the site was shut down in 1976 after defense officials admitted they couldn't stop enough Soviet warheads to justify the cost.

The treaty never was rescinded, though, and Perry has given himself until December 1996 to decide whether it prevents him from removing the Grand Forks missiles.

Although Marshall said the Grand Forks side intends to trumpet the treaty, Syria seemed unperturbed.

"We will not pick away at the treaty," he said. "The attorneys in the Pentagon are apparently somewhat concerned about it. I think it's wise to see : they come out with."

Two years ago, state officials succeeded in rescuing both bases from the chopping block. This time, Marshall said, he knew that Grand Forks' missile group was in trouble.

The unit oversees 150 active Minuteman III sites in eastern and central North Dakota. The Pentagon's plan is to move some of the missiles to Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Mont., keep some in depots and destroy the rest. Most of the silos also would be destroyed.

It's part of a reduction that would result in 450 to 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles at three U.S. sites by 2001, what the Pentagon considers to be "a credible deterrent force."

Perry's recommendations will go to members of an independent commission, who will make recommendations to Clinton by July 1.

Military bases have been closed around the country because of changing defense and spending needs. The Pentagon estimates that it will cost nearly \$ 12 million to take the missiles from Grand Forks, but that \$ 447 million will be saved over 20 years.

But Marshall said that comes at the expense of local services and merchants, who have come to count on expanded business from the Air Force base.

Star Tribune, March 1, 1995

"Small utilities supply electricity for the missile fields. How do you replace that, in one of our small towns? . . . Moving companies in Fargo get 40 percent of their business [from base employees]," he said. "There are 110 teachers at the Grand Forks Air Force Base. How do you replace all of those things?"

The Pentagon proposed 146 closings and "realignments" in the fourth and possibly final round of base closings since 1988. Of those, 16 involve closure recommendations affecting more than 1,000 jobs while six realignments would claim at least as many jobs at bases that remain open.

Texas, Alabama, New Mexico and Pennsylvania were hit hardest by the Pentagon's recommendations for base closings. Perry said that the closings will translate into nearly \$ 6 billion in savings by 2001.

Even with this round of closures, Perry said, the military will have more bases than it needs to maintain its force of 10 Army divisions, 11 aircraft carriers, 936 Air Force fighters and three Marine Corps divisions.

The Associated Press contributed to this story.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 1, 1995





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

March 20, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 9503243

The Honorable Edward Schafer
Governor
State of North Dakota
600 E. Boulevard Avenue
Bismarck, North Dakota 58505-0001

Dear Governor Schafer:

I am writing to you in reference to the upcoming regional hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in Grand Forks, North Dakota on March 30, 1995. The hearing will be held at the Chester Fritz Auditorium on the campus of the University of North Dakota, beginning at 7:30 PM.

The overall time has been determined by the Commission on the basis of the number of affected installations and the direct military and civilian personnel lost in North Dakota. Attached is a paper that further outlines the Commission's regional hearing, testimony and site visit procedures.

The total time allocated for military installations affected in the State of North Dakota is 90 minutes. Although the state may use the block of time as it chooses, the Commission allocated the time based on the following breakdown of installations:

Grand Forks AFB	45 minutes
Minot AFB	45 minutes

The time allotted for a state represents the total time available for all Commission discussion at the regional hearing. It has been the Commission's experience that the Commissioners' ability to ask questions of and to seek clarification from the witnesses is mutually beneficial. It is highly recommended

The Commission requests that the elected officials and community representatives in your state work together to coordinate witnesses to ensure that your allotted time is used for a concise presentation to the Commission. A witness list indicating the time allotted to each witness should be submitted to the Commission no later than three working days prior to the scheduled hearing.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or my staff at (703) 696-0504.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alan J. Dixon". The signature is stylized and cursive, with a large loop at the beginning and a long tail.

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

Enclosure

Document Separator



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

March 20, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950324-3

The Honorable Kent Conrad
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Kent:

I am writing to you in reference to the upcoming regional hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in Grand Forks, North Dakota on March 30, 1995. The hearing will be held at the Chester Fritz Auditorium on the campus of the University of North Dakota, beginning at 7:30 PM.

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Chairman

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1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

March 20, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 9503243

The Honorable Byron Dorgan
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Byron:

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
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Chairman

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1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

March 20, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950.324-3

The Honorable Earl Pomeroy
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Pomeroy:

I am writing to you in reference to the upcoming regional hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in Grand Forks, North Dakota on March 30, 1995. The hearing will be held at the Chester Fritz Auditorium on the campus of the University of North Dakota, beginning at 7:30 PM.

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
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Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

Enclosure



1995 List of Military Installations
Inside the United States for Closure or Realignment

Part I: Major Base Closures

Army

Fort McClellan, Alabama
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado
Price Support Center, Illinois
Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois
Fort Ritchie, Maryland
Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey
Seneca Army Depot, New York
Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
Red River Army Depot, Texas
Fort Pickett, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California
Ship Repair Facility, Guam
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland
Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts
Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Air Force

North Highlands Air Guard Station, California
Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, California
Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York
Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York

Chapter 4
The 1995 Selection Process

Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, Ohio
Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
Reese Air Force Base, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah

Part II: Major Base Realignment

Army

Fort Greely, Alaska
Fort Hunter Liggett, California
Sierra Army Depot, California
Fort Meade, Maryland
Detroit Arsenal, Michigan
Fort Dix, New Jersey
Fort Hamilton, New York
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
Fort Lee, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
Naval Activities, Guam
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington

Air Force

McClellan Air Force Base, California
Onizuka Air Station, California

Chapter 4
The 1995 Selection Process

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
 Robins Air Force Base, Georgia
 Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana
 Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico
 Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota
 Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
 Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
 Hill Air Force Base, Utah

*Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignments,
 Disestablishments or Relocations*

Army

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, California
 East Fort Baker, California
 Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California
 Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut
 Big Coppett Key, Florida
 Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland
 Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland
 Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts
 Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts
 Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), Missouri
 Fort Missoula, Montana
 Camp Kilmer, New Jersey
 Caven Point Reserve Center, New Jersey
 Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey
 Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York
 Fort Totten, New York
 Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, North Carolina
 Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginia
 Camp Bonneville, Washington
 Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), West Virginia

Navy

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West
 Coast Division, San Diego, California
 Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California

Chapter 4
The 1995 Selection Process

Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California
 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California
 Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut
 Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida
 Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam
 Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana
 Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland
 Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi
 Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
 Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
 Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania
 Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania
 Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina
 Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia
 Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, Virginia
 Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia

Navy/Marine Reserve Activities

Naval Reserve Centers at:

Huntsville, Alabama
 Stockton, California
 Santa Ana, Irvine, California
 Pomona, California
 Cadillac, Michigan
 Staten Island, New York
 Laredo, Texas
 Sheboygan, Wisconsin

Naval Air Reserve Center at:

Olathe, Kansas

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:

New Orleans, Louisiana (Region 10)
Charleston, South Carolina (Region 7)

Air Force

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, California
Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta, Georgia
Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas

Defense Investigative Service

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird, Maryland

Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC Recommendations

Army

Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland

Navy

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California
Naval Air Station Alameda, California
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California
Naval Training Center, San Diego, California
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida

Chapter 4
The 1995 Selection Process

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida
Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida
Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii
Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.
Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C.

Air Force

Williams AFB, Arizona
Lowry AFB, Colorado
Homestead AFB, Florida (301st Rescue Squadron)
Homestead AFB, Florida (726th Air Control Squadron)
MacDill AFB, Florida
Griffiss AFB, New York (Airfield Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division)
Griffiss AFB, New York (485th Engineering Installation Group)

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, California