

# UTAH

## 1995 DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

### REGIONAL HEARING

### DEFENSE DEPOT OGDEN UTAH

### DUGWAY PROVING GROUND

### HILL A.F.B./OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

Commissioner Wendi Louise Steele

**DEFENSE DEPOT  
OGDEN UTAH  
DDOU**

**Major General Mike Pavich, USAF (retired)  
President, Hill/DDO '95, Inc.**



# **PURPOSE: Demonstrate that**

- **DLA deviated from base closure criteria in selection of DDOU for closure**
- **DLA did not comply with law**
  - **Installations not considered equally**
  - **Appearance of pre-selection**



# ★ **What is the REAL military value of a distribution system?**

To Provide:

- 1) **What the customer wants**
- 2) **Where they want it**
- 3) **When they want it**
- 4) **At the lowest possible cost**

- **All of these factors are measured**
- **All impact operational readiness of DoD's total force**
- **None were used in DLA's evaluation of military value**
- **This is a deviation from Criteria 1**

**Operational efficiencies given  
least consideration—when, in  
fact, it is the most important**

**Example: DLA pays for its operation by  
charging the Services for each transaction  
(currently \$27.60)**

**- Almost \$1 Billion Annually**



**O&M=Operations and Maintenance Budget**

**X=Operations Tempo (exercise of military muscle)**

**Y=Supplies**

**Z=Maintenance of military equipment**


**X+Y+Z=O&M=Military Readiness**

**Using proven cost effective depots drives  
Y down and provides more**


**\$ for OPS tempo and maintenance.**

★ **-Real Military Value-** ★

# Distribution System Costs



DLA did not consider most significant costs in their analysis:  
**COST OF DEPOT OPERATIONS**



**Including G & A BOS Costs that support reimbursable missions inflates DDOU's BRAC BOS Costs.**

**BOS: Base Operation Support  
G&A: General and Administrative**

**DLA's own study (KPMG)  
defines DDOU as the most  
cost efficient depot of  
California, Pennsylvania  
and Utah depots.**





## **Workload Mix From Peat Marwick Study**

	<b>BIN</b>	<b>BULK</b>	<b>HAZARDOUS</b>	<b>TOTAL COST</b>	<b>TOTAL COST</b>	<b>COST PER UNIT</b>
Tracy/ Sharpe	68%	31%	1%	\$75 million	3,400 (K)	\$22
Mechbrg/ New Cumb.	71%	29%	0%	\$90.4 million	3,930 (K)	\$23
Ogden	70%	27%	3%	\$32.5 million	2,000(K)	\$16
Spread High/low	3%	4%	3%			

### **From KPMG Peat Marwick "Findings;"**

**"Our analysis revealed that Bin, Bulk and Hazardous receipts and issues were comparable missions within the depots analyzed."**

# **Comparisons of depots can be made by looking at indicators which can be grouped into three categories:**

- **Comparable general indicators including:**
  - Total direct costs per employee
  - Total G&A as a percentage of direct
  - Total indirect as a percentage of direct
  
- **Comparable mission indicators including:**
  - Unit Cost by category (i.e. Bin, Bulk, Hazardous)
  - Direct Cost per line
  - Workload by category
  
- **Other comparable indicators including:**
  - Headcount analysis



**DLA inappropriately  
disregarded their (KPMG)  
commissioned analysis.**



**Question:**

**WHY WOULD DLA DISREGARD THEIR  
OWN COMMISSIONED ANALYSIS?**

**Answer:**

**TO DEFEND A PRE-CONCEIVED  
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.**





# **Review of minutes of DLA BRAC Executive Group indicate:**

- 1) Eight stand alone depots considered at beginning of process.**
- 2) In April '94 the concept of operations pre-selected California and Pennsylvania depots to be combined and called Primary Distribution Sites (PDS)—No Analysis involved.**
- 3) In August '94 directed a change in concept of operations.**

# **MINUTES OF DLA's BRAC EXECUTIVE GROUP ★**

## **April 1994:**

**"We need to insure the concept of operations is well crafted so it fully supports our BRAC '95 decisions."**

## **Decisions Reached:**

**"Primary Distribution Sites (PDS's) at San Joaquin (Tracy and Sharpe facilities) and Susquehanna (Mechanicsburg and New Cumberland facilities) will not be reviewed in BRAC '95."**

## **August 1994:**

**"The Distribution Concept of Operations was changed to remove any appearance of pre-decision about the location of the primary distribution sites."**

# Analysis of Alternatives

## Attainable Cubic Feet (ACF) IN MILLIONS

Ogden	31.8
Tracy	34.8
Sharpe	30.7
Richmond	27.3
Memphis	34.0
Mechanicsburg	37.6
New Cumberland	32.0
Columbus	28.6
Red River	23.0
Letterkenney	25.1
Other Co-located	

**DLA GOAL—CLOSE 64 MILLION ACF**


**The BRAC law states that  
each installation will be  
treated equally.**




**Contrary to '93, DLA arbitrarily combined  
two stand alone depots and evaluated  
them as one. They violated the law.**


**DLA** states that strategic location and capability to process wartime requirements were of great importance.


★ **However, no analysis was accomplished in this area- especially performance during past contingencies.** ★






**A=FIRST DESTINATION \$\$\$**  
**B=SECOND DESTINATION \$\$**





**8 OF 10 DDOU TOP CUSTOMERS  
IN UTAH OR POINTS EAST**

**A=First Destination \$\$  
B=Second Destination \$\$**





**DLA** criteria skews the outcome  
of the military value analysis  
—favors combined depots.

- Changes from '93 to '95 support pre-selected PDSs
- Points for CCP are inappropriate
- Throughput design capacity improperly used

# **From '93 to '95 DLA changed emphasis**

**FROM:**



- **Costs (Operational Efficiencies)**
- **Expansions Capability**
- **Excess Storage**

**TO:**

- **Current Workload**
- **Storage Space**
- **Being a Containerization  
Consolidation Point (CPP)**

# **What is a CCP?**

**All depots have the capability and many have served as a CCP.  
CCP points should be assigned  
*equally* to all depots  
- **or assigned to none.****



**Existing workload does not  
represent the throughput  
capacity/capability  
of a depot.**



**DLA's use of existing workload  
skews the data and is totally  
misleading in evaluating a  
depot's military value.**

# **What would the outcome be:**

- **Evaluating each depot independently**
- **Giving No points for a CCP**
- **Using correct value for throughput capacity?**



# STAND ALONE ANALYSIS

( 8 DEPOTS )

DEPOT	MISSION SCOPE	MISSION SUIT.	OPS. EFF.	EXPANSION	TOTAL
Tracy	161	374	63	91	689
Ogden	133	364	72	106	675
Sharpe	161	339	69	106	675
New Cumb.	139	364	72	68	643
Memphis	126	369	76	67	638
Mechanicsburg	139	346	73	70	628
Richmond	141	312	80	35	568
Columbus	132	277	84	58	551



# **DLA DOES NEED TO REDUCE EXCESS WAREHOUSE CAPACITY**

**Given this evaluation, we believe  
the TRUE DLA excess in the west  
is at SHARPE.**

**Sharpe, not Defense Depot  
Ogden, is the obvious  
closure candidate.**

# **IN CONCLUSION:**



**We have demonstrated that the DLA process:**

- 1) Deviated from the closure criteria**
  - Not selecting best military value combination**
  - Not selecting the most cost effective combination**
- 2) Did not treat all installations equally**
- 3) Gives the appearance of pre-selection**

# **STAND ALONE ANALYSIS COMPARING COMBINATIONS**

<b>DEPOT</b>	<b>MISSION SCOPE</b>	<b>MISSION SUIT.</b>	<b>OPS. EFF.</b>	<b>EXPANSION</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Tracy/Sharpe	161	337	70	112	680
Tracy/Ogden	183	414	71	130	798
Ogden/Sharpe	183	405	71	128	787






**OTHER FACTORS  
DEMONSTRATE  
IMPORTANT  
CONSIDERATIONS:**



# ON-TIME RECEIPTS


## Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93



% On Time	■	99.9	99.5	99.1	98.8	98.5	98.4	97.0	95.1
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# DENIALS


Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93



% Denials	0.59	0.61	0.65	0.76	0.83	0.90	0.91	1.06
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# LOCATOR ACCURACY


## Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93



<b>% Accuracy</b>	99.7	99.1	99.0	97.7	97.5	96.2	96.0	93.8
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# ON-TIME MRO PROCESSING IPG I

Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93




% On Time	■	99.5	99.3	99.1	98.2	98.1	96.2	96.1	57.3
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# ON-TIME MRO PROCESSING IPG II

Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93



% On Time	■	99.6	99.5	99.4	99.1	98.5	97.5	94.3	63.9
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# **INSTALLATION EXCELLENCE:**

- **Demonstration of outstanding performance**
- **Employee participation in cost reductions**
- **Continued low cost operation**
  
- **DLA Award for Installation Excellence**
- **Ogden won the award every year given ('87 - '93)**



# **DDOU HAS BEEN THE DLA LEADER IN COST EFFICIENT OPERATIONS**

**Current Unit Cost  
DDOU -- \$21.13  
Projected Unit Cost -- \$18.56**

## **WHY?**

- **Lower labor cost**
- **Cheaper transportation**
- **Lower depot operating costs**
- **More productive work force**
- **Reimbursable workload**
- **Designed for fast moving stock**

# **Hill Air Force Base not considered by DLA:**

- Provides aerial port when needed
- Used during every contingency
  - Desert Shield/Storm: Special airlift missions plus 184 air shipments total 326,214 lbs.
  - Cuba and Haiti: Special airlift missions total 927,286 lbs.

**HAFB adds military value  
not considered by DLA**

# **Reimbursable Workload DEPMEDS:**

**D e p l o y a b l e   M e d i c a l   F a c i l i t i e s**

- **One-of-a-kind activity**
- **Essential for contingencies or humanitarian relief**
- **Army wants to stay in Ogden**
- **Reduced cost of operations**
- **Costly to move**



# Tenants

- IRS not considered: Over 900 people
- DLA's System Design Center must stay or lose knowledge base
  - Costly to move
- DRMS: best suited to Ogden location

# **SUMMARY:**

- **DDOU cost efficient operations and past performance demand inclusion in western PDS analysis**
- **DDOU provides added flexibility and better strategic location.**
- **DDOU's history demonstrates it is the supplier of choice.**
- **DDOU is the constant in any optimal western depot combination**  
***"Any team Michael Jordan plays on is the best team."***

JAMES V. HANSEN  
1ST DISTRICT, UTAH

COMMITTEES  
ARMED SERVICES  
INTERIOR AND  
INSULAR AFFAIRS  
STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL  
CONDUCT

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
ROOM 2421  
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4401  
(202) 225-0453

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-4401

DISTRICT OFFICES  
1017 FEDERAL BUILDING  
324 25TH STREET  
OGDEN, UT 84401  
(801) 393-8362  
(801) 825-5677  
(801) 451-5822  
435 EAST TABERNACLE  
ST GEORGE, UT 84770  
(801) 828-1071

April 17, 1995

Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon,

The purpose of this letter is to clarify an area of disagreement regarding the conclusions in a 1993 KPMG Peat Marwick study accomplished for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Since I first raised the concern that DLA was not considering one of the best candidates, Defense Depot Ogden, as a primary distribution site, DLA contracted with Peat Marwick to provide data to substantiate their selection process. My review of the results of the study reinforces my position and casts doubt on DLA's selections.

As you know, DLA contends that it is not appropriate to rely on the study for cost and efficiency comparisons among the activities reviewed due to the wide variations in workload mix and accounting procedures. The study results state, "Our analysis revealed that bin, bulk and hazardous receipts and issues were comparable missions within the depots analyzed." The data collected for the study came from the Defense Business Management System which is used by all activities studied. It reveals that during the period studied, the workload mix was nearly identical at all sites. I have included an enclosure showing the specific workload mix figures used in the study.

The study was not intended to provide an across-the-board comparison, since all depots were not included. But it does serve well to compare those activities best postured for consideration as a Primary Distribution Site (PDS) in the west. Highest military value should be the objective as measured by highest throughput possible, greatest expansion capability, lowest total cost to the customer, and best performance. By combining the qualifications (excluding total cost) of two distinct activities, the former Tracy Depot with the former Sharpe Army Depot, DLA assumes it has achieved the highest military value for the western PDS.

I do not dispute the concept of combining activities, but to ensure the above characteristics for the optimum PDS are maximized, including least cost, all possible combinations among the western stand-alone depots should be analyzed and given

Chairman Alan J. Dixon  
April 17, 1995  
Page 2

equitable consideration. I contend that Ogden's high performance and least cost should be allowed to have an influence on the combination selected. Since the data for such an analysis has already been collected by KPMG Peat Marwick from the same sources for all candidates, there is opportunity to allow review of all alternative combinations. As shown by the enclosure, workload mix is very near the same and the cost accounting system used by the western stand-alone depots is the same; therefore, cost comparisons are possible, appropriate, and fair.

Any assessment of military value must give substantial consideration to total operating cost if the assessment is to serve the very purpose of the BRAC process -- to maintain the highest military value at the least possible cost.

I look forward to the opportunity for further discussion of our perspectives at the Commission briefing in Albuquerque.

Sincerely,



James V. Hansen  
Member of Congress

JVH:lt  
Enclosures

Enclosure 1

**WORKLOAD MIX OF WESTERN STAND-ALONE DEPOTS**

(As taken from the 1993 KPMG Peat Marwick Study)

	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>F</b>
	Bin	Bulk	Haz.	Total Cost	Total Line Count	Cost Per Unit
<b>TRACY/ SHARPE</b>	68%	31%	1%	\$75M	\$3.4M	\$22
<b>MECHANICSBURG/ NEW CUMBERLAND</b>	71%	29%	0%	\$90.4M	\$3.9M	\$23
<b>OGDEN</b>	70%	27%	3%	\$32.5M	\$2.0M	\$16
<b>Spread from High to Low</b>	3%	4%	3%			

The KPMB Peat Marwick Study stated: **"Analysis based on line count ... may not accurately reflect differences in handling characteristics for a unit cost comparison."**

This statement is true if there are workload mix variations. Obviously, if a wide variation exists between the percent volumes in columns A, B and C, a comparison based only on a total units figure (only Column E) will not be valid since it does not take into account the level of effort and cost differences (i.e. a Column A unit and a Column B unit.) However, if the workload mix figures are reasonably close, a cost comparison can be made using only the total units produced (Column E) divided into the total cost (Column D from the same accounting system) to get a valid cost per unit for making a unit cost comparison. The latter is the case in the workload mix percentages shown in the table above. This is why the study concluded, **"bin, bulk and hazardous receipts and issues were comparable missions within the depots analyzed."**

Note: Selected pages from Pete Marwick Study attached.


The purpose of this task was to review FY93 cost data and provide adjustments for FY94 at selected DLA distribution depots

**Financial Infrastructure Differences**

- **Chart of Accounts**
- **Accounting Methods / Systems**
- **Workload Implications**
- **Coding Consistency**

**Goal: Data Comparability**

Our approach was to evaluate the sample depots and develop the basis for an “apples to apples” comparison



**Data Comparability: Our analysis revealed that bin, bulk, and hazardous receipts and issues were comparable missions within the depots analyzed**

- Originally, depot personnel suggested that within these categories there are items whose handling characteristics are much different than typical mission stock. These items were originally thought to adversely affect unit cost comparability. These hard to handle items include:
  - Steel
  - Tires
  - Helicopter Blades
  - Concertina and Barbed Wire
  - Rope, Cable, and Wire
  - Tank Tracks
  - Pipe
  - Aluminum Airplane Skins
  - Lumber

## Data Comparability (cont.)

- We investigated the possibility of isolating the hard-to-handle items. These items would have the following estimated unit cost in aggregate:

	<u>DDJC</u>	<u>DDOU</u>
Estimated fully absorbed cost	\$3,080,000	\$740,000
Estimated Work Counts	<u>101,223</u>	<u>33,351</u>
	<u>\$30.43</u>	<u>\$22.19</u>

- DDSP was unable to provide us with an estimate of the costs of their hard to handle items.

## Data Comparability (cont.)

- Excluding these costs from the calculation of unit cost for other mission stock would show the following:

	<u>DDJC</u>		<u>DDOU</u>	
Mission Total Costs	\$96,500,000		\$40,450,000	
Less: Costs of Other Comparables	<u>3,080,000</u>	93,420,000	<u>740,000</u>	39,710,000
Total Mission Work Counts	3,530,198		1,988,352	
Less: Work Counts of Other Comparables	<u>101,223</u>	<u>3,428,975</u>	<u>33,351</u>	<u>1,955,001</u>
Revised Unit Cost		<u>\$27.24</u>		<u>\$20.31</u>
Total Mission Unit Cost		<u>\$27.34</u>		<u>\$20.34</u>
<b>Difference</b>		<b>\$00.10</b>		<b>\$00.03</b>

- We determined that the impact of hard-to-handle items was negligible in terms of comparability, hence these items were included as part of the comparable depot missions

## Data Comparability (Cont.)

- Given the adjustments made by KPMG for the depots analyzed, the following categories are comparable:
  - Bin issue
  - Bin receipt
  - Bulk issue
  - Bulk receipt
  - Hazardous issue
  - Hazardous receipt
  
- Two costs were not considered directly comparable:
  - Second Destination Transportation
  - Reimbursable work

Comparisons of depots can be made by looking at indicators which can be grouped into three categories

- Comparable general indicators including:
  - Total direct costs per employee
  - Total G&A as a percentage of direct
  - Total indirect as a percentage of direct
  
- Comparable mission indicators including:
  - Unit Cost by category (i.e. Bin, Bulk, Hazardous)
  - Direct Cost per line
  - Workload by category
  
- Other comparable indicators including:
  - Headcount analysis

*Information that follows reflects adjustments by KPMG unless otherwise noted*


## 5. KPMG also reviewed the regional depreciation allocation methodologies

- The cost of an asset is one of the costs of the services it renders during its useful economic life. GAAP requires that this cost be spread over the expected useful life of the asset in such a way as to allocate it as equitably as possible to the periods during which services are obtained from the use of the asset. This procedure is known as **depreciation accounting**, a system of accounting that aims to distribute the cost or the basic value of tangible assets in a systematic and rational manner. [ARB43, ch9C, ¶15].
- A large complex commercial organization will calculate depreciation for each separate business unit. For example, General Motors would evaluate the Pontiac division's operation vis a vis the Chevrolet division, including depreciation in the operating results for each division. Likewise, Pontiac would record depreciation at each of its separate locations individually.

## 5. Depreciation (cont.)

- When examining costs of a depot, the actual depreciation incurred on the assets for a particular depot should be included in the costs **of that depot**.
  - Depots with new and expensive buildings and equipment will cost more than a depot with older buildings/equipment
  - To evaluate the return on investment in assets, DLA should charge the cost of the assets (i.e., record depreciation) against revenues generated by the assets
  
- However
  - To ensure the unit cost incurred at a depot with significant depreciable assets is competitive, the depot must operate at the capacity planned for the building(s) / equipment
  - If such a depot cannot generate competitive unit costs due to depreciation, DLA management should make some type of change, for example:
    - » Improve efficiency
    - » Increase throughput
    - » Dispose of the building


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**S. LEE KLING, COMMISSIONER**  
**WENDI L. STEELE, COMMISSIONER**  
**BRAC 95**

13 April 95


# Defense Distribution Region West (DDRW)



***Distribution is our Business***

# DDOU ORGANIZATION

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# **DDOU TENANTS**

**As of Mar 95**

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- 1. Internal Revenue Service/966**
- 2. Company C321st Engineering Battalion (USAR)/155**
- 3. DLA System Design Center/129**
- 4. 172nd Medical Battalion Logistics Forward (USAR)/122**
- 5. Administrative Support Center West/90**
- 6. Defense Reutilization/Market Service, Operations West/80**
- 7. Defense Mega Center Ogden/30**
- 8. Utah National Guard (Joint Language Training Center)/30**
- 9. Defense Distribution Region West/21**
- 10. DLA Civilian Personnel Support Office/11**
- 11. Defense Criminal Investigation Service/9**
- 12. Defense Contract Management District West/6**
- 13. US Army Material Management Agency/6**
- 14. Defense Reutilization and Marketing Operations/5**

# DDOU PERSONNEL

As of 30 Sep 94

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• <b>Military</b>	<b>3</b>
• <b>General Schedule (GS)</b>	<b>339</b>
• <b>Wage Grade (WS/WG)</b>	<u><b>753</b></u>
<b>DDOU Total</b>	<b>1,095</b>
• <b>Tenants</b>	<u><b>1,677</b></u>
<b>Total on Depot</b>	<b>2,772</b>

**DDOU TENANTS (cont)**  
As of Mar 95


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- 15. US Army Civilian Health Clinic/4**
- 16. Area Maintenance Support Activity (USAR)/4**
- 17. America First Credit Union/3**
- 18. DLA Central Design Activity/2**
- 19. DLA Customer Supply Assistance Office/1**
- 20. Defense Printing Service/1**
- 21. AAFES Post Exchange/1**
- 22. First Security Bank/1**

**1,677 Total Tenant Employees**

# DDOU RECEIVING/SHIPPING WORKLOAD

FY92 - FY94



# DDOU TOP TEN DESTINATIONS

FY94

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1. CONSOLIDATION & CONTAINER POINT - WEST
2. STOCK MAINTENANCE, DDOU, UT
3. MCLB, BARSTOW, CA
4. CONSOLIDATION & CONTAINER POINT - EAST
5. TRAVIS AFB, CA
6. HILL AFB, UT
7. FT. HOOD, TX
8. FT. CARSON, CO
9. MCCLELLAN AFB, CA
10. TINKER AFB, OK

DIRECT  
WORLDWIDE DISTRIBUTION

**74.7%**

Top Ten  
Destinations  
represent  
25.3% of  
DDOU's  
Distribution  
Business




# DDOU TOP TEN CUSTOMERS

FY94

1. STOCK MAINTENANCE  
DDOU, UT
2. HILL AFB, UT
3. FT. HOOD, TX
4. FT. CARSON, CO
5. MCCLELLAN AFB, CA
6. TINKER AFB, OK
7. FT. LEWIS, WA
8. FT. BLISS, TX
9. FT. RILEY, KS
10. NAS, ALAMEDA, CA

## WORLDWIDE DISTRIBUTION



TOP TEN  
Represent  
16% of  
DDOU's  
Distribution  
Business


# DDOU PERFORMANCE

FY94

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	FY 94	STANDARD
<b><u>RECEIPTS</u></b>		
. NEW PROCUREMENT	0.9	4 DAYS
. RETURNS	4.9	10 DAYS
<b><u>MATERIEL RELEASE ORDER</u></b>		
. HI PRI'S	0.4	1 DAY
. ROUTINES	7.1	8 DAYS
<b><u>DISPOSAL RELEASE ORDER</u></b>	43.7	21 DAYS
<b><u>MRO DENIALS</u></b>	0.63	.80%
<b><u>LOCATOR ACCURACY</u></b>	99.7	99.0%

# Defense Distribution Depot Ogden



# **DDOU STORAGE INFORMATION**

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- **Number of Warehouses - 44**
- **Number of NSNs - 658,546**
- **Allocated Storage Space**
  - **Bin 3.7%**
  - **Bulk 96.3%**
    - **Hazardous 10.1%**
- **Commodity (% Lines / Occupied Sq Ft)**
  - **Medical .8% / 59K**
  - **Industrial 31% / 165K**
  - **Electrical 48% / 110K**
  - **Clothing and Textile .2% / 402K**
  - **General 5% / 489K**
  - **Construction 15% / 325K**

# DDOU FACILITIES INFORMATION

---

## Covered Storage

	<u>NSF*</u>	<u>OCF**</u>
<b>General Purpose</b>	<b>1.73M</b>	<b>18.8M</b>
<b>Shed</b>	<b>369K</b>	<b>3.1M</b>
<b>Hazardous</b>	<b>213K</b>	<b>2.0M</b>
<b>Freeze/Chill</b>	<u><b>5K</b></u>	<u><b>26K</b></u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.32M</b>	<b>23.9M</b>

\* Net Square Feet

\*\* Occupied Cubic Feet

# **DDOU FACILITIES INFORMATION**

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## **Open Storage**

<b>Hardstand/Improved Outside</b>	<b>1.47M NSF</b>
<b>Unimproved</b>	<b>2.14M NSF</b>
<b>Undeveloped Land</b>	<b>9.15M GSF*</b>

**\* Gross Square Feet**

# **DDOU FACILITIES INFORMATION**


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## **Unique Operational and Administrative**

	<u><b>NSF</b></u>
<b>DEPMEDS(Deployable Medical Systems)</b>	<b>3.2M</b>
<b>Administrative</b>	<b>321.4K</b>
<b>Railroad</b>	<b>214.3K LRF*</b>
<b>Humanitarian Assist Program</b>	<b>31.4K</b>
<b>Cylinders/Sandblast Facility</b>	<b>10.5K</b>
<b>Bearings Facility</b>	<b>4.9K</b>
<b>Electronics Test Facility</b>	<b>2.4K</b>
<b>Dry Nitrogen Storage</b>	<b>1.3K</b>

**\* Linear Rail Feet**

# DDOU ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP



● Contaminated Screening Sites

● Solid Waste Management Units

■ Underground/Aboveground Storage Tanks

● Operable Units


# DDOU ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP

<b>PROJECT</b>	<b>OBLIGATED COST</b>	<b>YEAR ESTIMATED COMPLETION</b>
<b>OPERABLE UNITS</b>	<b>5.77 M</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>CONTAMINATED SCREENING SITES</b>	<b>500 K*</b>	<b>?</b>
<b>RCRA FACILITY INVESTIGATION (Solid Waste Management Units)</b>	<b>800 K*</b>	<b>?</b>
<b>REFUELING STATION</b>	<b>25 K*</b>	<b>?</b>
<b>BULK FUEL STORAGE AREA</b>	<b>200 K*</b>	<b>?</b>
<b>UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK SITE</b>	<b>100 K*</b>	<b>?</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7.37 M</b>	

\* Areas being investigated - we have no estimate of total cost

? No estimated completion date available

**\$31.4 million Environmental funds spent from FY85 to date**





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

U.S. ARMY MEDICAL MATERIEL AGENCY  
FREDERICK, MARYLAND 21702-5001



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

March 28, 1995

Office of the Commander

Mr. R. H. Jones  
3539 North 2550 East  
Layton, Utah 84040-8497

Dear Mr. Jones:

I want you to know the BRAC closure announcement of DDOU was quite a surprise to the United States Army Medical Materiel Agency, as well as to you dedicated employees at Ogden, Utah.

We have undertaken dialogue with the Defense Logistics Agency; the Commander, DDOU; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army; the United States Army Office of The Surgeon General; and others to proactively continue this critical function of DEPMEDS reassembly and rebuild which has proven to be both cost efficient and wise.


Unfortunately, I am not in an official position to be able to tell you or your co-workers what the final decision will be.

At USAMMA, we want this mission to continue and will pursue all avenues to ensure its uninterrupted success. We join in your concern and will continue to enlighten all how critical that this mission continue.

Perhaps together we shall achieve success in maintaining this mission essential function for the Army Medical Department.

We applaud the great work you are doing out there. Keep the faith and good luck in your pursuits as we hope to be successful in ours.

Sincerely,



James P. Normile III  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Commander

# Document Separator

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN MATTHEWS  
REGIONAL HEARING - DUGWAY PROVING GROUND  
APRIL 20, 1995

THANK YOU, CONGRESSMAN HANSEN....

CHAIRMAN DIXON, COMMISSIONERS---

MY TASK IN THE NEXT FEW MINUTES IS TO GO OVER THE ARMY'S PROPOSAL FOR DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS, AND TO CONVINCING YOU OF THE OBVIOUS FLAWS IN THE ARMY'S PLAN ---WHATEVER THAT PLAN MAY BE.

THAT'S PART OF THE PROBLEM --THE ARMY STILL ISN'T CLEAR ON WHAT THEY ACTUALLY PROPOSE FOR DUGWAY. THERE ARE CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS FROM WITHIN THE ARMY ITSELF --ITS AS IF THE RIGHT HAND DOESN'T KNOW WHAT THE LEFT IS DOING.... WHICH IS WHAT I WANT TO LAY OUT FOR YOU.

TO BEGIN, I NEED TO TAKE JUST A MOMENT TO DESCRIBE TO YOU EXACTLY WHERE DUGWAY IS, AND WHAT IT DOES, AND WHY IT IS SO VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

FIRST, DUGWAY IS LOCATED IN UTAH'S VAST WEST DESERT REGION. DUGWAY ENCOMPASSES 802,724 ACRES ---WHICH IS LARGER THAN THE ENTIRE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND! IT IS HUGE. IT IS SIMPLY ONE OF THOSE PLACES IN THE WEST THAT ONE HAS TO VISIT TO APPRECIATE. YOU REALLY CAN'T ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE ITS REMOTENESS, NOR ITS VASTNESS. AS COMMISSIONERS KLING AND STEELE CAN TELL YOU, DUGWAY HAS TO BE EXPERIENCED TO BE BELIEVED.

DUGWAY IS REMOTE. THERE'S NO GETTING AROUND THAT. IT IS A GOOD 45 MINUTES DRIVING AT TOP SPEED FROM DUGWAY'S FRONT GATE UNTIL THE NEXT REAL SIGNS OF CIVILIZATION. AND IN BETWEEN, THERE'S A NARROW ROAD OVER A HIGH MOUNTAIN PASS WHICH OFTEN BECOMES IMPASSABLE IN WINTER. THERE'S NO GAS STATION, NO CONVENIENCE STORE, AND NOT MUCH ELSE EXCEPT SAGEBRUSH, COYOTES AND JACKRABBITS. IT IS SIMPLY NOT LIKE SUBURBAN MARYLAND WHERE HOUSING AND SERVICES ARE READILY AVAILABLE.

THAT REMOTENESS IS ONE OF DUGWAY'S BIGGEST ASSETS. DUGWAY IS A TEST CENTER OF THE U.S. ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION COMMAND AND IS A DOD MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY. LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT LAST THOUGHT. WHILE DUGWAY IS AN ARMY INSTALLATION, IT DOES CHEM/BIO TESTING FOR ALL OF THE SERVICES. DUGWAY TESTS CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS GASMASKS, DETECTORS, SHELTERS, VEHICLE AND AIRCRAFT AIR FILTRATION SYSTEMS, AND PROTECTIVE CLOTHING. THESE TESTS ENSURE THAT OUR ARMED FORCES ARE PROTECTED IN THE EVENT OF A CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL ATTACK. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT I NEED TO EXPOUND TOO MUCH ON THE CRITICAL NEED OF DUGWAY'S TESTING. THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS

FROM VARIOUS HOSTILE PARTS OF THE WORLD IS EVER INCREASING AND ALL TOO APPARENT.

DUGWAY IS HOME TO THREE BRAND-NEW TEST FACILITIES --- A NEW \$32 MILLION DOLLAR MATERIEL TEST FACILITY WHICH HAS SEALED CHAMBERS IN WHICH TO TEST ALL OF THESE ARTICLES IN A REAL CHEMICAL AGENT ENVIRONMENT; A NEW BIOLOGICAL TEST FACILITY WHICH WILL REPLACE A 1950'S VINTAGE BL-3 FACILITY WITH STATE OF THE ART CAPABILITY TO TEST AGAINST LIVE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS; AND A COMBINED CHEMICAL TEST FACILITY WHICH AIDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEXT-GENERATION CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTION SYSTEMS. UTAH HAS GIVEN DUGWAY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS TO BE ABLE TO CONDUCT THIS TESTING. THERE IS NO WHERE ELSE IN THE COUNTRY AT THE MOMENT WHERE THIS CAN BE DONE.

DUGWAY ALSO HAS THE MISSION TO TEST SMOKE AND OBSCURANTS, WHICH CAN ONLY BE TESTED OUTDOORS IN UTAH AT THE PRESENT TIME.

IN ALL, DUGWAY HAS UNDERGONE NEARLY HALF-A BILLION DOLLARS IN NEW FACILITIES AND MODERNIZATION IN THE LAST DECADE.

DUGWAY IS MORE THAN ANOTHER MILITARY BASE. BY SHEER NECESSITY, IT IS ITS OWN SELF-CONTAINED COMMUNITY WHICH HOUSES MOSTLY DEFENSE CIVILIAN WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. THIS AREA IS REFERRED TO AS "ENGLISH VILLAGE." IT HAS A NEW COMMUNITY CENTER AND LIBRARY. IT HAS A MOVIE THEATRE, A BOWLING ALLEY, A GOLF-COURSE, A NEW \$5 MILLION DOLLAR FITNESS CENTER, A COMMISSARY AND CLINIC. IT HAS 578 SEPARATE HOUSING UNITS AND CONSIDERABLE BACHELORS QUARTERS. DUGWAY'S STUDENT POPULATION IS EDUCATED IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE TOOELE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT. IN FACT, THE TAXPAYERS OF TOOELE COUNTY HAVE RECENTLY FINANCED CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW \$7 MILLION ADDITION TO DUGWAY'S HIGH SCHOOL.

THE ARMY'S INITIAL RECOMENDATION:

HAVING DESCRIBED DUGWAY, I THINK YOU CAN NOW IMAGINE OUR TOTAL SURPRISE AT THE ARMY'S INITIAL RECOMMENDATION TO REALIGN DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS. WHEN THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE ON FEBRUARY 28, 1995, THE ARMY RECOMMENDED DUGWAY'S CHEM/BIO MISSION AS REALIGNING TO ABERDEEN, MARYLAND AND DUGWAY'S SMOKE AND OBSCURANT MISSION AS MOVING TO YUMA, ARIZONA. THIS, DESPITE THE LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING FROM EITHER MARYLAND OR ARIZONA. INCREDIBLY, THE ARMY ALSO RECOMMENDED THE CLOSURE AND DISPOSAL OF ENGLISH VILLAGE. THE ONLY THING THAT WOULD REMAIN AT DUGWAY, AS FAR AS THE ARMY WAS CONCERNED, WOULD BE A HANDFUL OF CIVILIANS TO ENSURE SECURITY OF THE AREA AS WELL AS TO ACCOMODATE THE OCCASIONAL "SAFARIS" FROM ABERDEEN OR YUMA TO DO SOME TESTING THAT COULDN'T BE DONE ANYWHERE ELSE.

SEVERAL PROBLEMS WERE GLARINGLY APPARENT IN THE ARMY PLAN. SOME OF THE MORE GLARING INCLUDED:

--LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS AT EITHER RECEIVER LOCATION IN MARYLAND AND YUMA. IT WOULD BE AT LEAST 2 YEARS BEFORE THE ARMY WOULD KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THEY COULD EVEN GET THESE PERMITS. AND ENCROACHMENT PROBLEMS AT BOTH RECEIVER LOCATIONS MAKE APPROVAL OF THOSE PERMITS HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

--LACK OF PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY HEALTH CARE OR FIREPROTECTION UPON THE CLOSURE OF ENGLISH VILLAGE.

--COMPLETE LACK OF CONCERN OR ANALYSIS BY THE ARMY AS TO HOW ITS TESTING MISSION AND PRODUCTIVITY WOULD SUFFER BECAUSE OF THE LONG AND UNREALISTIC COMMUTING DISTANCES REQUIRED OF ITS REMAINING WORKFORCE BECAUSE OF THE CLOSURE OF ENGLISH VILLAGE.

--COMPLETE LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH, OR APPROVAL BY, ANY OF THE OTHER SERVICES OUTSIDE OF THE ARMY ON WHETHER OR NOT THEY CAN CONTINUE TO HAVE THEIR CHEM/BIO TESTING NEEDS MET.

ARMY OFFICIALS CONCEDE ERROR:

WHEN THE EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE, IT TOOK MANY OFFICIALS IN THE ARMY BY TOTAL SURPRISE, INCLUDING TOP OFFICIALS AT TECOM (MAJOR GEN. TREGELMAN, TECOM COMMANDER DID NOT RECOMMEND THIS). THE NUMBERS IN THE COBRA ANALYSIS WERE WAY OFF. THEY HAD LISTED OVER ONE THOUSAND JOBS AS BEING ELIMINATED BY THAT RECOMMENDATION WHEN THERE ARE ONLY AROUND 600 DOD CIVILIANS EMPLOYED AT DUGWAY CURRENTLY.

IN AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY WHAT WAS GOING ON, CONGRESSMAN HANSEN HELD A MEETING WITH ARMY OFFICIALS ON MARCH 23, 1995, WITH MR. WALTER HOLLIS, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH; LT. GENERAL JOHN COBURN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND; AND MS. ALMA MOORE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR INSTALLATIONS.

AT THAT MEETING, MR. HOLLIS AND GENERAL COBURN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARMY 'USED THE WRONG NUMBERS,' AND THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN HANSEN WITH A CORRECTED VERSION AND RECOMMENDATION THE FOLLOWING DAY. THESE OFFICIALS SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT "IT WAS NEVER THE ARMY'S INTENT TO MOVE TEST MISSIONS FROM DUGWAY." MR. HOLLIS ACKNOWLEDGED THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING ISSUE IN MARYLAND AND ARIZONA. HE STATED THAT DUGWAY WAS UNIQUE, AND THAT IT MUST CONTINUE TO KEEP ITS TEST MISSIONS INTACT. HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT ENGLISH VILLAGE WOULD STILL BE RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE. THIS MEETING IS OUTLINED IN A LETTER DATED MARCH 24, 1995, FROM CONGRESSMAN HANSEN TO CHAIRMAN DIXON. A COPY OF THIS LETTER IS IN THE MATERIALS GIVEN TO YOU EARLIER ---AS ARE COPIES OF ALL OTHER DOCUMENTS TO WHICH I WILL REFER.

THE FOLLOWING DAY, AN ARMY REPRESENTATIVE, LTC JACK MARRIOTT, THE ANALYST WHO WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DUGWAY PROPOSAL, PROVIDED CONGRESSMAN HANSEN'S STAFF WITH A REVISED COBRA

ANALYSIS WHICH SHOWED MOST TEST POSITIONS AS STAYING AT DUGWAY, WHILE ENGLISH VILLAGE WOULD STILL BE CLOSED, RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF 329 CIVILIAN POSITIONS, MOSTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMISSARY, THE EXCHANGE, THE MEDICS, AND OTHER SUPPORT PERSONS AT ENGLISH VILLAGE.

HOWEVER, LTC MARRIOTT'S REVISED ANALYSIS STILL SHOWED THE REALIGNMENT OF TEST POSITIONS TO ABERDEEN AND YUMA. HE DESCRIBED THESE PERSONS AS BEING THE "COMMAND AND CONTROL' ELEMENTS OF DUGWAY'S TEST MISSIONS. APPARENTLY, LTC MARRIOTT HAS NOT YET REALIZED THAT THESE MANAGERS --COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS AS HE CALLS THEM, ARE THE SAME PEOPLE AS THOSE WHO ACTUALLY DO THE TESTING AT DUGWAY! THEY ARE THE SAME PEOPLE!!

EVEN AT THAT, LTC MARRIOTT'S VIEWS CONTRADICTED THE STATEMENTS MADE THE DAY BEFORE BY HIS SUPERIORS, MR. HOLLIS AND LT. GEN. COBURN TO THE EFFECT THAT NO PART OF DUGWAY'S TEST MISSIONS WHATSOEVER WOULD BE MOVED.

LTC MARRIOTT NEVER COULD ADDRESS THE VERY REAL QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE ARMY PLANNED TO HAVE ON-CALL MEDICAL PERSONEL TO SUPPORT DUGWAY'S TESTING IF IT CLOSES ENGLISH VILLAGE. THE ARMY HAS AN ON-GOING REQUIREMENT TO HAVE AT LEAST 3 CHEMICALLY-TRAINED DOCTORS ON-HAND DURING TESTING. THIS MEDICAL REQUIREMENT, SO FAR, HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE ARMY.

GENERAL SHANE LETTER OF APRIL 13, 1995: CONFUSION REIGNS

ON APRIL 13TH, BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES SHANE, THE MANAGER OF THE ARMY'S BRAC LIST, WROTE A LETTER TO CHAIRMAN DIXON AND THE COMMISSION OUTLINING 'HIS VIEWS' ON DUGWAY. ALTHOUGH HE APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION ON DUGWAY ON THE PART OF THE ARMY, HE PROCEEDED TO ONLY ADD TO THAT CONFUSION. AGAIN, COPIES OF THIS LETTER ARE BEFORE YOU.

IN THAT LETTER, HE REAFFIRMS THE ARMY'S POSITION TO COMPLETELY REALIGN DUGWAY'S SMOKE AND OBSCURANT MISSION TO YUMA AND SOME "RESEARCH" IN CHEM/BIO TO ABERDEEN.

GENERAL SHANE THEREFORE CONTRADICTED BOTH MR. HOLLIS AS WELL AS LTC MARRIOTT ON THE SMOKE MISSION GOING TO YUMA; AS WELL AS CONTRADICTING MR. HOLLIS ON MOVING CHEM/BIO TO ABERDEEN. GENERAL SHANE DOES NOT SPECIFY WHICH PARTS OF "RESEARCH" HE WOULD MOVE TO ABERDEEN. DUGWAY DOES NOT DO BASIC RESEARCH. DUGWAY DOES TESTING WHICH IS PLANNED BY ABERDEEN --THE HEADQUARTERS OF TECOM. SO GENERAL SHANE'S COMMENTS IN THE LETTER ARE VAGUE AND DISTURBING. TO THE UTAH DELEGATION, IT SEEMS AS THOUGH GENERAL SHANE AND THOSE INVOLVED IN THE BRAC ARE GREATLY LACKING IN THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF DUGWAY AND WHAT EXACTLY IS DONE THERE.

THIS IS WHERE WE NEED YOUR HELP. THE ARMY HAS LEFT THE RECOMMENDATION ON DUGWAY VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS. DIFFERENT PARTS OF

THE ARMY ARE SAYING DIFFERENT THINGS, AS I HAVE JUST OUTLINED. WHO SPEAKS FOR THE ARMY? AT THIS POINT, IT IS THE UTAH DELEGATION'S VIEW THAT IT IS NOW IN THE COMMISSION'S COMPETENT HANDS SINCE THE ARMY CAN'T SEEM TO STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT. AS YOU CONSIDER THESE POINTS, PLEASE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT.

FEBRUARY 10, 1995 MEMORANDUM: the 'smoking gun'

AS PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW PROCESS ON BRAC, DOD'S TOP TEST AND EVALUATION OFFICIALS --DR. PHILLIP E. COYLE, THE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION; AND DR. JOHN A. BURT, THE DIRECTOR OF TEST SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND EVALUATION, WROTE A MEMO TO JOSHUA GOTBAUM AND JOHN DEUTCH, DATED FEBRUARY 10, 1995, REGARDING REALIGNMENT OF T&E FACILITIES IN BRAC 1995. THESE TWO CHIEF DOD SCIENTISTS STATED THAT THEY HAD REVIEWED THE SERVICES' T&E PROPOSALS, AND THAT "TWO WERE MAJOR SHOWSTOPPERS."

ONE OF THOSE "SHOWSTOPPERS" WAS THE ARMY'S PROPOSAL ON DUGWAY.

I KNOW YOU HAVE THE DOCUMENT IN THE PACKET WE HAVE PROVIDED YOU... BUT I THINK IT IS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL THAT I HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL PASSAGES FOR YOU.

THESE OFFICIALS WRITE:

"THE ARMY'S PROPOSAL TO REALIGN DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS ... SHOULD BE CHALLENGED.

RATIONALE 1: DUGWAY OCCUPIES VALUABLE LAND AND AIRSPACE TO THE TEST AND EVALUATION MISSION THAT CAN'T BE CONDUCTED ELSEWHERE WITHOUT HIGH RISKS OF ENVIROMENTAL AND SECURITY COMPROMISE.....

RATIONALE 2: MOVING CHEM/BIO AGENT RESEARCH TO ABERDEEN/ EDGEWOOD IS HIGH RISK. EDGEWOOD IS IN AND NEAR HIGHLY POPULATED AREAS (BALTIOMRE) AND MAJOR BODIES OF WATER (CHESAPEAKE BAY) WHERE ACCIDENTS OR MISCALCULATIONS CAN RESULT IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT WITH LITTLE CHANCE FOR TIMELY CONTROL...

RATIONALE 3: COSTS TO DUPLICATE AT EDGEWOOD NEW FACILITIES CURRENTLY AT DUGWAY ARE UNNECESSARY.....

RATIONALE 4: SINCE DUGWAY DOES CHEM/BIO TESTING FOR ALL OF THE SERVICES, EACH OF THE SERVICES NEEDS TO SIGN=OFF ON THE ARMY'S PROPOSAL, AND AGREE THAT THEY COULD CONTINUE TO HAVE THEIR TESTING NEEDS MET.

IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT DRS. COYLE AND BURT ISSUE THEIR

STRONGEST RECOMMENDATION:

THEY RECOMMENDED, " ARMY WITHDRAW ITS PROPOSAL TO CHANGE STATUS OF DUGWAY, AND INSTEAD DEVELOP PROPOSAL TO RELOCATE AND CONSOLIDATE ALL CHEM=BIO TESTING AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES TO DUGWAY.

SO NOT ONLY DO DR. COYLE AND DR. BURT --DOD'S TOP SCIENTISTS, RECOMMEND LEAVING DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS ALONE, BUT THEY GO SO FAR AS TO RECOMMEND THAT THE ARROWS GO IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION, MEANING THAT THE ARMY SHOULD CONSOLIDATE CHEM/BIO TESTING AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES TO DUGWAY FROM EDGEWOOD, OR OTHER LOCATIONS.

THERE IS NO WRITTEN RECORD AS TO HOW THIS ADVICE WAS HANDLED BY JOSH GOTBAUM OR DR. DEUTCH, OR THE ARMY. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS MEMO WAS IGNORED WITH NO SUPPORTING RATIONALE AS TO WHY THAT ADVICE COULD SAFELY BE IGNORED. THAT'S A TERRIBLE FLAW IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, AND WE WOULD ARGUE SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATES FROM THE SELECTION CRITERIA ON MILITARY VALUE. (SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL)

SO, WHAT WAS THE ARMY'S RATIONALE FOR CLOSING ENGLISH VILLAGE AND REALIGNING DUGWAY? THE ARMY SAYS THAT IT HAS TO GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF SUPPORTING CIVILIAN HOUSING.

WELL, THAT'S FINE IF THAT HOUSING AREA IS NEAR BALTIOMRE WHERE PLENTY OF ALTERNATIVE HOUSING IS AVAILABLE, AS WELL AS ALL COMMUNITY SERVICES. ITS A DIFFERENT STORY AT DUGWAY, WHERE ITS LOCATION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE. WHY DIDN'T THE ARMY RECOMMEND CLOSING HOUSING AREAS AT ABERDEEN, OR YUMA IF IT HAS TO GET OUT OF THAT BUSINESS AS IT CLAMS?

FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, IT'S ALL A QUESTION OF PRIORITY. THE ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION BUDGET HAS OVER \$30 MILLION DOLLARS IN ITS BASE OPERATIONS AND REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTS BETWEEN FISCAL 1995 AND FISCAL 1997. THESE ACCOUNTS WOULD BENEFIT BY THE \$6.9 MILLION IN SAVINGS BY CLOSURE OF ENGLISH VILLAGE. BASICALLY, TECOM HAS THE BUDGET TO FUND THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF ENGLISH VILLAGE IF IT WANTED TO, BUT IT CHOOSES TO SPEND THOSE FUNDS ELSEWHERE --TO THE DETRIMENT OF ITS TESTING MISSION. THIS IS WHERE WE NEED YOUR HELP --TO ACT AS THE VOICE OF REASON BY TELLING TECOM TO KEEP ENGLISH VILLAGE OPEN AND VIABLE.

NATIONAL GUARD PROPOSAL:

I NEED TO TAKE A MOMENT AND GO OVER A PROPOSAL BY THE UTAH NATIONAL GUARD REGARDING TAKE-OVER OF THE ENGLISH VILLAGE AREA. DISCUSSION OF CLOSING ENGLISH VILLAGE HAS OCCURED OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS. THE UTAH NATIONAL GUARD, WANTING TO PRESERVE THE ABILITY TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE LIVE FIRING RANGES AT DUGWAY, SOUGHT TO FIND A WAY TO KEEP ENGLISH VILLAGE OPEN IN ORDER TO SUPPORT GUARD HOUSING QUARTERS AND TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES. THE GUARD

ENTERED INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH TECOM AND INVESTIGATED THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING OVER AS LANDLORD OF THE 14 SQUARE MILES WHICH MAKE UP THE ENGLISH VILLAGE PROPERTY. THE GUARD LOOKED AT LEASING BACK ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE TO TECOM TO SUPPORT CONTINUED DUGWAY TESTING, AND ALSO LEASING OUT ADDITIONAL HOUSING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

THE FINANCIAL ABILITY OF THE GUARD TO TAKE ON THIS RESPONSIBILITY HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED, AND AT THIS POINT, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE GUARD COULD ASSUME THIS LIABILITY WITHOUT A MINIMUM OF \$9.5 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE ARMY IN UP-FRONT CASH TO GET STARTED. IT IS FAR FROM A SURE THING. AS GOVERNOR LEAVITT HAS STATED, NEITHER THE STATE NOR THE GUARD WANTS OR IS ACTIVELY SEEKING TO TAKE OVER ENGLISH VILLAGE. IT IS OUR CLEAR VIEW THAT THE ARMY AND TECOM SHOULD KEEP ENGLISH VILLAGE OPEN TO SUPPORT VITAL DOD TESTING OPERATIONS.

FINALLY, I WANT TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO A LETTER FROM BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVE NYDAM, USA, RETIRED, WHO USED TO BE THE COMMANDER OF DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS, AND RETIRED AS THE COMMANDER OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE COMMAND AT EDGEWOOD, MARYLAND. IT WOULD BE HARD TO FIND ANYONE MORE "EXPERT" IN THESE MATTERS. GENERAL NYDAM WAS UNABLE TO BE HERE TODAY TO TESTIFY, ALTHOUGH HE WANTED TO VERY BADLY. INSTEAD, HE HAS SIGNED A LETTER TO YOU INDICATING WHY DUGWAY'S TEST MISSION NEEDS TO REMAIN INTACT, AND WHY CLOSURE OF ENGLISH VILLAGE IS NOT IN OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

SUMMARY:

IN CONCLUSION, WE ASK YOUR CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF THE ARMY'S PROPOSAL ON DUGWAY. IT MAKES NO SENSE TO US. THIS SAME PLAN WAS CONSIDERED AND THEN REJECTED BY ARMY OFFICIALS IN 1993 AS BEING "UNWORKABLE." NOTHING HAS CHANGED SINCE 1993 TO MAKE THIS FLAWED PLAN MORE WORKABLE IN 1995.

I WILL CLOSE WITH ONE THOUGHT.... THE COBRA ANALYSIS SO WIDELY USED DOES NOT CONSIDER THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT WITHIN A COMMUNITY FOR A PARTICULAR MISSION. WHEN IT COMES TO CHEMICAL AGENT AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE TESTING, MOST COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE COUNTRY WOULD SAY, "NOT IN MY BACKYARD." MANY ARE SAYING JUST THAT --INCLUDING THE COMMUNITIES NEAR EDGEWOOD, MARYLAND. THERE IS NO WAY TO QUANTIFY THAT SUPPORT FOR THE PURPOSES OF MATHEMATICAL CALCULATIONS. HOWEVER, I SUBMIT TO YOU THAT THIS COMMUNITY SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY ON MISSIONS SO SENSITIVE AND CONTROVERSIAL AS CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL, IS ABSOLUTELY AS CRITICAL TO MISSION SUCCESS AS THE PHYSICAL FACILITIES INVOLVED OR THE LEVEL OF EXPERTISE BY THOSE INVOLVED. IT WOULD BE HARD TO FIND A COMMUNITY OR STATE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF DUGWAY AND ITS DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY MISSIONS THAN UTAH OR TOOELE COUNTY. THIS IS SOMETHING THE ARMY HAS TOTALLY OVERLOOKED.

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY. AT THIS TIME, THE

DELEGATION WOULD HAVE YOU RECOGNIZE GENERAL MIKE PAVICH AGAIN, FOR 15 MINUTES, IN ORDER TO DISCUSS HILL AIR FORCE BASE AND TACTICAL MISSILE REPAIR CONSOLIDATION.

03/27/95 18:22

CONG. HANSEN

TIM RUPLEY

0002/00

JAMES V. HANSEN

1ST DISTRICT, UTAH

COMMITTEES:

NATIONAL SECURITY

RESOURCES

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

ROOM 2486

RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4401

CELL 225-4452

1077 RECORD BUILDING  
1000 WEST 1000 SOUTH  
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84119  
(801) 225-4400  
(801) 225-4401  
(801) 225-4402  
435 EAST PAPERBACKE  
SUITE 301  
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770  
(801) 225-1071

# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

### Washington, DC 20515-4401

# COPY

March 24, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman - Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

RE: U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS, UTAH

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing to notify you of a significant development relating to the U.S. Army's recommendation to "realign" Dugway Proving Grounds.

On Wednesday, March 22, 1995 at 1:30 p.m. in my Rayburn office, I met with Mr. Walter W. Hollis, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research; Lt. General John Coburn, Deputy Director of U.S. Army Materiel Command; Ms. Alma Moore, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations; and Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marriott, U.S. Army TABS Analyst, to discuss the Army's recommendation for Dugway Proving Ground. Also in attendance were Ms. E. Jean Turner, Congressional Liaison for the U.S. Army Materiel Command; Lieutenant Colonel David M. Reed, Army Legislative Liaison; as well as Mr. Steve Petersen and Mr. Bill Johnson of my personal staff.

I had fully intended on asking these Army officials some difficult questions regarding the Army's initial recommendation. However, before I even got a chance, Mr. Hollis indicated that the initial recommendation which was included in the February 28, 1995 Department of Defense announcement, was misleading and used "the wrong numbers."

Mr. Hollis, with the concurrence of General Coburn and Ms. Moore, further indicated that they would provide me with a revised "COBRA" analysis and language for the recommendation to realign Dugway Proving Ground. Mr. Hollis indicated that it was "never the Army's intent" to move the biological (BL-3) testing from Dugway to Aberdeen, Maryland, because of the lack of state permits in Maryland. The same was true with the smoke and obscurant testing. The Army, he said, did not plan to move it to Yuma, Arizona, because of the permitting issue.

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon

PAGE 2:

March 24, 1995


Mr. Hollis and General Coburn reiterated the need to keep Dugway's testing missions in place, and that the revised COBRA analysis would basically show that the "realignment" would consist of the disposal of Dugway's housing area, referred to as "English Village," and the elimination of 329 civilian positions associated with support of English Village.

Enclosed is a copy of the newly revised COBRA analysis which was provided to my office one day later, on March 23, 1995, by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marriott. As you can see, it recommends realigning Dugway by "closing English Village." This differs considerably from the original COBRA recommendation provided to the Commission on February 28, 1995. As you recall, that recommendation listed not only the closure of English Village, but also the relocation of 338 test positions. The new COBRA analysis now lists only 82 positions to be realigned.

Inasmuch as the original flawed recommendation is currently before the Commission, I requested these Army officials to contact you and your staff to relay the Army's revised language. They indicated to me that they would contact you and provide you with this information.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward to working with you and the Commission to resolve the final recommendation for Dugway.

Sincerely yours,

  
James V. Hansen  
Member of Congress

JVH:sp  
Enclosure (1)

cc: The Honorable Togo West  
Governor Mike Leavitt  
Senator Orrin Hatch  
Senator Bob Bennett



CLOSE HOLD - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

10 February 1995

**COPY**

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ECONOMIC  
SECURITY (ECONOMIC REINVESTMENT AND BRAC)

SUBJECT: Functional Assessment of Proposed Military Department  
Base Realignment and Closure Actions

Proposed BRAC actions by the MILDEPs as available on 9 February 1995, have been reviewed, and except as identified in the attachments, determined to be acceptable from the perspective of the DoD test and evaluation mission. Of those in the attachments, two are considered to be major showstoppers (regarding Dugway Proving Grounds and Fort Hunter-Liggett), and another a minor showstopper (Tunnel 9 inclusion in the White Oak closure). The remainder are considered incomplete requiring additional alternatives to be analyzed before we can agree to them.

Philip E. Coyle  
Director, Operational  
Test and Evaluation

John A. Burt  
Director, Test  
Systems Engineering and  
Evaluation

Attachments: a/s

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ISSUE

The Army's proposal to realign Dugway Proving Grounds to relocate the "chemical-biological research" mission to Aberdeen/Edgewood should be challenged, and the alternative of relocating the chem-bio mission from Aberdeen/Edgewood to Dugway investigated. And rationale for relocating the smoke-obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Grounds is not clear.

RATIONALE

1. Dugway occupies valuable land and airspace to the test and evaluation mission that can't be conducted elsewhere without high risks of environmental and security compromise, and needs to be preserved as a national asset for such purposes. Test missions ranging from electronic combat, cruise missiles, high performance aircraft, munitions and armament delivery, and artillery, as well as chemical-biological testing, are typically conducted at this location because of its unique geographic features.
2. Moving levels 2 and 3 chemical-biological agent "research" to Aberdeen/Edgewood is high risk. Edgewood is in and near highly populated areas (including Baltimore), as well as near major bodies of water (Chesapeake Bay), where accidents or miscalculations can result in environmental impact with little chance for timely control.
3. Costs to duplicate at Edgewood the recently constructed new facilities and capabilities that are at Dugway will be an unnecessary tax burden. Other facilities at Edgewood would likewise have to undergo major repairs at additional costs.
4. Differentiation between "research" and testing is not identified in the write-up. By Memorandum of Agreement between all three Military Departments under T&E Reliance, Dugway is the site where all DoD testing of chem-bio programs will be tested - Agreement by the other Military Departments would be required along with agreement that all of their requirements can be satisfied at Edgewood.

RECOMMENDATION

→ Army withdraw proposal to change status of Dugway, and instead develop proposal to relocate and consolidate all chem-bio testing and research activities to Dugway.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
200 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

13 APR 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I would like to add my views to those raised in Representative Hansen's letter dated March 24, 1995, concerning Dugway Proving Ground.


It seems that considerable confusion exists over the actual intent of the Army's recommendation. Regrettably, misunderstandings over the number of personnel relocating from Dugway have contributed to this confusion. The actual number moving depends on the amount and extent of testing that can only be conducted at Dugway, the ability or desire to pursue permits in Maryland and Arizona, and use of special purpose facilities at Dugway. The Army always planned to continue testing at Dugway Proving Ground because of its unique capabilities. The terrain, weather, and test facilities would be difficult and costly to replicate anywhere else in the United States.

We believe the Army's recommendation is a sound decision. The disposal of English Village is necessary to reduce infrastructure and base operating costs. The realignment of the smoke/obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and some chemical/biological research to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, will consolidate command and control elements of these two programs. Testing will still be performed at Dugway Proving Ground.

Preliminary implementation analysis shows that fewer test personnel would move because of testing restrictions. The planning figure used consisted of only 8 Government civilians from the mission area. Of the remaining 76 realignments, 18 military and 58 Government civilians are related to Defense organizations. As a result, the one-time costs for the recommendation are less and the savings are greater (a revised COBRA analysis is enclosed). It is important to note that these changes do not affect the overall intent of the Army's recommendation.

This recommendation is important to the Army and allows us to continue important missions at Dugway with less infrastructure and lower costs. Please let me know if you need further assistance.

Sincerely,



James E. Shane, Jr.  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Director of Management

Enclosure

April 17, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman - Defense Base Closure and Realignment  
Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon and Commissioners:

I am a recently retired Army Brigadier General with 33 years of service and advanced degrees in microbiology and public administration, with emphasis on management engineering. I also attended two senior service schools (the Industrial College of Armed Forces and the Army War College). I was the Deputy for Special Operations at the U.S. Army Biological Laboratories when we had an offensive biological warfare program. I commanded Dugway Proving Ground and the Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center, now referred to the Chemical Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), and was the original Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization effort.

As pertains to Dugway Proving Ground, I cannot understand the Army and DOD position that portions of the mission should be moved and English Village closed. I recognize the difficult job you have in attempting to help this country align its military base posture in the most cost efficient and mission supportable way possible, but this recommended action does not seem to satisfy any cost effective mission enhancement goals.

As you know, the threat and vulnerability of the United States to chemical and biological warfare is extremely high. This has been borne out by Desert Storm; reinforced by current intelligence reports and accentuated by newspaper accounts of the situations like those in the Japanese subway system.

To keep these things in check, our government has placed priority on the joint defensive research and development which is conducted at places like CBDCOM at Edgewood, Maryland, Natick Laboratories in Massachusetts, the Navy, Airforce and Marine Corps. The equipment they developed needs verification testing to see if it will, indeed, protect our fighting forces from the enemy use of chemical and biological agents.

The Army, as the executive agent for chemical and biological defense, must test their ideas and products someplace--and the only logical place is Dugway Proving Ground. Dugway Proving Ground has the facilities, the equipment, and a high skilled work force

to conduct these tests. Dugway is environmentally suited in that it has permitting in place, and as importantly, has the years of environmental background data necessary for the analysis and study of future missions.

Dugway is a national resource in that the land area is large and the location remote. The large area means two things: First, it can test items no other test activity can (i.e., smoke, obscurants and chemical and biological stimulants), and secondly, it provides potential area for other Army mission expansion. For example, the Department of Defense has massive environmental problems and Dugway Proving Ground could be used to test potential solutions to those problems. Also, the Department of Defense has a massive problem in getting rid of ammunition in an environmentally safe manner. Again, Dugway Proving Ground is ideally suited for testing the concepts as they are developed. It is one of the few places that there are no bars, pawn shops and used car lots outside the gate, and none are likely--ever!! The nearest activity is over 40 miles away.

Being the remote, isolated activity that it is, the English Village is extremely vital to the success of Dugway's mission. It is very difficult to quantify its importance, but we know that if you commute two plus hours each day to your work place, efficiency on a job will drop considerably. Also, there is a synergy of community spirit when it comes to times of crisis. For example, the desert is often subject to range fires brought about by lightning storms. The way everyone, [Ph.D. scientists, military leaders, and mission support personnel] all work together is something I have never seen happen elsewhere at the numerous installations throughout the world that I have served. Also, safety is extremely important and a part which is indigenous to the community at Dugway's English Village. When an incident occurs, like a "artillery shell cook-off" in an environmental conditioning chamber, it is great to be able to get those who know the most about the problem, out and on the job in a minimum amount of time.

Dugway Proving Ground is a vital national resource, with the potential of providing even more benefits to the nation than it currently does. English Village is a key part of the resource, which should remain intact. This insures personnel and environmental safety; security; and the quality of life necessary to guarantee the best chemical-biological testing for the Department of Defense.

I thank you for your attention.

Very respectfully,

David A. Nydam  
Brigadier General (Ret.)  
U.S. Army

**ENID G. WALDHOLTZ**

UTAH

RULES COMMITTEE

515 CANNON BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
(202) 225-5911125 SOUTH STATE STREET  
SUITE 2311  
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84108  
(801) 524-4394

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, DC 20515-4402

April 10, 1995

Chairman Alan J. Dixon  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore St.  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to express my deep concern over the future of Utah's military installations under consideration by the Commission for realignment and closure. I recognize the tremendously difficult decisions the Commission must make, and I appreciate your willingness, along with the other Commission members, to assume such a complex and controversial responsibility.

Utahns have always been willing to shoulder their share of the burden of defending our nation, sometimes at great risk to their safety and health. And, we are prepared to absorb reductions that make strategic sense. We simply ask that the Commission continue to make its decisions based on objective criteria, by which Utah's installations stand on their own merits.

Hill Air Force Base, which was listed for realignment, has become a crucial part of the Utah economy. It functions as the second-largest employer in the state, employing approximately 11,000 civilian and 5000 military workers. But every military base becomes a linchpin of the local economy. Hill AFB is a critical, irreplaceable asset for our nation's defense.

The Air Force's own analysis shows that Hill AFB is the only Air Logistics Center to rank in the first tier as both an aviation depot and as an operational base. One of the most valuable and unique assets of Hill AFB is the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR), the crown jewel in the Department of Defense's entire test-range complex. The UTTR's unusual value lies in the fact that it is the least-congested of any test-range complex, and it has unlimited restricted airspace for military use--the largest of this kind in the lower 48 states. Additionally, the UTTR's proximity to Hill AFB increases Hill's military value tenfold over any other operational base or air logistics center. The UTTR also needs to be preserved for its future role as the ideal, open-area test site for F-22s. Unless testing is performed on a

continual basis at UTTR, the FAA will balk at keeping airspace withdrawn for military use until the F-22's are built, and in all probability will return the airspace to public use, causing the military to lose one of its most valuable holdings.

The Utah work ethic is legendary, and Ogden Air Logistics Center, another valuable component of Hill AFB, has certainly benefited from this. In terms of productivity, it has comparatively been the best air logistics center over the past 20 years. Ogden ALC has benefited further from the proximity of the UTTR, and tactical missile work can be accommodated at Ogden ALC without further military construction costs; it is already performed there now.

I also ask for your careful scrutiny of the Army's proposed realignment of Dugway Proving Ground. Dugway is located in a remote area encompassing more land than the state of Rhode Island. While it is an Army installation, it performs chemical and biological testing for all of the services. The proposed realignment calls for the relocation of chemical and biological testing to Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, a highly populated area near the Chesapeake Bay, where accidents could result in severe environmental impact. Dugway occupies valuable land and airspace for the test and evaluation mission, which cannot be conducted elsewhere without high risks of environmental and security compromise.

I hope that the Commission will also take a second look at Defense Distribution Depot Ogden (DDOU), which is on BRAC's closure list. One of the Commission's fundamental charges is that all communities and bases must be treated equally and fairly. However, it appears the Defense Logistics Agency did not follow that principle when considering DDOU. Although the DLA chose to view Tracy-Sharp in California as one depot, it did not consider DDOU and Hill AFB as one unit. This is blatantly unfair to the Ogden community and workforce. DDOU has a proven track record of productivity and Ogden, as the hub of the West, is equally distant from all Pacific coast seaports. In addition, DDOU would serve as a good back-up to Tracy.

As defense spending continues to shrink in the post-Cold War environment, we are all working to ensure that we receive the greatest value for our defense dollar. The realignment and closure of certain military installations is a critical part of that process. However, we must be sure that we do not, in error, compromise our military readiness or fail to make these decisions on fair, objective, strategic criteria. I believe that Hill Air Force Base, Dugway Proving Ground and Defense Distribution Depot Ogden are essential components of our defense infrastructure. I appreciate your attention to my concerns, and wish you the best in your deliberations.

With best regards,



Enid G. Waldholtz,  
Member of Congress

# Document Separator

BV  
16

## TECHNICAL REPORT COBRA ANALYSIS -- DUGWAY PROVING GROUND

### INTRODUCTION

The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) computer model is the approved device used to develop return on investment (ROI) analysis necessary to address BRAC Criteria 5. The model requires entry of two discrete sets of data -- a data file and a "standard factors" file.

The data files are straight-forward -- each containing the specific closure or realignment scenario and data unique to each of the bases involved in that scenario. The only issue is whether or not the data used by the DoD in a data file is, in fact, accurate. However, the "standard factors" files are less straight-forward.

Despite the fact that the COBRA model was developed under contract for the Defense Department (DoD), the "standard factors" file is the subject of considerable misunderstanding within the DoD and its subordinate elements. Its components are interpreted as common to the entire DoD or to one of the military departments or agencies. Instead, as prescribed on page 67 in the *COBRA User's Manual*, these factors should be developed **independently** for each scenario. By way of illustration:

One input included in the "standard factor" file is the percentage of civilian personnel who, if their positions are eliminated, will get new Federal jobs under the Priority Placement System. The figure is important because severance (RIF) payments need not be paid to those employees receiving new jobs. Here, the DoD directed that the figure of 60 percent will be used throughout the Department. However, the number actually varies significantly depending on the types of jobs involved.

If, for example, the employees involved are members of a Schedule A Civil Service rather than members of the Competitive Civil Service, none of them will be eligible for participation in the priority placement System. Similarly, if the employees hold low-density or highly-specialized skills, only between 0 and 10 percent of them will be able to obtain new jobs under the Priority Placement System.

For the foregoing reasons, to the maximum extent possible, the Community used actual data in its analysis of the Department of the Army (DA) recommendation to close the Dugway Proving Ground (DPG).

The effects of using these adjusted data inputs are included in each section under the heading "Community." It must be emphasized that the two sets of analyses (DA) purport to represent the same realignment actions -- a preliminary estimate versus a final estimate based upon an in-depth review.

### FINDINGS

It should be noted that the Community analysis contained herein focuses completely on the return on investment; it makes no attempt to assess the military value of the recommended realignment.

In the COBRA analysis submitted with the DoD recommendation, the DA presented the following results:

- One-time costs of \$25.406 million.
- A net present value of - \$306.685 million in 2015.
- A return on investment achieved in 1 year.

In the refined COBRA analysis submitted in late May 1995, the DA presented the following outcomes:

One-time costs of \$9.461 million.  
A twenty-year net present value of - \$305.290 million.  
The return on investment achieved immediately.

Both of the DA outcomes are very attractive. However, the Community COBRA analysis found that, through flaws and shortcomings both in the basic scenario and in the data collection, the DA seriously underestimated the one-time costs and **vastly** overestimated the twenty-year savings. The Community reached the following results:

One-time costs of \$19.544 million  
A net present value of - \$6.762 million in 2015.  
A return on investment achieved in 12 years.

Although the Community results remain within the BRAC Criteria because savings are realized within 20 years, the savings to be achieved are very small compared to the costs that must be paid up front. Indeed, it can be argued that such a small return on the investment represents a **substantial deviation** from BRAC Criterion 5. Furthermore:

Expenditures of the magnitude involved to achieve such small savings -- savings that can likely be achieved anyway through management rationalization -- compound the problems that the DoD has already publicly admitted -- that it can't close as many installations as it should because it cannot afford the initial closure costs.

As discussed below, in its final submission, there is some evidence that DA anticipates obtaining BRAC funding to move a manpower positions from the DPG than are already programmed to be eliminated under known force structure reductions **that are independent of the BRAC process**. If this proves to be the case, it constitutes attempted fraud.

Both DA COBRA analytical efforts (PG2-2X6.CBR / SF7DEC.SFF and PG2-2X7.CBR / SF7DEC.SFF) and the Community COBRA analysis (DUG10.CBR / DUG5.SFF) are enclosed hereto in both hard copy and computer disc formats.

## SCENARIO

### Department of the Army

The essence of both of the DA submissions involves the transfer of certain mission functions from the DPG to the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) and the Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) and the closure of English Village, a distinct housing area at the DPG.

While there is no change in the scenario description provided by the DA in its two submissions, there are significant differences in the realignment activity contained therein. Whereas the first anticipated moving a total of 338 personnel, the second moves only 82 personnel. The bulk of these personnel are to be moved to "BASE X" -- a notional set of data pertaining to an installation yet to be identified. Indeed, in the second submission, only 8 positions associated with mission work are being moved from the DPG.

## Community

The Community scenario parallels the second DA submission in moving personnel to the APG and the YPG. However, because planned force structure reductions **that are independent of the BRAC process** will eliminate far more positions than those that the DA planned to move to "Base X," the Community scenario deleted this notional set of data.

## STANDARD FACTORS FILE

### General

Each "standard factors" file consists of inputs organized into four discrete components, individually covering personnel, facilities, transportation, and construction. As noted above, the COBRA model was designed to use a unique standard factors file with each particular scenario.

### Department of the Army

The "standard factors" file (SF7DEC.SFF) used by the DA for the DPG realignment scenario was used by the Department for all other recommendations submitted during the BRAC 95 process. As a result, the values it contains are not entirely applicable to the scenario involved in the proposed DPG realignment. As an example, it uses the DoD-wide assumption that separated personnel will be eligible for only 18 weeks of unemployment compensation whereas the standard in most states -- including Utah -- is 26 weeks of eligibility. As another illustration, the average officer salary used (\$67,948 per year) pertains to the very unaverage rank of lieutenant colonel (pay grade O5).

For these reasons, correction of the "standard factors" file was both appropriate and necessary.

### Community

In each instance where the Community validated the DA entries or could not develop independent data, its analysis used the DA data contained in the SF7DEC.SFF "standard factor" file. However, the Community made certain adjustments in certain of the personnel and facility standard factors.

Within the personnel category, all salaries were reduced to reflect the actual DPG averages. The DA data for both quarters allowances and the unemployment compensation eligibility period and weekly benefit were similarly corrected.

Within the facilities category, adjustments were made to the BOS Index and to the average size of both bachelor and family quarters. In the latter case, the actual quarters at the DPG both smaller the DA estimates. Estimated annual inflation rates were also modified.

Within the transportation category certain factors were adjusted to reflect the DPG's historical experience.

The components of the construction segment of the "standard factors" file were not changed from the DA inputs.

## DATA FILE

### General

Whereas the "standard factors" file is designed to contain data common to all bases within a specific scenario, the data file contains the data that is unique to each of the bases. The data file contains static base information (information assumed to remain relatively constant), dynamic base information (that changes during the scenario), information regarding personnel force structure changes, and information regarding construction required by the scenario.

### Department of the Army

#### STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Static base information reported by the DA in its second effort was identical to that submitted the first time.

The DA analysis reported the DPG personnel authorization to total 884 personnel -- a figure somewhat larger than the actual FY 1995 personnel authorization.

The DA reported 1.596 million square feet of facilities at the DPG and that installation support costs totalled \$39.483 million. The former figure is much smaller than the actual facilities while the latter overstates the base operations costs. Furthermore the difference between reported BOS non-payroll costs of \$23.665 million and BOS payroll costs of \$9.667 is not credible. Unless there are peculiar circumstances (which is not the case at the DPG) or BOS functions are contracted out (which is also not the case at the DPG), BOS payroll costs should typically be in the neighborhood of the combined RPMA and BOS non-payroll costs.

#### MOVEMENT TABLES

In the analysis accompanying the DoD recommendation to realign the DPG, the DA anticipated:

Moving 5 officers, 6 enlisted personnel, 99 civilian personnel, and 2,500 tons of mission equipment to the APG.

Moving 2 officers, 37 enlisted personnel, 18 civilian employees, and 2,500 tons of mission equipment to the YPG.

Moving 16 officers, 99 enlisted personnel, and 56 civilian employees to BASE X.

In its refined submission in late May, the DA anticipated:

Moving only 2 civilian employees to the APG. No equipment was moved.

Moving only 6 civilian employees to the YPG. No equipment was moved.

Moving only 3 officers, 15 enlisted personnel, and 56 civilian employees to "BASE X."

#### DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Although the scenario statements pertaining to both DA submissions state that \$2.6 million of

recurring costs are included for "SAFARI" *per diem* payments, these figures are not actually included in either analysis.

In both submissions, the DA envisages closing only 200,000 square feet at the DPG. Based on the scenario description and the number of civilian positions to be eliminated, the DA apparently thinks that it requires 329 civilian employees to operate 200,000 square feet of facilities. This comes close to being one manpower authorization for every two houses!

Both DA submissions show the cumulative loss of 50 civilian positions in FY 97 and FY 98 due to force structure changes. No force structure changes are made in the military personnel categories even though these are actually programmed to occur.

#### MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

The first DA submission requires construction costing a total of \$8.522 at the APG. This construction requirement is appropriately deleted in the second DA submission.

No figures are included in either analysis to replace mission essential facilities currently located in the English Village complex at the DPG.

#### Community

In each instance where the Community validated the DA inputs or could not develop independent data, its analysis used the DA data contained in the PG2-2X7.CBR data file.

#### STATIC BASE INFORMATION

The Community did not change any DA entries for either the APG or the YPG.

With regard to the DPG, the Community data is that pertaining to the actual size today -- as modified by programmed force structure changes that are **independent of the BRAC process**. Herein, the DPG's actual 1995 manpower authorization is for 24 officers, 70 enlisted personnel, and 653 civilian employees -- for a total of 747 personnel.

The Community corrected the figure for total facilities at the DPG. These actually total 2.571 million square feet -- some 61.1 percent larger than reported by the DA.

The community corrected the base operations costs to total \$27.676 million. This figure is based on actual programmed FY 1995 obligations. Similarly, the family housing costs were corrected to the actual FY 95 figure of \$871,000.

#### MOVEMENT TABLES

The Community analysis moves the same numbers of positions to the APG and the YPG as did the second DA submission.

#### DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Unlike either of its DA counterparts, the Community analysis contains the \$2.6 million in recurring costs for "SAFARI" *per diem*.

As reported by the DA, the force structure reductions at the DPG are understated. Instead of a total of 50 civilian positions, the DPG is programmed to lose 15 officer, 40 enlisted, and 129 civilian positions -- for a total of 184 positions. The Community analysis appropriately uses these figures. Their inclusion as force structure reductions is the rationale behind the Community's deletion of "BASE X" from its scenario.

The Community analysis closes all 996,000 square feet of facilities actually comprising English Village. However, unlike the DA analysis, the Community only deleted the manpower positions actually associated with operating and supporting the English Village complex. Instead of the 329 civilians apparently assumed by the DA, these actually comprise 3 officer positions, 9 enlisted positions, and 22 civilian positions -- for a total authorization of 34 personnel.

## MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

In recommending closure of the English Village complex, the DA apparently omitted from consideration the fact that, although predominantly a military housing area, the complex also contains several mission-essential facilities. If the English Village complex is closed while the rest of the DPG remains in operation, these facilities will have to be replicated. Accordingly, the Community analysis contains appropriate data concerning the replacement cost of these mission-essential facilities.

It should be noted herein, that the DoD recommendation involves a significant military construction bill -- totalling \$17,206 million -- to replace perfectly adequate mission-essential facilities that are being closed!

## SUMMARY

### Department of the Army

Based on the second DA calculations, after BRAC and force structure actions are complete, the DPG will be authorized 423 personnel. This represents a decrease of 461 positions from the reported total FY 95 authorization of 884 personnel. This represents a reduction of 52.1 percent.

Similarly, the second DA calculations indicate that the total facilities at the DPG will decrease from 1.596 million square feet to 1.396 million square feet. This represents a reduction of 12.5 percent.

With no substantive change in the mission, the large disparity between the percentage of personnel being reduced and the percentage of facilities being closed is simply not credible. At the very least, it requires some explanation.

### Community

Based on the Community calculations, after BRAC and force structure actions are complete, the DPG will be authorized 511 personnel. This represents a decrease of 236 positions from the actual total FY 95 authorization of 747 personnel. This represents a reduction of 52.1 percent. However, of these reductions, only 42 stem from BRAC activity.

Similarly, the second DA calculations indicate that the total facilities at the DPG will decrease from 2.571 million square feet to 1.575 million square feet. This represents a reduction of 61.3 percent.

It should be noted that the correlation between the percentage of facilities being closed and the percentage of personnel positions involved represents a more realistic outcome.

## CONCLUSIONS

It must be stressed again that this report focuses only on the return on investment issues, ignoring the more important military value issues associated with the DoD recommendation.

Instead of an immediate return on investment or a return within one year, the actual answer is that the return on investment will not occur for 12 years. Furthermore:

Of more importance than the actual return on investment is the scope of the recommendation. It actually involves no more than 42 manpower positions and therefore falls **well outside BRAC parameters**. Indeed, a recommendation of this insignificant scope should never be considered in the BRAC process. Realignment activity of this scope should be covered by normal DA funding. Instead, if approved, the recommendation will consume BRAC funding that the Congress intended to be devoted to substantive closure and realignment recommendations. As the DoD has noted, it can't close as many installations as it should because it can't afford the closure costs. Recommendations such as this one -- if approved -- magnify the problem!

Of equal importance, by moving positions to BASE X that are actually programmed to be eliminated under force structure reductions **that are independent of the BRAC process**, the DA appears to be trying to capture BRAC funding to support nonexistent BRAC activity.

Finally, the DoD recommendation involves a significant military construction bill -- totalling \$17,206 million -- to replace perfectly adequate facilities that are being closed! A far better solution would be to reject the DoD recommendation and then allow the DA to make such adjustments as it considers appropriate at the DPG.

In short, the DoD recommendation to realign the DPG should be rejected as a violation of the intent and purpose of the BRAC process.

## ENCLOSURES

- 1 Summary and input reports for first DA COBRA analysis (PG2-2X6.CBR / SF7DEC.SFF).
- 2 Summary and input reports for second DA COBRA analysis (PG2-2X7.CBR / SF7DEC.SFF).
- 3 Summary and input reports for Community COBRA analysis (DUG10.CBR / DUG5.SFF).
- 4 Computer disc for all runs.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/2  
 Data As Of 16:19 09/08/1994, Report Created 11:03 06/11/1995

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SP7DEC.SFF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 1998  
 ROI Year : 1999 (1 Year)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -306,685  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 25,406

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	705	7,818	0	0	0	0	8,522	0
Person	0	0	-5,677	-13,922	-13,922	-13,922	-47,443	-13,922
Overhd	2,515	1,886	-3,593	-14,323	-14,323	-14,323	-42,162	-14,323
Moving	0	0	9,235	0	0	0	9,235	0
Missio	0	0	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	10,400	2,600
Other	0	0	409	0	0	0	409	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,220</b>	<b>9,704</b>	<b>2,974</b>	<b>-25,645</b>	<b>-25,645</b>	<b>-25,645</b>	<b>-61,039</b>	<b>-25,645</b>

POSITIONS ELIMINATED	1996						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	329	0	0	0	329
<b>TOT</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>329</b>

POSITIONS REALIGNED	1996						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	0	0	23	0	0	0	23
Enl	0	0	142	0	0	0	142
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	173	0	0	0	173
<b>TOT</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>338</b>

Summary:

-----  
 REALIGN DUGWAY PG. CLOSE ENGLISH VILLAGE.  
 CONSOLIDATE PG WORK TO EXISTING PGs. SUPPORTS WESTERN TEST COMPLEX  
 REMAINING PERSONNEL NOT JUST MAINTENANCE; INCLUDES CHEM/BIO PEOPLE  
 EXCESS MILITARY TO BASE X  
 CONTAINS \$2.6M RECURRING COSTS FOR SAFARI PER DIEM

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Pctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	705	7,818	0	0	0	0	8,522	0
Person	0	0	1,890	1,211	1,211	1,211	5,524	1,211
Overhd	2,515	1,886	3,109	1,444	1,444	1,444	11,844	1,444
Moving	0	0	9,500	0	0	0	9,500	0
Missio	0	0	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	10,400	2,600
Other	0	0	409	0	0	0	409	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,220</b>	<b>9,704</b>	<b>17,508</b>	<b>5,256</b>	<b>5,256</b>	<b>5,256</b>	<b>46,199</b>	<b>5,256</b>

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	7,567	15,133	15,133	15,133	52,967	15,133
Overhd	0	0	6,702	15,768	15,768	15,768	54,006	15,768
Moving	0	0	265	0	0	0	265	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14,534</b>	<b>30,901</b>	<b>30,901</b>	<b>30,901</b>	<b>107,238</b>	<b>30,901</b>

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 16:19 09/08/1994, Report Created 11:03 06/11/1995

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SP7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
DUGWAY PG, UT	Realignment
ABERDEEN PG, MD	Realignment
YUMA PG, AZ	Realignment
BASE X, US	Realignment

Summary:

-----  
 REALIGN DUGWAY PG. CLOSE ENGLISH VILLAGE.  
 CONSOLIDATE PG WORK TO EXISTING PGs. SUPPORTS WESTERN TEST COMPLEX  
 REMAINING PERSONNEL NOT JUST MAINTENANCE; INCLUDES CHEM/BIO PEOPLE  
 EXCESS MILITARY TO BASE X  
 CONTAINS \$2.6M RECURRING COSTS FOR SAFARI PER DIEM

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
DUGWAY PG, UT	ABERDEEN PG, MD	2,262 mi
DUGWAY PG, UT	YUMA PG, AZ	775 mi
DUGWAY PG, UT	BASE X, US	1,340 mi
ABERDEEN PG, MD	YUMA PG, AZ	2,200 mi
ABERDEEN PG, MD	BASE X, US	1,340 mi
YUMA PG, AZ	BASE X, US	1,340 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	5	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	6	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	99	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	2,500	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	37	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	18	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	2,500	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	16	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	99	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	56	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

Total Officer Employees:	28	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,150
Total Enlisted Employees:	169	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	23,666
Total Civilian Employees:	687	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	9,667
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	2,089
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.97
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,596	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	113	Activity Code:	49295
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	61	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	98	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

Total Officer Employees:	446	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	34,274
Total Enlisted Employees:	1,863	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	2,996	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	124,706
Total Civilian Employees:	6,771	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	50,936
Mil Families Living On Base:	76.2%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	7,292
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.92
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	12,121	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	130	Activity Code:	24015
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	155	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	116	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

Total Officer Employees:	34	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	5,300
Total Enlisted Employees:	234	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	19,455
Total Civilian Employees:	1,518	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	7,946
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	3,597
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.11
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,353	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	250	Activity Code:	4985
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	138	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	86	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

Total Officer Employees:	752	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,891
Total Enlisted Employees:	4,208	Communications (\$K/Year):	1,514
Total Student Employees:	1,121	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,982
Total Civilian Employees:	2,709	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	21,877
Mil Families Living On Base:	55.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,151
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.09
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	6,091	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	178	Activity Code:	BASEX
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	132		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	200					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				100.0%

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSP):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSP):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-6	-44	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-329	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	-2	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-53	-186	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	96	-47	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	8	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-12	-28	-19	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
RDT&E	RDT&E	30,000	0	0
GEN PURP ADMIN	ADMIN	13,400	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	77.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	58.50%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	91.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	67,948.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,717.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	1,109.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	30,860.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,223.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburs Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	45,998.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	19.00%
SF File Desc:	SF7DEC.SPF	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	12.00%

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X6  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X6.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index: 0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost: 59.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population): 0.54	Info Management Account: 15.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)	MilCon Design Rate: 10.00%
Program Management Factor: 10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate: 6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care): 162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate: 7.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF): 1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate: 24.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF): 388.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF): 1,819.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:	
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.80% 1998: 2.90%	1999: 2.90% 2000: 2.90% 2001: 2.90%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb): 710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton): 284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb): 14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile): 0.09
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb): 9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile): 0.09
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb): 6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile): 0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb): 18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years): 2.90
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb): 35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour): 4,665.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile): 0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$): 6,134.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ): 700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$): 4,381.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	38	APPLIED INSTR	(SF)	114
Waterfront	(LF)	0	LABS (RDT&E)	(SF)	175
Air Operations	(SF)	130	CHILD CARE CENTER	(SF)	120
Operational	(SF)	119	PRODUCTION FAC	(SF)	100
Administrative	(SF)	106	PHYSICAL FITNESS FAC	(SF)	128
School Buildings	(SF)	104	2+2 BACHQ	(BA)	19,140
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	108	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(BA)	46,227	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	96,040	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	60	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	180	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyards Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	139	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

EQUIPMENT SHIP WEIGHTS ARE ESTIMATES

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 1998  
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015(\$K): -305,290  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 9,461

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	-6,585	-14,592	-14,592	-14,592	-50,363	-14,592
Overhd	1,550	1,162	-5,335	-9,416	-9,416	-9,416	-30,870	-9,416
Moving	0	0	4,608	0	0	0	4,608	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	320	0	0	0	320	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,550</b>	<b>1,162</b>	<b>-6,992</b>	<b>-24,008</b>	<b>-24,008</b>	<b>-24,008</b>	<b>-76,304</b>	<b>-24,008</b>

POSITIONS ELIMINATED	1996						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	329	0	0	0	329
<b>TOT</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>329</b>

POSITIONS REALIGNED	1996						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Enl	0	0	15	0	0	0	15
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	64	0	0	0	64
<b>TOT</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>82</b>

Summary:

-----  
 REALIGN DUGWAY PG. CLOSE ENGLISH VILLAGE.  
 CONSOLIDATE PG WORK TO EXISTING PGs. SUPPORTS WESTERN TEST COMPLEX  
 REMAINING PERSONNEL NOT JUST MAINTENANCE; INCLUDES CHEM/BIO PEOPLE  
 EXCESS MILITARY TO BASE X  
 CONTAINS \$2.6M RECURRING COSTS FOR SAFARI PER DIBM

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SFF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	981	541	541	541	2,604	541
Overhd	1,550	1,162	1,367	246	246	246	4,816	246
Moving	0	0	4,637	0	0	0	4,637	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	320	0	0	0	320	-0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,550</b>	<b>1,162</b>	<b>7,306</b>	<b>787</b>	<b>787</b>	<b>787</b>	<b>12,377</b>	<b>787</b>

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	7,567	15,133	15,133	15,133	52,967	15,133
Overhd	0	0	6,702	9,661	9,661	9,661	35,686	9,661
Moving	0	0	29	0	0	0	29	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14,298</b>	<b>24,795</b>	<b>24,795</b>	<b>24,795</b>	<b>88,682</b>	<b>24,795</b>

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 16:19 09/08/1994, Report Created 11:05 06/11/1995

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
DUGWAY PG, UT	Realignment
ABERDEEN PG, MD	Realignment
YUMA PG, AZ	Realignment
BASE X, US	Realignment

Summary:

-----  
 REALIGN DUGWAY PG. CLOSE ENGLISH VILLAGE.  
 CONSOLIDATE PG WORK TO EXISTING PGs. SUPPORTS WESTERN TEST COMPLEX  
 REMAINING PERSONNEL NOT JUST MAINTENANCE; INCLUDES CHEM/BIO PEOPLE  
 EXCESS MILITARY TO BASE X  
 CONTAINS \$2.6M RECURRING COSTS FOR SAFARI PER DIEM

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
DUGWAY PG, UT	ABERDEEN PG, MD	2,262 mi
DUGWAY PG, UT	YUMA PG, AZ	775 mi
DUGWAY PG, UT	BASE X, US	1,340 mi
ABERDEEN PG, MD	YUMA PG, AZ	2,200 mi
ABERDEEN PG, MD	BASE X, US	1,340 mi
YUMA PG, AZ	BASE X, US	1,340 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	6	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SFP

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	3	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	15	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	56	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

Total Officer Employees:	28	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,150
Total Enlisted Employees:	169	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	23,666
Total Civilian Employees:	687	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	9,667
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	2,089
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.97
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,596	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	113	Activity Code:	49295
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	61		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	98	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

Total Officer Employees:	446	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	34,274
Total Enlisted Employees:	1,863	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	2,996	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	124,706
Total Civilian Employees:	6,771	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	50,936
Mil Families Living On Base:	76.2%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	7,292
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.92
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	12,121	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	130	Activity Code:	24015
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	155		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	116	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

Total Officer Employees:	34	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	5,300
Total Enlisted Employees:	234	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	19,455
Total Civilian Employees:	1,518	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	7,946
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	3,597
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.11
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSP):	1,353	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	250	Activity Code:	4985
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	138		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	86	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

Total Officer Employees:	752	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,891
Total Enlisted Employees:	4,208	Communications (\$K/Year):	1,514
Total Student Employees:	1,121	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,982
Total Civilian Employees:	2,709	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	21,877
Mil Families Living On Base:	55.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,151
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.09
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	6,091	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	178	Activity Code:	BASEX
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	132		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	200					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				100.0%

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-6	-44	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-329	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	-2	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-53	-186	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	96	-47	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	8	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-12	-28	-19	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	77.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	58.50%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	91.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	67,948.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,717.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	1,109.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	30,860.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,223.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	45,998.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	19.00%
SF File Desc:	SF7DEC.SPF	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	12.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	59.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	15.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	10.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	7.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	24.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	388.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,819.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 0.00%	1997: 2.80%	1998: 2.90%	1999: 2.90%
			2000: 2.90%
			2001: 2.90%

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : PG2-2X7  
 Scenario File : A:\PG2-2X7.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\SF7DEC.SPF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	2.90
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	4,665.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	6,134.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	4,381.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	38	APPLIED INSTR	(SF)	114
Waterfront	(LF)	0	LABS (RDT&E)	(SF)	175
Air Operations	(SF)	130	CHILD CARE CENTER	(SF)	120
Operational	(SF)	119	PRODUCTION FAC	(SF)	100
Administrative	(SF)	106	PHYSICAL FITNESS FAC	(SF)	128
School Buildings	(SF)	104	2+2 BACHQ	(EA)	19,140
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	108	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(EA)	46,227	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	96,040	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	60	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	180	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	139	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

EQUIPMENT SHIP WEIGHTS ARE ESTIMATES

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : DUG10  
 Scenario File : A:\DUG10.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\DUG5.SFF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 1998  
 ROI Year : 2010 (12 Years)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -6,762  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 19,544

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	11,954	5,251	0	0	0	0	17,206	0
Person	0	0	-235	-1,207	-1,207	-1,207	-3,856	-1,207
Overhd	117	88	2,208	-869	-869	-869	-195	-869
Moving	0	0	426	0	0	0	426	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	27	0	0	0	27	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12,071</b>	<b>5,339</b>	<b>2,426</b>	<b>-2,076</b>	<b>-2,076</b>	<b>-2,076</b>	<b>13,608</b>	<b>-2,076</b>

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS ELIMINATED</b>							
Off	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Enl	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civ	0	0	22	0	0	0	22
TOT	0	0	34	0	0	0	34

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS REALIGNED</b>							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	8	0	0	0	8
TOT	0	0	8	0	0	0	8

Summary:  
 -----

REALIGN DUGWAY PROVING GROUND. CLOSE ENGLISH VILLAGE. TRANSFER CHEM/BIO WORK TO ABERDEEN PG. TRANSFER SMOKE/OBSURANT WORK TO YUMA PG. MILCON REQD TO REPLACE MISSION-ESSENTIAL FACILITIES BEING CLOSED IN ENGLISH VILLAGE.

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : DUG10  
 Scenario File : A:\DUG10.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\DUG5.SFP

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	11,954	5,251	0	0	0	0	17,206	0
Person	0	0	368	0	0	0	368	0
Overhd	117	88	3,975	2,664	2,664	2,664	12,174	2,664
Moving	0	0	426	0	0	0	426	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	27	0	0	0	27	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12,071</b>	<b>5,339</b>	<b>4,797</b>	<b>2,664</b>	<b>2,664</b>	<b>2,664</b>	<b>30,202</b>	<b>2,664</b>

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	603	1,207	1,207	1,207	4,225	1,207
Overhd	0	0	1,768	3,534	3,534	3,534	12,368	3,534
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,371</b>	<b>4,741</b>	<b>4,741</b>	<b>4,741</b>	<b>16,593</b>	<b>4,741</b>

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 16:19 09/08/1994, Report Created 11:10 06/11/1995

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : DUG10  
 Scenario File : A:\DUG10.CBR  
 Std Pctrs File : A:\DUG5.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
DUGWAY PG, UT	Realignment
ABERDEEN PG, MD	Realignment
YUMA PG, AZ	Realignment

Summary:  
 -----

REALIGN DUGWAY PROVING GROUND. CLOSE ENGLISH VILLAGE. TRANSFER CHEM/BIO WORK TO ABERDEEN PG. TRANSFER SMOKE/OBSCURANT WORK TO YUMA PG. MILCON REQD TO REPLACE MISSION-ESSENTIAL FACILITIES BEING CLOSED IN ENGLISH VILLAGE.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
DUGWAY PG, UT	ABERDEEN PG, MD	2,262 mi
DUGWAY PG, UT	YUMA PG, AZ	775 mi
ABERDEEN PG, MD	YUMA PG, AZ	2,200 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	2	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from DUGWAY PG, UT to YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	6	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : DUG10  
 Scenario File : A:\DUG10.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\DUG5.SPF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

Total Officer Employees:	24	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,843
Total Enlisted Employees:	70	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	8,747
Total Civilian Employees:	653	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	12,086
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	871
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	60.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.97
Officer Housing Units Avail:	41	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	111	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	2,571	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	49295
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	98	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

Total Officer Employees:	446	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	34,274
Total Enlisted Employees:	1,863	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	2,996	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	124,706
Total Civilian Employees:	6,771	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	50,936
Mil Families Living On Base:	76.2%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	7,292
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.92
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	12,121	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	130	Activity Code:	24015
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	155	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	116	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

Total Officer Employees:	34	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	5,300
Total Enlisted Employees:	234	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	19,455
Total Civilian Employees:	1,518	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	7,946
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	3,597
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.11
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,353	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	250	Activity Code:	4985
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	138	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	86	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		



Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : DUG10  
 Scenario File : A:\DUG10.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\DUG5.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	-15	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	-40	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	-129	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	-3	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-9	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-22	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Name: ABERDEEN PG, MD

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	-2	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-53	-186	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	96	-47	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Name: YUMA PG, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-12	-28	-19	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: DUGWAY PG, UT

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
COMMO CTR ADD	OTHER	4,800	0	1,053
CONV METAL SHOP	MAINT	0	346	420
SUPPLY COMPOUND	OPERA	26,644	0	0
CLINIC ADDITION	MEDFC	7,900	0	1,300
ADMIN BUILDING	ADMIN	28,574	0	0
FIRE STATION ADD	OPERA	4,352	755	0
CONTRACTOR COMPOUND	OPERA	4,800	0	0
FENCE BOUNDARY	OTHER	23,760	0	530
REFUSE TRANS STN	OTHER	0	0	97
ENGR MAINT SHOP	MAINT	11,600	0	0

Department : ARMY  
 Option Package : DUG10  
 Scenario File : A:\DUG10.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : A:\DUG5.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	70.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	48.00%	Priority Placement Service:	40.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	91.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	100.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	45,216.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	8,364.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	1,109.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	17,600.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	4,368.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	253.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	26	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	41,500.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	2.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	72.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	2.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	2.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	25.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	19.00%
SF File Desc:	DUG5.SFF	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	12.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	59.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.75	Info Management Account:	15.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	10.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	7.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	24.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	120.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,200.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 2.90% 1997: 3.00% 1998: 3.00%		1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%	

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	255.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	4,358.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	3,564.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	500.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.30
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	6,805.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	3.20
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	4,655.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	6,134.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	4,381.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	38	Applied instr	(SF)	1,140
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Labs (RDT&E)	(SF)	175
Air Operations	(SF)	130	Child care ctr	(SF)	120
Operational	(SF)	119	Production fac	(SF)	100
Administrative	(SF)	106	Physical fitness fac	(SF)	128
School Buildings	(SF)	104	2+2 bach qtrs	(EA)	19,140
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	108	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(EA)	46,227	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	96,040	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	60	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	180	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	139	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

Department : ARMY  
Option Package : DUG10  
Scenario File : A:\DUG10.CBR  
Std Pctrs File : A:\DUG5.SPF


EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

EQUIPMENT SHIP WEIGHTS ARE ESTIMATES

# Document Separator

April 1995

# Hill AFB/ Ogden AIRC



Maj Gen Mike Pavich  
(USAF Ret.)  
Hill/DDO '95

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology... Today**

# Transition Plan

## Remaining Workload

No MILCON

Minor Upgrades

Common Skills

Workload

Bldg

- Dragon 5
- Phoenix 5
- Shillelagh 5
- Sparrow 5
- TOW II 5
- MLRS 5, 847
- LCSS 847
- TOW Launcher 847
- TOW BFVS 847

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

# Transition Plan

## Remaining Workload (Cont)

Workload*	Bldg
• AMRAAM	100
• Standard	100
• Avenger	100, 847
• Red River Workload	847
• Patriot	5, 847
• HAWK	5, 847
• Tobyhanna Workload	5, 100
• HARM	5
• ATACMS	5
• Crane Workload	509
• Black World	1515

\*Transition Must Start Immediately Upon BRAC 95 Decision

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# Conclusions

## Tactical Missile Consolidation Makes Sense at Hill AFB

Can Accommodate Entire DoD Workload

Provides Full Service Support

Postured for Future Technologies (Stealth)

Minimizes Impact to the Customer

Meet Original BRAC Schedule

Save Millions

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## Summary (Cont)

### Ogden ALC Provides Full Service Missile Support

Support Infrastructure in Place and Producing  
Facilities Available - No Milcon  
Skills, Experience and Technology in Place  
Over 30 Years Experience--Most Extensive  
in DoD

Consolidation/Interservicing of Tactical  
Missile Workload Makes Sense

Current Cost Savings in Question With  
Drop in Workload Hours

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# Summary

## Facilities

NO MILCON

## Costs

Hill: \$32M Total

LEAD: \$35M Remaining

Savings of \$3M

## Skills

Ogden Has Trained and Experienced Workforce in  
Tactical Missile Maintenance

Ogden is Producing Production Quantities NOW

## Schedule

Implement Immediately

Complete All Transitions by FY99

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# Facilities

No MILCON, only minor modifications  
Consolidation of Workload

Letterkenney, Tobyhanna, Red River LRUs

- Bldg 5B, C, D, E, F, G, P, M (2 Radar Ranges)
- Bldg 100 A, K, L, N

Crane Fuse Work

- Bldg 509

Tactical Missile Vehicles

- Bldg 847

WR-ALC (Black)


- Bldg 1515

Letterkenney

- Bldg 2026, 1825, 1826

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# Transition Plan - Capabilities



## Skills

Technician and Engineering  
Guidance and Control Section (GCS)

Launchers

- Hardware and Software Repair/Modification

AUR Maintenance and Testing

Vehicle and Erector Maintenance

- ICBM Transporter Erector

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# DoD Tactical Missile Workload

## Present Tactical Missile Workload

<u>Depot</u>	<u>DL H (000)</u>
LEAD	623

## Additional Workload

Red River (Vehicle and Launchers)	59
Crane (Fuzes)	38
Tobyhanna (Missile Components)	58
<u>Black World</u>	<u>13</u>
Subtotal	168

**Total** **791**

# Hill AFB, A TIER I Base

Rated Tier I For Installation Military Value By  
USAF

Rated Tier I For Depot Military Value By  
USAF

Rated Tier I USAF Depot by DoD JCSG/DM

## The Only Depot So Rated

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# Transition Plan

## Integrate Immediately

No MILCON/Upgrade

Workload Already In-Place

### Workload

- AUR
- Sidewinder (AF, Navy)
- Maverick (AF, Navy, USMC)
- Hellfire (Army)
- SLAM (Navy)

### Bldg

2026

100


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# Cost Savings



Original BRAC Consolidation at LEAD	\$51M
Committed	<u>\$16M</u>
Remaining	\$35M
Consolidate 93 Workload At Hill	\$26M
JCSG/DM Consolidation	<u>6M</u>
• Red River (Vehicles and Launchers)	\$32M
• Tobyhanna (Missile Components)	
• Crane (Fuzes)	
• Black World	
Savings	\$3M

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# Transition Plan

## Hill AFB Can Handle All DoD Workload

### Existing Capability

- 56,810 ft<sup>2</sup> Expandable by 165,000 ft<sup>2</sup>

### Skills Already in Place

No MILCON

Minor Upgrades

Move Equipment Not Already at Hill AFB

Meet BRAC 93 Schedule

Cost Savings - \$3M


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**Edgden Air Logistics Center**

# **Tactical Missile Workload Transition Plan**


**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

# Consolidate At Ogden



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# Missiles of the Future




Consolidation Decision Drives Future Repair Locations

Tactical Missiles of the Future Will Include Stealth Technology

Hill AFB Has Only Missile Stealth Capability in DoD Today

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# USAF Investment



Significant Investment at Hill AFB to Consolidate Engineering, Test, and Repair Allows:

Synergy Between Strategic Missiles and Tactical Missiles

Optimizes Customer Support By Sharing of Overhead Costs Between Missile Systems

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## Alternative Solution (Cont)

Capability Exists to Consolidate DoD Tactical Missile Workload

- Support Equipment
- GCS
- AUR
- Launchers
- Vehicles

Full Service Missile Support  
Established Infrastructure

Hill AFB Designated Tier I Depot

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# Current Interservicing

## Technical/Engineering

Maverick - (Navy, Marines, USAF)

Paveway - (Mod - Navy, Marines)

Harm - (Navy containers)

AIM-9 - (Navy, USAF)

## Testing

Paveway - Maverick - AMRAAM (Navy, USAF)

HARM - (Navy, USAF)

Sparrow - (Navy, USAF)

## Depot

Maverick - Sidewinder - Paveway - SLAM

Launchers (Navy, Marines)

HARM Containers (Navy)

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# Why Hill AFB?

## Total Organic Missile Workload Vehicles, Launchers, GCS, AUR, Launch Control

All Repair

OO-ALC Repair

Assets	Direct Labor Hrs (K)	Direct Labor Hrs (K)	%
USAF	730.5	717.5	98
DoD	1687	745.9	44

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# DoD Tactical Missile Guidance and Control Workload ( 000 DLH)\*

Total	Hill Current	LEAD Current	Barstow Current	Future (Contract)
283.6	121.8	43.4	30	88.4
100%	43%	15%	11%	31%

\*Hours are Based on Projected FY99 Workload

# Alternative Solution

Hill AFB Provides a Viable Alternative

35 Years of Missile Experience

USAF Consolidated Workload at Hill AFB 1970's

Significant Amount of DoD Organic Tactical  
Missile Workload

- 43% GCS
- 150,000 DLH Launcher and Vehicle Workload

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
1.11 AFB

# Alternative Solution

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

# Background

## Tactical Missiles Consolidation Workload Changes (LEAD)



**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

# Background

DoD Recommended Disestablishment of the  
LEAD

1995 DoD Recommendations

Guidance & Control to Tobyhanna AD

Guidance & Control Plus Towed and Self-  
Propelled Vehicles to Anniston AD

Hawk Missile System to Barstow USMC Depot

AUR & Storage For Four (4) Systems Remain at  
Letterkenny AD

Nullifies 93 BRAC Consolidation Decision

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

# Background

BRAC 93 Consolidate Tactical Missile Work  
Projected Workload Decreased to 623K DLH  
LEAD No Longer a Viable Candidate for This  
Consolidation

Army has Recommended Disestablishment  
of LEAD

# Background

## Army Audit Agency Concluded

Savings Realized from Consolidation at  
Letterkenny Army Depot Equivalent to Savings  
from Proposed Realignment

“ IF “

All Workload Including Private Sector Moved to  
Letterkenny - 2.2M Direct Labor Hours

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# Background

BRAC 93 Consolidated Tactical Missile Work


Commission Found:

Consolidation of Tactical Missile Maintenance  
at a Single Depot was a Valid Plan Worthy of  
Implementation

To Create Efficiency and Reduce Cost

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

Hill Air Force Base  
Tactical Missile Consolidation  
19 April 1995



# A Major Opportunity for Consolidation

Hill AFB will Satisfy USAF and DoD Future  
Force Structure Requirements

UTTR and Unique Utah Environment Provide  
Outstanding Opportunities for DoD  
Consolidation

Optimizing These Facilities and Capabilities is  
Good Business for DoD

Major Opportunity is available for Joint  
Consolidation

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

# Document Separator

Manhours expended:

36.4 per unit

Savings:

\$27,457

### Capacity

There are no facility or equipment capacity concerns at Ogden ALC given additional manpower, we could assume an immediate increase of 149 to 200 gear annually without impacting current customers.

### Manpower Estimates

C-130 Gear and Components

\*17 Ea Production Personnel

<u>SERIES</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
8-WG 8840	9/10	AIRCRAFT PARTS REPAIRER
6-WG 3414	09/10	MACHINIST
3-WG 3711	09	ELECTROPLATER

\*Note: Manpower estimates were computed using comparisons to existing Air Force requirements and work specification standards. Air Force standards require a complete remanufacturing of the gear and all components. Without specific work standards, statements of work, and work load volume, it is impossible to compute exact manpower requirements.

## CANDIDATE ITEM F-14 INTERSERVICEABILITY, F-15 COMPARISON

### Capability

We currently have a F-14 Nose Landing Gear in our facility for a prototype repair. All piece parts have been repaired and we are now awaiting the outer cylinder from the Navy to assemble the gear. There has been no unexpected problems with the repair of this prototype. Ogden ALC has extensive experience with the F-15 which has a similar Nose Landing Gear. We believe the processes and costs of the F-14 Landing Gear will be similar to those we have experienced with the F-15.

### Current Status

We are currently producing 72, F-15 Landing Gear annually by trained and certified mechanics. With additional personnel, we could easily integrate the F-14 into our existing repair process with no significant changes or impacts. Significant savings have been realized for repair of the F-15 Landing Gear as the below cost/savings data will attest.

F-15 Main Landing Gear	New Cost:	\$105,802
	Repair cost:	\$ 11,417
	Manhours expended:	83 per unit
	Savings:	\$ 94,385
F-15 Nose Landing Gear	New Cost:	\$ 46,005
	Repair cost:	\$ 9,620
	Manhours expended:	68 per unit
	Savings:	\$ 36,385

Capacity

Capacity is not a problem, we have the facilities and equipment in place. F-14 Landing Gear work load could easily be coordinated and included in our repair system with minor tooling and fixturing for our shops. No significant process changes would be required.

Manpower Estimates

F-14 Gear and Components

\*27 Ea Production Personnel

<u>Series</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Title</u>
1-WG 8840	10	SUPV AIRCRAFT MECH PARTS REPAIRER
10-WG 8840	09/10	AIRCRAFT MECHANICAL PARTS REPAIRER
8-WG 3414	09/10	MACHINIST
4-WG 3711	09	ELECTROPLATER
1-WG 3769	08	SHOT PEEN MACHINE OPERATOR
1-GS 0895	09	INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER TECHNICIAN
1-GS 1152	09	PRODUCTION CONTROLLER
1-GS 0830	12	PROCESS ENGINEER

\*Note: Manpower estimates were computed using comparisons to existing Air Force requirements and work specification standards. Air Force standards require a complete remanufacturing of the gear and all components. Without specific work standards, statements of work, and work load volume, it is impossible to compute exact manpower requirements.

## CANDIDATE ITEM AIRCRAFT WHEELS

### Capability

With the proper number of personnel, the Landing Gear Division has the capability and capacity to repair all the aircraft wheels and related components for the Department of Defense. With the use of a computer assisted Mechanized Material Handling System, component parts are efficiently and safely moved from disassembly through the cleaning, inspection, plating and paint areas with a minimum of manual handling. Facility layout and equipment were specifically designed and selected to optimize this process.

### Current Status

In FY93, we completed a planned work load of 7,919 wheel assemblies using a total of 77,058 manhours. An additional unplanned work load of 393 wheels totaling 3874 hours was completed at our customers request. Through continued process improvements and efforts driven by competition, we reduced the standard labor hours on wheel overhaul and repair by an average of 26 percent. Repair flow days from induction to shipment average less than ten working days. We are confident that we could apply these same lessons learned to Navy products. A few examples indicate the following:

Noun	New Cost	Repair Cost	Std Hrs
F-15 Wheel Main	\$9,524	\$1,540	8.0
F-15 Wheel Nose	3,138	730	4.7
F-16 Wheel Main	3,400	1,272	5.8
F-16 Wheel Nose	973	400	4.5
C-130 Wheel Main	6,116	950	7.8
C-130 Wheel Nose	2,018	658	5.0

## Capacity

Facility capacity is not a concern because the Landing Gear complex was specifically designed to perform repair operating on all landing gear and related components work load. We are currently operating a modified one shift operation, maintaining only process essential personnel on second and third shifts. With additional personnel, we could easily expand to full second and third shift operations and immediately accept Navy wheel work load.

## Manpower Estimates

\*25 Ea Production Personnel

<u>SERIES</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1-WS 8840	09/10	AIRCRAFT MECHANICAL PARTS REPAIRER
9-WS 8840	09	AIRCRAFT MECHANICAL PARTS REPAIRER
4-WG 3414	09	MACHINIST
7-WG 3711	09	ELECTROPLATER
3-WG 3769	08	SHOT PEEN MACHINE OPERATOR
1-GS 0895	09	INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER TECHNICIAN

\*Note: Manpower estimates were computed using comparisons to existing Air Force requirements and work specification standards. Air Force standards require a complete remanufacturing of the gear and all components. Without specific work standards, statements of work, and work load volume, it is impossible to compute exact manpower requirements.

## CANDIDATE ITEM AIRCRAFT BRAKES

### Capability

With 40 years experience, the Landing Gear Division has the knowledge and capability to repair aircraft brakes and related components for the Department of Defense. A computer assisted Mechanized Material Handling System efficiently and safely moves parts from disassembly through cleaning, inspection, plating and painting areas with minimum manual intervention. The entire Landing Gear facility was designed and equipped to optimize this process.

### Current Status

In FY 93 we completed a planned work load of 4,872 brake assemblies using a total of 62,561 hours. An additional unplanned work load of 138 brakes totalling 2258 hours was completed at our customers request. Brake flow days from induction to shipment is an average of 17 days.

Currently the Air Force is using the innovative two for one carbon brake plate program. Two plates that are worn beyond acceptable limits are machined and joined together making a "good as new" plate at a significant savings. This program could be applied to Navy systems where feasible on the F-16. This process saved approximately \$5,000 per brake heatstack. Below are a few examples of our brake costs:

Noun	New Cost	Repair Cost	Std Hrs
F-15 C/D Brake Assy	\$20,830	\$ 3,580	20.4
F-15 C/D Restack Heatstack	8,028	993	5.8
F-15 C/D Two For One Heatstack	8,028	2,500	15.4
F-16 Block 40 Brake Assy	13,925	2,678	19.0

F-16 Two For One Heatstack	7,961	1,150	18.4
C-130 Brake Assy	7,356	2,511	18.7

Capacity

Facility capacity is not a concern because the Landing Gear complex was specifically designed to perform all landing gear and related components work load. We are currently operating a modified one shift operation, maintaining only process essential personnel on second and third shifts. With additional Navy personnel, we could easily expand to full second and third shift operations and immediately accept Navy brake work load.

Manpower Estimates

\*28 Production Personnel

<u>SERIES</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1-WS 8840	09/10	SUPV AIRCRAFT MECH PARTS REPAIRER
11-WG 8840	09	AIRCRAFT MECHANICAL PARTS REPAIRER
4-WG 3414	09	MACHINISTS
4-WG 3769	08	SHOT PEEN MACHINE OPERATORS
5-WG 3711	09	ELECTROPLATERS
1-WG 3712	10	HEAT TREATER
1-GS 0895	09	INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER TECHNICIAN
1-GS 1152	09	PRODUCTION CONTROLLER

\*Note: Manpower estimates were computed using comparisons to existing Air Force requirements and work specification standards. Air Force standards require a complete remanufacturing of the gear and all components. Without specific work standards, statements of work, and work load volume, it is impossible to compute exact manpower requirements.

## CANDIDATE ITEM

### JOB SHOP MANUFACTURING AND INVESTMENT CASTING

#### Capability

The Manufacturing Section of the Landing Gear Division has the capability and capacity to manufacture replacement recoverable and expendable components for Naval Aviation Systems. We have extensive experience in manufacturing aircraft quality pins, bushings, braces, ribs, fittings, hinges, collars, and stiffeners for the systems that we support. In addition, our tool and die area manufactures all of our tooling and fixturing to support our current systems and industrial operations such as electro plating and grinding. They also manufacture our Investment Casting molds which has allowed us to operate the Air Force's first full production investment casting facility.

#### Current Status

We currently have produced 49 part number components in direct support of the F-18 Navy Contract in Ogden ALC Aircraft Division. The majority of these components were needed immediately to prevent aircraft repair line stoppages, and were manufactured within 30 days after receiving the funded request. Additionally our investment casting facility has 623 hours of Navy work "on the books" at a dollar value of \$41,080. Any manufacturing, short of forgings and within machine capability, could be accomplished within days after receipt of funding.

#### Manpower Estimates

Current manpower capability (Journeyman Machinists WG-3414/10) exists to support Air Force work load and any additional Navy candidate item. Investment Casting manpower (4 Ea WG-4616/14) may need to be augmented if any of these Navy candidates required a significant increase in casting support.

## CANDIDATE ITEM F-18 INTERSERVICEABILITY, F-16 COMPARISON

### Capability

Although no direct comparison can be drawn between the unique design of the Navy F-18 and Air Force F-16 Landing Gear, a functional comparison can be made of shock strut components, material and repair processes necessary for refurbishment. The Shock Strut has a similar function on both aircraft. Our extensive knowledge of the F-16 Actuating Cylinder and other similar Air Force systems can be easily transferred to the F-18 Landing Gear with no significant problems. Therefore, a comparison can be drawn between the two weapon systems Landing Gear.

### Current Status

We are currently producing 136 F-16 Landing Gear annually by trained and certified mechanics. With additional personnel, Navy F-18 work load could easily be integrated into our repair system. The Air Force has realized significant savings of F-16 repair as indicated below:

F-16 Main Landing Gear	New cost:	\$10,216
	Repair cost:	\$ 2,277
	Manhours expended:	23 per unit
	Savings:	\$ 7,939
F-16 Nose Landing Gear	New cost	\$43,718
	Repair cost	\$ 5,502
	Manhours expended:	22 per unit
	Savings:	\$38,216

## Capacity

Capacity is not a problem. Our current systems can accommodate from small T-38 to large C-5 landing gear components. We have the facilities, machines, chemical tanks and technical expertise to take on the F-18 Landing Gear. Tooling and fixtures can be designed and manufactured by our design and manufacture personnel with no significant problems anticipated.

## Manpower Estimates

### \*96 Production and Support Personnel


<u>SERIES</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1-WS-16 OR GM-1601-13		
1-WS 8840	09/10	SUPV AIRCRAFT MECH PARTS REPAIRER
30-WG 8840	09/10	AIRCRAFT MECHANICAL PARTS REPAIRER
1-WS 3414	10	MACHINIST SUPERVISOR
33-WG 3414	09/10	MACHINISTS
1-WG 3707	10	METALLIZING EQUIPMENT OPERATOR
11-WG 3711	09	ELECTROPLATERS
4-WG 3769	08	SHOP PEEN MACHINE OPERATORS
4-WG 4102	08/09	PAINTER
2-WG 0830	12	MECHANICAL ENGINEER
2-GS 0869	12	INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER
2-GS 0895	09	INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER TECHNICIAN
1-GS 1152	09	PRODUCTION CONTROLLER
1-WG 6910	07	MATERIAL EXPEDITER
2-WG 5406	09	UTILITY SYSTEMS OPERATOR

\*Note: Manpower estimates were computed using comparisons to existing Air Force requirements and work specification standards. Air Force standards require a complete remanufacturing of the gear and all components. Without specific work standards, statements of work, and work load volume, it is impossible to compute exact manpower requirements.

# Document Separator

Hill AFB

# Tactical Missile Repair




Jeannie Hathenbruck

28 April 1995

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## Overview

- Background
- Alternative Solution
- Full Service Support
- Transition Plan
- Conclusions



## Background


- ▶ DoD Recommended Closing Letterkenny (LEAD) in 1993
- ▶ BRAC 93
  - Consolidated Tactical Missiles at LEAD
  - DMRD 908 “Tactical Missile Study”
  - Good Decision to Consolidate
  - Fundamentals Driving Decision Remain Valid

## Background

- ▶ Reduction in Labor Hours
- ▶ Several Systems Now Excluded
  - Contractor Support Issues
  - Retire In-Place
  - Deep Storage
  - Service Retained

# Background

## Tactical Missiles Consolidation Workload Changes (LEAD)



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# DoD Tactical Missile Workload

## ➤ Present Tactical Missile Workload

### ➤ Depot

### ➤ FY99 Projected Workload

DL H (000)

677

## ➤ Additional Workload

- Red River (Vehicle and Launchers) 59
- Crane (Fuzes) 38
- Tobyhanna (Missile Components) 58
- Black World 13
- Subtotal 168

## ➤ Total

**845**

## Background

- Army Recommended Disestablishment of LEAD Depot
- 1995 DoD Recommendations
  - Guidance & Control to Tobyhanna AD
  - Guidance & Control Plus Towed and Self-Propelled Vehicles to Anniston AD
  - Hawk Missile System to Barstow USMC Depot
  - AUR & Storage For Four (4) Systems Remain at Letterkenny AD
- Nullifies 93 BRAC Consolidation Decision
- LEAD is Army Tier II Depot, Will Not Be USAF Missile Storage Site

**Hill AFB**

# **Alternative Solution**

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

## Alternative Solution

- ▶ Hill AFB Provides a Viable Alternative
  - 35 Years of Missile Experience
  - USAF Consolidated Workload at Hill AFB 1970's
  - USAF Missile Investment at Hill Exceeds \$1B
  - Significant Amount of DoD Organic Tactical Missile Workload
    - 53% GCS
    - 44% DoD Missiles
    - 150,000 DLH Launcher and Vehicle Workload

# DoD Tactical Missile Guidance and Control Workload ( 000 DLH)\*

Total	Hill Current	LEAD Current	Future (Contract)
229.6	121.8	18.8	89.0
100%	53%	8%	39%

\*Hours are Based on Projected FY99 Workload

# Why Hill AFB?

## ➤ Total Organic Missile Workload

- Vehicles, Launchers, GCS, AUR, Launch Control

	All Repair	OO-ALC Repair	
Assets	Direct Labor Hrs (K)	Direct Labor Hrs (K)	%
USAF	730.5	717.5	98
DoD	1687	745.9	44

## Alternative Solution (Cont)

- Capability Exists to Consolidate DoD Tactical Missile Workload
  - Support Equipment
  - GCS
  - AUR
  - Launchers
  - Vehicles
- Full Service Missile Support
- Established Infrastructure

Hill AFB Designated Tier I Depot

## Hill AFB, A TIER I Base

- ▶ Rated Tier I For Installation Military Value By USAF
- ▶ Rated Tier I For Depot Military Value By USAF
- ▶ Rated Tier I USAF Depot by DoD JCSG/DM


The Only AF Depot So Rated

**Hill AFB**

# **Full Service Support**


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# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



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## Management

### ➤ System Acquisition

- "Cradle to Grave" System Management
- Integrated Weapon System Management (IWSM)
- Product Group Manager (PGM) for all Air-to-Ground Munitions


### ➤ Specialized Management

- Silo-Based ICBM System Program Office
- Maverick System Program Office
- Missile Component and Container Managers

### ➤ System, Supply, and Field Support

- Explosives Experts
- End Item and Spares Procurement

# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



## Industrial Support

► Hill AFB Provides Extensive Infrastructure Capabilities

- Optical Refurbishment
- Radar Overhaul/Repair
- Printed Circuit Board Manufacturing
- Electrical Harness Repair
- Investment Casting
- Hazardous Waste Management System

## Industrial Support


### ➤ Hill AFB Provides Extensive Infrastructure (Cont)

- Precision Measurement Equipment Lab
- Physical Science Lab
  - State and EPA Certified
- Hydraulics/Electronics Support
- Machine Shop
- Automated Supply Distribution System

### ➤ Major Missile Contractors in Local Area

- Hercules/Alliant, Thiokol, Williams International


# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



## Engineering

- Systems Engineering Support
  - Hardware/Software, Design, Development, Test, and Integration Expertise "In-House"
  - Software-in-the-Loop Testing
- Independent Software Verification and Validation
- Structural & Electrical Failure Analysis
- Time Studies & Process Improvement
  - Probabilistic Modeling and Simulation for Tactical Missiles and Aircraft
- Provide Service to All Branches of the Armed Services and FMS


# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



## Assessment

- ▶ Explosives Analysis
  - High Energy X-Ray and Computed Tomography (CT)
  - Rocket Motor and Warhead Dissections
  - Chemical and Physical Analysis
  - EPA Certified Chemical Analysis
- ▶ Survivability/Vulnerability Analysis
  - Radiation
  - Shock and Vibration
  - Electromagnetic Compatibility/Interference

# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

## Test


- Acquisition and Sustainment Testing
- Aging and Surveillance of AUR and Explosive Components
  - Service Life Predictions
  - Safety Assessments
- Live and Static Firing
  - Warheads/Large Motors: UTTR
  - Small Motors/Components: On-Base
- Propellant Dissection Lab
  - Chemical/ Physical Properties

## Test (Cont)

### ► Operational Users on Hill AFB

- ALC - Analysis
- 545th Test Group - Weapon System Test
- 388th and 419th Fighter Wings - Operational Flight
- Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR)

# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

## Storage


### ► Explosive Storage

- Hill AFB Missile Assembly & Maintenance Storage
  - 247,000 ft<sup>2</sup>
  - 259 Structures
- 400,000 Cubic Ft Adjacent to Hill AFB Runway
- Oasis
  - 108,000 ft<sup>2</sup>
- Tooele AD
  - 1M ft<sup>2</sup>

### ► Non-Explosive Storage

- Hill AFB Storage Area is 252,000 ft<sup>2</sup>
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Storage Area is 3.4M ft<sup>2</sup>

# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability




**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

## Distribution

- ▶ Ammunition Control Point for All USAF Non-Nuclear Munitions
  - \$10 Billion Inventory
  - Manage over 9500 Stock Numbers for Tactical Missiles
  - Processed Over 4165 Tons of Munitions (167 Boeing 707 Equivalents) During Two-Month Period in Support of Desert Storm
- ▶ Located Near Major Transportation Networks
  - Airfields, Interstates, & Rail Service

# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability




**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

## Disposal

- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Division
- Uses Thermal Treatment Unit at Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR)
  - Capable of Disposing of Large Explosives While Maintaining EPA Compliance
  - One of a Few Select Sites
- Tooele AD Also Used for Demilitarization
- Use of New Technologies
  - CRDA with USU and Thiokol for Rocket Motor Washout to Reclaim AIM-9 Casings
  - Propellant Reclaimed for Commercial Use

# Hill AFB Missile Support Capability



**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology... Today**

## Repair and Modification

### ► Repair and Modify Strategic and Tactical All-Up-Round (AUR) Missiles

- Minuteman ICBMs
- Peacekeeper ICBMs
- Maverick Missile
- Air Launch Cruise Missiles (ALCM)
- Advance Cruise Missile (ACM)

## Repair and Modification (Cont)

- ▶ Guidance and Control Sections (GCS)
  - Maverick, Sidewinder, Surface Launch Attack Missile (SLAM)
- ▶ Field and Depot-Level Test Equipment
  - Hardware and Software
- ▶ Missile Launch and Control Facilities

## Repair and Modification (Cont)


### ➤ Launcher Repair

- Both Strategic and Tactical Missiles
- Launch Control

### ➤ Vehicle Repair

- Strategic Missiles

### ➤ Customers Include: USAF, Navy, Marines, Foreign Military Sales



## Current Interservicing

### ➤ Technical/Engineering

- Maverick - (Navy, Marines, USAF)
- Paveway - (Mod - Navy, Marines)
- Harm - (Navy containers)
- Sidewinder- (Navy, USAF)

### ➤ Testing

- Paveway - Maverick - AMRAAM (Navy, USAF)
- HARM - (Navy, USAF)
- Sparrow - (Navy, USAF)

### ➤ Depot

- Maverick - Sidewinder - Paveway - SLAM
- Launchers (Navy, Marines)
- HARM Containers (Navy)

## Missiles of the Future

- Consolidation Decision Drives Future Repair Locations
- Tactical Missiles of the Future Will Include Stealth Technology

Hill AFB Has Only Missile Stealth Capability in DoD Today

## USAF Investment

- ▶ Significant Investment ( $\geq$ \$1B) at Hill AFB to Consolidate Engineering, Test, and Repair
- ▶ Allows:
  - Synergy Between Strategic Missiles and Tactical Missiles
  - Optimizes Customer Support By Sharing of Overhead Costs Between Missile Systems

**Hill AFB**


# **Tactical Missile Workload Transition Plan**

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

## **Transition Plan**


- ▶ **Hill AFB Can Handle All DoD Workload**
  - Existing Capability
    - 56,810 ft<sup>2</sup> Expandable by 165,000 ft<sup>2</sup>
  - Skills Already in Place
  - No MILCON
  - Minor Upgrades
  - Move Equipment Not Already at Hill AFB
- ▶ **Meet BRAC 93 Schedule**
- ▶ **Initial Cost Avoidance: \$12.17M**

## Cost Avoidance



➤ Original BRAC Consolidation at LEAD	\$51M
● Committed	<u>\$16M</u>
● Remaining	\$35M
➤ Consolidate 93 Workload At Hill	\$26M
● JCSG/DM Consolidation	<u>  6M</u>
• Red River (Vehicles and Launchers)	\$32M
• Tobyhanna (Missile Components)	
• Crane (Fuzes)	
• Black World	
➤ Savings	\$3M

# Depot Labor Rate Comparison




Hill AFB	LEAD
\$69.27	\$101.33

*Depot Maintenance Operations Indicator Report  
FY93/1 - FY94/2 Latter 4 Qtr Average Rates*

Hill AFB	LEAD	ANAD	TOAD
\$49.38	\$65.33	\$52.06	\$58.31

Based on *Cost Comparability Handbook* and  
Army Reported Depot Hourly Rates


# Labor Rate Impact



	<b>94 Base Rate</b> \$/Hr	<b>FY99 Earned Hrs 845.4K</b> \$M	<b>Learning Curve Loss (000) Hrs</b>	<b>Learning Curve Loss \$M</b>
<b>LEAD</b>	65.33	55.23	128.7	8.41
<b>Hill AFB</b>	49.38	41.75	55.4	2.74
<b>Hill AFB Avoidance</b>	<b>15.95</b>	<b>13.48</b>	<b>73.3</b>	<b>5.67</b>


Based on Labor Rates and Projected Learning Curve

## Cost Avoidance (Chart 1 of 2)



➤ Original BRAC Consolidation at LEAD	\$51M
• Obligated and Committed	<u>(\$26M) ?</u>
• Remaining	\$25M
➤ Consolidate 93 Workload At Hill	<u>(\$26M)</u>
• Delta	(\$ 1M)
JCSG/DM Consolidation Cost	<u>(\$ 6M)</u>
• Red River (Vehicles and Launchers)	
• Tobyhanna (Missile Components)	
• Crane (Fuzes)	
• Black World	
➤ Subtotal Delta	(\$7M)

## Cost Avoidance (Chart 2 of 2)



➤ Delta	(\$ 7.0M)
➤ Other Cost Avoidance	<u>\$13.5M</u>
• Recurring (1 Year)	
• Hill AFB \$15.95/Hr Less	
➤ Cost Avoidance	\$6.5M
➤ Non-Recurring Cost Avoidance	<u>\$5.67M</u>
• Learning Curve (3 Years)	
➤ Total Cost Avoidance	\$12.17M

# Transition Plan

## ► Integrate Immediately

- No MILCON/Upgrade
- Workload Already In-Place


● Workload	Bldg
• AUR	2026
• Sidewinder (AF, Navy)	100
• Maverick (AF, Navy, USMC)	5
• Hellfire (Army)	5
• SLAM (Navy)	5

# Transition Plan

## ► Remaining Workload

- No MILCON
- Minor Upgrades
- Common Skills
- Workload

• Dragon	5
• Phoenix	5
• Shillelagh	5
• Sparrow	5
• TOW II	5
• MLRS	5, 847
• LCSS	847
• TOW Launcher	847
• TOW BFVS	847



# Transition Plan

## ► Remaining Workload (Cont)

- Workload\*

- AMRAAM
- Standard
- Avenger
- Red River Workload
- Patriot
- HAWK
- Tobyhanna Workload
- HARM
- ATACMS
- Crane Workload
- Black World

Bldg
100
100
100, 847
847
5, 847
5, 847
5, 100
5
5
509
1515

\*Transition Must Start Immediately Upon BRAC 95 Decision

**Hill AFB**

# **Conclusions**

**Integrating Tomorrow's Technology...Today**

## Conclusions

### ► Tactical Missile Consolidation Makes Sense at Hill AFB

- Can Accommodate Entire DoD Workload
- Provides Full Service Support
- Postured for Future Technologies (Stealth)
- Minimizes Impact to the Customer

Meet Original BRAC Schedule

Save Millions

# Document Separator

# **HILL AIR FORCE BASE**

## **Ogden Air Logistics Center "An American Aviation Treasure for more than 50 years"**

Hill Air Force Base (AFB), located in Ogden, Utah, has played a crucial role in projecting democracy around the world for more than 50 years. Home to the Ogden Air Logistics Center, two of the Air Force's premier fighter wings and one of the Defense Department's computer megacenters, the 15,684 military, civilian and Air Force Reserve members continue to be called upon any time the nation responds to a crisis in the world.

### **Experts in Fighter Aircraft Repair**

Ogden Air Logistics Center provides worldwide logistic management and depot maintenance for the F-16 Fighting Falcon -- the world's largest fleet of fighter aircraft. This includes 21 countries employing more than 3,000 F-16 aircraft. The Ogden team reinvented the depot repair system for F-16 avionics. Working with the fighter wings, repair pipelines were cut from 70 to 7 days in-country and 13 days for bases overseas (this includes transportation time). This will save the Air Force \$380 million over 5 years. In 1993, Ogden won the only major interservice fighter aircraft maintenance contract ever when it was selected by the Navy to repair Navy and Marine F/A 18 fighters. Last year, the center performed 2.25 million manhours of maintenance and modifications on more than 300 F-16's, 29 F-4's and 50 C-130's, while beginning interservicing work on 36 Navy F/A-18's.

### **Nation's Only Repair Source for Silo-Based ICBM's**

Ogden Air Logistics Center is the only repair source for our nation's fleet of silo-based ICBM's, including Minuteman II's and III's, and Peacekeepers. The base is an important participant in Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties on an international scale. It recently played a key role in the test firing of a Minuteman III carrying one warhead, a crucial step in ensuring the United States complies with terms of START treaties once they are ratified. Hill AFB's missile directorate has made outstanding strides in cutting costs. In 1993, they improved operations 261 percent returning \$7.8 million to their customers in the form of lower rates and an additional \$3 million in 1994. The group was recognized by Vice President Al Gore as "Heroes of Reinvention" for their accomplishment of making government work better and cost less. This Hammer Award was one of only 79 given across the country.

### **The World's Best Landing Gear Facility**

Ogden Air Logistics Center operates the world's largest overhaul facility for aircraft landing gear, brakes, struts and wheels. This facility handles all Air Force (and 70 percent of the Defense Department's) repair needs and produces 4,600 complete gear assemblies for 27 different weapon systems annually. These vary from the small T-38 Talon nose gear to the massive three-ton C-5 Galaxy main gear. The Landing Gear Facility has 382,000 square feet of dedicated overhaul capabilities enhanced by two miles of fully-automated overhead material handling. It also has the capability to do all of the Defense Department's work of this type in the most cost effective process available. The facility won the 1991 President's award for quality and productivity improvement. Process improvements will save over \$3.65 million in the 1994/1995 Fiscal Year time frame.

# ACT IN HASTE — REGRET AT LEISURE.

***“Today’s defense debate centers too narrowly on the size of the military budget. The real questions are: What threats do we face? What forces do we need to counter them? How must we change?”***

— Candidates Bill Clinton and Al Gore

Mr. President:

In an increasingly volatile world, America’s citizens deserve the highest quality national defense. Through their tax dollars, the American people pay for a strong defense capability and should receive it. The question is, will we?

During the 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC) process, a major decision will be America’s depot infrastructure. There is excess depot capacity, but all depots are not equal.

- ★ How will DoD consolidate the work and missions of these facilities?
- ★ How will **you** measure effectiveness and efficiency with certainty?
- ★ How will **you** decide the best solution?

**Excess capacity alone is not the appropriate measure.**

#### **WHAT IS THE ANSWER?**

To satisfy the goal of real savings, DoD must use best business practices without sub-optimizing each service component. Good business practice would dictate consolidation of the workload in the fewest facilities possible, regardless of service branch.

Those facilities that have the greatest capacity to manage diverse workloads should be retained. These are the installations which have the greatest potential for increased throughput — the installations which are large, modern and technologically advanced. These facilities reflect huge investments and a readiness to assume additional capacity, workload and missions. Maintaining their efficiencies and accessing their ability to accommodate increased responsibilities will produce substantial savings.

Mr. President, these installations are America’s Air Logistics Centers. Over the years the Air Force has built national assets — proven in efficiency, performance and work ethic — and home to other significant military missions which cannot be easily or effectively moved. Investigative data shows that these installations would be the most costly (and take the longest) to close. According to the model used by the BRAC Commission for Costs and Savings (COBRA), the cost to close ALC’s is between \$1- 2 billion each with a breakeven point for savings 100 years in the future! Would this be a good business decision for DoD?

#### **A MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR BUSINESS**

The business of rightsizing the United States military involves billions of taxpayer dollars. It’s a business in need of a national policy which addresses the total DoD support infrastructure and industrial base.

- ★ We cannot afford interservice rivalry and parochial agendas.
- ★ We cannot simply give work to industry without a clear understanding of the costs, both in dollars and defense readiness.
- ★ We must have a policy which is value-based, using an auditable process open to all.

The right approach rests in maximizing the use of our finest facilities, using competition as a tool when it provides certified savings.

With the resulting infrastructure under military control, the nation will have a solution that works, one that provides responsive support to every military need and the best chance for cost containment and savings in depot consolidation.

This is a critical issue for our country. We’re counting on your leadership to ensure the right solution is achieved.

Sincerely,

**HILL/DDO '95**

**UTAH**

# THE FACTS ARE ON THE SIDE OF HILL AIR FORCE BASE...

"Secretary Aspin... earlier rejected the Air Force recommendation to close McClellan Air Force Base... We put McClellan back on the list for consideration and we added the names of Kelly, Tinker and Robins... We elected to not put Hill Air Force Base on the list because of our concern about Hill's work on ICBM's, operational attributes that accrue from the adjacent Utah Test Range, and continuing uncertainties about the START Treaty... It just did not strike us as logical for the Commission to think about closing Hill, the Air Force's only strategic missile depot."

*Jim Courter  
Former Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission*

Dear Secretary Perry:

The facts are on the side of Hill Air Force Base and the reasons for retaining it are compelling:

- ★ *Hill AFB is home to the Ogden Air Logistics Center (ALC), two of the Air Force's premier fighter wings and one of the Defense Department's computer megacenters.*
- ★ *Ogden ALC is the system program office and only repair source for America's fleet of silo-based ICBM's. In 1993, they improved operations 261 percent returning \$7.8 million to their customers in the form of lower rates and an additional \$3 million in 1994. The group was recognized by Vice President Al Gore as "Heroes of Reinvention" for their accomplishment in making government work better and cost less.*
- ★ *Ogden ALC provides worldwide logistic management and depot maintenance for the F-16 Fighting Falcon — the world's largest fleet of fighter aircraft. This includes 21 countries employing more than 3,000 F-16 aircraft.*
- ★ *Ogden ALC operates the world's largest overhaul facility for aircraft landing gear, brakes, struts and wheels — optimized for efficient production. This facility handles all Air Force and 70 percent of the Defense Department's repair needs and has the capability to do ALL of the Defense Department's work of this type. Process improvements will save more than \$3.65 million in the '94/'95 time frame.*
- ★ *Ogden ALC is the leading provider of rocket motors, small missiles, air munitions and guided bombs. Ninety two percent of all Air Force missile maintenance and 48 percent of all Defense Department missile work is accomplished at Ogden ALC. Ogden has the capacity in existing modern facilities to accomplish ALL DoD in-house depot maintenance on missiles.*
- ★ *Hill AFB's environmental excellence has won five major awards in the past two years, including the Secretary of Defense's "Environmental Quality Award" for best in the DoD.*
- ★ *Hill AFB provides support for the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR), the Defense Department's largest over-land special use airspace. This provides unparalleled training capabilities for the 388th and the 419th Fighter Wings, producing two of the last four overall Gunsmoke champions. The combination of Hill AFB and the UTTR is an irreplaceable national asset.*

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is charged with evaluating military installations on specific criteria. When looking at Hill AFB, they will find one of the largest, most modern and most technologically advanced installations in the country. An installation with:

- ★ *significant military value based on missions already in place and the UTTR*
- ★ *existing capability for development, acquisition and depot maintenance of several types of military systems*
- ★ *capacity for accepting additional DoD missions with ease*
- ★ *a record of outstanding workforce performance with demonstrated ability to accommodate new and changing workloads*
- ★ *specialized equipment, facilities and processes that are costly to move or duplicate*

All cost estimates predict that Hill AFB would be the most costly of the ALC's to close. The huge expense of closure, some \$2 billion, would not produce real savings in our lifetime.

Hill AFB has not been a candidate for closure in any of the earlier BRAC rounds. The Air Force is on record (1993) with their determination that Hill AFB is not a base to close. Recently, senior Air Force leaders have stated "nothing has changed." Clearly, they are correct. **NOTHING HAS CHANGED.** Hill AFB is a national asset effectively filling the defense needs of America under any scenario. The facts, the quality and the military value of Hill AFB speak for themselves.

Mr. Secretary, we are confident you will decide similarly — that, by any measure, Hill AFB and Ogden Air Logistics Center should remain open and is a prime candidate for consolidation of other DoD missions.

**HILL/DDO '95**

**UTAH**

**ROBERT C. OAKS**  
General, USAF (Retired)  
1500 Twisting Tree Lane  
McLean, Virginia 22101

17 January 1995

Honorable William J. Perry  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As a past commander of the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and user of both the operational and depot resources of Hill AFB, I want to make an input as you approach your 1995 recommendations for base closure and realignment. From my perspective of assessing the strategic and military value of Hill AFB, I find the attached quote from Jim Courter still valid. The facts are on the side of Hill AFB and the reasons for retaining it are compelling.

- Hill AFB is home to the Ogden Air Logistics Center (ALC), two of the Air Force's premier fighter wings and one of the Defense Department's computer megacenters.
- Ogden ALC is the system program office and only repair source for America's fleet of silo-based ICBM's. In 1993, this organization improved operations 261 percent returning \$7.8 million to its customers in the form of lower rates and an additional \$3 million in 1994. They were recognized by Vice President Al Gore as "Heroes of Reinvention" for their accomplishment in making government work better and cost less.
- Ogden ALC provides worldwide logistic management and depot maintenance for the F-16 Fighting Falcon -- the world's largest fleet of fighter aircraft. This includes 21 countries employing more than 3,000 F-16 aircraft. These foreign Air Forces depend on the relationship they have built with Ogden ALC and the support they receive. This is not just a U.S. Air Force issue.
- Collocation of F-16 fighter wings with the F-16 depot provides substantial operational advantage and increased readiness. This unique arrangement made the bold step of two level maintenance for F-16 avionics and radar equipment a possibility. Ogden has the fastest repair turnaround program for these spares of any two level support in the Air Force. This is critical to maintaining readiness of USAFE F-16's as intermediate level capability was removed from operational wings.

- Ogden ALC operates the world's largest overhaul facility for aircraft landing gear, brakes, struts and wheels -- optimized for efficient production. This facility handles all Air Force and 70 percent of the Defense Department's repair needs and has the capability to do ALL of the Defense Department's work of this type. Process improvements will save more than \$3.65 million in the '94/'95 time frame.
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Honorable William J. Perry  
17 January 1995  
Page 3

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Mr. Secretary, I am confident you will decide similarly -- that, by any measure, Hill AFB should remain open and is a prime candidate for consolidation of other DoD missions.

Sincerely,



Robert C. Oaks  
General, USAF (Retired)  
Commander, USAFE (Jan. 1990 - Aug. 1994)

RCO/ar

Enc. 1

1. Quote by Jim Courter

"Secretary Aspin... earlier rejected the Air Force recommendation to close McClellan Air Force Base... We put McClellan back on the list for consideration and we added the names of Kelly, Tinker and Robins... We elected not to put Hill Air Force Base on the list because of our concern about Hill's work on ICBM's, operational attributes that accrue from the adjacent Utah Test Range, and continuing uncertainties about the START Treaty... It just did not strike us as logical for the Commission to think about closing Hill, the Air Force's only strategic missile depot."

Jim Courter  
Former Chairman  
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Introduction.** During the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, a decision was made to consolidate all tactical missile guidance and control section (GCS) maintenance at one location, reaffirming the recommendation of interservice consolidation in DMRD 908. This decision was based on extensive analysis and led to the eventual plan to consolidate this workload at the Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (LEAD). We feel the decision to consolidate was a good one. It provides the potential for greater efficiency and reduces costs and down time for vital defense assets. For the 1995 BRAC round, the Office of the Secretary of Defense endorsed an Army recommendation to deviate from the 93 BRAC decision and realign the LEAD consolidation in a three part move. The OSD recommendation retains All-Up-Round (AUR) testing, maintenance and storage at LEAD, and moves the maintenance of the GCSs to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA (TOAD) and the launchers and vehicles to Anniston Army Depot, AL (ANAD). The Army recommendation reverses the intent of the 1993 BRAC decision by fragmenting rather than consolidating the tactical missile workload.

Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and the Air Force provide a viable alternative to allow complete consolidation of the tactical missile maintenance workload at one location. Hill currently provides depot maintenance for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Sidewinder and Maverick missile GCSs as well as AUR maintenance for the Maverick. In addition, Hill is the management focal point for the Maverick missile system. Hill AFB provides the capability to go beyond the BRAC 93 decision and accept the consolidated workload from GCS and All-Up-Round maintenance to launcher/vehicle maintenance.

The facilities (modification, repair, test and storage), personnel skills base, infrastructure, and transportation are available to ensure consolidation at a low cost, within the time frame specified by the 93 BRAC. This consolidation would provide synergism with precision guided munitions, cruise missiles, and ICBM missile workload currently being accomplished at Hill AFB, through sharing of similar technology bases. An overview of the major areas to be considered in workload consolidation are provided in the subsequent paragraphs.

**Facilities.** The tactical missile GCS maintenance will be centrally located in the missile and aircraft electronic maintenance area. The interconnecting bays allow for rapid movement of components from receipt through delivery. While some equipment relocation and facility repair funds are required, there are no MILCON requirements to complete the consolidation.

Hill AFB has a state of the art facility for AUR testing and maintenance. This facility will provide sufficient space to handle most of the projected AUR workloads. In addition, several large missile integration maintenance facilities are available to overflow workload.

Extensive explosive storage and classified warehouse space is available at Hill AFB and adjacent military facilities to handle consolidation of the tactical missile workload. This will provide immediate access to assets entering the depot maintenance process.

Vehicle and launcher repair will be integrated into the Hill AFB intercontinental ballistic missile erector and transport overhaul and repair facility. With collocated support infrastructure, i.e., paint shop, sand blast, and machine shop, the vehicle repair facility provides processes for rapid repair of some of the largest surface vehicles and erectors in the free world.

**Skills.** Hill AFB tactical missile GCS personnel retain a high electronics skills base coupled with specific training and expertise in the four major GCS skill areas, Electro-Optical, Infra-Red, Laser, and Radar. Hill AFB is also the single source of repair for the Air Force ICBM workload and combined with the tactical missile workload currently at Hill, accomplishes 70 percent of the overall DoD missile workload. With over 100 tactical missile skilled GCS technicians and 300 strategic missile technicians, training requirements are greatly reduced and rapid ramp up time ensured over personnel with basic electronics experience and little or no GCS specific skills.

Hill AFB has extensive experience in the maintenance and testing of AUR missiles. This provides a core of missile technicians with an intimate understanding of the requirements for system integration between explosive and non-explosive components in tactical missiles.

The ICBM transport erector skilled personnel coupled with the Army trained vehicle mechanics, recently laid off from Toole Army Depot, available in the local skills base provide a strong personnel core to complete the vehicle and launcher maintenance portion of the consolidated workload.

**Infrastructure.** As a major Air Force maintenance depot, Hill AFB provides the full scope infrastructure to manufacture or repair most any item not immediately available through the supply system or one of the hundreds of manufacturers in the immediate area. In addition, extensive experience with solid rocket motors and the associated skills and facilities provide the capability to test and maintain all types and sizes of motors required to support the tactical missile consolidation. Also, two major rocket motor manufacturers are located within the community, providing an additional source of technical expertise.

**Transportation.** Hill AFB enjoys the benefit of an active military runway, routinely accommodating C-5 aircraft, immediately adjacent to the munitions storage and staging area. This capability, not available to the present OSD proposal sites, provides immediate, twenty-four hour support for world wide distribution of munitions. Coupled

The Army has proposed moving the GCS repair portion of the tactical missile workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot, separating it from AUR testing and launcher maintenance. There are several disadvantages to this recommendation. First, as noted above, this fragments the tactical missile workload. Second, the entire GCS workload would have to be moved to TOAD (which currently has no missile workloads or experience) where virtually all personnel would have to be trained in specialized tactical missile skills, resulting in higher costs. Finally, TOAD apparently does not have the capability to handle the other two aspects of the tactical missile consolidation; vehicle repair and AUR repair.

The Army recommendation moves the repair of tactical missile launchers and vehicles to Anniston Army Depot. ANAD is probably not an option for complete consolidation, as space for additional electronic repair workload, such as GCS repair, and facilities for AUR maintenance are apparently not available.

The Army has recommended that the remaining portion of the tactical missile maintenance mission, AUR testing and repair, remain at Letterkenny Army Depot. Once again it results in the fragmentation of the tactical missile workload. The Army's recommended plan to disperse the workload leads us to believe they are not confident that consolidation at LEAD is a viable alternative. If consolidation remains the goal, and LEAD is an unacceptable site to accomplish this consolidation, then Hill AFB remains the only viable alternative.

A decision to consolidate the tactical missile workload at Hill AFB allows the consolidation to be completed in less time and with less cost than the option recommended by the Army. The expected costs of moving the workload to Hill AFB are lower than those expected by LEAD, primarily due to the experience base in tactical missile related skills and the reduction in systems requiring movement to a new location. We believe that the cost savings would be of similar magnitude when compared to the plan presented by the Army in the BRAC 95 recommendations. In order to fulfill the Army's recommendation, 100 percent of the GCS workload would have to be moved to TOAD. The only savings would be from leaving AUR maintenance in place at LEAD. Choosing to move the tactical missile workload to Hill AFB would result in savings (of approximately \$12 million) from not moving two major GCS workloads, having a base of specific tactical missile trained personnel, existing vehicle maintenance facilities and skilled personnel, and sufficient adjacent storage to support all aspects of the tactical missile operation.

With the Army's decision to end maintenance operations at LEAD, the only location capable of handling the entire tactical missile consolidation, at reasonable cost, is Hill AFB. A proposal (Attachment 2) was made, in February 1995, by Hill AFB personnel to consolidate, not only the workload scheduled for LEAD, but also all other tactical missile workloads, at Hill AFB. The proposal provides the only viable solution to

with an explosive sited railroad spur and immediately adjacent North-South, East-West Interstate system, Hill AFB provides rapid transportation to any desired destination.

**Transition Schedule.** We recognize the need to ensure the completion of the workload consolidation within the time schedule established by the 93 BRAC decision. The transition plan prepared by Hill AFB personnel demonstrates the consolidation will easily be completed by the end of FY98, well within the desired schedule. The present workload provides the base for the Hill AFB tactical missile transition schedule. Transition of the workload to other Army depots will require secondary transfer of the workload at LEAD and the initial transfer of the workload from Hill and other depots, thus increasing the overall transfer costs and the associated risk. Due to the commonality of the systems, consolidation at Hill can be completed with minimal risk. The sidewinder equipment presently in place will be used to immediately begin repair of the Navy sidewinder workload, as demonstrated during Desert Storm. The commonality between the Maverick equipment makes the transfer and integration of the Hellfire missile system a very low risk situation.

**Cost.** Analysis of the current cost requirements for tactical missile consolidation at LEAD and projections made by Hill AFB personnel show that the consolidation could be completed at Hill for much less than projected at LEAD and likely within the remaining LEAD consolidation budget. This is attained by reaping the benefits of an almost \$12 million cost avoidance by not moving the tactical missile system currently located at Hill AFB. Additional savings are gained by taking advantage of more highly skilled personnel currently located at Hill AFB. The ultimate result is consolidation within the original budget proposed by LEAD during the BRAC 93 round.

**Workload.** The workload has greatly decreased through approval of waivers and changes in the force structure requirements since the 93 BRAC recommendation. This climate makes the consolidation much easier than originally planned and much more critical if the ultimate benefits of consolidation are to be achieved. A table showing the expected workloads transferring under tactical missile consolidation and the associated hours for each systems is located at Attachment 1.

Consolidation of the tactical missile workload remains the most desired option, providing optimum facility utilization, a centralized strong skills base to rapidly respond to changing requirements, and potential for the lowest life cycle cost. Consolidation at Hill AFB will provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with a single source of repair (SOR) with proven capability to accomplish the tactical missile maintenance mission and improves on the purpose of the original decision to consolidate the workload at one location. The Army's recommended plan to disperse the tactical missile workload among three depots leaves Hill AFB as the only viable alternative for complete consolidation.

facilitate the DMRD 908 recommendation and BRAC 93 decision for consolidation of tactical missile workloads. We recognize consolidation is the best decision for long term tactical missile sustainment in DoD.

## INTERSERVICING PROPOSAL INTRODUCTION

On behalf of the Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC) and specifically the Landing Gear Division we are pleased to present the following candidates as areas of consideration for interservicing. Because of similarities with existing Air Force systems, we believe there exists a high degree of feasibility for a smooth and rapid transition to full production on any new workloads transferred to the division.

For more than 40 years, Ogden ALC has been known for providing our customers with world class quality, on-time deliveries, using specially designed facilities, modern specialized equipment, uncompromising process control and strict environmental compliance in our pursuit of excellence. This ensures our customer receive best value remanufactured landing gear, wheels, brakes and related components, and will also ensure the Navy retains its highly reliable landing gear systems.

The labor hours and costs revealed on the following pages are based on average current work load procedure and firm fixed end item sales prices. Actual hours and cost may vary due to condition of assets, repair requirements and availability of repair parts/material.

We trust, that after a thorough review of the proposed areas, one or several will be selected to begin this pioneering effort of joint product and process management. We envision joint management to include Navy personnel being placed in such positions as Deputy, Production Management (GM 13 or MIL 04 or 05), or even Chief of Operations (GM 14 or MIL 05), depending upon the percent of Navy work load. Actual position placement would conform to any existing Memorandum of Agreement. We would also envision Navy Engineering authority, as well as other functional specialists, becoming part of any joint endeavor.

# CANDIDATE ITEM

## C-130 LANDING GEAR AND COMPONENTS

### Capability

The Ogden ALC has the capacity (plant, process, and equipment) in place to produce in excess of thirty five thousand aircraft landing gear, wheels and brakes per year. Due to DOD manpower reductions, however, we are currently producing eighteen thousand finished components per year leaving us with excess capacity. With additional personnel we have the ability to easily double the number of Landing Gear components we produce per year and still maintain a surge capability in the event of a conflict or war.

### Current Status

OO-ALC is currently overhauling a total of 184 C-130 Air Force main and nose gear annually. Additionally, we will produce 25 Navy C-130 gear as a result of a proposal submitted to the Navy in 1993. We have the facilities, equipment and fixturing in place that would allow us to expand our overhaul process within months and assume the entire Navy requirement in less time that would be needed to initiate contracts commercially.

As mentioned, we are currently producing a total of 209 C-130 gear. However, with the GAO reversal of our Landing Gear Contract award, this number is reduced to a "warm base" concept of 60 gear for FY96. This unexpected gap creates a prime opportunity to increase the quantity of Navy landing gear overhauled at our facility. Current cost and remanufacture data indicates the following:

C-130 Main Landing Gear:	\$35,975
Repair Cost:	\$ 6,015
Manhours expended:	67.5 per unit
Savings:	\$29,960
C-130 Nose Landing Gear:	\$35,121
Repair Cost:	\$ 2,503

# Document Separator

**Hill/DDO '95  
ADDITIONAL  
INFORMATION**

DLA took on the mission of distribution for DoD in 1961. DDOU, formerly the Utah Army Depot, was DLA's first choice of the Army Depots considered to come under DLA in 1964. Not all of the Army depots were accepted by DLA in 1964, Sharpe Army Depot, for instance. Since that time DDOU has been the leader in DLA distribution in terms of efficiency and economy as well as customer responsiveness.

During the 60's and 70's DDOU adopted an aggressive modernization program. Leading edge technology was incorporated into the DDOU processes. In some instances industry lacked the technology DDOU sought and as a result DDOU pioneered many of the processes now used in the distribution industry. For instance, the first storage carousel anywhere was fabricated at DDOU. The first laser marking system was developed at DDOU to address containers. DDOU was instrumental in developing the bar code technology appearing throughout DoD.

Unlike some of the Services, cost effectiveness and performance were closely measured for economic pay back before requesting funding. Quick amortization was always the measure of continued pursuit of a new idea. The private sector distribution giants came to DDOU to learn the latest technologies.

It was during this period of modernization that DDOU incurred the irritation of some of the DLA headquarters middle managers. They became somewhat annoyed at DDOU for their impertinence in stepping beyond the DLA planners and designers in getting improvements installed. In addition, the relationship between DDOU and the nearest trailing competitor in performance, efficiency and cost - Defense Depot Tracy, Ca. - became increasingly adversarial. Eventually, the DLA middle managers and even some of the top managers from competing activities, who had migrated to the decision making chairs at DLA, took the opportunity to eliminate DDOU.

In 1979 DLA announced it's intention to close DDOU. Their decision was not based on efficiency, performance or cost, but primarily on it's geographical location,

With a high level of support from the community and the state government, DDOU presented the facts and figures that should have been researched beforehand. DDOU was successful in refuting DLA's plan. However, DDOU's success was not without consequences. It served to deepen the antagonism of DLA and DDTC toward DDOU.

During the 80's almost all distribution activities began exploring modernization technologies not just within DLA but all the services. It was a decade of competition among the services as to who could buy and install the latest, fanciest, prettiest equipment and facilities. Unfortunately, not enough regard was given the actual capacity required based on workload projections. By the end of the decade DoD found that it had spent hundreds of millions in dollars for capacity that far exceeded requirements.

The Navy built four mechanized facilities called NISTARS. The Army planned three more called AOD's, and DLA built still two more called IMC's. All were very expensive and many could not deliver the throughput advertised.

In 1986-87 DLA conducted a Binnable Stock Location Study while DLA yet included only six distribution activities at Tracy, Ca., Ogden, Ut., Memphis, Tn., Columbus, Oh., Mechanicsburg, Pa., and Richmond, Va. The purpose of the study was to determine where to place active binnables to gain the best economy and responsiveness.

The study concluded that DDOU was the best placement. In 1988 DLA announced that DDOU would be the single stockage location for binnables. DDOU responded to that new increased role by installing additional bin locations within existing buildings, in contrast to what the Army and the Navy were pursuing - funding for entirely new buildings filled with equipment.

With the publication of Defense Management Review Decision 902 in 1990, DLA inherited twenty-seven additional distribution sites. To manage the increase in span of control DLA adopted a plan to "regionalize". The number of regions were yet to be determined and also their location. Ogden appeared to be a true front runner candidate for a region headquarters because of it's excellent performance, lowest cost, and largest size. In October, 1990 DLA announced there would be three regions with the headquarters at Tracy, Ca., Memphis, Tn. and Mechanicsburg, Pa.

Ogden, was not included in any of the three regions, but remained autonomous as a single depot appearing as an asterisk on the regions maps. Of major impact to DDOU was the designation of the three regions to be Primary Distribution Sites where DLA intended to place the most active items. DDOU was to be a Specialized Storage Site of lesser activity. These decisions were made in spite of the Binnable Stock Location Study advising otherwise.

DDOU proposed a plan to DLA that included four regions. It provided a better balance of sites within a region and better span of control, optimized space availability, improved storage occupancy rates, and shorter transportation distances to western customers.

DLA countered with their own study called the Primary Distribution Site Location Analysis. That study had several critical flaws all of which were to DDOU's disadvantage. It understated DDOU's true throughput capacity by almost half. It used what DLA called a generic unit cost figure, which was actually an average of all DLA activities. This obviously would favor higher cost depots. The study used the same bin/bulk ratio for all depots which would favor a bulk depot. Though DLA responded to DDOU's objections with a promise to correct the erroneous figures and rerun the study, it was never done. DDOU reran of the study anyway with the corrections. The result was that the figures supported a two Primary Distribution Site concept - Ogden, Ut. and Mechanicsburg, Pa.

In 1992 DLA explored a stockage policy called "closest to the vendor". It specified that there were savings to be had by placing the most active items at the closest PDS to the vendor instead of the customer. DLA concluded this was a good approach since it was nearly impossible to predict where the customer would ultimately be but it was possible to determine where the vendor would probably be for the next replenishment buy. This would save first destination transportation charges (vendor to depot) but had little effect on second destination charges (depot to customer) which were not predictable anyway.

What this new concept did not consider was the internal operational costs inside the depot to process the new receipt and ultimately to process the eventual shipments to customers. In fact, only eleven percent of the total cost to deliver an item to a customer is involved in transportation. And only 10%-15% of the receiving process cost at a depot involves new procurements. The majority of the receiving workload is in base returns and redistributions. So the study attempted to save considerable funds by influencing only 15% of the workload and only 11% of the cost.

DDOU tried to convince DLA of the geographic advantages of Ogden known for decades to railroad barons and highway builders. That advantage, when carefully considered becomes obvious. The preponderance of the vendors supplying DLA and much of the private sector are located in the "rust belt" - Ohio, Pennsylvania, etc. That means items purchased by the customers on the west coast predominantly migrate from east to west with a stop "somewhere" for storage for some period of time until an order is received. The main artery from the rust belt to the west coast is Interstate 80. Obviously, a depot on that artery is in a strategic economical location. But not just anywhere on I-80. The best place is at a cross roads with a north-south artery.

Looking only at Ogden/Tracy, they are both near I-80, and they are both on north south arteries, as well. But, Ogden has a distinct advantage over a California location. For example a customer in San Diego orders an item from DLA which probably came west from the rust belt. If the item had been stocked at Ogden it would travel 750 miles less in total than had it been stocked at Tracy. That is because it would go directly from Ogden to San Diego on southbound I-15 without ever having traveled across Nevada. The same advantage exists for, say, Bremerton Wa. Even if the customer is in the Bay Area, the miles are no worse than equal. In addition, about 15% of the time the customer is east of both Tracy and Ogden. In this case the item moves west on I-80 and then back east on I-80. But, at least, with a stockage point of Ogden the Nevada miles are avoided twice - 1500 miles.

The strategic location Ogden enjoys is one of the primary reasons that Utah is experiencing an extraordinary growth in private sector, profit motivated distribution corporations migrating from California and other western states.

In terms of speed of delivery, Ogden is almost the same distance from San Diego and Bremerton as Tracy. But, probably due to uncongested highways, Ogden's delivery to

either area is faster than Tracy. Even to the Bay Area Ogden is only a half day behind Tracy.

Ogden even tried to dissuade DLA from their intentions using "customer" endorsements. Among them were;

"DDOU stands out as the overall best in terms of excellence in achieving their mission."... "very difficult to overlook this area (Ogden) as a premium storage location of choice"..."We should reconsider the decision to store all our material at New Cumberland"....Captain Malsack, USN, DISC.

DLA will pay unnecessarily high first destination costs to a higher cost PDS while a lower cost SDS (Specialized Storage Site is closest to vendor..."  
Gen. Browning, DCSC

"\$14.4 million more cost to handle DESC items"...Gen. Oster, DESC.

DDOU was the only activity not placed under a region. The asterisk was due primarily to the lack of facts for not selecting Ogden as a region headquarters, the political pressure to produce the facts, and, DLA's recognition that they could not support DDOU's nonselection with irrefutable data. It became apparent that DLA chose to delay the consequences of placing DDOU under a region. Further inquiries by DDOU, congressional sources, and the Utah community were basically patronized or ignored.

While DDOU was not yet a region, it was, at least, still autonomous with a full support staff very capable of collecting, reviewing and analyzing information about DDOU's operation, cost, performance and planning. It was through that Command staff that DDOU developed and forwarded the critical information submitted to the 1993 BRAC. That information, compared to the information from other DLA activities, reflected DDOU's posture to be near the top in all critical categories. For example the throughput capacity for DDOU was over six million line items annually, not including Hill which was separate in the '93 BRAC.

In February 1993 DLA announced that DDOU, historically DLA's leader among the depots, would become subservient to it's former sister depot to the west. The justification of course, was the savings this strategy promised. But, other combinations of activities were not reviewed. The decision was made without the benefit of a full analysis for alternatives offering greater savings. DLA also reduced from three regions to two by placing Memphis under DDRE in New Cumberland.

DLA assumed the two region headquarters activities would become their TWO distribution "super depots" with all other depots in support of these SUPER-TWO. No analysis has been done which validates the selection of the these super depots. Probably, due, in part, to DDOU's objections and inquiries, DLA contracted Peat Marwick

Management Consultants to provide an analysis advising the most economical structure to support DLA's overall distribution mission. That analysis did not support DLA's concept of operation. It concluded that DDOU as a Primary Distribution Site was most economical - not DDRW. DLA ignored the recommendation.

DDRW acted quickly in asserting its authority over DDOU. Ogden began a precipitous decline in workload, decision making authority, and responsibility. One result of DDOU's new and lesser posture was the loss of authority to influence its own destiny in terms of continued improvements, workload, processes, and policies. Most of the Command staff was placed directly under region supervision. DDOU objections to DDRW decisions detrimental to Ogden were muzzled and attempts to revise flawed information concerning DDOU were repudiated. The most glaring example is the 1995 BRAC submission itself.

While there are flaws in the data, the most glaring errors are in the assumptions under which the data was assembled. Unlike 1993, DLA chose to combine all information regarding Sharpe Army Depot, in Lathrop, California and Defense Depot Tracy, California thereby making it impossible to review each of these activities separately or in alternative combinations with other activities that may prove more economical. One obvious advantage given the Tracy depot and the Sharpe depot is in the area of throughput, a critical data point since it weighs heavily in the BRAC criteria of MILITARY VALUE. DLA's assumption that two distinct activities could be considered to be ONE activity appears neither appropriate nor equitable for BRAC purposes. BRAC submissions to be most accurate and fair must remain discreet by site.

## DDOU DISCUSSION OUTLINE

### INTRODUCTION

#### I. DLA SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED

- Did not comply with law
- Did not consider the most cost efficient operation
- Appearance of pre-selection

#### II. BRAC LAW

- Mandates bases to be given equal consideration
- Not the case in DLA process
- Requires individual evaluation of each base or evaluation of all combinations

#### III. DLA CHANGED THE EVALUATION CRITERIA FROM FY '93 TO FY '95 (POINT VALUES) EVEN THOUGH DOD DID NOT CHANGE THE BASE CRITERIA

- Operational efficiency category downgraded
- Redefined criteria to support recent DLA management decisions

#### IV. DLA'S STUDY OF OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES NOT USED IN BRAC EVALUATION

- DLA's response to the Commission's inquiry inaccurate regarding their study
- Peat Marwick group's cost analysis is pertinent certifiable data that should be used (see Attachment 3)
  - Costs between depots are comparable
  - DDOU, even with changing workload mix, is still the least cost per line item
- Must consider depreciation as a cost -- includes new facilities and equipment (DLA did not consider)
- This will drive up customer costs for every transaction in the future
- Keeping big, new facilities is not in the best interest of DoD -- unless demonstrated efficiencies offset depreciation costs (Peat Marwick study)

## V. MILITARY VALUE

- Skewed by DLA depot combinations (see Attachment 2)
  - Throughput capacity inappropriately treated
- DDOU/Tracy combination has highest military value for western operations using DLA criteria
- DDOU/Tracy combination reduces DLA's risk of inadequate storage capacity
- DDOU/Tracy gives added military value
  - Much better strategic location:
    - Geographic separation in case of attack or natural disaster
    - Proximity to Hill AFB a major plus -- demonstrated in past contingency operations
    - DDOU is the transportation hub of the west (see supporting data)
- DDOU/Tracy provides more cost efficient operation than Sharpe/Tracy
  - DLA "SAILS" model will support (see Attachment 4)
- Demonstrated past performance
  - Vietnam:
    - 40% of tonnage and 60% of line items sent to Pacific area from DDOU
    - Manpower build-up from 1,500 to 5,600 demonstrates system expansion capability
    - Assumed some of Tracy's missions because of capability (back-up demonstrated)
  - Desert Storm:
    - DDOU took up slack when New Cumberland could not keep up
    - Used Hill AFB to ship "over the top" to Europe
    - Used rail for medical hospital shipments to New Orleans when other ports overloaded
  - Six continuous years as best depot installation in DLA (1987-1993)
    - Won Commander-in-Chief Award in 1987
    - Selected as test/implementation site for distribution automated systems
    - Recognized as best DLA depot since 1964

## IV. HAZARDOUS STORAGE A MAJOR CONSIDERATION

- DDOU established as hazardous storage for the west because of excellent record, workforce, and facilities

- Sharpe/Tracy does not have hazardous storage capability or trained work force
- Hazardous waste user fees in California will drive up cost of operations in that state
- DDOU/Tracy means no requirement to build hazardous storage facility or train a new work force

VII. BETTER RETURN ON INVESTMENT WITH DDOU/TRACY COMBINATION

- Less costly to close Sharpe than DDOU (est. \$80 million vs. \$110 million)
- DDOU has lowest cost per square feet for RPM of any DLA depot (DLA analysis)
- DDOU reimbursable workload offsets DLA's costs of operations at Ogden site
- Tenants:
  - DMRS West and DSDC are best suited to Ogden operation
  - DSDC knowledge based workforce will not move -- irreplaceable in short term
  - Army wants reimbursable workload done in Ogden -- much work to build integrated operation

SUMMARY

- DLA must consider other base combinations or each individually
- Data supports DDOU/Tracy combination with closure of Sharpe

# HILL/DDO '95

27 March 1995

## (ATTACHMENT 1)

### BRAC '93 VERSUS BRAC '95 POINT ALLOCATIONS

	1993	1995
Mission Scope (essentially '93)	200	290
Strategic Location	140	100
Contingency Op. Readiness (CCP 100)	0	140
Mission Suitability	350	475
Age and Condition of Facility	100	135
Storage Capacity (excess)	25	150
Specialized Storage	70	10
Throughput Capacity (design to workload)	25	150
Location	50	20
Operational Efficiencies	275	100
Base Operating Costs*	195	70
Transportation Costs	60	30
Expandability	175	135
Facility/Installation Expansion	150	115
Mobilization	25	20

**\*Note: ('93 included all Peat Marwick comparable costs, '95 excluded all Peat Marwick comparable costs)**

# HILL/DDO '95

27 March 1995

## (ATTACHMENT 2)

### STAND ALONE ANALYSIS (8 DEPOTS)

DEPOT	MISSION SCOPE	MISSION SUIT.	OPS. EFF.	EXPANSION	TOTAL
Tracy	161	374	63	91	689
Ogden	133	364	72	106	675
Sharpe	161	339	69	106	675
New Cumb.	139	364	72	68	643
Memphis	126	369	76	67	638
Mechanicsburg	139	346	73	70	628
Richmond	141	312	80	35	568
Columbus	132	277	84	58	551

Note(1): All depots have the capability and many have served as a CCP, so no points were assigned for CCP operations. (Same rationale DLA used for non-assignment of points for surface transportation.) DLA BRAC '95 Distribution Military Value -- Stand Alone Depots Point Distribution Methodology reference IIB1c.

Note(2): DLA chose to use each depot's existing workload to assign the highest amount of points given in military value (150 points) for throughput capacity (BRAC question VB22 answer and column titled "Total Current Throughput," page 8.2 DLA BRAC Detailed Analysis February 1995.) Existing workload does not represent the throughput capacity/capability of a depot. Existing workload does not have near the military value as the design capacity/capability of a depot. DLA's use of existing workload to represent a depot's design capacity to process workload through a depot skews the data and is totally misleading in evaluating a depot's military value. Therefore, the above analysis replaced each depot's existing workload answer to BRAC question VB22 with each depot's design workload capacity answer to BRAC question VB47.

### STAND ALONE ANALYSIS COMPARING COMBINATIONS

DEPOT	MISSION SCOPE	MISSION SUIT.	OPS. EFF.	EXPANSION	TOTAL
Tracy/Sharpe	161	337	70	112	680
Tracy/Ogden	183	414	71	130	798
Ogden/Sharpe	183	405	71	128	787

## (ATTACHMENT 3)

### KPMG PEAT MARWICK STUDY FOR DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY DISTRIBUTION DEPOT COST DATA ANALYSIS -- JANUARY 1994

#### Depreciation

- DLA BRAC did not consider depreciation
  - Should have been used to reduce the points applied to "Age and Condition of Facilities."
- Depreciation increases the cost to do business. DLA passes this cost on to the services through discrete pricing (unit costs)

"Depots with new and expensive buildings and equipment will cost more than a depot with older buildings/equipment." (KPMG Peat Marwick Management Briefing -- Rev. 1 -- January 1994)

#### Unit Cost

- Data Comparability: "Our analysis revealed that bin, bulk and hazardous receipts and issues were comparable missions within the depots analyzed." (Tracy, Sharpe, Mechanicsburg, New Cumberland and DDOU Ogden.)
- Comparable general indicators included:
  - Total direct costs per employee
    - DDSP = \$48
    - DDJC = \$53
    - DDOU = \$45 (lowest)

- Total general and administrative overhead as a percentage of direct cost
  - DDSP = 106%
  - DDJC = 96%
  - DDOU = 80% (lowest)
  
- Total indirect overhead as a percentage of direct cost (only 10% of total cost)
  - DDSP = 26%
  - DDJC = 17%
  - DDOU = 30% (highest)

- Comparable mission indicators included

- Unit cost by depot (includes bin, bulk and hazardous)
  - DDSP = \$23 per line
  - DDJC = \$21 per line
  - DDOU = \$16 per line (lowest)
  
- Direct cost per line (includes bin, bulk and hazardous)
  - DDSP = \$7.86
  - DDJC = \$7.32
  - DDOU = \$6.36 (lowest)

## (ATTACHMENT 4)

### SAILS MODEL RESULTS

Objective: Identify DLA's optimized depot configuration to minimize relative distribution system operating costs


Costs Included: First and second destination costs (transportation) and infrastructure costs (overhead) to maintain DLA's distribution system plant equipment and support services

Analysis: Established a base line of 6 stand alone depots costs as described above. It then systematically evaluated the closure of each stand alone depot leaving five stand alone depots. Finally, it closed 3 combinations (Memphis-Ogden, Memphis-Richmond and Ogden-Richmond) of 2 stand alone depots leaving 4 depots open. (This failed to consider 12 other combinations of closing 2 stand alone depots.)

Results: The greatest reduction in operating costs (\$13.9 million or 5.1 percent) occurred when closing the San Joaquin Depot in the 5 open depot scenario. The 4 open depot scenario could not be realistically evaluated since only 3 combinations or 4 open depots were considered of a possible 15 combinations.

# DLA/DOD WESTERN AREA TRANSPORTATION DISTANCES

## DDOU/HILL vs DDTC/SHAD



AVERAGE VENDOR	PDS	CUSTOMER	DISTANCE (MILES)	ADVANTAGE
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	PUGET SOUND	2600	DDOU/HILL (700 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	PUGET SOUND	3300	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	BAY AREA	2450	NEUTRAL
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	BAY AREA	2450	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	SO. CALIF.	2500	DDOU/HILL (450 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	SO. CALIF.	2950	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	FORT SILL	2750	DDOU/HILL (1500 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	FORT SILL	4250	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	FORT HOOD	3050	DDOU/HILL (1300 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	FORT HOOD	4350	

NOTE: THE GEOGRAPHICAL CENTER FOR MANUFACTURING IN CONUS IS AT COLUMBUS, OHIO



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
U.S. ARMY MEDICAL MATERIEL AGENCY  
FREDERICK, MARYLAND 21702-5001



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

March 28, 1995

Office of the Commander

Mr. R. H. Jones  
3539 North 2550 East  
Layton, Utah 84040-8497

Dear Mr. Jones:

I want you to know the BRAC closure announcement of DDOU was quite a surprise to the United States Army Medical Materiel Agency, as well as to you dedicated employees at Ogden, Utah.

We have undertaken dialogue with the Defense Logistics Agency; the Commander, DDOU; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army; the United States Army Office of The Surgeon General; and others to proactively continue this critical function of DEPMEDS reassembly and rebuild which has proven to be both cost efficient and wise.


Unfortunately, I am not in an official position to be able to tell you or your co-workers what the final decision will be.

At USAMMA, we want this mission to continue and will pursue all avenues to ensure its uninterrupted success. We join in your concern and will continue to enlighten all how critical that this mission continue.

Perhaps together we shall achieve success in maintaining this mission essential function for the Army Medical Department.

We applaud the great work you are doing out there. Keep the faith and good luck in your pursuits as we hope to be successful in ours.

Sincerely,



James P. Normile III  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Commander

# DDO FACT SHEET

- **Total jobs to be lost due to closure - 1,365**
  - Civilian - 1,092**
  - Military - 3**
  - Tenants - 270**
  
- **Total amount of wages to be lost due to closure - \$54,800,000**
  - Civilian - 40,800,000**
  - Military - 200,000**
  - Tenants - 13,800,000**
  
- **Average wage of civilian jobs to be lost - \$40,088**
  - Civilian - \$37,362**
  - Tenant - \$51,111**
  
- **Amount of contracted funds to be lost - \$17,800,000**

# WEBER COUNTY/DDO

- Total government jobs in Weber County - 18,065
  - Federal - 7,516
  - State - 4,071
  - Local - 6,478
- Total jobs at DDO - 1,365
- Percent of DDO jobs (as part of gov't total)
  - Total - 7.5%
  - Federal - 18%
- Total wages produced by gov't sector in Weber County - \$505,639,350
- Percent of total wage produced by DDO
  - without tenants - 8%
  - with tenants - 11%
- Average governmental wage in Weber Co. - \$22,392
- Average civilian wage for DDO employee
  - without tenants - \$37,362
  - with tenants - \$43,827

## Impact of Hill DDO Closure on Community

<i>Employment/ Activity</i>	<i>#Number of People</i>	<i>Annual Compensation</i>	<i>Total Impact</i>
<b><u>DDO</u></b>			
<b><u>Employment</u></b>			
<i>Civilian</i>	1092	\$40,800,000	\$123,000,000
<i>Military</i>	3	\$200,000	\$500,000
<b><u>Contracts</u></b>			
<i>Transportation</i>		\$10,000,000	\$30,200,000
<i>Other local</i>		\$7,800,000	\$23,500,000
<b><u>Tenants</u></b>			
<i>DDRW</i>	85	\$3,500,000	\$10,400,000
<i>DRMO</i>	80	\$3,900,000	\$11,700,000
<i>DSDC</i>	105	\$6,400,000	\$19,300,000
<b>Totals</b>	1,365	\$72,600,000	\$218,600,000

# **DDOU TENANTS**

**As of Mar 95**

---

- 1. Internal Revenue Service/966**
- 2. Company C321st Engineering Battalion (USAR)/155**
- 3. DLA System Design Center/129**
- 4. 172nd Medical Battalion Logistics Forward (USAR)/122**
- 5. Administrative Support Center West/90**
- 6. Defense Reutilization/Market Service, Operations West/80**
- 7. Defense Mega Center Ogden/30**
- 8. Utah National Guard (Joint Language Training Center)/30**
- 9. Defense Distribution Region West/21**
- 10. DLA Civilian Personnel Support Office/11**
- 11. Defense Criminal Investigation Service/9**
- 12. Defense Contract Management District West/6**
- 13. US Army Material Management Agency/6**
- 14. Defense Reutilization and Marketing Operations/5**

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**DDOU TENANTS** (cont)  
As of Mar 95

- 15. US Army Civilian Health Clinic/4
- 16. Area Maintenance Support Activity (USAR)/4
- 17. America First Credit Union/3
- 18. DLA Central Design Activity/2
- 19. DLA Customer Supply Assistance Office/1
- 20. Defense Printing Service/1
- 21. AAFES Post Exchange/1
- 22. First Security Bank/1


**1,677 Total Tenant Employees**

# DDOU STORAGE INFORMATION

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- **Number of Warehouses - 44**
- **Number of NSNs - 658,546**
- **Allocated Storage Space**
  - **Bin 3.7%**
  - **Bulk 96.3%**
    - **Hazardous 10.1%**
- **Commodity (% Lines / Occupied Sq Ft)**
  - **Medical .8% / 59K**
  - **Industrial 31% / 165K**
  - **Electrical 48% / 110K**
  - **Clothing and Textile .2% / 402K**
  - **General 5% / 489K**
  - **Construction 15% / 325K**

# Defense Distribution Depot Ogden



# Defense Distribution Depot Ogden




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TAB 1	DLA's Military Value Point Allocation Comparisons <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 93 BRAC to 95 BRAC</li><li>- KMPG Peat Marwick Study Summary</li><li>- SAILS Model Analysis <i>φ</i></li></ul>
TAB 2	Issue Papers
TAB 3	DLA's Military Value Point Assignments - Six Depots (Stand-Alone)
TAB 4	DDOU's Military Value Point Assignments - Eight Depots
TAB 5	DDOU's Military Value Point Assignments Comparing Western Combinations
TAB 6	Workpapers

BRAC 93 VS BRAC 95  
POINT ALLOCATIONS

	93	95
Mission Scope (Essentiality 93)	200	290
- Strategic Location	140	100
- Contingency Op. Readiness (CCP 100)	0	140
 Mission Suitability	 350	 475
- Age & Condition of Facility	100	135
- Storage Capacity ( <del>Excess</del> )	25	150
- Specialized Storage	70	10
- Throughput Capacity (Design to Workload)	25	150
- Location	50	20
 Operational Efficiencies	 275	 100
- Base Operating Cost (93 Included all Peat Marwick Comparable Costs - 95 excluded all Peat Marwick Comparable Costs)	195	70
- Transportation Costs	60	30
 Expandability	 175	 135
- Facility/Installation Expansion	150	115
- Mobilization	25	20

	<u>1993</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>% Change</u>
<b><u>MISSION SCOPE</u></b> .....	200	290	+45%
● Ogden's % of points .....	58.5%	45.6%	-12.9%
- 117.0 points in 93 of 200 possible			
- 133.0 points in 95 of 290 possible			
● Ranking with 8 stand-alones .....	2	3	Down
* CCP added in 95 (100 points)			

<b><u>MISSION SUITABILITY</u></b> .....	350	475	+35.7%
● Ogden's % of points .....	70%	51.4%	-18.6%
- 189.0 points in 93 of 350 possible			
- 234.0 points in 95 of 475 possible			
● Ranking with 8 stand-alones .....	3	5	Down
* Storage capacity/throughput increased 6 times (25 in 93 and 150 in 95), the 93 value-in BRAC 95. Combining allowed DDJC and DDSP to get 79.8% and 77.6% of the points in BRAC 95. The next closest non-combined depot received 55.8% of the points possible.			

<b><u>OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES</u></b> .....	275	100	-63.6%
● Ogden's % of points .....	73.3%	72.0%	-1.3%
- 201.6 points in 93 of 275 possible			
- 72 points in 95 of 100 possible			
● Ranking with 8 stand-alones .....	3	5	Down
* DLA took out all 4 unit cost comparisons used in 93 BRAC for BRAC 95. KMPG Peat Marwick in FY94 independently used the same four unit cost comparisons and found Ogden the lowest cost overall.			

	<u>1993</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>% Change</u>
<u>EXPANDABILITY</u> .....	175	135	-22.9%
● Ogden's % of points .....	50.7%	48.9%	-3.6%
- 88.7 points in 93 of 175 possible			
- 66.0 points in 95 of 135 possible			
● Ranking with 8 stand-alones .....	1	3	Down

\* Excess storage capacity (85 of 135 points) drove the final point ratings and DDJC and DDSP were allowed to combine, which gave them 83.0% and 55.6% of the points respectively in BRAC 95. The next closest non-combined depot (Ogden = 66 points) received 48.9% of the possible points.

- ● In every military value major category, DDOU's ranking went down from 93 BRAC to 95 BRAC.

.. Bottomline: 1993 Points were re-allocated from costs (operational efficiencies), expansion capability and excess storage space to current workload, storage space and being a CCP.

KPMG Peat Marwick Study for Defense Logistics Agency  
Distribution Depot Cost Data Analysis  
January 1994

DEPRECIATION:

- DLA BRAC did not consider depreciation. Depreciation should have been used to reduce the points applied to Age and Condition of Facilities.
- Depreciation increases the cost to do business. DLA passes this cost on to the services through discrete pricing (unit costs).
- "Depots with new and expensive buildings and equipment will cost more than a Depot with older buildings/equipment" (KPMG Peat Marwick Management Briefing REV 1, January 1994).

UNIT COST

- Data Comparability. "Our analysis revealed that bin, bulk and hazardous receipts and issues were comparable missions within the Depots analyzed" (Tracy, Sharpe, Mechanicsburg, New Cumberland and DDOU Oqden).
- Comparable general indicators included

Total direct costs per employee:

DDSP	\$48
DDJC	53
DDOU	45 ... lowest

- \* Total General and Administrative Overhead as a percent of Direct Cost:

DDSP	106 %
DDJC	96 %
DDOU	80 % ... lowest

- \* Total Indirect Overhead as a percent of Direct Cost:

DDSP	26 %
DDJC	17 %
DDOU	30 % ... highest

- Comparable Mission indicators included

\* Unit Cost by Depot (includes bin, bulk and hazardous):

DDSP	\$23 per line
DDJC	21 per line
DDOU	16 per line ... lowest

\* Direct Cost per line (includes bin, bulk and hazardous):

DDSP	\$7.86
DDJC	7.32
DDOU	6.36 ... lowest

Bottomline: Costs at the depots (DDJC, DDSP, DDOU and DDRV) are comparable and DDOU is the least cost depot.

\* 4 of the 5 Comparable indicator costs identified by Pent Marwick were in DLAI's 93 BRAC Military Value points under operational efficiency and represented 175 points.

SAILS MODEL RESULTS

OBJECTIVE: Identify DLA's optimized depot configuration to minimize relative distribution system operating costs.

COSTS INCLUDED: First and second destination costs (transportation) and infrastructure costs (overhead) to maintain DLA's distribution system plant equipment and support services. DDOU reimbursement costs included.

ANALYSIS: Established a base line of 6 stand-alone depot costs as described above. It then systematically evaluated the closure of each stand-alone leaving 5 stand-alone depots. Finally, it closed 3 combination (Memphis-Ogden, Memphis-Richmond, Ogden-Richmond) of 2 stand-alone depots leaving 4 depots open. (Failed to consider 12 other combinations of closing 2 stand alone depots).

RESULTS: The greatest reduction in operating costs (\$13,896 or 5.1%) occurred when closing the SanJoaquin depot in the 5 depot scenario. The 4 depot scenario could not be realistically evaluated since 3 combinations of 4 open depots was considered of a possible 15 combinations.

No actual <sup>Direct/Indirect</sup> operating costs  
DEPOTS Costs

Transportation =	12.5 %	45.2 % (SAILS)
G & A =	32.7 %	
Direct =	42.1 %	54.8 % (Not IN SAILS)
Indirect =	12.7 %	
	100.0 %	

\* Included DDOUs reimbursable mission overhead in the analysis (see chart) which inflates DDOUs relative cost.

BottomLine: The SAILS Model Results are SKewed, don't include overhead. The depots costs, include reimbursable mission overhead and didn't consider all possible combinations.

# G&A BASE OPERATING SUPPORT COSTS (BOS)

## Relationship to Lines In and Out and Reimbursable Missions

---

	Reimbursable \$10.5 Million 36.1%	← Reimbursable O/H included in Lines In & Out	
<b>G&amp;A OVERHEAD</b>	Lines In & Out \$ 18.6 Million 63.9%	Reimbursable \$ 10.5 Million 36.1%	<b>TOTAL</b> \$ 29.1 Million 28.6%
<b>DIRECT/INDIRECT COSTS</b>	Lines In & Out \$ 49.9 Million 68.6%	Reimbursable \$ 22.9 Million 31.4%	\$ 72.8 Million 71.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Lines In & Out \$ 68.5 Million 67.2%	Reimbursable \$ 33.4 Million 32.8%	\$ 101.9 Million 100.0%

**BOTTOM LINE:** Including G&A BOS Costs that Support Reimbursable Missions in the Lines In and Out Costs inflates DDOU's BRAC BOS Costs

ISSUE PAPER

Container Consolidation Points

- Given no military value in 93 BRAC.
- Given 100 points (10%) in 95 BRAC
- All DLA Stand-Alone Depots have served as CCP.
- DDOU meets DOD's definition and has the capacity.
- Since all Depots (Stand-Alone) have been a CCP, no points should be given in 95 BRAC. (This is the same rationale DLA used for Surface Transportation in 95 BRAC.)

Issue Paper  
Storage Capacity

- Given 25 points in 93 BRAC Ogden received 16.8 points, Tracy received 12.9 points, Sharpe received 0 points.
- Given 150 points in 95 BRAC Ogden received 61 points, Tracy/Sharpe received 150 points.
- DDSP and DDJC were allowed to combine two separated depots (93 BRAC) into one depot, DDSP or DDJC for 95 BRAC.
- The point differential between the highest combined depot (DDJC = 150 points) and the highest non-combined depot (DDOU = 61 points) was 89 points or 59% of the total possible points.
- Combining gives unrealistic advantage and skews military value.

Issue Paper  
Throughput Capacity

- Given 25 points in 93 BRAC and was based on design capacity.
- Given 150 points in 95 BRAC and was based on current workload.
- In 93 BRAC, Tracy's design throughput capacity for 1 8-hour shift submission was 19,500 lines and Sharpe's was 2,955 or 22,455 lines. Ogden was 27,177 lines, however, DLA replaced Ogden's submission with Warner Robins and was only given credit for 17,801 lines.
- In 95 BRAC, Tracy/Sharpe's design throughput capacity was 67,946 (3 times the 93 BRAC submission) lines per 1 8-hour shift and Ogden's was 27,307 lines.
- DDOU's design throughput capacity for ~~95~~ BRAC was independently provided by DLA DOSO ... Tracy/Sharpe refused DLA DOSO's independent throughput numbers and submitted their own. *47,385* *and was 27,307*
- DDSP and DDJC were allowed to combine two separated depots (93 BRAC) into one depot, DDSP or DDJC for 95 BRAC.
- The point differential between the lowest combined depot (DDJC = 101 points) and the next highest non-combined depot (DDMT = 63 points) is 38 points or 25% of the total possible points.
- Combining gives unrealistic advantage and skews military value.
- Design capacity has greater military value than current workload.

## Issue Paper

### Base Operating Support (BOS)

- Given 195 points in 93 BRAC and included cost categories that in 1994 KMPG Peat Marwick study said were comparable costs of the depots. Ogden received 128.1 points, Tracy received 165 points, and Sharpe received 104.2 points.
- Given 70 points in 95 BRAC and excluded the cost categories that were in 93 BRAC and shown by the KMPG Peat Marwick Study of 1994 to be comparable between depots. Also, 95 BRAC included only General and Administrative (G&A) overhead costs that support the base, i.e., facilities, fire, security, base supply, equipment maintenance, etc. Ogden received 21 points, Tracy/Sharpe received 29 points.
- DDOU G&A reimbursable mission costs and paid equivalents were included in the BOS costs per paid equivalent. In 95 BRAC this inflates the BOS costs to support the Lines In and Out Mission by \$10.5 million in support costs (see chart). This same problem impacts the SAILS model also.

Mission

Lines In & Out

<u>Mission Category</u>	<u>(\$000) Direct</u>	<u>(\$000) Indirect</u>	<u>(\$000) G&amp;A</u>	<u>(\$000) Total</u>
Bin Received	2,146	2,596	2,434	7,175
Medium Bulk Received	1,967	2,406	2,255	6,628
Hazardous Received	56	69	64	189
Heavy Bulk Received	31	38	36	105
Bin Issued	9,886	5,434	5,094	20,414
Medium Bulk Issued	12,558	8,709	8,164	29,431
Hazardous Issued	1,514	536	502	2,552
Heavy Bulk Issued	<u>1,872</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>2,059</u>
TOTAL	\$30,030	\$19,884	\$18,639	\$68,553

Direct and Indirect = \$49,914 - 68.6%

Reimbursable Mission

Unit/Set	1,261	1,499	1,405	4,165
DEPMEDS	3,818	3,767	3,531	11,116
End Items	415	507	475	1,397
Center Directed	24	29	27	81
Other DEPMEDS	4,436	4,076	3,822	12,334
DERA	321	0	0	321
4P&M	<u>1,356</u>	<u>1,368</u>	<u>1,282</u>	<u>4,005</u>
TOTAL	\$11,631	\$11,246	\$10,542	\$33,419

Direct and Indirect = \$22,877 - 31.4%

TOTALS:

Direct and Indirect ..... \$72,791 (71.4%)  
 G&A ..... \$29,181 (28.6%)

GRAND TOTAL ..... \$101,972

## Issue Paper

### Excess Storage Capacity

- Given 60 points in 93 BRAC. Ogden received 1.9 points because Ogden's submission was ~~replaced~~ with Warner Robins submission who received 16.3 points. Tracy received 21.1 points and Sharpe received .1 point. *interchanged*
- Given 85 points in 95 BRAC, Ogden received 33 points and Tracy/Sharpe received 85 points.
- DDSP and DDJC were allowed to combine two separated depots (93 BRAC) into one depot, DDSP or DDJC for 95 BRAC.
- The point differential between the highest combined depot (DDJC = 85 points) and the highest non-combined depot (DDOU = 33 points) is 52 points or 61% of the total possible points.
- Combining gives unrealistic advantage and skews military value.

Stand Alone Analysis  
Eight Depots

<u>Depot</u>	<u>Mission Scope (1)</u>	<u>Mission Suit (2)</u>	<u>Operational Efficiencies</u>	<u>Expansion</u>	<u>Total</u>
Tracy	161	374	63	91	689
Ogden	133	364	72	106	675
Sharpe	161	339	69	106	675
New Cumberland	139	364	72	68	643
Memphis	126	369	76	67	638
Mechanicsburg	139	346	73	70	628
Richmond	141	312	80	35	568
Columbus	132	277	84	58	551

(1) All Depots have the capability and many have served as a CCP, so no points were assigned for CCP operations (same rationale DLA used for non-assignment of points for surface transportation). DLA BRAC 95 Distribution Military Value - Stand Alone Depots Point Distribution Methodology reference IIB1c.

(2) DLA chose to use each Depot's existing workload to assign the highest amount of points given in military value (150 points) for throughput capacity (BRAC question VB22 answer and column titled "Total Current Throughput" page 8.2 DLA BRAC Detailed Analysis Feb 1995. Existing workload does not represent the throughput capacity capability of a Depots existing workload and does not have near the military value as the design capability/capacity of a depot. DLA's use of existing workload to represent a Depot's design capacity to process workload through a depot skews the data and is totally misleading in evaluating a Depots military value. Therefore, the above analysis replaced each depots existing workload answer to BRAC question VB22 with each Depots design workload capacity answer to BRAC question VB47. Also noted is that Tracy, Sharpe, New Cumberland and Mechanicsburg workload numbers reported in BRAC question VB22 does not match the workload numbers reported in DLA's RCS 232 Report and DLA's MIS Reports. The BRAC submission is substantially higher than DLA's official source reports for workload.

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STAND ALONE ANALYSIS  
(8 DEPOTS)

MISSION SCOPE (290)

BRAC QUEST	AVAIL. POINTS	SHARPE	TRACY	OGDEN	RICHMOND	COLUMBUS	MEMPHIS	MECHANICSBURG	NEW CUMBERLAND
IA1	(25)	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
IA2	(25)	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
IB1A	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IB1B	(15)	0	0	8	0	15	0	0	0
IB1C	(10)	10	10	1	9	1	0	1	1
IB1D	(5)	0	0	0	5	3	2	1	1
IB1E	(70)	61	61	70	48	58	69	69	69
IC1	(100)*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IC2A	(20)	20	20	2	15	3	2	11	11
IC2B	(20)	20	20	2	14	2	3	7	7
TOTAL		161	161	133	141	132	126	139	139

MISSION SUITABILITY (475)

BRAC QUEST	AVAIL. POINTS	SHARPE	TRACY	OGDEN	RICHMOND	COLUMBUS	MEMPHIS	MECHANICSBURG	NEW CUMBERLAND
IIA1	(20)	6	6	4	5	3	6	5	5
IIA2	(100)* <i>Dep</i>	80	<i>Avg.</i> 75	88	92	77	87	56	<i>Avg.</i> 60
IIA3A	(15)	14	14	9	14	15	13	9	9
IIA3B	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IIA3C	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IIA4	(10)	10	10	10	10	0	10	10	10
IIA5	(150)* <i>Sta.</i>	122	139	127	109	114	135	150	127
IIA6	(10)	0	3	10	9	0	4	0	0
IIA7	(150)* <i>Thruput</i>	90	110	115	72	57	97	113	150
IIB1A	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IIB1B	(10)	10	10	0	1	1	10	1	1
IIB1C	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IIB1D	(10)	7	7	1 <i>? Hill</i>	0	10	7	2	2
TOTAL		339	374	364 <i>Air</i>	312	277	369	346	364

OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY (100)

BRAC QUEST	AVAIL. POINTS	SHARPE	TRACY	OGDEN	RICHMOND	COLUMBUS	MEMPHIS	MECHANICSBURG	NEW CUMBERLAND
IIIA1	(35)* <i>Bos</i>	29	29	21	35	31	31	30	30
IIIA2	(35) <i>RPM</i>	19	19	<u>35</u>	26	31	28	22	22
IIIB1	(15)	6	8	9	9	15	7	14	6
IIIB2	(15)	<u>15</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL		69	63	72	80	84	76	73	72

EXPANDABILITY (135)

BRAC QUEST	AVAIL. POINTS	SHARPE	TRACY	OGDEN	RICHMOND	COLUMBUS	MEMPHIS	MECHANICSBURG	NEW CUMBERLAND
IVA1	(85)* <i>EXCLUS</i>	85	69	67	20	45	47	46	42
IVA2	(25) <i>Blay, ACV</i>	5	2	25	0	0	3	5	3
IVA3	(5)	0	0	0	5	5	5	5	5
IVAB1a	(10)	8	10	7	5	4	6	7	9
IVAB1b	(10)	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>9</u>
TOTAL		106	91	106	35	58	67	70	68
GRAND TOTAL		675	689	675	568	551	638	628	643

Stand Alone Analysis  
Comparing Combinations

<u>Depot</u>	<u>Mission Scope (1)</u>	<u>Mission Suit (2)</u>	<u>Operational Efficiencies</u>	<u>Expansion</u>	<u>Total</u>
Tracy/Ogden	183	414	71	130	798
Ogden/Sharpe	183	405	71	128	787
Tracy/Sharpe	161	340	70	112	683

(1) All Depots have the capability and many have served as a CCP, so no points were assigned for CCP operations (same rationale DLA used for non-assignment of points for surface transportation). DLA BRAC 95 Distribution Military Value - Stand Alone Depots Point Distribution Methodology reference IIB1c.

(2) DLA chose to use each Depot's existing workload to assign the highest amount of points given in military value (150 points) for throughput capacity (BRAC question VB22 answer and column titled "Total Current Throughput" page 8.2 DLA BRAC Detailed Analysis Feb 1995. Existing workload does not represent the throughput capacity capability of a Depots existing workload and does not have near the military value as the design capability/capacity of a depot. DLA's use of existing workload to represent a Depot's design capacity to process workload through a depot skews the data and is totally misleading in evaluating a Depots military value. Therefore, the above analysis replaced each depots existing workload answer to BRAC question VB22 with each Depots design workload capacity answer to BRAC question VB47. Also noted is that Tracy, Sharpe, New Cumberland and Mechanicsburg workload numbers reported in BRAC question VB22 does not match the workload numbers reported in DLA's RCS 232 Report and DLA's MIS Reports. The BRAC submission is substantially higher than DLA's official source reports for workload.

Stand Alone Analysis  
Comparing Combinations

Mission Scope (290)

	<u>Tracy/Sharpe</u>	<u>Tracy/Ogden</u>	<u>Sharpe/Ogden</u>
IA1 (25)	25	25	25
IA2 (25)	25	25	25
IB1a (0)	0	0	0
IB1b (15)	0	8	8
IB1c (10)	10	10	10
IB1d (5)	0	5	5
IB1e (70)	61	70	70
IC1 (100)*	0	0	0
IC2a (20)	20	20	20
IC2b (20)	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	161	183	183

Mission Suitability (475)

IIA1 (20)	6	5 (avg)	5 (avg)
IIA2 (100)* <i>Condition 48</i>	78	82 (avg)	84 (avg)
IIA3a (15) <i>314</i>	14	12 (avg)	12 (avg)
IIA3b (0)	0	0	0
IIA3c (0)	0	0	0
IIA4 (10)	10	10	10
IIA5 (150)*	122	150	150
IIA6 (10)	3	10	10
IIA7 (150)*	90	128	117
IIB1a (0)	0	0	0
IIB1b (10)	10	10	10
IIB1c (0)	0	0	0
IIB1d (10)	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTAL	340	414	405

Operational Efficiencies (100)

IIIA1 (35)	29	25 (avg)	25 (avg)
IIIA2 (35)	19	27 (avg)	27 (avg)
IIIB1 (15)	7	8 (avg)	8 (avg)
IIIB2 (15)	<u>15</u>	<u>11</u> (avg)	<u>11</u> (avg)
TOTAL	70	71	71

Expandability (135)

IVA1 (85)	85	85	85
IVA2 (25)	7	25	25
IVA3 (5)	0	0	0
IVB1a (10)	10	10	9
IVB1b (10)	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>
TOTAL	112	130	128
GRAND TOTAL	683	798	787

* CCP PLACED AT:	<u>Tracy/Sharpe</u>	<u>Tracy/Ogden</u>	<u>Sharpe/Ogden</u>
Ogden	683	898	887
Sharpe	783	798	887
Tracy	783	898	787
McClellan	683	798	787

# Document Separator

**DUGWAY PROVING GROUND  
ENGLISH VILLAGE**

**INITIATIVE.** Turn over operation of English Village, Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), Utah to the Utah National Guard.

**BACKGROUND.** Throughout its long and proud history, DPG has supported training activities of the Utah National Guard (UTNG) as well as other Department of Defense (DoD) entities. This relationship with the UTNG has been continuous for the past forty years, during which time a permanent base of operations at Bullene barracks was established within the English Village complex. The United States Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) operates English Village, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. Today, TECOM is confronted with budget shortfalls and uncertainties which are forcing consideration of drastic alternatives, including installation closure. Accordingly, the UTNG, along with TECOM, the state of Utah and other local government entities are working to preserve the TECOM mission while transferring installation ownership for English Village to the National Guard.

**JUSTIFICATION.** This proposal illustrates how the UTNG at English Village will:

- retain the TECOM mission as the priority;
- develop a self-sustaining community;
- maintain the quality of life;
- expand the scope of the UTNG mission;
- utilize a market-driven approach;
- promote commercial and industrial enterprises.

The decisions which will ultimately impact on the existence of English Village are: a) close the facility and relocate residents to distant communities with a deterioration to real property; or b) transition ownership of the property and facilities to another organization that can maintain base operations support at no long-term cost to the U.S. Army.

The UTNG proposes to acquire the sixteen plus square miles that encompass English Village. The intent is to continue base operations to the fullest extent possible using business principles and revenue enhancers. Preserving the integrity and long-term growth of the TECOM mission will be the underpinning consideration.

Closing English Village and requiring employees to relocate to other communities is an expensive project. The communities of Tooele and Salt Lake City, Utah, located 48 miles and 80 miles away respectively, are not economically capable of absorbing the 2000 residents of English Village in the short term. Closure of English Village will result in a monetary loss to the U.S. Army through environmental remediation and personnel relocations through FY 96, whereas the residents will suffer a protracted economic burden in the short and long term. The scenario lends itself to the potential loss of real property assets and encroachment by other governmental or private interests that would not be conducive to the mission of TECOM.

The UTNG proposal focuses on continued base operations support using appropriated funds through FY 96 while creating a community that will generate income from existing resources. The plan will provide long-term economic stimuli to residents of English Village and promote growth through commercial interests. This business climate will produce "bill payers" without the need for government support after FY 96. Also, user fees will be collected from government organizations and private entities interested in conducting business at DPG.

Long-term development can be sustained within the sixteen plus square mile area well into the twenty first century. Vacant land, existing structures and the current infrastructure are ideal for establishing a corporate culture that will promote a diverse competitive market place.


As other training areas throughout the United States are closed, DPG will be the only place to fire long-range artillery weapons systems. The transition of English Village to the state of Utah with the National Guard as executive manager will be a valuable training asset to the Utah National Guard and the National Guard Bureau. If English Village is allowed to close, the UTNG's readiness will deteriorate as time goes by and encroachment restricts the primary training site at Camp W.G. Williams. By keeping English Village open, the training and readiness of the UTNG will expand. The current battalion training site will expand to a brigade- and two battalion-size major training areas.

Rents received from housing, billeting, and land use will build the financial foundation of this transition. The UTNG will provide occupancy assurances during the transition period for all residents who remain at English Village. There will be adjustments in rents due to privatization of quarters, inflation and the loss of Real Property Operations and Maintenance (RPOM) monies. Existing activities now operated and maintained by the Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) branch of the U.S. Army will be taken over by a non-profit tenants' organization. The opportunity exists for community residents to generate revenue to maintain the quality of life that now exists in the community.

Acreage will remain available to DoD agencies for testing and research and development. DoD contractors, State agencies and private corporations interested in establishing remote production/research and development facilities will be solicited as sources of potential income. This income will be used to support and upgrade existing facilities and expand as necessary.

**CONCLUSION.** With this commitment, the UTNG will manage base operations and will help in decisions which affect support of multi-family housing. The present occupancy rate and the forecast for growth will sustain installation operation in the out years. Through a smooth transition process, the UTNG will absorb the costs associated with operating English Village without extraordinary government subsidies or appropriated means. A comprehensive master plan that will meet the demands of balanced private and governmental development is being drafted.

RANGE 9 WEST RANGE 8 WEST



RANGE 9 WEST RANGE 8 WEST

ENGLISH VILLAGE AREA  
16+Sq. Miles



# **Utah Army National Guard**

## **English Village Proposal**



## **Information Briefing**

# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **BACKGROUND**

---

- **English Village Closure**
  - **DOD Budget Reductions**
  - **Test Evaluation Command Directed**
  - **Property Excessed 1 Oct 96**
  - **All Personnel to Commute**
  - **Test Mission to Continue**

Information Briefing



Utah Army National Guard  
English Village Proposal  
**NATIONAL GUARD REQUIREMENTS**

---

- **Adjutant General Directs Study of Combat Missions**
- **Study Resulted In Enhanced Training Requirements, Including:**
  - **Combined Arms Training**
  - **Year-Round Live Fire**
  - **Brigade Training Complex**

Information Briefing



**Utah Army National Guard  
English Village Proposal  
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

---

- **UTNG Retains Bullene Barracks/Mission**
  - **Federal License to UTNG**
  - **Federal Lease to UTNG**
  - **Deed To State of Utah**
- **Complete Caretaker Status/Closure**

Information Briefing



# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **PLANNING BACKGROUND**

---

- **Concept Briefings For:**
  - **National Guard Bureau**
  - **Governor**
  - **Secretary of the Army**
- **Guidance To Proceed**
- **Planning Teams Established**
- **Plans Prepared**
- **Briefings Prepared/Given**

Information Briefing



# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **BRIEFS GIVEN**

---

**Governor/Staff**

**Senate/Congressional Delegation**

**State Legislative Members**

**Tooele County Commissioner**

**Dugway Proving Ground**

**Test and Evaluation Command**

**Army Materiel Command**

**Honorary Colonel Corp of Utah**

**Utility Companies**

**Army & Air Force Exchange Service**

**Defense Commissary Agency**

**Various State Agencies**

**Fruit of the Loom**

Information Briefing



# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **PLAN**


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- **Facility Breakout**
  - **Brigade (black)**
  - **Morale, Welfare and Recreation (green)**
  - **Housing (red)**

Information Briefing



Brigade Complex Facilities  
 MWR Facilities  
 Tenant Owned Housing  
 Public Schools



# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **BRIGADE COMPLEX**

---

- **Funding Source**
  - NGB (Present & Future)
  - Billeting Operations
  - Housing Operations
  - External Funding
- **Manpower**
  - State Employees
  - Federal Employees
- **Operations and Maintenance**
  - Maintenance (NGB)
  - Utilities (NGB)



Information Briefing

**Utah Army National Guard  
English Village Proposal**

**MORALE, WELFARE AND RECREATION**

- **Funding Source**
  - **Locally Generated Funds**
  - **\$1.5 Million for Equipment and Supplies**
  
- **Manpower**
  - **Management Guidance by Community Council**
  
- **Operations and Maintenance**
  - **Maintenance (Community)**
  - **Utilities (Paid direct to UTNG)**



Information Briefing

# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **HOUSING**

- **Funding Source**
  - Mortgage *Let them buy*
  - Rents *no*
- **Manpower**
  - **Planned Unit Development Council**
- **Operations and Maintenance**
  - **Rentals - UTNG**
  - **Purchased - Individual**



Information Briefing

**Utah Army National Guard  
English Village Proposal  
SUPPORT FACILITIES**

<b>Clinic</b>	<b>Gas Station</b>
<b>Fire Station</b>	<b>Commissary</b>
<b>Post Exchange</b>	<b>Guard House</b>
<b>Theater</b>	<b>Chapel</b>

- No Rent Required**
- Utilities Reimbursed**



Information Briefing

# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **EQUIPMENT**

- **Table of Distribution Allowances Equipment**
  - **Facilities Maintenance Equipment**
  - \* **Lateral Transfer**
  
- **Common Table of Allowances**
  - **Office Furniture, Etc.**
  - \* **Lateral Transfer**
  
- **Installation Property**
  - **In-Place Equipment**
  - \* **Lateral Transfer**



Information Briefing

# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **INFRASTRUCTURE**

- **Waste Collection**
- **Telecommunications**
- **Power Distribution**
- **Road Maintenance**
- **Sewer Distribution**
- **Water Distribution**



Information Briefing

# Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal **MANAGEMENT**

---

- **Management Committees**
  - **Executive Council**
  - **MWR Council**
  - **Housing Council**

Information Briefing



**Utah Army National Guard  
English Village Proposal  
FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS**

- **6.5 Years Initial Operation**
  - **Cost Avoidance Monies (Legislative Action)**
- **Revenue Sources**
  - **Housing (Rental/Sales)**
  - **Billeting**
  - **Governmental Use**
  - **Commercial Development**



Information Briefing


# **Utah Army National Guard English Village Proposal CONCLUSIONS**

- **Benefits of National Guard Acquisition**
  - **Supports National Guard's Mission**
  - **Community Remains**
  - **Supports/Enhances TECOM's Mission**
  - **Enhances Tooele County**
  - **Supports Potential State Missions**
- **No State Liability**
- **Legislative Action if Plan Approved**



Information Briefing

# Document Separator



# *DUGWAY PROVING GROUND*

---

■ **Community Briefing**

■ **BRAC Site Visit**

■ **April 13, 1995**



# *DoD ACTIONS TO DATE*

- 
- March 22 Meeting with Army
  - February 10 OSD Memo
  - April 17 OSD BRAC Testimony

JAMES V. HANSEN

UTAH DISTRICT OFFICE

COMMITTEES:

NATIONAL SECURITY

RESOURCES

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

ROOM 248

RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4401

CELL 225-4452

# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

### Washington, DC 20515-4401

UTAH DISTRICT OFFICE  
 100 WEST CENTER STREET  
 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102  
 (801) 467-4401  
 FAX (801) 467-4402  
 435 EAST DUBUQUE BLVD  
 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84103  
 (801) 467-1077

# COPY

March 24, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
 Chairman - Defense Base Closure and  
 Realignment Commission  
 1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
 Arlington, Virginia 22209

RE: U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS, UTAH

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing to notify you of a significant development relating to the U.S. Army's recommendation to "realign" Dugway Proving Grounds.

On Wednesday, March 22, 1995 at 1:30 p.m. in my Rayburn office, I met with Mr. Walter W. Hollis, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research; Lt. General John Coburn, Deputy Director of U.S. Army Materiel Command; Ms. Alma Moore, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations; and Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marriott, U.S. Army TABS Analyst, to discuss the Army's recommendation for Dugway Proving Ground. Also in attendance were Ms. E. Jean Turner, Congressional Liaison for the U.S. Army Materiel Command; Lieutenant Colonel David M. Reed, Army Legislative Liaison; as well as Mr. Steve Petersen and Mr. Bill Johnson of my personal staff.

I had fully intended on asking these Army officials some difficult questions regarding the Army's initial recommendation. However, before I even got a chance, Mr. Hollis indicated that the initial recommendation which was included in the February 28, 1995 Department of Defense announcement, was misleading and used "the wrong numbers."

Mr. Hollis, with the concurrence of General Coburn and Ms. Moore, further indicated that they would provide me with a revised "COBRA" analysis and language for the recommendation to realign Dugway Proving Ground. Mr. Hollis indicated that it was "never the Army's intent" to move the biological (BL-3) testing from Dugway to Aberdeen, Maryland, because of the lack of state permits in Maryland. The same was true with the smoke and obscurant testing. The Army, he said, did not plan to move it to Yuma, Arizona, because of the permitting issue.

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon

PAGE 2:  
March 24, 1995

Mr. Hollis and General Coburn reiterated the need to keep Dugway's testing missions in place, and that the revised COBRA analysis would basically show that the "realignment" would consist of the disposal of Dugway's housing area, referred to as "English Village," and the elimination of 329 civilian positions associated with support of English Village.

Enclosed is a copy of the newly revised COBRA analysis which was provided to my office one day later, on March 23, 1995, by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marriott. As you can see, it recommends realigning Dugway by "closing English Village." This differs considerably from the original COBRA recommendation provided to the Commission on February 28, 1995. As you recall, that recommendation listed not only the closure of English Village, but also the relocation of 338 test positions. The new COBRA analysis now lists only 82 positions to be realigned.

Inasmuch as the original flawed recommendation is currently before the Commission, I requested these Army officials to contact you and your staff to relay the Army's revised language. They indicated to me that they would contact you and provide you with this information.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward to working with you and the Commission to resolve the final recommendation for Dugway.

Sincerely yours,

  
James V. Hansen  
Member of Congress

JVH:sp  
Enclosure (1)

cc: The Honorable Togo West  
Governor Mike Leavitt  
Senator Orrin Hatch  
Senator Bob Bennett



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



CLOSE HOLD - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

10 February 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY (ECONOMIC REINVESTMENT AND BRAC)

SUBJECT: Functional Assessment of Proposed Military Department Base Realignment and Closure Actions

Proposed BRAC actions by the MILDEPs as available on 9 February 1995, have been reviewed, and except as identified in the attachments, determined to be acceptable from the perspective of the DoD test and evaluation mission. Of those in the attachments, two are considered to be major showstoppers (regarding Dugway Proving Grounds and Fort Hunter-Liggett), and another a minor showstopper (Tunnel 9 inclusion in the White Oak closure). The remainder are considered incomplete requiring additional alternatives to be analyzed before we can agree to them.

DONALD E. COVEY  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS  
TEST AND EVALUATION

JOHN H. BURR  
DIRECTOR, TEST  
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING  
EVALUATION

ATTACHMENTS: a/s

CLOSE HOLD - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

## CLOSE HOLD - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

### ISSUE

The Army's proposal to realign Dugway Proving Grounds to relocate the "chemical-biological research" mission to Aberdeen/Edgewood should be challenged, and the alternative of relocating the chem-bio mission from Aberdeen/Edgewood to Dugway investigated. And rationale for relocating the smoke-obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Grounds is not clear.

### RATIONALE

1. Dugway occupies valuable land and airspace to the test and evaluation mission that can't be conducted elsewhere without high risks of environmental and security compromise, and needs to be preserved as a national asset for such purposes. Test missions ranging from electronic combat, cruise missiles, high performance aircraft, munitions and armament delivery, and artillery, as well as chemical-biological testing, are typically conducted at this location because of its unique geographic features.
2. Moving levels 2 and 3 chemical-biological agent "research" to Aberdeen/Edgewood is high risk. Edgewood is in and near highly populated areas (including Baltimore), as well as near major bodies of water (Chesapeake Bay), where accidents or miscalculations can result in environmental impact with little chance for timely control.
3. Costs to duplicate at Edgewood the recently constructed new facilities and capabilities that are at Dugway will be an unnecessary tax burden. Other facilities at Edgewood would likewise have to undergo major repairs at additional costs.
4. Differentiation between "research" and testing is not identified in the write-up. By Memorandum of Agreement between all three Military Departments under T&E Reliance, Dugway is the site where all DoD testing of chem-bio programs will be tested - Agreement by the other Military Departments would be required along with agreement that all of their requirements can be satisfied at Edgewood.

### RECOMMENDATION

Army withdraw proposal to change status of Dugway, and instead develop proposal to relocate and consolidate all chem-bio testing and research activities to Dugway.

CLOSE HOLD - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE





# ***ENGLISH VILLAGE - MILITARY VALUE***

- 
- **Critical Support of Test Mission**
    - *Impractical and Unsafe to Commute*
    - *Irregular Testing Schedules*
    - *Quality of Life Issues!*



# *MILITARY VALUE*

## *(continued)*

---

### ■ *Medical Facilities*

- *Required for Test Mission Safety*
- *BRAC Cobra Realigns These Positions*

### ■ *DITTO Field MILCON Requirements*

- *BAKER LAB Unsatisfactory*
- *Administrative and Supply Complex*
- *Expanded Medical and Fire Facilities*

# ***ARMY COBRA FLAWS***

---

- **Realigns 329 Base Ops Positions?**
  - *Only 250 Current Positions*
- **Realigns Command and Control Positions?**
  - *Same People Perform Test Functions*
- **Realigns 64 Support Positions?**
  - *DPG Will Still Require Medical, Commissary and Exchange Support*
- **Savings of \$312 Million Grossly Overstated**



Don't Close English  
Village!

Keep America Strong!

National Association of Government Employees

#R14-9

Michael D. LeFevre, President

# The Best in Test

DPG Employees

- ▶ Dedicated
- ▶ Committed
- ▶ Highly educated
- ▶ Multi-disciplinary
- ▶ Irreplaceable as a group

# Workforce Concerns

NAGE R14-9

- ▶ Worker Turmoil(RIF)
- ▶ Worker Safety(Long commuting)
- ▶ Absence of Housing in reasonable proximity to DPG
- ▶ Quality of our Product
- ▶ Increased operating costs if proposal adopted(every employee entitled to travel pay, including contractors)

# Other Options Deserve Consideration

- ▶ Move other missions to DPG
- ▶ Partner with National Guard
- ▶ Fully develop "Reliance" concept, and other services for their share of DPG support

# World Class Community

enhances Testing Mission

- ▶ Established to support test mission
- ▶ Safe, clean community
- ▶ Excellent schools, state lead in sports, music, and academics for its size
- ▶ Diverse community
- ▶ Closing rifts life-long relationships apart

# Document Separator

6 April 1995

Mr. Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am enclosing a Guest Commentary I wrote and that was published 5 April in the Standard Examiner Newspaper. I hope you and your staff can find time to read and consider what I have to say.

I have over 30 years service at Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, most of which was as a top management official and feel I am very qualified to know what has and will happen if we ever have another major military action in the Pacific area.

DLA's plan to close DDO and replace it with the Sharpe Depot has gross weaknesses to it. Sharpe Depot will never be capable of handling the workload accomplished by DDO during Vietnam. Moving stocks anywhere near the problem area of the Oakland Port is a major mistake. DDO is located at the best vantage point.

DDO, as the primary depot for DLA stocks and with Tracy Depot primary for subsistence was a team that was highly successful during Vietnam. Why discard a proven track record for one that has not been tested in the real world? I don't think intelligent men will.

Thank You,

John L. Stewart  
1251 Hudson Street  
Ogden, UT 84404  
Phone (801) 394-0384

# Supply depot should stay in 'hub of West'



■ **John Stewart**  
Guest Commentary

Ogden was selected for the building of a supply depot with the strategic location of a superb highway, rail and air capability to all west coast ports of embarkation and central service to all military activities in the Western United States as the compelling factors.

The history of what has actually happened since 1940 bears out the facts and proof that Ogden was and still is the tremendous "hub of the West."

The records achieved over the years by DDO are proof beyond a doubt that it is the No. 1 supply depot. It has always been number one in:

1. Cost effectiveness.
2. Highest productivity per employee.
3. Responsiveness to all situations.
4. On-time shipments.
5. Cost reductions.
6. Inventiveness to new management programs.
7. New mechanization of warehouse operations.
8. Computer applications to warehouse and transportation operations.
9. Zero-defects performance.

There are many others too numerous to mention.

Let's take the Vietnam situation and briefly review the performance of DDO during that period.

Prior to Vietnam, the depot was at a low of about 1,500 employees with a large portion of these employed in Engineering and QM Depot Maintenance.

On Jan. 1, 1964, DDO was transferred from the Army to the Defense Supply Agency. Its mission was vastly expanded in both areas to serve and the types of items to handle.

The buildup started in 1963, and soon after we were heavily involved in supplies to Vietnam. The depot and the surrounding communities responded rapidly just as they had in WWII and Korea.

New items stored were electronics, industrial and construction, along with expanded general supplies, clothing and textiles.

Our mission area expanded to west of the Mississippi and the Pacific. We went from a few trucks and rail cars in and out to a peak of about 186 rail cars and 200 trucks in and out each day, seven days a week. It was whole trains coming and going. We were shipping 40 percent of the DLA tonnage and 60 per-

cent of the line items to Vietnam.

Besides rail and trucks, we moved tremendous tons of stock via LOGAIR flights out of HAFB and SLC International airports. We did all of this in a cost-effective manner with on-time shipments to our troops.

It couldn't have been accomplished without DDO's always dedicated employees, outstanding community support, and especially Weber State College (University) furnishing as many as 650 college students to work for us on swing and grave shifts.

Also, the truck companies and the railroads were most responsive.

No other DLA depot has met such a test for performance, nor do I think any of them are capable of such a challenge; maybe on paper, but never in the "real world."

During this same period, we bailed out the Tracy Depot and took over part of their subsistence and general supplies missions. We also bailed out the Oakland port, which in every major war mission in the Pacific becomes overloaded, backed-up, confused, etc., and asks for help.

In the early 1990s, DLA added an additional depot to its system — Sharpe Depot. Why they took over more storage space when they were already in an excess position can only be because of some inexperienced supply personnel in the headquarters who believed storage close to the coast is better.


Sharpe is untested and has no track record for being able to handle DDO's mission in the real world of another Vietnam. Where is good statistical evidence that Sharpe would be nearly as cost-effective or could it perform at peak emergencies?

The Department of Defense and the BRAC Committee's objective is to down-size, but to retain the best possible defense readiness posture.

Why would anyone want to close a superb depot like DDO with a proven track record during many emergencies, always No. 1 in performance.


This whole exercise of DLA replacing Ogden Depot with Sharpe Depot can be likened to the Chicago Bulls coach replacing Michael Jordan with a new rookie for the big game. The main difference is that here we may be affecting our national future.

*John Stewart was director of planning and management resources at DDO before retiring.*



**Hill/DDO '95  
COMMUNITY  
PRESENTATION**

Hill/DDO '95



# **DEFENSE DEPOT OGDEN UTAH**

## **DDOU**

**MAJOR GENERAL MIKE PAVICH, USAF (retired)**

**PRESIDENT, HILL/DDO '95, INC.**



## **PURPOSE:**

**To demonstrate that:**

- **DLA deviated from base closure criteria in selection of DDOU for closure**
  
- **DLA did not comply with law**
  - Installations not considered equally**
  
  - Appearance of pre-selection**



# **WHAT IS THE REAL MILITARY VALUE OF A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM?**

## **To Provide:**

- 1) What the customer wants**
  - 2) Where they want it**
  - 3) When they want it**
  - 4) At the lowest possible cost**
- All of these factors are measured**
  - All impact operational readiness of DoD's total force**
  - None were used in DLA's evaluation of military value**
  - This is a deviation from Criteria I**




## **OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES GIVEN LEAST CONSIDERATION --**

### **WHEN IN FACT IT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT**

**Example:**

- **DLA pays for its operation by charging the services for each transaction -- (currently \$27.60)**  
**-- Almost \$1 billion annually**



**O & M = Operations and Maintenance  
Budget**

**X = Operations Tempo (Exercise of  
Military Muscle)**

**Y = Supplies**

**Z = Maintenance of Military Equipment**

**X + Y + Z = O & M = Military Readiness**

**Using proven cost effective depots drives Y down and provides  
more \$ for ops. tempo and maintenance**

**-- REAL MILITARY VALUE --**



**DDOU HAS BEEN THE  
DLA LEADER  
IN COST EFFICIENT OPERATIONS**

Current Unit Cost

DDOU \$21.13

Projected Unit Cost \$18.56

**WHY?**


- Lower Labor Cost
- Cheaper Transportation
- Lower Depot Operating Costs
- More Productive Work Force
- Reimbursable Workload
- Designed for Fast Moving Stock



**DLA'S OWN STUDY (KPMG) DEFINES  
DDOU AS THE MOST COST EFFICIENT  
DEPOT OF CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA AND  
UTAH DEPOTS**

**DLA INAPPROPRIATELY DISREGARDED THEIR  
(KPMG) COMMISSIONED ANALYSIS  
DEMONSTRATING DDOU AS THE MOST COST  
EFFICIENT DEPOT OPERATION**

**-- Chairman Dixon's question was inaccurately answered**



**Question:**

**WHY WOULD DLA DISREGARD  
THEIR OWN COMMISSIONED ANALYSIS?**

**Answer:**

**TO DEFEND A PRE-CONCEIVED CONCEPT  
OF OPERATIONS**

## REVIEW OF THE MINUTES OF DLA'S BRAC EXECUTIVE GROUP INDICATE:

- 1) Eight stand alone depots were considered at the beginning of the process
- 2) In April 1994, the concept of operations pre-selected California and Pennsylvania depots to be combined and called primary distribution sites (PDS) -- no analysis was involved
- 3) In August 1994, the direction was taken to change con. ops. to remove the appearance of pre-decision



## **MINUTES OF DLA'S BRAC EXECUTIVE GROUP**

### **April 1994:**


"We need to insure the concept of operations is well crafted so it fully supports our BRAC '95 decisions."

### **Decisions Reached:**

"Primary Distribution Sites (PDS's) at San Joaquin (Tracy and Sharpe facilities) and Susquehanna (Mechanicsburg and New Cumberland facilities) will not be reviewed in BRAC '95."


### **August 1994:**

"The Distribution Concept of Operations was changed to remove any appearance of pre-decision about the location of the primary distribution sites."




**THE BRAC LAW STATES  
THAT EACH INSTALLATION WILL  
BE TREATED EQUALLY**



Contrary to 1993 -- DLA arbitrarily combined  
stand alone depots and evaluated them as  
one -- they violated the law





**DLA STATES THAT STRATEGIC LOCATION  
AND THE CAPABILITY TO PROCESS  
WARTIME REQUIREMENTS  
WERE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE**

However, no analysis  
was accomplished in this area --  
especially performance during past contingencies











**8 OF 10 DDOU TOP CUSTOMERS  
IN UTAH OR POINTS EAST**

**A=First Destination \$\$**  
**B=Second Destination \$\$**



**A=First Destination \$\$**  
**B=Second Destination \$\$**



**DLA CRITERIA SKEWS THE  
OUTCOME OF THE MILITARY VALUE  
ANALYSIS -- FAVORS COMBINED DEPOTS**


- CCP points wrongly awarded to provide advantage
- Throughput capacity improperly used
- Changes from '93 to '95 support pre-selected PDS's



## WHAT IS A CCP?

All depots have the capability and many have  
served as a CCP.

CCP points should be assigned  
*equally* to all depots --  
**or assigned to none.**



**EXISTING WORKLOAD DOES NOT  
REPRESENT THE THROUGHPUT  
CAPACITY/CAPABILITY OF A DEPOT.**

DLA's use of **existing** workload  
skews the data and is totally misleading  
in evaluating a depot's military value.




**WITH THESE CORRECTIONS IN PLACE AND  
TREATING EACH INSTALLATION EQUALLY,  
WHAT WOULD THE OUTCOME BE?**



# STAND ALONE ANALYSIS


## (8 DEPOTS)

DEPOT	MISSION SCOPE	MISSION SUIT.	OPS. EFF.	EXPANSION	TOTAL
Tracy	161	374	63	91	689
Ogden	133	364	72	106	675
Sharpe	161	339	69	106	675
New Cumb.	139	364	72	68	643
Memphis	126	369	76	67	638
Mechanicsburg	139	346	73	70	628
Richmond	141	312	80	35	568
Columbus	132	277	84	58	551



## STAND ALONE ANALYSIS COMPARING COMBINATIONS

DEPOT	MISSION SCOPE	MISSION SUIT.	OPS. EFF.	EXPANSION	TOTAL
Tracy/Sharpe	161	337	70	112	680
Tracy/Ogden	183	414	71	130	798
Ogden/Sharpe	183	405	71	128	787




**OTHER FACTORS DEMONSTRATE  
IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS:**



# ON-TIME RECEIPTS

## Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93




% On Time	■	99.9	99.5	99.1	98.8	98.5	98.4	97.0	95.1
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


# DENIALS

## Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93




% Denials	0.59	0.61	0.65	0.76	0.83	0.90	0.91	1.06
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# LOCATOR ACCURACY

## Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93




% Accuracy	■	99.7	99.1	99.0	97.7	97.5	96.2	96.0	93.8
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# ON-TIME MRO PROCESSING

## IPG I

### Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93




% On Time	99.5	99.3	99.1	98.2	98.1	96.2	96.1	57.3
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


# ON-TIME MRO PROCESSING IPG II

## Composite of FY91, FY92, & FY93




% On Time	■	99.6	99.5	99.4	99.1	98.5	97.5	94.3	63.9
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## **REIMBURSABLE WORKLOAD:**


### **DEPMEDS -- DEPLOYABLE MEDICAL FACILITIES**

- Army wants to stay in Ogden
- Reduced cost of operations
- Costly to move




## TENANTS

- IRS (not considered) -- approaching 900 people
- DLA's System Design Center must stay or lose knowledge base
- Costly to move
- Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) is best suited to Ogden location



## SUMMARY:


- DDOU is the most cost efficient depot as demonstrated by the KMPG analysis
- DDOU provides added flexibility and better strategic location
- DDOU's history demonstrates it is the supplier of choice
- DDOU is **the constant in any optimal western depot combination** -- *"Any team Michael Jordan plays on is the best team."*



# **DLA DOES NEED TO REDUCE EXCESS WAREHOUSE CAPACITY**

Given this evaluation, we believe the **true DLA**  
excess in the west is at Sharpe.



**Sharpe, not Defense Depot Ogden, is the obvious**  
closure candidate.



## IN CONCLUSION:

# WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE DLA PROCESS

- 1) Deviated from the closure criteria
  - In not selecting the best military value combination
  - In not selecting the most cost effective combination
- 2) Did not treat all installations equally
- 3) Gives the appearance of pre-selection



**Hill/DDO '95  
ADDITIONAL  
INFORMATION**

# HILL/DDO '95

27 March 1995

## DDOU DISCUSSION OUTLINE

### INTRODUCTION

#### I. DLA SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED

- Did not comply with law
- Did not consider the most cost efficient operation
- Appearance of pre-selection

#### II. BRAC LAW

- Mandates bases to be given equal consideration
- Not the case in DLA process
- Requires individual evaluation of each base or evaluation of all combinations

#### III. DLA CHANGED THE EVALUATION CRITERIA FROM FY '93 TO FY '95 (POINT VALUES) EVEN THOUGH DOD DID NOT CHANGE THE BASE CRITERIA

- Operational efficiency category downgraded
- Redefined criteria to support recent DLA management decisions

#### IV. DLA'S STUDY OF OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES NOT USED IN BRAC EVALUATION

- DLA's response to the Commission's inquiry inaccurate regarding their study
- Peat Marwick group's cost analysis is pertinent certifiable data that should be used (see Attachment 3)
  - Costs between depots are comparable
  - DDOU, even with changing workload mix, is still the least cost per line item
- Must consider depreciation as a cost -- includes new facilities and equipment (DLA did not consider)
- This will drive up customer costs for every transaction in the future
- Keeping big, new facilities is not in the best interest of DoD -- unless demonstrated efficiencies offset depreciation costs (Peat Marwick study)

## MILITARY VALUE

- Skewed by DLA depot combinations (see Attachment 2)
  - Throughput capacity inappropriately treated
- DDOU/Tracy combination has highest military value for western operations using DLA criteria
- DDOU/Tracy combination reduces DLA's risk of inadequate storage capacity
- DDOU/Tracy gives added military value
  - Much better strategic location:
    - Geographic separation in case of attack or natural disaster
    - Proximity to Hill AFB a major plus -- demonstrated in past contingency operations
    - DDOU is the transportation hub of the west (see supporting data)
- DDOU/Tracy provides more cost efficient operation than Sharpe/Tracy
  - DLA "SAILS" model will support (see Attachment 4)
- Demonstrated past performance
  - Vietnam:
    - 40% of tonnage and 60% of line items sent to Pacific area from DDOU
    - Manpower build-up from 1,500 to 5,600 demonstrates system expansion capability
    - Assumed some of Tracy's missions because of capability (back-up demonstrated)
  - Desert Storm:
    - DDOU took up slack when New Cumberland could not keep up
    - Used Hill AFB to ship "over the top" to Europe
    - Used rail for medical hospital shipments to New Orleans when other ports overloaded
  - Six continuous years as best depot installation in DLA (1987-1993)
    - Won Commander-in-Chief Award in 1987
    - Selected as test/implementation site for distribution automated systems
    - Recognized as best DLA depot since 1964

## IV. HAZARDOUS STORAGE A MAJOR CONSIDERATION

- DDOU established as hazardous storage for the west because of excellent record, workforce, and facilities

DLA took on the mission of distribution for DoD in 1961. DDOU, formerly the Utah Army Depot, was DLA's first choice of the Army Depots considered to come under DLA in 1964. Not all of the Army depots were accepted by DLA in 1964, Sharpe Army Depot, for instance. Since that time DDOU has been the leader in DLA distribution in terms of efficiency and economy as well as customer responsiveness.

During the 60's and 70's DDOU adopted an aggressive modernization program. Leading edge technology was incorporated into the DDOU processes. In some instances industry lacked the technology DDOU sought and as a result DDOU pioneered many of the processes now used in the distribution industry. For instance, the first storage carousel anywhere was fabricated at DDOU. The first laser marking system was developed at DDOU to address containers. DDOU was instrumental in developing the bar code technology appearing throughout DoD.

Unlike some of the Services, cost effectiveness and performance were closely measured for economic pay back before requesting funding. Quick amortization was always the measure of continued pursuit of a new idea. The private sector distribution giants came to DDOU to learn the latest technologies.

It was during this period of modernization that DDOU incurred the irritation of some of the DLA headquarters middle managers. They became somewhat annoyed at DDOU for their impertinence in stepping beyond the DLA planners and designers in getting improvements installed. In addition, the relationship between DDOU and the nearest trailing competitor in performance, efficiency and cost - Defense Depot Tracy, Ca.- became increasingly adversarial. Eventually, the DLA middle managers and even some of the top managers from competing activities, who had migrated to the decision making chairs at DLA, took the opportunity to eliminate DDOU.

In 1979 DLA announced it's intention to close DDOU. Their decision was not based on efficiency, performance or cost, but primarily on it's geographical location,

With a high level of support from the community and the state government, DDOU presented the facts and figures that should have been researched beforehand. DDOU was successful in refuting DLA's plan. However, DDOU's success was not without consequences. It served to deepen the antagonism of DLA and DDTC toward DDOU.

During the 80's almost all distribution activities began exploring modernization technologies not just within DLA but all the services. It was a decade of competition among the services as to who could buy and install the latest, fanciest, prettiest equipment and facilities. Unfortunately, not enough regard was given the actual capacity required based on workload projections. By the end of the decade DoD found that it had spent hundreds of millions in dollars for capacity that far exceeded requirements.

The Navy built four mechanized facilities called NISTARS. The Army planned three more called AOD's, and DLA built still two more called IMC's. All were very expensive and many could not deliver the throughput advertised.

In 1986-87 DLA conducted a Binnable Stock Location Study while DLA yet included only six distribution activities at Tracy, Ca., Ogden, Ut., Memphis, Tn., Columbus, Oh., Mechanicsburg, Pa., and Richmond, Va. The purpose of the study was to determine where to place active binnables to gain the best economy and responsiveness.

The study concluded that DDOU was the best placement. In 1988 DLA announced that DDOU would be the single stockage location for binnables. DDOU responded to that new increased role by installing additional bin locations within existing buildings, in contrast to what the Army and the Navy were pursuing - funding for entirely new buildings filled with equipment.

With the publication of Defense Management Review Decision 902 in 1990, DLA inherited twenty-seven additional distribution sites. To manage the increase in span of control DLA adopted a plan to "regionalize". The number of regions were yet to be determined and also their location. Ogden appeared to be a true front runner candidate for a region headquarters because of it's excellent performance, lowest cost, and largest size. In October, 1990 DLA announced there would be three regions with the headquarters at Tracy, Ca., Memphis, Tn. and Mechanicsburg, Pa.

Ogden, was not included in any of the three regions, but remained autonomous as a single depot appearing as an asterisk on the regions maps. Of major impact to DDOU was the designation of the three regions to be Primary Distribution Sites where DLA intended to place the most active items. DDOU was to be a Specialized Storage Site of lesser activity. These decisions were made in spite of the Binnable Stock Location Study advising otherwise.

DDOU proposed a plan to DLA that included four regions. It provided a better balance of sites within a region and better span of control, optimized space availability, improved storage occupancy rates, and shorter transportation distances to western customers.

DLA countered with their own study called the Primary Distribution Site Location Analysis. That study had several critical flaws all of which were to DDOU's disadvantage. It understated DDOU's true throughput capacity by almost half. It used what DLA called a generic unit cost figure, which was actually an average of all DLA activities. This obviously would favor higher cost depots. The study used the same bin/bulk ratio for all depots which would favor a bulk depot. Though DLA responded to DDOU's objections with a promise to correct the erroneous figures and rerun the study, it was never done. DDOU reran of the study anyway with the corrections. The result was that the figures supported a two Primary Distribution Site concept - Ogden, Ut. and Mechanicsburg, Pa.

In 1992 DLA explored a stockage policy called "closest to the vendor". It specified that there were savings to be had by placing the most active items at the closest PDS to the vendor instead of the customer. DLA concluded this was a good approach since it was nearly impossible to predict where the customer would ultimately be but it was possible to determine where the vendor would probably be for the next replenishment buy. This would save first destination transportation charges (vendor to depot) but had little effect on second destination charges (depot to customer) which were not predictable anyway.

What this new concept did not consider was the internal operational costs inside the depot to process the new receipt and ultimately to process the eventual shipments to customers. In fact, only eleven percent of the total cost to deliver an item to a customer is involved in transportation. And only 10%-15% of the receiving process cost at a depot involves new procurements. The majority of the receiving workload is in base returns and redistributions. So the study attempted to save considerable funds by influencing only 15% of the workload and only 11% of the cost.

DDOU tried to convince DLA of the geographic advantages of Ogden known for decades to railroad barons and highway builders. That advantage, when carefully considered becomes obvious. The preponderance of the vendors supplying DLA and much of the private sector are located in the "rust belt" - Ohio, Pennsylvania, etc. That means items purchased by the customers on the west coast predominantly migrate from east to west with a stop "somewhere" for storage for some period of time until an order is received. The main artery from the rust belt to the west coast is Interstate 80. Obviously, a depot on that artery is in a strategic economical location. But not just anywhere on I-80. The best place is at a cross roads with a north-south artery.

Looking only at Ogden/Tracy, they are both near I-80, and they are both on north south arteries, as well. But, Ogden has a distinct advantage over a California location. For example a customer in San Diego orders an item from DLA which probably came west from the rust belt. If the item had been stocked at Ogden it would travel 750 miles less in total than had it been stocked at Tracy. That is because it would go directly from Ogden to San Diego on southbound I-15 without ever having traveled across Nevada. The same advantage exists for, say, Bremerton Wa. Even if the customer is in the Bay Area, the miles are no worse than equal. In addition, about 15% of the time the customer is east of both Tracy and Ogden. In this case the item moves west on I-80 and then back east on I-80. But, at least, with a stockage point of Ogden the Nevada miles are avoided twice - 1500 miles.

The strategic location Ogden enjoys is one of the primary reasons that Utah is experiencing an extraordinary growth in private sector, profit motivated distribution corporations migrating from California and other western states.

In terms of speed of delivery, Ogden is almost the same distance from San Diego and Bremerton as Tracy. But, probably due to uncongested highways, Ogden's delivery to

either area is faster than Tracy. Even to the Bay Area Ogden is only a half day behind Tracy.

Ogden even tried to dissuade DLA from their intentions using "customer" endorsements. Among them were;

"DDOU stands out as the overall best in terms of excellence in achieving their mission."..."very difficult to overlook this area (Ogden) as a premium storage location of choice"..."We should reconsider the decision to store all our material at New Cumberland"....Captain Malsack, USN, DISC.

DLA will pay unnecessarily high first destination costs to a higher cost PDS while a lower cost SDS (Specialized Storage Site is closest to vendor..."  
Gen. Browning, DCSC

"\$14.4 million more cost to handle DESC items"...Gen. Oster, DESC.

DDOU was the only activity not placed under a region. The asterisk was due primarily to the lack of facts for not selecting Ogden as a region headquarters, the political pressure to produce the facts, and, DLA's recognition that they could not support DDOU's nonselection with irrefutable data. It became apparent that DLA chose to delay the consequences of placing DDOU under a region. Further inquiries by DDOU, congressional sources, and the Utah community were basically patronized or ignored.

While DDOU was not yet a region, it was, at least, still autonomous with a full support staff very capable of collecting, reviewing and analyzing information about DDOU's operation, cost, performance and planning. It was through that Command staff that DDOU developed and forwarded the critical information submitted to the 1993 BRAC. That information, compared to the information from other DLA activities, reflected DDOU's posture to be near the top in all critical categories. For example the throughput capacity for DDOU was over six million line items annually, not including Hill which was separate in the '93 BRAC.

In February 1993 DLA announced that DDOU, historically DLA's leader among the depots, would become subservient to it's former sister depot to the west. The justification of course, was the savings this strategy promised. But, other combinations of activities were not reviewed. The decision was made without the benefit of a full analysis for alternatives offering greater savings. DLA also reduced from three regions to two by placing Memphis under DDRE in New Cumberland.

DLA assumed the two region headquarters activities would become their TWO distribution "super depots" with all other depots in support of these SUPER-TWO. No analysis has been done which validates the selection of the these super depots. Probably, due, in part, to DDOU's objections and inquiries, DLA contracted Peat Marwick

Management Consultants to provide an analysis advising the most economical structure to support DLA's overall distribution mission. That analysis did not support DLA's concept of operation. It concluded that DDOU as a Primary Distribution Site was most economical - not DDRW. DLA ignored the recommendation.

DDRW acted quickly in asserting its authority over DDOU. Ogden began a precipitous decline in workload, decision making authority, and responsibility. One result of DDOU's new and lesser posture was the loss of authority to influence its own destiny in terms of continued improvements, workload, processes, and policies. Most of the Command staff was placed directly under region supervision. DDOU objections to DDRW decisions detrimental to Ogden were muzzled and attempts to revise flawed information concerning DDOU were repudiated. The most glaring example is the 1995 BRAC submission itself.

While there are flaws in the data, the most glaring errors are in the assumptions under which the data was assembled. Unlike 1993, DLA chose to combine all information regarding Sharpe Army Depot, in Lathrop, California and Defense Depot Tracy, California thereby making it impossible to review each of these activities separately or in alternative combinations with other activities that may prove more economical. One obvious advantage given the Tracy depot and the Sharpe depot is in the area of throughput, a critical data point since it weighs heavily in the BRAC criteria of MILITARY VALUE. DLA's assumption that two distinct activities could be considered to be ONE activity appears neither appropriate nor equitable for BRAC purposes. BRAC submissions to be most accurate and fair must remain discreet by site.

# DDO FACT SHEET

- **Total jobs to be lost due to closure - 1,365**
  - Civilian - 1,092**
  - Military - 3**
  - Tenants - 270**
  
- **Total amount of wages to be lost due to closure - \$54,800,000**
  - Civilian - 40,800,000**
  - Military - 200,000**
  - Tenants - 13,800,000**
  
- **Average wage of civilian jobs to be lost - \$40,088**
  - Civilian - \$37,362**
  - Tenant - \$51,111**
  
- **Amount of contracted funds to be lost - \$17,800,000**

- Total general and administrative overhead as a percentage of direct cost
  - DDSP = 106%
  - DDJC = 96%
  - DDOU = 80% (lowest)
  
- Total indirect overhead as a percentage of direct cost (only 10% of total cost)
  - DDSP = 26%
  - DDJC = 17%
  - DDOU = 30% (highest)
  
- Comparable mission indicators included
  - Unit cost by depot (includes bin, bulk and hazardous)
    - DDSP = \$23 per line
    - DDJC = \$21 per line
    - DDOU = \$16 per line (lowest)
  
  - Direct cost per line (includes bin, bulk and hazardous)
    - DDSP = \$7.86
    - DDJC = \$7.32
    - DDOU = \$6.36 (lowest)

- Sharpe/Tracy does not have hazardous storage capability or trained work force
- Hazardous waste user fees in California will drive up cost of operations in that state
- DDOU/Tracy means no requirement to build hazardous storage facility or train a new work force

VII. BETTER RETURN ON INVESTMENT WITH DDOU/TRACY COMBINATION

- Less costly to close Sharpe than DDOU (est. \$80 million vs. \$110 million)
- DDOU has lowest cost per square feet for RPM of any DLA depot (DLA analysis)
- DDOU reimbursable workload offsets DLA's costs of operations at Ogden site
- Tenants:
  - DMRS West and DSDC are best suited to Ogden operation
  - DSDC knowledge based workforce will not move -- irreplaceable in short term
  - Army wants reimbursable workload done in Ogden -- much work to build integrated operation

SUMMARY

- DLA must consider other base combinations or each individually
- Data supports DDOU/Tracy combination with closure of Sharpe

# HILL/DDO '95

27 March 1995

## (ATTACHMENT 1)

### BRAC '93 VERSUS BRAC '95 POINT ALLOCATIONS

	1993	1995
Mission Scope (essentially '93)	200	290
Strategic Location	140	100
Contingency Op. Readiness (CCP 100)	0	140
Mission Suitability	350	475
Age and Condition of Facility	100	135
Storage Capacity (excess)	25	150
Specialized Storage	70	10
Throughput Capacity (design to workload)	25	150
Location	50	20
Operational Efficiencies	275	100
Base Operating Costs*	195	70
Transportation Costs	60	30
Expandability	175	135
Facility/Installation Expansion	150	115
Mobilization	25	20

**\*Note: ('93 included all Peat Marwick comparable costs, '95 excluded all Peat Marwick comparable costs)**

## (ATTACHMENT 3)

### KPMG PEAT MARWICK STUDY FOR DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY DISTRIBUTION DEPOT COST DATA ANALYSIS -- JANUARY 1994

#### Depreciation

- DLA BRAC did not consider depreciation
  - Should have been used to reduce the points applied to "Age and Condition of Facilities."
- Depreciation increases the cost to do business. DLA passes this cost on to the services through discrete pricing (unit costs)

"Depots with new and expensive buildings and equipment will cost more than a depot with older buildings/equipment." (KPMG Peat Marwick Management Briefing -- Rev. 1 -- January 1994)

#### Unit Cost

- Data Comparability: "Our analysis revealed that bin, bulk and hazardous receipts and issues were comparable missions within the depots analyzed." (Tracy, Sharpe, Mechanicsburg, New Cumberland and DDOU Ogden.)
- Comparable general indicators included:
  - Total direct costs per employee
    - DDSP = \$48
    - DDJC = \$53
    - DDOU = \$45 (lowest)

# HILL/DDO '95

27 March 1995

## (ATTACHMENT 4)

### SAILS MODEL RESULTS

- Objective: Identify DLA's optimized depot configuration to minimize relative distribution system operating costs
- Costs Included: First and second destination costs (transportation) and infrastructure costs (overhead) to maintain DLA's distribution system plant equipment and support services
- Analysis: Established a base line of 6 stand alone depots costs as described above. It then systematically evaluated the closure of each stand alone depot leaving five stand alone depots. Finally, it closed 3 combinations (Memphis-Ogden, Memphis-Richmond and Ogden-Richmond) of 2 stand alone depots leaving 4 depots open. (This failed to consider 12 other combinations of closing 2 stand alone depots.)
- Results: The greatest reduction in operating costs (\$13.9 million or 5.1 percent) occurred when closing the San Joaquin Depot in the 5 open depot scenario. The 4 open depot scenario could not be realistically evaluated since only 3 combinations or 4 open depots were considered of a possible 15 combinations.

# WEBER COUNTY/DDO

- **Total government jobs in Weber County - 18,065**
  - Federal - 7,516**
  - State - 4,071**
  - Local - 6,478**
- **Total jobs at DDO - 1,365**
- **Percent of DDO jobs (as part of gov't total)**
  - Total - 7.5%**
  - Federal - 18%**
- **Total wages produced by gov't sector in Weber County - \$505,639,350**
- **Percent of total wage produced by DDO**
  - without tenants - 8%**
  - with tenants - 11%**
- **Average governmental wage in Weber Co. - \$22,392**
- **Average civilian wage for DDO employee**
  - without tenants - \$37,362**
  - with tenants - \$43,827**

## Impact of Hill DDO Closure on Community

<b><i>Employment/ Activity</i></b>	<b><i>#Number of People</i></b>	<b><i>Annual Compensation</i></b>	<b><i>Total Impact</i></b>
<b><i>DDO</i></b>			
<b><i>Employment</i></b>			
<b><i>Civilian</i></b>	1092	\$40,800,000	\$123,000,000
<b><i>Military</i></b>	3	\$200,000	\$500,000
<b><i>Contracts</i></b>			
<b><i>Transportation</i></b>		\$10,000,000	\$30,200,000
<b><i>Other local</i></b>		\$7,800,000	\$23,500,000
<b><i>Tenants</i></b>			
<b><i>DDRW</i></b>	85	\$3,500,000	\$10,400,000
<b><i>DRMO</i></b>	80	\$3,900,000	\$11,700,000
<b><i>DSDC</i></b>	105	\$6,400,000	\$19,300,000
<b><i>Totals</i></b>	1,365	\$72,600,000	\$218,600,000

# HILL/DDO '95

27 March 1995

## (ATTACHMENT 2)

### STAND ALONE ANALYSIS (8 DEPOTS)

DEPOT	MISSION SCOPE	MISSION SUIT.	OPS. EFF.	EXPANSION	TOTAL
Tracy	161	374	63	91	689
Ogden	133	364	72	106	675
Sharpe	161	339	69	106	675
New Cumb.	139	364	72	68	643
Memphis	126	369	76	67	638
Mechanicsburg	139	346	73	70	628
Richmond	141	312	80	35	568
Columbus	132	277	84	58	551


Note(1): All depots have the capability and many have served as a CCP, so no points were assigned for CCP operations. (Same rationale DLA used for non-assignment of points for surface transportation.) DLA BRAC '95 Distribution Military Value -- Stand Alone Depots Point Distribution Methodology reference IIBlc.

Note(2): DLA chose to use each depot's existing workload to assign the highest amount of points given in military value (150 points) for throughput capacity (BRAC question VB22 answer and column titled "Total Current Throughput," page 8.2 DLA BRAC Detailed Analysis February 1995.) Existing workload does not represent the throughput capacity/capability of a depot. Existing workload does not have near the military value as the design capability/capacity of a depot. DLA's use of existing workload to represent a depot's design capacity to process workload through a depot skews the data and is totally misleading in evaluating a depot's military value. Therefore, the above analysis replaced each depot's existing workload answer to BRAC question VB22 with each depot's design workload capacity answer to BRAC question VB47.

### STAND ALONE ANALYSIS COMPARING COMBINATIONS

DEPOT	MISSION SCOPE	MISSION SUIT.	OPS. EFF.	EXPANSION	TOTAL
Tracy/Sharpe	161	337	70	112	680
Tracy/Ogden	183	414	71	130	798
Ogden/Sharpe	183	405	71	128	787

# DLA/DOD WESTERN AREA TRANSPORTATION DISTANCES DDOU/HILL vs DDTC/SHAD



AVERAGE VENDOR	PDS	CUSTOMER	DISTANCE (MILES)	ADVANTAGE
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	PUGET SOUND	2600	DDOU/HILL (700 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	PUGET SOUND	3300	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	BAY AREA	2450	NEUTRAL
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	BAY AREA	2450	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	SO. CALIF.	2500	DDOU/HILL (450 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	SO. CALIF.	2950	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	FORT SILL	2750	DDOU/HILL (1500 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	FORT SILL	4250	
OHIO	DDOU/HILL	FORT HOOD	3050	DDOU/HILL (1300 MILES)
OHIO	DDTC/SHAD	FORT HOOD	4350	

NOTE: THE GEOGRAPHICAL CENTER FOR MANUFACTURING IN CONUS IS AT COLUMBUS, OHIO

# Document Separator



*Kimbrough*  
*Army Community Hospital*

# **AGENDA**

**Introduction**

**Kimbrough Today**

**Escorted Tour**

**Lunch**

**Kimbrough Tomorrow**

**Impact of BRAC**

**Community Discussion**


**Exit Brief with Commander**



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

# POPULATION

Thousands





## **STAFFING BY FUNCTION**

<b>Physicians</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Registered Nurses/CRNAs</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>Direct Care Paraprofessional</b>	<b>283</b>
<b>Admin/Clerical Support</b>	<b>199</b>
	<hr/>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>595</b>



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

## DAILY AVERAGES

• Clinic Visits	1,056
• ER Visits	66
• Prescriptions	1,316
• Radiology Procedures	100
• Lab Procedures	562
• Daily Census	21
• Surgical Cases	7
• Occ. Health Visits	25

- Level II

FY 94 averages

Secondary Levels of  
Care -

Discharge rates / 1000

Avg Exp. 2800  
vs. WICAME



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

## **ACUTE CARE**

- **Staff/operate 36 beds**
  - **28 Medical/Surgical**
  - **4 Peds**
  - **4 ICU**
- **Support**
  - **Level II ER**
  - **Primary and specialty care**
- **Community hospital reverse referral**

*To Tertiary Care Facilities  
also some From Tertiary Care.*



*Kimbrough*  
*Army Community Hospital*

## **SDS PROGRAM FY95**

### **Procedures**

• Internal Medicine	148
• General Surgery	255
• Ophthalmology	38
• Oral Surgery	59
• ENT	166
• Urology	207
• GYN	230
• Orthopedics	154
• Podiatry	78

*Staffe contract  
procedures*

---

**TOTAL 1,335**



**Kimbrough**

Army Community Hospital

## **EXPANDED SDS PROGRAM FY95**

### **Procedures**

#### **WRAMC**

Urology

312

GYN

144

Internal Medicine

250

#### **NNMC**

ENT

312

GYN

120

Ophthalmology

12

Plastic Surgery

208

---

**TOTAL 1,358**

*ect KAC #  
w/ WR providers*

*Shared staff concept  
w/ WR - NNMC*

*changed to do  
@ secondary /  
w tertiary  
facility*



## **EXPANDED SDS Program**

### **Annual Costs**

- **Total expenses for SDS: \$1.1 M** (supplies, personnel, ancillary services)
- **Cost Avoidance: \*2M**
  - **SDS: \$1.5M - procedures**
  - **Clinic: \$.5M - 4680 visits**

\*Based on average CHAMPUS allowable per procedure/visit




*Kimbrough*  
*Army Community Hospital*

# CHAMPUS

Millions

**Inpatient/Outpatient Costs**





**Kimbrough**  
Army Community Hospital

# CHAMPUS Funded Initiatives

*HSC approved*

*Funded*

*Savings*

Women's Health Care (Mammography)	\$ 535.0K	\$4,917K
Internal Medicine	\$ 430.0K	\$435.2K
Urology	\$ 80.3K	\$306.6K
GYN 1	\$ 213.5K	\$ 98.3K
GYN 2	\$365.6K	\$ 96.2K
ER	\$ 198.0K	\$216.0K
Physical Therapy	\$ 90.1K	\$ 98.6K
CRNA	\$158.6K	\$ 3.0K
Ambulatory Medicine	\$ 326.0K	\$ 9.2K

**TOTAL GOV'T COST SAVINGS: \$6.18 Million**



# CHAMPUS

## FY95 Proposed Initiatives

	Proposed Cost	Government Savings
Mental Health <i>all outpatient</i>	\$825.0K	\$200.2K
Replacement of Dermatology Partnership Provider	\$178.2K	\$ 24.3K
<b>TOTAL GOV'T COST SAVINGS:</b>		<b>\$224.5K</b>



**Kimbrough**

*Army Community Hospital*

## **ACCESS TO CARE Initiatives**

- **Appointment waiting lists**
  - Decreased patient complaints by 80%
  - Reduced average hold time by 55%
- **Walk-in Clinic**
  - Increased patients seen per day by 30%
- **Pharmacy**
  - Reduced wait time for Active Duty sick call by 50%
- **ER**
  - Decreased triage time by 47%
- **X-Ray**
  - Eliminated regional mammography wait list



## **Support to NCA GME/Graduate Education Regional Integration**

*From letter  
WR - Bostwick*

- **Medical Students - 34**
  - Rotations - Derm, Peds, Medicine, Psychiatry, Ortho, GYN, Surgery
- **Residents/Interns - 18**
  - Rotations - Medicine, GI, GYN, ENT, Urology, Psychiatry, Surgery
- **Social Work - 3**
  - Rotations - CMHS, SWS
- **Physicians Assistants - 2**
  - Rotations - Peds
- **Psychologist - 5**
  - Rotations - CMHS



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

**GME Support**  
**Top 5 Referrals to Tertiary Care**  
**FY94**

- 1. Congestive Heart Failure (35)**
- 2. Intracranial Injury (30)**
- 3. Threatened Abortion, Antepartum(30)**
- 4. Convulsions (26)**
- 5. Acute MI, Unspecified Site (20)**

*These go away  
with elimination  
of impact on*

May 2 1988

**Kimbrough Army  
Community Hospital**  
Planning for Tomorrow



# MISSION:

To conserve the fighting strength,  
ensure high value health care,  
provide easy access, and  
customer satisfaction.

*not just cost effective*

*removing barriers*

*keep people happy  
with their health  
care*



# VISION:

To be a recognized leader in  
quality, managed health care

revised to  
reflect 12/15/2012



## **GOALS**

- **Member of the NCA's managed health care system**
- **Offer a comprehensive Primary Care System**
- **36 bed hospital with ICU**
- **Same Day Surgery**
- **Continuing support of GME and Readiness**



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

**MEDDAC  
MISSION**

**MEDDAC  
VISION**

**STRATEGIC PLAN**

**Primary Care  
Product  
Line**

**Specialty  
Services  
Product Line**

**Same Day  
Surgery  
Product Line**

**Inpatient  
Services  
Product Line**

**Readiness  
Product  
Line**

**Management  
Services  
Product Line**

Business Initiatives

**With continuous feedback loop through the process**



## **STRATEGY**

# **Making Our Vision Reality**

- Resources
  - Ensure facilities within JCAHO compliance
  - Ensure personnel resources available
  - Ensure automation systems are available
- Process
  - Integrate principles of TQM/CQI
  - Integrate resource allocation and marketing initiatives
  - Ensure readiness issues are addressed



## **STRATEGY**

### **Making Our Vision Reality**

- **Organizational Structure**
  - **Revise organizational structure to maximize efficiency**
- **Services**
  - **Based on market analysis modify existing services**
  - **Implement new programs/services in support of managed care**



## **PRODUCT LINES**

- Primary Care
- Specialty Care Services
- Same Day Surgery
- Inpatient Services
- Readiness
- Management Services



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

# PRIMARY CARE PLAN

- Establish 1 hospital-wide firm
- Register 47K to one of 3 Primary Care Specific Clinics (PCSC's)
  - Pediatrics: 10,328
  - Ambulatory Medicine: 23,474
  - Internal Medicine: 13,000
- Staffing per PCSC (2000/1)
  - Pediatrics: 6 Pediatricians/1 PNP
  - Ambulatory Medicine: 6 GMOs/2 FPs/1 FPNP
  - Internal Medicine: 5 Internists/1 ANP
- Offer comprehensive benefits package to include:
  - Adolescent Medicine Clinic
  - Woman's Wellness Clinic
  - Wellness/Health Promotion
  - Advice Nurse

*RESTRUCTURE  
region & guidance*

*shglaty advise centrally  
accounted Pediatrics in  
by 1/11/01*



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

## **Specialty Care Services:**

- Allergy/Immunization
- Audiology
- Dermatology
- ENT
- General Surgery
- Ophthalmology
- Optometry
- Orthopedics
- Physical Therapy
- Plastic Surgery
- Podiatry
- Urology

### **STAFFING FOR THE PRODUCT LINES**

Clinic and Ancillary Staff will be provided by Kimbrough  
Army Community Hospital

- Specialty Care Providers are from:
  - Shared Staff
  - Contract
  - Direct Hire/Active Duty

*Just looking at what  
in isolation doesn't sound  
complete picture*



## **Same Day Surgery Program**

- OR capacity to perform additional surgeries *excess of capacity*
- Model of inter-service cooperation
- "Win-Win" for WRAMC, NNMC, KACH
  - WRAMC/NNMC - OR time in support of GME
  - KACH - Expanded clinic and SDS services
  - CHAMPUS cost avoidance



## **SAME DAY SURGERY**

### **Expanded with Shared Staff**

- NCA tertiary care MTFs provide surgeons
- Support NCA GME
- Kimbrough provides OR and associated ancillary staff
- 42% increase in procedures
- CHAMPUS cost avoidance

<b>SERVICE</b>	<b>PROCEDURES</b>
Int. Medicine	179
Gynecology	2,400
Urology	657
ENT	556
Plastic Surgery	318
General Surgery	983
Orthopedics	1,303
<b>Total:</b>	<b>6,396</b>

*AD  
 more than 100% increase in  
 total volume of procedures  
 volume Army dep't and others  
 MOAs are 10% less  
 than 50% have  
 to be with patient*

*= 11 FTE surgeons*



**Kimborough**  
*Army Community Hospital*



## **ACUTE CARE**

- **Staff/operate 36 beds**
  - 28 Medical/Surgical
  - 4 Peds
  - 4 ICU
- **Support**
  - Level II ER
  - Primary and specialty care
- **Community hospital reverse referral**

*go away w/  
realignment*



## **READINESS**

- Provide a ready, trained, and mobile group of health service professionals to support a variety of contingencies
- Continue to maintain strong communications with members of the IMA program who are aligned with us and backfill our PROFIS losses
- Develop memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with area providers

*10/1/15*  
*(work to meet to ensure full access during deployments)*




## **Management Services**

**Maintain necessary administrative and ancillary support services to uphold clinical product lines**

S. Gammill

KIMBROUGH  
ARMY COMMUNITY  
HOSPITAL



INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Impact of Realignment on Kimbrough Army Community Hospital

1. Purpose. To provide information on the impact of converting the Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to an Army Health Clinic.

2. Mission.

a. The Kimbrough facility is a small community hospital which offers basic primary care, emergency room service, limited specialty referral, ambulatory surgery, and inpatient care. Four of the current 36 beds are intensive care beds. The remaining beds are located on a single consolidated ward which mixes all ages and both sexes. See TAB A for staffing and workload information.

b. The Hospital also functions as the command and control headquarters for eight ambulatory occupational health and primary care clinics at small military installations in the Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania area. These clinics also rely on Kimbrough as a referral center for non-emergency inpatient and outpatient services. See TAB B for information on external clinics.

c. Reserve and National Guard medical units in the Maryland and Pennsylvania area use Kimbrough as a training location for weekend and two week training opportunities throughout the year.

d. In addition to serving the Fort Meade military beneficiaries, the hospital has agreements to support the Jessup Correction Facilities and the MARC Rail System. See TAB C for the full scope of provided services.

3. Realignment Impact. See TAB D for a listing of consequences of discontinuing inpatient services. This is not an all inclusive list, because the final design of the Kimbrough facility has not been approved by the MEDCOM headquarters. A number of potential impacts will depend on that final approved design. Only those issues that are a direct consequence of ending inpatient services are shown here.

JOHN SCHNEIDER/(301) 677-8304

David W. Roberts  
Colonel, Medical Corps

KIMBROUGH ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL  
STATISTICAL DATA

1. Staffing as of 31 January 1995.

- a. Military: 305
- b. Civilian: 290
- c. Total: 595

2. Kimbrough Army Community Hospital catchment area.

a. The hospital's inpatient catchment area includes all zip codes whose centers are within 40 miles of Fort Meade. Where the catchment areas of Kimbrough Army Community Hospital and WRAMC overlap, the beneficiaries within that zip code are assigned to the nearest of the two.

b. Breakout of the hospital's beneficiary population within the catchment area:

- (1) Catchment Area Population
  - Total population: 76,144
  - Total AD population: 14,945
  - Navy has largest % of AD: 6,892
- (2) Beneficiary Category
  - Largest % are AD dependents: 32,701
  - Dependents of retirees: 17,828
- (3) Age of Population
  - Pediatric (under 18): 18,896
  - 18 to 64: 47,939
  - 65 and over: 9,309

3. Fiscal Year 1994 inpatient and outpatient workload.

- a. Inpatient Admissions for Same Day Surgery: 1,335
- b. Inpatient Admissions for All Other Reasons: 2,217
- c. Inpatient Discharges: 3,409
- d. Emergency Room Visits: 22,622
- e. Outpatient Visits: 281,601

- 4. Beds.
  - a. During renovation: 36
  - b. After renovation: 50
  - c. Average beds occupied during FY 94: 21
- 5. Record of transfers to other hospitals during FY 94.

		AVERAGE DRIVING TIME
a. Military Hospitals		
WRAMC	452	45 min
Bethesda	47	50 min
Malcolm Grow	13	45 min
b. Civilian Hospitals		
Greater Laurel/Beltsville		15 min
North Arundel		15 min
Francis Scott Key (Burn Center)		40 min
Univ of MD Shock Trauma		20 min
Union Memorial (Hand Surgery)		40 min
Anne Arundel Medical Center		20 min
TOTAL FOR ALL CIVILIAN HOSPITALS		

KIMBROUGH ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL  
OUTLYING CLINICS

U.S. Army Health Clinic  
Defense Distribution Region East  
New Cumberland, PA 17070-5006  
DSN: 977-7281  
Commercial: (717) 770-7281

Dunham U.S. Army Health Clinic  
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5003  
DSN: 242-3041  
Commercial: (717) 245-3041

Fort Detrick U.S. Army Health Clinic  
Fort Detrick, MD 21702-5000  
DSN: 343-7175  
Commercial: (301) 619-7175

U.S. Army Health Clinic  
HQ, Fort Indiantown Gap  
14118 Hospital Road  
Annville, PA 17003-5031  
DSN: 291-2130  
Commercial: (717) 861-2130

Fort Ritchie U.S. Army Health Clinic  
341 Banfill Ave  
Fort Ritchie, MD 21719-1515  
DSN: 277-4455  
Commercial: (301) 878-4455

Kirk U.S. Army Health Clinic  
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5131  
DSN: 298-3105  
Commercial: (410) 278-3105

U.S. Army Health Clinic  
Letterkenny Army Depot  
Chambersburg, PA 17201-4190  
DSN: 570-8805  
Commercial: (717) 267-8805

U.S. Army Health Clinic  
Tobyhanna Army Depot  
Tobyhanna, PA 18466-5083  
DSN: 795-7225  
Commercial: (717) 895-7225

KIMBROUGH ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL  
SERVICES PROVIDED

1. Inpatient Services.

Same Day Surgery  
Operating Room  
Post Anesthesia Care Unit (Recovery Room)  
Intensive Care Unit (4-bed)  
Inpatient Ward (32-bed)  
Food Service from Hospital Dining Facility

2. Outpatient (Ambulatory Care) Services.

Emergency Room Service (Level 2)  
Ambulance Service  
General Outpatient Clinic  
Pediatrics Clinic  
Well Baby Clinic  
Dermatology Clinic  
Ambulatory Care Pharmacy (also supports inpatients)  
Radiology Service to include X-ray, ultra-sound and C-Scan  
(also supports inpatients)  
Tumor Registry Service  
Urology Service  
Orthopedics Service  
Podiatry Service  
Physical Therapy Clinic  
Gynecology Service  
Eye, Ear, Nose & Throat Clinic  
Audiology Service  
Optometry Service  
Community Mental Health Service  
Laboratory Service (also supports inpatients)  
Preventive Medicine Service  
Occupational Health  
Social Work Services  
Community Counseling Center (Drug and Alcohol Counseling)

3. Support to the Fort George G. Meade Installation.

Preventive Medicine Service  
Environmental Health  
Industrial Hygiene  
Community Health Nursing  
Exceptional Family Member Program  
Communicable Disease  
Mess Facility (the hospital's dining facility serves as a Consolidated Mess for all units stationed at Fort Meade and also provides dietary assistance to the Fort Meade daycare centers. It is the only military operated dining facility on the installation, excluding NSA.)

TAB C

4. Support to the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The hospital provides a training arena for USAR and ARNG officer and enlisted soldiers in both inpatient and outpatient medical environments. The inpatient training provided by the hospital is especially noteworthy.

5. Support to the Eight Outlying Clinics. There are two major outlying clinics (Dunham and Kirk) and six minor outlying clinics (DDRE, Fort Detrick, Fort Ritchie, Fort Indiantown Gap, Tobyhanna and Letterkenny).

a. Dunham and Kirk are staffed to provide most of their administrative and logistical services they require. They are dependent on Kimbrough Army Community Hospital for all resource management support, some logistical support, and information management support, primarily in the areas of forms management and automation. For all intent and purposes, these are fully functional units.

b. The six minor outlying clinics, because of their size, are more dependent upon Kimbrough Army Community Hospital for support than are Dunham and Kirk.

6. Support to the Fort Meade Dental Clinic and Fort Meade Veterinary Services Branch. These organizations, although separate from the hospital, are not staffed to perform all necessary functions and are, therefore, dependent upon the hospital for much administrative and logistical support.

# **IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF INPATIENT SERVICES**

## **Anticipated impact in the following areas:**

- **Loss of hospital status (loss of catchment area/non-availability statement issuing authority)**
- **Loss of inpatient medical/surgical beds (20.8 occupied/3,552 admissions)**
- **Loss of ICU beds (432 admissions)**
- **Loss of Level II emergency Room (668 transfers from ER)**
- **Loss of membership in the Maryland Emergency Medical Services**
- **Reduced disaster response capability for the community**
- **Loss of market share as the region begins TRICARE**
- **Loss of third party collection income**
- **Inpatient FY 93 \$385,509  
FY 94 \$395,835**
- **Loss of 196 beds for NCA Mobilization Plan**
- **Loss of Capstone (USAR/ARNG) training base**
- **Loss of control over "Absent Sick" soldiers (active duty admitted to civilian hospitals at government expense)**
- **Loss of "Medical Board" authority to process soldiers for medical discharge from service (100 per month, AD and USAR)**
- **Increase in CHAMPUS costs**
- **NOTE: FY 94 STATISTICS**



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*



# Averages

<b>Discharge rate per 1,000</b>	<b>129.68</b>
<b>Days of care per 1,000</b>	<b>566.05</b>
<b>Average length of stay</b>	<b>2.21</b>
<b>Avg. expense per ambulatory visit</b>	<b>92.00</b>
<b>Average inpatient expense</b>	<b>2,800.00</b>

*Note: FY93*

*Data from Defense Medical Information System (DMIS)*

# Document Separator



*Kimbrough*  
*Army Community Hospital*



# **BRAC IMPACT ON STRATEGIC PLAN**



# **BRAC IMPACT Specialty Care**

**Services remain the same**

**Staff to be shared with  
WRAMC/NNMC**

**Support functions remain Meade  
activity**

*Board certified specialists  
need to have inpatient  
aspect - some specialists  
will have to split  
time in order to  
maintain range  
of practice*



## **BRAC Impact SDS**

**Services remain the same**

**Staff to be shared with  
WRAMC/NNMC**

*larger portion would  
have to be shared*

**Support functions remain Meade  
activity**



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# **BRAC Impact on Management Services**

**C2 of Ft Meade and supported areas continue with reduced staff**

*anticipate continuing to support  
outlying clinics*

**Transitions to new patient management practices  
will require significant organizational change**

**Cancel construction for inpatient/support**



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Army Community Hospital

# **BRAC Impact on Acute Care**

*1000 students at  
Ft. Meade at any  
given time*

## **Inpatient becomes short stay unit**

*↳ contagious illness*

## **ER becomes "Acute Care" Clinic**

*↳ no longer part of Maryland EMS system*

## **Re-route patients requiring admission:**

**NCA MTFs  
Civilian hospitals**

*some portion will never  
get into MTF in first  
place (as they do now)*



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# BRAC Impact on Readiness

## MISSION

## STAFFING REQUIRED

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

10<sup>1</sup>

PROFIS

11<sup>1</sup>

CT PROFIS

22<sup>1</sup>

ALTERNATE NATIONAL MILITARY  
COMMAND & CONTROL (SITE-R)

33<sup>2</sup>

CHEMICAL CONTINGENCY &  
ANNUAL TRAINING MEDICAL SITE  
SUPPORT (CAIRA)

8-15<sup>3</sup>

USAR/ARNG ANNUAL TRAINING  
MEDICAL SITES WITHIN MD/PA/DE

6<sup>4</sup>

*taskings*  
many will have to  
be reassigned

- 1 = Only with dedicated IMA & TPU backfills
- 2 = Only with the assumption that should this site be activated we are on the brink of thermonuclear war and medical support to our constituents is secondary to the national interest. Weekend training and coordination of support team is possible.
- 3 = Support CAIRA short term only for 1-2 days
- 4 = Number of personnel to support the identified readiness platform is predicated on the number of projected to require training time the number of training days necessary for the situation plus 20% administrative handling.




# **BRAC Impact on Patient Managed Care**



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# Inpatient Dispositions


NCA FACILITIES  
66.0%  
{10XCOST}



CIVILIAN  
34.0%

No "good deal"  
(MD rate regulated)  
WRAP AROUND CONTRACT

managed care is rate regulated,  
state of Maryland - can't  
negotiate best deal  
with Maryland  
hospitals like in  
most other places



CHAMPUS


{1.61XCOST}

vector says 2/3 of KAC it  
patients can go to other  
NCA MTFs - costs there are  
higher (but does that mean  
these patients will cost more?)



# Inpatient Care Management

*when patients come to KACH, inpatient needs go to . . .*





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# **BRAC PROPOSAL**

## **Top 5 (DRGs) Kimbrough**

- 1. Endoscopic Tubal Interruption**
- 2. Breast Biopsy/Local Excision**
- 3. Esoph, Gastro, 7 Misc. Digestive Disorders**
- 4. Bronchitis & Asthma**
- 5. Rule Out M/I**


*all admissions*

*usually not inpatient elsewhere - but EFMP has many Asthma patients at Ft. Meade*



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*Army Community Hospital*

# **BRAC PROPOSAL Admission Process**





**Kimbrough**

*Army Community Hospital*

## **Exceptional Family Member Program**

**(EFMP)**

- How many are asthma?*
- 20% (418/2100) of families residing in Ft Meade are enrolled in EFMP
  - A total of 761 families are enrolled in the EFMP at Ft Meade
    - 65% of the EFMP have chronic/terminally ill conditions
  - Assignment of EFMP active duty sponsor based on:
    - Availability of identified EFMP specialty care provider (duty assignment must be within 40 miles of required specialist-WRAMC/NNMC)
    - Availability of emergency room



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
## DoD TRICARE Access Standards

Ambulatory	30 minutes
Specialty	60 minutes
Hospital	40 miles from MTF

**Will lose potential market share for TRICARE Prime**

Capitation ↓ → Potential Svcs Loss

Civ. Services Use ↑ → Higher \$/ Admission Episode




*10,000 beneficiaries*

*This portion may choose not to enroll because travel times for full range of services will be higher.*

*Continuity becomes an issue for chronic patients who need occasional inpatient becomes impossible for "some" how many? don't know*



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
# **Impact of Inpatient Closure**

## **FY94 Statistics**

- **Loss of hospital status (loss of catchment area/NAS issuing authority)**
- **Loss of inpatient medical/surgical beds (20.8 occupied/3,552 admissions)**
- **Loss of ICU beds (432 admissions)**
- **Loss of Level II Emergency Room (668 transfers from ER)**
- **Loss of membership in the Maryland Emergency Medical Services**



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# **Impact of Inpatient Closure**

## **FY94 Statistics**


- **Loss of market share as the region begins TRICARE**
- **Reduced disaster response capability for the community**
- **Loss of third party collection income**
  - **Inpatient FY93      \$385,509**
  - **Inpatient FY94      \$395,835**
- **Loss of 196 beds for NCA mobilization plan**
- **Loss of Capstone (USAR/ARNG) training base**
- **Loss of control over "Absent Sick" soldiers**
- **Loss of "Medical Board" authority to process soldiers for medical discharge from service**
- **Increase in CHAMPUS costs**



## **CONCLUSION**

- **Can substitute civilian services at significant cost**
- **Can maintain support to GME**
- **Can achieve manpower savings target**
- **Unlikely to achieve \$ savings (\$50M)**
- **Lose on-post community asset (ER, Inpatient beds)**
- **Lose degree of readiness, area support**
- **Community loses emergency medical response (Odenton, Jessup, Gambrills, Prisons)**
- **Convenience reduction will impact "customers choice" for TRICARE**

# Document Separator



# KIMBROUGH ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DIV.



FACSIMILE HEADER SHEET

COMMAND	CONTACT	TELEPHONE NUMBER	AUTHORIZED RELEASER'S SIGNATURE
FROM: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DIV.	M. Richardson	COMMERCIAL # (301) 877-8158,8127 FAX # (301) 877-8980 DSN # 023-0158,8127 FAX # 023-0000 8566	
TO:	MR. LEWIS	DSN 226-0550	DAY MONTH YEAR
REMARKS MR. LEWIS, ADDITIONAL INFO - CALL ME IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS!  Maurer			TIME
			TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET



FT. MEADE, MD  
20755



BRAC PROPOSAL:

PROJECTED \$50M SAVINGS OR \$2.5M (NET PRESENT VALUE) \* 20 YRS

OUR PROJECTION:

DIRECT HEALTH PROGRAM

PER THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; 66% OF INPATIENT WORKLOAD WOULD BE ABSORBED BY NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA DIRECT CARE SYSTEM. 24% WOULD TRANSFER TO CHAMPUS AND 10% TO THIRD PARTY INSURANCE (TPI).

FY 94	WORKLOAD	=	2217	ADMISSIONS
66%	OF 2217	=	1463	ADMISSIONS TO NCA
24%	OF 2217	=	532	ADM TO CHAMPUS
10%	OF 2217	=	222	TO TPI

APPLYING THE NCA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY TO DHP COSTS:

FY 94 INPATIENT DIRECT CARE COSTS = \$12.7M

66% OF FY 94 INPT COSTS	=	\$8.4M TO NCA
ADMISSION TO CHAMPUS * AVG GOV'T COST PER ADM (532 * \$6,843.00)	=	3.6M TO CHAMPUS
10% OF FY 94 INPT COSTS	=	.7M SAVINGS
	=	=\$12.7M

(10% OF INPATIENT ADMISSIONS THAT WOULD CHOOSE TO USE TPI. THIS WOULD RESULT IN A \$700K COST AVOIDANCE TO THE GOV'T)

TO GAIN AN ACCURATE COMPARISON OF THE COSTS TO BE BORNE BY THE NCA; A COST PER RELATIVE WEIGHTED PRODUCT (RWP) MUST BE APPLIED. THE COST PER RWP NORMALIZES THE TYPES OF PROCEDURES PROVIDED AND ALLOWS A MORE ACCURATE BASIS FOR COMPARISON. THE COST PER RWP AT WRAMC IS 139% OF KIMBROUGHS.

139% OF \$8.4M	=	\$11.7M	COST TO WRAMC TO CARE FOR 66%
INCREASED COST	=	3.3M	(11.7M - 8.4M = 3.3M)

THE SAVINGS OF \$.7M IS THEN SUBTRACTED FROM THE INCREASED COST (\$3.3M) FOR A NET INCREASED COST TO THE GOVERNMENT OF \$2.6M.

CHAMPUS COSTS

FY 94 CHAMPUS COSTS	=	\$15.2M
24% OF FY 94 TO CHAMPUS	=	3.6M
PROJECTED COST TOMMOROW	=	18.8M

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
THE FINAL ANALYSIS:

IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS BRAC PROPOSAL YIELDS AN INCREASED COST TO THE GOV'T OF \$52M (\$2.6M NET PRESENT VALUE \* 20 YRS) AND NOT A SAVINGS OF \$50M.

**KACH  
TODAY**

**BRAC  
PROPOSAL**

(COST TO CARE FOR 2,217 ADMISSIONS)



**NOTES:**

- \* - 66% OF \$12.7M = \$8.4M x 139% = \$11.7M
- \*\* - 532 ADMITS X \$6,843 (AVG GOV'T COST) = \$3.6M
- \*\*\* - 222 ADMITS X \$6,843 (AVG GOV'T COST) = \$1.5M COST AVOIDANCE



**Kimbrough**  
*Army Community Hospital*

# **BRAC Impact on Readiness**

## **MISSION**

## **STAFFING REQUIRED**

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR	10 <sup>1</sup>
PROFIS	11 <sup>1</sup>
CT PROFIS	22 <sup>1</sup>
ALTERNATE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND & CONTROL (SITE-R)	33 <sup>2</sup>
CHEMICAL CONTINGENCY & ANNUAL TRAINING MEDICAL SITE SUPPORT (CAIRA)	8-15 <sup>3</sup>
USAR/ARNG ANNUAL TRAINING MEDICAL SITES WITHIN MD/PA/DE	6 <sup>4</sup>

1 = Only with dedicated IMA & TPU backfills

2 = Only with the assumption that should this site be activated we are on the brink of thermonuclear war and medical support to our constituents is secondary to the national interest. Weekend training and coordination of support team is possible.

3 = Support CAIRA short term only for 1-2 days

4 = Number of personnel to support the identified readiness platform is predicated on the number of projected to require training time the number of training days necessary for the situation plus 20% administrative handling.

SP117



**Kimbrough**  
Army Community Hospital

# READINESS

READINESS TITLES	EST OF PERSONNEL TO SPT MISSION	*TURNOVER RATE PERSONNEL	EST # OF PERS. TO TRAIN YRLY	REQ INDIV DAYS OF TRAINING	NBC &/or WEAPONS TRAINING	FTX/VISIT TO UNITS	ANNUAL SRPs
OOTW	10	0.00%	10	1,810	1 Day/Yr	179 Days/Yr	1 Day/Yr
PROFIS	11	66.67%	18	165	1 Day/Yr	7 Days/Yr	1 Day/Yr
CT PROFIS	22	66.67%	37	587	1 Day/Yr	14 Days/Yr	1 Day/Yr
SITE-R	33	66.67%	55	220	1 Day/Yr	2 Days/Yr	1 Day/Yr
CAIRA TEAM	8	66.67%	13	120	3 Days/Yr	4 Days/Yr	N/A
"AT" SITE SUPPORT	6	0.00%	6	834	N/A	139 Days/Yr	N/A
	90		139	3,736			

\*NOTE: Anticipate 100% turnover every 18 months.

	EST # OF REQUIRED LABOR HRS (8 Hrs/Day)	EST # OF MAN-HOURS TO SUPPORT THESE TNG PLATFORMS (20%)	TOTAL HOURS	EST OF PERS SPT TO PLATFORM
OOTW	14,480	2,896.00	17,376.00	10
PROFIS	1,320	264.00	1,584.00	1
CT PROFIS	4,693	938.67	5,632.00	3
SITE-R	1,760	352.00	2,112.00	1
CAIRA TEAM	960	192.00	1,152.00	1
"AT" SITE SUPPORT	6,672	1,334.40	8,006.40	5
TOTAL MAN-HOURS	29,885	5,977.07	35,862.40	
TOTAL MAN-YEARS	17.14	3.43	20.56	21

## MEDICAL READINESS

### What are the Deployable platform/mission support requirements?

The U.S. Army Medical Department Activity (USAMEDDAC), Fort Meade has 5 primary missions to support. A short synopsis of each mission follows:

- Mobilization. This USAMEDDAC is required to expand our in-patient operations from 86 to 206 beds. While this is not a "Deployable" platform/mission, if mobilization begins and our WAR-TRACE (formerly CAPSTONE) unit (1125th U.S. Army Hospital, Auburn, Maine) is not activate this hospital must provide personnel to initiate the medical portion of the Fort Indiantown Gap "Soldier Readiness Process (SRP)."

- Professional Filler System (PROFIS). We currently augment 9 separate "go-to-war" military units/organizations. If any of these units are called to action, pre-designated individuals from this USAMEDDAC will respond. Response time is normally within 72 hours. The most active of these units is the 28th Combat Support Hospital (CSH), Fort Bragg, NC. The 28th CSH is under the 18th Airborne Corp.

- Site-R. This is a Department of Defense, Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Continuity of Operations (COOP) facility. Currently we have the mission to provide all Medical/Dental support. Response time is established at 48 hours. The mission is classified. With the changing world situation, the likelihood of supporting this operation is shrinking.

- Chemical Contingency. If a chemical accident occurs at Aberdeen Proving Ground, this USAMEDDAC will deploy a trained backup team.

- Annual Training (AT) Site Support. The U.S. Army Health Clinic (USAHC) at Fort Indiantown Gap (FIG), Annville, Pennsylvania must be augmented from April to mid September each year. Augmentation is required to provide adequate medical care to the 27,000 National Guardsmen and U.S. Army Reservist training on the installation. By agreement between U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) each USAMEDDAC and USAMEDCEN will assume a progressive assumption of this mission until we reach 100 percent by the year 2003. Current plans call for 15 additional personnel to augment the USAHC, FIG.

### What is the backfill plan?

Currently there are no backfill plans in place for either Site-R or Chemical Contingency. We have taken steps to have the Site-R mission categorized as PROFIS.

Current planning doctrine calls for Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) (Reservist) to backfill for PROFIS losses. The plan has some drawbacks:

- Activation of the Reserves requires a Presidential "Call Up." Historically that occurs late in the process and usually takes several weeks/months before replacement arrives. This may improve if congress grants the Secretary of Defense the authority to "Call Up" 25,000 reservist (action pending).

- The supply of qualified IMAs does not meet the demand on a perfect 1 to 1 ratio, nor will it based on PROFIS assignment turbulence. Our current PROFIS roster fluctuates daily.

- Most "go-to-war" units try to have a Field Training Exercise (FTX) annually. We currently work closely with these units so as to arrange for comparable coverage from IMAs or members of other Reserve organizations (Troop Program Units (TPUs) or the National AMEDD Augmentation Detachment (NAAD)).

- Operations Other Than War (OOTW) occur without activating the Reserves. In these cases we identify our need to the North Atlantic Health Services Support Area (NAHSSA) who will task another Health Care Provider to backfill us.

Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) for Mobilization is handled by our WAR-TRACE unit. The SRP at Fort Indiantown Gap is their mission. If we are forced to perform this mission, the 1125th U.S. Army Hospital, Auburn, Maine will ultimately relieve us.

Annual Training (AT) Site Support is a re-assumption of a MEDCOM mission previously provided by the Reserves. In theory we are to obtain our backfill support from our WAR-TRACE unit, who also has a Installation Medical Support Unit (IMSU) designated for FIG. This entire mission may be better served under contract with a local hospital.

#### Who provides overall coordination and training?

The Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security Division, U.S. Army Medical Department Activity, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland has overall responsibility for coordination and training of personnel to meet our 5 Deployable platform/missions.

As of 4 October 1994 the following potential "Primary Care PROFIS Physicians" must be prepared to train a minimum of 1 week a year and/or deploy with their Go-to-War:

CPT Castillo, Alissandro	- No IMA backfill identified
COL Diallo, Thierno	- No IMA backfill identified
MAJ Hirota, William	- Backfill w/MAJ Davis, Gary
MAJ Jones, Janet	- Backfill by 2290th USAH
MAJ Kanjarpane, Devesh	- No IMA backfill identified
LTC Ross, David	- No IMA backfill identified

MAJ Stowell, Virginia

- Backfill by either  
MAJ Villareal, Virgilio or  
CPT Fox, Stephen

MAJ Wiley, Dean

- No IMA backfill identified

3 Current vacant positions

- Backfill by 2290th USAH

\*NOTE: The 2290th U.S. Army Hospital (1000 Bed), Rockville, Maryland is a U.S. Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) with the mission to backfill losses incurred by the deployment of the 85th General Hospital (Caretaker)(DEPMEDS), Fort Meade, Maryland.

Any deployment, without a pre-arranged backfill, will be identified to the Commander, North Atlantic Health Service Support Area (NAHSSA), Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC for immediate backfill action. First priority of backfill will be within the NAHSSA region. Second priority will be filled by MEDCOM from CONUS support base.

# Document Separator

## **STRATEGY**

*Making Our Vision Reality*

### **Resources:**


- Ensure facilities within JCAHO compliance
- Ensure personnel resources are available
- Ensure automation systems are available

### **Process:**

- Integrate principles of TQM
  - Integrate resource allocation and marketing initiatives
  - Ensure readiness issues are addressed
- Organizational Structure:
- Revise to maximize efficiency

### **Services:**

- Based on market analysis modify existing services
- Implement new programs in support of managed care



## **Planning for Tomorrow**

### **GOALS:**

- To be a member of the National Capital Area (NCA)
- To offer a comprehensive Primary Care System
- On-site ancillary and specialty care
- To be a 50 bed inpatient facility with ICU
- Continue to support GME
- Continue to support readiness mission

### **Kimbrough's Product Lines**

- Primary Care
- Specialty Care Services
- Same Day Surgery
- Acute Care
- Readiness
- Management Services

## **Primary Care**

### **TRICARE'S**

### **Kimbrough Community**

### **Health Plan**

We will offer a comprehensive primary care plan. Enrolled customers will be registered to one of our three Primary Care Clinics:

### **Pediatric**

### **Ambulatory Care**

### **Internal Medicine**

... and choose

a Primary Care Provider to manage their health care. Features of the plan include:


- Adolescent Medicine Clinic
- Woman's Wellness Clinic
- Wellness/Health Promotion
- Advice Nurse



Mission Statement  
Briefed to all staff  
Part of Command Orientation



## **Personalized Care for the Military Family**



**MEDDAC MISSION**  
To conserve the fighting strength, ensure high value health care, provide easy access, and customer satisfaction.

**MEDDAC VISION**  
To be a recognized leader in quality managed health care

**Fort Meade, Maryland**

## **Elements of Success for the Kimbrough Community Health Plan**

- ↔Resources will be based on capitation of enrollees
- ↔Voluntary enrollment will depend on satisfaction and service
- ↔Every customer encounter will shape the Kimbrough image in the community
- ↔Kimbrough will continue to become part of the Walter Reed and Joint Service Health Care Delivery System
- ↔Teamwork and innovation are the tools we'll use to achieve our goals

## **Specialty Care Services:**

Through resource sharing agreements with area military medical facilities we will offer a number of specialty care services on-site including:

**Urology**

**Dermatology**

**General Surgery and more...**

Services not available at KACH will be provided through other MTFs or with established Preferred Providers

### **Same Day Surgery:**

Increased OR capacity and clinic visits by working cooperatively with WRAMC and NNMC

### **Acute Care:**

To support our primary care plan and specialty care services

### **Readiness:**

Provide a trained & mobile health staff to support a variety of contingencies

### **Management**

### **Services:**

Maintain administrative and ancillary support services to uphold clinical product lines

**IMPORTANT NUMBERS:**

Central Appointments: 410-677-8854  
 Emergency Room: 677-8519  
 CHAMPUS: 677-8982  
 Comm. Health Nurse: 677-8434  
 Gen Outpatient Clinic: 677-8510  
 Information Desk: 677-8392  
 Occupational Health: 677-8695  
 Outpatient Records: 677-8693  
 Patient Representative: 677-8273  
 Pediatric Clinic: 677-8755  
 Pharmacy Refills: 677-8209

## Community Health Nursing Program is for you

Community Health Nurses provide health teaching and health care to military personnel (active and retired) and their dependents. We provide these services in the hospital, home, and unit.

Services offered:

**Health Promotion:** Health risk appraisal, classes promoting wellness and health awareness, individual counseling.

**Exceptional Family Member Program:** (EFMP) Provide screening, evaluation and enrollment. Provide coordination of care.

**Family Assistance:** Help cope with illness or behavioral problems. Topics include: sibling rivalry, discipline, toilet training. Resource locations and referrals for stress, marital problems, abuse and financial counseling.

**Communicable Disease Prevention:** Tuberculosis Surveillance. Information controlling infectious diseases including Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS.

**Expectant Parent Classes:** Four classes offered bimonthly.

Call us, we are here to help you....

Community Health Nursing 677-8434



## Occupational Health

Occupational stress is a national malady that has increased by leaps and bounds in recent years. Stress is identified as the body's response to any real or imagined demands placed on it. Signs and symptoms of stress can be physical (cardiac disorders, headaches), emotional (anxiety), and behavioral (withdrawal, drug abuse). Sources of stress may be found in our workplace, homelife, social life, or even in the expectations we place on ourselves. The Occupational Health Clinic will be offering classes on stress, violence, and conflict management in the workplace April, 95. For more information call P. Brothers, RN at 677-8402

If you are a DoD civilian or active duty military affiliated with Fort Meade you qualify to use Occupational Health and take advantage of all their benefits such as Back Safety Classes, Wellness Programs, and the Respiratory Protection Program. Call 677-8402

## Appointments Now in General Outpatient Clinic...

the GOC will see patients from 9am-4:15pm by APPOINTMENT ONLY. All appointments will be made on a same-day basis with no routine advance bookings, except CHAMPUS provider appointments. Active duty personnel on sick call should report by 0700 to be treated on a first-come, first-serve basis.

## TRICARE.....

**What is it?** The Defense Department's new managed health care program designed to save money and increase the access and quality of military health care. TRICARE is in various implementations throughout the country and will soon be here at Kimbrough. TRICARE is based on health care models used successfully by the civilian sector for years. One of the most unique aspects of TRICARE is that it will offer an option for eligible beneficiaries to enroll in an HMO (Health Maintenance Organization). Kimbrough's in the process of internally educating our staff on TRICARE and briefing the active-duty units. We will start scheduling dependent and retiree briefings soon.

**Kimbrough Community News is published bi-monthly**  
 EDITOR: Shannon Davenport 677-8675

Contributing writers: CPT Michael R. Floegel,  
 1LT Kelli M. Metzger, M. Annette Morrison, COHN



# Kimbrough Community News

Volume I March/April 1995

Kimbrough Army Community Hospital

## A New Kimbrough

You may have been surprised to see construction workers with blueprints in the clinics or carrying hammers and ladders throughout the hospital. These are becoming familiar sights around Kimbrough because of the many projects underway to upgrade our hospital. In fact, a major project that renovated and improved four wings of the hospital has just been completed. But it won't stop there...many projects and improvements are in store for the coming year. All projects are carefully planned out to minimize the impact the construction has on the patients of Kimbrough. So, please bear with us when a familiar area has changed or been moved. Our new directional signs will be up before April and should help you locate your area of care. The planning staff at Kimbrough has been very busy designing face-lifts to ultimately brighten your visit to the hospital and they greatly appreciate your patience.

## Kimbrough's Patient Survey

During the last week of January, Kimbrough Army Community Hospital mailed a comprehensive patient satisfaction survey to 1000 beneficiaries who used outpatient services during the month of December. The information gathered from this survey will be used to improve health care delivery at Kimbrough. The survey is being administered by the Administrative Resident at Kimbrough, Captain

Marsha Patrick. She encourages anyone who receives the survey to take the time to answer the questions and mail it back in the pre-paid envelope provided to each recipient. "It is your chance to voice your opinion about the health care you or your family members have received at Kimbrough." If you have any questions about the survey, please call CPT Patrick at 677-8181.

## Hourly Family Child Care

Family Child Care (FCC) has announced that hourly care availability has increased and they encourage patients to take advantage of this program. Fees are \$2/hour due on date of service. For more information contact FCC at 677-7712/6348. Hourly care is available between 7am and 6pm.

## SPECIAL EVENTS

### MARCH:

Nutrition Month

National Poison Prevention Week 19-25

### APRIL:

National Infant Immunization Week 22-28

Cancer Control Month

National Alcohol Awareness Month

Child Abuse Prevention Month

# CHAMPUS C O R N E R

Let our professional staff in the CHAMPUS office help you with your CHAMPUS needs.

**Nancy Ingle** Health Benefits Advisor  
**Jennie Funderburk** Health Benefits Advisor  
**Angela Watson** Receptionist/Assistant  
**Linda Starkey** Receptionist/Assistant

### Key Points:

- New CHAMPUS handbooks are available.
- New claim forms are white not yellow.
- You are responsible for copays and deductibles.
- There are 14 outpatient procedures that require non-availability statements.
- If you have 3rd party insurance, it will be billed first.

### CHAMPUS Hours of Operation

Mon-Fri: 7:30am-4:30pm  
 Phone: 677-8982

## March is National Nutrition Month

Nutrition affects everyone, everywhere, from those who suffer from malnutrition related to poverty or disease to those who have more than enough food. The foods we consume provide us with energy needed to perform everyday activities such as sitting, standing, breathing, running, biking, walking, and swimming. Certain components of our foods have also been linked to chronic diseases. Examples of these relationships include dietary fat and the increased risk of heart disease, adequate fiber intake and a decrease in certain types of cancer, and recommended calcium intake and a reduction in the incidence of osteoporosis. Nutrition-related topics such as antioxidants, saturated fat, trans-fatty acids, and numerous weight loss regimens have exploded into the media in recent years. Individuals may begin to feel overwhelmed by so much information and may have difficulty knowing the best food choices in all circumstances. Good nutrition decisions can be made most anywhere though.

March is National Nutrition Month and the theme for 1995 is "Discover Nutrition Anytime, Anywhere." Various members of the population have different nutrition needs. All of them, however, from children to the elderly, including pregnant females, athletes, and patients with a variety of disease states, can learn to make appropriate nutrition decisions. A registered dietitian (R.D.) can often assist individuals with these decisions. Plenty of nutritious food choices exist whether eating at the school or work cafeteria, eating on the go, dining out at restaurants, preparing for athletic competition, or shopping at the grocery store.

During National Nutrition Month, look for nutrition-related articles to appear in the Soundoff. In addition, we welcome the military community to utilize the knowledge of the dietitians at Kimbrough. Classes for individuals who desire to shed a few pounds, want to develop healthier eating habits, or have been affected by diabetes are offered on a regular basis.

### CLASSES IN MARCH:

<b>Weight Reduction</b>	<b>9:30am</b>	<b>13th</b>
	<b>10am</b>	<b>27th</b>
<b>Diabetes education</b>	<b>1:30pm</b>	<b>Mondays</b>
<b>Cholesterol*</b>	<b>1pm</b>	<b>3, 17, &amp; 31</b>
<b>Sports Nutrition</b>	<b>9:30am</b>	<b>6th</b>
	<b>9:30am</b>	<b>20th</b>
<b>Label Reading</b>	<b>2pm</b>	<b>10th</b>
	<b>2pm</b>	<b>23rd</b>

\*Appointments with the nurse practitioner begin at 1pm, nutrition class starts at 2:30pm.

For the topics being presented each week, interested individuals may call the Nutrition Care Division (NCD) at 677-8070. All classes will be held upstairs at the Community Health Nurse building, number 2454 on 85th Medical Battalion Avenue.



## Child Abuse Prevention Month is Fast Approaching and the following events have been planned thus far:

Spiderman will be at the Child Development Centers (CDC)

Puppet shows will be performed at the elementary school level.

Open Door Theatre actors from Washington state will perform at the middle school.

For more information call ACS at 677-3586

## April is Cancer Control Month

MAJ William K. Hirota, MD

Current American College of Physicians guidelines recommend routine cancer screening in the following areas:

### Female breast:

-Annual physical exam beginning at age forty

-Annual mammogram beginning at age fifty.

### Colon:

-Annual fecal occult blood testing beginning at age fifty

-Flexible sigmoidoscopy every 3-5 years beginning at age fifty.

### Cervix:

-Pap smear in all sexually active women, and all women age twenty or older; every three years until age 65 (after two annual smears at the onset of sexual activity).

Please contact your primary health care provider for further details.

## To Your Health Hospital Programs & Services

Recently our laboratory staff created a Home Glucose Monitoring System Control Program for diabetics. Patients can now call Mrs. Peggy Miller at 677-8821 and arrange an appointment to have their home glucose analyzer checked for linearity and quality control. Kimbrough cleans the photo optic cell, makes comparison graphs between patient's glucose level and the result of the patient's glucose instrument, and performs other tests as needed to record accuracy.

Call 677-8821 to arrange an appointment, it costs absolutely nothing.

# COMMANDER'S CORNER

As a hospital commander I take pride in being a part of the changes taking place in military health care. Our facility is in a constant process of improvement, moving towards a finer more efficient product. In the past, military health care was not expected to be competitive. Now, we have to become more competitive to keep our beneficiaries and provide them the care they need. Over the next several months you will see changes throughout Kimbrough designed to provide better access and customer service. This newsletter is the first of many that will help keep you, our customer, informed of Kimbrough activities. Remember to fill out the patient surveys and let us know what needs concern you. We are working hard to improve our facility and ensure your satisfaction.

COL David W. Roberts

## Alcohol Awareness

April is National Alcohol Awareness Month and Kimbrough wants to make sure you are aware of the complete list of services available at our Community Counseling Center and Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (CCC/ADAPCP):

Consultation Assessment Rehabilitation  
 Education Prevention

Services are available to:

Active Duty Military Personnel  
 DoD Civilian Employees  
 Retired Military Personnel  
 Family Members of AD/Retirees

The CCC/ADAPCP facility is located in Building T-2456, 85th Medical Battalion Avenue, Fort Meade. Hours are 7:30am-4:30pm Monday-Friday. Call 677-8344/8213 to arrange for an appointment.

## PHARMACY

### Hours:

7:30am-5pm Monday - Thursday  
 8:30am-5pm Friday  
 8am-noon Saturday  
 Refills: Call (301) 677-8209/8637.

